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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

conctKess of the united states 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 






S. Con. Res. 27 * ,flf 



■I ■*''>. 



(79th Congress) 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN y^ 7 /3^ 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



i 



PART 12 
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 1 THROUGH 6 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attadi 




PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 

OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 

(79th Congress) 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMRER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 12 

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 1 THROUGH 6 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
79716 WASHINGTON : 1946 



/ r U B L T C 



(llv^) 






Qif^ 



cS^ 



JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEAKL 

HAKBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, 7tce Chairman 
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GBARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Mlchl- tive from California 

gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 
North Carolina 



COUNSEL 



(Through January 14, 1946) 

William D. Mitchell, General Counsel 
Gebhard a. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel 
JnLE M. Hannaford, Assistant Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 

Sbth W. Richardson, General Counsel 
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 

II 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 


Pages 


Transcript 


No. 




pages 


1 


1- 399 


1- 1058 


2 


401- 982 


1059- 2586 


3 


983-1583 


2587- 4194 


4 


1585-2063 


4195- 5460 


5 


2065-2492 


5461- 6646 


6 


2493-2920 


6647- 7888 


7 


2921-3378 


7889- 9107 


8 


3379-3927 


9108-10517 


9 


3929-4599 


10518-12277 


10 


4601-5151 


12278-13708 


11 


5153-5560 


13709-14765 



Hearings 

Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 
Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945. 
Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 
Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 
Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3. 4, and 5, 1946, 
Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 
Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946. 
Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 
Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 
Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 
Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 
No. 



12 
13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 through 25 

26 

27 through 31 

32 through 33 

34 

35 

36 through 38 

39 



Exliibits Nos. 

1 through 6. 

7 and 8. 

9 through 43. 

44 through 87. 

88 through 1 10. 

Ill through 128. 

129 through 156. 

157 through 172. 

173 through 179. 

180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 

Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 

Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



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VIII 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



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6 

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u 

08 



s 



« 05 

°:: 

05,0 

Ph -^ 
« S 

03 O 
OQ « 

o 
H 



10 


2 





t^ 


00 





1-H 


M 


»o 


CO 





f-H 


•* 


00 


05 





W 


(N 


00 


cc 


CO 


CO 


CO 


■* 


■* 


•^ 


10 

1-< 


1—1 


CO 

I-H 


CO 


CO 


CO 

1-H 


CD 

1-H 


CO 

1-H 


CO 

1-H 


CO 

1-H 


CO 

1-H 


CO 

1-H 


CO 

1-H 


»o 


iC 


iC 


lO 


10 


10 


"5 


10 


»o 


10 


iC 




(N1-I 


^ 1 

i*r^ 

eO'-H 


ec"T 


§4 


eo"T 
0^ 


si 

1-H 


Si 


C07 

0^ 


^i 


^i 


N't* 

^i 


1-H 


fiH 


i-H 






I-H 


-c4 

1-H 


1^ 


T-H 


1-H 





to 



<s 


CO 


■* 


10 


CO 


l>. 


00 


o> 





1-4 


N 


CO 


•fl 


»o 


»« 


te: 


«c 


«o 


»o 


10 


CO 


CO 


CO 


CO 



XII 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



a 
o 






05 



3 



C 

g 

he 

a 
Q 

c 
.2 

S3 



3 

2 

60 
G 
'■J3 

g 

O 

c 

s 

CO 



s 



s 

c 




u 
<x> 

Q 

c 

e3 



> 

o 

o 
u 

o 

be 



3 
O 



a; 
Ph 

c3 

EC 

a 

00 



CO 

C 
O 
'■+3 
u 

a; 
a 

cc 
C 



1^ 
bC 



C 

o 
u 
c 
c 









-^ 
fc 






Cl-5 

o o 



cc e 
s3^ 






bC 



O 



■a 



O <*H 

•rs o 



13 
C 

53 



5 g 

bC.2 
^ -1^ 

03 

-SO, 
O O 3 

-^ "2 „ 
O ?^ S 

.bc ^ 



"C -u .3 

i!l 

i; 03 ** 



^ 2 ^ * 2 



^.H 



(Do— g •'- 



s^ o 



fc. 1—1 

Ph . 

bC 

O 3 

l§ 

GO O 
^ CO 

OG 

C< 00 

PL, g 

£ « 



o 



b 


• 


o 

T3 
03 

C/l 


1-H 


m 




OJ 




y 




<! 


bC 




3 


o 


< 



cc _, 

s3-g 

831-5 - 

cc 2 

cc «»-< ^ 

03 005 

J2 



a: 



O 

u 



o 



^-' <a 



M.SS 

- a, 

- S 



o2^ 



OQ «" 

CO ■** 
^^ 



s 

I. ■ 

a: 



c 

be O 



aj t> u 



T3;=i 

«; c 



»^ OD P 
CC "^ 

3 '^ 



c80 

a3.5'0 O , 

S ^^ S 
2£ " S 

2-0 §^ 

bC c 

08 2; 



O 

03 x; 

CO O 



03 











o 



00 
CO 



05 
00 
CO 






1— I 



OS 

I— I 









© 
io 

I 






id 



I I 



CO 

I I 



M I 

CO <— I 



<N I 

CO >-< 

^ I 






CO^ 



CO-^ 



OSiO 
CO^ 

^ I 



OJiO 

co^ 



-"el. 



CO 



CO 



CO 

CO 



CO 



00 
CO 



CO 



o 






CO 



IXDEX OF EXHIBITS 



XIII 



x: 
> 

O 

tc 

C 

(4 



c 

c9 
u 

• ■■4 

< 

C 

> 

el 

S5 OS 



OQ O 



03 



c 

^^ 
9 " 

e3 eS 

£0 



5 J: 

«^ c 
o 

I'' 

5S 



o 

4^ 



c 
> 

u o 



5E 



0) 
OS 

«= s 

o * 

to ia 
•i-t n 

>!-* 

£"^ 

<^ 

C.2 

W o 

u V 
oS bO 

03 
S >< 

2c 
.2 

^ 02 

. tv 
u bC 
V bC 

-2 2 

T3"E 

-pa 

§ bC 

c £ • 

03 S? » 

S o — 



bC*; 

cc 03 j:: 
o3^i3 

o o 2f 

j5j 



ffi 



cc-j, bc 
So — 

-r.S - 
c c 

•- D- 

> •- 
OT3 O 



tJ 
« 



S3 
w a; 



, O 
o3 »- 



^ a E 

32 2i r3 

ill 



a; -^ 
CC a; 

II 

.-£ e3 



o o> 

a. t-l 

c 

c -Si 
bc *- 



l§ 

c "^ 

is 

.2 fcoi 

-^ 

bcS o 

.s i"^ 

S-c c 

bc c ^ 

O a: bC 
CSS fc 

C ^ OJ 
O -, t. 



ST) • 
t, O JT 



0) 



e3 c 



.- 02 



502 



bC 
03 
•/: 
a: 



S3 









S^ 



0^ 
Oh 



bC-a 
C V 

as3^ 

02 J <; 3J 
S3 * aJ 

^■'^.S fee 

£3 3 

o 



X 

V 

S3 

-»^ 

"c 



03 



c3 >> - 

S = S 6 



ce 



bC 

3 

■a 
« 

S3 
T3 



> OJ 

S /5 o 
3Q0 

bCbcc 

3 03 "C 
.— y O 

► -►^ •- -S 



x: e3 

-tj — 

03 C 









03 

+5 



CC 









CI, 

s3 
I- 



bC 

_C 

'3 
u 
c 

3 
O 
U 

c 
.=£ -*^ 

■as 
> ?; 












02 

c; 



X 






"s 



X 

a; 

-CO 

« -<^ 

^£ 

T3 q; 
s3*^ 

^2; 



> w 






Is 



03 

z 

3 

o 

3 



S3 



02 

bC 



c; 




bL 


^-M 


1^ 


■* 


1) 


OS 


-ki 








^« 




HH 


'— 1 


_^ 




S3 


u 


> 


0) 


03 


Q 


z 


-0 


<»- 







08 


OJ 


^ 


«o 


5E 


"^ 








c 
< 



cS 

3 

sa 

o 
g 
a; 
3 

3 

X 

CJ 
S3 



X 

c 
o 

'u 

c 
u 
3 
S> 
bC 



u 33 



03 
> 
03 

c 

a 
u 

O 



is 
02 



7 
o 

B 

'x 

■> 
C 

I 

a; 
bC 






X 



Q 

bC 



3 



X 



> 

S3 



O S3 

s3 3, 



S5 

<2 



<3 c 

OS 



K^<^ X 

o§§ 

^^ ^ 
o aj == 

QO ^ c 

S"^ £ 

X t; 

1—1 3 c 
■^ o « 

2i.i: 

..3 2 
c^ ^ ^ 

O 3"S 

CS *^ 

I— 1 O 02 



**■ 3 T- 



V a; 
-^bcg 

cr.£-S 

biD.2£ OJ 
03 >T3 



c 



X 

u 
1) 
a 

•c 



'S 



X 



c3 

c 






3 « 



«s 2 



0) 



<v 



§1 



o t: 



e ^^ 



(1 S3 

« o 
X i 



SQ 



»o 


I— I 


"* 


■<t 


t>. 


00 





■* 


t^ 


>* 


(O 


t* 


ec 


■* 


■* 


in 


10 


<£: 


t^ 


1> 


CO 


«o 


to 


® 








1-H 






t>- 





00 


00 


00 




kO 



007 


10 


10 


10 


iC 


iC 


iC 


10 


10 


l« 


10 


■>*' 


^ 


■* 


■>* 


■>!}< 


•* 


Tj< 


■* 


■* 


Tf 


Tf 


CO 1 


iC 1 


0; 1 


(N 1 


■* 1 


•* 1 


■* 1 


■>* 1 


00 1 


■* 1 


10 1 


O"? 


5^2 


»« 


ovn 


-H iC 


Nt^ 


(Mt^ 


(Nt^ 


(Nt^ 


(M t^ 


10 1^ 


t^t* 


ts.»- 


|>r-H 


t^ — 


t^-H 


t> — 


r^^ 


t-^ 


l^'- 


t^^ 


t^--l 


t>.rt 


— 1 


<N 1 


-, 1 


^-, 1 




^H 1 


^ 1 


— 1 1 


^ 1 


—1 1 


'-H 


^ 1 


(N 


T— 1 


c« 


^H 


N 


(N 


• c^ 


(N 


(N 


C<1 


(N 


N 


^H 


T-^ 




^H 






1— t 




1-^ 


*-4 


1—1 






<; 



W5 









oc 



05 



o 

00 



« 



00 



eo 

00 



00 



XIV 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 




INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



XV 






^^ 
O 05 

OQ 

•3 .Si 
•Co 



c 
o 



00 



0) 



qaPn 
03 



CO 



Oi 



^ « I 
O 3 § 

Scoco 



A 1^ 

°§ 

► c 

V s 
c o 

e^ 

^^' 

0) « 
u 03 

"I 

ii 55 

C bC 
t5.S 

^-.£ ; 

S c «s 

o o o 

Jog 
2 « S 

^ O ^ 

^^ t*^ ^^ 

!» C Js 

-a o.g 
aj *^ c 

03 pi-5 

"^ 03 bc 

a fec^ 
g <= M 

O C C 
0) o («^ 



o 
> 

c 
o 

0) 
CQ 

<u 

c 

03 

a 

03 
bC 

"c 

(-< 
OJ 

w 

c 
o 
w 

c 



PL, 

o 

o 



03 
01 

u 
« 

>, 



*s s 

bC+j 
C 3 

« 

s° 

»9 

C " 

So 
c § 

«!« 

>. StC 

01 0- o 

" 01 "s 



•* 



03 

^'^ 
(N o 

^; 

I! 

r c 

0> 

s 

> 

o 



c 

03 

O 



o 
S c 

bC O 



01 03 
-►:> bC' 

I— I (C 

03 > 
> C 

03 1—1 

^- 

- c 

. Oi 

^§ 

o-g 

«-. 03 
a) (-1 

a c 



rt"- TfH a 



Oi 



a o 



B5 



OS— s 

O 

. C 

-^ > c 

&.;s o 

T3 OJ S 

O)^ c3 

a 

■a 

S c « 

g o 5 

b. s p 

o o S 

S S o 



;« 



o E 

£ s 
=« 5 

OJ 03 

c 

•*- "E o 



- s 



O 3 

to 

o c 

01 

u 



c 
o 

bC 

<: 



J2 
3 

o 

OJ 



s 



u 
g o 






05 



cc ^ 



0) 

o 



>" 

o 



o 



a. 

«2 



a &3 



CO 



^-< 72 O) V—, 

C fc- C I—' 

o3 <4-i 

a o 



a; 
> 



c 






03 



o 



X 

6 

I— I 
p 

Q 



o 



o 
S 



bC 

o 



I 

0) 
'V 

a 

03 



O 
Si 






Q 



Wo 

-I— I 
3 . 
xi « 

03 01 

OQ 
TO a) 

o .. 

^§ 

o 
a; bC 

O c 

^a 
5a 

cr o 

_ cc 

oS 

^ o 

<1 

1=. ^^ 

O O 

|o 

a.fci 



> 

'aa 

c 



05 






o 

/~\ 

Hi 

•c 
_o 

'C 

o 

o 



b. 
03 



b. 
oj 



02 



.2 
2 



T3 
01 
>, 
03 

£ 

c 

03 

CO 

.2 
u 

a 
o> 
bc 
03 

'C 
PQ 

01 

-o 

03 

03 ., 

C(M 

_0(N 
■*- . 
C > 

03 O 



«3 

s| 

1-5 bC 

^- c 
o-E 
oo 3 

oi-a 
+^ 

o3 ->^ 

03 5 

o> c 
01 
^% 

O 



01 

Q 

o 
-fci 

eo 



03 



O 



Lh 

a 

<; 

T3 
C 
c3 

b. 



w 



03 



o a 



0) 
0) 



O) 
J2 

O! 

b< 
01 

O) 



c 
.2-- 

eg 73 -^ 



> 03 

;^S 

a? 



u o 
O OS 

Pi'o 

w.a 

Oife 



= "03 OC 

aa bC 3 

c Ji s. r"^ 
HH o £^ 

03 £.=i'^ 

^ b 

01 r3 



-O 
cc 

03 o o 



^3 «'-:3a 

^ % <A o 

= >.^2 



> 



3 o3 03 

o|^| 

a-H^ % 

*5 030 5 



S 3 2 

03 03 — ' 

0> " -H- 



CC 



> a 



03 
u 
u 

03 

O 



O « X5 
, e3 0: 

■*^ rh -^^ 



3 
. 03 

3 f- cc 
C3t-I fc. 

>< a--2 

X3 t, bH 3 

3 c3"3 C3 

s aa-3 

H ^,- 5- 03 XJ 5 



o 



Oi 


t^ 


■* 


10 


<© 


CO 


I> 


00 


(M 





-* 


00 


00 





»-H 


1-H 




(N 





^H 


(M 


Tt< 


Tf 


10 


o> 

















F— ( 


^-H 


1-H 




1-H 


M 


1—4 


cs 


(N 


cq 


CN 


(N 


(N 


(N 


(N 


<N 


N 


(N 


«o 


lO 


iC 


»o 


iC 


10 


iC 


lO 


10 


10 


10 




rf 


■* 


T}- 


rf 


Tf< 


'i' 


"* 


t 


■* 


Tf 


■* 


«3 


^ 1 


^ 1 


CO 1 


'J' 1 


10 1 


iC 1 


10 1 


10 1 


10 1 


1 


to 1 


05 ■^ 


05^ 


Oi^ 


Oi — 


Cn r-H 


05 1-1 


Oi-H 


05 T-. 


Oi-H 


Oi.-i 


05'-l 


OS^ 


•«*< 1 


OM 


OM 


OC<3 


OfO 


oeo 


CO 


00 


OfO 


oeo 


OfO 


OCO 


eo-* 


(N 1 


<N 1 


<N 1 


N 1 


(N 1 


<N 1 


(M 1 


(N 1 


IN 1 


(N 1 


(N 1 


N 1 


CM 


CM 

1-H 




(N 


<M 


1— t 


(M 


1-H 


1— 1 


i-H 


(N 





CO 
<3> 



OS 



05 



OS 

OS 



O 

o 



s 



CO 

o 



o 



o 



CD 

o 



o 



XVI 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



a 
o 






o o 

C eg 

w ,^ 

x: ® 
I- 

S • 

4) ~ — < 
fee's G 
3 * . 

S ^' • 

= cr . 
>.c g 

03 «? iS 
O 5J 03 

O o 

•^ in c 

o 

73 *^ 03 
S cS o 



^'■Sj c 

0) C o o 

&. «^^-^ 

o5 ^ c 
g -^ x 
~t~-- '- 

2 >S « 

o 0.-3 e 

C O o8 
.2 08 Q, !» 
2 73 -^ 

O) -u c 
(D C 5 3J 

Jffi c > 

«3 *- _^ 
^§ OgJ 

h^ T-t «*« J 
•^ c o ^ 

■ ^ <i;<fc- 



W 



■r. 


r/; 


4^ 


I-* 


fe 


^ 


o 


O 


a; 


•CM 


H 


3U. 


-k^ 








« 


•> 


a 


C 


u 


a 


o 


crt 


0) 


O 


a; 


C 


^ 


k. 




rfi 


t> 


>> 


hf 


0) 


> 




C/J 


03 



^ c *^ 



^ 2 ea a: "C t- 



1? (N 03 



^± 8 

^ "' 03 

_ c c 
> s ^ •- 

>^ O cr. - 
'^ *- 03,^ 

2^ >- 2 

o3 ^^,"3 O 

•ax: c « 
as <— ~ pC 






J2 



C 

_o 
'■5 
03 
« 

o 
bC 

c 
o 

Xi 
t«" 

c 

3 
Eh 

pi 
■§ 
ja 



> 

o 

52: 



o 

05 



OS 



o 



d 






CO 



0. 

S 



tc 17; 

O) ■* 

^ > 

5'S 



o.S 



c 



a: 

C 



o 



_x « a; 



Q~ 08 



COS 



01 



-^ a 



o ■:s-r 



u 
03 



Oi . 



-^^ S 






03 


,0 


.2 
C 00 


PQ 


V 0) 
5^ 


bC 

C 


c 

03 


e 





a; 


00 


^>^ 


c 




0) 






e 

•0 

C 


E£< 


S-o 


GO 


'=^X3 


B 


bC 

c 


6 


£ 


0) •o 


4^ 


0) 


C^"^ 


<j 


V 


3 .- 


jj 





ao) 


E<H 


•0 fi 


u 


^H 


2S 



V3 
u 

O 



- c 

^- o 

"^ 'Z 

- o 

so 



OS 



-»« 

u 

O 

S 
OS 
73 



I 

u 

ki 

0) 



2 ^ 



.2 

'-2 



.TJ 


"C 


ja c 


«c 


01 c3 


M •" 


13.2 


6 s 


^ 


1^ 




73-= 


fcS 


.-03 

2^ 


il 


^0 


^ s 


^ 


Pui 



> 

ojx: 

00 - 
.«8 



5 Si 



73 +s^ 

*jx:.5 

S I' c 
e bcv 

Mi-3 bC 

73 TjtjC 

X 




CO 
05 



IN 

CO 

(N 



(N 









(N 



(N 

o 

(N 



CO 
(N 



eo 



00 

CO 



o 

z 



JZ 
K 



05M< 
t^ I 

(N I 



ft" Tf 

«0 ! 



to 



tC 



t- 1 t^ I 



N 



M 



(N I 



;0 CO 



05 



•o » 



OsT 

5:« 



CO 



CO 



o 



X 

o 



OS 

o 



o — 



(N 



CO 



I 

CO 



I 

CO 



o 

I 

CO 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



XVII 









|l 

S ^ — 

'^ ■ 



J5 
C O 

^ a 
.. a? «' 

00 « « 
OJ C ^ 
05 O 

o '^ 
.2 .~c 

■I^^ Si, 
^ o3 -H 



2 

o 

S 



02 



13 ■* 



, O 



o 



Tf<S 

PU( g I 

Pi aO 



&C 03 . o 

-|Qc3 
i-iCC o ^ 

o-E<N-g 

•*i M^ o 

c_ o 

o 



bC 
C 

■? 

o 

GO 



OS 



c 

OJ 

u 



OS 



C bC ^" 
o c •* 



s 

o 



ccc 

X 

C 

a 

- 1-9 
+= •►< 
.20 

X o 

qS 

X 

S £ 



3 
o 



0" 

J2i 



3 
bC 






0) 



s 

Pi 



. a 

^ -ki 
S£ 
21 

X * 
03 O 

§•£ 

^ X 

*^ c 
go, 

<< X 

"^ OJ 

-^"^ 
^ S 

03 XJ 
+s _ 

^S 

ffi a 
I- 

S = 
•a * 

B bC 

T3 C 



-3 O 



X 
X 

C 
<u 

v 



o 



« o 
c « 

O OS 

a— 

X ^ 

£eo . 

(1 . X 

o w o 

^o * 



12 

03 
IX! 



■3 


u 

< 


03 




X 


c 


+= 


03 


bfi 




C 


03 


C 


1 


03 


w 



c 
o 



OS 



.2 
03 

o 

CO* 



c 

03 



03 

C 
03 

c 
o 

a 

X 
03 
u 
tl 

O 
« 



> . 
03 "3 



^^ 



C X 
03 

^§ 
S:= 
«3 03 

^ & 

•M o3 

©a 

Is 

1*0 
03 
02 






X 

X 
03 

c 

03 

S 

3 

S 



bpx 
•3 03 

^t 

03 C 

c 
o 



03 
X 

03 
O 



C 

03 

M 

H 

03 

o 

X 

a 
a> 

02 



03 



C 
03 

a-' 

Wo 



bO 

c 



a 
a 

o 

OS .22 
^^ 



2 -:: ^ 



03 X^ 
P>hCC 

03 

« s 

03 



a o 
<^ 

"oc 

03 
^~& 

X 

"':^ 

C > 

03 u 

9^ 

W^ 

> 03 

c 

T3 c 

~o3 

03 « 

C 03 

sa 

o<J 

au- 

03 O 



OS 



03 

Q 



2h a 



3 

J3 
03 

o 

c 

'-kj 
<A 

02 



T3 
03 



Q 
X 

o 
Si 

X 

O 

bC 

o 

c 

03 



^ CT3 
> X o3 -'^ 



bC 



03 

a 
o 



S .2 b o 



03 



w 



OS <;'^ 



8|^ 

"« a ^° 

a o r 3 

o3 J "-p S 
8210-03 

bC 

;c 

. 03 



o . 

U 03 



hC bC C 

c.a-2 

a "^ a 
o^a 

03 O 



03 
ffl 

1 

a 
< 



n 03 
•^ C 

OS 



03 03 



03 

03 

a 

03 



-C ^^ _ 
OS -kJ 3 

• ^ *3 o 

03 

c 

03 
> 

c 
o 

«3 



o< 



03 

J3 
+i 

bC 
C 

'c 

03 
U 
3 
O 

a" 

T3 03 
03 -»? 

-f^ o3 



:3 'as 



03 

03 

(h 

03 

s 
_r 03 



a3 •-" 

83 X O 

3 X o3 

S-T3 «-OJ > 
o *&.^"ffi 

,^ 03 pO 03 

e 



3 03 
X -<J 

03^ 

O 03 

3 ^ 

3 e3 

O 

X e 
e| 

o o< 

03 



T3 

a 

03 

» 

O 

S 

d 

^i 

.t a 

SI 

•^ 03 

<» - 

as 

a 



a . 

hH 03 
r.-S 



S 03 

"3.2 
a«t; 



:3 < 



8 
03 



03 
03 
02 



X 
03 
C3 

3 

X 

a 

3 
u 



w 



ol 
03 

• 03 

Is 



o > 

a^ 



a 



03 W ^ 



X 



OS 2 

^^ .« 
-ks C 

3 S 

bO P 

^ 03 
u 

u 



T3 
3 
<A 

03 

3 

3 
i-s 

5 c 



bC 

3 

a 

u 

03 
C3 

B 
O 



03 

3 

03 

a ® 

ox 

03 • 

« 03 

^O 

03 

a: 



00 


T-H 


(M 


t>. 





t^ 


CO 


"* 


CO 


1-H 


l>. 


iC 


«e 





t^ 


l^ 








1— t 


»-M 


I— ( 


(N 


C< 


cc 


10 


CO 


CO 


CO 


t^ 


»» 


t^ 


t^ 


t^ 


t^ 


t^ 


t^ 


(N 


(M 


(M 


N 


(M 


(N 


(N 


C^ 


(N 


N 


M 


N 



CO 

§2 



w 



I 



CO 



OOT 

<n7 



CO 

OS I 



eo 



ec 



o 
eo 



CO 



cc 



!0 

HSci 



c^ 



I 



CO 



OS 



«i 



C<l 



CO 

-I 



CO 

si 



CO 
Ost 

si 



(N 



I 



CO 

Os^ 

<n7 



CO CO 

Ml Ml 



1 ( 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 

< 





1 1 I 1 1 II 
1 1 1 1 1 (1 

1 I 1 1 1 II 

1 1 1 1 1 II 



»o 



<o 



»c 



CO 



00 



OS 



o 

M 



M 



M 

M 



79716 O — 46 — pt. 12- 



XVIII 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



a 
o 



c 
o . 

«"* 

305 

o • 

tc O 
o +» 

a - 
ao5 



^ OS 

C u 

cO 

w 5 
<= S 



X S3 



J3 



> 

C>7 
« C 

I- 

So 

o ^ 

o-.S 

« 03 

b: ^- 

«o 

° a; 
c.S 

■•^ S 
^ 8 

02 



s 

< 

o 



K 
U 

0) 

C 

O 

05 
C 

_o 

ID 






c ^^ 



c X 

C- a; 

03 
u 

12 

73 o' 
C -^ 
03 . 

C . 
O^ 

a-* 

S2 
b. 
(-< . 






o 

o 

— > 

S3 o3 



SP*S 
-< o g 

55U 



«) 



■O+f 
05 O 

OS .lis 
? C 

o -k^ o 
Ht35 



s -H^q 



f Sis 

C O c 

31-2 

CO (u « 

|C « 

!> o iS 

c S g 

33 03 2- 

-tJ o3 tc 
^ i S 

. — -t^ 

« c c 

a ^^ 

^8 . 

X O 'T 
03 U O) 

c ^^ 

03 C3 - • 

(^•5 —' ■ 

■-53.0 

^ ,—1 "O ta 

c 



c 
o 



a: 

o 

J3 



O 

05 



03 
o 

o 



o 

S3 

c 

eS 

03" 
> 

3 

"S 

c 



05 



o 

Q 






o 

*« ^^ 
■^05 

»^ 

. 6 

CO 33 

^ 5 
1; r^ 

X(N 

<4-l > 

O o 

o 



e3 O 

M 05 

... 3 



* 4) 



<<-4 O 



c 
.2 



b< 

C3 

C . 
03 -H 

03^ 

'c 'Z ■<* 

s3^.-H 

±: o^ 

O "^ 3 
" bC'-i 

03 -»J 03 

O 05 - 
^ -U 05 

o-tf .2 

E>H > 3 

^'^ c 

eS 31— I 
xCO 

^ « 



ec 



o 
Z 

t< 

03 

03 ^^ 
g «S _ 

c'= 3 



0; 

>'05 



3 
S3 

S 

«3 o O 



03 

Q 



(A 

05 

C 

o 
u 

03 N 

+^ -tJ 

■5Z 

S3 g 

«| 

-<*: 
c 

o >, 
'x 0> 



e8r>. 

3^ 

& 13 

is 

« t 

-►^ 



S3 C 
ejZ 



5^ 
^ "3 



-SOQ 

5 -*^ 
2 « 

p.^-_03 
fc* 3 



S3 
S3 



X 

3 
03 

bt 

(^ 

u ^^ 
s3r}H 

12 

O ^ 

« 03 
03 C 
X 3 

g^ 

oST) 

a 03 

O >- 

03 

.2 "^ 

03"" 

X .« 

X 

O 3 

a— 

^s 

■^ X 

3 iS 

■pT3 
** q; 

C3.1i 
« 3 

"? >- 



ai 
a 



O 






O 



(1 
o 

03 
C 



S3 

03 

03 
03 
T3 

s 

cu 

d 

o „• 
3 ^ 

I- 

3 bC 

,5 = 

"^ S3 

^a 



03 ^ +5 X 

§^a§ 

t« > «J 
bc-a 2 ^ 

Bo 03'"' 

t" -f- X 03 
03 d 03 ^ 

0:3 a^ 

+:> bC^ 3 

3 3 s- 83 
3^;S « - 

-t^ p-H <i^ ^^ 

S3 3 03 ^ 
Cl-- -»^ 

a^ -2o" 

S bC • 
032 C> 
o3 -"O >7 

M ^ - 

«*- S E »3 
O 03 fc< ■ 

X ._ 



0; .ii t 

a s 

a pQ4< 






^ 

« 



«n 






3 

t, 03 - 

oa^ 

■jrt o 
-, ^ a 03 

Q PLi +3 M 

O 03 03 

x--a2^ 

2 03 ^?^ 

08 > s 






S3 



.2S"3rK == 



8 
e3 

03 

C 
03 



3 U 
O O 

£^ 

.-§ 

03 ja 

X a 



ajc 

oJ^" 



J=; o3c<i 

0; 

32 



O ^ 

bcO 

I- 

"- 3 
bc^jj 

Is 



5 
a8 

>^ 

■3 

cr 



c 
O 

> 

03 

3" 
_o 
'53 



o 
U 

X 
03 

Xi 

& 

JS 

a 



w 



— -a 
93 b. 
t 08 

S o 

o — 

3 03 

■■^«<" 
xQh 
03 



M 




















" 


isd 





CO 


05 


^-< 


CM 


t^ 





lO 


^H 


CO 


CO 


■* 


■* 


«^ 


CO 


«C 


t^ 


t^ 


T}< 


rr 




t^ 


t^ 


t^ 


qo 


oc 


00 


« 


00 


05 


OS 


c^ 


CM 


C^J 


CM 


CM 


CM 


CM 


CM 


CM 


CM 


«i 






















aiS 


«2 


CC 


tr 


iC 


C3 


^ 


CO 


CC 


<o 


CO 


^.Et5 


si 


5015 
-20-4 


^T 


ooT 


5^7 


ocT 


«T 


cM-r 


«f 


CM 7 


rings 
date 
duee 


CM 1 


cm7 


276 
-19- 


J22 

cm7 


284 
-19- 


287 
-21- 


H 


S-o 




e<i 


^« 






,— 




^H 


(<»H 




tag 






















d 


J 




















z 






















.a 




< 

1 


















2 


CO 


1 

CO 


Tf< 


in 


CC 


t^ 


00 


OS 





^ 


u 




C<l 


CM 


CM 


CM 


CM 

1^ 


CM 


CM 


CO 


CO 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



XIX 



(A 



C 

93 

O 

o 
H 

0) 



03 

c 

o 

c 

05 



.23 

« 

J3 



73 
C 
c3 

O 
bC 

O 

H 



o i- 

>>« 

.22 o5 

.E tH 






0) 
en 

I" 
^ e3 

.02 



C 3 



ti 

c 

bC 
0) 

o 



«3.i: 
«« c 

0-3 



c 

? . . O) • - 

9 +*:: fe:; 

C ^ C 35 

05 +? 05 OO" 'i OO' 
C .J? 05 • 05 • 

t- W C 05 05 03 

05 e8 ^^ - O - 

rt 03 tf 03 d 1^ 
►C 05 S ^ " 

'^.ti g'c'5.22 
«r^ S.2 S.2 

CU 5^ ST3 
•3 .2 93.=; 03 

« +» T3 CO ~ 03 

-g C C 2 "= 2 

lis 

05 



03 
bC 









S § 



V 



oT ® -h" bc 

3 _ O o 



051 



05 



rt > O 
0) > ^ 

ffi 05^ "l^ 
iH 05 _ 

oa - 
CO c- 
05 O 

bC 03 
,^ C t- 

"^ .2 •- j3 

f!^ .i^) Xi -t^ 
03 <» 

-' C OS'S 

^ .-^ « 

C.g*bcT3 



-(J 
u 

93 



>..2 



,73 * 05 

5 "-5 
o3 o 

-a cc 

o c >. 

>..2 M 

I- c S 

05 O ~ 

1/1 

! * 05 



05 ;r c c 



05 o 

03 



c §^- 



COO 
o . 
• JS « 

^° 

05 y 

c 
O 

35 ^ >, 

fl .S o 
= «« ^. 

03 -^ 
be*' 

%H 

g 05^^ 



O 



^ 05 

■** -^ "S ^ 

-*.' .t7 05 ,— . 

fl h 0,0 

a; O t« ^— • 

g tc 05 



0-2; T3 



05 a, 
Q 3? 






05 C 

>-U c . 

■^ 3^00 
o3.« C g 



O 
03 



0-, 



cc 



03; 



93--, ... 
C 03 ^-^.S 



Uo 



«5 

CO 



2j= *- 

-fJ CO ,£3 t' 

0) . c o 



Sec 

05 g ^ 
O O 

r- £ 

C 05 
05^ 



O 

bC 

c c 






C 33 
35 S 



r-TC 



a"SD-^ 



-"< c 

^•~ . 33 



X2 05 



05 05.S^ 



00 



00 ^ 



*^ 05 . 
^ — 4- O 



C C 4J 



0^5 



c 
.2 

'■^ -5^ TJ i-<" 



(Sr- 



05 03 
00 CO 



S I 35 

"^ 05 O 
. C5 03 



§1 

o3 CO 
+s 

05 U. 

00 03 
05 r\ 

C "o 

05 ° 
J2 05 

^ 05 

bC o 
C '- 

T3 G 
03-'" 

03 05 

'" A 

cc 

•|:S 

TJ X 

C 05 

8.e 

C ^ 

03 — 

c'-;3 

05 C 
> 05 
05 T3 



08 

a 

Cl-^ 



05 

(4 

bC 
- o 

05 U 

aa 



t- CO "C 
O 05 t. 
S 3 03 



U 



fc. l-i o 

^ "^ 

03 U 
■ S5 03 

C C 05 

_w.C fc« 



c o 

05 03 



o 

C 



05 
05 

+5 



o 
03 
b. 

C W 

35 r- IT 

ciS c 

03-1.3^' 

2 e 35 

O ° -P 
« C 05 

03 cB 

•■S c 

. s^ 

0; 35 CO 
35 35 

■S'^ 05 

c o c 
35 - a 



_co 



c ^ 
« .22 



■t^ 35'^ 

t- »-,c 

sll 

2 « c 

^ 03 05 

e^ 05 3 

. CO "^ 

> S : 

;z; « 
"^ g «= 

33 03 ^ 



03 
03 



bC 

C 

•f-4 

C 
Ui 
93 



C o; 

a 

05 



^-bC 

c.S 

05 +s 

t s 



33 
05 

a 
o 
o 



O 00 

^° 
^D. o 

35 _ 

c ^ 

?l 

t5 35 
^ bC 
C o 
05 ^ 
CO 

s-i O 

O -P 

05 

.., 50 

bC 05 
c — 

•S a 

03 ^ 

c"^ 

05^' 
05^ 

■> 00" 

05 C^ 
o3 O 

s;z; 

§ o 

.« 35 

1^ 

• -« 00 
Q, CO 

ii 



II 

S 93 
o - 

tC 05 

0.2 

93 05 

c « 

bC05 

—-03 

05 3 

^P 

o c 

• ^^ 
<%^ 

O "^ o 

bC ^ 

o E 03 
3-*^ 

— 05 

+i ^ 05 

bJ rt 35 

■^ a"^ 

- 2.C 

Tt< O" o3 
2 """^ 

^^< 

o o S 

Z c a 

— .202 
^ *^ .^ 
35 03 t 

05 S*^ 

I ^"2 

S 35 2 
o « S 

05 O C 



s 

03 

w 

00" 

c 
,0 

'■♦3 
03 



b< 
03 

XI 

2 



O _e3 

CO ^ 

OJ 05 

— -1.2 

3 08 

05 •" 
^ 73 

o £ 

05.5 
S S 

■■5x3 

00 s 

C w 



05 

£< '00 

05 3 

°S 
73"" 

hc2 
c 

ct-" 
S 45 

bc'^ 
1° 

03 C^ 

05 

C > 

8| 

oc 

^^ 
-»^ 

2 33 

•E^ 

° a 

sQ 
o 



02 



o^ 

^^ 

.s 

05 '^ 
*- /i^ 

Oh 

^j :: 
2 '3 

05 P 

Sc 

-=5.2 

00:3 

. «8 

05 03 
05 



O ." >*^t^ 



o o 

2- 
a5P 
p.- 
0873 

cS 

93 S 

c a> 
3-^ 
X - 
c o 

03 (N 

(-< 

2 bi)^ 

a 3^ 
a 

•« 03 O 

|^« 

+s . 05 

ofe a 



ec 


CO 


to 


■* 


-H 


t^ 


t^ 


iCi 


Tf 


Tf 


10 


(N 


t^ 


00 


ao 


OS 


o> 


OS 


05 


1— 1 


F*< 


1-H 


f-H 


T-l 


(N 


(N 


(N 


M 


M 


CO 


C3 


CO 



CO 



CO 



si 



»c 



c4 



10 

CO 
OS 



CD 

"*< 

I 

CO 



CO 



CO 
OS 
IN 



CO 
(N 



CO 

Sc4 



OS 



(N 

I 



CO 



CO J 



CO 

COtj* 

CO I 
OS CO 



CO 
CO-* 

t^ I 

OS CO 
(NN 

I 






CO 



CO 
CO 



CO 



CO 



CO 
CO 



CO 



00 
CO 



XX 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



•r, a: 



i 



O 

•o 

w 

s 

08 

c 

<V 
-(J 

c 
o 



o 

X! 
0) 



01 

o 



OS 



^ ^ 



"oS 

? 

O 
go 

2 






B 

E ^ 



«- ^ « 
""^Q 



«.2 



a; 5j o 

^a.2 

CO 23 

1 1 si 

^^^^ 

"Sis .2 






^-c 



V 



c 



15 

I 

o 

GO 

bC 

C 



c 
o 

a 
o 

GC 

QQ 

a 

a 

o 
O 

cc 
C 
O 

'c 

3 

a 
a 

o 
O 






■g^ as « 

2 all 

^ 2 C 3 

|a^p 



S3 

Oi 

c 

e 

o 
c 
.5 
"5 
& 



o 




^ 
<«-l 




13 






T3 


-►i 


O 


93 


u 



QQ 
O 



CO 

V 
O) 
GC 



S 
0) 

'S 
<]; 

&« 
a; 

Si 



X 



Q 

T3 



o 
a 
a 

c3 

C 

o 



a 
a 

o 

CO 

t, 
01 
X2 

O 

XI 
*s 

c irj 
c-c 

T3 3 
0> o 

8| 

Oh 



c 

c3 

3 

X 



aj 



=1 






s 

a 
a,0 

3^ 

§1 

3i> 

d O 
^^ 

eS 



H^ 

-4-9 

"3 **< 
C O 

a^ 

2^ 
S^ 

u ^* 

c . 

^* 

'■§ 

&•« 

c +» 

01 

a 



I * 



8iSJ %■% 



a) ^ 

JDCO 
O 01 

« a 

aj 3 

8« 

-oE 
Sg 

9, c 
•2 o 
So 

aj -: 

a^ 

«3 83 
0) u 

•M 3 

OO, 

O 



2=^ 



s 






























«o 


CC 


■«f 


(N 




00 


1-H 


e^ 


00 




M 


N 


N 


pagi 
No, 


Oi 


o 


iCl 


o 






M 


N 


N 




00 


CO 


00 




(N 


M 


00 




oo 


00 


CO 


00 




oo 


eo 


eo 


« 


00 


00 


00 




eo 


CO 


00 


CO 




00 


oo 


eo 


jarings, page 
d date intro- 
duced 


o 


co'^ 


® 




I 


« 


5C 


«o 




CO 


« 


(O 


CO 


® 1 

oec 


00 00 


00 


cods 




-.■* 

s.^ 




I 


N 1 
osr-- 


OS-* 


ST 

OSt- 


cow 


OOC^l 


CO 


coca 


CO 1 


00 1 


CO 


1 


CO 1 


eo 1 


eo 1 


1 


F^ 


1 




1 


1 


(N 


N 




c< 


c* 


c» 


M 


w§ 












^H 
















o 












1 

1 


1 

1 


t 


1 




> 






Z 














1 




1 

1 




1 

t 


















< 
1 


1 


1 


Q 




1 






3 


Oi 


d 


^ 


M 




1 
M 


1 


c!« 


1 




1 

CO 


■* 


to 


H 






"f 


■<t< 




■* 


"<*< 




•* 

w^ 




Tf 


■"J* 


Tf 

w^ 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



XXI 



Si 
•^ 

= 2 

e « 

aw 

>> 00 

> O 
'Oh 



CO 

c 



a 






o S 


, 




02 


>,D0 




93 


!^^ 


-ȣ 




£2: 


(U 


«2J 

a; OS 


15^ 


OJ — 


03 -^ 


OJ w" 


S 


x:^ 


.p^ 






X! 3 


^02 


•-S 


« ^^ 


y^v 


■»3 




OS 



a 

03 



£:?bc 



o 00 



tSPu i-i 



o o 
C.2 






O - 

a; o 

§t 

.2 2 

"S ° 
to"*- 

'■S "O 

K 0) 
OJ 3 

> C 



c 

08 



or 



•^ bC 

■^ S 
CJ o 

C c 

O r- 

^ G 

Q. S 

a? oj 
o o- 

>^ 



oo> 

O 1-H 

Oh 






■;£ >> 


bC 


^> 


c 


r^vca 


'■♦- 


s^ 


"a; 


2^ 


bL 
bC 

3 



-^ o 
g bC 

ro 



a; 
a: 






1S" 
III 

bcja^-i 

'C I- « 

3 cCO 

"^ . ^ 
•- -CQ 

^ CXI 
S a; fc> 



03 



3 
e^ 

az 3 

^1 



13 
01 



aj' 






fc. -kJ 



(U 



••- 


M 


cr 




CO 


03 



1—4 


bO 
C 


S 





TS 


TJt 


OJ 


o; 


3 


OJ 4.5 


u 


C3 





pTJ 


U 


Ih 






PLi 







83 



-r'S 

3 V 

e o 

a 00 

1^ -fci 



T3 



03 



2^ 

os<3 
1—1 
. (-> 

00 T3 

-^ s 

So 
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aj cc 

03 O 
-0-43 

-fi 3 



3 '>- 

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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



EXHIBIT NO. 1 

INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY 
THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY 1 AND 
DECEMBER 8, 1941 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Berlin 
July 2, 1941 
Purple (CA) (K9) 
Circular #1390 (Part 1 of 2.) 

(National Secret.) 

At the conference held in the presence of the Emperor on July 2nd 
"The Principal Points in the Imperial Policy for Coping with the 
Changing Situation" were decided. This Policy consists of the follow- 
ing two parts. The first part "The Policy" and the second part 
"The Principal Points" (I am wiring merely the gist of the matter.) 
Inasmuch as this has to do with national defense secrets, keep the 
information only to yourself. Please also transmit the content to 
both the Naval and Military Attaches, together with this precaution. 

The Policy. 

1 . Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world 
peace by establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity, 
regardless of how the world situation may change. 

2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose 
of the China incident, and shall take measures with a view to advancing 
southward in order to establish firmly a basis for her self-existence 
and self-protection. 

Army 20701 Secret Trans. 8/8/41 (NR) 



I Secret] 



From: Tokyo (Matsuoka) 

To: Washington 

July 2, 1941 

Purple (CA) (K9) 

Circular #1390 (Part 2 of 2.) 

The Principal Points. 

For the purpose of bringing the CHIANG Regime to submission, 
increasing pressure shall be added from various points in the south, 
and by means of both propaganda and fighting plans for the taking 
over of concessions shall be carried out. Diplomatic negotiations 
shall be continued, and various other plans shall be speeded with 
regard to the vital points in the south. Concomitantly, preparations 
for southward advance shall be reenforced and the policy already 
decided upon with reference to French Indo-China and Thailand 



2 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

shall be executed. As regards the Russo-German war, although 
the spirit of the Three-Power Axis shall be maintained, every prepa- 
ration shall be made at the present and the situation shall be dealt 
with in our own way. In the meantime, diplomatic negotiations 
shall be carried on with extreme care. Although every means avail- 
able shall be resorted to in order to prevent the United States from 
joining the war, if need be, Japan shall act in accordance with the 
Three-Power Pact and shall decide when and how force will be 
employed. 

Addresses to which this message is sent: U. S., Germany and 
Soviet Russia. From Germany transmit to Italy. 
Army 20702 Trans. 8/8/41 (S) 

[Secret] 
From: Canton 
To: Tokyo 
July 14, 1941. 
Purple 
#255. 

To be kept secret within the Department. 

Re my #253*. 

Subsequent information from the military officials to the Attaches 
is as follows: 

1. The recent general mobilization order expressed the irrevocable 
resolution of Japan to put an end to Anglo-American assistance in 
thwarting her natural expansion and her indomitable intention to 
carry this out, if possible, with the backing of the Axis but, if nec- 
essary, alone. Formalities, such as dining the expeditionary forces 
and saying farewell to them, have been dispensed with. That is 
because we did not wish to arouse greatly the feelmgs of the Japanese 
populace and because we wished to face this new war with a calm 
and cool attitude. 

2. The immediate object of our occupation of French Indo-China 
will be to achieve our purposes there. Secondly, its purpose is, 
when the international situation is suitable, to launch therefrom a 
rapid attack. This venture we will carry out in spite of any diffi- 
culties which may arise. We will endeavor to the last to occupy 
French Indo-China peacefully but, if resistance is offered, we will 
crush it by force, occupy the country and set up martial law. After 
the occupation of French Indo-China, next on our schedule is the 
sending of an ultimatum to the Netherlands Indies. In the seizing 
of Smgapore the Navy will play the principal part. As for the 
Army, in seizing Singapore it will need only one divisiop and in 
seizing the Netherlands Indies, only two. In the main, through the 
activities of our air arm (in your city, the Spratley Islands, Parao, 
Thaiese Singora, Portuguese Timor and French Indo-China) and our 
submarine fleet (in the South Seas mandate islands, Hainan Island, 
and French Indo-China) we will once and for all crush Anglo-Am- 
erican military power and their ability to assist in any schemes 
against us. 

3. The troops soon to occupy French Indo-China will be reorgan- 
ized as the 25th Army Corps (one Army Corps consists of four divi- 
sions) and also the 30th Armv Corps, consisting of the South China 
forces, which will be assigned to special duty with airplanes, tanks, 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3 

and howitzers. General IIDA (the IIDA Army mentioned in pre- 
ceding telegrams has been changed to the Nishimura detachment) 
will be placed in command and general military headquarters will be 
set up in Saigon. All preparations have been made. The ship fees 
have been paid and the expedition will soon proceed from here. 
Army 19731 Trans. 7-19-41 (5) 

• Not available. 

[Secret] 

From: Tokyo. 

To: Berlin. 

19 July 1941 

(Purple) 

#669 (Abstract) 

The Cabinet shake up was necessary to expedite matters in connec- 
tion with National affairs and has no further significance. Japan's 
foreign policy will not be changed and she will remain faithful to the 
principles of the Tripartite Pact. 

Relayed to Rome, Nanking. 
19842 
JD-1: 3838 (A) Navy Trans. 7-21-41 (C-NR) 



[Secret] 
From: Washington. 
To: Tokyo. 
21 July 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#545 

At the request of Acting Secretary of State Welles, Wakasugi called 
on him on the 21st. (The Ambassador is expected back in Washing- 
ton tomorrow morning.) Welles said that he has been giving careful 
study to recent world conditions. He had asked Wakasugi to come 
to his office, he said, so that he could express the opinions reached by 
Secretary Hull and himself, in the light of recent world developments, 
regarding the unofficial discussions which have been taking place for 
the past several months between the Ambassador and Secretary Hull. 

After thus prefacing his remarks, the Undersecretary said that the 
real objectives, set up by the Ambassador, Wakasugi, et al., of the 
Japanese-U. S. conversations, were identical to those towards which 
the Secretary was striving. 

According to information received from various sources in various 
areas, he continued, there are definite indications that Japan is 
planning to take some steps very shortly which would upset the peace- 
ful status of certain areas. If these reports are based on fact, he said, 
there would be a conflict between Japanese acts and the gist of the 
Ambassador's intentions expressed during the conversations. 

Recently when the Ambassador met with him, Welles said, Japan's 
position was discussed. In the course of those conversations, the 
Ambassador claimed that Britain, the United States and other nations 
were applying the pressure on Japan, and described this as an 
"encirclement" of Japan. This expression is identical to that em- 
ployed earlier by Germany, he pointed out. 

As a matter of fact, the Undersecretary continued, the above was 
clearly a misunderstanding on the part of Japan, because the United 



4 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

States has no such intentions as those Japan apparently feels. It is 
because the United States wishes to maintain peace between the two 
countries that she has been continuing the talks. 

He went on by saying that the advices received were to the effect 
that Japan would take the southern portion of French Indo-China by 
force within the next few days. Such an act would definitely be in 
violation with the spirit of the Japanese-U. S. conservations which 
are being conducted in behalf of maintaining peace on the Pacific. 

That is the American viewpoint, he said, but would appreciate being 
advised of the Japanese viewpoint. 

Wakasugi, therefore, replied that he was well aware of the fact that 
the Ambassador and the Secretary were conducting negotiations aimed 
at improving U. S.-Japanese relations, and that he, himself, prays that 
they will succeed. By "a reliable source of information", Wakasugi 
asked, did the Undersecretary mean the U. S. Embassy in Japan? To 
this, avoiding a clear answer, Welles merely replied that the report 
was an accurate one. 

Wakasugi then said that he would relay the information contained 
in the report referred to to the Ambassador. In the meantime, he 
said, he would like to make an inquiry, as one emanating purely from 
himself and one which in no way should be considered an official one. 
Assuming, Wakasugi said, that Japan is planning to make a move in 
the manner described by the Undersecretary in some direction, what 
effect would that have on the U. S.-Japanese discussions which were 
being conducted? 

Welles replied that such an act on the part of Japan would be in 
direct conflict with the spirit of the discussions. So saying, he implied 
that further discussion would be in vain. On the other hand, he con- 
tinued, he had been lead to understand that the new Foreign Minister 
of Japan was a close friend of Ambassador Nomura. Moreover, in 
view of the fact that very little time has elapsed since the new Cabinet 
was installed, probably it had not decided upon any definite policy as 
yet. In view of this fact the United States would patiently await 
developments before taking any steps to halt the discussions. 

Wakasugi told Welles that he would report this conversation to the 
Ambassador in detail, and withdrew. 

20026 

JD-1:3937 (D) Navy Trans. 7-25-41 (X) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo. 
To: Washington. 
23 July 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#397 

Regarding your message #545*. 

1, You were correct in assuming that I have not as yet determined 
upon a definite policy because of the fact that I have not been in 
office very long. 

As was pointed out in my message #368**, our occupation of Frecnh 
Indo-China was unavoidable. This step had been decided upon by 
the Cabinet even before I assumed office. It is to be carried uot 
peacefully for the purpose of jointly defending French Indo-China. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5 

It is my intention to continue to make an effort to decrease the 
friction between Japan and Britain-U. S. 

Should the U. S., however, take steps at this time which would 

unduly excite Japan (such as closing of for all practical purposes 

and the freezing of assets), an exceedingly critical situation may be 
created. Please advise the United States of this fact, and attempt 
to bring about an improvement in the situation. 

2. Please carefully reread messages Nos. 368 ** and 396 ***, and 
make an effort to improve the situation. 

3. With regard to your message #536**** (last 13 groups 

garbled). 

•JD-l: 3937. Wakasugi reports conversation with Undersecretary Welles. 

••JD-1: 3680 (S. I. S. #19501). Tokyo informs Washington of the contemplated negotiations with France 
or establishment of Jap naval and air bases in French Indo-China. 
•••JD-1: 3953 (S. I. S. #20029). 
••••JD-1: 3974 (S. I. S. #20087). 

20091 

JD-1: 3986 (D) Navy Trans. 7-25-41 (S-TT) 



[Secret] 
From: Washington. 
To: Tokyo. 
23 July 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#555 (In 2 parts, complete). 

Since Wakasugi had called on the Acting Secretary of State, as 
reported in my message #545*, I called on Welles myself this after- 
noon. I explained to him that our southern occupation was absolutely 
essential from the standpoint of national security and economic safety. 
I further pointed out the impossibility of Japan to pursue a "do 
nothing" policy in the face of the embargoes being clamped down- 
against her by various countries, for such a policy would lead to na- 
tional suicide. 

After carefully explaining the above situation, I said that according 
to press report the French Indo-China affair was apparently being 
carried out peacefully with the full approval of the Vichy government. 
I added that in view of those circumstances, it was my hope that the 
government of the United States would restrain itself from jumping 
to hasty conclusions, and instead would watch the trend of further 
developments for a little while yet. 

I told him that I feared considerable repercussions among the gen- 
eral public, if measures such as an export embargo on oil is put into 
effect at a time such as this. 

The new Cabinet in Japan, I advise the Undersecretary, is as 
anxious to bring the U. S. -Japanese ''Understanding Pact" to a suc- 
cessful conclusion, as was the previous cabinet. 

To the above, the Undersecretary replied that he would not reiterate 
his statements to Wakasugi. He would not, he said, reconcile the 
Japanese policy with regard to French Indo-China with the basic 
principles of the plans being discussed by Secretary Hull and niyself. 
Neither Great Britain nor the United States had any intention of 
attacking French Indo-China, he said. The concensus here is, he 
said, that Vichy's submission came as a result of pressure from Hitler 
and that Japan intends to use French Indo-Ctuna as a base from 
which to make further southward moves. 



6 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The U. S. Government, he continued, has not for the past many 
years made any hasty conclusions. Her actions are governed by 
Japan's policies. 

Although he did not mention what steps the United States is 
planning to take in the future, he did say, as I was about to depart, 
that Secretary Hull was expected back at his desk very shortly and 
that he would no doubt welcome an opportunity to discuss matters 
with me. 

In reply to my inquiry, the Undersecretary said that traffic through 
the Canal has been indefinitely suspended while it is undergoing 
repairs. He asserted that no particular nation was suffering dis- 
criminatory action. 

(Time at present: 2130). 

•JD-l: 3937 (S. I. S. 20026). Acting Secretary Welles, in a requested interview with Jap Minister Waka- 
sugi, states that the reported aggressive move by Japan toward F.I-C. would violate the basis of proposed 
understanding with Japan. Requests Japanese statement of intentions. Wakasugi asks for source of 
Welles information and is told that "it is accurate". 

20186 

JD-l: (D) Navy Trans. 7-29-41 (2) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
July 24, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#406 

Secret outside the Department. 

Remy#397^ 

That the leaders of the United States Government will at this time 
display a high degree of statemanship is what I am secretly hoping 
for the sake of maintaining peace in the Pacific. The Japanese Gov- 
ernment would do likewise and woidd like to reciprocate. However, 
according to information received by us lately, especiallj^ according 
to newspaper reports, there is the possibility of the United States 
freezing Japanese funds or of instituting a general embargo on petro- 
leum, thus strongly stimulating public opinion in Japan. Should 
this plan of freezing Japanese funds be put into effect, it would have 
an adverse effect on many aspects of our domestic life and might 
compel us to resort to diverse retaliatory measures. This would 
lead to a breakdown of Japanese-American economic relations and 
we cannot be certain that it would not in turn hasten the develop- 
ment of the worst situation. Will you please get in touch with 
Finance Official NISHIYAMA and, in accordance with the contents 
of the caption telegram, requcst the United States Government to 
favorably treat this question. 

Army 20034 Trans. 7/25/41 (5) 

• Not available. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 7 

[Secret! 
From: Tokyo 
To: Net 
July 26, 1941 
Red 
Circular #1616 

Depending upon how Japanese relations with England and the 
United States turn out, we may have to consider divesting England 
and the United States of all their interests in China. If and when 
things come to the worst, I want all areas concerned to cooperate in 
either destroying or seizing the considerable mining and other indus- 
trial equipment and ships of these countries. Be particularly sure 
to let nothing be taken away. I want you all to be ready at any 
moment to take this precautionary step of transferring the property 
of these two nations to our control. 
Army 20144 Trans. 7-28-41 (5) 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
27 July 1941 
(Purple) 
Circular #1622) 

In retaliation for the steps taken by the British and United States 
by which our assets were frozen, the rules restricting foreign business 
transactions in Japan which are included in the rules governing foreign 
exchange, shall be put into effect on the 28th by order of the Finance 
Ministry. Manchukuo will also take similar steps while in China 
proclamations by the Consulates will be made subsequently. As an 
emergency measure, the above regulations will be announced by the 
Consulates as a bulletin and will be made effective for all practical 
purposes. (All transactions involvmg Britain and America will be 
placed on a license basis). At the same time, the Chinese will receive 
instructions to put similar measures in effect. 

With regard to the Customs, all exports to countries which have 
frozen our assets, shall have to receive licenses in accordance with 
orders issued by the Financial Bureau. Guidance will be given to 
settle all complications which accompany the materialization of these 
regulations. 

Ample study has been made so as to make these measures counter 
whatever measures the opposition should choose to actually take. 

This message addressed to London and Washington. 

20267 

JD-1:4111 (D) Navv Trans. 7-29-41 (S-TT) 



8 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokvo 
July 30, 1941 
Purple 
#609 Re my #608*. 

Today I knew from the hard looks on their faces that they meant 
business and I could see that if we do not answer to suit them that 
they are going to take some drastic steps. 

During my first conversation with Roosevelt after I took office the 
President, referring to the Panay incident, said that at the time he 
cooperated with the Secretary of State and succeeded in restraining 
popular opinion but that in case such a thing happened a second 
tim^, it would probably be quite impossible to again calm the storm. 
The latest incident brought all this back to me and I can see just 
how gravely they are regarding it. Think of it! Popular demand 
for the freezing of Japanese funds was subsiding and now this had 
to happen. I must tell you it certainly occurred at an inopportune 
moment. 

Things being as they are, need I point out to you gentlemen that 
in my opinion it is necessary to take without one moment's hesitation 
some appeasement measures. Please wire me back at the earliest 

possible moment. 

^— ^— .^— — ^^— ^^— * 

• See S. I. S. #20331 (J. D.-l: 4149): Welles summons Nomura and demands explanation of Tutuila bomb- 
ing immediately. 

Army 20423 Trans. 8/2/41 (2) 

[Secret] 

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) 

To: Washington 

July 31, 1941 

Purple (CA) K9 

#433 (Part 1 of 4) (Message to Berhn #708) 

From time to time you have been sending us your various opinions 
about what we ought to do to help Germany who desires our assistance 
now that she is at war with Russia. After a conference with the mili- 
tary, at the risk of a certain amount of repetition which may cause 
you some ennui, I am wiring you the Imperial Government's policy 
and views. Hereafter, will you please act accordingly. 

1. In a cabinet meeting during the forenoon of July 2, the broad 
outlines of our decision concerning our future policy were drawn. 
You were informed of it by Circular #1390*. Ever since then the 
Government has been and is devoting every effort to bring about the 
materialization of that policy. 

2. The China incident has already extended over a period of four 
years, and the Imperial Government's general trend, particularly 
its military trend, has hitherto been to expend the greater part of its 
energies in an endeavor to bring a conclusion to the incident, and now 
a new situation faces us from the north and from the south. In order 
to meet it, there is more reason than ever before for us to arm ourselves 
to the teeth for all-out war. 

• Not available. 

Army 20461 Trans. 8/4/41 (NR) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 9 

[Secret] 

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) 

To: Washington 

July 31, 1941 

Purple (CA) 

#433 (Part 2 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708) 

It seems that Germany also understands this position of ours 
fairly well. The German Embassy people here in Tokyo are already 
quite aware of it. And yet I fear that their homeland is not yet as 
well informed as they are on our position. 

3. Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third 
countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually 
becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. 
Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures 
to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire must 
immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening 
chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and 
with the participation of England and the United States, acting like 
a cunning dragon seemingly asleep. That is why we decided to 
obtain military bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops 
occupy that territory. 

That step in itself, I dare say, gave England and the United States, 
not to mention Russia, quite a set-back in the Pacific that ought to 
help Germany, and now Japanese- American relations are more 
rapidly than ever treading the evil road. This shows what a blow it 
has been to the United States. 

Army 20462 Trans. 8/4/41 (NR) 

[Secret] 

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) 

To: Washington 

July 31, 1941 

Purple (CA) 

#433 (Part 3 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708) 

Needless to say, the Russo-German war has given us an excellent 
opportunity to settle the northern question, and it is a fact that we 
are proceeding with our preparations to take advantage of this occa- 
sion. Not only will we have to prepare, however, but we must choose 
well our chance. In view of the real situation facing our Empire, this 
should be easily understood. If the Russo-German war proceeds too 
swiftly, our Empire would inevitably not have time to take any 
effective symmetrical action. 

5. I know that the Germans are somewhat dissatisfied over our 
negotiations with the United States, but we wished at any cost to 
prevent the United States from getting into the war, and we wished 
to settle the Chinese incident. We were working toward those 
objectives. Let him who will gainsay the fact that as a result we 
have indehbly impressed upon the United States the profoundness of 
the determination of the Empire of Japan and restrained her from 
plunging into the conflict against Germany. 

It should be understood that we started these talks at a time which 
seemed opportune to us, and on the assumption that there was com- 
plete trust between Japan and Germany. For that matter, did not 

7S716 O — 46— pt. 12—3 



10 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Germany start a war with Russia because of her own military expedi- 
ency when it was least desirable on our part? Now we have not only 
to settle the Chinese incident but have to meet a new challenge in the 
north as well as in the south, and this is quite inconvenient. 

Army 20463 Trans. 8/4/41 (NR) 



[Secret] 



From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) 

To: Washington 

July 31. 1941 

Purple (CA) 

#433 (Part 4 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708) 

We are expending our best efforts to cooperate with Germany. 
She knows it and ought to understand our actions. 

6. Well, the formula for cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin, 
in order to realize the fundamental spirit of the Tripartite Pact, 
should be for each country to have a certain flexibility in its conduct. 
What I mean to say is that each should understand that real cooper- 
ation does not necessarily mean complete symmetry of action. In 
other words, we should trust each other and while striving toward 
one general objective, each use our own discretion within the bounds 
of good judgment. 

Thus, all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon 
a determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the 
Tripartite Pact. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation 
of an Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization 
of those objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly 
no time to engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action. 

Please send to Rome. Have sent to Washington. 

Army 20464 Trans. 8/4/41 (NR) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo. 
To: Washington. 
5 August 1941. 
(Purple) (CA) 
#447 (In 2 parts, complete). 

1. The Imperial Government is trving to give its attention to the 
all important matter of Japanese-U. S. relations. This is not an easy 
task, for there are numerous obstacles involving domestic politics. 

According to the various reports you have submitted on the subject, 
the President and the Secretary of State are displaying considerable 
understanding in their attitudes towards Japan, You imply that they 
view the situation cool headedly, regardless of the trend of general 
public opinion. 

On our side, however, there are quite a few persons who vigorously 
insist that the U. S. economic pressure on Japan is being daily in- 
creased in intensity. For example, the newspaper Yomiuri carried a 

dispatch from ■ on the 2nd, in which it was reported that the 

President of the United States had either ordered the complete sus- 
pension of, or curtail to the extreme, all exports of petroleum prod- 
ucts. As a result of this order, the dispatch continued, even those 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 11 

exports for which permits had already been issued, had to be can- 
celled. 

Regardless of whether there was any truth in the report or not and 
regardless of the extent of the alleged curtailment, such reports give 
the antagonists a strong talking point. This is a situation which 
causes us no end of anxiety. 

2. If it is believed by any that our people and country can be 
threatened into submission by the so-called strengthened encircle- 
ment policy or by the application of economic pressure, it is a mis- 
taken notion. As a matter of fact it is erroneous to the exti'eme as 
should be obvious to any who understands our national character- 
istics. 

If such a policy as the above is adopted, we cannot guarantee that 
the trend will not be in directly the opposite direction from our goal 
of an improved U. S. -Japanese relationship. One should be able to 
see this clearly from the example set forth above. 

3. We are convinced that we have reached the most important, 
and at the same time the most critical, moment of Japanese-U. S. 
relations. It was at a time like this that the Imperial Government 
voluntarily agreed to temporarily cease the bombing of Chungking 
and its suburban area. This should clearly indicate Japan's sincerity, 
considerateness, and restraint toward the United States. 

If an improvement in the relations between the United States and 
Japan, as two equal powers on the Pacific, is sincerely desired, the 
points which will most effectively bring about such improvements 
must be given unbiased and cool consideration. 

For the purpose of preventing the possibility of letting anyone, 
either within or out of the country, be under the impression that the 
negotiations were conducted under the threat of economic pressure, 
all measures wiiich may be construed as being economic pressure 
should be abandoned at once. That we shall reciprocate in kmd was 
made clear in the recent statement issued by the Minister of Finance. 

4. Based on the general plan outlined by the last Cabinet, the 
Imperial Government proposes a plan, set forth in my separate mes- 
sage #448*, to improve Japanese-U. S. relations. This last plan was 
drawn up as a reply to the plan suggested by the President on the 24th, 
and is being submitted only after the respective positions of the United 
States and Japan as they affect the other, were given thorough con- 
sideration. 

Will Your Excellency make an effort to clearly impress this point 
on the President and the Secretaiy of State and at the same time draw 
their attention to the graveness of this matter. 

5. In form, the proposal which is being forwarded herewith, is a 
reply to the President's plan of the 24th. Our real motive, however, is 
to incorporate its provisions into the final agreement. With this 
instrument, we hope to resume the Japanese-U. S. negotiations which 
were suspended because of the delay in the delivery of our revised 
proposals of 14 July and because of our occupation of French Indo- 
China which took place in the meantime. Since that is our intention, 
please relay the matter contained in my separate message #448* 
without delay. 

•JD-l: 4326. 

20615 

JD-l: (D) Navy Trans. 8-6-41 (S-TT) 



12 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

From: Tokyo. 
To: Washington. 
7 August, 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#452 

Through my previous messages on the subject, you are perfectly well 
aware of the fact that the Konoye Cabinets have been sincerely inter- 
ested in the betterment of Japanese-U. S. relations. Through mis- 
understandings and manipulations by third countries, and in spite of 
our above described desires, Japanese-U. S. relations are, today, criti- 
cally tense. We feel that a policy of laissez faire should no longer 
be pursued. 

We are firm in our conviction that the only means by which the 
situation can be relieved is to have responsible persons representing 
each country gather together and hold direct conferences. They shall 
lay their cards on the table, express their true feelings, and attempt to 
determine a way out of the present situation. 

2. In the first proposal made by the United States mention was 
made of just such a step. If, therefore, the United States is still 
agreeable to this plan. Prime Minister Konoye himself will be willing 
to meet and converse in a friendly manner with President Roosevelt. 

Will you please make clear to them that we propose this step be- 
cause we sincerely desire maintaining peace on the Pacific. Please 
sound out their attitude on this proposal. 

3. If, however, they show any signs of hesitation (from the con- 
tents of your message #649* this possibility cannot be discounted 
entirely) on the grounds of our occupation of French Indo-China 
and the reports that we have increased our military strength in the 
north, put up the following arguments: 

(a) That we recognize the exceedingly criticalness of the situation 
and for that reason, the Prime Minister made up his mind to break 
all precedent to represent his country himself. 

(b) That unless every possible effort is made to maintain peace on 
the Pacific, we would be failing to fulfill our duties to our people. 

4. If they are agreeable to holding such a conference, make inquiries 
as to the time which would best meet the President's convenience. 
In view of the times and conditions, we are of the opinion that the 
sooner that such a meeting took place, the better. 

The subjects which will be discussed, undoubtedly will depend 
greatly on the time it is held. In general, however, the discussion 
will be conducted along the lines of the negotiations which were being 
conducted in an attempt to bring about better relations between 
Japan and the United States. In view of the fact that both the Prime 
Minister and the President have many uses for their time, arrange- 
ments should be made so that the discussions between them will last 
no longer than a few days. With a view to practicalness it is our 
hope that the delegations representing Japan and the United States 
will consist of the minimum number of persons. 

5. In view of the extremely important nature of this subject, it is 
essential that strict secrecy be observed until the holding of the 
discussions are definitely agreed upon. Therefore, Your Excellency 
will convey this proposal in person to the President or to the Secretary 
of State. .As soon as you come to an agreement and if the President 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 13 

has no objections, it shall be publicly announced. Therefore, will 
you confer as to the opportune time, etc. and come to an agreement 
on those points as well. 

For the purpose of security, we are not advising the U. S. Ambassa- 
dor in Tokyo regarding this subject for the time being. This is for 
your information. 

•JD-l: 4345 S. I. S. #20649. Amb. Nomura discusses various angles of Jap-U. S. relations with a U. S. 
cabinet member (identity not given); suggests conclusion of an agreement upholding the integrity of terri- 
tories adjacent to F. I. C. to facilitate supplies of materials. 

20699 

JD-l: (D) Navy Trans. 8-8-41 (S-TT) 



[Secret] 
From: Washington. 
To: Tokyo. 
7 August 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#663 (In 2 parts, complete). 

U. S. -Japanese relations have now reached an extremely critical 
stage. However, this does not come unexpectedly; undoubtedly it 
was unavoidable and is the by-product of our government's pursuing 
other essential policies. 

I now wish to describe the recent general outlook in the United 
States. I realize, of course, that I may be too presumptuous, but 
I do so only because I believe it might be of some interest to one 
whose time in office has been as short as yours. 

1. Fundamentally speaking, the United States is under the im- 
pression that the ties between the Axis partners are closer than appear 
on paper. It is convinced that the East is working in close coopera- 
tion with the West, and vice versa. It assumes that the aims of 
Germany and Italy in the West and Japan in the East are to conquer 
the world. Talking with ones who harbor such policies, the United 
States says, is out of the question. 

We, therefore, carefully explained that Japan is guided solely b^ 
the principles of HAKKO ITIU (brotherhood of mankind) and that 
the Axis Pact, like the earlier Anglo-Japanese Pact, is merely an 
agreement within limitations. This explanation lead eventually to 
beginning the unofficial discussions. 

Then, while the Secretary of State was on leave due to illness, the 
occupation of French Indo-China took place. The United States, 
refusing to accept our explanation that that was a peaceful occupa- 
tion, discontinued the unofficial discussions then and there. More- 
over, the United States returned to its original opinion with regard 
to Japan. Acting Secretary of State Welles made this clear in his 
statement and it was later confirmed by Secretary Hull himself. 
Last night, the Secretary expressed his deep disappointment to me. 
According to the Postmaster General, this disappointment on the 
part of the Secretary was all the deeper because he had been so very 
interested in bettering the relations between Japan and the United 
States. I have already reported that Secretary Hull and his very 
good friend Walker were put in an exceedingly embarrassing spot in 
their relations with their Cabinet colleagues. 



14 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2. The United States policy toward Japan cannot be termed as 
one of definite unfriendliness to Japan herself, they explain. The 
United States has to take some measures, they say, to counteract 
certain steps taken by Japan. The United States is only taking 
measures which will counter Japanese southward or northward 
expansion attempts. 

When Japan occupied French Indo-China, the United States 
retaliated with the "freezing" order and the export embargo; a 
joint warning by Hull and Eden was issued with regard to any 
ambitions in the direction of Thailand. There is no doubt what- 
soever that the United States is prepared to take drastic action 
depending on the way Japan moves, and thus closing the door on 
any possibility of settling the situation. 

With regard to a northward move by us, it must be remembered 
that the United States has suddenly established very close relations 
with the Soviet Union. In view of this fact, it is highly doubtful 
that the United States would merely watch from the sidelines if we 
should make any moves to the north. 

It is reported that the President accompanied by high army and navy 
officials is meeting with Churchill. This indicates that careful 
preparations are being made to counter our every move without 
falling back a single time. 

3. It must be noted that the government of Germany is exercising 
the utmost precaution and perseverance in dealing with the United 
States. It has even gone so far as to issue peace terms in an attempt 
to ease U. S. public opinion. Therefore, the Pacific, of late, has 
become the center of public attention and there is a good possibility 
that, depending on developments in Europe, this trend will be 
considerably invigorated in the near future. 

I have submitted niy humble opinions before and they are un- 
changed today. Our country is at present standing at a most critical 
crossroads. My only desire is that we choose the right road, for the 
sake of the future of our country. 

21045 

JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 8-15-41 (X) 



[Secret] 
From: Washington. 
To: Tokyo. 
9 August 1941 
(Purple) 
#674 (In 2 parts, complete). 

Re your #465* 

Upon the President's return to Washington (when this will be is 
unknown) I shall make arrangements to call on him and explain to 
him the subject contained in your message referred to above. I shall 
do everything in my power to make a favorable impression on the 
President on that occasion. 

As I have pointed out in my various reports on this subject, I am 
convinced that as long as we proceed along the lines of our present 
policy, the United States, too, will undoubtedly undeviatingly follow 
the course whose trend has already been established. The United 
States assumes that our occupation of South French Indo-China 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 15 

indicates that Japan has definitely set h^r course. On this point the 
President and the Secretary of State are in complete agreement and it 
would be a mistake to try to differentiate between their attitudes. 
I was made acutely aware of the firm attitude of the United States 
during my conversations of the 6th and the 8th. 

In view of this situation, I greatly fear that even the offer of the 
Prime Minister to personally come here, would not move the United 
States to any perceptible degree. For this reason, I regret to have 
to say that I do not expect too much from th<) interview I plan to 
have with the Pr.^sident. 

Unless we can draw up some plan by which we can persuade the 
United States to change its policy toward Japan, I can only feel 
pessimism for any attempts to break up the present critical situation. 

Though I regret that I can report only dark clouds over the world 
from my distant vantage point, I submit these humble opinions to you 
for whatever value they may bs. 

*JD-1 : 4429. Immediately upon Roosevelt's return to Washington call upon him and do your utmost to 
bring about a materialization of these conversations (re Jap-American understanding). 

20868 

JD-1: 4465 (D) Navy Trans. 8-12-41 (2) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo. 
To: Berlin. 
15 August 1941 
(Purple) 
#739 (Separate message) 

At the time of my conversation with Ambassador Smetanin the 
other day, I mentioned our desires in regard to the full realization of 
our rights and interests in Northern Saghalien and also the removal 
of danger zones in the waters of the Far East. Since then, we have 
been asked by the Soviet as to the attitude of Japan toward the 
German-Russian war; to which we have replied that there has been no 
change in our intentions of continuing friendly relations between 
Japan and Russia, that thus far we have maintained an attitude of 
observing the neutrality pact, and that it is still our desire to continue 
this in the future, but, that whether or not we can continue thus is a 
question that depends on the way in which the Soviet Union responds 
to this. For instance if (a) any of the Soviet Union's territory in 
East Asia should be ceded, sold, or leased to a third power, or offered 
as military bases, (b) the Soviet Union should take any steps that 
would cause the sphere of any third power's military movements to be 
extended into East Asia, or should conclude with a third power an 
alliance that might have the Empire as its object, we certainly could 
not overlook the threat that this would be to our nation. 

To this the Soviet Ambassador replied, that the Soviet government 
is rigidly observing the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact, and that as 
far as the above mentioned two points are concerned he could give 
assurance that there has been nothing of the kind and that there will 
be none in the future. 

I furthermore took this opportunity to call the attention of the 
Soviet to the fact that of late it is persistently rumored that the United 
States will be shipping munitions to the Soviet via Vladivostok, and 



16 CONGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that if this should be true, Japan would have to take a serious view of 
it, as it would involve the three power pact relations. 

In regard to the Japanese Government's attitude to the German- 
Russian war, I reiterated that there has been no change in our foreign 
policy, which has as its keynote the spirit and the objectives of the 
three power pact, even as Foreign Minister Matsuoka had com- 
municated to the Soviet Government 2 July, and that this point is 
well understood by the Soviet. 

21175 

JD-1: 4637 (F) Navy Trans. 8-19-41 (C-NR) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Berlin' 
15 August 1941 
(Purple) 
#740 

On the 15th T told the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo, 
confidentiallv, of mv recent conversations with the Soviet Ambassa- 
dor along the lines of my separate message #739*. Ambassador Ott 
expressing a desire to understand the basic problem, said that accord- 
ing to the notice sent to the German Government on 2 July, he 
understood that the possibility of Japan's participating in the German- 
Russian war was not precluded, but asked if, now since the Soviets 
have given assurances regarding the two points which Japan considers 
vital, to the effect that there has been nothing of the kind and will 
not be in the future, the Soviets do not have the impression that 
Japan will not take part in the German-Soviet war. To this I replied 
that, in view of the military expansion the Empire is at present 
effecting, I think under present existing conditions the above-men- 
tioned arrangement with the Soviet is the very best means of taking 
the first steps toward carrying out future plans concerning the Soviet, 
which will be undertaken together with the German Government, 
that this is entirely in harmony with the spirit and objectives of the 
Tripartite Treaty, and that I hoped that the German Government 
would fully understand this point. Ambassador Ott thereupon asked 
if it is proper to understand that this present arrangement is the first 
step toward future measures that are to be taken against Russia, 
that this is merely a temporary arrangement, in other words that it 
partakes of the nature of a restraint upon the Soviet until preparations 
can be completed. To this I replied in the affirmative. 

Please relay to Rome together with the separate message. 

•JD-l: 4637 S. I. S. #21175, Report of conversation between Japanese Foreign Minister and the Soviet 
Ambassador in Tokyo, in which both insist the Neutrality Pact is being strictly observed; Japan warns 
against third power's acquiring Russian territory in East Asia; extension of third power's military movp- 
ments to East Asia, and shipment of U. S. munitions to Vladivostok. 

21219 

JD-1: 4656 (F) Navy Trans. 8-20-41 (C-NR) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 17 

[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
August 16, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#703 (Part 1 of 4) 

Re your #480*. 

(1) As 1 have successively reported to you, Japanese-American 
relations have today reached a stage in which anything might happen 
at any moment, and they are likely to grow worse suddenly as soon 
as Japan makes her next move. That this sudden change will take 
place with Japan's occupation of Thailand is a view upon which both 
Japanese and Americans agree. As I have already informed you, the 
United States has not yet attained sufficient unity of mind with 
regard to participation in the European war, and the President 
himself is hesitant. However, the people are unanimous with regard 
to taking a strong hand in the Far East. According to those well 
versed in political affairs, this is what Great Britain approves of and 
both China and Germany desire. 

• Not available. 

Army 21150 Trans. 8/19/41 (2) 

[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
August 16, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#703 (Part 2 of 4) 

I hardly think the President will go to the extreme, inasmuch as he 
and the naval leaders realize what a tremendous undertaking a Pacific 
war would be. I understand that the British believe that if they 
could only have a Japanese-American war started at the back door, 
there would be a good prospect of getting the United States to partici- 
pate in the European war. The people here believe that though Ger- 
many might eventually defeat Soviet Russia, the war has already 
passed the stage of being a short, decisive one and has entered the 
stage of being one of attrition; that inasmuch as the submarine war 
in the Atlantic is turning in favor of Britain and the United States, 
these countries will be able in time to attain their original objective; 
and that the situation resembles closely that which existed in 1917. 
I understand that confidence in ultimate victory is gaining. 
Army 21151 Trans. 8/19/41 (7^ 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

August 16, 1941 

Purple (CA) 

#703 (Part 3 of 4) 

(2) Since such is the state of affairs in this country, I could not 
have helped but refer to the State Department the proposal for a 
conference which you made in your telegram, but as you already 
know, the Secretary of State gave a negative reply to the proposal. 



18 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I, therefore, subsequently tried to interest a member of the cabinet 
who was intimately associated with the Secretary of State, but he 
also showed little interest in the subject. Besides, it is customary for 
the Secretary to be present at such conversations. I understand the 
President at one time had thought of arranging for a conference 
between the leaders of the two countries, but since Japan's occupation 
of French Indo-China, he has come to believe that Japan does not 
want a fundamental readjustment of Japanese-American relations but 
that she is carrying on an appeasement policy toward the United 
States. I hear that they ar3 beginning to think that I have been 
fooled by my country and that his having conferred with me was an 
exceptional thing. 
Army 21152 Trans. 8/19/41 (2) 

[Secret] , 

From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokvo 
August 16, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#703 (Part 4 of 4) 

In the meantime, Japanese newspapers have printed scorching 
criticism of the statement issued by the American Government. 
Thus the atmosphere is getting worse. Unless something is done 
now to eliminate this misunderstanding, I shall not be able to accom- 
plish our object. Furthermore, viewing the problem from the political 
standpoint, so long as the head of the country remains unfavorable 
to the proposal, we cannot expect him to do anything about it. I 
believe the United States is washing that we would give, at least, 
some sort of a pledge regarding those three critical points taken up 
during the past conversations; namely, the question of self-defense, 
withdrawal of troops from China, and nondiscrimination in trade. 
Today, when the Secretary of State has already rejected our proposal, 
I cannot help but feel keenly the necessity of careful consideration 
and a great deal of smoothing out if we are to bring about what you 
have instructed me in your telegram. I am told that the President 
will be returning in a few days, so will you please consider the points 
I have given above, and if you have any further instructions, wire 
them at once. 
Army 21153 Trans. 8/19/41 (2) 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
August 20, 1941 
Purple CA 
#487 (Part 1 of 2) 

Re the last part of your #705*. 

We cannot, of course, predict what the outcome of the Russo- 
German war will be, but this does not preclude our anticipating the 
fact that in case Soviet Russia loses and as a result the Stalin Regime 
disintegrates. Far Eastern Russia will be thrown into political con- 
fusion. It is a self-evident fact that Japan is pressed with the neces- 
sity of taking precautionary measures for the sake of maintaining 
peace in the Far East as well as for the sake of Japan's national defense 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 19 

and security, in view of the actuality that that part of Soviet Russia 
is adjacent to Japan and Alanchuokuo. Furthermore, since, due to 
the Russo-German war, there is a possibility of the influence of a 
third power being implanted in Far Eastern Soviet Russia, as for 
instance of Soviet Russia resorting to such unfriendly act as to allow 

the establishment of and military bases in the Maritime 

province of Siberia or in Kamchataka, and consequently of the secu- 
rity of both Japan and Manchuokuo being threatened, we need to 
prevent such a thing from happening. 

The Japanese Government has decided to increase the Japanese 
forces in Manchuokuo to the minimum number necessary to cope with 
such a possibility. On the other hand negotiations are being carried 
on in Tokyo with Soviet officials in order to arrive at a friendly solu- 
tion of various matters having to do with this area. I understand 
that the Soviet officials have been instructed by the party leaders to 
be cautious in their attitude toward the forces stationed in Man- 
chuokuo. This is solely for your information. 
Army 21234 Trans. 8/19/41 (S) 

» S. I. S. #21165. NOMURA asks to be informed for his own information what the Japanese government 
Intends to do with regard to her northern policy. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
August 20, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#487 (Part 2 of 2) 

If the United States Government asks you questions 

concerning the increase of Japanese troops in the North, will you 
explain to them suitably as your own view of the matter what I have 
pointed out above. Impress upon their minds that the movement of 
the troops has for its objective purely preventive precautions against 
unforseen emergency and that by it we will be able to forestall any 
possibility of peace in the Far East being disturbed. 

Recently when the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo inquired about 
this matter, I replied that so long as the Russian Government lives 
up to the treaty Japan also will be faithful to it. The Ambassador 
was very much pleased to hear this, saying that my statement had 
clarified the matter. This is solely for your information. 

If it becomes definitely known that the United States is shipping 
iron, airplanes and other materials by way of Japanese coastal waters 
to assist Soviet Russia, this fact would unnecessarily provoke the 
feelings of the Japanese people, and it cannot be said that it will not 
have an unfavorable effect on the question of readjusting Japanese- 
American relations — a question which is at the present stage a very 
delicate one. We would like, therefol'e, to see the United States 
refrain from such action. Will you take a good opportunity and 
tactfully call the attention of the United States authorities to this 
fact. Today I personally called the attention of the American Am- 
bassador to it. 
Army 21235 Trans. 8/20/41 (S) 



20 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo. 
To: Washington. 
23 August 1941 
(Purple) 
#497 

From Financial Attache lS[ishiyama (#70). 

1. American inspection of JapLnese firms and banks comes closer 
to being a search for "subversive acts" rather than an inspection con- 
nected with the freezing order. There was a marked difference in 
the Japanese inspection of American banks. Influential persons in 
the Specie Bank are much concerned and desire an investigation to 
ascertain just what the real purpose of the American officials is. 
Furthermore the National City Bank is arranging for the Kobe and 
Yokohama branches to unite with the Tokyo office and is closing out 
the Dairen office. According to Curtis's explanation the above move 
is dictated by economic pohcy as was the case in the Osaka amal- 
gamation and that there is no other reason for the move. Two or 
three young Amencans will be left in the Tokyo office and the others 
will be returned home. 

2. A proposal has been received from the British-Dutch Bank to 
exchange commodities for commodities in order to liquidate the 
bank's accounts and this matter is being pressed by the head of the 
London branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank. However officials in 
the foreign office do not look with favor upon pushing negotiations 
to the solution of this one problem when there are so many other 
questions pending between Japan and Britain. Also the immediate 
conclusion of such an agreement would exert an unfortunate influence 
upon the leadership of public opinion hence orders have been issued 
not to ratify such an agreement. 

(This item is for your information only) . 

21644 

JD-1: 4860 (H) Navy Trans. 8-30-41 (S-TT) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
August 26, 1941 
Purple CA (Very Urgent) 
#504 

Re my #503. 

That message contains the maximum concessions that we can make 
to the proposal of the President of the United States; however, whether 
or not you can convince the Americans of this is naturally another 
matter. Now the international situation as well as our internal situa- 
tion is strained in the extreme and we have reached the point where 
we will pin our last hopes on an interview between the Premier and 
the President. 

Please try to convince ROOSEVELT and HULL to this effect and 
please bear in mind that I do not consider that the interview need 
necessarily be bound strictly by what is set forth in my caption 
message. 

Army 21481 Trans. 8/26/41 (S) 



EXHIBITS OF JOIXT COMMITTEE 21 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
August 26, 1941 
Purple 
#505 

Notwithstanding representations made by us on successive occa- 
sions the United States is treading a course which seems to be bent 
on exciting public opinion within our country. Beginning the first 
day of September they are exercising stringent limitations on gasoline 
shipments essential to our civilian population. At this time they 
are planning to pass through waters adjacent to our shores with 
cargoes of petroleum products which should be coming to us. The 
fact that they are transporting these petroleum products to Madi- 
vostock has dealt a severe blow to the sensibilities of our government 
and people. At the same time that this brings about grave effects 
upon Japan and American relations, a terrific blow is being dealt by 
those in Washington to the whole country far more than you can 
realize. 

This being the case, we are forced to cry out our disapproval of 
the realization of such measures and the Ministry of Interior as well 
as the War Ministry are very apprehensive. Therefore, because such 
measures are not in keeping with the neutrality treaty between Japan 
and Soviet Kussia nor in accord with the interpretation of interna- 
tional law, I would like to have you make representations again to 
the Secretary of State in order that he may reconsider an immediate 
cessation of these measures from the general view point of the current 
Japan- American diplomatic relations. Wire me back as soon as you 
have filed these representations. 

In the event the United States assumes the position that it is im- 
possible to cut ofl shipments of petroleum products to the Soviet, 
then as it seero.s advisable to your Excellency make suggestions that 
they change the transportation route. However, should they not 
comply with this request, either, I think it would be wise to try to 
persuade the American authorities that they revive shipments of 
petroleum products to Japan immediately. 

Furthermore, additional representations have been filed with the 
Soviet too, as of the 26th. 
Army 21482 Trans. 8/26/41 (S) 

[Secret] 
From: Washington. 
To: Tokyo. 
29 August 1941 
(Purple— C A) 
#756 (4 part message, complete except for Part 4) 

Regarding my #732 (?)* 

The folio whig is the gist of my discussion with Hull, last evening, 
(28th), regarding the proposed conference, etc. 

(A) As the result might be quite unfortunate should either one of 
the conferring heads of the two governments assume an uncompro- 
mising attitude on certain points, it is the expressed desire of Hull to 



22 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

hold preliminary conversations for tlie purpose of effecting a general 
agreement prior to the meeting of the two heads, and also to make the 
decisions of the two principals as final. (Hull used the expression 
"certification"). (Regarding this point please refer to my #703 (?)**). 

(B) While it is necessary to bring up to date the various points of 
past conversations, the United States maintains that the adjustment 
of Japanese-American relations can be achieved without considering 
the question of China, which is vital to her. 

(C) Despite Japan's insistance that she cannot alter her polic)' 
towards China, the United States government is unwilling to seek 
adjustments in Japanese-American relations at the expense of existing 
American-Chinese relations. Neither is the United States Govern- 
ment willing to give cause to "explosion" in China by its action. 
Furthermore, the task of placating China by the United States 
Government for accepting the basis of Chinese-Japanese negotiations 
will involve the tremendous effort of winning the approval of Britain 
and the U. S. S. R. and for this reason it is deemed unfeasible. 

(D) Regarding the question of withdrawal of our troops from China 
and the right of protection, I informed the Secretary that I had nothing 
to state except what has already been stated on previous occasions. 
However, when I explained that so long as Prince Konoe remains in 
the saddle, I am confident that he will make every effort to settle 
these questions satisfactorily, Hull replied that he hoped that the 
Imperial Government will see fit to take definite steps towards this 
end. 

Please check over my #540*** regarding these questions and let 
me know the government's opinion regarding them. Also please 
obtain details regarding same from Colonel Iwakuro upon his return. 

(E) I wish to make the following suggestions in the event that it 
has been decided to hold the "Leaders' Conference". 

(1) While it is the desire of the Japanese Government to designate 
Hawaii as the meeting place, we should consent to accept Juneau, if for 
reasons of constitutional requirements or persoijal safety, Hawaii is 
unsatisfactory to the President. 

(2) The conference date should be from September 21st (?) to . 

(3) Five persons each from the Foreign Office, the Ministries of 
Navy and War, the Embassy and Consulate, that is a total of 20 
persons or less, should be present at the conference. 

(Part 4 not yet available). 

•#732 available, not translated. Dated 23 August. Corrects the word "insisted" in a previous mes- 
sage to "instituted". 

"JD-l; 4642 (S. I. S. #211.S0 to53). Amb. Nomura brings up to date the seriousness of Japanese-American 
relations; reports that since Secy. Hull has already rejected Japan's proposal (for continued negotiations) 
and the President is returning shortly, Tokyo should consider giving the I'. S. some sort of pledge regarding 
the three critical points: self-defense, withdrawal of troops, and nondiscrimination in trade. 

**'jn-l: .3842 (S. I. S. #19911). Amb. Nomura exi)resses the opinion that, based on the thought and dis- 
cussions given the proposals for an Understanding Pact, there is a wide gap between the viewpoints of the 
two countries, and that Tokyo's proposals will lead to a misunderstanding. Comments on several items 
of the proposal and requests Tokyo's opinion regarding each. 

21732 

JD-1: (A) Navy Trans. 9-3-41 (7) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 23 

[Secret! 
From: Batavia (Isizawa) 
To: Tokyo 
September 2, 1941 
Purple 
#902 

Re the first part of Circular #261^ from Ambassador HONDii. 

1 . Conditioned by our military invasion of French Indo-China, it is 
a fact that the government of these islands has drastically stepped up 
their anti-Japanese tendencies and very evidently assumed an attitude 
of aid to China. This is evidenced by the unconvincing control exer- 
cised by the authorities here over the anti-Japanese editorials of the 
Chinese press, the solicitation of funds for the construction of military 
airplanes for Chungking among Chinese resident here, and their de- 
mand for suspension of publication of the Japanese-operated East India 
Daily News Chinese character edition, as well as the Malayan language 
magazine Sinarusuratan. However, on the other hand, in order that 
we may give a sufficiently clear picture of the situation, there is a small 
group of Chinese resident here whose anti-Japanese tendencies have 
slightly improved as a result of the activities of the government here. 
However, no sooner than they got the impression that these Chinese 
were coming slightly closer to us in feeling, it could be seen that they 
began to exercise their old tendencies on a still greater scale. Japanese 
who had good contacts with Chinese here were unmercifully exiled, 
and these Chinese friends were hauled unceremoniously to the police 
stations for questioning or possibly taken before the person in charge 
of Chinese affairs here. It has been anonymously reported that a 
statement has been made that they are in danger of their lives. Thus 
they have begun to hinder our schemes with regard to the Chinese 
with more and more determination. 

2. Therefore, when an excellent opportunity presented itself, I 
deliberately took the occasion to -exchange arguments on the Sino- 
Japanese incident with the Chief of the Far Eastern Section, RO", 
who is chiefly in charge, within the government circles, of the handling 
of the Chinese question. At that time, the fundamental points of 
his argument relating to the Chinese question here, I am giving below 
for your information. 

(a) "I have lived in China many, many years. In addition, since 
my return to the Netherlands East Indies ten years ago, I have 
gradually come into repute in my handling of the Chinese question. 
I think I am pretty well aware of matters having to do with the 
Chinese, but the fact that Japan has set up the Nanking regime and 
is very anxious to overthrow the regime of CHIANG KAI-SHEK is, 
I think, extremely foolhardy and has slight chance of success. I per- 
sonally cannot condone Japan's effort to beguile the Chinese masses 
from CHIANG KAI-SHEK through the establishment of the Nanking 
Government made up of second-rate or worse individuals. There is 
no more logical course for Japan to follow in the settlement of the 
China incident than to reach a compromise with CHIANG KAI- 
SHEK. This is my firm belief. 

(b) "Though it is said that there are practically no Chinese living 
here in the Netherlands East Indies who support the Nanking Gov- 
ernment, this is actually no exaggeration. All Chinese here give their 
support to CHIANG KAI-SHEK. Furthermore, the Dutch Gov- 
ernment recognizes the CHIANG regime, and because she does not 



24 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

recognize the Nanking regime, it can be clearly seen that the Nether- 
lands Government entertains the same convictions. 

(c) "WANG CHING-WEI, who heads the Nanking Government, 
is sold on the Asia doctrine. He advocates Sino-Japanese peace. 
His fundamental policy is the expulsion of the white man from East 
Asia. It is but natural that the Netherlands East Indies Government 
should oppose this theory. Therefore, the consequent reaction here 
is the decision to follow a course of seeing to it that the Chinese on 
these islands are not swept off their feet. 

(d) '*At the present time, martial law has been put into effect on 
these islands, and everything is on a wartime footing. The people 
are united, and in order that the Netherlands home government 
might be restored, they are ready to fight. The 1,500,000 Chinese 
resident here on these islands are an important and integral part of the 
society of the Netherlands Indies. Their well-being greatly affects 
the peace, order, and economic livelihood of all living on these islands. 
Therefore, the Netherlands Indies authorities have definitely decided 
to follow a policy of unequivocally crushing out political schemes from 
abroad directed toward the Chinese resident here." 

3. Having said all this, I endeavored to refute him with all the 
strength that I could command. RO, however, would not be con- 
vinced and adamantly stuck to his statements. Not only is the 
situation like this, but recently the fact that the police strength on 
these islands has been greatly augmented has made it extremely 
difficult for us to carry on our schemes toward the Chmese residents 
here. As a consequence, the situation practically means that we can 
do nothing directly. Therefore, I would like to have our organs here 
for the manipulation of public opinion as well as those who work in 
the development of our schemes remain passive for a little while. 
For the time being, we are concentrating our efforts in the collection 
of intelligences having to do with the activities of Chinese here as well' 
as other things. 

4. Therefore, in the meantime, until we have securely brought 
French Indo-China and Thai within our sphere of influence, I think 
that it would be most propitious for us to strengthen our schemes 
with regard to the Chinese here." For this purpose I would like to 
have sent to these islands influential persons in whom the Nanking 
Government has much confidence, who can command large numbers 
of followers among the Chinese here, who will have for their main ob- 
jective the preaching of the doctrine that the Chinese and the Japa- 
nese are one, as well as set up organizations to influence Chinese opinion. 
These men would have absolutely no relations with either this office 
or with Japanese persons but would meet in large and small groups 
and talk with influential Chinese as well as substantial individuals of 
that group here. 

Please transmit this message to Ambassador HONDA in China and 
to other competent diplomatic officials to whom this information, in 
your good judgment, might be usable. 
Army 21816 Trans. 9/4/41 (7) 

• Not available. 
OROFINCK. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 25 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo. 
To: Washington. 
3 September 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#524 

Since the existence of the Premier's message was inadvertently 
made known to the public, that gang that has been suspecting that 
unofficial talks were taking place, has really begun to yell and wave 
the Tripartite Pact banner. 

In the midst of this confusion at home Fleisher's story in the Herald- 
Tribune relating the rumor of a proposed conference between the 
Premier and the President broke, which was unfortunate, to say the 
least, as you can well imagine. 

The government is not afraid of the above mentioned confusion; 
nor does it feel that that condition will destroy the fruits of the said 
conference. It is only that the government wished to keep the matter 
a secret until the arrangements had been completed. I am sure that 
you are aware that such a policy is not limited to just this case. 

Because of the circumstances being what they are, we would like 
to make all arrangements for the meeting around the middle of 
September, with all possible speed, and issue a very simple statement 
to that effect as soon as possible. (If the middle of September is not 
convenient, any early date would meet with our approval). 

Will you please convey this wish of the government to Hull and 
wire us the results. If an immediate reply is not forthcoming, we 
plan to issue a public statement describing our position in this matter. 
We feel that this should be done from the viewpoint of our domestic 
situation. Please advise the United States of this plan. 

21792 

JD-1:4923 (D) Navy Trans. 9-5-41 (S-TT) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
September 4, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#528 (Part 1 of 2.) 

Re your #556*. 

1. What the United States Government proposed as a preliminary 
to the meeting of the leaders of the two countries were the questions 
of self-defense, occupation of China by the Japanese Army and equal 
treatment in trade, discussed during the informal negotiations in the 
past. The fact is that the recent situation in Japan, especially since 
the leakage of Premier KONOYE's message, has made it urgent to 
hold the conference as soon as possible and thereby adjust Japanese- 
American relations. However, if we Continue to argue merely the 
legal angle of the aforementioned three pending questions as we have 
been doing, we believe that it would be impossible to be ready, as 
you have suggested, by the latter part of September. Furthermore, 
regarding what was communicated to us by the United States Gov- 
ernment on July 24th and (August ?) 17th, we have already expressed 
our views, in addition to our sending the Premier's message. Since 

79716 O— 46~pt. 12 4 



26 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

we have nothing more to say on the subject, we have decided to ex- 
press first of all our viewpoint given in #529 **, and, after finding out 
on what points the leaders of the two countries preliminarily and prin- 
cipally can agree, to hold a conference for the discussion of those 
points and then issue a joint statement at the end (I will wire you 
our text as soon as it is ready,) and thus help create a more whole- 
some atmosphere between the two countries. 

Army 21790 ' . Trans. 9/4/41 (S) 

• Not available. 

b See S. I. S. #21786, #21787 and 21788. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
September 4, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#528 (Part 2 of 2.) 

And so at 4:30 P. M. on the 4th I asked Ambassador GREW to 
come to see me and, upon his arrival, I communicated to him what is 
in the separate telegram. Bearing this in mind, will you also com- 
municate the same to the Secretary of State. 

2. The points in the separate telegram which require special ex- 
planation are as follows: (This was promised by the leaders of the two 
countries today during their conference. Whether it should take the 
form of a secret agreement or an ordinary agreement will be left to 
the discretion of the conferees.) 

(1) We expect each of the matters upon which Japan has made her 
pledge, especially Japan's stand with regard to the Three-Power 
Alliance, will win the approval of the United States Government. 

(2) As to the withdrawal of the orders for freezing of assets by 
both countries, you should avoid giving the impression that this 
freezing measure taken by the United States had proven to be dam- 
aging to Japan. 

(a) Explain the fact that if the — of this measure is technical and 
complicated and, furthermore, a halfway step, it will not be under- 
stood by the people at large. 

(b) Explain the fact that this step which the United States has 
taken has given the impression to the Japanese people that it was 
meant to be a punishment for Japan's occupation of French Indo- 
China. 

(c) Consider its spectacular aspect as secondary and emphatically 
propose that in view of the importance of the pledges made at this 
time by Japan, the United States must reciprocate Japan's decision 
even by overcoming a possible strong opposition within the American 
Government. By the word "immediately" with reference to the time 
when these orders are to be withdrawn, the time when an agreement 
regarding the matter included in the aforementioned (1) has been 
reached by the leading conferees, is meant. 

(3) By ceasing to take military measures we mean, for example, to 
cease dispatching more submarines and airplanes to the Philippines 
and cease acquiring military bases in the southwestern Pacific area, 
in China and in Far Eastern Russia. 

Army 21791 Trans. 9/4/41 (S) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 27 

[Secret] 
From: Washington. 
To: Tokyo. 
15 September 1941 
(Purple) 
#819 (In 3 parts, complete). 

Re your 561 to 563*. 

Points that have occurred to us here: 

(1) Whatever we tell to Secretary Hull you should understand will 
surely be passed on to the President if he is in Washington. It seems 
that the matter of preliminary conversations has been entrusted by 
the President to Secretary Hull, in fact he told me that if a matter 
could not be settled by me and Secretary Hull it would not be settled 
whoever conducted the conversations. Hull himself told me that 
during the past eight years he and the President had not differed on 
foreign policies once, and that they are as "two in one". 

(2) The expression "Communistic and other subversive activity" 
would arouse their caution, and the words "common defense in 
China" would give rise to questions, while "agreement" would still 
leave a doubt as to just what it does mean in concrete terms. 

(3) The United States has intimated that it wants to be advised 
of the peace terms between Japan and China and has further indicated 
that she would refuse to act as intermediary in the peace negotiations 
unless the terms were fair and just. Under such circumstances, I 
feel certain that the United States will not agree to promoting the 
peace conference if we now avoid outlining our terms. 

(4) In view of the national characteristics of the United States and 
of the President's position, it will be next to impossible to leave the 
interpretation of the Tripartite Pact up to the "leaders" at the con- 
ference, for them to settle from a political viewpoint. In other words, 
if opinions of both sides do not coincide at the preliminary conferences, 
there will be no "leaders' conference". 

(5) The United States has absolutely no objections to making these 
talks a Japanese-U. S. affair. Moreover, she has never even suggested 
the addition of a third power to it. The only thing they want to do 
is to arrange matters with Britain, China, Netherlands, etc. in advance, 
so that they wiU not get the impression that the United States is 
trading them off. However, I shall, of course convey the gist of 
your instructions to Hull. 

(6) I have been doing everything in my power, however insig- 
nificant my efforts may seem, to carry out your various instructions 
and suggestions concerning the proposed negotiations. I fear, how- 
ever, that if I were to go ahead and make some disposition of the 
various points you are discussing in Tokyo, I may find myself 
going off at a tangent. I should like, therefore, to leave these points 
alone for the time being and watch developments. 

22427 

JD-1: • (FD) Navy Trans. 9-18-41 (1) 

♦#561— JD-l: 5159. (S. I. S. #22247) 
#562— JD-1: 5160. (S. I. S. #22248) 
#563— JD-1: 5161. (S. I. S. #22249) 



28 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) 
17 September, 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#823 (Parts 1 and 2 of 3)» 

(1) On 6 August, I said at the White House that of the three main 
points, both parties were in agreement in principle on two. As for the 
matter pertaining to our evacuating our troops, I expressed ray 
opinion that it was only because he was confident that an agreement 
could be reached that the Premier is prepared to attend the meeting. 
At that time, the Secretary of State said that there were two or three 
other points that had to be clarified and "brought up to date." When 
he said that, he was referring to our proposal of 24 June. 

Although we are aware of your instructions contained in your 
message #397 of 24 July,* since the negotiations broke down at about 
that time, we could do nothing about your instructions of 15 July. 
The break-down continued, and the talks were resumed only after 
the recent message was sent. 

(2) The "understanding" which was put into words and submitted 
as a proposal on 24 June, was the culmination of over a dozen con- 
ferences between the Secretary of State and myself, in accordance 
with your instructions of 11 May. The Secretary and I conferred 
almost up to the moment he departed on his trip in behalf of his 
health. It is natural that the Secretary feels considerable attached 
to the proposal, since he had worked on it so hard for so many months. 

It is my opinion that the U. S will be more likely to come to terms 
at the preliminary negotiations if the general Unes contained in that 
proposal were followed. 

Hull (insists ?) that the negotiations be held here. 

•JD-l: 3986 (S. I. S. #20091)— (You were correct in assuming that I have not as yet determined on a defi- 
nite policy because of the fact that I have not as yet been in office very long. It is my intention to continue 
to make an effort to decrease the friction between Japan and Britain-U. S. Should the U.S., however, take 
steps at this time which would unduly excite Japan (such as the freezing of assets), an exceedingly critical 
situation may be created. Please advise the U. S. of this fact, and attempt to bring about an improvement 
in the situation. 

• For Part 3; see 8. 1. S. #22477. 

22506 

JD-l: 5301 Navy trans. 9-19^1 (7) 

[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) 
17 September, 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#823 (Part 3 of 3)» 

In view of the above facts, I believe that it is doubtful whether the 
preliminary negotiations can be arranged in accordance with only 
our proposal of 4 September. In any event, our first task is to find 
terms which are acceptable to both sides concerned, regarding the 
three points — particularly regarding the matter of garrisoning troops. 

According to information from that usual source, the atmosphere 
of the Cabinet meeting held here last Friday showed considerable 
signs of anticipation of a Japanese-U. S. conference. There is no 
mistaking the fact that the President is prepared to attend the meeting 
if the preliminary arrangements can be made. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 29 

Nishiyama (Financial Attache) says that a very good friend of 
his told him that Hull said to him (the friend) that the President 
"went too far" during the talks with this Ambassador. 

• Parts I <b 2 not available. 

22477 ' 

JD-1: 5301 Navy Trans. 9-19-41 (7) 



[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

September 22, 1941 

J-19 

#839 (Part 1 of 4) 

Currently the feeling here is, as ever, to aid the various countries on 
the side of the United States in carrying out the ultimate destruction 
of Germany. Though the Soviet, far more than was expected, has 
been able to put up a remarkable fight, there are many who sense an 
early defeat. England and the United States render such assistance as 
is possible in order to make impossible a separate peace or surrender. 
They are hopeful of being able to maintain her fighting strength in the 
spring, provided she can weather the winter. Opinion has developed 
to this point. The United States is putting up an estimated 
$-0,000,000 worth of assistance. As a result of this, they plan to 
encourage the Britons' will to fight. 

With regard to submarines, their utter annihilation is recognized to 
be virtually impossible. But then the American Navy could move 
directly into the Atlantic in order to protect Atlantic shipping. 
Furthermore, after the anticipated 6,000,000 "dead-weight" tons of 
increased construction have been completed by the United States 
alone during the twelve months of next year, a crisis will arise in the 
Atlantic. No one is unduly alarmed about submarines. 

Army 23011 Trans. 10/3/41 (2) 

[Sepret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

September 22, 1941 

J-19 

#839 (Part 2 of 4) 

With regard to the question of the policy toward , the people, 

as a general rule, are extremely happy-go-lucky. Should a war develop 
between Japan and the United States, "why worry, it's inevitable," 
is their attitude. There is still a great deal of talk on the comparative 
merits of the navies of feoth countries, the gist of which can be summed 
up as follows: A war between Japan and the United States will be 
one within the scope of the navy alone; Japan's economic strength 
cannot stand a long war; the United States excels greatly in its ability 
to replace warships lost in battle; saying these things, they boast of 
their ability to win out in a short while. There are only a few who 
are at all conscious of the danger of a war with Japan. In the field 
of international diplomacy, they still maintain their age-old policy 



30 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

toward There are many who argue that to reach a com- 
promise with Japan at the expense of China is fundamentally wrong. 
For example, according to the Hyde Park correspondent writing in 
the New York Times, Sunday edition, at the present time attempts 
to ameliorate the situation existing between Japan and the United 
States are deadlocked. Because Japan's demands for the continued 
occupation of territory held by them in China is not in agreement 
with HULL'S categorical denial of the possibility of such continued 
occupation, Premier KONOYE has requested a direct conference 
with the President. 
Army 23012 Trans. 10/3/41 (2) 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

September 22, 1941 

J-19 

#839 (Part 3 of 4) 

•Nevertheless, notwithstanding all that, since the German people's 
will to fight is stronger than ever before, there are a greater number of 
people who feel that such a non-aggressive policy as outlined above 
cannot bring about a successful conclusion. 

Many feel that as a result of the discontent of people in occupied 
lands, Italy will withdraw herself from the line of battle. In addition, 
many feel that the unrest of people in occupied areas will continue to 
increase. There are others, too, who pin unfounded hopes that the 
power of endurance of the German people will crumble within a short 
space of time. 

If the war is to be a short one, one or two years will be required. 
If it is a long one, it will be protracted from five to ten years. The 
people generally here are maintaining an extremely happy-go-lucky 
frame of mind. There are practically none at all who think that as a 
result of this war the United States will be destroyed. With regard 
to their will to enter into the war, they feel that naval participation 
is sufficient. And, aside from the preparations being undertaken by 
military authorities, there are practically none who anticipate the 
dispatch of expeditionary forces on a large scale. 

However, most recently there has been a sharp decline in the isola- 
tionist opinion expressed in the houses of Congress. One group is 
already going over to the majority group who back up the Govern- 
ment's foreign policy. 
Army 23013 Trans. 10/3/41 (7) 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

September 22, 1941 

J-19 

#839 (Part 4 of 4) 

Nevertheless, the President is a person who unceasingly confers 
with HULL. Today the greater portion of the American Navy is 
being kept in the Pacific. Japan, in the event of the Russian down- 
fall, might move either to the south or to the north. In such a case 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 31 

there is some fear that a frontal clash might occur at the same time in 
the Atlantic and the Pacific as well. The President is giving the 
utmost consideration to this matter. 

As for Japan's peace terms, rumors are being circulated that in 
addition to Japan demanding the treaty ports and the four southern 
provinces in China, she might go so far as to demand other points of 
military importance. 

Finally, though the United States Government does not wish to 
compromise with Japan at the expense of China, should Japan give 
up forceful aggressions, Japanese-American trade relations could be 
restored, and the United States would even go so far as to render 
economic assistance to Japan. 

The above are the critical observations concerning the trend of 
opinion in the United States made by KURATUKUHOON," and I 
think he hit the nail on the head. 

• Kana spelling. 

Army 23014 Trans. 10/3/41 (2) 

[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
23 September, 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#842 (3 Parts — complete) 

On the morning of the 23rd. I called on Hull and handed to him the 
English texts of your messages #562* and #564**, and our terms of 
peace between Japan and China as contained in your message #590***. 

I took this opportunity to point out the following points: That with 
these notes, together with the various other statements made by us, 
we have said all that we can say ; that we have nothing further to say 
to Ambassador Grew, either; that we shall leave all matters pertaining 
to the Tripartite Pact, other than the points which have already been 
brought up and explained, to be decided upon at thg meeting of the 
leaders of the two countries; that the proposals which we now make 
are not intended to show down the original proposals made by the 
U. S., but rather are intended to enlarge their scope. 

I continued by describing the situation and conditions in Japan in 
accordance with the contents of your message #589****. I added 
that our government was sincerely interested in having the "Leaders' 
Conference" materialize at the earliest possible opportunity. 

Part 2. 

In reply to this, Hull said that he was spending m.uch time in pro- 
moting the materialization of the "Leaders' Conference". He then 
said that he had previously expressed his hope that we would guide 
public opinion to a more favorable one, and inquired if we had been 
successful in this. 

I replied that as I had pointed out on several previous occasions, 
the government has faced this problem with sincerity, and that it is 
gradually being improved. 

Hull then asked for my own personal opinions on the matter, so I 
replied that it is the government's opinion that the Tripartite Pact 



32 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and the improvement of U. S.-Japanese relations can be made to 
parallel each other. I also said that I was firmly convinced that the 
meeting between the two leaders would immeasurably strengthen the 
peace of the Pacific. 

Part 3. 

Hull then advised me that he has received Grew's report of the 
Minister Toyoda-Grew meeting of the 22nd, and that he is giving it 
his careful study at the present time. He said that he is anxious to 
reply to it at the earliest possible moment. I then tried to have him 
commit himself to be in favor of the materialization of the "Leaders' 
Conference", even if in principle only, but I was unable to make him 
say anything definite. 

Hull then went on to say that in view of world conditions, it is not 
too early even now, for the U. S. and Japan to consider the recon- 
struction of a peaceful world. He, himself, thinks that Japan and 
the U. S. are ideally situated right now to lend leadership to the world. 
At the same time, however, he is not sure whether the caliber of the 
statesmanship of the two countries is capable of coping with such an 
undertaking. 

I, therefore, said that even from this standpoint, it was essential 
that the "Leaders' Conference" takes place. 

With this, our meeting was brought to an end. 

•JD-l: 5160 (S. I. S. #22248)— Detailed reply of Foreign Minister to Grew's request for interpretation of 
various phrases and paragraphs in Japan's notes and statements of intentions in the current U. S. nego- 
tiations. 

••J D-1: 5162 (S. I. S. #22250)— "Equitable basis" is not to be judged solely by Japan. (Refers to open door & 
commerce in China.) 

•••JD-l: 5360 (S. I. S. #22550-51)— Outline of Japan's terms for peace with China. 

••••JD-l: 5359 (S. I. S. #22547-49)— Orew-Toyoda talk in which Japs again emphasize that all U. S. ques- 
tions have now been answered and they therefore expect a U. S. reply on the leaders' conference question. 
The situation during past month has steadily become more critical and will become more so, due to pro-Axis 
elements in Japan, if a decision is not reached prior to the 1st anniversary of the Tripartite Pact the 28th of 
this month. 'Tell the Secretary this and wire his reactions. 

22749 

JD-l: Navy trans. 9-26-41 (1) 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
September 26, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#597 

In solving so difficult a problem as Japanese-American relations, 
your Honor's troubles and anxieties have always been deeply appre- 
ciated by me. I can easily see that, concerning the negotiations. 
Your Honor's views are not infrequently at variance with mine; but, 
as I told you in my #554', this is a very serious matter and I am pro- 
ceeding cautiously and deliberately. Therefore, I wish to caution you 
again not to add or detract a jot or tittle on your own without first 
getting in contact with me. In this connection, please wire me back 
concerning the following points: 

1. Have you communicated to them the contents of my #590**? 

1. In your conversation with the President, did he not mention a 
promise on our part that we would avoid and cease any further increase 
in our troops stationed in French Indo-China for the sake of success 
in the Japanese-American negotiations? When the President stated 
with smiling cynicism that he expected we might occupy Thailand 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 33 

while the Premier and he were talking, just as we did French Indo- 
China while you and the Secretary of State were conferring (see your 
#752"), did he not also refer to such a promise? I think he probably 
did. In view of the seriousness of matters as they stand, although I 
know the hour is all ready late, because of the necessity of keeping 
records, I want you please to go and question them again. Now 
when Germany (?) is becoming so aroused, we have no intention of 
rehashing things which have been gone over in the past. Please, also, 
(tell this to them?). Needless to say, there will be no changes in 
my #595** of today, so will you please communicate it to them. 

• See S. I. S. #22191 in which Tokyo tells Ambassador NOMURA that the texts of certain notes are decided 
upon after very careful study by all of the various ministries involved. If, however, he notes any points in 
such messages, he should make inquiries and suggestions by cable before delivering them to the addressees. 

•> See S. I. S. #22550-51 in which Tokyo sends Washington the text of the basic terms of peace between 
Japan and China. 

• See S. I. S. #21651 and #21615 in which Ambassador NOMURA wires Tokyo of his conference with the 
President with regard to the meeting between Prince KONOYE and the President. 

<> See 8. 1. S. #22748 in which Tokyo wires Washington the text of a proposed agreement between Japan 
and the United States. 

Army 22753 Trans. 9/26/41 (S) 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
27 September 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#604 

On this the 27th, at 1630, after completing the ceremonies cele- 
brating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, I requested Ambas- 
sador Grew to call on me. Off the record, I talked to him along the 
lines contained in my separate message #605*. I urged him to strongly 
recommend to his home government to have the "leaders' meeting" 
materialize immediately. Will you too, therefore, carefully read the 
contents of my separate wire and secretly do everything in your 
power to prevail upon the President to have this meeting materialize. 

The above is not to be construed as being the absolutely final 
proposal on our part, nor is it absolutely essential that a time limit 
be put in force. However, in view of internal and external circum- 
stances of our country, we cannot keep postponing matters forever. 
Please, therefore, put primary emphasis on the importance of holding 
the meeting immediately. (I mentioned this point to the U. S. 
Ambassador, too.) 

•JD-l: 5503. 

22863 

JD-l : 5502 (D) Navy Trans. 9-30-41 (S-TT) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
27 September 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#605 (In 4 parts, complete) 

{Translator's note. This is the gist of the off-the-record statement 
made by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Grew — see Tokyo 
to Washington #604* — and is written in the first person, Toyoda 
speaking.) 



34 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(Part 1) 

1. Europe has now fallen into a chaotic condition. The flames of 
war have spread to the Atlantic and they are enveloping the various 
powers of the world. Fortunately, however, no war has, as yet, 
broken out in the Pacific. The United States and Japan, alone, hold 
the key to continued peace or war in the Pacific. 

Should the United States and Japan come to blows, the Pacific, 
too, would be inmiediately thrown into the chaos that is war. World 
civilization would then come crashing down. No greater misfortune 
could befall mankind. 

In recent times, there have been numerous and various incidents 
between Japan and the United States. Relations are at an exceed- 
ingly sensitive point, and even the slightest thing must be treated 
with the utmost precaution. 

If, at this time, Japanese-U. S. relations were to be adjusted so as 
to promote friendship between them, the effects would be felt not 
only by the United States and Japan, but would indeed contribute 
greatly to a world peace. The Imperial Government desires the 
adjustment of Japanese-U. S. relations not only for the sake of Japan 
and the United States, but hopes that at the same time, such a step 
would become the opening wedge to bringing about peace throughout 
the world. 

2. Since assuming my post two months ago, I have been working 
on the matter of readjusting Japanese-U. S. relations even to the 
extent of almost forgetting to eat and sleep. It is with the same 
objective that Premier Konoye has expressed his willingness to act 
as a leader in a conference with President Roosevelt. 

(Part 2) 

3. Japan is connected to Germany and Italy by an alliance. The 
fact that the Premier of Japan had volunteered to meet the President, 
in itself has given rise to much misunderstanding regarding her 
relations with Germany and Italy. Thus, there is proof that Japan 
is making a supreme sacrifice. Kloreover, the history of Japan has 
no precedence of an instance where the Premier himself has gone 
abroad in behalf of diplomacy. This fact in itself should clearly 
show the sincerity of the government of Japan in its expressed desire 
of adjusting the relationship between Japan and the United States, 
and through that, of maintaining peace on the Pacific, and, indeed, 
for the world. 

4. Maintenance of peace is Japan's sole motivating power. Should 
there be those who believe that Japan was forced to her knees by 
U. S. pressure, it would indeed be a sad misconception on their part. 
Japan desires peace; she is not succumbing to outside pressure. 
Moreover, Japan is not one to yearn for peace at any price. 

The Japanese people have a peculiar characteristic of repelling all 
outside pressures. We have pointed this fact out previously but in 
view of the general tone of U. S. newspapers hi the past, (it is admitted 
that this has been considerably toned down of late), I feel that it is 
necessary to repeat this. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 35 

(Part 3) 

5. Japanese-U. S. relations are exceedingly complicated. Hence, 
it is quite possible that the entire matter cannot be settled in a day 
and a night. It is quite possible that not all of the difficult problems 
can be ironed out by a single meeting between the leaders of the two 
countries. However, the political aspect of such a meeting would 
have exceedingly far reaching effects. Moreover, those items which 
have as yet remained unsettled (we do not believe that any of these 
exist any longer, but assuming that some do) after all of the goings 
and comings of cables, they could undoubtedly be settled at the 
conference. It should be unnecessary to point out the turn for the 
better in U. S. -Japanese relations that this would have. 

We are under the impression that in theory, your side is not 
opposed to the holding of the "leaders' conference". Should, how- 
ever, in spite of this, the meeting does not materialize for some 
reason, we doubt if another opportunity such as the present would 
appear for some time to come. Moreover, it is quite possible that 
there may be some fearsome reactions from such a failure. 

6. Japan has already announced the proposals she will make at 
the meeting. We have moreover already submitted for your con- 
venience a complete resume in accordance with the lines contained 
in the United States' proposal of 21 June. I feel certain, therefore, 
that the United States is fully aware of the Japanese viewpoint by 
this time 

7. We have, of course, already decided upon the vessel which will 
transport the Premier and his party; the personnel of his party, in- 
cluding the generals and admirals, have also been decided upon. 
We are in a position to start at any moment now. 

(Part 4) 

8. Since the situation is as described above, the Imperial Govern- 
ment awaits with expectations the United States' reply at the earliest 
possible moment. Any further delays would place the government 
in an exceedingly difficult position from the viewpoint of the Tri- 
partite Pact. Your Excellency is certainly fully aware that there is 
every possibility of commemorating the first anniversary of the Tri- 
partite Pact, to strengthen the ties of the three powers. 

From the viewpoint of the weather there is considerable danger 
that it will become unfavorable in the North Pacific and in the Alaska 
area. 

9. From both domestic and external circumstances, time is of 
paramount importance, as I have pointed out previously. It is 
essential that the meeting be decided upon at all possible speed and 
it is with this thought uppermost in my mind that I so strongly 
insist upon this matter at this time. I would consider it to be of 
greatest fortune if we were to receive a definite reply at the earliest 
moment. 

From our standpoint if the meeting were scheduled from 10 to 15 
October, it would meet with our best convenience. 

In conclusion, I would like to say that in a negotiation of this type, 
it is of the utmost importance that each respect the other's reliability 



36 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and sincerity. Your Excellency is fully cognizant of Premier Konoye's 
character and his political position. I hardly feel that I can add any- 
thing in this respect at this time. However, as I said before, I doubt 
if another opportunity to adjust Japanese-U. S. relations will present 
itself because, at present, the Premier and the entire Cabinet are 
behind the move. At the same time, it is essential, even under 
present circumstances, that the leaders meet and confer directly, 
and at the earliest possible time. I repeat this last point over and 
over again. 

•JD-l: 6602. 

JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 9-30-41 (S-TT) 

22864 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
27 September 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#865 (In 10 parts, complete) 

{Part 1) 

On this, the 27th, I had Matudaira call on Ballantine and had him 
relay the contents of your message and at the same time deliver the 
English texts contained in your messages 591* and 595**. He 
requested that they be delivered to Hull. 

I am taking this opportunity to express my humble opinion on 
various points which happen to draw my attention in regard to your 
message #595**. I pass them on to you for whatever value they 
may have. 

1. As I have pointed out on several previous occasions while 
reporting on matters pertaining to this issue, the United States insists 
that it would be inappropriate to hold the "leaders' conference" until 
the two nations have come to a complete agreement on all the points 
involved. At present the United States is allegedly investigating our 
attitude with regard to said various points. Since, as you said, we 
have already said all that is to be said, we are now committed to 
await expression of intentions by the United States. 

{Part 2) 

If we submit further papers to them in advance of receiving some 
reply from them, there is a danger that matters would become further 
complicated and less clear. I am of the opinion that this would tend 
to hamper the progress of the negotiations. 

If, by some chance, some apparent inconsistencies appear in our 
various papers, it may lead to their becoming suspicious of our 
sincerity. 

{Part S) 

Fundamentally speaking, the United States wishes to proceed along 
the lines she express in the U. S. proposals of 21 June. Judging from 
developments to date we do not feel that the premises outlined in 
those proposals are too far afield. Moreover, from the viewpoint of 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 37 

practicability we feel that they are the most concrete. I, therefore, 
nope that you will accept the reasonings embodied therein. 

2. The deletion of the item reading "no northward advance shall 
be made without justification" will no doubt be the point which wiU 
invite the most suspicion. 

{Part 4) 

3. The respective attitudes of the two nations to the war in Europe: 
As I have pointed out in messages pertaining to this phase, (see par- 
ticularly my message #540***), it would be exceedingly difficult from 
the United States' viewpoint to retain paragraph 1 proposing joint 
mediation. Recent developments (particularly in view of the Presi- 
dent's statement subsequent to the sinking of the U. S. vessel) have 
further stiffened the U. S. attitude. Therefore, it is my opinion that 
considerable difficulty will be encountered in securing U. S. agree- 
ment to this point. 

{Part 5) 

Concerning the matter of self defense as contained in paragraph 
two: Again, as I have previously reported, all U. S. moves pertaining 
to the European war are allegedly being made from the basic national 
policy of self defense as the starting point. Even if the United States 
does become actively involved in the war, she will do so in behalf of 
self defense and will not, supposedly, be in any sense an aggressive 
attack, even though she may have had ample provocation to make 
it so. In this way, they intend to obviate the necessity of our invok- 
ing the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Thus, the United States is very 
anxious to have the term "right to self defense" as elastic as possible. 
(Read Secretary Hull's speech, contained in my message #381****). 
For this reason, they may not be tempted to accept the wording of 
our proposal on this point. The fact that we outline our needs for 
self defense may unduly arouse their suspicion. 

{Part 6) 

Regarding the matter pertaining to the settlement of the Chinese 
Incident: As I pointed out in my message #540***, the United States 
has, fundamentally speaking, insisted that we outline the peace terms 
we shall propose to China. She maintains that she will enter into 
the real negotiations only after a complete agreement as to the con- 
tents of the "annex." Therefore, we shall undoubtedly be confronted 
with the diflBcult task of coming to an agreement on the matters of 
garrisoning troops and non-discriminatory treatment. I am of the 
opinion that in the final analysis, we shall have to agree to the terms 
oflFered by the United States in so far as they do not conflict with the 
terms of the Nanking Agreement. We should word our explanations 
and counter proposals with this in mind. 

{Part 7) 

Before we are able to have the United States yield, we shall un- 
doubtedly have to conduct several negotiations even after this. The 
danger of the negotiations breaking down completely as a result of 
the matter of our stationing troops, is constantly on the increase. 



38 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The "non-discrimination" phase is not quite as tickling a problem as 
the former. In our proposal we state that non-discrimination will 
apply to the conducting of business between China and Japan only. 
We add that as long as any third nation conducts her economic enter- 
prises on a fair and even basis, she will in no way be discriminated 
against. I am not at all sure that the United States wUl be satisfied 
with these conditions. 

{Part 8) 

Furthermore, we will probably encounter considerable difficulty in 
making the United States swallow, from the standpoint of policy, the 
new "principle of especially close relations". 

Aside from these points, paragraph one is so worded as to imply 
that the United States and Japan were jointly responsible to settle 
the China Incident. I am not at all confident that we shall be able 
to succeed in this because it may not give a favorable impression at 
the time this "understanding" is published. (As I have reported in 
previous messages, the United States is not in favor of keeping this 
"understanding" a secret). 

with regard to the contents of paragraph two 

referring to having the United States use her good offices 

and the point making the demands, shall necessitate the making of 
new demands if we are to pursue the lines laid down heretofore, as 
well as those contained in your instruction of 11 April. 

(Part 9) 

I also believe that considerable difficulty will be encountered in 
having them agree to the new matter. In that part referring to peace 
terms, the following words appear: "Konoye statement and those agree- 
ments between Japan and China". I feel that here, too, we shall en- 
counter difficulty in getting their approval. Since President Roose- 
velt is very interested in taking the mediation actions himself it might 
be well to insert the word "President" in the sentence. 

(Part 10) 

5. We have your instructions of 15 July with regard to the matter 
of trade between the two countries. We would appreciate your basing 
your proposal on the U. S. proposal of 21 June. 

6. With regard to the matter pertaining to the political stabilization 
of the Pacific, it is said that that part of the U. S. proposal of 21 June 
referring to it was written by Secretary Hull himself. Since the United 
States looks upon this phase with the most importance, we would ap- 
preciate your allowing that part of their proposal to stand as is. We 
would particularly appreciate your deleting from the new proposals 
that part which states that we agree to evacuate our troops from 
French Indo-China only at the termination of the China Incident. 
We feel that it would be more acceptable to the United States if we 
were to retain only that part which refers to the condition of a large 
scale peace on the Pacific. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 39 

In other words, we hope to wind up all arrangements of the prelim- 
inary conference. 

•JD-l : 5415 (S. I. S. #22709). Japan presents a long explanation of the necessity for her maintaining troops 
in certain parts of China even after peace with Japan is restored. 

••JD-l: 5438 (S. I. S. #22748). Tokyo sends what appears to be nearly their final effort to get the U. S. to 
agree to a "leaders' conference". . . ^ ^ ^ ,_ ^ ... ^ j. 

•••JD-l: 3842 (S. I. S. #19911). Amb. Nomura expresses the opmion that based on the thought and dis- 
cussions given the proposals for an Understanding Pact, there is a wide gap between the viewpoints of the 
two countries, and that Tokyo's proposals will lead to a misunderstanding. Comments on several items 
of the proposal and requests Tokyo's opinion regarding each. 

••••Not available. 

22961 

JD-l: 5534 (D) Navy Trans. 10-1-41 (2) 

[Secret] 

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) 

To: Washington 

September 28, 1941 

Pm-ple (CA) 

#606 (Part 1 of 2) 

In connection with my off-the-record communication to the Ameri- 
can Ambassador in Tokyo last night, in case you have an interview 
with the President, the following is for your information: 

1. As the last paragraph of that communication makes clear, we do 
not mean at all that all questions and answers are now useless. How- 
ever, I wished again to emphasize that the first anniversary of the 
conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance is the turning point and that this 
occasion is all the more grave. If they have any questions, of course, 
we will be glad cordially to respond (but as a matter of fact, they have 
not asked us a single thing since the 10th, and I find this very 
mysterious). 

2. The meaning of the statement that yesterday was the turning 
point and that the occasion is an important factor is that for the last 
few days a movement to strengthen the Axis has been afoot, and the 
popular psychology is being adverted toward this trend. Conse- 
quently, the tendency to oppose an adjustment with the United 
States is naturally increasing. Hence, now is the time, if ever, to 
concentrate on this accord. This does not mean at all that the power 
of the present government has dwindled or that the advocates of 
an ti- Americanism have strengthened their position. 

Army 22819 Trans. 9/29/41 (S) 

[Secret] • 

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) 

To: Washington 

September 28, 1941 

Purple (CA) 

#606 (Part 2 of 2) 

It is true, we shall have to get quicker and better results than ever 
before from our endeavors for an understanding. It may even be 
necessary for us to publish them. Nevertheless, once the negotia- 
tions are decided upon or once the date of an interview is set, the 
government of this country is sure that the people wUl stand united 
and that the opposition's voice wiU be quickly drowned in a chorus 
of approval. Of this we have always been sure, nor has our convic- 
tion waned for a moment lately. Notwithstanding, the Premier sent 
his message more than a month ago. Nothing has happened; it 



40 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

seems as though it were pigeon-holed. The government is very much 
worried over this, needless to say. 

3. It is true that one influential admiral and one general were in- 
cluded in the Premier's entourage. This made the United States 
suspect that a hostile military was holding the whip hand over us. 
I took this action, therefore, to dispel any such fear on their part (I 
seem to recall that HULL asked Your Honor something about this 
once) . 

4. I talked with the British Ambassador the other day and he said, 
"To speak frankly, the trouble is that the United States is mieasy 
and lacks confidence concerning the attitude of the government of 
Japan." Well, the integrity of Premier KONOYE and of the present 
government ought to be a hundred per cent reliable, and the American 
Ambassador must have sufficiently advised his government on the 
trustworthiness of Prince KONOYE. 

Army 22820 Trans. 9/29/41 (S) 

[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
29 September 1941 
(Purple) (CA) 
#867 

During the morning of this, the 29th, (Monday), I called on the 
Secretary of State, and, in accordance with the instructions contained 
in your messages from 604 to 606*, I asked that I be granted a secret 
interview with the President. The Secretary said that because of 
death in his family, the President had been in Hyde Park since 
Thursday. Upon his return to Washington, however, he would see 
the President, he said and would hand me a memo of the U. S. Gov- 
ernment within the next couple of days. He added that he read 
Ambassador Grew's report yesterday and thus gave evidence of being 
thorouglily famUiar with the situation. 

Hull gave indications that he too felt that immediate action was 
essential. At the same time, however, he seemed to think that it 
was of primary importance to get public opinion in Japan thoroughl}'^ 
unified in favor of it. 

I, therefore, pointed out that though the government, the army, 
and the navy, were in full accord with the proposals being discussed, 
considerable time would have to elapse before the entire public could 
be made to understand them. There are those, fop example, who 
cannot understand why the United States should meddle so deeply 
in Asiatic affairs when she herself constantly refers to the Monroe 
Doctrine and who, in actual practice, has seized the leadership of the 
American continents, Japanese public opinion cannot be made to 
conform with the every whim of the United States. To await its 
doing so would be like watchfully waiting for the century plant to 
bloom, I said. 

23033 

JD-1: 5592 (D) Navy Trans. 10-3-41 (7) 

•604-JD-l: 5502 (S. I. 8. #22863). Toyoda-Orew talk held 1630 Sept. 27. Japs again stronRly urge early 
action on the "leaders' conference", and directs Nomura to do everything possible to avoid further post 
ponement. 

♦605-JD-l: 6503 (S. I. S. #22864). Gist of remarks made by Toyoda to Grew. 

•606-JD-l: 6604 (S. I. 8. #22819-20). Toyoda elucidates for Nomura's information various points of bis 
talk with Grew. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 41 

[Secret] 
From: Washington. 
To: Tokyo. 
29 September 1941 
(Purple) 
#870 (In 4 parts, complete) 

{PaH 1) 

To Chief of Bureau Terasaki from Iguti. 

I realize, of course, that I am being presumptuous, but the following 
are my opinions of the negotiations to adjust U. S, -Japanese relations: 

(1) In view of such incidents as were described in our message 
#866*, we believe that it would be well if we did not deliver those 
papers here which have already been delivered in Tokyo to Ambassador 
Grew. Duplications in this manner are apt to create misunder- 
standings through transmission errors and through differences in 
translations. This is particularly true of some vague passage which 
cannot be made clear without lengthy explanations. (Please see our 
message #865**, and others for points which are in doubt). Under 
these circumstances, we are unable to make explanations when we 
are requested to do so by the United States. The Ambassador 
himself is placed in an exceedingly awkward position. We, therefore, 
would prefer to put most of our efforts in trying to sound the U. S. 
attitude. 

{Part 2) 

(2) We have already said that we have said all that is to be said. 
To keep submitting notes after notes, thereafter, which do not always 
run in sequence with the previous note, is not good, for it causes 
confusion and further delays. 

As a matter of fact DESUBANIN * * * told us in confidence that 
the United States is of the opinion that the scene of the negotiations 
was shifted to Tokyo by us so as to bring about delays. They think 
that we are watching developments of the German-Soviet war, and 
that we shall launch a northward move if indications seem to favor it. 

{Part 3) 

(3) Father Drught advises us that a friend of his in Tokyo (prob- 
ably Walsh) reports that Japanese governmental circles feel that 
there is absolutely no reason why the United States should not accept 
the most recent proposals. The fact that she has not done so, must 
be 4ue to interference from some Washington source, Walsh cables. 

For the past six months, we have been holding talks here during 
which the attitude and stand of the United States has been set down 
clearly. We feel confident that you are aware, through our various 
reports on the subject, that it is exceedingly unlikely that the United 
States has any intention of backing down from those established 
stands. 

We feel that there must be a tendency in Tokyo to view the United 
States statements too optimistically. It is imaginable to us that 
there are those who approach the Premier with a little too much 
"wishful thinking". 

79716 O — 46— pt. 12 5 



42 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

{Part 4) 

(4) It is admittedly true that impatience in this matter must be 
avoided. We realize, of course, that circumstances have made it 
unavoidable to a certain extent, but even so, it seems to us that we 
have been urging the United States to reply quite frequently of late. 
This apparently is giving the impression to the United States that we 
are overly anxious. 

On the other hand, the United States applied the "freezing" order 
on us, effecting our entire economic structure. Since then, they have 
been sitting tight, awaiting and watching subsequent developments. 
The United States does not suffer greatly from that measure; hence 
they are in no rush. 

Under such circumstances, we do not feel that it is to our advantage 
to show signs of over-anxiety all by ourselves. 

23110 

JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 10-4-41 (1) 

•JD-l: 5560 (S. I. S. #22977). Orew's report of our terms of peace with Cbina differs from what you sent 
me. Please check. 

•*JD-1: 6534 (8. I. S. #22961). Long report from Nomura giving his views of current state of U. S.-Jap 
negotiations. 

•**R. E. Desvemine, President American Crucible Steel Co. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
September 30, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#614 (Part 1 of 3.) 
Re your #865*. 

1. As you say, so long as they do not send us any reply we should 
avoid presenting them with various written suggestions. I am en- 
tirely in agreement with you. 

2. I, too, in the beginning was in a hurry to draw up a plan and 
hurry along the negotiations, that is why on the 14th of July I sent 
you some instructions, but since you never presented the American 
officials with them, and in the light of subsequent events, in order to 
finally evolve a comprehensive settlement, on September 4 I brought 
forth a proposal. I incorporated this proposal in my #595'' and did 
my best to harmonize it with the American proposal. There are no 
changes to be made in the substance of it and if the Americans so 
desire I think we might negotiate on the basis thereof. 

3. My views on certain points which you mention in your message 
are as follows. In case they question you please answer accordingly: 

1. The reason why I left out the expression, "As there is no real 
objection we will make no northward invasion", in part 2 of your 
message is that if we were to insert this into the body of the text it 
might only give them the suspicion that we have direct designs against 
the Soviet. This whole matter, after all, concerns the China incident 
and the South Seas question. There is no particular problem in the 
north. In the preface to the clause concerning the stability of the 
Pacific area, this matter is fully included so I am willing to leave it up 
to the leaders on both sides and if necessary to clarify this in the 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 43 

minutes. In my proposal of the 4th I made it plain that there was no 

objection to this statement. 

Army 22870 Trans. 9/30/41 (S) 

• Not available. 

b See S. I. S. #22748 in which Tokyo wires Washington the text of a ifoposed agreement between Japan and 
the United States. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
September 30, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#614 (Part 2 of 3) 

2. The first clause relating to the attitude of both Governments 
toward the European war is all right as it stands so far as I am con- 
cerned. Since we say "when the proper time comes" I am sure that 
this will cover their misgivings. 

3. Concerning the second clause of the same article, as you say, 
they may have something more to say. We will merely wait for them 
to broach the subject and if necessary not be loathe to consider it 
again. 

4. The part concerning the adjustment of the China incident. 

a. We do not mean by the first clause that this is the joint responsi- 
bility of the Japanese and the American Governments. All along the 
United States has insisted that a settlement of the China trouble has 
a great bearing on the stability of the Pacific. That is why we went 
so far as to say that both Governments "will endeavor to bring about 
etc." We do not mean to discuss this in detail but if they oppose it 
as it stands we are ready to change it or leave it out. 

b. We have been looking forward with expectancy from the begin- 
ning to American mediation and so we are not making any new 
requests such as you mentioned. 

c. The insertion of the phrase "a treaty between Japan and China" 
is merely in accordance with the three principles laid down by 
KONOYE and there is no special meaning to it. Please explain this 
to them. 

d. There is no objection to requesting that President ROOSEVELT 
mediate. 

Army 22871 Trans. 9/30/41 (S) 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
September 30, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#614 (Part 3 of 3.) 

e. When we come to the question of non -discrimination in economic 
activities in China, I want you to make it clear to them so that they 
will not entertain any misgivings that this principle should not apply 
merely between Japan and China but also to third countries. Advise 
them, furthermore, that the principle that neighbors naturally have 
Ultimate relations is practiced throughout the whole world and is by 
no means a new theory. 



44 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

5. The clause concerning commerce between the two countries in 
my #595* coincides in meaning with the American proposal. Only 
in the meantime the freezing order has taken place and subsequent 
developments have modified the situation. We only hope that con- 
ditions will soon be ameliorated. Once they eliminate this order we 
will have no objection to their proposal on this subject. 

6. a. Concerning the stipulations about the political stability of 
the Pacific, the stipulations in the American proposal are pet principles 
of Secretary HULL and the United States sets great store by them. 
They are merely general stipulations, therefore, we will not be loathe 
to reconsider them. 

h. I transferred the matters concerning the military evacuation of 
French Indo-China and the settlement of the Chinese incident to the 
clause concerning the establishment of peace in the Pacific. This will 
make the clause more harmonious and expand its significance. That 
is all I meant by this action. If they don't like it, however, we will 
put it back like it was. 

If the Americans present you with an aide memoire today, without 
any delay, wire it on to me. I am ready and eager to make a trans- 
lation of it. If possible, before you send it, send me a brief summary. 

Army 22872 Trans. 9/30/41 (S) 

• See S. I. S. #22748 in which Tokyo wires Washington the text of a proposed agreement between Japan 
and the United States. 



(Secret] 
From: Rome 
To: Tokyo 
September 30, 1941 
Purple 
#627 

Our recent negotiations with the United States have put a bad 
taste in the mouths of the people of this country. Our attitude 
toward the Tripartite Alliance appears to them to be faithless. 
Recently the newspapers have been growing more critical in tone 
where we Japanese are concerned. Official comment, too, has been 
none too complimentary. As for Italy's attitude toward the recent 
celebration of the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Japanese- 
German-Italian Tripartite Alliance, its coolness reflects the attitude 
of the whole Italian people. I mean to say: 

1. The Propaganda Department told the press to confine itself to a 
mere mention of the present anniversary and to turn its attention 
mainly to other things, refraining from discussion of the bearing of 
this alliance upon the present international situation. 

2. The ceremonies attendant upon this anniversary were carried 
out half-heartedly or even less by the Italians. It would even seem 
that this was done to spite Japan and Germany. At Villa Madama 
there was a reception held for CIANO, but certainly no festivities 
worth mentioning took place. At a reception held for the press, at 
first the German and Italian flags only were hanging in the hall. A 
Japanese reporter mentioned this, and then they pulled them all down. 

3. When asked about felicitations and ceremonies, the Propaganda 
Department always replied that this was not a good time to be 
ostentatious. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 45 

Furthermore, the other day PRUNAS told ANDO that word had 
been received from Ambassador INDELLI that when he inquired of 
the Japanese Foreign Office officials concerning the negotiations be- 
tween Japan and the United States, they were very reserved and un- 
communicative, showing that their erstwhile fervor for the Axis was 
not as glowing as in days gone by. 

All this shows how dissatisfied the Italian people are. All I can 
say is that the exercises held in Tokyo on the and the Minis- 
ter's speech, together with the messages from the Premier and 
Minister, saved the situation perhaps to some extent,. 

Army 22946 Trans. 10/2/41 (G) 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
September 30, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#881 Part 1 of 2» 

Last Monday after a long time I went to call on Admiral STARK. 
In the middle of our conversation Rear Admiral TURNER joined us. 
The Admiral said that after all the question of troops stationed in 
China would do most damage to the negotiations and that unless the 
China Incident is settled an understanding between Tokyo and 
Washington will be impossible. TURNER said that he doubted if we 
would agree to evacuate China, but if no agreement were reached in 
the preparatory talks any conversations between the leaders of the 
two countries might be dangerous. 

While we were talking about the Tripartite Alliance, the Admiral 
stated that the United States does not intend to go ahead and strike at 
Japan, adding that if the United States fights a two ocean war after all 
she will have to defend herself in the Pacific. 
Army 22987 Trans. 10/2/41 (2) 

• Part 2 not available. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
1 October 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#618 (In 5 parts, complete) 

(Parti) 

To Counselor Iguti from Terasaki. 
Re your #870* 

1. Please refer to our message #613** with regard to the matter 
contained in your #866***. . 

2. I feel that you are justified to a certain extent when you com- 
plain that after we have stated that we have put all of our cards on 
the table, we continue to send you note after note, etc. Our note of 
4 September was so designed to contain our views of the three subjects 



46 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

which have been discussed hitherto in a very broad Hght. It was not 
drawn up with any intention of "slowing down" the procedure in the 
sense voiced by Hull. We were of the opinion that there were some 
points of the preliminary talks which needed clearing up. Thinking 
that it would facilitate matters if we drew up our proposals in the 
form that the U. S. proposal of 21 June was put in (my message 
#595****). We further sent you message #590*****, dealing with 
Japanese-Chinese peace terms and my message #591****** pertaining 
to the garrisoning of troops, in the hope that they would supplement 
and explain our note of 4 September. They were forwarded to your 
office by the Foreign Minister, as reference material to be used by the 
Ambassador in explaining our position to the United States. They 
were sent at the request of the Premier and the military. 

(Part 2) 

Putting it bluntly, we were quite unaware of the fact that the 
Ambassador in the United States had allegedly submitted, for the 
purpose of further consideration by this office, certain changes in our 
note of 4 September, (the 1st, 4th — including the supplements — , 
6th and 7th paragraphs were unchanged ; paragraph 2 was unchanged 
with the exception of that part referring to the exchanging of official 
notes; paragraph 3 was identical to the Japanese note of 15 June; and 
to paragraph 5 was added the words: "For the production and pro- 
curement of national resources" to the U. S. proposal of 21 June), 
until we were questioned about it by the U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo. 
This allegation came as a great surprise and the Foreign Minister 
replied that the note of 14 July must have been the one implied. The 
Minister added that if the Embassy in Tokyo was in immediate need 
of the English text of that message, he could no doubt obtain it from 
the State Department, and that we could supply him with the Japanese 
text immediately. 

It was then that that part which appears in parentheses in the pre- 
ceding paragraph came to light. At the same time, the fact that the 
Japanese Ambassador had said that .the "draft was not official" to 
the State Department was also brought to hght. 

{Part 3) 

These conditions have further complicated the already exceedingly 
complicated negotiations and for that reason, it is indeed very regret- 
table. 

3. It is regrettable that in spite of the fact the Ambassador in 
Washington and yourself are putting forth your best efforts and in 
spite of the fact that we are facing the problems with the utmost sin- 
cerity, the United States does not reciprocate our statesmanship. 
However, there are none here who are underrating the United States 
or who are looking upon the developments with undue optimism. 

4. We fear that possibly you are not completely familiar with the 
exceedingly critical situation at home. It is only through the clear 
thinking of the military and the superhuman work on the part of all 
those officials concerned with domestic matters that we have been 
able to avert the breaking out of any unfortunate incident subsequent 
to the 27th*******. The utmost caution ^all have to be exercised 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 47 

in the future to preserve this condition. Will you please obtain from 
Minister Wakasugi at first hand a description of the situation in Japan. 
This is, of course, for your and the Ambassador's information only. 

Your explanation to the United States should be made along the 
following lines: "Apparently there are those in the United States who 
misunderstand the political situation in Japan. These persons seem 
to be of the opinion that the Konoye cabinet's position is not strong. 
Therefore, any agreement entered into with that government is in 
danger of being disregarded by the military or some other strong or- 
ganization. This is not a correct analysis of the situation in Japan. 
It is true that there are those who express opposition to the present 
cabinet but these elements can be easily overruled. 

(Part 4) 

"Of course there have been public utterances such as Colonel Ma- 
buchi's broadcast and Nakano's speech, who expressed, judging from 
the reports, opinions opposed to those contained in the Premier's 
message. Anyone, however, who knows the characteristics of the 
Japanese and who are familiar with conditions in Japan, should be 
able to understand the true meaning of those speeches. Mabuchi 
placed the most emphasis on encouraging the people while Nakano, 
pursuing his usual line, need not be looked upon with any importance. 

"Unfortunately, however, foreign newsmen stationed in Japan, 
attached much importance to these speeches. British and American 
newspapers which place the most importance on 'journalistic interest' 
played up minor points in an exaggerated manner. 

"These, of course, are causing misunderstandings. We are con- 
fident, however, that the people who have spent any time at all in 
Japan can see the true picture, etc." 

We believe that if the situation were explained to them in that 
manner, they will more readily understand matters. Moreover, it is 
the truth. 

Not only the Foreign Minister but all concerned are as one in this 
matter, and are willing to meet any without fear. You can readily 
see, in view of domestic circumstances and in view of external rela- 
tions, that we are all eager to have the "leaders' conference" take 
place. This is but a natural development, and if they insist on 
construing it to be impatience on our part, I guess it can't be helped. 

(Parts) 

That we intend Washington to be the central locale of these nego- 
tiations is as you stated in your recent message and should have been 
further clarified by the telephone communication between the Foreign 
Office and the Embassy. Because of some peculiar circumstances, 
the occasion may arise where some talks aie conducted in Tokyo 
first. That would be done only under unavoidable circumstances. 
Any who believe that any idea of stalling was behind such a move, 
thoroughly misunderstands the Foreign Minister's motives. 

Time is now the utmost important element. Whether this matter 
materializes or not has a direct and important bearing on peace on 
the Pacific and even of the world. The seriousness of the situation 



48 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

must be thoroughly recognized. Please exercise every bit of power 
available to bring about a favorable conclusion of this matter. 

Paragraph 2 of my message #614******** was meant to point out 
that we have no objections to using the contents of my message 
#595**** as a basis of negotiations if so desired by the United States. 

Although there is that matter contained in my message 
#617*********, we make the above statement anew. 

23078 

JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 10-4-41 (S-TT) 

•JD-l: 5614. Available, being translated. 

••Available, not translated; dated 30 September. 

•••JD-1: 5560 (S. I. S. #22977). Orew's report of OUT terms of peace with China differs from what you sent 
me. Please check. 

••••JD-1: 5438 (S. I. S. #22748). Tokyo sends what appears to be nearly their final effort to get the U. S. 
to agree to a "leaders' conference". 

•••♦•JD-1: 5360 (S. I. S. #22550-51). Outline of Japan's terms for peace with China. 

••••••JD-1: 5415 (S. I. S. #22709). Japan presents a long explanation of the necessity for her maintaining 

troops in certain parts of China, even after peace with Japan is restored. 

•••••••First anniversary of the Tripartite Pact. 

••••••••JD-1: 5510 (S. I. S. #22870-71-72). I agree that we should avoid any more written suggestions to 

the U. S. until they give us some reply. 

•••••••••JD-1: (Available, being translated.) 



[Secret] 
From: Berlin 
To: Tokj?o 
1 October 1941 
(Purple) 
#1198 

On this the occasion of the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, 
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop has come to Berlin from the Imperial 
Headquarters especially and 1 have had several visits with him. Using 
this opportunity I, and the other members of the staff, have mingled 
with people from all classes of society and visited with them, I am 
endeavoring to sum up all these experiences and analyze the present 
state of feeling toward Japan held by Germany in this report to you. 

1. Ribbentrop said that he had absolute proof that, while reports 
of the content of the Japanese-American negotiations were withheld 
from Ambassador Ott, America was in secret communication with 
England in regard to the Japanese-American negotiations. Even 
Ribbentrop who is supposed to understand Japan's position, expressed 
great dissatisfaction regarding Japan's attitude. 

2. That the Foreign Office staff from Weizsacker down and also 
everyone in general were thoroughly disgusted with Japan was very 
apparent from their attitude toward myself and other members of the 
staff. Everyone who feels kindly disposed toward Japan is deeply 
concerned over this state of affairs. Even those who do not come to 
the same conclusion that Ambassador Ott did in his telegram are 
outspoken in their dissatisfaction and expression of pessimistic views. 
I am trying to take the position in interviews with newspaper cor- 
respondents and others concerned with the outside that Germany is 
cognizant of the Japanese-American negotiations and that they are 
no indication of an alienation between Japan and Germany. 

3. Foreign diplomats and newspaper correspondents of third coun- 
tries show great interest in the Japanese attitude and seem to consider 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 49 

it in a certain sense as a barometer by which the course of the European 
war can be judged. However we receive the impression that the 
greater number feel that Japan is avoiding war because of the impover- 
ishment resulting from the China incident and is taking a pessimistic 
attitude toward the course of the European war. 

4. Even though it might be said that Germany is prepared for these 
machinations of estrangement by third countries and that she is keep- 
ing up the pretence that there is no change in her feelings toward 
Japan, the fact that the feeling of German leaders and the people in 
general toward Japan is getting bad is one that cannot be covered. 
Please bear this fact in mind. If Japan takes a wishy-washy attitude 
and goes ahead with her negotiations without consulting Germany 
there is no telling what steps Germany may take without consulting 
Japan. 

Please convey this to the army and navy. 

Relayed to Rome. 

23673 

JD-1 : (H) Navy Trans. 10-18-41 (4) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
October 2, 1941 - 

(Purple— CA) 
#625 

Special intelligence #330 from New York states that an A. P. 
dispatch declares that the Japanese-American negotiations warrant 
a pessimistic outlook and that the KONOYE Cabinet will face a 
crisis in about two weeks, whereupon it will be inevitable that the 
Cabinet undergo a revision. It seems that this rumor is going around 
in Washington, but in any case, it is absolutely false and untrue. 
The situation here in Japan as described in my #618* should be known 
to you and, whenever necessary, will you please enlighten the Ameri- 
cans. Too, Secretary HULL appears to be gravely concerned over 
pubUc opinion here in Japan. I think that he has questioned you 
twice on this subject. Well, let me tell you that public opinion is 
very calm here and we intend to take advantage of the situation. 
We are merely awaiting their memorandum, and the Government 
entertains the view that we had better issue a statement on these 
Japanese-American negotiations at the earliest opportunity. This 
opinion is growing. 

Naturally the substance of this statement will be confined to our 
side. We can merely refer briefly to matters on the American side. 
In any case, we will discuss all this with the Americans. 

It seems that there have been a number of rumors concerning a 
statement by the Government, lately. Among them there are many 
mistaken ones. 

Army 22988 Trans. 10/2/41 (S) 

• Not available. 



50 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

October 2, 1941 

(Purple— CA) 

#889 

At Secretary HULL's invitation, I called on him at nine o'clock this 
morning. He handed me the reply of the United States Government 
which I have given in the separate telegram #890* and said that it is the 
opinion of the United States Government that a conference of the 
leaders of the two governments would be a precarious affair unless a 
(complete ?) understanding could be arrived at thereby and that if 
peace is to be maintained all over the Pacific, a "patch-up" under- 
standing would not do, but a "clear-cut" understanding would have 
to be made. I remarked that the Japanese Government will, no 
doubt, be very much disappointed in such a reply but that in any case 
I would transmit it. 

Army 23001 Trans. 10/3/41 (7) 

» Not available. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
3 October 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#627 

I described the various problems involving the United States and 
Japan to British Ambassador Craigie who was scheduled to have gone 
on a vacation trip to the United States on 28 September. (He had 
planned to leave from Nagasaki and make connections with the 
President Coolidge at Shanghai on 4 October. However, in view of 
illness on the part of the Counselor who was to have acted as Charge 
d'Affaire in the Ambassador's absence, his trip has been apparently 
postponed for about three weeks). 

At the same time, we asked Ambassador Grew to also speak to 
Ambassador Craigie and we understand that they also discussed 
matters on the same day. 

Subsequently, according to absolutely unimpeachable sources, 
Ambassador Craigie cabled Foreign Secretary Eden and Ambassador 
Halifax, explaining the im portance of having the United States and 
Japan come to an immediate agreement to hold a conference . The gist 
of Craigie's opinions contained in those messages is being forwarded 
to you as my supplementary message #628*. 

In view of the source, will Your Excellency keep the information 
contained strictly to yourself only. 

23079 

JD-1: 5623 (D) Navy Trans. 10-4-41 (W-TT) 

•JD-l: 5624. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 51 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
3 October 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#628 

1. With the resignation of former Foreign Minister Matuoka the 
chances of turning away from the Axis poHcy and toward the De- 
mocracies, has been considerably enhanced. 

2. Among the difficult points in the materialization of a Japanese- 
United States conference, is that with Japan speed is required. More- 
over, she can enter into nothing more, at the present time, than a 
temporary undei'standing. On the other hand, by pursuing a policy 
of stalling, the United States is arguing about every word and every 
phrase on the grounds that it is an essential preliminary to any kind 
of an agreement. It seems apparent that the United States does not 
comprehend the fact that by the nature of the Japanese and also on 
account of the domestic conditions in Japan, no delays can be counte- 
nanced. It would be very regrettable indeed if the best opportunity 
for the settlement of the Far Eastern problems since I assumed my 
post here, were to be lost in such a manner. 

3. Prince Konoye is sincerely desirous of avoiding the dangers 
which Japan may face through her connections in the Tripartite Pact 
and in the Axis for which the Prince, himself, feels responsibility. 
Opposition within the country to the Prince's reversal of policy is 
fairly strong. Therefore, unless the Japanese-U. S. conversations are 
held in the very near future, the opportunity will probably be lost. 
Moreover, if by some chance, meetings fail to materialize, or if they 
are unduly delayed, the Konoye cabinet will be placed in a precarious 
position. 

4. We realize, of course, that there are numerous very complicated 
matters involved in the proposed negotiations. However, both the 
U. S. Ambassador in Japan and I are firmly of the opinion that it 
would be a foolish policy if this superb opportunity is permitted to 
slip by assuming an unduly suspicious attitude. 

In conclusion, it must be added that until Japan's reversal of policy 
is concretely proven — in other words, until the Konoye principles 
actually materialize — there should be no let up in the retaliatory 
economic measures by us. 

(Note. — The above message expresses the views of British Ambas- 
sador Craigie in Tokyo, as explained in JD-1: 5623). 

23080 

JD-1: 5624 (D) Navy Trans. 10-4-41 (S-TT) 



[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo. 

3 October 1941 

(Purple— CA) 

#894 (In 4 parts, complete) 

Although there is a feeling that the Japanese-U. S. talks have 
finally reached a deadlock, we do not believe that it should be con- 
sidered as an absolutely hopeless situation. We are of the impression 



52 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that the United States worded their memorandum in such a way as 
to permit a ray of hope to penetrate through. 

The general public has been becoming more and more favorable to 
the President's foreign policy, until today it is being supported over- 
whelmingly. The program of war time industrial production has 
been making satisfactory progress, and it may be said that the general 
public is taking a more optimistic view of the European war. This 
last is due to the surprisingly good showing the Soviet Union has been 
making in her war efforts. The United States is well satisfied with 
that. 

At the same time, however, both the United States and Great 
Britain are fearful lest the Soviet Union enter into an independent 
peace. The United States and Britain are giving determined aid to 
the Soviet Union in order to prevent such a peace from materializing, 
and, if possible, to enable the Russians to hold out over the winter 
and resume fighting next spring. The Atlantic war has shown a 
definite turn in favor of Britain; submarine losses have increased and 
hence, loss to shipping has dropped radically. Due to the vastly 
strengthened air arm of the British and because of her power on the 
seas, England herself is practically safe from invasion. 

{Part 2) 

That all is not perfect for Germany in the war on her eastern front 
may be seen from the fact that the various Balkan countries show 
some hesitancy. At the same time unrest is on the increase in the 
various occupied areas and Italy's war strength is constantly on the 
decrease. Apparently it is only through German intervention and 
pressure that Italy is prevented from entering into a separate peace. 
The effectiveness of the blockade will increase as the war is prolonged, 
and the same situation as existed in the last war will probably be 
brought about. 

Such are the optimistic predictions being made here with regard to 
the final outcome of the war. 

Should Germany succeed in bringing about an independent peace 
with the Soviet Union at this time, Germany would be able to amply 
reinforce her forces directed to)vard England. This would place 
England in a critical position once again and this is probably the one 
thing the United States does not want. (Translator's note: From 
this point to end of Part 2 badly garbled; guess work contained in 
translation). For such a development will probably involve the 
United States very deeplv in the Atlantic war and it is possible that 
the United States would lose ships because of it. If such a situation 
materializes, the United States would for the first time realize the 
imminence of the war to herself and may then — but not until then — 
take a slightly more conciliatory attitude toward Japan. 

From the Japanese point of view, it would be most favorable if the 
Soviet Union does sue for an independent peace and if, as a result, the 
Germans launch a new phase of the war on the Atlantic, such devel- 
opments would undoubtedly have the most favorable effects on U. S.- 
Japanese relations. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 53 

{PaH 3) 

It is true that the Konoye message relieved to a certain extent the 
very critical situation between the United States and Japan for it 
had a tendency to squelch those few in the United States who advo- 
cate going to war against Japan first. This sentiment has been kept 
smothered since then and at the same time the message did, indirectly, 
tend to get the United States to become further involved in the At- 
lantic. 

On the other hand, however, the United States has not decreased 
her economic pressure against Japan one iota. It should be care- 
fully noted that the United States is proceeding along a policy of 
making this her threatening power. Should the United States con- 
tinue along her present economic policy, without resorting to the 
force of arms, she shall gain her objectives of a war against Japan 
without once resorting to a battle. Moreover, I am of the opinion 
that unless there is a radical change in the world situation or unless 
Japan changes her foreign policy, the United States will not alter this 
policy of hers against Japan. 

{Part 4) 

Of the three major topics involved in our negotiations, two have 
been agreed upon for all practical purposes. (Hull is an advocate 
of free trade and believes that "bloc" economics is the cause of wars. 
He is trying to force the British Empire to accept this philosophy at 
the present time). Thus the only remaining problem is that con- 
cerning the evacuating of our troops. In view, however, of the 
conditions you referred to in your message #622*, and upon taking 
into consideration the undoubted confusion in the future of the 
world, it will become apparent that a complete evacuation would be 
an impossibility. We do not believe that it will be an impossible 
task for us to come to some acceptable understanding with the 
United States at a later date. 

In view of the fact that the "understanding" between the United 
States and Japan hinges on this one point, I would appreciate your 
giving this phase your further consideration. 

Incidentally, in the course of a friendly discussion with a Cabinet 
official, he advised me that both the President and the Secretary of 
State are sincere in their desire to bring about an "understanding" 
between Japan and the United States and that the matter of the 
removal of the troops is the only thing that blocks the attainment of 
this goal. 

In the opinion that the matter involved is of much importance, 1 
submit my humble opinions concerning it to you. 

23166 

JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 10-7-41 (2) 

•JD-l: 5634 (S. I. S. #23073-75). Long 3 part summary of military-political-economic conditions with 
"free China". 



54 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo (Toyoda) 
To: Washington 
October 4, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#637 

Re your #890*. 

Please (make sure ?) immediately and suitably the following points: 

1. Since the United States Government wishes to get our explana- 
tions regarding the fundamentals before entering upon the Japanese- 
American negotiations, theoretically speaking, as soon as we have 
satisfied it with our explanation we should be reaching the stage of 
actually opening the negotiations. As to the details of these funda- 
mentals, we have already exchanged our views and so they should be 
clear. Now that only those points which the United States Govern- 
ment has pointed out remain difficult of agreement (namely, economic 
activity in the Pacific; withdrawal as well as stationing of troops, 
and the question of the Three-Power agreement), would it be all 
right for us to assume that the United States Government has a 
clear comprehension of the other points? 

2. Now, as to the approval the Premier has given to the four basic 
principles, he has merely approved of them in principle. In other 
words, although in principle he considers them good, there may be 
differences of opinions when it comes to actually applying these four 
principles. The Premier stated that he would like to consider these 
differences at the time of the negotiations. In fact, it is on the pre- 
sumption of doing so that we have been managing affairs domesti(^ally. 
Since this matter is of a delicate nature in its bearing upon the internal 
situation, I would like to have you see to it that the United States 
Government has no misunderstanding of it. 

Army 23118 Trans. 10/6/41 (X) 

» See S. I. S. #2310]-#23109 Inclusive and #23n5-23116, inclusive. Text of American Government's state- 
ment to the Japanese Government. 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
7 October 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#643 (In 3 parts, complete) 

I requested the U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo to call on me on the 7th, 
and he complied. The following is the gist of our conversation, and 
I forward it to you for your information only. 

"I am in receipt of the U. S. memorandum of the 2nd, and I (the 
Foreign Minister) assume that you (the U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo) 
have also received notification thereof from your home government. 
I would consider myself excedingly fortunate if I were permitted 
to hear your opinions thereon". I said. 

To this the Ambassador replied that he had received a resume of 
that memo from Washington, but that was all and for that reason he 
said he had no way of expressing his opinion. I, therefore, said that 
since the resume undoubtedly limited itself to the listing of all of the 
more important points, it should facilitate the forming of an opinion. 
I added that I was striving to reach an understanding through coop- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE ' 55 

eration, in the same manner as is the Ambassador, not so much as a 
diplomat, but rather as a human being. From that viewpoint, what 
are the views of the U. S. Ambassador, I asked of him, and also asked 
him if he had not had some communication from his home government 
which would tend to explain or express opinions on the above men- 
tioned resume. 

The Ambassador said he had been cabled the resume only, and 
nothing more. Without seeing the entire memo, he said, he could 
not ascertain the tone thereof. He would be very happy if he could 
be permitted to read the full text, he said. Should, however, he be 
forced to express an opinion with his inadequate knowledge of the 
circumstances, he would be inclined to believe that the United States 
is trying to secure an agreement on the preliminary conditions. 

1, therefore, replied that putting things bluntly, from the viewpoint 
of the sincere efforts we were making in this matter, we were not 
completely satisfied with the U. S. note referred to at present. 

{Part 2) 

By the above I do not imply that we do not trust the sincerity of 
the United States, I explained, but say so after taking into considera- 
tion the domestic and external circumstances of Japan. 

The Ambassador then advised me that even as recently as on the 
5th, he wrote up a fourteen page, 3000 word report of the various 
conditions in Japan based on what he had actually seen and heard 
himself during his many years of service in Japan. In it, he said 
that he fully described the real efforts that were being made by us 
in this matter. However, he did not dwell on this phase of the 
matter. 

2. According to the U. S. memorandum of the 2nd, I continued, 
the Prime Minister of Japan allegedly stated that he "fully sub- 
scribed" to the Four Principles referred to during his conversations 
with the U. S. Ambassador on the 6th of last month. The record of 
the meeting, however, shows that the Premier stated that he was in 
accord with them only in principle. To this the Ambassador replied 
that being fully aware of the importance of every word of that inter- 
view, he had reported it absolutely accurately to his home govern- 
ment. I, therefore, said that it was because I agreed with him as 
to the importance of the matter that I wished to make this point 
clear. Our notes of the meeting clearly records that we agreed in 
principle only. The copies of the U. S. memorandum which were 
sent to various persons concerned for their perusual and study were 
corrected from "fully" to "in principle" so as to coincide with the 
original. We have already requested the Ambassador in the United 
States, I continued, to notify the United States of this correction. 
I am reporting this matter to His Excellency, I said, because I felt 
that he was concerned. The only reason we mentioned this matter 
to Ambassador Nomura was because this memorandum had been 
handed to him for delivery. There was absolutely no other motive 
in doing so, I said. 

The U. S. Ambassador seemed to be thoroughly satisfied with my 
explanation and expressed his thanks for reporting it to him. 



56 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

{Part 3) 

Continuing, 1 said that though I had no intention of being too 
argumentative, there was one item I would Hke to question the 
Ambassador about. I pointed out that in doing so, I did not want 
the friendly relations between himself and myself to be altered in 
any manner. 

After thus prefacing my remarks, I said that fundamentally speak- 
ing the Prime Minister's message was a private message addressed 
to a private party. How, then, I lightly pressed, was it that passages 
therefrom could be quoted in the memorandum which is an official 
note? 

The Ambassador replied that he could see our point clearly and 
added that it must have been due to faulty handling of the various 
papers in the State Department. He said that that wms entirely an 
on-the-spot assumption on his part. He went on to say that he would 
now be able to definitely state that the Prime Minister was in accord 
"in principle". 

3. Returning to the matter concerning the "fully subscribed'-' 
quotation, the Ambassador started to say that he seemed to recall 
that when that matter was first brought up. Ambassador Nomura 
had accepted the "Four Principles" unconditionally. I, therefore, 
said that if there is some misunderstanding on the part of the United 
States through erroneous handling of some papers by our representa- 
tive, it may become necessary to correct it at some future date. To 
attempt to do so now, though, I said, involves the danger of needlessly 
confusing the issue. (I referred to "Ambassador Nomura's draft" 
incident of 4 September as an example) and for this reason, I said 
that I thought it would be better if nothing were done about it at 
present. 

23349 

JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 10-11-41 (1) 



[Secret] 



From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) 

To: Washington 

October 8, 1941 

Purple (CA) 

Message to Berlin #873. Part 1 of 4. 

Re my #708 ^ 

1 . The Japanese American negotiations began under the conditions 
described in my aforementioned message during the Administration 
of the 2nd Konoye Cabinet. There was, however, a rupture caused 
by the occupation of French Indo-China. We hope by the penetra- 
tion of French Indo-China to hasten the end of the China trouble; 
to break the Anglo-American encirclement by joint defense; and to 
procure raw materials. It is a measure taken in self defense. But 
England and the United States brought to bear against us measures 
equivalent to an economic blockade. Japanese-American relations 
deteriorated extremely and our internal situation was perilously 
affected. In the meantime, the European War took the trend of a 
protracted struggle. The fight between the Reich and the Soviet 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 57 

Union contrary to the calculations of Berlin reached a deadlock. 
Now the Soviet is going over to the Anglo Saxon camp and we m\ist 
make ready to cope with this situation. Moreover commerce is 
disrupted between Europe and Asia and liaison between our country 
and Germany and Italy is for the time being severed. 
Army2322r Trans. 10/8/41 (S) 

» Sop S. I. S. #20461-42 inclusive, giving the statement of the policy and views of the Imperial Government. 



[Secret] 



From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister") 

To: Washington 

October 8, 1941 , 

Purple (CA) 

Message to Berlin #873 Part 2 of 4 

All the while England and the United States were strengthening 
their net about us and we could see no means of concluding the Sino- 
Japanese affair. It was under these conditions that the Imperial 
Government suddenly decided upon diplomatic negotiations to termi- 
nate their struggle with the Chinese; to establish an area of co- 
prosperity in East Asia; and to conserve our national resources in 
preparation for the future. We feel that it is necessary to open the 
way for a compromise in our relations with the United States. 

2. When we concluded the Three Power Pact, we hoped while 
maintaining amicable relations with America, and to tell the truth 
through this very means, to conclude the China trouble; to win 
the Soviet over to the Japanese-Germ an -Italian camp; to have Ger- 
many use her good offices between Tokyo and Moscow (ST AH ME R 
said that Germany would be an honest go-between and would be 
sure to bring about the solution of oiu- troubles with the Kremlin 
and OTT sent us a letter to the effect that he himself was going to 
work for an understanding between Japan and the Soviet); to guar- 
antee goods from the South Seas to Germany and Italy who, in turn, 
were to give us mechanical and technical assistance. But since then 
times have changed and unexpected events have taken place. AU 
that remains unchanged is Japanese-American relations and that is 
about the only thing that could be patched up. 
Army 23222 Trans. 10/8/41 (S) 

[Secret] 

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) 

To: Wasliington 

October 8, 1941 

Purple (CA) 

Message to Berlin #873 Part 3 of 4 

At the time Germany stated that she would not spare any effort 
to prevent a clash between Japan and the United States and that she 
would even do all she could to improve relations between the two 
countries (this was during the MATSUOKA-STAHMER talks.) 
Then Japan and Germany felt the need of preventing the United 
States from entering the war. 

3. The objective of the Japan-German-Italian Three Power Pact 
wf^s to prevent the expansion of the European war, to restrain the 

79716 O— 46 — pt. 12 6 



58 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

United States from participating, and to establish universal peace. 
Statements exchanged at the time make this perfectly clear but now 
the war covers the face of Europe. The only placid expanse of water 
on earth is the Pacific. Under these circumstances, it is felt that it 
is up to both nations to probe into the causes of the trouble between 
their respective governments and to assure the harmony of the Pacific. 
It is further felt that this coincides witn the spirit of the Three Power 
Pact. 
Army 23223 Trans. 10/8/41 (S) 

[Secret] 

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) 

To: Washington 

October 8, 1941 

Purple (CA) 

Message to Berlin #873. Part 4 of 4 

4. It was with this view that the former cabinet began negotiations 
with Washington and still today we feel the necessity of continuing 
them. On the very occasion when Tokyo and Washington were 
arguing over our occupation of French Indo-China, Prince KONOYE 
was moved to reopen negotiations and messages were exchanged' 
between him and President ROOSEVELT and ever since the respec- 
tive Governments have been endeavoring to lay the groundwork for 
the opening of parleys through an exchange of opinions. We ^ot our 
latest answer from Washington on the 4th of October and we are 
studying it now. It is not that we are divergent from our relations 
with the signatories of the Tri-Partite Pact but we are continuing our 
negotiations hoping to end the China affair. (The three principles of 
KONOYE envision a conclusion of hostilities with China through a 
basic treaty and the use of the United States to coerce the CHIANG 
regime, to establish an area of co-prosperity in greater East Asia, to 
procure materials, to prevent the expansion of the European war, to 
seal peace in the Pacific area and to prevent the United States from 
entering the war. Of course, however, we expect our ups and downs.) 
This is for your private information. 

Relayed to Washington. 

Army 23224 Trans. 10/8/41 (S) 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
October 8, 1941 
Purple 

#907 (Part 1 of 4)" 

(To be handled in government code. Departmental Secret) 

Re your #637.'' 

I will tell you more about this after I interview the Secretary of 
State a little later on. However, m^ views at present are as follows: 

(1) According to the American memorandum of the 1st, the Ameri- 
cans realize that there is unanimity on the various principles and 
fundamentals which they have stuck to. However, they are dissatis- 
fied because you did not express a desire to go into a detailed discus- 
sion. The Americans believe in the four principles as the basis on 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 59 

which relations between the two countries must be adjusted. The 
Americans consider that it is necessary to achieve unanimity on the 
various questions which have been fundamentally explored by both 
nations in the unofficial talks held so far in order to settle the Pacific 
question. They have always felt that if conversations between the 
leadere of the two countries are to be realized immediately, it must be 
definitely understood that these principles are to be applied to the 
concrete problems in the Pacific, and they desire a further clarification 
of our views. 

Army 23319 Trans. 10/10/41 (1) 

» For Part 3 of 4, see S. I. S. #23293. 

b S. I. S. #23n8 in which the Foreign Minister, TOYODA, asks Ambassador NOMURA to Immedi 
ately clarify with the U. S. Government two points. 



[Secret] 



From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

October 8, 1941 

Purple 

#907 (Part 2 of 4) 

(To be handled in government code. Departmental Secret) 
Thus, they hope that we will make ourselves clearer on these points. 
In our proposal of the 6th and in the explanation thereof, not only did 
we limit them and narrow what we had discussed in our informal 
conversations thus far, but we also curtailed extremely the guarantees 
we offered concerning the aforementioned principles. We equivocated 
concerning guarantees that we would not engage in armed aggression. 
We limited the area to which the principle of non-discriminatory 
treatment would apply in the Pacific, and on the excuse that China 
was geographically near to us, we limited the very principle itself. 
On the question of stationing and evacuating troops in and from 
China (including French Indo-China), the Americans are making 
some demands which we in principle have objections to. Moreover, 
they figure that they must be much surer of our attitude toward the 
three-power pact. These points you probably already know. 

Army 23320 Trans. 10/10/41 (1) 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

October 8, 1941 

Purple 

#907 (Part 3 of 4) « 

(To be handled in government code.) 

judging by the impression I got from the above mentioned facts 
and my contacts with them so far, they figure on first bringing about 
unanimity on the fundamental questions on which our two countries 
have so far failed to see eye to eye, and then gradually to turn to the 
other matters. They evidently feel that so long as there is disagree- 
ment on the aforementioned points it would be vain and futile to 
discuss the various other problems, therefore, up to now the United 
States has done no more than express her opinions on the other matters 



60 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

in the proposal of June 11. (As I have wired you, some changes 
were made in the last clause.) 

In their proposal of June 21, they made it evident that they were 
going to stick to this as the basis for negotiations. The latest reply 
of theirs shows, I am sure, that they are entirely disregarding our 
own proposal of the 25th. This shows that they are going to stick 
to their ideas as they stand; however, it will still be necessary for us 
to talk through certain matters concerning, A. The matter men- 
tioned in the annex of the clause concerning the China incident. 
B. Discontinuing activities designed to help CHIANG. C. The 
stipulation concerning Nanking Treaty in the clause concerning the 
China incident (an agreement between Japan and China); joint 
mediation and the right of self-protection mentioned in the clause 
concerning our attitude toward the European war; the question of 
eliminating the annex to the clause concerning commerce between 
the two nations.) 
Army 23293 ' Trans. 10/10/41 (7) 

• Parts 1 and 2 not available. 



[Secret] 



From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

October 8, 1941 

Purple 

#907 (Part 4 of 4) 



. Concerning the four principles mentioned in 

(2) during the conversation mentioned in your #634*, the American 
Ambassador talked like I had already reached an understanding with 
Secretary HULL on this. As I have told you in various messages, 
they shelved the question in both letter and spirit, but on April 16 
when Secretary HIJLL presented me with these four points (see my 
#277''), I certainly was in no position to accept such a proposal before 
getting instructions from my home government, nor would I give the 
impression that we would accept them. Please note that. Never- 
theless, these are very abstract principles, and I figured that there 
would be some elasticity in their application. This country applies 
them with prudence to other foreign nations; for example, in peace 
conferences, discussions of principles are extremely circunilocutionary, 
so 1 do not think you need to be troubled over this. 
Army 23321 Trans. 10/10/41 (2) 

• The number is apparently wrong, as the subject matter of the message mentioned is unrelated. 
•> S. I. S. #17168 in which NOMURA gives his views on the attitude for policies of the United States 
aovernment, and the four basic points which the United States advocates. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 61 

[Secret] 
From: Washington. 
To: Tokyo. 
9 October 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#915 

Re your #637* 

This morning, the 9th, I called on Hull and relayed tlie matter 
contained in your instructions, and at the same time brought up the 
points discussed at the White House on 3 September. The Secretary, 
in reply, merely repeated that non-discriminatory treatment should 
extend over the entire Pacific area. He added that geographical 
proximity, etc., could be interpreted in many ways. He said that he 
would have Ballantine and others make a detailed reply to me later 
after the papers I submitted were carefully perused and studied. 
(Hamilton and Ballantine are supposed to call on me this afternoon.) 

Referring to the matter of evacuating or stationhig of troops in 
China, I carefully and in detail described the political situation in 
China from the Japanese viewpoint and pointed out that stationing 
of our troops in certain parts of China was absolutely essential. 
I requested that this point be given a reconsideration in this light. 

I also stated that the Prime Minister had stated that he was in 
accord with the "Four Principles" in principle only, but Hull indicated 
that he was already aware of this fact. 

•JD-l: .5665 (S. I. S. #23118). Be the U.,S. Dote of 2 October it is assumed there is agreement with the 
U. S. CD all points of the negotiations for an "Understanding Agreement", except evacuation from China, 
and the Tripartite Pact. Is that true? Konoye approves in principle the Four Principles laid down by 
the U. S. and expected to iron out their application in conference. 

23437 

JD-l: 5805 (D) Navy Trans. 10-13-41 (1) 



[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
9 October 1941 
(Purple) 

#917 (In 2 parts, complete) 

For official code handling. 

Secret outside of department. 

Re my #915*. 

On the 9th, Hamilton (accompanied by Ballantine and Schmidt) 
called on me on instructions of the Secretary of State, and 1 tried, 
on the basis of your #637** and along the general lines of your tele- 
phone conversation, to ascertain their intentions. They went into 
minute explanations pointing out that the U. S. Government's atti- 
tude is made plain in the memorandum of October 2nd, namely that 
this government is seeking to promote peace in the Pacific on the 
basis of the so-called Four Principles, and that the views of the United 
States in regard to such problems as Japan's forced advances north- 
ward and southw^ard, indiscriminatory treatment in the Pacific, with- 
drawal of troops in China, and the Tripartite Treaty, have their origin 
in a fundamental concern with regard to the future. They stated 
that these principles apply to the entire Pacific area, and that there 



62 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

is no reason for applying different principles in the various areas of 
the Pacific. In reply to my question as to whether or not the United 
States is satisfied with our explanation in regard to all other points 
aside from those pointed out in the memorandum of the 2nd, they 
replied that they would like to have this ascertained from the basic 
attitude of the U. S. Government which is indicated in the memo- 
randum of the 2nd, that this memorandum was given careful study 
by the U. S. Government and that this represents all that the U. S. 
Government has to say and that therefore there is nothing more for 
them to add. They emphasized the fact that they think that the 
U. S, Government does not now desire to enter upon any more dis- 
cussions in regard to details, and that if there is a "meeting of minds" 
between the two nations in regard to the interpretation of the four 
basic principles, the other questions will find a natural understanding; 
but they avoided giving much in the way of definite replies to my 
questions. 

Of course, they did state that there might be points in the proposal 
of June 21st which would need revision because of subsequent changes 
in the situation, but that in its larger aspects there has been no change 
and added further that after having studied these four basic principles, 
if Japan should reconsider the September 6th proposal and submit a 
second proposal, the United States stands ready to give it careful 
consideration. 

With the situation as thus stated, I think we might as well proceed 
on the assumptions mentioned in my #907***. 

23438 

JD-1: (F) Navy Trans. 10-14-41 (2) 

•JD-l: 5805 (S. I. S. #23437). 

••JD-1: 5665 (S. I. S. #23118). Re the U. S. note of 2 October, it is assumed there is apreement with the 
U. S. on all points of the negotiations for an "Understanding Agreement", except evacuation from China, 
and the Tripartite Pact. Is that true? Konoye approves in principle the Four Principles laid down by 
the U. S. and expected to iron out their application in conference. 

•••JD-1: 5740 (S. I. S. #23319). In reply to Tokyo query whether the U. S. agrees to all points except 
"evacuation from China", Nomura explains in detail his ideas of the U. S. position and reasons for refusing 
the leader's meeting. Japan has equivocated and limited her agreement to the Four Principles the U. S. 
insist must be the basis of an understanding. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo (Toyoda) 
To: Washington 
October 10, 1941. 
Purple (CA) 
#650 

Re your #915^ 

1. Slowly but surely the question of these negotiations has reached 
the decisive stage. I am doing my utmost to bring about a decision 
on them and the situation does not permit of this senseless procrasti- 
nation. The difficult points must be clarified now. My #637 " and 
related messages were sent you for that reason. What I wish of you 
now is to find out as soon as possible the opinions of the United States 
concerning the matters mentioned in those messages. (Otherwise, as 
I have told you two or three times, it will be impossible for me to 
decide upon our policy.) Yes, I know you have told me your opinions 
quite sufficiently In a number of messages, but what I want is the 
opinions of the American officials and none other. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 63 

2. In your caption message you do not tell me whether or not we 
have a chance to proceed with these parleys. You do not tell 
me how HULL answers. You do not tell me anything else I need to 
know for my future consideration. You must wire me in detail and 
immediately the minutes of these conversations, what they say and 
the prospect for negotiations. Hereafter, when you interview HULL 
or the President of the United States, please take WAKASUGI or 
IGUCHI with you and please send me without any delay the complete 
minutes of what transpires. 

Army 23384 Trans. 10-13-41 (X) 

• Not available. 

b S. I. S. #23118 in which the Foreign Minister, TOYODA, asks Ambassador NOMURA to clarify im 
mediately with the U. S. Oovernment two points. 



[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
October 10, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#923 

I have read your #650*. 

What they want is the maintenance of peace in the Pacific and they 
claim that our policy is semi-pacific and semi-aggressive. They say 
that our proposal of September 6 diverged greatly from preceding 
statements, and that it will be out of the question to agree on any 
preparatory talks on the basis of such a proposal. In addition to the 
three matters mentioned in your message, it seems that there are many 
other objections. I have repeatedly asked them to clarify what I do 
not understand, but they won't answer. At any rate, however, I 
feel safe at least in saying that they are demanding that we compromise 
in accordance with the lines laid down in their memorandum of Octo- 
ber 2. I am sure that there is not the slightest chance on earth of them 
featuring a conference of leaders so long as we do not make that 
compromise. 

In other words, they are not budging an inch from the attitude they 
have always taken; however, they act as if they were ready to consider 
at any time any plan of ours which would meet the specifications of 
their answer of the 2nd. 

I think that you fully realize the situation I described in my #917' 
yesterday. However. I am sending you this for your information. 
Army 23355 ^ Trans. 10/11/41 (7) 



Not available. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo (Toyoda) 
To: Washington 
October 12, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
# 54 

On the afternoon of the 10th I asked Minister GREW to call on 
me. For your private information I spoke to him as follows, and as 
I have asked you before, I want you to continue your efforts to lead 
the United States officials to present us with a clear-cut proposal: 

1. "On the 3rd we received the American memorandum of the 2nd 
and have given it our most cordial consideration. It is a little difficult 



64 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

for US to grasp the important points of it, but as best we can make 
out, they are (1) garrisoning and evacuating soldiers; (2) the English, 
Japanese, American attitude toward the European war; and (3) non^ 
discrimination in commerce in China. 

2. "Now we wish to put all our cards on the table and to proceed 
with negotiations. If the United States has any misgivings on those 
three points, or on any others, I am sure it will be possible for us to 
straighten them out. I would like to present to the treaty officials a 
proposal having some possibilities of adoption. Concerning those 
three points, there is also a question of time. . There is no use in 
exchanging official letters, notes and other documents as we now are. 
If we would only start out with a conference of leaders, such difficulties 
as exist may fade away automatically." 

3. The American Ambassador said "The United States is a free 
country and we have to carefully consider public opinion." I retorted 
"Well, it is none the less so with us. It is true that we are under 
the thumb of public opinion, but if we can agree with the United 
States on a conference, public opinion will, of itself, calm down and 
no such unrest as now exists will continue. If we go on this way, it 
will be hard to say what the extremists may do." 

4. I passed on to the Army Your Honor's communication concern- 
ing French Indo-China, but so far I have received no reply. I expect 
it soon. 

Army 23517 Trans. 10/15/41 (X) 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
13 October 1941 
(Purple) (CA) 
#658 

Re my #657* 

I presume that your talks with Welles will cover the U. S.-Japanese 
negotiations in toto. We are particularly anxious to be advised as 
soon as possible, as I have mentioned in previous nu^ssages referring 
to this subject, on the points listed lielow. (The situation at home 
is fast approaching a crisis and it is becoming absolutely essential 
that the two leaders meet if any adjustment of Japanese-U. S. relations 
is to be accomplished. I cannot go into details now, but please bear 
this fact in mind). 

1. May we assume that the United States has no particular dis- 
agreements other than the three points v/hich are under consideration 
at the present time? 

2. Submitting by the United States a counter proposal to our 
proposal of -. September. (As you are well aware, our proposal of 
__ September embodied our claims in the form submitted by the 
United States as their proposal on 21 June. Should the United States 
be reluctant to submit a clearcut counter proposal to ours referred 
to above, we should request that they submit a basidy new proposal 
immediately). 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



65 



Of point 1 set forth above, we are particularly interested in being 
advised of what the United States exactly desires concerning the 
matter of evacuation or garrisoning of troops. 



23421 
JD-1: 5779 

•JD-l: 5778 (S. I. S. #23420). "We shall cable our instructions with regard to the talks referred to, sub 
sequently. Please be so advised. 



(D) Navy Trans. 10-13-41 (S-TT) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
13 October 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#662 

We have made the necessary arrangements for a telephone connec- 
tion between Chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, 
Terasaki, and Minister Wakasugi, for noon (Japan time) on the 14th, 
On this occasion, the following passwords and codes will be used. 



U. S. attitude 
Is reasonable 



MARIKO 

OTAKU NI ASOBI NI KU- 

RUYA 
(Is Mariko coming to pay you a 

social call?) 
MARIKO 

ASOBI NI KO NU 
(Mariko is not coming to pay a 

General outlook of the negotia- SONO GO NO KOSI NO 

KENKO 
(The health of the Minister since 

then.) 
SITIFUKUJIN NO KAKE 

MONO 
(Japanese scroll of the Seven Luck 

Gods.) 
KI NI IRIMASITA KA 
(Did it meet with your approval?) 
KI NI IRIMASEN KA 
(Did it not meet with your ap- 
proval?) 



U. S. attitude 
Is unreasonable 



tions 
The Four Principles 

Will they stick to it? 

Is there some way through it? 



23514 
JD-1: 5840 



(D) Navy Trans. 10-14-41 (S-TT 



66 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
13 October 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#663 

Re my #658* 

I pointed out in mj'' message referred to in the heading that circum- 
stances do not permit even an instant's delay. Please, therefore, 
submit a report on the rough outline and the general tone of the 
conference between Wakasugi and Welles immediately, and dispatch 
a cable giving the details, subsequently. 

23443 

JD-1: 5815 (D) Navy Trans. 10-14-41 (S-TT) 

•JD-l: 5779 (S. I. S. #23421). 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokvo 
13 October 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#939 (In 3 parts, complete) 

The details of the Wakasugi-Welles conversations will be reported 
in a subsequent cable*, but in the meantime, I shall submit this 
which concerns the two points on which you requested information 
in your message #658**. In view of the fact that the talks lasted for 
over two hours, will you please await the subsequent message for the 
details of the tone, etc. of the talks. 

In general, the tone of the talks were friendly and frank. Welles 
said that there is no change in the President's expressed desire of 
meeting with the Premier if the three points can be agreed upon. He 
added that Secretary Hull is in full agreement on this point, too. 

(1) As far as he knew, Welles said, there were no obstacles to the 
materialization of the leadei-s' conference, other than the three points. 
Wakasugi said that he got the impression that Secretary Hull was of 
the opinion that there would be one or two more points which would 
have to be cleared up when the preliminary arrangements were brought 
up to date, and asked Welles about that. Welles replied that he had 
not been advised by Hull of those points but that he would ascertain 
them and then advise us. 

(Part 2) 

With regard to the matter of withdrawing or stationing troops in 
China, Wakasugi said that the U. S. attitude had been made clear in 
her proposal of 21 June and again in her oral statement of 2 October. 
We have no intention of arguing about that point any further, Waka- 
sugi continued, but that he would like to ask one question about it. 
This question was his own personal one as an individual and was not 
instigated by or put with the knowledge of either the Government or 
the Ambassador. 

So saying, Wakasugi said that when a nation had been sending 
fighting forces to another over a long period of years, it was exceed- 
ingly difficult, from a practical standpointj to suddenly evacuate them. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 67 

Even if such a program were to be carried out, years and months 
would be required before its completion, Wakasugi said, adding that 
Welles, who has had long years of experience as a diplomat should 
well understand that. 

Moreover, Wakasugi continued, the matter of whether troops were 
to be removed or not was a matter involving Japan and China. 
Should, therefore, the United States be assured the withdrawal of 
troops by Japan, would the United States be willing to leave the 
details up to Japan and China to decide? 

{Part 3) 

Welles replied that that would depend entirely upon Japan's sin- 
cerity. If Japan is truly sincere in her assurance of troop evacuation 
there no doubt would be ways of coming to a successful agreement as 
to ways and means of carrying it out. 

1 . The United States has no intention of making any counter pro- 
posals other than those she has already submitted to Japan on 21 
June and the Oral Statement of 2 October. The above two proposals 
were the result of careful and thorough consideration. However, it 
is in the realm of possibility that if the objectives contained in those 
proposals are kept intact the wording may, under certain circum- 
stances, be altered. The United States' objections to the Japanese 
proposals of — — September and 25 September are based on the fact 
that they considerably restrict the terms contained in the two U. S. 
proposals — which incidentally, contained the terms of the earlier 
Japanese proposals — referred to above. 

23704 

JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 10-20-41 (1) 

•Available, dated 13 October. (A 6 part message, only Part 4 available at present.) 

**JD-1: 5779 S. I. S. #23421. Since the situation at home is fast approaching a crisis, in your talks with 

Welles cover the entire subject of the U. S.-Jap negotiations, and in particular, just what the U. S. wants 

re evacuation or garrisoning of troops in China. 



[Secret] 



From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

13 October 1941 

(Purple) 

#941 (In 6 parts. Part 4 only available). 

5. Of the three points, please be advised of the matter pertaining 
to withdrawing or stationing of our troops in China, by my previous 
report. 

6. Wakasugi, therefore, said that in the final analysis, the stumbling 
block lies in the fact that whereas the United States is interested in 
agreeing upon basic principles first, Japan is insisting that the matter 
of primary importance is the clearing up of the outstanding differences 
first and then to discuss the generalities such as basic principles, etc. 
The truth of the matter is, Wakasugi continued, it is indeed rarely 
that a basic principle can be carried as such to any satisfactory- degree. 
Moreover, he pointed out, without agreements or concrete factors, 
an agreement on principle is without meaning. 

To this, the Undersecretary said that the basic principle should 
first be agreed upon, after which the actual problems can be fitted to it 



68 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

for individual agreements ♦ * * (2 lines missed) * * * 
(Wakasugi pointed out that) our proposal of G September expressed 
a willingness to sacrifice a practically unanimous desire of the people 
of Japan for a northward and/or southward military move, for the 
sake of an adjusted relationship with the United States. This was 
indeed a bold stroke and probably one which a subsequent cabinet, 
regardless of its nature, would not dare to duplicate. 

In view of this daring step, wouldn't the United States be willing 
to display some boldness in behalf of great statesmanship?, Wakasugi 
asked. 

The Undersecretary said that he fully appreciated our moves and 
that the United States felt considerable encouragement therefrom. 
However, the United States has experienced disappointing reverses he 
said, pointing to the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China, even 
after matters had progressed to the point of the United States sub- 
mitting the 21 June proposal. 

Wakasugi, therefore, pointed out that the occupation of French 
Indo-China had a direct bearing on the China incident. He explained 
that, with a view to our security, we took this step with the agreement 
of the Government of France. 

23817 

JD-1: 5967 (D) Navy Trans. 10-21-41 (2) 



[Secret] 



From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

October 14, 1941 

(Purple) 

#943 (Part 1 of 2)" (To be handled in Government Code) 

I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If 1 sum up 
what he told me, it is this: 

"What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite 
promise. Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments 
be held without a definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the 
meantime, an advance be made into Siberia, the President would be 
placed in a terrible predicament. Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific 
and talks as if she can decide matters independently, and so it would 
seem to me that Japan could set aside most of her obligations toward 
the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of withdrawing or 
stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all at once, 
it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between 
Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal." 

He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face 
internally. It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the 
Secretary of State. 

Army 23570 Trans. 10/16/41 (2) 



• For Dart 2 see S. I. S. #23516. 



EXHIBITS OF JOIN't COMMITTEE 69 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

October 14, 1941 

(Purple) 

#943 (Part 2 of 2)* 

He said that should the Kusso-German war suddenly end and should 
Germany offer Great Britain peace, it would be after all a German 
peace and England would not now accept it. Now, this man is a 
responsible fellow in an important position and I take it that this is 
the view of the Navy. On the other hand, HOOVER and his follow- 
ing consider that should Moscow make a separate peace with Berlin 
and should Berlin then turn to London with generous peace terms, 
this whole fray would end with unimaginable quickness. CASTLE •* 
told me that HUGH GIBSON feels the same way and that Japan, 
too, should be on the alert for this possibility. This, however, I 
take to be a minority view entertained by the Isolationists. MOORE " 
reports that Secretary HULL told Senator THOMAS that he is pro- 
ceeding patiently with the Japanese-American negotiations, but he 
hopes that Japan will not mistake this for a sign of weakness on 
America's part, and that no answer had arrived to the memo of 
October 2nd.^ KIPLINGER ^ reports that there is a very good 
basis for rumors of a cessation of hostilities between Russia and 
Germany and that the chances for war between Japan and the United 
States are fifty-fifty. 

Army 23516 Trans. 10-15-41 (7) 

» Part 1 of 2 not available. 

>> Former U. S. Ambassador to Japan. 

» American legal advisor to Japanese Embassy in Washington. 

<* A Washington newspaper correspondent. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
15 October 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#667 

Regarding your #939* and #941**. 

Your message has clarified many points regarding the situation and 
the matter can be charged up to Welles' state of agitation. However 
as I feel that further conversations with Wakasugi might be continued, 
please maintain contact and also bear the following points in mind: 

(1) If we quibble over the argument set forth in paragraph 6 of 
your message #941**, it may give them an opening to insist on having 
the Four Principles included in the text proper of the agreement. 

However, since not only have the so-called basic American stipula- 
tions been omitted from the preamble of the American proposal of 
June 21st, but the reference is made in the final clause to the effect 
that the principles (stipulations) contained in the proposal of June 21st 
are also included in the document of October 2nd. We wish to hold 
to this and should take advantage of the American desire to use the 
proposal of June 21st as the basis of negotiations and continue our 
conversations on the basis of the same proposal, without taking up the 
Four Principles independently. 



70 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(2) Our proposal is nothing more than our proposal of September 
16th incorporated into the American proposal of June 21st. However, 
there is no need for us to make any further move until the other side 
decides that it is impossible to clarify the concrete proposal am^ 
further. Therefore please discuss the points of variance between our 
proposal and that of June 21st and ascertain the United States inten- 
tions regarding the various points involved in the concrete proposal, 
and reply results. 

(3) Due to the nature of this negotiation we wish to have it han- 
dled between Wakasugi and Welles, for the time being, and should 
progress warrant, to transfer the whole negotiation to be handled 
between you and the Secretary of State. 

23706 

JD-1: 5933 (A) Navy Trans. 10-20-41 (2) 

•JD-l: 5929 (S. I. S. #23704). 

••Available, dated 13 October. (A 6 part message, only Part 4 available at present.) 



[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
15 October 1941 
(Purple) 
#950 

Chief of Office routing. 

Regarding Your #667*. 

Tomorrow afternoon (1 6th )_ Wakasugi is expected to confer \\'ith 
Welles. Yesterday (14th) "O" is said to have conferred with the 
President and also with the heads of the Far Eastern Affairs. (For 
your information). 

The Military Attache here has been instructed by the headquarters 
in Tokyo to advise us not to yield an inch in our stand regarding the 
question of the evacuation of troops. They are apprehensive that 
we have not emphasized enough our stand regarding it and urge us 
to lay special stress on this point. 

It goes without saying that we fully understand our country's 
stand regarding this question and both Colonel Iwasa and I have 
repeatedly informed the other side of this. 

However, when Wakasugi conferred with Welles on the 13th, he 
purposely did not go deeply into the subject of the evacuation of 
troops because it happens to be one of the three major questions 
which have been gone over many times before and the purpose of the 
above conference was to clarify certain points in the United States 
proposal in order to ascertain their intentions. You may be assured 
that we do not intend to nimimize the importance of this question 
nor to effect any compromise. 

At tomorrow's conference we intend to bring up this question for 
discussion once again. 

Should you have any inquiry from the Military regarding this 
matter please explain the above in order to avoid any misunderstand- 
ing. I have already explained the situation as stated above to our 
Military Attache. 

23708 

JD-1: 5935 (A) Navy Trans. 10-20-41 (7) 

•JD-l: 5933 (S. I. S. #23706). 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 71 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo (Toyoda) 
To: Washington 
October 16, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#671 

Although I have been requested by both the German and ItaUan 
Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the 
Japanese-American negotiations, I have, in consideration of the 
nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early 
this month, following the German attacks on American merchant 
ships and the consequent (revival ?) of the movement for the revision 
of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the 
Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message 
to the effect that the Japanese Government observes that if the 
ROOSEVELT Administration continues to attack the Axis Powers 
increasingly, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between 
Germany and Italy on the one hand and the United States on the 
other, and this would provide the reasons for the convocation of the 
duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and might lead 
Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United States. 
We have not, as yet, submitted this message because, in view of the 
Japanese-American negotiatioas, we found it necessary to consider 
carefully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The 
German authorities have been repeatedly making the same request 
and there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed 
any longer. While Japan on the one hand finds it necessary to do 
something in the way of carr3dng out the duties placed upon her by 
the Three Power Alliance she had concluded with Germany, on the 
other hand, she is desirous of making a success of the Japanese- 
American negotiations. Under the circumstances, we can do no 
other than to warn the United States at an appropriate moment in 
such words as are given in my separate telegram #672 * and as would 
not affect the Japanese- American negotiations in one way or another. 
This message is a secret between me and you. 

Army 23631 Trans. 10/17/41 (7) 

» See S. I. S. #23571— English text of a message from the Imperial Japanese Government to the American 
Government. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
October 16, 1941 
Purple (English Text) 
#672 

The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the 
American Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to 
contribute toward the prevention of a further, extension of the 
European war. Should, however, the recent tension in the German- 
American relations suffer aggravation, there would arise a distinct 
danger of a war between the two powers, a state of affairs over which 
Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact, naturally cannot help 
entertain a deep concern. Accordingly, in its sincere desire that not 
only the German-American relations will cease further deterioration 



72 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

but the prevailing tension will also be alleviated as quickly as possible, 
the Japanese Government is now requesting the earnest consideration 
of the American Government. 

Army 23571 . Trans. 10/16/41 (S) 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

October 16, 1941 

Purple 

#959 (Part 1 of 2) 

On the evening of the 15th TERASAKI was invited to the home of 
Admiral TURNER, who, as you know, is a most trusted friend of 
Admiral STARK. In the course of their conversation TURNER said: 

(a) "If HITLER gains control over Europe, it will constitute a 
direct threat to Central and South America, and America must cer- 
tainly fight this. Therefore, it is the present policy of the United 
States to prevent the enfeeblement of Great Britain's national resources 
(including the Far East) by assisting her in stopping Germany." 

(b) "It is said that the present Japanese cabinet is a strong one; 
however, it is doubtful whether it has the support of the Army, and 
if the Military finds itself at variance with the opinions of the cabinet, 
the cabinet might be overthrown at any time. Therefore, the United 
States cannot help feeling a little trepidation in broaching any nego- 
tiations with the Japanese Government under these circumstances." 

(c) "It is urgent that a formula be drawn up on the basis of a fifty- 
fifty compromise between Tokyo and Washington." (TURNER does 
not think that we are compromising.) 

Army 23715 - Trans. 10-20-41 (2) 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

October 16, 1941 

Purple 

#959 (Part 2 of 2) 

RETRANSLATION 

TERASAKI explained that some Americans had already questioned 
him about the permanence of the present cabinet but that this was 
beside the point because to broach the Japanese-American negotia- 
tions while doubting the permanence of the cabinet was putting the 
cart before the horse. He said that at present, when mutual doubts 
were rife, particularly in the United States, the United States ought 
certainly to exercise statesmanship, and continued, "The United 
States is exceedingly idealistic concerning the Far East. Aiding 
China might be called a question of principle, but if I may say so, 
this talk of principles is a sort of hobby among the rich. If it's not a 
' question of principle, all I can conclude is that you all are determined 
to make us fight with China until we are exhausted. On the other 
hand, you have followed a very, very realistic policy in Central 
America. Forgetting the history of Panama for a moment, we can 
find plenty of present examples proving what I say. Well, China is 
not an over-simplified question of principle with us Japanese. It is a 



EXHIBITS OF JOIXT COMMITTEE 73 

question of our life. We have already fought there for four years. 
You went to Japan on the Astoria. I am sure you know something 
of the temperament of the Japanese. Once a Japanese is in a corner, 
he will forget all interest in life and death and fight back with fury. 
I know that we are much poorer than you Americans in material 
things. I don't know what the result of Japanese- American war 
might be, but even though we lost, I can tell you we would put up an 
awful fight. If we do not achieve what we are trying to do, it may 
come to that. Now if you Americans would only extend your hand 
in friendshin to us a little, you could have our lasting amity ; otherwise 
we may turn out to be permanent enemies. 
Army 23716 Trans. 10/22/41 (2) 

[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
October 16, 1941 
Purple 
#962. (Part 1 of 5) (Extremely Urgent) 

By previous arrangement WAKASUGI, HULL and WELLES had a 
conference lasting two hours beginning at 5:00 p. m., on the 16th. 
The substance of their talk was as follows: (Probably because he had 
received news of our Cabinet's general resignation, WELLES said 
that he would like to talk with WAKASUGI in the presence of Secre- 
tary HULL. He led WAKASUGI to HULL's room and they talked 
together.) 

1 . HULL asked the circumstances of the Cabinet's general resigna- 
tion and wished to know what the outlook for the new Cabinet was. 
WAKIASUGI said that all we had received was a public announcement 
of the general resignation and as yet no detailed news had reached us. 
WAKASUGI continued, "No rq.atter what sort of Cabinet it is, 
however, it is impossible to leave Japanese-American relations in their 
present state. The world being in its present condition, particularly 
faced by the China problem, our people cannot continue undecided 
as they now are in the face of American opposition. They demanded 
a Government that wouljd take a definite stand either to the right or 
to the left. There is no mistake about that. If no unanimity can be 
discovered between our two nations, it would be hard to say in which 
direction the wind wiU blow. I wanted to talk with the Under- 
Secretary today and see if we could not find some points of agreement 
between your proposal of June 21st and our proposal of September 
25th. That is why I came." 
Army 23711 Trans. 10-20-41 (2) 

[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
October 16, 1941 
Purple 
#962. (Part 2 of 5) (Extremely Urgent) 

HULL spent half an hour recounting the substance of his coii- 
versations so far and then went on to say, **The United States is 
certainly not playing along with a policy of procrastination. I 
earnestly wish to see peaceful and normal political relations reestab- 

79716 ()— 46 — i>t. 12 7 



74 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

lished between Japan and the United States. In Europe HITLER 
is trying to set up a new order by force of arms. Now, if you 
Japanese also are attempting to set up a new regime in the Far East 
by force of arms, this world is becoming cramped indeed. We cannot 
stand by and approve this course of events with equanimity. We 
stand for non-discrimination in trade and for freedom of the seas and 
are opposed to all of these militaristic policies. One of the hardest 
things to reconcile in Japanese-American relations is the fact that, 
while proclaiming the maintenance of peace, Japan actually carries on 
a military invasion. There are so many military expansionists now 
among the Japanese people and among influential people there that 
I doubt if it would be possible for Japan to cooperate on a new peace- 
ful policy." WAKASUGI then said, "It is true that there are those 
who advocate expansion northward or southward; however, ever 
since we have been a naval power foreign nations have lined up our 
neighbors as colonies of theirs to oppose us. Recent events show how 
this economic pressure has again brought us to grief. All we have 
done is to follow the trend necessary for the national security and 
existence of our people. As a measure for self preservation we had to 
get necessary materials. Do not think that we deliberately em- 
barked on a military campaign with any joy. 

Army 23712 Trans. 10-20-41 (2) 

[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
October 16, 1941 
Purple (Extremely Urgent) 
#962 (Part 3 of 5) 

"The United States seems to have an idea that in order to establish 
an understanding with Japan on these important questions, she must 
stop military moves northward and southward, but unless the United 
States ceases measuring everything by her own yardstick and under- 
stands Japan's peculiar position, and unless she shows a friendly 
attitude in lifting the limitations on the settlement of the China 
question which faces Japan, as well as commercial limitations, the 
situation will inevitably continue to grow worse." 

3. WELLES urged HULL himself to continue an explanation of 
the three points he had made, and HULL repeated that the present 
object of the United States is to defeat Hitlerism; in short, (a) to 
abolish all militarism, and (b) to bring about equality of treatment 
and opportunity throughout the whole Pacific area, including China. 
He showed quite a bit of understanding of Japan's position with 
respect to the Tripartite Alliance. He seemed, however, loathe to 
go too deeply into the question of peace between Japan and China 
because he has always been an advocate of nonintervention in the 
internal affairs of other powers. He asked if there was not some 
Chinese with whom he (WAKIASUGI) could discuss these matters 
directly. WAKASUGI, however, said that although he knew both 
AMBASSADOR HU SHIH and SOONG TSE-WTEN, he was not 
able to discuss the relations of the two countries with them. HULL 
seemed to understand this and said that in any case this would have 
to be worked out between Japan and China. 
Army 23713 Trans. 10/20/41 (2) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 75 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

October 16, 1941 

Purple (Extremely Urgent) 

#962 (Part 4 of 5)'^ 

WAKASUGI then went on to say that it would be very difficult 
for us to evacuate China. He told them it was very necessary to 
keep troops there. He went on to explain the activities of the Com- 
munist forces in the north as described in your messages and by the 
Naval Attache. He told them that the Communists were like a 
cancerous growth on the development of China. He explained that 
we had to keep forces and to protect the lives, property, and com- 
mercial interests of both Japanese and foreigners. HULL then 
asked, "Well, if you did not take your troops away and left them 
there for a long time, how would the Chinese take it?" WAKASUGI 
said, "What the Chinese are most interested in is the safety of their 
lives and a guaranteed livelihood." He went on to say, "So far as 
the maintenance of peace is concerned, the Chinese do not care in the 
hands of what people it is. It is apparently being reported to the 
President that the Communist Party is engaged merely in educational 
activities. However, this is a tragic error. What the Communists 
are trying to do is to destroy Chinese society and industry at the very 
roots. All the Chinese fear this exceedingly." HULL, however, 
countered by saying, "In the past we, too, stationed some soldiers in 
Central America and left them there as long as ten years, but the 
results were bad, and we brought them out. Since then we have 
found it more profitable to practice the "Good Neighbor Policy." 
He did not appear to wish to discuss this matter any further and 
seemed to think that this should be thrashed out between ourselves 
and the Chinese. WELLES then asked, "Well, have you any other 
questions besides those three which you wish to discuss?" and HULL 
answered, "None in particular." 

4. WELLES told HULL the desire of WAKASUGI to look into 
the differences and points of agreement in the Japanese- American 
proposals. HULL immediately agreed. He was all in favor of 
having the officials concerned in this business convene and work out 
the details immediately, but WAKASUGI said that when the officials 
concerned on both sides had met before, all they had done was waste 
their time in arguments without any results. He said that the time 
would not permit of such procrastination and that he would, for the 
time being, like to confine his discussions to important questions only 
and to discuss them with the Under Secretary alone. 
Army 23714 Trans. 10/20/41 (2) 

• Part 5 not available. 



76 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR' ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
17 October 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#682 

The Cabinet has reached a decision to resign as a body. At this 
time I wish to thank Your Excellency and your entire staff for all 
the efforts you have made. 

The resignation was brought about by a split within the Cabinet, 
It is true that one of the main items on which opinion differed was on 
the matter of stationing troops or evacuating them from China. 
However, regardless of the make-up of the new Cabinet, negotiations 
with the United States shall be continued along the lines already 
formulated. There shall be no changes in this respect. 

Please, therefore, will you and your staff work in unison and a single 
purpose, with even more effort, if possible, than before. 

23677 

JD-1:5923 (D) Navy Trans. 10-18-41 (S-TT) 



[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokvo 
17 October 1941 
(Purple) 
#966 (In 6 parts, complete) 

Wakasugi met and talked with Hull and Welles for about an hour 
and a half, from 4:30 p. m, on the 17th. The following is the gist of 
their talk: 

1. Wakasugi stated that he would like to further discuss the three 
points involved in the U. S. -Japanese negotiations with the under- 
standing that neither side commit itself to what is said here in view of 
the fact that we were not in receipt of instructions from the new 
cabinet as yet. Hull expressed his agreement to this proposal and 
then inquired what the outstanding points were in the respective 
proposals. 

In reply, Wakasugi read those paragraphs pertaining to the right of 
self-defense under the terms of the Tripartite Pact as contained in our 
proposal of 25 September, and the U. S. proposal of 21 June. He went 
on to explain the features in accordance with the various instructions 
from Tokyo, pointing out that we had made the right of self-defense 
on which the U. S. placed much emphasis, a mutual right. Did that 
not satisfy the U. S. demands?, Wakasugi asked. 

Hull replied that during the tenure of the former Foreign Minister 
it was loudly broadcast that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was to 
prevent the United States from entering the war. Since the United 
Stktes may be forced to enter the war for self-defense purposes, the 
United States could not help but have doubts as to Japan's true 
motives. The United States has no intention of taking military 
aggression against any nation; her only intention is to consider ways 
and means of defending herself, he explained repeatedly. 

Wakasugi, therefore, pointed out that fundamentally the thing 
called "right of self-defense" was put in mption in the direction it is 
intended to be used by the state which invokes its use. Therefore, 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 77 

it is natural that depending on the intentions of another, we should 
restrain ourselves .from fulfilling our duties under the ternis of an 
agreement. 

That is why we definitely established the fact in our proposal that 
our intentions are strictly self-preservation and that application of 
any phases thereof, would be absolutely on behalf of self-preservation. 
Self-preservation, as we have used the term, implies that Japan and 
Japan alone shall determine the means of carrying it out without 
depending on any foreign country whether it be Britain the United 
States or Germany, or any other. There are no other implications or 
interpretations to the phrases from our viewpoint. 

Fundamentally, Wakasugi continued, wasn't it a self-evident fact 
that political agreements such as the Tripartite Pact cannot limit the 
signatories to any political commitments against a third country? 

In the light of the Imperial Rescript published at the time of the 
signing of the Tripartite Pact, the spirit and the aims of said Pact 
should be evident. In the final anlaysis, that Pact's real mission is 
the contribution to world peace and does not support any intent of 
aggression and aggrandizement. 

Hull listened carefully to Wakasugi's detailed explanations. Ap- 
parently the Secretary suspects that, basicly, the nature of the Pact 
could be twisted at will to suit the needs of either a Japanese cabinet 
favoring military aggression or a cabinet favoring peace. Wakasugi, 
therefore, asked whether it was not true that unless suspicions were 
allayed, it would be impossible to come to agreements with any 
country. Was it not true, he continued, that when viewed through 
eyes of suspicion there would be much that could be questioned, even 
in the so-called defense measures of the United States? 

In any event, it was agreed that both of the proposals in question 
shall be given careful study after which a reply would be submitted. 

2. Hull places the most emphasis on matters pertaining to non-dis- 
crimination in trade. He urged that we listen carefully to Welles* 
explanation of how Japan would actually profit by such a system. 
Hull then went on to point out that materialization of the non- 
discrimination in trade matters has been his main objective since his 
assumption of post many years ago and described the progress he has 
made in various quarters. As an example, of the success of his pro- 
gram, he pointed to the recently signed trade agreement with Argen- 
tina. He seemed particularly proud of this accomplishment and 
added that even the self-interested British appeasement policy had 
been prevented in Central and South America. (What was meant 
exactly by this was not made clear). 

Hull went on to say that if this policy were limited merely to the 
southwest Pacific area, it would not be of much value. Unless this 
principle is applied to the entire Pacific area (including China) the 
contribution it would make toward peace would be negligible. There 
is more probability that world peace, under present world conditions, 
can be attained through adjustments in trade relations than through 
adjustments of political relations between nations, he claimed. 

It cannot be doubted for a moment, he continued, that if Japan 
adopts this basic policy and applies it in the Far East, that she will 
have the advantage over all countries in her area because of her geo- 
graphical position, her race, and because of her business acumen. 
He urged repeatedly that the concrete and positive advantages be 
pointed out to our government. 



78 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK ^ 

Will you please therefore, be thoroughly advised of this phase and 
let us know your opinions thereof. 

Wakasugi then said that he would admit that the various principles 
set forth by the United States were indeed fine and as guiding prin- 
ciples no one could possibly find fault with them. The cold facts 
are, however, that different means have to be used by each individual 
nation in order to survive. In spite of this fact it is the United States' 
custom to measure the others needs by a ruler which measures the 
needs of her own country, which is the most blessed from the stand- 
point of nature, of any nation in the world. The fact that the position 
and circumstances of other countries differ from those of the United 
States apparently is not taken into consideration by the United 
States, Wakasugi said. 

Japan occupies only a small corner of what is known as the Far 
East; moreover, she has been occupied for over four years with the 
China incident. She has, therefore, a number of circumstances 
which are peculiar to herself. So though she may want to comply 
with all of what the United States suggests, it is impossible for her 
to immediately do so. For example, for obvious and unavoidable 
reasons, Japan has established various organs and put into effect 
various systems in China to cope with temporary conditions and 
circumstances. Even if we tried to comply with the basic principles 
advanced by the United States, we could not do so overnight where 
these are concerned. It would be an absolute impossibility from a 
practical and actual standpoint. 

If the United States' principles are to be applied to the world at 
the end of the war, it is indeed a worthy undertaking and merits 
serious consideration. However, it is not in the realm of practicality 
to attempt to apply these principles at a time when the whole world 
is in a chaotic condition. It is asking too much of Japan to expect 
her to accept these principles under such world conditions, and to 
expect her, in turn, to apply them immediately to the Far East 
area which has been undergoing particularly unfavorable conditions. 

Therefore, Wakasugi continued, the immediate need is to discuss 
matters which Japan is capable at the present time of carrying out. 
These actual problems should be worked out to the maximum point 
of possibility under present circumstances and in this manner, the 
first opening to the road of joint and cooperative action should be 
found. 

Hull replied that he well understood Japan's position and the cir- 
cumstances in which she was involved. However, he continued, the 
United States also has to cope with domestic problems. For example, 
there are complaints from U. S. business men in China who have 
been squeezed out or whose activities have been curtailed because of 
the monopolistic attitude Japan has assumed in the China trade. 
When these complaints are voiced, because of the make-up of the 
United States, they cannot be left unnoticed. 

Returning again to fundamentals, it is an unalterable fact, the 
Secretary continued, that the United States' basic principle is ad- 
vantageous to Japan. For this reason he desired acceptance of it 
by Japan, the Secretary repeated. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 79 

He agreed to compare the two proposals on this point, too, and to 
submit a reply after so doing. 

In conclusion Hull asked what the conditions were in Japan. 
Wakasugi replied that the general public were very strained. The 
government is being forced to take an immediate and decisive turn 
to either the right or the left. The people are apparently ready to 
jump at a chance for an understanding with the United States and 
because of the sensitiveness of the Japafiese peopJe, the tension will 
no doubt be immediately relieved if there is the slightest gesture on 
the part of the United States to warrant it. 

Although it may be true that more time will be required before an 
agreement can be reached on the weighty items, however, there would 
be made favorable reactions if even minor matters, such as the fol- 
lowing, were cleared up: releasing of the Itukusima Maru and the 
Syoyo Maru which have been tied up in San Francisco for over a 
month because the money with which to pay for their fuel has been 
frozen; releasing of funds with which to pay for fuel for those ships 
which are coming over here at present. (There is some interference 
from the Treasury Department in this instance). 

As W akasugi mentioned these items, Welles took down the names 
of the vessels and other pertinent facts and promised to take the 
matter up with bureaus concerned. 
23818 
JD-1: 5968 (D) Navy Trans. 10-21-41 (2) 



[Secret] 



From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo . . ' 

October 18, 1941 

CA 

Accept my congratulations on your appointment. Although I was 
instructed to carry out the policy of the former cabinet and endeavored 
to do my best, I was not able to do anything useful and naturally I 
have been keenly conscious of the responsibility. Since my appoint- 
ment to this post, things have developed contrary to my wishes and, 
for this reason, I am deeply concerned. It should be fairly clear that 
I, with my limited ability, shall not be able to accompUsh much in 
the future; I am afraid I shall be leading not only a useless existence 
but even a harmful one. Grateful for the kind encouragement which 
the former minister gave me, I would like to think over carefully what 
I should do; I would like also to return to Japan in the near future so 
that I may personally report the situation here to you and inci- 
dentally receive your instructions in all matters. Will you, therefore, 
give your approval at once. Inasmuch as both WAKASUGI and 
IGUCHI are men of ability and efficiency, there should be no objec- 
tions to leaving matters in their hands after I have left. 
Army 23803 Trans. 10/22/41 (2) 



80 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
October 20, 1941 
Purple (CA) 

(RETRANSLATION BASED ON COMPLETE INTERCEPT COPY) 

Will Your Excellency please read this for your own information 
and then please transmit it to the Minister of the Navy. 

My dear Mr. Minister: 

Congratulations on your new appointment! Wlien this humble 
Ambassador was appointed to his present post he asked for the fervent, 
support of the whole Navy Department, but since I came to Washing- 
ton I am sorry to say that there has been no cooperation between us. 
Furthermore, the Navy has not cooperated with the Foreign Office. 
The times do not permit of such incoordination. On the one hand 
the United States is faced by the European war and on the other 
hand by the Pacific problem, but still she has made no military move. 
I believe that there is a weak point here. Therefore, I had expected 
the United States to take a more or less conciliatory attitude toward 
us as soon as the situation was favorable, but, contrary to my sur- 
mises, so far all America has done is to stick to her own national 
policy, and I am beginning to doubt if she can be reformed very much. 
I think that probably in the last analysis this is due to the fact that 
the United States has too many interests in China. My own desire 
has been to leave the China question out of the picture and work out 
some modus vivendi between our two countries. In my conversations 
with the Secretary of State I have shown this by my way of talking. 
However, the Secretary says that the China question is inseparably 
bound up with the stability of the Pacific^. Some days ago I talked 
for an hour or more with HALIFi\X. He said that the British 
Empire has a great interest in the Pacific problem and he would like 
to see some modus vivendi worked out between Japan and the United 
States to avoid a crisis. He said that he would like to talk with 
Secretary HULL about this. Since then, however, I have had no 
chance to talk with him. Well, before I came here I had talked with 
all the cabinet officials of that time and thought I thoroughly under- 
stood the position of the Government; however, since then there 
have been two administrative changes and now I am left floundering. 
I cannot tell you how much in the dark I am. I have talked along my 
own lines with the Secretary of State so often that, ifwe now explored 
the situation from a new angle, all my presence would do would be 
to confuse the situation and cause an unfavorable reaction. There 
is no doubt about this. That is v^hy I wired you the other day that I 
would like to come home. If you have anything which you want the 
Foreign Office to transmit to me, please be sure to let them know. 
Army #23774 Trans. 10-22-41 (1) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 81 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
21 October 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#698 

Re your #966* 

What you say is well justified. We should, of course, send you 
instructions immediately, but in view of the fact that the new cabinet 
was only just formed, they have been unavoidably delayed. 

The new cabuiet differs in no way from the former one in its sincere 
desire to adjust Japanese-United States relations on a fair basis. 
Our country has said practically all she can say in the way of express- 
ing of opinions and setting forth our stands. We feel that we have 
now reached a point where no further positive action can be taken 
by us. except to urge the United States to reconsider her views. 

We urge, therefore, that, choosing an opportune moment, either 
you or Wakasugi let it be known to the United States by indirection 
that our country is not in a position to spend much more time dis- 
cussing this matter. Please continue the talks, emphasizing our 
desire for a formal United States counter-proposal to our proposal of 
25(?) September. 

23968 

JD-1: 6015 (D) Navy Trans. 10-23-41 (S-TT) 

•JD-l: 5968. (Long 6 part report). Wakasugi-Welles-Hull talk on 17 Oct. in which there is an exten- 
sive rehash of arguments and counter arguments that have been repeatedly discussed before. Wakasugi 
continues to emphasize the impracticability of evacuating China, while Hull emphasizes non-discrimination 
in trade (i. e. the Open Door up-to-date). 



[Secret] 



From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
October 22, 1941 
Purple (CA) 

I have already wired you something about my present psychology. 
I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know 
that for some time the Secretary of State has known how sincere your 
humble servant is, yet how little influence I have in Japan. I am 
ashamed to say that it has come to my ears that this is the case. 
There are some Americans who trust this poor novice and who say 
that things will get better for me, but, alas, their encouragement is 
not enough. Among my confreres here in the United States there are 
also some who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor deluded 
souls. As for Your Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI can carry 
them out fully. Nor do I imagine that you all have any objections. 
I don't want to be the bones of a dead horse. I don't want to con- 
tinue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people. No, don't 
think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of 
honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send 
me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech 
your forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and 1 prostrate myself 
before you in the depth of my rudeness. 

Army #23859 

JD 6017 , Trans. 10-23-41 (7) 



82 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
23 October 1941 
(Purple-CA) 
Unnumbered 

From your message (s) I am advised of the various difficulties you 
are coping with and I wish to express to you that I appreciate the 
efforts you are making. As you are well aware, the outcome of those 
negotiations have a great bearing upon the decision as to which road 
the Imperial Government will pursue. As such, it is an exceedingly 
important matter. We are placing all of our reliance on Your Excel- 
lency's reports for our information on this matter. 

For the above reason, we express our hope that you will see fit 
to sacrifice all of your own personal wishes, and remain at your post. 

23860 

JD-1: 6016 (D) Navy Trans. 10-23-41 (S-TT) 



[Secret] 



From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

October 24, 1941 

Purple 

#995 (Part 1 of 4) 

Re your #698 *. 

On the 24th from 2:30 p. m., WAKASUGI conferred with WELLES 
for an hour, and following the purport of your telegram, explained 
that our new cabinet was as anxious as the former cabinet for a just 
readjustment of our relations; that our desires have already been 
clearly stated ; and that since, from what WAKASUGI himself could 
judge on the basis of what he saw and heard during his recent visit in 
Japan, circumstances there do not permit prolonging these conversa- 
tions any longer, he — though not yet in receipt of detailed instruc- 
tions—would like to see, without a day of further delay, some sort of 
conclusion reached. He then requested that the United States sub- 
mit a counter-proposal to our proposal of September 25th. WELLES 
first expressed his pleasure of learning that the new cabinet intends to 
continue the discussion of this question and proceeded to say that 
recently men in responsible positions in Japan — for example, the 
Naval spokesman — had made such a war-like statement as "the 
Japanese Navy is 'itching for action' ", and that the ferocious attacks 
which the Japanese newspapers have been making on the United 
States had greatly provoked the American people both in and out of 
the government and are injurious to the continuation of discussions. 
Army #24002 Trans. 10-27-41 (1) 

• S. I. S. #23968 which points out the fact that the new cabinet is anxious as the former one to adjust 
Japanese-U. S. relations and that Japan has made her stand perfectly clear and can do no more. It further- 
more directs WAKASUGI to inform the U. S. that Japan is not in a position to prolong the discussion and 
would like to be informed of the United States' counter-proposal to that of Japan's dated September 25th. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 83 

[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
October 24, 1941 
Purple 
#995 (Part 2 of 4) 

WAKASUGI -replied that there were not a few influential politicians 
in the United States as, for example, Senator PEPPER, who have 
severely criticized Japan; that especially the speech made today by 
Secretary of Navy KNOX to the effect that Japanese- American war 
is inevitable and the clash of the two countries is only a few days 
ahead and other warlike statements are quite provocative to the 
Japanese government as well as the people ; and that in this respect 
the two countries are very much alike. To this, WELLES came back 
with the argument that the Naval Secretary's speech was not such a 
provocative one but the newspapers had played up certain parts of it; 
that as a man responsible for the United States Navy, which is the 
most powerful influence in the country, he occasionally indulges in 
strong words with the intention of encouraging the Navy; and that he 
would like WAKASUGI to reahze that these speeches are nothing 
other than those made for such purposes. WELLES proceeded, 
saying, "As to the counter-proposal which you request of the United 
States, as I have repeated at the time of the previous conversation, 
the principles as well as the proposal of the American Government are 
clearly given in the proposal made on June 21. To be sure, one way 
of approaching a solution would be to adjust the wordings of that 
proposal to those of the proposal made by Japan. 
Army 24003 Trans. 10/27/41 (1) 

[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
October 24, 1941 
Purple 
#995 (Part 3 of 4) 

"However, in the light of the experience of the informal discussions 
held during the past several months, to do no more than to consider 
each paragraph of the past formula would result in repetition of the 
same old arguments and, therefore, would not be conducive to 
progress. As I have pointed out during the previous conversation at 
which Secretary HULL was present, it might be well to try to reach 
an agreement on such general matters as the three important points 
which are comparatively easy of settlement; such a new formula may 
be a short-cut. However, if this is to be done, we had better take up 
at the beginning the question of equal treatment in commerce, a 
question which is comparatively easy of agreement by both countries 
(in reference to this point, WELLES asked if we had transmitted to 
our government what HULL had §o strongly advocated during the 
previous conversation, and so WAKA.SUGI replied that he had com- 
municated the matter in detail) ; and secondly, we should debate the 
question of Japan's duties to the Three-Power Alliance." He spoke 
as if there was a possibility of some adjustment also on the part of 
the United States with regard to this question. WELLES then 
suggested taking up the China question next. Thus, he made an 
entirely new proposal. 
Army 24004 Trans. 10/27/41 (1) 



84 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
October 24, 1941 
Purple 
#995 (Part 4 of 4) 

WAKASUGI replied, saying, "Since I have not yet received de- 
tailed instructions from my government, I haven't the liberty to add 
anything today to the proposal of September 25, but I would like 
to have the United States authorities draw up a definite proposal 
with reference to the new approach you just suggested and submit it 
before we will have our next conversation. We, too, shall make a 
study of this point." 

Speaking on the request that frozen funds be released for the 
dispatching of the two tankers referred to during our previous con- 
versation and the two ships of the NYK line at this time, WELLES 
said, "We at that time made immediate arrangements, and all pro- 
cedures have been completed by the Treasury Department with 
regard to the three NYK ships; but in the matter of tankers, since the 
United States banking laws require strict investigations for the pur- 
pose of protecting bank depositors, once money has been transferred 
to an account with the Yokohama Specie Bank, it is impossible to 
release it, regardless of the fact that the money is in the form of cash 
or of a draft for transference of money to that bank. However, the 
State Department will offer as much assistance as possible if you wish 
to have drafts made so that they could be transferred through some 
American bank." 
Army 24005 Trans. 10/27/41 (1) 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
25 October 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#709 

Re your #989*. 

We are particularly anxious to get an idea of the extent to which 
the United States will a^ee with our final proposal. We are putting 
much expectation that this point will be clarified during the Wakasugi- 
Welles talks on the 25th. 

With regard to the military general staff office's message, we ob- 
tained an explanation from it after we received your message. It 
seems that that message was an expression of the General Staff's 
hopes and the government in the meantime is going ahead with its 
studies to establish a basic national policy, embodying the results of 
the Japanese-United States negotiations. 

My personal intentions are as I outlined in my message #698** 
(those on which the army and navy concurred). Bearing these facts 
in mind, will you please urge the United States to voice its intentions. 
At the same time will you continue to make an effort to definitely 
ascertain the U. S. attitude ^^dth regard to our proposal. I am ex- 
ceedingly anxious to receive your findings on these points. 
24069 
JD-1: #6117 (D) Navy Trans. 10-25^1 (S-TT) 

• 8. I. S. #23996. 

••JD-1: 6016 (S. I. 8. #23968). New cabinet sends first instructions on U. S.-Jap negotiations. The 
situation is at an impass^ unless the U. S. will change its views. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 85 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

27 October 1941 

(Purple) 

#1004 

Chief of Office Routing. 

On the 25th, I met and talked with Admiral Pratt. The Admiral 
is one who recognizes the fact that in the final analysis, the aims of 
economic warfare and actual armed conflict are one and the same. 
He is of the opinion that as long as Japan stays within the scope of 
the China Incident, there will be no shooting war between Japan and 
the United States. He said, however, that if Japan moved either 
northward or southward, he feared the consequences. He added that 
the final decision rested in the Emperor and the President. 

Knox's speech, he went on, was exceedingly unfortunate. When 
he (the Admiral) writes for magazines or speaks on the radio, he 
always takes Japan into his calculations very carefully. After all, 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, as far as the President is con- 
cerned, is of course. Stark. The opinions of the two completely 
coincide. Unfortunately, however. Stark cannot be said to be a 
"strong" individual, Admiral Pratt said. Hart, on the other hand, 
although he has enemies within the Department, is a strong character. 

He further reported that he had heard from other sources that the 
President is sincerely desirous of having a peaceful and stabilized 
Pacific. However, because he is advised by various people to pursue 
various courses of action, the Admiral could not guarantee that there 
would be no trouble on those waters. 

Admiral Pratt went on to say that Harriman, who was sent to the 
Soviet Union, is a very capable person in whom every confidence 
could be placed. This man states that Stalin is not in a position to 
discuss peace and that without a doubt. Hitler is winning that battle. 

Concerning the project to attempt to have Italy enter into a 
separate peace, Pratt is of the opinion that such a peace would put 
Italy in the same disastrous position that France now occupies and 
for this reason he is incHned to doubt that Italy will consider it. 

In the final analysis, the Admiral is of the opinion that the war 
will be a long drawn out aflPair, and that sooner or later, one side will 
become more fatigued than the other. 

Thus, he expressed what probably is the most optimistic view to 
come from any authoritative American. 

He went on to express his opinion that the Atlantic would be saved 
for Great Britain. 

Japan should do everything to avoid impairing her might on the 
seas, so that she can take it with her to the eventual peace conference. 
It will be only with a strong navy to fall back on that Japan will have 
much say in those peace terms, he said. 
24192 
JD-1: 6175 (D) Navy Trans. 10-30-41 (1) 



86 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] v 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

29 October 1941 

(Purple) 

#1008 (In 3 parts, complete) 

From Minister Wakasugi 

U. S. -Japanese relations are now fast approaching a critical cross- 
road. In view of the fact that the times are indeed grave, I am waiv- 
ing formality and, though it may seem very presumptuous of me, am 
reporting to you my views on the general attitude of the United States 
after coming in contact with its representatives on several occasions. 

As you no doubt are well aware through the many other reports 
pertaining to this matter, the basic U. S. policy is the crushing of the 
so-called "Hitlerism", (establishment of a new order through the force 
of arms). Working from this principle, the United States is gradually 
strengthening its war-time structure. Britain and China have been 
set up as the first line of national defense. In this way, the United 
States has succeeded in steamrollering over the isolationist opposition 
and is forcing the government and the public alike to follow this 
policy. 

The government has determined to gamble on a long term program. 
It is on these grounds that Hull has said on several occasions that 
though he yearns for the preservation of peace on the Pacific, on the 
other hand it will have to be based on agreements covering the entire 
Pacific area and not upon a patchwork of hit-or-miss local agreements. 
During my talks with him on the 24th, Welles said that the United 
States was not in agreement with the British practice in the past of 
establishing special relations with her colonial holdings. The United 
States is a firm advocate of an absolute non-discrimination and equal 
opportunities for all in the entire Pacific area, (including Japan, United 
States, Britain, China, Australia, Netherlands East Indies, etc.) Every 
nation will be offered opportunities equal to those existing between the 
home government and its colonies. For this reason, Welles pointed 
out on that occasion, this policy should be advantageous to Japan as 
well. 

Judging from these factors, we assume that the United States based 
their demands for equal opportunities of access to the natural resources 
of French Indo-China and Thailand, as well as a guarantee that they 
will remain strictly neutral, upon their principle of non-discrimination. 
Apparently, they presume that we intend to develop this area under 
the principle of our military's co-prosperity sphere, in a monopolistic 
manner, and through the force of arms. 

Thus, there has arisen a clash of ideologies. 

The United States wants to tackle the China problem as merely 
one phase of the aforementioned "peace on the Pacific" issue. On 
the other hand, it should be recalled that Hull once said to the late 
Ambassador Saito that it was exceedingly doubtful that there should 
be war between Japan and the United States over merely the China 
problem. There are indications that the United States is still not 
anxious to fight Japan over only the China problem. However, it 
must be borne in mind that China is now relying solely on the United 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 87 

States. (It is said that T. V. Soong and others in the United States 
are working on the Treasury Department in particular) and the United 
States is doing everything in its power to prevent the bringing about 
of a truce between Japan and the United States. Since China is 
entirely dependent on the United States, the United States cannot 
turn a cold shoulder to her pleas. It is impossible for the United 
States to cruelly impose terms on China which would be almost im- 
possible for the United States herself to endure. 

Welles used the above described excuse during our talks on the 
24th. He went on to say, however, that the United States would 
not be unreasonable; she would not demand of Japan to carry out 
that which is immediately impossible. What his implications were 
when he said that is not clear, but possibly he may have been referring 
to some such tough problem as that of evacuating our forces, (indica- 
tions are that in spite of our repeated explanations concerning the 
garrisoning of troops in China, the above ambiguous statement may 
have been his carnouflaged way of pointing out a means of carrying 
out a program of withdrawal of troops). I got the impression that 
he wanted to convey to me that the United States would not demand 
that it be carried out immediately. 

In any event, it has become apparent that U. S. -Japanese relations 
have now become an integral phase of the national policy of the 
United States. There is every indication that the United States is 
anxious to adjust the relationship between the two nations as it has 
much bearing on her national policy. However, she is willing to 
come to terms only if the conditions suit her. She has set forth her 
stand in her proposals of 21 June and of 2 October. I am very doubt- 
ful that she will make any concessions therefrom. 

Her preparations in the event of the worst have been completed. 
Therefore, I cannot believe that she is stalling for time. On the other 
hand, I am of the opinion that she is not so anxious to enter into the 
agreement that she will sacrifice any of her terms. Therefore, I do 
not believe that we should expect any further counter proposals from 
them. They have decided on a course of economic pressure plus 
watchful waiting. 

Therefore, if we choose to good naturedly continue these talks, I 
am of the opinion that all is not hopeless. I feel that such a move 
will almost automatically open up ways of breaking down differences 
if we make the best use of world developments. However, if we de- 
pend on immediate settlement by settling local differences by insisting 
upon our freedom of action, we must have our minds made up that 
not only will these negotiations be terminated, but that our national 
relations will be severed. 

The United States has expressed its interest in continuing with the 
talks after she has been advised of the attitude and policy of the 
newly formed Cabinet of Japan. I urge, therefore, that the new 
Cabinet establish its basic policy as speedily as possible, so that we 
may lay our cards on the table for them to see. I sincerely believe 
that that would be to our best interests. 
24250 
JD-1: 6207 (D) Navy Trans. 11-1-41 (1) 



88 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

29 October 1941 

(Purple) 

#1010 (In 2 parts, complete) 

Chief of Office routing. 

I report the foD owing points to you merely as reference material 
in connection with the adjusting of national relations. 

1. Admiral Standley, Retired, told Member of Parliament Kasai 
that the more influential Congressmen from the Middle West (where 
there are many Americans of German descent) state that the majority 
of the Middle Westerners are opposed to a war against Germany, 
but that at the same time, a great number of them favor a U. S.- 
Japanese war. This is due, in part, he said, to Germany's superior 
propaganda work. I have heard O'Laughlin, who is familiar with 
that area, express similar opinions. 

2. Secretary Hull has told Congress that the U. S. Government 
looks upon the Tripartite Pact as an instrument to be used to intimi- 
date the United States. Its aim is to make impossible the aiding of 
Great Britain by the United States and thus gradually to force the 
United States to give up the control of the seas and bring back the 
first line of U. S. defense to the U. S. shore line. The United States 
desires peace; however, it is a well established fact that there is a 
better chance to have peace if strength can be shown. If I (Hull) 
were to make too many concessions to the Axis powers, there is danger 
that they would be interpreted as weaknesses on my part and no 
doubt their demands would be increased. (This is particularly true 
in Tokyo). There are indications, Hull continued, that the degree 
of enthusiasm in Tokyo to proceed on selfish courses, is determined 
to a considerable extent on how the German-Soviet war is going. 

It is said that he went on to say that the situation was "very 
delicate and very changeable". (Reported in the New York Times, 
28th). 

To me. Secretary Hull once said that the people of both Japan 
and the United States were proud peoples. For this reason, neither 
would easily succumb to bluffs of the other. 

3. It is said that Assistant Secretary of State Breckenridge Long 
told a certain Japanese who called on him and set forth the many 
advantages of speedily entering into an understanding with Japan 
along the lines published in a newspaper as a Tokyo dispatch, that it 
would be impossible for the United States to get everything in order 
before 15 November. 

4. On two different occasions recently, I met and talked with Lord 
Halifax. I tried to sound him out as to British attitude with regard 
to a Japanese-U. S. understanding. I gather from these that, in 
accordance with the Churchill speech, Britain would string along with 
the United States. Lord Halifax said that British did not want 
trouble on the Pacific; that is true of the United States, too, he said, 
adding that he hoped that Japan would give the matter her thorough 
study from all angles and exercise the utmost of patience before doing 
anything. 

He refused to enlarge upon the U. S. and British embargo policy in 
effect at present. ■ 

24376 

JD-1: (D) Navy Trans, 11-5-41 (2) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 89 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Nanking 
31 October 1941 
(Purple) 
#464 

The agreement is to go into effect November 25th, and it is generally 
agreed between Japan, Germany, and Italy that it shall be continued 
for a period of five years. Negotiations should be begun between 
the three countries regarding the proposal for a new protocol. This 
is strictly secret and for your information. 

24290 

JD-1: 6225 (H) Navy Trans. 11-3-41 (5-AR) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
1 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#721 

Please advise this office what actual relationship exists at present 
between the original contents of the U. S. proposal of 21 June and 
the following points: 

The matter pertaining to the exchanging of the official texts which 
was put into the 21 June proposal as a footnote to Section 2 thereof, 
(that part concerning the attitude of the respective nations to the 
European war) ; and, the three questions which were submitted con- 
cerning the United States' proposal of non-discrimination in trade, a 
subject which was put in as a supplement to Section 3, (concerning 
peace between China and Japan), of the 21 June proposal. 

According to your message #424*, you told Secretary Hull on 22 
June that you could not deliver the official note to the home govern- 
ment. Moreover, there seems to be indications that the U. S. Govern- 
ment is beginning to understand our viewpoint with regard to the 
matter of the right of self-defense. 

In view of these facts, may we assume that the matter of exchang- 
ing of official notes has been dropped by the United States? We 
must have this information to discuss this whole matter in a business 
like manner, so please advise us immediately, although it may seem 
like bringing up old issues. 

24531 
JD-1: 6323 

(D) Navy Trans. 11-7-41 (S-TT) 

•JD-1: 3271 (SIS #18717, and 18735) dated 24 June Arab. Nomura wires Tokyo that in an interview with 
Secy. Hull, Hull made the statement that there seems to be influential people in Japan who do not desire an 
understanding with the U. S. so, after all, does Japan consider the composure of relations between the two 
countries so important. Nomura replies that such concession as the U. S. has so far offered are not worthy 
of consideration. 



79716 O— 46 — pt. 12- 



90 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo (Togo) 
To: Washington 
November 2, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#722 

The Government has for a number of days since the forming of the 
new Cabinet been holding meetings with the Imperial headquarters. 
We have carefully considered a fundamental policy for improving 
relations between Japan and America, but we expect to reach a final 
decision in a meeting on the morning of the 5th and will let you know 
the result at once. This will be our Government's last effort to 
improve diplomatic relations. The situation is very grave. When 
we resume negotiations, the situation makes it urgent that we reach 
a decision at once. This is at present only for your information. 
When we take up these negotiations once more, we trust you will 
handle everything with the greatest of care. 
Army 24292 Trans. 11-3-41 (S) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 2, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#723 (Part 1 of 2) 

Day before yesterday when I met the diplomatic corps, during the 
conversation I had with the American Ambassador, I said, "I am very 
sorry that Japanese- American relations have lately been growing worse 
and worse. If this continues, I fear that unfortunate results will 
ensue. For six months, negotiations have been dragging along, and 
our people are growing impatient. Therefore, I hope that a speedy 
settlement will be reached. In this connection, I would like to ask 
your friendly cooperation." I added, "It is necessary for the United 
States, in order to arrive at a frank understanding, to relinquish its 
theoretical procedure and view the Oriental situation realistically. 
For example, when we come to the question of evacuation, there are 
other countries besides Japan who actually have occupation forces in 
China. Furthermore, although Outer Mongolia is considered a part 
of Chinese territory, the Soviet has a considerable force stationed there. 
The United States must realize these facts and understand our posi- 
tion." The Ambassador nodded to this and promised cooperation. 
He said that he would like for the parleys between the United States 
and Japan to proceed amicably. 
Army 24293 Trans. 11/3/41 (S) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 91 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 2, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#723 (Part 2 of 2) 

On the 26th the British Ambassador came to see me on other 
business, and I said to him, "The attitude of the United States is 
entirely too theoretical, and if this continues there will be scant 
chance of a settlement. At the present time I am very much con- 
cerned over this. If the negotiations turn out to be a failure, can- 
not tell but what a lamentable situation will occur. Now you English, 
who have such important interests in the Far East, would not like 
this. I think that England ought to endeavor to improve Japanese- 
English-American relations in order to reestablish ^nd maintain the 
peace of the world." The Ambassador replied that he would trans- 
mit what I said immediately to London. I saw him again (yesterday?) 
and endeavored to impart to him the impression that the situation is 
waxing more and more acute and will not permit of procrastination. 

Sent also to London. 

Army 24294 Trans. 11/3/41 (S) 



[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

3 November 1941 

(Purple— CA) 

#1021 

I plan to see Hull in two or three days. If possible I would like to 
be advised of the Cabinet's definite policy before then. If this is 
impossible will you please advise me of the points I should bear in 
mind while talking to the Secretary. 
24424 
JD-1: 6277 (D) Navy Trans. 11-5^1 (2) 



92 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

3 November 1941 

Purple (CA) 

#1025 

Re your #721* 

1. As you mentioned in your message, it is true that I refused to 
relay the text of the exchanged notes. They have stuck firmly to 
their original stand and consequently the two proposals have remained 
at odds with each other. 

2. The questions regarding the three items were made with reference 
to the 21 June proposal. They are still, as before, awaiting our 
definite reply. 

24476 

JD-1: 6316 (D) Navy Trans. 11-7-41 (2) 

•Available, being decoded; will be translated. Dated 1 November. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 4, 1941 
Purple (CA) (Urgent) 
#725 (Part 1 of 3) 
Concerning my #722 *, 

1. Well, relations between Japmn and the United States have 
reached the edge, and our people are losing confidence in the possi- 
bility of ever adjusting them. In order to lucubrate on a fundamental 
national policy, the Cabinet has been meeting with the Imperial 
Headquarters for some days in succession. Conference has followed 
conference, and now we are at length able to bring forth a counter- 
proposal for the resumption of Japanese-American negotiations based 
upon the unanimous opinion of the Government and the military 
high command (ensuing Nos. 726 '' and 727 "). This and other basic 
policies of our Empire await the sanction of the conference to be held 
on the morning of the 5th. 

2. Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense 
that no longer is procrastination possible, yet in our sincerity to 
maintain pacific relationships between the Empire of Japan and the 
United States of America, we have decided, as a result of these deliber- 
ations, to gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys, but 
this is our last effort. Both in name and spirit this counter-proposal 
of ours is, indeed, the last. I want you to know that. If through it 
•we da not reach a quick accord, I am sorry to say the talks wiU cer- 
tainly be ruptured. Then, indeed, will relations between our two 
nations be on the brink of chaos. I mean that the success or failure 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 93 

of the pendijag discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny 
of the Empire of Japan, In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on 
the throw of this die. 

Army 24330 Trans. 11/4/41 (S) 

JD 6248 



• S. I. S. #24292 which states that meetings are being held with the Imperial Headquarters to consider a 
fundamental policy for improving relations between Japan and America and that a final decision is to be 
made on the morning of the 5th. 

b Not available. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 4, 1941 
Purple (CA) (Urgent) 
#725 (Part 2 of 3) 

When the Japanese-American meetings began, who would have 
ever dreamt that they would drag out so long? Hoping that we 
could fast come to some understanding, we have already gone far 
out of our way and yielded and yielded. The United States does 
not appreciate this, but through thick and thin sticks to the self-same 
propositions she made to start with. Those of our people and of 
our officials who suspect the sincerity of the Americans are far from 
few. Bearing all kinds of humiliating things, our Government has 
repeatedly stated its sincerity and gone far, yes, too far, in giving in 
to them. There is just one reason why we do this — to maintain 
peace in the Pacific. There seem to be some Americans who think 
we would make a one-sided deal, but our temperance, I can tell you, 
has not come from weakness, and naturally there is an end to our 
long-suffering. Nay, when it comes to a question of our existence 
and our honor, when the time comes we will defend them without 
recking the cost. If the United States takes an attitude that over- 
looks or shuns this position of ours, there is not a whit of use in ever ' 
broaching the talks. This time we are showing the limit of our 
friendship; this time we are making our last possible bargain, and I 
hope that we can thus settle all our troubles with the United States 
peaceably. 

Army 24331 Trans. 11/4/41 (S) 



94 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 4, 1941 
Purple (CA) (Urgent) 
#725 (Part 3 of 3) 

3. It is to be hoped earnestly that looking forward to what may 
come at the end — at the last day of Japanese- American negotiations— 
the Government of the United States will think ever so soberly how 
much better it would be to make peace with us; how much better 
this would be for the whole world situation. 

4. Your Honor will see from the considerations above how impor- 
tant is your mission. You are at a key post, and we place great hopes 
in your being able to do something good for our nation's destiny. 
Will you please think deeply on that and compose yourself and make 
up your mind to continue to do your best. I hope you will. Now 
just as soon as the conference is over, I wUl let you know immediately, 
and I want you to go and talk to President ROOSEVELT and Secre- 
tary HULL. I want you to tell them how determined we are and 
try to get them to foster a speedy understanding. 

5. In view of the gravity of these talks, as you make contacts 
there, so I will make them here. I wiU talk to the American Ambas- 
sador here in Tokyo, and as soon as you have got the concensus of 
the American officials through talking with them, please wire me. 
Naturally, as these things develop, in case you take any new steps, 
I want you to let me know and get in contact with me. In this 
way we will avoid letting anything go astray. Furthermore, lest 
anything go awTy, I want you to follow my instructions to the letter. 
In my instructions, I want you to know there will be no room for 
personal interpretation. 

Army 24332 Trans. 11/4/41 (S) 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 4, 1941 
Purple (CA) (Urgent) 
#726 (Part 1 of 4.) 

Proposal "A". 

1. This proposal is our revised ultimatum made as a result of our 
attempts to meet, insofar as possible, the wishes of the Americans, 
clarified as a result of negotiations based on our proposals of Septem- 
ber 25. We have toned down our insistences as follows: 

(1) The question of non-discrimination in trade. 

Should they appear not to accede to our proposal of September 25 
in this respect, insert the following statement, "The Japanese Govern- 
ment is prepared to carry out this principle in the entire Pacific area; 
that is to say, China as well, providing the principles of non-discrimina- 
tion are applied to the entire world." 

(2) The question of our understanding and application of the 
Tripartite Alliance. 

At the same time that you clarify to them that we intend no expan- 
sion of our sphere of self-defense, make clear, as has been repeatedly 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 95 

explained in the past, that we desire to avoid the expansion of Europe's 
war into the Pacific. 

Army 24334 Trans. 11/4/41 (S) 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 4, 1941 
Purple (CA) (Urgent) 
#726 (Part 2 of 4.) 

(3) The question concerning the evacuation of troops. 

We are toning down our stipulations in this connection as follows: 

(A) The stationing and evacuation of troops in China since the 
outbreak of the China Incident. 

Japanese troops which have been sent to China will be stationed 
in North China, on the Mongolian border regions, and on the Island 
of Hainan after the establishment of peace between Japan and China, 
and will not be evacuated until the elapse of a suitable interval. The 
evacuation of other troops will be carried out by Japan and China at 
the same time that peace is established. In order to maintain peace 
and order, this will be carried out within a period of two years. 
(Note: Should the American authorities question you in regard to 
"the suitable period", answer vaguely that such a period should 
encompass 25 years.) 

(B) The stationing and evacuation of troops in French Indo-China. 
The Japanese Government respects the territorial integrity of the 

French possession, Indo-China. In the event that a just peace is 
established, or that the China IncidWt is brought to a successful 
conclusion, Japanese troops which have been dispatched to French 
Indo-China and are there now shall be evacuated. 

(4) As a matter of principle, we are anxious to avoid having this 
inserted in the draft of the formal proposal reached between Japan and 
the United States (whether it is called an understanding proposal or 
some other sort of a statement.) 

Army 24335 Trans. 11/4/41 (S) 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 

To: Washington , 

November 4, 1941 
Purple (CA) (Urgent) 
#726 (Part 3 of 4) 

2. Explanation. 

(1) Of course, there is the question of geographical proximity 
when we come to consider non-discrimination in commerce. However, 
we have revised our demands along this line hitherto and put the 
question of non-discrimination on a world-wide basis. In a memo- 
randum of the American Government, they state in effect, however, 
that it might be feasible for either country within a certain specified 
area to adopt a given policy and for the other party within another 
specified area to adopt a complementary policy. Judging from this 



96 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

statement, I do not believe they will oppose this term. I think that 
we can easily reach an understanding on this matter. 

(2) As for the question of the Three-Power Pact, your various 
messages lead me to believe that the United States is, in general, 
satisfied with our proposals, so if we make our position even more 
clear by saying that we will not randomly enlarge upon our inter- 
pretation of the right of self-defense, I feel sure that we will soon be 
mutually agreed on this point. 

Army 24336 Trans. 11/4/41 (S) 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 4, 1941 
Purple (CA) (Urgent) 
#726 (Part 4 of 4) 

(3) I think that in all probability the question of evacuation will 
be the hardest. However, in view of the fact that the United States 
is so much opposed to our stationing soldiers in undefined areas, our 
purpose is to shift the regions of occupation and our officials, thus 
attempting to dispel their suspicions. We will call it evacuation; but 
although it would please the United States for us to make occupation 
the exception rather than the rule, in the last analysis this would be 
out of the question. Furthermore, on the matter of duration of occu- 
pation, whenever pressed to give a clear statement we have hitherto 
couched our answers in vague terms. I want you in as indecisive yet 
as pleasant language as possible to euphemize and try to impart to 
them the effect that unlimited occupation does not mean perpetual 
occupation. Summing this up, Proposal A accepts completely Amer- 
ica's demands on two of the three proposals mentioned in the other 
proposal, but when it comes to the last point concerning the stationing 
and evacuation of forces, we have already made our last possible con- 
cession. How hard, indeed, have we fought in China for four years! 
What tremendous sacrifices have we made! They must know this, 
so their demands in this connection must have been only "wishful 
thinking." In any case, our internal situation also makes it impos- 
sible for us to make any further compromise in this connection. As 
best you may, please endeavor to have the United States understand 
this, and I earnestly hope and pray .that you can quickly bring about 
an understanding. 

Army 24337 Trans. 11/4/41 (S) 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 4, 1941 
Purple (CA) (Urgent) 
#727 

1. Proposal "B'^ 

This proposal is based upon proposal "A". If there appears to be 
a remarkable difference between 'the Japanese and American views, 
since the situation does not permit of delays, it will be necessary to 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 97 

put forward some substitute plan. Therefore, our second formula is 
advanced with the idea of making a last effort to prevent something 
happening. The substance is as follows: 

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States agree that 
neither will militarily invade any area in Southeast Asia and the South 
Seas with the exception of French Indo-China. 

(2) The Governments of Japan and the United States will cooperate 
mutually in guaranteeing the obtention of the materials they need in 
Netherlands India. 

(3) The Governments of Japan and the United States will mutually 
return to the situation prior to the freezing of their respective assets 
and the Government of the United States will agree to furnish Japan 
with the petroleum she needs. 

(4) The Government of the United States will engage in no activity 
which might put an obstacle in the way of Japan in her efforts to make 
peace with China. 

Addendum: 

(1) If necessary, upon the establishment of this understanding, as 
soon as peace is established between Japan and China, or as soon as 
a just peace is made in the Pacific area, Japan has no objection to 
promising to evacuate her troops. 

(2) If necessary, we will insert an additional stipulation concerning 
the interpretation and carrying out of the Three-Power Pact and the 
question of non -discrimination in commerce which were referred to in 
proposal "A" in my #726*. 

Army 24338 Trans. 11/4/41 (S) 

• See S. I. S. #24334 to 24337. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 4, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#730 

Re my #725*. 

In view of the gravity of the present negotiations and in view of 
your request on instructions from me. Ambassador KURUSU is 
leaving — on the 7th by clipper to assist you. He will be your right- 
hand man in these parleys. He is carrying with him no additional 
instructions, so in order to prepare him for the talks, will you please 
tell him all, and I hope that you can, by all means, arrange for an 
interview between him and President ROOSEVELT. 

By the way, will you please be sure to keep Ambassador KURUSU's 
activities strictly secret. 

Army 24339 Trans. 11/4/41 (S) 

• S. I. S. Nos. 24330, 31, 32. 



98 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 4, 1941 
Purple (CA) (Urgent) 
#731 

Remy#725.» 

In these negotiations, Great Britain also is an actively interested 
party and has vast interests in the Far East. Therefore, in order to 
carry out this proposal (both Proposal A and Proposal B), it would 
certainly behoove Great Britain and, for that matter, the Netherlands 
also as interested parties, to put into effect the terms of the under- 
standing in question. If we should proceed without any definite 
assurances on this point and reached an accord with Washington alone, 
it might very well be that it would never work. 

Consequently, I want you please to impress upon the American 
officials the importance of this essential measure and have them agree 
to make Great Britain and the Netherlands both simultaneously sign 
those terms in which they are concerned. Please wire me the results. 
Army 24333 Trans. 11/4/41 (S) 

« See 8. 1. S. #24330, 31, 32. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
5 November 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#732 

Re my #725* 

If and when an agreement is reached on the basis of our latest 
proposal we would prefer that it not be written up in the form of a 
treaty. Ratification of the Senate is required for a treaty, and we 
fear that too much time would be consumed obtaining this. From 
the viewpoint of speed and certainty, we would like to avoid having 
to follow this course. From the gist of the U. S, proposals, we feel 
that the U. S. Government is also desirous of not having to await 
Senate ratification. 

We have been lead to believe that it is the U. S. Government's 
intention to use this instrument as a basis for some future treaty, 
and that it would be classified as one tvpe of an "Executive Agree- 
ment" as the President is authorized to ao. We have been proceeding 
in the past on this assumption. (Please refer to page (3 ?) 1, Volume 
2, of Hyde's International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied 
by the United States). Will you please ascertain the U. S. attitude 
on this point. 

In any event, it is of utmost importance that an agreement be 
entered into along the lines given in the message referred to in the 
heading at the earliest possible moment. Under present conditions, 
speed is an absolutely essential factor. 
24372 
JD-1: 6253 (D) Navy Trans. 11-5^1 (S-TT) 

•JD-1:6248. 8. 1. 8. 134330. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 99 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo. 
To: Washington. 
5 November 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#735 

1. Our counter proposal in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations referred 
to in my message #725* was taken up at the Imperial Conference on 
this, the 5th, and was given approval. Therefore, will you please 
begin the talks along the lines given in my instructions. 

2. We assume that it would meet with the U. S. approval, in view 
of past developments, if, for the time being, the 21 June proposal — 
25 September's from our point of view — was used as a basis of these 
new talks. Subsequently, we feel that from the standpoint of the 
likelihood of reaching an early agreement, our Proposal A (contained 
in my message #726**) should be submitted for discussion. (As a 
matter of fact, there are a number of points in the form and in the 
expressions used in the U. S. proposal which do not meet with our 
complete approval. However, we feel that for convenience and 
speed's sake, Proposal A should be submitted first.) Please, there- 
fore, explain these points to the United States and at the same time 
have them clearly understand the circumstances contained in my 
message #725*. Thereupon, do your utmost to have them accept 
that proposal in the shortest possible time. 

3. If the United States expresses too many points of disapproval 
to Proposal A and if it becomes apparent that an agreement cannot 
be reached, we intend to submit our absolutely final proposal, Pro- 
posal B (contained in my message #727***). Please, therefore, as- 
certain the U. S. attitude to Proposal A as soon as possible, and 
advise this office. Be sure to advise this office before Proposal B is 
submitted to the United States. 

4. As stated in my previous message, this is the Imperial Govern- 
ment's final step. Time is becoming exceedingly short and the situ- 
ation very critical. Absolutely no delays can be permitted. Please 
bear this in mind and do your best. I wish to stress this point over 
and over. 

5. We wish to avoid giving them the impression that there is a 
time limit or that this proposal is to be taken as an ultimatum. In 
a friendly manner, show them that we are very anxious to have them 
accept our proposal. 

(Although a "1" was placed at the beginning of the body of my 
message #727***, there was on need for it, so please delete it. 
24387 
JD-1: 6276 (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT) 

•JD-l: 6248 (8. 1. 8. #24330-32). 
••JD-1: 6249 (S. I. 8. #24334-37) 
•••JD-1: 6260 (S. I. 8. #24338). 



100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
5 November 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#736 

(Of utmost secrecy). 

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all 
arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 
25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under 
the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this 
thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. 
relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great 
determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you. 

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only. 
24373 
JD-1: 6254 (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT) 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
5 November 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#1037 

I have received all of your messages of instructions, and after 
giving the matter my very careful consideration, I have decided to 
continue to put forth my best efforts, however feeble they may be. 
I, therefore, made arrangements immediately on this, the 5tn, to 
meet with President Roosevelt through Hull. (I shall advise you 
the date and time of this interview as soon as it is made definite). I 
am of the opinion that it would be to our advantage to keep this 
meeting as secret as possible. I would appreciate being advised of 
the Foreign Office's view on this point as soon as possible. If you 
believe that it would be better if this were made an official interview, 
please advise me as to the manner in which it should be announced 
to the public. 
24573 
JD-1: 6364 (D) Navy Trans. 11-10-^1 (2) 



[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

5 November 1941 

(Purple) 

#1040 

Re your #735, paragraph 5*. 

On the 5th, reports from Tokyo were played up by the newspapers 
here to the effect that Domei, the mouthpiece of the Japanese Govern- 
ment and the Times-Advertiser, the mouthpiece of the Foreign Office, 
were declaring that the 15th had been set as the "deadline" for the 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 101 

negotiations and were giving a list of the Japanese demands, (seven 
was given as the number). 

While I recognize that the above may be considered as well inten- 
tioned efforts on our part to lead to a favorable reception of the nego- 
tiations still the above reports are directly opposed to the interest of 
your caption telegram. As you are well aware in view of the present 
delicate situation such reports will have the effect of alienating 
American public opinion or causing it to become actively opposed 
to Japan. 

There is danger that America will see through our condition. If 
we have really made up our minds to a final course of action it would 
be the part of wisdom to keep still about it. I realize that the internal 
situation is causing you no end of worry, however I feel that in view 
of the present grave situation still further guidance should be given 
to the newspapers. 

24479 

JD-1: 6320 (H) N"avy Trans. 11-7-41 (7) 

•JD-l: 6276 (H-24387) . 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 6, 1941 
Purple (CA) (Urgent) 
#739 

Re my #730." 

The reason why we are sending Ambassador KURUSU to you so 
quickly is, in addition to what I have already wired you, to show 
our Empire's sincerity in the negotiations soon to follow.- As I 
wired you before, he brings with him no new instructions in addition 
to the ones I have already sent you. I wish him, however, to com- 
municate to you at first hand as best he may, the exact situation 
here in Japan, and now that we are on the last lap of these negotia- 
tions, I do hope that he can help you in unravelling this bewildering 
maze and through 'cooperation lead to a solution, and that right 
soon. To make it sound good, we are telling the public that he is 
coming to help you quickly compose the unhappy relations between 
the two nations. We have explained all this fully to the British 
and American Ambassadors here in Tokyo, and Ambassador KURUSU 
himself had a heart-to-heart talk with the American Ambassador 
here before he left, and both Ambassadors fully understand why he 
is making the trip. 

The officials of both the Army and the Navy are pleased with the 
special dispatch of the Ambassador and are very grateful for the 
trouble he is taking. After you read this, please go and tell the 
American officials concerned and wire me back their reply. 
Army 24439 Trans. 11/6/41 (S) 

• S. I. S. #24339 which states that Ambassador KURUSU is being sent to Washington on the 7th by 
clipper to assist in the Japanese-American parleys. 



102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 6, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#740 

Re your #1025.* 

Through Your Honor's continuous efforts, gradually both the 
Japanese and American insistences centering around the question of 
self-defense in connection with the Tripartite Treaty have become 
clear. Now we might say that there exists almost no division between 
our respective views. At any rate, we have been taking it for granted 
that this is the case for some time. Our proposal of September 25, 
which is a counter-proposal to the American proposal of June 21, 
makes no reference to any exchange of notes, which means that we 
are refusing to consider such an exchange. We are taking it for 
granted that the United States, too, is eliminating this as a matter 
of course from the negotiations, and we are continuing the negotiations 
on the assumption that there will be no such exchange of notes. If, 
by any misadventure, the United States should say that they will 
not leave out the proposal for exchange of notes, it will be utterly and 
absolutely impossible for us to agree, so when you negotiate, please 
be fully aware of this. 
Army 24442 Trans. 11/6/41 (S) 

» Not available. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 6, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#741 

Re your #1037.» 

The matter of Your Honor's interviewing, the President is delicate 
in the extreme, and if the newspapers speculate bn the import of it, 
the effect would doubtless be most regrettable. Therefore, if possible, 
I think we should avoid letting the press get wind of the substance of 
the interview or even the fact of the interview. If the American 
officials will agree with this, naturally we, too, will observe the same 
secrecy. 

Carrying this idea still further, in all your subsequent contacts with 
American oflBcials I would like for you to do your utmost to maintain 
the same secrecy and avoidance of publicity. 
Army 24440 Trans. 11/6/41 (S) 

• Not available. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 103 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

November 6, 1941 

Purple 

#1051 

In the present delicate state of Japan-American relations the local 
press is becoming more and more excited over the dispatch of 
KURUSU, etc. From now on all kinds of articles and editorials 
based on conjecture will continually be appearing. Although I have 
been very careful in my contacts with the local and foreign press, on 
account of the rivalry between the different newspapers, spontaneous 
conjectures and reports are published. 

Moreover these articles in English-language newspapers may be 
sent just as they are to Japan where I fear they would have an unfore- 
seen influence on our already tense population. Considering tJle 
seriousness of the situation please prevent the publication of such 
writings for the time being in the interest of better Japan-American 
relations, and, keeping a strict control, foUow the most prudent policy. 

Army 24552 Trans. 11/10/41 (1) 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

7 November 1941 

(Purple) 

#1053 

Re my #1040*. 

We are of the opinion that it is absolutely essential that, at this 
time, to either through direct means or through suitable indirect 
channels, strike home Japan's determinations to the U. S. Govern- 
ment. Under this assumption we are making every effort to carry 
this out. 

As I pointed out in the message referred to in the heading, there is 
everything to lose and nothing to gain to resort to a press campaign 
at a time like this, for such a campaign is aimed at the general public. 
The Times Advertiser is referred to here as the official government 
organ. We urge you to make that paper refrain from too bluntly 
commenting on the negotiations. As a matter of fact, we would be 
in favor of their remaining completely silent. We are convinced that 
an ominous silence would have the best effect, so will you make 
arrangements towards this end immediately. 

24645 

JD-1: 6401 (D) Navy Trans. 11-12^1 (1) 

•JD-l: 6320 (8. 1. 8. #24479). 



104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
7 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#1054 

Re my #10 

I met and talked with Secretary Hull at 0930 on the 7th, and I ex- 
plained our new proposal to him in accordance with your instructions. 
I requested that it be given consideration by the United States and 
at the same time I expressed my desire to meet with the President at 
the earliest possible moment. Hull promised to give them his con- 
sideration. 

With regard to the matter of nondiscrimination in trade, Hull 
showed indications of being satisfied. He did not indicate either ap- 
proval or disapproval of the matters pertaining to rights of self- 
defense and of withdrawal of our troops. 

The interview lasted approximately one hour. 

This message dispatched at 1330. 
24576 
JD-1: 6372 (D) Navy Trans. 11-10-41 (7) 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
7 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#1055 (Part 1 of 3) (Part 2 not available) 

At 0900 on this, the 7th, I, accompanied by Wakasugi, called on 
Secretary Hull at his home. (Ballantine was also present.) 

I said that I had been instructed by my home government to ex- 
plain to the President and to the Secretary of State, Japan's attitude 
and position in the hope of bringing about immediate settlement of 
the various problems involved in the relationship between Japan and 
the United States. 

In way of replying to this, HuU said that at present there were two 
political factions in this world which were at odds with each other and 
which were, consequently, embroiled in an armed conflict. Neither 
faction is able to decide the outcome speedily and hence there is a 
danger that they will be gradually thrown into the chaos of anarchism. 

If, at a time like this, the United States and Japan simultaneously hit 
upon a method of maintaining peace on the Pacific, it is quite possible 
that the world may be saved from the apparently imminent chaos. 

I, therefore, said, in accordance with your your various instructions, 
that: 

1. Of the three outstanding problems, agreements have been 
practically been reached on two. With regard to the matter of 
garrisoning or withdrawing troops, Japan is prepared to make the 
maximum concessions which can be permitted by the domestic 

political conditions of Japan. (9 groups missed here ) 

I urged that the United States cooperate in bringing about a speedy 
settlement on that assumption. 

24577 

JD-1: 6372 (b) (D) Navy Trans. 11-10-41 (7) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 105 

MEMORANDUM 

In JD-1: 6372 (b), the last paragraph on the first page of this 
message should be changed to read as follows: 

1. Of the three outstanding problems, agreements have been 
practically reached on two. With regard to the matter of garrisoning 
or withdrawing troops, Japan is prepared to make the maximum 
concessions which can be permitted by the domestic political conditions 
of Japan. 

2. From the viewpoint of U. S.-Japanese friendship in its broad 
sense, the U. S. Government should take a philosophic attitude 
concerning present conditions, I said, and I urged that the United 
States cooperate in bringing about a speedy settlement on that 
assumption. 

S. I. S. #24577. 



[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

7 November 1941 

(Purple) 

#1055 (Part 2 of 3)* 

. . . . (I pointed out that): 

3. I have been instructed by my home government to fully explain 
Japan's determination and Japan's position to the President and the 
Secretary of State, and through such understandings to reach settle- 
ments as soon as possible. 

4. After six months of negotiations, the people of Japan are getting a 
little impatient and that hence the situation there is becoming exceed- 
ingly critical. For this reason, we are very anxious that these negotia- 
tions are brought to a successful conclusion as soon as possible. 

5. In view of the very critical situation parallel negotiations in 
Tokyo are to be conducted. 

Explaining that Japan is now displaying the maximum amount of 
good will and the utmost of sincerity, I submitted the counter proposal 
wl^ch you sent us, to them. I requested that the United States give 
it her consideration from the broad aspect, and urged them to accept 
the terms contained therein. 

HuU carefully read this document. He nodded approval of the 
section concerning the principle of non-discrimination, and com- 
mented that that way would prove to be to Japan's interest. With 
regard to the section of garrisoning troops, he simply asked what would 
be the proportion of those remaining to those being withdrawn. I 
replied that much the greater part would be withdrawn and only a 
small portion would be kept in China. I went on to explain our 
position with regard to the "right of self-defense" issue, in accordance 
with your instruction which I received today. 

It was decided that an answer to all of the points would be submitted 
after this note had been carefully studied by them. They wiU submit 
their reply after my interview with the President, at which time I 
shall endeavor to make more detailed explanation. 

24646 

JD-1: 6372 (b) (D) Navy Trans. 11-12-41 (1) 

• Parts 1 and 3—8. 1. 8. #24677. 
79716 O— 46 — pt. 12 9 



106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secretl 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
7 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#1055 (Part 3 of 3) (Part 2 not avaUable) 

Hull went on to say that as he had said on previous occasions, 
Britain, China, the Netherlands and other countries had to be con- 
sulted regarding Japanese-U. S. talks of maintaining peace on the 
Pacific. He let it leak out in this connection that China was being 
consulted with regard to matters pertaining to the China problems. 

Hull th en said that he had happened to wonder what Japan's atti- 
tude would be if there were the following developments: Supposing 
an influential and reliable representative of China were to join in 
these talks. Supposing, further, that this representative states that 
China is desirous of resuming friendly relations with Japan, giving 
his pledge of true friendship and sincerity. What would Japan's 
reaction be? 

Wakasugi asked whether he could assume first, that China's atti- 
tude had been ascertained. Hull replied that the matter hadn't been 
taken up with China as yet, and that it was just something that he 
as an individual had happened to think of. If such a thing could be 
done, however, he continued, peace on the Pacific would be main- 
tained, and no doubt it would set an example for the world and thus 
have a very favorable effect on it. 

We got the impression that he may have already discussed this 
matter with the Chinese and that his plan was a consequence thereof. 
In either event, Hull requested that this plan be struck upon, be 
relayed to the government of Japan and its attitude on it be ascer- 
tained. I said that I would give it my consideration. 
24577 
JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 11-10-41 (7) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
9 November 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#751 

Re the last part of your message #1055*. 

We interpret Secretary Hull's plan to have a Chinese person of the 
highest integrity give his pledge regarding the China problem, to 
mean that tne Secretary wishes to leave the China problem which 
has been a stumbling block in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations, up to 
direct negotiations between Japan and China for settlement. This 
would lead to having Chiang Kai-shek propose to us that peace 
negotiations be begun. 

We recognize this to be a great contribution toward bringing about 
friendly relations between Japan and China and for this reason we 
highly welcome it. We will, of course, follow this message up with 
another giving this government's opinions. In the meantime please 
ascertain and advise us what relation this proposal has upon the 
Japanese-U. S. negotiations. Please make suitable inquiries on this 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 107 

phase to obtain as much information as possible, on whatever con- 
crete plans the United States may have. 

24579 

JD-1: #6374 (D) Navy Trans. 11-10-41 (S-TT) 

~ 'JD-l: 6372 (b) (S. I. S. #24677). 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
9 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#752 

Re your #1040* and #1053**. 

1. This office is in complete agreement with the contents of your 
messages referred to above. The government is doing everything in 
its power to giving enlightenment to correctly guide public opinion. 
The censor bureau has evolved a plan whereby there will be no com- 
ments on the U. S. -Japanese negotiations. It goes without saying, of 
course, that the contents of the negotiations will not be published, but 
furthermore, all utterances which may tend to excite the United States 
will be censored. (It has been unofficially decided to even suppress 
information as to the dates on which the representatives of the two 
nations confer). We shall prevent the publication of anything that 
may interfere with the progress. We have issued a particularly vigor- 
ous warning to the Times of dire consequences if there are any 
infractions. 

2. We see reports from correspondents in the U. S. area, (for exam- 
ple from the Domei office in your city) , which are not in accord with 
our established policy of maintenance of calm and patience regarding 
the Japanese-U. S. talks. The situation here is a critical one, so 
please give correct guidance to all of the correspondents there. 

24580 

JD-1: 6375 (D) Navy Trans. 11-10-41 (S-TT) 

•JD-l: 6320 (8. 1. 8. #24479). 
••Not available. 



(Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 10, 1941 
Purple (CA) (Urgent) 
#755. Part 1 of 2. 

Re my #754*. 

In adjusting Japanese- American relations, the Government of 
Japan has attached a great deal of importance on speedy solution of 
the China Incident. At the same time the United States Government 
also has maintained the attitude that if peace is to be established in 
the Pacific, the China question cannot be overlooked. Now, if it is 
the intention of the United States Government to mediate between 
Japan and China along the lines proposed by Secretary HULL and 
also to leave the matter of peace terms to the Japanese and Chinese 
Governments, this plan harmonizes with what the Japanese Govern- 



108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ment has been looking forward to since the beginning of . It 

would mean that the question of withdrawing troops from China would 
according to HULL'S suggestion be left out for the time being from 
the negotiations. This would make it possible for us to hasten the 
settlement by means of negotiations conducted between Japan and 
China alone and it would also have the advantage of bringing about 
peace between Japan and China without American interference. 

Should we take advantage of this proposal, it goes without saying 
that it would be necessary to secure a promise or a definite statement 
that the settlement of the negotiations between Japan and the United 
States would not make the establishment of peace between Japan and 
China its condition and that the United States would not interfere 
with the peace to be established between Japan and China. (This 
promise includes cessation of activities for aiding CHIANG.) Fur- 
thermore, it is necessary to make it clear that the agreement between 
Japan and the United States would be immediately signed and put 
into effect. 
Army 24581 Trans. 11/10/41 (S) 

• Not available. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 10, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#755. Part 2 of 2. 

As regards the China question, this would mean that the paragraph 
concerning the China Incident in Proposal "A" of my #726 ' (para- 
graph 3 of the Agreement) should be eliminated from the agenda of 
the negotiations and paragraph 4 of Proposal "B" given in my #727 " 
(namely that the United States will refrain from any action detri- 
mental to the efforts made for the purpose of establishing peace 
between Japan and China) be substituted in its place. 

Furthermore, I believe that the United States wishes to see a 
speedy establishment of an agreement between Japan and the United 
States and so, for this reason, HULL'S proposal is a sincere one and 
from this standpoint the United States Government proposes to 
mediate between Japan and China. If the United States is of the 
intention of postponing the settlement of questions other than the 
China question until peace is established between Japan and China 
or of continuing aid to CHIANG, we shall not be able to accept the 
proposal for it would prevent the establishment of an agreement 
between Japan and the United States and, furthermore, would be 
apt to put the blame for the failure of the Japanese- American negotia- 
tions upon us. I need hardly point this out to you but I would like 
to have you take care so that this would not happen. 
Army 24582 Trans. 11/10/41 (S) 

• S. I. S. #24334-37. 
l> S. I. S. «24338. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 109 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 10, 1941 
Purple 
#757 (Part 1 of 3) (To be handled in government code) 

On the 10th I went to talk to the American Ambassador, and 
DOOMAN sat with us. I opened the conversation with a resume of 
my #725 * and reiterated my earnest hope that a decision could be 
reached in the negotiations on a basis just to our Empire. I explained 
that I would bend every effort toward the solution of this diflBcult 
situation. Then I continued, "Having examined the results of the 
negotiations thus far, what I feel is that the United States does not 
have full knowledge of the true situation. I feel that the United 
States does not have enough understanding and knowledge. Secre- 
tary HULL says that he recognizes Japan's stabilizing influence, yet 
unless he realizes sufficiently present conditions in East Asia and that 
we Japanese have been occupied over a period of four and a half years 
with the China incident, even though he calls us a stabilizing influence, 
he contradicts himself. Our population is ever increasing. Already 
we have about 100,000,000 people. In order to maintain their 
existence, we absolutely must obtain the necessary materials. On the 
other hand, six months have passed since Japanese-American negotia- 
tions began, and during that time, although we have given in as much 
as we could, the United States sticks to her first proposals and will not 
bend an inch. This is a most regrettable circumstance. It would 
seem that there are not a few Japanese who doubt the sincerity of the 
American Government. Consequently, a further delay would do 
great damage to our popular spirit. Moreover, the cabinet will soon 
convene, and the situation is becoming exceedingly tense. Without 
the loss of a day, we should establish these negotiations. I hope that 
the American Government, too, will fully consider all these points and 
take the large view, settling the whole thing at once. I do not honestly 
believe that there is any other way to settle this perplexing situation. 
Army 24583 Trans. 11/10/41 (s) 

• S. I. 8. #24330-32 states that as a result of a conference between the Foreign OflSce and the Military High 
Command, two new proposals, containing the final concessions Japan is willing to make, have been devised. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 10, 1941^ 
Purple (Urgent) 
#757 (Part 2 of 3) (To be handled in government code) 

Next I presented him with the English text of Proposal A contained 
in my #726 * and said, "As a result of deep thought, this was arrived 
at by the Government and represents the maximum compromise that 
we can endure to make. There is absolutely no possibility of our 
yielding any further. 

"1. The attitude of both nations toward the European war is 
recorded in our proposal of September 25. Therefore, I take it for 
granted that we are in agreement on this score. 



110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"2. I feel that this proposal fully covers America's desires concerning 
non-discriminatory treatment in commerce. 

"3. Concerning the ever-knotty problem of evacuating troops, the 
present proposal, in view of the difficulties we face here in Japan, 
ventures our maximum compromise. I am sure that the United 
States officials can readily comprehend this. Let me tell you how 
strongly I hope that we can reach a quick settlement. Now included 
in this documents are many matters in which Great Britain's interests 
are deeply concerned, so it is necessary that, simultaneously with the 
establishment of Japanese-American negotiations, Japan and England 
make preparations to sign." I added, "I hope that the Government 
of the United States will undertake this." 

The American Ambassador answered, "I have had no instructions 
from my home government, so I would like to reserve my opinion. 
Only as a hint, let me say that I have wired to Washington the true 
situation in detail, so the American Government understands the 
Oriental situation fully. Concerning influence for stability, there are 
many ways of interpreting that. Concerning the question of the 
obtention of materials, the present negotiations aim at that very 
thing, and I think that there will probably be some way for you 
Japanese to obtain what you need in a peaceful manner." 
Army 24584 Trans. 11/10/41 (S) 

• See S. I. S. #24334, #24335, #24336, and #24337. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 10, 1941 
Purple 
#757 (Part 3 of 3) (To be handled in government code) 

I answered, "Though I have all along fully appreciated the efforts 
of Your Excellency, I do not feel tnat the Government of the United 
States has as yet fully appreciated the situation. The feeling in 
favor of stability and peace is, as a matter of course, the feeling of 
the majority of the people. Then too, insofar as the question of 
resources is concerned, if we take the example of the recent situation 
wherein the supplying of raw materials to Japan was suspended as a 
result of America's actions in the freezing of assets, such strong-arm 
measures of economic pressure, in addition to being a threat indicate 
the probability of even more severe measures in tl\e future. The 
people of Japan, though they may feel deeply within themselves that 
extreme steps for self-defense must be brought to bear, cannot bring 
themselves to the point of carrying this out. 

"On this question there is a definite need for the United States to 
give the most careful consideration. Furthermore, insofar as the 
China question is concerned, would you have us ignore the successes 
gained as a result of sacrifices that we have made over four and a half 
years? Submission to terms such as these would be suicidal to Japan. 
For the Government, as well as for the people, I believe that such a 
course is impossible." 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE HI 

At this point, Counselor DOOMAN interposed the following: 
"We cannot accept the results of aggression." I refuted him by 
saying, ** The Imperial Government does not consider that it has 
carried on a war of aggression. Therefore, the question of the results 
of aggression cannot be raised . We should , therefore, make an excep- 
tion even in a non-aggression pact insofar as military action in the 
interests of self-defense is concerned. The fact is, insofar as the 
interpretation of the right of self-defense is concerned, judging by the 
examples of recent arguments, I believe that it is the United States 
which has been exhibiting a tendency to wrongfully magnify this. 
Therefore, it seems indicated that it is for Japan to call for the exercise 
of self-control by the Government of the United States. But at any 
rate, insofar as today is concerned, it behooves us not to become too 
involved in such arguments as these." 
Army 24585 Trans. 11/10/41 (S) 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

November 10, 1941 

Purple (CA) 

(Urgent) 

#1066. Part 1 of 2 

1. I sent MOORE * to contact Senator THOMAS of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Conamittee and HULL. His report reads as fol- 
lows: 

"The United States is not bluffing. If Japan invades again, the 
United States will fight with Japan. Psychologically the American 
people are ready. The Navy is prepared and ready for action." 

2. Yesterday evening, Sunday, a certain Cabinet member, discard- 
ing all quibbling, began by saying to me: 

"You are indeed a dear friend of mine and I tell this to you alone." 
Then he continued: "The American Government is receiving a num- 
ber of reliable reports that Japan will be on the move soon. The 
American Government does not believe that your visit on Monday 
to the President or the coming of Mr. KURUSU will have any effect 
on the general situation." 

I took pains to explain in detail how impatient the Japanese have 
grown since the freezing; how they are eager for a quick understanding; 
how both the Government and the people do not desire a Japanese- 
American war; and how we will hope for peace untU the end. 

He replied, however: 

"Well, our boss, the President, believes those reports and so does 
the Secretary of State." 

Army 24655 Trans. 11/12/41 (2) 

• Frederick Moore— Legal Adviser to the Japanese Embassy in Washington. 



112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

November 10, 1941 

Purple (CA) 

(Urgent) 

#1066 (Part 2 of 2) 

In the newspapers and magazines, with the exception of the Daily 
News and the Hearst Papers, it is reported that the Americans are 
much more eager for a war with Japan than they are for one with 
Germany. It is said that some of the British are using tliis inclination 
for their own advantage and that already parleys have been started 
for joint Anglo-American action. Suggestions have already been 
made to the effect that it is necessary for some of the British fleet to 
be located in the Pacific. Now even if the President and other states- 
men tlo not follow this trend, who can say how it wUl be? The friend 
I just spoke of told me that the United States cannot stop now because 
if Japan moves something will have to be done since it is a question 
of the United States saving its face. 

3. Well, in any case, I am going to see the President today and talk 
with him on the bases of your instructions. You may be sure that 
I will do my very best. 

Army 24656 Trans, 11/12/41 (2) 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

November 10, 1941 

Purple CA 

(Extremely Urgent) 

#1069 

Today, the 10th, at 11:30, accompanied by WAKASUGI, I had an 
hour's conversation with President ROOSEVELT in the presence of 
Secretary HULL, I told them what you said in your instructions 
and explained in detail our proposal for the settlement of the three 
problems. In response the President said that in the present world 
crisis the American Government has as its objective to contribute to 
the establishment of peace and order in the Pacific in the spirit of 
fair play and that he hoped the Japanese-American conversations 
would be effective. 

He continued, "In accordance with the desire of the Japanese Gov- 
ernment we will endeavor immediately to continue the parleys and I 
hope that Japan too will make it evident that she intends to take a 
friendly attitude. What the United States most desires is (1) to 
prevent the expansion of the war, and (2) to bring about a lasting 
peace." 

He concluded with the promise that he would carefully study, with 
Secretary HULL, our proposals as explained by me and after thinking 
them over make a reply. 

I will wire you the details later, however, I am in a hurry to send 
you this r6sum6. 
Army 24652 Trans. 11/12/41 (7) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 113 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

November 10, 1941 

Purple (Extremely Urgent) 

#1070 (Part 1 of 4) 

(To be handled in Government Code. Secret outside the depart- 
ment) 

My interview with the President, referred to in my #1069,* was 
held in a private room in the White House in order to avoid publicity. 
It was as follows: 

Prefacing my remarks with the fact that I was speaking on instruc- 
tions, I said, "I have had no talks with the Secretary of State for 
about three weeks: ever since the resignation of the KONOYE cabinet; 
and since the present situation between Japan and the United States 
is such that it could not be left as it is, I am very pleased to have this 
opportunity of speaking with you. The conversations on this ques- 
tion have lasted for more than six months. From their inception, 
Japan has been wishing to arrive at a quick settlement. The people 
of Japan also looked forward to these conversations with much hope; 
however, the conversations have dragged on and in the meantime 
the relation between the two countries has grown worse. It has be- 
come increasingly diflBcult for the people of my country to be patient. 
Now, the Government of Japan has in the meantime made many con- 
cessions, but the Government of the United States has held to its 
arguments and has shown no willingness to respond to our compro- 
mises. As a result, some people in Japan have begun to doubt if 
the United States is really sincere in this matter. The Japanese 
people regard the freezing of funds as a kind of economic blockade, 
and there seem to be some who say that modern warfare is not limited 
to shooting alone. No country can exist without the supply of ma- 
terials indispensable to its industry. From what reports I have re- 
ceived from Japan, the situation seems to be serious and threatening 
and, therefore, the only way to keep peace is for Japan and the United 
States to come, without further delay, to some kind of a friendly and 
satisfactory agreement. It is for no other purpose than that of 
keeping peace in the Pacific that the Japanese Government is endeavor- 
ing so hard to arrive at a satisfactory agreement by continuing our 
conversations. 

Army #24714 Trans. 11/13/41 (1) 

• 8. I. 8. #24652 which states that President ROOSEVELT will endeavor to continue the parleys and 
that what the United States most desires is (1) to prevent the expansion of the war, and (2) to bring about 
a lasting peace. 



114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
November 10, 1941 
Purple (Very Urgent) 
#1070 (Part 2 of 4) 

"As a major effort in attaining this objective, our Government has 
made the recent proposal. I wish that your Government would make 
its views clear to us as soon as possible by responding to the views and 
desires expressed by the Japanese Government." 

I incidentally told him that the Japanese Government, reaUzing 
the seriousness of the situation, is dispatching Ambassador KURUSU 
to assist me. Then I continued and said, by way of an explanation 
of our proposal, that taking together the views expressed on October 
2 by the Secretary of State relative to our proposal of September 25, 
and what both the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary had said 
subsequent to that date, the whole question could be boiled down to 
consist of the following three difficult points. I went on to say: 

1. "As to the principle of non-discrimination, we have decided to 
recognize the fact that if this principle is, as your Government wishes, 
to be applied to the whole world, it is to be applied in the entire 
Pacific area including China. Since this is something which the 
Secretary of State has often spoken to me about as being a long- 
cherished desire of his, I hope that this guarantee which our Govern- 
ment is offering would prove to be satisfactory to you. 

2. "Now as to the attitude of the two governments toward the 
European war, we proposed in our proposal of September 25 that the 
action on the part of the two governments should be based upon con- 
sideration of 'protection and self-defense.' " (The English text used 
our expression as it stood.) 

Regarding this point, I asked whether the United States Govern- 
ment would guarantee that it will not give an unnecessarily broad in- 
terpretation to the words "protection" and "self-defense", and I said, 
"If the Japanese Government could get such a guarantee from the 
United States Government, the Japanese Government is also willing 
to give a similar guarantee." I continued, "As to the words 'in case 
the United States enters the war, etc.,' since our conversations had for 
their object the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, we are not in a 
position, under the present circumstances, to make any definite state- 
ment outside of what has been given in our proposal of September 25. 
Unless we have confidence in each other, as you well realize, no guaran- 
tee would be a satisfactory one even if backed by a hundred promises 
and a hundred documents." 
Army 24715 Trans. 11/13/41 (1) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 115 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
November 10, 1941 
Purple (Very Urgent) 
#1070 (Part 3 of 4) 

3. I submitted the new proposal, as it stood, regarding the question 
of stationing and withdrawing of troops and proceeded to say, "With 
regard to this question, the Japanese Government has gone a step 
beyond her past proposals and has, by definitely fixing not only the 
localities in China where our troops would be stationed but also the 
period of their occupation, made it clear that the occupation is not a 
permanent and definite one. No doubt you would like to see the 
troops withdrawn at once, but I am sure you well understand that it is 
impossible under the present circumstances to do so. I earnestly wish 
that you would give favorable consideration to this question from the 
standpoint of the general situation." 

Next, I said, "The Japanese Government is making the following 
proposal with regard to the Japanese troops in French Indo-China," 
and so saying, I submitted the proposal contained in your instructions. 

In reply to this, the President, remarking that he had already 
thought on the question before our explanation was given him, spoke 
as follows from a note which he had been holding in his hand, "As a 
result of a confusion created by the forces of aggression, the whole 
world has faUen into a critical state. What seems to me to be common 
sense is for us to wish earnestly that the world will return to peaceful 
normalcy and for the United States Government to do its utmost in the 
spirit of fair play for the establishment of peace, stability, and order 
in the Pacific. If this object is to be realized, actual results must be 
effected for the sake of human welfare. It is my earnest wish that the 
preliminary talks relative to this question would have good result's 
which would serve as a basis of future negotiations. I wUl; just as 
the Japanese Government hopes, do my best in order to help carry on 
these negotiations successfully. I wish that the Japanese Govern- 
ment would clearly set forth its intention of following a peaceful course 
in its poHcy and not an opposite course. This is the way to attain the 
results toward which both you and we are working." 

What the United States desires, according to the President, are: 
(1) to prevent the war from spreading; and (2) to establish a permanent 
peace. 
Army 24716 Trans. 11/13/41 (1) 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
November 10, 1941 
Purple (Very Urgent) 
#1070 (Part 4 of 4) 

The President elaborated on the point that with regard to the 
question of non-discrimination, he had agreed with CHURCHILJl* 
when he had conferred with that statesman to abolish the economic 



116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

limitations throughout the world; that he had opposed Germany be- 
cause Germany followed a policy contrary to this idea; and that he 
wished that the principle of non-discrimination would be applied 
generally throughout the world. The President then said by way of 
an incidental remark that in the days of President TAFT when dis- 
turbance arose in Cuba, the United States had failed by resorting to a 
policy of force; however, today under his administration, because the 
government had adopted a friendly policy, the relations with the Latin- 
American countries had improved. He then explained how necessary 
it is to follow a new policy in accordance with new situations. Secre- 
tary HULL inserted the remark that the South American countries, 
who had in the past been fearful of the United States, have come to 
take an attitude of welcoming the United States. Speaking on the 
remark I had made to the effect that economic pressure had aroused 
the ill feelings of the Japanese people and had made them impatient, 
the President said, "It is necessary to find a modus vivendi if the 
people are to live," and proceeded to explain that this expression should 
be translated as "method of living." Although it is not clear to me 
what it really means, I intend to ascertain whether he refers to, 
possibly, a provisional agreement. 

The President then asked if Ambassador KURUSU was bringing 
with him a proposal other than that referred to above. I replied that 
he was not bringing any proposal, but in response to my wishes he was 
coming to assist me. Then the President said that he is leaving on 
the 15th and will be away for one week, as he must attend, as is his 
custom, a children's party at Warm Springs during the Thanksgiving 
week (the 20th), and that he wondered whether he would have the 
opportunity of meeting Ambassador KURUSU before he leaves. 
Army 24717 Trans. 11/13/41 (1) 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
11 November 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#762 

Re your #1069* 

Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be 
indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the 
exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. The fact remains that 
the date set forth in my message #736** is absolutely immovable 
under present conditions. It is a definite dead-line and therefore it is 
essential that a settlement be reached by about that time. The 
session of Parliament opens on the 15th (work will start on (the 
following day ?)) according to the schedule. The government must 
have a clear picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the 
session. You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax, 
and that time is indeed becoming short. 

I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in 
view of the above mentioned situation, will you redouble them. 
When talking to the Secretary of State and others, drive the points 
home to them. Do everything in your power to get a clear picture of 
the U. S. attitude in the minimum amount'of time. At the same time 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 117 

do eveiything in your power to have them give their speedy approval 
to our final proposal. 

We would appreciate being advised of your opinions on whether 
or not they will accept our final proposal A. 

24653 

JD-1: 6415 (D) Navy Trans. 11-12-41 (S^TT) 

•S. I. S. #24662. 

••JD-1: 62M (S. I. S. #24373). 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
11 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#763 

Re my #671* 

With regard to our representations to the United States in this 
matter, we have received two representations from the Germans 
since then. On 6 November, I advised the German Ambassador in 
Tokyo that in view of the present general relationship between the 
United States and Japan, it was essential that this mat+er be given 
very careful study. I explained that there is a good chance that it 
would be more effective under the present circumstances, for us to 
present a determined attitude rather than to merely make representa- 
tions to the United States. It is exceedingly doubtful, I pointed out, 
whether a mere representation would bear any fruit. ^ 

24654 

JD-1: 6416 (D) Navy Trans. 11-12-41 (S-TT) 

•JD-1; 5901 (S. I. 8. #23631). Tokyo wires Nomura secretly that the Axis countries are demanding that 
Japan send a message to the U. S. stating that if the Roosevelt administration does not cease attacks on the 
Axis, it would provide reasons for convocation of the Three Power Pact and lead to war with Japan. Toyoda 
has to date held up such a note as well as information on talks with the U. S. in order to further those nego- 
tiations, but a warning note must now be presented by Japan in order to fulfill her obligations under the 
Tripartite Pact. (Msg. dated 16 October 1941) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
11 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#764 (In 3 parts, complete) 

1. On the 11th, the British Ambassador, while calling on me on 
some other business, brought up the subject of the conversations. 
He advised me that he reported my talks of the other day (see contents 
of 2 of my message #723*) to his home government, to which his 
government replied along the following lines, he said: 

"The British Government is not aware of the details of the conver- 
sations being conducted in Washington. Since its success would be 
of interest to Britain and Japan, it is fervently hoping for the success 
thereof. However, unless the basis of discussion is first settled upon, 
it would be useless to go ahead and enter into negotiations of the 
details. The British Government feels that discussions as to the 
basic principles could safely be left up to the U. S. Government. 
However, as soon as the real negotiations begin, the United States is 



118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to coftfer with Great Britain according to arrangement. Therefore, 
when that time arrives, negotiations will be carried on jointly with the 
United States and Japan." 

2. I replied that in the matters being discussed between Japan 
and the United States there were some phases which greatly affected 
Great Britain. In the event of an agreement between Japan and the 
United States, Japan will simultaneously seek Britain's agreement. 
I wish to arrange matters so that the two agreements may be signed 
at exactly the same time. In view of the fact that to do the above is 
necessary, we have already requested the United States to give their 
approval to the terms, I said to the British Ambassador. 

The British Ambassador said that he was not aware as to how much 
progress had been made between the United States and Japan, but 
he assumed that they were still in the preliminary stages. 

I, therefore, replied that his assumption may have fitted in the 
past, but that at present they had already entered into the realm of 
the actual negotiations. Moreover, the Imperial Government has 
already submitted its final proposal, thus bringing the negotiations to 
the final phase. We have made this fact absolutely clear to the 
United States, I added. 

I went on to say that I hear that the British Prime Minister made 
a speech at a luncheon given by the Mayor of London in which he 
stated that though he did not know the developments in the U. S.- 
Japanese negotiations, he would issue a warning to Japan. Would 
it not be more to the point, I challenged, if, instead of making threats 
without knowing of what he spoke, he were to try to more clearly 
understand the issues and to cooperate in an effort to clear them up? 
However, I said, with the U. S. -Japanese talks in the phase they are 
today, and in view of the fact that I realized that there were certain 
relationships between the United States and Great Britain, I have no 
intention of urging or opposing British participation in these talks 
at this time. 

The Imperial Government has made the maximum concessions she 
can in drawing up its final proposal, I explained. We are of the 
opinion that the United States will find no objectionable points in 
it. I believe that it will be possible to sign the agreement within a 
week to ten days, I said. If, unfortunately, the United States refuses 
to accept those terms, it would be useless to continue the negotiations. 
Our domestic j)olitical situation will permit no further delays in 
reaching a decision 

I am making superhuman efforts at this time, I pointed out, in 
the attempt to ride out the crisis in the U. S. -Japanese and the British- 
Japanese relations. There are factions in the country which insist 
that there is no need for negotiating and point out the uselessness 
of doing so. The negotiations are being continued only after these 
factions were checked. 

For these reasons, it is absolutely impossible that there be any 
further delays. 

A speedy settlement can be made depending entirely upon the 
attitude of Britain and the United States, I said, and suggested that 
his country give serious consideration to this, and cooperate in bring- 
ing about an early agreement. 

In the above manner, I pointed out the criticalness of the situation. 
The Ambassador Ustened to what I said very attentively, giving 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 119 

indications that he was reahzing for the first time how critical the 
situation was. He advised me that he would send his government a 
report of the above conversation and that he himself would do his 
best to bring about a speedy settlement. 

3. Thus, there are indications that the United States Government 
is still under the impression that the negotiations are in the pre- 
liminary stages and that we are still merely exchanging opinions. 
This is further supported by the words of President Roosevelt re- 
ported by you in your message #1070** (that part in which he says 
that he hopes that these preliminary discussions will lead to the basis 
of the real negotiations, etc.) 

That the United States takes this lazy and easy going attitude in 
spite of the fact that as far as we are concerned, this is the final phase, 
is exceedingly unfortunate. Therefore, it is my fervent hope that 
Your Excellency will do everything in your power to make them 
realize this fact and bring about an agreement at the earliest possible 
moment. 
24824 
JD-1: 6417 (D) Navy Trans. 11-12-41 (S-TT) 

•JD-l: 6228 (S. I. S. #24293-«4). 
•*Not available. 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
11 November 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#1074 

Re your #762* 

After my conversation with the President, I told Hull that as the 
situation is urgent, I would like to meet him the same evening or 
this morning, and go on with concrete discussion. He replied that 
they understand fully our need of haste, that, as a matter of fact 
both yesterday after our conversation and today, although it is the 
11th and the Armistice holiday, he would gather those concerned 
and give study to our proposal, and that it would facilitate the nego- 
tiations to have our discussion tomorrow the 12th after hearing their 
opinions. 

As for a conjecture Regarding the success or failure of the negotia- 
tions, I will . . . after getting their opinions in tomorrow's inter- 
view. 

24711 

JD-1: 6453 (F) Navy Trans. 11-13-41 (7) 

• JD-1: 6415 (8. 1. 8 #24653). 



[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
November 12, 1941 
Purple 
#1087 (Part 1 of 4) 

(Departmental secret. To be handled in Government code.) 
On the 12th at 3 p. m. WAKASUGI went with me to talk with 
Secretary HULL. BALLANTINE sat in and we conversed for about 



120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

an hour. I asked if they had any answer to our proposal and HULL 
gave me the oral statements contained in my #1083 * and #1084 •*. He 
said that he wanted me to ascertain if the new. cabinet would also 
approve of oral statement A and stated that oral statement B was 
presented in the sense of a suggestion concerning peace between 
Japan and China referred to in our last conversation in accordance 
with our request. He went on to say that if the same principle were 
applied to the China question as was applied to all the other problems, 
a settlement should be possible ; that also, such things as the question 
of non-discrimination in commerce had to be connected with this ; and 
that by day after tomorrow he could let us have a definite proposal. 
I said that judging from this suggestion and our conversation it looked 
as though it was implied that unless Japan and China could get 
together on the question of the stationing of troops there would be no 
chance for any success at all in the Japanese-American negotiations. 
I said that if this was what was meant it would be leaving the key to 
Japanese-American relations in the hands of someone else, which 
looked rather inappropriate, and I asked him if he meant that Japanese- 
Chinese relations could be left to Japan and China and that the 
United States and Japan could agree on the other questions. HULL, 
however, replied vaguely that if the general principles were applied to 
China too, an understanding would be possible. 

He then continued, "We have not yet privately informed China 
about these talks, but we are letting England and the Netherlands, who 
are concerned, know something of their general lines. In case some 
basis for negotiations is worked out, I believe it possible that they may 
sign along with the United States. However," he added, "I cannot 
guarantee this." 

Army 24794 Trans. 11/14/41 (2) 

• See S. I. S. #24785-24788, inclusive. 

>> See S. I. S. #24789 for part 1 of 4. Other parts not available. 



[Secret] 



From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

November 12, 1941 

Purple (Extremely Urgent) » 

#1087. Part 2 of 4." 

To be handled in government code. 

Then B ALLAN TINE inserted the remark that itjs stipulated in 
the American proposal of June 21st that the United States will not be 
a party to applying to other countries any condition conflicting with 
the principles which the United States has been consistently upholding. 

WAKASUGI said: 

"While we heartily welcome the Suggestion offered, I would like to 
know more definitely how China is to be made to pledge to follow the 
suggestion. Is it the intention of Secretary HULL to leave this 
matter up to direct negotiations to be conducted between Japan and 
China ; or is it his intention to have the United States secure the pledge 
from China and transmit it to Japan ; or it is to be accomplished with 
Japan, the United States, and China meeting in a conference?" 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 121 

It seems that Secretary HULL had no definite plan in mind regard- 
ing this matter, but he spoke as if he was confident that if the Japanese- 
American negotiations are carried out in accordance with the principle 
of peace that a stage would in due time be reached at which this 
suggestion could be carried out. 

Whereupon WAKASUGI asked: 

"Is it your intention to have China make this pledge when that 
stage has been reached in the course of the negotiations?" 

HULL avoided making a definite reply and instead he brought out 
an example, stating that when two parties in a dispute wish to come 
to an agreement they could do so by the mediation of a third party 
and, so saying, HULL hinted his having the intention of mediating 
between Japan and China depending, of course, on conditions. 

Army 24837 Trans. U/15/41 (2) 

• For Part I see S. I. S. #24794. 



[Secret] ' 

From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
November 12, 1941 
Purple 

#1087 (Part 3 of 4)» (Departmental Secret) (To be handled in 
government code) 

Concerning the stationing of troops, I explained to him that in the 
new proposal we made it clear that we do not mean to keep them there 
indefinitely. HULL replied that to interfere in the private affairs of 
other nations contravenes any general peace program and that per- 
manent occupation is impossible. However, he seemed quite satisfied 
with my explanation. 

In connection with a general peace policy, HULL said, "In one 
breath you say that the three-power pact has a peaceful objective and 
in the other you confess that Japan is bound by the agreement and is 
tied up with Germany. Now the officials of our country and our public 
are at a loss to understand any explanation like this. HITLER has 
a hard task and to carry it out, he is making the people of the various 
small nations sujffer. Now he cannot hold out forever in such a diffi- 
cult undertaking, and sooner or later we are going to have to take 
charge of things after the war. In this we are going to need every 
resource. Leaders of both Japan and the United States ought to coop- 
erate in a peaceful program. Thus, if some sort of plan can be worked 
out between Japan and the United States comprising the nations con- 
cerned — for example, England and the Netherlands — to bring about 
complete harmony over the Pacific, Japan would no longer need to 
worry about the three-power pact, and the three-power pact would die 
a natural death." I refuted this argument, saying, "The Japanese- 
British alliance was in effect at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, 
but afterwards at the time of the Washington conference it was nulli- 
fied, so you see the situation changes with the times. The existence 
of the three-power pact presents no obstacle to any peace plan. 
Army 24838 Trans. 11/15/41 (2) . 

• Part 4 of 4 not available. 
79716 O— 46— pt. 12 10 



122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

November 12, 1941 

Purple 

#1087 (Part 4 of 4)* 

Departmental secret. (To be handled in government code.) 

Continuing, he said, "Japan does not like to exercise force — not by 
any means. If we could get petroleum and other raw materials from 
the United States and the Netherlands Indies, we would not have to 
use force, would we? Then, when we come to the question of non- 
discrimination in commerce, I don't think that the United States will 
have any objection to our proposal." 

HULL answered, "The tJnitec States also recognizes that the situ- 
ation is tense and is considering your proposals concerning the three 
problems. We are doing this just as fast as we can but questions 
pending over a period of ten years cannot be settled over night. By 
day after tomorrow, I will be ready to reply." 

WAKASUGI reiterated, "As I told you, the Diet assembles on the 
25th and the situation is drawing more and more grave. I want to 
get a definite reply to our proposal at any time now so by day after 
tomorrow I will expect a clear concise reply on these various problems." 

In a word, during that conversation they sought our recognition 
of the statement of August 28, number B, and made explanations of 
their recent suggestions for a Japanese-Chinese peace. They only 
wished to tell us that the United States is going deeper into the three 
problems and our proposal of September 25 and that they are making 
ready for a quick reply. I am not satisfied with their attitude toward 
taking up negotiations so tomorrow morning I am going to have 
WAKASUGI again tell HULL please to hurry up with a decision. 
Army 25428 Trans. 11/26/41 (X) 

• For Part 1 of 4 see S. I. 8. #24794. For parts 2 and 3 see S. I. S. #24837 & #24838. A report of the confer- 
ence between Ambassador NOMURA and Secretary HULL with WAKASUGI and BALLANTINE 
present. 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Vichy 
November 12, 1941 
Purple 
#528 

In the face of the ever-straining international situation, the army 
is endeavoring to perfect as quickly as possible military facilities in 
French Indo-China. As a result, they now face a great need of making 
certain preparations in North Indo-China which would be in viola- 
tion of the NISIHARA-MARUTAN agreement, especially the clause 
which forbids occupation by the army of the area south of the river 
Auju*. The French Indo-China authorities, I understand, claiming 
that they could not permit the Japanese Army to make such prepara- 
tions because they consider the restrictions stipulated in the agree- 
ment still valid, refuse absolutely to recognize the demands of the 
Japanese Army. However, at the time the treaty for the joint defense 
was concluded, in anticipation of just such a case as this, we saw to 
it that a clause was inserted to the effect that the treaty includes 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 123 

cancellation of the restrictions stipulated in the NISIHARA-MARU- 
TAN agreement. Therefore, urge them to issue at once definite in- 
structions to the French Indo-China authorities to withdraw their 
claim and then wire me the results. 
Army 24915 Trans. 11/18/41 (NR) 

• Eana spelling. 



[Secret] 
From: Toyko 
To: Washington 
13 November 1941 
(Purple -CA) 
#766 

Re your 1055* 

1. Through the U. S. Ambassador's courtesy, I was, in confidence, 
shown the record of your conversations with Secretary Hull of the 
7th. According to this record, the Secretary asked you, point blank, 
in connection with the so-called self-defense rights, for a "concrete 
statement of Japan's relations with the Axis powers". 

You made no mention of this in your message. Will you please give 
us a detailed report of this. 

2. Judging from the tone of these talks, the United States is appar- 
ently still assuming that they are of a preliminary nature. We 
pleaded with the U. S. Ambassador again on the 12th to try and see 
the seriousness of the situation. Will you, too, do everything in 
your power to make them realize this in accordance with the lines 
contained in my various instructions on this subject. 

3. Since the record of your conversations with Hull were shown to 
me only through the personal courtesy of the Ambassador, please 
maintain strict secrecy regarding it. 

24712 

JD-1: 6455 (D) Navy Trans. 11-13-41 (S-TT) 

•JD-l: 6372(b) (S. I. S. #24577 & 24646). 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
13 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#1089 

Re my #1087* 

On this, the 13th, Wakasugi called on Ballantine. 

(1) Wakasugi said: 

"Yesterday's conversations led to no settlement and moreover, the 
outcome of it fell far short of Japanese anticipations. The times have 
become exceedingly critical and the Japanese people have become 
impatient with regayd to the Japanese-U. S. conversations. They 
are becoming desperate as far as Japanese-U. S. relations are con- 
cerned. This being the general condition in Japan, and being con- 
fronted with the fact that it is the eve of the convening of the session 
of the Diet, the government of Japan is anxious to have these U. S.- 
Japanese talks reach some conclusion without a moment's unnecessary 
delay. 



124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"The above is as was explained forcefully in yesterday's conversa- 
tions. In the next conversations, any discussions of general attitudes 
and comments on the possible outlook should be unnecessary. 

"We request that Hull be asked to give a clear reply at our next 
meeting on the following points: Does the United States intend to 
accept our proposal of 25 September, including the proposals sub- 
mitted by us on 7th and 10th of this month? If not, will the United 
States submit a counter proposal to the above, clearly indicating the 
revision desired? Or, on the other hand, is the United States of the 
attitude that she will stick to her proposal of 21 June and make that 
instrument her final proposal? 

"Many in Japan are of the opinion that the United States is pur- 
posely stalling the procedure", Wakasugi said. 

Ballantine: 

"The United States is also aware of the fact that matters have 
reached an exceedingly critical stage. In spite of the fact that the 
11th was a holiday, it was disregarded and this matter was discussed. 
There is no truth in the charge that the United States is pursuing a 
"stalling" policy. 

"However, in spite of the fact that we do not wish to appear to 
be quibbling about details, there are several points which will have 
to be explained by Japan before the United States can make definite 
replies. 

(Part 2) 

"For example, Japan has expressed her acceptance of non-discrimi- 
nation of commerce on the Pacific but on condition that said non- 
discriminatory treatment be applied to the entire world. Does this 
sweeping proposal include those nations which are at present em- 
broiled in the war? We cannot help but have some misgivings as to 
when such an agreement would become effective over the entire 
Pacific area, if its effectivity there depends on its applicability on the 
nations at war." 

Wakasugi: 

"Fundamentally speaking, the basic aims of this is to bring about a 
U. S.-Japanese agreement. The supporters would be Japan and the 
United States, hence the terms are not intended to be made applicable 
to every country in the world. It is our intention that the United 
States and Japan agree upon the basic principle of non-discriminatory 
treatment throughout the world." 

(2) Concerning the matter contained in your messages #758** and 
#764***, it is true that the United States is still assuming that, as it 
was in the beginning, these talks are as yet in the exploratory stages 
through which the basis of agreements may be discovered. We, on 
the other hand, are going on the assumption that these are the actual 
negotiations. There exists, therefore, a fundamental discordant note. 

Wakasugi pointed out this fact, to which Ballantine replied: 

"The United States is proceeding along the lines set forth heretofore. 
Even as late as yesterday, Hull said that if these conversations can 
be carried to the point of their being made the basis of a negotiation, 
we could no doubt get Britain and The Netherlands to participate." 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 125 

{Part 3) 

Wakasugi: 

"Leaving aside the U. S. viewpoint on this particular matter for 
the time being, if talks between the duly recognized Ambassador of 
one country and the President and Secretary of State of another, 
concerning adjustments of relations between the two countries they 
represent — regardless of the form in which said talks are conducted — 
are not negotiations, we are indeed hard put to it to figure out what, 
indeed, does constitute a diplomatic negotiation. 

"I request that Hull be clearly advised that we are treating the 
present proceedings as part of the negotiations." 

(3) Regarding your message 766****: 

The main objective of that day's interview was to submit our new 
proposal and to arrange for a meeting with the President together 
with Secretary Hull and to advise them that we would make a more 
detailed explanation at that time. For that reason, as I reported in 
my message, the only reference I made to the Tripartite Pact was to 
express my hopes that they would not insist upon enlarging the scope 
of the right of self-defense. Besides that, we discussed nothing per- 
taining to the Tripartite Pact. Hull never requested that we made a 
"concrete statement" concerning our relations with the Axis Powers. 
Had he done so, I would have been compelled to make some reply. 

For the sake of reassuring myself, I had Wakasugi make indirect 
reference to this matter to Ballantine who was present on the occasion 
in question. Wakasugi asked Ballantine if he could remember any 
other points that might have been discussed, stating that he wanted 
this information for the sake of the records. Ballantine replied that 
he could recall nothing further. 

If any mention was made of the topic you state was in the records 
of the meeting, it would not be likely that Ballantine, who was the 
only other person there, knows nothing about it. No doubt there is 
some mistake there. You are aware, of course, that the United States 
is trying to get us to assure them on our stand with regard to our duties 
under the terms of the Pact. You can see that by the contents of 
their proposal. 

(Please insert '766-(2)" following that part reading "764" m (2) 
of this message.) 

24882 

JD-1: 6559 (D) Navy Trans. 11-17-41 (2) 

♦JD-l: 6521 (S. I. S. #24794, 24837-38). 

••JD-1: 6413 (S. I. S. #24650). 

•••JD-1: 6417 (S. I. S. #24824). (Note: In connection with this ref. see last sentence above.) 

••••JD-1: 6465 (S. I. S. #24712). 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 14, 1941 
Purple (CA) (Urgent) 
#772 

The time of presentation of Proposal B will be according to my 
instructions of today. We have drawn up this proposal in a formal 



126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

measure including the addendum, (I mean to say the proposal you 
are to present to the American officials upon instructions from me.) 
I am sending to you the English text thereof in ensuing message #773.* 
Army 24791 Trans. 11/14/41 (S) 

• Seo S. I. S. #24792. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 14, 1941 
Purple (CA) (Urgent) 

Points 1, 2, 3, and 4 are given in my #727 *. 

5. The Japanese Government agrees to withdraw her army, which 
is at present stationed in French Indo-China, whenever peace shall 
have been established between Japan and China or a just peace firmly 
established in the Pacific area. 

6. The Japanese Government (agrees ?) that if the principle of non- 
discriminatory treatment in trade is to be applied throughout the 
world the same principle should also be applied to the entire Pacific 
area, in other words, in China as well. 

7. The two governments shall make world peace their common 
objective and shall cooperate at a suitable time for speedy realization 
of world peace. However, in dealing with developments prior to the 
establishment of world peace, the two governments shall act in accord- 
ance with the viewpoint of protection and self defense. Furthermore, 
in the event of the United States' participation in the European war, 
Japan shall automatically carry out what she understands to be the 
obligations which befall her as a party to the Three Power Agreement 
existing between Japan, Germany and Italy. (Point 7 is identical 

with what is given in paragraph 2 of our proposal of of this 

month and does not contain the purport given in the first part of (2) 
of our Proposal "A". This is for your information.) 

Army 24792 Trans. 11/14/41 (S) 

• 8. 1. S. #24338. Text of proposal "B". 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Hongkong 
November 14, 1941 
Purple 
Cir. #2319 (To be handled in Government Code) 

(Strictly secret outside the Department) 

Though the Imperial Government hopes for great things from the 
Japan-American negotiations, they do not permit optimism for the 
future. Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation 
in which the Empire will find herself wiU be one of tremendpus crisis. 
Accompanying this, the Empire's foreign policy as it has been decided 
by the cabinet, insofar as it pertains to China, is: 

a. We will completely destroy British and American power in China. 

h. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy important 
rights and interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in China. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 127 

c. We will take over all rights and interests owned by enemy 
powers, even though they might have connections with the new 
Chinese government, should it become necessary. 

In realizing these steps in China, we will avoid, insofar as possible, 
exhausting our veteran troops. Thus we will cope with a world war 
on a long-time scale. Should our reserves for total war and our future 
military strength wane, we have decided to reinforce them from the 
whole Far Eastern area. This has become the whole fundamental 
policy of the Empire. Therefore, in consideration of the desirability 
to lighten our personal and material load, we will encourage the activ- 
ities of important Chinese in their efforts in the occupied territories 
insofar as is possible. Japan and China, working in cooperation, will 
take over military bases. Thus, operating wherever possible, we will 
realize peace throughout the entire Far East. At the same time, we 
place great importance upon the acquisition of materials (especially 
from unoccupied areas). In order to do this, all in the cabinet have 
concurred, in view of the necessity, in a reasonable relaxation of the 
various restrictions now in force (after you have duly realized the 
critical situation which has brought the above decisions into being you 
will, of course, wait for instructions from home before carrying them 
out). 

In connection with the above, we have the precedent of the freezing 
legislation. We are wiring you this particularly for your information 
alone. Please keep absolutely quiet the existence of these decisions 
and the fact that they have been transmitted to you. 

This message is directed to Nanso," Hokudai,* Shanghai, Tientsin, 
Hsinkow, Hankow, Canton, and Hongkong. Hokudai * will transmit 
to Kalgan and Taiyuan. Tsingtao will transmit to Tsinan. Canton 
will transmit to Amoy. 
Army 25322 
JD 6801 Trans. 11/26/41 (NR) 

* Ksna spelling. 



[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
November 14, 1941 
Purple 
#1090 (Part 1 of 3)* (Departmental Secret) 

(To be handled in Government Code) 

I am telling Your Excellency this for your own information only. 

I believe that I will win out in the long run in these negotiations, 
and I will fight to the end. I will do my very best with infinite 
patience and then leave the outcome up to God Almighty. However, 
I must tell you the following: 

1 . As I told you in a number of messages, the policy of the American 
Government in the Pacific is to stop any further moves on our part 
either southward or northward. With every economic weapon at 
their command, they have attempted to achieve this objective, and 
now they are contriving by every possible means to prepare for actual 
warfare. 

2. In short, they are making every military and every other kind 
of preparation to prevent us from a thrust northward or a thrust 



128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

southward; they are conspiring most actively with the nations con- 
cerned and rather than yield on this fundamental political policy of 
theirs in which they believe so firmly, they would not hesitate, I am 
sure, to fight us. It is not their intention, I know, to repeat such a 
thing as the Munich conference which took place several years ago 
and which turned out to be such a failure. Already 1 think the apex 
of German victories has been passed. Soviet resistance persists, and 
the possibility of a separate peace has receded, and hereafter this 
trend will be more and more in evidence. 

3. The United States is sealing ever-friendlier relations with China, 
and insofar as possible she is assisting CHIANG. For the sake of 
peace in the Pacific, the United States would not favor us at the 
sacrifice of China. Therefore, the China problem might become the 
stumbling block to the pacification of the Pacific and as a result the 
possibility of the United States and Japan ever making up might 
vanish. 

Army 24877 Trans. 11/17/41 (2) 

• For Part 2, see S. I. S. #24857; Part 3 of 3 not available. 



[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
November 14, 1941 
Purple (Urgent) 

#1090 (Part 2 of 3)» (Departmental Secret) (To be handled in 
Government Code) 

4. There is also the question of whether the oflScials of the Japanese 
Government are tying up very intimately with the Axis or not. We 
are regarded as having a very flexible policy, ready, nevertheless, in 
any case, to stab the United States right in the back. Lately the 
newspapers are writing in a manner to show hpw gradually we are 
tying up closer and closer with the Axis. • 

5. If we carry out a venture southward for the sake of bur existence 
and our lives, it naturally follows that we will have to fight England 
and the United States, and chances are also great that the Soviet will 
participate. Furthermore, among the neutral nations, those of Cen- 
tral America are already the puppets of the United States, and as for 
those of South America, whether they like it or not, they are dependent 
for their economic existence on the United States and must maintain 
a neutrality partial thereto. 

6. It is inevitable that this war will be long, and this little victory 
or that little victory, or this little defeat or that little defeat do not 
amount to much, and it is not hard to see that whoever can hold out 
till the end will be the victor. 

7. It is true that the United States is gradually getting in deeper 
and deeper in the Atlantic, but this is merely a sort of convoy war- 
fare, and as things now stand she might at any moment transfer her 
main strength to the Pacific. 

Army 24857 

JD 6553 Trans. 11/17/41 (7) 

■ Parts 1&3 not available. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 129 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

November 14, 1941 

Purple 

#1090 (Part 3 of 3)° (Secret outside the Department) 

Great Britain, too, in the light of the present condition of the 
German and Italian navies, has, without a doubt, moved considerable 
strength into the area of the Indian Ocean, I had expected in the 
past that should the United States start warlike activities in the 
Atlantic, there would be considerable feeling for a compromise in the 
Pacific, but there has been no evidence of such an inchnation as yet. 
There are even now many arguments against war with Germany 
as opposed to internal questions, but there is not the slightest opposi- 
tion to war in the Pacific. It is being thought more than ever that 
participation will be carried out through the Pacific area. 

8. Though I cannot be a hundred per cent sure of the present 
situation in Japan, having read your successive wires I realize that the 
condition must be very critical. In spite of the fact that it is my 
understanding that the people and officials, too, are tightening their 
belts, I am going to pass on to you my opinion, even though I know 
that I will be harshly criticized for it. I feel that should the situation 
in Japan permit, I would like to caution patience for one or two 
months in order to get a clear view of the world situation. This, I 
believe, would be the best plan. 

Furthermore, I would like to call your attention again to my wires 
Nos. 894* and 901" sent to you on the 3rd and 4th of November, 
respectively. 

Army 25139 Trans. 11/22/41 (NR) 

• S. I. 8. #23166 in which NOMURA gives his views on the present world situation. 

•> S. I. S. #23114 in which Ambassador NOMURA apologizes for expressing himself carelessly on the spur 
of the moment on October 3 and ventures the opinion that Japan will have to drastically reorganize ner 
economy before she is able to become self-sufficient as a result of the establishment of the sphere of co-pros- 
perity. He suggests a profitable foothold from a southward movement within several years. 

• For Parts 1 and.2, see S. I. S. Nos. 24877 and 24857. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
15 November 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#774 

Re your #1087* 

During the conversations with Hull, Wakasugi asked, with regard 
to the form in which the "B" suggestion should materialize, "or is it 
your intention to have it conducted by the consular representatives 
of Japan, the United States, and China?" As you are aware, the 
Imperial Government is opposed to its taking that course. 

Please be aware of the fact that the "B" suggestion was taken up 
because we thought it might be a short cut to settlement. In other 
words, we decided to take it up because we thought it would speed 
up the procedure. We do not wish to give it even a chance to further 
complicate and prolong matters. 



130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Bearing this in mind, do everything Ln your power to not only pre- 
vent further compHcations but to simplify matters as much as pos- 
sible. 

24833 

JD-1: 6530 ' (D) Navy Trans.' 11-15-41 (S-TT) 

•JD-l: 6521 (S. I. S. #24787). 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
15 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#775 

Through my various messages on the subject, you are fully aware 
of the fact that these talks have gone beyond the preliminary stage 
and that they are now well within the realm of the "real thing". It 
is true that at the time the Konoye statement was dispatched, the 
negotiations were more or less conducted as preliminary to a meeting 
of "the leaders".. However, for all practical purposes, the talks had 
gone beyond the point where they could be termed as being of a 
"preliminary" nature. By that time, we had centered all of om* 
efforts toward bringing about a speedy termination of the talks. 
That has been made perfectly clear. I feel sure that the United 
States too, regardless of what they may have said, recognized this 
fact from a realistic point of view. 

It is true that the United States may try to say that since we made 
no particular mention of the changed status of the talks, they were 
under the impression that they were still of a preliminary nature. 

Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that the date set forth 
in my message #736* is an absolutely immovable one. Please, there- 
fore, make the United States see the light, so as to make possible the 
signing of the agreement by that date. 

24834 

JD-1: 6531 (D) Navy Trans. 11-15-41 (S-TT) 

•JD-l: 6254 (S. I. S. #24373). 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
15 November 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#781 

To Ambassador Kurusu. 

I wish to express my sympathy on the presumption that you must 
be experiencing considerable fatigue as a consequence of your long 
trip by air. Not alone this Minister, but everyone in government 
circles, feels deep gratitude that you have agreed to tackle the ex- 
ceedingly difficult problems which confront us. As I said, I reaUze 
that your task is a difficult one, but at the same time it is an important 
one; success or failure will have a great bearing on the rise or decUne 
of our nation. 

Please explain to Ambassador Nomura the conditions which exist 
here, and at the same time describe our determinations in detail to 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 131 

him. After you have perfect understanding of each other, cooperate 
with him in an unsparing effort to guide the negotiations to any early 
settlement. That is my fervent prayer which I hope may be granted. 

Even after the presentation of the final proposal by us, the U. S. 
Government apparently continues to show laxness. There are even 
those who suspect that the United States is intentionally stalling for 
time. In view of the fact that the crisis is fast approaching, no 
subsidiary complications can be countenanced even when considering 
the time element alone. Such an eventuality would make impossible 
the surmounting of the crisis. 

Please familiarize yourself with my various instructions to Am- 
bassador Nomura on this subject, after which do everything in your 
power to make the United States come to the realization that it is 
mdeed a critical situation. I beg of you to make every effort to 
have them cooperate with us in assuring peace on the Pacific. 

Because of your expressed desires prior to your departure from 
here, we have not as yet presented our "B" proposal to the United 
States. We are of the opinion, however, that we had better submit 
it to them at an early opportunity. 

24873 

JD-1: #6556 (D) Navy Trans. 11-17-41 (S-TT) 



[Secret] 



From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

15 November 1941 

(Purple) 

#1095 (In 2 parts, complete) 

On this, the 15th, I, accompanied by Wakasugi, called on Secretary 
Hull, (Ballantine was also present), for an interview which lasted 
about one hour and a half. I shall report in detail subsequently, but 
in the meantime, I am sending you a resume of the meeting as foUows: 

The United States handed us an explanation of their stand on the 
"non-discriminatory treatment in commerce" matter, which I am 
forwarding to you as separate wire "A", numbered my message 
#1096*; separate wire "B", numbered my message #1097**, contains 
the text of their proposal involving this matter. (The latter is a 
proposed joint statement on economic policy and is composed of (1) 
general poUcy ; (2) Japanese-U. S. relations; and, (3) poUcies involving 
the Pacfiic area) . 

We stated that we would give these notes our careful study and 
after requesting our government's advice, would make a reply. We 
went on to s&j that we insist that these talks have now progressed 
to the negotiations stage. 

To this Hull repUed that before any settlements can be reached, 
it is necessary that other countries involved, such as Britain and the 
Netherlands East Indies, be consulted. This procedure is desired 
by Japan too, he pointed out. There are reasons, he said, that make 
it inconvenient for the United States to state that negotiations are 
bein^ conducted with Japan alone, before they have had a chance to 
participate therein. He went on to repeat that for those reasons, 
these talks shall continue to be of an exploratory nature. At the 



132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

same time, the continuation of these conversations shall not be 
hampered, he promised. 

We then requested that he reply with regard to other matters to 
which Hull said: 

"Japan on the one hand is attempting to enter into a peaceful 
agreement with the United States, while simultaneously, on the 
other hand, she is insisting that her military alliance with Germany 
be maintained. I, personally, can understand Japan's explanations, 
however, I feel that it would be exceedingly diffecult to make the 
general U. S. public and even of the world, see through the seeming 
paradox. 

(Part 2) 

"For this reason, it is essential that we have the definite word of 
the new Japanese Cabinet on the peaceful policy. In other words, it 
is essential that this new Cabinet give definite recognition and ap- 
proval of the statement submitted by the previous government con- 
cerning this matter. On 21 June, we made certain proposals which 
concerned political stabilization of the entire Pacific area. Even if 
Japan were to favor limiting this area to only the southwestern Pacific 
area, the United States would continue to desire that it be made ap- 
plicable to the entire Pacific area. 

"Therefore, we shall submit our reply on the other two points only 
after we have received a reply to the proposal we are submitting to 
you today." 

We therefore stated that our government's attitude has already 
been expressed by the contents of our proposal through which it may 
be seen that there has been no changes therein. However, for the 
sake of reassurance, we would ascertain this point, we said, 

Hull expressed several doubts concerning our relations to the Tri- 
partite Pact. He pointed out that in spite of the Japanese-U. S. S, R. 
neutrality pact, it was apparently essential that great armed forces 
of both countries had to constantly face each other across the Japanese- 
U. S. S. R. border. The United States wants no peace of that nature. 
He went on to say that the United States desires that simultaneously 
with a peace agreement between Japan and the United States, the 
Tripartite Pact shall become a mere scrap of paper. 

We, therefore, repeated that part of our proposal which involved 
that alliance and again pointed out that there need be no clash be- 
tween U. S.-Japanese peace and the continued existence of that treaty. 
We went on to say that our government would no doubt be very dis- 
appointed at the results of today's conversations. We then decided 
to meet again after I had received my government's further instruc- 
tions. 

Will you, therefore, please rush your instructions concerning the 
matters contained herein. 

24930 

JD-1: 6584 (D) Navy Trans. 11-18-41 (2) 

•JD-l: 6585 S. I. 8. No. 24931. 
••JD-1: 6586 8. 1. 8. No. 24932. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 133 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

15 November 1941 

(Purple) 

#1098 (In 2 parts, complete) 

Let us suppose that the Japanese-U. S. negotiations for the adjust- 
ment of relations between the two countries which are being con- 
ducted at present, unfortunately break down, and that, as a conse- 
quence, we pursue an unrestricted course. The following is my guess 
as to what would be the relationship between the United States and 
Japan under such circumstances. 

Much, of course, would depend on what move we make and how we 
make it, but 

(a) It is most probable that diplomatic relations between the two 
countries would be broken off immediately; 

(b) Even if they are not, the same situation as now exists between 
Germany and the United States — that is, the closing of the consulates 
and recalling of the Ambassador — will probably be effected. 
(Through the application of the order freezing the assets, economic 
relations have already been broken off for all practical purposes). 
Under such circumstances, only a small staff will remain at the 
Embassy here. (Please see my separate wire #1099 * for my suggestion 
as to the personnel of such a reduced staff) . 

I presume that the government has given careful consideration as to 
the disposition of the various offices and our nationals residing here. 
I would appreciate being advised in confidence of your decision in 
these matters. 

In the event of (b) , I presume that the same procedure as was fol- 
lowed in the case of U. S.-Germany will be followed. That is, per- 
sonnel of the consulates of the respective countries will no doubt be 
evacuated by mutual consent. We can see that it could be possible 
for the officials and business men who remained here at that time (they 
would total about 300 or 400), to be evacuated on another vessel. 
However, we fear that the number of persons desiring passage will 
undoubtedly skyrocket. The Consuls will, of course, urge our 
nationals to remain here even if the worst eventuality should mate- 
rialize, but we feel that there will be many who, because of various 
circumstances, will find it impossible to do so. 

It will be practically impossible to make a distinction between them 
and officials and business men. Will you, therefore, give your con- 
sideration to sending enough ships to evacuate these people. 

{Part 2) 

In the event of (a) — 

(1) No doubt some agreement between the United States and 
Japan wiU be entered into to guarantee the safe passage of Embassy 
and Consulate staff members, (agreements will no doubt be entered 
into with regard to the course of the vessel, markers, and communica- 
tion methods). (One plan may be to have these officials sent to some 
half-way point, for example Hawaii, some port in the Aleutian Inlands, 
or, if imavoidable to French Tahiti, on ships belonging to the nation 
to which they are accredited, and at such prearranged place, have the 
respective ships exchange passengers). To the representative of 



134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

what nation do we plan to entrust our national property and to protect 
the rights of our nationals remaining here? Is it correct to assume that 
negotiations with the country which has been selected will be com- 
pleted in Tokyo with the diplomatic representative of that country 
and in that country by our ambassador or minister? 

(2) Japanese residents here who are of military age, will undoubtedly 
be held here. Therefore, a plan to exchange our nationals residing 
here for Americans residing in Japan is conceivable, but in view of 
the difference in numbers, it is indeed a very slim hope. Dependence 
on ships of neutral register, too, would be an exceedingly precarious 
undertaking should war actually be declared. We would appreciate 
being advised of the government's attitude on these points. 

25032 

JD-1: 6631 (D) Navy Trans. 11-19-41 (2) 

' 'JD-l: 6654 (S. I. 8. #25033) 



[Secret] 



From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

15 November 1941 

(Purple) 

#1106 (In 6 parts, complete.) 

Chief of Ofl&ce routing. 

The following is the conversation I had with Hull on the 15th, the 
gist of which I reported to you in my message #1095*: 

Hull said that the United States is making sincere eflForts too, and 
through such efforts, he said, he is now able to present a proposal 
concerning the commerce problem. So saying, he related to me 
Note "A", which was reported to you as my message #1096**. 

Hull: "The United States has entered into trade agreements with 
22 nations, all of which are based on the status of a "most-favored 
nation". Through them trade barriers throughout the world are 
being removed. There actually are between 1000 and 1200 articles 
on which tariffs have been substantially reduced. I strongly advo- 
cated this policy at the Economic Conference which was held in 
London some time ago, but because opposition to it was voiced by 
some, it was not adopted at that time." (He added that Germany 
was one of the countries which was opposed to it.) 

"In this way, the United States desires to apply the non-discrim- 
inatory policy over a wide scope. Japan wants that part of the 
proposal which advocates the appUcation of these terms to the 
entire Pacific area to be revised so that it will be applicable to the 
entire world. The United States is unable to guarantee any con- 
ditions which are outside of the United States' sphere of influence. 
Therefore, I hope that Japan will agree to delete her condition, in 
which she insists that she will agree to applying the non -discriminatory 
treatment to the Pacific area only if it is applied to the world." 

(Part 2) 

So saying, he submitted Note "B" which contains the U. S. pro- 
posal and which was sent to you as my message #1097***. Wakasugi 
asked Hull if this was a counter proposal to that part of our proposal 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 135 

which we submitted the other day concerning the three major 
problems, pertaining to non-discrimination. Hull replied that in its 
application it covers a wider range, (meaning, apparently, that its 
contents covers a wider range). I, therefore, advised Hull that we 
would give it our study and that we would seek our government's 
opinion thereon after which I would submit our reply. 

I said: "Since official proposals have been submitted by me to the 
President and the Secretary of State, we feel that these talks should be 
looked upon as negotiations." 

Hull: "Your government may consider those talks as being nego- 
tiations today. As I said at our previous meeting, however, the 
subjects being discussed must be taken up with Britain, Netherlands, 
and others. Moreover, the Foreign Minister himself told Ambassa- 
dor Grew in Tokyo that it was essential that those countries partici- 
pate in the negotiations. For these reasons, we feel that it is neces- 
sary to hold these prehminary exploratory conversations between 
Japan and the United States first. It would be inappropriate if we 
were to consider these talks formal negotiations, because then it would 
seem as if we were trying to force whatever settlements we reached 
upon those other nations. 

"I feel that we should first find the basic principles on which a 
suitable agreement could be reached, after which, the United States 
would reveal its attitude to those other countries, and ask them to par- 
ticipate in the final settlement. Thus until we work things out to a 
point which would seem to be satisfactory to all parties concerned, I 
shall consider these talks to be exploratory in nature. 

(Part 3) 

"From a more practical viewpoint, too, if there were negotiations, 
the free exchange of opinions between the United States and Japan 
would be considerably hindered. In Tokyo the Foreign Minister 
requested to Ambassador Grew that . . . (several hues missing). 

"In the United States proposal of 21 June, the United States advo- 
cates that that part pertaining to the poUtical stabiUzation be made 
applicable to the entire Pacific area. Japan wants to limit it to the 
southwestern Pacific area only. In view of the fact that my talks 
with Your Excellency concerns the estabUshment of peace in the entire 
Pacific area, I find it difficult to imderstand Japan's desires to so limit 
the area. I would like to have this point explained." 

He went on to repeat what he has said from time to time before, 
regarding Japan's peace poUcies and her connections in the Tri- 
partite Pact. 

(Part 4) 

Hull, as he did on the previous occasion, requested that the present 
government of Japan give its definite approval of the spirit of peace 
contained in our statement of 28 August. 

I therefore repUed: "The spirit of that statement was contained in 
our latest proposal and therefore I am convinced that there has been no 
change in our government's attitude. We are doing everything in 
our power to bring about a settlement so that peace may be guaran- 
teed on the Pacific. It is true that the words "southwestern Pacific" 
appear in the main text of our proposal, but in the preface thereto we 



136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

made it clear that our aims are to establish and maintain peace on 
the entire Pacific area." 

Hull: "The preface is not a part of the main text and therefore its 
contents had no binding powers. The only parts which have any 
binding powers are the contents of the main text." 

So saying, he again repeated his doubts as to Japan's expressed 
peaceful intentions. 

He went on to say that Japan is apparently wanting to enter into 
a peaceful agreement with the United States on the one hand while 
maintaining a military aUiance with Germany on the other. 

Hull: "I, myself, can understand Japan's viewpoint and explana- 
tions on this matter. The general public, however, are aware only 
that Japan is alUed to Germany and to it — the general public — this 
has a very militariastic connotation. Should the United States, dis- 
regarding what seems to be a paradox, enter into a peace agreement 
with Japan, the general pubhc and the world in general would probably 
howl with laughter. We would be in a very difl&cult position to try 
to make any explanations. 

"If Japan secceeds in coming to an agreement with the United 
States, she would not find it necessary to hold on to the Tripartite 
Agreement, would it? 

(Part 5) 

"While on the one hand Japan is asking that Britain and the 
Netherlands, which are at war with Germany, to participate in a 
peaceful agreement which is to be established between Japan and the 
United States, while on the other she negotiates a military alliance 
with Germany which is the enemy of Britain and the Netherlands. 
That is incongruous." - 

I: "We have already explained our position in the Tripartite Pact 
in our proposal. As I said before, an alUance and a peace agreement 
need not necessarily be at odds with each other as may be seen by the 
example of the Japanese-British alliance. Fundamentally speaking, 
this alliance in question has peace as its main objective. Germany, 
too, understands that the alliance would not conflict with peace be- 
tween Japan and the United States.'* 

Hull: "If Japan insists on adhering to the alliance with Germany 
even after an agreement is reached between Japan and the United 
States, we could not explain the apparent paradox to other countries. 
The United States does not desire a situation such as exists between 
Japan and the U. S. S. R., which in spite of the fact that a Neutrality 
Pact exists, vast armed forces of each nation must constantly be fac- 
ing each other across the national boundary. We desire that simul- 
taneously with the establishment of an agi'eement between Japan and 
the United States, the Tripartite Pact shall disappear." (He called 
it a "dead letter"). 

Wakasugi: "In other words, do you mean that a U. S.-Japanese 
agreement is an impossibility as long as Japan does not withdraw 
from the Triple Alliance?" 

Hull: "A peace agreement and a military alliance must be at odds 
with each other. Therefore, if and when an understanding is reached 
between Japan and the United States, I desire that the alliance be- 
come a dead letter". 

Wakasugi: "May we consider that as your reply to our proposal 
pertaining to the matter of right of self-defense which is a part of the 
other two subjects?" 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 137 

{Part 6) 

Hull: "Our reply to the other two problems will be issued after we 
receive: Definite assurance that your present government approves 
the peace policy expressed in a statement issued by the previous gov- 
ernment; clarification of the meaning of changing "the entire Pacific 
area" in the U. S. proposal, to Japan's proposal's "southwestern 
Pacific area"; Japan's reply to today's U. S. proposal regarding a 
joint statement on the economic policy." 

I said: "In view of the very critical situation, I am afraid that my 
government will be very disappointed over your replies," 

We agreed to meet again after I had received further instructions 
from my home government. 

Today's talks can be boiled down to the fact that the United States 
did clarify their attitude on the trade question. On the other two 
problems,*^ although we agree in principle, we differ on interpretations. 
They harbor deep doubts as to the sincerity of our peaceful intentions 
and apparently they view the China situation through those eyes of 
suspicion. 

Since the above seems to have been fairly clearly established, will 
you please speedily express your definite approval of the government's 
statement involved, so that we may make a reply to their proposal. 

25085 

JD-1: 6627 (D) Navy Trans. 11-21-41 (2) 

•JD-l: 6584 (S. I. S. #24930). 

••JD-1: 6585 (S. I. S. #24931 & 25006). 

•••JD-1: 6586 (S. I. S. 24932 & 25007). 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
15 November 1941 
(Purple— J 19) 
Circular #2330 

The following is the order and method of destroying the code ma- 
chines in the event of an emergency. 

Note: Three paragraphs giving detailed instructions for the destruction of code 
machines have not been printed. 

Washington relay to Mexico, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. 

Berne relay to NSW and NLH (Rome and Ankara (?)). Bankok (?) 

relay to Hanoi. 

25235 

JD-1: 6752 (D) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (S) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 16, 1941 
Purple (CA) (Urgent) 

# -- 

For your Honor's own information. 
1. I have read your #1090 *, and you may be sure that you have all 
my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our 
Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight 
harder than you ever did before. 

79716 O — 46 — i)t. 12 11 



138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, 
so and I have given it ah-eady the fullest consideration, but I have 
only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725.'' 
Will you please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we 
ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. 
However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this 
out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these 
negotiations in my #736," and there will be no change. Please try to 
understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not 
allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations 
any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of oui" proposals, 
and do your best to bring about an immediate solution. 
Aimy 2487 8 Trans. 11/17/41 (S) 

• For Part 1, see S. I. S. #24877. For Part 2, see S. I. S. #24857 in which NOMURA gives his views on the 
general situation. Part 3 not available. 

b S. I. S. #24330 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the Japanese Empire will 
not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States, 

• S. I. S. #24373 in which TOGO says that it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing 
of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 16, 1941 
Purple 

#782 (To be handled in government code.) 
Ke your #1083." 

1. Please give the following reply to them regarding the question of 
recognition: 

the various points in the statement made by the 

Japanese Government on August 28, which is included in the American 
oral statement, (quote only the points given in the said oral statement) 
were also included in our proposals of September 6 and 25, and the 
present cabinet also has no objection to recognizing them as they 
stand. However, these points have been given on the assumption 
that the Japanese-American negotiations would reach an agreement. 
Naturally, therefore, should the negotiations end in a failure, these 
points would not be binding on Japan alone. We wish to have this 
clearly understood. 

2. Regarding the general question of use of force, the expression 
"without provocation" was used in the reply of the Japanese Govern- 
ment made on August 28, In the same reply, relative to the Soviet 
question, we used the words "as long as the Soviet Union remains 
faithful to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty" and then in our 
proposal of September 6, we used the words "without any justifiable 
reason." Now all these expressions mean fundamentally the same 
thing. The reason for our having gone somewhat into detail concern- 
ing the Soviet Union is that we found it necessary to do so in view of 
the connection between the existence of the Japan-Soviet Neutrality 
Treaty and the Russo-German war. 

In short, we had stipulated the "qualification" which we as an 
independent country should necessarily and naturally state. It goes 
without saying that this qualification by no means either limits nor 
minimizes our peaceful intentions. 
Army 2487 9 Trans. 11/17/41 (S) 

• See S. I. S. #24786-88, inclusive. The text of an oral statement given to Ambassador NOMURA by 
Secretary Hull at the conference on the 12tta, 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 139 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

November 16, 1941 

(Purple) 

#1107 (Departmental Secret) (Strictly Secret) 

1. I sent ARMSTRONG to the State Department on the 15th to 
have him feel out the atmosphere (see my #1029''). ARMSTRONG 
then informed TERASAKI that during the last two days something 
happened, apparently, to make the President strongly desire the 
maintenance of peace between Japan and the United States. (I dare 
say, however, that the attitude of the United States toward us is 
just about the same as always and that this is just a ripple on the sea. 
Nevertheless, as we have heard the same thing from other quarters, 
I send it to you for what it may be worth.) 

2. ARMSTRONG, furthermore, said that the advent of Ambas- 
sador KURUSU is having a very good effect. (The newspapers, too, 
in general, have been showing considerable good feeling. Two or 
three days before Ambassador KURUSU arrived at his post, not only 
did news articles become quite friendly toward him, but the press in- 
terviews in every place drew, in general, the most favorable com- 
ments. Will you also, therefore, direct public opinion along these 
lines.) 

Army #24978 Trans. 11/19/41 (2) 

• 8. I. S. #24475 which describes the organization of a committee for the promotion of friendly relations 
between Japan and America in which TERASAKI is liaison agent and through ARMSTRONG keeps in 
contact with the State Department. 



From: Washington (Nomura). 

To: Tokyo 

17 November 1941 

(Purple) 

#1113 

At 10:30 a. m. on the 17th I caUed on Secretary of State Hull ac- 
companied by Kurusu, following which we both had an interview with 
the President at 11:00 which lasted for about an hour and 15 minutes. 
Today's conference was largely concerned with formalities and we did 
not get down to business. However, I stated that the intentions of 
the Japanese Government were peaceful, however as we see it the 
situation is very acute. To this the President replied that America 
also desired to preserve the peace of the Pacific. (In regard to main- 
taining peace in the Pacific I could see that he was outlining some 
formula in his mind). I will wire the details in a subsequent telegram. 

25028 

JD-1: 6648 (H) Navy Trans. 11-19-41 (7) 

[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
17 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#1114 

Schmitt's report: 

On the evening of the 16th, we had Schmitt try to feel out the State 
Department's attitude. He reports that he talked with his good 



140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

friend Williamson (secretary to Assistant Secretary of State Hurley). 
According to him, Williamson, the stumbling points in the Japanese- 
U. S. negotiations are the Tripartite Pact and the matters pertaining 
to the China incident. A solution in so far as it involves the actu^ 
points is apparently quite possible from both the United States and 
Japanese viewpoints. The difficulty seems to be a more spiritual 
one — that is, the suspicion that the United States harbors of Japan. 
The United States bases its suspicion on the fear that the German and 
Japanese military cliques will apply pressure and prevail upon the 
Japanese Government. In other words, the United States believes 
that there is a possibility that immediately subsequent to the estab- 
lishing of a U. S.-Japanese accord, the Japanese Government may be 
forced by Germany or by the Japanese military to pursue a course 
entirely different from that charted by the accord. 

Compared to the above obstacles, the solution of the economic 
problems, of which the petroleum question is one phase, is indeed a 
very simple matter. 

25133 

JD-1: 6693 (D) Navy Trans. 11-22^1 (2) 



From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

November 16, 1941 

(Purple) 

#1118 (Part 1 of 5.*) (To be handled in government code) 

On the morning of the 17th at half-past ten, I, accompanied by 
Ambassador KURUSU, called on Secretary HULL. First HULL 
said, "After the last war there were no able statesmen; therefore, a 
situation like the present one came about. What we have to think 
about now is saving the world from this sort of extremity." KURUSU 
replied, "I am in entire agreement with what you say. Fortunately, 
the United States and Japan, who have not yet participated in this 
war, have a grave responsibility on their shoulders for working in this 
direction. However, before we can talk about that, there are some 
things which have to be settled between Japan and the United States. 
Still, if we do not engage in concrete negotiations, we cannot get 
anywhere." (Then he went on briefly to tell how he had come to 
the United States at the behest of the Premier and Your Excellency.) 
Then he continued: "The Premier earnestly hopes for a settlement 
between Japan and the United States. As a matter of fact, he seems 
to be rather hopeful beyond expectation. There are at present three 
problems causing a deadlock between Japan and the United States: 
They are: Equality in commerce, the Tri-partite Agreement, and 
evacuation. The Premier seems to be very hopeful of a settlement 
concerning the first two. However, when it comes to the third 
question — that of evacuation — he seems to entertain great concern. 
Army 25091 Trans. 11/21/41 (1) 

• Part 2, S. I. S. #24940; Part 3 not available; Parts 4 and 5, S. I. 8. No. 25084. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 141 

[Secret] 

From: Washington 

To: Tokyo 

November 16, 1941 

Purple (Extremely Urgent) 

#1118 (Part 2 of 5)* 

Since the time had come to m3et the President and since HULL 
had expressed his wish to continue the conversation in the presence of 
the President, we aQ left our seats. Together with Secretary HULL, 
I went to see the President at 11:00 a. m. 

KURUSU began his conversation by saying, "As I had already told 
Secretary HULL, the present Cabinet is very much interested m the 
Japanese- American negotiations. You, Mr. President, as a states- 
man, no doubt well understand in what frame of mind the Japanese 
people are after four years of experience in the China incident. While 
on my way to this country I noticed — though I am not by any means 
an expert in making such observations — that the situation is militarily 
strained in Hongkong, Manila and in other islands. The situation is 
so tense that we cannot tell when an explosion would occur and, even 
if it occurred, of what benefit would such a situation be to the United 
States and Japan? (The President showed that he felt the same way.) 
To be sure Japan wishes that the Japanese- American negotiations 
would prove to be a success. However, the time element must be 
taken into consideration. Delaying the solution avaUs Japan nothing 
since in the meantime conditions, both militarily and economically, 
would become less favorable to her if she is to defend herself. The 
Premier also seems to be quite hopeful that all of the three questions, 
namely, that of the Three Power Alliance and Pact and the question 
of withdrawing troops would be settled." However, he is very much 
worried over the question of withdrawing troops." 

Army 24940 Trans. 11/18/41 (M) 

• Part 1, 3, 4 and 5 not available. 

b Translator's note: Apparently the writer neglected to include in the three questions that of non- 
discrimination in trade. 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
17 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#1118 (Part 3 of 5) 

The President: "A long time ago, Secretary of State Bryan once 
said, 'There is no last word between friends'. 

"There have been many so-called * non-aggression pacts' in the past, 
but all of them are now out of date. I believe, however, that by the 
establishing of some general understanding between the United States 
and Japan, the situation may be saved." 

Kurusu: "That would seem to be very acceptable from my point 
of view. From my way of looking at it, apparently the main diffi- 
culties in the U. S. -Japanese negotiations to date, have been over the 
problem of what to do about Japan's connections with the Tripartite 
Pact, and what to do about the various claims that the United States 
has made with regard to the method in which the China Incident 



142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

should be settled. In. the final analysis, it would seem as if adjusting 
these two points is the main problem at hand at the present time. 

"With regard to the Tripartite problem, Japan is bound by certain 
duties under the terms of that instrument. Moreover, she must 
consider her dignity and honor as a great power. Because of these 
considerations, it is impossible for her to violate the terms of an alli- 
ance. Since the United States has been strongly insisting right along 
that international agreements must be adhered to, I cannot believe 
that the United States is urging us to do so now. I feel doubly sure 
of this where the Tripartite Pact is concerned since the basic objectives 
of that pact are the prevention of the war's spreading and the main- 
tenance of peace. 

"Under these circumstances, it seems as though it should be possible 
to coordinate and adjust the two problems so as to bring about a 
settlement. Please understand, however, that no proposal, regardless 
of how good it may sound, can be accepted by Japan if the terms 
contained therein cannot be put into effect." 

The President: "With regard to the China problem, I have been 
advised that Japan finds the withdrawal of troops from China a very 
difficult undertaking. The United States is not trying to intervene 
or mediate in the problems of Japan and China. I don't know whether 
there is such a word in the parlance of diplomats or not, but the 
United States' only intention is to become an 'introducer'." 

25129 

JD-1: 6643 (D) Navy Trans. 11-22^1 (2) 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
17 November 1941 
(Purple) 

#1118 (Parts 4 and 5 of 5) (Parts 1, and 3, not available). (For 
Part 2 see JD-1: 6643) (S. I. S. 24940). 

(Part 4) 

Kurusu: "Concerning Japan's duties to go to war under the terms 
of the Tripartite Pact, Japan has stated that Japan alone will deter- 
mine this. The United States apparently interprets this to mean that 
Japan will wait until the United States is deeply involved in the battle 
on the Atlantic and then stab the United States in the back. This is 
not the case. There have been indications in the past that there are 
those in the United States who have been laboring under the erroneous 
belief that Japan would move at Germany's demands; that Japan 
was merely Germany's tool. Japan issued the statement that she 
would act in accordance with Japan's decisions alone, for the purpose 
of correcting this misapprehension. 

"In any event, if at this time a great understanding between the 
United States and Japan with regard to the Pacific can be reached 
as described by the President, such an understanding would far out- 
shine the Tripartite Pact. Under such circumstances, I feel confident 
that all doubts you may harbor regarding the application of the Tri- 
partite Pact would automatically and completely melt away". 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 143 

At this point, Hull broke in, and after describing Germany's policy 
of conquest, said: "Suppose that Germany succeeds in conquering 
England and then establishes various subservient governments in 
South America. Suppose after that that Germany attacks the United 
States with the British fleet. If the United States waits till then, it 
would be too late regardless of what she tries to do. That is why the 
United States must prepare her defenses now and this is what the 
United States calls her rights under defense. There is no reason why 
Japan cannot see this." 

Thus did Hull go over his theory again. 

The President: "The map I referred to in my speech the other day, 
which described GermaiT policy in Central and South America, was 
an authentic map. Its source was the German Government circles." 

Kurusu: Mr. President, a while ago you made reference to the 
general relationship between Japan and the United States. As long 
as we are speaking of peace on the Pacific, and since at least one side 
of the western hemishpere is on the Pacific, the various countries in 
Central and South America must be covered when we speak of the 
Pacific area. It would be impossible for Japan to be a partner in 
any project aimed at disturbing the peace of the western hemisphere. 

"You say that people would give voice to their disapproval should 
these negotiations lead to a successful settlement between us on the 
grounds that Japan would be promising the United States peace while 
on the other hand she would be carrying the spear for Germany. 
From the beginning, however, the Japanese Government has been 
saying that should a just peace be established on the Pacific, she 
would withdraw her troops from French Indo-China. If, therefore, 
matters progress to that point, this withdrawal should satisfy the 
general public of the United States as actual proof of Japan's peaceful 
intentions. 

"In any event, I am convinced that the immediate objective is 
to successfully and speedily come to an agreement on the various 
problems now being discussed at present between Ambassador No- 
mura and Secretary Hull." 

Hull: "I favor the continuation of these talks. Heretofore, I and 
Ambassador Nomura have met and talked on numerous occasions but 
we always seem to come to a certain point and then start going around 
and around the same circle. I would welcome your — Kurusu 's — 
attacking this point from a different angle." 

The President expressed his approval of this, and said: "I am 
planning to remain in Washington until this Saturday (the 24th). I 
shall be glad to discuss matters with you and Secretary Hull at any 
time before then. 
25084 
JD-1: 6654 (D) Navy Trans. 11-21-41 (1) 



144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
17 November 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#783 

Re your #1110* 

We have no objections to have it apply to the entire Pacific area. 
Therefore, we shall not object to your deleting the word "south- 
western" from Article 6 of our proposal of 25 September. 

24881 

JD-1: 6560 (D) Navy Trans. 11-17-41 (S-TT) 

•Not available. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
17 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#784 

Re your #1096* 

By "in the event that the principle of non-discriminatory treatment 
is applied to the entire world", we mean that the Imperial Govern- 
ment desires that said principle would be applied uniforrnly throughout 
the world. Upon the realization of this hope, we anticipate that the 
principle will be applied on China as well. 

We do not imply that the United States shall be held responsible 
for any violations of this principle outside of the United States' 
sphere of influence. 

Even before the outbreak of this European war, the trend was 
away from the above mentioned basic principle. Since the outbreak 
of this war, practically all traces of the principle have been obliterated. 
Under these circumstances it would be only one with a very unrealistic 
view of the situation who could expect any fruit from an attempt to 
apply the principle to China alone. 

Japan is not refusing to apply the principle on China on the grounds 
that a few nations in the world refuse to comply. Japan desires to 
apply it to China when world conditions are such that a majority of 
the nations therein are in favor of the principle. 

(Through an error, the serial number 781 was applied on two 
messages**. Will you please give the number 781-B to that message 
dated the 16th which contained information for Your Excellency 
only). 

24880 

JD-1: 6561 (D) Navy Trans. 11-17-41 (S-TT) 

•Not yet available. 

••One available thus far. Dated 15 November; JD-1: 6656 (8. 1. 8. #24873). 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 145 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
17 November 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#785 

Re your #1097* 

1. The contents of 3 of paragraph 2 pertaining to Japanese-U. S. 
relations, seems to be about the same as the terms contained in the 
supplementary provision of the United States' 21 June proposal. 
In view of the fact that "materials necessary for one's own country's 
safety and for self-defense" shall be an exception, there is a danger 
that even after the agreement is entered into, they will put some 
restrictions on the exporting of petroleum. We cannot accept that 
phraseology, therefore, unless they agree not to restrict exports on 
articles needed by us which will be clearly listed. 

2. Regarding sub-sections 1 and 2 of paragraph 3 of that message 
which concerns the policy on the Pacific area: Under paragraph 5 of 
the basic terms of Japanese-Chinese peace which was appended to 
our 25 September proposal**, regarding economic cooperation, there 
is no objection to a third country's engaging in economic activities in 
China as long as it is conducted on a fair basis. Our proposal is 
aimed at our having the right to develop and have access to natural 
resources vital to national defense. In view of the great sacrifices 
made by Japan in the past four and a half years, this is but a natural 
demand. 

If, therefore, the United States recognizes the basic forms of our 
peace with China, and if the contents of your message #1096*** and 
sub-sections 1 and 2 of the paragraph referred to, are meant to be 
the basis from which a permenent policy is to be established subse- 
quent to the establishment of peace under the terms set forth by us, 
we shall give it our favorable consideration. 

If, on the other hand, the contents of your message #1096*** and 
sub-sections 1 and 2 of the referred to message (1097*) are aimed at 
making us alter the basic peace terms, the Imperial Government 
finds them absolutely unacceptable. 

{Part 2) 

3. Re the same paragraph 3: 

It is feared that the terms included in this paragraph will lead to 
joint supervision of finances and credit in China. Since this conflicts 
with the fundamental principles of the New Order policy of the 
Empire, (please point out that these terms conflict with the basic 
principles that the United States has been proclaiming of late, too), for 
that reason, it is impossible for us to give our approval thereto. 

4. After all is said and done, the various paragraphs noted above 
are apparently parts of a proposal which is attempting to completely 
disregard our sacrifices during four and a half years of war. Settle- 
ment based on this proposal is absolutely out of the question. Since 
the United States herself has stated that this was an unofl&cial and 
exploratory proposal which has no binding powers, please lead the 



146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR- ATTACK 

United States to completely abandoning it and to proceed, using our 
proposal of 25 September as the basis on which to do so. 

24937 

JD-1: 6589 (D) Navy Trans. 11-18-41 (S-TT) 

•JD-l: 6586 (S» I. S. #24932). 
••JD-1: 5360 (S. I. S. #22550-51). 
•••JD-1: 6585 (S. I. S. #24931). 



[Secret] 



From: Washington 

To: Tokyo. 

17 November 1941 

(Purple.) 

#1127 

The most emphasis in the talks between Hull, I, and Ambassador 
Kurusu on the 18th, (lasting about three hours), was placed on matters 
pertaining to the Triple Alliance. Hull, in his customary manner, 
denounced the Hitlerian policy of expansion through armed force. 
He pointed out that as long as Japan is tied up with such a policy 
through the Tripartite Pact, it would be difficult to adjust Japanese- 
U. S. relations. 

Kurusu then said that it would be impossible to comply if he was 
demanding of Japan that she abrogate the Tripartite Pact. He also 
pointed out that the alliance was not aimed at expansion through the 
force of arms. 

Hull said that he was in no position to tell Japan to abrogate the 
Pact but that as long as there is no substantiating proofs of the real 
aims of the pact, it serves absolutely no purpose. 

Then I and Kurusu explained that it was an impossibility to settle 
such a basic point in any specified time limit. However, to ease the 
exceedingly critical situation, the first step would be to mutually 
return to the situation which existed prior to the date on which the 
freezing of assets order was put into effect, (in other words, Japan 
would withdraw from south French Indo-China and the United States 
would rescind her order to freeze the assets). Talks should then be 
continued in a more congenial atmosphere, we suggested. 

He did not seem particularly receptive to this suggestion. He said 
that if the government of Japan could make it clear that it wants to 
pursue a course of peace, then the United States would confer with 
the British on the subject of returning to the conditions which existed 
prior to the time that the freezing order went into effect. It is essen- 
tial, however, that under those conditions, Japan continue to pursue a 
peaceful policy with ever increasing vigor. 

There were indications that Hull, because of his usual cautious 
nature, was somewhat influenced by the exaggerated reports carried 
in the press regarding the Premier's speech in the Diet in which he 
expressed the three basic principles of international relations and 
intention of increasing the troops in French Indo China. 

Details will be sent in a subsequent message. 

25170 

JD-1: 6722 (D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (2) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 147 

[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 

18 November 1941 (Probable date of drafting) 

19 November 1941 (Intercepted) 
(Purple) 

#1129 

Re your #784* and my #1106**. 

During my talks with Hull on the 18th it became evident that he 
is thinking about readjusting the economic situation of the world 
after the conclusion of this war and that he has only a passing interest 
in the various problems of China. Furthermore, there are indications 
that the matter prognosticated by Ambassador Kurusu in the separate 
message, is also being given consideration by Hull. 

As a matter of routine, of the three points contained in our Proposal 
"A", they are apparently desirous of first disposing the matter per- 
taining to non-discriminatory treatment. In view of this attitude on 
this subject, unless we delete from our Formula "A" that part which 
follows after "on the understanding", (as you are aware, Konoye's 
message contained no such qualification), and give them a more 
definite agreement, I fear that the progress of our talks may be 
impeded. This is, of course, not in accordance with our policy of a 
speedy settlement. Since our formula concerning non-discrimination 
is also contained in our "B" proposal, unless we reach an agreement 
on this point now, I fear that our Proposal "B" will not help matters 
any. 

I realize thoroughly that there are domestic issues which make it 
very difficult. Please give your consideration to the deletion of that 
part which follows "on the understanding", etc. 
25241 
JD-1: 6758 (D) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (1) 

*JD-1: 6561 (S. I. S. )l'24880). Explanation of phrase: "in the event that the principle of non-discrimina- 
tory treatment is applied to the entire world." We mean that it shall apply uniformly throughout the 
world. China included. Japan desires to apply it to China when world conditions are such that a majority 
of the nations are in favor of the principle. 

••JD-1: 6627 (S. I. S. #25085). "The following is the conversation I had with Hull on the 15th, the gist 
of which I reported to you previously". 



[Secret] # 

From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
18 November 1941* 
(Purple) 

#1131 (Partl&2of5) 
(Foreign Office Secret) 
(Chief of Office routing) 

On the 18th, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu called on Secre- 
tary Hull at 10:30 in the morning and we conversed for two hours 
and forty-five minutes. 

Hull (in his customary tone): "I am one who worried about Hitler's 
activities right from the beginning. However, at that time, no one 
paid any attention. He is a man who does not know how to stop 
once he starts. The United States will no doubt become his objective 
in the near future." (So saying, he repeated his theory which he 
expounded on the 17th). "In the event that Hitler continues to be 
victorious, Japan should be thinking of his coming on to the East 

* Translator's note: Date is evidently the 18th, though the first two parts were encoded with key 
for 17tb. 



148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAFL HARBOR ATTACK 

Asiatic stage. If Japan doesn't see this for herself, I can't feel sorry 
for her." (He continued in his usual vein, bringing up again a de- 
scription of the 'confused era (?)' and the tiu-n about in Germany's 
attitude toward the Soviet Union). 

"The basis of the national policy of the United States is and will 
be the maintenance of peace. Therefore, it is impossible for the 
United States to ever condone the policies of Hitler which depends on 
expansion through the force of arms. 

"As long as Japan is tied to Hitler by means of the Tripartite Pact, 
there shallbe great difficulties in adjusting Japanese-U. S. relations". 

Placing emphasis on Japan's part in the Tripartite Pact the Secre- 
tary went on to describe his point of view. 

Hull: "Even if an agreement is reached between Japan and the 
United States at this time, it would be impossible at this time to shake 
the general U. S. public's conviction that, as Germany is pursuing a 
policy of expansion by force of arms, Japan is doing likewise in the 
Far East. 

"Of the extremists in the United States, there are those who even 
say that the United States has become Hitler's partner in his policy 
of aggression, through her relationship with Japan. 

(Part 2) 

"Even if some agreement is reached between Japan and the United 
States under present circumstances, it could mean no more than the 
existing agreement between Japan and the U. S. S. R., under which, 
the agreement notwithstanding, enormous forces, which are constantly 
being increased, have to be facing each other at all times. 

"Unless the fundamental trouble is removed, it will be impossible 
to expect any progress in our talks." 

Kurusu: "If something is impossible to do, it simply can't be done, 
regardless of what fancy words may be used to dress it up. 

"Even if you tell us to abrogate, or at least to make ineffective, the 
Tripartite Pact at this time, that is something that is impossible for 
us to do," 

Hull: "The United States is not in a position to demand that you 
muUify the effect of the Tripartite Pact. The only thing I say is that 
although I can comprehend the circumstances making it possible for 
Japan to maintain the status quo of her relationship to the Tripartite 
Pact and at the same time seek an agreement with the United States, 
in view of the nature of the United States, it is impossible to completely 
disregard the effects of public opinion." 

Kurusu: "The alliance in question does not advocate, or even con- 
done, expansion through the force of arms." 

Hull: "If that is the case, it is a useless instrument unless some 
definite proof as to its purposes are presented." 

Nomura: "It would be difficult to do so within any limited time. 
The situation in the southwestern Pacific area is at present very crit- 
ical. To counter Japan's sending of troops to French Indo-China, 
Britain is increasing her armed forces in Singapore while the United 
States is doing likewise in the Philippine Islands. 
25143 
JD-1: 6664 (D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (1) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 149 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

November 18, 1941 

Purple 

#1131 (Part 3 of 5)* (To be handled in government code.) 

"If we both undertake to increase our military strength at any time, 
something which we would regret might occur. Therefore, since 
even though we keep fighting each other with broad, idealistic argu- 
ments there would be no end to them, let us first relax this tension for 
the time being. To do this we should return to the situation prior 
to the exercise of the freezing order. I mean Japan should evacuate 
southern French Indo-China, and in return the United States should 
rescind the freezing order. If the atmosphere is calm in this manner, 
there will be no need of sending warships to Singapore or strengthening 
military facilities in the Philippines. Then we would like to contine 
these talks." HULL said, "While we are not yet agreed on funda- 
mental questions, it would be futile to do what you say as a temporary 
stop-gap measure. We hope that as first of the East Asiatic nations, 
Japan will take the leadership for a policy of peace. However, if a 
policy of armed conquest is to dominate Japan, we will consider it a 
danger to world peace, and we will not, by any means, yield. (To this 
both I an Ambassador KURUSU had something to say). If the 
leaders of the Japanese Government will show that they will exert a 
peaceful policy in any event, why then in turn, I will not object to 
getting in touch with Great Britain, the Netherlands, etc., and con- 
sider returning to the status prior to the exercise of the freezing order. 
However, this is so that Japanese politics will turn more and more 
toward a peaceful trend." 
Army 25086 Trans. 11/21/41 (1) 

■ Parts 1 and 2 not available. 



[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
November 18, 1941 
Purple 
#1131 (Part 4 of 5) (To be handled in government code) 

Concerning the China question, HULL asked a question about the 
stationing of troops. I explained what you said in Proposal A of your 
#726 * (of course, I didn't mention the twenty-five years you spoke 
of), and HULL let it go at that. Referring again to the China ques- 
tion, he said that England, the Netherlands and China had all con- 
tacted him, and KURUSU wanted to know on what points they were 
concerned. HULL said that he assumed that Great Britain was 
mainly interested in the principle of equality of treatment in com- 
merce; that it was the same in the case of the Netherlands; and as for 
China, she merely spoke in generalities without going into definite 
matters. Now concerning the principle of equality of treatment, the 
following conversation took place: HULL: "Have you received any 
reply from Tokyo on our proposal of the 15th?" (See my #1095.'') 
KURUSU: "Well, we have a general answer, but further study is 
necessary. I haven't enough to tell you yet. You seem to mean 
that the United States can't bear the responsibility of other countries. 



150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Well, aren't we pretty much in the same position? Until peace is 
estabhshed between Japan and China, we could say the same thing 
about the China question, I think. You see, Japan and the United 
States are in different economic positions. You Americans are in an 
advantageous position relative to the various nations when it comes to 
commercial negotiations. We do not have the advantageous bargain- 
ing position that you have. 

Army 25087 Trans. 11/21/41 (1) 

» S. I. S. Nos. 24334, 5, 6, 7. 

b S. I. S. #24930 which gives an explanation of the U. S.'s stand on the "non-discriminatory treatment in 
commerce" matter. 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) ^, 

To: Tokyo ^' 

November 18, 1941 

Purple (Urgent) 

#1131 (Part 5 of 5) (To be handled in government code) 

"There is a remarkable difference between the extent to which the 
economy of the United States depends on foreign trade and that to 
which ours does. You cannot measure them by the same rule. When 
the economic set-up is suddenly disrupted, great turbulence ensues. 
Take, for example, the question of controlled exchange in North 
China. If that were abolished now, the economy of a hundred million 
Chinese would be thrown into chaos. Now out of consideration of 
the welfare of the Chinese people alone, we could not do such a thing 
as that." HULL: "I well understand that. When I was insisting 
on the principle of equality of treatment in commerce, I had the post- 
war situation in mind. I rather think that in post-war economic re- 
construction, probably the principle of non-discrimination will be. an 
all-encompassing one. What I would like to see is Japan and the 
United States working together for the principle of non-discrimination. 
Now all along I've fought against the preferential system of the 
British Empire resulting from the Ottawa Conference, and now we are 
talking it over with England. I don't want you to tell anybody about 
this, but don't you know, only lately Great Britain is coming around 
to my point of view." (In this connection, see the newspaper article 
quoted in separate wire #1132.* 

Army 25088 Trans. 11/21/41 (1) 

• Not available. 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 

(18 November — probable date of drafting) 
(19 November — intercepted) 
#1133 (In 2 parts, complete) 

From Kurusu. 

(1) According to Ambassador Nomura's and my own observations, 
the President is maintaining a very self-composed attitude outwardly, 
but he seems also to be very much in earnest in regard to effecting an 
understanding between Japan and the United States. Therefore, 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 151 

we must exercise great care just now against forming a hasty con- 
clusion that they are merely deferring in order not to seem to swallow 
our proposals at a gulp, and also against taking any steps that might 
prove irretrievable. 

(2) As a result of the revision of the neutrality act, the attention 
of the United States has turned more than ever toward the Atlantic 
of late, and a determination is being strengthened to be ready even 
for a war with Japan if necessary. However, there seems to be a 
desire to be reassured as to their rear by negotiations with our coun- 
try. Herein seems to be the chief reason why both in the conference 
with the President on the 17th and in the one with Secretary Hull on 
the 18th the point of emphasis was on the Three Power Pact, and 
there was more insistence than heretofore on this. In other words, 
the United States, in order to give the American people the impression 
that an estrangement is taking place between Japan and Germany, 
would make use either of a joint declaration by Japan and the United 
States regarding non-discrimination in trade, or of having Japan 
become party to a treaty on problems similar to those on which nego- 
tiations are now in progress between Britain and the United States, 
or again, of a message from our country giving a declaration of peace 
policies, as was suggested by Secretary Hull in conference on the 
18th. 

(3) Of course, any sudden change in the present status of Japanese- 
German relations would be out of the question, but in view of the 
above mentioned situation I feel that it is most essential that we do 
everything we can to fully reassure the United States and let them 
become more and more involved in the Atlantic areas, and thus 
place us in a favorable position, not only for effecting a settlement of 
the China incident, but also, in regard to the international situation 
following the war. 

{Part 2) 

In regard to the question as to whether after the war Britain and 
America will not turn their weapons toward oppressing us, in our 
conference on the 17th, I explained about the bitter experience that 
came to us after the former world war, and frankly told them how 
some of our nation have felt in regard to Britain and the United 
States. To this the President replied that the treaty now under 
consideration would "cover all" such points. 

(4) In view of the internal situation in our country, although I 
think there will be difficulties to be met in trying to reach a settlement 
in harmony with the wishes of the Americans, I feel that as a stop- 
gap for the present, we should ask them to consider our strong desires 
for a " time limit" in connection with the conclusion of such a Japanese- 
American agreement and for the purpose of breaking the present 
deadlock, as them for the removal at once of the freezing act and also 
for assurances regarding imports of a specified amount of oil. 

In the conference of the 18th both Ambassador Nomura and I 
suggested the resumption of the status quo prior to 24 July, but in 
view of the progress of negotiations thus far, the Americans will 
likely not consent to this merely for our agreeing to not forcefully 
invade any territory aside from French Indo-China as per Proposal 



152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"B" or for our promise in vague terms of evacuation of troops from 

French Indo-China Please have your mind made up to 

this. I desire instructions re "time limit" and as we 

desire to press for a speedy settlement, please give consideration to 
the above and advise at once. 

25242 

JD-1: 6759 (F) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (2) 



[Secret] 



From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

November 18, 1941 

Purple 

#1134 (Parti of 2)* 

Re my #1 131 ^ 

In our conversations of today, as a practical means of alleviating 
the ever worsening front with which we are faced and to quiet the 
fearful situation, as well as, to bring about a return to the situation 
existing before the application of the freezing legislation, we suggested 
the evacuation of Japanese troops stationed in the southern part of 
French Indo-China. 

HULL, showing considerable reluctance replied, "After Japan has 
clearly demonstrated her intentions to be peaceful I will confer with 
Britain, the Netherlands and other interested powers." 

In the past it would seem that the greatest stumbling block for the 
American authorities was the question of our troops of occupation in 
China. Recently, however, the United States, what with her internal 
situation and, especially insofar as it concerns the revision of the 
Neutrality Agreement, her increasing involvement in the war in the 
Atlantic, seems to have undergone a change. She is now, rather, 
exhibiting a tendency to lay more emphasis on Japan's peace plans 
insofar as they pertain to the Tri-Partite Alliance. With regard to 
other questions, too, it seems very clear that they are of a mind to 
bring about a compromise after making sure of our peaceful intentions. 
In view of these circumstances, as a result of our deliberations of 
successive days it would seem that should we present Proposal "B" 
immediately, an understanding would be more difficult to realize than 
if we went on with our discussions of Proposal "A". Therefore, 
looking at it from a practical point of view, we are of the opinion that 
prior to presenting of Proposal "B" it wo'ild be more advisable to 
reach a practical settlement, principally on the questions of the ac- 
quisition of goods and the cancellation of the freezing legislation men- 
tioned in Proposal "B" and then to try to proceed with the solution of 
other questions on this basis. Unless we foUow this course we are 
convinced that an immediate solution will be extremely difficult. 

Army 25090 Trans. 11/21/41 (2) 

• Part 2, in S. I. S. #25243. 
>> See S. I. S. #26086. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 153 

[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 

(18 November — Probable date of drafting) 
(19 November — Intercepted) 
#1134 (Pt 2 of 2) (This message should probably be #1128). 

It is true that the Konoye government reiterated its approval of 
the government's statement referred to here. However, that state- 
ment carried several supplementary notes, some of which apparently 
aroused the suspicion of the United States. These supplementary 
notes were of such character that even if they are not written down 
in black and white, they would naturally become applicable under the 
rights of self-defense in the event that to do so becomes necessary. 

Please therefore issue a statement as that of the new government's, 
in which there are no provisional notes, and which express our peaceful 
policies. 

The United States, of course, has indicated clearly that she is not 
interested in mere promises as much as she is in putting said promises 
in effect. It is necessary, therefore, for us to be prepared to withdraw 
our troops as soon as the freezmg order is rescinded and materials 
are made available to us. 

Please advise us as to your intentions after perusing my message 
#1133*. (Hull told me that he would be glad to see me at any time. 
However, the day after tomorrow, the 20th, is a major holiday here, 
so if you could make it possible for me to make a reply tomorrow, 
it would be very convenient for me.) 

25243 

JD-1: 6760 (D) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (2) 

•JD-l: 6759 (S. I. S. #25242). 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 18, 1941 
Purple 
#788 (Strictly Secret) 

Re your #1098.* 

1. It is hard to prophesy the future course of. events, but m the 
case of "B" if we carry out the first sailing proposal in my #786 * 
for: (a) the remaining ofl&cials; (b) such persons as must absolutely 
not be held back; (c) company employees; and (d) all residents who 
were unable to board the three ships previously dispatched, the matter 
can be satisfactorily handled. We will at this sailing have the 
families of our various diplomatic officials as well as members of 
their staffs who must retm-n to Japan, without an exception, board 
the ship. However, we do not intend to warn any save those of our 
residents who must of a certainty return to sail. The number of 
those who actually embarked at the first sailing was much smaller 
than the original number of appHcants. The reason was, doubtless, 
nostalgia and a reluctance to part with their property. 

2. Will you secretly, therefore, suitably advise the several consuls 
to take the following steps: (a) to help our citizens who remain behind 
to work together for the common good ; (b) to destroy immediately 
such secret documents and so forth as are in the possession of Japanese 
companies and chambers of commerce. 



79716 O— 46 — pt. 12 12 



154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

3. We are now studying ways and means of cooperation between 
our diplomatic officials and our consulates, as Well as responsibility 
for the interests of our high offices in case of "B". We will negotiate 
concerning the latter here in Tokyo. 

4. I am wiring you next a plan for reducing the members of staffs. 

Army 24976 Trans. 11/19/41 (S) 

» Not available. 



[Secret] 



From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

November 18, 1941 

Purple CA 

#1135 (Departmental Secret) 

On the evening of the 17th, both of us went to call on a certain 
cabinet member and this is what he told us: 

''The President is very desirous of an understanding between Japan 
and the United States. In his latest speech he showed that he enter- 
tained no ill will towards Japan. I would call that to your attention. 
Now the great majority of the cabinet members, with two exceptions, 
in principle approve of a Japanese American understanding. If 
Japan would now do something real, such as evacuating French Indo- 
China, showing her peaceful intentions, the way would be open for 
us to furnish you with oil and it would probably lead to the reestab- 
lishment of normal trade relations. The Secretary of State cannot 
bring public opinion in line so long as you do not take some real and 
definite steps to reassure the Americans," 
Army 25089 Trans. 11/21/41 (2) 

From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
19 November 1941 
(J 19) 
Circular #2353 

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency. 

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), 
and the cutting off of international communications, the following 
warning will be added in the middle of the daUy Japanese language 
short wave news broadcast. 

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO 
KAZEAME.* 

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.** 

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.*** 

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather 
forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is 
heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a com- 
pletely secret arrangement. 

Forward as urgent intelligence. 

25432 

JD-1: 6875 (Y) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S^TT) 

*East wind rain. 
••North wind cloudy. 
•••West wind clear. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 155 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
19 November 1941 

(J 19) 
Circular #2354 

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add 
the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence 

(1) If "it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI". 

(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA". 

(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E, I.) ; 

"NISHI". 
The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and 
end. 

Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco. 

25392 

JD-1: 6850 ■ (Y) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
19 November 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#798 

Re my #797* 

The condition outlined by them namely "After the peaceful policies 
of Japan have been made more definite", we imagine would naturally 
have reference to the question of the three-power treaty. It does not 
mean merely that Japan will withdraw her troops from Southern 
Indo-China, and that then the U. S. will go back to conditions prior 
to the freezing act. It leaves the way open for the U. S. to bring up 
rather complicated terms. 

On the other hand, the internal situation in our country is such that 
it would be difficult for us to handle it if we withdraw from Southern 
French Indo-China, merely on assurances that conditions prior to this 
freezing act will be restored. It would be necessary to have a pro- 
posed solution that would come up to the B** proposal. With the 
situation as urgent as it is now, it is of utmost importance that you 
play your hand for the amelioration of the situation, to the extent of 
the proposal in your message, then to push on for an understanding. 

The Ambassador did not arrange this with us beforehand, but made 
the proposal contained in your message for the purpose of meeting^ 
the tense situation existing within the nation, but this can only result 
in delay and failure in the negotiations. The Ambassador, therefore, 
having received our revised instructions, (after reading ouj- #797*, 
#800,*** and #801****) will please present our B** proposal of the 
Imperial Government, and no further concessions can be made. 

If the U. S. consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will 
have to be broken off; therefore, with the above well in mind put forth 
your very best efforts. 



156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

We note what you say in your #1133***** and #1134*****, but in 
these negotiations consent can be given only within the scope of the 
instructions of this office. We would emphasize this. 

S. I. S. #25040 

JD-1: 6658 (F) Navy trans. 11-20^1 (S-TT) 

•JD-l: 6657. 

••JD-1: 6250, with additional paragraphs 5, 6, 7 in JD-1: 6528. 

•••JD-1: 6660. 

••••JD-1: 6661. 

•••••Not yet available. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
19 November 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#799 (In 2 parts, complete) 

In the proposal for a joint declaration by Japan and the United 
States, given in your #1096*, there are many points to which it 
would be difficult for the Imperial Government to give consent, as 
I have already cabled you. Secretary Hull's advocacy of a reciprocal 
trade agreement stated in the same dispatch, we can consent to as 
something he has advocated for many years, but we imagine it would 
have as many as possible of the opinions of the State Department's 
China specialists woven into it. Therefore, if we were to go into a 
discussion of each of these particulars, we would have to give up 
hopes of the possibility of reaching a settlement in a short time, (see 
my #736**). Now that matters have progressed this far, we think 
the only way to reach a full solution is to conclude an agreement 
now on a few absolutely essential items in order to prevent matters 
from going from bad to worse by long- view political adjustments, 
thus first of all avoiding the danger of an outbreak of war. 

(PaH 2) 

Therefore you will please delete from my #780***, paragraph 6 
(nondiscrimination in trade) and paragraph 7 (the Tripartite Agree- 
ment) and add my #801**** as item 2 of paragraph 5, and hand this 
to Secretary Hull. This will "drop" the question of non-discrimina- 
tion in international trade which has heretofore been an important 
pending problem between the two countries, and in view of the 
tjnited States attitude regarding troops stationed in China, this will 
be made the subject of conversations between Japan and China, in 

an effort to ease up the present tension. item 2: the 

transfer of troops from southern French Indo-China to the northern 
part, is an important concession we would venture to make for the 

sake of speeding the agreement, in order to save the situation 

and with President Roosevelt's immediate (this should mean within 
one week) approval, have it ready for signatures of both countries. 

Furthermore if they insist, it will be all right to agree to the 

of 6 and 7 (non-discrimination in trade and Tripartite Treaty) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 157 

of my #780***, but because of the reasons stated in your #1129*****, 
in regard to our attitude to these two questions, we cannot change 
my #784******. (As Hull at present does not seem to be taking so 
much account of matters in China, I think he (or we) will not insist 
on deleting from "on the understanding" on. 

In regard to paragraph 7 (the Tripartite Treaty) see the latter 
part of my #800*******. 

25035 

JD-1: 6659 (F) Navy Trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT) 

•JD-l: 6585 (S. I. S. #24931 and 25006). 
••JD-1: 6254 (S. I. S. #24373). 
•••JD-1: 6555 (S. I. S. #24872). 
••••JD-1: 6661 (S. I. S. #25037). 

•••••Not available. 

••••••JD-1: 6561 (S. I. S. #24880). 

JD-1: 6660 (S. I. S. #25036). 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
19 November 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#800 

Re my #799* 

Re paragraph 1 of my #781**. 

Southeast Asia and the South Pacific includes the Netherlands 
East Indies and Thai, but does not include China. Re item 2 of 
paragraph 3. All the main items shall be considered and settled by 
the two governments before signatures are affixed to this agreement. 
Please bear in mind that paragraph 4 means the cessation of all help 
to Chiang Kai-shek by the United States. 

Re paragraph 5. Article 2 (my #801***) is an important concession 
we venture to make for the sake of speeding the conclusion of the 
agreement. 

Re paragraph 6. We could not agree to the principle of no dis- 
crimination in trade being applied only to China, as I have stated 
in my #784****. 

Re paragraph 7, item 2, the explanation of our attitude ( self- 
defense ) in the event of the United States entering the European 

war. in such a case the Empire would as to whether 

or not there had been an attack the interpretation of the pro- 
vision of the Tripartite Treaty. You may make it clear that there 
are no secret agreements in the Three Power Treaty. (However, 
you will please withhold your explanation of this item until you 
see prospects of this agreement materializing). 

25036 

JD-1: 6660 (F) Navy Trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT) 

•JD-1: (S. I. S. #25035^ 
••JD-1: 6556 (S. I. S. #24873). 
•••JD-1: 6661 (S. I. S. #25037). 
••••JD-1: 6561 (S. I. S. #24880). 



158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
19 November 1941 
(Purple) (Eng.) 
#801 

The government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove 
the Japanese troops now stationed in the southern part of French 
Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the con- 
clusion of the present agreement. 

25037 

JD-1 6661 • (M) Navy Trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT) 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
19 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#1136 

I know that it is beyond our powers to imagine the anxiety felt by 
the Cabinet leaders who bear the heavy responsibility of saving the 
nation and succoring the people at this time when relations between 
Japan and the United States have now at last reached the point of 
cruciality. There are now tnree ways which the Empire might take — 

(1) Maintain the status quo. 

(2) Break the present deadlock by an advance under force of 

arms. 

(3) Devise some means for bringing about a mutual non-aggres- 

sion arrangement. 

No. 1 would mean that both sides would continuie to increase war 
preparations and send out larger fleets of war vessels bringing about 
a state where only a contact would be needed to start a conflagration. 
In other words this would finally result in an armed clash and it 
differs from No. 2 only in the matter of the longer or shorter time 
involved . 

No. 3 would mean finding some provisional arrangement by which 
the present deadlock might be broken, and at the same time attaining 
our objectives under the peace for which we have been striving. My 
#1134* of yesterday was sent with this purpose in mind. The dis- 
pleasure felt by the government is beyond my power of comprehension, 
but as I view it, the present, after exhausting our strength by four 
years of the China incident following right upon the Manchuria inci- 
dent, is hardly an opportune time for venturing upon another long 
drawn out warfare on a large scale. I think that it would be better 
to fix up a temporary "truce" now in the spirit of "give and take" 
and make this the prelude to greater achievements to come later. 

I am thus frankly setting before you my humble opinion as supple- 
mentary to my message of yesterday.** 

25248 

JD-1: 6769 (F) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (2) 

•JD-l: 6665. 

••Wash-Tok #1138 (JD-1: 6771) says: "At the end of my message #1136 (S. I. S. #25250) please add 'please 
convey the above to- the (Prime 7) Minister' ". 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 159 

, [Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
19 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#1140 

Re your #791* 

(1) We assume that the date, 25 November, mentioned in your 
message #736**, is an absolutely unalterable one. We are making all 
our arrangements with that as the basis. 

We are also in receipt of your instructions concerning your con- 
versations with the British Ambassador (your message #763***). 

In view of those, we have been hinting to the United States that 
it is of much importance that we receive some definite reply within 
ten days and that it is impossible for us to continue with the negotia- 
tions if there is any further delay. 

At a time when we are thus pressing them for an early reply, I feel 
that it would do us great harm were we to announce that we are 
having ships, with all the accompanying dark implications, leave on or 
about the 25th or 26th. We feel that such a statement by us would 
lead to their having doubts of the determined front we have been 
putting up. We feel that such a step would not be in accordauce 
with your repeated instructions to bring about an early settlement. 

In view of these facts, I beg of you to reconsider the matter. 

If it is impossible to do so, please let us postpone our making that 
announcement for at least four or five days to permit us to see how the 
talks are progressing. 

After you have given these points your consideration, please advise 
us. 

(2) The number of persons connected with business firms who still 
remain here and who wish to return to Japan does not warrant the 
sending of a ship at this time. If it is for the purpose of taking our 
nationals home from Panama, we feel that a ship sent to South 
America could be rerouted for them. 

(3) If the final decision is reached to have the ship sent here, there 
will be no difficulty in arranging matters for the evacuating of govern- 
ment officials and their wives. However, there will no doubt be much 
complication if it is your intention to have all men connected with 
business firms depart. We feel that it would be necessary that the 
home offices of these people should be notified, and that the said home 
offices should in turn send notifications and instructions to their 
personnel on the scene. 

Please give these points your consideration. 
25142 
JD-1: 6708 (D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (2) 

- *Not available. 
•*JD-1: 6254. 
•••JD-1: 6416. 



160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] » 

From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
20 November, 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#806 

It seems that your #1136* passed my #798** enroute, but under 
the circumstances here, we regret that the plan suggested by you, as 
we have stated in our message would not suffice for saving the present 
situation. 

We see no prospects for breaking the deadlock except for you to 
push negotiations immediately along the lines of the latter part of 
our #798. Please understand this. The Premier also is absolutely 
in accord with this opinion. 

S. I. S. #25038 

JD-1: 6663 (F) Navy Trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT) 

*Not yet available. 
♦•JD-1: 6658. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo (Togo) 
To: Ankara 
November 20, 1941 
J-16 
Circular #2364 (Strictly secret) 

1. Since the formation of the Cabinet, the Government has been 
in conference for successive days with the Imperial General Head- 
quarters. They have given due consideration to the development of 
a fundamental national policy which will correspond to the urgent 
exigencies of the situation. Insofar as this is concerned, in the 
conference which took place on the morning of the 5th, decisions were 
reached covering fundamental policies having to do with the adjust- 
ment of diplomatic relations with Japan and the United States. 

2. Insofar as Japanese-American negotiations are concerned, 
in proceeding upon these negotiations for the adjustment of diplomatic 
relations on a just basis, conferences have been in progress since the 
7th. However, there is great disparity between their opinions and 
our own. In the light of the trend of past negotiations there is 
considerable doubt as to whether a settlement of the negotiations 
will be reached. Insofar as we are concerned we have lent our maxi- 
mum eflorts in order to bring about a settlement of the negotiations. 
However, the situation not permitting any further conciliation by us, 
an optimistic view for the future is not permitted. In the event that 
negotiations are broken off, we expect that the situation in which 
Japan will find herself will be extremely critical. The above is for 
your information alone. 

This message is addressed to Switzerland, Turkey and Moscow. 
Switzerland will transmit to France, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Finland 
and South Africa. Turkey will transmit to Roumania, Bulgaria, 
Hungary. 
Army: 25427 Trans. 11/2S/41 (2) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 161 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

November 20, 1941 

Purple (Extremely Urgent) 

#1144 

At noon on the 20th I, accompanied by Ambassador KURUSU, 
called on Secretary HULL at the State Department and we talked 
for an hour and a half. Today we went into a somewhat lengthy 
explanation of the various subjects taken up in the instructions in 
your message #798 *. On everything else HULL expressed no note- 
worthy differences of opinion, however, when we came to the part 
about the United States doing nothing to obstruct our efforts for a 
comprehensive peace with China, he showed that he was terribly 
aroused. He said, "So long as it is not made clear that Japan is 
turning toward a peaceful policy it will be impossible to stop aiding 
CHIANG just like it will also be impossible to cut off assistance from 
Great Britain," or words to that effect. He said that in any case, 
after particular study, he would have some views to express. 
Army 25137 Trans. 11/22/41 (2) 

» See S. I. S. #25040. Tokyo says that no further concessions can be made other than the "B" Proposal 
and if the United States' consent to this cannot be secured negotiations will have to be broken off. 



[Secret] 
To: Tokyo 
From: Washington 
November 20, 1941 
Purple (Very Urgent) 
#1147. Departmental secret 

To be handled in Government Code. 

(Part 1 of 2) 

Our conversation with HULL on the 20th may be summarized as 
follows: (That day is America's biggest holiday. They call it 
"Thanksgiving." In spite of that, however, Mr. HULL not only 
agreed to talk with, but seemed glad to see both me and Ambassador 
KURUSU when we went to call on him.) 

First, we explained the various items mentioned in the instructions 
in your #798 *. HULL had only one or two questions about the 
other parts and expressed hardly any opinions but, when we came to 
the part where we state that we do not want the United States to do 
anything to hinder us in bringing about a complete peace over China, 
he seemed extremely reluctant to consider it. He went on to reiterate 
what he has always said about the Tri-Partite Alliance. He said that 
so long as fears emanating from that treaty existed in the heads of the 
Americans, the United States would find it well-nigh impossible to 
cease aiding CHIANG KAI-SHEK and that, as we knew, the United 
States is now opposing the German policy of military expansion which 
knows no bounds; that on the one hand she is helping Great Britain 
and on the other hand CHIANG KAI-SHEK; that thprefore until 
we Japanese made it perfectly clear that our policy is to be one of 
peace, it will be impossible to cease aiding China, just like it will be 



162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

impossible to stop aiding England. He continued that, leading up 
to the state of affairs we find today, American interests in Japan, 
including Manchukuo, had undergone terrible embarrassment. 

Army 25179 Trans. 11-24-41 (S) 

» S. I. S. #25040 which tells Ambassador NOMURA to present Proposal "B" to the U. S. Government 
and says that no further concessions will be made. 



[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
November 20, 1941 
Purple 
#1147 (Part 2 of 2) (Departmental Secret) 

(To be handled in Government Code.) 

KURUSU said, "When I had an interview with the President the 
other day, he talked as if he would like to act as an introducer. Now 
if he wants to take the trouble to do this introducing in order to bring 
about peace, I cannot reconcile it with continued assistance to 
CHIANG KAI-SHEK, which actually hinders peace. In other words, 
it seems quite reasonable to us to ask the President to stop aiding 
CHIANG if he is going to act as an introducer." HULL replied, 
"Well, what the President meant when he said that was that he was 
presupposing that you Japanese would first make it apparent that 
your fundamental policy was peaceful. Heretofore, influential 
Japanese statesmen have expressed opinions favorable to HITLER 's 
military expansion policy, and the American people find it very diffi- 
cult to believe that Japan is turning peaceful." I said, "Well, the 
plan which I proposed today makes no progress whatever on two or 
three points. However, since the situation is so tense, if the tension 
between Japan and the United States can be relaxed, be it ever so 
little, particularly in the southwestern Pacific, and quickly clear the 
atmosphere, then I think we could go on and settle everything else." 
HULL said, "Yes, I understand what you mean thoroughly, but that 
would be very hard to do. In any case, you and I have on our 
shoulders a heavy responsibility toward both the Japanese and Ameri- 
can people. I might say toward the whole human race." Mr. 
hull's face assumed a sadly compassionate expression, and he said, 
"I want to think over this proposal you have brought me fully and 
sympathetically, and then I want to talk to you again. 

Army 25180 Trans. 11/22/41 (2) 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

November 20, 1941 

Purple 

#1148. (To be handled in government code) 

Secretary of State HULL, in the conversations I detailed in my 
#1144 *, expressed his satisfaction that in the last two or three days 
Japanese newspaper editorial comment on the United States had 
become calm. This, doubtless, is due to your great efforts. 

Since newspaper editorial comment in this country has become 
extremely circumspect in conjunction with our conversations, no 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 163 

doubt as a reflection of State Department opinion, I would like to 
have you continue your efi"orts in guiding newspaper opinion. 
Army 25174 Trans. 11/24/41 (2) 

» S. I. S. #25137 in which HULL says that so long as it is not made clear that Japan is turning toward a 
peaceful policy, it will be impossible to stop aiding China. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
21 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#810 (Part 1 of 2) (Separate wire) 

(Chief of Office routing) 

Formal note 

"I have the honor of addressing this note to you to inform you that 
my home government has instructed me to forward you a copy of an 
agreement drawn up between tlie government of Japan and the govern- 
ment of the United States of America on the . . . (blank) . . . 
of this month. At the same time I have the honor to transmit to you 
the following information: 

"For the purpose of assuring the maintenance of peace on the 
Pacific and through that to contribute to the recovery and promotion 
of peace tlu-oughout the world, this agreement was drawn up between 
Japan and the United States. 

"The Imperial Government is firmly convinced that the govern- 
ment of your country, like the governments of Japan and of the United 
States, is vitally interested in the purposes indicated above. We, 
therefore, beg permission to draw your government's attention to the 
contents of this agreement, and particularly to Article One, Article 
Two, Article Three, Article Four, and Article Six, (Article Six, only 
if it is included), thereof. 

"The various articles enumerated above concern, respectively, the 
political stabilization in the Pacific area; access to materials produced 
in the Netherlands Indies; the trade relations between Japan and the 
United States; the China Incident; and, the non-discriminatory 
treatment in international commerce, (this last, only if it is included 
in the agreement). 

"The two governments have made a joint declaration including the 
above points. We feel that your government and mine could utilize 
the understandings in the same manner as between Japan and the 
United States. 

"Therefore, in the hopes that the aims thus drawn up in this agree- 
ment may more fully be realized, the Imperial Government herewith 
wishes me to advise you that it is prepared to take suitable steps to 
come to a formal understanding between your government and mine 
on the specific points enumerated above. We expectantly await 
your government's advice that it would be similarly disposed. 

"Accept, Sir, these renewed assurances of my highest consideration." 

— formal close — 

N 

{Part 2 follows) 
25126 
(JD-1: 6687) (D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (S-TT) 



164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From-c Tokyo 
To: Washington 
21 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#810 (Part 2 of 2) 

Formal reply 

"I have the honor of addressing you in order that I may respectfully 
acknowledge the receipt of a copy of the Agreement on a Joint Under- 
standing which has been drawn up between your government* and 

the government of the United States dated the (blank date) 

of this month and your accompanying explanatory note. 

"Your explanation was to the effect that 

"I have the honor to inform you that I am receipt of a reply from 
my government to the effect that the government of Great Britain (or 
the Netherlands Government) understands the objectives drawn up in 
this draft agreement, and in the hope that they may be more fully 
realized, is disposed to take suitable steps to come to a formal under- 
standing between your country and mine on the points specifically 
enumerated above. 
"Accept, Sir, renewed assurances of my highest consideration." 
(Leave some space, and then way down at the bottom place:)** 

— formal close — 

/s/ ** 

25126 JD-1: 6687 (D) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (S-TT) 

•Japan. 

**This is Japanese language epistolary style. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
21 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#811 

In case you use Proposal "B"* for an agreement, as an introductory 
paragraph please tentatively incorporate the following draft: 

"The Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the 
United States of America, impelled by their strong desire of preserv- 
ing peace in the Pacific, and recognizing the vital importance of a 
frank expression on the part of both countries of a sincere determina- 
tion to embrace peaceful methods, declare it as their mutual under- 
standing that:" 

25130 

JD-1: 6688 (M) Navy Trans. 11-22-41 (S-TT) 

•JD-l: 6250 (S. I. S. #24338). 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 165 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Berlin 
21 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#969 

At present, the possibility of peace between Germany and the 
Soviet Union seems remote. However, it may be that Germany 
would prefer to avoid being faced with a long term resistance by the 
U. S, S. E., so that she — Germany — may transfer her entire fighting 
forces to some other part. On the Soviet side, it seems possible that 
sentiment for peace may develop when she views the situation from 
the standpoint of reconstruction. 

Our relations with the United States may have considerable effect 
on our southward program, depending, of course, on what turns those 
relations take. In other words, our relationship with Great Britain 
and the United States has a great bearing on the future of our national 
greatness. 

For this reason, we would like to avoid the rise of any violence at 
this time. At the same time, we would like to break up the policy of 
British-U. S.-U. S. S. R. joint action. We would, therefore, welcome, 
if anything, peace between Germany and the Soviet Union. For the 
purpose of enhancing our position, we would not be opposed to medi- 
ating in a peace, if such a course is possible. 

Will you, therefore, bearing the above in mind, keep an eye on 
developments (message unfinished) . 

25171 

JD-1: 6731 (D) Navy Trans. 11-24^1 (C-NR) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 22, 1941 
Purple CA (Urgent) 
#812 

To both you Ambassadors. 

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my 
#736*. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. 
Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and 
try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond 
your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese- American rela- 
tions by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can 
finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be 
completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you — twenty ninth); 
if the pertinent notes can be exchanged ; if we can get an understand- 
ing with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything 
can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time 
we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After 
that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into 
your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. 
This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors 
alone. 

Army 2513 8 Trans. 11/22/41 (S) 

• See 8. 1. S. #24373. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely 
necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. 



166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 22, 1941 
Purple (GA) 
#815 

The Anti-Comintern Agreement runs out on the 24th, and for some 
time we have been conferring with the signatories. It has been de- 
cided that this agreement shall be in effect for five more years and that 
on the 25th in Berlin, Japan, Germany, Italy, Manchukuo, Hungary, 
and Spain will all six sign the protocol. 

Germany, fighting Russia as she is, seems to be thinking about the 
propagandistic effect of this signing. However, we, for several con- 
siderations, intend to handle the matter circumspectly. You know 
we have Japanese- American relations to think about. This is for 
your information. 
Army 25140 , Trans. 11/22/41 (S) 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 22, 1941. 
Purple (CA) (Urgent) 
#816. 

So it Seems that the United States is reluctant to definitely promise 
to do nothing to prevent the establishment of peace between Japan 
and China in accordance with Clause 4 of Proposal "B". Well, if 
they will accept our proposal "B", we will have no objection to letting 
President ROOSEVELT be our introducer. Through his mediation, 
on the basis of the American proposal (B) of the 12th, China would 
be made to express her friendly intentions toward Japan, and, as a 
result, peace negotiations would ensue. Then as soon as an armistice 
agreement were established between Tokyo and Chungking, there 
would be no basis in fact for continuance of American assistance to 
CHIANG KAI-SHEK. Thus, as a result of the mediation which 
President ROOSEVELT would exercise, CHIANG KAI-SHEK 
would by the American Government be caused to propose a cessation 
of hostilities. The American Government accordingly, hoping for 
the establishment of amicable relations between the Japanese and 
Chinese, should do her best to support our efforts in this direction 
and they should make it clear that they will refrain from any act 
that would hinder us in achieving this objective. Therefore, will you 
please endeavor to have the Americans accept our "B" proposal and, 
in case an understanding is reached, please endeavor by the date set 
in my #812 * to have the President prevail upon CHIANG KAI- 
SHEK to send us a peace proposal (a very brief one will be all right). 

Army 25175 Trans. 11-24-41 (2) 

• S. I. S. #26138 in which the deadline is extended from the 25th to the 29th 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 167 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 22, 1941. 
Purple (CA) (Urgent) 
#817 

Ee your #1144.* 

I take it»that the "B" plan which you proposed on the 20th included 
the second clause of (5) relative to moving troops from southern to 
northern French Indo-China, and left out (6) concerning non-discrim- 
ination in commerce and (7) the Tri-Partite Treaty. Am I right? 
Wire me back just as soon as you get this whether or not the Americans 
took any particular note of the fact that you left out (6) and (7). 
Army #252 12 Trans. 11-25-41 (S) 

• S. I. S. #25137— Ambassador NOMURA says Secretary HULL has expressed no noteworthy differences 
of opinion except with regard to China. He said that so long as it is not made clear that Japan is turning 
toward a peaceful policy, it will be impossible to stop aiding CHIANG. 



[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

November 22, 1941 

Purple 

#1158 (Government Code) (Secret outside the Department) 

Re your # 817.* 

As you are aware, I have advised them concerning the first part. 
Insofar as the latter part of that message is concerned, on the occasion 
of the interview outlined in my #1147," no reference was made to this 
matter. However, after they have studied the matter, they wUl 
doubtless present some opinions concerning it. 

Furthermore, Ambassador KURUSU and myself, at their request, 
are scheduled to have an interview, as already announced, with Sec- 
retary of State HULL at 8:00 P. M. today, the 22nd. 
Army 25181 . Trans. 11/24/41 (2) 

• Available, being worked on. 
b See S. I. S. #25179-80. 



[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

23 November 1941 

(Purple) 

#1159 (In 4 parts, complete) 

On the 22nd, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu, called on the 
Secretary of State, Hull. (Ballentine was also present). The resume 
of our conversation follows: 

Hull: ''I conferred with the Ambassador and Ministers of Britain, 
Australia, and the Netherlands on the 22nd." (The press reports 
that this conference lasted for about two and a half hours.) "I sought 
their opinion on the Japanese proposals. They all said that if Japan's 
intentions are assuredly pacific, then they would wholeheartedly favor 
them. They said that it would be the source of much joy to them to 



168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

cooperate in the matter of resuming trade relations with Japan under 
those circumstances. 

"However, they said, we are not sure of Japan's real intentions as 
yet, for while on the one hand she apparently indicates her desire for 
peace by dispatching a special envoy, the tone of the politicians and 
press of Japan seems to be in direct opposition. 

"The diplomats who called on me also pointed out that just prior 
to the application of the freezing order, Japanese imports of petroleum 
took a very sudden upward swing, disproving any contention that it 
was to be used solely for peaceful undertakings, but that it was being 
stored away by the navy. 

"They further expressed the opinion that the embargo should be 
lifted only in slow degrees. 

"These diplomats, however, said that they would seek their home 
governments' instructions regarding the Japanese proposals and would 
submit their replies by the coming Monday. Upon receiving these 
advices, I shall make a reply to you." 

{Part 2)* 

Thus the Secretary seemed to feel considerable concern over the 
recent trend of Japan's public opinion. He pointed out that a clear 
statement by the Japanese Government of its desire for peace would 
have a most important reaction on the public opinion of the United 
States. (Ballantine said that a clear statement of attitude from the 
government of Japan to the Japanese people, which would of course 
be cabled abroad, would bear more fruit than propagandistic reports 
sent through press channels for foreign consumption only) and in turn 
would have a most favorable bearing on the chances of a settlement. 
He even went on to say that was it not the duty of every politician to 
strive for peace up to the day before war is found to be unavoidable? 
The President and the Secretary of State, he said * * * (two or 
three lines too badly garbled). 

I then said: "Leaving British, Australian and Dutch opinions aside 
for the time being, what is the attitude of the United States itself 
regarding our pr^^osal?" 

His subsequent reply, which he made by taking up the proposal 
paragraph by paragraph, was a complete evasion. However, there 
were indications that what the United States, Britain, Australia, etc. 
actually desire is to dissolve the crisis in the south Pacific, so that the 
fighting powers they have to maintain in this area to keep things 
under control, may be transferred for action in other parts. 

{Part 3) 

He pointed out that since that is their main objective, the assurances 
given by Japan in her proposals were insufficient. 

I said: "Our troop concentrations in the northern part of French 
Indo-China are aimed at cutting Chungking's life line. Therefore, 
they are, for the most part, directed towards Yunnan. As such, they 
do not and are not intended to form a threat to the south Pacific area." 

After I pointed out this fact, Kurusu said that the acceptance of our 
proposal would naturally lead to the conditions desired not only by 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 169 

the United States, but by the other nations he referred to. To this, 
Hull replied that what these countries desired was a quick turn-about 
in the situation. 

Hull: "With regard to resumption of trade, a rapid change in the 
situation can be wrought here, too, once Japan's Pacific intentions 
have been ascertained. This change for the better can be brought 
about in a mere matter of days." 

Regarding aid to China, Hull said: 

"We must take into consideration the possibility of a U. S. media- 
tion when considering the possibility of cutting off aid to Chiang. 
If we promise Japan that we shall cease aiding China, the United 
States could no longer be considered a fair and neutral party to propose 
peace between China and Japan. 

(Part 4) 

"Moreover, if it is terminated immediately upon the beginning of 
the negotiations, the promise would be utterly without value. In 
any event, the so-called 'aid to Chiang Kai-shek' is not as great as is 
commonly publicized. 

"It is Japan's desire to improve the situation which has reached a 
critical stage by first settling the outstanding factors involved. Since 
that is the desire expressed by your proposals, we cannot at this time 
concur in Japan's demands with regard to stopping aid to Chiang." 

He went on to say that he did not believe that the time was as yet 
ripe for the President to suggest peace to China. 

I said "I feel that on Monday the United States will submit some 
sort of a counter proposal to us. I further feel that this proposal will 
contain a suggestion that Japan join in some plan to maintain peace 
on the Pacific and in some kind of a trade agreement. No doubt it 
wUl be necessary for the United States and Japan to come to some 
preliminary agreement, after which it would be submitted to the other 
countries for their approval." 

Kurusu: "If it is intended that a sort of a group be formed by 
those nations and that if they expect to make it appear as if we were 
'voted down' by the majority of the voters, we wish to state now 
that we shall be absolutely unable to accept such a proposal." 

25347 

JD-1: 6839 (D) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (2) 

•Part 2 badly garbled; considerable reconstruction work contained. 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
23 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#1160 (In 2 parts, complete) 

Re my #1159* 

From Kurusu: 

Secretary Hull and I conferred for about a half an hour on the 21st 
to arrange our talks for the 22nd. At that time Hull said that he 
thought my idea of attaching so much importance to the agreement 
that it would outshine the Tripai'tite Pact, as expressed by me during 
our talks on the 18th, was wholeheartedly in favor of peace on the 

79716 O— 46— pt. 12 13 



170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Pacific through joint action of the United States and Japan, and 
through this accomplishment, to contribute to the peace of the world. 
He went on to say that he still remembers with pleasure that at the 
Economic Conference in London, he fought for free commerce shoulder 
to shoulder with Viscount Isii and (Eigo Fukai ?). Hull said that 
he has looked upon Japan's leadership in the Far East as only a 
natural phenomenon. It is true that Japan's actions and statements 
regarding the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere have been slightly on 
the unpolished and abrupt side but he is able to be sympathetic with 
the spirit of it. 

{Part 2) (Garbled) 

As long as Japan strives for this goal without resorting to the force 
of arms, the United States has nothing against the program and has 
no intention of interfering with its realization. 

"I would like to see the U. S. -Japanese relationship which existed 
shortly subsequent to the Russo-Japanese war reestablished. At that 
time Japan and the United States exercised their influence over the 
Far East and the Western Hemisphere respectively, but at the same 
time maintained very friendly relations and close cooperation in all 
matters with each other. 

"I hope that we can revive the spirit of those times and reach an 
agreement to maintain peace on the Pacific. At the same time, I 
wish that Japan would make it clear that the Tripartite Pact is not 
an obstacle to attaining that goal". 

Under the present critical conditions, the United States acceptance 
or rejection of our Proposal "B" may have a vital bearing on whether 
or not the negotiations will break down. Ho»vever, because of the 
circumstances outlined in my message referred to in the heading, we 
may receive some proposal from Hull with regard to an agreement 
covering the Pacific area on Monday. 

In the meantime, if you have any suggestions which may lead to a 
settlement, please advise us immediately. 
25397 
JD-1: 6857 - (D) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (2) 

•JD-l: 6839 (S. I. S. #25347). 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
23 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#1161 (In 2 parts, complete) 

Regarding my #1160* 

General outline of conversation on the night of 22nd is as follows: 
Trade between Japan and the United States could gradually be 
resumed if Japan were willing to take a peaceful attitude, representa- 
tives of foreign powers that are friendly with the United States met in 
conference yesterday. They were all advised of this and are to meet 
again on Monday, after they have reported to their own government 
and received their answers. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 171 

Hull continued that there was a limit to his powers, and although 
he understood the reason for Tokyo's demand of urgency regarding 
the matter, he does not seem to see the reason why Tokyo can not wait 
a few days. 

The Chinese Ambassador KOTEKI came to the conference yester- 
day, getting up from bed (due to illness) and arriving at the end of the 
conference. 

According to Hull he does not intend to act as a mediator in the 
Japan-China incident right now, or to give up aid to China, (however 
the aid to China today is not to a very great extent). It seems as 
though he wishes to handle (discuss) the China incident later. 

According to reliable information it seems that to station troops for 
duration of necessity can be considered as stationing of troops in- 
definitely, but if it was stated that troops were to be stationed for a 
certain period of four or five years, at the end of which period condi- 
tions were to govern restationing of troops, there might not be so much 
opposition. But with just an indefinite stationing of troops for an 
indefinite period, it would be against the U. S. policy which is against 
annexation and interfering with self-government. (The fact that 
during the preparatory conference last July, the Japanese troops went 
into French Indo-China, causing the conference of that time to be 
broken off) — the above was mentioned again today and thus hinting 
that it was hoped a similar occurrence would not develope this time. 

He continued that to merely move troops which were in southern 
French Indo-China to the north would not relieve the tension in the 
south Pacific or relieve the anxiousness of the countries of the south 
Pacific, etc. so that it was explained that to an experienced military 
observer this was great information and should add much to the peace 
of that part. Hull explained that the contents of the conference 
would be strictly restricted to himself alone, (then later said he would 
mention it to a few), so that gave the appearance of his not understand- 
ing much about military aspects. 

I presented the prelude of our B Proposal and tried to get his answer 
of yes or no on each item, and Hull seemed to feel that our B Proposal 
was a demand on the United States by Japan, and seemed very dis- 
pleased. He said there was no cause for Japan's making such de- 
mands, and that he was greatly discouraged in the attitude of Japan 
of insisting on direct answers when he was trying so hard to arrange 
a peaceful negotiation between the two countries. 

We (Japanese Ambassadors) kept a calm appearance throughout the 
talk, and at no time became excited, and the opponent's attitude was 
also the same. 

Hull explained that the United States was following peaceful atti- 
tude in the negotiations and he hoped Japan would also follow this 
peaceful attitude of the United States throughout the negotiations. 
25588 
JD-1: (Y) Navy Trans. 12-2^1 (X) 

•JD-l: 6857 (S. I. S. iKSSST). 



172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 24, 1941 
Purple (Very Urgent) 
#821 (Government Code) 

1. It seems that the United States as well as England, Australia, 
and the Netherlands is not satisfied with evacuation merely from the 
Southern part of French Indo-China. We have gone out of our way 
to venture this proposal in order to break the deadlock. We abso- 
lutely cannot make any further concessions. 

2. Our expectations, as I told you in my #798," go beyond the 
restoration of Japan- American trade and a return to the situation 
prior to the exercise of the freezing legislation and require the reali- 
zation of all points of Proposal B with the exception of clauses 6 and 
7. Therefore, our demand for a cessation of aid to CHIANG (the 
acquisition of Netherlands Indies goods and at the same time the supply 
of American petroleum to Japan as well) is a most essential condition. 
In view of the fact that this is a just demand, the fact that the gov- 
ernment of the United States finds it hard to accept it makes us here 
in Japan suffer inordinately. Therefore, on the basis of what I told 
you in my #816,* as well as all that has gone before, please make every 
effort to persuade the Government of the United States. 

3. Insofar as what we propose in Proposal B is concerned, the 
United States has misconstrued it as our demand. We here in Japan, 
in view of the extremely critical situation, only hope most earnestly 
for a speedy settlement. Naturally, that's all we want. Speaking 
further on this, it is necessary to warn the United States against 
enticing England, Australia, the Netherlands, etc., in paving the way 
for a joint hostile set-up. As you have written, we would like to 
secure the agreement of other competent countries in accordance 
with the gist of my #731 ^ at the same time Japan and the United 
States reach an understanding. 

Army 25176 Trans. 11/24/41 (S) 

» Not available. 

*> S. I. S. #25040 which tells Ambassador NOMURA to present Proposal B to the U. S. Oovenunent and 
says that no further concessions will be made. 

• See S. I. S. #25175. 

<• 8. I. S. #24333 in which Tokyo instructs Washington to impress upon the American officials the im- 
portance of having Great Britain and the Netherlands also agree to the proposals. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 24, 1941 
Purple (Very Urgent) 
#822. Secret outside the department. 

Re my #821.* 

On the 23d I asked the American Ambassador in Tokyo to visit me 
and added the following to what I had told him in my caption tele- 
gram: The movement of Japanese troops from southern French Indo- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 173 

China to the north is very important from a military standpoint. 
The occupation of northern French Indo-China is related to the basic 
settlement of the China incident, whereas the occupation of the 
southern portion was related to the freezing of funds by England and 
America. At the present time a total withdrawal of troops is utterly 
impossible and when the American President, acting as a spokesman 
for CHIANG KAI-SHEK, brings a proposal of peace to Japan in the 
China question, if Japan accepts this and enters into negotiations, it is 
only proper that we demand that America should not interfere with 
our efforts for peace. The above solution is not only the best, but 
the only way. Until this point is made clear, it is absolutely incom- 
patible with the sentiment of the Japanese people to settle the Japan- 
American negotiations and it is impossible for us to understand why 
America does not agree to this. I have been making the greatest 
efforts for our new proposal from the standpoint of cooperation 
with the American peace policy and have tried to cut down our 
stipulations, making them clear and concise. When these negotiations 
are established, we intend to pursue an increasingly peaceful policy 
on this basis. After I had told him this, the Ambassador left at once 
to cable the gfist to his home office. 
Army 25177 Trans. 11-24-41 (S) 

• S. I. S. #25176. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 24, 1941 
Purple 
#823 (Restricted Distribution) 

For both Ambassadors. 

The time limit set in my message #812 * is in Tokyo time. 

Army 25178 ^ Trans. 11/24/41 (NR) 

JD 6744 



• S. I. S. #25138 in which the deadline is extended from the 25th to the 29th. 



{Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Nanking 
25 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#499 

Re your #818* 

To Naval authorities: 

We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not 
reached an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have 
them (defer ?) for a while. 

25390 

JD-1: 6848 (F) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (6-AR) 

•Not available. 



174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
25 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#1177 
Re your #792* 

In this office we are withholding all reports regarding the content 
of the Japanese- American negotiations themselves or any predictions 
regarding the future. The State Department also is exercising ex- 
treme caution in its press conferences. Hence the Japanese corre- 
spondents here are transmitting various trends of the negotiations 
copied from newspaper articles here that are based on pure conjecture. 
Among these correspondents are those who recognize that the articles 
are valueless but who are being pressed by the head office for news. 
I have observed particularly this meaningless competition to get the 
news among the correspondents who have come to Washington from 
New York. That this senseless competition to gather inaccurate news 
will not exert a harmful influence on the course of the negotiations 
themselves is something that I cannot guarantee. Ii#view of this 
situation I would greatly appreciate it if the Foreign Office would 
speak a word of caution to the newspapers concerned regarding this 
useless competition between their special correspondents in collecting 
news regarding these negotiations. And it would be particularly 
helpful if the head offices of the newspapers concerned would issue 
orders direct to their special correspondents along this line. 

25434 

JD-1:6880 (H) Navy Trans. 11-28-il (1) 

♦Not available. 



[Secret] 
From: Hanoi 
To: Tokyo 
25 November 1941 
(Purple— YO) 
#118 

(Strictly secret.) 

We are advised by the military that we are to have a reply from 
the United States on the 25th. If this is true, no doubt the Cabinet 
will make a decision between peace and war within the next day or 
two. It goes without saying here, of course, that if the U. S. -Japanese 
negotiations are brought to a successful termination, the various 
enterprises shall be launched in accordance with the plans which have 
been laid down in advance. 

Should, however, the negotiations not end in a success, since prac- 
tically all preparations for the campaign have been completed, our 
forces shall be able to move within the day. 

Under these circumstances, however, there shall have to be some 
alterations in the program we have laid out for the various enter- 
prises. We shall, undoubtedly, have to establish organs and conduct 
negotiations which will not conflict with the campaign. The thing 
that we are most concerned about is whether or not, in the event of 
war, the status quo will be maintained as far as the French Indo- 
China's governmental set-up is concerned. I feel that it is essential 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 175 

that we not only be advised of this, but it must be done immediately 
as we wish to make all prearrangements as far in advance as possible. 

If you have any opinions as to the outcome of the Japanese-U. S. 
negotiations, will you please inform this office of them together with 
whatever other pertinent information you may deem wise to impart 
to us. 

Of course, I realize that secrecy is of the utmost importance. 
According to press reports, however, the United States conferred 
with the representatives of Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, and 
even of China, in Washington, and hence the governments of these 
countries are now aware of the matters being discussed in the Japanese- 
U. S. negotiations. Moreover, by means of (courier ?) service, the 
military here are aware of not only our stand in the negotiations but 
also of the general atmosphere of the said negotiations. 

We feel as if we, a Foreign Office organ, alone have been left out of 
the picture. As you pointed out in your circular message #2353* the 
situation is becoming exceedingly critical. Please, therefore, make 
arrangements to advise us on these points by means of either cable 
or by special messenger services. 

25345 

JD-1: 6838 (D) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S-TT) 

•Available, dated 19 November. 



[Secret] 
From: Bangkok 
To: Tokyo 
25 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#849 (In 2 parts, complete) 

In the event of the Empire's taking decisive action in a southward 
advance, it will of course be necessary in the exercise of a belligerent's 
rights to make clear the relations of sovereign and subjects. On the 
one hand it will be absolutely necessary to bring Thai into our camp. 
My conversation with Pibul as reported in my #834* was undertaken 
with this as the underlying motive. If and when Japan at last does 
make her proposals of joint defense, the following three points should 
be made especially definite, and Thai should be led to voluntarily take 
an attitude of cooperation with us. 

(1) In the event of an attack upon Burma and Malay, there would 
of course be a temporary infringement upon the territorial sovereignty 
of Thailand, but after our objectives have been attained, restoration 
would immediately be made, and the independence of Thai would be 
respected even more than at present while Thai is maintaining 
neutrality. 

(2) In case she cooperates in a positive way with Japan, full 
assurances will be given that Thailand's swamp lands will be reclaimed 
in the areas concerned. 

(3) In the event of Thai's assets in England being frozen great 
fluctuation would result in the value of Thai's money, but Japan would 
make available sufiicient funds to create a foundation for a yen 
"bloc" money system, and also give every consideration to providing 
petroleum and other essential commodities. 



176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

To summarize: By cooperating with Japan tli« racial longings of 
Thailand will be realized, and with indivisible relations with Japan 
her existence as an independent nation will be strengthened . . . (three 
lines missed) . . . stop with as simple a ... as possible to the effect that 
"will cooperate in every way for the realization of the objectives of 
East Asia coprosperity and stability", while the particulars as neces- 
sity may require will be put into a secret treaty . . . 

Furthermore, in the light of Japan's basic national policy which 
has for its purpose the establishment of an East Asia coprosperity 
sphere, and the emancipation of the Asiatic peoples, it goes without 
saying that Thailand's sovereignty must not be impaired beyond the 
minimum limits of necessity, and that her standing as an independent 
nation must be maintained to the very last; while strictest military 
discipline must be used to reassure the Thai populace and strict con- 
trol should by all means be exercised over any attempts at profiteering. 

Have sent by the hand of Consul General Asada who has re- 
turned to Japan, but to make doubly sure I am also cabling it to you. 

25389 

JD-1:6844 (F) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (S-TT) 

•Available, dated 21 November. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo (Togo) 
To: Washington 
November 26, 1941 

Purple (CA) (Urgent) 
#830 

To both Ambassadors. 

It seems that the American newspapers think that there is a connec- 
tion between the question of withdrawing our army from French 
Indo-China and that of the freezing of assets. As I have already 
indicated in my #798,* my proposal made on the 17th, even if sub- 
mitted by you, would be inadequate to meet the situation. Our 
final proposal envisages an agreement on the basis of the "B" pro- 
posal in toto (it excludes from the "B" proposal paragraphs 6 and 7; 
namely, the question of non-discrimination in trade and the question 
of the Three-Power Agreement, and includes, as indicated in my 
#816,^ the proposal which the United States Government made on 
the 12th; that is, the question of mediation by the United States for 
the purpose of establishing peace between Japan and China as con- 
tained in our Proposal '*B"), and so the acceptance of this proposal is 
the most that we can expect. In view of the fact that time is getting 
short with but few days left this month, I would like to have you at 
once contact the United States authorities again and do your utmost 
in getting them to accept our proposal. 

I need not suggest the following, for you, no doubt, have already 
thought of it. I would like to have you make full use of influential 
Americans about whom you have wired me in the past and put 
pressure on the United States authorities indirectly as well. 

Army 25790 Trans. 12-5-41 (6) 

• 8. 1. S. #25040 which states that no further concessions can be made and if the U. S. does not consent to 
Proposal B, the negotiations will have to be broken off. 

*> 8. 1. 8. #25175. If the U. S. accepts Proposal B, Japan wiH have no objection to letting Pres. ROOSE- 
VELT act as mediator between Japan and China. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , 177 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 26, 1941 
Purple (Priority) 
#833 (To be handled in Government Code) 

Re my #798* 

When you reach a settlement in accordance with our new proposal, 
it is essential that you secure guarantees for the acquisition of goods 
in connection with clauses 2 and 3 of that proposal. Of these goods, 
the acquisition of petroleum is one of the most pressing and urgent 
requirements of the Empire. Therefore, in accordance with the course 
of negotiations, prior to the signing of an understanding, and at as 
early a date as possible, I would like to have you make our wishes 
known insofar as petroleum imports are concerned along the following 
lines: 

4,000,000 tons per year from the United States. (This figure is the 
average amount of imports during the years 1938, '39, and '40 from 
the United States. The breakdown according to type, aviation gaso- 
line included, corresponds to the actual figures covering imports 
before the freezing legislation went into effect.) That is to say, 
roughly 333,000 tons per month. 

In addition, on the basis of past negotiations and roughly in the 
agreed amounts, we hope to import from the Netherlands Indies 
1,000,000 tons per year. 

After the establishment of a verbal agreement, I would like to have 
a definite promise of the above incorporated into an exchange of docu- 
ments between Your Excellency and the Secretary of State. 

Furthermore, these figures are to be taken as the basis for negotia- 
tion (however, they can not be called our absolute minimum figures). 
On the other hand, as far as we are concerned, along with a restoration 
of trade in the future, we hope for an increase of these figures over the 
past. Therefore, after you have read aU this, please negotiate along 
these lines to the best of your abilities. 

Army #25346 Trans. 11/26/41 (S) 

E 



• S. I. 8. #25040 which states that no further concessions can be made and if the United States does not 
consent to Proposal B, the negotiations will have to be broken off. 



178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 26, 1941. 
Purple 
#836. To be handled in Government Code. 

The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams 
take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your 
reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up 
Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and 
make your report to him. At that time we will use the following code: 



Japanese 
Sangoku Joyaku Mondai 
(Three-Power Treaty question) 
Musabetsu Taiguu Mondai 
(The question of nondiscrimina- 
tory treatment) 
Shina Mondai 
(The China question) 
Soori 
(Premier) 
Gaimudaijin 
(Foreign Minister) 
Rikugun 
(The Army) 
Kaigun 
(The Navy) 
Nichi-bei kooshoo 
(Japan- American negotiations) 
Daitooryoo 
(President) 
Haru 
(Hull) 

Kokunaijoosei 
(Internal situation) 
Jooho Suru 
(To yield) 
Jooho Sezu 
(Not to yield) 
Keisei Kyunten Suru 
(Situation taking critical turn) 

For your information, telephone addresses other than our Home 
Office are as follows: 

Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO: Setagaya 4617 
Section Chief KASE: Yotsuya 4793 
The Minister's residence: Ginza 3614 
The Vice-Minister's residence: Ginza 1022 



English 
Nyuu Yooku 
(New York) 
Shikago 
(Chicago) 
Sanfuranshisuko 
(San Francisco) 
I too Kun 
(Mr. Itoo) 
Data Kun 
(Mr. Date) 
Tokugawa Kun 
(Mr. Tokugawa) 
Maeda Kun 
(Mr. Maeda) 
Endan 

(Marriage proposal) 
Kimiko San 
(Miss Kimiko) 
Fumeko San 
(Miss Fumeko) 
Shoobai 
(Trade) 

Yama Wo Uru 
(To sell the mountain) 
Yama Wo Urenu 
(Not to sell the mountain) 
Kodomo Gaumareru 
(The child is born) 



Army #25344 
JD-6841 



Trans. 11-26-41 (S) 



, EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 179 

[Secret] 
. From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 

26 November 1941 (1745 EST) 
(Telephone code) * 
Trans-Pacific Telephone 

To Kumaicho Yamamoto** from Kurusu: 

Wakasugi speaking, said: 

"This is Wakasugi speaking at Kurusu 's request. Kurusu and 
Nomura have at this very moment gone to meet Hull with whom 
they had an appointment at 4:45." 

Yamamoto: "Would they then meet the President?" 

Wakasugi: "The would (arrange ?) (to) meet the President after 
seeing Hull, but they had not yet taken steps to see the President. 
Hull has been conversing with the Chinese for three days past and 
had seen the Chinese today also. The future of the present talks 
would be decided during the course of today's conversations." 

Yamamoto: "Call me by telephone again upon completion of to- 
day's meeting." 

Wakasugi: "Have you anything you want me to tell Kurusu?" 

Yamamoto: (Reply unintelligible to intercepter and according to 
him unintelligible to Wakasugi as well.) 

After above few unintelligible sentences Wakasugi concluded with 
a promise to phone later. 

(Note: A call has been placed for 2100 EST this evening). 

25348 

JD-1: 6842 (M) Navy Trans. 26 Nov. '41 (12-TT) 

•See JD-1: 6841 (S. I. S. #25344). 

••Head of American Division of Japanese Foreign Office. . 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 

26 November 1941 (1946 to 1953 EST) 
(Telephone Code)** 

Trans-Pacific Telephone 

To Kumaicho Yamamoto* from Kurusu: 

Kurusu: "I have made all efforts, but they will not yield.*** I 
sent a cable expressing my opinions to the Foreign Minister this 
morning. The situation is just like that. Otherwise there is no 
means of accomplishing it. I shall cable you now. Already," he 
interrupted himself, "you have a general understanding I imagine. 
Accordingly, I do not know how things will turn out regarding my 
meeting with the President. Hull is not making much progi'ess it 



seems." 



Apparently referring to the above mentioned cable he continued: 
"If tliat method can be worked out I shall work night and day on it. 
But there is no other means we can use. It is very regrettable." 

Yamamoto: "The situation in Tokyo is extremely critical also." 
After thanking Kurusu for his efforts he continued: "The proposition 
sent to the Foreign Minister is extremely difficult." 

Kurusu: "I believe it is of no avail". 

Yamamoto reiterated his opinion regarding its difficulty. 



180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Kurusu: "I rather imagine you had expected this outcome." 
Yamamoto: "Yes, I had expected it, but wished to exert every 

effort up to the final moment in the hope that something might be 

accomplished." 

Kurusu: "I am unable to make any movement (i. e. progress?) at 

all. Something will have to be done to get out of this situation." 

25349 

JD-1: 6843 (M) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (12-TT) 

•Head of American Division of Japanese Foreign Office. 

•♦See JD-l: 6841, (S. I. S. #25344), of this date. 

•••Interpretation is doubtful as yet. The intercepter read this as "Sore . . . kesa" (that . . . this 
morning) and translated this as "It is now . . .", with a distinct pause before and after this phrase. How- 
ever, the telephone code was not available to him. Verification will follow receipt of record. 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
November 26, 1941 
Purple (Extremely urgent) 
#1180. (Parti of 2) 

From NOMURA and KURUSU. 

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility 
of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other 
hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are 
to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they 
may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are com- 
plete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although 
we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President 
ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that 
Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of 
peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, 
we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in 
us) , and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not 
only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Con- 
sidering the possibility that England and the United States are 
scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection 
through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we 
should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French 
Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last Sep- 
tember President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French 
Indo-China and Thai.) 

Army 25435 

JD: 6891 Trans. 11-28-41 (1) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 181 

[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
November 26, 1941 
Purple (Extremely urgent) 
#1180. (Part 2 of 2) 

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not 
necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after 
we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India 
is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would 
attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the 
question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the 
third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, 
you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to 
wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled. 

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will 
have to express, so will Tour Excellency please be good enough at 
least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we 
hope that you will wire us back instantly. 

Army 25436 

JD: 6896 Trans. 11-28-41 (1) 



[Secret] 



From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
November 26, 1941. 
Purple (Extremely urgent) 
#1189. (Parti of 2) 

At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU 
met with Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours. 

HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government 
has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring 
carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty pro- 
posal presented by Japan on the 20th of this month, and I am sorry 
to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel 
compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment, 
reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st 
and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the 
following two proposals: 

A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four princi- 
ples." 

B.'(l) The conclusion of a mutual non-agression treaty between 
Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and 
Bangkok. 

(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the 
Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo- 
China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China. 

(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all 
French Indo-China. 

(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support 
no regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK. 

(5) The abolition of extra-territoriaUty and concessions in China. 
Army 25441 Trans. 11-28-41 (1) 



182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
November 26, 1941 
Purple (Extremely urgent) 
#1189. (Part 2 of 2) 

(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and 
the United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment. 

(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing 
orders. 

(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange. 

(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United 
States has contracted with third countries, they both definitely 
promise that these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the 
objectives of this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. 
(This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the Three-Power Pact.) 

In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded 
and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to 
Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a 
rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms 
as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and China doubtless put 
her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping 
CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches 
have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. 
Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai 
that she give us complete control over her national defense. All that 
is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so. 

Army: 25442 Trans. 11-28-41 (1) 

[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
November 26, 1941 
Purple (Extremely urgent) 
#1190. (Part 1 of 2) » 

Judging from the progress of present Japanese-American relations, 
with which you are well acquainted through successive telegrams, the 
American proposal on the 26th (message #1189") showed a great dis- 
parity between the demands of both parties. Unfortunately, there 
are no hopes of acceptance of our demands within the time limit you 
set. 

Although we have requested the agreement of various countries to 
the numerous demands made, the United States presented this pro- 
posal after having conferred with the same countries. Although we 
cannot allow ourselves to be caught napping by this scheming, we 
must follow out instructions. Up to the present we have only been 
able to press them for an early solution. During this time we have 
not expressed any final intention. Even the President on the 17th 
said that there would be "no last words." If we do not cause any 
stop in the present negotiations, in the case of taking independent 

action after the time set 

Army 25444 Trans. 11-28-^1 (1) 

• Part 2 not available. 

bS. I. 8. #26441. ^ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 183 

[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
November 26, 1941 
Purple (Extremely Urgent) 
#1190. (Part 2 of 2 )» « 

To be handled in Government Code. 

The United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiat- 
ing with the various competent countries. In view of the fact that 
she will propagandize that we are continuing these negotiations 
only with the view of preparing for our expected moves, should we, 
during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our 
scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility 
for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have 
been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing 
conversations because of our invasion of French Indo-China. Now, 
should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our 
negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent operations, 
there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counter- 
propaganda against us. They might consider doing the same thing 
insofar as our plans for Thai are concerned. Nevertheless, such a 
thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret; 
consequently, I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of 
course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotia- 
tions be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announce- 
ment to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for 
internal and external consumption. I would like, if such a course is 
followed, to make representations here at the same time. 

Furthermore, in view of the fact that there are considerations of 
convenience having to do with my interview with the President, 
should there be anything that you would want me to say at that 
time, please wire me back at once. 

Army 25480 Trans. 11-29-41 (1) 

• S. I. 8. nsiii. (Part 1 of 2). 



[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
November 26, 1941 
Purple (Extremely Urgent) 
#1191 Parti of 4. 

On the 26th at the request of Secretary HULL, KURUSU and I 
visited him. First of all, we read over cursorily the documents he 
handed us, which we sent you in separate messages #1192*, 1193** 
and 1194", and then engaged in an argument. The gist of it was 
as follows: 

(1) HULL said: "Although we have conferred with the various 
nations concerned and have studied your proposal of the 20th (B 
proposal with 6 and 7 left out) for five days, we have decided that 
we cannot consider it." 

(2) I said: "You talk of reconciling the American proposal of June 
21st with ours of September 25th, but this is vastly different from 
either." 



184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

HULL retorted: "As for that I want you to read and compare 
the paragraph I point out with the one immediately preceding it. 
I said that it was a plan for reconciling both the Japanese and Ameri- 
can proposals. Since the opening of conversations, the contents of 
it have heen kept secret and, therefore, in this country where popular 
opinion counts for so much, various surmises are arising; particidarly 
rumors are being circulated to the effect that we are leaving China 
in the lurch. I myself am in the foreground and in spite of what 
Japan said at the time of our conversation of the 22nd, various 
important people are still uttering non-pacific statements. There 
does not seem to be much I can do in the fact of that." 
Army 25481 Trans. 11/29/41 (2) 

» See S. I. S. #25485. 
b See S. I. S. #25489. 
• See S. I. S. #25491. 



[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
November 26, 1941 
Purple (Extremely Urgent) 
#1191 Part 2 of 4. 

To be handled in government code. 

(3) Concerning Section 1 of the proposal, I pointed out that of the 
four principles, the fourth has changed the so-called Stimson Doc- 
trine; but I got no clear reply. I reminded him of their uisistances 
so far concerning the principle of non-discrimination and said that if 
we applied that immediately to China there would be a sudden dark- 
ening of the already cloudy economic situation and that this was im- 
proper and impossible. 

HULL replied: "I fully understand that and the principle as such 
does not necessarily have to be put into effect right away." 

(4) Concerning 1 of Section 2 of this proposal, I said: "If this plan 
aims to revive a Nine-Power Treaty set-up, we cannot feature it at 
all because we have fought a four year war in China without a cent of 
profit." 

To this he countered with no strong rebuttal. 
Army 25482 Trans. 11/29/41 (1) 

[Secret] 
From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
November 26, 1941 
Purple (Extremely Urgent) 
#1191 Part 3 of 4 

(5) I said that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the same section were out of the 
question and, as for paragraph 4, for a country like the United States, 
who recognizes the Chungking Government, to say that she cannot 
desert the Chiang Regime is just like us saying that we certainly 
cannot desert the Nanking Regime." 

In reply HULL said: "The evacuation under 3 would be carried out 
by negotiations. We are not necessarily asking that it be effected 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 185 

immediately. As for the Nanking Government, according to the 
best reports available to us, it hasn't much influence over China as a 
whole any way." 

I retorted: "Well, that argument is based on the statement that in 
the long history of China there have been many rises and falls of 
governments." 

(6) When we came to the question of the Three Power Treaty, I 
said: "For the United States to hope, on one hand, that she can make 
us make the last possible concession regarding the Three Power Pact 
and on the other virtually to say to us concerning the China question 
'apologize to Chungking' is certainly strange. I do not suppose that 
that is what the President meant the other day when he spoke of 
'introducing'." 

HULL made no special answer. 

Army 25483 Trans. 11/2/41 (2) 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 
To: Tokyo 
November 26, 1941 
Purple (Extremely urgent) 
#1191. (Part 4 of 4) 

I said, "Well, I have read this only cursorily. It is a very difficult 
plan for us to consider accepting. As far as the China part is con- 
cerned, it contains clauses which are entirely out of the question so 
I, who would like to see an understanding established between Japan 
and the United States, do not know if I should even report it to 
Japan as it now stands. I have grave doubts. We will both read 
it over again and consider it fully. Then we will reply." Finally 
I said, "I wonder if the United States means that there is no other 
way but for us to consider this plan. You know the President the 
other day said that between friends there are no last words. I 
wonder if you could arrange for an interview." To the former he 
replied that in a word this was a plan, and to the latter he said that, 
although he did not think that much progress was being made, he 
would manage the matter. 
Army 25484 Trans. 11-29-41 (2) 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
27 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#841 

Please make the following corrections throughout the entire English 
text of the B Proposal: 

Delete the "the" preceeding the word "peace" in "the peace in the 
Pacific"; 

Change "elucidating" to affirming"; 

Change "agreed upon" to "reached; and 

Delete "mutual" from "mutual understanding". 
25791 
JD-1: 7079 (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (6-AR) 

79716 O— 46 — i>t. 12 14 



186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo (Togo) 
To: Washington 
27 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#842 

In the middle of your message #1280*, there is the part which men- 
tions that the United States might make a protective occupation of 
the Dutch East Indies. Now this is a very important matter, and a 
point which we would like to know more about. 

Will you please give us the reason for your mentioning this point, 
and any other item which might be of help to us in this matter. 

25781 

JD-1: 7080 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5^1 (6-AR) 

•Not available. 



[Secret] 

From: Tokyo 

To: Washington 

27 November 1941 

(J 19) 

Circular #2409 (In 4 parts, complete) 

Rio de Janeiro to Santiago as Circular #324 

(Washington sent to Ottawa, Mexico City, Bogota, Caracas, Havana, 
Panama, New York, and New Orleans as unnumbered message.) 

{PaH 1) 

Handle as Chief of Office routing. 

With international relations becoming more strained, the following 
emergency system of despatches, using INGO DENPO (hidden 
word, or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect. Please 
study this carefully. 

Make up a table with the left column containing the code words 
and the right the corresponding plain (decoded) text. Please see that 
there is no mistake in transcribing this. 

Example. A message meaning: 

"Japan and U. S. S. R. military have clashed", will read: 
"HIJIKATA and KUBOTA, clerks, have both been ordered 
to your embassy on 15th (begin spell) STOP (end speU)." 

In order to distinguish these cables from others, the English word 
STOP will be added at the end as an indicator. (The Japanese word 
"OWARI" (end) will not be used). 

{Part 2) 
Code Word Meaning 

ARIMURA ' Code communications prohibited. 

ASAI Communications will be by radio broadcasts. 

ASAKURA Will communicate by radio broadcast. You 

are directed to listen carefully. 
ASIKAGA Reception of overseas broadcast impossible 

due to interference. 
AZUMA Piessure on Japan Increasing continually. 

EDOGUTI Prepare for evacuation. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



• 187 



Code Word 
HANABUSA 

HANAZONO (?) 

HATAKEYAMA 

HATTORI' 

(Part 3) 
HIZIKATA 

HOSINO 

IBARAGI 

INAGAKI 

ISHIKAWA 
KASHIWAGI 

KOBAYAKAWA 

KODAMA 

KOMIYAMA 

KOYANAGI 

KUBOTA 

KURIBARA 

KUSUNOKI 

MATUTANI 



MINAMI 

MIWATA 

MIYAZAKI 

MOROKOSI 

MOTIZUKI 

NAGAMINE 

NAKAZATO 

NANGO 

NEGI (?) 

OGAWA 

OKAMOTO 

OKUMURA 

ONIZUKA 

ONODERA 

OTANI 

ONISI 

SIMANAKA 

SAKAKIBARA 



Meaning 
Preparations for evacuation have been com- 
pleted. 
Prepare to entrust Embassy property to suit- 
able foreign envoy (or consul) there. 

Relations between Japan and (blank) 

have been severed. 

Relations between Japan and (blank) 

are not in accordance with expec- 
tation. 

Japan's and (blank's) military 

forces have clashed. 
Japan and (blank) are enter- 
ing a full fledged general war. 
Communicate to us probable date of breaking 
off of relations between Japan and the coun- 
try to which you are accredited. 
Have you ? the . . . (blank) . . . mat- 
ter? 

I have ? the . . . (blank) . . . matter. 

We are commencing military action ? against 

. . . (blank) . . . 
Stop issuing all entrance and transient visas to 
Japan, to persons of . . . (blank) . . . na- 
tionality. 
Japan. 
China. 
England. 
U. S. S. R. 
France (?) 
Germany. 
Italy. 

(Part 4) 

U. S. A. 

Canada. 

Mexico. 

Brazil. 

Panama. 

Argentina. 

Thailand. 

French Indo-China. 

Netherlands East-Indies. 

Burma (?). 

Malaya. 

Australia. 

Union of South Africa (?). 

Enemy country. 

(?) (Possibly: friendly, or aUied country?) 

Year. 

Day (?) 

Tsuki) Month 



188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Code Word 




SIGENOI 


(KO) Paragraph 


SANZYO 


(Toki) Time 


ITIRO 


1 


NISAKU 


2 


SANTARO 


3 


YOITI 


4 


GORO 


5 


MASAROKU 


6 


SIMETARO 


7 


YASOKITI 


8 


HISAMATU 


9 


ATUMI 





25609 




JD-1: 6985 


(y; 



Meaning 



(Y) Navy Trans. 12-2-41 (7) 



Decode of Voice Code 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 

27 November 1941 (2327-2334 EST) 
(Telephone Code)— (See JD-1 : 6841) (S. I. S. #25344) 

Trans-Pacific 
Telephone 

(Conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and Japanese Foreign 
Office American Division Chief, Yamamoto.) 

Literal translation 

(After connection was completed:) 

Kurusu: "Hello, hello. This \s Ku- 
rusu". 

Yamamoto: This is Yamamoto". 

Kurusu: "Yes, Hello, hello." 

(Unable to get Yamamoto for about six or 
eight seconds, he said aside, to himself, or 
to someone near him:) 

Kurusu: "Oh, I see, they're making a 
record of this, huh?" 

(It is believed he meant that the six second 
interruption was made so that a record could 
be started in Tokyo. Interceptor's machine 
had been started several minutes earlier.) 

Kurusu: "Hello. Sorry to trouble you 
so often." 

Yamamoto: "How did the matrimonial 
question get along today?" 

Kurusu: "Oh, haven't you got our tele- 
gram* yet? It was sent — let me see — at 
about six — no, seven o'clock. Seven o'clock. 
About three hours ago. 

"There wasn't much that was different "There wasn't much 
from what Miss Umeko said yesterday." that was different from 

Hull's talks of yester- 
day." 



"How did the nego- 
tiations go today?" 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



189 



Literal translation 

Yamamoto: "Oh, there wasn't much diff- 
erence?" 

KuRUSu: "No, there wasn't. As before, 
that southward matter — that south, 
SOUTH — southward matter, is having con- 
siderable effect. You know, southward 
matter." 

Yamamoto: (Obviously trying to indicate 
the serious effect that Japanese concentra- 
tions, etc. in French Indo-China were having 
on the conversations in Washington, He 
tries to do this without getting away from the 
"Miss Umeko childbirth, marriage" charac- 
ter of the voice code.) 

Yamamoto: "Oh, the south matter? It's 
effective?" 

KuRUSu: "Yes, and at one time, the matri- 
monial question seemed as if it would be 
settled." 

KuRUSu: "But — well, of course, there are 
other matters involved too, but — that was 
it — that was the monkey wrench. Details 
are included in the telegram* which should 
arrive very shortly. It is not very long and 
you'll be able to read it quickly." 

Yamamoto: "Oh, you've dispatched it?" 

KuRUSu: "Oh, yes, quite a while ago. At 
about 7 o'clock." 

(Pause.) 

KuRUSu: "How do things look there? 
Does it seem as if a child might be born?" 

Yamamoto: (In a very definite tone): 
"Yes, the birth of the child seems imminent." 

KuRUSu: (In a somewhat surprised tone, 
repeating Yamamoto's statement): 

"It does seem as if the birth is going to take 
take place?" 

(Pause.) 

KuRUSu: **In which direction. . ." 

(Stopped himself very abruptly at this slip 
which went outside the character of the voice 
code. After a slight pause he quickly re- 
covered, then to cover up the slip, con- 
tinued:) 

KuRusu: "Is it to be a boy or a girl?" 

Yamamoto: (Hesitated, then laughing at 
his hesitation took up Kurusu's cue to re- 
establish the voice code character of the 
talk. The "boy, girl, healthy" byplay has 
no other significance): 

Yamamoto: "It seems as if it will be a 
strong healthy boy." 



Decode of Voice Code 



tn 



'Yes, and at one 
time it looked as 
though we could reach 
an agreement". 



"Does it seem as if a 
crisis is at hand?" 

"Yes, a crisis does 
appear imminent." 



"A crisis does ap- 
pear imminent?" 



190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Literal translation 

KuRUSu: "Oh, it's to be a strong healthy- 
boy?" 

(Rather long pause.) 

Yamamoto: "Yes. 

"Did you make any statement (to the news- 
papers) regarding your talk with Miss 
Kimiko today?" 

KuRUSu: "No, nothing. Nothing except 
the mere fact that we met." 

Yamamoto: "Regarding the matter con- 
tained in the telegram** of the other day, 
although no definite decision has been made 
yet, please be advised that effecting it will be 
difficult." 

KuRUSu: "Oh, it is difficult, huh?" 

Yamamoto: "Yes, it is." 

KuRUsu: "Well, I guess there's nothing 
more that can be done then," 

Yamamoto: "Well, yes." 
(Pause) 

Yamamoto: "Then, today . . ." 

KuRUsu: "Today?" 

Yamamoto: "The matrimonial question, 
that is, the matter pertaining to arranging a 
marriage —don't break them off." 

Kurusu: "Not break them? You mean 
talks." 

(Helplessly:) 

Kurusu: "Oh, my." 

' (Pause, and then with a resigned laugh: 

Kurusu: "Well, I'll do what I can." 
(Continuing after a pause:) 

Kurusu: "Please read carefully what Miss 
Kimiko had to say as contained in today's 
telegram*." 



Yamamoto: "From what time to what 
time were your talks today?" 

Kurusu: "Oh, today's was from 2:30." 
(Much repeating of the numeral 2) 
Kurusu: "Oh, you mean the duration? 
Oh, that was for about an hour." 

Yamamoto: "Regarding the matrimonial 
question." 

"I shall send you another message. How- 
ever, please bear in mind that the matter of 
the other day is a very difficult one." 



Decode of Voice Code 



"Did you make any 
statement regarding 
your talks with the 
President today?" 



"Regarding negotia- 
tions, don't break them 
off." 



) 



"Please read care- 
fully what the Presi- 
dent had to say as con- 
tained in today's tele- 
gram*." 



"Regarding the ne- 
gotiations." 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



191 



Literal translation Decode of Voice Code 

KuRUSu: "But without anything, — they "But without any- 
want to keep carrying on the matrimonial thing, — they want to 
question. They do. In the meantime keep on negotiating, 
we're faced with the excitement of having a ~ ' 
child born. On top of that Tokugawa is 
really champing at the bit, isn't he? Toku- 
gawa is, isn't he?" 



(Laughter and pause.) 

KuRUsu: "That's why I doubt if anything 
can be done." 

Yamamoto: "I don't think it's as bad as 
that." 

Yamamoto: "Well, — we can't sell a moun- 
tain." 

KuRUsu: "Oh, sure, I know that. That 
isn't even a debatable question any more." 

Yamamoto: "Well, then, although we 
can't yield, we'll give you some kind of a re- 
ply to that telegram." 

KuRUsu: "In any event, Miss Kimiko is 
leaving town tomorrow, and will remain in 
the country until Wednesday." 



In the meantime we 
have a crisis on hand 
and the army is champ- 
ing at the bit. You 
know the army." 



"Well,— we 
yield." 



can't 



"In any event, the 
President is leaving 
town tomorrow, and 
will remain in the coun- 
try until Wednesday." 



Yamamoto: "Will you please continue to 
do your best." 

KuRUSu: "Oh, yes. I'll do my best. 
And Nomura's doing everything too." 

Yamamoto: "Oh, all right. In today's 
talks, there wasn't anything of special in- 
terest then?" 

Kurusu: "No, nothing of particular in- 
terest, except that it is quite clear now that 
that southward — ah — the south, the south 
matter is having considerable effect." 

Yamamoto: "I see. Well, then, good 
bye." 

Kurusu: "Good bye." 

25443 

JD-1: 6890 (M) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 ( ) 

•JD-l: 6915 (S. I. S. #25495). Outline of interview on 27 November with Eoosevelt-Hull-Kurusu- 
Nomura. 

••Probably #1189 (S. I. S. #25441-42). (JD-1: 6896). Washington reports the two proposals presented 
by the U. S. on 26 November. 



192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
27 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#1204 

Re your #842*. 

The United States has been conferring with the Netherlands on 
subjects pertaining to U. S. claims and because we asked them to do 
so. In the midst of these talks, the White House suddenly came 
forth with the announcment on the 24th, that the United States is 
occupying Dutch Guiana, with the agreement of the government of 
the Netherlands, for the purpose of protecting it. 

As was made plain in the text of this announcement, the main ob- 
jective of this occupation was to guarantee accessibility to aluminum 
produced there, which is vital to the national defense of the United 
States. Ordinarily, the Netherlands Government would dispatch 
its armed forces stationed in the Netherlands East Indies for this 
purpose, but she is unable to do so at present because of the present 
situation in the southwest Pacific area. For this reason, the U. S. 
Army is being used to protect the aluminum mines in that area. At 
the same time, at the invitation of the Netherlands Government, 
Brazil is also taking part in protecting them. 

The Netherlands Foreign Minister stopped in the United States en 
route to visiting the Netherlands East Indies, and conferred with U. S. 
government officials. Since then, there has been a considerable in- 
crease in the amount of military supplies being shipped to the Nether- 
lands East Indies; the traffic of technicians and experts between the 
United States and N. E. I., has swung up sharply. From these indi- 
cations as well as from the history of the Netherlands East Indies, it 
is believed, that depending upon the atmosphere at the time the 
Japanese-U. S. negotiations break off, Britain and the United States 
may occupy the Netherlands East Indies. They will do this, prob- 
ably, much in the same manner as U. S.-Rrazil joint occupation of 
Netherlands Guiana, in the name of protecting the products of the 
N. E. I. which are vital to national defense, tin and rubber. 

I feel that it is essential that we give careful consideration to this 
possibility. I made reference to this point in my message #1180**. 
The gist of this message does not differ from that contained in that 
message. 
25535 
JD-1: 6914 " (D) Navy Trans. 11-29-41 (X) 

•Not available. 

♦*JD-1: 6891 (S. I. S. #25435-36). 



[Secret] 
From: Washington. 
To: Tokyo. 
27 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#1206 (In 4 parts. Part 4 not available) 

On the 27th, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu, called on the 
President. (Secretary Hull was also present.) The resum6 of our 
talks follows: 

The President: "In the last Great War, Japan and the United 
States were together on the side of the AUies. At that time, both 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 193 

Japan and the United States were given ample proof that Germany 
failed to comprehend the way the people of other countries think. 

"Since these conversations were begun, I am aware of the fact that 
much effort has been made by the Japanese side, too, by those who 
cherish peace. I am highly appreciative of this fact. It is clear that 
the majority of the American people are anxious to maintain peaceful 
relations with Japan. I am one of those who still harbors much hope 
that Japanese-U. S. relations will be settled peacefully." 

I: "Your recent proposal will no doubt be the cause of painful 
disappointment to the Japanese Government." 

The President: "To tell you the truth, I, too, am very disappointed 
that the situation has developed in the manner that it has. However, 
during the several months that these conversations were being con- 
ducted, cold water was poured on them when Japan occupied southern 
French Indo-China. According to recent intelligences, there are fears 
that a second cold water dousing may become an actuality." (He 
apparently meant the increase in our troops to French Indo-China 
and our occupation of Thai.) (See my message #1205*.) "I fully 
understand that the general public in Japan who has been living in 
war conditions for the past year, cannot see a parallel with conditions 
in the United States, which is living under peaceful conditions. 

"During all of the time, however, that Your Excellency and Secre- 
tary Hull have been conversing, we have never heard of or seen 
concrete proof of any peaceful intention by the leading elements of 
Japan. This has made these talks an exceedingly difficult undertak- 
ing. 

(Part 2) 

"Even the suggestion that the present situation be overcome by a 
'modus Vivendi' would be without any value if in the final analysis 
the basic principles of international relations of Japan and the United 
States do not agree. If there is a basic difference, no stop gap measure 
could carry any weight, it seems to me. 

"In my conversations with Churchill on the high seas, for example, 
it was predetermined that our respective basic policies coincided. 
Moreover, even the subjects which were to be agreed upon had been 
clearly defined in advance." 

Kurusu: "Judging from the records of the developments of our 
negotiations in the past, the differences of opinions between Japan 
and the United States were not differences in the basic principles of 
each. Rather, the differences arose in the practical applications 
thereof. For a \ery simple example Japan has no disagreements to 
the principle of non-discriminatory treatment of commerce, strongly 
advocated by the United States. 

"However, it is when we consider the immediate application of this 
principle in China, bringing about a radical and sudden change in the 
economic situation there, it is only natural that Japan insists upon 
certain special conditions. I feel that this difference may have been 
the source of some misunderstanding." 

Hull: "By your frequent explanations, we thoroughly understand 
that point. According to advice I have received, however, there are 
approximately 250,000 Japanese merchants in China at present who 
followed or accompanied the military. These are engaging in various 
business enterprises. There have been indications that various 
incidents have arisen involving the relations between these merchants 



194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and nationals of a third country. If you are going to consider the 
profits of these people, the problem of course will become an exceed- 
ingly difficult one." 

Kurusu: "Japan's claims are not based on such minor factors, but 
concern only the various major problems." 

{Part 3) 

We then went on and brought up the subject which has reference 
to the President's "suggestions". 

The President: "have not abandoned giving consideration to that 
matter. However, it is first essential that both Japan and China 
simultaneously desire that that be done." 

We pointed out that from a practical standpoint that would be very 
difficult to accomplish. To this, the President said: 

"In domestic issues, I have had several experiences along the same 
lines. No doubt, some method will be found in this case, too." 

I. "We have, as yet, received no instructions from Tokyo regarding 
your proposal. I, for one, hope that you, Mr. ' President, whose 
statesmanship I respect highly after over thirty years of close ac- 
quaintance with it, will find some way that will lead to a settlement." 

The President: "To tell you the truth, I have since the end of last 
week, twice postponed a trip which I was going to take for my health, 
because of a critical domestic issue, and because of the arrival of 
Ambassador Kurusu to the United wStates. I am leaving tomorrow 
afternoon, Friday, for the country for a rest." (He looked very 
tired). "I plan to return next Wednesday. I would like to talk with 
you again then. It would be very gratifying, however, if some means 
of a settlement could be discovered in the meantime. 

(Part 4 not available.) 
25495 
JD-1: 6915 (D) Navy Trans. 11-29-41 (X) 

•Not available. 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
27 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#1206 (Part 4 of 4) (Parts 1,2, and 3 previously translated) 

In the middle of our talks, Hull, with reference to the cause for the 
failure to agree upon a modus vivendi, said: 

"There are other factors other than those pointed out by the 
President. Japan has sent vast numbers of troops to French Indo- 
China with which to keep the military powers of other countries 
checked. With this advantage on her side, Japan carries in one hand, 
the Tripartite Pact, and in the other, the Anti-Communism Pact. 
Armed with these, she demands of the United States that petroleum 
be made available to her. 

"It would be absolutely impossible to reconcile the people of the 
United States to granting such a demand. As I stated during our 
last conversations, while we here are putting forth our best efforts 
in attempting to bring about peaceful settlements of Japanese-U. S. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 195 

differences, your Premier nor your Foreign Minister nor any other 
influential person utters not a single word nor moves one finger to 
facilitate these talks of ours. On the contrary, they insist upon 
promoting the establishment of a New Order through might. This 
is an exceedingly regrettable state of affairs." 
Parts 1, 2, & 3 see S. I. S. 25495. 

25608 

JD-1: 6915 (D) Navy Trans. 12-2-41 (2) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 28, 1941. 
Purple (CA) 
#844 

Re your #1189" 

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, 
in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this 
humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely 
regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a 
basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the 
Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send 
you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. 
This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impres- 
sion that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that 
you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your 
Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinJiing 
the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne 
great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have 
always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but 
that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, 
making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since 
things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in 
your #1180 ^ and he said that under the present circumstances what 
you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can. 

Army 25445 

JD 6898 Trans. 11-28-41 (S) 

» S. I. S. # 25441, # 25442. 
b S. I. 8. * 25435, * 25436. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo (Togo) 
To: Honolulu 
November 28, 1941 
J 19 (Priority) 
#118 

Re your #232 ». 

To be handled in government code. 

Anticipating the possibility of ordinary telegraphic communication 
being severed when we are about to face the worst of situations, these 
broadcasts are intended to serve as a means of informing the diplo- 
mats in the country concerned of that situation without the use of the 



196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

usual telegraphic channels. Do not destroy the codes without regard 
to the actual situation in your locality, but retain them as long as the 
situation there permits and until the final stage is entered into. 

Army 25859 Trans. 12/7/41 (S) 

» Not available. 

b S. I. S. #25432 in which Tokyo sends a circular giving hidden-meaning words which will be broadcast 
in the event that code communication is cut off. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo (Togo) 
To: Hanoi 
November 28, 1941 
Purple (YO) 
#93 

Re your #118 ^ 

The trend of Japan-American- negotiations is as I told you in my 
circular #2414 ^. The current outlook is as I delineated in my 
circular #2416 ". Even though the worst possible situation developed, 
and it will in all likelihood, the Imperial Government has made no 
decisions with regard to changing the position of the French Indo- 
Chinese Government. Therefore, I would like to have you give due 
consideration to the policy of maintaining the status quo for the 
time being. If you have no objections, bearing this in mind, I would 
have you act with prudence. 

We have transmitted this to France and Germany. 
Army 25547 Trans. 12-1-41 (5) 

• S. I. S. #25345 in which Hanoi suggests that they be advised as early as possible whether the status quo 
will be maintained as far as French Indo-China's governmental set-up is concerned, so that pre-arrange- 
ments can be made. 

b Not available. ' 



[Secret] 
From: Rio 
To: Santiago 
November 28, 1941 
J-19 
Circular #326 (Message from Tokyo Circular #2416) 

(To be handled in Government code) 

Concerning Japanese-American negotiations, the counter proposal 
presented to us by the United States on the 27th, overlooks all we 
stand for; therefore, of course we disregard it. There is nothing to 
do but break off negotiations, and our relations with England and 
the United States within the next few days will assuredly take a 
-critical turn. The above is for your information only. 

Army 26000 Trans. 12/9/41 (7) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 197 

[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

November 28, 1941 

Purple (Priority) 

#1209. To be handled in Government Code. 

What the Imperial Government must, of course, consider is what 
Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and China, egged on by the 
United States, will do in case the Imperial forces invade Thailand. 
Even supposing there is no armed collision with British forces, in the 
Oral Statement of President ROOSEVELT on the 17 th of this month 
he prophesied that suitable action would be taken immediately in 
case Japan carries on any further penetration beyond French Indo- 
China. Moreover, newspaper reports at present would tend to Jead 
to the conclusion that, even though England and the United States 
might not oppose us militarily within Thai, the United States assisting 
all nations concerned would adopt the policy of so-called joint defense 
throughout the whole southwestern Pacific area; thus, as I said in 
my #1204 *, there is no slight possibility that she might occupy the 
Netherlands Indies on the excuse that this action would be necessary 
for purposes of defense. I am sure you already have all these things 
in your mind, but in view of the gravity of the present situation, I 
just wanted to remind you again. 

Army 25793 Trans. 12-6-41 (X) 

• S. I. S. #25535 in which Ambassador NOMURA discusses the United States' occupation of Dutch 
Guiana and says it is believed that, depending upon the atmosphere at the time the Japanese-American 
relations break off, Britain and the United States may occupy the Netherlands East Indies. He says it 
Is essential that the Japanese give careful consideration to this possibility. 



[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

November 28, 1941 

Purple 

#1214. To be handled in Government Code 

Re my #1190* 

So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with 
the United States; however, now the results of our conference of the 
26th are out and headlines like this are appearing in the paper: "Hull 
Hands Peace Plan to Japanese," and "America Scorns a Second 
Munich." The papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the 
American proposal with its four principles, or face war, in which latter 
case the responsibility would be upon Japan. 

This we must carefully note. 
Army 25548 Trans. 12-1-41 (2) 

• S. I. S. #25444 and #25480 in which NOMURA expresses the danger of the responsibility for the rupture 
of negotiations being cast upon Japan should Japan enter into her scheduled operations during the course 
of the negotiations. He suggests that the negotiations be irrevocably concluded either through an announce- 
ment to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumotio 



198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Hsinking 
To: Tokyo 
November 28, 1941 
Purple 
#781. Strictly Secret 

To be handled in Government Code. 

■ In view of the situation, after conferring with the competent author- 
ities, the following measures having to do with the treatment of British 
and American nationals in Manchukuo in the event that war breaks 
out with England and the United States are as outlined below. We 
are unanimously agreed on these matters. Should there be any 
questions regarding them, please wire me at once. 

I. Policy. On the outbreak of war with England and the United 
Stafes, after you have at the appropriate time gathered all these 
nationals together, they are to be returned each to his own homeland 
at as early a date as possible. However, until this return can be 
arranged, they are to be interned in places of concentration in 
Manchukuo. 

The control of such property as they might leave behind will be 
administered by the Manchukuo Government. 

II. Detailed ovtline. 

1. Persons to be interned: 

a. British nationals — 339. 

b. American citizens — 81. 

c. Of these, consular officials and Catholic mis- 

sionaries are to be given preferential treat- 
ment. 

d. Nationals of the Soviet or other third powers 

observed to be obnoxious characters with 
pro-British and American leanings are to 
be suitably taken care of. 

2. Time and Method of Internment. 

a. Persons mentioned in the paragraph above are 

to be advised to get in touch with the Jap- 
anese Chief of Detention. They are to be 
concentrated in the three areas, Harbin, 
Mukden and Chokinshu.* 

b. Then, depending on negotiations, they will be 

returned each to his own country. When 
evacuation is through the Soviet, we will 
release them at Manchuli, and when they are 
to be transported to Shanghai, they will be 
released in Dairen. 

c. This will be carried out by the Manchukuo 

Police authorities, (In Kwantung Province 
the procedure will be controlled by the 
Provmcial Police Office,) 

d. All property left behind is to be administered 

through legal measures by the Manchukuo 
Government. 
Army 25572 Trans. 12-2-41 (5) 

■ Kana spelling. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 199 

[Secret] 

From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
29 November 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#857 

Re my #844* 

We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the 
following lines: 

The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and 
judicial position and has formulated its policies after full consider- 
ation of the claims of both sides. 

However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand 
why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have 
made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has 
made new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia 
and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government. 
With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China 
problem, what has l^ecome of the basic objectives that the U. S. 
government has made the basis of our negotiations during these 
seven months? On these points we would request careful self- 
reflection on the part of the United States government. 
(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not 
lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.) 

25496 

JD-1: 6921 (F) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (S-TT) 

•JD-l: 6898 (S. I. S. 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the new U. S. proposals 
castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends a reply in 2 or 3 days giving its views on them the nego- 
tiations will be 'de facto' ruptured. However, do not give the impression that negotiations are broken off. 



[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

29 November 1941 

(Purple) 

#1216 

In the Washington special intelligence dated the 28th concerning 
the White House interview, President Roosevelt is the person meant 
where reference is made to "authoritatively stated" and to an "ad- 
ministration spokesman". We understand that Roosevelt par- 
ticularly requested that the source be kept unclear. 

(Please exercise caution in handling this). 

25711 

JD-1: 7038 (D) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (1) 



200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Berlin 
To: Tokyo 
29 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#1393 (In 3 parts, complete) 

By his request, I was supposed to have called on Foreign Minister 
Ribbentrop during the evening of yesterday, the 28th. Suddenly, 
however, he requested that the time be postponed and it was not 
until 10 : 30 at night that I finally saw him. 

This delay was occasioned by the fact that a long conference of the 
bigwdgs of the government and military, from Goering down, was being 
held at the official residence of the Fuehrer. The war against the 
Soviet Union has now taken definite shape and the outcome can be 
unerringly foretold. Next year's campaigns were mapped at this con- 
ference, taking into consideration the points brought up at the con- 
ference of the various Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of 
Europe. It is an absolute certainty that Japan's moves were also 
given discussion at this conference. 

1. Ribbentrop opened our meeting by again inquiring whether I had 
received any reports regarding the Japanese-U. S. negotiations. I 
replied that I had received no official word. 

Ribbentrop: "It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in 
East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been and 
probably never will be a time when closer cooperation under the Tri- 
partite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this time, and 
Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New Order, all the 
military might of Britain and the United States will be concentrated 
against Japan. 

"As Fuehrer Hitler said today, there are fundamental differences in 
the very right to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United 
States. W e have received advice to the effect that there is practically 
no hope of the Japanese-U. S. negotiations being concluded success- 
fully, because of the fact that the United States is putting up a stiff 
front. 

"If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a decision 
to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident that that will 
not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan jointly, but would 
bring about favorable results for Japan herself." 

I: "I can make no definite statement as I am not aware of any 
concrete intentions of Japan. Is Your Excellency indicating that a 
state of actual war is to be established between Germanv and the 
United States?" • 

Ribbentrop: "Roosevelt's a fanatic, so it is impossible to tell what 
he woukl do." 

Concerning this point, in view of the fact that Ribbentrop has said 
in the past that the United States would undoubtedly try to avoid 
meeting German troops*, and from the tone of Hitler's recent speech 
as well as that of Ribbentrop's. I feel that Gorman attitude toward 
the United States is being considerably stiffened. There are indica- 
tions at present that German}'^ would not refuse to fight the United 
States if necessarv. 

(Part 2) 

2. I made inquiries as to the future of the war against the Soviet 
Union. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 201 

Ribbentrop: "The Fuehrer has stated that he is now determined 
to crush the Soviet Union to an even greater extent than he had 
planned at first. He is now bent on completely wiping out that 
state and went on to announce that practically all of the main military 
objectives had been attamed and that a greater part of the German 
troops would shortly be brought back to Germany. 

"Following up those campaigns, the Caucasus campaign will be 
launched in earnest. Next Spring Germany will advance to and 
cross the Ural Mountains and chase Stalin deep into Siberia." 

I: "Approximately when do you expect that?" 

Ribbentrop: "The campaign will be launched in about May of 
next year, according to present schedules." 

I. "According to what you say, Germany is apparently preparing 
to gamble quite a bit in her Russian campaign. We hope that air 
connections between Germany and Manchukuo can be established at 
an early time." 

Ribbentrop: "That is an item that Germany has been considering 
for some time. By summer of next year I do not believe that air 
CDniiection from the Ural area to Manchukuo will be an impossibility." 

3. I then asked him about the campaign against England proper to 
which he replied that before launching landing operations against 
England, Germany will probably completely wipe out Britain's 
influence in the Near East, Africa, Gibraltar and the Mediterranean 
Sea. I got the impression that more emphasis is being placed on this 
area than heretofore. So, I asked whether it was Germany's intention 
to conclude the war without attempting to go through with a cam- 
paign against England. 

Ribbentrop: "Germany has, of course, made all necessary prepara- 
tions for this campaign. However, Germany is in receipt of intelli- 
gences which would seem to indicate that all is not well within England 
herself. For example, we hear that there is a split within the ranks 
of the Conservatives; that Churchill's influence is on the wane; that 
Bevin, Chief of the Labor Party, is advocating revolutionary measures. 
All of these are tending to make the preservation of order there 
increasingly difficult. 

"Of course, I am not one to implicitly believe all of this. However, 
I am convinced that things are getting bad in England. Under these 
circumstances, it may be that Germany's various other campaigns 
may cause England to fall even without our going through with our 
landing operations against England herself. 

(Part 3) 

"In any event, Germany has absolutely no intention of entering 
into any peace with England. We are determined to remove all 
British influence from Europe, Therefore, at the end of this war, 
England will have no influence whatsoever, in international affairs. 
The Island Empire of Britain may remain, but all of her other posses- 
sions throughout the world will probably be divided three ways by 
Germany, the United States, and Japan, In Africa, Germany will 
be satisfied with, roughly, those parts which were formerly German 
colonies. Italy will be given the greater sh^re of the African colonies. 
Germany desires above all else, to control European Russia." 

4, In conclusion, I said: "I am fully aware of the fact that Germany's 
war campaign is progressing according to schedule smoothly. How- 

7»71« O— 40 — pt. 12- 13 



202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ever, suppose that Germany is faced with the situation of having not 
only Great Britain as an actual enemy but also have all of those areas 
in which Britain has influence and those countries which have been 
aiding Britain as actual enemies as ^e\\. Under such circumstances, 
the war area will undergo considerable expansion, of course. What is 
your opinion of the outcome of the war under such an eventuality?" 

Ribbentrop: "We would like to end this war during next year. 
However, under certain circumstances, it is possible that it will have 
to be continued on into the following year. 

"Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States 
Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is 
absolutely no possibility of Germany's entering into a separate peace 
with the United States under such circumstances. The Fuehrer is 
determined on that point." 

In closing this conference, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop requested 
that the contents of our talks be kept a strict secret. Please, there- 
fore, exercise particular caution in handling this message. 

I have shown copies of this message to the military and naval 
attache's, Lt-Gen. (Vice Adm.?) Nomura, and Maj-Gen (Rear Adm.?) 
Abe. Please show a copy to the Army and Navy authorities in 
Tokyo, too. 

(In the last section of the first part of this message, we wrote * * * 
"the U. S. would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops" 
* * * That should have read: "the U. S. would undoubtedly try to 
«void war".) 

25556 

JD-1: 6942 (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (7) 

• Sec end of message. 



[Secret] 
From: Bangkok 
To: Tokyo 
29 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#872 (In 2 parts, complete) 

Re my #855.* 

As a result of my conversation with PIBUN**, I have been able 
to ascertain his attitude to a large degree, arid therefore through 
Yoshioka who as the outside agency of the Naval Attache's office, 
we have suggested to SIN and WANITTO*** that, in the event of 
Thai's abandoning her neutrality policy in the future, it would be 
better both from the standpoint of face and also for material reasons 
for her to go through the formality herself of requesting cooperative 
action from the nation concerned, rather than to be put in the posi- 
tion of being compelled to consent to it because of pressure brought 
to bear. The shifts within the government mentioned in my caption 
message, are a result of the above. When SIN heard this from Yo- 
shioka, he said that this is a matter he has been concerned over the 
past two years, and as he feels that he himself is the most suitable 
person to handle the matter he promised to put forth every effort 
for its realization. He is also said to have told WANITTO that the 
matter should be left to him. WANITTO and SIN are keeping in 
touch with us through Yoshioka in regard to subsequent develop- 
ments within the government, and we are giving them appropriate 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 203 

guidance under cover. The main points of the same are as follows: 
(Yoshioka's mediation in this puts him in a "delicate" position in 
relation to the army attache' so this should be kept absolutely con- 
fidential within the department). 

(1) Whenever there is discussion in the cabinet the points raised 
are, the real intentions of Japan, that is, the meaning of the East 
Asia Coprosperity plan, the involvements of the southward expansion 
policy, the extent of commodity supplying, and the duration of the 
time of stationing troops. Great Britain seizes upon .these points 
and furnishes all kinds of contradictory material with which to keep 
the pro-British elements busy. To meet this WANITTO presents 
the absolute necessity of union between Japan and Thai and this 
has already become the firm conviction of the pro-Japanese. group, 
and there thus is no need for further discussion as far as they are 
concerned. However the opposition have been bringing up trouble- 
some arguments and hold tenaciously thereto. Since it was so diffi- 
cult to convince them an appeal was made to us for material with 
which to counter them and their arguments. 

(2) Since then the pro-Japanese group have been having better 
success in their attempts, and their position has become more favor- 
able. As a result the opposition, since about the 25th has kept 
silent. However, the matter has not been concluded. 

(Part 2 being translated) 



From: Bangkok 

To: Tokyo 

29 November 1941 

(Purple) 

#872 (Part 2 of 2) 

3. The question of joint military action between Thai and Japan 
has already been brought up by the pro-Japanese faction, but up to 
date, they have expressed a desire to pursue a course of strict neutral- 
ity. They had taken a fairly firm stand that the first one, regardless 
of whether this be Britain or Japan, who makes the first move shall be 
considered Thai's enemy. Therefore, for Japan to be looked upon as 
Thai's helper, she should put Britain in a position to be the first aggres- 
sor. For the purpose of accomplishing this, Japan should carefully 
avoid Thai territory, and instead, land troops in the neighborhood of 
KOTAPARU in British territory, which would almost certainly force 
Britain to invade Thailand from PATANBESSA. The consequence 
would be Thai's declaration of war on Britain. 

This strategy is being given careful consideration. Apparently this 
plan has the approval of Chief of Staff BIJITTO. Our naval At- 
tache has advised the Naval General Staff, also, I think. 

4. WANITTO and SIN are both considerably concerned of the 
weak character of PIBUN. As a means of making PIBUN make a 
decision, they think that it would be well to have some outside pres- 
sure brought to bear on him. As one means, they suggest that some 
undesirable Japanese be forcibly removed from Thai by Japan, and 
then to publicize this as the forerunner of a general evacuation of 
Japanese nationals from Thai. 

From the above and from other considerations, including that of the 
tone of PIBUN 's radio broadcast which was reported in my message 
#871****, the situation here may show some unexpectedly speedy and 



204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

favorable developments. I feel that we should not fumble this situa- 
tion, but should proceed carefully and take the best advantage of it. 
25499 
JD-1: 6923 (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT) 

•JD-l: 6881 (S. I. S. #26417). 
♦*Preirier and Foreign Minister. 
••••Actively in charge of Foreign Office. 
••••Not available. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Berlin 
November 30, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#985. (Part 1 of 3)* 

Re my Circular #2387.*' 

1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last 
April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the 
sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured — 
broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments in separate 
message #986 ") In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situ- 
ation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, 
immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister 
RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary 
of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the 
United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say 
that they are planning to move military forces into various places in 
East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving 
troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that 
war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and 
Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the 
breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams. 

Army 25552 

JD: 6943 Trans. 12-1-41 (NR) 

• Part 2 not available. For Part 3 see 8. 1. S. #25653 
•> Not available. 

• See 8. 1. S. #26654, 25666. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Berlin 
November 30, 1941. 
Purple (CA) 
#985. (Part 3 of 3) 

4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question 
you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already 
clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last 
July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to 
relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands 
tighter with England and the United States and resists us with 
hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, 
right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south ana for the time 
being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north. 

5. This message is important from a strategic point of view and 
must under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. 
This goes without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon 
the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 205 

6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated 
this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier 
MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as a date is 
set for a conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me 
know. 

Will you please send this message also to Rome, together with the 
separate message. 
Army 25553 Trans. 12-1-41 (NR) 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Berlin 
November 30, 1941 
Purple 

#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code) 
(Part 1 of 2) (Secret outside the Department) 

1. Japan- American negotiations were commenced the middle of 
AprU of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been 
continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly 
stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national 
policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. 
In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the 
United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within 
the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United 
States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude 
of carrying through these negotiations. 

2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, 
with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on 
a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried 
on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the 
evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they de- 
manded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French 
Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other. 

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, 
we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with 
its traditional idealogical tendency of managing international rela- 
tions, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional 
policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and 
England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States 
in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment 
of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the 
Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As 
long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, 
there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan 
and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of 
view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce 
of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This 
was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only 
been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become 
gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could 
no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became 
clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be 
detrimental to our cause. 
Army 25554 Trans. 12/1/41 (NR) 



206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL. HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secretl 
From: Tokyo 
To: Berlin 
November 30, 1941 
Purple 
#986. (Part 2 of 2) 

3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made 
this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting 
clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into 
with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing 
upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace 
in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It 
means that in case the United States enters the European war at any 
time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to 
Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let 
alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American 
proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States 
brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the 
Netherlands, and China — they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is 
clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and 
has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an 
enemy. 

Army 25555 Trans. 12-1-41 CNR^ 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 

30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST) 
Telephone Code 
Transpacific Radio Telephone 

(Note. — Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversa- 
tion between Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office 
American Division Chief Yamamoto on Sunday night) 

Kurusu: "It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We 
received a short one from you, didn't wc? Well, we will meet him in 
regard to that. There is a longer one coming isn't there? In any 
case we are going to see him about the short one." (i. e. telegram. 
The longer one is probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals.) 

Yamamoto: "Yes. I see." 

Kurusu: "The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying 
home." 

Y: "Is there any special significance to this?" 

K: "The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and 
it is having strong repercussions here." 

Y: "Is that so." 

K: "Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers 
carried large headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning 
because of it. There no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason 
the newspapers are giving." 

(Pause.) 

"Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and 
others, it puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there 
must watch out about these ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. 
Tani." 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 207 

Y: "We are being careful." 

K: "We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon 
by the correspondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please 
caution the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the 
Foreign Minister that we had expected to hear something different, 
some good word, but instead we get this." (i. e. Premier's speech) 

(After a pause, Kurusu continues, using voice code.) 

K: "What about the internal situation?" (In Japan.) 

Y: "No particular (one or two words faded out) " 

K: "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?" 
■ Y: "Yes." 

K: "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you; but 
now you want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both 
the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of 
their speeches ! ! ! ! Do you understand? Please all use more 
discretion." 

Y: "When will you see them. The 2nd?" 

K: "Let's see — this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning 
at ten. That will be Monday morning here." 

(Pause.) 

"Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of hap- 
penings in the South. You understand don't you?" 

Y: "Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets 
back?" 

K: "I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started 
at 4:00 this afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning some- 
time." 

Y: "Well then— Goodbye." 

25497 

JD-1: 6922 (M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5) 



(Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

November 30, 1941 

Purple 

#1222 (Secret) 

Premier TOJO's speech was published here on the 30th in the news- 
papers under conspicuous headlines. They printed especially notice- 
ably the sentence, "The exploitation of the Asiatics by Americans 
'must be purged with vengeance'." On the other hand, according to 
the newspapers, a White House secretary has issued an announce- 
ment to the effect that Secretary HULL had at once telephoned the 
President, resting at Warm Springs, concerning the Premier's speech 
and, as a result, the President, changing his schedule, was leaving 
Warm Springs on the afternoon of the 30th and is expected to return 
to Washington on the morning of the first. Inasmuch as this speech 
will be used extensively for propaganda purposes by the Americans, 
will you please take suitable steps. Furthermore, will you please 
send me at once copies of the text (both Japanese and English)? 
Army 25761 Trans. 12/5/41 (2) 



208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Manila (Nihro) 
To: Tokyo 
November 30, 1941 
Purple (Priority) 
#809 

Due to the straining of international relations, we have destroyed 
in readiness for emergency out of the codes kept at this office the 
Yokohama Special Bank code, the TU code, MATU Chinese 
Character List (it was, of course, reported in my #806 (?)) on the 
29th. 

As a result we find it impossible to decipher your message of the 

29th (Yokohama Special Bank request telegram number of 

words 18.) 

WUl you please wire the same in the Foreign Office code. 
25862 Trans. 12/7/41 (6) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
1 December 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#865 

Re my #857*. 

1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the 
situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent 
the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been ad- 
vising the press and others that though there are some wide differences 
between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. 
(The above is for only your information). 

2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S, 
Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message 
#1124***. Please make the necessary representations at your end 
only. 

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the 
capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea 
that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far 
Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter. 

25605 

JD-1: 6983 (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT) 

•JD-l: 6921 (S. I. S. #25496). 
••JD-l: 6710 (S. I. S. #25138). 
•••Not available. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
1 December 1941 
(Purple) 
Circular #2436 

WTien you are faced with the necessity of destroying codes, get in 
touch with the Naval Attache's office there and make use of chemicals 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 209 

they have on hand for this purpose. The Attach^ should have been 
advised by the Navy Ministry regarding this. 

25545 

JD-1: 6939 (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To; Washington 
1 December 1941 
(Purple) 
Circular #2444 

The four cflfices in London, Hongkong, Singapore and Manila have 
been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to dispose 
of them. The machine in Batavia has been returned to Japan. 
Regardless of the contents of my Circular message #2447*, the U. S. 
(office) retains the machines and the machine codes. 

Please relay to France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey from Switzer- 
land; and to Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico from Washington. 

25606 

JD-1: 6984 (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT) 

•Not available. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: London 
1 December 1941 
(Purple) 
Circular #2443 

Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it 
immediately. 

In regard to the disposition of the machine please be very careful 
to carry out the instructions you have received regarding this. Pay 
particular attention to taking apart and breaking up the important 
parts of the machine. 

As soon as you have received this telegram wire the one word 
SETUJU in plain language and as soon as you have carried out the 
instructions wire the one word HASSO in plain language. 

Also_at this time you will of course bum the machine codes and the 
YU GO No. 26 of my telegram. (The rules for the use of the machine 
between the head office and the Ambassador resident in England.) 
25787 
JD-1: 7091 (H) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (L) 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo. 
To: Hsinking. 
1 December 1941 
(Purple) 
#893 

In the event that Manchuria participates in the 

war in view of various circumstances it is our policy to 

cause Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria 
will take the same steps toward England and America that this 
country will take in case war breaks out. 



210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A summary follows: 

1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be 
recognized as having spec"al rights. Their business will be stopped 
(the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be 
forbidden). However it is desired that the treatment accorded them 
after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan 
accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in Japan. 

2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, 
private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable 
to that accorded by Japan. 

3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their 
consular offices and interests will not be recognized. 

However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall 
be equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.. 

4. The treatment accorded Kussians resident in Manchoukuo shall 
conform to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. 
Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia. 

25783 

JD-1: 7092 (H) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (5-AR) 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
1 December 1941 
(Purple) 
#1225 (Part 1 of 3)» 

When I and Ambassador Kurusu called on Secretary Hull on the 
1st, we conveyed to him the matter contained in your message #857*. 
Roughly speaking, Hull's reply stayed within the bounds of his earlier 
explanations. He placed the most emphasis on two points, namely, 
the tone and trend of the Japanese Government's expressions and 
movements and that of the general public opinion organs; and, the 
increase in strength of the garrisons in French Indo-China. 

From the beginning of today's conference. Secretary Hull wore a 
deeply pained expression. Without wasting any time, he brought up 
the subject of the Premier's statement, (see my message #1222**), 
and said that that was one of the reasons for the President's sudden 
return to Washington. (Upon our arrival at the State Department, 
we found not only newspaper men, but even some members of the 
Departmental staff crowding the corridors. Some of these specu- 
lators were of the opinion that the issue of war or peace was to be 
immediately decided upon. In general, the scene was highly dra- 
matic.) 

We, therefore, replied that we were convinced that the Premier's 
statement had been erroneously and exaggeratedly reported in the 
vernacular. We pointed out that regardless of who the speaker may 
be if only an excerpt from his speech is reported, without having the 
entire text available, it is quite possible that the reader will get 
exactly the opposite meaning from that intended by the speaker. 

We went on to advise the Secretary that we were at present await- 
ing the delivery of the entire text. 

During the course of our explanations, the Secretary showed visible 
signs of relief. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 211 

He said: "Since our talks were begun recently, there has not been 
a single indication of endorsement and support from Japan. I have 
not heard of any steps being taken in Japan aimed at facilitating 
these conversations, all of which is exceedingly regrettable." 

25778 (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2) 

JD-1: 7042 



• For Part 2 see S. I. S. #25715. 

•JD-1: 6921 (S. I. S. #25496). 

••Available, dated 30 November (S. I. S. #25761). 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
1 December 1941 
(Purple) 
#1225 (Part 2 of 3) (Parts 1 and 3 not available) 

(Message having the indicator 20803* is part one of three.) 

For this reason CHA has been the target of considerable attack 
and dissatisfaction. It was admitted that he was in a very tight 
spot. As the President recently said, it is clearly understood that 
the people of Japan, after over four years of the Japanese-Chinese 
incident, are very tense. 

Japan, too, is highly desirous of having peace on the Pacific assured 
by successfully concluding these negotiations. It is our hcpe that 
he would give his support and encouragement to the efforts that Hull 
and we are making in this direction. 

With regard to the matters pertaining to French Indo-China . . . 
the govermnent of the United States, too, cannot help but feel con- 
cern since it has been receiving report after report during the past 
few days, from U. S. officials stationed in that area, of unusual move- 
ments of the Japanese army and navy; the landing of various types 
of arms; and the movements of transport vessels. Concern is felt 
as to the goal of all these activities (the implication was that they 
feared that they were going to be used not only against Thailand but 
in the southwestern Pacific area). 

As to what plans the responsible persons in the Japanese army and 
navy are planning are not difficult to guess if one goes on the assump- 
tion that the Japanese army and navy joins forces with the Germans; 
even if, in actuality, that is not what is taking place, preparations 
must be made for this possible eventuality, and all nations concerned 
must concentrate their fighting forces in that area. 

25715 

JD-1: 7042 (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (7) 

•Not available, probably is Part 1 of this message. 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
1 December 1941 
(Purple) 

#1225 (Part 3 of 3) 
(Purple) 

Hull: "In the fTnal analysis, that means that Hitlerism is being 
given indirect support, and for this reason please exercise the utmost 
of caution. 



212 CONGRESSIONAL IN\'ESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"In view of the fact that Japan is acting in the manner described 
above, there is absolutely no way of bringing about a settlement of 
the situation. 

"Disruptions in Japanese-U. S. relations is exceedingly unfortunate, 
not only for our two countries, but to the world in general. There 
shall be nothing constructive about a Japanese-U. S. war. We fully 
realize that it can be nothing other than destructive. For this reason, 
we are still highly desirous of biinging these conversations to a suc- 
cessful conclusion. 

"However, with the existence of the above described conditions, and 
because of the nature of this country, the Secretary of State and the 
President are placed in an exceedingly difficult position." 

I: "It seems mutually regrettable that all of our efforts which lead 
to the 21 June and 25 September proposals, should have been in 
vain." 

In general he expressed his agreement to this. 

Hull: "The recent situation in Japan and the U. S. public opinion 
made it necessary for us to return to the most recent proposal." 

We then said that behind the problems at hand, there has always 
been the China problem. 

^"As I have pointed out on several occasions", I said, "this has been 
the bitterest experience since the Washington Conference. Peace 
between Japan and China could net be attained through any such 
terms as were contained in your most recent proposal. We hear 
your argument to the effect that you cannot stand by and do nothing 
while China dies. The converse of that argiunent should be even 
stronger. That is, that it is of the utmost importance for us to avoid 
standing by and watching our own respective countries die, just be- 
cause of the China problem." 

Hull indicated his agreement with this, but went on to say: 

"Because the situation is as I have already described, I hope that 
Japan will take steps to bring about order through her public organs." 

25778 

JD-1: 7042 (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2) 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
1 December 1941 
(Purple) 
#1226 

Re my #1222* 

Following up the reporting of Premier Tojo's speech, the press here 
carried reports of the speech delivered by Vice President Ando of the 
Imperial Rules Assistance Association, on the 30th. Special attention 
was paid in these dispatches to those parts of the speech in which the 
Vice President advocated the reinvigorating of the alliance ties with 
Germany and Italy, and where he pointed out the United States as 
being the biggest obstacle to the establishment of the Far Eastern 
Co-Prosperity Sphere. 

This report together with the report of President Roosevelt's sudden 
decision to return immediately to Washington and the disclosure of 
Hull's conferences with the British Ambassador on the 29th and the 
30th, is attracting considerable attention of the general pubhc 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 213 

The general tone of these reports is that Roosevelt decided to cut his 
vacation short and rush back to Washington because Hull advised 
him by telephone that Premier To jo had made an unusually strong 
speech, and relayed to him that a Far Eastern crisis may be at hand. 
Within governmental circles, although decisive comments were with- 
held, the general opinion seems to be that Tojo's speech indicates the 
refusal of the Japanese Government to accept the proposals submitted 
to it by the United States on the 26th. These circles also seem to 
feel that the speech indicated Japan's decision to give up hope for the 
talks and to resort to stronger measures. 

The press on the 1st carried a U. P. dispatch from Tokyo reporting 
that though Japan was not satisfied with the United States' reply, 
Japan is desirous of having the discussions continue for at least two 
more weeks. In view of the reports of the Premier's speech, this 
report has an ominous tone about it. 

Some of the newspapers comment that since Japan's invasion of 
Thai has already been definitely mapped out, the above is merely a 
means of stalling for time so as to give the Japanese a chance to seize 
the most opportune moment with respect to developments in Europe, 
to launch this attack. 

25726 

JD-1: 7054 (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1) 

•Not available. 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
1 December 1941 
(Purple) 
#1227 

Indications are that the United States desires to continue the 
negotiations even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the 
so-called basic principles. However, if we keep quibbling on the 
critical points, and continue to get stuck in the middle as we have been 
in the past, it is impossible to expect any further developments. If it 
is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a leaders' 
meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference 
between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence, (for 
example. Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States 
and the former Premief Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the 
President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The 
meeting could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. 
High army and navy officers sholild accompany these representatives. 
Have them make one final effort to reach some agreement, using as the 
basis of their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each. 

We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to 
war or peace. 

We realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt 
and former Premier Konoye meet, failed. Bearing in mind the reac- 
tion to that in our nation, it may be to our interest to first ascertain 
the U. S. attitude on this possibility. Moreover, since we have no 
guarantee either of success or failure of the objectives even if the 
meeting is held, careful consideration should first be given this matter. 



214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are 
face to face, it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to 
us. It is our opinion that it would be most effective to feel out and 
ascertain the U. S. attitude regarding this matter, in the name of the 
Japanese Government. However, if this procedure does not seem 
practical to you in view of some internal condition, then how would it 
be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and in 
that manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it 
the government could make the official proposal. 

Please advise me of your opinions on this matter. 
25727 
JD-1: 7055 (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1) 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
1 December 1941 
(Purple) 
#1230 

Re your #865.* 

The immediate reasons for the President's sudden return to Wash- 
ington are as I reported in my message #1222**. Basically speaking, 
however, the United States has been aroused against us by the reports 
of Premier Tojo's speech to Parliament, and by the speech of Cabinet 
official Kaya and Suzuki to the Convention of the Imperial Rules 
Assistance Association. The dispatches concerning these speeches 
gave one the impression that anti-foreignism, crushing of Britain and 
the United States, were the points most emphasized. 

Japan's true motives are being further doubted here because of the 
reports of increased troop movements in French Indo-China. 

Thus, in the midst of this atmosphere, fraught with suspicion as it 
was, the report of Premier Tojo's speech arrived, in which it was 
alleged that the Premier advocated the purging of all Britons and 
Americans out of the Far East. 

Since the alleged speech was made at a time when the United States 
was expectantly awaiting our reply to their official note of the 26th 
to Japan, particular importance was attached to it. (It is possible 
that the U. S. Government assumes that the speech was made by 
way of expressing our complete disapproval of the U. S. proposal and 
that it foreshadowed our launching a military campaign. Some of the 
newspapers go to the extreme of commenting that if the speech is 
given a literal interpretation it can mean nothing except a declaration 
of war.) 

The President's speeches concerning foreign affairs are consistently 
very cautiously worded, for they are usually taken as a description of 
U. S. national policy. It is almost natural that people who are 
accustomed to interpret speeches in that manner, reacted the way they 
did to the Premier's speech. 

I assume that you have already taken measures to do so, but may 
I suggest that when the Prime Minister or any Cabinet officer is to 
touch upon Foreign Affairs, careful consideration be given to those 
factors. I make this suggestion only because our country is at a 
very critical point in her history. Even if the worst eventuality. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 215 

materializes, we should be in a position to show all neutrals and out- 
siders the complete innocence on our part. 
25728 
JD-1: 7056 (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1) 

•JD-l : 6983 (S. I. S. #25605). 
**N<)t available. 



[Secret] 
From : Tokyo ( Togo ) 
To: Washington 
December 2, 1941 
Purple 

CORRECTED TRANSLATION 

#867. ( Strictly Secret ) 

1. Among the telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped 
burn all but those now used with the machine and one copy each 
of "Opcode (Oite) and abbreviating code (L). (Burn also the various 
other codes which you have in your custody.) 

2. Stop at once using one code machine unit and destroy it com- 
pletely. 

3. When you have finished this, wire me back the one word 
''haruna." 

4. At the time and in the manner you deem most proper dispose of 
all files of me.ssages coming and going and all other secret documents. 

5. Burn all the codes which Telegraphic Official KOSAKA brought 
you. (Hence, the necessity of getting in contact with Mexico 
mentioned in my #860 ^ is no longer recognized.) 

Armv 25640 Translated 12-8-41 (X) Corrected 12^-41 

» S. I. S. #25550 in which Tokyo wires Washington advising them to have KOSAK.\ re- 
turn to .Taoan on the Tatsuta Maru which sails on the 28th. If this makes it impossible 
for KOSAKA to make his trip to Mexico, make some other arrangements with regard ta 
KOSAKA's business in Mexico. 



[Secret! 
From: Tokyo (Togo) 
To : Havana 
December 2, 1941 
J 19-K 9 
Circular #2445 Strictly secret. 

Take great pains that this does not leak out. 

You are to take the following measures immediately : 

1. With the exception of one copy of the O and L code, you are 
to burn all telegraph codes (this includes the code books for com- 
munication between the three departments and the code books for 
Army and Navy communication). 

2. As soon as you have comi)leted this operation, wire the one 
word Haruna. 

3. Burn all secret documents and the work sheets on this message. 

4. Be especially careful not to arouse the suspicion of those on the 
outside. Confidential documents are all to be given the same han- 
dling. 

The above is preparatory to an emergency situation and is for your 
information alone. Remain calm . 



216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Also sent to Ottawa, Vancouver, Panama, Los Angeles, Honolulu, 
Seattle and Portland. 

Army 25879 Trans. 12/8/41 (3) 



[Secret] 
From: Bern (Mitani) 
To: Ankara 
December 2, 1941 
J 19-K 9 

(Tokyo Circular #2447) 

Orders have been issued to our diplomatic officials in North America 
(including Manila), Canada, Panama, Cuba, the South Seas (including 
Timor), Singora, Chienmai, and to all our officials in British (including 
our Embassy in London) and Netherlands territory to inform me 
immediately upon the burning of all their telegraphic codes except 
one copy of Oife and "L". 

Relay from Berlin to Lisbon, Helsinki, Budapest and Vienna; 

Relay from Rome to Bucharest, ; relay from Berne to Vichy, 

Ankara, Lisbon, Madrid; relay from Rio to Buenos Aires, Lima, 

Santiago, , Mexico, Panama, Bogota; relay from Bangkok to 

Hanoi, Saigon; relay from Canton to Haihow, . 

Army 25837 Trans. 12/6/41 (M) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Singapore 
December 2, 1941 
Purple 
Circular #2450 (5 parts complete.) 

Re my Circular #2409*. 

We have drawn up the following table for the particular needs of 
your localities to supplement for the already given Hst. 

Code Word Meaning 

KIKUTI Shipments on the road whereby CHIANG 

receives assistance (the Burma road ?) are now 
very lively. 

KAGEYAMA Shipments along the road whereby 

CHIANG receives assistance (the Burma 
road ?) have now virtually stopped. 

(DE ?)GUTI . . . (blank) (blank) . . . has been 

forced backward at . . . (blank) . . . 

AYAOKA The Burmese Independence movement is 

gradually gaining momentum. The officers 
are endeavoring to quell this with every re- 
source, however, the movement is gradually 
growing more fierce. 

ITAGISI On the . . . the Burma . . . (blank) . . . was 

attacked by the Independents wing with 
pistols (or dynamite) . 

FUKUNISI On the . . . th in the . . . (blank) . . . area 

rioting broke out. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



217 



Code Word 

MIYAMOTO 



KITAMURA 

MUTO 

NAGAOKA 

INABA 

YASmOEN 

TUMURA 

HINO 

NAGAI 
HIGUTI 

SEGAWA 



YASUI 
NARUSE 

KUBOTA 
NIBA 

MOORI 

SEKYA 

TUKAMOTO 

OCHIAI 

KURIBARA 

NISIYAMA 

YAMANOUTI 

NOSE 

KURODA 

HIRAI 

INOYAMA 

ENDOO 

79716 O — 46 — pt. 12- 



Meaning 
I will continue the action I described to you 
until advised by you to do otherwise, then I 
will end it immediately. 

(Part II) 

Recently . . . (blank) . . . American military 
planes arrived at . . . (blank) . . . 

. . . (blank) . . . and pilots numbering . . . 
(blank) . . . arrived at . . , (blank) . . . 

. . . (blank) . . . divisions of . . . (blank) 
. . . troops arrived at . . . (blank) . . . and 
left for . . . (blank) ... on the . . . th. 

. , . (blank) . . . divisions of . . . (blank) 
. . . troops are reportedly concentrated on the 
. . . (blank) . . . border. 

The Independents movement at . . . (blank) 
. . . and negotiations thwarting England are 
now progressing smoothly. 

At present there is a total of . . . (blank) 
. . . enemy merchant men docked at . . . 
(blank) . . . 

Merchant ships now docked at . . . (blank) 
. . . are as follows: American . . . (blank) 
. . .; British . . . (blank) . . .; Netherlands 
. . . (blank) . . . 

an merchant ships left for . . . 

(blank) . . . loaded with arms. 

Our means of communication with Burma 
and the South Seas is disrputed and we can- 
not receive. 

Our resident Nationals have been camped. 

Part III 

It is reported that riots are breaking out. 

Progressing with preparations to bomb oil 
fields. 

Oil fields bombed. 

The residents of area re pre- 
paring to flee. 



Orders issued to residents of 

. . area to flee. 

Morale wavering. 

Netherlanders. 

Japanese Nitta Natives. 

Japanese. 



(blanks 



Premier. 

Specialists' Commission. 

High tide (?) 

Some ofl&cers and private citizens 

Telegraphy. 

The Yamashita Agency. 



-16 



218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Code Word 

ATUKAI 

KOIZUMI 

ABE 

EDOGUTI 

HIROSE 

HUKUI 

INOUYE 

FUKA 

KASAURA 
IKAWA 



HUJIMURA 

IIJIMA 

ARIASA 

HURUYA 

NIWA 

KAMIYA 

ISIDA 

NINOMIYA 

HOSOKAWA 

NEZU 

YOKOTA 

NUMATA 

WATANZAKA 

NOZAKI 

KERI 

SERINE 

SERISAWA 

SONE 

ANDO 

DOBASI 

FUKUSIMA 

HAKAMATSU 



ISTUMOTO 

NAKINO 

MAKING 

SAKURAI 

TAKANO 

UEDA 

YANAGIYA 

WATAGI 

EGAWA 

AIDA 

BANDO 

FUNABASI 

IKEDA 

KATAGIRI 

MIZOCUTI 

NUKADA 



Meaning 
The Nakamura Company. 
India. 
Java. 
Sumatra. 
Celebes. 
Borneo. 



British India. 
Ceylon. 

. (Part IV) 

Hainan Island. 

The Spratleys. 

Singapore. 

Pinan. 

Bangkok. 

Chien mai* — 

Saigon. 



Tonkin. 
Cambodia. 

Manila. 

Batavia. 
Menado. 
Makassar. 



Singora. 



Pankaran-Brandan * . 
Pankan Susii*. 
Mandalay. 
Palembang. 

PART V 

Jambi. 
Tarakan. 

Pa Pan. 

Sageirinda*. 

Sanga Sanga*. 

Piuira*. 

Banka*. 

Biriton*. 

Sunda*. 

Malacca. 

Sumaran*. 

Timor. 

New Guinea. 

Lashio. 

The Perurisu* region. 

The Geta* region. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



219 



Code Word 

SAWAKAWA 

TAKESITA 

UTSUNOMIYA 

YAMANE 

ARAMAKI 

DOOKE 

Army 25943 



Meaning 
The Kota Bharii Region. 
East. 
West. 
South. 
North. 
Island. 

Trans. 12/9/41 (NR) 



» See S. I. S. #25609 in which Tokyo sends out a circular containing hidden-meaning words to be used as 
an eirergency system for dispatches. 
•Kana spelling. 



[Secret] 

From: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) 
To : Santiago 
2 December 1941 
(J 19) 
Circular #328 

Tokyo to Rio de Janeiro as Circular #2431, 29th November 

Re my Circular #2409.* 

Additions to the list already sent; please use with others. 

Code Word 

KASIMA 
KANO 
KIKUTI 
KATUN O 



KAWASIMO 



KAKAO 

(Kayao) 
TUJIKITA 



TABUSE 

(Tabu_ti) 
SAITO 



HAYASAKI 



ISEZAKI 

WANAMI 

YASUNO 

UNO 

ITIOTA 

(perhaps ITIOKA) 

(probably UTIOKA) 

26144 
JD-1: 



Meaning 

Have Japanese living there been interned? . 

Japanese living here are all safe. 

Japanese living here have all been interned. 

Some of Japanese living here have been 
interned. 

The wave length of General Information 
broadcast will be changed to . . kilocycles 
from . . . (day) . . . (month) . . . 

Reception of General Information broad- 
cast bad, please change wave length. 

Please change wave length of General In- 
formation broadcast to a shorter wave length 
than the present wave length. 

Please change wave length of General In- 
formation broadcast to a longer wave length. 
The time of General Information broadcast 
is to be changed starting on . . . (day) . . . 
from . . . (time) . . . to . . . (time) . . . 

Please change time of General Information 



broadcast, starting on 
from . . . (time) ... to 

100 (hvaku). 

1,000 (sen). 

10,000 (man). 

100,000 (jyu man). 

1,000,000 (hyakuman). 



(day) 
. (time) 



to, 



(Y) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7) 



•JD-l: 6985. List of code words similar to above. 



220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



[Secret] 

From: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii) 

To: Santiago 

2 December 1941 

(J 19) 

Circular #329 (In 3 parts, complete) 

Tokyo to Rio as Circular #2432, on 29 Nov. 

Re my Circular #2409*. • 

The following are added this date to my Circular #2409*, for special 

use in your area. Please use them together with the others, (after 

making them up in a table). 

{Translator's note. Underlined values are doubtful due to garbles. 

Probable correct value added below in parenthesis.) 



Code Word 

ASHINA* 



DATE* 
KAWAHARA 

NIWAGUCHI 

(Kawaguchi) 
NAKAMUTA 

(Nakamura) 
SATU NAKATA 
(Munakata) 
KAZAMA 

TOKUSIMA 

TAKENOUTI 

YA_GI 

(YANAGI) 

TONEGI 



Meaning 

From . . . (blank) . . . (date), Japanese 
ships stopping here will not be allowed to take 
on fuel. 

Please telegraph probable amount of . . . 
(blank) . . . that can be imported. 

I estimate we can probably import about 
. . . (blank) . . . tons of . . . (blank) . . . 

It is impossible to carry out . . . (blank) 

Are in the process of arranging for im- 
portation of . . . (blank) . . . 

Send communications via . . . (blank) 

. . . (country). 

Communications will be through offices 
stationed in , , . (blank) . . . (country). 

Japanese ship should arrive in . . . (blank) 
. . . (country) on . . . (blank) . . .(month) 
. . . (blank) . . . (day). 

Is it possible for Japanese ships to come 
to . . . (blank) . . . (country)? 

It is not possible to send Japanese ships 
to . . . (blank) . . . (country). 

It is possible to send Japanese ship(s) to 
. . . (blank) . . . (country). 

{Part 2) 



TAKAGI 


Minerals 


SAWAMURA 


Lead. 


SUMI 


Mercury. 


(Kasumi) 




IWASAKI 


Petroleum. 


HIROHATA 


Diamonds for industrial use 


ITAMI 


Platinum. 


KADA 


Copper. 


NAKAGAWA 


Carat. 


MA EH AT A 


Peru. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 221 

Code Word Meaning 

MASUKO Chile. 

SENEDA Colombia. 

TAKENAKA Paraguay or Uruguay (?) 

SIMAZU Paraguay or Uruguay. (?) 

IMAZAWA Venezuela. 

FUJIKAKE San QTNY** 

HASIMOTO Cuba. 

SINDO Havana. 

TIBA Rio de Janeiro. 

TOZAWA Sao Paulo. 

{Part 3) 

HASEGAWA Riberao Preto. 

IRIFUNE Santos. 

ENOMOTO * Bauru. 

BEPPU Curityba. 

TIKAMATU Belem. 

SUETUGU Buenos Aires. 

OKIZUMI Santiago. 

YAMATO Lima. 

UMEGAWA Bogota. 

HARA Caracas. 

ISONO Montevideo. (?) 

FUKAMATI Asuncion. 

Relay from Rio de Janeiro to TPT***, Lima. Sao Paulo. Mexico 
City relay to Washington, Panama, Havana, Caracas (?), Bogota. 
25830 
JD-1 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5^1 (7) 

•JD-l: 6985 (S. I. 8. #25609). List of code names to be used in plain language messages, with indicator 
S T O P at end. 
••Code value is QINY, (probably Salvador or Domingo). 
♦♦•Probably "Buenos Aires and Santiago." 



[Secret] 



From: Washington 

To: Tokyo 

December 2, 1941 

Purple 

#1232 (Part 1 of 2) 

COMPLETED " TRANSLATION 

Re my #1231.'^ 

Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview 
with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing 
his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the 
President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance 
of my separate wire #1233.* Thereupon we said: "wSince we haven't 
been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in 
French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations 
directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never 
considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshdt of 
their proposals of November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: 
"I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that 



222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon 
we replied: ''The United States and other countries have pyramided 
economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I 
made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than 
forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons 
of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are 
faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have 
but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the 
chains that it invokes. *We want you to realize this as well as the 
situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the 
four-year incident in China; the President recently expressed cogni- 
zance of the latter situation. 

Army 25659-B Trans. 12/3/41 (7) 

» Not available. 

•Original translation incomplete from this point on. 



y [Secret! 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To\ Tokvo 

December 2, 1941 

Purple 

#1232 (Part 2 of 2) 

Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent 
American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most 
profound consideration to this important question which has to do 
with our national destiny." Under-Secretary of State WELLES 
said: "I am well aware of that." I continued: "We cannot over- 
emphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually 
impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now 
stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals 
of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on 
the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the 
agreement of both sides was in the ofRng. it has come to naught. 
At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new 
proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement 
of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops 
from French Indo-Chiiui in the event of a settlement of the Sino- 
Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far 
East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamenlal questions, the 
question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve." 
The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: "The 
American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity 
to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal 
situation here." Then he continued: "In regard to the opinions 
that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer 
with the Secretary," 

I got the impression from the manner in which Jie spoke that he 
hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would 
leave this much room. 

Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st 
and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, 
is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I 
am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settle- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 223 

merit. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considera- 
tions of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate 
wire #1233*. 
Army 25660 Trans. 12-3-41 (7) 

• Not available. 



[Secret] 



From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

December 2, 1941 

Purple (Urgent) 

#1234 

Strictly Secret.- 

Re your #862*. • 

I knew that to leave that error in the publication of this speech as 
it now stands would have a bad effect on negotiations, so on the 
morning of the 2nd prior to my interview with WELLES I sent 
TERAZAKI to visit B ALLAN TINE at the State Department to 
explain the substance of your #862. BALLANTINE said, "At this 
tense psychological moment in Japanese-American negotiations, the 
fact that such a strong statement as this has been circulated has given 
a severe shock to the American Government and people and it is very 
unfortunate and dangerous." TERAZAKI replied, "Well, as it was 
the American newspapers that made such a clamor about it, I did not 
come to vindicate ourselves or make any explanation. I merely 
wished to state the facts." He added, "At present the newspapers 
of both countries ought both to be cool and calm, so will you please 
advise them hereafter concerning this point." 

Army 25730 

JD: 7059 Trans. 12-4-41 (2) 

» Not available. 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
December 2, 1941 
Purple 
#1239 

Re my #123. "^ 

On the 2nd in a press interview the President stated that he had 
sent us an inquiry that day concerning our increasing troops in French 
Indo-China. Expressing his own views for the first time, he briefly 
stated that the trend of Japanese-American negotiations for the past 
few days and our rumored increasing of troops in southern French 
Indo-China had both thrown obstacles in the way of the progress of 
the negotiations (see special intelligence from Washington). This was 
the first interview since returning from Warm Springs > and particular 
attention is to be paid to the fact that he referred directly to nego- 
tiations. 
Army 25690 Trans. 12/4/41 (NR) 

• Not available. 



224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Canton 
To: Tokyo 
December 2, 1941 
J-19 
#512 Secret outside the department 

If hostilities are to begin we here are all prepared. The army has 
completed all preparations to move immediately upon Thai. Should 
the British resist to the bitter end, it is understood that the army is 
prepared to go so far as to militarily occupy the country. 

(Japanese) 
Army 26103 Tians. 12/11/41 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
3 December 1941 
(Purple) 
#875 Chief of Office routing 

Re your #1232*. 

Please explain the matter to the United States along the following 
lines: 

There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in 
French Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently 
there has been an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in 
the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo-China border. In view of this, 
we have increased our forces in parts of northern French Indo-China. 
There would naturally be some movement of troops in the southern 
part as a result of this. We presume that the source of the rumors is 
in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have 
in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French 
joint defense agreement. 

25725 

JD-1: 7057 (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT) 

•JDj-l: 7021 (S. I. S. #2565»-60). 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
3 December, 1941 
(Purple) 
#876 

Re your 1227* (Washington to Tokyo). 

As you are well aware, during the tenure of the previous cabinet, a 
meeting between the leaders of the two countries was suggested by us 
but the proposal failed to materialize. It is felt that it would be 
inappropriate for us to propose such a meeting again at this time. 
Please be advised of this decision. 

25699 

JD-1: 7018 Navy Trans. 12-3-41 

•Not available. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 225 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
3 December 1941 
(Purple) 
#877 

Re #1225* from Washington to Tokyo. 

Your message #1225* of course refers to the U. S. proposal of June 
and our September proposal but it goes without saying that the one 
we are holding to now is our 20 November proposal, which now super- 
cedes the September proposal. 

25700 

JD-1: 7019 Navy Trans. 12-3/41 

*Not available. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo. 
To: Washington. 
3 December 1941 
(Purple) 
#878 (In 2 parts, complete) 

Re your #1225*. 
Chief of Office routing. 

1. Apparently, the United States is making much of the statements 
issued by our governmental organs, the trend of the public opinion, as 
well as of our troop movements in the south. They have used these 
as an excuse to doubt our sincerity in wanting to bring about a suc- 
cessful settlement in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations. 

We explained the truth behind the alleged Tojo statement in my 
message #866**. The English translation (this was done in the offices 
of the Domei News agency) of that statement was very different from 
the original, and that was responsible for the unexpected reactions. 

With regard to guiding general public opinion, this Minister him- 
self has made considerable effort. 

The State Department should be in receipt of a report from the 
U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo regarding this point. As a matter of 
fact, as your report in your message #1148*** Secretary Hull has ex- 
pressed his satisfaction over the change for the better along these 
lines. 

In spite of this, the tone of some of the U. S. newspapers seem to be 
unduly ominous. Moreover, the radio (particularly those which are 
aired via short wave from Sdin Francisco very recently) has been daily 
broadcasting in considerable detail, the progress being made in the 
negotiations. It is quite evident that persons who have access to the 
records of the meetings are acting as liaison agents for those broad- 
casts, for otherwise it would be impossible to obtain some of the in- 
formation that is being aired. We feel that it is very inappropriate 
for the United States to criticize us without looking after her own 
house. 

{Part 2) 

2. Recently, Britain, the United States, and others have been mak- 
ing military preparations against Japan at an every increasing tempo. 
At the same time, they have been acting in a more and more antag- 
onistic manner of late. For example, on the 20th of last month, a 



226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

U. S. plane made a reconnaissance flight over Garanpi in the southern 
part of Formosa. (We filed a protest with the U. S. Ambassador on 
the 27th regarding this matter). Since then, however, the British 
and the United States have shown no indication of ending such activi- 
ties. In view of the very critical times, we cannot help but hope that 
such incidents would cease. 

3. Our proposal which was submitted on 20 November was based 
on just principles. Will you please point out again that these prin- 
ciples undoubtedly offer the best chance of leading to an eventual set- 
tlement. (We assume that when the United States says in their coun- 
ter proposal .hat our terms are not in sympathy with the existing 
principles, the y refer to the contents of Article 4 in which it is stated 
that the peace between Japan and China shall not be disturbed. We 
are insisting that all aid to Chiang cease as soon as Japanese-Chinese 
negotiations, at the instigation of the President of the United States, 
are launched. Hence, our proposal in no way conflicts with the spirit 
of the so-called fundamental principles being proclaimed by the United 
States. Please bear that in mind. 

25720 

JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (&-TT) 

•JD-l: 7042 (S. I. S. #25715). 
••Available, dated 3 December. 
•••.in-1: 6737 (S. I. S. #25174). 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: —(Circular) 
3 December 1941 
(PA-K2) 
Circular #2461 

Please keep the code list (INGO HIKAE)* (including those in con- 
nection with broadcasts) until the last moment, and if by any chance 
you have already destroyed them they will have to be resent to you, 
so please notify us of this fact immediately. 

This message is as a precaution. 

25855 

JD-1: 7123 (Y) Nav-y Trans. 12-6-41 (S-TT) 

•"Hidden Word" code to be used in plain Japanese language messages. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Vancouver 
3 December 1941 
(PAK-2) 
#92 

Please retain the "hidden meaning" codes and the codes to be used 
in conjunction with radio broadcasts until the last moment. If you 
have already destroyed them, advise' and we will retransmit them. 

26787 

JD-1: 7775 (D) Navy Trans. 12-24-41(CN) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 227 

[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
3 December 1941 
(Purple) 
#1243 

If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is 
expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore 
consideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection with 
the evacuation of the Consuls. 

25721 

JD-1: 7050 (F) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT) 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
3 December 1941 
(Purple) 
#1243 

Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military 
action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without 
a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupa- 
tion of Thailand. 
25785 
JD-1: 7098 (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7) 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
3 December 1941 
(Purple) 
#1245 

Terasaki now in the midst of — — — intelligence work at a 
most important time, would like to have him stay over a while and go 
by the sailing on the 19th. Takagi busy on Tatsuta Maru business. 
(Negotiating with State Department for securing space) — — — 
— — air plane. 

(Note. — Many gaps in this message.) 
25722 
JD-1: 7051' (F) Navy Trans. 12^-41 (S-TT) 



[Secret] 

From: Washington (Nomura) 

To: Tokyo 

December 3, 1941 

Purple (Urgent) 

#1256. 

Re your #875 ». 

I receiv^ed your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this 
reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The 
United States Government is attaching a great deal of importance on 



228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

this reply. Especially since the President issued his statement yes- 
terday, it is being rumored among the journalists that this reply is 
to be the key deciding whether there will be war or peace between 
Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what the United 
States Government wUl take a bold step depending upon how our 
reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to 
arrive at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would 
neither satisfy them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred 
to — even if your reply is made for the mere purpose of keeping the 
negotiations going. Therefore, in view of what has been elucidated 
in our proposal which I submitted to the President on November 10th, 
I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our 
peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this question with 
this is mind and wire me at once. 

Army 25849 Trans. 12/7/41 (1) 

JD: 7128 

» See S. I. S. #25725— Explanation of Japan's increase of their forces in French Indo-China. 



[Secret] 
From: Rome 
To: Tokyo 
3 December 1941 
(Purple— CA) 
#985 

Re your message #985* to Berlin. 

On this day, at 11 o'clock in the morning, I, accompanied by Ando, 
called on Premier Mussolini, (Foreign Minister Ciano was also 
present). I described the developments in the Japanese-U. S. 
negotiations in accordance with the contents of your message #986** 
to Berlin. 

Mussolini: "I have been carefully watching the progress of the 
Japanese-U. S. talks from the very beginning and therefore am not 
at all surprised to receive your report. As a matter of fact, in view 
of the utter bull-headedness of the United States and the meddlesome 
nature of President Roosevelt, I should say that the outcome was 
nothing but what should have been expected. One of the aims of the 
United States is to make the Far East her own, from an economic 
standpoint. I have felt from the beginning that if it was the intention 
of the United States to separate Japan from the Axis first and then 
intervene in Europe, the United States was doomed to fail because of 
Japan's loyal and sincere nature. 

"As Your Excellency and Your Excellency's predecessor know, I 
wholeheartedly endorse Japan's policy of creating a New Order in 
East Asia. This has been true in the past, is true now and will be 
so in the future. I am one who is firmly convinced that Japan has 
every right to be the leader of the Great East Asia area." 

I continued by relating to him the contents of your message referred 
to in the heading, (with regard to paragraph 3 of that message, I 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 229 

said that I had been advised that some arrangements were being 
made between our Ambassador in Berlin and Ribbentrop). 

With regard to paragraph 2, Mussolini said that should war break 
out, Italy would give every military aid she had at her disposal, i. e., 
that she would make every effort to keep the British navy checked 
in the Mediterranean. 

Mussolini: "Recently, the formation of an Italian-German air 
force bloc was discussed so as to afford closer cooperation between the 
two to apply further pressure on the British in the Mediterranean. 
The negotiations on this proposal have progressed to a point where 
it may be signed any day now." 

Regarding paragraph 2 again, should Japan declare war on the 
United States and Great Britain, I asked, would Italy do likewise 
immediately? Mussolini replied: "Of course. She is obligated to 
do so under the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Since Germany would 
also be obliged to follow suit, we would like to confer with Germany 
on this point." 

With reference to paragraph 3, I submitted the French text of 
your message #987***, as one proposal, and asked him whether he 
preferred it to be separately or jointly. He replied that as long as 
it was done simultaneously with Germany it did not make much 
difference to him, but if it were done jointly he thought it would give 
the impression of more strength. He said he would confer with 
Ambassador MAKKENZEN. 

Mussolini failed to bring up the subject of Soviet Russia, so the 
matter was not brought up at all. 

In the first part of this message, please correct "N-NKEN WA" 
to "KINKENSHA WA". 

(D) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (W-TT) 



25833 
JD-1: 


(D) 


•JD-l: 6943 (8. I. S. #25552-53). 
••JD-1: 6944 (S. I. S. #25554-55). 
•••Not available. 




From: Bangkok 

To: Tokyo 

3 December 1941 

(Purple) 

#892 


[Secret] 



In order to meet an emergency situation it is most important that 
we have our currency arrangements for Thailand in readiness. There- 
fore please have the Finance Minister appoint a suitable person as a 
member of the Embassy Staff, and send him out as soon as possible. 
25724 
JD-1: 7053 (F) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S^TT) 



230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Peking 
To: Net 

3 December 1941 
(Purple) 
Circular #616 (In 3 parts, complete) 

Peking to Tokyo #763 (Most secret outside the Ministry). 
Kitazawa, Commander Army of North China. 
Arisue, Vice Chief of Staff. 
Nishimura, 4th Section, Staff Headquarters. 
Kazayama, Chief of Staff. 
Shiozawa, Liaison Officer, Chinese Development Board. 

At a meeting on December 1st and 2nd, of the above five, the follow- 
ing conclusions and decisions were reached: 

"If this war does start, this will be a war which wiU decide the rise 
or fall of the Japanese Empire. For this reason it goes without say- 
ing, do not have small, or local, insignificant matters, occupy you. 
Instead quiet such things imimediately and settle in a most advantage- 
ous way to us. In addition, all administrative control of these dis- 
tricts should be carefuUy planned anew with the above in view. For 
example, 'the fact that this war is one which is unavoidable for the 
existence of Japan and the maintenance of peace in East Asia' should 
be made very clear to all foreign nations and thus internally strengthen 
the unity of the people while guiding the world's public opinion in a 
direction beneficial to Japan. Thus both during, the period of war 
and at the end of the war during the peace negotiations the greatest 
benefit will accrue to Japan. 

"Especially on the minds of the southern native peoples we must 
make an impression so as to draw them towards us and against the 
United States and Britain. For this purpose, when this war starts 
all district and regional authorities must as much as possible adhere 
to existing international laws, etc. and under no condition should any 
action which would look like 'stealing while the house burns' to foreign 
countries be taken which might result in the loss of the main issue for 
a small immediate local profit. 

{Part 2) 

"In order to end this affair in a profitable note for Japan, one need 
but remember that in the Russo-Japan war it was necessary to have 
President Roosevelt act as peace mediator, to appreciate that for the 
expected coming war the only one who can be imagined as an inter- 
mediary is the Pope. This fact should be kept in mind in any step 
which is taken in the occupied territory. And for this reason too the 
enemy's position should be considered, and the handhng of enemy 
churches etc. in China should be carefully studied. 

"It is evident that Japan will have to put everything that they have 
in the coming war, and for this reason it is only natural that our 
burden in China be made as light as possible, so that our strength 
must be saved. For this reason matters other than political or 
economic, that can be handled by China should as much as possible 
be left to China to manage and thereby get credit for this from the 
Chinese, too. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 231 

"It can be imagined that the next war is to be a longer one than 
the China incident, so that in this region the main issue should be 
the obtaining of materials. For this reason the question of closed 
trade and methods of gathering material should again be thoroughly 
studied. 

{Part 3) 

II "The military will of course try to handle matters as much as 
possible according to the International code. They will increase even 
more their close cooperation with the Legations, especially regarding 
protection of churches. In this regard they have already planned a 
complete education of the soldier groups stationed in the occupied 
territories." 

Arisue mentioned that he was on close terms with the Vatican here 
(2 lines garbled) 

(Arisue mentioned that he had always approved of allowing the 
Chinese to handle their own affairs and as a matter of -fact he had 
been acting with that in mind. However, he was only worried that 
by handing over the management of things to the Chinese, that they 
might get the mistaken idea that the Japanese had become weakened. 
This point should be kept in mind and any action of this kind should 
be done in such a way as to not let them get such a mistaken idea.) 

"It is of course important to obtain materials, but regarding easing 
the ban on free trade in enemy territory, this subject should be 
studied from various angles." 

III Shiozawa expressed his agreement with most items mentioned, 
and declared that very close touch has been kept with military forces 
and different methods of leading North China politically were being 
studied. 

26881 

JD-1: 7848 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-26-41 (C-NR) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
December 4, 1941 
Purple 
#881 

Re my #867."^ 

Before you burn the codes brought you by KOSAKA, have him 
teach all your telegraphic staff how to use them. If you have not yet 
burned the keying described in my Circular #2400", keep it in your 
custody until the last moment. Moreover, send it by some suitable 
plane to our ministry in Mexico in care of Junior Secretary MATSUI 
or Secretary NAGAKI in San Francisco or some other suitable 
courier. Wire this to Mexico and let me know what reply they make. 

Army 25754 Trans. 12-4-41 (S) 

• S. I. S. #25640 which gives instructions regarding the destruction of codes, 
b See S. I. S. #25753. 



232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 

To: Washington ^ 

December 4, 1941 
Purple (Urgent) 
#891 

To be handled in Government Code. 

Re your #1256*. 

What you say in your telegram is, of course, true, but at present it 
would be a very delicate matter to give any more explanations than 
set forth in my #875**. I would advise against it because unfortunate 
results might follow, so please reply in accordance with my afore- 
mentioned message. 

Army 25731 Trans. 12-4-41 (S) 

JD-7105 



• Not available.' 
b S. I. S. #25725. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Net 

December 4, 1941 
Purple 
Cir #2467 

Departmental secret to be handled in Government code. Strictly 
secret outside the department. 

On the 4th, the Government held a conference for control and 
liaison and decided on the policy which Manchukuo must follow in 
case of a sudden change in the International relations. It is as follows: 

Policy 

When Japan enters a war, Manchukuo for the time being shall not 
enter it because of Manchukuo's relation to Japan and her policy. 
Manchukuo shall treat Gr^at Britain, the United States and Nether- 
land Indies as enemy countries, and shall take measures to that end. 

The Pnncipal Points. 

1 . Manchukuo shall not recognize either the consuls and 

or as enjoying privileges and shall forbid them 

to carry on their duties. (The use of code telegrams and short wave 
radio sets shall be prohibited). Furthermore in regards to the treat- 
ment to be accorded, performance of their duties. Manchukuo shall 
accord treatment in the spirit of fairness following the methods 
employed by Japan in dealing with latest 

2. Manchukuo follows the same methods as Japan in dealing with 
public and private properties of and the 



3. Manchukuo shall not recognize any request addressed to any 
third power for the protection of consulate buildings and the interests 
of the residents. However, Manchukuo shall carry out her legal 
measures following the methods employed in Japan for dealing 
with and do so in the spirit of fairness and justice. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 233 

4. In the treatment to be accorded the citizens of Soviet Russia 
residing in Manchukuo in view of the existance of a neutraHtv treaty 
between Soviet Russia and Japan, she shall keep in step witn Japan 
and take every precaution so as not to provoke Soviet Russia. 

This message sent to Peking, Nanking, and Shanghai. 

(Japanese) 
Army 25994 Trans. 12/9/41 NR 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 

To: Nanking, Shanghai, Peking, Hsinking 
December 4, 1941 
Purple 

Circular #2468 Separate wire, Restricted Distribution. 
(Secret outside the Department). 

1 . Until a state of war develops between Japan and the Netherlands, 
the Netherlands Government will be considered a quasi-enemy power. 
Already they have put into force prohibitions regarding the use of 
cod«s and are exercising rigid control and surveillence of our officials 
(consequently it is indicated that they are positively working in con- 
junction with enemy powers). 

2. In the event the Netherlands declares war, we will issue a declara- 
tion to the effect that a state of war exists between Japan and the 
Netherlands. In the event that a state of war exists between our 
country and the Netherlands before the Netherlands has actually 
made a declaration of war, we will issue a declaration to the effect that 
a state of war exists between Japan and the Netherlands. Otherwise, 
in accordance with International Law, we will treat her as an enemy 
nation. 

A. The advantages accruing the Netherlands Government through 
repudiation would be that at the same time she carried out her repudia- 
tion she would declare the Minister to be persona non grata. Though 
there are indications that she has gone beyond this, there will be no 
need to handle the situation any other way but in accordance with (1) 
above. 

B. Should the Netherlands Government repudiate this, there will 
be no responsibility under International Law for the Netherlands to 
protect our nationals in the Netherlands East Indies. Then, too, 
even after a state of war has been brought about in her relations 
with us, she will be forced to stand in the position of not accepting 
a protest under International Law. Then again, she could bring 
about great inconvenience by demanding the evacuation of our 
Consular officials. 

C. To date the Netherlands Government has actually maintained 
her position under International Law, but should she repudiate this, 
there would be no advantage in any other plan but A, mentioned 
above. Then, too, in the event that the Netherlands Government 
begins hostilities, this would indicate her intention to repudiate our 
relationships and there would be no necessity to handle her in any 
other way but as a qiesa enemy nation. 

(Translation sketchy due to garbles.) 
Army 26101 (Japanese) Trans. 12/11/41 

7971« <) — 4<5 — i)t. 12 1 7 



234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Hsinking 
December 4, 1941 
Purple 
#909 (Strictly Secret) 

Re my #892^ 

On the fourth, in a joint conference with the Government Control 
Board, we decided upon steps which we will have Manchukuo take in 
case the international situation turns critical. Differing from what I 
said in my #873* our policy was changed as follows: 

"When the Japanese Empire commences hostilities, for the time 
being Manchukuo will not participate. Because Manchukuo is closely 
bound up with the Japanese Empire and because England and the 
United States and the Netherlands have not recognized the Govern- 
ment of Manchukuo, as a matter of fact, Hsinking will regard those 
three nations as de facto enemies and treat them accordingly." 

\\'herever "England and the United States" and "English and 
Americans" occur in the text, we changed them to "England, the 
United States, and the Netherlands" and "English, Americans and 
Netherlanders." 

(Japanese) 
Army 26142 Trans. 12/11/41 (5) 

• Not available. 



[Secret! 
From: Berlin 
To: Tokyo 
December 4, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
#1410 

In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, 
I would like to arrange to have Secretary MATSUI of that office and 
three others (URABE and KOJIMA and one other) from among the 
higher officials and two other officials (UEHARA and YUWASAKI) 
stay here. Please do your best to this end. 

Army 25807 

JD-7134 Trans. 12-5^1 (W) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
5 December 1941 
(Purple) 
#896 

Re your #1245* 

Will vou please have Terasaki, Takagi, Ando, Yamamoto and others 
leave by plane within the next couple of days. 

25839 

JD-1: 7140 (D) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S-TT) 

•JD-l: 7051 (S. I. S. #25722). 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 235 

T-i Tir , • [Secret] 

i^rom: Washington 

To: Tokyo 

5 December 1941 

(Purple) 

#1261 (In 2 parts, complete) 

On the 5th I, together with Ambassador Kurusu, called on Secre- 
tary Hull, and, puttmg the matter contained in your instructions in 
writmg, submitted it to him. 

Hull: "You explain the matter as if the Chinese have concentrated 
troops near the border and that there is a fear that they would take 
aggressive action." -^ 

We: "Whether or not they would attack and where from if thev do 
attack, depends entirely on such thmgs as the military strengths of 
each and on other considerations. We who do not have a clear picture 
ot the exact conditions on the scene, cannot make any explanations 
other than those contained in the instructions we receive 

"However the fact remains that there is a possibility that the 
Chinese would take the offensive. We have been in receipt of advices 
for some tune past that the Chinese have been concentrating large 
forces in the Kwangsi area." ^ ^ 

Hull said that he would relay the explanations to the President 

While we were there, we continued along the following line- 
J^undamen tally speakmg, it was because we wanted to avoid just 
exactly what happened as a result— namely, the misinterpretations 
and the consequent belligerent argumentations— of the President's 
most recent inquiries, that we wished to brmg about a speedy settle- 
ment tlirough our 20 November proposal. 

T !i'^?.^-^^^P ^^^^^i^g up. the subject of our occupation of French 
Jjido-Chma. Basically this is merely a phase of 'power polities'. 
Your country herself, has stated that the 'best defense is an offense' 
Your military men in particular have taken this adage hterally, and as 

?nTfV T'^'J ' . fiy" h^^^^^^^^.'^'^f'^y ^^«^t to strengthen the army 
and the fleet of the ABCD. With this situation being flaunted before 
tneir eyes, our army and navy cannot remain unconcerned " 

bo saymg, we repeated the gist of the contents of your message 
#878**. J & 

• (Part 2) 

Hull: "Since these conversations were started this spring until 24 
July when Japan occupied the southern part of French Indo-China 
the United States contmued to permit the exporting of oil to Japan 
During that time, I was the target of terrific criticism for allowing 
this, from Senators and from many other sources. Even in those 
times, the opposition to allowing this was of blistering intensity. 
Public opinion would absolutely prohibit the resumption of exporting 
of petroleum to Japan today." ^ ^ 

We: "If the relationship between Japan and the United States 
underwent some improvement and if peaceful cooperation between 
our two countries is established, in accordance with that which is 
lour J^xcellencys custom to advocate, the concern you express now 
would automatically be dissolved. 

"We are convinced that the correct starting point leading to the 
above described ideal situation, is to settle our major differences indi- 



236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

vidually, rather than attempt to reach a blanket agreement, along 
the lines proposed by us on 20 November." 

Hull then pointed out that the general tone of our press and other 
publications were making it difficult for the United States and Japan 
to reach an agreement. We therefore said that the same can be said 
of a portion of the U.S. press and went on to relate to him the con- 
tents of paragraph 1 of your message #878**. 

(Translator's note: Last 5 lines of text unreadable). 
25842 
JD-1: 7139 (D) Navy Trans. 12-6-^1 (S-TT) 

••JD-l: 7049 (S. I. S. #25720). 
•JD-1: 7105. 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 

5 December 1941 ~^ 

(Purple) 
#1268 

Re your #867*. 

From Councillor of Embassy Iguchi to the Chief of the Communi- 
cation Section: 

We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U. S.- 
Japanese negotiations are still continuing I request your approval 
of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code 
machine. 

25836 

JD-1: 7136 (M) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S-TT) 

•(Dated 2 December) JD-1: 7017 (8. 1. 8. #26640) : Directs Washington to destroy all copies of codes except 
one copy of certain ones, and also destroy one code machine. 



[Secret] 
From: Peking 
To: Tokyo 
5 December 1941 
(Purple) 
Cir #625 — (Circular Number) To be handled in government code. 

Re my secret military communication #262* of November 30th. 

1. Concurrent with opening war on Britain and America we have 
considered Holland as a semi-belligerent and have exercised strict 
surveillance over her consulates and prohibited all communication 
between them and the enepiy countries. 

2. Coincident with the beginning of the war against Britain and 
America we have taken steps to prohibit the use of code messages 
and the use of wireless by the Holland consulates. 

3. In case war breaks out with Holland we wUl take the same steps 
toward that country that we have taken in the case of Britain and 
America. 

26108 

JD-1: 7335 (H) Navy Trans. 12-11^1 (AR) 

•Not available. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 237 

[Secret] 
From: Peking. 
To: Shanghai. 
5 December 1941 
(Purple) 
#626 (Circular) 

Peking to Tokyo #770 (To be handled in government code) 
Re your Circular #2467* 
(Strictly confidential) 

1. It is recognized that the treatment accorded to the property and 
staff of the consulates of Britain, America, and Holland in North 
China should be, as a matter of policy, comparable to that accorded 
them in occupied territory. We have gone ahead with our prepara- 
tions on this basis. This is for your information. 

2. Is there any objection to our adopting the policy of recognizing 
a suitable person of a third power (say for instance Belgium, Spain, 
or Brazil) as custodian of the interests of Britain, America, and Hol- 
land in North China^ 

Relayed to NAN JO (GAISIN), Shanghai. 

26107 

JD-l: 7334 (H) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (5-AR) 

•JD-l: 7246. Re policy of Manchukuo in event Japan enters war. S. I. S. No. 25994. 



[Secret] 
From: Panama (Akiyama) 
To: Tokyo 
5 December 1941 
(PA-K2) 
#367 

Re your #134.* 

Reporting destroying by burning the code books in accordance 
with instructions. 

26068 

,TD-1: 7313 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (7) 

•Available, badly garbled, not yet identified. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
December 6, 1941 
Purple (Urgent) 
#897 

Re your #1268." 

To Counselor IGUCHI from KAMEYAMA. 

What 1 meant in paragraph 2 of my #867 ** was that of the two sets 
of "B" code machines with which your office is equipped, you are to 
burn one set and for the time being to continue the use of the other. 
Army 25835 Trans. 12/6/41 (S) 

• Not available. 

*> S. I. S. #25640 regarding the destruction of codes and one code niacbine in the Washington office 



238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo (Togo) 
To: Washington 
December 6, 1941 
PA-K2 
#899 (Strictly Secret.) 

1. The recent occupation of Netherlands Guiana by American 
troops, or call it what you will — occupation it is, is the first example 
in the present war of the United States' invading South America. 
In the light of the Havana agreement, French territory may next be 
expected to be taken over. As for the Good Neighbor Policy, so far 
it has been used merely for getting military bases and aeronautical 
rights together with certain economic and financial interest. But 
now that the situation is tenser, the hitherto good neighbor, the 
United States, will no longer hesitate to use arms. This at length has 
come to the surface, and we must be on the strictest alert. 

2. Based on an agreement with France, we penetrated Southern 
French-Indo China for joint defense. Scarcely were our tracks dry, 
when along comes good old nonchalant America and grabs Nether- 
lands Guiana. If she needs any of the American countries for her 
own interest, hiding under the camouflage of joint defense, she will 
take them, as she has just proven. This is a menace to the Latin 
American nations; so will you please at every opportunity, impress 
upon the Government and people of the country to which you are 
accredited that the United States bodes them naught save ill. More- 
over, please investigate the following points and wire me back. 

(1) Has there been any other agreement or understanding estab- 
lished between the Netherlands Government and the Latin American 
Nations and the United States besides the one concerning Nether- 
lands Guiana? If so, what is it like with reference say to bases, 
troop movements, annexation, etc.? 

(2) The attitude of the country to which you are accredited toward 
this act of aggression, and the trend of public opinion. 

Please send to all Ambassadors and Ministers in Central and South 
America (including San Paula). 

Sent to Washington. Washington will send to Ottawa. 
25868 Trans. 12/7/41 (7) 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
December 6, 1941 
Purple 
#901 

Re my #844». 

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American pro- 
posal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a 
memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message 
#902'' (in English). 

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in four- 
teen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I 
am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you 
receive it I want you to please keep it secret for the time being. 

3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the 
United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I 
want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 239 

every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you 
receive instructions. 

Aimy 25838 

JD: 7149 Trans. 12-6HH (S) 

• See S. I. S. #25445 in which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot accept the United 
States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Qovernment which will be sent in 
two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to 
give the impression that negotiations are broken off. 

•> Not available. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
December 6, 1941 
Purple 
#902 (Part 1 of 14) Separate telegram 

MEMORANDUM 

1 . The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come 
to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United 
States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may 
secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward 
the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the 
utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United 
States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese- 
American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area. 

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its' views, 
concerning the claims the American Government has persistently 
maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great 
Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months. 

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure 
the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to 
enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world. 

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the 
part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese 
Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has con- 
sistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extention of war-like 
disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year 
Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy. 

JD-1: 7143 

25843 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 

From: Tokyo 

To: Washington 

December 6, 1941 

Purple 

#902 (Part 2 of 14) 

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted 
to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to 
obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and 
China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the- 
stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East 
Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frus- 
trate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity 
in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in ac- 
cordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense 



240 CONGRESSIOINAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, wil- 
fully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and induc- 
ing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the 
assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. 
While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries 
have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encircle- 
ment of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers 
the very existence of the empire. 

JD-1:7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41(8) 

25843 

From: Tokyo 

To: Washington 

December 6, 1941 

Purple 

#902 (Parts of 14). 

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan 
proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States 
for a discussion of important problems between the two countries 
covering the entire Pacific area. However, whUe accepting in prin- 
ciple the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take 
place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental 
— (75 letters garbled) — The Japanese government submitted a pro- 
posal based on the formula proposed by the American government, 
taking ^fully into consideration past American claims and also incor- 
porating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in 
producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, there- 
fore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating stUl further the Jap- 
anese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the nego- 
tiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the 
American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, 
failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The 
negotiation made no progress. 

JD-1:7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41(8) 

25843 

From: Tokyo 

To: Washington 

December 6, 1941 

Purple 

#902 (Part 4 of 14) 

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its 
utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, sub- 
mitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive 
at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions 
which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following 
points: 

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake 
not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French 
Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area. 

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the 
acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and com- 
modities of which the two countries are in need. 

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial 
relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 241 

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the re- 
quired quantity of oil. 

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort 
to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restora- 
tion of general peace between Japan and China. 

(5) The eTapanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now 
stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace 
between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace 
in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops 
in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon 
the conclusion of the present agreement. 

JD-17143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 

25843 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
December 6, 1941 
Purple 
#902 (Part 5 of 14) 

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its 
readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to 
act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was pre- 
viously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United 
States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese 
peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations. 

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned 
new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to 
Chiang Kai-Shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, 
withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called ''Intro- 
ducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not 
yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose 
upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently 
maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignor- 
ing Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Jap- 
anese Government. 
JD-1:7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41(8) 

25843 

[Secretl 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
December 6, 1941 
Purple 
#902 (Part 6 of 14) 

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese 
Goverimient has always maintained an attitude of fairness and 
moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made 
all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties. 

As for the China question which constituted an important subject 
of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most con- 
ciliatory attitude. 

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Com- 
merce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese 
Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied 
throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice 
of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would 



242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

endeavor to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and 
made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China 
economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis. 

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from 
French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as 
mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from 
Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation. 
JD: 1-7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41(8) 

25843 

From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
December 4, 1941 
Purple 
#902 (Part 7 of 14) 

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost 
degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appre- 
ciated by the American government. 

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast 
to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on 
its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It 
is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government 
and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the 
American government especially to the following points: 

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace 
those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese govern- 
ment the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought 
about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through 
recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of 
one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and im- 
poses one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of 
facilitating the consummation of negotiations. 

25843 

[Secretl 
From: Tokyo 
To:. Washington 
December 6, 1941 
Purple 
#902 (Part 8 of 14) 

Of the various principles put forward by the American government 
as a basis of the Japanese- American agreement, there are some which 
the Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view 
of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the 
part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate 
adoption. 

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact 
between Japan, the United vStates, Great Britain, China, the Soviet 
Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the 
old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of 
East Asia. 

The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both 
governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded 
with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to 
conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the estab- 
lishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 243 

presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to 

restrain Japan from fulfiUing its obhgations under the Tripartite Pact 

when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and^ as such, 

it cannot be accepted bv the Japanese Government. 

JD-1:7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 

25843 

From: Tokyo 

To: Washington 

December 6, 1941 

Purple 

#902 (Pa;-t 9 of 14) 

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and 
opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. 
While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the 
Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain 
and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and 
Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. 
Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon 
which the American Government proposes to found the stability of 
the Pacific area through peaceful means. 

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it 
rigidly upholds, objects to settHng international issues through mili- 
tary pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and 
other nations pressure by economic power. Kecourse to such pres- 
sure as a means of dealing with international relations should be 
condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure. 
JD-7143 ' Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 
25843 

From: Tokyo 

To: Washington 

December 6, 1941 

Purple 

#902 (Part 10 of 14) 

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American 
Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with 
Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto 
occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a 
fact of history that one countr — ^(45 letters garbled or missing) — 
been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American 
policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the — es to the 
prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot 
tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs 
counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy 
each its proper place in the world. 

JDl-7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 

25843 

From: Tokyo 

To: Washington 

December 6, 1941 

Purple 

#902 (Part 11 of 14) 

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to 
French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned 
American policy. That the six countries,^ — Japan, the United States, 



244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand, — excepting 
France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of 
treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing 
that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those 
six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally 
ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese 
government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered 
as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the 
n — (50 letters missed) — sible for the present predicament of East Asia. 
JDl-7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 

25843 

From: Tokyo 

To: Washington 

December 6, 1941 

Purple 

#902 (Part 12 of 14) 

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government 
regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or uncon- 
ditional application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in Inter- 
national Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are 
calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of 
East Asia. The attitude of the American government in demanding 
Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime 
other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence 
of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present 
negotiation. This demand of the American government falling, as it 
does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the 
Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American 
government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between 
Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia. 
JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 

25843 

From: Tokyo 

To: Washington 

December 6, 1941 

Purple 

#902. (Part 13 of 14) 

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable 
items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion 
of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and 
stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra- 
territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal 
in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China 
Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour 
and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese gov- 
ernment regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of 
negotiation. 

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion 
of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion 
of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with 
Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was 
accepted by the American government. However, since the American 
government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 245 

frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Nether- 
lands and Chungking, ANDND* presumably by catering to the 
wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of CHTUAL 
YLOKMMTT** be concluded that all these countries are at one with 
the United States in ignoring Japan's position. 

JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 

25843 

•Probably "and as." 
••Probably "China, can but." 

From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
7 December 1941 
(Purple— Eng) 
#902 Part 14 of 14 

(Note. — In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling 
this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT") 

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to 
conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's 
efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a 
New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American 
rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war This in- 
tention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present 
negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government 
to adjust Japanese- American relations and to preserve and promote 
the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Gov- 
ernment has finally been lost. 

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the 
American Government that in view of the attitude of the American 
Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an 
agreement through further negotiations. 
25843 
JD-1: 7143 (M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941 (S-TT) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
December 6, 1941 
Purple 
#904 

Re my #902. 

There is reaUy no need to tell you this, but in the preparation of the 
aide memoire be absolutely sure not to use a typist or any other person. 

Be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy. 
Army 25844 
JD: 7144 Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Berlin 
December 6, 1941 
Purple (CA) (Urgent) 
#1003 

Re J^ of your #1418 *. 

1, From the standpoint given in 4 of uiy #985", we would like to 
avoid bringing about any situation likdy to result in an armed clash 



246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

with Soviet Russia until strategic circumstances permit it; and so get 
the German Government to understand this position of ours and 
negotiate with them so that at least for the present they would not 
insist upon exchanging diplomatic notes on this question. 

In doing this, explain to them at considerable length that insofar as 
American materials being shipped to Soviet Russia through any point 
lying within the scope of our intelligence are concerned, they are neither 
of high quahty nor of large quantity, and that in case we start our war 
with the United States we will capture all American ships destined for 
Soviet Russia. Please endeavor to come to an understanding on this 
line. 

2. However, should Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP insist upon 
our giving a guarantee in this matter, since in that case we shall have 

no other recourse, make a statement to the effect that we 

would, as a matter of principle, prevent war materials from being 
shipped from the United States to Soviet Russia via the Japanese 
waters and get them to agree to a procedure permitting the addition 
of a statement to the effect that so long as strategic reasons continue 
to make it necessary for us to keep Soviet Russia from fighting Japan 
(what I mean is that we cannot capture Soviet ships), we cannot carry 
this out thoroughly. 

3. In case the German Government refuses to agree with 1 or 2 
and makes their approval of this question absolutely conditional 
upon our participation in the war and upon our concluding a treaty 
against making a separate peace, we have no way but to postpone 
the conclusion of such a treaty. This point is intended for you to bear 
in mind. 

4. Concerning our participation in the war and the question of our 
promising not to conclude a separate peace, I shall wire you later. 
Army 25925 • Trans. 12/8/41 (NR) 

» Not available. 

b Parts 1 and 3, S. I. S. Nos. 25552, 3; Part 2 not available. Tokyo informs Berlin that there is extreme 
danger of war suddenly breaking out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan and that if Russia joins 
hands with England and the United States against her, Japan will turn upon her with all her might. 



[Secretl 
From: Tokj^o 
To: Canton 
December 6, 1941 
Purple 
#225 (Strictly secret) 

Re your #516 *. 

You are to note the following points: 

1. In your communication to the British and American. Consuls, 
the statement, "We will take over the concessions and other inter- 
ests", is not necessarily accurate so you had better change it to "We 
will place the settlements and other interests under the control of the 
Imperial Army." 

2. The evacuation of the Consular staffs and resident Nationals 
of hostile nations will have to parallel and coincide with measures 
concerning the departure of our Consular staffs and our resident 
Nationals, so when you receive orders from Headquarters you may 
proceed to handle this matter. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 247 

3. Public property of hostile nations, Consulates, and buildings 
will be seized or commandeered and after being sealed they will be 
in our custody. 

4. Private property, even though it might serve us in some military 
way, cannot be seized. It might merely be taken over and kept 
under surveillance. 

(Japanese) 
Army 25997 Trans. 12/9/41 (5) 

» Not available. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Bangkok 
December 6, 1941 
Purple (Urgent) 
(CA) 
#852. 

The ( )* day (X Day) decided by the '' liaison conference 

on the 6th (f)" is the 8th and the day on which the notice is to be 
given is the 7th (?) (Sunday). As soon as you have received this 
message, please reply to that effect. 

Army 25881 Trans. 12/8/41 NR) 

Translator's assumptions: 

• "Proclamation" or "declaration." 

•> "Ambassadorial" or "China." 

« This word is garbled and could be either the word "6th" or the word "November." 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
December 6, 1941 
Purple (Urgent) 
#1272 

In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President 
and HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet 
members having close relations with the President and through indi- 
viduals equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the 
State Department, please keep this point strictly secret). Up until 
this moment we have the following to report: 

(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President 
and advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to 
do the "introducing" at once between Japan and China. However, 
the President did not make known what he had in mind. According 
to these men, this attitude of the President is his usual attitude. Re- 
cently, when the President discussed matters with LEWIS and settled 
the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advise of these 
individuals. 

(2) Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of 
November 20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating 
those sections in the United States' proposal of November 26th which 
are either innocuous or advantageous to us (MESSAGE IN- 
COMPLETE) 

Army 25846 

JD: 7176 Trans. 12/7/41 (2T) 



248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Secret] 
From: Bangkok 
To: Tokvo 
Decembor 6, 1941 
Purple 
#9 1 9 (Departmental Secret) 

Re your #821* and #2,3* addressed to Your Excellency from Singora. 
All telegraphic codes referred to have been destroyed on December 5th 
Army 25885 Trans. 12-8-41 (NR) 

• Not available. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
December 7, 1941 

Purple (Urgent — Very Important) 
#907 To be handled in government code 

Remy#902.* 

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Govern- 
ment (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United 
States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time. 
Army 25850 Trans. 12/7/41 (S) 

" S. I. S. #25843— text of Japanese reply. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
December 7, 1941 
Purple (Urgent) 
#908 (To be handled in government code) 

All concerned regret very much that due to failure in adjusting 
Japanese-American relations, matters have come to what they are 
now, despite all tlie efforts you two Ambassadors have been making. 
I wish to take this opportunity to offer my deepest thanks to you both 
for your endeavors and hard work as well as for what all the members 
of the Embassy have done. 
Army 2585.3 Trans. 12/7/41 (S) 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
December 7, 1941 
Purple (Urgent) 
#909 
From Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO to Commercial Attache IGUCHI 

and his staff as well as to Secretary YUKI. 

I, together with the members of the' Bureau, deeply appreciate and 
heartily thank you for your great effort which you have been making 
for many months in behalf of our country despite all difficulties in 
coping witli the unprecedented crisis. We pray that you will continue 
to be in good health. 
Army 25858 Trans. 12/7/41 (S) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 249 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
December 7, 1941 
Purple (Extremely Urgent) 
#910 

After deciphering part 14 of my #902 "^ and also #907 ^, #908 *> and 
#909 ^, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all 
machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents. 

Army 25854 Trans. 12/7/41 (S) 

• S. I. S. #25843— text of reply, 
b S. I. S. «25850. 

• S. I. S. #25853. 
d S. I. S. #25858. 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo. 
To: (Circular) 
7 December 1941 
(Purple) 
#2492 Confidential within diplomatic circles. 

The Departments concerned have been giving study to the ques- 
tion of handling enemy subjects, and enemy property in Japan, as 
well as the handling of neutrals, and on the 6th the results were re- 
ported to the Imperial Headquarters; the main points of which I am 
giving in my separate circular #2493*. Both this message the sepa- 
rate message are addressed to Manchoukuo, Taiwan, NANSO, (for 
foreign propaganda), Peking, Shanghai, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Hankow, 
Canton. 

Peking will contact Kalgan, and Dairen (?). Tsingtao will can tact 
Tsinan; Canton will contact Amoy. 

25966 

JD-1: 7229 (F) Navy Trans. 12-9-41 (C-NR> 

•JD-l: 7231 (S. I. S. #25967). 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: Net 

7 December 1941 
(Purple) 

Circular #2493 (In 2 parts, complete) Secret Separate message 
Policies: 

In regard to our handling of enemy subjects and enemy property in 
Japan, we will approach this matter in the magnanimity of a great 
nation, complying with international law as far as possible, and exer- 
cising care not to give the enemy nations or other third party nations 
any occasion for taking retaliatory measures, or for making unfavor- 
able propaganda. 

^Iain points: 

(1) Diplomatic officials of enemy countries: 

(a) Evacuation. The evacuation of enemy diplomatic officials will 
be carried out on the basis of exchanges for our diplomatic and con- 
sular officials resident in enemy countries. 

79716 O — 46 — pn 12 ^18 



250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(b) Handling of the above until their evacuation. The inviolable 
rights pertaining to diplomatic officials of enemy countries, whose 
duties come to an end simultaneously with the beginning of war, will 
be respected as a general rule. However, telephones will be cut off, 
and the use of both code and plain language telegrams will be pro- 
hibited. Short wave radios and wireless transmitters will be seized. 
Members of the staffs of embassies and legations, for the present, as a 
general rule will be allowed to live in the embassy or legation com- 
pounds, and no inconvenience will be caused in the matter of daily 
living. 

(2) Consular officials: 

(a) Evacuation. As far as possible consular officials will be handled 
under the same heading with diplomatic officials. 

(b) The handling of the same until the time of their evacuations: 
The offices will be closed and sealed. Short wave radio and wireless 
equipment will be seized. Members of consulate staffs for the time 
being will be allowed to live at their present places of abode and as 
far as conditions warrant may use their official residences, with no 
restrictions upon their daily living. 

(3) Enemy subjects residing in Japan: 

In addition to such police surveillance and protection as is neces- 
sary, individuals regarding whom there is ample ground for suspicion 
will be rounded up; and all military men, seamen, or aviation per- 
sonnel as well as those qualified for these services, persons of special 
technical skill, persons suspected of being foreign spies, and all males 
between 18 and 45 will for the present be placed under arrest. How- 
ever in view of the fact that we have a very large number of subjects 
residing in enemy territory, we will exercise caution so that there 
may be nothing of the nature of ill-treatment occasioned for them. 

(4) Publicly owned enemy property: 

Such public property, aside from embassy, legation and consular 
buildings, which can be used either directly or indirectly for military 
purposes will, if necessary, be confiscated. 

(5) Privately owned enemy property: Privately owned property 
will not be seized or confiscated except in the event of general requisi- 
tioning. 

(6) Wliile no special restrictions will be placed upon the diplomatic 
and consular officials of neutral countries resident in Japan, those of 
quasi enemy countries (such as Panama, Iran, Norway, Belgium, 
Egypt, Greece, etc.) will be denied the use of codes. 

The evacuation of the enemy diplomatic and consular officials who 
are in Manchoukuo and China will be handled in the same manner 
as the above. 
25967 
JD-1: (F) Navy Trans. 12-9-41 (C-NR) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 251 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: (Circular telegram) 
7 December 1941 

(Plain Japanese language using code names) 
Circular #2494 

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with 
expectation. 

25856 

JD-1: 7148 (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT) 



[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: (Circular) 
7 December 1941 
(Purple) 
Circular #2499 (Part 1 of 3) (Part 2 not available) 

In the event of international crisis following upon our pursuance 
of our national policy regarding the China affair, which was decided 
on at the liaison-conference held on November 13th, the following 
steps will be taken in China: 

(1) British concessions — upon issuance of orders, the present force 
will occupy and take over these areas. However, every effort will 
be made to accomplish this end through the instrumentality of existing 
set-ups. 

(2) Shanghai International Settlement and the Peking Legation 
compounds: Upon issuance of orders, our troops will take over these 
grounds, however, without exceeding their present strength they will 
make every effort to maintain order and avoid causing confusion. 

Also this will be accomplished by the aid of the existing set-ups and 
their staffs as well as that of various important Chinese agencies. 

(3) Amoy settlement: The same procedure as the above will be 
employed. 

(Part 2 not available) 
JD-1: 7210 (A) Navy Trans. 12-8-41 (6-AR) 

25937 

[Secret] 
From: Tokyo 
To: (Circular) 
7 December 1941 
(Purple) 
Circular #2499 (Part 3 of 3) (Part 2 not available) 

Upon declaration of war by Japan, the Nanking government will 
not be directed to participate in war but will be directed to maintain 
close relations and absolute cooperation with Japan. 

(10) In maintaining close relations with our country the Nanking 
Government will be directed and guided in strengthening its morale 
and organization so that it may help alleviate Japan's burden in 
participating in a protracted world war. 

(11) Steps will be taken to propagate among the people through 
the cooperation of the Nanking Government, the true meaning of the 
present war, and to issue orders to maintain quiet and order among 
the general public. 

(12) Regardmg economic plans in China, with a view to retaining 
and increasing mutual economic self-sufficiency, the emphasis will be 



252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

placed on the utilization of productive powers, solicitation of local 
capital and investments, increased production of commodities. For 
this purpose efforts of every department will be made use of. 

Note. — Those departments in the above category which are con- 
nected with the Nanking Government will continue to maintain even 
closer contact with that government. 

25937 

JD-1: 7210 (A) Navy Trans. 12-8-41 (6-AR) 



[Secret] 
From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
7 December 1941 
(Purple) 
#1278 

Re your #910.* 

Your instructions and your #911** have been duly received and 
decoded, and as soon as we have composed and dispatched this tele- 
gram we will commence the demolition and destruction by fire. 

Also we have destroyed the codes brought by Kosaka. (The HA 
code, O code, NE code, and the YO code). 

Furthermore, the key of your #881***, first part, and your Circular 
#2400****, should have been burned but because the mails to Mexico 
are not safe it has not yet been sent. 

Please be advised of the above. 

26047 

JD-1: 7299 (H) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (S-TT) 

•JD-l: 7147 S. I. S. 25854. Directs destruction of remaining cipher machine and machine codes. 

**Not available. 

••*JD-1: 7101 S. I. S. 25754. Instructions for disposing of codes. 

••••JD-1: 7076 S. I. S. 25753. Re new keying method for cipher machine. 



[Secret] 
From: Budapest 
To: Tokyo 
December 7, 1941 
LA 
#104 

Re my #103.* 

On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of 
this country a British Government communique to the effect that a 
state of war would break out on the 7th. 

Relayed to Berlin. 

Army 25866 

JD 7184 Trans. 12/7/41 (2) 



1 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 253 

[Secret] 
From: Berlin 
To: Tokyo 
Decembers, 1941 
Purple (Priority) 
#1437 Limited distribution 

Re my #143(9?)." 

At 1:00 p. m. today (8th) I called on Foreign Minister Kibbentrop 
and told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy issue formal 
declarations of war on America at once. Ribbentrop replied that 
Hitler was then in the midst of a conference at general headquarters 
discussing how the formalities of declaring war could be carried out so 
as to make a good impression on the German people, and that he would 
transmit your wish to him at once and do whatever he was able to have 
it carried out promptly. At that time Ribbentrop told me that on the 
morning of the 8th Hitler issued orders to the entire German navy to 
attack American ships whenever and wherever they may meet them. 

It goes without saying that this is only for your secret information. 
Army 25978 Trans. 12/9/41 

» Not available. 



254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



EXHIBIT NO. 2 



JAPANESE MESSAGES CONCERNING MILITARY 
INSTALLATIONS, SHIP MOVEMENTS, ETC. 



CONTENTS 



1. Hawaii i-age 

a. Translated before 7 December IMl 2 

b. Trauslated after 7 D^icember 1941 16 

2. Panama Canal 

a. Translated before 7 December 1041 31 

b. Translated after 7 December 1941 48 

3. Philippines 

a. Translated before 7 December 1941 54 

b. Translated after 7 December 1941 97 

4. Southeast Asia and Netherlands P^ast Indies 

a. Translated before 7 December 1941 100 

b. Translated after 7 December 1941 107 

5. West Coast 

a. Translated before 7 December 1941 109 

b. Translated after 7 December 1941 113 

(!. Miscellaneous llo 

7. Messajies of particular interest transmitted before 1 August 1941 117 

Note. — Except for messages of particular interest (see section 7) and messages 
relating to Hawaii (see section 1), this exhibit includes only those messages 
transmitted alter 1 August 1941. 

All the messages were classified "Secret" at the time of translation. 



[ij 1. Hawaii 

A. Mi:S8A(JKS THANSLATKI) BEFOHK 7 DECEMBKK 19 4 1 

i'J] From Honolulu (Okuda) 
To: Tokyo (Gainiudaijiu) 
2 December, 15)40 
(J17-K()) 

#21(5 

The following ships were observed at Pearl Harbor <m the 1st: . 
Battleship: Texas type 1 



n^ 



Potal 1 



Heavy cruiser : 

Indianapolis type__ 1 

Unidentified type 2 



'"P 



Potal 3 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 255 

Light cruiser: 

Honolulu type 2 

Omaha typ* (1 in dock) ^ 6 

Total S 

Destroyer: 27 

Submarine : 6 

Special Service ship: 1 troop ship 3 

A so two des.royers off Waik.ki. 

JD-1 : 208 18655 2 December, 1940 Navy Trans. 1-14-41 (2) 



From: Honolulu (Okuda) 
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) 
20 Derernber, 1940 
(J17-K6) 

#232 

1. There was no sliip movement in Pearl Harboi- on the 19th. 

2. On the same day. I dispatched a man to Lahaina and learned 
that the fleet has not been in for over three weeks. Apparently train- 
ing is being done elsewhere. 

JD-1: 393 13868 20 December, 1940 Navy Trans. 1-23-41 (2) 



[3] From: Honolulu (Okuda) 

To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) 

24 December, 1940 

(J17-K6) 

#234 

It is reported that ships from the battleships down returned to 
Pearl Harbor on Dec. 20th, and will stay until Jan. 4 (5th or 6th) 
on Christmas leave. 

JD-1 : 74 13380 24 December, 1940 Navy Trans. 1-6-41 (2) 



From : Honolulu (Okuda) 

To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) 

6 January, 1941 

(J17-K6) 

#002 (in 2 parts — complete) 

Re my message #234 of last year.* 

Vessels seen in Pearl Harbor on the morning of the 5th were as 
follows : 

Five battleships (New Mexico, Mississippi, and probably the Idaho 
as well as two of the Texas class) : five heavy cruisers (one of the Port- 
land class, three of the class, and one of the New Orleans) ; 

nine light cruisers (five) of the Honolulu class and four of the Omaha 
class); 37 destroyers; five destroyer tenders; two (patrol boats?): 
several special service ships (of which two seemed to be submarines, 
but it could not be definitely determined) ; two heavy cruisers in (dry 
dock?); one vessel — either a battleship or a cruiser, is outside the 
harbor. 



256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Key-shaped cranes, similar to those toward the stern of the Idaho 
class cruisers, are being constructed on the five light cruisers of the 
Honolulu class, on the extreme end of the after-deck. 

It was also noted that the more modern masts have replaced the 
mainmasts which used to be on the four Omaha class vessels. 

The vessels which were previously reported to be mine sweepers are, 
in reality, patrol boats, so please make corrections. 

JD-1 : 165 13495 6 January, 1941 Navy Trans. 1-10-41 (2) 



•JD-l 74 (SIS #13380). 



[4] From: Honolulu (Okuda) 

To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) 

7 January, 1941 

(J17-K6) 

#003 

Re my #002*. 

Battleships New Mexico (flag), Oklahoma, Idaho, and Mississippi, 
together with many cruisers and destroyers left Pearl Harbor on the 
morning of the 6th for training. It is reported that they will return 
on the 12th?). 

JD-1: 185 13525 7 January, 1941 Navy Trans. 1-10-41 (2) 



•JD-l : 165. 



From : Honolulu (Okuda) 
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) 
9 January, 1941 
( J17 K6) 

#005 

Re message #474* of last year from (Manila) to you. 
It is reported that the liglit cruiser Cincinnati returned here from 
the Philippine Islands. This message sent to Washington and Manila. 

JD-1 : 434 13899 '9 January, 1941 Navy Trans. 1-25-41 (7) 

*Not available. 



From : Honolulu (Okuda) 
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) 
16 January, 1941 
(J17 K6) 

#011 (2 parts, complete) 
Re my #008*. 

1. The capital ships returned to Pearl Harbor immediately. The 
Pennsylvania arrived on the 14th. 

2. The number of vessels seen in the harbor on the morning of the 
16th was as follows: 5 battleships (Mississippi, New Mexico, Idaho, 
Pennsylvania, Oklahoma), 5 light cruisers of the Omaha class (of 
which one is in dock), 19 destroyers, 2 destroyer tenders. 1 

, about six small submarines, 1 submarine tender, 

1 patrol boat, 7 vessels which may have been patrol boats, 3 transports. 

The Yorktown is not in port. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 257 

[5] 3. It is reported that the capital ships Arizona, Tennessee, 
California, West Virginia, Colorado and Maryland which are at pres- 
ent around the mainland, will return here by 1 February. 

The CinCUS shifted the flag from the New Mexico to the Pennsyl- 
vania on 15 January. 

JD-1: 629 14163 16 January, 1941 Navy Trans. 1-31-41 (2) 



•Available, not translated; too garbled to read. (Re: U. S. Navy ship movements.) 



From: Honolulu (Okuda) 
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) 
21 January, 1941 
( J17 K6) 
#014 

The aircraft carriers Lexington and Enterprise, together with four 
destroyers arrived in Pearl Harbor from the mainland on the 21st. 

JD-1: 563 14078 21 January, 1941 Navy Trans. 1-30-41 (2) 



From: Honolulu (Okuda) 
To: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) 
28 January, 1941 
(J17 K6) 

#018 

Re contents of my No. 11*. 

1. Four battleships of the Colorado class and fourteen destroyers 
arrived in Pearl Harbor from the continent on the 27th. 

2. The following vessels were seen in Pearl Harbor during the after- 
noon of the 27th, (the numbers in the parentheses represent the in- 
crease since the previous day) ; 9 battleships (4) ; 2 aircraft carriers; 
1 heavy cruiser (1) ; 14 light cruisers (3) ; 4 old light cruisers of the 
Omaha class (1) ; 48 new destroyers (12) ; patrol boats, 5 Eagles (1) 
and 3 SC's (1) ; 1 submarine tender; 1 oil supply ship. There was 
also one destroyer lying outside of the harbor. 

3. One cruiser of the 10,000 ton class and one light cruiser (both 
were included in the counts in the above paragraph) were alongside 
the repair dock. They were apparently being equipped with anti- 
U-boat wirings, and with antiaircraft guns. 

[6] JD-1 :747 14304 28 January, 1941 Navy Trans. 2-6-41 (2) 



•JD-1 : 629. Re : U. S. Navy ship movements (SIS #14163). 



From : Honolulu (Okuda) 

To:. Tokyo 

February 6, 1941 

J17-K6 

#25 _ _ 

This morning I observed the following ships of war in Pearl Harbor : 
8 battleships, 3 of which were of the San Francisco, Pensacola and 



258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

New Orleans class. Of the 5 remaining, 3 were of the Honolulu class 
and 2 of the Omaha class. 
16 destroyers 

3 destroyer tenders 
10 — 

4 auxiliary ships. 

Now, the airplane carrier Enterprise, accompanied by 14 or 15 de- 
stroyers and some 6 submarines, left on the morning of the 5th. 

Have forwarded by mail in code form to Washington, Los Angeles, 
San Francisco, and Seattle. 

AKM Y # 14405 Trans. 2/10/41 ( 7 ) 



From : Honolulu (Oliuda) 

To: Tokyo (Gaimadaijin) 

21 February, 1941 

(J17 K6) 

^029 (In 2 parts, complete) 

1. The capital ships and others departed from Pearl Harbor on the 
13th and returned on the 19th. (It is said that they will depart again 
on the coming Wednesday and return on the following Wednesday). 

[7] Judging from the statements by various sailors who were 
on these vessels, the training was apparently held in the vicinities of 
Kauai, Lahaina and Hilo. 

2. The following vessels were seen in Pearl Harbor in the afternoon 
of the 20th. 

Seven battleships (three of the New Mexico class, two of the Penn- 
sylvania class, one each of the Oklahoma and California classes) ; 
four heavy cruisers, (two of the New Orleans class and two of the 
Portland class) ; ten light cruisers, (four of the Honolulu class; six 
of the Omaha class of which one is in drydock) ; thirty destroyers; 
three destroyer tenders; aircraft carriers, Yorktown and Enterprise; 
one troop transport; one submarine tender; (no submarines were 
visible). 

Besides tlie above, three destroyers and one vessel of the Pensacola 
class were at anchor outside of the harbor, while one destroyer was sail- 
ing in the general direction of Lahaina. 

Mailed to , San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle. 

JD-1: 1189 14967 21 February, 1941 Navy Trans. 2-28-41 (2) 



From: Honolulu (Okuda) 

To: Tokyo 

February 24, 1941 

J17-K6 

#31 ^ _ _ _ 

The Enterprise came into port from the continent on the 21st, having 
transported 31 Army pursuit planes of the Ciiitiss-Hawk P36 classi- 
fication. She immediately returned to the continent; (there is a 
rumor that she went on to Manila). I have observed the following 
ships in Pearl Harbor: 

6 battleships, two of the New Mexico, two of the Pennsylvania, one 
of the Oklahoma, and one of the California type. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 259 

4 heavy cruisers, two of the New Orleans, and two of the Portland 
class. 

7 light cruisers, three of the Honolulu and four of the Omaha type. 

The aircraft carrier Yorktown. 

85 destroyers. , 

[S] 3 destroyer tenders for those destroyers. 

1 auxiliary ship. 

3 hospital ships. 

36 submarines. 

Have forwarded by mail in code form to Washington, San Fran- 
cisco, Los Angeles and Seattle. 

ARMY 15149 Trans. 3/8/41 (2) 



From : Honolulu (Okuda) 
To : Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) 
27 February, 1941 
(J17 K6) 
#034 

Ee my #29*. 

Apparently the Fleet goes to sea for a week of training and stays 
in Pearl Harbor one week. Every Wednesday, those at sea and those 
in the harbor change places. This movement was noted on last 
Wednesday, the 26th. 

The following vessels were seen in Pearl' Harbor on the 27th : 4 
battleships (1 of the California class and 3 of the Maryland class) ; 
4 heavy cruisers (all of the San Francisco class) ; 6 light cruisers (4 
of the Honolulu class and 2 of the Omaha class) ; 25 destroyers (of 
which 3 were outside of the harbor) ; 2 destroyer tenders ; 1 troop trans- 
port; several transports; several submarines; and 2 submarine tenders. 

The Yorktown was not in port. A vessel which appeared to be a 
heavy cruiser was anchored outside of the harbor. 

JD-1: #1339 15165 Navy Trans. 3-7^1 (2) 

*JD-1 : 1189 ; U. S. Navy ship movements in Pearl Harbor. 



[9] From: Honolulu (Okuda) 
To:Tokvo (Gaimudaijin) 
10 March, 1941 

( J18 KB) 
#043 

Vessels seen in Pearl Harbor on (9th) were the following: 

Four battleships (two of the New Mexico class and two of the 
Pennsylvania class). 

Five heavy cruisers (two of the class, one of the 

class, and two of the class) . 

Six light cruisers (four of the class and two of the 

Omaha class). 

Yorktown. 

25 destroyers ( ) . 



260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Two destroyer tenders. 

Several submarines. 

One submarine tender. 

Several transports. 

Mailed to Washington, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle. 

JD-1 : 1842 15976 Navy Trans. 4-5-^1 (S) 



[JO] From : Honolulu 

To : Tokvo 

May 12, 1941 

J18-K8 

#78 

Warships observed at anchor on the llth in Pearl Harbor were as 
follows : 

Battleships 11 

Colorado, West Virginia, California, Tennessee, Idaho, Missis- 
sippi, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Arizona, Oklahoma, and 
Nevada. 

1 old battleship (a target ship, probably the Utah). 
Heavy cruisers 6 

Pensacola class 1. 

class 1. 

class 1. 

San Francisco (?) class 3. 
Light cruisers 10 

class 5. 

Omaha class 5. 

Destroyers 37( ?) 

Destroyer tenders 2 

Submarine tenders 1 

Submarines 11 

Eagle boats ( ?) 10 

Transports several 

The airplane carrier "The Lexington", accompanied by two de- 
stroyers, is cruising off the east shores of Oaliu Island. 

AKMY 177784 Trans. 6-1-41 (2) 



\jn From: Honolulu (Kita). 

To : Tokyo. 

May 26, 1941. 

J18-K8. 

#86 

Warships anchored in Pearl Harbor on the 24th (?) and the 25th 
( ?) were as follows: six battleships — the Pennsylvania, Arizona, Cali- 
fornia, Tennessee, Oklahoma, and Nevada; light cruisers, seven, four 

of the chiss and three of the Omaha class; destroyers, 

nineteen; destroyer tenders, one; submarines, five, submarine tenders, 

one; , four; , one; large type oil tankers, two; 

transi)orts, three, aircraft carriers (rest of message consisting 

of two groups unintelligible). 

ARMY 19955 Trans. 7/24/41 (7) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 261 

From : Honoliulu (Kita) 

To: Tokyo 

June 14, 1941 

J18-K8 

#100 

On the 11th ( ?) two English converted cruisers entered Pearl Har- 
bor and are at present undergoing repairs at the old ( ? ) dry docks. 

ARMY 18805 Trans. 6/30/41 (2) 



From : Honolulu (Kita) 

To: Washington 

September 22, 1941 

J-19 

Circular #38. Message to Tokyo #173. 

Re my message #166.* 

A destroyer left port on the 16th bound for New Caledonia. 

Naval Captain G. T. GARGENLIEU, High Commissioner for Pacific 
territories under the jurisdiction of the DeGaulle Regime, and Com- 
mander G. GABANTER, Commander of Defense, took passage on 
this destroyer to take up their new posts. 

ARMY 23095 Trans. 10-^-41 (2) 

» Not available. 

[1^] From : Tokyo (Toyoda) 
To: Honolulu 
September 24, 1941 
J-19 

#83 _ 

Strictly secret. 

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning 
vessels along the following lines insofar as possible : 

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five 
sub-areas. (We have no objections to your abreviating as much as you 
like.) 

Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal. 
Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford 
Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.) 
Area C. East Loch. 
Area D. Middle Loch. 
Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes. 

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to 
have you report on those at anchor, (these are not -so important) tied 
up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes 
briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the 
fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.). 

ARMY 23260 Trans. 10/9/41 (S) 



262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[J3] From: Honolulu (Kita) 

To: Washington 

29 September 1941 

(J19) 

Circular #041 

Honolulu to Tokyo #178 

Ke your #083*. 
(Strictly secret.) 

The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location 
of vessels: 

1. Repair dock in Navy Yard (The repair basin referred to in my 
message to Washington #48**) : KS. 

2. Navy dock in the Navy Yard (The Ten Ten Pier) : KT. 

3. Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island : FV. 

4. Alongside in Ford Island: FG. (East and west sides will be 
differentiated by A and B respectively. 

Relayed to Washington, San Francisco. 

JD-1:5730 23312 . (D) Navy Trans. 10-10-41 (X) 



•Not available. 

•♦Available, dated 21 August. 



From: Tokyo (Togo) 
To: Honolulu (Riyoji) 
15 November 1941 
(J19) 

#111 

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, 
make your "ships in liarbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a 
week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra 
care to maintain secrecy. 

JD-1:6991 25644 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S) 



m\ From: Honolulu (Kita) 

To: Tokyo 

November 18, 1941 

J-19 

#222 

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told 
you in my #219" on that day. 

Area A"" — A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker 
left port. 

Area C — 3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor. 

2. On the I7th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier. 
Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of 
the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks 
"KS". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D**. 



• Available, dated November 14. Code under study. 
*> Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal. 
' East Loch. 
"• Middle Loch. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 263 

3. At 10 : 00 a. m. on the morning of the I7th, 8 destroyers were ob- 
served entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows : In a single 
file at a distance of 1 000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, 
they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor 
through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, 
they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed 
time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A 
after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side. 

Eelayed to . 

AKMY 23817 Trans 12/6/41 (2) 

[15] From: Tokyo (Togo) 

To: Honolulu 

November 18, 1941 

J-19 

#113 

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein : 
Area "N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Set^ Honolulu,^ and the Areas Adja- 
cent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.) 

ARMY 25773 Trans. 12/5/41 (S) 

• Probably means Mamala Bay. 

From: Tokyo (Togo) 
To: Honolulu 
November 20, 1941 
J-19 
#111 

Strictly secret. 

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet bases in the 

neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation. 

ARMY 25694 JD7029 Trans. 12-4-41 (S) 

From : Tokyo 

To : Honolulu 

29 November 1941 

J-19 . " • 

#122 

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in 
future will you also report even when there ar'e no movements. 

JD-li 7086 25823 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2) 

[16] B. MESSAGES TRANSLATED AFTER 7 DECEMBER 1941 

From: Honolulu (Kita) 

To: Tokyo 

November 24, 1941 

J-19 

#234 (Part 1 of 2) 

Reyour#114^ 
Strictly Secret. 

1. According to normal practice, the fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, 
conducts maneuvers and forthwith returns. 

• Not available. 



264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2. Recently the fleet has not remained for a long period of time 
nor conducted maneuvers in the neighborhood of Lahaina Roads. 
Destroyers and submarines are the only vessels who ride at anchor 
there. 

3. Battleships seldom, if ever, enter the ports of Hilo, Hanalei, or 
Kaneohe. Virtually no one has observed battleships in maneuver 
areas. 

4. The manner in which the fleet moves : 

Battleships exercise in groups of three or five, accompanied by 
lighter craft. They conduct maneuvers for roughly one week at sea, 
either to the south of Maui or to the southwest. Aircraft carriers 
maneuver by themselves, whereas sea plane tenders operate in concert 
with another vessel of the same class. Airplane firing and bombing 
practice is conducted in the neighborhood of the southern extremity 
of the island of Kahoolawe. 

ARMY 26351 (Japanese) Trans. 12-16-41 (2) 



[17] From: Honolulu 

To: Tokyo 

November 24, 1941 

J-19 

#234 (Part 2 of 2) 

The heavy cruisers in groups of six carry on their operations over 
a period of two to three weeks, doubtless gomg to Samoa. The length 
of time that they remain at anchor in Pearl Harbor or tied up at docks 
is roughly four or five days at a stretch. 

The light cruisers in groups of five spend one to two weeks in 
operations. It would seem that they carry on their maneuvers in the 
vicinity of Panama. 

The submarines go out on 24-hour trips Mondays, Wednesdays, 
and Fridays. 

The destroyers, in addition to accompanying the principal units of 
the fleet, carry on personnel training activities in the waters adjacent 
to Hawaii. 

Mine layers (old-style destroyers) in groups of , have been 

known to spend more than three weeks in operations in the Manila 
area. 

Furthermore, on the uight of the 23rd, five mine layers conducted 
mine laying operations outside Manila harbor. 

ARMY 26352 (Japanese) Trans. 12/16/41 (2) 

[18] From: Tokyo (Togo) 
To: Honolulu 
November 28, 1941 
J19-K9 

#119 

Re your message #243.* 
Secret outside the Department. 

Intelligences of this kind which are of major importance, please 
transmit to us in the followiuir manner: 



* Available in code under study. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 265 

1. When battleships move out of the harbor if we report such move- 
ment but once a week the vessels, in that interval, could not only be in 
the vicinity of the Hawaian Islands, but could also have travelled far. 
Use your own judgment in deciding on reports covering such move- 
ments. 

2. Report upon the entrance or departure of capital ships and the 
length of time they remain at anchor, from the time of entry into 
the port until the departure. 

ARMY 25880 JD-7158 Trans. 12/8/41 (S) 



[J9] From: Honolulu 
To: Tokyo 
November 28, 1941 
J-19 

#238 

Military report : 

(1) There are eight "B-17" planes at Midway and the altitude 
range of their anti-aircraft guns is (5,000 feet ?) . 

(2) Our observations at the Sand Island maneuvers are: — number 
of shots — 12; interval of flight — 13 seconds; interval between shots — 
2 minutes ; direct hits — none. 

(3) 12,000 men (mostly marines) are expected to reinforce the 
troops in Honolulu during December or January. 

(4) There has usually been one cruiser in the waters about (15,000 
feet ? ) south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance 
to the harbor. 

ARMY 25928 JD-7212 Trans. 12-8-41 (7) 



[W] From : Honolulu (Kita) 

To : Tokyo 

1 December 1941 

(J19) 

#241 (In 2 parts, complete) 

Re your #119*. 

Report on ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor : 

1. The place where practice maneuvers are held is about 500 nautical 
miles southeast of here. 
Direction based on : 

(1) That direction taken when the ships start out is usually south- 
east by south and ships disappear beyond the horizon in that direction. 

(2) Have never seen the fleet go westward or head for the "KAIUI" 
straits northwards. 

(3) The west sea of the Hawaiian Islands has many reefs and 
islands and is not suitable as a ocean maneuver practice sea. 

(4) Direction of practice will avoid all merchant ship routes and 
official travel routes. 



79716 O— 46 — i)t. 12 19 



266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Distance based on : 

(1) Fuel is plenty full and long distance high speed is possible. 

(2) Guns can not be heard here. 

(3) In one week's time, (actually the maneuvers mentioned in my 
message #231** were for the duration of four full days of 144 hours), 
a round trip to a distance of 864 nautical miles could be reached (if 
speed is 12 knots), or 1152 nautical miles (if speed is 16 knots), or 
1440 nautical miles (if speed is 20 miles) is possible, however, figuring 
on 50% of the time being used for maneuver technicalities, a guess 
that the point at which the maneuvers are held would be a point of 
about 500 miles from Pearl Harbor. 

2. The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleships is : 
leaving on Tuesday and returning on Friday, or leaving on Friday 
and returning on Saturday of the following week. All ships stay in 
port about a period of one week. 

JD-1 : 7294 26053 ( Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2) 



♦JD-l : 7158. 

** Available, dated 23 November. 



[21 \ From: Tokyo (Togo) 
To : Honolulu 
December 2, 1941 
J-19 

#123 

(Secret outside the department.) 

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, 
airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, 
to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in 
each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl 
Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also 
advice me whether or not the warships are provided with anti- 
mine nets. 

ARMY 27065 JD 8007 (Japanese) Trans. 12/30/41 (5) 



Note. — This message was received here on December 23. 



From : Honolulu (Kita) 

To : Tokyo 

3 December 1941 

(PA-K2) 

#247 

Ship report : 

2nd. Military transport (name unknown) sailed out toward main- 
land. 

' 3rd. RARIN came into port from San Francisco. 
26065 

JD-1: 7309 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



267 



[2£] From: Honolulu (Kita) 

To: Tokyo 

3 December 1941 

(PA-K2) 

^245 (In 2 parts, complete) 

(Military secret.) 

From Ichiro Fuji to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Head- 
quarters. 

1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the 
following : 

I. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows : 

Meaning Signal 

Battleship divisions including Preparing to sortie. 1 



scouts and screen units 
A number of carriers 
Battleship divisions 
Carriers 


Preparing to sortie. 

All departed between ,1st and 3rd. 

Several departed between 1st and 

3rd. 
All departed between 1st and 3rd. 
All departed between 4th and 6th. 
Several departed between 4th and 

6th. 
All departed between 4th and 6th. 


2 
3 

4 


Carriers 

Battleship divisions 
Carriers 


5 
6 

7 


Carriers 


8 



26145 

[23] 2. Signals. 

I. Lanikai* Beach. House will show lights during the night as 
follows : 

Signal 

One light between 8 and 9 p. m 1 

9 and 10 p. m 2 

" 10 and 11 p. m l 3 

" 11 and 12 p. m 4 



II. 



Two lights 



12 and 1 a. m. 

1 and 2 a. m. 

2 and 3 a. m. 

3 and 4 a. m. 



7 
8 



{Part 2) 



III. Lanikai* Bay, during daylight. 

If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates 
signals 1, 2, 3, or 4. 

If there is a "star" and a Koman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 
7, or 8. 

IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House** will indicate the 



following: 

Times Signal 

1900-2000 3 

2000-2100 4 

2100-2200 5 



Times Signal 

2200-2300 6 

2300-2400 7 

0000-0100 8 



V.K.G.M.G.*** Want Ads. 

A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P. O. box 1476 indicates 
signal 3 or 6. » 



268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



B. CHIC. . CO farm etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 
4 or 7. 

C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates 
signal 5 or 8. 

3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made 
from Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula 
Sanatorium * * * * at a point halfway be- [^i] tween 
Lower Kula Koad and Haleakala Road (latitude 20° 40' N., longi- 
tude 156° 19' W., visible from seaward to the southeast and southwest 
of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until 
younr EXEX signal is received : 

Time Signal 

From ^10 5 or 8 

(M) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7) 



Time Signal 

From 7-8 3 or 6 

From 8-9 4 or 7 

JD-1:7370 



•Between Waimanalo and-Kailua Beaches on east coast of Oahu. 
•*A beach village on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile northwest of Lanikai. 
♦•*A radio broadcast station in Honolulu. 
••♦♦At latitude 20-42-45 N., longitude 156-20-20 W. 



From: Honolulu (Kita) 

To: Tokyo 

3 December 1941 

(PA-K2) 

#248 

Ship report. 

December 3rd. Wyoming and 2 seaplane tenders left port. No 
other movements. 
26066 



JD-1 : 7310 



(Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2) 



\'£S] From: Honolulu (Kita) 
To: Tokio 
December 4, 1941 
PA-K2 

#249 

On the afternoon of the 3rd one British gunboat entered Honolulu 
harbor. She left port early on the morning of the 4th. She was 
roughly of the 1,100 ton class. She had but one funnel and carried 
one 4 inch gun fore and aft. . 

Furthermore, immediately after the vessel entered port a sailor 
took some mail to the British Consular Office and received some mail 
in return. 



ARMY 26161 (Japanese) 



Trans. 12/12/41 (2) 



1^6] From: Honolulu (Kita) 

To: Tokyo 

5 December 1941 

(PA-K2) 

#252 

(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships men- 
tioned in my message #239* arrived here. They had been at sea for 
eight days. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 269 

(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day. 

(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th: 
8 battleships. 

3 light cruisers. 
16 destroyers. 
Four ships of the Honolulu class and were in dock. 

26029 

JD-1 : 7280 (D) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2) 

♦Available, dated 29 November. 



From: Tokyo (Togo) 
To: Honolulu 
December 6, 1941 
PA-K2 
#128 

Please wire immediately re the latter part of my #123" the move- 
ments of the fleet subsequent to the fourth. 
ARMY 26158 JD 7381 (Japanese) Trans. 12/12/41 (5) 



» Not available. 



[27] From : Honolulu 
To : Tokyo 
December 6, 1941 
PA-K2 

#253 

Re th'e last part of your #123.^ 

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training 
barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only 
have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood 
that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of 
Hawai and Panama. In so far as Hawai is concerned, though inves- 
tigations have been made in the neighborhood, of Pearl Harbor, they 
have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops 
to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training 
for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present 
time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it 
is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even 
though they have actually made preparations, because they must con- 
trol the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the 
vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa," there are limits to 
the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability 
there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise 
attack against these places. 

[28] 2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. 
The details are not known. I will report the results of my 
investigation. 

ARMY 25877 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT) 



• Not available. 

• Kana spelling. 



270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[29] From: Honolulu 

To.: Tokyo 

December 6, 1941 

PA-K2 

#254 

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered 

port were and one submarine tender. The following ships 

were observed at anchor on the 6th : 

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, 
and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks 
(the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left). 

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the 
fleet air arm. 

ARMY 25874 JD-7179 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT) 

[30] 2. Panama Canal 

[si] a. translated before 7 december 1941 

From: Tokyo (Toyoda) 

To: Panama 

August 2, 1941 

J-19 

#63 

If possible, I would like you to telegraph me concerning the transit 
of the canal by English and American merc^iant ships. 

ARMY 23506 Trans. 10-15-41 (S) 



From: Panama (Akiyama) 
To : Tokvo 
August 18, 1941 
J-19 

#120 

Report on observations: 

1. Ships moving through the Panama Canal toward the Atlantic: 

August 15th Four U. S. submarines (number ) 

" 16th Two " freighters 

" 17th One " 

One '• 



2. Moving toward Pacific: 

August 15th One U, S. freighter 

One DeGa 111 list Government destroyer 
(Triumphant) (now anchored at 
Balboa) 

3. August 17th One U. S. destroyer anchored at Balboa 

One warsliip whicli a])j)eared to be a 
cruiser was seen to arrive. 

Recently five large-size destroyers have been in port (taking on fuel, 
rations and other supplies). 

ARMY 22813 Trans. 9-29-11 (S) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 271 

[S2] From : Panama (Akiyama) 

To : Tokyo 

August 18, 1941 

J-19 (Urgent) 

#121 

1. The Douglas B-18, the Martin B-17A bombers, totaling 100 
planes, as well as a number of heavy Boeing 24's, which have been 
stationed at Albrook Field in the past, completely disappeared about 
two weeks ago. I am attempting to find out where they went. 

2. I have heard that approxmiately (35 or 45 ?) two-motored 
bombing planes are stationed at the newly constructed Agua Dulce 
Air Field in the province of Cocli. 

ARMY 22855 Trans. 9/30/41 (S) 

From: Panama (Akiyama) 

To: Tokyo 

August 20, 1941 

J-19 

#123 

1. Please refer to (?) of my message #120". The Triomphant 
left Balboa for Tohita on the I7th according to report. 

2. On the 19th two United States freighters and 1 British freighter 
were observed to transmit the Canal toward the Pacific. 

ARMY #23342 Trans. 10/11/41 (2) 

See S. I. S. #22813. Panama reports movements of ships through the Panama Canal. 



[3S\ From: Panama (Akiyama) 
To : Tokyo 
September 22, 1941 
J-19 

#173 

Ships passing through the Canal between the 17th and 21st are 
as follows : 

1. Pacific bound: 

1. American Tanker 
4. American Freighters 

2. Atlantic bound : 

2 American Tankers 
4 American Freighters 
1 English Freighter 

ARMY #22954 Trans. 10/2/41 (J) 

[■SJf] From : Buenos Aires 

To: Panama 

23 September 1941 

J 19 

Circular #146 

Buenos Aires to Tokyo #416. 

Strictly secret ; C. O. R. 

When Minister Yamagata* was in Panama he was asked by the 
Italian Minister there to deliver some maps and charts of the Panama 



272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Canal Zone for him, which he did. Since then, we had Usui go to 
Chile to take charge of those maps and upon their arrival here they 
were delivered to the Italian Ambassador. At the same time, we re- 
quested that we be given copies of them. 

Recently, these copies were delivered to us. (At the time of this 
delivery, Assistant Attache Kimeda and Usua were present to ascer- 
tain that tliey were exact copies of the originals). And we entrusted 
them to our Navy's courier Tatuma who is returning home on the 
Buenos Aires Maru. 

The Italian Ambassador here requests that upon the arrival of these 
papers in Tokyo, we notify the Italian Government to that effect 
through (our Embassy in Rome?) 

Minister Yamagata has already advised Chief of Bureau Terasaki 
regarding this matter. The Navy has also sent a report. 

23814 

JD-1 : 5970 (D) Navy Trans. 10-22-41 (X^ 



♦Minister to Chile. 



[SS] From: Panama (Akiyama) 
To : Washington / 

September 30, 1941 
J 19 

#51 

(Message to Tokyo #188.) 

On tlie (29th?) two (French ?) warships left port bound for the 

Pacific. One vessel of the Omaha class left port on the night of 

for an unknown destination. In spite of the rumor that the raider is 
in the neighborhood of the Galapagos, rumors are circulating that it is 
in water adjacent to the Canal. 

Relayed to Washington. 

ARMY 23304 Trans. 10/10/41 (X) 



[S6\ From: Panama (Akiyama) 

To : Tokyo 

October 2, 1941 

J-19 

#190 (2 parts complete) 

1. Since the recent shift in military aviation efforts to the Pacfic 
Area the ''Panama Air Depot" located at France Field was transferred 
to Curunda Heights (immediately adjacent to Albrook Field). 

2. Rear Admiral SADLER, Commander of the 15th Naval Dis- 
trict, since the extensive activities on the Pacific end of the Canal, 
made public on the 1st a statement to the effect that because of the 
increase of naval supplies a four-story warehouse built on pier 18 
(it will be completed the middle of November), the ammunition un- 
loading pier (west of pier 18) consisting of 32 buildings, and the exist- 
ing buildings in the neighborhood of the Balboa dry dock would all 
be taken over as warehouses. Fiirthermoie, the petroleum sii])ply 
tanks at Boca on the Pacific side and at Mt. Hope (the railroad junc- 
tion from which the line branches to Colon and Ft. Randolph) on the 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 273 

Atlantic side (recently it is believed that these tanks have been camou- 
flaged) have been taken over. 

3. There are intelligences at hand concerning the construction of 
a food storage depot at Corozal which would contain sufficient food- 
stuffs to supply the Canal Zone for a six-month period, even though 
shipping routes between this point and the United States are severed. 

ARMY 23699 Trans. 10-20-41 (2) 

[S7] From: Panama (Akiyama) 
To: Tokyo 
October 2, 1941 
J -19 (Priority) 

#191 

Between the 30th and the 2nd, three American freighters and one 
English hospital ship transited the canal to the Pacific, and nine 
American freighters and one American liner transited the canal to the 
Atlantic. 

ARMY 23668 Trans. 10/18/41 (2) 



From: Panama (Akiyama) 

To : Tokyo 

October 4, 1941 

(J l^K 9) (Urgent) 

#194 

Re my message #193'. 

One vessel left for the Pacific at 11 : 00 A. M. on the 3rd. 

From the 3rd until the morning of the 4th three American freighters 
and one French steamer moved out into the Pacific. During the same 
interval, seven American freighters, the "Union tanker", one destroyer 
and two British freighters went through the Canal in the direction 
of the Atlantic (one of the two British freighters was of the 10,000 
ton class). All of the vessels bound for the Atlantic went through 
the Canal successively. The two cruisers which I mentioned in my 
caption message accompanied these vessels as far as Balboa. There- 
fore, it w^ould seem indicated that their entire cargoes were made up 
of military supplies. 

Relayed to Washington. 

ARMY 23664 Trans. 10/18/41 (2) 



» Not available. 



ISS] From: Panama (Akivama) 

To : Tokyo 

October 6, 1941 

J-19 

#194 

The result of my investigations, as I reported in my secret letter 
#142,^ are as follows : 

1. The airplane bases which the United States is constructing are 
located at La Chorrera in Panama province, (please refer to part 4 



274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of my #149'') Chitre in Herrera province, Mensabe ^ in Los Santos 
province and at Rsniidios and Las Ra — Hasu in Chiriqui province. 

2. The Panamanian, airports already constructed which will be 
converted into military establishments are the ones at David in 
Chiriqui province and Paidonya *> outside the limits of Panama City. 

3. Airports which have been surveyed but because of the poor con- 
dition of the terrain have not been constructed, are the airports at 
Guarare in Los Santos province and at eight other projected points, 

ARMY 24465 Trans. 11/7/41 (2) 



.1 Not available. 
" Kana spelling. 



[30] From: Panama (Akiyama) 

To : Tokyo 

October 18, 1941 

J-19 

#220 (Part 1 of 2) 

1. Ship movements from the 14th to the 18th : 

Moving toward the Pacific: 4 American, 1 British freighters; 2 
American tankers. 

Moving toward the Atlantic : 4 American, 2 British, 1 Dutch freight- 
ers; 1 American tanker, 1 American passenger steamer. Recently 
ships have been going through the canal at night. 

2. In order to find out the plans of the Canal command, I inspected 
the military establishment at the Pacific end on the 10th. (Naturally 
they do not allow us to inspect the forts.) I found that construction is 
going on at a rapid rate and the whole area is being covered with 
fortifications. Specifically, at Albrook Field, 3 large hangars, store- 
houses for airplane jxirts, underground tanks, and 8 barracks to ac- 
commodate 200 men each. 

At Corozal, 4 two-hiindred-men barracks, 55 two-family officer's 
quarters and a 500-patient hospital are Hearing completion. 

ARMY 23909 Trans. 10-23-41 (2) 



\4^] From: Panama (Akiyama) 

To : Tokyo 

October 18, 1941 

J-19 

#220 (Part 2 of 2) 

At Fort Clayton thei-e are .stationed, as before, the 2nd Field Artil- 
lery Battalion, the 1st Engineers, and the 33rd Infantry. Besides bar- 
racks for the (signal ?) unit attached to these groups, 18 or (48 ?) 
barracks large enough to accommodate 250 persons each are approach- 
ing completion. In addition to the recently completed hangars at 
Howard Field, barracks for 26 companies have been roughly com- 
pleted at Fort Kobbe. Some of these are already in use (details will 
be sent (by mail 0- I'^ the Canal Zone there are between the two 
oceans three cruisers, 8 new type destroyers, 18 submarines, one gun- 
boat, and one submarine tender. The construction work of the sub- 
marine base at Balboa is progressing. According to information com- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 275 

iiig from , 16-inch <runs have been emplaced on Pearl Islands, 

and some of the warships of (this country ^^'^ patrolling the waters 
around them. 

ARMY 23910 Trans. 10/24/41 (2) 



[4-?] From: Panama (Akiyama) 
To : Tokyo 
October 28, 1941 
J-19 

#232 

1. On the 27th, a warship of the Omaha class left this port for the 
Pacific. 

2. On the same day, two single-funnel destroyers, one light cruiser, 
and one 10 000 ton class transport were anchored in Balboa harbor. 

3. On the 26th, one American destroyer and two submarines were 
anchored in the harbor at Cristobal. 

4. From the 22nd until the 27th, four American and four British 
merchant vessels passed through the Canal bound for the Pacific (one 
of the British vessels was of the 14,000 ton class) . Six American mer- 
chant vessels, one American tanker, and one Netherlands cargo ship 
passed through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic. 

ARMY 24995 Trans. 11/19/41 (2) 



[4^^] From : Panama (Akiyama) 
To : Tokyo 
November 4, 1941 
J-19 

#241 

1. On the 3rd, one American destroyer was seen to pass through 
the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic. On the same day, an 
American warship (which did not seem to be the Zane), having two 
funnels on her fore deck and airplane equipment on her -after deck, 
of 2,000 or 3,000 tons, was seen to pass through the Canal going in the 
same direction. 

2. From the 2nd to the 4th of this month, nine American freighters 
and one tanker passed through the Canal heading in the direction of 
the Pacific. Five American Freigliters and one American passenger 
vessel as well as one Danish ship were observed passing through the 
Canal heading in the direction of the Atlantic. 

ARMY 24749 Trans. 11/14/41 (2) 



[4^] From: Panama (Akiyama) 

To : Tokyo 

5 November 1941 

J-19 

#246 _ ■ . 

1. According to news from an Italian source, it is reported as fol- 
lows: Fifty army air officers of Italian origin who had been training 



276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

at Riohato departed for China during the end of October. It is 
thought that they were sent to China as they are of Italian blood 
and would not be suitable for Europe. 

2. Report on ships passing through Panama. 

November 2nd, an army transport of over 6,000 tons, with capacity 
load of army men, headed for Pacific. 

3. November 4th, two cruisers of Omaha type anchored at Balboa. 

4. Ships that passed during 4th and 5th towards Pacific, one U. S. 
freighter, one British freighter, 1,400 tons. From Pacific, three 
XJ. S. freighters, one U. S. tanker, one British freighter, 20,000 tons. 

JD-1 : 6745 (Y) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (7) 

25228 



[4-i] From: Panama (Akiyama) 
To: Tokyo 
November 10, 1941 
J-19 

#265 

1. The warship mentioned in my #262* is not of the Vanoc class 
but has been confirmed to be the Diomede. Its destination is the 
Pacific. 

2. On the 10th two American submarines moved through the Canal 
into the Pacific. 

ARMY 24989 Trans. 11/19/41 (2) 



• Available in code under study. 



From: Panama (Akiyama) 

To: Tokyo 

11 November 1941 

(J 19) 

#273 

Ships passed through Panama on 11th and 12th. 

To Pacific: Freighters: 1 American, 2 British, (one 10,000 ton 
with tower looked like warship). 

To Atlantic: Freighters: 3 American, 3 British, (One with 2 
guns, two with 1 gun.) 

JD-1 : 6748 (Y) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (2) 

25231 



[4^] From: Panama (Akiyama) 

To : Tokyo 

November 12, 1941 

J-19 

#282 

1. On the night of the 11th, a British light cruiser went through the 
Canal in the direction of tlie Atlantic. This cruiser is undei-stood to 
have undergone repair in San Francisco and seems to have been the 
Liverpool. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 277 

2. On the 1 2th, a British military transport of approximately 27,000 
tons, of the Union Castle class, passed through the Canal on its way 
from the Pacific, filled to capacity with military personnel. 

3. Early in November, 12 Douglass two-motored bombers and six 
Airacobra paFsait planes, flew here to increase the Canal air force. 

ARMY 25636 Trans. 12/3/41 (2) 



[^^] From: Panama (Akiyama) 

To: Tokyo 

13 November 1941 

(J 19) 

#285 

Panama shipping report : 

(1) A commercial ship of Union Castle type passed through toward 
the Atlantic, with about 1000 of what seemed like evacuees (women 
and children) and a few wounded, aboard, on the 13th. 

(2) The heavy cruiser which passed through on the 11th is believed 
to be passing through to make up a convoy on the Atlantic, and looks 
as though it had accompanied #1 (Union Castle type commercial 
ship) from the Pacific. The German reports say it is a Liverpool class 
cruiser, but not the Liverpool. 

j[3) The Omaha type ship has the bow painted black and the stern 
painted white and at a glance looks like a destroyer. 
25234 

JD-1 : 6751 ( Y) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (J) 



[47] From: Panama (Akiyama) 
To : Tokyo 
November 18, 1941 
J-19 

#300 

1. On the 18th, one British ship and one Netherlands vessel of ap- 
proximately 17,000 tons went through the Canal in the direction of 
the Pacific. One 10,000 ton British vessel and one American ship went 
through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic. 

2. One destroyer and one submarine are undergoing repairs in 
Cristobal. 

ARMY 25774 Trans. 12/5/41 (2) 

[4^] B. TRANSLATED ATTER 7 DECEMBER 1941 

From: Panama (Akiyama) 

To: Tokyo 

November 20, 1941 

J-19 

#310 

1. On the 19th and 20th, four American cargo ships, one British 

cargo ship and one tanker, and one French .passed across to the 

Pacific. 



278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2. An American cargo ship and one tanker passed across to the 
Atlantic. 

3. ( message goes off .) 

AKMY 26092 (Japanese) Trans. 12/10/41 (2) 



[4^1 From: Panama (Akiyama) 

To: Tokyo 

November 22, 1941 

J-19 

#321 (Part 1 of 4) 

Strictly secret. 

I suppose you are already acquainted with these facts but the manner 
of defending the canal is now as follows : 

1. The United States is publishing as though it were utterly true 
that a Troy horse has been found not only among the foreigners in 
Panama but also in government circles. However, this country replies 
that her principle is Panama for Panamanians. ARIAS stated that 
though Panama was weak, if certain concessions were made to neigh- 
boring countries, the United States might be defied. The United 
States, however, fixed his regime good and proper. At present the 
canal officials are checking over, one by one, 2,000 Geimans, 700 
Italians, and 400 Japanese. 

2. I hear that the United States has set up in Panama air bases 

(some of which have ), anti-aircraft gun bases, and airplane 

detector bases (some of these detectors are said to be able to discover 
a plane 200 miles away ) . Thus we see that in her policy toward South 
America the United States is now exerting unprecidented pressure. 

ARMY 26820 (Japanese) Trans. 12725/41 (X) 



[SO] From: Panama (Akiyama) 

To: Tokyo 

November 22, 1941 

J-19 

#321 (Part 2 of 4*) 

Strictly secret. 

In spite of the fact that it is in violation of the treaty concluded 
in 1936, the United States is coercing Panama where the canal is. 
She is expending vast sums of money there, and if necessary will take 
still more drastic steps. However the difference in the points of view 
is forever and eternally a cancer's growth in the -relations of the two 
countries. 

3. From the Pacific to the Atlantic coast, between Panama and 
Colon, there is no thoroughfare. The reason why one has not been 
constructed, is that the jungle constitutes a natural defense for the 
canal. As an indication of the United States' policy of defense, lately 
they have begun to construct a road even of macadam which will 
probably go as far as Colon. However it is not yet completed. This 
is an exceptional case in preparation for the possible destruction of 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 279 

the canal. It also seems that when complete the American continental 
highway will extend as farjis the borders of Colombia, but when this 
will be IS uncertain. 

ARMY ^821 (Japanese) Trans. 12/25/41 (X) 



• Part 3, S. I. S. #26794. Part 1, S. I. S. #26820. Part 4 available, being translated. 
(SIS #26830) 



[51] From: Panama (Akiyama) 

To : Tokyo 

November 22, 1941 

J19-K9 

#321 (Part 3 of 4 «) 

4. The United States Government is going on the assumption that 
the attack on the Canal will be made from both air and sea. 
Especially in preparation for a possible attack from the Pacific side, 
it has reenforced the special fleet recently, as I have already indicated 
in my telegram. They have mapped out an area 900 (kilometers?), 
with the center of the radius at Panama, as a patrol area and are con- 
stantly patroling it. The Army has built fortifications here and there 
in the territory of Panama in which there are 16" and 14" gun em- 
placements. (These forts are equipped with. hygienic facilities. The 
soldiers are indulging in pleasures. The distance of the forti- 
fications if exceeds 1500 (kilometers?).) In addition, 

they are endeavoring to guard such vital points as locks, spillways, 
and especially the control tower controlling the spillway on Lake 
Gatun and the electric plant. 

ARMY 26794 (Japanese) Trans. 12/25/41 (2) 

* Parts 1, 2 and 4 available. Being translated. 



[521 From: Panama (Akiyama) 

To: Tokyo 

November 22, 1941. 

J-19 

#321 (Part 4 of 4^) 

The anti-air defenses (?) on lock #1, which is now being used, are 
being improved. (Of course, there are anti-air defenses (?) at lock 
#3.) The naval defense area, patrolled against possible lightning 
attacks, extends in the north from Salina Cruz on the Tehuantepec 
Isthmus to Monepene ^ (on ? ) the Gulf of Fonseca. The southern 
limits extend to the air base on the Galapagos Islands. 

5. Present army strength is 47,000; naval, 10,000; air force, 5,000. 
In addition, it is estimated that there is approximately twice this gen- 
eral total, made up of the families and laborers (excluding Pan- 
amanians) . 

ARMY 26830 (Japanese) Trans. 12-25-41 (X) 

» For Parts 1, 2 and 3 of 4 see S. I. S. #26820, #26821 and #26794 which report 
American military and naval preparations in the Panama region. 
" Kana spelling. 



280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

From: Washington 
To: Panama 
1 December 1941 
(J 19) 

#040 

Report passage through the Canal of the U. S. S. MISSISSIPPI, 
NORTH CAROLINA, WASHINGTON, WASP. 

JD-1: 7318 26084 (G) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (X) 

[S3] 3. Philippines 

[J^] A. TRANSLATED BEFORE 7 DECEMBER 194 1 

From : Tokyo 

To: Manila 

1 August 1941 

(Purple) 

#245 (or 246) (?) 

Please inform us regarding the camouflage and distinguishing marks 
of the American naval and military aeroplanes in Manila. 

20983 

JD-1 : 4,506 (H) Navy Trans. 8-13-41 (6-AR) 



From: Manila (Nihro) 
To : Tokyo 
August 2, 1941 
Purple 

#474 

1. Anchored warships — Dfionomi.* 

2. There is (are) anchored Danish ship(s) garbled 

after loading at Webu * (Ebu ?) will leave for America. In addition 
two ships touched port on the 1st and 2nd from Orongabo.^ 

3. Harrison and Coolidge entered port on the 31st and 1st respec- 
tively. 

20513 

ARMY Trans. 8/5/41 (6) 



■ Kana spelling. 



[S5] From: Manila (Nihrp) 

To : Tokyo 

August 2, 1941 

Purple 

#476 

Re your #245." 

In observing planes on practice flights, I notice that the color of 
military and naval planes has not been changed and that they are not 
camouflaged. However, I have heard that among the naval planes 
there are those which have been observed to be painted a light green. 



i 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 281 

Though I am making additional secret investigations, that is all for 
the time being. 

Furthermore, in recent times, the number of planes flying above 
the city has decreased considerably. 

AKMY 20641 Trans. 8/7/41 (6) 

• Not available. 



[S6] From: Manila (Nihro) 
To: Tokyo 
August 4, 1941 
Purple 

#480 

Intelligence of primary order. 

1. Two destroyers sailed on the fourth. All the war ships at an- 
chor have sailed. There are, however, several small destroyers in 
the neighborhood of Corregidor^ (This was observed by the crews 
of the Koden Maru and the Kaisoku Maru.) 

2. About six-hundred American soldiers have arrived in Manila 
on the Coolidge. (This was learned from the crew of the Coolidge.) 

ABMY 20634 Trans. 8/7/41 (6) 

» An island in Cavite Province at the entrance of Manila Bay. 



[57] From: Manila (Nihro) 
To : Tokyo 
August 12, 1941 
Purple 

#507 

Re : Your #254.^ 

(1) At the time a non-commissioned officer of the American Navy 
told me confidentially that the ship mentioned in my #414* (5?)* 
was the Warspite and I took this to be reliable information. This 
British ship, however, had its name painted over. Some spies who 
viewed the ship when it docked report that it was something like a 
7,000-ton vessel. It was further reported that this ship moored at 

Cavite pier on the th. Now, considering the shallowness of the 

water there, I do not see how it could have been the Warspite. (When 
the Cincinnati approaches that dock, it gradually lets out water bal- 
last.) Judging from its shape, I would say that it was a light cruiser 
of the Leander class. (According to another report it was an 8,000- 
ton craft. This seems rather accurate.) (2) Among the members 
of the crew who came on shore there were some with such names 
as YORK. GEORGE, etc., on their hatbands and we also have a spy 
repo! t to the eti'ect that some forty-eight soldiers wounded in the Med- 
iterranean were being accommodated. (3) I know nothing of the 
movement of this ship after my #451.'* 

Lately no British ships save this has entered port here (that is 
side from the Taggubwno (?) mentioned in my #494.* 

ARMY 21094 Trans. 8/16/41 (6) 



• Not availahle. 

" (SIS #20468) British cruiser which was anchored at Cavite for several days departed 
for on the 27th. 

79716 O— 46— pt. 12 20 



282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[S8] From: Manila 
To: Tokyo 
August 20, 1941 
Purple 

#532 

Re your Circular #1793 *. 

I am reporting to you below information which I have been able to 
get, though it may be somewhat incoherent. 

1. There are many tall buildings in the city, to the upper stories of 
which admittance is forbidden. It is thought, therefore, that anti- 
aircraft guns have been placed in them. It is fairly certain that guns 
have been placed on the Great Eastern Hotel (some have actually seen 
ten disguised machine guns on the top of it,) the (hitchcock?) Avenue 
Hotel (this is the former Marco Polo Hotel), and on the Insular Life 
and the Trading Commerce. Besides these, I presume guns have been 
placed on top of the Capitol, the Municipal Building, the post office, 
etc. (I believe that the army and the navy both have in their posses- 
sion a map giving the locations of the tall buildings in the city. ) . 

2. A person has seen during the evenings in. the latter part of July, 
36 anti-aircraft guns being transported to Camp Murphy. 

ARMY 21461 Trans. 8/26/41 (6) 



• Not available. 



[Sd] From: Manila 

To: Tokyo 

August 20, 1941 

Purple 

#533 (Report of Primary Importance) 

Last March work was begun on the reparation of the airplane base 
south of Darurakku * on the way to San Miguel. For a time, however, 
the work was stopped. Lately it seems that the undertaking has been 
resumed. 

Eye witnesses say that they are using about 300 employees and are 
hurrying the work along. I understand that at present the gliding 
ground is being prepared. 
ARMY 21563 Trans. 8/28/41 (6) 

• Kana spelling. 



[60] From: Davao (Kihara) 

To: Tokyo 

August 22, 1941 

J-19 

#104 (Intelligence of Primary Importance) 

Because too much time would be required to fill in the paddy fields 
as originally planned in the construction of a new air base, it is 
rumored that these plans have been changed. Construction is to 
begin on an air base which will be laid down between the sea and the 
paddy fields where now stands a cocoanut grove. In order that 
bombing planes can use this air field, four concrete runways are to be 
constructed. It is understood that some 2,500 recruits from among 
the local populace will be used in this construction enterprise. Four 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 283 

or five hundred wheelbarrows which will be used in this construction 
work have already been unloaded onto the pier. When I last visited 
this area and made an investigation of the land they planned to use, 
it seemed to me that they would have to use more than three feet of 
dirt to fill in these paddy fields. A great deal of work will be entailed, 
I observe, in the cutting down and removal of the cocoanut trees in 
the grove. 

ARMY 24063 Trans. 10/28/41 (6) 

[61] From: Davao (Kihara) 

To: Tokyo 

August 22, 1941 

J-19 

#107 

1. During the middle of July a number of American destroyers 
entered the harbor of Jolo. We have intelligence to the effect that 
they came to this port from Hawaii, but we have no evidence to 
substantiate it. 

2. During the last ten days of July, 6 American destroyers entered 
the ports of Jolo,* Kabunko ^ and Kanbin.'' (Please refer to part 3 
of my #32.*^) While in the area of these three ports, they engaged 
in target practice with live ammunition. 

3. During the middle of August, one large airplane capable of carry- 
ing 26 persons landed on the water in the vicinity of Jolo and was tied 
up there for a number of hours. 

4. It is understood that there are approximately 2,000 drums of 
airplane gasoline stores within the military establishment at Jolo. 

Furthermore, reports on the movements of war vessels in and out 
of the port of Jolo are prone to be delayed because of the existing 
conditions. Do you want me to send this sort of delayed information, 
by urgent wire? Please wire. 

ARMY 23958 Trans. 10-24-41 (6) 

* Town on tbe Island of tbe aame name, one of tbe southernmost islands of the 
Philippine Island group. 
■> Kana spelling. 
" Not available. 



[62] From : Manila (Nihro) 

To : Tokyo 

23 August 1941 , 

(Purple) 

#543 

1. Ships in port on the 23rd. 

A. Manila. 

Transports 6. 

HON 

PISU (Arrived the morning of the 23rd). 

B. Cavite. 

Destroyers 1. (Arrived from Manila on the 21st). 
Transports GORUDOSTNA (entered port about a 
month ago and is now under repairs.) 



284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2. The oiler TORINIRCIC left harbor on the 22nd headed for 
Tarakan in order to take on oil. 

3. Recently several destroyers and submarines have been stationed 
in the vicinity of Mariveles. We are investigating the number sta- 
tioned at present. 

4. Brig. General Cragette arrived here on the 20th apparently on 
the Dutch ship TIBADAEKY and had a conference with MacArthur 
on the 21st. 

5. According to newspaper reports the CHANTO (formerly the 
Hilda Maersk) arrived here the 20th after having been repaired 
at Olongapo and her sister ship the KABARUNDO (formerly the 
Gertrude Maersk) is at present being repaired there. Hence the 
floating drydock must have been there formerly, however we will con- 
tinue investigations. 

6. On the 16th a ship which appeared to be the Mx^DDO and two 
destroyers arrived in Cebu and all left that same night. 

21518 

JD-1 : 4810 (H) Navy Trans. 8-27-41 (6-AR) 



[6S] From : Manila (Nihro) 
To : Tokyo 
August 26, 1941 
Purple 

#554 

Four "S"^ boats on the 24th and "REI" on the 25th entered 
the harbor. 

ARMY 21611 Trans. 8/29/41 (6) 



■ Submarine. 



[64] From: Manila 

To: Tokyo 

August 30, 1941 

Purple 

#559 (Primary Intelligence) 

1. Warships at anchor in this harbor on the 30th : 

(1) In Manila, 3 destroyers of the Bell class; 6 submarines (sub- 
marines left port on the 27th but have returned). Furthermore, the 
tanker Trinity came to this port on the 27th and dropped anchor here 
(please refer to Part 2 of my #543 *). 

(2) One destroyer (undergoing repairs) Gorudosu. 

2. A large portion of the submarines, according to intelligences which 
have come to me, are now in the Ringaen " area. 

3. 500 American soldiers arrived here on the Cleveland the 29th. 
Furthermore, on the same day the Migsk entered this harbor. 
(Though details of this ship could not be ascertained, it is understood 
that she is loaded to capacity with military equipment. 

ARMY 21666 Trans. 9/2/41 (6) 

■ S. I. S. #21518 regarding boats In harbor at Manila. 
■> Lingayen on the west coast of the Island of Luzon. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 285 

[65] From: Tokyo (Toyoda) 

To: Manila 

August 30, 1941 

J-19 

#277 

According to intelligences obtained by naval authorities, the Hous- 
ton was observed on the 20th or there about to pass through the harbor 
entrance but since that time they have not been able to learn where it 
went. Please investigate the waters in and around Manila for some 
trace of this warship and then make your report. 

ARMY 24527 Trans. 11/8/41 (6) 



From: Manila (Nihro) 

To: Tokyo 

1 September 1941 

(Purple) 

#562 ( i) 

The Marblehead returned to port on the 31st. Two destroyers left 
port on the 1st. 
22349 

JD-1 : 5198 (H) Navy Trans. 9-16-41 (AR) 



[66] From: Tokyo 

To: Manila 

1 September 1941 

(Purple) 

#279 (?) 

Strictly confidential. 

In regard to the points you were to note, from now on in case there 
is no special change, report once a week, but report each change of the 
following as they occur : 

1. Arrival and departure of Houston. 

2. Arrival and dep,arture of more than 5 or 6 destroyers or sub- 
marines. 

3. Arrival and departure of naval ships other than American; 
(report in detail the particulars and relationships involved). 

22081 

JD-1: 5037 (H) Navy Trans. 9-11-41 (6-AR) 



[67] From: Manila (Nihro) 

To: Tokyo 

September 8, 1941 

(Purple) 

#590 

On the 7th, the Hov^ton and two destroyers entered port. 
ARMY 22061 Trans. 9/11/41 (6) 



286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

From : Manila (Nihro) 

To: Tokyo 

11 September 1941 

(Purple) 

#595 

The Houston^ which we reported having entered on the 7th, has 
been alongside the pier loading fuel and stores until today when it 
left for unknown destination accompanied by two submarines and two 
destroyers. 
222*54 

JD-1 : 5153 . (M) Navy Trans. 9-15-41 (5-AR) 



From : Manila 

To: Tokyo 

13 September 1941 

(Purple) 

#601 

1. Ships in port on the 13th : 

BUKKU (Black Hawk?) 

2 destroyers. 

BERU 

1 submarine 

2. On the 13th an American cruiser of the Brooklyn class entered 
port and is taking on supplies. It is said to have come from Hawaii. 
I am investigating names of ships and other details but am sending 
this much on for the present. 

22422 

JD-1: 6263 (H) Navy Trans. 9-17-41 (6-AR) 



[68\ From : Manila 

To: Tokyo 

15 September 1941 

(Purple) 

#604 

Re my #601*. 

According to secret information received, it is the St. Louis, with 
three other vessels (names unknown) said to be starting for Singapore. 
It was observed that waves of about 24 or 25 knots are painted on the 
bows. At present explosives are being lowered (red flags being 
hoisted). 

22430 

JD-1: 5271 (F) Navy Trans. 9-18-41 (6-AR) 

•JD-1 : 5263 (SIS #22422). 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 287 

From: Manila (Nihro) 
To : Tokyo 
September 16, 1941 
Purple 

#605 

Re my #604^ 

They left the harbor early on the 16th loaded with food supplies. 
On the stern three sea planes (single wing) were observed. Desig- 
nation is as stated in my previous message. It is also reported that 
they (arrived here ?) by way of Australia but whether this is true or 
not I don't know. 

ARMY 22693 • Trans. 9/25/41 (6) 

• S. I. S. #22430. I have secret information that the St. Louis and three other ships 
are leaving for Singapore and that they apparently have ammunition on board. 



[69] From: Manila (Nihro) 

To : Tokyo 

September 18, 1941 

Purple , 

#613 

On the afternoon of the 17th, the Phoenix came in port and is now 
being refueled at the pier. 

It is reported two more ships of the same type will soon arrive. 

ARMY 22497 Trans. 9/20/41 (6) 

From: Manila (Nihro) 
To : Tokyo 
September 20, 1941 
Purple 

#618 

The boats anchored here, the 26th, are : 
Phoenix 
*Bukko * 



a chartered boat (12,000 to 13,000 tons, number of crew unknown) 
carrying ( 'i ) approximately 200 sailors. 

The Pitasu ^ (Peters ?), which entered the harbor on the 18th, is 
reported to have carried 500 soldiers. 

ARMY 22772 Trans. 9-27-41 (6) 



Kana spelling. 



[70] From: Manila (Nihro) 
To: Tokyo 
September 22, 1941 
Purple 

#623 

Re my message #618.* 

The Phoenix leit port the morning of the 22nd. 

ARMY 22771 Trans. 9/27/41 (6) 

• See S. I. S. #22772. 



288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

From: Davao (Kihara) 
To: Tokyo 
September 26, 1941 
J-19 

#135 

Upon my arrival to take up my post here, I heard the following 
report concerning Zamboanga : ^ 

Since last August American destroyer tenders, destroyers and sub- 
marines enter that port from the South Seas every Saturday. After 
they have lain at anchor for one or two days they leave again for the 
South. In summing up the statements of members of the crews of 
these boats, it appears that these warships ply the waters from Jolo '' 
to Tawao •= and Tarakan ^ on the island of Borneo. 

AKMY 24468 Trans. 11/7/41 (6) 

• A city on the island of Mindanao. 

•" Name of the island connecting the main Philippine group to Borneo. 

« Town in British North Borneo. 

d In Netherlands Borneo. 



[71] From: Tokyo 
To: Davao 
October 2, 1941 
J-19 

#62 ^ 

Re your #105.* 

Please wire me the location and movements of fishermen and 

since your last report. 

ARMY 25697 Trans. 12^^1 (6) 

« Not available. 



From: Tokyo (Toyoda) 
To: Manila 
October 4, 1941 
Purple 

#318 

I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along 
the east, west and southern coasts of the Island of Luzon, reporting 
on their progress, strength, etc. Also please investigate anything else 
which may seems of interest. 

ARMY 23207 Trans. 10/8/41 (6) 

[72] From: Manila (Nihro) 

To : Tokyo 

October 14, 1941 

Purple (Primary Intelligence) 

#685 

On the afternoon of the 13th, the Hmifiton, the Marhlehead, the 
Hoh,^ five destroyers, and two mine layers left port. Their destina- 
tion is unknown. 

The following sliips are tied up in this harbor at the present time : 
The Black Hmvk, the Pas,^ four destroyers, 10 submarines (the sub- 

■ Kana spelling. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 289 

marines are of Classes 170 and 190), and the Gold Star (all of the 
above-mentioned submarines are tied up on either side of the Gold 
Star and are taking on supplies) . 

ARMY 23755 Trans. 10/21/41 (6) 



[7J] From: Manila 

To: Tokyo. 

17 October 1941 

(Purple) 

#691 

Reports of reliability A. 

On the afternoon of the I7th the 

TON 

MADDO 

HON 

4 destroyers 

5 submarines (140 class) 
BERU 

1 minelayer and 
oiler TRINITY 

entered harbor. 

In addition to the above ships in port at present on the 18th are 
as follows : 

A. Manila. 

The same as my #685* 

B. Cavite. 

REI 

2 minelayers 

(4 groups missing). 

3. Large scale barracks are being constructed at NljEBA ESIHA 
between Cabanatuan and Laur (about 131 kilometers from Manila). 

4. It is said that mechanized maneuvers are being carried out be- 
tween Laur and Aguilla. 

23856 

JD-1 : 6004 (H) Navy Trans. 10-22-41 (6-AR) 



•JD-l : 5952 (SIS #23755). 



\7Jf] From: Manila (Nihro) 

To: Tokvo 

October 20, 1941 

Purple 

#693 

Primary intelligence. The Houston, the Marblehead, eight de- 
stroyers, ten submarines (of the 170 and 190 class) and one mine 
layer left port on the morning of the 20th. Their destination is 
unknown. 

ARMY 23906 Trans. 10/24/41 (6) 



290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

From: Davao (Kihara) 

To: Tokyo 

21 October 1941 

(J 19) 

#156 

Kegarding my #124*. 

As an air base for central Mindanao district, 300 men are being 
managed by Americans, and the ground is now being leveled. 

An under ground hangar and under ground oil tanks are planned ; 
however, the material for this is delayed so that building on diis is 
not progressing as planned. 

Already several times a week planes are flying here, and it seems 
they are expecting large heavy bomber planes too, very soon. 

25580 

JD-1 : 6945 ( Y) Navy Trans.12-1-41 (6) 



♦Not available. 



[75] From: Manila 
To: Tokyo 
October 24, 1941 
Purple 

#707 

1. Two destroyers, the Ton * and the Maddo,^ two submarines, and 
one mine layer touched port on the afternoon of the 23rd. 

2. The President Cleveland, which entered the port on the after- 
noon of the 23rd, landed American soldiers (an unconfirmed report 
is that there were 2,500 ) . 

3. The Chester, a Class A Cruizer no doubt convoying the Cleve- 
land, also entered the port on the afternoon of the 23rd. 

4. Referring to my #661 " and #685 <= the Gold Star was a mistake 
for the Ohotos * (or Ohotou *) (estimated to be a 10,000 ton ship 
formerly Norwegian and remodeled after the war) . 

AEM Y 23980 Trans. 10/27/41 ( S) 



• Kana spelling. 
•J Not availal)le. 

' See S. I. S. #23755. Manila wires Tokyo the ships that are laid up in the harbor at 
the present time and the ones that left port on the afternoon of the 13th. 



176] From: Manila (Nihro) 
To: Tokyo. 
25 October 1941 
(Purple) 

#711 

1. The REI* and one destroyer left during the morning of the 25th. 
Destination is not known. 

2. Ships in port are the following : 

a. Manila. 
TON* 
MADDO* 
CHESTER 
BUKKU* 
BERU* 



i 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 291 

ROYGXOMU (?) 

HON* 

5 destroyers 

11 large submarines 

5 small submarines 
b. Cavite. 

PASU* (under repair) 

2 destroyers 
3. There are indications that all of the vessels are to be repainted 
into an ash color (almost a grey), the TON* and one destroyer have 
already been repainted. 

JD-1 : 24182 (D) Navy Trans. 10-29^1 (6-AR) 

•Possible equivalents for these abbreviations are : 
REI — Langley 
TON — Houston 
MADDO — Marblehead 
BUKKU— Black Hawk 
BEKU— Isabel 
HON — Heron 
PASU — Canopus 



[77^ From: Manila (Nihro) 
To: Tokyo 
27 October 1941 
(Purple) 

#713 

1. The PISU entered Cavite on the 26th and the REI entered on 
the morning of the 27th. 

2. On the morning of the 27th, 3 destroyers, 11 submarines of the 
N type, the HON and 2 minelayers left port, destination unknown. 
JD-1: 6214 24284 (H) Navy Trans. 11-3-41 (6-AR) 



From: Manila 
To: Tokyo 
29 October 1941 
(Purple) 

#719 ? 

The TON* and the MADDO** sailed on the afternoon of the 28th 
and the Chester on the morning of the 29th. Destination unknown. 

JD-1: 6712 25164 (H) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (5-AR) 



•Houston? 
••Marblehead? 



From: Manila (Nihro) 

To: Tokyo 

1 November 1941 

(Purple) 

#722 

1. The TON*, MADDO*, HON*, 7 destroyers, 8 submarines and 3 
minesweepers entered port on the 31st. But the TON* left again on 
the morning of the 1st, destination unknown, 

2. On the morning of the 1st the President Cleveland and the Presi- 
dent Madison left port loaded with American soldiers whose time was 
up, (number uncertain). 



292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

3. According to reports received from [75] what we believe 
are reliable sources the number of American military and naval planes 
in the Philippine Islands is as follows : 

(a) Military planes. 

Large bombers, 29. 
Scout planes, 324. 
The same, B type, 62. 
Fighters, 317. 
The same, B type, 131. 
Pursuit planes, 302. 
The same, D type, 69. 
Training planes, 49. 
Total 1,283. 

(b) Naval planes. 

Large flying boats, 26. 

4. Ships in port on the 1st: MADDO,* BUKKU,* PISU,* HON,* 
BERU,* 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, WOHOTOSU. 3 minelayers. 
In Cavite : REl,* PASU,* 2 Z. 

5. According to a report from the De La Rama steamship com- 
pany two of their ships, the Dona Estaban (1,616 tons), and the 
MADBUKARU (191 tons) , had been requisitioned by the local Amer- 
ican Army. 

JD-1: 6335 (H) Navy Trans. 11-8-41 (6-AR) 

24533 



• Possible equivalents for these abbreviations are: TON (Houston) : MADDO (Marble- 
head) ; HON (Heron) ; BUKKU (Black Hawk) ; PISU (Canopus) ; BERU (Isabel) ; REX 
(Langley) ; PASU (Canopus). 



[79] From: Manila (Nihro) 

To: Tokyo 

1 November 1941 

(Purple) 

#723 

(RE your #318)* . 

Strict guard is being maintained hence the gathering of informa- 
tion is extremely difficult. We are making secret investigations but 
I will wire you the following newspaper and foreign office reports for 
the present. 

1. The incorporation of the^ Philippine Army into the Far Eastern 
Army is progressing slowly but surelv and it is reported tliat bv the 
end of the year the incorporation of 120,000 will be completed. Addi- 
tions to the barracks at the various camps are being rushed to com- 
pletion. It seems that particular emphasis is being placed on the 
concentration of military strength. 

Localities are as follows : Kabanatuan. San Marcelino 

(several groups missing). 

Furthermore there is to be a great increase in the number of soldiers 
stationed in the vicinity Lingayen during the month of November. 
Army maneuvers are to be carried out during the middle of the month. 
This may be a temporary measure. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 293 

2. In the vicinity of Mariveles more than 3000 workmen are being 
used to rush the work on the various jirojects. However, there are 
not more than 300 infantry and cavalry troops stationed there. 

On the 27th, what I estimated to be between 2000 and 3000 infantry 
troops left Manila by bus headed north. Their destination may have 
been the above place. It is being investigated at present. It appears 
that three airports are being built there and the docks are being 
enlarged. 

In the Bataan area the surveillance is particularly strict and it is 
said that even the entry of Filipinos is prohibited. 

3. Work is being rushed on the road between Dingalan and 
RAARU (Laur?) and by the middle of October there were less than 
two kilometers that had not been completed [80] and this 
will be finished in the near future. The road between Infanta and 
Manila is being widened to 5 meters. Work is being carried on day 
and night and the progress is amazing. 

4. In Iba there are 30 or 40 fighter planes, 20 or 30 light bombers 
and several score of altitude planes {?) it is said. 

Details by Mail. 

JD-1: 6270 

24382 (H) Navy Trans. ll-4r-41 (S-TT) 

•JD— 1 : 5681. "I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the 
east, west and southern coasts of the island of Luzon, reporting their progress, strength, etc. 
Also please investigate anything else which may seem of interest." (SIS #23207) 



From : Manila, Hihro) 
To: Tokyo 
November 4, 1941 
Purple 

#726 

PISU, HON, BERU D-8, S-13 and M-3 left on the afternoon of 

the 3rd, destination unknown and D-1 are now 

inHaku (Brazil ?). 

ARMY 24691 Trans. 11/13/41 (6) 



[81] From: Manila (Nihro) 
To: Tokyo 
November 4, 1941 
Purple 

#727 

Intelligence. 

1. Since about a month ago little by little brown soldiers have been 
arriving at the Stotsenburg Barracks. The number at present is about 
two or three thousand. In view of the fact that these soldiers speak 
Spanish, they may be "Iko's." I understand that they are not very 
friendly with American soldiers. We are now secretly investigating 
where they have come from. 



294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2. Taraiao.* Recently the Miguel Air Field has been extended to 
form a rectangle about 1,000 meters long. 

3. All the wooden bridges on the national highway between Taraiao 
and Lingayen ^ have been replaced with concrete bridges. 

4. At the foot of a hill situated to the north of Teraiao (the hill 
overlooks the Lingayen Gulf) about 200 barracks have been con- 
structed. I understand that new barracks are being built at Ste 
Ignatia. 

5. From what I hear the American soldiers stationed at Stotsenburg 
maintained an arrogant attitude toward the Filipinos and, since there 
have been two or three cases of assault on Filipinas, the Filipinos are 
furious. 

ARMY 2462'6 Trans. 11/12/41 (6^ 

» Tarallo, Camarines Province. 

" Pangasinan Province, Luzon, Philippine Islands on Lingayen Gulf. 



[82] From: Tokyo 

To: Manila 

5 November 1941 

(Purple) 

#355 

For Secretary Yuki. 

The Naval General Staff has requested that investigation be made on 
the following items. Please arrange as you think best for the same : 
These items in regard to each port of call : ; 

( 1 ) Conditions at air ports on land. 

(2) Types of planes at each, and number of planes. 

(eS) Warships ; also machinery belonging to land forces. 

(4) State of progress being made on all equipment and estab- 
lishments. 
JD-1 : 6424 (F) Navy Trans. 11-13-41 (6-AR) 

24696 



[S3] From: Manila (Nihro) 
To: Tokyo 
November. 6, 1941 
Purple 

#735 

Of first importance. Rs my #743 ^ 

The following information has been pieced together from two intelli- 
gence reports. 

1. 50 American officials and 1200 Philippine soldiers are stationed at 
Bugallon in Pangasinan '' province. There are also 8 light tanks and 
8 aircraft guns (with fixed mounts). There is a number of American 
artillery men stationed in the Yashiyama (literally — Coconut(?) 
mountain) between Sual •= and Lingayen*. 

2. There are 10 two-motored light bombers, 190 Curtis fighting 
planes (up to now intelligence reports have given the number to be 60 
but recently reenforcements were received) and 400 American air force 
officers stationed at Iba in Zambales ^ province. A division of Philip- 
pine soldiers (15,000) are stationed at San Marcelino. This division 
is composed of 3 infantry regiments, 3 field artillery companies and 3 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 295 

self-propelled armored artillery companies and it is expected that a 
reent'orcement of a large number of tanks will soon be received. They 
have recently started the construction of a new air field there. 
Furthermore, 320 Philippine soldiers are stationed at Botolan. 

3. They are now constructing barracks at three points (out 4 kilo- 
meters, (less than 10) kilometers and 22 kilometers) on the [54] 
road from Tarlac to Santa Ignacia in Tarlac province which will ac- 
commodate 500, 1000, 1500 soldiers respectively, a total of 3,000. Also 
construction is being started on a new air field 5 kilometers south of 
Tarlac (a five year plan) apparently a part of the leveling has already 
been finished. A military road from Capas through O'Donnell to 
Botolan in Zambales province is almost completed. (Upon several 
occasions lately troop camouflaging was observed.) 

4. Eecently 200 light tanks were (landed?) at Stotsenburg in Pam- 
panga.^ 

ARMY 24813 Trans. 11/15/41 (6) 

• Not available. 

" Province north of Manila beyond Tarlac province. 

« Pangaslnan Province. 

•• On the western side of the peninsula across the bay from Manila. 

* On the northwest shore of Manila Bay between Tarlac and Bataan Province. 



[85] From: Manila 
To: Tokyo 
November 8, 1941 
Purple 

#738 

Re your #353.* 

Retransmitting that portion of the message following Raichaku. ' 

#732. Re my #723." 

1. Since the last part of last month a reinforcement of 4 or 5 thou- 
sand soldiers has been received in the province of Bataan.'^ They were 
stationed along the coast and in the central mountain districts at Say- 
sain,"^ Cobcaben, Lamao, Limay, etc. 

2. An excellent military highway has been constructed between 
Lamao and Mariveres ( 154 kilometers to 157 kilometers from Manila) 
along the coasts and in the interior. Sentries are posted at the en- 
trance prohibiting the passage of civilians, Philippine military and 

others not possessing special permits 

(powerful?) guns and many defenses seem to have been put in. 

Although the road between Bagac and Balanga has already been 
converted into a military highway, construction of a military road 
connecting Moron and Olongapa has been suspended. I believe that 
commercial connections between these places have been by boat for a 
long time. 

(Message incomplete) .® 

ARMY 24744 Trans. 11/14/41 (S) 

• Not available. 

" See S. I. S. #24382 ; in which Manila wires a report on the defense activities in tfte 
Philippine Islands gathered from newspapers and foreign oflBce reports. 
« Philippine province across the bay from Manila. 

• All places mentioned in this message are in Bataan province. 

• The last part of the message was not retransmitted. 



296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[86] From: Manila (Nihro) 
To: Tokyo 
November 8, 1941 
Purple 
.#742 

The warships at anchor in the harbor on the 8th are as follows: 
The Marhlehead, the Black Hawk^ eight destroyers, nine submarines, 
the Heron^ the Wohotosu,^ the Isabel, and the tanker Trinity (the 
latter arrived on the 8th). 

ARMY 24745 Trans. 11/14/41 (6) 



■ Kana spelling. 



From: Manila (Nihro) 
To: Tokyo 
November 10, 1941 
Purple 

#745 

. 1. The Houston touched port at Cavite on the 8th. 

2. Four destroyers left port on the 10th. Destination unknown. 

3. Two cargo boats (former president boats of the 10,000 ton class 
with the names painted over) entered port on the 9th, landing 2,300 
soldiers. 

ARMY 24755 Trans. 11/14/41 (6) 

[87] From: Manila (Nihro) 
To: Tokyo 
November 10, 1941 
Purple 

#746 

Re my #722,* first part of part 3 — the number of large attack 
planes, latest models, 4-motored B-19's, is 32. 

Re my #727,'' the black soldiers are American negroes. 

ARMY 24850 Trans. 11/17/41 (6) 

* See S. I. S. #24533 ; in which Manila informs Tokyo in regard to the number of Ameri- 
can military and naval planes in the Philippine Islands. 

" See S. I. S. #24626 ; in which Manila reports on defense activities in the Philippines, 
sayinj" they are secretly investlsrating where the 2 or 3,000 brown soldiers arriving at the 
Stotsenburg Barracks have come from. 



From: Manila (Nihro) 
To: Tokyo 
November 12, 1941 
Purple 

#753 

On the morning of the 12th, an American cruiser of the Chester 
class entered port. She is now tied up at dock #7 and is taking on 

. It is thought likely that this vessel accompanied one of the 

President line ships into port. This vessel preceded the cruiser into 
port. 

ARMY 24923 Trans. 11/18/41 (6) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 297 

[SS] From: Manila (Nihro) 

To : Tokyo 

November 12, 1941 

Purple 

#754 

According to a report handed on to me by a Japanese who has lived 
in the Province of liocos Norte for some fourteen or fifteen years, the 
following has been ascertained. 

1. At the present time there are approximately 400 Philippine 
soldiers and seven or eight officers stationed in Laoag.^ It is being 
rumored, however, that the Philippine troops will be increased to 
approximately 1,700. At the present time they are constructing 
additional barracks. 

2. There seems to be no indication that they plan the expansion of 
the present civil airport in Laoag (length, 1.200 metres; width, 850 
metres) nor are they stationing any military planes at that field. 
Aside from a reconnaissance flight nightly (one plane) over the coastal 
area in the vicinity of the city, no extensive activity is in progress. 

3. Though it is said that Claveria '' and Burgos " are being equipped 

with , the details are unknown. (I am continuing my 

private investigations in this connection.) 

ARMY 25064 ■ Trans. 11/21/41 (6) 



« Seaport in the Province of Ilocos Norte on the Island of Luzon, P. 1. 
" Towns on the northern shore of the Island of Luzon, P. I. 



[89] From : Manila (Nihro.) 
To: Tokyo 
November 12, 1941 
Purple 

#755 

A report given me by a Japanese who resides in Camarines Norte "^ 
is as follows : 

1. In that area at the present time there does not seem to be many 
troops stationed. Only about 60 members of the Philippine Patrol 
organization, with headquarters in Daet,^ are located in that area. 
Every day five or six of these patrolmen are dispatched as a relief unit 
to Paracale " and Jose Panganiban.** 

2. The Civil Airport at Paracale is not being used at the present 
time. Insofar as the military air field at Daet is concenied, though 
one or two military planes landed there during February of this 
year, from that time to this there has not been a single military plane 
alight on this field. As this field is located right on the beach, should 
it be necessary it is said that naval planes could land in the shipping 
lane just off the beach as well. 

3. On the point of land, San Muricio,® north of Jose Panganiban 

it is rumored that they are equipping with , but this has 

not been verified. (I am continuing my secret investigations.) 



7971« O — 46 — pt. 12 21 



298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

4. Twelve or thirteii coastal reconnaissance planes were seen to have 
iiown over the area within a period of three days. Toward the latter 
part of last year 13 American freighters are said to have entered the 
port of Panganiban. Since then, almost on the average of once a 
week, American freighters sail from Batganas ' to Hondagua.^ 

ARMY 25162 Trans. 11/24/41 (6) 

[90] * Province near southeastern extremity of Luzon. 

" City on southeastern extremity of the Island of Luzon. 

•^ Seaport in the province of Caniarines Norte. 

" English spelling. Cannot identify. 

* English spelling. Point of land cannot be identified. 

' Seaport in southwestern Luzon. 

8 Seaport on "Lopez Bay off Lamon Bay. 



From : Manila 

To: Tokyo 

13 November 1941 

(Purple) 

#757 

1. The CA heavy cruiser of my #753* was the Portland. 

2. On the morning of the 13th a British destroyer of the Defender 
type entered port. 

3. It has been ascertained that 8 {or 4 f) of the nine submarines 
of mv #742* are of the 129 class. They have entered port here recently 
but the exact date is uncertain. 

JD-1: 61)03 24780 (H) Navy Trans. 11-13-41 (S-22) 



*Not available. 



[91] From: Tokyo 

To: Manila 

15 November 1941 

(Purple) 

#368 

Strictly confidential. 
Re your #746*. 

Please ascertain by what route the large bombers went to the Philip- 
pines, and also please make investigations again as to their number. 

JD-1: 6753 25236 (H) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (AR) 



•.TD-l : 6545 (SIS #24850). Reports 32 B-19 bombers in the Philippines. 



From: Manila (Nihro) 

To: Tokyo 

15 November 1941 

(Purple) 

#767 

1. It lias been ascertained that the ship of my #757*, ])aragraph 2, 
was a British transport, the AWATEA which entered port at the 
same time under convoy, (12000 or 13000 tons, 700 or SOO soldiers on 
board). Both ships sailed again on the evening of the 14th, destina- 
tion unknowm. 

2. On the afternoon of the 14th, 4 destroyers, 11 submarines, 1 mine- 
layer, entered port. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 299 

3. Ships in port on the 15th : 
A. Manila: 

MADDO 
Portland 
BUKKU 
BERU 
BERU** 
HON 

WOHOTOSU 
8 destroyers 
20 submarines 
1 minelayer 
[92] B. Cavite : 
TON 
PASU 

JD-1:6754 25237 (H) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (AR) 

*JD-1 : 6503 (SIS #24780). Ke movements of U. S. Naval and British Naval craft in 
Manila area. 

••BERU repeated. 



From : Manila 

To : Tokyo 

15 November 1941 

(Purple) 

#767 

We are retransmitting our machine telegram of the 14th with indi- 
cator 97720 because of a mistake on the plug board, as follows : 
The following is from a report of a Japanese resident in Cebu. 

1. At present there are about 300 American and 2,500 Filipino 
soldiers stationed there. (There are four barracks each with a 
capacity of about 500 or 600 soldiers. 

2. The airport has an area of about 196 acres but is being enlarged 
(by use of convict labor). About 12 planes (of medium size) used 
by the Philippine Army, have been transported to Java by air, and 12 
or 13 American Army planes, (monoplanes — whether they were scout 
planes or pursuit planes was not clear), are now stationed there. In 
addition to these there is one large bomber in the hangar (double type, 
capacity 40 planes). 

3. The headquarters of the former patrol force are being used as the 
cominisariate storehouse and all sorts of provisions are being stored 
there. 

4. On the 22nd of September, about 20 American warships anchored 
on the northwest coast of the Sulu Archipelago. Around the middle 
of October two destroyers and one cruiser entered Cebu harbor and 
early this month, one oil supply ship of the 20,000 ton class, and a 
camouflaged cruiser of the 10,000 ton class, entered port and anchored 
for two or three days. It has been recognized that occasionally two 
or three American ships anchor around the south of Mactaii, Bacol, 
and Panglao. 

5. There is an open drydock at MAKUGAA (operated by Chinese) 
capable of handling ships up to 10,000 tons. 

JD-1:6587 24933 (H) Navy Trans. 11-18-41 (S-TT) 



300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK. 

[93] From: Manila (Nihro) 
To: Tokyo 
17 November 1941 
(Purple) 
#769 
On the morning of the I7th the 

MADDO* 

Portland 

J** 10 ships 

M*** 1 ship 
left port. Destination unknown. 

JD-1 : 6761 25244 (H) Navy Trans. 11-24-41 (AR) 



*Marblehead? 

**May be garble for "D" — destroyer, 

♦♦♦Minelayer. 



From : Tokyo (Togo) 

To : Manila 

November 20, 1941 

Purple 

#372 (Strictly Secret) 

Please advise immediately the results of your investigations as to the 
type of drift presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic 

Furthermore, please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as 
well as to Tokyo. 

ARMY 25314 Trans. 11-26-41 (6) 



♦ Near Manila, P. I. 



[94] From: Manila (Nihro) 
To: Tokyo 
November 22, 1941 
Purple 

#785 

1. A camouflaged British cruiser (gues.sed to be 4 or 5 thousand tons ; 
having 8 guns ; name unknown ) entered port on the morning of the 21st 
and anchored at Pier #7, sailing at 5 in the afternoon, destination 
unknown. 

On the 21st an American transport (rumored to be the President 
Harrison) entered port and took on soldiers (number unknown) and 
materiel. 

2. Boats anchored in port on the 22nd were : 

Manila — Portland (entered tlie port on the 21st); Marblehead; 
Black Hawk; Isobel; Heron; Wohotosu^; Pisu"; one mine layer; 9 
destroyers; 20 submarines. 

Cavite — Houston ( ? ) ; Canopus. 

ARMY 25471 Trans. 11/29/41 (6) 



* Kana spelling. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 301 

From: Manila (Nihro) 
To: Tokyo 
November 24, 1941 
Purple 
#789 

1. Putting together various reports, it appears that a large amount 
of military stores was removed from the "port area" during the "black- 
out" on the night of the 21st. Forty or fifty civilian buses (carrying 
the "mark" of the Manila Electric Company) were seen in the Rizal 
Province district. Investigations are being made to find out if these 
were loaded with troops. 

2. At about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 22nd, 60 light tanks 

(carrying one gun, two ) and 20 ammunition trucks were seen 

leaving ( Quezon Bridge ? ) . These light tanks and ammunition trucks 
were seen on the 21st grouped near the headquarters of the "port area" 
military police. It is conjectured that (troops ?) arrived on military 
boats recently entering the harbor. An English language "bulletin" 
of the 24th stated that a large number of light tanks and ammunition 
trucks had left at four and six o'clock on the afternoon of the 22nd in 
transit for Meycuayan in Bulacan Province and San Fernando in 
Pampanga Province. I believe that these had been landed sometime 
around the 21st. The final destination of these tanks and trucks is now 
being investigated. 

3. At present it is seen that there are two or three hundred American 
army trucks near the "port area" which have been imported at short 
intervals, creating a hurried atmosphere. Also, troops have newly 
arrived at (certain places in ?) the hills within the city. They are 
evidently American reinforcements. Feeling among the people in 
general has become tense. 

ARMY 25530 Trans. 12/1/41 (6) 

[96] From: Manila (Nihro) 

To: Tokyo 

25 November 1941 

(Purple) 

#790 

1. On the 23rd a camouflaged submarinetender, the Holland * 
(5 or 6 thousand tons, apparently a camouflaged Dutch vessel) , entered 
port. 

2. On the 24th, 5 submarines left port, destination unknown. 

3. On the 25th, 7 destroyers left port, destination unknown. 

JD-1 : 7035 25708 (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (6-AR) 

•Probably the U. S. S. HOLLAND (of 8000. tons). 

From: Manila (Nihro) 

To: Tokyo 

27 November 1941 

(Purple) 

#797 

The Portland, BUKKU*, 2 destroyers, 10 submarines, left port on 
the 26th ( f) . Destination unknown. 

JD-1: 7082 25782 (H) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (6-AR) 

'Probably Black Hawk. «, 



302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

From: Manila (Nihro) 
To: Tokyo 
November 28, 1941 
Purple 

#799 

Recently they have utilized a group of nine planes (one flight of six 
and another of three planes) in high-level scouting patrols over the 
city of Manila from four o'clock in the morning. In addition, three 
other planes fly over the city independently. Though in the morning 
and evening the weather is clear and windless, squalls come once a day. 

ARMY 25764 Trans. 12/5/41 (6) 

[97] B. TRANSLATED AFTER 7 DECEMBER 1941 

From: Manila (Nihro) 

To: Tokyo 

29 November 1941 

(Purple) 

#805 

Ships in port on the 29th. 
"1 ^1 fl n 1 1 fi ' 

Submarine tender WOTOSU and HORAN * 

Submarines 190 class 5 

Submarines 170 class 5 

Submarines 180 class 5 

(When the 180 class entered port there were 8 but 3 departed, 

destination unknown.) 
Submarines 150 class 5 
Submarines small size 4 
Oilers, 2 (PISU * and TRINITY) 
Destroyers, 2 
Gunboats, 1 (BERU*) 

2. Cavite: 

TON * 

PASU* (being repaired). 

3. It was announced on the 27th that for a time the lights at Sangley 
Point in Cavite, at Manila, Bagnio, and on the buoys in the bay would 
be turned out. 

JD-1 : 7207 25935 (H) Navy Trans. 12-8-41 (6-AR) 



•Probably HOLLAND, PECOS. ISABEL. 



[98] From: Manila (Nihro). 

To: Tokyo. 

1 December 1941 

(Purple) 

#812 

Ships in port on the 1st. 
1. A. Manila. 

Submarine tender HOLLAND. 
, Submarines, small, 2. 



B. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 303 

Submarines, large, 6. 

Oilers, 2 (PISU* and TRINITY). 

Gunboats, 1 (KASUBERU). 

The PASU* which was undergoing repairs at Cavite lies at 

anchor off . 

Cargo ship, 1 (4000 ton class), taking on provisions. 



The submarine tender WOTOSU. 

14 large submarines and 

3 destroyers, left port this morning, destination unknown. 

The American Navigation (10,000 ton class) entered port about 
3 days ago. From it are being unloaded 12 objects 1 meter in diameter 
and about 3 meters in length. I think they are boilers. (I am making 
investigations). 

A former Danish ship, the Manchen Maersk (10,000 ton class), 
present registry Panama, present name unidentifiable (under inves- 
tigation) entered port this morning, about half loaded, it appeared. 

5 British freighters (6000 ton class) are at the pier taking on cargo, 
details not ascertainable. 

The Spencer Kelogg (American registry, 6000 ton class), entered 
port about 2 days ago, unloaded crude oil and is scheduled to load 
castor oil. 

The Don Esteban (requisitioned by the American Army) entered 
port this morning. 

2. Cavite. TON.* 

JD-1 : 7208 25936 (H) Navy Trans. 12-8-41 (6-AR) 

•Probably Pecos, Canopus, and Houston. 



[901 4. Southeast Asia and Netherlands East Indies 

[100] A. translated before 7 DECEMBER 1941 

From: Batavia (Ishizawa) 
To : Tokyo 
August 28, 1941 
Purple 

#895 

(Secret outside the department.) 
Re my #77 *. 

The large transport planes turned out to be two DC 5's of KUNI- 
RUMU.^ Now, according to a newspaper report, the KUNIRUMU •" 
Company owned planes are : 

5 of the DC 5 type 

3 of the DC 3 type 

3 of the DC 2 type 

14 Lockheeds 

2 of the Sikorsky S 43 type 

2 of the Ouranmen ^ G. E. 21 type 

1 De Haviland Dragon 

2 of the Fokker EHS 7 type 
2 of the Fokker LHU 12 type 



304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

And it is understood that the Kacf ueru " EMU has 4 of the DC 3 
type. 

While the Java class Cruiser was still at anchor in Puriooku •* 
harbor, on the morning of the 27th, one destroyer of the Bankerutu '' 
class entered port. 

ARMY 21721 Trans. 9/3/41 (5^ 



a Not available. 
" Eana spelling. 



[101] From : Tokyo (Toyoda) 

To: Singapore and Batavia 

September 6, 1941 

Purple 

Cir. #1947 (Strictly Secret) 

After you have made an immediate investigation on the following 
matters, please make a report, sending it to us in an appropriate 
manner, , 

1. Please inform me as to the various types of fishing entered into 
by Japanese from the point of view of their use in fishing of gasoline- 
powered vessels ("gasoline-powered vessels" is a military term for 
vessels known as "sea arks" which have a considerable cruising 
ability). 

2. In regard to these fishing concerns who operates these so-called 
"sea arks" : 

(a) List the number of vessels for each concern separately. 

(b) Give the tonnage of each vessel. 

(c) The speed of each vessel. 

(d) Whether or not they have wireless equipment. 

(e) Give the present position of each ship. 

(f ) Should we require the use of these fishing vessels, please advise 
us as to the method by which we could transmit instructions for each 
vessel. (This is particularly important.) 

(g) The time of day we should wire these orders. (This is particu- 
larly important.) 

[102] (h) Please ascertain the length of time required subse- 
quent to receipt of orders to move from their present position to the 
southern part of French Indo-China. 

ARMY 22009 Trans. 9/10/41 (6) 



From : Tokyo 
To: Singapore 
October 22, 1941 
Purple 
#316 

Strictly secret 

From the Vice-Chief of General Staff. Through Chancellor 
TAHIRA please report the following two things concerning the air 
force now stationed in the Federated Malay States : 

1. Their drills and battle maneuvers (aerial formations). 

2. Investigate their organization. 

ARMY 23902 Trans. 10-24-41 (S) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , 305 

From : Tokyo 
To : Batavia 
October 22, 1941 
Purple 

#669 

To Major KURIYA from the Assistant Chief of Staff. 
Will you please inspect and report on the air force in the Dutch 
Indies in regard to : 

1. Training, formation, and aerial combat methods. 

2. Organization, types, number and location of planes. 

3. Types and number of planes being sent from England and 
the United States. 

ARMY 23893 Trans. 10/24/41 (S) 



[JOS] From: Batavia 

To: Tokyo 

25 October 1941 

(Purple) 

#1150 

Secret within the Foreign Office. 

Secret within the Military. 

Please convey to Assistant Chief of Staff: (Very secret). 

message #25. 

As complete and reliable information regarding the N. E. I. air 
forces is not yet in hand, I will merely report the main items: 

(1) Items concerning destroyer units: 

(a) Formation 3 planes iii small triangle formation (some- 
times 4 planes in a diamond shaped formation) and three of these 
formations making one unit. 

(b) As for their combat methods, they have been observed to work 
on the plan of having three pursuit planes attack light bombers from 
behind and below, attacking one plane at a time, but aside from this 
particulars are not known. 

(2) Items concerning organization : 

(a) Aviation headquarters in the army at 

Bandoeng. The first Bandoeng air force is at Malang in western 
Java, and the second air force seems to have charge of eastern and 
central Java ( its symbol is "LFX") . The number of planes stationed 

there seems to be combat planes 9 (?) 2 planes light 

bombers . 

(b) Types of planes: (The number of planes given in brackets 
are very unreliable). 

Combat (destroyer) planes: ZATAISUHUOOKU and Curtis in- 
terceptor. reconnoiter and bombing plane — Curtis — 

Falcon." (About 5(?)). 

Light bombers : Glen Martin and Lockheed (about 150). 

Flying boats: DONIERU (about 20) and recent Catalina 5 sea- 
planes (medium and small types, about 50). 



306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[104] (c) The number of planes for both army and navy total 
about 500 of first line planes, and adding second line planes it would 
come to between 700 and 1000, (including training planes). During 
the review of troops on 1 September, about 100 planes were flying over 
Batavia. 

(d) Points at which planes are stationed: (numbers given are very 
unreliable) . Also see Java message #18* in regard to stations. 

(1) Aviation force #1. Bandon. 
Light bombers, 30. 
Combat planes, 70. 

KARIJATE "LFX"** and parachute troops (tem- 
porarily created). 
TIRIRITAN**. Combat planes, 12; light bombers. 

"LFX" BOITE SPORUHU**, combat 70, light bomb- 
ers 6. 
PUMx'nBUKKU**, (on south coast) some light 

bombers. 

(2) Aviation force #2. "LFX". 
AARAN**, quite a number of light bombers. 
SOERABAJA, (north field), combat planes, 40; scout 

planes, 30 ; light bombers, 30. 
MAOSCTMATOI**, (west of MAJION), light bomber 

"LFX". 
JOKUJA*'^, light bomber, combat plane. 

(3) Naval planes: 

SOERABAJA, flying boats, 20, (including some Catalinas 

recently arrived). Seaplanes, "LFX". 
TANJONPURIOOKU**, flying boats, "LFX". 
(4) Outlying territories : 

Menado, flying boats on the lake to the south, "LFX". 
Anbon, flynig boat, "LFX". Barikupapan, light 
bomber, "LFX". 

[105] (3) The situation as regards replenishments and arrivals: 

(a) Two Catalina flying boats were ferried from the United States 
in early part of September, and three the latter part of October. 

(b) Others, it would seem, are being imported from time to time 
by American and Dutch ships, but tlie actual facts are not known. 

(c) According to newspaper reports contracts have been made in 
the United States amounting to $24,000,000 for the purchase of two- 
motored medium weight bonibers of the B type. 

(d) The supplementary naval appropriaticm just passed provides 
14,340,000 guilders for plane purchases for the purpose of creating 
a tx)rpedo plane force. 

(e) There seem to be supply depots at each of the flying fields at 
Soerabaja and Bandoeng; and assembling and repair of planes are 
done at these places. 

(4) Other items: 

(a) Of late volunteer flying corps are being organized in various 
places for the purpose of traniing second line pilots, and there are 
already about 40 each in training at Batavia and Soerabaja. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 307 

(b) Of late there has been an increase of plane accidents (especially 
light bombers) in the Netherlands East Indies. This is thought to be 
a result of these efforts at expansion . 

JD-1: 24185 (F) Navy Trans. 10-30-41 (6-AR) 

•Not available. 
**Place name. 



[106] From: Honkong (Yano) 

To : Ottawa 

17 November 1941 

(J19) 

Unnumbered 

Hongkong to Tokyo #542 

There have been rumors to the effect that the Canada army troops 
would soon be sent to the Orient. 

On the 16th (morning) a Canadian Pacific line steamer came in 
port guarded by a British warship. This ship had on board about 
1000 Canadian soldiers, who were entered in the Kuryushinho barracks. 

These troops are Canadian volunteers and are of mixed nationality. 
They are keeping the strength, etc. of this division a secret, but accord- 
ing to reports another 2000 are expected. 

Kelayed to Canton, Ottawa. Relay to Shanghai and Nanking. 

JD-1 : 6874 25431 ( Y) Navy Trans. 11-28^1 (CN) 



From: Tokyo (Togo) 
To: Singapore 
November 18, 1941 
Purple 
#353 

that a squadron consisting of eight ships of the 

15,000 ton class and ten other boats set out from port on November 4th 
with about 10,000 Briti.sh troops, including many aviators, heading 
for the Malay States. Therefore, please pay particular attention to 
the above. 

ARMY 25221 Trans. 11-25-41 (6) 



[J07] B. TRANSLATED AFTER 7 DECEMBER 1941 

From : Tokyo 
To: Singapore 
5 December 1941 
(PA-K2) 

#377 

(Abstract) 

Wants immediate report on ships in port and movements of capital 
ships. 

JD-1: 7446 26263 (A) Navy Trans. 12-13-41 (AR) 



308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[JOS] 5. West Coast 

[109] A. TRANSLATED BEFORE 7 DECEMBER 1941 

From : San Francisco (Muto) 

To: Tokyo 

September 18, 1941 

J-19 

#218 

According to a spy report, the English warship Warspite arrived 

here from Bremerton on the — and is at present moored near 

the (naval arsenal at Mare Island ?). It has been determined that 
it requires two more months for repairs at Liverpool (my message 
#187*). 

Relayed to , Los Angeles and Seattle. 

ARMY 22689 Trans. 9/25/41 (2) 



Not available. 



From: Seattle (Sato) 
To: Tokyo 
September 20, 1941 
J-19 

1. The following warships are now at Bremerton : 

The Warspite (repair work continuing. The upper part of the 
bridge and the left side of the bow spotted here and there with red 
paint.) 

Maryland class — one ship (the bridge, turrets and other main arma- 
ments have been painted red. Also, they seem to be constructing 
mountings on the foreward main deck for ten anti-aircraft guns. 

Saratoga class air-craft carrier, 1 ship (tied up alongside the pier.) 

[110] One ship which appears to be a cruiser (it has two smoke 
stacks but we were unable to distinguish anything else.) 

One other ship just arrived for repair. 

2. The New Mexico class ship mentioned in message #101 * has 
departed. 

ARMY 22776 Trans. 9-27-41 (2) 



» Not available. 



From: San Francisco (Muto) 

To: Washington 

October 2, 1941 

J-19 

Circular #222. Message to Tokyo as #280. 

1. One Oklahoma class battleship has arrived in port and is moored 
in front of the Bethlehem ship-building yard. No reconstruction 
work is going on on the outside but a great deal of repair work appears 
to be in progress within the ship. 

2. It has been announced by the local headquarters of Naval Dis- 
trict #(?) that the Hunter's Point shipyard, which was bought 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 309 

last year and which has been undergoing repairs, will be taken over 
formally in the near future in advaaice of expectations. (Refer 
to confidential letter :j!^216 * of last year.) 

Relayed to Washington, Los Angeles, Seattle and Honolulu. 

ARMY 23598 Trans. 10-17-41 (2) 

• Not available. 



[Ill] From Tokyo (Toyoda) 

To : Seattle 

October 16, 1941 

J-19 

Cir. #2187 

Henceforth, I would like to have you refer in your reports to the 
movement of warships as follows : 

1. As long as there are no great changes in the movement and bas- 
ing of warships, report on them at least once every ten days. In the 
event of priority intelligence, report such on each occasion. 

a. The arrival or departure of American flagships of the fleet or 
scouting force. 

h. Should more than ten vessels of any type arrive or depart from 
port at one time. 

c. The arrival or departure of warships of countries other than 
the United States (give as detailed a report as possible on the class 
of ). 

2. Should patrolling be inaugurated by naval planes, report it at 
once. 

ARMY 24117 Trans. 10/29/41 (S) _ 



From: Seattle (Sato) 
To: Tokyo 
October 22, 1941 
J-19 (Priority) 

#147 

The following warships entered Bremerton Naval Yard on the 21st : 
The Warspite (repairs are to be made to her bridge) , the Maryland 
and a vessel which seems to be a cruiser. 

Relayed to and Los Angeles. 

ARMY 24316 . Trans. 11/4/41 (7) 



[J 12] From: Seattle (Sato) 

To: Tokyo 

October 28, 1941 

J-19 (Priority) 

#150 

In commemoration of Navy Day, the 27th, fifteen Coast Guard ves- 
sels sailed through the harbor here in single file. Their names were 
as follows: The Kane, Cirmna,^ the Brooks, the Fox (the above listed 



310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

vessels have had their four-inch guns replaced by five-inch guns; all 
of these were brand-new ones) , the Frigate Bird^ the Crow^ the Pintail^ 
the Eagle 57, Batukei,"- the Butternut, the Amber, the YP 83, 87, 89, 
and 90. 

ARMY 24997 Trans. 11/19/41 (2) 

a Kana spelling. 



From: Seattle (Sato) 

To: Tokyo 

November 10, 1941 

J-19 (Priority) 

#165 (Message to Washington Circular #80.) 

Vessels anchored in Brementon on the 9th: Saratoga, Warspite, 
Colorado, (I have confirmed that the latter ship is the one which I 
have reported on successive occasions as the Maryland) and the 
Charleston. 

Relayed to and Los Angeles. 

ARMY 24990 ' Trans. 11/19/41 (2) 



[J IS] B. TRANSLATED AFTER 7 DECEMBER 1941 

From: Seattle 
To: Tokyo 
December 6, 1941 
PA-K2 

#184 (Urgent intelligence.) 

1. The ships at anchor in Bremerton on the 5th were the Warspite 
(came out of the dock and at present is tied up at a pier) and the 
Colorado. 

2. The Saratoga sailed the same day. 

ARMY 25876 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT) 



[J141i 6. Miscellaneous 

[77-5] From: Havana (Nan jo) 

To: Tokyo 

August 2, 1941 

J-19 

#44 (Strictly secret) 

Between the 16th and the 24th of July, the following American war- 
ships were anchored in the naval harbor of Guantanamo: 2 battle- 
ships; 4 light cruisers; 4 destroyers; 2 Coast Guard cutters; 2 (long 
range ?) heavy bombing planes. 

ARMY 23382 Trans. 10-13-41 (2) 



I 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 311 

From: Tokyo 

To : San Francisco 

29 November 1941 

(J19) 

Circular #2431 

Make full report beginning December 1st on the following: 
Ship's nationality, ship's name, port from which it departed, (or at 
which it arrived), and port of destination, (or from where it started), 
date of departure, etc., in detail, of all foreign commercial and war 
ships now in the Pacific, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea. 
JD-1 : 7037 25710 ( Y) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (2) 

[JJ6] 7. Other Messages of Particular Interest, 

Transmitted Before 1 August 1941 

[117] From: Tokyo (Matuoka) 

To: Washington (Koshi) 

15 February, 1941 

(J17-K6) 

#073 (2 parts— complete) 

Ke my #43 *. 

The information we particularly desire with regard to intelligence 
involving U. S. and Canada, are the following : 

1. Strengthening or supplementing of military preparations on the 
Pacific Coast and the Hawaii area; amount and type of stores and 
supplies; alterations to air ports (also carefully note the clipper 
traffic). 

2. Ship and plane movements (particularly of the large bombers 
and sea planes). 

3. Whether or not merchant vessels are being requisitioned by the 
government (also note any deviations from regular schedules), and 
whether any remodelling is being done to them. 

4. Calling up of army and navy personnel-, their training, (outlook 
on maneuvers) and movements. 

5. Words and acts of minor army and navy personnel. 

6. Outlook of drafting men from the view-point of race. Particu- 
larly, whether Negroes are being drafted, and if so, under what 
conditions. 

7. Personnel being graduated and enrolled in the army and navy 
and aviation service schools. 

8. Whether or not any troops are being dispatched to the South 
Pacific by transports ; if there are such instances, give description. 

9. Outlook of the developments in the expansion of arms and the 
production set-up; the capacity of airplane production; increase in 
the ranks of labor. 

10. General outlooks on Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, with par- 
ticular stress on items involving plane movements and shipment of 
military supplies to those localities. 

11. Outlook on U. S. defense set-ups. 
JD-1: 

#14738 1030 (continued) Navy Trans. 2-20-41 ( 1 ) 

•JD-1 : 77& — "We have decided to de-emphasize our propaganda worlc and strengthen our 
intelligence work in the U. S." 
(SIS #14341) 



312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[118] 12. Contacts (including plane connections) with Central 
and South America and the South Pacific area. Also outlook on ship- 
ment of military supplies to those areas. 

Please forward copies of this message as a "Minister's Instruction' 
to New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle, Portland (Chicago 
or New Orleans ? ) Vancouver, Ottawa, and Honolulu. Also to Mexico 
City and Panama as reference material. 
JD-1: 

#14738 1030 15 February, 1941 Navy Trans. 2-20-41 (1) 



[119] From : Tokyo (Matuoka). 
To: Honolulu (Riyoji). 
15 February, 1941 
(J17 K6) 

#008 

Re my #73 to Washington*. 

In gathering intelligence material, your office will pay particular 
attention to paragraphs 1 and 2. 
JD-1: 

#14729 1035 15 February, 1941 Navy Trans. 2-20-41 (S) 

•JD-1 : 1030 — Outlines details of intelligence information desired. 
(SIS #14738) 



From: Tokyo (Matuoka) 
To: San Francisco (Riyoji) 
15 February, 1941 
(J17 K6) 

#020 

Secret. 
Re mv #73 to Washington*. 

Will your office please pay particular attention to gathering intelli- 
gence material which will fall under the classifications outlined in 
paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, and 12. 
JD-1 : 1031 

#14733 15 February, 1941 Navy Trans. 2-20-21 (S) 

♦JD-1 : lOSO — Outlines details of intelligence information desired. 
(SIS #14738) 



[1^0] From: Tokyo (Matuoka) 

To: Los Angeles (Riyoji) 

15 February, 1941 

(J17 K6) 

#013 

Secret. 

Re my #73 to Washington*. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 313 

In connection with collecting intelligence material, your office will 
pay particular attention to contents of paragraphs 1, 2, 8, 9 and 11. 

JD-1: 1032 

#14730 15 February, 1941 Navy Trans. 2-20^1 (S) 

♦JD-l : 1030 — Outlines details of intelligence information desired. 
(SIS #14738) 



From Tokyo (Matuoka). 
To: New York (Riyoji). 
15 February, 1941 
(J17 K6) 
#018 

Re my #73 to Washington*. 

In gathering intelligence material, your office will pay particular 
attention to contents of paragraphs 4, 6, 7, and 9. 

JD-1: 1033 

#14732 15 February, 1941 Navy Trans. 2-20-41 (S) 

•JD-1 : J030— Outlines details of intelligence information desired. 
(SIS #14738) 



From: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister). 

To: Vancouver (Japanese Consul) 

15 February, 1941 

(J17 K6) 

#008 

Secret. 

Re my #73 to Washington*. 

In gathering intelligence material, your office will lay particular 
stress on paragraph 10. 

JD-1: 1034 

#14736 15 February, 1941 Navy Trans. 2-20-41 (S) 



•JD-1 : lOSO — Outlines details of intelligence information desired. 
(SIS #14738) 



[121] From : Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) 
To: Vancouver 
February 26, 1941 
J17K6 

#12 

Re my #8.* 

Please wire reports covering the positions and movements also of the 
ships of Canada's Pacific Fleet. Please transmit to Ottawa and from 
that office to the Naval Attache. 

ARMY 15310 Trans. 3/13/41 (S) 

• See S. I. S. #14736. Directs Vancouver, in gathering intelligence material, to lay 
particular stress on general outlooks in Alaska and Aleutian Islands, especially on items 
Involving plane movements and shipments of military supplies to those localities. 

79716 O— 46 — pt. 12 22 



314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

From: Tokyo (Matsuoka) 

To: Singapore 

May 16, 1941 

PA-K2 

#120 (Strictly Secret) 

According to a telegram from our consul in Colombo, a New York 
Reuters dispatch states that it is reported that the United States has 
already stationed a fleet in the Indian Ocean. Please pay great atten- 
tion to the movements of American warships. 

ARMY 19894 Trans. 7/23/41 (6) 



[122] From: Tokyo (Jap Foreign Minister) 

To: Mexico (Koshi) 

23 June 1941 

(Purple) 

#106 

Regarding the plans for procuring maps of the Panama Canal and 
vicinity, please have career attache Kihara make an official trip to 
Panama. (It might be well to have secretary Yoshimizu accompany 
him.) 

Have the maps taken out by plane, and then have Sato, the Naval 
Attache, bring them to Tokyo with him when he returns. 

Furthermore, since the Panama Legation, in their #62* from 
Panama to me, mentioned the question of a trip, get in touch with 
them regarding date and time of arrival. (American surveillance 
will unquestionably be vigilant. There are also some suspicions that 
they read some of our codes. Therefore, we wish to exercise the 
utmost caution in accomplishing this mission. Also, any telegrams 
exchanged between you and Panama should be very simple.**) 
18581 

JD-1 : 3198 Navy trans. 6-24-41 (S) 

•Available, not jet translated — elated 17 June. 

•*i. e. "Kantan" — may also mean "Brief, short" ; hence, cryptographically secure, or 
may infer that they should be in plain language, but innocuous in appearance. 



[J£3] From: Vladivostok 
To: Tokyo 
25 June 1941 
(Red) 

#230 

There has been no great change in conditions here up to the 25th. 
Emergency measures are in force, the regulation of commodities and 

supplies to the defense force . The fleet and the air corps began 

practice on the 24th. The attitude toward Japan ( ^) has undergone 
no change. Some civilians talk to the officials. 

Details of military conditions are as follows: 

1. Conditions on the 22nd. 

(1) About.7 :30 p. m. emergency orders were issued to the army and 
navy sentries who had gone out for the evening and they could be seen 
everywhere in the city running to their posts of duty. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 315 

(2) At about 9 p. m. one truck loaded to capacity with armoured 
infantry and following this three navy trucks loaded with 4-turret 
high angle machine guns could be seen moving out to guard (duty ) . 

(3) The fleet was inactive and nothing out of the ordinary could 
be observed. The corps that had charge of air defense seemed to be at 
their posts. 

2. Conditions on the 23rd. 

(1) Military trucks were going back and forth constantly in con- 
nection with the air defense. 

(2) The fleet was still inactive, but part of it engaged in target 
practice. 

(3) The radio broadcast throughout the day concerning coastal 
defense. 

3. Conditions on the 24th : , 

(1) No change on the land front from the previous day. The num- 
ber of soldiers in the city seemed to be about as before. 

JD-1: 3394 18959 (continued) (H) Navy Trans. 7-2-41 (6-AR) 

[124] (2) The warships that had been in the harbor for the 
past several days sailed out early in the morning apparently for prac- 
tice maneuvers. 

(3) The air corps began making flights from this morning. The 
guards who are on duty in the city in ordinary times began practicing 
in earnest. 

4. The 25th. 

(1) No change during the forenoon. 

(2) The fleet had already gone out for practice maneuvers but the 
warships left in the harbor at 8 a. m. were as follows : 

1 light cruiser 
1 mine layer 

1 submarine tender 

4 destroyers 

2 torpedo boats 
10-20 submarines 

5 special service ships 

Most of these were being repaired. 

18959 

JD-1: (H) Navy Trans. 7-2-41 (6-AR) 



[WS] From: Vladivostok 
To: Tokyo 
3 July 1941 
(Red) 

#259 

Report on recent naval activities in this area. 

Since the beginning of the German-Soviet war the naval authorities 
here have tightened up on watch and are engaged in naval prepara- 
tions by enforcing various exercises to meet any eventuality. However, 
naval exercises are limited to only one section of the force for there 
are many ships which are undergoing repairs. Evidently the prepara- 
tions are intended for defense against Japan. 

(1) Activities of the fleet. 



316 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A part of the ERI type and SICHA type submarines assigned to 
this area appear to be operating somewhere else, for there are com- 
paratively few submarines in port at present. However, the remainder 
of submarines, the torpedo boat division, mine layer division, mine 
sweeper division, high speed torpedo craft division, etc. are still here 
and are either undergoing repairs or are engaged in exercises. The 
first phase of exercises ended with the basic maneuvers in early June 
and the 2nd phase is already underway. Lately the departure of craft 
from the bay has become infrequent but since the war, those craft 
which do go out seldom return, even though it be Saturday or Sunday. 
Not only this, but planes of types SB, E15, E16 and OFUBOOHU are 
quite active and it appears that they are engaged in exercises with the 
fleet. However, the exercises appear to be greatly handicapped by so 
many ships being placed under repairs. 

19616 

JD-1: 3709 (A) Navy Trans. 7-16-41 (3) 



lim] From: Manila (Nihro) 

To: Tokyo 

25 July 1941 

(Purple) 

#433 

The United States is making a concentrated effort to strengthen 
Philippine defenses. There are at present 460 planes, and about 1300 
pilots. iVrmy force numbers 10,000 and an effort is being made to 
increase this number. The Philippine Army numbers about 130,000 
including those on active duty, reserve lists and the gendarmerie. In 
an emergency, about 100,000 men could be turned over to U. S. officers 
to command, it is estimated by the bureau concerned. 

20387 

JD-1 : 4155 (D) Navy Trans. 8-1-^1 (6-AR) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



317 



EXHIBIT NO. 3 



NAVAL MESSAGE 



NAVT DEPARTMENT 



EXTENSION NUMBER 



ADDRESSEES 



PRECEDENCE 



HONL. 



QPNAV 



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NG£RSQLL 



bATE_ 



25 NOVEMBER 1941 



TOR CODE ROOM. 



DECODED »Y_ 



LUNDBERG 



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ROUTED BY_ 



ASTERISK (♦) AlUttORAM ADDRESSEE 



COM 12 



CINCPAC 
CINCAF 
COM 14 
COM 16 



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8 

4 

6 

6 

7 

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10 

11 

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''"^"""' 14 

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IF OPERATIONAL 16 
CHECK BEIOW 

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OCT 20 



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UNIESS OTHERWISE INDICATED. THIS DISPATCH Will U TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE AND AS ADMINISTRATIVE. 



252203 CR 0600 



' ORIGINATOR FUl IN DATE AND TIMEi 



DATE 



ON OUTGOINO DISPATCHES PLEASE LEAVE AtOUT ONE INCH CLEAR SPACE SEFORE BEOINNING TEXT 



ROUTE ALL TRANSPACIFIC SHIPPING THRU TORRES 
STRAITS. CINCPAC AND CINCAF PROVIDE NECESSARY 
ESCORT. REFER YOUR DISPATCH 230258. 



TOP SECRET 



DISTRIBUTION; 



38s ACTION 

RECORD COPY 12 l6 38 38W 
FILE 

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY 



CNO FILE 
200P FILE 




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SECRET 

oritiul oady. Dalivar to Code Room Watch OScer in peraon. (Sea Art. 76 (4) NAVRBGS.) 



ACTION 21 
22 
23 
24 
2S 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
38 
88 
34 
36 
86 
87 
88 
89 
40 
41 
42 
48 
44 
46 
46 
47 
48 
49 
60 
61 
62 



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V. •. MvaaHnrr niiirnH* orvici 16 — 4Stf7-l 



318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



EXHIBIT NO. 4 

(Exhibit No. 4 is a map of the Hawaiian Islands showing the record 
of early flights 7 December 1941 obtained by Opana radar detector sta- 
tion. This map is printed as Item No. 1 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRA- 
TIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.) 

EXHIBIT NO. 5 
ARMY EXHIBIT 



INDEX TO ARMY EXHIBIT 

Section Subject Page * 

I. Unit Locations by District, Hawaiian Department, 7 December 

1941 - 1 

II. Strength Report by Unit and Station, Hawaiian Department, 30 

November 1941 2-5 

III. Principal Weapons of Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, 7 De- 

cember 1941 . 6 

IV. Copy of Record of Early Plights, 7 December 1941, Obtained by 

Opana Detector Station 7 

Copy of Mobile Detector Station Records Prior to 7 : 00 a. m., 

7 December 1941 1 8 

V. Status of Combat Planes, Before and After the Attack, 7 December 

1941 9 

VI. Time of Take-offs bv Airfield after Beginning of Attack 7 December 

1941 10 

VII. Action and Disposition of Antiaircraft Batteries, 7 December 1941__ 11-12 
VIII. Army Casualties, 7 December 1941 13 



[7] Section I 

Kauai District: 

3d Battalion, 299th Infantry (less Companies "K" & "L") and 
attached troops. 

Company "C", 299th Infantry. 

1st Platoon, Signal Company, Aircraft Warning. 

Air Corps Detachment. 
Maui District: 

1st Battalion, 299th Infantry (less Company "C") and attached 
troops. 

Company "K", 299th Infantry (MOLOKAI). 

4th Platoon Signal Company, Aircraft Warning. 

Air Corps Detachment. 



^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original Exhibit. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 

Hawaii District: 

2d Battalion, 299th Infantry and attaclied troops. 

Camp Detachment, KILAUEA MILITARY CAMP. 

5th Platoon Sigfnal Company, Aircraft Warning. 

Air Corps Detachment. 
Oahu District: 

24th Infantry Division (less 299th Infantry Regiment), 

25th Infantry Division. 

Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. 

Hawaiian Air Force. 

34 Enginers. 

804 Engineer Battalion (Aviation). 

11 Tank Company - 

Company "A," 1st Separate Chemical Battalion. 

Hawaiian Pack Train. 



319 



m 



Section II 



STRENGTH REPORT BY UNIT AND STATION, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT 



30 November 1941. 





Enlisted 


Officer 




Enlisted 


Officer 


Barking Sands— Kauai: 299th 
Inf 


67 


3 


[S] Fort Shafter- Oahu: 
9th Sig Serv Co 


327 

181 

2,085 



29 

230 

156 

155 


1 




53rd CA Brie 


14 


Bellows Field— Oahu: 


88 
262 


22 
37 


64th CA 


73 


Hq Bellows Fid 


Hq Ft Shafter 


16 


86th Obs Sq 


Hq Med Depot.. 


3 




Hn Haw Dpnt 


153 




350 


59 


MP Co, Haw Dept - 


2 




Det QM Ft Shafter 

Det MD Ft Shafter .- 

Det FD Ft Shafter 




Camp Malakolc — Oahu: 
Det QM Cp Malakole 


24 
1,313 


2 
56 





251st CA 


Fort Weaver— Oahu: 97th CA-_ 

Hawaiian Ordnance Depot— 
Oahu: 
61st Ord Co 






3,163 
329 


262 
17 




1.337 


58 


Fort Armstrong— Oahu: 

395th QM Bn 


161 
20 
279 
119 
82 
64 
61 


3 
3 

26 





62 
68 
65 
39 

9 




Sta Disp»ensary 


2 


Haw QM Depot 


62nd Ord Co.. 


2 


90th Sep QM Bn 


63rd Ord Co -- 


1 


32nd Sep QM Co 


74th Ord Co..- 


1 


1st Prov Trk Co 


Hq Haw Ord Dpt 


•11 


2nd Prov Trk Co 


Vet Genl Hosp 


2 




Hickam Field— Oahu: 

5th Bomb Group 




Fort Barrette- Oahu: 97th CA. 


786 
128 


32 
5 


243 


19 


1,264 

115 

930 

27 

67 

940 

173 

140 

37 

73 

72 

73 

118 

129 

38 

45 



31 

242 

107 

151 





122 




Fort De Russy — Oahu: 


313 

169 

29 




8 

5 

2 

16 


146 


16th CA . 


5th Cml Co Av : 


3 


55th CA 


11th Bomb Group ..... 

12th Sig Plat AB 


126 


Haw CA Comd 


1 


Ha Haw CA Comd 


13th QM Co Tr 


2 




17th A R Orniin 


24 




511 


31 


Hq 18th Bomb Wing 

iQth TrftTiQ SnH 


16 

7 


Fort Kamehameha — Oahu: 


712 
507 
463 
339 


28 
10 
12 
15 

9 


39th QM Co 


1 


15th CA 


324 Sig Av Co 


4 


41st CA 


407th Sig Avn Co 


3 


55th CA . 


428th Sig A vn Co - 


3 


97th CA.. 


481st Ord Co Av 


4 


Det QM Ft. Kam 


482nd Ord Co Av 


4 


Det MD Ft. Kam 


740 Ord Co Av 


1 




WftUT (~?nmmnn<5 


1 




2,097 


74 


Haw Air Deoot .. . 


21 






2 


Fort Ruger— Oahu: 
16th CA.. . 


347 
435 

) » 




11 
13 

7 

14 


Hq, Hq Sqn Haw AF 

Det FD & MD Hickam 
Fid 


41 


55th CA... 





Det QM Ft Ruger 


Det QM Haw Dept.. - 

Sta HosD 


11 


Det MD Ft Ruger 


23 


Hq HD Honolulu 


Hq Hickam Fid 


34 




Tow Tarept Dpt 


8 




852 


45 








4.894 


4sa 



320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Hilo— Hawaii: 299th Inf 

Homestead Field— Molokai: 
299th Inf 



U] 



Honolulu— Oahu: 
299th Inf 

Dist Engr Off 

Kam Schools 

McKinley High 

Punahou Academy. 

Roosevelt High 

Univ of Hawaii 

Finance Of! USA... 



Lihue— Kaui: 299th Inf. 



Schofleld Barracks— Oahu: 
Co "A" 1st Cml Bn-- 

3rd Engr Bn 

8th FA Bn 

11th FA Bn 

11th QM Bn 

nth Tank Bn 

11th Ord Co 

13th FA Bn 

19th Inf 

21st Inf 

24th Inf Oiv 

24th Med Bn 

24th Sig Co 

24th Div Arty 

25th Inf Div 

25th Med Bn 

25th Sig Co 

25th Div Arty 

27th Inf 

33rd Sep QM Co 

34th Engrs 

3»th Inf 

52nd FA Bn 

63rd FA Bn 

64th FA Bn 



Enlisted 


Officer 


453 


15 


94 


3 


5 


9 





16 


1 


1 


2 


2 


2 


1 





1 





3 


5 


3 


15 


36 


191 


9 


207 


3 


523 


19 


391 


15 


590 


19 


141 


1 


122 


4 


133 


2 


392 


15 


2,090 


56 


2,225 


62 


185 


20 


92 


8 


133 


4 


101 


10 


184 


23 


91 


8 


136 


5 


146 


12 


2,135 


54 


191 


2 


1.243 


40 


2,122 


63 


392 


16 


363 


15 


403 


14 



Schofleld Barracks — Oahu — 
Continued 

65th Engr Bn 

72nd Sep QM Co 

89th FA Bn 

90th FA Bn 

97th CA 

98th CA_ 

298th Inf 

299th Inf 

804th Engr Bn Av 

Haw Pack Train 

Det Sta Vet 

Haw Cml WF Dept 

Sig Co Air Warn 

StaHosp 

Hq Det Sch Brks 

Bee Center 



[S] Tripler General- Oahu: 

DetQMTOH 

Det MDTOH 

Wailuku— Maui: 299th Inf... 



Wheeler Field— Oahu: 
Hq 14th Pur Wing. 

15th Pur Group 

18th Pur Group 

18th AB Group 

45th Sig Plat 

307th Sig Co Av 

674th Ord Co 

696th Ord Co 

741st Ord Co 

Det QM Haw Dep. 
Det MD WH Fld). 
Det FD WH Fid.. 
Det 39th QM Co... 



Enlisted 



521 

23 

378 

480 

475 

1,154 

856 

28 

610 

221 

17 

18 

348 

275 

338 

800 



21, 273 

278 
430 



120 

790 

848 

752 

23 

71 

49 

54 

36 

124 

37 

74 



2,978 



' 40, 469 



Officer 



19 

2 

15 

20 

24 

52 

63 

1 

21 

2 



2 

13 

137 

45 





906 

126 
25 



8 

82 
106 
54 
1 
3 
2 
3 
2 
7 

11 





279 



'2,490 



Grand total: 

Enlisted 40.469 

Officers 2,490 



42, 959 



[^] 



Section III 



PRINCIPAL WEAPONS OF HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND 

4 3" 



4 16" guns. 

2 14" guns (obsolescent). 

4 12" guns (2 obsolescent) 

20 12" mortars (obsolete), 

16 8" guns. 

4 6" guns (obsolescent). 



seacoast guns. 



36 155 mm guns. 

86 3" antiaircraft guns (70% mo- 
bile). 
20 37 mm antiaircraft guns. 
107 caliber .50 antiaircraft guns. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



321 




322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




-a- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 

[0] Section V 

Status of combat planes, before and after the attack, 7 December 1941 

HICKAM FIELD 



323 



Type 


Heavy 
bomb- 
er 


Medium 
bomber 


Light 
bomber 


Pursuit 


Observation 




B-17 


B-18* 


B-12* 


A-20 


A-12* 


P-40 


P-36» 


P-26* 


0-47 


0-49 


OA-8 


OA-9 


Prior to attack: 

In commission 


6 
6 


20 
12 




5 

7 


















Out of commission 




































Total on hand 


12 


32 




12 




































After attack: 

In commission 


4 
4 


10 
10 




5 
5 


















Out of commission.. . 




































Total on hand 


8 
4 


20 

12 




10 
2 


















Destroyed-- - 





































WHEELER FIELD (including planes temporarily assigned to Haleiwa) 



Prior to attack: 
In comijiission 




1 



1 
2 




2 



52 
35 


20 
19 


10 

4 


1 






1 



3 


Out of commission. 













Total on hand 




1 


3 




2 


87 


39 


14 


1 




1 


3 








After attack: 

In commission 




1 



1 
2 




1 
1 


27 
30 


16 
19 


4 
4 


1 





1 




1 


Out of commission... 













Total on hand . 




1 


3 




2 


57 
30 


35 
4 


8 
6 


1 




1 


1 


Destroyed 




2 























BELLOWS FIELD 



Prior to attack: 

In commission 












12 







4 
2 


2 







Out of commission. 








































Total on hand 












12 






6 


2 


























After attack: 

In commission. 












6 
4 






4 
2 


1 







Out of commission. 








































Total on hand.. .. 












10 
2 






6 


1 

1 






Destroyed 











































•Obsolescent types. 



[10] 



Section VI 



TIME OF TAKE-OFFS BY AIRFIELD AFTER BEGINNING OF ATTACK, 7 DEC. 1941 

Hickmn Field 



11:27 a. 


m. 


4 A-20's 


1:30 p. m. 


2 B-18's 


- 11 : 40 a. 


m. 


2 B-17's 


3:20 p. m. 


3 B-17's 


1 : 00 p. 


m. 


3 A-20's 


Wheeler Field 




8:30 a. 


m. 


4 P-40's 
2 P-36's 


9:30 a. m. 


5 P-40's 

6 P-36's 


8:55 a. 


m. 


2 P^O's 


12:00 noon 


5 P-40's 


9:15 a. 


m. 


6 P-36's 


3:00 p. m. 


11 P--t0's 



324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Bellows Field 

9 : 50 a. m. 1 0-47 3 : 00 p. m. 3 0-47's 

10:40 a.m. 3 O-47's 3:49 p.m. 6 P-40's 

12:45 p. m. 5 P-40's 

Haleiwa Field 

8 : 15 to 10 : 00 a. m., Two flights, each consisting of 4 

P-40's and 1 P-36. 

[11] Section VII 

ACTION AND DISPOSITION OF 5 3RD CA BRIGADE (ANTIAIRCRAFT) ON 

7 DECEMBER 1941 

64th CA {A A) Regiment 

All 3-inch gun batteries and automatic weapons batteries of the 64th 
CA (AA) were alerted at Fort Shafter at 8: 15 a. m. and were in 
position as follows: 

Battery "A" (Searchlight) at Honolulu, 10: 00 a. m. 
"B" (3-inch) at Aiea, 10: 00 a. m. 
"C" (3-inch) at Aliamanu, 10:30 a. m. 
"D" (.3-inch) south of Aliamanu, 11 : 00 a. m. 
"E" (Searchlight) at Ewa-Pearl Harbor, time not known. 
"F" (3-inch) at Pearl City, 11:05 a. m. 
"G" (3-inch) at Ahua Point, 10:. 30 a. m. 
"H" (3-inch) at Ft. Weaver, 11:45 a. m. 
"I" (37 mm.) at Aliamanu.' 
"K" (37 mm.) at Hickam Field.* 
"L" (37 mm.) at Hickam Field.' 
"M" (37 mm.) at Wheeler Field, 11 : 55 a. m. 

97th CA {AA) Regiment 

Batteries of the 97th CA (AA), except Battery "A" at Fort Kame- 
hameha, were stationed at Ft. Weaver. They were alerted between 
7 : 55 and 8 : 10 a. m. and were in position ready to fire as follows : 

Battery "A" (Searchlight) at Ft. Kamehanieha, 8:34 a. m. (Engaged 

enemy with small arms at 8:34 a. m.) 
"F" (3-inch) at Ft. Kamehanieha, 8:55 a. m. (Engaged enemy at 

9:00 a. m.) 
"G" (3-inch) at Ft. Weaver, 8:30 a. m. (Engaged enemy at 8:30 

a. m.) 
"H" (.3-inch) at Ft. Barrett, 10:20 a. m. 
"B", "C", "D", "E", and 3d Bn not yet organized. 

98th CA {A A) Regiment 

Batteries of the 98th CA (AA) Regiment were stationed at Schofield 
Barracks with the exception of Battery "D" which was stationed at 
Camp Malakole. They were in position ready to fire as follows : 

Battery "A" (Searchlight) at Schotield Barracks, time not known. 
"B" (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks, 9:55 a. m. 
"C" (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks, 10:30 a. m. 
"D" (3-inch) at Puuloa Dump, South of Ewa, 11:45 a. m. 
"E" not yet organized. 

"F" and "G" (3-inch) at Kaneohe Naval Air Station, 1:15 p. m. 
"H" (3-inch) at Waipahu High Schc¥»l, 1 : 30 p. m. 
3rd Bn 98th CA (AA) not yet organized. 



^ Known only that batteries were in position before 11 : 45 a. m. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 325 

[m] ^51st CA {A A) Regiment {less 3rd Bn.) 

All units of the 251st at Camp Malakole were alerted at 8:05 a. m. 
Batteries of the 1st Battalion were in position and ready for action as 
follows : 

Battery "A" (Searchlight) at Ewa, time not known. 
"B" (3-inch) at West Loch, 11 : 45 a. m. 
"C" (3-inch) at Ewa Beach, 11 : 45 a. m. 
"D" (3-inch) at South of Ewa, 11 : 45 a. m. 
"E" (50 cal. ) at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, 12 : 41 p. m. 
"F" (37 mm.) at Navy Recreation Area, 12 : 30 p. m. 
"G" (37 mm.) at Tank Farm, Schofield Barracks, 11 : 00 a. m. 
"H" (37 mm.) at Navy Yard, 12 : 05 p. m. 

AADet Battery ''F'' 55th C A 

This detachment was at Sand Island when the attack started and 
engaged the enemy with 3-inch guns at 8 : 15 a. m., shooting down two 
enemy planes at that time. 

[IS] Section VIII 

ARMY CASUALTIES, 7 DECEMBER 1941, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT 

Killed in action 194 

Wounded in action 360 

Missing in action 22 

Died — nonbattle 2 

Declared dead (Public Law 490) 1 

Died of wounds 21 

Total 600 

(In addition to the foregoing Sections I-VIII, Exhibit No. 5, in- 
cludes the following maps and diagrams:) 

(Map of North Pacific Ocean showing distances in miles between 
Honolulu, T. H., and San Francisco, California; Honolulu, T. H., and 
Hawaii, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Christmas Islands; and 
Honolulu, T. H., and Tokyo, Japan. This map is printed as Item 
No. 2 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint 
Committee.) 

(Map of Hawaiian Islands showing disposition of Army forces. 
This map is printed as Item No. 3 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRA- 
TIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.) 

(Map of Oahu showing Army installations, including airfields. 
This map is printed as Item No. 4 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRA- 
TIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.) 

(Diagram of Wheeler Field, Oahu, T. H., showing number and 
formations of attacking Japanese planes, times of attacks, disposition 
of United States planes, and locations of bomb explosions. This 
diagram is printed as Item No. 5 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS 
to Proceedings of Joint Committee.) 

(Diagram of Hickam Field, Oahu, T. H., showing number and 
formations of attacking Japanese planes, times of attacks, disposition 
of U. S. planes, and locations of bomb explosions. This diagram 
is printed as Item No. 6 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to 
Proceedings of Joint Committee.) 

(Diagram of Bellows Field, Oahu, T. H., showing number and 
formations of attacking Japanese planes, times of attacks and dis- 
position of U. S. planes. This diagram is printed as Item No. 7 
in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Com- 
mittee.) 



326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



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334 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 









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336 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 337 

EXHIBIT NO. 6 
NAVY EXHIBIT 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Item 1. Disposition of United States Pacific Fleet 7 December 1941 

Item 2. Table of Distances in Pacific Area. 

Item 3. Fleet Operating Areas, Hawaiian Area. 

Item 3a. Naval Installations, Hawaiian Area. 

Item 4. Time Comparison Tables. 

Item 5. List Showinjj Disposition of the United States Pacific Fleet 
at 8 : 00 A. M. on 7 December 1941. 

Item 6. Troop and Cargo Carriers. 

Item 7. Approaches to Pearl Harbor Entrance Channel and Inshore 
Patrol Area. 

Item 8. Pearl Harbor Anchorage Plan, 7 December 1941. 

Item 9. List of Ships at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941. 

Item 10. Air Searches Flown in Hawaiian Area. 

Item 11. Table Summarizing Number of Japanese Planes Taking 
Part in Attack. 

Item 12. Table of Navy and Marine Corps Aircraft in Hawaiian Area 
7 December 1941. 

Item 13. Chart Showing Disposition of Aircraft, Hawaiian Area, 
7 December 1941. 

Item 14. List of Anti- Aircraft Guns by Ship Classes. 

Item 15. Damage to United States Naval Forces and Installations, 
7 December 1941. 

Item 16. United States Naval and Marine Corps Aircraft Losses. 

Item 17. Composition of Japanese Task Force Allocated to Pearl 
Harbor Attack. 

Item 18. Chart of Pacific Showing Track of Japanese Striking Force. 

Item 19. Air Searches Flown in Hawaiian Area and Track of Japan- 
ese Striking Force. 

Item 20. Track of Japanese Plane Attack Routes over OAHU. 



338 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Item 1 



atem 1 is a map of the North Pacific Ocean showing the disposition 
^'orthVunilVstates Pacific Fle^ on 7 De..^^^ 

is printed as Item No. 8 m EXHIBITS-ILLUSlKAiiUJNb to 

Proceedings of Joint Committee) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



339 



Item 2 



TABLE OF DISTANCES 



The following; table presents distances between important U. S. 
Pacific outposts and other points in the Pacific Ocean (one nautical 
mile equals IVs I'^nd miles; all distances are shortest navigable 
distances) : 



Pearl Harbor to — Nautical miles 

San Francisco 2, 091 

San Diego 2, 278 

Los Angeles (Long Beach) 2,228 

Panama 4, 685 

Seattle 2,409 

Midway 1,134 

Wake 1,994 

Johnston 711 

Canton Islands 1,660 

Hilo 190 

Palmyra 959 

Kwajalein 2, 124 

Dutch Harbor 1,990 

Truk 3,028 

Samoa 2,260 

Manila 4,767 

Yokohama (Yokosuka) 3,397 

Sasebo 4,072 

Kure 3,683 

Ominato 3,370 

Hitokappu Nan (Tennei)__- 3,150 

Midway to — 

Yokohama 2,250 

Hitokappu (Tennei) 2,035 

Sasebo 2, 898 

Ominato 2, 260 

Wake 1,034 

Kwajalein 1, 425 

Truk 2, 146 



Midway to — Con. Nautical milea 

Guam 2,301 

Saipan 2, 195 

Manila 3, 685 

Wake to — 

Yokohama 1, 740 

Hitokappu (tennei) 1,865 

Sasebo 2, 255 

Ominato 1, 925 

Kwajalein 636 

Eniwetok 533 

Truk 1, 117 

Guam 1, 334 

Manila- 2, 772 

Manila to — 

Pearl Harbor 4,767 

Midway 3, 685 

Wake 2,772 

Guam 1, 499 

San Francisco 6, 221 

Palao 930 

Takao 495 

Sama (Hainan) 720 

Sasebo__ J 1, 349 

Yokohama 1, 758 

Shanghai 1,156 

Hong Kong 631 

Singapore 1, 330 

Saigon 907 

Davao to Palao 600 



Item 3 

(Item 3 is a map of the Hawuiiian Islands showing fleet operating 
areas in the Hawaiian area. This Map is printed as Item No. 9 in 
EXHlBITS-ILLUSTKATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Com- 
mittee.) 

Item 3a 

(Item 3a is a map of the Hawaiian Islands showing U. S. Naval In- 
stallations in the Hawaiian area. This map is printed as Item No. 



10 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS 
Committee.) 



to Proceedings of Joint 



340 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Item 4 



Time comparison tables for each hour of the day at Greenwich, 
Washington, D. C, San Francisco, Hawaii, Japan, and Manila on 
December 6, 7 and 8, 1941 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



341 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



343 



GrffiE?r;/icH 



TJASH. p. C» SAN Fil''.MCISCO HA'TAII JAPAIJ Mi\NIL.1 



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344 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



1. TABT.n 


FO5 COrrVERTiriG NAVY TJl'Z TO GIVILL\N TrtE FOR 
E/iCH H/.LF HOUR OF THG UlY. 




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1230 


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0100 


IjOO A.M. 


1300 


1:00 P.M. 


0130 


1:30 A.M. 


1330 


1:30 P.M. 


0200 


2:00 A.M. 


14.00 


2:00 P.M. 


0230 


2:30 A.M. 


1430 


2:30 P.M. 


0300 


3:00 A.M. 


1500 


3:00 P.M.. 


0330 


3:30 A.M. 


1530 


3:30 P.M. 


04.00 


4.:00 A.M. 


1600 


4:00 P.M. 


0430 


A:30 A.M. 


1630 


4:30 P.M. 


0500 


5:00 A.M. 


1700 


5:00 P.M. 


0530 


5:30 A.M. 


1730 


5:30 P.M. 


0600 


6:00 A.M. 


1800 


6:00 P.M. 


0630 


6:30 A.M. 


1830 


6:30 P.M. 


0700 


7:00 A.M. 


1900 


7:00 P.M. 


0730 


7:30 A.M. 


1930 


7:30 P.M. 


0800 


8:00 A.M. 


2000 


8:00 P.M. 


0830 


8:30 A.M, 


2030 


8:30 P.M. 


0900 


9:00 A.M. 


2100 


9:00 P.M. 


0930 


9:30 A.M. 


2130 


9:30 P.M. 


1000 


10:00 A.M. 


2200 


10:00 P.M. 


1030 


10:30 A.M. 


2230 


10:30 P.M. 


1100 


11:00 A.M. 


2300 


11:00 P.M. 


1130 


11:30 A.M. 


2330 


11:30 P.M. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



345 



Item V 

Disposition of the U. S. Pacific Fleet at 8 a. m. on 7 Dec. 1941 (except ships in Pearl 

Harbor which are listed separately ) 



Location 



21-nN, 161-OOW. 



23-30N, 170-30W. 



OS Johnston Island. 



21-N, 158-W. 



22N, 165W.. 

20N. 159W.. 

17N, 166W.. 

22N, 163W.. 

21N, 172W.. 

Off Midway 
28N. 177W_. 
27N, 175W.. 
19N, 167E..- 
20N, 170E... 
Off Wake... 
7N, 161W... 

Samoa 

88, 171E 

48, now... 

28N, 135W.. 
27N, 142W.. 



Ship name 



Enterprise 

Northampton.. 

Chester 

Salt Lake City. 

Balch 

Maury. 

Craven 

Oridley. 

McCall 

Dunlap 

Benham 

Fanning 

EUet 



'Lexington. 
Chicago... 
Portland. - 

Astoria 

Porter 

Drayton.. 

Flusser 

Lamson... 
.Mahan 



Indianapolis. 

Hopkins 

Southard 

Dorsey 

Elliot 

Long 



Minneapolis. 

Chandler 

Hovey 

Hoggs 

Lamberton... 



(Plunger... 
^Pollack... 
IPompano. 

[Litchfield. 

JThresher.. 
Robin 



Wright.. 
Sonoma. 



Trout 

Argonaut ., 

Regulus 

Tambor 

Wm. Ward Burrows. 

Triton 

Kuala 



Kingfisher 

Louisville ' 



Pensacola. 
Seminole.. 
Neches 



Ship No. 



CV6.... 
CA 26... 
CA27... 
CA25... 
DD 363.. 
DD401. 
DD 382- 
DD38b. 
DD400. 
DD384. 
DD 397. 
DD385. 
DD298. 

CV2.... 
CA29... 
CA33... 
CA34... 
DD356. 
DD366. 
DD368. 
DD 367. 
DD364. 

CA35... 
DMS 13 
DMS 10 
DMS 1.. 
DMS 4.. 
DMS 12 



CA 36... 
DMS 9. 
DMS 11 
DMS 3. 
DMS 2. 

SS 179... 
SS180... 
SS 181... 

DD 336. 

SS200... 
AM 3... 

AV 1... 

AT 12... 

SS202... 
SM 1 ... 
AK 14.. 
SS 198... 
AP6 ... 
SS201... 
AG 33.. 

AM 25.. 
CA 28... 

CA24... 

AT 65... 

AO 5. .. 



Remarks 



This group of ships was desig- 
nated Task Force Eight. 
Location was about 200 
miles west of Pearl Harbor 
returning from Wake Is- 
land. Ships consisted of 
the following tyjies: 

A ircraf t C arrier 1 

Heavy Cruisers 3 

Destroyers 9 

Total 13 

This group of ships was desig- 
nated Task Force Twelve. 
Location was about 460 
miles from Midway Island 
enroute Midway. Ships 
consisted of the following 
types: 

Aircraft Carrier 1 

Heavy Cruisers 3 

Destroyers 5 

Total 9 

This group of ships was des- 
ignated Task Force Three. 
Ships consisted of the 
following types: 

{ Heavy Cruiser 1 

Destroyer Mine- 
sweepers 5 

Total 6 

/■Location was in the Fleet 
Operating Area, about 25 
miles south of Oahu. 
Ships consisted of the fol- 
lowmg types: 

Heavy Cruiser 1 

Destroyer Mine- 
sweepers 4 



Total 5 

} Three submarines. About 
200 miles east of Oahu. 

I Destroyer. About 60 miles 
southwest of Oahu. 
Submarine. About 60 miles 
southwest of Oahu. 
Minesweeper. About 550 

miles southwest of Oahu. 
Seaplane tender. About 300 

miles west of Oahu. 
Ocean-going tug. Between 

Oahu and Wake. 
Submarine. 

Submarine. Near Midway. 
Cargo ship. Near Midway. 
Submarine. Near Wake. 
Transport. Enroute Wake. 

Submarine 

Enroute Palmyra, 60 miles 

northeast. 
Minesweeper. 
Heavy cruiser. 

Solomons Is. 
Heavy cruiser. 

Samoa area. 
Ocean-going tug. 

to San Diego. 
Oiler. Between San Fran- 
cisco and Pearl Harbor. 



Escort duty 
area. 
Escort duty 



Honolulu 



79716 O — 46 — pt. 12- 



-24 



346 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
Disposition of the V. 8. Pacific Fleet at 8 a. in. on 7 Dec. 19-il — Continued 



Location 



Honolulu 

Lahaina Roads, T. H. 



Mare Island Navy Yard- 



Passage from San Diego to 
Mare Island Navy Yard. 



San Diego. 



33-N, 121-W 

San Pedro 

Los Angeles 

Alameda, Gal 

San Francisco 

Wilmington, Calif 

Puget Sound Navy Yard 

Seattle 

Yakutat Bay, Alaska 

53-N 15&-W 

10-S, 8»-W 

Balboa, C. Z 

11-N, 91-W... 

17-N, 102-W 



Ship name 



fAntares. 

I Vega 

Seagull.. 

Arctic. -. 



Clark. 

Gushing 

Perkins 

Preston 

Smith- 

Rathburne. 

S-27 

S-28 .- 

Nautilus... 
Cuttlefish-. 

Tuna 

Kanawha. - 

Sabine 

Kaskaskia.. 

Pelican 

Bridge 

Dixie 

Ballard 



Saratoga 

Concord 

Dent-. 

Talbot. 

Waters 

S-18 

S-23 

S-34 

S-35 

Harris 

Ortolan 

Guyama 

Sepulga 

Pinola 

Platte 

Procyon 

fBoreas 

lAldebaran... 
Tippecanoe. 



{Colorado 
Casco 
Williamson. 

Teal- 

Oillis 

Brazos 



Richmond - 

Trenton 

Fulton 



OAR. 



Ship No. 



AKS3.. 
AK17--. 
AM30.. 

AF7-... 

DD 361. 
DD 376. 
DD 377. 
DD 379- 
DD 378. 
DD 113. 
SS 132-.. 
SS 133... 
SS 168... 
SS 171... 
SS 203-.. 
AOl---- 
A0 25.-. 
AO 27... 
AV6.... 
AFl.... 
AD 14.. 
AVD 10 

CV3 ... 
CLIO-.. 
DD 116. 
DD 114. 
DD 115. 
SS 123... 
SS 128-.. 
SS 139... 
SS 140— 
AP8-... 
ASR5-. 
A0 3.... 

AO20... 
AT 33... 
OA 24.. 
AK 19.. 
AF9.... 
AF 10... 
A0 21... 

BB 45... 
AVP 12. 
AVD 2-. 

AVP 5.. 
AVD 12 
A0 4.... 

CL9.... 
CLll... 
ASH... 

SS206... 



Remarks 



Stores issue ship. 

Cargo ship. 

Minesweeper. 

/Stores ship. At degaussing 
I range. 



Ships at the Mare Island 
Navy Yard consisted of 
the following types: 

Destroyers 6 

Submarines 5 

Oilers 3 

Seaplane tender 1 

Stores ship 1 

Destroyer tender 1 

Total.. 17 



Seaplane tender. 

\ Ships at or oft San Diego 
consisted of the following 
types: 

Aircraft carriers. 

Light cruisers 

Destroyers 

I Submarines 

Transport 

Submarine rescue ves- 
sel. . 

Oiler 



Total 13 

Oiler. Near San Diego. 
Ocean going tug. 
Oiler. 
Stores ship. 

Stores ships. 

Oiler. 

Ships in Puget Sound Navy 
Yard: 
Battleship 1 

Seaplane tenders 2 

Total 3 

Seaplane tender. 
Seaplane tender. 
Oiler. About 600 miles east 

of Dutch Harbor. 
Light cruiser. Off Peru. 
Light cruiser. 
Submarine tender. Off 

Ouatemala. 
Submarine. Off Mexico. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



347 



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348 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In addition, the following ships were in the ports indicated. 

Location on 
Name of ship: 7 Dec. I9ii- 0800 

S. S. Mariposa Sidney. 

S. S. Portmar Do. 

S. S. Collingsworth Port Darwin. 

S. S. Perida Do. 

U. S. A. T. Liberty Port Moresby. 

M. V. Day Star Soerabaja, Java. 

S. S. Admiral Cole Philippine Islands. 

S. S. American Leader Do. 

S. S. President Grant Manila. 

U. S. A. T. Ludington Canton Island. 

Item 7 

(Item 7 is a map of the South coast of Oahu, T. H., showing the 
approaches to the Pearl Harbor Entrance Channel and the Inshore 
Patrol Area. This map is printed as Item No. 11 in EXHIBITS- 
ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.) 

Item 8 

(Item 8 is a map showing the Pearl Harbor Anchorage Plan, 7 
December, 1941. This map is printed as Item No. 12 in EXHIBITS- 
ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.) 

Item 9 

List of ships present at Pearl Harbor at the time of the Japanese attack 

Dec. 7, 19. ',1 



Name 



Battleships: 

West Virginia. 

Maryland 

Tennessee 

California 

Pennsylvania.. 

Arizona 

Nevada 

Oklahoma 

Heavy cruisers: 

New Orleans . . 

San Francisco. 
Light cruisers: 

St. Louis. 

-Helena 

Phoenix. 

Honolulu 

Raleigh. 

Detroit 

Destroyers: 

Bagley... 

Patterson 

Ralph Talbot.. 

Helm 

Mugford. 

Henley. 

Jarvis... 

Blue 

Conyngham... 

Reid-. 

Tucker 

Case 

Shaw 

Cassin 

Downes 

Cummings 



Class 



West Virginia. 

do.- 

Tennessee 

do 

Pennsylvania. 

do... 

Nevada 

do 



New Orleans. 
do 



St. Louis. 
Helena .- 

do... 

...do... 
Raleigh.. 
do... 



Oridley. 

do.. 

do.. 

do.. 

do.. 

do.. 

dc- 

do.. 

Mahan.. 

do.. 

do.. 

....do.. 

do.. 

do.. 

do.. 

do.- 



Tonnage 


Year com- 
pleted 


31,800 


1923 


31.500 


1921 


32,300 


1920 


32,600 


1921 


33.100 


1916 


33,100 


1916 


29.000 


1916 


29,000 


1916 


9.950 


1934 


9,950 


1934 


10,000 


1939 


10,000 


1938 


10,000 


1938 


9,650 


1937 


7,050 


1922 


7,050 


1922 


1,500 


1938 


1,500 


1938 


1,500 


1938 


1,500 


1937 


1,500 


1936 


1,500 


1937 


1,500 


1937 


1,500 


1938 


1.500 


1937 


1,480 


1937 


1,500 


1937 


1,500 


1937 


1.500 


1035 


1,500 


1035 


1,500 


1036 


1,465 


1837 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



349 



List of ships present at Pearl Harbor at the time of the Japanese attack 

Dec. 7, J 941— Contlnned 



Name 



Destroyers— Continued 

Selfridge -.. 

Phelps 

Farragut... 

Monoghan. 

Dale 

Aylwin .--. 

Hull. 

Dewey 

Worden _ 

MacDonough. 

Schley. 

Chew. 

Allen. 

Submarines: 

Gudgeon 

Tautog 

Cachalot 

Narwhal 

Dolphin _. 

Gunboat: Sacramento 

Destroyer minelayers: 

Preble... 

Breese 

Tracy 

Pruitt. 

Sicard... 

Ramsay 

Gamble 

Montgomery 

Minelayer: Oglala 

Destroyer minesweepers: 

Perry 

Wasmuth 

Trever 

Zane 

Minesweepers: 

Grebe , 

Bobolink 

Vireo. 

Turkey.. 

Rail.... ._- 

Tern 

Auxiliaries: 

Medusa 

Vestal.. 

Rigel _ 

Neosho 

Ramapo 

Dobbin 

Whitney 

Curtiss 

Tangier 

Avocet 

Swan. 

Thornton 

Hulbert 

Argonne 

Sumner. 

Solace 

Castor _ 

Pelias 

Ut'b 

Navajo 

Ontario 

Pyro.. 

McFarland 

Widgeon 



Class 



Porter.- 

do.. 

Farragut 

do.. 

do.- 

do 

do.. 

do.. 

do.. 

do 

Flush Deck DD. 
do-. 



Tambor. 
do... 



Repair ship.. 

do 

Battle damage, repair ship. 

Oiler 

do 

Destroyer tender 

do 

Seaplane tender 

do 

Small seaplane tender 

do 

Destroyer seaplane tender.. 

do 

Miscellaneous auxiliary 

do 

Hospital ship 

Store issue ship 

Submarine tender 

Target ship. 

Oceangoing tug 

do.... 

Ammunition ship 

Destroyer seaplane tender.. 
Submarine rescue vessel 



Tonnage 


Year com- 
pleted 


1,8.50 


1937 


1,850 


1936 


1,365 


1934 


1,395 


1935 


1,395 


1935 


1,365 


1935 


1.395 


1935 


1,345 


1934 


1,410 


1935 


1,395 


1935 


1,060 


1918 


1,060 


1918 


920 


1917 


1,475 


1941 


1,475 


1940 


1,110 


1933 


2,730 


1929 


1,540 


1932 


1,430 


1914 


1,190 


1920 


1,160 


1918 


1,190 


1920 


1,190 


1920 


1,190 


1920 


1,160 


1918 


1,160 


1918 


1,160 


1918 


6,000 


1907 


1,190 


1922 


1,190 


1921 


1,190 


1922 


1,190 


1921 


840 


1918 


840 


1918 


840 


1918 


840 


1918 


840 


1918 


840 


1918 


13,480 


1923 


9,435 


1909 


9.245 


1918 


21,077 


1941 


16, 800 


1919 


1,245 


1921 


1.245 


1921 


13.880 


1940 


17, 606 


1940 


840 


1918 


840 


1918 


1.190 


1919 


1,190 


1918 


11,400 


1920 


4,400 


1915 


8.660 


1927 


13,900 


1939 


14,200 


1939 


19,800 


1909 


1,270 


1940 


1,080 


1912 


7,025 


1920 


1,190 


1920 


1,060 


1918 



Item 10 

(Item 10 is a diagram showing air searches fk)wn in the Hawaiian 
area (a) 6 December 1941, (b) prior to the Japanese attack 7 Decem- 
ber 1941, and (c) after the Japanese attack 7 December 1941. This 
diagram is printed as Item No. 13 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRA- 
TIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.) 



350 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Item 11 
Table summarising number of Japanese planes taking part in attack 



Total number of planes making attacks (including 

those which repeated) 

Total number of planes (exclusive of those which re- 
peated) 

Phase I (torpedo and dive-bomber attacks) 

Phase II ("Lull")^ 

Phase III (horizontal bomber attacks) 

Phase IV (dive-bomber attacks) 



Torpedo 
planes 



21 

21 
21 



Dive 
bombers 



90 

48 
30 

US 
18 

'27 



Horizontal 
bombers 



45 

36 
15 



21(9) 



Totals 



156 

105 
66 
15 
48 
27 



' Engaged in earlier attacks. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



351 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



353 



Item 13 

(Item 13 is a map of Oahii, T. H., showing: the disposition, number, 
types, and operational and readiness condition of the U. S. Navy 
aircraft on 7 December 1941. This map is printed as Item No. 14 
in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Com- 
mittee.) 

Item 14 



Antiaircraft guns, by ship classes and types of guns 



Units 


Class 


Type 


S-inch, 

38-cal- 

iber 


■5-inch, 

25-cal- 

iber 


3-inch, 

,50-cal- 

iber 


3-inch, 

23-cal- 

iber 


IM 
quad- 
ruple 

mount 
heavy 

A A ma- 
chine 
guns 


.50 cal- 
iber 

A A ma- 
chine 
guns 


.30 cal- 
iber 

XA ma- 
chine 
guns 


37 
miUi- 
meter 


2 


Nevada 

Pennsylvania.^ 


Battleships - 




16 
16 
16 
8 
8 
16 
16 


4 
4 
8 
4 
4 

/4 
6 
2 

18 






16 

16 

16 

8 

11 

16 

24 

8 

16 

32 

40 

32 

4 

4 

4 

24 

16 

10 
4 
4 
4 






2 


do 












2 


do 












1 




do 












1 


West Virginia. 
New Orleans.. 

Brooklyn 

St. Louis 


do 












2 


Heavy cruisers 
Light cruisers- 
do 


...... ^. 

8 




4 
6 
2 






3 






1 






2 




do 






8 


Farragut 

\fnhnn 


Destroyers 

do 


40 
40 
32 












g 














g 


Gridleu 


do 














1 


Allen 


do 




3 










2 


Selfridge 


... do 








4 






2 


Flush-Deck- , 
Destroyer 

Destroyer 

Submarines 


do 

High speed 
minesweep- 
ers. 
Light mine- 
layers. 








2 






4 






g 








8 








5 






3 
2 
1 
4 






1 


Medusa 

Vestal 


Reoair shin 














1 


do 














1 


Rigel 


do 














1 


Neosho... 


Oiler 


4 












1 


do 




4 
8 






4 

8 

10 

8 
4 

12 

4 

2 
4 

2 

4 
2 
12 
4 
4 

4 






2 


Dobbin 

Curlis 


Destroyer 

tenders. 
Seaplane 

tender, 
do 














1 


4 












1 






4 
4 










2 


"Old Bird".... 

[Thornton 

{Hulbert 

[McFarland 

Castor 


Small seaplane 

tenders. 
1 Ex-destroyer 
seaplane 
tenders. 
Stores issue 
ships, 
do 














3 


^ 












1 






4 

4 
4 

2 










1 
















1 


Argonne 

Widgeon 

Pelias 


■Miscellaneous 
auxiliaries. 

Submarine 
rescue ves- 
sel. 

Siih tpndor 














1 










2 




1 






4 






1 


Sacramento 

Bird 


Gunboat 








12' 


1 


6 


Minelayers 






12 
1 
2 

4 
1 








2 


Tues 


Tug 












1 


Pyro 


Ammunition 

ship. 
Store shin 














1 


A rctic 














1 


Oglala 


Minelayer 
















Totals .. 




















136 


96 


121 


14 


16 


397 


14 


1 











Crews also broke out of ships' arsenals numerous light landing force guns, .30 caliber Lewis machine guns 
and Browning automatic rifles, to augment standard antiaircraft batteries. 



354 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Item 15 

Damage to United States naval forces and installations resulting from the 
Japanese attack on the island of Oahu on 7 Dec. 1941 

(a) The following United States ships were sunk or damaged at Pearl Harbor: 



Type 


Name 


Tonnage 


Sunk 


Battleships 


Arizona 


33,100 

32,600 

31,800 

29,000 

29,000 

31,500 

33,100 

32,300 

10,000 

10,000 

7,050 

1,500 

1,500 

1,500 

9,435 

6.000 

13.880 

19,800 


Sunk. 




California 

West Virginia. 


Do. 
Do. 




Oklahoma 


Capsized. 




Nevada.. . 


Heavily damaged. 




Maryland.. . 


Damaged. 




Pennsylvania 


Do. 




Tennessee.. 


Do. 


Light cruisers 


Helena. 


Heavily damaged. 




Honolulu 


Damaged. 




Raleigh . . . 


Heavily damaged. 


Destroyers. 


Shaw - . 


Do. 




Cassin . . 


Heavily damaged, burned. 




Downes- 


Do. 


Repair ships.. 


Vestal .. 


Badly damaged. 


Minelayers 


Oglala ... 


Sunk. 


Seaplane tenders.. 

Miscellaneous auxiliary 


Curtiss 

Utah 


Damaged. 
Capsized. 









BATTLESHIPS 

Arizona. — 33,100 tons. Sank at her berth as a result of being hit by 
one or more aircraft torpedoes and about eight heavy bombs. One 
of the bomb hits (estimated as 2,000 pounds) exploded the forward 
magazines. The ship was considered to be a total wreck except for 
material which could be salvaged and reassigned. 

California. — 32,600 tons. Sank at her bei-th as a result of hits by 
two aircraft torpedoes and one or more near bomb misses. Also re- 
ceived one large bomb hit on starboard upper deck abreast of foremast, 
which caused a serious 5-inch powder fire. She sank gradually for 
about 3 or 4 days and rested rather solidly on a mud bottom so that the 
quarterdeck was under about 12 feet of water and the port side of 
forecastle under about 3 feet of water. 

West Virginia. — 31,800 tons. Sank at her berth as a result of four 
or five aircraft torpedo hits and at least two bomb hits and rested on 
a hard bottom with all spaces flooded up to 2 or 3 feet below the main 
deck. Most of the damage from torpedoes was in the midship area, 
which w^as badly wrecked both below water and above water. A large 
bomb passed through the firetop and the boat deck and apparently 
exploded near the port side on the main or second deck. This ex- 
plosion caused considerable wreckage and a terrific powder and oil 
fire, which burned out the whole area and extended to the foremast 
structure up to and including the bridge. A second bomb hit the top 
of turret III and passed through the 6-inch top. The nature of the 
penetration indicated defective material. This bomb did not explode 
but caused damage to the slide of the left gun. Subsequently, another 
torpedo hole and pai-ts of the torpedo were located aft under the 
counter. 

Oklahonw. — 29,000 tons. Capsized at her berth within 8 to 11 
minutes after receiving thrt^e or more hits by aircraft torpedoes. The 
hull was 20° to 30° from l^eing upside down with a considerable por- 
tion of the bottom and starboard side above water. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 355 

Nevada. — 29,000 tons. Struck by one or more aircraft torpedoes 
and by at least five bombs and two near misses. Each of the near 
misses caused rupturing of the hull on the port and starboard bows, 
respectively. One bomb hit near the foremast, caused explosion and 
fire damage which wrecked the vertical area extending from the sec- 
ond deck to the bridge. Several bomb hits wrecked the forecastle 
from side to side forward of No. 1 turret, and this damage extended 
down to the second deck. Fragments from a bomb hit amidships 
caused considerable local damage to the mainmast, stack, and other 
structure and caused many casualties to 5-inch gun crews. 

Maryland. — 31,500 tons. Two bomb hits in the forecastle. One 
small bomb (probably 100 pounds) passed through the forecastle 
deck forward of the chain pipes and exploded on the main deck 
causing only a small amount of damage. The second bomb (prob- 
ably 500 pounds) passed through port side of the ship about 12 feet 
under water and exploded in the construction and repair storeroom. 
This explosion wrecked flats and bulkheads in that area, and frag- 
ments caused numerous leaks in the sides and bottom. These were 
temporarily patched without going into drydock. 

Pennsylvania, — 33,100 tons. One bomb hit near after 5-inch gun 
starboard side. The damage from bomb explosion was considerable, 
but not of a vital nature, although there were a large number of 
casualties and one gun was put out of commission. The damage did 
not extend below the second deck. 

Tennessee. — 32,300 tons. Two bomb hits (probably 15-inch shell 
type). One of the bombs struck the center gun of No, 2 turret, caus- 
ing a large crack which necessitated replacement of the gun. This 
bomb exploded and did considerable local fragment damage. An- 
other similar bomb struck the top of No. 3 turret. This bomb was a 
dud and did no serious damage except for putting one ranmier out 
of commission. The Tennessee also suffered serious damage aft in 
officers' quarters due to fire resulting from the great heat caused by 
the oil fire starting from the Arizona. The shell plates around the 
stern were somewhat buckled and joints broken. 

LIGHT CRUISERS 

Helena. — 10,000 tons. Hit at frame 80 starboard side by aircraft 
torpedo causingthe flooding of No. 1 and 2 firerooms and the forward 
engine room. The starboard engine was found to be seriously dam- 
aged. Temporary repairs to hull were completed at Pearl Harbor, 
and the vessel proceeded to Mare Island under two shafts to await 
permanent repairs, 

Honolulu. — 10,000 tons. Damaged by large bomb (probably 500 
pounds) which passed through deck and exploded 15 or 20 feet from 
the port side at frame 40, This explosion caused considerable dam- 
age to the hull and resulted in the flooding of storerooms and maga- 
zines in that area and also dimmed out the electric power cables of 
turret II, Most of the flooding resulted from rupture of a magazine 
flood seachest; the hull of the ship was not opened up but leaked 
some due to pulled joints and rivets. Permanent repairs were com- 
pleted at Pearl Harbor. 

Raleigh — 7,050 tons. Hit by one aircraft torpedo amidships on 
port side which flooded the forward half of the machinery plant. The 



356 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ship was also hit by one bomb (probably 500 pounds) which passed 
through three decks and out the ship's side and finally exploded about 
50 feet away. The damage from the explosion was not extensive but, 
together with the hole made in the side, caused serious flooding on 
the port side aft. This flooding was out of all proportion to the ex- 
tent of damage and resulted from inability to close armored hatches 
tightly against the water head. The bomb struck only a few feet 
abaft of the gasoline stowage. Permanent repairs to the hull were 
completed at Pearl Harbor. 

DESTROYERS 

Shaw. — 1,500 tons. Hit by one bomb while docked on floating dry- 
dock and by many fragments from another bomb which struck the 
drydock. The serious fire following the bomb hits resulted in blowing 
up of forward magazine and heat damage to shell plating in the for- 
ward areas. The after part of the ship was not seriously damaged. 
The Shaw was redocked on the same drydock on January 26, 1942, for 
installation of a false bow at about frame 50. 

Cassin and Downes. — Gassin was struck by one bomb and Dovmes 
by two (probably 500 pounds). One bomb explosion aft between the 
two vessels apparently knocked the Casmn partly off the drydock 
blocking and caused her to fall over on the Downes when the dock was 
being flooded during the raid. This caused a serious structural failure 
amidships and considerable local damage in way of the bridge. The 
torpedo warheads in the starboard tube of the Downes were set off and 
blew out the main deck and starboard side of the vessel in that area. 
This caused some damage to boilers and engines. A serious oil fire 
followed the explosion and caused extensive damage to the hull of both 
vessels. Fragments and explosions caused over 200 holes in the hull 
of the Cassin and probably well over 400 in the hull of the Downes. 

REPAIR SHIPS 

Vestal. — 9,435 tons. Struck by two bombs (probably 500 pounds). 
One bomb hit forward and exploded in the steel shape storage which 
stopped a large part of the fragments and minimized damage con- 
siderably. The other bomb struck aft and exploded in the hold, caus- 
ing a large number of fragment holes through the shell. Flooding 
aft caused the after part of the vessel to submerge to the main deck. 
The vessel was alongside the Arizona when the raid commenced and 
was beached at Aeia to prevent further sinkage. 

MINELAYERS 

OglaJa. — 6,000 tons. Sunk by one aircraft torpedo which passed 
under the ship from the starboard side and exploded against the 
starboard side of the Helena. Vessel sank slowly at 10-10 dock and 
capsized against the dock about li^ hours after being struck. 

SEAPLANE TENDERS 

Curtiss. — 13,880 tons. Struck on kingpost starboard crane by Jap- 
anese airplane out of control. This resulted in some wreckage and 
damage due to fire. Machinery of the crane was seriously damaged, 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



357 



and the radio antennas were put out of commission. One bomb (prob- 
ably 500 pounds) struck the forward end of the hangar on the port 
side off the center line, exploding on the second deck. The explosion 
and resulting fire caused a great amount of wreckage and loss of 
material. 



MISCELLANEOUS AUX. 

Utah. — 19,800 tons. Struck by two, and possibly three, aerial tor- 
pedoes and capsized at berth. Ship Avas within a few degrees of being 
exactly upside down. 

Item 16 

u. s. naval and marine corps aircraft losses 

U. S. plane losses and damage to installations at Ford Islajid Naval 
Air Station, Kaneohe Naval Air Station, the marine air base at Ewa, 
and the Enterprise is shown in the following table : 

1. Ford Island Naval Air Station. 

(1) Plane losses. 



Total 



Fighters 

Scout Bombers (VSB) 

Patrol Bombers (VPB) 

Observation/Scouts (VO-VS) 

Utility (VJ) 

Trainmg (VN) 

Transports (VR). _ 

Total 



Airborne 


Non- 
airborne 





4 





3 





19 





























26 



4 
3 
19 







26 



(2) Installations. — The only portion of this station subject to severe 
attack was the seaplane hangars and parking area in the southwest 
corner of the island. 

Damage sustained to the station was as follows : 

Hangar No. 6 was set on fire apparently as a result of a bomb ex- 
plosion immediately to the east of the hangar and the consequent 
explosive action of the nearby patrol planes which were ignited by 
this blast. There were at least five bomb hits in the vicinity of 
Hangar No. 6, the largest producing a crater approximately 20 feet 
in diameter and 7 feet deep. The northeast corner of Hangar No. 6 
was badly damaged by fire. In addition to the damage to the seaplane 
parking area, minor damage \vas inflicted on Hangar No. 38 by nearby 
bomb explosions. 

2. Kaneohe. 

(1) Plane losses. 



Fighters (VF) _ 

Scout Bombers (VSB). 

Patrol Bombers (VPB) _ 

Observation/Scouts' (VO-VS) 

Utility (VJ) 

Training (VN) 

Transports (VR) 

Total 



Airborne 


Nonair- 
borne 

















27 





1 























28 



Total 





27 
1 






28 



358 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(2) Installations. — A complete hangar (No. I), in which planes 
were already stored, was destroyed together with the planes and with 
fire-fighting apparatus which had been brought there to fight the fire. 

Two other hangars under construction, one almost completed, were 
not bombed. The seaplane parking area and the Aqua system were 
damaged. 

3. Ewa. 

(1) Plane losses. 



Fighters (VF) 

Scout Bombers (VSB) 

Patrol Bombers (VPB)...... 

Observation/Scouts (VO-VS) 

Utility (VJ) 

Training (VN) 

Transports (VR).. 

Total 



Airborne 


Nonair- 
l)orne 


Total 





9 


9 





18 


18 























3 


3 





1 


1 





2 


2 





33 


33 



(2) Installations. — Considerable damage was suffered by material, 
installations, machinery, tentage, and buildings at Ewa. Damage to 
Government motor vehicles was slight, but privately owned automo- 
biles suffered heavily. Damage to aircraft was extremely heavy as 
the primary objective was aircraft on the ground and attacks were 
made on individual aircraft by enemy planes using explosive and in- 
cendiary bullets from extremely low altitudes. 

4. Five Scout planes from the carrier Eiiterprise were lost. 

Item 17 



COMPOSITION OF TASK FORCE ALLOCATED TO PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Striking force 

Commanding Officer : CinC 1st Air Fleet, Vice Admiral Chuichi NAGUMO. 

Battleship Division 3 (1st Sec-tion) (HIEH, KIRISHIMA), 2 Battleships. 

Carrier Division 1 (KAGA, AKAGI). 

Carrier Division 2 (HIRYU, SORYU). 

Carrier Division 5 (SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU), 6 Aircraft Carriers. 

Cruiser Division 8 (TONE, CHIKUMA), 2 Heavy Cruisers. 

Destroyer Squadron 1 (ABUKUMA), 1 Light Cruiser, 4 Destroyer Divisions, 16 

Destroyers. 
11 Train Vessels, 

Advance expeditionary force 

Commanding Officer : CinC 6th Fleet, Vice Admiral Mitsumi SH4MIZU. 

ISUZU, YURA, 2 Light Cruisers. 

KATORI, 1 Training Light Cruiser. 

I-class submarines (including Submarine Squadrons 1, 2, 3) 20 Submarines 

(I-l, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 16. 17, 18, 20, 22-24, 68, 69, 74). 

Midget submarines, 5 Midget submarines. 

6 Train Vessels. 

Item 18 

(Item 18 is a map of the North Pacific Ocean showing the track of 
the Japanese Striking Force. This map is printed as It*m No. 15 in 
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Commit- 
tee.) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 359 

Item 19 

(Item 19 is a diagram showing air searches flown in the Hawaiian 
area (a) 6 December 1941, (b) prior to the Japanese attack 7 Decem- 
ber 1941, and (c) after the Japanese attack 7 December 1941, and the 
track of the Japanese Striking Force. This diagram is printed as 
Item No. 16 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of 
Joint Committee.) 

Item 20 

(Item 20 is a diagram showing track of Japanese plane attack routes 
over Oahu, T. H. This diagram is printed as Item No. 17 in EX- 
HIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.) 

Note 

(There are appended hereto copies of official photographs of dam- 
age to U. S. Navy ships and installations at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 
1941.) 



360 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



361 




79716 O— 40 — pt. 12 2t 



362 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



363 







364 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 








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371 





U. S. S. Downes — Destroyer, hit by Japanese bombs during attack on Pearl Har- 
bor, Hawaii, December 7, 1941. U. S. S. Cassin, destroyer, in about same 
condition, lies behind the Downes. 



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Wreckage of U. S. S. Arizona, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, December 7, 1941. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



389 




U. S. S. Dowties and Cassin — The jumbled mass of wreckage in the foreground 
of drydock No. 1 are the U. S. destroyers. Downes (left) and Cassin (right). 
The battleship in the rear is the U. S. S. Pennsylvania, 33,100-ton Flagship of 
the Pacific Fleet, which suffered relatively light damage during the Japanese 
attack. The Pennsylvania was repaired shortly after the attack. Main and 
auxiliary machinery fittings of the Downes and Cassin are being transferred 
to new hulls. 



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