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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."



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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORB THB 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEAEL HAEBOE ATTACK 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 



SECOND SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 



''til CI 
S. Con. Res. 27 /^ f 

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress) 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN ^^ 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 11 

APRIL 9 AND 11, AND MAY 23 AND 31, 1946 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




■6*': 



PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress) 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 11 

APRIL 9 AND 11, AND MAY 23 AND 31, 1946 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
79716 WASHINGTON ; 1946 




-^/ftT^/^^^'^- 






JOINl COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL 
HARBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California 

gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 
North Carolina 



COUNSEL 
(Through January 14, 1946) 
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel 
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel 
JULE M. Hannaford, Assista7it Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel 
Samdbl H. Kadfman. Associate General Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
Logan J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Hearings 

Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 
Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945. 
Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 
Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 
Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 
Jan. 15, 16, 17, IS, 19, and 21, 1946. 
Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 20, 2S and 29. 194G., 
Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 
Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 
Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19. and 20, 1946. 
Apr. 9 and 11, and Mav 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 


Pages 


Transcript 


No. 




pages 


1 


1- 399 


1- 1058 


2 


401- 982 


1059- 2586 


3 


983-1583 


2587- 4194 


4 


1585-2063 


4195- 5460 


5 


2065-2492 


5461- 6646 


6 


2493-2920 


6647- 7888 


7 


2921-3378 


7889- 9107 


8 


3379-3927 


9108-10517 


9 


3929-4599 


10518-12277 


10 


4601-5151 


12278-13708 


11 


5153-5560 


13709-14765 



Part 




No. 


Exhibits Nos. 


12 


1 through 6. 


13 


7 and 8. 


14 


9 through 43. 


15 


44 through 87. 


16 


88 through 110. 


17 


Ill through 128. 


18 


129 through 156. 


19 


157 through 172. 


20 


173 through 179. 


21 


180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 



22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 

Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



17 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

5269-5291 

3814-3826 
3450-3519 

"'5089-5122 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 
"471-516" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


tiTf iiriiiiiiiiiiiiiiiTfiCOl 
1 f<0 1 1 1 1 t 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 rOCD 1 

(? 1 I 1 ! 1 1 1 1 ! ! : ; ; 1 ; ! : 1 : ! "^ i 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1914; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 1 1 1 1 ' 1 iC4 

^ : M M : ! : 1 M M i ; ! M i 1 : r 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 

"660-688' 


Joint 
Committee 
E.xhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

Julv 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 
3165-3120' 
2479^2491' 

4622-4627" 

148-186 

2567-2.-.86' 

3972-3988 

2492-2515 

1575-1643" 

3726-3749" 
1186-1220 

1413-1442" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

""391-398" 
"'115-134' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 III 1 1 1 1 1 

OS 1 1 1 1 1 lOOOO 1 1 n-H irj< 11-1 05 lOOl lO 1 

O 1 1 1 1 1 iCOCO 1 1 i(M i(M iiCOl iOO(M i (N 1 

"(N 1 1 1 1 1 it-<0 t 1 It- iN i05C0 iCO(N iCO 1 

Si llllll^.-4|IH-ll^l|r-ll|,-(ll 1 

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f^O t^OO 1 1 lO id> iOO(N it^r)< i,-i 1 

(N 1 1 1 1 1 iC<)CO 1 1 I.-H 1^ lOOOO ieO(N iCO 1 

1 1 1 1 1 Ir-lO 1 1 lt~ 1C<J 1 CO 1 (N 1 1 


§ 


Allen, Brooke E., Maj 

Allen, Riley H 

Anderson, Edward B., Maj 

Anderson, Ray 

Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adm 

Anstev , Alice 

Arnold, H. H., Gen 

Asher, N. F., Ens 

Ball, N. F., Ens 

BaUard, Emma Jane , 

Barber, Bruce G 

Bartlett, George Francis ._ 

Bates, Paul M., Lt. Comdr 

Beardall, John R., Rear Adm 

Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens 

Beatty, Frank E., Rear Adm 

Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm 

Benny, Chris J 

Benson, Henry P 

Berquist, Kenneth P., Col 

Berry, Frank M., S 1/c 

Betts, Thomas J., Brig. Gen 

Bicknell. George W., Col 

Bissell, John T., Col 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


oiiiiiidooii II i-r_ro 1 1 

CO 1 1 1 1 1 lOcO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ig^ITO 1 1 

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f^io 00 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i^2-H 1 1 

iciiiiiiTfH iiiiiiiiiiio;3|ioii 


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Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


1 1 1 1 1 CO 1 (M Cl 1 1 II 

1 1 1 1 1 lO 1 Crs rt< 1 1 II 

« «OiCSiiiiiiii,i.-iii II 

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o 1 1 1 1 1 T-1 1 <M 1 1 1 1 1 Oil II 

°H ^lOOilliiiiiiirJHii II 

iiiiiOirt ,,-,11 II 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

103 
107-112 

186 
219-222 

102 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sei)t. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


- i i i 1 i 1 : 1 1 i i i i i i i 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 

90^^918 

628-643 

734-746' 

""852-885' 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

2()()5-2695" 
3028-3067 

1161-1185" 

2787-2802" 
1014-1034 
1678-1694 
3226-3250 

2362-2374" 

2-54" 

T. S. 2-52, 

192-226 

3126-3152 

1816-1913 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

214^22.5 
363-367 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 

1146-1150" 

1156-1171" 

4—32 
1068-1095 

1272-1285" 

""500^564" 

1793-1805" 

"320-352," 
1048- 
1659 


1 


Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN 

Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen 

Landreth, J. L., Ens 

Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/O 

Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col 

Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC 

Lawton, William S., Col 

Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN 

Leahy, \Mlliam D., Adm 

Leary, Hert)crt F., Vice Adm 

Lewis, Fulton, Jr 

Litell, S. H 

Locey, Frank H 

Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA 

Lorence, Walter E., Col 

Lumsdcn, George, Maj 

Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN 

Lynch, Paul J 

Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr 

MacArthur, Douglas, Gen 

Marshall, George C, Gen 

Marston, Morrill W., Col 

Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XI 



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XII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTaCK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to Mav 31, 

1940 


Pagss 

.5210 
4933-5009 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

""387-388" 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

14S 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


CDii 111 11^ 1 (Mil it^ii 

TJH 1 1 111 1 1 00 1 CO 1 1 1 l^ 1 1 

IS 1 ' '-< 1 (Mil 1 1 1 1 

toiQ II 111 III 1 11 1 CD P 1 
e Tti 1 1 111 1 1 (35 1 11 1 1^ 1 1 
Cli it^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^ i i i ill i i i i i i i 1 ! i i 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


1 i>0 111 III _r-f „-IM"Nr(M 1 1 CD 1 1 00 CO 

I lo 111 III r:K:f2oo=^"^ ' "* > lOo 

1 1 IT III 111 7^1^°:^;: l I7 l i?;:: 
l-lltl III 111 ^^cJ,777llt^ lloo7 

II 111 iif (MiC(-5_^,, iiO 


Joint 
Committee 
E.xhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Uarbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

1107-1100," 
1240-1252 

3636-3640 
2375-2398, 
3990-3996 
3153-3165 
2923-2933 
3885-3915 

i968"i988" 
1035-1070 

778-789 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
147-109 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Comm.ission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


1 ifV-I^rM 1 1 CD i,_-,„-00 1 1 ICO^ 1 1 1 1 

iiiToOOiii iOiJ2'2(Nl liOOOOiiii 

»ii^{MiOii COiSn^Tt<i lit^OOiiii 

^llCNt,^,! ,_HI^^ 1 11,-Hlllll 

^ 1 \'^iJ, 1 1 i i^g ! 1 icis 1 1 1 1 

I l?^^S 1 1 g 1^^ 1 i iS"^ 1 ; I i 


Witness 


Pettigrew, Moses W., Col 

Phelan, John, Ens . _. 

Phillips, Walter C, Col 

Pickett, Harry K., Co] 

Pierson, Millard, Col 

Pine, Willard B 

Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov 

Powell, Boiling R., Jr., Maj 

Powell, C. A., Col 

Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr 

Prather, Louise 

Pratt, John S., Col 

Pye, William S., Vice Adm 

Rafter, Case B 

Raley, Edward W., Col 

Ramsev, Logan C, Capt., USN 

Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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XIV 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31. 

1946 


iw 1111 ;=2S 1 ic^ 1 ^SFfss^ ' 'o^ 1 1 I 

i(N 1 1 1 1 1 J;: lo 1 1 o 1 ' £^^ l2 ^ S lO 1 1 TjH o 1 1 1 

« 1? 1111 \^^ 1 1? 1 :c^^^'? i \z^ 1 1 1 

J iS i i i i 'M i i§ i i^^s§g 1 'M i i i 


Joint 

(Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


II iioi.io llllll III icol 
11 1 1 1 1 it- Ill 1^ 1 

E 1 1 1 1 TtH 1 1 CO IIIIII 111 1 'JH 1 

S. 1 1 II III 1 111 III 

Oil II 1 iio IIIIII 111 1 ,-1 1 

1^ CO 1 1 1 1 . 1 III 1^ 1 

11 11 1 1 CO llllll III 1 rjl 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

69' 
195-197 

203-204 

185' 


Joint 

Comniittpe 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1045) 


11 1 1 ilM 1 1 1 1 IIM 1 1 111 111 

^ M i i 1 I III 11 III III 
II 111 11 111 11 1 -I* 1 111 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19. 1944) 


lO (M —illl 1 ' -O 1 

it^ i^ooiiii^;^-H 1 

Em 1 1 1 1 1? 2 1 1 1 lS?^<f ; ! 1 i ! i 

.5 1 O 1 1 1 1 1 00 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 TfH 

tii(N iiiii(Nt^iiii<=^Sf^ 1 

ilN iiiiiiOt^iiiiX^ir^ 111 111 
1 lllll O 1 1 1 1 f^ 111 111 


Joint 

Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 
3044-3650 
276-541. 
4411-4445 

3265-328G' 

1539-' 1575' 
4037-4094 

c 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
32-65" 

323-334 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


lOt^iOiilii i(NiiO00 1 

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ts iCCt-^>0 lllll .00 1 1 O lO 

1 --W Tt< 1 1 1 1 1 1 TO 1 1 C» O 111 III 
lO lllll it^iit-HOO 111 111 




Short, Arthur T 

Short, Walter C, Maj. Gen 

Shortt, Creed, Pvt 

Sisson, George A 

Smedberg, William R., IT, Capt. USN.- 

Smith, Ralph C, Maj. Gen 

Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen 

Smith, "William W., Rear Adm 

Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN 

Smoot, Perry M., Col 

Fonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr 

Spalding, Isaac, Brig. Gen 

Staff, W. F, CH/CM 

Stark, Harold R., Adm 

Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR 

StUphen, Benjamin L 

Stimson, Henry L 

Stone, John F 

Street, George 

Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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XVI CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1915, 

to May 31, 

1946 


, , , , , lo , , , : , : 1 1 ! 1 1 1^^ ; 

r-t 1 1 1 1 1 X? CO 1 

SI 1 II . 1 1 l"^ 1 1 

&. CO 1 1 CO 1 

«= 1 1 1 1 1 i(M 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 iJ2o • 

1 i M M" i i M M M ! i M"" i 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

"389^410" 

376^386 
541-553 
597-602 

442-450 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1914, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

187-189 
105-106 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^ 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
1083-1090 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 
2722-2744 
3120-3124 

1989^2007" 
2456-2478 

1345-1381" 

910-931 
3663-3665 

3677-3683' 

3750-3773 
3357-3586" 

2580a-2596 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
""279-288" 

379-"-3S2 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 
1311-1329 
496-499 
1830-1842 

133^1340" 

""247-259" 

1525-1538" 
1683-1705 


3 


Wells, B. H., Maj. Gen 

West, Melbourne H., Lt. Col 

Whaling, William J., Lt. Col 

White, William R., Brig. Gen 

Wichiser, Rea B 

Wilke, Weslie T 

Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm 

Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen 

Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen 

Wilson, Erie M., Col 

Wimer, Benjamin R., Col 

Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm 

Wong, Ahoon H 

Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR 

Woodward, Farnsley C, Lt. (jg), USN. 

Woollcy, Ralph E 

Wright, Wesley A., Comdr 

Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col 

York, Yee Kam 

Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN 

Zucca, Emil Lawrence . 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5153 



[13709^ - PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



TUESDAY, APRIL 9, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investication 

OF the Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington^ D. C. 
The joint committee met, piirsuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in the 
caiicns room (318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley 
(chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, 
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, 
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. 

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Hasten, Edward P. 
Morgan and Logan J. Lane, of counsel; and Mrs. Flo E. Bratten, 
executive secretary to the joint committee. 

[Xi77^] The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Admiral Stark, will you come and take the witness chair? 

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK, U. S. NAVY 
(RETIRED)— Resumed ^ 

The Chairman. You have already been sworn, haven't you? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. All right, Mr, Counsel. 

Mr. Richardson. Admiral, in your former testimony my notes show, 
about page 5812 and again 6099,^ you were interrogated on the 
subject of where you were on the evening of December (S. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Richardson. And you testified, speaking generally, according 
to my notes, that your date calendar had been disposed of and that 
you had no recollection which permits you to say where you were on 
the night of December 6. 

Since you testified in that regard, information has been received 
that during the afternoon of December 6 there was a party given 
for the Canadian Minister and his wife, at which, according to the 
information that we have, a number of naval officials of high rank 
were invited, and among them, you and Mrs. Stark, Admiral IngersoU 
and his wife, Capt. Theodore Wilkinson, and others. 

I wanted to ask you. Admiral, whether you have any {^13711^ 
recollection of about that time, or at that time, attending an affair 
given for the Canadian Minister? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir ; I do not. I might say, however, as regards 
our date calendar, our home engagements calendar, that Mrs. Stark 

1 Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of 
testimony. 

- See p. 5512, infra, for corrections in his testimony submitted by Admiral Stark. 
» Hearings, Part 5, pp. 2183 and 2290, respectively. 

79716— 46— pt. 11 2 



5154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

finally found it, after a long search back for several years. It shows 
that Canadian party that afternoon, but it does not show whether we 
were there. Her remembrance is she did not go. I hardly ever went 
to those parties. Frequently I asked her to go to represent us, but 
I have not the slightest recollection of going, and I think I did 
not go. 

I might say also with reference to that calendar, that it shows noth- 
ing for that Saturday night, but it does show the Canadian party. 

Mr. Richardson. My preliminary idea in asking j^ou about that 
party was that it frequently happens that an afternoon aflfair is cul- 
minated by some of the group present continuing on at other affairs 
later in the evening, and there has been testimony offered here that 
during the evening of the 6th the President sought to contact you and 
was advised, according to his immediate report as to information 
he received over the telephone, that you were at the National Theater, 
giving the number of your box or seat, whichever it may have been, 
and that he then said that he would not disturb you while you were 
at the theater but would contact you later. 

From that information I gathered that during the evening 
[13712] of December 6 you had attended the National Theater. 
Upon inquiry I ascertained that the play produced on that evening 
was the very familiar musical comedy The Student Prince, which 
is an operatic production which has been extant for many years, 
and I think every year or 2 years revived, and embraces the tale of 
a prince who went to college and tried to keep up his college associa- 
tions, with the usual feminine interludes. 

The Chairman. Wliat do you mean "usual'" ? 

Mr. Richardson. The interludes which you and I recall from our 
college davs. but which the Chairman does not. 

Tliere are several very celebrated songs in it, and I refer to those 
things simply to find out from you, Admiral, whether you have any 
recollection of ever having seen The Student Prince? 

Admiral Stark. I remember very clearlj' having seen a revival of 
The Student Prince, but I had not connected it with that Saturday 
night, and I do not now. When I first heard of it, when someone 
had said I had seen The Student Prince, my recollection was it was 
in Philadelphia, and I contacted my daughter and her husband who 
were there, and they said no. The next I heard of it was in connec- 
tion with Commander Schulz' testimony. It does not ring any bell 
with me that I was there that night, but I can only assmne, in view 
of the testimony of Commander Schulz and of others who tried to 
contact [lo713] me, and my remembrance of having seen 
the revival, that I probably was there. 

I found out at the theater that the}' had no way of telling whether 
I was there or not. They said not, but they told me it was The Student 
Prince. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you have any recollection. Admiral Stark, of 
ever having seen The Student Prince more than once ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes ; I think I saw it earlier. 

Mr. Richardson. We haven't even that help to help us then, have 
we? 

Admiral Stark. No sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, you were living at that time out 
in Spring Valley ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5155 

Admiral Stark. No, sir; I was living in the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions' quarters. 

Mr. Richardson. That is right on Massachusetts Avenue? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. You had at that time always somebody in your 
home to answer the telephone ? 

Admiral Stark. That is right ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And if it should be that you attended a per- 
formance of The Student Prince at the National Theater on the night 
of December 6, there would still be someone in your home, according 
at least to your arrangements, to receive [13714-] information 
that might come there over the telephone? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson, Would that person there be someone directly con- 
nected with the Naval Establishment ? 

Admiral Stark. One of the servants, who would be in the Navy. 

Mr. Richardson. When you went to your office on the morning of 
the 7th — the exact time being uncertain — from your own recollection, 
is it your recollection now that that is the first time you found oUt 
there had been a reply by the Japanese to the earlier Hull message to 
them? 

Admiral Stark. That is my very clear and very distinct recollec- 
tion. 

Mr. Richardson. Now before you arrived at your office on the morn- 
ing of the 7th, had anyone given you any information that there was 
in existence such a message, or any part thereof? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir; to the best of my knowledge and belief 
there had not. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, Admiral, would you be able to state posi- 
tively that no one either sent you a message or telephoned to you on 
the night of December 6 or the morning of December 7 telling you 
of this message, of its receipt or of its contents ? 

Admiral Stark. That is my belief ; yes, sir. 

[ISyiS] Mr. Richardson. Your visit to your office on the morn- 
ing of Sunday, December 7, was a routine visit, was it not, Admiral ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. It was just the same kind of a visit that you were 
accustomed to make to that office every Sunday ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And had nothing to do with any specific dispatch 
or any specific information concerning which you were interested 
in seeing or being advised concerning? 

Admiral Stark. There was a dispatch — I have forgotten just when 
it was received, I think the day before but I am not certain — from 
Admiral Hart. If you will recall. Admiral Turner stated that I 
called him to get the answer out to Admiral Hart. I do not have 
definite recollection whatever. 

Now whether that dispatch might have come on that morning and 
I then called Turner, I am not positive without reference to the 
record, but I think we had it prior to that. 

Mr. Richardson. Now you would be able to state positively, would 
you not, Admiral, that you did not spend any nights away from your 
residence on Massachusetts Avenue during November or December 
1941? 



5156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. I would not state that without a check-up. I do not 
recall any. 

Mr. Richardson. Have you any information of having spent 
[13716] any night away from your residence on Massachusetts 
Avenue within 2 or 3 days of the attack on Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir; nor within 2 or 3 weeks, but occasionally 
we went and spent a night with our children in Philadelphia. 

Mr. Richardson. According to tlie procedure that you followed 
in your staff. Admiral, would it have been the duty of any of your 
staif, upon being advised of the receipt and contents of an important 
message connected with magic, for any of them to contact you about it? 

Admiral Stark. If they had thought it sufficiently important they 
undoubtedly would have. 

Mr. Richardson. Now it appears here in the testimony that on 
the evening of the Oth, while Admiral Wilkinson was entertaining 
General Miles and Admiral Beardall at his home socially, the first 
13 parts of this so-called 14-part message were delivered to Admiral 
Wilkinson by Captain Kramer; that the message was read by all of 
you officers at that dinner, and that their recollection is that Admiral 
Wilkinson did some telephoning. 

I wanted to asik whether under your procedure it would have been 
expected that upon reading a message of that kind Wilkinson would 
have been expected to have contacted you? 

Admiral Stark. If he considered it sufficiently impoi'tant. 
[13717] If he were in doubt he might have contacted Ingersoll 
or Turner, and I believe he did contact Ingersoll. whose testimony, 
as I I'ecall it, is to the effect that he considered it notliing but a restate- 
ment and unimportant, that is unimportant as regards doing anything 
about it at that time. 

Mr. Richardson. But you have no recollection now of having any 
telephone or other type of connnunication from any of your staff in 
connection with this message until hite the next morning when you 
got to your office ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct; yes sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Now that inchides, does it not. Admiral, no 
information of any kind on the evening of the 6tli or the morning 
of the 7th from either Secretary Knox or from Secretary Stimson. 
or from Secretary Hull? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. It is all-inclusive. 

Mr. Richardson. And you have no information at all, or you 
had no information at all. did you. Admiral, until after you reached 
your office on the morning of the 7th, that a meeting had been called 
between Hull and Knox and Stimson to consider this particular 
dispatch ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir; I did not know of that meeting. 

Mr. Richardson. And you do not know to this day of any effort 
that anyone made in connection with that meeting to advise you con- 
cerning it. or ask you to be present at it? 

[13718] Admiral Stark. That is perfectly correct. 

Mr. Richardson. When did you find out, if you found out at all. 
Admiral, that these three Secretaries were meeting on the morning 
of December 7 ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5157 

Admiral Stark. I do not recollect having found out about it. I 
might have, because I saw Colonel Knox later in the day, he may have 
mentioned it, but as to their being together that forenoon, I have no 
recollection, except as I learned of it subsequently. 

Mr. EicHARDSON. Well, you learned of it first after the contact 
between you and General JNIarshall had been completed? 

Admiral Stark. Well, it was not prior to that. 

Mr. EicHARDSON. Yes, I see what you mean. Now, did anyone 
tell 3^ou, or did you receive any information which would disclose 
to you, that the 13-part message, which had grown to the 14-part 
message by the time you got to your office, had been exhibited to the 
President on the night before? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you have any information of any kind that 
upon an examination of that dispatch the night before the President 
had characterized it in this language, "This means war"? 

Admiral Stark. I never heard of it until I heard of it here. 

[1S719] Mr. Richardson. As Chief of Naval Operations, would 
such an expression from the President with reference to an intercepted 
dispatch have been an important item for you to consider in looking 
over such a dispatch? 

Admiral Stark. I would have said yes, provided that were an 
opinion held after perhaps a second reading and looking over it more 
carefully, and if I had had anything of that sort I would have taken 
some action, I would have gone to the office and gotten out a dispatch 
and seen my advisers, but I had nothing on that evening. 

Mr. Richardson. Let me put it this way, if it is a proper question, 
Admiral : If you had been advised on the night of the 6th of an exam- 
ination of this 13-part message by the President and his conclusion 
within the meaning of the phrase "This means war", acquiesced in by 
his associate Mr. Hopkins, would your itinerary on the morning of 
December 7 have been changed, so far as going to your office is con- 
cerned ? 

Admiral Stark. I feel certain I would have gone there that Saturday 
night, if I had had any such intimation. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, then, so far as the evening of Saturday, 
December 6, is concerned, events leading up to it, wdiat occurred 
during the evening, your recollection cannot help us? 

Admiral Stark. That is right. 

1 13720] Mr. Richardson. But you would be able to say, Admiral, 
definitely, that you received no connnunication from the President 
of the United States on that night ? 

Admiral Stark. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the 
President did not call me that night. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you think it would be possible, Admiral, for 
you to have forgotten such an incident had it occurred ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, it would be possible, but I think it would not 
have been possible that I had had the intimation that there was a 
dispatch down there which was clear-cut and wdiich meant war. While 
I felt we had every warning that war was coming, we all felt that, we 
were pi'actically certain of it, nevertheless if there had been anything 
definitely clinching it of that nature and any such expression from the 
President, I think I would not have rested until I had seen that dis- 
patch. 



5158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. EicHARDSON. Admiral, the testimony on the President's use of 
the phone in order to speak to you and his report that you were at the 
theatre would indicate that he had received infonnation over the tele- 
phone from some source that you were at the theater. Now what 
would have been your usual routine if you did go to the theater, as to 
leaving information as to where you were going? 

Admiral Stark. With the duty officer at the Navy Department 
[13721] and my flag lieutenant. They would normally have been 
acquainted with it, as well as at the house. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you think it would have been possible — it 
would have been possible, but do you think it would be at all probable 
that you went to the theater, if you did go, without leaving that infor- 
mation as to where you were going ? 

Admiral Stark. It would have been possible but not probable. I 
never went out of the house at evening without leaving word as to 
where I was going. 

Mr. Richardson. Well, if you went to the theater on that evening, 
when the theater was over you expect that you went directly home, 
do you not ? 

Admiral Stark. After the theater? 

Mr. Richardson, Yes. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Then you would remain there during the night? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And there were during that night and every night 
about that time, people in the house who could have answered the 
telephone if it had rung ? 

Admiral Stark. Oh, yes ; and I had one right at my bedside. 

Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Admiral, just one question. 

[13722] I believe you stated in your former testimony that you 
regarded the 13 parts of this message, when you did see them the 
next morning, as routine, or rather as a rehashing of the attitude of 
the Japanese towards the situation which had been accumulating over 
a period of weeks or months? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And that the 13 parts by themselves carried no 
implication to you beyond that, that it was a rehashing, a restatement 
of their attitude ; that was your impression when you saw it the next 
morning ? 

Admiral Stark. It was ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You stated, I believe, that based upon those 13 
parts you did not regard it necessary to give an}^ additional warning. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Because warnings had been given to all the officers, 
that you regarded as stifficient. If you had seen the 13 parts of that 
message on the night before, would your opinion of it have been any 
different from what it was the next morning? 

Admiral Stark. I think not. I think my reaction would have been 
the same as the testimony of, so far as I know, everyone else who 
was here indicates, that it was not of any urgency, that it was a 
restatement. 

The Chairman. But if you had been called by the President, 
[13723] or had been communicated with by him following his re- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5159 

ceipt of that message, and he had told you that he thought that that was 
leading to war, or that meant war, you would have taken such steps 
as that incident might have impelled you to take, in view of the Presi- 
dent's opinion of it, and in that case you would have gone to the office, 
or gone down to look at the message and examine i^ further and see 
upon what basis the President thought those 13 parts meant war? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That did not take place? 

Admiral Stark. That did not take place. I had no intimation of 
the President's reaction. I did not know that the President had read 
that dispatch that night, until it was brought out here before the 
committee. 

The Chairman. Yes. Mr. Cooper. 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral, as I recall, the effect of your pre- 
vious testimony was that the first 13 parts of the so-called 14-part 
message, the 13 parts having been received on Saturday night, indi- 
cated nothing to attract any attention about Pearl Harbor. 

Admiral Stark. Absolutely. 

The Vice Chairman. And as I recall Commander Schulz' testi- 
mony to this committee, Pearl Harbor was not mentioned by the 
President, or Mr. Hopkins, during their discussions on the [137£41i 
first 13 parts of this 14-part message. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. Nor did I ever hear anyone else mention 
Pearl Harbor in that connection. 

The Vice Chairman. And the fact that that might have indicated 
war, there was nothing there to attract any attention or give any in- 
dication that Pearl Harbor was involved ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

The Vice Chairman. I thank you. 

The Chairman. Mr. Clark. 

Mr. Clark. I have no questions. 

The Chairman. Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Stark, on the 27th of November, you had 
already sent out the war warning, had you not? 

Admiral Stark. We had; yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. And you sent this message, and you said in that mes- 
sage "This is a war warning", you sent it to the different Pacific 
theaters ; that is right, isn't it ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. And then the President, sometime prior to December 
1, said that he expected we would be attacked probably by Monday, 
did he not? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. That was previous to December 1 ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

[13725] Mr. Murphy. Now we have a Navy man saying that 
the President saw the first 13 parts and said "This means war." The 
fact is most of those in high command, if not all of those in high 
command, were expecting very definitely the possibility of war at 
that time, were they not ? 

Admiral Stark. We were. We had sent out warning messages 
regarding it. The President himself had directed either one or two 
messages to be sent in that connection. 



5160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. MuBj'HY. Were yoii present at the White House, Admiral, on 
December 7 ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir, I was not in the White House, as I 
remember, on December 7. 

Mr. MuRPHY.^We have here the stenographic report on the words 
of the President of the United States on December 7 before some of 
the great men of this country. Mr. Chairman, I think those notes 
ought to be produced by counsel so they can be made a part of the 
record in this case. 

Mr. Richardson. Has not that already been done? 

Mr. Murphy. They have not been made part of the record. They 
should be. 

Mr. Richardson. I will wait until we have a chairman here. 

Mr. Murphy. You were not present, at any rate, when the leaders 
of the Senate and House and others were present at the [13726] 
White House with the President on the evening of Sunday. December 
7, at which time he discussed the reactions of those in the White House, 
the reactions of themselves and others in the days preceding Decem- 
ber 7? 

Admiral Stark. My recollection is that I did not leave my office from 
the time I got there Sunday morning until early Monday morning. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, on the evening 
of December 7, 1941, there weie certain persons, leading Americans, 
at the White House, and as I understand it further, there Avas a 
stenographic report of the remarks made by the President at that 
time. In view of the fact that we have seen fit to have a witness 
come here to tell what the President said on the 6th of December, I 
think that the remarks of the President on the 7th of December 191:1 
ought to be made a part of the record. 

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest, we are now 
having that full stenographic report mimeographed for introduction 
as an exhibit, largely in connection with the Stimson statement, be- 
cause it much more directly relates to that than it does to this witness' 
testimony. 

Mr. Murphy. The one I have reference to consists only of about 
4 pages, or maybe 5 and maybe 6 at the most. 

Mr. Richardson. There is only one and that is the one [13727] 
we are having mimeographed. 

Mr. ]\IuRPHY. At any rate, I think that shoidd be made a part of the 
record. I will not press it now, but I think it ought to be made 
a part of the record at some time. 

The Chairman. That will be presented to the committee for inclu- 
sion as an exhibit, as I understand. 

Mr. Richardson. Yes ; as soon as it is mimeographed. 

The Chairman. All right. Is that all? 

Mr. Murphy. That is all. 

The Chairman. Mr. Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. No questions. 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Stark, did not your duty officer at your 
office have a log where he entered all telephone calls if you were not 
there, so that the next day, or at the time you Avould come in, the log 
would indicate who called and if they had a message? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5161 

Admiral Stark. I think not. If there had been a message or any- 
thing definite to be brought to me he undoubtedly would have told me, 
but I know of no log kept by the duty officer. There may have been 
one, but I just do not recall it. 

Senator Ferguson. Is not that the ordinary practice in the Navy, 
that if you have a watch officer he keeps a log? 

Admiral Stark. Of anything worth while ; yes, sir. 

[J3?'2S] Senator Ferguson. Would not a communication from 
the President of the United States on Saturday evening, December 
6, to be a worth-while item to enter m a log if you were not there and a 
telephone call was made to your duty officer to reach you? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; I would say so. 

Senator Ferguson. You would say that would be worth while, 
would you not? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you ever looked for such a log? 

Admiral Stark. No ; I have not. 

Senator Ferguson. Counsel, or Mr. Hasten, do you know whether or 
not there has been a search for such a log? 

Mr. Masten. They gave us a list of the people who were in the 
office, and that is in the record. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I ask you now that counsel re- 
quest that an examination be made to see if there is such a log. 

Did you have naval aides at your home? 

Admiral Stark. Have what, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. Naval aides. 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you just have civilian servants working for 
3^ou personally or were they Government employees? 

Admiral Stark. I understood your question to say did I [13729^ 
have naval aides. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. I was thinking of that, when you said that, of my 
flag secretary. The servants were Government servants. 

Senator Ferguson. What classification in the Navy would they 
have ? 

Admiral Stark. Mess attendants, steward, cook and mess attend- 
ants. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have a secretary or anyone like that 
at home ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Anyone to take phone calls? 

Admiral Stark. The boys — they were intelligent, good boys, would 
take a telephone call. 

Senator Ferguson. Were they Filipino boys? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir, they were colored. 

Senator Ferguson. And j^ou do not recall getting any message from 
any servant ? 

Admiral Stark. No ; I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. About a call from the President? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Do yoti recall any calls from Kramer? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 



5162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[13730] Senator Ferguson. Captain Kramer? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have a policy or a plan that you were 
going to undertake if war actually came? You had one of these cards, 
did you not, that you could be telephoned on the winds message ? Do 
you recall that? 

Admiral Stark. No ; I do not recall any card with regard to being 
telephoned on the winds message. 

Senator Ferguson. A memorandum that "East wind rain" meant 
war? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You never saw such a card ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Or memorandum? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. If anything important on that would 
have come in I w^ould have been notified, but I was given no card. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you knew that they were alerted to the 
receipt of a winds message ? 

Admiral Stark. I know it now, and I testified that my recollec- 
tion on the winds message was not clear, except to the extent that it 
was my belief that an implementation of the wdnds message never 
came in. We covered that. 

Senator Ferguson. I want to go further than that. I [13731] 
want to know what you knew about the fact that your Department 
was expecting a so-called winds message which would indicate cer- 
tain things, as set out by the Japanese messages. You are familiar 
with those messages now that we have had them here ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now will you state to the committee what you 
knew about that set-up? Did you know anything about it? 

Admiral Stark. I know" what it is now. I do not recall being 
familiar with the details of that set-up at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Now if it was important enough for your staff 
under you to arrange it so that any member could be called on the 
phone and he would have in his possession information that he could 
tell what they were talking about without giving away any secret — in 
other words, the testimony now indicates that if your inferior officers 
had called you on the telephone and said, "Admiral, East wind rain", 
that that had a significant meaning and that you w^ould have laiOAvn 
that that was a reply to the wind code message. 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall having that at that time. My office 
was about 10 minutes from the Navy Department and any message 
could have come up there very quickly. I say 10 minutes, but maybe 
15, say, at the outside. 

Senator Ferguson. I know, but you also were out of the Navy 
office at times. 

[13732] Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you do not recall any such set-up, as far 
as you are concerned? 

Admiral Stark. No, I do not. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5163 

Senator Ferguson. Then I take it you had no policy or plan as to 
what the Navy would do at the time you received a winds intercept? 
Admiral Stark. No, we had no special policy or plan if the winds 
message had come in showing a break, for example, or strained re- 
lations because we already had them. 

Senator Ferguson. I see. But the Dutch themselves said that the 
winds code would mean war. Did you know that ? 

Admiral Stark. I have heard it since. I do not recall at that time of 
having any interpretation of the winds message, the meaning war. 
It has been much discussed since then. 

Senator Ferguson. What I am trying to get at is if the President 
did come to the conclusion Saturday night that, reading the 13 parts 
and the other messages connected with it, this meant war, as the Dutch 
had interpreted the winds code message, if it was received, would mean, 
the Navy Dapartment of the United States of America had no plan as 
to what they would do upon the happening of that event, is that true? 

Admiral Stark. That is true. We had a plan in case of war, which 
of course, you are all familiar with, and when war [1S7331 
came we simply sent out the execute of that plan. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, you say that relations were 
very strained on Saturday and Friday? 

Admiral Stark. I certainly would say so ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Did you have a plan that if you received 
word, or something that would indicate that America was going to 
war, that the United States Navy had a plan that you were going to 
do something, that you would act ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, we had already sent in the war warning 
an alert against the possibility of war. Until the clash came we had 
nothing else. When the clash came we were fully covered. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, you felt that the message of 
the 27th was your full plan and that you had no part to take, that 
you had no steps to take until war actually broke out? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. We considered w^e had fully 
alerted them with the directives which were given both by the Army 
and by ourselves. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, how do you explain the calling of the 
meeting Sunday morning in your office of the various officers? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall it. 

Senator Ferguson. Was there such a meeting called ? 

Admiral Stark. Not to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
[J3734-] That has also been covered, I believe, in previous 
testimony. 

Senator Ferguson. Were there various officers assembled in your 
office Sunday morning ? 

Admiral Stark. Not that I recall, except those that came in on 
routine business, and with the message, but as for a meeting that 
morning, a regularly scheduled meeting, I think it did not take place. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, do I understand from the testimony that 
you gave to Mr. Richardson, the counsel, this morning, that your 
mind is rather a blank on what took place Saturday afternoon and 
Saturday night ? 

Admiral Stark. As regards the 13-point message; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, Well, as to where you were ? 



5164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; and as to where I was, except that 
I was in the office Saturday afternoon. 

Senator Ferguson. Wonkl it do any good to try to refresh your 
memory on the people that were at this party? I think we have a list. 

Admiral Stark. No, it would not, I can tell you that in advance. 
My opinion is and my belief is that I was not at that party. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know the naval attache from Canada, 
Mr. and Mrs. Brodeur ? Do you laiow them ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes; I think I knew them. 

[1S7SS] Senator Ferguson. Did you know the McCarthys? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I knew so many people of slight acquaintance 
that I would remember their faces and ])erhaps not their names. 

Senator Ferguson. Suppose you look at the society column in the 
Sunday Star, Admiral (handing document to Admiral Stark). 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you just look and see whether or not the 
write-up on that party would in any way refresh your memory? 

Admiral Stark. I would like to say as regards parties. Senator 
Ferguson, that in a very recent important party to which I had been 
invited, and at which I was hot present, but the press having the 
list put me down as one of the important persons there. 

Senator Ferguson. I did not mean to prove by the fact that the 
press listed you as being there, that you were there, but I thought that 
the write-up of the society editor would give you some information 
that would refresh your memory as to being at that kind of party. 

Admiral Stark. I will gladly read it, sir. 

Mr. MuRPiiY. For the record, the Star you inentioned is the Wash- 
ington Star? 

[lS7rS6] Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. MuRPiiY. You referred to the Star. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; the Washington Star. 

Admiral Stark (after perusing document). No, it does not. It 
says I was there, but my knowledge on reporting things of this sort 
does not make that at all conclusive. 

Senator Ferguson. Would the fact that the Minister from the 
Commonwealth of Australia, Mr. Casey and Mrs. Casey, are listed 
there, would that in any way refresh your memory? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. I knew Mr. Casey quite well. I saw him 
frequently. 

Senator Ferguson. So that does not refresh vour memorv in the 
least? 

Admiral Stark. It does not. There were many such parties, to 
which I did not go generally. 

Senator Ferguson. We have some more information on the ques- 
tion as to what happened Saturday. I want to know whether or not 
you were consulted by the President in relation to a message received 
from the Prime Minister, sent to the President of the United States, 
in relation to a message to be sent by the British Government and 
the Dominion Government. I will show you that document and let you 
read it. 

(The document was handed to Admiral Stark.) 

Senator Ferguson. Does counsel want to offer that in [137371 
evidence now? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5165 

Mr. KiGiiARDSON. I think it would probably be just as well, if it 
suits the Chairman, to have it included in the record. 

The Chairman. Is this the document on our desks here ? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. It might be included in the record instead 
of making it an exhibit. 

The Chairman. Dated December 7, 1941 ? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. I will read it into the record, or suppose we let 
Mr. jSIasten read it into the record ? 

Mr. Masten. I think the record should show in addition. Senator, 
the covering letter from the State Department, which reads as follows : 

Dear Mr. Richardson : In further reference to Mr. Masten's memorandum 
of February 23, regarding the clearance of certain documents, the British Gov- 
ernment has now notified us that clearance has been obtained for documents 
numbered 6 and 8. We are informed, however, that the Australian Government 
has requested that document No. S should only be released together with a para- 
phrase of a telegram from the Australian Minister of External Affairs relating 
to this document. A paraphrase of that telegram as received from the British 
Embassy is therefore [13738] enclosed herewith. 
Sincerely yours, 

/S/ Herbert S. Marks 
Herbert S. Ma2ks 
Assistant to the Under Secretary. 

Senator, do you want me to read this ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, you may read that. 

Mr. Masten. The documents enclosed are as follows, and the first 
is a memorandum dated December 7, 1941, which appears to have been 
on stationery bearing the British seal, and reads as follows : 

The Prime Minister would be very glad of any comments which the President 
may have on the attached draft of a declaration to the Japanese Government. 

The Dominion Governments liave yet to give their views on this text. They 
are being consulted urgently. 

The Netherlands Government have been given a copy of the draft. 

The next one is : 

YouE Excellency, 

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have been instructed to 
make the following communication to the Imperial Japanese Government on 
behalf of His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, the Com- 
monwealth [13739] of Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South 
Africa. 

His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, Canada, Commonwealth 
of Australia, New Zealand, Union of South Africa have followed closely in con- 
sultation with the United States Government the negotiations in which the latter 
have been engaged with the Japanese Government with a view to relieving the 
present tension in the Far East. His Majesty's Governments viewed with the 
same concern as the United States Government the rapidly growing concentration 
of Japanese forces in Indo-China which prompted the enquiry by the United 
States Government to the Japanese Government on December 2nd. They have 
found Japanese reply to that enquiry extremely disquieting. However valid the 
explanations in regard to North Indo-China as to which they expressly reserve 
their views the reply entirely fails to explain the fact that the bulk of Japanese 
forces are stationed in South Indo-China and are being constantly and heavily 
augmented. 

There is no threat from any quarter against Indo-China and this concen- 
tration in South Indo-China is only explicable on the assumption that the 
Japanese Government are preparing for some further aggressive move directed 
against the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya or Thailand. 

Relations between the Governments of the British Commonwealth and the 
Netherlands Government are too well known for [137 f/O] the Japanese 
Government to be under any illusion as to their reaction to any attack on terri- 



5166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tories of the Netherlands. In the interest of peace His Majesty's Governments 
feel it incumbent upon them however to remove any uncertainty vphich may 
exist as regards their attitude in the event of attack on Thailand. 

His Majesty's Governments have no designs against Thailand. On the con- 
trary preservation of full independence and sovereignty of Thailand is an 
important British interest. Any attempt by Japan to impair that independence 
or sovereignty would affect the security of Burma and Malay and His Majesty's 
Governments could not be indifferent to it. They feel bound therefore to warn 
the Japanese Government in the most solemn manner that if Japan attempts 
to establish her influence in Thailand by force or threat of force she will do 
so at her own peril and His Majesty's Governments will at once take all appro- 
priate measures. Should hostilities unfortunately result the responsibility will 
rest with Japan. 

These two documents, Senator, came from President Roosevelt's 
file. 

Senator Ferguson. I asked that they be cleared, and then, as I 
understand it, before they could be cleared the Australian Government 
insisted upon attaching the paper that you read now. 

Mr. Masten. That is correct. 

[137^1'] Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield for the pur- 
pose of making an explanation ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Were those produced by Miss Tully some months 
ago? 

Mr. Masten. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. But we were waiting for clearances until just 
recently. 

Mr. Masten. That also is correct. The final document is the para- 
phrase of a telegram from the Australian Minister for External Af- 
fairs to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs of the United 
Kingdom, which is the telegram referred to in the letter to Mr. 
Eichardson from the State Department, and is as follows : 

Subject to conditions that President gives prior approval to text of warning 
as drafted and also gives signal for actual delivery of warning, we concur in 
draft as a joint communication from all His Majesty's Governments. I point 
out that message from Australian Minister at Washington just received uotes 
that, 

1. President has decided to send message to Emperor. 

2. President's subsequent procedure is that if no answer is received by him 
from the [13742] Emperor by Monday evening, 

(a) he will issue his warning on Tuesday afternoon or evening, 

(b) warning or equivalent by British or others will not follow until 
Wednesday morning, i, e. after his own warning has been delivered repeatedly 
to Tokyo and Washington. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, my question on that is: Were 
you ever consulted by the President of the United States in relation 
to that document, the one first read ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall that I was. Senator Ferguson. We 
often talked over the Thailand situation, and that entire area, but 
as to this specific document, I do not recall that I was ever consulted 
by the President with reference to it. 

Senator Ferguson. You were the Chief Naval Officer and it would 
be very important. If any steps were to be taken, you were the man 
that would take them, isn't that true? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I would be very much interested, along with 
the Army. He may have talked that over with me. I recall so much 
conversation with reference to that whole area that I do not pin 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5167 

it down to that specific document dated the 7th of December, and to 
which the reply would be made after the 7th. 

[13743] Senator Ferguson. This does not state that a reply 
would be made necessarily after the 7tli, unless you relate it to the last 
page. 

Admiral Stark. I was relating it to the last page ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The first item — now, this would indicate it was 
prior to 9 o'clock on the 6th of December, because the message to the 
Emperor was sent at 9 o'clock or shortly after, on the 6th of December 
1941, and it appears that the Australian Minister had a message from 
the President to this effect, "President has decided to send message to 
Emperor." That would indicate that it was not sent, that he had 
decided to send it, and prior to sending it he had notified the Prime 
Minister, or the Australian Minister, which would be Mr. Casey. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the President had decided 
to send that message prior to its being sent on the night of the 6th? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir ; I recall the talk of the President sending 
a message to the Emperor. I did not see the message beforehand, as I 
recall, but it had been discussed when I was present. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know how long before the 61h — or was 
it on the 6th — that you discussed it with the President ? 

[13744] Admiral Stark. I think that message to the Emperor 
was discussed some days before, as I remember. I have forgotten just 
when. 

Senator Ferguson. The next item, "President's subsequent proce- 
dure is that if no answer is received by him from the Emperor by 
Monday evening" that he would do certain things, first, "he will 
issue his warning on Tuesday afternoon or evening." Did the Presi- 
dent consult you in relation to that? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall it. 

Senator Ferguson. That would be a very important matter, would 
it not? 

Admiral Stark. It would be a very important matter. 

Senator Ferguson. That he was going to send the message? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And then he was going to wait until Monday 
evening as to whether or not a reply was made by the Emperor, and if 
no reply was made, that he was going to issue his warning. That 
would be a warning to Japan, I take it, on Tuesday afternoon or 
evening. 

Admiral Stark. It would be a very important State Department 
matter in that sphere, and, of course, we would know of it. We might 
not necessarily be particularly consulted about it beforehand, al- 
though I do recollect the thought of a message to the Emperor. 

[1374-5] Senator Ferguson. When we were on the verge of war 
a diplomatic move would be very material to the Navy, would it not, 
and you would not be consulted with relation to that ? 

Admiral Stark. Not necessarily. It would be very important, but 
the President's principal adviser in that connection was Mr. Hull, and 
while we would probably learn of it, we would not necessarily be 
consulted. 



5168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do I understand that you had practi- 
cally washed your hands of the matter 10 days before and had sent a 
warning and were just sitting and waiting until something happened? 

Admiral Stark. No ; I do not mean to convey that at all. We were 
intensely interested. When you ask me if the President would not 
consult me as regards that message, he might and lie might not have. 

Senator Ferguson. Had not Mr. Hull told you and General Mar- 
shall sometime before that he was through, that it was up to the Navy 
and Army? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you do not recall being consulted by any- 
one, or hearing about "We will wait until Tuesday afternoon or eve- 
ning before we will reply," or something of that sort ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall that point at all ; no, sir. \^137Jp6'] 
I might have known of it, but I do not recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Then the (h) "warning or equivalent by British 
or o'thers will not follow until Wednesday morning, i. e., after his own 
warning has been delivered repeatedly to Tokyo and Washington," 
that is the President's own warning. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I do not think. Senator Ferguson, that 
because Mr. Hull stated he had washed his hands of it and it was now 
up to the Army and Navy, that that would in any sense indicate that 
Mr. Hull would not be the primary adviser of the President on any- 
thing of this sort, and would not continue to be until war actually 
broke. 

Senator Ferguson. Was not this to be a military or naval decision, 
if a warning like this was to be given? I take it from the original, 
that is, the original memorandum from the Prime INIinister of Great 
Britain, that they were talking about an ultimatum, they were talking 
about real action, they were going to wai-n Japan and she could not 
move any further, and therefore if you wanted to stop the movement 
by an ai'my or a navy, you would have to stop it not by diplomacy, 
you would have to stop it by might. You and General Marshall con- 
trolled the might of the United States, did you not? 

Admiral Stark. Well, we fight for peace after it has been lost by 
diplomacy and not beforehand. I would consider that the message 
which went out woukl be diplomatic and would be a {^13747^ 
state matter from the State Department political angle, and that that 
would be primarily their responsibility. 

Senator Ferguson. You were controlling the Navy. Would not 
you have to be ready tliat if this warning was sent it might and could 
possibly mean war. and that war might or could possibly start imme- 
diately, and therefore a new alert, something new would be necessary? 

Admiral Stark. Not to my mind ; no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You do not think so ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. We felt we were fully alerted. Our plans 
were ready, if war broke, in all theaters. 

Senator Ferguson. Now I have another item here. I show you a 
message from OPNAV, which was your Department, to CINCAF, 
which was sent about noon prior to the attack on the 7th. Would you 
just read that and tell me if you know anything about it ? I received 
that March 6 from counsel. It was requested prior to that but was 
sent to me on that day. 

(The document was handed to Admiral Stark.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5169 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield before we go on to another 
subject? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. I wonder if there is anything to show that this sug- 
gested paper, which has been read into the record, was ever sent by 
the British Government ? 

[13748] Senator Ferguson. Yes; the first sheet shows that the 
British Government sent it to us. 

Mr. Murphy. No; but I mean to Japan. Did the President send 
that message to Japan? 

Senator Ferguson. No, it does not show. 

Mr. Murphy. This is just a tentative suggestion, isn't that right? 

Mr. Masten. That is correct, so far as we know. 

Mr. Murphy. So far as you know, there never was a message sent by 
the British to Japan ? 

Senator Ferguson. I would like to say here, Counsel, Mr. Hull 
nowhere in his statement mentions this item. So far the records have 
not shown that any message was delivered to the Australian Minister, 
or that the President had decided to do what is set forth here by the 
Australian Minister. I wish you would now check the records of the 
Secretary of State and White' House to ascertain what memorandum 
we have about what the President had determined to do, when he 
determined to do it, and wdien the messages were sent, and when this 
message was sent to the Australian Minister. I think that is very 
important in this record. 

Mr. Masten. We will be glad to do that. I think if there were any 
further documents in the State Department about that they would 
have turned it over in response to the numerous [l-j'/'^O] re- 
quests we have made to them, and the request which was made orig- 
inally to them. We can ask them again. 

Senator Ferguson. I just cannot conceive of the fact that our Gov- 
ernment would send this kind of message to the Australian Minister 
and keep no memorandum of it. Our State Department functions 
in the way we have been shown by the record, that of anything that is 
done a memorandum is made. 

Mr. Masten. Senator, this is not a memorandum from our (lovern- 
ment. 

Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that very much. It comes from 
the Australian Government, but it indicates clearly that the Austra- 
lian JNIinister had this information from our Government, and I have 
never known our Government to give verbal information ; they would 
make a memorandum of what they had given to another Government. 
Governments do not function along that line. For that reason I ask 
that the Secretai-y of State's office again be asked for this information. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield just for the one matter of the 
insertion in the record? 

Senator Ferguson. There would be a memorandum of a conversa- 
tion, because if they have a conversation they make a memorandum of 
it. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; I will yield. 

[13760] Mr. Murphy. Don't you think the record should sho^^• 
what you are reading from is a paraphrase of a telegram from the 

79716— 46— pt. 11 3 



5170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of State 
for Dominion Affairs of tlie United Kingdom? 

Senator Ferguson. That has already been read into the record. 

Mr. Murphy. I do not believe it has. 

The Chairman. I would like to ask one question about this. The 
first paper you read is dated December 7. That is the day on which the 
attack was made, and it refers to the papers that were read later. 

Now obviously that message, that memorandum was made before 
the attack, otherwise it would have no purpose whatever, and when 
the attack came of course it vitiated and nullified all this talk of what 
vas going to be done in that suggestion. 

Does the record show at what time that memorandum was received 
or made or sent ? It must have been on the morning of the 7th. 

Mr. Masten. There is nothing on that shown in the document. We 
have photostats of the original here. 

The Chairman. It is obvious it must have been made before the 
attack. 

Mr. Maoten. That is correct. 

The Chairman. There would be no point to sending it after 
1137S1'] the attack, because the whole situation had changed. 

Mr. Masten. That is correct. 

Mr. Richardson. There is only one date, Mr. Chairman, on this 
entire photostat, and that is in the first memorandum, the first note 
of the Prime Minister, that bears the date on the bottom of 
December 7. 

The Chairman. It bears the date December 7, and it refers to 
these other documents you have read, and it seems obvious to me that 
all this must have happened on the morning of the 7th before the 
attack, because there would have been no point in having such docu- 
ments or making any such suggestions or recommendations after the 
attack became known. 

Senator Brewster. Will the Senator yield ? 

The Chairman. Yes. I am just trying to straighten this out here. 

Senator Brewster. WTien you say it all transpired earlier, it ap- 
pears that the message from the Prime Minister of the Dominion 
Government could have been 1, 2, or 3 days earlier. It does not ap- 
pear as to the date that message was submitted to our Government 
on the 7th, and there also appears no time on the paraphrase of the 
telegram. Do you know why that is? Wliy should not we have the 
day and time of that? 

Mr. Masten. I understand we asked the State Department for that 
date. 

[13752] The Chairman. This December 7 document, the only 
one that has any date on it, must have been submitted to the Presi- 
dent on that day, because it says the Prime Minister would be glad 
to have any connnents which the President may have on the attached 
draft. Whenever that other draft was written does not seem to 
appear. 

Senator Ferguson, Mr. Chairman, I think it is material if you 
look at the original photostatic copy, the first sheet, which is a small 
paper from the British Embassy. It is mimeographed and there- 
fore does not show it. At the top of it it has the seal of the British 
Government, indicating that they attached the sheet sent to our State 
Department, or to the President, the next two sheets. But the sig- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5171 

nificant-part of that is that the last page indicates the negotiations 
Avere going on with Australia prior to that, because the President 
had not sent his message to the Emperor until the night of the 6th, 
and this says, "The President has decided to send a message to the 
Emperor." It would indicate that he had not sent it, that he had 
just decided to send it, and that this is what he is going to do after 
it goes, he is going to wait until Monday. 

I think it is very material that we get all these dates. 

The Chairman. That was all thrown out the window by what hap- 
pened at noon Sunday, which must have been not very long [1S7SS^ 
after this thing was delivered to the President, because it was delivered 
to him on the morning of the 7th. There seems to have been a con- 
fusion there as to the time. I do not know that it makes much differ- 
ence when these other papers were drafted. They were evidently 
submitted to the President on the 7th. 

Mr. Richardson. My view, and the interpretation we have made 
at our office of it was that this proposed dispatch from the British 
Government to Japan, consisting of two pages here in this photostat, 
was a document prepared by the British Government without date, 
for the purpose of being transmitted to the President. That is the 
idea the British Government had as to what the President might do, 
and as to its reliance on it. That, in connection with the preparation 
of this document by the British Government, the Australian Minister 
for External Affairs put a condition on his agreement to it. Then 
that added to the other was to be presented to the President. 

Now, it seems perfectly clear that it was intended to be presented to 
the President, and it seems perfectly clear that before the Australian 
Minister made up his dispatch the President had not yet sent his 
message to Japan. 

The Chairman. He had not received these papers, either. 

Mr. Richardson. The Australian Minister must have received the 
proposal of the British Government, because a [1S7S4.] part 
of the Australian Minister's answer is that the President has decided 
to send a message. 

Now, apparently they were not through with contact with the Do- 
minion Government at that time, at the time this first note of Decem- 
ber 7 was made, because of the recital that the Dominion governments 
have yet to give their views on this text. Consequently, it would seem 
as though the thing was all tentative and was to be crystallized when 
the President issued his message to Japan. 

The important thing about it, from our standpoint, was the second 
clause, which indicates a knowledge on the part of the Australian 
Minister of what the President proposed to do if he received no reply 
from Japan. 

Now, the interesting thing is, or was, to us as soon as we saw this, 
which was recently, and that is where did the Minister from Australia 
get his authority to state what the President's procedure was to be? 
Now, if that was a conversation between him and the President, then 
we have to look in the Presidential files possibly for the basis for that 
conversation. 

If the State Department had anything to do with it I am satisfied 
we would find in the State Department records a memorandum of the 
President's procedure, but until this Australian document came in we 
found nothing that indicated [1S7SS] any procedure on the 



5172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

part of the President at all after his message. Of course, it- is true 
that before any of it could be crystallized into action the attack came 
about; but that still does not dispose of the question as to whether 
the President had made u]) liis mind as to what he intended to do. 

[137S6] Mr. Clark. I would like to ask, counsel, if you have 
any evidence that the President ever saw these papers before he sent 
his message to Japan. 

Mr. Richardson. These papers came to us from Miss Tully in an- 
swer to our request that she take from the Presidential records any- 
thing that had any reference to Pearl Harbor. 

So they went to the President. There is nothing to indicate here 
that the President saw them before the Pearl Harbor attack. 

Mr. Clark. I mean before he sent his message to Japan, to the Em- 
peror. 

Mr. Richardson. There is nothing in these papers to indicate that 
(he President saw any of these documents before he made his address 
to the Emperor. 

Mr. Clark. Then what is the significance of them here? 

Mr. Richardson. The only significance — I won't say the only signi- 
ficance — but the sharp significance to us, Mr. Congressman, was that 
Australia seemed to have learned from the President that if the Jap- 
anese did not reply to the prospective message that President Roose- 
velt was to send to the Emperor, that then President Roosevelt had 
determined that he would issue the Presidential warning on Tuesday 
afternoon or evening. 

Up to now we have had no such information from any source. 

[Lrr.57] Mr. Clark. But he did actually send it on the 6th? 

Mr. Richardson. Yes. 

Mr. Clark. The night of the 6th. 

Mr. Richardson. He sent it on the 6th. Now, did he receive a reply 
to his message to the Emperor? 

Mr. Murphy. Not until after the attack. 

Mr. Richardson. Then before he could act on it, under the procedure 
identified by the Australian Minister, presumably the attack on Pearl 
Harbor came about. 

The Chairman. The message sent on the night of the 6th was not the 
warning contemplated by these papers. 

Mr. Richardson. That is right. 

The Chairman. His message was more in the nature of an appeal. 

Mr. Richardson. That is right. 

The Chairman. Not a warning. These papers indicate that if he 
got no reply by the following Tuesday, he then would issue to the 
Japanese Government what was regarded as a warning. 

Mr. Richardson. Yes, sir. 

The Chair^ian. The attack cut that all off. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I don't think the record should 
stand as it now stands, that the Australian Minister knew facts and 
circumstances that the Secretary of State of [JIS75S] the United 
States did not know. For that reason I would like to clear up as to 
whether it is possible that the Australian Minister in Washington 
knew these facts set forth which our own Secretary of State didn't 
know, and which the American people haven't known until this 
morning. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5173 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. I think that we ought to look into the facts in 
the Secretary of State's office to see whether that is possible. 
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 
Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. I would like to inquire whether, since this has been 
known long enough for us to have clearance from the British Govern- 
ment, if counsel, or anyone has asked the State Department that spe- 
cific question, or Sumner Welles, as to their knowledge as to this par- 
ticular document. 

Senator Ferguson, Mr. Welles w^as examined in detail. 
Mr. Murphy. The fact is that we had to wait until counsel got 
clearance through the State Department. 

Since it was known that it was going to be introduced, has the 
State Department or Mr. Welles, formerly with the State Depart- 
ment, been asked this question, as to whether the American State 
Department knew about it ? 

Mr. Masten. That question has not been asked. 
[J37S9] Mr. Murphy. I don't think it is a fair inference to say 
that our State Department did not know, and that it was not known 
b}' the American people until this morning, then. 

Mr. Masten. I think perhaps the record should show where the 
documents came from, and when. 

The two British documents were found in the President's file by 
Miss Tully, and were not found in the State Department files. They 
were in the papers that wei-e submitted to the committee informally 
several months ago, and it was decided to request a clearance. That 
request was made as soon as the instructions were given by the com- 
mittee. 

Clearance was not given until this letter from the State Department 
was received, last Friday, I believe. It is undated, but I understand 
that it came in the office last Friday. And the reason clearance was 
held up was because the British Government advised the State De- 
partment that they wanted to submit this document to the Dominions — 
because the first memorandum says the Dominions were being con- 
sulted at the time it occurred. The documents were then mimeo- 
graphed and were distributed here this morning. 

Senator Ferguson. So the record may be clear, I don't purport to 
state what the Secretary of State knew. I merely stated that our 
record up to date indicates that he didn't know this, and that is why 
I think he ought to have a chance [13760] to look into it. 

The Chairman. Counsel will inquire of the State Department any 
further facts relating to these documents that are on record.^ 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Stark, we can prove one fact here 
this morning, can we not, that the Navy, as far as you were concerned 
had no knowledge of the contents of these documents that we have 
been speaking so much about this morning ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct, to the best of my remembrance; 
and after hearing the discussion, I don't think I could be expected 
to have any, in view of the time and date. 

Senator Ferguson. All of this discussion has not refreshed your 
memory ? 
Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

1 See p. 5507 et seq., infra, for further information in this connection. 



5174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Brewster. May I interrupt? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Senator Brewster. What you say as to the timing, Admiral, is not 
quite relevant, as, if this document of the Australian is correct, and 
that a decision had been reached on procedure. That must have been, 
I would assume, prior to December 7, as the clear implication of the 
document is that the Australian Government had sent this message to 
the Prime Minister and had received prior thereto word from the 
Australian Minister in Washington as to what was contemplated would 
be done. That [13761'] must have been a decision at or earlier 
than December 6, and would, presumably have been the result of con- 
sultations between the responsible authorities, among whom you would 
be included. 

So I don't think you can dispose of the matter by saying it was 
simply relating to December 7. If there were a decision, it must have 
been certainly some days earlier. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; I see your point. 

Senator Brewster. You would agree that that was so? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. It seems to me that this illustrates very clearly 
the necessity of thorough exploration and the tremendous vahie of 
cross-examination — not in any hostile sense, but in simply seeking 
out all of the relevant material, since we have been on this question 
now for nearly 6 months and here is something which would appear 
to be the basis for decision relating to this anair which none of us 
have been previously advised of, and either the Secretary of State 
did not know about it, which seems unlikely, or didn't consider it 
material in his review of the situation. 

The result is to leave one pondering how many other documents, 
or material of this character may still have not been developed. 

The Chairman. Before j^ou go on to your next matter [137621 
Senator Ferguson, there is a question of procedure that has to be 
settled. 

I have got to be on the floor at 12 o'clock on account of the housing 
bill, and the members of the House tell me that they have to be over 
in the House. 

The other day you indicated to me that you couldn't be here to- 
morrow. 

Senator Ferguson. That is correct. 

The Chairman. And I can't be here tomorrow because I have to 
be before another committee. 

Under those circumstances we cannot hold a session this afternoon. 
It may have to go over until Thursday morning. 

Senator Ferguson. On Thursday I couldn't reach Washington until 
about 11 o'clock. 

The Chairman. General Marshall advises me that he is extremely 
anxious to return to China on account of the situation that we are 
all familiar with. He is getting daily requests to return immediately. 
For that reason I don't like to hold him here longer than necessary. 

This is off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

The Chairman. Come around then, General. Maybe we can finish 
with you now. 

Admiral Stark, you will be available? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5175 

[1376S] Admiral Stark. Yes, sir.^ 

The Chairman, It is very essential that we conclude these hearings 
at the earliest possible date. Time is rmming against us. We are 
all hoping that there will not be another request for an extension 
of time to make a report. 

But that is another matter. 

Go ahead, counsel. 

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL OF THE ARMIES GEORGE C. MARSHALL 

(Resumed) 

Mr. Richardson. General, where were you living on the 6th and 7th 
of December 1941? 

General Marshall. Fort Myer, Va., sir. 

Mr. Richardson. The evidence that has been taken here indicates, 
at pages 2930 and 3091,^ that your records show nothing to indicate 
that you were not home on the night and evening of December 6th. 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. There was at all times at your home, people who 
knew your whereabouts? 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Richardson, And who could answer telephone inquiries as to 
your whereabouts? 

General Marshall. Correct, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. You recall when you came to your office 
[13764] on Sunday morning, the Ttli, seeing the message that was 
referred to as the 14-parts message? 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. When you first saw that message, it was complete 
was it not. General ? 

General Marshall. It was complete. 

Mr. Richardson. With the 1 o'clock p. m., notice in connection 
with it? 

General Marshall, "That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. That was the first time, as I understand your 
testimony, which you already have given, that you ever saw that 
message, or any part of it ? 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Richardson, Did anyone at any time prior to your seeing that 
message, tell you the nature of the intercept which constituted the 
14-part message ? 

General Marshall, Only to the extent that when I came in from 
a ride on that Sunday morning of December 7, I was told, either 
after I got in the shower, or as I went into it, that the officer in charge 
of the "magic," Colonel Bratton, desired to come out right away to 
show me an important message. But the contents were not mentioned. 
The fact that it was important was mentioned. And my reply was 
that I would reach the Department immediately, not to come out to 
the house, 

[137615] Mr. Richardson. Were you first contacted by your 
aide? 

General Marshall. I had no aide. My orderly gave me the message. 

Mr. Richardson. He gave you the message that Colonel Bratton 

General Marshall. Wanted to come out to the house. 



1 Admiral Stark's testimony is resumed on p. 5202, infra. 
* Hearings, Part 3, pp. 1110 and 1174, respectively. 



5176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. KiciiAKDSox. Then your reply Avas, Colonel Bratton testified, 
to take it to your office, and that you would come to your office. 

General Marshall. Correct. 

Mr. RiciiARDSox. The only description of what the message was, was 
that it was an important message? 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. 

JSIr, RicHARDSox. Was there any attempt, do you know of any 
attempt prior to Colonel Bratton 's contact with your orderly, to engage 
your attention in connection with slwj part of this 14-part message? 

General Marshall. I know of no such attempt. 

Mr. Kichardsox. Would there, in your opinion, have been any diffi- 
culty in reaching you on Saturday night at your home ? 

General Marshall. None whatever. 

^Ir. RicHARDSox. Would you be able to testify definitely. General, 
that no one did reach you with any message in refer- [13766] 
ence to the 14-part message on the, night of December 6? 

General Marshall. Xo one did reach me in regard to that message. 

Mr. Richardsox. And when you rose in the morning, went for your 
ride, you were entirely without any knowledge whatever that any such 
message, any part of the message, had been received the night before, 
or that tlie balance of it had alreadv been received on the morning of 
the 7th > 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Richardsox. There was no comnuniication to you that the 13- 
part message had been presented to the President? 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Richardsox. Or that the President had characterized its 
nature ? 

General JMarshall. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. RicHARDSox^. And, so far as you know, no one made any at- 
tempt whatever to get information to you until Colonel Bratton 
attempted to on the morning of December 7 ? 

General iSIarshall. That is correct. 

Mv. Richardsox'. Xo furtlier questions. 

The Chairman. No questions, 

Mr. Cooper? 

The Vice Chairmax\ Just one point, if ^ may, G?neral. 

As I recall. Colonel Bratton test'fi?d that he called you home Sun- 
day morning, and talked to your orderly there, and was told that you 
had gone for your horseback ride and that he asked the orderly if 
he knew how to get in touch v\-ith you and he stated that he did: 
that Colonel Bratton thereupon requested the orderly to get in touch 
with you and ask you to go to the nearest telephone and call him; 
and, as I recall Colonel Bratton also stated that his recollection was 
that you called him about 10 : 30 and that lie told yoi: that he had an 
important message that he wanted to show vou and that you told him 
you woi^ld be at the War Department in a short time. 

Do you have any recollection of having called Colonel Bratton that 
morning, and having such a conversation? 

General Marshall. Xone whatever. 

The Vice Chairmax. I thank you. 

The Chairman. Mr. Clark. 

Mr. Clark. No questions. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5177 

The Chairman. Mr. Murphy. 

]Mr, Murphy. No questions. 

The Chairman. Senator Brewster? 

Senator Brewster. General, there is just one matter that I wanted 
to have a little more formally established than was before in your 
evidence. 

It seems to have some sijjjnificance. 

[13768] That is, your expression of opinion — I do not know how 
casual it was, which appears on page 1149 of the printed proceedings 
now, page 3,028 of the record, concerning the decision of the Japa- 
nese, and this was the language which you used : 

Had they — 

meaning the Japanese — 

not attacked on December Ttli, liad they waited, for example, until January 1st, 
there is a possibility that they would not have launched the attack. 

That, I assume, represents a rather considered judgment as to, at 
least, what was a possibility ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. And that was based, as the context shows, on 
the events around Moscow, Avhere the German attack was going for- 
ward, but the turn came at just about that time. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. In the early days. 

General JNIarshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. The Japanese found themselves then committed. 

General Marshaix. Yes. It also related to what we were going to 
be able to do in the interim. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

General Marshall. Between, we will say, the 1st of [13769] 
December, and the 1st of January. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. You and Admiral Stark had both con- 
curred in hoping that decision might be deferred for at least 2 or 3 
months. 

General Marshall. That was our great desire. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. That was the occasion of the discussion 
of the modus vivendi ? 

General Marshall. That is correct. 

Senator Brewster. And the documents in relation thereto? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. To what extent was there knowledge in our 
Department here, and yom- information, if you have any recollection 
at this time, as to the imminence of any change in the situation around 
Moscow at that time, do you recall ? 

General Marshall, I don't recall what the status of that informa- 
tion was on December 6 and December 7. I recall when the cumula- 
tive information came in, we became aware that the change of 
weather had ruined the Germany Army, in addition to the added 
troop defense of Moscow. But whether that came to us on that date 
or later, I couldn't say. The newspaper files could tell us a great deal 
on that. 

Senator Brewster. Did we have intelligence operating at that time 
regarding those events ? 



5178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

That is, what sources did we have? 

[13770'] General Marshall. Our sources were largely those that 
came from the Russian Government in its official communiques. 

Senator Brewster. From what? 

General Marshall. The Soviet Government, in its official communi- 
ques. 

Senator Brewster. Well, didn't the British have additional Intelli- 
gence, as a result of their involvement ? 

General Marshall. I don't recall whether tliey gave us anything at 
that time. 

Senator Brewster. But whether they would have had it? 

General Marshall. They might have had. 

Senator Brewster. My question was as to whether they would have 
any more means, as they were actively involved. 

General Marshall. Yes. I don't know how well their system was 
built up at that time, but they might have had more. 

Senator Brewster. Would there be records as to the interchange of 
information between our Government and the British Government at 
the military level regarding the developments prior to December 7 ? 

General Marshall. There might be in the G-2 files. 

Senator Brewster. Well, presumably there was a great change after 
December 7. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

[13771'] Senator Brewster. What I am concerned with is how 
far you had gone in developing the interchange of the military infor- 
mation regarding enemy movements. 

General Marshall. At that time, I am quite certain that the facts of 
the British source of information was not known to us — I am quite 
certain of that, naturally, it was not known to us — but in addition they 
were not giving us the facts. They were not jeopardizing the source. 

Senator Brewster. Yes, and they would probably 

General Marshall. It was quite some time after that, quite a long 
time after that before they took the risk of telling us exactly what they 
had. They gave us the sense of the reports, but the actual authoritative 
statements of what it was, and who said it, we did not know. 

Senator Brewster. Would it be a fair inference that prior to De- 
cember 7, the British were in all probability far better informed re- 
garding events around Moscow, in the month of November than was 
our own Intelligence ? 

General MLvrshall. I couldn't give an opinion on that. Senator 
Brewster, for the reason that I don't know just when the British ac- 
i^omplished the break-down of the German codes. It was not only a 
question of breaking it down, but the rapidity with which you could 
pick up the changes. All of which was a tremendous development. I 
don't know what that was at [13772] that time. They may 
have been 3 or 4 weeks behind the events. 

Senator Brewster. Didn't the British necessarily have some form 
of liaison with the Russians during that period? 

General Marshall. I don't know that they had any better than 
we had. 

Senator Brewster. They were at war and we were not. 

General Marshall. Yes; but after we were in the war we still de- 
pended largely on the Soviet communiques for a long time. The 
Soviet Government didn't trust our security. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5179 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

General Marshall. And they were very reluctant to open that up 
to us. 

Senator Brewster. Do you think they may have been equally skep- 
tical regarding the British ? 

General Marshall. Well, the British have a pretty firm law on the 
question, which we do not have. 

Senator Brewster. That is right. 

General Marshall. They have the means of maintaining security 
which we lack. 

Senator Brewster. There might be closer coordination between two 
nations that were actually involved in war on the same side, and 
another country which was not. 

General Marshall. I was judging that through the back side 
[13773] of my knowledge of our relationships with the Soviet 
Government later on. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. What interested me was the dropping of 
the modus vivendi around November 26, concerning which Secretary 
Welles testified, which apparently occasioned some surprise to Lord 
Halifax, who, as he said, came down quite early the next morning, 
and wanted to know what happened with the modus vivendi, and was 
simply surprised that London had indicated the day before that they 
thought it had better be dropped. 

That may have been a very important turning point, if your opinion 
is correct, if the modus vivendi which, apparently was being very 
seriously considered, and had been approved by you and Admiral 
Stark on November 25, I think it was, as adequate to protect our in- 
terests, had gone into effect for 3 months, then we should have had 
exactly the situation you envisaged in your opinion, the Japanese 
having discovered meanwhile that the Moscow retreat was on, and 
it might have reoriented their entire view. Would that be a fair 
inference ? 

General Marshall. That might be, but as I recall — I am trying 
to think back to the terms of discussion of that day, and the docu- 
ments — the Chinese reaction was quite pertinent to the occasion; as 
I recall that was the most vigorous opposi- [13774] tion to the 
affair, and that the real decision was largely based on that, where we 
dropped the matter; that the Generalissimo was terribly upset over 
the psychological reaction to China. 

Senator Brewster. Do you recall discussion of the decision to drop 
the modus vivendi around November 25, when that decision was 
reached? Do you recall. Secretary Stimson's report to us showed, 
and Colonel Knox's that some 2 days before they carefully considered 
this modus vivendi, in conference with you and Admiral Stark, and 
had decided that it would adequately protect us. Then, Secretary 
Stimson showed, a day or two later, that that had been dropped. This 
showed it was on November 25. 

Mr. HxTLL. This was a very full day indeed. At 9 : 30, Knox and I met in 
Hull's oflSce for our meeting of three. Hull showed us the proposal for 3 months 
truce which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It 
adequately safeguarded all of our interests, I thought, as we read it, but I don't 
think there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it, because it was so drastic. 

Mr. Murphy. I think you said Mr. Hull. Those are Mr. Stimson's 
words, aren't they? 



5180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Seiuitor Brfavstkr. If I said Mi\ Hull. I meant to say Mr. Stimson. 

\i:^77o] Mr. Mi'HiMiY. I think you did. 

Senator Bkkwstkr. Yes. This is Mr. Stimson's report of his con- 
ference with Mr. Hull and with Colonel Knox. 

Now, immediately following that, 2 days later, this was dropped and 
Ml'. Hull re])orted that they decided to drop the modus vivendi, and 
were going forward with the- document which has heen variously dis- 
cussed as to whether it was an ultimatum or not. Do you recall any 
conversations following the approval of the modus vivendi as ade- 
quate, which, I assume. Secretary Stimson had arrived at after con- 
sultation with you, do you recall any conversations following that 
as to the dropping of the modus vivendi? 

General Marshall. My recollection is. and I have a fairly clear 
recollection of our disappointment, that from the military point of 
view, meaning Army and Xavy, that we would not gain any more 
time; our relationship to these discussions was on the one side the 
desire to gain as much time as we possibly could and on the other 
to see that commitments were not made that endangered us from 
a military point of view. 

Senator Brewster. Do you recall the day you went away? 

General Marshall. I left, I think, the night of — I wasn't here 
the 27th 

[13776] Senator FERGtrsoN. The night of the 2C)th. 

General Marshall. I left the night of the 26th. 

Senator Brewster. On the 26th, Mr. Stimson records in his diary: 

Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his 
mind not to give (make) the proposition that Knox and I passed on the othei- 
day to the .Japanese, but to kick the whole tiling over — to tell them that he 
has no other proposition at all. The Chinese have objected to that proposi- 
tion — when he showed it to them; that is, to the pntposltion which he showed 
to Knox and me, because it involves giving to the .Japanese a small modicum 
of oil for civilian use during the interval of the truce of the 'A months. Chiang 
Kai-Shek had sent a special message to the effect that that would make a terrif- 
ically bad impression in China ; that it would destroy all of their courage 
and that they (it) w.ould play into the hands of his, Chiang's, enemies, and 
that the Japanese would use it. 

A few minutes later I talked to the President over the telephone and I asked 
him whether he had received the paper which I had sent him over last night 
about the .Japanese having started a new expeditnni from Shanghai down to- 
wards Indo-China. He fairly blew up — jumped up Into the air, so to speak, 
and said he hadn't seen it * * *. 

[1S777] The decision by Hull was, a|)parently, arrived at in a 
24-hour period there, but it is not clear as to the considerations other 
than the objections of the Japanese 

General Marshall. Chinese, you mean ? 

Senator Brewster. Yes, the Chinese. 

The British message, meanwhile, as I recall it, the only cable we 
have regarding it, the morning of the 26th, to which Secretary 
Welles referred, said, speaking of the Chinese opposition. 

Isn't this a pretty thin diet? 

That was the comment. Now, can you recall any conversations in 
those 2-day periods, the 25th and the 26th, regarding the dropping of 
the modus vivendi, which was of, certainly, gieat significance from 
your viewpoint, because it, instead of giving you the 3 months that 
you and Admiral Stark desired, it meant that you might have to 
face the eventualities in the immediate future '( 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5181 

General Marshall. I do not recall the specific conversations. I 
do recall our disappointment tliat the objections made by the Chinese 
Government had caused the matter to be dropped, as I recall, at the 
time. 

Senator Brewster. Counsel reminds me that there was a memo- 
randum to the President from you and Admiral Stark regarding this 
period. Do you recall that? 

[1S778] Senator Ferguson. Dated the 27th of November. 

Senator Brewster. What was the date of it? 

Mr. Masten. The 27th of November. 

Senator Breavster. Have you got it there ? 

(Exhibit No. 17 was handed to Senator Brewster.) 

Senator Brewster. Exhibit 17. 

Senator Ferguson. There were two messages that were very similar, 
one of November 5, which is Exhibit 16, and this, which is Exhibit 17. 

Mr. Murphy. November 5 was the one at the time they were going 
to go into Hunan Province ; the 27th was before you went south ? 

General Marshall. Oh, yes. 

Senator Brewster. That is a matter of record. Undoubtedly it 
represents your views on the matter at that time. But you do not 
recall whether you had any conversations regarding the matter with 
Mr. Stimson or Admiral Stark on the 25th or 2(ith following your 
approval of the modus vivendi ? 

General Marshall. I would be pretty certain that I did discuss it 
with Mr. Stimson because we were talking every day a number of times 
a day, on what was going on. 

Senator Brewster. My attention is called to this, I don't know 
what significance it may or may not have, but on December 7, 1941, 
in the Sunday Star, Washington, in a review [13779] of the 
war, there appears this report, apparently summarizing the events of 
the preceding week : 

By Friday, Moscow claimed 4,000 square miles re-won. Berlin admitted re- 
verses but minimized their extent and emphasized Russian losses. Although the 
present phase of this Red counter-offensive Is an early one, the immediate effect 
is to relieve for the present the threat to the Nazi entrance into the oil areas of 
the Caucasus. 

That, apparently, is the information which we had here. Now, to 
what extent was consideration of the Russian situation entering into 
your calculations in estimating probable Japanese actions at that time? 
Did you at that time think of that as a factor? 

General Marshall. I would have great difficulty in giving aai 
accurate answer to that. It was quite evident to us, of course, when the 
German Army was repulsed, and had to retreat, that there had been a 
tremendous change in the European situation. 

Senator Brew^ster. Yes. 

General Marshall. But until we knew that, until that was conclu- 
sively established, and not subject to the suspicion of over-propa- 
gandized communiques, we were going along, you might say, from clay 
to day in the general battle. The German advances had been con- 
sistent throughout and here came [13780] a turning point. 

Until we knew that, of course, I doubt if great emphasis was being 
placed by us on the current situation in Russia, other than the fact 
that so far as the Japanese would be concerned, the Russian Army 



5182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

was imperiled, and, of course, their situation was vastly simplified 
if the Kussian Army was out of the picture because of Manchuria. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. Well, to what extent were you revising 
your estimates of the Russian strength in the light of developments? 
In the earlier case there had been a pretty general opinion that they 
probably wouldn't be able to hold out. As the time went on, I assume 
your respect for their military potential increased. 

General Marshall. Respect for their endurance and their prodigi- 
ous ability to take losses increased. Later on, beginning with the 
Moscow incident, our respect for their technical, military capabilities 
rapidly increased and came to a very decided point with the surrender 
of the German Army before Stalingrad. 

Senator Brewster. This is the memorandum which was referred to, 
of November 27, when, as I understand it, you were out of town, (Re- 
fers to Exhibit No. 17.) 

General Marshall. Yes. 

[13781'] Senator Brewster (reading) : 

Memorandum for the President. 
Subject : Far Eastern Situation. 

It must have been prepared- 



General Marshall. Prepared on the 26th, I think, after a Joint 
Board meeting. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. That would be coincident with Mr. 
Hull's advice to Mr. Stimson that he thought he would drop the modus 
Vivendi, that he would drop that arrangement which had been approved 
by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy the day before, 
the 25th, and now he thought he would drop it. 

General Marshall. Whether or not that is coincident depends on 
whether or not we knew the minute that thing was being drafted what 
the Secretary said. 

Senator Brewster. You said you thought it was probably prepared 
the day before. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brewster. That happens to be the precise time, November 
26, when Mr. Stimson records in the diary, 

Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his 
mind not to give (make) the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other 
day, to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over * * *. 

And so, on the 27th, this memorandum goes to the President 
{13782'] signed by yourself and Admiral Stark which emphasizes, 
apparently, the importance of delay. This is a portion of your 
language : 

The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to pain 
time. Consequently Navy and Army reinforcements have been rushed to the 
Philippines, but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. The process 
of reinforcement is being continued. Of great and immediate concern is the 
safety of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine Corps' convoy just 
leaving Shanghai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000 are due to sail from the 
United States by December 8, 1941, and it is important that this troop reinforce- 
uient reach the Philippines before hostilities commence. 

Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided so long ns 
consistent with national policy. The longer the delay, the more positive becomes 
the assurance of retention of these islands as a naval and air base. * * * 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5183 

And then you conclude: 

It is recommended that : 

Prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military counter-action 
be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens the United States, 
British, or Dutch territory as above outlined ; * * * 

This is where you used the latitude : 

[13783] However, a Japanese advance to the west of 100 degrees East 
or South of 10 degrees North, immediately becomes a threat to Burma and 
Singapore. Until it is patent that Japan intends to advance beyond these lines, 
no action which might lead to immediate hostilities should be taken. 

That is your reference to the threat. 
Continuing your recommendations : 

In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United 
States, the British, and the Dutch Governments that advance beyond the lines 
indicated may lead to war ; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be 
undertaken; * ♦ • 

And, finally : 

Steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch 
for the issuance of such warning. 

That, apparently, \Yas what may have been a factor in the Presi- 
dent's decision regarding these warnings, but the thing which is of 
significance, in the light of all that transpired, is the extent of the 
British expression of viewpoint on that; that is the thing I think 
becomes of possible significance in the light of Lord Halifax's apparent 
surprise on the morning of November 27 that the modus vivendi had 
been dropped. Apparently he was not informed of the communica- 
tions. And Secretary Welles said, "Well, that is not the way London 
[13784] sounded yesterday," I think, was his comment on it to 
Lord Halifax. 

Now, do you have any recollection as to any emphasis on the British 
viewpoint in the situation at that time apart from the Chinese ? 

General Marshall. I have no recollection. 

Senator Brewster. Would that have been a matter that would have 
come to your attention under any normal circumstances? 

General Marshall. Normally, I think I would have heard it from 
the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson. 

Senator Brewster. Now, the report of Secretary Stimson to the 
committee, which is now before the committee, on page 18, reads : 

Later, Mr. Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and Gen- 
eral Gerow. General Gerow was Chief of the War Planning Division. General 
Marshall was absent, having left the Department to attend certain Army training 
maneuvers which were going on that day. Both Admiral Stark and General 
Gerow were urging that any crisis be postponed as long as possible, to enable 
our preparations to proceed. A memorandum had been prepared by General Mar- 
shall and Admiral Stark to the President on this subject. The opinion of our top 
military and naval advisers was that delay was very desirable but [13785] 
that nevertheless we must take military action if Japan attacked American or 
British or Dutch territory or moved her forces in Indo-China west of 100 degrees 
east or south of 10 degrees north. I told them, which was the fact, that I also 
would be glad to have more time but I did not want it at the cost of humiliation 
of the United States or of backing down on any of our principles which would 
show a weakness on our part. 

That represents, apparently, a summary of what went on as far as 
the War Department and your advice was concerned. 



5184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Now, to what extent, since you have ventured an opinion on Japa- 
nese psycholo<>y and action, in connection with your suggestion that 
if they had delayed until Januai-y they might not have attacked, to 
what extent would Japanese opinion be atTected by knowledge of our 
contemplated action? 

General JNIarsiiall. What action are you referring to? 

Senator Brewster. There are two hypotheses. One indicated by 
the President's statement to Admiral Richardson that even if the 
Japanese attacked the Philippines he wasn't certain that we would 
go to war. The other, the discussions which indicated, apparently, 
that this Government had reached the point where we had concluded 
that if there was an attack on the Dutch or British in the Orient we 
^^ould be obliged to participate. That was the expression of opinion 
of the Cabinet, that it would be supjjorted by the people, and it was 
your [J37S6] opinion you could not allow the Japanese to go 
any further south or west without taking action. Now, to what ex- 
tent would the Japanese decision be affected by knowledge as to our 
contemplated action ? 

Let us assume first that they knew tliat we were going to go to war 
if they attacked Malaya or any portion of that land there. Let us 
assume on the other hand that they knew we were not going to par- 
ticipate unless we were directly attacked ourselves. To what extent 
would their decisions as to action be affected by that knowledge? 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. You nuist also take into consideration our note of 
August 17 to the Japanese. The note we gave to the Japanese on 
August 17 stating what our position was. 

General Marshall. Japanese psychology being what it is and the 
Japanese Army domination being what it was, their general scheme 
for the assumption of power throughout the Far East, particularly the 
Southwest Pacific, being known now, I don't think that would have 
had any particular effect one way or the other. 

Their misjudging regarding us I think was more a question of our 
willingness, our energy, our ability to fight effectively. [13787^ 
They had misjudged us on that. They thought we would be ineffective 
after we started to fight, that we could not organize sufficiently to fight 
effectively. 

They felt that we were highly dangerous with our fleet, when it 
was actually in being, but it requires support, it requires defense of its 
bases at distant points, which means land troops and means sufficient 
air forces for a real protection. Beyond that I don't think that they 
would be deterred from their purpose. 

To that extent they would have felt that it was vital that we be 
isolated out of the wai" in order that they might go ahead with the 
obstruction of British power and, of course, the British Empire, and 
the Dutch, in the Southwest Pacific. That is a rather involved state- 
ment. 

Senator Brewster. I think it is clear. General. That is, you feel 
that their estimate of our potential military striking force was so low 
that they didn't care particularly whether we were in the war or out? 

General Marshall. Except as to the fleet. 

Senator Brewster. Except as to the fleet. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5185 

General Marshall. And they recognized with the fleet that we were 
incapable at that time, apparently, of furnishing the fleet with a base 
in the Far East, unless we took Singapore, because, as you recall, and 
I think the testimony showed, that [1S788] with, I think it was 
26 ocean-going submarines sent to the Philippines, we couldn't even 
give them 1 antiaircraft gun for coverage. 

The matter of Russia would have had dominant importance in their 
minds because that affected the picture. 

Senator Brewster. Because of the Manchurian picture ? 

General Marshall. Because of Manchuria, and because of the effect 
that would have on the conduct of the war in Europe, which up to that 
time had been assumed as a certain eventual German triumph. 

Senator Brewster. In other words, you think that the elimination 
of Russia from the war was something of far more significance to 
them than the possible participation of the United States in the war? 

General Marshall. Very much so. 

Senator Brewster. That is, of course, interesting, and in a way 
complimentary to our Russian friends. 

General Marshall. It is a humiliating admission but that was the 
judgment of the Japanese I think. One of their greatest errors was 
their misjudgment of our fighting capacity. 

Senator Brewster. Yet you would agree that, simply from the im- 
mediate military situation, that if they had felt at all sure that they 
would have had 6 months or a year to carry on their conquests in th« 
Orient without intervention by the [13789] United States, they 
would have felt that was a considerable advantage ? 

General Marshall. Well, I think they would have felt it was an 
advantage to conduct that campaign without the intervention of the 
United States because our naval force that remained after Pearl Har- 
bor was sufficient to enable us to establish bases in Australia. 

Senator Brewster. Yes. 

General Marshall. Now, the Japanese had appeared with their 
heavy war vessels in the Indian Ocean, which meant that the line 
to Australia was very definitely threatened from that side. If the line 
to Australia was also impossible to establish in the Pacific then the 
problem of the Japanese in the long run was infinitely simpler. 

Senator Brew^ster. Has there ever been any indication that the 
Japanese did anything in breaking our codes? 

General Marshall. We have had no indication of that. 

Senator Brewster. That has been explored ? 

General Marshall. I think conclusively. 

Senator Breavster. Of course, this is all hypothetical and has no 
particular relation to the primary purpose here except as the object 
of this inquiry is to keep us out of another difficulty of this kind, but 
would this be a fair inference that if the Japanese knew that we were 
going to [13790] intervene in the event of attack on Malaya, 
they would then recognize that they must, if possible, eliminate our 
fleet on their flank, and, therefore, strike at the onlv real potential we 
then had, which was our fleet? 

General Marshall. That is a possible assumption. 

Senator Brewster. Well, wouldn't that be, from a military stand- 
point, almost inevitable, that the Japanese would never dare move out 
of Malaya if they knew it was going to mean our participation in the 
war, without undertaking to eliminate the fleet on their flank? 

79716— 46— pt. 11 1 



5186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall. It depends on wliat you mean by the word 
"eliminate." They had ah^eady estabhshed themselves in Indochina. 
They were stretched, we thought, even then, into Siam. The question 
was whether they would boldly go with their shipping into the Gulf 
of Siam. They "could have dominated the China Sea in any event. 
They had Koreu to the north of the Philippines. They had the whole 
China coast and the bulge of Indochina all under their control at 
that time. We had no bases. If we had tried, at least in limited 
numbers, to take Singapore, which was the only form of base in the 
Far East, we would have come under the Japanese air out of Indochina 
and out of Siam. 

So there was a very restricted use for our fleet. We had no base in 
Guam. Manila was hopeless. It would have been [13791^ sui- 

cide to put the base in Manila. So that whatever operation we did 
would have to be based back on Hawaii, and the fleet would be out, 
we might say, most of the time, on the end of a plank, as it were, in 
its operations. 

Under those conditions, the Japanese could have gone ahead. Not 
as freely as they could if we were severely damaged, possibly not 
spread out so much as they did if we were not severely damaged, but 
that might have been to their advantage also, because they got too 
large an extension of perimeter; but they still could have gone ahead 
with their affairs with the limitations I have just stated. 

But it would be a very difficult thing for the fleet to operate in the 
Western Pacific without any base of any kind unless it was Singapore. 
That lacked all the essentials necessary to maintain large ships of the 
character which we had. And also that would have been under air 
attack from the Japanese air establishments that already were in Indo- 
china and were, apparently, creeping into Siam. 

Senator Brewster. You would emphasize then that the only thing 
for which the Japanese had much respect, as far as we were concerned, 
was our fleet? 

General Marshall. That is correct. 

Senator Brewster. That was at least potential. But all of these 
considerations and factors entered into your estinuite [J3792] 
of why you did not expect an attack on Pearl Harbor? 

General Marshall. I will say as to the attack on Pearl Harbor, we 
felt that was a vital installation, but we also felt that that was the 
only installation we had anywhere that was reasonably well equipped. 
Therefore, we were not worried about it. In our opinion, the com- 
manders had been alerted. In our opinion, there was nothing more 
we could give them at the time for the purpose of defense. In our 
opinion, that was one place that had enough within itself to put up a 
reasonable defense. 

MacArthur, in the Philippines, was just beginning to get something. 
His position was pitiable, and it was still in a state of complete flux, 
with the ships on the ocean en route out there and the planes half de- 
livered and half still to go. 

[13793] The Panama Canal was quite inadequate at that period, 
seriously inadequate in planes, and, of course, of vast importance to 
anything in the Pacific. 

The only place we had any assurance about was Hawaii, and for 
that reason we had less concern ab(Hit Hawaii because we had worked 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5187 

on it very industriously, we had a tremendous amount of correspond- 
ence about it, and we felt reasonably secure at that one point. 

Therefore we felt that it would be a great hazard for the Japanese 
to attack it. 

Senator Brewster. I hadn't intended to reopen those questions but 
only to go into the broader question of your estimate of whether the 
Japanese attack might be logically expected. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. I read Mr. Stimson's report this 
morning, and his summary of the conditions, and that expresses my 
opinion A^ery well. We had these positive conditions, a little by magic 
and mainl}^ by reconnaissance of the various movements being carried 
on in the Far East, so it was quite evident that the most serious inten- 
tions were there, which was the case in the general campaign. 

Senator Brewster. Hindsight is, of course, easier than foresight, 

General Marshall. Much more convenient. 

[1S794] Senator Brewster. In the light of your review now, it 
would appear that if the advice which you and Admiral Stark had 
given had been accepted, on November 25, 26, and 27, to enter into 
the modus vivendi which, it Avas the considered conclusion of the Army 
and Navy, including the Secretaries of War and Navy, was adequate 
to protect our interests, we do not know what the course of history 
might have been. 

General Marshall. No, we do not know what would have hap- 
pened. You might have had a complete collapse in China which 
might have had a tremendous effect on the balance of the war. 

Senator Brewster. It would be interesting when you have con- 
cluded your labors, to know. I address myself to this only for pos- 
terity. They have got to gather as much wisdom as they can from 
our conduct. 

General Marshall. I might add there, that is what I am engaged 
in in China now. This war started out there, and now the desire is 
to try in some way to arrange it so there will not be a recurrence. 

Senator Brewster. That is all. 

The Vice Chahjman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. General Marshall, you have read Secretary Stim- 
son's memorandum. I want to go to page 12 and ask you if you were 
notified of this — quoting the Secretary of [187951 War : 

The President at the meeting undertook to take an informal vote of the Cabinet 
as to whether it was thought the American people would back us up if it became 
necessary to strike at .lapan, in case she should attack England in Malaya, or the 
Dutch in the East Indies. The Cabinet was unanimous in the feeling that the 
country would support such a move. 

That comes from the diary as of November 7. 

Were you advised as to that vote? 

General Marshall. I have no recollection of it, but I am pretty 
certain he must have told me, because he was telling me the results of 
those meetings. 

Senator Ferguson. Tlien I go to page 27 (page 46) of his memoran- 
dum. This is on November 25. This is the day before the Secretary 
of State sent his message to the Japanese. He is quoting the Presidient : 

Then, at 12 o'clock, General Marshall and I went to the White House where 
we were until nearly half-past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, 
Stark, and myself. There the President, instead of bringing up the Victory 
Parade * * ♦ 



5188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

He says of the Victory Parade : 

This was an office nickname for the General Staff strategic plan of national 
action in case of war in Europe. 

[13796] Going on : 

* * * brought up entirely the relations with the Japanese. He brought 
up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next 
Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, 
and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should 
maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too 
much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition. 

Do you recall that discussion with the President ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How was it thought that we could maneuver 
them into firing the first shot ? Was that discussed ? 

General Marshall. I don't recall the details of that particular 
phase of the matter. 

Senator Ferguson. This takes place before we sent the message of 
the 26th. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Or before you had sent your message to General 
Short on the 27th. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. "Wliat were we going to do to maneuver them 
into firing the first shot? Wliat was the plan of operation? 

General Marshall. You are talking. I take it, about [13797] 
diplomatic procedure? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

General Marshall. I am assuming that it is the diplomatic pro- 
cedure that is being discussed at the present time. We knew our 
resources. We knew our deployment. It was impossible to change 
that on any brief notice. We were committed to deployment thou- 
sands of miles away from the United States. 

So far as the war plan goes, the concern was whether or not the 
final alert should be given. 

I took a discussion of this kind — at least I take it now — was a dis- 
cussion of the diplomatic procedure involved, having in mind that 
it was the accepted thought in all of our minds at that time, that 
if we were forced to take offensive action, immediate ojffensive action, 
that it would be a most serious matter as to its interpretation by the 
American people, whether we would have a united nation, or whether 
we would have a divided nation in getting into a world conflict. 

Senator Ferguson. But this 

General Marshall. The planning they are talking about is the 
discussion that came later, as I understood. 

Senator Ferguson. You would take it that Mr. Stimson has in 
mind that we were going to maneuver diplomatically into a position 
where they would be compelled to fire the first shot? 

[13798] General Marshall. No, I don't mean to imply that. I 
mean the expression he is using relates to what would be the diplo- 
matic procedure we would follow, so we would not find ourselves in 
a dangerous position where we had to do something initiating a fight. 
He was not trying to provoke the Japanese to fight. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5189 

Senator Ferguson. Let's take his language : 

The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the 
first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. 

General Marshall. That is exactly what I said, sir. When you are 
sitting back and the other man is doing all of the maneuvering, you 
are in a very dangerous position. The question and the desire at that 
time was to delay in every way possible a rupture in the Pacific. 

Now, if they were going to attack, it was very important 

Senator Ferguson. Right there, General, may I interrupt to ask, 
were we of the opinion at that time that they were going to attack? 

General Marshall. That was the general opinion, that they were 
going to attack, definitely, in the Southwest Pacific. 

Senator Ferguson. And we wanted to lay our course diplomatically 
so that we would make sure that thej^ would fire the^ [13799] 
first shot ? 

General Marshall. So that we would make sure that we would 
not be in such a dangerous position that we would be forced to fire the 
first shot ourselves. That is another way of putting it, but that is 
what he is talking about. 

Senator Ferguson. That is one of the things that led to this re- 
stricted language in the message of the 27th. 

General Marshall. So far as the first shot is concerned ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And also as to — well, the first overt act is the 
same thing as the first shot. 

General Marshall. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And that was leading up to that message; is 
that correct ? 

General Maeshall. No, this was leading up, as I understood it, 
and as I recall it, to what the diplomatic procedure was to be. The 
alert, to a certain extent, you might say, is a routine. Not in one sense 
that alert for war is ever routine, but the arranging, the phrasing of 
that alert to fight. What the diplomatic and political situation was, 
was another matter. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, was this discussed at the same meeting? 

Mr. Stimson said, at the bottom of page 47 : 

I pointed out to the President that he had already taken [13S00] the 
first steps toward an ultimatum in notifying ,7apan way 'back last summer that 
if she crossed the border into Thailand, she was violating our safety, and that 
therefore he had only to point out (to Japan) that to follow any such expedition 
was a violation of a warning we had already given. So Hull is to go to work on 
preparing that. 

Now, I take it he was talking about the memorandum and the con- 
versation he had on the 27th of August. That is when the President 
returned from the Atlantic Conference. 

We had taken, as Mr. Stimson defines it, the first step in an ulti- 
matum, and that if America wanted to, we could rely upon that 
particular message as saying — 

We have warned you. Therefore if you do anything you take the first step 
and fire the first shot. 

Is that correct ? Is that a fair analysis ? 

General Marshall. I think that is the rough idea of the thing ; yes. 



5190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. And it says then : 

So Hull is to go to work on preparing that. 

What did he mean by "preparing that"? Have you any idea? 

General Marshall. You are having me act as both Mr. Stimson 
and Mr. Hull. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, the reason I am asking you, General, is 
that you were supposed to be at this meeting. 

[13801] General Marshall. Yes. As I said, they were trying 
to arrange a diplomatic procedure, rather than firing off a gun, that 
would not only protect our interests, by arranging mutters so that 
the Japanese couldn't intrude any further in a dangerous way, but 
also that anything they did do, they would be forced to take the offen- 
sive action, and what we were to do had to be prepared for the 
President by Mr. Hull. It was not a military order. It was not a 
military arrangement. 

Senator Fergt^son. Do I understand it correctly then that it was 
agreed that day among you and Admiral Stark, the two Secretaries, 
and the President, that this message of the 17th of August was, in 
effect, a first ultimatum ? 

General Marshall. I don't recall that that specific thing was dis- 
cussed other than the statement Mr. Stimson makes here. I am not 
the judge of that. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. General, did you have one of these messages in 
the Army that if the winds code came in that you could receive a 
telephone call — ^"east wind," and so forth ? 

General Marshall. I had no such arrangement, that I would re- 
ceive a telephone call. I knew that they were monitoring to receive 
this message, to pick up this message if it came, and that would be in 
the general arrangement whereby anything [13802] of impor- 
tance was conveyed to me as quickly as possible. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you have a plan or a policy as to what 
steps you would take if such a message had been received? 

General Marshall. Once the alert had been given, of course, the 
commanders were supposed to be in a state of readiness. If such a 
message as that had come in, showing conclusively its relation to 
previous magic, that they were going to attack, it is probable that 
we would have acted toward that in some way as we endeavored to act 
toward the 1 o'clock Sunday message. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, another alert? 

General Marshall. No, sir. Not another alert. An item of in- 
formation. 

Senator Ferguson. An item of information. Now, the language of 
the President, as given here by Commander Schulz is: 

When the President saw or read the first 13 parts of the message, he said, 
"This means war." 

That would be equally as definite as the winds message, would it 
not — "This means war"? 

General Marshall. You mean the President's statement? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Now, if you had had the President's statement Saturday [13803] 
evening, "This means war," in relation to the 13-part message, would 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5191 

you have acted on that the same as you did at 11 : 35, or whatever the 
time was, on Sunday, the 7th of December? 

General Marshall. I don't think I could give you an accurate back- 
sight on that, Senator, There was some discussion over the 1 o'^^lock 
message. I thought the 1 o'clock should go in, because that was a new 
item of information of a very peculiar character. 

Now, wdiether the President, making that statement would have 
inspired me, as Chief of Staif in the War Department to start off an- 
other message, I couldn't tell jou now, as a backsight. 

We had given certain definite instructions, which we assumed were 
being carried out, and which were being carried out, in most places. 

Senator Ferguson. General, it is a very significant fact that the 
President stated: "This means war"; and if that message had been 
conveyed to you, that language, the President saying, "This means 
war," 

General Marshall. Does the record show that the President told 
the Secretary of War, "This means war"? 

Senator Ferquson. Not the Secretary of War. 

General Marshall. He didn't tell me, and he didn't tell the Sec- 
retary of War. So he made a statement offhand on reading the thing. 

[13804^] Senator Ferguson. But I am trying to get what your 
action would have been. 

General Marshall. I can't say. I doubt if I would have sent any- 
thing on that statement of the President at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. Now. this is not clear in the record, General. 
I don't know as you can help clear it up, but I would like to ask it. 

Do you know how the 13 and the 14 part message, the whole of the 
14-part message, got on your desk on Sunday morning? We haven't 
any evidence to show how it got there. Do you know? Have you 
been told ? 

General Marshall. Well, I know that when I came to the office, it 
was there. Colonel Bratton was on the heels of it waiting to see me. 
General Miles came in. I had General Gerow come in. While I was 
reading the message — I have stated previously, in answering Senator 
Brew^ster, how word came to me that they had important information 
for me. and I went down to the War Department to receive that im- 
portant information. 

I was going anyway, because that was my regular Sunday morning 
routine, in contrast to Monday or Saturday, when I got down at 7 : 30. 
The procedure that they had gone through I don't know. I think my 
testimony Avill show whether it was here or before the Board, that 
my reaction at the moment was [1380-5] that they told me that 
half of the message had come in the evening before, and during the 
night that the other half had come, sometime in the middle of the 
night, and had been parcelled out, tlie War Department, as I recall, 
to do the translating from Japanese into English having been sent over 
from the Navy — they having actually deciphered the Japanese 
message. 

Now, that is my recollection of the affair at the time. The other 
item was that the particular part which affected me and caused me to 
act was not the 14 parts, it was the one o'clock, which, unfortunately, 
they put on the bottom f)f the pile and I read through everything 
before I came to that. 



5192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. General, on pao;e 7984 of our typewritten record, 
under General Short's testimony, we find this language : 

* * * Japan had been semiofficially told tliat : 

"If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan." 

And the American Government had, and believed, reports that : 

"* * * Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does 

not believe that your visit on Monday to the President, or the coming of Mr. 

Kurusu will have any effect on the general situation." 

Now, my question is, Did you know that the Japanese knew 
[13806] semiofficially — and, as I understand this testimony, it 
would appear that Postmaster General Walker, or someone operating 
between the State Department and the Japanese, was conveying cer- 
tain messages, and that this was one of the messages that was delivered, 
that if Japan invades again the United States 

General M.\rsitall. If Japan invades again? 

Senator Ferguson. Again, the United States will fight with Japan. 
Did you know that they were semiofficially notified to that effect, that 
if she moved south we would fight? 

General Marshall. I don't recall. 

Mr. Murphy. She had official notice in the note of August 17. 

Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that. 

Mr. Murphy. That was official. 

Senator Ferguson. But at this late date that he was telling us — 
this was in November, that she had the notice. 

Have you any knowledge as to who wrote Exhibit 17, being the 27th 
of November ? 

General Marshall. I have no accurate knowledge. I assume that 
it was drafted in the War Plans Division under General Gerow's 
direction. It may be that it was drafted initially in the Navy Depart- 
ment, but my assumption was that it was drafted in War Plans Divi- 
sion, and I assume that because my [13807] signature being on 
the document and its date of November 27, meaning that I possibly 
signed it on the night of the 26th, but they didn't get Admiral Stark's 
signature, naturally, until the 27th, and they dated it accordingly. 

Senator Ferguson. I think the facts show it was on Navy stationery, 
but there isn't any doubt that it represents your idea at that time? 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, General, you were sittin^^ here this morn- 
ing while we were discussing this memorandum from the British 
Government and the one from the Australian Government? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir; I heard the discussion. 

Senator Ferguson. I now ask you, did the President of the United 
States or anyone else ever take up with you any of the things men- 
tioned in those memorandums that we discussed here this morning ? 

General Marshall. Well, I have to answer that this way. Senator. 
I never heard of those memorandums until this morning, and as to 
did he ever discuss any of these things, of course, they were related to 
a good many things, including this document here [indicating]. 

Senator Ferguson. The reason I put an all-inclusive question was 
that I wanted to finish as soon as I could. 

[13808] When did you first learn that the President had decided 
to send a message to the Emperor? 

General Marshall. I don't recall that, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5193 



Senator Ferguson. Was it before- 



General Marshall. Mr. Stimson would have told me, I would have 
learned it that way, I think. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether you knew it before the 
7th? 

General Marshall. No, sir. I don't. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn : 

President's subsequent procedure — 

That is after he sent the message to the Emperor. 

is that if no answer is received by him from the Emperdf by Monday evening, 

(a) he will issue his warning on Tuesday afternoon or evening 

(b) warning or equivalent by British or others will not follow until Wednesday 
morning, i. e., after his own warning has been delivered repeatedly to Tokyo and 
Washington. 

General Marshall. I have no knowledge of that whatsoever. 1 
imagine that was washed out by the actual attack on Pearl Harbor 
and I was interested in other matters. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, you were not consulted 
[13809] prior to the time of this memorandum ? 

General Marshall. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You were not consulted? 

General Marshall. To the best of my recollection I was not con- 
sulted. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will inquire, General. 

Mr. Keefe. General, tlie testimony of Commander Schulz indicates 
that after the President on the evening of December 6th, read the 
13-part message, in effect, turned to Mr. Hopkins, and said "This 
means war," and indicated that he would have to get in touch with 
Betty, meaning Admiral Stark, immediately. 

Now, as one member of the committee, and I speak only for myself, 
that impressed me, that the President did, or had in his mind, as a 
result of the conclusion after reading that message, "This means war," 
did the thing which we would expect the Commander in Chief to do. 
namely, to immediately contact his Chief of Naval Operations. 

The evidence further indicates that he took the phone, called the 
Navy Department, and was advised that Admiral Stark was attending 
the National Theater ; he hung up the phone and indicated, according 
to Commander Schulz's testimony that he [13810] wouldn't 
call Admiral Stark out of the theater because it might cause some 
public comment, but that he would get him later. 

Now, in view of that testimony, which I have sketched without any 
attempt to state the testimony exactly, we are left in the dark as to 
whether or not the Commander in Chief contacted you as Chief of 
Staff that evening of December 6. 

Can you state definitely whether or not you have a present recol- 
lection as to whether the President did in fact contact you? 

General Marshall. I am quite certain that he did not. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, could there be any question about it? 

General Marshall. There is no question in my mind ; no. That is 
a positive answer. 

Mr. Keefe. And you are certain that you did not attend any meet- 
ing then, at the Wliite House that night ? 



5194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Marshall. I am absolutely certain of that. 

Mr. Keefe. I see. 

General Marshall. I might say that since I appeared before the 
committee I learned one little item that I had forgotten at the time, 
and that is not only had I no dinner engagements of any kind be- 
tween the 1st of November and the 7th of December, except one family 
dinner, as a matter of fact with Mrs. Nicholas Longworth, whom I 
see sitting here, [1-3811] but that Mrs. Marshall was con- 
valescing from having broken three or four ribs and we didn't go out 
anywhere; we certainly were not going out under those conditions; 
and I found out afterwards that that morning, Sunday morning, that 
I had breakfast with her in her bedroom, by her bed. 

So, all the evidence, in my own mind, short of my absolute knowl- 
edge of the matter, is that I was home, as was customary. 

Mr. Keefe. That is your present recollection, that on the evening 
of the 6th of December you were at home ? 

General Marshall. I can't say that is my recollection. I am cer- 
tain I was at home, but I don't recall anything about it. 

Mr. Keefe. But you are certain of one thing and that is that you 
received no communication from the President on the evening of the 
6th of Decemeber and that you didn't attend any meeting at the White 
House that night ? 

General Marshall, That is correct. I will add that the first infor- 
mation I had of anything unusual was, as I have testified, after I got 
into my shower, or was going into my shower when this message was 
relayed to me from Colonel Bratton that he wanted to come out to 
the house with an important matter. 

Mr, Keefe. Now, General Marshall, do you have a clear present 
recollection as to the meeting at the White House on [13812] 
Tuesday, November 25? 

General Marshall. I have gotten most of my recollection out of 
reading Mr. Stimson's report, he having the only diary. 

Mr. Keefe. In other words, in answer to the questions that have 
been asked you with respect to that meeting of the 25th, am I to 
infer that your memory has been refreshed by reason of your having 
read the memorandum submitted to the committee by former Secre- 
tary Stimson? 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe, Do you have any independent present recollection of 
the events that took place or the conversations that took place at this 
meeting of November 25 ? 

General Marshall. No, sir; I do not. What he is talking about 
here, had been talked about back and forth through so many com- 
binations that I cannot recollect the events of a particular meeting at 
this moment. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you have any independent recollection of having 
been told by Secretary Stimson of the Cabinet meeting of Friday, 
November 7, when a poll was taken of the Cabinet on the question as 
to "whether the people would back" the Cabinet and the President 
"in case we struck at Japan down there, and what the tactics should 
be?" 

I am quoting from Secretary Stimson's language. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5195 

[138 IS] General Marshall. I testified a little bit ago, I think, 
in regard to that, that I had no recollection of it, but I am quite cer- 
tain Mr. Stimson must have told me that. 

Mr. Keefe. Of course, in connection with what took place on the 
25th, when you were present with the President, and the Secretaries 
and Admiral Stark, it would be quite important to have known of 
the previous action of the Cabinet, when that question was presented, 
and the unanimous vote was recorded, as recorded in Secretary Stim- 
son's diary, so I ask you now, at the time you met with these people 
on the 25th, do you have any present recollection now of having 
known of this meeting on the 7tli, and its possible influence on the 
conversation which took place on the 25th ? 

General Marshall. I can only say what I said a few moments ago : 
I have no recollection of being told about the vote, and I assume that 
I was told. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you agree with Secretary Stimson when he sets forth 
in his diary as follows : 

I pointed out to the President that he had already taken the first steps towards 
an ultimatum in notifying Japan way back last summer that if she crossed the 
border into Thailand, she was violating our safety and that therefore he had only 
to point out (to Japan) that to follow any such expedition was a violation of a 
warning we had already given. 

[13814] General Marshall. Yes, sir; I am in agreement with 
what he is saying. The actual terminology he uses in regard to an 
ultimatum — it certainly was a very definite notification.. 

[13815] Mr, Keefe. Now, do I understand you to say, General 
Marshall — this will shorten the thing up, because I am as anxious to 
conclude this examination as you are — that you have read the state- 
ment of Secretary Stimson and that Secretary Stimson's statement, 
so far as you are concerned, conforms to your own knowledge and 
recollection of the events set forth, and you agree with that statement? 

General Marshall. I will put it this way, that there is nothing he 
says in here that I take exception to in my recollection, and his state- 
ment has reminded me of a great deal that I had entirely forgotten, 
and I am in general agreement with all that he states. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, to narrow it down one step further, is there any- 
thing in this statement that you do take exception to ? 

General Marshall. I can think of nothing now, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And is there anything in his record, as set forth in his 
diary, which is appended to his general statement, that you consider 
not to be in accordance with the facts, in accordance with your present 
recollection ? 

General Marshall, There is nothing t hat I know of, of that 
character. 

Mr. Keefe. So that as a member of the committee I am safe in ac- 
cepting the statement of Secretary Stimson, together with the memo- 
randa contained in his diary, as being in full [13816] accord 
with your own attitude toward the things and events which he 
described ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir, including that about the War Depart- 
ment General Staff. 

Senator Ferguson. You mean by that, the criticism, if it is criticism ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 



5196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. I didn't have particular reference 

Senator Ferguson. That is what you meant by that ? 

General Marshall. I didn't understand. 

Senator Ferguson. That there was some criticism. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir ; I accepted that. 

Senator Ferguson. You accepted that. 

General Marshall. I don't take exception to it. 

Mr. Keefe. I want to say, General Marshall, that so fai as my ques- 
tion was concerned, I was not specifically referring to the (umclusions 
as to responsibility which Secretary Stimson setb forth in his 
statement. 

General Marshall. I was trying to make perfectly cleai my agree- 
ment with what he says. 

Mr. Keefe. I am trying to limit my question to the facti..il informa- 
tion which is contained in his statement and the matter of conclusions, 
I assume, will be the prerogative of this committee. 

[13,817'\ But on the factual information set foith ir liis state- 
ment and in the diary, you are in accord ? 

General Marshall. I noted nothing that I would take exception 
to. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you think of anything that you would add to that 
statement that Secretary Stimson has excluded? 

General Marshall. I suppose if I took a few hours off I might 
bring up a great many things, but I think he covers the general ques- 
tion of the whole affair very well. 

Mr. Keefe. That is all. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Clark. 

Mr. Clark. General Marshall, I should like to ask you, as a mili- 
tary man, as one who has had at least some contacts with diplomatic 
activities, as to whether there was, in your opinion, anything in the 
13-part message any more indicative of war than what had been 
received up to that time? 

General Marshall. I am sorry, I can't give 3^ou a categorical 
answer to that, for the reason that I read it that morning very hur- 
riedly, and then I never read it again until just before I came up 
here, and I tried to time myself in reading it that time, and I was 
interrupted before I finished, and I never read it since; so there we 
stand. I have been busy and I just haven't read it all. 

[13818] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murph3^ 

Mr. Murphy. For the record there has been question after ques- 
tion about Commander Schulz saying the President said "This means 
war", and I would like to read Commander Schulz's exact words, 
page 12441 of the transcript. 

Commander Schulz. Mr. Hopkins then read the papers and handed them 
back to the President. The President then turned toward Air. Hopkins and 
said in substance — I am not sure of the exact words, but in substance — "This 
means war." Mr. Hopkins agreed, and they discussed then, for perhaps five 
minutes, the situation of the Japanes forces, that is, their deployment and 

Again on page 12443.^ 

There has been a statement made that the President called the Navy 
Department. 

» Hearings, Part 10, p. 4663. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5197 

Page 12443 : 

Commander Schtjlz. There was no mention made of sending any further 
warning or alert. However, having concluded this discussion about the war go- 
ing to begin at the Japanese convenience, then the President said that he believed 
he would talk to Admiral Stark. He started to get Admiral Stark on the tele- 
phone. It was determined — I do not recall exactly, but I believe the [13S19] 
White House operator told the President that Admiral Stark could be reached 
at the National Theater. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. General, to carry Mr. Keefe's question further, 
about whether the President had seen the 13-part message, I want to 
ask you whether or not you had any information that the President 
had seen this message and made any remarks about it prior to the time 
of the attack? 

General Marshall. I had no such information. 

Senator Ferguson. One more question. 

On page 53 of the Secretaary of War's statement, he has this lan- 
guage — talking with the President : 

I told him I could see two. His alternatives were — first, to do nothing ; second, 
to make something in the nature of an ultimatum again — 

Notice he says "ultimatum again". 

stating a point beyond which we would fight ; third, to fight at once. I told him 
my only two were the last two, because I did not think anyone would do nothing 
in this situation, and he agreed with me. I said of the other two, my choice was 
the latter one. 

That was to fight at once. 

JNow, did Secretary Stimson ever discuss with you that language or 
that idea? 

[13820] It doesn't purport to have you in the conversation. 

General Marshall. I wasn't in the conversation. I was just trying 
to think of his conversations with me. 

He was very much afraid — he feared that we would find ourselves 
involved in the developing situation where our disadvantages would 
be so great that it would be quite fatal to us when the Japanese 
actually broke peace. 

He also felt very keenly that, and thought about this part a great 
deal more than I did, because it was his particular phase of the matter, 
that we must not go so far in delaying actions of a diplomatic nature 
as to sacrifice the honor of the country. He was deeply concerned 
about that. 

My approach to the matter, of course, was much more materialistc. 
I was hunting for time. Hunting for time, so that whatever did 
happen we would be better prepared than we were at that time, that 
particular time. 

So it was a question of resolving his views as to the honor, we will 
say, of the United States, and his views of a diplomatic procedure 
which allowed the Japanese to continue movements until we would 
be in a hopeless situation before the peace was broken, and mine, which 
as I say, were much more materialistic, as I think they should have 
been, that we should get as much time as we could in order to make 
good the terrible deficiencies in our defensive arrange- [13821] 
ments. 



5198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

This particular statement that he makes here, that he made to the 
President, I don't recall of his ever making it quite so flat-footedly to 
me. that we would strike first. 

Senator Ferguson. At least the substance of this was discussed with 
you ? 

General Marshall. Oh, yes; we talked many times about it. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it generally agreed between the War Cab- 
inet, as it has been described, that we would not strike first ? 

That was generally agreed on, was it not ? 

General Marshall. I don't recall exactly the time the President 
enunicated the directive that we must not make the overt act. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. So it was finally agreed. Secre- 
tary Stimson's idea to fight at once was overruled, and we took another 
course ? 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Which was carried out. 

General Marshall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Your idea was, as you say you were more 
realistic 



General Marshall. I said "materialistic." 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Materialistic. You realized what 
[1S822] we had to fight with, did you not, and that is what caused 
you to hesitate? 

General Marshall, Mine was, in a sense, a technical job. I was 
struggling with the means to fight. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; and you wanted time. 

General Marshall. I wanted time, and the question was how much 
time could be given to us and still maintain the honor of the United 
States and not get ourselves in a hopeless position. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever get to the point of discussing the 
point where you would attack if you did attack first, or was that ruled 
out because the President made a policy? 

General Marshall. We went back, of course, to youf arrangement 
with the British, as to the prospective deployment of the fleets, who 
w^ould assume the burden of responsibility here and who would receive 
the burden of responsibility there. 

As a matter of fact our first issue, undoubtedly, would have been 
to protect our convoys, and to have continued the reinforcement of 
the Philippines. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. As I recall the testimony. General Marshall, 
[13823] with respect to the sending of this message of the 26th, 
there was some question in your mind, and in the record it was not clear, 
just what the events and circumstances were with respect to the 
preparation of that warning message that was sent to General Short. 

Now, if Mr. Stimson's report is correct, and I assume that it is, that 
question seems to be lesolved, because he states that on the 27th, on 
page 19 of his report : 

We then discussed the message that might be sent to the commanding officers 
of the various theaters, including in particular General MacArthur, who was in 
the Philippines and in the forefront of the threatened area. We had already 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5199 

sent MacArthur a warning but I felt that the time had now come for a more 
definite warning. In talliing with the President on the telephone that morning, 
I had suggested, and he had approved the idea, that we should send out a final 
alert, namely that they should be on the qui vive for any attack, and explaining 
the exact situation. Ordinarily, of course, there would be no reason for me to 
participate in the sending of any such message which was the normal function 
of the military staff. As the President himself, however, had now actually di- 
rected the sending of the message, and as I wanted the message clearly to apprise 
the commanding [13824] officers in the various areas as to exactly what 
the diplomatic situation was, I undertook to participate in the framing of this 
message myself. 

So it now appears from his statement that that message was actually 
framed on the 27th while you were attending maneuvers. Do you so 
understand it now, General Marshall? 

General Marshall. My confusion was with relation to the previous 
evening. My recollection was that before I left for North Carolina 
I had discussed with General Gerow the general terms of such a 
message. 

Mr. Keefe. But it was not prepared ? 

General Marshall. He was in the business of preparing it and 1 
tliink he brought in to Mr. Stimson the draft. That is my recollection 
of the procedure. What INIr. S'imson says is accurate. My trouble 
was trying to orient what I had said before the message was prepared 
and what my reaction was after they showed me the message on my 
return. 

Mr. Keefe. So you did have a discussion with General Gerow the 
night before ? 

General Marshall. I say that was my recollection, that before I left, 
the afternoon before, I had a discussion with him. I don't know what 
General Gerow testified. I was in a confused state of mind as to 
whether that was correct or whether it was my reaction when I saw 
tlie message that had [13825] already been sent, and I couldn't 
remember which was which. 

Mr. Keefe. You are in agreement with the thesis that so far as the 
actual message was concerned it was prepared on the 27th and that 
Secretary Stimson himself participated in the preparation of that 
message ? 

General Marshall. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. And did the unusual, as he says, in that matter, because 
it was on what he conceived to be direct orders of the President that 
such a message be sent ? 

General Marshall. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. And he wanted to be sure that it accurately conveyed 
the necessary information to the commanders in the fields 

General Marshall. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. That clears up that little bit of discrepancy that existed 
in the other hearings, and I am glad that it has been cleared up in 
accordance with Secretary Stimson's statement. 

That is all. 

The Vice Chairman. Does counsel have anything further? 

Mr. Richardson. No. 

The Vice Chairman. Any further questions ? 

(No response.) 

The Vice Chairman. Is there any reason why General Marshall 



5200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[138^6] cannot now be excused ? 

(No response.) 

The Vice Chairman. General, we thank you for your appearance 
and the additional information you have given the committee and 
you are excused. 

General Marshall. Thank you very much. 

The Vice Chairman. The Chair is advised that Chairman Barkley 
and Senator Ferguson have agreed that we will ad j urn at this point 
until 11 o'clock Thursday morning. 

We will ask Admiral Stark to be back at 11 o'clock Thursday 
morning. 

(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., an adjournment was taken until 11 a. m., 
Thursday, April 11, 1946.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5201 



[1382^-] PEAEL HARBOR ATTACK 



THURSDAY, APRIL 11, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington, D. C. 

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 11 a. m., in 
room 312 Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chair- 
man) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman) and Ferguson; and Kepre- 
sentatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and 
Keefe. 

Also present : Seth W. Kichardson, general counsel ; Samuel H. 
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Mor- 
gan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, and Mrs. Flo E. Bratten, executive 
secretary, to the joint committee. 

[13S29] The Chairman. The committee will please come to 
order. 

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, we have three exhibit numbers that 
we would like to assign just before the examination proceeds. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Masten. At page 13G30 of the record the committee decided that 
the reports, findings, and conclusions of the various prior proceedings 
should be made an exhibit separate from the transcripts of testimony 
in those proceedings. We would like to assign Exhibit No. 157 to a 
compilation of those reports and findings. 

The Chairman. Without objection, that will be done. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 157.") 

Mr. Masten. As Exhibit No. 158, we would like to offer the addi- 
tional documents released by the British Government, which have been 
previously distributed to the committee and which were released for 
publication yesterday. This exhibit will consist of 14 documents and 
attachments. 

I would like to point out that document No. 9 in this exhibit relates 
primarily to Exhibits Nos. 16 and 47 but has been included in Exhibit 
No. 158 due to the fact that the printing of the prior exhibits has 
proceed past Exhibits Nos. 16 and 47. 

The Chairman. Without objection, that will be done. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 158.") 

[13830] Mr. Masten. As Exhibit No. 159, we would like to offer 
the additional documents released by the Chinese Government, which 
also have been distributed to the committee previously. This exhibit 
will consist of five documents and enclosures. 

The Chairman. Those will be filed as exhibits, accordingly. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 159.") 

The Chairman. Admiral Stark, will you come around ? 

79716 — 46— pt. 11 6 



5202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIOATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK, UNITED STATES 
NAVY (RETIRED)— Resumed 

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson, I think you vere examinmg 
Admiral Stark. 

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would read that into the record, 
and then I want to ask you some questions about it. It is a message 
from OPNAV to CINCAF, is it not? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Before the attack, from OPNzVV to CINCAF, 
on Sunday, December 7; is not that correct? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, 7 December, 71722, which is 5 : 22. That is 
Greenwich time, however. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Stark (reading) : 

The State Department is informing the Japanese Government the SS Madison 
is eni'oute to Chingwangtao to arrive about December 10 and depart for Manila 
3 days later and requesting that in view of arrangements made for Tatuta Maru 
now enroute Los Angeles to evacuate [13831] Japanese citizens that 
Japan direct her sea and land forces to allow Madison to proceed freely and 
without hindrance and provide her necessary facilities at Chingwangtao. Ad- 
vise this office of any change in the Madison's schedule. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, had you known about that message before 
it was sent ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall knowing about it before it was 
sent. I remember the picture very conclusively on the sending of 
that ship up there, so distinctly that I wanted to verify my memory 
and I thought it would be well to get the record on it, so I asked 
the Department to have copies of dispatches in relation thereto, and 
they are now available to the committee if they want them. 

I think, before giving you my answer, which would be based on 
those, I might read them, because the dispatches in question, from the 
record, give a very good picture of this whole affair. 

Senator Ferguson. I would be glad to have you give any informa- 
tion you have on that. My inquiry was going to be as to why that 
was sent. You knew that war was coming and you wanted to try 
to get an agreement on the safe passage of two ships, one of ours and 
one of theirs. 

Admiral Stark. It was sent for the reason that we were [ISSS^] 
worried about that ship. We took a deliberate chance when we told 
Admiral Hart, in response to a dispatch from him on 1 December, 
to send her up there. We had left in North China approximately 
200 Marines. We had received a dispatch from the Embassy, or 
rather Admiral Hart sent us word that there were about 6 000 Ameri- 
cans up there and he noted that a ship could be made available to go 
up there. He recognized the risk and put it up to the Department 
for decision. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, when you say "the risk," you mean that 
war would break out while it was enroute ? 

Admiral Stark. I mean that war might break out. 

SenatorFERGusoN, Well, were you just considering it a "might" 
then ? 

Admiral Stark. At that time; yes, sir. We felt reasonably certain 
that war was coming but we could not tell when. It was a matter of 
timing. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5203 

Senator Ferguson. But you were concerned with it and it was a 
grave question, so grave that you were working on it on Sunday? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. We had guaranteed the safety of the 
Japanese ship which was then enroute to San Francisco, and as I recall, 
it was to go from there down to the Canal Zone picking up Japanese 
nationals and taking them back. 

Senator Ferquson. All right. Had the Japanese asked for 
[1S83S] a guarantee of a safe passage of their ship? 

Admiral Stark. As I recall, they had asked that she be given free 
passage, and we had granted it, and we were asking for a similar 
treatment for the American ship. 

Senator Ferguson. That would indicate that both countries, at the 
time this request was made, were anticipating a war, and that if war 
broke out in the meantime these two ships were to have safe passage? 
Is not that a correct view? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that is what you arranged for here [indi- 
cating dispatch] ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. And then 

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. I do not want to cut off any 
testimony you may have or any instruments that you may want to 
refer to that can aid us along this line. 

Admiral Stark. They are short, and I think the record should be 
complete on this, and it would be well to put them in here. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you put them in? 

Admiral Stark. I will read them if you would like to have them. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. The first is a message from the Commander in 
Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, our forces in the Pacific, which was 
[13834] sent by him on 1 December, and which reads as follows — 
Before I read it, it was to OPNAV anci it was for information to the 
Commanding Officer, U. S. Marine Forces in North China. 

Embassy advises six one one five American nationals in Peiping Tientsin area. 
Estimate civilian requirements uncertain. President Madison uove available for 
withdrawal Marines from North China. Ship can arrive Chingwangtao about 
December 10th and depart about three days later. If Department thinks advis- 
able accept attendant risks and attempt this withdrawal request authority to 
use this vessel. Advise. 

Mr. Keete. The date of that is December 1? 

Admiral Stark. December 1, yes, sir. 

Now, on the same day we have a dispatch from the Department. 
We answered it immediately, and the message is from the Secretary 
of the Navy, released by me. I remember the incident, because we 
recognized the situation as grave at that time and were taking it up 
with the Secretary for decision, and the reply is to the Commander 
in Chief of the Asiatic, and information of the U. S. Marine Forces 
in North China : 

Your 010300 approved. 

That message is the message that I just previously read from 
Admiral Hart. 

Authority granted charter President Madison [13835] at tariff rate for 
one trip Chingwangtao to Manila. Inform State Department officials North 
China of prospective schedule. 



5204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The next message is from Admiral Hart, dated 2 December, to the 
Commanding General of the Marine Forces in North China, and 
information of the Marine Corps and OPNAV in Washington. 
This was on the second, and priority : 

Withdraw North China Marines via President Harrison due arrive Chinwang- 
tao December tenth expected turn around. Nonmilitary property that cannot 
be exacuated to be sold or left Peiping. Notify consul Tietsin and Embassy. 
APL authorized to book civilian passengers in normal manner. Advise exact 
time of sailing when determined. 

Then, there is another dispatch from the Commander in Chief 
Asiatic to OPNAV on 3 December. 

Mr. Richardson. Just a minute, Admiral Stark. Is the reference 
in the dispatch you just read to the President Harrison an intentional 
change from Madison'i 

Admiral Stark. That is what got me looking up this dispatch. 
The dispatch that Senator Ferguson gave me to read said the Madi- 
son, and my remembrance is that it was the Harrison. I rlarted 
to check up on the Harrison and ran into the rest of the dis};atches. 
They used actually the Harrison [138S6] and not the Madison. 

Fourth Marines 796 officers and men arrived Olongapo 1 QM oleik 3 enlisted 
remain Shanghai temporarily. President Harrison vice Madison departing Ma- 
nila 4 December for Chinwangtao evacuate personnel and rucD equipment as 
reaches there by arrival date. Luzon and Oahu well on way Manila successful 
completion voyage expected. 

I might add those were two gunboats which we had left in China. 
We wanted to leave them until the last minute, and they had arrived. 

Senator Ferguson. You mean the last minute before the war 
started ? 

Admiral Stark. I mean we had debated a good deal when to bring 
them out. We were debating for some time on this. We finally 
decided at this time it was time to get them out. 

Senator Ferguson. That you were at about the last minute ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, it was getting close to it. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. When I say the last minute, I have forgotten 
just when 

Senator Ferguson. T^at is near the deadline ? 

Admiral Stark. I have forgotten just when the dispatch directing 
Hart to bring those gunboats out was made, but we [13837] 
thought it was time to get our nationals and our marines out of China. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you remember — if I may interrupt — that 
we had a memorandum here from the British to our State Department 
and on the end of it Mr. Hamilton said — it was about the 3d or 4th of 
December — they wanted us to act on a parallel course witli them, as I 
remember the exhibit, if we could get it. It would speak for itself. 
On the bottom of that it said that that was a matter that would have 
to be taken up with the President, that it would indicate we were going 
to war and thereafter they could not pass on it. Do you remember 
that document'^ 

Admiral Stark. No, sir; I do not particularly at this moment re- 
member that particular document, but I do recall that in evacuating 
our nationals and in evacuating our marines it was taken up with the 
White House. Of course, the State Department was as much inter- 
ested as anybody else in that picture, and more so as regards nationals. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5205 

Senator Ferguson. Did you personally have any conversation with 
the President or with the State Department — I am talking about prior 
to the 7th of December — about the removal of our nationals? 

Admiral Stark. Oh, yes. Not only our nationals, but we had talked 
about our marines, and so forth, for some months. We [13838] 
had evacuated, for example, all naval families out of Manila a con- 
siderable period before this. 

Senator Ferguson. What was the policy adopted by the President 
or the State Department, as far as you knew, about the nationals ? 

Admiral Stark. We were endeavoring to get them out. 

Senator Ferguson. And that was because you anticipated war ? 

Admiral Stark. That was certainly because of the possibility, and 
in the interest of safety to them. We gave them the opportunity to get 
out, and the State Department, I believe, chartered the ships which we 
sent over there. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of anything that was done between 
the 27th of November and the 7th of December about getting our 
nationals out? 

Admiral Stark. This matter in hand is between that time. 

Senator Ferguson. I mean outside of these, that were taken up 
directly with the President. 

Admiral Stark. At the moment I do not recall anything else. We 
had been getting them out for some time. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. There is considerable information on the Japanese 
and what they did for some months before they started to get their 
ships home, and their nationals, too. 

[13839'] Senator Ferguson. Yes ; I appreciate that. 

Admiral, you may proceed, if you do not recall any of the others 
now. 

Admiral Stark. I recall the earlier incidents. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. As to this ship, we took what we call a calculated 
risk, in the interest of getting our people out, balanced against the 
possibility of losing the ship. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 

[13840] Admiral Stark. If we got them out, fine ; if we did not 
get them out, we might lose the ship and would not be any better off. 

Senator Ferguson. And you were working for a safe voyage, if 
possible, even though war had broken out ; is not that true? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. We were asking for transit. 

Senator Ferguson. For a safe voyage? 

Admiral Stark. For a safe voyage. Whether that would cover the 
contingency if war actually broke or not, I do not know, because we 
canceled the massed after the war broke out. 

Senator Ferguson. You were endeavoring to do it? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. And did we grant safe voyage to their ship so 
it would apply after war started ? 

Admiral Stark. I don't remember any application after war. They 
had asked us to facilitate this voyage, and we had agreed to it. The 
details of that would probably better come from the State Department. 

Senator Ferguson. You are not familiar with it then ? 



520(5 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. Not on that point, not enough to make a positive 
statement. 

Senator Ferguson. Whether or not it applied in case of war, the 
instruments will probably speak for themselves, [1S84^ when 
you get them all in. 

Admiral Stark. I started reading that dispatch and I guess I 
finished reading it. 

The next dispatch is the one which you gave me yesterday. 

The State Department is informing the Japanese Government the SS Madison is 
enroute Chingwangtao due to arrive about December 10 and depart for Manila 
3 days later and requesting that in view of arrangements made for Tatuta Maru 
now enroute Los Angeles to evacuate Japanese citizens that Japan direct her sea 
and land forces to allow Madison to proceed freely and without hindrance and 
provide her necessary facilities at Chingwangtao. Advise this office of any change 
in the Madison schedule. 

Then, there was one to Admiral Hart, the text of which was : 

Give appropriate instructions to Madison. Cancel my 071722. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, this message sent on the morning 
of the 7th about the safe voyage, the safe course, was sent after we had 
canceled our codes, or destroyed our machines in Tokyo, and we knew 
of their messages in relation to their codes, and you had in your depart- 
ment the full 3 parts, and the 14th part, and 1 o'clock message, and all 
of these otlier messages ; isn't that true ? 

[13842'] Admiral Stark. It was after the codes' destruction. 

The time group on this is 

Senator Ferguson. Twelve-something, isn't it? Can you figure it 
out from the Greenwich time ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes ; it is 1722'. 

Senator Ferguson. Which would have been 5 hours and a half? 

Admiral Stark. Which would have been about 12 o'clock. 

Senator Ferguson. About 12 o'clock noon on Sunday ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. W^ill the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. It is my impression that the codes were not destroyed 
by 12 noon in Tokyo. Ambassador Grew said they were not, did 
he not ? 

Senator Ferguson. I am speaking more about ordering them de- 
stroyed. The record will speak for itself. 

Admiral Stark. We had sent the message regarding the destroying 
of their codes. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. And we had authorized our people in the outlying 
islands, and Guam and authorized Kimmel to direct them to destroy 
what he considered necessary. 

Senator Ferguson. That all being true, the language [ISSJtS] 
used in this message that I had you read the other day, and question 
about this morning, would indicate, would it not, that we knew war 
was coming, and this was to take place after the war came. 

Admiral Stark. We felt war was coming; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. The language indicates that the armies and 
navies of Japan were to allow this ship to have a free couse, a safe 
passage. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5207 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. At the time when this was initiated, it 
was the first of December, and that was the first correspondence with 
reference to it, and it was, of course a matter of timing. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Are there any other messages you have 
there now ? 

Admiral Stark. That is all I have on it, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. May I inquire from counsel, if you have a memo- 
randum to Mr, Hull from Admiral Schuirmann on December 4, 1941 
in relation to the Dutch? 

Mr. Masten. We do not have it here, Senator. Do you want it ? It 
is down in room 201. 

Senator Ferguson. I would like to have it. I did not like to use a 
copy of it, I wanted to be exact on its language. 

Mr. Murphy. As long as you are sending down there, will you be 
sure to have the notes of the President on the 7th here [13844^ 
too? 

Mr. Masten. They will be here this noon. They are being mimeo- 
graphed. 

Senator Ferguson. Until we get that, I will pass this for the mo- 
ment. 

Admiral, since you were on the stand, we have received a memoran- 
dum that was sent from the military observer, Captain Creighton, 
from Singapore to Admiral Hart. Are you familiar with that message 
about von Papen ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not know just to what you refer without look- 
ing at it. 

Senator Ferguson. It is the message from the military observer in 
Singapore to Admiral Hart. You remember the original memoran- 
dum in relation to Admiral Hart, that he sent to your department, that 
we had agreed to give the British support in three or four eventuali- 
ties? 

Admiral Stark. That he had heard that we had ? 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 

Admiral Stark. And he asked us about it ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, I remember that message ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you are not familiar with the other mes- 
sage that was sent from Captain Creighton, are you ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall it at the moment. 

[i,?<9^5] Senator Ferguson. Would you locate that? 

Mr. EiCHARDsoN. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, were you familiar with the fact that 
the Navy Department had a special file that they kept the communica- 
tions between Britain and the President, that were sent through the 
Communications of the Navy, and that the file was kept in the Navy ? 

Admiral Stark. No. 

Senator Ferguson. When the British, Mr. Churchill, and others in 
the British Government would cable or communicate with the Presi- 
dent at times they used your facilities; that is, the Navy facilities, and 
that there was a S])9cial file kept in the Navy Department with those 
papers, or those coded messages, or decoded messages, but they re- 
tained them in the Navy Department. 

Were you familiar with that fact? 



5208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. I was not familiar with it, but I would say if that 
occurred, it would be a very normal procedure to keep the President's 
messages separate on a thino; of that sort. We did in London. 

Senator Fekguson. Did you know that the President had used your 
communications to communicate with the British? In relation to the 
Far East I am only talking- about now. 

Admiral Stark. Well, I know he used our communications. 

[13846] Senator Ferguson. That being true, would you not keep 
copies, or at least the papers in your files in relation to those commu- 
nications? 

Admiral Stark. It would be a very natural thing to keep one copy 
in a very secret status. 

Senator Ferguson. Isn't it true that there was a very secret file, 
which you now describe, kept under secret orders, so that when Cap- 
tain Lavender, who is one of the counsel here, made an inquiry he^ 
could not even see it, and he has not seen it ? Did you know that ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Would it be such that no one could see, that it 
would be super-secret? 

Admiral Stark. I do not know. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Stark. That is a detail of filing which could be obtained 
from the Department. So far as my knowledge goes, I thought we 
could get anything we asked for. I did not know until this minute 
that anything had been refused at this time. 

The Chairman. You do not know it now ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not know it now ; no, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. There has nothing been refused. It is all in the 
record. 

[1S847] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, in view of the Senator's 
statement about Captain Lavender 

Senator Ferguson. I am asking questions now. 

Mr. Murphy. I want to object to the Senator testifying until such 
time as we know who Captain Lavender is. The Senator stated some- 
thing that is not in evidence. I think in fairness to the record, and the 
other members of the committee, if that is true, we ought to find out 
who this Captain Lavender is, and his connection with the case. 

Senator Ferguson. I will find out now. 

Do you know Captain Lavender? 

Admiral Stark. I do, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Has he been acting as counsel for anyone in 
this case ? 

Admiral Stark. He has been associated with Admiral Kiinmel. 

Mr. Murphy. Is he in the room ? ]May we have a look at him ? 

Senator F'erguson. Is Captain Lavender in the room? 

(iSo response.) 

Admiral Stark. I might state that he was up here yesterday, and 
I think he can be made available if you would like to get him. 

Senator Ferguson. Does not counsel have a letter in relation to this 
file? 

Mr. Richardson. All of it is in the Navy. It has been [ISS^S] 

furnished us by the Navy and it has been in evidence here. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5209 

Mr. Masten. We have a memorandum from, I think, Commander 
•Baecher, I think the memorandum was dated sometime in November 
or December of hxst year. It states that all of the messages from 
the President, which were found in that file, are now in the record. 

My recollection is, Senator, that the only two messages in it were 
the two messages to the Philippines. 

Senator Ferguson. I just want to find out now about the file. Your 
statement now is — and I do not think this was put in the record 
before — that the only two messages in that file are in the record. Are 
they in the record itself ? 

INIr. Masten". I think so, Senator. There is a memorandum from 
Commander Baecher which I think is in the record. If it is not, we 
will check this noon. 

The CriAiRMAisr. It is my recollection that memorandum was put 
in the record at the time it was received. 

Mr. Masten. At the time the messages were put in, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. There isn't a question but that Congress ought 
to know about this thing, because a letter was written, and the request 
was refused. 

Mr, MuRPiiT. My only reason for interposing is if there is some 
Captain Lavender, this is the first time that his [138/f9^ name 
appears in this hearing, after 13,000 pages, and the statement has 
been made that he has been refused something. 

I do not think the record should go on without knowing who he is. 

Senator Ferguson. I think this requires putting the President's 
letter in the record. 

Would you, Mr. Masten, get a copy of the President's letter in 
relation to this file ? 

Mr. Masten. There was no letter of the President, Senator, that I 
recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Did not the President write a letter to someone, 
either Rugg, or Kimmel, or Lavender? 

Mr. Masten. I have no recollection of that. You mean President 
Roosevelt ? 

Senator Ferguson. No, no. President Truman. 

Mr. Masten. I have no recollection of that. I will have to look 
through the file. All the letters that President Truman wrote, or 
the memoranda, are in the record, that I recall. 

Senator Ferguson. The Congressman has made it appear that the 
Senator from Michigan wanted the record to show that there was a 
denial, I am trying to ask questions. I am certain there was a letter 
written by the President of the United States, but I cannot tell you 
to whom it was addressed. 

[JS8S0] The Chairman. There were letters written by the Presi- 
dent to the heads of all of the departments. 

Senator Ferguson. This is a special letter in relation to this par- 
ticular file that I was making inquiry about. I will try to ascertain it. 

Is there anyone in the room who represents Admiral Kimmel ? 

Ensign Phelan. Yes; I am. 

Senator Ferguson, Ensign Phelan, do you know of any letter 

The CiiAiiiMAN. If he is going to testify, we had better swear him. 

(Ensign Phelan was duly sworn by the chairman.) 

Senator Ferguson. Better give your first name, now. 

Ensign Phelan. John Phelan. 



5210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

TESTIMONY OP ENSIGN JOHN PHELAN, UNITED STATES NAVY 

Senator Ferguson. Ensign, will you tell us as to whether or not 
you had any knowledge in relation to a special file of communications 
between the President of the United States and the British Govern- 
ment, or any member of the British Government, that was kept in 
the Navy Department ? 

Ensign Phelan. I have no personal knowledge of that. Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not any letter was 
written in relation to it, as far as Admiral Kimmel was concerned? 

[ISSSl] Ensign Phelan. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have a copy of that letter, or do you 
know where we can get a copy of it ? 

Ensign Phelan. No, sir; I haven't a copy of it here. I believe 
Admiral Kimmel has a copy of it. 

Senator Ferguson. But you do know a letter was written by the 
President ? 

Ensign Phelan. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. To whom was it written ? 

Ensign Phelan. To Admiral Kimmel. 

The Chairman. Which President? 

Senator Ferguson. President Truman. 

Ensign Phelan. President Truman. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. About when was that letter written? 

Ensign Phelan. Since these hearings have been in progress. 

Senator Ferguson. Captain Lavender was one of the counsel, was 
he not ? 

Ensign Phelan. That is right, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not this file was denied 
to him, and it had to be taken up directly with the President, and a 
letter was written on it ? 

Ensign Phelan. I so understand, Senator. 

[J'SSS^I Commander Baecher.^ 1 can explain it. 

Senator Ferguson. All I want is an explanation. 

Commander Baecher. I know all about it ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Let us get it all, so there will be no mystery about 
it. 

Commander Baecher. I hesitate to inject myself, but as I under- 
stand it, Admiral Kimmel desired to get into this file, which is the 
White House file of the Navy Department. 

Under the direction of the President, as we interpreted the direct- 
ives, the committee alone had the right to go into the departmental 
files, so Admiral Kimmel was not permitted to do it, so he wrote a 
letter to the President as a naval officer, which went through naval 
channels, and asked for that permission, and the President answered 
and said under his directives only this committee could have access 
to these departmental files, and this committee could have anything 
it wished, and this committee has. 

That is the entire story. 

1 Navy Department liaison officer to the committee. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5211 

Senator Ferguson. Was the request made by Captain Lavender 
instead of Admiral Kimmel personally? I want to get the record 
straight. 

Commander Baecher. I do not know who acted physically, but it 
was done in Admiral Kimmel's name. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 

[1S8SS] Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Why cannot we get the letters here? 

Senator Ferguson. If we can get them, and make them a part of 
the record, that is all right with me. 

Mr. Murphy. Put them in. I would like to see what date they 
were written, and when they started inquiring about this file, in view 
of it being several months ago, in December, and it just coming out 
now. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there anything done with the file? 

Commander Baecher. It was submitted to this committee. 

Mr. Richardson. All of it? 

Commander Baecher. There were two dispatches in it, and copies 
of it have been submitted to this committee along with the letter 
saying they are all there is. 

Senator Ferguson. Could we get now from you. Commander, what 
dispatches were in this supersecret file? 

Commander Baecher, As I recall it — and it is a hazy recollection — 
they were to the High Commissioner of the Philippines, 

Mr, Richardson, We can get them. 

Senator Ferguson, They were to the High Commissioner of the 
Philippines? 

Commander Baecher, Yes, 

Senator Ferguson, That would not be a message between 
[13So4] the British Government and the United States Govern- 
ment ? 

Commander Baecher, I understand there were none. The record 
will speak better than I can now. It has been several months. We 
submitted a box full of dispatches between the Navy and the British 
Admiralty, which would be intergovernmental, you might say. 

Senator Ferguson. I wanted what the Admiral was talking about. 
When the communications were made from the President, the Navy's 
comnmnications were used, and the copies ordinarily would be kept 
in the file and that would be a super-secret file. 

Commander Baecher, We wrote a letter in answer to a direct 
request on that, Senator, and it is here. That letter states that we 
have submitted all of these dispatches that were in the so-called White 
House file, and we submitted them along with the letter. 

There were no others. 

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand there were only two papers in 
this White House file, and they related to the High Commissioner of 
the Philippines? 

Commander Baecher. I think that is the purport of the certification 
we made, although I prefer you see that certification before you con- 
clude that issue. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you have personal knowledge of this, 
[138o5] Commander, that when the file was obtained, there were 
only two papers in it ? Are you speaking from personal knowledge ? 



5212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Commander Baectier. No; I am not. I did not go into the raw 
material. 

Senator Ferguson. It is what someone has told you ? 

Commander Baeciier. Yes. Someone who is very responsible. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you state who is very responsible? Who 
told you? 

Commxinfler Baeciier. The Director of Naval Communications. 
The officer in charge has changed in the last several months. Admiral 
Stone is in charge now, and before Admiral Stone, it was some other 
admiral. 

Admiral Stark. Eedman? 

Commander Baeciier. Redman, yes. It was either Stone or 
Redman. 

Mr. Richardson. When a request is made of you, you send that on 
to the officer that has charge of the papers that you are asked to 
produce ? 

Commander Baecher. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Who produces that information and you convey 
that information to us here? You do not yourself go into the file 
and handle the papers physically yourself? 

Commander Baeciier. Very seldom ; if I am not satisfied with what 
I get on it. 

[J38S6] Senator Ferguson. Were you satisfied in this case? 

Commander Baeciier. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I would like to, if possible, o;et the letter now of 
President Truman. I think it ought to go into this record, to make it 
clear. 

The Chairman. I think Mr. Masten has gone down to get that. 

Mr. Richardson. I do not think we have the letter from President 
Truman. I have not seen it. 

Senator Ferguson. May I reserve the right to obtain from Ensign 
Phelan a copy of that letter, or the original, so it will be inserted in the 
record ? 

Mr. Murphy. Together with tlie letter from Admiral Kimmel. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 

[13SS7] Commander Baeciier. I can furnish a copy of that 
letter. 

I would not be surprised but that I may have the original in my 
files. 

Senator Ferguson. You will be able to get us copies? 

Commander Baecher. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. We will get it for you, Senator.^ 

Let us see w^hat we have right here now. 

(The documents were handed to Senator Ferguson.) 

Mr. Masten. Senator, I think all of those should be read into the 
record, if they are not in. 

Senator Ferguson. These are not the letters we are talking about. 

Mr. Masten. They are the memorandum from Admiral Colclough, 
rather than Commander Baecher, with the two messages from 
the President. Those are the only things we have had. The two mes- 
sages are the two messages that are already in the record. 

Senator Ferguson. The messages are already in the record? 

Mr. Masten. That is my recollection. I am not sure whether the 
memorandum is. 

1 See p. 5493. infra. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5213 

The Chairman. Do you want these read into the record or filed and 
printed in the record ? 

Senator Ferguson. They ought to be printed. 

The Chairman. It seems to me they might as well be printed at 
this point instead of read. They are photo- [13S58] static 
copies. 

Mr. Richardson. Are they at all significant? It seems to us they 
were entirely irrelevant. 

Senator Ferguson. I do not claim they are, but I certainly do not 
want to keep them out. 

Mr. Richardson. The first one, Mr. Chairman, is with reference to 
the Philippine matter and the second is also with reference to the 
Philippine matter. I have examined them and thought they were 
entirely irrelevant as to our examination here. Unless somebody says 
they are, why should the record be further encumbered ? 

Senator Ferguson. But the record still stands, I think I am not 
commenting on the evidence, except insofar as it relates to what we 
may inquire about here. 

The Chairman. The letters would at least show that it is not claimed 
the President wrote to Churchill, and for that purpose probably they 
might as well go in. 

Mr. Richardson. All right. 

(The documents referred to follow :) 

\ 13859] Decembek 1, 1945. 

Memoranduvi to Admiral Colclough: 

It is our understanding that there is in the office of the Director of Naval Comi- 
munuications a file designated "White Hous.e File", containing communications 
sent by President Roosevent to England and other points through Navy com- 
munication channels. This is to request that we be furnished, as promptly 
as possible, copies of all messages contained in this file sent to or received by the 
President or other White House aides during the period October 1, 1941, to 
December 7, 1941, inclusive, with reference to Japan or matters pertaining to 
political or military developm-ents in the Far East. It is probable that the 
request submitted by us under date of November 28th, emanating from Congress- 
man Keefe, will include some of this material, and in this event it will be suffi- 
cient In response to that request. 

William D. Mitchell. 



Department of the Navy, 

Office of the Secketaky, 
Washington, 10 December 1945. 
Memorandum to: Mr. William D. Mitchell. 

1. There are forwai'ded to you herewith copies of two dispatches as follows: 

(1) #261854 of 26 November 1941 from the President to the High Commissiioner 
of the Philippine Islands. 

(2) #280228 of 28 November 1941 from Cincaf to the President. 

2. These dispatches are delivered in response to your request of 1 December 
1945 for copies of dispatches in the Navy Department's "White House file" during 
the period October 1, 1941 to December 7, 1941, inclusive, "with reference to Japan 
or matters pertaining to political or military development in the Far East." 

8. No other dispatches responsive to your request have been discovered. 
4. It is requested that you receipt for the above two copies of dispatches on a 
copy of this memorandum. 

/S/ O. S. Colclough, 
O. S. Colclough, 
Rear Admiral, USN. 



5214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[J3S61] Naval Message Navy Department 

From OPNAV To: CINCAF 

Released by : H. R. Stark Priority PP 

Date : 26 Nov. 1941 
261854 
From the President. For the High Commissioner Philippines. 

ADMIRAL HART WILL DELIVER TO YOU A COPY OF A DESPATCH 
WHICH WITH MY APPROVAL THE CNO AND THE COS ADDRESSED TO 
THE SENIOR ARMY AND NAVY COMMANDERS IN THE PHILIPPINES IN 
ADDITION YOU ARE ADVISED THAT THE JAPANESE ARE STRONGLY 
REENFORCING THEIR GARRISONS AND NAVAL FORCES IN THE MAN- 
DATES IN A MANNER WHICH INDICTES THEY ARE PREPARING THIS 
REGION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AGAINST A POSSIBLE ATTACK ON 
THEM BY US FORCES. HOWEVER I AM MORE PARTICULARLY CON- 
CERNED OVER INCREASING OPPOSITION OF JAPANESE LEADERS AND 
BY CURRENT SOUTHWARD TROOP MOVEMENTS FROM SHANGHAI AND 
JAPAN TO THE FORMOSA AREA. PREPARATIONS ARE BECOMING AP- 
PARENT IN CHINA FORMOSA AND INDO CHINA FOR AN EARLY AGGRES- 
SIVE MOVEMENT OF SOME CHARACTER ALTHOUGH AS YET THERE 
ARE NO CLEAR INDICATIONS AS TO ITS STRENGTH OR WHETHER IT 
WILL BE DIRECTED AGAINST THE BURMA ROAD THAILAND MALAY 
PENINSULA NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES OR THE PHILIPPINES. 
ADVANCE AGAINST THAILAND SEEMS THE MOST PROBABLE. I CON- 
SIDER IT POSSIBLE [13S62] THAT THIS NEXT JAPANESE AG- 
GRESSION MIGHT CAUSE AN OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN 
THE US AND JAPAN. I DESIRE THAT AFTER FURTHER INFORMING 
YOURSELF AS TO THE SITUATION AND THE GENERAL OUTLINES OF 
NAVAL AND MILITARY PLANS THROUGH CONSULTATION WITH AD- 
MIRAL HART AND GENERAL MacARTHUR YOU SHALL IN GREAT CON- 
FIDENCE PRESENT MY VIEWS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHIL- 
IPPINE COMMONWEALTH AND INFORM HIM THAT AS ALWAYS I AM 
RELYING UPON THE FULL COOPERATION OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND 
HIS PEOPLE PLEASE IMPRESS UPON HIM THE DESIRABILITY OF 
AVOIDING PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENT OR ACTION SINCE THAT MIGHT 
MAKE THE SITUATION MORE DIFFICULT. ROOSEVELT XX. 

Copy to Op-12 War Plans Div. U. S. Army 

No other persons to receive copies 

[seceet] 



[13863] Naval Message Navy Department 

From: CINCAF _ ^. _,„_ 

To : OPNAV Routine RRR 

Date : NOVEMBER 28, 1&41 

280228 

From High Commissioner Sayre Personal for President Roosevelt 

YOUR MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 26TH IS GREATLY APPRECIATED. 

I HAVE BEEN ASKED BY PRESIDENT QUEZON TO INFORM YOU THAI 
YOU MAY BE ABSOLUTELY ASSURED THAT TO THE LAST MAN THE GOV- 
ERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH, AND THE FILIPINO 
PEOPLE, WILL STAND BEHIND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
ACTION: WHITE HOUSE. 
SS FILE. 

[13864] Senator Ferguson. It still remains, Admiral, that there 
were communications, using the Navy facilities between the President 
and the British Government in relation to the Far East ; is not that a 
correct statement? 

Admiral Stark. I think so ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And the copies would be kept m a supersecret 
file in the Navy Department? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5215 

Admiral Stark. I have no personal knowledge of that, but that 
would be a perfectly plausible thing to assume. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, did you find the message or memo- 
randum to Mr. Hull ? 

Mr. Masten. This is it (handing document to Senator Ferguson). 

Senator Fergusox. Admiral, we have a memorandum for the Sec- 
retary of State dated December 4, 1941. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the whole memorandum put in, 
but I particularly want to question the Admiral about the last several 
paragraphs. 

The Vice Chairman. You want the whole memorandum inserted 
in the record ? 

Senator Ferguson. I want the whole memorandum inserted in the 
record. 

The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered. 

(The memorandum referred to follows:) 

[13865] 

Navy Department. 
Washington, December 4, 1941- 
Memorandum for Secretary of State. 

November 22nd the Special Naval Observer London informed the Chief of Naval 
Operations that Vice Admiral Furstner, Minister of Marine of the Dutch Gov- 
ernment in London and Commander in Chief of All Dutch Naval Forces had 
received information that the Japanese vrere concentrating an expeditionary 
force in the Pelew Islands and that the Dutch Government were considering what 
it should do in case a Japanese expeditionary force should cross the Davao- 
Waigeo line or the equator east of that line, and that the Dutch Government 
were Inclined to regard such a movement as a direct threat to the territories and 
interests of Great Britain and the United States, which should immediately be 
countered by force. The Dutch stated that before making up their minds they 
would like the views of the Chief of Naval Operations. 

The Chief of Naval Operations replied that he discounted the information as 
to the assembly of an expeditionary force in the Pelews. That he was not in a 
position to offer advice as the question asked involved political questions, but 
authorized the Naval Observer London to express his views as to the importance 
of the Pelews for the protection of the Mandates and for an offense against the 
Philippines or the Netherland East Indies. 

[13866] December 3 the Special Naval Observer London reported that 
he has kept the British Admiralty informed of the above as the same subject 
has been discussed by the Dutch with the British. He suggested to the British 
Admiralty that it might be necessary for the Dutcli to declare the area south 
of the Davao-Waigeo-Eqnator line an area dangerous to shipping, in order 
that Dutch forces might be free to take prompt action against suspicious vessels 
crossing from the North and from the East. The Briti.sh Admiralty concurred 
that this would constitute a useful defense measure from the naval point of 
view. However it was essential for political reasons that the zone should be 
declared in as unprovocative a manner as possible and should be represented as 
a defense zone rather than as a dangerous zone. 

The British Admiralty informed Furstner that they also doubted the accuracy 
of his information and suggested the Dutch take the matter up with the Foreign 
Office. 

When the Dutch Foreign Minister visited Eden his proposal went beyond 
that of Furstner as It invited a joint declaration of a defense zone by the United 
States or Great Britain. After consulting the Admiralty, Eden replied to the 
Dutch Foreign Minister as follows: (A) That during the continuance of the 
present negotiations between Japan and the United States, it was undesirable 
that any declaration be made unless there was the plainest evidence that the 
Japanese were preparing an expedition against the Netherlands territory, and 
that until [13867] more definite evidence becomes available that Japanese 
concentrations are threatening Dutch territory no declaration should be made. 
(B) That Great Britain recognizes the military value the declaration of a 
defense zone would have, but that it considers it would be less provocative to 



5216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Japan and less prejudicial to the Washington negotiations if it were confined to 
a unilateral declaration by tlie Netherlands East Indies of a zone manifestly 
designed as a defense measure for their own shores. (C) That in similar cir- 
cumstances His Majesty's Government had been compelled to make a unilateral 
declaration of a defense zone on the open seas off the coast of Johore when the 
Japanese concentrations on the border of Indo China began to constitute a threat 
to Malaya ; the declaration of this zone in waters adjacent to British territory 
was plainly a measure of defense and at the time was accepted as such by Japan 
without serious criticism. 

Mr. Eden therefore suggested tliat if a declaration should prove necessary 
the Netherlands Government should declare that certain military and naval 
defense measures have been taken in the area south and west of the Davao- 
Waigeo-Equator line and that accordingly all vessels intending to enter this 
zone must notify the Netherlands Naval authorities of their intention and call 
at specified ports for routing instructions. Such a declaration would be analogous 
to that made by His Majesty's Government off Johore and would not be likeLv 
to increase existing tension. 

[13868] On December 4 the Chief of Naval Operations directed the Special 
Naval Observer in London to transmit to the Dutch and British Admiralties in 
London, the following views on the military aspect of this subject. 

While the Chief of Naval Operations believes the November reports of a 
concentration in the Pelews were unfounded, the possibility of a Japanese attack 
from that region against the Philippines or Netherlands East Indies cannot be 
ruled out. 

In regard to the Dutch project to declare areas south and west of the Davao- 
Waigeo-Equator line dangerous to shipping in order that Dutch Forces may 
attack suspicious vessels entering from the North and East, if this were done it 
would apply to all merchant shipping regardless of nationality and to British 
and United States Naval vessels as well as those of Japan. It is doubtful if the 
Dutch could establish promptly a control system which would not cause excessive 
delay to shipping important to the United States particularly to the shipping 
carrying reinforcements to the Philippines as all United States shipping between 
the United States and the Far East is routed via Torres Straits. 

The declaration of this large area as a defense zone would hardly be analogous 
to the British declaration of the Johore area, as the latter area is a small one. 
The declax'ation of a large area of the high seas as a defense zone would create 
a precedent for Japan to close the Okhotsk Sea. Sea of Japan, [138691 the 
western part of the South China Sea, and the Gulf of Siam. If the United States 
acquiesced in the Dutch declaration, it would be difficult to object to similar 
declarations by the Japanese. 

At present aid to Russia is being shipped via the Okhot.sk Sea and Sea of 
Japan. The Dutch, British and United States are taking reconnaissance meas- 
ures to cover areas considered dangerous. Shipments to Siberia and patrol 
measures should continue. The Chief of Naval Operations is convinced that the 
closing of the area west and south of the Davao-Waigeo-Equator area by the 
Dutch would be prejudicial to the naval and military interests of all three 
powers. 

If the Dutch desire to give a warning to the Japanese the Chief of Naval 
Operations believes it should be in the form of a declaration to Japan, that if 
during the current situation Japanese Naval vessels or expeditionary forces cross 
the Davao-Waigeo line it would be considered a hostile act and the forces crossing 
this line would be attacked. 

Ambassadors Winant and Biddle have been informed by the Special Naval 
Observer London of the contents of the memorandum. 

/S/ R. E. SCHUIRMANN, 

By Direction. 

[1S870] Senator Ferguson. I never believed we should take iso- 
lated paragraphs out without putting the whole memorandum in. It 
is a memorandum by Admiral Schuirmann. 

I will read you several items in it. 

On December 4 the Chief of Naval Operations — 

that would be you — 

directed the Special Naval Observer in London to transmit to the Dutch and 
British Admiralties in London, the following views on the military aspect of 
this subject. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5217 

I am just taking one paragraph. 

Mr. Geakhart. Will the Senator state the date ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. The 4th of December, 1941. It is a mem- 
orandum for the Secretary of State from R. E. Schuirmann, by direc- 
tion. R. E. Schuirmann was an admiral, was he not, or a captain ? 

Admiral Stark. He was a captain at that time. He is a rear ad- 
miral now, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. May I just ask one preliminary question ? 

Senator Ferguson, li^es, indeed. 

Mr. MuRPHT. How long have we had the memorandum before the 
committee ? 

Mr. Masten. That memorandum has been in counsel's office since 
last November and available to every member of the committee. Yes- 
terday, Mr. Greaves came down to look through [13871} vari- 
ous papers and this question I imagine is based on that examination 
yesterday. 

Mr. MuRPHT. Fine. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, the paragraph I want to read to you, and 
it follows the paragraph I did read and is the second from the last 
j)aragraph in this memorandum, is as follows : 

If the Dutch desire to give a warning to the Japanese, the Chief of Naval Op- 
erations believes it should be in the form of a declaration to Japan, that if dur- 
ing the current situation Japanese naval vessels or expeditionary forces cross 
the Davao-Waigeo line it would be considered a hostile act and the forces cross- 
ing this line would be attacked. 

Now, this is a message from Captain Schuirmann to the State De- 
partment, and it is on your direction, and I read you that part : 

If the Dutch desire to give a warning to the Japanse, the Chief of Naval Op- 
erations — 

that is you — 

believes it should be in the form of a declaration to Japan, that if during 
the current situation Japanese naval vessels or expeditionary forces cross 
the Davao-Waigeo line it would be considered a hostile act and the forces cross- 
ing this line would be attacked. 

Attacked by whom ? 

[1387^1 Admiral Stark. Attacked by the Dutch. 

Senator Ferguson. Why were you dictating the message that the 
Dutch were to give to Japan ? 

Admiral Stark. I remember that. My remembrance is that it came 
up before, but I am not certain, but we were undoubtedly asked, and 
that was our opinion. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, if you can give us the answer, why were 
you consulted as to what kind of a message the Dutch Government 
would give to the Japanese Government in a question solely between 
the Dutch Government and the Japanese Government, as to the Japa- 
nese Government moving troops or moving vessels across a certain 
line? 

Admiral Stark. Well, we were 

Senator Ferguson. Were you taking parallel action? 

That is the question. 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I think the witness ought to be given 
an opportunity to answer the question. It seems like an important 
question. 

79716 — 46— pt. 11 6 



5218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson, It is a very important question. 

Mr. Murphy. Then, let him answer. 

Admiral Stark. No ; we were not taking parallel action. We could 
not take a parallel action. 

Mr. MuRpnY. I submit the question has not been answered, 
[J 3873] Senator. The second question was just answered, but the 
other question has not been answered. 

Senator Ferguson. Read the question, please, Mr. Reporter. 

(The question was read by the reporter.) 

Admiral Stark. My remembrance of that is that the Dutch asked 
us for an opinion and we gave it to them. There is much in the record 
showing an interdependent interest more or less in this whole area. 

Senator Ferguson. All right 

Now, I will ask you upon what you based your opinion that you had 
a right to tell the Dutch that they should give a message to the Japa- 
nese Government that if this line was crossed by the Japanese it would 
be considered a hostile act and the forces crossing this line would be 
attacked, that you believed that the Dutch should say that if the Japa- 
nese crossed that line the Dutch should attack? What did you base 
that on ? 

Admiral Stark. I based that on the fact that if they did, it looked 
like an attack on the N. E. I., on the Netherlands East Indies, and 
they could consider it such, it was my opinion an attack, and in that 
event to repel it. I might draw a similar line — perhaps, exaggerate 
it a little bit — by saying if they attempted to go into Manila Bay 

Senator Ferguson. That was in our territory ? 

[31874] Admiral Stark. That was in our territory. But they 
asked me for an opinion, and tliat was my opinion. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you contact tlie President before you gave 
this opinion ? It is an important opinion, is it not ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It might have meant war between the United 
States and Japan? This kind of advice, could it not mean war? 

[13875] Admiral Stark. It could have meant war between the 
Dutch and the Japs. Wliat the ultimate reaction to it would have been, 
I do not know. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. That is because you had written to Admiral 
Kimmel that God alone would know what was going to happen ? Is 
that the reason you did not take it to mean war between the United 
States and Japan? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I could not tell whether it meant war or not. 
Under our Constitution the Congress had to declare war, and we could 
not take any independent action, so far as hostilities were concerned. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, Mr. Chairman, I want to object on the ground 
that there is a "yes, sir" answer in there, and there were two questions 
and the record does not show which question the answer "yes, sir" is 
to. The first was: "Did you ask the President?", and then there was 
another question asked and the answer was "Yes, sir." The record 
does not show to anyone reading it whether the "Yes, sir" is to the first 
question or the second question. 

Senator Ferguson. One question was: "It is an important message, 
isn't it?" 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5219 

What is your answer to that ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

[1SS7S] Senator Ferguson. Is your answer to the other ques- 
tion the same, "Yes, sir" ? 

Admiral Stark. As to whether or not I consulted the President? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall definitely having consulted the 
President on that point, but I would assume that any clispatch of that 
nature would have been taken up with the Secretary and with the 
State Department, and probably with the President. It was along a 
similar line of the line which we had drawn in our memorandum of the 
5th and the 27th. 

Mr. Masten. Senator, may I suggest something there that would be 
helpful to you? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Masten. The memorandum which you have is a memorandum 
which describes the final message which appears in Exhibit No. 79 and 
which was introduced last December. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I have that here. 

Mr. Masten. This exhibit gives the entire background of most of 
that memorandum, I think. 

Senator Ferguson. But it is dated subsequent, is the only thing? 

Mr. Masten. It appears that that is the telegram referred to in tlie 
memorandum, because the language is practically [13S77] 
identical with the descriptive langiiage in the memorandum. 

Mr. Murphy. For the record, when you said "this memorandum," 
you had one in your hand ? 

Mr. Masten. That wa.s Exhibit No. 79. 

Admiral Stark. You say you liave just taken a paragraph out. I 
would like to see the dispatch and see the correspondence, what is 
in it. 

Mr. Masten. This is tlie final dispatch in Exhibit No. 79, Admiral. 

Admiral Stark. I do recall that myself. 

Senator Ferguson. Noav, you will notice what you are reading, Ad- 
miral, is dated the 5th, which is the day following, and I cannot quite 
get the record straight in my own mind, how you can rely upon some- 
thing that came subsequent to the time that you directed this advice 
to be given. Can you straighten that out? 

Mr.MuRPHY. Now, will the Senator yield ? 

Admiral Stark. WJiat I would like to see is where we start on this 
and who asked what. 

Mr. Murphy. The record shows the 5th where? The 5th here 
or the 5th with the Dutch ? 

Mr. Masten. The final telegram in Exhibit No. 79 bears the date 
December 5, w^hereas the memorandum that Senator Ferguson is using 
is dated December 4. But the fact is that the language of [1S878 \ 
the memorandum and of the telegram are practically identical, so it 
Avould seem to be clear that the memorandum is referring to the 
telegram. 

Admiral Stark. This is the memorandum w^here they started? 

Mr. Masten. That is the memorandum under discussion. 

Admiral Stark. May I take the time to read it, sir? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes, certainly. 



5220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. MuKPHT, I think, Mr. Chairman, the record should also show 
that the dispatch of the 5th is addressed to our own naval attache at 
London. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Is there anything here showing any dispatch directly 
to the Dutch? 

Mr. Masten. The memorandum refers to a dispatch of the 4th. 
There is a discrepancy on the dates. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield while the Admiral is reading? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. I think, Mr. Chairman, the record should show that 
Exhibit No. 79 consists of 10 dispatches. Exhibit No. 79 was admitted 
in the record some month ago, and the part on which the Admiral is 
being questioned now, as to what the Chief of Naval Operations said, 
is in the dispatch of December 5. It has been in the record for some 
months. 

[13879] Senator Ferguson. Yes, but the record did not show 
before that this was all under the direction of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, which is the witness. 

Mr. Murphy. Yes, it does show it. It says, 

If Dutch authorities consider some warning should be given Japan CNO 
believes it should take the form of a declaration to Japan that in view of the 
current situation Japanese naval vessels, or expeditionary forces crossing the 
Davao-Waigeo line would be considered hostile and would be attacked. Com- 
municate these views to the Admiralty and the Dutch Naval Command in London. 

[13880] Senator Ferguson. It does not cover what I am in- 
quiring about now. 

Admiral Stark. I have read these, and to make it clear I would 
suggest, if they are not already in the record in connection with this 
questioning, that it would be well to put them in, or refer to them at 
this point. 

Senator Ferguson. They will be referred to now, because through 
the counsel's statement, the exhibit number has been put in. 

Admiral Stark. That shows the entire discussion. This memoran- 
dum was a memorandum by Schuirmann at my direction to the Sec- 
retary of State, with whom these things had been considered, and then 
I said if the Dutch were going to do something, I suggested the 
following. 

Now, I may state with regard to this picture in general, that it had 
been suggested at times that we rule out certain parts of the sea and 
call them defensive sea areas, that nothing could come in there. 

Senator Ferguson. When you say "we," whom are you speaking 
about ? 

Admiral Staek. We had to consider the same thing in the South- 
ern Philippine waters. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you mean you as the Navy, or the President, 
the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy? 

[13881] Admiral Stark. The Navy Department. 

Senator Ferguson. The Navy Department ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

As I recollect, we had had some correspondence with Admiral Hart 
about it, about making a defensive sea area which would prohibit 
vessels coming in there except they asked permission to come in, so 
that we would know what was going through that area. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5221 

As noted here, the British had declared one such area. I recollect 
clearly when the question first came up, as opposing it, because if 
we did, we could have no complaint of the Japs, perhaps, closing the 
Sea of Japan, or closing the northern waters where we were sending 
vessels into Kussia. 

That is mentioned here, and that was our thought on the subject. 

It is all in these dispatches. 

Then we went on to say finally — 

If the Dutch desire to give a warning to the Japanese, the Chief of Naval 
Operations believes it should be in the form of a declaration to Japan, that if 
during the current situation, Japanese naval vessels or expeditionary forces cross 
the Davao-Waigeo line it would be considered a hostile act, and the forces crossing 
this line would be attacked. 

11388£] That is very much the same thing as the defensive sea 
area. They cannot get into what they consider vital waters to them 
without asking permission, or being attacked. 

Senator Ferguson. Would you read just the next paragraph? 

Admiral Stark. May I go on just a little further ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. Those questions had been discussed in the Navy 
Department and in the State Department. This first memorandum is 
to the State Department, and I think we were all pretty much of one 
mind with regard to it. 

Now as to your question, as to whether this was taken up with 
the President, I do not recall. The last paragraph that you suggest 
I read is : 

Ambassadors Winant and Biddle have been informed by the Special Naval 
Observer, London, of the contents of the memorandum. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you think today that you described this 
important matter as to advising the Dutch to do this without taking 
it up with the President of the United States ? 

Admiral Stark. No, I do not think I would. I certainly would 
not do it without taking it up with the Secretary of the Navy, and 
without a complete interchange with the State Department. 

[1S883] As I remember the first instance, when we were talking 
about the southern Philippine waters, of discussing it with the Presi- 
dent, but I just cannot say absolutely that I took up that particular 
paragraph with the President. 

I am under the impression I did, but I hesitate, when he is not 
here, to state positively that I did, when it is not perfectly clear to 
my mind that I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Unless it is your memory that it is perfectly 
clear, I would not want you to. 

Admiral Stark. On things of that sort, we just could not go along 
by ourselves. It had to involve the State Department, and things 
of that sort were always taken up with the President, and we were 
very close to him. 

Senator Ferguson. What I want to get at is, in your opinion now, 
if they had moved across this line, and the Dutch had attacked, 
would you have said that that meant war also with the United States ? 

Admiral Stark. No; I would not. 

Senator Ferguson. Then I want to read to you out of Mr. Stimson's 
memorandum. 



5222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mv. MuRriiY. Will the Senator yield before you proceed? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Ml-. MuRi'iiY. How does this Davao-Waigeo line compare with the 
line set forth in the areas described in the memorandum [13S84\ 
of November 5? 

Senator Ferguson. It was over in the Netherlands East Indies 
area, and, as I recall, would have put an amphibious Japanese force 
I'ight on the doorstep. 

Admiral Stark. Of the NEI. 

Senator Ferguson. Of the NEI ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. But it had nothing to do wath the line that you 
had General Marshall establish in your memorandum of the 5th and 
27th of November ? 

Admiral Stark. That is a different line. 

Mr. Murphy. Is not there a paragraph in the November 5 memo- 
randum as to what the recommendations of our military authorities 
were if the NEI were attacked? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I want to bring up next. 

Admiral Stark. I think so. 

Senator Ferguson. "Friday, November 7, 1941." This is out of 
Secretary Stimson's diary. 

Cabinet meeting tliis afternoon. The President opened with telling the story 
of Lincoln and his Cabinet — how he polled the Cabinet and found them all polling 
"no," and then he said "The ayes have it." With that, he started to have 
[138S5] what he said was the first general poll of his Cabinet, and it was on 
the question of the Far East — whether the people would back us up in case we 
struck at Japan down there, and what the tactics should be. 

Now, he has got a note there, and the note is : 

See statement, page 11, as to this Cabinet meeting. 

Now, continuing reading from the memorandum : 

It was a very interesting talk — the best Cabinet meeting I think we have ever 
had since I have been there. He went around the tabk^ — first Hull and then 
myself, and then around through the whole niimber, and it was unanimous in 
feeling the country would support us. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 

Don't you think the Admiral ought to have a copy so he can follow 
you? 

Admiral Stark. I brought that up with me. 
Senator Ferguson. It is on page 42, Admiral. 
Admiral Stark. Thank you. 
Senator Ferguson. About half way down. 

He said that this time the vote is unanimous, he feeling the same way. Hull 
made a good presentation of the general situation. I told them I rather nar- 
rowed it down into a following up the steps which had been done to show what 
needed to be done in the future. The thing would have been much [13886] 
stronger if the Cabinet had known — and they did not know except in the case of 
Hull and the President — what the Army is doing with the big bombers and how 
ready we are to pitch in. 

Now, that is the end of the memorandum. 

Mr. Murphy. At that point. Senator, don't you think it is unusual 
that he did not include Secretary Knox? Certainly, lie wouhl know, 
too. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5223 

Senator Ferguson. I can only read from the diary of the Secretary 
of War. I am not putting any language in it. It may seem strange. 

Admiral Stark. I may state Colonel Knox did know. 

Senator Ferguson. You say Colonel Knox did know ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; he knew everything I did, and I was per- 
fectly familiar with that program. 

Senator Ferguson. And j^ou were familiar with what is contained 
in the diary of the Secretary of War? 

Admiral Stark. I did not recall that vote. It may have been I was 
told, but I do not recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I will go to pages 11 and 12, because it 
i-efers to that, and I will keep this record straight. 

On Friday, November 7, we had the nsnal weekly Cabinet meeting. The Far 
Eastern situation was npiiermost in many of our minds. Mr. Hull informed us 
that relations had become [13887] extremely critical and that we should 
be on the outlook for an attack l>y Japan at any time. 

Now, this is November 7. 

"Our military advisers" — and you would be one of those would you 
not, Admiral? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 
Senator Ferguson. Reading on : 

— while desirous of delay, had urged military action if Japan attacked territory 
whose security was vital to us, and in this connection specified American, British, 
or Dutch territory. 

Now, I will ask you whether or not the Dutch territory was the same 
territory that was described in the memorandum of Schuirmann on 
your direction ? 

Admiral Stark. In effect; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It was? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So that you had given the opinion to apparently 
the President, and apparently to the other members of the War Cabi- 
net, that we should attack if this territory south of this particular — 
what is the name of it? Davao-Waigeo? 

Admiral Stark. Davao-Waigeo. 

Senator Ferguson. "South of tliis particular Davao [1S888] 
Waigeo line, "isn't that true? Tliat was your opinion as early as the 
7th? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; and on that same 7th, I wrote that war 
might be delayed a month longer, but I did not see how it could go 
beyond that. 

I might say with regard to that — and I have a remembrance that in 
my previous testimony I said that — what I was afraid of was one at a 
time, and then a squeeze play, and I think I am on the record as saying 
under certain conditions we would have to fight for our own safety. 

Senator Ferguson. Coming back to my question, here on the 7th of 
November, you are of the opinion, and have advised the President and 
the War Cabinet, as one of our military advisers, that if Japan attacked 
the territory of the Dutcli, which includes the very territory that you 
are now telling the Dutcli to give this warning about, and that they are 
to attack, you would say then that it did mean war, in your opinion; is 
that not a correct statement? 

Admiral Stark. No, it is not. There is a distinction there, 



5224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Will yoii tell us what it is ? 

Admiral Stark. It is this, that while it would mean that Marshall 
and I, these advisers — which is a matter of record — had advised this, 
we could not say that our advice [lS88d] would be followed. 

What the Congress would do if this was put up to them, I had no 
means of knowing. That is why I say it did not mean war, because 
we thought it ought to. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Stark, did you ever consider on this 
question of whether or not we would start war with Japan, whether 
there would be shots from the Japanese side, and, therefore, we would 
be in war ; whether that question would ever be submitted to the Con- 
gress of the United States ? 

Admiral Stark. Our instructions were very clear on not to commit 
an overt act. So far as I was concerned, I could do nothing in that line 
without authority higher up. 

Unless something had occurred, such as did occur, the normal pro- 
cedure was for a declaration by Congress, in accordance with our 
Constitution. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did not you know that Colonel Knox 
advised the President of three alternatives, and he advised as the last 
that we should attack ? 

Mr. KJEEFE. You mean Colonel Stimson? 

Senator Ferguson. Colonel Stimson. 

Admiral Stark. That paragraph which is in here 

Senator Ferguson. It is on page 53. 

Admiral Stark. In view of the rest of the paragraphs in here 
where Colonel Stimson states 

[1S890] Senator Ferguson. It is on page 53, if it will help you. 

Admiral Stark. I want to finish that sentence. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. Where Colonel Stimson states, on page 55 of this 
memorandum, and I quote: 

It further became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the force as 
it went by without any warning, on the one hand, which we didn't think we 
could do ; or sitting still and allowing it to go. 

and so forth. 

There Colonel Stimson puts himself on record as stating that 
he could not strike without warning. 

Now, I think that there is another paragraph here that bears on 
that same thing, if I may look for it, while this talk is on this matter. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. 

Mr. Richardson. Look on page 56. 

Admiral Stark. I will come right back to it. 

On page 28, Colonel Stimson further states : 

On the other hand we also decided that we could not attack without a further 
warning to Japan, and we discussed what form that warning should take. The 
President suggested a special telegram from himself to the Emperor of Japan. 
After some discussion, it was decided that he would send such [13891] a 
letter to the Emperor, which would not be made public, and that at the same 
time he would deliver a special message to Congress reporting on the danger 
and reporting what we would have to do if the danger happened. 

Now, Colonel Stimson, I think, in those two statements, which I 
have quoted, and there may be others here — clearly states, in my 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5225 

Opinion, that he could not go ahead and make an attack without first 
warning, and he suggests that the President shouki go to Congress. 

Senator Ferguson. Did not he also advise the President that he 
believed the message of the I7th of August — he calls it the 19th, but 
apparently that is wrong 

Admiral Stark. Yes ; that is an error. 

Senator Ferguson. That the message of the 17th of August was 
such a warning, that if they crossed that line, we would be justified in 
attacking without congressional action? 

Admiral Stark. I do not gather that he considers that. That mes- 
sage of the I7th of August — and while I have not refreshed my mem- 
ory on it for a long time, as I recall wound up with some statement 
to the effect that if the Japs encroached further in southeast Asia, we 
reserved to ourselves the right to take any action which we saw fit in 
our national interest. 

[13892] Senator Ferguson. Now, would not one of those actions 
be that we would attack if we would take any action ? 

Admiral Stark. I would not say it would be to attack without warn- 
ing. I feel so strongly on that, that my only suggestion is — you are 
asking me to interpret Colonel Stimson's thoughts. He is available to 
answer that question. 

Senator Ferguson. I will come back to it. 

Did you expect this war to start by the Japanese doing the first 
shooting, after Congress had declared war upon Japan ? Is not that 
contrary to all of the philosophy of Japan, that they would allow us, 
if they were going to make war, to declare war first ? 

Admiral Stark. Again I would like to state this with regard to 
that: My thought was that the Japs would strike without warning. 
That was their history. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 

Admiral Stark. Now, as to the second part of your question 

Senator Ferguson. I think you testified to that before. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

As to the second part of your question, as to our striking after decla- 
ration of war on our part, if the situation became intolerable to us, and 
our national safety, if the Japs had not struck and we thought then 
that our safety was imperiled, [1389S] if we did not fight, I 

think it would have been done in a constitutional manner. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, you expected Japan to attack 
without warning? 

Admiral Stark. I did. 

Senator Ferguson. And that would be before we declared war? 

Admiral Stark. At that time ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Therefore, the war would start before Congress declared war, be- 
cause we would not allow Japan to attack us and not even shoot back, 
would we ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I think your question is just stating what has 
happened. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that what you anticipated? My original 
question was prefaced, and I am carrying out the idea, by what hap- 
pened prior to the 7th. 

It is exactly what happened, but) I want to know whether that is 
what you anticipated would happen. 



5226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stakk. I did. 

I did anticipato an attack without warning, I said so in personal 
letters for over a year. I stated so unequivocally in dispatches in the 
latter part of November. 

Senator Ferguson. Isn't it true that that was taken up [13894] 
at the War Cabinet meeting, as related in the Stimson statement ? 

Admiral Stark. If you; will give me the page, I will follow you, 
Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Look at page 47. 

Then, at 12 o'clock, we (viz. General Marshall and I) went to the White House, 
where we were until nearly lialf-past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, 
Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the President, instead of bringing up the 
Victory Parade, brought up entirely the relations with the Japanese. He brought 
up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Mon- 
day, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and 
the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver 
them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger 
to ourselves. 

It was a difficult proposition. 

Now, is that not exactly what the whole War Cabinet expected, that 
there would be an attack by the Japanese before anything would be 
Mubn itted to Congress and have America declare war upon Japan? 

Aimiral Stark. We thought action by Japan attacking us was 
aboi t to start, and we said so. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

[13S&5] Now, I come to the question here : 

Wasn't it also true that you expected that attack before Congress 
would declare war upon Japan ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, because I thought it was in the immediate 
offing. • 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. But I do again make the statement, and I want it 
clear on the record, so far as my thoughts are concerned, that if Japan 
had not attacked, and if conditions had become intolerable to our na- 
tional safety because of what she w\as doing, it is then my opinion 
that there would have been only one road for us to take, and that would 
have been through the Congress. 

It did not have to be, because she attacked. 

Senator Ferguson. And you expected she would attack, and the 
President expected she would attack? 

Admiral Stark. Yes ; at that time there w^as not any question about 
it in our minds. I said so at tliat time, on the 25th. 

Senator Ferguson. You did not change your mind, and as far as 
you know", the President did not change his, at least saying so to you, 
up to the 7th of December ? 

Admiral Stark. No one changed their minds, so far as I know. 
You will recall on the 6th we sent a dispatch [13S96] about 
codes, to hold on to the last minute. That showed we were still expect- 
ing that minute to happen at any time. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, he states : 

The question was how we should maneuver them — 

I take it that means the Japanese — 

into the position of firing the first sliot without allowing too much danger to 
ourselves. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT "COMMITTEE 5227 

Now, did you discuss with the President and those present at that 
meeting how you would maneuver the Japanese into shooting the 
first shot ? 

Admiral Stark. I have no recollection of that. My recollection of 
that meeting, on which I testified before — and which the record, the 
written record shows — is that I wrote Kimmel about both the President 
and Mr. Hull stating that they would not be surprised at a surprise 
attack. 

But as to our maneuvering them, if you take the language baldly, 
just Avhat it says, that it was trying to get them to shoot at us, I do not 
recall any such conversation. 

I do recall the meat of the thing, and which meant what Colonel 
Stimson meant, tliat we should not commit the first overt act, and I 
heard Marshall's testimony yesterday when he said he thought this 
was to keep the record clear, and that it was to be political. Maybe 
that was it ; I don't know. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he say, "political'' or "diplomatic"? 

[1S897] Admiral Stark. Diplomatic, perhaps it was. 

Senator Ferguson. In other words, is that your own opinion, that 
we were to keep the diplomatic record in shape so that Japan would 
shoot the first shot rather than America declaring war? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recollect that having gone through my 
mind at that time. As I said, I did not recollect discussing this, just 
as it is here, except that we would not commit the first overt act. 

I do know, however, that there was a desire to keep the record 
straight on our offers, for example. 

To go back a little bit, I think it was back in July when I Avas 
present with Nomura, and with Welles in the White House, when 
Nomura brought up the subject that what they were concerned Avith 
was raw materials, and particularly food, rice; and the President 
then offered, so far as he possibly could, to guarantee that they would 
get these things if Japan would stop her aggression. 

I remember his remark afterwards, that she probably would not 
stop her aggression. But that was to keep the record straight, and 
they were continually trying to prevent war in the Pacific. 

I think the record is clean on it. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it, you do not [13898] 
remember this being taken up at that meeting, and you do not remem- 
ber that the "maneuver" meant diplomatic maneuver. You do not 
remember either ? 

Admiral Stark. No; I do not. Senator Ferguson. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr, Murphy. Was Admiral Stark at this Cabinet meeting? 

Admiral Stark. Yes ; I was. 

Senator Ferguson. It was the War Cabinet meeting. 

Mr. Murphy. All right. 

Senator Ferguson. You were present ? 

Admiral Stark. I was present at that meeting ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I think you wrote to Kimmel advising him 
that the President had expected the war by Japan attacking by — 
what was it? Monday? 

Mr. Keefe. The following Monday, December 1. 



5228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. That is what the President said. If you recall, 
when you questioned me about this before, I said I thought we went 
into all phases of it, but my memory was not clear as to just what 
we had discussed in detail, but that I had written Kimmel of the Presi- 
dent's and Mr. Hull's belief that a surprise attack might come any 
time, and as early as "next Monday." 

There are things in here, of course, from Mr. Stimson's [ISSPO] 
diary. I kept none. 

Senator Ferguson. I think that is all. 

The Vice Chairman. Does Mr. Keef e desire to inquire ? 

Mr. Keefe. May I have the diary? 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will inquire. 

Mr. Keefe. I would like to have it perfectly clear, if I can — and I 
listened attentively to the questions and answers that have been pro- 
pounded by Senator Ferguson, and that you have given. Admiral 
Stark 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. But according to Secretary Stimson's diary, under date 
of November 7, 1941, in which he described the Cabinet meeting held 
that afternoon, Friday afternoon, where the President polled the 
cabinet on the question "whether the people would back us up in case 
we struck at Japan down there and what the tactics should be," whether 
the fact that such a vote was taken by the full Cabinet, and they had 
voted "aye," expressing their respective opinions that the people 
would back them up if they struck at Japan, whether that was known 
to you when you attended the meeting of the War Cabinet on Tuesday, 
November 25 ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not think it was. I do not recall Colonel 
Knox having given me that information. 

Obviously I would not have gotten it from anyone else, [1S900'] 
unless Marshall had gotten it from Stimson and told me. 

I have no recollection of it. 

Mr. Keefe. It is obvious from the memorandum prepared by Secre- 
tary Stimson and appearing in his diary that that whole question was 
gone over by the Cabinet. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; I think there is no question of that. It 
states so, from his note made at the time. 

Mr. Keefe. But you, as Chief of Naval Operations, state to us now 
that you had no knowledge that that question was discussed at that 
Cabinet meeting of November 7 ? 

Admiral Stark. I have no recollection of it. 

Mr. Keefe. Then, am I to understand that it is a mere lapse of 
memory that you do not have a recollection; that it may have been 
discussed and you have forgotten it ? 

Admiral Stark. It is possible that I might have. In my opinion, I 
did not know. 

After all, that is going on 5 years, and there was an awful lot 
going on. But I have no recollection of that vote, until I read it here ; 
and I think I did not get it. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, the reason I am asking that. Admiral Stark, is 
because it impressed me, when I read it, that it was a very important 
matter, reflecting itself on subsequent actions, perhaps, of the Cabinet 
and subsequent action of the so-called War Cabinet, but your final 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5229 

judgment before [13901] this committee today is that when 
you met with the war cabinet on the 25th of November, or at any 
other time, that the war cabinet met subsequent to November 7, you 
do not have any present recollection of ever having laiown of its 
meeting and its determination and vote on the 7th of November? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. If I had had it, I do not know 
that it would have affected my independent judgment. 

Mr. Keefe, The thing that impressed me about this memorandum 
of the former Secretary Stimson is the fact that they apparently 
were concerned about the imminence of war, and how we were to 
meet it without being put in the position of having it said that we had 
fired the first shot, or committed the first overt act. You were con- 
cerned about that too, as Chief of Naval Operations, were you not? 

Admiral Stakk. I was concerned with the imminence of war, and 
surprise attack by the Japs which we were expecting at any moment 
at that time. 

I say "at that time," my message of the 24th put it down as a pos- 
sibility ; my message of the 27th was positive, and you recall the sub- 
sequent messages to the 27th about the codes and so forth. We were 
expecting such an attack. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, I understand that clearly, but I [13902] 
gained the impression from reading Secretary Stimson's statement 
to this committee, together with the excerpts from his diary which he 
has submitted to the committee that there was a question in the minds 
of the Cabinet officers as to whether or not there was such a division 
among the people of this country with respect to the possibility of 
war in the Pacific, or whether or not the country was so solidified 
on that question that they would back up the President and the 
Cabinet if they did actually, in view of the circumstances, strike at 
Japan and commit the first overt act, and the Cabinet, when polled 
on that question, said they thought the country would back them up. 
Did you share that belief at that time ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I certainly would not have had any such 
unanimity with regard to the country backing them up as was in- 
dicated there by the Cabinet poll. 

I had recalled when I thought we would get the draft without any 
question, we got it by one vote, after a good deal of contest, and the 
sentiment of the country, which is portrayed here by Colonel Stimson — 
for example, may I quote here, speaking of the officers and what the 
military was working on at that time. Colonel Stimson said, "Yet they 
were surrounded, outside of their offices and almost throughout the 
country, by a spirit of isolationism and disbelief [13903] in 
danger which now seems incredible." 

Mr. Keefe. You felt that way too, did you not, because you wrote 
Admiral Hart on that same thing, did you not ? 

Admiral Stark. I wrote I did not know what we would do and 
there has been a good deal of comment on that in articles one way or 
the other, as though it might seem strange that the Chief of Naval 
Operations did not know what to do under certain conditions. 

Mr. Keefe. You would have good 

Admiral Stark. May I finish? 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 



5230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. It would have taken a brave man right here in 
Congress at that time to have predicted what w^ould have to be done, 
if it was put up to Congress. 

Mr. Keefe. I recall a letter which you wrote, which is in the record 
here — I cannot quote it exactly — but I do recall a letter which you 
wrote to Admiral Hart in which you said to him, in substance, that 
you could not understand the attitude of the people of this country, 
and especially the people up on the Hill that were debating the 
question of arming the ships and so on, that they apparently did not 
realize that the country was already at war, that we were at war in 
the Atlantic, and you said to him, "You and I know it." 

[1390J^] ' Do you have that letter? 

Admiral Stark. I remember very distinctly a letter in which I 
stated, "Although the country does not realize, we are in war in the 
Atlantic." 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. We covered that in the previous testimony. 

Mr. Keefe. You, as Chief of Naval Operations, knew it, but you 
expressed the opinion at that time, that the people of the country 
and the Congress itself did not seem to understand and know the 
facts. 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. \ You remember the testimony, I 
think, to the effect that w^e did not have belligerent rights, and so 
forth, that went with the full declaration of war. There were a lot 
of things we could not do, but technically, in certain areas, we had 
given an order to shoot at any Axis craft we saw, and the public had 
been fully informed on that by the President. 

Mr. Murphy. In the speech of September 11, wasn't it? 

Admiral Stark. September 11; yes, sir; I think that was the 
speech. It has all been covered. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now; in answer to the questions of Senator 
Ferguson, you indicated that you have very little present recollection 
of what actually took place at this [^13905^ meeting of the War 
Cabinet on the 25th. as described here by Secretary Stimson. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I searched my memory just as carefully 
as I could. I kept no diary. I have the written record of Kimmel on 
that, in which I referred to that meeting. The only thing additionally 
that I want to bring up, and was refreshed on in Colonel Stimson's 
memorandum was what I knew at the time, that we were not to 
commit the first overt act. That could be one interpretation of the 
statement which he makes there, and also the President and Mr. Hull 
stating unequivocally that they would not be surprised if the Japs at- 
tacked us without warning. I immediately transmitted that to Ad- 
miral Kimmel. 

Mr. Keefe. The attack which Avas in your mind, and the possibility 
of attack which was in your mind, and in the minds of all the others, 
as far as you knew it, was an attack down in the Far East, wasn't it? 

Admiral Stark. That is where we were looking for it ; yes, sir. 

We knew the other was a possibility. For example, the dispatches 
we sent made both the Commanders in the Pacific action addressees; 
it made King in the Atlantic "information," but we expected the 
attack in the southeast F'acific, and we were surprised when they 
struck at the time they did in [13906] Hawaii. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5231 

Mr. Keete. Now, Admiral. I understood you to say when you were 
here the last time, a couple of days ago, that you had since located an 
engagement book, or something of that kind. 

Admiral Stark. That was Mrs. Stark's engagement book, in which 
everything of a social nature, or in going out, was kept. 

Mr. Keefe. Is it here ? 

Admiral Stark. No ; I haven't got it here, but I would be glad to 
give it to you^ if you want to see it. I will tell you, there was nothing 
there regarding that Saturday night, at least we could not find that. 

Mr. Keefe. When you first testified, you testified you could not find 
it, it was not available, and you have since located it, since the last 
Jiearing? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; and I so stated in my testimony here. 

Mr. Keefe. Is it available so you can bring it to the committee? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. I would like to see it. 

Admiral Stark. Aye, aye, sir. I will give it to Baecher. 

[1S907] Mr. Keefe. You told us there was absolutely no entry 
for Saturday, the 6th of December, did you not ? 

Admiral Stark. Noiie for Saturday evening, the 6th of December. 

Mr. Keefe. Is there anything for Saturday afternoon? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, there is for Saturday afternoon, about the 
Canadian party. 

Mr. Keefe. Then, that refreshes your recollection that you were 
present at that Canadian party, does it ? 

Admiral Stark. It does not. 

[13908] Mr. Keefe. That simply was an entry? 

Admiral Stark. It simply was an entry. Those parties usually 
were put down, and our answers to them always were if anything was 
required I would go if I could, but actually I practically never went. 
1 was too busy. I did not have time to go to cocktail parties. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you have any present recollection as to whether you 
did go to this cocktail party on December 6 ? 

Admiral Stark. My recollection is I did not go, and Mrs. Stark said 
she did not go. Often, particularly where friends were concerned, I 
would ask her to go, just as a matter of good will, to represent me. 
I did not have time. 

Mr. Keefe. Your testimony is you did not attend that cocktail party 
on that afternoon, December 6, is that right? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And that the newspaper statement is siniply a list of the 
guests that were there, and it was just perhaps taken from those that 
were invited, and so far as you are concerned, you were not at that 
party ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you have any recollection as to where you were that 
afternoon ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, my recollection, the only recollection I would 
have of that business, or anything else, is in the office. [13909] 
That is where I usually spent it. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you have any recollection as to where you spent the 
evening ? 



5232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. "Well, I can only assume that I was at the National 
Theater. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, Admiral, I am not asking you to assume anything, 
I am asking you whether you have any present recollection as to 
where you were. 

Admiral Stark. No ; I do not, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, from where do you obtain the assumption that 
you were at the National Theater ? 

Admiral Stark. Commander Schulz' testimony. 

Mr. Keefe. Do you have any present recollection as to where you 
were at all Saturday evening ? 

Admiral Stark. No, I do not. I had been under the impression, as I 
have previously testified, that I was at home, because I have no other 
recollection of being anywhere else. The testimony makes it rather 
clear, I would say, that I was not, and that I was at the National 
Theater. As I have also testified, I do recall having seen the revival 
of "The Student Prince," but I did not connect it up with that Saturday 
night, and I still draw more or less of a blank on it, except I did see 
a revival of "The Student Prince." 

Mr. Keefe. Do I understand your testimony to be that you 
{^13910^ can state with positiveness and certainty that you did not 
go to the White House that night, December 6 'I 

Admiral Stark. I am absolutely certain of that. 

Mr. Keefe. And are you also absolutely certain that you received 
no telephone calls from the White House that night ? 

Admiral Stark. I am certain the President did not call me that 
night. 

Mr. Keefe. And you are also certain that you did not see the first 
13-parts of the Jap 14-part message that night ? 

Admiral Stark. I am; yes, sir; perfectly. I am perfectly certain 
of that. 

Mr. Keefe. Did anyone tell you, or have you any present recollection 
of any one of your servants telling you that Captain Kramer had called 
and tried to locate you that night ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Are you certain that you had no telephone message that 
night from Secretary Knox? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I haven't the slightest recollection of it. 
Yes ; I am certain that I heard nothing that Knox said that night. 

Mr. Keefe. Did you have any telephone message from Admiral 
Wilkinson ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. I think Wilkinson has also testified to 
that same fact, and also Kramer. 

\13911~\ Mr. Keefe. Well, I might say. Admiral, it is rather 
amazing to me that you have a pretty clear negative memory that 
certain things did not happen, but you cannot recall anything that 
you actually did that night. 

Admiral Stark. That is the fact, Mr. Keefe. Whether it seems 
strange to you or not, that is the fact. 

Mr. Keefe. I understood your testimony, in response to questions 
asked by Senator Ferguson, that your visit to your office Sunday 
morning was just a norma], ordinary routine matter and there was 
no meeting with an extraordinary show-up of naval officers there that 
morning out of the qrdiLnary. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5233 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

Mr. KJEEFE. That is all. 

Admiral Stark. Mr. Keefe, I will bring that book up to you and 
show it to you personally, 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Ciiairmax. Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Stark, when you were questioned previously 
about what you would have done, had you known that the President, 
in substance, uttered some words which the witness interpreted as 
"This means war," referring to the 13-part message, as I understand 
it, you said you would have gone to your office. Is that what you 
said you would have done? 

Admiral Stark. If I had known that a message had been 
[1S912'] received which caused the President to make any ex- 
planation to the effect "This means war," of course I would have 
been so interested that I might have picked up the telephone and 
called him. I would not have hesitated to have called him or seen 
him. My relations were such that I could have at the time, or I would 
have called Ingersoll, or someone, and I would have followed through 
on it until I had seen that message. I have read Schulz' testimony 
since I was up here the other day, and I am not convinced from it 
that the President did say "This means war." 

Mr. Murphy. The witness said that the President said something 
which, in substance, he interprets "This means war." 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he use the word "interprets"? 

Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir. Let me get his exact words. I will come 
back to that. 

At any rate, if you had known that the President did say something 
in substance "This means war," about the 13-part message, was there 
anything you would have done that night except to read the message? 
Is there anything you could now tell us you would have done, in the 
way of backsight or hindsight that you would have don© that you did 
not do ? 

Admiral Stark. It would not be backsight or hindsight, because 
when I read it on Sunday morning I saw nothing in it to [13913] 
cause me to take any further action on it. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, the actual testimony, at page 12,441, of Com- 
mander Schulz was, in the transcript : ^ 

Commander Schulz. Mr. Hopkins tlien read the papers and handed them back 
to the President. The President then turned toward Mr. Hopkins and said in 
substance — I am not sure of the exact words, but in substance — "This means 
war." Mr. Hopkins agreed, and they discussed then, for perhaps five minutes, 
the situation of the Japanese forces, that is, their deployment and 

Now, then, if you had known that the President said, in substance, 
that, you would no doubt have gone and read the 13-part message, 
would you not? 

Admiral Stark. There isn't any doubt in my own mind but that I 
would have. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, is there anything in Commander Schulz' testi- 
mony, you having read it, that would have given you the slightest 
indication that there was to be any attack specifically at Hawaii? 

1 Hearings, Part 10, p. 4662. 

79716 — 46 — pt. 11 7 



5234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Mr, MuRPiiY. Now, there has been some testimony about the Cabi- 
net meeting of November 7. You were not at the Cabinet meeting 
where the vote of the Cabinet was taken? 

[13914] Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. As to the attitude of the American people, were you ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Do you know anything of the plans that were made, 
either at that Cabinet meeting or immediately subsequent to the Cab- 
inet meeting, to have the diiferent members of the Government in high 
places address the American people on the war question ? 

Admiral Stark. No, not as a result of or tied up with that meeting. 
There were talks by — I have forgotten just what the talks were. 

Mr. Murphy. It was done by Sumner Welles on November 11, on 
Armistice Day ; do you remember that ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not remember. I think he stated we might 
be in the war at anytime, or something to that effect. 

Mr. Murphy. Subsequent to the Cabinet meeting there were some 
talks, I believe, by leading Americans on the possibility of a war 
coming. 

Admiral Stark. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. You were not, as I understand it, at any meeting 
where the necessity of having those talks Avas discussed ? 

Admiral Stark. The only one that I remember with regard to 
action of that sort was the one — and I am not sure just [13915] 
when it came up — was the President's message to the Emperor. 

Mr. Murphy. That is on the night of December 6th ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, along about then. I am not sure. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, in Colonel Stimson's diary there is a no- 
tation — let me see that diary. The entry of November 27, this part 
about the question of firing the first shot. Was there ever at any time 
any discussion by anyone in the Government that you know of where 
there ever was any intention on our part of avoiding doing anything 
joossible to prevent war with the Japanese ? 

Admiral Stark. No. 

Mr. Murphy. Was not that our intention right up to December 7, 
if it could be done without sacrificing American honor and principles ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir; and we had been working for months on 
that, and the record is complete in regard to that. 

Mr. Hull stated we tried to avoid war, in his testimony. As you 
recall, I recorded that over the period of months. I stated in my 
opinion there was always one stumbling block which we could not get 
around, and that was the Chinese-Japanese War. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, about the so-called first shot, the fact 
is the Japanese had fired a great many shots previous to November, 
1941, had not they? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. 

[13916] Mr. Murphy. They had smik the Pan ay, they had 
bombed our missions in China, and they had also attacked another 
ship and committed a great many acts which would be unfriendly to 
America ; had not they 'I 

Admiral Stark. The Panay incident I remember very distinctly. 
The bombing or the near-bombing of our diplomatic residence 'I also 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5235 

remember. I think there was a near-attack or miss that could not 
be called an attack on another ounboat. I forget where it was. 

Mr. Murphy. There were also attacks on American property on a 
number of occasions? 

Admiral Stark. That had been going on for a long time. 

Mr. Murphy. Despite all those acts we were still continuning in a 
state of peace with the Japanese up until December 7, 1941? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. That is all. 

The Vice Chairmax. Any further questions? 

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Gearhart. 

Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Stark, you recall rather definitely what 
you were doing during the Sunday upon which the attack occurred; 
do you not ? 

Admiral Stark. There are certain things, of course, that [ISQl?] 
stand out on that Sunday, the 7th, that I am very clear on. One is 
in regard to the 1300 message and the conversation almost exactly 
as it took place. The other was the message that came in stating, 
"This is no drill." That is when the Japanese attacked. And the 
rest of it was, of course, messages coming in during the afternoon. I 
was in the office from that morning until about 2 :00, as I recall, the 
next morning. We also went to work immediately, in the late hours, 
shifting some ships from the Atlantic back to the Pacific. 

Mr. Gearhart. Just how long after the news of the attack reached 
Washington was it before Secretary Knox began to talk about his 
desire to make a trip to Hawaii, so he could personally inspect it? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall that. He went shortly after, but 
just when he started talking about it I do not know. 

Mr. Gearhart. You were in constant consultation with him; were 
you not? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. 

Mr. Gearhart. Until the time of this tragic event? 

Admiral Stark. I was ahvays in touch with him; every day. 

Mr. Gearhart. Cannot you recall when he first mentioned his 
desire to go there? 

Admiral Stark. It was shortly after that he said he better go out 
and take a look himself. That was after he had talked [13918] 
with the President. 

Mr. Gearhart. After he decided he would go to Hawaii did he ask 
you to make any investigation for him, to inform him of any facts or 
things that might have happened theretofore ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. He had everything we had which had 
come in, in the way of dispatches. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, how long was it after the event before you 
began to hear about the possibilities of a Roberts Commission being 
organized. 

Admiral Stark. Just about the time it happened, just about the 
time the Commission was formed here. 

Mr. Gearhart. That was right immediately, or almost immediately 
after the bombs fell at Pearl Harbor that there was talk in the United 
States about creating a nonpartisan national commission to go to 
Hawaii to make an investigation with respect to the causes and 
responsibilities involved? 



5236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. There was talk, of course, about an investigation. 
I could not give you the date, but it was shortly after December 7 
that that investigating commission went out. 

Mr, Gearhart. It was only a few days until the Congress acted and 
a commission was authorized, the President made the appointment of 
Justice Eoberts, is that correct? 

Admiral Stark. I have forgotten about the Congress authorizing it. 
It was only a few days. 

[13919] Mr. Gearhart. I am in error. It was only a few days 
that the President made the appointment and made the announcement 
of the Commission ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. I think the record should show that the Congress did 
not authorize it. 

Mr. Gearhart. I did make that correction. It was not necessary 
for you to interpose. 

Now, as soon as it was determined to have an investigation by an 
impartial board it became necessary to amass testimony and evidence 
for the benefit of the Commission, did it not ? 

Admiral Stark. During the process ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. And did you assist in the gathering of the informa- 
tion for the Roberts Commission ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir, except that I testified. 

Mr. Gearhart. And you heard the testimony of General Marshall 
that he immediately busied himself in getting evidence together for 
the benefit of the Commission, did not you ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recaU that. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Then, there were other investigations that 
were conducted, some informally and some formally, were there not, 
following in rapid succession, right on down until the Army board was 
organized and until the Navy Court of Inquiry was organized, and 
there were investigations after investigations [139£0] follow- 
ing one after another ? 

Admiral Stark. I remember of none other except that of the Roberts 
Commission, unless you call Colonel Knox's trip out there to see what 
had happened one. I do not recall any other up until the summer of 
1944, I think, when the Army and Navy held their — There was one 
other. Admiral Hart was sent by the Secretary of the Navy, I be- 
lieve — I did not appear before him, I was in Europe — on an investi- 
gating committee, and the Army may have sent someone at the same 
time, but I am not clear on that. But the only ones I remember were 
the Roberts Commission and Hart prior to the Regular Army and 
Navy courts. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then, there were investigations following the Army 
and Navy inquiries ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, there was Admiral Hewitt. He was appointed 
by the Secretary to make a follow-up of the Navy inquiry. 

Mr. Gearhart. And the Colonel from San Francisco was appointed 
to conduct a parallel investigation on the part of the Army, was not he ? 

Ajdmiral Stark. I have not paid any attention to that. I think 
they made further investigations, 

[1S9£1] Mr. Murphy. Colonel Clausen, 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5237 

Mr. Gearhart. Then after that time, there was a still further in- 
vestigation, was there not, prior to the beginning of this investigation, 
the Clarke investigation? 

Admiral Stark. I do not remember that. 

Mr. Gearhart. In how many of those investigations did you testify ? 

Admiral Stark. I testified before the Roberts Commission ; I testi- 
fied before the Navy, and I testified before this committee. 

I was not interviewed by Admiral Hart, nor was I interviewed by 
Admiral Hewitt. 

Mr. Gearhart. In relation to those investigations that you did not 
testify in, did you have anything to do with the collection of evidence 
for the benefit of those investigations? 

Admiral Stark. Nothing whatsoever; no sir. I was not here; I 
was in Europe. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, were you interrogated when you testified be- 
fore the Roberts Commission as to where you were the previous Satur- 
day night ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall that. I think I was not. I do not 

{13922^ Mr. Gearhart. What? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall. 

Mr. Gearhart. You had testified prior to the commencement of 
this investigation that you did not know where you were on the pre- 
vious Saturday night, had you not ? 

Admiral Stark. I have forgotten for the moment whether that 
came up in the Navy Court, or not. That would be the onJy one 
where I was questioned. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, it was generally known, before we came 
together in this investigating body that you had testified or stated 
theretofore that you did not know where you were on Saturday night ? 

Admiral Stark. That would be logical. 

Mr. Gearhart. Then you had told some people, some investigating 
body before this hearing began that you did not know where you were 
the previous Saturday night? 

Admiral Stark. If I did, that would have been in the Naval Court 
of Inquiry. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, do you remember whether or not that question 
was asked you in the Roberts Investigation ? 

Admiral Stark. I think it was not. I have no recollection of it. 

Mr. Gearhart. When were you first asked as to where you were 
on the previous Saturday night ? 

{13923'\ Admiral Stark. I would have to check that in the 
Naval Court of Inquiry. I may have been asked at that time. 

Mr. Gearhart. Were you not asked informally by some other people 
prior to that time ? 

Admiral Stark. Not that I recall ; no, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, this has been quite an old question with you 
as to where you were the previous Saturday night, has it not? It 
has been asked you over and over again ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. What effort have you made to ascertain, prior to 
this investigation, where you were the previous Saturday night? 

Admiral Stark. Only to search my memory, Mr. Gearhart, to see 
if I could recollect anything, which t had been unable to do. When 



5238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I lieard *'The Student Prince" mentioned — and as I testified before, 
I cannot think of anythinf^ which I haA^e not covered on it — I immedi- 
ately contacted my daughter and her husband in Philadelphia. I 
have an impression that I had seen the revival there, and they said 
"no." I let it go at that, until it came up here that I was at the 
National Theatre that night. You will recall that in previous testi- 
mony I said I doubted if they had tried to contact me on Saturday 
night, because it was not clear to me, from reading Kramer's testimony 
or Wilkinson's testimony, that they had contacted [13924] me. 

Kramer said he thought Wilkinson was going to do it. 

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. 

Now, did you and Mrs. Stark give any theater parties about that 
time ? 

Admiral Stark. I do not recall without looking at the record. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, do you 

Admiral Stark (interposing). Now, just for a minute. Perhaps 
with impropriety, do you recall any parties that you gave about that 
time? 

Mr. Gearhart, No ; and that is just the diiference between you and 
me. I have no reason to think about what I did the previous Saturday 
night until I was appointed on this committee, but you have been 
working with the evidence in this case constantly, from the very be- 
ginning of the case, after the tragic event. Your mind has been con- 
stantly kept upon it, and this question has been constantly propounded 
to you, "Where were you the previous Saturday night?" 

Admiral Stark. May I ask what you mean by "constantly?" 

Mr. Gearhart. Just as I have pointed out, in these various 
investigations. 

Admiral Stark. I had no reason to stop and recall where I Avas that 
Saturday niglit until the question was propounded to [139^5] 

me by the investigating committee some years after the event. 

Mr. Gearhart. You were constantly interrogated in presenting 
evidence, were you not, and digging up evidence in connection with 
this affair, until you left for London ? 

Admii-al Stark. No, I was not. I was busy fighting a war up until 
the time I left for London. 

As I previously recorded here, I was not going into i^ost mortems. 
We were just as busy as we could be looking ahead and fighting a war 
every minute of the day and night, and on the record, it shows, I 
think, about 16 hours a day or 18 hours on the job. 

Mr. Gearhart. Where should you have been, Admiral Star!*:, on 
that night, when an attack was expected any moment? Don't you 
think you should liaA'e been with your Commander in Chief? 

Admiral Stark. No, I do not. If that had been maintained as you 
state, and as Colonel Stimson states, I would have been with the 
Commander in Chief constantly for several days. 

Mr. Gearhart. Well, had you not been as a matter of fact in his 
company very, very frequently, prior to the 7th of December? 

Admiral Stark. I was always able to get in touch with him. Every- 
body was always able to get in touch with me. I would not say we 
were placed in confinement. 

113926] Mr. Gearhart. Let us drop this matter. 

The Vice Chairman. Just a moment. 

What is the wish of the committee about continuing? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5239 

Senator Ferguson. I have some questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Stark. So far as I am concerned, I could go on indefinitely. 

The Vice Chairman, We will try to get through with Admiral 
Stark. 

Mr. Gearhart. When did you send Admiral Ingersoll to London 
to discuss the possible naval cooperation of the British and American 
Navies ? 

Admiral Stark. I did not send Admiral Ingersoll to London to 
discuss such a point. That occurred prior to my tenure of office as 
Chief of Naval Operations. 

Mr. Murphy. 1938. 

Mr. Gearhart. And he was sent by whom ? 

Mr. Richardson. If you know. 

Admiral Stark. AVell, Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval Op- 
erations prior to my going there. If it was in his tenure of office, he 
would have been sent undoubtedly by concurrence with the Secretary, 
or direction of the Secretary, but he was sent previous to my time. 

Mr. Gearhart. Now, directing your attention to the year 1940, 
did you request the British Government to send [13927] naval 

experts to the United States to discuss the possibility of naval cooper- 
ation ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, I did. I think it was May of 1940, but those 
meetings were held in early 1941, as I recall, and completecl in March 
of 1941. 

Mr. Gearhart. But it was in 1940, the fall of 1940 that you com- 
municated with Admiral Sir Dudley Pound of the British Navy, 
requesting that he send his naval experts to the United States to 
discuss collaboration between the two navies ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct, in case of war. 

Mr. Gearhart. Upon whose responsibility was that message sent? 

Admiral Stark. My OAvn, 

Mr. Gearhart. Did you discuss the subject with the President? 

Admiral Stark. I sent that on my own, and I did not notify the 
President until after I had done it. 

Mr. Gearhart. After you had sent the message, or after they had 
arrived for consultation? 

Admiral Stark. I think I notified him sometime in January, 

Mr. Gearhart. And you want the members of this committee to 
believe that you opened negotiations with the British first sea lord, 
requesting him to send a committee of experts from [13928] 

England to the United States to consult with you in respect to pos- 
sible naval cooperation without your even telling the Commander 
in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States ? 

Admiral Stark. I so stated, and I hope the committee believes me. 

Mr, Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ? 

Mr. Gearhart. I yield . 

Mr. Murphy. He so stated several months ago in this record. 

Mr. Gearhart. Does that help the situation right now? 

Mr, Murphy. I mean we covered it then. 

Mr. Gearhart. And as the result of that message that you sent to 
Sir Dudley Pound, a commission did arrive in the United States from 
England ? 

Admiral Stark. They did ; yes, sir. 



5240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gearhakt. And thej came in civilian clothes ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Gearhart. And a number of consultations were held at which 
you were present ? 

Admiral Stark. Generally speaking, I was not present with the 
working committee, but of course I was in consultation with them, and 
was informed as to what was going on. 

Mr. Gearhart. Did you attend all of the meetings that were held 
in the United States ? 

[139^9] Admiral Stark. No, no; very, very few of them. 

Mr. Gearhart. Where were those meetings held ? 

Admiral Stark. They were held in the Navy Department. 

Mr. Gearhart. Are you sure they were not held in private apart- 
ments ? 

Admiral Stark. My recollection is that they were held in the Navy 
Department or the War Department. I consulted Marshall with 
regard to sending that message. We were in agreement, and I think 
the meetings were held in the Navy Department. They were not held 
in private apartments. 

Mr. Gearhart. Have you read this little article that appeared in the 
October issue of Reader's Digest ? 

Admiral Stark. I think not. That is this year ? 

Mr. Gearhart. In October of 1944, an article which is from the pen 
of Frederick Sundern, Jr. Do you recall it ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, I have read that. The meetings, which were 
held quietly, there were one or two Canadian meetings, where Cana- 
dians came up to my house. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, unfortunately, I have another 
appointment. I ask that we ad j ourn until 2 : 30. 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, we will stand adjourned 
until 2 : 30. 

(Whereupon at 1 : 10 p. m., the committee adjourned to 2 : 30 p. m., 
of the same day.) 

[139S0'\ atternoon session — 2 : 30 p. M. 

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order. 

Does counsel have anything at this time ? 

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, we have two exhibits, the first of which 
is a memorandum which has been distributed to the committee, and 
the first page of which is on White House stationery, dated December 
13, 1941. It is entitled, "Remarks of the President on the occasion of 
the meeting of his Cabinet at 8:30 and continuing at 9:00 o'clock 
with legislative leaders, on December 7, 1941." 

We would like to offer that as Exhibit No. IGO. 

I should like to point out that at the top of the second page, in 
parentheses, there is a note to the effect that a series of periods in 
the memorandum "indicates inaudibility." I call your attention to 
that note in connection with your reading of the memorandum. 

The Vice Chairman. Let me inquire. The first page reads : 

Remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his Cabinet at 8 : 30 
and continuing at 9 o'clock with legislative leaders, on December 7, 1941. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5241 

Is that a. m. or p. m. ? 

Mr. Masten. Presumably that is the evening of December 7. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that the context 
shows clearly that it is in the evening. 

The Vice Chairman. It just so happens that I was one_ of 
[13931] those present. I know they had one at that time. I just 
wanted to know if it was the same one. 

Mr. Murphy. I think you will find your name, Mr. Chairman, men- 
tioned in the contents. 

Senator Ferguson. May I inquire, Mr. Chairman, just what the evi- 
dence will show as to what time this memorandum was received by 
counsel ? 

Mr. Masten. Senator, that was received last October or November, 
I believe, from Miss Tully, and has been available to the committee 
members ever since. I think it was last mentioned on the record by 
Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. I requested that, in view of the fact we have gone into 
the night of December 6, and what the President's attitude was, in 
view of the fact that there was a discussion here as to the mind of the 
President and what had occurred for the weeks preceding Pearl 
Harbor, I thought we ought to have the whole picture. 

Senator Ferguson. There is no doubt we ought to have it. But I 
don't recall this, Mr. Masten. I thought I had seen all the papers 
that weren't in evidence. 

Mr. Masten. This was in the papers that you looked at. 

Senator Ferguson. I don't recall this. 

Mr. Masten. I have the photostat here, which was in the papers 
you examined. 

Senator Ferguson. I don't recall the "indicates [139S2] in- 
audibility." 

Mr. Richardson. You will notice, Senator, that there are through 
the whole thing lapses. Evidently the stenographer was a little over- 
come in the situation. 

Mr. Murphy. All the papers have been furnished copies of it, have 
they not ? 

Mr. Masten. Yes, they have. 

The second exhibit which we would like to offer as Exhibit 161, 
consists of two documents which are drafts of a proposed message to 
the President, which drafts were prepared by Secretary Knox and 
Secretary Stimson. 

They are referred to in Secretary Stimson's statement and his notes, 
at pages 28, 29 and 56. We would like to offer them as Exhibit No. 161. 

I might add that these drafts are the papers referred to by Secretary 
Hull on page 2 of Exhibit No. 19 in this proceeding, where he says, in 
his memorandum to the President "there is attached a draft of a 
proposed message to Congress, to which draft the Secretary of War 
and the Secretary of Navy made material contributions." 

It is our understanding which these two drafts, which we now offer 
as Exhibit No. 161, are the material contributions referred to in Ex- 
hibit No. 19. 

The Vice Chairman. The exhibits will be received, as indicated 
by counsel. 



5242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[1393o] (The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits No. 
160 and No, 161," respectively.) 

The Vice Chairman. Is that all from counsel? 

Mr. Hasten. That is all. 

The Vice Chairman. Very well. 

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK (Resumed) 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral, do you have anything further you 
desire to say before your.examination is resumed? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, the last exhibit, which is the one from 
the Secretary of the Navy, dated November 29, 1941 (Exhibit No. 161) 
contains this sentence on page No. 5 : 

Unless Japan renounces such purposes and withdraws this threat of further 
conquest by force, the four nations involved must resort to force to prevent this 
aggression, since arguments appear to have failed. 

Were you consulted by the Secretary in relation to that? 

Admiral Stark. No sir; I don't — I don't know what this docu- 
ment is. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, it is a tnemorandum which gives his ver- 
sion as to what should be said to Congress by the President. 

Admiral Stark. Well, I know his thoughts on that, and he 
[13934-] talked about it a great deal. In fact, I don't know that 
there was much of anj^thing we hadn't gone over. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted by Secretary Knox about 
the fact that a message was to be prepared for Congress and what he 
should put in it, you being the Chief of Naval Operations? 

Admiral Stark. May I read this over, just to reflect a little on it? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

(Pause.) 

Admiral Stark. He states here, 

I have had the assistance of both A(hniral Stark and Admiral Turner in the 
summation of the military situation. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. So it is apparent that we were consulted. 

Senator Ferguson. But you don't recall it ? 

Admiral Stark. I recall having talked over every phase of this 
situation as it went along, and I have no doubt if he was preparing a 
memorandum of this sort that he talked to me about certain phases. 

Senator Ferguson. It shows that you were present at the meeting. 
It is on page 55 and 56 of Secretary Stimson's memorandum, where that 
message is spoken about. Did you discuss the contents at tliat meeting ? 

[13935] Admiral Stark. Well, I would just like to look at the 
record. Page what ? 

Senator Ferguson. Pages 55 and 56. 

(Pause.) 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Stark, you have read over this proposed 
message or information for a message. You note it is dated November 
29th. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It says. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5243 

The President — en route to Warm Springs, Georgia. 

You also recall, do you not, that the 29th was the final deadline. 
That is the one where they said, "spell it out." The 29th. 

Admiral Stakk. Yes, sir ; I recall that. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you anticipated an attack immediately 
following the 29th, isn't that correct ? 

Admiral Stark. We anticipated an attack following the 29th. I 
wouldn't say immediately. You may recall that on the very day of 
this deadline a dispatch came in from Tokyo to make one more try. 

I think we, as I recall, broke that down on the 30th. And in the 
case of Italy, I had seen deadlines come and go until I was leary of 
them. That is why in mv first dispatch, instead of putting down the 
29th, which, like the 25tli, had [13936^ passed, I said, "within 
the next few days." We didn't know just when. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, you remember — and the reason I cite the 
Secretary of War is that he kept a diary. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You will recall that somewhere 

Admiral Stark. This is Colonel Knox. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. The Secretary of War, I was saying, kept 
a diary. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You recall that he stated that the President 
had said an attack by Monday, when j^ou were holding a meeting, 
immediately preceding the first of December? 

Admiral Stark. Yes sir, I recall that. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, when did it change, after the President 
told you an attack would take place any day, and probably by 
Monday ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, we 

Senator Ferguson. Which would be immediately following the 
29th. 

Admiral Stark. We didn't know. Senator Ferguson, just when 
that blow would fall. We were expecting it any day. But just when, 
we didn't know. And we didn't know until December 7. 

[13937] Senator Ferguson. Well, does this change your opinion 
of this warning that you anticipated that an attack would be made 
by Japan rather than America declaring war? Would this message 
of Secretary Knox have been a request of Congress to declare war? 
It wouldn't, would it? As I read it. 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. The last paragraph, I think, makes that 
fairly clear, in which it states : 

In a final effort to prevent an extension of liostilities in the Far East, I have 
acWressed an appeal to the Emperor of Japan to join me in my efforts. 

Those efforts being toward continued peace in the Pacific. 

Senator Fei{guson (continuing) : She can go no further without seriously 
threatening the vital interests of Great Britain, the Netherlands Indies, Aus- 
tralia and ourselves. Unless Japan renounces such purposes and withdraws 
this threat of further conquest by force, the four nations involved must resort 
to force to prevent this aggression, since arguments appear to have failed. 

In a final effort to prevent an extension of hostilities in the Far East, I have 
addressed an appeal to the Emperor of Japan to join me in my efforts. In the 
meantime, while I await the result of this latest effort toward peaceful solution, 
I felt it incumbent upon me to apprise the Congress, and through you, the people 
of the United States, of the [139S8] serious situation with which we 
are confronted. 



5244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. That, I take it, is Colonel Knox's way, the way 
he would have put it, had he been President. 

Senator Ferguson. That is correct; but it wasn't understood at the 
meeting that Colonel Knox was to submit a draft, and the Secretary 
of State, and the Secretary of War, that those drafts were to be call- 
ing for a declaration of war? 

Admiral Stark. I don't quite get your question on that, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. When you held the meeting and it was suggested 
that the three Secretaries give to the President a rough draft, or a 
draft of what they thought ought to go into a message to Congress, 
there was no idea that that message to Congress was to be a declara- 
tion, a request for a declaration of war from Congress, it was merely 
to advise the people of the United States, through their Congress, as 
to how serious the situation looked to the President of the United 
States; isn't that correct? 

Admiral Stark. It was certainly to show the people of the United 
States and Congress how serious he considered the situation. Whether 
or not anything would have been put in there which in certain con- 
tingencies the President might request or ask authority to go ahead, 
I don't know. 

[139S9] Senator Ferguson. But I am asking you, was there any- 
thing discussed at the meeting 

Admiral Stark. I don't 

Senator Ferguson (continuing). — That is was contemplated by the 
President that he would request Congress to declare war ? 

Admiral Stark. I don't recall so. 

Senator Ferguson. Then it would be fair to say that this was a fair 
appraisal of what they were to do, at least this was Mr. Knox's part 
in the situation? 

Admiral Stark. That was the way he felt about it. He wrote it. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, is that as you understood it? 

Admiral Stark. Well, as I have stated before, my recollection of 
that is that they would make a final appeal to the Emperor and that 
they would also inform the Congress of the picture. I don't recall 
particularly that in that address to Congress it was to be mentioned 
that the President — that it was to be considered a request for a decla- 
ration. 

Senator Ferguson. That was your understanding of the situation. 

Now, I want to call your attention, so that the record may be 
straight, Mr. Gearhart is not here, but there was some question as to 
whether or not you had been asked the [1S940] question as to 
where you were on Saturday in the evening, before the Navy board. 

Admiral Stark. Yes sir. 

Senator Ferguson. On page 166 of the Navy Court of Inquiry 
transcript, August 11, 1944 : 

Q. Do you recall two occasions on eitlier the fourth or fifth of December when 
Captain Wilkinson and Commander McCollum came to your office to confer 
about intelligence relative to the Pacific and Japanese situation that you con- 
sidered of such import that you called a conference with Admiral Turner, Admiral 
Ingersoll, and Admiral Noyes? 

A. No, I don't recall. 

Q. Do you recall the events of Saturday, December 6, 1941? 

A. No. 

Q. Do you recall what time you left the office after the routine day, the time 
in the afternoon or evening? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5245 

A. No, I do not. 

Q. Do you recall what you were doing Saturday evening, 6 December? 

A. No, I couldn't say what I was doing that evening. My remembrance is — 
I think I was home but I couldn't say. I don't recall clearly. 

Q. Do you recall receiving at your home, or wherever [13941] you were, 
between 9 and 10 p. m., Washington time, important intelligence information 
brought by an officer messenger? 

A. No, I haven't the slightest recollection of anything of that sort on that 
evening. 

Q. Do you remember whether there was a Lieutenant Commander Kramer 
stationed in Naval Communications or ONI? 

A. Yes, there was. 

Then they go to another subject. 

Admiral Stark. Yes sir. 

Senator Ferguson, Doesn't that refresh your memory that you were 
questioned at the 1944 hearing on August 11 in that regard? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, it is evident I was. 

Senator Ferguson. I would like to straighten the record. This 
morning there was some question asked about the passing of an act 
relative to the draft in 1941. 

Admiral Stark. Yes sir. 

Senator Ferguson. That was the extension of the draft, was it not, 
so that they would be kept in longer than one year, which was originally 
called for ? The draft bill would have gone on just the same, they would 
have been drafted and kept in their year, but those that were about to 
get out would have been retained ; isn't that correct ? 

Admiral Stark. It probably is, if you recall it. I [1394^} 
remember that we wanted to extend the time. Marshall did. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. We had a 6-year enlistment at that time. 

Senator Ferguson. You had enlistments, so you had a different 
proposition. 

Now, Congressman Murphy asked you whether or not this was the 
first shot, and I take it that was as to the first shot in the war between 
America and Japan. Was there any other shooting prior to this, in 
this war, other than Pearl Harbor ? 

Mr. Murphy. I don't remember asking him that. I asked him about 
the Panay and the other boat, and the American missions, and the 
American property in China. I said that those things had all occurred 
before Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to get it from the Admiral. 

So far as you were concerned, this was the first shot in the war 
between the United States and Japan, at Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Stark. In the war between us ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. There wasn't any shooting at sea, at \lS9Ji3'\ 
submarines. Admiral Stark? 

Admiral Stark. Well, to be perfectly accurate, and I think it is 
in the record, there was a submarine attacked by our forces that 
morning. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I am talking about this Pearl Harbor 
attack on the 7th. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And I include 

Admiral Stark. That would include that, yes, sir. 



5246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. But no others that you know of? 

Admiral Stakk. I don't recall any others, no, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do you recall the so-called i^ists, 
when you would receive these messages you would get a gist, that is 
a memorandum or a flag, saying what was in the various papers that 
you got ? 

Admiral Stark. I think — are you referring to magic? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. The word would come in, it wouldn't be a gist, it 
would be a clip on the messages which were considered of importance. 

Senator Ferguson. We have in eA^dence now a gist which was 
attached to the October — no, September 29 — it is the bomb plot 
niesage. 

Mr. Murphy. September 29. 

\1394i] Senatoi- Ferguson. 1941. 

Mr. Murphy. Translated on October 9 or 10. October 9 or 10. 

Senator Ferguson. The testimony shows that that had a gist 
attached to it indicating the contents of it. 

Could you find that testimon}'^, the testimony on that gist, Mr. 
Masten? 

Mr. Masten. I don't know whether we can put our hands on it 
immediately. We will try. 

Senator Fefguson. Now, Congressman Murphy asked s(mie ques- 
tions of Captain Kramer at page 11,096 of the typewritten record : 

Mr. Murphy. Now, yoii also referred, in your letter from the South Pacific, 
to the possibility of certain summaries. 

Did you retain summaries, or was that just to meet the situation from day 
to day in order to explain to the recipients of magic what the developments were? 

Captain Kkammek. I meant simply the gist that I have just referred to, sir. 

But I didn't find the gist. 

Does that refresh your memory? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir; not at all. I don't know Avhat he is refer- 
ring to, unless he kept a gist for his own running [lS,94^j] in- 
formation. I kept a gist, what I call a "do list", also, things that I 
wanted to follow through on. 

Senator Ferguson. The testimony showed that these gists were 
attached. 

Now, I asked you the other day, the last day you were here, about 
the logs at your office? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. I have a paper purporting to be the log dated 
December 6, from "1145-1900, December G, 1941." 

What time of day w^ould that be ? 

Look at the top of that, Admiral, and tell me. 

(The log above referred to, later marked ''Exhibit No. 162," was 
handed to the witness.) 

Admiral Stark. That would be from 11 : 45 in the morning until 7 
in the evening, that first one, December 6. 

Senator Ferguson. What is the next one ? 

Admiral Stark. The next one is 061535. That w^ould be on the 6th, 
3 : 35 p. m. And between that and 1730, which would be 5 : 30. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, would that indicate that you were not in 
between those hours and that message was left for you ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5247 

Admiral Stark. No, sir; this is simply the log of the watch officer. 

\139Jf6\ Senator Fi:kgusox. And 

Admiral Stark. The duty officer. As you mentioned the other day, 
the duty officer usually keeps a log of ji^wy happenings. 

Senator Ferguson. I want you to read into the record the log. If 
I might see it again, I will tell you the part I would like to have. 

It begins, "1900, 6 December, to 0200 7 December." 

What is 1900? 

Admiral Stark. 7 p. m. 

Senator Ferguson. This message: 

"At 2000"— 2000 is 8 o'clock? 

Admiral Stark. S p. m., yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. 8 p. m. 

Would you read that item into the record. I want to ask you some 
(juestions about it. 

Admiral Stark. "1800, 6 December, to 0200, 7 December." 

Senator Ferguson. The next item appears to be "2000". Read that. 

Admiral Stark. At "2000", which would be 8 p. m., "Major E. L. 
Harrison, aide to the Secretary of War, telephoned that the Secretary 
of War desired the following information by 0900, Sunday" — morning. 

Senator Ferguson. What time is 0900 Sunday morning? 

[13947] Admiral Stark. 9 a. m. 

Senator Ferguson. 9 o'clock Sunday morning. Will you continue? 

Admiral Stark (reading) : 

Compilation of men-of-war in Far East, British American, Japanese, Dutch, 
Russian. Also compilation of American men-of-war in Pacific Fleet, with 
locations 

I suppose — well. 

with locations, and a list of American men-of-war in the Atlantic without loca- 
tions. Admirals Ingersoll, Stark, and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted, 
and the Secretary directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him 
prior to 1000— 

which would be 10 a. m. 

Sunday, December 7. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that tlie end ? 

Admiral Stark. That is the end. 

The next thing is Sunday, 7 December, at 2030, which would be 8 
o'clock that night. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, the Secretary of War of the 
United States was inquiring from your office through his aide that 
the Secretary of War desired the following information by 9 o'clock 
Sunday morning, December 7 : 

Compilation of men-of-war in the Far Bast, British, American, Japanese, 
Dutch, Russian. Also compilation of American men-of-war in Pacific Fleet, with 
locations. 

[1394^1 Now, can j'ou explain the Secretary of AVar of the United 
States at 8 o'clock Saturday evening was requesting from your office, 
OPNAV, all of the warships — and that is what they mean by men- 
of-war? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. That was the entire strength of the allied 
fleet in the Pacific. 



5248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; with the locations. That would mean that 
he wanted to know where the ships were, whether they were in Pearl 
Harbor or where they were ; isn't that true ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. He also refers to the Far East, Russian, and 
the whole business. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. But the Secretary of the United States on 
Saturday evening through his aide was requesting your office to give 
him the location of every man-of-war of the United States in the 
Pacific, and that would include where the ships were, whether laying 
at dock or in Pearl Harbor or what, would it not ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, it would indicate whether they were in Pearl 
Harbor or not. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. What was in Pearl Harbor and what was in 
Manila, and what was in the N. E. I., et cetera. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us why the Secretary of War 
wanted to know what ships were in Pearl Harbor and wanted 
[1S94^] it by 9 o'clock Sunday morning ? 

Admiral Stark. I don't know Senator Ferguson why he wanted 
it, unless at that time, and whether he did or not, I don't know, the 
record will show, he had received the 13-point message, or how he 
considered it — I don't know why he wanted it. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Not yet. . I don't want the witness interrupted 
at the moment. 

Admiral Stark. I really don't know why he wanted it. 

Senator Ferguson. That is 8 o'clock on Saturday evening. 

Admiral Stark. Yes. I have got the thing perfectly, just exactly 
what he wanted, and the time he wanted it, but I don't recall the 
incident. 

Senator Ferguson. "Admirals Ingersoll, Stark" — and that would 
be you, would it not ? 

Admiral Stark. That would be myself. 

Senator Ferguson, "and the Secretary of the Navy were con- 
sulted" — which was Frank Knox — "were consulted" — and this is prior 
to 8 o'clock Saturday evening. 

Admiral Stark. It doesn't say prior to 8 o'clock. 

Senator Ferguson. He telephoned it in at 8 o'clock. 

Admiral Stark. They came over and contacted our watch officer 
at 8 o'clock for this information. Why both Inger- [ISOSO] 
soil and myself were to be contacted, I do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. No, you hadn't been contacted. You were 
consulted. 

"and the Secretary directed" — that is the Secretary of War — 
"that the information be compiled" and delivered to him prior to 10 
o'clock Sunday morning, the 7th of December. 

Mr. Keefe. You mean the Secretary of the Navy. 

Senator Ferguson. Secretary of the Navy. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. It is 10 o'clock. 

Admiral Stark. I can make an assumption in view of the testi- 
mony I have heard since then. 

Senator Ferguson. No. You were consulted at least prior to 8 
o'clock. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5249 

Admiral Stark. I don't think it states that I was consulted prior 
to 8 o'clock. 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

Admirals Ingersoll, Stark and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted. 

Admiral Stark. It doesn't say prior to 8 o'clock. 

Senator Ferguson. This was entered at 8 o'clock. How would the 
man write in there that you were consulted if you weren't consulted ? 

Admiral Stark. I would like to recite on that, because I have a 
different idea from that what you are stating. 

[13951] Senator Ferguson. I was reading. 

Mr. MuKPHY. Are there copies for the other members of the com- 
mittee ? 

Senator Ferguson. The surprising thing is, to this member of the 
committee, that it took almost 4 months to get from the Navy Depart- 
ment this log. 

Commander Baecher.^ It was requested for the first time day before 
yesterday. 

Senator Ferguson. As I understood it, all papers were to be de- 
livered by the Navy to counsel. Counsel has nothing to do with us 
not getting it because counsel didn't know it existed. In fact, I do not 
think the committee knew it existed until the questions were asked the 
day before yesterday. 

Mr. Murphy. Does the record show the request was made day before 
yesterday. 

Commander Baecher. The record shows that, yes, sir. In view of 
the situation maybe the answer to Mr. Richardson should be produced. 

Admiral Stark. "At 2000", which is 8 p. m., "Major E. L. Harrison, 
aide to the Secretary of War, telephoned that the Secretary of War 
desired the following" — Now, I do not read into that, that it was 
prior to 8 o'clock. 

Senator Ferguson. At 8 o'clock, the aide telephoned that the Secre- 
tary of War desired it. So the telephone call would [13962] be 
at 8 o'clock. 

Admiral Stark. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. I am just assuming that if he telephoned it in 
that at least a fraction of a second before that the Secretary of War 
wanted the information. 

Admiral Stark. Oh, I see what you mean. It was just a case of 
construction. I thought you meant he had telephoned prior to 8 
o'clock or that I had known prior to that. That is plain. 

Senator Ferguson. That the Secretary of War desired the follow- 
ing information by 9 o'clock Sunday morning December 7. Wliat 
does he want ? 

Admiral Stark. He wanted the disposition of the fleet in the Pacific 
and the knowledge of what we had in the Atlantic without reference 
to location in the Atlantic. 

Senator Ferguson. But he wanted the exact location of the ships 
in the Pacific, every man-of-war, didn't he? 

Admiral Stark. Yes; and I wanted it, too. Senator Ferguson and 
I kept a running record of it, to show what our strength was in the 
various quarters, and to get a clear picture of the fleets of the world. 
That was the most natural way in the w»rld to show it, just as he 
gave it. I also kept the Atlantic Fleet, complete with the British, 
French, and Italian. 

1 Navy Department liaison officer to the committee. i. . _ 

79716 — 46 — pt. 11 8 .^fc,. _ 



5250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. He wanted to know the exact location of 
[13[)-5o] each man-of-war by Sunday morning? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. At 9 o'clock. 

Now, 1 ask you was that information furnished to the Secretary of 
War by 9 o'clock the next morning? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I suppose so. I have no record of that but 
unquestionably if he wanted it at that time that information was 
available and he got it. 

Senator Ferguson. That would be in writing, would it not? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. I ask that we get that record. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Not now. 

Commander Baecher, wdll you get that information that was fur- 
nished by 9 o'clock that morning ? 

Commander Baecher. If it is available. 

Senator Ferguson. What do you mean, if it is available. That is, 
if you can find it ; is that what you mean ? 

Commander Baecher. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Will the Senator yield on a point of informa- 
tion ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes ; to the Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. I am not clear on one point. It seems, from 
what you have read and what the Admiral has said, that the [13954-] 
Secretary of War requested this information by 9 o'clock Sunday morn- 
ing, and it seems, as I caught it, that the Secretary of the Navy asked 
that the information be furnished him by 10 o'clock. 

Senator Ferguson. We will clear that up. 

The Vice Chairman. I had assmned that when this request came 
from the Secretary of War to the Navy Department, that the Secre- 
tary of the Navy, naturally being anxious to comply with a request 
of his Cabinet colleague, the Secretary of War would request that the 
information be assembled and that it would be furnished to the Secre- 
tary of the Navy to be transmitted to the Secretary of War, which 
would look to me like it obviously should come to the Secretary of 
the Navy before it went to the Secretary of War, but yet the note read 
indicates that the Secretary of the Navy requested it to be sent to 
him an hour after the Secretary of War had requested that he get it. 
That is the way it reads. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment until I try to clear something up. 

Admiral 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. There isn't any doubt after you read this that 
this was a request by the Secretary of War for informa- [1395S] 
tion relative to the location of each man-of-war in the Pacific by 
9 o'clock on Sunday morning ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, when is the first that you knew that the 
Secretary of War wanted this information ? 

Admiral Stark. I don't recall this. Senator Ferguson. It would 
be unusual for both Ingersoll and myself to be called on this. That 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5251 

sort of information I had. It was readily available. P)Ut this par- 
ticular thing here, I do not recall. 

Senator 1^ erguson. Do I understand that you knew where every 
ship, every man-of-war, was in the Pacific on Saturday? 

Admiral Stark. When you say where every man-of-war was, w^e 
knew, for example, the constitution of the Pacific Fleet, and that it 
w^as basing in the Hawaiian area. Just wiiere they were we could 
not generally have told day by day, because they had their exercises, 
and so forth. 

Now, as to Hart's fleet in the Pacific, we knew- exactly what he had. 
We knew that certain craft he had sent south, because that had been 
reported. Just what he had out at that time, I do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. He wanted tiie location. 

Admiral Stark. Well, we could have said, "basing," for example, 
"on Manila," but if he had four or five submarines reaching out to the 
northwest on reconnaissance duty we would [13956] not have 
known it necessarily. 

Senator Fergusox. Wouldn't you have found it out and told him 
that you had ships out at sea, the submarines were in certain locations? 

Admiral Stark. Not necessarily. 

Senator Ferguson. The battleships were in Pearl Harbor, the de- 
stroyers were so and so; Halsey's fleet was at a certain location? 

Admiral Stark. No. You wull recall that some of the movements 
which were made we did not know of until after Pearl Harbor, That 
is all in the testimony. 

Senator Ferguson. Didn't this chart in your office show the lo- 
cation ? 

Admiral Stark. Not the exact location. That has been made plain 
before, that the commander in chief, within his area, moves the ships 
around. We know the area. We do know where they are, according 
to our major schemes. When a ship goes into overhaul, where they are 
holding target practice, the periods for it, and so forth, but just what 
is in and out we do not know. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you get us the records in the office that 
were used to give this information to the Secretary of War by 9 o'clock 
the following morning? 

What was done by the Navy Department to get the information 
[13957] for the Secretary of Wa^r? 

Admiral Stark. Well, that, I take it, you want directed to the Navy 
Department; not to me? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. You haven't access to it? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. Commander Baecher is here for that pur- 
pose. 

Senator Ferguson. I address that through the Chair. Mr. Chair- 
man, I W'ould like to have those. 

The Vice Chairman. An effort will be made to supply the informa- 
tion requested. 

Admiral Stark. This is off the record. You can get that, Com- 
mander Baecher, in Intelligence — or Brainerd might be able to fur- 
nish something. The ship movements and foreign business will all 
be in Intelligence. 

Senator Ferguson. Can you tell us why the Secretary of War 
wanted the location of the men-of-war by 9 o'clock Sunday morning ? 

Admiral Stark. He wanted to know where they were. 



5252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why he wanted to know ? 

Admiral Stark. Except he was interested in it. No; I could not 
state exactly why he wanted it. He was making his estimates of the 
i^icture, and he wanted the entire picture. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you discussed this question prior to 8 
o'clock with anyone? 

[139S8~\ Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Particularly not the Secretary of War? 

Admiral Stark. Not that I recall. And I may state that a record 
of that sort was something that I was always keeping. And periodic 
reports. 

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, we come to the "period." — 
"without locations," as far as the Atlantic Fleet was concerned. That 
is a "period." And then we start out : 

Admirals Ingersoll, Stark, and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted and 
the Secretary directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him 
prior to 1000"— 

10 o'clock- 
Sunday, 7 December. 

That would indicate that at least prior to 8 o'clock on Saturday evening 
you were consulted about this and the Secretary of the Navy was con- 
sulted and Admiral Ingersoll was consulted. Will you state whether 
or not you were consulted prior to this ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, there is nothing here, again, I would say, to 
indicate that I was consulted prior to 8 o'clock. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, if this was written at 8 o'clock and it said 
you were consulted, it would indicate that you were consulted prior 
to that, would it not ? 

Admiral Stark. Not to me ; no, sir. 

[139691 It states "Admirals Ingersoll, Stark, and the Secretary 
of the Navy were consulted." This was after the 2000 call, as I make 
it. 

Senator Ferguson. The next 

Mr. Keefe. Right there, Senator : Do I understand Admiral Stark 
to mean that his contention is that this message came to the watch 
officer, he made a notation of the request, and then he says that Admiral 
Stark and Admiral Ingersoll and somebody else were consulted, and 
that they were consulted after the call came in ? 

Admiral Stark. That is what it says to me ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Below "7 December" at 2030— that is 8: 30? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So then you would say that under your reading 
prior to 8: 30 that night you had been consulted, because if this man 
is keeping proper records he entered the next entry at 8 : 30. 

Admiral Stark. This is something else again. 

Senator Ferguson. Sure. 

Admiral Stark. This states : 

At 2030 the Coast Guard Duty Officer telephoned to tlie Operations Duty Officer. 
Commander Feinald read Secret Dispatch 070715. No action taken. 

[13960'] That is part of his log. Whether it has any bearing 
whatsoever on the former question I don't know, and I could not tell 
unless I saw that dispatch. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE ' 5253 

Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't you say the log officer, when keeping 
his log, would write them down as they came in? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Therefore, his next entry, being at 2030, that 
which had happened prior to that he put prior to 2030 — which is 
8:30? 

Admiral Stark. That could be an assumption. Senator Ferguson, 
as I see it, but not necessarily an accurate one. 

You may put down a telephone call and try to do something. Per- 
haps the line is busy. You may have to wait; meanwhile, another 
call may come in. I don't know. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, I will 

Admiral Stark. It might be right ; it might not. 

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you: Did this log officer reach you 
or anyone representing you between 8 and 8 : 30 so he could get this 
information ? 

Admiral Stark. I don't recall it. 

Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't you recall if someone was telling you 
that the Secretary of War wanted to know the location of every one 
of your men-of-war in the Pacific and he had to have it — or wanted 
it, at least — prior to 9 o'clock the [13961] next morning and 
you were consulted? 

Admiral Stark. I wouldn't necessarily remember it after a lapse 
of 5 years. Senator. I had furnished Mr. Stimson data from time to 
time. He was intensely interested in the broad picture and from 
time to time we furnished that data to different people, but I do not 
recall at this particular instance that evening. He may have. I don't 
deny that he did, but I do not recall it. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

I think there is an answer to what you are looking for right here. 
Secretary Stimson's diary tells you what he is looking for. 

Senator Ferguson. I will take that later. I want to find out what 
this witness knows. 

Do you know why the Secretary of the Navy would direct your 
office to furnish him this same information as to the location of your 
men-of-war in the Pacific which would have told them that your fleet 
was in Pearl Harbor, to be compiled and delivered to him prior to 
10 o'clock? 

Admiral Stark. No; I do not. Unless he had been in touch with 
Stimson, and, of course, we do now know from the record that they 
met together that morning. Whether it was 1000 or 1030, I am not 
sure. But I did not know it. 

Senator Ferguson. You were not consulted about it? 

[13962] Admiral Stark. I state that I do not recall. Senator 
Ferguson, this thing at all. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you read the Stimson statement? 

Admiral Stark. I have ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. May I see that log. Senator? 

Admiral Stark. I will give him this one. 

Senator Ferguson. I think there is a difference in them. 

Mr. Keefe. What is that? 



5254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson (reading) : 

At 2030 the Coast Guard Duty Officer telephoned 

Mr. Keefe. It follows after the 2000 entry. 
Senator Feeguson. Mine is : 

telephoned to report the following. 
What does that one say ? It is on the third page. 
Admiral Stark. It starts at the bottom of one of the pages. 
Mr. Keefe (reading) : 

Admirals Ingersoll, Stark, and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted and 
the Secretary directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him 
prior to 1000 Sunday 7 December. 

Then, another notation under 7 December : 

At 2030 the Coast Guard Duty Officer telephoned 

Senator Ferguson. But read the next line, "telephoned to" what 'i 

Mr. Keefe. "Telephoned." It doesn't say. 

[13963] Admiral Stark. Ol^DO — operations duty officer," he 
probably means. 

Mr. Keefe. Oh, yes. "OPDO— Commander Feinald." 

Senator Ferguson. That is not in here, if you will compare them. 
The commander's name is not in the photostatic copy. It may have 
been torn off the top when they were clipped. 

Mr. KJEEFE. The sequence may be wrong. 

Mr. Murphy. The sequence is wrong. It is a different page. One 
says "telephoned to report the following." 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. It is a different page. 

Senator Ferguson. They just got them clamped together in the 
wrong order. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. Yes. 

Senator FeKguson. Will you turn to Colonel Stimson's statement, 
Sunday the 7th. 

Admiral Stark. Page 59. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Do you know of anything in here that will 
give us any light on what he wanted these locations for ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. I saw nothing in here to indicate that un- 
til I saw that this morning. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

[13964] Mr. Murphy. On Sunday, December 7, 1041, page 60 
of the Stimson papers : 

"Well, I have heard the telegrams which have been coming In about the Japa- 
nese advances in the Gulf of Siam." He said, "Oh, no ; I don't mean that. They 
have attacked Hawaii. They are now bombing Hawaii." Well, that was an ex- 
citement indeed. The messages which we have been getting through Saturday 
and yesterday and this moi-ning are messages which are brought by the Britisli 
patrol south of Indochina, showing that large Japanese forces were moving up 
into the Gulf of Siam. This itself was enough excitement and that was what we 
were at work on our papers about. 

I read that as an answer to your question. 
Admiral Stark. May very well be. 

Senator Ferguson. What did that have to do with the location of 
the men- of -war? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5255 

Admiral Stark. I gather this, from Congressman Murphy, and he 
can correct 

Senator Ferguson. You tell us what you say about it. 

Admiral Stark. I say this would mean that we had been getting 
messages of the disposition of the Japanese and Colonel Stimson 
wanted to know what we had in that same area and he wanted to see 
just what picture we had of the Japanese ships. 

[13966] Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield further to read 
just three or four more lines? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy (reading) : 

The observer thought these forces were going to land probably either on the 
eastern side of the Gulf of Siani, where it would be still in Indochina or on the 
western side, where it would be the Kra Peninsula or possibly Malaya. The 
British were very much excited about it, and our efforts this morning in drawing 
our papers was to see whether or not we should all act together. The British 
will have to fight if they attack the Kra Peninsula. We three all thought that 
we must fight if the British fought. But now the Japs have solved the whole thing 
by attacking us directly in Hawaii. 

There are the papers he was preparing on the morning. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what papers he was preparing, 
Admiral ? 

Admiral Stark. No. sir; I do not. 

Senator Ferguson. Then, how do you know that this memorandum, 
request for the location, had anything to do with what they were pre- 
paring at the time of the attack? 

Admiral Stark. Well, if they asked for them, and if they were 
preparing something, it might have been they were studying the rela- 
tive forces. I don't laiow, I never heard it discussed since. I have 
no way of knowing. 

[13966] Senator Ferguson. You haven't heard that an order 
from the Secretary of War, direction by the Secretary of War and 
the Secretary of Navy, had not been complied with by 10 o'clock 
Sunday morning? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So you have every reason to believe they had the 
location of every man-of-war of our fleet? 

Admiral Stark. I think unquestionably it was the duty officer's job 
to get that through to somebody, Ingersoll, or me, or somebody, to get 
the Secretary of War's request made up, and usually when we got those 
requests we sat up all night, if necessary, to comply with them. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I ask that the man that made this report, 
I can't tell his name from this — would you be able, Mr. Masten, to tell 
us who made this report — be called and also that the aide of Secretary 
Stimson be called as witnesses that we may get a detailed explanation 
of this log.^ 

Commander Baecher. The person who wrote that item in the Navy 
log is named C. D. Glover. He is now a rear admiral and is in 
Honolulu. 

Senator Ferguson. That is only a few days from Washington. Do 
you know who the aide is? 

[13967] Commander Baecher. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Who is in charge of the Army liaison here 
today? Do you know who the aide is? 

^ See p. 5482, infra. 



5256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Nelson.^ No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you notify the committee, please, where 
the aide is located? 

Captain Nelson. I will attempt to locate him. 

Mr. Masten. Senator, we have located the page reference to this 
gist matter. 

Senator Ferguson. I would like to see the gist matter. Wliat is the 
first paper ? 

Mr. Masten. It begins at the first paper, and the reference you 
wanted is the second. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, instead of calling two or three wit- 
nesses, it might be a good idea to ask Secretary Stimson if he got the 
memorandum. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I have asked the Commander if he would 
get us what information was furnished to the Secretary. I have 
directed quite a number of questions to Secretary Stimson and I will 
be glad to add to that list. We haven't gotten answer to the others, 
though. 

Now, going to page 11,000 of this paperbound volume, 11,207 in this 
paperbound volume,- the Senator from Michigan is asking the question : 

[13968] Senator Ferguson. And what was there on that? Read what is on 
there. 

Captain Kbamee. The gist of this message is : Tokyo directs special reports on 
ships in Pearl Harbor which is divided into five areas for the purpose of showing 
exact locations. 

Now, that is a sheet of paper attached to the magic, which was the 
bomb plot as we describe it here, and the record shows what we are 
talking about, and the gist was a flag, in other words, from which you 
would be able to read this language : 

Tokyo directs special reports on ships in Pearl Harbor which is divided into 
5 areas for the purpose of showing exact locations." 

Now, that would point out the significance, would it not? The next 
question by the Senator from Michigan was : 

Now, this particular paper that I have in mind and have shown you with this 
written on it. 

And then I read this report, or part of it. That would be a flag to 
you, would it not. Admiral, telling you the substance of what the 
Japanese were trying to find out about our ships in Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Stark. It shows very clearly what they wanted. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes; what they wanted. 

[13969] Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Someone had boiled this down, sunmiarized it, 
and gave you in a few words, or gave in this gist which was attached 
to this message, what it was? 

Admiral Stark. Well, now, when you say "gave you,'' which means 
''gave me" 

Senator Ferguson. Do you claim you never got any gists? 

Admiral Stark. I do. We have been over this bomb plot thing 
from start to finish, all of us in the front office, and I still not only have 
no recollection of having seen it, it is my honest opinion that I did not 
see it. 

' Capt. C. Roger Nelson. U. S. Army, liaison officer to the committee. 
' Hearings, Part 9, p. 4196. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5257 

Senator Ferguson. You say that you have gone over it with x^eople 
in the front office? 

Admiral Stark. No. I say this, that the testimony shows — Inger- 
soll, as I recall his testimony, stated that he had not seen it. Wliat 
came to me always came to him in the magic. I have forgotten defi- 
nitely about Turner but I believe he states he did not see it. 

Senator Ferguson. So 

Admiral Stark. The message was — well, go ahead. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you want to add something? 
■ Admiral Stark. No, sir. I was going to say we have covered it in 
the light of hindsight, and one thing or other indicated in the light 
of hindsight, that we did not see them ; either the [ISO'/O] Anny 
or Navy. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you remember seeing any gists on any of 
the magic that came to you ? 

Admiral Stark. It is customary and routine in the Navy, frequently, 
if we get a dispatch that refers to two or three other dispatches, you 
may have typed on the bottom of it what the other dispatches were, to 
give you a complete picture without you having to send for those dis- 
patches. If you call that a gist — that was routine. 

Senator Ferguson. No. that is not what we are talking about. 

Admiral Stark. No, sir. I do not recall, except as from time to 
time estimates were made — McCoUum would sometimes make an 
estimate. 

Senator Ferguson. I would want to read a paper to you and ask 
you some questions on it. 

This telegram must be closely paraiihrasecl before being communicated to 
anyone. 

Secretary of State, 

Washiriffton. 
From Batavia, dated September 22, 1941, received 10:4,5 a. m., September 23, 
1941. 
149, September 22nd, 4 p. m. 

The following summary of statements to newspaper [13971] corre- 

spondents by the Right Honorable Duff Cooper, who arrived at Batavia September 
19 and returned to Singapore September 21. 

One. His plan is to form a council or body in Singapore to pass on Far Eastern 
political questions; to discuss the entire political sitiiation with the Governor 
General and to obtain his views concerning the above-mentioned council which 
is to function as does that under Lord Lyttleton at Cairo and which will relieve 
the military authorities of political responsibility. 

Two. An effective liaison exists between the British and the Dutch and Com- 
manders in Chief have a complete understanding. Asked if the British would 
welcome a Dutch expeditionary force, he said that the British were adequately 
manned and that Dutch troops would be more effective here. However, if the 
hub of activity should shift to British territory the luiderstanding between Com- 
monders in Chief would cover any requirements. 

This is the part I wanted to read particularly. This is the part 
I am interested in 

Admiral Stark. That is headed Batavia? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. It is signed by "Foote," to our Secretary 
of State. 

[13972] Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. He was one of our State officials there as I 
understand it. 



5258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In response to a question concerning the use of the base of Singapore by the 
United States he said that there is no "agreement on paper but the answer is 
obvious," asljed if the ABCD front was merely wishful thinking he said "Emphati- 
cally no. It is a fact." When questioned by an American newspaper correspond- 
ent he was not so emphatic. For example, "I deem the ABCD front to be a 
fact." 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield? 

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know about that, Admiral ? 

Admiral Stark. I don't recall it. I could comment on it easily 
enough — the ABCD front. If it means that we were tied up with the 
Dutch, or if it means that we had an approved plan with the Dutch 
and British out there at that time, we did not. 

You will recall in the record exhibits showing the rejection of what 
has been proposed out there, and that the scheme of working together, 
between the British and ourselves, was finally not approved, until — 
I think we sent it out the night of December 7. It came in from Hart 
and Phillips just about that time, around the 6th. 

[13973] Senator Ferguson. But it was written before the attack. 

Admiral Stark. We had directed them to find a means of working 
together so that if and when the thing happened the effort would 
more or less dovetail. We had done it here in Washington for the 
entire world, in the spring of 1941, and as I have stated it was my job 
to do it and we were directing it be done out there, and we had done 
it in Washington. 

Senator Ferguson. That is what I want to get to. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Not this moment. If Duff Cooper was telling 
the w^orld through a newspaper correspondent, when questioned by an 
American newspaper correspondent — he was not so emphatic — "I deem 
the ABCD front to be a fact" ; would not that notify the Japanese that 
in fact there was an ABCD front ? 

Admiral Stark. It would be a fact to the Japanese that he had 
said so if they believed it. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Not this moment. Now, have you any' doubt 
that the Japanese did believe that statement? 

Admiral Stark. I don't know, Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Ferguson. If the Japanese believed that statement, 
[13974-] then I want to know, from a military and naval point of 
view, whether or not you would judge, if there was this threat to 
attack the Kra Peninsula, and we had a front, between the American 
and British and Dutch and the Chinese, that we should have consid- 
ered that Japan would attack the only thing that was the deterrent in 
the Pacific, that was our fleet? I am talking from a military and 
naval point of view. 

Admiral Stark. Well, that is some question. May I boil it down to 
see if I have it correctly ? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. That assumes that the Japs believed what Duff 
Cooper stated, that we had a combined front. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. That is what Duff said. 

Admiral Stark. Therefore, they assumed that if they attacked the 
Kra Peninsula, that, in effect, Britain would go to war, and the Dutch, 
this combined front. We would be involved. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5259 

Senator Ferguson. And we would go to war if we had a combined 
front. You can't have a combined front and have three of them in 
war and one not. 

Admiral Stark. I am working on a premise which I do not admit to 
be a fact. That is, fighting the problem. 

Senator Ferguson. It doesn't make any diffei'ence whether it is a 
fact or not if the British said it and if the Japanese [13975] 
believed it. 

Admiral Stark. If the British said it and if the Japanese believed 
it, if they attacked one they would probably attack the combination 
so as to do the most damage. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Stark. But there is an "if" in that question. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that the way you want to leave the answer? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield ? 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know this, as to whether or not publicly 
it was ever denied that there was an ABCD front? 

Admiral Stark. I do not know why we should have denied it if we 
never had one. 

Senator Ferguson. The question was : Do you know whether it was 
ever denied publicly or to the Japanese ? 

Admiral Stark. I don't recall any specific denial from high author- 
ity but I certainly also don't recollect any hint that such a thing existed 
by high authority. 

Senator Ferguson. I understand that. That wasn't the question I 
was asking you. 

Admiral Stark. No ; but I think it belongs in the answer. 

Senator Ferguson. And it is going to be there. Now, I am going 
to talk about another subject. 

[13976] Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield before going on to 
another subject? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Mr. Murphy. I think the record should show the official position of 
Duff Cooper. At the time he was in charge of British propaganda, 
wasn't he ? 

Senator Ferguson. I read all I knew^ about it. 

Mr. Murphy. I think you will find that at the time he was in 
charge, Director of Public Information and Propaganda, for Great 
Britain, and they were at war. Apparently he was putting forth the 
strongest possible front he could for his country. 

[13977] Senator Ferguson. Of course, I am not asking for the 
Congressman's opinion. I am trying to point out, from a military or 
naval viewpoint, we didn't anticipate certain things in this attack on 
Pearl Harbor. Now, going to the next subject. You remember we 
contemplated an attack upon the Azores ? 

Admiral Stark. I don't know that the word "contemplated" is a 
correct one. Senator Ferguson. We were ordered to draw up plans for 
that. We had, as I previously testified, drawn up plans for Martinique. 
It is our business to draw up plans for any contingency. 

Senator Ferguson. Didn't you even get the ships ready? 

Admiral Stark. We brought 

Senator Ferguson. For the Azores? 



5260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Stark. Yes, we broiio;ht some ships to tlie Atlantic, and 
we brought some Marines to the Atlantic, who were afterward sent to 
Iceland. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why the plan not to attack the 
Azores was arrived at? 

Admiral Stark. Do I know what. Senator? 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why we did not attack the Azores? 
Do you know whether it was decided between the British and our- 
selves that we would be attacking a neutral, which was Portugal, and 
therefore we decided not to do it, i\nd we took [13&/8] another 
tack and went to Iceland? 

Admiral Stark. I would say that the occasion for attacking the 
Azores simply did not arise. It just went on diplomatically there. 
I may not be completely informed of it, but there was worry and had 
been worry as to the possibility of the Axis attacking Portugal, going 
down through the Spanish Peninsula, and possibly compromising the 
Azores. We couldn't afford to have the Azores in anybody else's 
possession. 

Senator Ferguson. Was it ever contemplated, ns far as you know, 
to come to Congress to declare war on Portugal and take the Azores? 

Admiral Stark. I never heard of it, or I never thought of it until 
this minute. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, if you were preparing the fleet, and pre- 
paring ships to take the Azores, it wasn't just a drill, was it ? 

Admiral Stark. We prepared to take the Continent of Europe too. 

Senator Ferguson. That early? 

Admiral Stark. Sir? 

Senator Ferguson. That early? That early, back in 1941? 

Admii-al Stark. Well, I dare say that the Army was working on 
plans, and they were asking for men, and so forth, for a big and huge 
Army. But I mean, I was referring to when you spoke [13979] 
of declaring war on Portugal. 

Senator Ferguson. How would you attack and take the Azores with- 
out a declaration of war on Portugal? She owned them. 

Admiral Stark. I can tell you one way. Suppose the Germans had 
taken Portugal. Would we have to declare war on Portugal to take 
the Azores ? I don't think we would have. 

Senator Ferguson. I assume you are right on that, if it wasi cap- 
tured and in the hands of the Germans it would be German territory, 
and we would have to declare war on Germany. 

Admiral Stakk. Yes, sir. I always construed that situation, with 
regard to the Azores, as to have plans ready, and be ready, if an emer- 
gency arose there. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, let's go to Iceland. 

Mr. Clark. You are a long way from Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Ferguson. No, I am not. My questions will come around to 
Pearl Harbor. They will come around to Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Clark. I didn't mean to interrupt. 

Senator Ferguson. We did go and land in Iceland? 

Admiral Stark. We did ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you wrote letters and said that we had a 
shooting war in the Atlantic? 

Admiral Stark. In effect ; yes, sir . 



Proceedings of joint committee 5261 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. You know what Admiral Ingersoll 
[JS980] said about it. It wasn't a "legal" war but it was a war. 

Admiral Stark. Well, when I think of the term "legal" 

Senator Ferguson. It wasn't a declared war. 

Admiral Stark. It wasn't a declared war. What we were doing was 
a limited defense against German aggression in what had been termed 
our waters. We didn't, for example, go over to Germany at that time 
or attack Europe. 

Mr. Murphy, The Senator misquoted the witness — unintentionally. 
Admiral Ingersoll corrected his testimony, Senator. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, I took his original statement. You know 
what I am talking about, don't you? 

Admiral Stark. I think I know what you are talking about. We 
covered this same point before. 

Senator Ferguson. But I am going to lead up to this question, to 
show that I am still at Pearl Harbor : 

Do you know whether it was ever discussed in the War Cabinet — • 
and you know who that would be — that it would be necessary for 
Germany to fire the first shot? We had a plan and a policy in the 
Pacific that Japan — I don't want to quote the Secretary of War again— 
but it was to be for Japan to fire the first shot and foi- us not to be 
harmed too nuich by it. You said that was the studied plan and the 
design. 

[139SJ] Now, I want to know why, if you know, there was a 
distinction between the Atlantic and the Pacific about the firing of 
the first shot. 

Admiral Stark. Germany had attacked and sunk one of our ships 
in June. She had attacked three destroyers in the Atlantic, sinking 
one of them — I think it was in October or November, along in there, 
between September and October. And certainly the 1st of December 
she had attacked and wounded badly one tanker, the /Salinas, 1 believe 
it was, which got back to the Canadian coast. The Congress of the 
United States had voted billions for material to go to Britain. We 
considered it our job to- get that material through, not simply to use 
this money for material and let it be sunk without taking any action 
on it. There were^ certain waters defined, and limits established, 
which, I believe, we* called our waters. The President's speech shows 
it very plainly, in which he stated, if the Germans came within that 
area they would do so at their peril. They ctime in and attacked us. 
As a result, we got together what we called the hemispheric defense 
plans, which I have outlined previously and which provided for 
shooting at any German combatant ships which came within that area, 
and we did do it. 

Senator Ferguson, We did shoot ? 

Admiral Stark, Yes, sir. But I think that that situation is not 
comparable to wdiat was going on in the Pacific, [139Sl^] where 
the Japs had not attacked our ships, unless you go back to the Panay 
incident. 

Senator Ferguson. If you go back to the Panay, it is the same 
situation ? 

Admiral Stark. No ; I don't think so. 

Senator Ferguson. Not as bad ? 

Admiral Stark. I think it is different. 



5262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. All right, "different." 

Is that what was discussed by the war cabinet? Was that dis- 
cussed by the war cabinet, so that you would have one policy in the 
Pacific and another policy in the Atlantic ? 

Mr. Kep^fe. You can't be all-inclusive in the Pacific, because I 
understand the evidence clearly shows that in certain areas, in the 
Southwest Pacific, this shooting war applied. 

Senator Ferguson. It did apply in the Southeast Pacific. 

Admiral Stark. Off the west coast, the Southeast Pacific, we made 
one of the hemispheric defense plans apply to the area which we 
outlined there. 

Senator Ferguson. That is the Southeast Pacific? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Take the other part of the Pacific where this 
not-firing-the-first-shot policy was. 

Admiral Stark. American material was going in a steady stream 
across the Pacific, I don't know how big a stream, in [13983] 
Russian ships and into Russian territory. I can think of no instance 
where anything we had commercially going across the Pacific was 
attacked until the President Hari^ison was lost after December 7. In 
other words, our ships were moving freely. However, I took no 
chance, you know, and in October I directed all our Pacific ships into 
port and thereafter routed them and kept them on routes where I 
thought in emergency they could duck for safety or we could give 
them some protection. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

The Vice Chairman. Any other questions ? 

Mr. Murphy. I have one or two questions, Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral Stark, will you refer to the memorandum of 
December 13, 1941? 

Will you give the admiral a copy of it (Exhibit No. 160) ? 

I understand these to be notes of the remarks of the President of 
the United States on the night of December 7, 1911. 

Toward the middle of the first page I note the following : 

About 2 weeks ago we began to realize that the pi-obability of Japan being 
in earnest was so slim that it was time to make a final and definite effort to pin 
them down on the one subject tliat they liad never ever been pinned down on, 
and that was that they were to agree to cease their acts of aggression, and that 
they would [1398Jf] try to bring the China War to a close. 

You know that to be a fact, do you not, from yoiu' experience, that 
they had not agreed to that, and we were attempting to get them to 
agree on it, in diplomatic negotiations ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. In the next paragraph I read again : 

From that time on we were getting more and more definite information that 
Japan was headed for war, and that the reply to the Secretary of State would 
be in the negative. 

That was the Secretar}^ of State's message of November 26, was it 
not? 

Admiral Starks Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, at the bottom of the page : 

* * * Geographically Indochina was at a hub, from which any attack can 
be made in a number of directions. It is only a very short distance from there 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5263 

to the Philippines in the east. It is a relatively short distance from there down 
to the Dutch East Indies, which is the most industrial part — southwest there is 
Singapore — fortified. 

Then I skip seven or eight lines. 

We are getting a very large proportion of our supplies — rubber, tin, et cetera — 
from that whole [13985] area of Southwestern Pacific * * *. 

And then again, coming to the next paragraph : 

In addition to tliat, of course, is the fact that if the Japanese did move to 
the south, to the Dutch East Indies, from Indochina, the Philippines would be 
virtually surrounded. They would haA^e the Japanese on both sides — Indochina — 
the mandated islands to the west, this side of the Philippines, and the Dutch 
Indies and the Japanese possessions in the south. They would be completely 
encircled by a military power. 

Did you have that particular circumstance in mind when you sent 
this memorandum to Spenavo, about which the Senator from Michigan 
questioned you this morning, the fact that the Philippines would be 
endangered by that situation if the Davao-Waigeo line was crossed? 

Admiral Stark. Yes. It flanked us on the south; and we were 
already flanked on the west and north. 

Mr. Murphy. It would make the position of the Philippines much 
more dangerous, would it not ? 

Admiral Stark. Unquestionably. 

Mr. Murphy. That is all. 

Mr. Keefe, I have a couple of questions, Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe. 

Mr. Keefe. In connection with the questions of the Senator from 
Michigan, I note in the diary of Secretary Stimson of the conference 
which was held at the office of Secretary Hull on the morning of 
December 7, Sunday, where former Secretary Stimson records a por- 
tion of the conversations in this manner : 

Hull expressed his views, giving the broad picture of it, and I made him 
dictate it to a stenographer and I attach it to the end of this. Knox also had 
his views as to the importance of showing immediately how these different nations 
must stand together, and I got him to dictate that and that is attached hereto. 

Now, turning to page 67 of the Stimson report you will find the 
suggestion dictated by Secretary Knox in which he lists six para- 
graphs. In the first four paragraphs he refers to the possibility of 
the Japs attacking Singapore and the Dutch. Then, in paragraph 5, 
he says : 

If the above be accepted, then any serious threat to the British or Dutch is a 
serious threat to the United States ; or it might be stated any threat to any one 
of the three of us is a threat to all of us. We should therefore be ready jointly 
to act together, and if such understanding lias not already been reached, it should 
be reached immediately. Otherwise we may fall individually, one at a time 
(or somebody may be left out [13987] on a limb). 

That indicates that so far as Secretary Knox was concerned, he 
apparently was in an indefinite mood as to whether or not an under- 
standing had already been reached. 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. That is the way I read it. 

Mr. Keefe. Betw^een these nations. 

Admiral Stark. He says : 

* * * and if such imderstanding has not already been reached, it should be 
reached immediately. 



5264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK. 

Which, to my mind- 



Mr. Keefe. It is surprising that he wouldn't know of such an under- 
standing if one had been reached, and that he would express it in that 
rather indefinite manner. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. I have also expressed, several times, the 
fact that I didn't know of any agreement. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, Admiral, I listened attentively to the ques- 
tions asked you by the Senator from Michigan with respect to this log 
prepared, apparently, by the watch officer at the Navy Department, and 
I confess that at the end of it I am very much confused and I would 
like to get straightened out if I can. 

Admiral Stark. I am somewhat confused myself on it. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, when I read it and get it in chronological form — 
it was all mixed up as it was stapled together — [1S988] but 
when I get it in pamphlet form the confusion, to me at least, seems to 
vanish, and I wonder if you will agree with me. It reads: 

1900, 6 December, to 0200, 7 December. At 2000 

That is 8 o'clock, is it not? 
Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 
Mr. K^EEFE (reading) : 

Major F. L. Harrison, Aide to the Secretary of War, telephone that the Secretary 
of War desired tlie following information by 0900, Sunday, 7 December : Compila- 
tion of men-of-war in Far East ; British, American, Japanese, Dutch, Russian. 
Also compilation of American men-of-war in Pacific Fleet, with locations, and a 
list of American men-of-w^ar in the Atlantic without locations. 

That is perfectly clear as to what he requested ? 

Admiral Stark. Perfectly clear ; yes. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, to depart from the quotation, I understood your 
testimony to be, in response to questions asked by Senator Ferguson, 
that it would be the duty of the watch officer, in the event of receiving 
a request of this kind, to put it through by contacting someone with 
authority to direct that the compilation be made ? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe, So that, when Major Harrison called the watch 
[1S989] officer and stated the request of the Secretary of War, it 
was then the duty of the watch officer to attempt to contact someone 
in authority to put the order through ? 

Mr. Keefe. Now, then, if you follow through — and I will read what 
is further indicated on this statement — the watch officer states this 
[reading] : 

Admirals Ingersoll, Stark, and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted 

That is clear, isn't it ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Keefe (reading) : 

and the Secretary directed that the information be compiled and delivered to 
him prior to 1000 Sunday, December 7. 

Now, to me that is just as clear as a bell. It means that the watch 
officer consulted Admirals Ingersoll and Stark and the Secretary of 
the Navy in order to put through this request, and that the Secretary 
of the Navy instructed them to deliver the compilation to him before 
10 o'clock, the time when he was to meet at the Secretary's office, in 
Secretary Hull's office, \fith Secretary Stimson. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5265 

Now, the inevitable question arises in my mind, If tliis watcli officer 
made this written record, statino; that he [13990~\ consulted 
with Admirals Ingersoll and Stark and the Secretary of the Navy, 
either he did or he didn't. 

Now, you say you have no recollection of his having consulted with 
you? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct ; yes, sir, 

Mr. Keefe. Well, if he did consult with you, as he says he did in 
this memorandum, he nmst have consulted with you subsequent to 
8 o'clock, the time the request came in. 

Admiral Stark. That is correct. 

Mr. Keefe. And you must have been some place where he could con- 
tact you. 

Admiral Stark. If he did ; yes, sir. Assuming, from what he said, 
mat he did. 

Mr. Keefe. Well 

Admiral Stark. He says that we were consulted; that he got in 
touch with us. Why he would have gotten in touch with both me and 
Ingersoll, I don't understand. Wiether he means he had telephoned, 
or what, I don't know. The plain statement is that he did consult me. 
I don't recall it. But if he did, it had been sometime subsequent to 
8 o'clock. 

Mr. Keefe. Being a person who is inclined to accept somebody's 
M'ord for something in this hearing, especially when it is written, and 
there is no reason to assume a man would write something down in a 
public record that didn't occur, it seems [13W1] to me a rea- 
sonable assumption to believe that the watch officer charged with 
the responsibility of meticulously writing down the information that 
comes to his attention, wouldn't say that he consulted you and Ad- 
miral Ingersoll and the Secretary of the Navy miless he did. 

Admiral Stark. I quite agree with you. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, we are in a position, then, if you were not at the 
theater, you weren't at home, you don't remember where you were, 
somebody ought to be able to trace this down, we finally are on a lead 
where, if we get this man, we might be able to find out, he might be able 
to remember where he got you that night ; isn't that true? 

Admiral Stark. He might be. 

Mr. Keefe. Now, Admiral, let me ask you this simple question — I 
would like to get through with this thing sometime and pin one of 
these things down so we have something definite 

Admiral Stark. So would I. I wish I could recall that incident. 

Mr. Keefe. I wish you could, too. 

Admial Stark. That has been blank in my mind all through, and 
when people have stated something, I have accepted it, and I have no 
reason to doubt what he put down there, but I just don't recall. 

{13992'] Mr. Keefe. Yes. You have told us that a number of 
times. What I would like to know is this — perhaps it appears hereto- 
fore, but it won't hurt to have it appear once more. 

As I understand it, it is the fundamental practice in the Navy De- 
partment, and had been for a long time, for a man in the position of 
Chief of Naval Operations to let someone know where he is at every 
hour of the day. 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

79716—46 — pt. 11 9 



5266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Keefe. Isn't that true ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. And if you were going to the National Theater on Sat- 
urday evening, December 6, you would, in accordance with your usual 
custom, practice, and procedure, advise someone in the Navy Depart- 
ment where you could be found ; isn't that true? 

Admiral Stark. That is correct; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Would this watch officer, who made this report that has 
just been read into the record, be the one with whom you would leave 
that information ? 

Admiral Stark. As a rule, he was always told when I went out; 
yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. So that the watch officer who made the memorandum 
Avhich we have just read into the record would be the person 
with whom you would leave the information where you [13993'] 
could be found? 

Admiral Stark. Normally ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. Would there be a memorandum or a record made by 
the Avatch officer that would be preserved, indicating or showing where 
the Chief of Naval Operations would be ? 

Admiral Stark. Well, I don't know about that, Mr. Keefe. It was 
the practice to telephone. I don't know that we made any record of 
that type. He probably put a slip on his desk as to where I could be 
found. 

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, I don't go to the National Theater very 
often 

Admiral Stark. I don't either. ♦ 

Mr. Keefe. But my recollection is, from the few times I have gone 
down there, it was about 8 : 30 or 8 : 45, that is about the time the 
show opens. 

Admiral Stark. I think that is correct ; around 8 : 30, 1 think, maybe 
8:15; maybe, sometimes 8 : 45. 

Mr. Keefe. That would have given the watch officer an opportunity 
to contact you some place before you even got to the theater, wouldn't 
it, if you did go there? 

Admiral Stark. Yes; depending on the time I left the house. 

Mr. Keefe. If the watch officer called your home, wouldn't there 
be somebody there to answer the telephone ? 

[1934-] Admiral Stark. Yes. I may have been there myself. I 
may not have left for the theater when he called. I don't recall the 
incident. If the theater opened at 8 : 30, it is not over a 10-minute trip 
from the house down there. 

Mr. Keefe. If anybody called your house and you were away, 
wouldn't the person that was in charge at your home make a memo- 
randum of it and give it to you ? 

Admiral Stark. Yes; we always left word in the house with the 
boys who would answer the telephone, where we were. 

Mr. Keefe. Weren't you told that Commander Kramer called your 
home and tried to get you that night ? 

Admiral Stark. I have no recollection of that. 

Mr. Keefe. You have no recollection of anybody having called you 
at your home ? 

Admiral Stark. I have not. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5267 

Mr. Keefe. And you have no recollection of giving the instructions 
to this watch officer to furnish this information to Secretary Stimson 
and to Secretary Knox ? 

Admiral Stark. No ; I do not recall that incident, 

Mr. Keefe. Do I understand that this watch officer is now an 
admiral ? 

Commander Baecher. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Keefe. He is in Hawaii ? 

Commander Baecher. He is ComAirPac, I am informed. That 
[1S99S] is his job. He is a rear admiral. He is stationed in 
Hawaii. 

Mr. Keefe. What was his rank at the time he made this memo- 
randum ? 

Commander Baecher. He was a commander. I am not certain. 

Mr. Keefe. You can't read his signature? 

Commander Baecher. Yes. It took me a while. 

Senator Ferguson. Would the Congressman yield just for informa- 
tion, not for questions? 

Mr. Keefe. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I have been going over this 
memorandum that we received today, and that the Congressman has 
been questioning the witness on, and on which I had questioned the 
witness previously. There are quite a number of messages indicated 
in that memorandum. I would like to request of Commander Baecher 
that they furnish to committee counsel all of these various messages 
that are indicated. 

[13996] Mr. Keefe. I am interested, too, in those messages be- 
cause there is some rather astounding information contained in the 
report of this watch officer as to the seizure of certain Finnish ships 
by the Coast Guard and wiiat disposition was to be made of them, this, 
that, and the other. 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, that effort will be made. 

Mr. Keefe, Maybe we w^ill run finally onto something that may help 
clear up this situation that has bothered you. Admiral, and which I, 
as a member, have wondered at. 

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, the Commander will note 
the request.^ 

Mr. Keefe. Is there any way to contact the watch officer ? 

Commander Baecher. I will do that. I will ask him whether he 
remembers whether he got in touch with Admiral Stark, if he remem- 
bers it at all, and have a positive answer from him shortly. 

Mr. Keefe. He ought to be able to remember that. It is in his 
handwriting. Maybe he can remember that he wrote it. 

Mr. Richardson. You are an optimist. 

Mr. Keefe. Counsel suggests that I am an optimist. I have done 
my best to get the facts. That is all. 

Admiral Stark. I have done my best to give them to you. 

[13997] The Vice Chairman. Are there any other questions ? 

Mr. Murphy. In this log. Admiral, that has been handed to us, I 
notice that there are entries made in first one handwriting and then 
after that the entries are made by Glover, now Rear Admiral Glover, 
and then there are entries made by a man named Wyatt, on the 6th 

^See p. 5482, infra. 



5268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of December, aiul then under tlie date of the Tth of December there 
is an entry : 

The following officers entered 2601. 

Then there is a list of names : 

Lieutenant Commander — 

some name T can't decipher — 

Captain Beardall, Lieutenant Kramer, Captain Wilkinson, Captain Schuirmann, 
Captain Metcalfe, Lieutenant Commander Mason. 

And 

Captain Griflin, Captain Metcalf, Captain Wilkinson, Commander Cary, Com- 
mander Glover, Commander Alexander. 

Then it says : 

Action taken as indicated on dispatches. 

Would that mean there was some watch officer who was making 
entries as to who came in at certain times? 

Admiral Stark. I don't know what that means. I don't know who 
occupied room 2601. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you yield? Not for a question. 

Mr. Murphy. I will be glad to. 

Admiral Stark. One of those mentioned is the next witness. 

[13998] Mr. Keefe. What is that time, 2601 ; what time would 
that be? 

Admiral Stark. That is the room number. 

]\Ir. Keefe. I see. 

Senator Ferguson. What I wanted 

Mr. Keefe. What is the time specified ? 

Mr. MuRPiiY. It says something about 11 : 45„ about the Coast 
Guard called for release of information on Finnish ships. It was 
advised to call Captain Schuirmann. Then it sa^^s: "The following 
officers entered 2601." The list of names follows. Then, it says: 
"Action taken as indicated on dispatches." 

Senator Ferguson. You read that previously. 

Mr. Murphy. There are entries made as to entering a certain room, 
2601, for what reason I do not know, and apparently tliere aren't any 
entries as to the rest of December 7, as to you being there, and as to 
Admiral Turner and Admiral Ingersoll, so these notes are certainly 
not such as to purport to show who went into tJie Navy Department 
on December 7, are they ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir; oh, no. 

The Vice Chairman. Whose room was this, 2601? 

Admiral Stark. I don't know ; but the Department can furnish that. 
That is the second floor, 6 Wing. One of the firet rooms. But I do 
not know who was in that office. You [13999'] could establish 
it. You could not do it by going to w^ho is there now, because the 
people have been shifted a good deal. But if you want that infor- 
mation, the Department can give it to you. Admiral Beardall is here. 
He may possibly recall. 

The Vice Chairman. All right. Are there any further questions ? 

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, that is one of the meetings which one of 
the witnesses described, some place in the 1P>,000 pages here, that has 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5269 

been the unusual assemblage of all the top-flight boys that happened 
to get down just accidently on Sunday morning. 

Mr. Murphy. The top flight was not there. I ask, Mr. Chairman, 
that the particular entry in question, in view of the fact that we have 
read only excerpts, that this particular group of papers be marked as 
an exhibit and macle a part of the record. 

The Vice Chairman. Is there objection to the request? The Chair 
hears none. What will be the number of the exhibit, Mr. Counsel? 

Mr. Masten. Exhibit No. 162. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be received. 

(The documents referred to were marked ''Exhibit No. 162.") 

The Vice Chairman. Are there any further questions ? Does coun- 
sel have anything further ? 

{lJ/)00\ Mr. Richardson. No. 

The Vice Chairman. Does counsel for Admiral Stark have any- 
thing ? 

Mr. Obear. No questions. 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral, do you have anything further ? 

Admiral Stark. No, sir; I can think of nothing I haven't covered 
in any connection in this whole thing. 

The Vice Chairman. Is there any reason why Admiral Stark cannot 
now be excused? 

Senator Ferguson. I think it should be understood that when some 
of these witnesses come in that have been requested it may be the desire 
of at least one member of the committee to ask more question of the 
Admiral. 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral, we thank you for your appearance 
and the additional information you have given the committee. You 
are excused. 

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to present Admiral 
Beardall. 

The Vice Chairman. Admiral Beardall, will you come forward, 
please, and be sworn ? 

(The witness was sworn by the Vice Chairman) 

\^1J4)01\ TESTIMONY OF REAR ADM. JOHN R. BEARDALL, 
UNITED STATES NAVY^^ 

Mr. Richardson. Admiral, will you state your full name, please? 

Admiral Beardall. John R. Beardall, Rear Admiral. 

Mr. Richardson. You were aide to the President at the time of the 
attack on Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. How long had you been such aide? 

Admiral Beardall. Since May 1941. 

Mr. Richardson. What had been your previous assignment ? 

Admiral Beardall. Previous to that I was in command of the 
U. S. S. Vhicennes. 

Mr. Richardson. How long have you been in the Navy up to now, 
Admiral ? 

Admiral Beardall. Forty-two years, from the time I entered the 
Naval Academy. 

^ See p. 5512, infra, for suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by Adm, 
Beardall. 



5270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. KiCHARDSON. What were your duties as naval aide ? 

Admiral Beardall. The duties of aide are not prescribed by any 
regulations but are such duties as your chief, who in my case was the 
President, might give. 

Mr. Richardson. Where did you have your office, Admiral ? 

Admiral Beardall. My office was in the Navy Department. 

[1400^] Mr. Eichardson. Did you have an office in the White 
House ? 

Admiral Beardall. No, not regularly assigned. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there anyone else there with whom you 
divided your duties at the time you became naval aide? 

Admiral Beardall. No. 

Mr. Richardson. Who was later appointed to assist you there in 
your duties ? 

Admiral Beardall. Commander Schulz and then later on some 
other officer. He was one of the first that was detailed to assist me. 

Mr. Richardson. Commander Schulz came to assist you just before 
the attack on Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. At that time did you have any office or place at 
which you could have a desk in the White House ? 

Admiral Beardall. We were endeavoring to set one up, and it was 
a little difficult to get space so they gave us a small space down near 
the mail room, which is on the west side, on Executive Avenue, just 
across from the State Department. 

Mr. Richardson. If any communication was brought to you physi- 
cally, to the White House, then that would be the place where ordi- 
narily you would be found ? 

Admiral Beardali.. Not I. The Avatch officer would be there but 
I would probably be up in the military aide's office [14003] or 
the Secretary's office. 

Mr. Richardson. You know what we mean when we speak of magic, 
Admiral? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. You were familiar with the delivery of magic to 
the White House? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. It has been generally testified here that it was de- 
livered in a locked pouch. You are familiar with that method of de- 
livery, are you, Admiral? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you have a key to the pouch — when it was 
brought to the White House? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. You would, therefore, be entitled to see the magic 
yourself ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. And when that magic was brought there it was for 
the purpose of giving it to the President? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. What would be done with it in the ordinary 
routine way if it was brought for delivery to the President i 

Admiral Beardall. It would be delivered to him. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5271 

[14004] Mr, Richardson. By whom? 

Admiral Beardall. By me, normally. 

Mr. Richardson. Would the pouch be opened by you before it went 
to tlie President ? 

Admiral B?l\rdall. It might or might not be. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, you recall the Saturday before the Pearl 
Harbor attack, December 6 ? 

Admiral Beardall. Y^es. 

Mr. Richard; ;<N. Were you advised in any way during the after- 
noon of that d' that there was expected to be ready for delivery to 
the White Hoi j and the President a dispatch of unusual importance? 

Admii-al B rdall. Yes. 

Mr. RiCHA >soN. Do you remember how that information came to 
you ? 

Admiral 1»eardall. I don't recollect accurately. Probably from 
Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who usually brought the pouch to 
me, either in the Navy Department, or wherever I might be. 

Mr. Richardson. You were acquainted with Captain Kramer? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Have you any recollection that Captain Kramer 
at other times had advised you in advance that there would be a mes- 
sage in the near future ? 

[14005] Admiral Beardall. Yes. In the afternoon, late in 
the afternoon, in the Navy Department, when it came about time tc 
go home, sometimes he would say, when I would inquire, "There is 
no magic ready for the President now," or "There might be some- 
thing later," or "Nothing until tomorrow morning." Something of 
that sort. 

Mr. Richardson. Commander Schulz testified here that he had been 
advised by you in the afternoon of December 6, Saturday, to remain 
in attendance, because you had been advised that there would be an 
important dispatch for delivery to the President; is that your recol- 
lection ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir; that is my recollection. 

Mr. Richardson. When did you leave the White House that after- 
noon ? 

Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection about 5 : 30 or 
a quarter to 6. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you go back to the White House at any time 
that day ? 

Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection about it. 

Mr. Richardson. You do recall being at Admiral Wilkinson's house 
for dinner that night? 

Admiral Beardall. I do. 

Mr. R'CHARDSON. And the evidence indicates that with you were 
Admiral Wilkinson and General Miles, you recall that? 

[I4OO6] Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Richardson. You spent the evening there ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Was it an evening where you were accompanied 
by your wives ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Was your wife with you ? 



5272 CONGRESSIOKAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. KiCHARDsoN. Where were you living then ? 

Admiral Beardall. In Washington, on Phelps Place, Northwest. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, do you recall the incident of Captain Kramer 
coming there ? 

Admiral Beardall. I do. 

Mr. Richardson. And delivering a message ? 

Admiral Beardall. I do. 

Mr. Richardson. Was that a magic message ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes. 

Mr. Richardson. Was it brought in the pouch, locked pouch, in the 
way those messages were brought? 

Admiral Beardall. I am not sure on that, but I imagine it was. 
I don't recollect. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you read the message there? 

Admiral Beardall. I glanced through it. 

[14-^)07] Mr. Richardson. Did the other officers there read it? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Have you any recollection of any of you doing 
any telephoning after the message was read ? 

Admiral Beardall. I have none. We moved around but I have no 
recollection of any telephoning, of my telephoning or seeing the others 
telephone. 

Mr. Richardson. Captain Kramer says that Admiral Wilkinson did 
some phoning. You couldn't verify that? 

Admiral Beardall. No, sir. He may have. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you know about how long it was after that 
message was delivered to you there that you left the Wilkinson house? 

Admiral Beardall. Well, I should say about a half hour, to the best 
of my recollection. 

Mr. Richardson. Is it your recollection that you went from there 
to your home ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you recall during that evening at all checking 
up with Scliulz at the White House ? 

Admiral Beardall. I don't recollect that, but I noted he has testi- 
fied I did, and I accept that, because it was the normal thing to do. 

Mr. Richardson. Would it be a routine thing for you to do 
[14008] to contact him to see what had happened in the White 
House during that tour of duty ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes ; in the case of a message like that. 

Mr. Richardson. How long would he be expected to remain at the 
White House? 

Admiral Beardall. I think his instructions at that time — this was 
before we had the situation and map room, before the war — was until 
after the President had turned in. 

Mr. Richardson. Had gone to bed? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you recall going to the White House Saturday 
morning? 

Adrhiral Beardall. I do now, after refreshing my memory, recall 
going there Saturday moi-ning. 

Mr. Richardson. "Did you go before you went to your own office in 
the Navy Building? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5273 

Admiral Beardall. Yes. 

Mr. KiCHARDsoN. Would Schiilz have been at the White House when 
you arrived there in the morning? 

Admiral Beardall. Not necessarily. I don't think he had any in- 
structions to come back. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you have any recollection of having any con- 
versation with Schulz on Sunday morning at the White House ? 

[14009] Admiral Beardall. None that I know of. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Richardson, your previous question stated 
"Saturday." 

Mr. Richardson. I meant Sunday. Admiral, do you recall any con- 
versation of any kind that you had when you came to the White House 
on Sunday morning on your way to your ofHce in the Navy Building 
with reference to what had happened the night before with respect to 
the delivery of any messages ? 

Admiral Beardall. None. 

Mr. Richardson. You then, except for this report which passed 
between you and Schulz on Saturday night, had no further knowledge 
of what happened to the magic message that was sent by Kramer to 
the White House on the evening of Saturday, December 6 ? 

Admiral Beardall. None. 

Mr. Richardson. Now, in event the President should desire to send 
any messages from the White House, would they be sent through you? 

Admiral Beardall. No. 

Mr. Richardson. Would you have any knowledge of what tele- 
phone conversations he might have had out of the White House? 

Admiral Beardall. Never. 

[14010] Mr. Richardson. Then the only way you would know 
anything about what the President did there would be when he re- 
quested you as his aide to do something for him? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you recall the President or anybody for him 
made any request of you either on the night of December 6 or on the 
morning of December 7 witli reference to the conveying of any dis- 
patches or information or directions? 

Admiral Beardall. None. 

Mr. Richardson. You had no contact with him at all then from the 
time you left the White House on the afternoon of December 6 until 
after the Pearl Harbor attack ? 

Admiral Beardall. This is Schulz? 

Mr. Richardson. This is tlie President. 

Admiral Beardall. The President ; I may have gone to see him that 
Sunday morning after I went to the White House. 

Mr. Richardson. Do you have any recollection you did ? 

Admiral Beardall. I have a hazy recollection I did. 

Mr. Richardson. Have you any recollection of any conversation 
with him that had any relation to any messages? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes; as I recollect it, I went into his room, 
early, about 10 o'clock on Sunday morning, with a message or mes- 
sages, which I presume, to the best of my recollection, was the 14th 
part of this 13-part message that [14OII] came in the night 

before, which I delivered to him. 

Mr. Richardson. Was tliere any discussion or conversation with 
him when you made that delivery ? 



5274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral BmRDALL. No discussion. We never discussed magic. I 
do recollect him saying though which marks this in my mind, that it 
looked as though the Japs are going to sever negotiations, break off 
negotiations. 

Mr. Richardson. Was there anybody else present? 

Admiral Beardall. None. 

Mr. Richardson. Your recollection is it was just between youJ 

Admiral Beardall. Just between us. 

Mr. Richardson. Can you recall what the occasion was of your see- 
ing him ? Was it simply to inquire whether he had duties for you ? 

Admiral Beardall. Normally that would be the case, but I think on 
this occasion I must have taken some message to him. 

Mr. Richardson. There is a notation here, which has just been re- 
ferred, the watch officer's log in which he says : ''The following officers 
entered 2601." Do you know what room that would be ? 

Admiral Beardall. I don't know definitely, but I think, from the 
people's names mentioned there, it was the watch officer's room there, 
where they gathered, and since Kramer [lIiOV2\ was j?",' 
Avhere we delivered the magic, or had contact with people who did. 
That is the best of my recollection. . , i 

Mr. Richardson. Do you have any recollection of what the occasion 
would be for the number of persons who are noted in the log as having 
come to that room at that time on Sunday morning would be? 

Admiral Beardall. I don't except perhaps to keep m contact with 
what might be coming in in reference to these messages. 

Mr. Richardson. Did you see anything of the 14-part message on 
the morning of December 7 yourself ? 

Admiral Beardall. Not that I recall, except I may have seen it, 
if this was the one that I gave to the President. 

Mr Richardson. Did you, yourself, read the 14th part ^ 

Admiral Beardall. My recollection is not clear on that. 1 may have 

or may not have. . , ^ •. i i j v 9 

Mr." Richardson. Do you remember seeing the 1 o clock delivery { 

Admiral Beardall. I" don't remember. . ^^ ,^ 

Mr Richardson. Did you have any contact with anyone while the 
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, was examining the instru- 
ment in the Navy Department? 

Admiral Beardall. No ; no. runi^i 

Mr Richardson. Do you have any knowledge as to who ilJiULS\ 
delivered the 13-part or the 14-part message or the 1 o'clock message in 
the Navy Department on Sunday morning? 

Admiral Beardall. None. -^i ^i .? 

Mr. Richardson. You had nothing to do with that f 

Admiral Beardall. Nothing. 

Mr Richardson. Then the only knowledge you have of that mes- 
sage is in connection with the event which occurred at the White House 
that you have testified to ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Richardson. No further questions. 

The ViCF Chairman. Admiral, as I understood, you stated you are 
not certain whether you saw the fourteenth part message or not i 

Admiral Beardall. I am not dead certain whether I saw it or not 
I sometimes read dispatches and sometimes I didn t. If it was the 
fourteenth part I probably read it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5275 

The Vice Chairman. You have no present impression that you did 
read it ? 

Admiral Beardall. I have a present impression I did. 

The Vice Chairman. You did ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes. 

The Vice Chairman. Well, is it your recollection that that four- 
teenth part message was what you delivered to the President Sunday 
morning ? 

[14014] Admiral Beardall. That is my impression. 

The Vice Chairman. About what time, would you say ? 

Admiral Beardall. About 10 o'clock, I should say. 

The Vice Chairman. And there was no discussion between you and 
the President? 

Admiral Beardall. No discussion at all. 

The Vice Chairman. Other than the remark, I believe you said, that 
he said it looked like Japan was going to break off negotiations ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. Something to that effect ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. May I have that last part read ? 

(The sentences referred to were read by the reporter.) 

The Vice Chairman. You say there was nobody else there with the 
President at the time 3'ou saw him ? 

Admiral Beardall. Nobody else, to the best of my recollection. 

The Vice Chairman. Was that the only time on Sunday that you 
saw him ? 

Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection that is the only 
time on Sunday I saw him until after the Pearl Harbor attack, when 
I joined him. 

The Vice Chairman. You did join him after the attack? 

[I4OIS] Admiral Beardall. After the attack. 

The Vice Chairman. About what time was it? • 

Admiral Beardall. About 2 o'clock, I w^as at home, at lunch, just 
after lunch, when I got the word that Pearl Harbor was being bombed, 
''This is no drill," and went immediately to confirm it, and then over 
to the White House and joined the President. 

The Vice Chairman. You stayed there then the rest of the day ? 

Admiral Beardall. The rest of the day and rest of the evening; 
yes, sir. 
* The Vice Chairman. All right, thank you. Mr. Clark. 

Mr. Clark. No questions, Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, when you went to the White House after 
the bombing, did the President make any comments to you? 

Admiral Beardalol,. This is after the bombing? 

Mr. Murphy. After. 

Admiral Beardall, Yes. When I got there only Mr. Hopkins. 
Harry Hopkins, was with him, and he was on the phone. To whom 
he was talking I don't know; but evidently he got some call from 
Admiral Stark, and he told me, he said, "Tak^ over the [I4OI6] 
phone to the Navy Department," and so I went out in the lobby and 
kept on the job, trying to get the news of what was going on in Pearl 
Harbor. 



5276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. MuKrHY. And yoii were reporting to him? 

Admiral Beardall. And reportino; to him. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you at any time talk to the President about his 
reactions on Saturday night when the paper was delivered to him by 
Commander Schulz? 

Admiral Beard all. Never. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you at any time on Saturday evening, after you 
went to Admiral Wilkinson's, talk to the President? 

Admiral Beardall. Never. 

Mr. Murphy. Between that time and Sunday morning at 10 o clock? 

Admiral Beardall. Never. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you at any time on Saturday night or early Sun- 
day morning talk to Admiral Stark? 

Admiral Beardall. I did not. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you at any time Saturday night or early Sunday 
rnorning make any inquiry or attempt to locate Admiral Stark? 

Admiral Beardall. No ; I did not. 

Mr. Murphy. No other questions. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

[14i017] Senator Ferguson. Admiral, going back to Saturday 
evening— rather Saturday all day— in the morning do you recall any 
messages being delivered to you as aide to the President? 

Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of it. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you handle messages from the Secretary of 
State? 

Admiral Beardall. I did not. 

Senator Ferguson. Who handled those, to the President, as far as 
the President was concerned? 

Admiral Beardall. I do not know that. I think— I don't know 
who handled the State Department messages. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, the State Department messages were never 
delivered in a locked pouch, is that correct— or were they ? 

Admiral Beardall. I am not sure. I don't know the method of 
delievery of the State Department messages. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, we have here in the evidence a message 
from the Ambassador in London telling us, about 10 : 40 on Saturday 
morning, telling us about a movement of ships, and it is addressed, as 
I understand it, to the Secretary of State's office. 

That would not come to you in your regular duty ? 

Admiral Beardall. No, sir. . r moi 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any messages, magic [24018 \ 
messages, delivered to you while you were on duty on Saturday, and 
that you delivered to the President? 

Admiral Beardall. None ; have no recollection of any. 

Senator Ferguson. So then you would say, as far as your testimony 
is concerned, no messages were delivered to you, or through you, to 
the President on Saturday? 

Admiral Beardall. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, that we might have the time as to when 
someone notified you there would be messages after you left, or after 
the time of notifying you, will you tell us who notified you that there 
would be messages that evening or that afternoon ? 

Admiral Beardall. As I previously testified it must have been Lt. 
Commander Kramer because he was the one who used to bring me 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5277 

regularly this pouch for delivery. He was the distributor of these 
messages. 

Senator Ferguson. When you say "must" you mean because he was 
the distributing agency? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Therefore you assume that that is who gave 
you that message ? 

Admiral Beardall. That is right. 

Senator Ferguson. Could you place the time? 

Admiral Beardall. I should say about 5 : 30, because normally I 
stayed at the Navy Department until about that time [14019] 
and often inquired if there was any magic coming in that might be 
destined for the White House, for the President, so that I could take 
it to the President at the end of the day, when it would be delivered. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understood Captain Kramer's testi- 
mony, he indicated that he would take these messages to the White 
House and deliver them to you, as the aide? 

Admiral Beardall. No. He did toward the end, when the watch 
officer was there. Sometimes Kramer would bring them over, later on, 
after the war started, but before Pearl Harbor there was no situation 
room and no map room in the White House; we didn't have one, and 
he would bring them to me in my office at the Navy Department and I 
would carry them myself. 

Senator Ferguson. And do you know of any occasion when he 
delivered messages to you as the naval aide to the President in the 
Wliite House and that you would take them to the President ? 

Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of it. 

Senator Ferguson. Prior to Pearl Harbor, prior to the attack on 
Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Beardall. I can't recall any. 

Senator Ferguson. Well then, as I understand it. Commander 
Schulz, then Lieutenant Schulz, wouldn't be at the White House while 
you were on duty on Saturday? 

[140£0] Admiral Beardall. No, not necessarily; no. At that 
time. Prior to Pearl Harbor. 

Senator Ferguson. Prior to Pearl Harbor. Now, do you know 
where Schulz was when you instructed him to go to the White House 
and wait for the messages that would be delivered later ? 

Admiral Beardall. Well, he may have been in the Navy Depart- 
ment and he may have been over in that mail room we established. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall that? 

Admiral Beardall. Well, I don't recall it; no, but I know that was 
the normal procedure. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall whether or not as your — what did 
you call him, assistant aide? » 

Admiral Beardall. He was a communication watch officer. 

Senator Ferguson. He didn't classify as an aide? 

Admiral Beardall. No. 

Senator Ferguson. He was a communication watch officer. Did 
you at all times have a watch officer in the White House? 

Admiral Beardall. No. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you start putting a watch officer in 
the White House? 

Admiral Beardall. After Pearl Harbor. 



5278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Well, if Commander Schulz, Lieutenant 
[I4OSI] Sclnilz at that time, indicated on this record that he was 
in the White House from the time he received, at least, this message 
from you, I mean the message as to the fact that there would be an- 
other message delivered, then you would say that he was acting as a 
watch officer in the White House ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. The watch officers were instructed, 
if it came in, to take it to the President. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you give him any instructions as to 
how to deliver this message to the President ? 

Admiral Beardall. I may have. I am not positive in my mind. 
But that would have been the normal thing for me to do. 

Senator Ferguson. Did anyone tell you that day that this would 
be important, this message ? 

Admiral Beardall. No. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever had a man remain on duty to 
deliver to the President a message, the time being 5 : 30 that you 
received this notice, prior to Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of it. 

Senator Ferguson. So you would say this was the first time you 
designated a watch officer to remain so that he could deliver a mes- 
sage to the President ? 

Admiral Beardall. I would. 

Senator Ferguson. Then I take it that there must have been some- 
thing said indicating that this was an important [1402^] mes- 
sage, that it would have to get to the President immediately, or it 
would have happened as in the case of all normal messages, that it 
would have remained in the Navy Department until the next morning, 
Sunday ; is that a fair statement ? 

Admiral Beardall. That is a fair statement, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So we find that the first time in the history of 
the Navy Department, in your experience as naval aide — and you 
were naval aide for how many years? 

Admiral Beardall, I was naval aide for about 7 months. 

Senator Ferguson. During that entire 7 months' period no occasion 
had arisen that you had placed anyone else — or that you had delivered 
a message after the ordinary day, which was 5 :30 or 6 o'clock ; is that 
a correct statement ? 

Admiral Beardall. That is a correct statement. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you check that evening, this bein^ an un- 
usual situation, did j^ou check with Schulz later that evening, and 
before the next morning, as to whether or not he ever received and 
delivered to the President this important message? 

Admiral Beardall. I accept his statement that he called me up 
and told me that he had delivered this 13-part, this message, he didn't 
know what it was, this part to the President. 

Senator Ferguson. Did he say "part" or "13 parts"? 

Admiral Beardall. I don't recall what he said but the [140^3] 
message that he received fi-om Commander Kramer. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, if it turns out from the testimony that 
there was more than one message you would say that he probably told 
you that he had delivered, plural, the "messages" ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5279 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir ; the messages that were in the pouch. 

Senator Ferguson. That were in the pouch. Now, had you any in- 
structions or information that that would be the last delivery that 
night or evening ? 

Admiral Beardall. No. 

Senator Ferguson. What did you tell Schulz about remaining on 
duty? 

Admiral Beardall. I don't recall what I told him. I accept his 
statement that he asked permission to go home and that he did go 
home. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you assume from that that your instruc- 
tions would be that he could leave ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, you received the message, 13-part mes- 
sage. Were there any other messages with that message — when you 
were at Admiral Wilkinson's home ? 

Admiral Beardall. I recollect none with it. 

Senator Ferguson. You recollect no other message ? 

[14-(^4] Admiral Beardall. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then as far as the record will show now, no 
messages were delivered to you, or you had no knowledge of any 
messages, on Saturday, as far as magic was concerned, or messages 
to the President, except the 13-part which you read at Admiral Wilk- 
inson's ? 

Admiral Beardall. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct? 

Admiral Beardall. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, I assume that evening you and Mrs. Beard- 
all left the AVilkinson home and went home ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Have you any idea what time you got home ? 

Admiral Beardall. 1 have no clear idea. 

Senator Ferguson. Well 

Admiral Beardall. Probably somewhere between 11:00 and mid- 
night, as I recollect. 

Senator Ferguson. And during the time you were home that eve- 
ning did you get any calls ? 

Admiral Beardatx. None at home that I recollect. 

Senator Ferguson. Were any messages delivered to you or did any- 
one come to your home ? 

Admiral Beardall. Not to my recollection. 

[1402s] Senator Ferguson. Then the next morning were you on 
the alert, was your department alerted, so that you anticipated or 
expected something to happen ? 

Admiral Beardall. By my department 

Senator Ferguson. What department would you be in at the Navy 
as aide to the President ? 

Admiral Beardall. I was aide to the President. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Well, were you on the alert for war? 

Admiral Beardall. I was on the alert for the delivery of these 
messages to the Secretary of State by the American Ambassadors of 
Japan. I mean, I was concerned about that. 



5280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Well, if you had a department, which I assume 
you did have, as naval aide to the President, one man in it, your 
department was alerted? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And you were alerted ; is that correct ? 

Admiral Beardall. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You were then anticipatmg a fourteenth part, 
because of the information you received at Admiral Wilkinson's ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know a man named Carson, a JSavy 

officer ? 

[UdsG] Admiral Beardall. I have heard of him since I have 

been back to Washington this time. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know^ who he is? What his rank is? 
Was he connected with this department of yours ? 

Admiral Beardall. I understand— he was another youngster that 
we had got hold of to use as a relief for Schulz. I mean, as an extra 
watch officer after we established this mail-room communication cpter. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, why did you establish a watch office m 
the mail room and put Schulz in and have a man named Carson as his 

relief man? , ^ , ^ 

Admiral Beardall. Well, so that Schulz could be oft sometime, 

acquaint, break this boy in so we could use him. , «. • ^i 

Senator Ferguson. When did you establish this watch office m the 

White House? 

Admiral Beardall. I should say about ; oh, 2 days, 3 days before 

Pearl Harbor. ^ , -r^r , • .i ^ ^ 

Senator Ferguson. Two or 3 days before Pearl Harbor is the hrst 
we find that a watch place was in the White House. And can you 
tell us why it was established? 

Admiral Beardall. Well, it was established so that there would be 
someone there to receive this magic who was more or less in the way 
of officer-messenger so that if I wasn't available there could be some- 
one there. These messages were [14027] coming in. The 
situation w^as getting more tense in the diplomatic relations, and I 
wanted somebody there in case I was going out for dinner or some- 
where else, that could receive this and be trusted to deliver it. 

Senator Ferguson. Who advised you that the situation was getting 
more tense, causing you to come to the conclusion that a watch office 
should be set up in the White House ? How did you come to that con- 
clusion that it was getting more tense? 

Admiral Beardall. I just think my own reasoning and 

Senator Ferguson. You had examined all magic that came through 
vou, and, therefore, you drew the conclusion that the situation was 
changing, rapid enough, at least, that you wanted to establish a watch 
office ? 

Admiral Beardall. Correct, yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct ? 

Admiral Beardall. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And that these messages were so important at 
that time that they w^ere to be delivered at once to the President instead 
of having to wait until Admiral Beardall was found, there would be 
someone on duty, either Schulz or Cnrson, to deliver these messages; 
is that a correct statement? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5281 

Admiral Beardaix. That is a correct statement; and to keep them 
secure. 

[14028] Senator Ferguson. At that time, let's say the 5th, be- 
fore you established the watch office, what were your hours at the 
White House, or on duty ? 

Admiral Beardall. My hours at the White House, I would probably 
go there in the morning and in the afternoon, unless the President had 
some other instructions for me, and I would spend the balance of the 
day in my office at the Navy Department. 

Senator Ferguson. What were your office hours in the Navy De- 
partment and at the Wliite House both ? 

Admiral Beardall. Well, I should say from 9 : 30, from 9 in the 
morning until probably 5 : 30, and sometimes 6. 

Senator Ferguson. About 9 or 9 : 30 to 5 : 30 or 6 were your regular 
hours ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. When did you establish longer hours for the 
delivery of these messages either through you or these two assistants? 

Admiral Beardall. I don't understand the question, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Schulz goes on night duty at least on Saturday. 
Had you established this watch for longer hours than daylight hours 
that 3^ou have given us, from 9 to 6 ? 

Admiral Beardall. No, not regularly. As I recollect. Immedi- 
ately after Pearl Harbor we set up 

[14-029] Senator Ferguson. I just want before Pearl Harbor. 

Admiral Beardall. Before 

Senator Ferguson. You don't recall. So this would be the first 
night duty? 

Admiral Beardall. First night duty that I can recollect. 

Senator Ferguson. Or first special duty ; is that correct ? 

Admiral Beardall. First special duty, yes; to the best of my 
recollection. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you working Sundays prior to Pearl 
Harbor ? 

Admiral Beardall. No, not necessarily, because I was perhaps the 
only aide, or secretary, around the White House on Sunday morning. 

Senator Ferguson. I mean, previous. For instance, on the 1st. 
Did you work Sunday? 

Admiral Beardall. I don't recall. 

Senator Ferguson. Had you worked previous to the 7th ? 

Admiral Bi^ardall. On Sunday? 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Adrniral Beardall. If I had something to do, I had some special 
duty, if I had been directed by the President, I may have gone to 
the White House or Navy Department on that Sunday depending 
on what was going on. 

Senator Ferguson. Prior to the 7th had you ever remained 
[I4OSO] on duty Sunday to deliver any messages ? 

Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of doing that. 

Senator Ferguson. So, the first time on a Sunday that you were 
on dut}^ to deliver messages was the 7th ; is that correct? 

Admiral Beardall. That is a correct statement, sir, to the best of 
my recollection. 

79716— 46— pt. 11 10 



5282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, when did you first receive instruc- 
tions to appear for duty on Sunday the 7th? 

Admiral Beardall. I received no instructions. 

Senator Ferguson. You never received instructions to go on duty 
on the 7th ? 

Admiral Beardall. No. 

Senator Ferguson. From no one? 

Admiral Beardall. No one that I know of. 

Senator Ferguson. How does it come that you got on duty on 
the 7th? 

Admiral Beardall. Well, my own initiative. 

Senator Ferguson. Why, what caused you to — well, you being the 
only man in the department, I was going to say, instruct yourself 
to be on duty — but you being the only one in that department, and 
being the superior officer, how does it come that you went on duty 
that morning? 

Admiral Beardall. Well, my recollection is because I had perused 
those 13 parts that evening at Captain Wilkinson's [14^031'] and 
there must have been some indication there was another part coming 
to be delivered, which might have occasioned me, through a sense of 
duty, to look into it. 

Senator Ferguson. I take it then the reading of the 13 parts caused 
you to believe there would be another part come in and therefore you 
went to duty and were on duty Sunday morning ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you go to the White House ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. What time did you arrive at the White House? 

Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection I would say 
about 9 : 30. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you see the President before you received 
any messages? 

Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of that, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. No recollection of that? 

Admiral Beardall. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Then when did you first know that another part 
had come in, and that you were going to receive one for the President? 

Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of receiving any word 
that another one was coming in. 

[l^OS^I Senator Ferguson. Did anyone deliver a message to 
you, magic, on Sunday morning, to be delivered to the*President? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir ; they must have, else I wouldn't have 
had it. 

Senator Ferguson. Where were you when it was delivered to you ? 

Admiral Beardall. I think either in the little mail room or in the 
office upstairs, in the military aide's room. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, not to repeat, but you have given us the 
hour, about 10 o'clock, and you haven't any reason to state that it was 
before that, because if you got there about 9 : 30 it would be about 
10 o'clock; is that correct? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And it would come, I take it, in the same ponch. 
Did you read it before you took it to the President? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMriTEE 5288 

Admiral Beardall. I do not recollect that clearly, whether I did 
or not. I might have or might not. 

Senator Ferguson. Don't you think that the fourteenth part of this 
message would be rather vivid in your memory if you had read it 
before you took it into the President? 
Admiral Beardall. I think it would ; yes. 

Senator Ferguson. For that reason it would seem that you hadn't 
read it. You think you hadn't read it ? 

[14'0-33] Admiral Beardall. I don't know. I may or may not 
have read it. 

Senator Ferguson. Was there any message beside that fourteenth 
part that came to your attention or to your knowledge that morning? 

Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of any. 

Senator Ferguson. You have no recollection of any other message, 
whether it was the 1 o'clock message, or a message that indicated no 
one was to typewrite the message except' the Ambassador himself? 

Admiral Beardall. Correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. So you have no recollection; that doesn't re- 
fresh your memory? 

Admiral Beardall. Not a bit, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When you took this to the President, in what 
room was the President? 

Admiral Beardall. In his bedroom. 

Senator Ferguson. He was in his bedroom ; is that correct ? 

Admiral Beardall. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, prior to the reading of it by the Presi- 
dent, did you have a conversation or did he say anything? 

Admiral Beardaltv. I don't recollect him saying anything except 
"Good morning." 

[14^034] Senator Ferguson. Then did he sit and read whatever 
was in that pouch that morning? 

Admiral Beardall. He did. 

Senator Ferguson. And you remained there while he read it? 

Admiral Beardall. I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Then what would you say he said after, giving 
us the exact words or the substance. 

Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection the substance 
of his words were : "It looks like the Japanese are going to break off 
negotiations." 

Senator Ferguson. That is the substance of what he said? 

Admiral Beardall. That is the substance. 

Senator Ferguson. He handed back whatever was in the file and 
whatever he had read ; is that correct ? 

Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection. 

Senator Ferguson. No other delivery to your knowledge was de- 
livered to him that morning ? 

Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, what did you do with that pouch and 
where did you go for the rest of the day up to the time of the attack? 

Admiral Beardall. The best of my recollection 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. 

Admiral Beardall. I took the pouch back to the Navy [14035] 
Department. 



5284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. And remained at the Navy Department? 

Admiral Beardall. I remained there until lunch time. 

Senator Ferguson. Then went home and were having lunch when 
the attack came? 

Admiral Beardall. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any other conversations you 
had, for a week, with the President, other than the one that you state, 
in relation to the Far East? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes ; I recollect one very clearly. 

Senator Ferguson. When was that? 

Admiral Beardall. That was about the 4th or 5th, in connection 
with the delivery of the magic. I took the liberty of inviting special 
attention as significant the message about the burning of codes. 

Senator Ferguson. Then you had a conversation with the Presi- 
dent about the burning of codes ; is that correct? 

Admiral Beardall. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us as near as you can, in substance 
if you can't give us the exact words, what that conversation was by 
you and by the President ? 

Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection the conversation 
was, I said, "Mr. President, this is a very significant dispatch," which 
he read very carefully, and he said [I4OS6'] "Well, when do 
you think it will happen?" I said, "Most any time." That was the 
gist of the conversation. 

[I4O37] Senator Ferguson. What did the President say, did he 
>give you any time when he said, "When do you think it will happen," 
and you said, "Most any time," did he reply as to what his opinion was? 

Admiral Beardall. Not at all. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you recall any other conversations 
with him about the Far East? 

Admiral Beardall. None. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, of course, you knew what he meant when 
he asked you when it would happen? 

Admiral Beardall. Well, I can't state what was on the President's 
mind, but I understood him to mean 

Senator Ferguson. What did you understand, from what had taken 
place ? 

Admiral Beardall. I understood him to mean. When is war going 
to break out, when we are going to be attacked, or something. 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. That is why you said that "almost any 
time," is that correct? 

Admiral Beardall. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Because from your knowledge it indicated that 
war could be at any moment, an attack could be at any minute. Is 
that correct? 

Admiral Beardall. That is correct. 

[14038] Senator Ferguson. Admiral, when did you come to that 
conclusion, when did you come to the conclusion that war was immedi- 
ately imminent? 

Admiral Beardall. I can't exactly say when I came to that con- 
clusion that it was immediately imminent, but I will say that that 
message of burning codes influenced me very much, that we were get- 
ting through with these diplomatic negotiations, and there was going 
to be war. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5285 

Senator Ferguson. You are a graduate of Annapolis? 

Admiral Beardall. I am, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Your career is that of a Navy man? 

Admiral Beardall. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Therefore you had a right to apprise what was 
going on, to determine whether or not there would be war. I want 
the record. I want the record merely to show your experience, so that 
we may value your opinion. 

That is correct. 

Admiral Beardall. That is correct, that I am a graduate of Annap- 
olis, and a naval officer. 

Senator Ferguson. And you have been a naval officer all your life? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson, Have had a great amount of experience in the 
Navy. 
^ [liOS9] (No response.) 

Senator Ferguson. You came to the conclusion that, by reading 
these codes, then, that war was imminent, and you replied to the Pres- 
ident "almost any time"? 

Admiral Beardall. Correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall, Admiral, any other conversa- 
tions ? 

Admiral Beardall. Those are the only ones. 

Senator Ferguson. With the President, about the Far East? 

Admiral Beardall. Those are the only ones I recall. 

Senator Ferguson. You can't recall any prior to that now ? 

Admiral Beardall. No, no ; he never discussed it with me. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any with Harry Hopkins? 

Admiral Beardall. None. 

Senator Ferguson. About tlie Far East ? 

Admiral Beardall. None. 
. Senator Ferguson. I notice in Commander Schulz's testimony, lie 
said, on page 12451 : 

The first time I was ever in the White House was on the 5th of December. 

That would refresh your memory as to when you put the 
[imO] watch on? 

Admiral Beardall. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you, on the morning, on Sunday morn- 
ing, while over in the watch room, have a conversation with these 
other men who were in that room, as indicated by this Watch Log, any 
conversation about the Far East ? 

Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of any conversation with 
them. I may have had in regard to the situation, but I have no 
recollection of it. 

Senator Ferguson. Could I see that memorandum. Was it the 
usual situation for Sunday morning to have eight or ten officers 
sitting in the watch office, or were they in the watch office, in the Navy 
Department ? 

Admiral Beardall. Well, about that time — it previously hadn't 
been. I would say it was an unusual situation to have that many 
coming in and going, so far as I can recollect. 

Senator Ferguson. You say that would be unusual ? 



5286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Beardall. I think so. I don't know — ^I mean that is just 
my opinion. 

Senator Ferguson. At least that is the first time you knew of any 
such experience? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Now, would you say that you had been back to 
the Navy Department after the delivery of this ' \^^0I|.1^^ mes- 
sage so that you would be in the watch office in a position to deliver 
any further messages to the President ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes ; I should say that, along with other rea- 
sons for going back, to see what was going on, and a natural interest 
in the situation. 

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, this was a very, very tense moment, 
not only in your life but in the country's life, and you realized it, as a 
Navy officer, did you not, that morning? 

Admiral Beardall. I think that is a correct statement, yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Therefore you were waiting in this office witR 
other Navy men ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes. Well, I — yes. I wasn't waiting in this 
office. 

Senator Ferguson. No ; I don't want to indicate that you were wast- 
ing any time, or loafing, or anything like that, but you were on duty 
there with the other Navy men ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir; but I could have come and gone, I 
had no special instructions. 

Senator Ferguson. I understand that. 

There was a Captain Schuirman, Captain Wilkinson, Captain Met- 
calfe. I think that is all the captains. You were a captain at that 
time, is that correct ? 

Admiral Beardall. That is correct. 

[14^4^] Senator Ferguson. And you can't recall any conver- 
sation among these men who were in this office No. 2601 at about 11 : 45 
that morning ? 

Admiral Beardall. I can't recall any specific conversation with 
them. 

Senator Ferguson. Did they indicate that they were waiting for 
something to happen ? 

Admiral Beardall. I don't know that they indicated they were 
waiting for something to happen, but they were interested in the 
situation before us. 

Senator Ferguson. They were there because of the very tense 
situation ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Just as you were there ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you see Admiral Stark ? 

Admiral Beardall. 1 did. 

Senator Ferguson. On Sunday morning? 

Admiral Beardall. I did. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you in his office? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conversation with him? 

Admiral Beardall. No direct conversation. I listened \_lJfij!f3^ 
into what might be going on and sat in a while. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5287 

Senator Ferguson. What time, did you first get to the Navy Depart- 
ment on Sunday morning? 

Admiral Beardall. To the best of my recollection, I should say it 
was, around 11 or 11: 15. 

Senator Ferguson. What time would you say you went into Admiral 
Stark's office? 

Admiral Beardall. I think about 11 or 11 : 30. I am not certain 
of the time there. 

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us, to the best of your knowledge, 
if you can't remember the exact language, the substance of the con- 
versation that took place in Admiral Stark's office ? 

Admiral Beardall. I have one recollection. 

Senator Ferguson. I would like to have that. 

Admiral Beardall. That the phone rang from General Marshall's 
office and something was said about "include the Navy" in this message, 
or that message — is o. k. Some conversation to that effect. That is 
the best of my recollection. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, first, you would get that from Ad- 
miral Stark? 

Admiral Beardall. Well, yes; I got that on the phone. I don't 
know what was coming in. 

[i^<9^4] Senator Ferguson. From what he said, you took it, it 
would be all right to include the Navy ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir ; or words to that effect. 

Senator Ferguson. Was anything.said about the kind of a message ? 

Admiral Beardall. No, sir ; not to my recollection. 

Senator Ferguson. Who would you say was in Admiral Stark's 
office during the time that this phone call came in ? 

Admiral Beardall. Well, I can't recollect who was in there then. 
There were some officers coming and going. There may have been 
Admiral Ingersoll. He was in the office next door. May have been 
Captain Wilkinson. I can't recall now just who did come and go dur- 
ing the time I was there. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you recall what would take you into Admiral 
Stark's office, he being the Chief in charge, did you go in to discuss 
anything with him, or just drop in ? 

Admiral Beardall. No ; I often went in his office. 

Senator Ferguson. Because of your rank, you had free access to 
the Admiral's office? 

Admiral Beardall. Correct, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You weren't called in for consultation? 

Admiral Beardall. I was not, sir. 

[1404^] Senator Ferguson. You don't recall any conference that 
you had with the Admiral about the situation as it stood? 

Admiral Beardall. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you get anything from that conversa- 
tion that the Admiral had with General Marshall, that things were 
very serious? 

Admiral Beardall. No; I gleaned that they were sending some 
message to the fleet, sending some message out. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that Ambassador Hu Shih of 
China had called on the President on Sunday morning? 

Admiral Beardall. I did not, sir. 



5288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. You had no knowledge of that ? I assume, then, 
that you had no knowledge of anyone calling on the President Sun- 
day morning? 

Admiral Beardall, No one. 

Senator Ferguson. You can't give us any information on this con- 
versation, any more of this conversation in Admiral Stark's office, 
than you have? 

Admiral Beardall. That is all I can recollect. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy. 

Mr, Murphy. Admiral Beardall, as I understand it, you did not 
have other naval officers at the White House until [^lJf.0J}.6~\ 2 
days before Pearl Harbor. That would be December 5, 1941 ? 

x^dmiral Beardall. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. So that the only occasion you ever had before Decem- 
ber 6 to assign anyone to remain after 5 : 30 was 1 day, that would 
be the evening of December 5 ? 

Admiral Beardall. That is correct. 

Mr. Murphy. Before that, do you know whether or not it was true 
that Captain Kramer sometimes in the evening delivered messages to 
the White House? 

Admiral Beardall. I do; I heard it. 

Mr. Murphy. In other words, he himself, without the necessity of 
having an officer take it from him and deliver it to the President, had 
delivered it personally? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. To the President, himself? 

Admiral Beardall. I think often to the President himself, from 
what I have learned, and sometimes, if I wasn't there, to General 
Watson, too. 

Mr. Murphy. There was a reference made that this was unusual. 
The only time before December 6 you had done it was December 5, 
because you had no assistant up until then? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. On the morning of December 7, you went to 
\_lJfOI(.7'\ the President with this particular message, and you would 
state that he said, "It looks as though they are breaking off negotia- 
tions." You had observed the President on many previous occasions, 
had you not ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. In your judgment was there anything in his manner 
which would indicate to you that he was expecting an attack within a 
period of hours? 

Admiral Beardsall. There was not, sir. 

Mr. Murphy. Will you state for the record why you come to that 
conclusion ? 

Admiral Beardall. Well, there was no alarm, or no mention of 
this, mention of war, or of any actions on his part that would indicate 
that he was expecting an attack. 

Mr. Murphy. Did he say anything at all to you, as his naval aide, 
at that time, that would indicate to you that he, the President, felt 
that war was a matter of hours ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5289 

Admiral Beardall. Nothing at all. 

Mr. Murphy. Now, there was before us as a witness, Commander 
Schulz. Did anyone make any attempt to inquire from you as to 
who was your assistant on duty at the White House on December 6, 
your aide, or whatever naval person was there on December 6, 1941 ? 
Do you understand my question ? 

Admiral Beardall. I don't quite follow it, sir. 

[l^O^S] Mr. Murphy. Strike that question. Did anyone ask 
you who was with you at the White House on December 6, 1941, by 
way of other Naval personnel ? 

Admiral Beardall. No ; to the best of my recollection. Commander 
Kramer, who handled this message, and who would be the one who 
would deliver anything that came in. 

Mr. Murphy. At any rate. Admiral, are you the one that submitted 
the name of Commander Schulz ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. , 

Mr. Murphy. As a witness for this committee ? 

Admiral Beardall. Correct. 

Mr. Murphy. Td whom did you give that name ? 

Admiral Beardall. To Lieutenant Commander Baecher here. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you have anything to do with Commander 
Schulz when he got to Washington ? 

Admiral Beardall. No. I haven't seen him. 

Mr. Murphy. Did you have anything to do with shielding that 
witness from this committee or its investigators ? 

Admiral Beardall. Nothing at all. 

Mr. Murphy. May I ask from Commander Baecher, there has been 
a national magazine article to the effect that steps were taken to shield 
Commander Schulz from the investigators and attorneys of the com- 
mittee and the members of the committee. Did the United States 
Navy do any such thing ? 

[1404^] Commander Baecher. No, sir; positively not. 

JNIr. Murphy. Who was it that brought Commander Schulz here? 

Commander Baecher. We did ; the Navy did. 

Mr. Murphy. On whose request? 

Commander Baecher. At the request of prior counsel. They en- 
quired, through me, of Admiral Beardall, who his assistants were. 

Mr. Murphy, Did you. Commander, attempt to conceal this wit- 
ness or keep him from any members of this committee, or the inves- 
tigators of the committee, prior to his going on the stand? 

Commander Baecher. Absolutely not. We wrote several memor- 
anda to counsel explaining where Commander Schulz was and the 
difficulties that might be involved in bringing him here and generally 
what he would testify to. And I interviewed him personally before 
he was brought to the committee room and I reported the substance of 
his testimony to Mr. Kichardson, to Senator Ferguson, and to Senator 
Lucas. 

[14050] Mr. Mutjphy. Did you attempt to conceal him from this 
committee over the lunch hour so that the committee couldn't talk to 
him or the committee investigators couldn't talk to him ? 

Commander Baecher. Absolutely not. 

Mr. Murphy. One other question. Admiral Beardall. Did you 
know about the war warning having gone out on November 27 ? 



5290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Beardall. No, sir. 

Mi-. Murphy. You did not know we had sent such warning to the 
theaters in the Pacific? 

Admiral Beardall. No, sir; I had no such knowledge. 

Mr. Murphy. That is all. 

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson. 

Senator Fer:^.uson. Admiral, you weren't in Washington for the 
last few months, were you? 

Admiral Beardall. No ; I have been away. 

Senator Ferguson. You have been in Panama? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. And Peru? 

Admiral Beardall. Panama and Peru. 

Senator Ferguson. Ho\y long have you been out of Washington? 

Admiral Beardall. Since last August. 

[J4051] Senator Ferguson. You are just returning to testify 
here and you are returning to Panama? 

Admiral Beardall. That is correct. 

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the Duty Officer Carson 
was on duty on Sunday? 

Admiral Beardall. 1 don't definitely. Senator. 

Senator P'erguson. You don't recall leaving anyone at the White 
House while you went to the Navy Department? 

Admiral Beardall. I have no recollection of it. 

Senator FERr.usoN. The record should show that Schulz was your 
Deputy Watch Officer at 'the White House, should it not? 

Admiral Beardall. AVhat record? 

Senator Ferguson. Well, the records of the Navy should have shown 
that his duty on Saturday was a deputy or assistant watch officer as 
aide to the President? 

Admiral Beardall. The knowledge would exist there but whether 
they had a record of it I couldn't be sure. 

Senator Ferguson. Wasn't it customary to assign the duty of a man ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, but Schulz was on temporary duty in the 
White House at that time. He was permanently attached to the Navy 
Department and I made a request on them to send an assistant over 
there, and whether they made a record of that I am not sure. 

[11^052] Senator Ferguson. When were you first consulted as to 
who received and delivered this message to the White House, this 
13-part on Saturday night? 

Admiral Beardall. When I came back here to see the former 
counsel. That was in November. Last November. 

Senator Ferguson. Were you in the city of Washington last 
November ? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. When in November? 

Admiral Beardali>. I arrived here about the 25th, somewhere 
around there. 

Senator Ferguson. Well, were you then asked as to whom was your 
associate or assistant at that time? 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. I spent a lot of time trying to find out 
who he was. 

Senator Ferguson. You had forgotten who he was ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5291 

Admiral Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. How did you find out who your assistant was? 

Admiral Beardall. Inquiring around with different people and 
trying to remember his name, and I finally struck somebody who re- 
membered what his name was, and I went to the Navy Department 
and Lieutenant Commander Baecher here, to find out where he was, 
and see if he was the right man. 

[14053] Senator Ferguson. Do you know why he wasn't brought 
here as a witness until about the Aveek of the 20th of February? 

Admiral Beardall. I haven't the slightest idea. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you locate him back in November? 

Admiral Beardall. I tliink we located him 

Commander Baecher, Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Let the Admiral answer. 

Admiral Beardall. I think he was located. 

Senator Ferguson. Did you talk with him? 

Admiral Beardall. No, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. You didn't talk with him? 

Admiral Beardall. No. 

Senator Ferguson. But you knew he was located. 

Admiral Beardall. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. That is all. 

The Vice Chairman. This room, 2601 you say, was the watch offi- 
cer's room in the Navy? 

Admiral Beardall. I think it was, sir. We can check that. I 
haven't any knowledge. 

The Vice Chairman. It wasn't your office? 

Admiral Beardall. It wasn't my office, no. 

The Vice Chairman. And all these officers whose names have been 
read here, they just came in and went out, passed through there? 

[14054] Admiral Beardall.. Exactly. I take it it wasn't a reg- 
ular office which anybody kept, except the watch officer, or some sort of 
a mail censor, or something of that sort. 

The Vice Chairman. The fact that all these names are listed would 
not indicate that they were all assembled there at any one time? 

Admiral Beardall. Not all all. 

The Vice Chairman. It would just indicate that they had passed 
through there sometime during the day? 

Admiral Beardall. Correct. 

The Vice Chairman. Thank you. Is there anything further? 
Does counsel have anything further? 

Mr. Richardson. No; nothing further from the witness. 

The Vice Chairman. Do you have anything further, Admiral, that 
you desire to give to the committee? 

Admiral Beardall. I can think of nothing, sir. 

The Vice Chairman. We thank you for your appearance and the in- 
formation that you have given us. You may be excused. 

(The witness was excused.) 

[I4055] Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that 
the members of the committee cannot attend for several days, if you 
could give us another half hour we could clear the record so as to help 
the printer out on the record. AVe need but one faithful committee 
member to remain with us while we put this material in. 



5292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice CiixVirman. Go ahead. 

Senator Ferguson. May I ask what it will be ? 

Mr. Richardson. This is a summation of requests heretofore made, 
and counsel is now prepared to present the matter. Mr. Morgan will 
present it. 

Mr. Morgan. Mr. Chairman, at pa^e 879 of the record Congressman 
Gearhart requested the log of the U. S. S. Helena. Commander 
Baecher has provided the log, which we would like to offer as Exhibit 
No. 163. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be received. 

(The log referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 163.") 

Mr. Morgan. At pages 8342 and 8346 Congressman Murphy re- 
quested reports supplied by General Short with respect to the attack 
on Oahu. These reports were shown to Mr. Murphy and we have them 
compiled and will offer them as Exhibit No. 164. 

The Vice Chairman. They will be so received. 

(The reports referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 164.") 

Mr. Morgan. We have a communication from the Army liaison 
[lJi.056'] office dated April 10, 1946 reading as follows : 

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson : 

In response to Congressman Murphy's inquiry at page 4532 of the committee 
transcript, there is enclosed a copy of a partial translation of a document relating 
to a 23 February 1941 conference between German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop 
and Japanese Ambassador Oshima. The partial translation was obtained from 
the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis 
Criminality. 

This document was distributed among the members of the committee. 
We would like to offer it as Exhibit No. 165. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be so received. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 165.") 

Mr. Morgan. Some time ago there was distributed to the members 
of the committee a copy of the dispatch from Ambassador Winant to 
the State Department dated November 2, 1941. Instead of offering this 
as an exhibit we would like to have it spread on the record. 

The Vice Chairman. The document referred to will be spread on 
the record. 

(The matter referred to follows:) 

[i^057] TEM This telegram must be London 

closely paraphrased before being com- Dated November 2, 1941. 

municated to anyone. (SC) Ree'd 7:36 a. m. 

Secbetaby of State, 

Washington. 
TRIPLE PRIORITY 
5213, November 2, noon. 

PERSONAL AND SECRET TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMER 
NAVAL PERSON 

As your Naval people have already been informed, we are sending that big 
ship you inspected into the Indian Ocean as part of the squadron we are forming 
there. This ought to serve as a deterrent on .Tapan. There is nothing like having 
something that can catch and kill anything. I am very glad we can spare her 
at this juncture as it is more than we thought we could do some time ago. The 
tirmer your attitude and ours, the less chance of their taking the plunge. 

I am grieved at the loss of life you have suffered with Reuhen James. I 
salute the land of unending challenge ! 

Winant. 
ALC 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5293 

114058] Mr. Morgan. Pursuant to the request of Senator Lucas 
at pages 154-5 of the record, we have a comunication, dated Novem- 
ber 30, 1945, from Commander Baecher, the Navy liaison officer con- 
cerning : 

Subject : Time of receipt of the message from the U. S. S. Ward, by Admiral 
Bloch and Admiral Kimmel. 

We would like to have this communication plus the enclosure spread 
on the record at this point. 

The Vice Chairman. The communication and the enclosure will 
be spread on the record at this point. 

(The matter referred to follows :) 

[I4O59] Depaktment of the Navy, 

Office of the Secbetaby, 
Washington, 30 November 1945. 
Memorandum to : Mr. William D. Mitchell. 

Subject : Time of receipt of the message from the U. S. S. WARD, by Admiral 
Bloch and Admiral Kimmel. 

1. Pursuant to your request there is enclosed a report indicating tht time the 
message, from the U. S. S. WARD, was received by Admiral Bloch and Admiral 
Kimmel. 

/s/ John Ford Baecher 
Lt. Comdr. USNR 
Acknowledge receipt of the above enclosure. 



Time of Receipt of Wakd's Message by Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel 

RECEIPT BY admiral BLOCH 

Robert's Report page 1727: 

The dispatch from the WARD was received by Lt. Comdr. Kaminski, the watch 
officer for the 14th Naval District, at 0712. 
Robert's Report page 17^7 

Captain John B. Earle, Chief of Staff of the 14th Naval District, states that 
he received this message from Lt. Comdr. Kaminski at OTIO or 0712, and that 
he immediately [14060] called Admiral Bloch, Commandant, 14th Naval 
District. 
Murfln Court Vol. 2, page 4OI. 

Admiral Bloch states that he was Informed of the WARD'S message at about 
0715 by Captain Earle. They discussed the possibility of this report being an- 
other false contact, and before the matter had been clarified, the air attack had 
begun. 

RECEIPT BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL 

Robert's Report Page 1727: 

Lt. Cdr. Kaminski, the watch officer for the 14th Naval District, states that he 
phoned the message to CincPac's duty officer a minute or two after receiving it 
at 0712. 
Murfin Court Vol. 2, pages S32-S: 

Admiral Kimmel (CiucPac) states that on receiving the message from his 
duty officer between 0730 and 0740, he presumed that this report was another 
false contact, and while waiting for amplification of it, the bombing attack 
started. 
Roberts Report Page 1544: 

At 0800, CincPac sent a message to all ships and stations, stating : "Air Raid 
on Pearl Harbor. This is not a drill." 

Mr. Morgan. At page 185 of the record, Senator Ferguson inquired 
as to why the B-lts which were sent to Hawaii shortly before the 
attack were unarmed. We have a communication from the Army liai- 
son officer, dated 2 April 1946, in this regard, which we would like to 
have spread on the record at this point. 



5294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record. 
(Tlie communication referred to follows:) 

m062] War Department, 

Washington, Room 4D757, The Pentagon, 2 April 1946. 

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson: 

At page 185 of the Committee transcript, Senator Ferguson asked why the 
B-17s which arrived at Oahu from the west coast on the morning of 7 December 
1U41 were witliout ammunition. Testuuony on this subject by General Marshall 
will be found in the Committee transcript at p. 2iJU0 and in the Army Fearl 
Harbor B(»ard top secret transcript at pages 20-21, and by General Arnold in 
he Army Boards secret transcript at page 1(JS. 

/s/ Gael R. Nelson, 

Capt., AVS. 

[14063] Mr. Morgan. Pursuant to a request made by Senator 
Ferguson at pages 200-201 of the transcript for all drafts and notes 
in connection with Admiral Inglis' statement of the attack, we now 
have a communication from the Navy Department dated January 25, 
1946 which we would like to have spread on the record. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record. 

(The communication referred to follows:) 

[I4O64] Department of the Navy, 

Office of the Secretary, 
Washington, 25 January 1946. 

Memorandum 

To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson. 

1. Reference is made to the request of Senator Ferguson (transcript pages 
200-2U1) that all drafts and notes in connection with Admiral Inglis' statement 
of attack be furnished the Committee. All of the material involved was destroyed 
as, in the course of work, it was superseded by more finished drafts, and when 
the tiual draft was completed on 24 November, ail pre\ious material was destroyed. 

/s/ John Ford Baecheu 

Lt. Comdr., USNR. 

[14005] Mr. Morgan. Pursuant to a request made by Mr. Gear- 
hart at page 276 of the record with respect to a search of the Navy 
Department files concerning any instructions relative to maintenance 
of radio silence in effect in the Atlantic and Pacific fleets at the time 
of Pearl Harbor, we have a detailed memorandum from Commander 
Baecher in this regard, dated February 19, 1946, which we ask be 
spread on the record. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record at this point. 

(The detailed memorandum referred to follows:) 

[14O6G] 1083A 
R#i2y 

Department of the Navy. 

Office of the Secretary, 
Washington, 19 February 1946. 
Memorandum 
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson 

1. Pursuant to committee request, a search has been made to determine the 
conditions of radio silence in efiect in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets at the time 
of Pearl Harbor. 

a. ATLANTIC FLEET 

In accordance with a directive issued by the CinC, Atlantic Fleet [CINCLANT 
Op-Plan No. 7-41, dated 1 September l'J41, tilo A4-3(4)/((X)164) ] and under 
whicii the fleet began to operate about 1 October 1941, radio communication was 
prohibited except that which was authoriaed by the following portion of the 
directive : 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5295 

(1) *'To forward contact and important amplifying reports which it is imprac- 
ticable to transmit by visual methods." 

(2) "All traffic pertaining to operations in progress for which plans are 
being made, may be transmitted by radio if trans- [IJfOGl] mission by 
visual metliods or mail are considered impracticable." 

(3) "Information considered vital to the accomplishment of the task and of a 
greater importance than the preservation of communication security may be 
transmitted by radio to units not within visual communication." 

B. PACIFIC FLEET 

In accordance with CinCPac directives to individual Task Forces (for example, 
CinCPac dispatch 280447 of November 1941 to Task Forces TWO and EIGHT), 
the fleet was operating under Radio Condition 19 which prohibited radio com- 
munication except that which was authorized by the following: 

(1) "To forward traffic vital to the accomplishment of an assigned task when 
no other means of transmission would suffice." 

(2) "To make the limited transmissions necessary for a parent vessel to 
recover lost planes." 

/s/ John Ford Raecher 

Lt. Cnidr., USNB 

[14068] 1083A 
R120 

Depaetment of the Navy, 

Office of the Seciuit.^by, 
Washington, 2 April 1946. 
Memorandum 
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson 

1. By memorandum of 19 February 1946 (10S3A R#120) information was for- 
warded you by the undersigned in respect of the conditions of radio activity and 
silence in effect in the Atlnntic and Pacific Fleets, including that the Atlantic 
Fleet was operating under Op-Plan 7-41. In amplification of tlie information in 
that memorandum, it is desired to further advise you that Op-Plan 7-41 was 
placed in effect in the Atlantic Fleet at 1200 hours dated 10 D.^cemher 1941. 

/S/ .TOHN FORn B.^ECHER 

Lieutenant Commander, USNR 

[1406.9] Mr. Morgan. At page 299 and again at 780-2 of the 
transcript, Congressman Gearliart requested records relating to the 
transfer of ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic, or vice versa, from 
May to December 1941. This material was rather extensive and de- 
tailed, and for purposes of the record we would like to indicate that 
it was delivered to Congressman Gearhart on April 10. with the request 
that he advise as to what portions, if any, he desired incorporated in 
the record. 

Senator Ferguson. May I request the Chair that the aide to the 
military, the Army, furnish us with all logs kept in the Secretary's or 
Chief of StaflF's office for the month of November and the first 7 days 
up until the 7th of December. 

Mr. Masten. What kind of logs? 

S'^nator Ferguson. Any logs like we have seen here today. 

Mr. Masten. Telephone operators? 

Senator Ferguson. Duty-officer logs and watch-officer logs. And I 
would like to have the Navy produce their loss for the same period. 

The Vice Chairman. The liaison, officers will take note of the re- 
quests.^ Proceed. 

Mr. Morgan. At page 7844 of the record. Congressman Murphy re- 
quested a copy of the order which stopped the formation of \lli070'] 
the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces after they had set up a command. 

^ See War Department communication on p. 5506, infra. 



5296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

This information has been supplied by the Navy. For purposes of 
the record we would like to indicate that it was presented to Mr. Murphy 
on April 10, 1946, with the request that he indicate what portions he 
desired incorporated in the transcript. 

At page 7940, Senator Ferguson requested identifying data con- 
cerning a message dated November 29, 1941, from the Adjutant Gen- 
eral to Commanding General, Hawaii, which was read into the record 
at pages 7937-7938. This has been supplied in a communication dated 
January 22, 1946, from the Army liaison officer, Lt. Col. Harmon 
Duncombe, which we ask be spread on the record. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record. 

(The communication referred to follows:) 

[I4071] Wae Depaetment, 

WasMngton, 22 January 1946. 
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson : 

The Office of the Adjutant General has supplied the following information 
concerning radio message No. 489, dated 29, November 1941, from the Adjutant 
General to the Commanding Genei'al, Hawaii : 

a. "AG 381 (11-29-41) MC-E" in the upper right corner is the file notation 
for the message. "AG 381" is the designation for "Far Eastern Situation"; 
"(11-29-41)" is the date of the memorandum directing the preparation of the 
cable. "MC" shows that the cable was prepared in the Miscellaneous Division, 
Confidential Section of the Office of the Adjutant General. "E" indicates that 
the memorandum directing the preparation of the cable was issued by the War 
Plans Division. 

b. "EHB/cdm — 1712" shows that Elmer H. Boughton in the Miscellaneous 
Division, Secret and Confidential Section of the Adjutant General's Office was 
in charge of the physical preparation of the cable, that it was typed by Corrine 
D. Moss, and that the work was done in Room 1712 Munitions Building. 

c. The signature is that of Colonel A. P. [1^0721 Sullivan, who at the 
time of the preparation of the cable was in charge of the Operations Branch, 
Adjutant General's Office. 

d. The handwritten notation "No. 489" is the number assigned to the message 
by the War Department Message Center. 

e. "BASED ON: WPD 4571-5, 11/29/41" in the lower left shows that the 
cable was prepared from a War Plans Division memorandum having the file 
number WPD 4571-5, of 29 November 1941. 

f. The stamp "47 AGO DEC 8 1941 Received" in the lower right shows that 
this copy of the cable was received on 8 December 1941, by Classifier No. 47, in 
the mail room of the Office of the Adjutant General. 

g. "File Dec 23 1941 BJS" in the lower right corner shows that the cable was 
received in the classified files of the Office of the Adjutant General on 23 Decem- 
ber 1941 ; the initials are those of Betty J. Sherbourne. 

h. "Green cy w/d & destroyed by burning, 12/30/41, CDM— 1705" in the 
lower left shows that the green-paper duplicate copy of this cable retained by 
the Miscellaneous Division, Secret and Confidential Section of the Office of the 
Adjutant General was withdrawn and destroyed by burning on 30 December 
1941. [IJ1O73] "CDM" are the initials of Corrine D. Moss, Room 1705 
Munitions Building. 

i. "Ro 1-6-42" in the lower left corner shows that this cable was indexed on 

6 January 1942 by Rose Coccaro. 

Harmon Duncombe, 

Lt. Colonel, OSC. 

[14-074] Mr. Morgan. Pursuant to a request made by Senator 
Ferguson at page 8531 of the transcript for information on the num- 
ber of priority dispatches sent to Hawaii by the War Department on 

7 December 1941, we have a communication, with enclosures from the 
War Department, dated 27 February 1946, We request that the letter 
of transmittal and enclosures be spread on the record at this point. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5297 

The Vice Chairman : The material will be so spread on the record. 
(The material referred to follows:) 

[14075] WAR DEPARTMENT, 

Washington, Room 4D757, The Pentagon, 27 February 19Jf6. 
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson : 

In response to your 31 January memorandum forwarding Senator Ferguson's 
request for information on tlie number of priority dispatches sent to Hawaii by 
the War Department on 7 December 1941, and to Senator Ferguson's further 
inquiry (Tr. 8530-1) as to what priority messages were decoded in Hawaii before 
the 7 December Marshall warning, the following information is submitted : 

a. In a search of the War Department records, file copies have been found of 
four radios to Hawaii, each marked "priority" and bearing the notation "Sent 
12/7". Three (Nos. 524, 525 and 527) are dated 6 December; the fourth. No. 530, 
is dated the 7th. 

&. No. 529, the Marshall warning, which was sent over commercial facilities, 
carried in its heading the notation "U. S. Govt", entitling it to priority in trans- 
mission in accordance with Western Union and RCA tariffs then in effect (In- 
closure No. 1). Testimony concerning additional measures taken to expedite 
transmission of No. 529 appears at page 195 [,lJi07G] of the Army Pearl 
Harbor Board transcript and page 1843 of the Roberts Commission transcript. 

c. No. 529 was received by RCA Honolulu at 7:33 a. m., delivered to the 
Signal Office, Fort Shafter, about 11 : 45 a. m., and decoded at 2 : 41 p. m. No 
records are available showing when the four messages mentioned in paragraph a 
were received and decoded in Hawaii. A delivery book of the Headquarters Ha- 
waiian Department shows that the three, dated 6 December, were delivered 
(presumably after decoding) as follows: No. 524 at 7:25 p. m. on 6 December; 
No. 525 at 5 : 14 p. m. on 7 December, and No. 527 at 9 : 25 a. m. on 8 December, 
all Hawaiian time. The delivery book shows that No. 530 of the 7th was delivered 
at "1002A", probably on the 7th (messages entered in the delivery book im- 
mediately before and after No. 530 have "32-7-41" in the "date delivered" column ; 
the date space for No. 530 contains initials rather than a date). If delivered at 
10 : 02 a. m. on 7 December, No. 530 must have been decoded before the Marshall 
warning was decoded. It will be noted, however, that No. 530 could not have 
been decoded before the attack, since, according to the time stamp on the back 
of the War Department copy, No. 530 did not leave the War Department until 
sometime after 2 : 14 p. m. Washington time (S : 44 a. m. Hawaiian time) . 

/s/ Haemon DUNCX)MBE, 
2 incls. Lt. Colonel, GSG. 

[14077] Signal Coeps, United States Akmy 

Received at 

DI 56 74/73 US GOVT 

DI WASHN DC DEC 7 1941 1201 PM 

CG 

Hawaiian Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H. 
529 Seventh 

( Note. — Text omitted. ) Marshall. 

1217 PM 



[14078] Signal Corps, United States Army 

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in code 

secret 

1549WS WASHINGTON DC 74/73 RCA USG ETAT^ 7 1218P 
CG 

Hawaiian Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H. 
529 7th JAPANESE ARE PRESENTING AT ONE PM EASTERN STANDARD 
TIME TODAY WHAT AMOUNTS TO AN ULTIMATUM ALSO THEY ARE 
UNDER ORDERS TO DESTROY THEIR CODE MACHINE IMMEDIATELY 
79716— 46— pt. 11 11 



5298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

STOP JUST WHAT SIGNIFICANCE THE HOUR SET MAY HAVE WE DO 
NOT KNOW BUT BE ON ALERT ACCORDINGLY STOP INFORM NAVAL 
AUTHORITIES OF THIS COMMUNICATION. 

Mabshaix. 
j SECRET "j 

Received as a | RESTmCTED^ [communication 

[ Strilce out two J 
Answer should be marked "Answer to Code Message No. 529 7IH" 
Decoded by : 

Lt. J. H. Babcock, 

251P Dec. 7, 1941. 

[I.'f079] The Western Union Telegraph Compant 

Takiff Book No. 73—1941 

LONGRAMS are telegrams accepted at rates lower than telegram or serial 
rates as a deferred service subordinated to telegrams and serials in transmission 
and delivery. These messages are identified by the symbol "LG". The service 
is available between points in the United States only. 

The rate for a LONGRAM of 100 words or less between points at which are 
located Western Union offices or agencies is twice the rate for a ten word telegram 
between the same points and an additional charge for each group of five words or 
less in excess of 100 words as indicated in the following table: 



Where the 


full 


A LONORAM of 


Each addi- 


telegram i 


rate 


100 words or 


tional 5 words 


for 10 words is 


less costs 1 


or less cost 


.20 




.40 


.02 


.25 




.50 


.02 


.30 




.60 


.03 


.32 




.64 


.03 


.36 




.72 


.03 


.37 




.74 


.03 


.40 




.80 


.04 


.42 




.84 


.04 


.48 




.96 


.04 


.60 




1.20 


.05 


.72 




1.44 


.06 


.90 




1.80 


.08 


1.20 




2.40 


.10 


)f 60 words 


or less take the lower day-letter rates. 


United States Government Messages 






DEFINITION. 





1. United States Government messages are those sent by duly accredited repre- 
sentatives of the Federal Government (this includes U. S. Senators and Congress- 
men) on official business of the Federal Government or its various bureaus and 
agencies and paid for out of Federal Government funds. 

2. Such messages are identified by the symbol "GOVT." The messages of the 
U. S. Weather Bureau, while actually government messages, are classed sepa- 
rately as weather messages and are identified by the symbol "WEA." 

CLASSES OF SERVICE. 

3. Any of the following classes of service may be used for government mes- 
sages : 

Telegram 

Day Letter 

Overnight Telegram 

Serial 

Timed Wire Service 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5299 

ACCfEPTANCE OF MESSAGES. 

4. Government messages have priority in transmission and delivery over all 
other messages of the same class of service. 

5. All messages offered for transmission at government rates must be endorsed 
"Official Business" by the sendei". The endorsement shall also include the sender's 
name and title and the name of the department, bureau, agency, etc. with which 
he is connected. Such messages not so identified will be charged for at commer- 
cial I'ates. 

6. Messages offered by telephone for transmission at government rates will be 
accepted without prepayment of tolls if telephoned from a subscriber's telephone, 
but will not be accepted without prepayment of tolls from public telephone 
stations. The sender of such a message will be required to furnish his full name, 
title, and the name of the department, bureau or agency with which he is con- 
nected and to state that the message is on official government business. 

7. Messages of United States Marshals and United States District Attorneys 
should not be sent "collect" to the Department of Justice at Washington, but 
should be prepaid by the senders. Other Government messages addressed to 
Washington, D. C. will be accepted "Collect." 

• 

COUNT OF GOVERNMENT MESSAGES. 

8. Government messages will be counted at commercial count, address and 
signature free. Extra words, code signatures, etc., will be counted as in com- 
mercial messages. 

CHECKS OF GOVERNMENT MESSAGES. 

9. The check will show the designation "GOVT.", the number of words accord- 
ing to commercial count, and in the case of day letters, overnight telegrams, 
serial or timed wire service, the class of service designation. 

10. Care should be taken to check all messages sent collect at government i*ates 
"CoUect Govt." The omission of "Govt." in the check causes serious difficulties. 

RATES 

11. Government telegraph rates apply to official United States government 
business exclusively, and no private individual, association, company or corpora- 
tion should in any way be benefited thereby. In cases where it becomes necessary 
for a government official to use the telegraph on any business in the special 
interest of any private person or persons, in which the government has no intei'est, 
the party for whom the service is performed will be required to pay for the 
messages both ways at commercial rates. 

12. The this-line charges for government telegrams, day letters and overnight 
telegrams are 60% of the charges for the same messages at commercial rates. 

13. The this-line charges for govcernment serials and timed-wire-service mes- 
sages are 80% of the charges for the same messages at commercial rates. 

14. In calculating the charges on government messages, if the result shows a 
fraction of a cent, such fraction will be dropped if less than one-half and will be 
counted as an extra cent if one-half or over. 

15. The following minimum charges apply to government messages between 
points where there are offices of the Company : 

For an Intracity Telegram $0.20 

For all other Telegrams .25 

For a Serial .54 

For a Timed-wire-service message .45 

For a Day Letter .45 

For an Overnight Telegram .30 

16. The government tolls must be computed on each separate message. It is 
not permissible to bill a series of government messages at commercial rates and 
then apiily the government percentage to the total. 

17. Except as indicated below, other-line charges to one-star points in the 
United States will be computed at sixty per cent (80% if serial or timed-wire- 
service) of the commercial other-line rates at commercial count with the same 
minimum charges as shown in paragraph 15. 

18. Exception : On government messages to one-star points in Alabama listed 
via York ; to one-star points in Arizona listed via Holbrook ; to one-star points in 



5300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Texas listed via Laredo ; to points in Minnesota listed as "30-2.5 more than Square 
478, ck. Minneapolis" ; to one-star points in Idaho listed via Weiser ; to one-star 
points in Minnesota listed via Duluth ; to one-star points in Georgia and North 
Carolina listed via Cornelia, Ga. ; and to one-star points in Idaho and Montana 
listed via Armstead, Mont., the other-line tolls will be charged for at the full 
commercial other-line rate shown in the directory of stations. 

19. To certain other one-star points government messages are carried by the 
other-line free or with a special rate. This is shown by special notation in con- 
nection with the listing of such one-star points. 

20. On government messages going to two-star, three-star or four-star points 
the this-line rate will be at government rates, and the other-line rate will be the 
regular other-line rate shown in the directory of stations unless otherwise indi- 
cated in connection with the listing of the point in question. 

21. In no case shall the rate charged for a government message exceed the 
amount charged for a commercial message of the same class of service and of the 
same length between the same points. 

22. The rates for government messages between points in the United States and 
points in Canada, where there are offices of the Canadian National Telegraphs, 
and points in Newfoundland and Miquelon Island are shown in the table below. 
For rates to points in Canada other than those where th^re are offices of the 
Canadian National Telegraphs, and the other-line rates shown in the directory 
of stations to the rates computed from this table. 

23. The rates for government messages between points in the United States 
and points in Alaska and Mexico are shown in the directory of stations with the 
listings for Alaska and Mexico respectively. 



F. C. C. NO. 15 

6TH REVISED TITLE PAGE 

(CANCELS 5TH REVISED TITLE PAGE) 

[imn R. C. A. COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 
TELEGRAPH TARIFF 

Foreign Radio-Teoxseaph and Wiee-Telegeaph Rates 

FBOM 

Baltimore, Md. ' New Orleans, La. 
Boston, Mass. New Tork, N. Y. 

Camden, N. J. Philadelphia, Pa. 

Chicago, 111, San Francisco, Cal. 

Detroit, Mich. Seattle, Wash. 

Los Angeles, Cal. Washington, D. C. 

TO 

All Foreign Countries (Except Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Newfoundland and 
St. Pierre-Miquelon), Guam, Hawaiian Islands, Midway, Puerto Rico and the 
Virgin Islands and to Ships at Sea 

AND FROM 

Honolulu, T. H. and San Juan, P. R. 

TO 

All Countries, Including Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Newfoundland and St. Pierre- 
Miquelon and to Ships at Sea Applicable to All Classifications of Service 
Shown Herein and Subject to Rules and Regulations Shown Herein 

Transmission by Radio-Telegraph or Wire-Telegraph or a Combination Thereof 

Issuing Date: Feb. 28, 1940. 

Issuing Officer: C. Sandbach, Manager TarifC Bureau, 66 Broad Street, New 
York, N. Y. 

Effective Date: April 1, 1940 except as otherwise indicated. Original tariff effec- 
tive February 1, 1936. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5301 

F. C. C. NO. 15 
1ST REVISED PAGE NO. lOB 
(CANCELS ORIGINAL PAGE NO lOB) 
{14082] R. C. A. COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 

The sender of an Ordinary Press telegram must write before the address the 
indicator "PRESSE" which is counted and charged for as one word. Ordinary 
Press telegrams take equal rank in transmission with ordinary Full Rate and 
CDE telegrams. 

Press telegrams may, if the sender desires, be sent as Urgent Press telegrams. 
The sender of such a telegram must write before the address the indicator 
"URGENT PRESSE" which is counted and charged for as two words. Urgent 
Press telegrams take equal rank in transmission with regular URGENT and 
CDE URGENT telegrams. 

To certain countries a Deferred Press service is also available. The sender 
of a Deferred Press telegram must write before the address the indicator 
"LCPS" which is counted and charged for as one word. Deferred Pi'ess tele- 
grams take equal rank in transmission with regular Deferred telegrams. 

The supplementary services. Reply Paid (RP), Collation (TC), Notification 
of Delivery (PC or PCP) are not admitted in Press telegrams. 

(f) Oovernment Telegrams 

Government telegrams must be properly endorsed to the effect that they are 
on ofl5cial business of the Government in whose behalf they are sent. 

The telegrams of consular agents carrying on private business are only re- 
garded as Government telegrams when they are addressed to an oflScial person 
and relate to oflScial matters. 

Government telegrams are given priority of transmission over all other classes 
of telegrams, except telegrams relating to safety of life at sea or in the air, 
unless they are filed as Deferred rate, or Radioletter rate, or unless the sender 
renounces the priority privilege at the time of filing. 

Government telegrams are repeated back by the receiving oflice at each stage 
of their transmission. 

Unless special reduced Government rates are in effect. Government telegrams 
are charged the Full Rate or CDE rate according to the language in which they 
are written. 

Issuing date : April 8, 1941 
Issuing OflBcer : 

C. Sandbach, Manager Tariff Bureau, 

66 Broad Street, New York, N. Y. 
Effective date : May 12, 1941 



[IJfiSS] ' SECRET 

Telegram 

OflScial Business — Government Rates 

From: War Department 

Bureau: OCSigO, Signal Intelligence Service 

R. W. Minckler 

R. W. Minckler, Lt. Col., Signal Corps 

pbiobity — secret 

December 7, 1941. 
734 SIGNALS MANILA, PI. 

530 FORT SHAFTER, TH. 

403 PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. 

SEND TO WAR BY PRIORITY ENCIPHERED RADIO ALL JAPANESE 
CLEAR MESSAGES ENDING WITH ENGLISH WORD QUOTE STOP UN- 
QUOTE SPELLED REPEAT QUOTE STOP UNQUOTE SPELLED COPIED 
SINCE NOVEMBER TWENTY SEVEN AND HEREAFTER 

CoLTON, Acting. 
SENT NO. 734 to Manila, 12/7 
SENT NO. 530 to Hawaii, 12/7 
SENT NO. 403 to Pres of S. f., 12/7 

[Stamped on reverse side :] Code Section. W. D. M. C 1941 Dec. 7 PM 2: 14. 



5302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[UOSU Mr. Morgan. Pursuant to a request of Senator Fergu- 
son at pages 8579-80 of the transcript we have the following communi- 
cation from the Army liaison officer, dated February 21, 1946 : 

Wak Department, 
Washington, 21 February 1946. 

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson. 

At nages 8579-80 of the transcript, Senator Ferguson asked what the radar 
stations at New York City, San Francisco, and Seattle were doing on 6 and 7 
December 1941 and whether they were alerted and operating 24 hours a day. 

In response to Senator Ferguson's request, there are transmitted herewith : 

(1) a paraphrase of a 31 January 1946 radio from the Commanding General 
Eastern Defense Command (Inclosure No. 1) ; ,. ^«. . ^, 

(*>) an 8 February 1946 memorandum from the Commanding Officer of the 
Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, Bradley Beach, New Jersey (Inclosure 

%) an 18 February 1946 memorandum from the Headquarters First Air Force 

(Inclosure No. 3) ; ,. ^ i * i.i in , <-v, a ?,. 

(4) a 4 February 1946 radio from the Commanding General of the Fourth Air 

Force (Inclosure No. 4). ,^. ,^ -rr t^ 

jq(,1s 4 (Signed) Harmon Duncombe, 

Lieutenant Colonel, OSG. 

We would like to have these inclosures spread on the record at this 

The Vice Chairman. They will be spread on the record. 
(The inclosures referred to follow:) 
[14085] 

Radio Fbom Commanding Genebal Eastern Defense Command to Wae 
Department, Dated 31 Januaby 1946 

(Paraphrase) 

On 6 and 7 December Twin Lights, Atlantic Highlands, N. J. (radar equip- 
ment not stated) and SCR 270 at ISlount Cadillac, Maine were operated by First 
Interceptor Command 24 hours a day. Foregoing from 1st Air Force historical 
records Officer this command, then Arty Eng Ft. Hancock, informally advises 
that in December SCR-268 sets operated in secret area Ft. Hancock. 

Army Service Forces, 

EteADQUARTEKS, SIGNAL CORPS ENGINEERING LABORATORIES, 

Bradley Beach, New Jersey, 8 February 1946. 

Refer to : SPSGS-CO r. . . ^ ■ ■ ^ 

Memorandum for: Major General G. L. Van Deusen, Chief, Engineering and 

Technical Service. 
Subject : Telephone Request of Captain Carl R. Nelson. 

1 These laboratories are in receipt of a request for information concerning 
radar operation on the dates of 6 and 7 December 1941. This information was 
requested by Capt. Carl R. Nelson, Legislative and Liaison Division, War Depart- 
ment Special Staff, Room 4D761, the Pentagon (Ext. 71470). 

[1J,08G] 2. As nearly as may be ascertained from a survey of flies cur- 
rently available at this organization, and from discussion with individuals who 
were present during December 1941, there were no radar sets in tactical operation 
manned by employees of Signal Corps Radar Laboratory, presently part of Signal 
Corps Engineering Laboratories. During the month of December 1941, tliere 
were in operation by this organization, one SCR-271 at Twin Lights. Atlantic 
Higlilands N. J., one SCR-271 at Atlantic City. N. J., an experimental 400 mc 
unit in the vicinity of Fort Hancock, plus a number of sets which were in varying 
stages of assembly. All of these equipments were being run only for technical 
observation, such as : life test of components, performance test of newly assembled 
equipments, and experimental work on new designs. Data from these tests 
would be in statistical form only and would not include dates of operation or 
times of day operated. Accordingly, it is not known what equipments under 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 6303 

control of this organization were in actual operation on the specific dates of 
6 and 7 December 1941. 

3. Based purely on the memory of individuals present during that period, it 
appears that some Kadar Sets SCR-270 were in operation in Long Ishand by the 
First Signal Air Warning Company and some Radar Sets SCR-268 were in 
operation by Coast Artillery personnel of Fort Hancock. Since there is no 
organizational tie between these organizations and the [140S7] Signal 
Corps Engineering Laboratories, there is no detailed information available here 
on location, method, or times of operation of this equipment. 

4. It is requested that if you see no objection to the above it be forwarded to 
Capt. Nelson. 

/s/ Victor A. Conrad 
Victor A. Conrad, 
Colonel, Signal Corps, 

Commanding. 

In Reply Refer To : J 413.44 

HEiADQTJAKTERS, FiRST AlR FOBCE, 

Mitchel Field, New York, 18 February 1946. 

Subject: Photostatic Copy of Logs of Radar Sets in Operation on 6 and 7 

December 1941 
To : War Department Special Staff, Room 4D761, Pentagon Building, Washington, 
D. C. (Attention: Capt. C. R. Nelson) 
In accordance with letter of Commanding General, Eastern Defense Command, 
dated 5 February 1946, above subject, to forward copies of radar logs of radar 
sets operating in the New York area during 6-7 December 1941, a search was made 
of records. An SCR-271A set was operated at sites 8A on [I4O88] dates 
in question by 1st Air Warning Company (SC) as a training measure. Existing 
records fail to reveal these logs. It is assumed these records were destroyed 
along with other confidential material due to lack of storage space and no appar- 
ent need for preservation by the New York Air Defense Wing prior to its 
deactivation. 

For the Commanding General: 

Raynor Gakey, 
Colonel, A. G. D., 
Adjutant General. 



Wab Department 
Classified Message Center 

INCOMING CLEAH MESSAGE 

From : CG, 4th Air Force, San Francisco, California 

To : War Department 

No : 4 AF 6 E 293 4 February 1946 

From Hale CG 4th AF to WDGS attn OPD Wash DC 4AF 6 E 293 ref yr 
WCL 43319 

No radar stations were in operation in Seattle area on 6 and 7 December 
1941. Stations in San Francisco area were operating during daylight hours 
on 6 and 7 December but only for testing and calibration in preparation for a 
proposed maneuver. No stations were alerted prior to 1400 7 December 1941. 
End 

[l!i089] Action: OPD 

Info : L & L Div • 

MC IN 53328 (6 Feb. 46) DTG 042335Z mec 

{llfOOO'] Mr. Morgan. Pursuant to a request of Senator Fergu- 
son at page 9550 of the transcript for a copy of a letter written by 
Admiral Nimitz, then Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, dated 25 
November 1941, we have now been supplied by the Navy Department 
a copy of this letter, which we ask to have spread on the record at this 
point. 



5304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record. 
(The letter referred to follows:) 

[IJfOOl] Nav-l-MM 
Confidential 

November 25, 1941. 

My Dear Kimmel : I am enclosing a memorandum which will give you a pretty 
clear picture of what we are doing in connection with Radar instruction. 

This, as you know, is highly important and while we have been working at it 
for sometime, we have been handicapped by the inability to obtain any Kadar 
material. That is coming along now and we are pushing these schools as fast 
as possible. 

From a morale point of view, we felt that it would be most desirable to take 
radiomen second class and give them this training, but in view of your strong 
protest, we are endeavoring to obtain recruits having basic knowledge of elec- 
tronics. The field has been pretty well combed over by Army, Navy, and British 
agencies and it is impossible to get men with the necessary qualifications to enlist 
as seamen second class. We are therefore taking them in as second class petty 
officers and will send them to the Fleet as first class or chief petty officers. They 
will be specialists in their particular line and while they will have had no previous 
seagoing experience, I hope they will be fovmd satisfactory. For such specialists 
we are creating a new rating as specialist third class, second class, first class, 
or chief specialist, so as to reduce the discontent that would otherwise be felt 
by petty officers of long standing at sea if men who have had no seagoing ex- 
perience were placed over their heads as would undoubtedly have been the case 
if we would send them out as radiomen first class or chief radiomen. 

"We are constantly keeping your needs in mind and endeavoring to do everything 
possible to fill up the Fleet, but we do have problems that are most difficult for 
solution. With the expanding Navy, our recruiting is not producing sufficient 
men and we have asked for language in the supplementary appropriation for 
1942 and in the appropriation bill for 1943 to iitilize men from Selective Service. 
We had to come to this, but men must be obtained and if we cannot get them by 
straight recruiting, we will have to go to Selective Service for they have. to be 
produced. The Pacific Fleet, I think, is in many ways fortunate. The percentage 
of men is greater than in the Atlantic which, at present, is engaged in active 
operations, and the number of Reserves in the Atlantic Fleet is considerably 
greater than in the Pacific. 

With kindest regards and best wishes to you, I am, 
Most sincerely, 

[C. W. NiMiTz, Admiral'] 
Admiral H. E. Kimmel. U. S. N., 

Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, U. S. 8. Pennsylvania, 
c/o Postmaster, Saji Francisco, California. 

[14:0921 Mr. Morgan. In accordance with a request of Senator 
Lucas, at page 9917 of the transcript, with respect to a false weather 
message, we have a communication from the Navy liaison officer, dated 
February 6, 1946, which we ask be spread on the record. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record. 

(The communication referred to follows:) 

[1^093] "Winds" 

Department of the Navy, 

Office of the Seceetary, 
Washington, 6 February 1946. 
Memorandum 
To : Mr. Seth W. Richarjjson 

1. On 4 February 194G Senator Lucas made a query as to a false weather 
message (Transcript Page 9917). These were two messages intercepted on 4 
and 5 December 1941 by the Federal Communications Commission at approxi- 
mately 2200 GMT and 2130 GMT respectively. 

2. These messages were in NCI Exhibit #65 and the full text of each can be 
found in the Narrative Statement, Volume II. Page 550 and Pages 573-574. Con- 
firmation of the transmittal of these messages by the Federal Communications 
Commission to the Navy 20-G Watch OflBcer may be found in the Fedex'al Com- 
munications Commission wafcb log which is Exhibit 142A in the present in- 
vestigation. 

/s/ .loHN Ford Baecher, 

Lt. Com dr.. U. 8. N. R. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5305 

[14094] Mr. Morgan. At page 12996 of the transcript, Con- 
gressman Murphy requested that there be incorporated in the record 
information concerning the organization of lend-lease. We now have 
a detailed letter from Chester T. Lane, Deputy Commissioner, Office 
of Foreign Liquidation Commission, Department of State, which we 
would like to have spread on the record at this point. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record. 

(The letter referred to follows:) 

[I4095] Office of Foeeign Liquidation Commissionejb 

DEPAETMENT OF STATE 

Washington 
Room 506, 1818 "H" Street, NW 

Mr. Seth W. Richardson, 

General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor 
Attack, Congress of the United States, Washington 25, D. C. 
Deab Mr. Richardson : 1. This is in reply to your letter dated March 6, 1946, 
addressed to Mr. Benno O. Schmidt, General Counsel of this OflSce, requesting a 
statement, for insertion in the record of the Committee's proceedings, "as to the 
organization which was set up by this Government (i. e. the United States) for the 
purpose of determining what distribution should tie made under lend-lease and 
what officials were responsible for such distribution". It is apparent from your 
letter that our reply may generally be limited to the method of allocating military 
equipment rather than the method of determining the distribution of non-military 
items, such as raw materials and supplies for civilian consumption. 

2. On December 6, 1939, the President appointed an informal inter-depart- 
mental committee for the coordination of foreign and domestic military procure- 
ment which became known as the President's Liaison Committee. This Com- 
mittee functioned as the coordinating body for all foreign military procurement 
in the United States until it was abolished in April 1941 after passage of the 
Lend-Lease Act. The membership of this Committee consisted of Rear Admiral 
Ray Spear, [lJf09G'\ Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, rep- 
resenting the Navy, Major General James H. Burns, representing the Army, and 
Mr. Philip Young, representing the Treasury Department. All early requests for 
lend-lease aid were channeled through this Committee to the appropriate agency 
of the Government for actual procurement and transfer of defense articles. 

3. On May 2, 1941, the Division of Defense Aid Reports in the Office for Emer- 
gency Management of the Executive Office of the President was established by 
Executive Order. The President appointed Major General James H. Burns as 
Executive Officer of the Division. The Division of Defense Aid Reports was estab- 
lished to provide for the effective administration of the Lend-Lease Act. This 
Division succeeded the President's Liaison Committee as the channel through 
which requests for lend-lease aid were forwarded to the procuring agencies. 

4. By Executive Order dated October 28, 1941, the President established the 
Office of Lend-Lease Administration, and transferred to this Administration all 
the functions previously vested in the Division of Defense Aid Reports and most 
of the powers conferred on the President by the Lend-Lease Act. Mr. Edward R. 
Stettinius, Jr. was appointed Administrator, a position which he retained 
throughout the period with which this letter is concerned. 

\_lJt09T\ 5. Military supplies transferred under the Lend-Lease Act prior to 
Pearl Harbor may be divided into three categories : 

(a) equipment procured by the War and Navy Department with funds 
appropriated prior to March 11, 1941 (a limit of $1,300,000,000 was placed 
by the Lend-Lease Act on the value of material transferred out of this 
category) ; 

(b) equipment in the possession of the Army or Navy, but procured with 
funda appropriated after March 11, 1941 ; 

(c) equipment procured with funds appropriated to the President for 
lend-lease purposes, under U. S. contracts placed with suppliers directly in 
response to requests submitted by foreign governments. 

Section 3 (a) (2) of the Lend-Lease Act provides that the equipment described 
in (a) and (b) above could be transferred to foreign governments only after 



5306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

consultation with the Chief of StafC of the Army or the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions of the Navy. Most of the pre-Pearl Harbor lend-lease transfers were in 
category (a), and all transfers in that category were personally approved by 
the Chief of Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations. Procurement of defense 
articles covered by (c) above, was effected by means of requests filed with one 
of the agencies described in U4098] paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above. After 
approval by one of these agencies, procurement was subject to priorities and 
controls established by the OflBce of Production Management, which operated 
in consultation with the Army and Navy Munitions Board. 

6. There was created in the War Department by order of the Secretary of War 
of April 8, 1941, a Defense Aid Division of the Office of the Undersecretary. This 
Division was responsible for coordinating and maintaining records on the lend- 
lease operations of the War Department. The officers in charge of the work of 
this Division were Colonel Henry S. Aurand, Lt. Col. Edward E. MacMorland 
and Major John H. Franks. Army Air Force lend-lease activities were under 
the direction of Lt. Col. Benjamin Meyers. In the Navy, Admiral Joseph M. 
Reeves, Liaison Officer for the Secretary of the Navy on lend-lease matters, and 
Rear Admiral Ray Spear, Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, were 
chiefly concerned with lend-lease operations. The requests of the foreign gov- 
ernments for military supplies, which were first submitted for approval to the 
agencies described in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this letter, were routed to these 
officers in the War and Navy Departments for allocation and procurement of 
such supplies. 

7. A special committee handled allocations of aircraft during the period under 
discussion, known as the Joint [1^099] Aircraft Committee, with member- 
ship consisting of General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces, Rear 
Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief of the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics, two representa- 
tives of the Office of Production Management, a representative of the President's 
Liaison Committee and representatives of the British Air Commission. This 
Committee controlled the allocation of all aircraft production in the United States 
prior to Pearl Harbor. The presence of General Arnold and Admiral Towers 
on this Board assured that no other governments would be allocated any aircraft 
which in the view of our military authorities was more urgently needed by our 
own forces. 

8. I trust that this explanation will be found to be a satisfactory description 
of the procedure followed in allocating lend-lease military supplies prior to 
December 7, 1941. The period in which you are interested was during the 
formative stages of these operations when the assignment machinery as it ulti- 
mately developed was not entirely in operation. However, I believe that it is 
evident that at all times the allocation of military supplies was subject to the 
approval of the high officers of the Army and Navy, and this fully safeguarded 
the interests of the United States Army and Navy in the distribution of valuable 
equipment. 

Very truly yours, 

/s/ Chesteb T. Lane:, 

Deputy Commissioner. 

\^lJflOO'\ Mr. Morgan. We have a series of communications from 
Admiral Noyes, Mr. Sonnett, former Secretary Hull, Captain Kramer, 
and Captain McCollum, with respect to certain corrections they would 
like to have indicated in their testimony. 

We would like to have these communications placed in the record 
at this point. 

(The communications referred to follow:) 

[UflOl] Navt Department, 

Board of iNSPEcrnoN and Sttrvbt, 
Washington 25, D. C, 25 Fetniary 1946. 
Memorandum for Counsel, Joint Pearl Harbor Inquiry Committee. 
Enclosure: (A) List of Typographical Errors Found in Record of Proceedings, 
Investigation of Pearl Harbor Attack. 
In reading over my testimony I noted that I failed to bring out the following 
point, which, however, Is supported by my previous testimony and by docu- 
mentary evidence. 

In connection with the alleged telephone couversatiou with me on 5 December 
to which Colonel Sadtler testified and which I did not recall in that form : 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5307 

On 5 December there was received by the Navy Department the message from 
Colonel Thorpe in Batavia addressed to General Miles in the War Department. 
This message was transmitted by the Naval Attache to Navy Department for 
delivery to General Miles. As I have already testified, the subject matter was 
under discussion between me and the War Department during that day. It is 
very probable that I would have called Colonel Sadtler and notified him of the 
fact that this message had been received and was being delivered to the War 
Department [14IO2] for General Miles on account of its importance. 
Since discussion took place between me and the War Department during that 
day on the subject matter of this message and the War Department recommended 
that we should make no change in our original translation of the setup of the 
Win^s Code (see previous testimony), it would appear that any possible authentic 
or false execute of the winds message would have also been discussed and 
settled during that day. 

Very respectfully yours, 

/s/ Leigh Noyes, 
Leigh Notes, 
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy. 

Enclosure A 

Navy Department, 
BOABD OF Inspection and Subvet, 
Washington 25, D. C, 25 February 1946. 
Memorandum for Lieut. Comdr. Baecher, USNR. 

Subject : Corrections in Report of Proceedings, Investigation of the Pearl Harbor 
Attack — testimony of Rear Adrimal Leigh Noyes, U. S. Navy.* 
1. The following is a list of corrections to be made [14103] in the testi- 
mony of Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, U. S. Navy : 
Page 12,559— line 18 : Change Bidell to Biddle. 

Page 12,559 — line 25: change to read, "Chief of Staff to Commander". 
Page 12,560 — line 15 : change to read, "No, September 1944, in San Francisco." 
Page 12,561 — line 10 : change to read, "what I do now." 
Page 12,562 — line 1 : Witness Noyes. 

Page 12,564 — lines 13, 14: strike out, "Who acted in my place" insert "or". 
Page 12,568 — line 18 : change to read, "they could not decipher the diplomatic 
traflSc and send it all to Honolulu." 

Page 12,571 — lines 13, 14: strike out, "or by ML the important ones." 
Page 12,574 — line 14 : "inkling." 
Page 12,580 — line 12 : change "words" to "worries". 
Page 12,581 — line 19 : change to read, ^'knew what the rules were." 
Page 12,586 — lines 20, 21 : change to read, "Chief of Naval Operations and the 
Army Chief of Staff to the Commanding General." 

Page 12,592 — lines 21, 22: change to read, "Naval Communications." 
Page 12,595 — lines 20; change to read, "several booklets and the Chief of 
Naval Communications." 

114104] Page 12,598 — line 7: change to read, "I do now". 
Page 12,603 — line 9 : change "mine" to "mind". 
Page 12,614 — line 6 : change "present" to "presented". 
Page 12,615— line 9: change to read, "Safford said". 

Page 12,625 — line 19: change to read, "I believe a reference to forty-six 
words". 

Page 12,643— line 14: change to read, "and it was some time after I got 
back." 
Page 12,686 — line 15 : change to read, "information to the Naval Attaches." 
Page 12,687— line 24 : change to read, "At the time when Italy came into the 
war, which". 
Page 12,688— line 14: change "by" to "but". 
Page 12,699 — ^line 21 : change "warning" to "morning". 
Page 12,710 — line 6 : change "technical" to "tactical". 
Page 12,711 — line 21 : change "Canada" to "Japanese". 

Page 12,729 — line 1 : strike out, "and I supposed the record was supposed to 
bear on subsequent events". 
Page 12,735 — line 23 : change "execute" to "setup". 

/s/ Leigh Noyes, 
Leigh Notes, 
„ Rear Admiral, U. 8. Navy. 

Enclosure B. 



^Adm. Noyes' testimony appears in Hearings, Part 10, pp. 4710-4792. 



5308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

\_i4iO5] Assistant Attorney General, 

Washington, February 27, 1946. 
Seth W. Richardson, Esquire 

General Counsel for the Joint Committee on the Investigation 
Senate Ojfice Building, Washington, D. C. 
Dear Mr. Richardson: The Navy Department has made available to me 
Volumes 60 and 67 of the transcript before the Joint Committee on the Investi- 
gation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, vphich contain my testimony along with the 
testimony of various other witnesses. 

In examining the transcript of my testimony I have noted a number of 
minor typographical and grammatical errors, which I have indicated on the 
transcript, and respectfully request be corrected. 
Very truly yours, 

/s/ John Sonuett. 

John F. Sonnett.' 
Enclosure A. 

[I4IO6] The following is a list of corrections to be made in the testimony 
of John F. Sonnett: 

Page 13,330— line 25 — add "of Justice" after "Department" 

Page 13,331— line 6— add "a" after "was" 

Page 13,331 — line 17 — change "investigate" .to "review" 

Page 13,331 — line 20 — add "and in general" after "tion" 

Page 13,331 — line 22 — change "was was" to "as might be" 

Page 13,332— line 5— change "1941" to "1945" 

Page 13,332— line 16— add "in the Navy" after "where" 

Page 13,333 — line 13 — change "at tempt" to "attempt" 

Page 13,334 — line 16 — cliange "t en" to "then" 

Page 13,335 — line 6 — change "is" to "was" 

Page 13,335 — line 6 — add "This was in" after "crazy." 

Page 13,335 — line 7 — add "and" after "document" 

Page 13,336 — line 20 — change "Navy" to "Navy," 

Page 13,351 — line 6 — change "lation," to "lations," 

Page 13,351 — line 13 — change "S. Correa" to "F. Correa" 

Page 13,353 — line 9 — change "civil" to "civilian" 

Page 13,353 — line 13 — change "civil" to "civilian" 

Page 13,358 — line 16 — change "be" to "be," 

Page 13,359 — line 9 — change "the Navy" to "Naval matters" 

Page 13,362 — line 11 — strike out "which I have mentioned" 

Page 13,366— line 3— strike out "which" 

[14107] Page 13,366 — line 4 — change "so were set" to "and were so set" 

Page 13,369 — line 25 — change "Reports" to "Report" 
Enclosure B 



[I4IO8] COEDELL HtlLL 

Wardman Park, Washington, D. C. 

My Dear Mr. Richardson : It will be appreciated if you will cause the following 
corrections to be made in my testimony as it appears in the transcript of the 
Pearl Harbor hearings : 

Volume 9, page I46O 

Line 5 : "Explore" should read "expose". 
Line 8: "Money" should read "cotton". 

Volume 9, page 1470 

Line 9 : Omit "and for 90 days". 

Volume 10, page 1594 

In reference to the first sentence of my reply to the Vice Chairman's question 
I find, upon careful rechecking of the time, that the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor occurred at 1 : 20 p. m., Washington time, so that the telephone message 
from the White House must have occurred shortly after 1 : 20, at which time 
the appointment to see the Japanese Ambassador had already been postponed upon 
the Ambassador's request to 1 : 45 p. m. 



- Mr. Sonnett's testimouy appears in Hearings, Part 10, pp. 5009-5027. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEP] 5309 

Volume 10, page 1612 

In reference to Senator Lucas' question beginning at line 5, to which I replied, 
"No," I had in mind the question whether tlie Army Board had conferred orally 
with me on this pointt As to correspondence, the Secretary of War in a letter 
[14109'i dated September 14, 1944, reciting that it was at the instance of the 
Army Board, asked me as to the truth or falsity of an allegation that an ultimatum 
had been delivered to Japan on November 26, 1941. I replied in a letter dated 
September 28, 1944, stating that my communication to the Japanese representa- 
tives on November 26 was in no sense an ultimatum. I added that if I could 
further assist the Board in its investigation I would be glad to do so. The corre- 
.spondence was made public by the State Department on August 30, 1945. 

Volume 10, page I6I4 

Line 4: Enclose in quotation marks, "poor, innocent, peace-minded". 

Sincerely yours, 

/S/ CORDELt, Huuu' 

The Honorable Sejth W. Richaedson, 

Oeneral Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harhor 
Attack, Congress of the United States. 



[I4IIO] Department of the Navy, 

Office of the Seoeetaby, 
Washington, 11 March 1946. 
Memorandum to : Mr. Seth W. Richardson. 

1. Forwarded herewith is a letter of Captain Alwin D. Kramer, U. S. Navy, 
requesting corrections in the reporter's transcript of his testimony before the 
Joint Committee. 

/s/ John Ford Baecher, 
John Foed Baecher, 

Lt. Comdr., USNR. 



Department op the Navy, 

Office of the Secretary, 

Washington, 8 Mar. 1946. 
Mr. Seth W. Riohabdson, 

Chief Counsel, Congressional Committee Investigating the Attack <m Pearl 
Harbor, 
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C. 
Dear Sdb: At the request of the reporters, I have checked the transcript of my 
testimony before the Congressional Committee, [I411I] and request that 
the corrections listed on the attached pages be made in the record. 
Very respectfully, 

/s/ A. D. Kramer 
A. D. Kramer,* 
Captain, U. 8. Navy. 
Italics indicates error or omission. 

Volume 55, of 6 Fehruan/ 1946 

Page Line Change 

10432 19 After "San Diego in" add "1935 and". 
433 16 "area" should be "Arear". 

435 20 should read "known as OP-20-GZ, OP-20-G being" etc. 

436 18 should read "until 9 or 10 or 11" etc. 
441 2 "knowledge of" 

444 4 & 5 Word after /'indicating" should be "punctuation." Text should 

therefore read : "three letter code groups, indicating punctuation 
of various kinds." 

445 25 "stronger in language". 



J Mr. Hull's testimony appears in Hearings. Part 2, pp. 403-457, 551-560. and 605-615 
aoon'^IPo.?''^™^'^'^ testimony appears in Hearings, Part 8, pp. 3893-3927 ; and Part 9, 



5310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

450 8 "believe at". ^ , .. 

451 20 After "folder" add", i.e. (cU)se quotes). ^^ 

454 21 Should read : "features required in handUng . 
462 24 Put a period after "Fort Myer", ^^ ^ 

464 17 Should read "heading only, and to . 

22 Should read "this code message, because . 
[14112] 467 17 "between "him, Mr. Hull", etc. 

470 19 "about to leave". „ 
20 Change to "plain language Japanese message. 

471 l\TZm ;':!;r"(b.aot)-couotry, («™e to be inserted) was uo. in 

accordance with expectations' . 

11 Should read "yeoman the sense". 
10472 6 Change "days" to "months". 

477 20 Insert comma after "interruptions . 

478 22 Change "quarters" to "country". « ^ ,„ .. 
484 20 Should read "supplements to that, four or five in. 

488 8 Change "Russian" to "Russia". 

489 22 Comma after "before". 

■189 23 Read "there was effected at about . 

10498 20 Read "message of 7 December". 

510 13 Read "the GY section for". 

513 14 Read "Yes, sir, if I can finish, etc. 

Volume 56, of 7 February 1946 

10524 8 Change "text" to "technique". 

12 Read "cancelled". 
526 17 Read "so indicated". 

536 3 Read "machine. My presumption. 
552 24 Read "called for by". 
ufnS} ^ ^Si "rRerd""reference to England. Tilings more emphatic" etc. 
7 Read "been. That is the scheme" etc. 

10 Read "Thailand with Japan. We knew" etc. 
558 17 "This". 

18 Read "indication". 

21 Comma after "Germans". 
568 6 "Roma/i." 
572 9 Comma after "messages . 

583 25 "alone". , .. „ . 

584 6 Read "running to 12 and 15 feet in length , etc. 

10605 25 fhoui?reII CfglnSg an encoded or enciphered message", etc. 

608 23 Should read "in a Division of Naval Operations" etc. 

611 13 "subsist out" should be quoted. 

618 5 Read "from Alusna, Batavia". . ^ , ,„ 

625 25 Should read "riji yori no tugoo aru ni tuki . 

627 7 Read "the code indicator "STOP"." 

635 19 Read "call KANA Morse," etc. 

654 5 & 6 Read "intercept net and" etc. ^ 

[14114] 660 7 Read "designated as J-12, in my etc. 

586 16 & 17 Read "messages 901 to 910". 

Ill A ir„r r„d'"'Tsrif i;sSS!ro».er co^e. <«««... fc- ««*«. 

tion." 

662 7 Read "The JD number" etc. 

664 10 Read "which I might characterize etc. 
690 9 Read "impression on that point." , 

694 22 Should read "Captain Kramer : That is etc. 

706 25 Omit comma. 
710 5 Read "particularti/ certain" etc. 

716 19 Omit "must as". 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5311 

Volume 57, of 8 February 1946 

10728 16 "shirts" should read "shifts", 

730 14 Should read "broadcast, one of", etc. 

731 9 Read "impression of irritation" etc. 
733 24 Change ''should" to "shall". 

735 2 Read "number for" etc. 

4 Read "last night, and there" etc. 

736 2 & 3 Read "during the war in interrogation", etc. 

7 & 8 Read "corresponds in Japan to our Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the 
months preceding Pearl Harbor." 
743 12 Add "of the" at end of line. 

746 21 Read "inserted". 

747 17 Insert comma after "down". 

748 6 Omit "and now" to read "at the time presumed". 
755 25 Change "was" to "were". 

775 20 Change "day" to "say". 
789 2 Change to "negotiations, hut" etc. 
[14115] 780 12 Read "other than that I linew that the Naval" etc. 
794 3 Read "approximately 8 : 15," etc. 
809 3 Change "sited" to "sighted". 

5 Read "contact with it, special" etc. 

809 25 Read "Intelligence, deals, perhaps 90 percent is more accurate, is of auy- 

810 2 thing but a positive nature." 

814 20 Change "At" to " — was the arrival" etc. 

816 12 Change "he" to "we". 

837 3 Change "no" to "not". 

837 13 Read "Pearl Harbor at" etc. 

838 14 Extend answer to read : "I did, yes, sir, but the matter of the time of 

crew's mess, and of the number of ship's personnel above or below 
decks were simply part of the factors in iJiy mind when I was re- 
marliing on 7:30 Sunday morning being the quietest time of the 
week. These factors were not stated, however, in my present best 
recollection." 
844 2 Read "refresh my memory on that point. I do not" etc. 

847 7 Change "characters" to "character". 

848 20 Change "hearings" to hearing". 

875 2 Read "the Japanese word 'KORYAKU', which means" etc. 
18 Read "Alusna, Batavia". 
[14116] 877 24 Omit comma after "at least". 

879 18 Change "Javorach" to "Jabberwock". 
888 17, 18 & 19 Should read : "translation of the Japanese version, which, 
in the light of seeing the work sheet just a few days 
ago I believe reads: NIHON TO TO NO KANKEI 
KITAI NI HAN SU". 
904 12 Read "through 1941, the only" etc. 
907 13 Expand to read : "Yes, sir, the original letter." 
912 17 Read "made by me only". 
919 22 Insert comma after "questions". 
927 6, 7, & 9 Change "Wilkinson" to "Kimmel" on these 3 lines. 
931 14 Read "and no reply to it". 
937 4 Read "impose 07i any friendships" etc. 
22 Read "what I already had. Not to" etc. 

Volume 58, of 9 February 1946 

10960 3 Read "Greenwich Mean Time, yes, sir". 
961 19 Read "Those trips, however," etc. 
984 7 Change "confirmation" to "consummation". 

10 Change "know" to "knew". 
990 23 Read "between about 8:15 and 9:S0, at" etc. 
996 23 Read "Pearl Harbor than" etc. 
997 2 & 3 Read "with Admiral Kimmel's request" etc. 

9 Read "hoped that it would not be" etc. 
11006 25 Read "nuwerous". 



5312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



U-iiiyi 11008 7 Add comma after "Sunday". 

010 8 Read "gotten np to it'\ etc. 

012 17 Read "Have no information" etc. 

013 2 Read "him only rarely" etc. 
18 Read "understandw/f/" etc. 

016 11 Read "Thank you. I hope I don't" etc. 
Note : The following? corrections on pages 11,020 and 11,021 apply to the page 
numbers as corrected by the Otfieial Reporters in their note of 10 Feb. 1946. 
11020 2 Read "Communications. When" etc. 
021 5 Read " — by the watch officer" etc. 
027 25 Read "A." "On receipt of" etc. 
031 9 Read "who presumafi/?/ would get it". 
20 & 21 Read "East Wind, Rain" meaning United States ; 
"West Wind, Clear" meaning England; 
"North Wind, Cloudy" meaning Russia. 
051 lO&ll Change capital to small "i" in the word "Investigation" 

on both lines. 
11052 8 & 9 Read "It was only, incidentally, in" etc. 
053 12 Read "and which was subsequently" etc. 

077 22 Read "by comparison vyith days" etc. 

078 21 Read "amounted to perhaps 100 feet' 'etc. 

097 22&23 The statement: "Senator Barkley informed me of that 
proposal" should appear as a remark of Senator Brew- 
ster rather than of the "Vice Chairman. 
14 & 15 Insert to read "Yes, using the touch system. I have 
never" etc. 
8 Read "Colonel Bales" etc. 



[ii/iS] 098 
104 



11117 



119 


18 


121 


19 


127 


8 


129 


4 


131 


22 




23 


133 


8, 9, 10, 11 


134 


22 


137 


22 




24 


138 


5 


142 


4 


147 


20 


160 


12 to 17 



11160 
165 



165 
170 



Volume 59, of 11 Fcdruary 1946 

lO&ll Read "classified papers, reading from this: (brown wrap- 
ping paper)", originated" etc. 
Read "the questions". 
Read "I therefore feel it" etc. 
Read "before that hearing" etc. 
Read "Will show him these later." 
Read "for the past month because" etc. 
Read "they consist" etc. 

Rearrange to read: "read these papers from mid-day 
1944 to this moment, other than to glance at the head- 
ings or first paragraphs of each on certain days and 
times last December" etc. 
Read "It was her I was about" etc. 
Read "teletype. Station 2 was" etc. 
Read "by Army and retained" etc. 
Read "except possibly Christmas" etc. 
Read "for periods varying" etc. 
Read "/ most certainly" etc. 

Repunctuate to read : "I recollect that this was inter- 
preted, I am uncertain of the precise wording of the 
interpretation, this was considered [14119] and 
I believe it was approximately my consideration at the 
time, as being an attempt" etc. 

23 Read "Diplomatic posts were" etc. 

25 Read "were usually pared," etc. 
6 to 9 Read "the Japanese shoehorned, if I may use that term, 
military men into the delegation conducting those nego- 
tiations. The Ambassador, or Special Enyoy, as I recall 
it, was named Yoshizawa." 

17 Read "in Panama and in all parts of" etc. 
6 & 7 Read "who, when I was speaking to him, was about ten 
or fifteen feet away from the conference table, and Just 
outside the closed door of the room. Mr. Hull's officp, 
wbpre tbp three seoretarips werp conferring." 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



5313 



170 

172 
177 
181 
183 



188 
202 



[1',I20] 11202 
204 



207 



208 
212 
213 
215 

217 
250 

258 

259 

261 
262 
263 
267 



\jmi] 



Uil22} 



21 Read "because the names associated with each other in 

mij mind." 
15 lusert comma after "oflScials". 
14 Read "Lassvvell, Commander Roenick," etc. 
23 Change "Halsey" to "I". 

13 Read "testified to," 
18 Read "engagement, which I previously testified to, at" 

etc. 
4 Read "That is Greenwich Meridian Time, is it?" 

14 Change "code developed" to "word developed" etc. 
17 Read "has" "1, 10, 12, 2X, P, S, G, MIS, BE. B". What 

is that?" " 
19 & Read "Pound sign. "AF, X. Y, MONO". Is that cor- 
20__ rect?" 

25 — Read "we actually never used it, sir". 
205 9&10_ Read "".B", ''BE" not used. "7?" 0P16-B, I think. 
What is that?" 
Read ""AF". CinCAF, Asiatic Fleet. "X" 20-GL— ". 
Read ""Tokyo to Honolulu, 24 September," that being 
the originator's date; originator's message "number 
83", and an asterisk meaning "an interesting mes- 
sage"." 
Read "would see exhibit 2," etc. 
Read "gists were'" etc. 
(Jhauge "Talk" to "Take". 
17& Read "footnote says: ''JD-1; 69U"- "I relayed"" etc. 
18__ 

7— Read "that letter". 
12 — Read ""No", is a postposition identical" etc. 

16 Read "mean" for "means". 

Read "There you have J/". 

Change "12^1" to read : "12-4-41". 

Read "4 or 5 December dates". 

Read "dividing" etc. 

Read "Nos. 7152 to 7184 vun chronologically" etc. 

Change "fact." to "facts." 

Read "testified, and those shown" etc. 

Read "simply to give Admiral Halsey" etc. 

Change "lohaV to "that", and change "onr" to "our". 

Read "did I have that conception" etc. 



268 



17__ 

12,13 

&14 



16— 

18— 
12__ 



25— 

4__ 

10__ 

11__ 

I24__ 
23__ 
13-_ 
4_- 
11_. 
12__ 



Department of the Navt, 

Office of the Secretaey, 
Washington, 1 April 1945. 
Memorandum To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson 

1. There are forwarded as enclosures A and B, respectively, a letter from 
Captain A. H. McCollum, U. S. N., requesting that certain typographical and 
grammatical errors be corrected in the transcript of his testimony before the 
Joint Committee and a list of the items by page and line number. 

/s/ John Ford Baecher 

John Ford Baechee 
I/i^Mtenant Commander, VSNR 



U. S. S. Helena (CA 75), 
Fleet Post Office, New York City, N. Y., March 18, 19^6. 
The Honorable Axben W. Babiclet, 

United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 
My Dear Senator : I have but recently had the opportunity of reading over the 
transcript of the testimony I gave on January 30, 1946, [14123] before 
your committee investigating the Japanese attack on our Fleet at Pearl Harbor 
on Sunday, December 7, 1941. In reading over the transcript of the record 
furnished me, I find what appear to be either clerical errors and omissions or 
errors due to lack of clarity of expression on my part. There are not many 
of these, and in the interests of clarity and precision I venture to suggest that, 
subject to the Committee's pleasure, I may be permitted to correct my testimony 
as transcribed in accordance with particulars listed on a separate page. 

79716— 46— pt. 11 12 



5314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

May I again express to you and to the Committee my appreciation for the 
thoughtful consideration and courtesy shown me during my testimony before you. 
Respectfully, 

/s/ A. H. McCollum, 

A. H. McCOLLUM,' 

Captain, U. S. N., Commanding. 
Enclosure A 



U. S. S. Helena (CA 75) 

SUGGESTED COEBEOTIONS TO TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN A. H. M'OOLLtJM, U8N 

Page Line 

9115 18 Change 6th word from "destroyer' 'to "transport" 

9116 5 Change 7th word from "'June" to "January" 
[14124] 9116 10 After last word of the line add "and" 

9117 6 Change last word from "billing" to "billet" 

9117 11 After 5th word insert "I served in the Mediterranean and" 

9117 22 After 6th word insert "as head of" 

9119 24 After 4th word insert "intelligence" 

9121 22 Strike out 5th, 6th and 7th words — "on the idea" 

9121 23 Strike out 2nd and 3rd words— "and it" 

9122 25 After 1st word insert "of it" 

9123 21 After 6th word insert "that". Change 8th word "to" to "or" 
9128 9 Strike out 4th and 5th words "me and", and 9th word "the". 

Change 11th word "Plans" to "Operations" 
9132 2 After 7th word insert "towards" 
9132 12 Change 8th word from "Hnrd" to "Heard" 

9138 15 After 3rd word insert "had to make" 

9139 7 Change 12th word from "much" to "such" 

9139 8 Change 8th word from "much" to "such" 

9140 14 Change last word from "the" to "a" 

9142 19 At end of line insert "from watch standing" 

9142 21 Strike out first three words "I take it" 

9143 2 After 1st word insert "Saturday night" 

9146 12 Change 7th word from "withint" to "without" 
[14125] 9146 24 Change 6th word from "is" to "was" 

9147 ,23 Strike out first three words "as they appeared" 
9149 22 Change 4th word from ''taking" to "checking" 
9152 21 Change 1st word from "movement" to "unit" 
9152 22 Change 7th word from "movement" to "unit" 
9152 24 Change 3rd word "sets" to "setup working" 

9152 24 Change 10th, 11th and 12th words "route of entry" to "unit" 

9153 21 Change 3rd word "that" to "as" 
9158 18 Change 2nd word "a" to "back the" 
9161 22 After 11th word insert "no" 

9170 11 After 9th word "on" insert "Japanese" 

9178 22 Change 4th word "discovered" to "so covered" 

9219 13 After 7th word "might" insert "not" 

9220 15 Strike out 4th word "and" 

9221 12 Last two words change "they did" to "did they" 
9252 9 Change 7th and 8th words "at the" to "as to" 
9275 24 Change 8th word "1907" to "1904" 

9287 15 Change 2nd word "Hurd" to "Heard" 
Enclosure B 

[I4JS6] Mr. Morgan. At page 7625 of the record Senator Brew- 
ster requested information concerning the sources from which the 
time table of attacks appearing on page 7622 of the record was pre- 
pared. A rather detailed reply has been received from the Navy De- 
partment under date of April 4, 1946, and we would like to have this 
communication spread on the record. 

' Capt. McCollum'8 testimony appears In Hfarlnjro, Part 8, pp. S381-S448. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



5315 



The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record at this point. 
(The communication referred to follows :) 

[I4127] Depabtmeitt of the Navy, 

Office of the Secretary, 

Washington, 4 April 1946. 
Memorandum To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson. 
Subject : Time Table of Japanese Attacks — source of material. 
Reference : 

(a) My memorandum to Mr. William D. Mitchell, dated 29 Nov. 1945. 

(b) My memorandum to Mr. Seth W. Richardson, file 1083A(HLB)R#112, 

dated 22 Jan. 1946. 

(c) My memorandum to Mr. Seth W. Richardson, file 1083A(HLB), R#112, 

dated 24 Jan. 1946. 
1. In response to the oral request of 28 March 1946 from Counsel for more 
specific data as to the information and sources of information which were here- 
tofore forwarded in reference (a) at the request of Mr. William D. Mitchell, in 
reference (b) at the request of Senator Brewster (Record of Proceedings, page 
7625) and in reference (c) at the request of Congressman Keefe, concerning the 
times of attacks by the Japanese on various places in the Pacific Ocean areas, 
the information, supplemented as requested, is restated and summarized for 
purposes of clarity as follows : 



Place 


Local time 


Greenwich 
time 


Washington 
time 


Source of information 


Kaneohe.NAS... 


7:60 am, 7th.. 


6:20 pm, 7th.. 


1:20 pm, 7th.. 


War Diary of Commandant 14th Naval 

District. 
Report by Admiral Nimitz dated 15 

Feb. 1942 of the attack at Pearl Harbor 

and War Dairy of the Comdt. 14th 

Kaval District, dated 3 Feb. 1942. 
Statement by Captain John M. Creigh- 

ton, U. S. N., who was at Singapore. 
This Information obtained by oral 

inquiry of the War Department, Col. 

McNall, USA, Q-2 MIS File. 
War Diary of U. S. S. Wm. B. Pretton. 
War Diary of Cmdt. U S Marine 


Pearl Harbor 

Singapore 

KhotaBaru 

Davao Gulf, P. I. 
Guam 


7:55 am, 7th __ 

3:00 am, 8th _. 
3:40 pm, 8th.. 

7:10 am, 8th- - 
9:10 am, 8th.. 

8:00 am, 8th.. 

12:00 noon, 
9:27 am, 8th.. 
9:30 pm, 7th.. 
3:00 am, 9th.. 


6:25pm, 7th.. 

8:00 pm, 7th.. 
8:40 pm, 7th.. 

11:10 pm, 7th. 
11:10 pm, 7th. 

Midnight, 7- 
8th 

1:00 am, 8th.. 

1:27 am, 8th.. 

9:20 am, 8th.. 

7:00 pm, 8th-. 


1:25 pm, 7th.. 

3:00 pm, 7th.. 
3:40 pm, 7th.. 

6:10 pm, 7th.. 
6:10 pm, 7th.. 

7:00 pm, 7th.. 

8:00 pm, 7th, . 
8:25 pm, 7th.. 
4:30 am, 8th.. 
2:00 pm, 8th.. 


Hong Kong 

Wake 


Corps, dated 31 March 1942. 

This information obtained by oral in- 
quiry of the War Department, Major 
R. E. Guest, USA, G-3. 

Report of Comdt. U. S. Marine Corps, 
dated 31 March 1942. 

This information obtained by oral in- 
quiry of the War Department. 

Log of the Coast Guard Cutter WAL- 


Clark Field, P. I. 
Midway 


Nichols Field 
(ManUa) 


NUT. 
Report of 16th Naval District Intelli- 
gence Officer, file 40207, 



(sgd) John Ford Baecher 
* John Ford Baecher, 

Lieutenant Commander, USNR. 

[14-130] Mr. Morgan. At this point, I would like to read a por- 
tion of a memorandum supplied by the War Department, dated 
January 14, 1946, as follows : 

Reference is made to Mr. Mitchell's memorandum of 31 December 1946 for- 
warding Senator Ferguson's request for any records showing who was in charge 
of the offices of the Chief of Staff and of General Gerow on the night of 6 Decem- 
ber 1941. 

General Gerow indicated to the Committee that as of 6 December 1941 War 
Plans Division had an arrangement whereby a duty officer was designated for 
the 24-hour period and, though not required to remain at the office throughout 
the night, was required to stay within calling distance of a telephone (Tr. 
4320-1). The Office of the Secretary General Staff maintained a similar duty 
officer arrangement for the Chief of Staff. A thorough search has been made for 
the duty rosters of War Plans Division and of the Office of the Secretary General 
Staff for the period including 6-7 December 1941, Those rosters have not been 
located and apparently it was not the practice to preserve such rosters. 



5316 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Pursuant to a request made by counsel we have a communication 
from the War Department dated 21 February 1946 setting forth the 
authority under which Lieutenant Colonel Clausen administered oaths 
during the course of his investigation. We would like to have this 
letter spread on the record. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record. 

(The letter referred to follows:) 

[IJflSl] War Department, 

Washington, 21 February 1946. 
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson: 

With reference to your inquiry concerning Lt. Colonel Clausen's authority to 
administer oaths during the investigation which he conducted at the direction 
of the Secretary of War, your attention is invited to U. S. Code, Title 10, Section 
1586 (Article of War 114), reading as follows: 

1586. Authority to administer oaths (article 114). 

Any officer of any component of the Army of the United States on active duty 
in Federal service commissioned in or assigned or detailed to duty with the 
Judge Advocate General's Department, any staff judge advocate or acting staff 
judge advocate, the President of a general or special court-martial, any summary 
court-martial, the trial judge advocate or any assistant trial judge advocate of a 
general or special court-martial, the president or the recorder of a court of in- 
quiry or of a military board, any officer designated to take a deposition, any 
officer detailed to conduct an investigation, and the adjutant, assistant adjutant 
ox personnel adjutant of any command shall have power to administer oaths 
for the purposes of the administration of military justice and for other pur- 
poses of military administration ; and shall also have the general power of a 
notary public in the administration [14132] of oaths, the execution and 
acknowledgment of legal instruments, the attestation of documents and all other 
forms of notarial acts to be executed by persons subject to military law ; Provided, 
That no fee of any character shall be paid to any any officer mentioned in this 
section for the performance of any notarial acts herein authorized (as amended 
Dec. 14, 1942, ch. 730, 56 Stat. 1050). 

(sgd) Harmon Dtjncombe. 

Lt. Colonel, GSC. 

[14J33] Mr. Morgan. At various places in the transcript, par- 
ticularly at pages 5484 and 11853-11854, information has been set 
forth concerning the air situation in the Philippines at the outbreak of 
the war. We have received a communication from the War Depart- 
ment dated February 1, 1946, enclosing additional material in this 
regard, and we would request that this letter and the enclosures be 
spread on the record. 

The Vice Chairman. The material will be spread on the record. 

(The material referred to follows :) 

[I4134] War Department, 

The Pentagon, Room. 4D 161, 
Washington, D. C, 1 Februanj 1946. 
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson : 

Three memoranda have been submitted by this office in response to requests 
by Committee members for information concerning the air situation in the 
Pliilippines at the outbreak of the war. The first, dated 27 December 1945, 
forwarded an account of the initial Japanese air attack against the Philippines 
contained in the Army Air Force narrative entitled "Army Air Forces in the 
War Against Japan 1941-1942". A second memorandum of the same date 
transmitted the available information on (a) the total number of planes in 
the Philippines on 7 December 1941, (b) the number of bombers at Clark Field 
when the Japanese first attacked, and (c) the number of bombers lost at Clark 
Field in that attack. The third memorandum, sent to you on 30 January, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5317 

forwarded material from the War Department files with regard to Japanese 
air reconnaissance over the Philippines and other U. S. possessions in the Pacific 
prior to 7 December 1941. 

Transmitted herewith is further information from the War Department files 
relating to the initial Japanese [14135] attack against the Philippines. 
Inclosure No. 1 consists of photostats of documents on which the account of the 
Japanese attack contained in "Army Air Forces in the War Against Japan" was 
based. Inclosure No. 2 is a niemorundum concerning the command organization 
of the United States Army Forces in the Far East and the Far Bast Air Force 
jis of 7 December 1941. 

/s/ Haemon Duncombe, 

Lt. Colonel, 08C. 
Incls.— 2. 

mi36} 

Headquaktees 

Fae East Aru Foeces 

APO 925 

History of the Fifth Aie Foecb (and Its Predeoessoes) 

part i, decembee 1941 to august 1942 

■ Deceinber, 19^1, Instalment 

INVENTORY SHEET accompanying package bearing Message Center Regis- 
tration No. H43. 

1. APPENDIX I, Maps and Charts, History of the Fifth Air Force {and its 

Predecessors), Part I, December, W^l-August, 1942. 

2. APPENDIX II, Documents, History of the Fifth Air Force (and its Predeces- 

sors), Part I, December 1941-Angust, 19^2. 

3. Note: Narrative to which these appendices are transmitted is sent by photo- 

mail, title: Narrative, History of the Fifth Air Force, {and its Predeces- 
sors), Part I, December, 1941-Augnst, 1942, December, 19Ifl, Instalment. 

[14137] DESIGNATION SHEET 

(Official designation, including number of unit and of each echelon in chain 

of command) 

AIR FORCE : FAR EAST AIR FORCES 

COMMAND : 

WING : 

GROUP : 

SQUADRON : 

AREA: 

BATTALION : 

CENTER : 

COMPANY : 

DEPOT : 

DETACHMENT : 

DISTRICT : 

DIVISION : 

PLATOON : 

REGIMENT : 

REGION : 

SCHOOL : 

SECTION : : 

UNIT : 

ETC. : 

Has Security Classification of material been checked? YES. 



5318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACS. 
IU1S8] 

EXPLANATOBY NOTE BE HiSTOEY OF THE FlFTH AlE F0RCE3, PAET I, DecEIMBEB 1941 TO 

August (Deo. 1941 Instalment). 

This document and its appendices purport to represent only a portion of the 
story of aerial operations in the Southwest Pacific Theater for December 1941. 
It incorporates such information as was found during the period of its prepara- 
tion — namely between January 1944 and June 1944 — in the files of Hq. Far East 
Air Forces (which were the files of Hq. Fifth Air Force until 15 June 1944), Hq. 
U. S. Army Air Forces in the Far East, and Hq. G. H. Q., S. W. P. A., augmented by 
personal interviews with several persons who were present in the theater in 
December 1941. It is expected several additional statements from persons in 
the latter category will still be obtained at A. P. O, 925. 

According to information obtained during the preparation of these documents, 
and from other sources, the following additional sources of information exist 
in the U. S. : 

1. The office of the Adj. Gen., G. H. Q., S. W. P. A., states that a number of 
records from the Philippines were transmitted to the War Dept., Washington in 
October 1942. 

2. An oral report states a report on the modification of the P-40E was sent from 
the Philippines to Washington. 

3. Operations reports and unit casualty reports sent from the Philippines to 
Washington. 

4. At the Fighter Command School (later the Army Air Forces School of 
Applied Tactics), Orlando, Fla., some detailed transcripts of statements by 
returned pilots, including those of a combat pilot's round table, were taken during 
the summer, fall and winter of 1942. These included a statement by Lt. Col. 
Boyd D. ("Buzz") Wagner. The latter also supplied a statement to the A-2 
and A-3 oflices of Hq., Army Air Forces, Washington. 

5. The papers of Lt. Col. W. E. Ryess, and his published book. 

6. General Eugene L. Eubank, Commanding General of Army Air Forces Board, 
Orlando, Fla. He was commander of the 19th Bombardment Group in the 
Philippines. 

7. Lt. Col. H. G. Thome. In charge of certain phases of P-38 training near 
Los Angeles. Was 1st Lt. in command of 3rd Pursuit Squadron, Iba, Luzon, 
P. I., at outbreak of war. 

8. Col. Orrin L. Grover. Was stationed at Army Air Forces Tactical Center, 
Orlando, Fla. in Jan. 1944. Was C. O. of 24th Pursuit Group in the Philippines, 
and is said to be the author of the History of the 24th Pursuit Group (Doc. I, 
App. II). 

9. "Various members of 19th Bombardment Group in the U. S. 
Additionally is Major General Lewis H. Brereton who was commanding General, 

Far East Air Force, in the Philippines. 

[U139] 

History of the Fifth Ara Force (and Its Predecessors) 

PABT I DECEMBEB 1941 TO AUGUST 1942 
DECEMBEK 1941, INSTALMENT 

Narrative 

[imO] LIST OF TABLES 

Table No. Title Page 

I Staff of the Far East Air Force 2 

II Japanese Air Strength, Dec. 8, 1941 7 

III Far East Air Force Dispositions, Dec. 7, 1941 8-9 

IV Tactical Missions by the 19th Bombardment Group, Dec. 1941 18-19 

V Casualties among Officers, 24th Pursuit Group, Dec, 1941 27 

VI Airplane Status at Brisbane 35 

VII Dates of Japanese Attacks in Philippines and Areas of Southwest 

Pacific, Dec. 8, 1941, August 1942 40-42 

[mil] TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Narrative 

Section Title Page 

I. The Far East Air Force 1 

II. Chance in Employment of the Air Force 20 

III. United States Army Forces in Australia 31 

IV. Transfer of the FEAF to Java 43 

Maps and charts Appendix I 

Documents Appendix II 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5319 

[I4142I Section I — The Far East Air Force 

When the month of December, 1941, opened in the Philippines the Far East 
Air Force was under the command of Major General Lewis H. Brereton. Units 
were fully alert. Due to the tense international situation, from November 15* 
"all pursuit aircraft were fully loaded, armed and on constant alert 24 hours 
each day with pilots available on 30 minutes notice".^ Throughout the Air 
Force intensive training was in progress and a number of newly arrived units 
were being integrated into the Air Force. Despite this fact, the Far East Air 
Force had but small forces to meet the attack which wias about to be launched. 

Organization and Equipment of the Far East Air Force 

In the Philippines the Far East Air Force was itself a new organization. The 
name had undergone two recent changes. The first change had followed the 
creation of the United States Army Forces in the Far East. Lieutenant General 
Douglas MacArthur had assumed command of USAFFE on July 27, 1941.* 
Following this he had redesignated on August 4, 1941 the Philippine Department 
Air Force as the Air Forces, United States Army Forces in the Far East.* 
This operated "directly under the Commanding General, United States Army 
Forces in the Far East, except for routine administration and supply, which will 
continue through Headquarters, Philippine Department".* At this date the 
Commanding General of the Air Forces was Brigadier Genertxl Henry B. Clagett, 
who had arrived in the Philippines on May 4, 1941. Subsequently, on October 
7, 1941 (West Longitude Time), the War Department designated Major General 
Lewis H. Brereton as the air commander.* He brought with him a number 
of oflBcers, including a new Chief of Staff, Colonel Friancis M. Brady. The War 
Department, on October 28. 1941. (West Longitude Time) redesignated the Air 
Force as the Far East Air Force. This redesignation became effective on Novem- 
ber 16, 1941.' 

Staff of the Far East Air Force 

With the arrival of General Brereton, his staff was organized as follows : (Table 
I. P. 2). 



(Footnotes in original.) 

^ In this narrative all time is given as Philippine Department Standard Time and all 
dates are East Longitude unless otherwise indicated. 

^History of the 2ith Pursuit Group in the Philippines (Document I, Appendix II). This 
document is from Fifth Air Force Files, and is dated October 10, 1942. Lieutenant Colonel 
Allison W. Ind, Allied Intelligence Bureau, and Colonel L. A. Diller, Public Relations, 
GHQ, SW7A, both state that this history was written by Colonel Orrin L. Grover, who was 
the Comm. of the 24th Pur. Gp. in the Philippines. 

' G. O. No. 1, United States Army Forces in the Far East, July 27, 1941. 

* G. O. No. 4, USAFFE, Aug. 4, 1941 (Doc. 2, App. II). 

» G. O. No. 4, USAFFE, Aug. 4, 1941 (Doc. 2, App. II). 

« Chronology of the Fifth Air Force, War Department, Washington, D. C. 

TG. O. No. 28, USAFFE, Nov. 14, 1941 (Doc. 3, App. II). 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5321 

[I4IM] Components of the Far East Air Force 

Next in chain of command in the Far East Air Force were tlie Fifth Inter- 
ceptor Command, Fifth Bomber Command, and Far East Air Service Command. 
The Fifth Interceptor Command was commanded by Brigadier General Henry B. 
Clagett, with Colonel Harold H. George as Chief of Staff. The authority for 
activation of this unit in the Philippines has not been found, but it is listed as 
operating on December 8. 1941, in the document tracing the chain of command 
of the Far East Air Force, which is in the USAFFE.' The Fifth Inter- 
ceptor Command also appears on the movement order to Bataan (Dec. 23),' 
and in subsequent General Orders of USAFFE." In the first available 
strength report this unit is shown as having five officers and fifteen enlisted 
men." 

The Fifth Bomber Command and Far East Air Service Command were acti- 
vated on November 16, the same day as the creation of the Far East Air 
Force." Lieutenant Colonel Eugene L. Eubank, also the commander of the 19th 
Bombardment Group, became the commander of the Fifth Bomber Command. 
This was only a skeleton unit, and although authorized full Table of Organization 
strength, had only one officer and twenty enlisted men on December 23." 
The Far East Air Service Command, under Colonel L. S. Churchill, had eight 
officers and sixty enlisted men." 

Pursuit Units 

The pursuit units in the Philippines consisted of the five squadrons of the 24th 
Pursuit Group, commanded by Major Orrin L. Grover." This unit was an 
outgrowth of the Fourth Composite Group, which at the start of 1941 had as its 
components all of the tactical air units in the Pliilippines. The three pursuit 
squadrons in this group, the 3rd, 17th, and 20th, were all equipped with P-26's 
until May, 1941. At that time they were re-equipped with F-35's.'^ Next, 
in July 1941, one squadron was equipped with P-4(JB's, and still later, P-40E's 
were received.^* On September 16, 1941, the 24th Pursuit Group was acti- 
vated and the three pursuit squadrons transferred to it from the Fourth Com- 
posite Group.^' In November, two additional squadrons, the 21st and 34th, 
arrived from the United States. They were a part of the 35th Pursuit Group, 
but pending the arrival of the rest of its units, were attached to the 24th Pursuit 
Group.'^ 

[I4145] Training of Pursuit Pilots 

In the summer of 1941 "100 new pilots from training schools" in the United 
States arrived and were used to build up the three original pursuit squadrons to 
strength. Because these pilots had not received combat training a training unit 
was formed at Clark E'ield.'* In addition it was necessary to train these pilots 
in gunnery, so a gunnery training camp was established at Iba.'" In October 
35 more new pilots were assigned to the pursuit units and the same program of 



« BEAF Chain of Command. (Doc. 4, App. II.) 

" (Doc. 5, App. II.) 

"GO No. 40, USAFFE, Mar. 14, 1942 (Doc. 6, App. II). 

^^ Movetnent Order to Bataan (Doc. 5, App. II). It should be noted that Headquarters 
and Headquarters Squadron of the Fifth Interceptor Command was under movement orders 
from the United States when war started. It had been activated from the Second Inter- 
ceptor Command (under WD letter, 14 October. 1941, AG 320, 2 (10-1-41) MR*M*AAF 
"Constitution and Activation of Air Corps Units"). Under command of Lieutenant 
Colonel Willis R. Taylor, this unit, with eight radar sets sailed from San Francisco at 
1800 on December 6, 1941 (San Francisco Time) on the Tasker H. Bliss. This ship put 
bacli into port on December 6 (San Francisco Time) and the Hq. and Hq. Sq., Fifth 
Interceptor Command debarked and returned to Seattle. History 0} the Headquarters 
and Headquarters Squadron, II Ititerceptor Command, II Fighter Command and V Fiahter 
Command. May 1941-December 1942. By Major Edward J. McCormick, Jr., pp. 10-13. 
This history also states that the 557th Signal AW Battalion, also under orders to proceed 
to the Philippines, was in the Port of Embarkation at the time, but was also ordered back 
to Seattle. 

" G. O. No. 28, USAFFE, Nov. 14, 1941 (Doc. 3, App. II). 

« (Doc. 5, App. II). 

" (Doc. 5, App. II). 

" History of 2/, Pur. Gp. (Doc. 1, App. II). 

" History of Si Pur. Gp. (Doc. 1, App. II). 

"G. O. No. 10. USAFFE, Sept. 16, 1941 (Doc. 7. App. TI). 

i^ History 2// Pur. Gp. (Doc. 1, App. II). 

^« History 24 Pur. Gp. (Doc. 1, App. II). 

'o History 2i Pur. Gp. (Doc. 1, App. II). 



5322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

training was started with them.^ At the gunnery camp at Iba "an extreme 
amount of difficulty was experienced in the malfunctioning of the guns, due to im- 
proper adjustment and mal-installation. In order to properly function it was im- 
perative that all gun installations should be modified".** 

Bombardment Units 

In the fall of 1941, the 19th Bombardment Group (H), with B-17's arrived in the 
Philippines. This group was commanded by Lt. Col. Eugene L. Eubank. Prior to 
its arrival the bombei's iu the Philippines had been B-lOs and B-18's, which were 
not suitable for combat. These planes had been assigned to the 28th Bombard- 
ment Squadron of the Fourth Composite Group. With the arrival of the 19th 
Bombardment Group the 28th Bombardment Squadron was transferred to the 19th 
Bombardment Group, re-equipped with B-17s and redesignated from medium to 
heavy on November 16, 1941." This gave the 19th Bombardment Group a 
headquarters squadron and a total of four instead of three subordinate squadrons. 
The group had a grand total of 35 B-17s. 

On November 20 the 27th Bombardment Group (D) arrived in the Philippines. 
This unit was commanded by Major John H. Davies. All of its aircraft (A-24s) 
were on a later convoy, which was on the high seas at the time war broke out, and 
had to be diverted to Brisbane, Australia. The non-arrival of the dive bombers 
left the bombardment component of the FEAF unbalanced, there being no unit 
specially adapted for use against shipping. 

Also in the Philippines was part of the ground echelon of the 7th Bombardment 
Group (H)."'' On December 7 (West Longitude) part of the air echelon, fly- 
ing from California landed at Pearl Harbor ; but none of the air echelon reached 
the Philippines. 

Observation 

With the transfer of all units except the 2nd Observation Squadron from the 
4th Composite Group, Headquarters squadron of this group was abolished on Nov- 
ember 16 and the 2nd Observation Squadron was thus placed directly under Head- 
quarters, FEAF.^ The squadron was equipped with observation type air- 
craft and was commanded by Captain J. Y. Parker.^ 

Airdromes 

At the start of 1941 there were three major military airfields in the Philippines, 
Clark Field, near Ft. Stotsenburg about 60 miles north of Manila, and Nielsen and 
Nichols Fields on the outskirts of Manila. These were all extended during 1941. 
Because of the shortage of suitable fields some had to be used even while under 
constructions, which increased the accident rate among the pursuit." 

[1^146] By December 1, the following fields were in use, or rapidly 
nearing completion : (For location see C. I. U. Map, Chart 1, App. I) . 
Pursuit Fields^: 

Nichols Field 

Nielson Field 

Clark Field 

Iba Field 

Resales Field 

Del Carmen Field 
Bombardment Fields*': 

Clark Field 

Del Monte Field, Mindanao 
Fields Nearing Completion '" : 

O'Donnel Field 

San Fernando Field 

Ternate Field 

San Marcelino 



"-^History 24 Pur. Op. (Doc. 1, App. II). 
"^-History 2!, Pur. Op. (Doc. 1, App. II). 
23 GO, 28 USAFFE, Nov. 14, 1941 (Doc. 3 — App. II). 

^Statement of Colonel R. L. Fry (Doc. 8, App. II) nnd Statement of Colonel Ray T. 
Elsmore (Doc. 30a, App. II). 

"GO. 28, USAFFE, Nov. 14, 1941 (Doc. 3, App. IT). 

=« FEAF Chain of Command (Doc. 4, -App. IT). 

^''History Zi Pur. Op. (Doc. 1, App. II). 

'^History 24 Pur. Op. (Doc. 1. App. II). 

» Statement of Colonel Harold Bads (Doc. 3, App. II). 

«o History 24 Pur. Op. (Doc. 1, App. II). 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5323 

In addition to the fields listed as nearing completion a more extensive air- 
drome construction program had been started in Luzon, but had not reached 
a point where it affected the situation prior to evacuation to Bataan." The 
fields provided did not allow for sufficient dispersion, nor for sufficient mobility 
of the air force. This was a cause of concern to General Brereton.^ 

South of Luzon, Del Monte in Mindanao was in use as already indicated. 
Santa Barbara on Panay, and Cebu, Cebu, together with a few other fields in 
Mindanao were also used after war started.® (See Chart 1, App. I). 

Co-Ordinated With Other Commands 

It was recognized that any defense of the Far East would demand the closest 
coordination with the British, Dutch, and Australians. Much of the work to 
this end was carried out by military staff missions of foreign governments in 
Washington in consultation with the War Department and does not fall within 
the limits of this narrative.'^ However, a considerable amount of planning 
was carried on through direct consultation. In the early summer of 1941 General 
Clagett received instructions to proceed to Singapore and China, where he 
carried on a number of conferences.^ 

[14H7] Still later. General Brereton, went through the Dutch East Indies, 
the Australian Mandates, and Australia. He held a number of conferences, 
concerning the improvement of ferry-routes to the Philippines, and the arrange- 
ment of I'outes for ferrying pursuit aircraft from Australia via Koepang, Kendari, 
Sandakan, Balikpapan, Tarakan, Del Monte (in Mindanao) and Santa Barbara 
(on Panay) '" Before the start of the war supplies of bombs and gasoline 
had already been sent into Rabaul, Port Moresby, and Darwin. Arrangements 
were also under way to send such stocks to Singapore and Balikpapan, but the 
war came first. Also General Brereton arranged future plans for staff coordina- 
tion with the Australians and the Dutch, which paved the way for later develop- 
ments. Among the most far-sighted of his arrangements was the development 
of Projects 1 and 2, which envisioned the use of Australian maintenance facilities, 
and called for considerable expenditures. These plans were left with Sir Charles 
Burnett, Chief of The Australian Air Staff in Melbourne. Some work was in 
progress when the war started. This was then speeded up and proved capable 
of meeting many of the actual requirements of the situation which developed 
early in December.'" 

Air warning system and communications 

The development of the Air Warning System in the Philippines was based 
primarily on a system of native observers. These reported in over the lines of the 
Philippine Telephone System to Interceptor Headquarters at Neilson. Data was 
then reported to the plotting board at Clark Field and based on it, orders were 
issued to the various squadrons. Commercial lines of the Philippine Telephone 
Company were all that existed for receiving reports. Delays were frequent. 
Clark, Nielson, and Nichols Fields were linked by teletype, and this circuit, 
supplemented by telephone when necessary, was used for direct communication. 
The third means of communication was radio, the major fields, each having an 
SCR 297 which was used for both point to point and ground to air communication. 

In addition to the ground observer system the first radar had been installed 
in the Philippines at Iba. A second was being assembled near Aparri, and a 
third was enroute to Legaspi. The set at Iba was in tactical use, and operated 
on a 24 hours per day basis.^ 

Antiaircraft Artillery 

Next to the inadequacy of the Air Warning System, was the shortage of AAA. 
General Brereton in March 1942, stated that before he left Washington in 1941, 

« Radio, General Brereton to General Arnold (Doc. 9, App. II) and History 2i Pur. Op 
(Doc. 1, App. II). 

S3 Rarlio, General Brereton to General Arnold, March 2, 1942 (Doc. 9, App. II) 

^^JourtJnl of l<)th Bomharffment Oroup — (Doc. 11 Ann II) 

« Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff 19^1-19 i's (War Department), p. — . [No page 
number in original]. •- f a 

^Lt. Col. Allison W. Ind (Bataan) (Msn). This book, as an unofficial source, is used 
only for material where the author was a direct particinant, and where the subiect dis- 
cussed falls within his field of military specialty, which is Intelligence. In this case for 
example he went on the trip with General Clagett. Permission for use in this official 
history has been granted bv Lt. Col. Ind. 

"" Ind, Bataan (Kss). p. 196 fF. 

!I f^olonel Merle-Smith to General Clagett, Dec. 24, 1941 (Doc. 12, App II) 

** History 2i Pur. Orp. (Doc. 1, App. II). 



5324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

he declared that — '"To put a bomber force in the Philippine Islands without 
providing adequate anti-aircraft defense measures was almost certain to 
mean their destruction." '^ Also General Brereton mentioned the inadequate 
fighter protection and inadequate air warning system. The amount of anti- 
aircraft was inadequate. The one anti-aircraft regiment at the airfields was the 
200th CA (AA) Regt., a mobile unit of one battalion of 3" and 1 battalion of 37mm 
guns. This unit was stationed at Clark Field. The remaining anti-aircraft 
regiment was the 60th CA with units on Bataan and the harbor forts in Manila 
Bay.*" The remaining airdromes were protected by only a few 50 calibre 
and 30 calibre machine guns. These offered but slight protection. 

[14148] Japanese Strength 

Intelligence estimates showed that the Japanese had overwhelming strength, 
m comparison with the Far East Air Force equipment in the Philippines. In the 
R. A. A. F. the air order of battle was given as follows : 

Table II. — Japanese air strength, Dec. 8th, I'J'/l 

Fleet Air Arm 612 

Manchuria 800 

Japan 600 

N. and Cen. China 198 

Mandated Is 100 

Malaya 300 

Phil inc. Canton Hainan, Formosa 250 

Total first line strength 2, 860 

While this estimate is from Australian sources, similar figures had been made 
available to General Brereton and his staff when they were in Australia on Nov. 
21-23 (40a) . Royal Air Force figures for this date placed the size of the Japanese 
Air Force as around 4,500 aircraft of front line strength, which is now generally 
accepted as correct." The RAAF and RAF figures are cited at this point 
because no estimates from the War Department, Washington, for the period 
December 8, 1941, are available here (APO 925). 

The estimates shown above indicate that from the Japanese bases in Southern 
Formosa (430 to 450 miles north of Clark Field) it was possible to throw vastly 
superior formations against the Philippines. It was also possible for the enemy 
to increase this superiority by the use of carriers. Finally, the southernmost 
islands of the Philippines were within range of Japanese air units based on Palau. 
(Chart VII, App. I ) . 

In the field of Intelligence the Japanese knew the disposition of our units, the 
location of important stores, the capabilities of our planes. They had excellent 
maps of the entire area, and objective folders on the important targets. Within 
the Philippines many of the large Japanese minority were organized as Sakhad- 
listas, a fifth column under the orders of Japan. In addition to transmitting 
information, this group even lighted flares at night to designate important targets. 
In some of the islands in the Far East, the Japanese withdrew their nationals 
prior to the outbreak of the war. In the Philippines they organized them. Our 
counter-espionage system was inadequate to cope with this organization; and the 
security measures around our installations were not great enough to prevent 
observation of the equipment and installations.*^ 



«» Brereton to Arnold, March 1, 1942. (This was actually written over a week earlier) — 
(Doc. 9. App. II). 

*«Lt. Col. Mellnik, AAA in Philippines (Dec. 24, App. II). It should be noted that a 
training program for Filipino AAA was in progress at Fort Wint. The organization of 
the Filipino Units was in progress and a number of regiments were scheduled to be trained 
b.v March, 1942. Equipment was being supplied from the U. S. From this equipment, after 
war was declared two additional regiments were organized : the 200th Provisional CA 
(AA) which came in part from the parent 200th, was moved to Nichols Field and areas of 
Manila 011 the night of December 8th. It was functioning bv Deceml>er 10th and was 
equipped with 12-3" and 12-.'?7mm AAA guns, as well as some .50 calibre which were 
placed at Nichols Field and at the port area on the night of December 8th. Also the 51st 
CA (AA) was organized and used after war began. It does not appear to have operated 
on air fields. 

■"""Central Operational Intelligence Center, Situation Report (now under GHQ SWPA), 
Dec. 12th, 1041. 

"Figure from Enemy Appreciation Section, Allied Air Forces, A-2, SWPA (S/L 
Felthan). 

*- Ind. (Bataan) (Mss), p. 246 flf. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



5325 



[14149] One of the available estimates of the situation of our forces in 
the Philippines at the end of November, 1941, was contained in a general intelli- 
gence summary used by the Tanaka Force. An exact extract of this document 
(to which are added translations reports the FEAF as consisting of: 

Unit Type 

24th Kuchiku Sentai (Pursuit Group) P-35. 

3rd Kuchiku Chutai (Pursuit Squadron) P-36. 

17th Kuchiku Chutai (Pursuit Squadron) P-38. 

20th Kuchiku Chutai (Pursuit Squadron) P-40. 

24th Kuchiku Chutai (Pursuit Squadron) 27 planes at Nichols Field 

above types included. 
J 9th Bakugeki Sentai (Bombardment Group) 1st Chutai of Kuchiku 

P-38 or P-40 27 planes. 

14th Bakugeki Chutai B-17 12 planes. 

28th Bakugaki Chutai B-18 13 planes. 

36th Bakugeki Chutai (Type of plane unknown). 

2nd Teisatsu Chutai (Reconnaissance Squadron) 0-19, 0-46, 0-47, 0-57. 

19 Teisatu Chutai unknown. 

The information above is essentially accurate, as comparison with the follow- 
ing table of our dispositions will show. The chief mistake is in listing part of 
the pursuit as components of the 19th Bombardment Group and not listing two 
of the squadron numbers in the 19th Bombardment Group. Also aircraft types 
are listed which were not in the Philippines. About December 1, the summary 
was shown by the Japanese to include: 

Fighters 130 

Bombers 30 

Naval Patrol 20 

Total 180 

This is also substantially correct, if it is assumed that observation be included 
under fighters. The fact is that this information is more accurate than that 
sent to the Australians by their Washington sources following the outbreak of 
war. The Japanese figure is closer to the number of operational aircraft, 
whereas those of the Australian Attache included obsolete planes to a greater 
extent, and also those not in commission." 

FEAF Disposition on Dec. 7, 1941 

In opposition to the Japanese Army and Navy Air Services, our dispositions on 
the eve of war were as follows : (See Chart II, App. I.) 

Table III. — Status and Location of Aircraft ' 



C. 0. 


Unit 


Location 


Type 


Number 
operat. 


Major 0. L. Grover 


24 Pur Grp 








Lt. W. B. Putman 


Hq. and Hq. Sq 

3rd Pur. Sq 


Clark 






Lt. W. G. Thome 


Iba . 


P-40-E-..- 
P-40-E.__. 

P-40- 

P-35 

P-40-E-._. 


18 


1st Lt. Boyd Wagner 


17th Pur - -. 


Nichols 

Clark 


18 


1st Lt. J. B. Moore 


20th Pur 


18 


1st Lt. Sam Marett 


21st Pur 


Del Carmen 


18 


1st Lt. W. E. Dyess 


34th Pur 


Nichols 


18 








Total pursuit 


90 













' This tabic has been compiled from the History 24 Pur. Grp. (Doe. 1) anA Journal 19 Bomb Op. (Doc.l, 
App. II). Gen. Marshall in his Biennial Report gives the number of P-40s as 107. The discrepancy is 
due to the fact that Table III above, is of planes operational on Dec. 8th, and excludes planes not erected 
or out of commission. 

There is some question as to who were the commanders of the 21st and 34th Pursuit Squadrons. In 
Q. O. No. 48, USAFFE, Dec. 21, 1941 (Dec. 18, App. II), 1st Lt. Sam Marett is given as commander of 
the 34th Sq. rather than the 21st. The Bataan Roster of the 2I,th Pursuit Group (Doc. 27, App. ID, also 
gives this as the status of the command, and gives 1st Lt. Wm. E. Dyess as the commander of the 21st Sq. 
In this narrative, however, the History of the 24th Pursuit Group has been followed. 



■•^ Compare the Japanese "No. 3, The Situation of Both Sides Prior to War", ATIS, 
Current Translations, No. 46 with COIC SITREP for the period after December 8. and 
through December ."0, 1941. Further, the Australian Naval Attache in Washington 
reported to his government on Dec. 12, that the 52 A-24's were operational in the 
Philippines (Doc. 13, App. II). Actually these aircraft were unloaded at Brisbane on 
December 22. Twelve of them were eventualy ready for the Java campaign. 



5326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



IWBO] 



CO. 



Unit 



Location 



Type 



No. 



Cpt. J. Y.Parker 

Lt. Col. Eueene L. Eubank 

Captain MacDonaM 

Major C. E. Combs... 

Major E. O. O'Donnell 

Major Wm. Fisher. ._ 

Major H. Gibbs 



tod Obs 

19th Bomb Group 

Hq & Hq Sq. 

93rd Sq. 

14th Sq. 

28th Sq 

30th Rq._ 



Clark. 



0-46, 52, 
79 



Clark 

Del Monte. 
Del Monte. 

Clark. 

Clark 



B-17-D... 
B-17-D... 
B-17-D... 
B-17-D... 



10-12 



Note.— Two planes out of commission at ClarK, also three planes of 93rd and 14th Squadron at Clark. 

6TH PURSUIT (PHIL. AIR FORCE) 

Captain Jesus A. Villamour 6th Sq BATANGAS.... P-26 12 

MISCELLANEOUS 

CLARK 1 

nichols^ b-18 10 

neilsonJ 
cabantuan. b-10 3 

Clark A-27 2 

Del Monte B-18 2 

Total first line Operational Aircraft Dec. 7th (19th Bomb. 24th Pursuit 2nd. Obsv.) 13.5 or 137 

All other operational tactical planes 29 

Grand Total Operational 164 or 166 



The total of Far East Air Force personnel in the Philippines on December 8th 
was about 8,000 of the total of U. S. Army personnel of 19,000." 

II4J0I] Of this air force total, approximately 7,500 was in Luzon. Of the 
personnel in Luzon, some 1,200 belonged to the 27th Bombardment Group (D) 
which had no aircraft. Also that part of the ground echelon of the 7th Bom- 
bardment Group (H) which had reached the Philippines was awaiting the ar- 
rival of the air echelon. The 500 air force personnel outside Luzon were scat- 
tered throughout a number of bases with the largest concentration at Del 
Monte, Mindanao. The Philippine Army Air Force had about 1,200." Total 
air force personnel was therefore around 9,200 including the Philippine Army 
Air Force. 

Events Prior to War 

Starting on December 2, the Japanese began a series of night and early morn- 
ing reconnaissance missions over Clark Field. The plane appeared at 0530 each 
morning, was sighted visually, and also tracked by the radar at Iba. Follow- 
ing the first sighting "instructions were given to force the aircraft to land or 
destroy it. On the three succeeding nights it was impossible to make the inter- 
ception, due to inability to see the aircraft in the dark, or the aircraft not get- 
ting close enough to be picked up by the seachlights." Accordingly, it was 
agreed that the AAA would have its turn on the night of December 7th. But 
on that night no plane came over.^" 

December 8th, 1941 

December 8th was the first day of war in the Philippines. Being east of the 
International Date Line, this was the same as December 7th at Pearl Harbor. 
-\lso due to this further distance to the east, it was still dark in the Philippines 
when the attack on Pearl Harbor came. First news of this attack was flashed 
to all units upon receipt of the report at 0330.^' The official USAFFE warn- 
ing was pent out at about 0430. Word was also received at 0630 at the bomber 
base at Del Monte.** War had begun.*" 

** Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff War Department, p. 10. Gen. Marshall's report 
gives the figure as 8,000. This is in agreement with the rosters and reports in Documents 
5, 8, 14, 15 and 30a (App. II). 

^^ Strength Report Philippine Air Force — Jan. 3, 1942. (Doc. 16, App. II.) 

*« History Pur. Op. Pg. 3 (Doc. 1, App. II). 

^'' Ibid. This news was by commercial radio and no oflScial action was taken except to 
order units to stations. The official warning was received by the pursuit units at 0445. 

^8 The message received at Del Monte stated "Hostilities have commenced, govern your- 
self accordingly." {Interview with Colonel Fry) (Doc. 8, App. II.) Message received at 
0630 hrs. according to Major Heald, Communications Officer. He remembers the message 
as : "Hostilities have begun. All airdromes alert." (Doc. 17, App. II.) 

*» History 24 Pur. Op. (Doc. 1, App. II). 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5327 

Pursuit Opex-ations " 

[I4152] Prior to receipt of oflScial word that war had begun, the radar at 
Iba reported a large foi-mation over the China Sea headed in the direction of 
Corregidor. Accordingly the 3rd Pursuit, stationed at Iba, was ordered to 
intercept. It proceeded to the heading given in its mission order, and the radar 
plot showed a successful interception. At this date, however, altitude could 
not be read from the radar. Actually the P-40's did not see the bombers in 
the darkness. Therefore they returned to their base for refueling. (Chart III, 
App. I). 

The next development occurred at 0930, with the reporting of a large forma- 
tion over the Lingayen Gulf headed for Manila. The orders issued from inter- 
cept headquarters, where Major Grover and Colonel George were operating, 
called for the 20th Pursuit Squadron to proceed north from Clark Field and 
intercept in the vicinity of Resales. Meanwhile the 17th Pursuit Squadron 
was sent from Nichols to patrol Clark Field and intercept any planes which 
might pass the 20th. But the Japs were only feinting. From Lingayen Gulf 
the Japs did not proceed south. Instead, they swung inland directly past, 
and hit the army installations at Baguie which was also the summer capital 
of the Philippines. They also hit airfields at Cabantuan. At the time of the 
aleit at Clark Field, the B-17's were ordered up, so they might not be caught 
on the ground. They landed again, however, at 1130, their landing being 
covered by the 20th Pursuit Squadron. (Chart III, App. I). 

The last two moves on the part of the Japanese had run two squadrons out 
of gas and thus limited the number of squadrons which would be available 
for the main raids. In this they were successful. At 1130 the 20th Pursuit 
Squadron at Clark Field was being regassed. The B-17's were back at Clark 
Field; the 17th Pursuit Squadron was being gassed at Nichols. The scene 
was set for the main strike. (Chart IV, App. I). 

There was not long to wait. At 1130 the Iba radar reported a large forma- 
tion over the China Sea. For the second time during the day the 3rd Pursuit 
Squadron at Iba was ordered to intercept. It immediately took off, although 
apparently eight planes were left on the field. Again, in this attempted inter- 
ception the Japanese were to show one of their tricks. Taking advantage of 
the limited gasoline supplies of the P-40, the incoming bomber formation feinted 
and then withdrew. This type of tactics had also been used in China, but for 
the first time United States air units came in contact with such tactics. The 
3rd Pursuit Squadron remained in the air, with its gasoline steadily diminishing. 

Believing that interception might not be made by the 3rd Squadron and fear- 
ing a direct thrust at Manila and the installations there, the two squadrons 
on Nichols Field were both sent off, the 17th Squadron to take station over 
Bataan, while the 34th Squadron was placed. on standing patrol over the city 
of Manila proper. (Chart IV, App. I). 

The next report came in at approximately 1145 of an unidentified formation 
"over Lingayen Gulf, headed south". This raised a new problem and the sit- 
uation was met by ordering the 21st Pursuit off Del Carmen to cover Clark Field. 
At the time the 20th, still regassing at Clark Field was ordered up as soon as 
refueling was completed. But no planes reached Clark Field prior to the attack. 
Dust on the field at Del Carmen delayed the take off of the P-35s. The first 
planes of the 21st Squadron which taxied out raised such a cloud that it was 
necessary to wait for the cloud to settle. The delay was so great that planes 
of the 21st Squadron did not reach Clark Field until after the Japanese attack 
was completed. (Chart IV, App. I). At this juncture communications broke 
down and no further reports were received at Clark Field or Neilson Field con- 
cerning the incoming Japanese bomber formation. At 1215 the 20th Pursuit 
Squadron on Clark Field completed gassing, and the planes started to take off. 
Four were off the ground and five more were in process of taking off, while five 
more were on the ground. At either 1217 or 1220 the first Jap planes arrived. 
There were 54 to 72 bombers in a very shallow V of V's and above 18,000' which 
bombed with accuracy." These were followed by a number of dive bombers 
mi5S] and fighters which came in to strafe."' The five planes of the 20th 
Pursuit Squadron which were in process of taking off and the five which were 



»" This account follows History 24 Pur. Orp. (Doc. 1, App. II). 

"■ "Sallys" predominated in the early attacks over the Philippines and probably con- 
stituted the bulk of this formation. 

" These were "Zekes" and possibly "Nates." 



5328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Still on the ground were all destroyed. The four in the air, led by the squadron 
commander, Lt. J. H. Moore, went into combat at low altitude and shot down 
four of the attacking planes." The bomber formation laid a pattern which de- 
stroyed most of the hangars and buildings, as well as most of the B-17s and 
B-18s on the field. The dive bombers (probably Vals) then came in strafing 
and set fire to most of the planes which were in the blast pens.** One of the first 
bombs made a direct hit on the radio station on the field, so that it was impossible 
to contact the 17th and 34th Pursuit Squadrons, still on patrol over the area of 
Manila and Bataan. Finally another radio did make contact with the 17th 
Pursuit Squadron, but it arrived over Clark Field seventy miles to the north of 
Bataan, after all enemy planes had withdrawn; the 21st also arrived from Del 
Carmen after the attack was completed. By this time the 17th Pursuit Squad- 
ron was running short of gasoline, so it landed at Del Carmen. (Chart IV, 
App. I). 

In the absence of effective interception, the defence of Clark Field was left 
to the AAA. The field was defended by the 200th CA (AAA). Also a number 
of air corps crew members heroically went to their planes during the attack 
and fired the machine guns in the grounded aircraft at the attacking strafers. 
For outstanding heroism in such action, the Distinguished Service Cross was 
awarded to the following: Pfc. Joseph G. McElroy, T/Sgt. Anthony Holub and 
Pfc. Greely B. Williams (posthumously). When the hangar in which his plane 
was located was set on fire, 1st Lt. Fred T. Crimmins of the 19th Bombardment 
Group taxied his plane into the open, only to have it destroyed by enemy strafing, 
he being hit and wounded.*^ 

Also, despite the continuous attacks on Clark Field many risked the strafing to 
help the casuaties. Among others, several examples will be mentioned. Private 
Robert J. Endres secured an abandoned truck and through the midst of the bomb- 
ing and strafing made seven trips between the field and the station hospital, 
on each trip carrying a load of wounded.°° The 19th Bombardment Group 
Flight Surgeon, Maj. Luther C. Heidger, stayed in the open during the attack 
to treat the wounded. The Chaplain. 1st Lt. Joseph F. LaFleur administered 
religious rites to the wounded and dying throughout the attack, and helped 
to treat the wounded."" All of these were awarded the Distinguished Service 
Cross. 

Meanwhile, as the Srd Pursuit Squadron was running low on gasoline, it 
turned back toward Iba. There it found the formation which it had been 
unable to intercept. Fifty-four bombers and an unknown number of strafers 
were attacking the field. Despite being low on gasoline the P-40's pressed 
home the attack. They arrived too late to prevent the bombing, but did prevent 
strafing. Casualties on the field were, however, heavy. All of the installa- 
tions, including the radar, were destroyed. Five P-40's were shot down in 
the air, and eight planes on the ground were destroyed. In addition, it being 
impossible to land on the field, three P-40's ran out of gasoline and crash landed 
on the beach. The remainder of the formation landed at O'Donnel Field. 
Gasoline and ammunition was dispatched from stores remaining at Clark Field 
to supply these planes. (Chart IV, App. I). 

[1415^] Employment of Bombardment 

Information on the employment of the bombardment planes still on Clark 
Field is not complete. One B-17 took off at 1030 for reconnaissance of Eastern 
Luzon.°® All that is authorative concerning the remaining bombardment planes 
is that at the time of the alert at 0930 "all bombardment was dispatched from 
Clark Field. The 20th Pursuit Squadron returned to Clark Field and gave the 



o'G. O. No. 48 USAFFB, Dec. 21, 1941 (Doc. 18, App. II). The citation granting Lt. 
Moore of the 20th Pursuit Squadron the Distinsuifihed Service Cross credits him with 
leading his formation from the field on Deoemher 10. however, the events are those described 
in the History 2/,th Pur. Orp. and Journal 19th Bomb. Grp. (Docs. 1 and 11, App. II) as 
takincT place on the 8tli. 

"* The strafing planes probably included fighters ("ZeTces") in addition. Reports varied 
Cf. Histom Z'lth Pur. Gro. and Journal 19th Bomb. Orp. (Docs. I and II, App. II.) 

"5 G. a. No. 48, U8AFFE, Dec. 21. 1941 (Doc. 18, App. II) and GO. No. 2, Hq. Southwest 
Pacific Command. Lembang .Tava. Feb. 15, 1942 (Doc. 19, App. II). 

oo O. 0. No. /,R, USAFFE, Dec. 21, 1941 (Doc. 18. App. II). 

"GO No. 2. SWP. command. Lembang Java, Feb. 15. 1942 (Doc. 19, App. II). 

'^Journal 19th Bombardment Op. (Doc. 11, App. II). 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5329 

bombardment cover while they were landing." =' Thus, at 1130, all except the B-17 
which was still on reconnaissance over Eastern Luzon, and the twelve aircraft at 
Del Monte, were on Clark Field. 

Of the total of 22 B-17 aircraft on Clark Field at the time of the Japanese 
attack, fifteen were destroyed. Two or three of those on the field escaped damage 
and were operational the following day. An additional three or four were 
repaired and made operational later. 

The one B-17 to encounter enemy action in the air on December 8, was a 
plane which left Del Monte at 0930 for repairs at Clark Field. This plane was 
piloted by Lt. E'. E. Tash.™ It arrived over Clark Field while the field was under 
attack, and immediately started back for Del Monte. Three enemy pursuit at- 
tacked, and the rear gunner, S/Sgt. Michael Bibin, was severly wounded in both 
shoulders. The first news of what was taking place to the north reached Del 
Monte at 1700 when Carpenter called over his radio as he came in to land, "Have 
been exposed to enemy, have ambulance ready." '^ One Zero was believed shot 
down. 

Summary of Raids on Clark Field and IBA 

In these two raids the Japanese had effectively destroyed the striking power 
of the Far East Air Force, had seriously cut down the pursuit strength, had 
destroyed most of the maintenance facilities for the B-17's, and had inflicted a 
number of casualties. Our forces had been on the alert. They had not been 
caught as at Pearl Harbor, with planes not loaded. But the damage inflicted 
was great. 

Before the conclusion of the first twenty-four hours of the war in the Philip- 
pines, one more attack was launched by the Japanese — against Nichols Field 
and its installations. By Midnight telephonic communication was reestablished 
from Nielson Field to the plotting board at Clark Field and operation of the air 
warning system was resumed. Shortly after midnight one flight of the I7th 
Pursuit Squadron was dispatched to intercept an enemy formation. The dust 
at Del Carmen again hindered the takeoff and one pilot was killed. The re- 
maining four aircraft did not find the enemy formation in the dark, so no inter- 
ception was accomplished. Some time later, at 0315 a large enemy force appeared 
over Nichols Field. 

The first Japanese aircraft to be shot down during the war is ofl5cially credited 
to 2nd Lt. Randall D. Keator of the 80th Pursuit Squadron, stationed on Clark 
Field. Taking off while the field was under attack, Lt. Keator's plane was at- 
tacked by nine Japanese aircraft. Despite this disadvantage he shot down one 
of these. Later, during the general combat over Clark Field he shot down an- 
other, making his score for the day two.*" 

[14155] Air Situation on December 9th 

At the close of the first day's campaign under constant enemy attack, the Far 
East Air Force was badly mauled. Costly losses in men and equipment had been 
sustained. Over a third of the pursuit were lost, while more were out of com- 
mission. Of B-17S, the operational aircraft had been reduced from 33 to 15 or 16. 
Moreover, the planes lost were irreplaceable. Wake Island was under attack, 
which cut the ferry route for B-17s which had been flown in from Hawaii. The 
destruction of naval forces at Pearl Harbor ended the chance that convoys might 
bring in pursuit directly. Finally the destruction of hangars, depot facilities, 
and parts indicated that maintenance constituted a major problem; but the 
nearest place with even partial facilities was Australia. 

Reo7'ganization 

During the night the high command of the Far East Air Force reorganized the 
tactical units. Lt. Wagner's squadron, the 17th, was transferred to Clark Field 



^« History 2-', Pur. Op. (Doc. 1, App. II). There was a staff meeting of FEAF at the 
Headquarters at Neilsoii Field, which was attended by Captain Harold Eads and Captain 
Allison Ind, and others. General Brereton also went to GHQ. This is stated by Captain 
Eads. Statement of Colonel Eads (Doc. 10, App. II). GHQ, SWPA, records contain no 
information on the matter. A letter has been written through channels, Hq. AAF, Wash- 
ington, requesting Gen. Brereton for any information but no reply has been received, cf. 
Eeg. 30503, FEAF, Registered on 23 April 1944. 

^"Journal 19 Bomb Op. (Doc. 11, App. II). 

^^ Interview with Colonel Fry (Doc. 8, App. II). 

«»G. O. 48, USAFFE, Dec. 21, 1941 (Doc. 18, App. II). 

79716 — 46 — pt. 11 13 



5330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and brought to strength by transferring airplanes from the 3rd Pursuit. The 
rest of the 3rd was absorbed into the 34th at Nichols Field. As already noted, 
the third had practically been wiped out at Iba. It no longer functioned as a 
separate squadron from this date. At the same time the ground crews were 
attempting to repair the pursuit planes'', and the B-17s at Clark Field which 
had not burned. The reaction of ground personnel to the bombing had been good 
on the whole although some had taken to the hills and did not drift in until night. 
Most were working feverishly to salvage planes and parts. Gun crews had 
stuck to their posts. 

On December 9th the bombardment squadrons at Del Monte were employed as 
follows : One plane went on reconnaissance of the Davao Area, and then went 
up to Luzon, landing on the airdrome at San Marcelino. The plane was damaged 
by fire of our ground forces while landing. At 1430 seven other aircraft took ofC 
from Del Monte for San Marcelino, and also were fired on by our ground forces 
while landing, but no damage resulted. Six aircraft took off on a reconnais- 
sance mission for Catandanes Islands, off Southern Luzon, found no enemy action, 
and then flew into Clark Field at 1430 to be prepared for a mission the next day. 
Immediately upon landing they took off because of air raid alarm, and landed 
after dark. From Clark Field, at 0800, one plane attempted the reconnaissance 
mission to Formosa, but turned back because of engine trouble, and then stayed 
up until after dark to avoid enemy attack on the field.*^ 

On the night of December 9/10, reports were received of a large enemy convoy 
off Vigan and another off Aparri.*° It was accordingly planned to hit them with 
all the available air power on the following day. 



[I4I5G] SECBET 

HiSTOEY 
OP 

30th Bombardment Squadbon (H) 

19th Bombardment Group (H) 

Period Covering 

December 7th, 1941 to December 31 st, 1942 

[I4157] On the morning of 8 December 1941 (Philippine Time), word of 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was flashed to members of the 30th Bomb 
Squadron, then stationed at Clark Field, Manila. 

Major David R. Gibbs. the SOth's Commanding Officer, immediately ordered all 
crews to report to the flight line, and upon the disposal of preliminary prepara- 
tions, the Squadron's B-17s, geared for action, took to the air. 

Ground crews likewise were on the alert, for the Japs were expected to attack 
Clark Field within the next 20 minutes, according to reports received by the 30th, 
and everything was considered in readiness to repel the enemy when he struck. 

For more than 3 hours, the 30th's planes circled Mt. Aryat, flying in and out 
of cloud banks, soaring over the plains of Luzon, unsuccessfully seeking traces 
of the enemy. At approximately noon, Major Gibbs ordered the planes to land, 
and as they did, they were dispersed around Clark Field. Some crews were re- 
quested to stand by their ships, with the remainder instructed to obtain a hasty 
meal and report to Group Headquarters for briefing. 

Shortly thereafter — about 12.30 p. m. — came the Japs ! A low, whistling noise, 
resembling wind through the trees, grew louder and louder with devastating 
crescendo, and a deafening explosion rocked Clark Field, signalizing the beginning 
of the attack. Blast after blast shattered the earth and nearly everything upon 
it. The initial Jap formation of 54 bombers unloosed tons and tons of high 
explosives, following with merciless strafing. 

The entire attack lasted about 40 minutes, with casualties heavy, the field torn 
and wrecked, and only one or two of the 30th's B-17s remaining for service. 
Brilliant, individual deeds of heroism characterized the efforts of oflScers and 
enlisted personnel, but they could not stem the Japs in their relentless assault. 



w History 2/, Pur. Op. (Doc. 1, App. II), 
^Journal 19 Bomb. Op. (Doc. 11, App. II). 
•* Colonel Ind'8 Bataan Mas., pp. 260 ff. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5331 

Follow-up attacks were naturally expected, and that evening, Major Gibbs 
moved the 30th from the ban-acks on Clark Field, establishing headquarters on a 
small knoll in a cane field about a mile and one-half away. It was shortly 
thereafter that Major Gibbs, on a mission in a B-18, did not return, and the 
Squadron lost the first of its several war-time commanding oflQcers. 



[14158} CONTIDENTIAL E-21 

Headqttabters 3bo Aib Fobcb 

OflBce of the Commanding General 

Tampa, Florida 

Lt. Col. Lucius P. Okdway 

A-2 Section Army Air Force, Munitions Buildinff, Washington, D. C. 
Dear Colonbx: 

Inclosed is a summary of operations in the Southwest Pacific Area as I saw 
them. After reading over the interview which is on file there in Washington, it 
appeared to be a good idea to clarify and add to the report. The form admittedly 
is not so good, but in general includes everything that I could remember that 
might be of interest. 
Sincerely, 

W. P. FISHEB 

W. P. Fisher 
Major, Air Corps Asst. OS 

114159} SECEET 

Eepobt of Phiuppinb and Java Opebations 
By W. P. Fisher, Major, Air Corps 

I was assigned as a flight commander in a provisional squadron of nine combat 
and maintenance crews, equipped with 9 B-17D Airplanes, which was formed at 
Hickam Field, Hawaii, in August of 1941. This was composed of personnel and 
equipment drawn from the two tactical groups stationed there. Training of this 
provisional squadron was carried out until the first of September at which time it 
was designated as the Fourteenth Heavy Bombardment Squadron and the ground 
component of the Fourteenth added to the combat echelon. The air echelon left 
Hickam Field on September 5th with orders transferring it to Clark Field in 
the Philippine Islands. The first stop was made at Midway Island. The flight 
remained overnight continuing on to Wake Island the following day. The depar- 
ture from Wake Island to Port Moresby, New Guinea, was made about midnight 
the following night under conditions of radio silence, arriving at the destination 
the following afternoon. After a one-day lay over for maintenance, the squadron 
continued on to Darwin, Australia. Another day's lay over was made there for 
maintenance and awaiting weather information before the final hop to Clark 
Field in the Philippines. This was the first squadron of B-17's to arrive in the 
Philippines. Following arrival at Clark Field, we immediately began intensive 
unit tactical training in high altitude formation flying, navigation, bombing, and 
gunnery. Missions at this time were scheduled from 20,000 to 30,000 feet. 

About a month after our arrival, the 19th Group stationed at Albuquerque, New 
Mexico, was transferred to the Philippine Department and, following the same 
route, arrived about the middle of October with two combat and one Head- 
quarters Squadron and equipped with 25 B-17D Airplanes. Following arrival 
of the air and ground echelons of the 19th Group, all Philippine Bombardment 
units were consolidated into the 19th Group. The organization then consisted 
of the 30th, 93rd, 14th, and 28th combat squadrons and a Headquarters Squadron. 
All airplanes and equipment were evenly divided among them, giving 8 B-17's 
to each combat squadron and 3 in the Headquarters Squadron. At this time, I 
was relieved from assignment to the 14th Squadron and given command of the 
28th Squadron which had been stationed at Clark Field prior to our arrival. 



5332 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

By the first of December the international situation was quite grave and recon- 
naissance patrols were being run by both ourselves and the Japanese between 
Formosa and Lu/.on. Visual contact by the aircraft had been made several 
times. At about this time, the air echelon of the 93rd and 14th squadrons, consist- 
ing of the combat crews, some maintenance men, and all airplanes were sent to 
Del Monte on the Island of Mindanao, our alternate Heavy Bombardment Base; 
the 28th, 30th and Headquarters squadrons remaining at Clark field. This was 
the situation that existed on December 7, when the attack on Pearl Harbor 
occurred. The training of the entire group was at a high state ; all personnel was 
experienced and our equipment in good condition. 

The attack on Pearl Harbor occured about 3 : 00 o'clock the morning of the 8th, 
Philippine time. The report of the attack was received first, of course, 
[14160] by radio news broadcast and all personnel were aware of it by dawn 
or shortly thereafter. All airplanes at Clark Feld had been dispersed and in 
revetments for some time prior to this and the entire group was prepared to 
perform missions at any time. While awaiting orders, the first air warning was 
received around 8 : 00 o'clock that a formation of enemy bombers was proceeding 
in the direction of Clark Field. Immediately all flyable airplanes were taken 
off and flown away from the vicinity of the field to avoid their destruction. 
Sevei'al warnings were received during the morning of enemy formations but no 
attacks were made on Clark Field. At about 11 : 00 o'clock, we were all called 
back in as no further enemy aircraft were reported. After landing, orders were 
received to attack Air Bases on Southern Formasa at dusk. Preparations for this 
mission were being made when at about 12 : 30 a formation of 54 Heavy Japanese 
Bombers was seen approaching the field. No warning had been received from our 
radio locator stations of any enemy aircraft in the vicinity, so our entire strength 
of aircraft was caught on the ground in their dispersed positions with the excep- 
tion of one B-17 on patrol. It was later found that all communications to Clark 
Field had been cut by saboteurs and radio communications jammed by radio inter- 
ference. The formation had been detected by the radio locators, but they were 
unable to get warning to Clark Field. 

Numerous zigzag trenches approximately 2' wide and 5' deep had been con- 
structed by Colonel Maitland, the base Commander, in previous months in the 
vicinity of the hangars and working area. Also additional trenches had been 
constructed near the dispersed positions of the airplanes. Upon sighting the 
approaching formation, warning was given and most of the personnel were able to 
take cover in these trenches. There was approximately 5 minutes between the 
time the formation was first seen and the attack on Clark Field. The attack 
was made diagonally across the quarters and hangar area by two formations of 
27 Heavy Bombers. Each 27 plane formation Avas in the form of a giant Vee. 
The bombs used in the attack varied from 100 # bombs down to smaller frag- 
mentation bombs and were dropped in train covering the field from the quarters 
area through the hangar and shop area. I estimate that approximately 300 bombs 
were dropped in this attack. Following the bombing attack, a formation of 18 
fighters came in, individually attacking the dispersed B-17's and other aircraft 
with machine guns and cannon fire. This attack lasted approximately 40 min- 
utes. Very few airplanes had been destroyed by the bombing attack which 
was conducted from approximately 23,000' but all air planes were completely 
destroyed or filled with bullet holes by the fighter attack. During this attack 
approximately six P-40's of the squadron stationed at Clark Field were able to 
get off and engage the attacking fighters. The 200th Coast Artillery (an anti-air- 
craft regiment) was in position to defend Clark Field and also took the fighters 
under fire with 30 cal., 50 cal., and 37 mm. gun fire. The damage to Clark Field 
from this attack was great as the hangars, shore, supply buildings, and other 
installations were struck by bombs and numerous fires started. Personnel casual- 
ties were approximately 100 men and officers killed and 200 wounded. Nearly all 
of the casualties were persons who were taken by surprise and were unable to 
take cover in the trenches which had been provided. The Japanese intelligence 
apparently had been complete as they had attacked only the tactical airplanes and 
installations. 

Operations were begun immediately and missions carried oiit against enemy 
surface vessels and convoys by the two squadrons stationed at Del Monte. Japa- 
nese landings were made at Aparri, Legaspi and Vigan and were successful. 
These landings were made from a small number of transports accompanied by 
surface vesels and under the protection of gun fire from the vessels. . . . 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5333 

[I4I6I] Headquarters, Far East Air Forces (P) 

Historical Record 

Chron No. 40-11-1 to A-1132 Hist. No. 42-4-27 
Subject Class: History 

Title of Document : 24tli Pursuit Group in P. I. 

Date of Document : 10 October 1942. File 5AF A-1. "Rosters V Bomber Com- 
mand P. I. — Java File 

Type of Document : PAGES IMP. P PUB. S 

From: TO 

Typed by T. Leach Checked by 

Synopsis : True Copy. 

Headquartebs, Fifth Atk Force, 

Brisbane, Q. October 10, l9Ji2. 

Subject : Activity of the 24th Pursuit Group in the Philippines. 

On or about November 1, 1940, the 4th Composite Group in the Philippine 
Islands was reinforced by the 17th Pursuit Squadron of the 1st Pursuit Group, 
commanded by K. J. Gregg. Major, Air Corps, and the 20th Pursuit Squadron 
of the 35th Pursuit Group, commanded by OL Grover, Captain, Air Corps. At 
this time, the 4th Composite Group commanded by L. S. Churchill, Colonel, Air 
Corps, was based at Nichols Field. It consisted of the 28th Bombardment Squad- 
ron detached at Clark Field, the 2nd Observation Squadron detached at Clark 
Field, and the following Squadrons at Nicbols Field: Headquarters and Head- 
quarters Squadron, 3rd Pursuit Squadron, 17th Pursuit Squadron and 20th Pur- 
suit Squadron, all equipped with obsolete P-26 type aircraft. During the month 
of May, 1941, Colonel Churchill assumed command of Nichols Field, and K. J. 
Gregg, Major, Air Corps, assumed command of the 4th Composite Group. The 
28th Bombardment Squadron and the 2nd Observation Squadron were assigned 
to Clark Field. 

In May, 1941, the Group was re-equipped with P-35 type aircraft destined for 
Sweden, but diverted to the Philippine Islands. During July, 1941. due to the 
conditions at Nichols Field, i. e. east-west runway undergoing construction, and 
north-south runway being unusable due to lack of drainage, the 4th Composite 
Group (less 17th Pursuit Squadron) was transferred to Clark Field. The 17th 
Pursuit Squadron was transferred to Iba to undergo gunnery training at that 
station. During the montli of July, 1941, one Squadron was re-equipped with 
P-40B type aircraft, the other squadrons still being equipped with P-35s. At 
the same time, one hundred new pilots arrived from the training school in the 
States, and were assigned to the Group. It became necessary to train these 
pilots. A training unit was instigated at Clark Pield and pursuit training was 
given. On or about August 1, Major Gregg was transferred to the F. E. A. F., 
and O. L. Grover, Major, Air Corps, assumed command of the Group. During 
September the 17th Pursuit Squadron was transferred to Nichols Field and the 
3rd Pursuit Squadron was transferred to Iba for gunnery training. This move- 
ment was necessary iu order to make room for contemplated bombardment re- 
inforcements at ciark Field. Nichols Field's construction was not complete 
and was not satisfactory for operations. These conditions occasioned a high 
accident rate for the 17th Squadron. 

On October 1. 1941, the 4th Composite Group, less 3rd, 17th and 20th Squadrons 
was transferred to Clark Field and the 24th Pursuit Group was activated at Clark 
Field. The 24th Pursuit Group consisted of Headquarters and Headquarters 
Squadron, 3rd Pursuit Squardon. 17th Pursuit Squadron and 20th Pursuit Squad- 
ron. During the month of October. 3-5 new pilots just graduated from the train- 
ing schools in the States arrived and were assigned, bringing the Group to full 
T/O officers' strength. It was necessary to train these pilots for duty in combat 
units. 

During the month of November. 1941. the 21st Pursuit Squadron and the 34th 
Pursuit Squadron arrived from the United States. They were part of the 35th 
Pursuit Group. They were attached to the 24th Pursuit Group for diity and 
administration pending the arrival of the remainder of their Group. On Decem- 
ber 1. 1941, the Pursuit units were as follows : 

a. Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 24th Pursuit Group, Clark Field, 
commanded by Lieutenant W. D. Putnam. 

Ulil62] b. 3rd Pursuit Squadron, Iba, commanded by Lieutenant H. G. 
Thorne, equipped with P-40Es. 

c. 17th Pursuit Squadron at Nichols 'Field, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Boyd 
D. Wagner, equipped with P-40Es. 



5334 CONGRESSIONAL. INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

d. 20tli Pursuit Squadron at Clark Field, commanded by 1st Lieutenant J. H. 
Moore, equipped with P-40Bs. 

e. 2ist Pursuit Squadron at Del Carmen, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Sam 
Marrett, equipped with P-35s. 

f. 34th Pursuit Squadron at Nichols Field, commanded by 1st LieutenantW. E. 
Dyess, partially equipped with P-40Es. 

Airdromes available to pursuit were: Nichols Field, Nielson Field, Clark Field, 
Iba, Resales, Del Carmen ; under construction O'Donnel, San Fernando, Ternate. 
Other commercial fields in the Islands were unsuitable for fully loaded pursuit 
aircraft. 

Communications for aircraft warning: The aircraft warning system consisted 
of native air watches, who relayed their reports over the telephone to the 5th 
Interceptor Headquarters at Neilson. The reports were then relayed via tele- 
type to the plotting board at Clark Field. One R. D. F. set was installed at Iba, 
one set in process of installation 60 miles west of Aparri and the third set was 
en route to Legaspi for installation. Delay in time for the relaying of messages 
due to telephone communications was from five to twenty-five minutes. 

From November 15, due to the tense international situation, all pursuit air- 
craft were fully loaded, armed and on constant alert 24 hours each day with 
pilots available on 30 minutes notice. On December 6, General Brereton held 
a conference and stated that war was imminent. At this time all units were 
placed completely on the alert with all combat crews, enlisted men and officers 
constantly ready for duty. 

On the night of December 7, the status report had shown : 

The 3rd Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-40Es in commission; 

The 17th Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-40Es in commission; 

The 20th Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-40Es in commission ; 

The 21st Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-35s in commission; 

The 34th Pursuit Squadron had 18 P-40Es in commission, 
giving the Group a total of 54 P-40Es, 18 P-40Bs and 18 P-35s in commission. 

The 34th Squadron received their last P-40E from the Depot on the evening 
of December 7. This squadron was unable to slow time all of the engines, bore- 
sights or check guns. 

During the period November 30 to December 6 all squadrons were undergoing 
intensive training in interception and gunnery. The squadrons were doing train- 
ing in conjunction with bombardment in day and night interception in coordina- 
tion with the anti-aircraft. 

Throughout the gunnery camp at Iba an extreme amount of difficulty was 
experienced in malfunctioning of the guns due to improper adjustment and nial- 
installation. In order to properly function it was imperative that all gun installa- 
tions should be modified. 

During the period December 2 to December 6, for four consecutive nights an 
enemy aircraft was sighted over Clark Field at approximately 5: 30 a. m. After 
the first sighting, instructions were given to force the aircraft to land or destroy it. 
On the three succeeding nights it was impossible to make the interception, due 
to inability to see the aircraft in the dark or the aircraft not getting close enough 
to be picked up by the searchlights. On the fifth morning all aircraft were kept 
on the ground and the anti-aircraft alerted for the interception ; however, no 
aircraft were located. During the same period enemy aircraft were tracked over 
Iba by the radar set. 

[V^t6!i^ On December 8th approximately 3:30 a. m. the commercial radio 
station at Clark Field intercepted a message from Pearl Harbor, reference the at- 
tack there. Unable to verify this interception no official action was taken other 
than notifying the Base Commander. However, all units were ordered to constant 
stations. 

At approximately 4 a. m. the radar at Iba reported a formation of unidentified 
aircraft approximately 75 miles off the cost heading towards Corregidor. The 
3rd Pursuit Squadron was dispatched for the interception. No interception was 
accomplished. However, the tracks on the plotting table showed that the inter- 
ception was successful and the formation of unidentified aircraft swung off to 
the west going out of range of the radar. This interception was hampered by 
darkness and a lack of altitude data from the radar, i. e. it is thought that the 
pursuit went underneath the formation of unidentified aircraft. At approximately 
4:45 official confirmation that a state of war existed was received. The 3rd 
Pursuit squadron returned to Iba, landed, regassed and went to Stations. 

At approximately 9:30, a large force of bombers over Lingayen was reported 
heading towards Manila. The 20th Pursuit Squadron was immediately dis- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5335 

patched for the interception over Rosales. The 17th Pursuit Squadron was 
immediately dispatched from Nichols Field to cover Clark Field. The inter- 
ception was not successful. The bombers proceeded on a course until approxi- 
mately 30 miles north of Kosales then made a turn to the northeast and proceeded 
to Baguio, bombed Baguio and Tagagarau and departed for the north. At the 
time the 20th took off all bombardment were dispatched from Clark Field. The 
20th returned to Clark Field and gave the bombardment cover while they were 
landing. Botli the 20th and the 17th then landed, regassed and went on the 
alert. 

At approximately 11 : 30 a large formation of bombers was reported over the 
China Sea headed for Manila. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron was dispatched for 
the interception. Uncertainties of time and place factors, due to the delay in 
communications, making it doubtful whether the 3rd would accomplish the inter- 
ception, the 17th was dispatched to cover Bataan, and the 34th was placed on 
standing patrol over Manila. At approximately 11 : 45 an unidentified report 
was received of a bombardment formation over Lingayen Gulf, headed south. 
The 20th not having completed gassing was not able to take off to investigate. 
At approximately 11 : 45 the 21st Pursuit Squadron was dispatched to cover Clark 
Field. At 12 : 15 the 20th completed gassing and was ordered to cover Clark 
Field. At 12 : 20 54 bombers and an undetermined number of dive bombers 
attacked Clark Field. The 20th Pursuit Squadron was in the process of taking 
ofe when the attack came. Four of their aircraft had cleared the ground. 
Another five were destroyed in the process of taking off by the bombardment! 
The remaining five were destroyed by straffing after the bombardment attack. 
The unidentified plot mentioned above proved to be the bombardment formation 
approaching Clark Field. Communications break down prevented proper iden- 
tification. At the time of the attack on Clark Field four squadrons of pursuit 
were in the air and the fifth in the process of taking off. Due to a direct hit on 
the center of communications at Clark Field, ground-to-air control was destroyed 
and thus no control could be maintained of the fighters in the air. 

The 3rd Pursuit Squadron, which had been dispatched for the interception over 
the China Sea, failed to make the interception and was notified of another raid 
approaching Iba, by the ground station at Iba. The radar set at Iba was plotting 
the approaching raid and relaying to the central plotting room at Neilson airport. 
However, due to a breakdown in communications these plots were never received 
at Neilson. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron returned to Iba and as they were circling 
the field 54 enemy bombers and an unknown number of dive bombers accom- 
panying them approached the field. These were immediately attacked by the 
3rd Pursuit Squadron. In the ensuing engagement one bomber and a number of 
strafers were claimed to have been destroyed. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron lost 
in the air five P-40s and although not preventing the bombardment of Iba did 
prevent the straffing. After the withdrawal of the enemy, three additional air- 
craft (P-40S) were forced to crash land on the beaches due to their gas supply 
being exhausted. The remainder of the squadron proceeded to O'Donnel airport 
and landed; they remained there until ammunition and gas were dispatched 
from Clark Field to reload and regas this squadron. The installations and air- 
craft on the ground at Iba were completely destroyed by enemy bombardment 
There were approximately eight airplanes on the ground at the time of the attack 
which were out of condition due to maintenance, engine change etc 

The 17th Pursuit Squadron over Bataan proceeded towards Clark Field but 
upon arrival there the enemy had withdrawn. The 17th, unable to contact the 
ground station, proceeded to Del Carmen and landed. The 21st Squadron was 
greatly delayed in taking off due to the excessive amount of dust on the field 
and made no interception. The 34th Squadron patroUed Manila area and landed 
at Nichols Field at the completion of the mission. 
[U164] Chron No. 10-41-6-44 D-1052 

- '.^ Headquarters, Fifth Air Force 

« K-s^ 4- r^^ r^ • ^- Historical Record 

Subject Class : Communications. 

Title of Document: Record of an interview with Major Heald, Communications 

OfBcer, Fifth Air Service Command. 
Date of Document : 15 May, 1944. 
File No. : Interview. 

Type of Document : Statement. Pages , Imp. Pub S 

From To 

Extract : Typed by C. Lutton. Checked by 1_I IIIIIIIl" 



5336 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Recobd of an Interview With Major Heald, Communications Officek, Fifth 
AiB FoECE Seevice Command 

15 May, 1944. 
******* 

When the Fifth Air Base Group came to the Philippines about 15 November 
1941, it was transferred from Manila to Mindinao where it established an air- 
drome at Del Monte. Lieut. Heald with nine men from the 19th Bombardment 
Group Hdq. Sq., and a large mobile radio truck, proceeded to Del Monte with the 
Fifth Air Base Group arriving at that base 1st December 1941. Base communi- 
cations were set up and radio communications established from Del Monte back 
to Clark Field and Nielson Field during the week from 1 December to 8 December 
1941. 

At the time of the attack upon the Philippines, Lieut. Heald received the first 
message radioed to Del Monte from General Headquarters, which he immediately 
related to Captain Gee (now Lieut Col) then adjutant of the Fifth Air Base 
Group. This was signed "MacArthur" and was received at approximately 0630 
and it read : "Hostilities have begun. All Airdromes alert". Five minutes later 
another message arrived from Lieutenant Colonel Eubank with about the same 
wording. 

* ****** 

During the 1 after part of December 1941 and all of January 1942, Lt. Brownwell 
made daily reconnaissance flights in a P-40 over Davao harbor which fell to the 
Japanese the first week of the war. 

This information (visual only as he had no photographic equipment) was sent 
by radio to General MacArthur — Great quantities of supplies and ships of all 
sorts were visible on the bay and in the harbor. At the time of the naval battle 
in Macassar Sts., 1 February to 6 February 1942, approximately fifty ships were 
in Davao Harbor — i. e. destroyers, ci'uisers, aircraft carriers, and cargo vessels. 
Several attempts were made by the enemy to follow Lt. Brownwell and locate 
the strip from which he operated, but he always managed to elude them and land 
on a strip that could not be found. 

There were no radio communications between strips on Mindanao. The only 
means of communication was over the Philippine Commonwealth telephone lines 
which were very unsatisfactory. 



mreS] 15 Januaby 1946. 

Memorandum for Lt. Colonel Duncombe. 
Subject : Organization of the Far East Air Force 

1. Inclosed herewith is the material you requested concerning the organization 
of the air force in the Philippines at the outbreak of the war. 

2. Inclosure No. 1 is a copy of a 4 August 1941 order stating that the Air Force, 
United States Army Forces in the Far East "will operate directly under" the 
Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East. Inclosure 
No. 2 is a 14 November 1941 order merely changing the name of the Air Force, 
United States Army Forces in the Far East to "Far East Air Force." 

3. Inclosure No. 3 is a chart showing the relationship of the principal air and 
ground commanders in the Philippines to General MacArthur. Inclosure No. 4 
is a chart giving in more detail the organization and location of the various air 
units in the Philippines. Inclosure No. 5 is a list of air force commanders in the 
Philippines at the outbreak of the war. The inclosures referred to in this para- 
graph have been recently prepared on the basis of records on file in the AAF 
Historical Office, Headquarters Army Air Forces and records in the possession of 
the Adjutant General. 

/s/ Joseph B. Mitchell, 

Lt. Colonel OSC. 
mi66] 5 Incls 

1. Cy of order dtd 4 Aug 41 

2. Cy of order dtd 14 Nov 41 

3. Chart air & gd comdrs in the Phil 

4. Chart Orgn of FEAF 

5. T,ist of Air Force rmdrs. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5337 

Ohron. No."41-8-^ D-1034 Headquarters, Fifth Air Force 

Historical Record 
Subject Class : Organization — Units 
Title of Document : Redesignation of Air Force 
Date of Document : 4 August 1941 File No. USAFFE 300.4 
Type of Document : General Order 

(Typed by O. Lutton) 
True Copy. 

Headquarters, 
Unitejd States Army Forces in the Far Bast, 

Manila, P. L, 4 August IdJfl. 
General Orders. No. 4. 

The Philippine Department Air Force as now constituted, Brigadier General 
Henry B. Clagett (0-2152), United States Army, Commanding, and such other 
units and installations as may be assigned to it, are hereby constituted as the 
Air [H161'\ Force, United States Army Forces in the Far East. It will 
operate directly under the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in 
the Far East, except for routine administration and supply, which will continue 
through Headquarters Philippine Department. 

By Command of Lieutenant General MacARTHUR : 

R. K. Sutheirland, 
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry, 

Acting Chief of Staff. 
Official : 

/s/ Carl H. Seals 

Colonel, A. G. D., 
Acting Adjutant General. 
True Copy 

/e/ Manning J. Dauer 

C apt. Air Corps. 



Chron No. 41-11-14 D-1051 

Headquarters Fifth Air Force 
Historical Record 
Subject Class — Organizations — Units 
Title of Document — General Order 
Date of Document— 14 November, 1941 File No. USAFFE— G. O. 

(Typed by C. Lutton) Extract 
Copy Heiadquarters, 

United States Army Forces in the Far East, 
[UIGS^ Manila, P. I., IJ, Novemher, 1941. 

General Orders No. 28 

1. Pursuant to authority contained in letter, War Department, October 28, 
1941, File AG 320.2 (10-20-41) MR-M-AAF, to this headquarters, effective No- 
vember 16, 1941, the following changes in Air Force Units of the command are 
announced : 

a. The Air Force, United States Army Forces in the Far East is effective this 
date, redesignated as "Far East Air Force". 

b. Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron. United States Army Forces in 
the Far East, effective this date, is redesignated as Headquarters and Head- 
(luarters Squadron, Far East Air Force. 

By command of Lieutenant General MacARTHUR 

E. K. Sutherland 
Brigadier General, GSC. 

Chief of Staff 
Official : 

Carl H. Seals, 
Colonel, A. G. D. 



5338 CONGKESSIONAL INVESTIGATION FEAKL HARBOR ATTACK 






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UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES 
FAR EAST 



AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 



Fab East 

Ala FoRcu 

(Nldson Field) 



5th iDterceptor 

Command 
(Nlelsoo Field) 



5th Bomber 

Command 

(NlelBon Field) 



Far East Air 
Service Command 
(NIelson Field) 



24th Pursuit 

Group 
(Clark Field) 



19th Bombardment 
Group (M) 
(Clark Field) 



27th Bombardment 

Group (L) 

(Nielsen Field) 



Phil. Air 
Depot 
(?«ielson 
Field) 



III 

5th Air Base 

Group 

(Del Monte 

Field) 



m 

20th Air Base 

Group 
(Nichols 

Field) 



in 

36th Air Base 
Group 
(NIelson 
Field) 



Sd Pursuit 
Squadron 
(Iba Field) 



n 

17th Pursuit 
Squadron 
(Nichols 
Field) 



20th Pursuit 

Squadron 
(Ourk Field) 



u 

21 St Pursuit 

Squadron 

(Del Carmen 

Field) 



II 

34th Pursuit 

Squadron 

(Nichols 

Field) 



14th Bomb 

Squadron 

(Del Monte 

Field) 



28th Bomb 

Squadron 

(Clark Field) 



30th Bomb 

Squadron 

(Clark Field) 



II 

93d BomI) 

Squadron 

(Del Monte 

Field) 



16th Bomb 

Squadron 

• (No planes) 



17th Bomb 

Squadron 

• (No planes) 



9lBt Bomb 

Squadron 

•(No planes) 



n 

2d Obsn. 

Squadron 
(Nichols 
Field) 



'Planes en route, did not arrive. Diverted to Aoatralia. 
79716 — 46 — pt. 11 (Faces p. 5338) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5339 

[I417I] Commanders of Aib Force Units in the Philippines at the Out- 

BBEAK OF THE WAB 

1. Far East Air Force (Nielson Field) — Maj. Gen. L. H. Brereton 

2. 5th Interceptor Command (Nielson Field) — Brig. Gen. H. B. Clagett 

3. 24th Pursuit Group (Clark Field)— Maj. O. L. Grover 

3rd Pursuit Squadron (Iba Field) 1st Lt. H. G. Thorne 

17th Pursuit Squadron (Nichols Field) — 1st Lt. B. D. Wagner 

20th Pursuit Squadron (Clark Field)— 1st Lt. J. H. Moore 

21st Pursuit Squadron (Del Carmen Field)— 1st Lt. W. B. Dyess 

34th Pursuit Squadron (Nichols Field)— 1st Lt. S. H. Marett 

4. 5th Bomber Command ( Nielson Field ) — Lt. Col. E. L. Eubank 

5. 19th Bombardment Group (H) (Clark Field)— Lt. Col. Eubank 

14th Bombardment Squadron (Del Monte Field — Maj. Emmett O'Don- 

nell, Jr. 
28th Bombardment Squadron (Clark Field) — Maj. W. P. Fisher 
30th Bombardment Squadron (Clark Field)— Maj. D. R. Gibbs 
93rd Bombardment Squadron (Del Monte Field) — Maj. C. E. Combs 

6. 27'th Bombardment Group (L) (Nielson Field) — Maj. J. H. Davies 

16th Bombardment Squadron — Capt. W. G. Hipps 
mi72} 17th Bombardment Squadron— 1st Lt. H. F. Lowery 
91st Bombardment Squadron — 1st Lt. W. E. Eubank 

7. 2nd Observation Squadron (Nichols Field) — Capt. J. Y. Parker 

8. Far East Air Service Command (Nielson Field) — Col. L. S. Churchill 

9. Philippine Air Depot (Nielson Field) — Lt. Col. W. N. Amis 

10. 5th Air Base Group (Del Monte Field) Maj. R. T. Elsmore 

11. 20th Air Base Group (Nichols Field)— Maj. W. H. Maverick 

12. 36th Air Base Group (Nielson Field) 

(It is believed that this was only a small detachment. The bulk of the 
group and its equipment went to Australia and never reached the Philip- 
pines. The detachment commander is believed to have been Capt. Waller.) 

13. Clark Field— Maj. M. J. Daly 

14. Del Carmen Field— 1st Lt. S. H. Marett 

(Lt Marett is also listed above as the Commanding Officer of the 34th 
Pursuit Squadron of the 24th Pursuit Group.) 

15. Del Monte Field — Maj R. T. Elsmore 

(Maj. Elsmore is also listed above as the Commanding Oflacer of the 5th 
Air Base Group) 

16. Iba Field— 1st Lt. H. G. Thorne 

(Lt. Thorne is also listed above as the Commanding [14173] Officer 
of the 3rd Pursuit Squadron of the 24th Pursuit Group) 

17. Nichols Field— Maj. W. H. Maverick 

(Maj. Maverick is also listed above as the Commanding Officer of the 
20th Air Force Group) 

18. Nielson Field 

(This field was not an operational field. It will be noted that only head- 
quarters units, or units which did not have their planes or equipment are 
listed as being stationed at this field. 

[14-^74] Mr. Morgan. "We have a series of communications from 
the Federal Communications Commission, dated February 11, 14, and 
18, 1946, concerning the matter of monitoring by the Federal Com- 
munications Commission at Hawaii for a "winds execute" message. 
Inasmuch as this question came up during the interrogation with re- 
spect to this matter, we would like to have these communications, which 
are from Mr. G. E. Sterling, Assistant Chief Engineer, together with 
enclosures, spread on the record at this point. 

The Vice Chairman. They will be spread on the record at this 
point. 



5340 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(The communications referred to follow :) 

[1/(175] Federal Communications Commission, 

Wa.shmgton 25, D. C, February 11, 1946. 
Mr. Seth Richardson, 

General Counsel, Pearl Harhor Investigatino Committee, 
Washington, D. C. 
(Attention: Mr. Morgan.) 
Dear Sir : Replies have been received from all officers who were in charge of 
the Commission's activities in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, in which they all 
state that they were not requested by any representatives of the military au- 
thorities in Hawaii to monitor for the "winds" execute message prior to December 
7, 1941. 
Copies of their statements are attached to this communication. 
Sincere] .V yours, 

(sgd) G. E. Sterling 
G. E. Sterling 
Assistant Chief Engineer. 
Attachments 



February 7, 1946. 
From : Supervisor H. A. M. A. 
[141761 To : Chief, R. I. D. 
Subject: "Winds Messages" 

My memorandum dated February 4, 1946, contained a blanket denial that any 
request to monitor for the so-called "Winds Messages" was received from the 
Army or the Navy prior to December 7, 1941. 

This is a repetition of that denial with the added statement that Col. Bicknell 
did not contact me (or any member of my staff) between November 28 and 
December 7, 1941, to request that we monitor for the "winds Messages" by making 
intercepts of .Japanese radio transmissions. 

/s/ Lee R. Dawson 



Radio Inteixigence Division, 
609 Stangenwald Bldg., Honolulu, T. H., February 4, 1946. 
From : Supervisor, H. A. M. A. 
To : Chief, R. I. D. 
Subject: "Winds Messages" 

I, Lee R. Dawson, Supervisor, Radio Intelligence Division, Federal Communica- 
tions Commission, Hawaiian Monitoring Area, do hereby affirm and state that 
the following statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief: 

(1) That I was actively in charge of the National [14177} Defense 
Operations Section of the Federal Communications Commission in the Hawaiian 
Islands from November 1, 1940, to December 7, 1941. 

(2) That no request was received by me or by any member of my staff from 
the Army or the Navy prior to December seventh, 1941, to monitor for the so- 
called "Winds Messages." 

/s/ Lee R. Dawson. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of February, A. D. 1946. 
[sea-l] /s/ Elbert D. Kwashigi, 

'Notary Public, Third Judicial Circuit, Territory of Hawaii. 

My commission expires June 80, 1949. 



Feb. 5, 1946. 
From : Earl A. Nielsen, Kealakekua, T. H. 
To : Chief, R. I. D. 
Subject : "Winds" Messages. 

I, Earl A. Neilsen, affirm and state that to the best of my knowledge and 
belief no request to monitor for "Winds" messages was received by me from 
the Army or the Navy prior to December 7th, 1941. I was employed as Assistant 
Monitoring Officer at HA-2, Hawaii National Park from July 1st, 1941 thru 
December 7th, 1941. 

Earl A. Nielsen. 



PKOCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMI'lTEE 5341 

Februaky 5, 1946. 
Mr. George E. Sterling, 

Federal Communications Commission, [lJfl78] Washington, D. G. 

Dear Mr. Sterling :1am writing to confirm our telephonic conversation of 
last night regarding matters pertinent to the Pearl Harbor Investigation. As 
you know, I w^as Inspector in Charge of the Engineering Department's Field 
Division ofiice in Honolulu from November 1940 to December 1945. At no time 
prior to December 7, 1941, was I contacted by G-2 of the Army, or by any other 
government office, with a request that my department make recordings or 
monitoring runs of radio broadcasts for the purpose of intercepting the so-called 
"winds" message from Japan. 

As I now recall, I was told by one Frank Santos, who operated a pleasure 
fishing boat out of Honolulu, that he had aboard a fishing party on the morning 
of Dec. 7, 1941. Amongst the fishermen were some Army oflBcers who became 
exasperated when their craft was strafed by the Japs because they thought 
the planes were our own and they were making their practice runs a bit too 
realistic. I was personally monitoring the 2638 ke band that morning and 
heard Santos ask the the Coast Guard station NMO for permission to enter the 
harbor. It was apparent from the conversation from NMO that personnel 
at the station did not realize that we were being attacked at the time. 

Tours truly, 
Ii^i75] (sgd) John H. Homsy. 

P. S. I trust that you can read this letter which is written at my bedside. 

73 
JHH 



Fedekal Communications Commission, 

Radio Intelligence Division, 
Honolulu 1, T. H., February 7, 19^6. 
Secret Via Clipper Airmail 

From : Assistant Supervisor, HA-P, Honcilulu, T. H. 
To : Chief, Radio Intelligence Division 
Subject: February radiogram 072007 BUSY SHIP 

In your message of February 7, 1946 it was requested that a written state- 
ment be prepared by Mr. Dawson, Mr. Wagner and Mr. Klima concerning a 
"so called" request to the Honolulu office of the FCC for intercepts of Japanese 
transmissions containing "winds messages" between November 28, 1941 and 
December 7, 1941. • 

I make the following statement: I, Tom B. Wagner, Assistant Supervisor, 
HA-P, can not recall any request made by Col. Bicknell, G-2, Honolulu, Hawaii, 
or other military personnel between November 28, 1941 and December 7, 1941 
to the FCC for Japanese intercepts [l/flSO] containing "Winds Messages". 
No written record can be found in the HA-P files for such a request. 

Such a request as this would require a clearance from the FCC office in Wash- 
ington, D. C, before such information could be furnished Col. Bicknell. No record 
of such a request can be found. 

Tom B. Wagner. 



Federal Communications Commission, 

Engineering Department, 
Radio Intelligence Division, 

February 6, 1946. 
To : Chief Radio Intelligence Division 

From : Monitoring Officer in Chg. Unit HA-3, Koloa Kauia TH 
Subject: Army/Navy monitoring requests re: Japanese winds message prior 

Dec 7 1941. 
Ref : Relative information requested Chief's Radiogram. 

This unit was placed in service March nineteenth 1941. The unit was located, 
temporary set up, at Lihue Kauai. Relocation of the unit to the National Guard 
Armory Hanapepe Kauai was completed April first 1941. 

The only office of military representation on the island of Kauai knovsm by 
this unit was that of the U S Army. 



5342 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[14^81} The commanding officer was contacted in person by myself, and 
information given as to our location, our aim and purpose in monitoring, and 
service rendered. 

As officer in charge of this unit between the dates of March nineteenth 1941 
and that of December eighth, 1941, and cognizant of all requests made for service 
at this unit by either the U. S. Army or Navy during this period, can state, that 
to the best of my knowledge neither the U. S. Army or Navy made a request for 
the monitoring of Japanese broadcasts for the interception of "winds message". 
This unit's official case record file substantiates the above statement. 

/s/ Theodore H. Tate 
Theodore H. Tate 
Monitoring Officer. 



Wae Department 
Foreign Broadcast Inteuuqence Service 

Field Division 
February 5, 1946. 

From : Waldemar M. E:iima, P. O. Box FF, Kekaha, Kauai, T. H. 
To : Mr. George E. Sterling, Chief, RID, Washington 25, DC 
Subject : Your request re the Winds message. 

This afternoon I received the following message by telephone from the HA-3, 
RID, unit near Koloa, Kauai, T. H. 

[14182] "Chief wants airmail statements from you and Klima regarding 
whether Army and Navy requested you to monitor for winds message from 
Tokyo prior to December 7th" 

The message was apparently a paraphrase by King (Wagner of HA-P) of 
Busy's message received from Washington. 

My statement follows : I am sufficiently certain to state that I personally did 
not receive a written, telephoned, or verbal request from any representative or 
any of the military agencies (Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, or Marines) 
on Oahu to monitor for a "Winds message" or any other specific or general mon- 
itoring request in the period of a week prior to December 7, 1941. Neither am I 
aware of any such request having been received by any one of the other HA-P 
or HA-1 staff members. No announcement of such a monitoring request was 
made verbally or in written posted form by the officers in charge of monitoring 
activities in the Punchbowl in Honolulu, T. H. 

(signed) Waldemar M. EHima 
Waldemar M. Klima 



# Fedebal Commttnications Commission 

Washington 25, D. C, February 14, 1946. 
Mr. Seth Richardson, 

[I4I8S] General Counsel, Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee, Wash- 
ington, D. C. 
Attention : Mr. Morgan 

Dew^r Snt: I have previously furnished you with statements received from 
responsible representatives of the Federal Communications Commission, who 
were on duty in Hawaii prior to December 1941, in which they stated that they 
had not been contacted by Colonel Bicknell for the purpose of engaging in moni- 
toring Japanese broadcast transmissions for the purpose of intercepting the 
"WINDS" message. 

I now enclose an affidavit made by an employee of the Federal Communications 
Commission, Mr. A. Prose Walker, in which he states that Colonel Bicknell on 
two occasions approached him for the purpose of ascertaining if he had any 
knowledge of Japanese radio stations under surveillance by the FCC, one of the 
inquiries being directed specifically to the "WINDS" message. 

It is very difficult for me to understand why Colonel Bicknell should make 
affidavit to the effect that he did contact FCC representatives for the purpose 
of intercepting the "WINDS" message when our own employees in responsible 
positions indicate they have no knowledge of such a contact. 

It is also difficult for me to understand why Colonel [I4I84'] Bicknell 
endeavored to ascertain information from Mr. Walker on the same subject on 
two occasions. 

I am also enclosing the original sworn statement made by Mr. Lee R. Dawson, 
a copy of which was furnished you with the other papers. Mr. Dawson was. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5343 

prior to December 7, 1941, and continues in charge of our Monitoring Activities 
in Hawaii. 

Very truly yours, 

G. E. Sterling 
/s/ G. E. Sterling 
Assistant Chief Engineer-. 
Enclosures. 

Office Memoeandum United States Government 

Februakt 13, 1946. 
To : Mr. Sterling 
From : Mr. Walker 

I recall that on two occasions I was approached by Army personnel relative 
to any interceptions which the FCC had made of Japanese transmissions prior 
to or on December 7, 1941. Before the departure of Colonel G. W. Bicknell, 
Assistant A. C. of S., G2 C. I. D., from the Hawaiian Department, I have a vague 
recollection that he asked me if I had any knowledge of the Japanese radio 
stations under surveillance at FCC monitoring stations in Hawaii. My reply 
was that I had no knowledge of the matter inasmuch as I was [14185] not 
present in Hawaii at that time, having arrived on March 2, 1942. I probably 
referred him to Mr. Dawson. I do not recall that any mention was made of 
the "WINDS" message. 

I entered on duty as Chief, Technical Operations Section, RID, on July 7, 
1944. Sometime during either July or August of that year, I had lunch witli 
Colonel G. W. Bicknell and he again mentioned the subject of the FCC intercept- 
ing any messages on or prior to December 7, 1941. I recall that during this 
conversation he specifically mentioned the "WINDS" message. Having no 
knowledge whatever at that time of such a message, my answer to Colonel 
Bicknell was that I knew nothing about it. 

/s/ A. Prose Walker. 

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 13th day of February, 1946. 
[sEAi] /s/ Hexen A. Makston 

Notary Public 



Federal Communications Commission 
Washington 25, D. C, February 18, 1946. 
Mr. Seth Richardson 

General Counsel, Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee, Washington, D. C. 
[14186'\ Attention: Mr. Morgan 

Dear Sib: There is submitted herewith additional information received from 
the Supervisor of the Hawaiian Monitoring Area of the Radio Intelligence Divi- 
sion, relative to Colonel Bicknell's affidavit relating to the "WINDS" message. 
Very truly yours, 

/s/ G. E. Sterling 

G. E. STEau^iNG 
Assistant Chief Engineer. 
Enclosure 



Federal Communications Commission, 

Radio Inteixigence Divtcsion 
Honolulu 1, T. H., February 11, 1946. 
From: Supervisor, Hawaiian Monitoring Area 
To : Chief, Radio Intelligence Division 
Subject : Col. Bicknell's Affidavit. 

Following my return this date from an exploratory survey trip around the 
island of Hawaii I have reviewed the correspondence between your office and 
HA-P during my absence and I believe the following remarks will shed some light 
on this controversy. 

[1^187] In the first place, there is absolutely no evidence on hand to bear 
out Col. Bicknell's statement that he (1) contacted the local FCC intercept sta- 
tion in Hawaii, (2) requested them to monitor for "winds messages" and (3) 
that intercepts were furnished him but were not what he was looking for. If Col. 



5344 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Bicknell had contacted HA-P he would normally have talked to either Mr. 
Wagner or myself. Neither one of us remembers any such call. If a request had \ 
been received by any of the HA-P stafiE to monitor for "winds messages" it would 
certainly have been brought to the attention of either Mr. Wagner or myself 
and such an unusual request would certainly have remained in our memories. 

Furthermore, if such a request had been received calling for the release of 
intercepted material, authorization would first have been obtained from your 
office before such release was made. Attention is called, in this regard, to the 
fact that the Navy made a request that HA-P participate in a direction finder 
problem during the latter part of November 1941 and that your office was im- 
mediately notified and authority requested before bearings were released to 
the Navy. 

With regard to the third point, I should like to ask what kind of intercepts 
we are supposed to have furnished him. I believe that we could show quite 
clearly that no intercepts were furnished Col. Bicknell. I suspect that, [I^ISS] 
if pressed on this point, he would describe the translations of the JZI inter- 
cepts which we furnished the Office of Naval Intelligence from May through 
December 1941. I refer to the Japanese propaganda broadcasts which we 
recorded and which were translated by ONI translators. Copies of these inter- 
cepts were furnished the FBI and the Office of Military Intelligence. No request 
for special monitoring with regard to these intercepts, or any other) was received 
from either the ONI or the MID during the period between November 28 and 
December 7, 1941. 

One other point comes to mind. You will remember that when I arrived in 
Washington during July 1943 on special detail, I reported verbally to you that 
Lt. Col. Henry Christian Clausen of the Judge Advocate General's Department, 
Army of the United States, had contacted me in Honolulu just prior to my de- 
parture and had specifically asked if Col. Bicknell had not requested us to do 
some monitoring just prior to December 7, 1941. Lt. Col. Clausen was very vague 
as to just what monitoring Col. Bicknell asked us to do and made no claim that 
the request had been to monitor s.pecifically for the "winds message". Both Mr. 
Wagner and I answered Lt. Col. Clausen in the negative and said then, as we do 
now, that we could recollect no such request from Col. Bicknell. 

That is all I can add to the story. I believe it was [lJfl89] during July 
1943 that I first learned that there was any such thing as a "winds message". I 
am absolutely certain that no request to monitor for such a message was received 
at HA-P prior to December 7, 1941. 

/s/ Lbb R. Dawson. 

[14190] Mr. Morgan. We have a telegram, dated August 16, 
1941, in five sections, from former Ambassador Grew, to the State 
Department. This telegram includes the substance of telegrams sent 
to the British Foreign Office by the British Ambassador reporting 
his conversation on August 11 with the Japanese Foreign Minister. 
The release of this document has been cleared with the British, and we 
request that it be spread on the record at this point with the observa- 
tion that in a note from the State Department liaison officer, dated 
January 9, 1946, he indicates : 

The British Government has agreed to the use of the attached telegram No. 123.5 
from Tokyo August 16, 1941. It points out an error in section 2, paragraph (A), 
fourth line from the bottom, where "Germany's policy" should read "Japan's 
policy." 

Aft indicated, we would like to have this telegram spread on the 
record. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record at this point. 
(The telegram referred to follows:) 

[l/^J90-'A^ TELE5GRAM RECEIVEn 

TEM 

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any- 
one. (A). Tokvo via Shanghai and N. R. Dated August 16, 1941. Rec'd 9:20 
p. m. 17th. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5345 

Secretary of State, Washington. 

123."), August 16, 3 p. m. (section one). 

Following is the (?) telegrams sent to Foreign Office by the British Ambas- 
sador reporting his conversation on August 11, with the Japanese Foreign 
Minister. 

"The strong representations to Minister for Foreign Affairs today in regard to 
spokesman's statement impugning the veracity (?) assurances as to the absence 
of any British aggressive designs against Thailand. The statement is that such 
assurances could not be accepted "(?) (?)" was not only calculated to inflame 
opinion in Japan, but was definitely offensive and I trusted that His Excellency 
would warn the spokesman of the need of greater (?) in making public state- 
ments in the present delicate state of Anglo- Japanese relations. I added that 
after a public statement of this kind, it was clear from what source the Japanese 
press received its inspiration for its attacks on my country. 

[l/il90-B] Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to pass on my remarks 
to Director General of Bureau of Information. 

Gbew. 

WSB 

llJfl90-C] TELEGRAM RECEIVED 

CORRECTED COPY 

LET 

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to 
anyone. (A). Tokyo via Shanghai and N. R. Dated August 14. 1941. Rec'd. 
11 : 10 p.m., 17th. 

Secretary of State. Washington. 

12.S5, August 14 3 p.m. ( Section Two) . 

I proceeded to say how regrettable it seemed to me to be that the Japanese 
Government should continue to place more reliance on reports (probably emanat- 
ing from interested quarters) in preference not anly to my own assurances but 
also to the public declaration made by yourself in the House of Commons. Assum- 
ing that the Japanese Government were sincere in their desire to avoid trouble 
over Thailand, such rumors appeared to me to be fantastic and I made an earnest 
appeal to His Excellency to place his cards on the table and give me some idea 
of the nature and the source of the reports on which they were acting. If His 
Excellency would deal with tlie matter thus frankly I was prepared to be equally 
frank in explaining the point of view and intention of His Majesty's Government. 

Two. Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed that if things were to be prevented 
from going from bad to [1^1!)0-D'\ worse, a frank interchange of views 
was essential and he then mentioned several examples of the reports which were 
creating so much concern in Japan and invited my comments: 

(A) Concentration of British troops on Thai frontier. Japanese reports were 
to the effect that large bodies of British troops had been concentrated ready for 
an immediate incursion onto Thai territory. I replied that this was a gross 
exaggeration : such British units as were on the Thai frontier were there purely 
for defensive purposes — as indeed were all our forces in Mala.ya and Burmah — - 
with Germany's policy steadily pushing southwards, it was an elementary pre- 
caution that the British border defences should be adequately manned. 

(B) Report that the WARSPITE was in the Gulf of Siam. 

Grew 
NPL 

[lJfl90-E] TELEGRAM RECEIVED 

EJ 

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any- 
one. (A). Tokyo via Shanghai and N. R. Dated August 14, 1941. Rec'd. 
11 : 45 p.m., 17th. 
Secretary of State, Washington. 

123.5, August 14, 3 p.m. ( Section Three) . 

This report, which he believed had originated with British .iournalists in 
Thailand, had received wide currency plausible if untrue, it was unfortunate that 
they allowed the rumor to spread. I replied that the report in the form in which 
it had appeared in the press was nonsense on the face of it and I thought it much 
more likely to have originated in Japanese than British journalistic circles in 

79716— 46— pt. 11 14 



5346 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Thailand (c) Alleged Russo-Japanese clash on Manchukuo front. This report 
had been spread with particular persistence from Singapore although there was 
no truth in it whatsoever. No such clash had occurred. I suggested to His 
Excellency that the report had originated in Manchuria and had received wide 
curi-ency, so that it was unfair to saddle Singapore with it. 

(D) Speeches by Oomuiander in Chief Far Ea.st and other high officers in 
Malaya. The reiterated public assertion of our growing military and air 
strength in [14190-F] Malaya conveyed an impression of aggressive in- 
tentions and had proved most disturbing to the public mind in Japan. Their 
effect was simply to increase the pressure on the Japanese Government to hasten 
and augment their own preparations to defend the sphere in which Japan had 
a vital interest. He made a strong plea for the adoption of a calm and un- 
provocative attitude on the part of all concerned in handling the present delicate 
situation, promising to do his best in this direction if the British authorities 
would do their part. I explained that our authorities in Malaya had to think 
of the morale of the local population, which might well be affected by Japan's 
steady advance towards our frontiers were it not for public assurances that all 
necessary measures had been taken for the defense of British territory. Never- 
theless I shared the opinion expressed by His Excellency that in such matters 
"silence is golden" and promised to impart his representations on this point 
to you. 



HSM 



Grew. 



[I419O-G] Corrected Copy 

TK 

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to 
anyone. (A). Tokyo via Shanghai and N. R. Dated August 14, 1941. Eec'd 
10 : 50 a. m., 17th. 
Secretary of State, Washington. 

1235, August 14, 3 p. m., (Section Four). 

Three. I then reverted to the signs of Japanese pressure on Thailand, quoting 
reports of concentration of Japanese troops along the Thai border and giving 
him recent examples of mendacious Japanese press attacks and allegations 
against us. His Excellency replied that only quite weak Japanese units had pro- 
ceeded to the Thai frontier and that I would be surprised if I knew how small 
was the Japanese force which had landed in Indochina. (I abstained from ask- 
ing for figures for fear of a request referring to our strength along Thai frontier). 

Four. A long conversation then ensued on the economic position as regards 
Thailand, particularly as regards rice, rubber, and other materials which it was 
now more vital than ever for Japan to secure from that country. His Excellency 
observed that Netherlands East Indies under British Influence had [l^iOO-H] 
decided to join in the freezing of Japanese assets, with the result that it is now 
more than ever essential for Japan to satisfy her urgent needs in such markets 
as were open to her. Japanese-Thai trade had recently showed a natural tend- 
ency to increase owing to the diflSculties of trade with third powers and the 
Japanese Government felt that they had a serious grievance against us for our 
attempts to induce Thailand to stop the export to Japan of even such a vital 
foodstuff as rice. I was able to show that in this respect His Excellency was 
laboring under a complete misapprehension, adding, however, that we were 
equally determined that our own right to purchase reasonable supplies of rice, 
rubber, et cetera, in Thailand, should not be interfered with by Japanese agen- 
cies. On His Excellency's charge that the surest way to ease the economic situ- 
ation as regards Thailand would be to induce the Netherlands East Indies to 
lessen the restrictions on exports to Japan. I suggested that he was putting the 
cart before the horse and that the allaying of British and Netherlands East Indies 
apprehensions in regard to Japan's intentions in Thai 

Gbbw. 

CSB 

[I4I9O-I] TELEQBAM BECEIVED 

LET 

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any- 
one. (A). Tokyo via Shanghai and N. R. Dated August 16, 1941. Rec'd. 10 
a.m., 18th. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5347 

Secrettaby of State, Washington. 

1235, August 16, 3 p.m. (Section five), 
should be the prelude to any overhauling of the economic restrictions imposed 
in the Netherlands East Indies or elsewhere. 

Five. I took the opportunity to say that the main point of our economic re- 
strictions on trade with Japan was, I believed, to bring home to the Japanese 
Government the fact that in our view Japan's successive southward advances 
had now reached a point at which words and protests were useless and deeds 
were necessary to bring it home to the Japanese Government and public how 
close they were to the danger zone. In denying that Netherlands East Indies 
action in this matter had been due to British pressure or influence I said that 
I assumed that the above considerations had also weighed with the Netherlands 
East Indies Government who must feel themselves threatened equally with us 
by the Japanese action in Indochina. I did not need to inform His [I419O-J] 
Excellency that the lifeline of our conuiumicatious with Australia and New 
Zealand run through the Netherlands East Indies thus creating a common prob- 
lem of defense. When he inquired "defense whom" and I replied "against 
Japan" His Excellency merely smiled and shook his head. 

Six. In conclusion we agreed that the main difficulty lay in the suspicions 
whicli each power entertained of tlie intentions of the other, though I did not 
fail to ridicule the apprehensions of a power which had been steadily advancing 
southwards imtil it had reached a point 1500 miles from Tokyo. Minister for 
Foreign Affairs reasserted that this advance was necessitated solely by Japan's 
determination to bring her war with China to a successful conclusion and he 
could only regret our apparent inability to accept his formal assurances that 
the advance into South Indochina was neither directed against us nor connoted 
any Japanese intention of attacking Thailand. We also agreed that our con- 
versation might have been useful as tending to dissipate unnecessary misunder- 
standings and that it would be desirable to have similar frank discussions from 
time to time. 

Seven. While apologizing for the length of this telegram I am anxious to 
convey to you as correct an [14190-K] impression as I can of the char- 
acter and views of the new Minister for Foreign Affairs. The convea'sation 
lasted for an hour and a half and touched on many subsidiary points which 
were useful for our mutual understanding though perhaps unnecessary to report 
by telegram". 

Sent Department, via air, mail to Shanghai. 

(End of message.) 

Grew. 

GW, 

[14Jl91'\ Mr. Morgan. At various places throughout the tran- 
script requests have been made for information Avith respect to "water- 
tight integrity of major vessels" located at Pearl Harbor. In order 
to bring together at one place all communications relating to this 
matter, we would like to have spread on the record at this time the 
following communications from the Navy Department : 

11 December 1945. 

Another one dated 11 December, 1945. 

One dated 3 January 1946. 

And a final memorandum dated 29 January 1946. 

This will enable us to have at one place all of the communications 
with respect to the condition of "water-tight integrity of major 
vessels." 

The Vice Chairman. They will be spread on the record at this 
point. 

(The communications referred to follow :) 

[ 14192] Department of the Navy, 

Office of the IJndbsi Secretary, 

Washington, 11 December 19Jf5 
Memorandum to : Mr. William D. Mitchell. 

1. With further reference to my memorandum to you dated 11 December 1945 
the subject of which was "Conditions of water-tight integrity of major vessels", 



5348 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

thei'e is attached hereto a table ^ showing the scheduled inspection of ships at 
Pearl Harbor during October, November and December 1941. It will be noted 
that this table does not contain all of the ships which were at Pearl Harbor on 
December 7 ; the explanation for tliis is, the ships which are not shown were not 
scheduled for inspection during the period October-December 1941. 

/s/ John Ford Baecher 
John Fokd Baecher, 

Lt. Comdr., USNR. 



[141931 Department of the Navy 

R-#16 Office of the Under Secretary 

Washington, 11 Decetn'ber WJ/S 
Memorandum : 
To : William D. Mitchell. 
Subject : Condition of water-tight integrity of major vessels. 

1. Pursuant to your request concerning the above matter, the following 
information has been obtained and is submitted." 

(a) An examination of the logs and records of the major vessels at Pearl 
Harbor indicates that onl yone vessel did not have an equivalent of the condition 
"all water-tight openings below tlie third deck closed" at the time of the attack. 
Tliat vessel, the USS California, had ten inner and outboard voids open for 
maintenance work. Its remaining water-tight openings below the third deck 
were closed. 

(b) The logs of the USS Oklahoma and USS Arizona were destroj'ed. How- 
ever information has been obtained through Commander Fuqua, the Damage 
Control Officer of the Arizona, that on his ship all water-tight doors below tlie 
third deck were clo.sed. Tliis was also the condition that prevailed in tlie USS 
Oklahoma, according to information stated by the Commanding Officer of that 
ship. 

[1419Jf'\ (c) Material conditions of readiness referred to as conditions 
"Baker" or "X-ray" or "Yoke" are higher tlian the minimum. The minimum 
requirements are considered to be those prescribed by Navy Regulations, tliat 
is, that all water-tight openings below the third deck be closed from 160O to 080O. 

(d) According to the best available analysis in the Navy Department, the 
USS California is the only ship that might have been saved from sinking by the 
closing of manhole covers that had been left open for maintenance. 

(e) The USS Pennsylvania was in dry dock and is not included within the 
above general statement concerning the conditions of water-tight integrity that 
prevailed at that time. 

2. If more specific and detailed information on these matters is desired, an 
attempt will be made to locate and have present necessary witnesses. 

/s/ John Ford Baecher 
John Ford Baeohejr, 

Lt. Comdr. USNR. 

[lJfl95] Department of the Navy 

Office of the Secrettary 
Washington 3, January 1945 * 
Memorandum : 
To : Mr. William D. Mitchell 

1. With reference to your memorandum of 11 December 1945 referring to the 
memorandum to you of the same date from Lt. Comdr. John F. Baecher en- 
titled "Conditions of Water-tight Integrity of Major Vessels," it is believed that 
the further memorandum to you from Lt. Comdr. Baecher of the same date (11 
December 1945) with enclosure "Compilation of Inspection Schedules Applicable 
to Vessels Present at Pearl Harbor 7 December 1941," together with the first 
mentioned memorandum constitutes the desired response to the inquiry con- 
cerning the " 'inspection' charge." 



* The table referred to appears in Hearhigs, Part 4, p. 1678. 
2 See Hearings, Part 6, pp. 2675-2676. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5349 

2. There has also been compiled a statement dated 20 December 1945 from 
the logs of the various ships of inspection that occurred on 5 and 6 December 
1941. A copy of this compilation is enclosed herewith since it bears on the 
same question. 

3. With reference to the inquiry concerning the names of persons from the 
various ships "who cou]^ testify about each vessel," it is believed that the best 
witnesses would be the Senior Surviving Officer from each vessel along 
\_14196] with that ship's Damage Control Officer. In addition to those officers, 
the names of whom are listed on the "Report of Senior Surviving Officers and 
Damage Control Officers," also enclosed herewith. Captain Leslie A. Kniskern, 
attached to the Bureau of Ships, Navy Department, Washington, D. C, who 
made a study and analyzed the damage to vessels at Pearl Harbor, may have 
something to contribute in the way of testimony, if the same is desired. Many 
of these prospective witnesses are located at points far distant from Washington 
and none of them have as yet been interviewed since the scope of any pre- 
liminary interview has not yet been determined. 

4. It will be appreciated if you will give advance notice in the event you 
desire to call any of these individuals as witnesses, or if you desire them to be 
preliminarily interviewed by the Navy representatives. 

/s/ John Ford Baecher 
John Fobd Baecher 

Lt. Comdr, USNR. 



A. Arizona 

1. SSO : Ellis H. Geiselman, Capt., USN. 

2. DCO: Samuel G. Fuqua, Capt., USN. 

B. California 

1. SSO : Joel W. Bunkley, R. Adm., USN. 

2. DCO: Marion N. Little, Capt, USN. 
U4197] C. Maryland 

1. SSO : John M. Haines, Capt., USN. 

2. DCO : Wm. S. G. Davis, Capt., USN. 

D. Nevada 

1. SSO : Francis W. Scanland, Commodore, USN. 

2. DCO : George C. Miller, Capt., USN. 

E. Oklahoma 

1. SSO : Thomas D. Cullins, Capt., USN. 

2. DCO : W. M. Hobby, Lt. Comdr., USN. 

F. Pennsylvania 

1. SSO : C. M. Cooke, Jr., Vice Admiral, USN. 

2. DCO : Wm. E. Stock, Comdr., USN. 

1. SSO : Charles E. Reordan, Capt, USN. 
*2. Ass't DCO: Robert R. Moore, Comdr., USN (Ret.) 
H. West Virginia 

1. SSO : R. H. Hillenkoetter, Capt., USN. 

2. DCO : J. S. Harper, Capt., USN. 

* DCO deceased. 



20 December 1945. 
Inspections made on U. S. Battleships which were at Pearl Harbor on 7 Dec. 
1941. These inspections occurred on 5 or 6 Dec. 1941 as designated.* 
[14198] USS Arizona 

No log received for Dec. 1941. 
USS California 

5 Dee. 1941 

1149 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples ; 
conditions normal. 

6 Dec. 1941 

1020 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples ; 
conditions normal. 
Made monthly inspection of all indices of smokeless powder on board ; 
conditions normal. 



*See Hearings, Part 3, p. 2677. 



5350 CONGRiJSSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

USS Marylcmd 

5 Dec. 1941 

0710 Food inspection. 

6 Dec. 1941 

0800 Made daily visual exaininatiou of all smokeless powder samples, violet 
paper, and test for local heating of magazines on board ship; condi- 
tions normal. ' 

1330 By order of the Commanding Officer, Lt. (jg) Nelson H. Randall, 
C-V(S) USNR, was suspended from duty for a period of five days 
from and including this date for iuiproper perforuaance of duty as 
Communication Watch Officer failing to deliver a despatch to the 
Commander Battleships Battle Force. The Commanding Officer fur- 
ther ordered that, due to the exigencies of the service [14199] 
Lt. (jg) Randall is restored to duty for the duration of the Annual 
Military Inspection and Damage Control I'ractice of this vessel on 
December 8, 1941 and December 9, 1941. 
US'S Nevada 

5 Dec 1941 

No inspections. 

6 Dec 1941 

0705 Food inspection. 

0900 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples ; 
conditions normal. 
USS Oklahoma 

No log received for Dec 1941. 
USS Pennsylvania 

5 Dec 1941 

0800 Food inspection. 

1150 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; 
conditions normal. 

6 Dec. 1941 

0833 Landing force left the ship to be inspected by Commander Battleship 
Division TWO. 1045 Landing force returned. 
USS Pennsylvania 
6 Dec 1941 

1155 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; 
conditions normal. 
[14200] USS Tennessee 

5 Dec. 1941 

1010 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless powder samples; 

conditions normal. 
1445 Secured boiler number 8 after having conducted tests on safety valves. 

6 Dec 1941 

0745 Commenced embarking Landing Force for Annual Military Inspection. 
1130 Landing Force returned aboard. Made daily inspection of magazines 
and smokeless powder samples ; conditions normal. 
USS West Virginia 

No log received for Dec 1941. 



Department of the Navy 

Office op the Secretary 
Washington, 29 January 1946 

R#16 

Memorandum : 

To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson 

1. In response to the suggestion in the Record of Proceedings page 7236 that 
the Navy would make a further check in respect of the logs of certain battleships 
that were at Pearl Harbor concerning water-tight integrity, it is thought ad- 
visable to first refer to the several memoranda previously [14201] for- 
warded counsel on that subject. 

Three previous memoranda with enclosures on this subject have been forwarded 
to counsel, two being dated 11 December 1945 and one 3 January 1946. The 
enclosures were dated October, November and December 1941 and 20 December 
1945. 

2. One of the 11 December 1945 memoranda forwarded as an enclosure a table 
showing the schedules of inspections of ships at Pearl Harbor during October, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5351 

November and December 1941. This memorandum was referred to in the Record 
of Proceedings at pages 4436-4439 and the enclosure became Exhibit #69 your 
investigation. 

The second memorandum dated 11 December 1945 referred to information 
which had been obtained regarding water-tight integrity of major vessels, in- 
cluding that only one vessel, the U S S California, might have been saved from 
sinking if certain manhole covers had not been left open for maintenance work. 
This memorandum was quoted in the Record of Proceedings at pages 7233-7235, 
and the enclosure at pages 7237-7239. 

It is noted that the memorandum of Mr. William D. 'Mitchell to Admiral 
Colclough dated 11 December 1945 which is quoted in the Record of Proceedings 
at page 7235, referred to only one of the two Navy Department memoranda to 
him of that date, and dealt with the question of the names of prospective 
[14^02] witnesses concerning the "inspection charge". This memorandum of 
Mr. Mitchell was a response to one of the Navy memoranda of 11 December 1945, 
quoted in the Record of Proceedings at pages 7234-7235, in which the Navy had 
previously volunteered to furnish the names of witnesses if such were desired 
by the committee or counsel, and it did not refer to the other Navy memorandum 
of 11 December bearing on the "inspection charge". 

The Navy memorandum of 3 January 1946 referred to the Navy memoranda 
of 11 December 1945, and enclosed a statement of mention in the logs of the 
major vessels at Pearl Harbor of inspections on 5 and 6 December 1941 and also 
a list as prospective witnesses of the names of Senior Surviving OflScers and 
Damage Control OflBcers of the several major ships sunk or damaged at Pearl 
Harbor. 

A perusal of the Record of Proceedings does not disclose that the Navy memo- 
randa of 11 December 1945 forwarding the schedule of inspections which became 
your Exhibit #69, or the Navy memoranda of 3 January 1946, or the list of 
prospective witnesses enclosed therewith in response to the memorandum of 
Mr. Mitchell printed in the Record of Proceedings at page 7235, have been incor- 
porated in the record. Such incorjwration may be appropriate in order to make 
the record complete. 

3.* With respect to the further check to be made by the Navy leferred to in 
the Record of Proceedings at page 7236, [14203] and supplementing the 
20 December 1945 enclosure forwarded with the memorandum of 3 January 1946, 
the logs of the USS California, Maryland, Nevada and Tennessee have been ex- 
amined for any record of any inspections, and for any references concerning 
water-tight integrity precedent to or in preparation for any inspections on 5, 6, 
and 7 December 1941, with negative results. 

/s/ John Ford Baecher 

John Ford BAECHEat 
Lieutenant Commander, U8NR 

[14^04-^ Mr. Morgan. We have a communication from Com- 
mander Baecher dated April 8, 1946, directed to Mr. Eichardson, as 
follows : 

Washington, 8 April 1946. 
Memorandum : 
To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson. 

1. In response to your request for the information, official notification to the 
Navy Department of the air raid on Pearl Harbor was received by Radio Wash- 
ington from Radio Honolulu at 1850 GOT (1350 EST), 7 December 1941, by dis- 
patch as follows: 

NPM 1516 

A0F2 1830 0F3 

FROM CINCPAC 

ACTION CINCLANT CINCAF OPNAV 

AIR RAID ON PEARL HARBOR X THIS IS NOT DRILL 

2. At 1930 GOT (1430 EST), 7 December 1941, an ALNAV message was sent by 
the Secretary of the Navy to all ships and stations reading "Execute WPL-46 
against Japan." 

/S/ John Fokd Baecher, 

Commander, U8NR." 



♦See Hearings, Part 3, p. 2676. 



5352 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[14^0S] Mr. Morgan. We have a further communication from 
the War Department with respect to reels of microfilm received from 
General MacArthur's headquarters, and we ask that this communica- 
tion, dated 28 February 1946 be spread on the record. 

(The communication referred to follows:) 

[I42O6] WaB DEOPABfTMENT, 

Room 4D757, The Pentagon, 
Washington, D. C, 28 February 19.^6 
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson : 

In addition to the 12 reels of microfilm previously received from General Mac- 
Arthur's headquarters (see Committee transcript pages 7874 and 13,662), there 
have now been received two more reels containing material from the Japanese 
file on United States-Japanese negotiations prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. 
From an examination by qualified Japanese linguists, it appears that of the 80 
items in these two reels all were intercepted by the United States at the time of 
transmission in 1941, except the following : 

1. A mesage from Berlin to Tokyo dated 22 May 1941, giving the substance of an 
article published in Pravda. 

2. A message from New York to Tokyo dated 10 July 1941, giving the substance 
of an article published in Newsweek. 

3. A message from Rome to Tokyo dated 15 September 1941, giving the sub- 
stance of two United Press dispatches. 

4. A message from London to Tokyo dated 19 May [^.^2^7] 1941, giving 
the substance of an article published in the Telegraph and Mail. 

5. A memorandum related to the "draft" submitted by Ambassador Nomura to 
the Secretary of State on 12 May 1941. The draft itself appears at page 420 of 
Volume 2 of Foreign Relations. 

Although none of the above items would appear to be helpful to the Committee, 
the War Department will of course furnish them if the Committee so requests. 

/s/ Harmon Duncombe 
Harmon Duncombe 

Lt. Colonel, GSC 

[14^08] Mr. Morgan. Pursuant to a request made by Senator 
Ferguson at page 522 of the record we have the following pertinent 
portion from a communication received from the Navy Department 
dated April 5, 1946 : 

In response to the request of Senator Ferguson ( Record of Proceedings, Page 
522), which is referred to in Item 4 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, 
there is forwarded herewith a copy of the document containing information of 
the Japanese plans leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor based on informa- 
tion obtain subsequent to 7 December 1941, that was presented to the Secre- 
tary of State, the Hcmorable James F. Byrnes, during the latter part of October. 

We request at this point that the entire memorandum be spread on 
the record. 

The Vice Chairman. It will be so spread on the record. 
(The memorandum referred to follows:) 

[14209] Reconstruction of Japanese Plans Leading Up to the Attack on 

Pearl Haebor. 

(BASED UPON information OBTAINED SUBSEQUENT TO 7 DECEMBER 1041) 

The following summarization has been prepared on the basis of reliable in- 
formation obtained from various sources subsequent to the attack on Pearl 
Harbor. Although this summary does not represent a resume of Japanese C'om- 
bined Fleet Operation Order No. 1, it will be apparent that heavy reliance has 
nevertheless been placed upon that document, a translation of which is sub- 
mitted under separate cover. 

The Japanese Naval High Command completed preparations during the sum- 
mer and fall of 1941 to carry out a projected 2-phase plan of conquest and 
consolidation in the Asiatic-Pjicific theatre. The essence of the plan lay in the 
element of surprise in a sudden attack which at one fell swoop would cripple 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5353 

the major potential opposition — the American Fleet maintained at Pearl Harbor. 
Following the crippling of this opposition weapon, coincident with the seizure 
and occupation of land masses desired for the economic, political, and military 
reasons that together /letermined the borders of the Greater East Asia Co- 
ProsiJerity Sphere, Phale 1 of the campaign would be completed, and Phase 2 — 
the consolidation of these gains by the seizure or neutralization of outer areas, 
together with the continued attrition of the enemy forces and his lines of 
[I4210 I supply — could be carried out to ensure the permanence of the new 
Empire. 

The Japanese fleet, which had been in training over a period of years for 
combat fleet operations, was in a state of readiness by the summer of 1941. 
By late August of 1941, there is evidence based on information believed to be 
reliable, that the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet ordered all fleet 
commanders and their key staff members to Tokyo for war games* preparatory 
to a final formulation of operation plans. The final games reportedly got under- 
way on 2 September 1941, with most of the high ranking officers participating 
on one of the three teams that were organized: the "N" (Nippon) Team, "A" 
(America) Team, and "E" (England) Team. 

During the afternoon of 3 September, 50 copies of an outline of conditions 
under which the games were to be held were prepared and contained the heart 
of Operation Order No. 1. These plans must have been under development for 
several months, as extensive preliminary planning was indicated. 

On 5 September, it is known that Pearl Harbor plans were under discussion 
and the Japs apparently expected to catch all major U. S. Fleet units in the 
Pacific in Pearl Harbor, as well as imits which they believed were recently 
transferred from the Atlantic. "N" Team expected to lose one-third of the 
units participating in the attack on Hawaii and one Akagi-c\ass [l/f211] 
aircraft carrier and one /Son/M-class aircraft carrier were estimated as sunk. 

On 6 and 7 September, "N" Team debated the best means of assaulting Pearl 
Harbor. Captain Kurojima (Deputy Chief of Staff) and Rear Admiral Ito 
(Chief of Staff) differed as to the practicability of conducting an amphibious 
assault on Hawaii. Ito was in favor of an early landing but Kurojima won the 
discussion by pointing out insuperable logistic problems. 

These early sessions apparently were confined primarily to two general prob- 
lems : first, the details for a surprise raid on Pearl Harbor ; and second, ai 
schedule for occupying, Malaya, Bui-ma. N. E. I., the Philippines, the Solomons, 
and Central Pacific Islands, including Hawaii. The conferences and games were 
ended about 13 September. At the end of September, the Main Body of the 
Jap Fleet moved to Saeki and four revisions of Combined Fleet Operation, 
Oi'der No. 1 were made while Nagato (Flagship) was at Saeki, although no 
major changes are indicated. 

The actual operation plan itself — Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order 
No. 1 — has since been recovered and is reproduced in its entirety under separate 
cover. The objectives of the campaign strategy, the outline and sequence of 
operations planned, and the organization of the naval forces allotted to each 
phase of the operations were set forth in the Operation Order, and are analyzed 
below. 

[14212] OTyjectives: 

The general aims of the entire campaign were predicated on the desires for 
military conquest and security, and enhancement of the Empire by the occupation 
of areas rich in natural resources : 

"1. In the east, the American Fleet will be destroyed and American lines of 
operation and supply lines to the Orient will be cut. 

"2. In the west, British Malaya will be occupied and British lines of operation 
and supply lines to the Orient, as well as the Burma Road, will be cut. 

"3. Enemy forces in the Orient will be destroyed, bases of operations will be 
seized, and areas with natural resources will be occupied. 

"4. Strategic areas will be seized and developed ; defenses will be strengthened 
in order to establish a durable basis for operations. 

"5. Enemy forces will be intercepted and annihilated. 

"6. Victories will be exploited to break the enemy's will to fight." 

Outline of operations: 

For the accomplishment of the objectives stated above, it was contemplated 
that operations would be carried out in two phases — the First Phase, comprising 



* See Appendix 1. 



5354 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

conquest of the American Fleet and occupation of areas desired, in large part, 
[1^213] for economic reasons (the Philippines, British Malaya, Netherlands 
East Indies) ; the Second Phase, comprising consolidation of these gains by 
mopping-up operations, establishment of advance bases for defense of the occupied 
territory, and the continued attrition of enemy forces and lines of communication. 
The conquest or neutralization of areas deemed of strategic importance primarily 
from the point of view ot military security was to occur during the Second Phase, 
no definite plan being provided initially for the chronology of those operations. 
Apparently both the precise timing of that portion of the campaign and the 
determination of which of these strategic areas (listed as Eastern New Guinea, 
New Britain, f 'iji, Samoa ; Aleutians and Midway ; Andaman Islands, strategic 
points in the Australia Area) would be seized and which merely neutralized, were 
problem to be worked out in detail following the completion of the occupation of 
the areas desired for their economic value as integral portions of the new Co- 
Prosperity Sphere, and to be solved "as quickly as operational conditions permit." 

A. Occupation: "First Phase Operations": 

Basically, at this initial stage of the war, the Imperial Navy had four missions 
to fulfill : 

[I4214] (i) The destruction of the American Fleet in the Hawaiian area. 

(ii) The maintenance and extension of control over the Central and South 
Pacific, to deny these waters to any force which might menace the flank of the 
forces driving southward. 

(iii) The support of army invasion of the Pbilippines-N. E. I.-Southeast 
Asiatic areas and the destruction of Allied naval forces therein. 

(iv) The protection of the North, both against thrusts by the United States 
from the Aleutians and also against a possible attack by the U. S. S. R. 

Aside from the considerably inferior air power and the relatively few scattered 
surface fleet units possessed by the Allies in the Asiatic-N. E. I. area, the only 
obstacle of consequence was the American Fleet and air-power based at Hawaii. 
While Japanese land-based air and surface task groups could suflfice to support 
the amphibious landings in the Philippines-N. E. I.-Asiatic area, a major Japa- 
nese task force, built around a carrier striking group, was essential to conduct 
a surprise attack on the American Fleet. Accordingly, the following general 
allocation of Japanese forces* was planned for the first Phase operations. 

(i) For the Pearl Harhor Attack: 

[I4215] The Striking Force under the Commander in Chief, 1st Air Fleet, 
comprising 2 fast battleships, 6 first-line carriers (with a maximum of 400 planes 
of all types), 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and 16 destroyers plus. 

The Advance Expeditionary Force under the Commander in Chief, 6th Fleet, 
comprising 1 training cniiser, 2 light cruisers, 20 fleet submarines, and 5 midget 
submarines. 

(ii) For the Invasion of Wake and Guam (and of Rabaul if conditions war- 
ranted) : 

The South Seas Force under the Commander in Chief, 4th Fleet, comprising 
4 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 1 training cruiser, 12 destroyers, 16 submarines. 

(iii) For the Invasion of the Philippines-N. E. I. -Malaya: 

The Southern Force under the Conunander in Chief, 2nd Fleet, comprising 2 
battleships, 2 small aircraft carriers, 11 heavy cruisers, 7 light cruisers, 52 
destroyers, 16 submarines. 

(iv) For the protection of the High North: 

The Northern Force, under the Commander in Chief, 5th Fleet, comprising 1 
heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, 2 destroyers. 

(y) In Reserve: 

The Main Body under the Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, comprising 6 
battleships, 2 light cruisers, 8 destroyers. 

The operations of these forces during the First Phase were to be divided into 
three periods : 

(a) First Period Operations: 

Operations from the outbreak of war until the main body of the invasion army 
had been landed in the Philippines. To end about X plus 20. 

(b) Second Period Operations: 

Operations after (a) and until the main body of the invasion army had been 
landed in British Malaya. To end about X plus 40. 



• See Appendix 2 for allocation of Japanese Task Forces. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5355 

(c) Third Period Operations: 

Operations after (a) and until the completion of the occupation of the Neth- 
erlands East Indies. 

(i) Central Pacific Opo'ations: 

(a) Attack on Ptarl Harbor — Assumptions t)ij the High Command: 

It is clear from a study of the operation plans that the Japanese High Com- 
mand made the following assumptions about the American Fleet : 

(a) That the main body of the United States Pacific Fleet would be at anchor 
within Pearl Harbor, or at least in [14217] the Hawaiian area. 

(b) That a fast carrier force could be moved from the Empire across the 
Pacific to the north of Midway, within striking distance of the main islands of 
the Hawaiian group without undue risk of detection by American defensive recon- 
naissance. 

(c) That should assumption (a) or (b) be in error, a reserve group of heavy 
units could sortie from the Inland Sea to give support to the carrier striking force 
in a decisive engagement against the American Fleet. The other task forces of 
the Japanese Fleet — the Southern Area Force, Northern Area Force, South 
Seas Force— would also be available. Implicit in the plan is the assumption that 
in the event of such an engagement, the combined strength of the bulk of the 
Japanese major fleet units could defeat the American Fleet. 

(d) That a powerful carrier air strike directed against the American forces 
based in Hawaii could, if tactical surprise were effected, achieve the strategic 
result of crippling the American Fleet, and the tactical result of destroying the 
American laud-based air to permit the Japanese striking force to withdraw 
without damage. While the latter assumption does not appear explicitly in the 
copy of the Japanese Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 1 recovered in the 
Philippines, it is logically implicit in the plan, and probably was a feature of the 
specific Operation Order issued by the Striking Force [1421S} Commander. 
The seizure of air superiority is part of the classic Japanese naval doctrine. 

The four assumptions outlined above were well grounded. An espionage net- 
work in the Hawaiian Islands, together with uninterdicted cable communications 
between Hawaii and Japan undoubtedly aided the Japanese in establishing 
their basichypothesis — namely, that the bulk of the American Pacific Fleet 
would be waiting at anchor at Pearl Harbor at the time of their surprise attack. 
The feasibility of a surprise attack prior to a declaration of war was, of course, 
borne out by events. 

(i) Diplomatic Deception: 

The operation plan providing for the outbreak of war and the attack on Pearl 
Harbor was published on 5 November 1941 as Combined Fleet Top Secret Opera- 
tion Order No. 1, and Y day (8 December, Japanese time) was set in Combined 
Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 2 on 7 November 1941. At the same time, 
the Japanese envoy Mr. Kurusu was en route to Washington to join the Japanese 
Ambassador in conducting conversations with the American Government. On 
7 November — the date that Y day was set — a "leading Japanese and reliable 
informant" visited the American Ambassador in Japan reportedly at the request 
of Foreign Minister Togo and urged repeatedly that, whether or not Japanese 
concessions were deemed inadequate by the United States, it was "of the highest 
importance [14219] that the Washington conversations be continued and 
not permitted to break down." These conversations were continued throughout 
November and until the actual launching of the surprise attack. While it is true 
that Operation Order No. 2, setting Y Day, was not suflScient by itself to effect the 
launching of the attack on that day, it was sufficient to despatch the various 
Japanese task forces to their scheduled pre-invasion rendevous points (Tankan 
Bay in the Kurlies for the Pearl Harbor Striking Force ; Mako in the Pescadores 
for the main body of the Philippines Force, etc.) and have the Fleet complete its 
basic preparations for an attack on that day. And it seems evident, from a study 
of such available subsidiary orders as were issued during November 1941 by 
certain of the task forces involved in the plan, that the supplementary orders 
that were to cause the task forces to move forward to their attack positions and 
were to specify precisely the time for the outbreak of war, were to be issued almost 
as inevitable concomitants of the initial decision embodied in Operation Orders 
Nos. 1 and 2. While a radical change in the diplomatic situation might have 
caused the plan to be abandoned, it seems probable that nothing short of complete 
American acceptance of the Japanese terms in their note of 20 November 1941 
would have been regarded as snfl5cient to cancel the plans already set in motion. 
In any event, the continuation of diplomatic negotiations by the Japanese after 



5356 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

llieir task forces were already [14220] eu route to their final goals must 
be deemed nothing short of deception. 
{ii) Radio Silence: 

The Striking Force, as it moved north to the sortie point in the Kuriles, and 
thence, to the eastern Pacific, was operating under strict injunctions to main 
radio isilence to help assure the secrecy of its movement and mission, 
(iii) Radio Deception: 

The 1st Combined Communications Unit was directed to maintain deceptive 
traffic to simulate the presence of the main strength of the Japanese Fleet in 
the Inland Sea. At the same time, the early December movements of the Japa- 
nese units en route to the south were not conducted under complete radio 
silence — possibly because the element of surprise for that part of the campaign 
could not be preserved by silence since Allied visual observations could be made 
of those movements and possibly because of the belief that the ability of Allied 
intelligence to trace the southward movements of the Southern Force, and only 
those movements, would further bolster the effectiveness of the strategic sur- 
prise desired for the operations of the Striking Force. 
Composition of the Forces Attacking Pearl Hardor: 

Striking Force 
Commanding Officer: Commander in Chief, 1st Air Fleet — Vice Admiral Chui- 
chi Nagumo. 

Battleship Division #3 (1st section) {Hid, Kirishima), 2 battleships. 
Carrier Division #1 {Kaga, Kagi). 
Carrier Division #2 (Hinju, Sori/it) 

Carrier Division #5 (Shokaku, Zuikaku) , 6 aircraft carriers. 
Cruiser Division #8 (Tone, Chikuma) , 2 heavy cruisers. 

Destroyer Squadron 1 {Ahukuma, 4 destroyer divisions) 1 light cruiser; 16 
destroyers, plus 11 train vessels. 
Advance Expeditionary Fleet 
Commamding Officer: Commander in Chief, 6th Fleet — Vice Admiral Mitsumi 
Shimizu. Isvzu, Yura), 2 light cruisers; (Katori), 1 training cruiser; I-class 
submarines (including Submarine Squadrons #1, #2, #3: (I-l, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
16, 17, IS, 20. 22-24, 68, 69, 74), 20 submarines. Midget submarines, 5 midget 
submarines, plus 6 train vessels. 
Execution of the Operation: 

The Striking Force a.ssembled at Tankan Bay in Etorofu Island (Kuriles) 
during late November 1941, and sortied for [lJi222] the attack on or 
about 27 November, following a course to the eastward and then southward, as 
indicated on the captured track chart appended (see Appendix 3). Of the 11 
train vessels allotted in the Operation Plan, reliable information suggests that 
only 3 tankers and 1 supply ship actually acc(»mpanied the Force. Apparently 
also, 3 submarines of the Advance Expeditionary Force (submarine fleet) accom- 
panied the Striking Force — the other submarines having proceeded from the 
Inland Sea independently of the Striking Force. During the fast voyage to their 
destination 200 miles due north of Oahu, the vessels of the carrier force were 
kept fueled successfully, albeit with considerable difficulty in many cases. Upon 
arrival at their destination, about 200 miles due north of Oahu, the carriers 
launched their aircraft, which rendezvoused further south and then flew in for a 
coordinated attack. Three waves of these carrier aircraft were employed, 
commencing at 0747 and ending at 0936, local time ; the first attack was) on 
various airfields, followed by attacks on the warships in Pearl Harbor. Follow- 
ing the successful completion of these surprise attacks, the carrier force with- 
drew to the Empire, taking a circuitous route to Hashirajima and arriving on 23 
December. En route. Carrier Division #2 {Hinju. Sonju) and Cruiser Division 
#8 (Tone, Chikuma) were detached as a small reinforcement group for the Wake 
Island operation. Losses sustained by the Striking Force during the Hawaiian 
operation reportedly [14223] totalled 29 aircraft. 

Until the completion of the surprise attack on Hawaii by the Striking Force, 
the "Advance Expeditionary Force" of submarines was under the command of 
the Striking Force Commander. The precise movements of the participating 
submarines prior to the actual attack are not clear, although some information 
suggests that the bulk of those units left the Empire in late November. So far 
as is known, the functions allotted the submarines in Operation Order No. 1 
were carried out as planned, viz : 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5357 

(a) Until X — 3, submarines were to reconnoiter important points in the Aleu- 
tians, Samoa, Fiji, and Tutuila, and were to observe and report on any powerful 
American foi'ces discovered. 

(b) One element was to patrol along the route of the Striking Force in advance 
of the movement of that Force — ensure the undetected approach of the carrier 
group to its destination. 

(c) Until X — 5, the remaining submarines were to surround Hawaii at extreme 
range while one element approached and reconnoitered without being observed. 

(d) On X day, the function of the submarines would be to "observe and attack 
the American Fleet in the Hawaii Area ; make a surprise attack on the channel 
leading into Pearl Harbor [14224] and attempt to close it; if the enemy 
moves out to fight he will be pursued and attacked." 

Prior to the attack on X Day, the force of I-class submarines took up scouting 
positions in several allotted patrol sectors covering the waters in the vicinity of 
Pearl Harbor, while the 5 midget submarines were lai'mched as a Special Attack 
Force to conduct an offensive attack against American warships within the 
Harbor and to prevent the escape of the fleet through the Harbor entrances 
during the scheduled aerial strike. Available data indicates that only one of 
the five subs penetrated into tlie Harbor ; none of the five inflicted any damage 
on American units, and none of the five rejoined the Japanese Fleet. American 
naval units accounted for 3, possibly 4, of the total, and the 5th beached itself at 
Oahu. 

During and after the attack, submarines outside of the Harbor area remained 
on patrol to oppose any possible sortie of American warships. The following is 
a translation of an extract from the "Report of the I-69's Operations off Pearl 
Harbor, 8-10 December 1941" (Tokyo time), written by the Commanding Officer 
of the 1-69 (flagship of Submarine Division 12) and presents a picture of the 
operation as exi>erienced b.v one of the Japanese units on patrol : 

"During daylight on December S (December 7 Honolulu time), the 1-69 was 
cruising submerged, engaged in surveillance in Scouting Sector D (about 17 
miles southwest of Pearl [14225] Harbor). Immediately after the attack 
upon the enemy by the Striking Force and the Special Attack Force, we were able 
to hear easily, by means of submarine sound detectors, explosions of bombs 
and torpedoes, and upon hearing the sound of depth charges, I judged that the 
Special Attack Force was engaged in heavy fighting. 

"At 1400 radio orders from the Commander of Submarine Forces were received, 
assigning the 1-69 to a surveillance in the central sector of E Inner Scouting Area 
(a circle with a radius of 8.5 nautical miles, with Pearl Harbor as the center). 
The orders further .specified the annihilation of the remaining enemy forces. 

"After sunset we surfaced, in an attempt to assist as much as possible, but 
during the night we sighted five destroyers. While submerging, we received a 

close-range depth-charge attack At 0015 on the 9th (Tokyo time) we 

surfaced, making certain that no enemy patrol boats were within close range. 
On a course obliquely to the west, and at battle speed, we hurriedly recharged 
batteries. 

"We sighted 2 patrol vessels on our port quarter and beam respectively, each 
about 5 kilometers away, and in about 30 minutes we reversed course. Pearl 
Hax'bor shone red in the sky, like a thing afire. It was already dawn." 

In the post-attack phase, the I-class submarines maintained their patrols for 
some time, and at least one of the [14226] group — the 1-7 — launched its 
aircraft to conduct a reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor to ascertain the status of 
the American fleet and installations. The operation plan had provided, in the 
event of the virtual destruction of the American Fleet at Pearl, that one Sub- 
marine Division or less would be placed between Hawaii and North America to 
destroy sea traffic and in fact at least one submarine — the 1-17 — was despatched 
for the Oregon coast about 14 December. 



5358 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

U4it7] 

Appendix 1. 



Naval general staS 



Official duties 



Umpires 

Nagano, Osami 

Fukutome, Shigeru... 

■Uozumi, Jisaku 

Yamamoto, Chikao 

Majiizumi, Ilarue 

Tamura, Saburo 

Sanaei, Tsuyoshi. _._ 

Uozumi, Yorlichi 

Navy Ministry 

Takata, Toshitane 

Shiki, Tsuneo 

Toibata, Kurip __ 

[14228] Fujii, Shigeru 

N-Team— Combined Fleet 

Yamamoto, Isoroku 

Ito, Swiichi 

Kurojima, Kameto 

Goto, Shieeru.. _. 

Isobe, Taro 

Sugi, Toma 

Sasaki, Akira 

Wada, Yushiro 

Nagata, Shigeru 

Watanabe. Yasuji 

Arima. Takayasu 

Seimi, Ichiyoshi.. 

Ota, Kanai 

1st Combined Communicatins 
Unit (Radio Intelligence) 

Kakimoto, Gonichiro 

Arisawa, Naosada... 

E-Team— Second Fleet 

[U2?9] Kendo, Nobutake.-.. 

Yanagizawa, Kuranosuke 

Oishi, Tamotsu 

Fourth Fleet 
Inoue, Semi 

Fifth Fleet 
Hosogaya, Boshiro. 

Eleventh Air Fleet 

Tsukahara, Nishizo 

Kusaka, Jinichi 

A-TEAM— Third Fleet (Amphi- 
bious Forces for Southern In- 
vasions) 

Takahashl, Ibo 

Ishihara, Majime 

Sixth Fleet 

Shimizu, Mitsumi 

Kanoaka, Tomojiro _. 

First Air Fleet (Carrier Fleet) 

Nagumo, Chuichi 

Kusaka, Rjainosuke 

Genda, Minoru 



Admiral 

Rear Admiral 

Captain 

Captain 

Commandei.. 
Commander.. 
Commander.. 
Commander.. 

Captain 

Commander.. 
Commander.. 
Commander.. 

Admiral. 

Rear Admiral. 

Captain.. 

Commander.. 
Commander.. 
Commander.. 
Commander.. 
Commander.. 
Commander. . 
Commander.. 
Commander.. 
Commander.. 
Commander.. 



Rear Admiral 
Commander.. 

Admiral 

Captain 

Commander.. 

Vice Admiral. 

Vice Admiral - 

Vice Admiral. 
Rear Admiral. 



Vice Admiral. 
Captain 

Vice Admiral. 
Captain. 

Vice Admiral. 
Rear Admiral 
Commander.. 



Head of First Section (War Planes and 

Operations). 
Member First Section. 
Head of Sub-Section, First Section. 
Member Sub-Section, First Section. 
Member Sub-Section, First Section. 
Member Sub-Section, First Section. 
Member Sub-Section, First Section. 



Member of Military Affairs Bureau. 
Member of Military Affairs Bureau. 
Member of Office of Military Supply. 
Private Secretary to Navy Minister 
(Admiral Shimada, Shigetaro). 



CinC Combined Fleet. 

Chief of Staff. 

Deputy Chief of Staff. 

Staff .Adjutant. 

Staff Engineering Officer. 

Staff Gunner Officer. 

Staff Air Officer. 

Staff Communication Officer. 

Staff Navigation Officer. 

Staff Operations and Plans Officer. 

Staff Torpedo Officer. 

Staff Supply Officer. 

Meteorologist Attached to Staff. 



Commander. 
Deputy Chief of Staff. 



Commander. 
Deputy Chief of Staff. 
Staff Navigation Officer 



Commander. 



Commander. 



Commander. 
Chief of Staff. 



Commander. 
Deputy Chief of Staff. 



Commander. 
Deputy Chief of Staff. 



Commander. 
Chief of Staff. 
Deputy Chief of Staff. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5359 

U4230] Appendix 2 

Japanese Task Forces 

Main Body {Commander in Chief ComMned Fleet) (Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto) ; 
(6 Battleships, 2 Light Cruisers, 8 Destroyers) ; Battleship Division #1 (2 Battle- 
ships) (Mntsu, Nagato) ; Battleship Division #2 (4 Battleships) {Ise, Hyuga, 
Fuso, Yamashiro) ; Cruiser Division #9 (2 Light Cruisers) {Kitagami, Oi) ; 8 
Destroyers (Names uncertain) 

Striking Force (Commander in Chief 1st Air Fleet) (Vice Adm. Chuichi Na- 
gumo) ; (2 Battleships, 6 Aircraft carriers. 2 Heavy Cruisers, 1 Light Cruiser, 
16 Destroyers) ; Battleship Division #3 (1st Section) (2 Battleships) (Hiei, Kiri- 
shima) ; Carrier Division #1 (2 Aircraft carriers) {Kaga, Akagi) ; Carrier Divi- 
sion #2 (2 Aircraft carriers) {Hiryu, Soryu) ; Carrier Division #5 (2 Aircraft 
carriers) (Shokakti, Zuikaku) ; Cruiser Division #8 (2 Heavy Cruisers) {Tone, 
Chikuma) ; Destroyer Squadron #1 (1 Light Cruiser, 16 Destroyers) {Adukuma, 
Destroyer names uncertain) 

Southern Force {Commander in Chief Second Fleet) (Vice Adm. Nobutake 
Kondo) ; (2 Battleships, 2 Small Aircraft carriers, 12 Heavy Cruisers, 7 Light 
Cruisers, 52 Destroyers, 16 Submarines) ; Battleship Divi'sion #3 (2nd Section) 
(2 Battleships) {Kongo, Haruna) Carrier Division #4 (1st Section) (2 Small 
Aircraft carriers) (Probably Shoho and Ryujo) ; Cruiser Division #4 (4 Heavy 
Cruisers) {Atago, Takao, Maya, Chokai) ; Cruiser Division #5 (3 Heavy Cruis- 
ers) {Haguro, Myoko, Nachi) ; Cruiser Division #7 (4 Heavy Cruisers) {Mo- 
gami, Mikuma, Kumano, Suzuya) ; Cruiser Division #16 (1 Heavy Cruiser, 3 
Light Cruisers) {Ashigara, Kuma, Kinu, Nagara) ; Destroyer Squadron #2 (1 
Light Cruiser, 12 Destroyers) {Jintsu. Destroyer names uncertain) ; Destroyer 
Squadron #3 (1 Light Cruiser, 16 Destroyers) {Sendai. Destroyer names un- 
certain) ; Destroyer Squadron #4 (1 Light Cruiser, 12 Destroyers) {Naka. 
Destroyer names uncertain) ; Destroyer Squadron #5 (1 Light Cruiser, 12 De- 
stroyers) {Natori. Destroyer names uncertain) ; About 16 Submarines (Names 
uncertain) 

[14231] Appendix 2 

Japanese Task Forces — (continued) 

South Seas Force (Commander in Chief 4th Fleet) (Vice Adm. Shigeyoshi 
Inoue) ; (4 Heavy Cruisers, 4 Light Cruisers, 12 Destroyers, 16 Submarines) 
Kashima (Light Cruiser) ; Cruiser Division #6 (4 Heavy Cruisers) (Aoha, Fur- 
titaka, Kinugasa, Kako) ; Cruiser Division #18 (2 Light Cruisers) (Tenryu, 
Tatsuta) ; Destroyer Squadron #6 (1 Light Cruiser, 12 Destroyers) (Yubari, 
Destroyer names uncertain) ; About 16 Submarines (Names uncertain) 

Northern Force (Commander in Chief 5th Fleet) (Vice Adm. Boshiro Hoso- 
kaya) ; (2 Light Cruisers, 2 Destroyers) ; Cruiser Division #21 (2 Light Cruis- 
ers) (Tama. Kiso) ; 2 Destroyers 

Advance Expeditionary Force (Commander in Chief 6th Fleet) (Vice Adm. 
Mitsumi Shimuzu) ; 3 Light Cruisers (Katori, Isuzu, Yura) ; About 26 Submarines 

Attached Forces (Training) ; Carrier Division #4 (2nd Section) (2 Small Air- 
craft carriers) (Probably Hosho and Ziiiho) ; Miscellaneous Vessels. 



5360 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5361 

[14232] Appendix 3 

Above [opposite] is shown a captured track chart of Jap carriers, covering the 
period from Pearl Harbor to Midway. During the operations noted, this Jap Car- 
rier Force was commanded by the late Vice-Admiral Nagumo as CinC First Air 
Fleet. The approximate approach of the Carrier Task Force to Hawaii is indi- 
cated. According to another document, recovered from a crashed enemy plane 
shortly after the raid, Jap aircraft tlew off their carriers about 200 miles due 
north of Oahu, rendezvoused further south, and then flew in for a coordinated 
attack. From 0755 to 0825 (Honolulu Time), VT and VD attacks were made on 
U. S. installations. After a 15-minute lull, these were followed by horizontal VB 
strikes and recurrent YD attacks. 

[14^S3] Mr. Morgan. Consistent with a request made by Senator 
Ferguson for information regarding reports of Japanese air recon- 
naissance over the Philippines, or other U. S. possessions in the Pacific 
}5rior to December 7, 1941, we have from the Navy Department a 
communication dated February 8, 1946, concerning tliis matter trans- 
mitting enclosures. We would request that the letter of transmittal 
and the enclosures be spread on the record at this point. 

The Vice Chairman. They will be spread on the record at this 
point. 

(The letter of transmittal and enclosures follow.) 

Dbpaetment of the Navy 

Office of the Secretaey 
Washitigton, 8 Fehruary 19J/6. 
1083A 
R. #119 
Memorandum: 
To : Mr Seth W. Richardson 

1. In response to Senator Ferguson's request for information regarding reports 
of Japanese air reconnaissance over the Philippines or other U. S. Possessions in 
the I'acific prior to December 7, 1941, the following references are given : 

a. " * * * 'Rear Admiral Toshio Matsunago, Retired, in [14234] 
interview published in Hoehi States Japanese should face future with calm confi- 
dence in ability Army Navy repel air attacks x Japan need not worry about 
weak ABCD powers encirclement plans x quoted as stating he has flown over 
Guam total sixteen times this year without sighting single American plane x 
American air power Far East negligible x prior retirement Matsunaga served 
twelve years as aviator Commander Ryujo Acagi Tateyama Air Station now Di- 
rector Japan airways.'" (Narrative Statement, page 239; NCI exhibit 12). 

b. Dispatch from INIarine detachment. Wake Island to ComFOURTEEN, dated 
25 November 1941, stating- that on 24 November 2115 hours the Pan-American 
clipper sighted foiar Japanese sea planes about 1.000 miles east of Guam, flying 
south at an altitude of 10,000 feet. Narrative statement, page 392 ; Hewitt ex- 
hibit 27, page 127) . 

c. Dispatch from GovGuam, 240610, dated November 24, 1941. Copy attached. 

d. Extract from the interrogation of Captain Takahashi. Copy attached. 

2. It is possible that support was given to the belief that Japanese air recon- 
naissance was being made throughout the Pacific (over all Allied Island posses- 
sions) by a report of such reconnaissance over the Gilberts, given in a dispatch 
originated by the naval attaclie at Singapore [14235] on 22 November, 
paraphrase of which is made in the Hewitt exhibit 27, page 14T. Copy of dispatch 
#220228 is attached. 

/s/ John Ford Baecher, 

Lt. Comdr., USNR. 



79716— 46— pt. 11 15 



5362 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[14236] Naval Message 

Navy Department, 
From : ALUSNA Singapore 
To: OPNAV (Action) 

CINX^PAC, CINCAF (Info.) 
Date : 23 November 1941 
220228 
Routine 

Dependable reports here of reconnaissance flights over Gilbert Islands on 
November 15 by monoplane v^ith tapered wings, single tailfin, twin engines. Next 
day repeated by monoplane flying boat silver color number of engines unobserved. 

Top secret. 

[14237] Naval Message 

Navy Deipabtmbnt 
From : Governor Guam 
To: OPNAV (Action) 

CINCPAC, CINCAF (Info.) 
Date : 24 November 1941 
240610 
Deferred 

At 1217 local time today unidentified two-engined plane sighted, circling south- 
ern end of island. Altitude approximately 15,000 feet. At 1226 local time plane 
passed out of sight to southwest. 

Top secret 

[14238] INTE31E0GATI0N OF CAPTAIN TAKAHASHI ON 20 0€TOBEB 1945 

/. Positioiis held by Captain Takahashi 

May 1941-December 1942 : On staff of Eleventh Air Fleet in Philippine Islands 
and Dutch East Indies. This was the duty i)eriod on which Captain Takahashi 
was questioned. 

January 1943-June 1945 : Senior member of Navy Aeronautical Bureau, Tokyo. 

July 1945-August 1945 : Senior Staff officer of Fifth Air Fleet and senior staff 
officer of Third Air Fleet. 

20 October 1945- : Chief of Sendai Naval Personnel Bureau. 

//. Summary 

* * * The primary mission of the Japanese Force in FORMOSA, composed 
of about 300 fighters and bombers, was the annihilation of the American Air 
Force in the PHILIPPINES. In this, it was successful partly because complete 
information relative to the American Air Force [14239] was obtained by 
Aerial Reconnaissance prior to commencement of hostilities. 

///. "Q" What gave the Japanese impression that there were 900 planes in the 
area and how did you discover that there were 300 instead of 900?" 

"A" The Navy received on 20 November 1941, a report from the Foreign Affairs 
Department that there Avere about 900 planes in the LUZON area. A photo- 
graphic reconnaissance plane conducted a search on the 24th or 25th of Novem- 
ber over that area and discovered that there were only 300 planes. One recon- 
naissance plane made flights at that time." 

[14^40] Mr. Morgan. We have here a letter from Commander 
Baecher, dated 7 March 1946, settino^ forth a request by Mrs. T. S. 
Wilkinson, the widow of Admiral Wilkinson, that certain informa- 
tion with respect to her husband and his testimony, and also a letter 
from Admiral Ingersoll to Admiral Wilkinson dated 26 December 
1945 be placed in the record.^ We request that this letter from the 
Navy Department of March 7, together with the enclosures be spread 
on the record at this point. 

1 Adm. Wilkinson's testimony appears in Hearings, Part 4, pp. 1723-1782, 1793-1858, 
1864-1911. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



5363 



The Vice Chairman. They will be spread on the record at this 
point. 

(The letter and enclosures referred to follow :) 



umi] 



Department of the Navy, 

Office of the Secretary, 
Washington, 7 March 1946. 



Memorandum : 

To : Mr. Seth W. Richardson 

1. It will be recalled that during the course of his interrogation Vice Admiral 
T. S. Wilkinson testified concerning the duties of his office which, at least in part, 
was transcribed at pages 4576-4577 of the Record of Proceedings. 

2. It further appears that at the request of Vice Admiral Wilkinson there wei-e 
read into the Record of Proceedings, at pages 5100-5104, a memorandum of Vice 
Admiral A. G. Kirk, and two dispatches exchanged between Vice Admiral Wilkin- 
son and Rear Admiral James, pertaining to matters referred to in the testimony of 
Vice Admiral Wilkinson at said pages 4576-4577 of the Record. 

3. In connection with the same matter Vice Admiral [l/i2Ji2] Wilkinson 
wrote a letter to Admiral R. E. Ingersoll on 20 December 1945, in which he re- 
ferx'ed to his own and Admiral Turner's testimony, and forwarded as the first 
enclosure a copy of the memorandum of Vice Admiral Kirk referred to above 
and as the second enclosure a copy of his own testimony as transcribed at said 
pages 4576-4577 of the Record of Proceedings before the Joint Committee, and 
inquired as to Admiral Ingersoll's recollection of the matter. Admiral Ingersoll 
answered Vice Admiral Wilkinson's letter by letter of 26 December 1945. 

4. Mrs. T. S. Wilkinson states that her lately deceased husband, Vice Admiral 
Wilkinson, refrained at the time from forwarding to the committee the exchange 
of correspondence with Admiral Ingersoll because he thought the subject matter 
would be covered when Admiral Ingersoll appeared as a witness. She feels that 
it now appears that the interrogation of Admiral Ingersoll did not cover the 
particular question, and has found the letters among Vice Admiral Wilkinson's 
effects. Accordingly Mrs. Wilkinson, having first obtained the permission of 
Admiral Ingersoll to such use of his letter, requests in behalf of her husband 
that the pertinent parts of the exchange of correspondence between Vice Admiral 
Wilkinson and Admiral Ingersoll bo I'ead into and made a part of 
the stenographic record of the committee's proceedings. Accordingly there 
are attached [142^3] hereto, marked Enclosures A and B respectively, 
copies of the second enclosure to Vice Admiral Wilkinson's letter of 20 December 
1945 to Admiral Ingersoll and of Admiral Ingersoll's letter dated 26 December 
1945. 

/s/ John Foed Babcher, 

Lt. Comdr. U8NR. 



EUSrOLOStrRE A 

Admiral Wilkinson. I said that the text of the regulations which you intro- 
duced read "Evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable." 

I understood our duties to be, and still understand, to disseminate and spread 
abroad all types of basic information, what General Miles has termed static 
information, such as the defenses of the country, its economics, the diplomatic 
relations, the characters and activities and previous careers of its military and 
naval men, the location of its fleets, the actual movements of its fleets and every- 
thing other than the enemy probable intentions, and such speciflc information 
as in itself might give rise or might require action by our fleet, or by our naval 
forces. 



5364 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In the latter case before dissemination I would consult higher authority, either 
the Assistant Chief, the Cliief of Naval Operations, or my Colleague, Chief of War 
Plans, in order that this information which I sent out would not be in conflict 
with his understanding of the naval situation, mii'i'i] and the operations 
for which he was responsible. 

]\Ir. Geseix. In other words, you had the responsibility to disseminate, but 
where you reached a situation which led you to feel that the information dis- 
seminated might approach the area of a directive, or an order to take some spe- 
cific action to the recipient then you felt you were required to consult War Plans, 
or the Chief of Naval Operations? 

Admiral Wilkinson. Exactly. 



Enclosure B : 

Staff Headquarters 
Western Sea Frontier 
Federal Office Building 
San Francisco, California, 26 December, 1945. 
My Dear Wilkinson : I have your letter of 20 December regarding your testi- 
mony before the Committee and also the two enclosures. 

My understanding of the instructions given to Naval Intelligence in 1941 is 
exactly in accord with your testimony as you gave it in the hearings, and as em- 
bodied in the second enclosure of your letter. 

I remember that discussions took place sometime in '41 although I had for- 
gotten that Kirk took part in the discussions. I remember it more as a discussion 
with you. I do remember distinctly, however, pointing out that our [14245] 
organization was not like military intelligence and that the Estimate of the Situ- 
ation should be prepared by the War Plans Division, although the data for the part 
"Enemy Intentions" naturally would have to be based on data and information 
gathered by Naval Intelligence. 

With kindest regards and all best wishes for the New Year, I am 
Very sincerely yours, 

/s/ Ingersoll. 
Vice Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, USN., 
3043 "A" Street, N. W., 
Washwfjton. D. C. 



[I4246] Mr. MoROxAN. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman. 

The Vice Chairman. There being nothing further, the committee 
will stand adjonrned subject to the call of the Chair. 

(Whereupon, at 5 : 40 p. m., the Committee adjourned, subject to 
the call of the Chair.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5365 



Umn PEAEL HAEBOR ATTACK 



THURSDAY, MAY 23, 1946 

Congress of the United States, 
Joint Committee on the Investigation 

OF THE Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Washington, D. C. 

The joint committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 : 30 a. m., in the com- 
mittee I'oom of the Committee on the District of Columbia, United 
States Capitol, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), Lucas, Brewster, and 
Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), and Murphy. 

Also present : Seth W. Richardson, general counsel ; John E. Masten, 
Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint 
committee. 

\^lJf24S~\ The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Richardson. 

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lane wants to offer, with the 
permission of the committee, a number of answers to requests which 
have been made in the record, in order to clean up that part of the 
record. 

The Chairman. I might state before you start that the Senate meets 
at 11 o'clock today and the House also meets at 11 o'clock. We will 
have to work pretty fast here to get through before the two Houses 
meet. 

I just wanted that to be understood, so that we wouldn't waste any 
time. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I suggested to Senator Fergu- 
son and counsel, while talking informally, that in view of the fact 
that the Senate is meeting at 11 o'clock today and the House is also 
meeting at 11 o'clock, that probably the best thing to do would be for 
us to receive these documents for the record, close the record, and then 
adjourn subject to call of the Chair, with the idea that as early next 
week as can be convenientl}^ arranged we could have another meeting 
of the committee. 

The Chairman. Senator George cannot be here this morning as he 
is presiding at a Finance Committee meeting; and Mr. Clark is away, 
as is also Mr. Gearhart. So it would be my purpose to call an executive 
committee meeting the first [H^JfQ'] day of next week that 
is available. 

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Clark will in all probability be back next 
week. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, it would be my suggestion that we 
hold this record open to put these things in. I would like to have 
time to go over them after they are in the record. 



5366 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

» 

The Chmrman. The Chair wishes to state this, Senator, that the 
committee voted last week to close the record today, and I wouldn't 
feel at liberty to hold the record open unless the committee reverses 
its action taken last week. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I received the answers to ques- 
tions put to Mr. Hull yesterday. As the Chair knows we have had 
very important sessions. We had a very important session yesterday 
and finally voted. It was necessary that I stay on the floor. I haven't 
had time to properly analyze the material to see whether or not other 
questions should be submitted. Those I analyzed were very unsatis- 
factory, so far as I personally was concerned. 

I feel that we have failed utterly to get information by the system 
of using interrogatories. It was difficult enough to get testimony 
from the witnesses in the hearings. I feel that it has failed and that 
we should have some time to submit interrogatories. 

For instance, I asked many questions of Mr. Stimson. He didn't 
see fit to answer the first set of questions at all. [14^50] Per- 
sonally I don't feel that he even answered the second questions, but 
he did at least give us some answers to those. 

Now, if we spend months, and we have spent months, on this matter, 
I feel that we should have a complete record. I certainly want to 
have a complete record of the Pearl Harbor facts. I feel that by- 
closing this record today, without the right to submit further questions, 
without tlie right of getting the Stimson diary, that we are not getting 
all of the facts. 

The Chairman. Well, the committee will have to pass on that. 

Senator Ferguson. I realize that, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. We will go ahead. We don't want to argue that 
now. 

Senator Ferguson. I am not arguing it. 

The Chairman. No; but we have taken time, which is very short 
and very precious. I will be perfectly frank to state that unless the 
committee itself orders it, reverses the action that it took to close 
the record today, that is what the order was, with only two votes 
against that motion, made by Mr. Keefe, unless the committee desires 
otherwise I am going to adhere to the action taken by the committee. 

I don't see how I can do otherwise as chairman of this committee. 
If the committee wants to take a different action when it meets again, 
that is its business, but so far as the orders of the committee are at 
present, the hearing of evidence [14^51] and the record was to 
be closed today. 

Whether you or I, or the committee, or anybody else, could get any 
additional information from Mr. Stimson than his reply to interroga- 
tories, I do not know. It is unfortunate that Mr. Stimson's health 
has been such that he couldn't appear in person. I think that we all 
have the greatest respect for Mr. Stimson and that the country has 
the greatest respect for Mr. Stimson. I haven't had a chance to read 
his replies, but I don't think it is necessary for me to read them in order 
to determine whether there should be any more hearings or any more 
questions asked of him. I presume he gave us the best information 
he could in reply to the questions. If he hasn't, I don't know whether 
additional questions sent to him would elicit anything further or not. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, it is only that I think we ought 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5367 

to be given that opportunity. At least I would like to have made a 
part of this record the questions that I submitted and a showing that 
he did not answer. 

The Chairman. I presume that the questions submitted are a part 
of the record, that they were made a part of the record, as much as 
the answers. Without seeing the questions and the answers, I as- 
sume the questions would be made a part of the record just as if they 
had been asked in open hearing. 

Senator Ferguson. I didn't know. That is the reason I asked. 

[14^-52] The Chairman. I assume so. Isn't that true, Counsel ? 

Mr. Richardson. My idea would be that whatever we got from Mr. 
Stimson would appear in this record. 

The Chairman. Yes, and the same with regard to Mr. Hull. Let's 
go ahead. 

Mr. ISIuRPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire if the Hull answers 
are here ready to be put in the record today ? 

Mr. Lane. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I presume all members received them and that they 
are here ready to be put in the record today. Go ahead. 

Mr. Lane. The Committee sent certain interrogatories to former 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull on April 5, 1946. We have received 
his answers to the interrogatories, and ask that the interrogatories, 
the answers thereto, and their letter of transmittal dated May 16, 1946, 
be spread on the record. 

The Chairman. Without objection, that will be done. 

(The answers given by Mr. Hull to interrogatories submitted to 
him by the Committee follow :)^ 

[14253] May 16, 1946. 

The Honorable Alben W. Babkley, Chairman, 

Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Peiakl Habboe Attack, 

Congress of the United States. 

My Deae Mb. Babkley, Reference is made to your letter of April 5, 1946, en- 
closing a set of 169 interrogatories wbich the committee desired me to consider 
and make such reply thereto as my recollection of the facts might warrant. 

In pursuance of your request I enclose my replies to the interrogatories. I feel 
that most of the matters covered in my replies have already been set forth in 
the record of the Department of State or in my prepared statement to the 
committee. I trust that my replies satisfactorily dispose of the questions con- 
cerning which the committee has inquired. 
Sincerely yours, 

[S] Cordell Hull. 
Enclosure : 

Replies to interrogatories. 

[U£54] REPLIES TO INTERROGATORIES PROPOUNDED BY THE 
HONORABLE HOMER FERGUSON, MEMBER OF THE JOINT COMMIT- 
TEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OE THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

1. Question : Is it correct to say, Mr. Secretary, that the first specific 
point in the 10 points of the American note of November 26, 
1941, proposed that Japan enter a seven-power nonaggression 
compact ? ( See For. Rel. vol. 2, 769. ) 

^ Mr. Hull was sworn by the Chairman at the time of his appearance before the Com- 
mittee on November 23, 1945. See Hearings, Part 2, p. 403 et seq. 



5368 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Answer: In this Government's outline of a proposed basis for 
agreement between the United States and Japan communi- 
cated to the Japanese Government on November 26 there were 
listed in section 2 under 10 headings steps to be taken by the 
Government of the United States and by the Government 
of Japan of which the first heading reads as follows : 

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of 
Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact 
among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet 
Union, Thailand, and the United States. 

2. Question : [14^55] Is it correct to say that, in j^our conversa- 

tion with the Japanese Ambassadors on November 22, 1941, 
you broached the matter of proposing to Japan SOMETIME 
a broad comprehensive plan involving the collaboration of 
other nations? (For. KeL voL 2, 761.) 
Answer: On November 22, 1941, 1 told the Japanese Ambassador 
that I had in mind taking up with him sometime a general 
and comprehensive program which we had been engaged in 

developing and which involved collaboration of other coun- 
tries. Our broad approach was toward a world objective, 
not a local, regional, or bilateral objective. While the initial 

step was bilateral as between the Japanese and ourselves, 
what we were trying to do was to get Japan to adopt a peace- 
ful program on world-wide lines. Had we been successful 
Japan would have been able to satisfy all her needs by taking 
advantage of the principles, for example, of the Nine-Power 
Agreement and the Good Neighbor policy. We envisaged, of 
course, the assumption by Japan of obligations along with 
the acquisition by her of rights. 

3. Question : Did the Japanese Ambassadors reply that Japan was 

interested in a bilateral agreement with the United States? 
(For.Kel. vol. 2,762.) 
[14:250] Answer: Tlie Japanese Ambassador said that the 
Japanese had in mind negotiating a bilateral agreement with 
us to which other powers could subsequently give their adher- 
ence. The Japanese, throughout the conversations, had 
shown ap])arently little thought for the rights and interests 
of countries in the Pacific area other than Japan and the 
United States. From the outset of the conversations I had 
endeavored to make it clear to the Japanese that this Govern- 
ment could not join with Japan in disposing of questions 
affecting the rights and .interests of the other concerned 
powers without consulting them prior to entering into formal 
negotiations on these matters with the Japanese. There could 
not have been, however, any doubt in the mind of the Japanese 
Ambassador that our conversations looked to our entering 
into a bilateral agreement with Japan as our immediate 
objective even though we held to the view that other powers 
should be consulted. 

4. Question : Did the Japanese Ambassadors say to you, after reading 

tlie note of November 26 and the oral statement of the 26th, 
that the American proposal was unacceptable and was to be 
interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end? (For. Rel. 
vol. 2, 766.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5369 

Answer : [1/^£S7] After the Japanese Ambassadors had 
read tlie documents handed to them on November 26 con- 
taining an outline of the proposed basis of an agreement 
between the United States and Japan and an exphmatory oral 
statement, Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that our response to 
their jjroposal could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning 
the end. Neither Mr. Kurusu nor Ambassador Nomura stated 
that the American proposal was unacceptable. 
5. Question : Is it correct to say that the position of the State Depart- 
ment has been that the American note of the 26th was a 
necessary restatement of American policy as the only logical 
and practical means by which peaceful conditions might 
obtain in the Pacific Ocean? (For. Rel. 767 et. al.) 

Answer : In answer to this question, I refer to my statement before 
the joint committee on November 19, 1915, in which I said : 

Our Government's proposal was offered for the consideration of the 
Japanese Government as one practical example of a program to be 
worked out. It did not rule out other practical examples which either 
Government was free to offer. 

In that same statement I also said : 

[lJf258] The Japanese were spreading propaganda to the effect 
that they were being encircled. On the one hand we were faced by 
this charge and on the other by one that we were preparing to pursue 
a policy of appeasing Japan. In view of the resulting confusion, it 
seemed important to restate the fundamentals. 

That confusion prevailed both in Japan and the United 
States. We knew from Japanese acts and utterances that 
the Japanese proposal of November 20 was their last word 
and it was obviously desirable that the record of the American 
Government's position throughout the conversations be made 
crystal clear. Tlierefore, the proposals of November 26 
were directed toward making our position utterly clear and 
toward keeping the door open for further conversations not- 
withstanding the ultimative character of the Japanese pro- 
posal of November 20. The principles set forth in our No- 
vember 26 proposal were in all important respects essentially 
the same principles w^e had been proposing to the Japanese 
right along. Had the Japanese had the least disposition to 
pursue a peaceful course, a more desirable program could not 
have been offered to them. All Japan had to do to take ad- 
vantage of our offer was to abandon her course of aggression 
and to adopt tlie accepted rules of peaceful international con- 
duct. In the explanatory statement which accompanied 
the proposal there was reviewed [14-259] briefly the 
objective sought in the exploratory conversations, namely, 
that of arriving at an agreement regarding Pacific questions 
on a basis of peace, law and order, and fair dealing among 
nations. 

6. Question : It was stated, was it not, by the American Government 
to Japan in the note of the 26th that the Japanese proposal 
of November 20 fell short of the objectives desired? (For. 
Rel. vol. 2, 767.) 



5370 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Answer: In this Government's communication to the Japanese 
Government of November 26 it was stated : 

The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on 
November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Gov- 
ernment, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part 
of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Gov- 
ernment has declared that it is committed. The Government of the 
United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not 
be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace 
under law, order, and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that 
further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard 
to the practical application of the fundamental principles already 
mentioned. 

The Japanese asked in their proposal of November 20 that the 
United States [14'^60] agree to cease giving aid to 
China; that the United States desist from augmenting its 
military forces in the western Pacific ; that the United States 
help Japan obtain products of the Netherlands East Indies; 
that the United States undertake to resume commercial rela- 
tions with Japan ; that the United States undertake to supply- 
to Japan "a required quantity of oil" ; while Japan on her part 
would be free to continue her military operations in and 
against China and to keep her troops in Indochina and to 
attack the Soviet Union, would have her funds unfrozen, 
would be able to buy with comparative freedom from the 
United States, would be assured adequate supplies of oil, and 
would be under no obligation to remove her troops from Indo- 
china until she should have completed her conquest of China 
or conditions of peace satisfactory to her had been estab- 
lished "in the Pacific area." 

Before and after presenting that proposal. Ambassador 
Nomura and Mr. Kurusu talked emphatically about the 
urgency of the situation and intimated vigorously that this 
was Japan's last word and if an agreement along those lines 
was not quickly concluded ensuing developments might be 
most unfortunate. 

Wliat Japan asked in that proposal would, had it been 
agreed to by the United States, have meant condonement by 
the United States of Japan\s past aggressions, assent by 
[14^61] the United States to unlimited courses of conquest 
by Japan in the future, abandonment by the United States of 
its whole past position in regard to the most essential prin- 
ciples of its foreign policy in general, betrayal by the United 
States of China, and acceptance by the United States of a posi- 
tion as a silent partner aiding and abetting Japan in her effort 
to create a Japanese hegemony in and over the western Pacific 
and Eastern Asia. 

Acceptance by us of the Japanese proposal of November 20 
would have placed Japan in a commanding position in her 
movement to acquire control of the entire western Pacific area ; 
would have destroyed our chances of asserting and maintain- 
ing our rights and interests in the Pacific; and in its final 
analysis would have meant a most serious threat to our na- 
tional security. She also clung to her vantage point in Indo- 
cliina which threatened the security of the countries to the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5371 

south and menaced vital trade routes. Their conditional offer 
to withdraw troops from southern Indochina to northern 
Indochina was meaningless as they could have brought those 
troops back to southern Indochina within a day or two, and 
furthermore they placed no limit on the number of troops they 
might continue to send there. 

7 Question: Did our Government reject the Japanese note ol 
• [lJi.-262'\ November 20, 1941, which you described as an 
ultimatum? 
Answer : The Japanese proposal of November 20, which I have 
described in response to question No. 6, was of so preposterous 
a character that no responsible American official could ever 
have dreamed of accepting it. Nevertheless, I felt that I 
should not be violent in my comment to the Japanese in regard 
to it so as to avoid giving'them any pretext to walk out on the 
conversations. 

Therefore, despite the ultimative character of the Japanese 
proposal, and despite the slim possibility that Japan would 
elect to continue the conversations, we proposed to keep alive 
that possibility while restating our fundamental principles. 
The Army and Navy were asking for more time, as they had 
for months past, and I had that situation very much at heart. 
Morever, we wanted to show our interest in peace up to the last 
split second and at the same time to expose the bad faith of the 
Japanese. Everything we said or did was with those consid- 
erations in mind. In drawing up a full restatement of our 
principles, we gave exemplifications of their application to the 
situation in the Pacific area, and we invited the Japanese to 
continue the conversations with that statement as a basis. 

8. Question: It was stated, was it not that, therefore, the United 
[1.^63] States was setting forth to Japan a broad and 
comprehensive program under which the desired objectives 
could be attained? (For. Kel. vol. 2, 767.) 
Answer: In this Government's oral statement to the Japanese 
Government of November 26 it was stated : 

* * * the Government of the United States ofCers for the considera- 
tion of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement 
covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a 
program which this Government envisages as something to be worked 
out during our further conversations. 

As I said in my statement before the joint committee of 
November 19, 1945, in reviewing what I had told press cor- 
respondents on the day following the date of delivery to the 
Japanese of the communication under reference, 

I found there had been so much confusion and so many collateral 
matters brought in along with high Japanese officials in Tokyo pro- 
claiming their old doctrines of force, that I thought it important to 
bring the situation to a clear prespective. So I had recounted and 
restated the fundamental principles and undertook to make application 
of them to a number of specific conditions such as would logically go 
into a broad basic peaceful settlement in the Pacific area. 

[1426Jf] There had been every kind of suggestion made as we 
had gone along in the conversations. I said that I had considered 
everything in the way of suggestions from the point of view whether 
it would facilitate, keep alive, and if possible carry forward conversa- 
tions looking toward a general agreement, all the while naturally 



5372 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

preserviiis the fullest integrity of every principle for which we stood. 
I had sought to examine everything possible but always to omit con- 
sideration of any proposal that would contemplate the stoppage of the 
C(mversations and search for a general agreement for peace. 

9. Question: When did you prepare the message which President 
Roosevelt was to send to the Japanese Emperor the night of 
December (>, 1941 ? 
Answer : The idea of a message from the President to the Eaiperor 
had been under consideration by the President and myself 
as far back as the middle of October, as is clear from the 
record before the committee. The message as actually sent 
was prepared in final form on December 6, and included 
contributions made in the White House as well as material 
contained in drafts prepared in the State Department during 
preceding weeks. 

[-/4^^'5] 10. Question : For the purpose of a question I shall quote 
from the President's message to the Emperor : "Thus a with- 
drawal of the Japanese forces from Indochina would result 
in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South 
Pacific area" — end of quotation and I ask : Is it correct to say 
that the withdrawal of the Japanese from Indochina, under 
a neutral guarantee of the integrity of Indochina by the 
interested parties, was the single specific proposal of the 
message of the Emperor, sent by President Roosevelt on De- 
cember 6? And fulfillment of it would have assured peace 
in the southwest Pacific, in the opinion of the President? 
Answer : In the President's message to the Japanese Emperor the 
President stated that "both Japan and the United States 
should agree to eliminate anj- form of military threat." The 
President was seeking to make a broad appeal. The with- 
drawal by Japan of its armed forces from Indochina would 
have assured the creation of an atmosphere which would have 
rendered possible resumption of conversations looking to a 
peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Con- 
versely, Japan's refusal to accept the President's proposal 
would expose her real purpose. Indochina was the logical 
and by far the most feasible jumping-otf place for a Japanese 
movement to the south. The [14^66] President by 
his proposal for the neutralization of Indochina on July 24 
had already strongly tested Japan's purposes in her continued 
movement south by proposing that she get out of Indochina — 
and the Japanese Government by its clear-cut refusal be- 
trayed its military designs on the South Sea area. This pro- 
posal also served to expose Japan's intentions not to consider 
peaceful arrangements with us unless we were prepared to 
make all the concessions. The President was now making an 
additional last-minute appeal. He, of course, knew that the 
huge Japanese armada had already left the jumping-off place 
in Indochina, which, .from our viewpoint, meant that the 
danger of attack could not have been more imminent. 
Nevertheless, the President believed that he should not neg- 
lect even the slim chance that an additional last-minute 
appeal might save the situation. It also served to make clear 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5373 

to the American people and to the workl our interest in 
maintaining peace up to the very last minute, 

11. Question: Was there any tiling in the December 6 message pro- 

posing a Japanese withdrawal from China — a pledge not to 
interfere should the United States be drawn into war by 
Germany — or a proposal for Japan's adherence to a seven- 
power nonaggression pact ? 
Answer: [14M7] Inasmuch as the November 26 proposal 
of this Government was already before the Japanese, the ap- 
peal to the Emperor was made specifically applicable to the 
critical situation created by the Japanese military movement 
from and within Indochina which we had very much in our 
minds. Indochina was the seat of the most acute and iminent 
danger at that moment. The other subjects at issue with 
Japan mentioned in your question had been thrashed out over 
and over again chiring 6 months of conversations. 

Throughout the conversations we had vainly urged on 
Japan that she abandon conquest, including the conquest of 
China. We also had asked the Japanese to give up her alli- 
ance with Germany and Italy which was directed against us, 
but they clung to that alliance like they clung to their very 
life. We had fully demonstrated the utter impossibility of 
getting Japan to budge on these questions. 
Questions 12, 13, and 38 are grouped in a single answer. 

12. Question: The intercepted diplomatic messages of the Japanese 

show that on November 26 Nomura and Kurusu requested 
permission of Tokyo to request that President Eoosevelt wire 
to a Japanese official, Premier Tojo, I presume, and ask that 
peace be maintained for the sake of posterity and that Japan 
replied with a cordial message, were you aware, on November 
29, that this document was in the possession {142€8'\ 
of the American Government as decoded on November 28? 
(Intercepted messages, exhibit 1, p. 180.) 

13. Question : The intercepted Japanese messages show that, on No- 

vember 28, the Japanese Ambassadors received from Tokyo a 
message that was secretly intercepted and decoded by the 
American Government on the same day, and which said: 
I quote: "I contacted the man you told me to in your No. 
1180 and he said that under present circumstances what you 
suggest is entirely unsuitable" end quotation : were you aware 
of the existence of this document on November 30^ (Cf. In- 
tercepted messages, exhibit 1, p. 195, last two sentences of 
No. 844.) 
38. Question: You saw the intercepted Japanese messages, did you 
not? 
Answer : I was at all times intensely interested in the contents 
of the intercepts. I instructed my secretaries to show me 
promptly any and all intercepts of material value and im- 
portance to the State Department. This, it seemed to me, 
they did. So far as I was able to judge, all of such intercepts 
were shown to me. The State Department was on a 24-hour 
basis and messages received in the Department after office 
hours in whatever form when important were delivered to 



5374 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

me at my home. At this late [14^69'\ date, in 1946, 
I cannot be certain wliether I received and read at the time all 
important intercepts or whether it might be possible that some 
of those I have read since that time or recently are con- 
fused in my mind with what I read at the time. I kept no 
records as to when particular messages reached me. 
Questions 14, 82, and 83 are grouped in a single answer. 

14. Question : It is proved by the intercepted messages, is it not, that 

Japan on November 28 had rejected the proposition of an 
exchange of peace messages between the heads of their respec- 
tive states ? ( No. 844, p. 195, exhibit 1. ) 

82. Question : Will you please look at message No. 844, page 195, 

exhibit 1, and state as to whether or not that message relates 
to a message from the President to the Emperor? 

83. Question : If your answer to the last question is "yes," then will 

you explain why the message was sent on the night of the 6th 
of December 1941, when you and the President had knowl- 
edge of the message of exhibit 1, message 844, page 195 ? 
Answer : The intercepted message cited (No. 844, exhibit 1. p. 195) 
seems to refer to a suggestion by the Japanese [14^0'] 
Ambassador for a Japanese initiative in proposing to this 
Government an exchange of messages between the President 
and a Japanese official, presumably the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. The Japanese Foreign Minister, after consulting 
with the Navy Minister, apparently did not approve of that 
suggestion. In the situation in which we found ourselves 
grabbing at straws to save the peace, this Government be- 
lieved that no possibility should be overlooked even at the 
last minute to appeal for peace. In any case, there was no 
reason why the President should not send a message to the 
Emperor regardless of the attitude of any particular sub- 
ordinate Japanese official. 

15. Question : On November 29, 1941, you rejected, did you not, as 

useless a suggestion of the Australian Minister that he try 
to mediate through Kurusu? 
Answer: On November 9, 1941, the Australian Minister called 
on me and brought up the question of his conferring with 
the Japanese representative, Mr. Kurusu, and suggesting 
to Kurusu that Australia would be glad to act as a mediator. 
I offered no objection to his taking such a step, but merely 
stated my opinion to the Minister that the diplomatic stage 
was over and that nothing would come of such a move. 

16. Question: [14271] On November 30, or around that date, 

did you recommend to the President that he deliver a message 
to Congress on the subject of American-Japanese relations? 
Answer : On November 29, 1 sent to the President a draft message 
to Congress, which Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox 
had helped to prepare, together with a draft message from 
the President to the Emperor. In my memorandum to the 
President I said : 

If you should send this message to the Emperor it would be advisable 
to defer your message to Congress until we see whether the message 
to the Emperor effects any improvement in the situation. I think we 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5375 

agree that you will not send message to Congress until the last stage 
of our relations, relating to actual hostility, has been reached. 

17. Question : What did the President say ? 

Answer : I have no specific recollection as to what President 
Roosevelt said regarding a message to Congress. But the 
record is that he did not send the message to Congress. 

18. Question : Why did he not send it to Congress? 

Answer: [14272] The President and I had for some time 
been communicating to various Members of Congress our 
views on the imminent dangers in the situation in connection 
with such matters as neutrality legislation and extension of 
selective service. A message to Congress during the last few 
days would have contained very little that was new without 
giving to the Japanese leaders material which would have 
enabled them to arouse their people against us all the more, 
a thing we wished to avoid so long as there was even the slight- 
est possibility of keeping the discussions alive. 

Furthermore, the powerful isolationist groups in this coun- 
try would probably have renewed their oft-repeated charges 
of "war-mongering" and "dragging the nation into foreign 
wars." The Japanese leaders would then have been in a posi- 
tion to play up the situation as evidencing disunity in the 
United States in order to gain support in Japan for plunging 
ahead. 

19. Question : Did it occur to you, in making such a recommendation 

that, either in wording or by precedent, there applied in the 
situation of November 30, 1941, that clause in the Constitu- 
tion of the United States which provides that, from time to 
time, tlie President shall inform the Congress of the state 
of the Union ? 
Answer: [14^73] I would say that among the considera- 
tions which led to the drafting of the message to Congress was 
the Constitutional clause you cite, but there was also the 
consideration whether sending such a message at that par- 
ticular time would have been helpful or otherwise in the 
critical situation then existing. 

20. Question : Did you tell a press conference on or about December 

3, 1941, that the Japanese Government on November 12 had 
taken the position that these talks were not informal and 
exploratory, rather that they constituted real negotiations, 
which were in their final stages and that in the event of 
their failure a critical and dangerous situation would result ? 
(Cf. For. Eel. p. 75.) 
Answer : The question whether the conversations with the Japa- 
nese in 1941 constituted real negotiations was not a matter 
of unilateral determination. This Government had made it 
clear to the Japanese from the outset that our conversations 
must remain on an exploratory basis until we could determine 
whether there existed a basis for negotiations. That point 
was never reached. Later, the Japanese Government ad- 
vanced the contention that we were in negotiation, with 
Ambassador Grew at Tokyo on November 12 and with us 



5376 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

here on November 13. On that day, I made [14^^74-] 
the position of this Government quite clear to the Japanese 
representatives, as follows: 

The Secretary, after asking the Japanese Minister to make accurate 
note of what the Secretary was about to say, replied that if we are 
to worlv out a peaceful settlement in the Pacitlc area he could do this 
only on the basis of carrying on exploratory conversations until we 
reached a stage when he could go to Great Britain, to China and to 
the Dutch and say to them that he believes tliat the attitudes of Japan 
and the United States are such as to afford a basis for negotiation 
and that we could call what took place thereafter a negotiation. 
(Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-il, vol. II, 
pp. 731-732.) 

Inasmuch as the Japanese Government did not subsequently 
refer to this point, it was to be assumed that it had accepted 
this Government's position. There was no occasion for re- 
ferring to this point in conference with the press. I did, 
however, make clear to the representatives of the press on 
November 27 and again on December 3 the seriousness of the 
situation. 
Questions 21 and 22 are grouped in a single answer. 

21. Question : From page 43 of your statement, I quote : "On Novem- 

ber 30, 1 was informed by the British Ambassador [14^275^ 
that the British Government had important indications that 
Japan was about to attack Siam and that this attack would 
include a seaborne expediion to seize strategic points in the 
Kra Isthmus" and quotation — I ask if you recall having any 
information on that day from the First Lord of the British 
Admiralty indicating a Japanese attack upon the United 
States? 

22. Question : I quote from the New York Times of December 1, a 

dispatch from London under date of November 30 : "A. V. 
Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, said that 'if Japan 
breaks wnth and attacks the United States we must go with 
the United States and I am glad we have been able to send 
naval reinforcements to the Far East,' end quotation: Did 
you see any official message to the United States of such a 
nature ? 
Answer: I do not recall receiving any information or messages 
on or about November 30 from the First Lord of the Admir- 
alty or from any other official source indicating a Japanese 
attack on the United States or pledging support to the United 
States if attacked; nor has there been found in the Depart- 
ment of State any record of such information having been 
communicated to the Department of State. 

23. Question : [14276] Was it a fact that, on November 30, and 

thereafter, the predominant opinion in the War Council was 
that, the attack would come against others rather than the 
United States? 
Answer : While it was my judgment that the Japanese were likely 
to attack in widely separated areas, all observable indications 
pointed to the likelihood that the attack would occur in the 
Southwest Pacific area. The most threatening activities 
known to our Government, so far as I saw or heard, were the 
Japanese movements near the jumping-off place in Indochina. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5377 

Malaya, the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies, and Siam 
were well within range of attack from that jumping-off place. 
The competent and appropriate military officials, I believe, 
have spoken for themselves on this subject. 

24. Question : When did you first see the cablegram from Ambassador 

Winant, dated December 6, and received in the State Depart- 
ment December 6, as to the movement of the Japanese fleet 
toward the Kra Peninsula ? 
Answer : The telegram in question, No. 5918 from the American 
Embassy in London, England, was received, according to the 
records, in the State Department at 10: 40 a. m. [14£77'\ 
December 6. in view of the message's character, of the no- 
tation that it was "most urgent," and of the fact that it was 
headed "Personal and Secret to the Secretary and the Presi- 
dent," it must have been shortly after its receipt that I saw it. 

25. Question: In your prepared statement to this committee, Mr. 

Secretary, I find no reference to your conversation with the 
Japanese* Ambassador on August 16, the day preceding the 
delivery of two notes to Japan by the President; and I ask 
if it is correct to summarize that conversation of August 16 
in these words : to the Ambassador's "pointed" request for a 
resumption of the conversations you stood by your position 
of July 23 in which you stated that because of Japan's viola- 
tion of the basis of the conversations by its seizure of Indo- 
china you saw no basis remaining; and after you had sug- 
gested that the Ambassador might see the President, if he 
desired, Nomura replied that he would be in no position to 
talk to the President until his Government had wired him 
concessions which he, as previously stated, believed his Gov- 
ernment was willing to make in order to have the conversa- 
tions resumed? (Cf. Foreign Relations II, pp. 553-554.) 
Answer: The conversation of August 16 with the Japanese 
[14^78] Ambassador is correctly summarized in Foreign 
Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931^1, volume II, 
pages 553-554: 

The Ambassador of Japan called at his request. He proceeded to say 
that he had again read over the documents that he and I had had under 
discussion, that he had been in communication with his Government, 
and that he believed there were grounds for progress in the conversa- 
tions. He said that his Government was very desirous of working out 
peaceful relations between our two countries and he elaborated further 
along this line and against the idea of war. He stated that he would 
favor concessions in order to avoid war and that from what he heard 
from his Government, it would make concessions in order to avoid war. 
He said that in fact it would be glad to have a high Japanese oflacial 
meet a high American official half way between the two countries in 
order to take up the matter in its final form. 

The Ambassador then pointedly inquired of me whether 
conversations such as he and I had been conducting could 
be resumed between our two Governments. I proceeded to 
reiterate and repeat the circumstances leading up to the cessa- 
tion of our conversations and the reasons which I set forth 
through Mr. Welles for their discontinuance. I did not pass 
further on the question which he propounded [14^79] 
but left it as it was. The Ambassador remarked that the 

79716 — 46— pt. 11 16 



5378 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

situation was critical and it was very important in his judg- 
ment for suitable steps to be taken to avoid serious develop- 
ments but I still revealed no sign whatever of saying any- 
thing favorable about his request for a resumption of con- 
versations. I said that as the matter stands Japan with her 
Army, Navy, and air forces was establishing many bases in 
and about French Indochina under her continued policy of 
conquest by force, that this would mean about the last step 
prior to a serious invasion of the South Sea area if it should 
be decided upon by Japan, that such an invasion would be a 
serious menace to British success in Europe and hence to the 
safety of the Western Hemisphere, including the United 
States, and that, therefore, this Govermiient could not for a 
moment remain silent in the face of such a threat, especially 
if it should be carried forward to any further extent. The 
Ambassador remarked that the people of Japan did not have 
enough foodstuffs and went to Indochina to secure such 
needed connnodities as rice. To this I promptly replied that 
if Japan had been willing to go forward with a peaceful 
settlement of the Pacific area in line with the principles and 
policies the Ambassador and I had discussed, Japan would 
have been able peacefully and without the use or threat of 
force to have equal access with every otlier nation to world 
IJ4^80] markets for rice and all other foodstuffs. 

The Ambassador repeatedly said that his country was very desirous 
of peaceful relations with this country in the future as well as now 
and that he beiieved his Government would make some concessions 
in order to resume conversations to this end. I expressed interest in 
this and again referred to Japan's continuing policy of conquest by 
force and of bitter denunciation of this country by the Government 
controlled press which is loudly supporting such a policy, and again 
I said that I would not be in a position to say anything relative to 
his request in addition to wliat I said some days ago when he first 
brought up the matter. 

I suggested to the Ambassador that the situation was very serious 
and that if he desired to talk to any others on this subject or to the 
President it would be perfectly agreeable with me and I would not 
consider it as in in any way going around me. et cetera. The Ambassa- 
dor said that he would not be in a position to talk to the President 
until he first telegraphed his country for instructions as to what con- 
cessions it might be willing to make in connection with a resumption 
of converations. 

26. Question : In your memorandum of the conversation in the White 
House among the President, Ambassador Nomura and 
[14£S1] yourself on August 17, you state that the Pres- 
ident requested the Ambassador to come to the White House 
(cf Foreign Relations 11, p. 554) : my question is: Had the 
President been informed that on the previous da3^ August 16, 
the Japanese Ambassador had stated that he did not wish to 
see the President until he had received concessions from the 
Japanese Government which he, the Ambassador, believed his 
Government would make? 
Answer: I find from the records that I informed the President 
prior to the White House conference on August IT of the 
substance of my conversation with the Japanese Ambassa- 
dor on the previous day, I refer to President Roosevelt's '' 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5379 

telegram to Prime Minister Cluircliill, of August 18, 1941, 
which is a committee exhibit. 

27. Question : Is it correct to state that tlie State Department records 

show no offer of concessions by Japan on August 17, 1941? 
Answer: This Government at no time in the course of the con- 
versations of 1941 talked to the representatives of the Jap- 
anese Government in terms of "concessions" to be made by 
Japan as condition for an agreement. It made known to the 
Japanese Government that its willingness to [142S2] 
enter into an agreement with Japan was contingent upon 
Japan's adopting consistently peaceful courses. At no time 
did the Japanese Government give any practical evidence on 
Avhich this GoA^ernment could rely or dependable pledges that 
the Japanese Government intended to pursue policies of 
peace. 

28. Question: When did the war with Japan become inevitable? 

Answer: The question of the inevitability of war with Japan 
involved two factors, the factor of Japanese plans and objec- 
tives and the factor of time. 

With regard to Japanese objectives, it is clear from the 
record that following the advent in 1927 of the Cabinet of 
General Tanaka, who inaugurated the so-called positive policy 
toward China, Japan had consistently been pursuing only one 
fixed policy — that of expansion by aggression. In 1931 
Japan occupied Manchuria by force; in 1933, Japan seized 
Jehol, penetrated Chahar and extorted from China a demili- 
tarized zone in north China. The truculent statement of 
Amau, spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office, on April 
17, 1934, in which Japan made clear a purpose to compel 
China to follow Japan's dictate and to permit other countries 
to have relations with China only as Japan allowed, made 
crystal clear [14283] Japan's policies of aggression. 
In 1937 Japan embarked upon military operations in north 
China which soon developed into an all-out attack on the 
whole of China. On September 21, 1938, 1 told the Canadian 
Minister that I had been in'oceeding on the theory that Japan 
definitely contemplated domination, by any and every kind 
of means, of East Asia and the Western Pacific area. In 
furtherance of these objectives Japan in September 1940 
entered into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, 
Japan's program thus being merged into a far-flung drive 
for world domination of which Japan's share was to be East 
Asia. On January 15. 1941, in a statement in support of the 
lend-lease bill before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the House of Representatives. I pointed out that Japan was 
out to establish herself in a dominant position in the entire 
region of the Western Pacific and that her leaders had openly 
declared their determination to make themselves masters of 
an area containing almost one-half of the entire population 
of the world. In the light of Japan's steady course of expan- 
sion by force, it was manifest that she would attack in her 
own good time unless we surrendered our principles. 

As I have repeatedly stated, this Government had fully 
taken into account Japan's record when it entered into the 



5380 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

conversations with the Japanese in 1941. [14£84] Nev- 
ertheless, tlie American Government responded favorably to 
the Japanese request that we enter into conversations looking 
to a settlement of Pacific questions even though it realized 
that there was but a slight chance that thereby Japan could 
be brought around to adopt peaceful courses. 

The second factor, that of time, was considered by us in 
the light of contemporary developments. Through the years 
that the Japanese Government was standing for policies of 
aggression, this Government was standing for policies of 
peace and of law and order with justice, as is clear from the 
record. These opposing policies were utterly irreconcilable. 
We knew that would would not surrender at any time our 
basic principles. As a result of our close-up conversations 
with the Japanese, we could not escape the conclusion that 
Japan would not abandon her policy of aggression. Our 
long-standing appraisal of Japanese policies and purposes 
of aggression and of attacking us and other countries in the 
Pacific area in furtherance of those purposes, was supported 
by Japanese utterances and acts. As regards the element of 
time, I was satisfied by early October from the evidence of 
feverish Japanese military activities and movements, the 
bellicose pronouncements of Japanese spokesmen and of the 
Japanese press, reports of growing political tension 
[J4^8S] in Japan, as well as from what was disclosed by 
the intercepted Japanese messages that the time when they 
would attack us was rapidly approaching. 

In looking back upon the developments in theix entirety 
during the last weeks and months prior to Pearl Harbor it can 
be clearly seen that our judgments and our methods of deal- 
ing with Japan as we did were overwhelmingly vindicated 
by Japanese acts and utterances as they later unfolded. 

At any time prior to Japan's attack it lay within her power 
to avert a war in the Pacific by abandoning her policy of 
aggression, just as a bandit might avert a clash with his in- 
tended victim by suddenly becoming law-abiding. Up to 
that time there was always open to her an honorable and 
reasonable alternative to the courses of aggression which she 
was pursuing — an alternative which would have given her 
all she professed to seek in the way of access to raw materials 
and markets, as well as other rights and opportmiities en- 
joyed by all nations. It lay solely within Japan's disposition 
to adopt a peaceful alternative and to revoke the decisions 
reached at the Imperial Conference of July 2, which reaffirmed 
Japan's purpose of subjugating China and which called for 
military advance to the south to establish "the great East 
Asia sphere of co-prosperity", that is to say, to establish 
Japanese [14^86] domination in Southeast Asia and 
the islands of the Western Pacific area. 

Questions 29 to 33 and 45 to 47 are grouped in a single answer. 

29. Question : When did you decide that further negotiations were 
useless and that you were going to turn the matter over to the 
Army and Navy ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5381 

30. Question :When did you advise either the Army or the Navy that 

you were turning the matter over to the army or navy or both ? 

31. Question: What had happened that you told Secretary Stimson 

you were turning the mater over to the Army and Navy? 

32. Question: Had you conferred with the President on the matter 

of turning the matter over to the Army and Navy? 

33. Question : Give date and conversation with the President on this. 
45. Question : Do you recall having a conversation with the Secretary 

of War, Mr. Stimson, about the negotiations with Japan 
being terminated and that you were turning the matter over 
to the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, or the 
Army and Navy ? 

[14^87] 46. Question : Will you state the date and the conversa- 
tion. 

47. Question : If such a conversation took place, did you consider that 
such conversation turned the matter over to the Army and 
Navy? 
Answer: After this Government had received and studied the 
Japanese proposal of November 20, which has already been 
described, together with Kurusu's representation to me on 
November 21 that Japan had nothing more to offer, it became 
obvious, especially in the light of Japan's menacing military . 
movements and of the indisputable proof derived from inter- 
cepted Japanese messages that the November 20 proposal was 
their last word, that the chances of meeting the crisis by 
diplomacy had practically vanished. From November 22 on 
it was my individual view that Japan was through with 
any serious conversations looking to a peaceful settlement. 
From that day I and my associates had reach a stage of 
clutching at straws in our effort to save the situation. We 
groped about for anything that might offer any possibility 
for keeping serious conversations going. We gave considera- 
tion to possible choices in an effort to determine the wisest 
and most feasible course. 

[14^SS] From November 22 on I did not conceal my 
conclusions on these points. It was on November 25 at the 
meeting of the War Council that I again emphasized the 
critical nature of the situation and stated more formally 
that, "the matter is now in the hands of the Army and the 
Navy." My most acurate recollection of my conversations 
along this line with the President and the War and Navy 
officials was contained in my statement of December 30, 1941, 
to the Roberts committee. I rely upon that statement to 
refresh my present recollection. The portion of that state- 
ment dealing with this point is as follows : 

On November 25 and on Noveiuber 28, at meetings of the War Council, 
at whicli tlie higliest officers of tlie Army and the Navy of course were 
present, I emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this coun- 
try with Japan : I stated to the conference that there was practically 
no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan ; that in my 
opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new 
acts of conquest by force ; and that the matter of safeguarding ovir 
national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy. At the 
conclusion I with due deference expressed my judgment that any plans 
for our military defense should include an assumption that the 



5382 CONCiRESSlONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Japanese might make [l-'i289] the element of surprise a central 
point in their strategy and also might attack at various points 
sininltaneonsly with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of 
coordination for purposes thereof. 

The expression, "the matter is now in the hands of the Army 
and the Navy," as applied in the situation which then arose, 
does not imply any idea of a transfer from the Department 
of State to the Departments of War and of the Navy of any 
part of the Department of State's functions or responsibilities. 
Nor do I think that there was any misunderstanding on the 
part of the President or of the Secretaries of War and of 
the Navy as to the sense in which this expression was used. 
It seemed self-evident that the Army and the Navy would 
be our chief reliance in the lioht of the critical situation known 
to all of us. It was, of course, the understanding of each of 
us that the Department of State would continue to function 
and coordinate its action with that of the Army and Navy, 
but I emphasized that we could no longer be expected mate- 
rially to control the situation. 
Questions 34 and 35 are grouped in a single answer. 

34. Question : Other than the Winant message, dated December 6, re- 

ceived by the State Department about 10 : 40 a. m., December 6, 
1941, did 3^ou have any other information as to the [14^90^ 
Japanese Fleet movements as indicated in the Winant mes- 
sage? 

35. Question : If so, will you state what the information was and when 

you received it? 
Answer : According to State Department records, similar infor- 
mation was received from the Navy Department (from the 
commander in chief. Asiatic Fleet) and from the War De- 
partment (from the United States military observer at Singa- 
pore.). The Navy report was available in Washington at 
10 : 57 a. m., December 6, and I am informed that the War 
Department report, so far as the records indicate, came in 
December 6 followed by a lengthy conference on the morning 
ment to the committee, the records show several telephone 
conversations between War and Navy officials and myself on 
December G follewed by a lengthy conference on the morning 
of December 7 between Secretary Stimson and Secretary 
Knox and myself. These conversations on December 6 and 7, 
according to my best recollection, comprised discussion of the 
Japanese convoys and other information regarding Japanese 
military movements which we had previously received. 
Questions 30 and 37 are grouped in a single answer. 

36. Question : [14^91] 1 show you a memorandum, exhibit 40, 

and ask you if there was any discussion with you or anyone 
else to your knowledge on this subject of armed support? 

37. Question : Who assured the British of American armed support 

as mentioned in their instructions to Singapore as shown by 
the message of our naval observer at Singapore to Admiral 
Hart? 
Anwer: Tliere was no discussion wnth me or with anyone else 
to my knowledge on the subject of advance assurance to Brit- 
ain of armed American support which would have served 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5383 

as a basis for the telegram from the commander in chief of 
the Asiatic Fleet to the Navy. Department quoted in exhibit 
No. 40. or for the message from Singapore referred to in ques- 
tion 37. I do not know who, or whether anyone, assured 
the British of American armed support. However, after wit- 
nessing the suicidal experiences of countries like Belgium 
and Holland which had failed to confer with the Allies be- 
fore they were invaded, it seemed to me but natural and nec- 
essary that the three or four governments deemed in immi- 
nent danger of attack by Japan may well have had conver- 
sations befoi-e the attack, subject, so far as we were concerned 
in the matter of commitments, to our constitutional limita- 
tions. 

[1I^292^ 38. See answer to questions 12 and 13. 

Questions 39 and 40 are grouped in a single answer. 

39. Question: Do you recall the one of November 7 — "all arrange- 

ments must be completed by the 25th 'I " 

40. Question : Did that message cause you to give the warning to the 

Cabinet ? 
Answer: I recall the message of November 5 (exhibit No. 1, 
p. 100) that, "all arrangements for the signing of this agree- 
ment must be completed by the 25th." I do not definitely 
recall whether the message referred to in question 39 was 
before me when I warned the Cabinet of the dangers in the 
situation on November 7. The record shows that the mes- 
sage in question was available on November 5, and presum- 
ably I saw it. I would say that my statement, to the Cabinet 
was prompted by. conclusions derived from a number of 
sources. 
Questions 41 and 42 are grouped in a single answer. 

41. Question : Mr. Secretary, you were familiar with our exhibit 16 

and exhibit 17, wherein both Admiral Stark and General 
Marshall requested time? 

42. Question : [14^9rj] Prior to your sending the note of the 

2r)th, were you familiar with the contents of the memorandum 
to the President, dated November 27, by Admiral Stark and 
General Marshall? 
Answer: I was familiar with the joint memoranda of Admiral 
Stark and (Tcneral Marshall of November 5 and November 27. 
I do not know just when those memoranda were brought to 
my attention, but I am satisfied that I did not see either 
memorandum prior to its date. I was, of course, familiar 
with the views of General Marshall and Admiral Stark in 
regard to their desire for time, and I myself was animated 
by a desire to do everything I could to gain time. 
Questions 43 and 44 are grouped in a single answer. 

43. Question : What dicl you do to obtain the time as asked for by 

Marshall and Stark in their memorandums of November 5 
and 27 ?_ 

44. Question: Did you discuss this question with the President and 

what was said by the President and you in that discussion ? 
Answer: Generally s])eaking, our entire's months of conversa- 
tions involved gaining time. There was no conflict between 
this objective and our intensive efforts to persuade 



5384 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[14294^] the Japanese to pursue policies of peace. After 
the Imperial Conference at Tokyo on July 2, 1941, the 
Japanese in pursuance of the decision to move south, pro- 
ceeded rapidly with the necessary preparations for a military 
movement on a large scale. 

It was obvious that the time of such attack as Japan would 
make w^ould be of Japan's own choosing, and would depend 
upon Japan's own estimate of her readiness and of favoring 
circumstances. It was not within the power of this Govern- 
ment otherwise than by abject submission to Japan's terms, 
to halt Japan in her course. However, I endeavored at all 
times to treat with the Japanese in a spirit of open-minded- 
ness, patience and goodwill. I sought from the outset of 
the conversations to explore thoroughly every possibility of 
bringing about a peaceful, fair and stabilizing settlement of 
the situation in the Pacific, and I spared no effort to keep 
always open a door to the continuation of the conversations. 
At the same time I had to be on guard against any manifes- 
tation of weakness which might have encouraged the Jap- 
anese to be more precipitate than they were in their action. 
In this way, I believe that we gained months of valuable time. 
It became clear, however, in October, as I saw it, that the 
Japanese had decided to strike in their own time unless this 
Government should be willing to yield abjectly [14^95] 
to Japan's terms. I constantly discussed with the President 
the question of gaining as much time as possible and we had 
the subject very much in mind throughout the conversations 
with the Japanese. 
45-47. See answer to questions 29 to 33. 

48. Question : Did the Secretary of State's office prepare a final draft, 

one ready for delivery to the Japanese, of a modus vivendi ? 
Answer : A draft of the modus vivendi dated November 25 which 
was labeled "Final draft," meaning that that was the last 
draft that was made of that document, has been furnished 
the committee. It cannot be accurately said that that draft 
was "ready for delivery to the Japanese," as it is impossible 
to tell what further revision might have been made if a de- 
cision had been made to offer the Japanese a modus vivendi. 

49. Question : Did you show such a draft to the Ambassadors of 

Britain, China, and the Netherlands ? 
Answer: The latest draft of the modus vivendi shown to the 
British, Chinese, and Netherlands diplomatic representatives 
was the draft of November 24. There were only [14^96] 
minor differences between the November 24 and the Novem- 
ber 25 drafts. 

50. Question: I call your attention to exhibit 19, page 1, where you 

used the following words: "My personal view continued as 
oil yesterday, November 28, to be that its sending will be of 
doubtful efficacy. Except for the purpose of making a rec- 
ord, it might even cause such a complication as Colonel Stim- 
son and I referred to on yesterday." I ask you, Mr. Secre- 
tary, to explain what conversations you and Colonel Stimson 
had with the President and what was said by each of the 
parties in that conversation ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5385 

Answer : I do not recall precisely what conversations Mr. Stimson 
and I had with the President on or about November 28 in 
regard to the proposed message to the Emperor other than 
the points mentioned in my memorandum which you cite. 
We all realized, of course, that the Emperor at that time was 
powerless before the military leaders. I recall very clearly 
that I had in mind that the sending of a message to the Em- 
peror might have prejudiced the situation owing to the 
probability that such an appeal would be likely to arouse 
resentment among the real leaders of Japan, because of our 
having gone over their heads, and moreover might have been 
interpreted as [14^97] weakness, since the Japanese 
themselves do not normally shift from a bold front attitude 
to one of pleading until the situation with them is desperate. 
These points, to the best of my recollection, were all brought 
out in the discussions I had with the President and Mr. 
Stimson. 

51. Question: What did you mean by the expression "for the purpose 

of making a record" ? 
Answer : The expression, "for the purpose of making a record," 
has reference to the matter of making perfectly clear to both 
the American and Japanese peoples then and for the future 
that all the efforts of this Government were directed toward 
maintaining peace to the very end. 

52. Question : When did you first know that the President had sent a 

message to the Emperor ? 
Answer: I was in consultation with the President at all stages 
of the drafting of the message to the Emperor and the mes- 
sage, of course, was sent through the State Department. I, 
therefore, was aware of the message being sent at the time 
of its sending, about 9 p. m., December 6, 1941. 
Questions 53 to 56 and 84 to 87 are grouped in a single answer. 

53. Question: [14^98] Was it before or after you learned 

of the pilot message, being message 901, exhibit 1, page 238? 

54. Question : Was it before or after you learned that Japan was re- 

plying to your November 26 message ? 

55. Question : Was it before or after you knew the contents of any 

part of the 14-part message, a reply to your November 26 
message ? 

56. Question : Had you learned of the receipt of any of the 13 parts of 

the 14-part message, being message 902, page 239, exhibit 1, 
before it was decided by the President, or by you, to send a 
message to the Emperor? 

84. Question: When did you first learn that the Japanese were reply- 

ing to your note of November 26 ? 

85. Question : When did you first see any of the parts of the 14-part 

message 902, exhibit 1, page 239? 

86. Question: When did you first learn that the message was to be 

delivered in accordance with a time later to be determined? 

87. Question : When did you first see the message No. 844, page 

[I4299] 195, exhibit 1, which contained the language: 
"therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Gov- 
ernment on this American proposal which I will send you in 
2 or 3 days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This 



5386 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

is inevitable. However, I do not wish to give the impression 
that the negotiations are broken off."? 
Answer : I cannot recall definitely the exact time when any of the 
messages referred to were seen by me. 

During the period in which those messages were being re- 
ceived and distributed, my attention was focused on reports 
of the extremely menacing movement made manifest by the 
sailing of the large Japanese armada from the jumping-off 
place in Indochina. Those reports thus were of more serious 
and urgent import than any threatening phase of intercepted 
messages relating to Japan's reply to our communication of 
November 26. As I made clear in my conversations and state- 
ments during those last days prior to Pearl Harbor, I felt 
that war would break out at any time and that the Japanese 
had given clear indication as to the course they would take. 
Notification through the intercepts of a forthcoming Jap- 
anese communication announcing that the Japanese would 
not continue the conversations was only confirmatory of the 
judgment which I had been passing on to my colleagues in the 
[^IJfrSOO] Government during the previous fortnight. 

Even had the intercepted messages clearly indicated im- 
mediate war, they could only have referred to attack by 
the gathering Japanese forces whose movements we had been 
watching for days. 

From the time the Japanese presented their drastic ulti- 
matum on November 20, no intimations were given us that 
the Japanese would make the slightest concessions in their 
demands, but, on the contrary, they drove steadily forward 
to the attack with their armed forces, while, at the same 
time, misrepresenting the attitude of this Government. The 
Japanese reply of December 7 was a false and fraudulent 
statement in the worst of bad faith of Japan's case and a 
monstrous misrepresentation of our position in what turned 
out to be a brazen attempt to shift from themselves to us 
responsibility for their attack upon us. 
Questions 57 to 60 are grouped in a single answer. 

57. Question : Did you discuss with the President the modus vivendi 

message ? 

58. Question : If so, what was said about it by the President and what 

did you say to the President ? 

59. Question : \1430i] Did you ever discuss with the President 

the fact that you were not going to send the modus vivendi 
but were going to send the note of the 26th? 

60. Question : If you had such a conversation or discussion with the 

President about tliat date on the modus vivendi will you give 
us the conversations? 
Answer: I was in constant touch with the President and con- 
sulted him fully at all stages of our consideration of the 
modus vivendi proposal. It is impossible to recall the details 
of the discussion, but the trend of our thought was indi- 
cated in my statement before the committee on November 19, 
1945. The President at no time expressed any dissent from 
views expressed by me. On November 26 I recommended to 
the President — and he approved — my calling in the Japanese 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5387 

representatives and handing them the broad basic proposals 
while withholding the modus vivendi plan. 
Questions 61 and 62 are grouped in a single answer, 

61. Question: Was it usual for the President to confer with Am- 

bassadors on Sunday? 

62. Question : Can you state why the meeting was held between the 

[14S02] Japanese Ambassador and the President on Sun- 
day, August 17, 1941, the day the President returned from the 
Atlantic Conference? 
Answer: Although, during the conversations with the Japanese 
in 1941, August 17 was the only Sunday occasion on which 
the President had received them, I had conversations with 
them by appointment made at their request on four other 
Sundays: namely, May 11, June 15, June 22, and December 
7. I, therefore, attached no special significance to the Presi- 
dent's receiving them on Sunday and I do not know the rea- 
son, other than possibly the President's convenience, why the 
President received them on August 17 rather than an early 
subsequent weekday. It is true, of course, that the President 
did attach great importance to the communications which 
he made to the Japanese Ambassador on that occasion. 

63. Question : Would you say that only an extraordinary matter re- 

quired that the President on a Sunday, and at the hour of his 
return to Washington from a conference with the head of 
another Government should deliver to a third Government a 
note which he said, "he regretted the necessity to deliver but 
which he felt compelled to deliver"? 
Answer: [14S03] I would not conclude that otherwise 
than as indicated in replay to your question No. 62, only an 
extraordinary matter required the President on a Sunday, and 
at the hour of his return to Washington, to receive the Jap- 
anese Ambassador. The world was then on fire and the ag- 
gressor nations, including Japan, were wholly untrustworthy 
and treacherous, capable of undertaking a desperate stab at 
any time. Those of us in charge of foreign policy during 
this critical period were accustomed to spend most Sundays in 
our respective oflices, including Sunday conferences involv- 
ing both the President and foreign ambassadors. 

64. Question : Was the situation between the American and Japanese 

Governments on August 17, the following : Because of Japan's 
violation of the basis of the conversations, by the seizure of 
Indochina, the American Government had broken off in- 
formal, exploratory conversations looking to the reestab- 
lishment of traditional relations and, because of the aggres- 
sion against'Indochina, the American Government had broken 
economic relations with Japan? 
Answer: An accurate description of the situation between the 
American and Japanese Governments on August 17 will be 
found in the two oral statements handed by President 
[14^304] Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador on August 
17, 1941. 

I think I should add that it was my strong opinion that 
the Japanese had convinced themselves that we were inade- 



5388 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

quately prepared and that tlierefore we would make sacrifices 
of our principles before undertaking to fight in their defense. 
It was incumbent on us, in justice to the Japanese as well as 
to ourselves, to tell them that if they pushed us too far, we 
would resist. I repeatedly and pointedly made this clear to 
the Japanese representatives in my conversations with them. 
President Roosevelt did likewise when he conferred with Am- 
bassador Nomura on August 17 and agreed to resume the 
conversations. These representations were calculated to 
sober somewhat the Japanese militarists bent on aggression. 
But the Japanese did not take them as a threat, as the record 
of subsequent events shows. 

65. Question : In your memorandum of the White House conversation 

of August 17, you say: "The President thereupon said that 
this Government should really bring the matters between the 
two Governments literally up to date and that he would there- 
fore, offer certain observations about the position of this 
Government; he added that he regretted the necessity of so 
doing but that he had no other recourse;" (cf. Foreign Rela- 
tions, vol. 2, p. 5.55). Will you give the [l^SOS] in- 
terpretation in the terms of diplomacy of the statement by 
the head of one nation to another nation, with whom rela- 
tions are critically strained, that he regrets the necessity of 
a note which he is about to deliver but that he has no other 
recourse but to deliver it? 
Answer: It seems perfectly clear to me that what the President 
regretted was that the Japanese should have created a situa- 
tion which rendered necessary a message of the import of the 
one which he at that time delivered to the Japanese. The 
President was endeavoring, in friendly fashion, to impress 
upon the Japanese Government our attitude as I have de- 
scribed it in answer to question 64. 

66. Question : Do you know of any agreement with another power 

which had fixed the date of delivery of this note, and the 
second note, to be August 17 ? 
Answer : I do not know of any agreement with any other power 
which called for delivery on August 17 of the two communi- 
cations which were made to the Japanese on that date. The 
official record shows, however, that President Roosevelt told 
Prime Minister Churchill at their Atlantic meeting that he, 
the President, planned to see the Japanese Ambassador imme- 
diately on his return to Washington. 
[14306] Questions 67 and 68 are grouped in a single answer. 

67. Question : Do you know on what date that other power took the 

same action as the President took in line with their agreement 
for the making of parallel representations to Japan ? 

68. Question : Have you ever seen the text of the representations which 

were made by the British Government on August 17, or any 
subsequent or preceding date, agreed upon to be made paral- 
lelly with those made by the President on or about August 17 ? 
Answer: The Department has no record of any parallel action 
taken by the British Government corresponding to the ac- 
tion taken by the President vis-a-vis the Japanese on August 
17, and I know of no parallel action taken by the British 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5389 

other than the radio address of the British Prime Minister 
on August 24, 1941. 
69. Question : The President by his action of August 16 was deciding 
ipso facto, not to await a bid which you had every reason to 
believe was coming from Japan. Did you suggest waiting? 
Answer: Our judgment as to potentialities of Japanese policy 
[l/p307] had to be formed in the light of Japan's actions 
toward implementation of the decision of the Imperial Con- 
ference of July 2, 1941, which called inter alia for a military 
advance south, of Japan's rejection of the President's pro- 
posal of July 24 to neutralize Indochina, and of 3 months of 
searching conversations with the Japanese Ambassador. 
With these in mind, it was idle to expect that the "conces- 
sions" which the Japanese Ambassador suggested might be 
forthcoming from his Government would be addressed to the 
fundamentals of the situation, which from our point of view 
called for Japan's removal of the menace she was creating to 
the United States and other peaceful nations and for her 
desisting from her aggressive courses. If Japan had in fact 
any intention of revising her position and adopting peaceful 
courses, there was nothing in the President's communication 
to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17 which would have 
tended to discourage Japan from adjusting her position; 
on the contrary, what the President said on that occasion 
was calculated to help rather than hinder reconsideration by 
Japan of her policies. There was therefore no advantage 
whatever in awaiting a further Japanese initiative. 
Questions 70, 71, and 72 are grouped in a single answer. 

70. Question: I find no reference, Mr. Secretary, in your prepared 

[I43OS] statement, to a communication from the Japanese 
Foreign Minister and an accompanying commentary by 
Ambassador Grew received by the State Department soon 
after midnight on August 18, 1941 : Do you recall such docu- 
ments which the State Department published in Foreign 
Kelations 11, pages 560-565? 

71. Question : They establish, do they not, that at the time the Presi- 

dent was delivering the first and then the second note of 
August 17, the Japanese Foreign Minister was delivering 
to Ambassador Grew^ a lengthy overture for the resumption 
of the conversations looking to a restoration of traditional 
relations? (N. B. Tokyo time, 14 hours later.) 

72. Question : And in transmitting the Japanese message. Ambassador 

Grew quote : "With all the force at his command, for the sake 
of avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly 
futile war between Japan and the United States, that this 
Japanese proposal not be turned aside without every prayer- 
ful consideration . . ." also that the proposal w^as "unprece- 
dented in Japanese history" and had been made with the 
approval of the Emperor and the highest authorities of the 
land ; that is correct, is it not ? 
Answer: [14^09] There is no controversy about the con- 
tents of the documents referred to in Foreign Relations of 
the United States, Japan, 1931-41, volume II, pages 560- 



5390 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

5G5, containing an account of the approach made by the 
Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Grew 
in regard to a proposal for a meeting between the Japanese 
Prime Minister and the President and a statement of Am- 
bassador Grew's reaction. That Japanese proposal is dis- 
cussed and analyzed at some length in my prepared state- 
ment to the connnittee, which it is unnecessary to repeat here. 
The President and I, together with our Far Eastern advisers, 
were looking at the situation with the benefit of all the world- 
wide information available to us in Washington. We judged 
that the Japanese Government had no serious expectation of 
reaching an understanding at the proposed meeting unless 
the American Government surrendered its basic position 
while Japan rigidly adhered to and went forward with its 
policy of aggression and conquest. We had fully tested out 
the Japanese Government by preliminary inquiries and found 
it adamant in its position. 

Nothing in the record of subsequent developments has con- 
tradicted our judgment at that time, but on the contrary, 
events have vindicated it. For example, the memoirs of 
Prince Konoye subsequently published in serial form in the 
Asahi Shimbun, a leading Tokyo newspai)er [14310] 
running from December 20 to December 31, 1945, state that 
the Japanese army leaders agreed, in writing, on August 4, 
1941 to Konoye's proposal for a meeting with the President 
only on condition that Japan adhere firmly to its fundamental 
policy and that in the event the President did not see eye to 
eye with the Japanese, Konoye would leave the meeting place 
determined to make war on the United States. Konoye also 
disclosed in his memoirs that at an Imperial Conference on 
September 6, 1941, the Japanese Government decided, in case 
there was no expectation within the first 10 days of October 
to gain her demands on the United States by diplomacy, to 
go to war with the United States, and accordingly to parallel 
diplomatic efforts with military preparations. 

These disclosures by Konoye show conclusively that the 
Japanese would attack in their own chosen time unless we 
should surrender abjectly to the drastic Japanese ultimatum 
of November 20 and that if we had made no reply instead of 
delivering our communication of November 26, the 10-point 
proposal, the Japanese would have attacked just the same. 
73. Question: On November 7, 1941, you warned the Cabinet they 
might look for an offensive by Japan at any time. What 
did you base that warning on? 
[14-311] Answer : My warning to the Cabinet on November 7 
was based upon the acceleration of Japanese military activi- 
ties and disquieting military disposals, especially in Indo- 
china, the growing agitation in the Japanese press and among 
Japanese spokesmen for positive action, the pressure tactics 
employed by the Japanese Government toward forcing accept- 
ance by this Government of the Japanese proposals, as well 
as the corroborative evidence of the intercepted Japanese 
messages. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5391 

74. Question : When did you draft the 10-point note of November 26 ? 
Answer: Under the modus vivendi proposal the Japanese would 

have been committed to affirming that their national policies 
were directed toward lasting peace throughout the Pacific area 
and that they had no territorial ambitions therein. Its ac- 
ceptance was also subject to the understanding that during its 
life (of ^ months subject to a further extension) there would 
be further conferences looking to a peaceful settlement cover- 
ing the entire Pacific area. There was attached to the modus 
vivendi proposal a plan of a comprehensive settlement as one 
practical exemplification of what we had in mind. This 
plan, consisting of two sections, a draft of a mutual [i^S/^] 
declaration of policy and a statement of the steps to be taken 
by the two Governments, was common to both the modus 
vivendi proposal and the communication of November 26. 
Some of the material in section 1 was drafted months earlier, 
the remainder, including the material in section 2, in the 
course of a few days preceding November 26, and the latter 
part of the accompanying explanatory statement, which was 
not contained in the modus vivendi draft, on November 26. 
Questions 75 and 76 are grouped in a single answer. 

75. Question : At any time before it was sent, did you show it to the 

President or call the contents to his attention ? 

76. Question : If so, what was your conversation ? 

Answer: In the light of the foregoing explanation, it is clear 
that as the President was thoroughly familiar with the en- 
tire proposal, all that was called for was to consult with him 
about dropping the modus vivendi feature of the proposal. 
This I did by presenting to him a memorandum on November 
26, a copy of which is in the hands of the committee, and 
obtained his prompt approval. I do not recall the details 
of any conversation on this. 

Questions 77 and 78 are grouped in a single answer. 

[14^31S] 7. Question : Did you see the message from General 
Marshall to Geenral Short on November 27 ? 

78. Question : If you saw such a note, when was its contents called to 

your attention ? 
Answer: I have no recollection that I saw before the publication 
of the Roberts Report the substance of General Marshall's 
message to General Short of November 27, 1941. 
Questions 79 and 80 are grouped in a single answer. 

79. Question : Did you the diplomatic relations between Japan and 

America grow worse after November 27 ? 

80. Question : If they did grow worse how do you account for no 

other message being given to the commanders in the field? 
Answer: Diplomatic relations between Japan and the United 
States could scarcely grow worse after November 27, except 
in the sense that the crisis foreseen by us and planned by the 
Japanese approached closer at hand. There was nothing 
fundamentally new in the diplomatic situation. That situ- 
ation as we viewed it, especially from November 21 until the 
attack on Pearl Harbor, was that Japan [^IJ^SUf] 



5392 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

might strike at any time and that the diplomatic establish- 
ment could not be expected to preserve national security. 

81. Question: Will you explain in detail if you were consulted in 

connection with the message to Short which contained the 
phrase "If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States 
desires that Japan commit the first overt act" and also in 
regard to not arousing the citizens ? 
Answer : I have no recollection of having been consulted in con- 
nection with the considerations which entered into inclusion 
in General Marshall's message to Short of the phrase, "If hos- 
tilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan 
commit the first overt act," or in regard to the caveat against 
arousing the citizens. This was primarily a military 
question. 

82, 83. See answer to question 14. 

84, 85, 86, 87. See answer to questions 53-56. 

88. Question : Did not that message 844, exhibit 1, page 195, indicate 

to you that your note of the 26th was not acceptable and, 
therefore, that war was imminent 2 
Answer: I was already satisfied that the Japanese would not 
agree to anything short of complete yielding by the United 
[14^315] States to Japan's demands. The intercepted 
Japanese message to which you refer did no more than con- 
firm what we already knew. As I have pointed out repeatedly 
Japan was bent on attacking us unless we made abject sur- 
render to her demands as an aggressor. We had no serious 
thought that Japan would accept our proposal of November 
26. I said at the time that there was only the barest pos- 
sibility of her accepting. She would have proceeded to at- 
tack us whether we had presented that proposal or any other 
proposal — unless it had been one of humiliating and abject 
surrender — or whether we had offered no proposal at all. 
Furthermore, while a number of us in the State, War and 
Navy Departments were desirous of grabbing at any straw 
and therefore hoped for favorable action on the modus 
vivendi, most of us agreed that the chances of its acceptance 
were very slim. The testimony of Army and Navy officials 
on this point is in the record. 

The November 26 proposal was another test of whether 
Japan was willing to abandon conquest and to adopt peace- 
ful policies; if she were so willing she would have seized 
upon our ten-point program as highly desirable. 

89. Question : Where were you on the night of December 6, 1941 ? 

Answer : I was most invariably at home at night working on 
[14'-^16] Departmental matters. While it is possible that 
I might be mistaken, my best recollection is that I was at home 
on the night of DecemlDer 6, 1941. 

90. Question : When did you first see or obtain information as to the 

contents of the following messages in exhibit 1 : 
j^904— page 245. 
#907— page 248. 
#908— page 248. 
#909— page 240. 
#910— page 249. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5393 

Answer : I do not recall the exact times that I first saw or learned 
of the contents of the messages you cite. 
Questions 91 to 96 are grouped in a single answer. 

91. Question : Did you discuss any of the intercepted Japanese mes- 

sages with the President? 

92. Question : If so, give us the conversations. 

93. Question : Did you discuss any of the intercepted Japanese mes- 

sages with General Marshall ? 

94. Question : If so, give us the conversations. 

\^lJiB17'\ 95. Question: Did you discuss any of the intercepted 
Japanese messages with Admiral Stark? 

96. Question : If so, give us the conversations. 

Answer : At this late date in 1946 I do not recall whether I dis- 
cussed any particular messages or the details of the discus- 
sion with the President, with General Marshall, or with 
Admiral Stark. It is true that in many of our conversations, 
including those with Secretaries Knox and Stimson, and 
some with the President, some of us would bring up one or 
another of the intercepted messages. But I have no recollec- 
tion of discussions of specific messages. 

97. Question : Who called the meeting in your office on the morning 

of December 7? 
Answer : As I recall it, the meeting in my office on December 7 
was the result of a mutual agreement on the part of Mr. Stim- 
son, Mr. Knox, and myself. It might have been suggested 
in the first instance by any one or two of us three. Accord- 
ing to my best recollection, the proposal for a meeting grew 
out of a desire to continue our dis- {^11^318^ cussion 
of the situation created by the movement of the huge Japa- 
nese armada southward and westward of the southernmost 
point of Indochina. 

98. Question : Tell us with whom you talked personally, by phone, or 

messenger, about this meeting and what was said. 
Answer: I cannot recall material details beyond what I have 
given in reply to question 97. 

99. Question : Please state in detail what was said by the persons at- 

tending the meeting in your office on December 7, 1941. 
Answer : As I indicated in my prepared statement to the joint 
committee as well as in my oral testimony. Secretary Stimson, 
Secretary Knox, and I in our conference of December 7, 1941, 
discussed the critical situation created by the large-scale Jap- 
anese military movement from the jumping-off place in Indo- 
china. I cannot recall details of that discussion. Secretary 
Stimson has described the discussion in his statement to the 
Committee and that statement speaks for itself. 
Questions 100 to 102 are grouped in a single answer. 

100. Question : Our record shows that the President saw the 13 parts 

[14319'] of the 14-part message at about 9 : 30 p. m., De- 
cember 6, 1941. Did you see or talk to the President from 
that time until after the attack at Pearl Harbor ? 

101. Question: If so, give us your conversations. 

102. Question : If you did not see him or talk to him or contact him — 

were you available? 

79716 — 46— pt. 11 17 



5394 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Answer : I have no record of nor do I recall having seen or having 
talked with the President between 9 : 30 p. m. on December 6, 
1941, and the moment of the Japanese attack on Pearl Har- 
bor. According to my best recollection, I was available dnr- 
ing all of that period. 
Questions 108 and 104 are grouped in a single answer. 

103. Question : Did anyone from the Army, Navy, or State Depart- 

ments, or executive offices contact you on Saturday, December 
C, and/or Sunday, December 7, up to 2 p. m. Sunday? 

104. Question : If so, give the conversations. 

Answer: I was in constant contact during Saturday, December 6, 
and Sunday, December 7, with officers of the State Depart- 
ment and of the Army and Navy. As recorded in annex 
A [14^20] Df mj'' statement to the committee, I had 
on those 2 days conferences, consultations and telephone con- 
versations — as entered in engagement books — with represen- 
tatives of the Army and the Navy, as follows : 



Secretary 
Secretary 
Secretary 
call from Admiral 



50 
15 
45 



December 7 10 : 30 
10 : 30 



December 6 10 : 45 a. m. : Telephone call from 

Knox. 
11 : 50 a. m. : Telephone call from 
Stimson. 
1 : 00 p. m. : Telephone call from 

Stimson. 
1 : 15 p. m. : Telephone 
Stark, 
p. m. : Captain Schuirmann. 
p.. m. : Telephone call to Admiral Stark, 
p. m. : Telephone call to Secretary 

Knox, 
a. m. : Telephone call to Admiral Stark, 
a. m. : Secretary Stimson, Secretary 
Knox. 
2:10 p. m.: Telephone call from Admiral 
Stark. 
In addition, I had many conferences on those days with 
officers of the Department of State. It would be [14^21] 
impossible to recall the details of all the conversations which 
took place, but I might say that the Japanese large-scale 
military movement from the jumping-off place in Southern 
Indochina was very much in the minds of all of us who were 
called upon to consider that situation. We were striving to 
ascertain the full significance of those military movements, 
their probable destination, etcetra. 
Questions 105 and lOfi are grouped in a single answer. 

105. Question: ]Mr. Secretary, will you agree that the official records 

of American-Japanese relations from August 28, 1941, until 
December 7, 1941, show that the Secretary of State never con- 
sidered that the Japanese Government was bluffing in its as- 
sertions that, should no agreement be reached with the United 
States, Japan would strike ? 

106. Question : In this connection, Mr. Secretary, will you agree that 

the records established that the Secretary of State accepted at 
face value the statements in diplomatic exchange wherein 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5395 

Konoye on August 28, Toyoda on September 27, Togo on 
November 12, Nomura on November 12, and Kurusu on No- 
vember 17 and 18, indicated or said that a rupture of the 
conversations would mean war in the Pacific? (Cf. Foreign 
Relations 11, pp. 572-3, 642, 719-22, 725, 740, 747.) 
[14J'2^] Answer : My view, as set forth in the record of Amer- 
ican-Japanese relations over several years, was that Japan 
was not blufling but was on a steady and fixed course of con- 
quest which would reach us in Japan's own chosen time. I 
believed that Japan was playing the role of an international 
desperado, and it is the principal business of a desperado — 
whether a nation or an individual — to fight. During that 
period Japan believed that she was exceedingly well armed 
for the purpose of achieving her intended conquests in the 
Pacific area. She likewise knew that at that time we were by 
no means sufticiently armed in the Pacific to resist successful!}^ 
a Japanese attack. Therefore, at the time, to which your in- 
quiry related, I was satisfied that Japan was not bluffing but 
rather was giving us a last chance to yield our basic prin- 
ciples which Avould enable her to continue her course of ag- 
gression and conquest without further serious risk of success- 
ful resistance. 

When we realize that Japan was carrying on flagrant ag- 
gressions and ruthless invasions of peaceful countries, that the 
United States was pleading with her from the beginning to 
cease her course of military conquest in close partnership with 
Hitler, and that all problems in the Pacific would practically 
settle themselves at once [14'3'2S] when Japan adopted 
a policy of peace, it becomes apparent that she had no more 
right to make demands on the United States — as though we 
too were an aggressor, instead of a law-abiding country plead- 
ing for peace — than an individual gangster has to assume a 
like attitude toward his intended victim. It is in the light 
of these circumstances that we must view all the arguments 
which the Japanese used in trying to browbeat the United 
States into yielding, such as those described in the reference 
cited in your question. 
Questions 107 to ] 09 are grouped in a single answer. 

107. Question: In this respect was the Secretary's evaluation of the 

situation at one with Ambassador Grew's, namely that the 
Japanese were not bluffing but could be expected to strike 
suddenly and dramatically? 

108. Question: Did the Secretary, with the information from Ambas- 

sador Grew that the Tojo cabinet had advised the Emperor as 
to how far it would go with the United States, and, with 
the information from an intercepted Japanese message that a 
deadline had been fixed for November 25, tell the American 
Cabinet on November 7 that a new and sudden Japanese ag- 
gression was to be looked for? (Cf. Foreign Relations 11, 
pp. 700-1, Intercepts, [^4^^] ex. 1, p. 100, Peace 
and War, pp. 135-7.) 

109. Question: Did the Cabinet thereupon vote unanimously that 

Secretary Knox and Under Secretary Welles should deliver 



5396 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

addresses on Armistice Day to the end of informing the nation 
as to American -Japanese relations? (Cf. Peace and War, 
pp. 136-7; 776-87.) 
Answer : In reply to these questions, I quote the first paragraph of 
page 29 of my prepared statement to the committee : 

On November 7, I attended the regular Cabinet meeting. It was 
the President's custom either to start off the discussion himself or to 
ask some member of the Cabinet a question. At this meeting he 
turned to me and asked whether I had anything in mind. I thereupon 
pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the international 
situation. I went over fully developments in the conversations with 
Japan and emphasized that in my opinion relations were extremely 
critical and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack 
anywhere by Japan at any time. When I finished, the President went 
around the Cabinet. All concurred in my estimate of the dangers. 
It [14325] became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical 
situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the coun- 
try would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development. 

I also quote a paragraph from Peace and War, pages 136- 

137: 

Four days later, on November 7, Secretary Hull stated at a 
Cabinet meeting that relations between Japan and the United States 
were extremely critical and that there was "imminent possibility" 
that Japan might at any time start a new military movement of con- 
quest by force. It thereupon became the consensus of the Cabinet that 
the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order 
that the country would, if possible be better prepared for such a 
development. Accordingly, Secretary of the Navy Knox delivered 
an address on November 11, 1941, in which he stated that we were 
not only confronted with the necessity of extreme measures of self- 
defense in the Atlantic, but we were "likewise faced with grim possi- 
bilities on the other side of the world— on the far side of the Pacific" ; 
that the Pacific no less than the Atlantic called for instant readiness 
for defense. On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles, 
[l/f32S] carrying out the cabinet suggestion in an address, stated 
that beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror had reduced 
more than half of Europe to abject serfdom and that in the Far East 
the same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all nations 
bordering on the Pacific. The waves of world conquest were "breaking 
high both in the East and in the West," he said, and were threatening, 
more and more with each passing day, "to engulf our own shores." He 
warned that the United States was in far greater peril than in 1917; 
that "at any moment war may be forced upon us." 

110. Question : Subsequent to November 7, will the witness agree that 
the official records and his testimony here show that he 
advised high military officials of the Government and also 
the British Ambassador that a sudden attack anywhere in the 
Pacific by Japan must be anticipated ? 
Answer: In reply I quote from Peace and War, 2 paragraphs 
appearing on pages 144-145 : 

On November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of high officials 
of this Government, Secretary Hull emphasized the critical nature of 
the relations of this country with Japan. He stated that there 
[14327] was practically no possibility of an agreement being 
achieved with Japan ; that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to 
break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force ; and that the 
matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the 
Army and the Navy. The Secretary expressed his judgment that any 
plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the 
Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their 
strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with 



^OCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE . 5397 

a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for pur- 
poses thereof. 

On November 29, 1941, Secretary Hull conferred with the British 
Ambassador. The Secretary said that, "the diplomatic part of our 
relations with Japan was virtually over and that the matter will now 
go to the officials of the Army and Navy." He said further that it 
would be "a serious mistake for our country and other countries 
interested in the Pacific situation to make plans of resistance without 
including the possibility that Japan may move suddenly and with every 
possible element of surprise and spread out over considerable areas and 
capture certain positions and posts before the [14328] peaceful 
countries interested in the Pacific would have time to confer and for- 
mulate plans to meet these new conditions ; that this would be on the 
theory that the Japanese recognize that their course of unlimited con- 
quest now renewed all along the line probably is a desperate gamble and 
requix'es the utmost boldness and risk." 

Furthermore, I and my associates were in daily consulta- 
tion with the Army and Navy officials throughout the period 
after November 7, exchanging information and views as to 
the critical character of the situation. 
111. Question : Is it correct to say that the intercepted dispatch from 
Tokyo on November 28 (No. 844, p. 195, Ex. 1) giving the 
reaction to the American notes of November 26, and also the 
intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to Berlin on November 30 
(No. 985, p. 204, Ex. 1) informing Hitler of Japan's inten- 
tions, confirmed the judgments you had been stating in official 
councils since November 7 ? 
Answer: During this period all the information we received 
made clearer Japan's purpose to attack unless the United 
States yielded to them. In other words, Japan had no inten- 
tion of yielding any part of her plan of conquest by force, 
but was giving the United States, by its pro- [14^29] 
posal of November 20, a last opportunity to choose between 
yielding or fighting. Insofar as the intercepted Japanese 
messages cited in the question indicated that in consequence 
of the refusal of the United States to yield to Japan's un- 
reasonable demands the Japanese intended to take forcible 
measures to gain their ends, those intercepted messages served 
to confirm my judgments as expressed by me in official coun- 
cils, especially during those last few weeks. 

112. Question: Did not the fact that JajDan, without a declaration of 

war, attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, confirm, in their 
entirety, the judgments you had been offering in official coun- 
cils since November 7 ? 
Answer: Japan's attack on a number of points over a sweep of 
thousands of miles, one of which points was Pearl Harbor, 
at about the same time confirmed our judgment as to the 
critically dangerous character of the situation. 

113. Question : Do you recall, Mr. Secretary, your meeting with the 

Japanese Ambassadors in your apartment on the night of 
November 22 in which they pressed for a reply to the Jap- 
anese note of November 20? (Cf. How War Came, p. 
[14.3SO] 304, also For. Eelations 11.) 
Answer : I do recall my meeting with the Japanese Ambassadors 
on November 22 when they pressed for a reply to the Jap- 
anese proposals of November 20. During the month of No- 



5398 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HAI^OR ATTACK 

vember the Japanese representatives were insistently worry- 
ing me with their importnnities for a quick understanding, 
intimating that otherwise something awful would happen. 

114. Question: I quote in full a secret message from Tokyo to the 

Ambassadors, under date of November 22, intercepted by 
the Army at Washington and translated on the same date: 

(Secret) 

From : Tokyo 

To : Washington 

November 22, 1941 

(Urgent) 

#812 

To both you Ambassadors. 

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in 
my No. 736. You should know this, however, I know you are working 
hard. Stick to our tixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts 
and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons 
beyond [14S31] your ability to guess why we wanted to settle 
Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next 3 or 
4 days you can finish your conversations with the Americans ; if the 
signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you — 
twenty-ninth) ; if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get 
an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in 
short if everything can be finished we have decided to wait until that 
date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be 
changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please 
take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you 
ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you 
two Ambassadors alone." (Cf. Intercepts No. 812, p. 165, exhibit 1, 
our record.) 

Did you telephone the President on the night of the 22 concerning this 
intercepted message? (Cf. How War Came, p. 304.) 
Answer : To the best of my recollection I did not telephone to the 
President on the night of tlie 22d of November in regard to 
the intercepted message quoted in the question, and I find no 
record of having made such a call. 

115. Question : Did you on November 26 hand the Japanese Ambassa- 

dor [143S3] an oral statement which rejected the Jap- 
anese note of November 20 ? 
Answer : Please refer to my replies to your questions Nos. 6 and 7. 

116. Question : Did you, at the same time, hand them a tentative 10- 

point proposal for a broad settlement of the Pacific situation ? 
Answer : Please refer to my reply to your question No. 8. 

117. Question : Did the Japanese Ambassadors say that their Govern- 

ment would throw up its hands because of these American 
documents and that their nature was tantamount to meaning 
the end of the conversations ? 
Answer: What the Japanese representatives said is covered 
in the memorandum of my conversation of November 26, 
1941, with the Japanese representatives. (Foreign Rela- 
tions of the United States, Japan. 1931^1, vol. II. pp. 
764-766) . 

As I saw the situation at that time, the Japanese had 
in fact already "thrown up their hands," and, as subsequent 
disclosures show, their fleets and armed forces [14S3S] 
were then moving for an attack on some five points extending 
over a vast space. The attitude evinced by the Japanese 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5399 

on the occasion under reference was confirmatory of their 
fixed purpose of requiring us to surrender our basic policy 
while they maintained intact their policy of aggression and 
force. 

118. Question : Did the reports of the Japanese Ambassadors to their 

Government concerning the meeting of November 26, reports 
known to you by the interception of the messages to Tokyo, 
coincide in the main with your understanding of what had 
taken place on November 26 ? 
Answer: The published record of this Government (Foreign 
Kelations of the United States, Japan, 1931-41, vol. II, pp. 
764^765) contains a full account of the substance of the 
conversation which I had with the Japanese representatives 
on November 26. The accounts in the Japanese intercepted 
messages of that conversation in order to be correctly evalu- 
ated must be considered in the light of the background of the 
situation. It is my understanding that the main object of 
the Japanese Government in pressing for a reply to their 
November 20 proposal was to ascertain beyond any doubt 
whether this Government would yield to the Japanese or 
whether this [14334] Government was going to stand 
firm, and if the Japanese had learned that we were standing 
firm they would continue forward with the attack. Our 
position of not yielding was as clear as crystal to the Jap- 
anese Ambassadors, and all their talk of being "dumb- 
founded" at the nature of our November 26 proposal was a 
prelude to an attempt, by outrageously false statements 
uttered in the utmost of bad faith, to shift to this Govern- 
ment responsibility for what they were planning. As show- 
ing this thought w^as specifically in their minds, I quote from 
the Japanese message 1190 of November 26, appearing on 
pages 182 and 183 of exhibit 1, especially that portion which 
reads as follows : 

The United States is using the excuse that she is at present nego- 
tiating with the various competent countries. In view of the fact 
tliat she will propagandize that we are continuing these negotiations 
only with the view of preparing for our expected moves, should we, 
during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our 
scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility for 
the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been 
times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing con- 
versations because of our invasion of French [14335] Indo- 
china. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rup- 
ture in our negotiations antl suddenly enter upon independent opera- 
tions, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as 
counterpropaganda against us. 

The foregoing is a virtual admission that the Japanese 
Ambassador recognized that responsibility for a rupture 
would be Japan's and of a purpose to attempt to shift that 
responsibility. 

119. Question: There is, in the record, an intercepted message from 

Tokyo, No. 823, page 173, which advised Nomura and Kurusu 
that the deadline fixed for November 29 was to be reckoned 
in Tokyo time : thus when the President left Washington for 
Warm Springs at 3 p. m. on November 28, the time in Tokyo 



5400 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

was 5 a. m. of November 29 ; do you know if there were any 
coincidence in the fact that the President was leaving Wash- 
ington at the time of the expiration of the deadline set by 
Tokyo? 
Answer: I do not myself recall anything on this point. The 
fact was that for some days the President and I believed 
that the chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had prac- 
tically vanished. 

On the day the President left for Warm Springs, 
[14^36] November 28, he told the press that he was 
leaving on a vacation that had twice been postponed, and that 
while he did not know when he would return, he hoped that it 
need not be before December 2, adding that he might have 
to return because of existing conditions in the Pacific. 
Asked how long he expected these conditions to exist, the 
President referred the inquirer to Tokyo rather than to 
Washington. 

120. Question : In a talk at the Thanksgiving Day dinner at Warm 
Springs on the night of November 29 the President said, 
speaking in terms of the Thanksgiving of the following year ; 
"It is always possible that our boys at the military and naval 
academies may actually be fighting for the defense of these 
American institutions of ours" (cf. N. Y. Times, November 
30) : in the circumstances would you say that the limitation to 
the boys of the military and naval academies was intended 
to have particular significance to the Japanese or to the 
American people ? 
Answer : I, myself, would not be a party to giving the President's 
statement the narrow construction suggested. The state- 
ment, directed toward national defense and made to an 
American audience, speaks for itself. 

Questioji 121 and 122 are grouped in a single answer. 

[14^87] 121. Question: I have found, Mr. Secretary, a discrep- 
ancy in the date given by you in your statement to the 
committee as to an address by Premier Tojo of Japan and 
your telephoning the President concerning that address and 
other developments; on pages 43-44 of your statement the 
date is fixed as of Sunday, November 30; the New York 
Times of the morning of November 30, fixes both occur- 
rences as of November 29 and gives this authorized state- 
ment by the President's secretary, Mr. Early, issued at 
Warm Springs on the night of November 29 : I quote Mr. 
Early's statement : "As sooA as the President returned to the 
cottage following the dinner this evening he found a call 
waiting from the Secretary of State, and they held a lengthy 
conversation. In view of the reported statement — an Asso- 
ciated Press dispatch by the Premier of Japan — the President 
tonight is of the opinion that he may have to leave Warm 
Springs tomorrow afternoon, arranging the railroad sched- 
ule so as to arrive in Washington Monday bef or enoon" : In 
view of this record Avould you say that the Tojo speech was 
delivered on November 29 and that you telephoned the 
President concerning it on November 29? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5401 

122. Question : Will you give the conversation between you and the 

President ? 

[IJfBSS'] Answer: I seem to have telephoned the President on 
November 29, instead of on November 30 as, by inadvertence, 
was inaccurately stated in my prepared statement to the 
Committee. The statement of Premier To jo was, according 
to State Department records, delivered in the form of a 
message to a Japanese meeting held on November 30. (See 
Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. II, p. 148.) The 
apparent discrepancy in time may have resulted from the 
fact that Japanese time is .about 14 hours laters than "Wash- 
ington time, or perhaps the message may have been available 
to the press prior to its delivery. 

I have no record of exactly what was said in that telephone 
conversation. As I told the committee in my prepared 
statement, in that conversation I advised the President to 
advance the date of his return to Washington. 

Questions 123 and 124 are grouped in a a single answer. 

123. Question: From page 195 of the record of the Intercepts, ex- 

hibit 1, 1 quote : 

(Secret) 

From Tokyo 

To Washington 

November 28, 1941 

[IJiSSB} # 844 

Re your file # 1189 

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, 
in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this 
humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely 
regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it 
as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views 
of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will 
send you in 2 or 3 days, the negotiations will be de fecto ruptured. 
This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression 
that the negotiations are broken off: Merely say to them that you 
are awaiting instructions, and that, although the opinions of 
your Government are not clear to you, to your own way of thinking 
the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne 
great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we 
have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, 
but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, 
making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things 
have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your 
No. 1180 and he said that under the present cii'cumstances what you 
suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best [i^^^O] 
you can. 

The record is that this intercepted message had been de- 
coded and translated on November 28 ; do you recall discuss- 
ing it with the President before his departure for Warm 
Springs on the afternoon of the 28th ? 

124. Question : Did you discuss this intercepted message in your tele- 

phonic conversation with the President at Warm Springs on 
the night of November 29 ? 
Answer : I do not recall discussing with the President the inter- 
cepted Japanese message quoted by you. 

125. Question : Would you say that it was the Tojo address which 

alone prompted your call and the President's return? 



5402 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Answer: The gravity of the situation was evident from many 
sources. As Tojo's statement reflected the extreme acuteness 
of the situation, in that sense it may be said that the state- 
ment prompted my telephone call and the President's return. 

126. Question : Did the intercepted message of the 28th constitute the 

first official knowledge you had of the Japanese Government's 
reaction to the notes of the 2Gth? 
[14^4^] Answer: As I have already stated, I kept no record 
of when particular messages reached me. I can therefore 
only presume that the intercepted Japanese message in ques- 
tion was the first knowledge I had of what purported to be 
the Japanese Government's reaction to this Government's 
proposal of November 26. This reaction was fully expected 
in the light of the delivery of the Japanese ultimatum on 
November 20 and of subsequent developments. 

127. Question : The message said definitely, did it not, that the Amer- 

ican note was unacceptable, that a rupture w^as inevitable 
within a few days, and that Nomura and Kurusu w^ere to 
make a pretense of carrying on the conversations until the 
official word came to them of the break? 
•Answer: The message indicated among other things that the 
Japanese Government would not accept as a basis for nego- 
tiations the American communication of November 26, that 
the "negotiations" would be de facto ruptured within 2 or 3 
days and that the Japanese ambassadors were to avoid giving 
the impression the "negotiations" were broken off'. I have 
hereinbefore pointed ou that I considered serious conversa- 
tions over after the 20th or 21st barring the very slight pos- 
sibility that the Japanese might come [14^342] back. 
When the full facts later came out they further confirmed 
our appraisal of the situation, 

128. Question : Did you have in mind, in any way, the secret Tokyo 

message of the 28th when, on the day following, you told 
Lord Halifax that the diplomatic phase was over and that 
the situation was now in the hands of the American Army 
and Navy ? (Peace and War, pp. 816-817.) 
Answer : I do not recall whether I had the message in mind when 
I talked to the British ambassador on November 29. Wliat I 
told the British ambassador was substantially what I had 
been saying to the President and to representatives of the 
Army and Navy for some days previously, based on con- 
clusions derived from various sources. 

129. Question : In line with your convictions as to the intentions of 

Japan did you accept at full value the statements expressed 
by Tokyo to Nomura and Kurusu on the 28th? 
Answer: I considered this message in the light of previous in- 
structions to Nonuira and Kurusu to do their utmost to induce 
the Government of the United States to surrender its basic 
policies. In the message of November 28 the Japanese Gov- 
ernment, realizing that the effort had ended [1434^] 
in failure, was thanking the Japanese representatives for 
their efforts ; secondly the Japanese addressed themselves to 
framing up a cloak to cover their attack already under way. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE, 5403 

which cloak inchided what was in effect the fantastic and 
monstrously false charge that this Government was treating 
the Japanese outrageously by refusing to surrender to them. 

100. Question : You have testified that on November 29, you prepared 

for the President's consideration a draft of a Presidential 
message to Congress advising that body of the Anierican- 
Japanese situation ? 
Answer : Please refer to my reply to your question No. 16. 

101. Question : Did you, on the evening of November 29, in your tele- 

phonic conversation with the President, discuss such a pro- 
posed message to Congress? 
Answer: I do not recall whether I discussed the proposed mes- 
sage to Congress in a telephone conversation with the Presi- 
dent on November 29. 
182. Quest on: In the preparation on the 29th of a proposed Presi- 
dential message to Congress did you have in mind, in any 
[14344-] way, that provision of the Constitution which 
provides that from time to time the President shall give to 
Congress information as to the state of the Union and rec- 
ommend to the Congress such measures as he shall judge 
necessary and expedient? (Cf. art. 11, sec. 3.) 
Answer : Please refer to my reply to your question No. 19. 

133. Question : If your answer to the previous question is "no" I 

ask you why such a course was considered even to prepara- 
tion of a message. 
Answer: In the critical situation which then existed it was 
deemed important to give consideration to any and all lines 
of action that might in the least be helpful in meeting the 
situation. 

134. Question : You have testified that on Sunday, November 30, Lord 

Halifax told you that the British Government had impor- 
tant indications that Japan was about to attack Siam and 
the Kra Peninsula; did Lord Halifax tell 3^ou that the 
British had obtained this information through interception 
of a Tokyo message intended for Hitler, personally ? 
Answer : [1434-5] I do not recall that the British Ambas- 

sador informed me of the source from which the British 
Government had had important indications that Japan was 
about to attack Siam and the Kra Peninsula, and I find 
nothing in the record indicating that he mentioned the 
source. 
Questions 135 and 137 are grouped in a single answer. 

135. Question : A message from the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin 

to Tokyo, datecl November 29 and decoded in Washington 
on December 1, has the Japanese Ambassador advising his 
Government that Kibbentrop had informed him that Ger- 
many had information that America's stitf front had practi- 
cally ended the Washington conversations; whereupon the 
Ambassador had told Ribbentrop that he had no official word 
from Tokyo as to the conversations or as to Japan's inten- 
tions; my question is: Did this intercepted message from 
Berlin to Tokyo fit in with the evidence of previous inter- 
cepts, and of Ambassador Grew's reports, that Japan had 



5404 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

been keeping Hitler in the dark as to the Washington 
conversations? (Cf. Intercepts, exhibit 1, p. 200.) 

137. Question : Is it not clearly indicated, if not established, by the 

intercept from Berlin of November 29 that on that day neither 
the Japanese Ambassador nor Hitler had [14'H6] def- 
. inite information as to Japan's intentions toward the United 
States ? 
Answer: It would seem clear from the message under reference 
that the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin had not communi- 
cated fi'om his Government to the German Government at 
that time a report on the current situation regarding the 
Japanese-Ame*rican conversations. The Germans had more 
than one way of keeping in touch with Japan. The pos- 
sibility is not excluded that Hitler and also Ribbentrop had 
received reports from the German Ambassador at Tokyo of 
the progress of the conversations. Therefore, I would not 
wish to undertake to interpret the message. 
136. Question: November 29 was the day of the Japanese dead line? 
Answer: Tokyo's message to the Japanese Ambassador No. 812 
of November 22, 1941, of which a translation appears on 
page 165, exhibit 1, contains the following passage: 

There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to 
settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next 
3 or 4 days you can finish your conversations with the Americans ; if 
the signing cv.w be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for 
you — [1434^] twenty-ninth) ; if the pertinent notes can be 
exchanged ; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and 
the Netherlands ; and in short if everything can be finished, we have 
decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the 
dead line absolutely cannot be changed. 

The foregoing bald confession by the Japanese Government 
of its plan and patent movement to attack unless the United 
States surrendered to the demands in Japan's ultimatum fits 
in with all that I said and did following that date. 

138. Question : Also intercepted, and decoded in Washington on De- 

cember 1, was a message from the Japanese Government to 
its Ambassador at Berlin, dated Tokyo, November 30 ; There- 
in the Japanese Ambassador is informed that American- 
Japanese conversations now "stand ruptured — broken"; the 
Japanese Government instructs the Ambassador to see Hitler 
and Ribbentrop immediately and to say "very secretly to 
them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly 
break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan 
through some clash of arms" and to "add that the time of 
the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone 
dreams" ; my question is : Did this message and the attendant 
circumstances of it strengthen your [1434-^] convic- 
tions as to Japan's intentions? (Cf. Intercepts, exhibit 1, 
p. 204.) 
Answer: The message to which you refer was cumulative evi- 
dence of the conclusions which I had already reached in 
regard to Japan's intentions, and which were overwhelm- 
ingly supported by the surrounding facts and circumstances. 
Questions 139 and 140 are grouped in a single answer. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5405 

139. Question : In fixing the deadline for November 29, Tokyo had 

secretly advised Nomura and Kurusu that after that date 
things would happen automatically, had it not ? 

140. Question : Did you consider the message to Hitler on November 

30, a portentous automatic happening in the crisis? 

Answer: On November 22 the Japanese Government instructed 
Nomura and Kurusu in regard to the extension from No- 
vember 25 to November 29 for the deadline for the conclusion 
of an agreement and stated that: "After that things are 
automatically going to happen" (exhibit No. 1, p. 165). 
The message from Tokyo to Berlin of November 30, 1941 
(exhibit No. 1, p. 204), was, of course, in harmony with 
what the Japanese had in mind as revealed through nu- 
merous sources. 
[14349] 141. Question : Did the President return to Washington 
on December 1 ? 

Answer : The record shows that the President returned to Wash- 
ington from Warm Springs on December 1. 
Questions 142 to 145 are grouped in a single answer. 

142. Question : Did he direct the preparation of a strong note to 

Japan asking of that Government an explanation for its 
concentration of forces in the southern part of Indochina? 

143. Question: Did the President on December 2, direct the State 

Department to hand the Japanese a communication in which 
the President stated tl\at Japanese concentrations in south- 
ern Indochina implied the utilization of these forces by 
Japan for aggression against the Philippines, the Dutch 
East Indies, Malaya or Thailand? (Cf. For. Rel. 11, pp. 
778-779.) 

144. Question: Was such a communication handed to the Japanese? 

145. Question: Did that communication state that the Hitleresque 

nature of the Japanese concentrations and the broad prob- 
lem of American defense had prompted the President's 
representations? (Cf. For. Rel. 11, p. 779, last [14350] 
paragraph of text of note.) 
Answer : The President on December 2 simply directed that in- 
quiry be made at once of the Japanese Ambassador in regard 
to the reasons for the continued Japanese troop movements 
in Indochina. On the same day the Under Secretary of 
State, in compliance, with the President's instruction, in- 
formed the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu of the 
President's inquiry. The record of the matter appears in 
Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-41. 
volume II, pages 778-781. 

146. Question : Did the Japanese military concentrations and mili- 

tary movements, known to the American Government in the 
period November 30-December 6, 1941, constitute threats to 
American Pacific possessions, to the countries neighboring 
Japan in the Pacific, and to the American sources of vital , 
materials? 
Answer: The Japanese military concentrations and military 
movements known to the American Government in the period 
November 30-December 6, 1941, so far as I could judge as 



5406 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Secretary of State, did constitute serious threats to Ameri- 
can Pacific possessions, to the countries neighboring Japan, 
and to American sources of vital [14'Ool] materials. 
Questions 147 and 148 are grouped in a single answer. 

147. Question : Did such threats require that the United States imme- 

diately take any and all steps to meet tliem in conformity 
with the statement of the American Government to Japan 
on August 17, 1941, to-wit : 

* * * this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of 
Japan that if the .Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance 
of a policy or program of military domination by force OR THREAT OF FORCE 
of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled 
to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward 
safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and toward 
insuring the safety and security of the United States. 

(Cf. For. Rel. 11, pp. 556-7.) 

148. Question : Did the Japanese military concentrations and move- 

ments of November 30-December 6 constitute a challenge to 
the Government of the United States to implement the posi- 
tion it had taken in its note of August 17 to Japan? 
Answer : The purpose of the United States, in making the state- 
ment of August 17 under reference, was to tell [14^352] 
Japan in a friendly way that if she kept encroaching upon 
our rights and interests, we would defend ourselves. This 
Government at that time was acutely concerned over Japan's 
refusal to agree to our proposal for the neutralization of 
Indochina, to abandon her jumping-off place there, and 
otherwise to desist from the menace she was creating to us 
and other peace-minded nations. It wholly misrepresents 
the attitude of the United States in the period after August 
17 to allege that this Government was planning any step 
other than that of pure defense in the event the Japanese 
should attack. Other aspects of this question, for example, 
where, when ftnd how we would resist the Japanese, were 
essentially a military matter. 

149. Question : Had the Secretary of State, in September 1940, in- 

formed Lord Lothian that American actions towards Japan 
in the Pacific would be predicated upon a policy of doing 
everything legitimately possible to help England win the 
war ^ (Cf. Peace and War, p. 575.) 
Answer: What I said to Lord Lothian on September 30, 1940, 
in regard to this matter is accurately described in my memo- 
randum of conversation with him appearing on pages 574-575 
of Peace and War. My comments to Lord Lothian \14o5S] 
had to do with the broad aspects of the situation created 
by the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact but also had special 
reference to the winning of the war by Great Britain against 
Germany. At that moment Germany had already overrun 
much of the Continent of Europe and the British and the 
entire Allied cause was virtually hanging by a thread. Every 
rational person realizes what would have happened to this 
country if Hitler and his allies had succeeded in their 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5407 

program. It was in these circumstances that I had my 
conversation with Lord Lothian. I said : 

The relations between Germany, Italy, and Japan, each having a 
common objective of conquering certain areas of the world and each 
pursuing identical policies of force, devastation and seizure, have been 
during recent years on a basis of complete understanding and of mutual 
cooperation for all purposes mutually desirable and reasonably prac- 
ticable, wath the result that the recent announcement was part and 
parcel of the chain of related events. 

I then proceeded to say that this Government lias pursued a definite 
and somewhat progressive line of acts and utterances in resisting 
Japanese aggression and treaty violations during recent years ; tliat 
these acts and utterances liave comprised repeated aid to China, suc- 
[1^35'f] cessive moral embargoes, abandonment of the commercial 
treaty, actual embargoes under law. the sending of our Navy to 
Hawaii, together with appropriate statements and notes of strong 
remonstrance against Japanese steps of aggression and constant repe- 
tition of the basic principles of world order under law. I added that I 
did not undertake to predict, much less to make commitments, as to 
how fast and how far this Government may go in following up the 
various acts and utterances in which it has been indulging ; that, of 
course, the special desire of this Government is to see Great Britain 
succeed in the war and that its acts and utterances with respect to the 
Pacitic area would be more or less affected as to time and extent by 
the question of what course woukl, on the part of this Government, most 
effectively and legitimately aid Great Britain in winning tlie war. 

150. Question : Had the Secretary of State in August 1941, informed 
Lord Halifax that a Japanese movement into the South 
Pacific would constitute a danger to England second only to 
a German invasion across the English Channel ? ( Cf . Peace 
and War, pp. 710-711.) 
Answer : What I said to Lord Halifax on August 9 in regard to 
this matter is accurately described in my memorandum 
[l^-SoS] of conversation with him appearing on pages 710- 
711 of Peace and War which reads as follows : 

The Ambassador made some inquiry about the amount of aid this 
Government might give in case Singapore or the Dutch East Indies 
should be attacked. I replied that I myself visualized the problem 
and issue in the broader way and that issue is presented by the plan 
of the Japanese to invade by force the whole of the Indian Ocean and 
the islands and continents adjacent thereto, isolating China, sailing 
across probably to the mouth of the Suez Canal, to the Persian Gulf oil 
area, to the Cape of Good Hope area, thereby blocking by a military 
despotism the trade routes and the supply sources to the British. I 
added that this broad military occupation would perhaps be more 
damaging to British defense in Europe than any other step short of 
the German crossing of the Channel. I said that this Government 
visualizes these broad conditions and the problem of resistance which 
they present ; that the activities of this Government in the way of 
discouraging this Japanese movement and of resistance will be more 
or less affected by the British defensive situation in Europe and hence 
by the question of the number of American naval vessels and other 
American aid that may be needed by Great Britain at the same time. 
I said that in the event of further [1^356] Japanese movements 
south this Government and the British Government should naturally 
have a conference at once and this Government would then be able to 
determine more definitely and in detail its situation pertaining to re- 
sistance, in the light of the statement I had just made. 



5408 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

151. Question: Had the Congress, on November 13, 1941, at the solici- 

tation of the President and the Secretary of State, committed 
the nation to keeping open tlie sea hmes so that Lend-Lease 
might fulfill its function? (Cf. New York Times, November 

Answer : My view of the significance of the measure passed by the 
House of Representatives on November 13, 1941, providing 
for the amendment to the Neutrality Act is contained in a 
letter I wrote to Speaker Rayburn and Representative 
McCormack on that same day. 
In that letter I stated : 

The breadth of our self-defense must at all times equal the breadth 
of the dangers which threaten us. In the circumstances of today, we 
must be free to arm our merchant ships for their own protection ; and 
we must be free, in the event of particular and extreme emergency, to 
use these ships for the carriage of supplies to nations which are resist- 
ing the world- [1^357] wide movement of conquest headed in 
our direction. This Government would, of course, use caution in 
carrying out the power which it could exercise upon the passage of 
the bill. 

I also stated : 

Tlie greatest intermediate objective of Hitler's armed forces is to 
capture Great Britain and to gain control of the high seas. To this end, 
Hitler has projected his forces far out into the Atlantic with a policy 
of submarine ruthlessness. By intimidation and terror he would drive 
our ships from the high seas, and ships of all nations from most of the 
North Atlantic. Even in the waters of the Western Hemisphere he 
has attacked and destroyed our ships, as well as ships of other Ameri- 
can republics, with resulting loss of American lives. 

The action of Congress in amending the Neutrality Act 
was only one factor in promoting the broad problem of self- 
defense, the necessity of which at that time was urgent and 
compelling. 

152. Question : In addition to the physical threat to the Philippines 

as stated in the President's communication to Japan of De- 
cember 2, did the Japanese military movements constitute 
a danger to the commitments made by Congress in author- 
[14^58] izing lend-lease and in re-establishing the Amer- 
ican policy of freedom of the seas? 
Answer : I would say that the Japanese military movements con- 
stituted a danger to the defense of free nations resisting the 
world-wide movement of conquest. The intent of lend-lease 
was to assist in that defense. The broad question of danger 
to this and to all peaceful countries was Japan's military 
partnership with Hitler for conquest. A material factor in 
the situation was Japan's flagrant violations of American 
rights and interests and the jeopardizing of American lives 
in China, which portended the extension of such violations 
over a much wider area. This Government could not afford 
to be deluded by Japan's false claims and pretensions which 
masked her designs of conquest, and to be oblivious to our 
own serious dangers. 

153. Question: You have testified, have you not, that the decision of 

the Executive, in the period November 29-December 6, was 
not to advise Congress in a message of the state of American- 
Japanese relations? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5409 

Answer : In my testimony on November 26, 1945, in reply to ques- 
tions by counsel as to "what the facts and circum- [14S69] 
stances were which led to the decision not to deliver that 
message to the Congress prior to December 7, "I set forth 
various considerations which influenced the President and 
myself against acting prematurely in that matter, I have 
also discussed this in answer to your questions Nos. 18 and 
19. The issue between isolationists and nonisolationists was 
then at fever heat and its line of cleavage extended through 
the Congress. The sending of a message to Congress at this 
critical juncture would have greatly accentuated that issue 
and would have correspondingly encouraged the Japanese 
militarists. The fact was that we had been doing our best 
to acquaint the Congress and the public with the critical 
dangers in the situation, and at the same time to avoid 
precipitating the crisis which the military people were anxi- 
to defer as long as possible. 
Questions 154 to 156 are grouped in a single answer. 

154. Question : As one reason for this decision not to send a message 

to Congress, you have testified that Congress only a few 
weeks before November 29, had by only one vote, sustained 
the Selective Service. Are you aware that the vote in ques- 
tion was in the House on August 13, 1941, 3^/2 months before 
November 29, 1941? 

155. Question : [14^60] Are you aware that the vote had to do 

with the matter of releasing at the end of a year's service 
those whose service had been limited to one year in the original 
bill? 

156. Question: Are you aware that the House took this vote in ig- 

norance of the fact that, a day or two before, the President, at 
the Atlantic Conference, was agreeing with the British Prime 
Minister on a course of American action with relation to 
Japan ? 
Answer: Without discussing the technicalities of the selective 
service extension bill under consideration in August 1941, it 
is still my convicition that the close vote in the House on that 
bill, 203 to 202, indicated the violently divided character of 
national opinion at the time. Furthermore, had the bill been 
defeated, the forces of aggression would have been greatly 
encouraged and the nations resisting aggression correspond- 
ingly discouraged. 

In his message to Congress on this subject, July 21, 1941, 
President Roosevelt said : 

Today it is imperative tliat I should officially report to the Congress 
what the Congress undoubtedly knows : That the international situa- 
tion is not less grave but is far more grave than it was a year ago. 
[143611 Occasional individuals, basing their opinions on unsup- 
ported evidence or on no evidence at all, may with honest intent assert 
that the United States need fear no attack on its own territory or on 
the other nations of this hemisphere by aggressors from without. 

Nevertheless, it is the well-nigh unanimous opinion of those who 
are daily cognizant, as military and naval officers and as Government 
servants in the field of international relations, that schemes and plans 
of aggressor nations against American security are so evident that 
the United States and the rest of the Americas are definitely imperiled 
In their national interests. * * * 

79716— 46— pt. 11 18 , 



5410 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I told the press on August 11, 1941, in response to a ques- 
tion whether failure of the bill would have any effect on 
Japan, that "the psychological effect alone on many phases 
of the international situation would be exceedingly bad, to 
say nothing of the actual results." 

With regard to the President's communication to the Japa- 
nese Ambassador of August 17, 1941, the President had noth- 
ing in mind except a friendly approach to discourage Japan 
from attacking us. Having participated in that interview, 
I received no impression from the President's tone or de- 
meanor of any suggestion of a threat. The [^lJt362'\ 
President in the same friendly tone agreed that the two Gov- 
ernments should resume amicable conversations looking to a 
peaceful understanding. Such conversations were then con- 
tinued in a friendly way for nearly four months. I, there- 
fore, do not see how the attitude of this Government could in 
any way be construed as offensive or unfriendly or how there 
can be any warrantable basis for criticism of the President. 
Questions 157 and 158 are grouped in a single answer. 

157. Question: Were you advised by anyone as to when the Army 

would be ready for war in the Pacific ? 

158. Question: Were you advised by anyone as to when the Navy 

would be ready for war in the Pacific ? 
Answer : The views of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval 
Operations on the need of more time for preparedness as set 
forth in their memoranda of November 5 and November 27, 
1941, were known to me at the time. Furthermore, the Army 
and Navy heads for some time had been representing to me 
their need of more time in which to strengthen the defense of 
the United States. 
Questions 159 and 163 are grouped in a single answer. 

159. Question: \^14363\ Will you advise the Committee as to 

who saw the final modus vivendi as prepared by the State 
Department? 
163. Question : Will you advise the committee as to who saw your 
November 26, 1941, message to Japan ? 
Answer: The November 25 draft of the modus vivendi was of 
course, seen, as were all previous drafts, by the far-eastern 
advisers of the Department of State. It contained nothing 
of material substance that was not contained in the November 
24 draft and the revisions it represented were largely refine- 
ments in the interests of precision. The November 24 draft 
was seen by the diplomatic representatives of the British, 
Netherlands, and Chinese Governments, and to the best of 
my recollection by the President and the representatives of 
the War and Navy Departments. I do not know who outside 
the Department of State saw the November 25 draft, and in 
any case there would hardly have been time for it to have any 
wide circulation before the decision was reached on the fol- 
lowing day to withhold, in delivering our reply to the Jap- 
anese, the modus vivendi feature. On this point I refer to 
the three successive drafts of the modus vivendi which are a 
part of the record. With regard to the 10-point proposal, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5411 

it is clear [14-364] from my reply to your question 
No. 74 that the contents of the 10-point proposal were seen 
by all who saw the modus vivendi drafts. However, I cannot 
say who, other than the far-eastern advisers of the State 
Department, saw the 10-point proposal in the exact form in 
which it was set up for delivery to the Japanese. To all of 
the modus vivendi drafts, the 10-point proposal was attached, 
as the modus vivendi was intended only to facilitate conver- 
sations with the proposals in the 10-point communication as 
a basis. Japan could not have accepted our modus vivendi 
draft without being prepared to take as a basis for further 
conversations a program along the lines of the 10-point pro- 
posal, nor could she have avoided declaring at the outset of 
the conversations that she would pursue a peaceful course, 
such declaration being set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
the modus vivendi in language as follows : 

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of 
Japan, both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, aflSrm that 
their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace 
throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs 
therein. 

2. They undertake reciprocally not to [1^365] make from 
regions in which they have military establishments any advance by 
force or threat or force into any areas in southeastern or northeastern 
Asia or in the southern or the northern Pacific area. 

Questions 160, 161, 164, and 165 are grouped in a single answer. 

160. Question : Will you advise the committee as to who opposed the 

sending of this modus vivendi ? 

161. Question : Will you tell us who favored the sending of this modus 

vivendi ? 

164. Question : Will you advise the committee as to who opposed the 

sending of this message (the November 26 message) ? 

165. Question : Will you advise us who favored the sending of this 

message ? 
Answer: While I, of course, consulted the military and naval 
authorities of this Government and with the far-eastern ad- 
visers of the Department of State on all plans for dealing 
with the critical situation in relation with Japan, the re- 
sponsibility for decisions, except in matters which I felt 
should be referred to the President, rested [14^66] 

with me, and I took no poll of "ayes" and "nays." So far as 
I am aware, however, among the top officials whose function 
it was to make decisions, there was no dissent at any stage of 
our intensive consideration in the days between November 22 
and November 26 of the modus vivendi proposal or the 10- 
point proposal. 

The situation with which we were called upon to deal be- 
tween November 22 and November 26 was briefly as follows : 
We had the indisputable evidence of the intercepted Japanese 
message of November 22, referred to in my reply to your 
question No. 136, that the Japanese Government had in- 
structed its representatives that there must be acceptance of 
its terms without any possibility of further concessions and 
within a definite time limit — November 29. I and my asso- 
ciates could not escape the conclusion from a reading of the 



5412 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Japanese message that the Japanese had decided to attack 
unless the United States made basic concessions. 

In our chitching at straws to see how far we could go toward 
tiding over the situation we got up the modus vivendi plan 
for possible inclusion as a part of our reply along with a plan 
for a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific 
area. The modus vivendi plan called for the participation 
of the Governments of Great Britain, Australia, and the 
Netherlands in connec- [14367] tion with the provi- 
sions in the plan for the modification of the freezing measures. 
We consulted those Governments and also the Chinese Gov- 
ernment which was vitally concerned. Generalissimo Chiang 
Kai-shek's reaction to the modus vivendi plan as communi- 
cated to this Government was that if there was any relaxa- 
tion of the embargo by this Government, or even a belief on 
the part of the Chinese people that such action would be 
taken, Chinese morale would be shattered, Chinese resistance 
would collapse, and the Japanese would be able to gain their 
ends. In the light of this serious development and of the 
chances being overwhelmingly against Japan's acceptance of 
the modus vivendi proposal, especially as we had convincing 
evidence that Japan was already moving forward with her 
military forces and had reached the jumping-off place in 
Indochina, consideration of all the surrounding circum- 
stances relating to the difficulties and the imminent dangers 
in the situation led to a conclusion not to propose our modus 
vivendi draft to the Japanese. 

In any event the modus vivendi plan would not have en- 
hanced appreciably the chances of Japan's adopting our 
counterproposal, for what we would have offered the Jap- 
anese in the modus vivendi was mere chicken feed compared 
with what they were asking for, as set forth in their ulti- 
matum of November 20. The view that Japan would not 
accept our counterproposal, even with the [14368] 
modus vivendi feature, was, to the best of my recollection, 
shared by all the high officials in the Government who are 
known to have expressed any views on the subject, as, for 
example, the following instances : On November 24 Admiral 
Stark, in a circular message, addressed, among others, to the 
Commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, pointed out that the 
chances of a favorable outcome of the negotiations with 
Japan were very doubtful and that a surprise aggressive 
movement by the Japanese in any direction was a probability. 
On November 25 Admiral Stark followed up that message 
with a letter to Admiral Kimmel. In the letter he stated that 
he had held up dispatch of the letter pending a meeting with 
the President and Mr. Htill. Admiral Stark stated that 
neither the President nor Mr. Hull would be surprised over 
a Japanese surprise attack and that they had confirmed the 
view expressed in the previous message regarding the gravity 
of the situation. Secretary Stimson in his diary entry for 
November 25 stated that at a meeting at the White House 
the President expressed the view that, "We are likely to be 
attacked perhaps as soon as — perhaps next Monday." 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5413 

Some persons, in attempting to reconstruct the situation 
which then existed, seem to have been misled by Japanese 
charges misrepresenting the character of the 10-point pro- 
posah They seem to have completely over- [14^69'] 
looked the fact, which was subsequently disclosed, that by 
November 26 when our proposal was delivered to the Japanese, 
orders had already been given to their fleet to sail preparatory 
to the attack which was later made according to schedule. It 
was this movement to attack which prompted the Japanese 
to start preparing their utterly false and fraudulent mis- 
representations, which amounted to the monstrous charge, 
made in the worst of bad faith, that they had been forced to 
fight because our statement of policy as contained in our 
November 26 proposal was harsh and humiliating. Neither 
the Japanese leaders who falsely pretended to be "dumb- 
founded" over our proposal of November 26, notwithstanding 
the fact that it was along lines we had been discussing for 
months, nor those who supported this Japanese contention had 
at any time claimed that the Japanese would make the least 
concession beyond their proposal of November 20, nor have 
they advanced any suggestion as to what further concessions 
the United States would have to make, short of complete 
acceptance of the Japanese proposal of November 20. 

There was no reason for the Japanese to have come to us 
at any stage with their demands, nor was there any need for 
a new agreement between the United States and Japan. All 
that was necessary was for Japan to [14370] abandon 
her course of aggression and adopt one of peace, and the situa- 
tion in the Pacific area would have adjusted itself almost 
automatically by the observance on the part of Japan, along 
with other signatory powers, of the Nine-Power Treaty, of 
the Kellog-Briand Peace Pact, and other treaties and commit- 
ments, including a commitment to respect the "open door" in 
China, to which Japan was a party. Nor must also the fact 
be overlooked that while Japan was repudiating these solemn 
treaty obligations by taking the aggressive and moving her 
armed forces toward us and other peaceful countries, we were 
pleading, as a peaceful and law-abiding nation, with Japan 
to abandon her course of conquest and likewise become law- 
abiding and j)eaceful. 

Our position, as summed up in the 10-point program, was 
really nothing new to the Japanese. We had been discussing 
with them throughout months of conversations broad-gaged 
principles, practical applications of which were along the 
lines of the 10-point proposal. The proposal was not pre- 
sented to them in the form of demands, but merely as an 
example of a kind of settlement we would like to see worked 
out in the Pacific area. We were not bargaining with the 
Japanese as if we ourselves had been offenders. The only 
issue or question to be settled was whether we could prevail 
upon Japan to abandon [14371] her increasingly dan- 
gerous movements of conquest and agree to become law-abid- 
ing and to adopt a peaceful course. This was the all- 



5414 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

important issue which the Japanese in the end sought to cover 
up and dodge. 

The 10-point program also summed up, so the general pub- 
lic might understand, many of the general and special bene- 
fits which might accrue to Japan if she renounced a course of 
aggression; such as, enhancement of her national security 
through participation in a multilateral nonaggression pact 
and through measures calculated to stabilize the situation 
in the Far East, including the abrogation by the powers of 
extra territoriality in China and the giving of mutual pledges 
regarding respect for the integrity of Indochina ; and an ad- 
vantageous exonomic program : A generous trade agreement 
with the United States, removal of the freezing regulations, 
an agreement upon a plan for stabilization of the dollar-yen 
rate. What Japan was asked to do in return was to give 
practical application to the professions she had made of her 
peaceful intent by agreeing to withdraw her armed forces 
from China and Indochina, to support no regime in China 
other than the National Government of China, and to agree 
not to interpret any agreement to which she was a party in 
such a way as to conflict with the establishment and preser- 
vation of peace throughout the [14^721 Pacific area. 
Surely, these latter were reasonable and necessary conditions 
for the privileges that were offered to Japan. The 10-point 
proposal would have been highly welcome to Japan it she 
had had any intention of adopting peaceful courses. It 
would be a monstrous travesty of the facts and an unspeakable 
libel on this country if the Japanese war lords in their effort 
to disclaim responsibility should be permitted to screen and 
shift their guilt in the face of all the facts to the contrary. 

162. Question : Did you agree with Ambassador Grew and others that 
the placing of the embargo upon Japan would mean war ? 
Answer: The general proposition regarding the effect of em- 
bargoes upon Japan, especially as applicable to the situation 
from 1938 to 1940, is set forth on page 88 of Peace and War, 
U. S. Foreign Policy. The important fact, however, which 
had to be taken into account in the situation at the time when 
this Government applied freezing measures to Japan in 
July, 1941, was the advance of Japan's armed forces so as 
seriously and immediately to imperil the security of this 
and other countries. At that stage, Japan was in effect 
brazenly demanding military supplies with which to attack 
this and other [14S73] countries to the south. The 
question of our self-defense had by that time become supreme 
with us and impelled us to refuse to furnish the invader with 
military supplies. 

Questions 166 to 169 are grouped in a single answer. 

166. Question : Were you or anyone in the State Department to your 

knowledge consulted in regard to the military plan being 
drawn up by America, Britain, the Netherlands, and China, 
sometimes known as the ABCD block? 

167. Question : If you were so consulted will you state who consulted 

you and what was said at the conference ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5415 

168. Question : Did representatives of the State Department partici- 

pate in any of these conversations ? 

169. Question : If so, state the name of that representative. 
Answer: From time to time I participated from the politi- 
cal angle, in discussions with the President and the leaders 
of the Army and of the Navy in regard to the subject of the 
military conversations with the British and the Dutch for 
joint defensive plans. No representative of the Department 
of State participated in those [14'374'\ staff conver- 
sations, but there was a Department of State representative 
who participated in the conversations regarding defense 
which were held with the Canadians. There was no Chinese 
participation in the foregoing conversations. 

In the discussions which I held with the President and the 
leaders of the Army and of the Navy in regard to those con- 
versations, as made clear above, I did not pass upon the mil- 
itary aspect of questions, but occasionally offered comments 
and suggestions as a layman. The views that I expressed 
were along the lines I had expressed publicly as well as in 
talks with diplomatic representatives. I refer you to what I 
said in that regard in an addrCvSS on March 17, 1938 (Peace 
and WH-r, pp. 412-413) , as follows : 

Prudence and common sense dictate tbat, where this and other 
nations have common interests and common objectives, we should not 
hesitate to exchange information and to confer with the govern- 
ments of such other nations and, in dealing with the problems con- 
fronting each alike, to proceed along parallel lines — this Government 
retaining at all times its independence of judgment and freedom of 
action. For nations which seek peace to assume with respect to each 
other [1^375] attitudes of complete aloofness would serve only 
to encourage, and virtually invite, on the part of other nations law- 
lessly inclined, policies and actions most likely to endanger peace. 

In the present Far Eastern emergency, we have consistently col- 
laborated with other peace-seeking nations in the manner I have just 
described. I have said often, and I repeat again, that in this collabo- 
ration there is not a trace of alliance or involvement of any sort. We 
have scrupulously followed and we intend to follow the traditional 
policy of our country not to enter into entangling alliances or involve- 
ments with other countries. 

On November 25, 1940, I gave my views to the British 
Ambassador, Lord Lothian, in commenting upon his ex- 
pressed view that there should be conferences between the 
naval experts of our two governments with respect to what 
each would or might do in case of military outbreaks on the 
part of Japan. I said that, of course, there could be no 
agreements entered into in this respect, but that there should 
undoubtedly be collaboration with a view to making known 
to each other any and all information practicable in regard 
to what both might have in mind to do, and when and where, 
in case of a military move- [14-^76] ment by Japan 
in the south or in some other direction. 

There was no suggestion on the part of any of us in this 
Government, so far as I knew, that in the military staff con- 
versations our representatives could go beyond, at the very 
most, making recommendations which, of course, would have 
been subject to congressional approval. 



5416 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Lant:. The committee received a sworn statement dated March 
1946 from former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. This state- 
ment was in response to inquiry by committee counsel for certain por- 
tions of a diary kept by Mr, Stimson. We ask that the statement and 
appendix thereto be spread on the record at this point. 

The Chairman. It is so ordered. 

(The statement referred to follows :) 

\_1J,B77^ STATEMENT BY HENRY L. STIMSON, FORMER 
SECRETARY OF WAR, TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE 
INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK, S. CON. 
RES. 27, WITH APPENDIX, MARCH 1946 

\_lJf378 — p. i^] Statement of Facts as Shown by My Current 
Notes and My Kecollection as Refreshed Thereby 

The committee already has before it my testimony before the Army 
Pearl Harbor Board. At that time I undertook to give the board the 
answers to the questions which were asked me as fully as I was then 
able, having in mind certain limitations on what I then felt was proper 
to discuss, including particularly any matters the revelation of which 
might in any way have jeopardized the safety of our then pending 
military operations. I am now able, however, to amplify in certain 
respects the testimony which I gave before the board. 

The evidence which I am able to give the committee comes not only 
from my recollection of the events which transpired preceding the 
Pearl Harbor attack, but I am able to refresh my recollection fromt 
a contemporaneous record which I kept from day to day for my own 
personal use. As I explained to the Army board, I had a dictograph 
at my house at which I dictated these memoranda each morning before 
going to the War Department. I read many excerpts from these to 
the Army Pearl Harbor Board. This committee last autumn asked 
me for my notes covering the dates of November 5, 6, 7, 10, 21, 24, 25, 
26, 27, 28, and December 2 and 7, 1941. [^. 2'] I am attaching 
to this statement as an appendix copies of my notes covering these 
dates, of matters \_lJt37-9'\ relevant to the Far Eastern situation 
and the events leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Although 
these extracts speak largely for themselves, they were made roughly 
and hastily and were not revised when dictated. They therefore 
naturally need some addition to tie them in as a connected story and 
to give the whole picture as I saw it. It is for this reason that I am 
accompanying them with this statement. 

No accurate understanding can be had of the situation which existed 
in the weeks preceding the Pearl Harbor attack or of the conduct of 
the various individuals concerned unless they are viewed in the light of 
the historical events which had been going on for some time and which 
ultimately led to the crisis that occurred in December and the war of 
the United States with the Axis powers. From some of the comments 
which have been made and given wide publicity, one receives the im- 
pression that many people have already forgotten the trend of events 

* Additional numbers in italics enclosed by brackets represent original pages in the state- 
ment submitted by Mr. Stimson, which pages were frequently referred to during the exami- 
nation of certain witnesses. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5417 

which were coming to a head in the autumn of 1941 and the threat to 
our own safety which had unmistakenly developed in the actions of the 
two great aggressor nations, Germany and Japan, who ah^eady in the 
preceding months and years had begun spreading destruction and 
terror throughout a large portion of the civilized world. 

[p. 3] Japan had started on her current path of aggression in 
the Far East as early as September 1931. She then attacked the Chinese 
in Manchuria and overran that territory, flouting her [14^80] 
obligations under the Pact of Paris and the Nine Power Treaty. There 
then followed her attacks on the Chinese in Shanghai. She invaded 
China in 1937, after the conclusion of the Anticomitern Pact with 
Germany. The brutal and barbarous type of military aggression for 
which she stood was typified by the outrages committed by her Army 
in the occupation of Nanking and similar incidents, which by 1941 had 
become notorious events of historj^ In September 1940, after Germany 
had set out on her temporarily triumphal path toward the subjuga- 
tion of the nations of Europe, Japan concluded a military alliance with 
Germany and Italy and placed herself formally in the camp of the 
Axis powers. 

By the summer of 1941, the Japanese intentions in the Far East 
became very clear. After Germany attacked Russia in June of that 
year, Japan began extensive military preparations — among other 
things, calling an additional 2,000,000 men to the colors. The utter- 
ances of her war lords became increasingly threatening. She extended 
her military operations into southern French Indochina. That she was 
headed toward the ultimate occupation of Singapore and the Nether- 
lands East Indies, and thence the domination of the [p. ^] en- 
tire Southeast Asia, was evident not only from her overt act and 
announcements but from certain of her intercepted diplomatic mes- 
sages in which her intentions were expressed in more detail. 

All of this presented a great threat to our safety and interests. If 
Singapore and the Netherlands Indies should be [14'3S1] oc- 
cupied, Japan would be strengthened by the acquisition of a great 
fortress and a great source of natural resources in rubber and oil, 
which would help her greatly to carry on her program of depredation. 
The Philippines, which lay between Japan and these British and 
Dutch targets, would inevitably be the next victim, and at her mercy. 
China might easily be forced to capitulate and taken out of the war. 
Our military advisers had given the President their formal advice 
that, if Japan attacked British Malaya or the Dutch East Indies or 
moved her forces west of a certain line in Indochina, we would have 
to fight for the sake of our own security. 

On the other side of the world, we were faced with a situation which 
was even more critical. Hitler, having seized Norway, France, Bel- 
gium, Denmark, and Holland, had just attacked Russia in June of 
1941 and the Russians were fighting a desperate battle to stop the 
German Army from overrunning a large portion of her territory and 
her capital. [p. 5] In the meantime, the Germans were main- 
taining large forces deployed on the north coast of Europe as a con- 
tinual threat of an invasion of England which, as we know, was ill 
prepared to meet it. As we now kiiow from the evidence presented 
at the trial of the German war criminals in Nuremburg, Hitler was 
planning ultimately to attack the United States and was conspiring 



5418 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

■with the Japanese to aid them while they attacked us in the meantime. 
It was then very apparent to everyone who had carefully followed the 
course of [143S2] events that we would sooner or later have to 
meet the threat to civilization which these aggressor nations were 
presenting to the world, and the great danger was that the nations 
who were then fighting desperately and gallantly to stem this threat 
would be knocked out of the war one by one before our turn came and 
that we would ultimately be left to face the onslaught alone. 

The American people had been slow to recognize the danger, but 
by the autumn of 1941 it was beginning to be understood more clearly. 
Early in 1941, Congress, in the Lend-Lease Act, had authorized the 
furnishing of munitions to the nations fighting the Axis and the shelter 
of our ports to their warships. In August 1941 the Congress passed 
a bill extending the draft. In November 1941, Congress voted to 
repeal important sections of the neutrality law, thus per- [p. 6] 
mitting the arming of our ships and their sailing into any combat 
zone or belligerent port in the world. On November 23, 1941, Kepre- 
sentative Gearhart of California, in a broadcast on the "American 
Forum of the Air," after pointing out Japan's breaches of treaty 
obligations and her subsequent aggression in China, stated : 

Japan's ruthlessness makes her an enemy not only of China but also a common 
foe of all nations. 

From some of the comments quoted in the public press, one would 
get the impression that the imminent threat of war in October and 
November 1941 was a deep secret, known only to the authorities in 
Washington who kept it mysteriously to themselves. [14S831 
Nothing could be further from the truth. At least one of our de- 
stroyers had been attacked by German war vessels. Aside from the 
war warnings which were sent to our military and naval commanders 
in the various theaters of danger, the imminence of war with Japan 
was a matter of public knowledge and the people were being warned 
time and time again of the danger which was approaching. One need 
only read the headlines of the newspapers during this period. For 
example, on October 17 the Navy ordered all American merchant ships 
in the Pacific to put into safe ports. On October 24 Secretary Knox 
publicly warned of a "clash" with Japan and the "seriousness [p. 7] 
of the situation." On November 11, 1941 — Armistice Day — the Presi- 
dent himself warned the people that the Nation was .facing a world 
war again. Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, declared on 
that day that "our people realized that at any moment war may be 
forced upon us." During this period, day after day, the headlines 
warned of the approaching crisis with Japan. On November 26 there 
appeared on the front page of the "New York Times" the notice that 
the United States consulate in Tokyo had warned Americans to get 
out of Japan promptly. On Monday, December 1st, appeared the 
headline that "Roosevelt Hurries Back in the Crisis." In Honolulu 
itself the papers were carrying equally sensational headlines. For 
example, on November 30 appeared the headline "Japanese May 
Strike Over Weekend." 

Meanwhile we had been doing what we could to get ready for 
[14^84] war if and when it came. After the long period neces- 
sary to lav the foundations of our ultimate enormous production, the 
output or war materials in this countrj^ was beginning to increase 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5419 

rapidly; but we were still using large quarntities of it under the 
Lend-Lease Act to satisfy the demands of the nations who were 
already in the battle and holding off the enemy. We were shipping 
all we could spare to England and in particular to Kussia, which was 
then in the forefront of the fight. 

[p. 8] In the meantime, the War Department was doing what it 
could to fortify the Pacific. We were giving all the material and 
effectives that we could spare to Hawaii in particular, which was 
in fact prior to the time of the Pearl Harbor attack reported to me 
Iby the Staff as the best manned and equipped of all our outposts on 
the Pacific, including the Panama Canal. We were also doing our 
best to reenforce the Philippines. The effectiveness of the airplane 
against a navy in narrow seas had been recently demonstrated in the 
Mediterranean by the German air attacks on British naval forces, as 
well as by the success of the British attack on the Italian fleet at 
Taranto. We decided that if a sufficient number of our bombing 
planes, which would be able to proceed to the Philippine Islands 
under their own power, could be gathered there, this would present a 
very effective nucleus of a defense against the advances of the Jap- 
anese Navy or convoys in South Asiatic waters. Accordingly, in 
August we started sending out to the Philippines as many four- 
engined [14385] bombers as we could spare, and by December 
7 we had in fact gathered there some 35 of these ships. This was the 
largest group of such American bombers yet in existence anywhere. 
We felt at the time that these presented a strong striking force which 
could be used with great effect in operations against the Japanese 
Navy. We underestimated, as did everyone else, the effective power 
of Japanese aviation, which [p. 9] asserted itself at Pearl 
Harbor and 1 day later in the Philippines by its attack on our installa- 
tions there, including the destruction of many of the bombers them- 
selves. 

In mid-October the Japanese Konoye cabinet fell and a new cabi- 
net under General Tojo came into power, which all expected would 
be even more aggressive and warlike. 

To sum up, the salient features of the situation, as they appeared 
to me early in November 1941, were as follows : 

1. War with Germany and Japan would ultimately be inevitable. 

2. It was vitally important that none of the nations who were 
then desperately fighting Germany — England, Russia, or China — 
should be knocked out of the war before the time came when we 
would be required to go in. 

3. While we very much wanted more time in which to prepare, 
nevertheless tve felt we had a fair chance to make an effective fight 
against Japan for the Philippines [14386] even if we had 
to enter the war at that time, in view of the air power that we were 
building up in the Philippines. 

4. If war did come, it was important, both from the point of view 
of unified support of our own people as well as for the record of 
history, that we should not [p. 10] be placed in the position 
of firing the first shot, if this could be done without sacrificing our 
safety, but that Japan should appear in her true role as the real 
aggressor. 



5420 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

During this entire period I kept in constant and close touch with 
Mr. Hull and Mr. Knox, as well as having frequent meetings with 
the President. In 1940 Messrs. Hull and Knox and I had inaugu- 
rated regular weekly meetings in Mr. Hull's office so that there would 
be close liaison between the three of us. These meetings were held 
on Tuesday mornings at 9 : 30 whenever we were present in Wash- 
ington and able to go. They were being held during this period, 
in October and November 1941, as well as meetings between us on 
other occasions. 

Early in November we received word that the Japanese were send- 
ing an additional special envoy, Kurusu, to Washington to partici- 
pate in the conversations that were being held. I had little hope 
that anything would come of his proposal, in view of all the infor- 
mation which we had been receiving as to the Jap's determination 
to proceed with their program of aggression. 

On November 6, I had an hour's talk alone with the [14^87^ 
President with regard to the Far Eastern situation and his approach- 
ing conference with Kurusu, who was coming from [p. ll] Ja- 
pan. The thing uppermost in his mind was how we could gain more 
time. I quote from my notes : 

The President outlined wbat he tliouglit he might say. He was trying to 
tliink of something tliat would give us further time. He suggested he might 
propose a truce in which there would be no movement or armament for six 
months and then if the Japanese and Chinese had not settled their ax-range- 
ment in that meanwhile, we could go on on the same basis. 

I personally did not approve of a truce on such a basis and told him 
so. I felt that it would tie up our hands just at a time when it was 
so important that we should go on completing our reenforcement of 
the Philippines and our military advisers then felt that if we could 
accumulate enough of them there it would place us in a favorable 
strategic position, and I did not approve of any arrangement that 
would prevent our continuing this program. Secondly, it was still 
very important that we keep the Chinese in the war, and I believed 
that they would feel that such a truce was a desertion of them, and 
that this would have a very serious effect on Chinese morale. 

On Friday, November 7, we had the usual weekly Cabinet meet- 
ing. The Far Eastern situation was uppermost in many of our 
minds. Mr. Hull informed us that relations had become [14388] 
extremely critical and that we should be on the outlook for an attack 
by Japan at any time. Our military [p. 12] advisers, while 
desirous of delay, had urged military action if Japan attacked terri- 
tory whose security was vital to us and in this connection specified 
American, British, or Dutch territory. The President at the meeting 
undertook to take an informal vote of the Cabinet as to whether it 
was thought the American people would back up up if it became 
necessary to strike at Japan, in case she should attack England in 
Malaya or the Dutch in the East Indies. The Cabinet was unanimous 
in the feeling that the country would support such a move. The 
Cabinet voted this way even though only Mr. Hull and the President 
knew of the efforts which we had been making to reenforce the Philip- 
pines with the big bombers and which we in the Army felt could be 
effective support in case any attack should be made on the British or 
Dutch in southeastern Asia. On November 10 at a staff meeting, 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5421 

General Marshall, among other things, read us a long letter from 
General MacArthur in the Philippines, telling us of hopeful progress 
in the reorganization of the Philippine Army and the construction of 
airports throughout the islands. 

Between November 10 and 21, talks were commenced in Washington 
between Nomura and Kurusu on the one hand, and the President 
and Mr. Hull on the other. During this period a very serious crisis 
developed by reason of the threatened [/>. 13] strike of the 
coal miners, which would have been a most serious obstacle 
[14^89] to our preparations for defense. Not only was the Pres- 
ident occupied with this but we in the War Department during this 
period were obliged to make preparations for taking over and oper- 
ating the coal mines in case the strike should eventuate. Much of my 
personal time was occupied during these days with these preparations. 
Fortunately, the strike was ultimately averted and the matter re- 
solved shortly after November 20. My notes contain no reference to 
any developments in the Japanese situation during this period. It 
was during this period, on November 20, that Kurusu presented the 
Japanese proposals to Mr. Hull which, among other things, demanded 
that we should withdraw all material and moral support to China 
and at the same time resume supplying to Japan the oil she required 
to assist her in carrying on her war with China. 

My notes recall to me the fact that on November 24 I had a good 
talk with General Olmstead, who had recently been promoted to be 
Chief Signal Officer. This department was of particular interest to 
me because I had been giving a great deal of personal attention dur- 
ing the past months to the development of radar by the Army. I 
had for some time become convinced of the importance of radar, both 
as an antiaircraft protection as well as its uses for [p. 14] in- 
stallation in planes and ships for combat purposes. We had made 
every effort to get as much radar equipment to Hawaii as possible, 
particularly for antiaircraft protection; and, as the committee has 
undoubtedly heard, [14390] substantial amounts of this equip- 
ment of the movable type were in Hawaii and capable of operation. 

On Tuesday, November 25, Secretary Knox and I met in Mr. Hull's 
office for our usual Tuesday morning meeting. Mr. Hull showed us a 
proposal that he had prepared, which he was considering laying before 
Nomura and Kurusu for a 3 months' truce. 

At 12 o'clock on the same day, we three went to the White House, 
where we met with the President and also General Marshall and Ad- 
miral Stark. The President at once brought up the relations with the 
Japanese. Mr. Hull said the Japanese were poised for attack — that 
they might attack at any time. The President said the Japanese were 
notorious for making an attack without warning and stated that we 
mi^ht even be attacked, say next Monday, for example. 

One problem troubled us very much. If you know that your enemy 
is going .to strike you, it is not usually wise to wait until he gets the 
jump on you by taking the initiative. In spite of the risk involved, 
however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that 
[p. JS] in order to have the full support of the American people 
it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this 
so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were 
the aggressors. We discussed at this meeting the basis on which this 



5422 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

country's position could be most clearly explained to our own people 
and [14391] to the world, in case we had to go into the fight 
quickly because of some sudden move on the part of the Japanese. 
We discussed the possibility of a statement summarizing all the steps 
of aggression that the Japanese had already taken, the encirclement 
of our interests in the Philippines which was resulting and the threat 
to our vital supplies of rubber from Malay. I reminded the President 
that on August 19 he had warned the Japanese Ambassador that if 
the steps which the Japanese were then taking continued across the 
border into Thailand, he would regard it as a matter affecting our 
safety, and suggested that he might point out that the moves the Jap- 
anese were now apparently on the point of making would be in fact a 
violation of a warning that had already been given. 

When I got back to the War Department after this meeting on that 
same day, I found news from G-2 that was very disturbing. It indi- 
cated that the Japanese were embarking a large expeditionary force of 
30, 40, or 50 ships at [p. 16] Shanghai and that this expedition 
was proceeding along the China coast south of Formosa. I at once 
telephoned Mr. Hull and also sent copies of the report to the President. 

The next morning, November 26, Mr. Hull told me over the tele- 
phone that he had almost decided not to make the proposition of the 
three months' truce that he had discussed with Knox and me on 
November 25. The Chinese, for one thing, had pointed out strong 
objections to the proposal, particularly the effect on the [14,392] 
morale of their own people. Mr. Hull stated that he felt the best thing 
to do was simply to tell the Japanese that he had no further action to 
propose. 

I telephoned the President shortly thereafter and asked him whether 
he had received the news of the new expedition from Shanghai pro- 
ceeding down the China coast toward Indo-China. He had not re- 
ceived it. He was shocked by it, and at once took it as further evidence 
of bad faith on the part of the Japanese, that while they were nego- 
tiating with him — negotiations in which we were asking for a with- 
drawal of their invading troops in China — they should be sending a 
further expedition down to Indochina. 

On Thursday morning, November 27, the news was still coming in 
of the movement of the large Japanese expenditionary force south from 
Shanghai and eventually [p. 17] headed toward Indochina, 
with a possibility that it might be proceeding to the Philippines or to 
Burma to cut off the Burma Road, or to the Dutch East Indies. It 
seemed probable, however, that it was a concentration to move over 
into Thailand, from which they could be in a position to attack Singa- 
l^ore at the proper moment; or, as the President later pointed out, it 
might develop into an attack on Rangoon and thus effectually stop the 
Burma Road at its beginning. 

Early that morning I had called up Mr. Hull to find out what his 
final word had been with the Japanese — whether he had [14393] 
handed them the proposal for 3 months' truce, or whether he had told 
them he had no other proposition to make. He told me that he had 
broken the whole matter off. His words were: "I have washed my 
hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox — the Army and 
the Navy." I then called up the President, who gave me a little differ- 
ent view. He said that it was true that the talks had been called off, 
but that they had ended up with a magnificent statement prepared by 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5423 

Mr. Hull. I found out afterwards that this was the fact and that 
the statement contained a reaffirmation of our constant and regular 
position without the suggestion of a threat of any kind. I personally 
was relieved that we had not backed down on any of the fundamental 
principles on which we had stood for [p. 28] so long and 
which I felt we could not give up without the sacrifice of our national 
honor and prestige in the world. I submit, however, that no impartial 
reading of this document can characterize it as being couched in the 
terms of an ultimatum, although the Japanese were of course only 
too quick to seize upon it and give it that designation for their own 
purposes. 

Shortly after this General Arnold came in with proposed orders 
for the movement of two of our biggest planes from San Francisco 
out across the Mandated Islands to Manila. We were to arrange to 
have these fly high over the Mandated Islands, beyond the reach of 
their pursuit planes, and photograph them with the idea of trying to 
detect any naval concentrations [i^W] that might be going 
on there. 

Later Mr. Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with 
me and General Gerow. General Gerow was Chief of the War Plans 
Division. General Marshall was absent, having left the Department 
to attend certain Army training maneuvers which were doing on that 
day. Both Admiral Stark and General Gerow were urging that any 
crisis be postponed as long as possible, to enable our preparations to 
proceed. A memorandum had been prepared by General Marshall and 
Admiral Stark to the President on this subject. The opinion of our 
top military and naval advisers was that [p. 15] delay was 
very desirable, but that nevertheless we must take military action if 
Japan attacked American, or British, or Dutch territory or moved 
her forces in Indochina west of 100° east or south of 10° north. I 
told them, which was the fact, that I also would be glad to have time 
but I did not want it at the cost of humiliation of the United States 
or of backing down on any of our principles which would show a weak- 
ness on our part. 

We then discussed the messages that might be sent to the command- 
ing officers of the various theaters, including in particular General 
MacArthur, who was in the Philippines and in the forefront of the 
threatened area. We had already sent MacArthur a warning but I 
felt that the time had now come for a more definite warning. In 
talking with the President on the telephone that morning, I had sug- 
gested, and he had approved [14395] the idea, that we should 
send out a final alert, namely that they should be on the qui vive for 
any attack, and explaining the exact situation. Ordinarily, of course, 
there would be no reason for me to participate in the sending of any 
such message which was the normal function of the military staff. As 
the President himself, however, had now actually directed the send- 
ing of the message, and as I wanted the [p. 20] message 
clearly to apprise the commanding officers in the various areas as to 
exactly what the diplomatic situation was, I undertook to participate 
in the framing of this message myself. In order that it should be 
strictly accurate, I called up Mr. Hull myself on the telephone and 
got his exact statement as to the status of the negotiations, which was 
then incorporated in the first sentence of the message. My papers 



5424 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

also indicate that I inserted in the second sentence the words "BUT 
HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT." 

This same message was sent to commanding office, Hawaiian De- 
partment, and to the three other commanding officers of our Pacific 
theaters or outposts, viz: Panama, the Philippines, and the west 
coast which included Alaska, except that in the case of the message 
to General MacArthur in the Philippines there were omitted from the 
third sentence from the end the following words: "BUT THESE 
MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT COM- 
MA REPEAT NOT COMMA TO ALARM CIVILIAN POPULA- 
TION OR DISCLOSE INTENT." The message as sent to General 
Short read as follows : 

[14396] 

Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shaffer, T. E. 
Negotiations with Japan appear to be tenninated to all practical purposes with 
only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back 
and offer to continue period Japanese futui'e action unpredictable but hostile 
action possible at any moment period If hostilities [p. 21] cannot com- 
ma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan com- 
mit the first overt act period This policy should not comma repeat not comma 
be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your 
defense period Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake 
such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these meas- 
ures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil 
population or disclose intent period Report measures taken period Should hos- 
tilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as 
they pertain to Japan period Limit dissemination of this highly secret informa- 
tion to minimum essential officers. 

Marsha't.t.. 

This message has been criticized as ambiguous and described as a 
"do-don't" message. The fact is that it presented with the utmost 
precision the situation with which we were all confronted and in the 
light of which all our commanding officers, as well as we ourselves in 
Washington, had to govern our conduct. The [14S97] situa- 
tion was admittedly delicate and critical. On the one hand, in view 
of the fact that we wanted more time, we did not want to precipitate 
war at this moment if it could be avoided. If there was to be war, 
moreover, we wanted the Japanese to commit the first overt act. On 
the other hand, the matter of defense against an attack by Japan was 
the first consideration. In Hawaii, because of the large numbers of 
Japanese inhabitants, it was felt desirable to issue a special warning 
so that nothing would be done, unless necessary to the defense, to alarm 
the civil population and thus possibly to precipitate an inci- 
dent [p. 23] and give the Japanese an excuse to go to war and 
the chance to say that we had committed the first overt act. 

All these considerations were placed before the commanding officers 
of their respective areas, and it was because they were thought com- 
petent to act in a situation of delicacy requiring judgment and skill 
that they had been placed in these high posts of command. One of the 
basic policies of the Army command, which has been adhered to 
throughout the entire war. and in most instances with complete suc- 
cess, has been to give the local commander his objective and mission 
but not to interfere with him in the performance of it. When General 
Short was informed on November 27 that "Japanese action unpredicta- 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5425 

ble" and that "hostile action possible at any moment," and that the 
policy directed "should not comma repeat not comma be construed as 
restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize 
your 114-398] defense," we had a right to assume that he would 
competently perform this paramount duty entrusted to him. We as- 
sumed that when he had been warned that hostile action was possible 
at any moment, it would not be necessary to repeat that warning over 
and over again during the ensuing days. The fact was of course that 
General Short did receive, not [p. 23] only from Washington 
but from other sources, repeated intelligence of the impending crisis. 

You will notice that this message of November 27 specifically 
mentions that reconnaissance is to be undertaken. This to my mind 
was a very important part of the message, not only because of its 
obvious desirability but also because we had provided the Hawaiian 
Department with what I regarded as a most effective means of recon- 
naissance against air attack and one to which I had personally de- 
voted a great deal of attention during the preceding months. I refer 
to the radar equipment with which the Hawaiian Department was 
then provided. This equipment permitted approaching planes to be 
seen at distances of approximately 100 miles; and to do so in darkness 
and storm as well as in clear daylight. In the early part of 1941 I 
had taken up earnestly the matter of securing such radar equipment 
for aircraft protection. I knew, although it was not then generally 
known, that radar had proved of the utmost importance to the 
British in the Battle of Britain, and I felt in the beginning of 1941 
that we were not getting this into production [14399] and to 
the troops as quickly as we should, and put on all the pressure I could 
to speed up its acquisition. By the autumn of 1941 we [p. 24] 
had got some of this equipment out to Hawaii, and only a few 
days before this I had received a report of the tests which had been 
made of this equipment in Hawaii on November 19, which indicated 
^•ery satisfactory results in detecting approaching airplanes. I testi- 
fied at considerable length with regard to this before the Army Pearl 
Harbor Board (A. P. H. B., 4064, et seq.). When we specifically 
directed the commanding officer at Hawaii, who had been warned 
that war was likely at any moment, to make reconnaissance, I assumed 
that all means of reconnaissance available to both the Army and Navy 
would be employed. On the same day a war warning was dispatched 
to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet by the Chief of Naval 
Operations. The standing instructions to the theater commanders 
were that all messages of this character were to be exchanged between 
the Army and Navy commands. 

I repeat that my participation in the drafting of this message of 
November 27 was unusual, since I do not believe it is advisable for 
the Secretary of War to meddle with military staff matters. As 
already stated, I did so on this occasion because I felt I was conveying 
a message from the President. The President had taken a [p. 25] 

momentous decision that day, namely to send what I call a final alert. 
The Chief of \_i44OO] Staff was away for the day, and I wanted 
to make certain that the President's orders were carried out accurately. 

You wdll note that my notes speak only of the message to General 
MacArthur. This is evidence of what was the fact — namely that we 
all felt in Washington that the first and most likely danger was an 

79716 — 46— pt. 11 19 



5426 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

attack on the Philippines and that such an attack would be most 
difficult to meet. Such information as we had been able to gather as to 
the movements of the Japanese forces indicated a movement toward 
the south, which might easily be diverted either to Indochina, Malay 
Peninsula, Dutch East Indies, or the Philippines. We were correct 
in this inference. Such an attack on the Philippines was being pre- 
pared and immediately followed the attack on Pearl Harbor. The 
movements of the fleet which attacked Pearl Harbor were entirely 
unknown to us. 

When the replies to these messages came in from General Mac- 
Arthur and General Short, they were checked to me by General Mar- 
shall, undoubtedly for the [p. 26] purpose of reassuring me 
that our messages had been duly received. The original documents 
bear my initials, indicating that they were noted by me. 

The first thing in the morning of the next day — Friday, November 
28—1 received information from G-2 of such a formidable character 
with regard to the movements of the Japanese forces along the Asiatic 
coast that I decided to take it to the President before he got up. I 
saw him while he was still [14WJ] in bed, and we discussed 
the situation. He suggested that there were three alternatives, as my 
notes show: First, to do nothing; second, to make something in the 
nature of an ultimatum, stating a point beyond which we would fight ; 
or, third, to fight at once. I said that I felt that to do nothing was 
out of the question and the President agreed with me. As to the other 
two alternatives, the desirable thing to do from the point of view of 
our own tactics and safety was to take the initiative and attack without 
further warning. It is axiomatic that the best defense is offense. It 
is always dangerous to wait and let the enemy make the first move. T 
was inclined to feel that the warning given in August by the President 
against further moves by the Japanese [p. 27] toward Thai- 
land justified an attack without further warning, particularly as their 
new movement southward indicated that they were about to violate 
that warning. On the other hand, I realized that the situation could 
be made more cleancut from the point of view of public opinion if a 
further warning were given. 

I went at 12 o'clock that day to a meeting of the so-called War 
Cabinet — that is to say, the President, Mr. Hull, Mr. Knox, Achniral 
Stark, General Marshall, and myself. The President had been 
studying the latest report of G-2 as to the movements of the Japanese 
expeditionary force, and we discussed the various possibilities as to 
what it meant. The various [14402] alternative mentioned 
were that it might develop into an attack on the Philippines, the 
landing of further troops in Indochina, an attack on Thailand, on 
the Dutch Netherlands, or on Singapore, or that it might develop 
into an attack on Rangoon and thus cut off the Burma Road at the 
beginning. The possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor was not 
discussed at the meeting, since our thoughts were all focused on this 
movement toward soutiieast Asia, which indicated a crisis in that 
direction. All agreed that if the expedition were permitted to land 
in the Gulf of Siam it would place a strong Japanese force in such 
a strategic position as to [p. 28] be a severe blow at all three of 
the powers in southeast Asia — the British at Singapore, the Nether- 
lands in the Indies, and ourselves in the Philippines. "VVe all agreed 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5427 

that it must not be allowed ; that, if the Japanese got into the Isthmus 
of Kra, the British would fight ; and, if the British fought, we would 
have to fight. /We realized that if this expedition was allowed to 
round the southern point of Indochina, this whole chain of disastrous 
events would be set on foot. 

We decided, therefore, that we could not just sit still and do noth- 
ing. On the other hand, we also decided that we could not attack 
without a further warning to Japan, and we discussed what form that 
warning should take. The President suggested a special telegram 
from himself to the Emperor of Japan. After some discussion it was 
decided that he would send such a letter [l^W^] to the Em- 
peror, which would not be made public, and that at the same time he 
would deliver a special message to Congress reporting on the danger 
and reporting what we would have to do if the danger happened. 
The President left after the meeting to keep his engagement at Warm 
Springs, where he was going to have Thanksgiving with the children. 
The rest of the week end was largely taken up with preparing 
[p. £9] a suggested draft of a message for the President to 
deliver to Congress, in which Secretary Knox and I cooperated with 
Mr. Hull and his associates in the State Department. 

On Monday morning, December 1, the President returned to Wash- 
ington. I recollect that in the meantime we had received evidence that 
the Japanese expedition which we had been watching was landing in 
Indochina in the neighborhood of Saigon, rather than going on to 
the Peninsula and up into the Gulf of Siam. This appeared to give us 
a little respite, since it indicated that perhaps they were not going 
to invade Thailand at once. The Russians had also made a new coun- 
ter-attack against the Germans at Rostov, and we thought that pos- 
sibly this had given the Japanese some pause. 

On Tuesday, December 2, Secretary Knox, Sumner Welles, and I 
met with the President, as Mr. Hull was laid up with a cold. The 
President went step by step over the situation, and I felt sure that he 
had made up his mind to go ahead with the message to Congress and 
possibly the message to the Emperor. [14404] We also learned 
that he had asked the Japanese through the State Department what 
they intended by this new occupation of southern Indochina and had 
demanded a quick reply. We were watching the situation in the Far 
East very carefully. I was in frequent [p. 30] conference with 
General Marshall and with General Miles of G-2 and also General 
Gerow of the War Plans Division of the General Staff. We were par- 
ticularly concerned with supplies which were on the way to the Phil- 
ippines and additional big bombers which we were trying to fly over 
there, some of which were scheduled to start at the end of the week. 
I gave up another engagement in order to stay in Washington over 
the week end. 

On Sunday, December 7, Mr. Knox and I went to Secretary Hull's 
office at 10 : 30 in the morning and talked the whole matter over. This 
was the day on which we knew the Japanese were going to bring 
their answer, and Mr. Hull said he was certain that the Japanese 
were planning some deviltry; and we were all wondering where the 
blow would strike. The messages we were receiving now indicated that 
the Japanese force was continuing on in the Gulf of Siam, and again 
we discussed whether we would not have to fight if Malaya or the 



5428 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Netherlands were attacked and the British or Dutch fought. We all 
three thought that we must fight if those nations fought. We realized 
that if Britain were eliminated it might well result ii|f the destruction 
or capture of the British Fleet. Such a result would give [14405] 
the Nazi allies overwhelming power in the Atlantic Ocean and would 
make the defense of the American Republics enormously difficult if 
not impossible. [p. SI] All the reasons why it would be neces- 
sary for the United States to fight, in case the Japanese attacked 
either our British or Dutch neighbors in the Pacific, were discussed at 
length and at my request Mr. Hull and Mr. Kjiox dictated their views. 
These views are attached to my notes of that day as submitted herewith. 
I returned to lunch at my home. At just about 2 o'clock, while I 
was sitting at lunch, the President called me on the phone and told 
me that the Japanese were bombing Hawaii. My notes for the re- 
mainder of December 7 speak for themselves and need no comment. 

Summary of My Views as to the Responsibility of Members of the 

Army 

My views as to these responsibilities are stated at length in my final 
official report made under the Joint Resolution of Congress approved 
June 13, 1944, after the Army Board and the Judge Advocate General 
had made their investigations and reports to me. Many of the discus- 
sions on this subject indicated a failure to grasp the fundamental 
difference between the duties of an outpost command and those of 
the commander in chief of an army or nation and his military advisers. 
The outpost commander is like a [p. 32] sentinel on duty 
in the face of the enemy. His fundamental duties are clear and 
precise. He must assume that the [llf^OG] enemy will attack 
at his particular post; and that the enemy will attack at the time 
and in the way in which it will be most difficult to defeat him. It is 
not the duty of the outpost commander to speculate or rely on the 
possibilities of the enemy attacking at some other outpost instead 
of his own. It is his duty to meet him at his post at any time and to 
make the best possible fight that can be made against him with the 
weapons with which he has been supplied. 

On the other hand, the Commander in Chief of the Nation (and 
his advisers), particularly of a nation which has been as habitually 
neglectful of the possibility of war as our own, has much more diffi- 
cult and complex duties to fulfill. Unlike the outpost commander, 
he must constantly watch, study, and estimate where the principal or 
most dangerous attack is most likely to come, in order that he may 
most effectively distribute his insufficient forces and munitions to meet 
it. He knows that his outposts are not all equally supplied or forti- 
fied, and that they are not all equally capable of defense. He knows 
also that from time to time they are of greatly varying importance 
to the grand strategy of the war. 

[p. 33] For all these reasons he is compelled to give constant 
and close attention to the reports from all his intelligence agencies 
in order that he may satisfactorily solve the innumerable problems 
which are constantly arising in the performance of the foregoing 
duties. 

[i^4^7] During those days in November 1941 we at the War 
Department had been informed and believed that Hawaii had been 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5429 

more generously equipped from the Nation's inadequate supplies of 
men and munitions than either of the other three important Pacific 
outposts, and we believed that with the fleet at hand there it was more 
capable of defense. We also knew that the Philippines was by far 
the least capable of defense, although we were working vigorously to 
get it into a position to put up a hard fight. We also knew that a 
disaster there would have an incalculably bad moral effect on account 
of our relations to the Filipinos — well known throughout the Far 
East — and our pledges given for their protection. Finally, we had 
received these specific warnings of a Japanese expedition being on its 
way to a commanding position from which it would attack the 
Philippine Islands. 

From the foregoing I believe that it was inevitable and proper that 
a far greater number of items of information coming through our 
Intelligence should be [p. S.Q collected and considered and 
appraised by the General Staff at Washington than those which were 
transmitted to the commander of an outpost. General Short had been 
told the two essential facts: (1) A war with Japan is threatening. 
(2) Hostile action by Japan is possible at any moment. Given those 
two facts, both of which were stated without equivocation in the 
message of November 27, the outpost commander should be on the 
alert to [i^-^^^J make his fight. 

Even without any such message, the outpost commander should 
have been on the alert. If he did not know that the relations between 
Japan and the United States were strained and might be broken at 
any time, he must have been almost the only man in Hawaii who did 
not know it, for the radio and the newspapers were blazoning out those 
facts daily, and he had a chief of staff and an intelligence officer to 
tell him so. And if he did not know that the Japanese were likely 
to strike without warning, he could not have read his history of Japan 
or known the lessons taught in the Army schools in respect to such 
matters. Under these circumstances which were of general knowledge 
and which he must have known, to cluster his airplanes in such groups 
and positions that in an emergency they could not take the air for 
several hours, and to keep his antiaircraft [p. 35'] ammunition 
so stored that it could not be promptly and immediately available, and 
to use his best reconnaissance system, the radar, only for a very small 
fraction of the day and night, in my opinion betrayed a misconception 
of his real duty which was almost beyond belief. 

In the next place, having made these mistakes and disregarded the 
whole tenor of the warning message to him, he then sent a reply mes- 
sage to Washington which gave no adequate notice of what he had 
failed to do and which was susceptible of being taken, and was taken, 
as a general compliance with the {1^09'] main warning from 
Washington. My initials show that this message crossed my desk, 
and in spite of my keen interest in. the situation it certainly gave me 
no intimation that the alert order against an enemy attack was not 
being carried out. Although it advised me that General Short was 
alert against sabotage, I had no idea that being "alerted to prevent 
sabotage" was in any way an express or implied denial of being alert 
against an attack by Japan's armed forces. The very purpose of a 
fortress such as Hawaii is to repel such an attack, and Short was the 
commander of that fortress. Furthermore, Short's statement in his 



5430 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

message that "liaison" was being carried out with the Navy, coupled 
with the fact that our message of November 27 had specifically di- 
rected recon- [p. 36'] naissance, naturally gave the impression 
that the various reconnaissance and other defensive measures in which 
the cooperation of the Army and the Navy is necessary, were under way 
and a proper alert was in effect. 

With the aid of. "hindsight" I believe now that to a staff oflficer whose 
specific duty was to make dead sure that the warning order was being 
intelligently and thoroughly put into effect, the lack of detail in the 
reply should have suggested the importance of a follow-up inquiry and 
I have so stated in my final official report of August 1945. 

With the further aid of such "hindsight" and in the same official 
report, I also reached the opinion that the War Plans Division of the 
General Staff would have placed itself and [^miO] the safety 
of the country in a sounder position if it had transmitted to General 
Short more information than it did. The novelty of the imminence of 
war and the fact that our outpost commanders were untried in their 
positions now indicate that more details and repeated emphasis would 
have been a safer policy. Also there seems to have been a lack of 
coordination in the General Staff in respect to the method in which 
the warnings against sabotage were sent, which would not have oc- 
curred later in the war after the staff was fully organized. 

[/>. 37] Yet none of these things in my opinion alter in any 
material degree the responsibility of General Short for the complete 
absence of a real alert, which he had been directed to take in the message 
of November 27, and for the placing of his defense in a more helpless 
position than it was before that alert message was sent. After all, 
he was the man upon whom the country had a right to rely for the 
defense of Hawaii, and he had been sufficiently warned. 

I have tried to review these various responsibilities with fairness 
to both the outpost commander and the staff officers at home. I am 
particularly led to do so because of the difficulty of reproducing now 
after the lapse of more than 4 years the background and atmosphere 
under which the entire Army was then working. Our general staff 
officers were working under a terrific pressure in the face of a global 
war which they felt was probably imminent. Yet they were sur- 
rounded, outside of \^mil] their offices and almost through- 
out the country, by a spirit of isolationism and disbelief in danger 
which now seems incredible. A single incident gives striking evi- 
dence of this. During the very last week before the Pearl Harbor 
attack there was made a most disloyal and almost unbelievable attack 
on the chief work of the staff. For months the \_p. 38] gen- 

eral staff had been laboring over the construction of a strategic and 
tactical plan for the fighting of a global war in case it should even- 
tuate. The making of such a plan is the highest and most important 
duty of a general staff — the chief purpose for which it exists. It is 
also naturally the most highly secret paper in the possession of the 
Government. On December 4, 1941, the Chicago Tribune published 
practically in full a copy of that plan. The impact of such a blow 
was very severe. It involved implications which stretched far and 
suspicions (happily not fulfilled) of disloyalty in the Army itself. 
The officers of the Army were then trying to do their duty in the 
deadening, if not actually hostile, atmosphere of a nation that was 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5431 

not awake to its danger. We are now engaged in passing judgment 
upon their actions in the wholly different atmosphere of a nation 
which has suffered some of the horrors of the greatest and most 
malignant war in history. In my opinion, it would be highly unjust 
to them if this complete difference of atmosphere was not given the 
weight which it deserves. 

(S) Henry L. Stimson. 

[I^f4l2 — p. 38-A] State of Nevv York, 

County of New York, ss: 

Henry L. Stimson, being duly sworn, deposes and says : 

I have prepared the foregoing statement, and the same is true and correct to 
the best of my recollection, information, and belief. 

(S) Henry L. Stimson. 
Sworn to before me this 19th day of March 1946. 

[seal] (S) Thomas DeRosa, 

Attorney and Counsellor at Law. 

Office address : 32 Liberty Street, New York City ; Residence : Bronx County. 

Bronx County Clerks No. 3, Reg. No. A-S3D7 ; New York County Clerks No. D, 
Reg. No. 439D7 ; 

Commission expires March 30, 1947, 

[14-4^3 — p. o9] Mr. Stimson 's Notes — Appendix to Statement 

OF Henry L. Stimson 

[14-^4 — P- 40] Wednesday, No\tember 5, 1941. 

Matters are crystallizing on both sides of us now and the Navy is 
meeting with big losses in the Atlantic and Japan is sending somebody 
to us, who, I think, will bring us a proposal impossible of acceptance. 
I spent part of the morning reading matters — secret reports — on the 
latter matter. 

[p. 4^] Thursday, November 6, 1941. 

Then I left for the White House conference and had about an hour's 
talk with the President — on the whole a good talk. He was apparently 
in very good feeling. We talked about the Far Eastern situation and 
the approaching conference with the messenger who is coming from 
Japan. The President outlined what he thought he might say. He was 
trying to think of something which would give us further time. He 
suggested he might propose a truce in which there would be no move- 
ment or armament for 6 months and then if the Japanese and Chinese 
had not settled their arrangement in that meanwhile, we could go on 
on the same basis. I told him I frankly saw two great objections to 
that : first, that it tied up our hands just at a time when it was vitally 
important that we should go on completing our reenforcement of the 
Philippines; and second, that the Chinese would feel that any such 
arrangement was a desertion of them. I reminded him that it has 
always been our historic policy since the Washington conference not 
to leave the Chinese and [1441^] Japanese alone together, be- 

cause the Japanese were always able to overslaugh the Chinese and the 
Chinese know it. I told him that I thought the Chinese would refuse 
to go into such an arrangement. 



5432 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Ip. 4^] Friday, November 7, 1941. 

Cabinet meeting this afternoon. The President opened with telling 
the story of Lincoln and his Cabinet — how he polled the Cabinet 
and found them all polling "no" and then he said, "the ayes have it." 
With that he started to have what he said was the first general poll of 
his Cabinet and it was on the question of the Far East — whether the 
people would back us up in case we struck at Japan down there and 
what the tactics should be.' It was a very interesting talk — the best 
Cabinet meeting I think we have ever had since I have been there. 
He went around the table — first Hull and them myself, and then 
around through the whole number and it was unanimous in feeling 
the country would support us. He said that this time the vote is 
unanimous, he feeling the same way. Hull made a good presentation 
of the general situation. I told them I rather narrowed it down 
into a following-up the steps which had been done to show what 
needed to be done in the future. The thing [144^6] would 
have been much stronger if the Cabinet had known — and they did 
not know except in the case of Hull and the President — what the 
Army is doing with the big bombers and how ready we are to pitch in. 



[p. 43'] Monday, November 10, 1941. 

In the second place he (General Marshall at a staff meeting) read 
us a long letter from General MacArthur in the Philippines, telling us 
of the progress of the reorganization of the Philippine Army and 
the construction of airports throughout the Islands. This was very 
interesting to me. 

[p. 44] Friday, November 21, 1941. 

I talked to the President about the question (danger) of poison 
gas in the Philippines. We have learned that the Japanese have 
used it on the Chinese at Ichang, where they killed some TOO China- 
men and disabled about -—I don't want to be caught without gas in 
the Philippines. And yet we have been afraid to send it for fear it 
would leak out and be misconstrued during these negotiations. But 
I thought the time had come when we ought to not delay any longer 
and I told the President so quietly and privately after the conference 
and he [144^'^] agreed with me. So when I got back I called 
in General Gerow in the absence of General Marshall and told him 
to look up all the facts and get ready for the possible shipments 
with the idea that it should be done so that it would not come out 
in the press. 

[p. 45] Monday, November 24, 1941 

I had a good talk with General Olmstead, whom I have recently 
promoted to be the chief signal officer on General Mauborgne's 
retirement. He is doing very well and outlined to me the work of 

' Note. — See statement, p. 11, as to this Cabinet meeting. 
^ Note : Blanlc in notes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5433 

reorganization of his office which he has accomplished. It was very 
good. 

Note. — This conference was on the subject of the use of radar as a defense 
against surprise attacks. See statement p. 13. 



[p. 46] Tuesday, November 25, 1941. 

This was a very full day indeed. At 9 : 30 Knox and I met in 
Hull's office for our meeting of Three. Hull showed us the proposal 
for a 3 months' truce, which he was going to lay before the Japanese 
today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I 
thought as we read it, but I don't think there is any chance of the 
Japanese accepting it, because it was so drastic. In return for the 
propositions which they were to do; namely; to at once evacuate 
and at once to [144-^8'} stop all preparations or threats of ac- 
tion, and to take no aggressive action against any of her neighbors, 
etc., we were to give them open trade in sufficient quantities only for 
their civilian population. This restriction was particularly applicable 
to oil. We had a long talk over the general situation. 



Then at 12 o'clock we (viz. General Marshall and I) went to the 
White House, where we were until nearly half past one. At the 
meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the 
President, instead of bringing up the Victory Parade,^ brought up 
entirely the relations [p. ^7] with the Japanese. He brought 
up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) 
next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack 
without warning, and the question was what we should do. The 
question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing 
the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was 
a difficult proposition.* Hull laid out his general broad propositions 
on which the thing should be rested — the freedom of the seas and 
the fact that Japan was in alliance with Hitler and was carrying 
out his policy of world aggression. The others brought out the fact 
that any such expedition to the South as the Japanese were likely 
to take would be an encirclement of our interests in the Philippines 
and cutting into our vital supplies of rubber from Malaysia. I pointed 
out to the President that he had already taken the first steps towards 
an ultimatum in notifying Japan way back last summer that if she 
crossed the border into Thailand she was violating our safety and 
that therefore he had only to point out (to Japan) that to follow 
any such expedition was a viola- [p. 48] tion of a warning 
we had already given. So Hull is to go to work on preparing that. 
When I got back to the Department I found news from G-2 that 
an (a Japanese) expedition had started. Five divisions have come 
down from Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai and there they had 
embarked on ships — 30, 40, or 50 ships — and have been sighted'^south 

3 This was an office nickname for the General Staff strategic plan of national action in 
case of war in Europe. 

* See statement, pp. 11 and 14. Our military and naval advisers had warned us that we 
could not safely allow the [lJiil9] Japanese to move against British Malaysia or 

the Dutch East Indies without attempting to prevent it. 



5434 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of Formosa. I at once called up Hull and told him about it and 
sent copies to him and to the President of the message from G-2. 



[p. 4^] Wednesday, November 26, 1941. 

[144^0] Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he 
had about made up his mind not to give (make) the proposition that 
Knox and I passed on the other day to the Japanese but to kick the 
whole thing over — ^to tell them that he has no other proposition at 
all. The Chinese have objected to that proposition — when he showed 
it to them ; that is, to the proposition which he showed to Knox and me, 
because it involves giving to the Japanese the small modicum of oil 
for civilian use during the interval of the truce of the 3 months. 
Chiang Kai-shek had sent a special message to the effect that that 
would make a terrifically bad impression in China; that it would 
destroy all their courage and that they (it) would play into the 
hands of his, Chiang's, enemies and that the Japanese would use it. 
T. V. Soong had sent me this letter and has asked to see me and I 
called Hull up this morning to tell him so and ask him what he wanted 
me to do about it. He replied as I have just said above — that he had 
about made up his mind to give up the whole thing in respect to a 
truce and to simply tell the Japanese that he had no further action to 
propose. 

A few minutes later I talked to the President over the telephone 
and I asked him whether he had received [p. 60'] the paper 
which I had sent him over last night about the Japanese havins; started 
a new expedition from Shanghai down toward Indochina. He fairly 
blew up — jumped up into the air, so to speak, and said he hadn't seen 
it and that that changed the whole [j?^^^i] situation because 
it was an evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese that while 
they were negotiating for an entire truce — an entire withdrawal (from 
China) — they should be sending this expedition down there to Indo- 
china. I told him that it was a fact that had come to me through 
G-2 and through the Navy Secret Service and I at once got another 
copy of the paper I had sent last night and sent it over to him by special 
messenger. 

[p. 61] Thursday, No\t5Mber 27, 1941. 

A very tense, long day. News is coming in of a concentration and 
movement south by the Japanese of a large expeditionary force moving 
south from Shanghai and evidently headed toward Indochina, with a 
possibility of going to the Philippines or to Burma, or to the Burma 
Road or to the Dutch East Indies, but probably a concentration to 
move over into Thailand and to hold a position from which they can 
attack Singapore when the moment arrives. 

The first thing in the morning I called up Hull to find out what his 
finale had been with the Japanese — whether he had handed them the 
new proposal which we passed on 2 or 3 days ago or whether, as he 
suggested yesterday he would, he broke the whole matter off. He told 
me now that he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, "I 
have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5435 

Knox — [14422] the Army and the Navy." I then called up 
the President. The President gave me a little different view. He 
said they had ended up, but they ended up with a magnificent state- 
ment prepared by Hull. I found out afterward that this was not 
a reopening of the thing but a statement of our constant and regular 
position. 

General Arnold came in to present the orders for the movement of 
two of our biggest planes out from San [p. 52] Francisco and 
across the Mandated Islands to Manila. There is a concentration 
going on by the Japanese in the Mandated Islands and these planes 
can fly high over them, beyond the reach of their pursuit planes and 
take photographs. 

Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and 
General Gerow. Marshall is down at the maneuvers today and I feel 
his absence very much. There was a tendency, not unnatural, on the 
part of Stark and Gerow to seek for more time. I said that I was 
glad to have time but I didn't want it at any cost of humility on the 
part of the United States or of reopening the thing which would show 
a weakness on our part. The main question has been over the message 
that we shall send to MacArthur. We have already sent him a quasi 
alert, or the first signal for an alert, and now, on talking with the 
President this morning over the telephone, I suggested and he ap- 
proved the idea that we should send the final alert; namely, that he 
should be on the qui vive for any attack and telling him [14423] 
how the situation was. So Gerow and Stark and I went over the pro- 
posed message to him from Marshall very carefully; finally got it in 
shape and with the help of a telephone talk I had with Hull, I got the 
exact statement from him of what the situation was. 



[p. 53] Friday, November 28, 1941. 

Pursuant to my instructions G-2 had sent me a summary of the in- 
formation in regard to the movements of the Japanese in the Far East 
and it amounted to such a formidable statement of dangerous possi- 
bilities that I decided to take it to the President before he got up. I 
told him there was an important coalition of facts and that I thought 
he ought to read it before his appointment which he had made for us 
at 12 o'clock, when the so-called War Cabinet was to meet him — Hull, 
Knox, myself with Stark and Marshall. He branched into an analysis 
of the situation himself as he sat there on his bed, saying there were 
three alternatives and only three that he could see before us. I told 
him I could see two. His alternatives were — first, to do nothing; 
second, to make something in the nature of an ultimatum again, stat- 
ing a point beyond which we would fight ; third, to fight at once. I 
told him my only two were the last two, because I did not think anyone 
would do nothing in this situation, and he agreed with me. I said of 
the other two my choice was the latter one. 

[14Ji^^] When we got back there at 12 o'clock he had read the 
paper that I had left with him. The main point [p. 5^] of the 
paper was a study of what the expeditionary force, which we know 
has left Shanghai and is headed south, is going to do. G-2 pointed 
out that it might develop into an attack on the Philippines or a land- 



5436 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ing of further troops in Indochina, or an attack on Thailand or an 
attack on the Dutch Netherhmds, or on Singapore. After the Presi- 
dent had read these aloud, he pointed out that there was one more. 
It might, by attacking the Kra Isthmus, develop into an attack on 
Rangoon, which lies only a short distance beyond the Kra Isthmus 
and the taking of which by the Japanese would effectually stop the 
Burma Road at its beginning. This, I think, was a very good sugges- 
tion on his part and a very likely one. It was the consensus that the 
present move — that there was an expeditionary force on the sea of 
about 25,000 Japanese troops aimed for a landing somewhere — com- 
pletely changed the situation when we last discussed whether or not 
we could address an ultimatum to Japan about moving the troops 
which she already had on land in Indochina. It was now the opinion 
of everyone that if this expedition was allowed to get around the 
southern point of Indochina and to go off and land in the Gulf of 
Siam, either at Bangkok or further west, it would be a terrific blow at 
all of the three Powers, Britain at Singapore, the Netherlands, 
If}. 66] and ourselves in the Philippines. It was the consensus of 
[144-26] everybody that this must not be allowed. Then we dis- 
cussed how to prevent it. It was agreed that if the Japanese got into 
the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight. It was also agreed that if 
the British fought, we would have to fight. And it now seems clear 
that if this expedition was allowed to round the southern point of 
Indochina, this whole chain of disastrous events would be set on foot 
of going. 

It further became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the 
Force as it went by without any warning on the one hand, which we 
didn't think we could do ; or sitting still and allowing it to go on, on 
the other, which we didn't think we could do — that the only thing for 
us to do was to address it a warning that if it reached a certain place, 
or a certain line, or a certain point, we should have to fight. The 
President's mind evidently was running towards a special telegram 
from himself to the Emperor of Japan. This he had done with good 
results at the time of the Panay incident, but for many reasons this 
did not seem to me to be the right thing now, and I pointed them out 
to the President. In the first place, a letter to the Emperor of Japan 
could not be couched in terms which [p. 66] contained an ex- 
plicit warning. One does not warn an Emperor. In the second place 
it would not indicate to the people of the United States what the real 
nature of the danger was. Consequently I said there ought to be a 
message by the President to the peoj)le of the United States, and I 
thought that the best [144^6] form of a message would be an 
address to Congress reporting the danger, reporting what we would 
have to do if the danger happened. The President accepted this idea 
of a message but he first thought of incorporating in it the terms of 
his letter to the Emperor. But again I pointed out that he could not 
publicize a letter to an Emperor in such a way ; that he had better send 
his letter to the Emperor separate as one thing and a secret thing, 
and then make his speech to the Congress as a separate and a more 
understandable thing to the people of the United States. This was 
the final decision at that time, and the President asked Hull and 
Knox and myself to try to draft such papers. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5437 

[p, S7'] Tuesday, December 2,- 1941. 

Dr. Alfred Sze and Dr. T. V. Soong came in to see me on their own 
request. I think Soong was anxious to have someone present as a 
witness to get me to corroborate what I said to him sometime ago 
about our intentions to fortify the Philippines. I told him simply 
that I knew what a difficult situation the Generalissimo was in and it 
was very presuming for me, sitting here in comfort, to ask him to be 
patient when he was in the middle of such anxieties and responsibilities 
there. Nevertheless I told him that that was, I am sure, the course 
that he should take. I said, I can only say that there is no change 
in the American policy from what I said to Dr. Soong some- [144^71 
time ago, and he can report that to the Generalissimo and tell him 
that I also counsel him to have just a little more patience and then 
I think all things will be well. Apparently that was all they wanted, 
for they at once got up and thanked me and went away. I warned 
them, of course, that they should not in any way make public or leak 
about what I had said to them. I called in Marshall and told him 
what had happened and asked him to remember what I said. 



I left for the White House conference at 12 o'clock, and there were 
present there just Knox, Sumner Welles [p. 8] and myself, 
as Hull is laid up with a cold. The President went step by step over 
the situation and I think has made up his mind to go ahead. He has 
asked the Japanese through Sumner Welles what they intend by this 
new occupation of southern Indochina — just what they are going to 
do — and has demanded a quick reply. The President is still deliberat- 
ing the possibility of a message to the Emperor, although all the rest 
of us are rather against it, but in addition to that he is quite settled, 
I think, that he will send a message to the Congress and will perhaps 
back that up with a speech to the country. He said that he was going 
to take the matters right up when he left us. 



\_lU^8—p. 59] Sunday, December 7, 1941. 

Today is the day that the Japanese are going to bring their answer 
to Hull, and everything in MAGIC indicated that they had been 
keeping the time back until now in order to accomplish something 
hanging in the air. Knox and I arranged a conference with Hull at 
10 : 30 and we talked the whole matter over. Hull is very certain that 
the Japs are planning some deviltry and we are all wondering Avhere 
the blow will strike. We three stayed together in conference until 
lunch time, going over the plans for what should be said or done. The 
main thing is to hold the main people who are interested in the 
Far East together — the British, ourselves, the Dutch, the Australians, 
the Chinese. Hull expressed his views, giving the broad picture of 
it, and I made him dictate it to a stenographer and I attach it to the 
end of this. Knox also had his views as to the importance of showing 
immediately how these different nations must stand together and I 
got him to dictate that and that is attached hereto. Hull was to see 
the Japanese envoys at 1 o'clock but they were delayed in keeping the 
appointment and did not come until later — as it turned out, till 2 



5438 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

o'clock or after. I returned to Woodley to lunch and just about 2 
o'clock, while I was sitting at lunch, the President called me up on 
the telephone and in a rather excited voice asked me, "Have you heard 
the news?" I said, [p. GO] "Well, I have heard the telegrams 
which have been coming in about the Japanese advances [144^9'] 
in the Gulf of Siam." He said, "Oh, no. I don't mean that. They 
have attacked Hawaii. They are now bombing Hawaii." Well, that 
was an excitedment indeed. The messages which we have been getting 
through Saturday and yesterday and this morning are messages which 
are brought by the British patrol south of Indochina, showing that 
large Japanese forces were moving up into the Gulf of Siam, This 
itself was enough excitement and that was what we were at work 
on our papers about. The observer thought these forces were going 
to land probably either on the eastern side of the Gulf of Siam, where 
it would be still in Indochina, or on the western side, where it would 
be the Kra Peninsula, or probably Malay. The British were very 
much excited about it and our efforts this morning in drawing our 
papers was to see whether or not we should all act together. The 
British will have to fight if they attack the Kra F'eninsula. We three 
all thought that we must fight if the British fought. But now the 
Japs have solved the whole thing by attacking us directly in Hawaii. 

As soon as I could finish my lunch, I returned to the office and 
began a long conference which lasted until 6 o'clock. The news 
coming from Hawaii is very bad. [p. 61]. They seem to have 
sprung a complete surprise upon our fleet and have caught the battle- 
ships inside the harbor and bombed them severely with losses. They 
have also hit our airfields there and have destroyed a great many of 
our planes, evidently before [144'^0] they got off the ground. 
It has been staggering to see our people there, who have been warned 
long ago and were standing on the alert, should have been so caught 
by surprise. At 4 o'clock McCloy had the chiefs of the arms of the 
services in his room and 1 went in there and made them a little pep-up 
talk about getting right to work in the emergency but most of the 
time was spent in conference with Marshall, Grenville Clark, Miles, 
Patterson, McCloy, and their assistants, Lovett and General Gullion, 
the Provost Marshal General. The main subject that we were talking 
about was the form of a declaration of war. Grenville Clark had drawn 
up a copy based largely on the Woodrow Wilson one. We all thought 
that it was possible we should declare war on Germany at the same 
time with Japan, but that, of course, is an open question. There will 
be no doubt about declaring war on Japan now, I think. The Presi- 
dent has set a conference at the White House at 8 : 30 this evening, 
in which the Cabinet had a conference and then a conference at 9 to 
which the leaders of the House were coming. 

[p. 62] When the news first came that Japan had attacked us, 
my first feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that 
a crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people. This 
continued to be my dominant feeling in spite of the news of catas- 
trophes which quicKly developed. For I feel that this country united 
has practically nothing to fear; while the apathy and divisions stirred 
up by unpatriotic men have \^lJi431] been hitherto very dis- 
couraging. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5439 

Our meeting with the President in the evening was in the Oval 
Room in the "White House. He sat behind his desk and we in a semi- 
circle in front of him. He opened by telling us that this was tlie 
most serious meeting of the Cabinet that had taken place since 1861 
and then Re proceeded to enumerate the blows which had fallen upon 
us at Hawaii. Before he got to that, Knox who sat next to me told 
me with a rather white face that we had lost seven of the eight battle- 
ships in Hawaii. This, however, proved later to be exaggerated. 
Steve Early sat near the President and dispatches were brought? in 
every few minutes during the meeting. The President had hastily 
drawn a draft of a message to Congress which he then read to us 
slowly. It was a vei-y brief message, presenting the same thoughts 
which he actually presented the following day in his finished message 
to the Congress. 

[p. 6S] After the talk with the Cabinet which lasted for at 
least three-quarters of an hour, the leaders of Congress who had been 
waiting below came in. I can remember the following as being pres- 
ent : The Vice President, Senators Barkley, Connally, Austin, Hiram 
Johnson, perhaps George; Representatives: Speaker Rayburn, Sol 
Bloom, Eaton of New Jersey, Joe Martin ; possibly others. The Presi- 
dent began by a very frank story of what had happened, including 
our losses. The effect on the Congressmen was tremendous. They 
sat in dead silence [144^^] and even after the recital was over 
they had very few words. The President asked if they would invite 
liim to appear Taefore the Joint Houses tomorrow and they said they 
would. He said he could not tell them exactly what he was going 
to say to them because events were changing so rapidly. We didn't 
finish until after 11 o'clock, when I returned to the office and stayed 
there until after 12. 

On my return to the office from lunch I had started matters going 
in all directions to warn against sabotage and to get punch into the 
defense move. Marshall had sent out word of the attack to all of the 
corps area commanders and all our people throughout the world, 
particularly in the Philippines, I ordered all the officers thereafter 
to appear in uniform ancl I found that others [p. 64-^ had or- 
dered the armed guards out over the War Department Building and 
additional guards over my house. We offered a gaiard to the White 
House but it was thought better there to have the FBI, This same 
activity went on during the intervals of my visit to the White House. 



[144'^3 — P- ^5] Proposed Statement for President by Hull — 
(See Record, December 7) 

The Japanese Government, dominated by the military fireeaters, 
is deliberately proceeding on an increasingly broad front to carry out 
its long proclaimed purpose to acquire military control over one-half 
of the world with nearly one-half its population. This inevitably 
means Japanese control of islands, continents, and seas from the Indies 
back near Hawaii, and that all of the conquered peoples would be gov- 
erned militarily, politically, economically, socially, and morally by the 
worst possible military despotism with barbaric, inhuman, and semi- 



5440 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

slavery methods such as Japan has notoriously been inflicting on the 
people in China and Hitler on the peoples of some 15 conquered nations 
of Europe. This would virtually drive and force all free and peaceful 
peoples off the high seas. 

At this moment of serious, threatened, and imminent danger, it is 
manifest that control of the South Sea area by Japan is the key to the 
control of the entire Pacific area, and therefore defense of life and 
commerce and other invaluable rights and interests in the Pacific area 
must be commenced within the South Sea area at such times and 
places as in the judgment of naval and military experts would be within 
sufficient time and at such strategic points as would [p. 66} 
make it most effective. In no other way can it be satisfactorily deter- 
mined that the Pacific area can be successfully defended. 

[144'34-] More than ever is the cohesive, closely related world 
movement to conquer and destroy, with Hitler moving across one half 
of the world and the Government of Japan under the military group 
moving across the other half of the world by closely synchronizing 
their efforts and collaborating and cooperating whenever to their in- 
dividual or their mutual advantage. 

This at once places at stake everything that is precious and worth 
while. Self-defense, therefore, is the key point for the preservation 
of each and all of our civilized institutions. 



[l^^-SS — p. 67] Suggestion by Knox — (See Kecord, December 7) 

1. We are tied up inextricably with the British in the present world 
situation. 

2. The fall of Singapore and the loss to England of Malaya will 
automaticallv not only wreck her far eastern position but jeopardize 
her entire etfort. 

3. If the British lose their position the Dutch are almost certain to 
lose theirs. 

4. If both the British and the Dutch lose their positions we are 
almost certain to be next, being then practically Japanese surrounded. 

5. If the above be accepted, then any serious threat to the British 
or the Dutch is a serious threat to the United States; or it might be 
stated any threat to any one of the three of us in a threat to all of us. 
We should therefore be ready jointly to act together and if such under- 
standing has not already been reached, it should be reached immedi- 
ately. Otherwise we may fall individually one at a time (or somebody 
may be left out on a limb) . 

6. I think the Japanese should be told that any movement in a 
direction that threatens the United States will be met by force. The 
President will want to reserve to himself just how to define 
this. The following are suggestions to shoot at: Any movement 
into Thailand; or any [p. 68] movement into [144-36] 
Thailand west of 100° east and south of 10° north — this in accordance 
with the recommendation of the British and Dutch and United States 
military authorities in the Far East; or any movement against British, 
Dutch, United States, Free French, or Portuguese territory in the 
Pacific area. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5441 

Mr. Lane. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I ask to have spread on 
the record those interrogatories submitted to former Secretary Stim- 
son by Senator Ferguson ^Yhich were not answered as explained in 
former Secretary Stimson's letter of transmittal covering the inter- 
rogatories which he did subsequently answer. The letter of trans- 
mittal, the interrogatories and answers thereto will be in our next offer. 

The Chairman. It is so ordered. 

(The interrogatories [unanswered] referred to follow :) 
[I4437] March 6, 1946. 

The Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack being 
advised that the former Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, is unable to appear 
before the committee because of illness, I submit the following questions to 
Mr. Stimson to be answered fully, completely, and under oath, and it is to be 
understood that the questions and answers are to be made part of the official 
record as if taken in open hearings. 

[S] HoMEE Ferguson, 
Homer Ferguson, 
United States Senate. 



1. In your testimony before the Pearl Harbor Board, you stated 
that you had memoranda and records of what took place at certain 
meetings relating to Japan and American relations during 1941. 
Will you please furnish for the committee copies of these memoranda 
and records so far as they disclose the Far East situation between 
November 1 and December 8, 1911 ? 

2. Did the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, have knowledge of 
what was taking place betw^een you and other Cabinet members and 
the President in relation to the Far Eastern situation ? 

3. On the 25th of November 1941, you had a conversation 
[144^3S] with the President wherein he stated that hostilities 

with Japan might start perhaps next Monday, and that you had a 
discussion with him at that time as to what we should do in relation 
thereto. Will you please give us in detail what was said by you and 
by the President at that time ? 

4. Having appointed a board under the statute to investigate the 
Pearl Harbor catastrophe, how do you account for the fact that a,fter 
the Board had completed the examination of witnesses you appointed 
Major Clausen to complete the investigation? 

5. Will you give us the details as to those with whom j^ou dis- 
cussed this matter and the conversations ? 

6. Did you have Major Clausen investigate our policy in the Far 
East as far as the Secretary of State's office was concerned? 

7. If not, will you tell us why not? 

8. Did you have Major Clausen investigate our policy in the Far 
East as far as the White House was concerned ? 

9. If not, will you tell us why not ? 

10. Why did j^ou not have the Board appointed to investigate 
this matter consider the so-called Clausen affidavits? 

11. Were all Magic, that is, intercepted Japanese messages, fur- 
nished to you ? 

If not all Magic, were the messages furnished to War Plans and 
Chief of Staff delivered to you? 

Will you tell us what Japanese messages you did discuss with the 
President ? 

7971G— 46 — pt. 11 20 



5442 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[1/^4^9] Will you state what discussion you had with the Presi- 
dent on the following Japanese messages : 

No. 985 Page 204, Exhibit 1. 

No. 986 Page 206, Exhibit 1. 

No. 865 Page 208, Exhibit 1. 

No. 844 Page 195, Exhibit 1. 

12. Did you discuss these Magic messages with the President ? 

13. I call your attention to the message in exhibit 2 and ask i,f you 
saw these messages prior to December 7, 1941. 

14. I call your attention to the message on page 12 of exhibit 2 
and ask you if you saw that message. 

15. I ask you what evaluation you placed on the messages on 
pages 12, 13, 14, and 15 of exhibit 2. 

16. Did you discuss the messages asked about in the previous 3 
questions with any person? If so, give us the details of the dis- 
cussion. 

17. Did you ever discuss with Secretary Hull why he decided not 
to send the modus vivendi? 

18. Did he ever tell you why he decided to send the note of Novem- 
ber 26, 1941, and not the modus vivendi ? If so, will you state what 
he said? 

19. Upon what conversations was it based and what was the rea- 
son for it? 

20. I show you exhibit 45 and ask you to explain in detail 
[1444^] why this language was used in that memorandum: "be 
sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recoimnenda- 
tion to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conver- 
sations." 

21. I call your attention to exhibit 45 and ask you whether it was 
originally intended to send this message discussed in this exhibit to 
General Short? 

22. Isn't it true that a message was only to be sent to General 
MacArthur and that you had discussed with the President this mes- 
sage only to General MacArthur ? 

23. Did you ever discuss with Secretary Hull the modus vivendi? 
Give us the details of your conversation. 

24. Did you advise for or against sending that proposal? If so, 
tell us what was said. 

25. Did Secretary Hull ever tell you why he sent the note of No- 
vember 26 and not the modus vivendi ? If so, give us the conversation. 

26. Exhibit No. 36 in the present investigation entitled "Memo- 
randum for the Adjutant General (Through Secretary, General Staff) , 
subject: Far Eastern Situation," signed by L, T. Gerow, Brigadier 
General, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, contains the following state- 
ment : "The Secretary of War directs that the following secret, first 
priority, message be despatched by cable, radio, or telegraph (which- 
ever method is the most secure from the viewpoint of secrecy) to each 
of the following : 

[1444^] Commanding General, Hawaiian Department 
Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command" 
There then follows the message sent by the War Department to General 
Short on November 27, 1941, signed "Marshall" being No. 472, which 
is set forth on page 7 of exhibit 32. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5443 

Wlien you directed that this despatch be sent to the Commanding 
General, Hawaiian Department, did you intend to cause him to alert 
the Hawaiian Department against hostile Japanese attack in the 
Hawaiian area? 

27. Exhibit No. 46 in this investigation is a copy of General Short's 
reply to the message from General Marshall referred to in the preced- 
ing interrogatory. This reply reads as follows : 

Report department alerted to prevent sabotage period. Liaison with Navy 
re URAD four seven two twenty seventh. 

Short. 

This exhibit containing General Short's reply bears the notation : 

Noted H. L. S. (Stimson) 

the "H L S" appearing to be your initials placed on the original War 
Department radiogram in your handwriting. 

When you read General Short's reply did you consider that it was 
an adequate and responsive answer to the War Department's message 
of November 27th signed: "Marshall," No. 472, [1U4^] re- 
ferred to in question 26 ? 

28. If your answer to the preceding question is in the negative, what, 
if any, action did you take to cause the character of alert in the Ha- 
waiian Department to conform to the type of alert you considered 
to be required by the message of November 27, 1941, to General Short 
from the War Department ? 

29. Did you discuss General Short's reply to the War Department 
message from General Marshall described in question 26 with any offi- 
cer in the War Department during the period from November 28, 1941, 
to and including December 7, 1941. 

30. After November 27, 1941, up to and including December 7, 1941, 
did the President address any inquiry to you as to the condition of 
alert maintained in the various overseas departments of the Army, 
and, specifically, as to whether in the Philippines and Hawaii, the 
Army was prepared to meet any type of Japanese attack? 

31. If your answer to question 30 is in the affirmative, what was the 
nature of the inquiry made to you by the President, and your response 
thereto ? 

(Please state in complete detail, as you now recall, what was said by 
the President and by you in any such conversation.) 

32. I am informed that you suggested to the President, and he ap- 
jDroved the idea, that a final alert should be sent to General MacArthur. 
Will you give us the details of your [i.^4^5] conversation with 
the President on this matter? 

33. I call to your attention a message sent by General Miles to the 
Commanding General at Panama dated December 5 : "IT. S.-Jap rela- 
tions strained. Stop. Will inform you if and when severance of 
diplomatic relations imminent. — sgd. Miles," and ask you if you ever 
knew that that was sent ? 

34 (a) If you knew of this message referred to in the last question, 
will you explain when it was drawn up and sent to the Commander in 
Panama ? 

(h) Wliy was it sent? 

(c) Why was the same message not sent to General Short at Pearl 
Harbor ? 



5444 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

35. Were you familiar with the reply that the commander in Panama 
made to the order of the 27th of November ? 

36. You have spoken in your testimony before the Pearl Harbor 
Board that the President had made a momentous decision on the 26th 
or near that date. It appears to be in connection with sending the 
final alert as indicated in your diary. Will you state what that de- 
cision was and all the conversations you had with the President in 
relation to it ? 

37. In that message the following language was used : "negotiations 
with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only 
the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back 
and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile 
action possible [i^^^i] at any moment." Is this your language 
and, if so, did you discuss it with anyone before the message of Novem- 
ber 27 was sent? 

38 (a) If the language used in the previous message is not your 
language, will you tell whose it was and what discussions you had in 
relation to it? 

(h) Did you discuss this language with the President? If so, will 
you give us the details of the conversation ? 

39. Isn't it true that the Japanese did come back for discussions 
and that the newspapers carried accounts of further discussions on 
December 1,2, and 5 ? 

40. Would not the reports in the newspapers that negotiations had 
been resumed tend to make General Short feel that the situation was 
less critical, especially when he had been given no further information 
by the War Department? 

41. You used the following language in the message : 

If hostilities cannot, repeat, cannot be avoided, the United States desires that 
Japan commit the first overt act. 

Whose language is this? 

411/^. You having directed the preparation of the message of No- 
vember 27 to General Short in General Marshall's absence, if that 
message was subject to more than one interpretation was it not your 
responsibility to check up on the reply to it under "report action 
taken"? 

42. Tell us as to the discussions you had concerning [1444^] 
whether it should be put in the message to General Short ? 

43. Did you ever discuss this first overt act as used in the Marshall 
message to Short on November 27 with the President? Tell us what 
was said and when you had the conversation. 

44. (a) Did you ever discuss this first over act language with Sec- 
retary of State Hull? Tell us what was said and wlien you had the 
conversation. 

(h) You knew that the message from Marshall to Short required 
Short to report measures taken ? 

45. Do you know whether any follow-up was made by the War 
Department on the report of measures taken made by Short to this 
message ? 

46. For the purpose of this question let us assume that General 
Short misinterpreted the Marshall message. If the answer is "no" 
to the previous question, is the fault that Short misinterpreted the 
message or that Washington failed to follow up his reply and see 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5445 

he misinterpreted your message? Was the surprise attack on Pearl 
Harbor caused by Short's misinterpretating the Marshall message of 
November 27 or Washington failing to see that he had misinter- 
preted your alert and not sending a new alert calling this error to 
Jiis attention. 

47. On the morning of November 28, you went to see the President, 
as you describe it "before the President got up." You had with you 
a November 28 G-2 report, or some other report from G-2. Will you 
tell us the conversation you had with [144-^6] the President — 
what was said by each o,f you. 

48. (a) If this was important to discuss with the Commander in 
Chief, the President, why did you not think it was also important to 
discuss it with General Short or to give him notice of it ? 

(h) Did you discuss the same thing with General Marshall or 
General Gerow? 

((?) Did you discuss it with anyone else — if so, give names and 
conversation. 

49. You have described the decision as "momentous." If this is 
true, should it not have been transmitted to General Short? 

50. Where did you expect the Japanese to strike on December 7, 
1941? 

51. Did the President say or intimate that he did not desire Short 
or Kimmel to fire the first shot or commit the first overt act? 

52. Did you concur without question in that attitude — that the 
first overt act should not be committed by Admiral Kimmel or General 
Short? 

53. If so, will you give us the reasons for such concurrence ? 

54. Had not the military movements of the Japanese clearly indi- 
cated that Japan was not coming back and not going to offer to 
continue the conferences? 

[1444'^] 55. Did you ever see the message of November 26, 1941, 
sent by Secretary Hull to the Japanese ? 

56. If your answer to the last question is "yes", did you know the 
contents of that message at the time it was sent or shortly thereafter? 
Will you explain as to whether or not you believed it broke off relations 
with Japan ? 

57. Will you state the full conversation you had with Secretary 
Hull in relation to the fact that he was through and that it was then 
up to the Army and Navy ? 

58. Did Mr. Hull explain why he was sending that message ? 

59. Are you conversant with an official document of the State Depart- 
ment of the United States wherein it is to be found these two sen- 
tences : "He (the Secretary of State) said that our proposed agreement 
(that is, the agreement proposed by Hull on the same day, the 26th) 
would render possible practical measures of financial cooperation 
which, however, were not referred to in the outline for fear that this 
might give rise to some misunderstanding. He (that is Mr. Hull) 
also referred to the fact that he had earlier in the conversations 
acquainted the Ambassador (that is, Nomura) of the ambition that 
had been his of settling the immigration question but that the situation 
had so far prevented him from realizing that ambition." 

60. Do you understand that these are Secretary Hull's own words, 
contained in a memorandum, transcribed for him by Assistant Secre- 



5446 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tary Ballantine who was present at the meeting? [l^H^] Do 
you understand that this is what Secretary Hull says he said to the Jap 
Government in the person of its ambassadors? 

61. Do they represent what is known as an unnamed consideration 
in the event of the American note of the 26th being accepted by the 
Japanese ? 

[l^H^] 62. Were you acquainted, when you reviewed the Army 
board's definition of the nature of the note of the 26th, with the fact 
that having read the note and having heard the Secretary's supple- 
mentary propositions, Ambassador Kurusu said "that when they re- 
ported our answer to their Government it would be likely to throw up 
its hands." (of Public Relations, vol. 2, p. 765) and that "Mr. Kurusu 
said that he felt that our response to their proposal could be inter- 
preted as tantamount to meaning the end * * *." (of Foreign Re- 
lations, vol. 2, p. 766). 

63. Your diary shows that Secretary Hull stated at the meeting on 
December 7 at the meeting between you, Secretary Knox, and Secretary 
Hull that the Japanese are planning some deviltry and that he won- 
dered where the blow would strike. Did you discuss Hawaii, or any 
other American possession at that time ? 

64. If so, will you state what was said and by whom ? 

65. (a) Did anyone at that meeting bring up the question of 1 p. m. 
Washington time being dawn or morning in Pearl Harbor ? 

(&) Did you three Secretaries on December 7, 1941, discuss the 1 
p. m. time of delivery and what was said by each of you ? 

66. Did anyone suggest or bring up the fact that this might or could 
mean an attack upon Hawaii or Pearl Plarbor ? 

67. If so, give us the details of that discussion. Give us the detailed 
conversation that took place in the Secretary of State's oflSce on Sunday 
a. m., December 7, 1941. 

[144^0] 68. On December 6, 1941, was an appointment arranged 
for a meeting between you, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary 
of the Navy, to be held at the State Department on December 7, 1941, 
at or about 10 o'clock a. m. ? 

69. (a) Who arranged the meeting referred to in the preceding 
question and at what time? What was to be the purpose of the 
meeting ? 

(h) Why was not General Marshall and/or Admiral Stark invited 
or in attendance ? 

(\c) If the meeting was to consider Japan's reply to the Secretary 
of State's note of November 26, why was the President not also con- 
ferred with ? 

70. What was the occasion for arranging the meeting referred to 
in question 68 ? 

71. (a) Who attended the meeting at the State Department on 
December 7, 1941, at or about 10 o'clock a. m. ? 

(b) What intercepted Japanese messages were before you at that 
meeting ? 

72. What discussion or discussions took place at the meeting held 
at the State Department on the morning of December 7, 1941, which 
you attended in company with the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, an<l 
the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox? (Please state in complete 
detail what was said by you and by the other participants in the dis- 
cussions at the meeting referred to.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5447 

[lJf4Sl^ 73. Wliat action did you take, or direct to be taken, on 
the morning of December 7, 1941, {a) when you learned of the exis- 
tence and tenor of the fourteenth part of the Japanese reply to the 
American note of November 26, 1941, which appears on page 245 of 
exhibit 1 ; and ( 5 ) when you learned that the Japanese Ambassador 
in Washington was directed to present the Japanese reply to the 
American note of November 26 at 2 p. m., Washington time? 

74. Was there any discussion between you and any individual on 
December 7, 1941, prior to the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, as 
to the significance of the Japanese message directing the Japanese 
Ambassador in Washington to present the Japanese reply to the 
American note of November 26, 1941, at 1 p. m., Washington time? 

75. If your answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, 
what was said by you and any other individual in connection with the 
subject matter of the significance of the hour fixed for the delivery of 
the Japanese note to the United States on December 7, 1941 ? 

76. After you learned of the existence of the fourteenth part of the 
Japanese message and the additional message fixing the time of de- 
livery as 1 o'clock p. m., Washington time, did you discuss either of 
these messages with the President, with General Marshall, or with 
Admiral Stark or any officer of the State Department, the Navy De- 
partment, the War Department ? 

[IJf.ItS^'] 77. If your answer to the preceding question is in the 
affirmative, what was said by you and what was said by the person or 
persons with whom you had any discussion or conversation referred 
to in the preceding question ? 

78. Did you talk with the President personally or by phone or 
contact him through a messenger on Saturday, December 6 or 7 from 
4 p. m. to the time of the attack ? 

79. If you did communicate in any way with the President, per- 
sonally or otherwise, give the details of that conversation. 

80. Did you at any time on December 6, 1941, receive the first 13 
parts of the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26, 
which appears on pages 239, 240, 242, 243, and 244 of exhibit 1 in this 
investigation ? 

81. If your answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, 
at what time and from what individual, did you receive the message 
referred to? 

82. When on December 6, 1941, did you learn that the first 13 parts 
of the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26 had been 
intercepted and translated by the Army and Navy ? 

83. From whom did you receive the information referred to in 
the preceding question? (Please state in complete detail, as you 
now recall, what was said by any person or persons informing you 
of the receipt of the 13-part message, and your [i^5^] re- 
sponse thereto.) 

84. Exhibit 58 of this investigation (item 2) contains a list of "tele- 
phone calls made from outside through Wliite House switchboard 
on December 6, 1941, and December 7, 1941, as compiled from op- 
erators' notes available." The following calls appear among others 
with the following notations as to time on December 6: 

1258 p. Secy Stimson eld Secy Hull Iwc — OK 1259 p. 

830 p. Secy Knox eld Secy Stimson OK 

845 p. Secy Knox eld Secy Hull OK 

847 p. Secy Knox eld Secy Stimson OK 



5448 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(a) Wliat was said by you and by Secretary Hull in the course of 
3'our telephone conversation at 12 : 58 p. m. on December 6, 1941 ? 

(h) Wliat was said by you and Secretary Knox in the course of 
your telephone conversation at 8: 30 p. m. on December 6, 1941? 

(c) What was said by you and Secretary Knox in the course of your 
telephone conversation at 8:47 p. m, on December 6, 1941? 

85. Did you have any conversation or conversations with Secretary 
Hull and Secretary Knox on 6 December 1941, other than those re- 
ferred to in the preceding question ? 

86. If your answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, 
what were the time or times of any such conversation [144^4-] 
or conversations, and what was said by you and the other party to 
each such conversation ? 

87. This question not used. 

88. This question not used. 

89. This question not used. 

90. At any time on December 6, 1941, did you discuss the "pilot 
message," so-called or the 13-part message referred to in question 80 
with any of the following individuals : 

(a) The President. 

(b) Secretary of State Hull. 

(c) Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox. 

(d) Mr. Sumner Welles. 

(e) Gen. George C. Marshall. 
(/) Admiral H. K. Stark. 
Iff) General Miles — G-2. 

(h) General Gerow. 
(i) Col. Rufus Bratton. 

(Please specify in your answer to this question the name of the 
individual or individuals referred to, with whom you had such discus- 
sion or conversation, and the time or times of such discussions or 
conversations.) 

(See question 94 for description of the pilot message.) 

91. What was said by you and by any of the individuals referred 
to in question 90 in the course of any conversations [144^S^ or 
discussions on December 6, 1941, with reference to : 

(a) The meaning of the so-called "pilot message" (see 
question 94.) 

(b) Any action to be taken by the War and Navy Departments, 
or the State Department, in connection with the so-called "pilot 
message" ; 

(c) The meaning of the 13-part message referred to in ques- 
tion 80 ; 

(d) Any action to be taken by the War and Navy Departments 
or the State Department with respect to the 13-part message. 

92.Where were you on December 6, 1941, from 4 p. m. to 12 midnight ? 

93. Did you learn of the contents of the thirteenth part of the 
14-part message before you saw it? If so, relate the circumstances. 

94. Your attention is "directed to pages 238 and 239 of exhibit 1 of 
this investigation, and specifically to the message appearing on such 
pages from Tokyo to Washington,' No. 901, on December 6, 1941, This 
message has been described in the course of this investigation as the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5449 

"pilot message" because it informs the Japanese representatives in 
Washington that Japan has prepared a memorandum in reply to the 
American note of November 26' to be sent in 14 parts, and that the time 
of its presentation was to be specifically fixed [14-4^6] in a later 
message. Col. Rufus Bratton has testified before this committee 
(record, p. 12050) that he disseminated this so-called "pilot message" 
around 3 o'clock of the afternoon of December 6, 1941, to "Secretary of 
State, Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Chief of the War Plans 
Division, G-2, and my own section." 
What action did you take upon receipt of this message ? 

95. With whom did you discuss the so-called "pilot message" referred 
to in the preceding question ? 

96. What was the nature of your discussion of the so-called "pilot 
message" with any person or persons on the 6th of December 1941? 
(Please state in complete detail what you said in any such discussion, 
and what was said by the person or persons wdth whom you discussed 
the "pilot message"?) 

97. When did you see the pilot message which is No. 901, page 238 
of exhibit 1 ? 

Had the contents of the pilot message been called to your attention 
before you saw it? If so, relate the circumstances. 

98. When did you first see or obtain information as to the contents 
o,f the following messages in exhibit 1 : 

No. 904 Page 245. 

No. 907 Page 248. 

No. 908 -■ Page 248. 

[UW] No. 909 Page 240. 

No. 910 Page 249. 

99. If you made plans at this meeting on the 7th between the three 
Secretaries as to what was to be said or done (the words said and done 
were used by you in your testimony before the Army board) did you 
discuss with anyone that this information should be sent to the field, 
particularly to Short ? 

Give us the conversations on what was to be said. 
Give us the conversations on what was to be done. 

100. At what time did you first get the fourteenth part of the 14- 
part message ? Give hour if possible. 

101. Did you see General Marshall on December 6 ? If so, give us 
detailed conversations between you. 

Did you see General Marshall on December 7 prior to the Japanese 
attack? If so, give us detailed conversation. 

Did you see General Gerow on December 6 or 7 up to the Jap 
attack? If so, give us detailed conversations between you. 

102. Did you talk with any Army officer after 4 p. m. on December 
6, 1941, up to the time of the attack on the 7th of December? If so, 
give us the conversations. 

103. I quote from exhibit 16 dated November 5, 1941, memorandum 
from Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff to the President : 

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the 
following conclusions : 

[1U5S] a. The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United 
States-British staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the 
two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany 



5450 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any ease, an 
unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a 
war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, 
the most dangerous enemy. 

b. War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building 
up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly 
threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great im- 
portance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or 
more of the following contingencies : 

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory 
or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or 
the Netherlands East Indies ; 

(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of the 
100° East or south 10° North ; or into Portugese Timor, New Caledonia, or 
the Loyalty Islands. 

[14459] c. If war with Japan cannot be avoided, it should follow the 
strategic lines of existing war plans, i. e., military operations should be primarily 
defensive, with the objective of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic 
position. 

d. Considering world strategy, a Japanese Advance against Kunming, into 
Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify 
intervention by the United States against Japan. 

e. All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the 
Chinese Central Government. 

f. In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated 
action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields should be undertaken in 
common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands 
East Indies. 

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the 
United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions. 

Specifically, they recommend : 

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for [14460] in- 
tervention against Japan in China be disapproved. 

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the need of 
Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces. 

That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated 
to the maximum practicable extent. 

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan. 

104. Did you discuss the above (question 103) with first the Presi- 
dent? If so, give us the details of the conversation; secondly, the 
Secretary of State ? If so, give us details of the conversation ; third, 
with General Marshall? If so, give us details of the conversation. 

105. Following is the fourteenth part of the 14-part message : 

From : Tokyo 
To : Washington 
7 December 1941 
#902 Part 14 of 14 

(Note. — In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this 
part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT") 

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with 
Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establish- 
ment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially 
to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping [144^1] 
Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the 
course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Gov- 
ernment to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the 
peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has 
finally been lost. 

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Gov- 
ernment that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but 
consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotia- 
tions. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5451 

[14462] 106. How do you account for the delay from 5 o'clock 
a. m., the date of the receipt of the fourteenth part of the 14-part 
message, until you did receive it ? 

107. If any of the delay was caused by delay in decoding and trans- 
lation, it seems clear it was translated by 8 a. m. or 8 : 15 a. m. on the 
morning of the 7th of December 1941, How do you account for the 
delay from 8 a. m. until you did see it ? 

108. Did you at any time prior to the attack discuss with the Presi- 
dent the contents of any part of the 14-part message ? 

109. If so, what was the discussion ? 

110. Did you discuss with General Marshall any of the Japanese 
messages received by our Government on December 6 or 7, 1941, and 
set forth in our exhibit 1? If so, state the time; give the number 
of the message and page of exhibit 1, also the details of what was said 
by each of you. 

111. If you discussed with the Secretary of State any of the Jap- 
anese messages received by our Government on December 6 or 7, 1941, 
and set forth in our exhibit 1 at any time other than at the meeting 
in his office at 10 or 10 : 30 a, m. on Sunday, December 7. State the 
times and give the number of the message, page of exhibit 1, and also 
the details of what was said by you and Mr. Hull. 

112. Did you discuss with anyone in the Army and Navy any of 
the Japanese messages received by our Government on December 6 or 
7 and set forth in our exhibit 1? Give the names of [14463'} 
persons, time of discussion or conversations, and conversation by you 
and the other party or parties. 

113. At the meeting of the three Secretaries on Sunday, December 
7, 1941, at 10 or 10 : 30 a. m. You, Mr. Stimson, were familiar with 
the message sent to General Short on November 27. Did you not 
consider with the information you had received here in Washington 
from that date until your meeting time on December 7 that a new alert 
was necessary to General Short ? 

114. You had seen on November 28, 1941, the reply from General 
Short to the message of November 27 which was as follows : 

Report department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy REURAD 
Four Seven Two Twenty Seventh. 

having in mind that reply showing his interpretation of the message of 
November 27 that a new alert was necessary. 

Your findings as to General Short indicate you believed he was 
subject to criticism for his interpretation of the message from General 
Marshall to him on November 27; is not the same thing true of the 
failure to properly evaluate his reply to that message. 

115. When did you first learn that General Marshall and General 
Gerow had failed to note what General Short had replied to their note 
of November 27 ? 

116. Did not the failure of the responsible Army officers in Wash- 
ington to properly evaluate General Short's reply to General Marshall's 
message of November 27 contribute to the Pearl Harbor [14464] 
disaster ? 

117. Did you know what messages were sent from Washington to 
General Short between November 27 and the 8th of December 1941 ? 

State the message you knew had been sent between November 27 
and December 8, 1941. 



5452 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Did you believe that General Short was getting all decoded Japanese 
diplomatic messages ? 

118. Did you believe that Pearl Harbor had the means to intercept, 
decipher, and translate Japanese diplomatic messages? 

119. Did you know that General Mac Arthur had access to the inter- 
cepted Japanese diplomatic messages through the Navy in the Phil- 
ippines ? 

120. Did you discuss with the President the 1 o'clock message, ex- 
hibit 1, No. 907, page 248? 

121. If so, give time and what was said by you and by the President. 

122. Wliy did our Government adopt the policy of leaning over 
backwards to keep from advising Japan that we were ready for any 
attack that they might make? 

123. If such was the plan, or our policy, who was responsible for its 
adoption ? 

124. With whom did you discuss it and give us the contents of the 
discussion. 

125. Do you know why General Marshall did not use the telephone 
to advise General Short of an anticipated attack or give [i^^5] 
him an alert ? 

How could the fact that we were alerted to air attack (if known by 
the Japs) been detrimental to the United States? 

126. You have made a statement that there was a preliminary alert 
given prior to the 27th and a full alert given on the 27th. As time 
went on, and the deadline date of the 29th passed, new developments 
arose as to the destruction of the codes, and other information came 
to our Government here in Washington. Did you discuss with any- 
one the sending of a new message to keep parties alerted and, if not, 
why not? 

127. The fact that General Marshall did send a message at 12:18 
on the 7th of December 1941, to General Short would indicate, would 
it not, that General Marshall did not consider the message of the 
27th as sufficient considering the further information that was ob- 
tained as to Japan's intentions? 

128. This being true, can you tell us why, if a new alert was to be 
given at all, it was not given earlier than 12 : 18, December 7? 

129. Was your Secretary of War's office alerted to war on the 5th 
or on the 6th or on the 7th of December 1941 ? 

130. If not, can you explain why not ? 

131. If it was, will you explain just how it was alerted and who was 
on duty in the office ? 

132. Wlien, in your opinion, did war between Japan and America 
become imminent ? 

[14-466] 133. Did you make any effort to contact General Mar- 
shall on the afternoon or night of December 6, or on the morning of 
December 7, 1941 ? 

134. If your answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, 
were you successful ? 

135. If your answer to question 133 is in the affirmative, what was 
said by you and by General Marshall ? 

136. Did you during the time, the 6th of December, contact Admiral 
Stark? 

137. If so, give us the conversations and what was discussed. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5453 

138. This question was not used. 

139. This question not used. 

140. Did you contact the Secretary of State, or did he contact 
you, or were you in communication with him either personally or by 
message on the 6th ? 

141. If so, give us the details of the conversation and the time of 
contact. 

142. When did you receive notice or information concerning a mes- 
sage from Ambassador Winant purporting to come from Churchill to 
the President, received in the State Department at 10 : 40 on Decem- 
ber 6? 

143. If you had a conference with the Secretary of the Navy about a 
meeting the next day, and were familiar with the fact that a 13-part 
message was in, and 1 part part had not been [i^^^7] received, 
can you explain why the meeting was held as late as 10 or 10 : 30 ? 

144. When did you learn that the President was preparing a message 
to the Emperor ? 

145. When did you first know or hear that that message was sent? 

146. If you had any conversations with the President about that 
message to the Emperor will you give us the conversations? 

147. Did you have a conversation at any time in November or De- 
cember 1941, with the President about a message to Congress concern- 
ing the Far Eastern situation? If so, give us details of that con- 
versation. 

148. Were you aware that the President, in informing the press on 
December 2, that he was asking Japan about the Indochina concen- 
trations, was asked by a reporter if any time limit had been set for a 
reply and that the President had said that the question was silly, had 
answered in the negative, and said that those tactics were used in the 
last century not in this, and had said that the United States was at 
peace with Japan and that the two nations were perfectly friendly ? 

149. Were you aware of the Jap Ambassador telling Under Secre- 
tary Welles, on delivery of the December 2 note, that it was apparent 
that both sides were preparing? (See Foreign Kelations, p. 780.) 

150. Were you aware on December 4 that the Japanese [144^8] 
movements in Indochina alone as represented in the President's note 
of December 2, constituted actions which the President in his note of 
August 17 had formally pledged the United States to resist? 

151. Do you have any evidence that that commitment on August 17 
had been made known to the American people or to the American 
Congress before December 7, 1941 ? 

152. Will you state your conversation with General Marshall, or 
any other military authority, in relation to the fact that negotiations 
were ended so far as the Secretary of State was concerned and that 
it was up to the Army and Navy ? 

153. When the President returned from the Atlantic Conference, 
did you discuss with him his conversations or negotiations with Prime 
Minister Churchill in relation to the Far East? 

154. I refer you to Foreign Kelations, volume 2, page 556, at the 
bottom of the page, the last paragraph, which continues on page 557. 
Did you know that that message was given by the President to the 
Japanese and did you discuss with him the message, or the contents 
thereof, and will you state your discussions, what he said and what 
you said ? 



5454 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

155. Did you know what our Government policy was in giving 
armed aid or support to Britain or the Dutch if there was an attack 
made by the Japanese upon the Malay Peninsula or any other British 
or Dutch possession and no direct attack [144^9] against 
American possessions ? 

156. Why were you concerned with the movement south of the 
Japanese to Thailand or the Malay Peninsula if we had no policy as 
to what we intended to do in case of any attack on the British and/or 
the Dutch? 

157. Did you ever discuss with the President and/or Secretary of 
State Hull the question of our policy in case of an attack upon the 
British and/or Dutch and no attack'^by the Japanese upon America 
or American possessions ? 

158. If you had such a discussion, give us the dates and details. 

159. At the meeting on December 7, 1941, with Secretary Hull and 
Secretary Knox, during that meeting or from the time of that meet- 
ing up until the attack, did you or anyone to your knowledge present 
at that meeting, or in that conference, communicate with the President 
and, if so, what were the contents of the conversation ? 

160. At the meeting between you and the other Secretaries and 
Cabinet members, you have stated that you stayed in conference until 
lunch time going over the plans for what should be said and done. 
Will you give us the details of that conversation or, if you do not 
remember the exact words, then the substance of the conference, par- 
ticularly what you meant by "plans for what should be said" and 
what is meant by that. Also in regard to "as to what should be done," 
will you tell us what [14470] was said by each on "as to what 
should be done." 

161. I refer you to a memorandum, exhibit 40, and ask you if there 
was any discussion with you or anyone else to your knowledge on this 
subject of armed support. 

Who assured the British of American armed support as mentioned 
in their instructions to Singapore as shown in the message of our 
naval observer at Singapore to Admiral Hart ? 

162. As Secretary of War on December 5, 1941, had you prepared 
or acted in any way to implement the declaration of the President 
to Japan on August 17 that the United States immediately would 
resist a Japanese threat or move into the Southwest Pacific? 

163. You were certain, if only from the President's note of Decem- 
ber 2, were you not, that Japanese concentration in southern Indo- 
china, constituted a threat within the meaning and letter of the dec- 
laration of August 17, 1941 ? 

164. As Secretary of War, on December 5, had you anticipated that 
American resistance to a Jap attack against some other nation would 
follow the pattern of American resistance to Germany's attacks on 
Great Britain in the Atlantic Ocean ? 

165. Was it ever called to your attention that the Secretary of In- 
terior was holding up the installation of the permanent radar sets? 
If so, what was done to expedite these installations ? 

166. What evidence was before you when General Short was 
[144'^^] relieved of his command? 

Whose decision was it to relieve General Short of his command ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5455 

167. It is true, is it not, that in late November and early Decem- 
ber 1941 yon and General Marshall shared with General Short the 
belief that Japan would not attack Pearl Harbor? (See par. 19, 
Stimson statement August 29, 1945.) 

168. It is true, is it not, that the American General Staff "com- 
pletely underestimated the Japanese military capabilities and particu- 
larly the advance which they had made in the use of aircraft"? 

169. Do you still think that "It is probably true that the emphasis 
on sabotage in several War Department warnings and the Depart- 
ment's caution against alarming the civilian population, coupled with 
the failure to comment on Short's report of November 27, confirmed 
him in his conviction that he had chosen the correct form of alert and 
might disregard all others, as you stated in your official report re- 
garding the Pearl Harbor disaster, released to the press on August 
29, 1945 ? 

170. If there was, in the opinion of the War Department General 
Staff, any "threat from without," in an overseas command, and the 
reports from that area showed only an alert against sabotage, who, if 
anyone, had the duty or authority in the War Department to trans- 
mit a message to correct the situation ? 

[144'^2] 171. In your public report of August 29 you stated that 
G-2 "had duties of collecting and analyzing information and trans- 
mitting information * * * to the theater commanders"; it is 
true, is it not, that neither G-2 nor the War Department sent any 
information to General Short between November 28, 1941, and De- 
cember 7, 1941 ? 

172. In your opinion, was the War Department on a sufficient 
alert on December 6, 1941 so that the Chief of Staff could reasonably 
assume that information such as was received indicating a breach of 
diplomatic relations would get to him before the next morning, or do 
you regard the delay in getting this information to General Marshall 
as an unusual circumstance which he could not have reasonably 
foreseen ? 

173. Do you believe that in early December 1941 the War Depart- 
ment had an efficient functioning system to get important intelligence 
promptly to the Chief of Staff? 

174. It is true, is it not, that neither you nor Colonel Clausen, your 
investigator even asked General Short about his knowledge of the 
"winds" code, but that, nevertheless, you made a finding in your 
official report that "this information was available to General ^hort 
or his command prior to December 7, 1941?" 

175. Were you consulted and did you have anything to do with 
the appointment of the Roberts Commission ? 

176. Did you see the Roberts Finding of Facts prior to its 
{HJf7'3'] signing and submission to the President? 



Mr. Lane. As just previously referred to, subsequently the com- 
mittee submitted certain additional interrogatories to Mr. Stimson. 
His reply has been received and we request that the interrogatories, 
the answers thereto, and the letter of transmittal dat^d April 23, 1946, 
be spread on the record at this point. 



5456 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. It is so ordered. 
(The mutter referred to follows :) 

Law Offices of 

WiNTHROP, STIMSON, PuTNAM & ROBERTS 

Mutual Life Building No. 32 Liberty Street 

NEW YOEK 5, N. Y. 

Whitehall 3-0700 

Henry L. Stimson, Counsel 

April 23, 1946. 
Hon. Alben W. Barkley, 

United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 

My Dear Senator Barkley: I have received your kind letter of April 4th 
enclosing the two sets of interrogatories which Senator Ferguson has submitted. 

I confess to disappointment that my previous effort to give your Committee a 
fair and full statement of what I could recollect in regard to the Pearl Harbor 
attack, based upon such effort and investigation as my health would allow, 
should now be followed by no less than 237 interrogatories submitted by Senator 
Ferguson. In preparing my statement I went to the very margin of the rules 
imposed upon me by my physicians. 

The interrogatories which you now send me are divided into two lists. The 
first dated March 6th must have been prepared before my statement sent to the 
Committee on March 13th could have been received by them. While I have not 
been able to examine [i^4~5] it carefully, it must have been in large 
part answered by that statement of mine. 

Senator Ferguson's second list by its title is related to my statement and is 
in substance a cross-examination of that statement. This second list I have 
now tried to answer to the best of my recollection and belief. 

I assume that the committee will be satisfied with my original statement as an 
answer to the first list and, if there are any questions in that list directed to 
matters not in the statement, it will assume that my recollection does not extend 
to that question. I really cannot in my present condition of health undertake 
the very heavy burden which would inure to another reexamination of all papers, 
documents, and evidence heretofore submitted. I did the best I could in that 
respect in my first statement. I hope you will find my answers to Senator 
Ferguson's supplemental questions satisfactory. I enclose them herewith. 

With many thanks for your courtesy and personal good wishes. 

I am, very sincerely, yours, 

(Signed) Henry L. Stimson. 

[IW^e] ANSWERS OF HENRY L. STIMSON TO SUPPLEMENTAL 
QUESTIONS PROPOSED BY SENATOR FERGUSON 

1. Mr. Secretary, you state in your statement to the Pearl Harbor 
Committee that our military advisers had given the President their 
formal advice that if Japan moved beyond certain lines we would have 
to fight for the sake of our own security. Are you referring to the 
memoranda to the President, dated November 5 and November 27, 
1941, and signed b}^ Admiral Stark and General Marshall? 

Assuming this statement is addressed to the sentence on page 4 of 
my statement, my answer is "yes." 

2. Was this advice on the request of the President ? 
I have no recollection as to this. 

3. Was that advice accepted and did it become our Government 
policy prior to the Pearl Harbor attack? 

It has always been the fixed and permanent policy of the United 
States Government to defend itself and its possessions. The Congress 
itself reaffirmed and endorsed this policy on numerous occasions as the 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5457 

dangers to this country from the war which was starting across the 
world became more acute. It reaffirmed it when the regular size of 
our ordinary military appropriations were enormously increased by 
the Congress in May and June 1940, at the time of the fall of France, 
Belgium, and the Netherlands. It reaffirmed it in September 1940, 
when it passed the draft law, and by the joint resolution in August 
[14p7] 1940, which authorized the total mobilization of the Na- 
tional Guard for large scale maneuvers or training. It reaffirmed 
it by its passage of the lend-lease legislation to assist in arming the 
nations who were fighting in the front line against aggression by the 
Axis and in opening our ports for the repairs of their warships. 
Each of these extraordinary congressional enactments indicated be- 
yond peradventure a policy to prepare the United States against an 
immediate impending attack by the Axis nations. 

It is the President of the United States who is charged with the 
execution of that policy, both as Chief Executive and as Commander 
in Chief of the armed forces. It was his duty to make the decisions 
as to how this policy of defense should be best carried out. The 
adoption of plans for defense are ultimately for his decision and if the 
adoption of a particular strategy is to be termed policy at all, it is 
executive policy the decision of which it entirely a matter for the 
President. In making this decision, the President receives the advice 
of numerous advisers, including his military advisers and the members 
of his Cabinet. Their views and recommendations, however, are 
purely advisory, and the final policy and strategy is for the decision 
of the President and it is his alone. 

As I have already pointed out in my statement, and as my con- 
temporaneous notes indicate, it was the consensus of [144'^^] 
opinion of the President's advisers that if the Japanese in the latter 
part of November should advance beyond a certain point the security 
of this country demanded that we would have to fight. It was also the 
consensus of opinion that a further warning by us to Japan should 
be given. The President was in fact during the early part of December 
engaged in preparing an address to the Congress which would incor- 
porate such a warning, and was also considering a special telegram 
to the Emperor of Japan. Before the address to the Congress was 
delivered, however, the Japanese struck on December 7. I do not recol- 
lect that the President prior to December 7 formally announced any 
decision on his part to fight if the Japanese passed the point in ques- 
tion, but he \yas undoubtedly considering such a decision most seri- 
ously, because it was the advice of his best qualified advisers. 

4. If so, what plans were promulgated to carry out that advice? 
See answer to question 3. 

5. Did you have information from the President that we would 
fight for the sake of our security upon the happening of that event 
mentioned in question 1? 

See answer to question 3. 

6. If so, did you convey that information to General Marshall ? 
See answer to question 3. 

7. Will you state if the Secretary of the Navy had such advice and 
if he conveyed it, or caused it to be conveyed, to [14479] Ad- 
miral Stark? 

I have no information as to this. 

79716— 46— pt. 11 21 



5458 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

8. On page 9 of your mimeographed statement to the committee, 
you have set forth four salient features of the situation as they ap- 
peared to you in November of 1941. Were any or all of these discussed 
with any other person ? 

All of these points were discussed many times and with numerous 
persons. I have already indicated in my statement the discussions 
that took place with the President, at Cabinet meetings and at meet- 
ings with the Secretary of State and Secretary of the Navy and with 
the chiefs of staff, all of whom shared my views, to the best of my 
information and belief, 

9. If so will you state with whom they were discussed and if anyone 
else shared your views on these features? Will you give their names? 

I have nothing to add beyond what I have already said in my state- 
ment of March 1946, and in my last answer. 

10. On page 12 of the mimeographed statement you speak of the 
vote of the Cabinet as to whether or not it was thought that the Ameri- 
can people would back you up if it became necessary to strike Japan 
in case she attacked England in Malay or the Dutch East Indies, does 
this mean that it became the policy of this Government at that time to 
take such steps ? 

See answer to question 3. 
[144^0] 11. If so, to whom was this policy communicated? 
See answer to question 3. 

12. Did you advise General Marshall and was he to advise others 
in the field of this policy ? 

See answer to question 3. 

13. Did you, Mr. Secretary, keep in close touch with the program of 
installing permanent radar in the Hawaiian Islands? 

I took a very active interest in insisting that proper installations of 
radar, both mobile and permanent, be installed in Hawaii as promptly 
as possible, but I, of course, left the details as to how and where the 
permanent apparatus should be installed to the military members of 
the staff and the local military commander, I have no recollection at 
this time as to how much detail I knew with regard to the permanent 
installations at Hawaii prior to December 7, 1941, I do remember 
distinctly the very favorable report of the test of the mobile apparatus 
that was made shortly before the Pearl Harbor attack, and that that 
report indicated that the mobile apparatus was in operation and was 
capable of detecting the approach of enemy planes at a distance of at 
least 80 miles, 

14. Will you state specifically what was done to expedite the in- 
stallation of permanent radar in Hawaii ? 

I have no recollection at the present time. 

15. Was it not called to your attention that there were many 
[14481] delays in the installing of radar equipment in the 
Hawaiian Islands? 

I have no recollection at the present time, 

16. On pages 14. and 15, you tell of a conversation between the War 
Cabinet — the President, Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, General 
Marshall, Admiral Stark, and the Secretary of State — on page 15 you 
state that certain things were discussed at the meeting. Was there 
any policy formulated by virtue of that discussion ? 

See answer to question 3. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5459 

17. If SO, will you state what the policy was and how it was to be 
carried out ? On page 15, you state that you reminded the President 
of his warning of August 19, 1 ask you if the correct date of that is not 
Sunday, August 17, when the President returned from the Atlantic 
Conference with Mr. Churchill ? 

See answer to question 3. I belive the correct date of the warning 
which I described as of August 19 should be August 17, 1941. 

18. I also ask you what the President replied to you when you made 
the statement to him as stated by you on page 15 as to the warning that 
he had given Japan ? 

I do not recollect. 

19. Will you state what the President said about this warning and 
your suggestion ? 

lUIfSd] I do not recollect, except that I do remember that the 
final view was that an additional warning to Japan should be given. 

20. When did you first become familiar with the warning that the 
President gave to Japan on August 17, 1941, as related in the White 
Paper (vol. 2, Foreign Relations of the United States, pages 556-557) ? 

I do not recollect. See answer to question 52 below. 

21. Did England ever give a parallel warning? If so, when? 
I do not recollect. See answer to question 52 below. 

22. Was it not important that you, as Secretary of War, be advised 
as to our policies in the Far East and that you advise General Marshall 
of that policy and that he, in turn, advise General Short and other 
officers in the field ? 

I think it was important that the Secretary of War and the Chief 
of Staff should be advised as to our policies in the Far East. As to 
what extent and in what detail the commander of the individual 
theater should be so advised depends on the circumstances of the 
particular situation. 

23. Was it not important that if our Government had a policy that 
if England or the Netherlands were attacked that we would consider 
it as an unfriendly act and an attack upon us, that our military authori- 
ties be fully advised as to that? 

See answer to questions 3 and 22. 

[1448S] 24. Was it not important that if Japan was to make an 
attack upon the British and/or the Dutch and our policy was that we 
were to treat that as an attack or unfriendly act upon us that the com- 
manding officer at Hawaii be fully informed as to this in order that 
he might guard against an attack upon our fleet and pDSsessions which 
were on the flank. of the Japanese? 

See answer to questions 3 and 22. The commanding officers of the 
individual Pacific theaters were advised on November 27 that hostile 
action was possible "at any moment." 

25. On page 17 of your statement, you speak of the conversation 
with Mr. Hull and state that he had washed his hands of it and that 
it was in the hands of the Army and the Navy, and that you had 
called the President who gave you a different view, do I understand 
that the President did not agree with Mr. Hull ? 

I think my statement and my notes of November 27 adequately cover 
the answer to this question. 

26. Will you give us the entire conversation you had with the Presi- 
dent in relation to this? 

I have nothing to add to what I have already said in my statement. 



5460 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

27. Did you discuss with the President on or about November 27, 
1941, the sendino; of a message to General MacArthur? 

[lUSIf] I did. 

28. Will you give us this conversation? 

I have nothing to add to what I have already said in my statement, 
page 19, and to what is contained in my notes of Thursday, November 
27, 1941. 

29. At that time, or on the 27th, did you discuss with the President 
the sending of a message to General Short ? 

I do not recollect. The sequence shows that such a message was 
sent to Short as well as the two other Pacific outposts; viz, Panama 
and the Pacific coast including Alaska. 

30. Will you give us the conversation with the President about 
sending General Short a message? 

See answer to question 29. 

31. WTien did it first come to your attention that the Japanese were 
treating our note of November 26, 1941, as an ultimatum? 

I do not recollect. I do not know that it ever came to my knowledge 
until after December 7. 

32. Was it not important that we understand the way the Japanese 
were treating it — as to what their acts would be rather than what our 
intentions were? 

I have nothing to say as to this. See answer to previous question. 

33. On pages 24 and 25 of your mimeographed statement you make 
the statement that the President had made a momentous [1^55] 
decision that day; that is, to send what you called a final alert. I 
wish you would explain why you refer to this as a momentous decision. 

The word "momentous" is perhaps not strictly accurate. It is a 
fair sample of the rough and hasty character of my daily notes as 
described in my original statement to your committee. The thought 
I intended to convey was that the President had himself directed that 
a final warning should be sent out and that as this decision had 
emanated from the Commander in Chief it was very important that 
it should be done. 

34. Why was it a momentous decision to advise our armed forces 
to be on the alert for an attack by the Japs ? 

See answer to question 33. 

35. Did you consider this a declaration of war with Japan and for 
this reason it was a momentous decision ? 

I did not consider this a declaration of war with Japan. 

36. State what was said between you and the President on this 
occasion so we may be advised as to why this was a momentous decision. 

I have already answered this in my statement of March 1946, at 
page 26. 

37. On page 26 of your mimeographed statement you say that our 
Government had decided not to attack without a further warning, 
and that the President suggested a special [-?^4<5^] telegram 
from himself to the Emperor of Japan. Was it decided as a policy 
of .our Government that we would attack after sending of that message 
if the Japanese continued their aggression further to the south? 

See answer to question 3. 

38. On the same page you state that a special message would be 
delivered to Congress. Will you state if you ever knew why that 
message was not delivered to Congress ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5461 

It was not delivered to Congress because the Japanese struck first. 

39. Why was Congress allowed to adjourn from December 4 to 
December 8 at a time when our Government knew of the movement of 
the Japanese to the south ? 

I have no recollection as to this. 

40. On page 28 of your statement you use the following language : 

On the other hand, we also decided that we could not attack without a further 
warning to Japan, and we discussed what form that warning should take. The 
President suggested a special telegram from himself to the Emperor of Japan. 
After some discussion it was decided that he would send such a letter to the 
Emperor, which would not be made public, and that at the same time he would 
deliver a special message to Congress reporting on the danger and reporting 
what we would have to do if the danger happened. 

Will you please explain as to whether this proposal [14487] in- 
volved coming to Congress in advance or whether the proposal was 
to strike Japan first then report to Congress what had been done? 
The proposal was to go to Congress in advance, and through the 
address to Congress to give the Japanese a final warning. 

41. Was it the intention of our Government, through the President, 
to notify Congress that certain things had happened which caused us 
to strike Japan, and that the report to Congress was to obtain Con- 
gress' ratification and approval? 

No. See answer to Question 40. 

42. Will you state why no action was actually taken upon this 
proposal ? 

See answer to Question 40. 

The fact that information coming in around the first of December 
indicated that the Japanese expedition was landing in Indochina in 
the neighborhood of Saigon rather than going on into the Peninsula 
and up in,to the Gulf of Siam may have prompted the President to 
think that perhaps the Japanese were not going to invade Thailand 
at once or attack the Malay Peninsula and may have delayed his ad- 
dress to Congress. 

43. On pages 29 and 30 of your message to the committee you go 
from Tuesday, the 2d of December to Sunday, the 7th, why is there 
this gap when we consider the crisis that was then pending ? 

[I44SS] The gap in my statement occurs primarily because of 
the fact that my notes of those days do not contain memoranda rele- 
vant to this inquiry. I remember that we were very busy on Wednes- 
day, December 3. I participated in a large staflf conference in which 
we discussed at length maneuvers that had recently been held and the 
lessons to be learned from them. I left in the late afternoon to go to 
New York to keep a dentist appointment on Thursday morning, De- 
cember 4. I returned to Washington on Thursday afternoon. When 
I arrived there I was greeted by the news of the publication by the 
Chicago Tribune on December 4 of our most secret war plans, which 
had caused great concern to the members of my staff. On Friday, 
December 5, my time was lergely occupied in discussion of this matter 
and in determining what action should be taken. On Saturday, De- 
cember 6, I was in frequent conference with General Marshall, and 
also with General Miles of G-2 and General Gerow of the War Plans 
Division, which concerned chiefly the supplies which were on the way 
to the Philippines and the additional big bombers which we were 
trying to fly over there. 



5462 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

44. Will you state what took place during these 5 days of the crisis 
with Japan? 

See answer to previous question. 

45. Did you leave Washington on December 5 and go to New York? 
No ; I was in Washington all that day and until long after Decem- 
ber 7. 

[144^91 46. If so, had you fully advised General Marshall of 
the situation, or had you advised your under secretary, so that they 
could proceed in an emergency ? 

See answer to previous question. 

47. On page 30 of your mimeographed statement you use the words 
"and we were all wondering where the blow would strike," will you 
explain to the committee who you include in "we" ? 

By "we" I referred to Mr. Hull, Mr. Knox, and myself. 

48. On page 35 of your mimeographed statement, will you state as 
to whether or not you made inquiry from any military personnel as 
to what was meant by an alert against sabotage, or being alerted to 
prevent sabotage? 

I made no such inquiry. 

49. Were you at any time acquainted with various alerts of the 
Army? 

I was not acquainted with the various alerts, the details of the 
strategic and tactical plans for the defense of the various theaters, 
nor was it my duty to be familiar with them. 

50. If not, was it not your responsibility, you having sent the mes- 
sage of November 27, under General Marshall's name, to acquaint 
yourself with the meaning of the reply ? 

There is nothing to add to what I have already fully covered in my 
original statement to your committee. See pages [l^-^O] 35 
and 36. 

51. Did the Marshall message of the 27th of November not call for 
General Short to reply to the measures taken ? 

It did. 

52. On page 47 you use the language "I pointed out to the President 
that he had already taken the first step toward an ultimatum," are 
you there referring to the message of August 17, 1941, delivered to 
the Japanese Sunday morning, August 17, 1941, and was not that 
message an ultimatum if the United States desired to use it as such ? 

I believe I am referring to the message of August 17, 1941. I have 
not before me the text of that message, nor have I any recollection 
of having ever seen that text. I had heard such a warning discussed, 
but I do not even recollect with whom such discussion or discussions 
took place. They were nearly 5 years ago. 

53. Is it not true that that message having been delivered that the 
Japanese had violated it in their movements south? 

See answer to previous question. 

54. Is it not true that the Japanese had violated the terms of the 
President's message of August 17, 1941, on Saturday, December 6, 
1941, Washington time? 

See answers to the previous two questions. 

55. On page 56 of your memorandum to the committee, under date 
of November 28, you state that the final decision at that [iPiPl] 
time was to send a speech to Congress and that the President asked 
Mr. Hull, Secretary Knox, and you to try to draft such papers. Did 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5463 

you aid him in the drafting of these papers, and, if so, will you tell 
us where we might get copies, or can you furnish us with copies ? 

I worked on the drafting of some paragraphs, but I have no copies 
in my possession, nor do I know whether any such copies still exist. 
Such drafts as I made were not used. 

56. With the situation gradually growing worse from November 28 
to and including the 6th, what happened that the message was not 
given to Congress and the message to the Emperor of Japan was not 
sent until after we had received the 13 parts of the 14-part message 
indicating a rejection by the Japanese of our proposals of the 26th 
of November ? 

See answer to questions 38 and 42, 

57. Referring to page 60 of your memorandum, you state the British 
were very much excited about it — will you state as to whether or not 
you had any contacts with the British on the 6th or 7th of December 
1941? 

I do not recollect that I personally had contacts with the British 
on either the 6th or the 7th of December 1941. 

58. If so, state what information you received, or what information 
you gave to the British. 

See answer to question 57. 

59. On page 67 of your memorandum, being part 5 of Secre- 
tary [144^^] Knox's suggestion, I call your attention to the 
statement "we should therefore be ready jointly to act together and 
if such understanding has not already been reached, it should be 
reached immediately." Do you know whether or not any understand- 
ing had been reached ? 

I know of no such understanding. The fact that Mr. Knox in 
his paper proposed the making of such an understanding confirms 
me in the belief that none existed. 

60. State whether such an understanding was attempted and, if 
so, what was done toward arriving at such an understanding. 

See answer to question 59. 

61. Was such an understanding ever reached and, if so, when? 
To answer such a question would require an examination o,f the 

minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff throughout the war. It 
was not my duty to follow such minutes and I have with me no other 
basis for refreshing my recollection. The long and harmonious co- 
operation throughout the war by our staff and the British staff 
would indicate that such an understanding was reached soon after 
we entered the war. 

114493] State of New York, 

County of New YorJc, ss: 
Henry L. Stimson, being duly sworn, deposes and says : 

I have prepared the foregoing answers to interrogatories. The same are 
true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. 

(Signed) Heney L. Stimson. 
Sworn to before me this 23d day of April 1946. 

[se-al] (Signed) Thomas de Rosa, 

Thomas de Rosa, 
Attorney and Counsellor at Law. 
OfBce address : 32 Liberty St., N. Y. C. Residing in Bronx County. Bronx 
Co. Clks. No. 3, Reg. No. A183D7. N. Y. Co. Clks. No. 9, Reg. No. 439D7. 
Commission expires March 30, 1947 



5464 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[144^4] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire 
whether or not all we are going to do this morning is to put these things 
in the record ? If so, there will be no necessity of my staying, and I 
have another committee meeting. 

The Chairman. That is my understanding. 

Senator Ferguson. I have another hearing. 

I do want the record to show how I feel, that the record should not 
be closed until we have had time to fill in the gaps, so as to make a 
complete record. 

The Chairman. All right. Your statements on that subject will 
be a part of the record. 

Go ahead, Mr. Lane. 

Mr. Lane. Mr. Chairman, we have a draft of a proposed message 
to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which contains 
suggestions made in a memorandum by Secretary Stimson and Secre- 
tary Knox, as shown in Exhibit No. 161. 

We ask that this draft be marked "Exhibit No. 161-A" and spread 
in the exhibits of the committee record. 

The Chairman. So received. 

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 161-A.") 

Mr. Lane. The log of the watch officer. Officer of Chief of Naval 
Operations, on the night of December 6, 1941, as shown in Exhibit No. 
162, contains references by serial numbers to certain naval communi- 
cations. Copies of these [l.U.9S'\ messages have been obtained 
from the Navy Department and we ask that thev be received and 
marked "Exhibit No. 162-A." 

The Chairman. So ordered. 

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 162-A.") 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt again, be- 
cause of my inability to be two places at once, I will ask to be excused. 

The Chairman. Do you intimate that you prefer the other place to 
this one? (Laughter.) 

Senator Ferguson. No, Mr. Chairman. I have done all I can do 
on this committee but I still have a great interest m it. It is only 
because the hearing is for the purj)ose of putting in records that I 
ask to be excused. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I did write a letter on May 20, 
after our last meeting, in relation to certain facts that I thought we 
should get from the official records in the War Department. I wrote 
the letter to Mr. Richardson on May 20. He has the letter now and 
if we might consider that letter at the present time I would appre- 
ciate it. 

(The text of the letter referred to by Senator Ferguson follows:) 

United States Senate, 

May 20, 1946. 
Mr. Seth W. Richakdson, 

General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the 
Pearl Harbor Attack, Senate Office Building. 
Dear Mr. Richardson : I have gone over the book The Case Against the 
Admirals, and it appears to me that we should have, for the record, the 
report on the bombing of the Utah in the fall of 1937. We should also have 
the program vphich was prepared by General Andrews and Colonel Knerr. 
The booli states they prepared a program to submit to the War Department 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5465 

calling for 108 B-17's for enlarging the Pacific Fleet so it would operate in 
the Pacific and also provided for training of men to cost $21,000,000. 

We should also have a copy of the budget of the Air Corps providing for 
this. We should also have the evidence showing why the War Department re- 
fused to submit the $21,000,000 item to Congress. 

I believe we should also secure copies of the letters from Colonel Knerr 
to the Senate on the B-17 program. 

On page 64 of the book is this quotation : 

"The War Department cannot approve the program for developing the 
the B-17's. Instead of the B-17 you are ordered to build a light, responsive, 
less-expensive type of bombardment plane with a range not to exceed 300 
miles." 

We should put this evidence from the War Department into the records. 
Sincerely, 

(S) Homer Fekgtjson. 

The Chairman. What is it you want Mr, Richardson to produce? 

Mr. Richardson. You will recall, Mr. Chairman, at our last meeting 
a question arose with reference to the possible [144^6~\ inter- 
rogation of General Knerr with reference to matters alleged to have 
taken place subsequent to 1937 in connection with the preparation of 
long distance bombers known as B-l7's. This letter is the communi- 
cation we received the 21st, I think, the day following the day it was 
written, requesting that this information be secured and put in the 
record. 

The facts that are involved in the question are : 
(1) A request for the report on the bombing of the Utah. 

(2) The program referred to which was prepared by General 
Andrews and General Knerr. 

(3) Copy of the Budget which asked for 21 million dollars for 
training. 

(4) The evidence why the War Department refused to submit the 
item covering these long distance bombers to Congress. 

(5) The Knerr letters to the Senate recommending the B-17 pro- 
gram and 

(6) The War Department statement disapproving the B-17 pro- 
gram. 

I am inclined to think that five of these six requests are docu- 
mentary and probably could be furnished by a request appropriately 
submitted to the War Department. The fourth one, evidence of why 
the War Department refused to submit the item to Congress, would 
be directly controversial, of course, and would require the calling of 
witnesses. 

[i^^7] Senator Ferguson. I didn't mean to call witnesses on 
that; if there was anything in the files. 

Mr. Murphy. Wasn't the Utah incident in 1938 ? 

Senator Ferguson. 1937. 

Mr. Richardson. 1937 is the recital here. 

Mr. Murphy. Wliere was it bombed in 1937, in Pearl Harbor? 

Senator Ferguson. It was a test bombing on this whole B-17 idea. 

Mr. Richardson. The point of this request is, as stated before, the 
question of how far the committee wants to go into the question of why 
the military services were short of B-17 bombers, and it would be 
expected that this evidence, if it was developed and put in the record, 
would disclose that, who was responsible for opposing the building 
of those bombers, and thereby would have the responsibility for 
failure to have them in our air force during 1941 when the situation 
with Japan grew more tense. 



5466 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

That is the question involved in this picture. 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I think that, in all fairness, if that 
were to go into the record that it would be necessary to go into a study 
of the defense strategy of the United States from 1937 on. We have 
a statement from General Marshall as to how much we actually had 
in the way of large bombers in the Service at December 7, 1941. 

This letter purports to be based upon a book which was [IJf.If.OS'] 
written by William Bradford Huie. Mr. Huie makes certain state- 
ments in this book that are open to challenge. I noticed a number of 
them that I think could be very easily refuted. 

But at any rate, questions arise out of a reading of this particular 
book, which is one placed on the market in 1946. 

He says, at page 162 : 

I suppose an objective discussion of the Marines is about as difficult to 
acliieve as is an objective discussion of religion or Roosevelt. 

That is the kind of a book it is. 

The Chairman. What is the name of it ? 

Mr. Murphy. The Case Against the Admirals. 

The Chairman. The committee discussed this book at its last meet- 
ing in executive session in connection with the suggestion that cer- 
tain people mentioned in the book be called as witnesses which, the 
committee felt, I think, in view of its action, would involve the com- 
mittee going into a controversy that was raging in 1937 as to whether 
these B-l7's should be ordered and an appropriation made for them. 

The action of the committee in ordering the record and the hear- 
ings closed today seems to preclude the calling of these witnesses and, 
obviously, if the theory in this book is to be exploited, or explored, 
everybody mentioned in the book would have to be called here as a 
witness, or at least \^lJiJi39'\ a certain number of them. Those 
against whom the book is written, being The Case Against the Ad- 
mirals, would certainly have a right to be heard in defense of their 
own theory, and it is my feeling, and I think it was the feeling of 
the committee, by their action, that that not be gone into. 

I don't think the committee can take any action based upon what 
is in that book. 

I stated at the time that the writer of the book was not under oath, 
as was everybody else who testified here, and if any statements or 
any things mentioned in it, are to be brought in as evidence, certainly 
those making the statements would have to be sworn, like everybody 
else, and that would make impossible, and be utterly inconsistent with 
the order of the committee that the record should be closed today. 
That is what I am going by. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, it wasn't my desire to make 
this book a part of the record. I never even suggested that it be 
made a part of the record. 

The Chairman. No, no ; I appreciate that. 

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I did read the book and I found 
some facts in it, which I checked with officials in the War Department, 
and I found one particular fact, that the War Department could not 
approve the program for developing the B-l7's, and instead of B-17's, 
were ordered to build a light, responsive, less expensive type of 
bombardment plane, \_14500^ with a range not to exceed 300 
miles. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5467 

Now, it is my contention that on this record as it now stands that 
when our fleet was moved to Pearl Harbor, someone, somewhere, 
should have developed a defense for that fleet. If it had been properly 
developed and if it had been properly taken care of, then Pearl Harbor 
could not have happened. I take that as being one of the things that 
we were to look into. 

Now, I did find in this book certain information which I thought 
should be brought to the attention of the committee to fill in certain 
gaps. We had a lot of testimony, it is no new subject, about taking 
the fleet to Pearl Harbor, and whether or not it was defended at Pearl 
Harbor. There was a lot in the record about who was to fly bombers 
out — whether they were to be flown out. The record shows that the 
reconnaissance was to be had. There is some doubt in the record as 
to who was to carry on that reconnaissance. Was it the fault of the 
Navy, was it the fault of the Army, or who in the Navy or who in the 
Army, or who somewhere else. 

I merely want to get information for the record officially. I am not 
taking Huie's language. I don't want to put his language in. I want 
official files in the record so that the committee when it gets up its 
report may give to the American people all of the facts. 

The Chairman. What is it you are asking to be done now ? 

Senator Ferg.usgn. I am asking that the War Department 
[14^01] furnish these particular things which Mr. Richardson 
read. I understand that the committee has ruled against me, that 
they are closing the record, but I did write this before the hearing 
came on, so that we could get these official records and put them in 
the record. That is all. 

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, as Mr. Masten just suggested to 
me, it would be possible, if the committee approves, to get whatever 
official records are involved in these inquiries presented to us, put them 
in shape, and that could be introduced in the record before the record 
was finally closed, without the necessity of additional testimony, or 
taking any particular time, except that at some time the committee 
would have to go in session, and do what they are doing this morning 
with reference to the exhibits. That could be done and it would only 
involve official records, apparently, from this request. 

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, couldn't you close the record today 
with permission to insert those at a later date ? 

Mr. Richardson. Whatever the chairman thinks advisable. 

The Chairman. The committee ordered the record closed today. I 
have to be governed by that action. If the record can be closed as of 
today I personally have no objection to these official documents being 
put in, as a part of today's record ; but if they are to be brought in 
before another session of the committee and then be the basis for 
further [l^SO^] requests, that is something else. We couldn't 
close the record on that basis. 

The definite action of the committee last Thursday or Wednesday, 
whenever it was that we met, was that today would close the record 
and it would come to an end. 

Mr. Richardson. I would like to ask the chairman whether he and 
the members of the committee would think it would be proper to 
close the record today as including these documents with the right to 
physically present the documents and put them in the record at some 
future date ? 



5468 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Senator Ferguson. That would solve the problem. 

The Chairman. Not some future date; that they be put in the 
record as of today. 

Senator Ferguson. That is right. 

The Chairman. Because if we ever get to the point where we can 
meet to consider a report we have got to have the record completed. 
And we have got to ask for another extension of time, up to July 1, 
I am not going to ask it beyond that, to make this report. 

But that would not, I suppose, violate the order of the committee. 
Any objection to it? ^ 

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether or not counsel 
is going to offer in evidence the letters of Colonel Stimson and the 
letters of Mr. Roosevelt in regard to the bomber program and the 
planes at Hawaii ? 

[14S03] The Chairman. I don't know. 

Mr. Richardson. I have no anticipation of offering them. 

Mr. Murphy. I ask that they be introduced, Mr. Chairman. We 
have had them for 6 months. 

Mr. Masten. Senator Ferguson has requested that all the papers 
in the President's file that have not heretofore been put in the record, 
be included. 

The Chairman. Without objection that will be ordered. 

Senator Ferguson. The letters would be part of that.^ 

The Chairman. Go ahead. 

Mr. Lane. Exhibit No. 21 contains two dispatches dated December 
6, 1941, from Ambassador Winant, London, to the State Department. 
The dispatch dated at 3 : 05 p. m. that day refers to State Department 
Dispatch No. 5682, dated December 5, 1941, to the American Embassy, 
London. Copy of dispatch No. 5682 has been obtained from the 
State Department and we ask that it be received and marked "Exhibit 
No. 166." 

The Chairman. It is so ordered. 

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 166.") 

Mr. Lane. The State Department file copy of the document handed 
by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on November 
26, 1941 ; statement to the press on that date, by the State Department, 
relating to delivery of the [I4SO4] document; the State De- 
partment press release No. 585, dated December 7, 1941, concerning 
delivery and text of the document ; and a memorandum dated Decem- 
ber 2, 1941, concerning the President's remarks as his press conference 
on that date, relating to delivery of the document, have been compiled, 
and we ask they be marked and received as Exhibit No. 167. 

The Chairman. So ordered. 

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 167.") 

Mr. Lane. A compilation of documents from State Department 
files which are dated in November and December 1941, concerning a 
proposed modus vivendi, which documents supplement those intro- 
duced as Exhibit No. 18, has been prepared. We ask that these docu- 
ments be received and marked "Exhibit No. 168." 

1 The information requested was subsequently admitted to the record as "Exhibit No. 183." 

2 See "Exhibit No. 179," subsequently introduced. 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5469 

The Chairman. So ordered. 

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 168.") 

Mr. Lane. A compilation of documents relating to conversations 
between State Department officials and representatives of the Thai- 
land Government, between August 6 and December 8, 1941, has been 
prepared, and we ask that they be received and marked "Exhibit 
No. 169." 

The Chairman. So ordered. 

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 169.") . 

[I45OS] Mr. Lane. Exhibit No. 140 contains certain documents 
introduced in connection with testimony relating to the retirement 
of Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short. At the request of the committee at 
page 8594 of the transcript, a comprehensive review of the War De- 
partment file has been made and a compilation of documents con- 
cerning the retirement of General Short, and related matters, has 
been made, and we ask that this material be received and marked 
"Exhibit No. 170." 

The Chairman. So ordered. 

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 170.") 

Mr. Lane. Pursuant to committee request at page 8649 of the 
transcript, the Navy Department has furnished a compilation of 
documents from departmental records concerning the retirement of 
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and related matters. We ask that 
this compilation be received and marked "Exhibit No. 171." 

The Vice Chairman. So received. 

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 171.") 

Mr. Lane. At page 12991 of the transcript, reference was made to 
material handled under lend-lease to foreign countries. Additional 
compilations have been made by the War and Navy Departments on 
request of counsel, concerning planes and guns produced and their 
distribution from February 1 to [I4SO6] November 30, 1941. 
We ask that this compilation be received and marked "Exhibit No. 
172." 

The Vice Chairman. So received. 

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 172.") 

Mr. Lane. The War Department has furnished a translation of the 
memoirs of Prince Konoye, former Prime Minister of Japan. These 
documents are reported to have been turned over to a representative 
of the United States Army in Japan by Prince Konoye, subsequent to 
the Japanese surrender. We ask that this translation be received and 
marked "Exhibit No. 173". 

The Vice Chairman. So received. 

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 173.") 

Mr. Lane. From numerous documents submitted by the State De- 
partment and examined by some members of the committee, a number 
of miscellaneous documents were requested for inclusion in the record. 
A compilation of these documents has been made, they are somewhat 
voluminous, and we ask that the compilation be received and marked 
"Exhibit No. 174". 

The Vice Chairman. So received. 

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 174.") 

Mr. Lane. The Secretary of Navy by memorandum dated Decem- 
ber 5, 1941, and the Secretary of War by letter dated [14S07'\ 



5470 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

December 6, 1941, submitted estimates concerning Japanese forces in 
Indochina and adjacent areas, to the Secretary of State, for delivery 
to the President. We ask that this compilation be received and 
marked "Exhibit No. 175." 

The Vice Chairman. So received. 

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 175.") 

Mr. Lane. At pages 13953 and 13956 of the transcript request 
was made for the compilation of data reported to have been requested 
of the Navy Department by the Secretary of War to be delivered to 
the Secretary of War on the morning of December 7, 1941. This 
data reportedly concerned the location of United States naval forces in 
the Atlantic, Pacific and the Far East. The War Department Liaison 
Office has obtained a copy of such a compilation dated as of December 
7, 1941, which is apparently the document in question. 

We ask that this document be received and marked "Exhibit No. 
176." 

The Vice Chairman. So received. 

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 176.") 

Mr. Lane. Senator Ferguson has requested that documents ob- 
tained from the State Department, dated in 1939, concerning a pro- 
posal made by former Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma for 
United States-Japanese understanding, be made a [I4SO8] 

part of the record. This compilation has been made and we ask that 
it be received and marked "Exhibit No. 177." 

The Vice Chairman. So ordered. 

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 177.") 

Mr. Lane. A compilation of documents from Ambassador Grew 
to the State Department and the President, and attached memoranda 
has been made, and we ask that it be received and marked "Exhibit No. 
178." 

The Vice Chairman. It will be so received. 

(The documents were marked "Exhibit 178.") 

Mr. Lane. A selection of documents from the files of the late Presi- 
dent Roosevelt, which were forwarded to the committee by Miss 
Grace Tully last November, in response to committee request for all 
material in the late President's files relating to Japan and the Far 
East, in 1941, has been obtained. 

At the request of Senator Ferguson, we ask that these documents 
be received and marked "Exhibit No. 179." It should be noted that in 
addition to these documents there are some 500 pages of other docu- 
ments from the President's files already in the record. With the 
introduction of this material, everything furnished by Miss Tully 
will be in the committee record. We ask that this material be marked 
"Exhibit No. 179." 

[l^OO] The Vice Chairman. So received. 

(The documents were marked "Exhibit No. 179.") 

JMr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the record show 
that the committee is aware of the fact that about three-fifths of this 
material has nothing to do with Pearl Harbor but is only being intro- 
duced because it was a part of the sum total of material furnished by 
Miss Tully. It has to do with elections in the Philippines, about 
differences with the Commissioner and Mr. Quezon, and about some 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5471 

matters in connection with General MacArthur, and about who is 
going to be named Governor in Hawaii, none of which data has any 
pertinence to this inquiry, and the only reason I do not object is that 
they are part of the files furnished by the White House. 

The Vice Chairman. Counsel may proceed. 

Mr. Lane. The Army and the Navy have presented to the committee 
organization charts of the Army and Navy at Washington and Hawaii. 
They are large charts, and we ask that they be received and marked 
"Exhibit No. 180." 

The Vice Chairman. So received. 

(The charts were marked "Exhibit No. 180.") 

Mr. Lane. With reference to Exhibits Nos. 117 and 117-A, which 
have been introduced, we wish that a letter dated February 4, 1941, 
from the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, \_lJf510'\ to vari- 
ous officers under his command, be spread upon the record at this 
point. 

The Vice Chairman. Be so ordered. 

(The letter referred to follows :) 

msm A4-1/VZ 

A4^3/VZ/(0195) 

Pearl Habbob, T. H., FeJ). 4, 1941. 
Confidential 

From: Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. 
To : Commander. Battle Force. 

Commander Scouting Force. 

Commandant Fourteenth Naval District. 

Commander Aircraft Battle Force. 

Commander Patrol Wing TWO 
Subject : Aircraft in Hawaiian Area, maximum readiness of. 

1. Many matters of Fleet material readiness are susceptible of improvement. 
I heartily endorse all effort, past and future, to obtain approval of and accom- 
plish expeditious action on these things. Meanwhile, the Fleet must be prepared 
at any given time to employ, with maximum effectiveness, all components as 
they actually exist. 

2. There is a definite line of demarkation between this objective and longer 
range planning. The latter has its proper sphere and must be continued as an 
essential basis for determining and stressing improved readiness x-equirements. 
This planning will naturally include the more effective schemes of employment 
that improved readiness, vehen attained, will permit. 

3. Current readiness plans, however, cannot be based on any recommedation 
for, or expectation of, improved conditions [14512] or facilities. Such 
plans must be based only on hard fact. They must be so developed as to provide 
for immediate action, based on facilities and materials that are now available. 

4. A subject emphatically calling for attention in line with the foregoing is 
maximum readiness in the Hawaiian area, particulrly for Pearl Harbor defense, 
of all all available aviation components. As is well known, much remains to be 
done for adequate future effectiveness in this respect. Much, however, can now 
be done with means now available, to make arrangements for local employment 
of aviation more effective than they now are. 

5. I propose, as a first step in direct action on this subject, to call a conference 
at an early date with the addressees of this letter. I desire that appropriate 
preliminary studies be initiated at once ; discussion may be had with Army au- 
thorities subject to the understanding that preliminary agreements must be 
confirmed by the senior oflScers of the respective services in this area. As a 
guide in such studies, intended in no way to exclude consideration of any other 
proposals that may occur to those concerned, a brief outline is appended. I con- 
sider these features to be the most obvious steps toward making the best use 
of everything that is now available for the purpose : 



5472 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(a) Joint Air Exercises. Desirability of intensified attention to this subject 
Frequency and [I45IS] scope. Degree of coordination. Improvement 
along practical lines. 

(b) Communications. Fully satisfactory communications between all Army 
and Navy air activities, both in the air and on the ground. Direct and instan- 
taneous communications, in particular, between all Army and Navy air fields. 
Continuation of and renewed stress upon joint communication exercises. 

(c) Air Command. Determination of responsibility and degree under various 
conditions. Arrangements between the two services for such direct exercise of 
air control as may be necessary. 

(d) Landing Fields, Mutual Use. "Scattering" plans, including dispersion 
of patrol planes. Familiarization of Navy and Army aircraft personnel with 
one another's landing fields and facilities, including actual practice in mutual 
use and servicing. 

(e) Aircraft Recognition and Familiarization. Recognition signals between 
air and ground. Familiarization of all personnel — air, ground and ship — with 
all local Navy and Army types. 

(f) Alert Watches. Determination of suitable alert watch conditions. Re- 
quirements for all naval aircraft types. Size and composition of watches. 
Watches with and without ship-based planes present. Conservation of 
[1451^] personnel and material. 

(g) Armament and Re-armament. Plans for adequate accomplishment with 
means now available. Ready storage. Speed. Replenishment. 

(h) Alarm and Detection. Effective and instantaneous air alarm arrange- 
ments. Detection by RADAR (and otherwise) and tracking of enemy planes. 
Possible restriction of own planes to specific operating areas for this purpose. 
Similarly, control of air traflSc approaches. 

H. E. KiMMEL. 

P. C. Crosley, Flag Secretary. 

Mr. Lane. We have four documents from the files of the State 
Department which we desire to add to the record. They consist of : 
A memorandum of conversation dated December 5, 1941 between 
Secretary of State and the British Ambassador concerning coopera- 
tion with the Dutch East Indies against the Japanese ; 

A dispatch dated December 8, 1941 from Ambassador Grew to the 
State Department ; 

A dispatch dated December 6, 1941 from the State Department to 
the American Ambassador to Chungking ; and 

A dispatch dated December 7, 1941 from the State Department to 
Ambassador Grew. 

The Vice Chaurman. So received. 

\^lJiS15'\ (The matter referred to follows :) 

Department op State 
Memorandum of Conversation 

Date : December 5, 1941 

Subject : Cooperation with Dutch East Indies against Japan. 

Participants : Secretary of State Hull and the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax. 

Copies to : 

The British Ambassador called at my apartment by his request. 

He said he had a message from Eden, head of the British Foreign OflSce, 
setting forth the British view that the time has now come for immediate coopera- 
tion with the Dutch East Indies by mutual understanding. This of course relates 
to the matter of defense against Japan. 

I expresed my appreciation. 

C H 
S CH:MA 



PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5473 

[Copy] 

MA 

Tokyo 

Dated December 8, 1941 
Rec'd. 6 : 58 a. m., 10th 
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before [lJf516] being com- 
municated to anyone, (br) 

Secretary of State, 

Washington. 

Triple priority. 

190tj, December 8, 1 a. m. 

Confidential. 

Department's 818, December 6, 9 p. m., was received and decoded late this 
evening and I was able to see the Foreign Minister immediately thereafter at 
12 : 15 a. m., when I requested an audience with the Emperor at the earliest pos- 
sible moment in order to communicate the President's message directly. The 
Minister said that he would present my request to the throne and would com- 
municate with me thereafter. I read to him and left with him a copy of the 
message. 

Grew. 
HTM 

[Telegram sent] 

Department of State, 
Washington, December 6, 1941. 9 p. m. 
Am. Embassy, 

Chungking (China). 

[14517] 286 
Triple priority. 
Confidential. 

Please communicate, in person if feasible, at the earliest possible moment to 
Chiang Kai-shelj for his confidential information a copy of a message which the 
President is sending to the Emperor of Japan, reading as follows : 

QUOTE (Telegraph Section: Insert here the text of the attached message 
from the President to the Emperor of Japan beginning with the words SUB- 
QUOTE Almost a century ago END SUBQUOTE to the end of page five including 
the President's name) UNQUOTE. 

In communicating copy of this message to Chiang Kai-shelj, please state orally 
as from the President that the quoted message has already been sent by the 
President to the Emperor ; that this message, as the situation now stands, would 
seem to represent very nearly the last diplomatic move that this Government 
can make toward causing Japan to desist from its present course; that if the 
slender chance of acceptance by Japan should materialize, a very effective meas- 
ure would have been taken toward safeguarding the Burma Road; and that it 
is very much hoped that Chiang Kai-shek will not make or allow to be spread in 
Chinese Government circles adverse comment. 

/s/ Hull. 
SKH 
FE : MMH : REK FE PA/H 

[Telegram sent] 

Gray 

Department of State, 
Washington, December 7, 1941, Midnite. 
Am. Embassy, 

Tokyo (Japan). 
Triple priority. 823 

The Department has been informed by the War Department that at 8 : 00 a. m. 
today (Honolulu time) fifty or more Japanese dive-bombing planes, presumably 
from an aircraft carrier, dropped bombs in and around Honolulu. According 

79716 — 46— pt. 11 22 



5474 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to unconfirmed