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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 

OF THE PEAEL HAEBOB ATTACK 

C0NGKES8 OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS P/*>/ 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 

(79th Congress) 



.AS- 



A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEAKL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 13 
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 7 AND 8 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Hartfor Attack 



X 




PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 

OF THE PEAKL HARBOK ATTACK 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS '*J)7i>) 

FIRST SESSION 1/2, 

PURSUANT TO ^ ^ >S^ 

S. Con. Res. 27 ^^V^ 

(79th Congress) /^^/ J 3 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 13 
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 7 AND 8 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
7971G WASHINGTON : 1946 



*D%1 
-^ . 
.As" 

0. S. SilcWlMTfflOENT OF OOCUMEWIJ JQUL 

SEP 231948 p^.^ y3 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEABL 
HABBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLET, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
WALTER P. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michl- tive from California 

gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 
North Carolina 



COUNSEL 



(Through January 14, 1946) 

William D. Mitchell, General Counsel 
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Asaiatant Counsel 
JDLE M. Hannaford, Ansistant Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 

Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel 
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 


Pages 


Transcript 


No. 




pages 


1 


1- 399 


1- 1058 


2 


401- 982 


1059- 2586 


3 


983-1583 


2587- 4194 


4 


1585-2063 


4195- 5460 


5 


2065-2492 


5461- 6646 


6 


2493-2920 


6647- 7888 


7 


2921-3378 


7889- 9107 


8 


3379-3927 


9108-10517 


9 


3929-4599 


10518-12277 


10 


4601-5151 


12278-13708 


11 


5153-5560 


13709-14765 



Hearings 



Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19 
Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 
Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 
Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18 
Dec. 31, 1945, and 
Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 
Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 
Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1 
Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 
Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, 
Apr. 9 and 11, and 



, 20, and 21, 1945. 

30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945. 
11, 12, and 13, 1945. 

19, 20, and 21, 1945. 
Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 

19, and 21, 1946. 

26, 28, and 29, 1946. 

2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 

13, and 14, 1946. 

and 20, 1946. 

May 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 

Part 

"So. Exhibits Nos. 

12 1 through 6. 

13 7 and 8. 

14 9 through 43. 

15 44 through 87. 

16 88 through 110. 

17 111 through 128. 

18 129 through 156. 

19 157 through 172. 

20 173 through 179. 

21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 

22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



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05 <« 



05 X! 

i 

PL| 



4S «M 

G 05 - 
05 tH 05 

> S c 

saf^ 

05 *^ 
01 o 

S-, o I 
osOO 

S ^ Oj 

202 CO 



«- .G 



< 

o 



<.2 

o.-s 

O O 



a5T3 
^O 

CS o 

CO 

co-rt 

C « 
B 03 

Ȥ^ 

§1 
03 02 

(X 05 
03 B 

•-5 ^ 

— >. 

O t- 

05 

bC > 

■43 as 
_rtT3 

"2^ 

C o 

g_o 

*^? 
T3"o 

08 _ 

sJ aT 
2P bC 
^ as 

^« 

O 05 

" B 

05 B 

T3^ 

. I1 

C 58 

o o< 

35 ^ 

S aT 

.G * 



=• B 

rt a) 
o> ^ 

^ 05 

t^ B 

. 3 

05 A- 

a5p5 



« 2 

■>± ft 

5? ft 

ft G 
.2 =0 

Q 



0; ft 
> a5 

03 6 

12 
So. 



a5 



ot^ 



' bC 

-cog 

c -2 
or? '43 

■-SS » 

S . M 

^^ O S 

B 






<o 


■* 


iC 


05 





CO 


10 


05 


05 


N 


CO 




e^ 


CO 


cc 


00 


05 


a> 











r^ 


1— 1 


cc 


CO 


CO 


CO 


CO 


CO 


CO 


CO 


■* 


■<* 


■* 


■* 




>v 






















»c 


iC 


iC 


10 


lO 


lO 


iC 


io 


iC 


iC 


i« 


IfJ 


•* 


Tfl 


•^ 


■^ 


■* 


■<r 


■t 


■* 


'* 


•^ 


■^ 








IM 1 

oco 

(N 1 






1^ 


si 

S?7 


S7 


00 1 

''* J, 


Ci 1 




















C<l 


c^ 


c>^ 


^•^ 


r-H 


f— t 




1-H 


^H 


»-H 


»-H 


1-H 

































INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



00 

SiC 

3 

o3 3 
• O 

< S 

o~ 
Q 



c * 

•Si 

OJ o 



o c 

2 o 

.2 » 

-►^ c 
« o 

^ -5 



-§1 

S Q 



3 « 

•n5£ 



O X e9 



W.5 

■5* 

o-S 

^ c 

" o 

5 ^ 

03 fc. 



O O &H 



SS 



V 



a) "D 

O 2^ 
= ^2 

_aj.-3 
'^"Z.'ii 

03 cc. o 

^ C -t^ 

■^ tt OJ 

^►5 5 



c9 



go «*- 






►-J a 

C 3 
03 O 






43 > r^ 

Q"SS •5' 



;^ 5 



= 03 03 C 



S5 

302 

e 03 

O cc 



^■£ O « f; 3 

CO CD H S-sj '^ 
£Q^;Sat; 

03-§2r„^|^ 

c p^ _ 5 o 

t; O O M^^ 
S^3^T3?« 

— 03 - c! O 

J^ Q MH ^^ oi 3 
s3 <u 



n 






OS O 



O 






•Si 3 

a o 
o «- 



(3 -^ 



2: .•;> o3T3 0) 

^ o bc.2-S^ 
lo'^ go's s 



.•0.2 






bc S - £ o oo" 

.S.2tJH « _^ 

3 13 05 ^, bC^j 

b 1— < 03 r- O 

03 bc «-Sr^ 
« 3 -J- 3 ^ W 
3 := "^ 03 bc-ri 
O ^ ■ bC fl S< 

§3 >;= §3 

3 03 --r) 1—4 - 03 



C CO £ 



3-" * 5 s ^ 

b.te ^^ a is 
J£ s ° 2 c 

iJ 03 3 gjgg. 

Q, 03 03 .3 g as 

a^ao^s 

3 
02 



03 



o 



PQ 




< 



o 
a 

bC 

c 



03 


> 

3 


■1^ 


O 


OS 


U 






m 


te 


•a 


08 


ii 


02 






3 


J3 


"i^ 


.2 



pq 



o 




2u^ 



S'i S*^ S'i 

2 I 2 I, 2 I 



i:; I 






so I 

OM 
(N 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



XI 



M 
M 

I 

o 

< 



OS 



02 

T5 
O 

'a 

c 

cS 

C 

o 



o 



o 


■* 


w 


05 




""I 


•«" 


00 


eS'-r 


IM 


c3X2 




as 


O 



a- 

m ^ 

«-« 
_ aj 

S « 

as rt 

-go 









^ -d 






_§P ^ 



S OS 

cW 
S o 

6-e 

O 01 

c® 
o'-' 

'■5 6D 



aj'O 
aj-g 
a < 

2 -^ 



9> 



V 



88 









;so 2 



2 fe 



O Oi 



Q 



* 


04 


s 


f% 


^ 


08 


a; 


ffi 


»• 


-ki 


e8 


08 


XI 


O 










X! 


< 


IS 








+J 


o 


05 




„ 


c 


'^ 


o 






o 

a; 
u 

O 



^ (3D 

a; " 
O o 



.SPh 



^ O 



— aj 
"Em 

3 » 

c a; 
c ^ 

§^ 



05 O 



Qi . 



■ CO 



ii X 

55 



m 



"5 >> 



a 


■*» 


3 


OJ 


TJ 


g 


1^ 


■e 


(-. 


S3 


o 


a 


g 


a; 


« 



^« i 



j: So 



F c « 
gS X 
Tf* »»^ aj 



o3 & 

O o 

^"^ 

«? c 



X w-^ 

::§^ 

^ a: « 
3 -^ 08 
!T cc +s 
03 a; -ki 
--^ 3 05 

a; C 
o C « 

P-a O 

o aj^ 
3 O 

'"' o a} 



a! E 05 

pW OS 

'c ^^ 
a; ts c 

i'-' a S 

! • — tC 
I bC a5 08 

aj o 
aj.1: 

O X 

; as.^ 
«*-i "O 'S 

god 

3 O*^ 

a b o 



"2 'f 1-H 
«05^ 

.2^ OS 
o8t* _ 

1*5 

*- aj „• 
^Q^ 
OS cH 

•x°fl 

•S'O ® 

S b 00 
08 -iJ 

,x o a 

a o 02 

Sa; a; 
rn x; cc 

a ^P-i 
asX^ 

c ^- so 

Oj X — • +» 

= 2; -=5 
^ 03O5 X 
ro «—< 01 



o £ 



o5 

X 

OS 

u 
c3 



o 



o 

(^ 

a 
3 
o 
(1 

O 



c ^ 



TS T2 ■** 



o 

X rH 



^ o 

a a> 

O X 

.2 >« 



O 



I ^ 

oS 1) 

a; 3 

X Hs 

a o 

•I ^ 

•tJ o 

* E 

a; o 



Eh 

-o 
a 
08 



aj _ 



£ ^ 

« O) 

°« 



^ 



o*" 



to 


CO 





t^ 


00 





f-4 


C<l 


m 


CO 





<-H 


■* 


w 


a 




N 


M 


ec 


CO 


w 


n 


ec 


■* 


■* 


■<}< 


lei 


10 


2 




I— 1 


?o 




« 




(D 


(O 








« 


iC 


IC 




iC 


10 


10 


lO 


m 


Hi 


10 


m 


10 


1 


«7 


cc7 

0^ 


s4 






0^ 




00 T 


w7 
§4 




N"^ 

-S 


^2 


'^^ 


-^^ 


"2 


'"S 


'"i 


1— ( 


"si 



to 


t>. 


00 


OS 





>-H 


M 


10 


m 


iC 


>o 





«o 


«o 



XII 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 






a 
O 

bC 

g 

'•V 

a 
S 

CO 



S 




a 
2 



J5 



.§t^- 



o 


bC 

O 3 


bl 


^<5 


Sj 




W 


l§ 




OJ t, 


03 


oo o 


(i 


rtS 






£ « 



^ o 



aj ^ 



to 

c 

■?^- 

O rr 

x _( 

e2 



O an 

►- c 



0) 



03 



.B M 

§.2 



O 

I- • 

^2 



»-i ''^ 



I" 

-< bO 

2^ 






03 0^ 



2£ 



00^ 


S o 


. OJ 


03 


Mg 


SPcS 


^^ 


T3 03 


-ci^ 


0) 


Oi 




-i^ O 


«t;j 


««:s 


■a r 


"^■^ . 




0) ^ o 


^■S 


^e.H 


=0 fci 

OJ Ph 


" £ g 



03 "O c 
=0 5 e 



•a »s £ 

83 «-g 
-.CO) 

O O 3 

b'S ^ 

o ?? S 

t^ bO fe 

-bC ^ 

^ * « 

t 00 r-. 

Oi § 

"5 03 
oo 2 
o3 O 05 

It- 

-5^3 
C 

g be o 



0«*- a; 

1:2° 

's •- "3 

Ph 



a; 



0) 



(U 



•2 03-^ 
cc-^ p 






J3 ^ 1— ( OD S 

^J 03 "^ 

^ g « ^ *^- « gg 

O-a^ g^ « pj «J 

^ o c SO « S 

gT3 O 

03^ g h 



a! 



-2 a> 



£ !«"!I 2 

O 4^ o3 C 
CO c8 T! 



-H .«2 bc^ 

. bC<.- Ml C 

_i 3 O 03 o 

bc r^ tzj J5 

3 T3 



x; c 

*^ oj 

a 

03 






c.:: 



5 «. 



o 



0) s a*© £ '^ 

y^ o a3^ *-i »-— < 

"tf >-0Q »- S, 03 

Ts a<*- o *= a/S 

OJ O ^ 03 H Q «> 
w OB'S «r'^W_g o 
g_g hcaS^ a> J o 

Q H 




'"' 


'"' 


^ 


'-' 


'-' 


—' 


^ 


'-' 


-^ 


'-' 


lO 


<o 


»o 


10 


10 


10 


lO 


lO 


>c 





■* 


■^ 


"* 


•t 


■>*> 


-* 


•* 


■* 


■>*< 


■* 


-<j<ec 


^ 1 


W 1 


■* lO 


t^ lO 


t^ 1 


1 
05 IC 


OiiO 


OS J: 


o»c 


iC^ 


in^ 


«0-H 


to,- 


(©-< 


;0 -t 


CO — 


1© — 


to— 1 


t^-< 


I'-H 


<-^ 1 


f-H 1 


"H 1 


— < 1 


l-H 1 


■-1 1 


"H 1 


■-1 1 


^c^ 


(N 


(N 


(N 


<N 


cq 


(N 


C<l 


(N 


(N 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



xin 



>H- P5 



> 

to _x, 

« > 



C 

1= 



CC 



to 



O « 
a> - 



o 

o3 > 



h. O 

= 5 

O o3 



^ c 
C.2 

« 03 
a: ^ 

W O 

l> 0) 
«8 bC 

a-g 

i: a:" 

— 'C 

2 = 



V bC 

g bc 



or:: 



be.*; 
C1.C 

&S o 

0) S 



ai . 



o 

CO W ^ 

o3 '"* +s 
<*^ ^ 

r, O 2^ 

« C P 
CO-flj bC 

- c «- 

• * o. 
>_■- 

^ o — 

-o J 
a> ._^ c 

ej a; H 

to s i: 
S^8 
2^ ^ 






>^ v^ gj .F^ — 

HS5 Pi^- 






'c *=■ 
c 

|f2 

^S 

•< 0^ 
- 02 

c ■£ 

^ c 
■° y: ■ 

§ St 



5 01 w 

"^ i >■ 

■o "^ _ 
^■c O 

bC C -j; 

OJ 03 — 



O X bC 
C.22 fe 






.2 « 
H 



c c^ 



t- o tr 
-2 ."^ 



■J- 03 

o bC 

O o3 



CC 



302 X 
03'^" « 

£- . CO . 

■p: "< '^ -^ 
x: ? o 

'- ^ ID +i 
.= 2 CT3 

aos'S- 

Q_ g bc 
X S3 _~; f, 

-§§.£& 

X S*^ — 



S = S o 






35 



^ o ^ « 
CO o JS 



oj bC bC C 

-^.5 to 
oj cx;^ 



T3 3 



03 « 

2 



" 3 

Is oj 






< 

X .2S * S 



O r--^ ,^: -^ 






>x: 
33-^ 



T3 r 



bC- 






o 






3 X 



CO -h: 


>i 


^ X 





.^^ 


^o 





O-ii 


" 


O-S 


• S 


■^A 


c 






23. 








^ ^ 


a 


-^•a 


TZ 






ss 


03 


Si 


3 






'^ c 


c 


<^R 


o 



^ 05 

-5 - 
. c^ X 

-^ -ti 

ZqS 
O o 2 

£ "S ''^ 

£ S-£ 
i X s 

o^ OJ ■^- 

X "C 

T}< o o 

3 43 

'^ *J -.i 

. X 

« C o 



T3 Si 

C3 a) H 



bC i_ 

iT.S X 

53 >T3 

V 03 -f^ 



"^ 03 

- « 



«x; 



0) 



0) 



§1 

x: *" 

3S 



'u A 



tC 


r-t 


■* 


■<* 


t>. 


X 





•* 


t>. 


■* 


CO 


l^ 


ec 


■* 


•* 


»C 


10 


CO 


t^ 


t^ 


CO 


CO 


CO 


CO 


1— ; 


t" 


t>. 


t^ 




t^ 


t^ 


r^ 


CO 


00 


QO 


00 

1-1 


10 


CO 


^ iO 


iC 


»o 


iC 


iC 


10 


lO 


10 


lO 


iC 


■* 


rr 


■<*< 


■* 


•* 


■* 


Tf< 


'* 


■<* 


Tj- 


•* 


« 1 


iC 1 


0: 1 


IN 1 


-t 1 


■* 1 


■* 1 


•* 1 


00 1 


■* 1 


•O 1 


iC 


S5- 


>« 


CC 


^ iC 


(Nt^ 


INI> 


(N t^ 


IN r- 


INt^ 


iCt^ 


t^l^ 


t^-^ 


t^^ 


tV-H 


t^—i 


t^r- 


l>.^ 


t^^ 


t^ — 


i^^ 


t^'l 


I^ — 


-• 1 


c^ V 


.-H 


^ 1 


T-^ 1 


— 1 


— 1 


—1 1 


-H 1 


'^ 1 


^ 1 


r-t 1 


C^ 




IN 




C^ 


(N 


(N 


IN 


C^ 


IN 


IN 


IN 






























XIV 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



J5 
O 



a. 

bC 

a 
'E 

3 

02 

C 

o 



> . 

*•-' 1—1 

o 









O 05 



OJ T3 

bC « 

O O 



o 


-o 




C J= 


02 


c 




OJ HJ 


C 


eS 




o-$ 


iri 






^ 


«3 








biD 

C 




05 

0) 


-ti 


«-l 


^r- 


«-. 




^ 




2i 


bC 




Is 

sS 3 


C 


S 

■kJ 


05 

o 




s3 




u 


02 


o 


c 


«c 


i2r 


s 


oi 


o 


^ (D 


-tJ 


rt 


2 a 


o 


83 


Oh 

C 
03 




s 


iC o3 


S 


O 


-H a 



«Q 



1'^ 

bC-lJ 

II 

C"" 
■-5 ■* 03 



OJ S^ 

o3 :8 

3 (S 

"2 * 



05 Cm 



3 
b£' 

a 



5 
S 



O 
> 



■SO 



.5 - •- 



2 0. 

= S 

<*« t- 

O o3 

03 1^ 

cr 
.2" 

O O 



-C 2R 






-^ -c 



bC 
c . 

f-i .zi 

bC te 

.-« 

0.3 

la 

05^ 

^§ 
■ +i 

^< 
/< 

s *^ 
O 2 

■v< 



05 ^ 



eQ 



+i 05 
03 c 

bC 83 od" 

y— bC 

^ SR C 

e 35 c 

H i^ 3^ 



c-5 



o e; 
o g 



-e o 

03 -N 

03 C 
£ 83 

S 03" 






IM 05 
05 O 



"S 0; 05 

leg 

§•^.2 

05 ST 03 

o; t- S 

- o & 

t, +i «*< 
**- 3 O 

- 05 

-H e Ml 

■* >- 3 
® g'S 

00 ""'"' 






03 

73- 

-« C 3 

O 05 .3 

a o 3 

.2 « o3 



62 

05.3 



s 



2.3 
05 _ *J 

.2 5 

^■+^ 03 

S 08 2 

r-i bc<w 
rfi 3 O 

^^ 03 



p. 



« 3 2 

05 05 O 

+j 05 

05 03^ 

03 05 02 

a o c 

2 -is c3 

Q 



W 02 

-3 

03 O 

SB 

05 O 

SK 

03 



.2 05 


02 

05 






J2 


05 O 


u 


■5 05 


br 


J2 


c 


Xx 




035 


e 


cox; 


o 


1^ ■ 

©3 


3 


;§a 


"o 






cc.S 



"o 


Ph 


> 


>. 




^ 


CO 




® 


3 

05 


o 


p 




05 






05 


03 


o 


to 



O o8 



>i3 




ao 




o 


o 




05 


r/T 










83 


i 




02 

o 


a 


'" 


-kJ 


o 




o 


O 


(N 


(Ih 







s 






l: a 



3^ 
45 , 

as 

> 10 

3| 

05 

ea '^ 
a, 22 

^a 

05 03 



So 

3-^ 

ar! 

O 05 

^■^ 

00 w 

a. 2 
<^ 

a^ 

o~ 

I- 05 

- o 

2^ 

.S 

o o 

?4PM 
>■ 3 

|H 

X) iS -t^ 

r,, V "* 

05 OtS 
ao 00 

»3 „, 3 
00 05 Q 

??'^_ 

05 '^J >, 

05 C -4^ 
g X 05 
05 S y 

00 



.2tii 

boS 

Is 

S >> 

O n 
W^ 

OJ s 

■2 = 

Ml 



05 



83 



3 

05 -T 



N 


>> 


'^ 


3 


>. 


•-s 




3 


1-: 


O 


05 

i5i 


3 

"2 


■o 


OJ 


rf\ 


J3 


-o 




1 

o 


rt 


o 


fci 




05 "^ 




Its 



Wig 



.-S-o 


O5 00 


lO 1 


00 05 


2d, 


00 1 


«o 1 


t^ 1 


00 1 


^ 1 


00 1 


'-> 1 


a*s 


(N X 


<©-< 


CO -X 


to ^ 


l^ ^ 


l^-t 


05 rt 


C a 3 


t^^ 


00 -< 


00-* 


05.-H 


05 (M 


oco 


OM 


oeo 


occ 


OC<3 


OM 


■ceo 


— 1 


.-1 1 








C^ 1 


IM 1 


CO 1 


CM 1 


CM 1 


CM 1 


S-o 


c<» 


c^ 


(N 


(N 


(N 


CM 


<N 


CM 


CM 


CM 


CM 


wg 
























d 
















' 








z 
























•w 
























pC 
























2 
























H 


to 


o 


t^ 


00 


05 


o 


_i 


CM 


CC 


■«*< 


lO 


00 


« 


00 


00 


« 


05 


OJ 


Oi 


O) 


a> 


OS 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



XV 



si 

c s>^ 
•3.S 
■Eo 

O 

c C 

o j^ 



" e8 

5-0 



■X3 C 

o o 
2s 



^ p 



u sS 

^ C 

^£ 

c o 
S^ 

5 o 

a2 <^ 

"i 

G W) 

^^ 

?, c 'S 

005 

ws s 

^ „ "^ 

-S °'^ 

5 « 

2 «S 






rt « £ 

S B3 • 

C.2 >> 
c 3 5 



^ C c3 



83 ^'►^ 

SJ2.S 

C bC^ 

O C C 

S S3,=« 



t-> ^4 



■ ^ 



5 c 
c S 



a; i§ 



0; 

bct: 
"5 J 



o o 

S° 



C W 



^ bC 

fl5 



+5 b£ 

C -^ 

HH a; 

r-, O 

d > 

> C 

^- 

- C 

-^ «-i 

. aJ 

o S 

^ o 

OS r^ 



.22 S .2 



s^- 






^ 02 • 



Sb5 



a3 03 

^ — 7: "^ 

•^ 'E o 
^^^-^ 

■ft J- o3 

a.1 c .S 

^ S^ 

S o = 
X"5 ? 



■a oj 



5 c aj 
3 CO 

c " 

o o 

6 u 



05 



o 



>' 

o 



o -^ _<: 

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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 391 



EXHIBIT NO. 7 

(Exhibit No. 7 is a map of Oahu, T. H., showing the record of the 
Opana radar detector station, 7 December 1941. This map is printed 
as Item No. 18 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of 
Joint Committee.) 

EXHIBIT NO. 8 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Exhibit No. 8 : Page 

(1) Messages from MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo, dated 14 and 

15 October 1945 to War Department 392 

(2) Report dated 26 October 1945 from General MacArthur to War 

Department with five inclosures 392 

(3) Report dated 1 November 1945 from General MacArthur to War 

Department with one inclosure 399 

(4) Report dated 8 November 1945 from General MacArthur to War 

Department with one inclosure 412 

(5) Source Documents used by Navy in compiling the "Navy Sum- 

mary of the Japanese Plan for the Attack on Pearl Harbor" 431 

Exhibit No. 8-A Report dated 12 November 1945 from General Mac- 
Arthur to War Department with one inclosure 413 

Exhibit No. 8-B Report dated 29 November 1945 from General Mac- 
Arthur to War Department with one inclosure 415 

Exhibit No. 8-C Report dated 4 December 1945 from General MacArthur 

to War Department with one inclosure 424 

Exhibit No. 8-D 'Report date<i 13 December 1945 from General Mac- 
Arthur to War Department with three inclosures 425 



392 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

confidential 

Pabaphbase of Message Dated 14 Octobee 1945 From MacAbthur's Headquabtebs 

TO War Department 

Japanese say many records were burned. However, complete report, with 
chart of task force, now being written and to be sent by air. Preliminary in- 
formation received from the Japanese Navy is as follows : On 5 November 1941, 
plan for attack on Pearl Harbor was adopted, and on 1 December 1941 Cabinet 
Council decided on commencement of hostilities. Order that hostile action 
should open on 8 December was issued by Imperial General Headquarters on 
2 December. Navy section of Imperial General Headquarters and Combined 
Fleet Headquarters were involved in discussions and decisions to make attack. 

Commander in Chief Combined Fleet on 25 November ordered task force to 
leave Hitokappu Bay next morning and proceed to 42° North — 170° East by 
afternoon 3 December for complete refueling. Attack force was organized as 
follows: 1st Air Squadron (Kaga and Alagi [Akagi]), 2nd Air Squadron 
(Hiryu and Soryu), 5th Air Squadron (Zuikaku and Shokaku), 3rd Squadron 
(Hiei and Kongo), 8th Squadron (Tone and Chikuma), 4 destroyer divisions 
making one squadron, 8 transports and 2 submarines. 

Japanese lost 27 aircraft ; estimate damage to U. S. Navy at 2 battleships 
(Oklahoma and West Virginia) sunk, 4 battleships and 4 heavy cruisers dam- 
aged, one transport and one destroyer sunk, and 350 planes burned or shot 
down. 

Intelligence from Hawaii was obtained through (a) American broadcasts from 
Hawaii, (b) reports from Naval Attache in Washington, (c) reconnaissance 
submarines in Hawaiian waters just before outbreak of war and, (d) things 
heard from ships which called at Hawaii mid-November. 



Pabaphrase of Messages Dated 15 October 1945 From MacAbthur's Head- 
quarters TO War De2'abtment 

1. We are continuing local investigation. 

2. As early as possible information available to Allied Technical Intelligence 
Service on Pearl Harbor attack will be forwarded. Material consisting of 
partial coverage from captured documents is already collated, but still on 
way to Tokyo from Manila. Documents on which collation is based have 
already been sent to Washington. 



GENEBAIi HEADQUARTEatS 

Supreme Commander fob the Aixied Powers 

AG 350.05 (26 Oct 45) GB 26 October 1945. 

Subject : Additional Data with Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor 
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attn : A. C. of S., G-2) 

1. In compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945, and 
WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from 
the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, 
the attached documents, Inclosures Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5, are forwarded in am- 
plification of preliminary report contained in our radio CAX 53287, 13 October 
1945. 

2. Investigation is being continued through the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) 
for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. A copy of a questionnaire which 
has been furnished and Liaison Committee in order to guide their efforts into 
the most productive channels and to insure the most complete coverage pos- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 393 

sible is attached hereto as Iiiclosure No. 4. A further report will be submitted 
as soon as answers to the questionnaires are received and translated. 
For the Supreme Commander : 

/S/ H. W. AiLEN, 

Colonel, A. O. D., 
Ass't Adjutant General. 
5 Incls : 

Incl 1— Report, Liaison Committee, 8 Oct 45. 
Incl 2 — Report, Liaison Committee, 10 Oct 45. 
Incl 3 — Report, Liaison Committee, 11 Oct 45. 
Incl 4 — Questionnaire to Liaison Committee. 
Incl 5 — Map, Routes of Jap Fleet. 

(Incl. #1) 

Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Impeeiai. Japanese Army and Navy 

8 October 1945. 
N. D. No. 108. 
To : Colonel F. P. Munson, USA 

G-2, GHQ of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. 
We forward herewith a general survey concerning the attack on Hawaii 
which has been hastily prepared in accordance with your oral instruction to 
Commander Yamaguchi, I. J. N. of the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the 
Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, 1,000 hours 8 October 1945. 

K. Nakamuba, 
Rear Admiral, I. J. N., 
Representing the I. J. Minister of the Nany. 

Oeneral Survey of the Attack on Han-aii Prepared in Accordance with Oral 
Instruction by Col. Munson to Commander Yamaguchi of the Liaison Com- 
mittee for the Impel 'Ol Army and Navy. 

1. Operational Orders 

(A) Orders of the Imperial General Headquarters 

(1) Imperial Naval Order 
(a) (Issued 1 December) 

Japan, under the necessity of her self-pres€^rvation and self-defense, 
has reached a decision to declare war on the United States of America, 
British Empire and the Netherlands. Time to start an action will be 
given later. 

(2) The Instruction by the Chief of the Naval General Staff imder the 
Authority delegated to him by the Imperial Naval Order. (Later abridged: 
Naval General Staff Instruction). 

(a) (Issued 1 December) 

The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall, at the start 
of war, direct his attack on the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Area to 
reduce it to impotency, using the First Air Fleet as the nucleus of 
the attack force. 
(3) Imperial Naval Order 

(a) (Issued 2 December > 

The hostile actions against the United States of America, the British 
Empire and the Netherlands shall be commenced on December 8. 
(4) Naval General Staff Instruction 

( a ) ( Issued 2 December ) 

Bear in mind that, should it appear certain that the Japanese-Amer- 
ican negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the com- 
mencement of hostile action, all the forces of the Combined Fleet 
are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their bases. 

(B) Orders of the Headquarters of the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet 
and other Headquarters. 

The subject matters are being investigated through members con- 
nected with the said forces of that period. 



394 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

II. Means used to gain intelligence from Hawaii and other sources 

(1) Reports of Naval Attache in Washington D. C. (Announcements by Amer- 
ican Authorities and Press reports were the sole source.) 

(2) Hearings of ships which called at Hawaiian ports in mid-November. 

(3) Through submarines on reconnaissance duty in Hawaiian waters imme- 
diately preceding the outbreak of wai-. 

(4) Radio Broadea.sts from Hawaii. 

III. Organization of Attacking Force 
First Air Squadron (Akagi and Kaga) 
Second Air Squadron (Soryu and Hiryu) 
Fifth Air Squadron ( Shokaku and Zuikaku) 
Third Squadron (Kongo and Hiei) 

Eighth Squadron (Tone and (^hikuma^ 

First Destroyer Squadron 'Abukuma. 6th Destroyejr Division, 17th Destroyer 
Division, 21st Destroyer Division and 27th Destroyer Division) 
Supply Force (8 Transports) 
Submarine Force (2 Submarines) 

IV. Movement of Attacking Force (S^-e attached Map) 

V. Estimated Damage inflicted on American Navy 

Sunk — 2 Battleships (West Virginia and Oklahoma) 

1 Destroyer 

1 Transport 
Seriously Damaged — 4 Battleships 

4 Heavy Cruisers 
Aircraft shot down or burned — over 350 

VI. Losses of Japanese Ndvy 
Failed to Return — 27 aircrafts 

N. B. — As this report hastily prepared based on the combined memory of those 
who were connected with the event, certain corrections will be expected to be 
made. 



(Incl #2) 

Liaison Committee (Tokyo) Exm the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy 

10 October 1945. 
N. D. No. 123 
To : Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander 

for the Allied Powers. 
Re : N. D. No. 108, 8 October 1945. 

Subject : Additions to the Answers already given to the questions regarding the 
Attack on Hawaii. 
1. Additional operational orders : 

(a) Units of the attacking force assembled in Hitokappu Bay (Etorofu- 
jima), by order of the Comiuander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet. 

N. B. — About 14 November the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet 
issued the above order because he lecognized Hitokappu Bay as the most suitable 
place for enabling the attacking force to meet any new development in the situa- 
tion, as well as to keep its location and movements seicret. 

(b) The attacking forces left Hitokappu Bay by order of the Imperial General 
Headquarters. 

N. B. — Around 21 November the situation had seemed to be approaching to a 
stage where commencemient of hostilities would be inevitable. The Navy Sec- 
tion of the Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, issued the following 
order (Imiierial Naval Order) to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined 
Fleet : "The Couimander-inChief of tlie Combined Fleet shall order necessary 
forces to advance to the area in which they are to wait in readiness and shall 
stati(m them in such positions that, in the event of the situation becoming such 
that commencement of hostilities be inevitable, they will be able to meet such 
situation promptly." 

But as the Japanese Government had sent Ambassador Kurusu to the United 
States by that time and was doing its utmost to bring the Japanese-American 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 395 

negotiations to an amicable settlement, an instruction had already been issued 
by the Chief of the Naval General Staff to the effect that the attacking forces 
were to return and re-assemble in the event of the negotiations with the United 
States proving successful. 

[2] 2. Information regarding the departure from Hitokappu Bay of the 
force, of which the nucleus was the First Air Squadron, was given to no one 
outside of the Japanese Navy. 

Even within the Navy, the only those who knew of the above fact were in 
addition to the attacking force itself, the leading officers of the Navy Section 
of the Imperial General Staff and of the Combined Fleet Headquarters and a 
certain restricted number of ollicers intimately concerned with the fleet operation. 
3. "Radio broadcaists from Hawaii" which we have mentioned as one source 
of information were the broadcasts made to the general public. 

K. Nakamuka, 
Rear Admiral, I. J. N. 
Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy. 



(Incl #3) 
Liaison Committee (Tokyo) fob the Imperial Japanese Akmy and Navy 

11 OcrroBE3t 1945. 

N. D. No. 130 

To : The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters of The Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers. 

In compliance with your letter delivered on 11 October, we forward hereby 
our report as follows : 

1. Order to the attacking force to assemble at Hitokappu Bay. 

- The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined 
Fleet on 7 November : 

"The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall assemble in Hito- 
kappu Bay by 22 November for re-fueling". 

2. Order giving the details of the mission of the attacking forces. 

The, following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined 
Fleet on 25 November : 

(a) "The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret and maintaining 
close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian 
waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of 
the U. S. Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The first air-raid is planned 
for the dawn of X day (exact date to be given by later order). 

"Upon completion of the air-raid, the Task Force, keeping close co-ordination 
and guai-ding against the enemy's counter-attack, shall speedily leave the enemy 
waters and then return to Japan". 

(b) "Should the negotiations with the United States prove successful, the 
Task Force shall hold itself in readiness forthwith to return and re-assemble". 

3. Order directing'the attacking force to proceed on its mission: 

[2] The following order was issuetl by the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Combined Fleet on 25 November : 

"The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall leave Hitokappu 
Bay on the morning of 26 November and advance to 42° N 170° E (standing-by 
position) on the afternoon of 3 December and speedily complete re-fueling". 

4. Exact time when the attack on Hawaii was decided upon. 

(a) By way of preparation for the opening of hostilities; the plan of naval 
operations against the United States, Great Britain and Netherlands (including 
the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor) was adopted on 5 November. 

(b) Commencement of hostilities was decided upon by Cabinet Council on 
1 December. 

(c) On 2 December the Imperial General Headquarters issued an order that 
hostile action was to be opened on 8 December. 

5. The following agencies of the Imperial Japanese Government were con- 
cerned in the discussions and decisions to execute the attack on Pearl Harbor: 

The Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters and the Head- 
quarters of the Combined Fleet. 



396 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

N. B. — Since this report is based on the combined memory of those who were 
connected with the matter, it is possible that some revisions may have to be 
made as a result of further investigation. 

K. Nakamura, 
Rear Admiral, UN. 
Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy. 



(Incl #4) 

11] 

Questionnaire 

17 OCTOBBB 45. 

To be answered completely. Answers to be substantiated by copies of all plans, 
orders, maps, photos, reports, and other oflScial documents available. In case a 
question is answered from memory, so state, giving name, rank, and official 
position. 

1. Who first thought of or proposed a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor? 

(Give names or agencies, e. g. Admiral -^ , General Staff, Naval General 

Staff, War Ministry, etc.) 

2. When? 

(Give date or approximate date as accurately as possible, e. g. August 
1940, Spring of 1941, year 1922 — any time such a proposal first was con- 
sidered either for actual use or in strategic planning, study, or discussion). 

3. Was this maneuver or any similar maneuver included in pre-war Japanese 
plans for possible use in event of war with U. S. ? 

4. If so, describe it as given in these pre-war plans. 

(State objectives, forces to be employed, routes of approach, what you 
expected to accomplish, etc.) 

5. When was the decision made to actually attack Pearl Harbor. 

(Gives dates as accurately as possible, e. g. 1 September 1941, Spring of 
1941) 

6. Who made this decision? (e. g. War Ministry, Chief of Staff, War Ministry, 
or some combination of persons or agencies.) 

7. If this decision was made in a conference give date (or approximate date) 
of that conference and the names of all known persons attending. 

8. What factors were considered in arriving at this decision? (e. g. Desire to 
cripple Pacific Fleet so as to gain freedom of action against P. I.?; Destroy U. S. 
main Pacific base?; Gain time for P. I. campaign? Protect mandated islands? 
or what?) 

[2] Who worked up the details of the plan as it was actually executed? 
(e. g. Planning Section, General Staff? Naval Staff? Individuals?) Note: 
When I say Plan, I differentiate between plans or staff studies and the actual 
orders issued to put the plan in effect. 

10. When did this work begin? 

11. When the plan was completed who finally approved it? 

12. When was the plan finally approved? 

13. What persons and agencies knew about this plan? (e. g. the Emperor, the 
War Ministry, the General Staff, the Naval Staff, the Cabinet, The consul at 

Honolulu, Military Attaches to The Amassador at Wash- 

ingrton, Kurusu, etc) Note: Names of individuals and agencies are both desired — 
for example, the Cabinet as a whole might not have been Informed but the War 
Minister would. Also : state persons who had partial knowledge, e. g. the Emperor 
might have known you planned to attack but not without declaring war, etc. 

14. What sources furnished information on which the plan was based? Give 
names, rank and positions, (e. g. Military attaches. Consuls, Japanese Civilian 
resident of Honolulu, Broadcasts, New articles). 

15. What features of information were obtained from each of the above-listed 
sources? 

16. How and by whom was the detailed information plotted on the maps car- 
ried by your aviators obtained? (e. g. Accurately plotted and named ship berths, 
barracks, azimuths on which to approach, etc.). 

17. How was this information checked while the Task Force was en route? 

18. What part did local agents in Hawaii play? 

[31 19. Were any photographs taken by the above persons of fleet units in 
the harbor : 

20. If so, when (particularly the date of the last taken). 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 397 

21. Give complete details of how the plan was developed. Discuss : 

a. Obstacles considered and how they were overcome. 

b. Partial decisions made and by whom. 

c. How were the commanders and particular units to participate (Both 
fleet units and air units) selected? 

d. Why was the route you selected chosen? 

e. What provision was made against discovery en route? 

f. What action was to be taken if discovered? 

g. What deceptive measures to draw U. S. attention elsewhere were 
employed? 

h. What action was to be taken if the attack failed? 

22. How was the date of December 7 selected and for what reasons? 

23. How was the time of attack selected? For what reasons? 

24. Give detailed composition of Task Force (Naval Vessels and Air Units). 
.25. Were any of these Fleet Units or Air Units to be detached at any time dur- 
ing the operation, e. g. to attack secondary targets? 

26. Give scheme of maneuver for air attack. Include : 

Number and type of planes assigned to attack each target. Why? 
Routes of groups of planes from carrier to target. Why? 
Time each group was to strike its target. 

Route (s) of escape after attack? Why was this route (these routes) 
selected? 

27. Discuss use of midget-submarines. 

(Why used, number used, whether you expected any back, did you get any 
back, ann other details, conclusions, as to usefulness of this weapon. ) 

[4] 28. Was the plan in any way tentative or contingent. If so, give 
details: (e g. If the U. S. had made some concession was it to be abandoned or 
changed? If the U. S. Pacific Fleet had put to sea what changes would have 
been made?) 

29. Furnish a copy of each of the following : 

a. The Plan for the Pearl Harbor Operation, 
ft. Any Staflf Studies or other subsidiary documents thereto. 
c. The Order (with all amendments thereto) that put the plan in effect. 
Note: If any document Is not available give all details of it you can from 
memory if necessary. (Items furnished from memory will be so marked.) 

30. When did you begin assembling the Task Force? 

31. Where did it assemble? 

32. When did it move out on its mission? 

33. Had an amicable settlement appeared likely or been agreed upon while 
the Task Force was en route what action was then to be taken. 

34. Did everything go as planned? 

35. If not, what change or mishaps occurred and why? 

36. Was the task force ever discovered and/or attacked while en route? 

37. Were any non-Japanese vessels sighted en route? 

38. If so, what was done about them? 

39. Why did you not follow up the air attack with a surface attack? With a 
landing? 

40. List your losses. 

41. List estimated U. S. losses. 

42. From what sources did you determine U. S. losses? 

[5] 43. Did you launch any additional raids or make any reconnaissance 
against Hawaii by either air, submarine, or surface vessels immediately follow- 
ing the attack, (e. g. night after attack, following day, etc.) 

44. If any questions remain unanswered, state exact reason in each case. (e. g. 

"All copies of order burned on surrender," "Adm. who is only person who 

knew this was killed on (date)."). 

45. Did you have any submarine operating in the Hawaiian ai*ea prior to the 
attack on Pearl Harbor? 

46. If so, where were these submarines based, what were their operation in- 
structions, what reports did they render during and after the attack, and were 
there any casualties among these submarines? 

47. If submarines were used, how long did they remain in the Hawaiian area? 

48. What information pertaining to the Pearl Harbor attack was received from 
Japanese merchant vessels before the attack on Pearl Harbor? 



398 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



•5 it 



\ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 399 

general headquarters 

Supreme Commander for the Aixieh) Powers 

AG 350.05 (1 Nov. 45)GB 1 November 1945. 

Subject: Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attacli on Pearl Harbor. 
To : Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. 
(Attention : A. C. of S., G-2) 

1. Reference our communication AG 350.05 (26 October 1945) GB, same subject, 
and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945 
and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained 
from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 
1941, a partial detailed report is forwarded herewith. 

2. This report was compiled by the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial 
Japanese Army and Navy in response to our Questionnaire furnished the Liaison 
Committee on 17 October, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our 
communication of 26 October (refered to above) and includes detailed information 
in answer to questions 1-13 inclusive, 21-28 inclusive, and 30-47 inclusive, 
thereof. 

3. In view of the fact that the Japanese records of this operation have been 
largely destroyed, the bulk of this information has been obtained by interroga- 
tion of important figures in the Japanese Military and Naval Establishments of 
the time. Sources of such items of information are stated in the text. 

4. The Japane.se report that answers to questions 14-20 inclusive and question 
48 (which concern their sources of military intelligence on which operational 
plans were based) will require further investigation, which is now in progi'ess. 
Documentary evidence required by Question 29 was destroyed at the time of 
surrender ; however, efforts to reconstruct it, at least partially, from memory and 
from fragmentary sources, are being continued. This additional information 
will be forwarded as soon as received and translated. 

For the Supreme Commander : 

/S/ H. W. AlXEN, 

Colmiel, A. G. D., 
Asst. Adjutant General. 
1 Incl : Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire. 

(Incl. 1) 

1082 Alued Translator and Interpretek Section 

UNITED states ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC 

Note: Translation of a document requested by Colonel MUNSON, Historical 
Investigation Section, G-3, 17 October-20 October 1945. 

Rep!ly to A Questionnaire Concerning the Pearl Harbor Attack 

Doc. #1032 DRM/FMO/HDP 

Pp. 1 I. Paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 48 (that is, the informa- 

tion therein) are under special investigation and the answers will be 
forwarded later. 

II. The reply to Paragraph 29 (concerning orders) will be delayed 
because all the copies of the orders were burned at the time of the sur- 
render. A detailed report based on the recollections of the people con- 
cerned and on fragmentary sources, without the aid of documents which 
should be available, is in preparation. 
Pp. 2 (Note : The following Paragraphs 1. 2, 3 and 4 are based on the recol- 

lections of Chief of Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt. 
TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi ; member of Operations Section Naval General 
Staff, Comdr. MIYO, Tatsukichi; Combined Fleet Staff members Capt. 
KUROSHIMA, Kameto. and Comdr. WANATABE, Yasuji.) 

1. Who convelved and proposed the PEARL HARBOR surprise attack? 
Adm. YAMAMOTO, Isoroku, then CinC, Combined Fleet. 

2. When was this done? 

The first part of January 1941. (CinC YAMAMOTO ordered Rear 
Adm. ONISHI, Takijiro, at that time Chief of Staff of 11 Air Fleet, to 
study the operation.) 
79716 O — 46 — pt. 13 3 



400 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

3. Was the said action (or similar actions in anticipation of a tear 
against the UNITED STATES) included in JAPAN'S prewar plans? 

No. 

4. If this is so, write the facts shown in the prewar plans. 

(No statement.) 
Pp. 3 (Note: The following Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 are based on the I'eeol- 

lections of Adm. NAGANO, Osami, then Chief of the Naval General 
Staflf.) 

5. When was it decided to attack PEARL HARBOR? 

3 Nov. 41. This date was set by the Chief of the Naval General StafC, 
NAGANO, when CinC, Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO came to TOKYO. 

6. Who made the foregoing decision? 
Chief of the Naval General Staff NAGANO. 

7. If the decision n-as made in conference, give time of said confer- 
ence and names of all persons present. 

It was not made in conference. 
Pp. 4 . (Note : The following Paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 are based upon the 
recollections of Chief of the Oijerations Section Naval General Staff, 
Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadato.shi ; Comdr. MIYO, Tatsukichi, a member of the 
Operations Section Naval General Staff; and Capt. KUROSHIMA, Ka- 
meto, a member of the Combined Fleet Staff. ) 

8. What important factors were considered in reaching this decision? 
The factors considered wete : ( 1 ) rendering impotent the UNITED 

STATES PACIFIC Fleet in order to gain time and maintain freedom of 
action in the SOUTH SEAS Operation (including the PHILIPPINE Is- 
lands), and (2) the defense of our mandated islands. 

9. Who vifere the persons who worked out the details of the actual plun? 
Members of Naval General Staff Operations Section, Combined Fleet 

Operations Staff and 1 Air Fleet Operations Staff. 

10. W.hen was the above undertaking started? 
In the first part of September 1941. 

11. Who made the final confirmation o/ this plan tchen it was com- 
pleted? 

CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO. 
Pp. 5^ 12. When was the final confirmation of this plan made? 

1 Dec. 41. 

13. Who were the people and organizations who knew of this plan? 

(Note: This answer is based <m the recollections of the Chief of the 
Naval General Staff, Adm. NAGANO, Osami ; Chief of the Operations 
Section Naval General Staff, Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi ; and Comdr. 
MIYO, Takkichi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General 
Staff.) 

Those connected with the Navy are as follows : 

(1) Those who knew the complete plan in advance: 
Chief of the Naval Qeneral Staff 
Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff 

Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff 
Members of Operations Section Naval General Staff 
The commanders in chief, the chiefs of staff and most of the staff 
members of the Combined Fleet Hq and 1 Air Fleet Hq 

(2) Those who knew a part of the plan in advance: 

Pp. 6 Chiefs of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Naval General Staff 

Navy Minister 
Navy Vice-Minister 

Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, Navy Ministry 
Chiefs of Sections 1 and 2, Bureau of Naval Affairs, and some 

of ftheir personnel 
Commander in chief of each fleet of the Combined Fleet, their 
chiefs of staff and some of the staff members. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 401 

(3) Those who knew the general outline of the plan in advance: 

The Emperor. (The Emperor knew of the objective of attacking 
the main strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet 
with a task force after the last ultimatum to the UNITED 
STATES Government had been delivered.) 
(Note: Any persons other than those connected with the Navy are 
unknown. However, it is certain tliat none of the Japanese officials who 
were in the UNITED STATES or its possessions, including Ambassador 
NOMURA, Ambassador KURUSU, the Navy and Army officers attached 
to the embassy in the UNITED STATES and the Imperial Consul in 
HONOLULU, knew anything about this plan in advance.) 
Pp. 7 (Note: The replies in Paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 are based on the recol- 

lections of the Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, 
Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi ; Comdr. MIYO, Takkichi, a member of the 
Operations Section Naval General Staff; Combined Fleet Staff members 
Capt. KUROSHIMA, Kameto, and Comdr. WATANABE, Yasuji ; and the 
commanding officer, officer of the Air Unit, Comdr. FUCHIDA, Mitsuo.) 
21. Write a detailed report on how this plan could have been improved, 

a. The obstacles which were considered and how they were overcome. 

(1) The impossibility of refueling at sea due to rough weather was 
considered. To overcome this difficulty, the ships with a limited cruis- 
ing range were deck-loaded with drums of heavy oil, and heavy oil was 
stowed In open spaces inside the ship. In the eventuality that there were 
no opportunity to refuel at sea, all the ships except the destroyers had a 
cruising radius extending to approximately E Long 160°. In the event 
the destroyers were unable to refuel there was a plan to have them 
separate and return. In actual fact, however, the sea was compara- 
tively calm and the scheduled refueling was possible. 

(2) It was decided that a torpedo attack against anchored ships was 
the most effective method of putting the main strength of the UNITED 
STATES PACIFIC Fleet in the HAWAII area out of action for a con- 
siderably long period of time. Hence, the following two obstacles were 
considered : 

(a) The fact that PEARL HARBOR is narrow and shallow. 

(b) The fact that PEARL HARBOR was probably equipped with 
torpedo nets. 

(c) In regard to point (a), it was planned to attach stabilizers to 
the torpedoes and launch them from an extremely low altitude. 

(d) In regard to point (b), since success could not be counted on, a 
bombing attack was also employed. 

b. Were local decisions made and, if so, by whom? 
There were none. 

c. How were the units and commanding officers who were to par- 
ticipate selected (surface forces and air forces) ? 

Pp. 9 Air forces : The basic unit was organized by attaching the flight per- 

sonnel of Car Div 4 (RYU JO and RYUHO) to Car Div 1 (AKAGI, 
KAGA) and Car Div 2 (SORYU and HIRYU), which were at that time 
the most highly trained units in the Combined Fleet. Car Div 5, because 
it had just been organized, was supplemented by highly trained flight 
personnel from every unit in JAPAN, and, by further concentrated train- 
ing, it was planned to bring them to peak efficiency. 

Surface forces: As for a possible, vessels with a long cruising range 
were selected. Persons of ability were selected for commanding officers. 

d. What were the reasons for the actual course selected? 

Three courses were considered for the HAWAII Operation. The 
northern course which was actually used, a central course which headed 
east following along the HAWAII Archipelago, and a southern route 
passing through the MARSHALL Islands and approaching from the 
south. On the northern route, although it was far from the enemy 
patrol screen of land-based airplanes and there was little chance of 
meeting commercial vessels, the influences of weather and topography 
were strong. Refueling at sea and navigation were difficult. On the 
Pp. 10 central and southern routes the advantages and disadvantages are gen- 
erally just the opposite to those of the above-mentioned route. Although 



402 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

it may be assumed that these routes would be preferable for purposes 
of refueling at sea, the chances of being discovered by patrol planes were 
great because the routes near WAKE, MID^^'AY, PALMYRA, JOHN- 
STON Islands, etc. Consequently, it could hardly be expected that a 
surprise attack could be made. 

The ability to refuel and a surprise attack were the keys to this 
operation. If either of them failed the execution of the operation would 
have been impossible. However, the refueling problem could be over- 
come by training. On the other hand, a surprise attack under all cir- 
cumstances could not be assured by our own strength. Therefore, the 
northern route was selected. 

e. What preparations were made for the prevention of discovery 
enroute? 

(1) By electing the route so as to pass between MIDWAY and the 
ALEUTIANS, we would pass outside the patrol zones of the patrol 
planes. 

(2) Screening destroyers were sent ahead in the path of the fleet and 
in the event any vessels were encountered, the main body of the fleet 
would make a severe change of course and endeavor to avoid detection. 

Pp. 11 (3) Complete radio silence was carried out. 

f. In the event of being discovered what countermeasures would have 
been taken V The day of the attack was designated as X-day. 

If discovered prior to X-2 day, we would have returned without 
executing the air attack. In the event of being discovered on X-l Day, 
the question of whether to make an attack or to return would have 
been decided in accordance with the local conditions. 

g. What means of deception were taken so as to direct the attention 
of the UNITED STATES elsewhere? 

The Main Force in the INLAND SEA Ai'ea and the land-based air 
units in the KYUSHU Area carried on deceptive communications, and 
deceptive measures were taken to indicate that the Task Force was 
still in training in the KYUSHU Area. 

h. If the attack had failed, what countermeasures would have been 
taken ? 

In order to bring in the Task Force it was planned to send the Main 
Force in the INALAND SEA out to the PACIFIC Ocean. 
Pp. 12 22. State reasons for and particulars of the selection of the date of 

7 December. 

(!) The Imperial Headquarters Navy Section generally acknowledged 

8 December (JAPAN time) to be suitable from an operational stand 
point and made the decision in cooperation with the leaders of the 
Combined Fleet. 

(2) For a dawn attack in the HAWAII Area in December, the tenth 
would have been suitable from the standpoint of the dark of the moon. 
However, since it was expected that the UNITED STATES PACIFIC 
Fleet, in accordance with its habits during maneuvers, would enter the 
harbor on Friday and leave on Monday, the eighth was decided on so 
as to hit between these days. 
Pp. 13 23. How uas the time for the attack selected and for what reasons? 

In order to assure the success of the attack and still avoid a night 
attack, the take-off time of the airplanes was set as near to dawn as 
possible. The attack time was set at 0330 hours (JAPAN time). Sun- 
rise that day was at 0230 hours. ) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



403 



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404 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Pp. 15 



(2) Air Strength. 

(a) Reconnaissance Unit. 



Type 


Type of airplane 


Number 
cf air- 
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Patrolling waters 
around OAHU. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



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406 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 407 

Pp. 18 25. During this operation were any of the fleet units or air forces 
diverted to attack secondary targets? 

(Note: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of 
Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was in command of the AKAGI Air 
Unit at that time.) 

(1) The MIDWAY Neutralization Unit (AKEMBONO. USHIO) left 
TOKYO Bay about 1 December, arrived at MIDWAY during the night of 
8 December, bombarded the air base, and returned to the western part 
of the INLAND Sea. The SHIRIYA moved with this unit and served 
as a supply ship. 

(2) On 16 December, while proceeding back from HAWAII, two air- 
craft carriers (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU), two cruisers (TONE, CHI- 
KUMA), and two destroyers (TANIKAZE, URAKAZE) were diverted 
to WAKE Island. They were sent by Combined Fleet orders to support 
the WAKE Invasion Operation. 

Pp. 19 26. (NOTE: These answers are based on the recollections and in- 
quiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was in command of AKAGI 
Air Unit at that time.) 

a. Explain the plans of action and the reasoning therein, for the air 
attack, giving the number and type of airplanes used against each target. 
(1) First Attack. 

(a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (50 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes). 
Target : Battleships. 

Reasoning : 

(i) It was presumed that the American battleships could be effec- 
tively crippled by 800-kg armor piercing bombs, dropped from an 
altitude of 3,000 meters or more. 
Pp. 20 (2) Horizontal bombing is relatively inaccurate, however, it was 

estimated that, with the degree of training the bombing unit had, 
an 80% ratio of hits could be expected against stationary battleships 
if formations of five airplanes were employed from an altitude of 
3,000 meters or more. Therefore, it was concluded that about four 
battleships could be effectively crippled with 10 formations of 
bombers. 

(3) Because of the accuracy of torpedo attacks, we desired to use 
as many of them as possible. However, both bombing attacks and 
torpedo attacks were used for the following reasons : 

(a) If torpedo nets were layed, the attack would otherwise be 
unsuccessful. 

(b) Launching torpedoes into shallow water such as that in 
PEARL HARBOR requires a special technique. 

(c) Ordinarily, ships were moored in pairs abreast each other. 
Consequently, bombing attacks were the only effective method 
against the inside ships. 

(b) Torpedo Bombing Unit (40 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes) . 
Target : Battleships and aircraft carriers. 

Reasoning : 

Torpedo bombing is very accurate. Therefore, the pilots most 
skillful at shallow water torpedo bombing were selected and an 
attempt made to put as many battleships and carriers temporarily 
out of action due to underwater damage as the conditions previously 
related in "(c)" would permit. (Because the carriers were not 
at their anchorages on the day of the attack, the airplanes concen- 
trated on the battleships.) 

(c) Dive Bombing Unit (54 Type 99 Carrier Bombers). 
Target : Air bases. 

15 Attack Unit (27 airplanes) — Hangars and grounded air- 
planes at FORD Island. 

16 Attack Unit (27 airplanes) — Hangars and grounded air- 
planes at WHEELER. 

Reasoning : 
Pp. 22 (1) Since the primary objective of this attack was to put the 

UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet temporarily out of action, the 
attack was directed at the battleships and carriers. However, 
fighter plane bases were attacked first because it was necessary to 
prevent a counterattack by American fighter planes against our 



408 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

main attack units — the horizontal bombing and torpero bombing 
units. 

(2) It had been concluded that WHEELER Field was a UNITED 
STATES Army fighter plane base and that carrier planes from the 
UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet were usually kept at FORD 
Island, 
(d) Fighter Striking Unit (45 Type Zero Carrier Fighters). 
Targets : Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes. 

2 Fighter Striking Unit— FORD Island and HICKMAN. 

4 Fighter Striking Unit— WHEELER and BARBERS POINT. 
6 Fighter Striking Unit— KANEOHE. 

Reasoning : 

(i) At the beginning of the attack the fighter striking unit was to 
maintain a single formation and patrol over OAHU, attacking any 
enemy fighter planes which got into the air. 
Pp. 23 (2) If no fighter opposition were met in the air, the unit was to 

split up as indicated above and attack grounded airplanes on the 
various airfields on OAHU, thereby preventing a counterattack. 
(2) Second Attack. 

(a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (54 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes). 
Target : Air bases. 

6 Attack Unit — Hangars and grounded airplanes at HICKHAM. 

5 Attack Unit — Hangars and grounded airplanes at KANEOHE, 
FORD Island and BARBERS POINT. 

Reasoning: 

By putting the American airplanes on OAHU temporarily out of 
action, a counterattack against the Task Force could be prevented. 

(b) Di\'€ Bombing Unit (81 Type 99 Carrier Bombers). 
Target : Aircraft carriers and cruisers. 
Reasoning : 

(1) Although the 250-kg bombs which the airplanes were able to 
to carry could not pierce the armor of the battleship, it was estimated 
that they would be effective against the UNITED STATES cruisers 
and carriers of that time. 

(2) It was estimated that there were then four or five American 
carriers operating in the HAWAII Area. They were the targets 
of this dive bombing unit. (Since the aircraft carriers were not at 
their anchorages on the day of the attack, most of the blows were 
directed against battleships.) 

(c) Fighter Striking Unit (36 Type Zero Fighters). 
Targets : Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes. 

2 Fightei^ Striking Unit— FORD Island and HICKHAM. 
Pp. 25 4 Fighter Striking Unit— WHEELER and KANEOHE. 

Reasoning : 

Same as stated previously. 

b. Explain the courses, and the reasoning therein, which the air units 
followed from the aircraft carriers to the targets. 

Both the First and Second Attack Units proceeded directly from the 
carriers to OAHU. They flew at an altitude of 3,000 meters. (Dense 
clouds hung at about 2,000 meters that day, so the airplanes flew above 
them. ) 

The positions of the carrier groups were as follows*: 

( 1 ) The airplanes in the First Attack Unit took off at 0130 hours. The 
carriers were 230 nautical miles bearing 0° from the western tip of 
LAXAI Island. 

(2) The airplanes in the Second Attack Unit took off at 0245 hours. 
The carriers were 200 nautical miles bearing 0° from the western tip of 
LANAI Island. 

Pp. 26 The movements of the airphines after they came in sight of OAHU is 
shown in the appended sketch. 

c. Give the times at which each unit attacked its target. 
First Attack Unit. 

Dive Bombing Unit 

WHEELER Field— 0325 hours. 
Torpedo Attack Unit 

Battleships at FORD Island Anchorage— 0327 hours. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 409 

Horizontal Bombing Unit 

' Same as above — 0235 hours. 
Fighter Striking Unit 

Began ground strating — 0330 hours. 
Second Attack Unit. 

All three units — Dive Bombing Unit, Horizontal Bombing Unit and 
Fighter Striking Unit — attacked their targets about 0430 hours. How- 
ever, details are not a wi liable because the Commanding Officer of the 
Second Attack Unit, Lt. Comdr SHIMAZAKI, was killed in combat in 
January 1945. 

(Note: The times at which the attacks started have been indicated. 
Both First Attack and the Second Attack continued for 30 minutes to an 
hour). 
Pp. 27 d. What courses did the airplanes follow on their flight back to the 
carriers? Why were these couiises chosen? 

A rendezvous was made with the Fighter Striking Unit 20 nautical 
miles bearing 340° from KAENA* Point. From there all units proceeded 
directly back to the carriers. 

Because of the flying time involved, no thought was given to with- 
drawing on courses designed to deceive possible opp(JSitiop. 
Pp. 29 27. How were midget submarines used? 

(Note: This reply is baised on the recollections of Rear Adm MITO, 
Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at that time.) 

a. Reasons for use: 

To cause the greatest possible damage to the enemy through co-opera- 
tion in the assault by the air forces. 

b. How many were used? 
Five. 

c. Were they expected to return? 

While the probability that they would be able to return was very 
small, it was not thought to be wholly impossible. All midget submarine 
personnel, however, were prepared for death and none expected to re- 
turn alive. (They were precursors of the KAMIKAZE Attack Units.) 

d. Did any return? 

None were recovered, though all possible recovering measures were 
exhausted. 

e. Give a detailed report and criticism on the effectiveness of this 
weapon. 

Pp. 30 The submarines which were on patrol duty outside the entrance to 
PEARL HARBOR witneissed a great explosion within the harbor at 1631 
hours 8 December (2101 hours, 7 December, HAWAII time). A radio 
report on the success of the attack was received fi-om one of the midget 
submarines at 1811 hours the same day (0041 hours, 8 December, 
HAWAII time). 

It was impossible to determine the total damage inflicted since there 
were no further detailed reports. This report did not confirm the day- 
light attack on 8 December ; but it was verified that the night attack 
on the same day had been carried out, and it was inferred that great 
damage was caused to one or more large war vessels. 

Pp.31 28. Was this a loell -elaborated plan or one developed for the emer- 
gency? 

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Capt TOMIOKA, 
Sadatoshi, Chief of Operations Section. Naval General Staff, and of 
Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at 
that time.) 

a. Had the UNITED STATES made concessions would the plan have 
been discarded or modified? 

(TOMIOKA) It would have been discarded. 

b. If the American fleet had been at sea, how would the plan have been 
modified? 

(Replies by FUCHIDA:) 

(1) Had the American fleet sought to intercept our Task Force or 
had there been a significant threat to the attack as planned, we would 
have counterattacked. 

(2) Had the American fleet left port we would have scouted an area 
of about 300 miles around OAHU and were prepared to attack. If the 
American fleet could not be located, we were to withdraw. 



410 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Pp.32 (Note: The following replies, Paragraphs 30-38, are based on the rec- 
ollections of Coradr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI 
Air Unit at the time of the attack.) 

30. When dicb the Task Force hegin to formt 

The various forces were to leave the several areas where they might 
be on or about 15 November, to proceed as single vessels or in small 
formations and to rendezvous in TANKAPPU-WAN by 22 November. 

31. Where tvas the rendezvous f 
TANKAPPU-WAN. 

32. When did the Task Force get underiray on its mission? 

It sailed from TANKAPPU-WAN at 0600 hours 26 November. 

33. Was there any provision to receive icord of a settlement ichile this 
Task Force was underway? What steps icould have been taken if a 
compromise had been reached? 

Depending on orders, the Task Force would have returned to TAN- 
KAPPU-WAN, HOKKAIDO, or to MUTSU-KAIWAN. 
34- Did everything proceed according to plan? 

Yes. 
Pp. 33 35. If it had not done so, what changes or mishaps might have arisen 
and why? 

(No statement. ) 

36. Was the Task Force sighted or attacked while underway? 
No. 

37. Was any shipping, other than Japanese, seen while underway? 
None. 

38. If any such shipping had been encountered, what measures ivould 
have been taken? 

(No statement.) 
Pp. 34 39. Why was the air assault not continued, and why was it not folloioed 
up by surface units or by a landing? 

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Comdr FUCHIDA, 
Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at the time of the 
attack. ) 

(1) The object of this attack was to destroy the capital strength of the 
UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet and to delay any attack which it might 
make across the PACIFIC. Hence this objective could be accomplished 
by air attack alone. Furthermore, since the whereabouts of the Ameri- 
can task forces were unknown, and since the chances of scouting them 
were small, in face of a possible counterattack in co-operation with the 
50-odd remaining HAW All-based large airplanes, the advantages of a 
quick withdrawal were apparent. Consequently, no naval assault was 
undertaken. 

(2) No landing operation was planned because it would have been 
impossible to make preparations for such a landing in less than a month 
after the opening of hostilities, and because it was recognized that the 
problems of speed and of supplies for an accompanying convoy would 
have made it unlikely that the initial attack could have been accom- 
plished without detection. 

Pp. 35 (Note: The following paragraphs, 40, 41 and 42 are based on the 
recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding 
Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.) 
40. What damage did the Japanese receive? 
In the First Attack : 

Fighter planes 3 

Dive bombers- 1 

Torpedo bombers . 5 

Total 9 

In the Second Attack: 

Fighter planes 6 

Dive bombers 14 

Total 20 

Grand total 29 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 411 

Jfl. What was the estimated damage to American forces? 

(1) Naval vessels: 

Sunk: 4 battleships 

1 cruiser 

2 tankers 

Pp. 36 Heavily damaged : 4 battleships 

Lightly damaged: 1 battleship 

(2) Airplanes 

Shot down : Approximately 10 Airplanes. 

turned or destroyed on the ground : Approximately 250 

airplanes 
Total : Approximately 260 airplanes. 
It is impossible to determine how many others, presumably a consider- 
able number were destroyed in the hangars. 
42. How was the ramage inflicted on the Americans determined? 

(1) From reports of flight personnel upon their return. 

(2) From studies of photographs taken by flight personnel. 

(Note: No reconnaissance planes were used to assess the results im- 
mediately after the attack, but one element of fighter planes was ordered, 
after completing its mission, to fly as low as possible to observe the 
results.) 

Pp. 37 43. Were any of the air, submarine or surface units employed in addi- 
tional attacks on HAWAII or in reconnaissance immediately after the 
main attack? 

(Note: The following paragraph is based on the recollections of Cmdr 
FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, at that time Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit, 
and of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet. ) 

A part from reconnaissance by submarines stationed at the mouth of 
PEARL HARBOR on the eve of the day of the attack, none engaged in 
follow-up attacks or in reconnaissance. 
Pp. 38 (Note: The replies in paragraphs 45, 46 and 47 are based on the recol- 
lections of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at the time of 
the attack. ) 

45. Were any submarines operating in Hawaiian waters prior to the 
attack on PEARL HARBOR? 

Submarines were stationed on lookout duty in Hawaiian waters, the 
day before the Task Force strike, on the evening of 7 December. They 
were ordered not to attack until the Task Force strike was verified. 

46a. If there were, where were these submarines based? 

Most of the submarines departed from JAPAN for a rendezvous at 
KWAJALEIN. to proceed thence to HAWAII. A few, which were delayed 
in leaving JAPAN, changed course and proceeded directly to HAWAII. 

b. What were their operation orders? 
Pp. 39 The orders given to the submarines were as follows : Part were to pro- 
ceed with the Task Force, screening it as it proceeded toward HAWAII ; 
the majority of the submarines were to take up lookout stations in 
Hawaiian waters by the evening of 7 December, while the midget sub- 
marines were to scout and reconnoiter a possible attack by the enemy 
fleet as well as strike into PEARL HARBOR. 

At the same time, they were given strict orders not to attack until the 
Task Force strike had been verifled. 
c. Were reports made during and after the attack? 

When the Task Force and the Uiidget submarine strikes were com- 
pleted, the midget submarines reported as follows : 

(1) Report of the attack as observed by a midget submarine on the 
of 8 December. 

(2) A midget submarine radioed the same night "Surprise attack 
succeeds". 

(3) A report on the departure of midget submarines and that it 
was impossible to recover their personnel though all recovery 
measures had been tried. 

d. What damage was sustained by the submarines? 
Pp. 40 One submarine was detected and depth-charged by patrol vessels near 
the entrance to PEARL HARBOR. Though it ran afoul of the antisub- 
marine net, it extricated itself, after some damage, and returned safely. 
Apart from this case there was one other submarine lost off PEARL 
HARBOR ; the time and place of its sinking are unknown. 



412 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Jft. How long did the suhmarines remain in Hawaiian waters? 

The submarines continued operations in the vicinity of HAWAII from 
8 December, the day of the attack, until early January of the following 
year. During this time, most of the submarines proceeded to the west 
coast of the UNITED STATES to destroy shipping, and part of the 
submarines returned to JAPAN. Only a small number remained in the 
Hawaiian area for the maximum length of time. 

End 



OENEBAL HE^ADQUABTEIBS 

SuPEEMB Commander fob the At-t-teid PowBats 

AG 350.05 ( 8 Nov 45) GB 8 Novbmbeb 1945. 

Subject. Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Atta^ck on Pearl Harbor. 
To : Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. 
(Attention : A. C. of S., G-2) 

1. Reference our communications AG 350.05 (1 November 1945) GB, and AG 
350.05 (20 October 1945) GB, same subject, and in further compliance with your 
radios WX 73711. War Sec. 7 October 1945 and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, 
requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to 
the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an additional partial report is 
forwarded herewith. 

2. This report contains answers to questions 14-20 inclusive and to question 48 
of our questionnaire to the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army 
and Navy, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our communication of 
26 October referred to above. 

For the Supreme Commander : 

/S/ H. W. Allen 
H. W. Allen, 

Colonel, A.O.D., 
Asst. Adjutant General. 
1 Incl : Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire. 

(Incll) 
Doc No. 1668 

Allied Translator and Interpreter Section 

united states army forces, pacific 

Note: Translation of document requested by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. 

Pearl Harbor Questionnaire 

26 October 1945 

The answers to questions 14, lH, 16, 17. 18, 19, 20 and 48 of Colonel MUNSONS 
questionnaire of 17 October, the PEARL HARBOR Attack are contained herein. 
NOTE: Because of the deaths of Commander KANAMOTO, Yoshihira (28 De- 
cember 1942), and Commander NAKAJIMA, Minato (6 August 1943), who were 
staff officers in the Intelligence Department of the Naval General Staff, and be- 
cause of the pertinent records have been burneil, these answers are based upon 
the recollections of Commander TA(^HIBANA, Itaru. who was on duty in the 
Intelligence Department at that time. 

14. Sources of intelligence? 

Such matters as the strength of the UNITED STATES Fleet in the HAWAII 
area, the condition of military installations, the da.vs upon which the fleet moved 
out of and into port, the location and condition of moorages, waters in which 
maneuvers were held, air patrols, etc. ; were used as basic intelligence material. 
This material was collated by the Intelligence Department of the Naval Gen- 
eral Staff and used as the basis for the operation plan. 

The primary sources were : 

1. Naval attache to the Japanese Embassy in Washington. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 413 

2. Public newspapers in the UNITED STATES. 

3. American radio broadcasts (public). 

4. Crews and passengers on ships which put in at HONOLULU. 

5. General information. 

15. Characteristics of intelligence? 

Emphasis was placed on material collected statistically over a number of 
years. 

16. How atid from whom were the details on the maps carried by personnel of 
the air units obtained? 

A. The location of the anchorages shown on the maps was determined on 
the basis of information gathered from the sources mentioned in "14", beginning 
in the early part of 1941. Information on the condition of the fleet moorages in 
PEARL HARBOR in the early part of November was forwarded to Fleet Head- 
quarters. Fleet Headquarters then corrected its information accordingly. 

B. Information on barracks and other military installations was compiled 
from the sources listed in "14". 

C. The general outlines of the approach to OAHU for both the Attack Force 
and the air units were determined from information provided by the previously 
named source. Factors taken into consideration in the choice were American 
air patrols, sea patrols, etc. The routes selected were judged to be those upon 
which there was slight chance of encountering a patrol, merchant ships, etc. 

17. In what way did the Attack Force check on information while it was under- 
way? 

As information was gathered from the sources mentioned in "14" it was 
forwarded to the Attack Force. 

18. What role was played by agents in HAWAII? 
None. 

19-20. Photographing of ships in the harbor and opportunities for same. 

Applicable facts not available. 

48. What pertinent information was received from merchant ships prior to the 
attack? 

Merchant ships provided fragmentary information on moorages in PEARL 
HARBOR, ship and air unit maneuvers, the names of vessels encountered in the 
HAWAII area, etc. This information was used in the statistical collation of 
information mentioned in "14". 

EXHIBIT NO. 8-A 

general headquarters 

Supreme Commander fob the Allied Powers 

AG 350.05 (12 Nov 45) GB 12 November 1945. 

Subject : Additional Data With Reference To Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor. 

To: Chief of Sl.afif, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attention: A. C. of S., 
G-2). 

1. Reference previous correspondence above file and subject, and in com- 
pliance with your radios WX 73711 War Sec, 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14 
October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese 
with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 1941, an additional 
document is forwarded herewith. 

2. This document provides further amplification previously furnished by the 
Japanese in answer to question 27 and questions 4.5-47 inclusive of our ques- 
tionnaire of 17 October 1945 with respect to submarine operations in connec- 
tion with the Pearl Harbor attack, and which was forwarded on 1 November 1945. 

For the Supreme Commander : 

/s/ H. W. Allen 
H. W. Allen, 
Colonel, A. G. D., 
As8t Adjutant General. 



414 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

1 Incl : Notes of Correspondent. 

[A newspaper Article Published in the Yomiuri-Hochi, 30 October 1945] 
[1] The Eve of "Pearl Harbor" 

An early chapter in the History of War Crimes. 

December 8, 1941. This is the fatal date when the American People as one 
resolved themselves to "Remember Pearl Harbor !" But long before this date 
Japan's submarine offensive on Pearl Harbor vrere going on and several eery 
periscopes were feeling out movements of American tleets from the rough sea. 
The former War Correspondent Hanakata has only now made public his notes 
taken at that time from direct narrations of the late Captain (then Lt Com- 
mander) Katsuji Watanabe of "I No. 69" and the late Rear Admiral (then 
Captain) Shinkl Nakaoka of the 11th EJetachment of the 3rd Submarine Fleet. 

"The Japanese submarine detachment belonged to the Sixth Fleet, whose 
flagship was the light cruiser Katori. In early November orders for war prepa- 
ration were given to this detachment, and on 11 November over ten submarines of 
the First and 3rd Detachnlents, including "I" Nos. 69. 74, 75 and others left 
Yokosuka Naval Base, with knowledge of the growing war fever in Washington 
and Tokyo. 

"The submarine fleet followed a course due east in line ahead, stretching over 
20 miles. They navigated at surface speeds of from 12 or 13 to 20 knots. But 
when they got near the Hawaiian waters they extended and followed their I'e- 
spective courses. The duties of the submarine fleet were known as (a) to feel 
the movements of American fleets around Pearl Harbor; (b) to disptach "spe- 
cial submarines" from their decks and to observe their war results; (c) to attack 
escaping American war vessels, if any; (d) to rescue operators of "special sub- 
marines", down fliers and others wherever possible. 

"In Hawaiian waters the submarines floated on the sea in the night, and in 
the day time they submerged to periscope depth. The schedule of Pearl Harbor 
attack at 0300 on December 8th was transmitted to the submarine fleet two or 
three days beforehand. On 7th "I No. 74" sighted the carrier Lexington but no 
trouble ensued. 

"The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was carried on as had been scheduled. 
Before this, five large sized "I" type submarines belonging to the First Sub- 
marine Detachment had launchetl "special submarines" from their decks. That 
was the departure of the now well known Commander Iwasa and other members 
of "special attack parties". 

"The submarines followed the upheaval in the harbor only through occasional 
land explosions coming through the deep water, and they confirmed the Harbor 
Battle at night when they emerged from the bottom of the sea. At 1631 (2101 
Hawaiian time) Rear Commander Watanabe of "I No. 69" detected from the 
periscope a huge fiery column which marked the end of the USS Arizotm. 

[2] "Lt. Commander Watanabe's radio intercepted dispatches in relation to 
this were by the enemy and his "I No. 69" was pursued by enemy destroyers which 
dropped depth charges madly. Under this circumstance "I No. 69" dived 60 to 70 
meters beneath the surface, though her ordinary diving capacity had been set at 
80 meters. The submarine sustained damage here and there and finally was 
caught by submarine wires. She struggled hard and just managed to get away 
from the wires. Altogether this old submarine remained submerged about 39 
hours. All hopes of rescuing fellow-fighters who had been shot down had been 
abandoned." 

The notes from direct narration by Captain Watanabe and Rear Admiral 
Nakaoka end here. But Mr. Hanakata observes that most of the officers and crews 
of Japanese submarines, including those participating in the siege of Pearl 
Harbor, perished at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean, the prey of American radio 
locators. For example, the said Captain Watanabe perished with his submarine 
in 1943 around the Gilbert Islands. Rear Admiral Nakaoka was promoted to be 
captain of the crack cruiser Atago but he also was killed in action by enemy 
bombs on the bridge of that vessel. 

The Yomiuri-Hochi 30 October 1945. 

I certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief the foregoing notes repre- 
sent a true report of the information given me by the late Captain Watanabe 
and the late Rear Admiral Nakaoka at the time of interview, 

/&/ M. Hanakata. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 415 

EXHIBIT NO. 8-B 

oenebax headquarters 

Supreme Commander for the Axlied Powers 

AG 350.05 (29 Nov 45) GB 29 November 1945. 

Subject : Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor. 
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attention Assistant 
Chief of Staff, G-2). 

1. Reference our communications of 26 October 1945, 1 November 1945, and 8 
November 1945, same tile number and subject, and in further compliance with 
your radios WX 73711, War Sec, 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, 
requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to 
the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an additional partial report is 
forwarded herewith. 

2. This report contains a reconstruction from memory of certain Japanese docu- 
ments relative to the attack, all originals of which are reported to have been 
burned at the time of surrender. The reconstructions have been obtained by the 
Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army and Navy in compliance with 
question 29 of our questionnaire of 17 October 1945, a copy of which was forwarded 
as Incl. No. 4 to our communication of 26 October referred to above. 

For the Supreme Commander : 

/sgd/ H. W. Allen 
H. W. Allen, 
Colonel, A.Q.D. 
Asst. Adjutant Oeneral. 
1 Incl : Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire, 
[i] Dec 1976 

Axlied Translator and Interpreter Section 
united states army forces, pacific 
Note: Translation of a document requested by Colonel MUNSON, Historical 
Investigation Sction, G-2. 

Reply to a Questionnaire Concerning the Pearl Harbor Attack 

22 October 1945. 
Navy Ministry 

The answers to Question 29 of Col. MUNSON's questionnaire on the PEARL 
HARBOR attack, dated 17 October, are contained herein. 
29. Copiesof the following will be submittefl : 

1. Operation plan for the PEARL HARBOR attack. 

2. Operational research and other documents related to the attack. 

3. Orders relative to carrying out the plan (together with all revisions). 

All copies of the above items were burned at the time of the surrender, and as 
a result no documents are available. The e.ssential points in the orders relative 
to carrying out the operation are hereby submitted. The information is based 
on the recollections and inquiries of the following three men : 
Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff. 
Section Orders and Directives 

Real Admiral TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi (then a captain and chief of Operation's 
Section, Naval General Staff) . 
Combined Fleet Orders 

Rear Admiral KUROSHIMA, Kameto (then a captain and member of Com- 
bined Fleet Senior Staff (SHUSEKI SAMBO).) 
Task Force Orders 

Capt FUCHIDA, Mitsuo ( then a commander and in command of AKAGI Air 
Unit). 
Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 1 (essentials). 

5 Nov 41. 
From : Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami. 
To : CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO. 

A. Because it is feared that war with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN 
and the NETHERLANDS is inevitable, it has been decided that for the sake of the 
Empire's defense general operational preparations will be completed by the first 
part of December. 

B. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will carry out the necessary oper- 
ational preparations. 

C. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff. 

79716 O— 46 — pt. 13 4 



416 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 1 (essentials) 

9 Nov 41. 
From : Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO. Osanii. 
To : CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO. 

A. The Combined Fleet will prepare itself for the possibility that war with 
the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS may become 
inevitable in the first part of December. The necessary forces will be sent to the 
prepared points at a suitable time prior to the beginning of operations. 

B. A strict watch against possible surprise attacks will be maintained during 
these movements. 

[S] C. The operation policy in the event hostilities break out with the 
UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS is set forth 
in the Separate Volume. 

Note: The part of the operation policy relating to the HAWAII area is re- 
called as follows : 

"At the very l)eginning of hostilities the UNITED STATES Fleet in the 
HAWAII area will be attacked by a force having 1 Air Fleet as its nucleus. 
An attempt will be made to destroy the American fleet" 



Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order (essentials). 

21 Nov. 41. 
From : Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami. 
To: CinC Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO. 

A. At the appropriate time the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will 
order the forces necessary for carrying out the operation to proceed to rendezvous 
areas. 

B. If friendly forces are challenged by American, English or Dutch forces 
during the operational preparations, the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet 
is authorized to use force in order to protect the friendly forces. 

C. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff. 



Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 5 (essentials). 

21 Nov. 41. 
From : Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami. 
To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO. 

A. In the event that an agreement is reached in the negotiations between 
the UNITED STATES and JAPAN the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet 
will immediately order the forces for the operation to return. 

B. The use of force mentioned in Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section 
Order 5 is limited to the following cases : 

1. If American English or Dutch surface forces should proceed into Japane.<!e 
territorial waters for reconnaissance purposes. 

[4] 2. If American, English or Dutch surface forces approach .Japanese 
territorial waters and it is recognized that they are jeopardizing our forces. 

3. If aggressive action imperiling our forces is taken by American, English 
or Dutch surface forces outside territorial waters. 



Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 9 (essentials). 

1 Dec. 41. 
From : Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO. Osami. 
To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO. 

A. It has been decided that JAPAN will commence hostilities with the 
UNITED STATES, ENGLAND and the NETHERLAN)6s in the first part of 
December. 

B. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will destroy enemy surface and 
air forces in the ORIENT, and, in the event enemy fleets attack, will intercept 
and destroy them. 

C. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, in co-operation with the Com- 
mander in Chief Southern Army, will rapidly attack important American, 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 417 

English and the Dutch bases in the ORIENT, and will occupy and protect 
them. 

D. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will co-operate in the operations 
of the CHINA area fleet when necessary. 

E. The times for starting the movement of forces for the above will be 
given in a later order. 

F. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff. 



Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 9 (essentials). 

1 Dec. 41. 
From : Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami. 
To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO. 

The Combined Fleet operiitions against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRIT. 
AIN and the NETHERLANDS will be based upon the Separate Volume — 
"Imperial Navy's Operation Policy against the UNITED STATES, GREAT 
BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS". 

[5] Note : As far as can be remembered, the Operation Policy in the Separate 
Volume was entii-ely the same as the Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section 
Directive of 5 November. 



Imi)erial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 12 (essentiajte). 

2 Dec. 41. 
From : Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami. 
To : CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO. 

A. Beginning 8 December, the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will start 
using military power in accordance with Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff 
Section Order 9. 

B. The use of military force against the NETHERLANDS will be started after 
moves have been made against the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN. 

C. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff. 



Chief of Naval General Staff Verbal Directive. 

2 Dec. 41. 
From : Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami. 

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO (given to him while he was in TOKYO). 
It is to be understood beforehand that if an agreement i.s reached in the 
negotiations between JAPAN and the UNITED STATES before the use of mili- 
tary power has started, the Combined Fleet forces will be directed by special 
order to return. 



Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Oijei-ation Order — (essentials). 

Flagship NAGATO HIROSHIMA-WAN 
7 Nov. 41 

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku 
CinC Combined Fleet 

[6] Combined Fleet Order 

The Task Force will gather in HITOKAPPU-WAN and remain there to take 
on supplies until 22 November. Every precaution will be taken to insure 
secrecy in movements. 

Note: About the time the above order was issued, a Combined Fleet order 
(giving directions for carrying out the Operation Policy) based on Imperial 
Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 1 was also i.ssued. Detailed in- 
formation as to its contents is not available. (It is thought that it was about 
the same as Paragraph 1 of Task Force Operation Order 1, which was issued 
later). 



418 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Combined Fleet Ultrasecx'et Operation Order — (essentials). 

Flagship NAGATO HIROSHIMA- WAN 
22 Nov. 41 

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku 
CinC Combined Fleet 

Combined Fleet Order 

A. The Task Force will move out from HITOKAPPU-WAN and proceed to the 
HAWAII area, maintaining the greatest secrecy as to its movements and a close 
watch against submarine or air attacks. At the opening of hostilities the Task 
Force will attack the main strength of the UNITED STATES Fleet in the 
HAWAII area and inflict crippling damage on it. 

The first attack will be at dawn on X-Day (to be given in a later order). 
At the conclusion of the air attacks the force will regroup and withdravi'u 
immediately to JAPAN, being prepared at all times to meet enemy counterattacks. 

B. In the event an agreement is reached in the negotiations with the UNITED 
STATES, the Task Force will immediately return to JAPAN. 

Note: In ND No 130 of 11 Oct 45 it was stated that this order was issued 
25 November. However, that was an error, and the date of the order has now 
been corrected to 22 November. 



Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order — (essentials). 

Flagship ?JAGATO HIROSHIMA-WAN 
25 Nov. 41 
[7] YAMAMOTO, Isoroku 

CinC Combined Fleet 
Combined Fleet Order 

The Task Force will move out of HITOKAPPU-WAN on 26 November and pro- 
ceed without being detected to the evening rendezvous point (Lat 40° N, Long 
170° W), set for 3 December, where refueling and supply will be carried out as 
quickly as possibly. 

Note : In accordance with this order the Task Force moved out of HITOKAPPU- 
WAN at 0600 hours on 26 November. 
Combined Fleet Dispatch Operation Order — (essentials). 
Time of origin : Approximately 1730 hours, 2 Dec 41. 
Text : X-Day will be 8 December. 
Task Force Ultrasecret Operation Order 1 (essentials). 

Flagship AKAGI, HITOKAPPU-WAN 
23 Nov 41 

NAGUMO, Chuichi 
Task Force Commander 
Task Force Order 

A. The Task Force will proceed to the HAWAII area, taking every precaution 
to insure the secrecy of its movements. The force will attack the enemy fleet in 
the HAWAII area and attempt to cripple it. 

The first air attack has been set for 0330 hours on X-Day. 

When the attacks have been completed the force will quickly withdraw. 
Upon returning to JAPAN the force will be re-equipped and supplied and then 
assigned a task in the Second Phase Operations. 

If, while underway, the Force is intercepted by the enemy fleet, encounters a 
powerful enemy force, or it appears that the enemy is going to attack in order 
to gain the advantage, the Task Force will attack immediately. 

B. Chart (See next page.) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



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420 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[S] C. Movements of each force. 

1. General : 

The entire force (except the MIDWAY Neutralization Unit) will leave HITO- 
KAPPU-WAN by special order. The force will proceed to the rendezvous point 
(Lat 42° N, Long 170° W) in convoy at a speed of from 12 to 14 knots, making 
every effort to conceal its movements and maintaining a strict watch against 
submarine and air attacks. Refueling will be carried out at evei"y opportunity 
en route. When X-Day (the day upon which hostilities will be started) is desig- 
nated, the force will proceed from the rendezvous point to the point where con- 
tact will be made with the enemy (Lat 32° N, Long 157° W). 

Beginning at 0700 hours on X-1 Day, the force will proceed due south at high 
speed (approximately 24 knots), arriving at the point from which the airplanes- 
will be launched (200 nautical miles north of the enemy anchorage) at 0100 
hours on X-Day. Air attacks will then be made against the enemy fleet and 
important air bases on OAHU. 

Upon completion of the air attacks, the airplanes will be taken aboard and the 
force will withdraw. It will proceed west, staying at least 800 nautical miles 
north of MIDWAY, to the regrouping point (Lat 30° N, Long 165° and from there 
the western part of the INLAND SEA. It will arrive there about X-15 Day and 
begin preparations for the Second Phase Operations. 

If the air attacks have been a complete success and there is little chance of an 
enemy counterattack, or if the problems of supply necessitate it, a return course 
which passes near MIDWAY may be taken. In this event. Car Div 5 and the two 
ships of Bat Div 3 will be dispatched from the Task Forse on the night of X-Day 
to early in the morning of X-1 Day, and will make an air attack against 
MIDWAY. 

If by some chance a powerful enemy force has cut off the return route, the Task 
Force will proceed south through the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS to the MARSHALLS. 

If it is anticipated that this fuel supply is insufficient for proceeding to the 
return route rendezvous point, the Screening Unit will be detached and sent 
back. 

2. Patrol Unit: 

The Patrol Unit will accompany the main unit. 

If the Screening Unit is detached, the Patrol Unit will be the advance screen 
for the main unit, and it will be responsible for screening the airplanes, during 
landings and takeoffs. 

After the air attacks the Patrol Unit will screen on the side nearest the enemy ; 
if the enemy attacks, the unit will engage and pursue him utilizing all available 
strength. 

3. MIDWAY Neutralization Unit: 

The unit will leave TOKYO Bay about X-6 Day, and after refueling, will 
proceed to MIDWAY taking every precaution to conceal its movements. It will 
arrive at MIDWAY on the night of X-Day, attack the air base, and withdraw. 
After refueling, it will return to the western part of the INLAND SEA. 

[9] The SHIRIYA will accompany the unit and act as the supply ship. 

The Supply Force will accompany the main unit to the point there the enemy 
will be contacted. After refueling the ships there, it will proceed immediately 
to the regrouping point and wait for the rendezvous to be made arriving there 
by 0800 hours on X-6 Day. While proceeding to the regrouping point the unit 
will stay at least 800 nautical miles north of MIDWAY. 

D. In the event that the operation is concelled while the Task Force is under 
wav, the force will return immediately to HITOKAPPU-WAN, HOKKAIDO or 
MUTSU-KAIWAN. 



Task Force Ultrasecret Operation Order 3 (essentials). 

Flagship AKAGI, HITOKAPPU-WAN 

23 Nov 41 

Nagumo, CHUICHI 

Task Force Commander 

Task Force Order 

The plan for the air attack against HAWAII is as follows : 
A. Movements of Air Attack Force. 

At 0600 hours on X-1 Day the force will be 700 nautical miles bearing 0° from 
Point Z (western tip of LANAI Island). Beginning at 0700 hours on X-1 Day 
the force will increase its speed to 24 knots, following a 180° course. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 421 

At 0130 hours on X-Day the First Attack will take off from a point 230 
nautical miles bearing 0° from Point Z. At 0245 hours the Second Attack Unit 
will take off from a point 200 nautical miles bejiring 0° from Point Z. 

When all the airplanes of the Second Attack Unit have taken off, the force 
will withdraw on a northerly course at approximately 24 knots. 

It is estimated that the airplanes of the First Attack Unit will return between 
0530 hours and 0600 hours and the airplanes of the Second Attack Unit between 
0645 hours and 0715 hours. 

When the units i-eturn preparations will be made immediately for the next 
attack. Carrier attack planes will be armed with torpedoes. 

If the land based air power has been completely knocked out, repeated attacks 
will be made immediately in order to achieve maximum results. However, if a 
powerful enemy force is in route to attack, subsequent attacks will be directed 
against it. 

B. Organization of air attack units. 
As shown in Separate Tables. 

C. Targets. 

1. First attack unit. 

[10] 2. 1 Group (SHUDAN) 

(1) Not more than four battleships and four carriers. 

(2) Order of selection. 

First battleships, then carriers. 

B. 2 Group will attack enemy land based air power as indicated below 

(1) 15 Attack Unit 

FORD Island — hangars and grounded airplanes. 

(2) 16 Attack Unit 

WHEELER Field — hangars and grounded airplanes. 

(3) Fighter Striking Unit 

Enemy airborne or grounded airplanes. 

2. Second Attack Unit 2. Group will bomb enemy air bases as indicated 
below. 

(1) 5 Attack Unit 

KANEOHE, FORD Island and BARBERS POINT— hangars and 

Grounded planes. 
(2)6 Attack Unit 

HICKHAM Field — hangars and grounded airplanes. 

b. 2 Group will have four or five aircraft carriers as its target. If there are 
an insufficient number of carriers present, cruisers and battleships will be 
attacked in that order. 

c. Fighter Striking Unit 

Enemy airborne or grounded airplanes. 

D. Outline of attack procedure. 

1. First Attack Unit. 

2. Surprise will be the basis of the attack. 1 Group Torpedo Bombing Unit 
will attack first ; 1 Group Horizontal Bombing Unit next, and 2 Group last. 

b. The Fighter Striking Unit will, as a single formation at the beginning come 
in over the target area at about the same time as 1 Group. Its main function will 
be to eliminate opposition from enemy fighters. 

If no opposition is encountered in the air, the unit will switch to the following 
strafing assignments against grounded airplanes. 
(1). 1 and 2 Fighter Striking Units 

Ford and HICKHAM 
(2). 3 and 4 Fighter Striking Units 

WHEELER and BARBERS POINT 
(3). 5 and 6 Fighter Striking Units 
KANEOHE 

C. In the event that the enemy has maintained strict lookouts and opposition 
is strong, the units will attack in the following order, with only a slight time 
interval between attacks. 

(1) Fighter Striking Unit 

(2) Ship Bombing Unit 

(3) Horizontal Bombing Unit 

(4) Torpedo Bombing Unit 
2. Second Attack Unit. 

The entire unit will attack at about the same time. 

The Fighter Striking Unit will follow the outline of movements given for the 
Fighter Striking Unit of the First Attack Unit. However, if no opposition is 



422 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

encountered in the air, strafing will be carried out as follows : 2. 1 and 2 Fighter 
Striking Units. 

FORD AND HICKAM 

b. 2 and 4 Fighter Striking Units. 

WHEELER and KANEOHE 

[11] 3. Outline for attack in case most of the carriers and battleships are 
anchored outside of PEARL HARBOR. 

2. The organization, targets, etc will be the same as that set forth in the 
previous section. However, 1 Group of the First attack Unit will increase its 
use of torpedo planes. 

b. Each air attack unit will first hit the fieet and then OAHU, maintaining 
its formation as a single group and striking under Air cover of the Fightei 
Striking units. 

However, if the attacks against the fleet anchorage proceed smoothly, the 
forces which didn't participate in those attacks will move on immediately to 
OAHU, while the units which participated will return to their ships. 

4. Regrouping and returning : 

a. The regrouping point following the attack will be 20 nautical miles bearing 
340" from the western tip (KAENA POINT) of OAHU. The airplanes will 
rendezvous at an altitude of 1,000m (if clouds are present at about that altitude 
the rendezvous will be made below them). 

b. The attack units will wait at the regrouping points for about 30 minutes. 
After making the rendezvous with the fighter striking units they will return to 
their ships. 

c. The fighter striking units will cover the return of the main attack uniti^ 
and intercept any enemy pursuit. 

E. Reconnaissance: 

1. Reconnaissance before the attack. 

No special reconnaissance will be made. 

2. Reconnaissance just before the attack. 

The two reconnaissance seaplanes of Cru Div 8 (DAIHACHI SENTAI 
will be launched at 0030 hours on X-day. Without being detected they will 
reconnoiter the PEARL HARBOR and CAHAINA anchorages, and report 
whether or not the enemy fleet (particularly carriers and battleships) is at 
these anchorages. 

3. Scouting and search. 

The reconnaissance seaplanes of Cru Div 8 (DAIHACHI SENTAI) will 
be launched about 0300. They will search over as wide an area as possible, 
between the Task Force and the enemy and along the channels on the east 
and west sides of OAHU. They will report the presence of enemy surface 
force moving out to attack and its movements, the presence of counter-at- 
tacking enemy airplanes and their movements, etc. 

4. Following the attack, if conditions permit, one element of the fighter planes 
(will be designated by the commanding officer of the fighter units) veill conduct 
a highspeed, low altitude reconnaissance of the damage done to ships and air^ 
planes. 

F. Air Patrol : 

From 1 hour before sunrise until ^f» minutes after sunset on the day of attack, 
Air Patrol Readiness Disposition 1, Plan B will be used. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



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424 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

EXHIBIT NO. 8-C 

geneikal headquartek8 
Supreme Commandeb for the Alued Powers 
AG 350.05 (4 Dec 45) GB 4 December 1945. 

Subject :Additional Data With Reference To Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor. 
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attention Assistants 
Chief of Staff, G-2) 

1. Reference previous correspondence same file number and subject and in 
further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec, 7 October 1945, and 
WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from 
the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, 
an additional partial report is forwarded herewith. 

2. This report contains data in amplification of the original Japanese answer 
to question 14 of our questionnaire of 17 October 1945. A copy of this ques- 
tionnaire was forwarded as Inclosure No. 4 to our communication of 26 October 
1945, and the original Japanese answer to question 14 thereof was included in 
inclosure to our communication of 8 November 1945. 

3. This report completes the series of partial reports obtained through the 
Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army and Navy .which series col- 
lectively provide all data available from known apanese sources on subjects listed 
in your radio WX 73711, War Sec, 7 October 1915. However, should additional 
data come to light incident to future investigations of Japanese conduct of the 
war, same will be promptly forwarded. 

For the Supreme Commander: 

/S/ E. D. Law, Jr. 
E. D. Law, Jr. 

Major, AOD, 
Asst. Adj. Oen. 
1 Incl : Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire. 

[i] 3543 B 

N. D. 406 

general headquarters ' 

Supreme Commander Fob the Allied Powehjs 

ALLIED translator AND INTERPRETER SECTION 

Note: Translation requested by Colonel MUNSON, G-2. 

' 17 November 1945. 

To : Colonel F. P. MUNSON 
From : Rear Admiral NAKAMURA 

Answers with reference to a letter to Rear Admiral Nakamura from Colonel 
Munson dated 10 November 1945 

1. In the report sent by the HONOLULU consul-general to the Foreign Min- 
istry, anything concerning the Navy was reported to the Intelligence Section of 
the Naval General Staff by that Ministry. These reports, it is recollected, were 
gradually increased in number as the relations between AMERICA and JAPAN 
became more tense. 

The above reports by the consul-general were chiefly items concerning the 
general political and economic situation in HAWAII and the UNITED STATES 
as seen from HAWAII, items concerning the Japanese living in the HAWAIIAN 
ISLANDS, and partly items concerning military matters. Thus, although there 
were things going on in HAWAII, as was reported at that time such as concen- 
tration of American fleet units in the PEARL HARBOR area and the consider- 
able hastening of expansion of military installations in the HAWAIIAN area, 
to which great attention was attracted as compared with reports by diplomatic 
establishments located in other areas, it is recalled that there was nothing which 
required special surveillance as far as the data for an attack on the UNITED 
STATES fleet in HAWAII were concerned. 

(Since the staff officer connected with the documents reporting the above facts 
has died and the various records have been burned, the foregoing is the con- 
jecture of commander TACHIBANA, Tomo who worked in the same department 
at that time.) 

The Intelligence Section of the Naval General Staff was having a most [2] 
difficult time judging the habits, strength, and security situations of the Amerl- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 425 

can fleet in the HAWAIIAN area. Owing to this, the Intelligence Section of 
the Naval General Staff had been for years compiling material by carefully col- 
lecting, making into statistics, and analyzing bits of information obtained from 
Naval oflBcers at WASHINGTON, newspapers and magazines published in 
AMERICA, American radio broadcasts, signal intelligence, passengers and crews 
of ships stopping over at HONOLULU, other foreign diplomatic establishments, 
commercial firms, and the like. 

The foregoing statistical method of estimation had been in use for a consider- 
able length of time. Publications with information on important moorings within 
PEARL HARBOR had already been compiled. 

Furthermore, if we were to go into the facts mentioned above more minutely, 
and if two or three examples which made a relatively strong impression were 
given, they would appear as follows : 

A. American radio broadcasts 5 December 1941 (or 6 December 1941) (Amer- 
ican time). 

The UNITED STATES broadcast of the number of battleships, cruisers, de- 
stroyers, and others entering (or anchored) in PEARL HARBOR was overheard. 

B. Signal intelligence. 

According to the signals of the American ships, the number of ships and 
small craft of the UNITED STATES fleet anchored in PEARL HARBOR or out 
on training was deduced. Again by combining the flying time (judged according 
to signal situations) of airplanes shuttling between bases and aircraft carriers 
out on training missions, and the location of UNITED STATES fleet units as 
seen by passengers and crews of ships stopping over at HONOLULU, the train- 
ing areas of the UNITED STATES fleet were determined. The zone, time, etc., 
of airplane patrols at HAWAII were deduced in the same way. 

C. Newspapers and magazines published in the UNITED STATES 
Material was obtained for deduction of AMERICA'S war preparation, prog- 
ress and expansion of military installations, location and capabilities of war- 
ships and airplanes, army strength at HAWAII, PANAMA, PHILIPPINES and 
other places, etc. 

D. Observation submarines 

With an observation submarine operating at a lessening distance outside the 
Islands, the sphere of observation of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS was gradually 
made smaller ( It reached outside of PEARL HARBOR on 6 December — American 
time). Thus, the ships out at sea, ships at LAHAINA, the airplane patrols, etc., 
were ascertained. 

The above submarine, while out at sea, did not discover an American fleet 
at sea or at LAHAINA, but met aircraft carriers and patrol planes. 
II. The gist of ". . . and other general intelligence" contained in the last 
items of the answer with reference to question No. 14, dated 17 October, was 
the reports for foreign diplomatic establishments, commercial firms in [3] 
foreign countries, etc., to the Foreign Ministry, the main store of the commer- 
cial firm, etc., chiefly on the general political and economic situation (some mil- 
itary matters included) of the country where the establishment or flrm was lo- 
cated. These reports were not important enough from the standpoint of intelli- 
gence to have a special write-up, and were considered on their own merits. 

EXHIBIT NO. 8-D 

general hel4.dquabtebs 

Supreme Commander fob the Allied Powebs 

AG 350.05 (13 Dec 45)BG 13 December 1945. 

Subject : Additional Data With Reference To Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor 
To : Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. 
(Attention : A. C. of S., G-2.) 

1. Reference Par 3 of our communication, same file number and subject dated 
4 December 1945, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War 
Sec., 7 October 1945 and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain infor- 
mation to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl 



426 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Harbor on 7 Deceinber 1941, copies of three (3) interrogations of Japanese Navy 
and Civil Officers are forwarded lierewlth. 

2. These interrogations, obtained by Naval sources, are believed to provide 
further amplification of data previously forwarded. 
For the Supreme Commander : 

/s/ E. D. Law, Jr., 
E. D. Law, Jr. 
Major, AOD, Asst. Adj. Oen. 
3 Incls: 

Incl 1 — Interrogation Capt. Genda. 
Incl 2 — Interrogation Mr. Kase. 
Incl 3 — Interrogation Mr. Tanomogi. 



[i] 



[Copy] 



Naval Technical Mission 
Date : 28 Nov. 1945. Place : FLTLOSCAP 

Interrogation No. 10 

Subject : Pearl Harbor Attack. 

Personnel Interrogated : Captain Minoru Genda ; Air Operations officer on staff 
of Admiral Nagumo during attack on Pearl Harbor. He was with Admiral 
Nagumo aboard his Flagship Akagi. Captain Genda was given the respon- 
sibility of planning the attack. 

Interrogators: Captain Robinson and Captain Payton Harrison, USNR. 

Interpretor : Douglas Wada. 

Summary : 

The idea of the surprise attack originated with Admiral Yamamoto during a 
conversation with Admiral Omishi of the 11th Carrier Division about February 1, 
1941. Captain Genda was present at this meeting and remembers Yamamoto 
saying, "If we have war with the United States we will have no hope of winning 
unless the U. S. Fleet in Hawaiian waters can be destroyed." After some further 
discussion Yamamoto directed Onlshi to draw up a plan for a surprise attack. 
Captain Genda was later called in by Onishi to draw up broad outlines for such 
a plan and determine its feasibility and possibility of success. 

About September 1st map games were begun at the War College in Tokyo, to 
test the plan on the game board and work out all details connected therewith. 
The following Naval officers were the only ones who had knowledge of the plan 
and who worked on it at the War College at this time ; Admirals Yamamoto, 
Ugiki, Naguno, Yamagushi, Okusaka ; Captains Onishi, Genda, Kuroshima ; Com- 
manders Sasaki, Ono ; following members of the Navy General staff : Admiral 
Fukudome, Captains Sanagl and Tonioka, Commander Miyo. 

On about November 15th Admiral Yamamoto finally approved the plan and gave 
it to Admiral Naguno with orders covering the manner of its final execution. On 
November 22nd the striking force rendezvoused at Etorofu and departed on its 
mission at 0600 hours Nov 26th. A speed of from 12 to 14 knots was maintained 
and the Task Force fueled at sea whenever the weather permitted, in order to 
keep full tanks. The weather was stormy and refueling difficult. It was, how- 
ever, because of the weather conditions prevailing in this part of the Pacific at 
this time of year that the northern route was chosen. They didn't expect to meet 
any shipping, and fog and stormy weather would impair visibility conditions, 
anyway. Twice after departure information was received from Naval General 
Headquarters in Tokyo giving the dispositions of the U. S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor. 
The second despatch on this subject was received three days before the attack, or 
December nth. 

[2] The green light to execute the attack was sent by Admiral Yamamoto 
from his Flagship the Yamato on December 2nd. The message was "NIITA 
KAYAMA NOBORE" and menas climb mount NIITAKA. This was the code 
phrase meaning "proceed with attack". There was an additional part to the mes- 
sage specifying X-Day as December 8th at the time this message was received, 
the striking force was near the 180th meridian at latitude 42. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 427 

In the early morning of December 7th the Force was 700 miles north of Lanai, 
at which time it turned south and commenced the dash in at a speed of 26 knots. 
The following was the composition of the striking force : 

6 Carriers with Akagi Flagship of Admiral Naguno. 
2 Battleships; Hiei and Kiroshima. 

2 Heavy Cruisers ; Tone and Chikuma. 

9 Destroyers with light cruiser Abukuma as flagship. 

3 Submarines ; 1-19, 1-21, and 1-23. 

Following is the number and type of planes used in the attack : 

Fighters 81 

Dive bombers 145 

Horizontal bombers .' 104 

Torpedo planes 40 

Total 370 

Of the fighters, 39 were kept around the Carriers as intercepters, in case the 
U. S. planes got in the air and made an attack. They went out in two waves 
about one half hour apart. At time of launching position of striking force was 
about 200 miles north of western tip of Lanai. 

Several planes were sent early which got over Pearl about daylight and reported 
that the Fleet was in. 

Surprise was expected, but if the U. S. Forces were on the alert and the attacked 
discovered, all attacking planes were to drive home the attack regardless. 

A very close watch was kept on Hawaiian broadcasts by Commander Ono, Staff 
Communication officer. Admiral Naguno and his staff felt that they could sense 
from these broadcasts whether or not the Forces on Oahu had an inkling of the 
impending attack. They felt they could judge the tenseness of the situation by 
these broadcasts. Since KGU and KGMB were going along in their normal 
manner, Nagumo felt that our forces were still oblivious to developments. 

For several days prior to the attack the Jap Force had been intercepting mes- 
sages from our patrol planes. They had not broken the code, but they had been 
able to plot in their positions with radio bearings and knew the number of our 
patrol planes in the air at all times and that they were patrolling entirely in the 
south western sector from Oahu. 

[3] The three submarines were placed in a line 100 miles ahead of the 
carriers for the final dash southward. Surface speed of these submarines was 23 
knots. If they sighted any planes or shipping they were to submerge, get clear 
and radio the striking force as soon as it was safe to surface. 

Everything went off according to plan. Total Japanese losses were 29 planes. 

[1] (Incl 2) 

[Copy] 

Naval Technical Mission 
Interrogation No. 9. 

Subject : Information received by Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Japanese 
Consul General in Honolulu. 

Personnel Interrogated : Mr. Toshikazu Kase, in charge of North American Sec- 
tion of Foreign Office at time of attack on Pearl Har- 
bor. Undergrad work Amherst ; graduate study at 
Harvard in international law, and relations 1928. 
Member of Foreign Office since late 1940. Became 
Chief of Section 1 (dealing with North America, i. e. 
U. S. and Canada) in October 1941. Held this post 
for about a year. 

Where Interrogated : Office of the Fleet Liaison Officer with the Supreme Com- 
mander for the Allied Powers. 

Interrogator: Captain Peyton HARRISON, USNR. 

Interpreter : Lt. ( jg) S. E. SPRAGUE. 

Summary : 

Mr. Kase stated that he was personnally acquainted with Mr. Kita, former 
Consul-General in Hawaii. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor Mr. Kita sent 



428 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

messages to the foreign oflBce every few days informing it of the presence of 
units of the U. S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor. Although the Foreign Office receive*? 
these wires, they paid little attention to them. Instead, they passed them right 
along to the Navy Ministry. Mr. Kase believes that all these despatches have 
been destroyed. At the time of receipt these despatches were not considered of 
any significance by the foreign office, but were considered just a matter of routine. 
However, "in the light of after events", Mr. Kase "can look back and see that 
Kita's telegrams had some significance". The foreign office was very busy with 
its negotiations with accredited representatives in Washington, and matters 
concerning the whereabouts and activities of the U. S. Fleet were not a matter 
of interest. Mr. Kase was busy sending despatches to Nomura and Kurusu and 
trying to improve the tense situation. The Navy department was not cognizant 
of these messages being sent to the foreign office representatives in Washington. 
The foreign ministry deliberately kept things from the Navy Department and 
vice versa. "Every Ministry had its own secrets". Mr. Kase had no recollec- 
tion of the presence of a certain Mr. Morimura who arrived at the Consul-General 
Office Honolulu, in the spring of 1941. Mr. Kase "could not speak with authority" 
on the question as to whether or not Mr. Morimura could have been sent by the 
war or Navy Departments with special and secret instructions to Consul-General 
Rita. 

[2] Q. What instructions were given Mr. Kita, Japanese consul at 
Honolulu, regarding transmission of information about U. S. fleet or military 
installations in Hawaii? 

A. I don't recall any specific instructions he had. He may have had general 
Instructions to be followed in case of disturbances because of the presence in 
Hawaii of many "hyphenated" citizens. After I became Chief of Section in 
October 1941 I don't recall any specific instructions being given him. 

Q. We know that Kita sent messages to Japan before the outbreak of war 
concerning the U. S. Fleet. To whom wei-e messages sent? Did you see them? 

A. They came through the Foreign Office and I saw them, perhaps without 
knowing their significance. As far as I am aware, the Foreign Office gave him 
no specific instructions about sending such information. He made reports as a 
routine matter. Messages were addressed to the Foreign Minister. 

Q. Those messages sent about the whereabouts of the U. S. Fleet; are any 
copies of these messages now in the Foreign Office? 

A. No, I don't think so. When I left my section, I take it for granted my 
section had these telegrams. There were two successors to me since I left 
my office. Department buildings were destroyed in May. I doubt if copies of 
messages are there. 

Q. Did Kita state every two or three days what ships were in Pearl Harbor? 

A. I remember there were a few telegrams of that sort. I would put them 
aside. We were more interested in the course of negotiations. At that time 
we were intensely absorbed in negotiations proper between Tokyo and Washing- 
ton. Such affairs as Kita's telegrams did not get much of our attention. 

Q. Who was most interested in these telegrams? 

A. I suppose the Navy Minister. 

Q. Who would know whether such telegrams are available? 

A. The chances are they have all been destroyed, don't you think so? Very 
short telegrams, usually, not even occupying a full page. These telegrams, were 
not considered important at all from our point of view. Very likely they have 
been burned. The Foreign Office served as a channel — we just had a look at 
them. We thought they were just matters of routine. In the light of after- 
events, I can look back and see that Kita's telegrams had some significance, 
But we did not know at the time. 

Q. Do you recall any trouble Kudo got into involving shipment of scrap iron? 

A. No. I don't recall him. 

Q. Interrogator recounted I'aflfaire Kudo and its expose in newspai)ers. 

A. Rather crude practice, wasn't it? I don't like to impugn his honor, but I 
don't think Mr. Kudo is one of our career men. I don't think that was done 
with knowledge of the Foreign Office. 

Q. Boxes were addressed to Foreign Office in Tokyo. 

A. Oh? 

Q. Can you find out where Mr. Kudo is? 

A. We can find out for you. I shall have his whereabouts found out. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 429 

[3] Q. You say you were absorbed in negotiations at the time. You were 
sending despatches to Nomura? 

A. Yes, we were primarily interested in that. I was engaged in clerical work 
of the negotiations. 

Q. Did Navy Ministry have knowledge of these despatches? 

A. No, I don't think so. Some were kept secret from Navy Department. 
Every ministry has its own official secrets. The majority of telegrams were not 
given to the fighting services. They were not in a position to request that just as 
we were not in a position to request their despatches. The gist of negotiations 
and their progress were sometimes discussed at joint conferences. 

Q. We know Kita was sending telegrams. Who would have given him such 
instruction? 

A. I don't know who would have given him such instructions. 

Q. Couldn't someone in Navy Department have given him instructions with- 
out your knowing it? Wouldn't that have been possible? 

A. (Hesitation.) It might have been possible. But not through Foreign 
Office by telegram. Every telegram to Kita had to pass through Foreign Office 
and be approved. I don't recall any specific instructions transmitted to Kita 
through Foreign Office. 

Q. In the spring of 1941, Mr. Morimura arrived in Honolulu to assist Mr. Kita. 
Do you know Mr. Morimura? 

A. I was not aware of his existence. I became Chief of Section in October 
1941 and was deeply absorbed in the Tokyo-Washington negotiations. I really 
did not have time to learn about minor officials in all the consulates. 

Q. Well, who would know of his existence and his work? Whose place did 
you take? 

A. Mr. Yuki, who accompanied Mr. Kurusu to Washington. I don't know 
exactly how long he was there before me. He is now councillor of embassy at 
Bangkok. 

(At some point about here, interrogator described Morimura's activities.) 

Q. Would it have been possible for the Navy Department to send Mr. Morimura 
to Honolulu? 

A. I don't know. I can't speak with any authority. That was before my time. 

Q. Who was Foreign Minister and Vice-Minister? 

A. Togo was Foreign Minister and Nishi was Vice-Minister. They assumed 
office in October 1941. 

Q. Would it have been possible for Morimura to have had instructions from 
Navy Department to give to Kita? 

A. I'm not qualified to answer that question. I don't know anything about 
this affair. I can't even say whether it was possible. 

Foreign Minister — Togo 
Vice Foreign Minister — Nishi 



Director American Affairs 
(Yamamoto) 



Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 

(North America) (So. America) (Passports, etc. ) 



430 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SOURCE DOCUMENTS USED BY NAVY IN COMPILING THE "NAVY 
SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL 
HARBOR" 

Page 

1. Japanese Combined Fleet Top Secret Operating Order #1 431 

2. Japanese Combined Fleet Top Secret Operating Order #2 485 

3. Japanese Submarine Operations (Pearl Harbor Attack) 487 

4. NaA'y study "Time Table of Japanese Submarine Operations" 493 

5. Translations of Captured Japanese Documents "Japanese Submarine 

School Notes Concerning Early War Experience off Hawaii" 497 

6. Translation of Captured Japanese Document "Patrol Operations of 

Japanese Submarine 1-69 off Pearl Harbor" 503 

7. Translation of Captured Japanese Document "The Southern Cross by 

Kuramotl, Iki" 512 

8. Translation of Captured Japanese Documents (a) "Japanese Sub- 

marine School Notes Concerning Early War Experiences off Hawaii", 
(b) "Japanese Instructions to Yatsumakl Butai", (c) "Japanese 
Places of Military Importance in the Kurlle Islands" „ 525 

9. Translation of Captured Japanese Document "Professional Notebook 

of an Ensign in the Japanese Navy" 538 

10. Interrogation of Japanese Prisoners of War Captured from the Japanese 

Submarine I-l which participated in Attack on Pearl Harbor 613 

11. Interrogation of Japanese Prisoners of War who participated in at- 

tack on Pearl Harbor as member of crew of the (CV) Kaga 619 

12. Navy Department Study of Japanese Espionage in Hawaiian Islands 

"Pre-War Espionage in the Hawaiian Islands, Report on Pre-War 
Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing Coded Information for 
the Japanese Fleet" 627 

13. Navy Department Study "Sorties by Enemy Sub-Carried Planes and 

Sub-Carrier Identification" 649 

14. Japanese Battle Lessons on Supply in the Greater East Asia War Sup- 

ply Battle Lesson No. 1 (Translation) 653 

15. Parallel translation of Source Document 14, supra 667 

16. U. S. Navy Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, Volume 1, No. 22, 8 Decem- 

ber 1944 704 

17. Photostatic copy of original Japanese document captured on Saipan 

consisting of notes on fueling at sea of Pearl Harbor Striking Force_ 767 

18. Original Japanese document captured by U. S. Navy at Manila, the same 

being the original material for the translations appearing in Source 
Documents Nos. 1 and 2, supra . 832 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 431 



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
WASHINGTON 



SOURCE DOCUIOENT #1 
"JAPANESE COMBINED FLEET TOP SECRET OPERATION ORDER #1« 
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE 
"aAVY SUMMARY OP THE JAPANESE PLA^' ,TOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" 
(Record of^ Proceedinge, pages 433-460), 

(EXTENDED A8 A PART OP EXHIBIT #3 
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION 
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR) 



segr: 



'T 

PkM 



7^' 



COiOilNFD FLoJJ .OP oBCKE. OPii.ATIo.^ ohLDv 1 



riagBhip .UCATO, ^3^1 bAI 5 Not 41 



lAMAMUTQ, iBoroku 
Cominnnder In Chief 
Coabined Fleet 



L45 of 700 eoplee 
OOieilB) TLSS ORDBl 



Cfablnad ri««t Openitiong in the •.'■ar Agrxlnet tne U-q. a. STATK^. 
QREAT BhITAlH aiki the KEriigcLAND^ will be conducted in accoruance 
with the Separate Voluae. 



79716 O— 46 — pt. 13- 



432 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Coabinsu Flaat Top 8*or«t Op«r«tioB Order 1 
Sap*r*t« Volua* 



f»4* Co3it)ln«cl fla>t Qparatlona In th» War Agaimt th> 

2/2 OtltaJ STAIES. GRUT BRITUH and th. ■ETtgRLAJna 



COITEVrS 



I. Oparationa of th* Combined ri«*t La Cat* Var with th« DRRED STATES, 
CaSAT EHIATUI aad th* lETllKRLAIDS Bagin* during tb* China Oporations. 

A. Outllna of opara lions 

B. Praparationa for var and tha otttbraak of war 

1. Praparationa for tha oatbraak of «&r 

2. Tha oatbraak of var aad tha uaa of araa th«rat«for* 

Pag* C. Pirat Phaaa (DAI ICHI DAM) Oparations 

2/3 

1. Operation policy 

2. Outline of operationa againat A (Tl Aaerioan.) Pleet 

3. OutliDa of Southern Area operationa 

4. Operation periods 

5. Allocation of foroea 

D. Seoond Phaae (DAI MI DAI) Operationa 

1. Operation polioy 

2. laportant polnta enleh auat be defended and adTanee taaaea 
in occupied territory 

3. Areaa expeotaa to be occupied or deatro/ed 
Page 4. Allocation of foroea 

2/4 

£. Protection of our aea traffic, deatruotioa at enaajr sea traffic, 
aad mine earfare 

1. Operationa to protect aea traffic 

2. Operationa to deatroy aea traffio 

3. Mine warfare 

P. Co— inJoationa 

G. Supfily 

U. Operationa other than thoae of the Conbiaed fleet 

1. Operationa of forcea at naral atationa and auxili&ry 
naval atationa 
Page 2. Operationa of tne CHIIA Area Pleet 



V5 



I. Joint Ani7-lav7 Agresnent (Separate Voluae) (Tl Miaaing.) 

II. Operatioaa of the Coaoinad fleet in Caae ffar with RUSSIA Bagina 
during tha lar with the OVITSD STATES, GRXAT BFUTAU, the IKTUEaUIDS 
aad CmiA 

A. Operation policy 

B. Allooation of foroea 

- 1 - 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 433 



SECRET 



C. Op«r«tlonJ otter tbui thoM of tb* CoabliMd n«*t 

1. Op«r«tion« of foroea at Bkral atMtiona and auxUlAry 
n*Tml atatlons 

2. Op«ratloa« of tba CUIIA Ira* riaat 

III. MiaoallajMoaa Ragulatloas 
Pa£« 
2/6 A. TlM to ba Oaad 

B. Cbarta to ba Oaad 

C. Idaatlflcatlon of friandljr and •umy forcaa 



Paga I. COMBIKO fUXS OPEiaXIOliS !■ CASi: lAii WITH TU£ OIITED STATES, 
2/7 GR£AT BRITUI lUD THE HETUfRIOliOS B£GIJIS DURIXG TU£ CUIIU OPERATIOliiS 

A. Outllna of Oparatlona 

1. In tha aaat tha ABarican 7i»at aiU ba daatro/ad and 
Aaarlcan llnaa of oparatlon and auppljr linaa to tba ORLEMT will b« cut. 

2. In tha aaat Brltlah MALAZA wUl ba oocuplad and Brltiab 
llnaa of operation ana aupply Unas to tha OtUOiT, aa well as tha 
BURMA Road, will ba cut. 

3. Eoaa/ forcaa in tba ORIEHT vill b« daatroyed, baaea of 
oparatlona vlll b« aelsaa, and araaa with natural raaourcaa ■111 ba 
oocupiaa. 

4. Strategic arsaa aill be aelsad and dereloped] defenaea 
alU be atren^tbanad in order to aatabllab a durable baala for 
oparatlona. 

Page 5. Eneay forcaa vill be intercepted and annihilated. 

2/8 

6. Victoriea vill ba exploited to break tba enaa/ alll to 
fight. 

B. Preparations for War and the OutbreoJt of War 

1. Preparationa for the outbreak of *ar 

a. The eapire la expecting var to break out with the 
UHITED STATES, GRZAT BRITAIN and the NeTTUERLANDS. When the deciaion 
la Bade to complete over-all preparationa for oparatlona, ordara will 
be lasued eatabliahing tba approxiaate data (X Daj) for oooaancaaant 
of operationa and announcing "Pirat Preparations for lar* . Tha 
Tarioua forcea will act aa followai 

(1) All fleeta and forcea, without apecial ordera. 
Page alll organiie and coaplete battle preparationa in accordance «ith tha 
2/9 allocation of forcea for Firat Period (OAI lUI) Oparatlona of Plrat 

Pbaae (DAI ICHI DAN) Operationa. When directed by tba coaaandlng 
officera of the varloua forces, they rill proceea at the proper tine to 
the pre-operat,lon renaatvoua and wait in readineaa. 

(2) All forces will be on atrict lookout for un- 
expected attacks oy the American, British and letberlanda forces. 

- 2 - 



434 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SECRET 



(3) The coaoikriala,- officer* of Lbe vkrioua foreea 
nay carry out, such ifcret raconnaliaance aa la •apeclAll/ Baceaa«r]r 
to tha oparatlon. 

(4) Purau&r.t to defenae plana, 4th fleat will bSf^a 
Mining tlia lAUPO GUNT?. 

b. JItien the advance I'orcoa necaaaar/ for c«rryln(; oat 
Paj^e the operation have bean dlapatcbua lo the area of operatlona, tba 
ii/lO order 'Seoond PreparatiotiB for War" will oe laaueu, and each force 

•ill act iB aocordanco with the foUoaingi 

(1) Subaarlne forcaa attached bo the Advance 
Expeditionary Porce (S£lllii3l iftllil), Striking Force, Coaaerce Leatructloi 
Dnit, Sout^iarn Area Porce and Soutn Seaa Force, on oriera fros tha 
coBaanuir.i^ offlcera of the varloua forcaa, aill prooeed at tha proper 
tiae to the area of opera tlona. 

(2) Reaalnin^ forcaa, on ordera froa the oeaaandlng 
offloera of the varloua foroea, •ill proceed ao aa to be In poaltion 
for tha outbreak, of war. 

c. After the required preparation* for war have been 
■ade, if tha aituation changes ai^ificantly, apecified foreea May 

be returned froB 'Second Preparaticna for Var* to 'Firat Praparatlona 
for War". 

Pag* 2. Tba outbreak of war and tha uae of araa there tof or* 

2/U 

a. The tlM for tba outbreak of war (X Day) will ba 
given in an laperlal Csnaral Heaaquartera order. The order will be 
given aeveral uaya in advance. After OOOO houra, X Day, a atata 

of war will exlat. Each force will coaaanoe operationa aooordin^' to 
plas. 

b. If a aerioua anaay attack la raoaivad before X Day, tba 
following aaaaures will be takent 

(1) Foreea which are attacked will counterattack 
laaediateiy. Before the X Day orJera are iaauej, connterattacka 
b/ baaa air foreea will aepend on laperlal General Beadquartera 
Oraara. 

Paga (2) After the X Day oraar la iaaaad, all 

2/12 forces will enter into a atate of war and be^dn operationa without 
waiting for special oraera. 

(3) Prior to iha lasuance of the X Day order, tha 
outbreak of war aill dapei.J on laperlal General Headquarters ordera. 

c. After 'Second Preparations for War* has been ordered, 
■ilitary force B«y be uaad In unavoidable oaaes aueh aa the followingi 

(1) If AB6rlcan, British or Idtherlanaa ahipa or 
airplanes approach ihu /icinity of oar territorial waters ami such 
action aeeaa to create a danger. 

(2) If our forces, wtille on the aove outside our 
territorial waters, are Involvea in poaltive actlona which appaar t« 
endanger thea by forces of these countries. 



3 - 



_, 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 435 



% 



SECRET 

t. VlMt Mm* (mi tfB Ml) 
1. OyanUMfalUr 



(n "^tt yiMt" la »«MU.)t tiriklM VVrM (Tfl 'l*t Air FlMt* la Uw 

y«iwU.)» •mU Smj Fctm (n "ith riMi* U taw pn«U.)* lOTttera 
rww (n ■5th riMt' la latUUbl* pM«U.) «ad Ikia Bodj (Tl ■ C—M— i 
riMt' la Hw yMoU.) •Ul •ftnU •«tljwt itaa AanrlMa flMt. 

(n Pn>tlm of pa«* out o«t and 'AdruM Ixpwdltleauy 
For** (sum BOIAI) ....* and ■StrUctac Fotm ...." laMrt*d In bLa* 
p«aoU. Aloag with 'South 8«a« roroo" tb»r aro provuMblj- aabJooU of 
tho foUovlng a*Dt«ao«.) Th« South Sms For** will oeoupr and doatror 
lapertAot aro&a la tb« Tlclalt/ »nd wlU bo roadjr for tho cao^r floot 
la thoAOSTRAUA Aroo. Tho lorthora Aroa Foroo olU bo roaponalbU for 
Fo«o potrola o«aiaat 80VUT RUSSU. 

b. Whllo wilatoinlag loool aaporlority, tho Soutbora 
Aroo Foroo (TI "aBd floet, 3rd Floot, Southern Sxpoditlonary FlooU oad 
Utb Air Floot* la ladollblo pondl.) oUl onalblXoU onoaF fX**t8 U 
tho FHUOPPIIZS, BrlUoh HAiAIA aad lETUERLAIDS IMD1X3 Aroo. At ttaa 
aoao tiaa It will oo-oporoto with tho krmj *• followai 

(1) Tbo oporoUona o«olaat Brltiah HALATA and tho 
FBZLIPPIHES vill bo cowMaood alaultoneouolj, and tho onoay air foreoa 
aad flooU la thooe aroaa will bo ropoatodly batUrod bjr air attaeka. 
Ara/ adraneo •xpocUtionary groupa (Sn&£N HIIDAI) will bo laadod la 
atratogic aroaa of HALAU, tho PUlLIPPDiSS and Brltiah BOfUDD a« 
qulckl/ aa poaaibla. Air Forooa will bo aont to rolnforoo air 
eporatlooa. 

FafO (2) Tbo roaulta of tbo oporatlona will bo ozploltod, 

2/15 *ad tho aaia bod/ of Aray Invaaion groupa (H&IOAI) will bo Uodod la 

tba PHILIPPIIES and tban MaLAIA la ordor to oeeupy thoir roapoctiro 

aroaa qulokl/. 

(3) During tho oarly atagoa of tbo oporatlona tto 
atratogic aroaa of tto CO^EBES, DUrCH BORIB) aad Southona SOMATRA 
will bo occuplod la tbo oraor naaoj. Tho atratagio aroaa of 
HOLDCCAS and TIMOR alao will bo occuplod. locoaaair air baaoa will bo 
proparod la tbasa aroaa. 

(^) Aa tboaa air baaoa ar« eoaplatod, air foreoa 
gradual!/ will be aant forward, ana onaa/ air atrengtb in tbo JAVA 
Pago Aroa will bo cruahad. N-.on thla la accoapliahod, the aain oody of 
2/16 tho Aray loTaalon group (KUDAI) will b« landed la JA7A to occupy It. 

(S) After the fall of SXNOAPORK tba atratogic aroaa 
of northern SUUAIRA will be occuplea. Oporatlona ag&inat SUPJIA will 
bo carried out at tho appropriate tiae to cut off i.he enoay supply 
route to CUIIA. 

c. If the Aaerlcac fleet attacka, 3rd Fleet and Southera 
Expodltio:hry Fleet alll carry out Southern Area oporatlona tsaporarily. 
The UiJi of coabat atrangth will neat tba attack. 

d. Aa eloaent (TB *2^S*** written in blue pencil.) of 
the Cofflbined Fleet will deatroy enoay aoa traffic in the PACIFIC aad 
IBJIAB Ocean Aroaa. 

e. In orier not to arouae the hoatllity of THAIliAMO 
Page and FRUiCH INDO-CiilNA, every effort ■ill be aaae U) aecur? their 
2/17 voluntary co-operation. But in the event of hoatllity, obatructiona 

to o\ir oporatlona will be eliainated by force. 



- 4 - 



436 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



8ECBET 



a. OtrtiiB* 9t 



Urn* M*ia«^ tte iMirl ■■■ t%mi 



•pwrAtieM ar« Mt*hli«ted im %te r«llMlB( tata*. 1Mb fvM wiU 
•p«r«t« la a««ardaao« with tb* •l*a«lfi«»tloB af oparationa ladiaaivd. 



2/18 



SITQAnOI 


cusamcATioi 

or OPBATKHB 


onun « oTBATion 


At OatbTMk of 


(n This portioa out 


oat.) 


■«r 






At Outbraak of 


■•thod 2 for opara- 


1. Tba Adranea Sxpadltloaary 


War (Sltuatloa 


tlona a^iaat Aaari- 


roroa (SDOCEB BOTAI) will | 


coaplloatad bf 


oan flaat 


raoonaolter aad naka a sur- 


ualn^ t«ak 




prise attack on tba Aaarl- 


foroa for 




oan fleet. 


attack) 




If conditions warrant, 
air bases at iCffLAND, 
TtmjILA, rUl, etc., will be 
attacked witb appropriate 
foroas. 
2. The Striking Faroe will pre- 
pare for the Aaarican fleet. 


In Case Aasri- 


Method 3 for epara- 


1. Tba Adrance Expeditionary 


oan Flaat Op- 




roroe (SEMKEH BOTAI), Strikixi« 


era t«a 

1 
i 


oaa flaat 


Faroe, South Saas Foroe 
and lortharn Area Force 
will operate against tba 
Aaarioan task foroe. 

2. If naoessary, the Mala 
Body will give support. 

3. If conaitions warrant, aa 
element of 11th Air Fleet mmj. 
be teaporarily dlrertad to 
the east. 


In Caaa Aaerl- 


Method 4 for opara- 


1. The Advance Expeditionary 


oan riaat Pro- 


tlona against Aaari- 


Force (SiJllZN BUTAI), Strik- 


caods to At- 


ean flaat 


ing Force, South Seas Force, 


1 t*ck. 




Morthorn Area Force and 
Main Body, deployed for 


i 
1 


^ 


Interception, will operate 
aeaiast tha Aaarican fleet. ! 



Tbe decisive battle strength 
of Southern Area Force will 
Join lma«Liiataly to aeet 
the attack. 

Southern Area operations 
will oe continueu uy 3rd 
Fleet, Southern Lxpeditionarx 
Fleet ana fl.jhters of 11th 
Air ri^et. 



Page 
^/19 



3> Outline ol' Southern Area Operations 

Southern Area Operations will be based on the operation 
policy aad on the a^p'^'^nent oetween Cooaander In Chief, Cor.blned 
Fle-it, and Coaiaoinuer In Ciiief, Southern Area Arjiy. Tne Soutbera 
Area Force Comoanaer will uirect the operations unless otherwise 
ordered. 



- 5 - 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 437 



SECRET ^. Ope, 



ailor. pt.-loas 



rir:iL Pt^se (Liil ICHI bAI) Opera Lions will b« cUsslfl^ 
as follows. C:-ar,,;fca will ti« o/ special order. 

a. Fli-st Porio'J (tAl IKii) 3,jfera-.l:)nst I .is period 
will covtfi- oparAlionb froa. the jutorodk ol' war until the culId bodjr 
of tno invasion ami/ hac been ianied in the PHILIPPISiS. 

0. Secona Period (jAI M KI) Operational In general, 
Pag* operations froB tne First Pc-riod (l/Al I.<KI} Operationa until the 
2/20 BiiiD oo~iy of cnu invasion aray has Oee.i lanaud in British MAULIA. 

c. liiiru P^rioo (^AI SAN KI) Oporatiao^i Operations 
from tne end of tue Secor.d (uAI Ul HI) P'iri»^ Operations to tb» 
completion of '-h^ occuputioi. of vne NirK.-..-UAI<L:3 &IS2 INIII^. 

. 5* Allocation of forces 

Allocation of forces -uring the First Phase (UAI ICHI 
iikS) Operations «ill tw as follows. 

a. Allocation of forces for first Period (DAI IKU) 
Oparationa - Separata Taole 1 

b. Allocation of forces for Second Period tOhl NI KI) 
Operations - Separate Table 2 

c. Allocation of forces for Third Period (DAI SAM KI) 
Operations - Separate Table 3 

J. Allocation of forces for intereeption eparatlona - 

Separate Taole 4 

Page D. Second Phase (UAI NI DAI) Operationa 

2/21 

1. Operation policy 

a. The Advance Expeditionary Force (SLNK£N BUTAI) will 
continue to Bale* recorjiaissance raids on the Aasrican and British 
fleets, tnese fleets will be attack<$d by base air forces, earrlar 
air forces, etc, at opportune) tines. 

b. American and British lines of operation and supply 
lines to the O-UICNT will be cut in ordor to strengthen the defenses 
of strategic areas. 

c. ^neay forces ini>the waters under our control and 
raasants of tne eneay in occupied areas will z,e sopped up in order 
to secure resources and protect sea traffic. 

u. If the Aaerican and British fleets attack, they 
Page will be aesLroyed inalvlaually by taking advantage of inner lines 
2/22 of defense. 

o. Operations to aestroy American and British sea 
traffic will be intfinsifieci. 

2. Important points which must be defended and advance 
bmses in occupied territory 

a. Important points in occupied territory which 
must be defended are as lollowsi 

MANIU, OAVAO, SIN^APOfll, BATAVIA, S0-HA3AJA, 
TARAKAN, BALIKPAPAN , MtNADO, MAKASSAK, AMBOB, PENAMG, HABAUL. 
(:■ DAVAO and MrXiDO emp^iaaix..^ by blue pencil circles.) 



438 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

b. AdTSBM b»Ma la MsaflAd t«rrlt*iT *r« t ^ tt U i 
W b* M e*lXam»t 

Ho 

2/23 3. Ar««a •i9*«t«d t« b« oe«ttpl«d or d*str«7«4 

Th« toXlowiag »r» 4r«*a •sp«et«<l t« b* oo«Vpl*d or 
dootrojrod «• (julokl/ «• op*raU.on*l eomUtlono pcraiti 

a. Kaatara OR OUIMKA, ■£> BRITAII, fUl aAd 8AM0A 

b. ALEUTI1I8 and MiOffAX 
0. AIDAIUI lalanda 

d. StraUKlc polnta in lb* AOSTRILIA iraa 

4< Allooatlon of foroaa 

Tha allooaUon of forcaa for Saeond rtm.»« (DAI MI DAN) 
Operatlona la aatabliabod la Separata Tabla ). 

Tba allocation of foroaa for lataroaptlon oparations 
■ill ba based oo Separate Tabla ^. 



- 7 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



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SECRET 

2. Operations to dcatro/ ■•& traffic 

a. Pollojr 

Pag* The Imnedlat* dastruotlon of vital points in tha 

2/27 aaa traffic of tba UNITUJ STATES, CHEAT BRITAIN and tha lETHKAUiiDS, 
ooablnad with a ohacklng of enaay foreea, will aid our principal 
oparatloaa. Ra will andaavor to crush the enaa/ will to fltibt by 
gradually Strang thaning our efforts ana by realising our alas over 
a long period of time. 

b. Outline for execution 

(1) Seisure of enesgr stiips at tba outbreak of van 
Enaay ships will be seised, provldaa that our principal operations are 
not there 0/ Impaired. Close liaison will be oaintalned wltn laperial 
Qeneral Headquarters ana with hoaeland coabat forces (NAISrlH BOTAI) . 
Sectors of responslDllity for each unit. In observation and seisure 
of oneay ships, will correspond in general to sectors of responslDllity 
in 1, 'Operations to protect sea traffic*. 

Page (2) Tha Coaaaree Destruction Dr.it, as prescribed 

2/28 by Its coaaandlng officer and as opportvinitles arise in the South 

Seas Area after the outbreak of war, willoperate between ClNPfUL 
and SOUTH AMi:,;aCA anu AOSTfUUA. Depending on the situation on 
the wast coast of SOUTH AM£RICA, one eleaent will proceed to tha 
INblAN Ocean Area and will operate between ADSTRALIA and AFRICA. 

(3) According to the progress of operations and 
to what is prescribed b/ the Advance HjcpeJitlonary Force (SENKUI 
BQTAI) comsiinder, expeaitionar/ forces not exceeoing one subaarine 
division will operate off the coasts of CENTRAL and NORTH AllIHICA 

to the extent that tha principal operations are not thereby hindered. 
Tha Hawaiian Area Force will endeavor to cut rear llnt.-s of supply 
at every opportunity. 

(4) One eleaent of DesRons 4, 5, 6, and 7 at tha 
una of First Period (iiAI IKJtl) Operations of First Phase (DAI ICHI 

Page DAM) Operations, will be assl^ed as directed oy Southern Force 
2/29 Conusanaer to destruction of sea traffic off the south coast of 

JAVA and at tne weatern entrance to the MALACCA Straits. When south- 
ern First Ptiaae (jAI ICHI iiAl) Operations are coBpletea, they will 
carry out a vigorous caapalgn of destruction of sea traffic in tba 
INDIA! Ocean and AUSTtULU Areas. 

(5) In tha pause after First Phase {bXl ICHI L-AM) 
Operations or whan opportunities arise auring operations, forces 
for destroylnf^ sea traffic will be strengthanea and will operata 
vigorously with surface ships ana airplanes. 

3. Uii.e warfare 

Coxoine>^ Fleet mine warfare will oe directed by 
Inaiviuual force comiL&n^ars, in a^aition to conformaru;*; with the 
following I 

Page 

2/30 a. Southern area of operations 

(1) StanJaru practices in offensive mine warfare - 
Appended Table 1 

(2) (Stinaara) Suojaary of oases to be protectea by 
■ines Ana antisubaarine nets - Appei^ued Table 2 

(3) SuBBur/ of mintr ana antisubnarine supplies - 
Appenaea Tabla 3 

- 9 - 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 441 

SECBtl 

(4) Outline for •■t«bliahlnt; mina barrisra «t 
bba mad of Flrat Phaae (UAX ICHI DAM) Oparationa - Appesdad Tabl* 4 

b. South Seaa Araa 

The 4th Flaet defanaa plan aill be follovad and 
offanaivs Bine sarfare will be oarrlea on aa dlraotad by tha South 
Saaa Foroe ConiBaDd«r. 

Page c. Wlion adnaa are laid or swept, tha fort* comaandar 

^/31 in each caaa *ill report positlona of aiicea, navigable aeotors, etc., 
to the proper authoritiaa. 

d. Ueclarations conaamin,; tha laying of oinea 

Declarationa will be iasued by Imperial General 
HaadquArters, after being routed through Conbined Plaat Headquartara| 
they vill be iaaueo chielly as a threat to tha anaay. 



10 - 



442 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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S55 



F. ri,—niiitaatiOM 



SECRET 



Poller 



Coablnad Pl*«t op«rmtloniLl iihimiiiiI 1 1 i arc b«a«l on 

n— tlir>1.«« C"^nr^^al^^nM R«'m1.t1nn« and on th* £sla|, 
fi^y»fcTT Lrrm,m,nt CnnrmmiTu, Cf^mi\U\^mn in Southa ra QpratloM. 
Xa «ddltlao« th«7 vlll eonfora to the following prorialon*. 

2. Dlaposltlona for coanoiioatloox 

a. Dlspoaitiona at th« oatbr«ak of war 

1^^ 9>ip« auteauria* and kirplan* ooaBonloations - Appended 

Jt/lz faM« 1 (tea*) ooaBonloatlona - Appcndod Tabl* 2 (r«far to appended 
•tert) 

Tbaac dlapoaitioaa will b« obangnd In tha future 
%e mtt tettla eoodltlona. Tha reapeetlTa foroa ooMandera will 
•kaag* tba dlapoaitioaa for aobaarina and alrplaoa ooainnloatlona 
u aaada arlaa. 

b. Tiaaa for taking np aaslgnaanta at the. outbraak of 
«ar aro aa foUowai 



2/Z 
2/a 



OLASSZrZCAIIOl 


TUX 


RBUBKS 


GoHnaioatloaa 
out rii— iiloaUona 


2i00 hra. 


After 2^00 hra, Z-2 and until 
apeolalljr dealgnated, 2nd China 
Kspedltlonary fleet aad Hainan 
0<MTd Dlatrlet will be in tha 
■hip ooaBoalcatlona ayatea. 


Ibip Coaaimioatloaa 


ZkOO hra, 
1-6 


Mbaariaa Ci— 1111I- 
•aUosa 


Alrplaaa C«amnl- 
•ationa 


2400 hra, 
X-3 


ni— ■iiloationa for 
ApMUlly I>oai«Mt«l 
Hon— 


By apeoial 
ord era 


lotMl 

1. Tor foroaa whloh auat take ap thalr aaalgnaanta bafora the 
tlaaa aet forth la thla table, the reapeotire force ooHaandera will 
dotondJM the tlae and report it to the proper authorltlea. 

2. la aoae oaaea, one eleaeat will take up Ita aaalgaaent at 
a tlaa differing froa that of the reaalnder of the force. 



3* CoiBnnloatlona prooodure 

a. Broadoaatlng will be the principal aeaoB of ooHiunloa- 
tlon wlthla an operational foroe. Aoknowledgaant will be required when 
there la uaeertalnty ooncemlng reoeipt of the aeaaage or when oon- 
fizaatloB la required beoaiue the aeaaage la eapeclally laportant. 

b. lach foroe, at the dlreetlon of Ita ooaaandlng officer, 
will ooae Into the ahort-range coasiinloatlona s/ataB of the neareat 
eoiBranloatioaa unit (T8 Add *and Into Ita broadcast couninlcations 
ajratea. '}i (In oaaea of apeoial neoeaalty. It will ooae Into the 
long»raage ooaMunlcatlona ayatan. } CoBaunloatlona deallois with trana- 
portatlon, aupply, peraonnel and other ooaounloationa not urgent froa 
the atandpolnt of operations naually will ooae under thla 

iSdltor'a Hotel Berlaed by 'Errata* Issued by Klag Seoretary, 
Coaiblned Fleet as Cc«hlned n.at Too Secret Serial 1 Part 99. 
dated 17 loT a, aboard the NAGATO, SAIZI WAN. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



447 



ooHUQloatlona V'*tea. Tha Striking foroa, Conaaroa Oastructlon Dnlt 
and otbar foreaa oparatlnx on apaolal ■laatona at (praat <ilat«ncaa, 
•ban tha/ aat out fro* thair randaavoua, vlll cona under apaclally 
daalgnatad ooaaunlcatlona a/ataaa cantarad around iha Tokyo CoBsuni- 
oationa Unit (TtTTstT) . 

Paga c. All coaaunlcatlona unlta vlll relay to tha proper 

Z/lA authorltiaa oooaunlcallona of oparatlonal foreaa within their 
raapaotlva araaa. Relay uaually vlll be by broadoaat, and 
aoknovlad^senia will b« required vban conflnutlon of receipt la 
aapaolally needed. Relays of aeaaagea claaalfled urgent or Idgher 
vlll be broadcaat Imiiadlately, other laportant aeaaagea at tha 
tiaaa Indicated in Paragraph d, below. 



Page 

2/46 



COMMUNICATIONS UNIT 


COMMUNICAIUNS TO B£ HinUr£D 


Tokyo CoBHunioationa 
Onlt 


Coaaunloatlons of Striking Force, Conaerce 
Deatruction Unit and other forcua under 
specially deaignated ooaaunioationa 
ayateas 


Takao CoMiunicatlona 
Unit 


Coaa\inications of subaarina and airplanea 
under SouUiern Force 


3rd Conunloatlonc Unit 


Coiaunioatlona of SubRon 5 and of airplanea 
baaed in PALAU vitbin Southern Force 


Slat CoMBinlcationa Unit 


Cooaunlcationa of airplanes and subaarines 
operating in tha SOUTH CUIiLA Sea Area 


5th CoMBunioatloaa Unit 


CoBmunlcations of subaarines and airplanea 
under South Seas Force 


6th Coaounlcatlona Unit 


CoBBunicationa of Advance Zzpeditionary 
Force (S£N££N BDTAI) aubaarlnea 


lotai 

Frequenciee to be uead in broadoaeta will be aa ahown in d. Whan 
there la no danger of Interf erring with tha operational coBSunioatlona 
of foreaa, frequencies of shlpa aay be uaed. i 



79716 O — 46 — ^pt. 13- 



448 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 449 

Pkg« •. ffh«n tha Main Body it in th« hoaal&nd area, tr«n«- 

2/49 ■isaton froa th« flagahlp of Coaaaader in Chlaf, Coabinad Pl««t «1I1 
control tb» tranaalaalon facllltlaa of th* Tokyo and Kura Coasuni- 
oatlona Unita (TfTSU, KURKTStT) > or t,h« Tokyo Coaaunloationa Unit 
(T^TSQ) will be asaignad tbia work. 

f. Coaaunloationa outalda tha flaata 

Except In oaaea of apaolal urgancy, ooaaunicatloaj 
will ba affactau by aaana of tha ooaaunioatlona ayataa throu^^h tha 
naaraat coaaunloationa unit. 

Paga 4. Safaguardin^ ooaaunicationa ^ 

2/50 

a. Safaguarding fraquanciaa 

Coabinad float Top Sacra t Order 177, Standard Control 
of rrao'uanoiea Oae4 Uurin.: Qperationa . will be applied. 

b. Safeguarding aeaaagea 

(1) Coae tablea and oall aigna to ba uaea are »;lven 
as followai Coabinea Fleet Top Secret Order 171, Dae of Codeet 
Coablnaa Fleet Top Secret Stanoing Order 52, Table of Combined 
Flsdt Special Wartiaa Call Si£nai Combined Fleet Top Secret Order 
169, AbbreviatoJ Call Sl.tn3 f-.r LKc!>iiD>:e of Stratetiic Inforaatloni 
Coablned Fleet Top Secret Oruar 179, Table of Syxbola Indicating 
baargency Clasaificationa for Saeclal Coablnoi Fleet Coaaunlcationa . 

Paga (2} Methoda of safeguardint; and distln>;ui8hing 

2/31 daceptl7t! diapatcbeai Combined Fleet Top Secret Standing Order 

49, Methoda of Safeguarding and UiBtlcgulBhin;: Deceptive Diapatchea . 

(3) Method of indicating dateai Combined Fleet 
SUiidinj, OrJer 51, Table of Coablned Fleet Special Abbreviationa 
for Da tea. 



450 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



451 



- SECRET 

^53 ^^ 5. Dtillilag and int«rf«rlng irith •namy coBBnunicatlona 

«. Utllltlng en«iiy coonunicatlana 

(1) Int«ro«pt squad* attached to each fleet «illl 
«tlllB« vmrnj eofOMinicatioaa aa directed by the coonandera in chief of the 
rMpeetiTe fleeia. 

(2) Intercept squada attached to coonunlcationa 
tadta "tn be aaaigned to utilisation of eneny comminicationa in accordance 
«iU tlM reUa«ii«i 






caaomcAnoKs unit 

Tetgro CoHnmieationa 
Dait 


OUTLINB 

The unit will obtain inforaation 
chiefly OQ aovements of the American 
hooM fleet and airplanes; also on 
■orements of Russian forces. 

Details to be prescribed b/ 
Coaaanding Officer, 1 Combined Coiaauni- 
cations Unit. 


Taku Coaamieationa 
O&ii 


1. The unit will obtain informa- 
tion chiefly on aorefflonts of American, 
British and Dutch fleets and airplanes 
in the PaR £A3T. 

Details to be prescribed by 
Ccoaanding Officer, 1 Combined Communi- 
cations Unit. 

2. Depending on conditions, one 
element will come under the connand of 
Canander in Chief, 11th Air Fleet. 

3. Aa the southern operations 
progress, it will proceed to occupied 
aactora whenever suitable. 


Other Coamaieationa 
Onita 


Under direction of Caamanding Officer, 
1 Combined Comsunicatlons Unit, they 
will gather operational information. 



b. Interference irith enemy ooainunicatlons will be 
diraet«d by the force coananders, except in cases of special orders. Sach 
/ore* iin— snilsi (Commanding officer, 1 Combined Coonunicatlons Unit), 

conditions are faTorable, will direct comminicitions units in the 
(subordinate ccKoinications units) to obstruct enemy connunications. 



452 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



SECRET 



Ant^ndad Tabl. 1 



zhn 



aaS, AIBPUNE AO) SabMAJUU£ CQiaiUHICATIOH& 



Pag* 
2/58 



COMtOtaCATIOILS 


COiUIUNICATIOIi& 1 1 


SlStHk 


DISPOSITIOI 


anuhxs 


Ship CooBniii- 




!• flagship eniiinl oationa 


oatlona 




■ystaa fraquanoiaa uaad nalnly by 
tha flagahlp of tha ooaoandar In 
ohiaf of aaoh flaat and by tha 
fUgahip of spaoially aatabliahad 
aquadrona. 




Stnt«glo CoMun- 


2. Ordinary ahort «aTa ia 




Isationa 2 


aaad by tha flagahlp of tha 




(2 snsuuA*) 


oonanding offlcar of a squadron 
and aben aspeoially naadad by 
ordinary Tassala. 




Frcquanoy ^ataa 


3. Fraquanoiaa uaad in ship 




3 (DBiPA SSaiTKI) 


ooMiunioatlona are OKinly 




{3TE«a) 


aaployad by Southarn Foroa and 
tboB* forcaa oloaal> oonnaetad 
with it. Othar forcaa usa than 




CoBBonieatlon 


for urgant ooHBanioations. Ho«- 




Claaaifloatloa 2 


•rer, whan tha Coabinad Flaat ia 




(2 KUN*) (?la«t 


taking up intaroaption (XOGBI) 




or f oroa oo- 


diapositiona, thair nain uaa will 




ordloatad 


no longar ba rastriotad to tha 




ooaaunioatiooa ) 


Southarn Foroa. 

4. Southam Foroa cuMiitid- 
oatlon claaaifioation ia Clasai- 
f ioation 3. 


^Irplan* 


Fraquaaoy HytXvL 




CoiMunl eatlona 


L (SBiPA SiS&SLl) 
(4 TEH*) 








Subnarin* 


Fraquanoy Syataa 


Tha iiiiiwiiiiliiiitlniiri of Advanoad 


CoMunlaatlon* 


3 (DiaiiPA i£>i>)XSLl) 


SspadiUonry Foroa (SEMUM bUTAI) 




(3 TE!I«) 


auboarlnaa will ba datarainad by 
tha coMBanding officara of tha 
AdTancad Ezpaditionar^ Foroa 
(SDKSN BUTAI). 


Motet 




The u«« of di 




Plaat niralaaa Ri 




as with the following! 


In tha aaln. 


night fraquaooiaa \ 


fill be uaad. If reliability of 


oom&anieatloiu o 


innot ba ascpactad of night fraquanoiaa only, dajr 


fraquanolae also 


will ba usad. 



Note* 



Tha symbol • indicated the enct BOMAJI tranalltention 
of the original LAIU. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



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454 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SECBti 

Ann^ndad T»hl« 2^ (ContintMd) 
Not««l 

1. Th« !!■•• of PL— unloatioix will b« «• usual unl«sa spMialljr 
d«t«rmiiMd. 

2. Ihvn ■•ndint; and r«e«lTlnt; oondltlons b«t«««n ahips and 
•tatlona in the aaas ayst** ar« poor, an Intaraadlat* ooaBunioations 
unit will ba raaponaibla for ral*/. 

3« Unlaaa otharwiae ordarad, Diapoaitloo 1 «ill ba uaad. 
Subaaquant altarmtiona ii. diapoaitiocs or fraquansiaa will b« aa 
praaorlbad by tha Co— anrtlag Offioar, lat Coabinad CoHninioation Unit. 

i. CoBBuaioationa unit (baaa) oomunioationa in 9«ouplad 
tarritoriaa, aonapt whara apaoiallor datarminad, will ba aa praaorlbad 
by tha ooBMindiag offioar of aaoh forea. 

5* Raaarra fraquanoiaa 

5,085 (TA«U) 

10,170 (TAn5) 

5,325 (T0«23) 

10,650 (T0«24) 

5,225 (SA*25) 

10,450 (SA«26) 

4,205 ;iK)*7l) 

8,ao (HO«»72) 

16,820 (HO*73) 

4,030 (aB*ll) 

8,060 (RSai2) 

16,120 (BBai3) 

6,820 (T0»51) 

13,040 (T0«48) 

4,665 (aA*U) 

9,330 (5A«15) 

13,660 (SA«16) 

Paga 6,150 (TO»43) 

2/62 12,360 (T0*U) 

Notai Tha synbol • indicataa an anet B0IIAJ7 tmnslitarmtion of tha 

original KAJU. 



i-i- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



455 



H 




456 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



vS 



SECRET 



ajR 



5S 



z& 



C. Supply 

1. Supply poliojr 

a. 0«n«nll7, •*«>> t^V «111 replenish its fuel when it 
fWll* b«lOT 60^ of Mpaolty. If Utile la anticipated, boeerer, every 
•ffort vill be aade to aaintaln oapaoitor. 

b. Ordnaaoe, aaBonitlon, boabs, rations and atorea will 
be repleniabed to eapaolty at every opportunity. 

2. OotUae of aupplj 

a. The allotBent of faaaea of operationa for the Initial 
pariod of operations ia established generally as folloesi 

^th Fleet, $th fleet, 6tb rieet - XOKOSUKA 

1st Fleet, 2ai Fleet, 1st Air Fleet, forces attached 
to Co^biaad Fleet - tO&X 

11th Air Fleet, Southern ficpeditioonry Fleet, 3rd 
riMt - SASSO 

b. The allotaent of bases of operations and supply 
polats to the sapply vessels attached to each force is established 
gaaemlly as folloesi 

Main Body, Striking Force, Advanced Expedltlomry 
Foree (SOKSN BOTAI), South Seas Foroe • TCXOSQU, KURX aul vicinity 

Southern Force - MAKO, TAKAO, SASE80 and vicinity 

lorthem Foroe - IQCOSIKA, CKlNATO and vicinity 

CoBMsree Destruction Unit - any suitable place 

«. The allotasQt of supply bases is established generally 
ai follovsi 

lortbera Foroe - PASAMUSUIBO, AXKESIZ, f AKXAIAI, 
GHZCHI JUA, MARCOS IsUnA 



Sooth Seas Force ) 



SAIPAI, aAJALEU, 



t*'**'/t.2?S2^^??^'^ f ■OTJS.'jAMIT, 
Foree (SBKBI BOTAI) } ^ ' 

TABOA, TBOK, POMAPS, PAUO (Second Period (DAI HI Kl) OperaUons and 

tbereafUr) 

Southern Foree - PALAD (until First Period (DAI IKKI) 
Operations have enled), SAIOOH, CAMaAK 

The initial fUll allovanoe for aupply bases and 
speeial supply points is as deteralned in Appanded Table 1. 

d. As the operation develops, speolal supply points 
(special stores departaent and special air depot) aill be set up 
In occupied areas. They will be under the direction of the 
ecBBandlng officer of the forces in suoh areas. The folloving 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 457 

looatlona hav* b«an choa«ni 

(1) 0;.VAO 

(2) TaKAKJBI 

(3) BALlKi-APAN 

(4) UANIU 

(5) UaKa^AR 

(6) SOKilABiiJA 

(7) SiNGKPOaE 

(8) BATAVIA 

(9) PQJANO 

Pag* •• Th« varloua forcas will be supplied by supply ships 

2/69 attachad to tham. 

f. If poasible, supply bases will not be used to supply 
other than airplanes and small vessels. In particular, except in 
unavoidable cases, supply bases will not be used to replenish stocks 
of supply ships. 

g. Supplies ajid stores for forces which have advanced into 
oaptured areas tii.ll be unloaded and trtLisported by base forces . 
(KONXYOCHI) (in "Base forces" changed to "special stores department ." ) 
in cooperation with forces in the area. 

Page h. VAien several forces are to be supplied at the same 

2/70 tine, the senior coaaanJing officer present will determine priority. 



TAble 2. 



i. The asalgnment of supply ships is given in Appended 



J. The renaezvous and subsequent movements of supplj; 
■hips attaohad to the Coobined Fleet are given in Appended Table 3* 

3* Important supply matters 

a. As shown in Appended Table 5> the Combined Fleet 
Supply Oept will direct the over-all planning of supply for the 
Combined Fleet anu will keej) in contact tvith Imperial General 
Headquarters aiiu tuxcU base of operationa. 

Pag* b. Tlie organization of the supply departnaents of the 

2/71 various forces (fleets) will be detenained by the respective force 
(or fleet) coooander. The supply departments of the various forces 
(fleets) will supply the various forces (fleets) and will maintain 
contact Mlth Combined Fleet Supply Oept, each base of operations 
and supply pojnts. 

e. VVhen a force is supplied by a supply ship attached 
to another force (fleet) or by a supply base, a report will be sent 
to the comoandiiv; oi.'i'icer of the force to which the ship is 
attacned or to the co.umanding officer of the supply base. 

d. Aaeii the cooimanding officer of the supply base 
furnishes considerable quantities and supplies to surfitce forces 
other than those for which he is resjsonsible, he will submit a 
report on current stocks to Imperied. General Headquarters, th* 
oommandlng officer of the bkse of operations aiid Cotnmander in 
Chief, Combineu Fleet. 

* Editor's Note: Ravisea by "jirrata" issued by Fla^ Secretary, 
Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Serial 1 Part 99. 
dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the NaGaTO, SAEKI .VAN. 



458 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SECfltT 

•. Vhsn th« foro* cammatimT oonoamad finds It nsosswrx 
to ch&a^a Uia Initial full alloakno* of th« supply ba*« or apcttl*! 
?mg9 ■uppl> point, ha will aak* • report to iHparial u«iMral U«adquart«ra 

2/72 and CaaMsdar la Chief, Ccabiaad Tl—t «ad will notify tta« ocbmoI- 
lag offioar of tha baaa of op«r«tlona. Ifaob aonth report* and 
notloaa «111 ba aubaittad in thla aannar ooaoaralag quaatltiaa 
aaoaaaary to mplaolah atookCt 

f . CooBanding offioara of aupply baaaa aad offlocra In 
obarga of apoolal supply points will Baintain a ourrent loraBtoiy 

of stodks and raquleition naoassary itaU froa tha basa of operations, 
taking Into oonsidaration atooks oarrlad by tha lattar. 

g. Force ooaaanders (or ooaaanders in chief of fleets) 
will indioaie the quantities and types of ■ilitery stores whioh aast 
be carried on the supply ships> Vhen supply ships are directed to a 
base of operations or to a supply point in order to restoek, they 
will notify the onawamllng officer of the beae (TM Add 'or supply 
point. 'n regarding tioe of arrival and quantities and types oi 
■nterlel required. 

Page h. When stores on supply ships haTe to be replenished 

2/73 ^r sappleaented, the force ooaaander (or fleet cosaander In chief) 
concerned rill subadt a report Imned lately to laperial General 
Headquarters and to Coaaander in Chief, Ccabined Fleet. 

i. Each force oceMander (or fleet eoaaander In chief) 
will secure froa the eoaaanding officer of the base of operations 
the necessary infomntion about the aoreaents of and the types and 
qunntitlcs of oateriel carried by supply ships which are dispatched 
as replaceaents or additions froa the base of operations or supply 
base to tha force (or fleet). 

^. Eeplenishaent of supply ships and supply bases 

f^g» a. £«ipply will be carried out In such a nanner that the 

2/7i Tarious supply ships will not have to be restocked at one tiJMi 

Supply ships will be restocked one at a tine at a supply base or 

base of operations. 

b. ^pply bases and special supply points usually will 
be restocked by laperial General Headv^uarters or the eoaaanding 
officer of the base of operations. 

Special orders will be issued to effect co-operation 
of supply ships of a force (or fleet). 

The Bonthly replenishaent allowances for supply 
bases and special supply points are given in Appended Table /t, 

Pnge 5. Protection of ships 

2/7$ 

When supply ships are to be dispatched, tha force 
ooeaander (fleet oooaander in chief) concerned will furnish suitable 
protection by foraing a convoy, charting the course and providing 
escort. Supply ships attached to the base of operations will be 
protected in like aanner. 

^Editor's Motel Rsrvlsed by "STrat** Issued by Flag Secretary, 
Ccabined Fleet as Ccabined Fleet Jltraseoret Serial 1 Part <W. 
dated 17 Hov a, aboard the HAOAIU, SAAI IIAtf. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



467 



% 



SvooQd period (OaI NI KI) Op«r4tiona aiid thareafUr will b« 
ilM MM «• rirat Period (DaI IKKI) Oparationa, axoapt for tha 
rello«ti>ci 



Strikinc Foroa 



Oil Supply 



KTOKUrO lUOi 

ttun MAiU) 

NIPK)N UaHU 

No. 2 KTOeJ MABU 



Total 6 



Soutli SMa 



Dill add TQliO UAtiU 



Total 22 



Soutbam Foroa 



Stijipljr forea 



Nill add KUriOSllIO 

lURU 

KOKUYO UaBU 



Total 35 
(TN Changad 
to 36)^ 



total 13 (W 
Chanrad to 
12. )1 



Mil add 3ilINK0KU 
UaRU. TOiU UAHU 
(TN Inaart . 

3HIRIY« URU.)-*- 



nMlter'e Notat Rariaad bjr "Errata" iaauad by Flag Sacratary, 
Coablaad Flaat aa Coabinad flaat Ultraaacrat :>arliil 1 Part 99, 
dAtad 17 Nov 41. aboard NaCaTO. jaBSI <AN. 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



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470 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




o ^ • t « 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 471 



SECRET 



Pag* H. OpcraUons Ottwr Tbaa Tboa* of tba CoablMd Flaat 

2/96 

1. Operations of forcaa at oaTal atatlona and auxUUry 
naral atatlona 

a. Tbaaa forcaa will atrangthen th« dafana* of 
atrategic polnta, protect aaa traffic and co-oparata with th* 
Coablned Fleet or China Irea rieet In operations In tba area In 
tbalr charge. 

b. Air forcaa and otbar necesaar/ forces vlll be aovaO. 
to the necesaar/ places as conultlons oeaand. They «ill be placed 
unaer the operational coouatLnd of the coBoanaer In chief of ths fleet 
concernea or of the coBiiiAncilng offlc#r of the force at the naval 
Station or auxiliary naval station In charge of the area concerned. 

2. Opera tlona of CHINA Area Fleet 

Page a. In general, the fleet vlll continue operations 

2/97 against CHIhA with Ita present strength. It will annihilate land 
forces and wrest control fro* the*. 

b. At the outbreak of war the force of which 2NC CHIHA 
Expeditionary Fleet Is the nucleus will co-operate with the Ar«y 
to occupy UONGIOMG ana annihilate eneay forces stationed there. 

0. The aefenses and security measures within the 
occupied areas will be strengthened and sea traffic alon^ the CUItiA 
coast will be protectee. At the aaae time every effort mill be siade 
to deny the uae of the CHINA coast to eneay ships and airplanes. 

d. It will co-operate, as the occasion demands, with the 
Coablnad Fleet and Southern Army In escorting Amy surface transports 
ana In aef ending asseably points. 

Page 

2/98 II. OPLRAriOMS OF THL OOHBIH£D FLSET IB CASE WAR iTITH RUSSIA BEGINS 

DDRING THE WAR WITH THE OHITED STATES, GREAr BRITAIN, THE NETHERUHDS 

AND CHINA 

A. Operation Policy 

1. The operations against ths OHITED STAPHS, GREAT BRITAIN 
aikd the NETHERLANDS will be aodeled generally after the operation 
policy aet forth In I. 

2. The policy for operations against RCSSIA will oe as 
follows t 

a. In the ev^nt war breacs out aurlng First Phase 
(uAI ICU OAN) OperaUons 

(1) For the aost part, 5th Fleet and the homeland 
coabat forces (NAISiJi BUTAI) will b« ch&ngea with defense. They elll 
protect vital sea traffic along the coast of JAPAN and will protect 
strategic areas from air attack. 

Pag* (2) Thereafter, as quickly as southern operations 

2/99 and operations against the Aaerlcan Fleet peralt, elements of 

light forces and air forces will oe alverted to operations M.c&inat 

RUSSIA. 

The operations described in the above para^aph 
ttaas will be strengthened. 



40 



472 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



SECRET 



SS 



2/100 



P&g* 
2/101 



•f rint PhftM (OAI lOMZ DU) OpM«Ueas. 

Tte gTMWr part of 5U FlMt aal «m •lM«at of tk* 
ll^t fore«« wlU b« ahlfWl to epwvtiona AfUaat EOASXA. Tba 
RuaaUa fl««t la tha OUXB will ba lawadUtaly aaalMUt«l. 
Praaaura will ba brooght t« baar aloag tha ooaat of Raaalaa tarrltasy 
la tha TAB U3t. la ao-apaaraUon vith tba Anij, thaaa foraaa will 
daatroy aaaay air atraagth la tha ■ARITIMX Prorlaaa and DSSOU 
ProTlBoa, aad oooup^ TLADITOarOt aad othar atratagla polnta la tha 

rAB use. 

B. Allooatloa of Foroaa. 

Saparata Tabla 6 (Ull ba aaat latar) (TM Mlaalag. ) 

C. Oparatloaa Othar TImd Thoaa of tha Coablaad Flaat 

1. Oparatloaa of foraaa at aaval atatlona and aazlliar7 
aaTal atatlona. 

a. Tha aaral atatlona at KXO£UKA, KURD, SASJBO and 
MAIZOEU and tha auzlUary mTal atatlona at OtUNATO, CUIIKAI and 
Port ABTUOft will atrangthan aaourlty aaaauraa agalnit Raaalaa 
aubaarlnaa and alrplanaa aad will aanlhllata thaa If thay appaar la 
araaa undar thalr jurlidlotlon. 

b. Whan tho outar ooabat foroaa angaga In aotlva 
oparatlona, air forcaa aad othar naoaaaary forcaa will ba tranafarrad 
to tha naoaaaary polnta and will eo-oparata In thaia oparatloaa. 

2. Oparatlona of tha China Araa riaat 

Tha forca whlob haa I China £xpadltlonary Flaat aad 3 
China Expadltlonary Flaat as Ita auolaus will ooTar the aoraaanta 
of tha Aray forcaa which will ba divartad from oantral and northam 
CUIMA. It will ascort thaaa forcaa during tranaport at aaa and 
daploy aultably. 



III. MISCEUAjra006 RiCDLATIOIS 

A. Tlaa to ba Uaad 
Cantral standard tlaa 

B. Charta to ba Uaad 

Charts (charts of allltary plaoas) to ba uaad are as 
followai 



Page 
2/102 



CUAfiT (CHART OF ULITAKI PLACSS) 


a&K (ON i3ilPi>) 


Navy Oltrasacrat 3^7 

Chart of Military Plaoas la 

PACIFIC Ocaan 


For use In general operations 
(ships) 


Speelal Chart of Military 
Placas 


1. For use In Joint Aray-Navy 
operations 

2. For use In oparatlo is la 
narrow waters 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 473 

^IJRET 

2/102 Nof«« 

ChMrta for general op«rmti>.<n« in the lULAI Ar«a will b« 
••tabliahad ■•par<it«ljr. (TN Thl« not* subaequentljr has b««n 
daiatwl. r 

C. IdcntlfloatioD of friandlgr and •naagr foro«a 

Tno laeatlflcii'vlon of friaDdljr and anaay forces will be 
Maad on CoabinM yieut Dootrlna asd the folloalagi 

IdantiflOMtion between Mavjr ships aod Japanese Barohant 
shlp-^iry, (including' transports aikl ships attached to the Aniy) and 
between tha warious Amy and Mavj laru Installations (inoludlog 
forcei<J will be In acconlanctt with ^^Ijnal Katfulatlona for Identlfioa- 
tlon of Jao aMaC ■'AlBB iU ^■BT'tliMi 

(T.H Insert "but, In oda-numberaa aon'>.hb ak«tho<i 1 <111 be 
follokea. In syen-nunberod aonths tiethoii J.') (TN Add "Identlfloatlon 
anoag airplanes will be bnsed on the Joint ArRy-lkYv AgTea«e nt 
Conearnln.- Idanllfleation or Fri nndlv Military Alrnlanea. "H 



-vlltor'i ;ote: '>Tls©d by "Errata* Issued by Flag oeoretary. 
Combined fleet, a:i Co»blD>d Fleet Jttraaeoret M.rial 1 Part 00. 
dated 17 Hav U, :-.joird the NAGaTO, IIAHILI UkU. 



42 



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•t npradaaUaa af 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 485 



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
WASHINGTON 



SODRCE DOCUMENT #2 
ENTITLED 
"JAPAHESE COMBINED FLEET TOP SECRET OPERATION ORDER #2" 
USED BY IHE NAVY IN COMPILING THE 
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPAMESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" 
(Record of Proceedings, pages U32-U60) 

(FJC TENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 
IN THE JOINT C0NGRF3SICNAL INVESTIGATION 
OF THE ATTACK ON PFJ^L HARBOR) 



486 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



SECRET 



2A52 



C)afci:iii FLiJiT 'iOP i^hL': OPiiiAilON OliDQt 2 



FUjiBhip NAGAiO, ciAQil BAI, 7 Nov. 41 



lA;«Aka*X), iBOPoku 
Cocsaandar in Chief, 
CombiiMd FIset 



CO>.h imij KLLJT JKDOi 

First proparations for war 
Y I>ay vlll ba 8 D«o«nb«r 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 487 



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
WASHINGTON 



SOURCE DOCUMENT #3 
(A NAVY STUDY RE ENEMY SUBMARINES) 
ENTITLED 
"JAPANESE SUBMARINE OPERAnONS (PEARL HARBOR ATTACK)" 
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING 1HE 
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FCR THE ATTACK GN PEARL HARBOR"* 
(Record of Proceedings, pages Ii32-li60)# 

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 
IN THE JOINT CCNGRESSICNAL INVESTIGATE ON 
OF Tim ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR) 



488 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

JiPiMSX SUBMARINI OPEUTIOWS J»/pJARL HABBO^ ffTifKfC j 

The operatlonB of Japanese eutomarlnes, both midget and full-eize, 

was one of the main factors In the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 

December 7, 1941. Ihe Conbined Fleet Secret OpOrder #1, vhich contained the 

basic plans for the Paciflo<>fide attacks which launched the var, contained a 

paragraph referring to submarine operations at Pearl Harbor, de text of 

this paragraph, as recalled by a reliable Japanese Qiief Teoman who was 

attached to. the staff of the late idmlral Tamamoto, CinC Conblned Fleet, read 

as follows t 

* 7, The Commander of the Surprise Attack Force (Submarine 
Force), having the 6th Fleet (Submarine Fleet) as its main 
element, will have most of the submarines leave the western 
part of the Inland Sea on X-30 Ca^ to attack Pearl Harbor. 
Its entire strength will be bo disposed so as to command the 
harbor south. It will attack any enemy warsnip ^ich may have 
esce^ed from the harbor. It will also carry out reconnale> 
eance before the attack, and if the opportunity presents 
itself, will carry out surpri8» attadcs on enemy warships with 
■Idget submarines. The time for such attacks will be after 
the flints of planes have attacked OAHU. Svery possible 
means for recovery of midget submarines should be considered. 

The organisations participating in the Pearl Ha;rbor attack, on the 
' basis of POV and documentary evidence, included Subrons 1, 2, and 3 (Minus 
Subdlv 20). This is a total of 20 submarines, not incloding the 5 midgets 
carried on the decks of five of the large submarines. Sixteen of the twenty 
submarines have been definitely identified as having participated (I>*1,2.3,4, 
5,6,7,17,16,18,20,22,34, (1)68,(1)69,(1)74). The other four, ndiich are 
assumed to have participated because they were pert of the same Subdivs both 
before and after December 7th and are not known to have had other assignjnents, 
are the 1-8,9,15. and (1)75. ▲ fairly reliable POW has suggested that the 
1*10 was also present, but there is no other evidence to indicate that it w&s. 

All of the submarines participating (with the exception of the 454on 
midgets) were of the I-type; i.e., over 1,000 tons. Sixteen of them were of 
the Long-^ange Cruiser type— over 1900 tons, with a range of above 12,000 
naatlcal miles at 14 knots. Of these, five (1-16.18,20,22,24) were equipped 
with midget submarines, the five midget submarines which attempted to get Ido 

- 1 - SICRIT 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 489 

SBCBBT 

Pearl Harbor. The remaining eleven Cruisers were plane-bearing eubmarines. 

Tour of the twenty were I (1)68 Class Submarines: 1400 tone, 6 
torpedo tubes and a range of 8,000 miles at 16 knots. 

The midget submarines used in the Pearl Harbor action (which sub- 
sequently were referred to as the "Pearl Harbor T^rpe") were 41' in length, 
carried two 18" torpedoes, had a range of 175 siles at 5 knots and 13 miles 
at 20 knots. 

When carried by the mother submarine, the midget sub is secured to 
the pressure hull with four heavy clamps and one auxiliary clamp. In access 
hatch, telephone and battery-charging leads connect the two submarines. The 
midget is launched by releasing the four main clantpa from the parent ship and 
the Auziliary clamp from within the midget. 

With regard to the anticipated results of the midget-submarines borne 

by the 1-16 Claes submarines, it is interesting to note that the Chief of 

Staff, Combined Ileet, in clarifying Secret OpOrder #1 is reported by the 

above-quoted Japanese Chief Yeoman as stating! 

!Qie fidget submarine unit has been studying and train- 
ing at thejaevy Yard with the CHIYODA for a year and a half, 
but it is still too much to hope that it has reached a stage 
of perfection. In any case, the crew members are supremely 
confident. Ihe 6th Tleet will attempt to use them in 
attacks within the harbor. 

PHASES or THE ATTACt 

Preliminary . According to the Secret OpOrder #1 schedule, most of 
the submarines in the attack force were supposed to leave the Inland Sea 
(presumably Sure, the major submarine base) on Z-30 Day (November 18th, Hono- 
lulu time). Subron 2, composed of 1-1,2,3,4,5,6,7, is reported by a reliable 
POW to have left YOKOSUKA two days later. The Commander of the Sixth neet 
remained behind at Sure. 

ipparently most of the submarines arrived in the Pearl Harbor are« 
a day or two before the attack. The log of the I^l reports that on December 
5th (all dates Honolulu time) it was 600 miles from Pearl Harbor. According 
to POV»s from the 1-17, this sub arrive off OAHU on the 6th. 

- 2 - SECHBT 



490 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Before the attack atarted, the tabmarlnes took up icoutlag positlont, 
Qie area around Pearl Harbor had heen divided Into rarlous tectora. That, 
the I~(l)69 cruiser auhmerged, engaged In aarrrelllanee In Scouting Sector J>, 
ahout 17 fflllea Soathvest of Pearl Harbor, according to the Gestured report 
of Ita skipper. !Die I-*!?, according to POW^a, took rxp a scouting position \^ 
Vorth of Honola^ There was also an X Inner Scouting Area: a circle with a 
radlua of 8.5 nautical milea* vlth Pearl Harbor aa the center. 

.One of the features of the submarine attack plan was to send at least 
two aldgets Into the harbor prior to the air attack In order to check on the 
ships present and their position. One midget was detected by the USCO COBOOR 
at 0350, four hours before the full aerial attack, as It was trailing the USB 
ANTARXS, apparently hoping to slip through the net defenses following the 
iiriASIS. This peo'tlcular midget was apparently eunk by the USS ViXD In 1300 
feet of water. Another midget was sunk in the harbor, probably having slipped 
in through the net>gate which had been opened at 0458 to permit the passage of 
two aineawcepers and not dosed until 0840, three-quarters of an hour after 
the aerial attack, ▲ navigation chart was recovered froa a third midget which 
beached Itself and the navigation track ^Ich was charted would have taken 
it all around ford Island in Pearl Harbor. (See attached chart) The original 
chart was evidently a U.S. Havy H.O. chart, with detailed navigational data 
carefully tranalated Into Japanese. Bough notes were scribbled on the chart. 
On the reverse side were further notes on navigation, etc. The sub carried 
a siiqile code which would have enabled It to transmit its information to the 
aaia force awaiting outside. 

The Attackt Prior to the full aerial attack which was launched about 
0800, the aaln function of the submarines, both fall-siise and midget, was 
reconnaissance and surveillance. After the opaning of the attack the full«> 
else submarines were svmposed to exploit the situation by torpedoing the 
ships which were trying to eseatpe the confineaent of the Harbor while the 



sxaiT 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 491 

SICBXI 

■idgett were 8i;^poted to alip into the harltor during the coafuelon and con> 
tribute to the deetruction caused by the carrier-borne atrial bombardment. 
Slaultaneoaslj they were aoppoaed to report the damage Inflicted by all 
Japaneae efforta back to the Coomander of the Striking Torce. Diia Infoma* 
tion was gained not only by periscope obaerration, but also by the aerial 
reconnaiaaance of the obaerration planes carried by eleren of the participating 
aubmarinea. One of the faetora reatricting the uae of thia type of obaervation 
waa the heavy weather which made launching difficult. 

ipparently all flTe of the midget auba launched were loat without 
cauaing any direct damage. The Japaneae admitted the loas of five midgets and 
only flTe midget-bearing aubmarinea (1-16,16,20,22,24) are known to have 
participated. There ia no known damage by midget aubmarinea and at leaat three 
are known to hare been aunk before they could do any damage. In addition to 
the one aunk trying to follow the iKTlEES into the Harbor, before the full 
attack, two were aunk in the harbor. One damaged itaelf on a reef to the 
rll^t of the entrance channel, and north of Buoy #1. It waa apotted there at 
0817 by the USS HiaJt which opened fire. Wiile being fired t^on it ellpped 
off the ledge and aubaerged. It waa apparently thia midget which beached it- 
aelf at QAEU, becauae the apparatua of the latter had been put out of commission 
by reef damage. 

The conning tower* of two midget submarines were sighted in the 
Vorth Channel, one by the CUBTIS. Thia latter midget waa aunk by the USS 
MOHAffiiK. the ready duty deatroyer which rammed It and depth-charged it. Qie 
fifth midget waa preauaably aunk in one of aereral eucceaaful a/^ attacka 
which were reported by the BLUZ, the RAMSIT and the BS£SZZ. Theae attacka 
preaumably accounted for the I-170(wfaich Japaneae documenta ahow aa being on- 
reported after December 8th} aa well aa the fifth midget. 

Poat-JLttack Phaae t It Is clear that one of the principal function* 
of the submarine attack force waa that of remaining In the vicinity of (earl 
Harbor to pick off ftaj damaged ahipa which might try to limp back to the 
mainland, or any other ahipa which mie^t bring reinforcement a to Pearl Harbor. 

- 4 - SECHBT 



492 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SEC3BIT 

We Icnov that the 1-1, which arrived on the eve of the attack did not leave 
the vicinity of Pearl Harbor until January 9th. 

One of the most difficult eituatione experienced by the Jspanese 
subs was that of the I-(l)69. At 1830 on December 7th it was ordered by the 
Commander of the Japanese Submarine forces to shift from Scouting Sector D, 
about 17 miles Southwest of Pearl Harbor, to surveillance in the central sector 
of Z Inner Scouting Area, a circle with a radius of 6.5 nautical miles with 
Pearl Harbor as the center. On the way it was forced down before it could 
complete recharging its batteries and subsequently was caught in an anti-sub 
net 4.2 miles, 130° off Barbaras Point. It was kept down on the bottom below 
its maximum safe diving depth for- 38 hours, but escaped with minor damage. 

After December 7th, submarine activity, at least on the part of 
those submarines which took part in the original attack, tapered off. About 
December 14th the 1-17 left for the Oregon coast. On December 20th the 1-174 
left the Oahu area for Kwajalein. Bie I-l which remained until Janrnry 9th, 
had an eventful cruise, but little success. On December 10th it sighted a 
CT but couldn't attfck. On December 13th it sighted an AC but was prevented 
from attacking by x/S activity. On 20th of December it sifted an AE but was 
unable to attack. On December 25th it was depth-charged without damage. On 
December 30th it shelled the harbor at Hilo. On January let it was sighted 
and attacked twice by U.S. planes without damage. 

Results I In summing up the part played by Japanese submarines in 
the attack on Pearl Harbor it is important to note that the Japanese lost 
one full-sise submarine (the I-(l)70) and five midgets, while American forces 
suffered no known damage from submarines. Balanced against this is the fact 
that the submarines served an iinportant scouting function and tied up American 
naval units. 



- 5 - 3ECB1T 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 493 



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
WASHINGTON 



SOURCE DOCUIiENT 0k 
( A NAVY STUDY RE T5NEMZ SUBMARINES ) 
ENTITLED 
"TIME TABLE OF JAPANESE SUBMARINES OPERATIONS" 
USED BY THE NAVY IN COIfPILING THE 
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE A TTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" 
(Record of Proceedings, pages Ii32-U60). 

(EXTEiroED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 

IN THE JOINT GONCtRESSIONAL IN^/ESTIGATION 

OF 'JHE ATTACK ON PFoARL HARBOR) 



18 Nov. 


'4.1 


20 Nov. 




25 Nov. 




5 Dec. 




5 Dec. 




6 Dec. 





494 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SECRET 

TIMETABI£ OF^SUB.'J^INE 
OPLRATIONS 

Submarines scheduled to leave Western part of Inland Sea 
for attack on Pearl ace. to Combined Fleet Secret OpOrd fi^l. 

The 1-1,1-2,1-3,1-4,1-5,1-6,1-7 left Yokosuka for Pearl. 

Com. 6th Fleet was on Hashira Shima. (KURE) 

OHATA, PO, says 1-174 arrived off OAHU at this tine with 
15 or 16 others. 

I-l was 600 miles from Pearl. 

1-17 arrived off OAHU, took scoutinR position 1° North of 
HONOLULU. 

7 Dec. I-(l)6o, Flag of Subdiv 12, took up surveillance position 

17 miles S\V of Pearl, before attack started, 

7 Dec. 0350 USCG CONDOR sighted the periscope of submerged sub when 

conducting sweeping operations approx 1-3/4 miles SW of the 
Pearl Harbor entrance buoy. 

0357 CONDOR informed the USS WARD by v isual signal. YlkBD, whJ.ch 
was patrolling off Pearl Harbor instituted search. 

0458 Net opened to permit the passage of two minesweepers. Not 
closed until O84O. 

O633 Navy patrol plane dropped two snoke pots near midget fol- 
lowing ANTARES. 

0637 BARD sighted the periscope of unidentified sub apparently 
trailing the BSS ANTARES then enroute to Pearl Harbor. 

0640 WARD commenced attack, which is believed to have been suc- 
cessful. 

0645 VJARD reported to Commandant 14th Naval District, first time 
this had been reported, 

0732 Patrol plane sank a hostile sub south of the entrance buoy, 
according to telephone call of Operations Officer, Patrol 
Wing TWO at 0740. This \ia.s later revealed to have been in 
cooperation with DD. Presumably this is the same action 
in which the V/ARD participated. 

0751 The ready duty Destroyer, USS MONOCHAN, received orders to 
"proceed immediately and contact the iliiRD in defensive 
sea area" and also apparently to close the netgate. See 
above. 

0755 Navy Yard Signal Tower telephoned Cincpac: "Enemy air 

raid not drill." ALnost simultaneously Japanese torpedo 

planes attacked the battleships. 

0817 The USS HEUI spotted the conning tower of a submarine to 

the right of the entrance channel and northward of Buoy #1, 
Though Immediately submerging, fire was opened when the 
submarine again surfaced temporarily, no hits were observed. 



SECHl 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 495 

This sub ap -eared to be touching bottom on ledge of 
reef and in line of breakers. V^hile still being fired 
at, it slinped off ledpe and submerged. 

0330 The USS ..iOHOGHAN, ready duty destroyer, vvhich had been 
ordered to sea at 0751 but had been temporarily delayed 
by the initiation of the enemy action, got under way. 

0836 The conning towers of two midpet subs sirjhted in North 
Channel; one by CURTIS (AV^i). 

0837 The MONOGHaN, having observed an enemy submarine under fire 
of both the CURTIS and the TaNGIEH, proceeded at flank 
speed and at about 08^.3 rammed; thereafter dropped two 
depth charges. The fire of the CURTIS resulted in two 

084^3 direct hits on the connin?; tower. This submarine (midget) 
was later salvaged for inspection. Before the UONOGHAN 
dispatched it one midget fired a torp which was apparently 
aimed at the USS RALEIGH but passed under the bow of the 
DALE and exploded on Ford Island. 

08^0 Het closed. Had been opened at 04.58 to permit passage of 
two mdnesweeoers. 

0915 USS 3LUE dropped four and two DCs in two successive at- 
tacks on sound contact aprroxiinatply four miles bearing 
190° from DIA;.10I€) Head Light. 

0950 USS BLUE dropped 6 DCs on good sound contact; resulted in 
large oil slick and air bubbles over a length of 200 feet. 
20° 11' 30" N 157° ii9' 45" W. 

1020 Two DCs dropped on sound contact by USS BLUE 6 miles, 200° 

from Diamond ;iead light. 

1108 .'iJTB reported a periscope to USS BREEZE, patrolling off 
Pearl Harbor. 

1115 BREEZE dropped two DCs with no results: bearing Barber 
Point 297° T, Diamond Head 073 T, Hickham Tower 357° T. 

1135 BREEZE picked up sound of submarine in same vicinity (see 
1115); dropped DCs, which brought up oil and debris. A 
second attack a few minutes later with four ieeper DCs 
brought no tangible results. 

1204 GAI,1BLE on sound attack dropped 3 DCs 168 T from Diamond 
Head, 2.5 miles. 

1830 Comnander of the Japanese Submarine Forces ordered I-(l)69 
» shift from Scouting Sector D, about 17 miles SW of PEARL 
HARBOR to surveillance in the central sector of E Inner 
Scouting Area (a circle with a radius of 8.5 nautical miles 
with Pearl Harbor as the center.) 

PK I-(l)6'^ reports sighting five DDs "during night". Re- 
ceived close-range DC attack from thera apparently no damage. 



2000 



8 Dec. 0U5 (JiONOLULU LOCAL) I-(l)6o surfaced, on course of 300° for 

Barber's Point, hxjrriedly charged batteries, while at 
battle speed. Sighted 2 patrol vessels, about 3 miles 
away. 



SECRET 



79716 O — 46 — ^pt. 13- 



496 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

0536 I-(l)6f5 is forced down by the DD; before it had com- 
pletely recharged; DD attacked it with DCs witihout re- 
sult. 

0910 I-(l)6o Caught in anti-sub net, L.2 miles off Barber's 
Point, at 130° 

1205? A few minutes after noon RAI.ISEY DCed submarine on ex- 
cellent sound contact 11 miles due west of Barber's 
Point, bringing up positive oil bubbles. 

1225? Ramsey heard sub apain and DCed, deepest about 250 ft. 
getting positive oil indications. 

° Dec. 1950 I- (1)69 surfaced after "i?, hours submerged. 

10 Dec. U\^-'^ si,=-hted CV but couldn't attack. 

lis) 

13 Dec. I-l sighted<,A0 but waacou|iJ,er-attacked and couldn't 

attack. About this tifTfj|j-17, which had held scouting 
position 1° North of Oahu, left for the OHEGON coast. 

19 Dec. ^J.-{\)lk left OaHU area for mVAJALEIN, ace. to POW PC 

OHATA. 

iinS) 

I-l sighted^AK but couldn't attack. 

I-l DCed without damage. 

I-l Departed Pearl Area for HILO. 



20 


Deo 


25 


Dec. 


27 


Dec, 


30 


Dec 


31 Dec 


1 


Jan, 


2 


Jan 


L, 


Jan, 


6 


Jan, 



n 



I-l attacked HILO harbor, shelllnf prob. DD. 

Wi^ (2tJL> 

1-3 reached deployment line; received report of CV and 
left line to shadow. 

I-l sighted by US PLANES, attacked twice; no damage. 

1-3 returned to deployment line. 

I-l proceeded to ^ast of Oahu and resumed patrol. 

I-l made unsuccessful attack on US DD. 

1-3 sighted and attacked group o5?7AKs, unknown result. 

9 Jan. I-l headed for KMJAI£IN. Q(tj) 

|l|Mr'>>f-18 rushed to attack on hearing report of^CV but no 
'r'^ result. 

11 Jan. 1^1^"" attacked CV Lexin^^on Class; claimed sinking. 



3 - 

SECRtl 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 497 



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
WASHINGTON 



SfJIRCE DOCUMENT B 
(mAJISLATION OF CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENTS) 
ENHTLED 
"JAPANESE SUBMARINE SCHOOL NOTES 

COtJCERNING 

EARLY y/AR EXPERIENCES OFF HA','/AII" 

USED HY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE 

"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" 

(Record of Proceedings, pages U32-U60). 

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION 
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR) 




498 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

« A ■ » r R g ■ » T A T^n 

m3ssmm,m.mm. 

Or »ai35«ttoi i : ^.„ 




Initl«l 1i>Kt« 



Flnsl Dais. 



[ It is iw4N£L«)iM to etate that caaiMt whicatioa xatMs corrwot aMsrgiMMf ; 

is of sroAt rwcsssitjr, aoc it is «cets>«{ae2;f 2'v<:^rottab}« tiuit t^mr* ha« b&oi 
no op: ortomLtjr to g&th<&r mtlSxcietA lafttucdl^ bafoare tbo ^raduatJMi of th« 
IXth. puriod spocial courft* students* wine*, i^wersr, ecem aaXeaeials is 
ths cet«3oi7 Ox eeKa:;«it laotructlotis has b««i <^t«iiMd with tha snibral in 
port «t flG&asriia«S'I-I6 aad X-63 roo»it3f, it has b«en diKSided to iapodiatftljr 
ndn»osx«tpb arid '?istribut« it &s siady nat«riel to tMs period *• special 

[-eoarsa stud«nta, Althtyigli it is diff-'jolt to juarantea that aaffiftg ths 
Itaos heard dirsctljr there &r« no poiata of diff erenca idth actual facts, 
it is believv'.' that thar« ara no gi^eat errors ia liie iknstructions obtained* ^^'t 



(1) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 499 

/ j^ con fTlOi 811 1 1 A 1. 

1. Use of aubaarina earri«i plaoas. . 
H. Afterihe aun»>ise attack on Pearl Harbor on Dec«ajber 3, ths milHosrixMi 

1-7 r«c«dv..d an order to carry out an aerial r«connais»aQce ot Pearl 
Harbor when the opportunllT' presented* Altbou^ she attoB!|>tfld to sond 
off a plcine from the noigliborhood of lilihau, it was lsjpossihl» to do so 
due to the weather. Henco she proceeded 3«ith5«rd tintil In the neij^b(Kr!>- 
hood of Haaaii and carried out the aerial recoanaissi^ice, 
B, Jken on picket suition, it any bu possible^ dopoading on tbn KJeathor, tho 
tnemy's alert condition, terrain and other conditiotu>, to send off ttie 
plan-5 carried from s. certain area, but it laay be icipossible to <b> so 
from another area, Consoquontly, besides this necesaity of dejAoylng air- 
plane carrying si^bnariiKS, therw is also tho nc<5wsaj.ty. of .doplpying'iaBHs? 
airplan>; oarrihg 3ub;.tarines, 
Since urgent execution of tho above nentioned r-cormaissancc was not 
neccsscry, uc sufforad no grs-at disadviiito-ge, but it '..'ouid be of groat 
cjisadvixntagc, '.,hcn urjoncy of cxec-ution is required, ' 

2. Movenent agaiist ena:^^ depth charges. 

A. Since xjerica's de-th charge setting, for the most part, has been defin- 
itely ascertained to be in the nei. iborhood .of 35 meters by previous in- , 
vestigations, si'b.narines attached to the Sixth Fleet have evaded theas at 
depths of 50 to 70 meters, (Soue subs ha.Ye evaded then at a depth of 100 
-letetrs). In the case of the I-l,\(70 meters depth), she received tjiree 
charges rlirectly over her, but suffered no damage. (Judging from the 
opinion that the. bursting charge of Araerica's d pth charges appeared to 

be feeble, it is doubtful as to wli«|ther the charges -^ere .directly vr&r^ 
hesid,^ 

B, '."hen the safe'subaergins depth is thoiight io be about 20 meters more than tto ' 
supposed depth setting of depth charges, it is deeced best to assume as far 

aa possible a position of 20 cietcrs or nore below the depth charge's depth 

setting. 

If not, it is doened best to ass'.'r'.s a position up high, but inpossible to b» ^. 

Mj. ''' 

detected, emd as far above as pc£,slble froa the supposed depth setting of _ 
the r^epth charge 
(a) The ISS prljaxal7 used souM list«iing^ petrol /ijifo/t ^^i^f^ ^ ^^ W^J 

mn - 



500 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 






i.r;r; Derisoer>e, 



liorceT.f^^J .ftj §\i f-^-^ J 




EXHIBITS OF JOIxVT COMMITTEE 501 



-"^ COMFIDSMTlAt 



X, OiuAxn* Cuzrent, 

A, ITw onshore currant in the area of Barber's ^int^ Oahu, ia very strong. 
Sines sabBfaTine I~6S padd little attention to this, she si Med 1*« 
breakers of Barber's Point ro«f at a irery close distance sftjen site raised 
iier periscope up to observe, bat she was able to prevent anj^thiag from 
happening bv turning inmodiateSy, 

B, Vifhon stationed on observation on the fi-ont lino, it is necessary to take 
^ into prtqx^ arij^Lderation the onshore tairrent when close to the shojre, 

HO. U, UrttiajVBSpG FOR„,ATTACK 

1. Protracted subraergod navigation. 

A. (l) In r«g. rd to subraariae I*-68, th;- raaaber of d^s of subinergcd navigation 
\ms 30 for an averasc of 14 hoiirs per day. Air porifior chca-oale were 
used only onco (20 rsieces) and the cooler was not used. 

(2) Although CO^ roachdd 4.6?, 0^ r«aehcd IS^ and the tonjperaturc; rv^achod 
32*^0-, there soentd to be no great of fact upon the aen, 

(3) Other than being us^ once 7fhen her subraergod navigation continued 
for 3i> hours, submarine 1-16- did not use the air purifier. Just as in 
the abovs case, iher^ se.med to bo practically no aifc-ct upon the asn. 

B. (1) Although there is no.d for the use of air purifiers in a sulsaerged 
navigation of sbout 14 hours, there is still a necessity for the gi.thoring 
of rtore data for further study. 

(2) It is necessary to acctlorate the caaplotion of thca study "ii'ashing 
purifior" ZT/T/^ i^^r -^'^ J *"3^ ^'^ iwi'lf-ruas method, 

2. .'Javes in the Hawaiian Area. 

A» During the operations of autoarinciS of the Sixth Fleet in the Hawaiian 
aroa, vravoe were high ovcry day and it has beon reported that submarine 
1-16 found it dif ficilt to laaintain Il«^r depth oven at the depth of about 
18 saeters and had to use hor standard spvod aargr times, ; 

Besides, these apf cared to b>; two or tlirco submarines that revealed their 
coruiing to-.<tr in the prosencc of the cnsnor, 

B, It is necessary to raai'.ntain the accuracy of the sovmd detector oxcollentlj' 
in order to do aivay vd.th any uneaainecs ia :;.«nd detection patrol. 
Also, considering this, thu pcricsope should be -lacle as long as possible. 



jIbL. •■^m^m9imm^m^»'<J^ ~^ 



502 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



(5) 



,:C N F I D :j: W T I A L 




aO. S. OOUiJ HICAT^ GN 

1, Undurwat^r ^riLn^loss rocwprticn ability, 

A, According t:; the .;xpcriwACtts of tho 1-16, it is r»jportad that sonsitiirity 

is 4 *t a depth of IS a ters and 3 at 20 aaters in the Hawaiian area, 

(Sendirig etation o.^AIll) 

^., .-... iisj JC_si:!CJ7 

1, gian^e in vroricLng of the ruclins gims durine operations. 

A, •hen 1-16 test fired her nachinc guos without takinc the trouble of claw* 
ing, cfter conducting operations for 30 days, of v.-hich 20 days wwo spent 
in subciarsed iS»vis:;tion, one machine gun fired without any trouble, irfiile '^ 

the othOT fired onl:'- one shot. - 

i 
Z, Dsijares caused by depth ohcjr^e attack, 

A. r.iile observing in "a.-aiian- area, subaarine I-6C v/as depth charged. Of 
about 100 de^th' clTarses dit>p,3«d, 12 B:q5lode<i v.ltliin, 200 aeters and 2 ^, 
e;xlodad directly above. Ths depth charge setting wit .Tithin 35 raters ^ 
iinc: the sub's dei-th 45 neters. The damage suffered from this attack, for 
the aost pert was as follov.-s: . )''^ 

(1) Of fr.e 172 electric li^lits, 75 v/esre 'anaged. .(Those that '.rere not ^M 
li,'-hted 'vere not t'.ariii^ed) . 

(2) S.-.'ftll a-oount of lealca,;2e fr«:i ths forward doorCs) of the torpedo tube(s). 

(3) Two deptii indicators \>egpsi to functioni incorrectly. 

(4) feiisitj.vity of £o\'nd detector bccarie bad. -^K^M 

(5) Becariie iepossiblc to use ths tronsroitter of the echo range depth finder. 
(o) Leaica-e in the Vd^^'i ressiu'e air val\re group and cd.r pressure 'fithin - -i 
'j:\ip iacrcased .:reatly. • _ .* 
(7) L. ^J<£j': i.1 .;.c' ^lir.-pton valve of t.he negative buoyancy tank increased, . 
(3) Due to the da-i^^e to the 50 wit poi/er supply, tho rudder ordor tclogra}^ 
vftnt out. Beoause of t;iis,-. the h^Lasaan mistakenly tl^ouglit that the rudder 
had be in datiatec. 
(S) The accuracy of t;;; ( ? ) anaeter decrsa:.cd. 

(10) Ic-ka-e frc«a tl'.s corroded tube(s) of nutiber 1 coolar. 

(11) Considerable Icwia^c fron the "constant usa" ajid reserve fuel tanks, 

B. (l; Disaaaomble the damaged r'epth indicator and rsuove the sea vfater 
betv/tcn thvj ,,'1 and uZ b<?ak» ^ "^'i^ ^ 
(2) To har» tuRMd o^f as fflaf^ •lACtric li^ts as :x>0sible. 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 503 



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
WASHINGTON 



SOURCE DOCUMPINT #6 
(•mANSLATTCN Ob" CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENT) 
ENTITLED 
"PATROL OPERATIONS OF JAPANESE SUBflARINE 1-69 OFT PEARL HARBOR" 
USED BY THE NAVT IN COMPILING THE 
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK CN PEAPi HARBCR" 
(Record of Proceedings, pages U32-l;60), 

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIQATICN 
OF TFIE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR) 



504 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



■PACBOL OFXBiTIOHS 0? JiJPAXXSS SDEMASIHI 1-69 OTV FZJLBL H&5B0S" 

N. N. 1. »s— i»a 

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION 

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 

NAVY DEPARTMENT 

JIDENTIAL 

INTELLIGENCE REPORT — -^ 

Serial ^.'ilzbl Monograph Index Guide l(o.'^.57j:M?9_y'_ 

(Start new series each year, i. e. 1-iO. 2-40) (To correspond with SUBJECT BivefUjels^w^SeeQ^^rlT Index Guide. 

Make separate report {or cacn majo title.) 

From Op-16-FE, ONI ^t^ iashington, D. C. p^te -J^ElLi? ^g 

(Ship, fleet, unit, ditftrlet. office, station, or i>er8oa) 

Rof.r>.n.a O p-lf-FE Serial Ul-^3 of April U> 19/>3. 

(DirecUve, oorrespondence, pi«vioua related report, etc., if applicable) 
■K . ' - 

Source „ ^- , Evaluation 

(Aa official, personal observation, publlcatios, press,- conversation with — (As reliable, doobtfol. anveclfied, etc) 

identiir when practicable, etc.) -, , 

SnhjWt Japan ____Nav2: Subm arines 

(Nation reported on) (Main title as per index guide) (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title) 

BRIEF. — (Hera enter careful summary of report, containing mibstance succinctly stated : include imi>ortant fBcla. namea, places. daUs, etc.) 

CCRRECTION 

Tlie reference report, a translation of a captured 
documen"'; written by the Commander of Submarine Division 
Mo. 12 dealing with patrol operations of the Japanese 
submarine 1-69 off Pearl Harbor, erroneously gives the 
date of thase f)perations as Dece.i.ber 6-j.O, \'-)L2. This 
error occurs in the fourth line of the cover cheet , in 
the heading cf the first page of the report , and in the 
fourth line of page 1, Tl'.e date in all cases mentioned 
should read, "December 8-lC , 19A1". 



CO 1FIDL.'TIAL 



Dbtil>ali« Bjr Orifiitte . 




(8) 



Gen'l 3oard 
' ar College 

::i£ (5) 

BuOrd (3) 
BuShips (3) 

usnc 

Comlnch (IC) 
ClncLant (9) 



Op-lC/11 
Op- 12 
Op-2C (5) 
I;A Chungking 
Com 11 (5) 
Naval Aide 
USJIC 
List I 



LlFt 11, less q 
List III, ff only 
Aust, Joint Staff 

(2) 
N. Z. Joint Staff 

(2) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



505 



COHglCTIMTIAL 



Seria|!|*i-iL 



ISSUED BY THE IMTEIXIGENCE DIVISION 

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 

NAVY DEPARTMENT 

INTEIXIGENCE REPORT 



(Start new mtrita «m1i jfliic L «. 1-40, S-U) 



Monograph Index Guide No. 



907-4400 



^^^ Op-ie-rS. OMI 



(Ship, flecrt, unit. dUtrlet. offio*. sUtioa, or p«noa) 

Reference 



(To coarrespond with SUBJECT Ktvcn bcknr. Sot O. N. L Index Gvk^ 

Waahington. D.C,'^"'^""1lgi-rf TUT «"•> 4: 
- at r ; Date . li 



_ 19_ 



(I>it«etlve, corrMpondenoe, pnrvlooa rdated report, etc.. If apfUi 

S«..»JS >P<^ed Japanese Document Evaluation 



LE 



Subjec^*P*^ 



^AM offldaJ. penoBal obaervmtlon, publication, praai.. oonvazaatico with.— 
Idantlfr Then practicable, etik|L_-- 



(Nation reported on) (Main title aa per Index guida) (Sobtitlea) (Hake scpazata report Cor each tttie) 



BEISF. — (H«r« enter careful nunmarr of report, oontaininjc mbatanoe eoceluetlj ttated ; Inetode Important facta. 



, plaoaa, datae, eto.) 



The attached report is an abridged translation of a Japanese 
captured document written by the Ccimnander of Submarine Division 
Ho. 12 dealing with patrol operations of the 1-69 off Pearl Harbor, 
Deoember 8-10, /l94|^uring which time the 1-69 was believed to 
have been caught in an underwater obstruction. 



CONFIDENTIAL 



DiMiujUbaQ Dj OiifkiaJar . 



laSkf Wi» Mee let aM ia O. N. L 

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Gen' 1 Board 
Uar College 
MIS (5) 
BuQyd (3) 
BuShips (3) 
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Comineh (lO) 
CineLant (9) 



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506 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDSMTUL 

Report qf 1-69' a Operations off Poarl Harbor, Deo. 8-10, ^94, 

The Japanese submarine 1-69, (Flagship of Submarine Division 12), 
attached to the 3rd Submarine Squadron of the Submarine Force, was caught in 
an underwnteroljstruotion while conducting surveillance of Pearl Harbor on 
Deoembar 9, flL94lj but finally freeing herself, was able to carry on with her 
specified taViCT 

The following is an abridged translation of the report of the event, 
submitted with various pertinent conclusions by the Commander of Submarine 
Division 12, and officially distributed (Japanese 6th Floot Secret Letter ifZ, 
Part .5, Jan. 10, 1942) as reference material of value for training. (Dates are 
in accordance with Japanese time), 

I. Circumstances, Before the Event . 

During daylight on Dooorabor 8, the 1-69 was cruising submerged, engaged 
in surveillance in Scouting tJootor D (about 17 miles southwest of Pearl Harbor). 
Immediately after the attack upon the enemy by the Striking Force and the 
Special Attack Force, we vrero able to hoar easily, by means of submarine sound 
detectors, explosions of bombs and tcrpcdoes, and upon hoT.ring the sound of 
depth charges, I judged thrit the Special Attack Force was engaged in heavy 
fighting. 

At 1400 radio orders from the Commander of Submarine Forces were re- 
ceived, assigning the 1-69 to surveillance in the central sector of E Inner 
Scouting Area (a circle v;ith a radius of 8.5 nautical milos, -with Poarl Har- 
bor as the center). The orders further specified the annihilation of the 
remaining enemy forces. 

After sunset wo surfaced, in an attempt to assist as much as possible, 
but during the night vie, sighted five destroyers. Whilo submerging, we received 
a close-range depth-charge attack. After that wo hoard onomy patrol boats 
coBtinually, and could not surface. I judged that those patrol boats wore 
disposed in all directions at intervals of 3 nautical miloi. Just at this time, 
the waves were from 4 to 5 (sic), and ... in proceeding awash there was 
difficulty in maintaining depth control vd.thout using standard, speed, ana 
battery discharge v;as comparatively high, 

I felt keenly the need of recharging the batteries that night, judging 
that demands, on battery pov.'cr the next day would be great, and recharging 
difficult, because of the presence of enemy patrol boats. So, although it 
involved arriving at the designated patrol r.TCx somev;hat behind schedule, I 
set course (300°) for the area southeast of Barker's Point, -where I thought 
the onomy patrol might bo comparatively lax. At 0015 on the 9th, we surfaced, . 
making certain that no enemy patrol boats v/ero within close range. On a course 
obliquely to the west, and at battle speed, we hurriedly recharged batteries. 

We sighted 2 patrol vessels on our port quarter and port beam- respect- 
ively, each about 5 kilomctors away, and in about 30 minutes wo reversed 
course. Poarl Hirbor shone red in the sky, like a thing afire. It was 
already dawn, and although vro operated vdth the land as a background, an onomy 
patrol vessel disoovorod us and fired vfhat looked like a green Very flare. 
The time v/as 0106 and our recharging was not yet finishcjd (73/? of used power 
had boon replenished). In that condition vre immediately submerged, and although 
we wore depth-charged by tho destroyer, the distance vris great, 

II, C iroumstancos of Running Afoul of 
Undervfator Obstacle end Measures Taken 

At 0440 (December 9) v;e experienced a strange vibration of the ship, 
and tho navigator ordered the engines stopped. At the time, our course was 
80 , 4 motors were running together, and depth was 37 meters. I was in my 
cabin resting, and upon receiving the report went directly to tho conning tov.'er. 
Upon learning of conditions from the submarine's Commanding Officer, I decided 
that wo had been caught in an anti-submarine not, and ordered the engines put 
into reverse in order to got. clear. Howcv'^r, the needle of the speed-gauge 
did not move, as if the pit log tube vrnre broken. It being difficult to dotor- 
mine our movement, I began to Surface tho ship, and increased tho angle of trim, 

- 1 - 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 507 



CONFIDENTIAL 



A slight tromor was felt in the ship, ind I stopped hoadwiy. Again I bnokod 
it full spocd, but the ship did not move. Tho ship's trim and depth w:!ro not 
normal. I ordered "Blow miin tank", and "Regain negative buoyancy." During 
those operations wo surfaced, or rose to a point at v/hioh t;o wore awash, throe 
times. According to tho obsorvations of tho Commanding Officer of tho SubBiarinc, 
taken at tho timo of surfacing, within tho limits of observation of tho periscope 
(fonvard of tho forward end of the gun platform) v;o wore not caught in anything. 
Two onomy destroyers wore about 5 kilomotors dead ahead. As wo had now reached 
a situation in which vie could not continue either submerged or on tho surface, 
I decided to lie submerged and to surface at sunset. 

At 0454, I stopped the electric motors, but the ship began to sink, 
I ordered "Blow main tank". The reading of the depth-gauge in the tower 
reached the extreme limit (85 meters), (We actually reached 125 meters). See- 
ing this condition, I thought we must be free of the net, and ordered ".■.head 
standard" at a depth of 40 meters, but as before there shortly occurred a 
slight tremor, headway v;as -lowed, and I ordered "Stop", ^.gain ivo began to 
sink. I ordered "Blow the main tank", but before v/e regained buoyancy control, 
tho ship slovred to a stop, almost lovol, at a depth of 87 meters. It was 
0506 when I realized vie v;oro resting on tho bottom. Our estimated position v;as 
4,2 nautical miles off Barber's Point at 130 . 

III. Situation and Measures Taken 
..ftor Reaching Bottom 

Although the sea bottom was bolov; safe submersible depth, (70 motors 
for the 1-69), our resting on the bottom was an oxtrcrtoly good thing for us 
in our situation. As soon as v;g had bottomed we knevr from sounds similar to 
those made by tho destroyer we had previously sighted, that it v/as eloso by; 
and from other sounds wo learned of tho approach of other patrol vessels, Tho 
onomy vrould stop occasionally, and if vie thought thoy vcro attempting sound- 
detection, we exorcised rigid sound control. That is to say, the use of all 
pumps oxoopt the oil-prossuro pump, and the movement of all rudders, oleotrio 
fans, (jyro-compass and ventilation blov;er wore suspended. I decided to sur- 
face at sunset, but though many hours passed there vrere continual sounds of 
patrol vessels coming and going, and sinco our position six miles from tho 
harbor entrance offered considorable chanco of discovery and consequent battle 
to the doath v/cro I to surface at sundovm, I decided to wait if possible till 
dusk of the follovdng night, the 10th. 

After bottoming, we recorded ovory hour the amount of bilge water, 
the inclination, the air pressure and the depth. The fact that the incroase 
per hour of bilge water was about one and a fraction metric tons, and prossuro 
in tho air reservoir i.vas 90 (kilos), convinced mo that it 'would be possible 
to surface at dusk on tho follov;ing day. 

jLntioipating that xio would have to submerge after only a short time 
on the surface, I charged tho air reservoir vjith high pressure air from our 
(6) reserve torpedoes, "jid was able to raise its pressure 25 kilograms. Although 
I thought it impossible to uso the high-prossurc air compressor, since, on 
account of our depth, v;o could not take in soa water for cooling, - tho engineer 
suggested circulating tho bilgewator as a cooling raodiua. ;.fter effecting sound 
control and recharging from the reserve torpedoes, I bocomo concernod, as 
timo passed, over the lowering of pressure in tho air reservoir, and although 
I didn't uso the high-pressure air compressor that day, I did use it on tho 
10th, raising tho air reservoir pressure from 105 to 138 kilograms, and re- 
ducing the air-prossure inside the ship from 891 ram to 780 mm. Tho additional 
air thus obtained subsequently proved most efficacious. 

Other measures consequent upon the length of tine on the bottom wore 
as follows I 

A - Air purification! 

To escape detection due to noise of ventilator motors, and to 
economizo on electric power, we used air-purifying chemicals threo times ■#hen 
we did not hear the onomy in the vicinity (tho amount of air purifier used 
was 60 units) over a total period of about twelve hours j oxygon was roloasod 
threo timos for o total of 45 minutos. At 0800 on the lOth there was a roading 
of 4.5^ carbon dioxido, and just before surfacing v/e must have reached approxi- 
mately 5.5J5, and the crow had headaches , A state was reached whore walking 
for oven a slight distance, or any oxortion, caused panting. 



508 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDENTIAL 



B - Stopping of bilgov/ator ciocumulition! 

117e tightened propollor-shnft packing by stuffing vdth v/iste and 
completely closed all valves to the outside. 

C - Meal SI 

To prevent rise of air temperature in the ship, and to oconomizo 
on power, we used no heat for cooking, but ate biscuits, canned fruit, improvised 
rice cakes, etc. 

D - Rest: 

To chock increase of cr.rbon-dioxide, wo had everyone not specially 
employed sleep as much as possible. In anticipation of a battle to the death, 
and to incite the desire for a hard fight, v^e served sake to all hands at 
supper on the 9th, the first time since leaving base. 

E - Defecation: 

In the absence of facilities for discharging excrement, we made 
use of '.-mpty oil cans, 

IV. Situation and Mrasures 
Taken Prior to Surfacing 



On the 10th we detected the presence of „ncmy p'trol vessels, but not 
so frequently as on the previous day. Sunset on the 10th being at 1253 and 
moonriso at 1827, I decided to surface \t 1500. My estimate of thj situation 
v;as as follows: 

A - It was possible that there might be no enemy patrol craft in the 
vicinity, since they knov; that the 1-69 was caught underrfatur; and in the 
event that 've might be able to free the ship easily and escape to a place of 
comparative safety, I decided to withdraw from the area and ascertain by radio 
the current state of affairs, before continuing the task assigned. 

B - In the event that freeing the ship might require some time, and 
that there might be considerable chance of discovery by the enemy, a.nd a conse- 
quent battle to the death, I decided upon preparations to make utmost use of 
all weapons. 

C - The possibilities v.'erc that v;e might be unable to move/ that wc 
might have to engage the enemy whether freed or not; that if freed, v;e might 
attempt to enter Pearl Harbor, or if unsuccessful in that, to block the channel. 

The measures I took with the above estimate of the situation as my 
basis, viorc as follows; 

A - Preparations for battle: 

Made preparations for gun, machine-gun and torpedo action. 
(Anticipating action against small ships, put 2-mL'ter depth sotting on torpedoes) 

B - Not Cutting Detail: 

Arranged a detail of 3 officers, 2 petty officers and 14 men to 
take 'charge of appropriate stations, tools, etc. 

C - Preparations for Self-destruction; 

Povfdor from 10 high-angle gun charges v/as oolloctod and arranged 
in the magazine with 2 tins of kerosene. Self-destruction ivas to be carried 
out if the worst cane to the v;orst, and would follow the broadcasting of the 
mossr.ga: "Wc arc unable to communicate". 

D - Preparations for Destruction of Secret Books; 

Operational orders and special instructions for use of Codebook A 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 509 



CONFIDENTIAL 



(trsl. notct K5, in Jipaneso), togocher \dth other p-ipcrs of a highly soorot 
chr.raoter w .-re out up, and destroyed by being churnod and pulped in a rcoep- 
taole filled v/ith sea water. Such things as secret charts and easily com- 
bustible documents vjcre romovcd to the magazine for burning at the time of ox- 
plosion. Things hard to bum, and v;hioh would have to be throvm into the sea 
wore torn up and weighted, to avoid being picked up by the oneray. The time for 
throwing these away was to bo specially designated before the explosion. 

E - Disposal of Bilge Watert 

Although vje triad as much as possible to prevent accumulation of 
bilge water, the amount was very great in the motor room. Since a large change 
in trim was naturally to be expected at the time of surfacing, there was groat 
concern lest the main electric motors be soaked with bilge water. Accordingly, 
the bilge water in the motor room was pumped into the after torpedo tube 
compartment, so that, even though the after torpedo tube compartment was flooded 
with bilge vfater above the deck plating before surfacing, the main electric 
engines would be perfectly safe at the time of surfacing and during subse- 
quent dive, in spite of a great inclination. We estimated that, before sur- 
facing, the amount of foul water in the ship totaled 50 metric tons, so 
prepared to pump it overboard immediately upon surfacing. 

V. Circumstances .-uid Measures 
Taken at time of Surfacing 

Upon completion of all pre-surfacing preparations, I .assembled all 
Warreint and higher officers, prayed for a good battle, and drajik toasts with 
beer. We then v;ent directly to our stations. The man in charge of listening 
gear reported all quiet in the vicinity. At 1457 *fe blew main tanks. Al- 
though the pressure in the air reservoir dropped from 138 to 85 metric tons 
(sic) the ship did not seem to be rising. The Senior Officer said, "Vfe don't 
float". I then ordered "Cut in motors", "Port and starboard motors ahead 
standard", and immediately we saw that we were free of the bottom. However, 
the change of trim gradually increased, and although we stopped blowing the 
forward main tank, this inclination did not change. '<Ve then opened vents 
in the forward main tank, and gradually prevented further change in trim, with 
a maximum inclination of 25 . At 1520 we surfaced. Our period of submersion 
had been 38 hours. 

As soon as the surfacing preparations had been completed, the net- 
cutting workers had been assembled, and I had instructed them not to be con- 
cerned with enemy fire, but rather to concentrate with calm certainty on 
cutting tho net. As soon as wo surfaced, the vrarking party went directly out 
on deck. The lookout reported no enemy in the vicinity, and immediately 
the net-cuttors reported no entanglement above tho water line. Because the 
pit log tube had been damaged the previous day, it was pushed out through 
the bottom of the ship. 

At this point, although I ordered stand-by on main engine, the oil 
in th,3 engine room sump tank overflowed, as a result of the previous inclina- 
tion, and for a short time it was impossible to use tho engines. Both motors 
vfore ordered ahcofd st?.ndard, but the stafboard motor didn't work. I wondered 
7.'hether or not the starboard propeller wore fouled in some obstruction, but 
when I saw the ship move fonvard I realized this was not so, and was greatly 
relieved, inasmuch as we could make out the light of an enemy attempting to 
challenge us. Our course v/as 270^. Dra-.ving near to the coast (to starboard), 
I headed for other areas, 

VI. Circumstances and Measures Taken After Surfacing 

As the port engine had been made ready, I ordered port engine cut in, 
ahead standard, at 1519^^. At 1533 we sighted an enemy destroyer on opposite 
course about 3 kilometers av/ay at 30 to port, and quickly submerged. Immed- 
iately after surfacing we had started pumping bilge water and replenishing 
air, but about 25 metric tons of bilge water still remained. After diving, 
trim was unsteady, varying from a maximum of 55 degrees (sic) down by the 
head to a maximum of 35 degrees (sic) down by the stern. We reached a maximum 
depth of 75 meters. The pressure in the air reservoir fell to 35 kilograms 
and I realized it would be impossible to continue submerged. I ordered tho 
ship to surface and fight it out, but after surfacing we did not sight the 
destroyer. The time was 1600, 



510 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDENTIAL 



Again neither engine would run, because of the overflovj of oil in 
the engine room sump tank. I ordered both motors ahead, and thenceforth 
proceeded on the basis that if we met the enony we v;ould fight a surface battle. 
Our course was generally northwest, vrith the coast for a background. At 1630, 
both engines voro in shape, and were out in. Vc went to ahead standard, 
ahead full, and finally flank speed. IVc wore able to withdraw from the area 
vdthout mooting any onemy. 

On account of the inclination during the dive mentioned above, the 
inside of the ship was extremely dirty from bilgo water, oil and excrement. 
In the after torpedo compartment, the torpedo tubes nore inundated at time 
of submersion, then v;hen we tilted back the forward bulkhead was covered v/ith 
dirty water. Also, the battery fluid from the main storage battery had leaked 
out, producing a foul odor, ilony hours ivoro required for cmcrgohoy repair 
measures, VJhen our communications apparatus had been repaired, I radioed 
a report of our condition. 

VII. Doraago 

Damage was chiefly to electrical equipment, from bilgo water; and 
to outsido' optical and listening gear, frflm long submorsion at groat depth, Wo 
v/ore not prevented from continuing our patrol, and v/ero able to carry on our 
assigned task. 

VIII, VietJs 

A. I am profoundly convinced that the 1-69' s .jsoaptj from danger v/as 
entirely due to Divine Providence, in thats 

1) The depth at v/hioh we bottomed was such that a ship could 
remain there for a long time. Just before bottoming vie h:.d sunk to 125 meters, 
and although it might ba only by chance th-.t vvc touched bottom at on 87 

miter spot, it is certcjinly unthinkable that vro could have stayed submorgi!d 
for so long a period at a greater depth, 

2) There v/is no onemy nc.'.rby at the time of surfacing, and that vre 
woro already free of the underwater obstacle. Had v/o needed a long time ■^o 
cut ourselves free, 'ind had there been a very strict enemy patrol in the 
vicinity, w.. should certainly have been discovered and ended up with a fight 
to the death. 

3) At the time we sighted the enemy destroyer at 1533, eind 
submerged, we were not lighted by the enemy. VTe wero unable to rig for 
noiseless running, and were in poor condition for submerged operation; in 
addition , our bow broke water, 

B. More research into and improvement of stoppage of oil-leakage in 
submarines are needed. .T/e know, from sound detection, that several onemy 
patrol vessels were directly above us. That we escaped bc;ing depth-chargod 
is due entirely to prevention of oil-leakage, 

C. Research and improvement in the field of noiseless running are 
needed. Although v.'e vrcre not depth-charged when bottomed, that was because of 
an entire absence of sound on our part. At many other times v;hcn we were 
running quiet we v/ore depth-charged. This indicates both that the enemy's 
sound-detection is superior to ours, and that our being detected was because 
of the noise of our equipment, 

■ D. The depth ot which the overboard discharge pumps (main and auxiliary), 
and the electric power pump in the head can be used is too limited; it needs 
to be increased by about 60 meters. 

E, There is immediate need of automatic dopth-oontrol gear. VJhen on- 
tangled and unable to move, it is nooossary, in order to remain below surface, 
to use discharge pumps a good part of the time. The sound of these pumps 
might easily load to detection and attack by tho enemy. 

Furthermore, night-time charging of batteries is oxtremoly diffi- 
cult in patrol areas. At tho outset v;e woro barely ablo to do 735? of o^r rO" 
charging. I consider the installation of automatic depth-control gear in 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 511 



CONFIDENTIAL 



submarines assigned to rooonnaissanoe of enomy harbors an imracdin.te and urgent 
necessity, 

P. Submarines should be equipped v/ith 4 pairs of net-outting shears 
of proper design. The array wire-cutters lent to this ship by the Kure Military 
Supply Department would be practically useless in net-outting. 

G, There should bo a supply of explosives for self-destruction. V/hen 
wo reached our crisis, I ordered preparations for blowing up the ship, but 
when I saw the crew panting in the foul air of the ship, and realized they 
would have to suffer further while v/aiting for the flames from the ignition- 
charge to explode the magazine, I felt that it was an unbearable situation, 

H. Morale was excellent. 

I. We throw overboard large quantities of waste, sandals, oil, etc., 
upon surfacing. I am not sure whether the enemy, seeing all this in the 
daytime, were made to accept it as proof of our sinking. I believe there will 
be many cases in which there will be difficulty in determining the effects 
of d3pth-chj.rg;o8 or attacks uftor a submarine is caught in a net. 



79716 O— 46 — pt. 13 10 



512 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
WASHINGTON 



SOURCE DOCUMENT #7 
(TRANSLAnCN OF A CAPTORED JAPANESE DOCUMENT 
TELLING THE EXPERIENCES OF A JAPANESE IN THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR) 

TilNTITLED 
"THE SOUTHERN CROSS HY KURAMOTI, Iki" 
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE 
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBCR" 
(Record of Proceedings, pages U32-li60). 

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 
IN THE JOINT CCNGRESSiaJAL INVESTIGATION 
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 513 



A h Op-16-FE 

Tr«nsI''<fcio 
2-3 July 19/ 



THE Z'"' '"' - 

by 
mM.:on, iki 



An «3ccount. -vritten in flo-/i;v;' l".n,"j':!f. of +hc 
experiencer of AlTiAl/iOri , Iki in thf ntt-.ck or. 
Pearl Karlxir ':nd in vp.rious other ooeritions 
in the South Sens in 1912. Itie furhor hie not 
been identified but wns probnbly ".n t-nlist-^d 
man. InterEpersec! in the :;ccovint ■..'ill U fo'ir. 
information of military interest fron 3ihist-,ri 
point of vie'.T, 



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514 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CO NFIDEMTIAL 

ME SOUTKSRI^ CR OSS 

INmODUCTION 



IVhen, in after years, one looks back on the events of the pest, 
the recollection brings tjith it a mood of deep and poetic emotion. Even 
the most unhappy events of foroer years are touched with beauty by the 
light of the past, and their unpleasantness forgotten like a dreaa. 

Just as the sun, sinJdnf^ into the sea, paints the twilight sky 
with rosy clouds and impresses the eye of the beholder irLth its beauty as 
its majestic form sinks moment by moment below the horizon, so the lind 
of man, loving the beautiful and hating the ugly, instinctively transnutes 
everything into beauty. 

TJhen I look at the moon, I recall an evening; in i^y native village 
when I watched it together T/ith a tender companion, in an ecstacy of love. 

When I look at the clouds, I think of a dry in nj' childhood ivhen, 
scolded by my mother, I flung nyself do.fn forlornly on the bank of e pool 
and watched the clouds drifting away into the distant sky, until finally 
my grief subsided to a vague sadness and in the twilight my mother led me 
home. 

TThen I look at the stars, I remember fondly a night when, out of 
work and wandering aimlessly, I saw through my tears the weeping Pleiades 
twinkling in en alien sky. 

With the passage of time, all these memories of the past become 
ever dearer to my heart. 

Now, in the midst of this preat world conflict of the Twentieth 
Century, I have taken up arms in the service of ny beloved homeland, and 
have made the dcring voyage to the South Sens, where- shines the Southern 
Cross, wy heart is joyful. I shall set down here for future years a 
record of these unforrettable days, so that their recollection may bring 
ne a Lifetime of delight. 

Die Southern Cross.' 

^Thether or not that name is a fitting title for this work, I do 
not know; but during my voyage to the South Sees that constellation im- 
pressed itself, I know not why, unforgettably upon ny aind, and its nane 
is indelibly written in my heart. Battles have folloaaa bottles, nnd 1 
believe their dazzling nuaber iTill remain recorded for posterity in this 
book, Ihe Southern Cross. 



KURAUOTO, Iki 



.(1) 



TU 



^7C^ 



•1- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 515 



CONFIDENTIAL 
The Great East Asia TJar.' Accursed conflict of nations! 

The peoples of this world, seeding to enlarge their countries 
to gratify their boundless ambition, have rushed like a raging wave 
into q great war such as has never before been ssen in the history of 
the vrorld. 

Epoch-making conflict of nations J 

tragic sight I 

The ^reak become the victi.Tis of the strong. Those viho hrve 
strength are victorious; those who have not strength are defeated. The 
victors use the nptural resources and extensive territories talm from 
the enemy for the benefit of their o'vn countrj'; and, at the same ti le, 
expand their military preparations more and nore in order to prevent 
the lies of enemy nations from ever again gainjmg a foothold* Like a 
great tree putting donn roots deeply into the ground, they try to 
build a firm and enduring Paradise on earth. 

The vanquished are driven from their country, and as an 
exiled race, gathered together into forlorn companies of the living 
dead, drift about aimlessly on a journey without end. 

As long as there exist great numbers of people leading a 
crovTded life on the limited surface of the earth, will not their innate 
passions of self-interest and srabition lead them to seek the means of 
living a r.ore secure existence, and thus embroil them inevitably in war 
after war? A study of the past history of the world will immediately 
make this problem clear. 

Houever, the wars of the past have been conflicts between two 
nations or at most a few nations only, in -Jhich only a part of the . 
world has stood divided. I believe it is no exaggeration to say that 
they are mere trifling altercations in co-nparison to the Great East Asia 
War, \fhioh may be truly called a '.'orld revolution. 

JloiT that we have been s'.jept into this world conflagration, I 
shall attempt to set down in tliis book a record of my part in the Great 
East Asia 'lar, and. the impressions I have received from the .Tiany battles 
in which I have taken part. But first I must express my earnest hope 
that, by means of the supreme love for humanity v;hich I take as r.iy slo- 
gan, this horrible war nay soon be ended in mutual understanc^inf among 
nations, and that the peaceful days of before the war may a'jain return 
to the earth. 

Wien I write thus solemnly, those who may read this book in 
later days may think that I am glorifying the second coming of Christ, 
or such a great love as described in the poems of Goethe. However, 
as already stated in the beginning of this book, I am an ordinary mortal 
born in this twentieth century, and a soldier who has taken part in 
this tragic upheaval out of a fervent love for the land of his ancestors. 

Ahi when one thinks of it, this is a century of endless 
change; he who in the morning is drunk with dreams of glory may, by 
evening, know the bitterness of affliction. The world is on the brink 
of a great transformation. 

While generally praising the holiness of love and mourning 
the t'imult of the world, I must yet take up arms for the land of my 
ancestors and fight to the last drop of my blood. IJierein lies the 
bitterness of life. 

What a contradiction! 

Below I shall attempt to set down, just as I recollect at 
random, a record of my participation in the war. 



516 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

COAT I D £ J .T_I_A_I; 

HA^AII Operation (8 December) 

At the time of year 'vhen green leaves turn suddenly to red 
in the cool ^nds of approaching autumn, and one begins to feel the 
piercing bresth of the North Wind - that is to say, Q^__18 Nc2vcmber l^iJJ. - 
fw e Ihft iOrni: harbor and sailaUlor^ jhe d istailt-JaQrtl:£rii-36as. The pui-- 
pose i>f this operation was unknown to us. 

lie hac* taken on board -.varri clothing, materials for protecting 
the guns against the cold, and a great quantity of sea nets, but ve 
understood nothing of this. 

. Day after day and night after night the ships carried out 

I target practice. 

In the ne .'spapers that '.le had on board it '.7as said that 'je 
Trere to attack DUTCH HAKBOR, but •;o did not believe it. 

'Thy did ve not believe it? Consider the .Moderate course of 
JaperiesediDloaacy up to that time. It seemed unlikely that Japan aeant 
et this time to lift up her hfind against Britain and America, Int'eed, 
was there not at that moment a coriferenoe in progress at "Jashington 
beti7een America and Japan? 

Our hopes vrere betrayed. '7e learneo this -./hen le ■.ont into 
port to refuel. Then ue learnt for the first time ho'.: grave the situation 
was. Within the bay in that island of the bitterly cold Iforth Pfciiio 
the air fleet was gathered. The crews, who every day were busy at con- 
ferences and discussions, were in an excited state of mind. 

Finally the Navigation Officer, Lieut. Comdr. YAIJO, told us 
we were to make a surprise attack on KAIAII. At last Japan .oyld be at 
war '-dth Britain and the U.S.A..' 

An air attack on HA7AII! A dream come true. That -..-ill the 
people at home think when they hear the ne:fs? lon't they be excited i 
I can see them clapping their hands and shouting iiith ioy. These were 
our feelings. T?e would teach the arrogant Anglo-Saxon scoundrels a 
lesson.' 

"'e must be inflexible in our course... .'Je could not expect 
to return alive. ... Thinking that, for all ie kne.;, -..'e night nov: be 
eating and drinking for the last time, v;e gorged ourselves on inrn, and 
cakes frou the canteen. 

• Finally, early in the morning of 26 ilovembcr, oiU" magnificent . 

lair fleet set out through the thick fog and stor.r.y -..'nves. Follo'.ang 
\a pre-arranged course it continued on its jay toj'rd PLAKL HAJ;30ri ex- 
pecting to destroy the enemy's Pacific Fleet. 

The ,'eathej ^ gro-7s w orse, a gale blovjs, the seas ra.:;c, a dense 
fog descends. In this bitter~ 'leather, a shoT/ of actual force, a test 
by the gods, though tossed about in their struggle -..-ith the eluai.nts, 
the ships continue on their glorious ^.'ay. 

In the several days of danger V7hen flags vjere blo'.m a'.ray, 
and men vrashed overboard, throughout the storm, the target practice v;ent 
on ceaselessly. 

Every man was completely exhausted by continuous watches 
without sleep, and by the silent struggle with Nature; but our spirits 
were buoyed up by the thought that we were to strike the very first 
blow in this greatest of all :7ar&. 

Behind us there were a hundred million people, amongst them 
our own families, who had limitless faith in us. Imagine the joy of 
these people on the morning when /e should successfully carry out this 
operation.' 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 517 



CONFIDE. J T I A L 

Soon the fleet crossed the 180° date-line into the Eastern 
Hemisphere. About this tine wo received a report that a steanship was 
proceeding on the same course as ourselves, from SAiI FRAIICISCO to RUSSIA. 

It was most important now to keep a good watch. There could 
be no doubt of our success, provided that this operation was not dis- 
covered by the enemy. Thereafter the whole crew Vept uatch for si^ht 
I or sound of this ship; but fortunately even when near point ■■e had 
( cau^t no sight of it. Considering the gcnsc fog , we seeraed to be under 
divine protection. 

C Finally, on the long-awaited X-Day, 8 December 19A1, at 0130, 
we reached a point 300 miles to the north of HATJAII. Ihcn the Impfarial 
decree on the great battle was made public. 

On this day there appeared in the clear sky a dense iihite 
cloud as if it were blessing our passage. Ihen from the decks of the 
aircraft carriers, plane after plane rose, flashing their silver \dngs 
in the sunlight, and soon there were a hundred and more aircraft in the 
^ sky. 



Our Sea Eagles v;ere now moving into n great formation. Our 
ten years and more of intensive training, during which \ie had endured 
many hardships in anticipation of this day — would they now bear fruit? 
At this thought a thousa id emotions filled our hearts as, close to tears, 
we watched this magnificent sight. One and all, in our hearts, we sent 
our pleas to the gods, and putting our hands together, iie prayed, 

JJeanwhile . our Sea Eagles, with the drone of their engines 
resoundinj^ across the heavens like a triumphal song, turn&d their course 
toward PEARL IiARBOh on the island of OAHU and set forth on their splendid 
enterprise. 

About thirty minutes later the fleet received the first report 
that the raid had been successful. 

r The second wave of the air attack force, in a lar.je fornation 
I composed of some two hundred planes, ttook off in the same way an hour 
l_later. 

Reports come in one after another: "Enemy anti-^aircraft fire 
is becoming more and more intense — we are now attacking agcinst the 
main force of the enemy — 're are bombing enemy airfields, the damage 
is enormous — " 

In this moment we are repaid for all our painstaking labors. 
Ihe gods themselves will bear witness to the glory of our great enterprise! 

Ihe deck is now transformed into a whirlpool of excitement. As 
the glorious battle results are announced one after another by the pipes 
of the hurrying orderlies, shouts of joy are raised on all sides, ind 
all gloom is completely swept away. 

Ct!eam7hile the fleet novos swiftly onward at a high spocd of 
26 knots. 

About 0900 the welcome shapes of the returning raiders begin 
to appear through the clouds. One by one, like fledglings longing for 
their nest, they come to rest on the decks of the carriers. 

Well done! But have they all come back? At this moment, my 
most earnest hope is that our losses may be small. 

Within an hour, all the planes were brought aboard. '.7e had 
\_lost only 29 plnnes. It was aa incredibly small number 'Then compared ^vith 
our glorious battle results; nevertheless, vjhen their heroic end i/as 
nnounced, the hearts of the crew were filled with sorrow for those .Tien, 



Qind for the fate of our special submrinfes'^ 
(Ij TOKUSHU SENKOffil f^^'^-^/{f^^ 



518 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDENTIAL 

Suddenly the anti-aircrnft defense signal was sotutded. An 
enemy plnne, above the clouds, \?ns insolently following Ih the trail 
of our aircraft. Intending to shoot it dovm with one blast from our 
ship, we manned our battle stations, but In n oonent the enemy got airsy. 

It Mcs rise reported that the enemy fleet wes on our trail; 
but this waa only a false r.larm, and all the ships vrithdrew tovardB 
point. 



IQ, 



niu3, having inflicted upon America a loss which cannot be 
wiped out in a lifetime, we finally _pet out upon our home»7ard journey. 

On the \iay, the 2nd MrFl o^ and the Sth OiuDl i ^»ere detached 
and headed for T7AKE Island r.s /in nttacl force. 



C, On ■ morning near the end of the year — 25 December — \re 
entered the h.irbor at KUES, -Aich we had long been yearning to see r.gf.in. 

On thinking beck, it was a long journey. Uio heroic men v/ho 
took part In it, the public excitement at home of vhich we learned by 
radio, and the \iilA u-^ves of the stormy Itorth Pacific, are all etched 
upon my heart like a vivid dream. 

Ah, memorable day - 8 December 19412 



(ihis concludes my recollections of the 
HAITAII Operation) 



(NEU GUINEA) RABArL OperaUons 

I had but a short whilf , but nevertheless I celebrated a 
victorious Nen Tear's Day in the homeland and enjoyed to the fullest 
the taste of ay native lend. Lerving KURE behind, I set out on the long 
sea voyage to my second field of operations in the South Seas - to that 
southern land -irhich I had longed for and dreamed of since ray childhood. 
I stood at my lookout station watching while seas of dancing silver ind 
gold waves and naked natives dancing in the shadow of coconut trees 
floated before my eyes. At length the fleet passed TAIT7AI! and. entftred 
the Itoplcal Zone. At IRUK, the Innd of eternal summer, \7e changed to 
our tropical uniforms. 

Ihe bright sun sent out blazing rays and it was steaaing hot 
Inside the ship, Hiis completely dissipated my cherished illusions 
about the tropics. Even so, the squalls which occasionally assailed 
us, accompanied as they were witJi cool winds and rain, ameliorated the 
heat. Then at night the gentle evening breeze, blowing dro'./sily, gave 
delicious coolness to my hot body. Looking heavenv/ard, stars like 
scattered gold and silver twinkled here and there in the evening sky. 
Ihe Southern Cross, which I was seeing for the first time, glittered 
there among them. 

Ihe nights in the South Seas roused vegue feelings of longing 
for home. Giving consolation for our inadequacies, the rippling waves 
broke against the side of the boot like sparkling scatterings of beauti- 
ful pure silver, the South Sea vegetation grew luxuriantly directly 
down to the benting '.wves and its beautiful contours were reflected on 
the surface of the sea. Adding the moon to this, the raid-day boat 
seemed n dream. 

!7e stopped here for a certain number of days, then \/hen the 
supplying was completed, finally turned toward the RABAUL theater of 
operations and went forth to the attack. Ihe gun shields were put up, 
and lookouts posted as usual. 



-5- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 519 



CONFIDENTIAL 

Slnoe leavlag KOBE Hartior, how many tines have I longed for » 
peaceful Bleep in a haamookl Exhausted Iff work during the day, at night 
I lay aooog the oachlne guns on the upper deck, never closing my watch- 
ful eyes for an Instant. Are the men on the homefront really avrrsre of 
these hardships? 

Finally, on 20 January, we launched our planes from a point 
200 miles north of RABAUL and NEt7 aiNEA. From that time until the 
24.th, uhen army units and landing forces carried out a bold Innding in 
the fnce of the enemy, «e sailed bock and forth across the equator, 
moving northward during the day and southward at night, ^o bombed every 
day at dawn for about 10 tiaes. Our beloved plane, the ABUKDUA^IJ also 
took pnrt in the bombing, receiving its baptism of fire, ./e did not 
see the oaeniy in this operation. Bitterly disappointed at this, vb 
returned once agnin to TKUK. 

Fort DAR'HH Operations 

f Ob 1 February we received word of the appearance of an enemy 

(i striking force on the east end of the liAFiSHALL Islands. Our striking 
jT foroe, under orders to take and externinnte this oneay immediately, 
headed stral^t for the lURSHAU. Islands. 



f hea 



Bowever, the hour arrived end the enemy was no^ere about, so 
there was nothing to do but to sail for the next field of operations, 
namely PALAU, where we were to carry out Joint operations with the 
Southern Feroe. 

PALAU Island boasts of being the most civilized among the 
various South Sea lalaads. S>e South Sea Islands Government Ofice is 
located here, and both the buildings and the inhabitants are civilized 
in comparison wilfc IBUX and other islands. 

With its stores, perks, shrines, APAI^^^ elementary schools, 
and in the military line the Air Qroup, Stores Department, etc., it 
reminded ne of country towns at home. 

Here I approached two native girls nnd in exchanging conver- 
sation with them on various subjects was amazed at their skill in Japa- 
nese, at their sioplielty and naivety, and at the intelligence of their 
profiles. 



/an 



On a oortain day here we were sent out to destroy POPiT DARTIt.', 

important port on the extreoe northern tip of hostile AVSffiALIA. Hbe 

■>~J planes took off as in the previous battle from a point 200 miles n^;ay, 
\and inflicted tremendous damage on the port. 

Our stMking force next had to prepare for the JAVA Operotione 
in the Indian Ooean. Qiving Chase to an enemy submarine, we sailed 
into STARING BAT in the Outah-held CEI£BES, which were now under occu- 
pation Ity our pnratroop forces and landing forces. 

Indian Ocean (JAVA) Operations 

England and Aoeirioa's ambitious lOO-year-oId dream of ad- 
vancing into the South Seas and the Orient was finally shaken to its 
foundations as defect followed defeat. In spite of the fact that they 
were taking their deathbed gasp; still Btubboi>n, they despatched the 



(2) APAI 7/>M unidentified. 



520 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDEUTIAL 

Combined Btitish, Dutch end Ancricsn Fleet, which now hpd no c-pit.^1 
ships, nnd continued their throes in the JAVA area, their list defense. 
Our striking force, "hich vws to help this enemy across its Irst river, 
nctinj in close cooperotion.'.Tith other South Sea forces, weighed nn- 
chor in iSTARIMG BAY on 25 Fobrjary and t7»^s on its way to the snlty 
Indian Ocean. 

The fleet, keeping a strict nnti-subrnprint pntrol in the sea 
areas where enemy submarines navigate, advanced between the islnnds 
which interspr.rse the CMBAI Straits. 

Diese waters, ripple-fi^e as flowing oil. reminded me of the 
Inland Sea...(T.H. Remainder of sentence illegible) 

Words at such a time fail to express what I feel. TJild ducks 
flying together, clouds flor^ting majestically, a great school of dolphins 
~ the very picture of peace. Could it be thct a bloody .far was being 
fought on such a sea? It is not surprising that we felt a sense of 
wonder. 

Finally the fleet made its splendid appenrnnoe in the Indian 
Ocean. A few hours later the Z+th Cruiser Division(l) separated from 
the force as a detached force end left for an undisclosed destination. 
The remainder, U r.ircraft carriers, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cniiser, 
and several destroyers arrived in the vicinity of CHRlSHviAS ISLAlffi to 
-try to sink the enemy's fleet. T7e received reports from the Air Fleet 11 
I that one enemy carrier and one destroyer were trying to make port at 
' CiI[tIST^'iAS ISli.JD. 7?e approached this isl-nd and sent up a reconnaissance 
plane, but it was not able finally to locate any trace of theu, Ilo 
doubt the swiftly retreati g enemy had learned of our approach, and had 
escaped under cover of night. 

Grumbling over our ill luck in being a.i^ain cheated out of an 
enga;'7oment, './e changed our course "nd. formation and headed for a supply 
base. Suddenly the alarm was given to man our battle stations. '.Jon- 
dvring what had happened, we leaped to our battle stations and srrj to 
our right n cloud of black smoke rising on the distant horizon. "Hie 
big guns of the T0NE(2) opened fire, belching black smoke. Ihe des- 
troyers up ahead also began firing. 

Soon the enemy merchant ship broke into flames, and in a few 
minutes sanlc to the depths of the Indian Ocean. 

From this first bombardment by our striking force, I las able 
to realize something of the difficulties of artillery warfare; I was 
surprised to learn th^t we had fired several hundred shells at a single 
merchant vessel. Several hours later we uere again ordered to nan our 
[battle stations. As we took up our posts, full of fighting spirit, the 
big guns of the T02ffi in the re^r were already firing and shortly there- 
after the HIEl(3) also opened fire. 

Finally v/e sighted the two enemy cruisers \7hich wore follo'.dng 
astern. They at once made -- quick 130° turn and fled into th^ clouds 
and mist. 



(3) it'f?s_ . 






EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 521 

CON FIDE UTIAL 

Apparently it •:ns considered too much trouble to finish then off 

Lifith irtillcry fire; so our Sea Er.gles rose vdth one flr.p of their Ings 
from the decks of the carriers. In a fer; moments they sent the eaeciy to 
the bottom nnd or-me triumphnntly bnck. In a short tine the rO.iC rescued 
I members of the enemy ore-.T from the snme ship and returned to its group. 
'In the meantime the destroyer AftlAKE(l) cone back '.Tith 27 crewmen :;nd 
lother persons from the merohrnt ship v/hich had previously been sunk. 

We, who hcd not fired a single shot while wc watched the ar- 
tillery fight of the other ships, grieved with vexation beyond descrip- 
tion, staring at the sky. In the meantime, off the coast of SQERABAJA 
and BATAVIA, our destroyer squadrons opened a day and night battle, and 
brilliant battle results followed in quick succession. 

The enemy oust have escaped somehow to Australia; not one of 

them was caught in our net. Finally, as a lest resort, we carried out a 

great bombing attack on a large group of transports that were entering 
the harbor of WIUTJAP. 

About that time the weather began to get worse, belying the 
reputation of the Indian Ocean as the most peaceful of the seven seas. 
The wind velocity increased to 20 meters per second, and the ships rolled 
with a 20-degreo list to port and starboard. Finally ue gave up taking 
on oil from alongside and began to take it stem on because of the heavy 
seas. 

Afterwards in the midst of the rough T/eather, our force re- 
sumed its ceaseless reconnaissance, moving erst and west in irregular 
movements in search of the enemy. At that time the stntenents of the 
survivors picked up by the TOIIE were made public. 

Hiese men knew nothing of the movements of their own fleet; 
they did not even know that HAWAII had been attacked. They sei^med to be- 
lieve that our fleet was concentr''.ted only in the CELEEES, From this we 
could see how America was concealing her crushing defeats in a desperate 
attempt to prevent a decline in morale. 

England and America, sacred countries of disguise, now your 
last time has come. Enemy of mankind, evil spirit of peace, the harsh 
blow of heaven has fallen a^^ainst you. 

Heaven will by no means forgive you, who for your ovm profit 
have planned an unscrupulous attack on Japan, the nation of righteousness, 
and on the Oriental people - you, who are trying to subjugate the world 
and to make the ^ro^ld a paradise for the white race! 

Among the races who have been exploited up till now by the 
English and Americans are the Indians, the Malayans, the Chinese, the 
Burmese, and countless other ignorant races whom civilization has by- 
passed. They have become the victims of the characteristic English- 
American policy of "squeeze and take", while the latter line their purses 
and nurture their overweening ambition. 

They cause GAMDHI to cry out for the independence of India and 
far away they carry on an opium \;ar in the Republic of China. 



(D^dJ] 



522 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



COHFIDENTIAI, 



All this is a ory from the henrt of the splendid peoples of the 
Orient who are trying to escape the pressure which is being brought upon 
them by England end America. 

However, now the blood of the Oriental peoples has returned ♦•■o 
the originpl cherished desire of the Orientals and has been embrpced b/ 
them. Iheir feelings are shown by the fact that they have pledged the'r 
mutual cooperation ind assistance for the great undertflking of Japp.n^ ;he 
lep.ding power of the Orient. 

Jnpan, vho, fs the leader of the Orient has opposed the powc* 
ful countries of England and America, really loves Asia and is laboring 
for the peace of mankind. 

Our task group was now passing in the vicinity of ADLilHALTY BAI 
and on the eleventh tre were scheduled to enter the port of KEHDATJ. 

Although scarcely two laonths hnd passed since we left the home- 
land, it sec-ned like two years. 

In the Indian Ocean, where once the Gernan ship EUDEH played 
a spectacular part in the destruction of trcde, there is no,; not a shadow 
of the enemy, and an uncanny silence peirvades the surfrce of the sea 
where there is a faint reflection of the aoon. 



/ 



Jhc__I ndir.n Oc ecn (CEYLON) 

ITith regard to the attack on CEYLON, v/hich must grace the final 
pages of the history of our striking force, every possible preparation 
for battle had been completed during the 15 days when we lay rt anchor in 
SIARING BAY. Actually it was at the very cr^-ck of dawn on 26 March 19.42 
when once again it sallied forth into the fleecy-capped waves of vhe X-, • 
dian Ocean. 7e saw, just as we did in the Java operation, the porpoit. =8 
playing near the ocean's surface, as if the quiet, gently- lapping waves 
of OMBAI Straits were lulling then to sleep. 

Ihere is a saying that the Indian Ocean has mountainous waves 
and that it is the ocean of the devil. But the Indian Ocean, shining 
before our eyes, was like an extremely quiet bay or a gently- rocking 
cradle. 

Sailing around from place to place like this, a mundane feeling 
touched rae. I was reminded of the days ^.en 1 was n young bachelor •.?ith 
my pay envelope containing my monthly 50 ¥ converted into pure happiness, 
when I was swaggering through the street shops '.ri.th an air of independence 
showing on my pimply ffice. 

'•hile I MRS waiting, so tense -rith excitenc.nt was I that I might 
easily have sold my dearest possession at bargain prices. As the saying 
goes, oy duties were like heavy weights on my shoulders. 

7e continued to sail siriftly and uneventfully, loadinjj oil 
from time to time, standing watch, and keeping anti-subinarine lookout, 
tihot strength there is in being vath speedy airplanes.' 

/ At daybreak of the day before the attack, 4 April 1942, i^OO 
miles from CEYLON, an enemy Consolidated Flying Boat Tib*- na. The bugle 
stirringly sounded "aerial attack" and the entire crew took up their posts. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 523 

CONFIDENTIAL 



Happy dayj My blood rnn fast and my fleoh tingled na the 
eneingr planes for which I had been waiting since the outbreak of the wsr 
appeared 30° off the port side. The shells nere bursting in the air. 
It was nore stiiTing than I had iorgined it would be. Bie enemy tried 
to hide himself, using the white clouds as a snoke screen, but to no 
avail; our ships' fire sought hin out, and after n few rujiutes of aerial 
warfare he came crashing doivn, trailing a long tail of snoke against the 
sky. Ahl Diey have exhausted all their secret methods J TThnt feelings 
the enemy must have experienced during those few minutes i TThnt a lanen- 
table way to spend one's lest few moments of life J 

Early on 5 April, for which we had been waiting, our force 
reached a point 200 miles south of CEYLON. The ireother was excellent 
for good aerial bombardment. 

Before daybreak, p. huge formtion of planes set out for the 
enemy's Inst stronghold, COLCtiBO in CEILON. "Qiis attack was timed to 
take place Just at the tine of an Anglo-Indian conference. Pifercin," the 
morning haze like inpetaous falcons, the planes soon disappeared from 
eight. 

In less than an hour we received our first reports. According 
to those, we obtained brilliant results from aerial attacks on an enemy 
escorted convoy, on ground installations and airfields, and on an enemy 
plane on patrol duty, ihe planes returned to the ships safely. 

Ueanwhile, shipbome reconnaissance seaplanes went out to 
search for the enemy, looking to the vrest and to the south for ships and 
small craft. Presently, we received a wireless message from a plane of 
the 8th Cruiser Division to the effect that one carrier and one des- 
troyer had been sighted. A carrier bomber unit was despatched instantly 
and sank them innediately. (Two enemy cruisers were mistaken for a 
carrier and destroyer). 



The force, going outside its patrol radius, sailed north and 
then south in irregular movements. 

Finally, after our supplying was completed, V76 turned to our 
next field of attack, IRIMCOLIALCE. 

Ue launched the attack from a point 200 niles to the east at 
dawn on 9 April, in fine weather. Inasmuch as our Irrgc flying boats 
had been shooting dovm enemy craft for some time, ue thought it likely 
that the enemy ws expecting an attack on this occasion. However, our 
bold and intrepid fliers will turn the tables on the English by using 
their own strategy of crushing the enemy vri.th a single blo.v. "Then we 
see the enemy, we will shoot hin doim without fail, the enemy faces 
the grim prospect of certain death. 

Ihe enemy's military installations at IRINCOIaALEE were bombed 
until there were none remaining. Furthermore, our fleet dispatched its 
reserve forces and in the work of a moment sank the aircraft carrier 
HERMES and a destroyer which were cruising in neighboring waters. V?e 
seemed to be inspired with superhuman powers. 

At this point, an enemy heavy bomber unit consisting of 9 
planes audaciously attacked our force; but because the bombs fell from 
an altitude of 6000 meters, they did no more harm than startling the fish 
in the sea. Our 25 mm. machine guns pursued the planes above the ships 
and spurting fire in unison, brought doxm seven of them. This one battle 
certainly proved how weak the fighting capacity of enemy planes is. 



-10- 



524 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



C :J F I D E II T I A 



The fnce of the braggnrt Churchill who before the \irr cUsd-ined 
r.nd scorned Jrpnn, r.nd the free of the miserable Churchill './ho no:.' stunbles 
stnight to defeat, '.vould berr resenblnnce to thi. fnce of rn fictor •..■ho 
plrys n double role of sorro\J nnd gloc. 

The strikinf^ force in the BAY OF BEIIG/iL pnd our forc< li'll C 
esch other; the DAY OF BENGAL force s^id it h-d been c."rryiiij on o>r.' -.ions 
for five dcys r.nd hnd obtained grent results. 



lost 



Hie English sun of military power in India, h'ving finnll;, 
its Inst vestige of defense, secned on the point of setting. 

The great British Eapire has been shaken to its foundations, r.nd 
its dream of .rorld domination has been turned into a nightmare. 

The passage of tine has now fulfilled its purpose. Heaven has 
sent down its blessing upon the righteous, and crushed the v/icked with an 
iron hand. Kow this earth, which \/a.s nade for the generel benefit of rll 
mnnlcind, \7ill be wholly transmuted into the paradise that has been the 
• cherished hope of Eastern peoples. Japan, at the he-'d, loudly sounds the 
knell of tyranny, and Japan, who le^ds the East to rebirth, is most fitted 
to bestow the blessing of the pods. 

Back to our longed-for mother coiintryi ^'^t long 1-st we return 
to our hone port. In frankness 1 admit that I shod a tear as •.;e bade fare- 
well to the- skies of the Southern Ser.s. The ship, seer.ing to quiver with 
joy, passed throuph the beautiful I.L..LACCA SIR-JIS on a northerly cnirsc. 

'.7e were on our ':jry to our distant hoMcl'-nd, our hearts filled 
vri.th emotion; loaded v/ith honor, the best gift ',/e coulc take to oij native 
land was our glorious victory and our triurjphal song. 

./"""N Soon, "S we were approaching the most northerly extre.i:'-';/ of the 
/] PHILIPPICS, we received \Jord by radio th-t an enemy tasl" forcv h"'.' svl ■ 
I denly appeared at a point 750 nllcs south of Tokyo. Our forcu \rs ordcrad 
/ ti^ destroy the ener.y immediately, '.'e sped to the attack "t " !ii,;h speed 
( of 20 knots, intending to attacl: the ene.my as lonj as oui^ fuel held out. 
S By an irony of f"te, hov;ever, before -.rc '.;cre able to reach this -point, 

on the 18th of Dece.mber sever-l cities in the TOIIOiOi district of Japan 

suffered an air attack on a s.T,all scale. 

■7e wept bitter tears and were filled -.ath indignation; but '1- 
though T/e continued the search for the enemy, we v;ero unable to find him. 
Hov/ever, it could not be helped -■rvi \:o T^lloved the pre-arranged c lurse 
that should have led us to the cir\c:vj, until, on the 23th, the i.'hole fleet 
dispersed in home waters and we hastened to our longed-for home ports. 

Friends and comrades of the strikinp force, for a long time we 
have suffered and been happy together: together '..'e have rendered a great 
service to our country. Now the tine h's come for us to part; but, so';ner 
or later, the day '.Till come v/hon 'fe shall be together rgain. Until then, 
enjoy yourselves and be happy.' TThile my heart is grieved at ttiis sad 
parting, I shall try to -vTrite n few lines of feeble verse. 

(T.W. The "few lines of feeble verse" (eight pages) have been omitted) 



-11- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 525 



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
WASHINGTON 



SOURCE DOCUMENT #8 
(TElANSLAnON OF THREE CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENTS ) 
ENTITLED 
(A) 
"JAPANESE SUBMARINE SCHOOL NOTES 

COflGERNING 
EARLY WAR ^PERI F:r>[GES OFF HAWAII" 
(same aa SOURCE DOCUMENT #5, SUPRA) 
(B) 
"JAPANESE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE YATSUMAKI BUTAI" 
(C) 
"JAPANESE PUCES OF MILITARY IMPORTANCE IN THE KURILE ISLANDS" 
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE 
"NAVY SWiMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" 
(Record of Proceedings, pages i;32-U60). 

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 

IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION 

OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL. HARBCR) 



526 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

lNTEIU(ffiRCE CBNIER, PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS ♦T iT I 

NAVY NUWHai 128' (Offi TWO EIGHT) f X^ ' 

c/o Fleet Poet Office " -.....-^.^.. 
San PrBncisco, California 

VL/iim ,;"" '"^.-^ ^ 

CONFIDENTIAL ^ . /W/^/7 ^f 3 f 

30 June 19W Serial AS-300921 Q'-'"'**' ' " 



/^3 




From: Officer in Charge. 

To: Distribution List Contain/d lii Paragraph 2. 

SubJ: ICPOA Tra;)slatioiyof O^V^^*^ Enemy Documents, 

Item No^'^72 ■* "jpubiMirine School Notes Coneeming 
Early WaS'^Sqjerienc/s off Hawaii." 



ICPOA Tra^jslatioryoy Captured Enemy Documents, 

Item No«'473j) "A^qitructions to the Yataumaki Butai." 

ICPOA Tr^psl^tion^of Captured Enemy Documents, 

Item No^ /»74 V "places of Military Importance in the 

Kurile Islsnda.' 

1. The enclosures forwarded herevrtth need not be reported and 
when no longer of value should be destroyed. No report of 
destruction is required, 

2. Distribution Is as follows: 

Mo. of Copies 

Cominch , 2 

VCNO (ONI) 5 

VCNO (OKI) (For CinC Sastem Fleet) 1 

CinCPac 1 

CinClant 2 

CcanNorPac 5 

ComSoPac 10 

ComSoT.'esPac , 5 

ComSubPac 10 

ComOesPac , 10 

ComAmphibForPac 3 

N2NB 2 



'^//If^f^^Ui^^CC- 



U. LECTaroRE 
By dli'ection 

Ends: 

1. Subject translations 

2. Original Documents #472^ and 473 (to CM only) 






EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 527 

C-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L- 
CAPTOH3D DOCUMEtlTS - TRANSLATSD BT ICPOA 

Original Item it ,ICPOA ttea i'LlJg Tranal.b ylCPOA Date 10 June 19^.3 

Title of Publication SUIIlu tR^ HE SCHOOL NOI BS OONCERKING 3AflLY <fAR 

JgJimSNCjS. OFF .KAmi 

m CAGI! OF DIARY, -R.;COHD, LOG, etc., GIV3 r/RlTiS'S 

Or;;anization 

Initial Date Final Date 



Js n. 12. 19^1 Instru ct or Maes hJjja 

It is needless to state that combat education in t his current entergenc7 
is of groat nooassity, and it is extremely regrettable that there has bten 
no op ortunity to gather sufficient matorial before tho graduation of the 
11th. period special course students, oince, however, some materials in 
the category of coauat instructions has been obtained with the airival in 
port of submarines- 1-16 and 1-60 recently, it has been decided to immediately 
mimeogranh and 'istribute it as study material to this period's special 
course students. Altho'igh it is diff. oult to suarantee that among the 
items heard directly there are no points of difference vdth actu£Ll facts, 
it is believ-^c' that there are no great errors in the instructions obtaoued. 



(1) 



79716 O — 46 — pt. 13 11 



528 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

— rjy— CONFIDENTIAL 

NO •- i.—TACTICS 

1. Use of submarine carried planes. 

A. After the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 8, the submarine 
1-7 received an order to carry out an aerial reconnaissance of Pearl 
Harbor when the opportunity presented. Although shu attempted to send 
off a plane from the neighborhood of Niihau, it was inpossiblfc to do so 
due to the weather. Hence she proceeded southv;ard until in the neighbor- 
hood of Haivaii and carried out the aerial reconnaissance, 

B, './hen on pxckut station, it may bo possi.blc, doporjding on the weather, the 
enemy's alert condition, terrain and other conditions, to send off the 
plants carried from a certain area, but it may be impossible to do so 
from another aroa.. Consequently, besides the necessity of deploying air- 
plane carrying submarines, tharo is aleo tno ncc\^ssity of deplpying many 

airplanu carrirtg submarines. 
Since urgent execution of the above mentioned r-connaissancc was not 
neci'ssrjiy, wo suffered no great disadvantage, but it v.'ould be of groat 
disadvantage, ■'.vhon urgency of execution is required, 

2, Movement agai ist enemy depth charges, 

A, Since xierica's depth charge setting, for the most part, has been defin- 
itely ascertciined to be in the nei,"iborhood of 35 meters by previous in- 
vestigations, submarines attached to the Sixth Fleet have evaded them at 
depths of 50 to 70 meters. (Sorae subs have evaded them at a depth of 100 
ijeters). In tne case of the 1-16 (70 meters depth), she received three 
charges directly over her, but suffered no damage. (Judging from the 
opinion that the bursting charge of America's d -pth charges appeared to 
be feeble, it is doubtful as to whether the charges were directly over- 
head,^ 

B, V/hen the safe" submerging depth is thought to be about 20 meters more than the 
supposed depth setting of depth charges, it is deemed best to assume as far 
as possible ? nosition of 20 meters or more below the depth charge's depth 

setting, 

-n 
If not, it is deemed best to assvune a position up high, but impossible to be 

detected, and as far above ao possible from the supposed deptli setting of 

the depth chairge 

(a) The 168 prliarily used soxind listening patrol /^Spn shokaipii^ B? ^^ fVi -J 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 529 

-V^-)- CON^IDEaTIAL 

to provent cUiy dooroaso in the efficiency of the listuniaig gear, the. f oL- 
lovd.ng.niethod.vfas used iwid no uneasiness. .n'as felt hccause of t-hc saund 
listening . patrol. 

3. Ubs^rvatr.on patrol. 

• A. (l) 3lo\.'cst speed usee'. 

(2) VcatiL.tion stopped. 

(3) In steering, ..■.ccaaiiical power aas used only for the diving rudder, 
v/hile the r.,3t uas all i lan pouer. 

(4) Althou:,h it I'as stipulated in the operational order that batteries 
should bo c.iar.jec' at ni^.ht at tl.^ o-.tor edge of the p;;.trol zone (about 
10 nautical :ail.-s iron haroer entrance), it v/as i;npossiblc to do so. 
Hance, b;,-tcrii:s vere o.-.jrct:d at a distcuicc of 40 ;iaut,ical lailos from 
the har'jor entrance and after that wo returned to the patrol zone. 

B. At night, when piclceting ':iy enemy pr.trol vessels is to be expected, it 
is deeraed best to increase the depth of the patrol zone. 

4, Patrol method of Ainerican destroyers, 

A. It seeins as if .American destroyers are equipped v.-ith accurate and good 
sound detectors and they, for the nost part, are e:Lecutins stationary 
or slow speed .atrol. 
E. -Dven i/hen c.n Anerican destroyer is atationarj', be on guaid. 
_Np,.„2,„Cpi3AT DUTY 
1, Ir.entixication method of friendly units vfhen returnin.15 to friendly harbor. 

A, The i.iethod carried out by I-I6 is as follo.js: 

(1) Hoisted a ''Treidth Four" Ensign at the „ip of the periscope. 

(2) Spread a "Breadth Four" 13nsi^,n on the ladder to the bridge, 

(3) notified the tine of its arrival within the 3OC nautical mile arc, 
its osition . nc" course one or t-o days previously to the hont combat 

force r;P'9 ^X ^^ f^ J 

Aien returning to an -dvanced base, /TioJ took the system of b.aving the 

commandant of the -.dvance basp force .indicate the point of passage into 
the 300 nautical mile arc. 

B. T.iere is aji e;o:mple of submarine 1-68 being .ittacked uith depth charges 
by a friendly destroyer v.-ben leavinc; an .'.dvanced ba.^e. Closest attention 
sfiould be paid to the identification of frie.ndly units \;hen entering and 
leaving a friendly harbor .nd to being r.lert. 

Z6I. 



530 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

-^^*^ CONFIDBNTIAL 

No... 3. MAVIGATION. '.YEAT1I3R Ai m S SA CONDITION 
1. Onshore Current, 

A. The onshore currant in the area of Barber's Point, Oahu, is very strong. 
Since suhmcrine 1-63 paid little attention to this, she si ,hted the 
breakers of Barber's Point reef at a very close distance when she raised 
her periscope up to obs^^rvc, but she was able- to prevent anything from 
happening by turning immediately, 

B, Vifhen stationed on observation 8n the front line, it is necessary to take 
into proper coMideration the onshore current v/hen close to the shore, 

NO. 4. MANSUVERIMG FOR ATTACK 

1. Protracted subnerged navigation, 

A, (l) In rog> rd to submarine 1-68, thi number of days of submerged navigation 
was 30 for an average of 14 hoiirs per day. Air purifier chcnt^cals were 
used only once (20 pieces) and the cooler was not used, 

(2) Although CO reached U'^%, ^ reached 16^ and the temperature roachod 
32°C., there seemed to bo no great effect upon the men, 

(3) Other than being usod once when her submerged navigation continued 
for 36 hours, submarine 1-16 did not use the air purifier. Just as in 
the above case, there se.med to be practically no offoct upon the men, 

B. (l) Although there is no-d for the use of air purifiers in a submerged 
navigation of about 14 hours, there is still a necessity for the gathering- 
of more data for further study, 

(2) It is necessary to accelerate the com])letion of the study ""v^ashing 
purifier" ZT/T^ '^r ^^ -7 *'yP"^ ^^^ purifj'lng method, 

2, /Javes in the Hawaiian Area, 

A. During the operatioiia of submarines of the Sixth Fleet in the Hawaiian 
area, waves were high every day and it has been reported that submarine 
1-16 found it difficult to maintain her depth evert at the depth of about 
18 meters and had to use her standard sp>-cd many times. 

Besides, there appeared to be two or tiiree submarines tliat revealed their 
conning tov/er in the presence of the enemy, 

B, It is necessaiT' to maintain the accuracy of the sound detector excellently 
in order to do away with anj' uneasiness in c.iund detection patrol. 

Also, considering this, the pericsope should be riade as long as possible. 



Ct,) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 531 

, CONFIOSMTIAL 
(5) 

tOv 5. , COIHJMICATION 

1, Undenvator ititoIoss rocoption ability. 

A, According to the oxpcri^iiccs of the 1-16, it is ro^xirtad that sensitivity 

IS 4 at a depth of 18 m ters and 3 at 20 meters in the Hawaiian area. 

(Sending station UtAlU) 

Ml'. P.: (IS, laSSIUGjJ 

1. Change in <:orking of the nacliine guns during operations, 

A. (hen 1-16 test fired her nachine guns without taking the trouble of clean- 
ing, after conducting operations for 30 days, of which 20 days were spent 
in submerged iSavigction, one machine gun fired without any trouble, i/hile 
the other fired onl;'- one shot. 

2. DMjages caused by d'eptli charge i.ttack. 

X. .ftole observing in Ilav/aiian area, submarine 1-68 was depth charged. Of 
about 100 depth cliarges dropped, 12 exploded within, 200 meters and 2 
exploded directly above. The depth charge setting us.& ifithin 35 meters 
and the sub's depth k5 meters. The damase suffered from this attack, for 
the most part v/as as follows: 

(1) Of the 172 electric li:;lit6, 75 were aoaged. (Those that were not 
li,';htod vfere not c'.an::ged) . 

(2) Sniall cvaount of leal:a2e from tbi forward doorCs) of the torpedo tube(s). 

(3) Tvro depth indicators began to function incorrectly. 

(4) Sensitivity ux sound detector became bad. 

(5) Becarae impossible to use the transmitter of the echo range depth finder. 

(6) Leakage in the high i-ressi.u:e air valve group and air pressure within 
Eiiip ini;reased t^reatly. 

(7) Ls-pJcase in the Kingston valve of the negative buoyancy tank increasea. 
(3) Due to the da.mgs to the 50 volt pov/er supply, the rudder order telegraph 
vrent out. Because of t;Tis,tthe hfelmSDian mistakenly thought that the rudder 
had be in daciaged. 

(9) The accuracy of ths ( ? ) ammeter decreased. 

(10) Leaka-e from the corroded tube(s) of number 1 cooler. 

(11) Considerable leciiage from the "constant use" and reserve fuel tanks, 

B. (1) Disassemble the damaged, r'epth indicator and reuove the sea water 
betwten the i,'l and i'/2 beaks jf o!±i -T? 

(2) To have tiorned o^f as raany electric lights as possible. 



532 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

C-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L 

CAPIURJSD DOCUIENTS - TRANSLATED BY ICPOA 

Original It^ d j ICPOA Item #473 Transl.b ylCPOA Date 6 June 1943 

Htle of Publication INSTRUCTIONS TO IKE YATSUMAKI BUTAI 
Orisinator 



IN CASs; OF DIARY, RECORD, LOG, etc., GIVE /RITER'S 
Or^.anization 



Initial Date 14 Oct ober 1942 final Date_ 



The following translation was made from a document recovered from a tivo- 
-jan submarine raised May 7, 1943, by the salvage ship, USS ORTOLAN, under the 
Command of Lt. Cocunander A. A. Holland. The sub was located in Visale Bay, 
N.U. GUADALCANAL. The submarine w.s raised, but on account of a storm, broke 
loose and sank again. 



October 14, 194 2 At Sea 

INSTRUCTIONS TO 'H IE YATSlT^Aig BUTAI 

1. On the evening of the 14th. after 2300 the midget subs will be lavmched 
'fest of Savo Island. 

2. JSach unit ivill accociplish its mission according to the plan. 

3. In order to avoid confusion with the 8th Fleet and the Transport Group to- 
night, you will proceed submerged at a great depth until 0300 on the IJth. 

4. ISdget submarines which have fired torpedoes and/or vfhich have insufficient 
battery power remaining will proceed inraediately to the shores of friendly 
places, if possible, to ICA;i-30. 

5. .As there is at present no information for the evaluation of the tme worth 

of the midget subaau-ine, it is expected that each man vd.ll, both in the 
attack eind the ivithdrawal,€Qcert his overy effort, and in this way (do his 
part) in supplying this information. 

6. Be confident in th& August Virtue of His Majesty, in Providential Assis- 
tance, and in your ability './hich you liave constantlj'- developed. 

Go forth uni/aunted. 

"Heaven helps those mo aelp themselves". 

j;nd. 

Comn£jiding Officer of the QilYODA, 

HAR'iDA, SATORU (AKIRA?). 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 533 

CXMIFIDENTIAL 
CAPTURED DOCUMENTS - 'BUNSLA'IED BT ICPCA 

Original Item # . , ICPOA Iten # LIL, , Transl. b y ICPQA D at o Jufe U. Ui 

Titlo of PubUoatio n PUCES OF tgLITARY IMPORT.UJCE IN THS KU PTT.f: TST./.wy; 
Originator Technician of the Fisheries Experinental Station 

IN C/iSE OF Dlifflr, HECOHD, LOG, etc., GIVE .miTEK«S 

Orcinization ,__^___________________________________— » 

Initial Date ^Flnal Dato 



TRANSUTtm'S FOTBf/OBD 
Itw followinc is a revised translation of r. Japanese docunont captured 
in the recent tTTO operations. The ori£;inal translation was nat'e by the 
Advanced Int«lllgonce Center, North Pacific Area, The ICPOA Revision 
includes the folloiflnc points; 

I4 Addition of positions ( in latitude and loncitude) of all 
geographical points uontionod in the original docunont. 

2* The pronunciations for all coosraphical points in the 

follonine revise* translation , arc tha pronunciations 
listed in Ijndej; ^ Japar^oso Placo Naqes. Appoarinf; in 
Japanese ttYdro/rranhio Publications. , prepared by lii- 
tolligenoe Saction, CinC Pacific Fleet, 1942. 

3« Explanatory nstes havo b«on added, 

(• Minor errors in the orifiinfll translation have boon corrected. 

There is disaareonent conceminc the proper pronunciation of inaiy 
ptLacer-noEies in the I&irilo Islands, even in Japanese rcferonco natcriols. 
For the sake if -unifomity, anrl because it is thought to be the nost 
accurate source, the CinCPAC Index has been used to asdertain the correct 
pronunciation for the place nanos incluc'.ed; in thc'fe>llotfing**raaBl»W.W» 
The CiaPAC: Index contains every ceosraphical point nentionei'. in the 
following translation with one e*coption. This exception is GXtnCJCU, 
47O09«N, 152°18«E,, on SKU-IUSHIRU Island. The translates have ascer- 
tained the position of GITHCUOJ \yith the help of "Jap.inesc Naval Air Chart," 
N0,11 ( V/ar Departoent Map Collection Office roproduction) . 
.\ny naterial in the foUovdnc which is not a direct transL-.tion fron the 
original docunont is indicated by brackets and the abbreviation "T.N,", 
noaning "translrvtor^s note," 

(1) 



534 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 

PLAC aS , OF iaXITARY m-ORIUK S m 1H E KURILE ISLANDS 
Notos i>j a technician of the Fisheries Sjqperimental Station 

AKATSUKI 6l7t Force 
INFOmmnON BULLbXiN 

1. This publication contains statements by a technician of the HOKICAIDO 
Government. 

2. By lir. 

■i-iJBe: 1935 - 1940 
Season: Jiine to August 

Place: Kurile Islands /f .N. - Chishlma Islan4§7 

A general invcstigatian of aquatic fauna has bcon oade (salmon, s2dmon- 

trout, shark, 9hollfish). 

Thg vessel used was a 26.76 ton, 60 HP, seni-dioscx, 
raOTiXTJD HARBORS IN THE KUSILE ISLANDS 
1. The Kurilost 

The Kurile IsliJids arc divided into the Southern Kuriles, Central Kurilos, 

and Northern Rurilos. 

A. Southern Kurilos: KUNISHIRI Island J^.th KL-NA^HIRI Island U°16« N, 
146°00' eJ, iSTORDFU Island ^.N. /v5°04' N., 147^' ^J. (These aro 
populated.) 

B. Central Kuriles: URUPPU Island ^.N. 45°56» N., I5O0OO' Sj7, CHIRIHOI 
Islands /t.N. North CHlfilHOI, l^°32< N., 150°53' 2..; South CHIRIKOI, 
46023«-N., 150®49'^j7i SHINCHI Island /f.N. SHUOISHIRU Island, 46°53' . 
U., 152°02' 1.7, KiLITOI Island y^.N, K,?rOI Island, 47*20' N., i5-i°30' 2j 
USKISIIIiUJ Island /f.N. 47°32' N, 152^49' eJ, R.^H0:,A Island ^'.N. 
itASHO^fA Island, 47*'45' W., 153°01'S^, HATSUt.A I-jland /f.N. 48°05' N. 
I53O131 jSj7, SHA5HIK0TAN Island ^.H, SHASUKOTAIl Island 48°49' N., 
154*^)6' :L_J, HARU:i;:OTAII island fr.n. 49°07' N., 154°31' i5s7, ONNEKOTAN 
Island ^,N. 0N3K0TAN Island, 49°25' W., 154°45' ^ij?. 

C. Northern Kuriles: HOROIUSHIHO Island /F.N. PARAiBSHIRU ISLAND, 5O°20»a. 
155°50' Zj7, 2Kmaj£HU Island ^.N. SHDJJSHU Island. 50°45'N., lp6°20«Bj7, 
AR.'aTO Island, ^.if. ARAIDO Isliind, 50°52' N., 155°34' ^x/, (Populated 
during the sui::ujer for fishing.) 

(2) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 535 

(3) C N F I D S-N T I A L 

2. Armanis to be Found in the Kuriles 

./alrus, sea-otters, and seals are native. Foxes z.re bred by the Departiaent 
of Agriculture and Forestry only in the Central Kuriles. Near the shore, 
AaU'Alil, SOIII J^.W. Translation for these f-sh unknovm/, salmon and si-ljnon- 
trout (retrning up -the rivers) and BOTAN Shrimp are fo\ind. Cod and 
T.iTJiSA Crabs are to- be found off-shore. 

3. Plants to be found in the Kuriles: 

There are forests as far north t.s URUPHJ Island; but on the islands north 
of CHIRIHOI Island, only creeping pines and black alders, no taller than 
6 feet,, and weeds exist. There is a type of sea-weed knoim as KAIROPPA, 
about 15 meters in length, v;hich has its leaf -sections floating on the 
surface. Also there is sea-weed and sea-moss. _^.M. Tlie Japanese term 
MCfRI has been tr^Jislated as "sea-moss". NORI, or ASAIOJSA MORI, is an 
ediblo red sea-weed. Its loaves are about 10 cm. vri.de and 20 cm. long. 
It grows best in --inter. The iveed is made into dried NORI, and is largely 
cultivated in estuaries ■-■here the water is brackish. It grows on sticks 
vriiich are stuck into the sand at low tide. 'Ae nature leaves are dried. 
Yearly production of NORI is valued at 15,000,000 rSS, ranking next after 
sardines and herring as a fisheries productj/ 

4. Sea Routes from OTARU ^.N. Position of port is 43°12' H., Ul°01' Ejjj 
HOKKAIDO to the Uorthem Kuriles. 

A, OTARU to the SOIA Straits J^.U. W°W M.,,142000« Ej7; heading in a 
soutiierly direction along KITAMI Coast /^.W. The area known as the 
KITAMI Coast extends along the northern coast of HOKKAIDO from -bout 
1/,?°in' ■£,. to lh5°2yZ_J; going from AEASHIRI /t.N. 44°01' U., 1U°17'Es7 
toirard DCABANOTSU Point ^.N. 45026 'N,, 147056' E»..7 on ETOROFU Island} 
heading in a Northerly direction along the archipelago; passing through 
the ONEKOTAN Channel ^.H. 49°50« N., 155*05' S.7; and coming out on 

the Pacific side. Distaiice: 360 nautical miles. 

B. OTARU to SOYA Straits and direct to the Northern Kuriles. Distance: 

800 nautical miles. 

5. Protected Harbors, 

Harbors suitable f9r sr::all vessels ("*" indicates harbors suitable for 
large vessels also) . 
(1) ETOROFU Island: 

* SHANA area: £i.li. Position of port of SHANA is 45°14' N.,147°53'Ej7 
0) 



536 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

^ CONFIDENTIAL 

Offers good shelter even from north-westerly vd.nds. Tliere is a 
\(aterfall suitable for drinking water urposes. There is a salmon- 
trout canning factory. Practical Iiaportance: It is a natural harbof j 
there are fishin,^ establis::ittants. 

aenarkB! On the Pacific ahore, there is the harbor of HITOKAPFU 
^-N. ltU°5B' N., U7°41'i: J **ich is suitable for large vessels. 

(2) URUPPU Island ( 

FUTAGOSHHIA /f.H, Small island near S.J. tip of URUPPU, position of 
island is 45°38' N., U9°27' ^J: There are shoals between HITAOOSHIMA 
and URL'PPO which reduce the force of the brealcers. There is no water 
suitable for drinking. 

•^lammk Bay-j^.N. i,6**U' H., 150O20' E^Jj a sheltered harbor with 
a aan^ bottoou Water from the KAIU&N River /x.N. 46°13' N,, X5(fi 
20' S. (position of aaixttijff is suitable for drinking* Saljaon md 
Qaloon^trout ascend the KAIli^ Aiver in the fall. 
Hwuurlat toBUME Bay ^.H. Position of KOBlIKE port is 45^56' M.. 
150^12^ ^i7 i-^ o^ '^ho Pacific side. Off the loouth of the Bay, is 
WSStBX JSk, 2B laetere lilghy uhloh serves as a good landnai^c for enter* 
ii)g tb» Bay« /f.N. TOGABI tfA is & pointed rock, 45°55« N., 150P 
12* ij. There is vnter suitable for drinking. 

HiF^tKaiaaX Xsl«nds: 

^«tBU Bay <^.M. 46°32' M., 150''56« ^J on Northern CHUUHOI Island. 
S^ atMf bottoa* Ho drinkuig water* 

^ SnrsaiUBJ Island: 

fflmaSKIHU Bay ^.N. 1^6^52* N., 1?!°' 51*^Jt It is not a good harbor, 

(jut Nta « Baoi^ batten. Nearoy is XSUBJRk ^.N. probably 

J^itdLH; position is /,6*52' »., 151*48' eJ' where there is drinking 

inter* Bracmw Bay ^.N. 47909«M., 152°13' S,J; A harbor suitable for 

tmSX shitw. Hater has entered the craturj and the 4epUi of the 

•ater and quality of the bottom Is Sxiitable for mooring in the area 

on tho eastern side of a line running from the mouth of the bay to 

the Agriculture and Forestry Depcirtmont ' s fox farm. 

The mouth of the bay is nari-ow and shallow, and therefore it is easier 

to enter the harbor by having sraall boats indicate the shallowest areas, 

and having the s'lTiy pass in between them. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 537 

(5) CONFIDENTIAL 

* (SCUKAKU /F.N. Pronunciation not confirmed. Position is 47*>09* N,, 
152018* &.; Do not confuse with GiUKAKU on PARAJflJSHIHU Islandj7« 
Althouglj the bottoim is not good, it offers good shelter from N.W. 
\«ind8t There is a road connecting tvlth BUBOTON Bay. 

(5) UATSUWA Island 

There is shelter between YAHATO Bay ^.N. 48°05.» N., Isa^lM Ej7 and 
BANJO Island /t.U. 43*^05' N,, 153°n' AJ» Although the bottom is 
rocky, the area is botmded by the tvro islands, and the wind and waves 
can be avoided. Drinking water is available. There is a naval air- 
field. 

^ SHASOKOTAM Island: 

OrcUE Bay ^.N. US^U&' M., 154°Q<»' eJ. A scadcircular bay with sandy 
bottoou It Is not a good harbor because of the wide mouth. Drinking 
watar Is available. 

(7) ONEKOTAH Island: 

mo Bdy ^.N. 49°37' N., 154°W 2*7' I* is not a good harbor, but 

hK «ttlt«ble as ahelter from soutb-oasterly winds. There is drinking 

m&ar. In raspoct to the nortVweaterly winda, the Pacific aide Is 

oC iralu*. 

mWJISia Bpy ^.N. 49**26« N., 154<*W sj'- Since KUROISHI Bay ta on 

tine IteiMo aide, it is of value irtion^ prevailing \Tind8 ar« fron the 

west* 

(fit) tiSMBSBim Islands 

KABQIABSTSU /"t.M. Position of port is 50°22' N., 155°36' ffj: There 
arb harbor facilities and a fine brcalwater. 

PABAiOBHIHU Straits j^.N. 50°43' N„ 156°10' E_J aro the straits 
betmon PARAUUSHIRU and SHUIUBHU Islands, and constitute the most 
valnablo area in the Northern Kuriles. KATAOKA Bay /"t.N. 50*'44' N,, 
15(fiJl' 5^, lanUKAllI Bay/f.M. 50044' N., 156*'09' Ej, KASHIV7AaARA 
B^ J^. 50°41^ N., 1S6°09' 2«7 ^ canning factories aro located 
along the ftraits. There are tupbot ^.N. flatf isli^ in ICiSHTt/ABARA 
Bay. The fishing industry flourishes on PARAMJSHIHU and SUBfflJSHU 
diiring the summer, and fishery instedlations are located at various 
points .-.long the seacor.st. 

KAT..OKA Bay is a navel ba&e and lO'iSHrvABiiRA Bay is an ^riiiy base. 
^ T.N. The orisinal document v/cs not clascifiodj?" 

C5) 



538 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
WASHINCrON 



SOORCE DOCUMENT #9 
(TRANSLAnON OF A CAPTURED ENEMT DOCUMENT 
DEALING mTH EVENTS IN THE JAPANESE TTAR 
COMMENCING THREE WEEKS BEF(«E IHE ATTACK CN PEARL HARBCR 
AND CONTINUING THROUGH MANY JAPANESE-UNITED STATES ACTICNS 
INCLUDING IHE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR, 
GUAM, WAKE ISLAND, THE BISMARCK SEA OPERATIONS, RABAUL, 
THE BATTLE OF THE COIAL SEA, IHE FIRST, SECOND AND 

THIRD SVA BATTLES OF THE SOLOMONS ISLANDS, 
THE JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS IN ATTU AND KISKA ISLANDS 
IN IHE ALEUTIANS, ETC», TO 20 SEPTEMBER 19U3) 
ENTITLRD 
"PROFESSIONAI. NOTEBOOK OF AN ENSIGN IN THE JAPANESE NAVT* 
USED BY THE NAVY IN COI^PLILING THE 
'»NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" 
(Record of Proceedings, pages Ii32-U60). 

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 

IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION 

OF THE ATTACK ON PFJIRL HARBOR) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



539 



JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER, PACCIC OCEAN AREAS 

NAVY NUMBER 128 (ONE-WO-EIGHT) 

c/o Fleet Post Office 

San Francisco, California 



CONFIDENTIAL 

25 February 19U - Serial ADM-250829 



RECEiVE[>OMI 

fcreig: 



L uOOM 

• 12 C4 



Fromt 
To : 

SubJ: 



Of f ioer-in-Charge . 
Distribution List. 



Translation of Captured Japanese Document - 

JICPOA Item No. ii986 - Professional Notebook of an Ensign in the 

Japanese Navy. 
Source: Captured TARAWA ZU November 1943. 



1. Subject translation, forwarded herewith, need not be reported and 

when no longer of value should be destroyed. No report of destruction is 
necessary. 



) 



////(^oviO^C 



M. LEqpDRE, 
By direotlon. 



Encls 

1. Subject Item No. 4986, 



DISTRISnTION LIST; 

No. Copies 

ARIC -ConfienCenPac, APO 958 2 

AC of S., A-2, 7th AAF, APO 953 2 

AC of S., G-2, Alaska Defense Command 1 

AC of S. , G-2, Western Defense Command 1 

CofflGen Hqa., USAFI3PA, APO 502 1 

Chief Military Intelligence Service 6 

Operations Division, War Department 6 

Chief of Engrs., War Department 4 

Dir. of Intell. Service, AAF, Arlington, Va 2 

Commandant, M. I.S.L. School, Camp Savage, Minn 2 

KAVI •Coininch 3 

CNO 12 

CNO (Eastern Fleet) 1 

BuAero 3 

ClcCPae 3 

CirCPac-2 1 

ComSerFor 3 

ComBatPao 3 

ConCruPac 12 

CooDesPao 3 

ComSubPac 3 

CoaSubTrainPac 1 

CooAirPac 3 

ComHawSeaFron 3 

DIO, UND - A-6 Sec 1 

FRUFAC 1 

ConCenPac 3 

ComFif thPhibFor 10 

ConGroupTwoFif thPhibFor 5 

ComGroupThreoFif thPhibFor 5 

ConfioWosPac 10 

Directorate of Intell., Hqs. Allied Air Forces, SoWosPac 3 

Director Naval Intelligence, Royal Australian Navy 2 

ComSoPac 5 

A AKHA 3 

v r Dir. Advanced Base Office Pacific 5 

. WV ^ U. 3. Advanced Pass Personnel Depot, San Bruno, Cal 5 

^\ \^ Acorn Training Detachment, Pt. Huonemo, Cal 5 

^ ;>^ W Advanced Base Depot, Pt. Rueneme, Cal 5 

\^\ 0-ln-C, Navy Unit, Weat Coast 1 

-^ Coamandant, Anqy & Havy Staff College 1 

A\ Xa^ Taak Foroe Coanaader 1 

(Cootiauad Raven e Side) 



540 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

25 February 19U - Serial ADiU-250829 

DISTRIBfTJTIOK LIST {Continued); 

No. Qoplga! 

MUIINES-Connnandant, U. S. Marine Corps 3 

CG, First Marine Amphibious Corps 3 

CG, Fifth Amphibious Corps 5 

CG, Marine Corps Schools 1 

CG, Marine Forces, Hi© 2 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 541 

CONFIDEHTIAL JICPOA Item ;'/W86 

TRANSLATION OF CAPTUHED JAPANESE DOCUMENT, 

Captured TARAVJA 24 November 1943 
Received JICPOA 6 December 1943 



TRANSLATOR'S FOliE'TORD 

JICPOA Items #4986 axvd //4986-A represent a complete translation of 
the professional notebook of Ensign NAKAMURA, Toshio (^TT^ ^,ifl)> UN. 
Although the material in the notebook is of uneven value, it was felt that 
a complete translation would bis of interest inasmuch as it represents the 
activities of an officer from the time he first boarded ship until shortly 
before the GILBERTS operation. 

Part of the material in the book seems to have been examined by 
some higher ranking officer, and, in some cases, the notation "Not Permitted" 
accompanied by a series of blue pencil marks, is found over passage^ which were 
thought censorable. However, the notebook itself bears the classification 
"MILITARY - VERY-SECRET" (GUNGOKUHI) on the cover, which seemed protection 
enough to the writer of the book for including material of a highly confi- 
dential nature. 

Nothing is known of the circumstances of capture of the notebook 
or of the fate of the writer. Since no l^orpedo boat unit was at TARAWA at 
the time of the American landing, it is entirely possible that the author 
escaped and is still alive. 



542 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDSMTIAL 

15 i;ovenber 19/4- 
15 November 

1 December 
1 April 19A2 

15 April 

25 April 

1 June 

1 June 
15 July 
15 August 

5 September 

9 September 
23 September (?) 



JIC'POA Iteni #4986 
Page 3 



CHRONOLOGY OF PKfiSONAL HISTORY' 



Received comirdssion as Passed Mdshipraan from the Mavy 
Department . 

Received orders from the Navy Department assigning ine to the 
KAKO (CA) . Jurdor Division Officer, 2nd Division, and Uacldne 
Gun Fire Control Officer. 

Received orders from Navy Department assigning me to the AOBA 
(CA). Staff Officer and Look-Out Officer. 

Received orders from the AOBA relieving ir;S of duties as Look- 
Out Officer and appointing me to Navigation Department, and as 
Junior Division Officer 7th Division. 

Received orders from the AOBA relieving me of duties to Navi- 
gation Department and as Junior Division Officer 7th Division 
and appointing me Coding Officer and Junior Division Officer 
6th Division, 

Received orders from the AOBA relieving me of duties as Coding 
Officer and appointing me Comiminications Officer. 
Commissioned Ensign by the Cabinet. 

Notified by the Navy Department of my assignm^jnt to tho AOBA. 
Assignment to AOBA confirmed by Navy Department. 
Attached to the DosDiv 9 by the Navy Department. 
Notified by AOBA to leave the ship and to take up position 
on NOVIAKI (DD). 

Assigned to the UDSGUMO (DD) by the Com DosDiv 9. 
Assigned to the ASAGUHO as Havigating Officer by tho Co 
Desbi'.'.9. 



15 November 1941 

November 

1° November 
21 iJov.jmber 

23 November 

24 Ncvomber 

25 Movomber 

26 KoViirabor 

29 November 

2 December 

4 December 

December 

7 December 



8 Dcoerabcr 



DIARY 

Graduated from the Naval College at KTAJIMA. Mado a midship- 

maii in the Navy. 

Ordered aboard the KAKO (CA) at KURE as Junior Officer, 2nd 

Division and Machine Gun Fire Control Officer. 

KAKO entered drydock ,;'3 at KURE. 

Granted leave and returned home. 

Returned to my ship, 

KAKO left drydock. 

K.">KO left KURE; anchored in HASHIRA SHIMA Channel. 

Paid our respscts to the Commander-in-Chief, 6th Fleet, on 

Hj.SHIRA SHUIA. 

Left HASHEt; SHBU Channel. :■:) 

Anchored at IU.UA SUB.Ui, 

Ordered aboard the AOBA (CA) as lookout officer (ICIHARISHI) . 

Left Hj".HA SHEii'. (to assist the GU/iM Occupation Force). 

Imperial Rescript to the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet: 
(rendered elsewhere). 

The Reply of the Comraandcr-in-Chicf , Combin^-d Fleet: 
(rendered elsewhere). 

The Commander-in-Chdcf, (lotihincd Fl^ot, to the Combined Fleet, 

(rendered elsewhere). 

The Emperor has proclaimed war on the UNITED ST/»TES and EliGL/J®. 

Imperial rescripts sent to the Ministers of the Army and Navy. 

Our striking force has delivered a successful surprise attack 

on HA'.VAII. 

Results: 



Sunk: 


Heavily D?jnagcd: 


1 CALIFORNIA Class BB 


1 C/JLIFORiNi;. Class BB 


1 i.L\RYLAIW Class BB 


1 M..RYL,Jff) Class BB 


] /JIIZONA Class BB 


1 NEVADA Class BB 


1 UTAH Class BB 


1 Cruiser 


1 Unidentified Ship 




2 Heavy Cruisers 




1 Oiler 





EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



543 



CONFIDENTI/iL 



JICPOA Item i5'4986 
Page 4 



8 December 19/*1 
(continued) 



Moderately Damaged ; 
1 NEVADA Class BB 
4 Cruisers 



Our Losses; 

9 Fighter Pianos 

15 Bombers 

5 Reconnaissance Planes 



Landings were made by our southern forces at KGTA BHARU, 
SINGORA, BATA/iN, ByjJCacOK, and AMBODJA Bay; BA3C0 was occupied. 
Our troops entered the International Settlement at SH/JJOIAI. 
The British Gunboat, PENGUIN, was sunk there. A detachment 
of American Marines at PEKING laid down their arms. 
SINQ.\PORE, MIDWAY, VUXE, CL.\RK FIELD, GUAM, HONGKONG, DAVAO 
were bombed, 
9 December The American sea-plane carrier LANGLEY was sunk (off DAVAO). 
10 Docember The Emperor was overjoyed with the results of the HjWAII oper- 
ation, sending another rescript to the Commander-in-Chief, 
Combined Fleet. 

Offensive and defensive alliamc with TE.lILAND signed, WAKE 
attacked. The destroyers HAYATE and KISARAGI were sunk by 
shell-fire. 

Landings effected at VIGAN. One sub-chaser sunk. GUAM, 
APARRI, MAKDI, TAR.V,U occupied. 

Minesweeper #19 wrecked off the mouth of the CAGAYAN River. 
The llth Mr Fleet participated in a naval battle of the 
MALAY PENINSULA. PRINCE OF '7ALES and REPULSE sunk. 
Tripartite Pact signed. WAKE attacked. Commander-in-Chief, 
Combined Fleet, the recipient of another imperial rescript 
decl'ring the Emperor's pleasure over the naval battle off 
the UI\1AY PENINSULA. GERMANY and ITALY declare war on the 
UNITED STATES. Landings effected at LEGASPI. 
Pur ship, the AOBA, anchored at TRUK. 
Left TRUK. 

The main naval force has arrived at HASHIRii SHBLA. 
AOBA anchored at ROI. 

SHINONaffi (DD) wrecked 15 kms. north of Bj\Ri'iM Point while 
on patrol duty off MIRI. The RO-66 collided with the HO-62 
and sank, 

p;ji;jii;i, costa rica, nicar/.gua, hojduras, DQiiNicAii republic, 

GUATQIALA, CUBA and Hi.ITI all declared war on our Empire, 
AOBA left ROI (to assist the WAKE Occupation Force). 
Landings effected at LING/iYEN. 
Occupation of 7/AKE completed. 

The (nS: HAWAII) Striking Force has arrived at HASHIRA SHIUA, 
AOBj'i returned to ROI and anchored. 
HONGKONG surrenders. 

Landings effected at JOLO in a surprise attack. 
Two enemy subs sunk off LING/lYEN Bay (by the destroyers 
ASAK/^ and S.iTSUKI). 

KUCRIUG occupied. The SAGIRI (DD) sunk by an enemy torpedo. 
Minesweeper #6 and the #2 UNYO Maru (ARS) were bombed and 
sunk. The UURi'.SAUE (DD) collided with Minesweeper ^'20 at 
TAKjIO. li'.NILA bombed. One enemy destroyer, two subs, and 
ten merchantmen sunk. The rv&'JCAZE s&^ik a sub off LING.\YEN. 
The American Amy comnandcr in the PHILIPPINES declared 
Mi'JIILA an open city, Mj'JIILA was bombed and ten merchantmen 
sunk. The NOJIMA (i'lF) was torpedoed and ran aground. 
The RO-60 ran aground south of ROI. 
The YAtlAGUMO (DD) hit a mine off LINGAYEN Bay, 
An enemy sub sank off LAOAG, 
1 January 1942 LABU/iN and BRUNEI occupied, 

3 January IWIIL/l surrendered, 

4 January The MYOKO (CA) was bombed off WdJd^G in DAVAO Ba.y. Has 

returned to SASEBO, damaged and with casualties. 

5 January AOBA left ROI at 0000, returned at 1000. (A report had been 

received that an enemy carrier and two cruisers had left 
H/-.'7AII for V.'AKE. We were ordered to leave at night on search 
and guard duty.) 



11 December 



12 December 

13 December 
December 

16 December 

17 December 



20 December 

21 December 

22 December 

23 December 

25 December 



26 December 



27 December 



29 December 
31 December 



79716 O — 46— pt. 13- 



-12 



544 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CO'JFIDENTIAL 



6 January 19A-2 

7 Janiiary 
9 January 



10 January 
12 January 



13 January 
18 January 



20 January 



21 January 



22 January 

23 January 



24 January 

25 January 

26 January 

27 Janur.ry 

30 Jc:uiu;-ry 

31 January 



29 January 
1 February 



3 February 

4 February 



JKPOA Iten ^'4986 
Pai;-e 5 

Left RDI at 0200, returned at 1030 on same mission. 

Left R0I_for THU^. .• j. 

The KAKKO Maru^< ^. ?> '1. ) was torpedoed and sunk in the 

DUTCH EAST INDES. 

Two more enemy subs have been sunk . 

Anchored at TRUK. . . 

The LEXINGTON sunk by the 1-6. 

TAHAKATJ surrendered. 

Minesweepers #13 and #14 sunk off LIHKAS. 

The iiinalayar, PRINS VAN ORANJE, sunk. 

MENGACHU FORT on LINKAS Island captured. 

Left TRUK. 

The I-131_sank a 10,000 merchantman north of TBTOFi. 

The BApHy^kiary 'V^ '' /- ) hit a mine and sank. 

The ASO Maru<^.?^y(^ ) (AP-AK) was severely damaged. 

At 1800 crossed the equator at 146°37' E. Lon.pr. going south* 

(Fighter planes from the ZUIKAKU shot down an <-;nemy flying 

boat that was approaching us. '.'fe spottod fiv<^ of its crow 

floating on the water, and picked them up as prisoners.) 

One s'wcial duty shio and several of our mcrcliantmen have 

been sunk at SIIjGAPORE. 

Our forcos attacked an enemy force concentrating at CEBU 

and sank several morchantmen. 

The NhNA Kiju^glj-J A. ) (AP-AK) was sunk Lin the south). 

The kSLCmO (DDrccllidcd with the 01 Uc.r\x/i:r~^ Jf A. ), 

Landings effected at the mouth of the SjA!UPAil,\ River .ind the 

mouth of KENDARI Bay. 

One of our destroyers has damaged six enemy moi-chantmen in 

the INDIjVN OCEAIj. 

H.-ive reached the southernmost point on our course (4°9' S., 

150°55'30" E.) 

Bhth.KA (?) iUrfield on GERIIN (?) Island occupied, -^s the 

result of an enemy torpedo attack, the TATSIIKjilil Liarui^ 

{jf- f^'^ K ) (AK), TSURUGA Maruv^jj '^1 L ) (AK), and the 

KU_RET.J<E Maru^l'f, 'i''j il^) were sunk'; the SULiANOUHA Uaru^' 

{'M.'^l .^fO '-nd Patrol Boat #37 were heavily liejiiajied. 

RrVBAUL occupied. 

Crossed the equator at 150°E. t'oing north at 0555. Recrosscd 

it going south at 150°5' E. at 1240. The iniTJKEN Marui^ 

(-frJ/ !? iL ) (AK) was sunk off C-ILI J.i-G. Landings effected 

at KEhU.iil and B;iIKP..P,J'. 

The T0KEGA'.VA Maru C^'] /f^"! /"J'^as grounded. 

Reached the southernmost point on our course at 1430 

(4°45' S., 149°52'E.). 

The British destroyer, T)-L'JIET, was surik. 

Landings made on PAii,iMGK;vT . SAIJBASU (?) occupied. 

AOBA c.nc;,orcd i.. .i-'.B;aiL Harbor at 0800. 

(Handed over our prisoners.) Loft R,iB.'i.UL at 1730. 

KJT„.I occ;r ied. 

Anchored in YSh EL PASSAGE. 

Our forces have progressed towards SliJGdPCrffi. 

Landings effected at aiBOK, RDT.Jl, and ' v:'\.... a. 

MINKA'TAN (?) and PONTI^.-.K occupied. 

Left Y&'.BEL PASSn(E. is\. enemy striking force appeared in 

the Vu.RSH-'JXS Area and we have received reports that- they 

are "attacking there, '"c left impiediately for K'.'A J.'^LEIN . 

The enemy force is composed of 2 carriers, five heavy (?) 

cruiser-ij, and five destroyers. 

The Submarine 1-62 sank a 10,000 ton tan>;er off COLOlwBO. 

J.iVu SEA Battle. 

Enemy Losses: 

1 Dutch Cruiser (J,kVA Class) sunk. 

1 Dutch Cruiser (DE RUYTER Class) sunk. 

1 Dutch Cruiser (jAVi> Class) mediam damage. 

1 American Cruiser (U-uiBLSHE-.D Class) medium damage. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



545 



COrJFIDEKTIAL 



JICPOA Item #4986 
Pai?e 6 



5 February 19A2 
2 February 

4 February 

5 February 

6 February 

7 February 



8 February 

9 February 



10 February 
12 February 

15 February 

16 February 

19 February 

20 February 



23 February 

24 February 

25 & 26 February 

27 February 

28 F.cbruary 

•2 Mr.rch 
4 Mr.rch 



5 March 

8 March 

9 March 

10 March 

11 March 

14 March 

15 March 

17 March 

18 March 

26 March 

27 March 



The Submarine RO-34 sank a destroyer in the S\Jl!Dk STRAITS. 

0116. Crossed the equator bearing north, 153°50' E. 

1C.7AJALEII]. Entered the Harbor at ROI. 

KVAJaLEIN. Left ROI. Anchored at the main island at 

P/AJALEII.'. 

IC'JAJALEIN. Departed from the main island. 

The HOYO {'jC-.i ^ '^ Marxi ran aground outside KEBIIJ Bay. 

The Submarine 1-124 had a gunnery engagement with an 

English destroyer and was sunk. 

The NAT5U3HI0 (DD) was sujy< by torpedoes. 

The KISOGA'fA ( ^fx "^| ") ^'O Maru wafe sunk off SAIGOH by an 

enemy submarine. 

Successful landings were carried out at MAKASSAR, AENBATO- 

BATO, SURUMI, and GASOATA. 

TRUK. Entered the harbor at TRUK. 

The YAMATO (BB) becr^-iie the flagship of the Combined Fleet, 

SINGAPORE fell. 

A message from the throne oa the occasion of the fall of 

SINGAPORE. / 

The MOKO (,-^-^' i^ -tv ) Maru was sunk off NOIO 3AKI by an 

enomy submarine, 

TRUK. Departed from TRUK. An enemy task force composed 

of 1 BB, 2 carriers, 2 cruisers and 9 c'estroy.irs '..l-.b 

appeared at a bearing of 75°46' off H,.BAUL and our force 

has set out to capture or annihilate it. It seems thst 

the enemy is planning to carry out a surprise attack on 

TRUK. 

Successful Irjidings were carried out ;.t L-'L.T and KOEP/JJG. 

BALI Island has been occupied. 

The Submarine 1-60 was sunk, in a naval battle off BAT/JJ'. 

4 I'cstroycrs were sunk and 2 cruisers and 1 i estroyer v/cre 

badly damaged. The MICHISHIO (DD) and OSHIO (DD) were 

badly daaaged. 

TRUK. Entered the harbor at TRUK. R^A'^TO (?) has been 
occupied. 

2 enemy cruisers and 2 destroyers have carried out an attack 
in the vicinity of '7AKE Island. 

A submarine shelled the American mainland. The subma.rine 
RO-63 met with m accident in tlie vicinity of j .■ j.:^ 
Island. 

In a naval battle off S0ERA3AYA, 5 cruisers and 6 destroyers 
were sunk. Their force consisted of 5 cruisers and 9 des- 
troyers. 

The Submarine 1-58 sank a 15,000 ton fueling slap in the 
SUNDA STRAITS. The Submarine 1-4 sunk a freighter south 
of JaVA. 

TRUK. Departed at 1000. Engaging in the Fourth CampaifTi 
(SR Operations). 

Crossed the equator at 0015 bearing southward, 150 54' E. 
An enemy carrier attacked MARCUS Island. The enemy force 
was composed of the ENTERPRISE, SjiLT LAKE CITY, NORTHAMPTON, 
ind a number of destroyers. Tlie ERIMO (^ '^ ) (AO) was 
sunk by torpedoes. 

At 0600 entered the harbor at a'.BAUL. Took on provisions. 
Departed at 1700. 

Successful landing carried out in liENA'')EI Vcl. m s 
Swept the sea around KUIM&'iRORj\ (?) and fvnchored there. 
The SNLF has landed and are cleaning out the enemy along 
the coast. Departed at 1615. 
Entered the harbor at RABAUL. Fueled, 
Departed from RuBAUL. 

Entered the harbor at KUIKK/iROR/. and stood by. 
Departed from KUirnO'.RQi:-. 
Anchored in MELLE CfUNKEL {''•'-> i- '^'-c- y) . 
Departed from MELLS CliANi.'EL. 
Entered the harbor at RABAUL. Fueled. 



546 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



COBFIDENTIAL 



28 March 19^2 
30 March 

1 April 

2 April 

7 April 

8 April 

10 April 
30 April 

5 May 

6 H?y 

7 May 

9 May 

11 Mny 

12 May 

13 May 

16 May 

17 May 
22 May 
25 May 
26-31 May 

29 May 

8 June 
10 June 



16 June 

17 June 

18 June 
23 Jiine 
30 June 

2 July 



5 July 

6 July 

7 July 
10 July 
lU July 
16 July 

18 July 

19 July 
21 July 



22 July 

26 July 
1 August 
7 August 



8 August 
10 August 



17 August 

19 August 

20 August 



JICPOA Item #4986 
Page 7 

Departed from RABAUL. Engaging in the Fifth Campaign. 
Landing at SHORTLAND successful. 
Entered harbor of RABAUL. Left the same day. 
Anchored in MELLS CH/JINEL. 
Departed from MELLE CH/JINEL. 
Crossed the equator bearing north, 148*^13' Et 
Entered the harbor at TRUK. 

Departed from TRUK to engage in the Fifth Campaign. 
Entered the harbor at SH0RTL'.ND. 
Departed from SHORTLAND. 

Attacked by enemy planes. The SHOHO (CV) was sunk at a 
bearing of 56°, 52 miles off DEBOYNE Island, 
^tercd the harbor at SHORTL'ID. 
Took on provisions and departed the sane day. 
The 0KIN0SHB1-; {'/f > i, ) (CM) was sunk by torpedoes. 
Entered the h?.rbor at KIETA, The SKLF landed. There was 
no sign of the enemy. 

Anchored at SHORTL'iJD. Took on provisions and departed 
the same day bound for TRUK, our destroyer alone. 
Entered the harbor at TRUK. 
Departed from TRUK, bound for KURE. 
Entered the harbor of KUIE at 1300. 
Entered No. 3 Dock at KURE. 
Had leave. Returned to ship. 
Loft the Dock. Moored to land at A Anchorage. 
Changed mooring to No, 18 Buoy. 

Departed from the harbor on a trial cruise. Returned the 
same day. Practiced avoiding torpedods while cruising. 
Tested our speed over a measured course. 
Departed at 0900. At 1745 entered the harbor at NAG/JliaiA. 
Departed from NX;j!.'i.li\ at 0900. At 1745 entered the harbor 
of KITSUKI. 

Departed from KITSUKI bound for TRUK. 
Entered the harbor at TRUK. 
Departed from TRUK, 

Crossed the equator_(the 9th time) bearing south. 
Time - 0230. The HO YD ('^54 ^ ) Maru drew alongside our 
port side and we refueled in tov;. 
Entered the harbor a^ jilETA. / 

Drew alongside the HOYO Maru/'H '-* A ) rjid refueled. 
Vfhen wu had finished, we left the harbor. 
Anchored in REKAT/. LAGOON. 
2 ."estroyers dropped anchor. 
Departed at 1200. 
Entered MELLE Channel. 
Set out for KUINK,J«)RA. 
Entered the harbor at KJDiKAROEA. 

Departed from KUINK^'J^ORt'i bound for R.£viUL (our destroyer 
alone). Refueled and left port the same day bound for 
YS/lBEL p..ss/>ge. 

/anchored in YSABEL P.JSSAGE. There wore 2 destroyers and 
we remained there until the 26th. 

Departed from YSABEL PASS/iGS and anchored in ^tkt.t.k CHANNEL. 
RABAUL. Departed from RABAUL. /Jichored in MELLE QiANNSL, 
Departed from MELLE CHANNEL. Received news that an anemy 
task force was attacking TULAGI, we made a forced run to 
RABAULj. The enemy had started to land at TULAGI. v/e joined 
the CHDKAl (CA), 

V/e made a night attack on TULAGI. 

The KAKO (CA) was struck by torpedoes from an enemy sub- 
marine and sank. (30,500 metres out from MARV/IU Island 
at a bearing of 48°; at about 2028' S., 152°11« E.) 
Anchored in MELLE CHANNEL. 
Left MELL2 CHANNEL. 
Anchored in REKATA BAY, 
Left REKATA BAY, 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



547 



CONFIDEKTIAL 



JICPOA Item #4936 



21 August 19W Joined the CHSkaI (CA_2. 

22 August Separated from the CHOKAI and the 2 DD's, anchoring at 

SHORTLAND for supplies. Vfl^en finished here, left. 
24 August Spotted a convoy. Rejoined the CHOKAI and the 2 DD's. 

26 August Anchored at KIETA. 

27 August Left KIETA. Anchored temporarily at SHORTLAND. 

28 August Left SHORTLAND for the south. 

4 September Anchored at KIETA. 

5 September Left KIETA. Anchored temporarily at SHORTLAND. Left ship 

after supper and reported on board the KOT/AKI (DDJ for dut^T. 

6 September Left SHORTLAIID. Headed for TRUK, escorting the TOA Maru / 

{% ^ k ) (XAO or AK?). 
9 September Anchored in TRUK Harbor at 1400. Vfas transferred aboard 
the MBIEGUMO (DD) after supper. _ 

10 September Left TRUK for the south, escorting the KENYO Maruw(aAO). 

«£:^-^ ). 

23 September Anchored at TRUK. Left the MINBGUMO and reported on board 

the ASAGUMO (DD) for duty. 
26 September Left TRUK for SHORTLAND (Apart from being in DesDiv 9, 
the ASAGUUO had also been made a part of the SOUTH SEAS 
Force (NANTO BUTAI). 

29 September iUichored at SHORTLAIrt). 

2 October Took on board materiel to be landed at GUADALC/JJAL and left 

SHORTLAND. Began unloading at 2058, completed it success- 
fully at 2230. 

3 October Returned to SHORTLAND for supplies. 

f) October Enemy carrier-based bombers attacked us (one bomb dropped 
very close: 200 metres on our port beam), but no damage. 
We repulsed them. Left SHORTL/iND for the second time on 
the "ferry service" to GUAD;iLC;>NAL. Vferc attacked by enemy 
planes. The NATSUGUMO (DD), UINEGUMO, and MURASAME turned 
back. 



(Reinforcement Butai) 

26 September The DesLiv 9 (IN: dg) was attached to the Outer South Seas 

Force and set out from TRUK. 
29 September altered the harbor- at SHORTLAND. 

2 October 0800 Depsirted from SHORTLAND on a .;outherly course. Our force 

was composed of the DesPiv 9 (IN: dg) and the Desriv 2 
(TN: dg) (minus the YUDACFil and the SAiilDARE). Had as 
passengers 250 soldiers who were to be put ashore; also 
carried provisions and 15 rear-cars which were to be put 
ashore . 

2048 Arrived at KMBiBO and commenced unloading operations, 

2230 Vfork was completed. 

2246 Departed from KAUIMBO, following a southerly course. 

3 October IO36 Anchored at SHORTLAND. 

5 October O63O Departed from SHORTLAND, follojving a southerly course. 
Our force was compaaed of the Des'ivs 9 and 2 (TN: dg). 
Carried as passengers 650 soldiers who were to 1:« put ashore. 
As cargo carried 2 mountain guns, telegraph apparatus, and 
tools for laborers, which were to be put ashore. 

1505 Were attacked by 10 enemy planes. The MINEGUUO (DD) was 
damaged by a near hit forward, sprang a leak and returned 
to SHDRTLAI^D escorted by the NATSUGUMO (DD). 

1552 Were attacked by nine enemy planes. Our ship was attacked 
by 3 carrier-based bombers. Bombs landed 100° to starboard, 
distance 50 meters, 50 meters off the bow, and 150° to star- 
board, distance 100 meters. Sustained no damage. 

1705 The MURASAME (DD), having sprung a leak, because of a near 
hit by a bomb, returned to SHORTLAND. 

1924 Enemy planes on patrol dropped -lares. 

2116 Arrived at TASSAFARDHGA and commenced unloading operations. 

2254 Unloading completed. 

2257 Departed from TASSAFARONGA, following a central course. 



548 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFID^JTI/J. 

6 October 
8 October 



9 October 



11 October 



12 October 



13 October 
lU October 



15 October 



JICt'OA Iteiu #/;986 
Page 9 

1019 Dropped anchor at SHOPJL-JJD, h".ving entered thu h:-rbor 
throuf^h the North Ch;-uinel. 

0551 Sei c'.il iroffl SHORTL/JiD, heading dov;n the "Slot". (TO: 

CHUO-KORO *'fj|'^i);L5'&). Our force was composed of the De*iv 
9 (minus the MINEG'JMO) and the De^iv 2 (niiiius the ULTRASAME 
and the SAHIDARE). Carried as passengers 560 r.ien who were 
to be put ashore. As cargo, carried 18 trench mortars. 
Also carried a LiAIZURU ith Special Kaval Landing Force 
Communications Unit and '.fork Unj.t, 

1607 V/ere attacksd by 11 enemy planes and our escort planes 
joined battle with them. 

2056 Reached TASSAFAfiDNGA and commenced disembarkirig operations. 

2219 Operations concluded. 

2224 Departed from TASSAFARONGA proceec.iig along the "Slot", 

0453 V.'ere attached by 11 enemy carrier-'jased bombers and oxir 
escort planes joined battle with them. 

0506 The enemy's carrier-based bombers attacked us and bombs 

landed 90° to port, distance 50 meters, 110° to starboard, 
distrjice 100 meters, and 80° to starboard; distance 50 
meters . Shot dovm one of the enejny pl^uies, 

1120 Dropped anchor, at SHORTLAIID. 

C558 Departed from SHORTLAi\ID, Our forco vjas composed of the 
I.'ISSHin (CVS), CHITCoE (CVS)^ AKITSJKI (DD), the DeEfiv 9 
and the D-s? iv 11 (111: dg) (minus two destroyers). Carried 
as passengers 728 :.i-'n vjho were to be put ashore. Also ca- 
ried 4 15 cm. hovdtzors, 4 tractors, 2 field guns, 16 cases 
(?) of ammunition, 1 antiaircraft gun, 1 fixed radio 
(HOTEI-LTJSEN). The above materials were aboard the HISSHB-I 
and CHITOSE. The ASAGbHO (DD) ,ind th- D'-sdiv 11 (minus 2 
destroy, rs) carried 1 regimental gun, 2 battalion guns, 2 
rapid-fire guns, 1 trench .TiortAr, and ten tons of provisions, 

2023 Arrived at TASSAFAROIiGA and commenced disembarking op^mtions, 

2i23 Operations completed. 

213c Departed from TASSAFAROHGA. 

2135 Sighted our forces engaged in battle vdth the enemy a 
little north of SAVO Island. (The losses sustained by 
our 6th Fleet were: FURUTMA (CA), sunk; AOBA (CA), badly 
damaged, and FUBUKI (DD), sunk), 

2236 Returned to our anchorage. The NISSHIN and CHITOSE had not 
completed the disembarkation of the materials she carried, 

2304 Operations were completed, and vje changed our coufse to 
the south, 

0655 Joined the SENDAI (CL), 

O85O The MURAKUMO was hit by bombs from enemy planes and was 

unable to proceed and the Des!jiv 9 vient to her assistance, 

1105 Arrived at our destination where we were assigned to patrol 
duty. Tried to tow the SHIRAYUKI (DD). 

125s Sighted 2 enemy carrier-based bombers, 

1323 Sighted the two planes again. 

1343 Attacked by 11 carrier-based bombers and 8 fighters. 

1348 The HATSUCHJMO was damaged by a bomb Sind was unabl3 to pro- 
ceed, and gradually began, to list, 

1415 The MURAKUMO was struck by a torpedo which exploded 

1427 The NATSUGUMO sank but the crew was saved. 

1445 Uade our escape from this place. 

1538 Joined the Des:'bn 3 (sd), 

I64O Proceeded to tow the IfJEAKUMO 

I85O Arrived at this place. 

1850 The SHIRAYUKI was disposed of with torpedoes. (RAIGDKI 
SH03UI>:SU). 

1909 Started back, 

O63O Put in at SHORTLAIiD. 

0353 S^;t out from SHDRTLAND via the North Channel. 

2021 Arrived at TASSAFARONGA where we changed our anchor.ago 
and established patrols. 

2350 The CHOKAI (CA) and the KD^JG/iSA shelled the airfield. 

0400 A tr.ansport fleet (SENDAI (CL), YUPJ> (CL), and TAT3UTA 
(CL), ) completed disembarking operations. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



549 



CONFIDENTIAL 



15 October 1942 
(Continued) O./ij 
1604 

17 October O3I6 

2029 

2205 
2216 

18 October 0446 



0930 

24 October I6I6 

25 October 



26 October 
30 October 



1 November 



2 November 



1325 
0100 

0123 



0800 



2230 

2020 



2330 



3 November 

4 November 


1540 
2330 
2357 


5 November 


2010 




2101 


6 Ifovtmber 


2227 


7 November 


0941 
0800 


8 November 


2300 
1926 


8 November 


1937 




2220 




2245 


9 November 


0554 




0850 
1500 


11 November 

12 November 


1520 
1330 



JICrOA Item #498* 
Page 10 



Started back, following a course north. 

Put in at SHORTLAND. 

Departed from SHORTLAND, following the northern route.. 

Arrived at SSPERAI^CE where we commenoed dissmbarking 

©perations. 

Finished the operations. 

Departed from ESPEFcAircE going down the "Clot". 

The SENDAI was struck by a torped<i from an enemy submarine 

but sustained no damage. Three depth charges were dropped 

with unknown results. 

Put in at SHORTLAND where we, were attached to the main 

Fleet (?) (TN: SHUTM 'i ^i}< ). 

Departed from SHORTL/J^ID in order to carry out an all-out 

attacl; against GU/DALCAN/X. 

Though we occupied one corner of the airfield on GUADAL- 

CAiViL, we aid not seize the airfield. Our forces stood 

by to the west. 

Put in at SHORTLAlNlD. 

Enemy planes dropped bombs and 3 landed 50 meters off 

the bow. 

Enemy planes dropped bombs and 6 landed 4CP to» port, 

distance, 30 meters. UCHIDA, ScaTian, 3r-d Class, v;a,s 

killed. 

The flag of the CinC of the Design 4 (4 sd) was run up 

on the ASAGUMO (DD). 

Set out from SHORTL/JJO, following the northern route. 

Left oui co.-npanion ships and proceeded to the anchorage 

of a trans|X>rt fleot. Maintained patrol outside (the 

anchorage) . 

Stopped disembarkation work aind started back, following 

a course north. 

Put in at SHORTL^iND. 

Set out from SHOuTL.iND, following the northern route. 

Enemy planes dropped some bombs 90° to port, distance, 

about 1000 meters. 

Parted ways with the transport fleet .?jid continued on to 

the anchorage whore vie took up patrol. 

The lIURASAJiE sighted a torpedo-boat which it illiL-ninated 

and shelled. 

Disembarking operations were finished ;nd we started back. 

The SHIGURE (DD) sighted a periscope (proceeding along a 

central course) and dropped depth charges. 

Dropped anchor at SHORTL.iND, 

The Coriimand Flag was transferred to the TENRYU (CL) vrfiere 

it uas run up. 

Departed from SHORTLAJID, follov.'iiig the northern route. 

Separated and proceeded to our patrol station. V.'ent to 

the anchorage of the transport fleet. 

The MOCHZUKI (DD) sighted a torpedo-boct and illuminated 

it. 

The SHIGURE, YUGURE (DD), and MDCHIZUKI went on ahead, ' 

starting back. 

The transport fleet completed the disembarkation work 

and started back. 

Torpedoes were fired at us by ah enemy subm-irine, which 

was proceeding along the "Slot". The SHIRATSUYU (DD) and 

YUDACHI -roceeded to attack the submarine and sink it. 

Put in at SHORTLATJD. 

The DesRon Flag of the CinC of the DesRon 4 (4 sd) was 

transferred to the ASAGCM) and run up. 

Returned to the Des.on 4, our original unit. 

Set out from SHORTLaKD (departing by the North Channel). 

Joined the Des! ivs 10 and 11 r^nd set off far the south 

where a battle developed off LUNGA, 



550 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDO'TIAL 



JICPOA Item #4986 
Page 11 



13 November 1942 



14 Nov amber 



15 November 



16 November 

18 November 
21 November 

26 November 

5 December 

6 December 

7 Deceoiber 

8 December 



9 December 
13 December 
15 December 

17 December 

18 December 

20 December 

21 December 

26 December 

27 December 



0000 



0052 

0126 
0906 
0935 
1414 
2010 
0355 
U35 

2200 
2205 



2355 

0123 
0233 
1110 

0600 

0719 
1000 

0800 
0730 
0630 
1513 
0600 

1540 
1706 

1530 

1420 
1445 

2335 

0627 
1200 
1903 
1015 

0715 
1U5 



Torpedoes were fired from starboard but we continued on 
our way. V.'e illuroinated and shelled an enemy destroyer 
and inflicted great damage. 

The YUDACHI was liit by a bomb and was unable to keep 
under way. 
It withdrew. 

Met up with the KIRISHBiA (BB). 
Set out to do rescue vicrk at the HIKI (BB). 
Stopped rescue work and ti-ied to join the Main Force. 
Met up with the Advance Force.. 
Were fueled by the HARUKA (BB). 

Three torpedoes passed underneath our ship. We dropped 
depth cliarges. A battle broke out off SAVD Island. 
Sighted 3 enemy battleships. A battle in which both 
r.orpedocs and guns were used broke out. 
Launch jd a torpedo with unknown result.s. Our main bat- 
Lories vjere very effective. The KIRISKHIA was hit with 
bombs and was unable to keep under way. 

Put in alongside the KIRISHHIA. The entire crew abandoned 
ship (TI^': the KIRISHBIA). 
The KmSHIMA sank. 

Ceased rescue operations and withdrew. 
Joined the SENDAI (CL) and at 2100 joined the CruDiv 
8 (SE). . 

Were supplied (with fuel) by the NICHIiil ><Pl ^S ^ ) ^''^^^^ 
(XAO). 

Put in at TRUK, entering by the North Channel. 
The Command FL-^.g was transferred to the NAGARA (CL) and 
run up. 

Entered the dock. 
Left the dock. 

Left the harbor and carried out patrol to tlie north. 
Sntercd the harbor, 

Departed from the harbor and carried out patrol while 
the SPIGURE had firing practice. 
Entered the hai'bor. 

Departed from the harbor and carried out patrol to the 
north. 

Departed by the north entrancLi and proceeded to escort 
the CFjTO (ACV). 

The CHJYO sighted the UZUKI (DD) off the bow. 
Cr.ught. up with her. She turned around and we proceeded 
on to IPOJK. 

Sighted a submarine on the surface and dropped 6 depth 
charges but were unable to determine results. 
Put in at TRUK by the North Channel. 
Departed from the harbor to carry out maneuvers. 

Returned, 

L>.-.ft thu harbor, escorting the CHUYO and bound for 

TOKOSUKA, 

Sighted FUJIYAltA. 

Entered the harbor where we were given leave, 

Went to TOKYO where 1 paid my respects to the Lnperial 

Palace, and worshipped at the shrine of UiilJI, and YASU- 

KUNI-JEJJA. 



2 January 1943 1545 Departed from YOKOSUKA bound for TRUK escorting the CHUYO. 

1700 Left TOKYO Bay. 
8 January 0700 Arrived at TRUK via the North Channel. 
11 January Were attached to the Southeast Area Fleet and were placed 

under the ClnC of the C.-'jfJiv 2. 
15 Janu.ary 1200 Departed from TRUK with a patrol unit for an air-craft 
carrier force, CarTiv 2 (minus the HIYO) in order to 
carry out "C" (HEI) transport operations. 
17 January 1140 Proceeded to a place about 200 miles north of '/("EWAK. _ 
25 fighters rnd 6 attack-bombers took off from the JUNYO. 
We headed for TRUK. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



551 



COHFIDjJjTIAL 
19 January 1943 



0712 



20 January 




21 January 


2323 
1115 
1915 


22 January 
25 January 


0840 




0523 
2130 


26 Janu:;ry 


1200 


27 January 
31 January 


1200 
0642 


1 February 




4 February 

5 February 
7 February 


0700 
1000 


8 February 

11 Febnaary 

12 February 


0130 




1S14 


13 February 


0900 


14 February 

17 February 
19 February 


1340 
1400 
0900 


22 February 

23 February 


1800 
0530 


24 February 

27 February 

28 February 

1 March 

2 March 


U50 
1250 
2255 

O63O 



JICPOA Itoa #49B6 
Page' 12 

Put in at TRUK via the South Channel and our escort task 
was concluded. Set out to finish off an onemy submai'ine 
which a float reconnaissance plane from the TAKAD (CA) 
had sighted and attacked at a place 25 kilometres from 
the South Channel at a bearing of 155°, 
#6C (?) Convoy was attacked by a submarine 286 nautical 
miles (TN: " ' " denotes a nautical miLe) from TRUK at 
a bearing of 145°. The SURABAYA LIarlM^^ == '^ ^ K ) was 
sunk and the M£IU Uaru ('^^'-f A. ) severely damaged. 
Proceeded to the rescue. 
Arrivjd -.t our destination. 

The MEIU Maru sanlc.\/Then turned back for TRUK. Picked 
up, however, 13 Army officers (warrant and above) and 
419 enlisted men; I46 members from the crews of the tvio 
ships; and two N.^vy men. 



I'^XC 



1420 



The KUNIKAVi'A Maru<XCVS) had engine trouble and halted 

in her course 300 nautical miles from TRUK at a bearing 

of 132°. 

Left TRUK to stand by her. 

Contact was made with the ship and we took charge of 

escorting her. ^^ 

The repairs on the KUNIICrtV:A Maru having been completed, 

proceeded to return. 

Arrived at TRUK. 

We left TPlUK, as the screening unit for the advance force 

(AdB) and main force ijhich were to assist in the "ke" (^ ) 

Campaign. (TN: "ke" Campaign seems to be a general 

Japimese term for an evacuation operation. ) 

Our ship hr.s been assigned to the Reiiiforcing Force (ZOB) 

of the Outer South Seas Force (SMB). ConsE;quontly, wo 

detached ourselves from the advance force (AdB). 

/jrrived at SHORTLJID. 

Lefo t'.-r:re (for our second transport duty at GUADALCANAL). 

Retv.i.,-'d to SHORTLAND. 

Lox't SHORTLAND (for our third transport duty at GUAD/vL- 

CAI^IiX) . 

Returned to SHORTL/JTO. Campaign "ke" ( */ ) is finished. 

Left SHORTUiND to escort the SENDAI (CL). 

Joined the SENDAI and returned to SHOnTUilD. Left there 

for P/iiVJ (with the SAMIDARK of Dea'iv 10). 

Spotted an enemy submarine. Droppx^c'. depth charges but 

results were undetermined. Left the SAillD/JiE and headed 

back to Ri'iBAUL to relieve our commander (3iIREI), 

Capt, KONISHI relieved our commander and assumed his 

ne\v dutie£. 

Capt. SATO loft the ship. 

Left R^'^AUL for PALAU. 

Arrived at ViJJiJ, . 

Left P/iLAU for Vffi\«M, escorting the JdTOSUMI Maruv' ^ 

{% -"^ -^ ), the AIKOKU Maru (XCL)X and the GOKOKU Maru/ 

{^l 1^ A ) , engaged in Operation #81. 

Entered ','ffiW/J( /inchorage. Kept a mobile guard. 

Unloading completed. Left the convoy and headed back 

to RABAUL. 

Arrived at R.'£AUL. 

Took on supplies (at KOKOPO) for the ;.niiy. 

Left RABAUL (in a transport operation to L/VE). 

Came in contact with enemy planes in the evening. 

Fought several enemy planes (PBY's and B-17's). The 

KYOKUSEI Maru {%%.\A "as so damaged by bombs that 

sho sank. Rescued those aboard, however. 

Raided again by several B-17's.- Together wij-h the YUKIKiiZE 

(DD) went on ahead to L/iE. Supplies wore unloaded for our 

troops. 



552 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDENTIAL 
3 March 1943 



4 March 



5 March 
7 March 


2200 
0600 
1700 


8 March 


1043 
1700 


9 March 
12 March 


1642 
1700 


13 March 


1700 


14 March 
30 March 


0600 
1839 


31 March 





1 April 

2 April 

3 April 

5 April 

6 April 

9 April 
10 April 
13 April 
20 April 

26 April 

28 April 

29 April 

30 April 

12 May 



15 May 

20 May 

21 May 
25 May 



JICFOA Iteni #4986 
Page 13 

Rejoined the convoy. 
0700 Fought off a 100-odd enemy fighters, bombers, and torpedo 

bombers, 10 or so of oiir own planes came to our defense. 

The convoy was destroyed. Rescued survivors, but dis- 
continued this at 1300 ai-Kl withdrew, changing our course 

southward and scouting. Able to detect nothing, however. 
1640 Arrived at KAVIrHG. Came alongside the SEITOAI and got 

some supplies. 

Left KAVIiiMG for RABAUL. 

Arrived at RABAUL. 

Left RABAUL for SHORTLAND (with' the YUKIKAZE, SHIKINAMI 

(DD), and URANAMI (DD) ). 

Arrived at SHORTLAI©. 

Left there through the south entrance (in the KOLO^©ANGARA 

ferry service). Completed our unloading there and pro- 
ceeded to return. 

Vfe separated from the SHIKINAMI and URANAMI. 

Arrived at RABAUL. 

Left RABAUL for SHORTLAND (with the YUKIKAZE and MINATSUKI 

(DD) ). 

Left SHORTLAND through the south entrance (in the KOLOM- 

BANGARA ferry service). Completed our unloading there 

and proceeded to return. 

Arrived at SHORTL/tND. Moved supplies, then left again. 

Arrived at RAB/iUL. 

Left RABAUL for SHORTLAND (with the SAMIDARE, YUGUMO 

(DD), KAZSGUMO (DD), and /iKIGUllO (DD) ). 

Arrived at SHORTLAND, then left through the south entrance 

(in the KODDUBANGARA ferry service). Vfcre in continual 

contact with enaray planes, making it difficult to unload. 

Abandoned all thought of unloading finally and proceeded 

to return, 
1700 Left again through the south entrance (in the KOLQUBAN- 

GARA ferry service), Comploted our unloading there and 

proceeded to return. 

Arrived SHORTLAND, leaving again for BUKA. Arrived at 

BUKA and picked up fuel, 
0500 Left BUKA for SHORTLAND. .\rrived there and found the 

KAZEGUMO and a merchantm damaged by a mine, (y/e 

suspect magnetic mines had been laid in the harbor.) 
1700 Left through the south entrance (in the KOIiafflyiNGARA 

ferry service). Complotad our unloading and proceeded 

to return. 

Returned to SHORTLAND, leaving again for TRUK. One B-25 

attacked us, but its bombs went wide of their mark, 
0800 Arrived at TRUK. 
0600 Left TRUK for YDKOSUKA. 
1000 Arrived there, mooring to Buoy Y-17. 

Receivijd a furlough and returncxi to my homo at IO3O 

(until the 24th). 
1130 Left for the (ATAMI) Health Resort. 
1000 Returned (i'-.:To YO.ILJ ..) I was now to bo stationed aboard 

the USUGUMO (E©). 

Left my old ship after lunch. 
0954 Arrived at ^MINATO (by train). Went aboard my new ship 

the USUGUMO. 

The situation in the northern area having changed sud- 
denly j_ stopped our present work, 
2345 Left OMINATO for PAaUflJSHIRD, 
0415 Arrived at the PARAMUSHIRO Straits. 
0725 Moving through the north entrance to P.'iRAUUSHIRO, wo 

went on patrol duty. 
0520 Returned to PARAUUSHIEO. 
1630 Left PARi'iMUSHIRO for ATTU. (V/c wjrc to attack the enemy 

fleet by surprise, transport urgently needed materiel, 

and pick up liaison men,) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



553 



CONFIDENTIAL 


30 May 1943 

31 May 

2 June 

3 June 
5 Jvine 



7 June 

19 June 

23 June 

24 June 



26 June 
30 June 



1 July 

5 July 

10 July 



11 July 

12 July 



13 July 

14 July 

15 July 

18 July 

19 July 

22 July 
26 July 

29 July 



31 July 



JICPOA Item #4986 
Page 14 

0240 Ceased our operations and proceeded to return. 

0825 Returned to PARAMUSHIRO. 

0612 Left to clean out enemy subs operating south of 

ARAIDO Island. 
1100 Ceased this work and returned to PARAMUSHIRO. 

Today was the occasion of the national funeral of 

YAUAMOTO, Admiral of the Fleet. 
0700 Observed his passing with a half-mast ceremony. 

The SHIRAKIM) (DD) collided with the NUilAKAZE (DD) 12 

nautical miles off CAPE LOP-^TKA at a bearing of 122°. 
0115 Headed in that direction to lend assistance. 
0355 Joined the SHIRAKIM). 

Returned to PARAMUSHIRO, escorting her. 
0950 Entered the harbor there. 
1125 Left to determine the calibration of our direction 

finder . 
1455 Having done this, returned again. 
0320 Left PARAiiUSHIRO Harbor escorting the IKUSHIi»iA Itoru V^ 

i>,>(.\,f.t ). 
1530 Ceased escorting and left the othjjr ship. 
2025 Joined the NITTEI liaru (r? •'^ ^v^and escorted it. 
0648 Ceased escorting and entered the harbor (^r ■ ..t .UIA 

I-IUSHIRD ?) 
1000 Cariie alongside the HjUCKAI iJaru (/ V -,1^ 1l\X, Sqioipped 

her with counter-radar (GYAKUTAN) and loaded landing 

barges on her. 
1155 Left the side of the' HAKKAI Maru. 
1700 Received warning to go on watch duty. 
1950 Weighed anchor and left port (headed for a spot 23 

nautical miles out of BETTOBU NUUA at a bearing of 350° 

where a submarine attack had been reported) . 
0930 Entered PARAiiUSHIRO Harbor. 

1930 Left (to participate in the "ke" Campaign at KISKA). 
0205 Planned to make a dash for KISKA, but the weather was 

not favorable for it, so at 203O we changed our course 

and ivithdrew. ^/^ 
0550 Joined the NIPPON Uaru*tXAO) and reccoAred oil. 
0735 Made a second attempt to dash into KISKA, but reversed 

our course again r.t 1520 because of unfavorable condi- 
tions. 
0240 Made our third attempt. 
1703 Gave up again. 
2145 Made our fourth attemprt,. 
0156 Gave up once more. 
1500 Tried for the fifth time. 
0430 Gave up again. 

0820 Ceased ouf operations and returned to PARAJUSHIRO. 
0830 Entored P.-.'iiUiUSHIliO Harbor. 

0630 Received an air raid v;arning for the northern KURILES. 
0645 Five B-24's bomb^id us but there was no damage. 
2000 Left for the second phase of our participation in the 

"ke" Campaign. 
1750 The KUNIJIRI (CM) and the ABUKUMA (CL) collided (duo to 

this, there was some confusion produced in the roar of 

the ' formation, and the WAK.\BA (DD), HATSUSHIMO (IS)), and 

NaGANa^ (DD) also collided). 
1105 Sighted the outline of nn island. 
1316 The ABUKUMA sighted the enemy ar^ fired 3ome torpedoes. 

It developed that we had mistaken LITTLE KISKA for the 

enemy. 
1321 The SHIMAKAZE fired its guns. 
1350 Dropped anchor in KISKA Harbor. 
1405 Had finished taking aboard the men. 
1420 The 2nd Transport Unit 1-iad finished. 
1427 Departed. 

0604 The weather cleared up. 
1530 We entered the harbor at PARAMUSHIRO. 



554 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONpPEKTIAL 



1 August 1943 
3 August 

6 August 

7 August 

8 August 

16 August 
15 Septeniber 
20 September 



JICPOA Ite:a jl-4986 
Page 15 

1000 Tho 1st Transport Unit arrived. _ 

1700 Departed from P.'tRAiiUoHIRO bound for OUINnTO. 

0600 Put in at OTARU. 

0730 V/ent ashore at YOKOSUKA Naval Base. 

lAOO Arrived at YOKOSUKA having received orders to report to 
the Commr.ndant of the Naval Torpedo School for duty. 
Started courses for torpedo-boat captain. 
Concluding my courses. 

Received orders assigning mo to the YOKOSUKA Guard Unit 
(SHBBITAI) and placing me in command of the Nu'aber 10 
Torpedo^Boat. 



!^ ACCOUMT OF Tfffi OUTBRKAK OF THE WAR BETOEEN JaPAM AND THE UNITED STATES 

7 December 1941 Imperial Rescript to the Conimrjider-in-Chief of the Ccnbincd 

Fleet: 
"We, by ordering this d'-spatch, delegate you to have the res- 
ponsibility of co.Tu;ianding the Canbinod Fleet, The responsi- 
bilitcs of the Combined Fleet will be extremely heavy rnd suc- 
cess or failure of the matter concerns the fate of the country. 
You have mcdo progress by urging ths achievements of Fleet-drill 
for many yec-rs, and you must be determined to meet our expecta- 
tions by exaltijig 'ini' fofcc rjid authority throughout the vrorld 
by annihilrting the enemy." 

Reply to the Empuror by the C-in-C of the Combined Fleet: 
"I was overwhoLningly impressed by the gracious Imperial Res- 
cript, at the outbrealc of the war, and 1 shall carry out his 
great orders v.dth reverence. The officers and men of the 
Combined Fleet hr.ve sworn to do their utmost and they will 
accorapli^ the aim of tl.c despatch. They €ire dctonnined to 
accept and carry out the Emperor's Commands." 

Orders from the C-in-C to the Combined Fleet: 
"The fate of our empire h?.ngs on this vicr. Each man must do 
his utmost to fulfil 1 his obligations," 

8 December 1941 The Imperial Edict .-eclrring i/ar c^gr.inst the UNITJD STATES and 

ENGLjJ© was issued. 

Imperial Rescript to the Ministers of the Army and Navy was 

received . 

Acceptance by the Minister of the Navy. 

Orders to the ilinister of the Navy and his department in general. 

Success of the ^^urprise , ttack on HAV/AII by our striking force: 



Surface Cr-ft 

Sunk: 

Seriously Damaged: 

Moderately Da'iaged: 



4 BB's, 2 Cruisers, 1 Oiler 
2 BB's, 2 Cruisers, 2 DD's. 
2 BB's, 4 Cruisers. 



Aircraft 

Seriously Darr.aged: 

Razed: 

Our Losses: 



157 Planes 
(sa..e) Hangars 
39 Planes 



At this time our southern forces started to make landings. Suc- 
cessful ones were jnade rt KOTA BlURU, SINGOilA, BATAAN, Bi^NGKOK, 
and AJBOINA. The wireless station and airfield at BASCO in the 
BaTAAN Islands north of LUZON wore occupied. At SHANGHAI, the 
British gunboat PENGUIN was sunk. The international Sett-leraent 
v/as entered. At PEICING, the Americ&n Marines laid dovvn their 
ar;iis. SINGAPORE was bombed. MIDWAY and V/nKE Islands v;ero 
bombed. CLARK. Field and IBA en LUZON were attacked. V.o have 
taken over British and American rights "nd privileges in the 
southern islands. GUAil was bombed. HONGKONG and DAVAO were 
bombed. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



555 



CONFIDENTIAL 



JICPOA Item #4986 
Page 16 



9 December 1941 V/AKE and GUAM were bombed. The American seaplane carrier LANGLEY 
was sunk (in DAVAO BAY) . An enemy sub appeared off TAKAO Harbor. 



10 December 



11 December 



15 December 

16 December 

17 December 

19 December 

20 Deccanber 



22 December 

23 December 



The resiJ.ts of our HA'.VAII Operation were the occasion for joy; 
an Imperial Rescript was presented to the Commander-in-Chief, 
Combined Fleet. A THAI-JAPANESE offensive and defensive alli- 
ance has been signed. WAKE Island was attacked. The HAYATE 
(DD) and KISARAGI (DD) were shelled and sunk. Successful land- 
ings were made at VIGAN on LUZON; we siiffered the loss of one 
sub-chaser. Occupation of GUAM completed. APARRI on LUZON also 
captured. UAKIN and TARAV/A occupied. Minesweeper #19 wecked 
off the mouth of the CAGAYAN River on LUZON. An English fleet 
was attacked off the MALAY coast, and two of the latest British 
battleships, the PRINCE OF '/VALES and the REPULSE, were sunk. 

Imperial Rescript: 
"At the very outbreak of tliis war, our Combined Fleet has displayed 
a brilliant strategy and fought bravely. At H^V.'AII it has 
heavily crushed the enemy's fleet and air strength. V/e have 
received the report of this signal achievement ourself. More- 
over, we extviiid our deepest praise to our fighting forces, 
officers and men alike. If they should strive harder and 
harder, we foresee a magnificent futui-e for our Eupiro. 

Establishraent of the ROiaE-BERLIN-TOKYO Tri-partite Pact. 
Attack on VJAKE. The results of the naval action off MALAYA 
were the occasion for joy; an Lmperial Rescript was presented 
to the C-in-C, Combined Fleet. 
"The Air Force of the Combined Fleet has crushed the mo.in force 
of the English .-^-iatic Fleet in the SOUTH CHINA SEA and has 
enhanced our fov-er and prestigo throagho^it the area. V/e are 
deeply pleased.'' 
Ansv;oi- of C-in--C. 

Declaration of war igainst AMERICA by IT/iLY and GERMi'iKY. 
Success of landing at LEGA3FE. 

1 Enemy Sub off ''""KYO Bay 

1 Encny Sub in the SUNGO CHANNEL 

3 Enemy Subs n-iar CFHiCMJIMA 

WAKE £itte.ckw;, 

10 E'-'emy jubs near CHICHIJDIA 

1 Ene-nv ub near TRUK 

3 Eneir.y -ubs at SHIO SAKI (i^J"^ ) 

The SHINONOMS was lost 15 km north of BARAM POINT while on 
patrol off MIRI . The RO-66 collided with the RO-62 tvrenty-f ive 
miles w^ni of "JAKE and sank instantly. The RO-62 suffered prac- 
tically no damage. 



WAKE bonbed. 



Dutch cubmarine near PALiiU. 



P;-JJAMA, COi;TA RICA, NIC^AGUA, HOITOUa'iS, GUnTEitLU, DO.ilNICAN 

REPUBLIC , CJ3A, U^lTl have declared vrar on JkPAK. MEXICO has 

broken ofi relations with JAPAN. 

Enemy Subm.irin£s: _ 

2-4 BUNCO Channel 
2-4 BONIN Islands 
1-2 TAr.VAN STRAIT 
2 P/iLAU 

1-2 



Near TOKYO Bay 
KII 

M/J'iCUS Islands 
HAINAN Island 
MARIANA Islands 



2-4 
3-4 
2-4 

4-5 



Successfully landed at LINGAYEN. 

Complete occupation of WAKE. Striking Force arrived at 
HASHIRA SHIMA (near KURE) . 



556 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL JICPOA Itejii R9B6 

Pa,-e 17 

25 December 1941 Surrender of HONG KONG. 

A successful surprise landing was .Ta.de it JOLO on I£[FDANAO. 

26 December The SAGIRI (DD) received a submarine torpedo attack north 

of KUCHIMG (oARAWAiO and sank._ KUCHIKG OGCUgied. 
The jS'6 Minesweeper and the U^.'YO #2 }ia.r\i\^^'V "A A) were 
surik by air banbing. 

The MJRASAiJE (DD) collided v.dth the #20 tii.nesweeper at TAKAC. 
— December Air attack at liANILA. 

1 DD, 2 SS, 10 merchant ships sunk. 
The ASAKA2E sank 1 S-S at LIKGaIEN. 

27 December The C-in-Ci of the American Army of the PH.ILIPPINiC d-.clared 

MAIJILA an open city. fiAMILA was heavily bai-bed. 



DETAILED DESCHIPTION OF GUAM (OliliAJIiiA) 
(12 December 1941) 

Installations: 

There are facilitie.s for 1 Naval St.Ation. 

There is one land air-base. There is also a seaplane base and dredging 

facilities. There is a PAA flying boat base wliichis used as a seaplane 

base. Submarine base facilities are being expanded. There are shore 

batteries. 

Naval Personnel - about 500 men. 

Army Personnel - about I6OO men. 
Supplies: 

Coal - about 6,000 tons. 

Heavy oil - thero are 6 heavy oil tanks but their capacity is not known. 

There are ammunition storehouses. 

Fresh water and provisions - small quantities. 
Others: 

APRA Harbor is suitable for protection from the islnd all year around. 

8 or 9 large warships can put in here. There are no suitable anchorages 

for other vessels. 



GUAM CCCUPaTIOK FOacE BATTLE REPORT 

The GUAM Island Occupation Forces protected the Southern Detachificnt (TN: 
Nan SHI TAIif) t^ ^f< ) and began landing at 0500 on the tenth. VWiile they 
continued mopping up activities and this force (TNj the GUAM Occupation Force) 
and the SNLF advanced to the Liiportant positions i urrounding APRA Harbor (TN: 
V^ '^ ) and occupied it caaplctoly. The en^^my lost his fighting spirit because 
of the attacks of sevoriil days previous V;* our air forces. 

Results of the Battle: 

A. We took prisoner the governor and many government employees, 
and about 200 iJarines, including their ccm.ander. 

B. There was fighting in the streets of .iGANA (TK:)''''] t^ ) . 50 
were killed, 

C. It was estimated that APRA harbor would bo cleared of mines 
and ships able to anchor within ten days. One oil tank, the 
gun batteries and powder magazines had been blown up, however, 
the oil was still burning after 3 days. 

D. A 3jOOO ton merchantman was seized. 100 kilolitres of airplane 
fuel was taken, as was much construction material (steel, baubs, 
too), 

E. The wireless and cable stations were both severely dainr.g.d and 
unfit for use. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



557 



CONFIDENTIAL 



JICPOA Item #4986 
Page 17-a 



SKBTCH ¥A? OF H/iHA SHIIIA - 2 December 1941 



26°40 




KARA SHI!i/\ 
LIT. CHIBUGA 



U.2 \ 34 ,, ^ 

100 Y nvj /;/.; ) 

^-/..v 43 A°-\0 ?l'TAGO SHIIIA 
'. .-. c:C^^-toRA SillMA 



f«JKO 
SHIiiA 



,:<:■' 



;i/\RU SHII.IA 



o 



AN3 
SHIIiA ' 



O 



IGI 
SlilliA 



n©To 
sim'A 

142° 10' E 



OKE.IJRA: 
popijlation 

1500 
Post Office 



Sleven transports were in the harbor (part of the GUAJl Occupation Force) 

HASHIRA SHE LI — f HAIIA SHIIIA 

J) ailCKI SHIIL\ 
<^ HAHA Stll'Ll, 





GUi\l.I 



H/iHA SHIM-i — >- GU.U.: 300 miles 



558 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item #4986 

Page 18 

My Opinions: 

For about 6 months before it was attacked, construction was in progress 
on GUAM: plans had been made on a larpe scale to make the island a sub base. 
Looking at the condition of the project after our occupation, I would venture 
to say th-t by strenj^thening these installations, the enemy will be unable to 
avoid damage by our(TN: submarine) forces a few months later on. 

I think the success of our occupation here was primarily due to the enemy's 
utterly deficient (defense), and then, too, the bold way in which we carried 
out our surprise attack. But I realise that, our next opseration must, at all 
costs, be begun as soon as possible. 



SUlOtARY OF V;AKE ISLAND 
27 December 1941 

Military Installations 

There is' a base for the Pan-American Ainvays flyir.g boats. Planes draw 
up alongside docks. As a base for flying boats, its value is greater than that 
of MIDV/AY. There is a v;ireless station. 
Supplies 

There are some facilities. On FEALE Island are the facilities of the Pan- 
American Airwaj^. There is an air-craft beacon, a powerplant, a hotel, ar.d p, 
wireless station. It is on the supply line v;hich runs to MIDVJAY and ti.'.7/;lJ ?nd 
(going southwest) to GUAM. 
Harbors 

As a haven from wind and waves its value is greater than that of MIDV/AY, 
Work had been proceeding on a channel v/Lich was to be 300 feet wide. At the 
entrance to thg ch?jinel, the coral re f was to be cut to a depth of 35 feet 
and on the inner side, to a depth of 30 feet (TN: This refers to the channel 
under construction at the outbreak of the v;ar. The outer channel was to be 
35 feet deep, the turning basin 30 feet deep, and the width of the channel, 
300 feet.) 

There are no anchorages in the vicinity and vessels tic up to buoys. 



OPERATIONAL SUMAHY OF TfE WAKE ISUND OCCUPATION 
28 December 1941 

1. Occupation schedxilcd for X / 4 day. (Occupation forces began operations 
after N .) (TN: Noon on X Dayj X Day - Dectanber 23 ?). 

2. Reconnaissance carried out 4 December(T-i-) by 6 flying boats O (from 22nd 

squadron (CHUTAI) headquarters) and 12 land-based aircraft (f X U ). 

3. 8 December 1000 

30 land-attack planes (f'' ) carried out, a bombing attack. (2 land planes 
( f" ) out of 9 were probably destroyed, one tank at the seaplane base (l*| 
was destroyed by fir^; 3 ^'igiiter planes ( fc ) were sighted, but they did 
not engage our aircraft.) (Japanese casualties: 1 Petty. Officer killed, 
several planes d'jnaged by shell-fire.) 

4. 9 December 0940 

A bombing attack was carried out by 26 land attack aircraft (TN: flo) 
(5 fighter planes were shot down, the north wing of the barracks was des- 
troyed by fire, part of the airfield i>i] ■) was demolished, the seaplane 
base ( li] ) radio station v;as baabed. No fljlng boats (fd) were sighted. 
Radio communications were disrupted from 1005 to 2145.) (Japanese casual- 
ties: 1 Air V.'arrant Officer killed, 1 man slightly wounded, 14 planes 
damaged by shell fire.) 

5. 10 December 2230 

A convoy of eleven merchant ships approached the south coast in a heavy 
swell. Landing operations were postponed, waatirig for an improvement in 
weather conditions. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



559 



JICPO/. Item A986 
Page 18-a 




«ft^ ® ^g«»-\D 



79716 O — 46 — pt. IS- 



IS 



560 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDENTIAL 

6. 11 December 

7. 11 December 



8. 11 December 

9. 11 December 

10. 11 DeseKber 



11, 12 December 

12. 12 December 



13. 12 December 



u. 






15. 


12 December 


U45 


16. 


13 December 


0530 


17. 


12 December 


0100 


18. 


13 Decomber 


0130 


19. 


13 December 


1010 



20. 13 December 

21. 13 December 



22. 14 December 



JKPOA Item fl*4986 
Page 19 

0645 The 'JAKE radio began transmitting to FEARL HARBOR 
(TN: "NHvi"). 

Jap casualties: The HAIAKAZE (DD) exploded and 
sank at 0452. 

The KISARAGI (DD) ej?)loded and 
sank at a531. 
The IXKGO Maru-'UfflL) was damaged by a hold fire. 
Rough weather still prevailed in the aftemo*n and 
(the landing force) decided to withdraw to K'AJALEIN 
to make further plans. At P715, 11 December, 17 
land attack planes (TK; flo) attacked the PEALE Is- 
land shore batteries . and MG positions, and were 
engaged by fighters for 30 minutes. One fighter was 
shot down. (Japanese losses: 2 land planes destroyed, 
1 reserve 1st Lieutenant, 9 petty officers, and 5 
enlisted men killed, 11 aircraft damaged by shell- 
fire, 1 man slightly wounded.) 

2330 The positions of tvjo naval craft were fixed by RDF 
in the viciiuty of 'TAKE Island (the ships w6re 
thought to be patrol craft, seaplane tenders or 
oilers) . 

2050 ^ ^ , y 27 has withdrawn from the VAKE, (attack) force 
and is joining the submarine, force. Most of the sub- 
marine force is engaged in patrolling "JAUE. 

1100 The TSUGARU (CU) and the i>:AIZURU 2nd SrJLF are standing 
by for the occupation of 'VAKE. At 0900 12 December 
(the attack group) secured from readiness and the . 
SI-ILF units re-turrned. 
The HOYO liaru^XAO) returned to RUOTTO for supplies. 

1000 CnC'iv 6 (TM: So) is to return before 16 Decsr.ter 

to RUOTTO in order to aid in the operation of the area. 

0840 26 land plan&o ( ;> .: .-.;. c-:' by Lieut. Cor.-r.znr'fiv ^iVTS'JDA) 
bombed TMS. (A warehouse and the western S'v;l;ni' 
AA gun were demolished. Two fighter pl.-j;os ei^^aged 
the attack group.) (Japanese casualties; 1 plane 
explod-J, 6 petty officers and 2 enlisted men killed, 
4 planes damaged by shell-fire.) 

An (American) naval vessel appearing at '.VJ\E radioed 
cm 14th Naval District at 0552, 0721, and 0937, 
12 December. 

The position of the American naval vessel v;hich was 
transmitting is — - nautical miles from "AKE at a 
bearinp of 115° 60'. 

The '7/iKE occupation force has arrived at RUOTTO. 
Fifteen land plaiies boinbed '"AKE with undetermined 
results. T'.vo"5 place_ flying boats (TN: ? f d x 2/5) 
bombed the airfield i^J • There was an air battle, 
(Japanese casuailties: 1 fljring boat failed to return.) 
COM Gru~iv 6 requested of Chief of Staff, 4th Fleet 
to include tho LIAIZUHU 2nd SNLF and the KIYOItA'.VA Uazny 
(;iPV) in the 'j-Jc^JL occupation force. 

A fighter-reconnaissanco plane attached to Airflot 24 
(at 5000 meters altitude) observing through a hole 
in the clouds (reported the following): One or two 
figiitcr planes in the revetments at the west side of 
the runway; no flying boats; one merchant ship carry- 
ing out unloading operations. 

1800 Cooperated with Striking Forcu (TN: KB). 

2320 The gunboat (T;;: C) group has been disbsjided. The 
"JkyjL (.occupation) force has been reinforced (TSOTO 
Maru^K^PV), KIYOrX'/A Maru->/APV), one company of the 
r.'u.lZUm SNLF, 2 DD of Jes iv 24.) 
Three 10 place flying boats (TM: f^ x 3/lO) (under 
Lieut, Commander TASHIHO) at 0137 and 30 land-based 
pianos t.t 0855 under Commander UCHINO bombed '.''AKE. 
(Direct hits were scored on the runway, rcv:;tment3 anc 
one fighter plane set afire; the vjarehouse was set on 
fire, (Japanese casualties: 11 fighters dam£.ged by 
shell-fire.) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



561 



COITIDEHTIAL JICPOA Item ,,'49b" 

Page 20 

23, 15 December I6IO 8 flying bor.ts (under the c^nmand of Lieut, Commander 

KOIZUKI) effectively bombed the barracks area in the 
northern part of the main island, 

24, 16 December 32 landrattack pianos (commanded by Lieut. ^U'J:UUSiE) 

and one fighter (at 7000 altitude) (reported the 
following): About 20 kk mobile guns, and a number 
of high-sp'.-ed torpedo boats have appeared, ( A heavy 
oil tank, .an ammunition magazine and a warehouse were 
set on fire, and the base on PEALE Island effectively 
bombed.) (Jap, casualties; 3 land-attack planes were 
damaged by shell-fire,) 

25, 17 December 1555 8 flying boats boiried the southeast section of PEALE 

Island, (Causing explosions at the AA gvin, the hotel, 
and ydreless station., 

26, 18 December 0940 Land-attack bombers (I^pe I) carried out reoormaissance, 

The southeast channel was blocked up, ^ 

27, 19 December 0845 27 land-based attack bombers bombed the airfield l?l 

on "JILKES Island. 1 fighter engaged them. The anti- 
aircraft guns on the airfield on '1LKES Island and 
one MG Unit were destroyed. (Japanese losses: One 
man killed aboard plane, 12 attack bombers (TN: 
here fid) were hit by shells. 

28, 20 December 1330 A flight of enemy patrol planes arrived (TIJ: 

SHOKAIKI). 

COKDITIOK OF THE ZMta 
(Based upon .-.erial i-econnaissance cuid sundry jitelligence r-sports) 



1. 
2, 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 



1. 



2, 



4, 



5. 

6. 



fferines 300 

Civilians imployed by the Llilitary 1000 

Dual purpose ^-uns 12 (part with mobile emplacements). 

Coast defense batteries, machine gun positions a great number. 

Fighters several 

Submarines euid torpedo-boats are lurking in the vicinity 

OUR FOHCES 

/dr Forces of the South Seas Force are carrying out bombing 
attacks day after day. 

A Submarine force (RO-6O, 61, 62) is caiTying out p>atrols 

around the island. _ _ 

Reinforcement Butai (SORYU and HIRYU) on the 20th cooperated 
in landing operations by sending their planes in to attack. 
Attacking Force ^JptJi/kV*<X 

(Flagship) YUa;RI (CL), SubRon 6i6SS).y 

Landing Force - KONGO lianJ^ KDJHYU Maruy Patrol Boats 

Nos. 32 and 33; 

Combined SI\ILF. 

SNLF Headquarters, 

1st Company (Company commanded by UCHIDA, li;.IZURB SNLF) 

2nd Company (Company commanded by TAKANO, 6th Base Force) 

3rd Company (Company commanded by ITAYA, LLAIZURU SIJLF) 
Covering Force 

TENRYU (CL) and TATSUTA (CL). 
Supporting Force 

Cru iv 6 (6S). 



PRCCEDUBE TO BE FOLLOVH) SHOULD ENEMY (SHIP) BE EIXOUl^TERED 

1. The ships which sight the enemy shall oqjend every effort to conceal our 
force by lajring smoke screens and by other means, 

2, In the event thatj_cn?my surface naval vessels approach, in accordance v.ith 
orders, the KINRYUJJaru and the patrol boats shall avail themselves of 
every opportunity to retire from the disputed aroa. 

The SubRon 6 (6SS) and the Cnf^iv 18 (18S) are to atinihilate the enemy. 



562 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL JlCPOi. Item ^4986 
Page 21 

liAINTEljANCE OF SBCHECY 

1. Limted use of radio. 

2. Light control 

3. Localizad use of lights for signalling at night and, as demanded 
bj- the situation, proper control of illuminating strength. May- 
be used to determine bearing, 

k. Throwing overboard things which vdll float in the water is strictly- 
forbidden. 
5, Disposal of bilge water which contains oily matter. 

OPERATIONS OF THE SUPPORTING FORCE 

1. On the 21st at 0800 the Force will lo.ivo UELLU Channel. The landing force 
will carry out a landing at 0200 on the sane day. The Force will proceed 
to a point about 50 miles to the oast of VJi-jCE Island and thereafter, 
shall act as the onunj' situation may warrant. 

2. "hen the attack on "'AKE gets under way, the Force shall proceed to a point 
about -50 miles to the southeast of the island and patrol in support 

(TN: of the attack). 

23 December 1030 The occupation of 'JAKE Island has been completed. 

SUMMARY OF Ttti BaTTLE 

1. Enecgr prisoners: Lt .-Colonel and his co:;imand 430 

Skilled laborers 1100 

In addition to this, many were killed and we acquired many installations, 
gun emplacements, and ammunition. 

2. Our Losses: 

Killed UCHIDA Company 9 

Seriously -'ounded 19 I-fen on Patrol Boat No, 32 

Slightly ■ founded 34 

In addition to these losses, 2 patrol boats were heavily dajnaged and 1 

plane was shot down. 

LESSONS LEiiRNED FPjDM THE B^.TTLE 

1. Vlhon we think about the lessons that may be leaned from a battle, we 
must -view it with the eyes of a critic eind to the end maintain the point 
of -view of the other side. 

2. Strive to the utmost to learn about the state of affairs of the enemy; 
though you may have exhausted every means to learn this, and you may be- 
lieve that you know enough about it, you never know enough. However, 
after you have learned about the enemy and have made thorough preparations, 
there remc>.ins onJLy the necessity for resolute action, 

3. '"hen it comes ti.v.o to o^rry out the operation, look at the situation as 
the enemy does and try to discover his weak points, 

4. Always take into account obstacles that may result from the weather (wind 
and waves, and range of vision). 

5. Do not be defeated by a multiplicity of plans, j'.ssemble similar plans 
into one whole. 

6. In the light of the battle, it is foolish to refrain from de3j.vering an 
all-out attack, 

7. The distribution of militarj' strength sho'ald be considered principally 
with regard to the cain strategy. The decision as to the tine of commence- 
ment of action must be made carefully. 

8. It is essential in an operation that the various types of aircraft be 
brought together. _ 

9. The fact that damage from accidental explosions (YUBriU) of torpedoes and 
depth charges was very great should be borne in mind. 

10, In war, the chances of success are three to seven. Out of 81 men 50 were 
killed. However, sever-il hundred prisoners ■ v;ere taken aod I'c ca;;t:irec" the 
whole island. The side that fights well the last five minutes is the 

one that wins. 

11. "/hen battle is undertaken, the leadership of the commanding officers should 
be firm. By no means, may there be any faltering, or hesitation. V/hen 
preparations have been made, action should follow. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 563 

COHFIDF,NTI/X JICPOA Item n*/t936 

Page 22 

12. Though it i3 oaey to throw away one's life by being impetuous, when once 
it is realized thr.t death is pleasant, to live and do one's duty is 
difficult. 

13. The idealist and the materialist are coraplimentary. The fallacy of 
AMERICA ivhich worships materialism has been exposed. 

lA. Leadership in battle: Inform even the engine-room hands who cnnnot see 
the enony of the situation. Exhaust all one's knowledge rjid ability 
when he is in a fatal position. 

15. Acquisition of air supremacy is necessary. However, naval vessels still 
fulfill tlisir 'ecOJ-.T _".rpose, 

16. In glorious battle, the function of the supporting force i2 a thankless 
task. 

17. Orders must be carefully considered. Once, however, they have been given, 
they should be carried out to the letter, 

18. Inventiveness and originality. The most profitable use of new weapons 
is the responsibility fo the strategist. (Believe earnestly in certain 
victory.) 

19. Since the advancement of L\ weapons is vcrj' slow we must fight planes 
with planes, and also we must destroy the base Before the enemy can rise, 

20. Importance of ir '"ascs (Bases for action). Planes must inevitably have 
bases. 

21. The capture of the isolated island by occupation operations will be com- 
paratively difficult as the whole island is a fortress; and, in addition 
to this, operating freely will be extremely difficult, 

22. There are opport'onities in battle. Seizing these opportunities wins 
victories; when one misses these opportunities he cannot win a victory 
no matter what he does, 

23. Occupation operations and subnarines. The enemy can only prove a threat 
by raerjis of its submarines. It nUst be said that if the enemy were to 
conceal even one or two submarines in the vicinity of VJAKE Island, they 
vjould be a great menace to cur operations. 

24. Operational Directions, 

(A) Combined operations (KYODO SjJCUSEIj) are not feasible, as a rule. 
If there were a Naval Specirl Landing Force of 20,000 men, landing 
operations would be easy. In combined operations there are many 
occasions where opportunities are missed for striking s.t weak points 
with force. (. JIT3U "0 MOTIE, KYO ''0 UTSU) 

(B) Insufficient military stren;;th causes uni'oreseen failure. It is 
said that the lion exhausts his entire strength even to catch one 
rabbit. _ 

(C) A force without a central unit (SKUTAI) is not possible. There is 
a need for operational leaders to amass (information). 



564 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIDErJTIAL JICPOA Item #4986 

Page 23 

THS BISIIARCK SEA OPERATIONS 
28 January, 1942 

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BISMARCK SEA OPERATIOTS: 

1. POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE (FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC): 

Foreign: In oirr war with ENGLAID and the UNITED STATES we are bringing 
to bear, as might have been expected, economic pressure and we are 
dispatching against ENGLAilD in the Orient armies of deliverance. We 
shall deliver a fatal blow against AUSTRALIA and shall carry out such 
attacks as will uproot the foundations of the British Colonial Qi5>ire 
which even now is In the process of disintegration. 

Domestic : In roading the history of the sea-girt Island Bnpire of 
JAPAN, as is natural, traces of those peerless men who ventured upon 
the seas and embarked upon adventures abroad are not lacking. Though 
it may be said that it v/as the WAKO (TN: A band of pirates who roamed thi 
seas of CHINA and KOREA during the ASHIKAGA period) who revealed the 
spirit of the Japanese nation by hoisting the ancient flag inscribed 
"HACHUJAN, GREAT EODDHI-SATVA" (TN: HACHDJU^ is the God of 'Jar in the 
Japanese pantology; BODDHI-SATVA is the BUDDHA-ELECT) and crossing 
the seas, the TOKUGAVJA's closed the country for the long period of 
three hundred years (TN: I638-I867) and the overseas expansion 
dissolved into nothingness like a dream. The delusion of national 
isolation was finally destroyed. Though it may be said that great 
strides forward were made during the period of UEIJI, it was a period 
of self-examination and development. During the TAISHO era we saw the 
nation carried away by the tide of international liberalism and 
effiminate ideals of poace. Retrenchment was a mistake. 

The present invasion, hov/ever, will awaken a billion people. 
Our confidence is unshaken and v;e proceed with the conviction that we 
shall smash through the strong points of the enemy by this southern 
advance and that we shall bring the campaign to a most successfiil 
conclusion. We shall spare not the slightest effort, 

2. ECONOIIC SIGNIFICANCE: 

The resources of NEW GUIIffiA have not yet been exploited. The mining 
industry, especially in the production of gold, is well-known. There 
are fisheries. Being an intermediate trading place, its future 
possibilities as a relay base for transportation and communications 
are enorrious. 

3. MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE: 

a. A stronghold from which aggressive offensives may be launched. 

It cuts the most advantageious South Pacific line of 
the American offensive strategy against JAPAN — HAV/AII, HOCIAND 
ISUND, SmOk, FIJI, SOLOi;ON ISLAiroS, and BISliARCK ARCHIPEUGO. 

b. From the standpoint of defense, it is a buttress against 
invasion. 

It presents a powerful defensive front aigainst the south. 

c. A base from which to carry out blockade; 

The sea routes which bind AUSTRALIA to ASIA will lie within 
bombing range of ovir planes. The shipping lanes, bays and ports 
which lie beyond bombing range may be threatened by our sub- 
marines based in ■'..•.' rrj-. ,.^. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 565 

COMFIDSNnAL JICPOA Item H^i^o 

Page 24 

STRENGTH CF TH3 ATTACKING FORCSS; 

1. NAVY: 

a. Striking and Holdi.ng Fleet (TN: KAKIJCTO- KAKTAl) : 
l&dn Units: 

liineDiv 19 (OKINOSHIUA Flagshla, TSUGARU, TJ3JY0 kARU, 

uogaiiigav:a uxsm)w 

SubT.on 6 (YUB/JII Flagship); 

DefiTiv 29 (OITji; Flagship, ASAflAGI and TOMAGI); 

Dea'iv 30 (MJTSUKI Flagship, YAYOI and liOCHIZUKI); 

KIYOKAWA (.%'') i^- ) , KONGO :.i-.-,5th Gun- 

boat Squadron, 14th iHnesweeper Squadron, and 
Submarine-chaser Dlv 56. 

Supporting Units: 

CmDiv 18 (TEllRYTJ Flagship, TaTSUTA); 

DesDiv 23 (KIKUTSUKI Flagship, UZUO and YUZUKI). 

KINRYU ,1-1 (TN: i ^ff. ^ ) 

MAIZURU 2nd SNIF 

HIROSHDU Naval Landing Force, one con^iany. 

b. Air Forc'js at TRUK: 

YOKOILUlv Naval Air Group (14 flying boats); 

CHITOSE Naval iVir Group (9 fighters and 18 medium 
attack bombers). ■ 

e. Indirect Guard Forces: 

Supporting Force— -6th Fleet; 

TRUK Area Guard Force; 

SAIPAN Area Guard Force; 
Cooperating Forces: 

Car'iiv 1 

§^i#3'(half) 

2. ARUY: 

Commander-in-Chief of South Seas Detachment: i&Jor-General 

SORII Toiaitaro, 

Infantry 144th Regiment; 

Cavalry 3rd Conpany; 

Ifourrtain Gun Troops 1st Battalion; 

Engineers—— 1st Compare; 



566 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item #4986 

Page 25 

Commissary 2nd Company; 

Mobile Field AA 1st Coiapaiiy; 

(The above all from the 55th Infantry Division). 

(TN: In the original, this to "Navy and Army", is ruled through and 
marked "not permissible".) 

ESTQIATE OF THE ENEI.iY IN THE BI3iAi?CK AR2As 

1. Surface Vessels; 

a. Australian Fleet; 

2 heavy cruisers, 3 light ciniisers, a few other ships. 
Location not clearly known. 

b. Anglo-/jnerican Fleet; 

5 battleships, 2 carriers, 4 heavy cruisers, unknown na-nber of 

destroyers. It is not known whether or not they will engage 

in battle (TK: RklKO ^^ f^- ). 

2. Aircraft: 

Several flying boats; several torpedo-bonibers , Airfield. 
Total planes, all types: about 50 (British and Australian). 
Total fl^in- boiits: under 50 (American). 

3. Submarines : 

There is as yet no inforaation concerning the situation of enemy 
submarines. There is a great possibility that American sub- 
marines have gradually imde their way west, '"'e assume, too, 
that British and Dutch submarines have made an appearance in 
the BISMilRCK Saa Area. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 567 

CONFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item #4986 

Page 26 

IMPORTANT POINTS ABOUT RABAUL 

29 January 1942 

I. MILITARY AFFAIRS; 

1. Air Fields (TN: 1^ ): RABAUL and VUIIAKAJjAU 

2. Defenses: Volunteer Defense Army (1 rifle coupany; 

1 MC- platoon). Roving Pati-ols (JUNKEITAI 
^^ f>fi. ) abput 172. 
Australian soldiers: About 500 
Batteries: Under construction at 

3 places. 

3. Security: 20 miles outside the harbor guard by planes. 

Outsiders forbidden to approach the air field 
and at night the movements of the Japanese 
are watched. 

II. ESSEHTIALS OF GO'/ERtJlvENT; 

"Territory of KE'.' GUINEA" Government Offices, Customs House, Law Courts 
Pojst Office, Vttreless Station, Prison, Hospital. 

III. POPUIaTION: 

Urban Areas about 4,000 

If nearby villsgos are included: about 12,500 

Of which are: 

Natives 10,300 (majority KICRONESL'JJ) 
""nites 1,000 

Chinese 1,200 

Japrjiese 25 

IV. CONDITIONS OF THE HARBOR: 



1. It is easy for a formation to enter the harbor. 

2. The body of water which lies north of an east-west line drawn through 
DAVfAPIA Rocks has a length of approximately 2 miles and a maximum 
breadth of 1.5 miles. Mud bottom. Depth of the water is from 84.1 — 
100 metres, but the northern half is 47 metres or less in depth. The 
anchorage for warships is, for the most ;5art, between 10.9 and 31»5 
metres in depth while the anchoraf,e for merchant shipping is 36.5 
metres deep. 

3. Berthing capacity for the harbor is 5 CruDivs. 

4. It affords excellent shelter. 

5. "fhenever there in a steady south-cast wind blowing strongly, the 
southern heilf is bound to be rough. 

6. Sea-defense is easy. 



568 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

COM='IDENTIAL JICPOA Item #4986 

Page 27 

METEOROLOGICAL INFOBliATION ABOUT THE RABAUL AREA 

(31 January 19h2) 

1. GENERAL 

Two periods are distinguished — i that of the northwest seasonal wind 
which extends from December to April and that of the southeast seasonal wind 
which extends from April to November. 

In the winter, the northeast tradewinds of the northern hemisphere are 
constantly blowing, part of which cross the equator and penetrate into the 
southern hemisphere, '''hsn the northwest seasonal winds begin, the southeast 
seasonal wind gradually recedes v.ith the fall of the southern hemispheric 
high pressure. It is believed that, about January, the area of variable 
winds at the cndo of the noriii and south air fronts (TN: doldrum area) 
passes over the fcABAUL region. As a consequence, the weather in this area 
is generally uncertain. 

2. SPECIAL C!-1ARACTBRISTICS OF THE YEATHER 

(a) Land and sea breozes are conspicuous. 

However, they rarely exceed an altitud* of 500 metres and their area 
are generally restricted to about 10 miles including inland and sea, 

(b) Windless Nights, 

It is said that this phenomenon is nore conspicuous during clear weather 
than during cloudj- woather. 

(c) Daily change of atmospheric pressure. 

The atmospheric pressure, as in the case of the inner South Seas shows 
a regular daily change. laaxL'uura highs are at 0900 and 2200 while maxi- 
mum lows are at O^iOO and 1600. 

(d) Amount of Rainfall, 

January has the her.vie'jt rainfall of the year, /in average amount of 
oVer 400 mm. of rain fall, 

(e) "find. 

In January, southerly winds are slightly more numerous, 355^ while 
northerly winds rire soraeirtiat fewer - 305?. 

However, in February, the southerly minds are reduced to 20^ while nortl^ 
erly winds are increased to 40?!. Judging from this in January, the 
winds alternate north and south with this area as the center of the 
doldrums region while in February the doldrums line has moved south. 

3. WEATHER FORaCASTING 

Judging from various conditions: 

(a) In the case of a northwecterly \6.nd, heavy rains accompanying 
sudden squalls. -Teather generally bad and continuing for several 
days. 

(b) In the case of a southeasterly wind: 

"Jinds are generally light, "feather in this region probably good, 

(c) In the case of the doldrums line s?Jiie as paragraph (Ji), 
V/eather bad and uncertain. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 569 

COKTIDEKTIAL JICPOA Item #4986 
Page 28 

RESULTS OF THE "R" CAMPAIOJ 
(At tho boginning of the landings - 0000 on 23 January 1942) 

0025 Succeeded in unloading at KAVIEMG without mishap. Met no resistance, 

0415 Occupied the airfield in the town. The city streets were razed by the 

fires the enemy had started. The telegraph office and all its installa- 
tions were smashed. Completed sweeping the anchorage for mines. 

1400 Occupied VMAK/'iNAU; enemy resistance there. Captured 17 foreigners at 
NE"f HANOVER; many heavy and light machine guns, rifles, Jimmunition and 
weripons ;vore also confiscated. No defense installations at ttiSUATA. 
The mopping up on CREDNER Island is finished, 

0250 Town of &i£AllL has been completely occupied. There was a counter-attack 
by enomj' planes. ''?e have surrounded and are attacking the enemy in the 
"FaLAUR Sector. The inhabitants of (RABAUL)have all flod. Apparently 
all the Japanese residents there had beun tsransportcd to SIDNEY on the 
14th. 100 prisoners taken. 6000 bombs and 60 drums of plane fuel were 
also captured. Our losses were one carrier-ba^ed torpedo bomber and one 
carrier-based bomber; The Army lost 14 dead and 15 wounded. 



OUTLII\iE OF THE S.N.L.F. LiJlDIl«; 
31 January 1942 
at YSABEL PnSSi^CE 
Flag signals from the commander (SHIREIKAN); 

Clean out the area along tlie shore near the anchorage. 
I. The Gbjects of the operation. 

A. Hostile persons (deserters, recalcitrant white men, etc.) 

B. Enemy installations (wireless, gun, rifle installations, etc.) 

II. Area to be deemed Out. 

The Morth shore of mn HANOVER Island is to be covered rrom 150°20» 
E. Long, eastward to 150°28' fi. Long, in sectors of two minutes longitude 
each. Our ships are to cover these sectors in reverse numerical order, 

III, The dispatched SNLF n 

Four platoons commanded by a company commander aboard each ship (1 V/O 
or above, 10 rated and non-rated men in each platoon); one command pla- 
toon; total personnel, 60 or less. 

IV. Landing Boats (HAKENTEI) 

They shall be armed, shall move along shore in pace vdth the progress 
of the SNLF, and shall stand ready to do signalling and any sudden mustering. 

V. Dress 

'The usual SNLF battle outfit will be worn. 

VI. Unless there are special orders to the contrary, the landing boats will 

leave their ships at 0700 on 1 February. They shall have returned by 1500, 



570 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONPIDEHTIAL JICPOA Item #4986 

Page 29 

CONDinCN OF THE SHORffi AIID ANTriORAGBS tJF ISA^ PASSAGE 

U February 19/t2 

From what we saw v;ith our glasses, the entire island (NEV/ HANOVER) was one 
large, dense jungle, upon which no axe had made itu mark since time began. 
Here and there alonj' the shore, howevor, were human habitations. The mode of 
living v;as not altogether strange; indeed, the general aspect was Occidental. 
I was surprised at the blackness of ths natives. Only a piece of cloth was 
wrapped about their loins. In general, they were resting in an absent-minded 
fashion, as if they didn't know the meaning of work. There was one man among 
them scratching his head just lilce a monkoy. They would crawl about when 
changing their positions. Their behavior approached that of an animal. 

At TSOI KOTO we spotted about twenty natives gathered together. Two or 
three persons stood in the center, surrounded by the others. The;- all seemed 
to be discussing something. Or cist they were surprised at our anchoring and 
had called a meeting. 

Living things ws^ _ o.-ei-yiihere. "'e saw only drooping trees soreading out 
their leafy branches. If we could have penetrated to the depths of tlie jungle, 
we would surely hsve seen many strfinge tilings. 

At TSOI KOTO an' Australian r.ianaged a plantation. He had a wostern-style 
house. 

The natives used a "cc.noc" in movinf: about on the water. 

The water's depth at our anchora-^o \v;-.s ;'.bout 15 metres. There was a shallow 
spot 10 metres deep, however. The bottom was sandy. 

The island had yet to bo exploited c.t all; but with the coming of our 
countrymen in the future, I bolicvo it will be gre.^tl;' developed. 



SAL;:CA-Li2 OPmiTIOMS: 

10 February 1942 

" LAE " 

Although there is no place vtiich cm be caJ.lcd a natural harbor, buildings 
and air fiold installitions I'lpvc been ^jt up; there are docks '.vheri^ 3ta--going 
vessels can tie up, and on calm days liners can put in there, lioreover, this 
harbor is equipped with 10-ton cranes md lighters with a capacity of 4000 tons 
and these transport and unload cargoes on ships which are bound for (TN: or 
are coming from) the SOLO-ION Isl:-'^'^.::. 

" SALAtiOA " 

Because this harbor is the port of entry to HORODE and "GOLDFIELD" (TN: ?) 
it is also called NEIT GOLDFIELD HARBOii. As a result of the harbor construction 
of 1926 there is a good harbor ";hioh affords shelter of various depths of water. 
Ships anchor about 550 metres off-shoro; although small-type vessels can approach 
the shore inside the harbor and drop anchor Uiere is nothing of p.^-rticular impor- 
tance vit present in the way of harbor facilitie.';. 

(TN: The next few lines ■vcro marked "Not Pei-mitted" in original document.) 



1. Forces occupying the Si ^roa; • 

Flag Dcsfion 6; Dcsgorv 6; Minoswe-p';r Division 14; KIYOKAV«A toru-tAP\^j 
TSUGARU (CIJ); TEJnCO •Haru; KII-'RYU KI .ru "OCCL); KONGO Maru i^ffiL); KOKAI U 
{^ l^ itff Bth Base Force (TN: Bg) SNLF. 



2. Supporting Forces (SHIEN BUTAI) 

Flag CraOiv 6; CruDiv 6; CruDiv 18; DocRon 23; TOHO liaru (XAO).^ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 571 

COMFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item jtk^Qb' 

Page 30 

3. Submarine Forces 

Flag SubRon 7; SubRon 7. 

k. Land Based Air Forces 

Flag Airflot 24; Airflot 2k', OBORO 

5. Carriers-based Air Forces 

Captain, dHOHO (CV); SHOHO (CV); HOKAZE (DD). 

Conditions of the Enemy: ' 

1. The Volunteer Defence Forces of the eneny in this area consist of 2 rifle 
companies and 1 machine gun platoon. 

2. The enemj- air forces are based at LAE and SALAMOA and they are in close 
communication with PORT MORESBY and TW/IJESVILLE while operating in the RABAUL 
Area (TN: "R" Area). 

There are less than 10 planes for each baa« aod their activity is not very 
lively; they fly in mobile deployment in eaoh place, however, and it will 
he difficult to wipe them out, 

3. We doubt that the American striking force vdll restore its operations in 
the SOUTH SEAS Area and there is only a possibility that they will strike 
in this area. 



PORT MORESBY (TN: UO) 

Operations and Disposition of Strength 15 May 1942 

(TN: In the origfnal document the following lines were crossed out and labeled 
"Not Permissible".) 

Central Unit (SHUTAI) 

Flag 4 Fleet KASHIMA (a) TOKr.'A (CM) YUNAGI (DD) SEISEN Maru (LPV) 

MORESBY Striking Force 

Flag CruDiv 5 (TN: 5S) (Minus the NACHJ) CarDiv 5 (Sf) DesDiv 27 
DesDiv 7 (dg) (minus 1 DD) T0H0>4ILaru (XAO or APV) 

MO Occupation Forces: 

Flag CruDiv 6; CruDiv 6; DesRon 6 (minus the 1 DD of DesDiv 23); SHOHS; 
DesDiv 7 (only 1 DD): SubDiv 21; Minesweeper 20; CruDiv 18lTSUGARU 
(CM); KAMIKA'VA Maru<<XCVS);'pY0KA7;A Air Group; KOEI KanvT^ ^ ^ ); 
i'lZUMASAK Mani»<|^J, ^_); GOYO M£'.ru v(^ 'ii i^/ ) ;■ OSHHU (-^.R) irii^' )', 
HOYOMaruy^ •;*.«.); IRO (;.0) {Xj /^ )', '^' 

TULAGI Occupation Operations 

Flag UinDiv A9; MinDiv 19 (TSUGARU) and TOKT'A (CM) ); DesDiv 23 I DD; 
SHOEI Maru>/j§^- ^A.^. 

Submarine Forces: 

Flag SubRon 7; SubRon 7 (minus SubDiv 21). 

Surface Escort Unit 2 (T/J), 

Flag Escort Unit 23 Surface Escort Unit (TAI) 2» 



572 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIDEMTIAL - JICPOA Iteir. #/.986 

P.-Ge 31 

Conditions of the ^ea^t 

1. A,-,erican Air Forces in tho Australian Area presumably 200 planes 

(1st line), 

2. It appears that considerable strength is concentrated in the PORT DAK/IM 
and T0:fflSVILL3 sectors. 

3. There is no information about the A crican Strikin,-: Force since (TN: their 
arrival), but there is a great possiblility that they are becoming stronger 
in this area. 

4. Ljoreover it appears that the British U-z.v/ has dispatched a force composed 
of 2-3 cruisers and some destroyers vdth a battleship as main strength to 
the Australian area. 

5. Although submarine activities have rot been very lively, submarines still 
exist in the riADAUL area. 

6. Transportation of materiel for AUSTTtALIA. Transportation by plane is 
becoming gradually more active, 

7. Since the activity of eneny reconnaissance planes has increased, it has 
become dj.fficult to conceal our plans from themj security precautions are 
particularly important. 

8. It has become necessary to take especially strict AA precautions. 



DEVjXOR.aiT OF THE CORAL SEA BATTLE 

Outline of Battle of 4th Fleet. 

On 4 iiay information concerning the enemy striking force (TN: KB) which 
had attacked TULAGI was not "cry clear. On 6 i'ay at 0830 a YOKOK.UL'x ilir 
Group (T1.': HAli/JCU) search plane discovorad an enemy force composed ofi CV, 1 
BB, 2 cruisers and 5 DD at SI50 55' E158° 35' proceeding south. This was out- 
side our radius of attack and ab.ut O9OO contact with the enemy was lost, Ag 
a result while the ilORESBY (UO) Striking Force (KB) was preparing for enemy opera 
tions, the IDRESBY (LIO) Occupation force acted in accordance with established 
plans (A shipping group left RABAUL (RR) at 1600 on 4 llay). 

On 7 -iay at 0600 5 enemy carrier-based planes and at 0622 35 carrier-based 
planes, attacked in the area assigned to the IIORESBY occupation force, Reconnaia 
sance planes of the CruDiv 6 at O64O sighted 1 BB, 1 CV, 2 cruisers and 7 W 
proceeding north at a point S12° 15' 3154° 30', Later, at OcIO it was announced 
that there were 2 CV. At 0558 patrol-attack planes of the MORESBY Striking 
Force sighted a force v/hioh included a ship resembling an aircraft carrier at at 
a point SI50 55' 31570 50'. The pianos i;cnt to destroy tho enemy force with its 
entire strength, Hovfevor, a tanker was recognized to the right (this ship was 
bombed by part of thj planes j he.^vily managed and sunk). The 'IJfiESBY Striking 
Force (MOlffl) hurried touarr! tlic eneijy in the west, 

O7OO: The I'JORESBY Occupation Force (TM: "UO" - KORYAKU BUTAI) has 
withdrawn its shipping group (TN: S^iiDAIl) to the northvfest and it is continuing 
strict AA precautionary measures. 

0920 : 52 miles bearing 59° from DEBOYNE approximately 60 enemy 
carricir-based bombers an^ fighters attacked us. They concentrated a torpedo and 
bombing attach on tho Sti(XiQ{C'\f) . CruDiv 6 (6S) mustered all available force and 
tried to protect the SIIOHO but she had been hit by more than 3 torpedoes and 6 
bombs. She fought bravely until the voiy last and at 0935 she sank. 

The Occupation Forces prepared for a second attack by the oncn^y and with- 
drew to tho north for a vfhile. The main force (TN: SHUTAl) retired to the north 
to avoid an air attack. 

1500: Thvj SA7..V":::i (DD)_whilc preparing for a counter attack at 
night picked up survivors of the SHOHO. 

1244: Land-based attack-planes from tho Base Air Force attacked thi 
enemy Striking Force (TN: Enemy "KB"), sank 1 battleship, and heavily dajnaged 
1 battleship. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 573 

CONFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item #4986' 
Page 32 

The MORESBY Striking Force planned to attack at dusk and at 1^20 15 carrier 
based attack and bombing planes were sent out, but we did not locate the enemy 
because of a sudden squeill over the target area. VJhile searching for the enemy 
in that vicinity we were attacked by enemy carrier-based fighters which came from 
the clouds and we engaged in an air battle with them. On the way back (TNi to the 
base) one gmupdCHI BU) of carrier-based bombers discovered the enemy Striking 
Force (TN: "KB") in a squall at 13° South 154° 14' East at 1700, but it could not 
attack them on account of the squall and darkness. At 2010 the planes returnfed 
and landed. 7 planes failed to return. At about "1800 traekir.g planes lost con- 
tact with the enemy and the enemy's movements bectoe urifaifl^n to us. The distance 
between us and the enemy was about 300 miles and the ftig^t battle stopped. At 
dawn on the 8th the attack was resumed and the day for the occupation of PORT 
HDRESBY was postponed until X plus 2 days. 

CruDiv 6 (TN: 6s) and 2 DD (TN: 2 D) were added to the MDRESBY Striking 
Forces, 

On the 8th at 0622 reconnaissance planes from the SHOKAKU (CV) sighted an 
enemy striking force con?»8ed of 1 battleship, 2 carriers, 3 cruisers, and 6 des- 
troyers at 14° 30' South 154° 40' East. The MDRESBY Striking Force dispatched an 
attack unit at 0730, At this time CruDiv 6 (TN: 6S) 100 nautical miles southwest 
of SHORTLAND Islands, was attempting to refuel from the IRO (AO) when patrol 
planes of the 11 Air Fleet (TN: 11 AF) reported that their and our striking forces 
were fighting. The ships stopped refuelling immediately and were ordered to join 
the CruDiv 18 and the DesBon 6 (TN: 6 Sd) and advance southward at full speed in 
order to cooperate with our striking force (TN; KB). 

At 0930 we attacked the enemy carriers of the SARATOGA Class and YORKTO'TO 
Class. We hit the SARATOGA Class ship with more than 9 torpedoes and 10 bombs 
and we hit the YOHCTCCTN Class ship with more than 3 torpedoes and 8 bombs. 
Definitely sjjink. In addition wc scored torpedo hits on 1 battleship. 

From 0856 to 1020 more than 60 enemy carrier-based planes attacked the 
UOHSSBY Striking Unit 3 times. They scored 3 bomb hits on the SHOKAKU (CV) and 
8 noar aisses. I^ ^*^8 impossible to take off or land because fires broke out. 
It left the battle area. 

At 0830 land-based search-attack planes sighted 1 BB, 2 cruisers and 4 DD 
of the enemy at 13° South and 149° East. Although we contacted them we could 
not dispatch an attack unit with the Base Air Force because of rain the the 
VUNAKANAU Area. 

At this point we had to take into consideration the condition of the enemy 
surface forces and the difficulties of protecting transport groups with carriers 
against enengr land-based planes. We have postponed the occupation of PORT MORESBY. 
The group (TN: transport group) will return to RABAUL, 

Itoreovor, in consideration of the fuel situation, etc., the Striking Force 
was ordered at 1300 to stop the attack and to go tiorth. The MORESBY main force 
(SHUTAI) aleo reversed its course and went to fuel. Thus, while the MORESBY op- 
erational force (SAKUSEN BUTAI) was prepariiig for the enemy striking force (KB) 
the order was issued to fall into position to help the occupation of the NAURU 
and OCEAN Areas. At 2045 the C-in-C of the Combined Fleet issued an order to 
strike to the utmost to £mnihilate remaining units of the enemy force. 

The MORESBY Striking Force (MOKB), the CruDiv 6, 1 DD, Desfton 6, and the sea- 
plane scouting squadron (SUITEITAI) were ordered to expedite fueling and to make 
attack preparations. 

On the 9th most of the float reconnaissance planes fitim the DEBOYNE base, 
acting in concert with the Base Air Forco in reconnoitering the enemy searched in 
the l«gton to the south. The MORESBY Occupation Force also set out to search for 
and pursue the remainirig enemy forces but was unable to follow the movements of 
the enemy. 



574 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIDENnAL JICPOA Item )i'4986 

Page 33 

Results of the Engagement 

1. Enemy Strength 

(a) 2 BB, 2 cruisers, 4 DD 

(b) 1 BB, 2 CV, 3 cruisers, 6 DD 

(c) 1 AO, 1 DD 

2. Sunk and Damaged 

7 May: 1 large type tanker (about 20000 tons), 1 DD sunk almost 

certciinly. 

8 May: 1 CV, SAIU.TOGA Class. Sinking confirmed. 

1 CV, YORKTOWN Class. Sinking corXirmed. 

1 BB (Class not certain). Set afire and made to release 

heavy oil by a torpedo. 

1 Cruiser (Class not certain). After receiving a torpedo fi^an 

a carrier-based attack plane, exploded, caught afire and 

listed. 
(The above results were obtained by CarDiv 5 and an air group (fg). 
7 May: 1 BB of CALIFORNIA Class sunk. 

1 BB of I'fARSPITE Class. Heavily damaged. 

1 CA of CANBERRA Class. Heavily drjnaged. 
(The above results were obtained by the Base Air Force.) 

3. Planes Shot Down (2 Ma£ - 8 May ) 

Ship-board fighters - 58 plumes 
T^rpe unknovm - 8 

aiipboard bombers and :.ttack planes - 32 
TOTi'iL - 98 (10 not positive) 

4. Remaining Strength 

(a) 1 BB (heavily damaged); 2 Cruisers (1 heavily damaged); 4 DD. 

(b) 1 BB (medium damage); 3 Cruisers (1 medium damage); 6 DD, 



COMBAT LESSONS FROla THE "JAR FOR GREiVTER K,'.ST ASIi^i 
SECTION I - AN OUTLINE OF IIi?ORTA^:T BATTLES 
CHAPTER I. First Sea Battle of the SOLaiON Islands. 

1. (A) Forces which participated: 

Flagship (TN:P ): CHOKAI (CA); CrdDlT 6 
(Flagship (TN:f ): AOBA (CA), KAKO_(CA), KINUGASA (CA), FURUTAKA ( 
Flagship (TN:}' ): TEKRYU (CL), YUBARI (CL), YUKAZE (DD) . 

(B) Enemy Forces: 

9 CA; 1 CL (TN: CXI); 6 DD's. 

2. Developments; 

(A) On the 7th at O.V35 the TULAGI Communications Base reported that an 
enemy striking force accompanied by an occupation force had begun 
landing operations at TULAGI and at GUADALCANAL. Our forces have 
therefore decided to penetrate their anchorage and annihilate then. 

(B) On the 8th at 2100 a search-attack plane with flares took off fron 
the ships, 

(C) 2120: Commanding Officer formed a single column with his ship at 

the head and moved to the attack. 

(D) At 2246 and at 2250: Sighted enemy destroyers sailing individual 

courses away from us but in order to conceal our plans we 
avoided being seen by the enemy and so passed them without 
action. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 575 

CONFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item #/»986 

Page 34 

(E) 233I: "All forces, Attack", was ordered; Course 120°, Speed: 

26 knots. 

(F) 2337: Sifted ACHILLES type enemy ship to the Northeast. 

CHOKAI fired torpedoes. 

(G) Thenceforth, each ship made a surprise torpedo attack on the enemy- 
ships which were making a rendezvous. By 2350 we had blown up and 
sunk (or attacked and sunk) 3 cruisers (TN: CX 3) and 1 destroyer. 

(H) After the FURUTAKA torpedoed and sank a large typ^ enwsy d6»tPoy«r 
at 2346 she was dangerously close to. colliding with a large damaged 
enemy cruiser but she changed her ciaorse by porting her rudder and 
torpedoed and sank said- large c^uiaer. fflie beo-jne- separated 
from the ship next ahead and proceeded with the YUBARI aind the 
TENHYU. 

(.1) After wo split to the Bast and West the CHOKAl (CA) and CfuDiv 6 
(minus the FURUT/JvA), which made up the Eastern Itoit, shelled and 
torpedoed the enemy h cruisers and ^ DD's newly sighted to the 
Horth. 'I'he FURUT;JCA, TENRYU, and YUBARI, which made up the 'Yestern 
Unit, shelled the enemy. The two groups, cooperating, attacked 
from both sides and by 0012 they had completely destroyed the 
enemy. 

(J) YUNAGI (DD) torpedoed and sarjc an eneny cruiser at 2355. Consid- 
ering the movements of the YUB/JU she executed a turn- at- a verj' great 
angle. Because she vas exceptionally far removed from the main 
force she reversed (Tl'J: made a complete turn), and continuing to 
battle vath one enemy destroyer, withdrew by herself. 

(K) On the 9th at 0200: In order to withdraw from the sphere of cnomy 
bombing, the whole force received orders to withdrav*. 

3. Results of the Battle: 

Blown up and sunk: 2 CA, 1 CL (TN: LCxl), 1 DD, 

Attacked and sunk: 1 CA (by torpedo), 2 CA (by torpedo and gunfire), 

2 CA, 6 DD. 
Damaged: 1 CA (by torpedo), 2 DD. 

CH/.PTER II. 12 November. The Third (sic) Sea Battle of the SOLOMONS Islands. 

1. Forces which participated: 

1 BetDiv {Ttii "US") (Flagship (TN: US) HIEI (BB) and the KIRISHIMA 
(BB) bombarded the airfield on GUviDALCAN;!. . 

CruDiv 10 (TN: "lOS) (TN: written a second tL-ne and crossed out) (Flag- 
ship (in: r ) NAG/Olfi .D'e^iT 61 (TN: 61 dg) (TERUTSUKI) DcsDlv 16 
(TN: 16 dg) Divisional Command (TN: P* ? ) YUKIKaZE and the «iL.TSUIJ.ZE 
DesOlv 6 (TN: 6 dg) (AKATSUKI, IK;^UCHI and the IN^iUlLO screened the 
firing units (SH'.GEKITAI) . 

DesRon 4 (TN: 4Sd) D*«)iv 9 (TN: 9 dg) (Flagship: £Wit^J Aa.GUMO) 
DftaBiv 2 (TN: 2dg) Divisional Command {TU: f* ?) MUH-'.S.>lffi, SnMID/Jffi, 

ruD^cHi, h.;rus;jje. 

Minesv/eeping and protection for the advance. 
Det^iv 27 (TN: 27dg) (Division Command (TN: A* ) .SIO-GDiffi, SHIRi.TSUYU, 
r.nd the lUGURE.) Protecting GU.J)jMCA1;AL and the RUSSELL Islands. 

Enemy forces: 

LUNGA Area: 4 CA 

2 CL 

7 DD 

6 Torpedo Boats {W: Tx^). 
TULi.GI Area: 3 CA 

2 DD 

1 Torpedo Boat (TN: GYORAITEI X 1) 

2, Developments: 

(A) O83O. A B-17 flying from the south came- in contact with BatDiv 11 
but was driven off by fighters of CarDiv 2 (TN: f c ) . 

2sf 



79716 O — 46 — pt. 13 14 



576 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item #4986 

Page 35 

(B) At about sunset a Type Zero float reconnaissance plane from the 
HIEI (BB) sighted so ne 10 enemy vessels anchored at GUADALCANAL. 

(C) 2312: Unable to find the enemy even by taking a firing course 

of 130°. 

(D) 2343: The YUDACHI and the HIEI sighted the silhouettes of severa 

enemy ships and charged with full force and began to battl 

(E) The Screening Force (CHOKUEI TAI) and the Firing Force (SHAGEKI TA 
fired guns and torpedoas at the enemy from his west flank. The 
YUDACHI (DD) conformed with this and doubled the attack from the 
dast and one a^ter another we blew up and sank the enemy. 

On account of this the enemy gradually retreated to the north; par 
of the Screening Force (CHOKUEI TAI) and the Firing Force (SHACEKI 
TAI) swept the enemy from the seas firing torpedoes and guns in 
succession. _ 

(F) The laopping-up dnit, before going ahead, fell behind (KORAKU) when 
the main force had iraneuverud to retire to the north of SAVO Islaxi* 
It came up almost abreast with the main force but passed astern of 
the main force at the south side of SAVO Island and went to the 
north side of the island. It cooperated with the Screening Force 
and part of the Firing Force causing the annihilation of the enemy 
forces remaining. 

(G) From 2350 to 0034 we destroyed the major part of the enemy power 
in the area and we then withdrew to the Horth. 

3. Results of the Battle: 

Sunk (by torpedoes): 3 Heavy Cruisers (TN: Ca x 3) 

1 Light Cruiser (TN: Ca x 1) 
Sunk (by gunfire): 2 Heavy Cruisers (TN: Ca x 2) 

1 Light Cruiser (TN: Ca x 1) 

3 Hestroyors (TN: d x 3) 
Severely Da-iaged: 2 Heavy Cruisers (TN: Ca x 2) 

5 Destroyers (W.': d x 5)(sank later) 

1 Torpedo Boat (TN: t x 1) (sank later) 
Medium Damage: 2 Destroyers (TO: d x 2) (sank later) 

1 Destroyer (TN: d x l) 

CHAPTER III. 14 November. The Third Sea Battle of the SOLCM(»I Islands. 

1. Forces which participated: 

CpuElv 4 (TN: 4S) (Flagship (TN: 1^ ) ATAGO, TAKAO, KIRISHBIA; bombarded 

the airfield on GUADALCANAL. 

CBuCiv 10 (Flagship (TN:P ) NAGARA and the Squadron Command (?) (TN:)^ 

SHIRAYUKI, HATSUYUKI, S/iMIDAHE, INAZU1.'JI. 

DesRon 4 (Flagship tod Squadron Command (TN:t^'* ) the ASAGUMO. 

DeeDiv 6i (TN: 61 dg) (division command (TN: p* ) TERUTSUKI, Protection 

(TI'J: screen) for the Firing Forces. 

DesRon 3 (TN: 3 sd): (Flagsliip ( TN: f ) SENDAI ^CU ) 

DesDiv 19 (TN: 19 dg) Division Command I.TN:F* ) the URAWAMI, the AYANAM 

and the SHIKIN.\UI. Clearing the course for other ships. 

Enemy Strength: 

4 BB, 2 CA; and 4 DD. 

2. Developments: 

(a) According to various intelligence reports from the planes of the 
S-'.NYO Maru (XCVS) and other sources we expected to eD0ounte9 «-vtm 
enemy force, it 1940 we withdrew our scrsen (CHOKUEI WO TESSURU) 
and moved it forward on the course ahead. At 2010 all forces were 
ordered to annihilate the enemy. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 577 

CONFIDEI.'TIiX JICPOA Item #4986 

Pag>:; 36 

(B) At 2010 the tlopping-Wp linit sighted silhouettes of ships to the 
northeast of SAVO Island atid gaVo cbasa, It aboiili-.Sll6 they engaged 
in battle. The AY/iNAMI iias ordsz-ed to separate (from tho main force) 
and to proceed to the LUNGA Point Area via the south side of S/iVO 
Islcind. 'flhile proceeding there she blew up and sank one onemy 
cruiser viiich she met at the south side of SaVO Island. 

(C) The siopping-up Uhit (minus the ASAGUMO and the TERUTSUKI) went ahead 
of the «ain force at 2120 and sailed 6-7 kilometres astern of the 
AYANi'iUI '/^hile proceeding, it met 1 enemy cruiser and 3 enemy des- 
troyers, It destroyed these and then at 2145 it sighted 2 battle- 
ships northwest of ESPEH/iNCE. \1hi.le reporting this to the entire 
force it tried to attack them, but the destroyers did not have 
their guns loaded in time to fire (JIIL.TSU SOTEN liL^IAV/AZU) . After 
that the enemy withdrew to the south and -ne pursued them with all 
our effort. At about 2340 we overtook them and carried out our 
second attack on them. 

(D) Just before 2200 C»»iDiv 4 (TN: 4S), KIRISHIMA, ASAGUMO, TERUTSUKI 
sighted 4 Battleships in succosAioi cmd attacked and sank 2 of them 
by torpedo and gvuifire. 

(E) At 2325 the C-in-C of the Second Fleet (Til: £; ) took into consid- 
eration the present situation, their and ^ our condition 
and the time of day and ordered our withdrawal to the north after 
carrying out an attack on enany forces which had been contacted. 

3. Results of the Battle: 

2 BB's attacked and sunk; 1 BB considerably damaged; 2 CA's blown up 
and sunk. 

1 DD blown up and sunk. 

3 DD's attacked and sunk. 

(End of Extracts) 



578 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item #4986 

Page 37 

ACCOUNT OF THE KOHTHEWJ CAIvIPAIGN (May-August 1943) 

I. CHH0N0L0GIC.<VL DIVISIONS 

1. ATTU Campaign. ' 
From 25 May to 1 June; cainpaifn ("ke"'T ) against ATTU. 

2. PtISKA Campaign. 

From 2 June to 26 Jime; first p-irt of campaign ("ke" *>" ) against 

KISKA (by submarine). 

From 27 June to IS July; first phase in second part of campaign ("ke'' 

against KISKA (by destroyer forces). 

From 19 July to 1 Aurn.-t; second phase in second part of campaign 

("ke"tr ) aj,a.'.n."3t, KIS1S.A (by destroyer forces). 

II. SITUATION AT ATTU BEFORE THE ENE!ytY ATTACK 

On 8 }is.y the enemy issued an official communique on AMCHITKA (monitored by 
the radio of the 51st Communications Unit (Cg) ) . In view of this intelli- 
gence, therefore, we were certain that the American array and navy had comple 
ted an air base and other installatior.s there. On the 9th BICEYATTO Island 
in the MALOELA? Grouo was bombarded at 1615, PAGiU^i Island (_in the MARIANAS) 
at 1910, and HOROBETSU Villii«9, 15 kilowetres northeast of MUHORAT^, at 2350. 
Vfere these bombardments meant to bo made in concert with the TUNISIAN Cam- 
paign as propaganda for an aggressive American offensive in the PACIFIC? 
Or, they mifiht have been judged as the heralding of a campaign in the NORTH 
or SOUTH _ (PACIFIC) . Be that as it may, it should have been considered 
in connection with the recent proi.dnence given to an enemy offensive in the 
PACIFIC, particularly in t!ie ALEUTI^JIS; and our forces should have been very 
much on guard against an enemy counter-attack. Hence, at 2335 on the 10th, 
there was the following order from the (HQ), Combined Fleet (GF) :- 

"(1) 111 view of communications intelligence (from 6th Communications 

Unit?) and the appearance of enemy submarines, there is suspicion 

of an operation by an ^^nomy task force. 
(2) Maintain a vigilant watch for an enemy occupation (force) 

and air attack." 
At this time the airfield installations on ATTU were expected to be almost 
finished by the ciid of May. But the air-raid trenches, fuel storehouses, 
shell and powder magazines, and other projects had y«t to be started, while 
their completion had been schednl.d for the first of June. Furthermore, 
DesBon 1 (CL KISO, DD SHIR.IKUMO, DD ".'AKABA) convoyed the KIMIKA'U Maru (XCV£ 
bringing flof.t planes for ATT". The ships left P..RAMUSHIKO at 1200 on the 
11th. Meanwhile, th,; K.'.Cill (CA) and the H..TSUSHn;0 (DD) had left YOKOSUKA 
at 0014 on the 11th, bound for PAPuJvlUSHIHO. Both groups were at sea then, 
when the American attr.ck was m.'^.do, F£.ch of the Submarines I-31> 1-34, and 
1-35 was engaged in transporting materiel for KISKA. 

III. SITUATION AT ATTU FCLLC'ING THE Et€;,iT ..TTivCK 

At 0449 on the 12th the 51st Comraunicutions Unit detected the call signal 
"BOU", making its first appearance on a frequency of 4385 K.C.; reception 
was extremly good. In the KISKA Area, enemy planes delivered a hour-long 
attack at about 0700. Enemy reconnaissance planes were also very active. 
From 0200 until 0900 attacking eiieir,y planes invaded the mists of ATTU, 
soaring over the island ceaselessly, relentlessly, as they strafed and 
bombed it. At this time absurd Ic'uMets urging surrender were dropped in 
the CHICHAGOF Harbor cactor. At 1000 the observation crew at HOLTZ Point 
spotted enemy boats headed for '.*E3T ARM Point. The Shipping Engineers were 
sent out immediately to investig'te from the sea. From them it was confirrae 
that the enemy was I'mding at '.VEST ABI.: Point and along the aorthwest coast. 
The forces in this sector at once entered upon Condition One as they determi 
to prevent the enemy landing even a part of his forces. At 1030 another 
enemy landing was announced in MASSj^CRE Bay. The enemy strength here was 
about 2000 men; but it seemed as if there were many more in reserve. In th 
meantime, enemy ships bombarded our forces with a threatening fire. At the 
report of an attack by a largo onemj- force, the ATTU Dispatched Force immcd. 
atoly set about burning all its documents save those in Cipher B (OTSU). 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 579 

CONFIDEMTIJX JICPCA Item #i9S6 

Page 38 

The strength of the attacking forces remained unknown because of the poor 
visibility at the time. However, judcing frran the noise of the guns, it was 
thou6;ht that there was a support force composed of several cruisers and 
smaller ships, and having seen the attacks delivered by carrier-based planes, 
the presence of carriers in the vicinity was suspected. By 1520 the following 
was known about the strength of the enemy force : Ther'.^ were 29 ohipo in HOLTZ 
Bay and at ',1EST ARM Point, 2? in I'lASSACuE Bay, and 6 in '.'EST Am Bay. Fur- 
thermore, more troops were continuing to land, and poor visibility prevent ;.d 
our forces from determining their number; According to communications intv-1- 
ligence at the time, a strong enemy force was operating in the Southern 
ALEUTIANS. 

IV. ORDERS OF THE 5TH FLEET AND STATE OF OUR FORCES FOLLO'VING THE ENEMY ATTACK 

(1) Submarines 1-31, 1-34, and 1-35 will cease their transport activities, 
and proceed at once to ATTU to attack the enemy transports. 

(2) The USUGUMO (DD) will cease its work and hasten to PARA},IUSHIRO to 
supply our forces. 

(3) The commander of the escort force will attack enemy shipping in the 
IMSSACRE Bay Ar ^a^.with pianos from the KILTKAV.'A Maru. 

(4) The ASAKA }Aa.r\iJc%;'^ fi ) will sail to AaiORI and pick up for transport 
to PARAMUSHIRO s^o arrry reinforcements. 

(5) The A'.'ATA Maru (.^^57 5^ ) will stand ready at YOKOSUKA (to transport 
naval reinforcements). 

The Cormander-in-Chief of thie 5th Fleet, commanding the MAYA (CA), loft 

PARi'vMUSHIRO to join the escort force. 
At this time, the TAMA (CL) (at i.l^JZURU) also stopped its vjork and v;as cble 
to leave on th« 20th; the ASAGUMO (DD) (at YOKOSUKA) was able to leave on 
the 21st. The ABUKUM;. (CL) (at SASEBO), however, was able to set out on 
the 16th. 

Thus, the strength with which wo could counterattack the enemy's assaiilt 
was merely one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, and three destroyers. 
Moreover, an air force was ordered to go to PARAMUSHIRO; but was delayed 
because of unfavorable -veathor. 

Summary of the Operations of the Combined Fleet: 

A. North .';rn Forces 

1. Submarines concentrated in the ATTU Area to destroy enemy shipping. 

2. Land-based air forces carried out patrols and attacks. 

3. Surface units awaited a favorable opportunity to destroy enemy 
fleet units in the ATTU Area. 

4. As it proceeded, our task force kept patrols on the enemy tack 
force (by observation craft, fishing boats, submarines, and float 
reconnaissance planes). 

5. An army of reinforcements was being transported to ATTU. 

B. Task Force. 

Proceeded from YOKOSUK/i on the 22nd. '.Vent through the v«nters east of 
the KUPJLES during the last of the month. Its purpose was to crush enemy 
fleet units I'sA task forces and to assist oui- Horthern forces. 

C. Co.'nbinod Fleet. 

Left TRUK on the 17th for YOKOSUKA. 

V. EVENTS UNTIL THE FALL OF ATTU 

The composition of the enemy fleet as seen from the land on the 13th was as 
f olloivs : 

In HOLTZ Bay - One CV (no bridge), one CHICAGO Class Cruiser, one OliAH,; 

Class cruiser, three DD's. 

In M-'iSSACRE Bay - One BB, two <5ruisers, five DD's, ton transports. 
About 1318 our submarines attacked the enemy fleet, causing the main body to 
withdraw eastward tempoi'arily. About 1900 lights were lit on ships arichored 
in U/iSSACRE Ray, apparently for something important which had happened. A 
destroyer ran aground near shore. 



580 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item #4986 

Page 39 

The enemy forces that had landed by 1300 on the 14th totalled not less than 
a division. Before long the enemy had put his carriers and battleships out 
to sea. However, the destroyers audaciously dropped anchor in the bay des- 
pite the attacks of our submarines, and observed us. (Thus, the enemy knew 
the weakness of our forces from previous reconnaissance.) 
An enemy battleship was greatly damaged in an attack by our submarines on 
the 14th. In general, however, our ships were checked by the enemy destroy 
By the 24th they had only inflicted severe damage on a cruiser and some dam 
on two unidentified warships. 

19 Medium bombers (CHIJKO) made the first attack by our planes on the l^th. 
They returned because of unfavorable we.-ithcr, ho->vever. Thereafter, on con- 
secutive days, our plsines were unable to attack due to unfavorable weather. 
Finally, on the 23rd, they attacked, destroying a cruiser and a destroyer, 
and setting fire to another ship. But on the following day, the enemy 

(fleet) had generally witliJi-awn an hour before our attack force arrived. 
ricnce, no results could be gained at sea, and our pianos had to confine them^ 
selves to bombing land targets. At this time, the destroyer force vhich had 
at last completed the assembling of a force planned to evacuate our forces 
on ATTU Isl.-xd, but though it pat out from PARA.MUSHIRO on the 25th, its 
efforts were of no avail because of continuous bad v^eather. In the meantime 
the Guard Unit on ATTU Island, although out-numbered, valiantly withstood 
the fierce attacks of the enemy, even at times carrying out night attacks an 
other operations which were doomed fi-om the start. They waged bitter battle 
but, in the end, having received rw reinforcements and having exhausted ever^ 
last artifice (to the last man), they met their deaths calmly. Finally, on 
the 29th ATTU Island fell in honor. 

VI. FIRST PART OF KISKA CMCAIOJ 

KISICA, of course, was placed in c. helpless position by the fall of ATTU. 
Therefore, it was decided to ojvacuato the island. V/e were entrusted with the 
task of evacuating the troops from the island by means of 10 submarines runnj 
back and forth. Since there were over 7000 men to evacuate and submarines 
have very limited capacity, it was not knovin how long it would take to finis) 
the evacuation. In addition to this, the patrols around KISKA had finally- 
become most strict and daia; ge to our ship had increased. Finally, the 1-7 
was lost. No matter how enshrouded by the fog we would be, we would instant 
be bombarded, for the offeciency cf the enemy's radar was far superior to vAi 
we had expected. 

VII. FIRST PHASE OF SECOI© Pijn OF KISKh C/J,ffAlGN 

To meet this situation, as a last resort we carried out "kc" (TN:V ) plan 
of operations by which we om;^''.oy^d a force of destroyer forceo (SUIRAIBtrTAl), 
In order to do t;a.s v.c iiiatalled as quicldy as possible, on the destroyers 
counter-radar equipment (TEKI-DEWTjiK NI TiJSURU GY/lKUTAN) and equipment to 
take aboard the lending barges to be used in the evacuation. Cti 6 July this 
work was, for the most part, completed. Because, however, there was uncer- 
tainty about the frequency of the enemy's radar there was some uneasiness 
about our counter-radar. 

On 7 July at 1930 wo sot out from P/.R;;L/iUSHinO. Our force was composed of 
2 cruisers and 10 destroyers. ,.t that time the state of affairs, as seen 
by the Grand Fleet (TN: GF), was as follows: 

"Regarding the situation, it may be said that the possibility of the 
enemy attacking us in the vicinity of KISKA is great," 
But, on the other hand, it wr.s felt that though the enemy had isolated KISKA 
he was hoping to starve out the gaa-rison. Only patrols around the island 
were strictly maintained. It was felt that an aggressive offensive and 
landing were not to be expected. According to intelligence reports up to 
the 7th, about the 26th a fleet of transports had departed from the west 
coast of NORTH /iMERICA and about the 3rd had reached the DUTCH Hi'kRBOR Area. 
Still more, we had received intelligence reports that transports had arrived 
at ATTU frequently during June. Furthermore, there was information that a 
powerful force had set out from DUTCH HAItBOR on 1 July and had arrived at 
AUCHITKA on the 4th, The enemy's northern Submarine force had been making 
preparations for battle since the 14th, or S5, and having completed these 
preparations about the 30th, had assembled at DUTCH HARBOR. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 581 

CONFIDEtiTIAL JICPOA Item #4936 

Page 40 

A squadron (TAI) of submarines, reinforceraents for the fiubmarine force, had 
reached DUTCH HARBOR from the American mainland about June 20th. Again there 
was intelligence that at the end of June, transports had arrived at ADAK and 
ATTU several times. On the 21st the air strength at AMCHITKA had been some- 
what increased and the base for land planes at ATTU was nearing completion. 
Atmospheric conditions in the KiacA Area up to the time we set out were as 
follows: 

On the 2nd and 3rd visibility was good, from 30 to 40 kilometres; on 

the 4th and 5th visibility was bad, from 2 to 3 kilometres. On the 

6th it was about 30 kilometres. 
In the meantime, a number of enemy planes — B-17's, B-24's, B-25's, PBY's, 
and others, in formations, singly, or in pairs were carrying out day after 
day bombing and reconnaissance missions. Patrol about the island v;as main- 
tained by a nujnbcr of cruisers and destroyers. 

On the 7th, the destroyer force (SUIRAI BUTAI) set out as scheduled. After 
they had set out, a thick fog rolled up and discovery and destruction by 
enemy submarines was rendered improbable. Thereafter, until we returned to 
PARAUUSHIRO the percentage of fog vias constantly about 85. On the 7th, visi- 
bility around KISKA was about 7 kilometres. En^my planes, (aach time a 
reconnaissance plane), approached at 0350, 0724, and 0835, and at 1140. 
6 (Jruisers and 4 destroyers bearing from the KH approached to a point 15 
miles south of GERTRUDE COVE and shelled it. At 14^5 3 enemy ships wore 
sighted about 30 kilometres from 3HIR0ZAKI (TN:\t;a.^ ). 

The above ships, judging from shell splinters, duds, and shell holes, were 
PENSACOLA dlass, 1 ship, HONOLULU class, 2 ships, a nevi class, 1 ship, and 
4 Destroyers, On the 8th, there was a thick fog from the morning on ind 
during the day visibility was from 1 to 3 kilometres; in the evening about 
6 kilometres. On this day no enemy pianos came. 

On the 9th, visibility to the SE was from 30 to 40 kilometres andfl-om the 
afternoon on clouds covered tho entire sky without a breaik. Though the 
clouds were 200 metres high and a thick fog hung upon the sea, visibility 
was from 8 to 10 kilometres. One enemy warship was sighted at 0833 forty 
kilometres, 220°, from SOUTH HEAD. At 1057 a ship was sighted at 340° off 
TAKAZAKI (TNrl^^ ). From 2050 to 2230 GERTRUDE COVE was shelled by des- 
troyers on patrol with guns of about 12cm. 

On the lOth at 0205 we speeded along our course and though we proceeded 
along our way until 2030, tho fog was thin enough to allow airplane flights 
and since this was to our disadvantage, we turned back. The weather forecast 
from the Headquarters of tho Desion 1 was as follows: 

"On the 12th there will be fog rolling up from tho SE at 8 metres per 
second with occasional breaks. On the 13th there will bo prevailingly 
east winds flowing from 8 to 12 metres per second and thick fog." 
'Ve prepared to make a d:'.sh for it on the 13th. Today (10th) there was fog 
around KISKA at the end of the day and visibility was from 1 to 2 kilometres. 
Enemy planes and also 2 single plemcs {'Ilii^'jf!^' TANKI) cane two or three 
times on reconnaissance flights, 

11 July: About 0200 visibility was about 20 kilometres and though the sky 
was covered with clouds, tho fog was light. Generally, visibility was from 
8 to 10 kilometres. At 2006 GERTRUDE COVE and at 2217 LITTLE KISKA were 
bombarded. Moreover, according to intelligence reports, the Arraj' Air Base 
on ATTU and the airfield for Army heavy bombers at i^iCHITKA and AGATTU were 
almost completed. Our observation boats (KAI^iSHI-TEl) based at PARhMUSHIiiO 
had discovered that patrols by the enemy to the vjest were becoming stricter 
and they were certain that along with the near completion of the land-plane 
base on ATTU patrols by the enemy carried out by aircraft, naval vessels, 
and submarines would be even stricter. 

12 July: At 0735 we sped along our course but the fog was light and at 1520 
wc turned back, "/e expect to dash forward on the 14th, Todr.y in the morning 
visibility around KISKA was from 6 to 8 kilometres, and though about noon 

it was 15 kilometres, the barometer fell. From 1300 on there was thick fog. 
Enemy planes, P-40"s, B-25's, PBY's, all on reconnaissance missions came 
during tho morning and about 1245 a small type naval vessel was sighted 
about 20 kilometres off T/J(AZAKI at 330°. 



582 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item #/*986 

Page 41 

13 July: Having taken in consideration weather around KISKA, at 02i»0 we 
hastened along our course. Patrol planes could not take off because of bad 
weather at /iMCHITKA and ATTU. No enemy planes were seen around the island. 
Only a small type naval vessel was carrying out patrol. However, because 
the visibility in the morning was from 8 to 10 kilometres we broke off our 
course and at 1703 turned back. Though we made the dash again at 2145,w.tui 

'back at 0156 on the l/(.th. The following is the weather forecast given 
out by headquarters on the 13th: 

"1. Tomorrow the weather around KISKA will not differ much from today' 

There will bo a light fog and it is expected that visibility will 

be fair. 

2. The high atmospheric prussure which prevails in these waters is 
slowly shifting to NE or EIJE. Thus, should we proceed along our 
course, thcr* is a possibility that the present state of weather 
and visibility will prevail as far as KISKA in the same general 
direction as the aforementioned high atmospheric pressure. 

3. At the same time as this high atnospheric pressure progresses, 
the possibility of flights from i<Dl>k is great, 

h. . We may conclude from the above that the possibility of success 
in our advance is oxtromcly slight and that we shall have to turn 
back and wait. Vte may look forward to proceeding on our mission 
on the day after tomorrow." 
(insert) 
According to the communications intelligence report of 13 July new call 
signals appeared on the 9th from the places wc had presumed to be naval air 
bases; these were presumed to ba a't rPEtar t he island neighboring. New call 
signals also appeared from the places wc hcd presided to be army air bases; 
we had figured two to be on ATTU and one in the neighboring islands. On 
the 11th, 6 army planes flew to ATTU. The total number of army and navy 
planes perraanontly based in the jiEUTI/JJS has grovm rapidly since the 9th; 
173 planes were, in the ALEUTLJJS by the 10th. 

Enemy planes have been -'.ctive on the 9th and 10th. Our patrols in the 
PARAMUSHIRO Area are vigilant. 

And we have great numbers of powerful fleet units operating in the CENTRAL 
PiXIFIC . 

According to the communications intelligence report of 15 Julj', a powerful 
enemy force has been under radio silence for several days. The number 
of enemy ships operating around KISKA is very large. According to the 
communications intelligence report 'jf 16 July, one part of the enemy fleet 
is apparently operating in the /1£UTI/>N nrea. Liaison activities between 
yilCHITKA and KULUf; Bay have bo^n great. The unemy sceias to be concentra- 
ting all his efforte in equipping and strengthening ^JilGHITKii. 
lU July: In the morning the weather changed for the '■wrso. The velocity 
of the wind was XU metres per second; atmospheric pressure was 757mm. 
Visibility was about 6 kilometres. In the afternoon conditions improved 
and the wind velocity, was from 5 to 8 mata^apwp aacfadr-nd visibility was 
5 kilometres. Today 3 or 4 enemy naval vessels were patrolling around 
the island. At 1500 we started .viut but there was a statement from head- 
quarters : 

"The weather in the vicinity of KISKi'. and along the course wc shall 
follov; has h.'.d a change for the better. For the present, there is 
no prospect of meeting a favorable fog from the sea. V/o shall turn 
back now and return to PAR/AfUSHIRO where wo shall plan a second 
Dperation." 

15 July: ->t 0430 we turned back. Today visibility around KISKa was 10 
kilometres and in tjio morning reconnaissance was carried out by a B-25, 

a P-38, and a PBY; and a f;.rmation of 7 B-24's and 5 B-25's bombed (KISKA). 
At 2202 enemy warships shelled GERTRUDE COVE. 

16 July: Visibility — 10 to 15 kilometres. 

17 July: There was thick fog in the morning and visibility was 1.5 kilo- 
metres. In the afternoon it was 6 k iioaieite'eB at tines Enemy planes wore 
carrying out reconnaissance and navax vessels v/ere maintaining patrols. 

18 July: At 0830 we entrcred the harbor at P/.jiAUUSHIRO. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 583 

CONFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item #it986 

Page 42 
VIII. SECOND PHASE OF SECOND Pj\RT OF KISKA CIMPklGH 

At 2000 on the 22nd we entered upon the second phase. 

On the 19th and 20th the visibility in the KISKA Area was 15 to 20 kilo- 
metres; on the 2l3t, it was 3 to 4 kilometres. To generalize the enemy's 
plans to the situation: There have been seven days out of 21 on which the 
enemy did not come over. Since the 9th enemy ships had bombarded KISICA 
five times. 

Our sorties recently have been an hour later than planned because of the 
thick fog. Moreover, it has been difficult to maintain our formation. 
In our first change (of position) the relative positions were totally 
unknown. Conmunication by telephone is poor. On the 2Uth, while it was 
clear and only slightly misty, we looked about and adjusted our formation. 
The TAMA, NIPPON Maru (XAO), and KUNIJIRI (CM) were not to be seen. (The 
Commander-in-Chief 5th Fleet, was aboard the TAMA.) 

At 0800 on the 24th, a patrol plane made a forced landing in Sector #10 
on the ATTU patrol line, and dispatchod a special urgent operational 
message. Indeed, there were 'several urgent messages to that effect. 
A dispatch from the 51st communications unit had arrived, saying that 
it was doubtful that the aviator had been located by the destroyer force. 
For 30 minutes after 0945 on the 23rd enemy ships bombarded from the 
northeast and south. And, as the skies were clsar, formations of enemy planes 
strafed and bombed several times. The number of participating planes was 
over 96. The enemy employed delayed action bombs, incendiary bombs, and 
parachute bombs. The delayed action bombs were sot at 30 minutes, one hour, 
15 hours, 24 hours, etc. 

On the 25th, it was clear, and formations of from three to nine P-40's raided 
KISKA seven times from AMCHITKA; all formations bombed only the landing 
field. The enemy bombers at AMCHITKA and KULUK Bay on ADAK, 51 all told, 
stood ready, their operating wave-frequencies lengths adjusted. The activity 
of enemy patrol planes at both bases was great. 

About 1700 the KAZEGUMO (DD) detected an enemy submarine transmitting a 
message. 

In view of our poor radio interception control, it is doubtful whether the 
sub was located. 

About 1500 on the 26th we made contact with all the ships save the KUNIJIrll, 
and the locations to which our formation had been adjusted again were visible. 
Suddenly, at 1750 the KUNIJIRI collided into the starboard side of the tS'J- 
KIMA. Damage to both ships was slight, but because of the accident some 
confusion was produced in the roar units. The '7AKABA, Hi'iTSUSHnW, and 
NAOANAIH (DD) collided, the latter receiving only slight damage. However, 
the WAKABA and NAGANAMI were now handicapped for operational cruising. 
The 'VAKABA returned to PARAMUSHIRO; the HATSUSHLMO entered the Naval Supply 
Unit. 

Oi the 27th we set our course south and tried to pick up the lost trail of 
an enemy submarine. 
We decided to make a dash for KISKA on the 2Sth. Conditions there had been 

(none too good) up to now. 
The visibility had been excellent on the 26th and hence a handicap to our 
operating units; for a total of 46 pianos raided KUKa that day. On the 25th 
a similar formation of P-40's liad attacked seven times. Enemy bombers wore 
generally in readiness at every base, their operatin;? wave-frequencies lengths 
adjusted. 

Patrol pianos were active, and a vigilant watch was kept in the north. 
Several enemy ships were operating in the waters south and west of KISK/i. 
At 1925 there was a night bombing. 

On the 27th, it was clear in the morning; visibility 20-30 kilometres, cloud 
ceiling at 3000 metres. But the fog appeared around 1800, On this day a 
total of 87 planes attacked. 8 B-24's bombed twice; afterv;ards, KISKA was 
subjected to reconnaissance for about three houis. At night single planes 
bombed three times; afterwards they dropped flares, which seemed strange 
cUid purposeless. 

The barometer fell gradually during the morning of the 26th; the mist \ 
thickened, and the visibility was only 8-10 kilometres. Perhaps because 
the weather changed for the worse enemy plrjies did not fly over KISKA after 
0340. By afternoon the fog had taken in the whole sky; the visibility was 
6-8 kilometres. 



584 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

COMFIDENTIAL " JICPOA Item #4986 

Page 43 

On the 29th, too, a heavy fog hung over our route. Vfe pressed forward to 
KISKA, plotting our course from its radio waves. Vfe only aw£iited the grace 
and aid of our gods. At 1105, while it cleared, for a bit, we recognized 
the outline of the island. Then th^ inevitable fog again. "Te sailed arounc 
to the north of KISKA, but saw no sign of enemy ships. At 1316 the ABUKUli\ 
sighted an entany vessel and launched several torpedoes, but it had mistaken 
LITTLE KISK.'i Island for the enemy. 

Again, at 1321, the SHBIAKAZE (DD) mistook the island for the enemy and 
opened fire with her guns. At 1325 we set our course to enter the harbor. 
Only within tho bay, strangely enough, was the mist completely absent, and 
the visibility was extremely good. The clouds were at about 100 metres, 
and dense. '.7e anchored at 1350. L-nmediately the landing barges which had 
been in readiness came alongside our ship and loaded the men aboard; in two 
trips, they had complet-ed their work. The 500-odd men that came aboard did 
so in an orderly fashion and in fir.o spirits. By 1420 each of the ships in 
the 2nd Transport Unit(YUSOTAl) had completed its loading. '7e left then at 
once. The 1st Transport Unit left the harbor a little later. After that 
the mist gradually became thicker in the bay. Thereafter, the 2nd Transport 
Unit did not see anything whatsoevor of the enemy. Vfe left and went on ahea. 
at a speed of 30 knots. The 1st Transport Unit, with the aBUKUMA, spotted 
a periscope, northeast of KlSKIi, but the submarine immediately disappeared 
beneath the waves and thereafter wasn't seen again. 

At 0600 on the 31st the mist had completely cleared, and at 1530 we entered 
PARf>MUSHIR0 Harbor. It seemed that the heaven were celebrating our 
success (in returning safely). At 1000 on the 1st of August the 1st 
Transport Unit entered the harbor; they had not lost a man. The evacuation 
of the defense force at KISKA, over 5,000 men, had been a success. 
The enemy apparently had not discovered tho evacuation of our troops at 
all. Thereafter, for day after day, they bombed and bombarded KISKA, 
and on August 15, the landing of ^-'uerican and Canadian troops on the 
island was announced. 
Truly the height of the ridiculous. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



585 



CONFIDENTIAL 



JICPOA Item #4986 
Page 44 



OFFICERS' REGISTER FOR THE KAKO (16 November 1941) 



Commanding Officers 

Executive Officer: 

First Lieutenant (UNYOCHO) and 
8th Division Officer: 

Gunnery Officer: 

Navigating Officer and 7th 
Division Officer: 

Torpedo Officer and 5th 
Division Officer: 

Communications Officer and 6th 
Division Officer; 

Aviation Officer and 9th 
Division Officer: 

2nd Division Officer and 
Officer of the Guard: 

1st Division Officer: 

3rd and 4th Division Officer: 

Deputy Gunnery Officer (SHOHOCHO): 

Junior Officer, 1st Division: 



Capt. TAKAHASHI, Yuji {^/f^Pi'X) 

Cmdr. TA'/JARA, Yasuedao ( -(^ '-^^ -^ ^ :fv ) 

Lt Cmdr AKUTAGAV.'A, Tadatarft (^ ;»} '"ii-^^^) 

Lt Cmdr NISHIUURA, Haruyoslii {^ii^^^ ) 
Lt Cmdr YAMAGUCHI, Tokio (vU C7 (3^ ^^ ) 

Lt. YONEI, Tsuneo {^^-^^^Pli) 

Lt. KONDO, Nobuichi (ii^.^-^^ ) 

Lt. SAITO, Yasukuni (.^P^'-^'^f' ) 

Lt. KAGA, Makoto (/>* ^ 'Jfet" ) 

S.D. Lt.(jg) MATSUNAGA, Isuke (^Ti'/K.'^^^^ ) 
Lt. (jg) OCHIAI, Otoichi (jI-'^ Z^'i^ ) 
S.D. Lt.(jg) MIZUNO, Toru (/K- *ft ^ ) 
S.D. Ens. OMURA, S6tar6 i^;^'^ ?.^- i^^ H^f ) 



Assistant Navigating Officer (KOKAISHI) Ens. KIKUCHI, Giichi (1g^^^^) 
and Junior Officer 4th Division: 



S.D. Ens. DATE, Jiro ('^^-^ ftJl) ) 
Ens. OMUR/i, Masao CK /f-^ ^ i^ ) 



Junior Officer, 2nd Division: 

Assistant Gunnery Officer and 
Jxinior Officer 3rd Division: 

Assistant Communications Officer and Ens. ISHIKA'.VA, Takatoshi (><» **■) 7» -^ ) 
Junior Officer, 6th Division: 



586 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

COMFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item #4986 

Page 45 

FACTS ABOUT THE KAKO (1? November 1941) 

I. TYPE: Heavy (first-class) cruiser. 

Vniere built: At the KAVrASi^JCI Dockyard in KOBE 

Keel laid: 17 Novembur 1922 

Launched: 10 April 1925 

Completed: 20 July 1926 

Modification completed: 28 December 1937 

II. PRINCIPAL UEASUPlEMENTS: 

A. Overall length: 185.2 metres 

B. Length between perpendiculars: ' 176.8 metres 

C. Maximum beara: 16.9 metres 
J. Draft: A. 8 metres 

E. Displacement: 7,100 tons 

F. Tonnage displaced per cm. of draft: 23.3 tons 

G. Moment required to change the trim 1 cm.: 246 metric tons 
H. Shaft' horsepower: 103,300 H.P. 

I. Speed: 33 knots 

J. Fuel carried: 1,842 tons 

K. Fresh water carried: 156 tons 

Drinking and all-purpose ivater: 66 tons 

V/ater, in drums: 90 tons 

. L. '.'.'ater evaporated in a day; 244 tons 

III. AHMj'^iJENT: 

A. Guns ; 

1. 6 20cm 50 cal. twin-mount guns, 3 year type, Model 2 

2. 4 12cm 40 cal. dual-purpose guns, 10 year type 

3. UG's: 4 13rjn Hotchkiss MG's. 

2 7.7mm Lewis MG's 

8 25mm twin-mount MG's, Type 96 

4. 179 Rifles, Type 38 

5. 43 pistols, ^irmy type 

B. Torpedoes ; 

1. 2 mounts of Type 92 quadruple torpedo tubes each 

2. 6 depth bombs 

3. 1 set of paravanes 

C. Searchlights : 

1. 3 110cm searchlights, Tj-pe 92 

2. 2 40cm ofc-a.xhli-htj. Type "SU" 

D. Range Finders : 

2 6-m3tre range finders. Type 14 

2 ^ type 6-metre range finders 

2^ t^jpe 4.5-nietrc range finders for dual purpose guns 

2 -jV^ type 1.5-metrQ range findc-rs 

2ifL type 3.5-metre range finders (for torpedo work) 

E. Planes ; 

Float recorjiaissance planes; 1 in use (1 in reserve) 

F. Wirolens Equipment ; 

a. Transmitters: 

1 500-watt transmitter, Type 91 Mark 4 (Special) Modification 1 
1 500-watt transmitter. Type 92 Mark 4 Modification 1 
1 1000-watt short-wave transmitter, Tjtdb 95 Mark 3 
1 500-watt transmitter, Tj.-pe 95 Mark 4 
1 350-w-'.tt transmitter, 'type 95 Mark 5 

b. Receivers: 

3 receivers. Type 91, Model 1 

3 short-wave receivers. Type 91 

16 special receivers. Type 92 Modification 3 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



587 



COITIDEfTIAL JICPOA Item ^986 

Page 46 

c. Wireless telephones: 

1 ultra short-wave wireless talephoiie, Tj'pe 93 

1 ultra short-viave wireless tt-lephone, Type 90, Modification 2 

1 ultra short-wave wireless telephone. Type 90, Modification 4 

2 wireless telephone microphones. Hark 2, Modification 3 

d. Signal strength Indicators (SOKUKU.I) and Cathode-ray Tube Screens 

1 ijme 92 Electric "fave Cathode-ray Tube .Screen, Modification I 
1 Tj'pe 92 Short Wave Cathode-ray Tube Screen, Modification I 

1 Type 92 Short '^ave Signal Strength Indicator, Modification I 

2 Type 15 Ko. 2 Cathode-ray Tubo Screen, Modification I 

e . Vlireless : 

1 Type TM Lir^ht 'Tireless, !todification I 

f . liadio Direction Finders: 

1 Type 93 Mark I, Radio Direction Finder 

IV. El.iGII.'ES: 

(1) Main engines "BURAIIKACHISU" Tj'pe Turbine - 4 

(screw propellers - 4 ) 

(cog-v<heel spe^d reduction gear install.ed) 

(2) H.P.il. of screw-propellers - (Maximum 360) 

(3) Boilers: Fleet Type - Mark "RO" crude-oil fired boilers exclusively - 

(4) Auxiliary Engine and Electric Engines 

(5) Lewis Type refrigero.tion machine _ 

(6) SEGAR i:,-/^" ) double-ej?fect (FUKKO) type carbonic acid gas iypa ice 
machine - 1 

(7) Type "UU" (TII:j^ ) "'att Type Air Compressing Puiii?~3 

(8) 4 6-pole, compound-wound generators ..Ith interpole 

4 compound-wound, D.C. electric motors with megapolc and interpole: 



2 3C 


)0-I{.'r;., 2 - 


135 K.-.'J. 








BOATS: 












,^e 


V/eifht 


Lcnf,-th 


Beaj-i 


Draft 


Men Carried 


Motor 












Boats (2) 


4.4 Tons 


11 Metres 


2.7 Metres 


.6 Metres 30 


Launch (1) 


3. " 


9 " 


2.5 " 


.6 " 


35 


Cutters (4) 


1.5 " 


9 " 


2.45 " 


.4 " 


45 


Dinghy (1) 


.6 " 


6 " 


1.5 " 


.2 " 


10 



VI. LOCATION, TYPE, AMD 'EIGHT C? AliCHORS: 



Bower anchors (2) 
Stream anchor (1) 
Kedgo anchor (1) 

VII. -yiCIIOR CABLES: 



Stockless bow; both sides eacli 4.8 tons 
''ith removable stock (?) stern; starboard 
Navy-type stern; port .5 ton 



1.4 tons 



Bower anchor cables (2); 57mm. diameter; 15 shots on starboard side for 
340.5 metres; 16 shots on port side for 351.4 metres; each cable shot is 
22.7 metres 

Stream anchor cable (1): 35:'im. diameter; 1S2.9 metres long; of steel wire 
Kedge anchor cable (1): 43 mm. diaineter; lt-2.9 metres long; of Manila rope 



588 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

COIJFIDEnTIAL JICPOA Item 7,''4986 

Page kl 

HEADQUARTERS STAiT, 6TH FLE2T (1 Jeoamber 19U) 

Rear-Ad-niral GOTO, Zonchi (jS- i' ^ ^.'■» ) ; Comr.iandin^ 

^■-iginesr Captain OMWCI, Jisaku {f\'% 'M^*^ ); Fleet Engineering Officer 

Coramander KISHIMA, Kikutoku ^%^^i^\%)'> Staff Officer 

Lt. Comdr. MIKiiMI, Iwau ( ^ ^f./T.^ ); Staff Officer 

Lt. Comdr. SEKINO, Hideo (j^l 'f j^;?*^); Staff Officer 

Eng. Lt. Comdr. ISIIISAKA, Harukictii {%-^^ %'%)\ Staff Officer 

'Tarrant Officer IZULiI, Iwao ('^ ^ /ii, ); Attached to Hdq. Staff 

OFFICERS OF T!E A03A 

Captain HISAIiUNE, Yonejir6 ( ^'v'.^. %. >/"• I'f^ ) Captain 

Commander NAKAMURA, Kenji ( ^l^./T^ '^M, 'M ) Executive Officer 

Eng. Corr.dr. HI!!^., Kiroloi \^j^ %,-^ i \ ) Engineering Officer 

Lt. Comdr. NISHIKOril, Tuji ( ^^ ll^t Ta ) !Javif:ator 

Lt. Comdr. DOI, Yasumi (^ ^ "^ ->- ) Ounnery Officer 

Lt. Comdi-. (M.C.) hillTU, Ontaro {J- lifj 5J2-/^^j^ ) Medical Officer 

Lt. Comdr. L'lYAZAKI, Isai.iu {\^J>^ % ) Torpedo Officer 

Lieutenant (sg) ElAUURA, Hashi {/^ -%^ S^) ) Aviation Officer 

Lieutenant (sg) IDETA, Hirokuni ( ^'. V^ ys^ I^J ) 1st Lieutenant 

Lieutenant (sg) TAKUBO, Tatsuo ( > j? '\ V7(-^'ri^1'^>- )2nd Division Officer 

Lieutenant (sg) HOSHINO, Seisaburo (^ ?) 'p\^^Vy ) Communications Office 

Eng. Lt. SIIIBATA, Yoshinori (i^, >^ ?5 f '1 ) 10th Division Officer 

Lt. (sg) (SC) UAT3UIJAGA, ieiryu ( /f i"- /K. '(i'- ^ ) Supply Officer 
.''oecial Duty Lt. (jg) K^JITA, Yoshisaburd ( /l^ \ J7 "^ -^ li^ ) 1st Division Of fie 

Special Duty Eng. Lt. (jg) IKCDA, Tada;-.ir3a ( j.^^ I'S?/!- ^ ) 12th Division Offic< 

Eng. Lt. (jg) NAKAJIMA, Riichi (*t'^;;;f) -" ) Division Officer 

Lt. (jg) YOSHEJIPvA, Goro ("$" /T'^ ^ fc^ ) Division Officer 

Eng. Lt. (jg) ilAOASE, Takeshi ( '^ '/,'f ^ ■j^V> ^ Division Officer 

Lt. (jg) (M.C.) HOSOKI, Daisabure {,h'<9 '/{^ f\-^\>f' ) Shio's Company 

Lt. (jg) N0N03U, Sadasuke ( >t ^^ ^1^ /C'^'^ ) Ship's Company 

Special Duty Ens. HASKIOKA, Gihachi (/t?^ 1^ ]%■' '^ ) Ship's Company 

Ens. (S.C.) KITAYA, Yoshikichi ( ;IC/^- '<!3 >^ ) Ship's Company 

S.D. Ens. YAMA3AYASHI, Tokuji ( J.. "^"^ f'^r >/ ^ ) ship' s Company 

Eng. Ens. HAIiAYA, Haruo ( / "I /? "^ A^*- ) Ship's Company 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



589 



COIJFIDEOTI/vL 

Ens. 

Res. Enf. Ens. 

Ens. 

Ens. 

Eng. Ens. 

Ens. (S.C.) 



JICPOA Item ;/4936 
Page 4S 

MAErrA"fA, Shinichi ( "fTl ** J ' "' "^ ) Ship's Company 

OSHIMA, Magane (-hifl -^ *- ) Ship's Company 

SATO, Tadashi {^ii. l-^i- Jt- ) Ship's Company 

ODEHA, ShunsaburO ( /^ "^ 1X- -^ l^f ) Ship's Company 

KOIZUMI, Yasutaro (,k }f^ '(^n/\^|' ) Ship's Company 

'.'.'ADA, Isaiau (yj^r \*? ^^ ) Ship's Company 



FACTS ABOUT TIE AOBA 
I. TYPE: Heavy (first-class) cruiser 



Where built: 

Keel laid: 

Launched: 

Completed: 

Jlodifications finished: 

II. PRDICIPAL lEASURELIEOTS: 



I'lTSUBISHI Dockyard at NAGASAKI 

U February 1924 
25 September 19.26 
20 September 1927 

30 October 1940 



A. Overall lenrth: 

B. Maximum beam: 

C. Length between nerpendiculars: 

D. Draft: 

S , Di s plac ement : 

F. Tonnage displaced per cm. of draft: 

G. Moment required to change trim 1 cm: 
H. Shaft horsepower: 

I . Speed : 

J. Fuel oil carried: 

K. Fresh ivater carried: 

Drinking water: 31.04 tons 

All-purpose water: 43 •23 tons 

Water in drums: 127. tons 

VJater evaporated in a day: 200, tons 

III. AEJiAlCajT, ETC. (same as the KAKO) 



181. 36 metres 

15.47 metres 

176.70 metres 

5.66 metres 

11,660. tons (sic) 

23.6 kgs. (sic) (TK: tons?) 
246.2 kps. (sic) (TKjtona?) 
103,000. S.H.P. 
33. knots 
20,400. 



FACTS ABOUT GOIHG ASHOKi aT HOI (iiUOTTO) (12-15-41) 

Flag Signal for the AOBA. 

1. Vfhile anchored at ROI and up until, the 29th, all hands are permitted to 
go ashor-3 and stroll about for three hours. 

2. Extent of our liberty ashore; islands in the vicinity, swimrrdng in the 
surf, and the wanton picking of fruit are prohibited. 

3. For alarins, the AOBA ;vill shoot two flares off in succession, in addi- 
tion to its use of the regulatio.n signals, 

(1) Liberty ashore every day from O6OO to O90O, and from 1100 to I4OO. 

(2) Complement — about 120. 

(3) Small boats in use: 1 lighter holding 90-100 men 

1 cutter holding 25-30 men 

(4) Place — EDGIGEK Island (uninhabited island) 
''fernir.gs when going ashore. 

1. This island is a breeding place for dengue fever, and the mosquitoes 
are extremely numerous here, "hen stripping or when you step into a 
thicket you must not be bitten b2'' any mosquitoes. 

2. You must not be naked at any time viiile ashore. Further, swimirang 
is strictly prohibited. 

3. The vianton picking of fruit is forbidden. Nor is it pennissible to 
bring aboard ship fruit that is unnecessary. 

4. You must bo assembled on the beach 20 minutes before it is time to 
return to the ship. 



590 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

COrTIPEHTIAL ' JICPOA Item A986 

Page 48-A 




\^ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 591 

CmFIDECTIAL JICPOA Item ;/4986 
Page 49 

5. Concerning Alarms: 

All hands will always be riindful of their ship, and must be a'ole to 
assemble together v hen the alarm is sounded. 

Therefore, at an alarm two flares will be fired in succession three 
times or more tiues from our ship. You ijust take care so that i;i this 
eventuality the conduct of our defense is not ir.periled. 



,n2 



THE REEFS AT THUK HARBOR (as observed from a 'aotorboat) 
(TM: To accompany till) 



I. Time and Place 

12 December 1941, 1430 (one hour before sunset). 

Off the south shore of DUBLOli Isl:...d ^i. the TRUK Island Group. 

II. Vfeather; Sea Conditions. 

Clear weather. South vdnd, velocity of approxi.;ately 6 meters (Tli: per 
secor.d) . 

III. Summary of Activities. 

'7e were unable to transport the official messen,3er to the Government Branch 
Office jetty, and the 15 Supply Departaent workers to the Liunitions Section 
jetty at NEBSRAI, but had accompciny us the nine midshipmen on a hydroivraphic 
■ survey, '"e -.lere familiar with the Government Branch Office jetty from our 
morning's experience. V/e were not familiar at all, however, with the loca- 
tion of the Munitions Section jetty. Even the charts we brought with us 
were not detailed. At the Branch Office jetty \->e asked people (for details, 
but without result), and although uneasy, we s3t out. We proceeded alonr,, 
seeing marker posts A & B on our right. Then .le passed two or three moored 
large flying boats. From point B v;e proceeded directly towards an object 
resembling a jetty. Because of our lack of self-confidence through this 
channel and of our loneasiness over the depths, we v;ent alon;; at slow speed, 
^'/hen we reached Point C, a rasping sound suddenly rent the air and our boat 
was jolted. The engine, of course, stopped at once. The boat, too, stopped, 
its bot::om grating on the reef for a while. Vfe felt that the boat vv'as barely 
being supported near its center. This was 300 meters frora the shore (to 
the right). The wind direction was on the starboard beam. The sun's angle 
of elevation was 15°. 

IV. Measures Taken. 

As stated above in describing the position of the bottom of the bo^ t, it 
was aground on the rcaf at the center of the boat and to ths loft, the water 
was rather deep and the bow ox the boat vfas slowl; being rocked to tho right 
by the vdnd. 

Accordingly, I ordered the passengers to draw back onto the stern as far as 
possible and haJ four men rock thj starboard bovj to the ri^ht, and, at the 
sarTiS time, the aotor was placed in reverse, ''/lien they hcd rocked the boat 
tv*o or three tines, we easily drew away from the roaf. After that, we con- 
tinued in reverse and -ihen we went sor.ie distance from the reef, we inspected 
the engine and gunwale cjid saw that no d.3ma£;o had been sustained. At thft 
time we received a .aessar-c by semaphore Trom the shore "Which said: "Do not 
£0 there", 

I immediately asked for the channel used by boats nc.vigating in tiiat area, 
■■/hen we were stranded on the reef and I thought about the Impact I believed 
for sure that we must have sustained somo damage. However, .''hen I was told 
that there was no damage, in ansv.'er to my inquiry, v.s proceeded ahead. 

V. Causes and Lessons, 

1. First of all, the foremost cause of this incident is the fact thet we 
sat out without knovdng clearly our mission and without Icnowing v.'hcre 
we were going. 

2. The charts which we had taken along wcrenot clear at all and shoiild 
not have been used, 

3. It \dll not suffice to guess at the depth of the water by advancing 
in the direction of the sun and, moroovor, one jiiust not fail to keep 
a sharp lookout at all jnoments and to pay attention to the lar^e fly- 
ing boats moored in the vicinity. 

4 . 7^e did not take soundings . 



79716 O— 46 — pt. 13 15 



592 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDENTIAL 



JICPOA Item 
Page 49-A 



/49'6 







■^1 



.1^. 



t 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 593 

COri FIDBK'TIAL - JICPOA Item ,'/4986 
Page 50 

VI. Measures Taken After Our Return to the Ship. 

I reported to the Executive Officer and to the Officer of the Day. As it 
was sunset I had the launch hoisted aboard. Thus, I was .iresent v.hen the 
' launch was hoisted aboard and v.heii tl\e bottom of the boft was inspected, 
aside from the fact that the keel plates had separated more or less, the 
boat v;as the same as ever, "fhen the coxsvjain and I inspected the bcrt 
two or three times, we could discover no dar.iare. Accoroi igl;.', I made a 
report to that effect to the Executive Officer, the Officer of the Day, ' 
and to the Officer-in-Charpe of the Division and thereby com,:J.tted a grave 
error. By this I mean that when vie inspected the boat the followin^^ i.iorning 
there was a concavity of about 100 square cuntLneters in area on the star- 
board keel in the center and uhe bottom of the boat v.as full of water. 
The damage, however, had already been repaired with copper plates by the 
boat's crew. I immediately notified the Executive Officer, the Officer 
of the Day, and the Division Officer. 

VII. Observations. 

1. V/hen in command of a boat, take full responsibility for matters affect- 
ing the boat, and do not listen to the opinions of others viith regard 
to measures to be taken when stranded on a reef. I should have relied 
upon m^r own opinions. 

2. Lookouts should hsve been most strictly posted. 

3. ''."hen I did not know how deep the water was, I should have proceeded 
at a reduced speed, 

4. The exajTsination of the damaged place should have been done more 
thoroughly. 

"To caution add care". 

5. I should have been quick to get in touch i.ith this ship. 

(Eiid of narrative) 



#10 



FACTS ABOUT TRUK (12-13-1^) 



A. Waters Suitable for Anchorage. 

On the west side of MOEN Island (and in the waters between t,ho north side 
and :^UAC). 

In the vicinity of TRUK Harbor (i.e., in the viators south of ULIAN Island 
and extending to OTTA Island and FAIIAM Island). 

B. Shelter from "Jind and TTaves. 

Depending on the selection of an anchorage, shelter can be afforded, no 
matter which direction the vind may come from. 

C. Passes. 
Northeast Pass. 

1. In the center of the pass are reefs 7.1 meters under water. 
T'ley are floating, crimson, circular iiiarkers here. 

2. Wien there is a strong northeasterly vdiid, there are great 
sv/ells at the entrance to the pass. 

3. Tidal current is 2 knots. 
North Pass. 

1. Fair sailing with northeast vdnds. 

2. The coconut grove to the northeast rfikes e good landmark. 

3. Channel is sinuous. 
South Pass. 

1. Navigable bj^ large ships. • 

2. There is rather deep water at the end of the reefs on both sides 
of the pass. You cannot, however, distinguish the change in the 
color of the water. 

3. Maintaining j'our distance abeam of FALEU Island, it is easy to 
pass through the narrows. 

EVERETT (EBARITTE) Pass. 

1. Free of obstacias. Navigable by large ships. 

D. Supply. 

Coal may be had at the naval coaling station on the south shore of DUBLON 

Island. 

Fuel oil (JUYU) may also be had here. 

Fresh water is to be had in containers of 260 and 160 tons (one each). 

Daily water allo'vanoe is 200 tons. 

Fresh provisions include egg-plants, small melons, sweet potatoes, taro, 

all kinds of fish, beef, and pork. 



594 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CO^'FIDENTIAL 



JICPOA Item #4986 
Page 50-A 



(Ea-iRITTE) 
NORTH P;i£S (sic) ILVERETT P.\SS 




7°40' 



15 



RUAC -f" 

^^ ISLAND 

V, ^ QUOI 
\ V NORTH 

F/O^ liORE 0^<^ PAT. 




y^ 



UL-'J^ 

a. 

y UDOTV i^ 

Ov Eld. d P'^Sf' 

F.XLA 
Bii»U3TS 
I 7020" 

151°40' 




^-^ V I MEN 

'SCIK FEF/iN ] } ^ l) 

V i r^ T ) 



TSIS 



^ 



ViffiST JJJ 



IDi'iN 



O 



^ 



oll;.n 



S;iL.lT / 



C^ 



SKETCH IL\P 
OF 

rauK 



ijesi:gon 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 595 

COMFIDE?.TIAL JICPOA Item ,;'4986 

Page 51 

VARIOUS IIJFCRMjlTION COK'CERI.'IKG SAILBIG Ai«D ALJCHCRACffiS Hi TKS IJU'iDATES 

I. IfjFOFAIATION FOR NAVIGATION 

1. The use of charts showing swept and sounded areas (30h>:I-S0}.UR-C-F,AIZU). 
These island groups are mainly composed of coral atolls. Since the 
bottom of the sea is very undulating, sweeping ani sounding r.iust be 
carried out evei when comparatively detailed sounding charts are 
available in order to avoid uncharted sunken reefs. 

2. The carrying out of soundings. 

TShen in the open sea and anong several atolls, even though you 
may be carrying out to the best of your sibiiity, souiiding of the deep 
waters and soundings for hidden reefs, when you have not navigated 
throughout the entire_area, it is necessary to continue sounding 
navigation (SOKUSHIijKOKO) most strictly. 

3. Post strict look-outs. 

A good part of the sea in these parts has not yet been sounded 
and in order to learn cbout chsmges in depths, it is necessary to 
post strict lookouts when navigating around these island groups, 
(note) Though recognition of shallov) reefs depends, in the 
main, upon changes in the color of the water, great 
care is necessary since conditions of light, clL^natc, 
and the nature of the sea bottom vary. 

Depth of ''Tater 

1. Dark purplo-indigo 70 metres t more 

2 . Purple-indigo 40 to 70 metres 

3. Purplish blue About 30 metres 

4. Blue About 20 metres 

5. Palo blue About IS metres 

6 . Bluish green About 10 actros 

7. Bluish yellow 2 to 5 metres 

6. Brownish green Under 2 .netros 

4. The southern part of these island groups is the region of equatorial 
counter currents, renerally from the east. Ho'.vever, around both the 
RALIK and RATAK chains the northern equatorial current (from the west) 
and the equatorial counter current (froiA the oast)run longitudinally 
south an-J north. Hence, the tidal currents and the i.dnds interact 
vdth an oxtro. .o coMploxity, and particular caution mist be taixn in 
navigfition'. 

II. Cautions ".liSN sntssiiig ajp leaving the passes to lagooks 

1. *."hen there are large waves on the sea outside the lagoon, and when 
their direction coincides uith that of the pass to the lagoon, the 
waves at tho ontr-noo to the pass will be rcjiarkably high. But you 
must allov; for a sufficient iii^rgin in your estimate of depths, 

2. In general, the tidal currents runriir^g through tho passes are strong. 
You may iiiake it a general rule to head inward at flood tide and outward 
at vbb tide, out you should also maintain a careful watch in steering 
your shiip, as the tides luay be irregular, depending on the topo^Taphy 
of tho ocean floor. 

3. 'Vhcn you are about to enter or leave a long and narrow pass, you must 
keep a sharr) o-'-c on tho v/oather lest a squall, proceeding inward, 
engulf you. Furthermore, in tho event you arc besot b;' a squ:J.l, you 
must have a plan of action ready beforehand. 

4. As the markers arc, on the whole, inconspicuous, it is nccossarj' that 
yx>\x do take soundings as you anter the pass, so that you na.y ascertain 
the positions of the ciP.rker and your ship with room to spare. 

5. If you should use small scale charts, you must bear in mind that the 
notations on swooping and depths have been oniitted. 



596 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

COMFIDENTIAL JICPCA Item ifU9^b 

Page 52 

III, CAUTIOUS IK DECIDIHG UPON AN ANCKOftAGE 

1. Throughout the year northeasterly to easterly winds prevail; the 
Tormer are genersilly strong. Aside from the period July to October, 
when the winds are calmest, you should be careful in the selection 
of your anchorage. _ 

2. Within an atoll there are several reef spots (TEIJSHO). Hence, in 
determining upon an anchorage, you should seek a place with an even 
depth and conspicuous markers nearby. You should also drop your 
anchor to determine the depth. 

3. In selecting an anchorage for fueling, especial consideration must 
be paid to wind, waves, and tides. 



About 1315 on 21 January 1942, a large enemy flying boat was sighted closing 
in upon us at 2°55' S. Lat., 149°40' E. Long, Immediately we notified the task 
force by radio. Three Zero fighters left the task force in our direction, but 
they turned ar'ound at our instruction and headed for the enemy plane. 'Yithin a- 
few minutes a trail of smoke was seen in the direction they had flown. Then we 
saw the three fighters circling at low altitude. It was certain noM that the 
enemy plane had been shot down, '.'e changed our course at once and proceeded in 
the direction of the fight. Shortly we saw the fighters flying toward us. "'e 
waved our caps in greeting, whereupon they returned our salute by dipping their 
wings, ".'hen we reached the vicinity of the place where we supposed the plane 
to have been shot down, sure enough, there was a large oil slick on the sea. 
We also sighted five of the plane's crow drifting about; we took them aboard as 
prisoners. Three of the flying boat's regular complement of eight had perished. 
Of the five we rescued, two were officers and the others rated men. 

THE TREAB'EHT Oi' PRISONERS OF "lAR 
(23 'anuary 1942) 
From Lt. HCSHIiJO 

I. LA"'S ON THE SUBJECT 

A. Regulations for the Treatment of Naval Prisoners of ITar 

B. Laws for Aerial "'arfare (Clauses n'ib to ffiS) 

C. Laws for Land Warfare 
»D, Applicable Precedents 

II. "TiO SHALL BE A PRISONER OF "JAR 

A. Combatants, non-combatants (personnel in the Medical Corps are not 
considered PO'"s) 

B. Those in active service at the front (personnel with the Signal Corps 
in the field, etc.) 

C. Rulers (SHUKENSHA) and similar persons. 

D. Responsible government officials, diplomatic envoys, etc. 

E. Civilians employed by the military (GUNZOKU). 

F. Natives who shall have defended themselves against their captors. 

G. The sick and wounded in the rd.litary service. 
H. Crews of captured ships and aircraft. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 597 

CONFIDE CTIAL JICPOA Item n(4986 
Page 53 

III. THEATIiE:JT OF PHISOfERS OF '"AR 

A. A General Approach 

It is of course ossontial that prisoners of war not be mistreated. 
The idea that aside from necessary restrictions, tliey should bo treated 
as military men who have been t."ken prisoner, is ;videly acoeptf;d. 
Even though they arc er.emj' officers and men, if it is considered that 
they wore all doing necessary service, and that they were sacrificing 
their lives for their country, one must feel respect and sympathy for 

thCE. 

Such springs from a ooinnon essence found in our so-called 
"DUSKIDO" (TN: "The '"Jay of the 'Tarrior"). However the handling of 
prisoners of war during the first "forld 'Tar was quite harsh and there 
were many cases of it not being effected in accordance with previously 
existing rulss. _ 

Our "BUGHIUO" has as its basis the principle "respect for honor", 
and the belief that giving a prisoner the opportunitj- to kill himself 
is noble treatment, 

Sespoct for the enemy on the field of battle rises above the 
spirit of combat in response to the enemy's bnivory. It is based on 
the belief that the warrior who vicv;3 the battlefield as an exjrcise 
ground is plcnsed to have taken an enem;;', regarding him as an opponent 
of exercise ground practice. In order to utilize this general concep- 
tion concerning prisoners, it is basic that one's attitude should not 
embrace any individual adivdration for the prisoner. It is thought that 
the differences in '.Vestem and Occidental schools of thought regrxding 
"I have done r.y duty" (TI.': In English in original) gives rise to dissia- 
ilarities in the concept of prisoners of war. 

B. Prisoners of war should be committed to the authority of the Gov- 
ernment of the country which has taken them prisoner and they should 
be treated huj-nanely. The prisoner may keep anj-thin^ belonging to hijn 
other than implements of war, horses, or military documents. There- 
fore, the prisoner of war must be given suitable treatment by us. 

(It is necessary to act according to the various articles and provis- 
ions in question.) 

Almost all confiscated documents and articles will be returned to 
these persons in view of the fact that Ihey are personal articles. 

C. Excerpts fror.i Measures for Treatment of Kr.val Prisoners of V/ar 

1. 'Then you have captured a person who shall be a prisoner of war, . 
immediately inspect the articles he carries vdth him. 

Confiscate weapons, ammunition, and oth-jr military articles 
(catalogue the articles). If he has any other possessions 
(it is necessary to catalogue the, articles) they should be 
carried by this person if convenient.' 

2. Only when it is necessary to recognize the dignity of an officer 
priscnor, can the naval officcr-in-charge wear his sword. (The 
circumstances and the officer's names are to be reported to the 
Minister of the Nav^O . 

3. A daily account, a list of names, and a catalogue of belongings 
should be made concerning the prisoner, including the PO'T's age, 
social position, rank, residence, Naval District to which attached 
(3H0ZCKU KANSEKCHO '; _. " ).;:...,: . ^ La-.; u wounded, 

4. Officer prisoners and non-conibatf.'nt officer prisoners should be 
distingiaished from petty officers and men and they should be 
treated in accordance vdth their social position and rank, liakc 
exceptions for infringements of ttic law or insincerity in answering 
questions of name ,and i'ank. 

5. "Jhen PO"."s axe disobedient or have plans to escape, etc., the 
necessary measures for imprisoaient or punishment cm be carried 
out. There will be no objection to the use of armed foi-ce. 

6. In connection with a PO'V's attempts to escape or misdemeanors 
apply the Ilaval Disciplinary Regulations. The ('isciplinary 
authority is a senior nav;il guard officer (GUTEI) who actu:illy 
takes in the prisoners. 



598 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

C OrriDSKTIAL JICPOA Item #4986 

Page 54 

7. The Naval officer in charge shall surrender the POT accompanied 
by his various documents and articles to the following: 

(a) He shall surrender hin to the Guard District of the NavsQ. 
Base. 

(b) In unavoidable circumstances he may surrender him to another 
Guard Officer(rw": GUNEI) 

(c) When he finds it advantageous he may confer with the Army 
or the Line of Coranunication (TIJ: HEITAN) Transportation 
and Communications Officer and he can surrender the prisoners 
of viar to them. (In_3uch instances, the officers, non-com- 
batant ofi'icers ( SOTOIOiK 'T? 'Is "? ) , and men shall be segre- 
gated and their number reported quickl" to the liinister.) 

8. When the PO""s are picked up, a custodiari will be appointed who 
shall look after the prisoners under the supervision of a naval 
officer. 

9. Telegrams and letters will be censored by the supervising officer. 
Only the harmless ones will be let through. The franking privi- 
lege shall apply. (Ycu r.ust consult the PC'-'s last P.O. first, 
however . ) 

10. ■ A POtl raaj' be pei-mitted to purchase daily necessities or other 

articles he ma- like wi-h ]±s own money, only when the super- 
vising officer sees no reason why he should not. 

11. VJhen a PO'f dies, a funeral sei-vice befitting his station and rank 
in life shall bo held. 

12. The Last Will and Testaincnt of a PO'T shall be handled as if it 
were fro.n a member of the Iraperial Japanese Navy. 

D. EiAracts from the General iiules for the Treatment of PO'T's (as estab- 
lis'ied in the Laws lo-: land '.'arfare). 

1. PO'.''s are obligated not to leave a certain area and may be de- 
tained in a fixed place. PO'/'s may be imprisoned as long as it 

is neccssar}', as a moosure to preserve the peace of th.- community, 
which must come first. 

2. The capturing nation ..iay utilize the PCW's as laborers, according 
to their ran)' and ability. 

Officers may not be employed. 
Tiie PO".''s duties shall not be excessive. 

The labor shall have no relation whatsoever with the military 
strategy and actions of the capturing nation. (This is very 
. inexplicit, so that in such matters the capturing nation enjoys 

a freedom of interpretntion and may exercise its discretion.) 
If worked, the PO'7 must be granted a remuneration comensurate 
with th^t given Array personiiel of his rank in the capturing 
nation. Thoy say that in tnis present ',var GSiUMJY grants its 
POn laborers a renunerction bO/o of what they are entitled. 

3. The government of the capturing nation is obligated to feed and 
clothe everj'' PO"'. .""hen there is no special agreement between 
two warring nations, the capturing state shall treat matters of 
food, bedding, and clothing on an equal footing with its own 
troops . 

4. The POW shall submit to the rules in force. If he does not, 
the supervising officer nay take stringent measures. If a P(7.7 
shall escape and be cau ht again before he has reached his objec- 
tive, ho ohall be punished. However, if ha shall have reached 
his objective, but become a prisoner again at a later date, he 
shall not be punished in the least for the former escape. 

5. The capturi.Tg nation ,'.ay permit a POV/ to talce a prescribed oath 
?-nd set hl-n fr.jo; i ut it may not force the PO".' to take this oath. 
Moreover, the government of the capturing nation need not accede 
to the request of a PO'J to take the oath and be set free, 

6. At the commencement of hostilities between belligerents, a neutral 
country shall establish a Prisoner of '.7ar Information Bureau, to 
be in operation the moment the first enemy nationals are rounded 
up on alien soil, 

7. P0'.7 mail shall be exar.ipted from the local postage regulations; 
presents and relief societ;' boxes addressed to PCTV's shall be 
free of import duties and railroad freight charges. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 599 

COMFIDEHTIAL * JICPOA Item itU^BS 

Pa-e 55 

8. Officer POV-f's shall receive the sajne pay that is granted officers 
of identical rank in the detaining countrj"-. This oay shall then 
be redeemed by the POlV's government. 

9. With the single stipulation that he shall abide by the rules 
governing order and discipline, as prescriV:ed by the An.ij'- author- 
ities, the PO'7 is granted religious freedo.n. 

10, After peace is restored, the PWf shrJ.1 be returned to his country 
as rapidly r.s possible. 

IV. UY a"N VIE."S (CONCERNli.G THE IirTSHROGATION OF POW's) 

Throughout the above stipulations, the freedom to interrogate PCTf's to 
further the operations of the capturing nation has not been granted. 
Kovievsr, I believe that when there are PO'.V's, ae between any warring states, 
it should properl' be the conventional thing to. interrogate thoai for infor- 
mation on their fightii g forces, xnerefore, I conclude that there .\s no 
need to adhere to the rules of international law and to liesitate in conduct- 
ing interrogations. Hovtever, if the POT's feelings are not given considera- 
tion, results either cannot be gained from the interrogation or will be 
meagre indeed. 

That is to say; 

A. Insofar as possible, PO'7's should be picked up separately. 

B. Conversation and communication between PO/f's should be restricted, 

C. To help elicit testimony from PC'/'s iraterial recognized to bo of 
value (documents, messa-es, etc.) should be gathered and arranged 
to the best of one's ability. The principal function- of interro- 
gation then, should be the further interpretation of this :Tiaterial, 

D. In interrogating, coercion should be the principle. Since in 
cases when the PCTT's native language differs from one's own, it 
i3 difficult to t;.ks advantage of any slip of his tongue, to 
practice detailed examination or to use indirect questioning 
(especially at tidies when one lacks confidence in one's vocabulary), 
it is easier (TN: for the interrogator) to adopt the formalities 

of a consultation. 

The feeling that the victor is superior, the loser inferior should 
pervade the incerrogation. If necessary, you should depend that 
questions and ansi"ers be made in writing. 

E. Until the object of the ir.terrogation has been attained, the PO.T 
should bu r.ip.de to feel amcious about his fate, should beco.Tie hag- 
gard physically. Consideration should be given to the PO'T's 
quarters, sustenance, surveillanoo, etc. 



ir;TE?iNATIOH/X LAT; IK TTARTUffi 

From Lt. HOSKIi'JO 

The UNITED STATES dccl?j-ed kANILA an open city (ITJ: "undefended town" 
written in Rn^iish). In ans\-er, our imperial forces continued to boj^b it. 
Finally, on 3 January they entered the city. Hovj shall our f.ctiou be 
explained in tho light of international law? 

Vfe had to consider IIAI'ILA a defended city (TN: this term rendered 
in English), and hence our attacks were ia.vful. 
(Reference ^iaterial:) 

A. The meaning of an "open city". 

The question of what rdlitary installations and troops consti- 
tute a city's defense is one to u c-oi '....'. on fact; (in practice, the 
question is whether or not the city is defcndeii). Howcvjt, there is 
no explicit authority on the subject. 

In generril, the follovdn^- cities are recognized .is "defended 
cities": 

1. A city surrounded by fortifications. 

2. A city in whose vicinity gun batteries and other positions 
hav.j been erected, 

3. A city in vihich troops are located and attempt to prevent 
the entrance of the cncm^'. (If there be a sirt-ll number of 
troops, but recognised to have no "ability to resist", the 
city shall not be treated as a "defended city",) 



600 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CO^^FIDE^iTIAL JICPOA Item ifU9^b 

Page 56 

4, A cit^'- where the -waters at the entrance to the harbor have 
been laid \.'ith (automatic) contact irdnes. 
B. VJhat Fhall be selected a^ attack objectives? 

There io sono dilTeience of opinion because of the divergenct 
of operational methods employed in naval, land, and ilr warfare, 

1. Targets in a "defended city": 

There is no necesr:it;' to limit the objectives in this 
instance to fortificationj and other defensive installations 
for troops. 

In air varfare (jombing) tjie objectives shall be the 
samo as thoss listed, in the next section. 

2. Tar^'ets in an "open city": 

a. Naval vessels (all ships used b the military services) 

b. Trooor; (ix' there are many troops located in the city, it 
shall be considered a defended city). 

c. Constructions with military possibilities: 

(1) Airfields (those which are priv&teiy owned but nuo 
be £iven over to iidliL-ary use in the future must b« 
included) . 

(2) Forts, trenches, obstructions, 

d. Jlilitary, n;-.V'l, (and airforce) installations (barracks, 
hangars, arsenals, etc.), 

e. Storage points for arms and other materiel, 

f . Factories and other installations that ma:- be put to 
military use. (Privatel:^ owned plants which vdll bo 
dofinit^ly turned over to the military ere included. 
However, accessory and sub-contract factories arc excep- 
tions . ) 

Railroads, v-ir^-lass stations, harbor installations. 
In land v;arfarc, arMss must conduct their operations by 
entering cities wi.ich render their attack and bo,-nbardmep 
impossible. In naval and air warfare, however, there ai 
no obstacles to an attack. 

3. An "open city" not resn...idi:ig to levies on its populace (The» 
are regulations to K'.eet Li.is situation in n;val warfare onl/ 
However, the same rules should ap-^lj' m land warfare. In aj 
■iiiarfare, the application of such rules would be impossible,) 

a. Should a naval force ordor a city to supply it vath the 
necc3sary provisions and stores for its irafuediate needs 
in a formal dui.iand and the city resist; (For details ( 
the execution of a levy, consult levj-i.ig orders and the 
"Regulations for Levying".) 

A lev,-- : "uuld cori-espond to tlic resources of the place 
u:-'on which it is made, and n-.ust li--ve the approval of th« 
corfi-.ander of the naval force. 

Unrestricted levlng by a SNLF., etc., and lev ing done 
by each ship is wronj-. 

b. Should the city officials fail to submit to. our orders 

It is perndssihle to assess all people in the city 
form of t<.x, but an "open city" cannot be bombardet 
because this levj- has not been collected, 

4. '/hen citie:. , towrs, and viliajes \x?:^- be bouibed in air warfare 
as objectives (this iricladed "open cities"). 

a. If a lar; e Joroe is in an area ihur.ediite to the operatic 
of the opposing land force (incVudinft; a SiiXF) and is con 
centrating it the city, tovm, or village in question, 

b. (civilians iray be in danger, hut that canr.ot be avoided. 
Hovover, iii such instances all possible steps shall be 
taken to reduce the danger to them.) 

c. (Bombing \»hich has as its object the intimidation of 
civil-i aj-is, the injury of non-co.ibatants, and the des- 
truction of non-i.iilitar:'- things is illegal.) 

However, there is no objection to destrojans indi\'idual targ» 
even if the city at a whole nay not be made an objective. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 601 

CCNFIDECTIAL JICPOA Item #4986 

P-£e 57 

C. Targets which may not be attacked (common to land, naval, r'jid air 
vjarf are ) . 

1. Religious buildings 

2. Buildings used in the learning of arts and crafts 

3. Buildings used by charity orgainizations 

4. HistoriCi.:l monuments 

5. Hospitals, collection stations for the sick amJ wounded, and 
hos;jitrl ships. 

But if it liad been a&sunod that these things would not be p:it to 
military use, and the ene.aj violated this asoumption, there cou].d 
not be the slij^htest objection to an attack. Kov-evsr in such an 
insi-ance, the existence or non-existence of the breach laust be made 
clear and attacks kept to the r.dnimuin necessitated. 

D. Is an attack without v.-arning lawful? (a step ttj.en at the outset 
of an attack) . 

In general, the cit^' officials should be notified beforehand, 
regardless of whether the city is defended Or not. 

The method of notification is left to i.he discretion of the 
attacker. The scrtterinr; of leaflets advising evacuation is one 
way. Especially should an attac>; on objects i.dthin an "open city" 
be announced, giving its .residents a considerable period of grace. 
(The length of this period wiil depend on circui:iEtance3,) 

If the situation is urgent, it is not necessarj'' to warn the 
city. It viill sufiice iS as nuch c nsiderat.ion as possible is given 
to the reduction of inconvenience to the cit"-'s inhabitants. 

^Tnsn an assault, surprise attack, etc., is an unavoidable 
military' necessity, an attjick vdthout 'vvarnir,;i is not unlawful. And 
in air attacks, too, it is not necessar; to v,arn tlie city beforehand, 
be it defended or not . 

However, an attack provoked by resistance to a levy mrst be 
preceded without foil by riOtification. 

E. Is it necessary that non-combatants be alicied to sejk refuge out- 
side the attack sectors when the city is bcin;- surrounded? 

This .say be rearlily refused, for favors based on pit-:' need 
not be carried to excess. 
II, There is evidence that the PHILIPPINE Govern;:iont employees witlidre'-n from 
MANILA on a hospital ship, ''as there an^ "thing to prevent us from subject- 
ing this ship to a visit and search and coizLig it? 

As necessary, it is possible to take charge of a ship, conduct a visit 
and search, and then i^et it on ^n isolated course or deoain it. 

However, a hospital ship i.iay not be molested as J.ong as it does not 
commit an act agair.st the enemy. 
( Reference Material : ) 

A. Definition of a hosDitsJ. ship 

1. A public vessel, private vessel, or ship of neutral registry v;hich 

is employed vdth the single purpose of succouring the sick, -.iounded, 
and ship—.vrecked. 

2. Types and markings: 

A flT ' bearing a red cross on a vi'hite field flown \,ith the 
nation.Tl flar is accepted identification. 

In each a. 1,'aval hospital ships 

case, the Painted white -..dth a lateral green stripe of about one metre 

states in in '.ddth. Built and outfitted in the country using it. 

conflict b. Privately owned hospital ships 

with the Painted white with a lateral red stripe of about one metre 

said belli- in width. Equipped by a private individual or corporation, 
gerent must r-.nd op;^ rated under orders from, the belligerent state, 

be notified c . Hospital ships of neutral registry 

of the. use Painted white with a lateral red strioe of about one metre 
of those in width. Equipped by a private individual or corporation 

ships in in the neutral stute, and must have the previous sanction 

advance, of the government of registry e^nd belligerent state. 



602 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAI. JICPOA Item ,,'4986 

- Page 58 

B. The Rights a".d Obligations of a Hospital Ship: 

1. Ko matter what nationality a ship ma^ be, it may rescue fixjm the 
sea the sick and wounded of belligerent pov/ers. 

2. Hospital ships may not bf; .itef for military purposes, 

3. Hospital ships may not interfere with the transport of combat- 
ant troops . 

Acoordinglj'', the. varships of beJJigersnt powers may direct 
a hospital ship on an isolated course. If necessary, the war- 
sliips can exercige the right of search and detention. 

4. Hospital ships operate at their ovvn xdsk: 

If the sjTabol of the hospital ship is not recognized and it 
is attacked, the rcspcnsiblity lies wholly vdth the hospital ship. 

C, In cases whort a hospital sl'dp engages in forbidden e.ctivities by 
taking advant,i,t,e of its spcciid rights as a hospital ship, such as 
engaging in the transportntion of personnel other thmi the sick, 
wounded, and survivors of ship-wreck or when it makes available infor- 
mation or engages i;. an;, other such militr.ry function, it torfoits its 
speoieil rights and may ba co.'.sid irod subject to the treatruent afforded 
ordinary ships. (According to British opinion, it xs not permissible 
for a hospital ship to return to the functions of a merchantmf-n) . 
\7hen we consider, however, those rij^hts wliich internu'cional law per- 
mits for the special handling of cases even in sick bays abocrd war- 
ships we note that the hoapiU'l ship goes beyond its allotted :oowers 
when it takes aboard (fro,ii a varship) sick and wounded. Although it 
is permissible to open firo l^-.imediately upon it, except in absolutely 
unavoidable cases, it is ■ ilo'..ed to get away. 

III. How would you, if you were Comniandor of the V.'AXE Island Occupation Force, 
have dealt with the ber\rer ^ j? a -.vhite flag? 

Though iha situacion is handled according to the decisions of the 
Commander of the Occupation Force and according to the principles estab- 
lished for land v/arfare, those .''.rticlos ',.hich treat of the situation in 
international Ir.v; are given belov;: 

A. What is meant by the bearer of a flag (TN: in Lnglish): 

1. He is acting under the orders of one of the belligerent parties 
(which indicates that he is represent ng one of the belligerent 
parties). 

His Duty: To negotiate on behalf of one of the belligerent partit 

His Identification: He bears a white flag. 

2. The bearer of the flag and the interpreter, drummer, and bugler 
w!io accompany'' him possess certain inviolable rights. 

B. Treatment of the Flag Bearer: 

1. The question of whether or hot to acknovjled^e the flag bearer who 
has been sent out is Icfi. to the discretion of the Force Conimande) 
and ho is not always obliged to receive him. 

(Hovjever, iii the a'oove case, a declaration that the flag 
bearer vill not be received is customary.) 

2. If the flag bearer takes advantage of his position tc deterrdne 
the state of affairs on our side, the Force C ■--•.'■.ander in order 
to prevent this may use >iha.t ever means h^ ■?..?",'. <•. ■ e'.3C.ry , 

3. If the enemy has abused the privilege of se;;o^,, r a vj.i.g bearer, 
he can be detained for a while. 

C. Circumstances in ".Tiich the Flt.g Bearer Loses I'lr, J:.,^iol£ble jiightss 

1. TOien he incites treach.ery or \;hen he t.-v ■ ^\j i.c:-.gc of his 
special right to furi/i^r Ids own int jr ■^"■.■" .. 

V/hen he Joes either of the above art'^. '.\ -■ .-■;:ii?'i .-tol'- f?i-fcits 
his special rights ^There should be no i>.i.-c\r-y.-L >-\ aoout t -eating 
him a^ : ;i enoiuy) . 

2. The fl?.g hearer who has been daniod r.-c ••',•■'. .'.o: t-;a:J. .ij:«:iertiatcly 
withdraw but because of this, he dooj.ir;. \i ■:•(.< hi -i :>i: ;.ial lights. 
That is to say, because reception has been d«;nied it is not per- 
missible to perform immediately a hostile ""* .■^•^a-i] ■=-• the flag 
bearer. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



603 



COt.TIDEMTIAL 



SPECIFICATIONS OF THE NO. 10 TYPE MTB 



1. HULL: 



Length Overall 

Length at Waterline (official) 

Beam 

Depth 

Displacement (official) 

" (fully loaded) 

" (light condition) 

Draft forward 

Draft aft 

Mean draft 

Fuel capacity 

Craising Rj.nre (official) 



(under special conditions) 



Maximum Soeed 



JICPOA Item 7/4986 
Page 59 



32.400 metres 

31.770 metres 
5.000 metres 
2.800 metres 

84.600 tons 

89.381 tons 

68. 2^7 tons 
1.104 metres 
1,116 metres 
1.111 metres 

17.000 liters 

Speed of 23 Knots 
for 410 lilies 

Speed of 16 Knots 
for 1200 iales 

30 Knots 



2. ARMAlffiNT: 

Type 96 25mm dual-mount machine guns, Liodel 1, Modification 1 1 

4 



Provisionally tenned 40 kilogram smoke lairing gear 
(TN: HATSUEN-K^r fj^-J^Z %. ) 

Type 99 7.7mm rifles 

Pistols 

Type 97 Gas Masks 

Steel Helmets 

Ammunition (25mm) 
" (rifle) 

" (pistol) 

T0RPL350 EQUIPMENT: 

Torpedoes Tj-pe 44 (Type 97) 

Side Dropping Gear, Uodel 2 

Director, Type 14, Kodel 2 

Type 95 i}epth Cha.rge (when torpedoes aboard, 10) 

Depth Charge Hand Launches, liiodel 2 

Air ReseiTToire 



5 
5 

18 
15 

1200 rounds 

1400 rounds 

360 rounds 



4 
4 
1 
18 
6 
2 



604 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

COKTID".imAL JICPOA Item #4986 

Page 60 

4. NAVIGATING EQUIPMEIIT: 

Type 90 Macnetic Compass, MoUel 2, Liodlfication 1 1 

Compass for Small Boats, l^odel 2 1 

5. OPTICAL ECUIPJ..EKT: 

Manoueverable Range-Finder 1 

7 Power Prism Binoculars (UOVA, Uoiel 1) 4 

Tj-pe 96 Sextant, Modification 1 1 

6. ELECTRICAL EQUmETiT: 

Prime ry Source of Power: 

Gasoline pov.ered 6 !C.' 105 V DC Generators 2 

(for steering po.ier and cooking use) 

Secondary Source Ox Power: 

Storage Batteries, llodel 3 1 

(for use in starting and illumination) 

Kavigation Light 1 

Illuminating Equipmant 1 

(including 300V; vvorking lights) 

Communication Apparatus 1 

7. RADIO EQUIPIffiNT: 

Tj-pe 96 Mark 4 Air (TT!: KU 'j- ) V/ireless, sendiiig 1 

(and receiving) 

Secondary Power Equipment 1 

Hydrophones (furnishied by special orders) 1 

8. ENGItJES: 

Main Engines - fferk 71 Model 6 intcrml combustion engines - 950 HP 

Gasoline Engines (VULCAI^; ('t /; y ) speed reduction 4 

equipment installed) 

Shafts and Scre'.vs 2 

Auxiliary En{.,ines, Steering Engines 1 

(mis Model 2 Steering Eq'oipment) 

9. CHE-T: 

Officers and "'arrant Officers 3 

Enlisted Men I5 



EXHIBltS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 605 

CON FIDEIiTIAL . JICPOA Itein //A.9S6 

Page 61 

10. PRINCIPAL STOieS: 

Anchor 100 kilograins 1 

Anchor cable - diameter 15nim 1 

Hand-operated '.'indlass 1 

Fire extinguishirig equipment, crrbon dio:d.de type 1 

ventilators (electrically operated) 

Training port (SENKAI30) (electrically operated) 3 

11. RUDDER: 

Balanced Rudder 



HEFUELLEIG Ili TUH 
1 February 1942 

1. ESSENTIALS: 

To execute refuelling safely and swiftly at any time and place desired, 
maintaining the desired iP.obile strength and preparations for Lwaediate 
response to the enecz'. 

2. PRECAUTIONS: * 

Since refuelling is an operation requiring cooperation betv;een the fuelling 
and refuelling ships, careful preparation and investigation are necessary 
before the fact in order to insure close intercommunication. 
Arrangements .nade beforehand; unitv of rjlannin?. 

3. METHODS: 

Refue^'-jig alongside: mainly done v.'ith cruisers and destroyers; suited to 
a pitching motion; large-scale refue-ing possible; siraole to perform, 
Refue.ang in tandem: possible for ships unsuited to refue". jng alongside; 
Diagonal refue'-Jjig. 



y(S"6 pc)trol ph he) 

FURUTAM 1 1 ^^"^ ^ \ K^l<0 





/</MtiG/^SA^Ljt)ij/\06A 

//?0 
rAO) 



606 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



COrTIDKNTIAL 



JICPOA Item #4986 
Page 61-A 




N|iniber \ 

Flag 



,'| Fender 

Derrick 

'^^^-^- — ri 

fs 127ram Copper m 
\A nose sra;. 




^ 



Fender 



metres 



Brivi,je 



Refueling 
Ship 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



607 



COrJFIDEIJTIAL 



JICPOA Item nk')ij(i 
Pa^e 62 



5. REFt^:ii;.GAL0nGSI3S - DIAGRAM: 

(See Enclosure) 

6. REFUSLING RECORD: 

A. Refueling method: alongside 

B. Date: 2k January 1942, 0600 

C. Place: (150° E. Long, on the eqaator) 

D. Course: 0° Course intersection angle: 

E. Shaft Speed: 6 Icnots (dangerous at 10-12 knots) Speed thru v;ater: 

6.6 knots, 

F. Rudder compensation: 5° outboard 

G. T/ind direction: 340° T/ind force: 3.5 metres per second 
H. Roll: port 1.5°, starboard 2° 

I. Barometric pressure: 758.4 nm Temperature: 25° C. 

J. Distance between ships: 30 metres. 

K. Pressure of oil pumped; 3 kilograias (TN: per sq. cm. ?) 

L. • Oil pumped: 240 tons per hour 

M. "teip;hts: 1.5 tons each '.'.'eight line: 24ram S.VJ. (steel wire) 

N. Forward rope: 48mm S.W. Mooring Rope: 48 mm S.Vf. 

7. HO?r TO CALCULnTE SHORT DISTaICES: 



■'^at.h Zt 


cK 




> 


i 


) j:i- 




As is shoijn by the chart, punct'ore a 
piece of cardboard in two places with 
large match sticks and then hold the 
cardboard in a perpendicular position. 
Align the points where the sticks are 
visible so that ttie two points and the 
waterline of the fueling ship will be 
in the sa-ne plane. The bearing on 
vjhich the distance being calculated 
lies in on the beai.i. 






8. PROPER POSITIONS FOfl TIS SF!IPS; 

Port to Starboard - Ships should be about 35 metres apart. 

Fore and Aft - The number flag flying aboard the fueling ship should 

be slightly forward of the bridge on the refueling ship. 
VJhen the ships are out of line, the proper position for each will be shown 
by numbers indicated on the side of the fueling shin. 

9. STAJ!D>>RD SIC-NALS; 

V.'hen the refueling ship hoists a white flag "The forward lines have 

been secured. No hindrance to putting out the weight." 

^Ihen the refueling ship hoists a red flag "The inboard line has been 

secured. Ko hindrance to running out the weisht," 

'Then the refuelin;- ship hoists a blue flag "The hoses have been con- 
nected. Begin to pump oil," 

V/hen the fueling shi.i hoists a blue flag "Have started to pump oil." 

After the fueling ship has started to pump oil, v/hen it hoists a blue 
flag "Have ceased pumping oil. Cast off the hose." 

V/hen the refueling ship hoists a blue fle.g "Flov* of oil has ceased. 

Hoses cast off.". 



79716 O— 46 — pt. 



608 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

C0;'FIDE1:TIAL JICPOA item #4986 

Page 63 

Completion of the Operation: 

'"hen the fueling ship hoists a red flag "Cast off inboard line." 

"■-"hen the fueling ship hoists a white flag "Cast off forward 

line< 

(For additional communication during the operation, write the message 
on a small black board and hold it up (so it may be seen).) 

10. CAlITIo^;s to be obssrved ".thek !.iAi.!Euv:.;tii]G the ships into POSIVIOM; 

(1) There must be close coordination between the turn and 'the compass. 
^'.Tien both ships draw near, there should be proper orientation of the 
magnetic compass. ^Tien the shi;js are maneuvering into position, 
changes in distances shall os made by the fuelirg ship and because 
of the deviations caused by prevalent currents, waves, and other 
elements, in the adjustment of positions, allowances shall be made 
for these variable influences. 

(2) VJhen the angle of intersection of the courses of the ships is too 
great, since this has a direct relationship to the process of suction 
between the ships, it is dangerous for theTi to approach too rapidly. 

(3) VJhen there is a variation in speed because of the displacement of 
the refueling ship, weather, and other reasons, this variation may 
be decreased when high speeds are involved by means of a standard 
rule: 

Cruisers Decrease from - 1/4 knots. 

Destro;'ers Decrease from l/4 - 1/3 knots,. If the differ- 
ences in speed are too great, great strain will 
be placed upon the foriivard line and upon the 
inboard line, 

(4) The angle of intersection of thf; course v.hich the refueling ship 
should maintain with respect to the fueling ship should be fixed 

by considering the type of the ships, speed, weight, distance between 
the ships, influencs of vdnd and waves, etc. C-enerally, 1° - 2^ 
vdll be suitable. 

If the anf:le of intersection is ^reat, there is open space betv.ieen 
the ships and if there is not much strain upon the forward and inboard 
lines, there is a tendency for the ships to nutuallj'' draw together. 



DRY-DOCKIKG OF THE KAKO 
(19 November 1941; KU.G) 

I. THE SUBORDINATE '7ATCH OFFICER' 3 DUTIES 

A. Hereafter he shell mf.nage ths docking operations 

B. Vfe olan to dock at 1030. Stand easy until then. 

C. He shall supervise the deck crc* in the changiag of the anchor cables 
and wire-rope for hawsers fore and aft. 

D. He shall prepare to cact both anchors. 

E. Using a- cutt.r, he shall chcjiga the wire-rope in the stern for a 
hawser, "'hsn finished, he shall supervise the hauling up of the 
bower cables. 

F. Aftennards, the cutter shaLl be sent ashore. 

G. He shall then supervise the securing of the gang 'ay and boom by the 
division assigned to the task, 

H. Davits shall than be t:-.:-..od inboard. 

I. After the men from the Harbor Liaster's Office have come aboard, the 

starboard gangivay shall be raised. 
J. After 0930 the use of the head is prohdbited. 
K, After docking, he shall imn\cdie.tely put into effect the port fire 

bill. Each division shall make its preparations, 
L. Otherwise^ he shall do such v(ork as is prescribed in the port bill 

(SHUTSUNYUKO 3USH0) . 
M. Attentionl Carr;' on work at handl 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



609 



COKFIDEMTIAL 



JICPOA Item ,/49B6 
Pa/ve 64 



II, (Enclosed a sketch). 



Point F\ 




III, docki::g essentials 

First, the wire rope aj't shall be taken in and replaced bj' a haviser, 
"fliile paying this out, the wire-rope fonvard shall be t^'.ken in and replaced 
by a hawser. Then haul in the anchor cable. 

One (150 ton) tu£-boat forward and one on each side airddships and 
aft. ".Mle pa^/ing out the forward hawser take in the ones aj.'t and let 
go the one forward. The fori'ard buoy wi]-l be chcinged to che starboard 
by the tug. When the tug turns at "A" (TN: see sketch) this ship -■sill 
aid in turning about by steering of the ship and then jroceed directly 
to the dock. Forward there are 2 clear!; visible iiarkers. The officers- 
in-charge of the work party are 1 Harbor Mastsr on "top" (TK: h ' "" ) 
and 1 officer-in-char^-e forward on the forecastle. 

There will be hand-flag communication betwe-^n the fonvard and ?.ft 
masts. 

Just a little before (TK: reaching) the dock the tug-boat changes 
course by turning to starboard, and lines are ;-/acsed from the shore to 
both sidea of the ship. As the stern approache's the entrance the tugs 
let go and lines are .Dasj;ed to both sides of the stem. Then while the 
starboard and ;X)r5' lines r.re being hauled the bow is pointed toward the 
two markers and the ship proceeds only by this power, (TN: i.e. by haul- 
ing on lin^s). 

When drjr-docking is complctccj, close the rear gatas and begin drain- 
age, 

(End) 



CONCFI.-fflli.'G DliY-DOCKIIvG 



STAHDAEDS OF DHY-DOCKING (Regulations for Construction and Repair of Vessels, 
Ite;n 61), 

Combined Fleet: 

1. Battleships and Carriers (those officially designated as being over 
30,000 tons displacement). 

and Special Duty Vessels — - Once a year, 

2. 'Tarahips: (Battlcfihips, Carriers (as above) excluded) 

Tivico -I ;'oar. 
Destroyers, Submarines 
Torpedo Boats and i.iine-Sweepers 

3. Special Duty Boats As necessarj'. 



610 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



COKFIDEMTIAL . JICPOA Item #4986 

Page 65 

DAILY ROUTINE ^'JHILE DOCKED 

0530 All hands turn to; calisthenics (outside the dock); swabbing 

outer decks, 

0645 Breakfast 

0730 Daily routine; Inspection 

0845 Lay to duties 

1139 Secure from duties 

1145 Lunch 

1305 Calisthenics 

1315 Commence instruction 

1600 Secure from instruction 

1615 Begin leisure tinie 

1700 End of leisxa-e time 

1715 Supper 

1745 Fire detail secures 



■ INSTRUCTIONS WHILE Hi DRY-DOCK 

1. There must be no running about on board ship. 

2. Beware of what lies under foot. Take care that you don't fall dovm onto 
the dock. 

3. A WO or above should be present vihen any heavy things are being moved or 
trcQiSDorted. 

4. The safety rope naist be used without fail whenever work is being done on 
the sides of the ship. 

5. Secrecy shall be maintained. Be especially careful of the movement of 
laborers. 

6. Fires are strictly prohibited. Do any work on the reverse side of a 
piece of oil-cloth. 

7. The fire bill in dock must be thoroughly carried out. 

8. The ship shall be fumigated upon entering and leaving the dock. 



WHEN THE KAKO LEA^-ES DRY-DOCK 
Preparations for Leavinc the Dock (25 November 1941) 

1. Hereafter (the subordinate watch officer) shall conduct the preparations 
for leaving the dock. 

2. We expect to leave the dock at 1315 • Afterwards we shall moor to buoy jfUm 

3. The fore deck crew shall prepare to moor the forward part of the ship. 

4. The anchor crew shall prepare to cast both anchors, 

5. The division assigned shall prepare to get out both gangways, swinging 
booms and propeller booms. 

6. The 1st and 2nd Divisions shall prepare to take aboard ammunition. 

7. All small boats shall proceed to the mooring place. 

8. All hands av;ay from tlieir ship shall return by 1300. 

9. Men performing work away from their ship will make certain of their life net 
10. Set about preparing to leave the dock. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 611 



COWFP)EiTO:AL JICPOA Item #4986 

Page 67 

Ships and shore stations spotting these signals shall iridicate that they 
have received and understood them by hoisting the UNCLE flag or by transmitting 
the U (or cancel-U) code Gi£nal, 



#3 

ADDiGSo BY OUR CAPTAIM UPON KI BOARDU.'G SHIP 

by Capt. TAKAHASHI, Yuji (Captain, K;iKO) 
16 November 1941 

"For three years you have studied your duties diligently. And nov( I 
believe that as you stand here, ct thp battle front, your e;notions have been 
heightened, as you sense impending action. 

PTien you reflect upon it, this is no training suqadronj you have been 
assigned directly to the front. Officers in charge of your guidance and their 
assistants have been selected; but the fact of the matter is that each and 
every one of them has his battle station and shall not be able to devote his 
whols-hearted attention to your instruction. You appreciate, I am sure, the 
present situation, and vdll not depend on others too heavily. You must under- 
take your duties assertively, with a healthy spirit of initiative. Moreover, 
at this time special emphasis should be given to the caution, 'Always be at 
your station} '. It is extremely important that line officers always be on 
the upper deck, and that they observe evo;r; thing, '''hen they are on the upper 
deck, they arc able to master anything that comes along. 

In short, the present situation is cortainly nearing its climax; indeed, 
it is in its most pregnant stage. I earnestly desire from you an uncocimon 
amount of determination and effort," 



ADDRESS ON tlS'l YEAR'S DAY, 1942 
by Capt. KISAJ'!":", Yonejiro (Captain, AOBA) 

"If we put aside our merrL-nent and stop to consider, we find that we have 
greeted this New Year's Day, in the 2602nd year of our Empire on the scene 
of battle. First, hoiveva- , we shoulc offer congratulations on the long life 
of our Emperor and Supreme Conimander. I feel thct it is not only a great honor 
for military men to greet the_Nev< Year on the battlefield, but that we shall 
long remember partaking of 'ZOKI' (TN: a traditional Japanese New Year's Day 
dish of rice cake boiled v/ith ve.-etables and meat), clad in our hot-weather 
gear. 

"However, our foe is of great strength, too. In particular, it has been 
judged that a lar^e American force of cruisers, in conjunction with carriers, 
has designs on the SOUTH SEA Islands. This force, v;hich is charged with the 
heavy duty of protecting the oCUTK SEAS, must not relax its vigilance for one 
second, ''.'e have v;hetted our swords ten years for this one battle. 1942 shall 
be the year in v/hich we will exalt our military laight before the world, and 
in which we ',jill achieve the object of our sacred war. Let each ;nan strive 
his hardest," 



612 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CCNFIDStrriAL JKPOA Item #4986 

Page 68 

ADDRESS NO. 4 TO THE COIBINED FLEETS 

(2003, 23 May 1943) 

By the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets 

On this occasion we paj' our respects to the memor;/ of a leader of 
the Combined Fleet, to a man whom we still remember. YAUAiiJOTO, the late Com- . 
mander-in-Chief, died at the front. If we annihilate our stubborn enemy even 
at the cost of our lives, we will know that his spirit lives on. 

During the past year and a half of this struggle, \:e have smashed 
the power of our great enemy snd though vie have, in the main, carried out our 
basic strategy, our enemy is striving for ultimate victory by expanding his 
preparations for offensive action and by devising plans for the strategic 
application of new weapons. Furthermore, taking advantage of the tide of the 
war in EUROPE, he is concentrating his main power in the GHiif.T EAST ASIA Area 
and is preparing to launch a counter-offensive. IIo matter how nanj'- times the 
enemy may advance against us, we shall always welcome combat v.'ith hin and in 
exterminating him and securing for ourselves the ultinate victory, we shall 
by united effort and perseverance forge for ourselvee a greater and greater 
military power. At the same time that wo manifest & relentless spirit of 
attack, we shall be prepared to maot.the changing conditions of warfare with 
new strategies and new weapons, alviaya keeping one stop ahead of the enemy. 

The war is now at its peak, ''fe defend what is ours and the task of 
meeting and striking the enemy must be the prerogative of the Imperial Navy. 
We shall defend ourselves to the last broath and shall totally destroy'' the 
enemy. Should we cross paths with tho enem^' upon the eoas, thiat will be fine. 
We shall in our traditional way close in upon him and deliver fierce attacks. 
We look forv.'ard confidentljr to seeing our encmj'- vanquished. 

If in accordance with this desire we doTote ourselves wholeheartedly 
to the utter destruction of the enem;-, being animated by the spirit of the late 
Comnander-in-Chiof YAilAMOTO, we shall be united, first of all, with the brave 
soul of the Admiral of the rteet and than with those many others now in Heaven, 
and shall be able to look forward to the crushing of the anomy and the fulfil- 
ment of the great responsibility of the defense of our fatherland. 

Let each and every one ponder well upon this task; let us all, by 
exerting our efforts look forward to the realization of the Imperial wishes 
by carrying to its conclusion this responsibility. 



( END ) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 613 



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
WASHINGTON 



SOURCE DOCUMENT #10 
(iNTERROGAnON OF JAPANESE PRISO^rER OF WAR 
CAPTURED FROM THE JAPANESE SUBMARINE I-l 
WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR) 
ENTITLED 
"KUBOAKI, TAKEO, SUPERIOR CLASS ENGINEER PETTY OFFICER, 
INTERROGATION OF" 
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE 
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR IHE ATTACK CN PEARL HARBCR" 
(Record of Proceedings, pages U32-ii60), 

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 

IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION 

OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR) 



614 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Aa/(25) 
Serlai' 0351 

CONFIDEN TIAL 

Ppom: 

To: 

Subject: 

Bnolosuret 

U 
tlon and use. 



Srora PACIFIC FORCE 
07 THE iraiTSD STATBS PACIFIC FLEET 
HEADqpARTEaS OP THS C0?£.IA1;D^ 



mR 



2 i9r- ■ 



The Ccaonander South Pacific Area and 
South Pacific Force. 
Distribution List. 

KUBAAKI, TAI^EO, Superior Class Engineer 
Petty Officer* interrogation of. 

(A) Subject Interrogation. 

Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith for inforna- 



DISTRIgJTl OM 
COlSSCH - 1 
CINCPAC - 1 
VICEOPNAV (ONI) ' Z 



CDT KARCORPS 
COIISOV/ESPAC 
ICPOA - 2 
COLIAIRSOPAC 
KJORD - 1 
3D3HIPS - 1 
HJPERS - 1 
COUAIRPAC - 



- 1 
- 4 



- 2 



CTP 11 
CTP 16 
CTP 18 
CTP 62 
CTP 64 
CTP 67 
CTP 69 






ComiTHIBPORPAC - 1 
COHAI!PHIBPORSCnESPAC - 1 
COMGEKSOPAC - 14 
COIIGEN Ist LIAC - 2 
NZNB - 1 
COIJCARDIV 22-1 
_fiir[ GHQ, New Delhi, India - 3 



^/i/!' 



H. D. MODLTON, 
Flag Secretary. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 615 

SOtnE PACmC FGRCS 
WUl'Witij Febrvary 26, 1943. 

JSZiiUmTlPK QJCr SOBOAgt. TAEO. SOPSRIOR CLASS SN&IN8SR P, 0» 

(Interrogator: Lt. Col* H. D. Harris, U.S.la.C.) 
(Interpreter: Gapt. J*. R. ShiTely, U.S.Il.C.R.) 

gffy^^ History; 

POVf was oaptured from the I-l after liaTine spent 24 hours in 
the water« Be was suffering from shark bites on the right heel and 
left forearm* POU had oonrpleted 9 years serrioe in Nip Navy; was 
28 years old; and had attended high school. The POV/ had a course 
at the Me^hanios School and tten finished tin SRbma^ine school and 
had returned to Ijechanios School for an additional course* POVf 
served aboard 1-4 for 1 year. POV; had been on the I-l for 26 months; 
previously to that he was on the KA.TORI from November 1939 to Ootobei 
1940. The POW was on duty with the diesel engines on both the KATOR^ 
and the 1*1. 

Identifications : 

The POV/ said that the oomuander of the 6th Fleet was 7ice 
ASmiral WHPSSU, Vise Admiral SEIL'JW formerly eommanded the 6th 
Fleet. 

The PO¥ir gave the following names for the officers of the I^l: 

Cewnanding Officer > SAKAI-IOTO, Lt. Gomdr* 

Znginser Officer • BDTO, Eisao, Lt. 

Ounnery Officer •> OUCAWA, Ensign 

A8st« Eng. Officer - FITJII^ V/arrant Officer 

Electrical Officer - SlAI, ^^arrant Officer 

Torpedo Off leer - was a warrant officer • neme xinlcnown 

Navigator • was a Lt* (Jg) * name unknown 

Operational Infomatiw : 

Following repreacDts a chronologioal record of I*X operations 
obtained from POW: 

1. I3ecesiber, 1941 - operated in Pearl Harbor area, 
firing several torpedoes at transport • no hits. 1^1 was 
attaeked on 2 or 3 occasions without effect, 

2* Jaavarj 13, 1942 - returned to Japan via Marshalls 
vdwre I-l refueled. Torpedo supply replenished in Jspan* 

3. February 2, 1942 • departed Japan aul proceeded to 
Indian Ocean remaining thera 2 months. One merchant Ship was 
attaelaed and sunk (probably Australian). The I«l developed 
engine trouble (bsoken shaft). 

- 1 - 



616 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIlENTIAL , r ^3 

If April 2, 19^2 * rotumed to Japan for onrerbftiilf re* 
nalnlag there 3 months* The ^after gun was removed and ship 
rigged to oerry one large motcr landing oraft ( jlIAIEATSU) . 
Ship's complamant was supplemented by 3 additional cien to 
man landing boat. 

5* During Jxily the I-l was In Aleutian waters on a 
cruise whloh lasted about 50 days, during ifAiioh no U.S. ships 
or planes were sighted. 

6* September 10, 19(t.2 • departed Jooan tar Rabaul, 
operating in Solomons area without incident until end of 
October. 

7* November 1, 1942 « returned to Trulc. 

&, Novei±er 10, 19Ei-2 - departed for Japan. 

9* November 20, 19i|.2 • azrired Japan, renal nlng there 
until end of December. 

10. Janxiary 3, 19(^3 • departed ICokosuka, Japan, for 
Trulc In company with I>17* The liQSASHI and "^CAKATO were ob* 
served at Trulc. The HAYATAXA left a day or two later, 

11, January XO, 1943 * proceeded to Habaul (ship re- 
painted; ei^lne trouble developed (clutch]}. Proceeded to 
Guadalcanal. 

12 • January 29, 19't'3*- 1*1 vms attadced and destroyed 
Jan\xiry 29, 1943, vftiile transporting stores aid supplies to 
Guadalcanal. 

Technical^ Information ; 

1. The 1*1 carried 53 centimeter torpedoes - the speed 
of which was estimated to be 50 knots. Air pressure was 200 
kg. per SQ. cm. 

2. The EATORI is powered vdth turbinss, main engines, 
supplemented v«lth dlesel auxiliaries. Speed under dle£>el is 
14 knots; dlesel and turbines combined Is 18 knots (carries 
one plane ) , 

3. The 1-17 is equipped with a monoplane (silver color) 
T*loh v4ien submerged Is housed Itorward of conning tower. 

4. Class *'I" subt^rlnes carrying planes are the: 

7, S, 9, 15, 17, 19, 21 ani 23 (planes were re- 
cently removed as battle ^eax from the 1-5 and 1-6). 

. 2 . 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 617 



COHFIEEWgjq 

5. "RO** subs, idilBh are smaller thux the "I" elasa^ 
do not carry plft&as. 

6. Tba "I" class sulmarlaBB oarrylo^ ial<lg6t<<iMi^ 
narlnes aret 

16, 18, 20, 22, 2^. 

7« Tbe MDSASHI aid 7AMAT0 (BBs) are apparently tin 
same size with 3 turrets of 3 guos eaoh believed to be y^Tf 
large* 

8» Tbe t«l required about one minute and 30 second ■ 
to submerge oonq^lstely and did not change course vAiile sub* 
merging. 

M iscellaneous ; 

!• Submarine sinkinss developed were on the approzi* 
mate dates as follows: 

1.63 • prior to Deeeidaer 7» 1941* 

1*124 • January, 19<^2. 

1*123 - September, 1942. 

1-15 - October, 1942. 

1*4 * about December 15, 1942. 

1*3 * Deoenbor 15* 1942. 

2*28 • no date. 

Z-1 * Jamary 29, 1943. 

2. Temperature rises to 40^ centigrade aboard larger 
subs. 

3. The following submarine divisions (SEIISUITAJ) are 
reputed to be based at Tokosuka: 

1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7» 8, and 9. 

4* ?our submarines are reported to be under con* 
struotion at Yokosuka (interval of construction 3 to 4 
months, output * 1 sub per month). No information on 
rate of produotion at other yards could be given by POW. 

5. Air attack alarms used at Rabaul are: 

(a) Siren (Suring day. 

(b) Red rockets at night. 



- 3 - 



618 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDENTIAL 

6. An airfield is knov«Q to be on Truk ( Island ct 
TAKESnU-lA.) . Service personnel at TruJc is principally 
navy (5,000), practically no army. Recreational facilities 
are provided. 

7« Tbere is a base hospital at Txuk, possibly on 
NATSU ISLAND. 

8* Following Qonsaents wore also made by POW: 

(a) V/bile in Rabaul (January. 19i»3). be did 
not get ashore much. However, sake was to be had 
aboard. 

(b) Believed sub sinkings in general prinol« 
pally eausod by depth oharges* 

(o) Preference of daty is aboard "I" olass of 
aibs* However, has had no experience with "SO** olaeSi 

(d) Doesn't consider submarines are partiou- 
larly good protection against ensmy subimrlnBS (how* 
ever, PO'J has never encountered eneniy subtoarlnes). 

9* POTf had heard that HOSEO (CV) was sunk and saw 
the SSOKAEd under repair at Yokosuka in December. 

10. Repair capacities at Rabaul are limited to th« 
faoilitjes carried on the one repair ship stationed there. 



- 4 - 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 619 



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
WASHINGTON 



SOURCE DOCUMUJIT #11 
(iNTHRROGATrCN CF JAPANESE PRISONER OF WAR 
ITHO PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR 

AS A mmm of the cre^.t cf the (cv) kaga) 

ENTITLED 
"PRISONER OF WAR YOKOTA, SHIGEKI" 
USED BI THE NAVY IN COICPILING THE 
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PFJRL HARBOR" 
(Record of Proceedings, pages U32-ii60) 

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATICN 
OF THE ATTACK (1^ PEARL HARBOR) 



620 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



621 




622 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



623 




79716 O— 46 — pt. 13- 



-17 



624 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



•a5 Hi'rOf:;-P'^o 

He knew no 

i .J ,.ith that of 

;.",at he 6^ A nr-" knoi 

-■> ^ <•■ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



625 



scrub, not higher itan ,':: or 3 1 ■■;t, an-j nc tre-. a could b« seen. Gr: 

-■- • "-'■ •••''■>. snow, but' thiirt; wfes nc ice in lay or a9h(3*(::, R} saw :,;. .,: i.,-- 

Ivcrs cr si«a-aps. thf coastal ar-ia appeared to fcs imlrthabitiad-taKept 
■ n «ho Itvua in 3 houses near pier. It was, 'howe-ser, 'impossiblii to 
.3: - details of a^ntre or North-Ea&tcnr; side of bay from KhGA, and view fcv-yond 
p.i.,r WJ53 obscurt,!;! bj* law iiills srid ari v-ateantet.nt. 



■ PH est! ■' of I 

(.ntrance and opp. t-a ix 

rock close, inshor ...-,„■ . ^.tiira o: 
but h.: did not kjaoii e»tct depth. 



.;y to bu 6,0C0 actres {>jid diatartoe btstwctn 
2,000 s-t-trti. Hii thought thore w!*a ?. large 
■—", **"- — "•i'^&par than aost harbcws", 
~itor right up to foreshore* 



Wind isms ftaa Korth-,Vcst , 
fii''! Pic.r tnd Vicinitv. There 



' rn hica of bay. It was coristructed of concrete and stones, about 15 
■• .; lor:g, L :i..tr«,g wid^. , 2 to 3 metres high, aixi hsd stvps cut at the end, 

: e.,i,jht wf;S 'iifiicult to j^*-5~ ' £ wvas v/t re fairly high alongside;. 
; • -ves no crsne or struc-^' Dtpfch of writer at stops w.-;s aboat 5 

r s, . Frf hni l-Rd-,d -it te ecci'sioti to burn rubbish, but wf.s not 

lovred to ■ inmcdi" t vici-i:..'- . k -suit!! er<y ideal fishcrrfii.n. 

■ wss lar'; h , l'!nd ,d. 



- .. ij. . eiv to South of 
aut CQoLd be- seen -from pier. 
eibo-ut 1 JO (10 ft)"hi<^. 
3ts (See:-; Sut-Soc (iv)). 
•'■*, bat statesd ther.,,- w»s 



626 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 627 



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
WASHINGTON 



SOURCE DOCUMENT #12 
(A NAVY STUDY OF JAPANESE ESPIONAGE IN HAWAIIAN ISLANDS 
GONSISnWG CF 
(A) 
COlflii LETTER TO CNO SERIAL OOOli WITH ENCLOSURE lUl.T) SERIAL 23li 

(B) 
CINCPAC-CINCPOA LETTER TO CNO SERIAL 0O07U2 
(C) 
COIFIFTH FLEET LETTER TO COTIENCH US PACFLEET SERIAL 000179 

(D) 
COICEN HQ 5th PHIBCORPS LETTER TO COMFIFTH FLEET SERIAL 00037UB 

with 
ENCLOSURE HQ 5th MARINE DIVISION i;96 CIC DETACH, SASEBO, KYUSHU, 
13 OCT li5, MEMO FOR THE AC OF S, G-2, 
WITH ACCOJff'ANYING IvIAP AND SKETCH OF KAUI AND OAHU ISLANDS 
SH057ING THE LOCAnONS OF ATTACKING JAPAITOSE 
AIRCR/iFT CARRirRS, AIRPLANES AND SUBIJARINES) 

ENTITLED 
"PRE-WAR ESPIONAGE IN THE HAWAIIAN ISUNDS, 
REPORT at] PRE-WAR HONOLULU COTiERCIAL BROADCASTS CONTAINING 
CODED INFORJXATION FOR THE. JAPANESE FLEET" 

USED BY IHE NAVY IN COMPILDIG THE 
"NAVY SUMtiARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FCR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" 
(Record of Proceedings, pages U32-U60) 

(EXTE^DED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 
IN THE JOINT CONGRFSSIONAL INVESTIGATI Cl[ 
OF IHE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBCR) 



628 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Serial 
TOP SECRET 



23 

0004 J . c.irr 

CO^-.T3CI. 
NO 



tLss:^... 



14TH NAVAL DISTRICT 

OFFICE OF COMMANDANT 

c/o Fleet Post Office 

San Francisco, California 

10 November, 1945. 



3rd ENDORSEMENT on HQ VPhibCorps 
Top Secret Ltr. 091/130, Serial 
000374B dated 14 October 1945. 



Fran: Commandant FOURTEENTH Naval District. 

To: Chief of Naval Operations. 

Svibject: Pre-War Espionage in Hawaiian Islands. 

Biclosure: (A) Top Secret Memo for DIO I4ND from Lt. R.H. 

Peterson, USNR, dated 7 Nov. 1945, Subject: 
Pre-Wair Honolxilu Commercial Broadcasts Contain- 
ing Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; 
Report of. 



1. 



Foirnarded. 



2, ihclosure (A) is submitted in accordance with paragraph two 

of second endorsement on basic letter. 



S.A. TAFFDIDER.- 



Copy to: 

Com 5th Fit (3rd Ehd. & Qicl (A). 
ComGenVPhibCorps (3rd Ehd. & Bicl (A) . 
CinCPac/POA (3rd Ehd. & End (A). 



>) Rooin205S fM 

<•• • ' ; ' - 



— im^t 







EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



629 



avrULi 0004 

TOP SEGKB 

10 lbT«ab«r, 1945. 

3yi E3B)0RSm«lff on HQ TPhlbCoxpa 
Top SMrai Lfcr. 091/130, Serial 
OOOyjkB <Ut«d U Ootebar 1945. 

FNat OommaridMit FOURTEENrH Naral Dlstilot. 

Tot Chief of Vacnl Operations. 

Subject I Pre-war Eepiona^ in HaMdlan lalands. 

&ioloeurei (A) Top Seeret Uano for DIO 14ND from Lt. R.H. 

Peterson, USNS, dated 7 Nor. 1945, Subject i 
P re- w ar Honolulu CoMwroial Broadeasts Contain- 
ing Ceded Ihfonution for the J^>enese Fleet) 
Report of. 



1. 



Fenwrded* 



2. Bieloaure (A) is stitnitted in aeoordenee with paragraph two 

of aeoond endorsement on basis letter. 



S.A. TAFPINDBK. 



Copy tot 

Coa 9th Fit (3rd Old. k Ehol (A). 
CooGenVPhibCorps (3rd Ehd. ft lihol (A) . 
ClnCPao/POA (3rd fod. 6 E^cl (A). 



3^fl[i!I)2l)5fi 



'*^L. 




-^¥ 



/f^ 






630 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Coiirtt-r-:-. ^Jovcl D.-itr.:l 

6th Moor. Young Hatol, 

Honolulu, liiwoii 

tmiai t94 Top secret "»/«»• 

T9r fig KIT 

▼ ■oTMWr It4t 

NBtO rORt Tta« Diftrist Zllt«llii«nM Offi«M>. 

•abj««t t yr«->ilKr Honolvlu Oa«i«r«ial BroaA«*«tt Oantaialac 
Ood«A Znfonuttioa for th« J«|Ma«i« nttt; Rsyort 
of. 

ftoforoaoo} (a) BQ. fifth Marino Oinoion, 40eth OZO Oote^Mont 
T0> SURET Moaoraadua f or tho A0 of S, O-t, 
datod IS Oot. IMS. ovbjoott rro-«br toioMgo 
la tho lavallaa Ifiandi. 

1. Roforoaoo (a) dlooloooo that Yoohlo tilXOA Lt.Ooadr.. UN, 
arlator who yartiolpatod la tho Japaaooo attaox on Foarl HarlMr 
on 7 Doooabor 19CL, aado tho followlac otatoaonto, la oubotaaoo. 
oa 9 Ootebor 104S to Rebort M. Talt, SpoolaX Aeont, CIO, at 
Oaura, Kyuoha, Jayaai 

(a) That ho bollOToA ^oito itroaf^ that Inforaatloa 
ooBOoralag all aoToaonte of ohlpo Into and oat of 
Foarl Harbor aao traaoalttod to tho floot throagh 
oodod aoooagoo broadoaat oror a Roaolala ooaaoroial 
broadoaotlac otatlon} 

(b) fhat, la hla oplnloa, tho oodof wtro aanjr and Tarlod 
bat that If, for oxMplo. It «aa broadoaot that tho 
•oraan attaoho loot oao dog, it aight aoan that a 
oarrlor loft Foarl Harbor, and that if, for anothor 
osaaplo, tho Oonua attaoho van tod a oook or a 
heaaobogrf It ali^t aoan that a battloohlir or oruloor 
had ontorod tho harbor) 

(o) That tho (forogelag) inforaatloa had boon glTon to 
hU br Lt.Ooadr. mfoham MURATA, IJM, Ohlof of tho 
Air iqaadron aboard tho flagohip AKAiSI, on tholr 
rotam to Jayanj 



(d) That tho (forogolng) laforaatien aao oonTojrod on 
radio prograao Jaot folloaing tho novo broadoaot 
ahl^ (SnOA otatod) aoro at 06S0, ItOO, 1900; 



(o) That tho tlao foUovlBff tho 1000 broadoaot aao 

frobablr aood, olnoo tho Japaaooo afoato voald thMi 
ha^o had an o yp o rta aity to oonToy Inforaatloa ooo- 




.'^- 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



631 



14KD/AS-2 
8«rlal 294 



TOP 



v^r 



TO? agCRKT 



0ubjeet: Pr«-War Honolulu Co«n«rol«l Broftdeasts Containing 

Ood«d Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of. 

oeming a whole day's aotlTltlee; 

(f) That, on the first Saturday the fores vas st sea, 
reports vers reoelTsd that there were onlj one or 
two oarriirs in Pearl Harbor; 

(g) That, on 6 Oeoeaber 1041, sonetime between 2000 
and ZIOO (Hawaiian time) news oame to him regarding 
nuabers of ships in Pearl Harbor; 

other 

(h) That he eould offer no ^eads oonec.' ..r«£ the espio- 
nage conducted for the attack than that of the 
Honolulu Broadcasting Station; 

(1) That, on 6 December 1941, the force was 800 ailes 
dus north of Hawaii, end that they then reoeired, 
fron the Japanese Havjr Departaent, a wirelee>s 
message "Oliab Mt. Niitaka", which was the signal 
for the attack. 

2. On 90 October 1946, rsi .Honolulu and 0-2(010} Honolulu 
were furnished one copy each of reference (a) by the Acting 
District Intelligence Officer, 14KD. PBI-flonol^iu, Q.2(CID) 
Honolwlv) and Dip-14MP cowduated oheok s of their respective 
files with negative results in locating trsJiseriptlons, 
continuity scFijlits, or outlines af prograsa lAiioh had eaanated 
froa stations t(BfB and KOU for the period of 27 November 
throu^ 6 Deoenber 1941. 

9. On 91 October and 1 November, 1946, reporting officer 
interviewed J. Hoirard WomiAL, i^anager of Station KGMB, 
Honolulu, }Aio stated substantially as follows after checking 
the files and transcription library of tOHBi 

There are no pre-war transcriptions, continuity scripts, 
or station logs for news, want-ads, or other local 
prograns. Including those which were given in the 
Japanese language, in our files or library. Transcriptions 
of the Jaoanese orograas were made for many weeks orior 
to the mir rl^t up to 7 December 1941. All of these, 
with the exception of those for about 1 through 6 Decea- 
ber, were cleaned out of our files and destroyed about 
tvo years ago following a discussion I had with sither 
the Army Intelligence or the FBI. I recall that it was 



- 2 • 



632 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
»«rial 254 ^ ^ ■■'— - 

8abj0Ot: Pr«-Har Honolulu Commcreiid Broadeaats Containing 

Ood«d InfomatlMi for th« Japanese fle«t; Report of. 

oon««4ed, I think bjr th« fBX, t^iat th«r« vas no reason 
yA)j «M ahottld eontinue to keep old mtterial in oar 
librury vtwn ve noedod the epaoe mo bedly. All of that 
■aterlal uhioh tho krmj wanted had be«i picked up, end 
the portion that was left, eoneieting of transorlptione 
of the Japanese programs, had been censored before it 
went out over the air. To my knowledge there was nerer 
anj eorreep<«denoe on the subjeet of cleaning out our 
files. )ta have kept no station logs oror two years old; 
the rCC rehires that we keep loge about two years before 
destroying thea. 

The transcriptions of Japans ss jprograas for about 1 



tlurott^ 6 "nnRrffbAy IS-II ^Nim turned brer lib ^Jor Henry 
G. Ptt^asi of Ansy Intelligence a short i^ile plter the 
war started. I recall that Hugh Lyttel (phonetic) and 
(fnu7ll1»rlght (phonetic) of Amy Intelligence were 
frequently up here early in the war assisting or working 
with Major Putnam. 

Oeorge FUJITA (George Maauso fUJITA) was in charge of the 
Japaneee prograas and HATASniOA (Akiyoshi HaYhSHII^a) went 
over the transcriptions prior to their being put on the 
air to make sure they contained nothing subversive or 
objectionable. HA3fA8HIQA was reooaraended to ue by Mr. 
Shivers of FBI as being entirely responsible and trust- 
worthy. Material gathered for the Japanese prograa as 
well AS the Want-Ads prograa had no direot connection with 
newspaper ads; ada which went out over the radio could 
have appeared in the newspapers although radio. time was 
bought separately froa newspaper space. 

Our librarian prior to and during the early part of the 
war was Alan LiasER, in ay opinion sntirely reliable, 
trustworthy and loyal. LI33SH if presently working in 
8an Francisco for station KTRC and would orobably recall 
the details of what we had 'and didn't have in the library 
during that period. 

As a rule, no transcriptions were made of local news or 
Want-Ads prograas; such broadcasts were prepared in note 
or continuity foni and given direot to the 'aike" by the 



• S - 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 633 



14ND/A8-2 
Serial «34 



T ft f ^ ^ c Rs y 

Subject: Ifm-Tilfkr Honolulu Cosm«reial Bro«deaat* Containing 

Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; R«poz»t of« 
— ..•...._--.-«..-.._-->-•-.- "'" 

annotuieer. 

Our Hllo station, KHBC, vas under a similar arranseneBt 
vlth reepeet to prograns glren In Japanese. A young 
VKKi^R, Miss Kazuho nZGUCIu, an Aiserlean eltlten of 
Japanese anoestry, euperrlsed and oensorvd all suoh 
progrABs before they went out 0T»r the air; ahe waa 
also reconmended to us by Mr. Shivers. 

4. On 31 Ootober 1946, reporting officer IntenrlewBd N. A« 
MULflbMY, Manager of Station KOU, Honolulu, who atatad tub- 
stantlally as follovs after checking his fllea: 

I i^tLP"*** ^*^* "* flft not have -tteR_iBontlmilty seripts 
o r prograi mitllnaa y<Ht *re_loo>lag foir. ~Be~lrM- 
•oriptlon£ were iR&t„£f. j|roj?*aas glTvn In Japanese 
during the pre->1ffar jpfrisd. He did aaKi~up continuity 
aori:ptf for Ihoae programs during that period. Copies 
of these serlots were furnished to DZ0-14MD, fRI-Honolalu, 
and Amy Intelligence; the copies were translated and 
sent back, with cownents, before the prograas went oa 
the air. As I recall, all of the scripts In our files 
were picked up shortly after ths war started by Aray 
Intelllgenoe. Z have the idea that soae were sent to 
tfashlngton: none were ever returned to XGU. I don't 
recall what person or persons picked up the scripts. 

Up until several aonths before the war, rURUKAUfA 
(5hlgeo rUKUKAVA) was In charge of the Japanese Sunday 
prograa; he was dishonest In his dealings with KOU. 
After he left this work, GOTO (Richard Hlsashl GOTO) 
was m charge; Jack NAVAIANI (Jack Iwasaburo NANAZaNI) 
did the announcing on week days. Material gathered 
for the Japanese Sunday prograa case froa subecrlbers 
contacted by FUHUKAMA and OOTO; the aaterlal didn't 
come fron the newspapers, few. If any, of the pr o graaa 
originating locally, including news and Want-Ads, were 
transeribed before being put on the air. NAMATAMI 
gathered aaterlal for the dally pregraae. 



- 4 - 



634 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

14III)/Ae-2 . ^^T^ ^^^^^^ 
Mrial 8S4 i CV "^ / "^ ET 

TO? 3K0REt 

Subject t Pre-vfar Honolulu CoBmcreial Broadoasta Containing 

Coded Infontatlon for the Japanese rieet; Report of. 

0. On 31 October 1946, reporting officer Interrleved L. R. 
PAMBON, Superrlaor of Federal CoBnunieationa Coi^ieeion, 
Honolulu, \iho stated substantially as follows: 

rgQjade no tranijsrlptlons of prograas originating fr<Mi 
HonoltuuPEnraadeasting stations prior to the var, exoept 
for the period of one week in July, 1941. At that tiae, 
looal prograas given in foreign languagee over KOMfl and 
K(W were traneoribed at the speelfio request of fCC in 
Washington and were forwarded to Washington without 
being translated loealljr. 

Coanercial broadcasting stations are required to keep 
station logs for one year before destroying thea. 

Amateur radio stations continued epex^ting right up to 
7 Deeeaber 1941. Czoept for speoifio oases iriiich were 
Oheoked \3f our aonitors, there were no records or tran- 
seriptions laade of aaateurs' transaissions in T.H. 
Tn'mix reports of speoifio eases oheoked by our aonitors 
ware forwarded long ago to FCC m Vashington. 

6. On 1 HoTsaber 1945, reporting officer interriewad Lt.Oel. 
WUson 0A0DI9 kOS, Pttbile Relations Office, 02, Port fthafter, 
Oatea, aho stated substantially as follows; 

Z worked very closely with Major Henry C. Putnaa In the 
Public Relations Office, 02, in the early part of the 
aar. X do not recall that Major Putnaa STor picked up 
transcriptions of any Japanese prograas froa kQHS follow^ 
lag the war. If he had, they would probably be in the 
files here or at a-3(CIU) Honolulu. Z feel certain that 
be has none of the transcript ions or continuity scripts 
with hia at the present tiae. 

After cheaklBg thoroughly In the files here, Z ean state 
that no su<^ transcrintions or continuity seripts are here. 

Major Putnaa' e present aitdress is Mid-Paolfie Liaison 
Offioer. Bureau of Public Relations, War Departaent, 
Washington 26, D. C. Major Putnaa will be baok at Port 
niafter, Oaha, about 1 Deoeaber 1946. 



- S - 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



635 



14NO/A0.2 
Svrlal 234 



TCP ,S^CRET 



fOP aEOP. ET 

8ttbj90tt 



Pr«-Mur Hcmolulu Cowmtfrolal BroadMUits Oontalninc 
Ood«d Information for th« Japan*** n**t} Report of. 



7. On SI Oetob*r, 2 and 9 NoT*mb*r 1946, fll*a of th* HoboI«1« 
Star-Bulletin, the Honolulu Advertiser, axtd the Arohivee of 
Hawaii vere checlced for infor?Mition pertinent to oode aentionad 
in reference (a). Nothing was found under Uant-Ade and other 
toetione in either ne>f«T>ax>er for the T>eriod of 27 Movenber 
through 6 Deoenber 1941 regarding the Oenaan attaoh* losing on* 
dog or the Oeman attache wanting a eook or houseboj. 

8. files of the ArchiTee of Hawaii, Konolulu, eh*ok*d on 3 
Kovember 1945, dieelosed the following inforaation relative 

to times of new*, want-ads, Japane*e isfrogrRms. and other progr a n* 
inmedietely following on stations XQMl) and KQU for ft, 9, and 
(aoheduled for) 7 Oeecnber 1941 > 

j^^ - Friday. S Deegmber 1941 ? this sohedul* rcpressntatir* 
of other week dajs: 

0716 He%rs 

0730 Wake Up and LIt* 

0630 News 

0036 Listen Ladies 

0946 News and Vant-Ads Progran (Mrs. Nita BKKCDXOT) 

1000 Around the Town Vith Gene Sawgrer 

1215 News 

ises stock Rotations 

1246 Japanese Progran 

1415 Columbia's Bohool of the Air (CBS) 

1600 News 

1605 Plantation Melodies 

1736 Mews 

1740 Show Parade 

1930 Kews 

1946 Joto Mesbit's Paasiog Par^kd* 

2059 streaalined Headlines 

eiOO Anos 'n* Andy 

2126 News (CBS) 

2130 Here's Morgan 

2200 Kews 

2215 Swing Koetume 



- • - 



636 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



t«rlal 234 

T9f sfiP^ 



SECRET 



Subject t frt^^lmr Honolulu C<Mvn«x>oial Broadeast* Containing 

Coded Inforutlon for tb« Japancs* flaet; Raport of. 



the foregoing except for the foil owl 



ng: 



sane at 



1415 Saturday Neva (following Japanese Prograa) 
14S0 football fiame Broadcast 
1945 80th Oenturj Serenade 
2130 South Aaerioan Vaj 

0600 to 0830 - Japanese Prograa 

0990 Newa 

0946 aporte Reporter 

1900 New* 

1915 Charioteers 

2200 Hews 

2215 Serenade in the Kifi^t 

iS3i r frlflaj. B flfQeia^wr ^flil; this schedule 

representative for oth«r week days: 

0600 Japanese CoBnaunltjr Prograa 

0646 Easy Tunes and Toplos 

0700 Shell Transradio News 

0710 Persan's Footwear Parade 

0800 Shoppers' Qulde 

08X0 Sunshine Prograa (C. Dropaan & Go.) 

0815 Bulletin Board 

0630 Shoppe Serenade 

0845 Waikiki on the Air 

0950 Shell Transradio News 

1000 Musio Sehool 

1046 Japanese Prograa 

1130 We The Abbotts 

1215 Miell Transradio Mews 

1226 Oddities in the News 

1900 Shell Transradio News 

1915 Parker ?aiiil7 (NBC) 

2?.56 Shell Transradio News 

2300 Ending 6987th Da7 of Broa4east 



- ? - 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



637 



14ND/A8-2 ^ 

8«ri«i 234 Top s^cfet 

yOP SEORST 

Subject: Frc-War Honolulu Comcroial BroaAaaata Containing 

Codad Information for the Japanaaa flaet; Raport of. 

Sc)iedule fo r Saturday. 6 Deoeabar 1941. aaaw aa 
forag^oing axoapt for tha following: 

1000 Morning Matinae 

1225 Interlude 

1715 Beyond tha Nawa 

1730 Ranoh Houae Roundup 

1915 Band Concert froa A.& K. YWCA, 

Schedule for Sunday. 7 Pacewber 1943.; 

1300-1450 Japanese Prograit 
1930 Shell Tranaradio lieira 
1945 Red 3kelton 4 Ooapany 

0. There la no record of tranacrlptiona or oontimii^ aeripta 
of Japaneae and other nrograma broadoaat by atationa KHBO, 
Hllo, Ha;reil» and KTOH, Llhue, Kauai, during the period of 
87 Soveraber throui^h 6 Daceaber 1641 in the fllea of the three 
Honolulu invdfftipativft agencies or at atationa KGMa and XCKi. 

10, While files of DI0-l4JJi) do not contain tranacrlptiona, 
continuity eoriota, or outlinea of prograaa of broadoaata on 
lOMB and KGU for the period of 27 Hovember through 6 Deoenber 
1941, there la oonaiderable highly clansified inforajation in 
the filea pertinent to this general aubject, aa followa in 
•ubatanoe: 

(a) Japaneae programs on atationa K.0M3 and KOU during 
the period of one to two weeka orior to 8 December 
1941 wei*e monitored by Lt.Comdr, Yale Maxon, UaNR, 
and Coadr. Denzel Carr, UiJNH, of i>I0-l4Wa. The 
cryptic phrasea liatenad for by these officere 
were never heard on Ka.4B or KWJ. Honitorinfr waa 
accompli al-ied by liatening direct to the broadoaata; 
no tranacrlptiona ware aade of eald broadoaata. 

(b) One of the cryptic phraaea lietened for did appear 
several times during the oourae of a Tokyo broadoaat 
aone hours after tha attack on Pearl Harbor took 
plao*. The cryptic phraae In queatlon eane 0T*r 



. 8 - 



638 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

•ISfi^ Top secret 

y gf 119 BIPT 

••bj««tt trm-'\ktr Kcmolulu Goanvrelfil Broadtacts Contalninc 

Oedad laforaation for the Japanaaa riaet; Rapert of. 

•tatian JZX profran {from Tokyo), at aoaa tlao 
latar ttiaa 1141 8 Daeeabar 1041, Japan tlaa, 
froquonay 9»39 koa. 

(a) ror aaajr aoatlia prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, 
«p through 6 Deeanber 1941, Hagao KIT A, Japanaoa 
OenaMl-Oonaral. Honolulu, kept the Japaaaec foreign 
Offiae auppliet with detailed information ooaoemlng 
■ovaaanta of U*8« NaTal Teaaela by seana of coded 
. diapctahea eent throu^ bomterolal telegraph 
•haaoiala. Of partleiuar note la the meaaage froa 
IXTA to Tokyo via K.C.A., under date of 6 Daoaabar 
194, idtloh glTea diapoaitlon of shlpa, ete., la 
faarl Harbor as of the erenlng of S Deeeaber 1941. 

(d) Barnard Julioa Otto KUS3», vith aliaeea, etpioaagc 
agent, auteltted a plan to the Japanese Oonaalnta, 
Honolulu, on or about 2 December 1941, InTolviag aeo 
of a aoda on the KQKB Want -Ada aoming progran 
(004ft), as followa: 

(1) A Qiiaaaa rug, ete., for sale- spply Fost 
Offiae Box 1476; indiaatea 3 or 6 



(2) A seaplats tftiskaa fara for sale; indiaatas 
4 or ? 

(S) Beauty parlor opsrator vented ; indisataa 
6 or 8. 

Under date of 3 Daoenber 1941 (Honolulu tins), this 
sinplifiad aode syaten wae transsltted by QTA to 
the foreign Minister, Tokyo. A duplieate »ss«^:« 
uns also nddreaaed to Chief of Third Soetion, Naval 
Oenaral Stnff, signed rUJXI. Onder date of 9 I>ee«n« 
bar 1941 (Japan tine), foreign Minieter TOOO tele- 
gmpiMd ta KZTA that he wanted HTA to hold onto 
the liat of aode words (presximably an older, ooapli- 
eatad aode ayataa), inaludlng those intended for uss 
on the radio broadoast, right \xp until the last 
nlMitsi ftnrthar, that wton the "break" aame. KITA 



- » - 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 639 

i4o/A0-t TOP S-.CRET 

l«rUl W4 

■tt^««ti 7n«itor llonol«lu OooMreial BroAdMata Ooataiaiac 

Ood0d XnfonMition for the Japmmm n*«ti lto»«r% •t. 



to fewa «lM codo iMoAlatoly ond wiro V0«0 
tli*% ho hod 4«iio oo. 

(•) FBI ogoiito ooiii«iotod an Imrootiffotion to dotor«iM 
vbothor OF not thoro hod ho«n any odTortiooaonto 
rogording tho Ohlnooo v«c, boaufr opormtor, or 
otai^un fom, oto. evor radio otatlon KGMB Mmt- 
Ado iwofmn ou b oof tt o n t to X Doooabor 1941; nmn^ 
p«por ano voro aloo tfieokod tor tho oaao laforaa- 
titm. Hoeordo of tho KQKB ^taat-AAo aoming 
progrwM (0S48} for tho porlod of 24 NoToaoor to 
a Poooabor 1W41 wtro oxaMlnod. No Inforoatlon o«o 
fowid. In tho radio prograBO or nowpaporo, rogard- 
iag tho broftdoaot oodo oyotea in quootlon. 

smssL 

11. MafptiTa r aoalto noro obtainod in looating ^panoorlptiono. 
Eiauitr 



oootinuiir o q rlpt a» or wtt i n ift jBt^JM^aMpaHULjidiijM UM§n otod 
froa^jgadlo •tatifHML.^P and tW for thfjwrJjA Of.^ Wo^oabor 
thr^wigh fi noooaborlSgr-IBgwgfi^ftXThaa Jtot boon peooitto 
to vorifir or rofiita atataMato pf Yoahia flHXOA, l.t.aoadr., 
XJX, ao ooatainod in ref or«BOo (a), 

18. Japanooo laaguago prograao en KMB and KOU during tho 
porlod of ono to too woeko prior to the attaek on Poarl Harbor 
vert monitorod bgr IM0.14ND. Although tho purpooo of thlo 
aenitoring aao to Hot on for oortaia phreooo ivhioh wtro not 
hoard on KQM8 or KOU), it doofl not appoar likoly that aajr 
phraooo rogarding the Oeraan attache voold hare been aioood 
by tho I>ZO«.l<ti(D monitoro. Thor* vas a Oexvan Conoul in 
Honolulu prior to T Doooabor 1641, but ao attache; in tho 
OTont, howoTor, that tho ward "attaoho" iforo oorreotly aaod, 
1310 iaplioatioa io that tho eoaooroial broadoaot oaanatod 
froa Japan. 

19. itMi jcotta ^^t«ftii« «ftwi%ng pa^p^m* tar 24 Nwroabor to 
8 Deooigborlil^ -ooro ^hooiwr bf yM4to i>olaIu with aogatlve 
rooolto in laaatiag-aay oodod ptaraaaa,iragardlJi£ j|,iSlf|no«o 



. 10 - 



79716 O — 46— pt. 13- 



640 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

•«^«i ts4 TOP SECRET 
T 9 f g t g Rl T 

•tttoj««tt fr^^ytmr Xonololu Ooaai«r«lal llroad«a«ta Oontalnlag 

Ood«d InfonMtion for the JaT>iinei« Fl««t; Il«i»«rt of, 

ru£. ohl«k«n farm, or iNMuity p*rlor eporator. It app«*r» 
onlikely that phrasoa regarding tho aeraan attaoba, hAd 
thej appoarod on thla progx**!! during the parlod In quoatloa, 
would have g-one unnotioad bjr the ai^enoy oonduetlng that 
Inreatlgatlon. 

14. It l^_polJttadout^toat th^ 

•ttoqaaefvC[ljn^!^S]JEyiC1Silan.a4 military InToroation to th« 
Japanaae fo»i0iiJ3fflaa.up to and InoludJjQs th^ flth of 
Daoenbar X94X.^ means of podtd diapatohea aent throu^^ 
o«B«areial telacraitliVj; chaanala. 



Al6. 

V \to I 
\^tti 



Inaaauoh aa dHI&A'a information waa reportedly giyan 
him by another of fleer aboard the AKAGI following the 
ttaokf ita aeeuraey la aubjeot to ao«e doubt. 



16. The aoeuraojr of the atateaent of /, Howard WCHRJL, 
manager of KQMB, regarding tranaeriptiona of Japanese prognuM 
for about 1 through 6 Oeeeaber 1941 being turned over to 
Major IHitnaa, la doubted in view of Lt.Col. Oaddia' atatwfUMit, 
hia aeardh of the filea at Fort %after, and a>2(CID) Honolu- 
lu' a aeareh of their filea. 



R, H. PCTOISOU 
Lieutenant, USNR 



- U - 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



641 



A8-6 



UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET 

AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS 

HEADQUARTERS OP TBE COMMANDER IN CBIEF 



Serial! 



OQ.':' 



6 NOV .945 



TOP SECRET 



a4 MPPB^agas on 

34 TPhltCorpa Top 
Secret Ltr. 091/130, 
Sar. 000374B dated 
14 October 1945. 



TQP g^C^gP 

From: 

To: 
Tia: 

Subject : 

1. 



Commander in Chief, U. S, F&cific 21eet 

and Pacific Ocean Areas. 
Chief of Baval Operations. 
Commandant FOUKTEEXTTH IJIaral District. 

Pre-Var Espionage in Hawaiian Islands. 

Forwarded. 



2. Comment is requested from Commandant FOUBTEMTE 

Saval I>istriet concerning broadcasts related in basic correspon- 
dence and on other material considered pertinent. 






C. H. MoMORRIS 
Chief of Staff 



Copgr tot 

Com 5th Fit (2nd End only) 
ComOenTXMbCorps (2nd Zod only) 



642 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



7Sif 



COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET 

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET 
FLAGSHIP OF THE C0MHAND8K 



A8-2(2) 



Serialr U00179 



FIRST ENDOBSEttaiT to 
Hq. V PhibCorps Top 
Secret Itr. 091/130, 
ser. 0OO374B dated 
1/+ October 1945. 



From: Commander FIFTH Fleet. 

To : Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, 

Subject: Pre-war Espionage in Hawaiian Islands. 

1, Forwarded. 



0^ 



24 OCT 1945 



h\ 



^t O^c 



Chief Of Staff, 







'^ c-'t7r^pg»j» 



1^1 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



643 



091/130 

Ser.000574B 



HEADCiUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS 
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO 



14 October, 1945. 

The Commrnding G-eneral. ' — — * 
The Commander, Fifth Fleet. 

Pre-war Espionage In Hawaiian Islands. 

(A) 2 copies subject publication. 



TOP SECRET 

From: 
To : 

Subject: 

Enclosui'es: 

1. The attfched progress report from the 49cth 
Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment is forwarded in duplicate 
for your information. 

2. Additional progress reports of the subject 
will be forwarded you as they become available ^o thi|s Headquarters. 




'■•T.l'.^ .«.>>« 



^>^ik" Sw, 



NiMi^'AJi <dei 



TOP SECRET 



644 COXGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

, , 1 

HEADQ,UARTERS ' ' ' 

FIFTH MARINE 'DIVISI ON 
il96th CIC DETACHMQTT 
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 

TOP SECHhT Sasebo, I^shu 

13 October I945 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE AC OF S, G-2t 

SUBJECT I PRE-W^ ESPIONAGE IN HAWAIIAN ISLANDS 

RE s Interview lulth YosMo SHIGA, 

Lt Cmdr, IJN 



On 9 October 1945? ti^s agent interviewed Yoshio SHIGA, Lt Cmdr, IJN, 
at the lankiso Tea House, CJIDRA, I^oishu. Although difficult, this interview 
was conducted without an interpreter as SHIGA speaks some English, Informant 
is an aviator and participated in the Japanese attack on PEARL HARBOR on 
7 December I94I, 'He lives at Itoyone, YAMAGUCHI CITY, Yamaguchi-Kfen, Honshu, 
On about I5 October 1945t ^ is scheduled to fly a Japanese plane (escorted) 
frcm CMDRA TO YOKCBUKA. Following this he plans to return to CM3RA, by train, 
where he expects to be discharged from the Navy, 

On about 1 April I94I, SHIGA said that he was directed to leave his 
assignment as instructor of pilots at OITA and report to SASEBO, Upon arrival 
he noted that the aircraft carrier "KAGA" was in port. Upon reporting' at the 
base he was ordered, by Teigi YAM&DA, Captain of the "KAGA", to go to YOKDSUKA 
with 23 other pilots and learn to fly "O's", From about 5 April until I9 April 
.the group practiced fl;ydag these planes. On 20 April 1941 they went to SUSUKA, 
Honshu, and received new "0" planes. 

The group practiced with these planes until the last of April rtien 
they were ordered to fly to KDNOYE, Kyushu, En-route SHIGA noted that the car- 
rier "EAGA" was anchored off KAGCBHIMA CITl, Following their arrival at 
IT3N0YE the group was ordered to practice landings aboard the "KAGA" as it 
steamed in and out of the bay. They did this until about 1 July 1941« 

About 1 July, the carriers AKAGI, SORYU, and HIRYtT arrived at SHIBCSHI 
BAY, a short distance from where the KAGA was anchored. All of the pilots 
from the carriers then went to KAGQSHII.IA CITS', In practice the carriers alter- 
nated, three at SHIBCSHI BAY and one in EAGCSHIMA BAY. The fliers practiced 
carrier landings and dog-fighting. Team work was the essential of this train- 
ing period. Two planes fought three planes, then three against six, and then 
six against nine. The objective of 9 against 18 was not reached, however. 



TOP SECRET 






EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 645 



TOi* SECRET 



On about 8 August 1941? all of the carriers were ordered to YOKDBUKA. 
On about 10 August, tiie carriers SQRYU and HIRYU were suddenly ordered to 
SAIGON, Indo-China, SHIGA, along with the rest of the pilots, was ordered 
aboard the HIHTO, The Japanese Army met no opposition at SAIGON. After the 
carriers were there for about a week they left for Japan euid arrived at 
SASEBO about 5 September l$kl. 

After two or three days the two carriers were ordered to SAHEKI, 
IJrushu, Upon arrival SHIGA noted the carriers SHOKAHJ and ZUIHVKIJ and the 
battleship YAMATO were in the harbor. He stated that he then became suspic- 
ious that "something big was going to happen". While there the pilots prac- 
ticed navigation, dog-fighting, and carrier landings* 

^ On 5. October 1 9i;l, a meeting was called of all officer pilots of the'~"jV (l 
carriers, abcprd the AT^QI in SHTEUSHI BAY, by the Cldef of Staff of the I 

carriers. Rear Admiral Rynosuke KDSAM. About 100 attended. They were told,/,) 
very secretly, that on 8 December 19ijl (Japan Time), a Japanese Naval air / ; 
force would stri!<E the American Fleet at HAV/AII. Grand Admiral of the Japan-i 
ese Navy, Isoraku YAMAMCTO, also addressed the group saying that although 
Japan never wanted to fight the United States they were forced to because thsy 
would be defeated regardleaa, if the United States continued its aid to Chint 
and its oil embargo. The U, S, fleet, he said, was Japan's strongest enemy, 
so if they could strike it unexpectedly at HAWAII it would be two or three 
months before it coiild manuever. By that time occupation of BORNEO, the 
PHIIIIPIKES, SINGAPORE, JAVA, and SUMATRA would be complete, '<* -, 

SHIGA stated that the consensus of the pilots following this startling 
news was, that to get to HAWAII secretly, was impossible. Hence it was a 
suicide attack. Also that it wo\ild be best for the Japanese Navy to fight the 
Anerican Navy at sea without this attack. All of the carrier pilots were then 
granted a 7 day leave. On their return they went to SAHEKI and again practiced 
vmtil 17 November 191j.l« On that date the laOA, with 24 fighter planes, 36 
torpedo planes, and 24 hell divers went to HITOKAPFU HARBOR. ,, 

Upon arrival at HITCK&PFU HARBOR, SHIGA noted the carriers AKAGI , SORYU, 
SHOGAKKD, ZUII^/lKU, battleships KONGO, HTEl, heavy cruisers KDKANO, IJUlWlk, 
SU2UYA, plus one other, about I6 destroyers, and four or more large submarines 
were in that port. He believed that these submarines had midget submarines 
aboard. In the carrier force there were about 300 planes plus 9 seaplanes 
aboard the battleships and cruisers. 

Prior to departure for HASTAII SHIGA said that they were briefed that 
PEARL HARBCR anchorages were:' battleships on the east side of FORD ISLAND, 
carriers on the west side, destroyers were anchored in northeastern corner, 
and heavy cruisers on the HICEAM FIELD side. They were -also told that the U, S, 



TOP SECRET 



646 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



TO? SECRET 



carriers trere usually around lAKAINA ROADS, MAUI, during vreek days fend entered 
PEARL HARBCR on Saturdays, where they stayed until Mondsy morninesi SHIGA 
said that Rear Admiral OiaiDA, Captain of the KAGA, visited the flagship AKAGI J^,|• 
daily. Ju st Tg'y ^ f' t . o ^r. " -f i r+ ii T* - r7 r ? i n /i . tini ,^ him t.hpt, there were 6 carriers in ,• 
Hawaiin waters, that the . SAa^JIOGA. was., on the U.S. west coast, ani that the ^ 
ZHTEHfffiS'S was two or three days out of Hawaiin vfaters, en- route / from the I 
PHILlIPlHES. ' 



Subject believes the force left HITOKAPFtJ HfiRBCR betwen the 27 and 
30 November and at cn.iising speed headed for HAYJAII. They knew, he said, 
that U. S. air patrols went 800 miles south of DUTCH HARBOR and i 00 miles 
north of MDWAY. Their course vjas right between the patrolled fjneas during 
which time, he said, the weather was foggy. They were 800 miles tue north of 
HAiVAII on 6 December* They then received, from the Japanese Navy Department, 
a wireless message, "CII^3 MT. KIITAEA", (This information corresponds with 
that received from a Japanese Navy Yeomen captvired during the SAJ FAN operation] 
This was the signal for the attack and at 22j knots they sped sout hweird to with- 
in 250 miles o'f GAHU. There the planes took off, 

X SHfO * e tntnri th^t b& - boli e ^ e A q^udio o<i3nongl y'4;hat ini'ormation concern-/j^i 
ing all movements of ships into and out of PEARL HARBCB was transmitted to the! 
fleet through poded messages broadcast over a HCNOLULU Commercial Broadcastingj 
Station, i^ifcwas certain'*that there was a Kav/aiin Nisei, who was a Japanese ' 
Naval Officer, aboard the flagship Al^I^^pJ^oae specific job was listening to 
these broadcasts and decoding themi' SSSftA^ said "that in his opinion the codes 
were many and varied but that if, for exam^jle, it was broadcast that the 
German attache lost one dog, it might mean that a carrier left I^EARL HARBCR. 
If the German attache wanted a cook or a houseboy, it might mean that a 
battleship or cruiser had entered tlie harbor, '' 



SHIGA said that this ini'ormation v/as given to him by Lt Cmdr MJRATA, 
Ghigeharu, Chief pf the AiV Squadron at^^oard the fla£,sliipi AKAGI, on their re- 
turn to .Tapan when SHIGA inquired of hita "who wa^ the heroic Iperson respon- 
sible for getting 'the information concerning the ships In rEARL HAHBCR", 

. "T ii nf i lin1in"n "-^1i--^ the information was conveyed on radio programs 
just following tiie news broadcasts, which he stated were at 623O AM, 12 Noon,/ 
and 7 PM, He was prone to think that time following the 7 TV. broadcast was i 
used cince the Japanese agents v/culd then have had an opport J.ty to convey __/ 
information concerning a whole day's activities, '• 

On the first Saturday when the force was at sea, (which means it had j 
to leave prior to 29 November), SHIGA said that tliey received Reports that I 
there was only one or two carriers in PEARL HARBCR, Because o^ this the 
pilots were disappointed. 



TCP SECHE1 



3 - 



(^ y^ f^'^'^^ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



647 



TOT SECRET 



SHIGA said that on 6 December 19W, some time between about £ and I 
9 HI (Hawaiian Tine^ nevra filtered to him that ti:3re were no carriers in j 
lEARL r:AR:-:CR, b»± that 8 battleships, and Ij cruissrs were in the harbor, | 
No rerort was received concernint' destro^'ers, Th 3re was no set V7ay of his 
receiving nevra of tliis type so it was impossible to determine at That tine 
the AiaGI mieht have relayed it to the Captain of\-fhe KAGA. 



At the briefing, prior to the operation, eich pilot was furnished 
with a photograph of a map of PEARL HARBCR, The nemes of the ships in i 
rEARL H/'fflBCT were not known and each pilot just laaae rough entries of ' 
courses and anchorage areas or missions. 



Since it was felt that more could be gained if a person versed in 
the technical phases of aviation interrogated SHIGA, he was turned over to 
Lt W. H. 5EDRICK, S-2, Marine Air Group 22, stationed at OIvIDRA, to fully 
deve3op the attack phase, A copy of his report, however, will be forward- 
ed to this headquarters. 

The rough sketch map concerning the attack, accompanying this re- 
port, is preliminary, resulting from the first interview with SHIGA by this 
agent. 

Concerning the espionage conducted for the erttack, which is of 
great interest to the CIC, SHIGA could offer no othdr leads than that of 
the HCiroiUlU Broadcasting Station, He said that at/no time, to his know- l^ 
ledge, were visual land signals used from HA',7AII, j 

The only person he could recall being alive from the AKAGI, who 
had participated in the PEARL HARBOR attack, was its commanding officer. 
Rear Admiral Rjmosuke KCBAKA, He is presently Chief Liaison Officer at 
the KCWOra Naval Base, 

This agent is p]?esently under orders and awaiting transportation 
to EX3N0YE where he will interview KCSAEA in an effort to obtain additional 
information. 



TOP SECRET 



,,^^- 




648 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(There is a map accompanying the above report of ROBERT N. TAIT, 
Special Agent, CIC, which portrays by rough sketch the islands 
of Oahu and Kavii and the Kaioi Channel, and has noted thereon 
information obtained ydth reference to the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor and other installations on 7 December 19iil as set 
forth in the report. This map is reproduced as Item No. // 
in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 649 



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
WASHINGTON 



SOURCE DOCIJLIENT #13 
(A NAVY STUDY) 
ENTITLED 
"SORnES BY SNElvff SUB-CARRIED FUllSS 
and 
SUB CARRIER IDENTIFICATION" 
USED BY THE NA\T IN CO?iPILING THE 
"NAVY Sm.{f.!ARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBCB" 
(Record of Proceedings, pages U32-ii60). 

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 
IN IHE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL IiWESTIGAncSNf 
OF THE ATTACK a^ PEARL HARBOR) 



650 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
EJiEMY Lisas SORTIES BY» SUB-CARRIED PLANES ( <A^^^) 

New information on the enemy's use of submarine-borne aircraft for 
reconnaissance is furnished by a captured document (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 
12,212), which lists a series of sorties covering nearly a year in time and 
extending from ZANZIBAR east to OREGON. 

During that period, the plane-carrying subs lost 24JJ of the aircraft 
which took off—most of thea in landing and recovery accidents. 

All sorties listed were flown from ten subs of the "I" class— the 
1-7, 1-8, 1-9, I-IO, 1-19, 1-21, 1-25, 1-29, 1-30 and 1-31. A total of 38 
sorties were flown bebtween 30 November 1941, and 11 November 1942. This was t 
the most active period for enemy sub-borne aircraft. (Hence, no mention is 
made of the Jap sub which reportedly reconnoltered PEARL HARBOR in October 1943. 

Many of the subs employed have probably been lost during the past 
two years. The only identifiable loss among the group listeo above, however, 
is the 1-7, sunk at TWIN ROCKS, KISKA on 21 June 1943. This was confirmed 
by salvage operations. 

The first listed flight, flown eight days before the attack on PEARL 
HARBOR, was a night sortie over SUVA BAY.- The document states succinctly 
that the plane "did not return". Also noted are flights over PEARL HARBOR 
on 17 December 1941, 5 Januarj' 1942, and 24 February 1942, and over the OREGON 
coast on the nights of 9 and 29 August 1942. 

-2- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



651 



The complete listj 
DATE Name of Sub 



Place 



Time 



30 Nov. 


•41 


I-IO 


17 Deo. 


•41 


1-7 


5 Jan. 


•41 


1-19 


7 Eeb. 


•42 


1-25 


24 Feb. 


•42 


1-9 


26 Feb. 


•42 


1-25 


1 Mar. 


•42 


1-25 


8 Mar. 


•42 


1-25 


13 Mar. 


•42 


1-25 


19 Mar. 


•42 


1-25 


Not known 


I-IO 


7 May. 


•42 


1-30 


8 May 


•42 


1-30 


19 May 


'42 


1-30 


19 May 


•42 


1-30 


19 May 


•42 


1-21 


23 May 


•42 


1-29 


24 May 


•42 


1-21 


25 May 


•42 


1-9 


26 May 


•42 


1-9 


27 May 


•42 


1-19 



SUVA BAY Night 

PEARL HARBOR Dawn 

PEARL HARBOR Nifht 

SYDNEY Dawn 

PEARL HARBOR Night 

MELBOURNE Dwm 

HOi-iART Day 

WELLINGTON Pre-dawn 

AUCKLAND Pre-davm 

SUVA Dawn 

DABAN( Comment J There is a DABANU on 
INOODLARK or VXSWk IS., between Eastern 
Wn GUINEA and NEW GEORGIA IS.) 
ADiiN Dawn 

JIBOUTI Dawn 

ZANZIBAR Dawn 

DAR-ES-SALAAM Dawn 

SUVA BAY Dawn 

SYDNEY Dawn 

AUCKLAND Dawn 

KISKA, AI.rcHITKA 
RISKA 

"Vfhile making preparations for a nipht 
flight on the Northern side of BOr.ORLOF 
ISLAND (Comment, Probably BOGOSLOF IS. IN 
the ALEUTIANS) an enemy destroyed wasreoognized 
and we submerged, badly damaging our plane." 



27 May 


•42 


1-25 


KODIAK 


Day 


29 May 


'42 


1-21 


SYDNEY 


Dawn 


30 May 


•42 


I-IO 


DIEGO SUAREZ 


Nipht 


31 May 


•42 


I-IO 


DIEGO SUAREZ 




1 June 


•42 


I-IO 


Plane search off coast of DIEGO 
SUAREZ 


Night 


9 Aug. 


•42) 


1-25 


OREGON (State) 


Night 


29 Aug. 


•42) 






Night 


19 Aug. 


•42 


1-29 


SEYCHELLES IS.(SEISEaU SHOTO) 


Day 


30 Aug. 


'42 


1-19 


SUDEKO TO 




13 Oct. 


•42 


1-7 


ESPIRITU SANTO IS. 


Dawn 


19 Oct. 


'42 


1-19 


NOUMEA 




30 Oct. 


•42 


1-9 


NOU^SA 


BOWQ 


2 Nov. 


•42 


1-8 


EFATE IS. 


"Moonlif:ht 
from 0000 
0030" 


4 Nov. 


•42 


1-31 


SUVA 


0100 


4 Nov. 


•42 


1-9 


NOWffiA 


Dawn 


11 Nov. 


•42 


1-7 


VANIKORO IS. 


Dawn 


11 Nov. 


•42 


1-21 


NOUMEA 


Dawn 






1-9 


ESPIRITU SANTO 


Dusk 


11 Nov. 


•42 









652 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Connnentj No mention was made in the document of the 1-17. Tfhen sunk off NEW 
CALEDONIA in August 1943, prisoners from this sub claimed that it ha4 reconnoitered 
west coast areas by plane in February 1942. 



JAP CARRIE R I DiJNTIFICATION 

A recently captured order (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item Vo. 12, 253) pre- 
sumed to have been issued by a Sq'jadron CO of the 121st Air Group, describes 
identification markings which appear on flight decks of combatant carriers. 
The captured order indicates that markings are to consist of either the 
first '.wo or the first and last Kana syllables of the ships' names. The Kana 
syllables "2U HO" were already noted in a photograph of the CVL 2UIH0, sunk 
on 25 October (see "Weekly Intelligence, Vo. 1, No. 18). 

The order states that large white Kana symbols are to appear on the 
starboard side toward the stern. The first Kana is to be eight meters (26|- 
feet) square, the second four meters square. 



-4- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 653 



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
WASHINGTON 



SOURCE DOCUMENT 0h 
ENTITLED 
"JAPANESE BATTLE LESSONS ON SUPPLY IN THE GREAIER EAST ASIA WAR 
SUPPLY BATTLE LESSON NO. 1" 
USED 3Y IHE NAVY IN COIfflLING THE 
"NA^rr SUMIiJARY OF IHE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR'^ 
(Record of Proceedings, pages ii32-U60). 

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 
IN IHE JOINT CONGRESSICNAL INVESTIGATION 
OF THE ATTACK ON PEAI^L HARBOR) 



This is a translation parallel to the 
translation stated in Source Dociunent 
#15 post of the same captured Japanese 
Document. 



654 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

#10,678 

SUPPLY BASES AND FUELING FLEET UNITS AT SEA 
dated 10 June 1943, captured on SAVfAV. 



EnTTGR'S KOTS 

This document comprises extracts taken from an offlcied. 
study of problems relating to supply conpllea 10 June 
1943. Recommendations are included for the enlargement 
of supply bases and depots at BAKO. UIKaWA V.'AN and KTiRE. 
l<:xamples are cited showing the difficulties experienced 
in fueling fleet units at sea during the first year and 
a half of the war; recommendations call for the installation 
of stern refeuling gear on all ships, an increase in the 
rate of supply per hour, and the strengthening of hoses 
used In fueling. It is stated that the maintenance of 
supply lines calls for the construction of two naval 
storeships of the IRAKO type. It is possible that keels 
for IRAKO type ships were laid before their usefulness 
as contemplated in this document was ■■gwtt¥ neutralized 
by the Allied advance. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 655 



#10,678 



Military > Very S«or«t (OUNOOKUHI) Ooamltta* en Invest Igatlon of 

Battle Leseons, Supply Section 
(BUNKAKAI) 

BATTI* LE3S0^S ON SUPPU IN TOE GREATER EAST ASIA WAR 
SUPPIZ BATTLE IJB3S0N No. 1 



Table 2^ Contecte 

^^ Page 



I. fcMiig»» Enlargement of Facilities at Supply Bases 
II. 



Fueling of Fleet Units at Sea. 
m. Capacity, Performance, exii Number of Supply Ships 



656 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

1/ 'ill'.. .... : 10, hi 8 

9 P moniMi 'w a p n e i 



I. anliirivnent oT >»cllltl-3 nt Supply Bsnaa, . 

1. Th«r« has b*«n a suddwi incr«aa* in the operating •fficieney of 
ngtn— h~-if'T, piers, and goTemnsnt buildinga being used by the TOKOSUKA NaTal 
Dlctrlet in TOKOHOUA. (T0K03UXA Civil &igr Dept). 

2. Facilities at Fuel Depot #3 mst be enlarged to penalt the aooring of 
two or three 10,000 ton AKs. (3rd Fuel Depot). 

3. Loading an)k su. ply facilities at BAKO nnut be ei^wnded. The capacity to 
•apply fuel oil Bust be increased to 10,000 tons per 24 hours. (2ad FlAst). 

4. Supply installations at UIKAIU KAN are insufficient and require enlarge- 
Mot. (1st Fltat). 

5. Tbs vuppljr <iuajr\of the KURE Replaeeaent Shop mat be enlarged. It is 
frequently found too narrow for supply loading work and^^lay r e saw s x 

(lltb Air Depot). 

6. Planes coaf>leted at the lltb Air Depot are operating on flights and as 
air transport after being transported by surface to the IK^EDNI Air Group; the 
loss in labor and tlae required for this ia great. At least one runway of the 
KURK Airfield aust be lengthened and widened. (11th Air Depot). 

7. There ai^ bums roos iAptance s/i^mBT t be capacities of local Stores 
Depart^nts have been insufficient nd %t6i^ ItHTMet the demands of operating 
forces. It is essential to czpaddr installations and place experienced persons 

in charge so as to keep on hand /arke aaounts of stores and insore a rapid supply. 
(All depts concerned with naraiJ atorik^t 

- 1 - 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 657 

6. In ontor to «zp«dlt« ■up(>lj' to th« varloua forc«8 In tb« farflung 
eoabftt ar«««, ■md aluo In coiial<l«Wtion a such things as air r&lcU, It !• a 
nccesasTT' to establish branch offl^«a of the local rtorea departmanta or 
branch aupply depots with e«eh frooA line force. (All 3tor«a Dapla). 

9> Bacauaa of Insufficient supply inatallaitloaa at local ^or«a ^partoents, 
hssTy equipment such as DP guns and gerkeratore cannot be unladed, and aoiaa thijifs 
cannot be Installed. The handling of torpedfoea and mines la also very difficult. 
Not onljr la tbsc* * great possibility of damage to delicate equl potent but there 
.are manj Instances when It la not suited to rapid suppljr. The Installatlonf of 
plera, cr&nea, cranea on cargo lighters, and trucks la absolutely neceas&ry. 
(All Stores Oepta). 

10. Acceleration In fitting out Specially Establlahed Naval Stores Oepart- 
asnts Is earnestly desired. Ths Ath Naval Stores Oepartioent legally Ig tact- 
ically aaalgned to the 4tb Fleet; however, it has a gre^ deal of importance as 
a front line supply base even for shlpa of the Coftbined Fleet. Thaz-efore It Is 
necessaiy to attempt the speedy completion of Inatallations as already planned 
and to equip them wlth'an eye toward our perslatentl|flrlve to the aouth. (2nd 
Fleet). 

11. At RABADL ther« liTN^ot a siogle aound pier installation, while great 
labor la being expended entlr«lX^° loaxUng and unloading. No matter what 

other sacrifices a»e made, ^^rt mus^sbe Installed Imawdlately. (lOSth Air Depot). 

Conclualoo I ^AaM^A^ In order that deficiency in supply Installations will have 
no great effect oo naval operations. It Is necessary to determine at the central 
/activity/ the urgency of actual conditions in all areas and to foivulate 
renedlal measures. 

- 2 - 



658 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

/O, 6'/S 



il» >Wi'lg 



Viiri^'^rni- ''' 



ir. Kiiallnr of Y\ «t Units <(t 39i . 

AT <C^— - — : -^ 

M Th«r« ^r* musj tlaas la operational Mit«r« wfaan fa*l oil e«nnot m 
«ttppli*d ualoaa r«fu«liac tnm astom ia oaad. 

^ Tha rata of oil raeaivatf bgr ahlpa par boor and tba rata of avppljr to 
amll ahipa ffoa larga ahlpa ia inauffieitei. (All Shipa). 

It ia naeaaaaiy in all eaaaa to incraaaa tha rata of rafaalinc to 300 

■•trie tona par hoar. (BatQlT 3). 

Tba maibar of tljMa rafuallad and raaulta during tba yaar alnea BatDlT 

3 coanancad operational _ 

KONCX) HARUMA Arara/ta A«>unt 

Froa AO (2 hoaaa aatam) 8 timm 5 tiiMa 160 » tona par hr 

froa CD (froB alcogaida) 17 tlowa 22 tiffiaa 110 m tona per hr 

The ZDIKAKU (CV) aiailarly- loaded at 160 Betrle tona per boor, taking 

on 3^42 ■ tona frcM the HICKITO kARU in 12 boura. An ineraaae to 300 or iiOO 

tona ia neeeaaarjr. (ZUIIAXD (CV)), 

Conelxtaiop f fyHyb]^ It ia urgently neeeaaarx froa a allitarr ataadpolnt to 
put into affect tha following aeaaurea for the auppljr of foal oil at aaat 

1. The inatallatioas af atam refueling gear on all ahlpa. 

2. A great increaaa in tha rata of auiqply per hoar in order to 
abortao the total tiaa required. 



-^x. 



- 3 - 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 659 



/o,i7S 






1. Uor* th«a t«n hoM« broira during iMrffT*r« on tb« UAIUII Opamtionjand 
dorLnf th« INDIAN OCS&N Operation th* boaaa of aa oil tankar war* daMi«ad and 
•upply «aa graatly dalajad. (CarDlT 2). 

2. Loaaaa froa euttlag and laakaga during towing and rafnaling ar« likalj 

to occur. Alao, aiaoo tba boaaa atratch about 10)(, tba part vbloh banda la 

likaly to bacoaa conatrictad and graatljr radtica^ tha capaeitx for aupplylng oil. 

Tba nonber of tijMi acoidanta happaaad to boaaa froa tba baglaniag of tha war up 

to tha and of 1942 ia abown balowt ^BatDlT 3). 

KONQO (BB) HlEOItt (BB) 

Tlnsa Saaoutad Tlaaa Daaac*^ Tlaaa SsMutad Tiaaa DuMgad 
Aatam fro. AO 8 9 (TN: aic) 5 3 

Alongside fron 

DD 17 3 22 1 

3. If tba inndr aarfaca of tha boaa braaka, tha filtar ia likaly to gat 
eloggad up. (KERTO UARU, ZUIBO (CVL)). 



u^-^'^^^ 



U, If tha waak pointa of tha 12 Mtar callpphana (Su ^f ^^^ J^ boaa wara 
iaproTad upon, it would ba aoitabla for uaa on uval y%»—\». Tan boaaa aigtat 
ba aada standard aqulFMot for BBa, raducing «ha obabar of 4.5 aetar boaaa now 



in uaa 

bosas aoat ba aada toughar. 



Concluaion (O n4A<^ CaUophana 6(^ ^Ol^*^) 



660 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

y. iMFROvaawT oi^gfapsylknxa/^iHiNERi^' nfHwGs and EqpiPMSwr 
^ -J— -r — ^— *--^ orNauPEia: opbraiioh3 




^ 



B*ttl» L«»>on 



zuuu 

1. It la a«c«*««r7 ^o install •qulp«»iit for rcfvMllng from aitam. 
(AUshlpc). 

2. In tha ease of tankars which auppljr fro* both si<l»s, if aupp^ cannot 
be carriad oat froa both aidaa at tha aaaa ti«9> tha transfar of fuel cannot ba 
inltiatad. Ii^provaaaota ara aacaaaarj So that aaparata alvpljring can ba carriad 
out. (iKSBONO UARU, OasRon 4). 

3. Thar* ara instancaa in iriiieh axtremraoua aattar baconaa misad with tha 
oil whan rafualing ia baing carriad oat fro* tank era. Rafualiog apyad ia radiiead 
aboot one-third and incoaranieaca in loading raaults. It ia necaasary to equip 
tankars with changeable filters. (ISS (BB)) 

4. In riew of tha many inatancas in which hoses are burst «aa-U> /art raaa 
praasure caused by faulty operation of the intake Talrea, it ia necaaaazy to 
Inatall aquip»ent which will prevejit great pressure, such aa automatic cut-off 
TalYes. (TOHOJiARD). 

5. Oil intake fwnals should be installed on all fuel tanka. (MIOKO (CA)). 

Conditions on the MTOKO 

Mo of funnels No of auaciliary linaa So of tank connection Mo of tanks 
froa each funnel ralrea f ran each lina 

12 1 12 . 

2 1 2 4 

e 2 ,16 

2 2 48 

6 3 ° H 

2 3 4 10 

4 5 20 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 661 



/^ 6/<f 



6. TtM gr*«t langth of tb* &lr outlvt {dp* on fuel t«nks malcaa iMasMuy 
th* •nlArgwMot of tb* pip* lin* to fAellltftt* th« ootlat of air. 

UlUs* tbtr* la conddarabl* prtavur* on tha intaka ralva, loa4ia( la 
lopoaalbla. (CHOKAI (CA)i, UTOKO (CA)}. 

7> FtoB tba atAndpoint of rapid aupply, it ia naeaaaajy to radoea tba nonbar 
of fnal tanks' and ijicraaaa tha Mpacltj. (CUOUI (CA)). 

8. It ia naeaaaairy to plaea tba containera foV tha f ual intaka Talra, tba 
Intake gauga pipa and tba hoa« in plAcaa eomraolant for loading operations. 
(CHOKAI (CA)), 

9. Nben the TUBARI (CL) is abotit half filled with oil, the upper t&nka 
cannot be filled unleaa the batch ia raiaoTed and the hoae directly led in* 
Since capacity fueling froa astam la 4Lff lenity and Inconraniant froai an 
operational etandpolnt, it la naaaaaaiy to equip each tank with a sain Intake 
pipe. Moreover, since funnel foaling of lower tanks requires tlDS, it is necessary 
to conrert to pressure fueling. (TUBARI (CL)). 

10. Often, large aauunts of oil collect in the tanker 'a hoses at the 
tins of refueling and the result is delay in the work of connecting the hoae 
(5 large bucketa of oil bare been collected froa one hose (about 0.3 ton)). 
(HAllAKAZE (I»)). 

11. By reaaon of the hindrance to rapid fueling occasioned by the length 
of time required to drain (1.5 hours), it is necessary to increase ft*oa UO tons 
to 80 tons the caftacity of the seAmter drainage ejector in the coapensitting oil 
tank. (WAKIGUUO (OD)). 

12. It is necessary to equip tankers with oil heating equipaent throughout^ 

In casa of low teoperatures, the effect on the speed of refueling is great.(BatDlv 3 



662 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



/o, h/s: _ I 



13. It is n«e«sMii7 to InatAll •qiilpa«nt ao tb*t oil mtq/ b« cuppllAd «t 
Blfht. (ONTO UAiiU). 

lit. It !• helpful If th« t«I«phoa« o«a b« u«*<l bgr both p«rtl«a *a a aMma 
of cri—iin1 cation during r«fualiii< oparatlona. Per raaaooa of aacurltf, flara 
■ignala ahould not be uaad dnriog rafualliig oparatlona at nlgbt. (EBTTO kARO). 

15. It la nacaaaary to proTlcU aTlatlon gaa auppljr ahipa »lth auppljr boaaa 
(about 50 ■). (CarUlY 4). 

14. AXa anat b« flttad out with hatehaa and darrleka, and tha craws auat 
ba wall Inatructad In thalr ua«. (llinaLayarDlT 18) 

Soaatliwaj^ two bonrs ar« nacaaauy for the launching of large i»w<<<ng 
bargee. There are eonrerted chartered Teasels whose batches are Inconrenlentlj 
placed for loading and unloading. (108th Air Depot). 

17. S CoDTerted AKs are inconvenient for supplying lubricating oil. 
(NiaSHO UAEU). 

Attention to ship*s e^aipnent is esaential. 

T» tirrttt#iMaaa»anyY t«Tany]| 
Conclusion ^4 wTV^g b lV I^ ^0 necessary to re-ezamine plans for the s^ply 
faciUtiee of Tsssels so that supply capacities nay be Increased to the utaost. 



\ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 663 

^ — — ' ^1_!1I1_! ^0, ^78 I 

III. Ca^ioltjj_P»rfonn«noe, and Nuisber of Supply Ship* 

'^ *Bg"^^^^^^"-n — Bi— ■ra^nnminrTrTn'nT mn o — mnnriMmr 

signal flaca ^ vttleh Um tjp* of aupply ship oui>b rMofnlMd at a 
glanea gn«t b« adoptad. AHd|iitloa ahlpa hav« baao alck^kaa Ua atorvahlpa. 7 

,^<_ — (\^ BaytU Lafon ^fc^l^ 

It la naceaaazy to aqulp AXa with 40 ton darrlcks fora and aft to ouJca 
possible the loading of lighters, large landing bargee and other haavjr objaeta. 
(TOKOSUKA Regional Transportation Dapt). 

Conclusion L lyt)/V^ It ia naeaaaarj to hara a large nnnbar of AXs which ar« 
equipped with haayy dairlcka. . 

2. It ia ganarally ^yh profitabla to nJi( a^U, high apya* ahipa ia 
sooibara araaa. (Minal^arOiT 10, ato). 
/ 



\ 




3. Vbao aecc^(liai7lxig a flaat, tba praaant ap j^ of 15 knot* is dlffioultj 

/ (V 

a speed of 20 kp6ta ia naeaaaary for f uliy loaded oilNtankar. (OHTO MARO). 

Condoai "" ,^*T)*t^V Good, fast ahipa auat be etaoaan as aapplj' ahipa to aeeoa^aaj 

tba flaeU 



-i 



Battle Laaaoo \J^v^a . 



1. ArMMot ia waak) it aust be strangtbaaad. (l(iQal4QrarDiT 18). 

2. Cii— iiilcatiooa aquipaaot ia rery dafieiaat; it ia ineonraniant ia 
diractii^ aaneurers. (2nd fleet), 

3. It is naxaaaaiy to add 2 IC. (Hare at preaent ana 7.7)ao liO aad 7 
riflaa). ^.paira of 12oa binoeulara are r^qoirad. (HaTe at praaant dea). 

(KKKTD kARn> 



664 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

■■■'■■■■- ! /£>,^7S 



Ll 



4. It la iM««M«i7 to inervAM rlflM bgr two OP gun* tod MB bjr it 12mt 
or 2$M UQ«. (EURB Na^ Yard). 

5. Thr«« 8ca binoflul*r«, ^ t«la aoont 11 hb UO, and DP gun at* r*qulr«4. 
Still anothtr Mcoaduy frwqosney for radAo traniMlaaion la raqulraA. (NICHITO 
lUSO). 

6. Thar* ara ouaaroua Instaacaa «b«n raqulaltloned ahlpa ar« attaeaad froa 
tha sida oppoalta tha gun. In rlaw of aetual elrcuaatancoa thay abould ba 
•qulppad with ona gun forward and ona aft. Sballa auat b« Incraaaa^ froa 20 to 
orar 50 rounda par gun, and dapth obargaa fron U to 6. (TOK03UKA Raglonal 
Tranaportation Oapt). 

ConclMJon {CAilk:^Bi ^ 

1, In Tlaw of th« Act that thara ara oangr tlaaa whan aldll in lookout 
and araslTa action drtandna tba fata of a ibip, it la profitabla to davalop 
thaca eapabilltlaa to tba ntaoat. 

2. Although Ai, ASK, and eoaunic^iooa aqaipnant hav* b*«n graatlj 
Ineraaaad, wa ballara that tba praaant atandard la lnada<laata. 

^^-^. — (y. Battle Laaaon \Bf»>tJ<U 

In aplta of the fact that there hare been nuaeroua opportunitlaa for 
oslng aoorerted airplane llgfatara, their nuabar has bean Inaufflelant, it haa 
the Duaber of large laniting bargea. (11th Air Fleet). 



Concluaioo p9f*^*hf)(^ Two eonrerted airplane ligbtera aust ba aaaignad each air 
fleet and they auat be aqoippad with I* large landing bargee. 

^ - J^ Battle Laaaon p^»al>g)^y ^ 

1. Conditlona are each that aappljr of fuel and lubricating oil in local 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 665 

arcM la lapoaaibl* \ak th« i«rp«l*«a aoppllad e«nn«t b« praparad for firing. 
Thia la grftduAlljr balng ialMn ^w* of bjr tranafarrlng aaall aacninta froa tha 
mppljc of othar ahlpa. SLiMa thia la a graat ftnoonranlanoa, It ■■si b« aada 
peaaibla t« gat oil fr«a aaBHoltloa ahlpa or froa all tankara. (KimnA8A (CA)) 

2. Tha torpadoaa avppUad, onaa adjuatad, go aararal Montha vitboot 
im1 nation and readjuataaat) thara tx* Mmjr that ara dafaatlro froa harlng 
Wan In aak atoraga a long tlaa. If aa mrm to p*rtlclpata In an oparatloa 
fm^tlUkx. liaMiataljr ^tar tha dallTar^ of thaaa torpadoaa, not onljr would wa 
find thaa not eoa«}lataljr ra*4r f^i* flrtJig, bu «• would hara aoaa nnaaalneaa 
ragardlng thalr acouraejr. (KHfUQAAA (CA)). 

JonolaalQC {^Qf^^^t^J 

1. rual oil and labrieating ell anat ba ineludad with torpadoaa auppliad 
froa aaawiltien ahlpa. (Thia has baan dona). 

2, Torpadoaa auppliad auat ba Inspectad at aultabla Intarrala and 
Laparfaet ona raadjuatad. 



i 



Battla LaaaoD {Jl^faij j'^ 
At praaant, c»ndltions ara auch that with rrsrj poaaibla uaa of tha 
KAHTTA (AF), and tha IRAXO (AT), auppl/ Is barel/ baing earriad IKi on. 

It Is jToarad that in tha orant of an aecidant to thaaa, aupplj' llnaa 
wcMxld ba throan Into diaordar and tha affact on laortLLa and on oparatlona 
would ba great. Two nar*! etorashlpa of tha IRAKO typa mut b« conatrjctad \ 

and put into oparation iamadlatelT- /in ordar to euppljr fraah proTiaiona/. 
(2nd riaat). 

.1, A ♦. • •■_.,. •-.■ ■ • wv-l n o» . (,ir! 11- 









jfr. . 


*< 


•. 1-- 


c. .,. 


\„' n» 


= „.. 


ll-o 


.„„. >^ .... 


fonclualon. 


, Th" 


rmm'ipr ^ n" 


le ■...•■ 


..= . cc 


"' . 





666 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CINC(^ (.!,.<.: U., lur.) .: 



^ 



l^A^ 



vt% MwilaM mm^mk tvt m iMg M iwMrtj 4«gr«* (OMften a)* 

8. Oil iMrinra oMk k« ncLppad viik i«fri<«Mi«'« Mtf Uetm b« mm^1«« 
to aap^ frMk yravitloM at «•• «t tto mm ilM ttei i^i^r npfly •U-* 
CburiMi). 

i* k* Mppll«4 with fTMh provUlau M ito ■«» 41jh m4 plM* tl»i tlM^ •*• 

Mppllad witk f«fil aU. 



rw) 



1^ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 0(37 



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
WASHINGTON 



SOURCE DOCmjlENT #15 
^TITLFD 
••JAPA>reS5 3ATTLE LESSOfJS ON SUPPLY IN THE aREATFlK EAST ASIA V^AR 
SUPPLY BATTLE LESSON HO. 1" 
UST^ BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE 
"NAVY SmCIARY OF THE JAPAJIESE PLAN FCR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBCR" 
(Record of Proceedings, pages U32-U60), 

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 
IN THE JOINT CCNGPJSSIONAL INVESHGATIGN 
CF TME ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR) 



This is a translation parallel to 
the translation stated in SOURCE 
DOCUMENT 0Jk supra of the same 
captured Japanese Doc\unent. 



668 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



669 












iM»«r«)k and pftipm»X«'iaa t«^ti« }«iMNn«. 
2.a»tt«8P» M* Wfti«r tfe4 Jt3Bit»4i«rM.«n oT 
e-^tear f(Ql»-««««ltt««»| , 

Kattar* ©oaeemioBg e^jajpftejit relat»d t« 
the Teoladjwtl Ds^it 

Matt«r« eooceming (?<5piijwieat Te3ja.%M t« 
Mattsr* concertjiag ahijis stor»s, <Jo^« 
«fttt«r» ceaseoTBing tmlL fi-ftsh imtei- ais. 

sM spoelal wsytiae tmppli.^ 
i»t*«HR«' o«»«rBi3Qg asdioAl «tareis 






ItasB r«latSag to Ai«y «aii Ba^y trsiieporU 



S^««hiffli«t^ SeJiool 



J&mvu. S«na Ster«6 



Sad H»v^ iir J^pot 



iCSeSDM St«r»» Dw|!t 



iOKi Stortse 0«i>t 



ICSCBBWKA StoJWie &« 



Offlc« I 

C aM S School 
lOKeSBKi CivU 
(KSSCBmJBll) 



p«rt«t4«Bi S*pt 



Ge!Mml ««!*r?^ Ke.y---^ ' ■* 



670 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 









.st«ai%?«tot «f Sv^jtSa" %«ttU«Ei» 



. f rittd^jpi *M %(fii&0tesi> tttm tj:^ 



<^ tCM G«Hid1M» ^3uiif!M» 






ImmmM^ far jMemmmmI «ftS«i«nirr in ^im 



f«Rr it i» •4113.. S«iBf5fi«rf«a*, tik«p«ffflf«, it ♦Hi. b« 'rm««i^dm& Itot «»«»(* 
WK«i* mttar «t kual 1« t* «f f»«t » hp«»k Isl t&a BfP»»«it dimaelt iitattfcoa bj- 

Ire. i%fmd'i»$.'^mi&'^ 9sp^S.9i:s^ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



671 












■3d l«glfftie« (Sf »si^t- 



i m. 1feHWl*NWw|#l«) 









4, Ite ;«i«»;, 8i|i i ^mmm-m* «wa^3*»! 















«)M> ImMm «f t«wMa« east 



'( nMH^ m ikiii^ 



672 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



673 














f '««#faNMMI8&^|Ki-S 



#llflt %«^^ fat: #£^iMi)eiMi|ii««i ««.' 



^I'TjIHfH"-; 'Jj^im. ^Ijlt^nit^^^^'- 







674 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



C C}J«C!'*C-«l«Ci'®A 



mtUimmm 



^c«Hte4«ii;i.,<^^ 



'■mm Imm^^tmwm^mA^iemmb^ 

mSSm^ ':mmmmSm^mtiUm9^ 
wmm» mm ; ^^m» mm^ m» mm i$m m mm$ 



«f- H i iHlttWM 



fc iiiHiini ml mm. 



n U AmiMt^ mmmwa *i» 



•ft K i twaii £er la wMM i pnirfe imm w r 



wmm mm Ur^Mmimamit mat mi\if«nMsmt 
imm §m if|niii'<iwiij,litiii- m mmef m^'^ikast 
m^4$tima. iaMm mi ■wum w iM ^ mem ^mA 

^a»M»Mwi ti» irt iiM w m* mmti > m wwt «— rVf 

«»«MK ■ *- -«— IP -f ^- -rtTftny liijIHint 



>lh«* Mia M toiAfiiiitp, 
C HHaTiii'ifWii at ) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



675 



iWfeilA fiattM^ ffiaiMilli i 



Z&i^JS: 









mtI- ftmmm* Umw»mitMm MNpMpte «• 



i«iir «• eMtUlwi* «l» Miflgr aT 






«i fM' ivUhmp tan iM»i«fe «f IKM «*»• . 



fMMlif ■ iHnttwi M awn m mx mmmh ■ 



mm%m3m teJMitei^ f/m<wt^ tm HmmmI 
mm iMi g»gwgita ^iM mmfiSm^^ *m**^ i 
•107 teff* • §mmmiUi»t MRNwt w «» alfiMl* 

mat ISwmJmmi i«i«X«|iii * ms^mi, twtaM^ 
to 4mmA mmiOw m^.^tfrnimmm ' 
iM.>i l Wi | iliii,; :'«ww> U atai Ite ppMbw» 



«(t fWM* SMllto •lTtf1»4. 



676 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Bi^tite T it itcn ( H < i4M«. ) 



^oaftlnsion {Og&aXm ) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 









«Mt 'y»»! exwMi^SK 



At&m •«•» .. lUfc — J' <l«ftl»« iHtw vMmevm % i'-iOimirtvd «MRai««^» OMgiifliMt 

iiMip. ai» ii ' ta» not topt {Ntw, tii»ni;l)iM Imma , clMwif ImI: 4D «li«»t»' mA jeiimt*- 



•ad «loeam!»i! AiUMd t« UMmmWKII «i^ : «t««««, «ai i« 

: ite ««Mii4iflB or. SwratI a»a»)(>«l lKi«4 <*«»- if i ihwwt i iw i'>» ii jiifm . j B PTt|»>iw 

■ mtMlgrt tvmipt mai itmm»m U lOn 

It in mm^simA m» iwx^ •Mmatl*! t« 
' tjtte •l>«w«MStieia»4 el««t«lfl»d diim— lite | < 

'; pabUiimA %. tte Istd eMwrnd 9feainr''Miil - 

to tiemeatkrtAm or tte nui«*r xmgitriay msi 



678 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



/Ohl^ 



Coacawlca (Opiaice) 
Mct*rials cwrrlitf by •iwel&llv 
\fore»a at tb» tlaa of th»lt 4«- 



liafasd f«nwt «i tte %im Of tlwlr dafinrt- p«rttt*« far eoabat an** ar* ale 



Battla UaaMM (Da 
That* la reek tvt fortUtr naaarcti «a 
tfea aatariala earriad by iLaiaUr avtab- 



«>• for 6<al»at ai«a«* Dmb 



tha eeMam of traaapotrtatlon. It 



that avoB tfea iMdJbw af acaa^itfltaar at ia aaaantl]^ to llidi ttaav to the 
fonrard anaa baa a«t bw» aa ^aixwtf aad aaoaaaary aialBtaa. 
aban oim eaaaldam tha 14>«r laraZaad la 
wlsaAlqc Is tiiaaa araaa, it m* ba zvocc- 
■iaad tbat bayoMt nA faBciag -^ ' ' 



toli« o*t f o* tlMi f irat tSsM aoatlba kafst 

at a nlBteBBi arad aant latar aa aai^Bdary 

fooda. Tbarafon, It la aaaastlal t^ iadieata tha 

tablaa atMaing i«c«latleB aMvnta of tetar- 
iala iB ortor U, iadleato ataadarda fW tha 



tlaa of dapartv* and for 



( 4.U Storaa papta ) 



It ia raoocBisrd tbat it ia aaaastl^^ to 
aicpadlta M|ttara by f e«nilatii« at eooa \ 



It la aaoaaaary to aaaad thone 



aa^adlta aattara by f ennilatiaK at eooa \ parte of aeeountlBg r»giLUtio(i6 

vagulatiofi^or aqaipaant aeoaoitlnK to aan- far •llltary atoiaa vhleh ux 9 a at 
torm to tba diaraeta|atlea af avlatia* aipliwallnihla M» aviation «qtilp«ent 



aqolpaant, t* aia|)llfy tbalr arraaffapant 
and fttiUar to elapllfy aqoiiaaiit raeorde. 
{ nth Air Dapot ) 



and to alapHf^'aqolpaBnt racordc 



zzHDanqponqpc . ^, 

It ia aaoaaaarr to allalitata tba aaad 
for obtaining tba lavy Miaiator'a approral 
for tba trasafar of eiwii ona plaaa to aaotbar 
ahip, ao that tbla oan ba ddia with tba 
ivproval of tba CinC. 
( lat «lr naat) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



It is ttecess-ry to elliBin?te 
'or g«ttin|; the Havy 
Minister's sppr 
transfer of erea one plaii' 
otJjer ship, so ttiat t]g>*S can be i^ 
Ame With the apgBitJval of the 



3t Mr Fleet) 



Mhlm spare parts are acarcs 
as at present, J »« fcwlieve that 
if t.hej- are ordared/^wdndtk,*!! as ' . 
either asterl*! or. •quipmont, Uiv com-/ 
petlUcndHrtnwBwt ■this Tarlotis depots 
nflll be- (sltsinated. ^roo'rer, XTj^f 
i^ o«5«red -as rsatleiel it will not / 
fc» n«c«ss*ry to transfer ii thsQjd* 

good« facilitated. ' / 

(nth JUr Oepct; / 



Or-iers for aircl 
, A - 

ffltiaebe centrally controlled. 



It sKust b« cl««riy;ii 
WtX. 8«nt««« goods tiecisMiry for 
all troop org-, nizations ii i«rtime 



sre to ti» h«ndl8d as i»ril stores. 



oStiwirfiac, 



we balier^ th*t 



»rtlcl«8 difficult te oitain or to 

npiSit, o.ice lamped uj\i4sr rone h<sa4, 
aJioulii b.e trestsd bo taat'th^ 
awy ls« delivered as b^cl« supplies 

f'|^«|^jbaKl!rHlh} (fflilliaiT stores 

' ■"*.£; taiElKIIt})fin<i, «ti«n n""' 



ntft h^ndlijcig pf eantsen foods 



Kt% ixOiMpmmtiilm to life in 



^ 1» kXmsr* ttftiataiiMd nA so that. 
MKiurity As not «adaag«r«d, and 
a IniaiHing standard fory^ships osust b« 

Mrtablishsd. 



680 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



^ i^ 



■^■mm*'^ 



to t¥.m c«nt,e«os. 



I Mll«r tH^ ar« Ukvjjr to .b* VrMtad 
1 * 



at rUm of ii«eart4^ too,, this i* » 






cxJ»«^'U 



iMtixxl I* to •«t4bXi«h a •iasX«| 
swetl«R(ftiitk«Kt food* tMUon) i^ 
tb« -JtailtistaNw O^pft to iua^lM tt 
•aceluwi'vcdy. lh«r« «r» -■- — — i-- 

I )M» glvan TiBtko obstaoXM ii «mh 

; g«iW7 «ork for ■itm.iy . 

; T«at«ti«« iilan* h&T« ! 

t tomura a stKodard for jji%6£.s, eats 



u.£ eatitMB 



j good* la 2nd n«ot #31-9 



<2»i n»«t} 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



681 




682 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




''i3j%*B«B 9^m) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



683 



tefrtaOlatiasi* i«*?«3*«ft# ^UMsaM and " J 
to <Kpti|>'|l «ltfe- «s :«gr« 4«wwfd «mr ] 

I (31) at SKiMwi tli«r«:*» BOt^ * ^•iaift* 

I «Ks^ |sl«r te!rt»ll»fei««,#sa.« frwife|l«l5©r 



is b«d»i . 



jtlraiy (» l(s&iS«f tut 



«i)uL&«*tog, »® «»tt«sr ■»teat otbw •fteni'r I 
fte«8 »r9 aad«, pi»r» ismt be tostiaiad J 



iasas»4i.»t«Xy, 



(l«th Mr S«p?t.) 



m sA«w« mShwrninr r«fca3-n to JAPAJ? 
for «fe«j»» the -Wpiy «f . «*tc«ift 

«g«ilsMrnit* ;ilild^l|R»<5t» »8i be 
. ©atfittsd with «q;«aii3wmtWd •b« >wae 

I (,1st, nth, mA 4tJj Air fttsVaw* 

C2) M'trOT alj/tfWi. i wn t th* ' feci 
tloail^le'sMh that it i« lap^Saibl* 

1 ^: ■ 

' to.renovat® |)»s««8 ei" to,:t«8li,iK"g9 
ftsir pj-pply 
or aedioai tjpss. im0m trm Mfm 

is alsd difficult' and th«8 sqsraadsiasai- 

aScrfaqfjWnct ttesre is ©»e*t aaxiitjr 

over opftrati««al flit^t®, , 



^t 8w#i be "kept 



loeal *i3? <|»J»*«' 



g84 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




^^, -.r-*fS' aHtlelpated ttet 
.rrangem«nts will be matie wbfreby 
sufficient supivies in the .required 

aaoant- van ali/sufaB^rin 

submarine !&is4 Ailts 
u' » ' « " ¥ *y»« 1-7} 1 



VH 


1 ^ 


S^' 


j 
^ 


ii 




L..* 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



685 



to in t m»imi aiedical supplies f; 
cr.nr^rt'^ h<>splfcal ships, 1 1 is 
regrettably difficult to supply the 
rsKjttlred aaoimt ta the req' irea 
pariot ©f ti«8 tecsuse of ;h« aove- 
watg sf both f?irtl«s MIW rt*»d, 
'f'-r«»:5fter " Jargn ma^i 0' iedlea* 
ais.triljutM t* Hai 
masMxmx&m favspltals |r tfie most 
■*"■' "'"i feaseSiSO as to bJ .able to 






686 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



irtKUftit-ttfetBatt — tmSiO i H AH 'fh x 



Caui<t*i!«kX« Aff orU ar* 1 
a»d« toBtrd local UXt-m^timui; in 

forwtry and *«riealttti« (m{BjtMM^ 

} akdlek «n woridag io t 

M^ «Lth frwh proirUloii* at t mJUi», 

Storaa uaiH iaaerat 



i-xs'd.slacdag #120, batfa haw , 

tMUHW and {arodaeias ar«aa la ' 
tatwKe ttrltlA arwt sorth of 
ubA tuerm ttiarttfor* r«J ia*o dif- 
fiealUaa. | 

Iter UMf^a: I 

IB jm* »f laat yaar 

Sjb< vapaal tiajISiiliftig'to tiM KSttjgO 

ia tiM fonMr Hcltlak pa«— 

oortit eaast of kojjmjsu). 

It ia Dae«aaai7 to gat ] Bniasioo 
fat 
to 1a»m fraah ragatablaa lx< a tha 

NiSSAA/, 

M«MMV iuaa at i'AdAu aod 

fraak provialooa aaa iaw i ^rl "- '■ — ' 

ansDl'T r 
ara bartarad for , 



Ooncluaioo ^.upinion) 

A eaatral agroMunt batween the 
JUfBjrancl kvrj- t"- ' ' 

local s«lj^>sttffiei«kex in 
provialacu^^ must ba a^a and X^ tha 
local a«itiK%ltl»8 ouat ba aadaV- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



687 



^it »A--AII e» this n\4e /TAHAKAN/ 

were to attsflipt 8«Ur-8uftio3©ncy, 

ther« would not Vw ervoij^i^ fresh pro- 

4^ the 1 ,, . 

Yisiems^ tntat aree. Pwsh eseaf and 

, ,,1»een v<!;'^tablss «8p<9Cis|lly raust b« 
suppl*«d fr«B.»<5m« plaC'SJ like JAVA, 
bwt at present a stor«iihip niakes 
oiily one or t-wo trips ev4ry two 
months from the 102Bd ^'a^ Store* 
t)«pt'{30aUBAJA). 1^? Ji!(4to.«r of 
storesliip* for local Stores' tJept;;*!? 

; 3niEt be i:n.creased; at leaSt two or 



For yvBT inforraation,! the aunovnts 
aeed«a here- and the *«**> ^t self- 
suTsply aee given in the following 



b7 all 5ovt . sel|r-sup- 
of f i'^es & pl^$ 
forces here \ 

(kg i»r day) ^, 



tfoUl^ 



k grMt«i^attal)«r oKaierMbipa 



la nMcl«d for 



localljr rKUM i^roTicLaM . 



fresh 
fish 


200,000 (5dajs 

km \ 


3,200 


3 mo 
averase 
start- 


rresh 
meet 


160,000 (10<?a;is 


1,030- 


Hov 
1943 ' 


•resh 


600,000 54.5* 


S,130 




vege- 
tables 









Sapply for personnel of ■ 


hit- imvtis i 


i» bhe Setttfe .Iduring .the fir fc phase 1 


of the war totalling 10Q,D00| 

■ - - ■ \ 


is • 


iasufficieat with the storesli 


\^''- 


used at preaant. 


,, 


^2n<i Fleet) 









688 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



689 









^t^i^ -' — TS'wtg, to Tw, . — ,.,-,,,;„^^„ 



,3t?rrtists.*««ff* 



:-?i8;t?«J.iiKit«d .storaje' space 

to »«« J«|>ort*sfc pl*B«8 «ad tfe*^ wry 
. i*«r^' iaall laiKlai cytit- sweS w 

I •supply «lisij>» «B»t >»! fi»«a th» Joe ■ 



690 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



#/^^'#"/^ 



piui^ unoro ■»«»! r««{>iui» 5th 
^'•^ . 1 

(3) liM mr wm rA t of iMwpitAl ahip* 
•r* )raz7 liaitwl; thv rtrslr go i«to 

ar««a liiMur* mmOI endTt «r« op«r>t^. 

H|»») MB* trip* «nc« «»• 

twiise * «citii.h and thwtfare ti»ir Jij»di- 

t 
e«l 9mo«ra mutt \tm maM rvppeaui^L* 

for th« mtp^plr ot aadletl wit«rlala 

b«t»MM(i.»hlp8. (tAittV moSOKA 6th SHLf) 



!lh«n chips sr« gotes to iM>«raaiirJ>«r« 



hj tr^mftf^rrlng ma astch of tbotr 
poasibX* to 



MAreltjr of i»vim, 



Sattlo L«*soa(H««aoa) 



C^tDiT 3) 



trtuaftf or b«t« 



cXothinA prortalnu, e*nt««a goods 



untj roiloi goo4«i *a4 ' ' 

wurtiiM kit«\aai*t bo'roguVtod «t 
float.Hq ia ow^»r to lMRiro;»8»oot..- 
noss and •ffieioifrey. 



JRWHR OF SDPPi: 



T SHIPS A-vfJ Tf^A^Sf^SfiT^-^r/j.A/ 



Signal flag* by which th« typo of sup- 
ply ship cut b« rooegtklxod at a gX&ae* aast 
bo adoirtod. JUmnltl^n ships bsro t>o«a 
adstskod for storoships, sad thorohy ^por- 

tunitios to load ai^pplio» haro lioon lost. 
(OssRon 2) 



(1) Higl>-fpo«i, 4SditM typo ships JBUst 

i usod in 11,1 tuislBi' **■■*;-:.( 8MP«SMt}er.c.:< 

(2) It is gonsarally rsry profitabl* to 
Ins* saall, hlgh-«p*od ships in soothsm 
lar«M. («■■** 18, otc.) , ^ 



Conelosioa (toinion) 

Signal fla|8 i«leh i2»iU.«st« 

the typ* of supp^ijr <ri)ip should b« 

y'. •-'■.» -. 

Mki*s4l- at «|^pro{Hriat« tinss. 



Cosij fast ships sust bo ahoioc 
a«9^^ ships to aooo^>w7 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



691 



•p^*4f* 



knot* i» i r i>q> * 4 r<d j<» * 



jfttUy lo«i«4 oil timk«. (iSESrO MAfiU) 

rl'i /ir';i=i.'f-rtt is wA, It mst b« 
strengthened. i^^HKHf. 18) 

(2) CoBSBunioations e-iiif^sent is 
,ww deficient; it ia inconvwa' 



, (1) In tri«« of tb« f «ct that 
ther« ar«^tlwi« i*«n •kill In 
lookout aM (UrMl"* t ^ ww t <t*- 

fciMfoLa* th» ir*t« of « »hip. 



creased frois 20 to; o«8r 5iv t^^nds per 
i-un, acd rl«peh charges; ffw 4 to b\ 

Dept) .• ■ , , 



f:ict that thera 



srttJtBlties for 



as V»as been the tiwaber of large 



<ioirvsvte4. 
TvfOAairpiane liphters imist b« 



air fleet a:.d they 



uust be aquiced wit; 
landing barges. 



'- (l)Conditions ars such that sappiy,: 

o" fuel- and lubrleating oil in *«*-&«« 

the 
ta .-impossible and, totTsedoe* supplied 

cannot be prepared for firing.' this is 

-,.ai,, !,i«<\c8a*e of by ti'&sis- 



. (Tiiis has be«a don 

, "(2) Torpedoes su^jplied ffisst 



it, suit -bis ints 



692 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



sweral EXJBtts *itho«t «xaBa~ 






tf -s^e -^^jr* to p&r- 



■■;■ lt»KJa!^'<i«li'«'ejry.ai' th«»© torpedoes, 
fjot fissa«r iK>iiild w» find ti«^ «o^ cm*' 
eletely mAij top tiTias, b«t Ictana^ 



r«g*rdi«g their 



sjid imperfect ones readjusted. 



,-..„,^-«'- 



»s«v<,i*s»iJ.p oijw bs«.wi. o4» far ;*s KASKISA- 



tr«r«*ms no gospifcalfsbip at mj^C, 



3; a«re «« f«if aoppc rtoaitiss tfor 
«syil:aA:ite«!,fa*»ieii&s« «« t% is difficult 
1k> **feit to£>& bo^lUl i^ p. lor a atippli' ef 
««<tt«&l aatertals, torpwiJ Boats and 



of seyloasly wounded are ta be 
■ -- -^ Aft«r bbtfi tte 131 W 



1 The numbar of hospibtal 
idps skst h^- increased knd the 
* * 5 of th«*sick f-^ - 



:.!aa|facilxtate(l. 

eajsacity ifrhogpit.ai 
sMm for Jkipplytag iaedic&l materi- 
als wtat belincreased. j 

gb lighters to 'c«;USs;d 
to transfer rfetieats smst he ' 
Wi«i*d aboard hosfitsd ships. 



v§t li,:5ht«rs w«ri borr»*«c 



i'ar tr&iigportifsg casualties', 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



693 



At pr«wnt wndltions ar« such that 
with «v»ry po»slbl« ua* of the UAUItk 

(AFj»nd th« mAKOvAF) 6ttj>ply i» barely 
b«lag c»rri«d on. 

It li feared thai in th» event of 
an accident to th«se, sun'i;/ iirias 
nfciu.d D « -throxn iato di.onj,*!- and 
■ «ii'ect «ii KOT&le and on oners^tior-.:; 



Ih« mit»b«r of. 9tor« ships for fi4sh 
prorlsions must bs increased. 



would be g*«a±. 



iA'& tjnp*' 



aust be constriici®.. and put into op8rat,4c 



C-^eratio^.al isaneuverg inlremote pl8«_es 
lest tftree oonths or more eii^ the rapid 

I quaatitiss cf storage 
goods to forward ar&'.s is ii^sosslble. 
Moreotrer, storage facilities for r>ro- 



visjons at forward supiuy 'bases are, poor 
and craoditions are mch thati ai& forces 



stationed in tJies© areas ary- JwawM- y sap- 
pliad^ Also, becawj.e other eeuiosnc^ax. 



aBasualtion, an* aUcellaneoas goods {-taviB 

heen losaied ,indi»criiainatel^ on supply 

ships of the Ti»ansportation De-jftTtraent 

system wA tii© laoiveraents of these ships 

have aot been tinder the direct super- 

visioG of.the'Combiued Fleei, the stat-s 

of transport fross JlF*.. Sas $e«n sucH thft 

*b6 " ? I of first life 

x^epid, large- scale supplsf ji*±p opsrafSi 



ated iritb the' 



,zfrsfl 



possible^———" ^■,,,-j * 

At least BO iiri>iiiiitinr.t ~ for storege 
-revisions (tnclixiing cafiteen goods asid 



694 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



fe»ttl« suppltee; nust be attjBChsd 



to the Cr«*liloc! ¥}.< 



^ lOwl^ 






(2) .:i#tank«ra isust fee •Cjuipjrtd 
with refyig4r«tor» and thaa b« easbled 
to supply f ra$h proMsioas at tb« saiw 
.ti*e that they sapply oil. 2ad Fleet) 



It *oaid t« «r«ll t9 ,'laa «#- 
4uSU« mall crai't tueb *• «^Mr 
to be «a|q?li»d «itfe fresh i>ro- 
▼iaidfl-; »fc tb« MAS tin* lad 
place that th«y «re euppli** wltfa 



■AIR TEAJSKJST 



B»ttle l*8son (Rsasoa.) 

{!) Siace it is b«liw«d t3 ba rejry 
profitabl* both in th« sapply end traa«f«r 
of argentJ^ needed. sj«r« parti., K si^i 



tWBBsjjssrt' plsnes shoald be d« i*il«d to all 
air d»pot« for their excXasi«» use. 
(lltti Mr Depot, i:. 3th Air D«pot) 

(2) Fleets or Stores D«|(^ itiwper* 

I . - 
aMbmmO. ar«&s aaiBt be pi-ovid|d fc pMi « p i >r t. 

pl&Tie* suid every effort njost jb© made to 
proTide a rapid supply of hi^lj expand- 
able light equlpsBent* • 
RavRl > 
O'OKOsaKA mm- Stores DepI) 

(3) In -view of the great |aiaount ot aedi- 
cal sup lies requtrint; eare Ija preservation^ 
and argent goods such as blo4d vaccine and 
X-ray fil«. It ie necessary 1* »eet the de- 
oand by Ijicraasing air facilities. 



ItURK Navy Yard, Si»*»-^a«r|t" j gi^.r) 1 

(4) Since it ijs difficulty to eupply 



icllitles. 



Cooclueion (Oplatoo) 



trshspoptsition. 



operational centers by eurfae^, aabulance 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



695 



»«r«iaa dp«Mlfl«« ,•*«.;: o«t was j>«ti«sta 



«aflgs8,-aBWs mt immiimnn^ mv^ steins fmm tm 



l»Mrs <»f *a- oil umK^ nars^diuBaiBsd *«i 

" • (2): &>»«• :fwi(p, 6«rt,tiii§"iuas XM^aMpg. 
^toKUse tasiag ««|- r«fB»li;.g «•• Mksly -to 
-,rcar, 4l*o,^ Binc« tha hotes stWftcih about 
;,!!:*,«» part ti*tl«Si. beads tsMlcely is. be- 
,«(i«ii mmiHeUA luad grM-tiy r»dac*« th« 
c*p*«ity fox faj^jjjriat oU. %• aaafcsr of 
ti»»s &c«i^«at8 fc«jPF«ae4 tf ;iBM*s fro* ths 
b4i|;li»ila|: of %b>i: ma. up to j^' «adt ot I9i& 






Viw*fro« 



«<1 :«at«d 
9(m etc) ' 5 



696 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



697 



c:i,cr„ 


QCr ■.: sur. .: 1 /OJ^l.r \ 


htgrn 30 




V«ri«M irtwtlM i» tin* iW4 «n» k«li« 


Pmm2mt.m{0^Mm) 


«al iribrtlaa cf WU4Ma7 dor** 


; Miitoi*4i4. I«*«n«b IMM «bri^ 


«l9rtliriite t* ^ tarn. «al ««»- - 


1 


MamlJK iil^Bl«eU«» la ]«driaK. 


tattarlM Mri pMkjlag far 1|m fc««wti« 




•f wOf 4lMtel«» ttMNMf pirii« «rwM- 




fwrtetiait «» st«r«cc« DmhtW is «1m « gmd* 




ml inprgwiiit ia Vuvan^ •qsiiaant. Tb»M 




>r«il«M liMNad W stiriLUdiia pmm tiaw m> 









£tii« Mwa MMT r t« wit iq;> wigotmm nmtr t ik 

i taastmi Hmrmm ti^ } 
2). tadiltgr is ]d# i» Iwrtt m«um, 
•ad la 'Ohm* vmui, augr wowta mm^XUi 
txm Ufa «r» WMHMiUa :4m rMCt^ad. It 
»>•• «i1^«Kt wjriac thatltlw i*M«mtleB 
jRf thMw it«Mi ia fibtn#BXt. 

( IQlat IMl Bqpot^ixUUUI BtukA } 
3)» Pry lOaU yhoUtyaiibia j i n i iii ii i i fapa 
payar .k^f ia atagraga 1^ taoraM saoaa for 
tfanw. aeatlH Daaaaaa aafXdjr i^ aaaaot 1m 



( l<mh iir D^pat > 

i«]fit«rimtt«B la grMt: tea ta Qia aeaai- 
aiaa Ja «h» araa. A« a iNMnat, tiia l|la»- 
iaatad dlala of aaaaniig JaatxtMsta a«xr- 
adaaaa tta iataraal aaitlMEBlaa «ad aoila 
ara teakaa we Aaaacadi. 

{ ifiettk iiy iH9«« f 



698 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



BatU* Immb (Bmumb) 



1). Dirf»etlT(i f«rt» «• 



tlyfflOBd 



CmmbUmUm (OpiBiw) 



It i» iMHiwftlii U OM aid?* vilMs tlMt IQmb OlMMifi« 

mwiiiite lAm m Imft i£ nm, <*» ww - 
taB4]« Hm MM «f tk* «fE«MBt(i» inwiags, . 
«e«e jwrtM «i«k IMW IAmI «3<uwifiMti«e ^ 






wa/btBf aad ylM* 



i) aurt te xwtii»MMi 






M IBBU ia *A* «rM «aA TCdOCI la 
IMI tMdt* or* tanHwrnrrai trm m» 
■JarthMT, it I* j M nm a iy faiiriMBag 



■fti 
•• tlMi a 



pcrta «wll^ i» Wff «>r«>^*« that a 

^Haaftlw «r yajbia will art rM«l». ^ (yoUo^'Jt^A '>'?'.»*:«$ J> y( 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



699 



-v^- AJ47^ 






C«Me2iMd«i<0|«art««) 



f«n>M 4«f«rt StoarM far 



•«M«« tnit* la 

^- " "- II 'n-' f "i 1 'Ti iiiiiiinimiiiiii ii iinj ii 



fill. 9R areonwiiT or shits" hbus, mcajwea. rmnKs asd EOKBTianf 
mm-im mjemim m swms (wmawm, 

!)• It la BMMMOT t* iiWl&ll OqailMMttt It in BMMVMUT t« wtftrwaBii 

far irafMUac firm mmtmm. {Oiom far «3m> at^fOy'lSt^tiM 

< AH ildiMi } «f TMNH»la ao that nf^Sjr Mmd 

2). £b tlw aam «r tokara abidi «QiI>27 aapwdttaa Mgr ^ ianwuad to 
firaa both alAac, if supply eaaaot Im earrlad ttia wfeMMt. 
aatt firaa bath «t4to« at th* a«M tdLM»« tba 
tnaMftar «r AmO. woMt te IMMatad. 
la pr e tww ita ura aa ta afaiy ao that aaistrata 
t appla rf i>K aaa ba aarrla4 a«t, 
( JUOSaCiO MSS, SatfoB I ) 

3). Ihaira ax* iaataaaaa ia libU^ aoctraik- 
aow aattar baeaawa sixad with tlw eU tOM 
rafnallag ia b^JnK aarriad oet trm %aaaum. 



mat laaaanaBiaaaa la lairflng xvaoXta. It la 
aaaaaaax7 to aqo^ taakaan with ^baataabla 



( m(W)wm > 

4}.Xa -*ia« «f tiia aaagr iaataasaa ia vbiah 

H» h eaa a ara bwrat <»a ta " 

aaetraaw pwwvra aama4 by ftaaty «pairati«B 



700 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



C!NC:'AC-C:i;CiOA He 



«f the* lirtite -valvM, it in wmmmaef U 
lastall <tBil|iwt. iriUA viU ivnmat fxmt 

( lMittl0} 
5). Oil iuMto ftMM2« UmbU Iw iairUUwt 

( KranTceA) } 

. CoiditiiBa «s tiw ICtOCp 

l9* ttf I*, of andUUUoT Uma l«. «f t«k e«aB*ett«B B». aT tMks 
taOMlii trm mA tmml mlw* firca Mwh Um 

12 1 ? 



6). Ite cnMt li^rtti or «b* air ontlat idpa 
an f«Ml taaka aalo^a aa oaa aa t y tba calaiva^ 
awnt of tlM pip* liB« to fMilltata tte oat. 
latafair. 

IhlMS thaar* ia •tKmi&KM33l» pnmmxn m 
tiaa iataka valva, iM^iag ia iivoaaiUa. 

( cmuiiCA), wxam'iGJk} ) 
7). rtm tba vtandipoiBt af ra|Kl4 tupg^, it 
la aaoeaa«i7 t« ratoaa Xbm aHibcr «f fpal 
taaka aad iierMM -ttw aiqpMitgr, 

( GSOUKCA} ) 
8). It ia aaewMHox to plaM tho aavtaiaara 
for tba fMl iadaka yXf, tbm iattOu g«i«* 
pipa wad tJM hoaa !> siU^oa MawBiattt far 
laodlsff MMr*tiaD>. ' C'P ^ f ■^ !^ -^M 1 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



CtNC?AC CIMCrOA Mem » I ^O&i"/^ 






a«iRsl»iiltn(0|piBl«B) 



< tmxLim } 



tta «f ail 9<^llM<t 



( auuuctai(90) > 



U). % nmmm adt 1il» MatoHSM to nq^ 



< iitllBaHKSD) ) 



; 12). It !• aMMMHwr7 to cq^ twdnvit «i«lt 



702 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



3attle Uamon (f»a.mii 



ipful i*' th« t.«ieph«ne can 



iBcna 'f svsc'rritr, flars^ slrr;4ia 



^/£i 71 



to r«fuei Mciigsi«te a caj-riftr. 



^»i !i?«rricf;s am ti; 



srews wsi* OTwt 



R«ll in»tr«oto4 . in their stie. 



fcxcs, ■ :;.-^{t Irfts^ two hour*- ars n«oessa5~^' 
for, tbe laimching of large laodlng b&rgKS 



whose hatche' 



vsniently placed 



for loading an6 unloading, 
( lC«th Air 3«pot } 



17,!, There are 



«s In which cargo 



spoil «g« has *^ *3 hi|5h aa y>i due to 

i 
refrigerators, * ak r«frig«ration, iap«rJ 

ect packini-i abb tPot iatoraahips. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



703 



ii^/Oh 7t 



18), Conv«ri«4 A.a».»r« inoonwnient f 
iK^ppljring l.dt»rle«tin| oil. 
( SISSi» 1I&S0 ) 
Att«n!fcl«B to ship's exjjlpKest is 



.'OSSRO JTAIU ) 
It i« ?^c«8*wy t» «<pip Afii with 40 
t<»» di«FriokK:foir« «i»l aft te isak« poss- 
ible th« lo«4iag «f li^hfe«»» large 

l«ndlx^ bargfts and otbw fee«»y ob4««ts- 
- -■-- -~-pf-mM^4i^h--4«.-^f^ 




It is a«c««s&fy to .have & large iMafc'er 

of AKa i»hich are e<juiped with h»a»y .*«* 
d«rrick«. 





l^' 


^ 





704 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
WASHINGTON 



SOURCE D0CUME2JT #l6 
(U S NAVY V?EEKLY INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 
VOLUME 1 No. 22, 8 DECEMBER 19hh) 
ENTITLED 
"UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS, 
TWEEKLT INTELLIGENCE" 
USED BT TOE NAVY IN COMPILING THE 
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR IBE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" 
(Record of Proceedings, pages ii32-U60). 

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION 
OF THE ATTACK CN PEARL HARBCR) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



705 




.iiMi«ii<iy|v/£l>1@i 



AFIRE :0N 7 DECEMBER 1941 
(see story of PEARL. HARBOR on pQQt 1) 



706 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CCWFIOENTIAL 



Any material appearing in "Weekly Intelligence" may be reproduced with or 
without credit, so long as proper classification is observed. 

"Weekly Intelligence" receives wide distribution among fleet units and key 
Navy, I'arine and Army Coniiaands. Any requests for additional distribution may be 
addressed to Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area. 



Note: Starting with the next issue, the regular publication date of CINC- 
PAC-CTTJCPOA "Weekly Intelligence" will be Monday rather than Friday. Therefore, 
Vol. 1, No. 23 will be issued on 18 December, 



CONTEyrS 

PKARL HARBOR: The Planning Stage Page 1-22 

Sub Situation 23 

Jap Ships Sunk in MANILA Harbor 2t - 25 

UANIU Strike Results 26 - 27 

Probable Conversion of Jap Hospital Ship 28 

Increased AA Armament on Jap Freighter-Transport 29 

MANIU, PHILIPPINK Islands 30 - 31 

KUKA-NATORI Class CL 32 - 33 

Long Delay Bomb Fuse 32 

Floating Mines in JAPAN Sea % - 35 

New Jap Rifle Grenade 3/^ 

GENYO Class Tanker Victim of PB/»Y 36 

Jap Aerial Anti-Sub Doctrine 37 - l^'} 

Long-Shafted Ehgino Used on JACK UU - U5 

New Army Air Division 45 

Jap Airfield Camouflage 46 - 47 

Thumbnail Biography of HELQJ 48 

Provisional Sketch of GEORGE 49 

Sidellglit on Suicides 50 

Japs Develop DIDO-CHINA 51-54 

Jap Ordnance vs Allied Aircraft 55-56 

Jap Anti-Sub Bomb 56 

Weekly Photo Coverage 57 - 58 

LUZON Airfields 59-62 

Enclosures: 

"Japanese Infantry Weapons" 

Revised Drawing of YAUATO Class BB 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 707 



CONFIDENTIAL 

PEARL HARBOR: THE PLANNING STAGE 

When Jap planes struck clustered U.S. warships and aircraft at PEARL HARBOR on 
7 December l^l, the enesay was carrying into effect pio-pointed plans conceived 
months in advance and long cloaked in secrecy. Until recently, little has been 
known of the planning stage prior to the sneak raid on HAWAII. 

The first concrete intimations of early enemy intentions are revealed in the 
Interrogation of a Japanese Chief Yeooan who worked closely with top-ranking Jap 
Navy personnel during critical months in mi<t-194l. The prisoner, who was captured 
on SAIPAN, had access to highly confidential documents as wall as behind-the-scenes 
rumors while plans for PEARL HARBOR were being perfected. 

The prisoner appears both exceptionally intelligent and cooperativ*. Testimony 
capable of confirmation from other soxurces checked closely. Tactical information 
(as contained in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol, 1, Nos. 2 and 3) proved reliable, 

liost remarkable of the PCW's assets is his memory of details, as indicated in 
his reconstruction of the historic Combined Fleet Secret OpOrder #1, of 1 November 
1941. This document, reproduced entirely by memory, is believed to be fairly 
accurately transcribed, and will be printed in full later in this articl«. 

As a yeoman attached to the Staff of CinC Combined Fleet (Adniral YAUAilOTO) , 
the prisoner became familiar with Jap war games. Staffs of the various Japanese 
Fleets worked these out on a large game board. Games were held frequently, some- 
times as often as twice a month. 

Prior tc late August (1941), war games were held at such anchorages as SUKUMO, 
SAEKI, KAGOSHIMA, and KANOYA. Close attention was devoted to current experimental 
data, which was incorporated in tactics employed. Although the prisoner insists 
that enemy countries were not specifically designated during these games, the ident- 
ity of possible Jap foes could scarcely have been obscure. 

During this period, the prisoner added, there was a constant interchange of 
persojinel between CinC Combined Fleet and the Naval General Staff, Uen on these 
staffs were reportedly "definitely much keener" than members of other Fleet staffs. 

Final planning stages were presaged late in August, when CinC Combined Fleet 
ordered all Fleet Commanders and their key Staff menibers to TOKYO for further war 
games. Offices at the Naval General Staff at JAPAN'S capital were found inadequate, 
and the games were thereafter helc! in the Naveil 'Tar College, The PCW claimed that 
secxxrity measures at the War College were woefully inadequate. Classes at the 
College conllnued as usual; "any man with a half-official air could easily have 
walked in". 

On 2 Septeaber the final all-important "games" got underway, with an intro- 
ductory speech to all officers taking part. Room? were assigned to the "N" Team, 
the "A" Team, and the "E" Team (Nippon, America, and England) and to the umpiree. 
The teams, composed of virtually every top-notch Jap Naval officer, were oade up 

COVT/M^eO 

PAGE I 



708 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDENTIAL 

as follows: 



UMPIRES 



NAVAL GENERAL STAFF 

NAGANO, Osami 
FUCTTOME, Shigeru 

UOZUUI, Jisaku 
YAliAMOTO, Chikao 
UAYUZUMI, Harue 
TAMURA, Saburo 
, SANAGI, Tsuyoshi 
UOZUVI, Yoriichi 

NAVY MINISTRY 

TAKATA, Toshitane 
SHIKI, Tsuneo 
TOIBATA, Kurie 
FUJII,- Shigeru 



N-TEAM 



COtXBINED FLEET 

TAllAMOTO, Isoroku 
ITO, Selichi 
KUROJDIA, Sameto 
GOTO, Shigeru 
ISOBE, Taro 
SUGI, Toma 
SASAKI, Akira 
WADA, Yushiro 
NAGATA, Shigeru 
WATANABE, Yasuji 
ARBIA, Takayasu 
SEDII, Ichiyoshi 
OTA, Kanai 



RANK 

Admiral 
Rear Admiral 

Captain 

Captain 

Commander 

Commander 

Commander 

Commander 



Captain 
Commander 
Commander 
Commander 



Admiral 

Rear Adinirftl 

Captain 

CoRBnander 

Coanander 

Commander 

CoDmander 

Coisnander 

Coisnander 

Cotomander 

Conmander 

Commander 

Coonandflr 



OFFICIAL DUTIES 



Head of Firat Section (War Planes 

and Operations) . 
Member First Section. 
Head of Sub-Section, First Sect. 
tiember « ■ ■ ■ 



Ueoiber of Military Affairs Bureau. 

n n H n H 

" " Office of Military Supply- 
Private Secretary to Navy 

Minister (Admiral SHIUADA, 
Shigetaro) . 



CinC Caobioad Fleet. 

Chief of Staff. 

Deputy Chief of Staff, 

Staff Adjutant. 

Staff Engineering Officer. 

Staff Gunnery Officer. 

Staff Air Officer. 

Staff Coanunication Officer. 

Staff Navigation Officer. 

Staff Operations and Plana Officer- 

Staff Torpedo Officer. 

Staff Supply Officer. 

Meteorologist attached to Staff. 



l9t COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (RADIO INTELLIGENCE) 



KAKIMOTO, Gonlchiro 
ARISAWA, Naosada 



Rear Admiral 
Conmander 



Commander. 

Deputy Chief of Staff. 



E-TEAM 



SECOND FLEET 

KONDO, Nobutake 



Admiral 



Coanander. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



709 



CONFIDENTIAL 



TANAGIZAWA, Suranosuke 
OISHI, 'nanotsu 

FOURTO FLEET 

INOUE, Semi 
FIFTH FLEET 

HOSOGAYA, Boshiro 

ELEVENTH AIR FLEET 

TSUKAHARA, Niohizo 
KUSAKA, Jinichi 



Captain 
CoBmandAT 



Vice Admiral 



Vice Adsiit-al 



Vice Admiral 
Rear Admiral 



Deputy Chief of Staff. 
Staff NaTigaUoQ Officer. 



Coomander* 



Coamander. 



Coomander. 
Chief of Staff. 



A-TEAtt 

THIRD FLEET (Amphibious Forces for Southern invasions) 



TAKAHASHI, Ibo 
ISHIHARA, Hajime 

SIXTH FLEET 

SHmiZU, Uitsuml 
KANOAKA, Tomojiro 



Vice Admiral 
Captain 



Vice Admiral 
Captain 



FIRST AIR FLEET (Carrier Fleet) 



NAGUMO, Chuichi 
KUSAKA, Ryunosuke 
GENDA, Minoru 



Vice Admiral 
Rear Admiral 
Ccounander 



Coianander. 

Deputy Chief of Staff. 



Conmander* 

Deputy Chief of Staff. 



Coamander. 
Chief of Staff. 
Deputy Chief of Staff. 



On 3 September, officers involved studied classified material. PCff was assigned 
to "N" Team (CinC Combined Fleet). That afternoon, Coamander WATANABE > Admiral 
YAMAUOTO's hard-working, fact-finding Plans and Operations Officer - handed the POI 
an outline of conditions under which the games were to be held, and requested fifty 
copies. These terms, which set forth a working basis for the games, contaloed the 
heart of the forthcoming 1 November OpOrder #1. Extensive preliminary planning 
was indicated. The prisoner believed that these plans must have been under develop- 
ment for several months. This was the first time that the POH realized that som^* 
thing of unusual slgnificajice was in the air. 

On 5 September, the POW was attached directly to Commander SASAKI, CinC 
Combined Fleet's Staff Air Officer. When he entered the smoke-filled room at about 
1000, he found PEARL HARBCB plans under discussion. The Japa apparently e:Q>ected 
to catch all major U.S. Fleet units in the Pacific in PEARL HAEBCa as well as units 
believed recently transferred from the Atlantic. The prisoner was surprised to 
overhear that "N" Team expected to lose one-third of the units participating in 
the attack on HAWAII; one AKAGI Class CV and one SORYU Class CV were estimated as 



710 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDENTIAL 

sxinlc. 

On 6 and 7 Septeniber, the conference of "K" Team debated the beet aeans of 
assaulting PEARL HARB(%. (The PC*f, who was adept at the abacus - calculating board - 
was often used during these sessions to estimate fuel \ised by Fleet units at 
varying speeds) . It was during this stage of pleuming that Captain KUROJIllA 
(Deputy Chief of Staff) and Rear Admiral ITO (Chief of Staff) differ«l as to the 
practicability of conducting an amphibious assault on HAWAII. The cool and precise 
ITO was (surprisingly) in favor of an early landing, and YAMAUOTO was inclined to 
agree, but the intuitive, tempenttental KUROJBtA won the discussion by pointing out 
insuperable logistics problems. The POW believes that ITO's plan was a last-minute, 
improvised idea, and that - when KUROJIUA's argtanent succeeded - the basic plan 
continued as originally intended. 

These early sessions, the PCM said, seeoted confined prijnariljr to two general 
problens: first, the details for a successful surprise raid on PEARL HARBOR; and 
second, a carefully worked-out schedule for occupying UAIAIA, BURliA, D.E.I. , tb« 
PHQIPPINHS, the SOLdlCTIS, and Central Pacific Islands - including (ultimately) 
HAWAII. Neither AUSTRALIA nor NEW ZEALAND was apparently considered as immmdlaf 
military objectives; the Japs intended simply to cut them off from outside help, 
nie POW heard INDIA mentioned only once, when sone senior officer remarked "that's 
where friction with GERUANT will begin". 

The conferences (and "games") were ended about 13 September. The prisoner 
helped carry the notes to KUSE, and thence by launch to the NAGATO, TAUAMOTO*s 
Flagship, which waa anchored at HASHIBAJIUA. About half of the Staff were already 
on board. 

On 15 September, all the Staff with four yeomen (not including PC*f) Journeyed 
to the IWAKUNI Air Group to confer with the Anny. The POW remembers TERAUCHI men*- 
tioned, but cannot recall other najaes. He insists, however, that TOJO - then still 
War Uinister - was not present. It was widely rumored (but never confirmed by other 
evidence) that the Anqy conferees at this meeting had not previously learned of' plans 
to attack PEARL HARBOR. 

The NAGATO remained at KASHIRA JIUA for about six more days. At the end of 
September, the main body of the Jap Fleet moved to SAEIQ. There were four revlaiow 
of Confined Fleet OpOrder #1 while the Flagship was at SASO, though no major chaogea 
were made. 

On 1 November, the final printing of the order was started, requiring almost 
three days to complete. Two copies were sent to the Anqy. Staff officers of other 
Fleet units at SAEKI called for copies in person. In all, 300 copies were distri- 
buted. OpOrders #2 and #3, designating Y-Day and X-Day, were issued on 5 and 10 
November, respectively. 

(Cooxnent: The eneiqy naturally uses East Longitude Time in hie OpOrder - i.e., 
the date of S Deceod>er for the PEARL HARBOR attack is correct ELT.) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 711 

CONFIDENTIAL 

The prisoner once knew the OpOrder intimately. Over a period of weeks, he has 
labored to reproduce on paper as much of the Order as he could remember. This ver- 
sion is obviously incomplete and not to be compared vrith the original document, but 
in main outline is believed to be substantially as printed. Notes in parentheses 
were added by the editor. 



Flagship NAGATO, SAEKI WAN 
1 November 19/J. 

COMBINED FLEET SECRET OPORD #1 

The Japanese Etapire will declare war on the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and 
the METH5RLANDS. 

War will be declared on X-Day, 

This order will became effective on T-Day. 

GENERAL SITUATION 

(a) Policy toward the UNITED STATES. 

In spite of the fact that the Qnpire has always maintained a friendly 
attitude toward the UNITED STATES, the UNITED STATES has interfered in 
all the measures which we have taken in self protection for the preservat- 
ion of our interests in East ASIA. Recently, she has blocked our speedy 
settlement of the CHINA Incident by aiding the government of CHIANG Kai- 
shek and has even resorted to the final outrage of breaking off economic 
relations. While senselessly prolonging Jap>anese-American negotiations, 
she has continued to strengthen her military preparations. She offers a 
threat to us in the form of a concentration of her Fleet in the PACIFIC 
OCEAN, thus attempting to exert on us both economic and military pressure* 

(b) Policy toward GREAT BRITAIN. 

BRITAIN is siding the government of CHIANG Kai-shek and, acting in concert 
with her Allies and the UNITED STATES, in interfering with our program of 
construction in East ASIA. Recently she has been steadily building up the 
defenses of her bases in East ASIA in an attempt to threaten us. 

(c) Policy toward the NETHERLANDS INDIES. 

Although economic negotiations of a peaceful nature have been underway 
with us for a number of months, the NETHERLANDS INDIES has been led by 
BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES to reject flatly the continuance of mutually 
beneficial economic relations. Recently she has threatened the fortunes 
of Japanese which have been built up as a result of persevering work through 
long years. 

(d) The ports and the vast fertile regions of the coast of CHINA have been 
occupied by us and most of her great cities captiired. CHINA, however. 



712 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIOENT/AL 



supported by BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, has not 7«t awtOcened from tha 
deluding draam of "Fight the War and Save the Country" and is attempting 
total resistance to JAPAN in the form of a "scorched earth" policy for 
all CHINA. 

While organized resistance is gradually beccming weaker, the prevalence 
of guerilla warfare has obliged us to comiit large nujnbers of troope to 
pexvianent garrison duty there. If we are to secure decisive victory, 
BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, the powers behind CHINA, must be destroyed. 

(e) Policy toward the SOVIET UNION. 

The strength of Soviet forces on the Sovlet-Uanehukuoan border Is formldabl*. 

The USSR is laaintaining a vlgilent alert, awaiting developments. However, 
if the Ekplre does not attack the SOVIET UNION, it is believed that the 
SOVIET UNION will not coomence hostilities. 

OUR SITUATION 

The fourth Fleet has largely completed preparation in the Uandated Islands, as 
has the fUeventh Air Fleet (Naval shore-based air) at essential bases In CHINA, 
niENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND, The state of repair of our ships and planes 
is generally excellent and the efficiency of their personnel has markedly im- 
proved. 

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 

To drive BRITAIN and AllERICA from Greater East ASIA, and to hasten the S6ttl»» 
ment of the CHINA Incident. In addition, it is expected that when BRITAIN and 
AUEEICA have been driven from the NETHHILANDS INDIES and the PHILIPPINES, an 
independent self-supporting economic entity nay be firmly established. The vast 
and far-reaching fundamental principle, the spiritual guide of our nation, (th« 
"Eight Comers of the World Under One Roof - HAKKO ICHIU ), may be demonstrated 
to the world. To this end we will use all the military strength necessary. 



STRATEGI 



The strategy to be adopted against BRITAIN, the UNITED STATES and the NETHIK- 
LANDS will be as directed in the Annexed Vol\m>e. X-Day and T-Day will be 
announced later. 

If before T-Day the enemy is believed to have been able to ascertain our plans, 
the execution of X-Day will be made the subject of a special oixter. 

If before X-Day we should be attacked by the encny, his attack will be crushed 
with all available strength. All coomanding officers will act in confomanc* 
with "Strategy to be Adopted in the Case of an Bhemy Attack". 

In the case of the SOVIET UNION, eveiy effort wUl be made to avoid provoking 
hostilities. At the same time, every effort will be made to Insure the secrecy 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 713 

CONFIDENTIAL 

of our plans. If the enenjr should aacertaln our plans, military operations 
will inmediately be begiin in accordance with "Ueasures to be Taken in the Case 
of an Attack by the SOVIET UNION". 

Circulation of this order is limited to Fleet and Force Comnanders. These 
Ccananders will take every possible measure to prevent leakage of these plans 
prior to their being carried out. 

Precaution: Disposal of this order. 

This order must be burned when no longer of use. If there is any danger of its 
falling into enemy hands as the result of a ship sinking or sorae other untoward 
occurrence, the responsible Commander shall personally make imLiediate disposal 
of it. 



Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #1 
ANNEXED VOLUME 

1. Joint Army-Navy operations will be carried out in accordance with the "Army- 
Navy Central Headquarters Agreement". 

2. A Striking Force (Carrier Task Force), having the 1st Air Fleet (Carriers 
and Escorts) as its main element, will depart its naval bases or operating 
areas about X-16 Day, and will set course, by way of TANKAN BAY (HTTOKAPPU 
BAY, ETOROFU ISLAND, KURHES) for PEARL HARBOR, the base of the American 
PACIFIC Fleet, where it will deliver a surprise attack. 

X-Day is expected to be during the early or middle part of December. 

3. Targets for attack are airfields; aircraft carriers; battleships, cruisers 
and other weirshlps; merchant shipping; port facilities; and land installat- 
ions, in that order. 

4. From the time set by the Force Comnander for the Striking Force to leave 
port in JAPAN, strickt radio silence will be observed. Conmunications 
will be via ordinary broadcast system. The code book to be used will be 
"(not certain)". The following communications abbreviations will be in 
effect : 

"Many warships dn PEARL HARBOR". - "The fate of the Einplre". 

"No warships in PEARL HARBOR". - "The cherry-blossoms are in all 

their glory". 

"The weather is clear and visibility - "Climb Iff FUJI", 
good in the region. Suitable for 
an attack". 

"The time to commence the attack - "The depth of the moat of HONNOJI 
is 0520". Temple is 0520". 

"All forces attack". - "Climb Iff NIITAKAl". 

etc* 



714 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDENTIAL 



5. Th« course and the dlspoaitlon of the attacking units will b« determined ^ 
by the Striking Force cooinander. 

The Ccmmander of the Striking Force will inform the proper authorities aa 
soon as he determines on the course and disposition of the attacking units. 
Care must be taken to avoid ordinary merchant shipping routes and to keep 
the plans from disclosure under any circumstances whatever. 

6. Procedure to be followed in case of discovery before the attack either by 
a ship of the nation against which war is to be declared, or by a ship of 
a neutral nation (including the SOVIET UNICMJ). 

(a) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship ot 

a nation against which war is to be declared, make inmedlate preparation 
to attack and sink it. 

(b) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a 
neutral nation, the ship should immediately be detained until it can 
do us no actual harm; strict surveillance should be kept of its radio 
transmission. In case it should make any transmissions which might 
prove harmful to us or give us reason to fear that oar plans might be 
revealed, the ship will be seized by a destroyer which will make im- 
mediate attack preparations. 

(c) In case of discovery by a foreign ship more than 600 miles from the 
objective, the ship will be detained £ind radio transmission forbidden. 
However, if it seems highly probable that our general intentions have 
been guessed, an attack should be made imnedlately, if between X-5 D&y 
and X-Oay. If before X-5 Day, the Striking Force commander will decide 
the disposition of the ship, depending on the circumstances. In the 
case of detention of an enemy ship, "B" method will be followed. 

7. The Commander of tae Siorprise Attack Force (Submarine Force), having the 
6th Fleet (Submarine Fleet) as its main el«ment, will have most of the 
submarines leave the western part of the INLAND SEA on X-20 Day to attack 
PEAflL HARBCfi. Its entire strength will be disposed so as to coooand the 
harbor mouth. It will attack any enemy warship which may have escapod from 
the harbor. It will also carry out reconnaissance before the attack, and 
if the opportunity presents itself, will carry out surprise attacks on 
enemy warships with midget submarines. The time for such attacks will be 
after the flights of planes have attacked OAHU. Every possible means for 
recovery of midget subtoarines should be considered. 

8. Joint Army-Navy operations should be carried out in accordance with the 
provisions of the Central Headquarters Agreement. The disposition of 
forces will be determined by the Commander of the Advance Force (princii>- 
ally Second Fleet cruisers and destroyers). The Commander of the Advance 
Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he decides on the 
course and disposition of the attacking units. 

The point of departure for the ships of the MALAY and FRENCH INDO-CHINA 
Forces will be BAKO and the point of depart\u*e for the PHILIPPINES Occupa- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 715 



CONFIDENTIAL 

tion Force will probably be PALAU. 

9. The capture of Qiglish and American troops and ships in CHINA will be 
arranged by the Commander-in-Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet. The occu- 
pation of HONR KMfG will conform to the provisions of the Army-Navy Central 
Headquarters Agreement and is the respmnsibility of the Commander, 2nd 
CHINA Expeditionary Fleet. 

10. English and American merchant ships which are in ports under Japanese 
sovereignty at the time of the outbreak of the war or which are in ports 
which may be taken are to be captured if possible. 

SOVIET shipping is to be kept under surveillance after undergoing a 
rigid inspection. 

It whould be so planned that none of our shipping will be in foreign ports 
when the war breaks out. 

11 Beginning on Y-Day the Commander of the Ist Combined Communication Unit 
will send false messages to give the impression that the main strength of 
the fleet is in the western part of the INLAND SEA. 

After Y-Day has been determined, the NYK passenger vessel TATSUTA UARU, 
which is scheduled to proceed to the west coast of AMERICA, will sail; 
arrangements will be made to have her return while en route. (This was 
done, and Allied passengers were interned; the same procedure would 
have been followed with any trans-Pacific liner scheduled to sail in 
this period). 

T/hen Y-Day has been determined, the Commandant of the YOKOSUKA Naval 
District will allow as many men of his coomand as possible to go ashore 
80 that the number of men on liberty in TOKYO and YC»(OHAJiA will give a 
false impression. (Another POTf confirms this). 

12. The Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Fleet (Mandates Fleet) will expedite the 
attack and occupation of British, American and Dutch bases in the North 
and South PACIFIC, acting in close cooperation with forces of the 11th 
Air Fleet in the South PACIFIC. Ehemy air power within our sphere of 
operations will be checked and coninunication between AUSTRALIA and the 
mainland of the UNITED STATES will finally be cut. 

It is expected that in this manner AUSTRALIA will be isolated and domin- 
ated completely. The natural resources of all kinds which the bast con- 
tinent of AUSTRALIA boasts will then fall to us. 

(The dates for execution of assault and occupation of various British, U.S., 
Netherlands bases were then listed in this paragraph - a few of which follow:) 

(1) CajAU about X plus 2. 

(2) WAKE about X plus 7. 



716 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



conf;oential 

(3) (The dates for the invasions of RABAUL and the islands 
from the SOLOMONS to the FIJIS, SAMOA, and SANTA CRUZ 
groups were all entered.) 

13. The date for the seizure of MIDWAY is set as late Spring of 19it2. The 
date for the occupation of the HAVfAIIAN ISLANDS is scheduled for October 
1942. 



Herewith are two of the above referenced documents 

THE ARMY-NAVY CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS ACKEEMENT. 

The object of Imperial Headquarters, Army Department and Imperial Headquarters, 
Navy Department in setting forth clearly the division of duties and command 
in joint operations was to promote a maximum display of efficiency, (Accord- 
ing to POW, it was issued at the end of October 191*1 • A resume of the contents 
follows:) 

1. The highest ranking Army officer for SUMATRA, BORNEO, the MALAY Peninsula, 
CELEBES, and the PHILIPPINES (including FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND) 
will be Field Marshal TERAUCHI, Hisaichi. His command will be called the 
Southern Array and its headquarters will be in SAIGON. 

2. Plans for escorting large Army convoys and the place, time and date for 
landings. 

3. Agreements on Aerial Warfare Agreements on the places to be attacked by 
both Army and Navy planes and on the places, dates and tines of attacks by 
Army or Navy planes acting independently. Agreements on the airfields to 
be uses, such as "XX Airfield will be used primarily by the Army and 
secondarily by the Navy." 

U. Supply Plans. 

Plans for the supply of Army landing forces to be effected by Amy ship- 
ping and for the Navy's support of same. 

5, Communications Flans. 

6. Agreement on occupied territories, cities, and resources such as, "The 
BANDJERUASIN Oil Refinery will be controlled by the Navy". 

MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF A SOVIBT ATTACK. 

(PCfW does not remember the date eocactly, but it was the end of October - and 
stated in effect:) 

"It is believed likely that we shall not be attacked by the SOVIET UNION un- 
less we attack first, but in case JAPAN is attacked first, the 5th Fleet 
(Northern Force) vrtll counterattack with all its strength and maintain local 
supremacy." 

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku 
Commanding, Cooibined Fleet 

PAGE 10 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 717 



CONFIDENTIAL 



Flagship AKAGI, SA£KI WAN 
10 Nov«ab«r 19U 

STRIKING FORCE OPORD dO. 

1. All ships will completa b&ttl« preparations by 20 Nov«nber. 

2. The fleet will rendevous at TANKAN WAN. (HrrOKAFFQ BAT, ETOROFV 
Is. KURILES). 

3. Inaauch as the plans for the caning operation aust be kept ab- 
solutely secret, strict security will be maintained in regard to 
them, up to the time they are explained to the crew after port 
of departure in JAPAN has been cleared. 

4. Break-down of attack plane units. 

The AKAGI 1st Attack Plane Unit 
Unit Camiander: Lt. Condr XX 
Ist Carrier Attack Unit 

Etc. (details not recalled by POW). 

5. Fleet cruising formation 

(Including retiring foraationa) 

6. All tx'anamission of messages is strictly forbidden. 

Tranaaission and reception will both use the TOKYO #1 broadcaat 
coanunl cat ions system, 

NAGUUO Chuichi 

CoBiaanding 
Striking Force 



Verbal explanation by the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet of ambiguities 
in Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #1, 

(Printed versicm of an explanation of details not covered in the 
order delivered to the High Commanders in an informal talk.) 

1. That the cooing declaration of war against EKQLAND and the 
UNITED STATES will usher in a great war of survival with the 
two leading naval powers of the world. 

That this war Is really one in which our socistence is in question, 
one in which we have no choice but to strike with our military 
power. 

2. That our Navy, in engaging a worthy eneoQr, is about to realize an 
ambition which dates back to the foundation of the Imperial Navy 
many years ago. 

COMTIHJCD P4QE 



718 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDENTIAL 



3, That the alliance with C2»MANr waa not desired bj the Navy, but 
was a project favored by the Amy which thoxight It would hold 
the SOVIET UNION in check, (t) 

^. That the campaigns In the NETHERIAND INDIES and in the PHILIPPINES 
will be preceded by the securing of advanced bases in THAILAND and 
FRENCH INDO-CHINA. It is believed that these operations will come 
off In eoctremely smooth order. 

The Navy will be able to secure sources of oil supply swiftly 
by means of these campaigns. 

5, In connection with the attack on PBf^RL HARBOR, reports indicate 
that a gigantic fleet, which includes the ATLANTIC Fleet, haa 
massed in PEARL HARBOR. 

This Fleet will be utterly crushed with one blow at the very begin- 
ning of hostilities. It is planned to shift the balance of power 
and thereby confuse the enemy at the outset and deprive him of his 
fighting spirit. 

Our objective, however, lies more than three thousand miles away. 
In attacking this large fleet concentration it is to be eocpected 
that countless difficulties will be encountered in preserving the 
absolute security of the plans. If these plans should fail at any 
stage, our Navy will suffer the wretched fate of never being able 
to rise again. The success of our surprise attack on PEARL HARBOR 
will prove to be the "V/ATERLOO" of the war to follow. For this 
reason the ^perial Navy is massing the cream of its strength in 
ships and planes to assure success. 

All of the planes of CarDlv 1, CarDlv 2, sind CarDlv 5 will be 
concentrated in the attack on OAHU. If there are any ships which 
escape, almost the entire submarine strength of the 6th Fleet will 
be in conunand of the harbor mouth and will concentrate torpedo 
attacks on them. In addition to these, the destroyer strength of 
(DesRon 1) will be deployed in a screen (mainly for night attacks) 
and the fast battleships of BatDlv 3 deployed in a fourth echelon. 
If the main force of the enemy fleet should escape from PEARL HARBC« 
and make for the open sea, it will be waylaid by the Uain Body of 
our fleet. 

6. The midget submarine unit has been studying and training at the 
KURE Navy Yard with the CHIYODA for a year and a half, but it is 
still too much to hope that it has reached a stage of perfection. 
In any case, the crew members are supremely confident. The 6th 
Fleet will attempt to use them in attacks within the harbor. 

7. It is clear that even if AMEEICA's enormous heavy industry pro- 
ductive power is iianedlately converted to the manufacture of ships, 
planes and other war materials, it will take at least several months 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 719 



CONFIDENTIAL 

for her manpwwer to be mobilized against us. If we insxire our 
strategic supren!ac7 at the very outset of the conflict by 
attacking and seizing all key points at one blow while A].ffiRICA 
is still unprepared, we can swing the scales of later operationa 
in our favor, 

8. Hearen will bear witness to the righteousness of our struggle. 
It is hoped that every man will exert his full efforts toward the 
realization of the objectives of this holy war by determinedly 
cariTing out our original purpose, in the full realization of the 
unparalleled opportunity which this war offers. 

Coonunications Plans. 

(POW does not know about these; no details.) 

Supply Plans, (outline) 

The Naval bases of YOKOSUKA, KURE and SASEBO will be rear supply 
bases. BAKO, PALAU, TRUK and OMINATO will be forward supply 
bases. In addition to these, supply ships will be attached to 
each fleet. 



5 November 
Combined Fleet SECRET OjJOrd #2 
Y-Day will be 23 November. 

10 November 
Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #3 
X-Day will be 8 December. 



During the actual attack on PEARL HARBOR, the prisoner remained aboard the 
NAGATO in the Qnpire with the Flag of CinC Combined Fleet. Details of the Carrier 
Task Force which conducted the raid are known from other prisoners and frcm docu- 
ments. See, for example, the chart of 1st Air Fleet movements as reproduced else- 
where in this issue. 

The TF sortied from ETOROFU TO, in the KURILES, on or about 27 November (ELT), 
end headed eastward under a heavy front before turning south to the attack. The 
composition of the Force, which was commanded by the late Vice Admiral NAGUUO 
(CinC Ist Air Fleet) is fairly well established. The enemy had six carriers: KA3A, 
AKAOI (CarDiv 1) SORYU, HIRYU (CarDiv 2) SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU (CarDiv 5 less HOSHO); 
two BBs: HIYEI, KIRISHIl'A (BatDiv 3, less KONGO and-HARUNA); three cruisers: TONE, 
CHIKUKA (CruDiv 8), plus ABUKUUA; elements of DesRon 1; and about twenty. subs. 



79716 O— 46 — pt. 13 23 



720 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 

(Coonent: It la of Interest to note that all six carriers and both battlashlfw 
participating are nan Identified as sunk, plvts the CA CHIKUUA; the majority of 
other units involved are also believed sunk cr severelj daoaged, although definite 
Identification Is not yet possible) . 

One of the Japs' chief headaches during the sortie ms the fueling problen. 
One well Infonaed prisoner who was a CPO on fueling detail described emergency 
aeasures required to keep the speedy SORYU and HIRTU In fuel. These two ahlpw wer« 
fueled dally, and drums carried as supercargo were unloaded by bucket-brigade when 
the fast dash to the plana-launching point was begun. At that, the SORICU arrived 
back at KURE with only 95 tons of oil in her tanks. AGs coming alongside the TF to 
fuel units had considerable trouble, and visibility was so bad that "towing spars" 
for position keeping were almost constantly In use. 

At the tins at the raid, considerable Infomatlon was derived froa documents 
taken from crashed planes and a beached midget sub. 

Bepredueed on the following page is a proposed track chart of a midget enib 
which had planned to transit PEARL HARBOR but apparently failed. This sub beached 
Itself the following day on the opposite side of OAHU, and one of the two crew 
meabers was taken prisoner. Little was learned from the PCRI, but it is believed 
that the sub was damaged on a reef near the entrance of PEARL HARBOR, putting sound 
gear out of coanlssion and forcing retirement. Subsequent examination of this sub*s 
torpedo tubes Indicated that an attempt had been made to fire torpedoes, but launch- 
ing gear fouled. 

The original chart, too frayed for reproduction, was evidently a U.S. Navy 
R.O. chart, with detailed navigational data carefully translated into Japanese. 
Rough notes were scribbled on the chart, in some cases too illegible to translate. 
On the reverse side were further notes on navigation, etc. The sub also carried a 
rough profile of the PEARL HARBOR skyline. The mission of the sub was both attack 
and reconnaissance. The KANA code as shown on the chart is similar to codes r^ 
covered from aircraft. 

At least three Jap midget subs were lost by our counter-actions at this time. 
One sub actually entered the harbor; it suffered a direct five-inch shell hit, and 
was thereafter rammed and depth-charged beyond recognition. The Japs admitted the 
loss of five of these underslze stibs. 




Midget sub beached on OAHU. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 721 



CONFIDENTIAL 



"•I 

|: . ^^;i;'"-'"-!! '■ '" ■ -^^' ■^~" '"' '^- "" ----- 



__^ ,: ' -ir*^-fij) 



;, ., 



* 



Translation of code tables carried by Jap planes. Simple combinations 
of two KANA syllables served to report disposition and movemBnts of U.S. Fleet. 



722 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIOENTIAL 



\ -1 







\ <^ 



,r 



(M. J^ ^A) 



I b Q- 







> J^ 






Photostat of a doctment from a crashed Jap plane after the ?EkSL HARBOR raid. 
Above, code dealgnationa are applied to ship anchorages near FCRD ISLAND. Below, 
sectors from UHAIMA (on UAUI, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS) are indicated in code. Codes 
presumably to be used for either 'voice or radio transnUslon. 

PAGE 18 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



723 



CONFIDENTIAL 






Novel aid for Jap PEARL HARBOR raiders. Captured fragment above gives name, 
frequency, tiine of transmission and signal strength of two chief HONOLUliJ radio 
stations. 




Chart of torpedo runs, recovered from crashed Jap plane. 6rt>ken lines ii>- 
dicate aircraft fron CV KACA. Solid lines denote planes from other carriers. 



724 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIOENVAL 




■SOU 

Is' 

o o 

• mo 

• «S a 

9 *' 
c « «* 



m^^sm- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



725 



CONFIDENTIAL 




^*3 

SS 

■H u 

ah 

Hi 



MO. 






^9 



726 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIOENTIAL 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



727 



SUBMARINE SITUATION 
NOV. 28 - DEC. 4 



CONnOENTIAL 



▲ - SIGHTING 

- SOUND CONTACT 

® -R 0/F FIX 



IIO'E 
S0» 




One eneoy submarine was definitely sunk near the Bnpire on the 29th. 



Absence of sighting and contact reports between HAWAII and the Mainland in- 
dicate the probable return of that sub to the Ekpire. 



728 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 

JAP SHIPS SUNK IN MANILA HARBOR, ^ 

THROUGH 14 NOVEMBER 1944 " 

It is ••tlut«l that Mor* than 160,000 gross tons ot Japanoss asrchant ahlpplag 
hava ba«n sunk In UANIIA Harbor as a rasult of air attacks by the Third Float. This 
••tlMitod tonnaca rafars ool/ to MAlfllA Harbor proper and does not Include tonnage 
sunk In adjacent areas. 

The 31 merchant ships noted to have been sunk consisted of two tankers, four 
of the new 6500 gross ton engine-aft cargo ships (see "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, 
No. 21), and 25 freighters or freighter-transports ranging from 2000 to 9000 gross 
tons. Ships of less than 1800 gross tons were not CCTnsidered in the above estimate . 

In addition to the above merchant ships, two warships were sunk in UANIIA Har- 
bor and have been Identified as a light cruiser of the KIDIA Class and a destroyer of 
either the TAKANAMI or new KIYOSHIMA Classej. 

The sketch on the opposite page shows the ^>proxlinate locations of the sunken 
ships, the names if identified, the tonnage and type. The symbol used to nark the 
location of each sunken ship also indicates the date of the photograph in which the 
ship was first observed to have been sunk. 

Of particular interest in MANILA Harbor is a ship of the HOSISAN Uaru Class, 
indicated by an arrow. The ship has a minimum of 10 gun positions and extra deck 
houses. The excessive AA plus the fact that the ship has remained in the same posi- 
tion throughout all photographic coverages suggest that it may be a flak ship. 





MANILA Hsji^or photographed on 5 November by TICONDGRAGA aircraft. Note 
concentration of destroyers. 

PAGE 2 4 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



729 



CONFIDENTIAL 




730 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDENTIAL 



MANILA STRIKE RESULTS 




Raoults of Third Fl««t 
aircraft strike on MANILA 
Harbor IL-H Noranb«r 19Aif. 
Ship in f orvgroxind ia a imw 
typa 6500 ton freighter, S»> 
gar Baker (a), described in 
"Weeklj^ Intelligence", Vol. 1, 
No. 21. 



<= 



4 mi 



TWo freighters on the 
bottom near the breakwater 
give testiaonj to the effect' 
iveness of the strike. 



o 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



731 




CONFIDENTIAL 



Buroing ahips and 
abor« Installationa at 
UANQA Harbor. 



o 



Pier Savon and other in- 
stallations showing danage fron 
Third Fleet bcobs, 11-14 Mov- 
•■tber 1944* 



c> 




732 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDENTIAL 

PROBABLE CONVERSION OF JAP HOSPITAL SHIP 

Photographed b«low in MANILA on 21 September is a ship apparently identical to 
the BAIKAL UARU, an AH. Still officially listed as a hospital ship, this vessel 
has no known sister ship. It was not painted with the prescribed markings for hos- 
pital ships and has apparently been reconverted to a merchantman to ease the curr«Bk 
severe Jap shipping shortage. Two gun platforss are noted forward and one aft. 

Although positive identification of this Teasel as the BAIKAL UARU must await 
further confirmation, it is logical to e3q>ect the envaj to reconvert his AHs for 
more practical if less humane purposes. Uore than 20 sizeable Japtanese vessels ar« 
still officially on the books as hospital ships - a disproportionate allotasnt in 
view of his general shipping situation. 




i^a^„ 






EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



733 



CONnOENTUL 



INCREASED AA ARMAMENT ON 
JAP FREIGHTER- TRANSPORT 




Photographed by planes of the 13th Bonber Comiand on 11 Noveiribar in ORUOC Bay, 
the Japanese freighter-transport seen above is more heaviljr araed with AA than any 
other ship of this type previously observed. 

The unusually large AA platform in the bow mounts four three-inch AA guns. In 
addition, there is one 25-om in the gun tub forward, and six additional light AA - 
probably single-mount 25-<an - mounted three on each end of the bridge. This anna- 
ment is in sharp contrast to the standard one or two AA guns usually observed on 
such vessels. 

The eneay may be^ expected to bolster his AA defense aboard all types of mer- 
chantmen when armament is available, in a further move to counter increasingly heavy 
Allied shipping strikes. 



734 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

MANILA , PK^f 



CONFIDENTIAL 




Thla striking photograph of IttNUA Harbor and envlroos «aa taken bj planes 
frcB the US5 HANCOCK on 25 Nov«nber. Host of the ships seen. Including a KlOU ClaM 
light cruiser, are resting on the bottoa. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



735 



>I^E 



CONFIDENTIAL 



ISLANDS 




The white governmental buildings are seeo In the right foreground. The largest 
pier (number Seven) has a sunken freighter alongside. The PASIG River winds through 
the city and enters the sea Just outside the breakwater. 



79716 O — 46 — pt. 13 24 



736 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CCWFIOENTIAL 

KUMA-NATORI CLASS CL ■ 



Sffectivoneas of Alllad aircraft againat Jap narshlpa has proiqyted a continuoua 
Increase in AA armament. Recent photographs of KDUA-NATORI Clase light croisera offer 
added docximentation of this trend. 

On the facing page are reproduced revised measured drawings. The refitted 
cruiaers are now believed amed as followa: 

Two 5~inch Ak in twin ahlelded mounta (theae replace the No. 7 
5.5-inch guna of the original amament). 

Five 5.5-inch guns of the original amament. 
Pour 25'-<iB single mount guna. 
Ten 25'-iiiB in dual mounta 
Three 25-eiB in a triple mount. 
Two 13<«in in a dual mount. 

Available photographs do not offer a clear view of the well aft of the bridge, 
and it is not possible to determine whether the two twin torfwdo tubes mounted 
there have been removed to make roon for additional AA. Although possible, this 
change is believed unlikely. 

The catapult and the crane on the mainmast have been rsnoved. A raised AA 
platform now occupying the former catapult base is believed to contain a triple- 
mount AA gun. 

The old 5.5-lnch No. 5 gun has been reatoved, and twin 25-am added on each 
side of its foraer location. 

A launch and whaleboat are now carried athwartshlp of the No. 1 and 2 stacks. 



LONG DELAY BOMB FUSE 

A captured document, (CINCPAC-CINCPCA Item No. 8309 ) disclosed that the Japan- 
ese have developed a new long delay bomb fuse. It is designated as E^qserlmental 
Type 1 Special Nose Fuse, and Is to be used in the Uodel 3 No. 6 Uark 23 bomb, 
Model 1. This bomb is the Japanese 132-lb. delay-type generally used against air- 
fields. 

Nothing is known of the time delay incorporated in this new fuse, but the 
only other Japanese time delay fuse known has three settings, 5 > 36 or 72 hours. 
In construction this new fuse is an improvement over the old one. 



ERRATUM: In "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 17, it was erroneously 
stated both in the text and on the charts of the Second Battle of the 
PHUIPPDIES Sea that Third Fleet BBo sank a crippled cruiser on the after- 
noon of 25 October. Actually, U.S. light cruisers sank thia Jap warahip. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



737 





_j 
o 

< 



< o 

i - 



Ss 



738 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDENTIAL 

FLOATING MINES IN THE JAPAN SEA 

Data on the chart on the opposite page was taken from a recently recovered 
enemy document (CINCPAC-CDJCPOA Item No. 12,0-0). Although dated well over a year 
ago, the information plotted offers a revealing glimpse of the extensive Japanese 
mining activity in the strategic waters of the JAPAN Sea. Floating mines reported 
to Jap hydrographers along the southwest coast of HONSHU wore very possibly brought 
north by ocean currents from the heavily-mined CHOSEN Strait. The cluster of mines 
reported south of VLADIVOSTOK reflects the use of mines by RUSSIA to protect her 
greatest Pacific port area. The total number of mines reported during the brief 
two-month period indicates one of the strongest threats to U.S. subs operating in 
these Jap-controlled waters. 



NEW JAP RIFLE GRENADE 



A new type of Japanese high explosive 
rifle grenade, embodying several features not 
previously encountered, was captured during a 
recent operation. This grenade is designed to 
be fired by a wooden bullet from the Type 38 
and Type 99 rifles. Since these rifles are 
standard combat issue, it is believed this 
grenade was produced for universal use. 

Carrying a main charge of three ounces 
of cast TNT and an instantaneous fuse, this 
grenade has four fins of light metal attached 
to the stabilizer to guide it in flight. 

Upon impact, an inertia block is forced 
into the fuse body, breaking a brass shear 
wire and driving the steel striker into the 
percussion cap. The cap ignites a black pow- 
der relay which sets off a cyclonite primer. 
Then, in succession, the tetryl booster and 
the main TNT charge are ignited. 




The heavy construction of the inertia weight shear pin indicates that contact 
with a soft object might not be sufficient to fire the fuse. However, a notation 
attached to the captured grenade warns against dropping or striking the nose of the 
projectile. A safety fork, which must be removed before firing, supposedly prevents 
accidental detonation. 



A complete round of this new grenade has been examined by Mobile Explosives 
Investigation Unit Ifk, but its effectiveness has not been determined. The explosive 
charge was reported comparable to the KISKA-type hand grenade. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



739 



CONFlOENTrAL 



CHART OF FLDATING MINES 

IN 

JAPAN SEA AREA 

MARCH 1943 to MAY 1943 

JAP SECRET (HI) NOTICE TO MARINERS 1943, 
SUPPLEMENT TO NO. 10 

LEGE ND 

OCEAN CURRENTS 
WIND DIRECTION 




740 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFJOENTiat 



6ENY0 CLASS TANKER VICTIM OF PB4Y 







'-tS.. 



*';^^^^ 





On 31 October, a 
PB4Y of the 115th Bomb- 
ing Squadron observed 
and photographed a 
10,000-ton GENYD Claaa 
Jap tanker off KUDAT 
airdrome In UARUDU Bay 
(North BORNEO). The 
Allied plane attacked 
and apparently sank the 
AO with a single 250- 
pound GP hit, which rip- 
ped an eight-foot hole 
in the starboard bow. 
A /f-5-8econd delay fVise 
was used. Photo below 
shows the victim on the 
neoct day. 



On 1 November 
another PB^T observed 
the same ship lying on 
Its side in this same 
location. On the fol- 
lowing day it was ob- 
seirved on the bottom 
in 10-15 fathoms. 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 741 

CONFIOENTIM. 

JAP AERIAL ANTI-SUB DOCTRINE 

A detailed explanation of the Japanese Nav7is aerial anti-submarine doctrine 
is contained in an unusually lucid and analytical captured document. 

Itiis document was sciDewhat nmtilated and its date of publication and Issuing 
authority are missing. Its relatively recent origin, however, is established by 
the fact that episodes as late as February 19^4^ are mentioned, and its general tone 
indicates that it may be one of the series of tactical research studies published 
by the authoritative YOKOSUKA Naval Air Group. 

Of special Interest are notations referring to the use of radar and magnetic 
dvtectors. The tactical doctrine for these devices appears to be still In a state 
of development, but their use may be expected to grow. Previous documentary evi- 
dence has established the installation of magnetic detectors on JAKEs early last 
summer and it is probable that other planes may be so equipped now. 

The document, which will be published in full as (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 9979), 
shows a full appreciation of the alertness and perseverance necessary in effective 
aerial anti-submarine warfare. It contains many combat examples which are not re- 
produced in this article. 

Aerial anti-sub tactics, says the document in its introduction, niuat be based 
on the rapid employment of large numbers of aircraft, even if it is necessary to 
make some sacrifice in quality. 

"The commanding officer must stand at the head of his troops", it states. 

"The present combat conditions, if compared to land warfare, represent not 
a battle of confrontation with the commander back of the center, but a final charge 
led by the coinnander. In forces having detachments, the commander shovild shift 
frequently to the various detachments, and direct activities on the spot. 

"Patrol duty requires especial attention to promotion of morale becaxise of 
the tediousness of the topography. A patrol which has been lacking in alertness 
is nothing but throwing away fuel." 

Aggressiveness is stressed . 

"It is necessary to attach importance to persistent and thorough sweep attacks. 
If we concentrate on defense alone in combat, the eneiny gradually counters with 
Increased threats. When we strike a strong blow against them, they immediately 
cease their pressure. This is shown by the fact that after the CAURANH Bay Force 
(BUTAI), KUSHIMOTO Force (BUTAI), and TATEYAMA Air Group YAMAOA Detachment had 
achieved considerable success in combat, the enemy subs in that area lay low for 
a while." 

Patience and imagination are essential . 

"Even though our efforts are not rewarded and success in battle is not attained, 

oom-jeo PAGE 37 



742 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONriOCNTIAL 

we must not become impatient and do anything raah. 

"Such things as new tactics should be tried out as much as conditions permit. 
In auti-suhoiarine patrol nothing as yet exists which can be called fixed niles. 
Biis is especially true under conditions where definite superiority cannot be de- 
termined." 

In regard to night operations . 

"Night training in many cases is not carried out due to the pressure of work 
or liberty or the like. However, there is great need for an increase of ability 
in night operations, and it is essential to carry this out strictly because of its 
special need in reference to the use of radar." 

Lack of proper preparation may spoil an attack. 

"In the fall of 1943 the CHUTD, about 300 nautical miles southeast of SUNOSAKI 
was hit by a torpedo and sank, but a nsdiuffl attack plane of the TATKZA1»A Air Group 
patrolling in the area ijosedlately after this sighted a surfaced enemy submarine 
and headed for it. The plane was shortly picked up by the radar and when it reached 
the spot, only the wake was to be seen. A bombing attack was made and the first 
bomb fell with a right-left deviation of 0, seventy meters ahead of the target, but 
the second bcob of the run did not drop because of failure of the release. Although 
they attacked again after repairing this, the bomb fell short and no results were 
obtained. If the second bomb had dropped on the first run, success would have been 
8issur«d, but because of poor preparations the opportunity was missed and they could 
get no revenge." 

Planes must be ready for instant operationa . 

"It is necessary to send out attack units iimediately after receiving warning 
reports. The sea area requiring patrol increases proportionately to the square 
of the time elapsed from the sighting of the eneny to the arrival on the scene 
of the attack units. However, since the arrival on the ^ot of attacking vessels 
is usually markedly late, it is essential that the air forces consider this matter 
so as to remedy the deficiency." 

Bad weather must be turned to account . 

"At such times there are chances for catching the eneoy. nhen the visibility 
on the surface is bad, it is generally the plane that makes the sighting before 
the suhmarine does. Instrument flying training should be carried out so that it 
is at least possible to fly with safety in bad weather. If necessary it should be 
carried out while on patrol at times when vigilance may be relaxed, -even if it neans 
sacrificing observation by the pilot. However, assigning unreasonable operations 
to untrained personnel and suffering useless losses is condemned. Hence, in weather 
in which the ability of the flying crew is not to be trusted, it is best to return 
to base without loss of time." 

U.S. submarine tactics . 

"By always carefully observing the condition of the enerny and knowing his 

DARF 38 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 743 

CONnOENTIAL 

present tactics, strike the first blow, and realizing that the tactics in present 
use niJLl finally become historical old tactics, prepare for future combat." 

"At present the eneay oakes the utmost use of radar and sonar to catch his 
prey, and then carries out accurate firing by exposing the periscope. However, 
a shift to completely submerged firing is being planned for the near future, 
Counter-meastires must be studied. 

"Surfaced submarines sometines use camouflage and deceptive measures. Vlhen 
a strange boat has been sighted, she must be reconnoitered in detail. These subs 
change their appearance to that of a fishing boat by the use of sails or nets, or 
put up false smokestacks, and the like, and disguise themselves as boats of other 
types. 

Tactics for anti-sub patrol. 

"When there are large and small planes at the same base, the large planes will 
chiefly carry out day and night long range patrols arcund convoy routes and make it 
impossible for enemy submarines to operate on the surface. In addition to making 
it difficult for them to approach our strategic places and convoys, these planes will 
carry out surprise attacks, taking advantage of the relaxing of the enemy's guard. 
The small type planes will have as their chief duty the thorough patrolling of 
areas near strategic points and direct escort of convoys. The large type planes, 
even though slow of movement, can still obtain favorable coirtiat results. 

"Patrol must be maintained day and night with as many planes as possible. 

"Continuous neutralizing sweeps only show results when there is no let-up 
during the night. No matter how severely subs may be suppressed during the day, 
if there are weak points at night it is very easy for enemy subs to flee on the sur- 
face . " 

Tactics for planes directly escorting convoys . 

"When direct escort planes sight torpedoes, they will bonb the spot from which 
the torpedo tracks originate and strafe the torpedoes. Depending on conditions 
(distance from the ships, muiber of bombs carried, etc.), the torpedoes may be 
bombed and a report of this made to the unit under direct escort (escorting vessels). 

Patrol altitudes and security. 

"Determine the altitude, considering foreaost ease in sighting, and secondarily 
the ease of carrying out bombing and/the possibility of/caofillcatlonfl* 

"(1). Vftien primarily for visual contact. 

"a. Usually ^00-600 wters will be suitable. 

"b. In darkness it ia best/to fly at/about 200 asters. 

"c. For confirming/sightings, etc/it is best to fly at about 300 mBt«n 

"(2). Wien using magnetic detector 

"Daytlmi - under 80 meters is best. 

***""" f*GE 39 



744 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIOENTIAL 

"Night time - 80-100 meters is best. 

"\1lhen an important escorted convoy is passing it is necessary to report its 
movements to the forces responsible for the next sector and niake sure that thera 
are no gaps in the escort protection, 

"In carrying this out, care must be taken that the enemy is not inforiaad of 
the movements of the convoy. 

Itie lookout . 

"The first step which determines the success or failure of attacks on eneniy 
subs is the lookout. 

"It is necessary that before boarding/the plane/the sectors of responsibility 
be determined, and that there be the will to sight the enemy without fail within 
the field of visibility by an alert lookout at all times. 

"liiemy submarines do not give up just because o£ the presence of a plane over- 
head. If there is neglect in the lookout, aimless flying or the like, serious 
results will certainly follow. In all the combat examples relating to the sighting 
of enemy submarines, one cannot but wonder whether the flight crews put forth seri- 
ous efforts. 

"It is necessary to maintain a strict visvial lookout even when using radar, 
magnetic detectors and the like. 

"The magnetic detector is employed especially in cases when the potentisJ. sub- 
marine area is small, as in the early iages after a sighting, and the like, and the 
radar is employed especially at night in search of surfaced enemy submarines. 

"When it is feared that an enemy submarine has gotten away, it is necessary 
to intensify direct escort in the area in Wiich it is most probable that the sub 
is operating or lying submerged, and the area must also be swept. Generally Wien 
patrol, direct escort, and attack are incompatible, put emphasis on the attack; 
and when afraid the enemy has been lost, the emphasis must be shifted to direct 
escort without loss of time. 

Principles of the attack. 

"When an enemy sub has been sighted, take care that it is not bombed in- 
accurately in confusion, and irake it a principle not to have to .Take a second try. 

Vyhen the aim is found correct, all bonbs must be dropped in one pauss". If they 
are not, the second attack generally has lost its target due to the sub's diving 
or there may be no results on single dropping due to fuse failure. When it is 
clearly recognized that there has been no result, a second attack must be planned. 

"However, if circumstances warrant, it may be all right to drop single bombs 
as signals. 

"The results of submarine attacks, even when the bomb lands well, being uncertain 

PAGE 40 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 745 

CONFIOCNTIAL 

dtM to ftrequentljr having a bad underwater trajectory or exploding at the wrong depth, 
it io necessary to attack with as many boiribs as possible. The vinderwater trajectory 
of a bomb is generally uniform to a depth of about 20 meters, but beyond that varies 
greatly. '.Vfien there is any suspicion of an enemy sub, unless there is fear of 
attacking friendly forces, attack and do not spare the bombs. 

"Intimidation attacks should be made when the positional error of the enemy 
sub is within 6000 meters amd there is necessity for preventing its raising its 
periscope and making another attack. 

Guiding other planes to the attack. 

"The plzme which has sighted an enemy submairine will drop target marker bombs 
so that it does not lose track of it, and guiding other planes by radio, it points 
the direction of the enemy sub with a small blue flag after bringing them to the 
position of the enemy sub, Uoreover, if necessary, it drops more target marker 
bombs and carries out bombing operations. It flies, banking toward the true bear- 
ing of the enemy sub's position from the bombing splashes and target markers, or 
reports the bearing and distance by radio. 

■The planes being guided will focus their attention on the direction indicated. 
(Jhen the position of enemy sighting or the point of the said direction and distance 
is an unknown distance, they wil] bomb a point 50 meters in that direction. If 
the planes being led do know the position of the enemy sub, when necessary they 
will approach the guide plane, show a nrnftll blue flag and bank. 

"VJhen two or moi'e planes have gone into bombing runs at the same time, the 
one having the higher altitude will give way and begin over again. When the alti- 
tude is the same, the one having the companion plane on its right will break off 
and make a second run. 

Cooperation of magnetic detector planes. 

To cooperate with magnetic detector planes, the bomber should follow the vector- 
ing borabless plane - but at the saas time, the bomber should keep a close visual 
lookout. (CoEiaent: sicl) 

"Method of dropping target bombs. 

Nijmber next to circles indicate the 
order of dropping. 



White are dropped accortUng to detector 

signal. 

(^reen are dropped when the (>^ area is 

reached. 




746 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 

"When the position of an eneiiiy sub Is deduced, drop a smoke bomb aa near as 
possible to that point. £sp>eciall7 are these always to be used Mhen guiding surface 
craft. 

"The attacking planes will watch the above conditions, infer the movements of 
the eneiqy, and attack. 

Cooperation with surface craft . 

"The secret of cooperation is based on mutual understanding. Therefore, we 
must work for perfection of communications, both visuEd and wireless, since they 
are a most important means of establishing understanding. 

"In establisiiing a thorough-going, unobstructed tinder standing, radio com- 
munications must by all means be put to practical use. Even under present conditions, 
this is never impossible; and, as the actual experience of the YOKOSUKA Air Q-oup 
clearly shows, if both parties have the proper determination, the desired under- 
standing can be realized. 

"Still, when the nature of the present surface craft anti-suboiarine staff 
is considered, present development primarily is awaiting vigorous leadership from 
the aircraft section. 

In directing surface craft, remember that they are often not furnished with • 
sonic gear, that their sighting level is restrictive, and that they are slow. Treat 
them as if blind. 

Ordnance and equipment. 

"New weapons should be quickly mastered. Before new equipment is received, 
as much research as possible should be carried out beforehand. Radar, in particular, 
has revolutionized warfare, and as it is said of old, "Without a rifle, no infantry", 
so without radar, no war planes. In this our country, since it is in the unfortun- 
ate position of having started late in this field, requires the utmost endeavor. 

"Tt\e No. 6 (132 lb.) bcoib has little power, and so if it does not hit directly, 
it can not cause great damage to the enemy. It is best to use the No, 25 (550 lb.) 
bomb as ouch as possible. 

"The fuse must be set properly. The depth of explosion of auiti-submarine bombs 
is better deeper, rather than shallower than the enemy's depth. Depending on trans- 
parency of the water in the patrol area, the type bomb used, and so on, a suitable 
fuse timing must be used. Usxially the first bomb will be set shjillow, and the second 
and succeeding ones should be set for a deep depth to cope with evasive tactics." 

(Comment: The Japanese use time, rather than hydrostatic fuses for anti-sub 
bombs.) 

"Aggressive use of machine gxins must be planned, fitting it to the conditions 
at the tine. Although the results of strafing sxibmarines cannot be e]g>ected to be 

R&6E 42 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 747 

CONROENTIAL 

outstanding, by casualties to the officers and other annoyances it can make diving 
inpossible. And it can make the submarine show its position by oil leakage, so the 
aggressive use of strafing aust be kept in mind. 

Maintenance, 

"The maintenance of aircraft, due to the inadequacies in the supply of materiel, 
depends in great p^rt on the efforts of the Air Group maintenance crews. For this 
reason the diligent endeavors of maintenance squad leaders are required." 

Conflraation evidence , 

"Tbe oonf ixaatlon of eoabat results Is extraaaly ia|>ortafit for the planning 
of future attacks. 

"Pvrtberaore, since it is not easy because of the peculiar characteristics 
of sutanarines and additionally because enei^y subs are pulling various sorts of 
deceptive tricks/confir»ation/is beconing more and more difficult. 

"Usually, either because the pilot is personally satisfied of the results or 
dislikes the trouble of continuing, the attack is broken off preaaturely. It is 
easy to let the ene^jr slip away in the last five minutes so care is necessary. 

"Rben the foUowlag phenomena have been noted, cotisldar the sinking conflrsied. 

"1. Large aaounis of oil leakage and leakage of air bubbles for over 10 
minutes, or, although the period of leakage of air is short, when a 
large amount of air is released due to the damage to the inner shell 
of the hull. 

"2. fhen oU leakage continues over a fortnight. 

"3. Mien parts which are Inside the Inner shell of the encmgr sub irtilch 
has been destroyed, ccas to the surface." 



748 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION FBABL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 

LONG-SHAFTED ENGI^E USED ON JACK 

The amoothly streamlined cowling of the new Jap Navy interceptor, JACK, Is 
made possible by the installation of an uDuaiially constructed engine, thevloqe- 
shafted Kasei 23. 

Information on the appearance of this new paaerplackt is gained from a recently 
recovered document ( CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,606). Data oa its perforuano* bma 
appeared in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. U and in other publications, 
l&jdmum horsepower is 1820 at takeoff. 

The extended, Farman-type reduction gearing penaits the installation of a 
highly streamlined cowling and results in a relatively anall frontal aitea. The 
cooling profctlem is overcoaie by the addition of an auxiliary fan, fieared to the 
propeller ahaft and turning in the same direction at an increase ratio i£ 3.18 to 
1. 

The Kasei 23 engine is the 20-3eries parallel of the older Kasei 13, which also 
has a Farman transmission and ia similar in appearance but lacking the faa. 
The 13 does not appear on any currently operational plane, but served its purpose 
as an experimental fore-runner of the 23. 

The Kasei 23 displays several features of German design influence. Tlie cooling 
fan is sljnilar to that employed on the FV/190; in place of a carburetor, it has 
a wobble-plate fuel injection system with individual injectors for each of its 




Kasei 23 engine, used in JACK. 

PAGE 44 



Photo from captured document. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 749 



CONFlDENT/AL 

l/» cylinders, a development aimilar to that used on the German BUW801. Tlie same 
device is used on the Ha 112, Model 2 engine installed in DIMAH 3. 

This type of fuel system plus the fact that the engine uses 91 octane aviation 
gas as well as water methanol makes its performance different from that of the 
Kasei 21. The dry weight of the engine, fully equipped, is 1895.95 lbs. 

Cf special interest is the duraluminum cooling fan which is nounted on a splined 
aleeve on the propeller shaft. The fan gearing consists of a set of planets mounted 
on a plate which is splined to the propeller shaft. 'Biese planets mesh with a fixed 
internal spur gear and rotate the sun gear which turns the cooling fan in the sane 
direction as the propeller. 

The sun gear rotates on a sleeire around the propeller shaft in a lead-bronze 
bearing. It is lubricated by oil under pressure from the propeller shaft. This 
oil is tlirown out from the sun gear auid lubricates the entire assembly. The pro- 
peller shaft has been lengthened 13.78 inches and the extended reduction gear housing 
is constructed of a lightwei^t magnesium alloy. 



NEW ARMY AIR DIVISION 

The existence of an 11th Amy Air Division is reveaded in a Jap address book 
taken from an Amy twin-engined bomber 3ALLX shot down over SAIPAN on 3 November 
(CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,300). The location of this unit is given as OSAKA, 
which is also the headquarters of the Central District Army. This association might 
indicate that the Uth Air Division has been established to control the air defense 
of the ioduBtri&l KOBB-OSAKA-NAGOYA area. The date of organization of the 11th Air 
DivlaiOTi is not given, althovigh the 10th is known from transfer lists to have been 
organized in JAPAN last Uarch. 

An Air Division in the Japanese Army Air Force is a high tactical and admin- 
istrative conmand, subordinate only to an Air Army. The 11th Air Division therefore 
is presumably subordinate to the 1st Air Army at TOKYO, which is the top Army Air 
Coomand for the £kq}ire. An Air Division theoretically consnands at least two Air 
Brigades of three Air Regiments each, or about 200 airplanes, Kowewer, in practice 
the strength of Air Divisions has varied widely. 



750 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



COWPIDENTIAL 



JAP AIRFIELD CAMOUFLAGE 



Jap use of trees and shrubbery to caaouflaga pl&nea on the ground Is Illustrat- 
ed by photographs of LIPA ^TEST FIELD on LUZCM. Methods ussd sr* regarded sa fairly 
successful; since planes are not easily visible from aediua altitudes. Note that, 
contrary to usual Jap practice, nettinx is not used. 




LIPA rxST FIELD'S paved runway and trunk taxLuays are not successfulljr toned 
doim and stand out clearly. Smaller loop taxiways, extending 650 yards from the rurv- 
way, are dirt surfaced euid do not stand out as sharply. Revetments, also made of earth, 
have shrubs growing on them and some have trees within their walls. This preventa 
sharp contrasts In color or tone in the dispersal areas. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



751 



CONFIDENTIAL 




Planes in this and the preceding photo are camotiflaged by hiding under trees 
and by tying palm fronda and other foliage to the winga and foliage. In most Inatano- 
es the tail assembly of the plane has been placed between two palms and the plane 
has been pushed under as far as possible. Protruding engines and noses are well cov- 
ered with foliage. In a few cases one or two palms have been removed, leaving enough 
space to push the plane clear under cover. Even when this is done, foliage has bMo 
thrown over the plane to prevent its disclosure by outline or reflection. 

Planes camouflaged in this way are necessarily located within one plane-length 
of the edge of the taxiway. In sane cases, the best indication of a hidden plane is 
the shadow of revetment walls showing between the trees. 

There are no dunany planes on the field, but dud planes are left in plain view 
even where they partially block taxiways. Mo damaged planes appear to be camouflaged 
but several apparently operational planes are left in treeless areas, both with and 
without foliage covering. 

(Photographs and interpretation by Second Carrier t^k Force). 



79716 O — 46 — pt. 13- 



-25 



752 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDENTIAL 

THUMBNAIL BIOGRAPHIES OF JAPANESE AIRCRAFT 

HELEN 
(Fourteenth in a series outlining the background of ijoporbant Jap)ane8e Aircraft)* 

HELEN, the Japanese Anq^'s Type 100 Boaber, has failed to prove in coobat the 
extravageuit clains which were made for it at the time of its introduction, but new 
deTelopments m&y make it nuch more formidable. 

This aircraft, made by Nakajima, is known to the Japanese as "The Dragon", and 
was hailed at one time as the plane which would bring the Pacific war to a quick end. 
However, it has not appeared in substantial quantities emd its performance to date 
has not been outstanding, even though it is among the most heavily armed and armored 
of Jap bombers. 

The original HELEN, Uodel 1, was powered with 1250 h.p. engines. It was re- 
placed in mid-19/t3 by a Uodel 2, with engines of 1450 h.p. Both models are similar 
in appearance, being distinguished by a built-up wing section between fuselage and 
nacelles similar to that of the British Uosquito. 

There are indications that a Uodel 3, equipped with engines of more than 2000 
h.p. and with greatly improved performance, is under development, but this version 
has not been definitely identified. 




Heavily canouflaged HELSi, under Allied strafing attacka. Photo frcn AAF, SHPA. 

PAGE 48 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



753 



CONHDENTUL 

PROVISIONAL SKETCH OF GEORGE 

Reproduced below are provisional sketches of GEORGE, new Jap Navy interceptor* 

This drawing has been synthesized from documentary evidence, POW statements and 
sketches, and two rou^ and incoinplete drawings found in a captured ndjneographed 
manual. 

No positively identifiable pictures of GEORGE are available, and no specimen has 
been examined in the field. The accompanying sketch is provisional and will be super- 
seded when better information is at hand. 

Characteristics on which available information agrees and which are believed 
quite reliable include the squarish wing and tail tips, blister canopy, airscoop at 
five o'clock and large spinner* 



Both reported variations of armament and wing position are shown. 



INTERIM DRAWING (Provislonol) 

GEORGE 

JAP NAVY FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR 




ARMAMENT fA) 2«20MM IN WiNGS 

2 I 20 MM BELOW WINGS (PACKAGE) 
2«7 7M6 IN FUSELAGE 
(» 4x20MMIN WINGS 
BOMBS 2x77 Oft 2il32 EXTERNALUr 

MAXIMUM SPEED 407MPH OMhnols) at 19,700 FT (HtGHBUMER 
CLIMB 4200 FpM AT SEA LEVEL (ESTIMATED) 

5 5 MINUTES TO 20.000 FT (ESTIMATED) 
RANGE PROBABLE MAX NORMAL RANGE 600 SW OR S2l NM 

PROBABLE MAX TACTtCAL RANGE 65% 
CEiUNG 40,000 FT (ESTIMATED) 

ARMOR a VULNERABU.ITY NO ARhlOR OR FUEL TANK PRO- 
TECTION KNOWN FROM CURRENT 
INFORMATION, BUT MAT EXIST. 
WING LOADING 32LBS PER SQ FT (ESTIMATED) 
POWER LOADING 385 LBS PER HP (ESTIMATED) 
REMARKS THtS IS ANOTHER OF THE NEW JAPANESE NAVV SHORT 
RANGE FJGHTEBS OR INTERCEPTORS IT HAS ASLiGMTLt 
MORE PWEHFUL ENGINE THAN JACK' AND WILL PROaftBLV OUT 
PERFORM iT ev SO*e FEW MILES PER HOUR AT MOST ALTITUDES 
IT IS a DEVELOPMENT OF REJt' THE FIRST MODELS HAD THE LCJW 
UID-WING AND ARM/JMENT AS IN (Al THE PRODUCTION MOOCLS 
ARE PflOefiar ALL LOW WING WITH ARMAMENT AS IN (Bl THIS 
DRAWING HAS BEEN DEVELOPED FROM INCONCLUSIVE SOURCES 
AND MUST BE VIEWED 



754 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

COWnOCNTIAL 

SIDELIGHT ON SUICIDES 

A JUDY pilot interrogated by Third Fleet after being shot dovm in an attack off 
the PHILIPPI^ES provides a sidelight on the nature of the so-called "^AMIKA2E Special 
Aasault Force" of suicide divers. 

This pilot was a member of 502 Naval Air Group, which he said had been joined 
■with several other groups for operations in the PHILIPPirfES. His information is open 
to question, but he appeared reliable on matters which could be checked. 

Quoting the interrogation report: 

"POW stated that his unit had become a "suicide" squadron on the 27th of October, 
The designation as a suiciae squad came as a result of the group's coomanding officer's 
request for such designation having been granted by higher authority. The prisoner 
stated that pilots and other personnel of the group were not questioned as to their 
desire to become members of a suicide squad. 

"He felt that the order to dive on carriers to one's self-destruction waa absurd 
(Bakarashii), but since it was an order he fully intended to carry it out. He did 
feel that there had been a needless expenditure of life with very little visible 
success to date. The pilot claimed that he had been given no instruction on the best 
way to carry out suicidal attacks on carriers; however, he did feel that he would 
attempt to hit an elevator in that elevators on a carrier were "w«ak points". At the 
tlae he left MABALACAT (his base) there were still 50 members of the suicide squadron 
alive but very few flyable aircraft were available. (Subsequent strikes on LUZON by 
our carriers may have cut down this number) . 

"POW hbls of the opinion that his unit was the only dive-bomber squadron in the 
Japanese Navy that had been designated as a suicide squadron; however, he felt that 
in the event of carrier attacks being launched on JAPAN proper, suicidal attacks in 
large numbers should be anticipated. POW did not believe green and yellow silk flight 
clothing reported as having been recovered from the body of a Jap pilot who had made 
a suicide attack on a U.S. carrier had any specied significance. 

"POW stated that the lack of aviation gasoline had caused the Japs to cut down 
on the extent of training, but he had heard of no instances in which offensive missions 
could not be flown as a result of a lack of AvGas." 

POW's belief that his unit was the only one designated as a whole for suicide 
work coincides with other available evidence. From recent Japanese propaganda broad- 
casts, it appears that most of the so-called "KAICIKAZE" units are made up more or less 
extemporaneously of volunteers from various groups acting independently. The "KAU- 
IKAZB" designation appears to be a special mark of distinction applied to einy such 
volunteers, rather than the name of a formal organization. 

If true, however, the designation of an entire air group as a suicide unit may 
mark a significant change in the development of this tactic. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



755 



CONFIOENTUL 



JAPS DEVELOP INDO-CHINA 



The strategic importance of INDO-CHIM to JAPAN has increased as the position 
of JAPAK in the PHILIPPINES and her supply line to the EAST INDIS have become 
more precarious. The limited railroad facilities of the country are being utilized 
to their fullest extent in an endeavor to find safe supply lines. Her ports, 
particularly SAIGON and CAU RANK BAI are used for the protection of convoys and 
as staging points for military operations. As JAPAN* s sources of supply on the 
periphery of her empire are cut off it is to be anticipated that the resources of 
IHDO-CHINA will be increasingly developed. 

It is estimated that there are at present no mora than 35>000 ground troop* 
permanently stationed in the country, plus approximately 2,000 special Navy Landing 
Force troops. 

There are 6U airfields, ranging from emergency fighter strips to major airports 
capable of handling Jap bombers. The larger fields, such as those at SAIGON, 
CAPE ST. JACQUES, TOURANE, CAT BAI and HAIPHONG, function not only as combat and 
transport plane bases, but also as training centers. 

Of the ten seaplane anchorages, the best equipped ones are in the HAIPHONG- 
HON GAY area, at TOURANE, CAU RANH BAI, and CAPE ST. JACQUES. The air force in 
INDO-CHINA is believed to consist mainly of float planes and flying boats for con- 
voy coverage and anti-submarine patrol. 




Fl«« 51 



756 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDENTIAL 



CAT BAI AIRFIELD 




CAT BAI A/r, located 3 milee SB of HAIPHONG, has two interoacting hard aurfacaa 
runnaya and is reported to be a firaUdaaa nllltary Installation. Included in the 
facilities are a radio station, repair shops and A* positions. Revetment areas are 
being extended and an atteB9)t is being made to camouflage the taxiways. 
Page 52 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



757 



CONF/OENTIAL 



HON GAY 




HON GAT - tb« chief ooallng port of FRENCH IHOO-CHINA, located on the north 
shore of the Onlf of TONKIN. Faolllties include a coal treating plant with ateaa 
and electric loading devices, concrete piers and axtensive railroad yards. 

Page 53 



758 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CAM RANH BAY 



CONFIOENTIAL 




CAN RANK BAY - one of the finest fleet anchorages In the GBISNT. Affording e<ai- 
plot« typhoon protection. It «aa a staging point for Jap troopa enroute for the cot^ 
qoeat of UALAIA and NETHHILANDS EAST INDIBS. 
Page 54 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 759 

CONFIDENTIAL 

JAP ORDNANCE VS ALLIED AIRCRAFT 

Improvisation in Japanese ordnance to combat strafing Allied planes continues. 
The latest development - the use of implanted bombs - is described in a report 
from the Central Pacific dated 23 September 19A4 and forwarded by BuOrd. 

Selecting the logical paths of approach of low-flying Allied planes on strafing 
missions, the Japanese had burled the bombs in definite patterns on all sides of the 
air strip. Particular attention was given to the approaches of revetments and the 
main parking areas on the field. 

Examination of the bombs revealed they were rigged in the following manner. 

a). The nose cavity of each bomb was filled with either Comp>osltion C or dy- 
namite. About one fourth of the bomb noses were filled with the plastic 
explosive and the remaining three fourths were filled with dynamite. 

b). The explosive was tamped into the nose cavity and electric blasting caps 
inserted Into the explosive. 

c). The electric blasting caps were wired in series and had 2 leads running 
to a dugout. The observer, hidden in the dugout, could detonate the 
bombs when the strafing planes were Immediately over the mined area. Each 
of the five areas had lead wires running to a separate dugout. The bombs 
were buried and well concealed with either sod or coconut leaves and would 
not be visible from the air. 

It is interesting to note that the Japs employed no particular type or size 
bouib for this purpose. Over 150 bombs rigged with electrical detonators and ranging 
in size from 32 kg. to 250 kg. were rendered safe. 

Other instances of Japanese ingenuity in organizing and planning defenses a- 
galnst low-flying aircraft are reported in Weekly Intelligence Summary No, ^0, Air 
Command, Southeast Asia. A brief resiuae of unorthodox and impromptu defenses en- 
countered by airmen in this theatre includes small arms fire by ground troops, 
multi-barrelled UG's mounted <» trucks and anti-aircraft guns mounted on freight 
cars. 

Among the more ingenious devices employed in the Southwestern Pacific area, 
wis a BETTY (medium bomber) conveniently parked at the end of a runway offering an 
unusually easy target. Unfortunately machine gun pits containing 20 im guns had 
been dug in the shadow of the wings. The attacking fighters received a very warm 
reception. In other cases of this type, trucks, tanks, huts and barges have been 
substituted for the BETTY as bait. 

Another type of defense against strafing is the use of wires, strung across 
narrow valleys, between large trees and between small hills on either side of the 
river. Bridges, railroads and landing strips have been reported as having possible 
trip-wires either over them or guarding the open approaches. 



Page 55 



760 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 

Oth«r arsaa hs^e reported the use of a type of 70-an' mortar. The projectile 
is reported to burst between 1500 and 2000 feet, ejecting 7 canisters which in turn 
release parachute-suspended bomb tubes. These take two or three adnutes to float 
to the ground and constitute a definite hasard as they are difficult to see. If 
contact is made with one of the suspending cords, it causes the boob to explode 
with a detonation described as about twice that of a 20-aB shell. 



JAP ANTI-SUBMARINE BOMB 



the enemy is having trouble because his anti-euboarine bombs ricochet. In 
the case of their 300-4cg. bomb (Type 1, No. 25 bomb, Ifark 2, Model 1, Modification 
1) the Japs have attempted to correct this with an anti-ricochet nose attachment. 
Photographs of an altered bomb captured on GUAM and examined by MEIU No. 4 show 
the steel cylinder which is secured to the nose of the boob by welding. This type 
of aJLtaratlon should prove reasonably effective. 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



761 



I t » ■ I L T 



CONFtOENTrAL 

■) 949i-Z7« 



30,000' 2]J>B-4je21 (BaMpM 
30,000* 2ira-^ue21 (lovloai 



3A>« 



to a^ 1»M>^Mi«m 1 Dill— 1m I ] 

* raPqS CU IKXIfKD 

•• SOBTIK DISniBinSD 



; Jl— t Good vvrtloU. ad obUqus larlUl oovanf* sliowlAc hcmb 



OBI 












ITWn- ooxi 


TMKi.1 p»U1 oxmn" of »»•<» •-> 


■•vu. 




»A) 


r. I. 


Ut. 


Sortl* 90, 


Jlop»# 


Ikto Tatei 


» 


15t.» 


— ]2,W0' 


ajO/35B^U 


W25-U 


10/31"" 


am- 


Oood •pUt-wrtlMl ud Tartltal omivga of 


orou India 


Btod. 


T 


1S.6 


B 20,000' 


an-UTL 


9840-153 


9/»9 


V 


»• 


32,600' 


ill3/5C-21B (1»>» 4/0) 


•K3(KZ22 


^3 


» 


2*' 


32,600' 


ia3/5C.Jl» (i»oT i/o) 


9231-223 


^Z 




»• 


25,450' 


1111/6C-211S (J»>T I».) 


9232-224 


U/I 


SiOlt 


2*» 


25,450' 


aX/iC-^US (IBV i».) 


«33-225 


U/7 


T«rt. 








«34-225 




T 


V 


29,300' 


irA-9R-41 (SbBKlal) 


9237-226 


7/12 


SpUt 


U' 


20,000* 


iiay-ZMM (iao7 Tie. to 


9241-227 


B/»~ 


¥«rt. 






(1. of a.11.) 


9U2-227 




SpUi 


2Jf 


20,000' 


4IU>J4ai (Llisrai to 


9249-Z2S 


Si/*. 


?«rt. 






SbKlnc) 


■B50.22S 




Split 
V«rt. 


24- 


20,000' 


4110.2401 (OkinkaBdil to 
Snltti Tic.) 


5051-229 
9BS2.i29 
9053-229 
«54-229 


«/»- 


Siillt 


24" 


20,000' 




9255-230 


8^." 


T«rt. 






s. of not>i) 


9256.230 
9057-230 
«5»-230 




SpUt 


24- 


20,000' 


4)l&>.24a (Swtfl* to 


9059J31 


l/O- 


¥»rt. 






1«>tT1o.) 


9260J31 
9241-231 
9B62-231 




» 


24- 


7,300' 


21P|.4aB01 
(Suiddoaa* - [HaHnn 
Il>o in.) 


9265-232 


9Al"" 


T 


24" 


9,000' 


21rB~4ia!01 (iBWiifaalai) 


«*-233 


9/21"" 


» 


24" 


14,000' 


2inMje201 (CUtlM} 


9«ff-214 


9/a- 


Spf 


24- 


20,000' 


'<ni->Mi (^mj» to 


9314-235 


?>*»*• 


T.rt. 






SolUu) 


9315J35 




SpUt 


24" 


20,000* 


?<ni..tan (iMtln to 


9316-236 


?/*>. 


»•«. 






Danrllrtlac) 


9317-236 




SpUt 


24" 


20,000' 


'Urm ^m^ (iw suabui 


931S-237 


7/»~ 


T*rt. 






I npctm) 


93C19.23T 




Split 


24" 


20,000' 


24aK4aia (■ pia<t« to 


9»W3« 


7/». 


T»rt. 






31 SmtD to Uirt«) 


9ja-23« 




SpUt 


24" 


20,000' 




9322-239 


7/S». 


»rt. 








«)23-239 




SpUt 


«• 


20,000' 




9324-240 


IfiM. 


t«rt. 






■ UfB) 


93B 5.240 




SpUt 


24" 


20,000' 


?tr»^M1 (1 Bl^po to 


9326-2U 


1fi»- 


Tart. 






■olnhioi^M^) 


9307-241 




SpUt 


V 


20,000' 




932«42 


i/rst. 


T.rt. 






hoiub} 


932»-242 




SpUt 


24" 


1«,500' 




9347-243 


0- 


Twt. 






• S.1.^) 


934*^43 




SpUt 


24" 


IS, 500' 




934».au 


V>" 


Tot. 






to IlMotO*) 


93««U 
93S-244 
9352-2U 




SpUt 


24" 


1«,500' 




935>-245 


a/7- 


T«rt. 






PBlaklk] 


9354-245 
9355-245 
9356-245 




SpUt 


24" 


IS, 500* 




9357-246 


«A- 


T«rt. 






to 10 U SI liMotoo - 10 


935e-246 




SpUt 


24" 


18,500' 




9359-247 


8A~ 


▼•rt. 






to ai*Q0»a«) 


9360.247 




SpUt 


24" 


18.500' 


iiai-41U2 (Pnvol to 


9361-248 


8/7" 


Tart. 






1-.J) 


9362-248 




' 


24" 


18,500' 


poi«tiuirio«) 


936>249 


8A- 


Split 


24" 


20,000' 


24qc-4Jfi-tta4 (26° 50- H. 
U-r 57' B to 26° 50- I, 


9395-250 




T.rt. 






939fcJ50 










U9° 24' t) 






SpUt 


24" 


20,000' 


24ae-4if«i4 (240 SO* I, 


9397-251 


9/17- 


Tnt. 






Uff» 10- E to 250 42' H, 
11^ 53' S) 


9398.251 




SpUt 


24" 


20,000' 




9J9».252 


9A7- 


T«rt. 






118° 59' « to 260 20' », 
U90 29- E) 


940(«S 







C-S40.2Ce3-4'U.65 


9401-184 


11/23" 


17,000 


B-933-26BO-4-U-65 


94<»-185 


U/23~ 




4-OOZ-2tt3-4-U.45 


9403-U6 


U/23- 




l-974-3»S.41130-71 


9404-177 


U/S4— 




B-97>3«3-4IO0-71 


9405-188 


U/S4"" 


19,450 


C-617-3SBS.4H»-71 


9406-lW 


11/24'" 




4-682-4205 


9407-190 


11/17— 




B.662-US3 




1V17-" 




0-327-42BS 


94W-192 


1V17 




4-526-819B3-UOO-71 


9454-193 


U/24~ 




C-674-819BS.A1I30-71 


9455-194 


11A4 




D-527-81'»S-4M30-71 


9456-195 


IIA4- 




4-873-9883-11-65-780 


9457-196 


11/23— 




S-87&.9883-U-65-7BC 


9458-197 


11/23— 


17,000 


09il-9«S-U-65-7K 


9459-198 


U/53- 


200 


1-016-431SS-4-U-64 


9474-199 


UA3— 






9475J00 


ll/!»~ 






9476-^01 


11/75- 






9477-202 


U/25— 






9478J03 


11/25— 




TD5-1C 


9479-204 


11/75- 


20,000 


105-18 


948<V205 


U/55— 




hab 






919>71 


U/»- 


12,725 


4.491-98B5-78C 


9194-72 


U/^ 




B.951-9»S-7BC 


919V73 


11/9- 




1-15>431B3.*7 








4-661-8iqB8-41l30-53 


9197-75 


11/6 






9196-76 




20c 


4.016.^31fie-4-U.^ 


9471-77 


U/SJ- 




B.22xnas-4-ii.*i 


9472-78 






8.683.819BS.4H30-71 


947>79 




u,ooc 




9470-80 


11/23- 






94«1-«1 


UA5— 


20,000 


TI»-2B 


9482-82 


11/75- 



> 6 3/p vu- moe-ia 



Good vu-tioBl partial onnafa 



of laljnd la oolar. 
9U9-261 



T 24^ 20,000' TI14-77 
T 24" 20,000* Tn4-97 


9221-363 

92: .264 


11/19 
llA9 


■una - Upo Shoto - Oood oovloto i«rtl>^ 






t 12" 13,300' 1-996-J921B.UOO-55 
T 24" 18,000' 4-<46-«aS-7>C 


9199-36 
9000-37 
9001-38 


U/T- 





If 


13,500' 


I«~-131 (T) 
t.o-131 (si 


9213-83 
9214-83 
9015-83 


9/lJ~ 




Oood trlMtrofoo lutUl oorwAfo. 






v 


13,500' 


I-..-131 (T) 
l-«-131 ip) 


9010-65 


9/l3~ 






92U-65 








S-ox-131 (si 


9212-65 






Oood opUt-ivrtJoal oad obUqm oovonga of Kn*» 1 


Bdloatod. 


24" 


Tor 


0116.2652 (llulU) 
cn6-2653 


9263-lS 
S064-U2 


U/5— 


6 }/»* 


Vu-- 


rioo-5 (Hoollo) 


9766-133 


11/5— 


6 VW' 




Tloo-6 dtanll*} 


9269-134 


U/5- 


6 3/» 


Tor 


Tloo-7 (MoBllo) 






6 VS" 


Vw 


Tleo-e (11.1111.) 


9271-136 


11/5— 


6 3/8" 




Tloo-9 (Huills) 


9272-137 


11/5— 


6 3/ff 




Tloo-10 (Itoall.) 


9073-138 


11/5— 






Tloo-U (lUoll.) 


9274-l» 




6 3/r 


Tor 


Tloo-12 (Mull.) 


9275-140 


11/5— 


6 3/»' 




Tloo-U (lUnll.) 


9276-Ul 


U/5— 


6 3/r 






9277-M2 


11/5— 


6 3/^ 


Tu- 




9278-143 


U/S— 


eV4" 


Tor 


tloo-17 (■wU.) 


9279-144 


U/6«" 



Page 57 



762 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDENTIAL 






«. y^ 


Tar 


CTU-125 (»ortJ» Tip) 


«»0-145 


10A8** 




t 3/^ 




WU-Ul (Korth Tip) 


9281-146 


10/18*« 




6 3/r 


T«r 


CTll-1 (lorUi Tip) 


9Ca2-U7 


1C/18~ 





t }/&• 




CT11-U4 {Kartb Tip) 


«e3-U8 


10/1).- 




t }/f 


Tar 


CTU-126 (Kortl Tip) 


9264-U9 


10/18** 




t 3/y 


Tar 


CTU-U3 (Wortli Tip) 


92S5-1SO 


10/lfl— 




6 3/8' 


Tar 


CVU-ltr? (Korti. Tip) 


9286-151 


10/18~ 




t 3/C 




CTU-112 (liorUj Tlpi 


9287-152 


10/H- 




6 3/«- 




Praiik-U9 (Manila B*j) 


9288-153 


10/18« 





6 3/<" 


Tar 


CTU7-201 (Manila Ba;) 


9289-154 


n/b— 




t.3/«- 




CT127-196 (MaiYlla Baj) 


9290-155 


iVs— 




6 3/? 




CTL27-198 (BauU. Baj) 


9291-156 


1V5" 




6 3/P 


Tar 


CfWI-2CS (Manila Bay) 


9292-157 


U/6~ 




6 3/r 


Var 


CT127-197 (Manila Bar) 


9293-158 


U/5~ 




6 3/«- 




CTia7-199 (Manila Bay) 


9294-lW 


ll/5~ 





t, 3/S- 




CV16-2U9 (Manila Bay) 


9295-160 


1V5~ 




6 3/6- 


Var 


cn6-2651 (Manila Bay) 


9296-161 


iVs" 




6 3/r 




EIM/.3** 


9297-162 


10/18— 




6 3/«- 




Bjmi^367 


9298-163 


10A8- 





* 3/»' 


'"■ 


BI»^368 


9299-164 


ID/U— 


BBSt 


Oood spUV-rcrUMl oanTft of «rM« Ij^ieata 


-1. 




SpUt 


24' 


W.OOO' 


2im.4ieU3 (Tatoo i/S 


«4>339 


9/12~ 


T«rt. 






ll>0d>) 


9244-339 




srut 


W 


2<,«X1' 


2U%.41i9163 (SUw» l/r) 


9245-340 


9/12- 


T«rl. 








9B46-340 




SpUt 


Uf 


29,SO0' 


21PII-4I0163 (Taito l/b) 


9247-341 


9/12— 


T«rt. 








924»-3a 




ItUI SIllBi Good 


TarUcal 










H' 


22,<7n< 


(4UKi)(4IB15)<4U-iC3S) 


9340-2 


11/5— 




«• 


21;KW 


(4t2BO)(4»15)(4M-4a75) 


93a-3 


U/J.. 




u- 


22,900' 


(444BC)(4IB15)(4U-4U«) 


9342-4 


U/5- 




u- 


21,000' 


(444BC)(4iei5)(4U-l£411) 


9343-5 


1V5~ 




v 


22,000' 


(444SC)(4IB15li4U-»C5a4) 


9344-6 


11/5- 




w 


22,300' 


(4UBC)iulB15)(444-iaB5) 


9345-7 


11/5- 




2*" 


22,300' 


(444B0) (4MB15) (444-1U19) 
(462ECH4IIB15)(4&2.4C3«2) 


•mh-e 


1V5- 




2*' 


21,300' 


9364-9 


U/5- 




24' 




(4<£BC)(4IC15)(462-4C5ai) 


9365-10 


U/5- 


|ilBt> 


Good 


vartlcaj 


eowi«(« of ar«aa Indlr^tad 












Rancooo) 








24' 


24,000' 


462BC) (AMBU) (462-iC-5Bl 


9366-3 


1V3" 


» 






462BC>(4JeU) (462-40329) 


9367-4 


11/3— 








( 462BC (4ieU) (462-4aT9 


9368-5 


r 


IJ" 


21,400' 


(462Bci (41B15) (462-»C4-;^) 


9369-6 


11/5— 


» 


40" 


23, »0 


(46ac)(4ieiJ)(462-4C444] 


9370-7 


11/3- 


T 






(4t2SC)(41BU)(462-4a75) 


9364-8 


S^ 




24- 


23,500' 


(462BC) (41«UH462-1C»3) 


9771-9 




24" 




(462BC)(4>ei4)(462^C461) 


9372-10 


11/3- 


f 


24» 




(462BC((aiBU)(462 -40506) 


9373-11 


^. 


t 


24' 




(444Ba) (4ieU) (444-4C4«S) 


9374-32 


» 


2^ 


22,000' 


(444BGHiai4)l444-4CU9) 


9375-13 


1V3— 


f 


24- 




(444BOH4IBUH4U-4C5SO) 


9?76-U 


IJA— 




4IP 


22,000' 


(444B0H4ieU)(444-4C524 


9377-15 


^ 


T 




22,000' 


(444BC) (4MB14) (444-4C41J) 


9378-16 




24- 


21,000' 


(14PU(4ieU(4«-iC525) 


9379-17 


1V3— 


T 


24" 


21,400' 


(Un.)(4»U)(468-lC494) 


9380-18 


IV}- 




I2» 


21,500' 


( 14PL) (4ieU) (46S-4CM6) 


9381-19 


iV>. 




41^ 


21, 200' 


(14PL)(4iei4}(46e-4C469} 


9382-20 


^ 


T 


24' 


21,000' 


(llFl.){4IBUH40.*C50e) 


9383-21 




12" 


20,500' 


(llJx)(41BU)(40-ia52) 


9384-22 


11/3— 


T 


I3- 


21,000' 


(lifl)(41BU)(4a*C574/ 


9385-23 


2/3- 


T 


12* 


20,800' 


(im.)(4ieU)(40-lC541) 
(TatBgop) 


9386.24 


1V3- 


' 


12" 


16,500' 


(444BC ) (4BU) (4U-4C2CC) 


9387-25 


U/>» 


^mi 


Oood wrUe«l cow«g» of U9» l^luted. 






' 


24- 


21,300' 


(4UBG) (4iei5) (444-4C5ao) 


9388-< 


1V5- 


CAaoLin ^^g^ 










£y«S)i 


Good TorUcal an] 


bllqwa oonra«a of araaa in 


dioatod. 






24' 


u.eco' 


28PR4ie-n-l (Babalthuap */>) 9421-475 


iVl 




4«' 




2BPR4ie90-l (EaialUwap l/P) 9422-476 


U/5 




4<^ 


13,000' 


2BPH4I»94-1 (Babaltlniap 1/F) 942>^4T7 


llyV 




24* 


12,000' 


28pl4Jffl82-l (Cantral Harbor 9424-478 


U/3 




6- 


2,500' 


28nUIIIS97-l (aprarxi 1>) 


9425-479 


11/10 




41F 


15,000' 


20'R4»95-1 (UrBkthapel la 


9426-480 


UA 




41^ 


U.OOO' 


2ai'«41IB8(>-l 


9427-481 


1V5 




4<^ 


10,000' 


28nuieiie-l (OnjkUiapal I 


) 942e-4«2 


11/15 




1? 


500' 


2emjia'rt^ (u.r.Bon« i> 


9429-.J3 


llAo 




V 






9430-484 


11/9 




if 


14,000' 


28PI«»e3-l (toror la) 


9431-485 


iiAo 








28Pft4iJCBlQ4-l (lyiaali la) 


9432-486 




12» 


50' 


28nujffiei-l (Rgareol la) 


9433-487 


11/2 




6 3/r 




VIS1J7 


9434-188 


11/17 


bBB 


1 Ited — rt 


leal and 


ebllqts partial coT«r««a. 






C 


tj/u- 


l.JCV" 


M4C22-nr.^(22-a 


93U-596 


U/52 




6 3/r 




M4C22-B4'«e 


9312-597 


11/22 





t 3/H' 


15,000' 


HiC22.VMr-U3^ 


9313-598 


11/52 


' 


2(^ 


10.000' 


MAC22.7 


9444-599 


11/12 



Oood wrtlokl partlAl oovrm^. 

Good Tsrlleal aod ohIi<|UM pvUal oo^trtf*. 



Good vvrtloaJ wk! obllqoa pullAl < 



rwrs^ utaovlBf boab 



B-1 51-27BS -4JOO-70 
C-935-i7BS-4IOO-70 
D-633-27BS-4JUO-70 
ft-ei.l>-2?BS-4Jpal70 

6-e38-39as-<U30.70 
, 600 • C-398-392B8-aO0-70 
D-35»-39as-*IOO-70 



9U.9-<>00 U/22 



ir'tlM" Oeed ebliqn* pu-tiAl ooivi«f«. 

) 6 3/^ T«r nU7-33 

rni]?rT ^ Ih»«< ifll3i ^ i Good ooApIxt* Tvrtloal «>Tm«». 

r U" U.OOO- B-e3e-2«s 

OMwm Good svplata ««rtlottl ovMnf*. 

r 24' 10,000' 291UMC166-I 

jfeofii Good otallqua parUal oarmxtt, 

) 6 3/^ tm- nm-zu 

tsA* (1<*^ «*rtle«l md ebllqas phtUaI oovarvfa. 

r 12« 3»000< 28fWUC167-l 



V* 7$' ZSPUKUTO 

p*rfim Oood obllqv* partial ovi«r< 
D 6 3/e" Tm- TB117-22 

HiTintirli lasit OMd obiiq» a^t. 

' 6 3/* T«r ?E117-2a 



9218-30 UA$^ 

9A69-6 Uy^B 

9223-6 1VU«- 

9237-UA IVU 

9236-183 UAt-* 

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9ti.96-lff7 IV16** 

922A-« U/U 

9226-1 U/U 



Page 58 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



763 



CONFIDENTIAL 



LUZON AIRFIELDS 



These photoa, taken by carrier-based planes, are representative of the Jap- 
held airfields encountered by our aircraft on recent strikes against LUZON. 




^^--je;;aB#"ia¥«s?^*s^*&s-M!fies3s#iui^ 



An eacample of the concentration of Jap fields In the vicinity of MANILA. Five 
of the six CLARK landing grounds are visible; the sixth is hidden by the cloud in 
upper right. Center - the four ANGELES airfields. 



Page 59 



764 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDENTIAL 



■fe- 



I 




CaUCS PARK Airfield, located In the northern part of MANILA, is a fighter 
field. - The new runway is concrete, however, the old runways outlined above are 
not paved and are believed unserviceable. 

Page 60 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 765 

CONFIDENTIAL 




LBGASPI Airfield, aituated ij miles north of LEGASPI Town, is a medium booiber 
field with an improved runway. Note bomb crater, fallen trees and debris in fore- 
ground - the result of one of our recent strikes. 

Page 61 



766 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDENTIAL 



jKT" 




Fort STOTSBtBURG, former American Amy Headquartera, now believed to be a 
Japanese Garrison Headquarters at least partly responsible for the defense of the 
many airfields In this area. 

Page 62 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 767 



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
WASHINGTON 



SOURCE DOCUMEUT #1? 
(PHOTOSTATIC COPT OF ORIGINAL JAPANESE DOCUMENT 
CAPTUTED BY U S MARINES 
AT SAIPAN DURING JUNE 19hh 

containing 

material pertinent to the japanese attack cn pearl harbcr 

consisting of 

notes on fueling at sea 

/Dueling at sea of pearl harbcr striking fcrc^/) 

ENTITLED 
"BATTLE LESSONS ON SUPPLY IN THE GREATER EAST ASIA WAR" 
USED BY THE NA\T IN CO?ffILING THE 
"NAVY SUJffliARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FCR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBCR" 
(Record of Proceedings, pages U32-U60). 

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #6 
IN IHE JOINT C0NGRF5SICNAL INVESTIGATION 
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR) 



The pertinent material in this SOURCE DOCUMENT is 
embraced in the translations stated in SOURCE 
DOCUMENTS Nos. Hi and 1$ ( supra ), irhich were used 
by the Navy in canpiling said Navy Sxunmary of 
the "Japanese Plan for the Attack on Pearl Harbor." 



79716 O— 46 — pt. 13 — —26 



768 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



769 




770 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



1 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



771 




772 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



773 




774 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



775 




776 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



777 




778 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



779 




780 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



781 















782 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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79716 O — 46 — pt. 13 27 



784 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



785 




786 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



787 




788 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



789 




790 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



791 




792 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



793 




794 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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797 




798 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



799 




79716 O— 46— pt. 13- 



-28 



800 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 






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802 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



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810 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



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812 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



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814 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



815 




79716 O— 46 — pt. 13- 



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816 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



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gl8 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



825 




826 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



827 




828 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



829 




830 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



831 




79716 O — 46— pt. 13- 



-30 



832 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
WASHINGTON 



SOURCE DOCUMENT #18 
(PHOTOSTATIC COPY OF ORIGINAL JAPANESE DOCUMENT 
CAPTURED BY U S NAVY 
AT f-IANILA FROM THE JAPANESE CRUISER NACHI ON 1 APRIL 19U5 
CONTAINING TN PAGES 2-1 THROUGH 2-1^2 ONLY 
MATERIAL PERTINENT (OIHER PAGES NOT BEING PERTENEMT) 
TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR 
CONSISTING OF 
PLANS AND ORDERS FCR CaOiENCEMENT CF THE ?:AR 70:TH THE UNITED STATES 

ENTITLED 
••TOP SECRET COMBINED FLEET OPERAnON CRDER #1 
and 
TOP SECRET COMBINED FLEET OPERATION ORDER #2" 

USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING TOE 
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE J^ANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK CN PEARL HARBOR" 
(Record of Proceedings, pages U32-U60), 

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 
IN ■nffi JOINT CCNGRESSiaiAL INV^TIGATICN 
OF THE ATTACK ON FFJ^RL HARBOR) 



•Hie material in this SOURCE DOCmiENT is embraced in 
the translations stated in SOURCE DOCUIiBNTS Nos. 1 and 
2 ( supra ), which were used by the Navy in compiling 
said fJavy Smsaary of the "Japanese Plan for the Attack 
on Pearl Harbor." 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 833 



TOP SECRET 



834 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



TOP SECRET 

DOCUMENT 
NO. 2 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 835 



DOCUMENT 
NO. 2 



836 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 





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848 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 









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