iyl-^ijy<v
opyo2
VV|>
->«3»^^
Given By
%i^^,,JiiAM^A\d^^
V- ______
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORB THB
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAEL HAEBOE ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
''til CI
S. Con. Res. 27 /^ f
(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN ^^
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 11
APRIL 9 AND 11, AND MAY 23 AND 31, 1946
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
■6*':
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 11
APRIL 9 AND 11, AND MAY 23 AND 31, 1946
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79716 WASHINGTON ; 1946
-^/ftT^/^^^'^-
JOINl COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California
gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin
North Carolina
COUNSEL
(Through January 14, 1946)
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel
JULE M. Hannaford, Assista7it Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel
Samdbl H. Kadfman. Associate General Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel
Logan J. Lane, Assistant Counsel
HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Hearings
Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
Jan. 15, 16, 17, IS, 19, and 21, 1946.
Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 20, 2S and 29. 194G.,
Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19. and 20, 1946.
Apr. 9 and 11, and Mav 23 and 31, 1946.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
Pages
Transcript
No.
pages
1
1- 399
1- 1058
2
401- 982
1059- 2586
3
983-1583
2587- 4194
4
1585-2063
4195- 5460
5
2065-2492
5461- 6646
6
2493-2920
6647- 7888
7
2921-3378
7889- 9107
8
3379-3927
9108-10517
9
3929-4599
10518-12277
10
4601-5151
12278-13708
11
5153-5560
13709-14765
Part
No.
Exhibits Nos.
12
1 through 6.
13
7 and 8.
14
9 through 43.
15
44 through 87.
16
88 through 110.
17
Ill through 128.
18
129 through 156.
19
157 through 172.
20
173 through 179.
21
180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
17
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
o
<
OS
»
a
0
»
ll^
u
>-
H
1— (
to
s
a
"?
o
0
U
o
>
o
w^
ro
H
M
W
«
H
(J
g
Q
OJ
H
w
H
to
m
1^
a
H
£::
u
Pi
H
(Xi
-
M
o
to
iz;
<)
H
I-}
•<
iz;
O
U
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
5269-5291
3814-3826
3450-3519
"'5089-5122
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
"471-516"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
tiTf iiriiiiiiiiiiiiiiiTfiCOl
1 f<0 1 1 1 1 t 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 rOCD 1
(? 1 I 1 ! 1 1 1 1 ! ! : ; ; 1 ; ! : 1 : ! "^ i
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1914; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 1 1 1 1 ' 1 iC4
^ : M M : ! : 1 M M i ; ! M i 1 : r
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
"660-688'
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
Julv 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
3165-3120'
2479^2491'
4622-4627"
148-186
2567-2.-.86'
3972-3988
2492-2515
1575-1643"
3726-3749"
1186-1220
1413-1442"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
""391-398"
"'115-134'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
1 1 1 1 1 1 III 1 1 1 1 1
OS 1 1 1 1 1 lOOOO 1 1 n-H irj< 11-1 05 lOOl lO 1
O 1 1 1 1 1 iCOCO 1 1 i(M i(M iiCOl iOO(M i (N 1
"(N 1 1 1 1 1 it-<0 t 1 It- iN i05C0 iCO(N iCO 1
Si llllll^.-4|IH-ll^l|r-ll|,-(ll 1
„ocOiliiiilL''ii'l'«=l '•>! i"*!
f^O t^OO 1 1 lO id> iOO(N it^r)< i,-i 1
(N 1 1 1 1 1 iC<)CO 1 1 I.-H 1^ lOOOO ieO(N iCO 1
1 1 1 1 1 Ir-lO 1 1 lt~ 1C<J 1 CO 1 (N 1 1
§
Allen, Brooke E., Maj
Allen, Riley H
Anderson, Edward B., Maj
Anderson, Ray
Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adm
Anstev , Alice
Arnold, H. H., Gen
Asher, N. F., Ens
Ball, N. F., Ens
BaUard, Emma Jane ,
Barber, Bruce G
Bartlett, George Francis ._
Bates, Paul M., Lt. Comdr
Beardall, John R., Rear Adm
Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens
Beatty, Frank E., Rear Adm
Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm
Benny, Chris J
Benson, Henry P
Berquist, Kenneth P., Col
Berry, Frank M., S 1/c
Betts, Thomas J., Brig. Gen
Bicknell. George W., Col
Bissell, John T., Col
INDEX OF WITNESSES
ICO
lo CO
I I
LO O
C^ 00
OQ CO
1. I
OifO
CO GO
IM CO
CD rt< 00
O'* O
I (M CO
'^ I I
LC 1^ CO
(N O
CI O
CSi I,
Tt< CO CD
<XJ 1>- cn
O O GO
CM CO I
I I 00
CO |>T}H
03 CD 00
lO O
(N CO
o ^ '^ ic cc CO
CO (M •* CO CO o
OO -H IM CD --
(N Tt< I CO CO- tJh
I I CO I I I
LO lO •* GO CO L.0
^ r^ ^ lO (N 0>
C^ O (NCD O
<N ■* CO CO ^
■^ CD iC
CO 05 i-o
T-H CD"*
CD t- t^
CDCD (M
CO (N
i(N (M
I I
I GO' O
I ic CO
Id,
TS
(1)
3
JD
r!
7^
O
o
o
o
w «
-a
S
o ,
m
Qi O
O t<
O r
-O 'r. a;
a o
03 03
W M pqpq Mffl
<= S 2
F.4 (_ ;^ ILh L^ tH
is c
•5- ill
gK'^ o
.— I O " —<
■^.^-^ c3^pq
02 J>
o<
-fe:..--
003>, ^^^-''-'-'^-'^il
MPQpqpqmpceempqpQK
c3 o3
CO oi
CO ^^
O
■ a 2 03
a
g n C O
O-^ 03 C
ii G C C
o o o o o
OOOOO
VI
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
C3 -»0
5£2c
o t- S *^ 2
'■6
6^^
c o fe <
^£^
Ow
ms
'^ CO — 1 ^
IM coco lO
C^ I (M I
I lO I 05
CO CO 05 •^
(Mrn (M
■3 ti.
,.2 2-3
•^t2 Osc.2-2 -
■5E-
.E"S
Co i; t- ^ s;
^ 10
OCD
fO.-H
I I
05(N
CO^
tj ■— ^ _ C*(N ■
> r;~ — ' O C " •
' gx: d P ,; O
o i? c!. ^ ^ rt
CO o
00 ^
«■* CO
& I I
eoO-H
■^ CO
o cooo
00 CO 05
^ CD ^
77<i
00O5l>
,-1 CO
eo-^os
00 lO lO
CO
o
O
'3
1-4
o
o
03-0
sooo .^
J^ ..- ■ S ^- o
e 2 = S§^
UOOOQQ
«
CD t^
a
'CO
.CO t-.
o
.00
03 O
o
O r .
cPh
K <'3;='_-
o 2 -Cj
r- ir! bC_r
„ S 3
COQP QQPlflOQQ
-^ K -5 1>
> ^ o3i-J
o3 03 0; <U
c o
^ 03 H^
"-=s.
^ 03 O 53 CM
QJ jS
■ o 'G C . - ~
— • S dj j» O) OJ
G G CO oi "j; '7^
^5^^'iS 03
QQQQpqpq
INDEX OF WITNESSES
V-II
PQ5
P3
c: o
&-C o
«
00 CO
^ o
00 ^
I -*
(N I
CO »o
GO 00
(Nco m
(M -* CO
lO CO 00
C-l '-^ (N
I I I
CO'* 00
>— I iC ■*
>0 (N 00
(M r-H (M
t^oo
^ CO
.-^co
I "*
CO -H
coc/^i^
O lOCO
COCO (M
IM ■=*" "*'
00-^05
(MCO .-1
C3 o
coo
coco
COCO o
1 1 ^"^
t-'-' 1
00 -^ o
IMCOl-
lO o
CR CO
i
(.O C-1
-^ o
CT>
CO
W^.'
^.SW-a^
_rX .CO
o ^ tf o o
^ -r: 1— , '^ hr G "
. - >-'
„- fi ;2 3
,c>
O <y>^
o3"< t^
■ iy^ ^3
•-5 '~
^
^p.':^
go
> oj 03 aj .=,
C o C
0.2.'-
S O 0)
•^ pi a r. - -3
X5;|^ ^ gS
c;ts= c'C-3'^
^ G =«■" G I.'?
t, t. 3 :; p 03
1-, Ui (ii fi, fcn C3
>-'C-i
2 o
-G QJ
^ o
— I tn
00
o
t-1
o r
Ok:
H '^
wW
c rG
00
o .
'G-a
o
-Pi ,'»-5
X
IS t^
'^ o
9 a; S^ b.- ,t;
^ S S ti
0000
S.9
oa
l>
CO P
tea
VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
73 •'o
o£2m
0603
^ OU n (7^
I CO lOOO
0-^ .
•M
S o
-2 2-3 ti^
"►5 3>i5^
s o' ozi ■«'
G3 (73 9^ OJ
INDEX OF WITNESSES
IX
777777 I 777oo
is
i
2^
00 :±^
I 7
i
OCDOO
t>- lO TtH
C^ iM "*
^-
CD lO ■*
to t^
Tf CO
J=
u^
CO CO
con
cot-
05(M
COI>
■^ CO (-TfX-OO .-H> CO
lO lO 3^ £2 ^ "^ t^ "^
o
o
a
O
T3 go
oO „-
ran. ^--j-i-.
O^ c3 <S o3
l-S(-5
^WMW
:^ o rsdW
eS <P 01 .S .S .3
Kf* >> K> >> kyX k>(
hH HH HH hi< >i| HM
O
bb
•c
bc'~=
-5 ;;^
o
u
flQ^
B'l^<
i§a
A'^t
bC bC bC bC bCiS :
CI a fl c c 43
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
oiiiiiidooii II i-r_ro 1 1
CO 1 1 1 1 1 lOcO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ig^ITO 1 1
>o ocoii 'iii£2^c<Jii
lo -^i II Z^lfrioi'
« 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I'T'T' 1 1 1
«=ioiiiiiiiMcoiiiii 22;t^''
f^io 00 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i^2-H 1 1
iciiiiiiTfH iiiiiiiiiiio;3|ioii
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
1 1 1 1 1 CO 1 (M Cl 1 1 II
1 1 1 1 1 lO 1 Crs rt< 1 1 II
« «OiCSiiiiiiii,i.-iii II
O. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ' 1 ' ' 1 '
o 1 1 1 1 1 T-1 1 <M 1 1 1 1 1 Oil II
°H ^lOOilliiiiiiirJHii II
iiiiiOirt ,,-,11 II
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
103
107-112
186
219-222
102
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sei)t. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
- i i i 1 i 1 : 1 1 i i i i i i i 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
90^^918
628-643
734-746'
""852-885'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2()()5-2695"
3028-3067
1161-1185"
2787-2802"
1014-1034
1678-1694
3226-3250
2362-2374"
2-54"
T. S. 2-52,
192-226
3126-3152
1816-1913
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
214^22.5
363-367
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
Pages
1146-1150"
1156-1171"
4—32
1068-1095
1272-1285"
""500^564"
1793-1805"
"320-352,"
1048-
1659
1
Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN
Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen
Landreth, J. L., Ens
Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/O
Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col
Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC
Lawton, William S., Col
Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN
Leahy, \Mlliam D., Adm
Leary, Hert)crt F., Vice Adm
Lewis, Fulton, Jr
Litell, S. H
Locey, Frank H
Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA
Lorence, Walter E., Col
Lumsdcn, George, Maj
Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN
Lynch, Paul J
Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr
MacArthur, Douglas, Gen
Marshall, George C, Gen
Marston, Morrill W., Col
Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen
INDEX OF WITNESSES
XI
CO 12
OJiC
i
GO ^
C50
I ^
1> I
05(N
O
(N 00
00 lO (N CO tti
02 (M CO ■* (M
/~y~i /•^^ rV^ /^/^ ^ _*
<r! 00 coco _H
CO r-1 OCOOJ
(NOJ
CO 00
00 ^
I CO
O I
Oi Tt<
l>00
CO
1 I CO
to Tf CO
CO-*
05 1-H
CO(N
iCOO
050
CO(M
CO 00
I <N
CO I
CO CO
00 LO(N
CO 05 lO
O '^ T}<
CO Tfl Ttl
o
^l
■^00
00 lO
a
M 03
CO
2«3
■+^0 r r I)
a T) 1-5 H^ pi
Ok o g t, r
-a bcf;;=ixi^
Qj.!:! 03;-< u^^
oCC >-i o3 O O
c3 03 u u c;>
s
•< 03'
S c q; o a b Ota
o
O '-'
o
T^W
CO
--a
-SccOO
o
^ 00^-5 03 03 O
_~ o (-1 -( -^ -1 -^
O
ssssss:§ssss^sss^ss§ s:§ss^^^g
^-' - >
<U C/i "1^
o ~ ^
a f^
0 o3
PQ a
o3
:=: t- cjP-1
- «-i ^
-5 (-. QJ >,
G -tf t-tC
cc 3 03 lU
OOPmPm
Oj 0) OJ
PLiPiPlh
XII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTaCK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to Mav 31,
1940
Pagss
.5210
4933-5009
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
""387-388"
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
14S
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
CDii 111 11^ 1 (Mil it^ii
TJH 1 1 111 1 1 00 1 CO 1 1 1 l^ 1 1
IS 1 ' '-< 1 (Mil 1 1 1 1
toiQ II 111 III 1 11 1 CD P 1
e Tti 1 1 111 1 1 (35 1 11 1 1^ 1 1
Cli it^ 1 1 1 1 1 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
^ i i i ill i i i i i i i 1 ! i i
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
1 i>0 111 III _r-f „-IM"Nr(M 1 1 CD 1 1 00 CO
I lo 111 III r:K:f2oo=^"^ ' "* > lOo
1 1 IT III 111 7^1^°:^;: l I7 l i?;::
l-lltl III 111 ^^cJ,777llt^ lloo7
II 111 iif (MiC(-5_^,, iiO
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Uarbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
1107-1100,"
1240-1252
3636-3640
2375-2398,
3990-3996
3153-3165
2923-2933
3885-3915
i968"i988"
1035-1070
778-789
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
147-109
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Comm.ission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
1 ifV-I^rM 1 1 CD i,_-,„-00 1 1 ICO^ 1 1 1 1
iiiToOOiii iOiJ2'2(Nl liOOOOiiii
»ii^{MiOii COiSn^Tt<i lit^OOiiii
^llCNt,^,! ,_HI^^ 1 11,-Hlllll
^ 1 \'^iJ, 1 1 i i^g ! 1 icis 1 1 1 1
I l?^^S 1 1 g 1^^ 1 i iS"^ 1 ; I i
Witness
Pettigrew, Moses W., Col
Phelan, John, Ens . _.
Phillips, Walter C, Col
Pickett, Harry K., Co]
Pierson, Millard, Col
Pine, Willard B
Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov
Powell, Boiling R., Jr., Maj
Powell, C. A., Col
Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr
Prather, Louise
Pratt, John S., Col
Pye, William S., Vice Adm
Rafter, Case B
Raley, Edward W., Col
Ramsev, Logan C, Capt., USN
Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm
INDEX OF WITNESSES
xm
oeo
«* o
coco
I CO
COM
CO t-
Cl CO
f
ok
(N ^ — I
I— I iC O
I I 1
C5C5 O
CDC3 ^
CO V ^
i
00 COIN
1-H r-H CO
c^ CO t^
O —I 05
.-H COtO
co^
to t^
coco t^c^
(N (N c^ r^
t^ CO 00 CD
I coco i-H
O: CO CO 4<
«oooo ti
lO 00 CO
CO CO "-H
O CO
Tf CO
(N CO
r-H TfH
I I
CO »0 C5 <
Tt> <N O .
(N 1-H
CD TT C»
OOOCD
-^ coco
TfCO I
I I i6
4< t^co
CD 00 CD
^ c^
"* CO
OiO
CO
CD(M
00
CO(N
CO
(MCO
Tt<
4J.
c^
lOO
CD
C0 04
00
c^co
rt<
CO
ci
coco
00 T^
TP O
Th (N
0^ .
_ (h G fV)
O O «^
a; <u ID .X
S -5! >
• ."^ (-H
0'-5 03 *
• c * *^
i-rJ « S fc
- & opQ
en ^~ d
t; -1^ CD cc
ca ^ a a
.2 o q o
o
a
o
-3 ^
O b£
o
cS
o r
Upq
O o.
o1
.a
H
-r ,„- .-T" o
rfl M ^ tS
o o o o
o h
"O 0^ CO
3 3 3
r
r-)
-^ e-^hJ
M
i=i
^>a (D 3
o
t-i
!rr
tT
S o.S -
S o ;« >-,
o
to
«8
«
CS « o o
C/J
CZ2
ccccccco
S3 pi
a
O l-i
CO •«C
3 3^3
o o a>
OQCCCC
e3
O
;p-i-
W " 5 ^h" M-
>; -" § 5
' t~ 0) fc S B
P-r; > 0) a>
o3.t;.2 o o
XIV
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31.
1946
iw 1111 ;=2S 1 ic^ 1 ^SFfss^ ' 'o^ 1 1 I
i(N 1 1 1 1 1 J;: lo 1 1 o 1 ' £^^ l2 ^ S lO 1 1 TjH o 1 1 1
« 1? 1111 \^^ 1 1? 1 :c^^^'? i \z^ 1 1 1
J iS i i i i 'M i i§ i i^^s§g 1 'M i i i
Joint
(Committee
E.xhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
II iioi.io llllll III icol
11 1 1 1 1 it- Ill 1^ 1
E 1 1 1 1 TtH 1 1 CO IIIIII 111 1 'JH 1
S. 1 1 II III 1 111 III
Oil II 1 iio IIIIII 111 1 ,-1 1
1^ CO 1 1 1 1 . 1 III 1^ 1
11 11 1 1 CO llllll III 1 rjl 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
69'
195-197
203-204
185'
Joint
Comniittpe
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1045)
11 1 1 ilM 1 1 1 1 IIM 1 1 111 111
^ M i i 1 I III 11 III III
II 111 11 111 11 1 -I* 1 111
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19. 1944)
lO (M —illl 1 ' -O 1
it^ i^ooiiii^;^-H 1
Em 1 1 1 1 1? 2 1 1 1 lS?^<f ; ! 1 i ! i
.5 1 O 1 1 1 1 1 00 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 TfH
tii(N iiiii(Nt^iiii<=^Sf^ 1
ilN iiiiiiOt^iiiiX^ir^ 111 111
1 lllll O 1 1 1 1 f^ 111 111
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
3044-3650
276-541.
4411-4445
3265-328G'
1539-' 1575'
4037-4094
c
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
32-65"
323-334
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
lOt^iOiilii i(NiiO00 1
ico-^ioiiiii i-<*<iic7;o 111 III
2 1 ,-1 CO Tt< 1 1 1 1 1 1 1>. 1 1 ,- CO
a It^7<M 1 I 1 I I I"! 1 'IT III III
ts iCCt-^>0 lllll .00 1 1 O lO
1 --W Tt< 1 1 1 1 1 1 TO 1 1 C» O 111 III
lO lllll it^iit-HOO 111 111
Short, Arthur T
Short, Walter C, Maj. Gen
Shortt, Creed, Pvt
Sisson, George A
Smedberg, William R., IT, Capt. USN.-
Smith, Ralph C, Maj. Gen
Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen
Smith, "William W., Rear Adm
Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN
Smoot, Perry M., Col
Fonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr
Spalding, Isaac, Brig. Gen
Staff, W. F, CH/CM
Stark, Harold R., Adm
Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR
StUphen, Benjamin L
Stimson, Henry L
Stone, John F
Street, George
Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen
INDEX OF WITNESSES
XV
to 00
(N CO
D05 10
<oooo^eciioi>r;
4<i',- , ., ■
«3 r- (M CO o o> L-
, - ^05 0 CO coo
r— I lO 1— I 1— I r-4 1— I
CD t^
I I
i>o
J:
l^ ■<*< t^
00 CO 00
00-^ ^
t^OO
Oi CO
^7
oo
COlM
I I
(N 00
OO
eo(N
i
(N 05(N O
CO-* rJiM
77»o7
oor^i-^ci
CO ■* c^
4<
CO 00
coi>
i7
Oi (M too
(Mcor^oo
00 00 CO ■*
,-(»-^ I I
I I oo<ri
a-. — I ooo
O CD CO ■*!
00 00
(N r-HOlOO
t^ 00-H (M
(M CO (N -*
777(M
C<I COCO(N
CD t^ rt Tfl
Ca CO(M
T3
r CO aj ^ ^
»-5 3 c .2 G
S^" C C tT fl
S o o o ii
^ oj S3 oSrC
0
O
m-^ -
^ a o
o o S
£hHH
O
^ M o r
O >' ^ S ri
o
U
u as
O «
:=! c a 3 b
:3 .« .s (h d
HHHHH
o3 o)
tip
02
oT^r^^ <" =« C S
« 3 ^_Pi § g W)0 CM
* a>
"S— a:S, S "^ * " «3 *> oj^ «
XVI CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1915,
to May 31,
1946
, , , , , lo , , , : , : 1 1 ! 1 1 1^^ ;
r-t 1 1 1 1 1 X? CO 1
SI 1 II . 1 1 l"^ 1 1
&. CO 1 1 CO 1
«= 1 1 1 1 1 i(M 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 iJ2o •
1 i M M" i i M M M ! i M"" i
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
"389^410"
376^386
541-553
597-602
442-450
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1914,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
187-189
105-106
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
^ 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
1083-1090
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2722-2744
3120-3124
1989^2007"
2456-2478
1345-1381"
910-931
3663-3665
3677-3683'
3750-3773
3357-3586"
2580a-2596
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
""279-288"
379-"-3S2
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
Pages
1311-1329
496-499
1830-1842
133^1340"
""247-259"
1525-1538"
1683-1705
3
Wells, B. H., Maj. Gen
West, Melbourne H., Lt. Col
Whaling, William J., Lt. Col
White, William R., Brig. Gen
Wichiser, Rea B
Wilke, Weslie T
Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm
Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen
Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen
Wilson, Erie M., Col
Wimer, Benjamin R., Col
Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm
Wong, Ahoon H
Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR
Woodward, Farnsley C, Lt. (jg), USN.
Woollcy, Ralph E
Wright, Wesley A., Comdr
Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col
York, Yee Kam
Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN
Zucca, Emil Lawrence .
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5153
[13709^ - PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TUESDAY, APRIL 9, 1946
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investication
OF the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington^ D. C.
The joint committee met, piirsuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in the
caiicns room (318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley
(chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster,
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.
Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H.
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Hasten, Edward P.
Morgan and Logan J. Lane, of counsel; and Mrs. Flo E. Bratten,
executive secretary to the joint committee.
[Xi77^] The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Admiral Stark, will you come and take the witness chair?
TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK, U. S. NAVY
(RETIRED)— Resumed ^
The Chairman. You have already been sworn, haven't you?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. All right, Mr, Counsel.
Mr. Richardson. Admiral, in your former testimony my notes show,
about page 5812 and again 6099,^ you were interrogated on the
subject of where you were on the evening of December (S.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr, Richardson. And you testified, speaking generally, according
to my notes, that your date calendar had been disposed of and that
you had no recollection which permits you to say where you were on
the night of December 6.
Since you testified in that regard, information has been received
that during the afternoon of December 6 there was a party given
for the Canadian Minister and his wife, at which, according to the
information that we have, a number of naval officials of high rank
were invited, and among them, you and Mrs. Stark, Admiral IngersoU
and his wife, Capt. Theodore Wilkinson, and others.
I wanted to ask you. Admiral, whether you have any {^13711^
recollection of about that time, or at that time, attending an affair
given for the Canadian Minister?
Admiral Stark. No, sir ; I do not. I might say, however, as regards
our date calendar, our home engagements calendar, that Mrs. Stark
1 Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of
testimony.
- See p. 5512, infra, for corrections in his testimony submitted by Admiral Stark.
» Hearings, Part 5, pp. 2183 and 2290, respectively.
79716— 46— pt. 11 2
5154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
finally found it, after a long search back for several years. It shows
that Canadian party that afternoon, but it does not show whether we
were there. Her remembrance is she did not go. I hardly ever went
to those parties. Frequently I asked her to go to represent us, but
I have not the slightest recollection of going, and I think I did
not go.
I might say also with reference to that calendar, that it shows noth-
ing for that Saturday night, but it does show the Canadian party.
Mr. Richardson. My preliminary idea in asking j^ou about that
party was that it frequently happens that an afternoon aflfair is cul-
minated by some of the group present continuing on at other affairs
later in the evening, and there has been testimony offered here that
during the evening of the 6th the President sought to contact you and
was advised, according to his immediate report as to information
he received over the telephone, that you were at the National Theater,
giving the number of your box or seat, whichever it may have been,
and that he then said that he would not disturb you while you were
at the theater but would contact you later.
From that information I gathered that during the evening
[13712] of December 6 you had attended the National Theater.
Upon inquiry I ascertained that the play produced on that evening
was the very familiar musical comedy The Student Prince, which
is an operatic production which has been extant for many years,
and I think every year or 2 years revived, and embraces the tale of
a prince who went to college and tried to keep up his college associa-
tions, with the usual feminine interludes.
The Chairman. Wliat do you mean "usual'" ?
Mr. Richardson. The interludes which you and I recall from our
college davs. but which the Chairman does not.
Tliere are several very celebrated songs in it, and I refer to those
things simply to find out from you, Admiral, whether you have any
recollection of ever having seen The Student Prince?
Admiral Stark. I remember very clearlj' having seen a revival of
The Student Prince, but I had not connected it with that Saturday
night, and I do not now. When I first heard of it, when someone
had said I had seen The Student Prince, my recollection was it was
in Philadelphia, and I contacted my daughter and her husband who
were there, and they said no. The next I heard of it was in connec-
tion with Commander Schulz' testimony. It does not ring any bell
with me that I was there that night, but I can only assmne, in view
of the testimony of Commander Schulz and of others who tried to
contact [lo713] me, and my remembrance of having seen
the revival, that I probably was there.
I found out at the theater that the}' had no way of telling whether
I was there or not. They said not, but they told me it was The Student
Prince.
Mr. Richardson. Do you have any recollection. Admiral Stark, of
ever having seen The Student Prince more than once ?
Admiral Stark. Yes ; I think I saw it earlier.
Mr. Richardson. We haven't even that help to help us then, have
we?
Admiral Stark. No sir.
Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, you were living at that time out
in Spring Valley ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5155
Admiral Stark. No, sir; I was living in the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions' quarters.
Mr. Richardson. That is right on Massachusetts Avenue?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. You had at that time always somebody in your
home to answer the telephone ?
Admiral Stark. That is right ; yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. And if it should be that you attended a per-
formance of The Student Prince at the National Theater on the night
of December 6, there would still be someone in your home, according
at least to your arrangements, to receive [13714-] information
that might come there over the telephone?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Mr. Richardson, Would that person there be someone directly con-
nected with the Naval Establishment ?
Admiral Stark. One of the servants, who would be in the Navy.
Mr. Richardson. When you went to your office on the morning of
the 7th — the exact time being uncertain — from your own recollection,
is it your recollection now that that is the first time you found oUt
there had been a reply by the Japanese to the earlier Hull message to
them?
Admiral Stark. That is my very clear and very distinct recollec-
tion.
Mr. Richardson. Now before you arrived at your office on the morn-
ing of the 7th, had anyone given you any information that there was
in existence such a message, or any part thereof?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; to the best of my knowledge and belief
there had not.
Mr. Richardson. Well, Admiral, would you be able to state posi-
tively that no one either sent you a message or telephoned to you on
the night of December 6 or the morning of December 7 telling you
of this message, of its receipt or of its contents ?
Admiral Stark. That is my belief ; yes, sir.
[ISyiS] Mr. Richardson. Your visit to your office on the morn-
ing of Sunday, December 7, was a routine visit, was it not, Admiral ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. It was just the same kind of a visit that you were
accustomed to make to that office every Sunday ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. And had nothing to do with any specific dispatch
or any specific information concerning which you were interested
in seeing or being advised concerning?
Admiral Stark. There was a dispatch — I have forgotten just when
it was received, I think the day before but I am not certain — from
Admiral Hart. If you will recall. Admiral Turner stated that I
called him to get the answer out to Admiral Hart. I do not have
definite recollection whatever.
Now whether that dispatch might have come on that morning and
I then called Turner, I am not positive without reference to the
record, but I think we had it prior to that.
Mr. Richardson. Now you would be able to state positively, would
you not, Admiral, that you did not spend any nights away from your
residence on Massachusetts Avenue during November or December
1941?
5156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. I would not state that without a check-up. I do not
recall any.
Mr. Richardson. Have you any information of having spent
[13716] any night away from your residence on Massachusetts
Avenue within 2 or 3 days of the attack on Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; nor within 2 or 3 weeks, but occasionally
we went and spent a night with our children in Philadelphia.
Mr. Richardson. According to tlie procedure that you followed
in your staff. Admiral, would it have been the duty of any of your
staif, upon being advised of the receipt and contents of an important
message connected with magic, for any of them to contact you about it?
Admiral Stark. If they had thought it sufficiently important they
undoubtedly would have.
Mr. Richardson. Now it appears here in the testimony that on
the evening of the Oth, while Admiral Wilkinson was entertaining
General Miles and Admiral Beardall at his home socially, the first
13 parts of this so-called 14-part message were delivered to Admiral
Wilkinson by Captain Kramer; that the message was read by all of
you officers at that dinner, and that their recollection is that Admiral
Wilkinson did some telephoning.
I wanted to asik whether under your procedure it would have been
expected that upon reading a message of that kind Wilkinson would
have been expected to have contacted you?
Admiral Stark. If he considered it sufficiently impoi'tant.
[13717] If he were in doubt he might have contacted Ingersoll
or Turner, and I believe he did contact Ingersoll. whose testimony,
as I I'ecall it, is to the effect that he considered it notliing but a restate-
ment and unimportant, that is unimportant as regards doing anything
about it at that time.
Mr. Richardson. But you have no recollection now of having any
telephone or other type of connnunication from any of your staff in
connection with this message until hite the next morning when you
got to your office ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct; yes sir.
Mr. Richardson. Now that inchides, does it not. Admiral, no
information of any kind on the evening of the 6tli or the morning
of the 7th from either Secretary Knox or from Secretary Stimson.
or from Secretary Hull?
Admiral Stark. That is correct. It is all-inclusive.
Mr. Richardson. And you have no information at all, or you
had no information at all. did you. Admiral, until after you reached
your office on the morning of the 7th, that a meeting had been called
between Hull and Knox and Stimson to consider this particular
dispatch ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; I did not know of that meeting.
Mr. Richardson. And you do not know to this day of any effort
that anyone made in connection with that meeting to advise you con-
cerning it. or ask you to be present at it?
[13718] Admiral Stark. That is perfectly correct.
Mr. Richardson. When did you find out, if you found out at all.
Admiral, that these three Secretaries were meeting on the morning
of December 7 ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5157
Admiral Stark. I do not recollect having found out about it. I
might have, because I saw Colonel Knox later in the day, he may have
mentioned it, but as to their being together that forenoon, I have no
recollection, except as I learned of it subsequently.
Mr. EicHARDSON. Well, you learned of it first after the contact
between you and General JNIarshall had been completed?
Admiral Stark. Well, it was not prior to that.
Mr. EicHARDSON. Yes, I see what you mean. Now, did anyone
tell 3^ou, or did you receive any information which would disclose
to you, that the 13-part message, which had grown to the 14-part
message by the time you got to your office, had been exhibited to the
President on the night before?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Did you have any information of any kind that
upon an examination of that dispatch the night before the President
had characterized it in this language, "This means war"?
Admiral Stark. I never heard of it until I heard of it here.
[1S719] Mr. Richardson. As Chief of Naval Operations, would
such an expression from the President with reference to an intercepted
dispatch have been an important item for you to consider in looking
over such a dispatch?
Admiral Stark. I would have said yes, provided that were an
opinion held after perhaps a second reading and looking over it more
carefully, and if I had had anything of that sort I would have taken
some action, I would have gone to the office and gotten out a dispatch
and seen my advisers, but I had nothing on that evening.
Mr. Richardson. Let me put it this way, if it is a proper question,
Admiral : If you had been advised on the night of the 6th of an exam-
ination of this 13-part message by the President and his conclusion
within the meaning of the phrase "This means war", acquiesced in by
his associate Mr. Hopkins, would your itinerary on the morning of
December 7 have been changed, so far as going to your office is con-
cerned ?
Admiral Stark. I feel certain I would have gone there that Saturday
night, if I had had any such intimation.
Mr. Richardson. Well, then, so far as the evening of Saturday,
December 6, is concerned, events leading up to it, wdiat occurred
during the evening, your recollection cannot help us?
Admiral Stark. That is right.
1 13720] Mr. Richardson. But you would be able to say, Admiral,
definitely, that you received no connnunication from the President
of the United States on that night ?
Admiral Stark. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the
President did not call me that night.
Mr. Richardson. Do you think it would be possible, Admiral, for
you to have forgotten such an incident had it occurred ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, it would be possible, but I think it would not
have been possible that I had had the intimation that there was a
dispatch down there which was clear-cut and wdiich meant war. While
I felt we had every warning that war was coming, we all felt that, we
were pi'actically certain of it, nevertheless if there had been anything
definitely clinching it of that nature and any such expression from the
President, I think I would not have rested until I had seen that dis-
patch.
5158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. EicHARDSON. Admiral, the testimony on the President's use of
the phone in order to speak to you and his report that you were at the
theatre would indicate that he had received infonnation over the tele-
phone from some source that you were at the theater. Now what
would have been your usual routine if you did go to the theater, as to
leaving information as to where you were going?
Admiral Stark. With the duty officer at the Navy Department
[13721] and my flag lieutenant. They would normally have been
acquainted with it, as well as at the house.
Mr. Richardson. Do you think it would have been possible — it
would have been possible, but do you think it would be at all probable
that you went to the theater, if you did go, without leaving that infor-
mation as to where you were going ?
Admiral Stark. It would have been possible but not probable. I
never went out of the house at evening without leaving word as to
where I was going.
Mr. Richardson. Well, if you went to the theater on that evening,
when the theater was over you expect that you went directly home,
do you not ?
Admiral Stark. After the theater?
Mr. Richardson, Yes.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Then you would remain there during the night?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. And there were during that night and every night
about that time, people in the house who could have answered the
telephone if it had rung ?
Admiral Stark. Oh, yes ; and I had one right at my bedside.
Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Admiral, just one question.
[13722] I believe you stated in your former testimony that you
regarded the 13 parts of this message, when you did see them the
next morning, as routine, or rather as a rehashing of the attitude of
the Japanese towards the situation which had been accumulating over
a period of weeks or months?
Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir.
The Chairman. And that the 13 parts by themselves carried no
implication to you beyond that, that it was a rehashing, a restatement
of their attitude ; that was your impression when you saw it the next
morning ?
Admiral Stark. It was ; yes, sir.
The Chairman. You stated, I believe, that based upon those 13
parts you did not regard it necessary to give an}^ additional warning.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Because warnings had been given to all the officers,
that you regarded as stifficient. If you had seen the 13 parts of that
message on the night before, would your opinion of it have been any
different from what it was the next morning?
Admiral Stark. I think not. I think my reaction would have been
the same as the testimony of, so far as I know, everyone else who
was here indicates, that it was not of any urgency, that it was a
restatement.
The Chairman. But if you had been called by the President,
[13723] or had been communicated with by him following his re-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5159
ceipt of that message, and he had told you that he thought that that was
leading to war, or that meant war, you would have taken such steps
as that incident might have impelled you to take, in view of the Presi-
dent's opinion of it, and in that case you would have gone to the office,
or gone down to look at the message and examine i^ further and see
upon what basis the President thought those 13 parts meant war?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. That did not take place?
Admiral Stark. That did not take place. I had no intimation of
the President's reaction. I did not know that the President had read
that dispatch that night, until it was brought out here before the
committee.
The Chairman. Yes. Mr. Cooper.
The Vice Chairman. Admiral, as I recall, the effect of your pre-
vious testimony was that the first 13 parts of the so-called 14-part
message, the 13 parts having been received on Saturday night, indi-
cated nothing to attract any attention about Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Stark. Absolutely.
The Vice Chairman. And as I recall Commander Schulz' testi-
mony to this committee, Pearl Harbor was not mentioned by the
President, or Mr. Hopkins, during their discussions on the [137£41i
first 13 parts of this 14-part message.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. Nor did I ever hear anyone else mention
Pearl Harbor in that connection.
The Vice Chairman. And the fact that that might have indicated
war, there was nothing there to attract any attention or give any in-
dication that Pearl Harbor was involved ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. I thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Clark.
Mr. Clark. I have no questions.
The Chairman. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral Stark, on the 27th of November, you had
already sent out the war warning, had you not?
Admiral Stark. We had; yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And you sent this message, and you said in that mes-
sage "This is a war warning", you sent it to the different Pacific
theaters ; that is right, isn't it ?
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. And then the President, sometime prior to December
1, said that he expected we would be attacked probably by Monday,
did he not?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. That was previous to December 1 ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
[13725] Mr. Murphy. Now we have a Navy man saying that
the President saw the first 13 parts and said "This means war." The
fact is most of those in high command, if not all of those in high
command, were expecting very definitely the possibility of war at
that time, were they not ?
Admiral Stark. We were. We had sent out warning messages
regarding it. The President himself had directed either one or two
messages to be sent in that connection.
5160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. MuBj'HY. Were yoii present at the White House, Admiral, on
December 7 ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir, I was not in the White House, as I
remember, on December 7.
Mr. MuRPHY.^We have here the stenographic report on the words
of the President of the United States on December 7 before some of
the great men of this country. Mr. Chairman, I think those notes
ought to be produced by counsel so they can be made a part of the
record in this case.
Mr. Richardson. Has not that already been done?
Mr. Murphy. They have not been made part of the record. They
should be.
Mr. Richardson. I will wait until we have a chairman here.
Mr. Murphy. You were not present, at any rate, when the leaders
of the Senate and House and others were present at the [13726]
White House with the President on the evening of Sunday. December
7, at which time he discussed the reactions of those in the White House,
the reactions of themselves and others in the days preceding Decem-
ber 7?
Admiral Stark. My recollection is that I did not leave my office from
the time I got there Sunday morning until early Monday morning.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, on the evening
of December 7, 1941, there weie certain persons, leading Americans,
at the White House, and as I understand it further, there Avas a
stenographic report of the remarks made by the President at that
time. In view of the fact that we have seen fit to have a witness
come here to tell what the President said on the 6th of December, I
think that the remarks of the President on the 7th of December 191:1
ought to be made a part of the record.
Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest, we are now
having that full stenographic report mimeographed for introduction
as an exhibit, largely in connection with the Stimson statement, be-
cause it much more directly relates to that than it does to this witness'
testimony.
Mr. Murphy. The one I have reference to consists only of about
4 pages, or maybe 5 and maybe 6 at the most.
Mr. Richardson. There is only one and that is the one [13727]
we are having mimeographed.
Mr. ]\IuRPHY. At any rate, I think that shoidd be made a part of the
record. I will not press it now, but I think it ought to be made
a part of the record at some time.
The Chairman. That will be presented to the committee for inclu-
sion as an exhibit, as I understand.
Mr. Richardson. Yes ; as soon as it is mimeographed.
The Chairman. All right. Is that all?
Mr. Murphy. That is all.
The Chairman. Mr. Gearhart.
Mr. Gearhart. No questions.
The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Stark, did not your duty officer at your
office have a log where he entered all telephone calls if you were not
there, so that the next day, or at the time you Avould come in, the log
would indicate who called and if they had a message?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5161
Admiral Stark. I think not. If there had been a message or any-
thing definite to be brought to me he undoubtedly would have told me,
but I know of no log kept by the duty officer. There may have been
one, but I just do not recall it.
Senator Ferguson. Is not that the ordinary practice in the Navy,
that if you have a watch officer he keeps a log?
Admiral Stark. Of anything worth while ; yes, sir.
[J3?'2S] Senator Ferguson. Would not a communication from
the President of the United States on Saturday evening, December
6, to be a worth-while item to enter m a log if you were not there and a
telephone call was made to your duty officer to reach you?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; I would say so.
Senator Ferguson. You would say that would be worth while,
would you not?
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Have you ever looked for such a log?
Admiral Stark. No ; I have not.
Senator Ferguson. Counsel, or Mr. Hasten, do you know whether or
not there has been a search for such a log?
Mr. Masten. They gave us a list of the people who were in the
office, and that is in the record.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I ask you now that counsel re-
quest that an examination be made to see if there is such a log.
Did you have naval aides at your home?
Admiral Stark. Have what, sir?
Senator Ferguson. Naval aides.
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you just have civilian servants working for
3^ou personally or were they Government employees?
Admiral Stark. I understood your question to say did I [13729^
have naval aides.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. I was thinking of that, when you said that, of my
flag secretary. The servants were Government servants.
Senator Ferguson. What classification in the Navy would they
have ?
Admiral Stark. Mess attendants, steward, cook and mess attend-
ants.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have a secretary or anyone like that
at home ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Anyone to take phone calls?
Admiral Stark. The boys — they were intelligent, good boys, would
take a telephone call.
Senator Ferguson. Were they Filipino boys?
Admiral Stark. No, sir, they were colored.
Senator Ferguson. And j^ou do not recall getting any message from
any servant ?
Admiral Stark. No ; I do not.
Senator Ferguson. About a call from the President?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Do yoti recall any calls from Kramer?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
5162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[13730] Senator Ferguson. Captain Kramer?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have a policy or a plan that you were
going to undertake if war actually came? You had one of these cards,
did you not, that you could be telephoned on the winds message ? Do
you recall that?
Admiral Stark. No ; I do not recall any card with regard to being
telephoned on the winds message.
Senator Ferguson. A memorandum that "East wind rain" meant
war?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You never saw such a card ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Or memorandum?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. If anything important on that would
have come in I w^ould have been notified, but I was given no card.
Senator Ferguson. Well, you knew that they were alerted to the
receipt of a winds message ?
Admiral Stark. I know it now, and I testified that my recollec-
tion on the winds message was not clear, except to the extent that it
was my belief that an implementation of the wdnds message never
came in. We covered that.
Senator Ferguson. I want to go further than that. I [13731]
want to know what you knew about the fact that your Department
was expecting a so-called winds message which would indicate cer-
tain things, as set out by the Japanese messages. You are familiar
with those messages now that we have had them here ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now will you state to the committee what you
knew about that set-up? Did you know anything about it?
Admiral Stark. I know" what it is now. I do not recall being
familiar with the details of that set-up at that time.
Senator Ferguson. Now if it was important enough for your staff
under you to arrange it so that any member could be called on the
phone and he would have in his possession information that he could
tell what they were talking about without giving away any secret — in
other words, the testimony now indicates that if your inferior officers
had called you on the telephone and said, "Admiral, East wind rain",
that that had a significant meaning and that you w^ould have laiOAvn
that that was a reply to the wind code message.
Admiral Stark. I do not recall having that at that time. My office
was about 10 minutes from the Navy Department and any message
could have come up there very quickly. I say 10 minutes, but maybe
15, say, at the outside.
Senator Ferguson. I know, but you also were out of the Navy
office at times.
[13732] Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And you do not recall any such set-up, as far
as you are concerned?
Admiral Stark. No, I do not.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5163
Senator Ferguson. Then I take it you had no policy or plan as to
what the Navy would do at the time you received a winds intercept?
Admiral Stark. No, we had no special policy or plan if the winds
message had come in showing a break, for example, or strained re-
lations because we already had them.
Senator Ferguson. I see. But the Dutch themselves said that the
winds code would mean war. Did you know that ?
Admiral Stark. I have heard it since. I do not recall at that time of
having any interpretation of the winds message, the meaning war.
It has been much discussed since then.
Senator Ferguson. What I am trying to get at is if the President
did come to the conclusion Saturday night that, reading the 13 parts
and the other messages connected with it, this meant war, as the Dutch
had interpreted the winds code message, if it was received, would mean,
the Navy Dapartment of the United States of America had no plan as
to what they would do upon the happening of that event, is that true?
Admiral Stark. That is true. We had a plan in case of war, which
of course, you are all familiar with, and when war [1S7331
came we simply sent out the execute of that plan.
Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, you say that relations were
very strained on Saturday and Friday?
Admiral Stark. I certainly would say so ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Did you have a plan that if you received
word, or something that would indicate that America was going to
war, that the United States Navy had a plan that you were going to
do something, that you would act ?
Admiral Stark. Well, we had already sent in the war warning
an alert against the possibility of war. Until the clash came we had
nothing else. When the clash came we were fully covered.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, you felt that the message of
the 27th was your full plan and that you had no part to take, that
you had no steps to take until war actually broke out?
Admiral Stark. That is correct. We considered w^e had fully
alerted them with the directives which were given both by the Army
and by ourselves.
Senator Ferguson. Well, how do you explain the calling of the
meeting Sunday morning in your office of the various officers?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall it.
Senator Ferguson. Was there such a meeting called ?
Admiral Stark. Not to the best of my knowledge and belief.
[J3734-] That has also been covered, I believe, in previous
testimony.
Senator Ferguson. Were there various officers assembled in your
office Sunday morning ?
Admiral Stark. Not that I recall, except those that came in on
routine business, and with the message, but as for a meeting that
morning, a regularly scheduled meeting, I think it did not take place.
Senator Ferguson. Well, do I understand from the testimony that
you gave to Mr. Richardson, the counsel, this morning, that your
mind is rather a blank on what took place Saturday afternoon and
Saturday night ?
Admiral Stark. As regards the 13-point message; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson, Well, as to where you were ?
5164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; and as to where I was, except that
I was in the office Saturday afternoon.
Senator Ferguson. Wonkl it do any good to try to refresh your
memory on the people that were at this party? I think we have a list.
Admiral Stark. No, it would not, I can tell you that in advance.
My opinion is and my belief is that I was not at that party.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know the naval attache from Canada,
Mr. and Mrs. Brodeur ? Do you laiow them ?
Admiral Stark. Yes; I think I knew them.
[1S7SS] Senator Ferguson. Did you know the McCarthys?
Admiral Stark. Well, I knew so many people of slight acquaintance
that I would remember their faces and ])erhaps not their names.
Senator Ferguson. Suppose you look at the society column in the
Sunday Star, Admiral (handing document to Admiral Stark).
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Will you just look and see whether or not the
write-up on that party would in any way refresh your memory?
Admiral Stark. I would like to say as regards parties. Senator
Ferguson, that in a very recent important party to which I had been
invited, and at which I was hot present, but the press having the
list put me down as one of the important persons there.
Senator Ferguson. I did not mean to prove by the fact that the
press listed you as being there, that you were there, but I thought that
the write-up of the society editor would give you some information
that would refresh your memory as to being at that kind of party.
Admiral Stark. I will gladly read it, sir.
Mr. MuRPiiY. For the record, the Star you inentioned is the Wash-
ington Star?
[lS7rS6] Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. MuRPiiY. You referred to the Star.
Senator Ferguson. Yes; the Washington Star.
Admiral Stark (after perusing document). No, it does not. It
says I was there, but my knowledge on reporting things of this sort
does not make that at all conclusive.
Senator Ferguson. Would the fact that the Minister from the
Commonwealth of Australia, Mr. Casey and Mrs. Casey, are listed
there, would that in any way refresh your memory?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. I knew Mr. Casey quite well. I saw him
frequently.
Senator Ferguson. So that does not refresh vour memorv in the
least?
Admiral Stark. It does not. There were many such parties, to
which I did not go generally.
Senator Ferguson. We have some more information on the ques-
tion as to what happened Saturday. I want to know whether or not
you were consulted by the President in relation to a message received
from the Prime Minister, sent to the President of the United States,
in relation to a message to be sent by the British Government and
the Dominion Government. I will show you that document and let you
read it.
(The document was handed to Admiral Stark.)
Senator Ferguson. Does counsel want to offer that in [137371
evidence now?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5165
Mr. KiGiiARDSON. I think it would probably be just as well, if it
suits the Chairman, to have it included in the record.
The Chairman. Is this the document on our desks here ?
Mr. Richardson. Yes. It might be included in the record instead
of making it an exhibit.
The Chairman. Dated December 7, 1941 ?
Mr. Richardson. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. I will read it into the record, or suppose we let
Mr. jSIasten read it into the record ?
Mr. Masten. I think the record should show in addition. Senator,
the covering letter from the State Department, which reads as follows :
Dear Mr. Richardson : In further reference to Mr. Masten's memorandum
of February 23, regarding the clearance of certain documents, the British Gov-
ernment has now notified us that clearance has been obtained for documents
numbered 6 and 8. We are informed, however, that the Australian Government
has requested that document No. S should only be released together with a para-
phrase of a telegram from the Australian Minister of External Affairs relating
to this document. A paraphrase of that telegram as received from the British
Embassy is therefore [13738] enclosed herewith.
Sincerely yours,
/S/ Herbert S. Marks
Herbert S. Ma2ks
Assistant to the Under Secretary.
Senator, do you want me to read this ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, you may read that.
Mr. Masten. The documents enclosed are as follows, and the first
is a memorandum dated December 7, 1941, which appears to have been
on stationery bearing the British seal, and reads as follows :
The Prime Minister would be very glad of any comments which the President
may have on the attached draft of a declaration to the Japanese Government.
The Dominion Governments liave yet to give their views on this text. They
are being consulted urgently.
The Netherlands Government have been given a copy of the draft.
The next one is :
YouE Excellency,
I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have been instructed to
make the following communication to the Imperial Japanese Government on
behalf of His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, the Com-
monwealth [13739] of Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South
Africa.
His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, Commonwealth
of Australia, New Zealand, Union of South Africa have followed closely in con-
sultation with the United States Government the negotiations in which the latter
have been engaged with the Japanese Government with a view to relieving the
present tension in the Far East. His Majesty's Governments viewed with the
same concern as the United States Government the rapidly growing concentration
of Japanese forces in Indo-China which prompted the enquiry by the United
States Government to the Japanese Government on December 2nd. They have
found Japanese reply to that enquiry extremely disquieting. However valid the
explanations in regard to North Indo-China as to which they expressly reserve
their views the reply entirely fails to explain the fact that the bulk of Japanese
forces are stationed in South Indo-China and are being constantly and heavily
augmented.
There is no threat from any quarter against Indo-China and this concen-
tration in South Indo-China is only explicable on the assumption that the
Japanese Government are preparing for some further aggressive move directed
against the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya or Thailand.
Relations between the Governments of the British Commonwealth and the
Netherlands Government are too well known for [137 f/O] the Japanese
Government to be under any illusion as to their reaction to any attack on terri-
5166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tories of the Netherlands. In the interest of peace His Majesty's Governments
feel it incumbent upon them however to remove any uncertainty vphich may
exist as regards their attitude in the event of attack on Thailand.
His Majesty's Governments have no designs against Thailand. On the con-
trary preservation of full independence and sovereignty of Thailand is an
important British interest. Any attempt by Japan to impair that independence
or sovereignty would affect the security of Burma and Malay and His Majesty's
Governments could not be indifferent to it. They feel bound therefore to warn
the Japanese Government in the most solemn manner that if Japan attempts
to establish her influence in Thailand by force or threat of force she will do
so at her own peril and His Majesty's Governments will at once take all appro-
priate measures. Should hostilities unfortunately result the responsibility will
rest with Japan.
These two documents, Senator, came from President Roosevelt's
file.
Senator Ferguson. I asked that they be cleared, and then, as I
understand it, before they could be cleared the Australian Government
insisted upon attaching the paper that you read now.
Mr. Masten. That is correct.
[137^1'] Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield for the pur-
pose of making an explanation ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Were those produced by Miss Tully some months
ago?
Mr. Masten. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. But we were waiting for clearances until just
recently.
Mr. Masten. That also is correct. The final document is the para-
phrase of a telegram from the Australian Minister for External Af-
fairs to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs of the United
Kingdom, which is the telegram referred to in the letter to Mr.
Eichardson from the State Department, and is as follows :
Subject to conditions that President gives prior approval to text of warning
as drafted and also gives signal for actual delivery of warning, we concur in
draft as a joint communication from all His Majesty's Governments. I point
out that message from Australian Minister at Washington just received uotes
that,
1. President has decided to send message to Emperor.
2. President's subsequent procedure is that if no answer is received by him
from the [13742] Emperor by Monday evening,
(a) he will issue his warning on Tuesday afternoon or evening,
(b) warning or equivalent by British or others will not follow until
Wednesday morning, i, e. after his own warning has been delivered repeatedly
to Tokyo and Washington.
Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, my question on that is: Were
you ever consulted by the President of the United States in relation
to that document, the one first read ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall that I was. Senator Ferguson. We
often talked over the Thailand situation, and that entire area, but
as to this specific document, I do not recall that I was ever consulted
by the President with reference to it.
Senator Ferguson. You were the Chief Naval Officer and it would
be very important. If any steps were to be taken, you were the man
that would take them, isn't that true?
Admiral Stark. Well, I would be very much interested, along with
the Army. He may have talked that over with me. I recall so much
conversation with reference to that whole area that I do not pin
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5167
it down to that specific document dated the 7th of December, and to
which the reply would be made after the 7th.
[13743] Senator Ferguson. This does not state that a reply
would be made necessarily after the 7tli, unless you relate it to the last
page.
Admiral Stark. I was relating it to the last page ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. The first item — now, this would indicate it was
prior to 9 o'clock on the 6th of December, because the message to the
Emperor was sent at 9 o'clock or shortly after, on the 6th of December
1941, and it appears that the Australian Minister had a message from
the President to this effect, "President has decided to send message to
Emperor." That would indicate that it was not sent, that he had
decided to send it, and prior to sending it he had notified the Prime
Minister, or the Australian Minister, which would be Mr. Casey.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the President had decided
to send that message prior to its being sent on the night of the 6th?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; I recall the talk of the President sending
a message to the Emperor. I did not see the message beforehand, as I
recall, but it had been discussed when I was present.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know how long before the 61h — or was
it on the 6th — that you discussed it with the President ?
[13744] Admiral Stark. I think that message to the Emperor
was discussed some days before, as I remember. I have forgotten just
when.
Senator Ferguson. The next item, "President's subsequent proce-
dure is that if no answer is received by him from the Emperor by
Monday evening" that he would do certain things, first, "he will
issue his warning on Tuesday afternoon or evening." Did the Presi-
dent consult you in relation to that?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall it.
Senator Ferguson. That would be a very important matter, would
it not?
Admiral Stark. It would be a very important matter.
Senator Ferguson. That he was going to send the message?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And then he was going to wait until Monday
evening as to whether or not a reply was made by the Emperor, and if
no reply was made, that he was going to issue his warning. That
would be a warning to Japan, I take it, on Tuesday afternoon or
evening.
Admiral Stark. It would be a very important State Department
matter in that sphere, and, of course, we would know of it. We might
not necessarily be particularly consulted about it beforehand, al-
though I do recollect the thought of a message to the Emperor.
[1374-5] Senator Ferguson. When we were on the verge of war
a diplomatic move would be very material to the Navy, would it not,
and you would not be consulted with relation to that ?
Admiral Stark. Not necessarily. It would be very important, but
the President's principal adviser in that connection was Mr. Hull, and
while we would probably learn of it, we would not necessarily be
consulted.
5168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do I understand that you had practi-
cally washed your hands of the matter 10 days before and had sent a
warning and were just sitting and waiting until something happened?
Admiral Stark. No ; I do not mean to convey that at all. We were
intensely interested. When you ask me if the President would not
consult me as regards that message, he might and lie might not have.
Senator Ferguson. Had not Mr. Hull told you and General Mar-
shall sometime before that he was through, that it was up to the Navy
and Army?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And you do not recall being consulted by any-
one, or hearing about "We will wait until Tuesday afternoon or eve-
ning before we will reply," or something of that sort ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall that point at all ; no, sir. \^137Jp6']
I might have known of it, but I do not recall.
Senator Ferguson. Then the (h) "warning or equivalent by British
or o'thers will not follow until Wednesday morning, i. e., after his own
warning has been delivered repeatedly to Tokyo and Washington,"
that is the President's own warning.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I do not think. Senator Ferguson, that
because Mr. Hull stated he had washed his hands of it and it was now
up to the Army and Navy, that that would in any sense indicate that
Mr. Hull would not be the primary adviser of the President on any-
thing of this sort, and would not continue to be until war actually
broke.
Senator Ferguson. Was not this to be a military or naval decision,
if a warning like this was to be given? I take it from the original,
that is, the original memorandum from the Prime INIinister of Great
Britain, that they were talking about an ultimatum, they were talking
about real action, they were going to wai-n Japan and she could not
move any further, and therefore if you wanted to stop the movement
by an ai'my or a navy, you would have to stop it not by diplomacy,
you would have to stop it by might. You and General Marshall con-
trolled the might of the United States, did you not?
Admiral Stark. Well, we fight for peace after it has been lost by
diplomacy and not beforehand. I would consider that the message
which went out woukl be diplomatic and would be a {^13747^
state matter from the State Department political angle, and that that
would be primarily their responsibility.
Senator Ferguson. You were controlling the Navy. Would not
you have to be ready tliat if this warning was sent it might and could
possibly mean war. and that war might or could possibly start imme-
diately, and therefore a new alert, something new would be necessary?
Admiral Stark. Not to my mind ; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You do not think so ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. We felt we were fully alerted. Our plans
were ready, if war broke, in all theaters.
Senator Ferguson. Now I have another item here. I show you a
message from OPNAV, which was your Department, to CINCAF,
which was sent about noon prior to the attack on the 7th. Would you
just read that and tell me if you know anything about it ? I received
that March 6 from counsel. It was requested prior to that but was
sent to me on that day.
(The document was handed to Admiral Stark.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5169
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield before we go on to another
subject?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. I wonder if there is anything to show that this sug-
gested paper, which has been read into the record, was ever sent by
the British Government ?
[13748] Senator Ferguson. Yes; the first sheet shows that the
British Government sent it to us.
Mr. Murphy. No; but I mean to Japan. Did the President send
that message to Japan?
Senator Ferguson. No, it does not show.
Mr. Murphy. This is just a tentative suggestion, isn't that right?
Mr. Masten. That is correct, so far as we know.
Mr. Murphy. So far as you know, there never was a message sent by
the British to Japan ?
Senator Ferguson. I would like to say here, Counsel, Mr. Hull
nowhere in his statement mentions this item. So far the records have
not shown that any message was delivered to the Australian Minister,
or that the President had decided to do what is set forth here by the
Australian Minister. I wish you would now check the records of the
Secretary of State and White' House to ascertain what memorandum
we have about what the President had determined to do, when he
determined to do it, and wdien the messages were sent, and when this
message was sent to the Australian Minister. I think that is very
important in this record.
Mr. Masten. We will be glad to do that. I think if there were any
further documents in the State Department about that they would
have turned it over in response to the numerous [l-j'/'^O] re-
quests we have made to them, and the request which was made orig-
inally to them. We can ask them again.
Senator Ferguson. I just cannot conceive of the fact that our Gov-
ernment would send this kind of message to the Australian Minister
and keep no memorandum of it. Our State Department functions
in the way we have been shown by the record, that of anything that is
done a memorandum is made.
Mr. Masten. Senator, this is not a memorandum from our (lovern-
ment.
Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that very much. It comes from
the Australian Government, but it indicates clearly that the Austra-
lian JNIinister had this information from our Government, and I have
never known our Government to give verbal information ; they would
make a memorandum of what they had given to another Government.
Governments do not function along that line. For that reason I ask
that the Secretai-y of State's office again be asked for this information.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield just for the one matter of the
insertion in the record?
Senator Ferguson. There would be a memorandum of a conversa-
tion, because if they have a conversation they make a memorandum of
it.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; I will yield.
[13760] Mr. Murphy. Don't you think the record should sho^^•
what you are reading from is a paraphrase of a telegram from the
79716— 46— pt. 11 3
5170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of State
for Dominion Affairs of tlie United Kingdom?
Senator Ferguson. That has already been read into the record.
Mr. Murphy. I do not believe it has.
The Chairman. I would like to ask one question about this. The
first paper you read is dated December 7. That is the day on which the
attack was made, and it refers to the papers that were read later.
Now obviously that message, that memorandum was made before
the attack, otherwise it would have no purpose whatever, and when
the attack came of course it vitiated and nullified all this talk of what
vas going to be done in that suggestion.
Does the record show at what time that memorandum was received
or made or sent ? It must have been on the morning of the 7th.
Mr. Masten. There is nothing on that shown in the document. We
have photostats of the original here.
The Chairman. It is obvious it must have been made before the
attack.
Mr. Maoten. That is correct.
The Chairman. There would be no point to sending it after
1137S1'] the attack, because the whole situation had changed.
Mr. Masten. That is correct.
Mr. Richardson. There is only one date, Mr. Chairman, on this
entire photostat, and that is in the first memorandum, the first note
of the Prime Minister, that bears the date on the bottom of
December 7.
The Chairman. It bears the date December 7, and it refers to
these other documents you have read, and it seems obvious to me that
all this must have happened on the morning of the 7th before the
attack, because there would have been no point in having such docu-
ments or making any such suggestions or recommendations after the
attack became known.
Senator Brewster. Will the Senator yield ?
The Chairman. Yes. I am just trying to straighten this out here.
Senator Brewster. WTien you say it all transpired earlier, it ap-
pears that the message from the Prime Minister of the Dominion
Government could have been 1, 2, or 3 days earlier. It does not ap-
pear as to the date that message was submitted to our Government
on the 7th, and there also appears no time on the paraphrase of the
telegram. Do you know why that is? Wliy should not we have the
day and time of that?
Mr. Masten. I understand we asked the State Department for that
date.
[13752] The Chairman. This December 7 document, the only
one that has any date on it, must have been submitted to the Presi-
dent on that day, because it says the Prime Minister would be glad
to have any connnents which the President may have on the attached
draft. Whenever that other draft was written does not seem to
appear.
Senator Ferguson, Mr. Chairman, I think it is material if you
look at the original photostatic copy, the first sheet, which is a small
paper from the British Embassy. It is mimeographed and there-
fore does not show it. At the top of it it has the seal of the British
Government, indicating that they attached the sheet sent to our State
Department, or to the President, the next two sheets. But the sig-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5171
nificant-part of that is that the last page indicates the negotiations
Avere going on with Australia prior to that, because the President
had not sent his message to the Emperor until the night of the 6th,
and this says, "The President has decided to send a message to the
Emperor." It would indicate that he had not sent it, that he had
just decided to send it, and that this is what he is going to do after
it goes, he is going to wait until Monday.
I think it is very material that we get all these dates.
The Chairman. That was all thrown out the window by what hap-
pened at noon Sunday, which must have been not very long [1S7SS^
after this thing was delivered to the President, because it was delivered
to him on the morning of the 7th. There seems to have been a con-
fusion there as to the time. I do not know that it makes much differ-
ence when these other papers were drafted. They were evidently
submitted to the President on the 7th.
Mr. Richardson. My view, and the interpretation we have made
at our office of it was that this proposed dispatch from the British
Government to Japan, consisting of two pages here in this photostat,
was a document prepared by the British Government without date,
for the purpose of being transmitted to the President. That is the
idea the British Government had as to what the President might do,
and as to its reliance on it. That, in connection with the preparation
of this document by the British Government, the Australian Minister
for External Affairs put a condition on his agreement to it. Then
that added to the other was to be presented to the President.
Now, it seems perfectly clear that it was intended to be presented to
the President, and it seems perfectly clear that before the Australian
Minister made up his dispatch the President had not yet sent his
message to Japan.
The Chairman. He had not received these papers, either.
Mr. Richardson. The Australian Minister must have received the
proposal of the British Government, because a [1S7S4.] part
of the Australian Minister's answer is that the President has decided
to send a message.
Now, apparently they were not through with contact with the Do-
minion Government at that time, at the time this first note of Decem-
ber 7 was made, because of the recital that the Dominion governments
have yet to give their views on this text. Consequently, it would seem
as though the thing was all tentative and was to be crystallized when
the President issued his message to Japan.
The important thing about it, from our standpoint, was the second
clause, which indicates a knowledge on the part of the Australian
Minister of what the President proposed to do if he received no reply
from Japan.
Now, the interesting thing is, or was, to us as soon as we saw this,
which was recently, and that is where did the Minister from Australia
get his authority to state what the President's procedure was to be?
Now, if that was a conversation between him and the President, then
we have to look in the Presidential files possibly for the basis for that
conversation.
If the State Department had anything to do with it I am satisfied
we would find in the State Department records a memorandum of the
President's procedure, but until this Australian document came in we
found nothing that indicated [1S7SS] any procedure on the
5172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
part of the President at all after his message. Of course, it- is true
that before any of it could be crystallized into action the attack came
about; but that still does not dispose of the question as to whether
the President had made u]) liis mind as to what he intended to do.
[137S6] Mr. Clark. I would like to ask, counsel, if you have
any evidence that the President ever saw these papers before he sent
his message to Japan.
Mr. Richardson. These papers came to us from Miss Tully in an-
swer to our request that she take from the Presidential records any-
thing that had any reference to Pearl Harbor.
So they went to the President. There is nothing to indicate here
that the President saw them before the Pearl Harbor attack.
Mr. Clark. I mean before he sent his message to Japan, to the Em-
peror.
Mr. Richardson. There is nothing in these papers to indicate that
(he President saw any of these documents before he made his address
to the Emperor.
Mr. Clark. Then what is the significance of them here?
Mr. Richardson. The only significance — I won't say the only signi-
ficance— but the sharp significance to us, Mr. Congressman, was that
Australia seemed to have learned from the President that if the Jap-
anese did not reply to the prospective message that President Roose-
velt was to send to the Emperor, that then President Roosevelt had
determined that he would issue the Presidential warning on Tuesday
afternoon or evening.
Up to now we have had no such information from any source.
[Lrr.57] Mr. Clark. But he did actually send it on the 6th?
Mr. Richardson. Yes.
Mr. Clark. The night of the 6th.
Mr. Richardson. He sent it on the 6th. Now, did he receive a reply
to his message to the Emperor?
Mr. Murphy. Not until after the attack.
Mr. Richardson. Then before he could act on it, under the procedure
identified by the Australian Minister, presumably the attack on Pearl
Harbor came about.
The Chairman. The message sent on the night of the 6th was not the
warning contemplated by these papers.
Mr. Richardson. That is right.
The Chairman. His message was more in the nature of an appeal.
Mr. Richardson. That is right.
The Chairman. Not a warning. These papers indicate that if he
got no reply by the following Tuesday, he then would issue to the
Japanese Government what was regarded as a warning.
Mr. Richardson. Yes, sir.
The Chair^ian. The attack cut that all off.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I don't think the record should
stand as it now stands, that the Australian Minister knew facts and
circumstances that the Secretary of State of [JIS75S] the United
States did not know. For that reason I would like to clear up as to
whether it is possible that the Australian Minister in Washington
knew these facts set forth which our own Secretary of State didn't
know, and which the American people haven't known until this
morning.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5173
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ?
Senator Ferguson. I think that we ought to look into the facts in
the Secretary of State's office to see whether that is possible.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. I would like to inquire whether, since this has been
known long enough for us to have clearance from the British Govern-
ment, if counsel, or anyone has asked the State Department that spe-
cific question, or Sumner Welles, as to their knowledge as to this par-
ticular document.
Senator Ferguson, Mr. Welles w^as examined in detail.
Mr. Murphy. The fact is that we had to wait until counsel got
clearance through the State Department.
Since it was known that it was going to be introduced, has the
State Department or Mr. Welles, formerly with the State Depart-
ment, been asked this question, as to whether the American State
Department knew about it ?
Mr. Masten. That question has not been asked.
[J37S9] Mr. Murphy. I don't think it is a fair inference to say
that our State Department did not know, and that it was not known
b}' the American people until this morning, then.
Mr. Masten. I think perhaps the record should show where the
documents came from, and when.
The two British documents were found in the President's file by
Miss Tully, and were not found in the State Department files. They
were in the papers that wei-e submitted to the committee informally
several months ago, and it was decided to request a clearance. That
request was made as soon as the instructions were given by the com-
mittee.
Clearance was not given until this letter from the State Department
was received, last Friday, I believe. It is undated, but I understand
that it came in the office last Friday. And the reason clearance was
held up was because the British Government advised the State De-
partment that they wanted to submit this document to the Dominions —
because the first memorandum says the Dominions were being con-
sulted at the time it occurred. The documents were then mimeo-
graphed and were distributed here this morning.
Senator Ferguson. So the record may be clear, I don't purport to
state what the Secretary of State knew. I merely stated that our
record up to date indicates that he didn't know this, and that is why
I think he ought to have a chance [13760] to look into it.
The Chairman. Counsel will inquire of the State Department any
further facts relating to these documents that are on record.^
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Stark, we can prove one fact here
this morning, can we not, that the Navy, as far as you were concerned
had no knowledge of the contents of these documents that we have
been speaking so much about this morning ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct, to the best of my remembrance;
and after hearing the discussion, I don't think I could be expected
to have any, in view of the time and date.
Senator Ferguson. All of this discussion has not refreshed your
memory ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
1 See p. 5507 et seq., infra, for further information in this connection.
5174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Brewster. May I interrupt?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Senator Brewster. What you say as to the timing, Admiral, is not
quite relevant, as, if this document of the Australian is correct, and
that a decision had been reached on procedure. That must have been,
I would assume, prior to December 7, as the clear implication of the
document is that the Australian Government had sent this message to
the Prime Minister and had received prior thereto word from the
Australian Minister in Washington as to what was contemplated would
be done. That [13761'] must have been a decision at or earlier
than December 6, and would, presumably have been the result of con-
sultations between the responsible authorities, among whom you would
be included.
So I don't think you can dispose of the matter by saying it was
simply relating to December 7. If there were a decision, it must have
been certainly some days earlier.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; I see your point.
Senator Brewster. You would agree that that was so?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. It seems to me that this illustrates very clearly
the necessity of thorough exploration and the tremendous vahie of
cross-examination — not in any hostile sense, but in simply seeking
out all of the relevant material, since we have been on this question
now for nearly 6 months and here is something which would appear
to be the basis for decision relating to this anair which none of us
have been previously advised of, and either the Secretary of State
did not know about it, which seems unlikely, or didn't consider it
material in his review of the situation.
The result is to leave one pondering how many other documents,
or material of this character may still have not been developed.
The Chairman. Before j^ou go on to your next matter [137621
Senator Ferguson, there is a question of procedure that has to be
settled.
I have got to be on the floor at 12 o'clock on account of the housing
bill, and the members of the House tell me that they have to be over
in the House.
The other day you indicated to me that you couldn't be here to-
morrow.
Senator Ferguson. That is correct.
The Chairman. And I can't be here tomorrow because I have to
be before another committee.
Under those circumstances we cannot hold a session this afternoon.
It may have to go over until Thursday morning.
Senator Ferguson. On Thursday I couldn't reach Washington until
about 11 o'clock.
The Chairman. General Marshall advises me that he is extremely
anxious to return to China on account of the situation that we are
all familiar with. He is getting daily requests to return immediately.
For that reason I don't like to hold him here longer than necessary.
This is off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
The Chairman. Come around then, General. Maybe we can finish
with you now.
Admiral Stark, you will be available?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5175
[1376S] Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.^
The Chairman, It is very essential that we conclude these hearings
at the earliest possible date. Time is rmming against us. We are
all hoping that there will not be another request for an extension
of time to make a report.
But that is another matter.
Go ahead, counsel.
TESTIMONY OF GENERAL OF THE ARMIES GEORGE C. MARSHALL
(Resumed)
Mr. Richardson. General, where were you living on the 6th and 7th
of December 1941?
General Marshall. Fort Myer, Va., sir.
Mr. Richardson. The evidence that has been taken here indicates,
at pages 2930 and 3091,^ that your records show nothing to indicate
that you were not home on the night and evening of December 6th.
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Richardson. There was at all times at your home, people who
knew your whereabouts?
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Richardson, And who could answer telephone inquiries as to
your whereabouts?
General Marshall. Correct, sir.
Mr. Richardson. You recall when you came to your office
[13764] on Sunday morning, the Ttli, seeing the message that was
referred to as the 14-parts message?
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Richardson. When you first saw that message, it was complete
was it not. General ?
General Marshall. It was complete.
Mr. Richardson. With the 1 o'clock p. m., notice in connection
with it?
General Marshall, "That is correct, sir.
Mr. Richardson. That was the first time, as I understand your
testimony, which you already have given, that you ever saw that
message, or any part of it ?
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Richardson, Did anyone at any time prior to your seeing that
message, tell you the nature of the intercept which constituted the
14-part message ?
General Marshall, Only to the extent that when I came in from
a ride on that Sunday morning of December 7, I was told, either
after I got in the shower, or as I went into it, that the officer in charge
of the "magic," Colonel Bratton, desired to come out right away to
show me an important message. But the contents were not mentioned.
The fact that it was important was mentioned. And my reply was
that I would reach the Department immediately, not to come out to
the house,
[137615] Mr. Richardson. Were you first contacted by your
aide?
General Marshall. I had no aide. My orderly gave me the message.
Mr. Richardson. He gave you the message that Colonel Bratton
General Marshall. Wanted to come out to the house.
1 Admiral Stark's testimony is resumed on p. 5202, infra.
* Hearings, Part 3, pp. 1110 and 1174, respectively.
5176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. KiciiAKDSox. Then your reply Avas, Colonel Bratton testified,
to take it to your office, and that you would come to your office.
General Marshall. Correct.
Mr. RiciiARDSox. The only description of what the message was, was
that it was an important message?
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.
JSIr, RicHARDSox. Was there any attempt, do you know of any
attempt prior to Colonel Bratton 's contact with your orderly, to engage
your attention in connection with slwj part of this 14-part message?
General Marshall. I know of no such attempt.
Mr. Kichardsox. Would there, in your opinion, have been any diffi-
culty in reaching you on Saturday night at your home ?
General Marshall. None whatever.
^Ir. RicHARDSox. Would you be able to testify definitely. General,
that no one did reach you with any message in refer- [13766]
ence to the 14-part message on the, night of December 6?
General Marshall. Xo one did reach me in regard to that message.
Mr. Richardsox. And when you rose in the morning, went for your
ride, you were entirely without any knowledge whatever that any such
message, any part of the message, had been received the night before,
or that tlie balance of it had alreadv been received on the morning of
the 7th >
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Richardsox. There was no comnuniication to you that the 13-
part message had been presented to the President?
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Richardsox. Or that the President had characterized its
nature ?
General JMarshall. That is correct, sir.
Mr. RicHARDSox^. And, so far as you know, no one made any at-
tempt whatever to get information to you until Colonel Bratton
attempted to on the morning of December 7 ?
General iSIarshall. That is correct.
Mv. Richardsox'. Xo furtlier questions.
The Chairman. No questions,
Mr. Cooper?
The Vice Chairmax\ Just one point, if ^ may, G?neral.
As I recall. Colonel Bratton test'fi?d that he called you home Sun-
day morning, and talked to your orderly there, and was told that you
had gone for your horseback ride and that he asked the orderly if
he knew how to get in touch v\-ith you and he stated that he did:
that Colonel Bratton thereupon requested the orderly to get in touch
with you and ask you to go to the nearest telephone and call him;
and, as I recall Colonel Bratton also stated that his recollection was
that you called him about 10 : 30 and that lie told yoi: that he had an
important message that he wanted to show vou and that you told him
you woi^ld be at the War Department in a short time.
Do you have any recollection of having called Colonel Bratton that
morning, and having such a conversation?
General Marshall. Xone whatever.
The Vice Chairmax. I thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Clark.
Mr. Clark. No questions.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5177
The Chairman. Mr. Murphy.
]Mr, Murphy. No questions.
The Chairman. Senator Brewster?
Senator Brewster. General, there is just one matter that I wanted
to have a little more formally established than was before in your
evidence.
It seems to have some sijjjnificance.
[13768] That is, your expression of opinion — I do not know how
casual it was, which appears on page 1149 of the printed proceedings
now, page 3,028 of the record, concerning the decision of the Japa-
nese, and this was the language which you used :
Had they —
meaning the Japanese —
not attacked on December Ttli, liad they waited, for example, until January 1st,
there is a possibility that they would not have launched the attack.
That, I assume, represents a rather considered judgment as to, at
least, what was a possibility ?
General Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. And that was based, as the context shows, on
the events around Moscow, Avhere the German attack was going for-
ward, but the turn came at just about that time.
General Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. In the early days.
General JNIarshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. The Japanese found themselves then committed.
General Marshaix. Yes. It also related to what we were going to
be able to do in the interim.
Senator Brewster. Yes.
General Marshall. Between, we will say, the 1st of [13769]
December, and the 1st of January.
Senator Brewster. Yes. You and Admiral Stark had both con-
curred in hoping that decision might be deferred for at least 2 or 3
months.
General Marshall. That was our great desire.
Senator Brewster. Yes. That was the occasion of the discussion
of the modus vivendi ?
General Marshall. That is correct.
Senator Brewster. And the documents in relation thereto?
General Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. To what extent was there knowledge in our
Department here, and yom- information, if you have any recollection
at this time, as to the imminence of any change in the situation around
Moscow at that time, do you recall ?
General Marshall, I don't recall what the status of that informa-
tion was on December 6 and December 7. I recall when the cumula-
tive information came in, we became aware that the change of
weather had ruined the Germany Army, in addition to the added
troop defense of Moscow. But whether that came to us on that date
or later, I couldn't say. The newspaper files could tell us a great deal
on that.
Senator Brewster. Did we have intelligence operating at that time
regarding those events ?
5178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
That is, what sources did we have?
[13770'] General Marshall. Our sources were largely those that
came from the Russian Government in its official communiques.
Senator Brewster. From what?
General Marshall. The Soviet Government, in its official communi-
ques.
Senator Brewster. Well, didn't the British have additional Intelli-
gence, as a result of their involvement ?
General Marshall. I don't recall whether tliey gave us anything at
that time.
Senator Brewster. But whether they would have had it?
General Marshall. They might have had.
Senator Brewster. My question was as to whether they would have
any more means, as they were actively involved.
General Marshall. Yes. I don't know how well their system was
built up at that time, but they might have had more.
Senator Brewster. Would there be records as to the interchange of
information between our Government and the British Government at
the military level regarding the developments prior to December 7 ?
General Marshall. There might be in the G-2 files.
Senator Brewster. Well, presumably there was a great change after
December 7.
General Marshall. Yes, sir.
[13771'] Senator Brewster. What I am concerned with is how
far you had gone in developing the interchange of the military infor-
mation regarding enemy movements.
General Marshall. At that time, I am quite certain that the facts of
the British source of information was not known to us — I am quite
certain of that, naturally, it was not known to us — but in addition they
were not giving us the facts. They were not jeopardizing the source.
Senator Brewster. Yes, and they would probably
General Marshall. It was quite some time after that, quite a long
time after that before they took the risk of telling us exactly what they
had. They gave us the sense of the reports, but the actual authoritative
statements of what it was, and who said it, we did not know.
Senator Brewster. Would it be a fair inference that prior to De-
cember 7, the British were in all probability far better informed re-
garding events around Moscow, in the month of November than was
our own Intelligence ?
General MLvrshall. I couldn't give an opinion on that. Senator
Brewster, for the reason that I don't know just when the British ac-
i^omplished the break-down of the German codes. It was not only a
question of breaking it down, but the rapidity with which you could
pick up the changes. All of which was a tremendous development. I
don't know what that was at [13772] that time. They may
have been 3 or 4 weeks behind the events.
Senator Brewster. Didn't the British necessarily have some form
of liaison with the Russians during that period?
General Marshall. I don't know that they had any better than
we had.
Senator Brewster. They were at war and we were not.
General Marshall. Yes; but after we were in the war we still de-
pended largely on the Soviet communiques for a long time. The
Soviet Government didn't trust our security.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5179
Senator Brewster. Yes.
General Marshall. And they were very reluctant to open that up
to us.
Senator Brewster. Do you think they may have been equally skep-
tical regarding the British ?
General Marshall. Well, the British have a pretty firm law on the
question, which we do not have.
Senator Brewster. That is right.
General Marshall. They have the means of maintaining security
which we lack.
Senator Brewster. There might be closer coordination between two
nations that were actually involved in war on the same side, and
another country which was not.
General Marshall. I was judging that through the back side
[13773] of my knowledge of our relationships with the Soviet
Government later on.
Senator Brewster. Yes. What interested me was the dropping of
the modus vivendi around November 26, concerning which Secretary
Welles testified, which apparently occasioned some surprise to Lord
Halifax, who, as he said, came down quite early the next morning,
and wanted to know what happened with the modus vivendi, and was
simply surprised that London had indicated the day before that they
thought it had better be dropped.
That may have been a very important turning point, if your opinion
is correct, if the modus vivendi which, apparently was being very
seriously considered, and had been approved by you and Admiral
Stark on November 25, I think it was, as adequate to protect our in-
terests, had gone into effect for 3 months, then we should have had
exactly the situation you envisaged in your opinion, the Japanese
having discovered meanwhile that the Moscow retreat was on, and
it might have reoriented their entire view. Would that be a fair
inference ?
General Marshall. That might be, but as I recall — I am trying
to think back to the terms of discussion of that day, and the docu-
ments— the Chinese reaction was quite pertinent to the occasion; as
I recall that was the most vigorous opposi- [13774] tion to the
affair, and that the real decision was largely based on that, where we
dropped the matter; that the Generalissimo was terribly upset over
the psychological reaction to China.
Senator Brewster. Do you recall discussion of the decision to drop
the modus vivendi around November 25, when that decision was
reached? Do you recall. Secretary Stimson's report to us showed,
and Colonel Knox's that some 2 days before they carefully considered
this modus vivendi, in conference with you and Admiral Stark, and
had decided that it would adequately protect us. Then, Secretary
Stimson showed, a day or two later, that that had been dropped. This
showed it was on November 25.
Mr. HxTLL. This was a very full day indeed. At 9 : 30, Knox and I met in
Hull's oflSce for our meeting of three. Hull showed us the proposal for 3 months
truce which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It
adequately safeguarded all of our interests, I thought, as we read it, but I don't
think there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it, because it was so drastic.
Mr. Murphy. I think you said Mr. Hull. Those are Mr. Stimson's
words, aren't they?
5180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Seiuitor Brfavstkr. If I said Mi\ Hull. I meant to say Mr. Stimson.
\i:^77o] Mr. Mi'HiMiY. I think you did.
Senator Bkkwstkr. Yes. This is Mr. Stimson's report of his con-
ference with Mr. Hull and with Colonel Knox.
Now, immediately following that, 2 days later, this was dropped and
Ml'. Hull re])orted that they decided to drop the modus vivendi, and
were going forward with the- document which has heen variously dis-
cussed as to whether it was an ultimatum or not. Do you recall any
conversations following the approval of the modus vivendi as ade-
quate, which, I assume. Secretary Stimson had arrived at after con-
sultation with you, do you recall any conversations following that
as to the dropping of the modus vivendi?
General Marshall. My recollection is. and I have a fairly clear
recollection of our disappointment, that from the military point of
view, meaning Army and Xavy, that we would not gain any more
time; our relationship to these discussions was on the one side the
desire to gain as much time as we possibly could and on the other
to see that commitments were not made that endangered us from
a military point of view.
Senator Brewster. Do you recall the day you went away?
General Marshall. I left, I think, the night of — I wasn't here
the 27th
[13776] Senator FERGtrsoN. The night of the 2C)th.
General Marshall. I left the night of the 26th.
Senator Brewster. On the 26th, Mr. Stimson records in his diary:
Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his
mind not to give (make) the proposition that Knox and I passed on the othei-
day to the .Japanese, but to kick the whole tiling over — to tell them that he
has no other proposition at all. The Chinese have objected to that proposi-
tion— when he showed it to them; that is, to the pntposltion which he showed
to Knox and me, because it involves giving to the .Japanese a small modicum
of oil for civilian use during the interval of the truce of the 'A months. Chiang
Kai-Shek had sent a special message to the effect that that would make a terrif-
ically bad impression in China ; that it would destroy all of their courage
and that they (it) w.ould play into the hands of his, Chiang's, enemies, and
that the Japanese would use it.
A few minutes later I talked to the President over the telephone and I asked
him whether he had received the paper which I had sent him over last night
about the .Japanese having started a new expeditnni from Shanghai down to-
wards Indo-China. He fairly blew up — jumped up Into the air, so to speak,
and said he hadn't seen it * * *.
[1S777] The decision by Hull was, a|)parently, arrived at in a
24-hour period there, but it is not clear as to the considerations other
than the objections of the Japanese
General Marshall. Chinese, you mean ?
Senator Brewster. Yes, the Chinese.
The British message, meanwhile, as I recall it, the only cable we
have regarding it, the morning of the 26th, to which Secretary
Welles referred, said, speaking of the Chinese opposition.
Isn't this a pretty thin diet?
That was the comment. Now, can you recall any conversations in
those 2-day periods, the 25th and the 26th, regarding the dropping of
the modus vivendi, which was of, certainly, gieat significance from
your viewpoint, because it, instead of giving you the 3 months that
you and Admiral Stark desired, it meant that you might have to
face the eventualities in the immediate future '(
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5181
General Marshall. I do not recall the specific conversations. I
do recall our disappointment tliat the objections made by the Chinese
Government had caused the matter to be dropped, as I recall, at the
time.
Senator Brewster. Counsel reminds me that there was a memo-
randum to the President from you and Admiral Stark regarding this
period. Do you recall that?
[1S778] Senator Ferguson. Dated the 27th of November.
Senator Brewster. What was the date of it?
Mr. Masten. The 27th of November.
Senator Breavster. Have you got it there ?
(Exhibit No. 17 was handed to Senator Brewster.)
Senator Brewster. Exhibit 17.
Senator Ferguson. There were two messages that were very similar,
one of November 5, which is Exhibit 16, and this, which is Exhibit 17.
Mr. Murphy. November 5 was the one at the time they were going
to go into Hunan Province ; the 27th was before you went south ?
General Marshall. Oh, yes.
Senator Brewster. That is a matter of record. Undoubtedly it
represents your views on the matter at that time. But you do not
recall whether you had any conversations regarding the matter with
Mr. Stimson or Admiral Stark on the 25th or 2(ith following your
approval of the modus vivendi ?
General Marshall. I would be pretty certain that I did discuss it
with Mr. Stimson because we were talking every day a number of times
a day, on what was going on.
Senator Brewster. My attention is called to this, I don't know
what significance it may or may not have, but on December 7, 1941,
in the Sunday Star, Washington, in a review [13779] of the
war, there appears this report, apparently summarizing the events of
the preceding week :
By Friday, Moscow claimed 4,000 square miles re-won. Berlin admitted re-
verses but minimized their extent and emphasized Russian losses. Although the
present phase of this Red counter-offensive Is an early one, the immediate effect
is to relieve for the present the threat to the Nazi entrance into the oil areas of
the Caucasus.
That, apparently, is the information which we had here. Now, to
what extent was consideration of the Russian situation entering into
your calculations in estimating probable Japanese actions at that time?
Did you at that time think of that as a factor?
General Marshall. I would have great difficulty in giving aai
accurate answer to that. It was quite evident to us, of course, when the
German Army was repulsed, and had to retreat, that there had been a
tremendous change in the European situation.
Senator Brew^ster. Yes.
General Marshall. But until we knew that, until that was conclu-
sively established, and not subject to the suspicion of over-propa-
gandized communiques, we were going along, you might say, from clay
to day in the general battle. The German advances had been con-
sistent throughout and here came [13780] a turning point.
Until we knew that, of course, I doubt if great emphasis was being
placed by us on the current situation in Russia, other than the fact
that so far as the Japanese would be concerned, the Russian Army
5182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
was imperiled, and, of course, their situation was vastly simplified
if the Kussian Army was out of the picture because of Manchuria.
Senator Brewster. Yes. Well, to what extent were you revising
your estimates of the Russian strength in the light of developments?
In the earlier case there had been a pretty general opinion that they
probably wouldn't be able to hold out. As the time went on, I assume
your respect for their military potential increased.
General Marshall. Respect for their endurance and their prodigi-
ous ability to take losses increased. Later on, beginning with the
Moscow incident, our respect for their technical, military capabilities
rapidly increased and came to a very decided point with the surrender
of the German Army before Stalingrad.
Senator Brewster. This is the memorandum which was referred to,
of November 27, when, as I understand it, you were out of town, (Re-
fers to Exhibit No. 17.)
General Marshall. Yes.
[13781'] Senator Brewster (reading) :
Memorandum for the President.
Subject : Far Eastern Situation.
It must have been prepared-
General Marshall. Prepared on the 26th, I think, after a Joint
Board meeting.
Senator Brewster. Yes. That would be coincident with Mr.
Hull's advice to Mr. Stimson that he thought he would drop the modus
Vivendi, that he would drop that arrangement which had been approved
by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy the day before,
the 25th, and now he thought he would drop it.
General Marshall. Whether or not that is coincident depends on
whether or not we knew the minute that thing was being drafted what
the Secretary said.
Senator Brewster. You said you thought it was probably prepared
the day before.
General Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. That happens to be the precise time, November
26, when Mr. Stimson records in the diary,
Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his
mind not to give (make) the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other
day, to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over * * *.
And so, on the 27th, this memorandum goes to the President
{13782'] signed by yourself and Admiral Stark which emphasizes,
apparently, the importance of delay. This is a portion of your
language :
The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to pain
time. Consequently Navy and Army reinforcements have been rushed to the
Philippines, but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. The process
of reinforcement is being continued. Of great and immediate concern is the
safety of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine Corps' convoy just
leaving Shanghai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000 are due to sail from the
United States by December 8, 1941, and it is important that this troop reinforce-
uient reach the Philippines before hostilities commence.
Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided so long ns
consistent with national policy. The longer the delay, the more positive becomes
the assurance of retention of these islands as a naval and air base. * * *
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5183
And then you conclude:
It is recommended that :
Prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military counter-action
be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens the United States,
British, or Dutch territory as above outlined ; * * *
This is where you used the latitude :
[13783] However, a Japanese advance to the west of 100 degrees East
or South of 10 degrees North, immediately becomes a threat to Burma and
Singapore. Until it is patent that Japan intends to advance beyond these lines,
no action which might lead to immediate hostilities should be taken.
That is your reference to the threat.
Continuing your recommendations :
In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United
States, the British, and the Dutch Governments that advance beyond the lines
indicated may lead to war ; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be
undertaken; * ♦ •
And, finally :
Steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch
for the issuance of such warning.
That, apparently, \Yas what may have been a factor in the Presi-
dent's decision regarding these warnings, but the thing which is of
significance, in the light of all that transpired, is the extent of the
British expression of viewpoint on that; that is the thing I think
becomes of possible significance in the light of Lord Halifax's apparent
surprise on the morning of November 27 that the modus vivendi had
been dropped. Apparently he was not informed of the communica-
tions. And Secretary Welles said, "Well, that is not the way London
[13784] sounded yesterday," I think, was his comment on it to
Lord Halifax.
Now, do you have any recollection as to any emphasis on the British
viewpoint in the situation at that time apart from the Chinese ?
General Marshall. I have no recollection.
Senator Brewster. Would that have been a matter that would have
come to your attention under any normal circumstances?
General Marshall. Normally, I think I would have heard it from
the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson.
Senator Brewster. Now, the report of Secretary Stimson to the
committee, which is now before the committee, on page 18, reads :
Later, Mr. Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and Gen-
eral Gerow. General Gerow was Chief of the War Planning Division. General
Marshall was absent, having left the Department to attend certain Army training
maneuvers which were going on that day. Both Admiral Stark and General
Gerow were urging that any crisis be postponed as long as possible, to enable
our preparations to proceed. A memorandum had been prepared by General Mar-
shall and Admiral Stark to the President on this subject. The opinion of our top
military and naval advisers was that delay was very desirable but [13785]
that nevertheless we must take military action if Japan attacked American or
British or Dutch territory or moved her forces in Indo-China west of 100 degrees
east or south of 10 degrees north. I told them, which was the fact, that I also
would be glad to have more time but I did not want it at the cost of humiliation
of the United States or of backing down on any of our principles which would
show a weakness on our part.
That represents, apparently, a summary of what went on as far as
the War Department and your advice was concerned.
5184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Now, to what extent, since you have ventured an opinion on Japa-
nese psycholo<>y and action, in connection with your suggestion that
if they had delayed until Januai-y they might not have attacked, to
what extent would Japanese opinion be atTected by knowledge of our
contemplated action?
General JNIarsiiall. What action are you referring to?
Senator Brewster. There are two hypotheses. One indicated by
the President's statement to Admiral Richardson that even if the
Japanese attacked the Philippines he wasn't certain that we would
go to war. The other, the discussions which indicated, apparently,
that this Government had reached the point where we had concluded
that if there was an attack on the Dutch or British in the Orient we
^^ould be obliged to participate. That was the expression of opinion
of the Cabinet, that it would be supjjorted by the people, and it was
your [J37S6] opinion you could not allow the Japanese to go
any further south or west without taking action. Now, to what ex-
tent would the Japanese decision be affected by knowledge as to our
contemplated action ?
Let us assume first that they knew tliat we were going to go to war
if they attacked Malaya or any portion of that land there. Let us
assume on the other hand that they knew we were not going to par-
ticipate unless we were directly attacked ourselves. To what extent
would their decisions as to action be affected by that knowledge?
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. You nuist also take into consideration our note of
August 17 to the Japanese. The note we gave to the Japanese on
August 17 stating what our position was.
General Marshall. Japanese psychology being what it is and the
Japanese Army domination being what it was, their general scheme
for the assumption of power throughout the Far East, particularly the
Southwest Pacific, being known now, I don't think that would have
had any particular effect one way or the other.
Their misjudging regarding us I think was more a question of our
willingness, our energy, our ability to fight effectively. [13787^
They had misjudged us on that. They thought we would be ineffective
after we started to fight, that we could not organize sufficiently to fight
effectively.
They felt that we were highly dangerous with our fleet, when it
was actually in being, but it requires support, it requires defense of its
bases at distant points, which means land troops and means sufficient
air forces for a real protection. Beyond that I don't think that they
would be deterred from their purpose.
To that extent they would have felt that it was vital that we be
isolated out of the wai" in order that they might go ahead with the
obstruction of British power and, of course, the British Empire, and
the Dutch, in the Southwest Pacific. That is a rather involved state-
ment.
Senator Brewster. I think it is clear. General. That is, you feel
that their estimate of our potential military striking force was so low
that they didn't care particularly whether we were in the war or out?
General Marshall. Except as to the fleet.
Senator Brewster. Except as to the fleet.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5185
General Marshall. And they recognized with the fleet that we were
incapable at that time, apparently, of furnishing the fleet with a base
in the Far East, unless we took Singapore, because, as you recall, and
I think the testimony showed, that [1S788] with, I think it was
26 ocean-going submarines sent to the Philippines, we couldn't even
give them 1 antiaircraft gun for coverage.
The matter of Russia would have had dominant importance in their
minds because that affected the picture.
Senator Brewster. Because of the Manchurian picture ?
General Marshall. Because of Manchuria, and because of the effect
that would have on the conduct of the war in Europe, which up to that
time had been assumed as a certain eventual German triumph.
Senator Brewster. In other words, you think that the elimination
of Russia from the war was something of far more significance to
them than the possible participation of the United States in the war?
General Marshall. Very much so.
Senator Brewster. That is, of course, interesting, and in a way
complimentary to our Russian friends.
General Marshall. It is a humiliating admission but that was the
judgment of the Japanese I think. One of their greatest errors was
their misjudgment of our fighting capacity.
Senator Brewster. Yet you would agree that, simply from the im-
mediate military situation, that if they had felt at all sure that they
would have had 6 months or a year to carry on their conquests in th«
Orient without intervention by the [13789] United States, they
would have felt that was a considerable advantage ?
General Marshall. Well, I think they would have felt it was an
advantage to conduct that campaign without the intervention of the
United States because our naval force that remained after Pearl Har-
bor was sufficient to enable us to establish bases in Australia.
Senator Brewster. Yes.
General Marshall. Now, the Japanese had appeared with their
heavy war vessels in the Indian Ocean, which meant that the line
to Australia was very definitely threatened from that side. If the line
to Australia was also impossible to establish in the Pacific then the
problem of the Japanese in the long run was infinitely simpler.
Senator Brew^ster. Has there ever been any indication that the
Japanese did anything in breaking our codes?
General Marshall. We have had no indication of that.
Senator Brewster. That has been explored ?
General Marshall. I think conclusively.
Senator Breavster. Of course, this is all hypothetical and has no
particular relation to the primary purpose here except as the object
of this inquiry is to keep us out of another difficulty of this kind, but
would this be a fair inference that if the Japanese knew that we were
going to [13790] intervene in the event of attack on Malaya,
they would then recognize that they must, if possible, eliminate our
fleet on their flank, and, therefore, strike at the onlv real potential we
then had, which was our fleet?
General Marshall. That is a possible assumption.
Senator Brewster. Well, wouldn't that be, from a military stand-
point, almost inevitable, that the Japanese would never dare move out
of Malaya if they knew it was going to mean our participation in the
war, without undertaking to eliminate the fleet on their flank?
79716— 46— pt. 11 1
5186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Marshall. It depends on wliat you mean by the word
"eliminate." They had ah^eady estabhshed themselves in Indochina.
They were stretched, we thought, even then, into Siam. The question
was whether they would boldly go with their shipping into the Gulf
of Siam. They "could have dominated the China Sea in any event.
They had Koreu to the north of the Philippines. They had the whole
China coast and the bulge of Indochina all under their control at
that time. We had no bases. If we had tried, at least in limited
numbers, to take Singapore, which was the only form of base in the
Far East, we would have come under the Japanese air out of Indochina
and out of Siam.
So there was a very restricted use for our fleet. We had no base in
Guam. Manila was hopeless. It would have been [13791^ sui-
cide to put the base in Manila. So that whatever operation we did
would have to be based back on Hawaii, and the fleet would be out,
we might say, most of the time, on the end of a plank, as it were, in
its operations.
Under those conditions, the Japanese could have gone ahead. Not
as freely as they could if we were severely damaged, possibly not
spread out so much as they did if we were not severely damaged, but
that might have been to their advantage also, because they got too
large an extension of perimeter; but they still could have gone ahead
with their affairs with the limitations I have just stated.
But it would be a very difficult thing for the fleet to operate in the
Western Pacific without any base of any kind unless it was Singapore.
That lacked all the essentials necessary to maintain large ships of the
character which we had. And also that would have been under air
attack from the Japanese air establishments that already were in Indo-
china and were, apparently, creeping into Siam.
Senator Brewster. You would emphasize then that the only thing
for which the Japanese had much respect, as far as we were concerned,
was our fleet?
General Marshall. That is correct.
Senator Brewster. That was at least potential. But all of these
considerations and factors entered into your estinuite [J3792]
of why you did not expect an attack on Pearl Harbor?
General Marshall. I will say as to the attack on Pearl Harbor, we
felt that was a vital installation, but we also felt that that was the
only installation we had anywhere that was reasonably well equipped.
Therefore, we were not worried about it. In our opinion, the com-
manders had been alerted. In our opinion, there was nothing more
we could give them at the time for the purpose of defense. In our
opinion, that was one place that had enough within itself to put up a
reasonable defense.
MacArthur, in the Philippines, was just beginning to get something.
His position was pitiable, and it was still in a state of complete flux,
with the ships on the ocean en route out there and the planes half de-
livered and half still to go.
[13793] The Panama Canal was quite inadequate at that period,
seriously inadequate in planes, and, of course, of vast importance to
anything in the Pacific.
The only place we had any assurance about was Hawaii, and for
that reason we had less concern ab(Hit Hawaii because we had worked
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5187
on it very industriously, we had a tremendous amount of correspond-
ence about it, and we felt reasonably secure at that one point.
Therefore we felt that it would be a great hazard for the Japanese
to attack it.
Senator Brewster. I hadn't intended to reopen those questions but
only to go into the broader question of your estimate of whether the
Japanese attack might be logically expected.
General Marshall. Yes, sir. I read Mr. Stimson's report this
morning, and his summary of the conditions, and that expresses my
opinion A^ery well. We had these positive conditions, a little by magic
and mainl}^ by reconnaissance of the various movements being carried
on in the Far East, so it was quite evident that the most serious inten-
tions were there, which was the case in the general campaign.
Senator Brewster. Hindsight is, of course, easier than foresight,
General Marshall. Much more convenient.
[1S794] Senator Brewster. In the light of your review now, it
would appear that if the advice which you and Admiral Stark had
given had been accepted, on November 25, 26, and 27, to enter into
the modus vivendi which, it Avas the considered conclusion of the Army
and Navy, including the Secretaries of War and Navy, was adequate
to protect our interests, we do not know what the course of history
might have been.
General Marshall. No, we do not know what would have hap-
pened. You might have had a complete collapse in China which
might have had a tremendous effect on the balance of the war.
Senator Brewster. It would be interesting when you have con-
cluded your labors, to know. I address myself to this only for pos-
terity. They have got to gather as much wisdom as they can from
our conduct.
General Marshall. I might add there, that is what I am engaged
in in China now. This war started out there, and now the desire is
to try in some way to arrange it so there will not be a recurrence.
Senator Brewster. That is all.
The Vice Chahjman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. General Marshall, you have read Secretary Stim-
son's memorandum. I want to go to page 12 and ask you if you were
notified of this — quoting the Secretary of [187951 War :
The President at the meeting undertook to take an informal vote of the Cabinet
as to whether it was thought the American people would back us up if it became
necessary to strike at .lapan, in case she should attack England in Malaya, or the
Dutch in the East Indies. The Cabinet was unanimous in the feeling that the
country would support such a move.
That comes from the diary as of November 7.
Were you advised as to that vote?
General Marshall. I have no recollection of it, but I am pretty
certain he must have told me, because he was telling me the results of
those meetings.
Senator Ferguson. Tlien I go to page 27 (page 46) of his memoran-
dum. This is on November 25. This is the day before the Secretary
of State sent his message to the Japanese. He is quoting the Presidient :
Then, at 12 o'clock, General Marshall and I went to the White House where
we were until nearly half-past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall,
Stark, and myself. There the President, instead of bringing up the Victory
Parade * * ♦
5188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
He says of the Victory Parade :
This was an office nickname for the General Staff strategic plan of national
action in case of war in Europe.
[13796] Going on :
* * * brought up entirely the relations with the Japanese. He brought
up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next
Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning,
and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should
maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too
much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition.
Do you recall that discussion with the President ?
General Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. How was it thought that we could maneuver
them into firing the first shot ? Was that discussed ?
General Marshall. I don't recall the details of that particular
phase of the matter.
Senator Ferguson. This takes place before we sent the message of
the 26th.
General Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Or before you had sent your message to General
Short on the 27th.
General Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. "Wliat were we going to do to maneuver them
into firing the first shot? Wliat was the plan of operation?
General Marshall. You are talking. I take it, about [13797]
diplomatic procedure?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
General Marshall. I am assuming that it is the diplomatic pro-
cedure that is being discussed at the present time. We knew our
resources. We knew our deployment. It was impossible to change
that on any brief notice. We were committed to deployment thou-
sands of miles away from the United States.
So far as the war plan goes, the concern was whether or not the
final alert should be given.
I took a discussion of this kind — at least I take it now — was a dis-
cussion of the diplomatic procedure involved, having in mind that
it was the accepted thought in all of our minds at that time, that
if we were forced to take offensive action, immediate ojffensive action,
that it would be a most serious matter as to its interpretation by the
American people, whether we would have a united nation, or whether
we would have a divided nation in getting into a world conflict.
Senator Ferguson. But this
General Marshall. The planning they are talking about is the
discussion that came later, as I understood.
Senator Ferguson. You would take it that Mr. Stimson has in
mind that we were going to maneuver diplomatically into a position
where they would be compelled to fire the first shot?
[13798] General Marshall. No, I don't mean to imply that. I
mean the expression he is using relates to what would be the diplo-
matic procedure we would follow, so we would not find ourselves in
a dangerous position where we had to do something initiating a fight.
He was not trying to provoke the Japanese to fight.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5189
Senator Ferguson. Let's take his language :
The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the
first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.
General Marshall. That is exactly what I said, sir. When you are
sitting back and the other man is doing all of the maneuvering, you
are in a very dangerous position. The question and the desire at that
time was to delay in every way possible a rupture in the Pacific.
Now, if they were going to attack, it was very important
Senator Ferguson. Right there, General, may I interrupt to ask,
were we of the opinion at that time that they were going to attack?
General Marshall. That was the general opinion, that they were
going to attack, definitely, in the Southwest Pacific.
Senator Ferguson. And we wanted to lay our course diplomatically
so that we would make sure that thej^ would fire the^ [13799]
first shot ?
General Marshall. So that we would make sure that we would
not be in such a dangerous position that we would be forced to fire the
first shot ourselves. That is another way of putting it, but that is
what he is talking about.
Senator Ferguson. That is one of the things that led to this re-
stricted language in the message of the 27th.
General Marshall. So far as the first shot is concerned ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And also as to — well, the first overt act is the
same thing as the first shot.
General Marshall. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. And that was leading up to that message; is
that correct ?
General Maeshall. No, this was leading up, as I understood it,
and as I recall it, to what the diplomatic procedure was to be. The
alert, to a certain extent, you might say, is a routine. Not in one sense
that alert for war is ever routine, but the arranging, the phrasing of
that alert to fight. What the diplomatic and political situation was,
was another matter.
Senator Ferguson. Now, was this discussed at the same meeting?
Mr. Stimson said, at the bottom of page 47 :
I pointed out to the President that he had already taken [13S00] the
first steps toward an ultimatum in notifying ,7apan way 'back last summer that
if she crossed the border into Thailand, she was violating our safety, and that
therefore he had only to point out (to Japan) that to follow any such expedition
was a violation of a warning we had already given. So Hull is to go to work on
preparing that.
Now, I take it he was talking about the memorandum and the con-
versation he had on the 27th of August. That is when the President
returned from the Atlantic Conference.
We had taken, as Mr. Stimson defines it, the first step in an ulti-
matum, and that if America wanted to, we could rely upon that
particular message as saying —
We have warned you. Therefore if you do anything you take the first step
and fire the first shot.
Is that correct ? Is that a fair analysis ?
General Marshall. I think that is the rough idea of the thing ; yes.
5190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. And it says then :
So Hull is to go to work on preparing that.
What did he mean by "preparing that"? Have you any idea?
General Marshall. You are having me act as both Mr. Stimson
and Mr. Hull.
Senator Ferguson. Well, the reason I am asking you, General, is
that you were supposed to be at this meeting.
[13801] General Marshall. Yes. As I said, they were trying
to arrange a diplomatic procedure, rather than firing off a gun, that
would not only protect our interests, by arranging mutters so that
the Japanese couldn't intrude any further in a dangerous way, but
also that anything they did do, they would be forced to take the offen-
sive action, and what we were to do had to be prepared for the
President by Mr. Hull. It was not a military order. It was not a
military arrangement.
Senator Fergt^son. Do I understand it correctly then that it was
agreed that day among you and Admiral Stark, the two Secretaries,
and the President, that this message of the 17th of August was, in
effect, a first ultimatum ?
General Marshall. I don't recall that that specific thing was dis-
cussed other than the statement Mr. Stimson makes here. I am not
the judge of that.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. General, did you have one of these messages in
the Army that if the winds code came in that you could receive a
telephone call — ^"east wind," and so forth ?
General Marshall. I had no such arrangement, that I would re-
ceive a telephone call. I knew that they were monitoring to receive
this message, to pick up this message if it came, and that would be in
the general arrangement whereby anything [13802] of impor-
tance was conveyed to me as quickly as possible.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did you have a plan or a policy as to what
steps you would take if such a message had been received?
General Marshall. Once the alert had been given, of course, the
commanders were supposed to be in a state of readiness. If such a
message as that had come in, showing conclusively its relation to
previous magic, that they were going to attack, it is probable that
we would have acted toward that in some way as we endeavored to act
toward the 1 o'clock Sunday message.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, another alert?
General Marshall. No, sir. Not another alert. An item of in-
formation.
Senator Ferguson. An item of information. Now, the language of
the President, as given here by Commander Schulz is:
When the President saw or read the first 13 parts of the message, he said,
"This means war."
That would be equally as definite as the winds message, would it
not — "This means war"?
General Marshall. You mean the President's statement?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Now, if you had had the President's statement Saturday [13803]
evening, "This means war," in relation to the 13-part message, would
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5191
you have acted on that the same as you did at 11 : 35, or whatever the
time was, on Sunday, the 7th of December?
General Marshall. I don't think I could give you an accurate back-
sight on that, Senator, There was some discussion over the 1 o'^^lock
message. I thought the 1 o'clock should go in, because that was a new
item of information of a very peculiar character.
Now, wdiether the President, making that statement would have
inspired me, as Chief of Staif in the War Department to start off an-
other message, I couldn't tell jou now, as a backsight.
We had given certain definite instructions, which we assumed were
being carried out, and which were being carried out, in most places.
Senator Ferguson. General, it is a very significant fact that the
President stated: "This means war"; and if that message had been
conveyed to you, that language, the President saying, "This means
war,"
General Marshall. Does the record show that the President told
the Secretary of War, "This means war"?
Senator Ferquson. Not the Secretary of War.
General Marshall. He didn't tell me, and he didn't tell the Sec-
retary of War. So he made a statement offhand on reading the thing.
[13804^] Senator Ferguson. But I am trying to get what your
action would have been.
General Marshall. I can't say. I doubt if I would have sent any-
thing on that statement of the President at that time.
Senator Ferguson. Now. this is not clear in the record, General.
I don't know as you can help clear it up, but I would like to ask it.
Do you know how the 13 and the 14 part message, the whole of the
14-part message, got on your desk on Sunday morning? We haven't
any evidence to show how it got there. Do you know? Have you
been told ?
General Marshall. Well, I know that when I came to the office, it
was there. Colonel Bratton was on the heels of it waiting to see me.
General Miles came in. I had General Gerow come in. While I was
reading the message — I have stated previously, in answering Senator
Brew^ster, how word came to me that they had important information
for me. and I went down to the War Department to receive that im-
portant information.
I was going anyway, because that was my regular Sunday morning
routine, in contrast to Monday or Saturday, when I got down at 7 : 30.
The procedure that they had gone through I don't know. I think my
testimony Avill show whether it was here or before the Board, that
my reaction at the moment was [1380-5] that they told me that
half of the message had come in the evening before, and during the
night that the other half had come, sometime in the middle of the
night, and had been parcelled out, tlie War Department, as I recall,
to do the translating from Japanese into English having been sent over
from the Navy — they having actually deciphered the Japanese
message.
Now, that is my recollection of the affair at the time. The other
item was that the particular part which affected me and caused me to
act was not the 14 parts, it was the one o'clock, which, unfortunately,
they put on the bottom f)f the pile and I read through everything
before I came to that.
5192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. General, on pao;e 7984 of our typewritten record,
under General Short's testimony, we find this language :
* * * Japan had been semiofficially told tliat :
"If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan."
And the American Government had, and believed, reports that :
"* * * Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does
not believe that your visit on Monday to the President, or the coming of Mr.
Kurusu will have any effect on the general situation."
Now, my question is, Did you know that the Japanese knew
[13806] semiofficially — and, as I understand this testimony, it
would appear that Postmaster General Walker, or someone operating
between the State Department and the Japanese, was conveying cer-
tain messages, and that this was one of the messages that was delivered,
that if Japan invades again the United States
General M.\rsitall. If Japan invades again?
Senator Ferguson. Again, the United States will fight with Japan.
Did you know that they were semiofficially notified to that effect, that
if she moved south we would fight?
General Marshall. I don't recall.
Mr. Murphy. She had official notice in the note of August 17.
Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that.
Mr. Murphy. That was official.
Senator Ferguson. But at this late date that he was telling us —
this was in November, that she had the notice.
Have you any knowledge as to who wrote Exhibit 17, being the 27th
of November ?
General Marshall. I have no accurate knowledge. I assume that
it was drafted in the War Plans Division under General Gerow's
direction. It may be that it was drafted initially in the Navy Depart-
ment, but my assumption was that it was drafted in War Plans Divi-
sion, and I assume that because my [13807] signature being on
the document and its date of November 27, meaning that I possibly
signed it on the night of the 26th, but they didn't get Admiral Stark's
signature, naturally, until the 27th, and they dated it accordingly.
Senator Ferguson. I think the facts show it was on Navy stationery,
but there isn't any doubt that it represents your idea at that time?
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, General, you were sittin^^ here this morn-
ing while we were discussing this memorandum from the British
Government and the one from the Australian Government?
General Marshall. Yes, sir; I heard the discussion.
Senator Ferguson. I now ask you, did the President of the United
States or anyone else ever take up with you any of the things men-
tioned in those memorandums that we discussed here this morning ?
General Marshall. Well, I have to answer that this way. Senator.
I never heard of those memorandums until this morning, and as to
did he ever discuss any of these things, of course, they were related to
a good many things, including this document here [indicating].
Senator Ferguson. The reason I put an all-inclusive question was
that I wanted to finish as soon as I could.
[13808] When did you first learn that the President had decided
to send a message to the Emperor?
General Marshall. I don't recall that, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5193
Senator Ferguson. Was it before-
General Marshall. Mr. Stimson would have told me, I would have
learned it that way, I think.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether you knew it before the
7th?
General Marshall. No, sir. I don't.
Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn :
President's subsequent procedure —
That is after he sent the message to the Emperor.
is that if no answer is received by him from the Emperdf by Monday evening,
(a) he will issue his warning on Tuesday afternoon or evening
(b) warning or equivalent by British or others will not follow until Wednesday
morning, i. e., after his own warning has been delivered repeatedly to Tokyo and
Washington.
General Marshall. I have no knowledge of that whatsoever. 1
imagine that was washed out by the actual attack on Pearl Harbor
and I was interested in other matters.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, you were not consulted
[13809] prior to the time of this memorandum ?
General Marshall. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You were not consulted?
General Marshall. To the best of my recollection I was not con-
sulted.
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will inquire, General.
Mr. Keefe. General, tlie testimony of Commander Schulz indicates
that after the President on the evening of December 6th, read the
13-part message, in effect, turned to Mr. Hopkins, and said "This
means war," and indicated that he would have to get in touch with
Betty, meaning Admiral Stark, immediately.
Now, as one member of the committee, and I speak only for myself,
that impressed me, that the President did, or had in his mind, as a
result of the conclusion after reading that message, "This means war,"
did the thing which we would expect the Commander in Chief to do.
namely, to immediately contact his Chief of Naval Operations.
The evidence further indicates that he took the phone, called the
Navy Department, and was advised that Admiral Stark was attending
the National Theater ; he hung up the phone and indicated, according
to Commander Schulz's testimony that he [13810] wouldn't
call Admiral Stark out of the theater because it might cause some
public comment, but that he would get him later.
Now, in view of that testimony, which I have sketched without any
attempt to state the testimony exactly, we are left in the dark as to
whether or not the Commander in Chief contacted you as Chief of
Staff that evening of December 6.
Can you state definitely whether or not you have a present recol-
lection as to whether the President did in fact contact you?
General Marshall. I am quite certain that he did not.
Mr. Keefe. Well, could there be any question about it?
General Marshall. There is no question in my mind ; no. That is
a positive answer.
Mr. Keefe. And you are certain that you did not attend any meet-
ing then, at the Wliite House that night ?
5194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
General Marshall. I am absolutely certain of that.
Mr. Keefe. I see.
General Marshall. I might say that since I appeared before the
committee I learned one little item that I had forgotten at the time,
and that is not only had I no dinner engagements of any kind be-
tween the 1st of November and the 7th of December, except one family
dinner, as a matter of fact with Mrs. Nicholas Longworth, whom I
see sitting here, [1-3811] but that Mrs. Marshall was con-
valescing from having broken three or four ribs and we didn't go out
anywhere; we certainly were not going out under those conditions;
and I found out afterwards that that morning, Sunday morning, that
I had breakfast with her in her bedroom, by her bed.
So, all the evidence, in my own mind, short of my absolute knowl-
edge of the matter, is that I was home, as was customary.
Mr. Keefe. That is your present recollection, that on the evening
of the 6th of December you were at home ?
General Marshall. I can't say that is my recollection. I am cer-
tain I was at home, but I don't recall anything about it.
Mr. Keefe. But you are certain of one thing and that is that you
received no communication from the President on the evening of the
6th of Decemeber and that you didn't attend any meeting at the White
House that night ?
General Marshall, That is correct. I will add that the first infor-
mation I had of anything unusual was, as I have testified, after I got
into my shower, or was going into my shower when this message was
relayed to me from Colonel Bratton that he wanted to come out to
the house with an important matter.
Mr, Keefe. Now, General Marshall, do you have a clear present
recollection as to the meeting at the White House on [13812]
Tuesday, November 25?
General Marshall. I have gotten most of my recollection out of
reading Mr. Stimson's report, he having the only diary.
Mr. Keefe. In other words, in answer to the questions that have
been asked you with respect to that meeting of the 25th, am I to
infer that your memory has been refreshed by reason of your having
read the memorandum submitted to the committee by former Secre-
tary Stimson?
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe, Do you have any independent present recollection of
the events that took place or the conversations that took place at this
meeting of November 25 ?
General Marshall. No, sir; I do not. What he is talking about
here, had been talked about back and forth through so many com-
binations that I cannot recollect the events of a particular meeting at
this moment.
Mr. Keefe. Do you have any independent recollection of having
been told by Secretary Stimson of the Cabinet meeting of Friday,
November 7, when a poll was taken of the Cabinet on the question as
to "whether the people would back" the Cabinet and the President
"in case we struck at Japan down there, and what the tactics should
be?"
I am quoting from Secretary Stimson's language.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5195
[138 IS] General Marshall. I testified a little bit ago, I think,
in regard to that, that I had no recollection of it, but I am quite cer-
tain Mr. Stimson must have told me that.
Mr. Keefe. Of course, in connection with what took place on the
25th, when you were present with the President, and the Secretaries
and Admiral Stark, it would be quite important to have known of
the previous action of the Cabinet, when that question was presented,
and the unanimous vote was recorded, as recorded in Secretary Stim-
son's diary, so I ask you now, at the time you met with these people
on the 25th, do you have any present recollection now of having
known of this meeting on the 7tli, and its possible influence on the
conversation which took place on the 25th ?
General Marshall. I can only say what I said a few moments ago :
I have no recollection of being told about the vote, and I assume that
I was told.
Mr. Keefe. Do you agree with Secretary Stimson when he sets forth
in his diary as follows :
I pointed out to the President that he had already taken the first steps towards
an ultimatum in notifying Japan way back last summer that if she crossed the
border into Thailand, she was violating our safety and that therefore he had only
to point out (to Japan) that to follow any such expedition was a violation of a
warning we had already given.
[13814] General Marshall. Yes, sir; I am in agreement with
what he is saying. The actual terminology he uses in regard to an
ultimatum — it certainly was a very definite notification..
[13815] Mr, Keefe. Now, do I understand you to say, General
Marshall — this will shorten the thing up, because I am as anxious to
conclude this examination as you are — that you have read the state-
ment of Secretary Stimson and that Secretary Stimson's statement,
so far as you are concerned, conforms to your own knowledge and
recollection of the events set forth, and you agree with that statement?
General Marshall. I will put it this way, that there is nothing he
says in here that I take exception to in my recollection, and his state-
ment has reminded me of a great deal that I had entirely forgotten,
and I am in general agreement with all that he states.
Mr. Keefe. Well, to narrow it down one step further, is there any-
thing in this statement that you do take exception to ?
General Marshall. I can think of nothing now, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And is there anything in his record, as set forth in his
diary, which is appended to his general statement, that you consider
not to be in accordance with the facts, in accordance with your present
recollection ?
General Marshall, There is nothing t hat I know of, of that
character.
Mr. Keefe. So that as a member of the committee I am safe in ac-
cepting the statement of Secretary Stimson, together with the memo-
randa contained in his diary, as being in full [13816] accord
with your own attitude toward the things and events which he
described ?
General Marshall. Yes, sir, including that about the War Depart-
ment General Staff.
Senator Ferguson. You mean by that, the criticism, if it is criticism ?
General Marshall. Yes, sir.
5196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Keefe. I didn't have particular reference
Senator Ferguson. That is what you meant by that ?
General Marshall. I didn't understand.
Senator Ferguson. That there was some criticism.
General Marshall. Yes, sir ; I accepted that.
Senator Ferguson. You accepted that.
General Marshall. I don't take exception to it.
Mr. Keefe. I want to say, General Marshall, that so fai as my ques-
tion was concerned, I was not specifically referring to the (umclusions
as to responsibility which Secretary Stimson setb forth in his
statement.
General Marshall. I was trying to make perfectly cleai my agree-
ment with what he says.
Mr. Keefe. I am trying to limit my question to the facti..il informa-
tion which is contained in his statement and the matter of conclusions,
I assume, will be the prerogative of this committee.
[13,817'\ But on the factual information set foith ir liis state-
ment and in the diary, you are in accord ?
General Marshall. I noted nothing that I would take exception
to.
Mr. Keefe. Do you think of anything that you would add to that
statement that Secretary Stimson has excluded?
General Marshall. I suppose if I took a few hours off I might
bring up a great many things, but I think he covers the general ques-
tion of the whole affair very well.
Mr. Keefe. That is all.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Clark.
Mr. Clark. General Marshall, I should like to ask you, as a mili-
tary man, as one who has had at least some contacts with diplomatic
activities, as to whether there was, in your opinion, anything in the
13-part message any more indicative of war than what had been
received up to that time?
General Marshall. I am sorry, I can't give 3^ou a categorical
answer to that, for the reason that I read it that morning very hur-
riedly, and then I never read it again until just before I came up
here, and I tried to time myself in reading it that time, and I was
interrupted before I finished, and I never read it since; so there we
stand. I have been busy and I just haven't read it all.
[13818] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murph3^
Mr. Murphy. For the record there has been question after ques-
tion about Commander Schulz saying the President said "This means
war", and I would like to read Commander Schulz's exact words,
page 12441 of the transcript.
Commander Schulz. Mr. Hopkins then read the papers and handed them
back to the President. The President then turned toward Air. Hopkins and
said in substance — I am not sure of the exact words, but in substance — "This
means war." Mr. Hopkins agreed, and they discussed then, for perhaps five
minutes, the situation of the Japanes forces, that is, their deployment and
Again on page 12443.^
There has been a statement made that the President called the Navy
Department.
» Hearings, Part 10, p. 4663.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5197
Page 12443 :
Commander Schtjlz. There was no mention made of sending any further
warning or alert. However, having concluded this discussion about the war go-
ing to begin at the Japanese convenience, then the President said that he believed
he would talk to Admiral Stark. He started to get Admiral Stark on the tele-
phone. It was determined — I do not recall exactly, but I believe the [13S19]
White House operator told the President that Admiral Stark could be reached
at the National Theater.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. General, to carry Mr. Keefe's question further,
about whether the President had seen the 13-part message, I want to
ask you whether or not you had any information that the President
had seen this message and made any remarks about it prior to the time
of the attack?
General Marshall. I had no such information.
Senator Ferguson. One more question.
On page 53 of the Secretaary of War's statement, he has this lan-
guage— talking with the President :
I told him I could see two. His alternatives were — first, to do nothing ; second,
to make something in the nature of an ultimatum again —
Notice he says "ultimatum again".
stating a point beyond which we would fight ; third, to fight at once. I told him
my only two were the last two, because I did not think anyone would do nothing
in this situation, and he agreed with me. I said of the other two, my choice was
the latter one.
That was to fight at once.
JNow, did Secretary Stimson ever discuss with you that language or
that idea?
[13820] It doesn't purport to have you in the conversation.
General Marshall. I wasn't in the conversation. I was just trying
to think of his conversations with me.
He was very much afraid — he feared that we would find ourselves
involved in the developing situation where our disadvantages would
be so great that it would be quite fatal to us when the Japanese
actually broke peace.
He also felt very keenly that, and thought about this part a great
deal more than I did, because it was his particular phase of the matter,
that we must not go so far in delaying actions of a diplomatic nature
as to sacrifice the honor of the country. He was deeply concerned
about that.
My approach to the matter, of course, was much more materialistc.
I was hunting for time. Hunting for time, so that whatever did
happen we would be better prepared than we were at that time, that
particular time.
So it was a question of resolving his views as to the honor, we will
say, of the United States, and his views of a diplomatic procedure
which allowed the Japanese to continue movements until we would
be in a hopeless situation before the peace was broken, and mine, which
as I say, were much more materialistic, as I think they should have
been, that we should get as much time as we could in order to make
good the terrible deficiencies in our defensive arrange- [13821]
ments.
5198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
This particular statement that he makes here, that he made to the
President, I don't recall of his ever making it quite so flat-footedly to
me. that we would strike first.
Senator Ferguson. At least the substance of this was discussed with
you ?
General Marshall. Oh, yes; we talked many times about it.
Senator Ferguson. Was it generally agreed between the War Cab-
inet, as it has been described, that we would not strike first ?
That was generally agreed on, was it not ?
General Marshall. I don't recall exactly the time the President
enunicated the directive that we must not make the overt act.
Senator Ferguson. That is right. So it was finally agreed. Secre-
tary Stimson's idea to fight at once was overruled, and we took another
course ?
General Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Which was carried out.
General Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Your idea was, as you say you were more
realistic
General Marshall. I said "materialistic."
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Materialistic. You realized what
[1S822] we had to fight with, did you not, and that is what caused
you to hesitate?
General Marshall, Mine was, in a sense, a technical job. I was
struggling with the means to fight.
Senator Ferguson. Yes; and you wanted time.
General Marshall. I wanted time, and the question was how much
time could be given to us and still maintain the honor of the United
States and not get ourselves in a hopeless position.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever get to the point of discussing the
point where you would attack if you did attack first, or was that ruled
out because the President made a policy?
General Marshall. We went back, of course, to youf arrangement
with the British, as to the prospective deployment of the fleets, who
w^ould assume the burden of responsibility here and who would receive
the burden of responsibility there.
As a matter of fact our first issue, undoubtedly, would have been
to protect our convoys, and to have continued the reinforcement of
the Philippines.
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe.
Mr. Keefe. As I recall the testimony. General Marshall,
[13823] with respect to the sending of this message of the 26th,
there was some question in your mind, and in the record it was not clear,
just what the events and circumstances were with respect to the
preparation of that warning message that was sent to General Short.
Now, if Mr. Stimson's report is correct, and I assume that it is, that
question seems to be lesolved, because he states that on the 27th, on
page 19 of his report :
We then discussed the message that might be sent to the commanding officers
of the various theaters, including in particular General MacArthur, who was in
the Philippines and in the forefront of the threatened area. We had already
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5199
sent MacArthur a warning but I felt that the time had now come for a more
definite warning. In talliing with the President on the telephone that morning,
I had suggested, and he had approved the idea, that we should send out a final
alert, namely that they should be on the qui vive for any attack, and explaining
the exact situation. Ordinarily, of course, there would be no reason for me to
participate in the sending of any such message which was the normal function
of the military staff. As the President himself, however, had now actually di-
rected the sending of the message, and as I wanted the message clearly to apprise
the commanding [13824] officers in the various areas as to exactly what
the diplomatic situation was, I undertook to participate in the framing of this
message myself.
So it now appears from his statement that that message was actually
framed on the 27th while you were attending maneuvers. Do you so
understand it now, General Marshall?
General Marshall. My confusion was with relation to the previous
evening. My recollection was that before I left for North Carolina
I had discussed with General Gerow the general terms of such a
message.
Mr. Keefe. But it was not prepared ?
General Marshall. He was in the business of preparing it and 1
tliink he brought in to Mr. Stimson the draft. That is my recollection
of the procedure. What INIr. S'imson says is accurate. My trouble
was trying to orient what I had said before the message was prepared
and what my reaction was after they showed me the message on my
return.
Mr. Keefe. So you did have a discussion with General Gerow the
night before ?
General Marshall. I say that was my recollection, that before I left,
the afternoon before, I had a discussion with him. I don't know what
General Gerow testified. I was in a confused state of mind as to
whether that was correct or whether it was my reaction when I saw
tlie message that had [13825] already been sent, and I couldn't
remember which was which.
Mr. Keefe. You are in agreement with the thesis that so far as the
actual message was concerned it was prepared on the 27th and that
Secretary Stimson himself participated in the preparation of that
message ?
General Marshall. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. And did the unusual, as he says, in that matter, because
it was on what he conceived to be direct orders of the President that
such a message be sent ?
General Marshall. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. And he wanted to be sure that it accurately conveyed
the necessary information to the commanders in the fields
General Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. That clears up that little bit of discrepancy that existed
in the other hearings, and I am glad that it has been cleared up in
accordance with Secretary Stimson's statement.
That is all.
The Vice Chairman. Does counsel have anything further?
Mr. Richardson. No.
The Vice Chairman. Any further questions ?
(No response.)
The Vice Chairman. Is there any reason why General Marshall
5200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[138^6] cannot now be excused ?
(No response.)
The Vice Chairman. General, we thank you for your appearance
and the additional information you have given the committee and
you are excused.
General Marshall. Thank you very much.
The Vice Chairman. The Chair is advised that Chairman Barkley
and Senator Ferguson have agreed that we will ad j urn at this point
until 11 o'clock Thursday morning.
We will ask Admiral Stark to be back at 11 o'clock Thursday
morning.
(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., an adjournment was taken until 11 a. m.,
Thursday, April 11, 1946.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5201
[1382^-] PEAEL HARBOR ATTACK
THURSDAY, APRIL 11, 1946
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.
The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 11 a. m., in
room 312 Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chair-
man) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman) and Ferguson; and Kepre-
sentatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and
Keefe.
Also present : Seth W. Kichardson, general counsel ; Samuel H.
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Mor-
gan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, and Mrs. Flo E. Bratten, executive
secretary, to the joint committee.
[13S29] The Chairman. The committee will please come to
order.
Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, we have three exhibit numbers that
we would like to assign just before the examination proceeds.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Masten. At page 13G30 of the record the committee decided that
the reports, findings, and conclusions of the various prior proceedings
should be made an exhibit separate from the transcripts of testimony
in those proceedings. We would like to assign Exhibit No. 157 to a
compilation of those reports and findings.
The Chairman. Without objection, that will be done.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 157.")
Mr. Masten. As Exhibit No. 158, we would like to offer the addi-
tional documents released by the British Government, which have been
previously distributed to the committee and which were released for
publication yesterday. This exhibit will consist of 14 documents and
attachments.
I would like to point out that document No. 9 in this exhibit relates
primarily to Exhibits Nos. 16 and 47 but has been included in Exhibit
No. 158 due to the fact that the printing of the prior exhibits has
proceed past Exhibits Nos. 16 and 47.
The Chairman. Without objection, that will be done.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 158.")
[13830] Mr. Masten. As Exhibit No. 159, we would like to offer
the additional documents released by the Chinese Government, which
also have been distributed to the committee previously. This exhibit
will consist of five documents and enclosures.
The Chairman. Those will be filed as exhibits, accordingly.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 159.")
The Chairman. Admiral Stark, will you come around ?
79716 — 46— pt. 11 6
5202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIOATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK, UNITED STATES
NAVY (RETIRED)— Resumed
The Chairman. Senator Ferguson, I think you vere examinmg
Admiral Stark.
Senator Ferguson. I wish you would read that into the record,
and then I want to ask you some questions about it. It is a message
from OPNAV to CINCAF, is it not?
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Before the attack, from OPNzVV to CINCAF,
on Sunday, December 7; is not that correct?
Admiral Stark. Yes, 7 December, 71722, which is 5 : 22. That is
Greenwich time, however.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark (reading) :
The State Department is informing the Japanese Government the SS Madison
is eni'oute to Chingwangtao to arrive about December 10 and depart for Manila
3 days later and requesting that in view of arrangements made for Tatuta Maru
now enroute Los Angeles to evacuate [13831] Japanese citizens that
Japan direct her sea and land forces to allow Madison to proceed freely and
without hindrance and provide her necessary facilities at Chingwangtao. Ad-
vise this office of any change in the Madison's schedule.
Senator Ferguson. Now, had you known about that message before
it was sent ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall knowing about it before it was
sent. I remember the picture very conclusively on the sending of
that ship up there, so distinctly that I wanted to verify my memory
and I thought it would be well to get the record on it, so I asked
the Department to have copies of dispatches in relation thereto, and
they are now available to the committee if they want them.
I think, before giving you my answer, which would be based on
those, I might read them, because the dispatches in question, from the
record, give a very good picture of this whole affair.
Senator Ferguson. I would be glad to have you give any informa-
tion you have on that. My inquiry was going to be as to why that
was sent. You knew that war was coming and you wanted to try
to get an agreement on the safe passage of two ships, one of ours and
one of theirs.
Admiral Stark. It was sent for the reason that we were [ISSS^]
worried about that ship. We took a deliberate chance when we told
Admiral Hart, in response to a dispatch from him on 1 December,
to send her up there. We had left in North China approximately
200 Marines. We had received a dispatch from the Embassy, or
rather Admiral Hart sent us word that there were about 6 000 Ameri-
cans up there and he noted that a ship could be made available to go
up there. He recognized the risk and put it up to the Department
for decision.
Senator Ferguson. Now, when you say "the risk," you mean that
war would break out while it was enroute ?
Admiral Stark. I mean that war might break out.
SenatorFERGusoN, Well, were you just considering it a "might"
then ?
Admiral Stark. At that time; yes, sir. We felt reasonably certain
that war was coming but we could not tell when. It was a matter of
timing.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5203
Senator Ferguson. But you were concerned with it and it was a
grave question, so grave that you were working on it on Sunday?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. We had guaranteed the safety of the
Japanese ship which was then enroute to San Francisco, and as I recall,
it was to go from there down to the Canal Zone picking up Japanese
nationals and taking them back.
Senator Ferquson. All right. Had the Japanese asked for
[1S83S] a guarantee of a safe passage of their ship?
Admiral Stark. As I recall, they had asked that she be given free
passage, and we had granted it, and we were asking for a similar
treatment for the American ship.
Senator Ferguson. That would indicate that both countries, at the
time this request was made, were anticipating a war, and that if war
broke out in the meantime these two ships were to have safe passage?
Is not that a correct view?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And that is what you arranged for here [indi-
cating dispatch] ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. And then
Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. I do not want to cut off any
testimony you may have or any instruments that you may want to
refer to that can aid us along this line.
Admiral Stark. They are short, and I think the record should be
complete on this, and it would be well to put them in here.
Senator Ferguson. Will you put them in?
Admiral Stark. I will read them if you would like to have them.
The Chairman. Yes.
Admiral Stark. The first is a message from the Commander in
Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, our forces in the Pacific, which was
[13834] sent by him on 1 December, and which reads as follows —
Before I read it, it was to OPNAV anci it was for information to the
Commanding Officer, U. S. Marine Forces in North China.
Embassy advises six one one five American nationals in Peiping Tientsin area.
Estimate civilian requirements uncertain. President Madison uove available for
withdrawal Marines from North China. Ship can arrive Chingwangtao about
December 10th and depart about three days later. If Department thinks advis-
able accept attendant risks and attempt this withdrawal request authority to
use this vessel. Advise.
Mr. Keete. The date of that is December 1?
Admiral Stark. December 1, yes, sir.
Now, on the same day we have a dispatch from the Department.
We answered it immediately, and the message is from the Secretary
of the Navy, released by me. I remember the incident, because we
recognized the situation as grave at that time and were taking it up
with the Secretary for decision, and the reply is to the Commander
in Chief of the Asiatic, and information of the U. S. Marine Forces
in North China :
Your 010300 approved.
That message is the message that I just previously read from
Admiral Hart.
Authority granted charter President Madison [13835] at tariff rate for
one trip Chingwangtao to Manila. Inform State Department officials North
China of prospective schedule.
5204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The next message is from Admiral Hart, dated 2 December, to the
Commanding General of the Marine Forces in North China, and
information of the Marine Corps and OPNAV in Washington.
This was on the second, and priority :
Withdraw North China Marines via President Harrison due arrive Chinwang-
tao December tenth expected turn around. Nonmilitary property that cannot
be exacuated to be sold or left Peiping. Notify consul Tietsin and Embassy.
APL authorized to book civilian passengers in normal manner. Advise exact
time of sailing when determined.
Then, there is another dispatch from the Commander in Chief
Asiatic to OPNAV on 3 December.
Mr. Richardson. Just a minute, Admiral Stark. Is the reference
in the dispatch you just read to the President Harrison an intentional
change from Madison'i
Admiral Stark. That is what got me looking up this dispatch.
The dispatch that Senator Ferguson gave me to read said the Madi-
son, and my remembrance is that it was the Harrison. I rlarted
to check up on the Harrison and ran into the rest of the dis};atches.
They used actually the Harrison [138S6] and not the Madison.
Fourth Marines 796 officers and men arrived Olongapo 1 QM oleik 3 enlisted
remain Shanghai temporarily. President Harrison vice Madison departing Ma-
nila 4 December for Chinwangtao evacuate personnel and rucD equipment as
reaches there by arrival date. Luzon and Oahu well on way Manila successful
completion voyage expected.
I might add those were two gunboats which we had left in China.
We wanted to leave them until the last minute, and they had arrived.
Senator Ferguson. You mean the last minute before the war
started ?
Admiral Stark. I mean we had debated a good deal when to bring
them out. We were debating for some time on this. We finally
decided at this time it was time to get them out.
Senator Ferguson. That you were at about the last minute ?
Admiral Stark. Well, it was getting close to it.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. When I say the last minute, I have forgotten
just when
Senator Ferguson. T^at is near the deadline ?
Admiral Stark. I have forgotten just when the dispatch directing
Hart to bring those gunboats out was made, but we [13837]
thought it was time to get our nationals and our marines out of China.
Senator Ferguson. Do you remember — if I may interrupt — that
we had a memorandum here from the British to our State Department
and on the end of it Mr. Hamilton said — it was about the 3d or 4th of
December — they wanted us to act on a parallel course witli them, as I
remember the exhibit, if we could get it. It would speak for itself.
On the bottom of that it said that that was a matter that would have
to be taken up with the President, that it would indicate we were going
to war and thereafter they could not pass on it. Do you remember
that document'^
Admiral Stark. No, sir; I do not particularly at this moment re-
member that particular document, but I do recall that in evacuating
our nationals and in evacuating our marines it was taken up with the
White House. Of course, the State Department was as much inter-
ested as anybody else in that picture, and more so as regards nationals.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5205
Senator Ferguson. Did you personally have any conversation with
the President or with the State Department — I am talking about prior
to the 7th of December — about the removal of our nationals?
Admiral Stark. Oh, yes. Not only our nationals, but we had talked
about our marines, and so forth, for some months. We [13838]
had evacuated, for example, all naval families out of Manila a con-
siderable period before this.
Senator Ferguson. What was the policy adopted by the President
or the State Department, as far as you knew, about the nationals ?
Admiral Stark. We were endeavoring to get them out.
Senator Ferguson. And that was because you anticipated war ?
Admiral Stark. That was certainly because of the possibility, and
in the interest of safety to them. We gave them the opportunity to get
out, and the State Department, I believe, chartered the ships which we
sent over there.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know of anything that was done between
the 27th of November and the 7th of December about getting our
nationals out?
Admiral Stark. This matter in hand is between that time.
Senator Ferguson. I mean outside of these, that were taken up
directly with the President.
Admiral Stark. At the moment I do not recall anything else. We
had been getting them out for some time.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. There is considerable information on the Japanese
and what they did for some months before they started to get their
ships home, and their nationals, too.
[13839'] Senator Ferguson. Yes ; I appreciate that.
Admiral, you may proceed, if you do not recall any of the others
now.
Admiral Stark. I recall the earlier incidents.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. As to this ship, we took what we call a calculated
risk, in the interest of getting our people out, balanced against the
possibility of losing the ship.
Senator Ferguson. That is right.
[13840] Admiral Stark. If we got them out, fine ; if we did not
get them out, we might lose the ship and would not be any better off.
Senator Ferguson. And you were working for a safe voyage, if
possible, even though war had broken out ; is not that true?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. We were asking for transit.
Senator Ferguson. For a safe voyage?
Admiral Stark. For a safe voyage. Whether that would cover the
contingency if war actually broke or not, I do not know, because we
canceled the massed after the war broke out.
Senator Ferguson. You were endeavoring to do it?
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. And did we grant safe voyage to their ship so
it would apply after war started ?
Admiral Stark. I don't remember any application after war. They
had asked us to facilitate this voyage, and we had agreed to it. The
details of that would probably better come from the State Department.
Senator Ferguson. You are not familiar with it then ?
520(5 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. Not on that point, not enough to make a positive
statement.
Senator Ferguson. Whether or not it applied in case of war, the
instruments will probably speak for themselves, [1S84^ when
you get them all in.
Admiral Stark. I started reading that dispatch and I guess I
finished reading it.
The next dispatch is the one which you gave me yesterday.
The State Department is informing the Japanese Government the SS Madison is
enroute Chingwangtao due to arrive about December 10 and depart for Manila
3 days later and requesting that in view of arrangements made for Tatuta Maru
now enroute Los Angeles to evacuate Japanese citizens that Japan direct her sea
and land forces to allow Madison to proceed freely and without hindrance and
provide her necessary facilities at Chingwangtao. Advise this office of any change
in the Madison schedule.
Then, there was one to Admiral Hart, the text of which was :
Give appropriate instructions to Madison. Cancel my 071722.
Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, this message sent on the morning
of the 7th about the safe voyage, the safe course, was sent after we had
canceled our codes, or destroyed our machines in Tokyo, and we knew
of their messages in relation to their codes, and you had in your depart-
ment the full 3 parts, and the 14th part, and 1 o'clock message, and all
of these otlier messages ; isn't that true ?
[13842'] Admiral Stark. It was after the codes' destruction.
The time group on this is
Senator Ferguson. Twelve-something, isn't it? Can you figure it
out from the Greenwich time ?
Admiral Stark. Yes ; it is 1722'.
Senator Ferguson. Which would have been 5 hours and a half?
Admiral Stark. Which would have been about 12 o'clock.
Senator Ferguson. About 12 o'clock noon on Sunday ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. W^ill the Senator yield ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. It is my impression that the codes were not destroyed
by 12 noon in Tokyo. Ambassador Grew said they were not, did
he not ?
Senator Ferguson. I am speaking more about ordering them de-
stroyed. The record will speak for itself.
Admiral Stark. We had sent the message regarding the destroying
of their codes.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. And we had authorized our people in the outlying
islands, and Guam and authorized Kimmel to direct them to destroy
what he considered necessary.
Senator Ferguson. That all being true, the language [ISSJtS]
used in this message that I had you read the other day, and question
about this morning, would indicate, would it not, that we knew war
was coming, and this was to take place after the war came.
Admiral Stark. We felt war was coming; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. The language indicates that the armies and
navies of Japan were to allow this ship to have a free couse, a safe
passage.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5207
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. At the time when this was initiated, it
was the first of December, and that was the first correspondence with
reference to it, and it was, of course a matter of timing.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Are there any other messages you have
there now ?
Admiral Stark. That is all I have on it, sir.
Senator Ferguson. May I inquire from counsel, if you have a memo-
randum to Mr, Hull from Admiral Schuirmann on December 4, 1941
in relation to the Dutch?
Mr. Masten. We do not have it here, Senator. Do you want it ? It
is down in room 201.
Senator Ferguson. I would like to have it. I did not like to use a
copy of it, I wanted to be exact on its language.
Mr. Murphy. As long as you are sending down there, will you be
sure to have the notes of the President on the 7th here [13844^
too?
Mr. Masten. They will be here this noon. They are being mimeo-
graphed.
Senator Ferguson. Until we get that, I will pass this for the mo-
ment.
Admiral, since you were on the stand, we have received a memoran-
dum that was sent from the military observer, Captain Creighton,
from Singapore to Admiral Hart. Are you familiar with that message
about von Papen ?
Admiral Stark. I do not know just to what you refer without look-
ing at it.
Senator Ferguson. It is the message from the military observer in
Singapore to Admiral Hart. You remember the original memoran-
dum in relation to Admiral Hart, that he sent to your department, that
we had agreed to give the British support in three or four eventuali-
ties?
Admiral Stark. That he had heard that we had ?
Senator Ferguson. That is right.
Admiral Stark. And he asked us about it ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. Yes, I remember that message ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, you are not familiar with the other mes-
sage that was sent from Captain Creighton, are you ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall it at the moment.
[i,?<9^5] Senator Ferguson. Would you locate that?
Mr. EiCHARDsoN. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, were you familiar with the fact that
the Navy Department had a special file that they kept the communica-
tions between Britain and the President, that were sent through the
Communications of the Navy, and that the file was kept in the Navy ?
Admiral Stark. No.
Senator Ferguson. When the British, Mr. Churchill, and others in
the British Government would cable or communicate with the Presi-
dent at times they used your facilities; that is, the Navy facilities, and
that there was a S])9cial file kept in the Navy Department with those
papers, or those coded messages, or decoded messages, but they re-
tained them in the Navy Department.
Were you familiar with that fact?
5208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. I was not familiar with it, but I would say if that
occurred, it would be a very normal procedure to keep the President's
messages separate on a thino; of that sort. We did in London.
Senator Fekguson. Did you know that the President had used your
communications to communicate with the British? In relation to the
Far East I am only talking- about now.
Admiral Stark. Well, I know he used our communications.
[13846] Senator Ferguson. That being true, would you not keep
copies, or at least the papers in your files in relation to those commu-
nications?
Admiral Stark. It would be a very natural thing to keep one copy
in a very secret status.
Senator Ferguson. Isn't it true that there was a very secret file,
which you now describe, kept under secret orders, so that when Cap-
tain Lavender, who is one of the counsel here, made an inquiry he^
could not even see it, and he has not seen it ? Did you know that ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Would it be such that no one could see, that it
would be super-secret?
Admiral Stark. I do not know.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Stark. That is a detail of filing which could be obtained
from the Department. So far as my knowledge goes, I thought we
could get anything we asked for. I did not know until this minute
that anything had been refused at this time.
The Chairman. You do not know it now ?
Admiral Stark. I do not know it now ; no, sir.
Mr. Richardson. There has nothing been refused. It is all in the
record.
[1S847] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, in view of the Senator's
statement about Captain Lavender
Senator Ferguson. I am asking questions now.
Mr. Murphy. I want to object to the Senator testifying until such
time as we know who Captain Lavender is. The Senator stated some-
thing that is not in evidence. I think in fairness to the record, and the
other members of the committee, if that is true, we ought to find out
who this Captain Lavender is, and his connection with the case.
Senator Ferguson. I will find out now.
Do you know Captain Lavender?
Admiral Stark. I do, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Has he been acting as counsel for anyone in
this case ?
Admiral Stark. He has been associated with Admiral Kiinmel.
Mr. Murphy. Is he in the room ? ]May we have a look at him ?
Senator F'erguson. Is Captain Lavender in the room?
(iSo response.)
Admiral Stark. I might state that he was up here yesterday, and
I think he can be made available if you would like to get him.
Senator Ferguson. Does not counsel have a letter in relation to this
file?
Mr. Richardson. All of it is in the Navy. It has been [ISS^S]
furnished us by the Navy and it has been in evidence here.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5209
Mr. Masten. We have a memorandum from, I think, Commander
•Baecher, I think the memorandum was dated sometime in November
or December of hxst year. It states that all of the messages from
the President, which were found in that file, are now in the record.
My recollection is, Senator, that the only two messages in it were
the two messages to the Philippines.
Senator Ferguson. I just want to find out now about the file. Your
statement now is — and I do not think this was put in the record
before — that the only two messages in that file are in the record. Are
they in the record itself ?
INIr. Masten". I think so, Senator. There is a memorandum from
Commander Baecher which I think is in the record. If it is not, we
will check this noon.
The CriAiRMAisr. It is my recollection that memorandum was put
in the record at the time it was received.
Mr. Masten. At the time the messages were put in, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. There isn't a question but that Congress ought
to know about this thing, because a letter was written, and the request
was refused.
Mr, MuRPiiT. My only reason for interposing is if there is some
Captain Lavender, this is the first time that his [138/f9^ name
appears in this hearing, after 13,000 pages, and the statement has
been made that he has been refused something.
I do not think the record should go on without knowing who he is.
Senator Ferguson. I think this requires putting the President's
letter in the record.
Would you, Mr. Masten, get a copy of the President's letter in
relation to this file ?
Mr. Masten. There was no letter of the President, Senator, that I
recall.
Senator Ferguson. Did not the President write a letter to someone,
either Rugg, or Kimmel, or Lavender?
Mr. Masten. I have no recollection of that. You mean President
Roosevelt ?
Senator Ferguson. No, no. President Truman.
Mr. Masten. I have no recollection of that. I will have to look
through the file. All the letters that President Truman wrote, or
the memoranda, are in the record, that I recall.
Senator Ferguson. The Congressman has made it appear that the
Senator from Michigan wanted the record to show that there was a
denial, I am trying to ask questions. I am certain there was a letter
written by the President of the United States, but I cannot tell you
to whom it was addressed.
[JS8S0] The Chairman. There were letters written by the Presi-
dent to the heads of all of the departments.
Senator Ferguson. This is a special letter in relation to this par-
ticular file that I was making inquiry about. I will try to ascertain it.
Is there anyone in the room who represents Admiral Kimmel ?
Ensign Phelan. Yes; I am.
Senator Ferguson, Ensign Phelan, do you know of any letter
The CiiAiiiMAN. If he is going to testify, we had better swear him.
(Ensign Phelan was duly sworn by the chairman.)
Senator Ferguson. Better give your first name, now.
Ensign Phelan. John Phelan.
5210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TESTIMONY OP ENSIGN JOHN PHELAN, UNITED STATES NAVY
Senator Ferguson. Ensign, will you tell us as to whether or not
you had any knowledge in relation to a special file of communications
between the President of the United States and the British Govern-
ment, or any member of the British Government, that was kept in
the Navy Department ?
Ensign Phelan. I have no personal knowledge of that. Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not any letter was
written in relation to it, as far as Admiral Kimmel was concerned?
[ISSSl] Ensign Phelan. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you have a copy of that letter, or do you
know where we can get a copy of it ?
Ensign Phelan. No, sir; I haven't a copy of it here. I believe
Admiral Kimmel has a copy of it.
Senator Ferguson. But you do know a letter was written by the
President ?
Ensign Phelan. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. To whom was it written ?
Ensign Phelan. To Admiral Kimmel.
The Chairman. Which President?
Senator Ferguson. President Truman.
Ensign Phelan. President Truman.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. About when was that letter written?
Ensign Phelan. Since these hearings have been in progress.
Senator Ferguson. Captain Lavender was one of the counsel, was
he not ?
Ensign Phelan. That is right, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not this file was denied
to him, and it had to be taken up directly with the President, and a
letter was written on it ?
Ensign Phelan. I so understand, Senator.
[J'SSS^I Commander Baecher.^ 1 can explain it.
Senator Ferguson. All I want is an explanation.
Commander Baecher. I know all about it ; yes, sir.
The Chairman. Let us get it all, so there will be no mystery about
it.
Commander Baecher. I hesitate to inject myself, but as I under-
stand it, Admiral Kimmel desired to get into this file, which is the
White House file of the Navy Department.
Under the direction of the President, as we interpreted the direct-
ives, the committee alone had the right to go into the departmental
files, so Admiral Kimmel was not permitted to do it, so he wrote a
letter to the President as a naval officer, which went through naval
channels, and asked for that permission, and the President answered
and said under his directives only this committee could have access
to these departmental files, and this committee could have anything
it wished, and this committee has.
That is the entire story.
1 Navy Department liaison officer to the committee.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5211
Senator Ferguson. Was the request made by Captain Lavender
instead of Admiral Kimmel personally? I want to get the record
straight.
Commander Baecher. I do not know who acted physically, but it
was done in Admiral Kimmel's name.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
[1S8SS] Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Why cannot we get the letters here?
Senator Ferguson. If we can get them, and make them a part of
the record, that is all right with me.
Mr. Murphy. Put them in. I would like to see what date they
were written, and when they started inquiring about this file, in view
of it being several months ago, in December, and it just coming out
now.
Mr. Richardson. Was there anything done with the file?
Commander Baecher. It was submitted to this committee.
Mr. Richardson. All of it?
Commander Baecher. There were two dispatches in it, and copies
of it have been submitted to this committee along with the letter
saying they are all there is.
Senator Ferguson. Could we get now from you. Commander, what
dispatches were in this supersecret file?
Commander Baecher, As I recall it — and it is a hazy recollection —
they were to the High Commissioner of the Philippines,
Mr, Richardson, We can get them.
Senator Ferguson, They were to the High Commissioner of the
Philippines?
Commander Baecher, Yes,
Senator Ferguson, That would not be a message between
[13So4] the British Government and the United States Govern-
ment ?
Commander Baecher, I understand there were none. The record
will speak better than I can now. It has been several months. We
submitted a box full of dispatches between the Navy and the British
Admiralty, which would be intergovernmental, you might say.
Senator Ferguson. I wanted what the Admiral was talking about.
When the communications were made from the President, the Navy's
comnmnications were used, and the copies ordinarily would be kept
in the file and that would be a super-secret file.
Commander Baecher, We wrote a letter in answer to a direct
request on that, Senator, and it is here. That letter states that we
have submitted all of these dispatches that were in the so-called White
House file, and we submitted them along with the letter.
There were no others.
Senator Ferguson. Do I understand there were only two papers in
this White House file, and they related to the High Commissioner of
the Philippines?
Commander Baecher. I think that is the purport of the certification
we made, although I prefer you see that certification before you con-
clude that issue.
Senator Ferguson. Do you have personal knowledge of this,
[138o5] Commander, that when the file was obtained, there were
only two papers in it ? Are you speaking from personal knowledge ?
5212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Commander Baectier. No; I am not. I did not go into the raw
material.
Senator Ferguson. It is what someone has told you ?
Commander Baeciier. Yes. Someone who is very responsible.
Senator Ferguson. Will you state who is very responsible? Who
told you?
Commxinfler Baeciier. The Director of Naval Communications.
The officer in charge has changed in the last several months. Admiral
Stone is in charge now, and before Admiral Stone, it was some other
admiral.
Admiral Stark. Eedman?
Commander Baeciier. Redman, yes. It was either Stone or
Redman.
Mr. Richardson. When a request is made of you, you send that on
to the officer that has charge of the papers that you are asked to
produce ?
Commander Baecher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Who produces that information and you convey
that information to us here? You do not yourself go into the file
and handle the papers physically yourself?
Commander Baeciier. Very seldom ; if I am not satisfied with what
I get on it.
[J38S6] Senator Ferguson. Were you satisfied in this case?
Commander Baeciier. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I would like to, if possible, o;et the letter now of
President Truman. I think it ought to go into this record, to make it
clear.
The Chairman. I think Mr. Masten has gone down to get that.
Mr. Richardson. I do not think we have the letter from President
Truman. I have not seen it.
Senator Ferguson. May I reserve the right to obtain from Ensign
Phelan a copy of that letter, or the original, so it will be inserted in the
record ?
Mr. Murphy. Together with tlie letter from Admiral Kimmel.
Senator Ferguson. That is right.
[13SS7] Commander Baeciier. I can furnish a copy of that
letter.
I would not be surprised but that I may have the original in my
files.
Senator Ferguson. You will be able to get us copies?
Commander Baecher. Yes.
Mr. Richardson. We will get it for you, Senator.^
Let us see w^hat we have right here now.
(The documents were handed to Senator Ferguson.)
Mr. Masten. Senator, I think all of those should be read into the
record, if they are not in.
Senator Ferguson. These are not the letters we are talking about.
Mr. Masten. They are the memorandum from Admiral Colclough,
rather than Commander Baecher, with the two messages from
the President. Those are the only things we have had. The two mes-
sages are the two messages that are already in the record.
Senator Ferguson. The messages are already in the record?
Mr. Masten. That is my recollection. I am not sure whether the
memorandum is.
1 See p. 5493. infra.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5213
The Chairman. Do you want these read into the record or filed and
printed in the record ?
Senator Ferguson. They ought to be printed.
The Chairman. It seems to me they might as well be printed at
this point instead of read. They are photo- [13S58] static
copies.
Mr. Richardson. Are they at all significant? It seems to us they
were entirely irrelevant.
Senator Ferguson. I do not claim they are, but I certainly do not
want to keep them out.
Mr. Richardson. The first one, Mr. Chairman, is with reference to
the Philippine matter and the second is also with reference to the
Philippine matter. I have examined them and thought they were
entirely irrelevant as to our examination here. Unless somebody says
they are, why should the record be further encumbered ?
Senator Ferguson. But the record still stands, I think I am not
commenting on the evidence, except insofar as it relates to what we
may inquire about here.
The Chairman. The letters would at least show that it is not claimed
the President wrote to Churchill, and for that purpose probably they
might as well go in.
Mr. Richardson. All right.
(The documents referred to follow :)
\ 13859] Decembek 1, 1945.
Memoranduvi to Admiral Colclough:
It is our understanding that there is in the office of the Director of Naval Comi-
munuications a file designated "White Hous.e File", containing communications
sent by President Roosevent to England and other points through Navy com-
munication channels. This is to request that we be furnished, as promptly
as possible, copies of all messages contained in this file sent to or received by the
President or other White House aides during the period October 1, 1941, to
December 7, 1941, inclusive, with reference to Japan or matters pertaining to
political or military developm-ents in the Far East. It is probable that the
request submitted by us under date of November 28th, emanating from Congress-
man Keefe, will include some of this material, and in this event it will be suffi-
cient In response to that request.
William D. Mitchell.
Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secketaky,
Washington, 10 December 1945.
Memorandum to: Mr. William D. Mitchell.
1. There are forwai'ded to you herewith copies of two dispatches as follows:
(1) #261854 of 26 November 1941 from the President to the High Commissiioner
of the Philippine Islands.
(2) #280228 of 28 November 1941 from Cincaf to the President.
2. These dispatches are delivered in response to your request of 1 December
1945 for copies of dispatches in the Navy Department's "White House file" during
the period October 1, 1941 to December 7, 1941, inclusive, "with reference to Japan
or matters pertaining to political or military development in the Far East."
8. No other dispatches responsive to your request have been discovered.
4. It is requested that you receipt for the above two copies of dispatches on a
copy of this memorandum.
/S/ O. S. Colclough,
O. S. Colclough,
Rear Admiral, USN.
5214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[J3S61] Naval Message Navy Department
From OPNAV To: CINCAF
Released by : H. R. Stark Priority PP
Date : 26 Nov. 1941
261854
From the President. For the High Commissioner Philippines.
ADMIRAL HART WILL DELIVER TO YOU A COPY OF A DESPATCH
WHICH WITH MY APPROVAL THE CNO AND THE COS ADDRESSED TO
THE SENIOR ARMY AND NAVY COMMANDERS IN THE PHILIPPINES IN
ADDITION YOU ARE ADVISED THAT THE JAPANESE ARE STRONGLY
REENFORCING THEIR GARRISONS AND NAVAL FORCES IN THE MAN-
DATES IN A MANNER WHICH INDICTES THEY ARE PREPARING THIS
REGION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AGAINST A POSSIBLE ATTACK ON
THEM BY US FORCES. HOWEVER I AM MORE PARTICULARLY CON-
CERNED OVER INCREASING OPPOSITION OF JAPANESE LEADERS AND
BY CURRENT SOUTHWARD TROOP MOVEMENTS FROM SHANGHAI AND
JAPAN TO THE FORMOSA AREA. PREPARATIONS ARE BECOMING AP-
PARENT IN CHINA FORMOSA AND INDO CHINA FOR AN EARLY AGGRES-
SIVE MOVEMENT OF SOME CHARACTER ALTHOUGH AS YET THERE
ARE NO CLEAR INDICATIONS AS TO ITS STRENGTH OR WHETHER IT
WILL BE DIRECTED AGAINST THE BURMA ROAD THAILAND MALAY
PENINSULA NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES OR THE PHILIPPINES.
ADVANCE AGAINST THAILAND SEEMS THE MOST PROBABLE. I CON-
SIDER IT POSSIBLE [13S62] THAT THIS NEXT JAPANESE AG-
GRESSION MIGHT CAUSE AN OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN
THE US AND JAPAN. I DESIRE THAT AFTER FURTHER INFORMING
YOURSELF AS TO THE SITUATION AND THE GENERAL OUTLINES OF
NAVAL AND MILITARY PLANS THROUGH CONSULTATION WITH AD-
MIRAL HART AND GENERAL MacARTHUR YOU SHALL IN GREAT CON-
FIDENCE PRESENT MY VIEWS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHIL-
IPPINE COMMONWEALTH AND INFORM HIM THAT AS ALWAYS I AM
RELYING UPON THE FULL COOPERATION OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND
HIS PEOPLE PLEASE IMPRESS UPON HIM THE DESIRABILITY OF
AVOIDING PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENT OR ACTION SINCE THAT MIGHT
MAKE THE SITUATION MORE DIFFICULT. ROOSEVELT XX.
Copy to Op-12 War Plans Div. U. S. Army
No other persons to receive copies
[seceet]
[13863] Naval Message Navy Department
From: CINCAF _ ^. _,„_
To : OPNAV Routine RRR
Date : NOVEMBER 28, 1&41
280228
From High Commissioner Sayre Personal for President Roosevelt
YOUR MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 26TH IS GREATLY APPRECIATED.
I HAVE BEEN ASKED BY PRESIDENT QUEZON TO INFORM YOU THAI
YOU MAY BE ABSOLUTELY ASSURED THAT TO THE LAST MAN THE GOV-
ERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH, AND THE FILIPINO
PEOPLE, WILL STAND BEHIND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
ACTION: WHITE HOUSE.
SS FILE.
[13864] Senator Ferguson. It still remains, Admiral, that there
were communications, using the Navy facilities between the President
and the British Government in relation to the Far East ; is not that a
correct statement?
Admiral Stark. I think so ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And the copies would be kept m a supersecret
file in the Navy Department?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5215
Admiral Stark. I have no personal knowledge of that, but that
would be a perfectly plausible thing to assume.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, did you find the message or memo-
randum to Mr. Hull ?
Mr. Masten. This is it (handing document to Senator Ferguson).
Senator Fergusox. Admiral, we have a memorandum for the Sec-
retary of State dated December 4, 1941.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the whole memorandum put in,
but I particularly want to question the Admiral about the last several
paragraphs.
The Vice Chairman. You want the whole memorandum inserted
in the record ?
Senator Ferguson. I want the whole memorandum inserted in the
record.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
(The memorandum referred to follows:)
[13865]
Navy Department.
Washington, December 4, 1941-
Memorandum for Secretary of State.
November 22nd the Special Naval Observer London informed the Chief of Naval
Operations that Vice Admiral Furstner, Minister of Marine of the Dutch Gov-
ernment in London and Commander in Chief of All Dutch Naval Forces had
received information that the Japanese vrere concentrating an expeditionary
force in the Pelew Islands and that the Dutch Government were considering what
it should do in case a Japanese expeditionary force should cross the Davao-
Waigeo line or the equator east of that line, and that the Dutch Government
were Inclined to regard such a movement as a direct threat to the territories and
interests of Great Britain and the United States, which should immediately be
countered by force. The Dutch stated that before making up their minds they
would like the views of the Chief of Naval Operations.
The Chief of Naval Operations replied that he discounted the information as
to the assembly of an expeditionary force in the Pelews. That he was not in a
position to offer advice as the question asked involved political questions, but
authorized the Naval Observer London to express his views as to the importance
of the Pelews for the protection of the Mandates and for an offense against the
Philippines or the Netherland East Indies.
[13866] December 3 the Special Naval Observer London reported that
he has kept the British Admiralty informed of the above as the same subject
has been discussed by the Dutch with the British. He suggested to the British
Admiralty that it might be necessary for the Dutcli to declare the area south
of the Davao-Waigeo-Eqnator line an area dangerous to shipping, in order
that Dutch forces might be free to take prompt action against suspicious vessels
crossing from the North and from the East. The Briti.sh Admiralty concurred
that this would constitute a useful defense measure from the naval point of
view. However it was essential for political reasons that the zone should be
declared in as unprovocative a manner as possible and should be represented as
a defense zone rather than as a dangerous zone.
The British Admiralty informed Furstner that they also doubted the accuracy
of his information and suggested the Dutch take the matter up with the Foreign
Office.
When the Dutch Foreign Minister visited Eden his proposal went beyond
that of Furstner as It invited a joint declaration of a defense zone by the United
States or Great Britain. After consulting the Admiralty, Eden replied to the
Dutch Foreign Minister as follows: (A) That during the continuance of the
present negotiations between Japan and the United States, it was undesirable
that any declaration be made unless there was the plainest evidence that the
Japanese were preparing an expedition against the Netherlands territory, and
that until [13867] more definite evidence becomes available that Japanese
concentrations are threatening Dutch territory no declaration should be made.
(B) That Great Britain recognizes the military value the declaration of a
defense zone would have, but that it considers it would be less provocative to
5216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japan and less prejudicial to the Washington negotiations if it were confined to
a unilateral declaration by tlie Netherlands East Indies of a zone manifestly
designed as a defense measure for their own shores. (C) That in similar cir-
cumstances His Majesty's Government had been compelled to make a unilateral
declaration of a defense zone on the open seas off the coast of Johore when the
Japanese concentrations on the border of Indo China began to constitute a threat
to Malaya ; the declaration of this zone in waters adjacent to British territory
was plainly a measure of defense and at the time was accepted as such by Japan
without serious criticism.
Mr. Eden therefore suggested tliat if a declaration should prove necessary
the Netherlands Government should declare that certain military and naval
defense measures have been taken in the area south and west of the Davao-
Waigeo-Equator line and that accordingly all vessels intending to enter this
zone must notify the Netherlands Naval authorities of their intention and call
at specified ports for routing instructions. Such a declaration would be analogous
to that made by His Majesty's Government off Johore and would not be likeLv
to increase existing tension.
[13868] On December 4 the Chief of Naval Operations directed the Special
Naval Observer in London to transmit to the Dutch and British Admiralties in
London, the following views on the military aspect of this subject.
While the Chief of Naval Operations believes the November reports of a
concentration in the Pelews were unfounded, the possibility of a Japanese attack
from that region against the Philippines or Netherlands East Indies cannot be
ruled out.
In regard to the Dutch project to declare areas south and west of the Davao-
Waigeo-Equator line dangerous to shipping in order that Dutch Forces may
attack suspicious vessels entering from the North and East, if this were done it
would apply to all merchant shipping regardless of nationality and to British
and United States Naval vessels as well as those of Japan. It is doubtful if the
Dutch could establish promptly a control system which would not cause excessive
delay to shipping important to the United States particularly to the shipping
carrying reinforcements to the Philippines as all United States shipping between
the United States and the Far East is routed via Torres Straits.
The declaration of this large area as a defense zone would hardly be analogous
to the British declaration of the Johore area, as the latter area is a small one.
The declax'ation of a large area of the high seas as a defense zone would create
a precedent for Japan to close the Okhotsk Sea. Sea of Japan, [138691 the
western part of the South China Sea, and the Gulf of Siam. If the United States
acquiesced in the Dutch declaration, it would be difficult to object to similar
declarations by the Japanese.
At present aid to Russia is being shipped via the Okhot.sk Sea and Sea of
Japan. The Dutch, British and United States are taking reconnaissance meas-
ures to cover areas considered dangerous. Shipments to Siberia and patrol
measures should continue. The Chief of Naval Operations is convinced that the
closing of the area west and south of the Davao-Waigeo-Equator area by the
Dutch would be prejudicial to the naval and military interests of all three
powers.
If the Dutch desire to give a warning to the Japanese the Chief of Naval
Operations believes it should be in the form of a declaration to Japan, that if
during the current situation Japanese Naval vessels or expeditionary forces cross
the Davao-Waigeo line it would be considered a hostile act and the forces crossing
this line would be attacked.
Ambassadors Winant and Biddle have been informed by the Special Naval
Observer London of the contents of the memorandum.
/S/ R. E. SCHUIRMANN,
By Direction.
[1S870] Senator Ferguson. I never believed we should take iso-
lated paragraphs out without putting the whole memorandum in. It
is a memorandum by Admiral Schuirmann.
I will read you several items in it.
On December 4 the Chief of Naval Operations —
that would be you —
directed the Special Naval Observer in London to transmit to the Dutch and
British Admiralties in London, the following views on the military aspect of
this subject.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5217
I am just taking one paragraph.
Mr. Geakhart. Will the Senator state the date ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. The 4th of December, 1941. It is a mem-
orandum for the Secretary of State from R. E. Schuirmann, by direc-
tion. R. E. Schuirmann was an admiral, was he not, or a captain ?
Admiral Stark. He was a captain at that time. He is a rear ad-
miral now, sir.
Mr. Murphy. May I just ask one preliminary question ?
Senator Ferguson, li^es, indeed.
Mr. MuRPHT. How long have we had the memorandum before the
committee ?
Mr. Masten. That memorandum has been in counsel's office since
last November and available to every member of the committee. Yes-
terday, Mr. Greaves came down to look through [13871} vari-
ous papers and this question I imagine is based on that examination
yesterday.
Mr. MuRPHT. Fine.
Senator Ferguson. Now, the paragraph I want to read to you, and
it follows the paragraph I did read and is the second from the last
j)aragraph in this memorandum, is as follows :
If the Dutch desire to give a warning to the Japanese, the Chief of Naval Op-
erations believes it should be in the form of a declaration to Japan, that if dur-
ing the current situation Japanese naval vessels or expeditionary forces cross
the Davao-Waigeo line it would be considered a hostile act and the forces cross-
ing this line would be attacked.
Now, this is a message from Captain Schuirmann to the State De-
partment, and it is on your direction, and I read you that part :
If the Dutch desire to give a warning to the Japanse, the Chief of Naval Op-
erations—
that is you —
believes it should be in the form of a declaration to Japan, that if during
the current situation Japanese naval vessels or expeditionary forces cross
the Davao-Waigeo line it would be considered a hostile act and the forces cross-
ing this line would be attacked.
Attacked by whom ?
[1387^1 Admiral Stark. Attacked by the Dutch.
Senator Ferguson. Why were you dictating the message that the
Dutch were to give to Japan ?
Admiral Stark. I remember that. My remembrance is that it came
up before, but I am not certain, but we were undoubtedly asked, and
that was our opinion.
Senator Ferguson. Now, if you can give us the answer, why were
you consulted as to what kind of a message the Dutch Government
would give to the Japanese Government in a question solely between
the Dutch Government and the Japanese Government, as to the Japa-
nese Government moving troops or moving vessels across a certain
line?
Admiral Stark. Well, we were
Senator Ferguson. Were you taking parallel action?
That is the question.
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I think the witness ought to be given
an opportunity to answer the question. It seems like an important
question.
79716 — 46— pt. 11 6
5218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson, It is a very important question.
Mr. Murphy. Then, let him answer.
Admiral Stark. No ; we were not taking parallel action. We could
not take a parallel action.
Mr. MuRpnY. I submit the question has not been answered,
[J 3873] Senator. The second question was just answered, but the
other question has not been answered.
Senator Ferguson. Read the question, please, Mr. Reporter.
(The question was read by the reporter.)
Admiral Stark. My remembrance of that is that the Dutch asked
us for an opinion and we gave it to them. There is much in the record
showing an interdependent interest more or less in this whole area.
Senator Ferguson. All right
Now, I will ask you upon what you based your opinion that you had
a right to tell the Dutch that they should give a message to the Japa-
nese Government that if this line was crossed by the Japanese it would
be considered a hostile act and the forces crossing this line would be
attacked, that you believed that the Dutch should say that if the Japa-
nese crossed that line the Dutch should attack? What did you base
that on ?
Admiral Stark. I based that on the fact that if they did, it looked
like an attack on the N. E. I., on the Netherlands East Indies, and
they could consider it such, it was my opinion an attack, and in that
event to repel it. I might draw a similar line — perhaps, exaggerate
it a little bit — by saying if they attempted to go into Manila Bay
Senator Ferguson. That was in our territory ?
[31874] Admiral Stark. That was in our territory. But they
asked me for an opinion, and tliat was my opinion.
Senator Ferguson. Did you contact tlie President before you gave
this opinion ? It is an important opinion, is it not ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. It might have meant war between the United
States and Japan? This kind of advice, could it not mean war?
[13875] Admiral Stark. It could have meant war between the
Dutch and the Japs. Wliat the ultimate reaction to it would have been,
I do not know.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ?
Senator Ferguson. That is because you had written to Admiral
Kimmel that God alone would know what was going to happen ? Is
that the reason you did not take it to mean war between the United
States and Japan?
Admiral Stark. Well, I could not tell whether it meant war or not.
Under our Constitution the Congress had to declare war, and we could
not take any independent action, so far as hostilities were concerned.
Mr. Murphy. Now, Mr. Chairman, I want to object on the ground
that there is a "yes, sir" answer in there, and there were two questions
and the record does not show which question the answer "yes, sir" is
to. The first was: "Did you ask the President?", and then there was
another question asked and the answer was "Yes, sir." The record
does not show to anyone reading it whether the "Yes, sir" is to the first
question or the second question.
Senator Ferguson. One question was: "It is an important message,
isn't it?"
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5219
What is your answer to that ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
[1SS7S] Senator Ferguson. Is your answer to the other ques-
tion the same, "Yes, sir" ?
Admiral Stark. As to whether or not I consulted the President?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir.
Admiral Stark. I do not recall definitely having consulted the
President on that point, but I would assume that any clispatch of that
nature would have been taken up with the Secretary and with the
State Department, and probably with the President. It was along a
similar line of the line which we had drawn in our memorandum of the
5th and the 27th.
Mr. Masten. Senator, may I suggest something there that would be
helpful to you?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Masten. The memorandum which you have is a memorandum
which describes the final message which appears in Exhibit No. 79 and
which was introduced last December.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, I have that here.
Mr. Masten. This exhibit gives the entire background of most of
that memorandum, I think.
Senator Ferguson. But it is dated subsequent, is the only thing?
Mr. Masten. It appears that that is the telegram referred to in tlie
memorandum, because the language is practically [13S77]
identical with the descriptive langiiage in the memorandum.
Mr. Murphy. For the record, when you said "this memorandum,"
you had one in your hand ?
Mr. Masten. That wa.s Exhibit No. 79.
Admiral Stark. You say you liave just taken a paragraph out. I
would like to see the dispatch and see the correspondence, what is
in it.
Mr. Masten. This is tlie final dispatch in Exhibit No. 79, Admiral.
Admiral Stark. I do recall that myself.
Senator Ferguson. Noav, you will notice what you are reading, Ad-
miral, is dated the 5th, which is the day following, and I cannot quite
get the record straight in my own mind, how you can rely upon some-
thing that came subsequent to the time that you directed this advice
to be given. Can you straighten that out?
Mr.MuRPHY. Now, will the Senator yield ?
Admiral Stark. WJiat I would like to see is where we start on this
and who asked what.
Mr. Murphy. The record shows the 5th where? The 5th here
or the 5th with the Dutch ?
Mr. Masten. The final telegram in Exhibit No. 79 bears the date
December 5, w^hereas the memorandum that Senator Ferguson is using
is dated December 4. But the fact is that the language of [1S878 \
the memorandum and of the telegram are practically identical, so it
Avould seem to be clear that the memorandum is referring to the
telegram.
Admiral Stark. This is the memorandum w^here they started?
Mr. Masten. That is the memorandum under discussion.
Admiral Stark. May I take the time to read it, sir?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, certainly.
5220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. MuKPHT, I think, Mr. Chairman, the record should also show
that the dispatch of the 5th is addressed to our own naval attache at
London.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Is there anything here showing any dispatch directly
to the Dutch?
Mr. Masten. The memorandum refers to a dispatch of the 4th.
There is a discrepancy on the dates.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield while the Admiral is reading?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. I think, Mr. Chairman, the record should show that
Exhibit No. 79 consists of 10 dispatches. Exhibit No. 79 was admitted
in the record some month ago, and the part on which the Admiral is
being questioned now, as to what the Chief of Naval Operations said,
is in the dispatch of December 5. It has been in the record for some
months.
[13879] Senator Ferguson. Yes, but the record did not show
before that this was all under the direction of the Chief of Naval
Operations, which is the witness.
Mr. Murphy. Yes, it does show it. It says,
If Dutch authorities consider some warning should be given Japan CNO
believes it should take the form of a declaration to Japan that in view of the
current situation Japanese naval vessels, or expeditionary forces crossing the
Davao-Waigeo line would be considered hostile and would be attacked. Com-
municate these views to the Admiralty and the Dutch Naval Command in London.
[13880] Senator Ferguson. It does not cover what I am in-
quiring about now.
Admiral Stark. I have read these, and to make it clear I would
suggest, if they are not already in the record in connection with this
questioning, that it would be well to put them in, or refer to them at
this point.
Senator Ferguson. They will be referred to now, because through
the counsel's statement, the exhibit number has been put in.
Admiral Stark. That shows the entire discussion. This memoran-
dum was a memorandum by Schuirmann at my direction to the Sec-
retary of State, with whom these things had been considered, and then
I said if the Dutch were going to do something, I suggested the
following.
Now, I may state with regard to this picture in general, that it had
been suggested at times that we rule out certain parts of the sea and
call them defensive sea areas, that nothing could come in there.
Senator Ferguson. When you say "we," whom are you speaking
about ?
Admiral Staek. We had to consider the same thing in the South-
ern Philippine waters.
Senator Ferguson. Do you mean you as the Navy, or the President,
the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy?
[13881] Admiral Stark. The Navy Department.
Senator Ferguson. The Navy Department ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
As I recollect, we had had some correspondence with Admiral Hart
about it, about making a defensive sea area which would prohibit
vessels coming in there except they asked permission to come in, so
that we would know what was going through that area.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5221
As noted here, the British had declared one such area. I recollect
clearly when the question first came up, as opposing it, because if
we did, we could have no complaint of the Japs, perhaps, closing the
Sea of Japan, or closing the northern waters where we were sending
vessels into Kussia.
That is mentioned here, and that was our thought on the subject.
It is all in these dispatches.
Then we went on to say finally —
If the Dutch desire to give a warning to the Japanese, the Chief of Naval
Operations believes it should be in the form of a declaration to Japan, that if
during the current situation, Japanese naval vessels or expeditionary forces cross
the Davao-Waigeo line it would be considered a hostile act, and the forces crossing
this line would be attacked.
11388£] That is very much the same thing as the defensive sea
area. They cannot get into what they consider vital waters to them
without asking permission, or being attacked.
Senator Ferguson. Would you read just the next paragraph?
Admiral Stark. May I go on just a little further ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. Those questions had been discussed in the Navy
Department and in the State Department. This first memorandum is
to the State Department, and I think we were all pretty much of one
mind with regard to it.
Now as to your question, as to whether this was taken up with
the President, I do not recall. The last paragraph that you suggest
I read is :
Ambassadors Winant and Biddle have been informed by the Special Naval
Observer, London, of the contents of the memorandum.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think today that you described this
important matter as to advising the Dutch to do this without taking
it up with the President of the United States ?
Admiral Stark. No, I do not think I would. I certainly would
not do it without taking it up with the Secretary of the Navy, and
without a complete interchange with the State Department.
[1S883] As I remember the first instance, when we were talking
about the southern Philippine waters, of discussing it with the Presi-
dent, but I just cannot say absolutely that I took up that particular
paragraph with the President.
I am under the impression I did, but I hesitate, when he is not
here, to state positively that I did, when it is not perfectly clear to
my mind that I did.
Senator Ferguson. Unless it is your memory that it is perfectly
clear, I would not want you to.
Admiral Stark. On things of that sort, we just could not go along
by ourselves. It had to involve the State Department, and things
of that sort were always taken up with the President, and we were
very close to him.
Senator Ferguson. What I want to get at is, in your opinion now,
if they had moved across this line, and the Dutch had attacked,
would you have said that that meant war also with the United States ?
Admiral Stark. No; I would not.
Senator Ferguson. Then I want to read to you out of Mr. Stimson's
memorandum.
5222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mv. MuRriiY. Will the Senator yield before you proceed?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Ml-. MuRi'iiY. How does this Davao-Waigeo line compare with the
line set forth in the areas described in the memorandum [13S84\
of November 5?
Senator Ferguson. It was over in the Netherlands East Indies
area, and, as I recall, would have put an amphibious Japanese force
I'ight on the doorstep.
Admiral Stark. Of the NEI.
Senator Ferguson. Of the NEI ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. But it had nothing to do wath the line that you
had General Marshall establish in your memorandum of the 5th and
27th of November ?
Admiral Stark. That is a different line.
Mr. Murphy. Is not there a paragraph in the November 5 memo-
randum as to what the recommendations of our military authorities
were if the NEI were attacked?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. That is what I want to bring up next.
Admiral Stark. I think so.
Senator Ferguson. "Friday, November 7, 1941." This is out of
Secretary Stimson's diary.
Cabinet meeting tliis afternoon. The President opened with telling the story
of Lincoln and his Cabinet — how he polled the Cabinet and found them all polling
"no," and then he said "The ayes have it." With that, he started to have
[138S5] what he said was the first general poll of his Cabinet, and it was on
the question of the Far East — whether the people would back us up in case we
struck at Japan down there, and what the tactics should be.
Now, he has got a note there, and the note is :
See statement, page 11, as to this Cabinet meeting.
Now, continuing reading from the memorandum :
It was a very interesting talk — the best Cabinet meeting I think we have ever
had since I have been there. He went around the tabk^ — first Hull and then
myself, and then around through the whole niimber, and it was unanimous in
feeling the country would support us.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Don't you think the Admiral ought to have a copy so he can follow
you?
Admiral Stark. I brought that up with me.
Senator Ferguson. It is on page 42, Admiral.
Admiral Stark. Thank you.
Senator Ferguson. About half way down.
He said that this time the vote is unanimous, he feeling the same way. Hull
made a good presentation of the general situation. I told them I rather nar-
rowed it down into a following up the steps which had been done to show what
needed to be done in the future. The thing would have been much [13886]
stronger if the Cabinet had known — and they did not know except in the case of
Hull and the President — what the Army is doing with the big bombers and how
ready we are to pitch in.
Now, that is the end of the memorandum.
Mr. Murphy. At that point. Senator, don't you think it is unusual
that he did not include Secretary Knox? Certainly, lie wouhl know,
too.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5223
Senator Ferguson. I can only read from the diary of the Secretary
of War. I am not putting any language in it. It may seem strange.
Admiral Stark. I may state Colonel Knox did know.
Senator Ferguson. You say Colonel Knox did know ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; he knew everything I did, and I was per-
fectly familiar with that program.
Senator Ferguson. And j^ou were familiar with what is contained
in the diary of the Secretary of War?
Admiral Stark. I did not recall that vote. It may have been I was
told, but I do not recall.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I will go to pages 11 and 12, because it
i-efers to that, and I will keep this record straight.
On Friday, November 7, we had the nsnal weekly Cabinet meeting. The Far
Eastern situation was npiiermost in many of our minds. Mr. Hull informed us
that relations had become [13887] extremely critical and that we should
be on the outlook for an attack l>y Japan at any time.
Now, this is November 7.
"Our military advisers" — and you would be one of those would you
not, Admiral?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Reading on :
— while desirous of delay, had urged military action if Japan attacked territory
whose security was vital to us, and in this connection specified American, British,
or Dutch territory.
Now, I will ask you whether or not the Dutch territory was the same
territory that was described in the memorandum of Schuirmann on
your direction ?
Admiral Stark. In effect; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. It was?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. So that you had given the opinion to apparently
the President, and apparently to the other members of the War Cabi-
net, that we should attack if this territory south of this particular —
what is the name of it? Davao-Waigeo?
Admiral Stark. Davao-Waigeo.
Senator Ferguson. "South of tliis particular Davao [1S888]
Waigeo line, "isn't that true? Tliat was your opinion as early as the
7th?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; and on that same 7th, I wrote that war
might be delayed a month longer, but I did not see how it could go
beyond that.
I might say with regard to that — and I have a remembrance that in
my previous testimony I said that — what I was afraid of was one at a
time, and then a squeeze play, and I think I am on the record as saying
under certain conditions we would have to fight for our own safety.
Senator Ferguson. Coming back to my question, here on the 7th of
November, you are of the opinion, and have advised the President and
the War Cabinet, as one of our military advisers, that if Japan attacked
the territory of the Dutcli, which includes the very territory that you
are now telling the Dutcli to give this warning about, and that they are
to attack, you would say then that it did mean war, in your opinion; is
that not a correct statement?
Admiral Stark. No, it is not. There is a distinction there,
5224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Will yoii tell us what it is ?
Admiral Stark. It is this, that while it would mean that Marshall
and I, these advisers — which is a matter of record — had advised this,
we could not say that our advice [lS88d] would be followed.
What the Congress would do if this was put up to them, I had no
means of knowing. That is why I say it did not mean war, because
we thought it ought to.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Stark, did you ever consider on this
question of whether or not we would start war with Japan, whether
there would be shots from the Japanese side, and, therefore, we would
be in war ; whether that question would ever be submitted to the Con-
gress of the United States ?
Admiral Stark. Our instructions were very clear on not to commit
an overt act. So far as I was concerned, I could do nothing in that line
without authority higher up.
Unless something had occurred, such as did occur, the normal pro-
cedure was for a declaration by Congress, in accordance with our
Constitution.
Senator Ferguson. Well, did not you know that Colonel Knox
advised the President of three alternatives, and he advised as the last
that we should attack ?
Mr. KJEEFE. You mean Colonel Stimson?
Senator Ferguson. Colonel Stimson.
Admiral Stark. That paragraph which is in here
Senator Ferguson. It is on page 53.
Admiral Stark. In view of the rest of the paragraphs in here
where Colonel Stimson states
[1S890] Senator Ferguson. It is on page 53, if it will help you.
Admiral Stark. I want to finish that sentence.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. Where Colonel Stimson states, on page 55 of this
memorandum, and I quote:
It further became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the force as
it went by without any warning, on the one hand, which we didn't think we
could do ; or sitting still and allowing it to go.
and so forth.
There Colonel Stimson puts himself on record as stating that
he could not strike without warning.
Now, I think that there is another paragraph here that bears on
that same thing, if I may look for it, while this talk is on this matter.
Senator Ferguson. All right.
Mr. Richardson. Look on page 56.
Admiral Stark. I will come right back to it.
On page 28, Colonel Stimson further states :
On the other hand we also decided that we could not attack without a further
warning to Japan, and we discussed what form that warning should take. The
President suggested a special telegram from himself to the Emperor of Japan.
After some discussion, it was decided that he would send such [13891] a
letter to the Emperor, which would not be made public, and that at the same
time he would deliver a special message to Congress reporting on the danger
and reporting what we would have to do if the danger happened.
Now, Colonel Stimson, I think, in those two statements, which I
have quoted, and there may be others here — clearly states, in my
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5225
Opinion, that he could not go ahead and make an attack without first
warning, and he suggests that the President shouki go to Congress.
Senator Ferguson. Did not he also advise the President that he
believed the message of the I7th of August — he calls it the 19th, but
apparently that is wrong
Admiral Stark. Yes ; that is an error.
Senator Ferguson. That the message of the 17th of August was
such a warning, that if they crossed that line, we would be justified in
attacking without congressional action?
Admiral Stark. I do not gather that he considers that. That mes-
sage of the I7th of August — and while I have not refreshed my mem-
ory on it for a long time, as I recall wound up with some statement
to the effect that if the Japs encroached further in southeast Asia, we
reserved to ourselves the right to take any action which we saw fit in
our national interest.
[13892] Senator Ferguson. Now, would not one of those actions
be that we would attack if we would take any action ?
Admiral Stark. I would not say it would be to attack without warn-
ing. I feel so strongly on that, that my only suggestion is — you are
asking me to interpret Colonel Stimson's thoughts. He is available to
answer that question.
Senator Ferguson. I will come back to it.
Did you expect this war to start by the Japanese doing the first
shooting, after Congress had declared war upon Japan ? Is not that
contrary to all of the philosophy of Japan, that they would allow us,
if they were going to make war, to declare war first ?
Admiral Stark. Again I would like to state this with regard to
that: My thought was that the Japs would strike without warning.
That was their history.
Senator Ferguson. That is right.
Admiral Stark. Now, as to the second part of your question
Senator Ferguson. I think you testified to that before.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
As to the second part of your question, as to our striking after decla-
ration of war on our part, if the situation became intolerable to us, and
our national safety, if the Japs had not struck and we thought then
that our safety was imperiled, [1389S] if we did not fight, I
think it would have been done in a constitutional manner.
Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, you expected Japan to attack
without warning?
Admiral Stark. I did.
Senator Ferguson. And that would be before we declared war?
Admiral Stark. At that time ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Therefore, the war would start before Congress declared war, be-
cause we would not allow Japan to attack us and not even shoot back,
would we ?
Admiral Stark. Well, I think your question is just stating what has
happened.
Senator Ferguson. Is that what you anticipated? My original
question was prefaced, and I am carrying out the idea, by what hap-
pened prior to the 7th.
It is exactly what happened, but) I want to know whether that is
what you anticipated would happen.
5226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stakk. I did.
I did anticipato an attack without warning, I said so in personal
letters for over a year. I stated so unequivocally in dispatches in the
latter part of November.
Senator Ferguson. Isn't it true that that was taken up [13894]
at the War Cabinet meeting, as related in the Stimson statement ?
Admiral Stark. If you; will give me the page, I will follow you,
Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Look at page 47.
Then, at 12 o'clock, we (viz. General Marshall and I) went to the White House,
where we were until nearly lialf-past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox,
Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the President, instead of bringing up the
Victory Parade, brought up entirely the relations with the Japanese. He brought
up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Mon-
day, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and
the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver
them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger
to ourselves.
It was a difficult proposition.
Now, is that not exactly what the whole War Cabinet expected, that
there would be an attack by the Japanese before anything would be
Mubn itted to Congress and have America declare war upon Japan?
Aimiral Stark. We thought action by Japan attacking us was
aboi t to start, and we said so.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
[13S&5] Now, I come to the question here :
Wasn't it also true that you expected that attack before Congress
would declare war upon Japan ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, because I thought it was in the immediate
offing. •
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. But I do again make the statement, and I want it
clear on the record, so far as my thoughts are concerned, that if Japan
had not attacked, and if conditions had become intolerable to our na-
tional safety because of what she w\as doing, it is then my opinion
that there would have been only one road for us to take, and that would
have been through the Congress.
It did not have to be, because she attacked.
Senator Ferguson. And you expected she would attack, and the
President expected she would attack?
Admiral Stark. Yes ; at that time there w^as not any question about
it in our minds. I said so at tliat time, on the 25th.
Senator Ferguson. You did not change your mind, and as far as
you know", the President did not change his, at least saying so to you,
up to the 7th of December ?
Admiral Stark. No one changed their minds, so far as I know.
You will recall on the 6th we sent a dispatch [13S96] about
codes, to hold on to the last minute. That showed we were still expect-
ing that minute to happen at any time.
Senator Ferguson. Now, he states :
The question was how we should maneuver them —
I take it that means the Japanese —
into the position of firing the first sliot without allowing too much danger to
ourselves.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT "COMMITTEE 5227
Now, did you discuss with the President and those present at that
meeting how you would maneuver the Japanese into shooting the
first shot ?
Admiral Stark. I have no recollection of that. My recollection of
that meeting, on which I testified before — and which the record, the
written record shows — is that I wrote Kimmel about both the President
and Mr. Hull stating that they would not be surprised at a surprise
attack.
But as to our maneuvering them, if you take the language baldly,
just Avhat it says, that it was trying to get them to shoot at us, I do not
recall any such conversation.
I do recall the meat of the thing, and which meant what Colonel
Stimson meant, tliat we should not commit the first overt act, and I
heard Marshall's testimony yesterday when he said he thought this
was to keep the record clear, and that it was to be political. Maybe
that was it ; I don't know.
Senator Ferguson. Did he say, "political'' or "diplomatic"?
[1S897] Admiral Stark. Diplomatic, perhaps it was.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, is that your own opinion, that
we were to keep the diplomatic record in shape so that Japan would
shoot the first shot rather than America declaring war?
Admiral Stark. I do not recollect that having gone through my
mind at that time. As I said, I did not recollect discussing this, just
as it is here, except that we would not commit the first overt act.
I do know, however, that there was a desire to keep the record
straight on our offers, for example.
To go back a little bit, I think it was back in July when I Avas
present with Nomura, and with Welles in the White House, when
Nomura brought up the subject that what they were concerned Avith
was raw materials, and particularly food, rice; and the President
then offered, so far as he possibly could, to guarantee that they would
get these things if Japan would stop her aggression.
I remember his remark afterwards, that she probably would not
stop her aggression. But that was to keep the record straight, and
they were continually trying to prevent war in the Pacific.
I think the record is clean on it.
Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it, you do not [13898]
remember this being taken up at that meeting, and you do not remem-
ber that the "maneuver" meant diplomatic maneuver. You do not
remember either ?
Admiral Stark. No; I do not. Senator Ferguson.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr, Murphy. Was Admiral Stark at this Cabinet meeting?
Admiral Stark. Yes ; I was.
Senator Ferguson. It was the War Cabinet meeting.
Mr. Murphy. All right.
Senator Ferguson. You were present ?
Admiral Stark. I was present at that meeting ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I think you wrote to Kimmel advising him
that the President had expected the war by Japan attacking by —
what was it? Monday?
Mr. Keefe. The following Monday, December 1.
5228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. That is what the President said. If you recall,
when you questioned me about this before, I said I thought we went
into all phases of it, but my memory was not clear as to just what
we had discussed in detail, but that I had written Kimmel of the Presi-
dent's and Mr. Hull's belief that a surprise attack might come any
time, and as early as "next Monday."
There are things in here, of course, from Mr. Stimson's [ISSPO]
diary. I kept none.
Senator Ferguson. I think that is all.
The Vice Chairman. Does Mr. Keef e desire to inquire ?
Mr. Keefe. May I have the diary?
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will inquire.
Mr. Keefe. I would like to have it perfectly clear, if I can — and I
listened attentively to the questions and answers that have been pro-
pounded by Senator Ferguson, and that you have given. Admiral
Stark
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. But according to Secretary Stimson's diary, under date
of November 7, 1941, in which he described the Cabinet meeting held
that afternoon, Friday afternoon, where the President polled the
cabinet on the question "whether the people would back us up in case
we struck at Japan down there and what the tactics should be," whether
the fact that such a vote was taken by the full Cabinet, and they had
voted "aye," expressing their respective opinions that the people
would back them up if they struck at Japan, whether that was known
to you when you attended the meeting of the War Cabinet on Tuesday,
November 25 ?
Admiral Stark. I do not think it was. I do not recall Colonel
Knox having given me that information.
Obviously I would not have gotten it from anyone else, [1S900']
unless Marshall had gotten it from Stimson and told me.
I have no recollection of it.
Mr. Keefe. It is obvious from the memorandum prepared by Secre-
tary Stimson and appearing in his diary that that whole question was
gone over by the Cabinet.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; I think there is no question of that. It
states so, from his note made at the time.
Mr. Keefe. But you, as Chief of Naval Operations, state to us now
that you had no knowledge that that question was discussed at that
Cabinet meeting of November 7 ?
Admiral Stark. I have no recollection of it.
Mr. Keefe. Then, am I to understand that it is a mere lapse of
memory that you do not have a recollection; that it may have been
discussed and you have forgotten it ?
Admiral Stark. It is possible that I might have. In my opinion, I
did not know.
After all, that is going on 5 years, and there was an awful lot
going on. But I have no recollection of that vote, until I read it here ;
and I think I did not get it.
Mr. Keefe. Well, the reason I am asking that. Admiral Stark, is
because it impressed me, when I read it, that it was a very important
matter, reflecting itself on subsequent actions, perhaps, of the Cabinet
and subsequent action of the so-called War Cabinet, but your final
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5229
judgment before [13901] this committee today is that when
you met with the war cabinet on the 25th of November, or at any
other time, that the war cabinet met subsequent to November 7, you
do not have any present recollection of ever having laiown of its
meeting and its determination and vote on the 7th of November?
Admiral Stark. That is correct. If I had had it, I do not know
that it would have affected my independent judgment.
Mr. Keefe, The thing that impressed me about this memorandum
of the former Secretary Stimson is the fact that they apparently
were concerned about the imminence of war, and how we were to
meet it without being put in the position of having it said that we had
fired the first shot, or committed the first overt act. You were con-
cerned about that too, as Chief of Naval Operations, were you not?
Admiral Stakk. I was concerned with the imminence of war, and
surprise attack by the Japs which we were expecting at any moment
at that time.
I say "at that time," my message of the 24th put it down as a pos-
sibility ; my message of the 27th was positive, and you recall the sub-
sequent messages to the 27th about the codes and so forth. We were
expecting such an attack.
Mr. Keefe. Well, I understand that clearly, but I [13902]
gained the impression from reading Secretary Stimson's statement
to this committee, together with the excerpts from his diary which he
has submitted to the committee that there was a question in the minds
of the Cabinet officers as to whether or not there was such a division
among the people of this country with respect to the possibility of
war in the Pacific, or whether or not the country was so solidified
on that question that they would back up the President and the
Cabinet if they did actually, in view of the circumstances, strike at
Japan and commit the first overt act, and the Cabinet, when polled
on that question, said they thought the country would back them up.
Did you share that belief at that time ?
Admiral Stark. Well, I certainly would not have had any such
unanimity with regard to the country backing them up as was in-
dicated there by the Cabinet poll.
I had recalled when I thought we would get the draft without any
question, we got it by one vote, after a good deal of contest, and the
sentiment of the country, which is portrayed here by Colonel Stimson —
for example, may I quote here, speaking of the officers and what the
military was working on at that time. Colonel Stimson said, "Yet they
were surrounded, outside of their offices and almost throughout the
country, by a spirit of isolationism and disbelief [13903] in
danger which now seems incredible."
Mr. Keefe. You felt that way too, did you not, because you wrote
Admiral Hart on that same thing, did you not ?
Admiral Stark. I wrote I did not know what we would do and
there has been a good deal of comment on that in articles one way or
the other, as though it might seem strange that the Chief of Naval
Operations did not know what to do under certain conditions.
Mr. Keefe. You would have good
Admiral Stark. May I finish?
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
5230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. It would have taken a brave man right here in
Congress at that time to have predicted what w^ould have to be done,
if it was put up to Congress.
Mr. Keefe. I recall a letter which you wrote, which is in the record
here — I cannot quote it exactly — but I do recall a letter which you
wrote to Admiral Hart in which you said to him, in substance, that
you could not understand the attitude of the people of this country,
and especially the people up on the Hill that were debating the
question of arming the ships and so on, that they apparently did not
realize that the country was already at war, that we were at war in
the Atlantic, and you said to him, "You and I know it."
[1390J^] ' Do you have that letter?
Admiral Stark. I remember very distinctly a letter in which I
stated, "Although the country does not realize, we are in war in the
Atlantic."
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
Admiral Stark. We covered that in the previous testimony.
Mr. Keefe. You, as Chief of Naval Operations, knew it, but you
expressed the opinion at that time, that the people of the country
and the Congress itself did not seem to understand and know the
facts.
Admiral Stark. That is correct. \ You remember the testimony, I
think, to the effect that w^e did not have belligerent rights, and so
forth, that went with the full declaration of war. There were a lot
of things we could not do, but technically, in certain areas, we had
given an order to shoot at any Axis craft we saw, and the public had
been fully informed on that by the President.
Mr. Murphy. In the speech of September 11, wasn't it?
Admiral Stark. September 11; yes, sir; I think that was the
speech. It has all been covered.
Mr. Keefe. Well, now; in answer to the questions of Senator
Ferguson, you indicated that you have very little present recollection
of what actually took place at this [^13905^ meeting of the War
Cabinet on the 25th. as described here by Secretary Stimson.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I searched my memory just as carefully
as I could. I kept no diary. I have the written record of Kimmel on
that, in which I referred to that meeting. The only thing additionally
that I want to bring up, and was refreshed on in Colonel Stimson's
memorandum was what I knew at the time, that we were not to
commit the first overt act. That could be one interpretation of the
statement which he makes there, and also the President and Mr. Hull
stating unequivocally that they would not be surprised if the Japs at-
tacked us without warning. I immediately transmitted that to Ad-
miral Kimmel.
Mr. Keefe. The attack which Avas in your mind, and the possibility
of attack which was in your mind, and in the minds of all the others,
as far as you knew it, was an attack down in the Far East, wasn't it?
Admiral Stark. That is where we were looking for it ; yes, sir.
We knew the other was a possibility. For example, the dispatches
we sent made both the Commanders in the Pacific action addressees;
it made King in the Atlantic "information," but we expected the
attack in the southeast F'acific, and we were surprised when they
struck at the time they did in [13906] Hawaii.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5231
Mr. Keete. Now, Admiral. I understood you to say when you were
here the last time, a couple of days ago, that you had since located an
engagement book, or something of that kind.
Admiral Stark. That was Mrs. Stark's engagement book, in which
everything of a social nature, or in going out, was kept.
Mr. Keefe. Is it here ?
Admiral Stark. No ; I haven't got it here, but I would be glad to
give it to you^ if you want to see it. I will tell you, there was nothing
there regarding that Saturday night, at least we could not find that.
Mr. Keefe. When you first testified, you testified you could not find
it, it was not available, and you have since located it, since the last
Jiearing?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; and I so stated in my testimony here.
Mr. Keefe. Is it available so you can bring it to the committee?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. I would like to see it.
Admiral Stark. Aye, aye, sir. I will give it to Baecher.
[1S907] Mr. Keefe. You told us there was absolutely no entry
for Saturday, the 6th of December, did you not ?
Admiral Stark. Noiie for Saturday evening, the 6th of December.
Mr. Keefe. Is there anything for Saturday afternoon?
Admiral Stark. Yes, there is for Saturday afternoon, about the
Canadian party.
Mr. Keefe. Then, that refreshes your recollection that you were
present at that Canadian party, does it ?
Admiral Stark. It does not.
[13908] Mr. Keefe. That simply was an entry?
Admiral Stark. It simply was an entry. Those parties usually
were put down, and our answers to them always were if anything was
required I would go if I could, but actually I practically never went.
1 was too busy. I did not have time to go to cocktail parties.
Mr. Keefe. Do you have any present recollection as to whether you
did go to this cocktail party on December 6 ?
Admiral Stark. My recollection is I did not go, and Mrs. Stark said
she did not go. Often, particularly where friends were concerned, I
would ask her to go, just as a matter of good will, to represent me.
I did not have time.
Mr. Keefe. Your testimony is you did not attend that cocktail party
on that afternoon, December 6, is that right?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And that the newspaper statement is siniply a list of the
guests that were there, and it was just perhaps taken from those that
were invited, and so far as you are concerned, you were not at that
party ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Do you have any recollection as to where you were that
afternoon ?
Admiral Stark. Well, my recollection, the only recollection I would
have of that business, or anything else, is in the office. [13909]
That is where I usually spent it.
Mr. Keefe. Do you have any recollection as to where you spent the
evening ?
5232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. "Well, I can only assume that I was at the National
Theater.
Mr. Keefe. Now, Admiral, I am not asking you to assume anything,
I am asking you whether you have any present recollection as to
where you were.
Admiral Stark. No ; I do not, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now, from where do you obtain the assumption that
you were at the National Theater ?
Admiral Stark. Commander Schulz' testimony.
Mr. Keefe. Do you have any present recollection as to where you
were at all Saturday evening ?
Admiral Stark. No, I do not. I had been under the impression, as I
have previously testified, that I was at home, because I have no other
recollection of being anywhere else. The testimony makes it rather
clear, I would say, that I was not, and that I was at the National
Theater. As I have also testified, I do recall having seen the revival
of "The Student Prince," but I did not connect it up with that Saturday
night, and I still draw more or less of a blank on it, except I did see
a revival of "The Student Prince."
Mr. Keefe. Do I understand your testimony to be that you
{^13910^ can state with positiveness and certainty that you did not
go to the White House that night, December 6 'I
Admiral Stark. I am absolutely certain of that.
Mr. Keefe. And are you also absolutely certain that you received
no telephone calls from the White House that night ?
Admiral Stark. I am certain the President did not call me that
night.
Mr. Keefe. And you are also certain that you did not see the first
13-parts of the Jap 14-part message that night ?
Admiral Stark. I am; yes, sir; perfectly. I am perfectly certain
of that.
Mr. Keefe. Did anyone tell you, or have you any present recollection
of any one of your servants telling you that Captain Kramer had called
and tried to locate you that night ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Are you certain that you had no telephone message that
night from Secretary Knox?
Admiral Stark. Well, I haven't the slightest recollection of it.
Yes ; I am certain that I heard nothing that Knox said that night.
Mr. Keefe. Did you have any telephone message from Admiral
Wilkinson ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. I think Wilkinson has also testified to
that same fact, and also Kramer.
\13911~\ Mr. Keefe. Well, I might say. Admiral, it is rather
amazing to me that you have a pretty clear negative memory that
certain things did not happen, but you cannot recall anything that
you actually did that night.
Admiral Stark. That is the fact, Mr. Keefe. Whether it seems
strange to you or not, that is the fact.
Mr. Keefe. I understood your testimony, in response to questions
asked by Senator Ferguson, that your visit to your office Sunday
morning was just a norma], ordinary routine matter and there was
no meeting with an extraordinary show-up of naval officers there that
morning out of the qrdiLnary.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5233
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Mr. KJEEFE. That is all.
Admiral Stark. Mr. Keefe, I will bring that book up to you and
show it to you personally,
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Ciiairmax. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral Stark, when you were questioned previously
about what you would have done, had you known that the President,
in substance, uttered some words which the witness interpreted as
"This means war," referring to the 13-part message, as I understand
it, you said you would have gone to your office. Is that what you
said you would have done?
Admiral Stark. If I had known that a message had been
[1S912'] received which caused the President to make any ex-
planation to the effect "This means war," of course I would have
been so interested that I might have picked up the telephone and
called him. I would not have hesitated to have called him or seen
him. My relations were such that I could have at the time, or I would
have called Ingersoll, or someone, and I would have followed through
on it until I had seen that message. I have read Schulz' testimony
since I was up here the other day, and I am not convinced from it
that the President did say "This means war."
Mr. Murphy. The witness said that the President said something
which, in substance, he interprets "This means war."
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did he use the word "interprets"?
Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir. Let me get his exact words. I will come
back to that.
At any rate, if you had known that the President did say something
in substance "This means war," about the 13-part message, was there
anything you would have done that night except to read the message?
Is there anything you could now tell us you would have done, in the
way of backsight or hindsight that you would have don© that you did
not do ?
Admiral Stark. It would not be backsight or hindsight, because
when I read it on Sunday morning I saw nothing in it to [13913]
cause me to take any further action on it.
Mr. Murphy. Now, the actual testimony, at page 12,441, of Com-
mander Schulz was, in the transcript : ^
Commander Schulz. Mr. Hopkins tlien read the papers and handed them back
to the President. The President then turned toward Mr. Hopkins and said in
substance — I am not sure of the exact words, but in substance — "This means
war." Mr. Hopkins agreed, and they discussed then, for perhaps five minutes,
the situation of the Japanese forces, that is, their deployment and
Now, then, if you had known that the President said, in substance,
that, you would no doubt have gone and read the 13-part message,
would you not?
Admiral Stark. There isn't any doubt in my own mind but that I
would have.
Mr. Murphy. Now, is there anything in Commander Schulz' testi-
mony, you having read it, that would have given you the slightest
indication that there was to be any attack specifically at Hawaii?
1 Hearings, Part 10, p. 4662.
79716 — 46 — pt. 11 7
5234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr, MuRPiiY. Now, there has been some testimony about the Cabi-
net meeting of November 7. You were not at the Cabinet meeting
where the vote of the Cabinet was taken?
[13914] Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. As to the attitude of the American people, were you ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Do you know anything of the plans that were made,
either at that Cabinet meeting or immediately subsequent to the Cab-
inet meeting, to have the diiferent members of the Government in high
places address the American people on the war question ?
Admiral Stark. No, not as a result of or tied up with that meeting.
There were talks by — I have forgotten just what the talks were.
Mr. Murphy. It was done by Sumner Welles on November 11, on
Armistice Day ; do you remember that ?
Admiral Stark. I do not remember. I think he stated we might
be in the war at anytime, or something to that effect.
Mr. Murphy. Subsequent to the Cabinet meeting there were some
talks, I believe, by leading Americans on the possibility of a war
coming.
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. You were not, as I understand it, at any meeting
where the necessity of having those talks Avas discussed ?
Admiral Stark. The only one that I remember with regard to
action of that sort was the one — and I am not sure just [13915]
when it came up — was the President's message to the Emperor.
Mr. Murphy. That is on the night of December 6th ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, along about then. I am not sure.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, in Colonel Stimson's diary there is a no-
tation— let me see that diary. The entry of November 27, this part
about the question of firing the first shot. Was there ever at any time
any discussion by anyone in the Government that you know of where
there ever was any intention on our part of avoiding doing anything
joossible to prevent war with the Japanese ?
Admiral Stark. No.
Mr. Murphy. Was not that our intention right up to December 7,
if it could be done without sacrificing American honor and principles ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; and we had been working for months on
that, and the record is complete in regard to that.
Mr. Hull stated we tried to avoid war, in his testimony. As you
recall, I recorded that over the period of months. I stated in my
opinion there was always one stumbling block which we could not get
around, and that was the Chinese-Japanese War.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, about the so-called first shot, the fact
is the Japanese had fired a great many shots previous to November,
1941, had not they?
Admiral Stark. Yes.
[13916] Mr. Murphy. They had smik the Pan ay, they had
bombed our missions in China, and they had also attacked another
ship and committed a great many acts which would be unfriendly to
America ; had not they 'I
Admiral Stark. The Panay incident I remember very distinctly.
The bombing or the near-bombing of our diplomatic residence 'I also
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5235
remember. I think there was a near-attack or miss that could not
be called an attack on another ounboat. I forget where it was.
Mr. Murphy. There were also attacks on American property on a
number of occasions?
Admiral Stark. That had been going on for a long time.
Mr. Murphy. Despite all those acts we were still continuning in a
state of peace with the Japanese up until December 7, 1941?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. That is all.
The Vice Chairmax. Any further questions?
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Gearhart.
Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Stark, you recall rather definitely what
you were doing during the Sunday upon which the attack occurred;
do you not ?
Admiral Stark. There are certain things, of course, that [ISQl?]
stand out on that Sunday, the 7th, that I am very clear on. One is
in regard to the 1300 message and the conversation almost exactly
as it took place. The other was the message that came in stating,
"This is no drill." That is when the Japanese attacked. And the
rest of it was, of course, messages coming in during the afternoon. I
was in the office from that morning until about 2 :00, as I recall, the
next morning. We also went to work immediately, in the late hours,
shifting some ships from the Atlantic back to the Pacific.
Mr. Gearhart. Just how long after the news of the attack reached
Washington was it before Secretary Knox began to talk about his
desire to make a trip to Hawaii, so he could personally inspect it?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall that. He went shortly after, but
just when he started talking about it I do not know.
Mr. Gearhart. You were in constant consultation with him; were
you not?
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Mr. Gearhart. Until the time of this tragic event?
Admiral Stark. I was ahvays in touch with him; every day.
Mr. Gearhart. Cannot you recall when he first mentioned his
desire to go there?
Admiral Stark. It was shortly after that he said he better go out
and take a look himself. That was after he had talked [13918]
with the President.
Mr. Gearhart. After he decided he would go to Hawaii did he ask
you to make any investigation for him, to inform him of any facts or
things that might have happened theretofore ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. He had everything we had which had
come in, in the way of dispatches.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, how long was it after the event before you
began to hear about the possibilities of a Roberts Commission being
organized.
Admiral Stark. Just about the time it happened, just about the
time the Commission was formed here.
Mr. Gearhart. That was right immediately, or almost immediately
after the bombs fell at Pearl Harbor that there was talk in the United
States about creating a nonpartisan national commission to go to
Hawaii to make an investigation with respect to the causes and
responsibilities involved?
5236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. There was talk, of course, about an investigation.
I could not give you the date, but it was shortly after December 7
that that investigating commission went out.
Mr, Gearhart. It was only a few days until the Congress acted and
a commission was authorized, the President made the appointment of
Justice Eoberts, is that correct?
Admiral Stark. I have forgotten about the Congress authorizing it.
It was only a few days.
[13919] Mr. Gearhart. I am in error. It was only a few days
that the President made the appointment and made the announcement
of the Commission ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. I think the record should show that the Congress did
not authorize it.
Mr. Gearhart. I did make that correction. It was not necessary
for you to interpose.
Now, as soon as it was determined to have an investigation by an
impartial board it became necessary to amass testimony and evidence
for the benefit of the Commission, did it not ?
Admiral Stark. During the process ; yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And did you assist in the gathering of the informa-
tion for the Roberts Commission ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir, except that I testified.
Mr. Gearhart. And you heard the testimony of General Marshall
that he immediately busied himself in getting evidence together for
the benefit of the Commission, did not you ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recaU that.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Then, there were other investigations that
were conducted, some informally and some formally, were there not,
following in rapid succession, right on down until the Army board was
organized and until the Navy Court of Inquiry was organized, and
there were investigations after investigations [139£0] follow-
ing one after another ?
Admiral Stark. I remember of none other except that of the Roberts
Commission, unless you call Colonel Knox's trip out there to see what
had happened one. I do not recall any other up until the summer of
1944, I think, when the Army and Navy held their — There was one
other. Admiral Hart was sent by the Secretary of the Navy, I be-
lieve— I did not appear before him, I was in Europe — on an investi-
gating committee, and the Army may have sent someone at the same
time, but I am not clear on that. But the only ones I remember were
the Roberts Commission and Hart prior to the Regular Army and
Navy courts.
Mr. Gearhart. Then, there were investigations following the Army
and Navy inquiries ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, there was Admiral Hewitt. He was appointed
by the Secretary to make a follow-up of the Navy inquiry.
Mr. Gearhart. And the Colonel from San Francisco was appointed
to conduct a parallel investigation on the part of the Army, was not he ?
Ajdmiral Stark. I have not paid any attention to that. I think
they made further investigations,
[1S9£1] Mr. Murphy. Colonel Clausen,
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5237
Mr. Gearhart. Then after that time, there was a still further in-
vestigation, was there not, prior to the beginning of this investigation,
the Clarke investigation?
Admiral Stark. I do not remember that.
Mr. Gearhart. In how many of those investigations did you testify ?
Admiral Stark. I testified before the Roberts Commission ; I testi-
fied before the Navy, and I testified before this committee.
I was not interviewed by Admiral Hart, nor was I interviewed by
Admiral Hewitt.
Mr. Gearhart. In relation to those investigations that you did not
testify in, did you have anything to do with the collection of evidence
for the benefit of those investigations?
Admiral Stark. Nothing whatsoever; no sir. I was not here; I
was in Europe.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, were you interrogated when you testified be-
fore the Roberts Commission as to where you were the previous Satur-
day night ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall that. I think I was not. I do not
{13922^ Mr. Gearhart. What?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall.
Mr. Gearhart. You had testified prior to the commencement of
this investigation that you did not know where you were on the pre-
vious Saturday night, had you not ?
Admiral Stark. I have forgotten for the moment whether that
came up in the Navy Court, or not. That would be the onJy one
where I was questioned.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, it was generally known, before we came
together in this investigating body that you had testified or stated
theretofore that you did not know where you were on Saturday night ?
Admiral Stark. That would be logical.
Mr. Gearhart. Then you had told some people, some investigating
body before this hearing began that you did not know where you were
the previous Saturday night?
Admiral Stark. If I did, that would have been in the Naval Court
of Inquiry.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, do you remember whether or not that question
was asked you in the Roberts Investigation ?
Admiral Stark. I think it was not. I have no recollection of it.
Mr. Gearhart. When were you first asked as to where you were
on the previous Saturday night ?
{13923'\ Admiral Stark. I would have to check that in the
Naval Court of Inquiry. I may have been asked at that time.
Mr. Gearhart. Were you not asked informally by some other people
prior to that time ?
Admiral Stark. Not that I recall ; no, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, this has been quite an old question with you
as to where you were the previous Saturday night, has it not? It
has been asked you over and over again ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. What effort have you made to ascertain, prior to
this investigation, where you were the previous Saturday night?
Admiral Stark. Only to search my memory, Mr. Gearhart, to see
if I could recollect anything, which t had been unable to do. When
5238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I lieard *'The Student Prince" mentioned — and as I testified before,
I cannot think of anythinf^ which I haA^e not covered on it — I immedi-
ately contacted my daughter and her husband in Philadelphia. I
have an impression that I had seen the revival there, and they said
"no." I let it go at that, until it came up here that I was at the
National Theatre that night. You will recall that in previous testi-
mony I said I doubted if they had tried to contact me on Saturday
night, because it was not clear to me, from reading Kramer's testimony
or Wilkinson's testimony, that they had contacted [13924] me.
Kramer said he thought Wilkinson was going to do it.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes.
Now, did you and Mrs. Stark give any theater parties about that
time ?
Admiral Stark. I do not recall without looking at the record.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, do you
Admiral Stark (interposing). Now, just for a minute. Perhaps
with impropriety, do you recall any parties that you gave about that
time?
Mr. Gearhart, No ; and that is just the diiference between you and
me. I have no reason to think about what I did the previous Saturday
night until I was appointed on this committee, but you have been
working with the evidence in this case constantly, from the very be-
ginning of the case, after the tragic event. Your mind has been con-
stantly kept upon it, and this question has been constantly propounded
to you, "Where were you the previous Saturday night?"
Admiral Stark. May I ask what you mean by "constantly?"
Mr. Gearhart. Just as I have pointed out, in these various
investigations.
Admiral Stark. I had no reason to stop and recall where I Avas that
Saturday niglit until the question was propounded to [139^5]
me by the investigating committee some years after the event.
Mr. Gearhart. You were constantly interrogated in presenting
evidence, were you not, and digging up evidence in connection with
this affair, until you left for London ?
Admii-al Stark. No, I was not. I was busy fighting a war up until
the time I left for London.
As I previously recorded here, I was not going into i^ost mortems.
We were just as busy as we could be looking ahead and fighting a war
every minute of the day and night, and on the record, it shows, I
think, about 16 hours a day or 18 hours on the job.
Mr. Gearhart. Where should you have been, Admiral Star!*:, on
that night, when an attack was expected any moment? Don't you
think you should liaA'e been with your Commander in Chief?
Admiral Stark. No, I do not. If that had been maintained as you
state, and as Colonel Stimson states, I would have been with the
Commander in Chief constantly for several days.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, had you not been as a matter of fact in his
company very, very frequently, prior to the 7th of December?
Admiral Stark. I was always able to get in touch with him. Every-
body was always able to get in touch with me. I would not say we
were placed in confinement.
113926] Mr. Gearhart. Let us drop this matter.
The Vice Chairman. Just a moment.
What is the wish of the committee about continuing?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5239
Senator Ferguson. I have some questions, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Stark. So far as I am concerned, I could go on indefinitely.
The Vice Chairman, We will try to get through with Admiral
Stark.
Mr. Gearhart. When did you send Admiral Ingersoll to London
to discuss the possible naval cooperation of the British and American
Navies ?
Admiral Stark. I did not send Admiral Ingersoll to London to
discuss such a point. That occurred prior to my tenure of office as
Chief of Naval Operations.
Mr. Murphy. 1938.
Mr. Gearhart. And he was sent by whom ?
Mr. Richardson. If you know.
Admiral Stark. AVell, Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval Op-
erations prior to my going there. If it was in his tenure of office, he
would have been sent undoubtedly by concurrence with the Secretary,
or direction of the Secretary, but he was sent previous to my time.
Mr. Gearhart. Now, directing your attention to the year 1940,
did you request the British Government to send [13927] naval
experts to the United States to discuss the possibility of naval cooper-
ation ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, I did. I think it was May of 1940, but those
meetings were held in early 1941, as I recall, and completecl in March
of 1941.
Mr. Gearhart. But it was in 1940, the fall of 1940 that you com-
municated with Admiral Sir Dudley Pound of the British Navy,
requesting that he send his naval experts to the United States to
discuss collaboration between the two navies ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct, in case of war.
Mr. Gearhart. Upon whose responsibility was that message sent?
Admiral Stark. My OAvn,
Mr. Gearhart. Did you discuss the subject with the President?
Admiral Stark. I sent that on my own, and I did not notify the
President until after I had done it.
Mr. Gearhart. After you had sent the message, or after they had
arrived for consultation?
Admiral Stark. I think I notified him sometime in January,
Mr. Gearhart. And you want the members of this committee to
believe that you opened negotiations with the British first sea lord,
requesting him to send a committee of experts from [13928]
England to the United States to consult with you in respect to pos-
sible naval cooperation without your even telling the Commander
in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States ?
Admiral Stark. I so stated, and I hope the committee believes me.
Mr, Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ?
Mr. Gearhart. I yield .
Mr. Murphy. He so stated several months ago in this record.
Mr. Gearhart. Does that help the situation right now?
Mr, Murphy. I mean we covered it then.
Mr. Gearhart. And as the result of that message that you sent to
Sir Dudley Pound, a commission did arrive in the United States from
England ?
Admiral Stark. They did ; yes, sir.
5240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Gearhakt. And thej came in civilian clothes ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And a number of consultations were held at which
you were present ?
Admiral Stark. Generally speaking, I was not present with the
working committee, but of course I was in consultation with them, and
was informed as to what was going on.
Mr. Gearhart. Did you attend all of the meetings that were held
in the United States ?
[139^9] Admiral Stark. No, no; very, very few of them.
Mr. Gearhart. Where were those meetings held ?
Admiral Stark. They were held in the Navy Department.
Mr. Gearhart. Are you sure they were not held in private apart-
ments ?
Admiral Stark. My recollection is that they were held in the Navy
Department or the War Department. I consulted Marshall with
regard to sending that message. We were in agreement, and I think
the meetings were held in the Navy Department. They were not held
in private apartments.
Mr. Gearhart. Have you read this little article that appeared in the
October issue of Reader's Digest ?
Admiral Stark. I think not. That is this year ?
Mr. Gearhart. In October of 1944, an article which is from the pen
of Frederick Sundern, Jr. Do you recall it ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, I have read that. The meetings, which were
held quietly, there were one or two Canadian meetings, where Cana-
dians came up to my house.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, I have another
appointment. I ask that we ad j ourn until 2 : 30.
The Vice Chairman. Without objection, we will stand adjourned
until 2 : 30.
(Whereupon at 1 : 10 p. m., the committee adjourned to 2 : 30 p. m.,
of the same day.)
[139S0'\ atternoon session — 2 : 30 p. M.
The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order.
Does counsel have anything at this time ?
Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, we have two exhibits, the first of which
is a memorandum which has been distributed to the committee, and
the first page of which is on White House stationery, dated December
13, 1941. It is entitled, "Remarks of the President on the occasion of
the meeting of his Cabinet at 8:30 and continuing at 9:00 o'clock
with legislative leaders, on December 7, 1941."
We would like to offer that as Exhibit No. IGO.
I should like to point out that at the top of the second page, in
parentheses, there is a note to the effect that a series of periods in
the memorandum "indicates inaudibility." I call your attention to
that note in connection with your reading of the memorandum.
The Vice Chairman. Let me inquire. The first page reads :
Remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his Cabinet at 8 : 30
and continuing at 9 o'clock with legislative leaders, on December 7, 1941.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5241
Is that a. m. or p. m. ?
Mr. Masten. Presumably that is the evening of December 7.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that the context
shows clearly that it is in the evening.
The Vice Chairman. It just so happens that I was one_ of
[13931] those present. I know they had one at that time. I just
wanted to know if it was the same one.
Mr. Murphy. I think you will find your name, Mr. Chairman, men-
tioned in the contents.
Senator Ferguson. May I inquire, Mr. Chairman, just what the evi-
dence will show as to what time this memorandum was received by
counsel ?
Mr. Masten. Senator, that was received last October or November,
I believe, from Miss Tully, and has been available to the committee
members ever since. I think it was last mentioned on the record by
Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. I requested that, in view of the fact we have gone into
the night of December 6, and what the President's attitude was, in
view of the fact that there was a discussion here as to the mind of the
President and what had occurred for the weeks preceding Pearl
Harbor, I thought we ought to have the whole picture.
Senator Ferguson. There is no doubt we ought to have it. But I
don't recall this, Mr. Masten. I thought I had seen all the papers
that weren't in evidence.
Mr. Masten. This was in the papers that you looked at.
Senator Ferguson. I don't recall this.
Mr. Masten. I have the photostat here, which was in the papers
you examined.
Senator Ferguson. I don't recall the "indicates [139S2] in-
audibility."
Mr. Richardson. You will notice, Senator, that there are through
the whole thing lapses. Evidently the stenographer was a little over-
come in the situation.
Mr. Murphy. All the papers have been furnished copies of it, have
they not ?
Mr. Masten. Yes, they have.
The second exhibit which we would like to offer as Exhibit 161,
consists of two documents which are drafts of a proposed message to
the President, which drafts were prepared by Secretary Knox and
Secretary Stimson.
They are referred to in Secretary Stimson's statement and his notes,
at pages 28, 29 and 56. We would like to offer them as Exhibit No. 161.
I might add that these drafts are the papers referred to by Secretary
Hull on page 2 of Exhibit No. 19 in this proceeding, where he says, in
his memorandum to the President "there is attached a draft of a
proposed message to Congress, to which draft the Secretary of War
and the Secretary of Navy made material contributions."
It is our understanding which these two drafts, which we now offer
as Exhibit No. 161, are the material contributions referred to in Ex-
hibit No. 19.
The Vice Chairman. The exhibits will be received, as indicated
by counsel.
5242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[1393o] (The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits No.
160 and No, 161," respectively.)
The Vice Chairman. Is that all from counsel?
Mr. Hasten. That is all.
The Vice Chairman. Very well.
TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed)
The Vice Chairman. Admiral, do you have anything further you
desire to say before your.examination is resumed?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, the last exhibit, which is the one from
the Secretary of the Navy, dated November 29, 1941 (Exhibit No. 161)
contains this sentence on page No. 5 :
Unless Japan renounces such purposes and withdraws this threat of further
conquest by force, the four nations involved must resort to force to prevent this
aggression, since arguments appear to have failed.
Were you consulted by the Secretary in relation to that?
Admiral Stark. No sir; I don't — I don't know what this docu-
ment is.
Senator Ferguson. Well, it is a tnemorandum which gives his ver-
sion as to what should be said to Congress by the President.
Admiral Stark. Well, I know his thoughts on that, and he
[13934-] talked about it a great deal. In fact, I don't know that
there was much of anj^thing we hadn't gone over.
Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted by Secretary Knox about
the fact that a message was to be prepared for Congress and what he
should put in it, you being the Chief of Naval Operations?
Admiral Stark. May I read this over, just to reflect a little on it?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
(Pause.)
Admiral Stark. He states here,
I have had the assistance of both A(hniral Stark and Admiral Turner in the
summation of the military situation.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. So it is apparent that we were consulted.
Senator Ferguson. But you don't recall it ?
Admiral Stark. I recall having talked over every phase of this
situation as it went along, and I have no doubt if he was preparing a
memorandum of this sort that he talked to me about certain phases.
Senator Ferguson. It shows that you were present at the meeting.
It is on page 55 and 56 of Secretary Stimson's memorandum, where that
message is spoken about. Did you discuss the contents at tliat meeting ?
[13935] Admiral Stark. Well, I would just like to look at the
record. Page what ?
Senator Ferguson. Pages 55 and 56.
(Pause.)
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Stark, you have read over this proposed
message or information for a message. You note it is dated November
29th.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. It says.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5243
The President — en route to Warm Springs, Georgia.
You also recall, do you not, that the 29th was the final deadline.
That is the one where they said, "spell it out." The 29th.
Admiral Stakk. Yes, sir ; I recall that.
Senator Ferguson. Now, you anticipated an attack immediately
following the 29th, isn't that correct ?
Admiral Stark. We anticipated an attack following the 29th. I
wouldn't say immediately. You may recall that on the very day of
this deadline a dispatch came in from Tokyo to make one more try.
I think we, as I recall, broke that down on the 30th. And in the
case of Italy, I had seen deadlines come and go until I was leary of
them. That is why in mv first dispatch, instead of putting down the
29th, which, like the 25tli, had [13936^ passed, I said, "within
the next few days." We didn't know just when.
Senator Ferguson. Well, you remember — and the reason I cite the
Secretary of War is that he kept a diary.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You will recall that somewhere
Admiral Stark. This is Colonel Knox.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. The Secretary of War, I was saying, kept
a diary.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You recall that he stated that the President
had said an attack by Monday, when j^ou were holding a meeting,
immediately preceding the first of December?
Admiral Stark. Yes sir, I recall that.
Senator Ferguson. Now, when did it change, after the President
told you an attack would take place any day, and probably by
Monday ?
Admiral Stark. Well, we
Senator Ferguson. Which would be immediately following the
29th.
Admiral Stark. We didn't know. Senator Ferguson, just when
that blow would fall. We were expecting it any day. But just when,
we didn't know. And we didn't know until December 7.
[13937] Senator Ferguson. Well, does this change your opinion
of this warning that you anticipated that an attack would be made
by Japan rather than America declaring war? Would this message
of Secretary Knox have been a request of Congress to declare war?
It wouldn't, would it? As I read it.
Admiral Stark. No, sir. The last paragraph, I think, makes that
fairly clear, in which it states :
In a final effort to prevent an extension of liostilities in the Far East, I have
acWressed an appeal to the Emperor of Japan to join me in my efforts.
Those efforts being toward continued peace in the Pacific.
Senator Fei{guson (continuing) : She can go no further without seriously
threatening the vital interests of Great Britain, the Netherlands Indies, Aus-
tralia and ourselves. Unless Japan renounces such purposes and withdraws
this threat of further conquest by force, the four nations involved must resort
to force to prevent this aggression, since arguments appear to have failed.
In a final effort to prevent an extension of hostilities in the Far East, I have
addressed an appeal to the Emperor of Japan to join me in my efforts. In the
meantime, while I await the result of this latest effort toward peaceful solution,
I felt it incumbent upon me to apprise the Congress, and through you, the people
of the United States, of the [139S8] serious situation with which we
are confronted.
5244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. That, I take it, is Colonel Knox's way, the way
he would have put it, had he been President.
Senator Ferguson. That is correct; but it wasn't understood at the
meeting that Colonel Knox was to submit a draft, and the Secretary
of State, and the Secretary of War, that those drafts were to be call-
ing for a declaration of war?
Admiral Stark. I don't quite get your question on that, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. When you held the meeting and it was suggested
that the three Secretaries give to the President a rough draft, or a
draft of what they thought ought to go into a message to Congress,
there was no idea that that message to Congress was to be a declara-
tion, a request for a declaration of war from Congress, it was merely
to advise the people of the United States, through their Congress, as
to how serious the situation looked to the President of the United
States; isn't that correct?
Admiral Stark. It was certainly to show the people of the United
States and Congress how serious he considered the situation. Whether
or not anything would have been put in there which in certain con-
tingencies the President might request or ask authority to go ahead,
I don't know.
[139S9] Senator Ferguson. But I am asking you, was there any-
thing discussed at the meeting
Admiral Stark. I don't
Senator Ferguson (continuing). — That is was contemplated by the
President that he would request Congress to declare war ?
Admiral Stark. I don't recall so.
Senator Ferguson. Then it would be fair to say that this was a fair
appraisal of what they were to do, at least this was Mr. Knox's part
in the situation?
Admiral Stark. That was the way he felt about it. He wrote it.
Senator Ferguson. Well, is that as you understood it?
Admiral Stark. Well, as I have stated before, my recollection of
that is that they would make a final appeal to the Emperor and that
they would also inform the Congress of the picture. I don't recall
particularly that in that address to Congress it was to be mentioned
that the President — that it was to be considered a request for a decla-
ration.
Senator Ferguson. That was your understanding of the situation.
Now, I want to call your attention, so that the record may be
straight, Mr. Gearhart is not here, but there was some question as to
whether or not you had been asked the [1S940] question as to
where you were on Saturday in the evening, before the Navy board.
Admiral Stark. Yes sir.
Senator Ferguson. On page 166 of the Navy Court of Inquiry
transcript, August 11, 1944 :
Q. Do you recall two occasions on eitlier the fourth or fifth of December when
Captain Wilkinson and Commander McCollum came to your office to confer
about intelligence relative to the Pacific and Japanese situation that you con-
sidered of such import that you called a conference with Admiral Turner, Admiral
Ingersoll, and Admiral Noyes?
A. No, I don't recall.
Q. Do you recall the events of Saturday, December 6, 1941?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall what time you left the office after the routine day, the time
in the afternoon or evening?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5245
A. No, I do not.
Q. Do you recall what you were doing Saturday evening, 6 December?
A. No, I couldn't say what I was doing that evening. My remembrance is —
I think I was home but I couldn't say. I don't recall clearly.
Q. Do you recall receiving at your home, or wherever [13941] you were,
between 9 and 10 p. m., Washington time, important intelligence information
brought by an officer messenger?
A. No, I haven't the slightest recollection of anything of that sort on that
evening.
Q. Do you remember whether there was a Lieutenant Commander Kramer
stationed in Naval Communications or ONI?
A. Yes, there was.
Then they go to another subject.
Admiral Stark. Yes sir.
Senator Ferguson, Doesn't that refresh your memory that you were
questioned at the 1944 hearing on August 11 in that regard?
Admiral Stark. Yes, it is evident I was.
Senator Ferguson. I would like to straighten the record. This
morning there was some question asked about the passing of an act
relative to the draft in 1941.
Admiral Stark. Yes sir.
Senator Ferguson. That was the extension of the draft, was it not,
so that they would be kept in longer than one year, which was originally
called for ? The draft bill would have gone on just the same, they would
have been drafted and kept in their year, but those that were about to
get out would have been retained ; isn't that correct ?
Admiral Stark. It probably is, if you recall it. I [1394^}
remember that we wanted to extend the time. Marshall did.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. We had a 6-year enlistment at that time.
Senator Ferguson. You had enlistments, so you had a different
proposition.
Now, Congressman Murphy asked you whether or not this was the
first shot, and I take it that was as to the first shot in the war between
America and Japan. Was there any other shooting prior to this, in
this war, other than Pearl Harbor ?
Mr. Murphy. I don't remember asking him that. I asked him about
the Panay and the other boat, and the American missions, and the
American property in China. I said that those things had all occurred
before Pearl Harbor.
Senator Ferguson. I am trying to get it from the Admiral.
So far as you were concerned, this was the first shot in the war
between the United States and Japan, at Pearl Harbor ?
Admiral Stark. In the war between us ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. There wasn't any shooting at sea, at \lS9Ji3'\
submarines. Admiral Stark?
Admiral Stark. Well, to be perfectly accurate, and I think it is
in the record, there was a submarine attacked by our forces that
morning.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. I am talking about this Pearl Harbor
attack on the 7th.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And I include
Admiral Stark. That would include that, yes, sir.
5246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. But no others that you know of?
Admiral Stakk. I don't recall any others, no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do you recall the so-called i^ists,
when you would receive these messages you would get a gist, that is
a memorandum or a flag, saying what was in the various papers that
you got ?
Admiral Stark. I think — are you referring to magic?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. The word would come in, it wouldn't be a gist, it
would be a clip on the messages which were considered of importance.
Senator Ferguson. We have in eA^dence now a gist which was
attached to the October — no, September 29 — it is the bomb plot
niesage.
Mr. Murphy. September 29.
\1394i] Senatoi- Ferguson. 1941.
Mr. Murphy. Translated on October 9 or 10. October 9 or 10.
Senator Ferguson. The testimony shows that that had a gist
attached to it indicating the contents of it.
Could you find that testimon}'^, the testimony on that gist, Mr.
Masten?
Mr. Masten. I don't know whether we can put our hands on it
immediately. We will try.
Senator Fefguson. Now, Congressman Murphy asked s(mie ques-
tions of Captain Kramer at page 11,096 of the typewritten record :
Mr. Murphy. Now, yoii also referred, in your letter from the South Pacific,
to the possibility of certain summaries.
Did you retain summaries, or was that just to meet the situation from day
to day in order to explain to the recipients of magic what the developments were?
Captain Kkammek. I meant simply the gist that I have just referred to, sir.
But I didn't find the gist.
Does that refresh your memory?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; not at all. I don't know Avhat he is refer-
ring to, unless he kept a gist for his own running [lS,94^j] in-
formation. I kept a gist, what I call a "do list", also, things that I
wanted to follow through on.
Senator Ferguson. The testimony showed that these gists were
attached.
Now, I asked you the other day, the last day you were here, about
the logs at your office?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I have a paper purporting to be the log dated
December 6, from "1145-1900, December G, 1941."
What time of day w^ould that be ?
Look at the top of that, Admiral, and tell me.
(The log above referred to, later marked ''Exhibit No. 162," was
handed to the witness.)
Admiral Stark. That would be from 11 : 45 in the morning until 7
in the evening, that first one, December 6.
Senator Ferguson. What is the next one ?
Admiral Stark. The next one is 061535. That w^ould be on the 6th,
3 : 35 p. m. And between that and 1730, which would be 5 : 30.
Senator Ferguson. Now, would that indicate that you were not in
between those hours and that message was left for you ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5247
Admiral Stark. No, sir; this is simply the log of the watch officer.
\139Jf6\ Senator Fi:kgusox. And
Admiral Stark. The duty officer. As you mentioned the other day,
the duty officer usually keeps a log of ji^wy happenings.
Senator Ferguson. I want you to read into the record the log. If
I might see it again, I will tell you the part I would like to have.
It begins, "1900, 6 December, to 0200 7 December."
What is 1900?
Admiral Stark. 7 p. m.
Senator Ferguson. This message:
"At 2000"— 2000 is 8 o'clock?
Admiral Stark. S p. m., yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. 8 p. m.
Would you read that item into the record. I want to ask you some
(juestions about it.
Admiral Stark. "1800, 6 December, to 0200, 7 December."
Senator Ferguson. The next item appears to be "2000". Read that.
Admiral Stark. At "2000", which would be 8 p. m., "Major E. L.
Harrison, aide to the Secretary of War, telephoned that the Secretary
of War desired the following information by 0900, Sunday" — morning.
Senator Ferguson. What time is 0900 Sunday morning?
[13947] Admiral Stark. 9 a. m.
Senator Ferguson. 9 o'clock Sunday morning. Will you continue?
Admiral Stark (reading) :
Compilation of men-of-war in Far East, British American, Japanese, Dutch,
Russian. Also compilation of American men-of-war in Pacific Fleet, with
locations
I suppose — well.
with locations, and a list of American men-of-war in the Atlantic without loca-
tions. Admirals Ingersoll, Stark, and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted,
and the Secretary directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him
prior to 1000—
which would be 10 a. m.
Sunday, December 7.
Senator Ferguson. Is that tlie end ?
Admiral Stark. That is the end.
The next thing is Sunday, 7 December, at 2030, which would be 8
o'clock that night.
Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, the Secretary of War of the
United States was inquiring from your office through his aide that
the Secretary of War desired the following information by 9 o'clock
Sunday morning, December 7 :
Compilation of men-of-war in the Far Bast, British, American, Japanese,
Dutch, Russian. Also compilation of American men-of-war in Pacific Fleet, with
locations.
[1394^1 Now, can j'ou explain the Secretary of AVar of the United
States at 8 o'clock Saturday evening was requesting from your office,
OPNAV, all of the warships — and that is what they mean by men-
of-war?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. That was the entire strength of the allied
fleet in the Pacific.
5248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; with the locations. That would mean that
he wanted to know where the ships were, whether they were in Pearl
Harbor or where they were ; isn't that true ?
Admiral Stark. Yes. He also refers to the Far East, Russian, and
the whole business.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. But the Secretary of the United States on
Saturday evening through his aide was requesting your office to give
him the location of every man-of-war of the United States in the
Pacific, and that would include where the ships were, whether laying
at dock or in Pearl Harbor or what, would it not ?
Admiral Stark. Well, it would indicate whether they were in Pearl
Harbor or not.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. What was in Pearl Harbor and what was in
Manila, and what was in the N. E. I., et cetera.
Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us why the Secretary of War
wanted to know what ships were in Pearl Harbor and wanted
[1S94^] it by 9 o'clock Sunday morning ?
Admiral Stark. I don't know Senator Ferguson why he wanted
it, unless at that time, and whether he did or not, I don't know, the
record will show, he had received the 13-point message, or how he
considered it — I don't know why he wanted it.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ?
Senator Ferguson. Not yet. . I don't want the witness interrupted
at the moment.
Admiral Stark. I really don't know why he wanted it.
Senator Ferguson. That is 8 o'clock on Saturday evening.
Admiral Stark. Yes. I have got the thing perfectly, just exactly
what he wanted, and the time he wanted it, but I don't recall the
incident.
Senator Ferguson. "Admirals Ingersoll, Stark" — and that would
be you, would it not ?
Admiral Stark. That would be myself.
Senator Ferguson, "and the Secretary of the Navy were con-
sulted"— which was Frank Knox — "were consulted" — and this is prior
to 8 o'clock Saturday evening.
Admiral Stark. It doesn't say prior to 8 o'clock.
Senator Ferguson. He telephoned it in at 8 o'clock.
Admiral Stark. They came over and contacted our watch officer
at 8 o'clock for this information. Why both Inger- [ISOSO]
soil and myself were to be contacted, I do not know.
Senator Ferguson. No, you hadn't been contacted. You were
consulted.
"and the Secretary directed" — that is the Secretary of War —
"that the information be compiled" and delivered to him prior to 10
o'clock Sunday morning, the 7th of December.
Mr. Keefe. You mean the Secretary of the Navy.
Senator Ferguson. Secretary of the Navy.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. It is 10 o'clock.
Admiral Stark. I can make an assumption in view of the testi-
mony I have heard since then.
Senator Ferguson. No. You were consulted at least prior to 8
o'clock.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5249
Admiral Stark. I don't think it states that I was consulted prior
to 8 o'clock.
Senator Ferguson (reading) :
Admirals Ingersoll, Stark and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted.
Admiral Stark. It doesn't say prior to 8 o'clock.
Senator Ferguson. This was entered at 8 o'clock. How would the
man write in there that you were consulted if you weren't consulted ?
Admiral Stark. I would like to recite on that, because I have a
different idea from that what you are stating.
[13951] Senator Ferguson. I was reading.
Mr. MuKPHY. Are there copies for the other members of the com-
mittee ?
Senator Ferguson. The surprising thing is, to this member of the
committee, that it took almost 4 months to get from the Navy Depart-
ment this log.
Commander Baecher.^ It was requested for the first time day before
yesterday.
Senator Ferguson. As I understood it, all papers were to be de-
livered by the Navy to counsel. Counsel has nothing to do with us
not getting it because counsel didn't know it existed. In fact, I do not
think the committee knew it existed until the questions were asked the
day before yesterday.
Mr. Murphy. Does the record show the request was made day before
yesterday.
Commander Baecher. The record shows that, yes, sir. In view of
the situation maybe the answer to Mr. Richardson should be produced.
Admiral Stark. "At 2000", which is 8 p. m., "Major E. L. Harrison,
aide to the Secretary of War, telephoned that the Secretary of War
desired the following" — Now, I do not read into that, that it was
prior to 8 o'clock.
Senator Ferguson. At 8 o'clock, the aide telephoned that the Secre-
tary of War desired it. So the telephone call would [13962] be
at 8 o'clock.
Admiral Stark. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. I am just assuming that if he telephoned it in
that at least a fraction of a second before that the Secretary of War
wanted the information.
Admiral Stark. Oh, I see what you mean. It was just a case of
construction. I thought you meant he had telephoned prior to 8
o'clock or that I had known prior to that. That is plain.
Senator Ferguson. That the Secretary of War desired the follow-
ing information by 9 o'clock Sunday morning December 7. Wliat
does he want ?
Admiral Stark. He wanted the disposition of the fleet in the Pacific
and the knowledge of what we had in the Atlantic without reference
to location in the Atlantic.
Senator Ferguson. But he wanted the exact location of the ships
in the Pacific, every man-of-war, didn't he?
Admiral Stark. Yes; and I wanted it, too. Senator Ferguson and
I kept a running record of it, to show what our strength was in the
various quarters, and to get a clear picture of the fleets of the world.
That was the most natural way in the w»rld to show it, just as he
gave it. I also kept the Atlantic Fleet, complete with the British,
French, and Italian.
1 Navy Department liaison officer to the committee. i. . _
79716 — 46 — pt. 11 8 .^fc,. _
5250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. He wanted to know the exact location of
[13[)-5o] each man-of-war by Sunday morning?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. At 9 o'clock.
Now, 1 ask you was that information furnished to the Secretary of
War by 9 o'clock the next morning?
Admiral Stark. Well, I suppose so. I have no record of that but
unquestionably if he wanted it at that time that information was
available and he got it.
Senator Ferguson. That would be in writing, would it not?
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. I ask that we get that record.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. Not now.
Commander Baecher, wdll you get that information that was fur-
nished by 9 o'clock that morning ?
Commander Baecher. If it is available.
Senator Ferguson. What do you mean, if it is available. That is,
if you can find it ; is that what you mean ?
Commander Baecher. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. Will the Senator yield on a point of informa-
tion ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; to the Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. I am not clear on one point. It seems, from
what you have read and what the Admiral has said, that the [13954-]
Secretary of War requested this information by 9 o'clock Sunday morn-
ing, and it seems, as I caught it, that the Secretary of the Navy asked
that the information be furnished him by 10 o'clock.
Senator Ferguson. We will clear that up.
The Vice Chairman. I had assmned that when this request came
from the Secretary of War to the Navy Department, that the Secre-
tary of the Navy, naturally being anxious to comply with a request
of his Cabinet colleague, the Secretary of War would request that the
information be assembled and that it would be furnished to the Secre-
tary of the Navy to be transmitted to the Secretary of War, which
would look to me like it obviously should come to the Secretary of
the Navy before it went to the Secretary of War, but yet the note read
indicates that the Secretary of the Navy requested it to be sent to
him an hour after the Secretary of War had requested that he get it.
That is the way it reads.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ?
Senator Ferguson. Just a moment until I try to clear something up.
Admiral
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. There isn't any doubt after you read this that
this was a request by the Secretary of War for informa- [1395S]
tion relative to the location of each man-of-war in the Pacific by
9 o'clock on Sunday morning ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, when is the first that you knew that the
Secretary of War wanted this information ?
Admiral Stark. I don't recall this. Senator Ferguson. It would
be unusual for both Ingersoll and myself to be called on this. That
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5251
sort of information I had. It was readily available. P)Ut this par-
ticular thing here, I do not recall.
Senator 1^ erguson. Do I understand that you knew where every
ship, every man-of-war, was in the Pacific on Saturday?
Admiral Stark. When you say where every man-of-war was, w^e
knew, for example, the constitution of the Pacific Fleet, and that it
w^as basing in the Hawaiian area. Just wiiere they were we could
not generally have told day by day, because they had their exercises,
and so forth.
Now, as to Hart's fleet in the Pacific, we knew- exactly what he had.
We knew that certain craft he had sent south, because that had been
reported. Just what he had out at that time, I do not know.
Senator Ferguson. He wanted tiie location.
Admiral Stark. Well, we could have said, "basing," for example,
"on Manila," but if he had four or five submarines reaching out to the
northwest on reconnaissance duty we would [13956] not have
known it necessarily.
Senator Fergusox. Wouldn't you have found it out and told him
that you had ships out at sea, the submarines were in certain locations?
Admiral Stark. Not necessarily.
Senator Ferguson. The battleships were in Pearl Harbor, the de-
stroyers were so and so; Halsey's fleet was at a certain location?
Admiral Stark. No. You wull recall that some of the movements
which were made we did not know of until after Pearl Harbor, That
is all in the testimony.
Senator Ferguson. Didn't this chart in your office show the lo-
cation ?
Admiral Stark. Not the exact location. That has been made plain
before, that the commander in chief, within his area, moves the ships
around. We know the area. We do know where they are, according
to our major schemes. When a ship goes into overhaul, where they are
holding target practice, the periods for it, and so forth, but just what
is in and out we do not know.
Senator Ferguson. Will you get us the records in the office that
were used to give this information to the Secretary of War by 9 o'clock
the following morning?
What was done by the Navy Department to get the information
[13957] for the Secretary of Wa^r?
Admiral Stark. Well, that, I take it, you want directed to the Navy
Department; not to me?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. You haven't access to it?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. Commander Baecher is here for that pur-
pose.
Senator Ferguson. I address that through the Chair. Mr. Chair-
man, I W'ould like to have those.
The Vice Chairman. An effort will be made to supply the informa-
tion requested.
Admiral Stark. This is off the record. You can get that, Com-
mander Baecher, in Intelligence — or Brainerd might be able to fur-
nish something. The ship movements and foreign business will all
be in Intelligence.
Senator Ferguson. Can you tell us why the Secretary of War
wanted the location of the men-of-war by 9 o'clock Sunday morning ?
Admiral Stark. He wanted to know where they were.
5252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Do you know why he wanted to know ?
Admiral Stark. Except he was interested in it. No; I could not
state exactly why he wanted it. He was making his estimates of the
i^icture, and he wanted the entire picture.
Senator Ferguson. Had you discussed this question prior to 8
o'clock with anyone?
[139S8~\ Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Particularly not the Secretary of War?
Admiral Stark. Not that I recall. And I may state that a record
of that sort was something that I was always keeping. And periodic
reports.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, we come to the "period." —
"without locations," as far as the Atlantic Fleet was concerned. That
is a "period." And then we start out :
Admirals Ingersoll, Stark, and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted and
the Secretary directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him
prior to 1000"—
10 o'clock-
Sunday, 7 December.
That would indicate that at least prior to 8 o'clock on Saturday evening
you were consulted about this and the Secretary of the Navy was con-
sulted and Admiral Ingersoll was consulted. Will you state whether
or not you were consulted prior to this ?
Admiral Stark. Well, there is nothing here, again, I would say, to
indicate that I was consulted prior to 8 o'clock.
Senator Ferguson. Well, if this was written at 8 o'clock and it said
you were consulted, it would indicate that you were consulted prior
to that, would it not ?
Admiral Stark. Not to me ; no, sir.
[139691 It states "Admirals Ingersoll, Stark, and the Secretary
of the Navy were consulted." This was after the 2000 call, as I make
it.
Senator Ferguson. The next
Mr. Keefe. Right there, Senator : Do I understand Admiral Stark
to mean that his contention is that this message came to the watch
officer, he made a notation of the request, and then he says that Admiral
Stark and Admiral Ingersoll and somebody else were consulted, and
that they were consulted after the call came in ?
Admiral Stark. That is what it says to me ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Below "7 December" at 2030— that is 8: 30?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. So then you would say that under your reading
prior to 8: 30 that night you had been consulted, because if this man
is keeping proper records he entered the next entry at 8 : 30.
Admiral Stark. This is something else again.
Senator Ferguson. Sure.
Admiral Stark. This states :
At 2030 the Coast Guard Duty Officer telephoned to tlie Operations Duty Officer.
Commander Feinald read Secret Dispatch 070715. No action taken.
[13960'] That is part of his log. Whether it has any bearing
whatsoever on the former question I don't know, and I could not tell
unless I saw that dispatch.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE ' 5253
Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't you say the log officer, when keeping
his log, would write them down as they came in?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Therefore, his next entry, being at 2030, that
which had happened prior to that he put prior to 2030 — which is
8:30?
Admiral Stark. That could be an assumption. Senator Ferguson,
as I see it, but not necessarily an accurate one.
You may put down a telephone call and try to do something. Per-
haps the line is busy. You may have to wait; meanwhile, another
call may come in. I don't know.
Senator Ferguson. Then, I will
Admiral Stark. It might be right ; it might not.
Senator Ferguson. I will ask you: Did this log officer reach you
or anyone representing you between 8 and 8 : 30 so he could get this
information ?
Admiral Stark. I don't recall it.
Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't you recall if someone was telling you
that the Secretary of War wanted to know the location of every one
of your men-of-war in the Pacific and he had to have it — or wanted
it, at least — prior to 9 o'clock the [13961] next morning and
you were consulted?
Admiral Stark. I wouldn't necessarily remember it after a lapse
of 5 years. Senator. I had furnished Mr. Stimson data from time to
time. He was intensely interested in the broad picture and from
time to time we furnished that data to different people, but I do not
recall at this particular instance that evening. He may have. I don't
deny that he did, but I do not recall it.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ?
I think there is an answer to what you are looking for right here.
Secretary Stimson's diary tells you what he is looking for.
Senator Ferguson. I will take that later. I want to find out what
this witness knows.
Do you know why the Secretary of the Navy would direct your
office to furnish him this same information as to the location of your
men-of-war in the Pacific which would have told them that your fleet
was in Pearl Harbor, to be compiled and delivered to him prior to
10 o'clock?
Admiral Stark. No; I do not. Unless he had been in touch with
Stimson, and, of course, we do now know from the record that they
met together that morning. Whether it was 1000 or 1030, I am not
sure. But I did not know it.
Senator Ferguson. You were not consulted about it?
[13962] Admiral Stark. I state that I do not recall. Senator
Ferguson, this thing at all.
Senator Ferguson. Have you read the Stimson statement?
Admiral Stark. I have ; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. May I see that log. Senator?
Admiral Stark. I will give him this one.
Senator Ferguson. I think there is a difference in them.
Mr. Keefe. What is that?
5254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson (reading) :
At 2030 the Coast Guard Duty Officer telephoned
Mr. Keefe. It follows after the 2000 entry.
Senator Feeguson. Mine is :
telephoned to report the following.
What does that one say ? It is on the third page.
Admiral Stark. It starts at the bottom of one of the pages.
Mr. Keefe (reading) :
Admirals Ingersoll, Stark, and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted and
the Secretary directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him
prior to 1000 Sunday 7 December.
Then, another notation under 7 December :
At 2030 the Coast Guard Duty Officer telephoned
Senator Ferguson. But read the next line, "telephoned to" what 'i
Mr. Keefe. "Telephoned." It doesn't say.
[13963] Admiral Stark. Ol^DO — operations duty officer," he
probably means.
Mr. Keefe. Oh, yes. "OPDO— Commander Feinald."
Senator Ferguson. That is not in here, if you will compare them.
The commander's name is not in the photostatic copy. It may have
been torn off the top when they were clipped.
Mr. KJEEFE. The sequence may be wrong.
Mr. Murphy. The sequence is wrong. It is a different page. One
says "telephoned to report the following."
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. It is a different page.
Senator Ferguson. They just got them clamped together in the
wrong order. Yes.
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Senator FeKguson. Will you turn to Colonel Stimson's statement,
Sunday the 7th.
Admiral Stark. Page 59.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Do you know of anything in here that will
give us any light on what he wanted these locations for ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir. I saw nothing in here to indicate that un-
til I saw that this morning.
Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
[13964] Mr. Murphy. On Sunday, December 7, 1041, page 60
of the Stimson papers :
"Well, I have heard the telegrams which have been coming In about the Japa-
nese advances in the Gulf of Siam." He said, "Oh, no ; I don't mean that. They
have attacked Hawaii. They are now bombing Hawaii." Well, that was an ex-
citement indeed. The messages which we have been getting through Saturday
and yesterday and this moi-ning are messages which are brought by the Britisli
patrol south of Indochina, showing that large Japanese forces were moving up
into the Gulf of Siam. This itself was enough excitement and that was what we
were at work on our papers about.
I read that as an answer to your question.
Admiral Stark. May very well be.
Senator Ferguson. What did that have to do with the location of
the men- of -war?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5255
Admiral Stark. I gather this, from Congressman Murphy, and he
can correct
Senator Ferguson. You tell us what you say about it.
Admiral Stark. I say this would mean that we had been getting
messages of the disposition of the Japanese and Colonel Stimson
wanted to know what we had in that same area and he wanted to see
just what picture we had of the Japanese ships.
[13966] Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield further to read
just three or four more lines?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy (reading) :
The observer thought these forces were going to land probably either on the
eastern side of the Gulf of Siani, where it would be still in Indochina or on the
western side, where it would be the Kra Peninsula or possibly Malaya. The
British were very much excited about it, and our efforts this morning in drawing
our papers was to see whether or not we should all act together. The British
will have to fight if they attack the Kra Peninsula. We three all thought that
we must fight if the British fought. But now the Japs have solved the whole thing
by attacking us directly in Hawaii.
There are the papers he was preparing on the morning.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know what papers he was preparing,
Admiral ?
Admiral Stark. No. sir; I do not.
Senator Ferguson. Then, how do you know that this memorandum,
request for the location, had anything to do with what they were pre-
paring at the time of the attack?
Admiral Stark. Well, if they asked for them, and if they were
preparing something, it might have been they were studying the rela-
tive forces. I don't laiow, I never heard it discussed since. I have
no way of knowing.
[13966] Senator Ferguson. You haven't heard that an order
from the Secretary of War, direction by the Secretary of War and
the Secretary of Navy, had not been complied with by 10 o'clock
Sunday morning?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. So you have every reason to believe they had the
location of every man-of-war of our fleet?
Admiral Stark. I think unquestionably it was the duty officer's job
to get that through to somebody, Ingersoll, or me, or somebody, to get
the Secretary of War's request made up, and usually when we got those
requests we sat up all night, if necessary, to comply with them.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I ask that the man that made this report,
I can't tell his name from this — would you be able, Mr. Masten, to tell
us who made this report — be called and also that the aide of Secretary
Stimson be called as witnesses that we may get a detailed explanation
of this log.^
Commander Baecher. The person who wrote that item in the Navy
log is named C. D. Glover. He is now a rear admiral and is in
Honolulu.
Senator Ferguson. That is only a few days from Washington. Do
you know who the aide is?
[13967] Commander Baecher. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Who is in charge of the Army liaison here
today? Do you know who the aide is?
^ See p. 5482, infra.
5256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Nelson.^ No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Will you notify the committee, please, where
the aide is located?
Captain Nelson. I will attempt to locate him.
Mr. Masten. Senator, we have located the page reference to this
gist matter.
Senator Ferguson. I would like to see the gist matter. Wliat is the
first paper ?
Mr. Masten. It begins at the first paper, and the reference you
wanted is the second.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, instead of calling two or three wit-
nesses, it might be a good idea to ask Secretary Stimson if he got the
memorandum.
Senator Ferguson. Well, I have asked the Commander if he would
get us what information was furnished to the Secretary. I have
directed quite a number of questions to Secretary Stimson and I will
be glad to add to that list. We haven't gotten answer to the others,
though.
Now, going to page 11,000 of this paperbound volume, 11,207 in this
paperbound volume,- the Senator from Michigan is asking the question :
[13968] Senator Ferguson. And what was there on that? Read what is on
there.
Captain Kbamee. The gist of this message is : Tokyo directs special reports on
ships in Pearl Harbor which is divided into five areas for the purpose of showing
exact locations.
Now, that is a sheet of paper attached to the magic, which was the
bomb plot as we describe it here, and the record shows what we are
talking about, and the gist was a flag, in other words, from which you
would be able to read this language :
Tokyo directs special reports on ships in Pearl Harbor which is divided into
5 areas for the purpose of showing exact locations."
Now, that would point out the significance, would it not? The next
question by the Senator from Michigan was :
Now, this particular paper that I have in mind and have shown you with this
written on it.
And then I read this report, or part of it. That would be a flag to
you, would it not. Admiral, telling you the substance of what the
Japanese were trying to find out about our ships in Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Stark. It shows very clearly what they wanted.
Senator Ferguson. Yes; what they wanted.
[13969] Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Someone had boiled this down, sunmiarized it,
and gave you in a few words, or gave in this gist which was attached
to this message, what it was?
Admiral Stark. Well, now, when you say "gave you,'' which means
''gave me"
Senator Ferguson. Do you claim you never got any gists?
Admiral Stark. I do. We have been over this bomb plot thing
from start to finish, all of us in the front office, and I still not only have
no recollection of having seen it, it is my honest opinion that I did not
see it.
' Capt. C. Roger Nelson. U. S. Army, liaison officer to the committee.
' Hearings, Part 9, p. 4196.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5257
Senator Ferguson. You say that you have gone over it with x^eople
in the front office?
Admiral Stark. No. I say this, that the testimony shows — Inger-
soll, as I recall his testimony, stated that he had not seen it. Wliat
came to me always came to him in the magic. I have forgotten defi-
nitely about Turner but I believe he states he did not see it.
Senator Ferguson. So
Admiral Stark. The message was — well, go ahead.
Senator Ferguson. Do you want to add something?
■ Admiral Stark. No, sir. I was going to say we have covered it in
the light of hindsight, and one thing or other indicated in the light
of hindsight, that we did not see them ; either the [ISO'/O] Anny
or Navy.
Senator Ferguson. Do you remember seeing any gists on any of
the magic that came to you ?
Admiral Stark. It is customary and routine in the Navy, frequently,
if we get a dispatch that refers to two or three other dispatches, you
may have typed on the bottom of it what the other dispatches were, to
give you a complete picture without you having to send for those dis-
patches. If you call that a gist — that was routine.
Senator Ferguson. No. that is not what we are talking about.
Admiral Stark. No, sir. I do not recall, except as from time to
time estimates were made — McCoUum would sometimes make an
estimate.
Senator Ferguson. I would want to read a paper to you and ask
you some questions on it.
This telegram must be closely paraiihrasecl before being communicated to
anyone.
Secretary of State,
Washiriffton.
From Batavia, dated September 22, 1941, received 10:4,5 a. m., September 23,
1941.
149, September 22nd, 4 p. m.
The following summary of statements to newspaper [13971] corre-
spondents by the Right Honorable Duff Cooper, who arrived at Batavia September
19 and returned to Singapore September 21.
One. His plan is to form a council or body in Singapore to pass on Far Eastern
political questions; to discuss the entire political sitiiation with the Governor
General and to obtain his views concerning the above-mentioned council which
is to function as does that under Lord Lyttleton at Cairo and which will relieve
the military authorities of political responsibility.
Two. An effective liaison exists between the British and the Dutch and Com-
manders in Chief have a complete understanding. Asked if the British would
welcome a Dutch expeditionary force, he said that the British were adequately
manned and that Dutch troops would be more effective here. However, if the
hub of activity should shift to British territory the luiderstanding between Com-
monders in Chief would cover any requirements.
This is the part I wanted to read particularly. This is the part
I am interested in
Admiral Stark. That is headed Batavia?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. It is signed by "Foote," to our Secretary
of State.
[13972] Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. He was one of our State officials there as I
understand it.
5258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In response to a question concerning the use of the base of Singapore by the
United States he said that there is no "agreement on paper but the answer is
obvious," asljed if the ABCD front was merely wishful thinking he said "Emphati-
cally no. It is a fact." When questioned by an American newspaper correspond-
ent he was not so emphatic. For example, "I deem the ABCD front to be a
fact."
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know about that, Admiral ?
Admiral Stark. I don't recall it. I could comment on it easily
enough — the ABCD front. If it means that we were tied up with the
Dutch, or if it means that we had an approved plan with the Dutch
and British out there at that time, we did not.
You will recall in the record exhibits showing the rejection of what
has been proposed out there, and that the scheme of working together,
between the British and ourselves, was finally not approved, until —
I think we sent it out the night of December 7. It came in from Hart
and Phillips just about that time, around the 6th.
[13973] Senator Ferguson. But it was written before the attack.
Admiral Stark. We had directed them to find a means of working
together so that if and when the thing happened the effort would
more or less dovetail. We had done it here in Washington for the
entire world, in the spring of 1941, and as I have stated it was my job
to do it and we were directing it be done out there, and we had done
it in Washington.
Senator Ferguson. That is what I want to get to.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ?
Senator Ferguson. Not this moment. If Duff Cooper was telling
the w^orld through a newspaper correspondent, when questioned by an
American newspaper correspondent — he was not so emphatic — "I deem
the ABCD front to be a fact" ; would not that notify the Japanese that
in fact there was an ABCD front ?
Admiral Stark. It would be a fact to the Japanese that he had
said so if they believed it.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ?
Senator Ferguson. Not this moment. Now, have you any' doubt
that the Japanese did believe that statement?
Admiral Stark. I don't know, Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. If the Japanese believed that statement,
[13974-] then I want to know, from a military and naval point of
view, whether or not you would judge, if there was this threat to
attack the Kra Peninsula, and we had a front, between the American
and British and Dutch and the Chinese, that we should have consid-
ered that Japan would attack the only thing that was the deterrent in
the Pacific, that was our fleet? I am talking from a military and
naval point of view.
Admiral Stark. Well, that is some question. May I boil it down to
see if I have it correctly ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. That assumes that the Japs believed what Duff
Cooper stated, that we had a combined front.
Senator Ferguson. That is right. That is what Duff said.
Admiral Stark. Therefore, they assumed that if they attacked the
Kra Peninsula, that, in effect, Britain would go to war, and the Dutch,
this combined front. We would be involved.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5259
Senator Ferguson. And we would go to war if we had a combined
front. You can't have a combined front and have three of them in
war and one not.
Admiral Stark. I am working on a premise which I do not admit to
be a fact. That is, fighting the problem.
Senator Ferguson. It doesn't make any diffei'ence whether it is a
fact or not if the British said it and if the Japanese [13975]
believed it.
Admiral Stark. If the British said it and if the Japanese believed
it, if they attacked one they would probably attack the combination
so as to do the most damage.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Stark. But there is an "if" in that question.
Senator Ferguson. Is that the way you want to leave the answer?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ?
Senator Ferguson. Do you know this, as to whether or not publicly
it was ever denied that there was an ABCD front?
Admiral Stark. I do not know why we should have denied it if we
never had one.
Senator Ferguson. The question was : Do you know whether it was
ever denied publicly or to the Japanese ?
Admiral Stark. I don't recall any specific denial from high author-
ity but I certainly also don't recollect any hint that such a thing existed
by high authority.
Senator Ferguson. I understand that. That wasn't the question I
was asking you.
Admiral Stark. No ; but I think it belongs in the answer.
Senator Ferguson. And it is going to be there. Now, I am going
to talk about another subject.
[13976] Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield before going on to
another subject?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. I think the record should show the official position of
Duff Cooper. At the time he was in charge of British propaganda,
wasn't he ?
Senator Ferguson. I read all I knew^ about it.
Mr. Murphy. I think you will find that at the time he was in
charge, Director of Public Information and Propaganda, for Great
Britain, and they were at war. Apparently he was putting forth the
strongest possible front he could for his country.
[13977] Senator Ferguson. Of course, I am not asking for the
Congressman's opinion. I am trying to point out, from a military or
naval viewpoint, we didn't anticipate certain things in this attack on
Pearl Harbor. Now, going to the next subject. You remember we
contemplated an attack upon the Azores ?
Admiral Stark. I don't know that the word "contemplated" is a
correct one. Senator Ferguson. We were ordered to draw up plans for
that. We had, as I previously testified, drawn up plans for Martinique.
It is our business to draw up plans for any contingency.
Senator Ferguson. Didn't you even get the ships ready?
Admiral Stark. We brought
Senator Ferguson. For the Azores?
5260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Stark. Yes, we broiio;ht some ships to tlie Atlantic, and
we brought some Marines to the Atlantic, who were afterward sent to
Iceland.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know why the plan not to attack the
Azores was arrived at?
Admiral Stark. Do I know what. Senator?
Senator Ferguson. Do you know why we did not attack the Azores?
Do you know whether it was decided between the British and our-
selves that we would be attacking a neutral, which was Portugal, and
therefore we decided not to do it, i\nd we took [13&/8] another
tack and went to Iceland?
Admiral Stark. I would say that the occasion for attacking the
Azores simply did not arise. It just went on diplomatically there.
I may not be completely informed of it, but there was worry and had
been worry as to the possibility of the Axis attacking Portugal, going
down through the Spanish Peninsula, and possibly compromising the
Azores. We couldn't afford to have the Azores in anybody else's
possession.
Senator Ferguson. Was it ever contemplated, ns far as you know,
to come to Congress to declare war on Portugal and take the Azores?
Admiral Stark. I never heard of it, or I never thought of it until
this minute.
Senator Ferguson. Well, if you were preparing the fleet, and pre-
paring ships to take the Azores, it wasn't just a drill, was it ?
Admiral Stark. We prepared to take the Continent of Europe too.
Senator Ferguson. That early?
Admiral Stark. Sir?
Senator Ferguson. That early? That early, back in 1941?
Admii-al Stark. Well, I dare say that the Army was working on
plans, and they were asking for men, and so forth, for a big and huge
Army. But I mean, I was referring to when you spoke [13979]
of declaring war on Portugal.
Senator Ferguson. How would you attack and take the Azores with-
out a declaration of war on Portugal? She owned them.
Admiral Stark. I can tell you one way. Suppose the Germans had
taken Portugal. Would we have to declare war on Portugal to take
the Azores ? I don't think we would have.
Senator Ferguson. I assume you are right on that, if it wasi cap-
tured and in the hands of the Germans it would be German territory,
and we would have to declare war on Germany.
Admiral Stakk. Yes, sir. I always construed that situation, with
regard to the Azores, as to have plans ready, and be ready, if an emer-
gency arose there.
Senator Ferguson. Now, let's go to Iceland.
Mr. Clark. You are a long way from Pearl Harbor.
Senator Ferguson. No, I am not. My questions will come around to
Pearl Harbor. They will come around to Pearl Harbor.
Mr. Clark. I didn't mean to interrupt.
Senator Ferguson. We did go and land in Iceland?
Admiral Stark. We did ; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And you wrote letters and said that we had a
shooting war in the Atlantic?
Admiral Stark. In effect ; yes, sir .
Proceedings of joint committee 5261
Senator Ferguson. Yes. You know what Admiral Ingersoll
[JS980] said about it. It wasn't a "legal" war but it was a war.
Admiral Stark. Well, when I think of the term "legal"
Senator Ferguson. It wasn't a declared war.
Admiral Stark. It wasn't a declared war. What we were doing was
a limited defense against German aggression in what had been termed
our waters. We didn't, for example, go over to Germany at that time
or attack Europe.
Mr. Murphy, The Senator misquoted the witness — unintentionally.
Admiral Ingersoll corrected his testimony, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Well, I took his original statement. You know
what I am talking about, don't you?
Admiral Stark. I think I know what you are talking about. We
covered this same point before.
Senator Ferguson. But I am going to lead up to this question, to
show that I am still at Pearl Harbor :
Do you know whether it was ever discussed in the War Cabinet — •
and you know who that would be — that it would be necessary for
Germany to fire the first shot? We had a plan and a policy in the
Pacific that Japan — I don't want to quote the Secretary of War again—
but it was to be for Japan to fire the first shot and foi- us not to be
harmed too nuich by it. You said that was the studied plan and the
design.
[139SJ] Now, I want to know why, if you know, there was a
distinction between the Atlantic and the Pacific about the firing of
the first shot.
Admiral Stark. Germany had attacked and sunk one of our ships
in June. She had attacked three destroyers in the Atlantic, sinking
one of them — I think it was in October or November, along in there,
between September and October. And certainly the 1st of December
she had attacked and wounded badly one tanker, the /Salinas, 1 believe
it was, which got back to the Canadian coast. The Congress of the
United States had voted billions for material to go to Britain. We
considered it our job to- get that material through, not simply to use
this money for material and let it be sunk without taking any action
on it. There were^ certain waters defined, and limits established,
which, I believe, we* called our waters. The President's speech shows
it very plainly, in which he stated, if the Germans came within that
area they would do so at their peril. They ctime in and attacked us.
As a result, we got together what we called the hemispheric defense
plans, which I have outlined previously and which provided for
shooting at any German combatant ships which came within that area,
and we did do it.
Senator Ferguson, We did shoot ?
Admiral Stark, Yes, sir. But I think that that situation is not
comparable to wdiat was going on in the Pacific, [139Sl^] where
the Japs had not attacked our ships, unless you go back to the Panay
incident.
Senator Ferguson. If you go back to the Panay, it is the same
situation ?
Admiral Stark. No ; I don't think so.
Senator Ferguson. Not as bad ?
Admiral Stark. I think it is different.
5262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. All right, "different."
Is that what was discussed by the war cabinet? Was that dis-
cussed by the war cabinet, so that you would have one policy in the
Pacific and another policy in the Atlantic ?
Mr. Kep^fe. You can't be all-inclusive in the Pacific, because I
understand the evidence clearly shows that in certain areas, in the
Southwest Pacific, this shooting war applied.
Senator Ferguson. It did apply in the Southeast Pacific.
Admiral Stark. Off the west coast, the Southeast Pacific, we made
one of the hemispheric defense plans apply to the area which we
outlined there.
Senator Ferguson. That is the Southeast Pacific?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Take the other part of the Pacific where this
not-firing-the-first-shot policy was.
Admiral Stark. American material was going in a steady stream
across the Pacific, I don't know how big a stream, in [13983]
Russian ships and into Russian territory. I can think of no instance
where anything we had commercially going across the Pacific was
attacked until the President Hari^ison was lost after December 7. In
other words, our ships were moving freely. However, I took no
chance, you know, and in October I directed all our Pacific ships into
port and thereafter routed them and kept them on routes where I
thought in emergency they could duck for safety or we could give
them some protection.
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
The Vice Chairman. Any other questions ?
Mr. Murphy. I have one or two questions, Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral Stark, will you refer to the memorandum of
December 13, 1941?
Will you give the admiral a copy of it (Exhibit No. 160) ?
I understand these to be notes of the remarks of the President of
the United States on the night of December 7, 1911.
Toward the middle of the first page I note the following :
About 2 weeks ago we began to realize that the pi-obability of Japan being
in earnest was so slim that it was time to make a final and definite effort to pin
them down on the one subject tliat they liad never ever been pinned down on,
and that was that they were to agree to cease their acts of aggression, and that
they would [1398Jf] try to bring the China War to a close.
You know that to be a fact, do you not, from yoiu' experience, that
they had not agreed to that, and we were attempting to get them to
agree on it, in diplomatic negotiations ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. In the next paragraph I read again :
From that time on we were getting more and more definite information that
Japan was headed for war, and that the reply to the Secretary of State would
be in the negative.
That was the Secretar}^ of State's message of November 26, was it
not?
Admiral Starks Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, at the bottom of the page :
* * * Geographically Indochina was at a hub, from which any attack can
be made in a number of directions. It is only a very short distance from there
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5263
to the Philippines in the east. It is a relatively short distance from there down
to the Dutch East Indies, which is the most industrial part — southwest there is
Singapore — fortified.
Then I skip seven or eight lines.
We are getting a very large proportion of our supplies — rubber, tin, et cetera —
from that whole [13985] area of Southwestern Pacific * * *.
And then again, coming to the next paragraph :
In addition to tliat, of course, is the fact that if the Japanese did move to
the south, to the Dutch East Indies, from Indochina, the Philippines would be
virtually surrounded. They would haA^e the Japanese on both sides — Indochina —
the mandated islands to the west, this side of the Philippines, and the Dutch
Indies and the Japanese possessions in the south. They would be completely
encircled by a military power.
Did you have that particular circumstance in mind when you sent
this memorandum to Spenavo, about which the Senator from Michigan
questioned you this morning, the fact that the Philippines would be
endangered by that situation if the Davao-Waigeo line was crossed?
Admiral Stark. Yes. It flanked us on the south; and we were
already flanked on the west and north.
Mr. Murphy. It would make the position of the Philippines much
more dangerous, would it not ?
Admiral Stark. Unquestionably.
Mr. Murphy. That is all.
Mr. Keefe, I have a couple of questions, Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe.
Mr. Keefe. In connection with the questions of the Senator from
Michigan, I note in the diary of Secretary Stimson of the conference
which was held at the office of Secretary Hull on the morning of
December 7, Sunday, where former Secretary Stimson records a por-
tion of the conversations in this manner :
Hull expressed his views, giving the broad picture of it, and I made him
dictate it to a stenographer and I attach it to the end of this. Knox also had
his views as to the importance of showing immediately how these different nations
must stand together, and I got him to dictate that and that is attached hereto.
Now, turning to page 67 of the Stimson report you will find the
suggestion dictated by Secretary Knox in which he lists six para-
graphs. In the first four paragraphs he refers to the possibility of
the Japs attacking Singapore and the Dutch. Then, in paragraph 5,
he says :
If the above be accepted, then any serious threat to the British or Dutch is a
serious threat to the United States ; or it might be stated any threat to any one
of the three of us is a threat to all of us. We should therefore be ready jointly
to act together, and if such understanding lias not already been reached, it should
be reached immediately. Otherwise we may fall individually, one at a time
(or somebody may be left out [13987] on a limb).
That indicates that so far as Secretary Knox was concerned, he
apparently was in an indefinite mood as to whether or not an under-
standing had already been reached.
Admiral Stark. That is correct. That is the way I read it.
Mr. Keefe. Betw^een these nations.
Admiral Stark. He says :
* * * and if such imderstanding has not already been reached, it should be
reached immediately.
5264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK.
Which, to my mind-
Mr. Keefe. It is surprising that he wouldn't know of such an under-
standing if one had been reached, and that he would express it in that
rather indefinite manner.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I have also expressed, several times, the
fact that I didn't know of any agreement.
Mr. Keefe. Well, now, Admiral, I listened attentively to the ques-
tions asked you by the Senator from Michigan with respect to this log
prepared, apparently, by the watch officer at the Navy Department, and
I confess that at the end of it I am very much confused and I would
like to get straightened out if I can.
Admiral Stark. I am somewhat confused myself on it.
Mr. Keefe. Well, when I read it and get it in chronological form —
it was all mixed up as it was stapled together — [1S988] but
when I get it in pamphlet form the confusion, to me at least, seems to
vanish, and I wonder if you will agree with me. It reads:
1900, 6 December, to 0200, 7 December. At 2000
That is 8 o'clock, is it not?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. K^EEFE (reading) :
Major F. L. Harrison, Aide to the Secretary of War, telephone that the Secretary
of War desired tlie following information by 0900, Sunday, 7 December : Compila-
tion of men-of-war in Far East ; British, American, Japanese, Dutch, Russian.
Also compilation of American men-of-war in Pacific Fleet, with locations, and a
list of American men-of-w^ar in the Atlantic without locations.
That is perfectly clear as to what he requested ?
Admiral Stark. Perfectly clear ; yes.
Mr. Keefe. Now, to depart from the quotation, I understood your
testimony to be, in response to questions asked by Senator Ferguson,
that it would be the duty of the watch officer, in the event of receiving
a request of this kind, to put it through by contacting someone with
authority to direct that the compilation be made ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe, So that, when Major Harrison called the watch
[1S989] officer and stated the request of the Secretary of War, it
was then the duty of the watch officer to attempt to contact someone
in authority to put the order through ?
Mr. Keefe. Now, then, if you follow through — and I will read what
is further indicated on this statement — the watch officer states this
[reading] :
Admirals Ingersoll, Stark, and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted
That is clear, isn't it ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe (reading) :
and the Secretary directed that the information be compiled and delivered to
him prior to 1000 Sunday, December 7.
Now, to me that is just as clear as a bell. It means that the watch
officer consulted Admirals Ingersoll and Stark and the Secretary of
the Navy in order to put through this request, and that the Secretary
of the Navy instructed them to deliver the compilation to him before
10 o'clock, the time when he was to meet at the Secretary's office, in
Secretary Hull's office, \fith Secretary Stimson.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5265
Now, the inevitable question arises in my mind, If tliis watcli officer
made this written record, statino; that he [13990~\ consulted
with Admirals Ingersoll and Stark and the Secretary of the Navy,
either he did or he didn't.
Now, you say you have no recollection of his having consulted with
you?
Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir,
Mr. Keefe. Well, if he did consult with you, as he says he did in
this memorandum, he nmst have consulted with you subsequent to
8 o'clock, the time the request came in.
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. And you must have been some place where he could con-
tact you.
Admiral Stark. If he did ; yes, sir. Assuming, from what he said,
mat he did.
Mr. Keefe. Well
Admiral Stark. He says that we were consulted; that he got in
touch with us. Why he would have gotten in touch with both me and
Ingersoll, I don't understand. Wiether he means he had telephoned,
or what, I don't know. The plain statement is that he did consult me.
I don't recall it. But if he did, it had been sometime subsequent to
8 o'clock.
Mr. Keefe. Being a person who is inclined to accept somebody's
M'ord for something in this hearing, especially when it is written, and
there is no reason to assume a man would write something down in a
public record that didn't occur, it seems [13W1] to me a rea-
sonable assumption to believe that the watch officer charged with
the responsibility of meticulously writing down the information that
comes to his attention, wouldn't say that he consulted you and Ad-
miral Ingersoll and the Secretary of the Navy miless he did.
Admiral Stark. I quite agree with you.
Mr. Keefe. Now, we are in a position, then, if you were not at the
theater, you weren't at home, you don't remember where you were,
somebody ought to be able to trace this down, we finally are on a lead
where, if we get this man, we might be able to find out, he might be able
to remember where he got you that night ; isn't that true?
Admiral Stark. He might be.
Mr. Keefe. Now, Admiral, let me ask you this simple question — I
would like to get through with this thing sometime and pin one of
these things down so we have something definite
Admiral Stark. So would I. I wish I could recall that incident.
Mr. Keefe. I wish you could, too.
Admial Stark. That has been blank in my mind all through, and
when people have stated something, I have accepted it, and I have no
reason to doubt what he put down there, but I just don't recall.
{13992'] Mr. Keefe. Yes. You have told us that a number of
times. What I would like to know is this — perhaps it appears hereto-
fore, but it won't hurt to have it appear once more.
As I understand it, it is the fundamental practice in the Navy De-
partment, and had been for a long time, for a man in the position of
Chief of Naval Operations to let someone know where he is at every
hour of the day.
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
79716—46 — pt. 11 9
5266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Keefe. Isn't that true ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And if you were going to the National Theater on Sat-
urday evening, December 6, you would, in accordance with your usual
custom, practice, and procedure, advise someone in the Navy Depart-
ment where you could be found ; isn't that true?
Admiral Stark. That is correct; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Would this watch officer, who made this report that has
just been read into the record, be the one with whom you would leave
that information ?
Admiral Stark. As a rule, he was always told when I went out;
yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. So that the watch officer who made the memorandum
Avhich we have just read into the record would be the person
with whom you would leave the information where you [13993']
could be found?
Admiral Stark. Normally ; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Would there be a memorandum or a record made by
the Avatch officer that would be preserved, indicating or showing where
the Chief of Naval Operations would be ?
Admiral Stark. Well, I don't know about that, Mr. Keefe. It was
the practice to telephone. I don't know that we made any record of
that type. He probably put a slip on his desk as to where I could be
found.
Mr. Keefe. Well, now, I don't go to the National Theater very
often
Admiral Stark. I don't either. ♦
Mr. Keefe. But my recollection is, from the few times I have gone
down there, it was about 8 : 30 or 8 : 45, that is about the time the
show opens.
Admiral Stark. I think that is correct ; around 8 : 30, 1 think, maybe
8:15; maybe, sometimes 8 : 45.
Mr. Keefe. That would have given the watch officer an opportunity
to contact you some place before you even got to the theater, wouldn't
it, if you did go there?
Admiral Stark. Yes; depending on the time I left the house.
Mr. Keefe. If the watch officer called your home, wouldn't there
be somebody there to answer the telephone ?
[1934-] Admiral Stark. Yes. I may have been there myself. I
may not have left for the theater when he called. I don't recall the
incident. If the theater opened at 8 : 30, it is not over a 10-minute trip
from the house down there.
Mr. Keefe. If anybody called your house and you were away,
wouldn't the person that was in charge at your home make a memo-
randum of it and give it to you ?
Admiral Stark. Yes; we always left word in the house with the
boys who would answer the telephone, where we were.
Mr. Keefe. Weren't you told that Commander Kramer called your
home and tried to get you that night ?
Admiral Stark. I have no recollection of that.
Mr. Keefe. You have no recollection of anybody having called you
at your home ?
Admiral Stark. I have not.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5267
Mr. Keefe. And you have no recollection of giving the instructions
to this watch officer to furnish this information to Secretary Stimson
and to Secretary Knox ?
Admiral Stark. No ; I do not recall that incident,
Mr. Keefe. Do I understand that this watch officer is now an
admiral ?
Commander Baecher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. He is in Hawaii ?
Commander Baecher. He is ComAirPac, I am informed. That
[1S99S] is his job. He is a rear admiral. He is stationed in
Hawaii.
Mr. Keefe. What was his rank at the time he made this memo-
randum ?
Commander Baecher. He was a commander. I am not certain.
Mr. Keefe. You can't read his signature?
Commander Baecher. Yes. It took me a while.
Senator Ferguson. Would the Congressman yield just for informa-
tion, not for questions?
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I have been going over this
memorandum that we received today, and that the Congressman has
been questioning the witness on, and on which I had questioned the
witness previously. There are quite a number of messages indicated
in that memorandum. I would like to request of Commander Baecher
that they furnish to committee counsel all of these various messages
that are indicated.
[13996] Mr. Keefe. I am interested, too, in those messages be-
cause there is some rather astounding information contained in the
report of this watch officer as to the seizure of certain Finnish ships
by the Coast Guard and wiiat disposition was to be made of them, this,
that, and the other.
The Vice Chairman. Without objection, that effort will be made.
Mr. Keefe, Maybe we w^ill run finally onto something that may help
clear up this situation that has bothered you. Admiral, and which I,
as a member, have wondered at.
The Vice Chairman. Without objection, the Commander will note
the request.^
Mr. Keefe. Is there any way to contact the watch officer ?
Commander Baecher. I will do that. I will ask him whether he
remembers whether he got in touch with Admiral Stark, if he remem-
bers it at all, and have a positive answer from him shortly.
Mr. Keefe. He ought to be able to remember that. It is in his
handwriting. Maybe he can remember that he wrote it.
Mr. Richardson. You are an optimist.
Mr. Keefe. Counsel suggests that I am an optimist. I have done
my best to get the facts. That is all.
Admiral Stark. I have done my best to give them to you.
[13997] The Vice Chairman. Are there any other questions ?
Mr. Murphy. In this log. Admiral, that has been handed to us, I
notice that there are entries made in first one handwriting and then
after that the entries are made by Glover, now Rear Admiral Glover,
and then there are entries made by a man named Wyatt, on the 6th
^See p. 5482, infra.
5268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of December, aiul then under tlie date of the Tth of December there
is an entry :
The following officers entered 2601.
Then there is a list of names :
Lieutenant Commander —
some name T can't decipher —
Captain Beardall, Lieutenant Kramer, Captain Wilkinson, Captain Schuirmann,
Captain Metcalfe, Lieutenant Commander Mason.
And
Captain Griflin, Captain Metcalf, Captain Wilkinson, Commander Cary, Com-
mander Glover, Commander Alexander.
Then it says :
Action taken as indicated on dispatches.
Would that mean there was some watch officer who was making
entries as to who came in at certain times?
Admiral Stark. I don't know what that means. I don't know who
occupied room 2601.
Senator Ferguson. Will you yield? Not for a question.
Mr. Murphy. I will be glad to.
Admiral Stark. One of those mentioned is the next witness.
[13998] Mr. Keefe. What is that time, 2601 ; what time would
that be?
Admiral Stark. That is the room number.
]\Ir. Keefe. I see.
Senator Ferguson. What I wanted
Mr. Keefe. What is the time specified ?
Mr. MuRPiiY. It says something about 11 : 45„ about the Coast
Guard called for release of information on Finnish ships. It was
advised to call Captain Schuirmann. Then it sa^^s: "The following
officers entered 2601." The list of names follows. Then, it says:
"Action taken as indicated on dispatches."
Senator Ferguson. You read that previously.
Mr. Murphy. There are entries made as to entering a certain room,
2601, for what reason I do not know, and apparently tliere aren't any
entries as to the rest of December 7, as to you being there, and as to
Admiral Turner and Admiral Ingersoll, so these notes are certainly
not such as to purport to show who went into tJie Navy Department
on December 7, are they ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; oh, no.
The Vice Chairman. Whose room was this, 2601?
Admiral Stark. I don't know ; but the Department can furnish that.
That is the second floor, 6 Wing. One of the firet rooms. But I do
not know who was in that office. You [13999'] could establish
it. You could not do it by going to w^ho is there now, because the
people have been shifted a good deal. But if you want that infor-
mation, the Department can give it to you. Admiral Beardall is here.
He may possibly recall.
The Vice Chairman. All right. Are there any further questions ?
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, that is one of the meetings which one of
the witnesses described, some place in the 1P>,000 pages here, that has
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5269
been the unusual assemblage of all the top-flight boys that happened
to get down just accidently on Sunday morning.
Mr. Murphy. The top flight was not there. I ask, Mr. Chairman,
that the particular entry in question, in view of the fact that we have
read only excerpts, that this particular group of papers be marked as
an exhibit and macle a part of the record.
The Vice Chairman. Is there objection to the request? The Chair
hears none. What will be the number of the exhibit, Mr. Counsel?
Mr. Masten. Exhibit No. 162.
The Vice Chairman. It will be received.
(The documents referred to were marked ''Exhibit No. 162.")
The Vice Chairman. Are there any further questions ? Does coun-
sel have anything further ?
{lJ/)00\ Mr. Richardson. No.
The Vice Chairman. Does counsel for Admiral Stark have any-
thing ?
Mr. Obear. No questions.
The Vice Chairman. Admiral, do you have anything further ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir; I can think of nothing I haven't covered
in any connection in this whole thing.
The Vice Chairman. Is there any reason why Admiral Stark cannot
now be excused?
Senator Ferguson. I think it should be understood that when some
of these witnesses come in that have been requested it may be the desire
of at least one member of the committee to ask more question of the
Admiral.
The Vice Chairman. Admiral, we thank you for your appearance
and the additional information you have given the committee. You
are excused.
Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to present Admiral
Beardall.
The Vice Chairman. Admiral Beardall, will you come forward,
please, and be sworn ?
(The witness was sworn by the Vice Chairman)
\^1J4)01\ TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. JOHN R. BEARDALL,
UNITED STATES NAVY^^
Mr. Richardson. Admiral, will you state your full name, please?
Admiral Beardall. John R. Beardall, Rear Admiral.
Mr. Richardson. You were aide to the President at the time of the
attack on Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. How long had you been such aide?
Admiral Beardall. Since May 1941.
Mr. Richardson. What had been your previous assignment ?
Admiral Beardall. Previous to that I was in command of the
U. S. S. Vhicennes.
Mr. Richardson. How long have you been in the Navy up to now,
Admiral ?
Admiral Beardall. Forty-two years, from the time I entered the
Naval Academy.
^ See p. 5512, infra, for suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by Adm,
Beardall.
5270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. KiCHARDSON. What were your duties as naval aide ?
Admiral Beardall. The duties of aide are not prescribed by any
regulations but are such duties as your chief, who in my case was the
President, might give.
Mr. Richardson. Where did you have your office, Admiral ?
Admiral Beardall. My office was in the Navy Department.
[1400^] Mr. Eichardson. Did you have an office in the White
House ?
Admiral Beardall. No, not regularly assigned.
Mr. Richardson. Was there anyone else there with whom you
divided your duties at the time you became naval aide?
Admiral Beardall. No.
Mr. Richardson. Who was later appointed to assist you there in
your duties ?
Admiral Beardall. Commander Schulz and then later on some
other officer. He was one of the first that was detailed to assist me.
Mr. Richardson. Commander Schulz came to assist you just before
the attack on Pearl Harbor ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. At that time did you have any office or place at
which you could have a desk in the White House ?
Admiral Beardall. We were endeavoring to set one up, and it was
a little difficult to get space so they gave us a small space down near
the mail room, which is on the west side, on Executive Avenue, just
across from the State Department.
Mr. Richardson. If any communication was brought to you physi-
cally, to the White House, then that would be the place where ordi-
narily you would be found ?
Admiral Beardali.. Not I. The Avatch officer would be there but
I would probably be up in the military aide's office [14003] or
the Secretary's office.
Mr. Richardson. You know what we mean when we speak of magic,
Admiral?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. You were familiar with the delivery of magic to
the White House?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. It has been generally testified here that it was de-
livered in a locked pouch. You are familiar with that method of de-
livery, are you, Admiral?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Did you have a key to the pouch — when it was
brought to the White House?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. You would, therefore, be entitled to see the magic
yourself ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. And when that magic was brought there it was for
the purpose of giving it to the President?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. What would be done with it in the ordinary
routine way if it was brought for delivery to the President i
Admiral Beardall. It would be delivered to him.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5271
[14004] Mr, Richardson. By whom?
Admiral Beardall. By me, normally.
Mr. Richardson. Would the pouch be opened by you before it went
to tlie President ?
Admiral B?l\rdall. It might or might not be.
Mr. Richardson. Now, you recall the Saturday before the Pearl
Harbor attack, December 6 ?
Admiral Beardall. Y^es.
Mr. Richard; ;<N. Were you advised in any way during the after-
noon of that d' that there was expected to be ready for delivery to
the White Hoi j and the President a dispatch of unusual importance?
Admii-al B rdall. Yes.
Mr. RiCHA >soN. Do you remember how that information came to
you ?
Admiral 1»eardall. I don't recollect accurately. Probably from
Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who usually brought the pouch to
me, either in the Navy Department, or wherever I might be.
Mr. Richardson. You were acquainted with Captain Kramer?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Have you any recollection that Captain Kramer
at other times had advised you in advance that there would be a mes-
sage in the near future ?
[14005] Admiral Beardall. Yes. In the afternoon, late in
the afternoon, in the Navy Department, when it came about time tc
go home, sometimes he would say, when I would inquire, "There is
no magic ready for the President now," or "There might be some-
thing later," or "Nothing until tomorrow morning." Something of
that sort.
Mr. Richardson. Commander Schulz testified here that he had been
advised by you in the afternoon of December 6, Saturday, to remain
in attendance, because you had been advised that there would be an
important dispatch for delivery to the President; is that your recol-
lection ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir; that is my recollection.
Mr. Richardson. When did you leave the White House that after-
noon ?
Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection about 5 : 30 or
a quarter to 6.
Mr. Richardson. Did you go back to the White House at any time
that day ?
Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection about it.
Mr. Richardson. You do recall being at Admiral Wilkinson's house
for dinner that night?
Admiral Beardall. I do.
Mr. R'CHARDSON. And the evidence indicates that with you were
Admiral Wilkinson and General Miles, you recall that?
[I4OO6] Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr, Richardson. You spent the evening there ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Was it an evening where you were accompanied
by your wives ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Was your wife with you ?
5272 CONGRESSIOKAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. KiCHARDsoN. Where were you living then ?
Admiral Beardall. In Washington, on Phelps Place, Northwest.
Mr. Richardson. Now, do you recall the incident of Captain Kramer
coming there ?
Admiral Beardall. I do.
Mr. Richardson. And delivering a message ?
Admiral Beardall. I do.
Mr. Richardson. Was that a magic message ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes.
Mr. Richardson. Was it brought in the pouch, locked pouch, in the
way those messages were brought?
Admiral Beardall. I am not sure on that, but I imagine it was.
I don't recollect.
Mr. Richardson. Did you read the message there?
Admiral Beardall. I glanced through it.
[14-^)07] Mr. Richardson. Did the other officers there read it?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Have you any recollection of any of you doing
any telephoning after the message was read ?
Admiral Beardall. I have none. We moved around but I have no
recollection of any telephoning, of my telephoning or seeing the others
telephone.
Mr. Richardson. Captain Kramer says that Admiral Wilkinson did
some phoning. You couldn't verify that?
Admiral Beardall. No, sir. He may have.
Mr. Richardson. Do you know about how long it was after that
message was delivered to you there that you left the Wilkinson house?
Admiral Beardall. Well, I should say about a half hour, to the best
of my recollection.
Mr. Richardson. Is it your recollection that you went from there
to your home ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Do you recall during that evening at all checking
up with Scliulz at the White House ?
Admiral Beardall. I don't recollect that, but I noted he has testi-
fied I did, and I accept that, because it was the normal thing to do.
Mr. Richardson. Would it be a routine thing for you to do
[14008] to contact him to see what had happened in the White
House during that tour of duty ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes ; in the case of a message like that.
Mr. Richardson. How long would he be expected to remain at the
White House?
Admiral Beardall. I think his instructions at that time — this was
before we had the situation and map room, before the war — was until
after the President had turned in.
Mr. Richardson. Had gone to bed?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Do you recall going to the White House Saturday
morning?
Adrhiral Beardall. I do now, after refreshing my memory, recall
going there Saturday moi-ning.
Mr. Richardson. "Did you go before you went to your own office in
the Navy Building?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5273
Admiral Beardall. Yes.
Mr. KiCHARDsoN. Would Schiilz have been at the White House when
you arrived there in the morning?
Admiral Beardall. Not necessarily. I don't think he had any in-
structions to come back.
Mr. Richardson. Do you have any recollection of having any con-
versation with Schulz on Sunday morning at the White House ?
[14009] Admiral Beardall. None that I know of.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Richardson, your previous question stated
"Saturday."
Mr. Richardson. I meant Sunday. Admiral, do you recall any con-
versation of any kind that you had when you came to the White House
on Sunday morning on your way to your ofHce in the Navy Building
with reference to what had happened the night before with respect to
the delivery of any messages ?
Admiral Beardall. None.
Mr. Richardson. You then, except for this report which passed
between you and Schulz on Saturday night, had no further knowledge
of what happened to the magic message that was sent by Kramer to
the White House on the evening of Saturday, December 6 ?
Admiral Beardall. None.
Mr. Richardson. Now, in event the President should desire to send
any messages from the White House, would they be sent through you?
Admiral Beardall. No.
Mr. Richardson. Would you have any knowledge of what tele-
phone conversations he might have had out of the White House?
Admiral Beardall. Never.
[14010] Mr. Richardson. Then the only way you would know
anything about what the President did there would be when he re-
quested you as his aide to do something for him?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Do you recall the President or anybody for him
made any request of you either on the night of December 6 or on the
morning of December 7 witli reference to the conveying of any dis-
patches or information or directions?
Admiral Beardall. None.
Mr. Richardson. You had no contact with him at all then from the
time you left the White House on the afternoon of December 6 until
after the Pearl Harbor attack ?
Admiral Beardall. This is Schulz?
Mr. Richardson. This is tlie President.
Admiral Beardall. The President ; I may have gone to see him that
Sunday morning after I went to the White House.
Mr. Richardson. Do you have any recollection you did ?
Admiral Beardall. I have a hazy recollection I did.
Mr. Richardson. Have you any recollection of any conversation
with him that had any relation to any messages?
Admiral Beardall. Yes; as I recollect it, I went into his room,
early, about 10 o'clock on Sunday morning, with a message or mes-
sages, which I presume, to the best of my recollection, was the 14th
part of this 13-part message that [14OII] came in the night
before, which I delivered to him.
Mr. Richardson. Was tliere any discussion or conversation with
him when you made that delivery ?
5274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral BmRDALL. No discussion. We never discussed magic. I
do recollect him saying though which marks this in my mind, that it
looked as though the Japs are going to sever negotiations, break off
negotiations.
Mr. Richardson. Was there anybody else present?
Admiral Beardall. None.
Mr. Richardson. Your recollection is it was just between youJ
Admiral Beardall. Just between us.
Mr. Richardson. Can you recall what the occasion was of your see-
ing him ? Was it simply to inquire whether he had duties for you ?
Admiral Beardall. Normally that would be the case, but I think on
this occasion I must have taken some message to him.
Mr. Richardson. There is a notation here, which has just been re-
ferred, the watch officer's log in which he says : ''The following officers
entered 2601." Do you know what room that would be ?
Admiral Beardall. I don't know definitely, but I think, from the
people's names mentioned there, it was the watch officer's room there,
where they gathered, and since Kramer [lIiOV2\ was j?",'
Avhere we delivered the magic, or had contact with people who did.
That is the best of my recollection. . , i
Mr. Richardson. Do you have any recollection of what the occasion
would be for the number of persons who are noted in the log as having
come to that room at that time on Sunday morning would be?
Admiral Beardall. I don't except perhaps to keep m contact with
what might be coming in in reference to these messages.
Mr. Richardson. Did you see anything of the 14-part message on
the morning of December 7 yourself ?
Admiral Beardall. Not that I recall, except I may have seen it,
if this was the one that I gave to the President.
Mr Richardson. Did you, yourself, read the 14th part ^
Admiral Beardall. My recollection is not clear on that. 1 may have
or may not have. . , ^ •. i i j v 9
Mr." Richardson. Do you remember seeing the 1 o clock delivery {
Admiral Beardall. I" don't remember. . ^^ ,^
Mr Richardson. Did you have any contact with anyone while the
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, was examining the instru-
ment in the Navy Department?
Admiral Beardall. No ; no. runi^i
Mr Richardson. Do you have any knowledge as to who ilJiULS\
delivered the 13-part or the 14-part message or the 1 o'clock message in
the Navy Department on Sunday morning?
Admiral Beardall. None. -^i ^i .?
Mr. Richardson. You had nothing to do with that f
Admiral Beardall. Nothing.
Mr Richardson. Then the only knowledge you have of that mes-
sage is in connection with the event which occurred at the White House
that you have testified to ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. No further questions.
The ViCF Chairman. Admiral, as I understood, you stated you are
not certain whether you saw the fourteenth part message or not i
Admiral Beardall. I am not dead certain whether I saw it or not
I sometimes read dispatches and sometimes I didn t. If it was the
fourteenth part I probably read it.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5275
The Vice Chairman. You have no present impression that you did
read it ?
Admiral Beardall. I have a present impression I did.
The Vice Chairman. You did ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. Well, is it your recollection that that four-
teenth part message was what you delivered to the President Sunday
morning ?
[14014] Admiral Beardall. That is my impression.
The Vice Chairman. About what time, would you say ?
Admiral Beardall. About 10 o'clock, I should say.
The Vice Chairman. And there was no discussion between you and
the President?
Admiral Beardall. No discussion at all.
The Vice Chairman. Other than the remark, I believe you said, that
he said it looked like Japan was going to break off negotiations ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Something to that effect ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. May I have that last part read ?
(The sentences referred to were read by the reporter.)
The Vice Chairman. You say there was nobody else there with the
President at the time 3'ou saw him ?
Admiral Beardall. Nobody else, to the best of my recollection.
The Vice Chairman. Was that the only time on Sunday that you
saw him ?
Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection that is the only
time on Sunday I saw him until after the Pearl Harbor attack, when
I joined him.
The Vice Chairman. You did join him after the attack?
[I4OIS] Admiral Beardall. After the attack.
The Vice Chairman. About what time was it? •
Admiral Beardall. About 2 o'clock, I w^as at home, at lunch, just
after lunch, when I got the word that Pearl Harbor was being bombed,
''This is no drill," and went immediately to confirm it, and then over
to the White House and joined the President.
The Vice Chairman. You stayed there then the rest of the day ?
Admiral Beardall. The rest of the day and rest of the evening;
yes, sir.
* The Vice Chairman. All right, thank you. Mr. Clark.
Mr. Clark. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Admiral, when you went to the White House after
the bombing, did the President make any comments to you?
Admiral Beardalol,. This is after the bombing?
Mr. Murphy. After.
Admiral Beardall, Yes. When I got there only Mr. Hopkins.
Harry Hopkins, was with him, and he was on the phone. To whom
he was talking I don't know; but evidently he got some call from
Admiral Stark, and he told me, he said, "Tak^ over the [I4OI6]
phone to the Navy Department," and so I went out in the lobby and
kept on the job, trying to get the news of what was going on in Pearl
Harbor.
5276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. MuKrHY. And yoii were reporting to him?
Admiral Beardall. And reportino; to him.
Mr. Murphy. Did you at any time talk to the President about his
reactions on Saturday night when the paper was delivered to him by
Commander Schulz?
Admiral Beard all. Never.
Mr. Murphy. Did you at any time on Saturday evening, after you
went to Admiral Wilkinson's, talk to the President?
Admiral Beardall. Never.
Mr. Murphy. Between that time and Sunday morning at 10 o clock?
Admiral Beardall. Never.
Mr. Murphy. Did you at any time on Saturday night or early Sun-
day morning talk to Admiral Stark?
Admiral Beardall. I did not.
Mr. Murphy. Did you at any time Saturday night or early Sunday
rnorning make any inquiry or attempt to locate Admiral Stark?
Admiral Beardall. No ; I did not.
Mr. Murphy. No other questions.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
[14i017] Senator Ferguson. Admiral, going back to Saturday
evening— rather Saturday all day— in the morning do you recall any
messages being delivered to you as aide to the President?
Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of it.
Senator Ferguson. Did you handle messages from the Secretary of
State?
Admiral Beardall. I did not.
Senator Ferguson. Who handled those, to the President, as far as
the President was concerned?
Admiral Beardall. I do not know that. I think— I don't know
who handled the State Department messages.
Senator Ferguson. Well, the State Department messages were never
delivered in a locked pouch, is that correct— or were they ?
Admiral Beardall. I am not sure. I don't know the method of
delievery of the State Department messages.
Senator Ferguson. Well, we have here in the evidence a message
from the Ambassador in London telling us, about 10 : 40 on Saturday
morning, telling us about a movement of ships, and it is addressed, as
I understand it, to the Secretary of State's office.
That would not come to you in your regular duty ?
Admiral Beardall. No, sir. . r moi
Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any messages, magic [24018 \
messages, delivered to you while you were on duty on Saturday, and
that you delivered to the President?
Admiral Beardall. None ; have no recollection of any.
Senator Ferguson. So then you would say, as far as your testimony
is concerned, no messages were delivered to you, or through you, to
the President on Saturday?
Admiral Beardall. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, that we might have the time as to when
someone notified you there would be messages after you left, or after
the time of notifying you, will you tell us who notified you that there
would be messages that evening or that afternoon ?
Admiral Beardall. As I previously testified it must have been Lt.
Commander Kramer because he was the one who used to bring me
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5277
regularly this pouch for delivery. He was the distributor of these
messages.
Senator Ferguson. When you say "must" you mean because he was
the distributing agency?
Admiral Beardall. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Therefore you assume that that is who gave
you that message ?
Admiral Beardall. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. Could you place the time?
Admiral Beardall. I should say about 5 : 30, because normally I
stayed at the Navy Department until about that time [14019]
and often inquired if there was any magic coming in that might be
destined for the White House, for the President, so that I could take
it to the President at the end of the day, when it would be delivered.
Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understood Captain Kramer's testi-
mony, he indicated that he would take these messages to the White
House and deliver them to you, as the aide?
Admiral Beardall. No. He did toward the end, when the watch
officer was there. Sometimes Kramer would bring them over, later on,
after the war started, but before Pearl Harbor there was no situation
room and no map room in the White House; we didn't have one, and
he would bring them to me in my office at the Navy Department and I
would carry them myself.
Senator Ferguson. And do you know of any occasion when he
delivered messages to you as the naval aide to the President in the
Wliite House and that you would take them to the President ?
Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of it.
Senator Ferguson. Prior to Pearl Harbor, prior to the attack on
Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Beardall. I can't recall any.
Senator Ferguson. Well then, as I understand it. Commander
Schulz, then Lieutenant Schulz, wouldn't be at the White House while
you were on duty on Saturday?
[140£0] Admiral Beardall. No, not necessarily; no. At that
time. Prior to Pearl Harbor.
Senator Ferguson. Prior to Pearl Harbor. Now, do you know
where Schulz was when you instructed him to go to the White House
and wait for the messages that would be delivered later ?
Admiral Beardall. Well, he may have been in the Navy Depart-
ment and he may have been over in that mail room we established.
Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that?
Admiral Beardall. Well, I don't recall it; no, but I know that was
the normal procedure.
Senator Ferguson. Do you recall whether or not as your — what did
you call him, assistant aide? »
Admiral Beardall. He was a communication watch officer.
Senator Ferguson. He didn't classify as an aide?
Admiral Beardall. No.
Senator Ferguson. He was a communication watch officer. Did
you at all times have a watch officer in the White House?
Admiral Beardall. No.
Senator Ferguson. When did you start putting a watch officer in
the White House?
Admiral Beardall. After Pearl Harbor.
5278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Well, if Commander Schulz, Lieutenant
[I4OSI] Sclnilz at that time, indicated on this record that he was
in the White House from the time he received, at least, this message
from you, I mean the message as to the fact that there would be an-
other message delivered, then you would say that he was acting as a
watch officer in the White House ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. The watch officers were instructed,
if it came in, to take it to the President.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did you give him any instructions as to
how to deliver this message to the President ?
Admiral Beardall. I may have. I am not positive in my mind.
But that would have been the normal thing for me to do.
Senator Ferguson. Did anyone tell you that day that this would
be important, this message ?
Admiral Beardall. No.
Senator Ferguson. Had you ever had a man remain on duty to
deliver to the President a message, the time being 5 : 30 that you
received this notice, prior to Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of it.
Senator Ferguson. So you would say this was the first time you
designated a watch officer to remain so that he could deliver a mes-
sage to the President ?
Admiral Beardall. I would.
Senator Ferguson. Then I take it that there must have been some-
thing said indicating that this was an important [1402^] mes-
sage, that it would have to get to the President immediately, or it
would have happened as in the case of all normal messages, that it
would have remained in the Navy Department until the next morning,
Sunday ; is that a fair statement ?
Admiral Beardall. That is a fair statement, sir.
Senator Ferguson. So we find that the first time in the history of
the Navy Department, in your experience as naval aide — and you
were naval aide for how many years?
Admiral Beardall, I was naval aide for about 7 months.
Senator Ferguson. During that entire 7 months' period no occasion
had arisen that you had placed anyone else — or that you had delivered
a message after the ordinary day, which was 5 :30 or 6 o'clock ; is that
a correct statement ?
Admiral Beardall. That is a correct statement.
Senator Ferguson. Did you check that evening, this bein^ an un-
usual situation, did j^ou check with Schulz later that evening, and
before the next morning, as to whether or not he ever received and
delivered to the President this important message?
Admiral Beardall. I accept his statement that he called me up
and told me that he had delivered this 13-part, this message, he didn't
know what it was, this part to the President.
Senator Ferguson. Did he say "part" or "13 parts"?
Admiral Beardall. I don't recall what he said but the [140^3]
message that he received fi-om Commander Kramer.
Senator Ferguson. Well, if it turns out from the testimony that
there was more than one message you would say that he probably told
you that he had delivered, plural, the "messages" ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5279
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir ; the messages that were in the pouch.
Senator Ferguson. That were in the pouch. Now, had you any in-
structions or information that that would be the last delivery that
night or evening ?
Admiral Beardall. No.
Senator Ferguson. What did you tell Schulz about remaining on
duty?
Admiral Beardall. I don't recall what I told him. I accept his
statement that he asked permission to go home and that he did go
home.
Senator Ferguson. Then you assume from that that your instruc-
tions would be that he could leave ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, you received the message, 13-part mes-
sage. Were there any other messages with that message — when you
were at Admiral Wilkinson's home ?
Admiral Beardall. I recollect none with it.
Senator Ferguson. You recollect no other message ?
[14-(^4] Admiral Beardall. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Then as far as the record will show now, no
messages were delivered to you, or you had no knowledge of any
messages, on Saturday, as far as magic was concerned, or messages
to the President, except the 13-part which you read at Admiral Wilk-
inson's ?
Admiral Beardall. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Is that correct?
Admiral Beardall. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I assume that evening you and Mrs. Beard-
all left the AVilkinson home and went home ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Have you any idea what time you got home ?
Admiral Beardall. 1 have no clear idea.
Senator Ferguson. Well
Admiral Beardall. Probably somewhere between 11:00 and mid-
night, as I recollect.
Senator Ferguson. And during the time you were home that eve-
ning did you get any calls ?
Admiral Beardatx. None at home that I recollect.
Senator Ferguson. Were any messages delivered to you or did any-
one come to your home ?
Admiral Beardall. Not to my recollection.
[1402s] Senator Ferguson. Then the next morning were you on
the alert, was your department alerted, so that you anticipated or
expected something to happen ?
Admiral Beardall. By my department
Senator Ferguson. What department would you be in at the Navy
as aide to the President ?
Admiral Beardall. I was aide to the President.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Well, were you on the alert for war?
Admiral Beardall. I was on the alert for the delivery of these
messages to the Secretary of State by the American Ambassadors of
Japan. I mean, I was concerned about that.
5280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Well, if you had a department, which I assume
you did have, as naval aide to the President, one man in it, your
department was alerted?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And you were alerted ; is that correct ?
Admiral Beardall. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You were then anticipatmg a fourteenth part,
because of the information you received at Admiral Wilkinson's ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know a man named Carson, a JSavy
officer ?
[UdsG] Admiral Beardall. I have heard of him since I have
been back to Washington this time.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know^ who he is? What his rank is?
Was he connected with this department of yours ?
Admiral Beardall. I understand— he was another youngster that
we had got hold of to use as a relief for Schulz. I mean, as an extra
watch officer after we established this mail-room communication cpter.
Senator Ferguson. Now, why did you establish a watch office m
the mail room and put Schulz in and have a man named Carson as his
relief man? , ^ , ^
Admiral Beardall. Well, so that Schulz could be oft sometime,
acquaint, break this boy in so we could use him. , «. • ^i
Senator Ferguson. When did you establish this watch office m the
White House?
Admiral Beardall. I should say about ; oh, 2 days, 3 days before
Pearl Harbor. ^ , -r^r , • .i ^ ^
Senator Ferguson. Two or 3 days before Pearl Harbor is the hrst
we find that a watch place was in the White House. And can you
tell us why it was established?
Admiral Beardall. Well, it was established so that there would be
someone there to receive this magic who was more or less in the way
of officer-messenger so that if I wasn't available there could be some-
one there. These messages were [14027] coming in. The
situation w^as getting more tense in the diplomatic relations, and I
wanted somebody there in case I was going out for dinner or some-
where else, that could receive this and be trusted to deliver it.
Senator Ferguson. Who advised you that the situation was getting
more tense, causing you to come to the conclusion that a watch office
should be set up in the White House ? How did you come to that con-
clusion that it was getting more tense?
Admiral Beardall. I just think my own reasoning and
Senator Ferguson. You had examined all magic that came through
vou, and, therefore, you drew the conclusion that the situation was
changing, rapid enough, at least, that you wanted to establish a watch
office ?
Admiral Beardall. Correct, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Is that correct ?
Admiral Beardall. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And that these messages were so important at
that time that they w^ere to be delivered at once to the President instead
of having to wait until Admiral Beardall was found, there would be
someone on duty, either Schulz or Cnrson, to deliver these messages;
is that a correct statement?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5281
Admiral Beardaix. That is a correct statement; and to keep them
secure.
[14028] Senator Ferguson. At that time, let's say the 5th, be-
fore you established the watch office, what were your hours at the
White House, or on duty ?
Admiral Beardall. My hours at the White House, I would probably
go there in the morning and in the afternoon, unless the President had
some other instructions for me, and I would spend the balance of the
day in my office at the Navy Department.
Senator Ferguson. What were your office hours in the Navy De-
partment and at the Wliite House both ?
Admiral Beardall. Well, I should say from 9 : 30, from 9 in the
morning until probably 5 : 30, and sometimes 6.
Senator Ferguson. About 9 or 9 : 30 to 5 : 30 or 6 were your regular
hours ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. When did you establish longer hours for the
delivery of these messages either through you or these two assistants?
Admiral Beardall. I don't understand the question, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Schulz goes on night duty at least on Saturday.
Had you established this watch for longer hours than daylight hours
that 3^ou have given us, from 9 to 6 ?
Admiral Beardall. No, not regularly. As I recollect. Immedi-
ately after Pearl Harbor we set up
[14-029] Senator Ferguson. I just want before Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Beardall. Before
Senator Ferguson. You don't recall. So this would be the first
night duty?
Admiral Beardall. First night duty that I can recollect.
Senator Ferguson. Or first special duty ; is that correct ?
Admiral Beardall. First special duty, yes; to the best of my
recollection.
Senator Ferguson. Were you working Sundays prior to Pearl
Harbor ?
Admiral Beardall. No, not necessarily, because I was perhaps the
only aide, or secretary, around the White House on Sunday morning.
Senator Ferguson. I mean, previous. For instance, on the 1st.
Did you work Sunday?
Admiral Beardall. I don't recall.
Senator Ferguson. Had you worked previous to the 7th ?
Admiral Bi^ardall. On Sunday?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Adrniral Beardall. If I had something to do, I had some special
duty, if I had been directed by the President, I may have gone to
the White House or Navy Department on that Sunday depending
on what was going on.
Senator Ferguson. Prior to the 7th had you ever remained
[I4OSO] on duty Sunday to deliver any messages ?
Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of doing that.
Senator Ferguson. So, the first time on a Sunday that you were
on dut}^ to deliver messages was the 7th ; is that correct?
Admiral Beardall. That is a correct statement, sir, to the best of
my recollection.
79716— 46— pt. 11 10
5282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, when did you first receive instruc-
tions to appear for duty on Sunday the 7th?
Admiral Beardall. I received no instructions.
Senator Ferguson. You never received instructions to go on duty
on the 7th ?
Admiral Beardall. No.
Senator Ferguson. From no one?
Admiral Beardall. No one that I know of.
Senator Ferguson. How does it come that you got on duty on
the 7th?
Admiral Beardall. Well, my own initiative.
Senator Ferguson. Why, what caused you to — well, you being the
only man in the department, I was going to say, instruct yourself
to be on duty — but you being the only one in that department, and
being the superior officer, how does it come that you went on duty
that morning?
Admiral Beardall. Well, my recollection is because I had perused
those 13 parts that evening at Captain Wilkinson's [14^031'] and
there must have been some indication there was another part coming
to be delivered, which might have occasioned me, through a sense of
duty, to look into it.
Senator Ferguson. I take it then the reading of the 13 parts caused
you to believe there would be another part come in and therefore you
went to duty and were on duty Sunday morning ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you go to the White House ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What time did you arrive at the White House?
Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection I would say
about 9 : 30.
Senator Ferguson. Did you see the President before you received
any messages?
Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of that, sir.
Senator Ferguson. No recollection of that?
Admiral Beardall. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Then when did you first know that another part
had come in, and that you were going to receive one for the President?
Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of receiving any word
that another one was coming in.
[l^OS^I Senator Ferguson. Did anyone deliver a message to
you, magic, on Sunday morning, to be delivered to the*President?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir ; they must have, else I wouldn't have
had it.
Senator Ferguson. Where were you when it was delivered to you ?
Admiral Beardall. I think either in the little mail room or in the
office upstairs, in the military aide's room.
Senator Ferguson. Well, not to repeat, but you have given us the
hour, about 10 o'clock, and you haven't any reason to state that it was
before that, because if you got there about 9 : 30 it would be about
10 o'clock; is that correct?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And it would come, I take it, in the same ponch.
Did you read it before you took it to the President?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMriTEE 5288
Admiral Beardall. I do not recollect that clearly, whether I did
or not. I might have or might not.
Senator Ferguson. Don't you think that the fourteenth part of this
message would be rather vivid in your memory if you had read it
before you took it into the President?
Admiral Beardall. I think it would ; yes.
Senator Ferguson. For that reason it would seem that you hadn't
read it. You think you hadn't read it ?
[14'0-33] Admiral Beardall. I don't know. I may or may not
have read it.
Senator Ferguson. Was there any message beside that fourteenth
part that came to your attention or to your knowledge that morning?
Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of any.
Senator Ferguson. You have no recollection of any other message,
whether it was the 1 o'clock message, or a message that indicated no
one was to typewrite the message except' the Ambassador himself?
Admiral Beardall. Correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. So you have no recollection; that doesn't re-
fresh your memory?
Admiral Beardall. Not a bit, sir.
Senator Ferguson. When you took this to the President, in what
room was the President?
Admiral Beardall. In his bedroom.
Senator Ferguson. He was in his bedroom ; is that correct ?
Admiral Beardall. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, prior to the reading of it by the Presi-
dent, did you have a conversation or did he say anything?
Admiral Beardaltv. I don't recollect him saying anything except
"Good morning."
[14^034] Senator Ferguson. Then did he sit and read whatever
was in that pouch that morning?
Admiral Beardall. He did.
Senator Ferguson. And you remained there while he read it?
Admiral Beardall. I did.
Senator Ferguson. Then what would you say he said after, giving
us the exact words or the substance.
Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection the substance
of his words were : "It looks like the Japanese are going to break off
negotiations."
Senator Ferguson. That is the substance of what he said?
Admiral Beardall. That is the substance.
Senator Ferguson. He handed back whatever was in the file and
whatever he had read ; is that correct ?
Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection.
Senator Ferguson. No other delivery to your knowledge was de-
livered to him that morning ?
Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection.
Senator Ferguson. Now, what did you do with that pouch and
where did you go for the rest of the day up to the time of the attack?
Admiral Beardall. The best of my recollection
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Beardall. I took the pouch back to the Navy [14035]
Department.
5284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. And remained at the Navy Department?
Admiral Beardall. I remained there until lunch time.
Senator Ferguson. Then went home and were having lunch when
the attack came?
Admiral Beardall. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any other conversations you
had, for a week, with the President, other than the one that you state,
in relation to the Far East?
Admiral Beardall. Yes ; I recollect one very clearly.
Senator Ferguson. When was that?
Admiral Beardall. That was about the 4th or 5th, in connection
with the delivery of the magic. I took the liberty of inviting special
attention as significant the message about the burning of codes.
Senator Ferguson. Then you had a conversation with the Presi-
dent about the burning of codes ; is that correct?
Admiral Beardall. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us as near as you can, in substance
if you can't give us the exact words, what that conversation was by
you and by the President ?
Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection the conversation
was, I said, "Mr. President, this is a very significant dispatch," which
he read very carefully, and he said [I4OS6'] "Well, when do
you think it will happen?" I said, "Most any time." That was the
gist of the conversation.
[I4O37] Senator Ferguson. What did the President say, did he
>give you any time when he said, "When do you think it will happen,"
and you said, "Most any time," did he reply as to what his opinion was?
Admiral Beardall. Not at all.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do you recall any other conversations
with him about the Far East?
Admiral Beardall. None.
Senator Ferguson. Now, of course, you knew what he meant when
he asked you when it would happen?
Admiral Beardall. Well, I can't state what was on the President's
mind, but I understood him to mean
Senator Ferguson. What did you understand, from what had taken
place ?
Admiral Beardall. I understood him to mean. When is war going
to break out, when we are going to be attacked, or something.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. That is why you said that "almost any
time," is that correct?
Admiral Beardall. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Because from your knowledge it indicated that
war could be at any moment, an attack could be at any minute. Is
that correct?
Admiral Beardall. That is correct.
[14038] Senator Ferguson. Admiral, when did you come to that
conclusion, when did you come to the conclusion that war was immedi-
ately imminent?
Admiral Beardall. I can't exactly say when I came to that con-
clusion that it was immediately imminent, but I will say that that
message of burning codes influenced me very much, that we were get-
ting through with these diplomatic negotiations, and there was going
to be war.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5285
Senator Ferguson. You are a graduate of Annapolis?
Admiral Beardall. I am, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Your career is that of a Navy man?
Admiral Beardall. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Therefore you had a right to apprise what was
going on, to determine whether or not there would be war. I want
the record. I want the record merely to show your experience, so that
we may value your opinion.
That is correct.
Admiral Beardall. That is correct, that I am a graduate of Annap-
olis, and a naval officer.
Senator Ferguson. And you have been a naval officer all your life?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson, Have had a great amount of experience in the
Navy.
^ [liOS9] (No response.)
Senator Ferguson. You came to the conclusion that, by reading
these codes, then, that war was imminent, and you replied to the Pres-
ident "almost any time"?
Admiral Beardall. Correct.
Senator Ferguson. Do you recall, Admiral, any other conversa-
tions ?
Admiral Beardall. Those are the only ones.
Senator Ferguson. With the President, about the Far East?
Admiral Beardall. Those are the only ones I recall.
Senator Ferguson. You can't recall any prior to that now ?
Admiral Beardall. No, no ; he never discussed it with me.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have any with Harry Hopkins?
Admiral Beardall. None.
Senator Ferguson. About tlie Far East ?
Admiral Beardall. None.
. Senator Ferguson. I notice in Commander Schulz's testimony, lie
said, on page 12451 :
The first time I was ever in the White House was on the 5th of December.
That would refresh your memory as to when you put the
[imO] watch on?
Admiral Beardall. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did you, on the morning, on Sunday morn-
ing, while over in the watch room, have a conversation with these
other men who were in that room, as indicated by this Watch Log, any
conversation about the Far East ?
Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of any conversation with
them. I may have had in regard to the situation, but I have no
recollection of it.
Senator Ferguson. Could I see that memorandum. Was it the
usual situation for Sunday morning to have eight or ten officers
sitting in the watch office, or were they in the watch office, in the Navy
Department ?
Admiral Beardall. Well, about that time — it previously hadn't
been. I would say it was an unusual situation to have that many
coming in and going, so far as I can recollect.
Senator Ferguson. You say that would be unusual ?
5286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Beardall. I think so. I don't know — ^I mean that is just
my opinion.
Senator Ferguson. At least that is the first time you knew of any
such experience?
Admiral Beardall. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Now, would you say that you had been back to
the Navy Department after the delivery of this ' \^^0I|.1^^ mes-
sage so that you would be in the watch office in a position to deliver
any further messages to the President ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes ; I should say that, along with other rea-
sons for going back, to see what was going on, and a natural interest
in the situation.
Senator Ferguson. Admiral, this was a very, very tense moment,
not only in your life but in the country's life, and you realized it, as a
Navy officer, did you not, that morning?
Admiral Beardall. I think that is a correct statement, yes.
Senator Ferguson. Therefore you were waiting in this office witR
other Navy men ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes. Well, I — yes. I wasn't waiting in this
office.
Senator Ferguson. No ; I don't want to indicate that you were wast-
ing any time, or loafing, or anything like that, but you were on duty
there with the other Navy men ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir; but I could have come and gone, I
had no special instructions.
Senator Ferguson. I understand that.
There was a Captain Schuirman, Captain Wilkinson, Captain Met-
calfe. I think that is all the captains. You were a captain at that
time, is that correct ?
Admiral Beardall. That is correct.
[14^4^] Senator Ferguson. And you can't recall any conver-
sation among these men who were in this office No. 2601 at about 11 : 45
that morning ?
Admiral Beardall. I can't recall any specific conversation with
them.
Senator Ferguson. Did they indicate that they were waiting for
something to happen ?
Admiral Beardall. I don't know that they indicated they were
waiting for something to happen, but they were interested in the
situation before us.
Senator Ferguson. They were there because of the very tense
situation ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Just as you were there ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you see Admiral Stark ?
Admiral Beardall. 1 did.
Senator Ferguson. On Sunday morning?
Admiral Beardall. I did.
Senator Ferguson. Were you in his office?
Admiral Beardall. Yes sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conversation with him?
Admiral Beardall. No direct conversation. I listened \_lJfij!f3^
into what might be going on and sat in a while.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5287
Senator Ferguson. What time, did you first get to the Navy Depart-
ment on Sunday morning?
Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection, I should say it
was, around 11 or 11: 15.
Senator Ferguson. What time would you say you went into Admiral
Stark's office?
Admiral Beardall. I think about 11 or 11 : 30. I am not certain
of the time there.
Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us, to the best of your knowledge,
if you can't remember the exact language, the substance of the con-
versation that took place in Admiral Stark's office ?
Admiral Beardall. I have one recollection.
Senator Ferguson. I would like to have that.
Admiral Beardall. That the phone rang from General Marshall's
office and something was said about "include the Navy" in this message,
or that message — is o. k. Some conversation to that effect. That is
the best of my recollection.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, first, you would get that from Ad-
miral Stark?
Admiral Beardall. Well, yes; I got that on the phone. I don't
know what was coming in.
[i^<9^4] Senator Ferguson. From what he said, you took it, it
would be all right to include the Navy ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir ; or words to that effect.
Senator Ferguson. Was anything.said about the kind of a message ?
Admiral Beardall. No, sir ; not to my recollection.
Senator Ferguson. Who would you say was in Admiral Stark's
office during the time that this phone call came in ?
Admiral Beardall. Well, I can't recollect who was in there then.
There were some officers coming and going. There may have been
Admiral Ingersoll. He was in the office next door. May have been
Captain Wilkinson. I can't recall now just who did come and go dur-
ing the time I was there.
Senator Ferguson. Do you recall what would take you into Admiral
Stark's office, he being the Chief in charge, did you go in to discuss
anything with him, or just drop in ?
Admiral Beardall. No ; I often went in his office.
Senator Ferguson. Because of your rank, you had free access to
the Admiral's office?
Admiral Beardall. Correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You weren't called in for consultation?
Admiral Beardall. I was not, sir.
[1404^] Senator Ferguson. You don't recall any conference that
you had with the Admiral about the situation as it stood?
Admiral Beardall. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, did you get anything from that conversa-
tion that the Admiral had with General Marshall, that things were
very serious?
Admiral Beardall. No; I gleaned that they were sending some
message to the fleet, sending some message out.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that Ambassador Hu Shih of
China had called on the President on Sunday morning?
Admiral Beardall. I did not, sir.
5288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. You had no knowledge of that ? I assume, then,
that you had no knowledge of anyone calling on the President Sun-
day morning?
Admiral Beardall, No one.
Senator Ferguson. You can't give us any information on this con-
versation, any more of this conversation in Admiral Stark's office,
than you have?
Admiral Beardall. That is all I can recollect.
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.
Mr, Murphy. Admiral Beardall, as I understand it, you did not
have other naval officers at the White House until [^lJf.0J}.6~\ 2
days before Pearl Harbor. That would be December 5, 1941 ?
x^dmiral Beardall. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. So that the only occasion you ever had before Decem-
ber 6 to assign anyone to remain after 5 : 30 was 1 day, that would
be the evening of December 5 ?
Admiral Beardall. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. Before that, do you know whether or not it was true
that Captain Kramer sometimes in the evening delivered messages to
the White House?
Admiral Beardall. I do; I heard it.
Mr. Murphy. In other words, he himself, without the necessity of
having an officer take it from him and deliver it to the President, had
delivered it personally?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. To the President, himself?
Admiral Beardall. I think often to the President himself, from
what I have learned, and sometimes, if I wasn't there, to General
Watson, too.
Mr. Murphy. There was a reference made that this was unusual.
The only time before December 6 you had done it was December 5,
because you had no assistant up until then?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. On the morning of December 7, you went to
\_lJfOI(.7'\ the President with this particular message, and you would
state that he said, "It looks as though they are breaking off negotia-
tions." You had observed the President on many previous occasions,
had you not ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. In your judgment was there anything in his manner
which would indicate to you that he was expecting an attack within a
period of hours?
Admiral Beardsall. There was not, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Will you state for the record why you come to that
conclusion ?
Admiral Beardall. Well, there was no alarm, or no mention of
this, mention of war, or of any actions on his part that would indicate
that he was expecting an attack.
Mr. Murphy. Did he say anything at all to you, as his naval aide,
at that time, that would indicate to you that he, the President, felt
that war was a matter of hours ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5289
Admiral Beardall. Nothing at all.
Mr. Murphy. Now, there was before us as a witness, Commander
Schulz. Did anyone make any attempt to inquire from you as to
who was your assistant on duty at the White House on December 6,
your aide, or whatever naval person was there on December 6, 1941 ?
Do you understand my question ?
Admiral Beardall. I don't quite follow it, sir.
[l^O^S] Mr. Murphy. Strike that question. Did anyone ask
you who was with you at the White House on December 6, 1941, by
way of other Naval personnel ?
Admiral Beardall. No ; to the best of my recollection. Commander
Kramer, who handled this message, and who would be the one who
would deliver anything that came in.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate. Admiral, are you the one that submitted
the name of Commander Schulz ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. ,
Mr. Murphy. As a witness for this committee ?
Admiral Beardall. Correct.
Mr. Murphy. Td whom did you give that name ?
Admiral Beardall. To Lieutenant Commander Baecher here.
Mr. Murphy. Did you have anything to do with Commander
Schulz when he got to Washington ?
Admiral Beardall. No. I haven't seen him.
Mr. Murphy. Did you have anything to do with shielding that
witness from this committee or its investigators ?
Admiral Beardall. Nothing at all.
Mr. Murphy. May I ask from Commander Baecher, there has been
a national magazine article to the effect that steps were taken to shield
Commander Schulz from the investigators and attorneys of the com-
mittee and the members of the committee. Did the United States
Navy do any such thing ?
[1404^] Commander Baecher. No, sir; positively not.
JNIr. Murphy. Who was it that brought Commander Schulz here?
Commander Baecher. We did ; the Navy did.
Mr. Murphy. On whose request?
Commander Baecher. At the request of prior counsel. They en-
quired, through me, of Admiral Beardall, who his assistants were.
Mr. Murphy, Did you. Commander, attempt to conceal this wit-
ness or keep him from any members of this committee, or the inves-
tigators of the committee, prior to his going on the stand?
Commander Baecher. Absolutely not. We wrote several memor-
anda to counsel explaining where Commander Schulz was and the
difficulties that might be involved in bringing him here and generally
what he would testify to. And I interviewed him personally before
he was brought to the committee room and I reported the substance of
his testimony to Mr. Kichardson, to Senator Ferguson, and to Senator
Lucas.
[14050] Mr. Mutjphy. Did you attempt to conceal him from this
committee over the lunch hour so that the committee couldn't talk to
him or the committee investigators couldn't talk to him ?
Commander Baecher. Absolutely not.
Mr. Murphy. One other question. Admiral Beardall. Did you
know about the war warning having gone out on November 27 ?
5290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Beardall. No, sir.
Mi-. Murphy. You did not know we had sent such warning to the
theaters in the Pacific?
Admiral Beardall. No, sir; I had no such knowledge.
Mr. Murphy. That is all.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Fer:^.uson. Admiral, you weren't in Washington for the
last few months, were you?
Admiral Beardall. No ; I have been away.
Senator Ferguson. You have been in Panama?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And Peru?
Admiral Beardall. Panama and Peru.
Senator Ferguson. Ho\y long have you been out of Washington?
Admiral Beardall. Since last August.
[J4051] Senator Ferguson. You are just returning to testify
here and you are returning to Panama?
Admiral Beardall. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the Duty Officer Carson
was on duty on Sunday?
Admiral Beardall. 1 don't definitely. Senator.
Senator P'erguson. You don't recall leaving anyone at the White
House while you went to the Navy Department?
Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of it.
Senator FERr.usoN. The record should show that Schulz was your
Deputy Watch Officer at 'the White House, should it not?
Admiral Beardall. AVhat record?
Senator Ferguson. Well, the records of the Navy should have shown
that his duty on Saturday was a deputy or assistant watch officer as
aide to the President?
Admiral Beardall. The knowledge would exist there but whether
they had a record of it I couldn't be sure.
Senator Ferguson. Wasn't it customary to assign the duty of a man ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, but Schulz was on temporary duty in the
White House at that time. He was permanently attached to the Navy
Department and I made a request on them to send an assistant over
there, and whether they made a record of that I am not sure.
[11^052] Senator Ferguson. When were you first consulted as to
who received and delivered this message to the White House, this
13-part on Saturday night?
Admiral Beardall. When I came back here to see the former
counsel. That was in November. Last November.
Senator Ferguson. Were you in the city of Washington last
November ?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. When in November?
Admiral Beardali>. I arrived here about the 25th, somewhere
around there.
Senator Ferguson. Well, were you then asked as to whom was your
associate or assistant at that time?
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. I spent a lot of time trying to find out
who he was.
Senator Ferguson. You had forgotten who he was ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5291
Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. How did you find out who your assistant was?
Admiral Beardall. Inquiring around with different people and
trying to remember his name, and I finally struck somebody who re-
membered what his name was, and I went to the Navy Department
and Lieutenant Commander Baecher here, to find out where he was,
and see if he was the right man.
[14053] Senator Ferguson. Do you know why he wasn't brought
here as a witness until about the Aveek of the 20th of February?
Admiral Beardall. I haven't the slightest idea.
Senator Ferguson. Did you locate him back in November?
Admiral Beardall. I tliink we located him
Commander Baecher, Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Let the Admiral answer.
Admiral Beardall. I think he was located.
Senator Ferguson. Did you talk with him?
Admiral Beardall. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You didn't talk with him?
Admiral Beardall. No.
Senator Ferguson. But you knew he was located.
Admiral Beardall. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
The Vice Chairman. This room, 2601 you say, was the watch offi-
cer's room in the Navy?
Admiral Beardall. I think it was, sir. We can check that. I
haven't any knowledge.
The Vice Chairman. It wasn't your office?
Admiral Beardall. It wasn't my office, no.
The Vice Chairman. And all these officers whose names have been
read here, they just came in and went out, passed through there?
[14054] Admiral Beardall.. Exactly. I take it it wasn't a reg-
ular office which anybody kept, except the watch officer, or some sort of
a mail censor, or something of that sort.
The Vice Chairman. The fact that all these names are listed would
not indicate that they were all assembled there at any one time?
Admiral Beardall. Not all all.
The Vice Chairman. It would just indicate that they had passed
through there sometime during the day?
Admiral Beardall. Correct.
The Vice Chairman. Thank you. Is there anything further?
Does counsel have anything further?
Mr. Richardson. No; nothing further from the witness.
The Vice Chairman. Do you have anything further, Admiral, that
you desire to give to the committee?
Admiral Beardall. I can think of nothing, sir.
The Vice Chairman. We thank you for your appearance and the in-
formation that you have given us. You may be excused.
(The witness was excused.)
[I4055] Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that
the members of the committee cannot attend for several days, if you
could give us another half hour we could clear the record so as to help
the printer out on the record. AVe need but one faithful committee
member to remain with us while we put this material in.
5292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Vice CiixVirman. Go ahead.
Senator Ferguson. May I ask what it will be ?
Mr. Richardson. This is a summation of requests heretofore made,
and counsel is now prepared to present the matter. Mr. Morgan will
present it.
Mr. Morgan. Mr. Chairman, at pa^e 879 of the record Congressman
Gearhart requested the log of the U. S. S. Helena. Commander
Baecher has provided the log, which we would like to offer as Exhibit
No. 163.
The Vice Chairman. It will be received.
(The log referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 163.")
Mr. Morgan. At pages 8342 and 8346 Congressman Murphy re-
quested reports supplied by General Short with respect to the attack
on Oahu. These reports were shown to Mr. Murphy and we have them
compiled and will offer them as Exhibit No. 164.
The Vice Chairman. They will be so received.
(The reports referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 164.")
Mr. Morgan. We have a communication from the Army liaison
[lJi.056'] office dated April 10, 1946 reading as follows :
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson :
In response to Congressman Murphy's inquiry at page 4532 of the committee
transcript, there is enclosed a copy of a partial translation of a document relating
to a 23 February 1941 conference between German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop
and Japanese Ambassador Oshima. The partial translation was obtained from
the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis
Criminality.
This document was distributed among the members of the committee.
We would like to offer it as Exhibit No. 165.
The Vice Chairman. It will be so received.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 165.")
Mr. Morgan. Some time ago there was distributed to the members
of the committee a copy of the dispatch from Ambassador Winant to
the State Department dated November 2, 1941. Instead of offering this
as an exhibit we would like to have it spread on the record.
The Vice Chairman. The document referred to will be spread on
the record.
(The matter referred to follows:)
[i^057] TEM This telegram must be London
closely paraphrased before being com- Dated November 2, 1941.
municated to anyone. (SC) Ree'd 7:36 a. m.
Secbetaby of State,
Washington.
TRIPLE PRIORITY
5213, November 2, noon.
PERSONAL AND SECRET TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMER
NAVAL PERSON
As your Naval people have already been informed, we are sending that big
ship you inspected into the Indian Ocean as part of the squadron we are forming
there. This ought to serve as a deterrent on .Tapan. There is nothing like having
something that can catch and kill anything. I am very glad we can spare her
at this juncture as it is more than we thought we could do some time ago. The
tirmer your attitude and ours, the less chance of their taking the plunge.
I am grieved at the loss of life you have suffered with Reuhen James. I
salute the land of unending challenge !
Winant.
ALC
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5293
114058] Mr. Morgan. Pursuant to the request of Senator Lucas
at pages 154-5 of the record, we have a comunication, dated Novem-
ber 30, 1945, from Commander Baecher, the Navy liaison officer con-
cerning :
Subject : Time of receipt of the message from the U. S. S. Ward, by Admiral
Bloch and Admiral Kimmel.
We would like to have this communication plus the enclosure spread
on the record at this point.
The Vice Chairman. The communication and the enclosure will
be spread on the record at this point.
(The matter referred to follows :)
[I4O59] Depaktment of the Navy,
Office of the Secbetaby,
Washington, 30 November 1945.
Memorandum to : Mr. William D. Mitchell.
Subject : Time of receipt of the message from the U. S. S. WARD, by Admiral
Bloch and Admiral Kimmel.
1. Pursuant to your request there is enclosed a report indicating tht time the
message, from the U. S. S. WARD, was received by Admiral Bloch and Admiral
Kimmel.
/s/ John Ford Baecher
Lt. Comdr. USNR
Acknowledge receipt of the above enclosure.
Time of Receipt of Wakd's Message by Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel
RECEIPT BY admiral BLOCH
Robert's Report page 1727:
The dispatch from the WARD was received by Lt. Comdr. Kaminski, the watch
officer for the 14th Naval District, at 0712.
Robert's Report page 17^7
Captain John B. Earle, Chief of Staff of the 14th Naval District, states that
he received this message from Lt. Comdr. Kaminski at OTIO or 0712, and that
he immediately [14060] called Admiral Bloch, Commandant, 14th Naval
District.
Murfln Court Vol. 2, page 4OI.
Admiral Bloch states that he was Informed of the WARD'S message at about
0715 by Captain Earle. They discussed the possibility of this report being an-
other false contact, and before the matter had been clarified, the air attack had
begun.
RECEIPT BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL
Robert's Report Page 1727:
Lt. Cdr. Kaminski, the watch officer for the 14th Naval District, states that he
phoned the message to CincPac's duty officer a minute or two after receiving it
at 0712.
Murfin Court Vol. 2, pages S32-S:
Admiral Kimmel (CiucPac) states that on receiving the message from his
duty officer between 0730 and 0740, he presumed that this report was another
false contact, and while waiting for amplification of it, the bombing attack
started.
Roberts Report Page 1544:
At 0800, CincPac sent a message to all ships and stations, stating : "Air Raid
on Pearl Harbor. This is not a drill."
Mr. Morgan. At page 185 of the record, Senator Ferguson inquired
as to why the B-lts which were sent to Hawaii shortly before the
attack were unarmed. We have a communication from the Army liai-
son officer, dated 2 April 1946, in this regard, which we would like to
have spread on the record at this point.
5294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record.
(Tlie communication referred to follows:)
m062] War Department,
Washington, Room 4D757, The Pentagon, 2 April 1946.
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:
At page 185 of the Committee transcript, Senator Ferguson asked why the
B-17s which arrived at Oahu from the west coast on the morning of 7 December
1U41 were witliout ammunition. Testuuony on this subject by General Marshall
will be found in the Committee transcript at p. 2iJU0 and in the Army Fearl
Harbor B(»ard top secret transcript at pages 20-21, and by General Arnold in
he Army Boards secret transcript at page 1(JS.
/s/ Gael R. Nelson,
Capt., AVS.
[14063] Mr. Morgan. Pursuant to a request made by Senator
Ferguson at pages 200-201 of the transcript for all drafts and notes
in connection with Admiral Inglis' statement of the attack, we now
have a communication from the Navy Department dated January 25,
1946 which we would like to have spread on the record.
The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record.
(The communication referred to follows:)
[I4O64] Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 25 January 1946.
Memorandum
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
1. Reference is made to the request of Senator Ferguson (transcript pages
200-2U1) that all drafts and notes in connection with Admiral Inglis' statement
of attack be furnished the Committee. All of the material involved was destroyed
as, in the course of work, it was superseded by more finished drafts, and when
the tiual draft was completed on 24 November, ail pre\ious material was destroyed.
/s/ John Ford Baecheu
Lt. Comdr., USNR.
[14005] Mr. Morgan. Pursuant to a request made by Mr. Gear-
hart at page 276 of the record with respect to a search of the Navy
Department files concerning any instructions relative to maintenance
of radio silence in effect in the Atlantic and Pacific fleets at the time
of Pearl Harbor, we have a detailed memorandum from Commander
Baecher in this regard, dated February 19, 1946, which we ask be
spread on the record.
The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record at this point.
(The detailed memorandum referred to follows:)
[14O6G] 1083A
R#i2y
Department of the Navy.
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 19 February 1946.
Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson
1. Pursuant to committee request, a search has been made to determine the
conditions of radio silence in efiect in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets at the time
of Pearl Harbor.
a. ATLANTIC FLEET
In accordance with a directive issued by the CinC, Atlantic Fleet [CINCLANT
Op-Plan No. 7-41, dated 1 September l'J41, tilo A4-3(4)/((X)164) ] and under
whicii the fleet began to operate about 1 October 1941, radio communication was
prohibited except that which was authoriaed by the following portion of the
directive :
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5295
(1) *'To forward contact and important amplifying reports which it is imprac-
ticable to transmit by visual methods."
(2) "All traffic pertaining to operations in progress for which plans are
being made, may be transmitted by radio if trans- [IJfOGl] mission by
visual metliods or mail are considered impracticable."
(3) "Information considered vital to the accomplishment of the task and of a
greater importance than the preservation of communication security may be
transmitted by radio to units not within visual communication."
B. PACIFIC FLEET
In accordance with CinCPac directives to individual Task Forces (for example,
CinCPac dispatch 280447 of November 1941 to Task Forces TWO and EIGHT),
the fleet was operating under Radio Condition 19 which prohibited radio com-
munication except that which was authorized by the following:
(1) "To forward traffic vital to the accomplishment of an assigned task when
no other means of transmission would suffice."
(2) "To make the limited transmissions necessary for a parent vessel to
recover lost planes."
/s/ John Ford Raecher
Lt. Cnidr., USNB
[14068] 1083A
R120
Depaetment of the Navy,
Office of the Seciuit.^by,
Washington, 2 April 1946.
Memorandum
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson
1. By memorandum of 19 February 1946 (10S3A R#120) information was for-
warded you by the undersigned in respect of the conditions of radio activity and
silence in effect in the Atlnntic and Pacific Fleets, including that the Atlantic
Fleet was operating under Op-Plan 7-41. In amplification of tlie information in
that memorandum, it is desired to further advise you that Op-Plan 7-41 was
placed in effect in the Atlantic Fleet at 1200 hours dated 10 D.^cemher 1941.
/S/ .TOHN FORn B.^ECHER
Lieutenant Commander, USNR
[1406.9] Mr. Morgan. At page 299 and again at 780-2 of the
transcript, Congressman Gearliart requested records relating to the
transfer of ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic, or vice versa, from
May to December 1941. This material was rather extensive and de-
tailed, and for purposes of the record we would like to indicate that
it was delivered to Congressman Gearhart on April 10. with the request
that he advise as to what portions, if any, he desired incorporated in
the record.
Senator Ferguson. May I request the Chair that the aide to the
military, the Army, furnish us with all logs kept in the Secretary's or
Chief of StaflF's office for the month of November and the first 7 days
up until the 7th of December.
Mr. Masten. What kind of logs?
S'^nator Ferguson. Any logs like we have seen here today.
Mr. Masten. Telephone operators?
Senator Ferguson. Duty-officer logs and watch-officer logs. And I
would like to have the Navy produce their loss for the same period.
The Vice Chairman. The liaison, officers will take note of the re-
quests.^ Proceed.
Mr. Morgan. At page 7844 of the record. Congressman Murphy re-
quested a copy of the order which stopped the formation of \lli070']
the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces after they had set up a command.
^ See War Department communication on p. 5506, infra.
5296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
This information has been supplied by the Navy. For purposes of
the record we would like to indicate that it was presented to Mr. Murphy
on April 10, 1946, with the request that he indicate what portions he
desired incorporated in the transcript.
At page 7940, Senator Ferguson requested identifying data con-
cerning a message dated November 29, 1941, from the Adjutant Gen-
eral to Commanding General, Hawaii, which was read into the record
at pages 7937-7938. This has been supplied in a communication dated
January 22, 1946, from the Army liaison officer, Lt. Col. Harmon
Duncombe, which we ask be spread on the record.
The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record.
(The communication referred to follows:)
[I4071] Wae Depaetment,
WasMngton, 22 January 1946.
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson :
The Office of the Adjutant General has supplied the following information
concerning radio message No. 489, dated 29, November 1941, from the Adjutant
General to the Commanding Genei'al, Hawaii :
a. "AG 381 (11-29-41) MC-E" in the upper right corner is the file notation
for the message. "AG 381" is the designation for "Far Eastern Situation";
"(11-29-41)" is the date of the memorandum directing the preparation of the
cable. "MC" shows that the cable was prepared in the Miscellaneous Division,
Confidential Section of the Office of the Adjutant General. "E" indicates that
the memorandum directing the preparation of the cable was issued by the War
Plans Division.
b. "EHB/cdm — 1712" shows that Elmer H. Boughton in the Miscellaneous
Division, Secret and Confidential Section of the Adjutant General's Office was
in charge of the physical preparation of the cable, that it was typed by Corrine
D. Moss, and that the work was done in Room 1712 Munitions Building.
c. The signature is that of Colonel A. P. [1^0721 Sullivan, who at the
time of the preparation of the cable was in charge of the Operations Branch,
Adjutant General's Office.
d. The handwritten notation "No. 489" is the number assigned to the message
by the War Department Message Center.
e. "BASED ON: WPD 4571-5, 11/29/41" in the lower left shows that the
cable was prepared from a War Plans Division memorandum having the file
number WPD 4571-5, of 29 November 1941.
f. The stamp "47 AGO DEC 8 1941 Received" in the lower right shows that
this copy of the cable was received on 8 December 1941, by Classifier No. 47, in
the mail room of the Office of the Adjutant General.
g. "File Dec 23 1941 BJS" in the lower right corner shows that the cable was
received in the classified files of the Office of the Adjutant General on 23 Decem-
ber 1941 ; the initials are those of Betty J. Sherbourne.
h. "Green cy w/d & destroyed by burning, 12/30/41, CDM— 1705" in the
lower left shows that the green-paper duplicate copy of this cable retained by
the Miscellaneous Division, Secret and Confidential Section of the Office of the
Adjutant General was withdrawn and destroyed by burning on 30 December
1941. [IJ1O73] "CDM" are the initials of Corrine D. Moss, Room 1705
Munitions Building.
i. "Ro 1-6-42" in the lower left corner shows that this cable was indexed on
6 January 1942 by Rose Coccaro.
Harmon Duncombe,
Lt. Colonel, OSC.
[14-074] Mr. Morgan. Pursuant to a request made by Senator
Ferguson at page 8531 of the transcript for information on the num-
ber of priority dispatches sent to Hawaii by the War Department on
7 December 1941, we have a communication, with enclosures from the
War Department, dated 27 February 1946, We request that the letter
of transmittal and enclosures be spread on the record at this point.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5297
The Vice Chairman : The material will be so spread on the record.
(The material referred to follows:)
[14075] WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, Room 4D757, The Pentagon, 27 February 19Jf6.
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson :
In response to your 31 January memorandum forwarding Senator Ferguson's
request for information on tlie number of priority dispatches sent to Hawaii by
the War Department on 7 December 1941, and to Senator Ferguson's further
inquiry (Tr. 8530-1) as to what priority messages were decoded in Hawaii before
the 7 December Marshall warning, the following information is submitted :
a. In a search of the War Department records, file copies have been found of
four radios to Hawaii, each marked "priority" and bearing the notation "Sent
12/7". Three (Nos. 524, 525 and 527) are dated 6 December; the fourth. No. 530,
is dated the 7th.
&. No. 529, the Marshall warning, which was sent over commercial facilities,
carried in its heading the notation "U. S. Govt", entitling it to priority in trans-
mission in accordance with Western Union and RCA tariffs then in effect (In-
closure No. 1). Testimony concerning additional measures taken to expedite
transmission of No. 529 appears at page 195 [,lJi07G] of the Army Pearl
Harbor Board transcript and page 1843 of the Roberts Commission transcript.
c. No. 529 was received by RCA Honolulu at 7:33 a. m., delivered to the
Signal Office, Fort Shafter, about 11 : 45 a. m., and decoded at 2 : 41 p. m. No
records are available showing when the four messages mentioned in paragraph a
were received and decoded in Hawaii. A delivery book of the Headquarters Ha-
waiian Department shows that the three, dated 6 December, were delivered
(presumably after decoding) as follows: No. 524 at 7:25 p. m. on 6 December;
No. 525 at 5 : 14 p. m. on 7 December, and No. 527 at 9 : 25 a. m. on 8 December,
all Hawaiian time. The delivery book shows that No. 530 of the 7th was delivered
at "1002A", probably on the 7th (messages entered in the delivery book im-
mediately before and after No. 530 have "32-7-41" in the "date delivered" column ;
the date space for No. 530 contains initials rather than a date). If delivered at
10 : 02 a. m. on 7 December, No. 530 must have been decoded before the Marshall
warning was decoded. It will be noted, however, that No. 530 could not have
been decoded before the attack, since, according to the time stamp on the back
of the War Department copy, No. 530 did not leave the War Department until
sometime after 2 : 14 p. m. Washington time (S : 44 a. m. Hawaiian time) .
/s/ Haemon DUNCX)MBE,
2 incls. Lt. Colonel, GSG.
[14077] Signal Coeps, United States Akmy
Received at
DI 56 74/73 US GOVT
DI WASHN DC DEC 7 1941 1201 PM
CG
Hawaiian Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.
529 Seventh
( Note. — Text omitted. ) Marshall.
1217 PM
[14078] Signal Corps, United States Army
The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in code
secret
1549WS WASHINGTON DC 74/73 RCA USG ETAT^ 7 1218P
CG
Hawaiian Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.
529 7th JAPANESE ARE PRESENTING AT ONE PM EASTERN STANDARD
TIME TODAY WHAT AMOUNTS TO AN ULTIMATUM ALSO THEY ARE
UNDER ORDERS TO DESTROY THEIR CODE MACHINE IMMEDIATELY
79716— 46— pt. 11 11
5298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
STOP JUST WHAT SIGNIFICANCE THE HOUR SET MAY HAVE WE DO
NOT KNOW BUT BE ON ALERT ACCORDINGLY STOP INFORM NAVAL
AUTHORITIES OF THIS COMMUNICATION.
Mabshaix.
j SECRET "j
Received as a | RESTmCTED^ [communication
[ Strilce out two J
Answer should be marked "Answer to Code Message No. 529 7IH"
Decoded by :
Lt. J. H. Babcock,
251P Dec. 7, 1941.
[I.'f079] The Western Union Telegraph Compant
Takiff Book No. 73—1941
LONGRAMS are telegrams accepted at rates lower than telegram or serial
rates as a deferred service subordinated to telegrams and serials in transmission
and delivery. These messages are identified by the symbol "LG". The service
is available between points in the United States only.
The rate for a LONGRAM of 100 words or less between points at which are
located Western Union offices or agencies is twice the rate for a ten word telegram
between the same points and an additional charge for each group of five words or
less in excess of 100 words as indicated in the following table:
Where the
full
A LONORAM of
Each addi-
telegram i
rate
100 words or
tional 5 words
for 10 words is
less costs 1
or less cost
.20
.40
.02
.25
.50
.02
.30
.60
.03
.32
.64
.03
.36
.72
.03
.37
.74
.03
.40
.80
.04
.42
.84
.04
.48
.96
.04
.60
1.20
.05
.72
1.44
.06
.90
1.80
.08
1.20
2.40
.10
)f 60 words
or less take the lower day-letter rates.
United States Government Messages
DEFINITION.
1. United States Government messages are those sent by duly accredited repre-
sentatives of the Federal Government (this includes U. S. Senators and Congress-
men) on official business of the Federal Government or its various bureaus and
agencies and paid for out of Federal Government funds.
2. Such messages are identified by the symbol "GOVT." The messages of the
U. S. Weather Bureau, while actually government messages, are classed sepa-
rately as weather messages and are identified by the symbol "WEA."
CLASSES OF SERVICE.
3. Any of the following classes of service may be used for government mes-
sages :
Telegram
Day Letter
Overnight Telegram
Serial
Timed Wire Service
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5299
ACCfEPTANCE OF MESSAGES.
4. Government messages have priority in transmission and delivery over all
other messages of the same class of service.
5. All messages offered for transmission at government rates must be endorsed
"Official Business" by the sendei". The endorsement shall also include the sender's
name and title and the name of the department, bureau, agency, etc. with which
he is connected. Such messages not so identified will be charged for at commer-
cial I'ates.
6. Messages offered by telephone for transmission at government rates will be
accepted without prepayment of tolls if telephoned from a subscriber's telephone,
but will not be accepted without prepayment of tolls from public telephone
stations. The sender of such a message will be required to furnish his full name,
title, and the name of the department, bureau or agency with which he is con-
nected and to state that the message is on official government business.
7. Messages of United States Marshals and United States District Attorneys
should not be sent "collect" to the Department of Justice at Washington, but
should be prepaid by the senders. Other Government messages addressed to
Washington, D. C. will be accepted "Collect."
•
COUNT OF GOVERNMENT MESSAGES.
8. Government messages will be counted at commercial count, address and
signature free. Extra words, code signatures, etc., will be counted as in com-
mercial messages.
CHECKS OF GOVERNMENT MESSAGES.
9. The check will show the designation "GOVT.", the number of words accord-
ing to commercial count, and in the case of day letters, overnight telegrams,
serial or timed wire service, the class of service designation.
10. Care should be taken to check all messages sent collect at government i*ates
"CoUect Govt." The omission of "Govt." in the check causes serious difficulties.
RATES
11. Government telegraph rates apply to official United States government
business exclusively, and no private individual, association, company or corpora-
tion should in any way be benefited thereby. In cases where it becomes necessary
for a government official to use the telegraph on any business in the special
interest of any private person or persons, in which the government has no intei'est,
the party for whom the service is performed will be required to pay for the
messages both ways at commercial rates.
12. The this-line charges for government telegrams, day letters and overnight
telegrams are 60% of the charges for the same messages at commercial rates.
13. The this-line charges for govcernment serials and timed-wire-service mes-
sages are 80% of the charges for the same messages at commercial rates.
14. In calculating the charges on government messages, if the result shows a
fraction of a cent, such fraction will be dropped if less than one-half and will be
counted as an extra cent if one-half or over.
15. The following minimum charges apply to government messages between
points where there are offices of the Company :
For an Intracity Telegram $0.20
For all other Telegrams .25
For a Serial .54
For a Timed-wire-service message .45
For a Day Letter .45
For an Overnight Telegram .30
16. The government tolls must be computed on each separate message. It is
not permissible to bill a series of government messages at commercial rates and
then apiily the government percentage to the total.
17. Except as indicated below, other-line charges to one-star points in the
United States will be computed at sixty per cent (80% if serial or timed-wire-
service) of the commercial other-line rates at commercial count with the same
minimum charges as shown in paragraph 15.
18. Exception : On government messages to one-star points in Alabama listed
via York ; to one-star points in Arizona listed via Holbrook ; to one-star points in
5300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Texas listed via Laredo ; to points in Minnesota listed as "30-2.5 more than Square
478, ck. Minneapolis" ; to one-star points in Idaho listed via Weiser ; to one-star
points in Minnesota listed via Duluth ; to one-star points in Georgia and North
Carolina listed via Cornelia, Ga. ; and to one-star points in Idaho and Montana
listed via Armstead, Mont., the other-line tolls will be charged for at the full
commercial other-line rate shown in the directory of stations.
19. To certain other one-star points government messages are carried by the
other-line free or with a special rate. This is shown by special notation in con-
nection with the listing of such one-star points.
20. On government messages going to two-star, three-star or four-star points
the this-line rate will be at government rates, and the other-line rate will be the
regular other-line rate shown in the directory of stations unless otherwise indi-
cated in connection with the listing of the point in question.
21. In no case shall the rate charged for a government message exceed the
amount charged for a commercial message of the same class of service and of the
same length between the same points.
22. The rates for government messages between points in the United States and
points in Canada, where there are offices of the Canadian National Telegraphs,
and points in Newfoundland and Miquelon Island are shown in the table below.
For rates to points in Canada other than those where th^re are offices of the
Canadian National Telegraphs, and the other-line rates shown in the directory
of stations to the rates computed from this table.
23. The rates for government messages between points in the United States
and points in Alaska and Mexico are shown in the directory of stations with the
listings for Alaska and Mexico respectively.
F. C. C. NO. 15
6TH REVISED TITLE PAGE
(CANCELS 5TH REVISED TITLE PAGE)
[imn R. C. A. COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
TELEGRAPH TARIFF
Foreign Radio-Teoxseaph and Wiee-Telegeaph Rates
FBOM
Baltimore, Md. ' New Orleans, La.
Boston, Mass. New Tork, N. Y.
Camden, N. J. Philadelphia, Pa.
Chicago, 111, San Francisco, Cal.
Detroit, Mich. Seattle, Wash.
Los Angeles, Cal. Washington, D. C.
TO
All Foreign Countries (Except Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Newfoundland and
St. Pierre-Miquelon), Guam, Hawaiian Islands, Midway, Puerto Rico and the
Virgin Islands and to Ships at Sea
AND FROM
Honolulu, T. H. and San Juan, P. R.
TO
All Countries, Including Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Newfoundland and St. Pierre-
Miquelon and to Ships at Sea Applicable to All Classifications of Service
Shown Herein and Subject to Rules and Regulations Shown Herein
Transmission by Radio-Telegraph or Wire-Telegraph or a Combination Thereof
Issuing Date: Feb. 28, 1940.
Issuing Officer: C. Sandbach, Manager TarifC Bureau, 66 Broad Street, New
York, N. Y.
Effective Date: April 1, 1940 except as otherwise indicated. Original tariff effec-
tive February 1, 1936.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5301
F. C. C. NO. 15
1ST REVISED PAGE NO. lOB
(CANCELS ORIGINAL PAGE NO lOB)
{14082] R. C. A. COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
The sender of an Ordinary Press telegram must write before the address the
indicator "PRESSE" which is counted and charged for as one word. Ordinary
Press telegrams take equal rank in transmission with ordinary Full Rate and
CDE telegrams.
Press telegrams may, if the sender desires, be sent as Urgent Press telegrams.
The sender of such a telegram must write before the address the indicator
"URGENT PRESSE" which is counted and charged for as two words. Urgent
Press telegrams take equal rank in transmission with regular URGENT and
CDE URGENT telegrams.
To certain countries a Deferred Press service is also available. The sender
of a Deferred Press telegram must write before the address the indicator
"LCPS" which is counted and charged for as one word. Deferred Pi'ess tele-
grams take equal rank in transmission with regular Deferred telegrams.
The supplementary services. Reply Paid (RP), Collation (TC), Notification
of Delivery (PC or PCP) are not admitted in Press telegrams.
(f) Oovernment Telegrams
Government telegrams must be properly endorsed to the effect that they are
on ofl5cial business of the Government in whose behalf they are sent.
The telegrams of consular agents carrying on private business are only re-
garded as Government telegrams when they are addressed to an oflScial person
and relate to oflScial matters.
Government telegrams are given priority of transmission over all other classes
of telegrams, except telegrams relating to safety of life at sea or in the air,
unless they are filed as Deferred rate, or Radioletter rate, or unless the sender
renounces the priority privilege at the time of filing.
Government telegrams are repeated back by the receiving oflice at each stage
of their transmission.
Unless special reduced Government rates are in effect. Government telegrams
are charged the Full Rate or CDE rate according to the language in which they
are written.
Issuing date : April 8, 1941
Issuing OflBcer :
C. Sandbach, Manager Tariff Bureau,
66 Broad Street, New York, N. Y.
Effective date : May 12, 1941
[IJfiSS] ' SECRET
Telegram
OflScial Business — Government Rates
From: War Department
Bureau: OCSigO, Signal Intelligence Service
R. W. Minckler
R. W. Minckler, Lt. Col., Signal Corps
pbiobity — secret
December 7, 1941.
734 SIGNALS MANILA, PI.
530 FORT SHAFTER, TH.
403 PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.
SEND TO WAR BY PRIORITY ENCIPHERED RADIO ALL JAPANESE
CLEAR MESSAGES ENDING WITH ENGLISH WORD QUOTE STOP UN-
QUOTE SPELLED REPEAT QUOTE STOP UNQUOTE SPELLED COPIED
SINCE NOVEMBER TWENTY SEVEN AND HEREAFTER
CoLTON, Acting.
SENT NO. 734 to Manila, 12/7
SENT NO. 530 to Hawaii, 12/7
SENT NO. 403 to Pres of S. f., 12/7
[Stamped on reverse side :] Code Section. W. D. M. C 1941 Dec. 7 PM 2: 14.
5302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[UOSU Mr. Morgan. Pursuant to a request of Senator Fergu-
son at pages 8579-80 of the transcript we have the following communi-
cation from the Army liaison officer, dated February 21, 1946 :
Wak Department,
Washington, 21 February 1946.
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson.
At nages 8579-80 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson asked what the radar
stations at New York City, San Francisco, and Seattle were doing on 6 and 7
December 1941 and whether they were alerted and operating 24 hours a day.
In response to Senator Ferguson's request, there are transmitted herewith :
(1) a paraphrase of a 31 January 1946 radio from the Commanding General
Eastern Defense Command (Inclosure No. 1) ; ,. ^«. . ^,
(*>) an 8 February 1946 memorandum from the Commanding Officer of the
Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, Bradley Beach, New Jersey (Inclosure
%) an 18 February 1946 memorandum from the Headquarters First Air Force
(Inclosure No. 3) ; ,. ^ i * i.i in , <-v, a ?,.
(4) a 4 February 1946 radio from the Commanding General of the Fourth Air
Force (Inclosure No. 4). ,^. ,^ -rr t^
jq(,1s 4 (Signed) Harmon Duncombe,
Lieutenant Colonel, OSG.
We would like to have these inclosures spread on the record at this
The Vice Chairman. They will be spread on the record.
(The inclosures referred to follow:)
[14085]
Radio Fbom Commanding Genebal Eastern Defense Command to Wae
Department, Dated 31 Januaby 1946
(Paraphrase)
On 6 and 7 December Twin Lights, Atlantic Highlands, N. J. (radar equip-
ment not stated) and SCR 270 at ISlount Cadillac, Maine were operated by First
Interceptor Command 24 hours a day. Foregoing from 1st Air Force historical
records Officer this command, then Arty Eng Ft. Hancock, informally advises
that in December SCR-268 sets operated in secret area Ft. Hancock.
Army Service Forces,
EteADQUARTEKS, SIGNAL CORPS ENGINEERING LABORATORIES,
Bradley Beach, New Jersey, 8 February 1946.
Refer to : SPSGS-CO r. . . ^ ■ ■ ^
Memorandum for: Major General G. L. Van Deusen, Chief, Engineering and
Technical Service.
Subject : Telephone Request of Captain Carl R. Nelson.
1 These laboratories are in receipt of a request for information concerning
radar operation on the dates of 6 and 7 December 1941. This information was
requested by Capt. Carl R. Nelson, Legislative and Liaison Division, War Depart-
ment Special Staff, Room 4D761, the Pentagon (Ext. 71470).
[1J,08G] 2. As nearly as may be ascertained from a survey of flies cur-
rently available at this organization, and from discussion with individuals who
were present during December 1941, there were no radar sets in tactical operation
manned by employees of Signal Corps Radar Laboratory, presently part of Signal
Corps Engineering Laboratories. During the month of December 1941, tliere
were in operation by this organization, one SCR-271 at Twin Lights. Atlantic
Higlilands N. J., one SCR-271 at Atlantic City. N. J., an experimental 400 mc
unit in the vicinity of Fort Hancock, plus a number of sets which were in varying
stages of assembly. All of these equipments were being run only for technical
observation, such as : life test of components, performance test of newly assembled
equipments, and experimental work on new designs. Data from these tests
would be in statistical form only and would not include dates of operation or
times of day operated. Accordingly, it is not known what equipments under
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 6303
control of this organization were in actual operation on the specific dates of
6 and 7 December 1941.
3. Based purely on the memory of individuals present during that period, it
appears that some Kadar Sets SCR-270 were in operation in Long Ishand by the
First Signal Air Warning Company and some Radar Sets SCR-268 were in
operation by Coast Artillery personnel of Fort Hancock. Since there is no
organizational tie between these organizations and the [140S7] Signal
Corps Engineering Laboratories, there is no detailed information available here
on location, method, or times of operation of this equipment.
4. It is requested that if you see no objection to the above it be forwarded to
Capt. Nelson.
/s/ Victor A. Conrad
Victor A. Conrad,
Colonel, Signal Corps,
Commanding.
In Reply Refer To : J 413.44
HEiADQTJAKTERS, FiRST AlR FOBCE,
Mitchel Field, New York, 18 February 1946.
Subject: Photostatic Copy of Logs of Radar Sets in Operation on 6 and 7
December 1941
To : War Department Special Staff, Room 4D761, Pentagon Building, Washington,
D. C. (Attention: Capt. C. R. Nelson)
In accordance with letter of Commanding General, Eastern Defense Command,
dated 5 February 1946, above subject, to forward copies of radar logs of radar
sets operating in the New York area during 6-7 December 1941, a search was made
of records. An SCR-271A set was operated at sites 8A on [I4O88] dates
in question by 1st Air Warning Company (SC) as a training measure. Existing
records fail to reveal these logs. It is assumed these records were destroyed
along with other confidential material due to lack of storage space and no appar-
ent need for preservation by the New York Air Defense Wing prior to its
deactivation.
For the Commanding General:
Raynor Gakey,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.
Wab Department
Classified Message Center
INCOMING CLEAH MESSAGE
From : CG, 4th Air Force, San Francisco, California
To : War Department
No : 4 AF 6 E 293 4 February 1946
From Hale CG 4th AF to WDGS attn OPD Wash DC 4AF 6 E 293 ref yr
WCL 43319
No radar stations were in operation in Seattle area on 6 and 7 December
1941. Stations in San Francisco area were operating during daylight hours
on 6 and 7 December but only for testing and calibration in preparation for a
proposed maneuver. No stations were alerted prior to 1400 7 December 1941.
End
[l!i089] Action: OPD
Info : L & L Div •
MC IN 53328 (6 Feb. 46) DTG 042335Z mec
{llfOOO'] Mr. Morgan. Pursuant to a request of Senator Fergu-
son at page 9550 of the transcript for a copy of a letter written by
Admiral Nimitz, then Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, dated 25
November 1941, we have now been supplied by the Navy Department
a copy of this letter, which we ask to have spread on the record at this
point.
5304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK.
The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record.
(The letter referred to follows:)
[IJfOOl] Nav-l-MM
Confidential
November 25, 1941.
My Dear Kimmel : I am enclosing a memorandum which will give you a pretty
clear picture of what we are doing in connection with Radar instruction.
This, as you know, is highly important and while we have been working at it
for sometime, we have been handicapped by the inability to obtain any Kadar
material. That is coming along now and we are pushing these schools as fast
as possible.
From a morale point of view, we felt that it would be most desirable to take
radiomen second class and give them this training, but in view of your strong
protest, we are endeavoring to obtain recruits having basic knowledge of elec-
tronics. The field has been pretty well combed over by Army, Navy, and British
agencies and it is impossible to get men with the necessary qualifications to enlist
as seamen second class. We are therefore taking them in as second class petty
officers and will send them to the Fleet as first class or chief petty officers. They
will be specialists in their particular line and while they will have had no previous
seagoing experience, I hope they will be fovmd satisfactory. For such specialists
we are creating a new rating as specialist third class, second class, first class,
or chief specialist, so as to reduce the discontent that would otherwise be felt
by petty officers of long standing at sea if men who have had no seagoing ex-
perience were placed over their heads as would undoubtedly have been the case
if we would send them out as radiomen first class or chief radiomen.
"We are constantly keeping your needs in mind and endeavoring to do everything
possible to fill up the Fleet, but we do have problems that are most difficult for
solution. With the expanding Navy, our recruiting is not producing sufficient
men and we have asked for language in the supplementary appropriation for
1942 and in the appropriation bill for 1943 to iitilize men from Selective Service.
We had to come to this, but men must be obtained and if we cannot get them by
straight recruiting, we will have to go to Selective Service for they have. to be
produced. The Pacific Fleet, I think, is in many ways fortunate. The percentage
of men is greater than in the Atlantic which, at present, is engaged in active
operations, and the number of Reserves in the Atlantic Fleet is considerably
greater than in the Pacific.
With kindest regards and best wishes to you, I am,
Most sincerely,
[C. W. NiMiTz, Admiral']
Admiral H. E. Kimmel. U. S. N.,
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, U. S. 8. Pennsylvania,
c/o Postmaster, Saji Francisco, California.
[14:0921 Mr. Morgan. In accordance with a request of Senator
Lucas, at page 9917 of the transcript, with respect to a false weather
message, we have a communication from the Navy liaison officer, dated
February 6, 1946, which we ask be spread on the record.
The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record.
(The communication referred to follows:)
[1^093] "Winds"
Department of the Navy,
Office of the Seceetary,
Washington, 6 February 1946.
Memorandum
To : Mr. Seth W. Richarjjson
1. On 4 February 194G Senator Lucas made a query as to a false weather
message (Transcript Page 9917). These were two messages intercepted on 4
and 5 December 1941 by the Federal Communications Commission at approxi-
mately 2200 GMT and 2130 GMT respectively.
2. These messages were in NCI Exhibit #65 and the full text of each can be
found in the Narrative Statement, Volume II. Page 550 and Pages 573-574. Con-
firmation of the transmittal of these messages by the Federal Communications
Commission to the Navy 20-G Watch OflBcer may be found in the Fedex'al Com-
munications Commission wafcb log which is Exhibit 142A in the present in-
vestigation.
/s/ .loHN Ford Baecher,
Lt. Com dr.. U. 8. N. R.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5305
[14094] Mr. Morgan. At page 12996 of the transcript, Con-
gressman Murphy requested that there be incorporated in the record
information concerning the organization of lend-lease. We now have
a detailed letter from Chester T. Lane, Deputy Commissioner, Office
of Foreign Liquidation Commission, Department of State, which we
would like to have spread on the record at this point.
The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record.
(The letter referred to follows:)
[I4095] Office of Foeeign Liquidation Commissionejb
DEPAETMENT OF STATE
Washington
Room 506, 1818 "H" Street, NW
Mr. Seth W. Richardson,
General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor
Attack, Congress of the United States, Washington 25, D. C.
Deab Mr. Richardson : 1. This is in reply to your letter dated March 6, 1946,
addressed to Mr. Benno O. Schmidt, General Counsel of this OflSce, requesting a
statement, for insertion in the record of the Committee's proceedings, "as to the
organization which was set up by this Government (i. e. the United States) for the
purpose of determining what distribution should tie made under lend-lease and
what officials were responsible for such distribution". It is apparent from your
letter that our reply may generally be limited to the method of allocating military
equipment rather than the method of determining the distribution of non-military
items, such as raw materials and supplies for civilian consumption.
2. On December 6, 1939, the President appointed an informal inter-depart-
mental committee for the coordination of foreign and domestic military procure-
ment which became known as the President's Liaison Committee. This Com-
mittee functioned as the coordinating body for all foreign military procurement
in the United States until it was abolished in April 1941 after passage of the
Lend-Lease Act. The membership of this Committee consisted of Rear Admiral
Ray Spear, [lJf09G'\ Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, rep-
resenting the Navy, Major General James H. Burns, representing the Army, and
Mr. Philip Young, representing the Treasury Department. All early requests for
lend-lease aid were channeled through this Committee to the appropriate agency
of the Government for actual procurement and transfer of defense articles.
3. On May 2, 1941, the Division of Defense Aid Reports in the Office for Emer-
gency Management of the Executive Office of the President was established by
Executive Order. The President appointed Major General James H. Burns as
Executive Officer of the Division. The Division of Defense Aid Reports was estab-
lished to provide for the effective administration of the Lend-Lease Act. This
Division succeeded the President's Liaison Committee as the channel through
which requests for lend-lease aid were forwarded to the procuring agencies.
4. By Executive Order dated October 28, 1941, the President established the
Office of Lend-Lease Administration, and transferred to this Administration all
the functions previously vested in the Division of Defense Aid Reports and most
of the powers conferred on the President by the Lend-Lease Act. Mr. Edward R.
Stettinius, Jr. was appointed Administrator, a position which he retained
throughout the period with which this letter is concerned.
\_lJt09T\ 5. Military supplies transferred under the Lend-Lease Act prior to
Pearl Harbor may be divided into three categories :
(a) equipment procured by the War and Navy Department with funds
appropriated prior to March 11, 1941 (a limit of $1,300,000,000 was placed
by the Lend-Lease Act on the value of material transferred out of this
category) ;
(b) equipment in the possession of the Army or Navy, but procured with
funda appropriated after March 11, 1941 ;
(c) equipment procured with funds appropriated to the President for
lend-lease purposes, under U. S. contracts placed with suppliers directly in
response to requests submitted by foreign governments.
Section 3 (a) (2) of the Lend-Lease Act provides that the equipment described
in (a) and (b) above could be transferred to foreign governments only after
5306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
consultation with the Chief of StafC of the Army or the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions of the Navy. Most of the pre-Pearl Harbor lend-lease transfers were in
category (a), and all transfers in that category were personally approved by
the Chief of Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations. Procurement of defense
articles covered by (c) above, was effected by means of requests filed with one
of the agencies described in U4098] paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above. After
approval by one of these agencies, procurement was subject to priorities and
controls established by the OflBce of Production Management, which operated
in consultation with the Army and Navy Munitions Board.
6. There was created in the War Department by order of the Secretary of War
of April 8, 1941, a Defense Aid Division of the Office of the Undersecretary. This
Division was responsible for coordinating and maintaining records on the lend-
lease operations of the War Department. The officers in charge of the work of
this Division were Colonel Henry S. Aurand, Lt. Col. Edward E. MacMorland
and Major John H. Franks. Army Air Force lend-lease activities were under
the direction of Lt. Col. Benjamin Meyers. In the Navy, Admiral Joseph M.
Reeves, Liaison Officer for the Secretary of the Navy on lend-lease matters, and
Rear Admiral Ray Spear, Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, were
chiefly concerned with lend-lease operations. The requests of the foreign gov-
ernments for military supplies, which were first submitted for approval to the
agencies described in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this letter, were routed to these
officers in the War and Navy Departments for allocation and procurement of
such supplies.
7. A special committee handled allocations of aircraft during the period under
discussion, known as the Joint [1^099] Aircraft Committee, with member-
ship consisting of General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces, Rear
Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief of the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics, two representa-
tives of the Office of Production Management, a representative of the President's
Liaison Committee and representatives of the British Air Commission. This
Committee controlled the allocation of all aircraft production in the United States
prior to Pearl Harbor. The presence of General Arnold and Admiral Towers
on this Board assured that no other governments would be allocated any aircraft
which in the view of our military authorities was more urgently needed by our
own forces.
8. I trust that this explanation will be found to be a satisfactory description
of the procedure followed in allocating lend-lease military supplies prior to
December 7, 1941. The period in which you are interested was during the
formative stages of these operations when the assignment machinery as it ulti-
mately developed was not entirely in operation. However, I believe that it is
evident that at all times the allocation of military supplies was subject to the
approval of the high officers of the Army and Navy, and this fully safeguarded
the interests of the United States Army and Navy in the distribution of valuable
equipment.
Very truly yours,
/s/ Chesteb T. Lane:,
Deputy Commissioner.
\^lJflOO'\ Mr. Morgan. We have a series of communications from
Admiral Noyes, Mr. Sonnett, former Secretary Hull, Captain Kramer,
and Captain McCollum, with respect to certain corrections they would
like to have indicated in their testimony.
We would like to have these communications placed in the record
at this point.
(The communications referred to follow:)
[UflOl] Navt Department,
Board of iNSPEcrnoN and Sttrvbt,
Washington 25, D. C, 25 Fetniary 1946.
Memorandum for Counsel, Joint Pearl Harbor Inquiry Committee.
Enclosure: (A) List of Typographical Errors Found in Record of Proceedings,
Investigation of Pearl Harbor Attack.
In reading over my testimony I noted that I failed to bring out the following
point, which, however, Is supported by my previous testimony and by docu-
mentary evidence.
In connection with the alleged telephone couversatiou with me on 5 December
to which Colonel Sadtler testified and which I did not recall in that form :
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5307
On 5 December there was received by the Navy Department the message from
Colonel Thorpe in Batavia addressed to General Miles in the War Department.
This message was transmitted by the Naval Attache to Navy Department for
delivery to General Miles. As I have already testified, the subject matter was
under discussion between me and the War Department during that day. It is
very probable that I would have called Colonel Sadtler and notified him of the
fact that this message had been received and was being delivered to the War
Department [14IO2] for General Miles on account of its importance.
Since discussion took place between me and the War Department during that
day on the subject matter of this message and the War Department recommended
that we should make no change in our original translation of the setup of the
Win^s Code (see previous testimony), it would appear that any possible authentic
or false execute of the winds message would have also been discussed and
settled during that day.
Very respectfully yours,
/s/ Leigh Noyes,
Leigh Notes,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy.
Enclosure A
Navy Department,
BOABD OF Inspection and Subvet,
Washington 25, D. C, 25 February 1946.
Memorandum for Lieut. Comdr. Baecher, USNR.
Subject : Corrections in Report of Proceedings, Investigation of the Pearl Harbor
Attack — testimony of Rear Adrimal Leigh Noyes, U. S. Navy.*
1. The following is a list of corrections to be made [14103] in the testi-
mony of Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, U. S. Navy :
Page 12,559— line 18 : Change Bidell to Biddle.
Page 12,559 — line 25: change to read, "Chief of Staff to Commander".
Page 12,560 — line 15 : change to read, "No, September 1944, in San Francisco."
Page 12,561 — line 10 : change to read, "what I do now."
Page 12,562 — line 1 : Witness Noyes.
Page 12,564 — lines 13, 14: strike out, "Who acted in my place" insert "or".
Page 12,568 — line 18 : change to read, "they could not decipher the diplomatic
traflSc and send it all to Honolulu."
Page 12,571 — lines 13, 14: strike out, "or by ML the important ones."
Page 12,574 — line 14 : "inkling."
Page 12,580 — line 12 : change "words" to "worries".
Page 12,581 — line 19 : change to read, ^'knew what the rules were."
Page 12,586 — lines 20, 21 : change to read, "Chief of Naval Operations and the
Army Chief of Staff to the Commanding General."
Page 12,592 — lines 21, 22: change to read, "Naval Communications."
Page 12,595 — lines 20; change to read, "several booklets and the Chief of
Naval Communications."
114104] Page 12,598 — line 7: change to read, "I do now".
Page 12,603 — line 9 : change "mine" to "mind".
Page 12,614 — line 6 : change "present" to "presented".
Page 12,615— line 9: change to read, "Safford said".
Page 12,625 — line 19: change to read, "I believe a reference to forty-six
words".
Page 12,643— line 14: change to read, "and it was some time after I got
back."
Page 12,686 — line 15 : change to read, "information to the Naval Attaches."
Page 12,687— line 24 : change to read, "At the time when Italy came into the
war, which".
Page 12,688— line 14: change "by" to "but".
Page 12,699 — ^line 21 : change "warning" to "morning".
Page 12,710 — line 6 : change "technical" to "tactical".
Page 12,711 — line 21 : change "Canada" to "Japanese".
Page 12,729 — line 1 : strike out, "and I supposed the record was supposed to
bear on subsequent events".
Page 12,735 — line 23 : change "execute" to "setup".
/s/ Leigh Noyes,
Leigh Notes,
„ Rear Admiral, U. 8. Navy.
Enclosure B.
^Adm. Noyes' testimony appears in Hearings, Part 10, pp. 4710-4792.
5308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
\_i4iO5] Assistant Attorney General,
Washington, February 27, 1946.
Seth W. Richardson, Esquire
General Counsel for the Joint Committee on the Investigation
Senate Ojfice Building, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Richardson: The Navy Department has made available to me
Volumes 60 and 67 of the transcript before the Joint Committee on the Investi-
gation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, vphich contain my testimony along with the
testimony of various other witnesses.
In examining the transcript of my testimony I have noted a number of
minor typographical and grammatical errors, which I have indicated on the
transcript, and respectfully request be corrected.
Very truly yours,
/s/ John Sonuett.
John F. Sonnett.'
Enclosure A.
[I4IO6] The following is a list of corrections to be made in the testimony
of John F. Sonnett:
Page 13,330— line 25 — add "of Justice" after "Department"
Page 13,331— line 6— add "a" after "was"
Page 13,331 — line 17 — change "investigate" .to "review"
Page 13,331 — line 20 — add "and in general" after "tion"
Page 13,331 — line 22 — change "was was" to "as might be"
Page 13,332— line 5— change "1941" to "1945"
Page 13,332— line 16— add "in the Navy" after "where"
Page 13,333 — line 13 — change "at tempt" to "attempt"
Page 13,334 — line 16 — cliange "t en" to "then"
Page 13,335 — line 6 — change "is" to "was"
Page 13,335 — line 6 — add "This was in" after "crazy."
Page 13,335 — line 7 — add "and" after "document"
Page 13,336 — line 20 — change "Navy" to "Navy,"
Page 13,351 — line 6 — change "lation," to "lations,"
Page 13,351 — line 13 — change "S. Correa" to "F. Correa"
Page 13,353 — line 9 — change "civil" to "civilian"
Page 13,353 — line 13 — change "civil" to "civilian"
Page 13,358 — line 16 — change "be" to "be,"
Page 13,359 — line 9 — change "the Navy" to "Naval matters"
Page 13,362 — line 11 — strike out "which I have mentioned"
Page 13,366— line 3— strike out "which"
[14107] Page 13,366 — line 4 — change "so were set" to "and were so set"
Page 13,369 — line 25 — change "Reports" to "Report"
Enclosure B
[I4IO8] COEDELL HtlLL
Wardman Park, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Mr. Richardson : It will be appreciated if you will cause the following
corrections to be made in my testimony as it appears in the transcript of the
Pearl Harbor hearings :
Volume 9, page I46O
Line 5 : "Explore" should read "expose".
Line 8: "Money" should read "cotton".
Volume 9, page 1470
Line 9 : Omit "and for 90 days".
Volume 10, page 1594
In reference to the first sentence of my reply to the Vice Chairman's question
I find, upon careful rechecking of the time, that the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor occurred at 1 : 20 p. m., Washington time, so that the telephone message
from the White House must have occurred shortly after 1 : 20, at which time
the appointment to see the Japanese Ambassador had already been postponed upon
the Ambassador's request to 1 : 45 p. m.
- Mr. Sonnett's testimouy appears in Hearings, Part 10, pp. 5009-5027.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEP] 5309
Volume 10, page 1612
In reference to Senator Lucas' question beginning at line 5, to which I replied,
"No," I had in mind the question whether tlie Army Board had conferred orally
with me on this pointt As to correspondence, the Secretary of War in a letter
[14109'i dated September 14, 1944, reciting that it was at the instance of the
Army Board, asked me as to the truth or falsity of an allegation that an ultimatum
had been delivered to Japan on November 26, 1941. I replied in a letter dated
September 28, 1944, stating that my communication to the Japanese representa-
tives on November 26 was in no sense an ultimatum. I added that if I could
further assist the Board in its investigation I would be glad to do so. The corre-
.spondence was made public by the State Department on August 30, 1945.
Volume 10, page I6I4
Line 4: Enclose in quotation marks, "poor, innocent, peace-minded".
Sincerely yours,
/S/ CORDELt, Huuu'
The Honorable Sejth W. Richaedson,
Oeneral Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harhor
Attack, Congress of the United States.
[I4IIO] Department of the Navy,
Office of the Seoeetaby,
Washington, 11 March 1946.
Memorandum to : Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
1. Forwarded herewith is a letter of Captain Alwin D. Kramer, U. S. Navy,
requesting corrections in the reporter's transcript of his testimony before the
Joint Committee.
/s/ John Ford Baecher,
John Foed Baecher,
Lt. Comdr., USNR.
Department op the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 8 Mar. 1946.
Mr. Seth W. Riohabdson,
Chief Counsel, Congressional Committee Investigating the Attack <m Pearl
Harbor,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.
Dear Sdb: At the request of the reporters, I have checked the transcript of my
testimony before the Congressional Committee, [I411I] and request that
the corrections listed on the attached pages be made in the record.
Very respectfully,
/s/ A. D. Kramer
A. D. Kramer,*
Captain, U. 8. Navy.
Italics indicates error or omission.
Volume 55, of 6 Fehruan/ 1946
Page Line Change
10432 19 After "San Diego in" add "1935 and".
433 16 "area" should be "Arear".
435 20 should read "known as OP-20-GZ, OP-20-G being" etc.
436 18 should read "until 9 or 10 or 11" etc.
441 2 "knowledge of"
444 4 & 5 Word after /'indicating" should be "punctuation." Text should
therefore read : "three letter code groups, indicating punctuation
of various kinds."
445 25 "stronger in language".
J Mr. Hull's testimony appears in Hearings. Part 2, pp. 403-457, 551-560. and 605-615
aoon'^IPo.?''^™^'^'^ testimony appears in Hearings, Part 8, pp. 3893-3927 ; and Part 9,
5310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
450 8 "believe at". ^ , ..
451 20 After "folder" add", i.e. (cU)se quotes). ^^
454 21 Should read : "features required in handUng .
462 24 Put a period after "Fort Myer", ^^ ^
464 17 Should read "heading only, and to .
22 Should read "this code message, because .
[14112] 467 17 "between "him, Mr. Hull", etc.
470 19 "about to leave". „
20 Change to "plain language Japanese message.
471 l\TZm ;':!;r"(b.aot)-couotry, («™e to be inserted) was uo. in
accordance with expectations' .
11 Should read "yeoman the sense".
10472 6 Change "days" to "months".
477 20 Insert comma after "interruptions .
478 22 Change "quarters" to "country". « ^ ,„ ..
484 20 Should read "supplements to that, four or five in.
488 8 Change "Russian" to "Russia".
489 22 Comma after "before".
■189 23 Read "there was effected at about .
10498 20 Read "message of 7 December".
510 13 Read "the GY section for".
513 14 Read "Yes, sir, if I can finish, etc.
Volume 56, of 7 February 1946
10524 8 Change "text" to "technique".
12 Read "cancelled".
526 17 Read "so indicated".
536 3 Read "machine. My presumption.
552 24 Read "called for by".
ufnS} ^ ^Si "rRerd""reference to England. Tilings more emphatic" etc.
7 Read "been. That is the scheme" etc.
10 Read "Thailand with Japan. We knew" etc.
558 17 "This".
18 Read "indication".
21 Comma after "Germans".
568 6 "Roma/i."
572 9 Comma after "messages .
583 25 "alone". , .. „ .
584 6 Read "running to 12 and 15 feet in length , etc.
10605 25 fhoui?reII CfglnSg an encoded or enciphered message", etc.
608 23 Should read "in a Division of Naval Operations" etc.
611 13 "subsist out" should be quoted.
618 5 Read "from Alusna, Batavia". . ^ , ,„
625 25 Should read "riji yori no tugoo aru ni tuki .
627 7 Read "the code indicator "STOP"."
635 19 Read "call KANA Morse," etc.
654 5 & 6 Read "intercept net and" etc. ^
[14114] 660 7 Read "designated as J-12, in my etc.
586 16 & 17 Read "messages 901 to 910".
Ill A ir„r r„d'"'Tsrif i;sSS!ro».er co^e. <«««... fc- ««*«.
tion."
662 7 Read "The JD number" etc.
664 10 Read "which I might characterize etc.
690 9 Read "impression on that point." ,
694 22 Should read "Captain Kramer : That is etc.
706 25 Omit comma.
710 5 Read "particularti/ certain" etc.
716 19 Omit "must as".
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5311
Volume 57, of 8 February 1946
10728 16 "shirts" should read "shifts",
730 14 Should read "broadcast, one of", etc.
731 9 Read "impression of irritation" etc.
733 24 Change ''should" to "shall".
735 2 Read "number for" etc.
4 Read "last night, and there" etc.
736 2 & 3 Read "during the war in interrogation", etc.
7 & 8 Read "corresponds in Japan to our Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the
months preceding Pearl Harbor."
743 12 Add "of the" at end of line.
746 21 Read "inserted".
747 17 Insert comma after "down".
748 6 Omit "and now" to read "at the time presumed".
755 25 Change "was" to "were".
775 20 Change "day" to "say".
789 2 Change to "negotiations, hut" etc.
[14115] 780 12 Read "other than that I linew that the Naval" etc.
794 3 Read "approximately 8 : 15," etc.
809 3 Change "sited" to "sighted".
5 Read "contact with it, special" etc.
809 25 Read "Intelligence, deals, perhaps 90 percent is more accurate, is of auy-
810 2 thing but a positive nature."
814 20 Change "At" to " — was the arrival" etc.
816 12 Change "he" to "we".
837 3 Change "no" to "not".
837 13 Read "Pearl Harbor at" etc.
838 14 Extend answer to read : "I did, yes, sir, but the matter of the time of
crew's mess, and of the number of ship's personnel above or below
decks were simply part of the factors in iJiy mind when I was re-
marliing on 7:30 Sunday morning being the quietest time of the
week. These factors were not stated, however, in my present best
recollection."
844 2 Read "refresh my memory on that point. I do not" etc.
847 7 Change "characters" to "character".
848 20 Change "hearings" to hearing".
875 2 Read "the Japanese word 'KORYAKU', which means" etc.
18 Read "Alusna, Batavia".
[14116] 877 24 Omit comma after "at least".
879 18 Change "Javorach" to "Jabberwock".
888 17, 18 & 19 Should read : "translation of the Japanese version, which,
in the light of seeing the work sheet just a few days
ago I believe reads: NIHON TO TO NO KANKEI
KITAI NI HAN SU".
904 12 Read "through 1941, the only" etc.
907 13 Expand to read : "Yes, sir, the original letter."
912 17 Read "made by me only".
919 22 Insert comma after "questions".
927 6, 7, & 9 Change "Wilkinson" to "Kimmel" on these 3 lines.
931 14 Read "and no reply to it".
937 4 Read "impose 07i any friendships" etc.
22 Read "what I already had. Not to" etc.
Volume 58, of 9 February 1946
10960 3 Read "Greenwich Mean Time, yes, sir".
961 19 Read "Those trips, however," etc.
984 7 Change "confirmation" to "consummation".
10 Change "know" to "knew".
990 23 Read "between about 8:15 and 9:S0, at" etc.
996 23 Read "Pearl Harbor than" etc.
997 2 & 3 Read "with Admiral Kimmel's request" etc.
9 Read "hoped that it would not be" etc.
11006 25 Read "nuwerous".
5312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
U-iiiyi 11008 7 Add comma after "Sunday".
010 8 Read "gotten np to it'\ etc.
012 17 Read "Have no information" etc.
013 2 Read "him only rarely" etc.
18 Read "understandw/f/" etc.
016 11 Read "Thank you. I hope I don't" etc.
Note : The following? corrections on pages 11,020 and 11,021 apply to the page
numbers as corrected by the Otfieial Reporters in their note of 10 Feb. 1946.
11020 2 Read "Communications. When" etc.
021 5 Read " — by the watch officer" etc.
027 25 Read "A." "On receipt of" etc.
031 9 Read "who presumafi/?/ would get it".
20 & 21 Read "East Wind, Rain" meaning United States ;
"West Wind, Clear" meaning England;
"North Wind, Cloudy" meaning Russia.
051 lO&ll Change capital to small "i" in the word "Investigation"
on both lines.
11052 8 & 9 Read "It was only, incidentally, in" etc.
053 12 Read "and which was subsequently" etc.
077 22 Read "by comparison vyith days" etc.
078 21 Read "amounted to perhaps 100 feet' 'etc.
097 22&23 The statement: "Senator Barkley informed me of that
proposal" should appear as a remark of Senator Brew-
ster rather than of the "Vice Chairman.
14 & 15 Insert to read "Yes, using the touch system. I have
never" etc.
8 Read "Colonel Bales" etc.
[ii/iS] 098
104
11117
119
18
121
19
127
8
129
4
131
22
23
133
8, 9, 10, 11
134
22
137
22
24
138
5
142
4
147
20
160
12 to 17
11160
165
165
170
Volume 59, of 11 Fcdruary 1946
lO&ll Read "classified papers, reading from this: (brown wrap-
ping paper)", originated" etc.
Read "the questions".
Read "I therefore feel it" etc.
Read "before that hearing" etc.
Read "Will show him these later."
Read "for the past month because" etc.
Read "they consist" etc.
Rearrange to read: "read these papers from mid-day
1944 to this moment, other than to glance at the head-
ings or first paragraphs of each on certain days and
times last December" etc.
Read "It was her I was about" etc.
Read "teletype. Station 2 was" etc.
Read "by Army and retained" etc.
Read "except possibly Christmas" etc.
Read "for periods varying" etc.
Read "/ most certainly" etc.
Repunctuate to read : "I recollect that this was inter-
preted, I am uncertain of the precise wording of the
interpretation, this was considered [14119] and
I believe it was approximately my consideration at the
time, as being an attempt" etc.
23 Read "Diplomatic posts were" etc.
25 Read "were usually pared," etc.
6 to 9 Read "the Japanese shoehorned, if I may use that term,
military men into the delegation conducting those nego-
tiations. The Ambassador, or Special Enyoy, as I recall
it, was named Yoshizawa."
17 Read "in Panama and in all parts of" etc.
6 & 7 Read "who, when I was speaking to him, was about ten
or fifteen feet away from the conference table, and Just
outside the closed door of the room. Mr. Hull's officp,
wbpre tbp three seoretarips werp conferring."
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
5313
170
172
177
181
183
188
202
[1',I20] 11202
204
207
208
212
213
215
217
250
258
259
261
262
263
267
\jmi]
Uil22}
21 Read "because the names associated with each other in
mij mind."
15 lusert comma after "oflScials".
14 Read "Lassvvell, Commander Roenick," etc.
23 Change "Halsey" to "I".
13 Read "testified to,"
18 Read "engagement, which I previously testified to, at"
etc.
4 Read "That is Greenwich Meridian Time, is it?"
14 Change "code developed" to "word developed" etc.
17 Read "has" "1, 10, 12, 2X, P, S, G, MIS, BE. B". What
is that?" "
19 & Read "Pound sign. "AF, X. Y, MONO". Is that cor-
20__ rect?"
25 — Read "we actually never used it, sir".
205 9&10_ Read "".B", ''BE" not used. "7?" 0P16-B, I think.
What is that?"
Read ""AF". CinCAF, Asiatic Fleet. "X" 20-GL— ".
Read ""Tokyo to Honolulu, 24 September," that being
the originator's date; originator's message "number
83", and an asterisk meaning "an interesting mes-
sage"."
Read "would see exhibit 2," etc.
Read "gists were'" etc.
(Jhauge "Talk" to "Take".
17& Read "footnote says: ''JD-1; 69U"- "I relayed"" etc.
18__
7— Read "that letter".
12 — Read ""No", is a postposition identical" etc.
16 Read "mean" for "means".
Read "There you have J/".
Change "12^1" to read : "12-4-41".
Read "4 or 5 December dates".
Read "dividing" etc.
Read "Nos. 7152 to 7184 vun chronologically" etc.
Change "fact." to "facts."
Read "testified, and those shown" etc.
Read "simply to give Admiral Halsey" etc.
Change "lohaV to "that", and change "onr" to "our".
Read "did I have that conception" etc.
268
17__
12,13
&14
16—
18—
12__
25—
4__
10__
11__
I24__
23__
13-_
4_-
11_.
12__
Department of the Navt,
Office of the Secretaey,
Washington, 1 April 1945.
Memorandum To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson
1. There are forwarded as enclosures A and B, respectively, a letter from
Captain A. H. McCollum, U. S. N., requesting that certain typographical and
grammatical errors be corrected in the transcript of his testimony before the
Joint Committee and a list of the items by page and line number.
/s/ John Ford Baecher
John Ford Baechee
I/i^Mtenant Commander, VSNR
U. S. S. Helena (CA 75),
Fleet Post Office, New York City, N. Y., March 18, 19^6.
The Honorable Axben W. Babiclet,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator : I have but recently had the opportunity of reading over the
transcript of the testimony I gave on January 30, 1946, [14123] before
your committee investigating the Japanese attack on our Fleet at Pearl Harbor
on Sunday, December 7, 1941. In reading over the transcript of the record
furnished me, I find what appear to be either clerical errors and omissions or
errors due to lack of clarity of expression on my part. There are not many
of these, and in the interests of clarity and precision I venture to suggest that,
subject to the Committee's pleasure, I may be permitted to correct my testimony
as transcribed in accordance with particulars listed on a separate page.
79716— 46— pt. 11 12
5314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
May I again express to you and to the Committee my appreciation for the
thoughtful consideration and courtesy shown me during my testimony before you.
Respectfully,
/s/ A. H. McCollum,
A. H. McCOLLUM,'
Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.
Enclosure A
U. S. S. Helena (CA 75)
SUGGESTED COEBEOTIONS TO TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN A. H. M'OOLLtJM, U8N
Page Line
9115 18 Change 6th word from "destroyer' 'to "transport"
9116 5 Change 7th word from "'June" to "January"
[14124] 9116 10 After last word of the line add "and"
9117 6 Change last word from "billing" to "billet"
9117 11 After 5th word insert "I served in the Mediterranean and"
9117 22 After 6th word insert "as head of"
9119 24 After 4th word insert "intelligence"
9121 22 Strike out 5th, 6th and 7th words — "on the idea"
9121 23 Strike out 2nd and 3rd words— "and it"
9122 25 After 1st word insert "of it"
9123 21 After 6th word insert "that". Change 8th word "to" to "or"
9128 9 Strike out 4th and 5th words "me and", and 9th word "the".
Change 11th word "Plans" to "Operations"
9132 2 After 7th word insert "towards"
9132 12 Change 8th word from "Hnrd" to "Heard"
9138 15 After 3rd word insert "had to make"
9139 7 Change 12th word from "much" to "such"
9139 8 Change 8th word from "much" to "such"
9140 14 Change last word from "the" to "a"
9142 19 At end of line insert "from watch standing"
9142 21 Strike out first three words "I take it"
9143 2 After 1st word insert "Saturday night"
9146 12 Change 7th word from "withint" to "without"
[14125] 9146 24 Change 6th word from "is" to "was"
9147 ,23 Strike out first three words "as they appeared"
9149 22 Change 4th word from ''taking" to "checking"
9152 21 Change 1st word from "movement" to "unit"
9152 22 Change 7th word from "movement" to "unit"
9152 24 Change 3rd word "sets" to "setup working"
9152 24 Change 10th, 11th and 12th words "route of entry" to "unit"
9153 21 Change 3rd word "that" to "as"
9158 18 Change 2nd word "a" to "back the"
9161 22 After 11th word insert "no"
9170 11 After 9th word "on" insert "Japanese"
9178 22 Change 4th word "discovered" to "so covered"
9219 13 After 7th word "might" insert "not"
9220 15 Strike out 4th word "and"
9221 12 Last two words change "they did" to "did they"
9252 9 Change 7th and 8th words "at the" to "as to"
9275 24 Change 8th word "1907" to "1904"
9287 15 Change 2nd word "Hurd" to "Heard"
Enclosure B
[I4JS6] Mr. Morgan. At page 7625 of the record Senator Brew-
ster requested information concerning the sources from which the
time table of attacks appearing on page 7622 of the record was pre-
pared. A rather detailed reply has been received from the Navy De-
partment under date of April 4, 1946, and we would like to have this
communication spread on the record.
' Capt. McCollum'8 testimony appears In Hfarlnjro, Part 8, pp. S381-S448.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
5315
The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record at this point.
(The communication referred to follows :)
[I4127] Depabtmeitt of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 4 April 1946.
Memorandum To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
Subject : Time Table of Japanese Attacks — source of material.
Reference :
(a) My memorandum to Mr. William D. Mitchell, dated 29 Nov. 1945.
(b) My memorandum to Mr. Seth W. Richardson, file 1083A(HLB)R#112,
dated 22 Jan. 1946.
(c) My memorandum to Mr. Seth W. Richardson, file 1083A(HLB), R#112,
dated 24 Jan. 1946.
1. In response to the oral request of 28 March 1946 from Counsel for more
specific data as to the information and sources of information which were here-
tofore forwarded in reference (a) at the request of Mr. William D. Mitchell, in
reference (b) at the request of Senator Brewster (Record of Proceedings, page
7625) and in reference (c) at the request of Congressman Keefe, concerning the
times of attacks by the Japanese on various places in the Pacific Ocean areas,
the information, supplemented as requested, is restated and summarized for
purposes of clarity as follows :
Place
Local time
Greenwich
time
Washington
time
Source of information
Kaneohe.NAS...
7:60 am, 7th..
6:20 pm, 7th..
1:20 pm, 7th..
War Diary of Commandant 14th Naval
District.
Report by Admiral Nimitz dated 15
Feb. 1942 of the attack at Pearl Harbor
and War Dairy of the Comdt. 14th
Kaval District, dated 3 Feb. 1942.
Statement by Captain John M. Creigh-
ton, U. S. N., who was at Singapore.
This Information obtained by oral
inquiry of the War Department, Col.
McNall, USA, Q-2 MIS File.
War Diary of U. S. S. Wm. B. Pretton.
War Diary of Cmdt. U S Marine
Pearl Harbor
Singapore
KhotaBaru
Davao Gulf, P. I.
Guam
7:55 am, 7th __
3:00 am, 8th _.
3:40 pm, 8th..
7:10 am, 8th- -
9:10 am, 8th..
8:00 am, 8th..
12:00 noon,
9:27 am, 8th..
9:30 pm, 7th..
3:00 am, 9th..
6:25pm, 7th..
8:00 pm, 7th..
8:40 pm, 7th..
11:10 pm, 7th.
11:10 pm, 7th.
Midnight, 7-
8th
1:00 am, 8th..
1:27 am, 8th..
9:20 am, 8th..
7:00 pm, 8th-.
1:25 pm, 7th..
3:00 pm, 7th..
3:40 pm, 7th..
6:10 pm, 7th..
6:10 pm, 7th..
7:00 pm, 7th..
8:00 pm, 7th, .
8:25 pm, 7th..
4:30 am, 8th..
2:00 pm, 8th..
Hong Kong
Wake
Corps, dated 31 March 1942.
This information obtained by oral in-
quiry of the War Department, Major
R. E. Guest, USA, G-3.
Report of Comdt. U. S. Marine Corps,
dated 31 March 1942.
This information obtained by oral in-
quiry of the War Department.
Log of the Coast Guard Cutter WAL-
Clark Field, P. I.
Midway
Nichols Field
(ManUa)
NUT.
Report of 16th Naval District Intelli-
gence Officer, file 40207,
(sgd) John Ford Baecher
* John Ford Baecher,
Lieutenant Commander, USNR.
[14-130] Mr. Morgan. At this point, I would like to read a por-
tion of a memorandum supplied by the War Department, dated
January 14, 1946, as follows :
Reference is made to Mr. Mitchell's memorandum of 31 December 1946 for-
warding Senator Ferguson's request for any records showing who was in charge
of the offices of the Chief of Staff and of General Gerow on the night of 6 Decem-
ber 1941.
General Gerow indicated to the Committee that as of 6 December 1941 War
Plans Division had an arrangement whereby a duty officer was designated for
the 24-hour period and, though not required to remain at the office throughout
the night, was required to stay within calling distance of a telephone (Tr.
4320-1). The Office of the Secretary General Staff maintained a similar duty
officer arrangement for the Chief of Staff. A thorough search has been made for
the duty rosters of War Plans Division and of the Office of the Secretary General
Staff for the period including 6-7 December 1941, Those rosters have not been
located and apparently it was not the practice to preserve such rosters.
5316 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Pursuant to a request made by counsel we have a communication
from the War Department dated 21 February 1946 setting forth the
authority under which Lieutenant Colonel Clausen administered oaths
during the course of his investigation. We would like to have this
letter spread on the record.
The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record.
(The letter referred to follows:)
[IJflSl] War Department,
Washington, 21 February 1946.
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:
With reference to your inquiry concerning Lt. Colonel Clausen's authority to
administer oaths during the investigation which he conducted at the direction
of the Secretary of War, your attention is invited to U. S. Code, Title 10, Section
1586 (Article of War 114), reading as follows:
1586. Authority to administer oaths (article 114).
Any officer of any component of the Army of the United States on active duty
in Federal service commissioned in or assigned or detailed to duty with the
Judge Advocate General's Department, any staff judge advocate or acting staff
judge advocate, the President of a general or special court-martial, any summary
court-martial, the trial judge advocate or any assistant trial judge advocate of a
general or special court-martial, the president or the recorder of a court of in-
quiry or of a military board, any officer designated to take a deposition, any
officer detailed to conduct an investigation, and the adjutant, assistant adjutant
ox personnel adjutant of any command shall have power to administer oaths
for the purposes of the administration of military justice and for other pur-
poses of military administration ; and shall also have the general power of a
notary public in the administration [14132] of oaths, the execution and
acknowledgment of legal instruments, the attestation of documents and all other
forms of notarial acts to be executed by persons subject to military law ; Provided,
That no fee of any character shall be paid to any any officer mentioned in this
section for the performance of any notarial acts herein authorized (as amended
Dec. 14, 1942, ch. 730, 56 Stat. 1050).
(sgd) Harmon Dtjncombe.
Lt. Colonel, GSC.
[14J33] Mr. Morgan. At various places in the transcript, par-
ticularly at pages 5484 and 11853-11854, information has been set
forth concerning the air situation in the Philippines at the outbreak of
the war. We have received a communication from the War Depart-
ment dated February 1, 1946, enclosing additional material in this
regard, and we would request that this letter and the enclosures be
spread on the record.
The Vice Chairman. The material will be spread on the record.
(The material referred to follows :)
[I4134] War Department,
The Pentagon, Room. 4D 161,
Washington, D. C, 1 Februanj 1946.
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson :
Three memoranda have been submitted by this office in response to requests
by Committee members for information concerning the air situation in the
Pliilippines at the outbreak of the war. The first, dated 27 December 1945,
forwarded an account of the initial Japanese air attack against the Philippines
contained in the Army Air Force narrative entitled "Army Air Forces in the
War Against Japan 1941-1942". A second memorandum of the same date
transmitted the available information on (a) the total number of planes in
the Philippines on 7 December 1941, (b) the number of bombers at Clark Field
when the Japanese first attacked, and (c) the number of bombers lost at Clark
Field in that attack. The third memorandum, sent to you on 30 January,
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5317
forwarded material from the War Department files with regard to Japanese
air reconnaissance over the Philippines and other U. S. possessions in the Pacific
prior to 7 December 1941.
Transmitted herewith is further information from the War Department files
relating to the initial Japanese [14135] attack against the Philippines.
Inclosure No. 1 consists of photostats of documents on which the account of the
Japanese attack contained in "Army Air Forces in the War Against Japan" was
based. Inclosure No. 2 is a niemorundum concerning the command organization
of the United States Army Forces in the Far East and the Far Bast Air Force
jis of 7 December 1941.
/s/ Haemon Duncombe,
Lt. Colonel, 08C.
Incls.— 2.
mi36}
Headquaktees
Fae East Aru Foeces
APO 925
History of the Fifth Aie Foecb (and Its Predeoessoes)
part i, decembee 1941 to august 1942
■ Deceinber, 19^1, Instalment
INVENTORY SHEET accompanying package bearing Message Center Regis-
tration No. H43.
1. APPENDIX I, Maps and Charts, History of the Fifth Air Force {and its
Predecessors), Part I, December, W^l-August, 1942.
2. APPENDIX II, Documents, History of the Fifth Air Force (and its Predeces-
sors), Part I, December 1941-Angust, 19^2.
3. Note: Narrative to which these appendices are transmitted is sent by photo-
mail, title: Narrative, History of the Fifth Air Force, {and its Predeces-
sors), Part I, December, 1941-Augnst, 1942, December, 19Ifl, Instalment.
[14137] DESIGNATION SHEET
(Official designation, including number of unit and of each echelon in chain
of command)
AIR FORCE : FAR EAST AIR FORCES
COMMAND :
WING :
GROUP :
SQUADRON :
AREA:
BATTALION :
CENTER :
COMPANY :
DEPOT :
DETACHMENT :
DISTRICT :
DIVISION :
PLATOON :
REGIMENT :
REGION :
SCHOOL :
SECTION : :
UNIT :
ETC. :
Has Security Classification of material been checked? YES.
5318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACS.
IU1S8]
EXPLANATOBY NOTE BE HiSTOEY OF THE FlFTH AlE F0RCE3, PAET I, DecEIMBEB 1941 TO
August (Deo. 1941 Instalment).
This document and its appendices purport to represent only a portion of the
story of aerial operations in the Southwest Pacific Theater for December 1941.
It incorporates such information as was found during the period of its prepara-
tion— namely between January 1944 and June 1944 — in the files of Hq. Far East
Air Forces (which were the files of Hq. Fifth Air Force until 15 June 1944), Hq.
U. S. Army Air Forces in the Far East, and Hq. G. H. Q., S. W. P. A., augmented by
personal interviews with several persons who were present in the theater in
December 1941. It is expected several additional statements from persons in
the latter category will still be obtained at A. P. O, 925.
According to information obtained during the preparation of these documents,
and from other sources, the following additional sources of information exist
in the U. S. :
1. The office of the Adj. Gen., G. H. Q., S. W. P. A., states that a number of
records from the Philippines were transmitted to the War Dept., Washington in
October 1942.
2. An oral report states a report on the modification of the P-40E was sent from
the Philippines to Washington.
3. Operations reports and unit casualty reports sent from the Philippines to
Washington.
4. At the Fighter Command School (later the Army Air Forces School of
Applied Tactics), Orlando, Fla., some detailed transcripts of statements by
returned pilots, including those of a combat pilot's round table, were taken during
the summer, fall and winter of 1942. These included a statement by Lt. Col.
Boyd D. ("Buzz") Wagner. The latter also supplied a statement to the A-2
and A-3 oflices of Hq., Army Air Forces, Washington.
5. The papers of Lt. Col. W. E. Ryess, and his published book.
6. General Eugene L. Eubank, Commanding General of Army Air Forces Board,
Orlando, Fla. He was commander of the 19th Bombardment Group in the
Philippines.
7. Lt. Col. H. G. Thome. In charge of certain phases of P-38 training near
Los Angeles. Was 1st Lt. in command of 3rd Pursuit Squadron, Iba, Luzon,
P. I., at outbreak of war.
8. Col. Orrin L. Grover. Was stationed at Army Air Forces Tactical Center,
Orlando, Fla. in Jan. 1944. Was C. O. of 24th Pursuit Group in the Philippines,
and is said to be the author of the History of the 24th Pursuit Group (Doc. I,
App. II).
9. "Various members of 19th Bombardment Group in the U. S.
Additionally is Major General Lewis H. Brereton who was commanding General,
Far East Air Force, in the Philippines.
[U139]
History of the Fifth Ara Force (and Its Predecessors)
PABT I DECEMBEB 1941 TO AUGUST 1942
DECEMBEK 1941, INSTALMENT
Narrative
[imO] LIST OF TABLES
Table No. Title Page
I Staff of the Far East Air Force 2
II Japanese Air Strength, Dec. 8, 1941 7
III Far East Air Force Dispositions, Dec. 7, 1941 8-9
IV Tactical Missions by the 19th Bombardment Group, Dec. 1941 18-19
V Casualties among Officers, 24th Pursuit Group, Dec, 1941 27
VI Airplane Status at Brisbane 35
VII Dates of Japanese Attacks in Philippines and Areas of Southwest
Pacific, Dec. 8, 1941, August 1942 40-42
[mil] TABLE OF CONTENTS
Narrative
Section Title Page
I. The Far East Air Force 1
II. Chance in Employment of the Air Force 20
III. United States Army Forces in Australia 31
IV. Transfer of the FEAF to Java 43
Maps and charts Appendix I
Documents Appendix II
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5319
[I4142I Section I — The Far East Air Force
When the month of December, 1941, opened in the Philippines the Far East
Air Force was under the command of Major General Lewis H. Brereton. Units
were fully alert. Due to the tense international situation, from November 15*
"all pursuit aircraft were fully loaded, armed and on constant alert 24 hours
each day with pilots available on 30 minutes notice".^ Throughout the Air
Force intensive training was in progress and a number of newly arrived units
were being integrated into the Air Force. Despite this fact, the Far East Air
Force had but small forces to meet the attack which wias about to be launched.
Organization and Equipment of the Far East Air Force
In the Philippines the Far East Air Force was itself a new organization. The
name had undergone two recent changes. The first change had followed the
creation of the United States Army Forces in the Far East. Lieutenant General
Douglas MacArthur had assumed command of USAFFE on July 27, 1941.*
Following this he had redesignated on August 4, 1941 the Philippine Department
Air Force as the Air Forces, United States Army Forces in the Far East.*
This operated "directly under the Commanding General, United States Army
Forces in the Far East, except for routine administration and supply, which will
continue through Headquarters, Philippine Department".* At this date the
Commanding General of the Air Forces was Brigadier Genertxl Henry B. Clagett,
who had arrived in the Philippines on May 4, 1941. Subsequently, on October
7, 1941 (West Longitude Time), the War Department designated Major General
Lewis H. Brereton as the air commander.* He brought with him a number
of oflBcers, including a new Chief of Staff, Colonel Friancis M. Brady. The War
Department, on October 28. 1941. (West Longitude Time) redesignated the Air
Force as the Far East Air Force. This redesignation became effective on Novem-
ber 16, 1941.'
Staff of the Far East Air Force
With the arrival of General Brereton, his staff was organized as follows : (Table
I. P. 2).
(Footnotes in original.)
^ In this narrative all time is given as Philippine Department Standard Time and all
dates are East Longitude unless otherwise indicated.
^History of the 2ith Pursuit Group in the Philippines (Document I, Appendix II). This
document is from Fifth Air Force Files, and is dated October 10, 1942. Lieutenant Colonel
Allison W. Ind, Allied Intelligence Bureau, and Colonel L. A. Diller, Public Relations,
GHQ, SW7A, both state that this history was written by Colonel Orrin L. Grover, who was
the Comm. of the 24th Pur. Gp. in the Philippines.
' G. O. No. 1, United States Army Forces in the Far East, July 27, 1941.
* G. O. No. 4, USAFFE, Aug. 4, 1941 (Doc. 2, App. II).
» G. O. No. 4, USAFFE, Aug. 4, 1941 (Doc. 2, App. II).
« Chronology of the Fifth Air Force, War Department, Washington, D. C.
TG. O. No. 28, USAFFE, Nov. 14, 1941 (Doc. 3, App. II).
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
e ;:3
fe "£
>a
■< S
Ec<
■o
b
H 2
!^
cd
fe
f^«
«
<)
H
tf w
CQ
§
(»
H .2
fe
CO
— l-H
Q ^
o
'a
««:
z *
a
PS
<3 hJ_
go
o
O
a -f
O
O a'
So
c
.?hJ
»
-^•s
S "3
"O — -
§«5
^' O) S*
a o
S rt
M K
Wa
^ o u
- O o t- ~ 1' --
ri at' t) *
s <=^
a (^^
osO
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5321
[I4IM] Components of the Far East Air Force
Next in chain of command in the Far East Air Force were tlie Fifth Inter-
ceptor Command, Fifth Bomber Command, and Far East Air Service Command.
The Fifth Interceptor Command was commanded by Brigadier General Henry B.
Clagett, with Colonel Harold H. George as Chief of Staff. The authority for
activation of this unit in the Philippines has not been found, but it is listed as
operating on December 8. 1941, in the document tracing the chain of command
of the Far East Air Force, which is in the USAFFE.' The Fifth Inter-
ceptor Command also appears on the movement order to Bataan (Dec. 23),'
and in subsequent General Orders of USAFFE." In the first available
strength report this unit is shown as having five officers and fifteen enlisted
men."
The Fifth Bomber Command and Far East Air Service Command were acti-
vated on November 16, the same day as the creation of the Far East Air
Force." Lieutenant Colonel Eugene L. Eubank, also the commander of the 19th
Bombardment Group, became the commander of the Fifth Bomber Command.
This was only a skeleton unit, and although authorized full Table of Organization
strength, had only one officer and twenty enlisted men on December 23."
The Far East Air Service Command, under Colonel L. S. Churchill, had eight
officers and sixty enlisted men."
Pursuit Units
The pursuit units in the Philippines consisted of the five squadrons of the 24th
Pursuit Group, commanded by Major Orrin L. Grover." This unit was an
outgrowth of the Fourth Composite Group, which at the start of 1941 had as its
components all of the tactical air units in the Pliilippines. The three pursuit
squadrons in this group, the 3rd, 17th, and 20th, were all equipped with P-26's
until May, 1941. At that time they were re-equipped with F-35's.'^ Next,
in July 1941, one squadron was equipped with P-4(JB's, and still later, P-40E's
were received.^* On September 16, 1941, the 24th Pursuit Group was acti-
vated and the three pursuit squadrons transferred to it from the Fourth Com-
posite Group.^' In November, two additional squadrons, the 21st and 34th,
arrived from the United States. They were a part of the 35th Pursuit Group,
but pending the arrival of the rest of its units, were attached to the 24th Pursuit
Group.'^
[I4145] Training of Pursuit Pilots
In the summer of 1941 "100 new pilots from training schools" in the United
States arrived and were used to build up the three original pursuit squadrons to
strength. Because these pilots had not received combat training a training unit
was formed at Clark E'ield.'* In addition it was necessary to train these pilots
in gunnery, so a gunnery training camp was established at Iba.'" In October
35 more new pilots were assigned to the pursuit units and the same program of
« BEAF Chain of Command. (Doc. 4, App. II.)
" (Doc. 5, App. II.)
"GO No. 40, USAFFE, Mar. 14, 1942 (Doc. 6, App. II).
^^ Movetnent Order to Bataan (Doc. 5, App. II). It should be noted that Headquarters
and Headquarters Squadron of the Fifth Interceptor Command was under movement orders
from the United States when war started. It had been activated from the Second Inter-
ceptor Command (under WD letter, 14 October. 1941, AG 320, 2 (10-1-41) MR*M*AAF
"Constitution and Activation of Air Corps Units"). Under command of Lieutenant
Colonel Willis R. Taylor, this unit, with eight radar sets sailed from San Francisco at
1800 on December 6, 1941 (San Francisco Time) on the Tasker H. Bliss. This ship put
bacli into port on December 6 (San Francisco Time) and the Hq. and Hq. Sq., Fifth
Interceptor Command debarked and returned to Seattle. History 0} the Headquarters
and Headquarters Squadron, II Ititerceptor Command, II Fighter Command and V Fiahter
Command. May 1941-December 1942. By Major Edward J. McCormick, Jr., pp. 10-13.
This history also states that the 557th Signal AW Battalion, also under orders to proceed
to the Philippines, was in the Port of Embarkation at the time, but was also ordered back
to Seattle.
" G. O. No. 28, USAFFE, Nov. 14, 1941 (Doc. 3, App. II).
« (Doc. 5, App. II).
" (Doc. 5, App. II).
" History of 2/, Pur. Gp. (Doc. 1, App. II).
" History of Si Pur. Gp. (Doc. 1, App. II).
"G. O. No. 10. USAFFE, Sept. 16, 1941 (Doc. 7. App. TI).
i^ History 2// Pur. Gp. (Doc. 1, App. II).
^« History 24 Pur. Gp. (Doc. 1, App. II).
'o History 2i Pur. Gp. (Doc. 1, App. II).
5322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
training was started with them.^ At the gunnery camp at Iba "an extreme
amount of difficulty was experienced in the malfunctioning of the guns, due to im-
proper adjustment and mal-installation. In order to properly function it was im-
perative that all gun installations should be modified".**
Bombardment Units
In the fall of 1941, the 19th Bombardment Group (H), with B-17's arrived in the
Philippines. This group was commanded by Lt. Col. Eugene L. Eubank. Prior to
its arrival the bombei's iu the Philippines had been B-lOs and B-18's, which were
not suitable for combat. These planes had been assigned to the 28th Bombard-
ment Squadron of the Fourth Composite Group. With the arrival of the 19th
Bombardment Group the 28th Bombardment Squadron was transferred to the 19th
Bombardment Group, re-equipped with B-17s and redesignated from medium to
heavy on November 16, 1941." This gave the 19th Bombardment Group a
headquarters squadron and a total of four instead of three subordinate squadrons.
The group had a grand total of 35 B-17s.
On November 20 the 27th Bombardment Group (D) arrived in the Philippines.
This unit was commanded by Major John H. Davies. All of its aircraft (A-24s)
were on a later convoy, which was on the high seas at the time war broke out, and
had to be diverted to Brisbane, Australia. The non-arrival of the dive bombers
left the bombardment component of the FEAF unbalanced, there being no unit
specially adapted for use against shipping.
Also in the Philippines was part of the ground echelon of the 7th Bombardment
Group (H)."'' On December 7 (West Longitude) part of the air echelon, fly-
ing from California landed at Pearl Harbor ; but none of the air echelon reached
the Philippines.
Observation
With the transfer of all units except the 2nd Observation Squadron from the
4th Composite Group, Headquarters squadron of this group was abolished on Nov-
ember 16 and the 2nd Observation Squadron was thus placed directly under Head-
quarters, FEAF.^ The squadron was equipped with observation type air-
craft and was commanded by Captain J. Y. Parker.^
Airdromes
At the start of 1941 there were three major military airfields in the Philippines,
Clark Field, near Ft. Stotsenburg about 60 miles north of Manila, and Nielsen and
Nichols Fields on the outskirts of Manila. These were all extended during 1941.
Because of the shortage of suitable fields some had to be used even while under
constructions, which increased the accident rate among the pursuit."
[1^146] By December 1, the following fields were in use, or rapidly
nearing completion : (For location see C. I. U. Map, Chart 1, App. I) .
Pursuit Fields^:
Nichols Field
Nielson Field
Clark Field
Iba Field
Resales Field
Del Carmen Field
Bombardment Fields*':
Clark Field
Del Monte Field, Mindanao
Fields Nearing Completion '" :
O'Donnel Field
San Fernando Field
Ternate Field
San Marcelino
"-^History 24 Pur. Op. (Doc. 1, App. II).
"^-History 2!, Pur. Op. (Doc. 1, App. II).
23 GO, 28 USAFFE, Nov. 14, 1941 (Doc. 3 — App. II).
^Statement of Colonel R. L. Fry (Doc. 8, App. II) nnd Statement of Colonel Ray T.
Elsmore (Doc. 30a, App. II).
"GO. 28, USAFFE, Nov. 14, 1941 (Doc. 3, App. IT).
=« FEAF Chain of Command (Doc. 4, -App. IT).
^''History Zi Pur. Op. (Doc. 1, App. II).
'^History 24 Pur. Op. (Doc. 1. App. II).
» Statement of Colonel Harold Bads (Doc. 3, App. II).
«o History 24 Pur. Op. (Doc. 1, App. II).
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5323
In addition to the fields listed as nearing completion a more extensive air-
drome construction program had been started in Luzon, but had not reached
a point where it affected the situation prior to evacuation to Bataan." The
fields provided did not allow for sufficient dispersion, nor for sufficient mobility
of the air force. This was a cause of concern to General Brereton.^
South of Luzon, Del Monte in Mindanao was in use as already indicated.
Santa Barbara on Panay, and Cebu, Cebu, together with a few other fields in
Mindanao were also used after war started.® (See Chart 1, App. I).
Co-Ordinated With Other Commands
It was recognized that any defense of the Far East would demand the closest
coordination with the British, Dutch, and Australians. Much of the work to
this end was carried out by military staff missions of foreign governments in
Washington in consultation with the War Department and does not fall within
the limits of this narrative.'^ However, a considerable amount of planning
was carried on through direct consultation. In the early summer of 1941 General
Clagett received instructions to proceed to Singapore and China, where he
carried on a number of conferences.^
[14H7] Still later. General Brereton, went through the Dutch East Indies,
the Australian Mandates, and Australia. He held a number of conferences,
concerning the improvement of ferry-routes to the Philippines, and the arrange-
ment of I'outes for ferrying pursuit aircraft from Australia via Koepang, Kendari,
Sandakan, Balikpapan, Tarakan, Del Monte (in Mindanao) and Santa Barbara
(on Panay) '" Before the start of the war supplies of bombs and gasoline
had already been sent into Rabaul, Port Moresby, and Darwin. Arrangements
were also under way to send such stocks to Singapore and Balikpapan, but the
war came first. Also General Brereton arranged future plans for staff coordina-
tion with the Australians and the Dutch, which paved the way for later develop-
ments. Among the most far-sighted of his arrangements was the development
of Projects 1 and 2, which envisioned the use of Australian maintenance facilities,
and called for considerable expenditures. These plans were left with Sir Charles
Burnett, Chief of The Australian Air Staff in Melbourne. Some work was in
progress when the war started. This was then speeded up and proved capable
of meeting many of the actual requirements of the situation which developed
early in December.'"
Air warning system and communications
The development of the Air Warning System in the Philippines was based
primarily on a system of native observers. These reported in over the lines of the
Philippine Telephone System to Interceptor Headquarters at Neilson. Data was
then reported to the plotting board at Clark Field and based on it, orders were
issued to the various squadrons. Commercial lines of the Philippine Telephone
Company were all that existed for receiving reports. Delays were frequent.
Clark, Nielson, and Nichols Fields were linked by teletype, and this circuit,
supplemented by telephone when necessary, was used for direct communication.
The third means of communication was radio, the major fields, each having an
SCR 297 which was used for both point to point and ground to air communication.
In addition to the ground observer system the first radar had been installed
in the Philippines at Iba. A second was being assembled near Aparri, and a
third was enroute to Legaspi. The set at Iba was in tactical use, and operated
on a 24 hours per day basis.^
Antiaircraft Artillery
Next to the inadequacy of the Air Warning System, was the shortage of AAA.
General Brereton in March 1942, stated that before he left Washington in 1941,
« Radio, General Brereton to General Arnold (Doc. 9, App. II) and History 2i Pur. Op
(Doc. 1, App. II).
S3 Rarlio, General Brereton to General Arnold, March 2, 1942 (Doc. 9, App. II)
^^JourtJnl of l<)th Bomharffment Oroup — (Doc. 11 Ann II)
« Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff 19^1-19 i's (War Department), p. — . [No page
number in original]. •- f a
^Lt. Col. Allison W. Ind (Bataan) (Msn). This book, as an unofficial source, is used
only for material where the author was a direct particinant, and where the subiect dis-
cussed falls within his field of military specialty, which is Intelligence. In this case for
example he went on the trip with General Clagett. Permission for use in this official
history has been granted bv Lt. Col. Ind.
"" Ind, Bataan (Kss). p. 196 fF.
!I f^olonel Merle-Smith to General Clagett, Dec. 24, 1941 (Doc. 12, App II)
** History 2i Pur. Orp. (Doc. 1, App. II).
5324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
he declared that — '"To put a bomber force in the Philippine Islands without
providing adequate anti-aircraft defense measures was almost certain to
mean their destruction." '^ Also General Brereton mentioned the inadequate
fighter protection and inadequate air warning system. The amount of anti-
aircraft was inadequate. The one anti-aircraft regiment at the airfields was the
200th CA (AA) Regt., a mobile unit of one battalion of 3" and 1 battalion of 37mm
guns. This unit was stationed at Clark Field. The remaining anti-aircraft
regiment was the 60th CA with units on Bataan and the harbor forts in Manila
Bay.*" The remaining airdromes were protected by only a few 50 calibre
and 30 calibre machine guns. These offered but slight protection.
[14148] Japanese Strength
Intelligence estimates showed that the Japanese had overwhelming strength,
m comparison with the Far East Air Force equipment in the Philippines. In the
R. A. A. F. the air order of battle was given as follows :
Table II. — Japanese air strength, Dec. 8th, I'J'/l
Fleet Air Arm 612
Manchuria 800
Japan 600
N. and Cen. China 198
Mandated Is 100
Malaya 300
Phil inc. Canton Hainan, Formosa 250
Total first line strength 2, 860
While this estimate is from Australian sources, similar figures had been made
available to General Brereton and his staff when they were in Australia on Nov.
21-23 (40a) . Royal Air Force figures for this date placed the size of the Japanese
Air Force as around 4,500 aircraft of front line strength, which is now generally
accepted as correct." The RAAF and RAF figures are cited at this point
because no estimates from the War Department, Washington, for the period
December 8, 1941, are available here (APO 925).
The estimates shown above indicate that from the Japanese bases in Southern
Formosa (430 to 450 miles north of Clark Field) it was possible to throw vastly
superior formations against the Philippines. It was also possible for the enemy
to increase this superiority by the use of carriers. Finally, the southernmost
islands of the Philippines were within range of Japanese air units based on Palau.
(Chart VII, App. I ) .
In the field of Intelligence the Japanese knew the disposition of our units, the
location of important stores, the capabilities of our planes. They had excellent
maps of the entire area, and objective folders on the important targets. Within
the Philippines many of the large Japanese minority were organized as Sakhad-
listas, a fifth column under the orders of Japan. In addition to transmitting
information, this group even lighted flares at night to designate important targets.
In some of the islands in the Far East, the Japanese withdrew their nationals
prior to the outbreak of the war. In the Philippines they organized them. Our
counter-espionage system was inadequate to cope with this organization; and the
security measures around our installations were not great enough to prevent
observation of the equipment and installations.*^
«» Brereton to Arnold, March 1, 1942. (This was actually written over a week earlier) —
(Doc. 9. App. II).
*«Lt. Col. Mellnik, AAA in Philippines (Dec. 24, App. II). It should be noted that a
training program for Filipino AAA was in progress at Fort Wint. The organization of
the Filipino Units was in progress and a number of regiments were scheduled to be trained
b.v March, 1942. Equipment was being supplied from the U. S. From this equipment, after
war was declared two additional regiments were organized : the 200th Provisional CA
(AA) which came in part from the parent 200th, was moved to Nichols Field and areas of
Manila 011 the night of December 8th. It was functioning bv Deceml>er 10th and was
equipped with 12-3" and 12-.'?7mm AAA guns, as well as some .50 calibre which were
placed at Nichols Field and at the port area on the night of December 8th. Also the 51st
CA (AA) was organized and used after war began. It does not appear to have operated
on air fields.
■"""Central Operational Intelligence Center, Situation Report (now under GHQ SWPA),
Dec. 12th, 1041.
"Figure from Enemy Appreciation Section, Allied Air Forces, A-2, SWPA (S/L
Felthan).
*- Ind. (Bataan) (Mss), p. 246 flf.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
5325
[14149] One of the available estimates of the situation of our forces in
the Philippines at the end of November, 1941, was contained in a general intelli-
gence summary used by the Tanaka Force. An exact extract of this document
(to which are added translations reports the FEAF as consisting of:
Unit Type
24th Kuchiku Sentai (Pursuit Group) P-35.
3rd Kuchiku Chutai (Pursuit Squadron) P-36.
17th Kuchiku Chutai (Pursuit Squadron) P-38.
20th Kuchiku Chutai (Pursuit Squadron) P-40.
24th Kuchiku Chutai (Pursuit Squadron) 27 planes at Nichols Field
above types included.
J 9th Bakugeki Sentai (Bombardment Group) 1st Chutai of Kuchiku
P-38 or P-40 27 planes.
14th Bakugeki Chutai B-17 12 planes.
28th Bakugaki Chutai B-18 13 planes.
36th Bakugeki Chutai (Type of plane unknown).
2nd Teisatsu Chutai (Reconnaissance Squadron) 0-19, 0-46, 0-47, 0-57.
19 Teisatu Chutai unknown.
The information above is essentially accurate, as comparison with the follow-
ing table of our dispositions will show. The chief mistake is in listing part of
the pursuit as components of the 19th Bombardment Group and not listing two
of the squadron numbers in the 19th Bombardment Group. Also aircraft types
are listed which were not in the Philippines. About December 1, the summary
was shown by the Japanese to include:
Fighters 130
Bombers 30
Naval Patrol 20
Total 180
This is also substantially correct, if it is assumed that observation be included
under fighters. The fact is that this information is more accurate than that
sent to the Australians by their Washington sources following the outbreak of
war. The Japanese figure is closer to the number of operational aircraft,
whereas those of the Australian Attache included obsolete planes to a greater
extent, and also those not in commission."
FEAF Disposition on Dec. 7, 1941
In opposition to the Japanese Army and Navy Air Services, our dispositions on
the eve of war were as follows : (See Chart II, App. I.)
Table III. — Status and Location of Aircraft '
C. 0.
Unit
Location
Type
Number
operat.
Major 0. L. Grover
24 Pur Grp
Lt. W. B. Putman
Hq. and Hq. Sq
3rd Pur. Sq
Clark
Lt. W. G. Thome
Iba .
P-40-E-..-
P-40-E.__.
P-40-
P-35
P-40-E-._.
18
1st Lt. Boyd Wagner
17th Pur - -.
Nichols
Clark
18
1st Lt. J. B. Moore
20th Pur
18
1st Lt. Sam Marett
21st Pur
Del Carmen
18
1st Lt. W. E. Dyess
34th Pur
Nichols
18
Total pursuit
90
' This tabic has been compiled from the History 24 Pur. Grp. (Doe. 1) anA Journal 19 Bomb Op. (Doc.l,
App. II). Gen. Marshall in his Biennial Report gives the number of P-40s as 107. The discrepancy is
due to the fact that Table III above, is of planes operational on Dec. 8th, and excludes planes not erected
or out of commission.
There is some question as to who were the commanders of the 21st and 34th Pursuit Squadrons. In
Q. O. No. 48, USAFFE, Dec. 21, 1941 (Dec. 18, App. II), 1st Lt. Sam Marett is given as commander of
the 34th Sq. rather than the 21st. The Bataan Roster of the 2I,th Pursuit Group (Doc. 27, App. ID, also
gives this as the status of the command, and gives 1st Lt. Wm. E. Dyess as the commander of the 21st Sq.
In this narrative, however, the History of the 24th Pursuit Group has been followed.
■•^ Compare the Japanese "No. 3, The Situation of Both Sides Prior to War", ATIS,
Current Translations, No. 46 with COIC SITREP for the period after December 8. and
through December ."0, 1941. Further, the Australian Naval Attache in Washington
reported to his government on Dec. 12, that the 52 A-24's were operational in the
Philippines (Doc. 13, App. II). Actually these aircraft were unloaded at Brisbane on
December 22. Twelve of them were eventualy ready for the Java campaign.
5326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
IWBO]
CO.
Unit
Location
Type
No.
Cpt. J. Y.Parker
Lt. Col. Eueene L. Eubank
Captain MacDonaM
Major C. E. Combs...
Major E. O. O'Donnell
Major Wm. Fisher. ._
Major H. Gibbs
tod Obs
19th Bomb Group
Hq & Hq Sq.
93rd Sq.
14th Sq.
28th Sq
30th Rq._
Clark.
0-46, 52,
79
Clark
Del Monte.
Del Monte.
Clark.
Clark
B-17-D...
B-17-D...
B-17-D...
B-17-D...
10-12
Note.— Two planes out of commission at ClarK, also three planes of 93rd and 14th Squadron at Clark.
6TH PURSUIT (PHIL. AIR FORCE)
Captain Jesus A. Villamour 6th Sq BATANGAS.... P-26 12
MISCELLANEOUS
CLARK 1
nichols^ b-18 10
neilsonJ
cabantuan. b-10 3
Clark A-27 2
Del Monte B-18 2
Total first line Operational Aircraft Dec. 7th (19th Bomb. 24th Pursuit 2nd. Obsv.) 13.5 or 137
All other operational tactical planes 29
Grand Total Operational 164 or 166
The total of Far East Air Force personnel in the Philippines on December 8th
was about 8,000 of the total of U. S. Army personnel of 19,000."
II4J0I] Of this air force total, approximately 7,500 was in Luzon. Of the
personnel in Luzon, some 1,200 belonged to the 27th Bombardment Group (D)
which had no aircraft. Also that part of the ground echelon of the 7th Bom-
bardment Group (H) which had reached the Philippines was awaiting the ar-
rival of the air echelon. The 500 air force personnel outside Luzon were scat-
tered throughout a number of bases with the largest concentration at Del
Monte, Mindanao. The Philippine Army Air Force had about 1,200." Total
air force personnel was therefore around 9,200 including the Philippine Army
Air Force.
Events Prior to War
Starting on December 2, the Japanese began a series of night and early morn-
ing reconnaissance missions over Clark Field. The plane appeared at 0530 each
morning, was sighted visually, and also tracked by the radar at Iba. Follow-
ing the first sighting "instructions were given to force the aircraft to land or
destroy it. On the three succeeding nights it was impossible to make the inter-
ception, due to inability to see the aircraft in the dark, or the aircraft not get-
ting close enough to be picked up by the seachlights." Accordingly, it was
agreed that the AAA would have its turn on the night of December 7th. But
on that night no plane came over.^"
December 8th, 1941
December 8th was the first day of war in the Philippines. Being east of the
International Date Line, this was the same as December 7th at Pearl Harbor.
-\lso due to this further distance to the east, it was still dark in the Philippines
when the attack on Pearl Harbor came. First news of this attack was flashed
to all units upon receipt of the report at 0330.^' The official USAFFE warn-
ing was pent out at about 0430. Word was also received at 0630 at the bomber
base at Del Monte.** War had begun.*"
** Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff War Department, p. 10. Gen. Marshall's report
gives the figure as 8,000. This is in agreement with the rosters and reports in Documents
5, 8, 14, 15 and 30a (App. II).
^^ Strength Report Philippine Air Force — Jan. 3, 1942. (Doc. 16, App. II.)
*« History Pur. Op. Pg. 3 (Doc. 1, App. II).
^'' Ibid. This news was by commercial radio and no oflScial action was taken except to
order units to stations. The official warning was received by the pursuit units at 0445.
^8 The message received at Del Monte stated "Hostilities have commenced, govern your-
self accordingly." {Interview with Colonel Fry) (Doc. 8, App. II.) Message received at
0630 hrs. according to Major Heald, Communications Officer. He remembers the message
as : "Hostilities have begun. All airdromes alert." (Doc. 17, App. II.)
*» History 24 Pur. Op. (Doc. 1, App. II).
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5327
Pursuit Opex-ations "
[I4152] Prior to receipt of oflScial word that war had begun, the radar at
Iba reported a large foi-mation over the China Sea headed in the direction of
Corregidor. Accordingly the 3rd Pursuit, stationed at Iba, was ordered to
intercept. It proceeded to the heading given in its mission order, and the radar
plot showed a successful interception. At this date, however, altitude could
not be read from the radar. Actually the P-40's did not see the bombers in
the darkness. Therefore they returned to their base for refueling. (Chart III,
App. I).
The next development occurred at 0930, with the reporting of a large forma-
tion over the Lingayen Gulf headed for Manila. The orders issued from inter-
cept headquarters, where Major Grover and Colonel George were operating,
called for the 20th Pursuit Squadron to proceed north from Clark Field and
intercept in the vicinity of Resales. Meanwhile the 17th Pursuit Squadron
was sent from Nichols to patrol Clark Field and intercept any planes which
might pass the 20th. But the Japs were only feinting. From Lingayen Gulf
the Japs did not proceed south. Instead, they swung inland directly past,
and hit the army installations at Baguie which was also the summer capital
of the Philippines. They also hit airfields at Cabantuan. At the time of the
aleit at Clark Field, the B-17's were ordered up, so they might not be caught
on the ground. They landed again, however, at 1130, their landing being
covered by the 20th Pursuit Squadron. (Chart III, App. I).
The last two moves on the part of the Japanese had run two squadrons out
of gas and thus limited the number of squadrons which would be available
for the main raids. In this they were successful. At 1130 the 20th Pursuit
Squadron at Clark Field was being regassed. The B-17's were back at Clark
Field; the 17th Pursuit Squadron was being gassed at Nichols. The scene
was set for the main strike. (Chart IV, App. I).
There was not long to wait. At 1130 the Iba radar reported a large forma-
tion over the China Sea. For the second time during the day the 3rd Pursuit
Squadron at Iba was ordered to intercept. It immediately took off, although
apparently eight planes were left on the field. Again, in this attempted inter-
ception the Japanese were to show one of their tricks. Taking advantage of
the limited gasoline supplies of the P-40, the incoming bomber formation feinted
and then withdrew. This type of tactics had also been used in China, but for
the first time United States air units came in contact with such tactics. The
3rd Pursuit Squadron remained in the air, with its gasoline steadily diminishing.
Believing that interception might not be made by the 3rd Squadron and fear-
ing a direct thrust at Manila and the installations there, the two squadrons
on Nichols Field were both sent off, the 17th Squadron to take station over
Bataan, while the 34th Squadron was placed. on standing patrol over the city
of Manila proper. (Chart IV, App. I).
The next report came in at approximately 1145 of an unidentified formation
"over Lingayen Gulf, headed south". This raised a new problem and the sit-
uation was met by ordering the 21st Pursuit off Del Carmen to cover Clark Field.
At the time the 20th, still regassing at Clark Field was ordered up as soon as
refueling was completed. But no planes reached Clark Field prior to the attack.
Dust on the field at Del Carmen delayed the take off of the P-35s. The first
planes of the 21st Squadron which taxied out raised such a cloud that it was
necessary to wait for the cloud to settle. The delay was so great that planes
of the 21st Squadron did not reach Clark Field until after the Japanese attack
was completed. (Chart IV, App. I). At this juncture communications broke
down and no further reports were received at Clark Field or Neilson Field con-
cerning the incoming Japanese bomber formation. At 1215 the 20th Pursuit
Squadron on Clark Field completed gassing, and the planes started to take off.
Four were off the ground and five more were in process of taking off, while five
more were on the ground. At either 1217 or 1220 the first Jap planes arrived.
There were 54 to 72 bombers in a very shallow V of V's and above 18,000' which
bombed with accuracy." These were followed by a number of dive bombers
mi5S] and fighters which came in to strafe."' The five planes of the 20th
Pursuit Squadron which were in process of taking off and the five which were
»" This account follows History 24 Pur. Orp. (Doc. 1, App. II).
"■ "Sallys" predominated in the early attacks over the Philippines and probably con-
stituted the bulk of this formation.
" These were "Zekes" and possibly "Nates."
5328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Still on the ground were all destroyed. The four in the air, led by the squadron
commander, Lt. J. H. Moore, went into combat at low altitude and shot down
four of the attacking planes." The bomber formation laid a pattern which de-
stroyed most of the hangars and buildings, as well as most of the B-17s and
B-18s on the field. The dive bombers (probably Vals) then came in strafing
and set fire to most of the planes which were in the blast pens.** One of the first
bombs made a direct hit on the radio station on the field, so that it was impossible
to contact the 17th and 34th Pursuit Squadrons, still on patrol over the area of
Manila and Bataan. Finally another radio did make contact with the 17th
Pursuit Squadron, but it arrived over Clark Field seventy miles to the north of
Bataan, after all enemy planes had withdrawn; the 21st also arrived from Del
Carmen after the attack was completed. By this time the 17th Pursuit Squad-
ron was running short of gasoline, so it landed at Del Carmen. (Chart IV,
App. I).
In the absence of effective interception, the defence of Clark Field was left
to the AAA. The field was defended by the 200th CA (AAA). Also a number
of air corps crew members heroically went to their planes during the attack
and fired the machine guns in the grounded aircraft at the attacking strafers.
For outstanding heroism in such action, the Distinguished Service Cross was
awarded to the following: Pfc. Joseph G. McElroy, T/Sgt. Anthony Holub and
Pfc. Greely B. Williams (posthumously). When the hangar in which his plane
was located was set on fire, 1st Lt. Fred T. Crimmins of the 19th Bombardment
Group taxied his plane into the open, only to have it destroyed by enemy strafing,
he being hit and wounded.*^
Also, despite the continuous attacks on Clark Field many risked the strafing to
help the casuaties. Among others, several examples will be mentioned. Private
Robert J. Endres secured an abandoned truck and through the midst of the bomb-
ing and strafing made seven trips between the field and the station hospital,
on each trip carrying a load of wounded.°° The 19th Bombardment Group
Flight Surgeon, Maj. Luther C. Heidger, stayed in the open during the attack
to treat the wounded. The Chaplain. 1st Lt. Joseph F. LaFleur administered
religious rites to the wounded and dying throughout the attack, and helped
to treat the wounded."" All of these were awarded the Distinguished Service
Cross.
Meanwhile, as the Srd Pursuit Squadron was running low on gasoline, it
turned back toward Iba. There it found the formation which it had been
unable to intercept. Fifty-four bombers and an unknown number of strafers
were attacking the field. Despite being low on gasoline the P-40's pressed
home the attack. They arrived too late to prevent the bombing, but did prevent
strafing. Casualties on the field were, however, heavy. All of the installa-
tions, including the radar, were destroyed. Five P-40's were shot down in
the air, and eight planes on the ground were destroyed. In addition, it being
impossible to land on the field, three P-40's ran out of gasoline and crash landed
on the beach. The remainder of the formation landed at O'Donnel Field.
Gasoline and ammunition was dispatched from stores remaining at Clark Field
to supply these planes. (Chart IV, App. I).
[1415^] Employment of Bombardment
Information on the employment of the bombardment planes still on Clark
Field is not complete. One B-17 took off at 1030 for reconnaissance of Eastern
Luzon.°® All that is authorative concerning the remaining bombardment planes
is that at the time of the alert at 0930 "all bombardment was dispatched from
Clark Field. The 20th Pursuit Squadron returned to Clark Field and gave the
o'G. O. No. 48 USAFFB, Dec. 21, 1941 (Doc. 18, App. II). The citation granting Lt.
Moore of the 20th Pursuit Squadron the Distinsuifihed Service Cross credits him with
leading his formation from the field on Deoemher 10. however, the events are those described
in the History 2/,th Pur. Orp. and Journal 19th Bomb. Grp. (Docs. 1 and 11, App. II) as
takincT place on the 8tli.
"* The strafing planes probably included fighters ("ZeTces") in addition. Reports varied
Cf. Histom Z'lth Pur. Gro. and Journal 19th Bomb. Orp. (Docs. I and II, App. II.)
"5 G. a. No. 48, U8AFFE, Dec. 21. 1941 (Doc. 18, App. II) and GO. No. 2, Hq. Southwest
Pacific Command. Lembang .Tava. Feb. 15, 1942 (Doc. 19, App. II).
oo O. 0. No. /,R, USAFFE, Dec. 21, 1941 (Doc. 18. App. II).
"GO No. 2. SWP. command. Lembang Java, Feb. 15. 1942 (Doc. 19, App. II).
'^Journal 19th Bombardment Op. (Doc. 11, App. II).
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5329
bombardment cover while they were landing." =' Thus, at 1130, all except the B-17
which was still on reconnaissance over Eastern Luzon, and the twelve aircraft at
Del Monte, were on Clark Field.
Of the total of 22 B-17 aircraft on Clark Field at the time of the Japanese
attack, fifteen were destroyed. Two or three of those on the field escaped damage
and were operational the following day. An additional three or four were
repaired and made operational later.
The one B-17 to encounter enemy action in the air on December 8, was a
plane which left Del Monte at 0930 for repairs at Clark Field. This plane was
piloted by Lt. E'. E. Tash.™ It arrived over Clark Field while the field was under
attack, and immediately started back for Del Monte. Three enemy pursuit at-
tacked, and the rear gunner, S/Sgt. Michael Bibin, was severly wounded in both
shoulders. The first news of what was taking place to the north reached Del
Monte at 1700 when Carpenter called over his radio as he came in to land, "Have
been exposed to enemy, have ambulance ready." '^ One Zero was believed shot
down.
Summary of Raids on Clark Field and IBA
In these two raids the Japanese had effectively destroyed the striking power
of the Far East Air Force, had seriously cut down the pursuit strength, had
destroyed most of the maintenance facilities for the B-17's, and had inflicted a
number of casualties. Our forces had been on the alert. They had not been
caught as at Pearl Harbor, with planes not loaded. But the damage inflicted
was great.
Before the conclusion of the first twenty-four hours of the war in the Philip-
pines, one more attack was launched by the Japanese — against Nichols Field
and its installations. By Midnight telephonic communication was reestablished
from Nielson Field to the plotting board at Clark Field and operation of the air
warning system was resumed. Shortly after midnight one flight of the I7th
Pursuit Squadron was dispatched to intercept an enemy formation. The dust
at Del Carmen again hindered the takeoff and one pilot was killed. The re-
maining four aircraft did not find the enemy formation in the dark, so no inter-
ception was accomplished. Some time later, at 0315 a large enemy force appeared
over Nichols Field.
The first Japanese aircraft to be shot down during the war is ofl5cially credited
to 2nd Lt. Randall D. Keator of the 80th Pursuit Squadron, stationed on Clark
Field. Taking off while the field was under attack, Lt. Keator's plane was at-
tacked by nine Japanese aircraft. Despite this disadvantage he shot down one
of these. Later, during the general combat over Clark Field he shot down an-
other, making his score for the day two.*"
[14155] Air Situation on December 9th
At the close of the first day's campaign under constant enemy attack, the Far
East Air Force was badly mauled. Costly losses in men and equipment had been
sustained. Over a third of the pursuit were lost, while more were out of com-
mission. Of B-17S, the operational aircraft had been reduced from 33 to 15 or 16.
Moreover, the planes lost were irreplaceable. Wake Island was under attack,
which cut the ferry route for B-17s which had been flown in from Hawaii. The
destruction of naval forces at Pearl Harbor ended the chance that convoys might
bring in pursuit directly. Finally the destruction of hangars, depot facilities,
and parts indicated that maintenance constituted a major problem; but the
nearest place with even partial facilities was Australia.
Reo7'ganization
During the night the high command of the Far East Air Force reorganized the
tactical units. Lt. Wagner's squadron, the 17th, was transferred to Clark Field
^« History 2-', Pur. Op. (Doc. 1, App. II). There was a staff meeting of FEAF at the
Headquarters at Neilsoii Field, which was attended by Captain Harold Eads and Captain
Allison Ind, and others. General Brereton also went to GHQ. This is stated by Captain
Eads. Statement of Colonel Eads (Doc. 10, App. II). GHQ, SWPA, records contain no
information on the matter. A letter has been written through channels, Hq. AAF, Wash-
ington, requesting Gen. Brereton for any information but no reply has been received, cf.
Eeg. 30503, FEAF, Registered on 23 April 1944.
^"Journal 19 Bomb Op. (Doc. 11, App. II).
^^ Interview with Colonel Fry (Doc. 8, App. II).
«»G. O. 48, USAFFE, Dec. 21, 1941 (Doc. 18, App. II).
79716 — 46 — pt. 11 13
5330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and brought to strength by transferring airplanes from the 3rd Pursuit. The
rest of the 3rd was absorbed into the 34th at Nichols Field. As already noted,
the third had practically been wiped out at Iba. It no longer functioned as a
separate squadron from this date. At the same time the ground crews were
attempting to repair the pursuit planes'', and the B-17s at Clark Field which
had not burned. The reaction of ground personnel to the bombing had been good
on the whole although some had taken to the hills and did not drift in until night.
Most were working feverishly to salvage planes and parts. Gun crews had
stuck to their posts.
On December 9th the bombardment squadrons at Del Monte were employed as
follows : One plane went on reconnaissance of the Davao Area, and then went
up to Luzon, landing on the airdrome at San Marcelino. The plane was damaged
by fire of our ground forces while landing. At 1430 seven other aircraft took ofC
from Del Monte for San Marcelino, and also were fired on by our ground forces
while landing, but no damage resulted. Six aircraft took off on a reconnais-
sance mission for Catandanes Islands, off Southern Luzon, found no enemy action,
and then flew into Clark Field at 1430 to be prepared for a mission the next day.
Immediately upon landing they took off because of air raid alarm, and landed
after dark. From Clark Field, at 0800, one plane attempted the reconnaissance
mission to Formosa, but turned back because of engine trouble, and then stayed
up until after dark to avoid enemy attack on the field.*^
On the night of December 9/10, reports were received of a large enemy convoy
off Vigan and another off Aparri.*° It was accordingly planned to hit them with
all the available air power on the following day.
[I4I5G] SECBET
HiSTOEY
OP
30th Bombardment Squadbon (H)
19th Bombardment Group (H)
Period Covering
December 7th, 1941 to December 31 st, 1942
[I4157] On the morning of 8 December 1941 (Philippine Time), word of
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was flashed to members of the 30th Bomb
Squadron, then stationed at Clark Field, Manila.
Major David R. Gibbs. the SOth's Commanding Officer, immediately ordered all
crews to report to the flight line, and upon the disposal of preliminary prepara-
tions, the Squadron's B-17s, geared for action, took to the air.
Ground crews likewise were on the alert, for the Japs were expected to attack
Clark Field within the next 20 minutes, according to reports received by the 30th,
and everything was considered in readiness to repel the enemy when he struck.
For more than 3 hours, the 30th's planes circled Mt. Aryat, flying in and out
of cloud banks, soaring over the plains of Luzon, unsuccessfully seeking traces
of the enemy. At approximately noon, Major Gibbs ordered the planes to land,
and as they did, they were dispersed around Clark Field. Some crews were re-
quested to stand by their ships, with the remainder instructed to obtain a hasty
meal and report to Group Headquarters for briefing.
Shortly thereafter — about 12.30 p. m. — came the Japs ! A low, whistling noise,
resembling wind through the trees, grew louder and louder with devastating
crescendo, and a deafening explosion rocked Clark Field, signalizing the beginning
of the attack. Blast after blast shattered the earth and nearly everything upon
it. The initial Jap formation of 54 bombers unloosed tons and tons of high
explosives, following with merciless strafing.
The entire attack lasted about 40 minutes, with casualties heavy, the field torn
and wrecked, and only one or two of the 30th's B-17s remaining for service.
Brilliant, individual deeds of heroism characterized the efforts of oflScers and
enlisted personnel, but they could not stem the Japs in their relentless assault.
w History 2/, Pur. Op. (Doc. 1, App. II),
^Journal 19 Bomb. Op. (Doc. 11, App. II).
•* Colonel Ind'8 Bataan Mas., pp. 260 ff.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5331
Follow-up attacks were naturally expected, and that evening, Major Gibbs
moved the 30th from the ban-acks on Clark Field, establishing headquarters on a
small knoll in a cane field about a mile and one-half away. It was shortly
thereafter that Major Gibbs, on a mission in a B-18, did not return, and the
Squadron lost the first of its several war-time commanding oflQcers.
[14158} CONTIDENTIAL E-21
Headqttabters 3bo Aib Fobcb
OflBce of the Commanding General
Tampa, Florida
Lt. Col. Lucius P. Okdway
A-2 Section Army Air Force, Munitions Buildinff, Washington, D. C.
Dear Colonbx:
Inclosed is a summary of operations in the Southwest Pacific Area as I saw
them. After reading over the interview which is on file there in Washington, it
appeared to be a good idea to clarify and add to the report. The form admittedly
is not so good, but in general includes everything that I could remember that
might be of interest.
Sincerely,
W. P. FISHEB
W. P. Fisher
Major, Air Corps Asst. OS
114159} SECEET
Eepobt of Phiuppinb and Java Opebations
By W. P. Fisher, Major, Air Corps
I was assigned as a flight commander in a provisional squadron of nine combat
and maintenance crews, equipped with 9 B-17D Airplanes, which was formed at
Hickam Field, Hawaii, in August of 1941. This was composed of personnel and
equipment drawn from the two tactical groups stationed there. Training of this
provisional squadron was carried out until the first of September at which time it
was designated as the Fourteenth Heavy Bombardment Squadron and the ground
component of the Fourteenth added to the combat echelon. The air echelon left
Hickam Field on September 5th with orders transferring it to Clark Field in
the Philippine Islands. The first stop was made at Midway Island. The flight
remained overnight continuing on to Wake Island the following day. The depar-
ture from Wake Island to Port Moresby, New Guinea, was made about midnight
the following night under conditions of radio silence, arriving at the destination
the following afternoon. After a one-day lay over for maintenance, the squadron
continued on to Darwin, Australia. Another day's lay over was made there for
maintenance and awaiting weather information before the final hop to Clark
Field in the Philippines. This was the first squadron of B-17's to arrive in the
Philippines. Following arrival at Clark Field, we immediately began intensive
unit tactical training in high altitude formation flying, navigation, bombing, and
gunnery. Missions at this time were scheduled from 20,000 to 30,000 feet.
About a month after our arrival, the 19th Group stationed at Albuquerque, New
Mexico, was transferred to the Philippine Department and, following the same
route, arrived about the middle of October with two combat and one Head-
quarters Squadron and equipped with 25 B-17D Airplanes. Following arrival
of the air and ground echelons of the 19th Group, all Philippine Bombardment
units were consolidated into the 19th Group. The organization then consisted
of the 30th, 93rd, 14th, and 28th combat squadrons and a Headquarters Squadron.
All airplanes and equipment were evenly divided among them, giving 8 B-17's
to each combat squadron and 3 in the Headquarters Squadron. At this time, I
was relieved from assignment to the 14th Squadron and given command of the
28th Squadron which had been stationed at Clark Field prior to our arrival.
5332 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
By the first of December the international situation was quite grave and recon-
naissance patrols were being run by both ourselves and the Japanese between
Formosa and Lu/.on. Visual contact by the aircraft had been made several
times. At about this time, the air echelon of the 93rd and 14th squadrons, consist-
ing of the combat crews, some maintenance men, and all airplanes were sent to
Del Monte on the Island of Mindanao, our alternate Heavy Bombardment Base;
the 28th, 30th and Headquarters squadrons remaining at Clark field. This was
the situation that existed on December 7, when the attack on Pearl Harbor
occurred. The training of the entire group was at a high state ; all personnel was
experienced and our equipment in good condition.
The attack on Pearl Harbor occured about 3 : 00 o'clock the morning of the 8th,
Philippine time. The report of the attack was received first, of course,
[14160] by radio news broadcast and all personnel were aware of it by dawn
or shortly thereafter. All airplanes at Clark Feld had been dispersed and in
revetments for some time prior to this and the entire group was prepared to
perform missions at any time. While awaiting orders, the first air warning was
received around 8 : 00 o'clock that a formation of enemy bombers was proceeding
in the direction of Clark Field. Immediately all flyable airplanes were taken
off and flown away from the vicinity of the field to avoid their destruction.
Sevei'al warnings were received during the morning of enemy formations but no
attacks were made on Clark Field. At about 11 : 00 o'clock, we were all called
back in as no further enemy aircraft were reported. After landing, orders were
received to attack Air Bases on Southern Formasa at dusk. Preparations for this
mission were being made when at about 12 : 30 a formation of 54 Heavy Japanese
Bombers was seen approaching the field. No warning had been received from our
radio locator stations of any enemy aircraft in the vicinity, so our entire strength
of aircraft was caught on the ground in their dispersed positions with the excep-
tion of one B-17 on patrol. It was later found that all communications to Clark
Field had been cut by saboteurs and radio communications jammed by radio inter-
ference. The formation had been detected by the radio locators, but they were
unable to get warning to Clark Field.
Numerous zigzag trenches approximately 2' wide and 5' deep had been con-
structed by Colonel Maitland, the base Commander, in previous months in the
vicinity of the hangars and working area. Also additional trenches had been
constructed near the dispersed positions of the airplanes. Upon sighting the
approaching formation, warning was given and most of the personnel were able to
take cover in these trenches. There was approximately 5 minutes between the
time the formation was first seen and the attack on Clark Field. The attack
was made diagonally across the quarters and hangar area by two formations of
27 Heavy Bombers. Each 27 plane formation Avas in the form of a giant Vee.
The bombs used in the attack varied from 100 # bombs down to smaller frag-
mentation bombs and were dropped in train covering the field from the quarters
area through the hangar and shop area. I estimate that approximately 300 bombs
were dropped in this attack. Following the bombing attack, a formation of 18
fighters came in, individually attacking the dispersed B-17's and other aircraft
with machine guns and cannon fire. This attack lasted approximately 40 min-
utes. Very few airplanes had been destroyed by the bombing attack which
was conducted from approximately 23,000' but all air planes were completely
destroyed or filled with bullet holes by the fighter attack. During this attack
approximately six P-40's of the squadron stationed at Clark Field were able to
get off and engage the attacking fighters. The 200th Coast Artillery (an anti-air-
craft regiment) was in position to defend Clark Field and also took the fighters
under fire with 30 cal., 50 cal., and 37 mm. gun fire. The damage to Clark Field
from this attack was great as the hangars, shore, supply buildings, and other
installations were struck by bombs and numerous fires started. Personnel casual-
ties were approximately 100 men and officers killed and 200 wounded. Nearly all
of the casualties were persons who were taken by surprise and were unable to
take cover in the trenches which had been provided. The Japanese intelligence
apparently had been complete as they had attacked only the tactical airplanes and
installations.
Operations were begun immediately and missions carried oiit against enemy
surface vessels and convoys by the two squadrons stationed at Del Monte. Japa-
nese landings were made at Aparri, Legaspi and Vigan and were successful.
These landings were made from a small number of transports accompanied by
surface vesels and under the protection of gun fire from the vessels. . . .
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5333
[I4I6I] Headquarters, Far East Air Forces (P)
Historical Record
Chron No. 40-11-1 to A-1132 Hist. No. 42-4-27
Subject Class: History
Title of Document : 24tli Pursuit Group in P. I.
Date of Document : 10 October 1942. File 5AF A-1. "Rosters V Bomber Com-
mand P. I. — Java File
Type of Document : PAGES IMP. P PUB. S
From: TO
Typed by T. Leach Checked by
Synopsis : True Copy.
Headquartebs, Fifth Atk Force,
Brisbane, Q. October 10, l9Ji2.
Subject : Activity of the 24th Pursuit Group in the Philippines.
On or about November 1, 1940, the 4th Composite Group in the Philippine
Islands was reinforced by the 17th Pursuit Squadron of the 1st Pursuit Group,
commanded by K. J. Gregg. Major, Air Corps, and the 20th Pursuit Squadron
of the 35th Pursuit Group, commanded by OL Grover, Captain, Air Corps. At
this time, the 4th Composite Group commanded by L. S. Churchill, Colonel, Air
Corps, was based at Nichols Field. It consisted of the 28th Bombardment Squad-
ron detached at Clark Field, the 2nd Observation Squadron detached at Clark
Field, and the following Squadrons at Nicbols Field: Headquarters and Head-
quarters Squadron, 3rd Pursuit Squadron, 17th Pursuit Squadron and 20th Pur-
suit Squadron, all equipped with obsolete P-26 type aircraft. During the month
of May, 1941, Colonel Churchill assumed command of Nichols Field, and K. J.
Gregg, Major, Air Corps, assumed command of the 4th Composite Group. The
28th Bombardment Squadron and the 2nd Observation Squadron were assigned
to Clark Field.
In May, 1941, the Group was re-equipped with P-35 type aircraft destined for
Sweden, but diverted to the Philippine Islands. During July, 1941. due to the
conditions at Nichols Field, i. e. east-west runway undergoing construction, and
north-south runway being unusable due to lack of drainage, the 4th Composite
Group (less 17th Pursuit Squadron) was transferred to Clark Field. The 17th
Pursuit Squadron was transferred to Iba to undergo gunnery training at that
station. During the montli of July, 1941, one Squadron was re-equipped with
P-40B type aircraft, the other squadrons still being equipped with P-35s. At
the same time, one hundred new pilots arrived from the training school in the
States, and were assigned to the Group. It became necessary to train these
pilots. A training unit was instigated at Clark Pield and pursuit training was
given. On or about August 1, Major Gregg was transferred to the F. E. A. F.,
and O. L. Grover, Major, Air Corps, assumed command of the Group. During
September the 17th Pursuit Squadron was transferred to Nichols Field and the
3rd Pursuit Squadron was transferred to Iba for gunnery training. This move-
ment was necessary iu order to make room for contemplated bombardment re-
inforcements at ciark Field. Nichols Field's construction was not complete
and was not satisfactory for operations. These conditions occasioned a high
accident rate for the 17th Squadron.
On October 1. 1941, the 4th Composite Group, less 3rd, 17th and 20th Squadrons
was transferred to Clark Field and the 24th Pursuit Group was activated at Clark
Field. The 24th Pursuit Group consisted of Headquarters and Headquarters
Squadron, 3rd Pursuit Squardon. 17th Pursuit Squadron and 20th Pursuit Squad-
ron. During the month of October. 3-5 new pilots just graduated from the train-
ing schools in the States arrived and were assigned, bringing the Group to full
T/O officers' strength. It was necessary to train these pilots for duty in combat
units.
During the month of November. 1941. the 21st Pursuit Squadron and the 34th
Pursuit Squadron arrived from the United States. They were part of the 35th
Pursuit Group. They were attached to the 24th Pursuit Group for diity and
administration pending the arrival of the remainder of their Group. On Decem-
ber 1. 1941, the Pursuit units were as follows :
a. Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 24th Pursuit Group, Clark Field,
commanded by Lieutenant W. D. Putnam.
Ulil62] b. 3rd Pursuit Squadron, Iba, commanded by Lieutenant H. G.
Thorne, equipped with P-40Es.
c. 17th Pursuit Squadron at Nichols 'Field, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Boyd
D. Wagner, equipped with P-40Es.
5334 CONGRESSIONAL. INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
d. 20tli Pursuit Squadron at Clark Field, commanded by 1st Lieutenant J. H.
Moore, equipped with P-40Bs.
e. 2ist Pursuit Squadron at Del Carmen, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Sam
Marrett, equipped with P-35s.
f. 34th Pursuit Squadron at Nichols Field, commanded by 1st LieutenantW. E.
Dyess, partially equipped with P-40Es.
Airdromes available to pursuit were: Nichols Field, Nielson Field, Clark Field,
Iba, Resales, Del Carmen ; under construction O'Donnel, San Fernando, Ternate.
Other commercial fields in the Islands were unsuitable for fully loaded pursuit
aircraft.
Communications for aircraft warning: The aircraft warning system consisted
of native air watches, who relayed their reports over the telephone to the 5th
Interceptor Headquarters at Neilson. The reports were then relayed via tele-
type to the plotting board at Clark Field. One R. D. F. set was installed at Iba,
one set in process of installation 60 miles west of Aparri and the third set was
en route to Legaspi for installation. Delay in time for the relaying of messages
due to telephone communications was from five to twenty-five minutes.
From November 15, due to the tense international situation, all pursuit air-
craft were fully loaded, armed and on constant alert 24 hours each day with
pilots available on 30 minutes notice. On December 6, General Brereton held
a conference and stated that war was imminent. At this time all units were
placed completely on the alert with all combat crews, enlisted men and officers
constantly ready for duty.
On the night of December 7, the status report had shown :
The 3rd Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-40Es in commission;
The 17th Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-40Es in commission;
The 20th Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-40Es in commission ;
The 21st Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-35s in commission;
The 34th Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-40Es in commission,
giving the Group a total of 54 P-40Es, 18 P-40Bs and 18 P-35s in commission.
The 34th Squadron received their last P-40E from the Depot on the evening
of December 7. This squadron was unable to slow time all of the engines, bore-
sights or check guns.
During the period November 30 to December 6 all squadrons were undergoing
intensive training in interception and gunnery. The squadrons were doing train-
ing in conjunction with bombardment in day and night interception in coordina-
tion with the anti-aircraft.
Throughout the gunnery camp at Iba an extreme amount of difficulty was
experienced in malfunctioning of the guns due to improper adjustment and nial-
installation. In order to properly function it was imperative that all gun installa-
tions should be modified.
During the period December 2 to December 6, for four consecutive nights an
enemy aircraft was sighted over Clark Field at approximately 5: 30 a. m. After
the first sighting, instructions were given to force the aircraft to land or destroy it.
On the three succeeding nights it was impossible to make the interception, due
to inability to see the aircraft in the dark or the aircraft not getting close enough
to be picked up by the searchlights. On the fifth morning all aircraft were kept
on the ground and the anti-aircraft alerted for the interception ; however, no
aircraft were located. During the same period enemy aircraft were tracked over
Iba by the radar set.
[V^t6!i^ On December 8th approximately 3:30 a. m. the commercial radio
station at Clark Field intercepted a message from Pearl Harbor, reference the at-
tack there. Unable to verify this interception no official action was taken other
than notifying the Base Commander. However, all units were ordered to constant
stations.
At approximately 4 a. m. the radar at Iba reported a formation of unidentified
aircraft approximately 75 miles off the cost heading towards Corregidor. The
3rd Pursuit Squadron was dispatched for the interception. No interception was
accomplished. However, the tracks on the plotting table showed that the inter-
ception was successful and the formation of unidentified aircraft swung off to
the west going out of range of the radar. This interception was hampered by
darkness and a lack of altitude data from the radar, i. e. it is thought that the
pursuit went underneath the formation of unidentified aircraft. At approximately
4:45 official confirmation that a state of war existed was received. The 3rd
Pursuit squadron returned to Iba, landed, regassed and went to Stations.
At approximately 9:30, a large force of bombers over Lingayen was reported
heading towards Manila. The 20th Pursuit Squadron was immediately dis-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5335
patched for the interception over Rosales. The 17th Pursuit Squadron was
immediately dispatched from Nichols Field to cover Clark Field. The inter-
ception was not successful. The bombers proceeded on a course until approxi-
mately 30 miles north of Kosales then made a turn to the northeast and proceeded
to Baguio, bombed Baguio and Tagagarau and departed for the north. At the
time the 20th took off all bombardment were dispatched from Clark Field. The
20th returned to Clark Field and gave the bombardment cover while they were
landing. Botli the 20th and the 17th then landed, regassed and went on the
alert.
At approximately 11 : 30 a large formation of bombers was reported over the
China Sea headed for Manila. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron was dispatched for
the interception. Uncertainties of time and place factors, due to the delay in
communications, making it doubtful whether the 3rd would accomplish the inter-
ception, the 17th was dispatched to cover Bataan, and the 34th was placed on
standing patrol over Manila. At approximately 11 : 45 an unidentified report
was received of a bombardment formation over Lingayen Gulf, headed south.
The 20th not having completed gassing was not able to take off to investigate.
At approximately 11 : 45 the 21st Pursuit Squadron was dispatched to cover Clark
Field. At 12 : 15 the 20th completed gassing and was ordered to cover Clark
Field. At 12 : 20 54 bombers and an undetermined number of dive bombers
attacked Clark Field. The 20th Pursuit Squadron was in the process of taking
ofe when the attack came. Four of their aircraft had cleared the ground.
Another five were destroyed in the process of taking off by the bombardment!
The remaining five were destroyed by straffing after the bombardment attack.
The unidentified plot mentioned above proved to be the bombardment formation
approaching Clark Field. Communications break down prevented proper iden-
tification. At the time of the attack on Clark Field four squadrons of pursuit
were in the air and the fifth in the process of taking off. Due to a direct hit on
the center of communications at Clark Field, ground-to-air control was destroyed
and thus no control could be maintained of the fighters in the air.
The 3rd Pursuit Squadron, which had been dispatched for the interception over
the China Sea, failed to make the interception and was notified of another raid
approaching Iba, by the ground station at Iba. The radar set at Iba was plotting
the approaching raid and relaying to the central plotting room at Neilson airport.
However, due to a breakdown in communications these plots were never received
at Neilson. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron returned to Iba and as they were circling
the field 54 enemy bombers and an unknown number of dive bombers accom-
panying them approached the field. These were immediately attacked by the
3rd Pursuit Squadron. In the ensuing engagement one bomber and a number of
strafers were claimed to have been destroyed. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron lost
in the air five P-40s and although not preventing the bombardment of Iba did
prevent the straffing. After the withdrawal of the enemy, three additional air-
craft (P-40S) were forced to crash land on the beaches due to their gas supply
being exhausted. The remainder of the squadron proceeded to O'Donnel airport
and landed; they remained there until ammunition and gas were dispatched
from Clark Field to reload and regas this squadron. The installations and air-
craft on the ground at Iba were completely destroyed by enemy bombardment
There were approximately eight airplanes on the ground at the time of the attack
which were out of condition due to maintenance, engine change etc
The 17th Pursuit Squadron over Bataan proceeded towards Clark Field but
upon arrival there the enemy had withdrawn. The 17th, unable to contact the
ground station, proceeded to Del Carmen and landed. The 21st Squadron was
greatly delayed in taking off due to the excessive amount of dust on the field
and made no interception. The 34th Squadron patroUed Manila area and landed
at Nichols Field at the completion of the mission.
[U164] Chron No. 10-41-6-44 D-1052
- '.^ Headquarters, Fifth Air Force
« K-s^ 4- r^^ r^ • ^- Historical Record
Subject Class : Communications.
Title of Document: Record of an interview with Major Heald, Communications
OfBcer, Fifth Air Service Command.
Date of Document : 15 May, 1944.
File No. : Interview.
Type of Document : Statement. Pages , Imp. Pub S
From To
Extract : Typed by C. Lutton. Checked by 1_I IIIIIIIl"
5336 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Recobd of an Interview With Major Heald, Communications Officek, Fifth
AiB FoECE Seevice Command
15 May, 1944.
*******
When the Fifth Air Base Group came to the Philippines about 15 November
1941, it was transferred from Manila to Mindinao where it established an air-
drome at Del Monte. Lieut. Heald with nine men from the 19th Bombardment
Group Hdq. Sq., and a large mobile radio truck, proceeded to Del Monte with the
Fifth Air Base Group arriving at that base 1st December 1941. Base communi-
cations were set up and radio communications established from Del Monte back
to Clark Field and Nielson Field during the week from 1 December to 8 December
1941.
At the time of the attack upon the Philippines, Lieut. Heald received the first
message radioed to Del Monte from General Headquarters, which he immediately
related to Captain Gee (now Lieut Col) then adjutant of the Fifth Air Base
Group. This was signed "MacArthur" and was received at approximately 0630
and it read : "Hostilities have begun. All Airdromes alert". Five minutes later
another message arrived from Lieutenant Colonel Eubank with about the same
wording.
* ******
During the 1 after part of December 1941 and all of January 1942, Lt. Brownwell
made daily reconnaissance flights in a P-40 over Davao harbor which fell to the
Japanese the first week of the war.
This information (visual only as he had no photographic equipment) was sent
by radio to General MacArthur — Great quantities of supplies and ships of all
sorts were visible on the bay and in the harbor. At the time of the naval battle
in Macassar Sts., 1 February to 6 February 1942, approximately fifty ships were
in Davao Harbor — i. e. destroyers, ci'uisers, aircraft carriers, and cargo vessels.
Several attempts were made by the enemy to follow Lt. Brownwell and locate
the strip from which he operated, but he always managed to elude them and land
on a strip that could not be found.
There were no radio communications between strips on Mindanao. The only
means of communication was over the Philippine Commonwealth telephone lines
which were very unsatisfactory.
mreS] 15 Januaby 1946.
Memorandum for Lt. Colonel Duncombe.
Subject : Organization of the Far East Air Force
1. Inclosed herewith is the material you requested concerning the organization
of the air force in the Philippines at the outbreak of the war.
2. Inclosure No. 1 is a copy of a 4 August 1941 order stating that the Air Force,
United States Army Forces in the Far East "will operate directly under" the
Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East. Inclosure
No. 2 is a 14 November 1941 order merely changing the name of the Air Force,
United States Army Forces in the Far East to "Far East Air Force."
3. Inclosure No. 3 is a chart showing the relationship of the principal air and
ground commanders in the Philippines to General MacArthur. Inclosure No. 4
is a chart giving in more detail the organization and location of the various air
units in the Philippines. Inclosure No. 5 is a list of air force commanders in the
Philippines at the outbreak of the war. The inclosures referred to in this para-
graph have been recently prepared on the basis of records on file in the AAF
Historical Office, Headquarters Army Air Forces and records in the possession of
the Adjutant General.
/s/ Joseph B. Mitchell,
Lt. Colonel OSC.
mi66] 5 Incls
1. Cy of order dtd 4 Aug 41
2. Cy of order dtd 14 Nov 41
3. Chart air & gd comdrs in the Phil
4. Chart Orgn of FEAF
5. T,ist of Air Force rmdrs.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5337
Ohron. No."41-8-^ D-1034 Headquarters, Fifth Air Force
Historical Record
Subject Class : Organization — Units
Title of Document : Redesignation of Air Force
Date of Document : 4 August 1941 File No. USAFFE 300.4
Type of Document : General Order
(Typed by O. Lutton)
True Copy.
Headquarters,
Unitejd States Army Forces in the Far Bast,
Manila, P. L, 4 August IdJfl.
General Orders. No. 4.
The Philippine Department Air Force as now constituted, Brigadier General
Henry B. Clagett (0-2152), United States Army, Commanding, and such other
units and installations as may be assigned to it, are hereby constituted as the
Air [H161'\ Force, United States Army Forces in the Far East. It will
operate directly under the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in
the Far East, except for routine administration and supply, which will continue
through Headquarters Philippine Department.
By Command of Lieutenant General MacARTHUR :
R. K. Sutheirland,
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry,
Acting Chief of Staff.
Official :
/s/ Carl H. Seals
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Acting Adjutant General.
True Copy
/e/ Manning J. Dauer
C apt. Air Corps.
Chron No. 41-11-14 D-1051
Headquarters Fifth Air Force
Historical Record
Subject Class — Organizations — Units
Title of Document — General Order
Date of Document— 14 November, 1941 File No. USAFFE— G. O.
(Typed by C. Lutton) Extract
Copy Heiadquarters,
United States Army Forces in the Far East,
[UIGS^ Manila, P. I., IJ, Novemher, 1941.
General Orders No. 28
1. Pursuant to authority contained in letter, War Department, October 28,
1941, File AG 320.2 (10-20-41) MR-M-AAF, to this headquarters, effective No-
vember 16, 1941, the following changes in Air Force Units of the command are
announced :
a. The Air Force, United States Army Forces in the Far East is effective this
date, redesignated as "Far East Air Force".
b. Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron. United States Army Forces in
the Far East, effective this date, is redesignated as Headquarters and Head-
(luarters Squadron, Far East Air Force.
By command of Lieutenant General MacARTHUR
E. K. Sutherland
Brigadier General, GSC.
Chief of Staff
Official :
Carl H. Seals,
Colonel, A. G. D.
5338 CONGKESSIONAL INVESTIGATION FEAKL HARBOR ATTACK
(H
<1
M
n
w
xn
o
fa
Q
Q
O
1?
M
<l
«
1-3
M^ 1
<;
1^
E£!
15
g
S
H
^
fU H 1
Ph
I-:)
<1
a
a.
O
1
<1
1
IS
«i5
Q
^
^ H
w U
s«
X
<
TJl
HH
K*
^:
B >
00 Q
H
>H
« O
H «
CB O
Hfa
CSJ
00 >.
OS p
OD ^
Q
.3>
Is
o
N
1
P H
1
hJ O
«
Wo
ei fa
p
o
JC
.T-( M
-00 M
»
o
N
P fa
iJ O
^ «
Wo
H fa
«
o
2;
OS >■
iH t-i
oo >
-rH (I
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
FAR EAST
AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR
Fab East
Ala FoRcu
(Nldson Field)
5th iDterceptor
Command
(Nlelsoo Field)
5th Bomber
Command
(NlelBon Field)
Far East Air
Service Command
(NIelson Field)
24th Pursuit
Group
(Clark Field)
19th Bombardment
Group (M)
(Clark Field)
27th Bombardment
Group (L)
(Nielsen Field)
Phil. Air
Depot
(?«ielson
Field)
III
5th Air Base
Group
(Del Monte
Field)
m
20th Air Base
Group
(Nichols
Field)
in
36th Air Base
Group
(NIelson
Field)
Sd Pursuit
Squadron
(Iba Field)
n
17th Pursuit
Squadron
(Nichols
Field)
20th Pursuit
Squadron
(Ourk Field)
u
21 St Pursuit
Squadron
(Del Carmen
Field)
II
34th Pursuit
Squadron
(Nichols
Field)
14th Bomb
Squadron
(Del Monte
Field)
28th Bomb
Squadron
(Clark Field)
30th Bomb
Squadron
(Clark Field)
II
93d BomI)
Squadron
(Del Monte
Field)
16th Bomb
Squadron
• (No planes)
17th Bomb
Squadron
• (No planes)
9lBt Bomb
Squadron
•(No planes)
n
2d Obsn.
Squadron
(Nichols
Field)
'Planes en route, did not arrive. Diverted to Aoatralia.
79716 — 46 — pt. 11 (Faces p. 5338)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5339
[I417I] Commanders of Aib Force Units in the Philippines at the Out-
BBEAK OF THE WAB
1. Far East Air Force (Nielson Field) — Maj. Gen. L. H. Brereton
2. 5th Interceptor Command (Nielson Field) — Brig. Gen. H. B. Clagett
3. 24th Pursuit Group (Clark Field)— Maj. O. L. Grover
3rd Pursuit Squadron (Iba Field) 1st Lt. H. G. Thorne
17th Pursuit Squadron (Nichols Field) — 1st Lt. B. D. Wagner
20th Pursuit Squadron (Clark Field)— 1st Lt. J. H. Moore
21st Pursuit Squadron (Del Carmen Field)— 1st Lt. W. B. Dyess
34th Pursuit Squadron (Nichols Field)— 1st Lt. S. H. Marett
4. 5th Bomber Command ( Nielson Field ) — Lt. Col. E. L. Eubank
5. 19th Bombardment Group (H) (Clark Field)— Lt. Col. Eubank
14th Bombardment Squadron (Del Monte Field — Maj. Emmett O'Don-
nell, Jr.
28th Bombardment Squadron (Clark Field) — Maj. W. P. Fisher
30th Bombardment Squadron (Clark Field)— Maj. D. R. Gibbs
93rd Bombardment Squadron (Del Monte Field) — Maj. C. E. Combs
6. 27'th Bombardment Group (L) (Nielson Field) — Maj. J. H. Davies
16th Bombardment Squadron — Capt. W. G. Hipps
mi72} 17th Bombardment Squadron— 1st Lt. H. F. Lowery
91st Bombardment Squadron — 1st Lt. W. E. Eubank
7. 2nd Observation Squadron (Nichols Field) — Capt. J. Y. Parker
8. Far East Air Service Command (Nielson Field) — Col. L. S. Churchill
9. Philippine Air Depot (Nielson Field) — Lt. Col. W. N. Amis
10. 5th Air Base Group (Del Monte Field) Maj. R. T. Elsmore
11. 20th Air Base Group (Nichols Field)— Maj. W. H. Maverick
12. 36th Air Base Group (Nielson Field)
(It is believed that this was only a small detachment. The bulk of the
group and its equipment went to Australia and never reached the Philip-
pines. The detachment commander is believed to have been Capt. Waller.)
13. Clark Field— Maj. M. J. Daly
14. Del Carmen Field— 1st Lt. S. H. Marett
(Lt Marett is also listed above as the Commanding Officer of the 34th
Pursuit Squadron of the 24th Pursuit Group.)
15. Del Monte Field — Maj R. T. Elsmore
(Maj. Elsmore is also listed above as the Commanding Oflacer of the 5th
Air Base Group)
16. Iba Field— 1st Lt. H. G. Thorne
(Lt. Thorne is also listed above as the Commanding [14173] Officer
of the 3rd Pursuit Squadron of the 24th Pursuit Group)
17. Nichols Field— Maj. W. H. Maverick
(Maj. Maverick is also listed above as the Commanding Officer of the
20th Air Force Group)
18. Nielson Field
(This field was not an operational field. It will be noted that only head-
quarters units, or units which did not have their planes or equipment are
listed as being stationed at this field.
[14-^74] Mr. Morgan. "We have a series of communications from
the Federal Communications Commission, dated February 11, 14, and
18, 1946, concerning the matter of monitoring by the Federal Com-
munications Commission at Hawaii for a "winds execute" message.
Inasmuch as this question came up during the interrogation with re-
spect to this matter, we would like to have these communications, which
are from Mr. G. E. Sterling, Assistant Chief Engineer, together with
enclosures, spread on the record at this point.
The Vice Chairman. They will be spread on the record at this
point.
5340 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(The communications referred to follow :)
[1/(175] Federal Communications Commission,
Wa.shmgton 25, D. C, February 11, 1946.
Mr. Seth Richardson,
General Counsel, Pearl Harhor Investigatino Committee,
Washington, D. C.
(Attention: Mr. Morgan.)
Dear Sir : Replies have been received from all officers who were in charge of
the Commission's activities in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, in which they all
state that they were not requested by any representatives of the military au-
thorities in Hawaii to monitor for the "winds" execute message prior to December
7, 1941.
Copies of their statements are attached to this communication.
Sincere] .V yours,
(sgd) G. E. Sterling
G. E. Sterling
Assistant Chief Engineer.
Attachments
February 7, 1946.
From : Supervisor H. A. M. A.
[141761 To : Chief, R. I. D.
Subject: "Winds Messages"
My memorandum dated February 4, 1946, contained a blanket denial that any
request to monitor for the so-called "Winds Messages" was received from the
Army or the Navy prior to December 7, 1941.
This is a repetition of that denial with the added statement that Col. Bicknell
did not contact me (or any member of my staff) between November 28 and
December 7, 1941, to request that we monitor for the "winds Messages" by making
intercepts of .Japanese radio transmissions.
/s/ Lee R. Dawson
Radio Inteixigence Division,
609 Stangenwald Bldg., Honolulu, T. H., February 4, 1946.
From : Supervisor, H. A. M. A.
To : Chief, R. I. D.
Subject: "Winds Messages"
I, Lee R. Dawson, Supervisor, Radio Intelligence Division, Federal Communica-
tions Commission, Hawaiian Monitoring Area, do hereby affirm and state that
the following statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief:
(1) That I was actively in charge of the National [14177} Defense
Operations Section of the Federal Communications Commission in the Hawaiian
Islands from November 1, 1940, to December 7, 1941.
(2) That no request was received by me or by any member of my staff from
the Army or the Navy prior to December seventh, 1941, to monitor for the so-
called "Winds Messages."
/s/ Lee R. Dawson.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of February, A. D. 1946.
[sea-l] /s/ Elbert D. Kwashigi,
'Notary Public, Third Judicial Circuit, Territory of Hawaii.
My commission expires June 80, 1949.
Feb. 5, 1946.
From : Earl A. Nielsen, Kealakekua, T. H.
To : Chief, R. I. D.
Subject : "Winds" Messages.
I, Earl A. Neilsen, affirm and state that to the best of my knowledge and
belief no request to monitor for "Winds" messages was received by me from
the Army or the Navy prior to December 7th, 1941. I was employed as Assistant
Monitoring Officer at HA-2, Hawaii National Park from July 1st, 1941 thru
December 7th, 1941.
Earl A. Nielsen.
PKOCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMI'lTEE 5341
Februaky 5, 1946.
Mr. George E. Sterling,
Federal Communications Commission, [lJfl78] Washington, D. G.
Dear Mr. Sterling :1am writing to confirm our telephonic conversation of
last night regarding matters pertinent to the Pearl Harbor Investigation. As
you know, I w^as Inspector in Charge of the Engineering Department's Field
Division ofiice in Honolulu from November 1940 to December 1945. At no time
prior to December 7, 1941, was I contacted by G-2 of the Army, or by any other
government office, with a request that my department make recordings or
monitoring runs of radio broadcasts for the purpose of intercepting the so-called
"winds" message from Japan.
As I now recall, I was told by one Frank Santos, who operated a pleasure
fishing boat out of Honolulu, that he had aboard a fishing party on the morning
of Dec. 7, 1941. Amongst the fishermen were some Army oflBcers who became
exasperated when their craft was strafed by the Japs because they thought
the planes were our own and they were making their practice runs a bit too
realistic. I was personally monitoring the 2638 ke band that morning and
heard Santos ask the the Coast Guard station NMO for permission to enter the
harbor. It was apparent from the conversation from NMO that personnel
at the station did not realize that we were being attacked at the time.
Tours truly,
Ii^i75] (sgd) John H. Homsy.
P. S. I trust that you can read this letter which is written at my bedside.
73
JHH
Fedekal Communications Commission,
Radio Intelligence Division,
Honolulu 1, T. H., February 7, 19^6.
Secret Via Clipper Airmail
From : Assistant Supervisor, HA-P, Honcilulu, T. H.
To : Chief, Radio Intelligence Division
Subject: February radiogram 072007 BUSY SHIP
In your message of February 7, 1946 it was requested that a written state-
ment be prepared by Mr. Dawson, Mr. Wagner and Mr. Klima concerning a
"so called" request to the Honolulu office of the FCC for intercepts of Japanese
transmissions containing "winds messages" between November 28, 1941 and
December 7, 1941. •
I make the following statement: I, Tom B. Wagner, Assistant Supervisor,
HA-P, can not recall any request made by Col. Bicknell, G-2, Honolulu, Hawaii,
or other military personnel between November 28, 1941 and December 7, 1941
to the FCC for Japanese intercepts [l/flSO] containing "Winds Messages".
No written record can be found in the HA-P files for such a request.
Such a request as this would require a clearance from the FCC office in Wash-
ington, D. C, before such information could be furnished Col. Bicknell. No record
of such a request can be found.
Tom B. Wagner.
Federal Communications Commission,
Engineering Department,
Radio Intelligence Division,
February 6, 1946.
To : Chief Radio Intelligence Division
From : Monitoring Officer in Chg. Unit HA-3, Koloa Kauia TH
Subject: Army/Navy monitoring requests re: Japanese winds message prior
Dec 7 1941.
Ref : Relative information requested Chief's Radiogram.
This unit was placed in service March nineteenth 1941. The unit was located,
temporary set up, at Lihue Kauai. Relocation of the unit to the National Guard
Armory Hanapepe Kauai was completed April first 1941.
The only office of military representation on the island of Kauai knovsm by
this unit was that of the U S Army.
5342 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[14^81} The commanding officer was contacted in person by myself, and
information given as to our location, our aim and purpose in monitoring, and
service rendered.
As officer in charge of this unit between the dates of March nineteenth 1941
and that of December eighth, 1941, and cognizant of all requests made for service
at this unit by either the U. S. Army or Navy during this period, can state, that
to the best of my knowledge neither the U. S. Army or Navy made a request for
the monitoring of Japanese broadcasts for the interception of "winds message".
This unit's official case record file substantiates the above statement.
/s/ Theodore H. Tate
Theodore H. Tate
Monitoring Officer.
Wae Department
Foreign Broadcast Inteuuqence Service
Field Division
February 5, 1946.
From : Waldemar M. E:iima, P. O. Box FF, Kekaha, Kauai, T. H.
To : Mr. George E. Sterling, Chief, RID, Washington 25, DC
Subject : Your request re the Winds message.
This afternoon I received the following message by telephone from the HA-3,
RID, unit near Koloa, Kauai, T. H.
[14182] "Chief wants airmail statements from you and Klima regarding
whether Army and Navy requested you to monitor for winds message from
Tokyo prior to December 7th"
The message was apparently a paraphrase by King (Wagner of HA-P) of
Busy's message received from Washington.
My statement follows : I am sufficiently certain to state that I personally did
not receive a written, telephoned, or verbal request from any representative or
any of the military agencies (Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, or Marines)
on Oahu to monitor for a "Winds message" or any other specific or general mon-
itoring request in the period of a week prior to December 7, 1941. Neither am I
aware of any such request having been received by any one of the other HA-P
or HA-1 staff members. No announcement of such a monitoring request was
made verbally or in written posted form by the officers in charge of monitoring
activities in the Punchbowl in Honolulu, T. H.
(signed) Waldemar M. EHima
Waldemar M. Klima
# Fedebal Commttnications Commission
Washington 25, D. C, February 14, 1946.
Mr. Seth Richardson,
[I4I8S] General Counsel, Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee, Wash-
ington, D. C.
Attention : Mr. Morgan
Dew^r Snt: I have previously furnished you with statements received from
responsible representatives of the Federal Communications Commission, who
were on duty in Hawaii prior to December 1941, in which they stated that they
had not been contacted by Colonel Bicknell for the purpose of engaging in moni-
toring Japanese broadcast transmissions for the purpose of intercepting the
"WINDS" message.
I now enclose an affidavit made by an employee of the Federal Communications
Commission, Mr. A. Prose Walker, in which he states that Colonel Bicknell on
two occasions approached him for the purpose of ascertaining if he had any
knowledge of Japanese radio stations under surveillance by the FCC, one of the
inquiries being directed specifically to the "WINDS" message.
It is very difficult for me to understand why Colonel Bicknell should make
affidavit to the effect that he did contact FCC representatives for the purpose
of intercepting the "WINDS" message when our own employees in responsible
positions indicate they have no knowledge of such a contact.
It is also difficult for me to understand why Colonel [I4I84'] Bicknell
endeavored to ascertain information from Mr. Walker on the same subject on
two occasions.
I am also enclosing the original sworn statement made by Mr. Lee R. Dawson,
a copy of which was furnished you with the other papers. Mr. Dawson was.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5343
prior to December 7, 1941, and continues in charge of our Monitoring Activities
in Hawaii.
Very truly yours,
G. E. Sterling
/s/ G. E. Sterling
Assistant Chief Engineer-.
Enclosures.
Office Memoeandum United States Government
Februakt 13, 1946.
To : Mr. Sterling
From : Mr. Walker
I recall that on two occasions I was approached by Army personnel relative
to any interceptions which the FCC had made of Japanese transmissions prior
to or on December 7, 1941. Before the departure of Colonel G. W. Bicknell,
Assistant A. C. of S., G2 C. I. D., from the Hawaiian Department, I have a vague
recollection that he asked me if I had any knowledge of the Japanese radio
stations under surveillance at FCC monitoring stations in Hawaii. My reply
was that I had no knowledge of the matter inasmuch as I was [14185] not
present in Hawaii at that time, having arrived on March 2, 1942. I probably
referred him to Mr. Dawson. I do not recall that any mention was made of
the "WINDS" message.
I entered on duty as Chief, Technical Operations Section, RID, on July 7,
1944. Sometime during either July or August of that year, I had lunch witli
Colonel G. W. Bicknell and he again mentioned the subject of the FCC intercept-
ing any messages on or prior to December 7, 1941. I recall that during this
conversation he specifically mentioned the "WINDS" message. Having no
knowledge whatever at that time of such a message, my answer to Colonel
Bicknell was that I knew nothing about it.
/s/ A. Prose Walker.
Sworn to and subscribed before me this 13th day of February, 1946.
[sEAi] /s/ Hexen A. Makston
Notary Public
Federal Communications Commission
Washington 25, D. C, February 18, 1946.
Mr. Seth Richardson
General Counsel, Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee, Washington, D. C.
[14186'\ Attention: Mr. Morgan
Dear Sib: There is submitted herewith additional information received from
the Supervisor of the Hawaiian Monitoring Area of the Radio Intelligence Divi-
sion, relative to Colonel Bicknell's affidavit relating to the "WINDS" message.
Very truly yours,
/s/ G. E. Sterling
G. E. STEau^iNG
Assistant Chief Engineer.
Enclosure
Federal Communications Commission,
Radio Inteixigence Divtcsion
Honolulu 1, T. H., February 11, 1946.
From: Supervisor, Hawaiian Monitoring Area
To : Chief, Radio Intelligence Division
Subject : Col. Bicknell's Affidavit.
Following my return this date from an exploratory survey trip around the
island of Hawaii I have reviewed the correspondence between your office and
HA-P during my absence and I believe the following remarks will shed some light
on this controversy.
[1^187] In the first place, there is absolutely no evidence on hand to bear
out Col. Bicknell's statement that he (1) contacted the local FCC intercept sta-
tion in Hawaii, (2) requested them to monitor for "winds messages" and (3)
that intercepts were furnished him but were not what he was looking for. If Col.
5344 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Bicknell had contacted HA-P he would normally have talked to either Mr.
Wagner or myself. Neither one of us remembers any such call. If a request had \
been received by any of the HA-P stafiE to monitor for "winds messages" it would
certainly have been brought to the attention of either Mr. Wagner or myself
and such an unusual request would certainly have remained in our memories.
Furthermore, if such a request had been received calling for the release of
intercepted material, authorization would first have been obtained from your
office before such release was made. Attention is called, in this regard, to the
fact that the Navy made a request that HA-P participate in a direction finder
problem during the latter part of November 1941 and that your office was im-
mediately notified and authority requested before bearings were released to
the Navy.
With regard to the third point, I should like to ask what kind of intercepts
we are supposed to have furnished him. I believe that we could show quite
clearly that no intercepts were furnished Col. Bicknell. I suspect that, [I^ISS]
if pressed on this point, he would describe the translations of the JZI inter-
cepts which we furnished the Office of Naval Intelligence from May through
December 1941. I refer to the Japanese propaganda broadcasts which we
recorded and which were translated by ONI translators. Copies of these inter-
cepts were furnished the FBI and the Office of Military Intelligence. No request
for special monitoring with regard to these intercepts, or any other) was received
from either the ONI or the MID during the period between November 28 and
December 7, 1941.
One other point comes to mind. You will remember that when I arrived in
Washington during July 1943 on special detail, I reported verbally to you that
Lt. Col. Henry Christian Clausen of the Judge Advocate General's Department,
Army of the United States, had contacted me in Honolulu just prior to my de-
parture and had specifically asked if Col. Bicknell had not requested us to do
some monitoring just prior to December 7, 1941. Lt. Col. Clausen was very vague
as to just what monitoring Col. Bicknell asked us to do and made no claim that
the request had been to monitor s.pecifically for the "winds message". Both Mr.
Wagner and I answered Lt. Col. Clausen in the negative and said then, as we do
now, that we could recollect no such request from Col. Bicknell.
That is all I can add to the story. I believe it was [lJfl89] during July
1943 that I first learned that there was any such thing as a "winds message". I
am absolutely certain that no request to monitor for such a message was received
at HA-P prior to December 7, 1941.
/s/ Lbb R. Dawson.
[14190] Mr. Morgan. We have a telegram, dated August 16,
1941, in five sections, from former Ambassador Grew, to the State
Department. This telegram includes the substance of telegrams sent
to the British Foreign Office by the British Ambassador reporting
his conversation on August 11 with the Japanese Foreign Minister.
The release of this document has been cleared with the British, and we
request that it be spread on the record at this point with the observa-
tion that in a note from the State Department liaison officer, dated
January 9, 1946, he indicates :
The British Government has agreed to the use of the attached telegram No. 123.5
from Tokyo August 16, 1941. It points out an error in section 2, paragraph (A),
fourth line from the bottom, where "Germany's policy" should read "Japan's
policy."
Aft indicated, we would like to have this telegram spread on the
record.
The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record at this point.
(The telegram referred to follows:)
[l/^J90-'A^ TELE5GRAM RECEIVEn
TEM
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any-
one. (A). Tokvo via Shanghai and N. R. Dated August 16, 1941. Rec'd 9:20
p. m. 17th.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5345
Secretary of State, Washington.
123."), August 16, 3 p. m. (section one).
Following is the (?) telegrams sent to Foreign Office by the British Ambas-
sador reporting his conversation on August 11, with the Japanese Foreign
Minister.
"The strong representations to Minister for Foreign Affairs today in regard to
spokesman's statement impugning the veracity (?) assurances as to the absence
of any British aggressive designs against Thailand. The statement is that such
assurances could not be accepted "(?) (?)" was not only calculated to inflame
opinion in Japan, but was definitely offensive and I trusted that His Excellency
would warn the spokesman of the need of greater (?) in making public state-
ments in the present delicate state of Anglo- Japanese relations. I added that
after a public statement of this kind, it was clear from what source the Japanese
press received its inspiration for its attacks on my country.
[l/il90-B] Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to pass on my remarks
to Director General of Bureau of Information.
Gbew.
WSB
llJfl90-C] TELEGRAM RECEIVED
CORRECTED COPY
LET
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to
anyone. (A). Tokyo via Shanghai and N. R. Dated August 14. 1941. Rec'd.
11 : 10 p.m., 17th.
Secretary of State. Washington.
12.S5, August 14 3 p.m. ( Section Two) .
I proceeded to say how regrettable it seemed to me to be that the Japanese
Government should continue to place more reliance on reports (probably emanat-
ing from interested quarters) in preference not anly to my own assurances but
also to the public declaration made by yourself in the House of Commons. Assum-
ing that the Japanese Government were sincere in their desire to avoid trouble
over Thailand, such rumors appeared to me to be fantastic and I made an earnest
appeal to His Excellency to place his cards on the table and give me some idea
of the nature and the source of the reports on which they were acting. If His
Excellency would deal with tlie matter thus frankly I was prepared to be equally
frank in explaining the point of view and intention of His Majesty's Government.
Two. Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed that if things were to be prevented
from going from bad to [1^1!)0-D'\ worse, a frank interchange of views
was essential and he then mentioned several examples of the reports which were
creating so much concern in Japan and invited my comments:
(A) Concentration of British troops on Thai frontier. Japanese reports were
to the effect that large bodies of British troops had been concentrated ready for
an immediate incursion onto Thai territory. I replied that this was a gross
exaggeration : such British units as were on the Thai frontier were there purely
for defensive purposes — as indeed were all our forces in Mala.ya and Burmah — -
with Germany's policy steadily pushing southwards, it was an elementary pre-
caution that the British border defences should be adequately manned.
(B) Report that the WARSPITE was in the Gulf of Siam.
Grew
NPL
[lJfl90-E] TELEGRAM RECEIVED
EJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any-
one. (A). Tokyo via Shanghai and N. R. Dated August 14, 1941. Rec'd.
11 : 45 p.m., 17th.
Secretary of State, Washington.
123.5, August 14, 3 p.m. ( Section Three) .
This report, which he believed had originated with British .iournalists in
Thailand, had received wide currency plausible if untrue, it was unfortunate that
they allowed the rumor to spread. I replied that the report in the form in which
it had appeared in the press was nonsense on the face of it and I thought it much
more likely to have originated in Japanese than British journalistic circles in
79716— 46— pt. 11 14
5346 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Thailand (c) Alleged Russo-Japanese clash on Manchukuo front. This report
had been spread with particular persistence from Singapore although there was
no truth in it whatsoever. No such clash had occurred. I suggested to His
Excellency that the report had originated in Manchuria and had received wide
curi-ency, so that it was unfair to saddle Singapore with it.
(D) Speeches by Oomuiander in Chief Far Ea.st and other high officers in
Malaya. The reiterated public assertion of our growing military and air
strength in [14190-F] Malaya conveyed an impression of aggressive in-
tentions and had proved most disturbing to the public mind in Japan. Their
effect was simply to increase the pressure on the Japanese Government to hasten
and augment their own preparations to defend the sphere in which Japan had
a vital interest. He made a strong plea for the adoption of a calm and un-
provocative attitude on the part of all concerned in handling the present delicate
situation, promising to do his best in this direction if the British authorities
would do their part. I explained that our authorities in Malaya had to think
of the morale of the local population, which might well be affected by Japan's
steady advance towards our frontiers were it not for public assurances that all
necessary measures had been taken for the defense of British territory. Never-
theless I shared the opinion expressed by His Excellency that in such matters
"silence is golden" and promised to impart his representations on this point
to you.
HSM
Grew.
[I419O-G] Corrected Copy
TK
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to
anyone. (A). Tokyo via Shanghai and N. R. Dated August 14, 1941. Eec'd
10 : 50 a. m., 17th.
Secretary of State, Washington.
1235, August 14, 3 p. m., (Section Four).
Three. I then reverted to the signs of Japanese pressure on Thailand, quoting
reports of concentration of Japanese troops along the Thai border and giving
him recent examples of mendacious Japanese press attacks and allegations
against us. His Excellency replied that only quite weak Japanese units had pro-
ceeded to the Thai frontier and that I would be surprised if I knew how small
was the Japanese force which had landed in Indochina. (I abstained from ask-
ing for figures for fear of a request referring to our strength along Thai frontier).
Four. A long conversation then ensued on the economic position as regards
Thailand, particularly as regards rice, rubber, and other materials which it was
now more vital than ever for Japan to secure from that country. His Excellency
observed that Netherlands East Indies under British Influence had [l^iOO-H]
decided to join in the freezing of Japanese assets, with the result that it is now
more than ever essential for Japan to satisfy her urgent needs in such markets
as were open to her. Japanese-Thai trade had recently showed a natural tend-
ency to increase owing to the diflSculties of trade with third powers and the
Japanese Government felt that they had a serious grievance against us for our
attempts to induce Thailand to stop the export to Japan of even such a vital
foodstuff as rice. I was able to show that in this respect His Excellency was
laboring under a complete misapprehension, adding, however, that we were
equally determined that our own right to purchase reasonable supplies of rice,
rubber, et cetera, in Thailand, should not be interfered with by Japanese agen-
cies. On His Excellency's charge that the surest way to ease the economic situ-
ation as regards Thailand would be to induce the Netherlands East Indies to
lessen the restrictions on exports to Japan. I suggested that he was putting the
cart before the horse and that the allaying of British and Netherlands East Indies
apprehensions in regard to Japan's intentions in Thai
Gbbw.
CSB
[I4I9O-I] TELEQBAM BECEIVED
LET
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any-
one. (A). Tokyo via Shanghai and N. R. Dated August 16, 1941. Rec'd. 10
a.m., 18th.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5347
Secrettaby of State, Washington.
1235, August 16, 3 p.m. (Section five),
should be the prelude to any overhauling of the economic restrictions imposed
in the Netherlands East Indies or elsewhere.
Five. I took the opportunity to say that the main point of our economic re-
strictions on trade with Japan was, I believed, to bring home to the Japanese
Government the fact that in our view Japan's successive southward advances
had now reached a point at which words and protests were useless and deeds
were necessary to bring it home to the Japanese Government and public how
close they were to the danger zone. In denying that Netherlands East Indies
action in this matter had been due to British pressure or influence I said that
I assumed that the above considerations had also weighed with the Netherlands
East Indies Government who must feel themselves threatened equally with us
by the Japanese action in Indochina. I did not need to inform His [I419O-J]
Excellency that the lifeline of our conuiumicatious with Australia and New
Zealand run through the Netherlands East Indies thus creating a common prob-
lem of defense. When he inquired "defense whom" and I replied "against
Japan" His Excellency merely smiled and shook his head.
Six. In conclusion we agreed that the main difficulty lay in the suspicions
whicli each power entertained of tlie intentions of the other, though I did not
fail to ridicule the apprehensions of a power which had been steadily advancing
southwards imtil it had reached a point 1500 miles from Tokyo. Minister for
Foreign Affairs reasserted that this advance was necessitated solely by Japan's
determination to bring her war with China to a successful conclusion and he
could only regret our apparent inability to accept his formal assurances that
the advance into South Indochina was neither directed against us nor connoted
any Japanese intention of attacking Thailand. We also agreed that our con-
versation might have been useful as tending to dissipate unnecessary misunder-
standings and that it would be desirable to have similar frank discussions from
time to time.
Seven. While apologizing for the length of this telegram I am anxious to
convey to you as correct an [14190-K] impression as I can of the char-
acter and views of the new Minister for Foreign Affairs. The convea'sation
lasted for an hour and a half and touched on many subsidiary points which
were useful for our mutual understanding though perhaps unnecessary to report
by telegram".
Sent Department, via air, mail to Shanghai.
(End of message.)
Grew.
GW,
[14Jl91'\ Mr. Morgan. At various places throughout the tran-
script requests have been made for information Avith respect to "water-
tight integrity of major vessels" located at Pearl Harbor. In order
to bring together at one place all communications relating to this
matter, we would like to have spread on the record at this time the
following communications from the Navy Department :
11 December 1945.
Another one dated 11 December, 1945.
One dated 3 January 1946.
And a final memorandum dated 29 January 1946.
This will enable us to have at one place all of the communications
with respect to the condition of "water-tight integrity of major
vessels."
The Vice Chairman. They will be spread on the record at this
point.
(The communications referred to follow :)
[ 14192] Department of the Navy,
Office of the IJndbsi Secretary,
Washington, 11 December 19Jf5
Memorandum to : Mr. William D. Mitchell.
1. With further reference to my memorandum to you dated 11 December 1945
the subject of which was "Conditions of water-tight integrity of major vessels",
5348 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
thei'e is attached hereto a table ^ showing the scheduled inspection of ships at
Pearl Harbor during October, November and December 1941. It will be noted
that this table does not contain all of the ships which were at Pearl Harbor on
December 7 ; the explanation for tliis is, the ships which are not shown were not
scheduled for inspection during the period October-December 1941.
/s/ John Ford Baecher
John Fokd Baecher,
Lt. Comdr., USNR.
[141931 Department of the Navy
R-#16 Office of the Under Secretary
Washington, 11 Decetn'ber WJ/S
Memorandum :
To : William D. Mitchell.
Subject : Condition of water-tight integrity of major vessels.
1. Pursuant to your request concerning the above matter, the following
information has been obtained and is submitted."
(a) An examination of the logs and records of the major vessels at Pearl
Harbor indicates that onl yone vessel did not have an equivalent of the condition
"all water-tight openings below tlie third deck closed" at the time of the attack.
Tliat vessel, the USS California, had ten inner and outboard voids open for
maintenance work. Its remaining water-tight openings below the third deck
were closed.
(b) The logs of the USS Oklahoma and USS Arizona were destroj'ed. How-
ever information has been obtained through Commander Fuqua, the Damage
Control Officer of the Arizona, that on his ship all water-tight doors below tlie
third deck were clo.sed. Tliis was also the condition that prevailed in tlie USS
Oklahoma, according to information stated by the Commanding Officer of that
ship.
[1419Jf'\ (c) Material conditions of readiness referred to as conditions
"Baker" or "X-ray" or "Yoke" are higher tlian the minimum. The minimum
requirements are considered to be those prescribed by Navy Regulations, tliat
is, that all water-tight openings below the third deck be closed from 160O to 080O.
(d) According to the best available analysis in the Navy Department, the
USS California is the only ship that might have been saved from sinking by the
closing of manhole covers that had been left open for maintenance.
(e) The USS Pennsylvania was in dry dock and is not included within the
above general statement concerning the conditions of water-tight integrity that
prevailed at that time.
2. If more specific and detailed information on these matters is desired, an
attempt will be made to locate and have present necessary witnesses.
/s/ John Ford Baecher
John Ford Baeohejr,
Lt. Comdr. USNR.
[lJfl95] Department of the Navy
Office of the Secrettary
Washington 3, January 1945 *
Memorandum :
To : Mr. William D. Mitchell
1. With reference to your memorandum of 11 December 1945 referring to the
memorandum to you of the same date from Lt. Comdr. John F. Baecher en-
titled "Conditions of Water-tight Integrity of Major Vessels," it is believed that
the further memorandum to you from Lt. Comdr. Baecher of the same date (11
December 1945) with enclosure "Compilation of Inspection Schedules Applicable
to Vessels Present at Pearl Harbor 7 December 1941," together with the first
mentioned memorandum constitutes the desired response to the inquiry con-
cerning the " 'inspection' charge."
* The table referred to appears in Hearhigs, Part 4, p. 1678.
2 See Hearings, Part 6, pp. 2675-2676.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5349
2. There has also been compiled a statement dated 20 December 1945 from
the logs of the various ships of inspection that occurred on 5 and 6 December
1941. A copy of this compilation is enclosed herewith since it bears on the
same question.
3. With reference to the inquiry concerning the names of persons from the
various ships "who cou]^ testify about each vessel," it is believed that the best
witnesses would be the Senior Surviving Officer from each vessel along
\_14196] with that ship's Damage Control Officer. In addition to those officers,
the names of whom are listed on the "Report of Senior Surviving Officers and
Damage Control Officers," also enclosed herewith. Captain Leslie A. Kniskern,
attached to the Bureau of Ships, Navy Department, Washington, D. C, who
made a study and analyzed the damage to vessels at Pearl Harbor, may have
something to contribute in the way of testimony, if the same is desired. Many
of these prospective witnesses are located at points far distant from Washington
and none of them have as yet been interviewed since the scope of any pre-
liminary interview has not yet been determined.
4. It will be appreciated if you will give advance notice in the event you
desire to call any of these individuals as witnesses, or if you desire them to be
preliminarily interviewed by the Navy representatives.
/s/ John Ford Baecher
John Fobd Baecher
Lt. Comdr, USNR.
A. Arizona
1. SSO : Ellis H. Geiselman, Capt., USN.
2. DCO: Samuel G. Fuqua, Capt., USN.
B. California
1. SSO : Joel W. Bunkley, R. Adm., USN.
2. DCO: Marion N. Little, Capt, USN.
U4197] C. Maryland
1. SSO : John M. Haines, Capt., USN.
2. DCO : Wm. S. G. Davis, Capt., USN.
D. Nevada
1. SSO : Francis W. Scanland, Commodore, USN.
2. DCO : George C. Miller, Capt., USN.
E. Oklahoma
1. SSO : Thomas D. Cullins, Capt., USN.
2. DCO : W. M. Hobby, Lt. Comdr., USN.
F. Pennsylvania
1. SSO : C. M. Cooke, Jr., Vice Admiral, USN.
2. DCO : Wm. E. Stock, Comdr., USN.
1. SSO : Charles E. Reordan, Capt, USN.
*2. Ass't DCO: Robert R. Moore, Comdr., USN (Ret.)
H. West Virginia
1. SSO : R. H. Hillenkoetter, Capt., USN.
2. DCO : J. S. Harper, Capt., USN.
* DCO deceased.
20 December 1945.
Inspections made on U. S. Battleships which were at Pearl Harbor on 7 Dec.
1941. These inspections occurred on 5 or 6 Dec. 1941 as designated.*
[14198] USS Arizona
No log received for Dec. 1941.
USS California
5 Dee. 1941
1149 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples ;
conditions normal.
6 Dec. 1941
1020 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples ;
conditions normal.
Made monthly inspection of all indices of smokeless powder on board ;
conditions normal.
*See Hearings, Part 3, p. 2677.
5350 CONGRiJSSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
USS Marylcmd
5 Dec. 1941
0710 Food inspection.
6 Dec. 1941
0800 Made daily visual exaininatiou of all smokeless powder samples, violet
paper, and test for local heating of magazines on board ship; condi-
tions normal. '
1330 By order of the Commanding Officer, Lt. (jg) Nelson H. Randall,
C-V(S) USNR, was suspended from duty for a period of five days
from and including this date for iuiproper perforuaance of duty as
Communication Watch Officer failing to deliver a despatch to the
Commander Battleships Battle Force. The Commanding Officer fur-
ther ordered that, due to the exigencies of the service [14199]
Lt. (jg) Randall is restored to duty for the duration of the Annual
Military Inspection and Damage Control I'ractice of this vessel on
December 8, 1941 and December 9, 1941.
US'S Nevada
5 Dec 1941
No inspections.
6 Dec 1941
0705 Food inspection.
0900 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples ;
conditions normal.
USS Oklahoma
No log received for Dec 1941.
USS Pennsylvania
5 Dec 1941
0800 Food inspection.
1150 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples;
conditions normal.
6 Dec. 1941
0833 Landing force left the ship to be inspected by Commander Battleship
Division TWO. 1045 Landing force returned.
USS Pennsylvania
6 Dec 1941
1155 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples;
conditions normal.
[14200] USS Tennessee
5 Dec. 1941
1010 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples;
conditions normal.
1445 Secured boiler number 8 after having conducted tests on safety valves.
6 Dec 1941
0745 Commenced embarking Landing Force for Annual Military Inspection.
1130 Landing Force returned aboard. Made daily inspection of magazines
and smokeless powder samples ; conditions normal.
USS West Virginia
No log received for Dec 1941.
Department of the Navy
Office op the Secretary
Washington, 29 January 1946
R#16
Memorandum :
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson
1. In response to the suggestion in the Record of Proceedings page 7236 that
the Navy would make a further check in respect of the logs of certain battleships
that were at Pearl Harbor concerning water-tight integrity, it is thought ad-
visable to first refer to the several memoranda previously [14201] for-
warded counsel on that subject.
Three previous memoranda with enclosures on this subject have been forwarded
to counsel, two being dated 11 December 1945 and one 3 January 1946. The
enclosures were dated October, November and December 1941 and 20 December
1945.
2. One of the 11 December 1945 memoranda forwarded as an enclosure a table
showing the schedules of inspections of ships at Pearl Harbor during October,
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5351
November and December 1941. This memorandum was referred to in the Record
of Proceedings at pages 4436-4439 and the enclosure became Exhibit #69 your
investigation.
The second memorandum dated 11 December 1945 referred to information
which had been obtained regarding water-tight integrity of major vessels, in-
cluding that only one vessel, the U S S California, might have been saved from
sinking if certain manhole covers had not been left open for maintenance work.
This memorandum was quoted in the Record of Proceedings at pages 7233-7235,
and the enclosure at pages 7237-7239.
It is noted that the memorandum of Mr. William D. 'Mitchell to Admiral
Colclough dated 11 December 1945 which is quoted in the Record of Proceedings
at page 7235, referred to only one of the two Navy Department memoranda to
him of that date, and dealt with the question of the names of prospective
[14^02] witnesses concerning the "inspection charge". This memorandum of
Mr. Mitchell was a response to one of the Navy memoranda of 11 December 1945,
quoted in the Record of Proceedings at pages 7234-7235, in which the Navy had
previously volunteered to furnish the names of witnesses if such were desired
by the committee or counsel, and it did not refer to the other Navy memorandum
of 11 December bearing on the "inspection charge".
The Navy memorandum of 3 January 1946 referred to the Navy memoranda
of 11 December 1945, and enclosed a statement of mention in the logs of the
major vessels at Pearl Harbor of inspections on 5 and 6 December 1941 and also
a list as prospective witnesses of the names of Senior Surviving OflScers and
Damage Control OflBcers of the several major ships sunk or damaged at Pearl
Harbor.
A perusal of the Record of Proceedings does not disclose that the Navy memo-
randa of 11 December 1945 forwarding the schedule of inspections which became
your Exhibit #69, or the Navy memoranda of 3 January 1946, or the list of
prospective witnesses enclosed therewith in response to the memorandum of
Mr. Mitchell printed in the Record of Proceedings at page 7235, have been incor-
porated in the record. Such incorjwration may be appropriate in order to make
the record complete.
3.* With respect to the further check to be made by the Navy leferred to in
the Record of Proceedings at page 7236, [14203] and supplementing the
20 December 1945 enclosure forwarded with the memorandum of 3 January 1946,
the logs of the USS California, Maryland, Nevada and Tennessee have been ex-
amined for any record of any inspections, and for any references concerning
water-tight integrity precedent to or in preparation for any inspections on 5, 6,
and 7 December 1941, with negative results.
/s/ John Ford Baecher
John Ford BAECHEat
Lieutenant Commander, U8NR
[14^04-^ Mr. Morgan. We have a communication from Com-
mander Baecher dated April 8, 1946, directed to Mr. Eichardson, as
follows :
Washington, 8 April 1946.
Memorandum :
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
1. In response to your request for the information, official notification to the
Navy Department of the air raid on Pearl Harbor was received by Radio Wash-
ington from Radio Honolulu at 1850 GOT (1350 EST), 7 December 1941, by dis-
patch as follows:
NPM 1516
A0F2 1830 0F3
FROM CINCPAC
ACTION CINCLANT CINCAF OPNAV
AIR RAID ON PEARL HARBOR X THIS IS NOT DRILL
2. At 1930 GOT (1430 EST), 7 December 1941, an ALNAV message was sent by
the Secretary of the Navy to all ships and stations reading "Execute WPL-46
against Japan."
/S/ John Fokd Baecher,
Commander, U8NR."
♦See Hearings, Part 3, p. 2676.
5352 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[14^0S] Mr. Morgan. We have a further communication from
the War Department with respect to reels of microfilm received from
General MacArthur's headquarters, and we ask that this communica-
tion, dated 28 February 1946 be spread on the record.
(The communication referred to follows:)
[I42O6] WaB DEOPABfTMENT,
Room 4D757, The Pentagon,
Washington, D. C, 28 February 19.^6
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson :
In addition to the 12 reels of microfilm previously received from General Mac-
Arthur's headquarters (see Committee transcript pages 7874 and 13,662), there
have now been received two more reels containing material from the Japanese
file on United States-Japanese negotiations prior to the Pearl Harbor attack.
From an examination by qualified Japanese linguists, it appears that of the 80
items in these two reels all were intercepted by the United States at the time of
transmission in 1941, except the following :
1. A mesage from Berlin to Tokyo dated 22 May 1941, giving the substance of an
article published in Pravda.
2. A message from New York to Tokyo dated 10 July 1941, giving the substance
of an article published in Newsweek.
3. A message from Rome to Tokyo dated 15 September 1941, giving the sub-
stance of two United Press dispatches.
4. A message from London to Tokyo dated 19 May [^.^2^7] 1941, giving
the substance of an article published in the Telegraph and Mail.
5. A memorandum related to the "draft" submitted by Ambassador Nomura to
the Secretary of State on 12 May 1941. The draft itself appears at page 420 of
Volume 2 of Foreign Relations.
Although none of the above items would appear to be helpful to the Committee,
the War Department will of course furnish them if the Committee so requests.
/s/ Harmon Duncombe
Harmon Duncombe
Lt. Colonel, GSC
[14^08] Mr. Morgan. Pursuant to a request made by Senator
Ferguson at page 522 of the record we have the following pertinent
portion from a communication received from the Navy Department
dated April 5, 1946 :
In response to the request of Senator Ferguson ( Record of Proceedings, Page
522), which is referred to in Item 4 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946,
there is forwarded herewith a copy of the document containing information of
the Japanese plans leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor based on informa-
tion obtain subsequent to 7 December 1941, that was presented to the Secre-
tary of State, the Hcmorable James F. Byrnes, during the latter part of October.
We request at this point that the entire memorandum be spread on
the record.
The Vice Chairman. It will be so spread on the record.
(The memorandum referred to follows:)
[14209] Reconstruction of Japanese Plans Leading Up to the Attack on
Pearl Haebor.
(BASED UPON information OBTAINED SUBSEQUENT TO 7 DECEMBER 1041)
The following summarization has been prepared on the basis of reliable in-
formation obtained from various sources subsequent to the attack on Pearl
Harbor. Although this summary does not represent a resume of Japanese C'om-
bined Fleet Operation Order No. 1, it will be apparent that heavy reliance has
nevertheless been placed upon that document, a translation of which is sub-
mitted under separate cover.
The Japanese Naval High Command completed preparations during the sum-
mer and fall of 1941 to carry out a projected 2-phase plan of conquest and
consolidation in the Asiatic-Pjicific theatre. The essence of the plan lay in the
element of surprise in a sudden attack which at one fell swoop would cripple
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5353
the major potential opposition — the American Fleet maintained at Pearl Harbor.
Following the crippling of this opposition weapon, coincident with the seizure
and occupation of land masses desired for the economic, political, and military
reasons that together /letermined the borders of the Greater East Asia Co-
ProsiJerity Sphere, Phale 1 of the campaign would be completed, and Phase 2 —
the consolidation of these gains by the seizure or neutralization of outer areas,
together with the continued attrition of the enemy forces and his lines of
[I4210 I supply — could be carried out to ensure the permanence of the new
Empire.
The Japanese fleet, which had been in training over a period of years for
combat fleet operations, was in a state of readiness by the summer of 1941.
By late August of 1941, there is evidence based on information believed to be
reliable, that the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet ordered all fleet
commanders and their key staff members to Tokyo for war games* preparatory
to a final formulation of operation plans. The final games reportedly got under-
way on 2 September 1941, with most of the high ranking officers participating
on one of the three teams that were organized: the "N" (Nippon) Team, "A"
(America) Team, and "E" (England) Team.
During the afternoon of 3 September, 50 copies of an outline of conditions
under which the games were to be held were prepared and contained the heart
of Operation Order No. 1. These plans must have been under development for
several months, as extensive preliminary planning was indicated.
On 5 September, it is known that Pearl Harbor plans were under discussion
and the Japs apparently expected to catch all major U. S. Fleet units in the
Pacific in Pearl Harbor, as well as imits which they believed were recently
transferred from the Atlantic. "N" Team expected to lose one-third of the
units participating in the attack on Hawaii and one Akagi-c\ass [l/f211]
aircraft carrier and one /Son/M-class aircraft carrier were estimated as sunk.
On 6 and 7 September, "N" Team debated the best means of assaulting Pearl
Harbor. Captain Kurojima (Deputy Chief of Staff) and Rear Admiral Ito
(Chief of Staff) differed as to the practicability of conducting an amphibious
assault on Hawaii. Ito was in favor of an early landing but Kurojima won the
discussion by pointing out insuperable logistic problems.
These early sessions apparently were confined primarily to two general prob-
lems : first, the details for a surprise raid on Pearl Harbor ; and second, ai
schedule for occupying, Malaya, Bui-ma. N. E. I., the Philippines, the Solomons,
and Central Pacific Islands, including Hawaii. The conferences and games were
ended about 13 September. At the end of September, the Main Body of the
Jap Fleet moved to Saeki and four revisions of Combined Fleet Operation,
Oi'der No. 1 were made while Nagato (Flagship) was at Saeki, although no
major changes are indicated.
The actual operation plan itself — Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order
No. 1 — has since been recovered and is reproduced in its entirety under separate
cover. The objectives of the campaign strategy, the outline and sequence of
operations planned, and the organization of the naval forces allotted to each
phase of the operations were set forth in the Operation Order, and are analyzed
below.
[14212] OTyjectives:
The general aims of the entire campaign were predicated on the desires for
military conquest and security, and enhancement of the Empire by the occupation
of areas rich in natural resources :
"1. In the east, the American Fleet will be destroyed and American lines of
operation and supply lines to the Orient will be cut.
"2. In the west, British Malaya will be occupied and British lines of operation
and supply lines to the Orient, as well as the Burma Road, will be cut.
"3. Enemy forces in the Orient will be destroyed, bases of operations will be
seized, and areas with natural resources will be occupied.
"4. Strategic areas will be seized and developed ; defenses will be strengthened
in order to establish a durable basis for operations.
"5. Enemy forces will be intercepted and annihilated.
"6. Victories will be exploited to break the enemy's will to fight."
Outline of operations:
For the accomplishment of the objectives stated above, it was contemplated
that operations would be carried out in two phases — the First Phase, comprising
* See Appendix 1.
5354 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
conquest of the American Fleet and occupation of areas desired, in large part,
[1^213] for economic reasons (the Philippines, British Malaya, Netherlands
East Indies) ; the Second Phase, comprising consolidation of these gains by
mopping-up operations, establishment of advance bases for defense of the occupied
territory, and the continued attrition of enemy forces and lines of communication.
The conquest or neutralization of areas deemed of strategic importance primarily
from the point of view ot military security was to occur during the Second Phase,
no definite plan being provided initially for the chronology of those operations.
Apparently both the precise timing of that portion of the campaign and the
determination of which of these strategic areas (listed as Eastern New Guinea,
New Britain, f 'iji, Samoa ; Aleutians and Midway ; Andaman Islands, strategic
points in the Australia Area) would be seized and which merely neutralized, were
problem to be worked out in detail following the completion of the occupation of
the areas desired for their economic value as integral portions of the new Co-
Prosperity Sphere, and to be solved "as quickly as operational conditions permit."
A. Occupation: "First Phase Operations":
Basically, at this initial stage of the war, the Imperial Navy had four missions
to fulfill :
[I4214] (i) The destruction of the American Fleet in the Hawaiian area.
(ii) The maintenance and extension of control over the Central and South
Pacific, to deny these waters to any force which might menace the flank of the
forces driving southward.
(iii) The support of army invasion of the Pbilippines-N. E. I.-Southeast
Asiatic areas and the destruction of Allied naval forces therein.
(iv) The protection of the North, both against thrusts by the United States
from the Aleutians and also against a possible attack by the U. S. S. R.
Aside from the considerably inferior air power and the relatively few scattered
surface fleet units possessed by the Allies in the Asiatic-N. E. I. area, the only
obstacle of consequence was the American Fleet and air-power based at Hawaii.
While Japanese land-based air and surface task groups could suflfice to support
the amphibious landings in the Philippines-N. E. I.-Asiatic area, a major Japa-
nese task force, built around a carrier striking group, was essential to conduct
a surprise attack on the American Fleet. Accordingly, the following general
allocation of Japanese forces* was planned for the first Phase operations.
(i) For the Pearl Harhor Attack:
[I4215] The Striking Force under the Commander in Chief, 1st Air Fleet,
comprising 2 fast battleships, 6 first-line carriers (with a maximum of 400 planes
of all types), 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and 16 destroyers plus.
The Advance Expeditionary Force under the Commander in Chief, 6th Fleet,
comprising 1 training cniiser, 2 light cruisers, 20 fleet submarines, and 5 midget
submarines.
(ii) For the Invasion of Wake and Guam (and of Rabaul if conditions war-
ranted) :
The South Seas Force under the Commander in Chief, 4th Fleet, comprising
4 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 1 training cruiser, 12 destroyers, 16 submarines.
(iii) For the Invasion of the Philippines-N. E. I. -Malaya:
The Southern Force under the Conunander in Chief, 2nd Fleet, comprising 2
battleships, 2 small aircraft carriers, 11 heavy cruisers, 7 light cruisers, 52
destroyers, 16 submarines.
(iv) For the protection of the High North:
The Northern Force, under the Commander in Chief, 5th Fleet, comprising 1
heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, 2 destroyers.
(y) In Reserve:
The Main Body under the Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, comprising 6
battleships, 2 light cruisers, 8 destroyers.
The operations of these forces during the First Phase were to be divided into
three periods :
(a) First Period Operations:
Operations from the outbreak of war until the main body of the invasion army
had been landed in the Philippines. To end about X plus 20.
(b) Second Period Operations:
Operations after (a) and until the main body of the invasion army had been
landed in British Malaya. To end about X plus 40.
• See Appendix 2 for allocation of Japanese Task Forces.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5355
(c) Third Period Operations:
Operations after (a) and until the completion of the occupation of the Neth-
erlands East Indies.
(i) Central Pacific Opo'ations:
(a) Attack on Ptarl Harbor — Assumptions t)ij the High Command:
It is clear from a study of the operation plans that the Japanese High Com-
mand made the following assumptions about the American Fleet :
(a) That the main body of the United States Pacific Fleet would be at anchor
within Pearl Harbor, or at least in [14217] the Hawaiian area.
(b) That a fast carrier force could be moved from the Empire across the
Pacific to the north of Midway, within striking distance of the main islands of
the Hawaiian group without undue risk of detection by American defensive recon-
naissance.
(c) That should assumption (a) or (b) be in error, a reserve group of heavy
units could sortie from the Inland Sea to give support to the carrier striking force
in a decisive engagement against the American Fleet. The other task forces of
the Japanese Fleet — the Southern Area Force, Northern Area Force, South
Seas Force— would also be available. Implicit in the plan is the assumption that
in the event of such an engagement, the combined strength of the bulk of the
Japanese major fleet units could defeat the American Fleet.
(d) That a powerful carrier air strike directed against the American forces
based in Hawaii could, if tactical surprise were effected, achieve the strategic
result of crippling the American Fleet, and the tactical result of destroying the
American laud-based air to permit the Japanese striking force to withdraw
without damage. While the latter assumption does not appear explicitly in the
copy of the Japanese Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 1 recovered in the
Philippines, it is logically implicit in the plan, and probably was a feature of the
specific Operation Order issued by the Striking Force [1421S} Commander.
The seizure of air superiority is part of the classic Japanese naval doctrine.
The four assumptions outlined above were well grounded. An espionage net-
work in the Hawaiian Islands, together with uninterdicted cable communications
between Hawaii and Japan undoubtedly aided the Japanese in establishing
their basichypothesis — namely, that the bulk of the American Pacific Fleet
would be waiting at anchor at Pearl Harbor at the time of their surprise attack.
The feasibility of a surprise attack prior to a declaration of war was, of course,
borne out by events.
(i) Diplomatic Deception:
The operation plan providing for the outbreak of war and the attack on Pearl
Harbor was published on 5 November 1941 as Combined Fleet Top Secret Opera-
tion Order No. 1, and Y day (8 December, Japanese time) was set in Combined
Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 2 on 7 November 1941. At the same time,
the Japanese envoy Mr. Kurusu was en route to Washington to join the Japanese
Ambassador in conducting conversations with the American Government. On
7 November — the date that Y day was set — a "leading Japanese and reliable
informant" visited the American Ambassador in Japan reportedly at the request
of Foreign Minister Togo and urged repeatedly that, whether or not Japanese
concessions were deemed inadequate by the United States, it was "of the highest
importance [14219] that the Washington conversations be continued and
not permitted to break down." These conversations were continued throughout
November and until the actual launching of the surprise attack. While it is true
that Operation Order No. 2, setting Y Day, was not suflScient by itself to effect the
launching of the attack on that day, it was sufficient to despatch the various
Japanese task forces to their scheduled pre-invasion rendevous points (Tankan
Bay in the Kurlies for the Pearl Harbor Striking Force ; Mako in the Pescadores
for the main body of the Philippines Force, etc.) and have the Fleet complete its
basic preparations for an attack on that day. And it seems evident, from a study
of such available subsidiary orders as were issued during November 1941 by
certain of the task forces involved in the plan, that the supplementary orders
that were to cause the task forces to move forward to their attack positions and
were to specify precisely the time for the outbreak of war, were to be issued almost
as inevitable concomitants of the initial decision embodied in Operation Orders
Nos. 1 and 2. While a radical change in the diplomatic situation might have
caused the plan to be abandoned, it seems probable that nothing short of complete
American acceptance of the Japanese terms in their note of 20 November 1941
would have been regarded as snfl5cient to cancel the plans already set in motion.
In any event, the continuation of diplomatic negotiations by the Japanese after
5356 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
llieir task forces were already [14220] eu route to their final goals must
be deemed nothing short of deception.
{ii) Radio Silence:
The Striking Force, as it moved north to the sortie point in the Kuriles, and
thence, to the eastern Pacific, was operating under strict injunctions to main
radio isilence to help assure the secrecy of its movement and mission,
(iii) Radio Deception:
The 1st Combined Communications Unit was directed to maintain deceptive
traffic to simulate the presence of the main strength of the Japanese Fleet in
the Inland Sea. At the same time, the early December movements of the Japa-
nese units en route to the south were not conducted under complete radio
silence — possibly because the element of surprise for that part of the campaign
could not be preserved by silence since Allied visual observations could be made
of those movements and possibly because of the belief that the ability of Allied
intelligence to trace the southward movements of the Southern Force, and only
those movements, would further bolster the effectiveness of the strategic sur-
prise desired for the operations of the Striking Force.
Composition of the Forces Attacking Pearl Hardor:
Striking Force
Commanding Officer: Commander in Chief, 1st Air Fleet — Vice Admiral Chui-
chi Nagumo.
Battleship Division #3 (1st section) {Hid, Kirishima), 2 battleships.
Carrier Division #1 {Kaga, Kagi).
Carrier Division #2 (Hinju, Sori/it)
Carrier Division #5 (Shokaku, Zuikaku) , 6 aircraft carriers.
Cruiser Division #8 (Tone, Chikuma) , 2 heavy cruisers.
Destroyer Squadron 1 {Ahukuma, 4 destroyer divisions) 1 light cruiser; 16
destroyers, plus 11 train vessels.
Advance Expeditionary Fleet
Commamding Officer: Commander in Chief, 6th Fleet — Vice Admiral Mitsumi
Shimizu. Isvzu, Yura), 2 light cruisers; (Katori), 1 training cruiser; I-class
submarines (including Submarine Squadrons #1, #2, #3: (I-l, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
16, 17, IS, 20. 22-24, 68, 69, 74), 20 submarines. Midget submarines, 5 midget
submarines, plus 6 train vessels.
Execution of the Operation:
The Striking Force a.ssembled at Tankan Bay in Etorofu Island (Kuriles)
during late November 1941, and sortied for [lJi222] the attack on or
about 27 November, following a course to the eastward and then southward, as
indicated on the captured track chart appended (see Appendix 3). Of the 11
train vessels allotted in the Operation Plan, reliable information suggests that
only 3 tankers and 1 supply ship actually acc(»mpanied the Force. Apparently
also, 3 submarines of the Advance Expeditionary Force (submarine fleet) accom-
panied the Striking Force — the other submarines having proceeded from the
Inland Sea independently of the Striking Force. During the fast voyage to their
destination 200 miles due north of Oahu, the vessels of the carrier force were
kept fueled successfully, albeit with considerable difficulty in many cases. Upon
arrival at their destination, about 200 miles due north of Oahu, the carriers
launched their aircraft, which rendezvoused further south and then flew in for a
coordinated attack. Three waves of these carrier aircraft were employed,
commencing at 0747 and ending at 0936, local time ; the first attack was) on
various airfields, followed by attacks on the warships in Pearl Harbor. Follow-
ing the successful completion of these surprise attacks, the carrier force with-
drew to the Empire, taking a circuitous route to Hashirajima and arriving on 23
December. En route. Carrier Division #2 {Hinju. Sonju) and Cruiser Division
#8 (Tone, Chikuma) were detached as a small reinforcement group for the Wake
Island operation. Losses sustained by the Striking Force during the Hawaiian
operation reportedly [14223] totalled 29 aircraft.
Until the completion of the surprise attack on Hawaii by the Striking Force,
the "Advance Expeditionary Force" of submarines was under the command of
the Striking Force Commander. The precise movements of the participating
submarines prior to the actual attack are not clear, although some information
suggests that the bulk of those units left the Empire in late November. So far
as is known, the functions allotted the submarines in Operation Order No. 1
were carried out as planned, viz :
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5357
(a) Until X — 3, submarines were to reconnoiter important points in the Aleu-
tians, Samoa, Fiji, and Tutuila, and were to observe and report on any powerful
American foi'ces discovered.
(b) One element was to patrol along the route of the Striking Force in advance
of the movement of that Force — ensure the undetected approach of the carrier
group to its destination.
(c) Until X — 5, the remaining submarines were to surround Hawaii at extreme
range while one element approached and reconnoitered without being observed.
(d) On X day, the function of the submarines would be to "observe and attack
the American Fleet in the Hawaii Area ; make a surprise attack on the channel
leading into Pearl Harbor [14224] and attempt to close it; if the enemy
moves out to fight he will be pursued and attacked."
Prior to the attack on X Day, the force of I-class submarines took up scouting
positions in several allotted patrol sectors covering the waters in the vicinity of
Pearl Harbor, while the 5 midget submarines were lai'mched as a Special Attack
Force to conduct an offensive attack against American warships within the
Harbor and to prevent the escape of the fleet through the Harbor entrances
during the scheduled aerial strike. Available data indicates that only one of
the five subs penetrated into tlie Harbor ; none of the five inflicted any damage
on American units, and none of the five rejoined the Japanese Fleet. American
naval units accounted for 3, possibly 4, of the total, and the 5th beached itself at
Oahu.
During and after the attack, submarines outside of the Harbor area remained
on patrol to oppose any possible sortie of American warships. The following is
a translation of an extract from the "Report of the I-69's Operations off Pearl
Harbor, 8-10 December 1941" (Tokyo time), written by the Commanding Officer
of the 1-69 (flagship of Submarine Division 12) and presents a picture of the
operation as exi>erienced b.v one of the Japanese units on patrol :
"During daylight on December S (December 7 Honolulu time), the 1-69 was
cruising submerged, engaged in surveillance in Scouting Sector D (about 17
miles southwest of Pearl [14225] Harbor). Immediately after the attack
upon the enemy by the Striking Force and the Special Attack Force, we were able
to hear easily, by means of submarine sound detectors, explosions of bombs
and torpedoes, and upon hearing the sound of depth charges, I judged that the
Special Attack Force was engaged in heavy fighting.
"At 1400 radio orders from the Commander of Submarine Forces were received,
assigning the 1-69 to a surveillance in the central sector of E Inner Scouting Area
(a circle with a radius of 8.5 nautical miles, with Pearl Harbor as the center).
The orders further .specified the annihilation of the remaining enemy forces.
"After sunset we surfaced, in an attempt to assist as much as possible, but
during the night we sighted five destroyers. While submerging, we received a
close-range depth-charge attack At 0015 on the 9th (Tokyo time) we
surfaced, making certain that no enemy patrol boats were within close range.
On a course obliquely to the west, and at battle speed, we hurriedly recharged
batteries.
"We sighted 2 patrol vessels on our port quarter and beam respectively, each
about 5 kilometers away, and in about 30 minutes we reversed course. Pearl
Hax'bor shone red in the sky, like a thing afire. It was already dawn."
In the post-attack phase, the I-class submarines maintained their patrols for
some time, and at least one of the [14226] group — the 1-7 — launched its
aircraft to conduct a reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor to ascertain the status of
the American fleet and installations. The operation plan had provided, in the
event of the virtual destruction of the American Fleet at Pearl, that one Sub-
marine Division or less would be placed between Hawaii and North America to
destroy sea traffic and in fact at least one submarine — the 1-17 — was despatched
for the Oregon coast about 14 December.
5358 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
U4it7]
Appendix 1.
Naval general staS
Official duties
Umpires
Nagano, Osami
Fukutome, Shigeru...
■Uozumi, Jisaku
Yamamoto, Chikao
Majiizumi, Ilarue
Tamura, Saburo
Sanaei, Tsuyoshi. _._
Uozumi, Yorlichi
Navy Ministry
Takata, Toshitane
Shiki, Tsuneo
Toibata, Kurip __
[14228] Fujii, Shigeru
N-Team— Combined Fleet
Yamamoto, Isoroku
Ito, Swiichi
Kurojima, Kameto
Goto, Shieeru.. _.
Isobe, Taro
Sugi, Toma
Sasaki, Akira
Wada, Yushiro
Nagata, Shigeru
Watanabe. Yasuji
Arima. Takayasu
Seimi, Ichiyoshi..
Ota, Kanai
1st Combined Communicatins
Unit (Radio Intelligence)
Kakimoto, Gonichiro
Arisawa, Naosada...
E-Team— Second Fleet
[U2?9] Kendo, Nobutake.-..
Yanagizawa, Kuranosuke
Oishi, Tamotsu
Fourth Fleet
Inoue, Semi
Fifth Fleet
Hosogaya, Boshiro.
Eleventh Air Fleet
Tsukahara, Nishizo
Kusaka, Jinichi
A-TEAM— Third Fleet (Amphi-
bious Forces for Southern In-
vasions)
Takahashl, Ibo
Ishihara, Majime
Sixth Fleet
Shimizu, Mitsumi
Kanoaka, Tomojiro _.
First Air Fleet (Carrier Fleet)
Nagumo, Chuichi
Kusaka, Rjainosuke
Genda, Minoru
Admiral
Rear Admiral
Captain
Captain
Commandei..
Commander..
Commander..
Commander..
Captain
Commander..
Commander..
Commander..
Admiral.
Rear Admiral.
Captain..
Commander..
Commander..
Commander..
Commander..
Commander..
Commander. .
Commander..
Commander..
Commander..
Commander..
Rear Admiral
Commander..
Admiral
Captain
Commander..
Vice Admiral.
Vice Admiral -
Vice Admiral.
Rear Admiral.
Vice Admiral.
Captain
Vice Admiral.
Captain.
Vice Admiral.
Rear Admiral
Commander..
Head of First Section (War Planes and
Operations).
Member First Section.
Head of Sub-Section, First Section.
Member Sub-Section, First Section.
Member Sub-Section, First Section.
Member Sub-Section, First Section.
Member Sub-Section, First Section.
Member of Military Affairs Bureau.
Member of Military Affairs Bureau.
Member of Office of Military Supply.
Private Secretary to Navy Minister
(Admiral Shimada, Shigetaro).
CinC Combined Fleet.
Chief of Staff.
Deputy Chief of Staff.
Staff .Adjutant.
Staff Engineering Officer.
Staff Gunner Officer.
Staff Air Officer.
Staff Communication Officer.
Staff Navigation Officer.
Staff Operations and Plans Officer.
Staff Torpedo Officer.
Staff Supply Officer.
Meteorologist Attached to Staff.
Commander.
Deputy Chief of Staff.
Commander.
Deputy Chief of Staff.
Staff Navigation Officer
Commander.
Commander.
Commander.
Chief of Staff.
Commander.
Deputy Chief of Staff.
Commander.
Deputy Chief of Staff.
Commander.
Chief of Staff.
Deputy Chief of Staff.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5359
U4230] Appendix 2
Japanese Task Forces
Main Body {Commander in Chief ComMned Fleet) (Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto) ;
(6 Battleships, 2 Light Cruisers, 8 Destroyers) ; Battleship Division #1 (2 Battle-
ships) (Mntsu, Nagato) ; Battleship Division #2 (4 Battleships) {Ise, Hyuga,
Fuso, Yamashiro) ; Cruiser Division #9 (2 Light Cruisers) {Kitagami, Oi) ; 8
Destroyers (Names uncertain)
Striking Force (Commander in Chief 1st Air Fleet) (Vice Adm. Chuichi Na-
gumo) ; (2 Battleships, 6 Aircraft carriers. 2 Heavy Cruisers, 1 Light Cruiser,
16 Destroyers) ; Battleship Division #3 (1st Section) (2 Battleships) (Hiei, Kiri-
shima) ; Carrier Division #1 (2 Aircraft carriers) {Kaga, Akagi) ; Carrier Divi-
sion #2 (2 Aircraft carriers) {Hiryu, Soryu) ; Carrier Division #5 (2 Aircraft
carriers) (Shokakti, Zuikaku) ; Cruiser Division #8 (2 Heavy Cruisers) {Tone,
Chikuma) ; Destroyer Squadron #1 (1 Light Cruiser, 16 Destroyers) {Adukuma,
Destroyer names uncertain)
Southern Force {Commander in Chief Second Fleet) (Vice Adm. Nobutake
Kondo) ; (2 Battleships, 2 Small Aircraft carriers, 12 Heavy Cruisers, 7 Light
Cruisers, 52 Destroyers, 16 Submarines) ; Battleship Divi'sion #3 (2nd Section)
(2 Battleships) {Kongo, Haruna) Carrier Division #4 (1st Section) (2 Small
Aircraft carriers) (Probably Shoho and Ryujo) ; Cruiser Division #4 (4 Heavy
Cruisers) {Atago, Takao, Maya, Chokai) ; Cruiser Division #5 (3 Heavy Cruis-
ers) {Haguro, Myoko, Nachi) ; Cruiser Division #7 (4 Heavy Cruisers) {Mo-
gami, Mikuma, Kumano, Suzuya) ; Cruiser Division #16 (1 Heavy Cruiser, 3
Light Cruisers) {Ashigara, Kuma, Kinu, Nagara) ; Destroyer Squadron #2 (1
Light Cruiser, 12 Destroyers) {Jintsu. Destroyer names uncertain) ; Destroyer
Squadron #3 (1 Light Cruiser, 16 Destroyers) {Sendai. Destroyer names un-
certain) ; Destroyer Squadron #4 (1 Light Cruiser, 12 Destroyers) {Naka.
Destroyer names uncertain) ; Destroyer Squadron #5 (1 Light Cruiser, 12 De-
stroyers) {Natori. Destroyer names uncertain) ; About 16 Submarines (Names
uncertain)
[14231] Appendix 2
Japanese Task Forces — (continued)
South Seas Force (Commander in Chief 4th Fleet) (Vice Adm. Shigeyoshi
Inoue) ; (4 Heavy Cruisers, 4 Light Cruisers, 12 Destroyers, 16 Submarines)
Kashima (Light Cruiser) ; Cruiser Division #6 (4 Heavy Cruisers) (Aoha, Fur-
titaka, Kinugasa, Kako) ; Cruiser Division #18 (2 Light Cruisers) (Tenryu,
Tatsuta) ; Destroyer Squadron #6 (1 Light Cruiser, 12 Destroyers) (Yubari,
Destroyer names uncertain) ; About 16 Submarines (Names uncertain)
Northern Force (Commander in Chief 5th Fleet) (Vice Adm. Boshiro Hoso-
kaya) ; (2 Light Cruisers, 2 Destroyers) ; Cruiser Division #21 (2 Light Cruis-
ers) (Tama. Kiso) ; 2 Destroyers
Advance Expeditionary Force (Commander in Chief 6th Fleet) (Vice Adm.
Mitsumi Shimuzu) ; 3 Light Cruisers (Katori, Isuzu, Yura) ; About 26 Submarines
Attached Forces (Training) ; Carrier Division #4 (2nd Section) (2 Small Air-
craft carriers) (Probably Hosho and Ziiiho) ; Miscellaneous Vessels.
5360 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5361
[14232] Appendix 3
Above [opposite] is shown a captured track chart of Jap carriers, covering the
period from Pearl Harbor to Midway. During the operations noted, this Jap Car-
rier Force was commanded by the late Vice-Admiral Nagumo as CinC First Air
Fleet. The approximate approach of the Carrier Task Force to Hawaii is indi-
cated. According to another document, recovered from a crashed enemy plane
shortly after the raid, Jap aircraft tlew off their carriers about 200 miles due
north of Oahu, rendezvoused further south, and then flew in for a coordinated
attack. From 0755 to 0825 (Honolulu Time), VT and VD attacks were made on
U. S. installations. After a 15-minute lull, these were followed by horizontal VB
strikes and recurrent YD attacks.
[14^S3] Mr. Morgan. Consistent with a request made by Senator
Ferguson for information regarding reports of Japanese air recon-
naissance over the Philippines, or other U. S. possessions in the Pacific
}5rior to December 7, 1941, we have from the Navy Department a
communication dated February 8, 1946, concerning tliis matter trans-
mitting enclosures. We would request that the letter of transmittal
and the enclosures be spread on the record at this point.
The Vice Chairman. They will be spread on the record at this
point.
(The letter of transmittal and enclosures follow.)
Dbpaetment of the Navy
Office of the Secretaey
Washitigton, 8 Fehruary 19J/6.
1083A
R. #119
Memorandum:
To : Mr Seth W. Richardson
1. In response to Senator Ferguson's request for information regarding reports
of Japanese air reconnaissance over the Philippines or other U. S. Possessions in
the I'acific prior to December 7, 1941, the following references are given :
a. " * * * 'Rear Admiral Toshio Matsunago, Retired, in [14234]
interview published in Hoehi States Japanese should face future with calm confi-
dence in ability Army Navy repel air attacks x Japan need not worry about
weak ABCD powers encirclement plans x quoted as stating he has flown over
Guam total sixteen times this year without sighting single American plane x
American air power Far East negligible x prior retirement Matsunaga served
twelve years as aviator Commander Ryujo Acagi Tateyama Air Station now Di-
rector Japan airways.'" (Narrative Statement, page 239; NCI exhibit 12).
b. Dispatch from INIarine detachment. Wake Island to ComFOURTEEN, dated
25 November 1941, stating- that on 24 November 2115 hours the Pan-American
clipper sighted foiar Japanese sea planes about 1.000 miles east of Guam, flying
south at an altitude of 10,000 feet. Narrative statement, page 392 ; Hewitt ex-
hibit 27, page 127) .
c. Dispatch from GovGuam, 240610, dated November 24, 1941. Copy attached.
d. Extract from the interrogation of Captain Takahashi. Copy attached.
2. It is possible that support was given to the belief that Japanese air recon-
naissance was being made throughout the Pacific (over all Allied Island posses-
sions) by a report of such reconnaissance over the Gilberts, given in a dispatch
originated by the naval attaclie at Singapore [14235] on 22 November,
paraphrase of which is made in the Hewitt exhibit 27, page 14T. Copy of dispatch
#220228 is attached.
/s/ John Ford Baecher,
Lt. Comdr., USNR.
79716— 46— pt. 11 15
5362 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[14236] Naval Message
Navy Department,
From : ALUSNA Singapore
To: OPNAV (Action)
CINX^PAC, CINCAF (Info.)
Date : 23 November 1941
220228
Routine
Dependable reports here of reconnaissance flights over Gilbert Islands on
November 15 by monoplane v^ith tapered wings, single tailfin, twin engines. Next
day repeated by monoplane flying boat silver color number of engines unobserved.
Top secret.
[14237] Naval Message
Navy Deipabtmbnt
From : Governor Guam
To: OPNAV (Action)
CINCPAC, CINCAF (Info.)
Date : 24 November 1941
240610
Deferred
At 1217 local time today unidentified two-engined plane sighted, circling south-
ern end of island. Altitude approximately 15,000 feet. At 1226 local time plane
passed out of sight to southwest.
Top secret
[14238] INTE31E0GATI0N OF CAPTAIN TAKAHASHI ON 20 0€TOBEB 1945
/. Positioiis held by Captain Takahashi
May 1941-December 1942 : On staff of Eleventh Air Fleet in Philippine Islands
and Dutch East Indies. This was the duty i)eriod on which Captain Takahashi
was questioned.
January 1943-June 1945 : Senior member of Navy Aeronautical Bureau, Tokyo.
July 1945-August 1945 : Senior Staff officer of Fifth Air Fleet and senior staff
officer of Third Air Fleet.
20 October 1945- : Chief of Sendai Naval Personnel Bureau.
//. Summary
* * * The primary mission of the Japanese Force in FORMOSA, composed
of about 300 fighters and bombers, was the annihilation of the American Air
Force in the PHILIPPINES. In this, it was successful partly because complete
information relative to the American Air Force [14239] was obtained by
Aerial Reconnaissance prior to commencement of hostilities.
///. "Q" What gave the Japanese impression that there were 900 planes in the
area and how did you discover that there were 300 instead of 900?"
"A" The Navy received on 20 November 1941, a report from the Foreign Affairs
Department that there Avere about 900 planes in the LUZON area. A photo-
graphic reconnaissance plane conducted a search on the 24th or 25th of Novem-
ber over that area and discovered that there were only 300 planes. One recon-
naissance plane made flights at that time."
[14^40] Mr. Morgan. We have here a letter from Commander
Baecher, dated 7 March 1946, settino^ forth a request by Mrs. T. S.
Wilkinson, the widow of Admiral Wilkinson, that certain informa-
tion with respect to her husband and his testimony, and also a letter
from Admiral Ingersoll to Admiral Wilkinson dated 26 December
1945 be placed in the record.^ We request that this letter from the
Navy Department of March 7, together with the enclosures be spread
on the record at this point.
1 Adm. Wilkinson's testimony appears in Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1723-1782, 1793-1858,
1864-1911.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
5363
The Vice Chairman. They will be spread on the record at this
point.
(The letter and enclosures referred to follow :)
umi]
Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 7 March 1946.
Memorandum :
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson
1. It will be recalled that during the course of his interrogation Vice Admiral
T. S. Wilkinson testified concerning the duties of his office which, at least in part,
was transcribed at pages 4576-4577 of the Record of Proceedings.
2. It further appears that at the request of Vice Admiral Wilkinson there wei-e
read into the Record of Proceedings, at pages 5100-5104, a memorandum of Vice
Admiral A. G. Kirk, and two dispatches exchanged between Vice Admiral Wilkin-
son and Rear Admiral James, pertaining to matters referred to in the testimony of
Vice Admiral Wilkinson at said pages 4576-4577 of the Record.
3. In connection with the same matter Vice Admiral [l/i2Ji2] Wilkinson
wrote a letter to Admiral R. E. Ingersoll on 20 December 1945, in which he re-
ferx'ed to his own and Admiral Turner's testimony, and forwarded as the first
enclosure a copy of the memorandum of Vice Admiral Kirk referred to above
and as the second enclosure a copy of his own testimony as transcribed at said
pages 4576-4577 of the Record of Proceedings before the Joint Committee, and
inquired as to Admiral Ingersoll's recollection of the matter. Admiral Ingersoll
answered Vice Admiral Wilkinson's letter by letter of 26 December 1945.
4. Mrs. T. S. Wilkinson states that her lately deceased husband, Vice Admiral
Wilkinson, refrained at the time from forwarding to the committee the exchange
of correspondence with Admiral Ingersoll because he thought the subject matter
would be covered when Admiral Ingersoll appeared as a witness. She feels that
it now appears that the interrogation of Admiral Ingersoll did not cover the
particular question, and has found the letters among Vice Admiral Wilkinson's
effects. Accordingly Mrs. Wilkinson, having first obtained the permission of
Admiral Ingersoll to such use of his letter, requests in behalf of her husband
that the pertinent parts of the exchange of correspondence between Vice Admiral
Wilkinson and Admiral Ingersoll bo I'ead into and made a part of
the stenographic record of the committee's proceedings. Accordingly there
are attached [142^3] hereto, marked Enclosures A and B respectively,
copies of the second enclosure to Vice Admiral Wilkinson's letter of 20 December
1945 to Admiral Ingersoll and of Admiral Ingersoll's letter dated 26 December
1945.
/s/ John Foed Babcher,
Lt. Comdr. U8NR.
EUSrOLOStrRE A
Admiral Wilkinson. I said that the text of the regulations which you intro-
duced read "Evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable."
I understood our duties to be, and still understand, to disseminate and spread
abroad all types of basic information, what General Miles has termed static
information, such as the defenses of the country, its economics, the diplomatic
relations, the characters and activities and previous careers of its military and
naval men, the location of its fleets, the actual movements of its fleets and every-
thing other than the enemy probable intentions, and such speciflc information
as in itself might give rise or might require action by our fleet, or by our naval
forces.
5364 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In the latter case before dissemination I would consult higher authority, either
the Assistant Chief, the Cliief of Naval Operations, or my Colleague, Chief of War
Plans, in order that this information which I sent out would not be in conflict
with his understanding of the naval situation, mii'i'i] and the operations
for which he was responsible.
]\Ir. Geseix. In other words, you had the responsibility to disseminate, but
where you reached a situation which led you to feel that the information dis-
seminated might approach the area of a directive, or an order to take some spe-
cific action to the recipient then you felt you were required to consult War Plans,
or the Chief of Naval Operations?
Admiral Wilkinson. Exactly.
Enclosure B :
Staff Headquarters
Western Sea Frontier
Federal Office Building
San Francisco, California, 26 December, 1945.
My Dear Wilkinson : I have your letter of 20 December regarding your testi-
mony before the Committee and also the two enclosures.
My understanding of the instructions given to Naval Intelligence in 1941 is
exactly in accord with your testimony as you gave it in the hearings, and as em-
bodied in the second enclosure of your letter.
I remember that discussions took place sometime in '41 although I had for-
gotten that Kirk took part in the discussions. I remember it more as a discussion
with you. I do remember distinctly, however, pointing out that our [14245]
organization was not like military intelligence and that the Estimate of the Situ-
ation should be prepared by the War Plans Division, although the data for the part
"Enemy Intentions" naturally would have to be based on data and information
gathered by Naval Intelligence.
With kindest regards and all best wishes for the New Year, I am
Very sincerely yours,
/s/ Ingersoll.
Vice Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, USN.,
3043 "A" Street, N. W.,
Washwfjton. D. C.
[I4246] Mr. MoROxAN. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. There being nothing further, the committee
will stand adjonrned subject to the call of the Chair.
(Whereupon, at 5 : 40 p. m., the Committee adjourned, subject to
the call of the Chair.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5365
Umn PEAEL HAEBOR ATTACK
THURSDAY, MAY 23, 1946
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.
The joint committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 : 30 a. m., in the com-
mittee I'oom of the Committee on the District of Columbia, United
States Capitol, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, Brewster, and
Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), and Murphy.
Also present : Seth W. Richardson, general counsel ; John E. Masten,
Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint
committee.
\^lJf24S~\ The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Richardson.
Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lane wants to offer, with the
permission of the committee, a number of answers to requests which
have been made in the record, in order to clean up that part of the
record.
The Chairman. I might state before you start that the Senate meets
at 11 o'clock today and the House also meets at 11 o'clock. We will
have to work pretty fast here to get through before the two Houses
meet.
I just wanted that to be understood, so that we wouldn't waste any
time.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I suggested to Senator Fergu-
son and counsel, while talking informally, that in view of the fact
that the Senate is meeting at 11 o'clock today and the House is also
meeting at 11 o'clock, that probably the best thing to do would be for
us to receive these documents for the record, close the record, and then
adjourn subject to call of the Chair, with the idea that as early next
week as can be convenientl}^ arranged we could have another meeting
of the committee.
The Chairman. Senator George cannot be here this morning as he
is presiding at a Finance Committee meeting; and Mr. Clark is away,
as is also Mr. Gearhart. So it would be my purpose to call an executive
committee meeting the first [H^JfQ'] day of next week that
is available.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Clark will in all probability be back next
week.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, it would be my suggestion that we
hold this record open to put these things in. I would like to have
time to go over them after they are in the record.
5366 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
»
The Chmrman. The Chair wishes to state this, Senator, that the
committee voted last week to close the record today, and I wouldn't
feel at liberty to hold the record open unless the committee reverses
its action taken last week.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I received the answers to ques-
tions put to Mr. Hull yesterday. As the Chair knows we have had
very important sessions. We had a very important session yesterday
and finally voted. It was necessary that I stay on the floor. I haven't
had time to properly analyze the material to see whether or not other
questions should be submitted. Those I analyzed were very unsatis-
factory, so far as I personally was concerned.
I feel that we have failed utterly to get information by the system
of using interrogatories. It was difficult enough to get testimony
from the witnesses in the hearings. I feel that it has failed and that
we should have some time to submit interrogatories.
For instance, I asked many questions of Mr. Stimson. He didn't
see fit to answer the first set of questions at all. [14^50] Per-
sonally I don't feel that he even answered the second questions, but
he did at least give us some answers to those.
Now, if we spend months, and we have spent months, on this matter,
I feel that we should have a complete record. I certainly want to
have a complete record of the Pearl Harbor facts. I feel that by-
closing this record today, without the right to submit further questions,
without tlie right of getting the Stimson diary, that we are not getting
all of the facts.
The Chairman. Well, the committee will have to pass on that.
Senator Ferguson. I realize that, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. We will go ahead. We don't want to argue that
now.
Senator Ferguson. I am not arguing it.
The Chairman. No; but we have taken time, which is very short
and very precious. I will be perfectly frank to state that unless the
committee itself orders it, reverses the action that it took to close
the record today, that is what the order was, with only two votes
against that motion, made by Mr. Keefe, unless the committee desires
otherwise I am going to adhere to the action taken by the committee.
I don't see how I can do otherwise as chairman of this committee.
If the committee wants to take a different action when it meets again,
that is its business, but so far as the orders of the committee are at
present, the hearing of evidence [14^51] and the record was to
be closed today.
Whether you or I, or the committee, or anybody else, could get any
additional information from Mr. Stimson than his reply to interroga-
tories, I do not know. It is unfortunate that Mr. Stimson's health
has been such that he couldn't appear in person. I think that we all
have the greatest respect for Mr. Stimson and that the country has
the greatest respect for Mr. Stimson. I haven't had a chance to read
his replies, but I don't think it is necessary for me to read them in order
to determine whether there should be any more hearings or any more
questions asked of him. I presume he gave us the best information
he could in reply to the questions. If he hasn't, I don't know whether
additional questions sent to him would elicit anything further or not.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, it is only that I think we ought
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5367
to be given that opportunity. At least I would like to have made a
part of this record the questions that I submitted and a showing that
he did not answer.
The Chairman. I presume that the questions submitted are a part
of the record, that they were made a part of the record, as much as
the answers. Without seeing the questions and the answers, I as-
sume the questions would be made a part of the record just as if they
had been asked in open hearing.
Senator Ferguson. I didn't know. That is the reason I asked.
[14^-52] The Chairman. I assume so. Isn't that true, Counsel ?
Mr. Richardson. My idea would be that whatever we got from Mr.
Stimson would appear in this record.
The Chairman. Yes, and the same with regard to Mr. Hull. Let's
go ahead.
Mr. ISIuRPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire if the Hull answers
are here ready to be put in the record today ?
Mr. Lane. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I presume all members received them and that they
are here ready to be put in the record today. Go ahead.
Mr. Lane. The Committee sent certain interrogatories to former
Secretary of State Cordell Hull on April 5, 1946. We have received
his answers to the interrogatories, and ask that the interrogatories,
the answers thereto, and their letter of transmittal dated May 16, 1946,
be spread on the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, that will be done.
(The answers given by Mr. Hull to interrogatories submitted to
him by the Committee follow :)^
[14253] May 16, 1946.
The Honorable Alben W. Babkley, Chairman,
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Peiakl Habboe Attack,
Congress of the United States.
My Deae Mb. Babkley, Reference is made to your letter of April 5, 1946, en-
closing a set of 169 interrogatories wbich the committee desired me to consider
and make such reply thereto as my recollection of the facts might warrant.
In pursuance of your request I enclose my replies to the interrogatories. I feel
that most of the matters covered in my replies have already been set forth in
the record of the Department of State or in my prepared statement to the
committee. I trust that my replies satisfactorily dispose of the questions con-
cerning which the committee has inquired.
Sincerely yours,
[S] Cordell Hull.
Enclosure :
Replies to interrogatories.
[U£54] REPLIES TO INTERROGATORIES PROPOUNDED BY THE
HONORABLE HOMER FERGUSON, MEMBER OF THE JOINT COMMIT-
TEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OE THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1. Question : Is it correct to say, Mr. Secretary, that the first specific
point in the 10 points of the American note of November 26,
1941, proposed that Japan enter a seven-power nonaggression
compact ? ( See For. Rel. vol. 2, 769. )
^ Mr. Hull was sworn by the Chairman at the time of his appearance before the Com-
mittee on November 23, 1945. See Hearings, Part 2, p. 403 et seq.
5368 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Answer: In this Government's outline of a proposed basis for
agreement between the United States and Japan communi-
cated to the Japanese Government on November 26 there were
listed in section 2 under 10 headings steps to be taken by the
Government of the United States and by the Government
of Japan of which the first heading reads as follows :
1. The Government of the United States and the Government of
Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact
among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet
Union, Thailand, and the United States.
2. Question : [14^55] Is it correct to say that, in j^our conversa-
tion with the Japanese Ambassadors on November 22, 1941,
you broached the matter of proposing to Japan SOMETIME
a broad comprehensive plan involving the collaboration of
other nations? (For. KeL voL 2, 761.)
Answer: On November 22, 1941, 1 told the Japanese Ambassador
that I had in mind taking up with him sometime a general
and comprehensive program which we had been engaged in
developing and which involved collaboration of other coun-
tries. Our broad approach was toward a world objective,
not a local, regional, or bilateral objective. While the initial
step was bilateral as between the Japanese and ourselves,
what we were trying to do was to get Japan to adopt a peace-
ful program on world-wide lines. Had we been successful
Japan would have been able to satisfy all her needs by taking
advantage of the principles, for example, of the Nine-Power
Agreement and the Good Neighbor policy. We envisaged, of
course, the assumption by Japan of obligations along with
the acquisition by her of rights.
3. Question : Did the Japanese Ambassadors reply that Japan was
interested in a bilateral agreement with the United States?
(For.Kel. vol. 2,762.)
[14:250] Answer: Tlie Japanese Ambassador said that the
Japanese had in mind negotiating a bilateral agreement with
us to which other powers could subsequently give their adher-
ence. The Japanese, throughout the conversations, had
shown ap])arently little thought for the rights and interests
of countries in the Pacific area other than Japan and the
United States. From the outset of the conversations I had
endeavored to make it clear to the Japanese that this Govern-
ment could not join with Japan in disposing of questions
affecting the rights and .interests of the other concerned
powers without consulting them prior to entering into formal
negotiations on these matters with the Japanese. There could
not have been, however, any doubt in the mind of the Japanese
Ambassador that our conversations looked to our entering
into a bilateral agreement with Japan as our immediate
objective even though we held to the view that other powers
should be consulted.
4. Question : Did the Japanese Ambassadors say to you, after reading
tlie note of November 26 and the oral statement of the 26th,
that the American proposal was unacceptable and was to be
interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end? (For. Rel.
vol. 2, 766.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5369
Answer : [1/^£S7] After the Japanese Ambassadors had
read tlie documents handed to them on November 26 con-
taining an outline of the proposed basis of an agreement
between the United States and Japan and an exphmatory oral
statement, Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that our response to
their jjroposal could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning
the end. Neither Mr. Kurusu nor Ambassador Nomura stated
that the American proposal was unacceptable.
5. Question : Is it correct to say that the position of the State Depart-
ment has been that the American note of the 26th was a
necessary restatement of American policy as the only logical
and practical means by which peaceful conditions might
obtain in the Pacific Ocean? (For. Rel. 767 et. al.)
Answer : In answer to this question, I refer to my statement before
the joint committee on November 19, 1915, in which I said :
Our Government's proposal was offered for the consideration of the
Japanese Government as one practical example of a program to be
worked out. It did not rule out other practical examples which either
Government was free to offer.
In that same statement I also said :
[lJf258] The Japanese were spreading propaganda to the effect
that they were being encircled. On the one hand we were faced by
this charge and on the other by one that we were preparing to pursue
a policy of appeasing Japan. In view of the resulting confusion, it
seemed important to restate the fundamentals.
That confusion prevailed both in Japan and the United
States. We knew from Japanese acts and utterances that
the Japanese proposal of November 20 was their last word
and it was obviously desirable that the record of the American
Government's position throughout the conversations be made
crystal clear. Tlierefore, the proposals of November 26
were directed toward making our position utterly clear and
toward keeping the door open for further conversations not-
withstanding the ultimative character of the Japanese pro-
posal of November 20. The principles set forth in our No-
vember 26 proposal were in all important respects essentially
the same principles w^e had been proposing to the Japanese
right along. Had the Japanese had the least disposition to
pursue a peaceful course, a more desirable program could not
have been offered to them. All Japan had to do to take ad-
vantage of our offer was to abandon her course of aggression
and to adopt tlie accepted rules of peaceful international con-
duct. In the explanatory statement which accompanied
the proposal there was reviewed [14-259] briefly the
objective sought in the exploratory conversations, namely,
that of arriving at an agreement regarding Pacific questions
on a basis of peace, law and order, and fair dealing among
nations.
6. Question : It was stated, was it not, by the American Government
to Japan in the note of the 26th that the Japanese proposal
of November 20 fell short of the objectives desired? (For.
Rel. vol. 2, 767.)
5370 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Answer: In this Government's communication to the Japanese
Government of November 26 it was stated :
The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on
November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Gov-
ernment, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part
of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Gov-
ernment has declared that it is committed. The Government of the
United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not
be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace
under law, order, and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that
further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard
to the practical application of the fundamental principles already
mentioned.
The Japanese asked in their proposal of November 20 that the
United States [14'^60] agree to cease giving aid to
China; that the United States desist from augmenting its
military forces in the western Pacific ; that the United States
help Japan obtain products of the Netherlands East Indies;
that the United States undertake to resume commercial rela-
tions with Japan ; that the United States undertake to supply-
to Japan "a required quantity of oil" ; while Japan on her part
would be free to continue her military operations in and
against China and to keep her troops in Indochina and to
attack the Soviet Union, would have her funds unfrozen,
would be able to buy with comparative freedom from the
United States, would be assured adequate supplies of oil, and
would be under no obligation to remove her troops from Indo-
china until she should have completed her conquest of China
or conditions of peace satisfactory to her had been estab-
lished "in the Pacific area."
Before and after presenting that proposal. Ambassador
Nomura and Mr. Kurusu talked emphatically about the
urgency of the situation and intimated vigorously that this
was Japan's last word and if an agreement along those lines
was not quickly concluded ensuing developments might be
most unfortunate.
Wliat Japan asked in that proposal would, had it been
agreed to by the United States, have meant condonement by
the United States of Japan\s past aggressions, assent by
[14^61] the United States to unlimited courses of conquest
by Japan in the future, abandonment by the United States of
its whole past position in regard to the most essential prin-
ciples of its foreign policy in general, betrayal by the United
States of China, and acceptance by the United States of a posi-
tion as a silent partner aiding and abetting Japan in her effort
to create a Japanese hegemony in and over the western Pacific
and Eastern Asia.
Acceptance by us of the Japanese proposal of November 20
would have placed Japan in a commanding position in her
movement to acquire control of the entire western Pacific area ;
would have destroyed our chances of asserting and maintain-
ing our rights and interests in the Pacific; and in its final
analysis would have meant a most serious threat to our na-
tional security. She also clung to her vantage point in Indo-
cliina which threatened the security of the countries to the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5371
south and menaced vital trade routes. Their conditional offer
to withdraw troops from southern Indochina to northern
Indochina was meaningless as they could have brought those
troops back to southern Indochina within a day or two, and
furthermore they placed no limit on the number of troops they
might continue to send there.
7 Question: Did our Government reject the Japanese note ol
• [lJi.-262'\ November 20, 1941, which you described as an
ultimatum?
Answer : The Japanese proposal of November 20, which I have
described in response to question No. 6, was of so preposterous
a character that no responsible American official could ever
have dreamed of accepting it. Nevertheless, I felt that I
should not be violent in my comment to the Japanese in regard
to it so as to avoid giving'them any pretext to walk out on the
conversations.
Therefore, despite the ultimative character of the Japanese
proposal, and despite the slim possibility that Japan would
elect to continue the conversations, we proposed to keep alive
that possibility while restating our fundamental principles.
The Army and Navy were asking for more time, as they had
for months past, and I had that situation very much at heart.
Morever, we wanted to show our interest in peace up to the last
split second and at the same time to expose the bad faith of the
Japanese. Everything we said or did was with those consid-
erations in mind. In drawing up a full restatement of our
principles, we gave exemplifications of their application to the
situation in the Pacific area, and we invited the Japanese to
continue the conversations with that statement as a basis.
8. Question: It was stated, was it not that, therefore, the United
[1.^63] States was setting forth to Japan a broad and
comprehensive program under which the desired objectives
could be attained? (For. Kel. vol. 2, 767.)
Answer: In this Government's oral statement to the Japanese
Government of November 26 it was stated :
* * * the Government of the United States ofCers for the considera-
tion of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement
covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a
program which this Government envisages as something to be worked
out during our further conversations.
As I said in my statement before the joint committee of
November 19, 1945, in reviewing what I had told press cor-
respondents on the day following the date of delivery to the
Japanese of the communication under reference,
I found there had been so much confusion and so many collateral
matters brought in along with high Japanese officials in Tokyo pro-
claiming their old doctrines of force, that I thought it important to
bring the situation to a clear prespective. So I had recounted and
restated the fundamental principles and undertook to make application
of them to a number of specific conditions such as would logically go
into a broad basic peaceful settlement in the Pacific area.
[1426Jf] There had been every kind of suggestion made as we
had gone along in the conversations. I said that I had considered
everything in the way of suggestions from the point of view whether
it would facilitate, keep alive, and if possible carry forward conversa-
tions looking toward a general agreement, all the while naturally
5372 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
preserviiis the fullest integrity of every principle for which we stood.
I had sought to examine everything possible but always to omit con-
sideration of any proposal that would contemplate the stoppage of the
C(mversations and search for a general agreement for peace.
9. Question: When did you prepare the message which President
Roosevelt was to send to the Japanese Emperor the night of
December (>, 1941 ?
Answer : The idea of a message from the President to the Eaiperor
had been under consideration by the President and myself
as far back as the middle of October, as is clear from the
record before the committee. The message as actually sent
was prepared in final form on December 6, and included
contributions made in the White House as well as material
contained in drafts prepared in the State Department during
preceding weeks.
[-/4^^'5] 10. Question : For the purpose of a question I shall quote
from the President's message to the Emperor : "Thus a with-
drawal of the Japanese forces from Indochina would result
in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South
Pacific area" — end of quotation and I ask : Is it correct to say
that the withdrawal of the Japanese from Indochina, under
a neutral guarantee of the integrity of Indochina by the
interested parties, was the single specific proposal of the
message of the Emperor, sent by President Roosevelt on De-
cember 6? And fulfillment of it would have assured peace
in the southwest Pacific, in the opinion of the President?
Answer : In the President's message to the Japanese Emperor the
President stated that "both Japan and the United States
should agree to eliminate anj- form of military threat." The
President was seeking to make a broad appeal. The with-
drawal by Japan of its armed forces from Indochina would
have assured the creation of an atmosphere which would have
rendered possible resumption of conversations looking to a
peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Con-
versely, Japan's refusal to accept the President's proposal
would expose her real purpose. Indochina was the logical
and by far the most feasible jumping-otf place for a Japanese
movement to the south. The [14^66] President by
his proposal for the neutralization of Indochina on July 24
had already strongly tested Japan's purposes in her continued
movement south by proposing that she get out of Indochina —
and the Japanese Government by its clear-cut refusal be-
trayed its military designs on the South Sea area. This pro-
posal also served to expose Japan's intentions not to consider
peaceful arrangements with us unless we were prepared to
make all the concessions. The President was now making an
additional last-minute appeal. He, of course, knew that the
huge Japanese armada had already left the jumping-off place
in Indochina, which, .from our viewpoint, meant that the
danger of attack could not have been more imminent.
Nevertheless, the President believed that he should not neg-
lect even the slim chance that an additional last-minute
appeal might save the situation. It also served to make clear
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5373
to the American people and to the workl our interest in
maintaining peace up to the very last minute,
11. Question: Was there any tiling in the December 6 message pro-
posing a Japanese withdrawal from China — a pledge not to
interfere should the United States be drawn into war by
Germany — or a proposal for Japan's adherence to a seven-
power nonaggression pact ?
Answer: [14M7] Inasmuch as the November 26 proposal
of this Government was already before the Japanese, the ap-
peal to the Emperor was made specifically applicable to the
critical situation created by the Japanese military movement
from and within Indochina which we had very much in our
minds. Indochina was the seat of the most acute and iminent
danger at that moment. The other subjects at issue with
Japan mentioned in your question had been thrashed out over
and over again chiring 6 months of conversations.
Throughout the conversations we had vainly urged on
Japan that she abandon conquest, including the conquest of
China. We also had asked the Japanese to give up her alli-
ance with Germany and Italy which was directed against us,
but they clung to that alliance like they clung to their very
life. We had fully demonstrated the utter impossibility of
getting Japan to budge on these questions.
Questions 12, 13, and 38 are grouped in a single answer.
12. Question: The intercepted diplomatic messages of the Japanese
show that on November 26 Nomura and Kurusu requested
permission of Tokyo to request that President Eoosevelt wire
to a Japanese official, Premier Tojo, I presume, and ask that
peace be maintained for the sake of posterity and that Japan
replied with a cordial message, were you aware, on November
29, that this document was in the possession {142€8'\
of the American Government as decoded on November 28?
(Intercepted messages, exhibit 1, p. 180.)
13. Question : The intercepted Japanese messages show that, on No-
vember 28, the Japanese Ambassadors received from Tokyo a
message that was secretly intercepted and decoded by the
American Government on the same day, and which said:
I quote: "I contacted the man you told me to in your No.
1180 and he said that under present circumstances what you
suggest is entirely unsuitable" end quotation : were you aware
of the existence of this document on November 30^ (Cf. In-
tercepted messages, exhibit 1, p. 195, last two sentences of
No. 844.)
38. Question: You saw the intercepted Japanese messages, did you
not?
Answer : I was at all times intensely interested in the contents
of the intercepts. I instructed my secretaries to show me
promptly any and all intercepts of material value and im-
portance to the State Department. This, it seemed to me,
they did. So far as I was able to judge, all of such intercepts
were shown to me. The State Department was on a 24-hour
basis and messages received in the Department after office
hours in whatever form when important were delivered to
5374 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
me at my home. At this late [14^69'\ date, in 1946,
I cannot be certain wliether I received and read at the time all
important intercepts or whether it might be possible that some
of those I have read since that time or recently are con-
fused in my mind with what I read at the time. I kept no
records as to when particular messages reached me.
Questions 14, 82, and 83 are grouped in a single answer.
14. Question : It is proved by the intercepted messages, is it not, that
Japan on November 28 had rejected the proposition of an
exchange of peace messages between the heads of their respec-
tive states ? ( No. 844, p. 195, exhibit 1. )
82. Question : Will you please look at message No. 844, page 195,
exhibit 1, and state as to whether or not that message relates
to a message from the President to the Emperor?
83. Question : If your answer to the last question is "yes," then will
you explain why the message was sent on the night of the 6th
of December 1941, when you and the President had knowl-
edge of the message of exhibit 1, message 844, page 195 ?
Answer : The intercepted message cited (No. 844, exhibit 1. p. 195)
seems to refer to a suggestion by the Japanese [14^0']
Ambassador for a Japanese initiative in proposing to this
Government an exchange of messages between the President
and a Japanese official, presumably the Minister for Foreign
Affairs. The Japanese Foreign Minister, after consulting
with the Navy Minister, apparently did not approve of that
suggestion. In the situation in which we found ourselves
grabbing at straws to save the peace, this Government be-
lieved that no possibility should be overlooked even at the
last minute to appeal for peace. In any case, there was no
reason why the President should not send a message to the
Emperor regardless of the attitude of any particular sub-
ordinate Japanese official.
15. Question : On November 29, 1941, you rejected, did you not, as
useless a suggestion of the Australian Minister that he try
to mediate through Kurusu?
Answer: On November 9, 1941, the Australian Minister called
on me and brought up the question of his conferring with
the Japanese representative, Mr. Kurusu, and suggesting
to Kurusu that Australia would be glad to act as a mediator.
I offered no objection to his taking such a step, but merely
stated my opinion to the Minister that the diplomatic stage
was over and that nothing would come of such a move.
16. Question: [14271] On November 30, or around that date,
did you recommend to the President that he deliver a message
to Congress on the subject of American-Japanese relations?
Answer : On November 29, 1 sent to the President a draft message
to Congress, which Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox
had helped to prepare, together with a draft message from
the President to the Emperor. In my memorandum to the
President I said :
If you should send this message to the Emperor it would be advisable
to defer your message to Congress until we see whether the message
to the Emperor effects any improvement in the situation. I think we
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5375
agree that you will not send message to Congress until the last stage
of our relations, relating to actual hostility, has been reached.
17. Question : What did the President say ?
Answer : I have no specific recollection as to what President
Roosevelt said regarding a message to Congress. But the
record is that he did not send the message to Congress.
18. Question : Why did he not send it to Congress?
Answer: [14272] The President and I had for some time
been communicating to various Members of Congress our
views on the imminent dangers in the situation in connection
with such matters as neutrality legislation and extension of
selective service. A message to Congress during the last few
days would have contained very little that was new without
giving to the Japanese leaders material which would have
enabled them to arouse their people against us all the more,
a thing we wished to avoid so long as there was even the slight-
est possibility of keeping the discussions alive.
Furthermore, the powerful isolationist groups in this coun-
try would probably have renewed their oft-repeated charges
of "war-mongering" and "dragging the nation into foreign
wars." The Japanese leaders would then have been in a posi-
tion to play up the situation as evidencing disunity in the
United States in order to gain support in Japan for plunging
ahead.
19. Question : Did it occur to you, in making such a recommendation
that, either in wording or by precedent, there applied in the
situation of November 30, 1941, that clause in the Constitu-
tion of the United States which provides that, from time to
time, tlie President shall inform the Congress of the state
of the Union ?
Answer: [14^73] I would say that among the considera-
tions which led to the drafting of the message to Congress was
the Constitutional clause you cite, but there was also the
consideration whether sending such a message at that par-
ticular time would have been helpful or otherwise in the
critical situation then existing.
20. Question : Did you tell a press conference on or about December
3, 1941, that the Japanese Government on November 12 had
taken the position that these talks were not informal and
exploratory, rather that they constituted real negotiations,
which were in their final stages and that in the event of
their failure a critical and dangerous situation would result ?
(Cf. For. Eel. p. 75.)
Answer : The question whether the conversations with the Japa-
nese in 1941 constituted real negotiations was not a matter
of unilateral determination. This Government had made it
clear to the Japanese from the outset that our conversations
must remain on an exploratory basis until we could determine
whether there existed a basis for negotiations. That point
was never reached. Later, the Japanese Government ad-
vanced the contention that we were in negotiation, with
Ambassador Grew at Tokyo on November 12 and with us
5376 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
here on November 13. On that day, I made [14^^74-]
the position of this Government quite clear to the Japanese
representatives, as follows:
The Secretary, after asking the Japanese Minister to make accurate
note of what the Secretary was about to say, replied that if we are
to worlv out a peaceful settlement in the Pacitlc area he could do this
only on the basis of carrying on exploratory conversations until we
reached a stage when he could go to Great Britain, to China and to
the Dutch and say to them that he believes tliat the attitudes of Japan
and the United States are such as to afford a basis for negotiation
and that we could call what took place thereafter a negotiation.
(Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-il, vol. II,
pp. 731-732.)
Inasmuch as the Japanese Government did not subsequently
refer to this point, it was to be assumed that it had accepted
this Government's position. There was no occasion for re-
ferring to this point in conference with the press. I did,
however, make clear to the representatives of the press on
November 27 and again on December 3 the seriousness of the
situation.
Questions 21 and 22 are grouped in a single answer.
21. Question : From page 43 of your statement, I quote : "On Novem-
ber 30, 1 was informed by the British Ambassador [14^275^
that the British Government had important indications that
Japan was about to attack Siam and that this attack would
include a seaborne expediion to seize strategic points in the
Kra Isthmus" and quotation — I ask if you recall having any
information on that day from the First Lord of the British
Admiralty indicating a Japanese attack upon the United
States?
22. Question : I quote from the New York Times of December 1, a
dispatch from London under date of November 30 : "A. V.
Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, said that 'if Japan
breaks wnth and attacks the United States we must go with
the United States and I am glad we have been able to send
naval reinforcements to the Far East,' end quotation: Did
you see any official message to the United States of such a
nature ?
Answer: I do not recall receiving any information or messages
on or about November 30 from the First Lord of the Admir-
alty or from any other official source indicating a Japanese
attack on the United States or pledging support to the United
States if attacked; nor has there been found in the Depart-
ment of State any record of such information having been
communicated to the Department of State.
23. Question : [14276] Was it a fact that, on November 30, and
thereafter, the predominant opinion in the War Council was
that, the attack would come against others rather than the
United States?
Answer : While it was my judgment that the Japanese were likely
to attack in widely separated areas, all observable indications
pointed to the likelihood that the attack would occur in the
Southwest Pacific area. The most threatening activities
known to our Government, so far as I saw or heard, were the
Japanese movements near the jumping-off place in Indochina.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5377
Malaya, the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies, and Siam
were well within range of attack from that jumping-off place.
The competent and appropriate military officials, I believe,
have spoken for themselves on this subject.
24. Question : When did you first see the cablegram from Ambassador
Winant, dated December 6, and received in the State Depart-
ment December 6, as to the movement of the Japanese fleet
toward the Kra Peninsula ?
Answer : The telegram in question, No. 5918 from the American
Embassy in London, England, was received, according to the
records, in the State Department at 10: 40 a. m. [14£77'\
December 6. in view of the message's character, of the no-
tation that it was "most urgent," and of the fact that it was
headed "Personal and Secret to the Secretary and the Presi-
dent," it must have been shortly after its receipt that I saw it.
25. Question: In your prepared statement to this committee, Mr.
Secretary, I find no reference to your conversation with the
Japanese* Ambassador on August 16, the day preceding the
delivery of two notes to Japan by the President; and I ask
if it is correct to summarize that conversation of August 16
in these words : to the Ambassador's "pointed" request for a
resumption of the conversations you stood by your position
of July 23 in which you stated that because of Japan's viola-
tion of the basis of the conversations by its seizure of Indo-
china you saw no basis remaining; and after you had sug-
gested that the Ambassador might see the President, if he
desired, Nomura replied that he would be in no position to
talk to the President until his Government had wired him
concessions which he, as previously stated, believed his Gov-
ernment was willing to make in order to have the conversa-
tions resumed? (Cf. Foreign Relations II, pp. 553-554.)
Answer: The conversation of August 16 with the Japanese
[14^78] Ambassador is correctly summarized in Foreign
Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931^1, volume II,
pages 553-554:
The Ambassador of Japan called at his request. He proceeded to say
that he had again read over the documents that he and I had had under
discussion, that he had been in communication with his Government,
and that he believed there were grounds for progress in the conversa-
tions. He said that his Government was very desirous of working out
peaceful relations between our two countries and he elaborated further
along this line and against the idea of war. He stated that he would
favor concessions in order to avoid war and that from what he heard
from his Government, it would make concessions in order to avoid war.
He said that in fact it would be glad to have a high Japanese oflacial
meet a high American official half way between the two countries in
order to take up the matter in its final form.
The Ambassador then pointedly inquired of me whether
conversations such as he and I had been conducting could
be resumed between our two Governments. I proceeded to
reiterate and repeat the circumstances leading up to the cessa-
tion of our conversations and the reasons which I set forth
through Mr. Welles for their discontinuance. I did not pass
further on the question which he propounded [14^79]
but left it as it was. The Ambassador remarked that the
79716 — 46— pt. 11 16
5378 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
situation was critical and it was very important in his judg-
ment for suitable steps to be taken to avoid serious develop-
ments but I still revealed no sign whatever of saying any-
thing favorable about his request for a resumption of con-
versations. I said that as the matter stands Japan with her
Army, Navy, and air forces was establishing many bases in
and about French Indochina under her continued policy of
conquest by force, that this would mean about the last step
prior to a serious invasion of the South Sea area if it should
be decided upon by Japan, that such an invasion would be a
serious menace to British success in Europe and hence to the
safety of the Western Hemisphere, including the United
States, and that, therefore, this Govermiient could not for a
moment remain silent in the face of such a threat, especially
if it should be carried forward to any further extent. The
Ambassador remarked that the people of Japan did not have
enough foodstuffs and went to Indochina to secure such
needed connnodities as rice. To this I promptly replied that
if Japan had been willing to go forward with a peaceful
settlement of the Pacific area in line with the principles and
policies the Ambassador and I had discussed, Japan would
have been able peacefully and without the use or threat of
force to have equal access with every otlier nation to world
IJ4^80] markets for rice and all other foodstuffs.
The Ambassador repeatedly said that his country was very desirous
of peaceful relations with this country in the future as well as now
and that he beiieved his Government would make some concessions
in order to resume conversations to this end. I expressed interest in
this and again referred to Japan's continuing policy of conquest by
force and of bitter denunciation of this country by the Government
controlled press which is loudly supporting such a policy, and again
I said that I would not be in a position to say anything relative to
his request in addition to wliat I said some days ago when he first
brought up the matter.
I suggested to the Ambassador that the situation was very serious
and that if he desired to talk to any others on this subject or to the
President it would be perfectly agreeable with me and I would not
consider it as in in any way going around me. et cetera. The Ambassa-
dor said that he would not be in a position to talk to the President
until he first telegraphed his country for instructions as to what con-
cessions it might be willing to make in connection with a resumption
of converations.
26. Question : In your memorandum of the conversation in the White
House among the President, Ambassador Nomura and
[14£S1] yourself on August 17, you state that the Pres-
ident requested the Ambassador to come to the White House
(cf Foreign Relations 11, p. 554) : my question is: Had the
President been informed that on the previous da3^ August 16,
the Japanese Ambassador had stated that he did not wish to
see the President until he had received concessions from the
Japanese Government which he, the Ambassador, believed his
Government would make?
Answer: I find from the records that I informed the President
prior to the White House conference on August IT of the
substance of my conversation with the Japanese Ambassa-
dor on the previous day, I refer to President Roosevelt's ''
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5379
telegram to Prime Minister Cluircliill, of August 18, 1941,
which is a committee exhibit.
27. Question : Is it correct to state that tlie State Department records
show no offer of concessions by Japan on August 17, 1941?
Answer: This Government at no time in the course of the con-
versations of 1941 talked to the representatives of the Jap-
anese Government in terms of "concessions" to be made by
Japan as condition for an agreement. It made known to the
Japanese Government that its willingness to [142S2]
enter into an agreement with Japan was contingent upon
Japan's adopting consistently peaceful courses. At no time
did the Japanese Government give any practical evidence on
Avhich this GoA^ernment could rely or dependable pledges that
the Japanese Government intended to pursue policies of
peace.
28. Question: When did the war with Japan become inevitable?
Answer: The question of the inevitability of war with Japan
involved two factors, the factor of Japanese plans and objec-
tives and the factor of time.
With regard to Japanese objectives, it is clear from the
record that following the advent in 1927 of the Cabinet of
General Tanaka, who inaugurated the so-called positive policy
toward China, Japan had consistently been pursuing only one
fixed policy — that of expansion by aggression. In 1931
Japan occupied Manchuria by force; in 1933, Japan seized
Jehol, penetrated Chahar and extorted from China a demili-
tarized zone in north China. The truculent statement of
Amau, spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office, on April
17, 1934, in which Japan made clear a purpose to compel
China to follow Japan's dictate and to permit other countries
to have relations with China only as Japan allowed, made
crystal clear [14283] Japan's policies of aggression.
In 1937 Japan embarked upon military operations in north
China which soon developed into an all-out attack on the
whole of China. On September 21, 1938, 1 told the Canadian
Minister that I had been in'oceeding on the theory that Japan
definitely contemplated domination, by any and every kind
of means, of East Asia and the Western Pacific area. In
furtherance of these objectives Japan in September 1940
entered into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy,
Japan's program thus being merged into a far-flung drive
for world domination of which Japan's share was to be East
Asia. On January 15. 1941, in a statement in support of the
lend-lease bill before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives. I pointed out that Japan was
out to establish herself in a dominant position in the entire
region of the Western Pacific and that her leaders had openly
declared their determination to make themselves masters of
an area containing almost one-half of the entire population
of the world. In the light of Japan's steady course of expan-
sion by force, it was manifest that she would attack in her
own good time unless we surrendered our principles.
As I have repeatedly stated, this Government had fully
taken into account Japan's record when it entered into the
5380 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
conversations with the Japanese in 1941. [14£84] Nev-
ertheless, tlie American Government responded favorably to
the Japanese request that we enter into conversations looking
to a settlement of Pacific questions even though it realized
that there was but a slight chance that thereby Japan could
be brought around to adopt peaceful courses.
The second factor, that of time, was considered by us in
the light of contemporary developments. Through the years
that the Japanese Government was standing for policies of
aggression, this Government was standing for policies of
peace and of law and order with justice, as is clear from the
record. These opposing policies were utterly irreconcilable.
We knew that would would not surrender at any time our
basic principles. As a result of our close-up conversations
with the Japanese, we could not escape the conclusion that
Japan would not abandon her policy of aggression. Our
long-standing appraisal of Japanese policies and purposes
of aggression and of attacking us and other countries in the
Pacific area in furtherance of those purposes, was supported
by Japanese utterances and acts. As regards the element of
time, I was satisfied by early October from the evidence of
feverish Japanese military activities and movements, the
bellicose pronouncements of Japanese spokesmen and of the
Japanese press, reports of growing political tension
[J4^8S] in Japan, as well as from what was disclosed by
the intercepted Japanese messages that the time when they
would attack us was rapidly approaching.
In looking back upon the developments in theix entirety
during the last weeks and months prior to Pearl Harbor it can
be clearly seen that our judgments and our methods of deal-
ing with Japan as we did were overwhelmingly vindicated
by Japanese acts and utterances as they later unfolded.
At any time prior to Japan's attack it lay within her power
to avert a war in the Pacific by abandoning her policy of
aggression, just as a bandit might avert a clash with his in-
tended victim by suddenly becoming law-abiding. Up to
that time there was always open to her an honorable and
reasonable alternative to the courses of aggression which she
was pursuing — an alternative which would have given her
all she professed to seek in the way of access to raw materials
and markets, as well as other rights and opportmiities en-
joyed by all nations. It lay solely within Japan's disposition
to adopt a peaceful alternative and to revoke the decisions
reached at the Imperial Conference of July 2, which reaffirmed
Japan's purpose of subjugating China and which called for
military advance to the south to establish "the great East
Asia sphere of co-prosperity", that is to say, to establish
Japanese [14^86] domination in Southeast Asia and
the islands of the Western Pacific area.
Questions 29 to 33 and 45 to 47 are grouped in a single answer.
29. Question : When did you decide that further negotiations were
useless and that you were going to turn the matter over to the
Army and Navy ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5381
30. Question :When did you advise either the Army or the Navy that
you were turning the matter over to the army or navy or both ?
31. Question: What had happened that you told Secretary Stimson
you were turning the mater over to the Army and Navy?
32. Question: Had you conferred with the President on the matter
of turning the matter over to the Army and Navy?
33. Question : Give date and conversation with the President on this.
45. Question : Do you recall having a conversation with the Secretary
of War, Mr. Stimson, about the negotiations with Japan
being terminated and that you were turning the matter over
to the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, or the
Army and Navy ?
[14^87] 46. Question : Will you state the date and the conversa-
tion.
47. Question : If such a conversation took place, did you consider that
such conversation turned the matter over to the Army and
Navy?
Answer: After this Government had received and studied the
Japanese proposal of November 20, which has already been
described, together with Kurusu's representation to me on
November 21 that Japan had nothing more to offer, it became
obvious, especially in the light of Japan's menacing military .
movements and of the indisputable proof derived from inter-
cepted Japanese messages that the November 20 proposal was
their last word, that the chances of meeting the crisis by
diplomacy had practically vanished. From November 22 on
it was my individual view that Japan was through with
any serious conversations looking to a peaceful settlement.
From that day I and my associates had reach a stage of
clutching at straws in our effort to save the situation. We
groped about for anything that might offer any possibility
for keeping serious conversations going. We gave considera-
tion to possible choices in an effort to determine the wisest
and most feasible course.
[14^SS] From November 22 on I did not conceal my
conclusions on these points. It was on November 25 at the
meeting of the War Council that I again emphasized the
critical nature of the situation and stated more formally
that, "the matter is now in the hands of the Army and the
Navy." My most acurate recollection of my conversations
along this line with the President and the War and Navy
officials was contained in my statement of December 30, 1941,
to the Roberts committee. I rely upon that statement to
refresh my present recollection. The portion of that state-
ment dealing with this point is as follows :
On November 25 and on Noveiuber 28, at meetings of the War Council,
at whicli tlie higliest officers of tlie Army and the Navy of course were
present, I emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this coun-
try with Japan : I stated to the conference that there was practically
no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan ; that in my
opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new
acts of conquest by force ; and that the matter of safeguarding ovir
national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy. At the
conclusion I with due deference expressed my judgment that any plans
for our military defense should include an assumption that the
5382 CONCiRESSlONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japanese might make [l-'i289] the element of surprise a central
point in their strategy and also might attack at various points
sininltaneonsly with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of
coordination for purposes thereof.
The expression, "the matter is now in the hands of the Army
and the Navy," as applied in the situation which then arose,
does not imply any idea of a transfer from the Department
of State to the Departments of War and of the Navy of any
part of the Department of State's functions or responsibilities.
Nor do I think that there was any misunderstanding on the
part of the President or of the Secretaries of War and of
the Navy as to the sense in which this expression was used.
It seemed self-evident that the Army and the Navy would
be our chief reliance in the lioht of the critical situation known
to all of us. It was, of course, the understanding of each of
us that the Department of State would continue to function
and coordinate its action with that of the Army and Navy,
but I emphasized that we could no longer be expected mate-
rially to control the situation.
Questions 34 and 35 are grouped in a single answer.
34. Question : Other than the Winant message, dated December 6, re-
ceived by the State Department about 10 : 40 a. m., December 6,
1941, did 3^ou have any other information as to the [14^90^
Japanese Fleet movements as indicated in the Winant mes-
sage?
35. Question : If so, will you state what the information was and when
you received it?
Answer : According to State Department records, similar infor-
mation was received from the Navy Department (from the
commander in chief. Asiatic Fleet) and from the War De-
partment (from the United States military observer at Singa-
pore.). The Navy report was available in Washington at
10 : 57 a. m., December 6, and I am informed that the War
Department report, so far as the records indicate, came in
December 6 followed by a lengthy conference on the morning
ment to the committee, the records show several telephone
conversations between War and Navy officials and myself on
December G follewed by a lengthy conference on the morning
of December 7 between Secretary Stimson and Secretary
Knox and myself. These conversations on December 6 and 7,
according to my best recollection, comprised discussion of the
Japanese convoys and other information regarding Japanese
military movements which we had previously received.
Questions 30 and 37 are grouped in a single answer.
36. Question : [14^91] 1 show you a memorandum, exhibit 40,
and ask you if there was any discussion with you or anyone
else to your knowledge on this subject of armed support?
37. Question : Who assured the British of American armed support
as mentioned in their instructions to Singapore as shown by
the message of our naval observer at Singapore to Admiral
Hart?
Anwer: Tliere was no discussion wnth me or with anyone else
to my knowledge on the subject of advance assurance to Brit-
ain of armed American support which would have served
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5383
as a basis for the telegram from the commander in chief of
the Asiatic Fleet to the Navy. Department quoted in exhibit
No. 40. or for the message from Singapore referred to in ques-
tion 37. I do not know who, or whether anyone, assured
the British of American armed support. However, after wit-
nessing the suicidal experiences of countries like Belgium
and Holland which had failed to confer with the Allies be-
fore they were invaded, it seemed to me but natural and nec-
essary that the three or four governments deemed in immi-
nent danger of attack by Japan may well have had conver-
sations befoi-e the attack, subject, so far as we were concerned
in the matter of commitments, to our constitutional limita-
tions.
[1I^292^ 38. See answer to questions 12 and 13.
Questions 39 and 40 are grouped in a single answer.
39. Question: Do you recall the one of November 7 — "all arrange-
ments must be completed by the 25th 'I "
40. Question : Did that message cause you to give the warning to the
Cabinet ?
Answer: I recall the message of November 5 (exhibit No. 1,
p. 100) that, "all arrangements for the signing of this agree-
ment must be completed by the 25th." I do not definitely
recall whether the message referred to in question 39 was
before me when I warned the Cabinet of the dangers in the
situation on November 7. The record shows that the mes-
sage in question was available on November 5, and presum-
ably I saw it. I would say that my statement, to the Cabinet
was prompted by. conclusions derived from a number of
sources.
Questions 41 and 42 are grouped in a single answer.
41. Question : Mr. Secretary, you were familiar with our exhibit 16
and exhibit 17, wherein both Admiral Stark and General
Marshall requested time?
42. Question : [14^9rj] Prior to your sending the note of the
2r)th, were you familiar with the contents of the memorandum
to the President, dated November 27, by Admiral Stark and
General Marshall?
Answer: I was familiar with the joint memoranda of Admiral
Stark and (Tcneral Marshall of November 5 and November 27.
I do not know just when those memoranda were brought to
my attention, but I am satisfied that I did not see either
memorandum prior to its date. I was, of course, familiar
with the views of General Marshall and Admiral Stark in
regard to their desire for time, and I myself was animated
by a desire to do everything I could to gain time.
Questions 43 and 44 are grouped in a single answer.
43. Question : What dicl you do to obtain the time as asked for by
Marshall and Stark in their memorandums of November 5
and 27 ?_
44. Question: Did you discuss this question with the President and
what was said by the President and you in that discussion ?
Answer: Generally s])eaking, our entire's months of conversa-
tions involved gaining time. There was no conflict between
this objective and our intensive efforts to persuade
5384 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[14294^] the Japanese to pursue policies of peace. After
the Imperial Conference at Tokyo on July 2, 1941, the
Japanese in pursuance of the decision to move south, pro-
ceeded rapidly with the necessary preparations for a military
movement on a large scale.
It was obvious that the time of such attack as Japan would
make w^ould be of Japan's own choosing, and would depend
upon Japan's own estimate of her readiness and of favoring
circumstances. It was not within the power of this Govern-
ment otherwise than by abject submission to Japan's terms,
to halt Japan in her course. However, I endeavored at all
times to treat with the Japanese in a spirit of open-minded-
ness, patience and goodwill. I sought from the outset of
the conversations to explore thoroughly every possibility of
bringing about a peaceful, fair and stabilizing settlement of
the situation in the Pacific, and I spared no effort to keep
always open a door to the continuation of the conversations.
At the same time I had to be on guard against any manifes-
tation of weakness which might have encouraged the Jap-
anese to be more precipitate than they were in their action.
In this way, I believe that we gained months of valuable time.
It became clear, however, in October, as I saw it, that the
Japanese had decided to strike in their own time unless this
Government should be willing to yield abjectly [14^95]
to Japan's terms. I constantly discussed with the President
the question of gaining as much time as possible and we had
the subject very much in mind throughout the conversations
with the Japanese.
45-47. See answer to questions 29 to 33.
48. Question : Did the Secretary of State's office prepare a final draft,
one ready for delivery to the Japanese, of a modus vivendi ?
Answer : A draft of the modus vivendi dated November 25 which
was labeled "Final draft," meaning that that was the last
draft that was made of that document, has been furnished
the committee. It cannot be accurately said that that draft
was "ready for delivery to the Japanese," as it is impossible
to tell what further revision might have been made if a de-
cision had been made to offer the Japanese a modus vivendi.
49. Question : Did you show such a draft to the Ambassadors of
Britain, China, and the Netherlands ?
Answer: The latest draft of the modus vivendi shown to the
British, Chinese, and Netherlands diplomatic representatives
was the draft of November 24. There were only [14^96]
minor differences between the November 24 and the Novem-
ber 25 drafts.
50. Question: I call your attention to exhibit 19, page 1, where you
used the following words: "My personal view continued as
oil yesterday, November 28, to be that its sending will be of
doubtful efficacy. Except for the purpose of making a rec-
ord, it might even cause such a complication as Colonel Stim-
son and I referred to on yesterday." I ask you, Mr. Secre-
tary, to explain what conversations you and Colonel Stimson
had with the President and what was said by each of the
parties in that conversation ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5385
Answer : I do not recall precisely what conversations Mr. Stimson
and I had with the President on or about November 28 in
regard to the proposed message to the Emperor other than
the points mentioned in my memorandum which you cite.
We all realized, of course, that the Emperor at that time was
powerless before the military leaders. I recall very clearly
that I had in mind that the sending of a message to the Em-
peror might have prejudiced the situation owing to the
probability that such an appeal would be likely to arouse
resentment among the real leaders of Japan, because of our
having gone over their heads, and moreover might have been
interpreted as [14^97] weakness, since the Japanese
themselves do not normally shift from a bold front attitude
to one of pleading until the situation with them is desperate.
These points, to the best of my recollection, were all brought
out in the discussions I had with the President and Mr.
Stimson.
51. Question: What did you mean by the expression "for the purpose
of making a record" ?
Answer : The expression, "for the purpose of making a record,"
has reference to the matter of making perfectly clear to both
the American and Japanese peoples then and for the future
that all the efforts of this Government were directed toward
maintaining peace to the very end.
52. Question : When did you first know that the President had sent a
message to the Emperor ?
Answer: I was in consultation with the President at all stages
of the drafting of the message to the Emperor and the mes-
sage, of course, was sent through the State Department. I,
therefore, was aware of the message being sent at the time
of its sending, about 9 p. m., December 6, 1941.
Questions 53 to 56 and 84 to 87 are grouped in a single answer.
53. Question: [14^98] Was it before or after you learned
of the pilot message, being message 901, exhibit 1, page 238?
54. Question : Was it before or after you learned that Japan was re-
plying to your November 26 message ?
55. Question : Was it before or after you knew the contents of any
part of the 14-part message, a reply to your November 26
message ?
56. Question : Had you learned of the receipt of any of the 13 parts of
the 14-part message, being message 902, page 239, exhibit 1,
before it was decided by the President, or by you, to send a
message to the Emperor?
84. Question: When did you first learn that the Japanese were reply-
ing to your note of November 26 ?
85. Question : When did you first see any of the parts of the 14-part
message 902, exhibit 1, page 239?
86. Question: When did you first learn that the message was to be
delivered in accordance with a time later to be determined?
87. Question : When did you first see the message No. 844, page
[I4299] 195, exhibit 1, which contained the language:
"therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Gov-
ernment on this American proposal which I will send you in
2 or 3 days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This
5386 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
is inevitable. However, I do not wish to give the impression
that the negotiations are broken off."?
Answer : I cannot recall definitely the exact time when any of the
messages referred to were seen by me.
During the period in which those messages were being re-
ceived and distributed, my attention was focused on reports
of the extremely menacing movement made manifest by the
sailing of the large Japanese armada from the jumping-off
place in Indochina. Those reports thus were of more serious
and urgent import than any threatening phase of intercepted
messages relating to Japan's reply to our communication of
November 26. As I made clear in my conversations and state-
ments during those last days prior to Pearl Harbor, I felt
that war would break out at any time and that the Japanese
had given clear indication as to the course they would take.
Notification through the intercepts of a forthcoming Jap-
anese communication announcing that the Japanese would
not continue the conversations was only confirmatory of the
judgment which I had been passing on to my colleagues in the
[^IJfrSOO] Government during the previous fortnight.
Even had the intercepted messages clearly indicated im-
mediate war, they could only have referred to attack by
the gathering Japanese forces whose movements we had been
watching for days.
From the time the Japanese presented their drastic ulti-
matum on November 20, no intimations were given us that
the Japanese would make the slightest concessions in their
demands, but, on the contrary, they drove steadily forward
to the attack with their armed forces, while, at the same
time, misrepresenting the attitude of this Government. The
Japanese reply of December 7 was a false and fraudulent
statement in the worst of bad faith of Japan's case and a
monstrous misrepresentation of our position in what turned
out to be a brazen attempt to shift from themselves to us
responsibility for their attack upon us.
Questions 57 to 60 are grouped in a single answer.
57. Question : Did you discuss with the President the modus vivendi
message ?
58. Question : If so, what was said about it by the President and what
did you say to the President ?
59. Question : \1430i] Did you ever discuss with the President
the fact that you were not going to send the modus vivendi
but were going to send the note of the 26th?
60. Question : If you had such a conversation or discussion with the
President about tliat date on the modus vivendi will you give
us the conversations?
Answer: I was in constant touch with the President and con-
sulted him fully at all stages of our consideration of the
modus vivendi proposal. It is impossible to recall the details
of the discussion, but the trend of our thought was indi-
cated in my statement before the committee on November 19,
1945. The President at no time expressed any dissent from
views expressed by me. On November 26 I recommended to
the President — and he approved — my calling in the Japanese
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5387
representatives and handing them the broad basic proposals
while withholding the modus vivendi plan.
Questions 61 and 62 are grouped in a single answer,
61. Question: Was it usual for the President to confer with Am-
bassadors on Sunday?
62. Question : Can you state why the meeting was held between the
[14S02] Japanese Ambassador and the President on Sun-
day, August 17, 1941, the day the President returned from the
Atlantic Conference?
Answer: Although, during the conversations with the Japanese
in 1941, August 17 was the only Sunday occasion on which
the President had received them, I had conversations with
them by appointment made at their request on four other
Sundays: namely, May 11, June 15, June 22, and December
7. I, therefore, attached no special significance to the Presi-
dent's receiving them on Sunday and I do not know the rea-
son, other than possibly the President's convenience, why the
President received them on August 17 rather than an early
subsequent weekday. It is true, of course, that the President
did attach great importance to the communications which
he made to the Japanese Ambassador on that occasion.
63. Question : Would you say that only an extraordinary matter re-
quired that the President on a Sunday, and at the hour of his
return to Washington from a conference with the head of
another Government should deliver to a third Government a
note which he said, "he regretted the necessity to deliver but
which he felt compelled to deliver"?
Answer: [14S03] I would not conclude that otherwise
than as indicated in replay to your question No. 62, only an
extraordinary matter required the President on a Sunday, and
at the hour of his return to Washington, to receive the Jap-
anese Ambassador. The world was then on fire and the ag-
gressor nations, including Japan, were wholly untrustworthy
and treacherous, capable of undertaking a desperate stab at
any time. Those of us in charge of foreign policy during
this critical period were accustomed to spend most Sundays in
our respective oflices, including Sunday conferences involv-
ing both the President and foreign ambassadors.
64. Question : Was the situation between the American and Japanese
Governments on August 17, the following : Because of Japan's
violation of the basis of the conversations, by the seizure of
Indochina, the American Government had broken off in-
formal, exploratory conversations looking to the reestab-
lishment of traditional relations and, because of the aggres-
sion against'Indochina, the American Government had broken
economic relations with Japan?
Answer: An accurate description of the situation between the
American and Japanese Governments on August 17 will be
found in the two oral statements handed by President
[14^304] Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador on August
17, 1941.
I think I should add that it was my strong opinion that
the Japanese had convinced themselves that we were inade-
5388 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
quately prepared and that tlierefore we would make sacrifices
of our principles before undertaking to fight in their defense.
It was incumbent on us, in justice to the Japanese as well as
to ourselves, to tell them that if they pushed us too far, we
would resist. I repeatedly and pointedly made this clear to
the Japanese representatives in my conversations with them.
President Roosevelt did likewise when he conferred with Am-
bassador Nomura on August 17 and agreed to resume the
conversations. These representations were calculated to
sober somewhat the Japanese militarists bent on aggression.
But the Japanese did not take them as a threat, as the record
of subsequent events shows.
65. Question : In your memorandum of the White House conversation
of August 17, you say: "The President thereupon said that
this Government should really bring the matters between the
two Governments literally up to date and that he would there-
fore, offer certain observations about the position of this
Government; he added that he regretted the necessity of so
doing but that he had no other recourse;" (cf. Foreign Rela-
tions, vol. 2, p. 5.55). Will you give the [l^SOS] in-
terpretation in the terms of diplomacy of the statement by
the head of one nation to another nation, with whom rela-
tions are critically strained, that he regrets the necessity of
a note which he is about to deliver but that he has no other
recourse but to deliver it?
Answer: It seems perfectly clear to me that what the President
regretted was that the Japanese should have created a situa-
tion which rendered necessary a message of the import of the
one which he at that time delivered to the Japanese. The
President was endeavoring, in friendly fashion, to impress
upon the Japanese Government our attitude as I have de-
scribed it in answer to question 64.
66. Question : Do you know of any agreement with another power
which had fixed the date of delivery of this note, and the
second note, to be August 17 ?
Answer : I do not know of any agreement with any other power
which called for delivery on August 17 of the two communi-
cations which were made to the Japanese on that date. The
official record shows, however, that President Roosevelt told
Prime Minister Churchill at their Atlantic meeting that he,
the President, planned to see the Japanese Ambassador imme-
diately on his return to Washington.
[14306] Questions 67 and 68 are grouped in a single answer.
67. Question : Do you know on what date that other power took the
same action as the President took in line with their agreement
for the making of parallel representations to Japan ?
68. Question : Have you ever seen the text of the representations which
were made by the British Government on August 17, or any
subsequent or preceding date, agreed upon to be made paral-
lelly with those made by the President on or about August 17 ?
Answer: The Department has no record of any parallel action
taken by the British Government corresponding to the ac-
tion taken by the President vis-a-vis the Japanese on August
17, and I know of no parallel action taken by the British
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5389
other than the radio address of the British Prime Minister
on August 24, 1941.
69. Question : The President by his action of August 16 was deciding
ipso facto, not to await a bid which you had every reason to
believe was coming from Japan. Did you suggest waiting?
Answer: Our judgment as to potentialities of Japanese policy
[l/p307] had to be formed in the light of Japan's actions
toward implementation of the decision of the Imperial Con-
ference of July 2, 1941, which called inter alia for a military
advance south, of Japan's rejection of the President's pro-
posal of July 24 to neutralize Indochina, and of 3 months of
searching conversations with the Japanese Ambassador.
With these in mind, it was idle to expect that the "conces-
sions" which the Japanese Ambassador suggested might be
forthcoming from his Government would be addressed to the
fundamentals of the situation, which from our point of view
called for Japan's removal of the menace she was creating to
the United States and other peaceful nations and for her
desisting from her aggressive courses. If Japan had in fact
any intention of revising her position and adopting peaceful
courses, there was nothing in the President's communication
to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17 which would have
tended to discourage Japan from adjusting her position;
on the contrary, what the President said on that occasion
was calculated to help rather than hinder reconsideration by
Japan of her policies. There was therefore no advantage
whatever in awaiting a further Japanese initiative.
Questions 70, 71, and 72 are grouped in a single answer.
70. Question: I find no reference, Mr. Secretary, in your prepared
[I43OS] statement, to a communication from the Japanese
Foreign Minister and an accompanying commentary by
Ambassador Grew received by the State Department soon
after midnight on August 18, 1941 : Do you recall such docu-
ments which the State Department published in Foreign
Kelations 11, pages 560-565?
71. Question : They establish, do they not, that at the time the Presi-
dent was delivering the first and then the second note of
August 17, the Japanese Foreign Minister was delivering
to Ambassador Grew^ a lengthy overture for the resumption
of the conversations looking to a restoration of traditional
relations? (N. B. Tokyo time, 14 hours later.)
72. Question : And in transmitting the Japanese message. Ambassador
Grew quote : "With all the force at his command, for the sake
of avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly
futile war between Japan and the United States, that this
Japanese proposal not be turned aside without every prayer-
ful consideration . . ." also that the proposal w^as "unprece-
dented in Japanese history" and had been made with the
approval of the Emperor and the highest authorities of the
land ; that is correct, is it not ?
Answer: [14^09] There is no controversy about the con-
tents of the documents referred to in Foreign Relations of
the United States, Japan, 1931-41, volume II, pages 560-
5390 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
5G5, containing an account of the approach made by the
Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Grew
in regard to a proposal for a meeting between the Japanese
Prime Minister and the President and a statement of Am-
bassador Grew's reaction. That Japanese proposal is dis-
cussed and analyzed at some length in my prepared state-
ment to the connnittee, which it is unnecessary to repeat here.
The President and I, together with our Far Eastern advisers,
were looking at the situation with the benefit of all the world-
wide information available to us in Washington. We judged
that the Japanese Government had no serious expectation of
reaching an understanding at the proposed meeting unless
the American Government surrendered its basic position
while Japan rigidly adhered to and went forward with its
policy of aggression and conquest. We had fully tested out
the Japanese Government by preliminary inquiries and found
it adamant in its position.
Nothing in the record of subsequent developments has con-
tradicted our judgment at that time, but on the contrary,
events have vindicated it. For example, the memoirs of
Prince Konoye subsequently published in serial form in the
Asahi Shimbun, a leading Tokyo newspai)er [14310]
running from December 20 to December 31, 1945, state that
the Japanese army leaders agreed, in writing, on August 4,
1941 to Konoye's proposal for a meeting with the President
only on condition that Japan adhere firmly to its fundamental
policy and that in the event the President did not see eye to
eye with the Japanese, Konoye would leave the meeting place
determined to make war on the United States. Konoye also
disclosed in his memoirs that at an Imperial Conference on
September 6, 1941, the Japanese Government decided, in case
there was no expectation within the first 10 days of October
to gain her demands on the United States by diplomacy, to
go to war with the United States, and accordingly to parallel
diplomatic efforts with military preparations.
These disclosures by Konoye show conclusively that the
Japanese would attack in their own chosen time unless we
should surrender abjectly to the drastic Japanese ultimatum
of November 20 and that if we had made no reply instead of
delivering our communication of November 26, the 10-point
proposal, the Japanese would have attacked just the same.
73. Question: On November 7, 1941, you warned the Cabinet they
might look for an offensive by Japan at any time. What
did you base that warning on?
[14-311] Answer : My warning to the Cabinet on November 7
was based upon the acceleration of Japanese military activi-
ties and disquieting military disposals, especially in Indo-
china, the growing agitation in the Japanese press and among
Japanese spokesmen for positive action, the pressure tactics
employed by the Japanese Government toward forcing accept-
ance by this Government of the Japanese proposals, as well
as the corroborative evidence of the intercepted Japanese
messages.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5391
74. Question : When did you draft the 10-point note of November 26 ?
Answer: Under the modus vivendi proposal the Japanese would
have been committed to affirming that their national policies
were directed toward lasting peace throughout the Pacific area
and that they had no territorial ambitions therein. Its ac-
ceptance was also subject to the understanding that during its
life (of ^ months subject to a further extension) there would
be further conferences looking to a peaceful settlement cover-
ing the entire Pacific area. There was attached to the modus
vivendi proposal a plan of a comprehensive settlement as one
practical exemplification of what we had in mind. This
plan, consisting of two sections, a draft of a mutual [i^S/^]
declaration of policy and a statement of the steps to be taken
by the two Governments, was common to both the modus
vivendi proposal and the communication of November 26.
Some of the material in section 1 was drafted months earlier,
the remainder, including the material in section 2, in the
course of a few days preceding November 26, and the latter
part of the accompanying explanatory statement, which was
not contained in the modus vivendi draft, on November 26.
Questions 75 and 76 are grouped in a single answer.
75. Question : At any time before it was sent, did you show it to the
President or call the contents to his attention ?
76. Question : If so, what was your conversation ?
Answer: In the light of the foregoing explanation, it is clear
that as the President was thoroughly familiar with the en-
tire proposal, all that was called for was to consult with him
about dropping the modus vivendi feature of the proposal.
This I did by presenting to him a memorandum on November
26, a copy of which is in the hands of the committee, and
obtained his prompt approval. I do not recall the details
of any conversation on this.
Questions 77 and 78 are grouped in a single answer.
[14^31S] 7. Question : Did you see the message from General
Marshall to Geenral Short on November 27 ?
78. Question : If you saw such a note, when was its contents called to
your attention ?
Answer: I have no recollection that I saw before the publication
of the Roberts Report the substance of General Marshall's
message to General Short of November 27, 1941.
Questions 79 and 80 are grouped in a single answer.
79. Question : Did you the diplomatic relations between Japan and
America grow worse after November 27 ?
80. Question : If they did grow worse how do you account for no
other message being given to the commanders in the field?
Answer: Diplomatic relations between Japan and the United
States could scarcely grow worse after November 27, except
in the sense that the crisis foreseen by us and planned by the
Japanese approached closer at hand. There was nothing
fundamentally new in the diplomatic situation. That situ-
ation as we viewed it, especially from November 21 until the
attack on Pearl Harbor, was that Japan [^IJ^SUf]
5392 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
might strike at any time and that the diplomatic establish-
ment could not be expected to preserve national security.
81. Question: Will you explain in detail if you were consulted in
connection with the message to Short which contained the
phrase "If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States
desires that Japan commit the first overt act" and also in
regard to not arousing the citizens ?
Answer : I have no recollection of having been consulted in con-
nection with the considerations which entered into inclusion
in General Marshall's message to Short of the phrase, "If hos-
tilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan
commit the first overt act," or in regard to the caveat against
arousing the citizens. This was primarily a military
question.
82, 83. See answer to question 14.
84, 85, 86, 87. See answer to questions 53-56.
88. Question : Did not that message 844, exhibit 1, page 195, indicate
to you that your note of the 26th was not acceptable and,
therefore, that war was imminent 2
Answer: I was already satisfied that the Japanese would not
agree to anything short of complete yielding by the United
[14^315] States to Japan's demands. The intercepted
Japanese message to which you refer did no more than con-
firm what we already knew. As I have pointed out repeatedly
Japan was bent on attacking us unless we made abject sur-
render to her demands as an aggressor. We had no serious
thought that Japan would accept our proposal of November
26. I said at the time that there was only the barest pos-
sibility of her accepting. She would have proceeded to at-
tack us whether we had presented that proposal or any other
proposal — unless it had been one of humiliating and abject
surrender — or whether we had offered no proposal at all.
Furthermore, while a number of us in the State, War and
Navy Departments were desirous of grabbing at any straw
and therefore hoped for favorable action on the modus
vivendi, most of us agreed that the chances of its acceptance
were very slim. The testimony of Army and Navy officials
on this point is in the record.
The November 26 proposal was another test of whether
Japan was willing to abandon conquest and to adopt peace-
ful policies; if she were so willing she would have seized
upon our ten-point program as highly desirable.
89. Question : Where were you on the night of December 6, 1941 ?
Answer : I was most invariably at home at night working on
[14'-^16] Departmental matters. While it is possible that
I might be mistaken, my best recollection is that I was at home
on the night of DecemlDer 6, 1941.
90. Question : When did you first see or obtain information as to the
contents of the following messages in exhibit 1 :
j^904— page 245.
#907— page 248.
#908— page 248.
#909— page 240.
#910— page 249.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5393
Answer : I do not recall the exact times that I first saw or learned
of the contents of the messages you cite.
Questions 91 to 96 are grouped in a single answer.
91. Question : Did you discuss any of the intercepted Japanese mes-
sages with the President?
92. Question : If so, give us the conversations.
93. Question : Did you discuss any of the intercepted Japanese mes-
sages with General Marshall ?
94. Question : If so, give us the conversations.
\^lJiB17'\ 95. Question: Did you discuss any of the intercepted
Japanese messages with Admiral Stark?
96. Question : If so, give us the conversations.
Answer : At this late date in 1946 I do not recall whether I dis-
cussed any particular messages or the details of the discus-
sion with the President, with General Marshall, or with
Admiral Stark. It is true that in many of our conversations,
including those with Secretaries Knox and Stimson, and
some with the President, some of us would bring up one or
another of the intercepted messages. But I have no recollec-
tion of discussions of specific messages.
97. Question : Who called the meeting in your office on the morning
of December 7?
Answer : As I recall it, the meeting in my office on December 7
was the result of a mutual agreement on the part of Mr. Stim-
son, Mr. Knox, and myself. It might have been suggested
in the first instance by any one or two of us three. Accord-
ing to my best recollection, the proposal for a meeting grew
out of a desire to continue our dis- {^11^318^ cussion
of the situation created by the movement of the huge Japa-
nese armada southward and westward of the southernmost
point of Indochina.
98. Question : Tell us with whom you talked personally, by phone, or
messenger, about this meeting and what was said.
Answer: I cannot recall material details beyond what I have
given in reply to question 97.
99. Question : Please state in detail what was said by the persons at-
tending the meeting in your office on December 7, 1941.
Answer : As I indicated in my prepared statement to the joint
committee as well as in my oral testimony. Secretary Stimson,
Secretary Knox, and I in our conference of December 7, 1941,
discussed the critical situation created by the large-scale Jap-
anese military movement from the jumping-off place in Indo-
china. I cannot recall details of that discussion. Secretary
Stimson has described the discussion in his statement to the
Committee and that statement speaks for itself.
Questions 100 to 102 are grouped in a single answer.
100. Question : Our record shows that the President saw the 13 parts
[14319'] of the 14-part message at about 9 : 30 p. m., De-
cember 6, 1941. Did you see or talk to the President from
that time until after the attack at Pearl Harbor ?
101. Question: If so, give us your conversations.
102. Question : If you did not see him or talk to him or contact him —
were you available?
79716 — 46— pt. 11 17
5394 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Answer : I have no record of nor do I recall having seen or having
talked with the President between 9 : 30 p. m. on December 6,
1941, and the moment of the Japanese attack on Pearl Har-
bor. According to my best recollection, I was available dnr-
ing all of that period.
Questions 108 and 104 are grouped in a single answer.
103. Question : Did anyone from the Army, Navy, or State Depart-
ments, or executive offices contact you on Saturday, December
C, and/or Sunday, December 7, up to 2 p. m. Sunday?
104. Question : If so, give the conversations.
Answer: I was in constant contact during Saturday, December 6,
and Sunday, December 7, with officers of the State Depart-
ment and of the Army and Navy. As recorded in annex
A [14^20] Df mj'' statement to the committee, I had
on those 2 days conferences, consultations and telephone con-
versations— as entered in engagement books — with represen-
tatives of the Army and the Navy, as follows :
Secretary
Secretary
Secretary
call from Admiral
50
15
45
December 7 10 : 30
10 : 30
December 6 10 : 45 a. m. : Telephone call from
Knox.
11 : 50 a. m. : Telephone call from
Stimson.
1 : 00 p. m. : Telephone call from
Stimson.
1 : 15 p. m. : Telephone
Stark,
p. m. : Captain Schuirmann.
p.. m. : Telephone call to Admiral Stark,
p. m. : Telephone call to Secretary
Knox,
a. m. : Telephone call to Admiral Stark,
a. m. : Secretary Stimson, Secretary
Knox.
2:10 p. m.: Telephone call from Admiral
Stark.
In addition, I had many conferences on those days with
officers of the Department of State. It would be [14^21]
impossible to recall the details of all the conversations which
took place, but I might say that the Japanese large-scale
military movement from the jumping-off place in Southern
Indochina was very much in the minds of all of us who were
called upon to consider that situation. We were striving to
ascertain the full significance of those military movements,
their probable destination, etcetra.
Questions 105 and lOfi are grouped in a single answer.
105. Question: ]Mr. Secretary, will you agree that the official records
of American-Japanese relations from August 28, 1941, until
December 7, 1941, show that the Secretary of State never con-
sidered that the Japanese Government was bluffing in its as-
sertions that, should no agreement be reached with the United
States, Japan would strike ?
106. Question : In this connection, Mr. Secretary, will you agree that
the records established that the Secretary of State accepted at
face value the statements in diplomatic exchange wherein
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5395
Konoye on August 28, Toyoda on September 27, Togo on
November 12, Nomura on November 12, and Kurusu on No-
vember 17 and 18, indicated or said that a rupture of the
conversations would mean war in the Pacific? (Cf. Foreign
Relations 11, pp. 572-3, 642, 719-22, 725, 740, 747.)
[14J'2^] Answer : My view, as set forth in the record of Amer-
ican-Japanese relations over several years, was that Japan
was not blufling but was on a steady and fixed course of con-
quest which would reach us in Japan's own chosen time. I
believed that Japan was playing the role of an international
desperado, and it is the principal business of a desperado —
whether a nation or an individual — to fight. During that
period Japan believed that she was exceedingly well armed
for the purpose of achieving her intended conquests in the
Pacific area. She likewise knew that at that time we were by
no means sufticiently armed in the Pacific to resist successful!}^
a Japanese attack. Therefore, at the time, to which your in-
quiry related, I was satisfied that Japan was not bluffing but
rather was giving us a last chance to yield our basic prin-
ciples which Avould enable her to continue her course of ag-
gression and conquest without further serious risk of success-
ful resistance.
When we realize that Japan was carrying on flagrant ag-
gressions and ruthless invasions of peaceful countries, that the
United States was pleading with her from the beginning to
cease her course of military conquest in close partnership with
Hitler, and that all problems in the Pacific would practically
settle themselves at once [14'3'2S] when Japan adopted
a policy of peace, it becomes apparent that she had no more
right to make demands on the United States — as though we
too were an aggressor, instead of a law-abiding country plead-
ing for peace — than an individual gangster has to assume a
like attitude toward his intended victim. It is in the light
of these circumstances that we must view all the arguments
which the Japanese used in trying to browbeat the United
States into yielding, such as those described in the reference
cited in your question.
Questions 107 to ] 09 are grouped in a single answer.
107. Question: In this respect was the Secretary's evaluation of the
situation at one with Ambassador Grew's, namely that the
Japanese were not bluffing but could be expected to strike
suddenly and dramatically?
108. Question: Did the Secretary, with the information from Ambas-
sador Grew that the Tojo cabinet had advised the Emperor as
to how far it would go with the United States, and, with
the information from an intercepted Japanese message that a
deadline had been fixed for November 25, tell the American
Cabinet on November 7 that a new and sudden Japanese ag-
gression was to be looked for? (Cf. Foreign Relations 11,
pp. 700-1, Intercepts, [^4^^] ex. 1, p. 100, Peace
and War, pp. 135-7.)
109. Question: Did the Cabinet thereupon vote unanimously that
Secretary Knox and Under Secretary Welles should deliver
5396 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
addresses on Armistice Day to the end of informing the nation
as to American -Japanese relations? (Cf. Peace and War,
pp. 136-7; 776-87.)
Answer : In reply to these questions, I quote the first paragraph of
page 29 of my prepared statement to the committee :
On November 7, I attended the regular Cabinet meeting. It was
the President's custom either to start off the discussion himself or to
ask some member of the Cabinet a question. At this meeting he
turned to me and asked whether I had anything in mind. I thereupon
pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the international
situation. I went over fully developments in the conversations with
Japan and emphasized that in my opinion relations were extremely
critical and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack
anywhere by Japan at any time. When I finished, the President went
around the Cabinet. All concurred in my estimate of the dangers.
It [14325] became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical
situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the coun-
try would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development.
I also quote a paragraph from Peace and War, pages 136-
137:
Four days later, on November 7, Secretary Hull stated at a
Cabinet meeting that relations between Japan and the United States
were extremely critical and that there was "imminent possibility"
that Japan might at any time start a new military movement of con-
quest by force. It thereupon became the consensus of the Cabinet that
the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order
that the country would, if possible be better prepared for such a
development. Accordingly, Secretary of the Navy Knox delivered
an address on November 11, 1941, in which he stated that we were
not only confronted with the necessity of extreme measures of self-
defense in the Atlantic, but we were "likewise faced with grim possi-
bilities on the other side of the world— on the far side of the Pacific" ;
that the Pacific no less than the Atlantic called for instant readiness
for defense. On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles,
[l/f32S] carrying out the cabinet suggestion in an address, stated
that beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror had reduced
more than half of Europe to abject serfdom and that in the Far East
the same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all nations
bordering on the Pacific. The waves of world conquest were "breaking
high both in the East and in the West," he said, and were threatening,
more and more with each passing day, "to engulf our own shores." He
warned that the United States was in far greater peril than in 1917;
that "at any moment war may be forced upon us."
110. Question : Subsequent to November 7, will the witness agree that
the official records and his testimony here show that he
advised high military officials of the Government and also
the British Ambassador that a sudden attack anywhere in the
Pacific by Japan must be anticipated ?
Answer: In reply I quote from Peace and War, 2 paragraphs
appearing on pages 144-145 :
On November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of high officials
of this Government, Secretary Hull emphasized the critical nature of
the relations of this country with Japan. He stated that there
[14327] was practically no possibility of an agreement being
achieved with Japan ; that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to
break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force ; and that the
matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the
Army and the Navy. The Secretary expressed his judgment that any
plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the
Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their
strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with
^OCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE . 5397
a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for pur-
poses thereof.
On November 29, 1941, Secretary Hull conferred with the British
Ambassador. The Secretary said that, "the diplomatic part of our
relations with Japan was virtually over and that the matter will now
go to the officials of the Army and Navy." He said further that it
would be "a serious mistake for our country and other countries
interested in the Pacific situation to make plans of resistance without
including the possibility that Japan may move suddenly and with every
possible element of surprise and spread out over considerable areas and
capture certain positions and posts before the [14328] peaceful
countries interested in the Pacific would have time to confer and for-
mulate plans to meet these new conditions ; that this would be on the
theory that the Japanese recognize that their course of unlimited con-
quest now renewed all along the line probably is a desperate gamble and
requix'es the utmost boldness and risk."
Furthermore, I and my associates were in daily consulta-
tion with the Army and Navy officials throughout the period
after November 7, exchanging information and views as to
the critical character of the situation.
111. Question : Is it correct to say that the intercepted dispatch from
Tokyo on November 28 (No. 844, p. 195, Ex. 1) giving the
reaction to the American notes of November 26, and also the
intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to Berlin on November 30
(No. 985, p. 204, Ex. 1) informing Hitler of Japan's inten-
tions, confirmed the judgments you had been stating in official
councils since November 7 ?
Answer: During this period all the information we received
made clearer Japan's purpose to attack unless the United
States yielded to them. In other words, Japan had no inten-
tion of yielding any part of her plan of conquest by force,
but was giving the United States, by its pro- [14^29]
posal of November 20, a last opportunity to choose between
yielding or fighting. Insofar as the intercepted Japanese
messages cited in the question indicated that in consequence
of the refusal of the United States to yield to Japan's un-
reasonable demands the Japanese intended to take forcible
measures to gain their ends, those intercepted messages served
to confirm my judgments as expressed by me in official coun-
cils, especially during those last few weeks.
112. Question: Did not the fact that JajDan, without a declaration of
war, attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, confirm, in their
entirety, the judgments you had been offering in official coun-
cils since November 7 ?
Answer: Japan's attack on a number of points over a sweep of
thousands of miles, one of which points was Pearl Harbor,
at about the same time confirmed our judgment as to the
critically dangerous character of the situation.
113. Question : Do you recall, Mr. Secretary, your meeting with the
Japanese Ambassadors in your apartment on the night of
November 22 in which they pressed for a reply to the Jap-
anese note of November 20? (Cf. How War Came, p.
[14.3SO] 304, also For. Eelations 11.)
Answer : I do recall my meeting with the Japanese Ambassadors
on November 22 when they pressed for a reply to the Jap-
anese proposals of November 20. During the month of No-
5398 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HAI^OR ATTACK
vember the Japanese representatives were insistently worry-
ing me with their importnnities for a quick understanding,
intimating that otherwise something awful would happen.
114. Question: I quote in full a secret message from Tokyo to the
Ambassadors, under date of November 22, intercepted by
the Army at Washington and translated on the same date:
(Secret)
From : Tokyo
To : Washington
November 22, 1941
(Urgent)
#812
To both you Ambassadors.
It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in
my No. 736. You should know this, however, I know you are working
hard. Stick to our tixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts
and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons
beyond [14S31] your ability to guess why we wanted to settle
Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next 3 or
4 days you can finish your conversations with the Americans ; if the
signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you —
twenty-ninth) ; if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get
an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in
short if everything can be finished we have decided to wait until that
date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be
changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please
take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you
ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you
two Ambassadors alone." (Cf. Intercepts No. 812, p. 165, exhibit 1,
our record.)
Did you telephone the President on the night of the 22 concerning this
intercepted message? (Cf. How War Came, p. 304.)
Answer : To the best of my recollection I did not telephone to the
President on the night of tlie 22d of November in regard to
the intercepted message quoted in the question, and I find no
record of having made such a call.
115. Question : Did you on November 26 hand the Japanese Ambassa-
dor [143S3] an oral statement which rejected the Jap-
anese note of November 20 ?
Answer : Please refer to my replies to your questions Nos. 6 and 7.
116. Question : Did you, at the same time, hand them a tentative 10-
point proposal for a broad settlement of the Pacific situation ?
Answer : Please refer to my reply to your question No. 8.
117. Question : Did the Japanese Ambassadors say that their Govern-
ment would throw up its hands because of these American
documents and that their nature was tantamount to meaning
the end of the conversations ?
Answer: What the Japanese representatives said is covered
in the memorandum of my conversation of November 26,
1941, with the Japanese representatives. (Foreign Rela-
tions of the United States, Japan. 1931^1, vol. II. pp.
764-766) .
As I saw the situation at that time, the Japanese had
in fact already "thrown up their hands," and, as subsequent
disclosures show, their fleets and armed forces [14S3S]
were then moving for an attack on some five points extending
over a vast space. The attitude evinced by the Japanese
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5399
on the occasion under reference was confirmatory of their
fixed purpose of requiring us to surrender our basic policy
while they maintained intact their policy of aggression and
force.
118. Question : Did the reports of the Japanese Ambassadors to their
Government concerning the meeting of November 26, reports
known to you by the interception of the messages to Tokyo,
coincide in the main with your understanding of what had
taken place on November 26 ?
Answer: The published record of this Government (Foreign
Kelations of the United States, Japan, 1931-41, vol. II, pp.
764^765) contains a full account of the substance of the
conversation which I had with the Japanese representatives
on November 26. The accounts in the Japanese intercepted
messages of that conversation in order to be correctly evalu-
ated must be considered in the light of the background of the
situation. It is my understanding that the main object of
the Japanese Government in pressing for a reply to their
November 20 proposal was to ascertain beyond any doubt
whether this Government would yield to the Japanese or
whether this [14334] Government was going to stand
firm, and if the Japanese had learned that we were standing
firm they would continue forward with the attack. Our
position of not yielding was as clear as crystal to the Jap-
anese Ambassadors, and all their talk of being "dumb-
founded" at the nature of our November 26 proposal was a
prelude to an attempt, by outrageously false statements
uttered in the utmost of bad faith, to shift to this Govern-
ment responsibility for what they were planning. As show-
ing this thought w^as specifically in their minds, I quote from
the Japanese message 1190 of November 26, appearing on
pages 182 and 183 of exhibit 1, especially that portion which
reads as follows :
The United States is using the excuse that she is at present nego-
tiating with the various competent countries. In view of the fact
tliat she will propagandize that we are continuing these negotiations
only with the view of preparing for our expected moves, should we,
during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our
scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility for
the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been
times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing con-
versations because of our invasion of French [14335] Indo-
china. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rup-
ture in our negotiations antl suddenly enter upon independent opera-
tions, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as
counterpropaganda against us.
The foregoing is a virtual admission that the Japanese
Ambassador recognized that responsibility for a rupture
would be Japan's and of a purpose to attempt to shift that
responsibility.
119. Question: There is, in the record, an intercepted message from
Tokyo, No. 823, page 173, which advised Nomura and Kurusu
that the deadline fixed for November 29 was to be reckoned
in Tokyo time : thus when the President left Washington for
Warm Springs at 3 p. m. on November 28, the time in Tokyo
5400 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
was 5 a. m. of November 29 ; do you know if there were any
coincidence in the fact that the President was leaving Wash-
ington at the time of the expiration of the deadline set by
Tokyo?
Answer: I do not myself recall anything on this point. The
fact was that for some days the President and I believed
that the chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had prac-
tically vanished.
On the day the President left for Warm Springs,
[14^36] November 28, he told the press that he was
leaving on a vacation that had twice been postponed, and that
while he did not know when he would return, he hoped that it
need not be before December 2, adding that he might have
to return because of existing conditions in the Pacific.
Asked how long he expected these conditions to exist, the
President referred the inquirer to Tokyo rather than to
Washington.
120. Question : In a talk at the Thanksgiving Day dinner at Warm
Springs on the night of November 29 the President said,
speaking in terms of the Thanksgiving of the following year ;
"It is always possible that our boys at the military and naval
academies may actually be fighting for the defense of these
American institutions of ours" (cf. N. Y. Times, November
30) : in the circumstances would you say that the limitation to
the boys of the military and naval academies was intended
to have particular significance to the Japanese or to the
American people ?
Answer : I, myself, would not be a party to giving the President's
statement the narrow construction suggested. The state-
ment, directed toward national defense and made to an
American audience, speaks for itself.
Questioji 121 and 122 are grouped in a single answer.
[14^87] 121. Question: I have found, Mr. Secretary, a discrep-
ancy in the date given by you in your statement to the
committee as to an address by Premier Tojo of Japan and
your telephoning the President concerning that address and
other developments; on pages 43-44 of your statement the
date is fixed as of Sunday, November 30; the New York
Times of the morning of November 30, fixes both occur-
rences as of November 29 and gives this authorized state-
ment by the President's secretary, Mr. Early, issued at
Warm Springs on the night of November 29 : I quote Mr.
Early's statement : "As sooA as the President returned to the
cottage following the dinner this evening he found a call
waiting from the Secretary of State, and they held a lengthy
conversation. In view of the reported statement — an Asso-
ciated Press dispatch by the Premier of Japan — the President
tonight is of the opinion that he may have to leave Warm
Springs tomorrow afternoon, arranging the railroad sched-
ule so as to arrive in Washington Monday bef or enoon" : In
view of this record Avould you say that the Tojo speech was
delivered on November 29 and that you telephoned the
President concerning it on November 29?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5401
122. Question : Will you give the conversation between you and the
President ?
[IJfBSS'] Answer: I seem to have telephoned the President on
November 29, instead of on November 30 as, by inadvertence,
was inaccurately stated in my prepared statement to the
Committee. The statement of Premier To jo was, according
to State Department records, delivered in the form of a
message to a Japanese meeting held on November 30. (See
Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. II, p. 148.) The
apparent discrepancy in time may have resulted from the
fact that Japanese time is .about 14 hours laters than "Wash-
ington time, or perhaps the message may have been available
to the press prior to its delivery.
I have no record of exactly what was said in that telephone
conversation. As I told the committee in my prepared
statement, in that conversation I advised the President to
advance the date of his return to Washington.
Questions 123 and 124 are grouped in a a single answer.
123. Question: From page 195 of the record of the Intercepts, ex-
hibit 1, 1 quote :
(Secret)
From Tokyo
To Washington
November 28, 1941
[IJiSSB} # 844
Re your file # 1189
Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but,
in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this
humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely
regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it
as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views
of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will
send you in 2 or 3 days, the negotiations will be de fecto ruptured.
This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression
that the negotiations are broken off: Merely say to them that you
are awaiting instructions, and that, although the opinions of
your Government are not clear to you, to your own way of thinking
the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne
great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we
have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude,
but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending,
making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things
have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your
No. 1180 and he said that under the present cii'cumstances what you
suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best [i^^^O]
you can.
The record is that this intercepted message had been de-
coded and translated on November 28 ; do you recall discuss-
ing it with the President before his departure for Warm
Springs on the afternoon of the 28th ?
124. Question : Did you discuss this intercepted message in your tele-
phonic conversation with the President at Warm Springs on
the night of November 29 ?
Answer : I do not recall discussing with the President the inter-
cepted Japanese message quoted by you.
125. Question : Would you say that it was the Tojo address which
alone prompted your call and the President's return?
5402 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Answer: The gravity of the situation was evident from many
sources. As Tojo's statement reflected the extreme acuteness
of the situation, in that sense it may be said that the state-
ment prompted my telephone call and the President's return.
126. Question : Did the intercepted message of the 28th constitute the
first official knowledge you had of the Japanese Government's
reaction to the notes of the 2Gth?
[14^4^] Answer: As I have already stated, I kept no record
of when particular messages reached me. I can therefore
only presume that the intercepted Japanese message in ques-
tion was the first knowledge I had of what purported to be
the Japanese Government's reaction to this Government's
proposal of November 26. This reaction was fully expected
in the light of the delivery of the Japanese ultimatum on
November 20 and of subsequent developments.
127. Question : The message said definitely, did it not, that the Amer-
ican note was unacceptable, that a rupture w^as inevitable
within a few days, and that Nomura and Kurusu w^ere to
make a pretense of carrying on the conversations until the
official word came to them of the break?
•Answer: The message indicated among other things that the
Japanese Government would not accept as a basis for nego-
tiations the American communication of November 26, that
the "negotiations" would be de facto ruptured within 2 or 3
days and that the Japanese ambassadors were to avoid giving
the impression the "negotiations" were broken off'. I have
hereinbefore pointed ou that I considered serious conversa-
tions over after the 20th or 21st barring the very slight pos-
sibility that the Japanese might come [14^342] back.
When the full facts later came out they further confirmed
our appraisal of the situation,
128. Question : Did you have in mind, in any way, the secret Tokyo
message of the 28th when, on the day following, you told
Lord Halifax that the diplomatic phase was over and that
the situation was now in the hands of the American Army
and Navy ? (Peace and War, pp. 816-817.)
Answer : I do not recall whether I had the message in mind when
I talked to the British ambassador on November 29. Wliat I
told the British ambassador was substantially what I had
been saying to the President and to representatives of the
Army and Navy for some days previously, based on con-
clusions derived from various sources.
129. Question : In line with your convictions as to the intentions of
Japan did you accept at full value the statements expressed
by Tokyo to Nomura and Kurusu on the 28th?
Answer: I considered this message in the light of previous in-
structions to Nonuira and Kurusu to do their utmost to induce
the Government of the United States to surrender its basic
policies. In the message of November 28 the Japanese Gov-
ernment, realizing that the effort had ended [1434^]
in failure, was thanking the Japanese representatives for
their efforts ; secondly the Japanese addressed themselves to
framing up a cloak to cover their attack already under way.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE, 5403
which cloak inchided what was in effect the fantastic and
monstrously false charge that this Government was treating
the Japanese outrageously by refusing to surrender to them.
100. Question : You have testified that on November 29, you prepared
for the President's consideration a draft of a Presidential
message to Congress advising that body of the Anierican-
Japanese situation ?
Answer : Please refer to my reply to your question No. 16.
101. Question : Did you, on the evening of November 29, in your tele-
phonic conversation with the President, discuss such a pro-
posed message to Congress?
Answer: I do not recall whether I discussed the proposed mes-
sage to Congress in a telephone conversation with the Presi-
dent on November 29.
182. Quest on: In the preparation on the 29th of a proposed Presi-
dential message to Congress did you have in mind, in any
[14344-] way, that provision of the Constitution which
provides that from time to time the President shall give to
Congress information as to the state of the Union and rec-
ommend to the Congress such measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient? (Cf. art. 11, sec. 3.)
Answer : Please refer to my reply to your question No. 19.
133. Question : If your answer to the previous question is "no" I
ask you why such a course was considered even to prepara-
tion of a message.
Answer: In the critical situation which then existed it was
deemed important to give consideration to any and all lines
of action that might in the least be helpful in meeting the
situation.
134. Question : You have testified that on Sunday, November 30, Lord
Halifax told you that the British Government had impor-
tant indications that Japan was about to attack Siam and
the Kra Peninsula; did Lord Halifax tell 3^ou that the
British had obtained this information through interception
of a Tokyo message intended for Hitler, personally ?
Answer : [1434-5] I do not recall that the British Ambas-
sador informed me of the source from which the British
Government had had important indications that Japan was
about to attack Siam and the Kra Peninsula, and I find
nothing in the record indicating that he mentioned the
source.
Questions 135 and 137 are grouped in a single answer.
135. Question : A message from the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin
to Tokyo, datecl November 29 and decoded in Washington
on December 1, has the Japanese Ambassador advising his
Government that Kibbentrop had informed him that Ger-
many had information that America's stitf front had practi-
cally ended the Washington conversations; whereupon the
Ambassador had told Ribbentrop that he had no official word
from Tokyo as to the conversations or as to Japan's inten-
tions; my question is: Did this intercepted message from
Berlin to Tokyo fit in with the evidence of previous inter-
cepts, and of Ambassador Grew's reports, that Japan had
5404 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
been keeping Hitler in the dark as to the Washington
conversations? (Cf. Intercepts, exhibit 1, p. 200.)
137. Question : Is it not clearly indicated, if not established, by the
intercept from Berlin of November 29 that on that day neither
the Japanese Ambassador nor Hitler had [14'H6] def-
. inite information as to Japan's intentions toward the United
States ?
Answer: It would seem clear from the message under reference
that the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin had not communi-
cated fi'om his Government to the German Government at
that time a report on the current situation regarding the
Japanese-Ame*rican conversations. The Germans had more
than one way of keeping in touch with Japan. The pos-
sibility is not excluded that Hitler and also Ribbentrop had
received reports from the German Ambassador at Tokyo of
the progress of the conversations. Therefore, I would not
wish to undertake to interpret the message.
136. Question: November 29 was the day of the Japanese dead line?
Answer: Tokyo's message to the Japanese Ambassador No. 812
of November 22, 1941, of which a translation appears on
page 165, exhibit 1, contains the following passage:
There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to
settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next
3 or 4 days you can finish your conversations with the Americans ; if
the signing cv.w be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for
you — [1434^] twenty-ninth) ; if the pertinent notes can be
exchanged ; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and
the Netherlands ; and in short if everything can be finished, we have
decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the
dead line absolutely cannot be changed.
The foregoing bald confession by the Japanese Government
of its plan and patent movement to attack unless the United
States surrendered to the demands in Japan's ultimatum fits
in with all that I said and did following that date.
138. Question : Also intercepted, and decoded in Washington on De-
cember 1, was a message from the Japanese Government to
its Ambassador at Berlin, dated Tokyo, November 30 ; There-
in the Japanese Ambassador is informed that American-
Japanese conversations now "stand ruptured — broken"; the
Japanese Government instructs the Ambassador to see Hitler
and Ribbentrop immediately and to say "very secretly to
them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly
break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan
through some clash of arms" and to "add that the time of
the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone
dreams" ; my question is : Did this message and the attendant
circumstances of it strengthen your [1434-^] convic-
tions as to Japan's intentions? (Cf. Intercepts, exhibit 1,
p. 204.)
Answer: The message to which you refer was cumulative evi-
dence of the conclusions which I had already reached in
regard to Japan's intentions, and which were overwhelm-
ingly supported by the surrounding facts and circumstances.
Questions 139 and 140 are grouped in a single answer.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5405
139. Question : In fixing the deadline for November 29, Tokyo had
secretly advised Nomura and Kurusu that after that date
things would happen automatically, had it not ?
140. Question : Did you consider the message to Hitler on November
30, a portentous automatic happening in the crisis?
Answer: On November 22 the Japanese Government instructed
Nomura and Kurusu in regard to the extension from No-
vember 25 to November 29 for the deadline for the conclusion
of an agreement and stated that: "After that things are
automatically going to happen" (exhibit No. 1, p. 165).
The message from Tokyo to Berlin of November 30, 1941
(exhibit No. 1, p. 204), was, of course, in harmony with
what the Japanese had in mind as revealed through nu-
merous sources.
[14349] 141. Question : Did the President return to Washington
on December 1 ?
Answer : The record shows that the President returned to Wash-
ington from Warm Springs on December 1.
Questions 142 to 145 are grouped in a single answer.
142. Question : Did he direct the preparation of a strong note to
Japan asking of that Government an explanation for its
concentration of forces in the southern part of Indochina?
143. Question: Did the President on December 2, direct the State
Department to hand the Japanese a communication in which
the President stated tl\at Japanese concentrations in south-
ern Indochina implied the utilization of these forces by
Japan for aggression against the Philippines, the Dutch
East Indies, Malaya or Thailand? (Cf. For. Rel. 11, pp.
778-779.)
144. Question: Was such a communication handed to the Japanese?
145. Question: Did that communication state that the Hitleresque
nature of the Japanese concentrations and the broad prob-
lem of American defense had prompted the President's
representations? (Cf. For. Rel. 11, p. 779, last [14350]
paragraph of text of note.)
Answer : The President on December 2 simply directed that in-
quiry be made at once of the Japanese Ambassador in regard
to the reasons for the continued Japanese troop movements
in Indochina. On the same day the Under Secretary of
State, in compliance, with the President's instruction, in-
formed the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu of the
President's inquiry. The record of the matter appears in
Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-41.
volume II, pages 778-781.
146. Question : Did the Japanese military concentrations and mili-
tary movements, known to the American Government in the
period November 30-December 6, 1941, constitute threats to
American Pacific possessions, to the countries neighboring
Japan in the Pacific, and to the American sources of vital ,
materials?
Answer: The Japanese military concentrations and military
movements known to the American Government in the period
November 30-December 6, 1941, so far as I could judge as
5406 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Secretary of State, did constitute serious threats to Ameri-
can Pacific possessions, to the countries neighboring Japan,
and to American sources of vital [14'Ool] materials.
Questions 147 and 148 are grouped in a single answer.
147. Question : Did such threats require that the United States imme-
diately take any and all steps to meet tliem in conformity
with the statement of the American Government to Japan
on August 17, 1941, to-wit :
* * * this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of
Japan that if the .Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance
of a policy or program of military domination by force OR THREAT OF FORCE
of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled
to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward
safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and toward
insuring the safety and security of the United States.
(Cf. For. Rel. 11, pp. 556-7.)
148. Question : Did the Japanese military concentrations and move-
ments of November 30-December 6 constitute a challenge to
the Government of the United States to implement the posi-
tion it had taken in its note of August 17 to Japan?
Answer : The purpose of the United States, in making the state-
ment of August 17 under reference, was to tell [14^352]
Japan in a friendly way that if she kept encroaching upon
our rights and interests, we would defend ourselves. This
Government at that time was acutely concerned over Japan's
refusal to agree to our proposal for the neutralization of
Indochina, to abandon her jumping-off place there, and
otherwise to desist from the menace she was creating to us
and other peace-minded nations. It wholly misrepresents
the attitude of the United States in the period after August
17 to allege that this Government was planning any step
other than that of pure defense in the event the Japanese
should attack. Other aspects of this question, for example,
where, when ftnd how we would resist the Japanese, were
essentially a military matter.
149. Question : Had the Secretary of State, in September 1940, in-
formed Lord Lothian that American actions towards Japan
in the Pacific would be predicated upon a policy of doing
everything legitimately possible to help England win the
war ^ (Cf. Peace and War, p. 575.)
Answer: What I said to Lord Lothian on September 30, 1940,
in regard to this matter is accurately described in my memo-
randum of conversation with him appearing on pages 574-575
of Peace and War. My comments to Lord Lothian \14o5S]
had to do with the broad aspects of the situation created
by the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact but also had special
reference to the winning of the war by Great Britain against
Germany. At that moment Germany had already overrun
much of the Continent of Europe and the British and the
entire Allied cause was virtually hanging by a thread. Every
rational person realizes what would have happened to this
country if Hitler and his allies had succeeded in their
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5407
program. It was in these circumstances that I had my
conversation with Lord Lothian. I said :
The relations between Germany, Italy, and Japan, each having a
common objective of conquering certain areas of the world and each
pursuing identical policies of force, devastation and seizure, have been
during recent years on a basis of complete understanding and of mutual
cooperation for all purposes mutually desirable and reasonably prac-
ticable, wath the result that the recent announcement was part and
parcel of the chain of related events.
I then proceeded to say that this Government lias pursued a definite
and somewhat progressive line of acts and utterances in resisting
Japanese aggression and treaty violations during recent years ; tliat
these acts and utterances liave comprised repeated aid to China, suc-
[1^35'f] cessive moral embargoes, abandonment of the commercial
treaty, actual embargoes under law. the sending of our Navy to
Hawaii, together with appropriate statements and notes of strong
remonstrance against Japanese steps of aggression and constant repe-
tition of the basic principles of world order under law. I added that I
did not undertake to predict, much less to make commitments, as to
how fast and how far this Government may go in following up the
various acts and utterances in which it has been indulging ; that, of
course, the special desire of this Government is to see Great Britain
succeed in the war and that its acts and utterances with respect to the
Pacitic area would be more or less affected as to time and extent by
the question of what course woukl, on the part of this Government, most
effectively and legitimately aid Great Britain in winning tlie war.
150. Question : Had the Secretary of State in August 1941, informed
Lord Halifax that a Japanese movement into the South
Pacific would constitute a danger to England second only to
a German invasion across the English Channel ? ( Cf . Peace
and War, pp. 710-711.)
Answer : What I said to Lord Halifax on August 9 in regard to
this matter is accurately described in my memorandum
[l^-SoS] of conversation with him appearing on pages 710-
711 of Peace and War which reads as follows :
The Ambassador made some inquiry about the amount of aid this
Government might give in case Singapore or the Dutch East Indies
should be attacked. I replied that I myself visualized the problem
and issue in the broader way and that issue is presented by the plan
of the Japanese to invade by force the whole of the Indian Ocean and
the islands and continents adjacent thereto, isolating China, sailing
across probably to the mouth of the Suez Canal, to the Persian Gulf oil
area, to the Cape of Good Hope area, thereby blocking by a military
despotism the trade routes and the supply sources to the British. I
added that this broad military occupation would perhaps be more
damaging to British defense in Europe than any other step short of
the German crossing of the Channel. I said that this Government
visualizes these broad conditions and the problem of resistance which
they present ; that the activities of this Government in the way of
discouraging this Japanese movement and of resistance will be more
or less affected by the British defensive situation in Europe and hence
by the question of the number of American naval vessels and other
American aid that may be needed by Great Britain at the same time.
I said that in the event of further [1^356] Japanese movements
south this Government and the British Government should naturally
have a conference at once and this Government would then be able to
determine more definitely and in detail its situation pertaining to re-
sistance, in the light of the statement I had just made.
5408 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
151. Question: Had the Congress, on November 13, 1941, at the solici-
tation of the President and the Secretary of State, committed
the nation to keeping open tlie sea hmes so that Lend-Lease
might fulfill its function? (Cf. New York Times, November
Answer : My view of the significance of the measure passed by the
House of Representatives on November 13, 1941, providing
for the amendment to the Neutrality Act is contained in a
letter I wrote to Speaker Rayburn and Representative
McCormack on that same day.
In that letter I stated :
The breadth of our self-defense must at all times equal the breadth
of the dangers which threaten us. In the circumstances of today, we
must be free to arm our merchant ships for their own protection ; and
we must be free, in the event of particular and extreme emergency, to
use these ships for the carriage of supplies to nations which are resist-
ing the world- [1^357] wide movement of conquest headed in
our direction. This Government would, of course, use caution in
carrying out the power which it could exercise upon the passage of
the bill.
I also stated :
Tlie greatest intermediate objective of Hitler's armed forces is to
capture Great Britain and to gain control of the high seas. To this end,
Hitler has projected his forces far out into the Atlantic with a policy
of submarine ruthlessness. By intimidation and terror he would drive
our ships from the high seas, and ships of all nations from most of the
North Atlantic. Even in the waters of the Western Hemisphere he
has attacked and destroyed our ships, as well as ships of other Ameri-
can republics, with resulting loss of American lives.
The action of Congress in amending the Neutrality Act
was only one factor in promoting the broad problem of self-
defense, the necessity of which at that time was urgent and
compelling.
152. Question : In addition to the physical threat to the Philippines
as stated in the President's communication to Japan of De-
cember 2, did the Japanese military movements constitute
a danger to the commitments made by Congress in author-
[14^58] izing lend-lease and in re-establishing the Amer-
ican policy of freedom of the seas?
Answer : I would say that the Japanese military movements con-
stituted a danger to the defense of free nations resisting the
world-wide movement of conquest. The intent of lend-lease
was to assist in that defense. The broad question of danger
to this and to all peaceful countries was Japan's military
partnership with Hitler for conquest. A material factor in
the situation was Japan's flagrant violations of American
rights and interests and the jeopardizing of American lives
in China, which portended the extension of such violations
over a much wider area. This Government could not afford
to be deluded by Japan's false claims and pretensions which
masked her designs of conquest, and to be oblivious to our
own serious dangers.
153. Question: You have testified, have you not, that the decision of
the Executive, in the period November 29-December 6, was
not to advise Congress in a message of the state of American-
Japanese relations?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5409
Answer : In my testimony on November 26, 1945, in reply to ques-
tions by counsel as to "what the facts and circum- [14S69]
stances were which led to the decision not to deliver that
message to the Congress prior to December 7, "I set forth
various considerations which influenced the President and
myself against acting prematurely in that matter, I have
also discussed this in answer to your questions Nos. 18 and
19. The issue between isolationists and nonisolationists was
then at fever heat and its line of cleavage extended through
the Congress. The sending of a message to Congress at this
critical juncture would have greatly accentuated that issue
and would have correspondingly encouraged the Japanese
militarists. The fact was that we had been doing our best
to acquaint the Congress and the public with the critical
dangers in the situation, and at the same time to avoid
precipitating the crisis which the military people were anxi-
to defer as long as possible.
Questions 154 to 156 are grouped in a single answer.
154. Question : As one reason for this decision not to send a message
to Congress, you have testified that Congress only a few
weeks before November 29, had by only one vote, sustained
the Selective Service. Are you aware that the vote in ques-
tion was in the House on August 13, 1941, 3^/2 months before
November 29, 1941?
155. Question : [14^60] Are you aware that the vote had to do
with the matter of releasing at the end of a year's service
those whose service had been limited to one year in the original
bill?
156. Question: Are you aware that the House took this vote in ig-
norance of the fact that, a day or two before, the President, at
the Atlantic Conference, was agreeing with the British Prime
Minister on a course of American action with relation to
Japan ?
Answer: Without discussing the technicalities of the selective
service extension bill under consideration in August 1941, it
is still my convicition that the close vote in the House on that
bill, 203 to 202, indicated the violently divided character of
national opinion at the time. Furthermore, had the bill been
defeated, the forces of aggression would have been greatly
encouraged and the nations resisting aggression correspond-
ingly discouraged.
In his message to Congress on this subject, July 21, 1941,
President Roosevelt said :
Today it is imperative tliat I should officially report to the Congress
what the Congress undoubtedly knows : That the international situa-
tion is not less grave but is far more grave than it was a year ago.
[143611 Occasional individuals, basing their opinions on unsup-
ported evidence or on no evidence at all, may with honest intent assert
that the United States need fear no attack on its own territory or on
the other nations of this hemisphere by aggressors from without.
Nevertheless, it is the well-nigh unanimous opinion of those who
are daily cognizant, as military and naval officers and as Government
servants in the field of international relations, that schemes and plans
of aggressor nations against American security are so evident that
the United States and the rest of the Americas are definitely imperiled
In their national interests. * * *
79716— 46— pt. 11 18 ,
5410 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I told the press on August 11, 1941, in response to a ques-
tion whether failure of the bill would have any effect on
Japan, that "the psychological effect alone on many phases
of the international situation would be exceedingly bad, to
say nothing of the actual results."
With regard to the President's communication to the Japa-
nese Ambassador of August 17, 1941, the President had noth-
ing in mind except a friendly approach to discourage Japan
from attacking us. Having participated in that interview,
I received no impression from the President's tone or de-
meanor of any suggestion of a threat. The [^lJt362'\
President in the same friendly tone agreed that the two Gov-
ernments should resume amicable conversations looking to a
peaceful understanding. Such conversations were then con-
tinued in a friendly way for nearly four months. I, there-
fore, do not see how the attitude of this Government could in
any way be construed as offensive or unfriendly or how there
can be any warrantable basis for criticism of the President.
Questions 157 and 158 are grouped in a single answer.
157. Question: Were you advised by anyone as to when the Army
would be ready for war in the Pacific ?
158. Question: Were you advised by anyone as to when the Navy
would be ready for war in the Pacific ?
Answer : The views of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval
Operations on the need of more time for preparedness as set
forth in their memoranda of November 5 and November 27,
1941, were known to me at the time. Furthermore, the Army
and Navy heads for some time had been representing to me
their need of more time in which to strengthen the defense of
the United States.
Questions 159 and 163 are grouped in a single answer.
159. Question: \^14363\ Will you advise the Committee as to
who saw the final modus vivendi as prepared by the State
Department?
163. Question : Will you advise the committee as to who saw your
November 26, 1941, message to Japan ?
Answer: The November 25 draft of the modus vivendi was of
course, seen, as were all previous drafts, by the far-eastern
advisers of the Department of State. It contained nothing
of material substance that was not contained in the November
24 draft and the revisions it represented were largely refine-
ments in the interests of precision. The November 24 draft
was seen by the diplomatic representatives of the British,
Netherlands, and Chinese Governments, and to the best of
my recollection by the President and the representatives of
the War and Navy Departments. I do not know who outside
the Department of State saw the November 25 draft, and in
any case there would hardly have been time for it to have any
wide circulation before the decision was reached on the fol-
lowing day to withhold, in delivering our reply to the Jap-
anese, the modus vivendi feature. On this point I refer to
the three successive drafts of the modus vivendi which are a
part of the record. With regard to the 10-point proposal,
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5411
it is clear [14-364] from my reply to your question
No. 74 that the contents of the 10-point proposal were seen
by all who saw the modus vivendi drafts. However, I cannot
say who, other than the far-eastern advisers of the State
Department, saw the 10-point proposal in the exact form in
which it was set up for delivery to the Japanese. To all of
the modus vivendi drafts, the 10-point proposal was attached,
as the modus vivendi was intended only to facilitate conver-
sations with the proposals in the 10-point communication as
a basis. Japan could not have accepted our modus vivendi
draft without being prepared to take as a basis for further
conversations a program along the lines of the 10-point pro-
posal, nor could she have avoided declaring at the outset of
the conversations that she would pursue a peaceful course,
such declaration being set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
the modus vivendi in language as follows :
1. The Government of the United States and the Government of
Japan, both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, aflSrm that
their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace
throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs
therein.
2. They undertake reciprocally not to [1^365] make from
regions in which they have military establishments any advance by
force or threat or force into any areas in southeastern or northeastern
Asia or in the southern or the northern Pacific area.
Questions 160, 161, 164, and 165 are grouped in a single answer.
160. Question : Will you advise the committee as to who opposed the
sending of this modus vivendi ?
161. Question : Will you tell us who favored the sending of this modus
vivendi ?
164. Question : Will you advise the committee as to who opposed the
sending of this message (the November 26 message) ?
165. Question : Will you advise us who favored the sending of this
message ?
Answer: While I, of course, consulted the military and naval
authorities of this Government and with the far-eastern ad-
visers of the Department of State on all plans for dealing
with the critical situation in relation with Japan, the re-
sponsibility for decisions, except in matters which I felt
should be referred to the President, rested [14^66]
with me, and I took no poll of "ayes" and "nays." So far as
I am aware, however, among the top officials whose function
it was to make decisions, there was no dissent at any stage of
our intensive consideration in the days between November 22
and November 26 of the modus vivendi proposal or the 10-
point proposal.
The situation with which we were called upon to deal be-
tween November 22 and November 26 was briefly as follows :
We had the indisputable evidence of the intercepted Japanese
message of November 22, referred to in my reply to your
question No. 136, that the Japanese Government had in-
structed its representatives that there must be acceptance of
its terms without any possibility of further concessions and
within a definite time limit — November 29. I and my asso-
ciates could not escape the conclusion from a reading of the
5412 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japanese message that the Japanese had decided to attack
unless the United States made basic concessions.
In our chitching at straws to see how far we could go toward
tiding over the situation we got up the modus vivendi plan
for possible inclusion as a part of our reply along with a plan
for a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific
area. The modus vivendi plan called for the participation
of the Governments of Great Britain, Australia, and the
Netherlands in connec- [14367] tion with the provi-
sions in the plan for the modification of the freezing measures.
We consulted those Governments and also the Chinese Gov-
ernment which was vitally concerned. Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek's reaction to the modus vivendi plan as communi-
cated to this Government was that if there was any relaxa-
tion of the embargo by this Government, or even a belief on
the part of the Chinese people that such action would be
taken, Chinese morale would be shattered, Chinese resistance
would collapse, and the Japanese would be able to gain their
ends. In the light of this serious development and of the
chances being overwhelmingly against Japan's acceptance of
the modus vivendi proposal, especially as we had convincing
evidence that Japan was already moving forward with her
military forces and had reached the jumping-off place in
Indochina, consideration of all the surrounding circum-
stances relating to the difficulties and the imminent dangers
in the situation led to a conclusion not to propose our modus
vivendi draft to the Japanese.
In any event the modus vivendi plan would not have en-
hanced appreciably the chances of Japan's adopting our
counterproposal, for what we would have offered the Jap-
anese in the modus vivendi was mere chicken feed compared
with what they were asking for, as set forth in their ulti-
matum of November 20. The view that Japan would not
accept our counterproposal, even with the [14368]
modus vivendi feature, was, to the best of my recollection,
shared by all the high officials in the Government who are
known to have expressed any views on the subject, as, for
example, the following instances : On November 24 Admiral
Stark, in a circular message, addressed, among others, to the
Commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, pointed out that the
chances of a favorable outcome of the negotiations with
Japan were very doubtful and that a surprise aggressive
movement by the Japanese in any direction was a probability.
On November 25 Admiral Stark followed up that message
with a letter to Admiral Kimmel. In the letter he stated that
he had held up dispatch of the letter pending a meeting with
the President and Mr. Htill. Admiral Stark stated that
neither the President nor Mr. Hull would be surprised over
a Japanese surprise attack and that they had confirmed the
view expressed in the previous message regarding the gravity
of the situation. Secretary Stimson in his diary entry for
November 25 stated that at a meeting at the White House
the President expressed the view that, "We are likely to be
attacked perhaps as soon as — perhaps next Monday."
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5413
Some persons, in attempting to reconstruct the situation
which then existed, seem to have been misled by Japanese
charges misrepresenting the character of the 10-point pro-
posah They seem to have completely over- [14^69']
looked the fact, which was subsequently disclosed, that by
November 26 when our proposal was delivered to the Japanese,
orders had already been given to their fleet to sail preparatory
to the attack which was later made according to schedule. It
was this movement to attack which prompted the Japanese
to start preparing their utterly false and fraudulent mis-
representations, which amounted to the monstrous charge,
made in the worst of bad faith, that they had been forced to
fight because our statement of policy as contained in our
November 26 proposal was harsh and humiliating. Neither
the Japanese leaders who falsely pretended to be "dumb-
founded" over our proposal of November 26, notwithstanding
the fact that it was along lines we had been discussing for
months, nor those who supported this Japanese contention had
at any time claimed that the Japanese would make the least
concession beyond their proposal of November 20, nor have
they advanced any suggestion as to what further concessions
the United States would have to make, short of complete
acceptance of the Japanese proposal of November 20.
There was no reason for the Japanese to have come to us
at any stage with their demands, nor was there any need for
a new agreement between the United States and Japan. All
that was necessary was for Japan to [14370] abandon
her course of aggression and adopt one of peace, and the situa-
tion in the Pacific area would have adjusted itself almost
automatically by the observance on the part of Japan, along
with other signatory powers, of the Nine-Power Treaty, of
the Kellog-Briand Peace Pact, and other treaties and commit-
ments, including a commitment to respect the "open door" in
China, to which Japan was a party. Nor must also the fact
be overlooked that while Japan was repudiating these solemn
treaty obligations by taking the aggressive and moving her
armed forces toward us and other peaceful countries, we were
pleading, as a peaceful and law-abiding nation, with Japan
to abandon her course of conquest and likewise become law-
abiding and j)eaceful.
Our position, as summed up in the 10-point program, was
really nothing new to the Japanese. We had been discussing
with them throughout months of conversations broad-gaged
principles, practical applications of which were along the
lines of the 10-point proposal. The proposal was not pre-
sented to them in the form of demands, but merely as an
example of a kind of settlement we would like to see worked
out in the Pacific area. We were not bargaining with the
Japanese as if we ourselves had been offenders. The only
issue or question to be settled was whether we could prevail
upon Japan to abandon [14371] her increasingly dan-
gerous movements of conquest and agree to become law-abid-
ing and to adopt a peaceful course. This was the all-
5414 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
important issue which the Japanese in the end sought to cover
up and dodge.
The 10-point program also summed up, so the general pub-
lic might understand, many of the general and special bene-
fits which might accrue to Japan if she renounced a course of
aggression; such as, enhancement of her national security
through participation in a multilateral nonaggression pact
and through measures calculated to stabilize the situation
in the Far East, including the abrogation by the powers of
extra territoriality in China and the giving of mutual pledges
regarding respect for the integrity of Indochina ; and an ad-
vantageous exonomic program : A generous trade agreement
with the United States, removal of the freezing regulations,
an agreement upon a plan for stabilization of the dollar-yen
rate. What Japan was asked to do in return was to give
practical application to the professions she had made of her
peaceful intent by agreeing to withdraw her armed forces
from China and Indochina, to support no regime in China
other than the National Government of China, and to agree
not to interpret any agreement to which she was a party in
such a way as to conflict with the establishment and preser-
vation of peace throughout the [14^721 Pacific area.
Surely, these latter were reasonable and necessary conditions
for the privileges that were offered to Japan. The 10-point
proposal would have been highly welcome to Japan it she
had had any intention of adopting peaceful courses. It
would be a monstrous travesty of the facts and an unspeakable
libel on this country if the Japanese war lords in their effort
to disclaim responsibility should be permitted to screen and
shift their guilt in the face of all the facts to the contrary.
162. Question : Did you agree with Ambassador Grew and others that
the placing of the embargo upon Japan would mean war ?
Answer: The general proposition regarding the effect of em-
bargoes upon Japan, especially as applicable to the situation
from 1938 to 1940, is set forth on page 88 of Peace and War,
U. S. Foreign Policy. The important fact, however, which
had to be taken into account in the situation at the time when
this Government applied freezing measures to Japan in
July, 1941, was the advance of Japan's armed forces so as
seriously and immediately to imperil the security of this
and other countries. At that stage, Japan was in effect
brazenly demanding military supplies with which to attack
this and other [14S73] countries to the south. The
question of our self-defense had by that time become supreme
with us and impelled us to refuse to furnish the invader with
military supplies.
Questions 166 to 169 are grouped in a single answer.
166. Question : Were you or anyone in the State Department to your
knowledge consulted in regard to the military plan being
drawn up by America, Britain, the Netherlands, and China,
sometimes known as the ABCD block?
167. Question : If you were so consulted will you state who consulted
you and what was said at the conference ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5415
168. Question : Did representatives of the State Department partici-
pate in any of these conversations ?
169. Question : If so, state the name of that representative.
Answer: From time to time I participated from the politi-
cal angle, in discussions with the President and the leaders
of the Army and of the Navy in regard to the subject of the
military conversations with the British and the Dutch for
joint defensive plans. No representative of the Department
of State participated in those [14'374'\ staff conver-
sations, but there was a Department of State representative
who participated in the conversations regarding defense
which were held with the Canadians. There was no Chinese
participation in the foregoing conversations.
In the discussions which I held with the President and the
leaders of the Army and of the Navy in regard to those con-
versations, as made clear above, I did not pass upon the mil-
itary aspect of questions, but occasionally offered comments
and suggestions as a layman. The views that I expressed
were along the lines I had expressed publicly as well as in
talks with diplomatic representatives. I refer you to what I
said in that regard in an addrCvSS on March 17, 1938 (Peace
and WH-r, pp. 412-413) , as follows :
Prudence and common sense dictate tbat, where this and other
nations have common interests and common objectives, we should not
hesitate to exchange information and to confer with the govern-
ments of such other nations and, in dealing with the problems con-
fronting each alike, to proceed along parallel lines — this Government
retaining at all times its independence of judgment and freedom of
action. For nations which seek peace to assume with respect to each
other [1^375] attitudes of complete aloofness would serve only
to encourage, and virtually invite, on the part of other nations law-
lessly inclined, policies and actions most likely to endanger peace.
In the present Far Eastern emergency, we have consistently col-
laborated with other peace-seeking nations in the manner I have just
described. I have said often, and I repeat again, that in this collabo-
ration there is not a trace of alliance or involvement of any sort. We
have scrupulously followed and we intend to follow the traditional
policy of our country not to enter into entangling alliances or involve-
ments with other countries.
On November 25, 1940, I gave my views to the British
Ambassador, Lord Lothian, in commenting upon his ex-
pressed view that there should be conferences between the
naval experts of our two governments with respect to what
each would or might do in case of military outbreaks on the
part of Japan. I said that, of course, there could be no
agreements entered into in this respect, but that there should
undoubtedly be collaboration with a view to making known
to each other any and all information practicable in regard
to what both might have in mind to do, and when and where,
in case of a military move- [14-^76] ment by Japan
in the south or in some other direction.
There was no suggestion on the part of any of us in this
Government, so far as I knew, that in the military staff con-
versations our representatives could go beyond, at the very
most, making recommendations which, of course, would have
been subject to congressional approval.
5416 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Lant:. The committee received a sworn statement dated March
1946 from former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. This state-
ment was in response to inquiry by committee counsel for certain por-
tions of a diary kept by Mr, Stimson. We ask that the statement and
appendix thereto be spread on the record at this point.
The Chairman. It is so ordered.
(The statement referred to follows :)
\_1J,B77^ STATEMENT BY HENRY L. STIMSON, FORMER
SECRETARY OF WAR, TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK, S. CON.
RES. 27, WITH APPENDIX, MARCH 1946
\_lJf378 — p. i^] Statement of Facts as Shown by My Current
Notes and My Kecollection as Refreshed Thereby
The committee already has before it my testimony before the Army
Pearl Harbor Board. At that time I undertook to give the board the
answers to the questions which were asked me as fully as I was then
able, having in mind certain limitations on what I then felt was proper
to discuss, including particularly any matters the revelation of which
might in any way have jeopardized the safety of our then pending
military operations. I am now able, however, to amplify in certain
respects the testimony which I gave before the board.
The evidence which I am able to give the committee comes not only
from my recollection of the events which transpired preceding the
Pearl Harbor attack, but I am able to refresh my recollection fromt
a contemporaneous record which I kept from day to day for my own
personal use. As I explained to the Army board, I had a dictograph
at my house at which I dictated these memoranda each morning before
going to the War Department. I read many excerpts from these to
the Army Pearl Harbor Board. This committee last autumn asked
me for my notes covering the dates of November 5, 6, 7, 10, 21, 24, 25,
26, 27, 28, and December 2 and 7, 1941. [^. 2'] I am attaching
to this statement as an appendix copies of my notes covering these
dates, of matters \_lJt37-9'\ relevant to the Far Eastern situation
and the events leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Although
these extracts speak largely for themselves, they were made roughly
and hastily and were not revised when dictated. They therefore
naturally need some addition to tie them in as a connected story and
to give the whole picture as I saw it. It is for this reason that I am
accompanying them with this statement.
No accurate understanding can be had of the situation which existed
in the weeks preceding the Pearl Harbor attack or of the conduct of
the various individuals concerned unless they are viewed in the light of
the historical events which had been going on for some time and which
ultimately led to the crisis that occurred in December and the war of
the United States with the Axis powers. From some of the comments
which have been made and given wide publicity, one receives the im-
pression that many people have already forgotten the trend of events
* Additional numbers in italics enclosed by brackets represent original pages in the state-
ment submitted by Mr. Stimson, which pages were frequently referred to during the exami-
nation of certain witnesses.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5417
which were coming to a head in the autumn of 1941 and the threat to
our own safety which had unmistakenly developed in the actions of the
two great aggressor nations, Germany and Japan, who ah^eady in the
preceding months and years had begun spreading destruction and
terror throughout a large portion of the civilized world.
[p. 3] Japan had started on her current path of aggression in
the Far East as early as September 1931. She then attacked the Chinese
in Manchuria and overran that territory, flouting her [14^80]
obligations under the Pact of Paris and the Nine Power Treaty. There
then followed her attacks on the Chinese in Shanghai. She invaded
China in 1937, after the conclusion of the Anticomitern Pact with
Germany. The brutal and barbarous type of military aggression for
which she stood was typified by the outrages committed by her Army
in the occupation of Nanking and similar incidents, which by 1941 had
become notorious events of historj^ In September 1940, after Germany
had set out on her temporarily triumphal path toward the subjuga-
tion of the nations of Europe, Japan concluded a military alliance with
Germany and Italy and placed herself formally in the camp of the
Axis powers.
By the summer of 1941, the Japanese intentions in the Far East
became very clear. After Germany attacked Russia in June of that
year, Japan began extensive military preparations — among other
things, calling an additional 2,000,000 men to the colors. The utter-
ances of her war lords became increasingly threatening. She extended
her military operations into southern French Indochina. That she was
headed toward the ultimate occupation of Singapore and the Nether-
lands East Indies, and thence the domination of the [p. ^] en-
tire Southeast Asia, was evident not only from her overt act and
announcements but from certain of her intercepted diplomatic mes-
sages in which her intentions were expressed in more detail.
All of this presented a great threat to our safety and interests. If
Singapore and the Netherlands Indies should be [14'3S1] oc-
cupied, Japan would be strengthened by the acquisition of a great
fortress and a great source of natural resources in rubber and oil,
which would help her greatly to carry on her program of depredation.
The Philippines, which lay between Japan and these British and
Dutch targets, would inevitably be the next victim, and at her mercy.
China might easily be forced to capitulate and taken out of the war.
Our military advisers had given the President their formal advice
that, if Japan attacked British Malaya or the Dutch East Indies or
moved her forces west of a certain line in Indochina, we would have
to fight for the sake of our own security.
On the other side of the world, we were faced with a situation which
was even more critical. Hitler, having seized Norway, France, Bel-
gium, Denmark, and Holland, had just attacked Russia in June of
1941 and the Russians were fighting a desperate battle to stop the
German Army from overrunning a large portion of her territory and
her capital. [p. 5] In the meantime, the Germans were main-
taining large forces deployed on the north coast of Europe as a con-
tinual threat of an invasion of England which, as we know, was ill
prepared to meet it. As we now kiiow from the evidence presented
at the trial of the German war criminals in Nuremburg, Hitler was
planning ultimately to attack the United States and was conspiring
5418 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
■with the Japanese to aid them while they attacked us in the meantime.
It was then very apparent to everyone who had carefully followed the
course of [143S2] events that we would sooner or later have to
meet the threat to civilization which these aggressor nations were
presenting to the world, and the great danger was that the nations
who were then fighting desperately and gallantly to stem this threat
would be knocked out of the war one by one before our turn came and
that we would ultimately be left to face the onslaught alone.
The American people had been slow to recognize the danger, but
by the autumn of 1941 it was beginning to be understood more clearly.
Early in 1941, Congress, in the Lend-Lease Act, had authorized the
furnishing of munitions to the nations fighting the Axis and the shelter
of our ports to their warships. In August 1941 the Congress passed
a bill extending the draft. In November 1941, Congress voted to
repeal important sections of the neutrality law, thus per- [p. 6]
mitting the arming of our ships and their sailing into any combat
zone or belligerent port in the world. On November 23, 1941, Kepre-
sentative Gearhart of California, in a broadcast on the "American
Forum of the Air," after pointing out Japan's breaches of treaty
obligations and her subsequent aggression in China, stated :
Japan's ruthlessness makes her an enemy not only of China but also a common
foe of all nations.
From some of the comments quoted in the public press, one would
get the impression that the imminent threat of war in October and
November 1941 was a deep secret, known only to the authorities in
Washington who kept it mysteriously to themselves. [14S831
Nothing could be further from the truth. At least one of our de-
stroyers had been attacked by German war vessels. Aside from the
war warnings which were sent to our military and naval commanders
in the various theaters of danger, the imminence of war with Japan
was a matter of public knowledge and the people were being warned
time and time again of the danger which was approaching. One need
only read the headlines of the newspapers during this period. For
example, on October 17 the Navy ordered all American merchant ships
in the Pacific to put into safe ports. On October 24 Secretary Knox
publicly warned of a "clash" with Japan and the "seriousness [p. 7]
of the situation." On November 11, 1941 — Armistice Day — the Presi-
dent himself warned the people that the Nation was .facing a world
war again. Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, declared on
that day that "our people realized that at any moment war may be
forced upon us." During this period, day after day, the headlines
warned of the approaching crisis with Japan. On November 26 there
appeared on the front page of the "New York Times" the notice that
the United States consulate in Tokyo had warned Americans to get
out of Japan promptly. On Monday, December 1st, appeared the
headline that "Roosevelt Hurries Back in the Crisis." In Honolulu
itself the papers were carrying equally sensational headlines. For
example, on November 30 appeared the headline "Japanese May
Strike Over Weekend."
Meanwhile we had been doing what we could to get ready for
[14^84] war if and when it came. After the long period neces-
sary to lav the foundations of our ultimate enormous production, the
output or war materials in this countrj^ was beginning to increase
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5419
rapidly; but we were still using large quarntities of it under the
Lend-Lease Act to satisfy the demands of the nations who were
already in the battle and holding off the enemy. We were shipping
all we could spare to England and in particular to Kussia, which was
then in the forefront of the fight.
[p. 8] In the meantime, the War Department was doing what it
could to fortify the Pacific. We were giving all the material and
effectives that we could spare to Hawaii in particular, which was
in fact prior to the time of the Pearl Harbor attack reported to me
Iby the Staff as the best manned and equipped of all our outposts on
the Pacific, including the Panama Canal. We were also doing our
best to reenforce the Philippines. The effectiveness of the airplane
against a navy in narrow seas had been recently demonstrated in the
Mediterranean by the German air attacks on British naval forces, as
well as by the success of the British attack on the Italian fleet at
Taranto. We decided that if a sufficient number of our bombing
planes, which would be able to proceed to the Philippine Islands
under their own power, could be gathered there, this would present a
very effective nucleus of a defense against the advances of the Jap-
anese Navy or convoys in South Asiatic waters. Accordingly, in
August we started sending out to the Philippines as many four-
engined [14385] bombers as we could spare, and by December
7 we had in fact gathered there some 35 of these ships. This was the
largest group of such American bombers yet in existence anywhere.
We felt at the time that these presented a strong striking force which
could be used with great effect in operations against the Japanese
Navy. We underestimated, as did everyone else, the effective power
of Japanese aviation, which [p. 9] asserted itself at Pearl
Harbor and 1 day later in the Philippines by its attack on our installa-
tions there, including the destruction of many of the bombers them-
selves.
In mid-October the Japanese Konoye cabinet fell and a new cabi-
net under General Tojo came into power, which all expected would
be even more aggressive and warlike.
To sum up, the salient features of the situation, as they appeared
to me early in November 1941, were as follows :
1. War with Germany and Japan would ultimately be inevitable.
2. It was vitally important that none of the nations who were
then desperately fighting Germany — England, Russia, or China —
should be knocked out of the war before the time came when we
would be required to go in.
3. While we very much wanted more time in which to prepare,
nevertheless tve felt we had a fair chance to make an effective fight
against Japan for the Philippines [14386] even if we had
to enter the war at that time, in view of the air power that we were
building up in the Philippines.
4. If war did come, it was important, both from the point of view
of unified support of our own people as well as for the record of
history, that we should not [p. 10] be placed in the position
of firing the first shot, if this could be done without sacrificing our
safety, but that Japan should appear in her true role as the real
aggressor.
5420 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
During this entire period I kept in constant and close touch with
Mr. Hull and Mr. Knox, as well as having frequent meetings with
the President. In 1940 Messrs. Hull and Knox and I had inaugu-
rated regular weekly meetings in Mr. Hull's office so that there would
be close liaison between the three of us. These meetings were held
on Tuesday mornings at 9 : 30 whenever we were present in Wash-
ington and able to go. They were being held during this period,
in October and November 1941, as well as meetings between us on
other occasions.
Early in November we received word that the Japanese were send-
ing an additional special envoy, Kurusu, to Washington to partici-
pate in the conversations that were being held. I had little hope
that anything would come of his proposal, in view of all the infor-
mation which we had been receiving as to the Jap's determination
to proceed with their program of aggression.
On November 6, I had an hour's talk alone with the [14^87^
President with regard to the Far Eastern situation and his approach-
ing conference with Kurusu, who was coming from [p. ll] Ja-
pan. The thing uppermost in his mind was how we could gain more
time. I quote from my notes :
The President outlined wbat he tliouglit he might say. He was trying to
tliink of something tliat would give us further time. He suggested he might
propose a truce in which there would be no movement or armament for six
months and then if the Japanese and Chinese had not settled their ax-range-
ment in that meanwhile, we could go on on the same basis.
I personally did not approve of a truce on such a basis and told him
so. I felt that it would tie up our hands just at a time when it was
so important that we should go on completing our reenforcement of
the Philippines and our military advisers then felt that if we could
accumulate enough of them there it would place us in a favorable
strategic position, and I did not approve of any arrangement that
would prevent our continuing this program. Secondly, it was still
very important that we keep the Chinese in the war, and I believed
that they would feel that such a truce was a desertion of them, and
that this would have a very serious effect on Chinese morale.
On Friday, November 7, we had the usual weekly Cabinet meet-
ing. The Far Eastern situation was uppermost in many of our
minds. Mr. Hull informed us that relations had become [14388]
extremely critical and that we should be on the outlook for an attack
by Japan at any time. Our military [p. 12] advisers, while
desirous of delay, had urged military action if Japan attacked terri-
tory whose security was vital to us and in this connection specified
American, British, or Dutch territory. The President at the meeting
undertook to take an informal vote of the Cabinet as to whether it
was thought the American people would back up up if it became
necessary to strike at Japan, in case she should attack England in
Malaya or the Dutch in the East Indies. The Cabinet was unanimous
in the feeling that the country would support such a move. The
Cabinet voted this way even though only Mr. Hull and the President
knew of the efforts which we had been making to reenforce the Philip-
pines with the big bombers and which we in the Army felt could be
effective support in case any attack should be made on the British or
Dutch in southeastern Asia. On November 10 at a staff meeting,
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5421
General Marshall, among other things, read us a long letter from
General MacArthur in the Philippines, telling us of hopeful progress
in the reorganization of the Philippine Army and the construction of
airports throughout the islands.
Between November 10 and 21, talks were commenced in Washington
between Nomura and Kurusu on the one hand, and the President
and Mr. Hull on the other. During this period a very serious crisis
developed by reason of the threatened [/>. 13] strike of the
coal miners, which would have been a most serious obstacle
[14^89] to our preparations for defense. Not only was the Pres-
ident occupied with this but we in the War Department during this
period were obliged to make preparations for taking over and oper-
ating the coal mines in case the strike should eventuate. Much of my
personal time was occupied during these days with these preparations.
Fortunately, the strike was ultimately averted and the matter re-
solved shortly after November 20. My notes contain no reference to
any developments in the Japanese situation during this period. It
was during this period, on November 20, that Kurusu presented the
Japanese proposals to Mr. Hull which, among other things, demanded
that we should withdraw all material and moral support to China
and at the same time resume supplying to Japan the oil she required
to assist her in carrying on her war with China.
My notes recall to me the fact that on November 24 I had a good
talk with General Olmstead, who had recently been promoted to be
Chief Signal Officer. This department was of particular interest to
me because I had been giving a great deal of personal attention dur-
ing the past months to the development of radar by the Army. I
had for some time become convinced of the importance of radar, both
as an antiaircraft protection as well as its uses for [p. 14] in-
stallation in planes and ships for combat purposes. We had made
every effort to get as much radar equipment to Hawaii as possible,
particularly for antiaircraft protection; and, as the committee has
undoubtedly heard, [14390] substantial amounts of this equip-
ment of the movable type were in Hawaii and capable of operation.
On Tuesday, November 25, Secretary Knox and I met in Mr. Hull's
office for our usual Tuesday morning meeting. Mr. Hull showed us a
proposal that he had prepared, which he was considering laying before
Nomura and Kurusu for a 3 months' truce.
At 12 o'clock on the same day, we three went to the White House,
where we met with the President and also General Marshall and Ad-
miral Stark. The President at once brought up the relations with the
Japanese. Mr. Hull said the Japanese were poised for attack — that
they might attack at any time. The President said the Japanese were
notorious for making an attack without warning and stated that we
mi^ht even be attacked, say next Monday, for example.
One problem troubled us very much. If you know that your enemy
is going .to strike you, it is not usually wise to wait until he gets the
jump on you by taking the initiative. In spite of the risk involved,
however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that
[p. JS] in order to have the full support of the American people
it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this
so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were
the aggressors. We discussed at this meeting the basis on which this
5422 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
country's position could be most clearly explained to our own people
and [14391] to the world, in case we had to go into the fight
quickly because of some sudden move on the part of the Japanese.
We discussed the possibility of a statement summarizing all the steps
of aggression that the Japanese had already taken, the encirclement
of our interests in the Philippines which was resulting and the threat
to our vital supplies of rubber from Malay. I reminded the President
that on August 19 he had warned the Japanese Ambassador that if
the steps which the Japanese were then taking continued across the
border into Thailand, he would regard it as a matter affecting our
safety, and suggested that he might point out that the moves the Jap-
anese were now apparently on the point of making would be in fact a
violation of a warning that had already been given.
When I got back to the War Department after this meeting on that
same day, I found news from G-2 that was very disturbing. It indi-
cated that the Japanese were embarking a large expeditionary force of
30, 40, or 50 ships at [p. 16] Shanghai and that this expedition
was proceeding along the China coast south of Formosa. I at once
telephoned Mr. Hull and also sent copies of the report to the President.
The next morning, November 26, Mr. Hull told me over the tele-
phone that he had almost decided not to make the proposition of the
three months' truce that he had discussed with Knox and me on
November 25. The Chinese, for one thing, had pointed out strong
objections to the proposal, particularly the effect on the [14,392]
morale of their own people. Mr. Hull stated that he felt the best thing
to do was simply to tell the Japanese that he had no further action to
propose.
I telephoned the President shortly thereafter and asked him whether
he had received the news of the new expedition from Shanghai pro-
ceeding down the China coast toward Indo-China. He had not re-
ceived it. He was shocked by it, and at once took it as further evidence
of bad faith on the part of the Japanese, that while they were nego-
tiating with him — negotiations in which we were asking for a with-
drawal of their invading troops in China — they should be sending a
further expedition down to Indochina.
On Thursday morning, November 27, the news was still coming in
of the movement of the large Japanese expenditionary force south from
Shanghai and eventually [p. 17] headed toward Indochina,
with a possibility that it might be proceeding to the Philippines or to
Burma to cut off the Burma Road, or to the Dutch East Indies. It
seemed probable, however, that it was a concentration to move over
into Thailand, from which they could be in a position to attack Singa-
l^ore at the proper moment; or, as the President later pointed out, it
might develop into an attack on Rangoon and thus effectually stop the
Burma Road at its beginning.
Early that morning I had called up Mr. Hull to find out what his
final word had been with the Japanese — whether he had [14393]
handed them the proposal for 3 months' truce, or whether he had told
them he had no other proposition to make. He told me that he had
broken the whole matter off. His words were: "I have washed my
hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox — the Army and
the Navy." I then called up the President, who gave me a little differ-
ent view. He said that it was true that the talks had been called off,
but that they had ended up with a magnificent statement prepared by
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5423
Mr. Hull. I found out afterwards that this was the fact and that
the statement contained a reaffirmation of our constant and regular
position without the suggestion of a threat of any kind. I personally
was relieved that we had not backed down on any of the fundamental
principles on which we had stood for [p. 28] so long and
which I felt we could not give up without the sacrifice of our national
honor and prestige in the world. I submit, however, that no impartial
reading of this document can characterize it as being couched in the
terms of an ultimatum, although the Japanese were of course only
too quick to seize upon it and give it that designation for their own
purposes.
Shortly after this General Arnold came in with proposed orders
for the movement of two of our biggest planes from San Francisco
out across the Mandated Islands to Manila. We were to arrange to
have these fly high over the Mandated Islands, beyond the reach of
their pursuit planes, and photograph them with the idea of trying to
detect any naval concentrations [i^W] that might be going
on there.
Later Mr. Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with
me and General Gerow. General Gerow was Chief of the War Plans
Division. General Marshall was absent, having left the Department
to attend certain Army training maneuvers which were doing on that
day. Both Admiral Stark and General Gerow were urging that any
crisis be postponed as long as possible, to enable our preparations to
proceed. A memorandum had been prepared by General Marshall and
Admiral Stark to the President on this subject. The opinion of our
top military and naval advisers was that [p. 15] delay was
very desirable, but that nevertheless we must take military action if
Japan attacked American, or British, or Dutch territory or moved
her forces in Indochina west of 100° east or south of 10° north. I
told them, which was the fact, that I also would be glad to have time
but I did not want it at the cost of humiliation of the United States
or of backing down on any of our principles which would show a weak-
ness on our part.
We then discussed the messages that might be sent to the command-
ing officers of the various theaters, including in particular General
MacArthur, who was in the Philippines and in the forefront of the
threatened area. We had already sent MacArthur a warning but I
felt that the time had now come for a more definite warning. In
talking with the President on the telephone that morning, I had sug-
gested, and he had approved [14395] the idea, that we should
send out a final alert, namely that they should be on the qui vive for
any attack, and explaining the exact situation. Ordinarily, of course,
there would be no reason for me to participate in the sending of any
such message which was the normal function of the military staff. As
the President himself, however, had now actually directed the send-
ing of the message, and as I wanted the [p. 20] message
clearly to apprise the commanding officers in the various areas as to
exactly what the diplomatic situation was, I undertook to participate
in the framing of this message myself. In order that it should be
strictly accurate, I called up Mr. Hull myself on the telephone and
got his exact statement as to the status of the negotiations, which was
then incorporated in the first sentence of the message. My papers
5424 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
also indicate that I inserted in the second sentence the words "BUT
HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT."
This same message was sent to commanding office, Hawaiian De-
partment, and to the three other commanding officers of our Pacific
theaters or outposts, viz: Panama, the Philippines, and the west
coast which included Alaska, except that in the case of the message
to General MacArthur in the Philippines there were omitted from the
third sentence from the end the following words: "BUT THESE
MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT COM-
MA REPEAT NOT COMMA TO ALARM CIVILIAN POPULA-
TION OR DISCLOSE INTENT." The message as sent to General
Short read as follows :
[14396]
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shaffer, T. E.
Negotiations with Japan appear to be tenninated to all practical purposes with
only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back
and offer to continue period Japanese futui'e action unpredictable but hostile
action possible at any moment period If hostilities [p. 21] cannot com-
ma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan com-
mit the first overt act period This policy should not comma repeat not comma
be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your
defense period Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake
such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these meas-
ures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil
population or disclose intent period Report measures taken period Should hos-
tilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as
they pertain to Japan period Limit dissemination of this highly secret informa-
tion to minimum essential officers.
Marsha't.t..
This message has been criticized as ambiguous and described as a
"do-don't" message. The fact is that it presented with the utmost
precision the situation with which we were all confronted and in the
light of which all our commanding officers, as well as we ourselves in
Washington, had to govern our conduct. The [14S97] situa-
tion was admittedly delicate and critical. On the one hand, in view
of the fact that we wanted more time, we did not want to precipitate
war at this moment if it could be avoided. If there was to be war,
moreover, we wanted the Japanese to commit the first overt act. On
the other hand, the matter of defense against an attack by Japan was
the first consideration. In Hawaii, because of the large numbers of
Japanese inhabitants, it was felt desirable to issue a special warning
so that nothing would be done, unless necessary to the defense, to alarm
the civil population and thus possibly to precipitate an inci-
dent [p. 23] and give the Japanese an excuse to go to war and
the chance to say that we had committed the first overt act.
All these considerations were placed before the commanding officers
of their respective areas, and it was because they were thought com-
petent to act in a situation of delicacy requiring judgment and skill
that they had been placed in these high posts of command. One of the
basic policies of the Army command, which has been adhered to
throughout the entire war. and in most instances with complete suc-
cess, has been to give the local commander his objective and mission
but not to interfere with him in the performance of it. When General
Short was informed on November 27 that "Japanese action unpredicta-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5425
ble" and that "hostile action possible at any moment," and that the
policy directed "should not comma repeat not comma be construed as
restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize
your 114-398] defense," we had a right to assume that he would
competently perform this paramount duty entrusted to him. We as-
sumed that when he had been warned that hostile action was possible
at any moment, it would not be necessary to repeat that warning over
and over again during the ensuing days. The fact was of course that
General Short did receive, not [p. 23] only from Washington
but from other sources, repeated intelligence of the impending crisis.
You will notice that this message of November 27 specifically
mentions that reconnaissance is to be undertaken. This to my mind
was a very important part of the message, not only because of its
obvious desirability but also because we had provided the Hawaiian
Department with what I regarded as a most effective means of recon-
naissance against air attack and one to which I had personally de-
voted a great deal of attention during the preceding months. I refer
to the radar equipment with which the Hawaiian Department was
then provided. This equipment permitted approaching planes to be
seen at distances of approximately 100 miles; and to do so in darkness
and storm as well as in clear daylight. In the early part of 1941 I
had taken up earnestly the matter of securing such radar equipment
for aircraft protection. I knew, although it was not then generally
known, that radar had proved of the utmost importance to the
British in the Battle of Britain, and I felt in the beginning of 1941
that we were not getting this into production [14399] and to
the troops as quickly as we should, and put on all the pressure I could
to speed up its acquisition. By the autumn of 1941 we [p. 24]
had got some of this equipment out to Hawaii, and only a few
days before this I had received a report of the tests which had been
made of this equipment in Hawaii on November 19, which indicated
^•ery satisfactory results in detecting approaching airplanes. I testi-
fied at considerable length with regard to this before the Army Pearl
Harbor Board (A. P. H. B., 4064, et seq.). When we specifically
directed the commanding officer at Hawaii, who had been warned
that war was likely at any moment, to make reconnaissance, I assumed
that all means of reconnaissance available to both the Army and Navy
would be employed. On the same day a war warning was dispatched
to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet by the Chief of Naval
Operations. The standing instructions to the theater commanders
were that all messages of this character were to be exchanged between
the Army and Navy commands.
I repeat that my participation in the drafting of this message of
November 27 was unusual, since I do not believe it is advisable for
the Secretary of War to meddle with military staff matters. As
already stated, I did so on this occasion because I felt I was conveying
a message from the President. The President had taken a [p. 25]
momentous decision that day, namely to send what I call a final alert.
The Chief of \_i44OO] Staff was away for the day, and I wanted
to make certain that the President's orders were carried out accurately.
You wdll note that my notes speak only of the message to General
MacArthur. This is evidence of what was the fact — namely that we
all felt in Washington that the first and most likely danger was an
79716 — 46— pt. 11 19
5426 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
attack on the Philippines and that such an attack would be most
difficult to meet. Such information as we had been able to gather as to
the movements of the Japanese forces indicated a movement toward
the south, which might easily be diverted either to Indochina, Malay
Peninsula, Dutch East Indies, or the Philippines. We were correct
in this inference. Such an attack on the Philippines was being pre-
pared and immediately followed the attack on Pearl Harbor. The
movements of the fleet which attacked Pearl Harbor were entirely
unknown to us.
When the replies to these messages came in from General Mac-
Arthur and General Short, they were checked to me by General Mar-
shall, undoubtedly for the [p. 26] purpose of reassuring me
that our messages had been duly received. The original documents
bear my initials, indicating that they were noted by me.
The first thing in the morning of the next day — Friday, November
28—1 received information from G-2 of such a formidable character
with regard to the movements of the Japanese forces along the Asiatic
coast that I decided to take it to the President before he got up. I
saw him while he was still [14WJ] in bed, and we discussed
the situation. He suggested that there were three alternatives, as my
notes show: First, to do nothing; second, to make something in the
nature of an ultimatum, stating a point beyond which we would fight ;
or, third, to fight at once. I said that I felt that to do nothing was
out of the question and the President agreed with me. As to the other
two alternatives, the desirable thing to do from the point of view of
our own tactics and safety was to take the initiative and attack without
further warning. It is axiomatic that the best defense is offense. It
is always dangerous to wait and let the enemy make the first move. T
was inclined to feel that the warning given in August by the President
against further moves by the Japanese [p. 27] toward Thai-
land justified an attack without further warning, particularly as their
new movement southward indicated that they were about to violate
that warning. On the other hand, I realized that the situation could
be made more cleancut from the point of view of public opinion if a
further warning were given.
I went at 12 o'clock that day to a meeting of the so-called War
Cabinet — that is to say, the President, Mr. Hull, Mr. Knox, Achniral
Stark, General Marshall, and myself. The President had been
studying the latest report of G-2 as to the movements of the Japanese
expeditionary force, and we discussed the various possibilities as to
what it meant. The various [14402] alternative mentioned
were that it might develop into an attack on the Philippines, the
landing of further troops in Indochina, an attack on Thailand, on
the Dutch Netherlands, or on Singapore, or that it might develop
into an attack on Rangoon and thus cut off the Burma Road at the
beginning. The possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor was not
discussed at the meeting, since our thoughts were all focused on this
movement toward soutiieast Asia, which indicated a crisis in that
direction. All agreed that if the expedition were permitted to land
in the Gulf of Siam it would place a strong Japanese force in such
a strategic position as to [p. 28] be a severe blow at all three of
the powers in southeast Asia — the British at Singapore, the Nether-
lands in the Indies, and ourselves in the Philippines. "VVe all agreed
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5427
that it must not be allowed ; that, if the Japanese got into the Isthmus
of Kra, the British would fight ; and, if the British fought, we would
have to fight. /We realized that if this expedition was allowed to
round the southern point of Indochina, this whole chain of disastrous
events would be set on foot.
We decided, therefore, that we could not just sit still and do noth-
ing. On the other hand, we also decided that we could not attack
without a further warning to Japan, and we discussed what form that
warning should take. The President suggested a special telegram
from himself to the Emperor of Japan. After some discussion it was
decided that he would send such a letter [l^W^] to the Em-
peror, which would not be made public, and that at the same time he
would deliver a special message to Congress reporting on the danger
and reporting what we would have to do if the danger happened.
The President left after the meeting to keep his engagement at Warm
Springs, where he was going to have Thanksgiving with the children.
The rest of the week end was largely taken up with preparing
[p. £9] a suggested draft of a message for the President to
deliver to Congress, in which Secretary Knox and I cooperated with
Mr. Hull and his associates in the State Department.
On Monday morning, December 1, the President returned to Wash-
ington. I recollect that in the meantime we had received evidence that
the Japanese expedition which we had been watching was landing in
Indochina in the neighborhood of Saigon, rather than going on to
the Peninsula and up into the Gulf of Siam. This appeared to give us
a little respite, since it indicated that perhaps they were not going
to invade Thailand at once. The Russians had also made a new coun-
ter-attack against the Germans at Rostov, and we thought that pos-
sibly this had given the Japanese some pause.
On Tuesday, December 2, Secretary Knox, Sumner Welles, and I
met with the President, as Mr. Hull was laid up with a cold. The
President went step by step over the situation, and I felt sure that he
had made up his mind to go ahead with the message to Congress and
possibly the message to the Emperor. [14404] We also learned
that he had asked the Japanese through the State Department what
they intended by this new occupation of southern Indochina and had
demanded a quick reply. We were watching the situation in the Far
East very carefully. I was in frequent [p. 30] conference with
General Marshall and with General Miles of G-2 and also General
Gerow of the War Plans Division of the General Staff. We were par-
ticularly concerned with supplies which were on the way to the Phil-
ippines and additional big bombers which we were trying to fly over
there, some of which were scheduled to start at the end of the week.
I gave up another engagement in order to stay in Washington over
the week end.
On Sunday, December 7, Mr. Knox and I went to Secretary Hull's
office at 10 : 30 in the morning and talked the whole matter over. This
was the day on which we knew the Japanese were going to bring
their answer, and Mr. Hull said he was certain that the Japanese
were planning some deviltry; and we were all wondering where the
blow would strike. The messages we were receiving now indicated that
the Japanese force was continuing on in the Gulf of Siam, and again
we discussed whether we would not have to fight if Malaya or the
5428 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Netherlands were attacked and the British or Dutch fought. We all
three thought that we must fight if those nations fought. We realized
that if Britain were eliminated it might well result ii|f the destruction
or capture of the British Fleet. Such a result would give [14405]
the Nazi allies overwhelming power in the Atlantic Ocean and would
make the defense of the American Republics enormously difficult if
not impossible. [p. SI] All the reasons why it would be neces-
sary for the United States to fight, in case the Japanese attacked
either our British or Dutch neighbors in the Pacific, were discussed at
length and at my request Mr. Hull and Mr. Kjiox dictated their views.
These views are attached to my notes of that day as submitted herewith.
I returned to lunch at my home. At just about 2 o'clock, while I
was sitting at lunch, the President called me on the phone and told
me that the Japanese were bombing Hawaii. My notes for the re-
mainder of December 7 speak for themselves and need no comment.
Summary of My Views as to the Responsibility of Members of the
Army
My views as to these responsibilities are stated at length in my final
official report made under the Joint Resolution of Congress approved
June 13, 1944, after the Army Board and the Judge Advocate General
had made their investigations and reports to me. Many of the discus-
sions on this subject indicated a failure to grasp the fundamental
difference between the duties of an outpost command and those of
the commander in chief of an army or nation and his military advisers.
The outpost commander is like a [p. 32] sentinel on duty
in the face of the enemy. His fundamental duties are clear and
precise. He must assume that the [llf^OG] enemy will attack
at his particular post; and that the enemy will attack at the time
and in the way in which it will be most difficult to defeat him. It is
not the duty of the outpost commander to speculate or rely on the
possibilities of the enemy attacking at some other outpost instead
of his own. It is his duty to meet him at his post at any time and to
make the best possible fight that can be made against him with the
weapons with which he has been supplied.
On the other hand, the Commander in Chief of the Nation (and
his advisers), particularly of a nation which has been as habitually
neglectful of the possibility of war as our own, has much more diffi-
cult and complex duties to fulfill. Unlike the outpost commander,
he must constantly watch, study, and estimate where the principal or
most dangerous attack is most likely to come, in order that he may
most effectively distribute his insufficient forces and munitions to meet
it. He knows that his outposts are not all equally supplied or forti-
fied, and that they are not all equally capable of defense. He knows
also that from time to time they are of greatly varying importance
to the grand strategy of the war.
[p. 33] For all these reasons he is compelled to give constant
and close attention to the reports from all his intelligence agencies
in order that he may satisfactorily solve the innumerable problems
which are constantly arising in the performance of the foregoing
duties.
[i^4^7] During those days in November 1941 we at the War
Department had been informed and believed that Hawaii had been
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5429
more generously equipped from the Nation's inadequate supplies of
men and munitions than either of the other three important Pacific
outposts, and we believed that with the fleet at hand there it was more
capable of defense. We also knew that the Philippines was by far
the least capable of defense, although we were working vigorously to
get it into a position to put up a hard fight. We also knew that a
disaster there would have an incalculably bad moral effect on account
of our relations to the Filipinos — well known throughout the Far
East — and our pledges given for their protection. Finally, we had
received these specific warnings of a Japanese expedition being on its
way to a commanding position from which it would attack the
Philippine Islands.
From the foregoing I believe that it was inevitable and proper that
a far greater number of items of information coming through our
Intelligence should be [p. S.Q collected and considered and
appraised by the General Staff at Washington than those which were
transmitted to the commander of an outpost. General Short had been
told the two essential facts: (1) A war with Japan is threatening.
(2) Hostile action by Japan is possible at any moment. Given those
two facts, both of which were stated without equivocation in the
message of November 27, the outpost commander should be on the
alert to [i^-^^^J make his fight.
Even without any such message, the outpost commander should
have been on the alert. If he did not know that the relations between
Japan and the United States were strained and might be broken at
any time, he must have been almost the only man in Hawaii who did
not know it, for the radio and the newspapers were blazoning out those
facts daily, and he had a chief of staff and an intelligence officer to
tell him so. And if he did not know that the Japanese were likely
to strike without warning, he could not have read his history of Japan
or known the lessons taught in the Army schools in respect to such
matters. Under these circumstances which were of general knowledge
and which he must have known, to cluster his airplanes in such groups
and positions that in an emergency they could not take the air for
several hours, and to keep his antiaircraft [p. 35'] ammunition
so stored that it could not be promptly and immediately available, and
to use his best reconnaissance system, the radar, only for a very small
fraction of the day and night, in my opinion betrayed a misconception
of his real duty which was almost beyond belief.
In the next place, having made these mistakes and disregarded the
whole tenor of the warning message to him, he then sent a reply mes-
sage to Washington which gave no adequate notice of what he had
failed to do and which was susceptible of being taken, and was taken,
as a general compliance with the {1^09'] main warning from
Washington. My initials show that this message crossed my desk,
and in spite of my keen interest in. the situation it certainly gave me
no intimation that the alert order against an enemy attack was not
being carried out. Although it advised me that General Short was
alert against sabotage, I had no idea that being "alerted to prevent
sabotage" was in any way an express or implied denial of being alert
against an attack by Japan's armed forces. The very purpose of a
fortress such as Hawaii is to repel such an attack, and Short was the
commander of that fortress. Furthermore, Short's statement in his
5430 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
message that "liaison" was being carried out with the Navy, coupled
with the fact that our message of November 27 had specifically di-
rected recon- [p. 36'] naissance, naturally gave the impression
that the various reconnaissance and other defensive measures in which
the cooperation of the Army and the Navy is necessary, were under way
and a proper alert was in effect.
With the aid of. "hindsight" I believe now that to a staff oflficer whose
specific duty was to make dead sure that the warning order was being
intelligently and thoroughly put into effect, the lack of detail in the
reply should have suggested the importance of a follow-up inquiry and
I have so stated in my final official report of August 1945.
With the further aid of such "hindsight" and in the same official
report, I also reached the opinion that the War Plans Division of the
General Staff would have placed itself and [^miO] the safety
of the country in a sounder position if it had transmitted to General
Short more information than it did. The novelty of the imminence of
war and the fact that our outpost commanders were untried in their
positions now indicate that more details and repeated emphasis would
have been a safer policy. Also there seems to have been a lack of
coordination in the General Staff in respect to the method in which
the warnings against sabotage were sent, which would not have oc-
curred later in the war after the staff was fully organized.
[/>. 37] Yet none of these things in my opinion alter in any
material degree the responsibility of General Short for the complete
absence of a real alert, which he had been directed to take in the message
of November 27, and for the placing of his defense in a more helpless
position than it was before that alert message was sent. After all,
he was the man upon whom the country had a right to rely for the
defense of Hawaii, and he had been sufficiently warned.
I have tried to review these various responsibilities with fairness
to both the outpost commander and the staff officers at home. I am
particularly led to do so because of the difficulty of reproducing now
after the lapse of more than 4 years the background and atmosphere
under which the entire Army was then working. Our general staff
officers were working under a terrific pressure in the face of a global
war which they felt was probably imminent. Yet they were sur-
rounded, outside of \^mil] their offices and almost through-
out the country, by a spirit of isolationism and disbelief in danger
which now seems incredible. A single incident gives striking evi-
dence of this. During the very last week before the Pearl Harbor
attack there was made a most disloyal and almost unbelievable attack
on the chief work of the staff. For months the \_p. 38] gen-
eral staff had been laboring over the construction of a strategic and
tactical plan for the fighting of a global war in case it should even-
tuate. The making of such a plan is the highest and most important
duty of a general staff — the chief purpose for which it exists. It is
also naturally the most highly secret paper in the possession of the
Government. On December 4, 1941, the Chicago Tribune published
practically in full a copy of that plan. The impact of such a blow
was very severe. It involved implications which stretched far and
suspicions (happily not fulfilled) of disloyalty in the Army itself.
The officers of the Army were then trying to do their duty in the
deadening, if not actually hostile, atmosphere of a nation that was
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5431
not awake to its danger. We are now engaged in passing judgment
upon their actions in the wholly different atmosphere of a nation
which has suffered some of the horrors of the greatest and most
malignant war in history. In my opinion, it would be highly unjust
to them if this complete difference of atmosphere was not given the
weight which it deserves.
(S) Henry L. Stimson.
[I^f4l2 — p. 38-A] State of Nevv York,
County of New York, ss:
Henry L. Stimson, being duly sworn, deposes and says :
I have prepared the foregoing statement, and the same is true and correct to
the best of my recollection, information, and belief.
(S) Henry L. Stimson.
Sworn to before me this 19th day of March 1946.
[seal] (S) Thomas DeRosa,
Attorney and Counsellor at Law.
Office address : 32 Liberty Street, New York City ; Residence : Bronx County.
Bronx County Clerks No. 3, Reg. No. A-S3D7 ; New York County Clerks No. D,
Reg. No. 439D7 ;
Commission expires March 30, 1947,
[14-4^3 — p. o9] Mr. Stimson 's Notes — Appendix to Statement
OF Henry L. Stimson
[14-^4 — P- 40] Wednesday, No\tember 5, 1941.
Matters are crystallizing on both sides of us now and the Navy is
meeting with big losses in the Atlantic and Japan is sending somebody
to us, who, I think, will bring us a proposal impossible of acceptance.
I spent part of the morning reading matters — secret reports — on the
latter matter.
[p. 4^] Thursday, November 6, 1941.
Then I left for the White House conference and had about an hour's
talk with the President — on the whole a good talk. He was apparently
in very good feeling. We talked about the Far Eastern situation and
the approaching conference with the messenger who is coming from
Japan. The President outlined what he thought he might say. He was
trying to think of something which would give us further time. He
suggested he might propose a truce in which there would be no move-
ment or armament for 6 months and then if the Japanese and Chinese
had not settled their arrangement in that meanwhile, we could go on
on the same basis. I told him I frankly saw two great objections to
that : first, that it tied up our hands just at a time when it was vitally
important that we should go on completing our reenforcement of the
Philippines; and second, that the Chinese would feel that any such
arrangement was a desertion of them. I reminded him that it has
always been our historic policy since the Washington conference not
to leave the Chinese and [1441^] Japanese alone together, be-
cause the Japanese were always able to overslaugh the Chinese and the
Chinese know it. I told him that I thought the Chinese would refuse
to go into such an arrangement.
5432 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Ip. 4^] Friday, November 7, 1941.
Cabinet meeting this afternoon. The President opened with telling
the story of Lincoln and his Cabinet — how he polled the Cabinet
and found them all polling "no" and then he said, "the ayes have it."
With that he started to have what he said was the first general poll of
his Cabinet and it was on the question of the Far East — whether the
people would back us up in case we struck at Japan down there and
what the tactics should be.' It was a very interesting talk — the best
Cabinet meeting I think we have ever had since I have been there.
He went around the table — first Hull and them myself, and then
around through the whole number and it was unanimous in feeling
the country would support us. He said that this time the vote is
unanimous, he feeling the same way. Hull made a good presentation
of the general situation. I told them I rather narrowed it down
into a following-up the steps which had been done to show what
needed to be done in the future. The thing [144^6] would
have been much stronger if the Cabinet had known — and they did
not know except in the case of Hull and the President — what the
Army is doing with the big bombers and how ready we are to pitch in.
[p. 43'] Monday, November 10, 1941.
In the second place he (General Marshall at a staff meeting) read
us a long letter from General MacArthur in the Philippines, telling us
of the progress of the reorganization of the Philippine Army and
the construction of airports throughout the Islands. This was very
interesting to me.
[p. 44] Friday, November 21, 1941.
I talked to the President about the question (danger) of poison
gas in the Philippines. We have learned that the Japanese have
used it on the Chinese at Ichang, where they killed some TOO China-
men and disabled about -—I don't want to be caught without gas in
the Philippines. And yet we have been afraid to send it for fear it
would leak out and be misconstrued during these negotiations. But
I thought the time had come when we ought to not delay any longer
and I told the President so quietly and privately after the conference
and he [144^'^] agreed with me. So when I got back I called
in General Gerow in the absence of General Marshall and told him
to look up all the facts and get ready for the possible shipments
with the idea that it should be done so that it would not come out
in the press.
[p. 45] Monday, November 24, 1941
I had a good talk with General Olmstead, whom I have recently
promoted to be the chief signal officer on General Mauborgne's
retirement. He is doing very well and outlined to me the work of
' Note. — See statement, p. 11, as to this Cabinet meeting.
^ Note : Blanlc in notes.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5433
reorganization of his office which he has accomplished. It was very
good.
Note. — This conference was on the subject of the use of radar as a defense
against surprise attacks. See statement p. 13.
[p. 46] Tuesday, November 25, 1941.
This was a very full day indeed. At 9 : 30 Knox and I met in
Hull's office for our meeting of Three. Hull showed us the proposal
for a 3 months' truce, which he was going to lay before the Japanese
today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I
thought as we read it, but I don't think there is any chance of the
Japanese accepting it, because it was so drastic. In return for the
propositions which they were to do; namely; to at once evacuate
and at once to [144-^8'} stop all preparations or threats of ac-
tion, and to take no aggressive action against any of her neighbors,
etc., we were to give them open trade in sufficient quantities only for
their civilian population. This restriction was particularly applicable
to oil. We had a long talk over the general situation.
Then at 12 o'clock we (viz. General Marshall and I) went to the
White House, where we were until nearly half past one. At the
meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the
President, instead of bringing up the Victory Parade,^ brought up
entirely the relations [p. ^7] with the Japanese. He brought
up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as)
next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack
without warning, and the question was what we should do. The
question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing
the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was
a difficult proposition.* Hull laid out his general broad propositions
on which the thing should be rested — the freedom of the seas and
the fact that Japan was in alliance with Hitler and was carrying
out his policy of world aggression. The others brought out the fact
that any such expedition to the South as the Japanese were likely
to take would be an encirclement of our interests in the Philippines
and cutting into our vital supplies of rubber from Malaysia. I pointed
out to the President that he had already taken the first steps towards
an ultimatum in notifying Japan way back last summer that if she
crossed the border into Thailand she was violating our safety and
that therefore he had only to point out (to Japan) that to follow
any such expedition was a viola- [p. 48] tion of a warning
we had already given. So Hull is to go to work on preparing that.
When I got back to the Department I found news from G-2 that
an (a Japanese) expedition had started. Five divisions have come
down from Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai and there they had
embarked on ships — 30, 40, or 50 ships — and have been sighted'^south
3 This was an office nickname for the General Staff strategic plan of national action in
case of war in Europe.
* See statement, pp. 11 and 14. Our military and naval advisers had warned us that we
could not safely allow the [lJiil9] Japanese to move against British Malaysia or
the Dutch East Indies without attempting to prevent it.
5434 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of Formosa. I at once called up Hull and told him about it and
sent copies to him and to the President of the message from G-2.
[p. 4^] Wednesday, November 26, 1941.
[144^0] Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he
had about made up his mind not to give (make) the proposition that
Knox and I passed on the other day to the Japanese but to kick the
whole thing over — ^to tell them that he has no other proposition at
all. The Chinese have objected to that proposition — when he showed
it to them ; that is, to the proposition which he showed to Knox and me,
because it involves giving to the Japanese the small modicum of oil
for civilian use during the interval of the truce of the 3 months.
Chiang Kai-shek had sent a special message to the effect that that
would make a terrifically bad impression in China; that it would
destroy all their courage and that they (it) would play into the
hands of his, Chiang's, enemies and that the Japanese would use it.
T. V. Soong had sent me this letter and has asked to see me and I
called Hull up this morning to tell him so and ask him what he wanted
me to do about it. He replied as I have just said above — that he had
about made up his mind to give up the whole thing in respect to a
truce and to simply tell the Japanese that he had no further action to
propose.
A few minutes later I talked to the President over the telephone
and I asked him whether he had received [p. 60'] the paper
which I had sent him over last night about the Japanese havins; started
a new expedition from Shanghai down toward Indochina. He fairly
blew up — jumped up into the air, so to speak, and said he hadn't seen
it and that that changed the whole [j?^^^i] situation because
it was an evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese that while
they were negotiating for an entire truce — an entire withdrawal (from
China) — they should be sending this expedition down there to Indo-
china. I told him that it was a fact that had come to me through
G-2 and through the Navy Secret Service and I at once got another
copy of the paper I had sent last night and sent it over to him by special
messenger.
[p. 61] Thursday, No\t5Mber 27, 1941.
A very tense, long day. News is coming in of a concentration and
movement south by the Japanese of a large expeditionary force moving
south from Shanghai and evidently headed toward Indochina, with a
possibility of going to the Philippines or to Burma, or to the Burma
Road or to the Dutch East Indies, but probably a concentration to
move over into Thailand and to hold a position from which they can
attack Singapore when the moment arrives.
The first thing in the morning I called up Hull to find out what his
finale had been with the Japanese — whether he had handed them the
new proposal which we passed on 2 or 3 days ago or whether, as he
suggested yesterday he would, he broke the whole matter off. He told
me now that he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, "I
have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5435
Knox — [14422] the Army and the Navy." I then called up
the President. The President gave me a little different view. He
said they had ended up, but they ended up with a magnificent state-
ment prepared by Hull. I found out afterward that this was not
a reopening of the thing but a statement of our constant and regular
position.
General Arnold came in to present the orders for the movement of
two of our biggest planes out from San [p. 52] Francisco and
across the Mandated Islands to Manila. There is a concentration
going on by the Japanese in the Mandated Islands and these planes
can fly high over them, beyond the reach of their pursuit planes and
take photographs.
Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and
General Gerow. Marshall is down at the maneuvers today and I feel
his absence very much. There was a tendency, not unnatural, on the
part of Stark and Gerow to seek for more time. I said that I was
glad to have time but I didn't want it at any cost of humility on the
part of the United States or of reopening the thing which would show
a weakness on our part. The main question has been over the message
that we shall send to MacArthur. We have already sent him a quasi
alert, or the first signal for an alert, and now, on talking with the
President this morning over the telephone, I suggested and he ap-
proved the idea that we should send the final alert; namely, that he
should be on the qui vive for any attack and telling him [14423]
how the situation was. So Gerow and Stark and I went over the pro-
posed message to him from Marshall very carefully; finally got it in
shape and with the help of a telephone talk I had with Hull, I got the
exact statement from him of what the situation was.
[p. 53] Friday, November 28, 1941.
Pursuant to my instructions G-2 had sent me a summary of the in-
formation in regard to the movements of the Japanese in the Far East
and it amounted to such a formidable statement of dangerous possi-
bilities that I decided to take it to the President before he got up. I
told him there was an important coalition of facts and that I thought
he ought to read it before his appointment which he had made for us
at 12 o'clock, when the so-called War Cabinet was to meet him — Hull,
Knox, myself with Stark and Marshall. He branched into an analysis
of the situation himself as he sat there on his bed, saying there were
three alternatives and only three that he could see before us. I told
him I could see two. His alternatives were — first, to do nothing;
second, to make something in the nature of an ultimatum again, stat-
ing a point beyond which we would fight ; third, to fight at once. I
told him my only two were the last two, because I did not think anyone
would do nothing in this situation, and he agreed with me. I said of
the other two my choice was the latter one.
[14Ji^^] When we got back there at 12 o'clock he had read the
paper that I had left with him. The main point [p. 5^] of the
paper was a study of what the expeditionary force, which we know
has left Shanghai and is headed south, is going to do. G-2 pointed
out that it might develop into an attack on the Philippines or a land-
5436 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ing of further troops in Indochina, or an attack on Thailand or an
attack on the Dutch Netherhmds, or on Singapore. After the Presi-
dent had read these aloud, he pointed out that there was one more.
It might, by attacking the Kra Isthmus, develop into an attack on
Rangoon, which lies only a short distance beyond the Kra Isthmus
and the taking of which by the Japanese would effectually stop the
Burma Road at its beginning. This, I think, was a very good sugges-
tion on his part and a very likely one. It was the consensus that the
present move — that there was an expeditionary force on the sea of
about 25,000 Japanese troops aimed for a landing somewhere — com-
pletely changed the situation when we last discussed whether or not
we could address an ultimatum to Japan about moving the troops
which she already had on land in Indochina. It was now the opinion
of everyone that if this expedition was allowed to get around the
southern point of Indochina and to go off and land in the Gulf of
Siam, either at Bangkok or further west, it would be a terrific blow at
all of the three Powers, Britain at Singapore, the Netherlands,
If}. 66] and ourselves in the Philippines. It was the consensus of
[144-26] everybody that this must not be allowed. Then we dis-
cussed how to prevent it. It was agreed that if the Japanese got into
the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight. It was also agreed that if
the British fought, we would have to fight. And it now seems clear
that if this expedition was allowed to round the southern point of
Indochina, this whole chain of disastrous events would be set on foot
of going.
It further became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the
Force as it went by without any warning on the one hand, which we
didn't think we could do ; or sitting still and allowing it to go on, on
the other, which we didn't think we could do — that the only thing for
us to do was to address it a warning that if it reached a certain place,
or a certain line, or a certain point, we should have to fight. The
President's mind evidently was running towards a special telegram
from himself to the Emperor of Japan. This he had done with good
results at the time of the Panay incident, but for many reasons this
did not seem to me to be the right thing now, and I pointed them out
to the President. In the first place, a letter to the Emperor of Japan
could not be couched in terms which [p. 66] contained an ex-
plicit warning. One does not warn an Emperor. In the second place
it would not indicate to the people of the United States what the real
nature of the danger was. Consequently I said there ought to be a
message by the President to the peoj)le of the United States, and I
thought that the best [144^6] form of a message would be an
address to Congress reporting the danger, reporting what we would
have to do if the danger happened. The President accepted this idea
of a message but he first thought of incorporating in it the terms of
his letter to the Emperor. But again I pointed out that he could not
publicize a letter to an Emperor in such a way ; that he had better send
his letter to the Emperor separate as one thing and a secret thing,
and then make his speech to the Congress as a separate and a more
understandable thing to the people of the United States. This was
the final decision at that time, and the President asked Hull and
Knox and myself to try to draft such papers.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5437
[p, S7'] Tuesday, December 2,- 1941.
Dr. Alfred Sze and Dr. T. V. Soong came in to see me on their own
request. I think Soong was anxious to have someone present as a
witness to get me to corroborate what I said to him sometime ago
about our intentions to fortify the Philippines. I told him simply
that I knew what a difficult situation the Generalissimo was in and it
was very presuming for me, sitting here in comfort, to ask him to be
patient when he was in the middle of such anxieties and responsibilities
there. Nevertheless I told him that that was, I am sure, the course
that he should take. I said, I can only say that there is no change
in the American policy from what I said to Dr. Soong some- [144^71
time ago, and he can report that to the Generalissimo and tell him
that I also counsel him to have just a little more patience and then
I think all things will be well. Apparently that was all they wanted,
for they at once got up and thanked me and went away. I warned
them, of course, that they should not in any way make public or leak
about what I had said to them. I called in Marshall and told him
what had happened and asked him to remember what I said.
I left for the White House conference at 12 o'clock, and there were
present there just Knox, Sumner Welles [p. 8] and myself,
as Hull is laid up with a cold. The President went step by step over
the situation and I think has made up his mind to go ahead. He has
asked the Japanese through Sumner Welles what they intend by this
new occupation of southern Indochina — just what they are going to
do — and has demanded a quick reply. The President is still deliberat-
ing the possibility of a message to the Emperor, although all the rest
of us are rather against it, but in addition to that he is quite settled,
I think, that he will send a message to the Congress and will perhaps
back that up with a speech to the country. He said that he was going
to take the matters right up when he left us.
\_lU^8—p. 59] Sunday, December 7, 1941.
Today is the day that the Japanese are going to bring their answer
to Hull, and everything in MAGIC indicated that they had been
keeping the time back until now in order to accomplish something
hanging in the air. Knox and I arranged a conference with Hull at
10 : 30 and we talked the whole matter over. Hull is very certain that
the Japs are planning some deviltry and we are all wondering Avhere
the blow will strike. We three stayed together in conference until
lunch time, going over the plans for what should be said or done. The
main thing is to hold the main people who are interested in the
Far East together — the British, ourselves, the Dutch, the Australians,
the Chinese. Hull expressed his views, giving the broad picture of
it, and I made him dictate it to a stenographer and I attach it to the
end of this. Knox also had his views as to the importance of showing
immediately how these different nations must stand together and I
got him to dictate that and that is attached hereto. Hull was to see
the Japanese envoys at 1 o'clock but they were delayed in keeping the
appointment and did not come until later — as it turned out, till 2
5438 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
o'clock or after. I returned to Woodley to lunch and just about 2
o'clock, while I was sitting at lunch, the President called me up on
the telephone and in a rather excited voice asked me, "Have you heard
the news?" I said, [p. GO] "Well, I have heard the telegrams
which have been coming in about the Japanese advances [144^9']
in the Gulf of Siam." He said, "Oh, no. I don't mean that. They
have attacked Hawaii. They are now bombing Hawaii." Well, that
was an excitedment indeed. The messages which we have been getting
through Saturday and yesterday and this morning are messages which
are brought by the British patrol south of Indochina, showing that
large Japanese forces were moving up into the Gulf of Siam, This
itself was enough excitement and that was what we were at work
on our papers about. The observer thought these forces were going
to land probably either on the eastern side of the Gulf of Siam, where
it would be still in Indochina, or on the western side, where it would
be the Kra Peninsula, or probably Malay. The British were very
much excited about it and our efforts this morning in drawing our
papers was to see whether or not we should all act together. The
British will have to fight if they attack the Kra F'eninsula. We three
all thought that we must fight if the British fought. But now the
Japs have solved the whole thing by attacking us directly in Hawaii.
As soon as I could finish my lunch, I returned to the office and
began a long conference which lasted until 6 o'clock. The news
coming from Hawaii is very bad. [p. 61]. They seem to have
sprung a complete surprise upon our fleet and have caught the battle-
ships inside the harbor and bombed them severely with losses. They
have also hit our airfields there and have destroyed a great many of
our planes, evidently before [144'^0] they got off the ground.
It has been staggering to see our people there, who have been warned
long ago and were standing on the alert, should have been so caught
by surprise. At 4 o'clock McCloy had the chiefs of the arms of the
services in his room and 1 went in there and made them a little pep-up
talk about getting right to work in the emergency but most of the
time was spent in conference with Marshall, Grenville Clark, Miles,
Patterson, McCloy, and their assistants, Lovett and General Gullion,
the Provost Marshal General. The main subject that we were talking
about was the form of a declaration of war. Grenville Clark had drawn
up a copy based largely on the Woodrow Wilson one. We all thought
that it was possible we should declare war on Germany at the same
time with Japan, but that, of course, is an open question. There will
be no doubt about declaring war on Japan now, I think. The Presi-
dent has set a conference at the White House at 8 : 30 this evening,
in which the Cabinet had a conference and then a conference at 9 to
which the leaders of the House were coming.
[p. 62] When the news first came that Japan had attacked us,
my first feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that
a crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people. This
continued to be my dominant feeling in spite of the news of catas-
trophes which quicKly developed. For I feel that this country united
has practically nothing to fear; while the apathy and divisions stirred
up by unpatriotic men have \^lJi431] been hitherto very dis-
couraging.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5439
Our meeting with the President in the evening was in the Oval
Room in the "White House. He sat behind his desk and we in a semi-
circle in front of him. He opened by telling us that this was tlie
most serious meeting of the Cabinet that had taken place since 1861
and then Re proceeded to enumerate the blows which had fallen upon
us at Hawaii. Before he got to that, Knox who sat next to me told
me with a rather white face that we had lost seven of the eight battle-
ships in Hawaii. This, however, proved later to be exaggerated.
Steve Early sat near the President and dispatches were brought? in
every few minutes during the meeting. The President had hastily
drawn a draft of a message to Congress which he then read to us
slowly. It was a vei-y brief message, presenting the same thoughts
which he actually presented the following day in his finished message
to the Congress.
[p. 6S] After the talk with the Cabinet which lasted for at
least three-quarters of an hour, the leaders of Congress who had been
waiting below came in. I can remember the following as being pres-
ent : The Vice President, Senators Barkley, Connally, Austin, Hiram
Johnson, perhaps George; Representatives: Speaker Rayburn, Sol
Bloom, Eaton of New Jersey, Joe Martin ; possibly others. The Presi-
dent began by a very frank story of what had happened, including
our losses. The effect on the Congressmen was tremendous. They
sat in dead silence [144^^] and even after the recital was over
they had very few words. The President asked if they would invite
liim to appear Taefore the Joint Houses tomorrow and they said they
would. He said he could not tell them exactly what he was going
to say to them because events were changing so rapidly. We didn't
finish until after 11 o'clock, when I returned to the office and stayed
there until after 12.
On my return to the office from lunch I had started matters going
in all directions to warn against sabotage and to get punch into the
defense move. Marshall had sent out word of the attack to all of the
corps area commanders and all our people throughout the world,
particularly in the Philippines, I ordered all the officers thereafter
to appear in uniform ancl I found that others [p. 64-^ had or-
dered the armed guards out over the War Department Building and
additional guards over my house. We offered a gaiard to the White
House but it was thought better there to have the FBI, This same
activity went on during the intervals of my visit to the White House.
[144'^3 — P- ^5] Proposed Statement for President by Hull —
(See Record, December 7)
The Japanese Government, dominated by the military fireeaters,
is deliberately proceeding on an increasingly broad front to carry out
its long proclaimed purpose to acquire military control over one-half
of the world with nearly one-half its population. This inevitably
means Japanese control of islands, continents, and seas from the Indies
back near Hawaii, and that all of the conquered peoples would be gov-
erned militarily, politically, economically, socially, and morally by the
worst possible military despotism with barbaric, inhuman, and semi-
5440 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
slavery methods such as Japan has notoriously been inflicting on the
people in China and Hitler on the peoples of some 15 conquered nations
of Europe. This would virtually drive and force all free and peaceful
peoples off the high seas.
At this moment of serious, threatened, and imminent danger, it is
manifest that control of the South Sea area by Japan is the key to the
control of the entire Pacific area, and therefore defense of life and
commerce and other invaluable rights and interests in the Pacific area
must be commenced within the South Sea area at such times and
places as in the judgment of naval and military experts would be within
sufficient time and at such strategic points as would [p. 66}
make it most effective. In no other way can it be satisfactorily deter-
mined that the Pacific area can be successfully defended.
[144'34-] More than ever is the cohesive, closely related world
movement to conquer and destroy, with Hitler moving across one half
of the world and the Government of Japan under the military group
moving across the other half of the world by closely synchronizing
their efforts and collaborating and cooperating whenever to their in-
dividual or their mutual advantage.
This at once places at stake everything that is precious and worth
while. Self-defense, therefore, is the key point for the preservation
of each and all of our civilized institutions.
[l^^-SS — p. 67] Suggestion by Knox — (See Kecord, December 7)
1. We are tied up inextricably with the British in the present world
situation.
2. The fall of Singapore and the loss to England of Malaya will
automaticallv not only wreck her far eastern position but jeopardize
her entire etfort.
3. If the British lose their position the Dutch are almost certain to
lose theirs.
4. If both the British and the Dutch lose their positions we are
almost certain to be next, being then practically Japanese surrounded.
5. If the above be accepted, then any serious threat to the British
or the Dutch is a serious threat to the United States; or it might be
stated any threat to any one of the three of us in a threat to all of us.
We should therefore be ready jointly to act together and if such under-
standing has not already been reached, it should be reached immedi-
ately. Otherwise we may fall individually one at a time (or somebody
may be left out on a limb) .
6. I think the Japanese should be told that any movement in a
direction that threatens the United States will be met by force. The
President will want to reserve to himself just how to define
this. The following are suggestions to shoot at: Any movement
into Thailand; or any [p. 68] movement into [144-36]
Thailand west of 100° east and south of 10° north — this in accordance
with the recommendation of the British and Dutch and United States
military authorities in the Far East; or any movement against British,
Dutch, United States, Free French, or Portuguese territory in the
Pacific area.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5441
Mr. Lane. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I ask to have spread on
the record those interrogatories submitted to former Secretary Stim-
son by Senator Ferguson ^Yhich were not answered as explained in
former Secretary Stimson's letter of transmittal covering the inter-
rogatories which he did subsequently answer. The letter of trans-
mittal, the interrogatories and answers thereto will be in our next offer.
The Chairman. It is so ordered.
(The interrogatories [unanswered] referred to follow :)
[I4437] March 6, 1946.
The Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack being
advised that the former Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, is unable to appear
before the committee because of illness, I submit the following questions to
Mr. Stimson to be answered fully, completely, and under oath, and it is to be
understood that the questions and answers are to be made part of the official
record as if taken in open hearings.
[S] HoMEE Ferguson,
Homer Ferguson,
United States Senate.
1. In your testimony before the Pearl Harbor Board, you stated
that you had memoranda and records of what took place at certain
meetings relating to Japan and American relations during 1941.
Will you please furnish for the committee copies of these memoranda
and records so far as they disclose the Far East situation between
November 1 and December 8, 1911 ?
2. Did the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, have knowledge of
what was taking place betw^een you and other Cabinet members and
the President in relation to the Far Eastern situation ?
3. On the 25th of November 1941, you had a conversation
[144^3S] with the President wherein he stated that hostilities
with Japan might start perhaps next Monday, and that you had a
discussion with him at that time as to what we should do in relation
thereto. Will you please give us in detail what was said by you and
by the President at that time ?
4. Having appointed a board under the statute to investigate the
Pearl Harbor catastrophe, how do you account for the fact that a,fter
the Board had completed the examination of witnesses you appointed
Major Clausen to complete the investigation?
5. Will you give us the details as to those with whom j^ou dis-
cussed this matter and the conversations ?
6. Did you have Major Clausen investigate our policy in the Far
East as far as the Secretary of State's office was concerned?
7. If not, will you tell us why not?
8. Did you have Major Clausen investigate our policy in the Far
East as far as the White House was concerned ?
9. If not, will you tell us why not ?
10. Why did j^ou not have the Board appointed to investigate
this matter consider the so-called Clausen affidavits?
11. Were all Magic, that is, intercepted Japanese messages, fur-
nished to you ?
If not all Magic, were the messages furnished to War Plans and
Chief of Staff delivered to you?
Will you tell us what Japanese messages you did discuss with the
President ?
7971G— 46 — pt. 11 20
5442 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[1/^4^9] Will you state what discussion you had with the Presi-
dent on the following Japanese messages :
No. 985 Page 204, Exhibit 1.
No. 986 Page 206, Exhibit 1.
No. 865 Page 208, Exhibit 1.
No. 844 Page 195, Exhibit 1.
12. Did you discuss these Magic messages with the President ?
13. I call your attention to the message in exhibit 2 and ask i,f you
saw these messages prior to December 7, 1941.
14. I call your attention to the message on page 12 of exhibit 2
and ask you if you saw that message.
15. I ask you what evaluation you placed on the messages on
pages 12, 13, 14, and 15 of exhibit 2.
16. Did you discuss the messages asked about in the previous 3
questions with any person? If so, give us the details of the dis-
cussion.
17. Did you ever discuss with Secretary Hull why he decided not
to send the modus vivendi?
18. Did he ever tell you why he decided to send the note of Novem-
ber 26, 1941, and not the modus vivendi ? If so, will you state what
he said?
19. Upon what conversations was it based and what was the rea-
son for it?
20. I show you exhibit 45 and ask you to explain in detail
[1444^] why this language was used in that memorandum: "be
sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recoimnenda-
tion to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conver-
sations."
21. I call your attention to exhibit 45 and ask you whether it was
originally intended to send this message discussed in this exhibit to
General Short?
22. Isn't it true that a message was only to be sent to General
MacArthur and that you had discussed with the President this mes-
sage only to General MacArthur ?
23. Did you ever discuss with Secretary Hull the modus vivendi?
Give us the details of your conversation.
24. Did you advise for or against sending that proposal? If so,
tell us what was said.
25. Did Secretary Hull ever tell you why he sent the note of No-
vember 26 and not the modus vivendi ? If so, give us the conversation.
26. Exhibit No. 36 in the present investigation entitled "Memo-
randum for the Adjutant General (Through Secretary, General Staff) ,
subject: Far Eastern Situation," signed by L, T. Gerow, Brigadier
General, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, contains the following state-
ment : "The Secretary of War directs that the following secret, first
priority, message be despatched by cable, radio, or telegraph (which-
ever method is the most secure from the viewpoint of secrecy) to each
of the following :
[1444^] Commanding General, Hawaiian Department
Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command"
There then follows the message sent by the War Department to General
Short on November 27, 1941, signed "Marshall" being No. 472, which
is set forth on page 7 of exhibit 32.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5443
Wlien you directed that this despatch be sent to the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, did you intend to cause him to alert
the Hawaiian Department against hostile Japanese attack in the
Hawaiian area?
27. Exhibit No. 46 in this investigation is a copy of General Short's
reply to the message from General Marshall referred to in the preced-
ing interrogatory. This reply reads as follows :
Report department alerted to prevent sabotage period. Liaison with Navy
re URAD four seven two twenty seventh.
Short.
This exhibit containing General Short's reply bears the notation :
Noted H. L. S. (Stimson)
the "H L S" appearing to be your initials placed on the original War
Department radiogram in your handwriting.
When you read General Short's reply did you consider that it was
an adequate and responsive answer to the War Department's message
of November 27th signed: "Marshall," No. 472, [1U4^] re-
ferred to in question 26 ?
28. If your answer to the preceding question is in the negative, what,
if any, action did you take to cause the character of alert in the Ha-
waiian Department to conform to the type of alert you considered
to be required by the message of November 27, 1941, to General Short
from the War Department ?
29. Did you discuss General Short's reply to the War Department
message from General Marshall described in question 26 with any offi-
cer in the War Department during the period from November 28, 1941,
to and including December 7, 1941.
30. After November 27, 1941, up to and including December 7, 1941,
did the President address any inquiry to you as to the condition of
alert maintained in the various overseas departments of the Army,
and, specifically, as to whether in the Philippines and Hawaii, the
Army was prepared to meet any type of Japanese attack?
31. If your answer to question 30 is in the affirmative, what was the
nature of the inquiry made to you by the President, and your response
thereto ?
(Please state in complete detail, as you now recall, what was said by
the President and by you in any such conversation.)
32. I am informed that you suggested to the President, and he ap-
jDroved the idea, that a final alert should be sent to General MacArthur.
Will you give us the details of your [i.^4^5] conversation with
the President on this matter?
33. I call to your attention a message sent by General Miles to the
Commanding General at Panama dated December 5 : "IT. S.-Jap rela-
tions strained. Stop. Will inform you if and when severance of
diplomatic relations imminent. — sgd. Miles," and ask you if you ever
knew that that was sent ?
34 (a) If you knew of this message referred to in the last question,
will you explain when it was drawn up and sent to the Commander in
Panama ?
(h) Wliy was it sent?
(c) Why was the same message not sent to General Short at Pearl
Harbor ?
5444 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
35. Were you familiar with the reply that the commander in Panama
made to the order of the 27th of November ?
36. You have spoken in your testimony before the Pearl Harbor
Board that the President had made a momentous decision on the 26th
or near that date. It appears to be in connection with sending the
final alert as indicated in your diary. Will you state what that de-
cision was and all the conversations you had with the President in
relation to it ?
37. In that message the following language was used : "negotiations
with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only
the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back
and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile
action possible [i^^^i] at any moment." Is this your language
and, if so, did you discuss it with anyone before the message of Novem-
ber 27 was sent?
38 (a) If the language used in the previous message is not your
language, will you tell whose it was and what discussions you had in
relation to it?
(h) Did you discuss this language with the President? If so, will
you give us the details of the conversation ?
39. Isn't it true that the Japanese did come back for discussions
and that the newspapers carried accounts of further discussions on
December 1,2, and 5 ?
40. Would not the reports in the newspapers that negotiations had
been resumed tend to make General Short feel that the situation was
less critical, especially when he had been given no further information
by the War Department?
41. You used the following language in the message :
If hostilities cannot, repeat, cannot be avoided, the United States desires that
Japan commit the first overt act.
Whose language is this?
411/^. You having directed the preparation of the message of No-
vember 27 to General Short in General Marshall's absence, if that
message was subject to more than one interpretation was it not your
responsibility to check up on the reply to it under "report action
taken"?
42. Tell us as to the discussions you had concerning [1444^]
whether it should be put in the message to General Short ?
43. Did you ever discuss this first overt act as used in the Marshall
message to Short on November 27 with the President? Tell us what
was said and when you had the conversation.
44. (a) Did you ever discuss this first over act language with Sec-
retary of State Hull? Tell us what was said and wlien you had the
conversation.
(h) You knew that the message from Marshall to Short required
Short to report measures taken ?
45. Do you know whether any follow-up was made by the War
Department on the report of measures taken made by Short to this
message ?
46. For the purpose of this question let us assume that General
Short misinterpreted the Marshall message. If the answer is "no"
to the previous question, is the fault that Short misinterpreted the
message or that Washington failed to follow up his reply and see
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5445
he misinterpreted your message? Was the surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor caused by Short's misinterpretating the Marshall message of
November 27 or Washington failing to see that he had misinter-
preted your alert and not sending a new alert calling this error to
Jiis attention.
47. On the morning of November 28, you went to see the President,
as you describe it "before the President got up." You had with you
a November 28 G-2 report, or some other report from G-2. Will you
tell us the conversation you had with [144-^6] the President —
what was said by each o,f you.
48. (a) If this was important to discuss with the Commander in
Chief, the President, why did you not think it was also important to
discuss it with General Short or to give him notice of it ?
(h) Did you discuss the same thing with General Marshall or
General Gerow?
((?) Did you discuss it with anyone else — if so, give names and
conversation.
49. You have described the decision as "momentous." If this is
true, should it not have been transmitted to General Short?
50. Where did you expect the Japanese to strike on December 7,
1941?
51. Did the President say or intimate that he did not desire Short
or Kimmel to fire the first shot or commit the first overt act?
52. Did you concur without question in that attitude — that the
first overt act should not be committed by Admiral Kimmel or General
Short?
53. If so, will you give us the reasons for such concurrence ?
54. Had not the military movements of the Japanese clearly indi-
cated that Japan was not coming back and not going to offer to
continue the conferences?
[1444'^] 55. Did you ever see the message of November 26, 1941,
sent by Secretary Hull to the Japanese ?
56. If your answer to the last question is "yes", did you know the
contents of that message at the time it was sent or shortly thereafter?
Will you explain as to whether or not you believed it broke off relations
with Japan ?
57. Will you state the full conversation you had with Secretary
Hull in relation to the fact that he was through and that it was then
up to the Army and Navy ?
58. Did Mr. Hull explain why he was sending that message ?
59. Are you conversant with an official document of the State Depart-
ment of the United States wherein it is to be found these two sen-
tences : "He (the Secretary of State) said that our proposed agreement
(that is, the agreement proposed by Hull on the same day, the 26th)
would render possible practical measures of financial cooperation
which, however, were not referred to in the outline for fear that this
might give rise to some misunderstanding. He (that is Mr. Hull)
also referred to the fact that he had earlier in the conversations
acquainted the Ambassador (that is, Nomura) of the ambition that
had been his of settling the immigration question but that the situation
had so far prevented him from realizing that ambition."
60. Do you understand that these are Secretary Hull's own words,
contained in a memorandum, transcribed for him by Assistant Secre-
5446 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tary Ballantine who was present at the meeting? [l^H^] Do
you understand that this is what Secretary Hull says he said to the Jap
Government in the person of its ambassadors?
61. Do they represent what is known as an unnamed consideration
in the event of the American note of the 26th being accepted by the
Japanese ?
[l^H^] 62. Were you acquainted, when you reviewed the Army
board's definition of the nature of the note of the 26th, with the fact
that having read the note and having heard the Secretary's supple-
mentary propositions, Ambassador Kurusu said "that when they re-
ported our answer to their Government it would be likely to throw up
its hands." (of Public Relations, vol. 2, p. 765) and that "Mr. Kurusu
said that he felt that our response to their proposal could be inter-
preted as tantamount to meaning the end * * *." (of Foreign Re-
lations, vol. 2, p. 766).
63. Your diary shows that Secretary Hull stated at the meeting on
December 7 at the meeting between you, Secretary Knox, and Secretary
Hull that the Japanese are planning some deviltry and that he won-
dered where the blow would strike. Did you discuss Hawaii, or any
other American possession at that time ?
64. If so, will you state what was said and by whom ?
65. (a) Did anyone at that meeting bring up the question of 1 p. m.
Washington time being dawn or morning in Pearl Harbor ?
(&) Did you three Secretaries on December 7, 1941, discuss the 1
p. m. time of delivery and what was said by each of you ?
66. Did anyone suggest or bring up the fact that this might or could
mean an attack upon Hawaii or Pearl Plarbor ?
67. If so, give us the details of that discussion. Give us the detailed
conversation that took place in the Secretary of State's oflSce on Sunday
a. m., December 7, 1941.
[144^0] 68. On December 6, 1941, was an appointment arranged
for a meeting between you, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary
of the Navy, to be held at the State Department on December 7, 1941,
at or about 10 o'clock a. m. ?
69. (a) Who arranged the meeting referred to in the preceding
question and at what time? What was to be the purpose of the
meeting ?
(h) Why was not General Marshall and/or Admiral Stark invited
or in attendance ?
(\c) If the meeting was to consider Japan's reply to the Secretary
of State's note of November 26, why was the President not also con-
ferred with ?
70. What was the occasion for arranging the meeting referred to
in question 68 ?
71. (a) Who attended the meeting at the State Department on
December 7, 1941, at or about 10 o'clock a. m. ?
(b) What intercepted Japanese messages were before you at that
meeting ?
72. What discussion or discussions took place at the meeting held
at the State Department on the morning of December 7, 1941, which
you attended in company with the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, an<l
the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox? (Please state in complete
detail what was said by you and by the other participants in the dis-
cussions at the meeting referred to.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5447
[lJf4Sl^ 73. Wliat action did you take, or direct to be taken, on
the morning of December 7, 1941, {a) when you learned of the exis-
tence and tenor of the fourteenth part of the Japanese reply to the
American note of November 26, 1941, which appears on page 245 of
exhibit 1 ; and ( 5 ) when you learned that the Japanese Ambassador
in Washington was directed to present the Japanese reply to the
American note of November 26 at 2 p. m., Washington time?
74. Was there any discussion between you and any individual on
December 7, 1941, prior to the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, as
to the significance of the Japanese message directing the Japanese
Ambassador in Washington to present the Japanese reply to the
American note of November 26, 1941, at 1 p. m., Washington time?
75. If your answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative,
what was said by you and any other individual in connection with the
subject matter of the significance of the hour fixed for the delivery of
the Japanese note to the United States on December 7, 1941 ?
76. After you learned of the existence of the fourteenth part of the
Japanese message and the additional message fixing the time of de-
livery as 1 o'clock p. m., Washington time, did you discuss either of
these messages with the President, with General Marshall, or with
Admiral Stark or any officer of the State Department, the Navy De-
partment, the War Department ?
[IJf.ItS^'] 77. If your answer to the preceding question is in the
affirmative, what was said by you and what was said by the person or
persons with whom you had any discussion or conversation referred
to in the preceding question ?
78. Did you talk with the President personally or by phone or
contact him through a messenger on Saturday, December 6 or 7 from
4 p. m. to the time of the attack ?
79. If you did communicate in any way with the President, per-
sonally or otherwise, give the details of that conversation.
80. Did you at any time on December 6, 1941, receive the first 13
parts of the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26,
which appears on pages 239, 240, 242, 243, and 244 of exhibit 1 in this
investigation ?
81. If your answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative,
at what time and from what individual, did you receive the message
referred to?
82. When on December 6, 1941, did you learn that the first 13 parts
of the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26 had been
intercepted and translated by the Army and Navy ?
83. From whom did you receive the information referred to in
the preceding question? (Please state in complete detail, as you
now recall, what was said by any person or persons informing you
of the receipt of the 13-part message, and your [i^5^] re-
sponse thereto.)
84. Exhibit 58 of this investigation (item 2) contains a list of "tele-
phone calls made from outside through Wliite House switchboard
on December 6, 1941, and December 7, 1941, as compiled from op-
erators' notes available." The following calls appear among others
with the following notations as to time on December 6:
1258 p. Secy Stimson eld Secy Hull Iwc — OK 1259 p.
830 p. Secy Knox eld Secy Stimson OK
845 p. Secy Knox eld Secy Hull OK
847 p. Secy Knox eld Secy Stimson OK
5448 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(a) Wliat was said by you and by Secretary Hull in the course of
3'our telephone conversation at 12 : 58 p. m. on December 6, 1941 ?
(h) Wliat was said by you and Secretary Knox in the course of
your telephone conversation at 8: 30 p. m. on December 6, 1941?
(c) What was said by you and Secretary Knox in the course of your
telephone conversation at 8:47 p. m, on December 6, 1941?
85. Did you have any conversation or conversations with Secretary
Hull and Secretary Knox on 6 December 1941, other than those re-
ferred to in the preceding question ?
86. If your answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative,
what were the time or times of any such conversation [144^4-]
or conversations, and what was said by you and the other party to
each such conversation ?
87. This question not used.
88. This question not used.
89. This question not used.
90. At any time on December 6, 1941, did you discuss the "pilot
message," so-called or the 13-part message referred to in question 80
with any of the following individuals :
(a) The President.
(b) Secretary of State Hull.
(c) Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox.
(d) Mr. Sumner Welles.
(e) Gen. George C. Marshall.
(/) Admiral H. K. Stark.
Iff) General Miles — G-2.
(h) General Gerow.
(i) Col. Rufus Bratton.
(Please specify in your answer to this question the name of the
individual or individuals referred to, with whom you had such discus-
sion or conversation, and the time or times of such discussions or
conversations.)
(See question 94 for description of the pilot message.)
91. What was said by you and by any of the individuals referred
to in question 90 in the course of any conversations [144^S^ or
discussions on December 6, 1941, with reference to :
(a) The meaning of the so-called "pilot message" (see
question 94.)
(b) Any action to be taken by the War and Navy Departments,
or the State Department, in connection with the so-called "pilot
message" ;
(c) The meaning of the 13-part message referred to in ques-
tion 80 ;
(d) Any action to be taken by the War and Navy Departments
or the State Department with respect to the 13-part message.
92.Where were you on December 6, 1941, from 4 p. m. to 12 midnight ?
93. Did you learn of the contents of the thirteenth part of the
14-part message before you saw it? If so, relate the circumstances.
94. Your attention is "directed to pages 238 and 239 of exhibit 1 of
this investigation, and specifically to the message appearing on such
pages from Tokyo to Washington,' No. 901, on December 6, 1941, This
message has been described in the course of this investigation as the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5449
"pilot message" because it informs the Japanese representatives in
Washington that Japan has prepared a memorandum in reply to the
American note of November 26' to be sent in 14 parts, and that the time
of its presentation was to be specifically fixed [14-4^6] in a later
message. Col. Rufus Bratton has testified before this committee
(record, p. 12050) that he disseminated this so-called "pilot message"
around 3 o'clock of the afternoon of December 6, 1941, to "Secretary of
State, Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Chief of the War Plans
Division, G-2, and my own section."
What action did you take upon receipt of this message ?
95. With whom did you discuss the so-called "pilot message" referred
to in the preceding question ?
96. What was the nature of your discussion of the so-called "pilot
message" with any person or persons on the 6th of December 1941?
(Please state in complete detail what you said in any such discussion,
and what was said by the person or persons wdth whom you discussed
the "pilot message"?)
97. When did you see the pilot message which is No. 901, page 238
of exhibit 1 ?
Had the contents of the pilot message been called to your attention
before you saw it? If so, relate the circumstances.
98. When did you first see or obtain information as to the contents
o,f the following messages in exhibit 1 :
No. 904 Page 245.
No. 907 Page 248.
No. 908 -■ Page 248.
[UW] No. 909 Page 240.
No. 910 Page 249.
99. If you made plans at this meeting on the 7th between the three
Secretaries as to what was to be said or done (the words said and done
were used by you in your testimony before the Army board) did you
discuss with anyone that this information should be sent to the field,
particularly to Short ?
Give us the conversations on what was to be said.
Give us the conversations on what was to be done.
100. At what time did you first get the fourteenth part of the 14-
part message ? Give hour if possible.
101. Did you see General Marshall on December 6 ? If so, give us
detailed conversations between you.
Did you see General Marshall on December 7 prior to the Japanese
attack? If so, give us detailed conversation.
Did you see General Gerow on December 6 or 7 up to the Jap
attack? If so, give us detailed conversations between you.
102. Did you talk with any Army officer after 4 p. m. on December
6, 1941, up to the time of the attack on the 7th of December? If so,
give us the conversations.
103. I quote from exhibit 16 dated November 5, 1941, memorandum
from Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff to the President :
The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the
following conclusions :
[1U5S] a. The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United
States-British staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the
two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany
5450 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any ease, an
unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a
war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany,
the most dangerous enemy.
b. War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building
up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly
threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great im-
portance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or
more of the following contingencies :
(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory
or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or
the Netherlands East Indies ;
(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of the
100° East or south 10° North ; or into Portugese Timor, New Caledonia, or
the Loyalty Islands.
[14459] c. If war with Japan cannot be avoided, it should follow the
strategic lines of existing war plans, i. e., military operations should be primarily
defensive, with the objective of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic
position.
d. Considering world strategy, a Japanese Advance against Kunming, into
Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify
intervention by the United States against Japan.
e. All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the
Chinese Central Government.
f. In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated
action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields should be undertaken in
common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands
East Indies.
The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the
United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.
Specifically, they recommend :
That the dispatch of United States armed forces for [14460] in-
tervention against Japan in China be disapproved.
That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the need of
Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.
That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated
to the maximum practicable extent.
That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.
104. Did you discuss the above (question 103) with first the Presi-
dent? If so, give us the details of the conversation; secondly, the
Secretary of State ? If so, give us details of the conversation ; third,
with General Marshall? If so, give us details of the conversation.
105. Following is the fourteenth part of the 14-part message :
From : Tokyo
To : Washington
7 December 1941
#902 Part 14 of 14
(Note. — In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this
part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")
7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with
Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establish-
ment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially
to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping [144^1]
Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the
course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Gov-
ernment to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the
peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has
finally been lost.
The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Gov-
ernment that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but
consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotia-
tions.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5451
[14462] 106. How do you account for the delay from 5 o'clock
a. m., the date of the receipt of the fourteenth part of the 14-part
message, until you did receive it ?
107. If any of the delay was caused by delay in decoding and trans-
lation, it seems clear it was translated by 8 a. m. or 8 : 15 a. m. on the
morning of the 7th of December 1941, How do you account for the
delay from 8 a. m. until you did see it ?
108. Did you at any time prior to the attack discuss with the Presi-
dent the contents of any part of the 14-part message ?
109. If so, what was the discussion ?
110. Did you discuss with General Marshall any of the Japanese
messages received by our Government on December 6 or 7, 1941, and
set forth in our exhibit 1? If so, state the time; give the number
of the message and page of exhibit 1, also the details of what was said
by each of you.
111. If you discussed with the Secretary of State any of the Jap-
anese messages received by our Government on December 6 or 7, 1941,
and set forth in our exhibit 1 at any time other than at the meeting
in his office at 10 or 10 : 30 a, m. on Sunday, December 7. State the
times and give the number of the message, page of exhibit 1, and also
the details of what was said by you and Mr. Hull.
112. Did you discuss with anyone in the Army and Navy any of
the Japanese messages received by our Government on December 6 or
7 and set forth in our exhibit 1? Give the names of [14463'}
persons, time of discussion or conversations, and conversation by you
and the other party or parties.
113. At the meeting of the three Secretaries on Sunday, December
7, 1941, at 10 or 10 : 30 a. m. You, Mr. Stimson, were familiar with
the message sent to General Short on November 27. Did you not
consider with the information you had received here in Washington
from that date until your meeting time on December 7 that a new alert
was necessary to General Short ?
114. You had seen on November 28, 1941, the reply from General
Short to the message of November 27 which was as follows :
Report department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy REURAD
Four Seven Two Twenty Seventh.
having in mind that reply showing his interpretation of the message of
November 27 that a new alert was necessary.
Your findings as to General Short indicate you believed he was
subject to criticism for his interpretation of the message from General
Marshall to him on November 27; is not the same thing true of the
failure to properly evaluate his reply to that message.
115. When did you first learn that General Marshall and General
Gerow had failed to note what General Short had replied to their note
of November 27 ?
116. Did not the failure of the responsible Army officers in Wash-
ington to properly evaluate General Short's reply to General Marshall's
message of November 27 contribute to the Pearl Harbor [14464]
disaster ?
117. Did you know what messages were sent from Washington to
General Short between November 27 and the 8th of December 1941 ?
State the message you knew had been sent between November 27
and December 8, 1941.
5452 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Did you believe that General Short was getting all decoded Japanese
diplomatic messages ?
118. Did you believe that Pearl Harbor had the means to intercept,
decipher, and translate Japanese diplomatic messages?
119. Did you know that General Mac Arthur had access to the inter-
cepted Japanese diplomatic messages through the Navy in the Phil-
ippines ?
120. Did you discuss with the President the 1 o'clock message, ex-
hibit 1, No. 907, page 248?
121. If so, give time and what was said by you and by the President.
122. Wliy did our Government adopt the policy of leaning over
backwards to keep from advising Japan that we were ready for any
attack that they might make?
123. If such was the plan, or our policy, who was responsible for its
adoption ?
124. With whom did you discuss it and give us the contents of the
discussion.
125. Do you know why General Marshall did not use the telephone
to advise General Short of an anticipated attack or give [i^^5]
him an alert ?
How could the fact that we were alerted to air attack (if known by
the Japs) been detrimental to the United States?
126. You have made a statement that there was a preliminary alert
given prior to the 27th and a full alert given on the 27th. As time
went on, and the deadline date of the 29th passed, new developments
arose as to the destruction of the codes, and other information came
to our Government here in Washington. Did you discuss with any-
one the sending of a new message to keep parties alerted and, if not,
why not?
127. The fact that General Marshall did send a message at 12:18
on the 7th of December 1941, to General Short would indicate, would
it not, that General Marshall did not consider the message of the
27th as sufficient considering the further information that was ob-
tained as to Japan's intentions?
128. This being true, can you tell us why, if a new alert was to be
given at all, it was not given earlier than 12 : 18, December 7?
129. Was your Secretary of War's office alerted to war on the 5th
or on the 6th or on the 7th of December 1941 ?
130. If not, can you explain why not ?
131. If it was, will you explain just how it was alerted and who was
on duty in the office ?
132. Wlien, in your opinion, did war between Japan and America
become imminent ?
[14-466] 133. Did you make any effort to contact General Mar-
shall on the afternoon or night of December 6, or on the morning of
December 7, 1941 ?
134. If your answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative,
were you successful ?
135. If your answer to question 133 is in the affirmative, what was
said by you and by General Marshall ?
136. Did you during the time, the 6th of December, contact Admiral
Stark?
137. If so, give us the conversations and what was discussed.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5453
138. This question was not used.
139. This question not used.
140. Did you contact the Secretary of State, or did he contact
you, or were you in communication with him either personally or by
message on the 6th ?
141. If so, give us the details of the conversation and the time of
contact.
142. When did you receive notice or information concerning a mes-
sage from Ambassador Winant purporting to come from Churchill to
the President, received in the State Department at 10 : 40 on Decem-
ber 6?
143. If you had a conference with the Secretary of the Navy about a
meeting the next day, and were familiar with the fact that a 13-part
message was in, and 1 part part had not been [i^^^7] received,
can you explain why the meeting was held as late as 10 or 10 : 30 ?
144. When did you learn that the President was preparing a message
to the Emperor ?
145. When did you first know or hear that that message was sent?
146. If you had any conversations with the President about that
message to the Emperor will you give us the conversations?
147. Did you have a conversation at any time in November or De-
cember 1941, with the President about a message to Congress concern-
ing the Far Eastern situation? If so, give us details of that con-
versation.
148. Were you aware that the President, in informing the press on
December 2, that he was asking Japan about the Indochina concen-
trations, was asked by a reporter if any time limit had been set for a
reply and that the President had said that the question was silly, had
answered in the negative, and said that those tactics were used in the
last century not in this, and had said that the United States was at
peace with Japan and that the two nations were perfectly friendly ?
149. Were you aware of the Jap Ambassador telling Under Secre-
tary Welles, on delivery of the December 2 note, that it was apparent
that both sides were preparing? (See Foreign Kelations, p. 780.)
150. Were you aware on December 4 that the Japanese [144^8]
movements in Indochina alone as represented in the President's note
of December 2, constituted actions which the President in his note of
August 17 had formally pledged the United States to resist?
151. Do you have any evidence that that commitment on August 17
had been made known to the American people or to the American
Congress before December 7, 1941 ?
152. Will you state your conversation with General Marshall, or
any other military authority, in relation to the fact that negotiations
were ended so far as the Secretary of State was concerned and that
it was up to the Army and Navy ?
153. When the President returned from the Atlantic Conference,
did you discuss with him his conversations or negotiations with Prime
Minister Churchill in relation to the Far East?
154. I refer you to Foreign Kelations, volume 2, page 556, at the
bottom of the page, the last paragraph, which continues on page 557.
Did you know that that message was given by the President to the
Japanese and did you discuss with him the message, or the contents
thereof, and will you state your discussions, what he said and what
you said ?
5454 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
155. Did you know what our Government policy was in giving
armed aid or support to Britain or the Dutch if there was an attack
made by the Japanese upon the Malay Peninsula or any other British
or Dutch possession and no direct attack [144^9] against
American possessions ?
156. Why were you concerned with the movement south of the
Japanese to Thailand or the Malay Peninsula if we had no policy as
to what we intended to do in case of any attack on the British and/or
the Dutch?
157. Did you ever discuss with the President and/or Secretary of
State Hull the question of our policy in case of an attack upon the
British and/or Dutch and no attack'^by the Japanese upon America
or American possessions ?
158. If you had such a discussion, give us the dates and details.
159. At the meeting on December 7, 1941, with Secretary Hull and
Secretary Knox, during that meeting or from the time of that meet-
ing up until the attack, did you or anyone to your knowledge present
at that meeting, or in that conference, communicate with the President
and, if so, what were the contents of the conversation ?
160. At the meeting between you and the other Secretaries and
Cabinet members, you have stated that you stayed in conference until
lunch time going over the plans for what should be said and done.
Will you give us the details of that conversation or, if you do not
remember the exact words, then the substance of the conference, par-
ticularly what you meant by "plans for what should be said" and
what is meant by that. Also in regard to "as to what should be done,"
will you tell us what [14470] was said by each on "as to what
should be done."
161. I refer you to a memorandum, exhibit 40, and ask you if there
was any discussion with you or anyone else to your knowledge on this
subject of armed support.
Who assured the British of American armed support as mentioned
in their instructions to Singapore as shown in the message of our
naval observer at Singapore to Admiral Hart ?
162. As Secretary of War on December 5, 1941, had you prepared
or acted in any way to implement the declaration of the President
to Japan on August 17 that the United States immediately would
resist a Japanese threat or move into the Southwest Pacific?
163. You were certain, if only from the President's note of Decem-
ber 2, were you not, that Japanese concentration in southern Indo-
china, constituted a threat within the meaning and letter of the dec-
laration of August 17, 1941 ?
164. As Secretary of War, on December 5, had you anticipated that
American resistance to a Jap attack against some other nation would
follow the pattern of American resistance to Germany's attacks on
Great Britain in the Atlantic Ocean ?
165. Was it ever called to your attention that the Secretary of In-
terior was holding up the installation of the permanent radar sets?
If so, what was done to expedite these installations ?
166. What evidence was before you when General Short was
[144'^^] relieved of his command?
Whose decision was it to relieve General Short of his command ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5455
167. It is true, is it not, that in late November and early Decem-
ber 1941 yon and General Marshall shared with General Short the
belief that Japan would not attack Pearl Harbor? (See par. 19,
Stimson statement August 29, 1945.)
168. It is true, is it not, that the American General Staff "com-
pletely underestimated the Japanese military capabilities and particu-
larly the advance which they had made in the use of aircraft"?
169. Do you still think that "It is probably true that the emphasis
on sabotage in several War Department warnings and the Depart-
ment's caution against alarming the civilian population, coupled with
the failure to comment on Short's report of November 27, confirmed
him in his conviction that he had chosen the correct form of alert and
might disregard all others, as you stated in your official report re-
garding the Pearl Harbor disaster, released to the press on August
29, 1945 ?
170. If there was, in the opinion of the War Department General
Staff, any "threat from without," in an overseas command, and the
reports from that area showed only an alert against sabotage, who, if
anyone, had the duty or authority in the War Department to trans-
mit a message to correct the situation ?
[144'^2] 171. In your public report of August 29 you stated that
G-2 "had duties of collecting and analyzing information and trans-
mitting information * * * to the theater commanders"; it is
true, is it not, that neither G-2 nor the War Department sent any
information to General Short between November 28, 1941, and De-
cember 7, 1941 ?
172. In your opinion, was the War Department on a sufficient
alert on December 6, 1941 so that the Chief of Staff could reasonably
assume that information such as was received indicating a breach of
diplomatic relations would get to him before the next morning, or do
you regard the delay in getting this information to General Marshall
as an unusual circumstance which he could not have reasonably
foreseen ?
173. Do you believe that in early December 1941 the War Depart-
ment had an efficient functioning system to get important intelligence
promptly to the Chief of Staff?
174. It is true, is it not, that neither you nor Colonel Clausen, your
investigator even asked General Short about his knowledge of the
"winds" code, but that, nevertheless, you made a finding in your
official report that "this information was available to General ^hort
or his command prior to December 7, 1941?"
175. Were you consulted and did you have anything to do with
the appointment of the Roberts Commission ?
176. Did you see the Roberts Finding of Facts prior to its
{HJf7'3'] signing and submission to the President?
Mr. Lane. As just previously referred to, subsequently the com-
mittee submitted certain additional interrogatories to Mr. Stimson.
His reply has been received and we request that the interrogatories,
the answers thereto, and the letter of transmittal dat^d April 23, 1946,
be spread on the record at this point.
5456 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Chairman. It is so ordered.
(The mutter referred to follows :)
Law Offices of
WiNTHROP, STIMSON, PuTNAM & ROBERTS
Mutual Life Building No. 32 Liberty Street
NEW YOEK 5, N. Y.
Whitehall 3-0700
Henry L. Stimson, Counsel
April 23, 1946.
Hon. Alben W. Barkley,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Senator Barkley: I have received your kind letter of April 4th
enclosing the two sets of interrogatories which Senator Ferguson has submitted.
I confess to disappointment that my previous effort to give your Committee a
fair and full statement of what I could recollect in regard to the Pearl Harbor
attack, based upon such effort and investigation as my health would allow,
should now be followed by no less than 237 interrogatories submitted by Senator
Ferguson. In preparing my statement I went to the very margin of the rules
imposed upon me by my physicians.
The interrogatories which you now send me are divided into two lists. The
first dated March 6th must have been prepared before my statement sent to the
Committee on March 13th could have been received by them. While I have not
been able to examine [i^4~5] it carefully, it must have been in large
part answered by that statement of mine.
Senator Ferguson's second list by its title is related to my statement and is
in substance a cross-examination of that statement. This second list I have
now tried to answer to the best of my recollection and belief.
I assume that the committee will be satisfied with my original statement as an
answer to the first list and, if there are any questions in that list directed to
matters not in the statement, it will assume that my recollection does not extend
to that question. I really cannot in my present condition of health undertake
the very heavy burden which would inure to another reexamination of all papers,
documents, and evidence heretofore submitted. I did the best I could in that
respect in my first statement. I hope you will find my answers to Senator
Ferguson's supplemental questions satisfactory. I enclose them herewith.
With many thanks for your courtesy and personal good wishes.
I am, very sincerely, yours,
(Signed) Henry L. Stimson.
[IW^e] ANSWERS OF HENRY L. STIMSON TO SUPPLEMENTAL
QUESTIONS PROPOSED BY SENATOR FERGUSON
1. Mr. Secretary, you state in your statement to the Pearl Harbor
Committee that our military advisers had given the President their
formal advice that if Japan moved beyond certain lines we would have
to fight for the sake of our own security. Are you referring to the
memoranda to the President, dated November 5 and November 27,
1941, and signed b}^ Admiral Stark and General Marshall?
Assuming this statement is addressed to the sentence on page 4 of
my statement, my answer is "yes."
2. Was this advice on the request of the President ?
I have no recollection as to this.
3. Was that advice accepted and did it become our Government
policy prior to the Pearl Harbor attack?
It has always been the fixed and permanent policy of the United
States Government to defend itself and its possessions. The Congress
itself reaffirmed and endorsed this policy on numerous occasions as the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5457
dangers to this country from the war which was starting across the
world became more acute. It reaffirmed it when the regular size of
our ordinary military appropriations were enormously increased by
the Congress in May and June 1940, at the time of the fall of France,
Belgium, and the Netherlands. It reaffirmed it in September 1940,
when it passed the draft law, and by the joint resolution in August
[14p7] 1940, which authorized the total mobilization of the Na-
tional Guard for large scale maneuvers or training. It reaffirmed
it by its passage of the lend-lease legislation to assist in arming the
nations who were fighting in the front line against aggression by the
Axis and in opening our ports for the repairs of their warships.
Each of these extraordinary congressional enactments indicated be-
yond peradventure a policy to prepare the United States against an
immediate impending attack by the Axis nations.
It is the President of the United States who is charged with the
execution of that policy, both as Chief Executive and as Commander
in Chief of the armed forces. It was his duty to make the decisions
as to how this policy of defense should be best carried out. The
adoption of plans for defense are ultimately for his decision and if the
adoption of a particular strategy is to be termed policy at all, it is
executive policy the decision of which it entirely a matter for the
President. In making this decision, the President receives the advice
of numerous advisers, including his military advisers and the members
of his Cabinet. Their views and recommendations, however, are
purely advisory, and the final policy and strategy is for the decision
of the President and it is his alone.
As I have already pointed out in my statement, and as my con-
temporaneous notes indicate, it was the consensus of [144'^^]
opinion of the President's advisers that if the Japanese in the latter
part of November should advance beyond a certain point the security
of this country demanded that we would have to fight. It was also the
consensus of opinion that a further warning by us to Japan should
be given. The President was in fact during the early part of December
engaged in preparing an address to the Congress which would incor-
porate such a warning, and was also considering a special telegram
to the Emperor of Japan. Before the address to the Congress was
delivered, however, the Japanese struck on December 7. I do not recol-
lect that the President prior to December 7 formally announced any
decision on his part to fight if the Japanese passed the point in ques-
tion, but he \yas undoubtedly considering such a decision most seri-
ously, because it was the advice of his best qualified advisers.
4. If so, what plans were promulgated to carry out that advice?
See answer to question 3.
5. Did you have information from the President that we would
fight for the sake of our security upon the happening of that event
mentioned in question 1?
See answer to question 3.
6. If so, did you convey that information to General Marshall ?
See answer to question 3.
7. Will you state if the Secretary of the Navy had such advice and
if he conveyed it, or caused it to be conveyed, to [14479] Ad-
miral Stark?
I have no information as to this.
79716— 46— pt. 11 21
5458 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
8. On page 9 of your mimeographed statement to the committee,
you have set forth four salient features of the situation as they ap-
peared to you in November of 1941. Were any or all of these discussed
with any other person ?
All of these points were discussed many times and with numerous
persons. I have already indicated in my statement the discussions
that took place with the President, at Cabinet meetings and at meet-
ings with the Secretary of State and Secretary of the Navy and with
the chiefs of staff, all of whom shared my views, to the best of my
information and belief,
9. If so will you state with whom they were discussed and if anyone
else shared your views on these features? Will you give their names?
I have nothing to add beyond what I have already said in my state-
ment of March 1946, and in my last answer.
10. On page 12 of the mimeographed statement you speak of the
vote of the Cabinet as to whether or not it was thought that the Ameri-
can people would back you up if it became necessary to strike Japan
in case she attacked England in Malay or the Dutch East Indies, does
this mean that it became the policy of this Government at that time to
take such steps ?
See answer to question 3.
[144^0] 11. If so, to whom was this policy communicated?
See answer to question 3.
12. Did you advise General Marshall and was he to advise others
in the field of this policy ?
See answer to question 3.
13. Did you, Mr. Secretary, keep in close touch with the program of
installing permanent radar in the Hawaiian Islands?
I took a very active interest in insisting that proper installations of
radar, both mobile and permanent, be installed in Hawaii as promptly
as possible, but I, of course, left the details as to how and where the
permanent apparatus should be installed to the military members of
the staff and the local military commander, I have no recollection at
this time as to how much detail I knew with regard to the permanent
installations at Hawaii prior to December 7, 1941, I do remember
distinctly the very favorable report of the test of the mobile apparatus
that was made shortly before the Pearl Harbor attack, and that that
report indicated that the mobile apparatus was in operation and was
capable of detecting the approach of enemy planes at a distance of at
least 80 miles,
14. Will you state specifically what was done to expedite the in-
stallation of permanent radar in Hawaii ?
I have no recollection at the present time.
15. Was it not called to your attention that there were many
[14481] delays in the installing of radar equipment in the
Hawaiian Islands?
I have no recollection at the present time,
16. On pages 14. and 15, you tell of a conversation between the War
Cabinet — the President, Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, General
Marshall, Admiral Stark, and the Secretary of State — on page 15 you
state that certain things were discussed at the meeting. Was there
any policy formulated by virtue of that discussion ?
See answer to question 3.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5459
17. If SO, will you state what the policy was and how it was to be
carried out ? On page 15, you state that you reminded the President
of his warning of August 19, 1 ask you if the correct date of that is not
Sunday, August 17, when the President returned from the Atlantic
Conference with Mr. Churchill ?
See answer to question 3. I belive the correct date of the warning
which I described as of August 19 should be August 17, 1941.
18. I also ask you what the President replied to you when you made
the statement to him as stated by you on page 15 as to the warning that
he had given Japan ?
I do not recollect.
19. Will you state what the President said about this warning and
your suggestion ?
lUIfSd] I do not recollect, except that I do remember that the
final view was that an additional warning to Japan should be given.
20. When did you first become familiar with the warning that the
President gave to Japan on August 17, 1941, as related in the White
Paper (vol. 2, Foreign Relations of the United States, pages 556-557) ?
I do not recollect. See answer to question 52 below.
21. Did England ever give a parallel warning? If so, when?
I do not recollect. See answer to question 52 below.
22. Was it not important that you, as Secretary of War, be advised
as to our policies in the Far East and that you advise General Marshall
of that policy and that he, in turn, advise General Short and other
officers in the field ?
I think it was important that the Secretary of War and the Chief
of Staff should be advised as to our policies in the Far East. As to
what extent and in what detail the commander of the individual
theater should be so advised depends on the circumstances of the
particular situation.
23. Was it not important that if our Government had a policy that
if England or the Netherlands were attacked that we would consider
it as an unfriendly act and an attack upon us, that our military authori-
ties be fully advised as to that?
See answer to questions 3 and 22.
[1448S] 24. Was it not important that if Japan was to make an
attack upon the British and/or the Dutch and our policy was that we
were to treat that as an attack or unfriendly act upon us that the com-
manding officer at Hawaii be fully informed as to this in order that
he might guard against an attack upon our fleet and pDSsessions which
were on the flank. of the Japanese?
See answer to questions 3 and 22. The commanding officers of the
individual Pacific theaters were advised on November 27 that hostile
action was possible "at any moment."
25. On page 17 of your statement, you speak of the conversation
with Mr. Hull and state that he had washed his hands of it and that
it was in the hands of the Army and the Navy, and that you had
called the President who gave you a different view, do I understand
that the President did not agree with Mr. Hull ?
I think my statement and my notes of November 27 adequately cover
the answer to this question.
26. Will you give us the entire conversation you had with the Presi-
dent in relation to this?
I have nothing to add to what I have already said in my statement.
5460 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
27. Did you discuss with the President on or about November 27,
1941, the sendino; of a message to General MacArthur?
[lUSIf] I did.
28. Will you give us this conversation?
I have nothing to add to what I have already said in my statement,
page 19, and to what is contained in my notes of Thursday, November
27, 1941.
29. At that time, or on the 27th, did you discuss with the President
the sending of a message to General Short ?
I do not recollect. The sequence shows that such a message was
sent to Short as well as the two other Pacific outposts; viz, Panama
and the Pacific coast including Alaska.
30. Will you give us the conversation with the President about
sending General Short a message?
See answer to question 29.
31. WTien did it first come to your attention that the Japanese were
treating our note of November 26, 1941, as an ultimatum?
I do not recollect. I do not know that it ever came to my knowledge
until after December 7.
32. Was it not important that we understand the way the Japanese
were treating it — as to what their acts would be rather than what our
intentions were?
I have nothing to say as to this. See answer to previous question.
33. On pages 24 and 25 of your mimeographed statement you make
the statement that the President had made a momentous [1^55]
decision that day; that is, to send what you called a final alert. I
wish you would explain why you refer to this as a momentous decision.
The word "momentous" is perhaps not strictly accurate. It is a
fair sample of the rough and hasty character of my daily notes as
described in my original statement to your committee. The thought
I intended to convey was that the President had himself directed that
a final warning should be sent out and that as this decision had
emanated from the Commander in Chief it was very important that
it should be done.
34. Why was it a momentous decision to advise our armed forces
to be on the alert for an attack by the Japs ?
See answer to question 33.
35. Did you consider this a declaration of war with Japan and for
this reason it was a momentous decision ?
I did not consider this a declaration of war with Japan.
36. State what was said between you and the President on this
occasion so we may be advised as to why this was a momentous decision.
I have already answered this in my statement of March 1946, at
page 26.
37. On page 26 of your mimeographed statement you say that our
Government had decided not to attack without a further warning,
and that the President suggested a special [-?^4<5^] telegram
from himself to the Emperor of Japan. Was it decided as a policy
of .our Government that we would attack after sending of that message
if the Japanese continued their aggression further to the south?
See answer to question 3.
38. On the same page you state that a special message would be
delivered to Congress. Will you state if you ever knew why that
message was not delivered to Congress ?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5461
It was not delivered to Congress because the Japanese struck first.
39. Why was Congress allowed to adjourn from December 4 to
December 8 at a time when our Government knew of the movement of
the Japanese to the south ?
I have no recollection as to this.
40. On page 28 of your statement you use the following language :
On the other hand, we also decided that we could not attack without a further
warning to Japan, and we discussed what form that warning should take. The
President suggested a special telegram from himself to the Emperor of Japan.
After some discussion it was decided that he would send such a letter to the
Emperor, which would not be made public, and that at the same time he would
deliver a special message to Congress reporting on the danger and reporting
what we would have to do if the danger happened.
Will you please explain as to whether this proposal [14487] in-
volved coming to Congress in advance or whether the proposal was
to strike Japan first then report to Congress what had been done?
The proposal was to go to Congress in advance, and through the
address to Congress to give the Japanese a final warning.
41. Was it the intention of our Government, through the President,
to notify Congress that certain things had happened which caused us
to strike Japan, and that the report to Congress was to obtain Con-
gress' ratification and approval?
No. See answer to Question 40.
42. Will you state why no action was actually taken upon this
proposal ?
See answer to Question 40.
The fact that information coming in around the first of December
indicated that the Japanese expedition was landing in Indochina in
the neighborhood of Saigon rather than going on into the Peninsula
and up in,to the Gulf of Siam may have prompted the President to
think that perhaps the Japanese were not going to invade Thailand
at once or attack the Malay Peninsula and may have delayed his ad-
dress to Congress.
43. On pages 29 and 30 of your message to the committee you go
from Tuesday, the 2d of December to Sunday, the 7th, why is there
this gap when we consider the crisis that was then pending ?
[I44SS] The gap in my statement occurs primarily because of
the fact that my notes of those days do not contain memoranda rele-
vant to this inquiry. I remember that we were very busy on Wednes-
day, December 3. I participated in a large staflf conference in which
we discussed at length maneuvers that had recently been held and the
lessons to be learned from them. I left in the late afternoon to go to
New York to keep a dentist appointment on Thursday morning, De-
cember 4. I returned to Washington on Thursday afternoon. When
I arrived there I was greeted by the news of the publication by the
Chicago Tribune on December 4 of our most secret war plans, which
had caused great concern to the members of my staff. On Friday,
December 5, my time was lergely occupied in discussion of this matter
and in determining what action should be taken. On Saturday, De-
cember 6, I was in frequent conference with General Marshall, and
also with General Miles of G-2 and General Gerow of the War Plans
Division, which concerned chiefly the supplies which were on the way
to the Philippines and the additional big bombers which we were
trying to fly over there.
5462 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
44. Will you state what took place during these 5 days of the crisis
with Japan?
See answer to previous question.
45. Did you leave Washington on December 5 and go to New York?
No ; I was in Washington all that day and until long after Decem-
ber 7.
[144^91 46. If so, had you fully advised General Marshall of
the situation, or had you advised your under secretary, so that they
could proceed in an emergency ?
See answer to previous question.
47. On page 30 of your mimeographed statement you use the words
"and we were all wondering where the blow would strike," will you
explain to the committee who you include in "we" ?
By "we" I referred to Mr. Hull, Mr. Knox, and myself.
48. On page 35 of your mimeographed statement, will you state as
to whether or not you made inquiry from any military personnel as
to what was meant by an alert against sabotage, or being alerted to
prevent sabotage?
I made no such inquiry.
49. Were you at any time acquainted with various alerts of the
Army?
I was not acquainted with the various alerts, the details of the
strategic and tactical plans for the defense of the various theaters,
nor was it my duty to be familiar with them.
50. If not, was it not your responsibility, you having sent the mes-
sage of November 27, under General Marshall's name, to acquaint
yourself with the meaning of the reply ?
There is nothing to add to what I have already fully covered in my
original statement to your committee. See pages [l^-^O] 35
and 36.
51. Did the Marshall message of the 27th of November not call for
General Short to reply to the measures taken ?
It did.
52. On page 47 you use the language "I pointed out to the President
that he had already taken the first step toward an ultimatum," are
you there referring to the message of August 17, 1941, delivered to
the Japanese Sunday morning, August 17, 1941, and was not that
message an ultimatum if the United States desired to use it as such ?
I believe I am referring to the message of August 17, 1941. I have
not before me the text of that message, nor have I any recollection
of having ever seen that text. I had heard such a warning discussed,
but I do not even recollect with whom such discussion or discussions
took place. They were nearly 5 years ago.
53. Is it not true that that message having been delivered that the
Japanese had violated it in their movements south?
See answer to previous question.
54. Is it not true that the Japanese had violated the terms of the
President's message of August 17, 1941, on Saturday, December 6,
1941, Washington time?
See answers to the previous two questions.
55. On page 56 of your memorandum to the committee, under date
of November 28, you state that the final decision at that [iPiPl]
time was to send a speech to Congress and that the President asked
Mr. Hull, Secretary Knox, and you to try to draft such papers. Did
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5463
you aid him in the drafting of these papers, and, if so, will you tell
us where we might get copies, or can you furnish us with copies ?
I worked on the drafting of some paragraphs, but I have no copies
in my possession, nor do I know whether any such copies still exist.
Such drafts as I made were not used.
56. With the situation gradually growing worse from November 28
to and including the 6th, what happened that the message was not
given to Congress and the message to the Emperor of Japan was not
sent until after we had received the 13 parts of the 14-part message
indicating a rejection by the Japanese of our proposals of the 26th
of November ?
See answer to questions 38 and 42,
57. Referring to page 60 of your memorandum, you state the British
were very much excited about it — will you state as to whether or not
you had any contacts with the British on the 6th or 7th of December
1941?
I do not recollect that I personally had contacts with the British
on either the 6th or the 7th of December 1941.
58. If so, state what information you received, or what information
you gave to the British.
See answer to question 57.
59. On page 67 of your memorandum, being part 5 of Secre-
tary [144^^] Knox's suggestion, I call your attention to the
statement "we should therefore be ready jointly to act together and
if such understanding has not already been reached, it should be
reached immediately." Do you know whether or not any understand-
ing had been reached ?
I know of no such understanding. The fact that Mr. Knox in
his paper proposed the making of such an understanding confirms
me in the belief that none existed.
60. State whether such an understanding was attempted and, if
so, what was done toward arriving at such an understanding.
See answer to question 59.
61. Was such an understanding ever reached and, if so, when?
To answer such a question would require an examination o,f the
minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff throughout the war. It
was not my duty to follow such minutes and I have with me no other
basis for refreshing my recollection. The long and harmonious co-
operation throughout the war by our staff and the British staff
would indicate that such an understanding was reached soon after
we entered the war.
114493] State of New York,
County of New YorJc, ss:
Henry L. Stimson, being duly sworn, deposes and says :
I have prepared the foregoing answers to interrogatories. The same are
true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.
(Signed) Heney L. Stimson.
Sworn to before me this 23d day of April 1946.
[se-al] (Signed) Thomas de Rosa,
Thomas de Rosa,
Attorney and Counsellor at Law.
OfBce address : 32 Liberty St., N. Y. C. Residing in Bronx County. Bronx
Co. Clks. No. 3, Reg. No. A183D7. N. Y. Co. Clks. No. 9, Reg. No. 439D7.
Commission expires March 30, 1947
5464 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[144^4] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire
whether or not all we are going to do this morning is to put these things
in the record ? If so, there will be no necessity of my staying, and I
have another committee meeting.
The Chairman. That is my understanding.
Senator Ferguson. I have another hearing.
I do want the record to show how I feel, that the record should not
be closed until we have had time to fill in the gaps, so as to make a
complete record.
The Chairman. All right. Your statements on that subject will
be a part of the record.
Go ahead, Mr. Lane.
Mr. Lane. Mr. Chairman, we have a draft of a proposed message
to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which contains
suggestions made in a memorandum by Secretary Stimson and Secre-
tary Knox, as shown in Exhibit No. 161.
We ask that this draft be marked "Exhibit No. 161-A" and spread
in the exhibits of the committee record.
The Chairman. So received.
(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 161-A.")
Mr. Lane. The log of the watch officer. Officer of Chief of Naval
Operations, on the night of December 6, 1941, as shown in Exhibit No.
162, contains references by serial numbers to certain naval communi-
cations. Copies of these [l.U.9S'\ messages have been obtained
from the Navy Department and we ask that thev be received and
marked "Exhibit No. 162-A."
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 162-A.")
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt again, be-
cause of my inability to be two places at once, I will ask to be excused.
The Chairman. Do you intimate that you prefer the other place to
this one? (Laughter.)
Senator Ferguson. No, Mr. Chairman. I have done all I can do
on this committee but I still have a great interest m it. It is only
because the hearing is for the purj)ose of putting in records that I
ask to be excused.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I did write a letter on May 20,
after our last meeting, in relation to certain facts that I thought we
should get from the official records in the War Department. I wrote
the letter to Mr. Richardson on May 20. He has the letter now and
if we might consider that letter at the present time I would appre-
ciate it.
(The text of the letter referred to by Senator Ferguson follows:)
United States Senate,
May 20, 1946.
Mr. Seth W. Richakdson,
General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the
Pearl Harbor Attack, Senate Office Building.
Dear Mr. Richardson : I have gone over the book The Case Against the
Admirals, and it appears to me that we should have, for the record, the
report on the bombing of the Utah in the fall of 1937. We should also have
the program vphich was prepared by General Andrews and Colonel Knerr.
The booli states they prepared a program to submit to the War Department
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5465
calling for 108 B-17's for enlarging the Pacific Fleet so it would operate in
the Pacific and also provided for training of men to cost $21,000,000.
We should also have a copy of the budget of the Air Corps providing for
this. We should also have the evidence showing why the War Department re-
fused to submit the $21,000,000 item to Congress.
I believe we should also secure copies of the letters from Colonel Knerr
to the Senate on the B-17 program.
On page 64 of the book is this quotation :
"The War Department cannot approve the program for developing the
the B-17's. Instead of the B-17 you are ordered to build a light, responsive,
less-expensive type of bombardment plane with a range not to exceed 300
miles."
We should put this evidence from the War Department into the records.
Sincerely,
(S) Homer Fekgtjson.
The Chairman. What is it you want Mr, Richardson to produce?
Mr. Richardson. You will recall, Mr. Chairman, at our last meeting
a question arose with reference to the possible [144^6~\ inter-
rogation of General Knerr with reference to matters alleged to have
taken place subsequent to 1937 in connection with the preparation of
long distance bombers known as B-l7's. This letter is the communi-
cation we received the 21st, I think, the day following the day it was
written, requesting that this information be secured and put in the
record.
The facts that are involved in the question are :
(1) A request for the report on the bombing of the Utah.
(2) The program referred to which was prepared by General
Andrews and General Knerr.
(3) Copy of the Budget which asked for 21 million dollars for
training.
(4) The evidence why the War Department refused to submit the
item covering these long distance bombers to Congress.
(5) The Knerr letters to the Senate recommending the B-17 pro-
gram and
(6) The War Department statement disapproving the B-17 pro-
gram.
I am inclined to think that five of these six requests are docu-
mentary and probably could be furnished by a request appropriately
submitted to the War Department. The fourth one, evidence of why
the War Department refused to submit the item to Congress, would
be directly controversial, of course, and would require the calling of
witnesses.
[i^^7] Senator Ferguson. I didn't mean to call witnesses on
that; if there was anything in the files.
Mr. Murphy. Wasn't the Utah incident in 1938 ?
Senator Ferguson. 1937.
Mr. Richardson. 1937 is the recital here.
Mr. Murphy. Wliere was it bombed in 1937, in Pearl Harbor?
Senator Ferguson. It was a test bombing on this whole B-17 idea.
Mr. Richardson. The point of this request is, as stated before, the
question of how far the committee wants to go into the question of why
the military services were short of B-17 bombers, and it would be
expected that this evidence, if it was developed and put in the record,
would disclose that, who was responsible for opposing the building
of those bombers, and thereby would have the responsibility for
failure to have them in our air force during 1941 when the situation
with Japan grew more tense.
5466 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
That is the question involved in this picture.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I think that, in all fairness, if that
were to go into the record that it would be necessary to go into a study
of the defense strategy of the United States from 1937 on. We have
a statement from General Marshall as to how much we actually had
in the way of large bombers in the Service at December 7, 1941.
This letter purports to be based upon a book which was [IJf.If.OS']
written by William Bradford Huie. Mr. Huie makes certain state-
ments in this book that are open to challenge. I noticed a number of
them that I think could be very easily refuted.
But at any rate, questions arise out of a reading of this particular
book, which is one placed on the market in 1946.
He says, at page 162 :
I suppose an objective discussion of the Marines is about as difficult to
acliieve as is an objective discussion of religion or Roosevelt.
That is the kind of a book it is.
The Chairman. What is the name of it ?
Mr. Murphy. The Case Against the Admirals.
The Chairman. The committee discussed this book at its last meet-
ing in executive session in connection with the suggestion that cer-
tain people mentioned in the book be called as witnesses which, the
committee felt, I think, in view of its action, would involve the com-
mittee going into a controversy that was raging in 1937 as to whether
these B-l7's should be ordered and an appropriation made for them.
The action of the committee in ordering the record and the hear-
ings closed today seems to preclude the calling of these witnesses and,
obviously, if the theory in this book is to be exploited, or explored,
everybody mentioned in the book would have to be called here as a
witness, or at least \^lJiJi39'\ a certain number of them. Those
against whom the book is written, being The Case Against the Ad-
mirals, would certainly have a right to be heard in defense of their
own theory, and it is my feeling, and I think it was the feeling of
the committee, by their action, that that not be gone into.
I don't think the committee can take any action based upon what
is in that book.
I stated at the time that the writer of the book was not under oath,
as was everybody else who testified here, and if any statements or
any things mentioned in it, are to be brought in as evidence, certainly
those making the statements would have to be sworn, like everybody
else, and that would make impossible, and be utterly inconsistent with
the order of the committee that the record should be closed today.
That is what I am going by.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, it wasn't my desire to make
this book a part of the record. I never even suggested that it be
made a part of the record.
The Chairman. No, no ; I appreciate that.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I did read the book and I found
some facts in it, which I checked with officials in the War Department,
and I found one particular fact, that the War Department could not
approve the program for developing the B-l7's, and instead of B-17's,
were ordered to build a light, responsive, less expensive type of
bombardment plane, \_14500^ with a range not to exceed 300
miles.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5467
Now, it is my contention that on this record as it now stands that
when our fleet was moved to Pearl Harbor, someone, somewhere,
should have developed a defense for that fleet. If it had been properly
developed and if it had been properly taken care of, then Pearl Harbor
could not have happened. I take that as being one of the things that
we were to look into.
Now, I did find in this book certain information which I thought
should be brought to the attention of the committee to fill in certain
gaps. We had a lot of testimony, it is no new subject, about taking
the fleet to Pearl Harbor, and whether or not it was defended at Pearl
Harbor. There was a lot in the record about who was to fly bombers
out — whether they were to be flown out. The record shows that the
reconnaissance was to be had. There is some doubt in the record as
to who was to carry on that reconnaissance. Was it the fault of the
Navy, was it the fault of the Army, or who in the Navy or who in the
Army, or who somewhere else.
I merely want to get information for the record officially. I am not
taking Huie's language. I don't want to put his language in. I want
official files in the record so that the committee when it gets up its
report may give to the American people all of the facts.
The Chairman. What is it you are asking to be done now ?
Senator Ferg.usgn. I am asking that the War Department
[14^01] furnish these particular things which Mr. Richardson
read. I understand that the committee has ruled against me, that
they are closing the record, but I did write this before the hearing
came on, so that we could get these official records and put them in
the record. That is all.
Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, as Mr. Masten just suggested to
me, it would be possible, if the committee approves, to get whatever
official records are involved in these inquiries presented to us, put them
in shape, and that could be introduced in the record before the record
was finally closed, without the necessity of additional testimony, or
taking any particular time, except that at some time the committee
would have to go in session, and do what they are doing this morning
with reference to the exhibits. That could be done and it would only
involve official records, apparently, from this request.
Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, couldn't you close the record today
with permission to insert those at a later date ?
Mr. Richardson. Whatever the chairman thinks advisable.
The Chairman. The committee ordered the record closed today. I
have to be governed by that action. If the record can be closed as of
today I personally have no objection to these official documents being
put in, as a part of today's record ; but if they are to be brought in
before another session of the committee and then be the basis for
further [l^SO^] requests, that is something else. We couldn't
close the record on that basis.
The definite action of the committee last Thursday or Wednesday,
whenever it was that we met, was that today would close the record
and it would come to an end.
Mr. Richardson. I would like to ask the chairman whether he and
the members of the committee would think it would be proper to
close the record today as including these documents with the right to
physically present the documents and put them in the record at some
future date ?
5468 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Ferguson. That would solve the problem.
The Chairman. Not some future date; that they be put in the
record as of today.
Senator Ferguson. That is right.
The Chairman. Because if we ever get to the point where we can
meet to consider a report we have got to have the record completed.
And we have got to ask for another extension of time, up to July 1,
I am not going to ask it beyond that, to make this report.
But that would not, I suppose, violate the order of the committee.
Any objection to it? ^
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether or not counsel
is going to offer in evidence the letters of Colonel Stimson and the
letters of Mr. Roosevelt in regard to the bomber program and the
planes at Hawaii ?
[14S03] The Chairman. I don't know.
Mr. Richardson. I have no anticipation of offering them.
Mr. Murphy. I ask that they be introduced, Mr. Chairman. We
have had them for 6 months.
Mr. Masten. Senator Ferguson has requested that all the papers
in the President's file that have not heretofore been put in the record,
be included.
The Chairman. Without objection that will be ordered.
Senator Ferguson. The letters would be part of that.^
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Mr. Lane. Exhibit No. 21 contains two dispatches dated December
6, 1941, from Ambassador Winant, London, to the State Department.
The dispatch dated at 3 : 05 p. m. that day refers to State Department
Dispatch No. 5682, dated December 5, 1941, to the American Embassy,
London. Copy of dispatch No. 5682 has been obtained from the
State Department and we ask that it be received and marked "Exhibit
No. 166."
The Chairman. It is so ordered.
(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 166.")
Mr. Lane. The State Department file copy of the document handed
by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on November
26, 1941 ; statement to the press on that date, by the State Department,
relating to delivery of the [I4SO4] document; the State De-
partment press release No. 585, dated December 7, 1941, concerning
delivery and text of the document ; and a memorandum dated Decem-
ber 2, 1941, concerning the President's remarks as his press conference
on that date, relating to delivery of the document, have been compiled,
and we ask they be marked and received as Exhibit No. 167.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 167.")
Mr. Lane. A compilation of documents from State Department
files which are dated in November and December 1941, concerning a
proposed modus vivendi, which documents supplement those intro-
duced as Exhibit No. 18, has been prepared. We ask that these docu-
ments be received and marked "Exhibit No. 168."
1 The information requested was subsequently admitted to the record as "Exhibit No. 183."
2 See "Exhibit No. 179," subsequently introduced.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5469
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 168.")
Mr. Lane. A compilation of documents relating to conversations
between State Department officials and representatives of the Thai-
land Government, between August 6 and December 8, 1941, has been
prepared, and we ask that they be received and marked "Exhibit
No. 169."
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 169.") .
[I45OS] Mr. Lane. Exhibit No. 140 contains certain documents
introduced in connection with testimony relating to the retirement
of Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short. At the request of the committee at
page 8594 of the transcript, a comprehensive review of the War De-
partment file has been made and a compilation of documents con-
cerning the retirement of General Short, and related matters, has
been made, and we ask that this material be received and marked
"Exhibit No. 170."
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 170.")
Mr. Lane. Pursuant to committee request at page 8649 of the
transcript, the Navy Department has furnished a compilation of
documents from departmental records concerning the retirement of
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and related matters. We ask that
this compilation be received and marked "Exhibit No. 171."
The Vice Chairman. So received.
(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 171.")
Mr. Lane. At page 12991 of the transcript, reference was made to
material handled under lend-lease to foreign countries. Additional
compilations have been made by the War and Navy Departments on
request of counsel, concerning planes and guns produced and their
distribution from February 1 to [I4SO6] November 30, 1941.
We ask that this compilation be received and marked "Exhibit No.
172."
The Vice Chairman. So received.
(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 172.")
Mr. Lane. The War Department has furnished a translation of the
memoirs of Prince Konoye, former Prime Minister of Japan. These
documents are reported to have been turned over to a representative
of the United States Army in Japan by Prince Konoye, subsequent to
the Japanese surrender. We ask that this translation be received and
marked "Exhibit No. 173".
The Vice Chairman. So received.
(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 173.")
Mr. Lane. From numerous documents submitted by the State De-
partment and examined by some members of the committee, a number
of miscellaneous documents were requested for inclusion in the record.
A compilation of these documents has been made, they are somewhat
voluminous, and we ask that the compilation be received and marked
"Exhibit No. 174".
The Vice Chairman. So received.
(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 174.")
Mr. Lane. The Secretary of Navy by memorandum dated Decem-
ber 5, 1941, and the Secretary of War by letter dated [14S07'\
5470 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
December 6, 1941, submitted estimates concerning Japanese forces in
Indochina and adjacent areas, to the Secretary of State, for delivery
to the President. We ask that this compilation be received and
marked "Exhibit No. 175."
The Vice Chairman. So received.
(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 175.")
Mr. Lane. At pages 13953 and 13956 of the transcript request
was made for the compilation of data reported to have been requested
of the Navy Department by the Secretary of War to be delivered to
the Secretary of War on the morning of December 7, 1941. This
data reportedly concerned the location of United States naval forces in
the Atlantic, Pacific and the Far East. The War Department Liaison
Office has obtained a copy of such a compilation dated as of December
7, 1941, which is apparently the document in question.
We ask that this document be received and marked "Exhibit No.
176."
The Vice Chairman. So received.
(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 176.")
Mr. Lane. Senator Ferguson has requested that documents ob-
tained from the State Department, dated in 1939, concerning a pro-
posal made by former Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma for
United States-Japanese understanding, be made a [I4SO8]
part of the record. This compilation has been made and we ask that
it be received and marked "Exhibit No. 177."
The Vice Chairman. So ordered.
(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 177.")
Mr. Lane. A compilation of documents from Ambassador Grew
to the State Department and the President, and attached memoranda
has been made, and we ask that it be received and marked "Exhibit No.
178."
The Vice Chairman. It will be so received.
(The documents were marked "Exhibit 178.")
Mr. Lane. A selection of documents from the files of the late Presi-
dent Roosevelt, which were forwarded to the committee by Miss
Grace Tully last November, in response to committee request for all
material in the late President's files relating to Japan and the Far
East, in 1941, has been obtained.
At the request of Senator Ferguson, we ask that these documents
be received and marked "Exhibit No. 179." It should be noted that in
addition to these documents there are some 500 pages of other docu-
ments from the President's files already in the record. With the
introduction of this material, everything furnished by Miss Tully
will be in the committee record. We ask that this material be marked
"Exhibit No. 179."
[l^OO] The Vice Chairman. So received.
(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 179.")
JMr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the record show
that the committee is aware of the fact that about three-fifths of this
material has nothing to do with Pearl Harbor but is only being intro-
duced because it was a part of the sum total of material furnished by
Miss Tully. It has to do with elections in the Philippines, about
differences with the Commissioner and Mr. Quezon, and about some
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5471
matters in connection with General MacArthur, and about who is
going to be named Governor in Hawaii, none of which data has any
pertinence to this inquiry, and the only reason I do not object is that
they are part of the files furnished by the White House.
The Vice Chairman. Counsel may proceed.
Mr. Lane. The Army and the Navy have presented to the committee
organization charts of the Army and Navy at Washington and Hawaii.
They are large charts, and we ask that they be received and marked
"Exhibit No. 180."
The Vice Chairman. So received.
(The charts were marked "Exhibit No. 180.")
Mr. Lane. With reference to Exhibits Nos. 117 and 117-A, which
have been introduced, we wish that a letter dated February 4, 1941,
from the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, \_lJf510'\ to vari-
ous officers under his command, be spread upon the record at this
point.
The Vice Chairman. Be so ordered.
(The letter referred to follows :)
msm A4-1/VZ
A4^3/VZ/(0195)
Pearl Habbob, T. H., FeJ). 4, 1941.
Confidential
From: Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.
To : Commander. Battle Force.
Commander Scouting Force.
Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.
Commander Aircraft Battle Force.
Commander Patrol Wing TWO
Subject : Aircraft in Hawaiian Area, maximum readiness of.
1. Many matters of Fleet material readiness are susceptible of improvement.
I heartily endorse all effort, past and future, to obtain approval of and accom-
plish expeditious action on these things. Meanwhile, the Fleet must be prepared
at any given time to employ, with maximum effectiveness, all components as
they actually exist.
2. There is a definite line of demarkation between this objective and longer
range planning. The latter has its proper sphere and must be continued as an
essential basis for determining and stressing improved readiness x-equirements.
This planning will naturally include the more effective schemes of employment
that improved readiness, vehen attained, will permit.
3. Current readiness plans, however, cannot be based on any recommedation
for, or expectation of, improved conditions [14512] or facilities. Such
plans must be based only on hard fact. They must be so developed as to provide
for immediate action, based on facilities and materials that are now available.
4. A subject emphatically calling for attention in line with the foregoing is
maximum readiness in the Hawaiian area, particulrly for Pearl Harbor defense,
of all all available aviation components. As is well known, much remains to be
done for adequate future effectiveness in this respect. Much, however, can now
be done with means now available, to make arrangements for local employment
of aviation more effective than they now are.
5. I propose, as a first step in direct action on this subject, to call a conference
at an early date with the addressees of this letter. I desire that appropriate
preliminary studies be initiated at once ; discussion may be had with Army au-
thorities subject to the understanding that preliminary agreements must be
confirmed by the senior oflScers of the respective services in this area. As a
guide in such studies, intended in no way to exclude consideration of any other
proposals that may occur to those concerned, a brief outline is appended. I con-
sider these features to be the most obvious steps toward making the best use
of everything that is now available for the purpose :
5472 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(a) Joint Air Exercises. Desirability of intensified attention to this subject
Frequency and [I45IS] scope. Degree of coordination. Improvement
along practical lines.
(b) Communications. Fully satisfactory communications between all Army
and Navy air activities, both in the air and on the ground. Direct and instan-
taneous communications, in particular, between all Army and Navy air fields.
Continuation of and renewed stress upon joint communication exercises.
(c) Air Command. Determination of responsibility and degree under various
conditions. Arrangements between the two services for such direct exercise of
air control as may be necessary.
(d) Landing Fields, Mutual Use. "Scattering" plans, including dispersion
of patrol planes. Familiarization of Navy and Army aircraft personnel with
one another's landing fields and facilities, including actual practice in mutual
use and servicing.
(e) Aircraft Recognition and Familiarization. Recognition signals between
air and ground. Familiarization of all personnel — air, ground and ship — with
all local Navy and Army types.
(f) Alert Watches. Determination of suitable alert watch conditions. Re-
quirements for all naval aircraft types. Size and composition of watches.
Watches with and without ship-based planes present. Conservation of
[1451^] personnel and material.
(g) Armament and Re-armament. Plans for adequate accomplishment with
means now available. Ready storage. Speed. Replenishment.
(h) Alarm and Detection. Effective and instantaneous air alarm arrange-
ments. Detection by RADAR (and otherwise) and tracking of enemy planes.
Possible restriction of own planes to specific operating areas for this purpose.
Similarly, control of air traflSc approaches.
H. E. KiMMEL.
P. C. Crosley, Flag Secretary.
Mr. Lane. We have four documents from the files of the State
Department which we desire to add to the record. They consist of :
A memorandum of conversation dated December 5, 1941 between
Secretary of State and the British Ambassador concerning coopera-
tion with the Dutch East Indies against the Japanese ;
A dispatch dated December 8, 1941 from Ambassador Grew to the
State Department ;
A dispatch dated December 6, 1941 from the State Department to
the American Ambassador to Chungking ; and
A dispatch dated December 7, 1941 from the State Department to
Ambassador Grew.
The Vice Chaurman. So received.
\^lJiS15'\ (The matter referred to follows :)
Department op State
Memorandum of Conversation
Date : December 5, 1941
Subject : Cooperation with Dutch East Indies against Japan.
Participants : Secretary of State Hull and the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax.
Copies to :
The British Ambassador called at my apartment by his request.
He said he had a message from Eden, head of the British Foreign OflSce,
setting forth the British view that the time has now come for immediate coopera-
tion with the Dutch East Indies by mutual understanding. This of course relates
to the matter of defense against Japan.
I expresed my appreciation.
C H
S CH:MA
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5473
[Copy]
MA
Tokyo
Dated December 8, 1941
Rec'd. 6 : 58 a. m., 10th
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before [lJf516] being com-
municated to anyone, (br)
Secretary of State,
Washington.
Triple priority.
190tj, December 8, 1 a. m.
Confidential.
Department's 818, December 6, 9 p. m., was received and decoded late this
evening and I was able to see the Foreign Minister immediately thereafter at
12 : 15 a. m., when I requested an audience with the Emperor at the earliest pos-
sible moment in order to communicate the President's message directly. The
Minister said that he would present my request to the throne and would com-
municate with me thereafter. I read to him and left with him a copy of the
message.
Grew.
HTM
[Telegram sent]
Department of State,
Washington, December 6, 1941. 9 p. m.
Am. Embassy,
Chungking (China).
[14517] 286
Triple priority.
Confidential.
Please communicate, in person if feasible, at the earliest possible moment to
Chiang Kai-shelj for his confidential information a copy of a message which the
President is sending to the Emperor of Japan, reading as follows :
QUOTE (Telegraph Section: Insert here the text of the attached message
from the President to the Emperor of Japan beginning with the words SUB-
QUOTE Almost a century ago END SUBQUOTE to the end of page five including
the President's name) UNQUOTE.
In communicating copy of this message to Chiang Kai-shelj, please state orally
as from the President that the quoted message has already been sent by the
President to the Emperor ; that this message, as the situation now stands, would
seem to represent very nearly the last diplomatic move that this Government
can make toward causing Japan to desist from its present course; that if the
slender chance of acceptance by Japan should materialize, a very effective meas-
ure would have been taken toward safeguarding the Burma Road; and that it
is very much hoped that Chiang Kai-shek will not make or allow to be spread in
Chinese Government circles adverse comment.
/s/ Hull.
SKH
FE : MMH : REK FE PA/H
[Telegram sent]
Gray
Department of State,
Washington, December 7, 1941, Midnite.
Am. Embassy,
Tokyo (Japan).
Triple priority. 823
The Department has been informed by the War Department that at 8 : 00 a. m.
today (Honolulu time) fifty or more Japanese dive-bombing planes, presumably
from an aircraft carrier, dropped bombs in and around Honolulu. According
79716 — 46— pt. 11 22
5474 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to unconfirmed radio reports, the Japanese Government has declared war against
the United States and Great Britain.
At 1 : 00 p. m. on December 7 the Japanese Ambassador asked for an appoint-
ment witli the Secretary of State. The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu were re-
ceived at 2 : 20 p. m. The Ambassador opened the conversation by saying that he
was sorry that lie had been delayed as his instructions were to deliver the paper
which he then handed the Secretary at 1 : 00 p. m., but that owing to Inability
to decode the message he had been delayed. After reading two or three pages of
the paper the Secretary asked the Ambassador whether it was presented under
instructions of the Japanese Government. The Ambassador replied in the affirm-
ative. The Secretary thereupon read the remainder of the paper after [14519]
which he made to the Ambassador a brief statement emphatically critical of the
contents of the document.
The Japanese representatives then took their leave without comment.
/s/ Hull.
SKH
FE :MWS/RLS :HES FE
Mr. Lane. In the testimony of Captain Zacharias at page 8734, a
question arose as to certain purported orders to Task Force 8 under
Admiral Halsey. The Navy has responded to our request by a memo-
randum dated May 3, 1946, and we ask that the Navy reply be spread
upon the record, together with the request.
The Chaieman". So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)
msm 1083A; R #145
Department of the Navt
Office of the Secbetary
Washington, S May 1946.
Memorandum
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
In compliance with the request of Senator Ferguson, referred to and forwarded
in your memorandum of 31 January 1946, that there be obtained a copy of the
orders purporting to delay the return to Pearl Harbor in December 1941 of
Task Force Eight under Admiral Halsey, as mentioned in the testimony of Cap-
tain Zacharias (Record of Proceedings Page 8734), careful and thorough searches
for the period 28 November to 7 December 1941 have been made of the files of
the Navy Department and of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Task
Force Eight was required by order to be off Wake on 3 December 1941, but
there were no orders to it to reduce speed nor any other directive to it to delay
its return to Pearl Harbor.
(S) John Ford Baechee,
John Ford Baecher,
Commander, USNR.
JANUARY 31, 1946.
Memorandum to Admiral Colclough
In the course of his testimony at page 8734 of the Committee transcript. Cap-
tain Zacharias refers to the fact that [14521] Halsey's Task Force was
originally scheduled to arrive back in Pearl Harbor on the fifth of December,
1941, but was delayed by fueling and weather and "now I know because of
certain orders which did not speed us up."
At the request of Senator Ferguson, it would be very much appreciated if
you would secure the orders to which Captain Zacharias refers to above.
S. W. Richardson, Counsel.
SWR : MBB
Mr. Lane. In response to a request of counsel of the Navy Depart-
ment concerning a memorandum prepared regarding the dissemina-
tion of Magic material and the submission of the raw material to the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5475
President, the Navy Department under memorandum dated May 23,
1946, has replied to counsel's request and we ask that the reply bo
spread upon the record.
The CiiAiKMAN. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)
[14522] 1070/JFB:ms; R. #185
Department of the Navt
Obtice of the Secretary
Washington, 23 Maij 1946.
•
Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
In response to the request of the first and second paragraph of your memo-
randum of 17 May 1946, a search has been made of the pertinent official files of
the Navy without success to find the memorandum dated 12 November 1941, pre-
pared by Captain A. D. Kramer, U. S. N., entitled "Dissemination to White
House," which you state was referred to by Captain L. S. SafEord in his testimony
or digest in the so-called Clarke Investigation conducted by the Army of the Jap-
anese attack on Pearl Harbor. A copy of the paper obtained from Captain
Safford is forwarded herewith, though because of the failure to find the original,
it has not been possible to check its accuracy.
The memorandum in question was a rough handwritten paper by Captain
Kramer for his possible future reference and not an official document of the Navy
of or concerning the events or conclusions referred to therein.
(S) John Ford Baecheb,
John Ford Baecher,
Conmiander, U8NR.
[14523] Confidential
Dissemination to White House
7 Nov. '41 Gen. Sherman Miles (G2) at 1600 called Capt. Wilkinson (DNI).
I was called In on the subject question. In reply to Miles' inquiry I explained
as follows :
0-2 ONI
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUG
SEPT
OCT
NOV
A. Through spring of '41 (G-2) (Bratton) and ONI had followed the signed
agreement of Jan. '41.
B. A combination of the following factors led to G-2 not sending anything to
the White House after May '41 :
1. Loss of Memo #9 by State in March.
2. German report to Japs of leakage in April and the resulting clampdown on
security.
3. G-2 lack of confidence in Gen. Watson's ideas of security, particularly due
to the absolute necessity thereof after 1 and 2 above, and because of the fact that
earlier in the spring one Memo to the White House was found by Col. Bratton
in Gen. Watson's wastebasket.
4. The feeling of G-2 that almost with- [14524] out exception the sub-
ject of the Memos and traffic was State business anyway, and the matters
should therefore be properly taken up with the White House by State, rather
than being sent directly.
C. During June, when the new Naval Aide to the President (Beardall) came,
he had taken the O. N. I. memos over as per agreement. In July I continued to
show things to him in original form to keep him informed and also because he
specifically requested this, since the President at times was asking him about
points appearing in this material.
D. Toward the end of September (G-2 having sent nothing to the White
House) Beardall stated the President wanted to see the material I was showing
him (Beardall). I informed DNI, explaining that G-2 permission must be
5476 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
obtained in accordance with the agreement. With DNI's permission I con-
tacted Col. Bratton and got his O. K.
E. During October (ONI dissemination duty), only the "memos" went.
F. Several times between 1 Nov. and 7 Nov. (today) Capt. Beardall was shown
original material. On F'rlday noon, 7 Nov., he asked to have a number of them
to take. I reminded him that November was Army's month for dissemination.
He acknowledged this and stated he had so informed Mr. Roosevelt, but Roosevelt
had directed him to bring it anyway. I told him I would get DNI and Gn-2
permission.
General Miles then said jG-2 was beginning again to disseminate to the White
House. I indicated that my concern was to comply with the agreement, and
particularly to avoid duplicating via the Naval Aide anything which Gr-2 might
send. This could be done by keeping in daily touch with Col. Bratton on what he
was sending to the White House. In fact, the Naval Aides could be entirely elimi-
nated during G-2's months and adhere strictly to the agreement, by having ONI
request G-2 to send anything Capt. Beardall felt should go. Gen. Miles agreed and
stated that he [14520] would confer with Gen. Watson on the matter.
7 Nov. 1630 I saw Capt. Beardall, to show him today's material, and explain
what had developed in the above talk. He elucidated further by saying that
when he had informed the President, in reply to a request for material, that it was
Army's month for dissemination, the President said he understood that, and was
in fact either seeing or being told about the material through Hull. However,
he desired to see the material via Beardall anyway. Beardall expressed the
opinion to me that President grasps things more rapidly visually than orally,
and therefore, wanted to see the material in addition to getting it from Hull.
7 Nov. 1100 I informed Capt. Wilkinson of the above. He indicated he was
going to pass it on to Miles.
10 Nov. 1230 I saw Beardall with today's material. He informed me that a
conference between him, Miles, Watson (and another?) had agreed to Beardall
alone handling [^4527] dissemination to the White House.
10 Nov. 1630 Saw DNI with today's material. He had already been informed
of the above and directed that I comply therewith.
12 Noi\ 1615 Started routine of giving Beardall the day's material for trans-
mission to the President, in compliance with the above outlined modification to
the signed agreement of Jan. "41 between. G-2 and ONI.
A. D. Kramer.
12 Nov. 1941.
Mr. Lane. By memorandum dated May 23, 1946, the Navy Depart-
ment has furnished a reply to the inquiry appearing at pages 271-273
of the transcript and at page 6144 of the transcript regarding orders
issued to Lt. Clarence E. Dickinson as noted in the October 10, 1942,
issue of the Saturday Evening Post. We ask that that reply be spread
upon the record.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)
Deipartment of the Navy
Office of the Secretary
Washington, 23 Mmj 1946.
U4528] 1070/JFB:ms; R. #102
MEMORANDUM
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
In response to the request of Congressman Gearhart (Record of Proceedings,
pages 271-273, and 6144), referred to in item 2 of your memorandum of 29 March
1946, in respect of statements made by Lieutenant Clarence E. Dickinson in the
16 October 1942 issue of The Saturday Evening Post, concerning orders under
which he flew an airplane from the U. S. S. Enterprise while it was engaged in
the mission of Task Force 8 from Pearl Harbor to Wake Island and return, 28
November-7 December 1941, it has been ascertained that on 28 November 1941,
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
5477
the date the Task Force departed Pearl Harbor, then "Vice Admiral William F.
Halsey, Jr., Commander, Task Force 8, sent to his command the following signal :
"Current operations involve necessity readiness for instant action."
This signal was received by the U. S. S. Enterprise, which was the flagship
of Task Force 8. It would be usual Navy practice, and may be assumed, that
the substance of the signal [14529] was communicated to all of the pilots
who flew planes from the Enterprise during the mission.
[S] O. S. COLCLOUGH
Bear Admiral, U. S. N.
Mr. Lane. Under date of May 22, 1946, the Navy Department has
furnished a reply in response to the request of Senator Ferguson at
pages 12792 and 12793 of the transcript concerning the so-called
History written in 1942 of the activity of the Communications Unit of
the Navy, which was testified about by Admiral Hart in connection
with conversations between Captain Safford and himself.
We ask that this reply be spread upon the record.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)
[14530]
Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 22 May 1946.
1070/JFB : ms
R. #179
MEMORANDUM
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
In response to the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, Pages
12792-12793, 12862 and 12875), referred to in Item 18 of your memorandum of
29 March 1946, there is enclosed a copy of all of the references to and of all
messages quoted concerning the Winds Code in the compilation or so-called
"history" written in 1942 of the activity of the Communications Unit, which
Admiral Hart testified was seen by him in connection with the incidents involving
or conversation between Captain Salford and himself in respect of the Winds
Code or any execute thereof.
The references in the commentary or explanatory paragraphs in the enclosure
to Japanese messages are to only those intercepts which are also quoted therein,
viz : JD-1 : 6875, JD-1 : 6850, JD-1 : 6985 and JD-1 : 7148.
The statement in the last commentary or explanatory paragraph, which is that
preceding the quotation of JD-1 : 7148, that there were "other reference to the
United States in [14.531] texts not available now," is an obvious confusion
of the Winds Code and the Hidden Word Code. It was made in connection with
the "Hidden Word" Japanese message of 7 December 1941 (Tokyo Circular No.
2494) JD-1 : 7148, in the first translation of which there was omitted the reference
to the United States conveyed by the Japanese code word "Minami." A thorough
search of the files of the cognizant activity of the Navy has failed to reveal any
other message received prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor containing
any reference to the United States in the Winds Code or the Hidden Word Code.
All of the messages referred to and quoted in the enclosure appear in Exhibit 1
of the Congressional Investigation, at pages as follows :
Tokyo Circular #2353 (JD-1: 6875) Page 154.
Tokyo Circular #2354 (JD-1: 6850) Page 155.
Tokyo Circular #2409 (JD-1: 6985) Pages 186-188.
Tokyo Circular #2494 (JD-1: 7148) Page 251.
(S) John Ford Baechee,
John Ford Baecher,
Commander, U8NR.
End (1).
[14,532]
5478 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
* * ♦ "instructions for secret broadcast signals to indicate critical relations
witli the United States, Russia, and Britain, were sent out from Tokyo."
*******
* * ♦ "A plain Japanese weather broadcast on December 7 indicated that
Japanese relations with England and the United States would be broken ofC."
*******
* . * * "Secret codes for emergency messages in the regular short wave broad-
casts from Tokyo were now issued by the Japanese. All of them dealt with the
rupture of relations between Japan and other countries.
From : Tokyo Circular #2353, Nov. 19, 1941.
To : Washington, J19.
Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
In the case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and
the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be
added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.
(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger— HIGASHI NO KAZBAME
(East wind rain).
(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI— [14533]
(North wind cloudy.)
(3) Japan-British relations: HISHI NO KAZE HARE— (West wind clear.)
This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast
and last sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all
code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.
jD-1 : 6875 Navy Translation
11-28-41
From : Tokyo Circular #2354, Nov. 19, 1941.
To : Washington, J19.
When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the follow-
ing at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts :
(1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI."
(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA."
(3) Japan-British relations (including Thai, Malaya, and NEI) — "NISHI."
The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.
JD-1 : 6850 Navy Translation
11-26-41
* * * "An interesting dispatch, which contained much valuable [14534]
information for the decryption purposes of U. S. Navy Radio Intelligence was
the subsequent one. Note the tone of finality in all the special messages.
From : Tokyo Circular #2409, Nov. 27, 1941.
To: Washington, J19 (in 4 parts— complete).
(Rio de Janeiro to Santiago as Circular #324).
(Washington sent to Ottawa, Mexico City, Bogata, Caracas, Havanna, Panama,
New York, and New Orleans as unnumbered message.)
(Part I)
Handle as Chief of Office Routing.
With international relations becoming more strained, the following Ingo Denpo
(hidden words, or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect. Please
study this carefully.
Make up a table with the left column containing the code words and the right
the corresponding plain (decoded) text. Please see that there is no mistake
in transcribing this.
Example. A message meaning:
"Japan and USSR military have clashed", will read "HIJIKATA and KUBOTA,
Clerks, have been both ordered to your embassy on 15th (begin spell) STOP
(end spell.)"
[145S5] In order to distinguish these cables from others, the English word
STOP will be added at the end as an indicator. (The Japanese word "OWART"
(end) will not be used.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5479
(Part 2)
Code word and meaning :
ARIMURA: Code communications prohibited.
ASAI : Communications will be by radio broadcasts.
ASAKURA : Will communicate by radio broadcast. You are directed to listen
carefully.
ASIKAGA : Reception of overseas broadcast impossible due to interference.
ASUMA : Pressure on Japan increasing continually.
EDOGUTY : Prepare for evacuation.
HANABUSA : Preparations for evacuation have been completed.
HANAZONO (?) : Prepare to entrust Embassy property to suitable foreign
envoy (or Consul) there.
HATAKEYAIVIA : Relations between Japan and have been severed.
[145S6] HATTORI: Relations between Japan and are not
in accordance with expectations.
(Part 3)
HIZIKATA: Japan's and 's military forces have clashed.
HOZINO : Japan and are entering a full fledged general war.
IBARAGI) : Communicate to us probable date of breaking off of relations
between Japan and the country to which you are accredited.
INAGAKI: Have you the matter?
ISHIKAWA : I have the matter.
KASHIWAGI : We are commencing military action? against
KOBAYAKAWA: Stop issuing all entrance and transient visas to Japan, to
persons of nationality.
KODAMA: Japan.
KOMIYAMA: China.
KOYANAGI: England.
KUBOTA: U. S. S. R.
KURIBARA: France?
KUSONOKI: Germany.
[i4537] MATUTANI: Italy.
MIWATA: Canada.
MINAMI : U. S. A.
MIYAZAKI: Mexico.
MOROKOSI: Brazil.
MOTIZUKI: Panama.
NAGAMINE: Argentina.
MAKAZATO: Thailand.
NANGO : French Indochina.
NEGI (?) : Netherlands East Indies.
OGAWA: Burma.
OKAMOTO: Malaya.
OKUMURA: Australia.
ONIZOKA : Union of South Africa ( ?) .
ONODERA: Enemy country.
OTANI: ? (Possibly: friendly or allied country?).
ONISI: Year.
SIMANAKA: Day (?).
SAKAKIBARA: (Tsuki) Month.
SIGENOI: (Ke) Paragraph.
SANZYO: (Toki) time.
ITIRO: 1.
NISAKU: 2.
SANTARO: 3.
YORI : 4
U4538] Goro: 5.
Masaroku : 6.
Simetaro : 7.
Yasokiti : 8.
Hisamatu: 9.
Atumi : 0.
JD-1 : 6985 Navy Translation
12-2-41
* ♦ • * • • •
5480 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
* * * "The first one (Dispatch on 7 December) was in plain Japanese, but
used the weather code, which signified the breaking off of diplomatic relation-
ships. Though this refers to England, other references were made to the United
States in texts not available now.
From : Tokyo Circular #2494, Dec. 7, 1941.
To: (Circular telegram.)
(Plain Japanese language using code names.)
Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.
JD-1 : 7148 Navy Translation
12-7-41"
[14SS9] Mr. Lane. By memorandum dated May 16, 1946, the
Navy Department in compliance with the request of Congressman
Cooper at page 10738 of the Record of Proceedings has furnished a
smooth copy of a study made by Captain Kramer of certain trans-
lations of Japanese intercepts.
We ask that this be spread on the record at this point.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)
[ 145 40] Depabtment of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 16 May 1946.
1083A(HLB)
Memorandum
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
In compliance with the request of Vice CShairman Cooper at page 10738 of
the Record of Proceedings, referred to in item 14 of your memorandum of 29
March 1946, Captain Kramer has prepared, and there is forwarded herewith, a
smooth copy of the study made by him of the times of delivery to the White
House of certain translations of Japanese intercepts.
/s/ John Ford Baecher,
John Ford Baecher,
Commander, U8NR.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
5481
? o
o
1^ a
o a
>._
*j H oj o K V
e-w
oP-i J3
Eg
SMTP'S
t^ lO Tt< lo r^ en
>— * CO CO C^ M CO
C<) (M C^ (N C^J (M
CD O O CO CD CO
cDr^r^t— t^cDr^r^
I C^ (N (N c^ c^ cs cs
CO »0 uO to CDCD
cDt^t^r^i^cDcot^
w cT cJ c^ cJ ^J cJ cT
00 to CO CD t^ <N
2 (N CD C^O O
^ ,-H 00 --H CO CTi
00O5 O ^ (N CO
CO CO ^ ^ ^ ^
^t^oooc^'-Hioai
OOO w^OOO
I I I I I I I I
5482 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[J4S4^] Mr. Lane. The request of Senator Ferguson at page
13966 and Congressman Keefe at page 13996 concerning data appear-
ing on the log dated December 6, 1941, kept by the Navy Department
operations watch officer, now Rear Admiral Cato D. Glover, USN,
has been replied to by the Navy Department, and we ask that the
information contained therein be spread upon the record.
The Chairman. Be so ordered.
(The matter referred to follows :)
[U54S] 1083 A
R. #168
Department of the Navt,
Office of the Secretaey,
Washington 26 April 1946.
Memorandum
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson
In response to the requests of Senator Ferguson and Congressman Keefe
(Record of Proceedings), Pages 13966 and 13996, respectively) inquiry was made
of Rear Admiral Cato D. Glover, U. S. Navy, by dispatch #152019 of April 1946
to ascertain his recollection in respect of the item (read into the Record of Pro-
ceedings at Pages 1394(>-13947) written by him in the log of the Operations Watch
Officer on the night of 6 December 1941 at 2"000, and his reply by dispatch
#160636 of April 1946 has been received. Photographic copies of each of these
dispatches are forwarded herewith.
Rear Admiral Glover is not the holder of any records in respect of the incident
noted in the log. It will be noted that while he remembers contacting Admiral
H. R. Stark at the latter's home between 000 and 0200 concerning the southern
movement of the Japanese convoy that ultimately landed near Kota Baru yet he
states he is unable to recall the 2000 of 6 December 1941 incident noted in the log,
but that he suggests a possible additional source of information in the form of a
"log kept by the Ship Movement Division." U45M A search has been
instituted to identify and locate any such 'log," and also to obtain the other
information in respect of the incident noted in the log which would be responsive
to the further requests of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, Pages 13953
and 13956), referred to in Items #2 and #3 of your memorandum of 19 April
1946. As of the present time these searches have not been successful but they
are not yet completed. You will be advised by subsequent memorandum of such
event and of the ultimate results.
John Ford Baekher,
Commander, VSNR.
NAVAL COMMUNICATION
From: SECNAV (JAG)
To: COMAIRPAC
Date : 15 APR 1946
152019
Restricted
For Rear Admiral Cato D. Glover USN X in congressional investigation of
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor question has arisen as to whereabouts of
Admiral H. R. Stark on night 6 December 1941 and Admiral Stark cannot recollect
that detail X Log of OPNAV duty officer for 6 dash 7 December 1941 indicates
you stood watch from 1900 to 0200 X This log contains over your signature the
following entry quote at 2000 [i-^545] Major F. L. Harrison comma aide
to the Secertary of War comma telephoned that the Secretary of War desired
the following information by 0900 Sunday 7 December colon compilation of
men of war in Far East comma British comma American comma Japanese
comma Dutch comma Russian comma also compilation of American men-of-war in
Pacific fleet comma with locations comma and a list of American men-of-war in
the Atlantic without locations X Admirals Ingersoll comma Stark and the
Secretary of the Navy were consulted and the Secretary directed that the
infoi'mation be compiled and delivered to him prior to 1000 Sunday 7 December
unquote X This entry does not recall to Admiral Stark any recollection as to
his whereabouts X He accepts the item but think it may possibly be inaccu-
rate because he cannot see why it would have been necessary to have consulted
all three paren Ingersoll himself and Knox paren in the matter referred to X
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5483
Advise by dispatch as soon as possible whether you recollect consulting Admiral
Stark as indicated comma as well as the manner in which and the approximate
time von contacted him and where he was located when reached by you X
From : COMAIRPAO 160636
To: SEC
P (JAG) WASHNDC
Restricted X
\1A5A6^ 1 regret that I am unable to recall the incident referred to in
vour 15'>019 X Information of the nature requested by the Secretary of War was.
normally compiled by the so-called quote War Room unquote which was then a
new section of the Ship Moyeraents Division of OPNAV X This section was
headed bv Captain Frank Leighton now deceased X Events of importance
originating from the War Room were entered in the log kept by the Ship Move-
ment Division X It is possible that Capt Leighton was the consultant X I do
remember very definitely having telephoned Admiral Stark during the night
concerning the movements of a Japanese convoy which was west of the Philip-
pines headed south X This was the convoy that made the initial landing on the
Malay Peninsula near Kota P.hnru X I am certain that this call was made
after" midnight as it was toward the end of the watch and that Admiral Stark was
then at his home X From Rear Admiral Cato D. Glover X
1083 A
Ty AL -1 no
' * DlSPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 7 May 1946.
Memorandum
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson
In response to the requests of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, Pages
13 953 and 13,956) referred to Umn in Items #2 and #3 of your memo-
randum of 11 April 1946, a thorough search, as heretofore indicated m the memo-
ianduS to you from th^ undersigned dated 26 April 1946 (1083A R #168) has
been made of the pertinent files of the Navy Department to locate the data or
document in respect of the compilation of ship locations requested by the Secre-
tary of War on 6 December 1941 as noted in the 2000 entry in the log of the watch
officer of Naval Operations and for the records used to give that information to
the Secretary of War. The search has now been completed but with negative
results
There was found, however, a copy of a statement of locations of U. S. Naval
forces and foreign naval forces as of 7 December 1941, which on comparison is
found to be in part the same as or a copy of and in other parts to contain infor-
mation substantially identical with that stated in the similar document found
in the files of the War Department on the outside sheet of which there appears
the notation "Secnav (2) 1000."^ A study of the two documents indicates that
the one found in the files of the Army is most probably a copy of that which
was prepared in pursuance of the request noted in the watch officer s log, and
which probably was delivered in duplicate to Secretary of the Navy Knox and
bv him a copy to Secretary Stimson at their conference at 1000 on 7 December
1941 while that now found in the files of the Navy was either a subsequently
typed document of the same date or more probably iUSm the rough draft
on which was based the final draft of the document delivered to the Secretary
of the Navy. A copy of the document which has been found in the files of the
Navy is forwarded herewith. .
Information of the nature reflected in ship location summaries such as those
referred to above is based on dispatches and other internal Navy intelligence
as to the locations and movements of United States ships, and on Intelligence
Reports and Estimates such as are in the Record of the Congressional Investiga-
tion as to foreign ships. .« ,. ,, T-, ., T> T,^^
(Sgd) John Ford Baecher,
John Ford Baecher,
Commander, U8NR.
1 See exhibit No. 176 for document from War Department files.
5484 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Lane. Congressman Murphy, at page 7496 of the transcript,,
requested copies of any report that, after a trial, a plan for readiness
of aircraft at Hawaii was abandoned due to wear on planes and crews.
Under date of May 8, 194G(, the Navy Department has replied to this
request and we request that the reply be spread upon the record.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)
[I4549] 1070/JFB : ms R. #182
Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 8 May 1946.
Memorandum
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
In compliance with the request of Congressman Murphy (Record of Proceed-
ings, Page 7496), referred to in Item #7 of your memorandum of 29 March
1946, a thorough seardi has been made of the pertinent files of the Navy De-
partment for a report submitted by the Commander-in-Chief, United States
Pacific Fleet, to the effect that because of the wear and tear on airplane crews
and planes there was abandoned after a few days trial at some indefinite time
prior to 7 December 1941, a plan whereby all Army and Navy planes, including
pursuit planes but excepting search planes, should be warmed up, manned, and
ready to take off before sunrise to 0800, and for one hour before and after sunset.
No such report could be found.
(Sgd.) John Ford Beacher,
John Ford Beacher,
Commander, USNR.
[US50] Mr. Lane. Senator Ferguson at page 13527-13529 of the
record requested copies of any message sent by Capt. John Creighton,
Naval Observer at Singapore, to Admiral T. C. Hart, Commander in
Chief, Asiatic Fleet, on 4, 5, or 6 December 1941, concerning the sight-
ing of a Japanese convoy south of Siam.
Under date of May 10, 1946, the Navy Department has replied to
this request and we ask that the reply be spread on the record.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)
[14551] 1070/JFB :ms R. #180
Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 10 May 1946.
Memorandum
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
In compliance with the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings,
Pages 13527-13.529), referred to in Item #20 of your memorandum of 29 INTarch
1946, a thorough search has been made of the files of the cognizant activity of
the Navy Department for the message which Captain John Creighton testified
was sent by him on 4, 5, or 6 December 1941 from Singapore to Admiral T. C.
Hart in respect of information received from the pilot of a British reconnaissance
plane that a Japanese convoy had been sighted south of the south point of Siam,
headed west, and that Japanese fighter planes had taken off from a Japanese
carrier in the escort to prevent the British plane from approaching the convoy.
No message containing such information could be found in the files of the Navy
Department.
(Sgd.) John Ford Beacher,
John Ford Beacher,
Commander, USNR.
[145S2'] _ Mr. Lane. A request of Senator Lucas, at page 152 of
the transcript, concerns long distance reconnaissance from Pearl
Harbor prior to December 7, 1941. The Navy Department, under date
of May 2, 1946, has replied to that request, and we ask that the reply
be spread on the record.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5485
The Chairman. Be so ordered.
(Tlie matter referred to follows:)
[14553] 10S3A, R #101, R #122. Depaktment of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington 2 May 1946.
Memorandum
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson
In response to the request of Senator Lucas (Record of Proceedings, Page 152),
the regular air search including the dawn patrol of the fleet operating areas from
Oahu was first prescribed on 15 Febrvuiry 1941, by Paragraph 3 (B) (1) of
Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 of that date, and was put into effect
on 25 February 1941, by Paragraph 2 of Pacific Fleet Confidential Memorandum
No. lCM-41, of that date.
There are enclosed photographic copies of (1) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter
No. 2CI^41, dated 15 February 1941, and (2) Pacific Fleet Confidential Memo-
randum No. ICM^l, dated 25 February 1941.
(s) John Ford Baecher,
John Ford Baechek,
Commander, VSNR.
U4554] Cinepac File No. A211/FFl/A4-3/QL/(0271) .
United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., February 15, 1941.
Confidential Destroyed Cy #5
Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41
From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To : Fleet.
Subject : Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.
Reference: (a) U. S. Fleet Conf. Letter No. 8CL-40.
(b) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 31^40 (Revised).
(c) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 9L-40.
(d) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 191^40.
(e) Section 3, Chapter II, U. S. F. 10.
(f ) Section 4, Chapter IV, U. S. F. 10.
1. Reference (a) is hereby cancelled and superseded by this letter.
2. The security of the Fleet operating and based in the Hawaiian Area may
reasonably be based on two assumptions :
(A) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present exist-
ing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and mis-
guided nationals of such powers may attempt :
(1) sabotage from small craft on ships based in Pearl Harbor.
[14555] (2) to block the Entrance Channel to Pearl Harbor by sinking
an obstruction in the Channel.
(3) lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.
(B) That a declaration of war might be preceded by ;
(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbort
(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area.
(3) a combination of these two.
3. The following security measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part
or in their entirety as directed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
or the Senior Officer Present Afloat in the Hawaiian Area :
(A) Maintain continuous patrols:
(1) Channel Entrance plus a ready duty destroyer moored near coal dock.
(2) Boom.
(3) Harbor.
(B) Intermittent patrols:
(1) Patrol Wing TWO shall search assigned operating areas and vicinity
prior to entry therein by operating forces and in early morning on subsequent
days.
(2) An off-shore destroyer patrol of three detroyers beginning twelve hours
prior to the sortie and/or entry of heavy ships to search that part of the circle
of a [14556] radius of ten miles from the entrance buoys not patrolled
by the Channel Entrance Patrol. This patrol shall be furnished by Commander
Destroyers, Battle Force, on request of Task Force Commander.
5486 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(3) An air patrol shall be established at least two hours prior to the sortie
of the first heavy ship to search that part of the circle of a radius of thirty miles
from the entrance channel buoys which is South of latitude 21°-20' N. This air
patrol shall be furnished : for sortie, from ship or carrier-based aircraft by the
Senior Office Present Afloat of unit remaining in the Harbor on the request of
the Sortie Task Force Commander; for entry, by the Task Force Commander
entering; when a sortie and entry occur in succession, by the Task Force Com-
mander entering.
(4) Daily sxoeep. Sweep for magnetic and anchored mines.
(C) Operating areas:
(1) The Naval Operating Areas in Hawaiian Waters (U. S. C. & G. S. Chart
No. 4102) are considered submarine waters. Observe requirements of reference
(e).
(2) When ships operate at sea from Pearl Harbor they shall be organized as
a Task Force to which will be assigned destroyers and patrol aircraft as neces-
sary for screening. Each task force shall be organized offensively and defen-
sively. These organizations shall be promulgated prior to leaving port
[^4557] and shall provide for the following:
(a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and attack hostile submarines.
(b) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number
of destroyers available in the priority :
Priority 1— BBs.
Priority 2— CVs.
Priority 3 — CAs.
Priority 4 — CLs.
(c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier 'if operating) and destroyers, to co-
operate with Patrol Wing TWO and Army Air Units in destroying hostile car-
rier group.
(d) A concentration of operating submarines preparatory to disposition as
circumstances require.
(D) Sortie, and Entrance:
(1) Comply with instructions in U.S.F. 10.
(2) Patrols outlined in (B) (2) and (B) (3) above, shall be established and
commanded by the Sortie Commander except when forces are entering only,
in which case they shall be established and commanded by the officer command-
ing the Task Force entering. When forces sortie and enter consecutively the
command of the patrols will be turned over to the entry Task Force Commander
on completion of the sortie by the Sortie Task Foi-ce Commander. These patrols
shall continue until released [lJt558'\ by the Task Force Commander of
the sortie in case of sortie only, or by the Task Force Commander entering in
ease of entry or successive sortie and entry.
(3) Degaussing coils, if calibrated, shall be energized in water of less than
sixty fathoms. Unless the Entrance Channel has been swept for magnetic
mines. Commander Base Force shall furnish a tug, minesweeper, or small ship
without protection to precede the first heavy ship in which the degaussing gear
is inoperative. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided if operations
permit.
(E) Conditions of ships at sea:
(1) Ships, except submarines, shall not anchor in unprotected anchorages.
Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului may be considered
as such if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and ships are so moored
as not to be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor.
(2) Task Force, or Task Group Commanders, if directed by the former, shall
maintain inner air patrol for disposition or formations, when, in assigned
operating areas.
(3) Maintain inner anti-submarine screens insofar as practicable with
assigned destroyers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screen-
ing when they are not employed in plane guarding.
(4) Maintain condition of readiness THREE on torpedo defense battei'ies
and equivalent condition of readiness [14559] in destroyers. Supply
ready ammunition and keep depth charges ready for use. Aircraft will not be
armed unless especially directed.
(5) Maintain material condition XRAY, or equivalent, in all ships.
(6) Steam darkened at night in defensive disposition either as a Task Force
or by Task Groups as practicable.
(7) Restrict use of radio to minimum required for carrying out operations.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5487
(8) Maintain horizon and surface battle lookouts.
(9) Submarine shall not operate submerged in the vicinity of surface ships
except in accordance with prearranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnerj)
exercises, or for services to other types.
(10) Submarine operations, except (9) above, shall be confined ordinarily
to Areas C-5, C-7, U-1, M-20, M-21 and M-24. Under special circumstances
submarines squadrons may request additional areas from the officer responsible
for assigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear of the general area
allocated to surface ships and shall notify all Fleet units in the Hawaiian Area.
While submarines are operating submerged in C-5 and C5-7 they will maintain
a guard ship on the surface to warn approaching surface ships.
(11) Except as specifically directed for exercise purposes all operations of
submarines other than those covered [14560] in sub-paragraphs (9) and
(10) above, shall be on the surface.
(12) Submarines may anchor in the following places: in Pearl Harbor, ofE
Lahaina, inside or outside Kahului, off Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrols need
be maintained.
(13) Commanders of surface task forces, when they have been designated,
shall be furnished with detailed submarine schedules and all changes thereto.
Commanders of surface task forces shall ensure that all air patrols are properly
notified thereof.
(F) Condition of ships in port:
(1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall carry out applicable measures,'
outlined in references (b), (c) and (d).
(G) Defense against air attack:
(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists of
several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference
of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the
middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine Defense
Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns are
located both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions.
(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor
plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.
[14561} (3) As a basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for
anti-aircraft fire, berths in the harbor are assigned to air defense sectors as
follows :
Sector I — Berths F2-F8, K2, CI to C.5. (Sector defined by approximate
bearings 045° to 190° true from assigned berths).
Sector II— Berths Fl, F9. Bl-3, Dry Docks, DG Calibrating Buoys, Tl-4,
WL-2-3, D2-7, X22, X28. (Sector defined by approximate bearings
190° to 270° true from assigned berths).
Sector III— Berths Dl, D9, FlO-13, X2, X15, X18. (Sector defined by ap-
proximate bearings 270° to 000° true from assigned berths).
Sector IV— Berths X3, X4, X5, X6 to X14, X17, C6. ( Sector defined by
approximate bearings 000° to 045° true from assigned berths).
Hostile planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets
for ships moored at that sector's berths. But ships at other sector berths may be
used to augment fire outside their sector at the discretion of the Sector Com-
mander.
(4) The Senor Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in-
Chief, TJ. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that
they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector commen-
surate with the total number of ships of all types in port. [14562] He is
authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships,
carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths
permit.
(5) The Senior Ofl5cer Present in sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G) (3)
above, is the Sector Commander, and will be responsible for the fire in his
own sector.
(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense
Ofl5cer (N.B.D.O.). As such he will—
(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against
air attack.
(&) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.
5488 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft arranging
through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for co-ordination of the joint air effort
between the Army and Navy.
(d) Co-ordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by —
(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) vphat condition of readiness to maintain.
(2) Holding necessary drills.
(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.
(4) Informing the Task Force Commander [lJf563] at sea of ihe
attack and the type of attacking aircraft.
(5) Arranging communication plan.
(6) Notify all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.
(7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are prescribed:
Condition I — General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as
prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.
Condition 11 — One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector
manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base
Defense Officer.
Condition III — Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector)
of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of
four guns required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed
by Naval Base Defense Officer.
(8) Searchlights of ships will not be used in event of a night attack.
(9) In event of an air attack, the following procedure will be followed by the
task forces :
(a) Senior Officer Emharked in Pearl Harbor.
(1) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating
task force commander.
[14364] (2) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest
practicable sortie.
(3) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie.
(4) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force
Commander operating at sea advised.
(b) Task Force Commander operating at sea.
(1) Despatch striking unit.
(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining
surface forces at sea.
(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require.
(4) Direct commander of operating submarines of action desired of him.
(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer
Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks, or hostile planes
sighted in the operating area.
(c) Naval Base Defense Officer.
(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not
already blacked out, each unit will execute blackout when the alarm is given.
(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type
of attacking aircraft.
(3) Launch air search for enemy ships.
[lJf565] (4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available.
(H) Action to be taken if submarine attacks in operating area:
(1) In the event of a submarine attack in the operating area, the following
general procedure will be followed ;
(a) Ship Attacked. Proceed in accordance with Article 509, F. T, P. 188.
Originate a plain langunge despatch, urgent precedence, containing essential
details and addressed to all ships present in Hawaiian Waters. To insure rapid
delivery this despatch should be transmitted by the attacked ship to the Task
Force Commander, to all ships present in Pearl Harbor on the harbor circuit
in effect, and to Radio Honolulu (NPM) on 355 kcs. for Commandant Fourteenth
Naval District, and relay on schedule. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will
clear the immediate submarine danger area at best remaining speed, then pro-
ceed toward Pearl Harbor using zigzag appropriate for speed in use.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5489
Ships other than one attacked.
ih) Battleships. Zigzag at maximum speed. Launcli aircraft armed for
inner air patrol. Do not approach scene of attack closer than 50 miles during
remainder of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to enable
them to join quickly.
(c) Carriers. Same as for battleships, [14566] except all aircraft
will be placed in Condition ONE, armed. Aircraft for initial inner patrol may
be launched unarmed. (At least one squadron with depth charges when they
become available). Launch planes other than those for inner air patrol as
ordered by Task Force Commander or as circumstances warrant.
(d) Cruisers. Same as for battleships, except that one-half available aircraft
(armed) will be used for own inner air patrol. The second half will be sent
to scene of attack, armed, to attack enemy submarine and to provide patrol for
damaged ship if damaged ship has been unable to provide its own inner air
patrol.
(e) Destroyers. Attack imit proceed at maximum speed to scene of attack.
Take determined offensive action. Screening units join heavy ship units to
which assigned. Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make immediate preparations
for departure. Sortie on orders of Senior Officer Present Afloat. Report to
Task Force Commander when clear of Channel.
if) Snimarines. Surface if submerged. Remain in own assigned areas, zig-
zagging at best speed until directed otherwise.
(g) Minecrajft. Augment screening units as directed by Task Force Com-
mander.
(h) Base Force. If ship attacked is damaged, tugs in operating areas slip
tows and join her at best speed, prepared to tow. Report in code positions of
rafts [14567] abandoned. Tugs in Pearl Harbor prepare for departure
Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. High speed towing vessels
proceed at discretion, keeping 50 miles from scene of attack.
(i) Patrol Wing Two. Assume readiness for offensive action. Carry out
search as directed by Task Force Commander. Prepare to establish station
patrol 220 mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next
succeeding daylight period.
(/) Shore-based Fleet Aircraft. Prepare to relieve planes in the air over the
attack area, unless Pearl Harbor is also attacked, in which case the instruction
issued by Naval Base Defense Officer have priority.
(k) Naval District. Clear Pearl Harbor Channel at once for either sortie or
entry. Prepare to receive damaged ship(s) for repair.
(1) S. 0. P. A., Pearl Harbor. Prepare destroyers in Pearl Harbor for sortie
and direct the departure of units as requested by the Task Force Commander
of units at sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force Com-
mander at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys.
(m) Task Force Commander at sea. Coordinate offensive and defensive meas-
ures. When immediate defensive measures have been accomplish, prescribe
rendezvous and issue necessary instructions for concentrating and foi'ming the
[14568] Task Force.
(2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate
the presence of more submarines awaiting to attack.
(3) It must be remembered too that a single submarine attack may indicate the
presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accom-
panied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his
Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in
order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air
search or other means.
H. E. KiMMEL.
Distribution : (List II, Case 1) : O ; X ; AAl ; AAAl ; ENl ; ENS ; NA12 ; NDllAC ;
NDll-12-13-14.
P. C. Crosley,
Flag Secretary.
79716 — 46— pt. 11 23
5490 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[14569] CinC File No.
A2-11/FF1/
A4-3/QL/0312
United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. Pennsyt.vania, Fi^gship,
Pearl Harhor, T. H., 25 February 1941.
CONFIDENTIAL.
Pacific Fleet Confidential Memorandum No. ICM-Jfl
From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: Fleet.
Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas — Measures to be
effective.
Reference: (a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.
1. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, directs that the following
security measures of reference (a) be effective as of the date of this letter.
2. Paragraph numbers herein correspond with those in reference (a).
U) (i).
Channel Entrance and ready duty destroyer — administered by Commandant
Fourteenth Naval District with services furnished by Commander Destroyers,
Battle Force.
(A) (2).
Boom — administered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District with services
furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.
U) (3).
[I457O] Harbor — administered by Commander Base Force with services
furnished by Commander Battle Force, from all ships present.
(B) (1) (2) (3).
(B) (4)-
Administered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval Disctrict with own services.
Commander Base Force will augment if so requested by Commandant Fourteenth
Naval District.
(C) (i).
(O (2) (a) (6) (c) (d).
Assignments only shall be made. The Task Force Commander will hold one
drill during each operating period, if employment permits, in the establishment
of units prescribed.
(D) (1) (2) (8).
(E) (1) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13).
(F).
The provisions of reference (b).
(G).
Entire article, except subparagraph 6 (b), which will be as arranged by Naval
Base Defense Officer with Commanding General Hawaiian Department.
(H).
Entire article.
3. Force Commanders and Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will issue
the necessary orders to make these [14571] measures effective.
H. E. KIMMEL.
Distribution : (List II, Case 1) .
O ; X ; AAAl ; ENl ; EN3 ; NA12 ; MDllAC ; NDll-12-13-14.
(s) P. C. Crosley,
P. C. Crosley,
Flag Secretary.
Mr. Lane. On the last pa^e of Exhibit No. 160, reference is made
to a statement by the late President Roosevelt concerning a report
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
5491
from a Captain Smith. The Navy Department was asked to identify
this Captain Smith, upon request of Senator Ferguson, and under
date of May 9, 1946, the Navy Department has advised that this officer
was then Lt. Comdr. (now Commander) C. D, Smith, U. S. N. R., Com-
manding Officer, U. S. S. Wake, and we ask that the full reply of the
Navy Department be spread on the record.
The Chairman. It is so ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)
[14572] 1070/JFB : ms
R#174
Department of the Navy,
Office of The Secketary,
Washington, 9 May 1946.
(Memorandum)
To Mr. SirPH W. Richardson.
In response to the request of Senator Ferguson of 16 April 1946, forwai-ded
by your memorandum of 19 April 1946, tlie Captain Smith referred to on the
last page of the 13 December 1941 memorandum of the remarks made by the
President on 7 December 1941, on the occasion of the meeting of the Cabinet
was then Lieutenant Commander (now Commander) C. D. Smith, U. S. N. R.,
Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Walce (River GunboJitj. The U. S. S. Wake was
captured by the Japanese at Shanghai, China, and Captain Smith was taken
prisoner. He escaped from a Japanese prison camp in China and returned to
naval jurisdiction in November 1944.
The phone call from the Japanese received by Captain Smith, which President
Roosevelt mentioned, was reported to the State Department in a message filed
by Consul General Stanton with Radio Shanghai at 2210 (10: 10 p. m.) 7 Decem-
ber 1941 (Greenwich Civil Time), which was 1710 (5: 10 p. m.), 7 December 1941,
Washington local time and 6 : 10 a. m., 8 December 1941, Shanghai local time.
The message was received in Washington at 1913 (7 : 13 p. m.) 7 December 1941,
Washington local time. A photostatic copy of the message is enclosed herewith.
[i^57^] The following is a chronological summarization of the
events surrounding the phone call and receipt of knowledge of it in
Washington.
[14574] Local time and date
Event
In Greenwich
In Washington
In Hawaii
In Shanghai
Attack on Pearl Harbor started
071820
6:20 p. ni. 7th
071320
1:20 p.m. 7th
m07B0
7:60 a. m. 7ih
080220
2:20 a. m. 8th
Elapsed time between attack and phone call: 1 hour, 55 minutes
Call received by Captain Smith I 072015 I 071615 I 070945
I 8:15 p. m. 7th | 3:15 p. m. 7th | 9:45 a. m. 7th
Elapsed time between call and filing message: 1 hour, 55 minutes
Message filed in Shanghai
071710
071140
080415
4:15 a. m. 8ih
080610
I 10:10 p. m. 7th \ 5:10 p. m. 7th | 11:40 a. m. 7th | 6:10 a. m.Sth
Elapsed time between filing messagejandlreceipt in|Washington: 2 hours, 3 minutes
Message received in Washington I 080013
1S:1S a. m. 8th
071913 I 071343 I 080813
7:13 p.m. 7th | 1:43 p.m. 7th | 8:13a. m.Sth
Elapsed time between receipt in Washington and mention by President: 2 hours, 17 minutes
Phone call mentioned by President 080230
2:30 a. m. Sth
072130
9:30 p. TO. 7th
071600 1 081030
4:00p.m. 7th 10:30a.m. Sth
(S.) John Ford Baecher,
Commander, U. S. N. R.
5492 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[14575] NPB 1535 RDO SHANGHAI CK XX GOVT STATE PRIORITY
SEVENTH 2210
Govt State SecState Waslin Info AmEmbassies Chungking Peiping Nanking
Amconsuls Hankow Hongkong Swatow Amoy Canton Chefoo Tsingtao
Captain C D Smitli Commanding U.S.S. Wake received telehpone call at four
fifteen this morning period A Japanese naval oflieer stated quote A state of war
exists between my country and yours and I am taking control of Wake unquote
period All communications with Wake cut off and no further information is avail-
able regarding her period HMS Peterel small British gunboat blew up at about
the same time period Japanese in control of waterfront biit have not taken over
settlement or French concession city quiet para all confidential codes and papers
destroyed including those aboard Wake except ditof
Stanton.
[14576] Mr. Lane. The request of Senator Ferguson at page
11220 of the transcript, concerns time of interception and translation
of a message from Berlin to Tokyo, serial 1405, mentioned in a series
of dispatches by Captain Kramer in his testimony before the commit-
tee. The War Department under date of May 1, 1946, and the Navy
Department under date of April 15, 1946, have replied to this request,
and we ask that their replies be spread upon the record.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)
[14577] Wae Depaktment,
Washington, 1 May 1946.
Memorandum fob Mr. Richardson :
With reference to the question raised by Senator Ferguson on page 11220 of
the transcript as to whether Message No. 1405 from Berlin to Tokyo was received
prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, a search of the files of the Signal Intelligence
Service discloses that the message was dated 2 December 1941, was received by
the Signal Intelligence Service on 5 December 1941, but was not decoded and
translated until 10 December 1941.
(S) Robert M. Diggs,
Robert M. Diggs,
Capt., AU8.
1083A(JFB) Department of the Navy,
R#14S Office OF the Secretary,
Washington, 15 April 1946.
(MEMORANDUM)
To Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
In response to the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings p.
11220), referred to in item 16 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, it has
been ascertained that the Berlin to Tokyo message # 1405 was intercepted and
translated by [14578] the Army, and therefore the files of the Navy do
not indicate whether it was received before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
on 7 December 1941.
(S) ,Tohn Ford Baecher,
John Ford Baecher,
Commander, USNR
Mr. Lane. At page 9671 of the transcript Congressman Murphy re-
quested monthly reports from the Intercepter Station at Winter Har-
bor, Maine, and Cheltenham, Md., for November and December 1941.
Under date of May 3, 1946, the Navy Department replied to this re-
quest and we ask that the reply be spread on the record.
The Chairman. So ordered.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
5493
(The matter referred to follows:'
R #183
1083A
Db3>artment of the Navy,
Office of the Secretaby,
Washington, 3 May 191,6.
MEMORANDUM
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
In response to the request of Congressman Murphy (Record of Proceedings
Page 9671), referred to In Item #13 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, the
November and December 1941 IMontlily Reports of the Navy Intercept Stations
at Winter Harbor, Maine and at Cheltenham, Maryland were taken on several
occasions by the undersigned to the regular daily hearings of the Joint Con-
gressional Committee.
At one such time it was explained to Congressman Murphy that in addition
to the material referred to in the testimony of Captain Safford (Record of
Proceedings Page 9672) those reports contained considerable technical and
oi)erational data which were pertinent to the Pearl Harbor inquiry and which
the Navy desired not to be disclosed for important reasons of security. On
receiving that information Congressman Murphy quickly acceded to the request
of the Navy and stated that he was desirous of cooperating to the fullest extent
to preserve the security of the data referi-ed to and that he would be satisfied
to obtain for the Record a statement that the Monthly Reports were physically
present in the Navy Department and available to authorized persons at that
[lli580'\ time and had been since 1941. The desired statements in the affirm-
ative were made by the undersigned in behalf of the Navy Department in
answer to questions put by Congressman Murphy on 16 February 1946 (Record
of Proceedings Pages 12,640-12,641 ) , and, to the extent it may be deemed neces-
sary, those statements are confirmed.
In view of the above it is believed the request of Congi-essman Murphy has
been complied with to his satisfaction. If this assumption is not true please
advise and any further desired information will be supplied.
(S) John Ford Baecher,
John Ford Baecher,
Commander, USNR.
Mr. Lane. Requests of Senator Ferguson and Congressman Murphy,
appear at page 13856 of the transcript, for copies of correspondence
between Admiral Kimmel and President Truman concerning the
examination of certain Navy Department files. Under date of April
26, 1946, the Navy has furnished the information requested and we
ask that the material be spread on the record.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)
[U581]
Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 26 April WJ/S.
MEMORANDUM
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
1. In response to the requests of Senator Ferguson and Congressman Murphy
(Record of Proceedings, Pages 13,856 and 13,857), referred to in Item #1 of
your memorandum of 19 April 1946 for copies of the exchange of correspondence
between Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Retired) and President Truman
there are enclosed copies of the following:
(1) Letter from Rear Admiral Kimmel to the President dated 13 November
1945.
(2) Memorandum from the President to the Secretary of the Navy dated 29
November 1945.
(3) Letter from the President to Rear Admiral Kimmel dated 29 November
1945.
(S) John Ford Baecher.
Commander, VSNR.
5494 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
U4582] Room 1N90 Navy Department,
Washington 25, D. C, 13 November 1945.
My Dear Mr. President : I have been informed that there are in the files of
the Director of Naval Comunications of the Navy Department copies of despatches
forwarded by the White House to London and other cities, in 1941.
I submitted a request to the Chief of Naval Operations under date of 8 November
1945 that I be given access to these files for examination, vpith the view to
selecting individual despatches in those files that relate to Pearl Harbor and to
the events leading thereto, and this for the purpose of obtaining photostat copies
thereof for use in the hearings of the Joint Congressional Investigating Com-
mittee.
I have been orally informed today that this request to you is necessary for
your approval before I may be given access to these files. I am, therefore,
submitting this request to you through the Secretary of the Navy.
Very i-espectfully,
Husband E. Kimmel,
Bea/r Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.).
To THE President of the United States,
The Whife House,
Washington, D. C.
m583] The White House,
Washington, 29 November 19Ii5.
MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of the Navy :
Replying to your memorandum dated 23 November 1945, forvparding a request
from Rear Admiral Kimmel for access to confidential files of the Navy Depart-
ment for use in hearings of the Joint Congressional Investigating Committee,
access to files that are material to the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack
is made available to the Congressional Committee by my memorandum of October
23, 1945, to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
I have found it necessary to lay down a policy that confidential files of the
Department may not be available for examination by individuals.
I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I have sent to Admiral Kimmel.
(S) Harry Teuman.
[14584'\ 29 November 1945.
Dear Admiral Kimmel: Replying to your letter dated 18 November 1945, re-
questing access to certain confidential files of the Navy Department for your use
in hearings of the Joint Congressional Investigating Committee, you are informed
that access to files in the Navy Department that are material to the investigation
of the Pearl Harbor attack is permitted to the Congressional Committee by my
memorandum of 23 October 1945 to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy.
I have found it necessary to lay down the policy that confidential files in the
Navy Department may not be made available for examination by individuals.
I am sure that if you made application to the Congressional Committee, it
w^ould obtain for you the informaton which you are seeking.
Very sincerely
(S) Harey S. Truman.
Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, USN (Ret.)
Room 1N90 Navy Department,
Washington 25, D. C.
[14^85] Mr. Lane. On request of Senator Brewster, page 8208,
for any report made by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy on
the report of the Roberts Commission, the Navj^ Department has re-
plied under date of April 26, 1946, to this request and we ask that the
reply of the Navy Department be spread on the record.
The Chairman. So ordered.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
5495
(The matter referred to .follows:)
[14586]
R#109
1083A
Depabtmknt of the Navy,
Oetice of the Secretary,
Washington, 26 Apr'il 19Ji6.
MEMORANDUM
To : Mr. Setli W. Richardson.
Response to the request of Senator Brewster (Record of Proceedings, Pages
8208-8211), referred to in Item #10 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, was
made by prior memorandum to Counsel for the Committee dated 21 January 1946
(File 1088A R#109), which advised that no record had been found in the Navy
Department of any report made by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy on
the report of the Roberts Commission. Further search has not disclosed any
such Report.
However, there was prepared by an officer on the working level in the office
of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy a rough draft from which were typed
smooth copies constituting what that officer conceived as a statement of possible
charges and specifications in respect of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy (Retired), but as to which no record has been found indicating it was ever
approved or passed on by either the Judge Advocate General of the Navy or the
Secretary of the Navy and which, therefore, never became a part of the official
records nor a document of the Navy. In the event this paper may be considered
at all responsive to the [14587] request of Senator Brewster, or in case
either you or the Committee may have any interest in it, a carbon copy is for-
warded herewith.
(S) John Ford Baeoher,
Commander, JJSNR.
NAV JAG-63-B
00-Kimmel, Husband E./A17-20
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.
To : Judge Advocate, General Court-Martial.
Subject : Charges and specifications in case of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,
U. S. Navy, Retired.
1. The above-named officer will be tried before the general court-martial of
which you are judge advocate, upon the following charges and specifications. You
will notify the president of the court accordingly, inform the accused of the date
set for his trial, and summon all witnesses, both for the prosecution and the
defense.
Charge 1. Culpable Inefficiency in the Performance of Duty
specification
In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired, while serving on
active duty as the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of
adjmiral, U. S. [14588] Navy, and it being the duty of the said Kimmel
while so serving as the said commander in chief to take all practicable steps to
keep the ships of his command ready for battle, did, in Hawaiian waters, from
about 1 February 1941 to 7 December 1941, while so serving as aforesaid, fail to
issue and see effected such timely orders as were necessary to keep the ships of
his, the said Kimmel's, command ready for battle, as it was his duty to do, by
reason of which inefficiency an attack by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941
resulted in a number of the said ships being damaged and destroyed.
Charge II. Negugence in Obeying Orders
SPECIFICATION
In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired, while serving
on active duty as the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of
admiral, U. S. Navy, having, in Hawaiian waters, on or about 27 November 1941,
been lawfully ordered by the Chief of Naval Operations to execute a defensive
5496 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
deployment of forces under his command in preparation for carrying out war
tasks, did, during the period from about 27 November 1941 to about 7 December
1941, at the place aforesaid, neglect and fail to make appropriate, adequate, and
timely defensive deployment of naval forces under his command preparatory for
carrying out war tasks [14589'\ as required by the imminence of hostilities
and in obedience to the aforesaid -orders, and as a result of which neglect and
failure as aforesaid an attack by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941 resulted in
Navy installations and ships of the U. S. Pacific Fleet being damaged and
destroyed.
Chabge III. Ne»lect of Duty
SPECIFICATION 1
In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired, while serving on
active duty us the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of
admiral, U. S. Navy, and it being the duty of the said Kimmel, while so serving
as said commander in chief, to protect the territory within the Hawaiian naval
coastal frontier against hostile expeditions, and he, the said Kimmel, well know-
ing of the possibility of an attack by Japan on the United States, did, in Hawaiian
waters, during the period from about 16 October 1941 to about 7 December 1941,
neglect and fail to protect the territory within the Hawaiian naval coastal frontier
against hostile expeditions, as it was his duty to do, by neglecting and failing to
provide and cause to be provided a proper and sufficient distant reconnaissance
although means were available for such reconnaissance, as a result of which
neglect and failure as aforesaid an attack by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941
resulted in Navy instal- [14590] lations and ships of the U. S. Pacific Fleet
being damaged and destroyed.
SPECIFICATION 2
In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired, while serving
on actitve duty as the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of
admiral, U. S. Navy, and while so serving, being jointly responsible with the
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for the defense of the Hawaiian
coastal frontier and well knowing of the possibility of a surprise attack by Japan
on the United States, did, in Hawaiian waters, during the period from about
27 November 1941 to about 7 December 1941, neglect and fail to consult, confer
and cooperate with the aforesaid commanding general with respect to measures
to be taken under the then existing plans for joint defense of the Hawaiian coastal
frontier and the adaptation of the said plans in whole or in part as required by
the imminence of hostilities, as it was the duty of the said Kimmel to do, and as a
result of which neglect and failure as aforesaid an attack by Japanese forces on
7 December 1941 resulted in Navy installations and ships of the U. S. Pacific Fleet
being damaged and destroyed.
SPECIFICATION 3
In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral. United States Navy, Retired, while
serving on active duty as the Commander in [l.'f591] Chief, United States
Pacific Fleet, with the rank of admiral, United States Navy, and while so serving,
being jointly responsible with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
for the defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier, having been informed by the
Chief of Naval Operations by despatch on or about 24 November 1941 that a sur-
prise aggressive movement in any direction by the Japanese, including an attack
on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility, and on or about 27 November 1941,
that negotiations with Japan had ended and Japan was expected to make an
aggressive move within a few days, and on or about 29 November 1941 that
Japanese action was unpredictable and hostilities on their part were momen-
tarily possible, did in Hawiian neglect and fail to consult and confer with the
said commanding general with respect to the meaning and intent of the warn-
ings issued by the said despatches and the appropriate measures of defense
required by the indicated imminence of hostilities, as it was the duty of the
said Kimmel to do, and as a result of which neglect and failure as aforesaid an
attack by Japanese forces of 7 December 1941. resulted in Navy installations and
ships of the U. S. Pacific Fleet being damaged and destroyed.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5497
SPECIFICATION 4
In that Husband E. Kimmel, rear admiral, IT. S. Navy, Retired, while serving
on active duty as the Conunander in [l.'i592] Cliief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
with the rank of admiral, U. S. Navy, and while so serving, being jointly respon-
sible with the Commanding General, Hawiian Department, for the defense of
the Hawaiin coastal frontier, having mi or about 27 November 1941 been in-
formed by the Chief of Naval Operations by despatch that negotiations with
Japan had ended and that Japan was expected to make an aggressive move with-
in a few days and that said despatch was to be considered a war warning, did, in
Hawaiian waters, between said date and 7 December 1941 neglect and fail to
put into effect within his command a state of alert and of readiness such as was
required to meet the emergency envisaged in the said despatch, as it was the duty
of the said Kimmel to do. in that a distant reconnaisance was not inaugurated
and maintained and shore batteries of the Navy and antiaircraft artillery on
board vessels of the fleet were not manned and supplied with ammunition, and
as a result of which neglect and failure as aforesaid an attack by Japanese
forces on 7 December 1941 resulted in Navy installations and ships of the U. S.
Pacific Fleet being damaged and destroyed.
[J4'^93] Mr. Lane. In response to the request of Congressman
Keefe, page 11033 of the record, the Navy Department has replied,
concerning the location of certain cards in respect to the winds code,
and "we ask that the Navy Department reply be spread on the record.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows :)
[145941 , Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 23 April 1946.
1083 A (HLB)
R#165
Memorandum
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
In response to the request of Congressman Keefe (Record of Proceedings,
page 11033), referred to in item 15 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, a
thorough search of the pertinent files of the cognizant activity of the Navy
Department has been made to find the cards in respect of the winds code which
were prepared at the direction of Read Admiral Noyes, and no information
or material of the type described has been found.
/s/ John Ford Baecher,
Commander, USNR.
[lJiS9Jf-A'] Mr. Lane. In respect to the request of Senator Fer-
guson for information as to the number of airplanes sent to Hawaii
and the Philippines during the period February 1, 1941, to December
7, 1941, in the transcript at page 12997, by reply dated April 22,
1946, the Navy Department has furnished this information and it has
been included in Exhibit No. 172 of the committee.
Mr. Murphy. In connection with that I would like for the record
to show that there are letters in the President's file that are pertinent
to that very question, letters from Secretary Stimson to the President
and from the President to the Secretary, in regard to the planes to
be sent to Hawaii.
The Chairman. Go ahead.
Mr. Lane. In response to Senator Ferguson's request at page 13995,
for the various messages noted in the operations watch officer log, the
Navy Department, under date of April 22, supplied this material,
and it has been made Exhibit 162-A.
At page 14064 of the transcript, a memorandum from the Navy De-
partment concerning the notes and drafts of Admiral Inglis' state-
ment before this committee was spread on the record. A correction of
5498 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the Navy Department memorandum has been received under date of
April 18, 1946. We ask that the correction be spread on the record.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter referred to .follows:)
[14595] 1083A(JFB)
RlOl
123
Depabtment of the Navy,
Offiob of the Seickettaky,
Washington, 18 April 1946.
Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
In respect of the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, pages
200-201) concerning the drafts and notes assembled in connection with the
preparation of the statement of Admiral Inglis, my previous memorandum
(dated 25 January 1946, R #101, 123) (Record of Proceedings, page 14065)
erroneously advised as to the date when the final draft was completed and the
woi"k material destroyed. The date of the occurrence of those events was 14
November 1945 and not 24 November 1945.
/s/ John Ford Baecher,
Commander, USNR.
Mr. Lane. We request that a memorandum from the War Depart-
ment liaison officer dated December 13, 1945 to committee counsel
concerning production and distribution of B-17 bombers as of Sep-
tember 1, 1941 be spread on the record.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)
War Department,
Washington, D. C, December 13, 19^5.
Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell.
With reference to your letter of Decmber 10, 1945, forwarding a copy of
Senator Brewster's request dated December 5, 1945 :
1. As of September 1, 1941, 133 B-17's had been produced.
2. Of the 133 B-lT's produced as of September 1, 1941, 113 had been de-
liverd to the Army Air Forces and 20 to Great Britain.
3. On September 1, 1941, the United States possessed 1Q9 B-17's, disposed
as follows :
Hawaii . 21
Panama 7
Continental United States 81
(S) Harmon Duncombe,
Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff Corps.
Mr. Lane. Senator Ferguson requested whether or not the OpNav
dispatch 061743, December 1941, to Admiral Kimmel, was a priority
message. The Navy Department has replied to this request and we ask
that the reply be spread on the record.
The Chairman. It is so ordered.
(The matter referred to .follows :)
[I4596] ' Deipartment of the Navy,
Office! op the Sexjbetaby,
Washington, 16 April 19^6.
Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
In response to the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of proceedings, page
7812) referred to in Item 8 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, Dispatch
601743 of December 1941 from OpNav to CinCPac for action to CinCAF for
information, was sent with deferred precedence.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5499
This message, as indicated in part in my memorandum (1083A (HLB) R#105
dated 29 January 1946) to you, was transmitted from Wasliington to radio
Honolulu on 6 December 1941 at 2254 Greenwich Time, which was 1754 Wash-
ington Local Time and 1224 Hawaiian Time (10: 54 p. m. Greenwich Time, 5 : 54
p. m. Washington Local Time and 12 : 24 p. m. Hawaiian Time) all of 6 December.
Since this message was transmitted by radio, it was received in Honolulu at the
moment of transmission. No record has yet been found at Pearl Harbor indicat-
ing the exact time of delivery of the message to Admiral Kimmel.
/s/ John Ford Baeiohek.
Commander, USNR.
[14^97] Mr. Lane. Senator Ferguson's request, at page 207 of
the transcript, for records relating to the phrase "provide necessary
escort" in the dispatch marked "Exhibit No. 3" of this committee, has
been answered by a reply of the Navy Department dated the 17th of
April 1946. We ask that this reply be spread on the record.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter referred to .follows:)
[14598] R #124
(JFB-efb) Department of the Navy,
(1070) Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 17 April 191,6.
Memorandum
To: Mr. vSeth W. Richardson.
In response to the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, Page
207), referred to in item 1 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, the direction
in dispatch 252203 of November 1941 from OpNav to Coml2 for action and to
CincPac, CinCaf, Coml4 and Coml6 for information (Cong. Inv. Exhibit 3),
reading 'CinCPac and CinCAf provide necessary escort", which follows the
instruction for the routing of all trans-PacLQc shipping through the Torrest
Straits, is usual Navy phraseology whereby it was indicated to the Fleet Com-
manders that they should detail as a protective escort such ships as in their
discretion they considered necessary to accomplish the purpose of guarding the
trans-Pacific shipping in question from any unfriendly action or aggressive attack.
/s/ John Ford Baecher,
Commander, USNR.
[14S99] Mr. Lane. In reference to page 14127 and page 14129 of
the transcript, information was recorded as received from the Navy
Department concerning the time of Japanese attacks in various
Pacific locations at the outbreak of war. This additional information
has been received from the Navy Department and we ask that it be
added to the record.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter referred to .follows :)
[14600} 1083A(HLB) Department of the Navy,
R #112 Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 17 April 1946.
Memorandum
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson,
Subject : Time Table of Japanese Attacks — source of material.
Reference is made to my memorandum file 1083A R#112 dated 4 April 1946
(Record of Proceedings, pages 14127-14129), in which the times of the Japanese
attacks at Clark Field, P. I., and Nichols Field, Manila (Record of Proceedings,
page 14129) were reported to be 9:27 am (December 8th, local time) and 3:00
am (December 9th, local time).
5500 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Further and later information received from the War Department now places
the times of the attacks at these places as follows :
Place
Local time
Greenwich time
Washington time
Clark Field, P. I .._
Nichols Field, Ma-
nila.
Between 12:17 and 12:20
p. m. December 8th.
3:15 a. m., December 9th..
Between 4:17 and 4:20
a. m. December 8th.
7:15 p. m., December 8th..
Between 11:17 and 11:20
p. m. December 7th.
2:15 p. m., December 8th.
/s/ John Ford Baecher
John Ford Baecher,
Commander, USNB.
[14601] Mr. Lane. Congressman Murphy requested at page
12635 of the transcript and the Navy has supplied four intercepted dis-
patches, mentioned in the statement before the committee of Capt. L.
F. Stafford. Opnav dispatch No. 282301, also requested at that time,
has been included as a part of Exhibit No. 142 of this committee. We
ask that the four intercepted dispatches be included in the record.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows :)
[14602] Department of the Navt,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington 15 April 1946.
1083A(JFB)
R #172
Memorandum
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
In response to the request of Congressman Murphy (Record of Proceedings,
page 12635), referred to in Item 17 in your memorandum of 29 March 1946, there
are enclosed herewith copies of the following documents :
(a) No. 843, Tokyo to Washington, 27 November 1941.
(b) Serial 1197, Washington to Tolvyo, 27 November 1941, (JD-1 No. 6908).
(c) Serial 482, Rio to Tolvyo, 30 November 1941, (JD-1 No. 6982).
(d) Serial 768, Rome to Tokyo, 29 November 1941, (JD- No. 6981).
/s/ John Ford Baecher,
John Ford Baecher,
Commander, USNR.
Ends. (4)
\l'i60S] From: Tokyo.
To : Washington.
27 November 1941
(Purple)
#843
Broadcast schedule as follows :
6 p. m. To Pacific Coast JVJ 12275.
6:30 p. m. To Western Hemisphere H^J ll^TS^"*^
7:00 p. m. To the Coast JVJ 12275!
8:00 p.m. To the Coast JHL 5160.
9:00 p.m. To the Coast JHL 5160.
10:00 p. m. To the Coast JHP 11980.
10:30 p. m. To Europe JHL 5160.
JD-1: 6899 Secret (H) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT) End (A)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5501
From : Washington.
To: Tokyo.
27 November 1941.
(Purple) #1197.
Re your #798* and #843**.
Due to reception of JUO and JVJ (general intelligence [UfGO-'i] infor-
mation— Morse code — broaden st) being weak, we desire that you change these
to JAV (27,327.5 kilocycles) and JUP (13,01J5 kilocycles), the change to be made
immediately.
Reception is also very weak on JHL (Domei news broadcast) so arrange to use
above wave length for this, too.
Due to static, the JAP (European broadcast) cannot be heard at all.
*JD-1 : ()658 — Instructions concerning talks on withdrawing troops from South-
ern Indochina.
*JD-1 :G899 — Tokyo broadcast schedule.
JD-1: Secret Navy Trans. 11-29-^1 (X) End (B)
From : Rio (Ishii).
To: Tokyo.
November 30, 1941.
Purple. #482.
I am making a general test of the reception of dispatches, and find that at
present we cannot receive the 10:30 P. M. (Japanese time) transmission at all.
At present the only one we can hear is the 6:30 P. M. (Japanese time) trans-
mission from JVJ to the United States, so please bear this in mind. Argentina
[l-'i065] reports the same.
As I would like to find out whether conditions are favorable here for reception
between 4: 00 and 6: 00 A. M. (Japanese time), it seems best to send to South
America at that time over a wavelength of from 10 to 15 megacycles.
25571 Army 6982 Secret Trans. 12-2-41 (7) End (D)
From : Rome.
To : Tokyo.
29 November 1941.
(Purple) # 768.
Re my #762*.
In regard to, the Japanese language radio broadcasts to Europe recently, JLT
cannot be heard at all and while JVW can be heard fairly well still there is inter-
ference from other wave lengths during the news broadcasts and static, etc.
Added to this is the fact that the announcer apparently speaks in a low tone,
vei*y rapidly and swallows the ends of his words, and the occasions when we do
not get good reception are numerous. There is great danger that we may miss
some important announcement such as was referred to in your telegram. Please
take up the following points that I am going to mention and [lJf606] please
arrange to do something about it, temporarily at least.
1. Select an announcer who can speak slightly louder than the present one and
who can enunciate clearly, one who does not intone and who can pronounce even
the last syllables of his words correctly and clearly.
2. In selecting the news please continue to place the most important news first
followed by items of lesser importance. However, as some time is usually con-
sumed in adjusting the machine, sometimes the important news is missed so
please repeat this again at the end of the broadcast even if this requires cutting
down on the entertainment features.
3. Before the Japanese news broadcast please be sure to always play several
minutes of Japanese patriotic music by way of introduction.
Relayed to Berlin.
*Not available.
JD-1 Secret (H) Navy Trans. 12-2-41 ((J-TT) End (C)
Mr. Lane. Senator Ferguson requested at page 6374 a memoran-
dum attached to a letter dated 4 April 1941 from Admiral Stark to
Admiral Kimmel. The Navy Department replied under date of May
1, 1946, and we ask that the reply be spread on the record.
The Chairman. It is so ordered.
5502 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(The matter referred to follows:)
[U607] 1083A R#131
Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 1 May 1946.
Memorandum
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
1. In compliance with the request of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings,
Page 6374), referred to in Item # 0 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946,
a careful search has been made of the files of the Navy Department for the
memorandum mentioned in the letter dated 4 April 1941 from Admiral Stark
to Admiral Kimmel. Neither the memorandum nor a copy can be found.
(S) John Ford Baecher,
John Ford Baeicheir,
Gonima7ider, U8NR.
Mr. Lane. Congressman Gearhart requested, at page 299 of the
transcript, orders transferring ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic
and vice versa from May to December 1941.
Under date of May 1, 1946 the Navy Department replied and we
ask that their reply be spread on the record.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows :)
[U608] 1083A R#47B
Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 1 May 19^6.
Memorandum
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
1. In response to the request of Congressman Gearhart, (Record of Proceed-
ings, Page 299) , referred to in Item #3 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946,
for copies of orders transferring ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic and vice
versa from May to December 1941, reference is made to the foUovping documents :
(a) CNO Secret letter. Serial 06538, dated 7 April 1941 which lists battleship
Division THREE ; either the Lexington or the Enterprise; Cruiser Division
EIGHT; Destroyer Squadron EIGHT (DesDiv 3 and 15), and Destroyer Squad-
ron NINE (DesDiv 17 and 18) as the units vphich are to be transferred from the
Pacific to the Atlantic "because of the existing and prospective strategic situation
in the Atlantic Ocean."
(b) CNO Serial 152153 dated 15 April 1941 (Narrative Statement, Page 156;
Hewitt Exhibit 70, Document U4609] 122) which modified item (a). This
dispatch orders that transfers indicated in item (a) are to be held in abeyance
until the international situation clears ; that the Enterprise or the Yorktown are
to be substituted for the transfer of the Enterprise or the Lexington; that when
the carrier is ready she is to proceed accompanied by the McDougall and
DesDiv 18.
(c) CinCPac Serial 162346 dated 16 April 1941 (Narrative Statement, Page
167; Hewitt Exhibit 70, Document 123) which reports the Yorktown and the
destroyers specified in item (b) ready to depart approximately 21 April.
(d) CNO Serial 132019 dated 13 May 1941 (Narrative Statement, Page 167;
Hewitt Exhibit 70, Document 125) which modifies item (a) and orders that
three groups, each consisting of one battleship, one light cruiser and three de-
stroyers from the units specified in item (a), be organized, as well as a fourth
group consisting of one light cruiser and DesDiv 3. This dispatch specifies the
intervals between departures for these groups.
(e) OPNav Serial 242155 dated 24 May 1941 (Narrative Statement, Page 168;
Hewitt Exhibit 70, Document 127) which orders two destroyers of the Cimaron
[ l.'iGlO^ class to the Atlantic Fleet.
(f) CNO Confidential letter Serial 023638 of 22 May 1941 (forwarded with
memorandum of the undersigned R#47B dated 8 February 1946) which outlines
the reoi-ganization of DesRon's 2, 8, 9, 11 and 13 by individual ship name. All
of the ships named in this letter with the exception of the Livermore, Eherle,
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5503
Kearney, Ericksson, Crtcin, Meredith, aud Grayson were at the time of the
writing of the letter in the Pacific.
(g) CNO Confidential letter Serial 021938 dated 16 May 1941 (forwarded with
memorandum of the undersigned R#47B dated 8 February 1946) reporting
the intention to transfer the USS Bridge and the USS Antares to the Pacific Fleet.
2. With the exception of CNO Secret letter Serial 06538 dated 7 April 1941
(item (a) above) all of the above references have previously been forwarded
to the Committee, and, therefore, a copy of only that letter is forwarded herewith.
( S ) John Ford Baecheb,
Commander, USNR.
[14611] Op-38-MG 4/5 Apr. 7, 1941.
Serial 06538
SECRET.
From : Chief of Naval Operations.
To : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject : Transfer of Units from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet.
Reference : (a) CinCus Secret letter A16/0140 of 28 January 1941.
1. Two battleships of the Atlantic Fleet are now under Navy Yard overhaul, one
a routine overhaul and the other of an emergency character. Both these
battleships will be absent from the Fleet until about the middle of May ; there-
after, a certain period of time will be required for training before they would
be ready to undertake their assigned duties if the United States were then in the
war. The Ranger is scheduled for Navy Yard overhaul from July 1st to Septem-
ber 1st for essential alteration of arresting gear and for routine work. The
Chief of Naval Operations considers that this overhaul cannot be indefinitely
postponed.
2. Because of the preceding circumstances and the existing and prospective
strategic situation in the Atlantic Ocean, it has now become apparent that the
Atlantic Fleet must have a greater initial strengh in order to perform effectively
the tasks that will be assigned it in war. It has therefore been decided to transfer
certain units from the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet.
3. The following is a list of the units which will be ordered to the Atlantic :
Battleship Division 3.
Either tlie U. S. S. Lexington or the U. S. S. Enterprise, as may be later
directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.
[14612] Cruiser Division 8.
Destroyer Squadrons 8 (Desdivs 3 and 15) and 9 (Desdivs 17 and 18) as
now constituted.
Vessels under overhaul are to be dispatched as soon as ready.
4. The movement of these units to the Atlantic must be accomplished with the
utmost possible secrecy. In order to promote secrecy, it has been decided not
to transfer all vessels at once but to make the transfer in several groups, with
about two weeks elapsing between departures of groups. The Chief of Naval
Operations will instruct you by secret dispatch as to the final dates for departure
of each group from tlie Hawaiian area.
5. The groups and tentative dates of departure will be as follows :
Group 1. Tentative date of departure from Hawaii April 15, 1941.
1 battleship of Battleship Division 3.
2 cruisers of Cruiser Division 8.
All available 1850 ton vessels of Destroyer Squadron 9.
Group 2. Tentative date of departure from Hawaii May 1, 1941.
1 battleship of Battleship Division 3.
2 cruisers of Cruiser Division 8.
Destroyer Division 17.
Group 3. Tentative date of departure from Hawaii May 15, 1941.
1 battleship of Battleship Division 3.
Lexington or Enterprise, as may later be directed.
Flagship of Detroyer Squadron 8 and Destroyer Division 15.
[14613] 6. After passage of the Canal, all groups will proceed to Hampton
Roads, unless otherwise directed.
7. You will direct that all vessels of the Atlantic detachments maintain radio
silence, except in emergency, from the time of depnrture from Hiiwaii niitil
5504 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
arrival in Hampton Roads. During transit of the Canal, the com;mander of
each group will report by dispatch, through the shore communication organiza-
tion, to the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, for duty.
8. With regard to item (19) of paragraph one of reference (a), in which you
recommend that Destroyer Division 12 remain with the Pacific Fleet instead
of being assigned to tlie Soutlieast Pacific Force, you are informed that in a
forthcoming revision of WPLr-44, Table USF-2 will be changed to require one
destroyer division, of the long range type, having five guns and two torpedp
tubes. After the transfers directed by this letter, two such divisions will remain
in the Pacific Fleet, viz., Destroyer Divisions 1 and 2.
9. Acknowledge receipt by dispatch, referring to the serial number of this
letter.
(S) H. R. Staek.
Copy to:
CinClant 147/89.
[l^^li] Mr. Lane. Congressman Murphy requested at page
9525 of the transcript, information concerning identity of a ship
located to the north of Hawaii on a chart dated 6 December 1941,
which chart is a part of Exhibit No. 109. Under date of April 30,
1946, the Navy Department has replied to this request identifying the
ship.
We ask that the reply be spread on the record.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter referred to .follows :)
[U61S] R#144
Department of the Navt,
Office of the Seceetaby,
Washington, 30 April 1946.
MEMORANDUM
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
In response to the request of Congressman Murphy (Record of Proceedings,
Page 9525), referred to in Item #12 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, the
ship indicated on the chart labeled "Secret, 5 Dec. '41" (one of the documents of
Exhibit 109 of the Congressional Investigation) as located northward of the
island of Oahu at 27° North Latitude and 153* West Longitude is the Royal
CaiKKiian naval vessel Prince Robert (XCL-38).
The chart in question, and the others of similar nature that are parts of
Exhibit 109 of the Congressional Investigation, are copies of photogi-aphs of
a wall chart which was maintained in the Navy Department for the purpose of
plotting the approximate locations of naval vessels of the United States and of
friendly foreign powers. The position of the Prinee Robert stated above as shown
on the chart is only approximate, and it has been ascertained that at noon
G.C.T. 5 December 1941 this ship was located at the position 25° 30 minutes North
Latitude and 152° 30 minutes West [l.'fGlG] Longitude. There is attached
hereto a further chart on which are indicated the two locations which have been
mentioned, that is (1) 27° North Latitude — 153° West Longitude, and (2) 25°
30 minutes North Latitude — 152° 30 minutes West Longitude.
The Prince Robert departed from Pearl Harbor at 2030 Greenwich Civil Time
on 4 December 1941 for Esquimalt, Vancouver, B. C, where it arrived 11 Decem-
ber 1941.
( S ) John Ford Baechek,
Commander, U8NR.
Mr. Lane. Congressman Gearhart requested, pages 780-782 of the
transcript, a list showing ships transferred from the lr*acific to Atlantic
or vice versa between May 1, 1940, and February 1, 1941. The Navy
Department replied to this request under date of April 29, 1946, and
we ask that the reply be spread on the record.
The Chairman. It is so ordered.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
5505
(The matter referred to follows:)
[14617]
1083A
#47A
Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretaky,
Washington, 29 April 19Jf6.
MEMORANDUM
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
In response to the request of Congressman Gearhart (Record of Proceedings,
Pages 780-782), i-eferred to in Item #5 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946,
there are forwarded herewith two tables showing (1) Ship transfers from the
Pacific to the Atlantic Fleets and from the Atlantic to the Pacific Fleets between
1 May 1940 and 7 December 1941, and (2) Ships, new or re-commissioned, that
were sent (otherwise than by transfers from Fleet to Fleet) to the Pacific to
augment the forces of the Pacific Fleet between 8 October 1940 and 7
December 1941.
(S) John Ford Baecher,
Commander, U8NR.
Enclosure: (a) Twelve (12) copies of tables (li and (2).
[14618] Table 1. — Transfers of ships from the Pacific and Asiatic fleets to
the Atlantic fleet and vice versa
From 1 May 1941 to 1 Feb. 1941
From 1 Feb. 1941 to 7 Dec. 1941
Atlantic
Pacific to Atlantic
Atlantic to Pacific
Pacific to Atlantic
to
Pacific
Battle-
None
None
BatDiv THREE: Idaho,
Mississippi, New Mex-
None.
ships.
Aircraft
None
None
ico.
Yorktown
None.
carri-
ers.
Cruisers..
Louisville, Chester, Cin-
Louisville, Chester, Trent-
1. CruDiv EIGHT: Phil-
None.
cinnati, Milwaukee,
on.
adelphia, Brooklyn, Sa-
Omaha, Memphia.
vannah, Nashville.
Note.— Also the Augusta
from Asiatic to Atlantic.
Destroy-
Sampson, Moffett, Ander-
Crane, Crosby, Kilty, Ken-
DesRon EIGHT: Ander-
None.
ers.
son, Hammann, Hughes,
nison, Anderson, Ham-
son, Mustin, Hammann,
Sims, Mustin, Russell,
mann, Hughes, Sims,
Rowan, Lang, Stack,
Mayrant, Rhind, Trippe.
Mustin, Russell, O'Bri-
en, Walke, Buck.
Sterett, Wilson.
DesRon NINE : McDoug-
all, Morris, Roe, Wain-
wright. Buck, Davis,
Jouett, Warrington,
Somers.
[14619]
None
None
None.
Subma-
rines.
Auxiliary
None
None ..
Cimmaron, Sangamon,
Santee, Relief, Wm. P.
None.
vessels.
Biddle, Fuller, Heywood,
Little, Manley, String-
ham, McKean, Brant,
Partridge, Algorma, Kal-
mia.
Note. — All transfers were between the Pacific Fleet and the Atlantic Fleet except as expressly noted
79710 — 46— pt. 11-
-24
5506 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
114620] Table 2. — Auyincntations in ship strength of Pacific fleet other than
by transfers from other fleets during the period 8 October IBJfO-
7 December 19^1
New ships sent to the Pacific Fleet
Older ships sent to the Pacific Fleet
Battleships
Aircraft carriers
None
None
None.
None.
Cruisers.
Destroyers '
Helena
None ...
St. Louis.
Allen, Chew, MacFarland, Schley.
Submarines
Car, Cudgeon, Tambor, Tautog, Thresher,
Triton, Trout, Tuna.
Aldebaran, Casco, Curtiss, Fulton, Har-
ris, Kuala, Pelias, Procyon, Sabine,
Solace, Tangier, Zeilen.
None.
Auxiliary vessels
Avocet, Ballard, Breese, Gillis, Ilulbert,
Regulus, Sacramento, Seminole, Thorn-
ton.
1 All classified as ODD (old destroyer, recommissioned) on Dec. 7, 1941.
[l^o^l] Mr. Lane. Senator Ferguson requested, page 14069 of
the transcript, all duty officer logs kept for the Office of the Secretary
of War and the Chief of Staff between 1 November and 7 December
1941.
The reply of the War Department has been received to this request,
and we ask that the reply, dated April 23, 1946, be spread on the
record.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)
[14622]
War Department
Washington, D. C.
Room IfDlGl, The Pentagon, 2S April 1946
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson :
At page 14,069 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson asked for all duty ofllcer
logs kept for the offices of the Secretary of War and the Chief of StafE between
1 November and 7 December 1941. Inclosed herewith is a letter from Major
General John R. Deane, who was an Assistant Secretary of the General Staff
during the period mentioned, describing the duty officer system of the office of
the Secretary of the General Staff in the months preceding Pearl Harbor and
stating tliat no logs were maintained by the duty officers of that office. The fore-
going duty officer arrangement served both the office of the Chief of Staff and
the office of the Secretary of War.
(S) Carl R. Nelson,
Captain, AUS
[Incl.]
[14623] Headquarters, Army Air Forces
Washington, 19 April 1946.
Capt. Carl R. Nelson
Rm 4D761 The Pentagon, Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Captain Nelson : In reply to your telephone request this date the follow-
ing represents to the best of my recollection, knowledge and belief the system
that was employed concerning duty officers in the Office of the Chief of Staff just
prior to Pearl Hai'bor.
There were 6 or 8 officers designated as Assistant Secretaries of the General
Staff, all of whom were on a roster as night and weekend duty officers. When
acting as duty officers they were reiptired to remain within reach of a designated
telephone so that they might be called by the Adjutant General's Office in case
anything unusual occurred outside of the regular hours.
I was Assistant Secretary of the G^eneral Staff during the few months preced-
ing Pearl Harbor and was one of the officers on the roster referred to above. I
do not recall ever having been called by the Adjutant General's Office because
some unusual situation had arisen. There was no log kept of the activities of
the duty officers. If anything arose that called for imnie- [lJt62.'i] diate action
such action would be taken at once; otherwise the circumstances would be re-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
5507
ported to the Secretary of the General Staff upon his arrival at the office on the
following day.
(S) John R. Deane,
Major Oeneral, USA.
Mr, Lane. In response to the request for iiiforniation concerning
Japanese estimates of the United States air strength in the Hawaiian
area prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the War Department by
memorandinn dated May 21, 1946, has furnished information obtained
from the Cliairman, United States Strategic Bombing Survey, and
we ask that this information be spread on the record.
The Chairman. It is so ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)
[14025] War Department,
Washington, D. C
Room 4D761, The Pentagon, 21 May 1946.
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson :
In response to your request for information concerning Japanese estimates of
United States air strength in the Hawaiian area prior to the attack on Pearl
Harbor, there is inclosed herewith a memorandum dated 21 May from the Office
of the Chairman, United States Strategic Bombing Survey.
(S) Robert M. Dicgs.
Captain, AUS.
[14625] United States Strategic Bombing Survey,
Office of the Chairman,
21 May 191(6.
Captain Robert M. Dtggs, A. U. S.,
Room 4D 757, Pentayon BuiUliny, Washington, D. C.
Dear Captain Diggs : In reply to your question concerning Japanese estimates
of United States air strength in the Hawaiian area prior to the Pearl Harbor
attack, the Survey can offer the following.
Last November in Tokyo Admiral Yonai, the last Japanese Navy Minister,
gave the Survey a document, the translated title of which is "Estimation of
Japanese Strength at the Outbreak of the Greater East Asia War (December
1941)." This paper which was used by the Japanese Cabinet for planning pur-
poses during the late fall of 1941 has the following estimated disposition of United
States air s-trength in the Pacific :
Fighter planes.
[14,6B7]
Large planes (4 engines)
Medium planes (2 engines)
Small attack planes
Reconnaissance and patrol planes
R econnaissance seaplanes
Flying boats
Hawaii area
About 200.
About 40_-
About 100
About 150
About 35..
About 110.
Wake-M id-
way
Wake, about
12.
Wake, about
6; TVTidway,
about 9.
Philippines
area
About 10.
About 40-
About 20-.-
About 10...
About 35...
Aleutian
area
About 12....
Available for
transfer to
Far East
About 1,000.
About 60.
About 200.
About 250.
Yours very truly,
(S) Walter Wilds,
Commander U. 8. N. R.
Mr. Lane. We have received answers to inquiry at page 13760 of
the transcript for further information regarding the proposed British
warning to Japan sent to President Roosevelt on December 6, 1941,
which involved the reply of the Australian Government.
We ask that this material now be spread on the record.
The Chairman. It is so ordered.
5508 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(The matter referred to follows:)
[14628] April 9, 1946.
Memorandum for Mr. Marks:
With reference to your undated letter advising that clearance has been obtained
from the British Government for doi-uments numbered 6 and 8 referred to in Mr.
Masten's memorandum of February 2.3, 1946, the Joint Committee desires the
following further information regarding document No. 8 (wliich is the memo-
randum dated December 7, 1941, apparently from Prime Minister Churchill to
President Roosevelt, enclosing a draft of a proposed declaration by the British
Government to the Japanese Government) :
1. The basis for the assertions made in the message from the Australian
Minister at Washington, mentioned in the telegram from the then Aus-
tralian Minister for External Affairs enclosed with your letter, regarding the
procedure to be followed by the President. It is requested that, if necessary,
appropriate inquiry be made of the then Australian Minister at Washington
as to the basis for these a.ssertions.
2. All information in the State Department files conceiming (a) the above-
mentioned document No. 8, and (&) the above mentioned telegram from the
Australian Minister for External Affairs.
3. The date and hour of dispatch of (a) the above- [14629] men-
tioned telegram from the Australian Minister for External Affairs, and (&)
the above-mentioned message from the then Australian Minister at Wash-
ington.
These matters were discussed at the Committee's hearing this morning, and a
prompt reply will be greatly appreciated.
(s) S. W. Richardson,
General Counsel.
April 17, 194G.
Dear Mr. Richardson : I refer to your memorandum to Mr. Marks dated
April 9, requesting information concerning a British memorandum of December
7, 1941 to President Roosevelt and an Australian telegram regarding that memo-
randum, a paraphrase of which the Department recently furnished to you.
In regard to point 2 of your memorandum, the files of the State Department
have again been searched, but no material has been found relevant to these
papers.
In regard to points 1 and 3, your request has been communicated to the Aus-
tralian Government. While, under ordinary circumstances, the Department of
State does not feel it should request other governments for documents in their
files, an exception has been made in this case because [l-'i630] of the fact
that the Australian telegram in question was placed in the record at the request
of the Australian Government.
Sincerely yours,
Joseph W. Ballantine,
Special Assistaiit to the Secretary.
The Honorable Seth W. Richardson,
General Counsel, Joint Comittee on the Investigation of the Pearl
Hartor Attack,
Congress of the United States.
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State,
Washington, May 23, 191,6.
Dear Mr. Richardson : In further reference to yonr letter of April 9, there are
enclosed two copies of a letter received from Mr. L. R. Mclntyre of the Australian
Legation which contains information requested by you.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Joseph W. Ballantine (per ONC)
Joseph W. Ballantine
Enclosure
Mr. Seth W. Richardson,
General Counsel, [1^631] Joint Committee for the Investigation of
the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Congress of the United States.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5509
[Copy]
Australian Legation,
Washingion 8, D. C, 22nd May, 1946.
Dear Mr. Richakus : I refer to Mr. Acheson's letter of April 16tli, 1946, to Mr.
Oldham, transmitting a request from the Joint Committee for the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbour Attack for further information regarding the telegram
from the Australian Minister for External Affairs to the Secretary of State for
Dominion Affairs of the United Kingdom which has been inserted in the I'ecord
of the Joint Committee's hearings.
The telegram contains the substance of a message which the Minister for
External Affairs had received from the Australian Minister at Washington. This
message was despached from Washington at 9 : 30 P. M. on December 6th, 1941.
The information contained therein regarding the procedure to be followed by
the President had come orally from the President late in the afternoon of De-
cember 6th.
There is no record of the exact time of despatch from Canberra of the telegram
to the Secretary of State for [1^632] Dominion Affairs beyond the fact
that it was despatched in the evening of December 7th, Canberra time.
Yours sincerely,
/s/ L. R. McIntyre.
Mr. Arthur L. Richards,
Room 377, State Building,
United States Department of State, Washington, D. C.
April 10, 1946.
Dear Miss Tully : There are enclosed with this letter mimeographed copies
of two documents which you furnished tlie Committee from the tiles of the late
President Roosevelt. The first document is dated December 7, 1941 and appears
to be a memorandum from Prime Minister Churchill to the President, and the
second document is the draft declaration attached to the first. There is also en-
closed a mimeographed copy of a paraphrase of a telegram from the Australian
Minister for p]xternal Affairs to the Secr^ary of State for Dominion Affairs in
the United Kingdom. Permission to use the first two documents was granted
the Committee by the British Government only upon the condition that the third
document be released at the same time.
At the public hearing last Tuesday, the Committee asked that a further check
of the records and files of President [l'i633] Roosevelt be made to ascer-
tain whether any further information or documents are available concerning the
enclosures. You will note the description of the "President's subsequent pro-
cedure" in the third document and the assertion tliat "he will issue his warning"
on Tuesday afternoon or evening. The Committee desires to know whether
the records and files of President Roosevelt contain any memoranda relating
in any way to the three documents mentioned above, and to the basis for the
assertion made by the then Australian Minister at Washington in the third
document regarding the intentions of President Roosevelt. In particular, the
Committee would like to know whether President Roosevelt's records and files
contain any memoranda of conversations between the President and the then
Australian Minister at Washington, Mr. Casey, or copies of memoranda or
messages from the President to Mr. Casey which might have served as the basis
for the Australian Minister's assertions.
We will greatly appreciate your usual prompt attention to the Committee's
request.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ S. W. Richardson,
General Counsel.
Miss Grace Tully,
3000 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D. C.
5510 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[IJfGS.'f] 3000 CONNK.CTIOUT AVENXTK,
Washington, D. C, April 11, 19ff6.
Hon. S. W. KiciiARDisoN,
General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attaek, Congress of the United States,
201 Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Richardson : I am sorry for the delay in answering your letter of
April tenth, but I have .iiist returned to Washington from New York.
I have made a further search of the files but I am unable to find any additional
documents or memoranda regarding the enclosures.
My feeling about the message from the Australian Minister at Washington,
Mr. Casey, is that he and the late President discussed the subject but, of course,
no record was ever made of such conversations.
I regret that I cannot be more helpful.
Very sincerely yours,
(S) Grace G. Tully
Grace G. Ttjlly.
[l-iSoS] Mr. Lane. At paee 84 of the committee transcript Sen-
ator Brewster requested that the final draft of a memorandum from
the committee for the President, which the committee proposed the
President send to the various executive departments and agencies, be
spread on the record. It was ordered by the committee Chairman.
We request that a copy of the letter dated November 2, 1945, from
the committee Chairman to Hon. Matthew J. Connelly, Secretary to
the President, which letter quoted the committee's proposed memo-
randum, be spread on the record, tofjether with a copy of the reply
dated November 7, 1945, from Mr. Connelly to the committee Chair-
man, wdiich enclosed a copy of the memorandum the President sent
to the executive departments and ao-encies that day. This latter
memorandum appears in the full in the committee transcript at page
30. However, the letter of transmittal does not appear at that point.
We ask that this material be spread on the record.
The Chairman- So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)
[1^636] [Copy] November 2, 1945.
Honorable Matthew J. Connelt.y,
Secretary to the President,
The White Hovse, Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Connelly : The Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack respectfully asks that the President approve the
following memorandum :
Memorandum for: The Chief Executives of all executive departments, agen-
cies, commissions and bureaus, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In order to assist the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of
the Pearl Harbor Attack in its desire to make a full and complete investigation
of the facts relating to the events leading up to or following the attack, and to
supplement previous directives and arrangements for fu)l disclosure to and co-
operation with the Joint Committee, and to add to the protections given in that
provision in Section 3 of the Concurrent Resolution creating the Joint Commit-
tee, which reads as follows :
Sec. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that
such per.son testified before the joint committee herein provided tor, siiall not be
[14637] used against him in any court proceeding or held against him in
examining his military status for credits in the service to which he belongs.
You are directed to authorize every person in your respective departments or
agencies whether in the armed sei'vices or in a civilian status, and whether or
not called to testify before the Joint Committee, if interrogated by the Com-
mittee or any of its members or counsel, to volunteer any information of which
they may have knowledge bearing on the sul)ject of the Committee's investiga-
tion, and whether or not so interrogated, to come forward voluntarily and dis-
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5511
close to tlie Committee, or to any of its members or its counsel, any information
such persons may have on the subject of the inquiry which they may have any
reason to think may not already have been disclosed to the Committee.
Respectfully,
Chairman.
The White House,
Washington, Novemhcr 7, IdJfS.
My Dear Senator Barkley : Tliis is to acknowledge your letter of November
second, \\ritten on behalf of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investi-
gation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.
I am enclosing a copy of the memorandum the President [lJf6S8'\ is today
sending to the Chief Executives of all Executive Departments, Agencies, Com-
missions and Bureaus, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Very sincerely yours,
(.Signed) Matthew J. Connelly,
MATTHEW J. CONNELLY,
Secretary of the President.
Honoraria Alben W. Barkley,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
[Enclosure.]
Mr. Lane. The committee has received, under date of April 23, 1946,
certain corrections requested by Captain Zacharias to be made in the
transcript of his testimony. We ask that his request be made a part
of the record.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)
[14639] Department of the Navy.
Office of the Secretary,
Washinqtov, 23 April 191/6.
1083A (HLB)
MEMORANDUM.
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
1. Captain Zacharias has reviewed the transcript of his testimony before the
Conunittee and has requested that the following typographical errors be corrected :
Page 8717, line 13, change "Jacinto" to "isidro".
Page 8718, line 15. change "come" to "came". .
Page 8720, line 5, delete "then".
Page 8723, line 19, delete "for".
Page 8724. lines 12 and 13, at end of line 12 change period to comma, and at
beginning of line 13 change capital "T" to small "t".
Page 8738, line 2, change "made" to "make".
Page 8743, line 23, cliange "nand" to "and".
Page 87.").5, line 3. change this line to read: "Why, here I am a Reserve Intelli-
gence Officer in G-2 and".
Page 8755, line 6, delete "I said,"
Page 8760, line 6, change "thatin" to "that in".
Page 8763, line 24, delete "Vice".
Page 8763, line 25, change "of" to "on".
[146JfO] Page 8995, line 19, insert "not" between "by" and "having".
Page 8986, line 23, change "sai" to ".said".
Page 8998, line 3, change "1924" to "1926".
Page 9007, line 22, change "from" to "into".
Page 9014, line 4, change "defer." to "refer to."
Page 9014, line 7, change "If you knew" to "In view of".
Page 9023, line 2, change "it" to "these".
Page 9024, line 4, change "Tmayer" to "T. Mayer".
Page 9024, line 21, before "Juno" insert "It says".
Page 9039, line 12, change "ability" to "a billet".
(S) John Ford Baecher.
Commander, USNR.
5512 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Lane. Under date of April 25, 104(5. we have received a list of
corrections suggested in the testimony of Admiral H. 11. Stark, by the
admiral. We ask that his request be made a part of the record.
The Chairman. It is so ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)
[i46Jil] . Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, 25 April 1946.
Memorandum
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
1. There is forwarded herewith as enclosure (A) a memorandum from Ad-
miral H. K. Stark requesting that certain typographical and grammatical errors
be corrected in the ti'anscript of his testimony before the Joint Committee.
These items are listed by page and line number.
(S) John Ford Baecher,
John Ford Baecher,
Commander, USNR.
Enclosure: (A) Memo from Admiral H. R. Stark to Commander J. F. Baecher
dtd 19 Apr 46.
19 April 1946.
Memorandum
To : Commander John Ford Baecher.
1. Referring to the recent hearings, I have read them over and I see no cor-
rections for us in Volume 68. However, on Page 13712 in the question by Mr.
Richardson in the paragraph at the top of the page next to the last line, the
word "Price" should be "Prince".
[146Jf2] 2. In Volume 69, page 13897 in the paragraph near the bottom of
the page starting "I remember her remark", change "her" to "the" so that it
would read "I remember the remai'k".
3. On page 13927, paragraph 1 at top of page, "May" should be "December".
If I said "May" it certainly was a mistake. I had meant and thought I had said
"I think it was December," etc.
4. Page 13948, line 19-20. insert "based" at the end of line 9 so that the answer
would read "they were based in".
(a) Page 139i2, line 2, change the last two words "any explanation" to "an
exclamation".
5. Going back to my former testimony, I note the following and which Dave
may have corrected but I think it might be well to check up :
Volume 35 :
(a) Page 6395, line 6 after the word "out" insert "except through" and
eliminate the word "of". It would then read "they couldn't get out except
through Intelligence".
(b) Page 6397, line 13 insert "the" between the words "when" and "King".
It would then read "when the King went back", etc.
(c) Page 6433, line 13 insert the word "not"' between the words "did and
"have.". It would then read "so we did [14G43] not have." This is
obviously a clerical error.
(d) Page 6,463, line 6 change "200" to "0200".
(e) Papge 6502, line 20 change the word "transport" to "task force."
(f) Page 6505, line 11 change the word "report" to "support."
(g) Page 6524, line 20 change the word "we" to the word "he."
H. R. Stark,
Admiral, U. S. Navy.
(S) H. R. Stark,
Enclosure (A)
Mr. Lane. Under date of May 20, 1946, we received a request from
Admiral Beardall of certain corrections he would like to have made
in his testimony. We ask that his request be made a part of the record.
The Chairman. It is so ordered.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
5513
(The matter referred to follows:)
Page
Line
14014
24
14020
2
14025
12
14025
13
14036
1
[ims^
14038
6
14039
15
14054
4
[146U} 1070/HLB : ms
Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secejetaey,
Washington, 20 May, 1946.
Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
Admiral Beardall has checked the transcript of his testimony before the Joint
Committee and requests that the typographical errors listed on the enclosure be
corrected in the transcript.
/S/ John Ford Baecheb,
Commander, USNR.
Italics indicates error or omission.
Volume 69, of 11 April 1946
Change
Should read : "Harbor attack when I joined him."
Should read : "No. not necessarily so. At that".
Change "American" to "Japanese".
Omat "of Japan".
Should read: "When do you think it will happen?".
Should read : ''the conclusion that it was immediately."
Read "No, he never discussed it with". ,
Should read : "or some sort of a mail center, or something."
Mr. Lane. We have received suggested corrections from Henry C.
Clausen to be made in his testimony before the committee, and we ask
that his request be spread on the record.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)
Mat 23, 1946.
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.
Gentlemen : Since my appearance on February 12, 13, and 14, 1946, as a witness
before your committee, I have reviewed a transcript of my testimony.
Please make the following corrections :
Corrections
Change "1944" to "1942".
Change "Conserto" to "Caserta".
Change "Biddlesmith" to "Beddle Smith".
Change "Naurein" to "Nauheim".
Change "had given to G-2" to "had been given by G-2".
Change "Jansen" to "Clausen".
Change "November" to "December".
Change "Colonel" to "Harvey".
Change "it" to "a slanted investigation".
Change "that I assume as you assume" to "what I assume
.you assume".
Change "given" to "begin".
Change "Colonel" to "Lieutenant".
Change "From my understanding" to "For my definition of
understanding".
Change "November" to "December".
Change "a manual" to "Emanuel".
Change "Mr. Gearhart" to "Colonel Clausen". •
Please inform me of the action taken.
Respectfully yours,
(S) Henry C. Clausen.
[14-64^'\ Mr. Lane. Mr. Chairman, interrogatories were sent by
the committee upon the request of Senator Ferguson, to Vice Admiral
William A. Glassf ord, U. S. N., in Germany, and to Brig. Gen. Francis
Page
Line
11475
15
11486
7
11483
14
11491
12
11492
14
11493
15
11493
17
11495
11
11496
8
11503
16
11504
15
11507
11
11531
8
11545
18
11659
14
11943
7
5514 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
G. Brink, U. S. A., in Shanghai, for the purpose of ascertaining
whether or not they have information concerning matters under review
by the committee. Inquiry was made by the Navy Department of
Rear Admiral Cato D. Glover, U. S. N., Honolulu, and his reply was
furnished to committee counsel, as were the replies to interrogations
by Admiral Glassford and General Brink. Brig. Gen. E. L. Harrison
was interviewed by counsel for a similar reason. The results of all
of these inquiries were presented in writing to each member of the
committee. It is the view of counsel that none of these officers has
information material to this inquiry, and unless the committee desires
otherwise, counsel does not contemplate them as witnesses.
Mr. Murphy. Are you offering, however, the interrogatories ?
The Chairman. You want that statement made a part of the record ?
Mr. Lane. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. I think, in view of the fact that there are statements
made in the record which would intimate that those gentlemen have
vital information, and in view of the fact that the interrogatories do
not so indicate, I think that those interrogatories ought to be made a
part of the record.
The Chairman. So ordered.
[1464'^] Mr. Lane. Mr. Chairman, we would like to have per-
mission to furnish those to the reporter because we don't have them
with us.
The Chairman. You will do it today ?
Mr. Lane. Yes, sir
(The matter referred to follows:)
[U64S] INTERROGATORIES AND REPLIES OE BRIGADIER
GENERAL FRANCIS G. BRINK
Request is made by Joint Committee investigating Pearl Harbor
attack that Brig. Gen. Francis G. Brink answer the following ques-
tions:
1. Did you know Brooke Popham, British Air Marshal, head of the
Royal Air Force in Malaya?
Answer : Yes.
2. Did you ever talk to him concerning what our policy would be should
the Japanese attack the British or Dutch ?
Answer: No.
3. A. At 3: 26 p. m. on 6 December 1941, Singapore time, Capt. John
Creighton sent the following message in code to Admiral
Hart at Manila :
On Saturday Brooke Popham received from AVar Depart-
ment London :
American armed support has now been assured us in fol-
lowing cases :
a. We have to execute our plans to prevent landing
. Isthmus of Kra by Japs or counteract Jap invasion else-
where in Siam.
b. Attack is made on Dutch Indies and we proceed
to their defense.
c. Japs attack L^S the British. Accordingly, put plan
in action without reference to London if you have good
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5515
information that Jap expedition is advancing apparently
with [U6.'i9^ intention of landing in Kra, or if
any part of Thailand is violated by the Japs.
Should NEI be attacked, put the plans agreed upon between
Dutch and British into operation.
B. Were the contents of this message discussed by you with
Brooke Popham 'i
Answer : No.
C. Was any or all of the information contained m the
message conveyed by you to Captain Creighton?
Answer: No.
D. Were the contents of the above message known to you
before it was sent ?
Answer: No.
E. If not, when did you first learn of the contents ?
Answer: In above cable received 15 April.
F. To your knowledge were the contents of that message
given to you or anyone by Brooke Popham before it was dis-
patched ?
Answer: No.
4. At what time did you first have knowledge that the Japs would
attack the Kra Peninsula ?
Answer : Unable to say accurately from memory without consult-
ing my reports between 3 and 8 December 1941 to the War
Department. Two convoys were reported off Cochin China,
traveling south, [/46'5(9] at least one day before the
Kra Peninsula landing; they turned west, then in darkness
turned south. The KAF observed the convoys and attacked
them at the time the landings in Malaya and South Thailand
were made. Possible landings on Kra and North Malaya
were a definite Japanese capability on the previous day when
the convoys were reported in the Gulf of Siam. To the best
of my recollection the time of the actual landing was on or
about the 8th of December.
5. When did yon first learn that they were going to attack any terri-
tory of the British ?
Answer : Answer to question 4 applies. I learned of landings at
Kota Bahru in Malaya at 0100, 8 December, Singapore time.
6a. Was anyone connected with tlie armed services of the American
Government advised by you of an expected attack?
Answer : Yes. I furnished the data given in reply to question 4.
b. If so, who was so advised and when ?
Answer: I notified the War Department and the
Philippine Department of the Japanese movements toward
the Kra Peninsula noted \^lJf651A^ in the answer to
question 4. The precise time would have to be obtained by
reference to the War Department message file.
7. What did you know from the British or the United States about
our policy should the Japanese attack the British and/or
the Dutch?
Answer : Concerning the United States policy covering this mat-
ter, I have no knowledge.
5516 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
8. Do you know of any policy that the United States had as to our ac-
tion in case the Japanese attacked the British and/or the
Dutch but not the Americans?
Answer : Same answer as in No, 7.
April 25, 1946.
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson'
Reference is made to the reply of Brigadier General Francis G. Brink to cabled
questions from the Joint Committee concerning his knowledge of the general
situation in the Far East just prior to December 7, 1941.
In reply to Question No. 4 and Questions 6A and 6B, it is noted that General
Brink refers to a dispatch he sent to the War Department concerning Japanese
movements toward the Kra Peninsula.
It is noted that at page 5507 of the Joint Committee transcript there appears a
paraphrase of a message sent by General Brink from Singapore on December 5,
1941, i-eporting [14652-4] this incident, and the War Department liaison
office has advised that this message is the only report received by the War Depart-
ment between December 3 and December 8, 1941, from General Brink.
A copy of the paraphrased message sent by Brink, as it appears in the transcript,
is attached.
In answer to Question No. 5, Gen. Brink says he learned of the landings at
Kota Bharu at 0100, 8 December, Singapore time. That is equivalent to 7 : 30 AM
December 7, Honolulu time, and 1 : 00 FM December 7, Washington time.
(S) LogAn J. Lane,
Counsel.
'i PARAPHRASE OF A SEOKBT MESSAaB RECEIVED AT WAR DEPARTMEINT AT 4 : 20 P. M.
DECEMBER G, 1941
From Singapore : Filed 5 : 13 P. M., December 5, 1941
Received in LB.: 1 : 35 A. M., December 7, l&ll No. 96
Brink advises that at one o'clock in the afternoon, following a course due west,
were seen a battleship, five cruisers, seven destroyers and twenty-five merchant
ships ; these were seen at 106°8' E., 8° N. ; this was the first report.
The second report was that ten merchant ships, two cruisers and ten destroyers
were seen following the same course at 106°20' E., 7°35' N.
Both of the above reports came from patrols of the Royal Air Force.
[14655] The Secretary of the Navy,
Washi7igton 6, 1946.
The Hon. Aiben W. Bakkley,
Chairman, Joint Committee on the
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, V. S. Senate.
Deak Senator Barkley : Reference is made to your letter dated 3 April 1946,
which forwarded interrogatories to be submitted to' Vice Admiral William A.
Glassford, U. S. Navy, which was acknowledged by letter dated 10 April 1946
from the Acting Secretary of the Navy.
The written replies of Vice Admiral Glassford to the interrogatories have now
been received, and I am enclosing for you the original signed by him.
Sincerely,
(S) James Forrestal.
[14^561 United States Fleet,
UNITED States Naval Forces, Germany,
% Fleet Pof<f Oijrce, New York, N. Y.. 20 April 19I,J3.
Enclosure (A) to Letter of Vice Adm. William Glassford,
U. S. Navy
WRITTEN REPLIES TO QUESTIONNAIRE OF SENATOR BARKLEY ^
Question 1. Admiral Ghissford, were you commandincr U. S. Naval
Forces in Chinese waters in October 1941 and was your su-
^ Questions by Senator Ferguson for submission by Senator Barkley as Chairman of the
Committee.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5517
perior officer Admiral Thomas A. Hart who had headquarters
at Manila ?
Answer : Yes.
Question 2. Did your flag lieutenant, at that time Lieutenant Chenault
on the U. S. Gunboat Luzon, advise you that Karl H. von
Wiegand had important information and that you were to
call him in regard to it ?
Answer: I have no recollection. However, I saw Mr. von Wie-
gand often by prearrangement.
Question 3. Did you on or about the iTth of October 1941 go to the
office of Karl H. von Wiegand in Shanghai and did he tell
you the following :
I have information tln-ougli what liitherto have been reliable chan-
nels, that the general staffs of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy,
together with the Japanese Government, have set December 6, 1941, as
the "deadline" for the negotiations in Washington. If no settlement
has been reached by that date, between the Japanese and [IJtSSI]
American Governments, war may start any hour after midnight De-
cember 6.
Answer: I saw Mr. von Wiegand freqeuently over a period of
time. I cannot therefore state whether or not I saw him on
or about the 17th of October 1941 ; but neither the statement
quoted nor its substance was communicated to me by Mr. von
Wiegand at any time.
Question 3 (continued) . If you do not answer that question in the af-
firmative, did he give you the substance of what was stated
in the previous question ? Or what do you now say that you
recall that he stated to you in regard to the above conversa-
tion 'I
Answer : At no time did I have a conversation with Mr. von Wie-
gand in which such information or its substance was given
to me.
Question 4. Did Karl H. von Wiegand tell you that he could not reveal
to you the source of his information since a leak might involve
the lives of several persons, but that he had reasons to be-
lieve that it came from a very high source in Tok}^©?
Answer : See my reply to question 3.
Question 4 (continued). Did you not know at the time that Karl H.
von Wiegand was careful in making statement to you ?
Answer : That was always my impression.
Question 5. Is it not true that Karl H. von Wiegand had given you
other information and that you had remarked that it had
proven better and more correct than information from Naval
[lJf658'] Intelligence in Shanghai?
Answer : Over a period of time Mr. von Wiegand gave me much
valuable information. I do not recall making the particular
remark mentioned.
Question 6. Did you, Admiral, state on or about October 17, 1941,
that you would immediately make a report on the information
that he had given to you about : "If no settlement has been
reached by that date between the Japanese and the American
Governments, war may start any hour after midnight, De-
cember 6, 1941 (") , or any conversation similar or containing
that statement ?
Answer : No ; since I did not receive the information.
5518 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Question T. To wliom did you report the convei'sation you had with
Karl H. von Wie<2:and on or about tlie 17th of October 1941 ?
Answer : To no one, since I had no conversation with Mr. von
Wiejiand of the nature referred to in questions 3, 6, and 8.
Question 8. To whom did you communicate the information that you
received from Karl H. von Wiegand relative to:
I have information through what hitlierto have been reliable
channels that the general staffs of the Imperial Japanese Army and
Navy together with the Japanese Government have set December 6,
1941, as the deadline for the negotiations in Washington. If no
settlement has been reached by that date, between the Japanese
and [14659] American Governments, war may start any hour
after midnight December 6.
Answer : No one, since I did not receive such information.
Question 8 (continued). Did you report this conversation or the sub-
stance of it or any part of it to Admiral Hart in Manila ?
Answer : No ; since the conversation did not take place.
Question 9. Did you send a report of this information (quotation in
question 8) or the substance of it or any part of it to any
official in Washington ?
Answer : No ; since I did not receive such information.
Question 10. If your answer to the previous question is "yes," to whom
did you report in Washington and give us the substance of
that report.
Answer : My answer to the previous question is "no."
Question 11. Did you ever advise anyone the substance of the quota-
tion contained in question 8 or any part of it?
Answer : No; since I did not receive such information.
Question 12. On or about December 7, 1941, Philippine time, did you
dine with Karl H. von Wiegand and another or others at
which time you discussed information that he had given you
about December 6 and that it might not come true and that
you had made the cryptic remark: "We may take the
initiative"?
Answer: I did dine with Mr. von Wiegand, To the best of my
knowledge I did not make the remark attributed to me.
[14^60] Question 12 (continued). Admiral, will you please
explain in detail what was meant by the remark, "We may
take the initiative," and where did you obtain that informa-
tion ?
Answer: I cannot explain a remark whicli, to tlie best of my
knowledge, I did not make.
Question 13. Do you recall a telephone conversation on Monday
morning Philippine time, with Karl H. von Wiegand and
that you stated to him : "The war is on. Your information
was correct."? Also that you related to him the news of the
attack on Pearl Harbor and tliat you were waiting to see
Admiral Hart and would be off to your flagship by seaplane?
Answer : I did telephone to Mr. von Wiegand. I did tell him that
Pearl Harbor had been attacked by the Japanese. However
I could not have referred to information which I had not
received.
(S) William Glassford,
I William Glassfokd.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5519
\ 14601]
Naval Communication System
Drafted by COMDR JOHN FORD BAECHER. Room No. 1070, Ext Nr. 2920.
Date, 15 APR 1946.
From: SECNAV(JAG) 152019 PRECEDENCE
To: COMAIRPAC (date/time group)
(GCT) X Routine
X RESTRICTED x
Text: RESTRICTED
For Rear Admiral Cato D Glover USN X In congressional Investigation of
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor Question has arisen as to whereabouts of
Admiral H R Stark on night of 6 December 194i and Admiral Stark cannot
recollect that detail X Log of OPNAV duty officer for 6 dash 7 December 1941
indicates you stood watch fr,om 1900 to 0200 X This log contains over your sig-
nature the following entry quote At 2000 Major F L Harrison comma Aide to
the Secretary of War comma telephoned that the Secretary of War desired the
following information by 0900 Sunday 7 December colon compilation of men of
war in Far East comma British comma American comma Japanese comma Dutch
comma Russian comma also compilation [14662] of American men of war
in Pacific Fleet comma with locations comma and a list of American men of
war in the Atlantic without locations X Admirals Ingersoll comma Stark and the
Secretary of the Navy were consulted and the Secretary directed that the
information be compiled and delivered to him prior to 1000 Sunday 7 December
unquote X This entry does not recall to Admiral Stark any recollection as to
his whereabouts X He accepts the item but things it may possibly be inaccurate
because he cannot see why it would have been necessary to have consulted all
three paren Ingersoll himself and Knox paren in the matter referred to X
Advise by dispatch as soon as possible whether you recollect consulting Admiral
Stark as indicated comma as well as the manner in which the approximate time
you contacted him and where he was located when reached by you X
FN COMAIRPAC 160636
To Sec
P (JAG) WASHN DC
RESTRICTED X
I regret that I am unable to recall the incident referred to in your 152019 X
Information of the nature requested by the Secretary of War was normally com-
piled by the so called quote [14663] war room unquote which was then
a new section of the Ship Movements Division of OPNAV X This section was
headed by Captain Frank Leighton now deceased X Events of importance
originating from the war room were entered in the log kept by the Ship Movement
Division X It is possible that Capt Leighton was the consultant X I do
remember very definitely having telephoned Admiral Stark during the night con-
cerning the movements of a Japanese convoy which was west of the Philippines
headed south X This was the convoy that made the initial landing on the Malay
Peninsula near Kota Bharu X I am certain that this call was made after
midnight as it was toward the end of the watch and that Admiral Stark was
then at his home X From Rear Admiral Cato D Glover X 0717/16 Apr. CH
160636Z 152019
[14664] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I make one other
request ?
The Chairman. Mr. Murphy
Mr. Murphy. During the course of the hearings, on countless occa-
sions each member of the committee referred to the United States News,
to quote from the different reports. In view of the great use that was
made of that vohime I ask that it be made an exhibit.
The Chairman. United States News?
Mr. Murphy. United States News. ^
^ The United States News, extra number, September 1, 1945.
5520 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. It Wcas referred to time and time again. We ought
to have the source in the record.
Mr. CiiATRMAx. You want it made a part of the record?
Mr. MuRPHv. I would like to have it made an exhibit, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lane. I ask that it be given Exhibit No. 181, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 181.")
The Chairman. Proceed, Counsel.
Mr. Lane. By letter dated May 6, 1946, Senator Ferguson asked that
Gen. Hugh Knerr be called as a witness before the committee. This
request was reported to the committee on May 14, 1946. We have not
been advised by the committee [14665] that General Knerr
should be presented as a witness. We would like to have that state-
ment appear in the record.
The Chairman. It will be noted in the record.
Senator Brewster. Was there any action by the committee?
The Chairman. We had that up last week. The matter was dis-
cussed and the committee in effect denied the request by ordering the
hearings and the record closed today. There was no understanding,
as I recall, of the committee that he would be called as a witness. It
would involve the calling of other witnesses.
Mr. Lane. By letter dated November 15, 1945, Senator Ferguson
requested copies of *all intercepted messages between January 1 and
July 1, 1941. Messages printed in Exhibit No. 1 were selected from
those sent during the period July 2, 1941, to December 8, 1941. Pres-
ent counsel have not pursued this request and, therefore, has not
available such intercepts.
Senator Brewster. What is the reason you didn't pursue it?
Mr. Richardson. As a matter of fact. Senator, it was a request
which was made of Mr. Mitchell early in the hearings and he turned
it over to Mr, Hannaford and it came to light when we started pre-
jDaring to close this record, and we just paid no further attention to it.
Senator Brewster. I think we did get some of the messages dur-
ing that period, which had a very illuminating bearing on this mat-
ter of the knowledge of the Japanese, as [14666'] to their
knowledge of the intercepted communications, warning the Japanese
Embassy to look out because they thought we were breaking the code.
You recall those episodes. Those conmiunications were not fur-
nished to us earlier, which, we thought, was unfortunate. It wasn't
until we went into their earlier period. How those were selected and
what was the basis of this earlier period, January to June, I don't
know.
Mr. Richardson. We are subject, of course, to whatever the com-
mittee wants to do. It came up from the bottom of the basket.
Senator Brewster. Do you know what the volume is ?
Mr. Richardson. I don't know.
Senator Brewster. Unless they are very extensive I think it would
be a good idea to have them in. We had these few in May and June,
as I recall it, which showed these communications betMeen Tokyo,
Berlin, and Washington, and they revealed very valuable information.
Now, how many intercepts there were during the 6 months' period
I don't know. Unless they are very extensive I think it would be a
good idea to have them.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5521
Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, it is my impression that the volume is
enormous.
The Chairman. I thought the intercepts which we had secured, and
made Exhibit 2, I believe it was, contained all [14.667^ the
pertinent intercepts.
Senator Brewster. No one has ever looked at these.
Mr. Richardson. Have you any idea, Mr. Masten, as to how ex-
tensive the intercepts are that would be responsive to this request?
Mr. Masten. The only information I have on that, Mr. Richardson,
is that Mr. Hannaf ord spent about 3 weeks over there, but what he went
through I don't know. I believe there is a memorandum in the file
which discusses what he did in examining the intercepts. I, myself,
know actually nothing other than that about it.
Mr. Richardson. It would be possible, still closing your record to-
day, to include all of these intercepts by reference. It would be
physically possible to ask to have the intercepts put into a document
and introduced in the record if you feel it is necessary, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brewster. I think it is.
The Chairman. Just to grab up all the intercepts between January
and July might mean producing a lot of highly immaterial stuff.
Mr. Richardson. The request covers that, just that, all of the inter-
cepts in that 6 months' period.
The Chairman. This printing bill is going to be something enormous
as it is, as everybody knows. I do not use that as an argument against
putting anything of value into the record, [14-66S] but if they
are very voluminous it is obvious that they might contain a lot of
items that have nothing to do with the inquiry.
Senator Brewster. Would it be possible to have counsel find out
about that and get a decision this afternoon ?
The Chairman. If the committee is willing to say that as of today
counsel shall examine these intercepts and include in the record what
counsel regards as pertinent, I would have no objection to that.
Senator Brewster. Could we leave it this way, that if it is found
they are not extensive, that they may go in. That would be easier — to
put them in.
The Chairman. That is a rather vague way of doing it.
Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, as I just said to Mr. Richardson, Mr.
Hannaford spent, I believe, 3 weeks over there, and the material that
was included in Exhibit No. 1 was what he regarded as relevant to the
inquiry. Now, whether or not he went behind July 1, my impression
is that he did, although I do not actually know, as I never discussed it
with him.
Senator Brewster. Is there a memorandum ?
Mr. Masten. There is a memorandum in the files describing the
procedure followed. I think the thing to do is to put the memorandum
in the record.
The Chairman. Why not put the memorandum in the record.
Would that be agreeable ?
[Ilf669~\ Senator Brewster. Subject to further check as to
whether he went into this period before July 1. In the first instance
he did not because that was what occasioned our later desire when
we got word that there were these earlier communications in May and
June.
70716— 46— pt. 11 25
5522 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Tlie Chairman. After all the time we liave spent on the intercepts,
it seems a little haphazard to come in on the last day and ask to go
back over another period, although I have no objection if it is
pertinent.
JSIr. KiCHARDsoN. Mr. Hasten tells me that it will be an enormous
task and will take a month. I don't know what the source of that
information is. I know nothing about this. The request came up
and rather than do anything about it I thought I would present it,
as we did.
The Chairman. We examined everybody who appeared for days
and days and days. I don't intimate that anybody was guilty of
laches in not bringing up these prior ones, but it is unfortunate that
on the last day we are requested to go back over those intercepts for
6 months.
Mr. Masten. There is this memorandum in the file, Mr. Chairman,
showing the basis on which the selection was made, I haven't lookecl
at it recently. I think that would be the thing to put in.
The Chairman. I suggest that the memorandum be printed as a
part of the hearing today. Can you get it for the record ?
[U670^ Mr. Masten. Yes.'
The Chairman. I will withdraw the other suggestion.
(The matter referred to follows:)
[lJt611] December 21, 1945.
Memorandum for the Files re Exhibits 1 and 2
Exhibits 1 and 2, containing intercepted Japanese messages, were prepared by
counsel from War Department records. Counsel examined the War Department's
file of Japanese intercepted messages from July 1 to December 31, 1941. No
examination was made of the Navy Department file of intercepts because coun-
sel was assured by both the Army and the Navy that the Navy's file is a duplicate
of the Army's. With respect to intercepts prior to July 1, 1941, the War
Department's files have not been examined completely, although earlier messages
on particular subjects have been examined after they had been dug out by the
War Department pursuant to request of counsel.
Exhibit 1 is intended to include the most complete picture of tlie Japanese-
United States negotiations from the Jap point of view that could be prepared
without producing an exhibit that was too bulky. In preparing the exhibit, the
following types of messages were eliminated:
1. Messages relating purely to administrative matters, such as salaries of
embassy clerks, etc.
2. Messages transmitting the text of United States or Japanese notes which
are printed in full in the State Department document entitled "Foreign Rela-
tions of the United States-Japan, 1931-1941."
[I.'i612] 3. Certain messages relating to the negotiations which were ex-
changed during the months of .Inly, August, and September. In these early
months selections were made to highlight the course of the negotiations, but as
the negotiations approached the critical stage — i. e., in the months of October, No-
vember and December — practically all messages were included.
4. Messages from the Japanese Ambassador in AVashington dealing with poli-
tical activities in the United States.
Exhibit 2 includes all intercepts that could be found which were transmitted
after Augi;st 1, 1941, and which dealt with ship movements, etc., except that mes-
sages of particular interest transmitted prior to that date are included in Section
7 and that all messages relating to Hawaii that were decoded in 1941 are included
in Section 1.
In both of the exhibits all reference to the type of code — i. e., purple — were
eliminated because at the time the exhibits were prepared it was contemplated
these matters would not be referred to in the hearings. These were the only
deletions from the War Department copies of the messages except that three
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5523
l);;ragraphs giving detailed iiistrnctioiis for tlie destruction of code machines were
deleted from circular No. 2380 which .ippears on page 137 of Exhihit 1.
[14(}7S] Senator Ferguson's letter of November 15th, a copy of which is
attached, asked for all intercepted Japanese messages between January 1 and
July 1, 1^1. Intercepted Japanese messages between those dates relating to
Japanese espionage activities have been included in Exhibit 2 and those showing
that the Japanese suspected we were breaking their codes, have been inserted
in the record. Due to the press of otlier worli, no steps liave been taken as yet
to answer the request completely.
November 15, 1945.
Honorable Wiu.iah D. IMitchell.
Room 201, Senate Offlee Bldg., WushiiKjton. D. C.
Dear INIr. Mitcheix : I have received tlie printed copies of tlie intercepted mes-
sages sent by the Japanese Government between July 1 and December 8, 1941.
I would greatly appreciate it if you would send me another copy of this material,
as well as a copy of all such intercepted messages between January 1 and Jvily 1,
1941.
With all good wishes, I am
Sincerely yours,
(Sgd. ) Homer Ferguson.
[14^674] Mr. Lane. With reference to .a letter dated November
3, 1945, from Senator Brewster requesting that all State Department
reports and inquiries between Washington and London on the Tyler
Kent affair be produced, by memorandum dated November 8, 1945,
the then general counsel, Mr. Mitchell, advised Senator Brewster that
the request had been forwarded to the State Department.
On November 20, 1945, by letter. Under Secretary Dean Acheson
stated :
Mr. Tyler G. Kent, formerly a clerk in the Foreign Service employed as a code
clerk in the American Embassy in London, was arrested in London in May 1940
and convicted by a British Court in October 1940 for violation of the British
Official Secrets Act. He was convicted of obtaining and communicating docu-
ments which might be useful to the enemy for a purpose prejudicial to the
interests and the safety of Great Britain and of stealing one of those documents.
The letter concluded :
This Department does not understand liow the facts concerning the arrest
and conviction of Kent, or correspondence between the Department and the
American Embassy in London in regard to tlie matter, could be considered
material to the committee's investigation witliin the meaning of the President's
order of October 23, 1945. Tlierefore, the Department is unable to comply with
the request of Senator Brewster.
In subsequent conversations, according to [14675] the files
of counsel's office, between Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Marks, assistant to
Mr. Acheson, it was understood that counsel might examine documents
in the Tyler Kent file for relevancy after the committee specified what
aspect of the case was considered pertinent.
The file has not been examined as the committee has not advised
counsel what aspect of the case was considered pertinent.
Senator Brewster. This is the first I ever heard of that. I never
heard of the Acheson letter and I never heard of this point that they
wanted to know what was pertinent. We repeatedly discussed it in
the committee and stated the pertinency when the matter came up.
The Chairman. I had a letter from Mr. Tyler Kent stating that
he had no information that he regarded as of value to the committee
in regard to Pearl Harbor. If I can find that letter I think it might
be well to put it in the record.
5524 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(The letter referred to follows:)
[14676] December 17, 1945.
Hon. AxBEN W. Barkley,
Chairman, Pearl Harbor Committee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.
SiE : Various recent newspaper references, and within the last few days some
expressions attributed to Members of Congress, seem to imply that I am expected
to testify before the Pearl Harbor Committee of which you are the chairman.
To clarify my position, may I respectfully state that since my arrival in America
from England on December 3 last, I have remained ready at all times to present
any information that I have to your committee or to any other official body.
I can think of nothing within my own knowledge that would throw light on
events directly connected with our country's disaster at Pearl Harbor. But I
shall gladly submit upon request, for whatever significance you may attach to
them, any of the facts with which I happened to become familiar in Europe, and
because of which, to prevent my imparting them to the American Congress in
1940, I was secretly, and I think very unjustly and illegally, tried and imprisoned
in England.
Respectfully,
(s) Tyleb Kent,
2112 Wyoming Avenue, N. W.
Washington 8, D. C.
[14^77-78] Senator Brewster. I have never asked for Tyler
Kent. I am not interested in Tyler Kent. I am interested in matters
of our State Department which, in my judgment, may have a relevancy.
And I am still disturbed and concerned at the handling of this matter.
The Chairman. Did you ask that this communication be made a
part of the record ?
Mr. Lane. I didn't ask, but we have it.
The Chairman. Let it go in as part of the hearings today.
(The document referred to follows :)
[14679] Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
OF the Pearl Harbor Attack,
November 3, 1945.
Hon. William D. Mitchell,
Room 201, Senate Office Bldg., Washington, D. C.
Dear Mb. Mitchell : Would you kindly secure for me copies of all State Depart-
ment reports and inquiries between Washington and London on the Tyler Kent
affair?
Thanking you for this courtesy, I am
Sincerely yours,
(s) Owen Brewster
Owen Brewster, U. S. N.
[OB : rg]
NOVEMBEE 8, 1945.
Memo to Senator Brewster:
Your request of November 3 for logs of ships has been [14680] presented
to the Navy Department.
Respecting your request of November 3 as to summaries of "oif the record"
testimony before the Army board, we instituted inquiry about that some time ago,
with the hope that someone made some notes about it, but so far we have not found
that anyone did so.
As to the Admiral Hewitt testimony, our only copy was loaned to Senator
Ferguson and has not been returned.
Your request for State Department reports and inquiries between Washington
and London on the Tyler Kent affair has been presented to the State Department,
William D. Mitchell.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE ' 5525
November 20, 1945.
My Dear Mr. Mitchell : I refer to your letter of November 9, 1945, referring to
this Department a letter dated November 3, 1945, to you from Senator Brewster,
in which Senator Brewster requested that you secure for him copies of all
State Department reports and inquiries between Washington and London on the
Tyler Kent affair.
Senate Concurrent Resolution 27, establishing the Joint Committee on the Inves-
tigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, provides that the comn*ittee "shall make a
full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events and circum-
stances leading up to or following tlie attack made by Japanese armed forces upon
[l-'/GSl] Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941,
* * *." The President's order of October 23, 1945, addressed to this and other
departments instructs the Secretary of State to make available to the joint
committee, for such use as the committee may determine, any information in his
possession "material to the investigation." In pursuance of this order, this
Department has made available to the committee counsel all information In its
possession which is material to the investigation.
Mr. Tyler G. Kent, formerly a clerk in the foreign service employed as a
code clerk in the American Embassy in London, was arrested in London in May
1940 and convicted by a British court in October 1940 for violation of the
British Official S'ecrets Act. He was convicted of obtaining and communicating
documents which might be useful to the enemy for a purpose prejudicial to the
interests and safety of Great Britian and of stealing one of those documents.
There is enclosed herewith for your further information, a copy of a release to
the press dated September 2, 1944, concerning the Kent case.
This Department does not understand how the facts concerning the arrest and
conviction of Kent, or correspondence between the Department and the American
Embassy in London in regard to the matter, could be considered material to the
committee's investigation within the meaning of the President's [14682]
order of October 23, 1945. Therefore, the Department is unable to comply with
the request of Senator Brewster.
Sincerely yours,
( Signed ) Dean Acheson,
Under Secretary.
(Enclosure: Press release No. 405, September 2, 1944.)
The Honorable William D. Mitchell,
General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor,
Atttack, Congress of the United States.
(Handwritten note on letter:) In subsequent conversations with Mr. Marks, it
was understood that counsel might examine documents in the TK file for relevancy
after the committee specified what aspect of the case was considered pertinent.
Department of State
For the press.
No. 405 Sbstembeb 2, 1944.
The Department of State has taken note of recent inquiries and newspaper
reports regarding the case of Tyler Kent, former employee of the American
Embassy at London, and the Office of Foreign Service Administration has been
instructed to review the matter thoroughly and prepare a comprehensive report.
The following is the text of the report :
[14683] Tyler Kent, American citizen, an employee of the American Foreign
Service assigned to London, was tried and convicted under the Official Secrets
Act (1911) of Great Britain before the Central Criminal Court at the Old Bailey,
London, in October 1940. The charges against him were the obtaining and de-
livering to an agent of a foreign country (Germany) copies or abstracts of docu-
ments which might have been directly or indirectly useful to the enemy, and
which were, at the same time, prejudicial to the safety or interests of Great
Britain. Incidental to the proceedings against him, it was brought out that
he had violated the Larceny Act of 1916 of Great Britain by the theft of docu-
ments which were the property of the Government of the United States in the
custody of the American Ambassador, London. The above-mentioned were found
proven by a jury on the basis of evidence presented during the trial. Kent had
worked through" a confederate who was allegedly anti-Jewish and pro-Nazi.
The background of the case and the circumstances leading up to Kent's arrest
and trial were as follows : Kent, at the age of 22, had entered the foreign service
as a clerk, his first assignment having been io the American Embassy at Moscow,
5526 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
He was later transferred to the American Embassy, London, arrivins there in
October 1939. He was assipjned to the code room as a code clerk, where his duties
were to encode and decode telej^rams. Before entering the service he had at-
tended Princeton University, the Sorbonne (Paris), the [IJ/GS/f] Uni-
versity of Madrid, and George Washington University. He had acquired several
foreign languages, including Russian, French, German, and Italian.
On May IS, 1940, a representative of the London Police headquarters at Scot-
land Yard called at the Embassy to report that Kent had become the ob.1ect of
attention by Scotland Yard through his association with a group of i>ersons
suspected of conducting pro-German activities under tiie cloalv of anti-Jewish
propaganda. Prominent in this group was Anna Wolkoff, a naturalized British
subject of Russian origin, the daughter of a former admiral of the Impei-inl Rus-
sian Navy. Miss Wolkoff had resided in Great Britain since emigrating, with
her father, from Russia following the Bolshevist revolution, had been hospitably
received and had made a considerable circle of friends among Londoners of
standing, some of whom had assisted in setting up the Wolkoff family in a small
i-usiness. After the outbreak of the present war, the British police had become
interested in Miss Wolkoff's activities, believing that she was in sympathy with
certain of Germany's ob.iectives, that she and some of her associates were
hostile to Britain's war effort, that she was involved in pro-German propaganda,
that she had a channel of communication with Germany and that she was making
use of that channel of communication.
Kent had been observed by Scotland Yard as having been [l'i6S5] in fre-
quent contact with Anna Wolkoff and in touch with others of a group known to her.
Among other things, it had been noted that Kent and Miss Wolkoff were sharing an
automobile and that Miss Wolkoff frequently drove this car using gasoline
allegedly supplied by Kent. Scotland Yard was now convinced that Anna Wolkoff
was receiving confidential information from K^nt and stated that she would be
arrested on May 20. The police added that on he same day they considered it
highly desirable to search the rooms occupied 1 y Kent. In reply to an inquiry
made by British authorities. Ambassador Kennedy with the approval of the
Department, informed such authorities of the wa!v(n* by this Government of
the privilege of diplomatic immunity. Scotland Yard thereupon indicated that
a search warrant would be issued and that Kent's rooms would be searched on
May 20, 1940.
The possibility that an employee of the Embassy having access to the con-
fidential codes, was making improper use of the material entrusted to him in
the course of his work was of the utmost concern to Ambassador Kennedy and
to the Government of the United States. Preservation of the secrecy of this
Government's means of communication with its establishments abroad is a matter
of foundamental importance to the conduct ,of our foreign relations. In the
circumstances described, it was imperative that Ambassador Kennedy ascertain,
and ascertain immediately, whether Kent was guilty of a violation [14686^
of trust. There was every reason, in the interest of the American Government,
for the waiving of diplomatic immunity and for allowing the British authorities
(who alone had the means of obtaining the evidence) to proceed in an effort to
prove or disprove their suspicions. In this connection it may be noted that it is
well established in internati(uial law that the so-called innnunity of an employee
of a diplomatic mission from criminal or civil processes may be renounced or
waived by the sending state at any time.
The search of Kent's room was conducted according to plan, an oflicer of the
Embassy being present throughout. It revealed that Kent had in his possession
copies of Embas.sy material totaling more than l,r)nO individual papers. He also
had two newly-made duplicate keys to the index bui-eau and tlie code room of
the Embassy, these being nnautliorized and in addition to the keys furnished him
officially for his use as a code clerk. lie explained that he had had these keys
made so that in the event he should ever be transferred from code work to another
section of the Embiissy he would still have access to the code room. Also fouiul
in liis possession were two photographic plates of Embassy documents believed
to have been made by confederates for the purpose of endeavoring to transmit
prints thereof to Gei-many, and certain printed propaganda material which was
prejudicial to the British conduct of tlie war. The police also established
[14087] that some of the papers f(mnd had been transmitted to an agent of
a foreign power.
An examination of the documents found in his room indicated that Kent had
begun classifying the material by subject, but this work was far from completed.
They covered practically every subject on which the Embassy was carrying on
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5527
correspondence with the Department of State. As may he supposed, they in-
cluded copies of telegrams emhodying information collected by the Embassy which
otherwise would not have been permitted to leave Great Britain without censor-
ship. As may be likewise supposed, they contained information which would have
been useful to Germany and which Great Britain would not have permitted to
reach Germany. It is of interest to note, in this connection that Kent had, during
his service in London written to the charge d'affaires of the American Embassy in
Berlin asking his assistance in arranging for his (Kent's) transfer to Berlin.
When questioned as to what he would have done with the documents in his
possessLou had he been transferred to Germany, Kent replied that he could not
state what he would have done with them; he regarded the question as a
hypothetical one.
Regardless of the purpose for which Kent had taken this material from the
Embassy, he had done so without authorization, in violation of the most ele-
mentary principles governing the rules for the preservation of the secrecy of
the Government's [I4688] correspondence. By his own showing he had,
while occupying a very special position of confidence, within the Embassy, dis-
played a shocking disregard for every principle of decency and honor so far
as his obligations toward the United States were concerned. The removal of so
large a number of documents from the Embassy premises compromised the whole
confidential communications system of the United States, bringing into question
the security of the secret ciphers. It was obviously impossible to continue his
services, and Kent was dismissed from the Government service as of May 20,
1940. Thereafter the question of diplomatic immunity naturally did not arise.
So far as the British police were concerned, the evidence found in Kent's room
was such as to convince them of the necessity of detaining iiim at Brixton
Prison pending investigation of the use he had made of the documents in his
possession and the true implications of his connection with Anna Wolkolf. Am-
bassador Kennedy, with the consent of the Department of State, agreed to
Kent's detention.
On May 28 a representative of Scotland Yard informed the Embassy that
investigations were proceeding, that the case became progressively more com-
plex, and that it could not be cleared up quickly. It was believed, howeveji",
that there would be a case for prosecution against Kent and Anna Wolkoff
under the Official Secrets Act of the United Kingdom.
\_i4689] Kent's trial eventually commenced August 8, 1940, and was at-
tended by the American Consul General. It was held in camera because of the
harmful effects to British counter-espionage efforts which were to be anticipated
if certain of the evidence became public. Prior to the trial the American Con-
sul General in London had called upon Kent (July 31, 1940) at Brixton Prison.
The Consul General informed him that he would be taken to court the following
day and formally charged 'with offens^e under the Ofiicial Secrets Act of the
United Kingdom, i. e., obtaining documents for a purjwse prejtidicial to the
safety or interests of the United Kingdom which might be directly or indirectly
useftil to an enemy. The Counsul General inquired whether Kent had a lawyer
to represent him, to which Kent replied that he had not, and that he had not
given the matter any thought. The Consul General advised him that he should
be represented by a lawyer and agreed to assist in getting in touch with a
suitable solicitor. Kent was subsequently placed in touch with a lawyer, whom
he engaged to represent him during the trial.
On October 28, 1940, the jury found Kent guilty of violating the Official
Secrets Act. The sentence was postponed tintil completion of the trial of Anna
Wolkoff. On November 7, 1940, Kent was sentenced to 7 years' penal servitude
and Anna Wolkoff was sentenced to 10 years. Kent's attorneys [lJf690]
applied for permission to appeal. On February 5, 1941, this application was
rejected by a panel of judges which included the Lord Chief Justice.
In reviewing the Kent case it is important to bear in mind the circumstances
surrounding it. At the time of Kent's arrest and trial Great Britain was at
war and the United States was not. The case involved a group of people suspected
of subversive activities. The evidence relating to individuals of the group was
inextricably mixed, and the activities of no single suspect could be separated
from the activities of the others. The interest of Great Britain in such a case, at
a time when it was fighting for its existence, was therefore preeminent. Deep
as was the concern of the Government of the United States over a betrayal of trust
by one of its employees, it is hardly conceivable that it would have been justified
in asking the Government of Great Britain to waive jurisdiction over an Ameri-
can citizen in the circumstances described. Kent was within the jurisdiction of
5528 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the British courts, and all the evidence, witnesses, et cetera, were available
to the Britisli courts. Moreover, it was, as has been mentioned, in the interest
of the United States to have determined immediately on the spot, where the
evidence was available, whether or not one of its employees in a position of trust
was violating such trust. The question whether the United States will prefer
additional charges against [14691] Kent will be decided after his release
from imprisonment in Great Britain and he again comes under the jurisdiction
of our courts.
[14692] Senator Bkewster. What is the disposal of the matter?
Mr. KiCHARDSON. It leaves the Tyler Kent business like Mohamet's
coffin, halfway between heaven and earth, A request is made of the
State Department and they reply that they don't think it relevant. It
was discussed tliree or four times in the committee in detail that that
was the position of tlie State Department. We have never received
any committee direction as to what it wanted to do with respect to
the position taken by the State Department and it stands there now and
we offer it so that the record will show that it, at least, was not over-
looked.
The Chairman. As counsel says this matter was brought up time
and time again and no action was taken in the committee. As I recall,
nobody ever made a motion to take action. It was left that way.
Senator Brewster. If the chairman will permit, each time I brought
it up the chairman requested me to defer it and said that the matter
would be taken up subsequently.
The Chairman. I don't recall that.
Senator Brewster. Several times you asked me to defer, not to
press it.
The Chairman. I haven't talked to the Senator from Maine about
it or in his presence for at least 3 months. The conversations were
always in the committee.
Senator Brewster. That is right.
[14'663] The Chairman. Not as individuals.
Senator Brewster. They were always in the committee. Every
time the matter was taken up I stated why I felt it was important for
us to have access to this information. And the last time was when we
were trying to complete the record, I think some time in February,
and we had two or three other matters, the Hull and Stimson matters
up, and the chairman suggested that we defer further consideration,
that we would take it up subsequently, and I deferred it.
The Chairman. I don't recall that. But if there is a record of it
the record will show it.
Senator Brewster. It was an executive session ; I don't think we had
a record.
The Chairman. The Kent matter was brought up in open session
several times, as I recall. Whatever the record shows I stand by.
Senator Brewster. Am I to understand that this matter is now to.
be ignored? I certainly do not accept the State Department's judg-
ment as to wliat is relevant after the revelations we had from them on
various matters, and I think the record is left in an awkward position,
when they are willing for counsel to look at the record and that has
not been done, as a result of the committee not taking action.
I now move that counsel be requested to look at the record and
report to us w^hether or not there is anything of [1.^64-]
relevancy.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5529
The Chairman. If that will involve any further hearings and in-
volves an extension of this hearing, so that we cannot complete this
record today, as far as I am concerned, as an individual member, I
vote against the motion.
Senator Brewster. I make that motion.
The Chairman. In favor of the motion ?
Senator Brewster. Aye.
The Vice Chairman. No.
The Chairman. No.
Senator Brewster. That makes the record very clear. One more
count in the indictment.
The Chairman. We are not indicting you.
Mr. Lane. Mr. Chairman, with respect
Senator Brewster. I would like to have a roll call on that.
I move that the counsel shall comply with the suggestion of the State
Department that the counsel may examine the Kent records in the
State Department and report to us whether or not it would appear
that they are relevant.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I make a statement on that, as
I wasn't here before.
The Chairman. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. I would like to state that Congressman Keefe and
Congressman Gearhart, members of this committee, spent \^lJf.695'\
several hours with Tyler Kent, discussed the matter thoroughly, and
reported to the committee in executive session that Tyler Kent himself,
as well as each of the said members who discussed the matter with
Tyler Kent, stated that he knew nothing about Pearl Harbor and
couldn't contribute anything.
Senator Brewster. I would like to make a little statement.
I do not think that the gentleman from Pennsylvania, or the other
members of the committee, saw any evidence as to make us think that
statement completes what the situation is.
It was thoroughly understood in executive committee discussions,
and I think in the record as well, that there were some twelve to fifteen
hundred messages between a certain naval person, otherwise known
as Winston Churchill, and Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt, which were
items about which a great deal of the preliminaries to this world
war evloved, and it is a fair presumption that in connection with this
affair and the alleged theft of certain of these documents that the
State Department records will disclose these communications which
never have been made available to this committee.
Whether or not they have a relevancy to the preliminaries to our
becoming involved in the war could only be determined by investiga-
tion. That has been clearly and repeatedly stated as the reason why
I felt this record should be looked over.
I have never been interested in Mr. Tyler Kent or in his evidence.
I have been offered an opportunity to talk with [146961 Mr.
Tyler Kent and I have not been interested. But I am interested in
what the record of the State Department shows as to these communica-
tions. And I think that this committee is making very clear their
desire to leave certain dark recesses unexplored in their continued re-
fusal to even permit counsel to examine this record and the other rec-
ords of the State Department in this connection.
5530 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. MuRPPiY. Senator Berkley?
The Chairman. No.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Cooper?
The Vice Chairman. No.
Mr. Murphy. Senator Brewster?
Senator Brewster. Aye.
Mr. Murphy. No.
Affirmative one; negative three.
The Chairman. The motion is lost.
Go ahead.
Mr. Lane. With reference to the requests which have been made
on the record by members of the committee throughout the hearings
and with reference to the requests they have made in writing, counsel
is in a position to state that except for those brought to our attention
just prior to this time, in this meeting, all of the requests have been
answered by the various departments, one way or another. Those in
writing from the various members were in general answered in
[14697] writing by the counsel to the various committee members,
transmitting the replies of the Department. Those that were on the
record we tried to answer by putting the material either in the record
itself or advising the member who asked the question and asking
whether he desired that the information be placed in the record.
Senator Brewster. I understand your statement on the Kent affair
was in the record, was it ; your statement of the discussions and the
letter was put in ?
Mr. Lane. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, in continuation of making the
record complete, I should like to call the committee's attention to a
letter from the War Department under date of April 29, 1946, with
reference to a request of Senator Brewster of April 16; a letter of
April 30, 1946, to me from Grace G. TuUy, which is self-explanatory;
together with a letter of May 3, 1946, to me from the Secretary of
State, signed by Herbert S. Marks, which is self-explanatory; letter
of May 13, 1946, from Commander Baecher of the Navy Department
in response to my request of April 25, 1946, which is self-explanatory.
May they be extended on the record ?
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The matter referred to follows:)
[14698] War Department,
Washington,
Room J,D761. The Pentagon, 29 April, 191,6.
Metnorandiim for Mr. Riehordson:
. With reference to your memorandnm of April 25 forwarding Senator Bi-ewster's
request of April 16 for all communications between the British Govei-nmeTit in
London and our Government in Washington on November 25, 20 and 27, 1941, a
search of the War Department tiles discloses no such communications.
/s/ Robert M. Diggs,
Captam,AUS.
13 May 1946.
iMemorandum
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
In response to your request dated April 25, 1946, for "copies of communications
concerning Japan and/or the Far East which were transmitted between the
British Government in London and our Government in Washington on November
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5531
25, 26 and 27, 1941, and which now appear in the Navy Department tiles",
U4699] you are advised that a search of the pertinent files of the Navy
Department reveals no dispatches of this nature.
There are, however, in Navy files, messages hetween the Navy Department and
the British Admiralty for 2"), 26 and 27 November 1941, copies of which were
furnished prior counsel (m 14 November 194r>, as follows:
Novemlier 2r)100r)Z Admiralty to vOpNav
November 251114Z Admiralty to OpNav
November 2ril20riZ Admiralty to CNO
November l.'ni733 OpNav to Admiralty
November 252229 Admiralty to Spenavo
November 261722A Admiralty to OpNav
November 262251 OpNav to Spenavo ft)r Admiralty
November 2700inz Admiralty to OpNav
November 27125()Z Admii-alty to OpNav
You will probably recall from our conversations and the correspondence of
the undersigned with prior counsel, tliat in view of the understanding between
the Navy Department and the British Admiralty, none of the messages referred to
above, nor any others between the Navy and the Admiralty, should be made
public until first there has been obtained the consent of the British Admiralty.
The obtaining of such consent may possibly require a consideralile period of time.
Since it is not known whetlier you desire that there be obtained the consent of
tlie [14700] British Admiralty to the publication of the above mentioned
messages, no proceedings will be initiated by the Navy toward that end unless
and until further advice is received from you.
/s/ John Ford Baecher,
Commander, USNR.
Department of State,
Washington, May 3, 1946.
Dear Mr. Richardson : I refer to your letter of April 25, 1946 requesting "copies
of communications concerning Japan and/or the Far East which were transmitted
between tlie British Government in London and our Government in Washington
on November 25, 26, and 27, 1941".
Enclosed are photostatic copies of four documents which are being furnished
in accordance with your request. After a careful search of the Department of
State files, these documents, other than those already furnished to tlie Joint Com-
mittee, appear to be the only communications between the United States and the
British Governments relating to Japan and/or the Far East covering the three
days .specified. The documents wliich have already been furnished are the follow-
ing:
(1) Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Britisli Ambassador,
which attaclied memorandum [I47OI] from the British Embassy, Novem-
ber 25, 1941 (Exhibit 18) ;
(2) Message ''For the President from the Former Naval Person", November
26, 1941 (Exhibit 23) ; and
(3) Conversation between Under Secretary of State and the British
Ambassador, November 27 1941 (Exhibit 18).
Sincerely yours,
/s/ HiaiBERT S. Mabks,
Assistant to the Under Secretary.
The Honorable Seth W. Richardson,
General Counsel, Joint Committee on the
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Congress of the United States
5532 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(The documents i-ef erred to follow :)
[24701-A] Department of State
m^cmorandum of conversation
November 27, 1941.
Subject :
1. British parallel action desired re our export policy to French Indo-China.
2. Desire of French ship in Philippines for bunkers.
Participants :
Mr. Thorold — British Embassy
Mr. Hallett Johnson — Department of State
Copies :
DE Mr. Bunn
A-A Mr. Reinstein
I referred to Mr. Thorold's letter to Mr. Reinstein of November 19, 1941, and
said that Mr. Reinstein was studying all possible means to prevent the shipment
of cotton to French Indo-China and that a communication would soon be
prepared in this regard.
I then informed Thorold that our authorities in the Philippines have been
informed that we do not desire that any commodities other than foodstuffs be
licensed for export to French Indo-China and said that we would be glad if the
British can see fit to take parallel action.
Thorold gave the following background with regards to British exports to
Indo-China :
Before the Japanese went into Indo-China, the British made what is knx>wn as
the Decoux Agreement. Un^er this agreement Indo-China agreed to export its
commodities through normal trade channels and to normal destinations. In
return, England agreed, apart from certain strategic commodities to maintain
normal trade with Indo-China. The purpose of this agreement was to prevent
the diversion of Indo-China exports from Hong Kong, Singapore, and France,
to Japan and to malie possible a continuance of riibber shipments to this country.
The chief value of the agreement to the British was that through it rice was
secured for British possessions. The agreement has not, however, been ade-
quately carried out since the export of rubber has been diverted from the U. S. A.
to Japan or to North Airica. The British have now cut off tlie export of oil
to Indo-China and have gradually whittled down other exports.
Tlix>rold will convey our suggestion regarding parallel action to London and
let us know upon receipt of reply. He believes that the reply will be favorable
except that the British will probably desire to continue to export to Indo-China
sufficient jute sacks for the rice still being exported from Indo-China to Hong Kong
and Singapore for the Straits Settlements and the Dutch East Indies.
In conclusion Thorold brought up another question. A french ship has applied
in the Philippines for sufficient bunkers for the voyage to Shanghai and back to
Indo-China. This ship is carrying coal from Indo-China to Shanghai for the use
of a public utilities corporation, the Shanghai Power Company. Thorold said
he understood the State Department was interested in the British viewpoint as
to the propriety of the ship being bunkered in the Philippines and added that
the British have no objection but wondered wliether the question had been studied
in the Department from the point of view of the desirability of facilitating the
export of coal from Indo-China.
DE : HJ : FBS
/s/ HJ Haixett Johnson.
II47OI-B] Department of State
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
NOVEMBEE 25, 1941,
Subject: Aid Needed by Thailand
PARTICIPANTS :
British Ambassador, the Viscount Halifax ;
Under Secretary, Mr. Welles.
Copies to : S, AA-, PA/D, Eu, PA/H, FE
The British Ambassador called to see me this evening at his request.
The Ambassador said he wished to discusswith me an urgent instruction he had
received from his Government concerning Thailand. A message received by the
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5533
British Foreign Office from Sir Josiah Crosby, tbe British Minister in Bangkok,
gave as the opinion of the latter that the Thai Government was again becoming
very shaky and that unless some practical action were taken by Breat Britain and
the United States, the Japanese influence would again become preponderant.
The Ambassador said that the aviation gasoline and the artillery given to the
Thai Government by the British had been regarded by the former as completely
insufficient and had had no appreciably beneficial effect. He stated that the
Thai Government was urgently desirous of obtaining airplanes. I replied that it
that was the case it would seem to me that the British might use some of the
planes allocated by the United States to Great Britian which are now in Singapore
and make these available to the Thai Government without publicity by flying them
in at night. The Ambassador said that the trouble was that the British Govern-
ment urgently needed all the airplanes they could get from us for use in Singapore.
I said that that was the situation with respect to the United States since, as the
Ambassador knew, we were building up as rapidly as possible our air strength in
the Philippines, and I had been informed by both General Marshall and Admiral
Stark that the planes we had in the Philippines are infinitely more valuable to
us there than they would be in Thailand.
The Ambassador then suggested on behalf of his Government that the situation
might be ameliorated by a credit of $10,000,000 to Thailand by the United States.
I said that this matter would be given Immediate consideration.
/s/ SW.
U : SW : GES
[H701-C] [Telegram receivedl
ALH This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to
anyone.
London
Dated November 27, 1941.
Rec'd 8 : 30 p. m.
Secretary of State,
Washington,
5727, November 27, 12 p. m.
Department's telegram 4222, October 3 ; Embassy's despatch 2127, November 19.
Ministry Economic Warfare is now making a special study of Japan's war
potential and as a part of a much larger work on Japan's economic and industrial
position has completed a preliminary survey, copies of which are being forwarded
with Embassy's despatch No. 2195, November 27. Ministry feels that this pre-
liminary survey fails to answer the main question of how far Japanese industry is
in a position to maintain military forces under blockade conditions and would
greatly appreciate Department's cooperations in assembling any information
already available in Washington on the following points :
(1) Iron and steel production Japan, Korea, Manchukuo and North China.
(2) Iron ore production particular in Manchukuo and Korea. Present annual
production and future planned production from the Tungpientao deposits in South-
east Manchuria and the Mosan deposits in Korea.
(3) Details of blast furnaces, steel furnaces, rolling mills and coke ovens,
(a) installed during recent years, (b) under construction.
(4) Position of coke supply for iron and steel industry. Are deposits of
reputedly good coking coal at Tungpientao being exploited and what is the pro-
duction and planned production? When is this coal shipped to (*)?
(5) What quantities of iron ore being obtained from China — Tayeh mines in
Central China and from North China?
(6) Synthetic oil production, (a) present and estimated future output, (b)
difficulties in obtaining the necessary coal, (c) any interference with develop-
ment through stoppage of German machinery supplies.
(7) Is there any shortage of mining labor? Are there difficulties in securing
Northern Chinese and Korean labor for coal and iron mines in Manchukuo and
Korea ?
(8) To what extent has morale been affected by (a) shortages of goods for
civilian consumption and of the increasing restrictions thereon, (b) the rationing
of rice and enforced mixing with other cereals, (c) any shortages of oil affecting
the fishing industry?
(9) Transport, (a) Is the railway system being overworked and i^the equip-
ment showing any signs of deterioration, (b) is the transport of essential goods
being unduly delayed?
5534 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(10) Japanese mining activities in Indochina or Thailand particularly as
regards exploitation of manganese deposits and phosphates in Tonkking (urgently
required).
(11) Stock i)osition. (a) What stocks of war materials especially nonferrous
metals have heen accumulated, (b) what is the public wai-ehousing position.
Are there difficulties in finding storage space?, (c) have large stocks of scrap
iron been accumulated in recent years? If so where is it stored and what area
cover ?
(12) Production of explosives. British officials believe better information is
available in United States on the iihenol position and suggest that the Monsanto
Chemical Company might be helpful as regards synthetic phenol.
(13) Automobile industry, (a) estimated production, (b) extent of assistance
in production of tanks and aircraft.
These questions have also been discussed with Military Attache who is advising
G-2 War Department.
WiNANT.
ICopy]
[li701-D]
November 25, 1941.
Mr. R. J. Stopford,
Financial Coufisclor, British Emhassih
My Dejar Mr. Stopford : I refer to INIr. Hall's letter of October 2 regarding
exports of cotton to Japan.
No licenses for the exportation of raw cotton to Japan were issued by the
Treasury Department in October. As has been previously indicated to the
Embassy, no such licenses were issued in September.
Official figiires for exports of cotton to China are not available as yet. Pre-
liminary figures obtained from the Treasury Department indicate shipments to
all of China during September of 1.55,120 pounds, values at $27,037. No division
of this figure between occupied and mioccupied areas is available. Shipments
of cotton to occupied China during October are tentatively estimated at 300,537
pounds, valued at .$50,045.
Sincerely yours.
Dean Acheson.
3000 Connecticut Avenue,
Washington, D. C, April 30, 1946.
Dear Mr. Richardson : After receiving your letter of April 25th, I again went
through the files of the late President Roosevelt and I find the only communica-
tions between our government and the British Government on the dates you
mention were sent to your Committee. They are as follows :
[14702] INIessage from the Former Naval Person to the President, dated
November 26, 1941, and signed by Ambassador Winant. I quote the beginning of
the message — "Your message about Japan received today. Also full accounts
from Lord Hallifax of discussions and your counter project to Japan on which
Foreign Secretary has sent some conmients."
Copy of a "INIemorandum of (Conversation", dated November 25, 1941 — Subject
"Suggested changes in Modus Vivendi" which Secretary Hull had with the
British Ambassador, and attached to it a memorandum given to Secretary Hull
by the British Ambassador.
Also, I find a mesage from the President to the Former Naval Person, dated
November 24, 1941, which starts as follows : "On November 2(Hh the Japanese
Ambassador communicated to us his proposals for a Modus Vivendi".
I hope the above information will be of some help to you.
Very sincerely yours,
(S) Grace G. Tully.
Honorable Seth W. Richardson,
General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Inrestif/ation of the Pearl Harbor
Attack,
201 Senate Office Buildivff.Washinffton, D. C.
P. S. f am sorry but I have no record of any telephone commu- [IJ/IOS]
nications which might have taken place on any of these dates.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5535
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pe-vbl Harbor Attack,
May 20, 1946.
Senator Owen Brewster
Room 248, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator : Reference is made to yonr letter (if April 16, 1946, in which
you suggested that the Committee should have available all communications be-
tween the British Government in London and our Government in Washington on
November 25th, 26th and 27th of 1941, including any trans-Atlantic telephone
communications during those days. Reference is also made to my memorandum
to you dated April 17, 1946, concerning your request. There are enclosed herewith
the following replies to youi' request : ^
1. Reply of Miss Grace G. Tully concerning the files of the late President Roose-
velt.
2. Reply of the Department of State, with attached photostats of documents.
3. Reply of the War Department.
4. Reply of the Navy Department.
Unless you desire that some of this material should become a part of the com-
mittee record, I do not contemplate offering it in evidence. I shall depend upon
you to advise me as to your wishes in the matter.
Yours very truly,
(S) Seth W. Richardson,
General Counsel.
Mr. Richardson. A request was made of me to ascertain from the
War Department whether any copy of the Stimson diary, so-called, was
in the possession of the War Department, and on May '2'2, 104:6, I con-
tacted the War Department and I have here the written statement of
Capt. Robert N. Diggs, representing the War Department, as follows :
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson :
With reference to your oral request today for a copy of Secretary Stimson's
diary, I am advised by the Office of the Secretary of War that the diary was not
regarded as an official War Department record, and that the War Department
has no copy of it.
That, I think, completes all of the record that we have. That would
complete all requests and all other sources which are identified in the
record except as we had the discussion [14-705] this morning.
I have this to say to the conmiittee, that we have received from the
Printing Office two copies of the page proofs of the exhibits. They
are the only two copies we have to date in our office. These two copies
of all exhibits to date have been placed in folders, and are plainly
marked for the purpose of facilitating examination of them. They
are available for any member of the committee who wants to use them.
That, of course, is preliminary to the final copies of all.
The Chairman. That is all counsel has to submit by way of evidence ?
Mr. Richardson. That is correct.
Senator Brewster. When will the printed copies, do you think, be
available; what is the latest estimate?
Mr. Lane. We have the entire transcript up to today s hearing in
page-proof form. It has to be footnoted to take care of the requests
and the answers, to tie them together. That has been done but it
hasn't been revised by the Printing Office. We have in page-proof
form all of the exhibits up to those introduced today and it is antici-
pated that as soon as the Printing Office can handle the material in-
troduced today they will be in shape to furnish a final print.
1 Printed immediately preceeding this document.
5536 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Chairman. How many bound volumes will the testimony and
the exhibits all make up when finally printed ?
Mr. Lane, We estimate 39 volumes, Senator.^
[14706] The Chairman. I hope we can adjourn Congress some-
time during July so I can spend the rest of the year reading them.
Senator Brewster. I still am not clear as to when you think those
might be available.
Mr. Lane. It probably won't be before 3 weeks from today.
The Chairman. You mean all of them ?
Mr. Lane. All.
The Chairman. There will be some available ?
Mr. Lane. The prior proceedings have been set in type and page-
proofed. There is a copy in the office of each member of the committee
and the entire transcript.
The Chairman. The committee doesn't have to wait until they
are bound up in printed form to have them available.
Mr. Lane. No, sir. However the committee doesn't have all copies
of the exhibits. We have these two copies that are complete.
Senator Brewster. There was some question about the military
intelligence reports. Do you know about those that were requested ?
I have a copy of it here. I don't know whether this has been put in
the record.
Mr. Richardson. I don't know about that.
Mr. Lane. I don't believe that is in the record. I have never seen
it before.
Mr. Richardson. I have no objection to putting these [14707]
in the record as an exhibit.
The Chairman. What are they?
Mr. Richardson. It is entitled "Military Intelligence Estimate, Jan-
uary 1 to July 1, 1941," prepared by G-2 of the War Department.
Senator Brew\ster. We have the last 6 months in. I thought this
should be in. Those are not complete. On what basis they were se-
lected I do not know. I don't know whether those relate to the Far
East. Do you know what the basis was ?
Mr. Mas'ien. I have never seen them before. Senator. I understood
they had been gotten through a request of yours.
Senator Brewster. They skip around.
The Chairman. How long has this been available ?
Mr. Masten. Either Mr. Hannaford or Mr. Gesell had them and
sent them to Senator Brewster, about 3 or 4 months ago.
The Vice Chairman. Apparently Mr. Greaves - presented it here.
Where did he get it ?
Mr. Richardson. From Senator Brewster's office, undoubtedly.
The Chairman. I thought where a Senator made a request through
the committee that the document came back to the committee, not just
to the member who made the request.
Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, it has happened that where
[14708] a committee member made a request for some documentary
evidence, the moment it came in, for facility, it was transmitted to that
member. Now, this has undoubtedly come in under the earlier regime
and I have never seen it or had my attention called to it. Since this
is all official I see no reason for not putting it in the record.
1 The complete record of this Committee comprises 39 parts.
^ Percy Greaves, an assistant to Senator Brewster.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5537
The Chairman.' I have no objection to it being put in. I was curious
as to why a document like that would come in months ago and show up
on the last day.
Mr. KicHARDSON. I can't help you on that.
The Chairman. All right. Without objection let it be printed.
Mr. Lane. We ask that be given Exhibit No. 182.
The Chairman. So ordered.
(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 182.'")
The Chairman. Is that all counsel has to offer?
• Mr. Richardson. I think that completes the record.
Just one moment. Let me be clear on this matter of Senator Brew-
ster's request.
If those documents that are asked for in his letter to me are included
in the record as of this date
The Vice Chairman. Do you mean Senator Brewster or Senator
Ferguson ?
Mr. Richardson. Senator Ferguson.
[lJi709^ If they are to be included in the record we will then
endeavor to get the documents and see that they go in physically.
The Chairman. They are, as I understood it, to be included in the
record as of today.^
Of course, there is tliis disadvantage about that, and it applies to
everything else that goes in, that we haven't had a chance to see it,
none of the committee knows what the documents contain, or what
statements are made. We are rather blind on that subject. But in
order that nobody can be prejudiced by it, it was understood that that
would go in as of today and be a part of today's record.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to whether or not all
of the interrogatories, some 238 of Senator Ferguson to Secretary
Stimson, are now a part of the record ?
Mr. Masten. You mean those not answered?
Mr. Murphy. Yes.
Mr. Lane. They are all in the record.
The Chairman. All asked, whether answered or not, all are made
a part of the record.
Mr. Lane, Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. That also holds true of Secretary Hull ?
The Chairman. The same applies.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I want to make a speech.
The Chairman. Here?
Senator Brewster. Yes.
[1I^710'] The Chairman. This is not the proper time. [Laugh-
ter.]
You have something you want to say ?
Senator Brewster. Yes. I will not tax the time of the committee
unduly.
I think the unusual if not irregular character of the situation is
illustrated by the comment of the chairman when he spoke about
having this material go into the record which none of the committee
members have seen. We have sat here and seen a vast stack go in,
which, so far as I know, no member has seen, or had opportunity to
1 Exhibit No. 183.
797H!— 40— pt. 11 26
5538 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
see. I think that officially illustrates the somewhat unjudicial char-
acter of the termination of this. I would not call it a legislative
divergence of the minority, but it certainly departs very considerably
from the original program of the committee and from the scope of
the investigation, which has covered a lot of ground, had a lot of
latitude, and brought t > light a lot of things.
On the other hand there have been certain twilight zones and brown-
outs into which the committee has not been permitted to penetrate
under the policy pursued by those who control the action.
Before the record closes I want to make it clear that I do not feel
that we have covered the ground we should have. We have gotten
75 or 80 percent of what we went after and it has been a matter of great
interest and value to the American people and has carried out to that
extent the very lofty purpose \^lJt.711'\ which the chairman
outlined when he presented his original resolution some time ago.
On the other hand we have faced these problems, and I want to
just enumerate three or four of the items which it seems to me leave
us still not in a sufficiently good position to pass finally on the matters
which we were authorized and directed to carry out.
One is the matter of the Philippine situation, which was clearly
within the scope of the committee as stipulated by tlie chairman and
the Senator from Illinois in colloquy at the time the resolution was
introduced; and outside of the discussion w^ith Admiral Hart when
he appeared in connection with certain other matters that has not been
at all explored.
In my judgment it has a vitally important bearing on the circum-
stances surrounding Pearl Harbor.
The refusal to have the Grew diary and the Stimson diary available
for examination of the committee I feel is a further unfortunate aspect
of the matter as it seems to me clear from what excerpts we have been
permitted to see, that they had a vitally important bearing, and I
do not believe that this committee can fulfill its functions by permit-
ting any other individuals, either inside or outside of Government, to
determine what is and what is not relevant. I believe that is a mat-
ter for the determination of the committee.
The unfortunate aspect of Mr, Hull's illness is something
[^lJi712'\ which is clear and we have done the best we could to meet
that.
The telephone communications between London and Washington
during the period before Pearl Harbor is something which we have
not been able, apparently, to run down. Miss Tully advises she has no
record. It seems to me incredible that communications of that im-
portance between the heads of state were not made a matter of rec-
ord. If they were not made a matter of record it seems to me there
was serious dereliction. If they were made a matter of record I
believe that this committee should have knowledge regarding them.
I think that covers some of the items. There are many other unex-
plored fields in the higher echelons which it seems to me most unfor-
tunate that the committee has not been able to explore and expose.
I want to conclude by saying that I do not feel this investigation
should be terminated at this time or at this point and I have so voted
consistently in the committee. I wanted this to be a matter of public
record at this time.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5539
The Chairman. The Chair wishes to state in connection with what
the Senator from Maine has stated that he thinks that this committee
has made as exhaustive, meticulous, careful, an investigation of the
pertinent or related facts connected with the Pearl Harbor attack as
any committee ever made of anything in connection with an episode,
incident, or the [14-713] official conduct of men in any branch
of our Government.
At the time this resolution was introduced by me I was interrogated
by Senator Lucas as to whether it was broad enough to include an
inquiry into the Philippine situation, which involved an attack the
following day after Pearl Harbor, and I stated that it was, and I
still maintain that the resolution was broad enough to do that.
The committee has never taken any action to follow up that. No-
body on the committee ever made a motion that we go to the Philip-
pines or that we investigate the Philippine end of it.
Evidently the committee felt that after going into the immediate
related facts pertaining to Pearl Harbor that it was not essential or
necessary that we go into the Philippine end of it, which may or may
not have involved somebody who happened to be in charge in the
Philippines at the time.
So far as these records of telephone conversations are concerned,
I think this committee, and counsel, have felt, and the President of
the United States, who issued orders with reference to the examina-
tion of documents in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and
other departments, and in the White House, realized that Miss TuUy,
who had been in charge of those documents, was a reputable, respon-
sible woman of long experience and high character, I think the com-
mittee felt that she had brought to the attention of counsel every-
thing [14714-] in the President's papers that had any relation-
ship to this investigation.
So far as the diaries of Mr. Grew and Secretary Stimson are con-
cerned, when Mr. Grew was on the stand he was asked by the com-
mittee with respect to his diaries kept in Japan consisting of some
13 volumes, many of which contained private comments and private
entries that had nothing to do with Pearl Harbor, and the question
was raised, although the committee never took a vote on it, whether
the diary should be requested, as I recall now, but the Chair would
say, speaking for himself, that he would not have voted, and would
not now vote, to require Mr. Grew to give his diary, his private diary,
kept over a long period of years, in his capacity as a diplomat, to
make it public and exhibit it before this committee.
The same applies to Mr. Stimson. If he had been able to appear
as a witness -members of the committee might have examined him
about entries in his diary or about statements that he was able to
refresh his mind on from reading his diary. But my attitude about
compelling him to make public his private diary, from which he has
taken anything that has a pertinency or relationship to this investiga-
tion, I certainly would not have voted, as a member, to require him
to make that diary public.
I am perfectly willing to take full responsibility as an individual
member for that attitude. That is my attitude. I [14715]
think that we have made a thorough, complete, broad investigation of
this whole matter. I have no doubt that we have, as part of the evidence
5540 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in this record, voluminous as it is, many things that really have no
bearing upon the attack on Pearl Harbor, because they have gone in
because members requested them. If they had any relationship to it,
well and good, and if they didn't, why, no harm was done.
I feel that this committee has devoted itself assiduously, in the midst
of great work in other fields of legislation, to the task set for it by the
Congress of the United States, and personally I feel that it has fulfilled
its duty to the fullest extent expected or required by the country.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman
The Chairman. The gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Murphy. I would like to state that Ambassador Grew, former
Ambassador Grew, stated that if his complete diary were to be placed
in the record that it would seriously impair the work of every American
diplomat and Ambassador or representative in the foreign field, and
that it would seriously interfere with the protection of American se-
curity in future years, and for that reason I would have voted, had it
come to a vote, against insisting upon the presentation of the diary.
Senator Brewster. I would not want anything I have said to infer
a lack of appreciation of the amount of time which \^H716^ the
chairman and the other very busy members and very responsible mem-
bers of both bodies have given.
In my experience I have never witnessed more time and diligence
given to a specific matter than in this case and I think that should
continue to be a matter of record.
On the other hand, I do feel, as I stated, about this unexplored field.
I am a little disturbed at the chairman making a point of the fact that
this has not been made an issue or a matter of a motion, so in order to
correct the record I would like to complete the record and to make the
three motions which, apparently, are essential in order to leave no
doubt as to the position of the members.
So I move that the committee should further explore the occurrences
at Manila and Clark Field and the Philippines on December 7 and
December 8, 1941.
The Chairman. I suppose from a technical standpoint, in view of
the action the committee has taken about closing the hearings today,
I could declare that motion out of order, but I will not do so.
Senator Brewster. The hearing and the record has not been closed.
The Chairman. The hearing and the record has been closed. We
will vote on it. Do you want a roll call ?
Senator Brewster. No.
The Chairman. As many in favor of the motion say "aye";
[J4.717] opposed, "no"; the motion is lost.
Senator Brewster. I move that the committee request that the Grew
diary be made available for examination of the committee and counsel
to determine the relevant portions which can be made a part of the
record without detriment to the public interest.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I state that means asking Mr.
Grew to produce 10 volumes.
The CiiAiRikiAN. As many in favor of that motion say "aye"; opposed
"no." Motion lost.
Senator Brewster. I move the same request be made for the Stim-
son diary, under the same circumstances and conditions.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5541
[14-'n^] I point out I do not contemplate the publicity which the
other gentleman has mentioned, but it shall be a matter for the com-
mittee to determine as to the relevancy and importance.
The Chairman. As many in favor of the motion say "aye" ; opposed
"no." Motion lost.
I should have said a while ago when I was responding to the sug-
gestions of the Senator from Maine, that the committee feels very
grateful to counsel, who have, in all cases, abandoned their legal
pursuits, their law practice, and the peace and quietude which they
would have otherwise enjoyed, to assist this committee; first, in the
case of Mr. Mitchell and his assistants, Mr. Hannaford, Mr. Masten,
and Mr. Gesell who, I think, in the gathering of evidence and in going
through the records and the comprehensive preparation of this inves-
tigation, did as magnificent a piece of work as was ever done by any
counsel for any committee in the Congress of the United States.
Unfortunately, Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Gesell were compelled to
retire from the investigation because of their private interests, and
the probability, as has turned out to be the fact, that the hearing would
drag on beyond the time which they could devote to it ; and in Janu-
ary, I think it was, we secured the services of Mr. Seth Richardson,
and Mr. Kaufman, of New York, and others, to take up where Mr.
Mitchell and Mr. Gesell and others left oif, to pursue this investiga-
tion to its ultimate conclusion. It was a difficult task which they
assumed in [7^775] stepping into the investigation, in the
midst of it, and grabbing up the loose threads and the continuity of the
testimony, in order to move on with it, and they did that in a manner
which I feel sure is eminently satisfactory to the committee, with a
devotion to duty that has never been excelled to my knowledge; and,
as a matter of fact, notwithstanding the change of counsel we lost
very little time by reason of that. So that the testimony went on
continuously and has now been completed.
I want to thank the counsel, all of them, from the top to the bot-
tom, both sets and all sets, and all their assistants, the girls that
worked with them and for them. I want to thank the Federal Bureau
of Investigation who were assigned to us by Mr. Hoover for the very
efficient and outstanding work they have done.
I wish also to take advantage of this opportunity to thank the
press who have been diligent in their attendance upon the hearings,
who have been fair in reporting the hearings. Obviously, in a long-
drawn-out hearing like this, over months, it is impossible for the news-
papers to carry the testimony in full so that the people who read can get
a full account of the testimony and what really happened. That is
perfectly obvious and it is inherent in the newspaper field. It isn't
possible that they could print every day all that everybody said. But
the press has been diligent, it has been fair, it has been, I think, con-
structive, and I want to, on behalf of the committee, thank the press
and the reporters who have set with us here since last September
[14'^SO] in undertaking to make the public aware of what we were
doing and let the public make up its own mind about this episode out
in the Pacific Ocean, which they may have done by now or will do
when the final conclusion is reached.
I think one of the valuable things, whatever else may happen, or
whatever else may be said about the investigation, whatever the re-
port may contain, one of the valuable things and maybe the most
5542 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
valuable of all is the fact that all these people involved in this un-
fortunate affair have had an opportunity to tell their story in public
and to have it reported so that the people could read it, hear it, and
make up their own minds with respect to it.
That has been a real service for which I am sure the committee in
its entirety is grateful.
I was about to include another group. The liaison representatives
from the War, Navy, and State Departments who have from the be-
ginning worked with counsel and with the committee in finding and
sorting the official testimony and records which we have called for.
They have been very efficient and always at the beck and call of the
committee and its counsel. We are very grateful to them.
I also wish to include in what I said about the press the radio.
That is a new field of intelligence and information. It is so import-
ant that we have set apart the radio press, and they are recognized
as a part of the informational set-up in [17421] the United
States.
All, radio, press, liaison, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
everybody who has assisted the committee, have our everlasting grati-
tude ; and if I have left out anybody, consider yourself included.
Senator Brewster. As a representative of the minority, and since
we have had some matters on which we haven't agreed, I wish to
associate myself with the expressions of appreciation of our distin-
guished chairman and particularly wish to thank the press who I
think have done an extraordinary job and have given the American
public a fair analysis.
I also wish to thank our distinguished counsel and his associates
who have labored in season and out of season in what was sometimes
seemingly an impossible situation.
The Vice Chairman. Now that we are all in accord, it would be a
good time to close.
The Chairman. Yes.
The Chair will announce that today officially closes the record of
this hearing, and the committee will now stand adjourned, subject
to call by the Chair, and I hope we will be able to call you early next
week.
(Whereupon, at 12 : 15 p. m., the committee adjourned, subject to the
call of the Chair.)
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5543
lUm'X PEAEL HAHBOE ATTACK
FRIDAY, MAY 31, 1946
Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
OF the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington^ D. G.
The joint committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a. m., in room 312,
Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) pre-
siding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, and Lucas and
Kepresentatives Cooper (vice chairman), and Keefe.
Also present : Seth W. Richardson, general counsel ; John E. Hasten,
Logan J. Lane, and Edward P. Morgan of counsel, for the joint
committee.
[14723] The Chairman. Admiral, will you come around?
Admiral Stark.
TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAEOLD E. STAEK (Eesumed)
The Chairman. Gentlemen, I want to explain for the record why
I called this meeting. It was called rather suddenly. I regret that it
had to be that way because some of the members are away on account
of Memorial Day and haven't returned.
Senator Ferguson and Senator Brewster are both away. Congress-
man Murphy, Congressman Clark. Congressman Gearhart is out in
California. Congressman Keefe is here. He told me to go ahead, that
he would come over as soon as he could, but not to wait for him.
The reason I called this meeting is that 2 or 3 days ago Admiral
Stark called over to the Capitol and gave me a letter, which I will read
for the record :
26 MAY 1946.
Hon. Alben W. Baekley,
Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the
Pearl Harhor Attack (8. Con. Res. 27), Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator Barkley : I have testified before the committee that the Presi-
dent did not call me on the night of 6 December (preceding the attack on Pearl
Harbor on 7 December). I also [14724] stated that it was of course pos-
sible that I might be mistaken on this after over 4 years lapse of time, but that
I recalled no such call.
I am nov7 informed that I did talk to the President over the telephone on 6
December, and hasten to put this before the committee in order to set the
record straight.
The circumstances are as follovps: Last night (Saturday 25 May) Capt. H. D.
Krick, USN, now on duty in the Bureau of Ordnance (Captain Krick had been
my flag lieutenant in my last sea command) and his wife made a social call
on Mrs. Stark and me. During the course of the evening Captain Krick asked
me if I recalled the evening of 6 December — when I replied "No" he recalled
5544 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that he and his wife had dinner with Mrs. Stark and me at my quarters, and
that we had then — the four of us — gone to see The Student Prince.
Captain Krick also recalled that on returning to my quarters after the theater
to pick up his car they, the Krieks, had come into the house for a while and that
I was told by one of the servants that the White House had called me ; that 1
then went upstairs to talk to the President (the White House phone was in my
house on the second floor). Krick further stated that when I came downstairs
after the phone call I said to him in substance that the situation with Japan
was very serious.
I felt I should put this matter before the committee [1^^725] imme-
diately. I have again searched my memory for this phone call and I can only
repeat that I do not recall it.
Very truly yours,
[S] H. R. Stark.
The Chairman. Now, Mr. Kichardson, you may proceed.
I might state before you start that Admiral Stark advises me that
he is leaving this afternoon for a long delayed important engage-
ment in London and that he will be gone 3 or 4 weeks; therefore it
seemed desirable that we get this in the record before he leaves, in
order to accommodate him as well as the committee.
Mr. Richardson. Admiral, your arrangements for this trip abroad
long antedated the discovery of the knowledge of Lieutenant Kidck
of this episode of Saturday evening, December 6, did it not ?
Admiral Stark. Yes ; months ago.
Mr. Richardson. So that your trip away has no reference whatever
to any of the transactions in connection with Pearl Harbor?
Admiral Stark. Not the slightest. I had been asked for this trip
last October and I refused, not being able to leave at that time, and
the date was then set the latter part of June which I accepted months
ago.
Mr. Richardson. Does this episode which the lieutenant refers to
in your letter refresh your recollection at all today. Admiral?
yH7B6'] Admiral Stark. No, sir ; it does not.
Mr. Richardson. You still have no recollection whatever of any
events of that evening ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Mr. Richardson. And you have no recollection of going upstairs
and using the AVhite House phone in response to any report made to
you by any of your servants ?
Admiral Stark. No ; I do not.
Mr. Richardson. The evidence, as you know, indicates here that
at an earlier time on that evening, when the President was made fa-
miliar with the first 13 parts of this now celebrated 14-part message,
he characterized the message and then sought to get in touch with
you, received a report that you were at the theater, and said he would
contact you later.
From that if we assume that he wished to talk to you about this
13-part message, it would be reasonable that any message to you from
the White House that night would have communicated to you the exist-
ence of that message, wouldn't j'ou think so?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Mr. Richardson. You will recall the last time you were on the
.stand you suggested that your visit to your office on Sunday morning
was in accordance with your praciice to go to your office on Sunday
morning, while you wei'e uncertain as to the precise time, being of
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5545
the opinion yourself that it might have been a little later because it
was Sunday morning
[14727] Admiral Stark. Yes.
Mr. Richardson (continuing). That you didn't go to your office for
the purpose of seeing a 13-part message because you had no recollec-
tion of having known there was such ?
Admiral Stark. That is correct.
Mr. Richardson. And the first time you saw the message, or the
fact that it existed came to your attention, is when you found it in
your office when you went there that morning?
Admiral Stark. That was my recollection.
Mr. Richardson. This discussion, with your letter, the detailed
report he gives you, doesn't refresh your recollection with reference
to any of those particulars ?
Admiral Stark. It does not.
I might say in that connection that I talked very frequently with
the President. I think you will all be surprised to know' how much,
how minutely he was following every detail, and how fully I kept him
acquainted with anything going on that was of any interest that came
to my attention in connection with naval matters and international
matters at that time. I frequently called the President along about
a quarter after 6 in the evening, which I knew was about the time he
was likely to be finished signing his mail, and I frequently called him,
and I mean frequently, not only at that time but after the war was
on, in the late evening, perhaps around half past 11, after I had gone
over the contents of [14728] my brief case, because at that
time the President was likely to be free. I would call and ask if he
were free and talk to him over any items of interest.
That went on continuously. So there was nothing unusual in my
talking to the President that time of night, not the slightest. I can
only assume that when the President called me that he mentioned this
note that we had received from the Japanese, that he did not, certainly
did not, impress me that it was anything that required action ; I took
none. I am certain that he gave me no directive or I would have car-
ried it out. It would have been the simplest matter in the world for me
to have called up the Department and said to send out that message if it
had been anything that I should have seen. The President, of course,
knew that I was going to the office the next morning; I was always
there ; he called me up Sunday mornings, and I called him up. And
in connection with that also it is my recollection that every witness
who testified as to the material which the President had before him
that evening, the 13 points, has stated that it was nothing but a rehash
and nothing which required any action.
I think that was the testimony of both Army and Navy. I remember
Ingersoll's particularly, and in talking to him about it later, that
there was nothing to it that required any action. I am certain that
nothing was indicated to me. [14729] I also testified that when
I did see that message, that had I seen it the night before I would have
taken no action on it. That was in response to a question by one of
the members of the committee. Not only the 13 points but even the
fourteenth point, which was different from the rest, and which struck
me in particular because it w^as almost a paraphrase of what T had
5546 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
included in our message of the 27th and confirmation of what I had
sent.
The President was familiar with every move we had made. I kept
him fully informed. We were all intensely aware of the seriousness
of the situation, watching it just as closely as we could. Even on the
6th we had sent a message authorizing destruction of certain codes to
the commanders in the Pacific, stating "Hold on to some", in winding
up the message, "until the last minute." Everything we had seen,
in our opinion had indicated the tenseness of the situation, that any-
thing might break at any time. In fact, we said so specifically.
Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, you remember when you were last
on the stand the question was asked you whether if you had received
any intimation from the President that he thought the 13-part message
meant war, that would have been a very important statement to you
and one that would have stirred you into action, based on the Presi-
dent's statement ? ^
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; if he had said anything to me [14730']
about the imminence or anything new, or indicated any action, it
would have stirred me into immediate action.
Mr. Richardson. Well, now, the testimony indicates that when the
President read this message he said, "This means war", or used
equivalent language. Would you, from your knowledge of the Presi-
dent and the detail, as you say, with which he followed the events
which were transpiring, would it be your presumption now that the
President made no such statement to you if he talked to you on the
night of December 6 ?
Admiral Stark. It would be, decidedly. We had, of course, and
I think my letter of the 25th indicated that, both the President and
Mr. Hull had stated in my presence that they would not be surprised
if the Japanese attacked at any time, and I think if the President
had made any such statement to me on the night of the 6th that I
would have recalled it.
I also remember Beardall's testimony when the fourteenth point
was presented the next morning and in which, I believe, he testified
to the best of his recollection that the President merely said, well, it
looked like a rupture of negotiations. That fourteenth point, of course,
was in much stronger, more definite language than the preceding 13.
Mr. Richardson. Now, the subject of this message and any dis-
cussion with reference to it would be within the limitations of magic,
would it not?
[U7S1] Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. So that any discussion between you and the White
House, if Captain Krick is correct, having been about magic, there
would be no possibility of discussing with Captain Krick any of the
details of your conversation?
Admiral Stark. Oh, no ; no, sir.
Mr. Richardson. So that when he told you that you stated that
our affairs with Japan were in a very critical condition, or something
of that sort, that would be as much comment as you could make, from
such a conversation?
Admiral Stark. Yes ; I think it would. I had made that statement
to others.
^ See p. 5157, supra.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5547
Mr. Richardson. Then, the fact that you didn't say anything to
Captain Krick as to the details of your conversation would be entirely
in accord with the way you would have to handle any information
that had anything to do with magic ?
Admiral Stark, Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Was Captain Krick one of those who would have
any knowledge of magic or transactions that were passing, magic
interceptions ?
Admiral Stark. I think not.
Mr. Richardson. Well, it turned out, did it not. Admiral, that this
14-part message was a very significant and important message?
[14732] Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. And there were significances with respect to it
which if fully appreciated made it of startling importance?
Admiral Stark. Well, we had come to the conclusion previously
that we considered Japan likely to attack at any time in any direc-
tion. I wouldn't say that it changed any of our previous concep-
tions. It was a confirmation, if anything.
Mr. Richardson. Would you include in that estimate any of the
significances of the use of the 1 p. m. date?
Admiral Stark. The 1 p. m. date, and again in the light of hind-
sight
Mr. Richardson. Yes ; I realize that.
Admiral Stark (continuing). Was different. It set a time and,
as you will recall, I was discussing the matter when General Marshall
called me, and my first reaction was that we had sent so much, and
we had assumed that what we had sent out there was, I previously
testified, enough to have everybody fully alerted, it was questionable
whether to send anything more, including the message, you remember,
which I recalled we sent on the 6th ; then, after only a little further
reflection I told Marshall to go ahead and send it and to be sure
that our people were notified.
I put that in a different category because I think there was nothing
in the 14-point message wliich in one way or another [14.7331 we
had not previously covered.
Mr. Richardson. Then, it would be your conclusion as Chief of
Naval Operations, Admiral, that the fact that the President made
no mention to you that in his opinion this message meant war, de-
ducing that — he couldn't have, because of the fact you have no such
recollection in your memory
Admiral Stark. That is the assumption, yes.
Mr. Richardson. Plus the fact that when Admiral Wilkinson saw
the message. General Miles saw the message, and Beardall saw the
message
Admiral Stark. Admiral IngersoU.
Mr. Richardson. Beardall saw the message the night before, I mean.
Admiral Stark. Yes.
Mr. Richardson. And Secretary Knox saw the message the night
before. The fact that nothing immediately was done with reference
to that message is because you feel that the message itself was simply
a rehash of information which had come before and of which you
were already aware?
Admiral Stark. I feel that very definitely ; yes, sir.
5548 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Richardson. And that if any of those high officers had any
different view there wonld have been a different attitude toward this
message ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; I think we all felt the same [147S4']
about it.
Mr. Richardson. Then, the first expression of anything unusual
about this message in point of action came with the suggestion of
General Marshall with reference to a message that he proposed to
send ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Did you have any, when you were examining the
message, when you went to your office — I have forgotten your testi-
mony, I am sure you testified on it — were you informed as to any of
the possible significance of this 1 o'clock date, from either Kramer's
report or the report of any of your aides ?
Admiral Stark. No, I was not.
Mr. Richardson. And as soon as Captain Krick told of this
incident, of his knowledge of this situation, you immediately prepared
this letter to the chairman of this committee in order to inform him
of this much light, at least, on what happened on Saturday night?
Admiral Stark. I did; yes, sir. When Captain Krick first men-
tioned this to me, about our having been to the theater that night
together, and about my having gone upstairs and talked to the Presi-
dent, which was the natural way for it to have followed through, that
the White House had called, my first thought was, well. I can't add
anything to this testi- [147S6'\ mony, it doesn't bring up any-
thing which I haven't covered so far as I can, goodness knows I have
racked my brains on that evening — why report it — and the more I
thought about it the more I realized that this indicated that my
testimony was incorrect, the impression of it, and it was quite defi-
nite that I had not talked to the President that night; the more I
thought of it the more disturbed I became that the committee should
have this, the record should have it straight, and I got up around 2
or 3 in the morning, thinking this thing over, and wrote this letter
in longhand and had it typed the following day, I sent it for typing
on Sunday, got it Monday, and brought it up to Senator Barkley,
Monday.
Of course, I am extremely glad it came up. If it had come up
after everything was over I never would have felt comfortable about
it, I wouldn't have known how to get it before the committee, and I
would have felt I couldn't rest until I squared this away.
You may recall — I think you were not here on my first hearing —
Avhen I stated that if anything whatsoever came up with regard to
Pearl Harbor, tliat I thought of anything of interest to this commit-
tee, that I would report it immediately. That was on the conclusion
of my hearings. And this is the only thing that has come up which
I have thought any different from what I have previously testified to.
{14736'] Mr. Richardson. Admiral, if the President had told
you in his talk with you that night, assuming that you talked to him,
and had told you that it was his opinion that this thirteenth-part
message meant war, thereby impressed you with his very serious esti-
mate of it, what would have been, in accordance with your custom,
the action for you to have then taken, with that information?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5549
Admiral Stark. I don't know, sir, that I would have, that we
would have sent anything more. I think that I should have gotten
in touch with Ingersoll and with Turner. We had had a conference
a few days previously, going over the seriousness of the situation,
if there was anything more we could have sent, and, as I say, we
practically repeated this fourteenth point, repeated, some days earlier
we had sent the same thing. We thought, and the President knew
every move that we had made, that we had sent everything possible,
on that premise, that war was in the immediate offing.
I don't know that I would have done anything. I couldn't say,
Mr. RicHARDSOisr. Would there have been any customary accelera-
tion of getting the completed message? The evidence indicates that
the message was completed around 4 or 5 o'clock in the morning; it
then lay without attention until Kramer came down about 7 : 30, and
it passed out of Kramer's hands along about [14-737] 9 or
9 : 30, somewhere in there.
Admiral Stark. At 10 : 30 — ^Well, the 1 o'clock part.
Mr. Richardson. What I am wondering is whether if you had been
apprised it would have been proper and usual to have taken steps
to see to it that someone was waiting and ready to receive the full
message for the purpose of effectuating such action as might be
necessary.
Admiral Stark. Well, I think it might have, sir, if I had had any
feeling as you have just represented, I think I should myself.
Mr. Richardson. Admiral, let me ask you another odd question.
Are you able to state from your recollection of Saturday the 6th
that there was not at the White House an extensive conference be-
tween the heads of the Army and the heads of the Navy in discussion
of matters and things which in part had to do with this fourteenth-
part message?
[14738] Admiral Stark. I never had heard of such a conference,
I know of nothing now regarding such a conference, I was not present
at it, I had never even heard anyone suggest such a thing until it was
mentioned here in previous hearings.
My honest opinion is that nothing of the sort took place. It was
a complete surprise to Marshall that even the question came up. It
was to me. I am certain that I didn't leave the house after the Kricks
left. I just can't think of any such thing as happening. Certainly
I was not present, and Colonel Knox never mentioned any such thing
to me.
Mr. Richardson. And despite your inability to recollect detail,
such a conference at the White House, under those circumstances,
would be so extraordinarily unusual, that don't you think that would
at least stand out in your memory, even though you don't remember
the details of this evening?
Admiral Stark. I think so, unquestionably.
Mr. Richardson. That is all the questions I have.
The Chairman. Admiral, had Captain Krick ever said anything
to you about this matter that he mentioned last Saturday night, until
last Saturday night, when his wife and he were guests of Mrs. Stark
and you ?
Admiral Stark. No, sir ; never. It was out of a clear sky to me.
The Chairman. You realize that it might seem strange that
[I4739] a thing like that would escape your memory altogether.
5550 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
What is your explanation or interpretation of the reason why, if all
this happened as he said, that it still doesn't register in your mind?
Admiral Stark. Well, lapse of time, I would say, was certainly
an important factor. The immediately following events, which stand
out crystal clear, as to some other events; and an awfully busy time
since then probably has simply wiped it out.
And I might say there was nothing unusual about the Kricks being
with us for any entertainment or otherwise. One's flag lieutenant
gets very close to one, and we had been together afloat just previous
to my coming ashore for a couple of years, attending many, many
functions together, and coming ashore about the same time, and they
were often with us.
The Chairman. Would the fact that you had, as you have testified,
frequent White House talks over your direct line with the President,
maybe night after night for a period, or as often as several times a
week, would that have anything to do with your ability to identify
this particular night as against any other night when you had a
conversation with the President over the telephone ?
Admiral Stark. I think so, because it wasn't something unusual
which might stand out. I mean, my talking to the White [1474^0]
House. I would pick up the phone and talk just as freely to the
President as I would, almost^ pick it up and call my own home.
The Chairman. Any questions ?
Mr Keefe. Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt at this point. As I
told you on the phone when I called I had just then received notice
that this meeting was to be held, just a few minutes before 10 o'clock,
and I hurried to get here.
The Chairman. I explained the reason for the sudden call was that
Admiral Stark is leaving tonight for London to fulfill a long-delayed
engagement, and upon the receipt of this letter I felt that whatever
pertained to it ought to go in the record and not simply have the letter
filed with the committee,
Mr. Keefe. I raised the question because I had understood that
the hearings had, by action of the committee, been closed, and that
the testimony had been closed, and I want to keep the record clear, in
the absence of my colleagues, none of whom are present here this
morning.
I assume that the chairman felt that it was due propriety that the
action heretofore taken by the committee in closing the testimony in
this matter should be vacated and set aside in order to permit this
testimony to go in, but I wonder if we have established a precedent
now that may plague us in the future, because I understood very defi-
nitely that the [1474^] testimony in this case was closed, defi-
nitely closed by vote and action of the committee.
Now, if it is to be reopened for this purpose, it may be perfectly
proper to reopen it for some other purpose, and this committee will
go on and on.
I want the record to show that I have raised this question. 1 do
not know, I haven't had any notice of action by the committee vacat-
ing the previous action closing the testimony, but it seems to me that
we ought to keep our record clear, Mr. Chairman.
I don't know whether this testimony amounts to anything or not.
T didn't hear the first part of it. I don't know what it is, except what
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5551
I heard since I came in, and that doesn't seem to cast very much light
on the testimony as it heretofore appears.
Unless Admiral Stark knows when he talked to the President and
what the President told him, what they talked about, I don't know
that it makes much difference to now confirm the fact that he attended
The Student Prince that night.
The Chairman. All you say is true now, Congressman, that the
hearings were closed.
Mr. Keefe. I am not criticizing the chairman.
The Chairman. This situation was brought suddenly to my atten-
tion. The admiral was on the verge of leaving the country [1 !i.74^'\
for 3 or 4 weeks, and I felt that in view of what Captain Krick had
said to him about it, and will say here in a few minutes when he is
called, that it was the part of wisdom to get the committee together,
even though all of them couldn't be here, and make this matter of
record by public testimony, instead of simply filing Admiral Stark's
letter with the committee.
I don't think it sheds any light on it, but Admiral Stark felt, having
been told this by Captain Krick, as late as last Saturday night, that
he ought to bring it to the attention of the committee, and he having
brought it to my attention, I felt whatever was done about it ought
to be done publicly and not just hand the letter in to the committee
and simply file it.
Mr. Keefe. I take it, Mr. Chairman, that if the testimony means
anything, it means that Admiral Stark now says his memory has or
has not been refreshed by reason of his conversations with Captain
Krick.
Now, if his memory has not been refreshed by reason of his talks
with Captain Krick, his whole testimony, it seems to me, is utterly
inconsequential and immaterial.
I am not interested in the fact that Captain Krick comes in and
now says that he was at the dinner with Admiral Stark and that they
went to the theater and saw The Student Prince, and then went home
and had a lunch and Admiral Stark went to [14-743] the tele-
phone and talked to someone, and then he left. I don't see that that
is of any particular probative value unless those facts related to him
will recall to Admiral Stark's mind those facts and the fact that
the President did talk to him and what the President said and what
was the discussion.
I understand that it doesn't click with him, he doesn't remember
any such situation. So under those circumstances, I feel compelled
to object to any further repetitious testimony going into this record
on a matter that is not of any probative force or value, in view of
the fact that the committee has definitely voted to close the testimony,
and it would establish a precedent which would clearly offer the op-
portunity for my colleague, Mr. Brewster, or Senator Ferguson, or
somebody else, to plague the committee with offers of testimony that
will continue this thing on and on and on.
I have made my statement. That is the way I feel.
The Chairman. The Chair appreciates your statement and can-
not controvert it. I mean, all you have said about the matter is
undoubtedly accurate..
5552 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I want to subscribe to the statements
made by the Congressman from Wisconsin. He has said exactly
what I was about to say. As he has said, if we are going to continue
hearings on this matter, there is no question but what somebody will
continue to bring [14^7^4] something forward, and cause delays.
I know that the chairman has been tremendously busy with legis-
lation on the Senate floor, and I think, perhaps — I am not criticiz-
ing him — but I think if we had discussed this in executive session we
might have accomplished something without this testimony.
I didn't know that we were going to have hearings this morning.
The Chairman. I will state this, that I conferred with counsel of
the committee in respect to the proceedings that ought to be had
in view of the admiral's letter to me. If we had had all the time
that might be available we might have had an executive session and
decided it wasn't worth while to even put the letter in the record.
The admiral felt compelled to address the letter to me, in order
not to be in a position of holding back something that somebody had
told him, and I called the hearing this morning because the admiral
is leaving the city and might not be back until we have made our
report, or were on the verge of doing so.
Mr. Richardson. Might I make this suggestion, Mr. Chairman.
Suppose we take the Captain's testimony, which will be very brief,
and then if the committee later decides not to use any of this testi-
mony, all right ; on the other hand, if they allow it to go in, we have it.
[1474S'\ I would like to state for the record that one of the
issues that I think is involved in the record is the fact that about 9 : 30
on Saturday evening the President sought to get in touch with Admiral
Stark. He was unable to do so. There, up to this morning
The Chairman. If you will permit, it was about 10 : 30 when Com-
mander Schulz delivered the message.
Mr. Richardson. All right. Whenever that time was.
It, therefore, would stand upon the record as though the President
paid no more attention to contacting Admiral Stark, because Admiral
Stark remembered nothing of any message from the White House that
evening. Apparently, from Captain Krick's testimony, it now becomes
definite that there was a communication after Admiral Stark came
home from the theater, between Admiral Stark and the President on
that evening; so that, so far as the President is concerned, his state-
ment that he would later contact Admiral Stark was accomplished.
I advised the chairman that I thought that that fact should be in
the record.
Senator Lucas. Well, it just shows one thing, that the President was
more alert than anybody else.
Mr. Keefe. Does Admiral Stark recall what the conversation was?
The Chairman. No.
[14746] Senator Lucas. He doesn't recall a thing.
Mr. Keefe. He doesn't recall that they even had a conversation,
or that he was called, or anything else?
Senator Lucas. That is right.
The Chairman. Nor that he went to see The Student Prince.
Senator Lucas. I don't see how Admiral Stark can go to London
this afternoon, in view of the fact that this has .been reopened, and in
view of the fact that Senator Brewster and Senator Ferguson are not
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5553
here; they are the individuals who voted not to close the hearings,
and they are the two individuals who are going to have much to say
if when they return they don't have a chance to examine Admiral
Stark, notwithstanding the fact that he doesn't know anything about
the conversation.
I have observed Mr. Brewster, and I say this not because he is
absent, but from beginning to end, trying to make — well
The Chairman. I might say that I asked Senator Ferguson after
the vote in the Senate Wednesday at 5 o'clock if he would be here
this morning. He was rushing to catch a plane. And he said he would
be here. I learned from his office that he wouldn't be here until this
afternoon. And Senator Brewster may be here this afternoon.
The committee can do what it wants to do. I did what I [1474^^
thought was my duty in calling the meeting, under the circumstances.
If the committee wants to postpone the meeting in order to get all
the members present, to let them examine into this matter as much
as they please, it suits me. I did what seemed to me to be the best
thing to do. I didn't feel that, with Admiral Stark on the verge of
leaving for London for 3 or 4 weeks, the matter should be withheld
from the committee.
Mr. Kj:efe. Mr. Chairman, I have not talked to Captain Krick, I
don't know what he is going to say, but from what has been stated,
and what appears in Admiral Stark's letter, there must have been
conversation between Admiral Stark and Captain Krick which would
inform Captain Krick that the President had called and that the
telephone conversation was between Admiral Stark and the President.
Admiral Stark. That is right.
Mr. Keefe. Now, then. Admiral Stark doesn't remember a thing.
He can recall nothing. Therefore the statement of Captain Kric^
hasn't prodded his recollection at all. I don't see how any great help
is being given to the record to have Captain Krick testify that he
was out at Admiral Stark's house and that Admiral Stark went to
answer the telephone and came back and said "I talked with the
President," or something of that kind.
[14748] Admiral Stark. Mr. Chairman, I may state that my
feeling is that I couldn't add anything to the record, except to show,
as counsel has suggested, that I did talk to the President that night.
The record as left showed that, too.
The Chairman. You mean you assume you talked to him from
what Captain Krick said?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. If you don't remember anything about it you are
no better off than you would be if Captain Krick didnit say that.
Admiral Stark. No, sir.
Tlie Chairman. But you are assuming that you talked to the Presi-
dent inasmuch as he. Captain Krick, did say that to you ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. And I thought that that fact should be
in the record, along the line of thought which counsel has suggested.
I don't know of another thing that I could give the committee.
Mr. Keefe, Mr. Chairman, I shall have to insist upon my point,
because it seems to me perfectly obvious that it is so unfair to the
other members of this committee, in view of the action heretofore
taken by the committee, to now reopen this case, without the other
79716— 46— pt. 11 27
5554 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
members of the committee being present and given an opportunity
to ask any questions ^IJp'JtO'] that they see fit to ask.
The chairman will recall, as will the other members, that it has
been my purpose to close these hearings and to get on Mnth the report
and finish our obligation, and I don't think that this little bit of
second-hand testimony would be, on the part of Captain Krick, very
important.
The Chairman. Assuming that, and I don't dispute it, I am sure
that you will agree, all members will agree, that having received this
letter from Admiral Stark, if I had stuck it in my pocket and sup-
pressed it and not brought it to the attention of the committee, I
would have been pilloried not only by certain members of the com-
mittee but by others for withholding something that the committee
was entitled to.
I have presented the letter. The committee may take such action as
they see fit. If it wants to have another meeting, maybe this after-
noon, when the other members can be here — I can't assure that.
Senator George. Mr. Chairman, I think the suggestion made by
counsel is not an unwise one, that we might have Captain Krick now
make a statement and subsequently, in executive session, decide
whether any of it would go into the record, beyond the bare letter
of the admiral, if he wishes it to go into the record.
The Vice Chairman. I agree with that statement, Mr. \^H750']
Chairman. I think that probably would be the best course, to hear
what Captain Krick has to say, and iust suspend the question until
a full attendance of the committee can be had.
The Chairman. Captain Krick is here in the Department in Wash-
ington. He can be obtained if the committee wants him at any time.
Is that agreeable ?
Admiral, we thank you for your appearance.
Senator Lucas. May I ask the Admiral one question before he
leaves ?
The Chairman. Senator Lucas,
Senator Lucas. Admiral, do I understand now from your conversa-
tion with Captain Krick that it appears you had dinner together that
night ?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Tlien following the dinner you went to the show?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Then from there you went home?
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. Captain Krick drove his car to my
quarters, we went to the show in my car, and he came back to my
quarters to get his car.
The Chairman. Do you remember any of that or are you saying
what he told you?
[I47SI] Admiral Stark. I am saying what he told me. That
would he the normal course.
Senator Lucas. You don't remember any thing of that kind?
Admiral Stark. I do not remember that evening and I have stated
90. My original impression was that I was home, which I know to
be incorrect, but I do not recall it. I stated that I recalled having
seen a revival of The Student Prince but I did not connect it with
the night of December 6. I still do not.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5555
Senator George. You have no independent recollection except
what you have given the committee?
Admiral Stark. That is right.
The Chairman. You mean you have no independent recollection?
Admiral Stark. I have not. I don't have any independent recol-
lection. My sole purpose was the fact that a conversation took place
that should be in the record.
The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral.
Well, if it is agreeable we will let Captain Krick make his state-
ment and then the committee can decide what course it wishes to take.
Admiral Stark. May I ask whether or not I shall be free to go on?
Senator Lucas. What time do you leave. Admiral ?
[i^75^] Admiral Stark. I am sailing tomorrow morning. Have
to be aboard ship between 8 : 30 and 10 : 30.
Senator Lucas. You will leave here tonight for New York?
Admiral Stark. I was leaving this afternoon. I could leave on
a midnioht train and make it.
The Chairman. Well, Admiral, it is rather difficult for me to say.
If the other members wish to be called into session I would be glad
to call a session this afternoon and let them decide.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I can't see any conceivable possible
statement that Admiral Stark can give the committee that he hasn't
already given them and he could go to London to perform his service
and perhaps be performing a greater service than sitting around
here and telling us that he doesn't remember anything.
Admiral Stark. I quite agree.
Mr. Keefe. That is, in substance, the picture as I see it. -
Admiral Stark. I thought of that when I wrote the letter, that I
couldn't add anything, but I couldn't leave without giving you this
letter.
The Chairman. Is it the feeling of the committee, in view of the
situation and suggestion, that Admiral Stark need not delay his trip?
Mr. Keefe. That is my opinion.
[i475«?] The Vice Chairman. I agree.
Senator George. That is my opinion.
Senator Lucas. I will agree but you will hear plenty about' it
afterwards.
The Chairman. Well, we can't help that.
Thank you. Admiral.
Admiral Stark. I am grateful to you, sir, for permitting me to say
what I have.
Senator Lucas. Don't find any more friends, please. When friends
come in say nothing about Pearl Harbor. [Laughter.]
(Admiral Stark was excused. )
The Chairman. Come up. Captain Krick. i
[74754] TESTIMONY OF CAPT. HAEOLD D. KRICK,
UNITED STATES NAVY
(Having been first duly sworn by the chairman:)
Mr. Kighardson. State your full name. Captain.
Captain ICrick. Harold D. Krick, United States Navy.
Mr. Richardson. How long have you been in the Navy, Captain?
5556 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Captain Krick. I will be in the Navy 28 years on the 7th of June
1946.
Mr. Richardson. How long have you known Admiral Stark ?
Captain Krick. I have known Admiral Stark since 1933 when he
commanded the U. S. S. West Virginia, to which ship I was attached.
Mr. Richardson. What was your last assignment with him?
Captain Krick. My last assignment with Admiral Stark was as his
flag lieutenant when he was commander of the cruisers of the battle
force.
Mr. Richardson. When did you come to Washington to live?
Captain Krick. I came to Washington to live in July 1939.
Mr. Richardson. Since your coming to Washington, has there been
a continuation of social relations between your family and Admiral
Stark's family?
Captain Krick. Yes, sir ; there has been a very close relation.
Mr. Richardson. Socially?
[14755] Captain Krick. Socially.
Mr. Richardson. Frequently at his house?
Captain Krick. Yes, sir ; frequently at his house.
Mr. Richardson. Were you familiar, from your acquaintance with
his house, whether Admiral Stark had a White House phone in his
house ?
Captain Krick. Yes, sir; Admiral Stark did have a Wliite House
phone in his house.
Mr. Richardson. What floor was it on ?
Captain Krick. It was on the second floor, in his study.
Mr. Richardson. Do you recall your whereabouts on Saturday
night, December 6 ?
Captain Krick. On Saturday night, December 6, 1941?
Mr, Richardson. That is right.
Captain Krick. I was with Admiral Stark and Mrs. Stark.
Mr. Richardson. Who was with you ?
Captain Krick. My wife.
Mr. Richardson. Just the four of you?
Captain Krick. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. When did you meet that evening, first ?
Captain Krick. We assembled at Admiral Stark's house about 6 :30
or 7 o'clock in the evening.
Mr. Richardson. Did you have dinner?
Captain Krick. We had dinner at the Stark residence.
\ 11(756'] Mr. Richardson. Were there any other guests?
Captain Krick. No other guests.
Mr. Richardson. Where did you go after dinner?
Captain Krick. After dinner we attended a performance, I believe
it to be the The Student Prince, at the National Theater in Washing-
ton, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Did you stay for the entire performance?
Captain Krick. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Were did you go after the performance?
Captain Krick. Subsequent to the performance we returned to the
Stark residence in order to pick up my transportation.
Mr. Richardson. Whose car did you go to the theater in, and
from?
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5557
Captain Krick. In the admiral's car.
Mr. Richardson-. And you left your car at the Stark house?
Captain Krick. That is correct ; yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. And you returned for it after the theater?
Captain Krick. Yes^ sir. ,
Mr. Richardson. Did you go in the Stark residence upon your
return ?
Captain Krick. Yes, sir; we did go into the Stark residence, as
was the custom, for a few moments, before returning to our home.
Mr. Richardson. To get something to eat and drink ?
[14-757] Captain Krick. There were usually refreshments ; that
was the usual custom.
Mr. Richardson. Do you recall the occasion of going into the house
on that evening ?
Captain Krick. Yes, sir ; I do recall that evening.
Mr. Richardson. What occurred when you went in the house ?
Captain Krick. One of the admiral's servants advised the admiral
that
Mr. Richardson. What did he say ?
Captain Krick. That there had been a White House call during
the evening, sir.
Mr. Richardson. What happened then?
Captain Krick. The admiral excused himself and retired to his
study on the second floor and returned.
Mr. Richardson. How long was he there ?
Captain Krick. I would say approximately between 5 and 10
minutes.
Mr. Richardson. Did he come downstairs again?
Captain Krick. Yes, sir; he did come downstairs.
Mr. Richardson. Did he say anything to you ?
Captain Krick. Only to the extent that the conditions in the Pacific
were serious ; that was the substance of it, that conditions with Japan
were in a critical state, something of that sort, sir.
[14768] Mr. Richardson. Did he say anything to you, as near
as you can recall, that he had had a telephone message, on the second
floor?
Captain Krick. That is my inference. There is absolutely no doubt
in my mind about it, sir. But I do not recall the exact statement. I
do not recall that he stated "I have talked with the President of the
United States". But I heard, of course the statement of the servant
that there had been a White House call, and the admiral retired imme-
diately, and he may have stated that he was going to call the White
House; but I have the distinct impression that the conversation was
with the White House.
[14759] Mr. Richardson. Do you have any impression that
upon his return from Upstairs Admiral Stark made any statement
then that his talk had been with the White House ?
Captain I^ick. My impression very definitely was that; yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. That was the end of the conversation ?
Captain Krick. That was the end of the conversation. The admiral
never talked over any of his affairs in that connection" with me, sir.
Mr. Richardson. How long did you stay after that statement ?
Captain Krick. Approximately not more than 15 minutes.
5558 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mr. Richardson. Then, you and your wife went home ?
Captain Krick. Yes sir; I would say that it would be not later than
11 : 30 on the night of the 0th.
Mr. Richardson. When did you first relate to anyone the details
of what you have just told us? ,
Captain Krick. That was the night, I believe, of the 25th of May
1940, at the admiral's home ; this conversation came up very casually.
Mr. Richardson. Who was there ?
Captain Krick. The admiral and Mrs. Stark and my wife.
Mr. Richardson. And yourself?
Captain Krick. That is correct.
fl^'^SO] Mr. Richardson. What was the conversation then?
Captain KincK. The substance of the conversation was referring
back to the night before Pearl Harbor on the 0th of December 1941,
that I had noticed a headline to the effect that the admiral hadn't
known where he was, I had not followed this case closely, and I then
informed the admiral that we were his guests that night, and I
informed hini what I have just said, to the effect that as usual he had
left with his boy the number of the National Theater, so that he
could be called in the event any calls came in.
Mr. Richardson. Wait just a moment. Was there any such con-
versation in your presence that evening before you went to the theater
between Admiral Stark and any of his servants?
Captain Krick. I am quite sure that there was ; sir.
Mr. Richardson. And what was the admonition which he gave to
his servants ?
Captain Krick. The custom was, sir, to give to the boy a slip of
paper with the number of the telephone where the admiral could be
contacted.
Mr. Richardson. Are you of the opinion that occurred that evening ?
Captain Krick. Yes, sir; I am quite sure of it.
Mr. Richardson. When you reached the theater what was done
with respect to advising the theater officials?
[14^761] Captain Krick. As I recall it, either the admiral or I
notified the head usher in that respect, where the admiral was sitting,
where we would be during the entire evening, and no call came for the
admiral during that time.
Mr. Richardson, What statement did the admiral make when you
told him what had ha]:)pened on thq night of December 0 ?
Captain Krick. The admiral was very disturbed. He said, in
effect, "You realize that I have testified to the contrary," and I told
him that I hadn't followed his testimony in the newspapers, and that
T, therefore, didn't realize what he had done, and he implied that it
should be laid before the committee, which has now been done, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Did you tell this incident to anyone else before
you recalled it to Admiral Stark?
Captain Krick. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Richardson. When this hearing was goin.g on and the news-
papers were referring to Admiral Stark's knowledge, had you made
any statement to anybody that you had any knowledge with reference
to where Admiral Stark was on the 6th?
Captain Krick. Possibly only conversation in the family, sir.
Certainly, to no one about the 6th.
PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5559
[14.762] I just didn't give this thing very much importance in
my own mind, sir.
Mr. Richardson. There was no attempt on your part to
conceal it ?
Captain Krick. Definitely not.
Mr. Richardson. Or not to advance the testimony?
Captain Krick. Definitely not. I just had not followed the
testimony.
Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions.
The Chairman. You never, between that night, the 6th of De-
cember 1941, and last Saturday night, the 25th of May this year, you
never attempted to remind Admiral Stark of the events of that niglit,
which you have detailed here and which j^ou detailed to him last
Saturday ?
Captain Krick. Never, sir.
The Chairman. Any further questions?
Mr. Keefe. No questions.
Senator Lucas. One question.
The Chairman. Senator Lucas.
Senator Lucas. What was the exact time. Captain, that you saw
Admiral Stark first on the evening of the 6th?
Captain Krick. That I saw him first on the evening of the 6th ?
Senator Lucas. Yes.
[14763] Captain Krick. I would say in the neighborhood of 7
or 7 : 15, sir, at dinner. He came in from the office, as I recall, about
that time, sir.
Senator Lucas. Did you have any conversation with him as to
where he might have been previous to the time you saw him ?
Captain Krick. No, sir; I did not, sir.
Senator Lucas. Did he say anything to you at that time about
having anj?^ conference of any kind or character with the President
and Cabinet officers before that dinner took place ?
Captain Krick. No, sir. As I previously testified, the admiral
never made any mention of his business at the office in my presence,
sir.
Senator Lucas. So you were with him from about 7 o'clock, then,
until about 11 that night?
Captain Krick. 11 or 11 : 30; yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. That night ?
Captain Krick. Yes sir.
Senator Lucas. Nov/, when he came away from the telephone after
having this purported conversation w^itli the President, was there
anythmg unusual about his appearance or demeanor, as a result of
that conference ?
Captain Krick. Absolutely not, sir, he was very much as he always
is, apparently not disturbed, there was nothing [1476~4]
unusual.
Senator Lucas. Did he make any further telephone calls while you
were there, to anyone?
Captain Krick. No, sir ; but I would not be in a position to know,
I was not in a position to know that, because his telephones were
in his study.
5560 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senator Lucas. I mean after he came down ?
Captain Kuick. After he came down, no, sir.
Senator Lucas. And he stayed with you until you left ?
Captain Krick. Yes. Not to my remembrance did he make any
additionaj calls.
Senator Lucas. How do you remember this so well, Captain?
Captain Krick. Because I was a very small fish, and great things
were transpiring, and you don't forget that sort of thing. It is not
like looking down, when you look up at something.
Senator Lucas. You were looking up, and the Pearl Harbor dis-
aster struck the following day, and the entire evening was definitely
impressed upon you?
Captain Krick. Yes, sir; and it will be there for a long time to
come.
Senator Lucas. Always will be.
Captain Kjiick. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. I am glad we found out where Admiral Stark
llJk765'\ was.
The Chairman. I thought until now I was the only man in the
United States who Imew where he was on Saturday night, the 6th
of December, but I find that I am not. I know where I was and why
I was there.
Senator Lucas. Even though Admiral Stark doesn't know.
The Chairman. Anything further?
- Senator George. No.
The Chairman. Mr. Cooper.
The Vice Chairjnian. No.
The Chairman. I believe you stated, Captain, that having served
with Admiral Stark as his flag officer, that you were friends, and you
and your wife were frequent vistors at their house?
Captain Krick. That is correct, sir, particularly was that true from
1939 until the admiral left for London in 1942, the spring of 1942, sir.
The Chairman. I don't think there is anything further. Thank
you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
The Chairman. The committee will adjourn, subject to call.
(Whereupon, at 11 : 15 a. m., the committee adjourned subject to
call of the Chair.)
X
BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
3 9999 06314 022 0
. hI
• ...v.
Live Music Archive
Librivox Free Audio
Metropolitan Museum
Cleveland Museum of Art
Internet Arcade
Console Living Room
Books to Borrow
Open Library
TV News
Understanding 9/11