^
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Given By
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X
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAEL HAEBOB ATTACK
C0NGKES8 OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS P/*>/
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
(79th Congress)
.AS-
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEAKL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 13
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 7 AND 8
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Hartfor Attack
X
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAKL HARBOK ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS '*J)7i>)
FIRST SESSION 1/2,
PURSUANT TO ^ ^ >S^
S. Con. Res. 27 ^^V^
(79th Congress) /^^/ J 3
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 13
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 7 AND 8
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
7971G WASHINGTON : 1946
*D%1
-^ .
.As"
0. S. SilcWlMTfflOENT OF OOCUMEWIJ JQUL
SEP 231948 p^.^ y3
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEABL
HABBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLET, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER P. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michl- tive from California
gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin
North Carolina
COUNSEL
(Through January 14, 1946)
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Asaiatant Counsel
JDLE M. Hannaford, Ansistant Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel
HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
Pages
Transcript
No.
pages
1
1- 399
1- 1058
2
401- 982
1059- 2586
3
983-1583
2587- 4194
4
1585-2063
4195- 5460
5
2065-2492
5461- 6646
6
2493-2920
6647- 7888
7
2921-3378
7889- 9107
8
3379-3927
9108-10517
9
3929-4599
10518-12277
10
4601-5151
12278-13708
11
5153-5560
13709-14765
Hearings
Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19
Nov. 23, 24, 26 to
Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10,
Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18
Dec. 31, 1945, and
Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18,
Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25,
Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1
Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12,
Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19,
Apr. 9 and 11, and
, 20, and 21, 1945.
30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
11, 12, and 13, 1945.
19, 20, and 21, 1945.
Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
19, and 21, 1946.
26, 28, and 29, 1946.
2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
13, and 14, 1946.
and 20, 1946.
May 23 and 31, 1946.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
"So. Exhibits Nos.
12 1 through 6.
13 7 and 8.
14 9 through 43.
15 44 through 87.
16 88 through 110.
17 111 through 128.
18 129 through 156.
19 157 through 172.
20 173 through 179.
21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
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XV
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 391
EXHIBIT NO. 7
(Exhibit No. 7 is a map of Oahu, T. H., showing the record of the
Opana radar detector station, 7 December 1941. This map is printed
as Item No. 18 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of
Joint Committee.)
EXHIBIT NO. 8
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Exhibit No. 8 : Page
(1) Messages from MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo, dated 14 and
15 October 1945 to War Department 392
(2) Report dated 26 October 1945 from General MacArthur to War
Department with five inclosures 392
(3) Report dated 1 November 1945 from General MacArthur to War
Department with one inclosure 399
(4) Report dated 8 November 1945 from General MacArthur to War
Department with one inclosure 412
(5) Source Documents used by Navy in compiling the "Navy Sum-
mary of the Japanese Plan for the Attack on Pearl Harbor" 431
Exhibit No. 8-A Report dated 12 November 1945 from General Mac-
Arthur to War Department with one inclosure 413
Exhibit No. 8-B Report dated 29 November 1945 from General Mac-
Arthur to War Department with one inclosure 415
Exhibit No. 8-C Report dated 4 December 1945 from General MacArthur
to War Department with one inclosure 424
Exhibit No. 8-D 'Report date<i 13 December 1945 from General Mac-
Arthur to War Department with three inclosures 425
392 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
confidential
Pabaphbase of Message Dated 14 Octobee 1945 From MacAbthur's Headquabtebs
TO War Department
Japanese say many records were burned. However, complete report, with
chart of task force, now being written and to be sent by air. Preliminary in-
formation received from the Japanese Navy is as follows : On 5 November 1941,
plan for attack on Pearl Harbor was adopted, and on 1 December 1941 Cabinet
Council decided on commencement of hostilities. Order that hostile action
should open on 8 December was issued by Imperial General Headquarters on
2 December. Navy section of Imperial General Headquarters and Combined
Fleet Headquarters were involved in discussions and decisions to make attack.
Commander in Chief Combined Fleet on 25 November ordered task force to
leave Hitokappu Bay next morning and proceed to 42° North — 170° East by
afternoon 3 December for complete refueling. Attack force was organized as
follows: 1st Air Squadron (Kaga and Alagi [Akagi]), 2nd Air Squadron
(Hiryu and Soryu), 5th Air Squadron (Zuikaku and Shokaku), 3rd Squadron
(Hiei and Kongo), 8th Squadron (Tone and Chikuma), 4 destroyer divisions
making one squadron, 8 transports and 2 submarines.
Japanese lost 27 aircraft ; estimate damage to U. S. Navy at 2 battleships
(Oklahoma and West Virginia) sunk, 4 battleships and 4 heavy cruisers dam-
aged, one transport and one destroyer sunk, and 350 planes burned or shot
down.
Intelligence from Hawaii was obtained through (a) American broadcasts from
Hawaii, (b) reports from Naval Attache in Washington, (c) reconnaissance
submarines in Hawaiian waters just before outbreak of war and, (d) things
heard from ships which called at Hawaii mid-November.
Pabaphrase of Messages Dated 15 October 1945 From MacAbthur's Head-
quarters TO War De2'abtment
1. We are continuing local investigation.
2. As early as possible information available to Allied Technical Intelligence
Service on Pearl Harbor attack will be forwarded. Material consisting of
partial coverage from captured documents is already collated, but still on
way to Tokyo from Manila. Documents on which collation is based have
already been sent to Washington.
GENEBAIi HEADQUARTEatS
Supreme Commander fob the Aixied Powers
AG 350.05 (26 Oct 45) GB 26 October 1945.
Subject : Additional Data with Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attn : A. C. of S., G-2)
1. In compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945, and
WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from
the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941,
the attached documents, Inclosures Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5, are forwarded in am-
plification of preliminary report contained in our radio CAX 53287, 13 October
1945.
2. Investigation is being continued through the Liaison Committee (Tokyo)
for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. A copy of a questionnaire which
has been furnished and Liaison Committee in order to guide their efforts into
the most productive channels and to insure the most complete coverage pos-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 393
sible is attached hereto as Iiiclosure No. 4. A further report will be submitted
as soon as answers to the questionnaires are received and translated.
For the Supreme Commander :
/S/ H. W. AiLEN,
Colonel, A. O. D.,
Ass't Adjutant General.
5 Incls :
Incl 1— Report, Liaison Committee, 8 Oct 45.
Incl 2 — Report, Liaison Committee, 10 Oct 45.
Incl 3 — Report, Liaison Committee, 11 Oct 45.
Incl 4 — Questionnaire to Liaison Committee.
Incl 5 — Map, Routes of Jap Fleet.
(Incl. #1)
Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Impeeiai. Japanese Army and Navy
8 October 1945.
N. D. No. 108.
To : Colonel F. P. Munson, USA
G-2, GHQ of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
We forward herewith a general survey concerning the attack on Hawaii
which has been hastily prepared in accordance with your oral instruction to
Commander Yamaguchi, I. J. N. of the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the
Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, 1,000 hours 8 October 1945.
K. Nakamuba,
Rear Admiral, I. J. N.,
Representing the I. J. Minister of the Nany.
Oeneral Survey of the Attack on Han-aii Prepared in Accordance with Oral
Instruction by Col. Munson to Commander Yamaguchi of the Liaison Com-
mittee for the Impel 'Ol Army and Navy.
1. Operational Orders
(A) Orders of the Imperial General Headquarters
(1) Imperial Naval Order
(a) (Issued 1 December)
Japan, under the necessity of her self-pres€^rvation and self-defense,
has reached a decision to declare war on the United States of America,
British Empire and the Netherlands. Time to start an action will be
given later.
(2) The Instruction by the Chief of the Naval General Staff imder the
Authority delegated to him by the Imperial Naval Order. (Later abridged:
Naval General Staff Instruction).
(a) (Issued 1 December)
The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall, at the start
of war, direct his attack on the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Area to
reduce it to impotency, using the First Air Fleet as the nucleus of
the attack force.
(3) Imperial Naval Order
(a) (Issued 2 December >
The hostile actions against the United States of America, the British
Empire and the Netherlands shall be commenced on December 8.
(4) Naval General Staff Instruction
( a ) ( Issued 2 December )
Bear in mind that, should it appear certain that the Japanese-Amer-
ican negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the com-
mencement of hostile action, all the forces of the Combined Fleet
are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their bases.
(B) Orders of the Headquarters of the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet
and other Headquarters.
The subject matters are being investigated through members con-
nected with the said forces of that period.
394 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
II. Means used to gain intelligence from Hawaii and other sources
(1) Reports of Naval Attache in Washington D. C. (Announcements by Amer-
ican Authorities and Press reports were the sole source.)
(2) Hearings of ships which called at Hawaiian ports in mid-November.
(3) Through submarines on reconnaissance duty in Hawaiian waters imme-
diately preceding the outbreak of wai-.
(4) Radio Broadea.sts from Hawaii.
III. Organization of Attacking Force
First Air Squadron (Akagi and Kaga)
Second Air Squadron (Soryu and Hiryu)
Fifth Air Squadron ( Shokaku and Zuikaku)
Third Squadron (Kongo and Hiei)
Eighth Squadron (Tone and (^hikuma^
First Destroyer Squadron 'Abukuma. 6th Destroyejr Division, 17th Destroyer
Division, 21st Destroyer Division and 27th Destroyer Division)
Supply Force (8 Transports)
Submarine Force (2 Submarines)
IV. Movement of Attacking Force (S^-e attached Map)
V. Estimated Damage inflicted on American Navy
Sunk — 2 Battleships (West Virginia and Oklahoma)
1 Destroyer
1 Transport
Seriously Damaged — 4 Battleships
4 Heavy Cruisers
Aircraft shot down or burned — over 350
VI. Losses of Japanese Ndvy
Failed to Return — 27 aircrafts
N. B. — As this report hastily prepared based on the combined memory of those
who were connected with the event, certain corrections will be expected to be
made.
(Incl #2)
Liaison Committee (Tokyo) Exm the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy
10 October 1945.
N. D. No. 123
To : Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers.
Re : N. D. No. 108, 8 October 1945.
Subject : Additions to the Answers already given to the questions regarding the
Attack on Hawaii.
1. Additional operational orders :
(a) Units of the attacking force assembled in Hitokappu Bay (Etorofu-
jima), by order of the Comiuander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.
N. B. — About 14 November the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet
issued the above order because he lecognized Hitokappu Bay as the most suitable
place for enabling the attacking force to meet any new development in the situa-
tion, as well as to keep its location and movements seicret.
(b) The attacking forces left Hitokappu Bay by order of the Imperial General
Headquarters.
N. B. — Around 21 November the situation had seemed to be approaching to a
stage where commencemient of hostilities would be inevitable. The Navy Sec-
tion of the Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, issued the following
order (Imiierial Naval Order) to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined
Fleet : "The Couimander-inChief of tlie Combined Fleet shall order necessary
forces to advance to the area in which they are to wait in readiness and shall
stati(m them in such positions that, in the event of the situation becoming such
that commencement of hostilities be inevitable, they will be able to meet such
situation promptly."
But as the Japanese Government had sent Ambassador Kurusu to the United
States by that time and was doing its utmost to bring the Japanese-American
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 395
negotiations to an amicable settlement, an instruction had already been issued
by the Chief of the Naval General Staff to the effect that the attacking forces
were to return and re-assemble in the event of the negotiations with the United
States proving successful.
[2] 2. Information regarding the departure from Hitokappu Bay of the
force, of which the nucleus was the First Air Squadron, was given to no one
outside of the Japanese Navy.
Even within the Navy, the only those who knew of the above fact were in
addition to the attacking force itself, the leading officers of the Navy Section
of the Imperial General Staff and of the Combined Fleet Headquarters and a
certain restricted number of ollicers intimately concerned with the fleet operation.
3. "Radio broadcaists from Hawaii" which we have mentioned as one source
of information were the broadcasts made to the general public.
K. Nakamuka,
Rear Admiral, I. J. N.
Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.
(Incl #3)
Liaison Committee (Tokyo) fob the Imperial Japanese Akmy and Navy
11 OcrroBE3t 1945.
N. D. No. 130
To : The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters of The Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers.
In compliance with your letter delivered on 11 October, we forward hereby
our report as follows :
1. Order to the attacking force to assemble at Hitokappu Bay.
- The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined
Fleet on 7 November :
"The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall assemble in Hito-
kappu Bay by 22 November for re-fueling".
2. Order giving the details of the mission of the attacking forces.
The, following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined
Fleet on 25 November :
(a) "The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret and maintaining
close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian
waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of
the U. S. Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The first air-raid is planned
for the dawn of X day (exact date to be given by later order).
"Upon completion of the air-raid, the Task Force, keeping close co-ordination
and guai-ding against the enemy's counter-attack, shall speedily leave the enemy
waters and then return to Japan".
(b) "Should the negotiations with the United States prove successful, the
Task Force shall hold itself in readiness forthwith to return and re-assemble".
3. Order directing'the attacking force to proceed on its mission:
[2] The following order was issuetl by the Commander-in-Chief of the
Combined Fleet on 25 November :
"The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall leave Hitokappu
Bay on the morning of 26 November and advance to 42° N 170° E (standing-by
position) on the afternoon of 3 December and speedily complete re-fueling".
4. Exact time when the attack on Hawaii was decided upon.
(a) By way of preparation for the opening of hostilities; the plan of naval
operations against the United States, Great Britain and Netherlands (including
the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor) was adopted on 5 November.
(b) Commencement of hostilities was decided upon by Cabinet Council on
1 December.
(c) On 2 December the Imperial General Headquarters issued an order that
hostile action was to be opened on 8 December.
5. The following agencies of the Imperial Japanese Government were con-
cerned in the discussions and decisions to execute the attack on Pearl Harbor:
The Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters and the Head-
quarters of the Combined Fleet.
396 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
N. B. — Since this report is based on the combined memory of those who were
connected with the matter, it is possible that some revisions may have to be
made as a result of further investigation.
K. Nakamura,
Rear Admiral, UN.
Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.
(Incl #4)
11]
Questionnaire
17 OCTOBBB 45.
To be answered completely. Answers to be substantiated by copies of all plans,
orders, maps, photos, reports, and other oflScial documents available. In case a
question is answered from memory, so state, giving name, rank, and official
position.
1. Who first thought of or proposed a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?
(Give names or agencies, e. g. Admiral -^ , General Staff, Naval General
Staff, War Ministry, etc.)
2. When?
(Give date or approximate date as accurately as possible, e. g. August
1940, Spring of 1941, year 1922 — any time such a proposal first was con-
sidered either for actual use or in strategic planning, study, or discussion).
3. Was this maneuver or any similar maneuver included in pre-war Japanese
plans for possible use in event of war with U. S. ?
4. If so, describe it as given in these pre-war plans.
(State objectives, forces to be employed, routes of approach, what you
expected to accomplish, etc.)
5. When was the decision made to actually attack Pearl Harbor.
(Gives dates as accurately as possible, e. g. 1 September 1941, Spring of
1941)
6. Who made this decision? (e. g. War Ministry, Chief of Staff, War Ministry,
or some combination of persons or agencies.)
7. If this decision was made in a conference give date (or approximate date)
of that conference and the names of all known persons attending.
8. What factors were considered in arriving at this decision? (e. g. Desire to
cripple Pacific Fleet so as to gain freedom of action against P. I.?; Destroy U. S.
main Pacific base?; Gain time for P. I. campaign? Protect mandated islands?
or what?)
[2] Who worked up the details of the plan as it was actually executed?
(e. g. Planning Section, General Staff? Naval Staff? Individuals?) Note:
When I say Plan, I differentiate between plans or staff studies and the actual
orders issued to put the plan in effect.
10. When did this work begin?
11. When the plan was completed who finally approved it?
12. When was the plan finally approved?
13. What persons and agencies knew about this plan? (e. g. the Emperor, the
War Ministry, the General Staff, the Naval Staff, the Cabinet, The consul at
Honolulu, Military Attaches to The Amassador at Wash-
ingrton, Kurusu, etc) Note: Names of individuals and agencies are both desired —
for example, the Cabinet as a whole might not have been Informed but the War
Minister would. Also : state persons who had partial knowledge, e. g. the Emperor
might have known you planned to attack but not without declaring war, etc.
14. What sources furnished information on which the plan was based? Give
names, rank and positions, (e. g. Military attaches. Consuls, Japanese Civilian
resident of Honolulu, Broadcasts, New articles).
15. What features of information were obtained from each of the above-listed
sources?
16. How and by whom was the detailed information plotted on the maps car-
ried by your aviators obtained? (e. g. Accurately plotted and named ship berths,
barracks, azimuths on which to approach, etc.).
17. How was this information checked while the Task Force was en route?
18. What part did local agents in Hawaii play?
[31 19. Were any photographs taken by the above persons of fleet units in
the harbor :
20. If so, when (particularly the date of the last taken).
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 397
21. Give complete details of how the plan was developed. Discuss :
a. Obstacles considered and how they were overcome.
b. Partial decisions made and by whom.
c. How were the commanders and particular units to participate (Both
fleet units and air units) selected?
d. Why was the route you selected chosen?
e. What provision was made against discovery en route?
f. What action was to be taken if discovered?
g. What deceptive measures to draw U. S. attention elsewhere were
employed?
h. What action was to be taken if the attack failed?
22. How was the date of December 7 selected and for what reasons?
23. How was the time of attack selected? For what reasons?
24. Give detailed composition of Task Force (Naval Vessels and Air Units).
.25. Were any of these Fleet Units or Air Units to be detached at any time dur-
ing the operation, e. g. to attack secondary targets?
26. Give scheme of maneuver for air attack. Include :
Number and type of planes assigned to attack each target. Why?
Routes of groups of planes from carrier to target. Why?
Time each group was to strike its target.
Route (s) of escape after attack? Why was this route (these routes)
selected?
27. Discuss use of midget-submarines.
(Why used, number used, whether you expected any back, did you get any
back, ann other details, conclusions, as to usefulness of this weapon. )
[4] 28. Was the plan in any way tentative or contingent. If so, give
details: (e g. If the U. S. had made some concession was it to be abandoned or
changed? If the U. S. Pacific Fleet had put to sea what changes would have
been made?)
29. Furnish a copy of each of the following :
a. The Plan for the Pearl Harbor Operation,
ft. Any Staflf Studies or other subsidiary documents thereto.
c. The Order (with all amendments thereto) that put the plan in effect.
Note: If any document Is not available give all details of it you can from
memory if necessary. (Items furnished from memory will be so marked.)
30. When did you begin assembling the Task Force?
31. Where did it assemble?
32. When did it move out on its mission?
33. Had an amicable settlement appeared likely or been agreed upon while
the Task Force was en route what action was then to be taken.
34. Did everything go as planned?
35. If not, what change or mishaps occurred and why?
36. Was the task force ever discovered and/or attacked while en route?
37. Were any non-Japanese vessels sighted en route?
38. If so, what was done about them?
39. Why did you not follow up the air attack with a surface attack? With a
landing?
40. List your losses.
41. List estimated U. S. losses.
42. From what sources did you determine U. S. losses?
[5] 43. Did you launch any additional raids or make any reconnaissance
against Hawaii by either air, submarine, or surface vessels immediately follow-
ing the attack, (e. g. night after attack, following day, etc.)
44. If any questions remain unanswered, state exact reason in each case. (e. g.
"All copies of order burned on surrender," "Adm. who is only person who
knew this was killed on (date).").
45. Did you have any submarine operating in the Hawaiian ai*ea prior to the
attack on Pearl Harbor?
46. If so, where were these submarines based, what were their operation in-
structions, what reports did they render during and after the attack, and were
there any casualties among these submarines?
47. If submarines were used, how long did they remain in the Hawaiian area?
48. What information pertaining to the Pearl Harbor attack was received from
Japanese merchant vessels before the attack on Pearl Harbor?
398 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
•5 it
\
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 399
general headquarters
Supreme Commander for the Aixieh) Powers
AG 350.05 (1 Nov. 45)GB 1 November 1945.
Subject: Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attacli on Pearl Harbor.
To : Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
(Attention : A. C. of S., G-2)
1. Reference our communication AG 350.05 (26 October 1945) GB, same subject,
and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945
and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained
from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December
1941, a partial detailed report is forwarded herewith.
2. This report was compiled by the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial
Japanese Army and Navy in response to our Questionnaire furnished the Liaison
Committee on 17 October, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our
communication of 26 October (refered to above) and includes detailed information
in answer to questions 1-13 inclusive, 21-28 inclusive, and 30-47 inclusive,
thereof.
3. In view of the fact that the Japanese records of this operation have been
largely destroyed, the bulk of this information has been obtained by interroga-
tion of important figures in the Japanese Military and Naval Establishments of
the time. Sources of such items of information are stated in the text.
4. The Japane.se report that answers to questions 14-20 inclusive and question
48 (which concern their sources of military intelligence on which operational
plans were based) will require further investigation, which is now in progi'ess.
Documentary evidence required by Question 29 was destroyed at the time of
surrender ; however, efforts to reconstruct it, at least partially, from memory and
from fragmentary sources, are being continued. This additional information
will be forwarded as soon as received and translated.
For the Supreme Commander :
/S/ H. W. AlXEN,
Colmiel, A. G. D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.
1 Incl : Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.
(Incl. 1)
1082 Alued Translator and Interpretek Section
UNITED states ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
Note: Translation of a document requested by Colonel MUNSON, Historical
Investigation Section, G-3, 17 October-20 October 1945.
Rep!ly to A Questionnaire Concerning the Pearl Harbor Attack
Doc. #1032 DRM/FMO/HDP
Pp. 1 I. Paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 48 (that is, the informa-
tion therein) are under special investigation and the answers will be
forwarded later.
II. The reply to Paragraph 29 (concerning orders) will be delayed
because all the copies of the orders were burned at the time of the sur-
render. A detailed report based on the recollections of the people con-
cerned and on fragmentary sources, without the aid of documents which
should be available, is in preparation.
Pp. 2 (Note : The following Paragraphs 1. 2, 3 and 4 are based on the recol-
lections of Chief of Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt.
TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi ; member of Operations Section Naval General
Staff, Comdr. MIYO, Tatsukichi; Combined Fleet Staff members Capt.
KUROSHIMA, Kameto. and Comdr. WANATABE, Yasuji.)
1. Who convelved and proposed the PEARL HARBOR surprise attack?
Adm. YAMAMOTO, Isoroku, then CinC, Combined Fleet.
2. When was this done?
The first part of January 1941. (CinC YAMAMOTO ordered Rear
Adm. ONISHI, Takijiro, at that time Chief of Staff of 11 Air Fleet, to
study the operation.)
79716 O — 46 — pt. 13 3
400 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3. Was the said action (or similar actions in anticipation of a tear
against the UNITED STATES) included in JAPAN'S prewar plans?
No.
4. If this is so, write the facts shown in the prewar plans.
(No statement.)
Pp. 3 (Note: The following Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 are based on the I'eeol-
lections of Adm. NAGANO, Osami, then Chief of the Naval General
Staflf.)
5. When was it decided to attack PEARL HARBOR?
3 Nov. 41. This date was set by the Chief of the Naval General StafC,
NAGANO, when CinC, Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO came to TOKYO.
6. Who made the foregoing decision?
Chief of the Naval General Staff NAGANO.
7. If the decision n-as made in conference, give time of said confer-
ence and names of all persons present.
It was not made in conference.
Pp. 4 . (Note : The following Paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 are based upon the
recollections of Chief of the Oijerations Section Naval General Staff,
Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadato.shi ; Comdr. MIYO, Tatsukichi, a member of the
Operations Section Naval General Staff; and Capt. KUROSHIMA, Ka-
meto, a member of the Combined Fleet Staff. )
8. What important factors were considered in reaching this decision?
The factors considered wete : ( 1 ) rendering impotent the UNITED
STATES PACIFIC Fleet in order to gain time and maintain freedom of
action in the SOUTH SEAS Operation (including the PHILIPPINE Is-
lands), and (2) the defense of our mandated islands.
9. Who vifere the persons who worked out the details of the actual plun?
Members of Naval General Staff Operations Section, Combined Fleet
Operations Staff and 1 Air Fleet Operations Staff.
10. W.hen was the above undertaking started?
In the first part of September 1941.
11. Who made the final confirmation o/ this plan tchen it was com-
pleted?
CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.
Pp. 5^ 12. When was the final confirmation of this plan made?
1 Dec. 41.
13. Who were the people and organizations who knew of this plan?
(Note: This answer is based <m the recollections of the Chief of the
Naval General Staff, Adm. NAGANO, Osami ; Chief of the Operations
Section Naval General Staff, Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi ; and Comdr.
MIYO, Takkichi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General
Staff.)
Those connected with the Navy are as follows :
(1) Those who knew the complete plan in advance:
Chief of the Naval Qeneral Staff
Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff
Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff
Members of Operations Section Naval General Staff
The commanders in chief, the chiefs of staff and most of the staff
members of the Combined Fleet Hq and 1 Air Fleet Hq
(2) Those who knew a part of the plan in advance:
Pp. 6 Chiefs of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Naval General Staff
Navy Minister
Navy Vice-Minister
Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, Navy Ministry
Chiefs of Sections 1 and 2, Bureau of Naval Affairs, and some
of ftheir personnel
Commander in chief of each fleet of the Combined Fleet, their
chiefs of staff and some of the staff members.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 401
(3) Those who knew the general outline of the plan in advance:
The Emperor. (The Emperor knew of the objective of attacking
the main strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet
with a task force after the last ultimatum to the UNITED
STATES Government had been delivered.)
(Note: Any persons other than those connected with the Navy are
unknown. However, it is certain tliat none of the Japanese officials who
were in the UNITED STATES or its possessions, including Ambassador
NOMURA, Ambassador KURUSU, the Navy and Army officers attached
to the embassy in the UNITED STATES and the Imperial Consul in
HONOLULU, knew anything about this plan in advance.)
Pp. 7 (Note: The replies in Paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 are based on the recol-
lections of the Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff,
Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi ; Comdr. MIYO, Takkichi, a member of the
Operations Section Naval General Staff; Combined Fleet Staff members
Capt. KUROSHIMA, Kameto, and Comdr. WATANABE, Yasuji ; and the
commanding officer, officer of the Air Unit, Comdr. FUCHIDA, Mitsuo.)
21. Write a detailed report on how this plan could have been improved,
a. The obstacles which were considered and how they were overcome.
(1) The impossibility of refueling at sea due to rough weather was
considered. To overcome this difficulty, the ships with a limited cruis-
ing range were deck-loaded with drums of heavy oil, and heavy oil was
stowed In open spaces inside the ship. In the eventuality that there were
no opportunity to refuel at sea, all the ships except the destroyers had a
cruising radius extending to approximately E Long 160°. In the event
the destroyers were unable to refuel there was a plan to have them
separate and return. In actual fact, however, the sea was compara-
tively calm and the scheduled refueling was possible.
(2) It was decided that a torpedo attack against anchored ships was
the most effective method of putting the main strength of the UNITED
STATES PACIFIC Fleet in the HAWAII area out of action for a con-
siderably long period of time. Hence, the following two obstacles were
considered :
(a) The fact that PEARL HARBOR is narrow and shallow.
(b) The fact that PEARL HARBOR was probably equipped with
torpedo nets.
(c) In regard to point (a), it was planned to attach stabilizers to
the torpedoes and launch them from an extremely low altitude.
(d) In regard to point (b), since success could not be counted on, a
bombing attack was also employed.
b. Were local decisions made and, if so, by whom?
There were none.
c. How were the units and commanding officers who were to par-
ticipate selected (surface forces and air forces) ?
Pp. 9 Air forces : The basic unit was organized by attaching the flight per-
sonnel of Car Div 4 (RYU JO and RYUHO) to Car Div 1 (AKAGI,
KAGA) and Car Div 2 (SORYU and HIRYU), which were at that time
the most highly trained units in the Combined Fleet. Car Div 5, because
it had just been organized, was supplemented by highly trained flight
personnel from every unit in JAPAN, and, by further concentrated train-
ing, it was planned to bring them to peak efficiency.
Surface forces: As for a possible, vessels with a long cruising range
were selected. Persons of ability were selected for commanding officers.
d. What were the reasons for the actual course selected?
Three courses were considered for the HAWAII Operation. The
northern course which was actually used, a central course which headed
east following along the HAWAII Archipelago, and a southern route
passing through the MARSHALL Islands and approaching from the
south. On the northern route, although it was far from the enemy
patrol screen of land-based airplanes and there was little chance of
meeting commercial vessels, the influences of weather and topography
were strong. Refueling at sea and navigation were difficult. On the
Pp. 10 central and southern routes the advantages and disadvantages are gen-
erally just the opposite to those of the above-mentioned route. Although
402 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
it may be assumed that these routes would be preferable for purposes
of refueling at sea, the chances of being discovered by patrol planes were
great because the routes near WAKE, MID^^'AY, PALMYRA, JOHN-
STON Islands, etc. Consequently, it could hardly be expected that a
surprise attack could be made.
The ability to refuel and a surprise attack were the keys to this
operation. If either of them failed the execution of the operation would
have been impossible. However, the refueling problem could be over-
come by training. On the other hand, a surprise attack under all cir-
cumstances could not be assured by our own strength. Therefore, the
northern route was selected.
e. What preparations were made for the prevention of discovery
enroute?
(1) By electing the route so as to pass between MIDWAY and the
ALEUTIANS, we would pass outside the patrol zones of the patrol
planes.
(2) Screening destroyers were sent ahead in the path of the fleet and
in the event any vessels were encountered, the main body of the fleet
would make a severe change of course and endeavor to avoid detection.
Pp. 11 (3) Complete radio silence was carried out.
f. In the event of being discovered what countermeasures would have
been taken V The day of the attack was designated as X-day.
If discovered prior to X-2 day, we would have returned without
executing the air attack. In the event of being discovered on X-l Day,
the question of whether to make an attack or to return would have
been decided in accordance with the local conditions.
g. What means of deception were taken so as to direct the attention
of the UNITED STATES elsewhere?
The Main Force in the INLAND SEA Ai'ea and the land-based air
units in the KYUSHU Area carried on deceptive communications, and
deceptive measures were taken to indicate that the Task Force was
still in training in the KYUSHU Area.
h. If the attack had failed, what countermeasures would have been
taken ?
In order to bring in the Task Force it was planned to send the Main
Force in the INALAND SEA out to the PACIFIC Ocean.
Pp. 12 22. State reasons for and particulars of the selection of the date of
7 December.
(!) The Imperial Headquarters Navy Section generally acknowledged
8 December (JAPAN time) to be suitable from an operational stand
point and made the decision in cooperation with the leaders of the
Combined Fleet.
(2) For a dawn attack in the HAWAII Area in December, the tenth
would have been suitable from the standpoint of the dark of the moon.
However, since it was expected that the UNITED STATES PACIFIC
Fleet, in accordance with its habits during maneuvers, would enter the
harbor on Friday and leave on Monday, the eighth was decided on so
as to hit between these days.
Pp. 13 23. How uas the time for the attack selected and for what reasons?
In order to assure the success of the attack and still avoid a night
attack, the take-off time of the airplanes was set as near to dawn as
possible. The attack time was set at 0330 hours (JAPAN time). Sun-
rise that day was at 0230 hours. )
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
403
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404 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Pp. 15
(2) Air Strength.
(a) Reconnaissance Unit.
Type
Type of airplane
Number
cf air-
planes
Ships on which
based
Duty
Airplanes for recon-
naissance just be-
fore the attack.
Type Zero Recon-
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Anchorage just be-
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sance Seaplanes.
4
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Tone (1)
Chikuma (1)
Patrolling waters
around OAHU.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
405
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406 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 407
Pp. 18 25. During this operation were any of the fleet units or air forces
diverted to attack secondary targets?
(Note: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of
Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was in command of the AKAGI Air
Unit at that time.)
(1) The MIDWAY Neutralization Unit (AKEMBONO. USHIO) left
TOKYO Bay about 1 December, arrived at MIDWAY during the night of
8 December, bombarded the air base, and returned to the western part
of the INLAND Sea. The SHIRIYA moved with this unit and served
as a supply ship.
(2) On 16 December, while proceeding back from HAWAII, two air-
craft carriers (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU), two cruisers (TONE, CHI-
KUMA), and two destroyers (TANIKAZE, URAKAZE) were diverted
to WAKE Island. They were sent by Combined Fleet orders to support
the WAKE Invasion Operation.
Pp. 19 26. (NOTE: These answers are based on the recollections and in-
quiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was in command of AKAGI
Air Unit at that time.)
a. Explain the plans of action and the reasoning therein, for the air
attack, giving the number and type of airplanes used against each target.
(1) First Attack.
(a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (50 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).
Target : Battleships.
Reasoning :
(i) It was presumed that the American battleships could be effec-
tively crippled by 800-kg armor piercing bombs, dropped from an
altitude of 3,000 meters or more.
Pp. 20 (2) Horizontal bombing is relatively inaccurate, however, it was
estimated that, with the degree of training the bombing unit had,
an 80% ratio of hits could be expected against stationary battleships
if formations of five airplanes were employed from an altitude of
3,000 meters or more. Therefore, it was concluded that about four
battleships could be effectively crippled with 10 formations of
bombers.
(3) Because of the accuracy of torpedo attacks, we desired to use
as many of them as possible. However, both bombing attacks and
torpedo attacks were used for the following reasons :
(a) If torpedo nets were layed, the attack would otherwise be
unsuccessful.
(b) Launching torpedoes into shallow water such as that in
PEARL HARBOR requires a special technique.
(c) Ordinarily, ships were moored in pairs abreast each other.
Consequently, bombing attacks were the only effective method
against the inside ships.
(b) Torpedo Bombing Unit (40 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes) .
Target : Battleships and aircraft carriers.
Reasoning :
Torpedo bombing is very accurate. Therefore, the pilots most
skillful at shallow water torpedo bombing were selected and an
attempt made to put as many battleships and carriers temporarily
out of action due to underwater damage as the conditions previously
related in "(c)" would permit. (Because the carriers were not
at their anchorages on the day of the attack, the airplanes concen-
trated on the battleships.)
(c) Dive Bombing Unit (54 Type 99 Carrier Bombers).
Target : Air bases.
15 Attack Unit (27 airplanes) — Hangars and grounded air-
planes at FORD Island.
16 Attack Unit (27 airplanes) — Hangars and grounded air-
planes at WHEELER.
Reasoning :
Pp. 22 (1) Since the primary objective of this attack was to put the
UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet temporarily out of action, the
attack was directed at the battleships and carriers. However,
fighter plane bases were attacked first because it was necessary to
prevent a counterattack by American fighter planes against our
408 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
main attack units — the horizontal bombing and torpero bombing
units.
(2) It had been concluded that WHEELER Field was a UNITED
STATES Army fighter plane base and that carrier planes from the
UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet were usually kept at FORD
Island,
(d) Fighter Striking Unit (45 Type Zero Carrier Fighters).
Targets : Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes.
2 Fighter Striking Unit— FORD Island and HICKMAN.
4 Fighter Striking Unit— WHEELER and BARBERS POINT.
6 Fighter Striking Unit— KANEOHE.
Reasoning :
(i) At the beginning of the attack the fighter striking unit was to
maintain a single formation and patrol over OAHU, attacking any
enemy fighter planes which got into the air.
Pp. 23 (2) If no fighter opposition were met in the air, the unit was to
split up as indicated above and attack grounded airplanes on the
various airfields on OAHU, thereby preventing a counterattack.
(2) Second Attack.
(a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (54 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).
Target : Air bases.
6 Attack Unit — Hangars and grounded airplanes at HICKHAM.
5 Attack Unit — Hangars and grounded airplanes at KANEOHE,
FORD Island and BARBERS POINT.
Reasoning:
By putting the American airplanes on OAHU temporarily out of
action, a counterattack against the Task Force could be prevented.
(b) Di\'€ Bombing Unit (81 Type 99 Carrier Bombers).
Target : Aircraft carriers and cruisers.
Reasoning :
(1) Although the 250-kg bombs which the airplanes were able to
to carry could not pierce the armor of the battleship, it was estimated
that they would be effective against the UNITED STATES cruisers
and carriers of that time.
(2) It was estimated that there were then four or five American
carriers operating in the HAWAII Area. They were the targets
of this dive bombing unit. (Since the aircraft carriers were not at
their anchorages on the day of the attack, most of the blows were
directed against battleships.)
(c) Fighter Striking Unit (36 Type Zero Fighters).
Targets : Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes.
2 Fightei^ Striking Unit— FORD Island and HICKHAM.
Pp. 25 4 Fighter Striking Unit— WHEELER and KANEOHE.
Reasoning :
Same as stated previously.
b. Explain the courses, and the reasoning therein, which the air units
followed from the aircraft carriers to the targets.
Both the First and Second Attack Units proceeded directly from the
carriers to OAHU. They flew at an altitude of 3,000 meters. (Dense
clouds hung at about 2,000 meters that day, so the airplanes flew above
them. )
The positions of the carrier groups were as follows*:
( 1 ) The airplanes in the First Attack Unit took off at 0130 hours. The
carriers were 230 nautical miles bearing 0° from the western tip of
LAXAI Island.
(2) The airplanes in the Second Attack Unit took off at 0245 hours.
The carriers were 200 nautical miles bearing 0° from the western tip of
LANAI Island.
Pp. 26 The movements of the airphines after they came in sight of OAHU is
shown in the appended sketch.
c. Give the times at which each unit attacked its target.
First Attack Unit.
Dive Bombing Unit
WHEELER Field— 0325 hours.
Torpedo Attack Unit
Battleships at FORD Island Anchorage— 0327 hours.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 409
Horizontal Bombing Unit
' Same as above — 0235 hours.
Fighter Striking Unit
Began ground strating — 0330 hours.
Second Attack Unit.
All three units — Dive Bombing Unit, Horizontal Bombing Unit and
Fighter Striking Unit — attacked their targets about 0430 hours. How-
ever, details are not a wi liable because the Commanding Officer of the
Second Attack Unit, Lt. Comdr SHIMAZAKI, was killed in combat in
January 1945.
(Note: The times at which the attacks started have been indicated.
Both First Attack and the Second Attack continued for 30 minutes to an
hour).
Pp. 27 d. What courses did the airplanes follow on their flight back to the
carriers? Why were these couiises chosen?
A rendezvous was made with the Fighter Striking Unit 20 nautical
miles bearing 340° from KAENA* Point. From there all units proceeded
directly back to the carriers.
Because of the flying time involved, no thought was given to with-
drawing on courses designed to deceive possible opp(JSitiop.
Pp. 29 27. How were midget submarines used?
(Note: This reply is baised on the recollections of Rear Adm MITO,
Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at that time.)
a. Reasons for use:
To cause the greatest possible damage to the enemy through co-opera-
tion in the assault by the air forces.
b. How many were used?
Five.
c. Were they expected to return?
While the probability that they would be able to return was very
small, it was not thought to be wholly impossible. All midget submarine
personnel, however, were prepared for death and none expected to re-
turn alive. (They were precursors of the KAMIKAZE Attack Units.)
d. Did any return?
None were recovered, though all possible recovering measures were
exhausted.
e. Give a detailed report and criticism on the effectiveness of this
weapon.
Pp. 30 The submarines which were on patrol duty outside the entrance to
PEARL HARBOR witneissed a great explosion within the harbor at 1631
hours 8 December (2101 hours, 7 December, HAWAII time). A radio
report on the success of the attack was received fi-om one of the midget
submarines at 1811 hours the same day (0041 hours, 8 December,
HAWAII time).
It was impossible to determine the total damage inflicted since there
were no further detailed reports. This report did not confirm the day-
light attack on 8 December ; but it was verified that the night attack
on the same day had been carried out, and it was inferred that great
damage was caused to one or more large war vessels.
Pp.31 28. Was this a loell -elaborated plan or one developed for the emer-
gency?
(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Capt TOMIOKA,
Sadatoshi, Chief of Operations Section. Naval General Staff, and of
Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at
that time.)
a. Had the UNITED STATES made concessions would the plan have
been discarded or modified?
(TOMIOKA) It would have been discarded.
b. If the American fleet had been at sea, how would the plan have been
modified?
(Replies by FUCHIDA:)
(1) Had the American fleet sought to intercept our Task Force or
had there been a significant threat to the attack as planned, we would
have counterattacked.
(2) Had the American fleet left port we would have scouted an area
of about 300 miles around OAHU and were prepared to attack. If the
American fleet could not be located, we were to withdraw.
410 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Pp.32 (Note: The following replies, Paragraphs 30-38, are based on the rec-
ollections of Coradr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI
Air Unit at the time of the attack.)
30. When dicb the Task Force hegin to formt
The various forces were to leave the several areas where they might
be on or about 15 November, to proceed as single vessels or in small
formations and to rendezvous in TANKAPPU-WAN by 22 November.
31. Where tvas the rendezvous f
TANKAPPU-WAN.
32. When did the Task Force get underiray on its mission?
It sailed from TANKAPPU-WAN at 0600 hours 26 November.
33. Was there any provision to receive icord of a settlement ichile this
Task Force was underway? What steps icould have been taken if a
compromise had been reached?
Depending on orders, the Task Force would have returned to TAN-
KAPPU-WAN, HOKKAIDO, or to MUTSU-KAIWAN.
34- Did everything proceed according to plan?
Yes.
Pp. 33 35. If it had not done so, what changes or mishaps might have arisen
and why?
(No statement. )
36. Was the Task Force sighted or attacked while underway?
No.
37. Was any shipping, other than Japanese, seen while underway?
None.
38. If any such shipping had been encountered, what measures ivould
have been taken?
(No statement.)
Pp. 34 39. Why was the air assault not continued, and why was it not folloioed
up by surface units or by a landing?
(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Comdr FUCHIDA,
Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at the time of the
attack. )
(1) The object of this attack was to destroy the capital strength of the
UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet and to delay any attack which it might
make across the PACIFIC. Hence this objective could be accomplished
by air attack alone. Furthermore, since the whereabouts of the Ameri-
can task forces were unknown, and since the chances of scouting them
were small, in face of a possible counterattack in co-operation with the
50-odd remaining HAW All-based large airplanes, the advantages of a
quick withdrawal were apparent. Consequently, no naval assault was
undertaken.
(2) No landing operation was planned because it would have been
impossible to make preparations for such a landing in less than a month
after the opening of hostilities, and because it was recognized that the
problems of speed and of supplies for an accompanying convoy would
have made it unlikely that the initial attack could have been accom-
plished without detection.
Pp. 35 (Note: The following paragraphs, 40, 41 and 42 are based on the
recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding
Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)
40. What damage did the Japanese receive?
In the First Attack :
Fighter planes 3
Dive bombers- 1
Torpedo bombers . 5
Total 9
In the Second Attack:
Fighter planes 6
Dive bombers 14
Total 20
Grand total 29
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 411
Jfl. What was the estimated damage to American forces?
(1) Naval vessels:
Sunk: 4 battleships
1 cruiser
2 tankers
Pp. 36 Heavily damaged : 4 battleships
Lightly damaged: 1 battleship
(2) Airplanes
Shot down : Approximately 10 Airplanes.
turned or destroyed on the ground : Approximately 250
airplanes
Total : Approximately 260 airplanes.
It is impossible to determine how many others, presumably a consider-
able number were destroyed in the hangars.
42. How was the ramage inflicted on the Americans determined?
(1) From reports of flight personnel upon their return.
(2) From studies of photographs taken by flight personnel.
(Note: No reconnaissance planes were used to assess the results im-
mediately after the attack, but one element of fighter planes was ordered,
after completing its mission, to fly as low as possible to observe the
results.)
Pp. 37 43. Were any of the air, submarine or surface units employed in addi-
tional attacks on HAWAII or in reconnaissance immediately after the
main attack?
(Note: The following paragraph is based on the recollections of Cmdr
FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, at that time Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit,
and of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet. )
A part from reconnaissance by submarines stationed at the mouth of
PEARL HARBOR on the eve of the day of the attack, none engaged in
follow-up attacks or in reconnaissance.
Pp. 38 (Note: The replies in paragraphs 45, 46 and 47 are based on the recol-
lections of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at the time of
the attack. )
45. Were any submarines operating in Hawaiian waters prior to the
attack on PEARL HARBOR?
Submarines were stationed on lookout duty in Hawaiian waters, the
day before the Task Force strike, on the evening of 7 December. They
were ordered not to attack until the Task Force strike was verified.
46a. If there were, where were these submarines based?
Most of the submarines departed from JAPAN for a rendezvous at
KWAJALEIN. to proceed thence to HAWAII. A few, which were delayed
in leaving JAPAN, changed course and proceeded directly to HAWAII.
b. What were their operation orders?
Pp. 39 The orders given to the submarines were as follows : Part were to pro-
ceed with the Task Force, screening it as it proceeded toward HAWAII ;
the majority of the submarines were to take up lookout stations in
Hawaiian waters by the evening of 7 December, while the midget sub-
marines were to scout and reconnoiter a possible attack by the enemy
fleet as well as strike into PEARL HARBOR.
At the same time, they were given strict orders not to attack until the
Task Force strike had been verifled.
c. Were reports made during and after the attack?
When the Task Force and the Uiidget submarine strikes were com-
pleted, the midget submarines reported as follows :
(1) Report of the attack as observed by a midget submarine on the
of 8 December.
(2) A midget submarine radioed the same night "Surprise attack
succeeds".
(3) A report on the departure of midget submarines and that it
was impossible to recover their personnel though all recovery
measures had been tried.
d. What damage was sustained by the submarines?
Pp. 40 One submarine was detected and depth-charged by patrol vessels near
the entrance to PEARL HARBOR. Though it ran afoul of the antisub-
marine net, it extricated itself, after some damage, and returned safely.
Apart from this case there was one other submarine lost off PEARL
HARBOR ; the time and place of its sinking are unknown.
412 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Jft. How long did the suhmarines remain in Hawaiian waters?
The submarines continued operations in the vicinity of HAWAII from
8 December, the day of the attack, until early January of the following
year. During this time, most of the submarines proceeded to the west
coast of the UNITED STATES to destroy shipping, and part of the
submarines returned to JAPAN. Only a small number remained in the
Hawaiian area for the maximum length of time.
End
OENEBAL HE^ADQUABTEIBS
SuPEEMB Commander fob the At-t-teid PowBats
AG 350.05 ( 8 Nov 45) GB 8 Novbmbeb 1945.
Subject. Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Atta^ck on Pearl Harbor.
To : Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
(Attention : A. C. of S., G-2)
1. Reference our communications AG 350.05 (1 November 1945) GB, and AG
350.05 (20 October 1945) GB, same subject, and in further compliance with your
radios WX 73711. War Sec. 7 October 1945 and WX 75561, 14 October 1945,
requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to
the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an additional partial report is
forwarded herewith.
2. This report contains answers to questions 14-20 inclusive and to question 48
of our questionnaire to the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army
and Navy, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our communication of
26 October referred to above.
For the Supreme Commander :
/S/ H. W. Allen
H. W. Allen,
Colonel, A.O.D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.
1 Incl : Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.
(Incll)
Doc No. 1668
Allied Translator and Interpreter Section
united states army forces, pacific
Note: Translation of document requested by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Pearl Harbor Questionnaire
26 October 1945
The answers to questions 14, lH, 16, 17. 18, 19, 20 and 48 of Colonel MUNSONS
questionnaire of 17 October, the PEARL HARBOR Attack are contained herein.
NOTE: Because of the deaths of Commander KANAMOTO, Yoshihira (28 De-
cember 1942), and Commander NAKAJIMA, Minato (6 August 1943), who were
staff officers in the Intelligence Department of the Naval General Staff, and be-
cause of the pertinent records have been burneil, these answers are based upon
the recollections of Commander TA(^HIBANA, Itaru. who was on duty in the
Intelligence Department at that time.
14. Sources of intelligence?
Such matters as the strength of the UNITED STATES Fleet in the HAWAII
area, the condition of military installations, the da.vs upon which the fleet moved
out of and into port, the location and condition of moorages, waters in which
maneuvers were held, air patrols, etc. ; were used as basic intelligence material.
This material was collated by the Intelligence Department of the Naval Gen-
eral Staff and used as the basis for the operation plan.
The primary sources were :
1. Naval attache to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 413
2. Public newspapers in the UNITED STATES.
3. American radio broadcasts (public).
4. Crews and passengers on ships which put in at HONOLULU.
5. General information.
15. Characteristics of intelligence?
Emphasis was placed on material collected statistically over a number of
years.
16. How atid from whom were the details on the maps carried by personnel of
the air units obtained?
A. The location of the anchorages shown on the maps was determined on
the basis of information gathered from the sources mentioned in "14", beginning
in the early part of 1941. Information on the condition of the fleet moorages in
PEARL HARBOR in the early part of November was forwarded to Fleet Head-
quarters. Fleet Headquarters then corrected its information accordingly.
B. Information on barracks and other military installations was compiled
from the sources listed in "14".
C. The general outlines of the approach to OAHU for both the Attack Force
and the air units were determined from information provided by the previously
named source. Factors taken into consideration in the choice were American
air patrols, sea patrols, etc. The routes selected were judged to be those upon
which there was slight chance of encountering a patrol, merchant ships, etc.
17. In what way did the Attack Force check on information while it was under-
way?
As information was gathered from the sources mentioned in "14" it was
forwarded to the Attack Force.
18. What role was played by agents in HAWAII?
None.
19-20. Photographing of ships in the harbor and opportunities for same.
Applicable facts not available.
48. What pertinent information was received from merchant ships prior to the
attack?
Merchant ships provided fragmentary information on moorages in PEARL
HARBOR, ship and air unit maneuvers, the names of vessels encountered in the
HAWAII area, etc. This information was used in the statistical collation of
information mentioned in "14".
EXHIBIT NO. 8-A
general headquarters
Supreme Commander fob the Allied Powers
AG 350.05 (12 Nov 45) GB 12 November 1945.
Subject : Additional Data With Reference To Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.
To: Chief of Sl.afif, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attention: A. C. of S.,
G-2).
1. Reference previous correspondence above file and subject, and in com-
pliance with your radios WX 73711 War Sec, 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14
October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese
with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 1941, an additional
document is forwarded herewith.
2. This document provides further amplification previously furnished by the
Japanese in answer to question 27 and questions 4.5-47 inclusive of our ques-
tionnaire of 17 October 1945 with respect to submarine operations in connec-
tion with the Pearl Harbor attack, and which was forwarded on 1 November 1945.
For the Supreme Commander :
/s/ H. W. Allen
H. W. Allen,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
As8t Adjutant General.
414 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1 Incl : Notes of Correspondent.
[A newspaper Article Published in the Yomiuri-Hochi, 30 October 1945]
[1] The Eve of "Pearl Harbor"
An early chapter in the History of War Crimes.
December 8, 1941. This is the fatal date when the American People as one
resolved themselves to "Remember Pearl Harbor !" But long before this date
Japan's submarine offensive on Pearl Harbor vrere going on and several eery
periscopes were feeling out movements of American tleets from the rough sea.
The former War Correspondent Hanakata has only now made public his notes
taken at that time from direct narrations of the late Captain (then Lt Com-
mander) Katsuji Watanabe of "I No. 69" and the late Rear Admiral (then
Captain) Shinkl Nakaoka of the 11th EJetachment of the 3rd Submarine Fleet.
"The Japanese submarine detachment belonged to the Sixth Fleet, whose
flagship was the light cruiser Katori. In early November orders for war prepa-
ration were given to this detachment, and on 11 November over ten submarines of
the First and 3rd Detachnlents, including "I" Nos. 69. 74, 75 and others left
Yokosuka Naval Base, with knowledge of the growing war fever in Washington
and Tokyo.
"The submarine fleet followed a course due east in line ahead, stretching over
20 miles. They navigated at surface speeds of from 12 or 13 to 20 knots. But
when they got near the Hawaiian waters they extended and followed their I'e-
spective courses. The duties of the submarine fleet were known as (a) to feel
the movements of American fleets around Pearl Harbor; (b) to disptach "spe-
cial submarines" from their decks and to observe their war results; (c) to attack
escaping American war vessels, if any; (d) to rescue operators of "special sub-
marines", down fliers and others wherever possible.
"In Hawaiian waters the submarines floated on the sea in the night, and in
the day time they submerged to periscope depth. The schedule of Pearl Harbor
attack at 0300 on December 8th was transmitted to the submarine fleet two or
three days beforehand. On 7th "I No. 74" sighted the carrier Lexington but no
trouble ensued.
"The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was carried on as had been scheduled.
Before this, five large sized "I" type submarines belonging to the First Sub-
marine Detachment had launchetl "special submarines" from their decks. That
was the departure of the now well known Commander Iwasa and other members
of "special attack parties".
"The submarines followed the upheaval in the harbor only through occasional
land explosions coming through the deep water, and they confirmed the Harbor
Battle at night when they emerged from the bottom of the sea. At 1631 (2101
Hawaiian time) Rear Commander Watanabe of "I No. 69" detected from the
periscope a huge fiery column which marked the end of the USS Arizotm.
[2] "Lt. Commander Watanabe's radio intercepted dispatches in relation to
this were by the enemy and his "I No. 69" was pursued by enemy destroyers which
dropped depth charges madly. Under this circumstance "I No. 69" dived 60 to 70
meters beneath the surface, though her ordinary diving capacity had been set at
80 meters. The submarine sustained damage here and there and finally was
caught by submarine wires. She struggled hard and just managed to get away
from the wires. Altogether this old submarine remained submerged about 39
hours. All hopes of rescuing fellow-fighters who had been shot down had been
abandoned."
The notes from direct narration by Captain Watanabe and Rear Admiral
Nakaoka end here. But Mr. Hanakata observes that most of the officers and crews
of Japanese submarines, including those participating in the siege of Pearl
Harbor, perished at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean, the prey of American radio
locators. For example, the said Captain Watanabe perished with his submarine
in 1943 around the Gilbert Islands. Rear Admiral Nakaoka was promoted to be
captain of the crack cruiser Atago but he also was killed in action by enemy
bombs on the bridge of that vessel.
The Yomiuri-Hochi 30 October 1945.
I certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief the foregoing notes repre-
sent a true report of the information given me by the late Captain Watanabe
and the late Rear Admiral Nakaoka at the time of interview,
/&/ M. Hanakata.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 415
EXHIBIT NO. 8-B
oenebax headquarters
Supreme Commander for the Axlied Powers
AG 350.05 (29 Nov 45) GB 29 November 1945.
Subject : Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attention Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2).
1. Reference our communications of 26 October 1945, 1 November 1945, and 8
November 1945, same tile number and subject, and in further compliance with
your radios WX 73711, War Sec, 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14 October 1945,
requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to
the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an additional partial report is
forwarded herewith.
2. This report contains a reconstruction from memory of certain Japanese docu-
ments relative to the attack, all originals of which are reported to have been
burned at the time of surrender. The reconstructions have been obtained by the
Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army and Navy in compliance with
question 29 of our questionnaire of 17 October 1945, a copy of which was forwarded
as Incl. No. 4 to our communication of 26 October referred to above.
For the Supreme Commander :
/sgd/ H. W. Allen
H. W. Allen,
Colonel, A.Q.D.
Asst. Adjutant Oeneral.
1 Incl : Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire,
[i] Dec 1976
Axlied Translator and Interpreter Section
united states army forces, pacific
Note: Translation of a document requested by Colonel MUNSON, Historical
Investigation Sction, G-2.
Reply to a Questionnaire Concerning the Pearl Harbor Attack
22 October 1945.
Navy Ministry
The answers to Question 29 of Col. MUNSON's questionnaire on the PEARL
HARBOR attack, dated 17 October, are contained herein.
29. Copiesof the following will be submittefl :
1. Operation plan for the PEARL HARBOR attack.
2. Operational research and other documents related to the attack.
3. Orders relative to carrying out the plan (together with all revisions).
All copies of the above items were burned at the time of the surrender, and as
a result no documents are available. The e.ssential points in the orders relative
to carrying out the operation are hereby submitted. The information is based
on the recollections and inquiries of the following three men :
Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff.
Section Orders and Directives
Real Admiral TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi (then a captain and chief of Operation's
Section, Naval General Staff) .
Combined Fleet Orders
Rear Admiral KUROSHIMA, Kameto (then a captain and member of Com-
bined Fleet Senior Staff (SHUSEKI SAMBO).)
Task Force Orders
Capt FUCHIDA, Mitsuo ( then a commander and in command of AKAGI Air
Unit).
Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 1 (essentials).
5 Nov 41.
From : Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
To : CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.
A. Because it is feared that war with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN
and the NETHERLANDS is inevitable, it has been decided that for the sake of the
Empire's defense general operational preparations will be completed by the first
part of December.
B. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will carry out the necessary oper-
ational preparations.
C. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.
79716 O— 46 — pt. 13 4
416 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 1 (essentials)
9 Nov 41.
From : Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO. Osanii.
To : CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.
A. The Combined Fleet will prepare itself for the possibility that war with
the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS may become
inevitable in the first part of December. The necessary forces will be sent to the
prepared points at a suitable time prior to the beginning of operations.
B. A strict watch against possible surprise attacks will be maintained during
these movements.
[S] C. The operation policy in the event hostilities break out with the
UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS is set forth
in the Separate Volume.
Note: The part of the operation policy relating to the HAWAII area is re-
called as follows :
"At the very l)eginning of hostilities the UNITED STATES Fleet in the
HAWAII area will be attacked by a force having 1 Air Fleet as its nucleus.
An attempt will be made to destroy the American fleet"
Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order (essentials).
21 Nov. 41.
From : Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
To: CinC Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO.
A. At the appropriate time the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will
order the forces necessary for carrying out the operation to proceed to rendezvous
areas.
B. If friendly forces are challenged by American, English or Dutch forces
during the operational preparations, the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet
is authorized to use force in order to protect the friendly forces.
C. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.
Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 5 (essentials).
21 Nov. 41.
From : Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.
A. In the event that an agreement is reached in the negotiations between
the UNITED STATES and JAPAN the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet
will immediately order the forces for the operation to return.
B. The use of force mentioned in Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section
Order 5 is limited to the following cases :
1. If American English or Dutch surface forces should proceed into Japane.<!e
territorial waters for reconnaissance purposes.
[4] 2. If American, English or Dutch surface forces approach .Japanese
territorial waters and it is recognized that they are jeopardizing our forces.
3. If aggressive action imperiling our forces is taken by American, English
or Dutch surface forces outside territorial waters.
Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 9 (essentials).
1 Dec. 41.
From : Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO. Osami.
To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.
A. It has been decided that JAPAN will commence hostilities with the
UNITED STATES, ENGLAND and the NETHERLAN)6s in the first part of
December.
B. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will destroy enemy surface and
air forces in the ORIENT, and, in the event enemy fleets attack, will intercept
and destroy them.
C. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, in co-operation with the Com-
mander in Chief Southern Army, will rapidly attack important American,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 417
English and the Dutch bases in the ORIENT, and will occupy and protect
them.
D. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will co-operate in the operations
of the CHINA area fleet when necessary.
E. The times for starting the movement of forces for the above will be
given in a later order.
F. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.
Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 9 (essentials).
1 Dec. 41.
From : Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.
The Combined Fleet operiitions against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRIT.
AIN and the NETHERLANDS will be based upon the Separate Volume —
"Imperial Navy's Operation Policy against the UNITED STATES, GREAT
BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS".
[5] Note : As far as can be remembered, the Operation Policy in the Separate
Volume was entii-ely the same as the Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section
Directive of 5 November.
Imi)erial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 12 (essentiajte).
2 Dec. 41.
From : Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
To : CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.
A. Beginning 8 December, the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will start
using military power in accordance with Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff
Section Order 9.
B. The use of military force against the NETHERLANDS will be started after
moves have been made against the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN.
C. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.
Chief of Naval General Staff Verbal Directive.
2 Dec. 41.
From : Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO (given to him while he was in TOKYO).
It is to be understood beforehand that if an agreement i.s reached in the
negotiations between JAPAN and the UNITED STATES before the use of mili-
tary power has started, the Combined Fleet forces will be directed by special
order to return.
Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Oijei-ation Order — (essentials).
Flagship NAGATO HIROSHIMA-WAN
7 Nov. 41
YAMAMOTO, Isoroku
CinC Combined Fleet
[6] Combined Fleet Order
The Task Force will gather in HITOKAPPU-WAN and remain there to take
on supplies until 22 November. Every precaution will be taken to insure
secrecy in movements.
Note: About the time the above order was issued, a Combined Fleet order
(giving directions for carrying out the Operation Policy) based on Imperial
Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 1 was also i.ssued. Detailed in-
formation as to its contents is not available. (It is thought that it was about
the same as Paragraph 1 of Task Force Operation Order 1, which was issued
later).
418 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Combined Fleet Ultrasecx'et Operation Order — (essentials).
Flagship NAGATO HIROSHIMA- WAN
22 Nov. 41
YAMAMOTO, Isoroku
CinC Combined Fleet
Combined Fleet Order
A. The Task Force will move out from HITOKAPPU-WAN and proceed to the
HAWAII area, maintaining the greatest secrecy as to its movements and a close
watch against submarine or air attacks. At the opening of hostilities the Task
Force will attack the main strength of the UNITED STATES Fleet in the
HAWAII area and inflict crippling damage on it.
The first attack will be at dawn on X-Day (to be given in a later order).
At the conclusion of the air attacks the force will regroup and withdravi'u
immediately to JAPAN, being prepared at all times to meet enemy counterattacks.
B. In the event an agreement is reached in the negotiations with the UNITED
STATES, the Task Force will immediately return to JAPAN.
Note: In ND No 130 of 11 Oct 45 it was stated that this order was issued
25 November. However, that was an error, and the date of the order has now
been corrected to 22 November.
Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order — (essentials).
Flagship ?JAGATO HIROSHIMA-WAN
25 Nov. 41
[7] YAMAMOTO, Isoroku
CinC Combined Fleet
Combined Fleet Order
The Task Force will move out of HITOKAPPU-WAN on 26 November and pro-
ceed without being detected to the evening rendezvous point (Lat 40° N, Long
170° W), set for 3 December, where refueling and supply will be carried out as
quickly as possibly.
Note : In accordance with this order the Task Force moved out of HITOKAPPU-
WAN at 0600 hours on 26 November.
Combined Fleet Dispatch Operation Order — (essentials).
Time of origin : Approximately 1730 hours, 2 Dec 41.
Text : X-Day will be 8 December.
Task Force Ultrasecret Operation Order 1 (essentials).
Flagship AKAGI, HITOKAPPU-WAN
23 Nov 41
NAGUMO, Chuichi
Task Force Commander
Task Force Order
A. The Task Force will proceed to the HAWAII area, taking every precaution
to insure the secrecy of its movements. The force will attack the enemy fleet in
the HAWAII area and attempt to cripple it.
The first air attack has been set for 0330 hours on X-Day.
When the attacks have been completed the force will quickly withdraw.
Upon returning to JAPAN the force will be re-equipped and supplied and then
assigned a task in the Second Phase Operations.
If, while underway, the Force is intercepted by the enemy fleet, encounters a
powerful enemy force, or it appears that the enemy is going to attack in order
to gain the advantage, the Task Force will attack immediately.
B. Chart (See next page.)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
419
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420 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[S] C. Movements of each force.
1. General :
The entire force (except the MIDWAY Neutralization Unit) will leave HITO-
KAPPU-WAN by special order. The force will proceed to the rendezvous point
(Lat 42° N, Long 170° W) in convoy at a speed of from 12 to 14 knots, making
every effort to conceal its movements and maintaining a strict watch against
submarine and air attacks. Refueling will be carried out at evei"y opportunity
en route. When X-Day (the day upon which hostilities will be started) is desig-
nated, the force will proceed from the rendezvous point to the point where con-
tact will be made with the enemy (Lat 32° N, Long 157° W).
Beginning at 0700 hours on X-1 Day, the force will proceed due south at high
speed (approximately 24 knots), arriving at the point from which the airplanes-
will be launched (200 nautical miles north of the enemy anchorage) at 0100
hours on X-Day. Air attacks will then be made against the enemy fleet and
important air bases on OAHU.
Upon completion of the air attacks, the airplanes will be taken aboard and the
force will withdraw. It will proceed west, staying at least 800 nautical miles
north of MIDWAY, to the regrouping point (Lat 30° N, Long 165° and from there
the western part of the INLAND SEA. It will arrive there about X-15 Day and
begin preparations for the Second Phase Operations.
If the air attacks have been a complete success and there is little chance of an
enemy counterattack, or if the problems of supply necessitate it, a return course
which passes near MIDWAY may be taken. In this event. Car Div 5 and the two
ships of Bat Div 3 will be dispatched from the Task Forse on the night of X-Day
to early in the morning of X-1 Day, and will make an air attack against
MIDWAY.
If by some chance a powerful enemy force has cut off the return route, the Task
Force will proceed south through the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS to the MARSHALLS.
If it is anticipated that this fuel supply is insufficient for proceeding to the
return route rendezvous point, the Screening Unit will be detached and sent
back.
2. Patrol Unit:
The Patrol Unit will accompany the main unit.
If the Screening Unit is detached, the Patrol Unit will be the advance screen
for the main unit, and it will be responsible for screening the airplanes, during
landings and takeoffs.
After the air attacks the Patrol Unit will screen on the side nearest the enemy ;
if the enemy attacks, the unit will engage and pursue him utilizing all available
strength.
3. MIDWAY Neutralization Unit:
The unit will leave TOKYO Bay about X-6 Day, and after refueling, will
proceed to MIDWAY taking every precaution to conceal its movements. It will
arrive at MIDWAY on the night of X-Day, attack the air base, and withdraw.
After refueling, it will return to the western part of the INLAND SEA.
[9] The SHIRIYA will accompany the unit and act as the supply ship.
The Supply Force will accompany the main unit to the point there the enemy
will be contacted. After refueling the ships there, it will proceed immediately
to the regrouping point and wait for the rendezvous to be made arriving there
by 0800 hours on X-6 Day. While proceeding to the regrouping point the unit
will stay at least 800 nautical miles north of MIDWAY.
D. In the event that the operation is concelled while the Task Force is under
wav, the force will return immediately to HITOKAPPU-WAN, HOKKAIDO or
MUTSU-KAIWAN.
Task Force Ultrasecret Operation Order 3 (essentials).
Flagship AKAGI, HITOKAPPU-WAN
23 Nov 41
Nagumo, CHUICHI
Task Force Commander
Task Force Order
The plan for the air attack against HAWAII is as follows :
A. Movements of Air Attack Force.
At 0600 hours on X-1 Day the force will be 700 nautical miles bearing 0° from
Point Z (western tip of LANAI Island). Beginning at 0700 hours on X-1 Day
the force will increase its speed to 24 knots, following a 180° course.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 421
At 0130 hours on X-Day the First Attack will take off from a point 230
nautical miles bearing 0° from Point Z. At 0245 hours the Second Attack Unit
will take off from a point 200 nautical miles bejiring 0° from Point Z.
When all the airplanes of the Second Attack Unit have taken off, the force
will withdraw on a northerly course at approximately 24 knots.
It is estimated that the airplanes of the First Attack Unit will return between
0530 hours and 0600 hours and the airplanes of the Second Attack Unit between
0645 hours and 0715 hours.
When the units i-eturn preparations will be made immediately for the next
attack. Carrier attack planes will be armed with torpedoes.
If the land based air power has been completely knocked out, repeated attacks
will be made immediately in order to achieve maximum results. However, if a
powerful enemy force is in route to attack, subsequent attacks will be directed
against it.
B. Organization of air attack units.
As shown in Separate Tables.
C. Targets.
1. First attack unit.
[10] 2. 1 Group (SHUDAN)
(1) Not more than four battleships and four carriers.
(2) Order of selection.
First battleships, then carriers.
B. 2 Group will attack enemy land based air power as indicated below
(1) 15 Attack Unit
FORD Island — hangars and grounded airplanes.
(2) 16 Attack Unit
WHEELER Field — hangars and grounded airplanes.
(3) Fighter Striking Unit
Enemy airborne or grounded airplanes.
2. Second Attack Unit 2. Group will bomb enemy air bases as indicated
below.
(1) 5 Attack Unit
KANEOHE, FORD Island and BARBERS POINT— hangars and
Grounded planes.
(2)6 Attack Unit
HICKHAM Field — hangars and grounded airplanes.
b. 2 Group will have four or five aircraft carriers as its target. If there are
an insufficient number of carriers present, cruisers and battleships will be
attacked in that order.
c. Fighter Striking Unit
Enemy airborne or grounded airplanes.
D. Outline of attack procedure.
1. First Attack Unit.
2. Surprise will be the basis of the attack. 1 Group Torpedo Bombing Unit
will attack first ; 1 Group Horizontal Bombing Unit next, and 2 Group last.
b. The Fighter Striking Unit will, as a single formation at the beginning come
in over the target area at about the same time as 1 Group. Its main function will
be to eliminate opposition from enemy fighters.
If no opposition is encountered in the air, the unit will switch to the following
strafing assignments against grounded airplanes.
(1). 1 and 2 Fighter Striking Units
Ford and HICKHAM
(2). 3 and 4 Fighter Striking Units
WHEELER and BARBERS POINT
(3). 5 and 6 Fighter Striking Units
KANEOHE
C. In the event that the enemy has maintained strict lookouts and opposition
is strong, the units will attack in the following order, with only a slight time
interval between attacks.
(1) Fighter Striking Unit
(2) Ship Bombing Unit
(3) Horizontal Bombing Unit
(4) Torpedo Bombing Unit
2. Second Attack Unit.
The entire unit will attack at about the same time.
The Fighter Striking Unit will follow the outline of movements given for the
Fighter Striking Unit of the First Attack Unit. However, if no opposition is
422 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
encountered in the air, strafing will be carried out as follows : 2. 1 and 2 Fighter
Striking Units.
FORD AND HICKAM
b. 2 and 4 Fighter Striking Units.
WHEELER and KANEOHE
[11] 3. Outline for attack in case most of the carriers and battleships are
anchored outside of PEARL HARBOR.
2. The organization, targets, etc will be the same as that set forth in the
previous section. However, 1 Group of the First attack Unit will increase its
use of torpedo planes.
b. Each air attack unit will first hit the fieet and then OAHU, maintaining
its formation as a single group and striking under Air cover of the Fightei
Striking units.
However, if the attacks against the fleet anchorage proceed smoothly, the
forces which didn't participate in those attacks will move on immediately to
OAHU, while the units which participated will return to their ships.
4. Regrouping and returning :
a. The regrouping point following the attack will be 20 nautical miles bearing
340" from the western tip (KAENA POINT) of OAHU. The airplanes will
rendezvous at an altitude of 1,000m (if clouds are present at about that altitude
the rendezvous will be made below them).
b. The attack units will wait at the regrouping points for about 30 minutes.
After making the rendezvous with the fighter striking units they will return to
their ships.
c. The fighter striking units will cover the return of the main attack uniti^
and intercept any enemy pursuit.
E. Reconnaissance:
1. Reconnaissance before the attack.
No special reconnaissance will be made.
2. Reconnaissance just before the attack.
The two reconnaissance seaplanes of Cru Div 8 (DAIHACHI SENTAI
will be launched at 0030 hours on X-day. Without being detected they will
reconnoiter the PEARL HARBOR and CAHAINA anchorages, and report
whether or not the enemy fleet (particularly carriers and battleships) is at
these anchorages.
3. Scouting and search.
The reconnaissance seaplanes of Cru Div 8 (DAIHACHI SENTAI) will
be launched about 0300. They will search over as wide an area as possible,
between the Task Force and the enemy and along the channels on the east
and west sides of OAHU. They will report the presence of enemy surface
force moving out to attack and its movements, the presence of counter-at-
tacking enemy airplanes and their movements, etc.
4. Following the attack, if conditions permit, one element of the fighter planes
(will be designated by the commanding officer of the fighter units) veill conduct
a highspeed, low altitude reconnaissance of the damage done to ships and air^
planes.
F. Air Patrol :
From 1 hour before sunrise until ^f» minutes after sunset on the day of attack,
Air Patrol Readiness Disposition 1, Plan B will be used.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
423
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424 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 8-C
geneikal headquartek8
Supreme Commandeb for the Alued Powers
AG 350.05 (4 Dec 45) GB 4 December 1945.
Subject :Additional Data With Reference To Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attention Assistants
Chief of Staff, G-2)
1. Reference previous correspondence same file number and subject and in
further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec, 7 October 1945, and
WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from
the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941,
an additional partial report is forwarded herewith.
2. This report contains data in amplification of the original Japanese answer
to question 14 of our questionnaire of 17 October 1945. A copy of this ques-
tionnaire was forwarded as Inclosure No. 4 to our communication of 26 October
1945, and the original Japanese answer to question 14 thereof was included in
inclosure to our communication of 8 November 1945.
3. This report completes the series of partial reports obtained through the
Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army and Navy .which series col-
lectively provide all data available from known apanese sources on subjects listed
in your radio WX 73711, War Sec, 7 October 1915. However, should additional
data come to light incident to future investigations of Japanese conduct of the
war, same will be promptly forwarded.
For the Supreme Commander:
/S/ E. D. Law, Jr.
E. D. Law, Jr.
Major, AOD,
Asst. Adj. Oen.
1 Incl : Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.
[i] 3543 B
N. D. 406
general headquarters '
Supreme Commander Fob the Allied Powehjs
ALLIED translator AND INTERPRETER SECTION
Note: Translation requested by Colonel MUNSON, G-2.
' 17 November 1945.
To : Colonel F. P. MUNSON
From : Rear Admiral NAKAMURA
Answers with reference to a letter to Rear Admiral Nakamura from Colonel
Munson dated 10 November 1945
1. In the report sent by the HONOLULU consul-general to the Foreign Min-
istry, anything concerning the Navy was reported to the Intelligence Section of
the Naval General Staff by that Ministry. These reports, it is recollected, were
gradually increased in number as the relations between AMERICA and JAPAN
became more tense.
The above reports by the consul-general were chiefly items concerning the
general political and economic situation in HAWAII and the UNITED STATES
as seen from HAWAII, items concerning the Japanese living in the HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS, and partly items concerning military matters. Thus, although there
were things going on in HAWAII, as was reported at that time such as concen-
tration of American fleet units in the PEARL HARBOR area and the consider-
able hastening of expansion of military installations in the HAWAIIAN area,
to which great attention was attracted as compared with reports by diplomatic
establishments located in other areas, it is recalled that there was nothing which
required special surveillance as far as the data for an attack on the UNITED
STATES fleet in HAWAII were concerned.
(Since the staff officer connected with the documents reporting the above facts
has died and the various records have been burned, the foregoing is the con-
jecture of commander TACHIBANA, Tomo who worked in the same department
at that time.)
The Intelligence Section of the Naval General Staff was having a most [2]
difficult time judging the habits, strength, and security situations of the Amerl-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 425
can fleet in the HAWAIIAN area. Owing to this, the Intelligence Section of
the Naval General Staff had been for years compiling material by carefully col-
lecting, making into statistics, and analyzing bits of information obtained from
Naval oflBcers at WASHINGTON, newspapers and magazines published in
AMERICA, American radio broadcasts, signal intelligence, passengers and crews
of ships stopping over at HONOLULU, other foreign diplomatic establishments,
commercial firms, and the like.
The foregoing statistical method of estimation had been in use for a consider-
able length of time. Publications with information on important moorings within
PEARL HARBOR had already been compiled.
Furthermore, if we were to go into the facts mentioned above more minutely,
and if two or three examples which made a relatively strong impression were
given, they would appear as follows :
A. American radio broadcasts 5 December 1941 (or 6 December 1941) (Amer-
ican time).
The UNITED STATES broadcast of the number of battleships, cruisers, de-
stroyers, and others entering (or anchored) in PEARL HARBOR was overheard.
B. Signal intelligence.
According to the signals of the American ships, the number of ships and
small craft of the UNITED STATES fleet anchored in PEARL HARBOR or out
on training was deduced. Again by combining the flying time (judged according
to signal situations) of airplanes shuttling between bases and aircraft carriers
out on training missions, and the location of UNITED STATES fleet units as
seen by passengers and crews of ships stopping over at HONOLULU, the train-
ing areas of the UNITED STATES fleet were determined. The zone, time, etc.,
of airplane patrols at HAWAII were deduced in the same way.
C. Newspapers and magazines published in the UNITED STATES
Material was obtained for deduction of AMERICA'S war preparation, prog-
ress and expansion of military installations, location and capabilities of war-
ships and airplanes, army strength at HAWAII, PANAMA, PHILIPPINES and
other places, etc.
D. Observation submarines
With an observation submarine operating at a lessening distance outside the
Islands, the sphere of observation of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS was gradually
made smaller ( It reached outside of PEARL HARBOR on 6 December — American
time). Thus, the ships out at sea, ships at LAHAINA, the airplane patrols, etc.,
were ascertained.
The above submarine, while out at sea, did not discover an American fleet
at sea or at LAHAINA, but met aircraft carriers and patrol planes.
II. The gist of ". . . and other general intelligence" contained in the last
items of the answer with reference to question No. 14, dated 17 October, was
the reports for foreign diplomatic establishments, commercial firms in [3]
foreign countries, etc., to the Foreign Ministry, the main store of the commer-
cial firm, etc., chiefly on the general political and economic situation (some mil-
itary matters included) of the country where the establishment or flrm was lo-
cated. These reports were not important enough from the standpoint of intelli-
gence to have a special write-up, and were considered on their own merits.
EXHIBIT NO. 8-D
general hel4.dquabtebs
Supreme Commander fob the Allied Powebs
AG 350.05 (13 Dec 45)BG 13 December 1945.
Subject : Additional Data With Reference To Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor
To : Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
(Attention : A. C. of S., G-2.)
1. Reference Par 3 of our communication, same file number and subject dated
4 December 1945, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War
Sec., 7 October 1945 and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain infor-
mation to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl
426 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Harbor on 7 Deceinber 1941, copies of three (3) interrogations of Japanese Navy
and Civil Officers are forwarded lierewlth.
2. These interrogations, obtained by Naval sources, are believed to provide
further amplification of data previously forwarded.
For the Supreme Commander :
/s/ E. D. Law, Jr.,
E. D. Law, Jr.
Major, AOD, Asst. Adj. Oen.
3 Incls:
Incl 1 — Interrogation Capt. Genda.
Incl 2 — Interrogation Mr. Kase.
Incl 3 — Interrogation Mr. Tanomogi.
[i]
[Copy]
Naval Technical Mission
Date : 28 Nov. 1945. Place : FLTLOSCAP
Interrogation No. 10
Subject : Pearl Harbor Attack.
Personnel Interrogated : Captain Minoru Genda ; Air Operations officer on staff
of Admiral Nagumo during attack on Pearl Harbor. He was with Admiral
Nagumo aboard his Flagship Akagi. Captain Genda was given the respon-
sibility of planning the attack.
Interrogators: Captain Robinson and Captain Payton Harrison, USNR.
Interpretor : Douglas Wada.
Summary :
The idea of the surprise attack originated with Admiral Yamamoto during a
conversation with Admiral Omishi of the 11th Carrier Division about February 1,
1941. Captain Genda was present at this meeting and remembers Yamamoto
saying, "If we have war with the United States we will have no hope of winning
unless the U. S. Fleet in Hawaiian waters can be destroyed." After some further
discussion Yamamoto directed Onlshi to draw up a plan for a surprise attack.
Captain Genda was later called in by Onishi to draw up broad outlines for such
a plan and determine its feasibility and possibility of success.
About September 1st map games were begun at the War College in Tokyo, to
test the plan on the game board and work out all details connected therewith.
The following Naval officers were the only ones who had knowledge of the plan
and who worked on it at the War College at this time ; Admirals Yamamoto,
Ugiki, Naguno, Yamagushi, Okusaka ; Captains Onishi, Genda, Kuroshima ; Com-
manders Sasaki, Ono ; following members of the Navy General staff : Admiral
Fukudome, Captains Sanagl and Tonioka, Commander Miyo.
On about November 15th Admiral Yamamoto finally approved the plan and gave
it to Admiral Naguno with orders covering the manner of its final execution. On
November 22nd the striking force rendezvoused at Etorofu and departed on its
mission at 0600 hours Nov 26th. A speed of from 12 to 14 knots was maintained
and the Task Force fueled at sea whenever the weather permitted, in order to
keep full tanks. The weather was stormy and refueling difficult. It was, how-
ever, because of the weather conditions prevailing in this part of the Pacific at
this time of year that the northern route was chosen. They didn't expect to meet
any shipping, and fog and stormy weather would impair visibility conditions,
anyway. Twice after departure information was received from Naval General
Headquarters in Tokyo giving the dispositions of the U. S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor.
The second despatch on this subject was received three days before the attack, or
December nth.
[2] The green light to execute the attack was sent by Admiral Yamamoto
from his Flagship the Yamato on December 2nd. The message was "NIITA
KAYAMA NOBORE" and menas climb mount NIITAKA. This was the code
phrase meaning "proceed with attack". There was an additional part to the mes-
sage specifying X-Day as December 8th at the time this message was received,
the striking force was near the 180th meridian at latitude 42.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 427
In the early morning of December 7th the Force was 700 miles north of Lanai,
at which time it turned south and commenced the dash in at a speed of 26 knots.
The following was the composition of the striking force :
6 Carriers with Akagi Flagship of Admiral Naguno.
2 Battleships; Hiei and Kiroshima.
2 Heavy Cruisers ; Tone and Chikuma.
9 Destroyers with light cruiser Abukuma as flagship.
3 Submarines ; 1-19, 1-21, and 1-23.
Following is the number and type of planes used in the attack :
Fighters 81
Dive bombers 145
Horizontal bombers .' 104
Torpedo planes 40
Total 370
Of the fighters, 39 were kept around the Carriers as intercepters, in case the
U. S. planes got in the air and made an attack. They went out in two waves
about one half hour apart. At time of launching position of striking force was
about 200 miles north of western tip of Lanai.
Several planes were sent early which got over Pearl about daylight and reported
that the Fleet was in.
Surprise was expected, but if the U. S. Forces were on the alert and the attacked
discovered, all attacking planes were to drive home the attack regardless.
A very close watch was kept on Hawaiian broadcasts by Commander Ono, Staff
Communication officer. Admiral Naguno and his staff felt that they could sense
from these broadcasts whether or not the Forces on Oahu had an inkling of the
impending attack. They felt they could judge the tenseness of the situation by
these broadcasts. Since KGU and KGMB were going along in their normal
manner, Nagumo felt that our forces were still oblivious to developments.
For several days prior to the attack the Jap Force had been intercepting mes-
sages from our patrol planes. They had not broken the code, but they had been
able to plot in their positions with radio bearings and knew the number of our
patrol planes in the air at all times and that they were patrolling entirely in the
south western sector from Oahu.
[3] The three submarines were placed in a line 100 miles ahead of the
carriers for the final dash southward. Surface speed of these submarines was 23
knots. If they sighted any planes or shipping they were to submerge, get clear
and radio the striking force as soon as it was safe to surface.
Everything went off according to plan. Total Japanese losses were 29 planes.
[1] (Incl 2)
[Copy]
Naval Technical Mission
Interrogation No. 9.
Subject : Information received by Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Japanese
Consul General in Honolulu.
Personnel Interrogated : Mr. Toshikazu Kase, in charge of North American Sec-
tion of Foreign Office at time of attack on Pearl Har-
bor. Undergrad work Amherst ; graduate study at
Harvard in international law, and relations 1928.
Member of Foreign Office since late 1940. Became
Chief of Section 1 (dealing with North America, i. e.
U. S. and Canada) in October 1941. Held this post
for about a year.
Where Interrogated : Office of the Fleet Liaison Officer with the Supreme Com-
mander for the Allied Powers.
Interrogator: Captain Peyton HARRISON, USNR.
Interpreter : Lt. ( jg) S. E. SPRAGUE.
Summary :
Mr. Kase stated that he was personnally acquainted with Mr. Kita, former
Consul-General in Hawaii. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor Mr. Kita sent
428 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
messages to the foreign oflBce every few days informing it of the presence of
units of the U. S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor. Although the Foreign Office receive*?
these wires, they paid little attention to them. Instead, they passed them right
along to the Navy Ministry. Mr. Kase believes that all these despatches have
been destroyed. At the time of receipt these despatches were not considered of
any significance by the foreign office, but were considered just a matter of routine.
However, "in the light of after events", Mr. Kase "can look back and see that
Kita's telegrams had some significance". The foreign office was very busy with
its negotiations with accredited representatives in Washington, and matters
concerning the whereabouts and activities of the U. S. Fleet were not a matter
of interest. Mr. Kase was busy sending despatches to Nomura and Kurusu and
trying to improve the tense situation. The Navy department was not cognizant
of these messages being sent to the foreign office representatives in Washington.
The foreign ministry deliberately kept things from the Navy Department and
vice versa. "Every Ministry had its own secrets". Mr. Kase had no recollec-
tion of the presence of a certain Mr. Morimura who arrived at the Consul-General
Office Honolulu, in the spring of 1941. Mr. Kase "could not speak with authority"
on the question as to whether or not Mr. Morimura could have been sent by the
war or Navy Departments with special and secret instructions to Consul-General
Rita.
[2] Q. What instructions were given Mr. Kita, Japanese consul at
Honolulu, regarding transmission of information about U. S. fleet or military
installations in Hawaii?
A. I don't recall any specific instructions he had. He may have had general
Instructions to be followed in case of disturbances because of the presence in
Hawaii of many "hyphenated" citizens. After I became Chief of Section in
October 1941 I don't recall any specific instructions being given him.
Q. We know that Kita sent messages to Japan before the outbreak of war
concerning the U. S. Fleet. To whom wei-e messages sent? Did you see them?
A. They came through the Foreign Office and I saw them, perhaps without
knowing their significance. As far as I am aware, the Foreign Office gave him
no specific instructions about sending such information. He made reports as a
routine matter. Messages were addressed to the Foreign Minister.
Q. Those messages sent about the whereabouts of the U. S. Fleet; are any
copies of these messages now in the Foreign Office?
A. No, I don't think so. When I left my section, I take it for granted my
section had these telegrams. There were two successors to me since I left
my office. Department buildings were destroyed in May. I doubt if copies of
messages are there.
Q. Did Kita state every two or three days what ships were in Pearl Harbor?
A. I remember there were a few telegrams of that sort. I would put them
aside. We were more interested in the course of negotiations. At that time
we were intensely absorbed in negotiations proper between Tokyo and Washing-
ton. Such affairs as Kita's telegrams did not get much of our attention.
Q. Who was most interested in these telegrams?
A. I suppose the Navy Minister.
Q. Who would know whether such telegrams are available?
A. The chances are they have all been destroyed, don't you think so? Very
short telegrams, usually, not even occupying a full page. These telegrams, were
not considered important at all from our point of view. Very likely they have
been burned. The Foreign Office served as a channel — we just had a look at
them. We thought they were just matters of routine. In the light of after-
events, I can look back and see that Kita's telegrams had some significance,
But we did not know at the time.
Q. Do you recall any trouble Kudo got into involving shipment of scrap iron?
A. No. I don't recall him.
Q. Interrogator recounted I'aflfaire Kudo and its expose in newspai)ers.
A. Rather crude practice, wasn't it? I don't like to impugn his honor, but I
don't think Mr. Kudo is one of our career men. I don't think that was done
with knowledge of the Foreign Office.
Q. Boxes were addressed to Foreign Office in Tokyo.
A. Oh?
Q. Can you find out where Mr. Kudo is?
A. We can find out for you. I shall have his whereabouts found out.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 429
[3] Q. You say you were absorbed in negotiations at the time. You were
sending despatches to Nomura?
A. Yes, we were primarily interested in that. I was engaged in clerical work
of the negotiations.
Q. Did Navy Ministry have knowledge of these despatches?
A. No, I don't think so. Some were kept secret from Navy Department.
Every ministry has its own official secrets. The majority of telegrams were not
given to the fighting services. They were not in a position to request that just as
we were not in a position to request their despatches. The gist of negotiations
and their progress were sometimes discussed at joint conferences.
Q. We know Kita was sending telegrams. Who would have given him such
instruction?
A. I don't know who would have given him such instructions.
Q. Couldn't someone in Navy Department have given him instructions with-
out your knowing it? Wouldn't that have been possible?
A. (Hesitation.) It might have been possible. But not through Foreign
Office by telegram. Every telegram to Kita had to pass through Foreign Office
and be approved. I don't recall any specific instructions transmitted to Kita
through Foreign Office.
Q. In the spring of 1941, Mr. Morimura arrived in Honolulu to assist Mr. Kita.
Do you know Mr. Morimura?
A. I was not aware of his existence. I became Chief of Section in October
1941 and was deeply absorbed in the Tokyo-Washington negotiations. I really
did not have time to learn about minor officials in all the consulates.
Q. Well, who would know of his existence and his work? Whose place did
you take?
A. Mr. Yuki, who accompanied Mr. Kurusu to Washington. I don't know
exactly how long he was there before me. He is now councillor of embassy at
Bangkok.
(At some point about here, interrogator described Morimura's activities.)
Q. Would it have been possible for the Navy Department to send Mr. Morimura
to Honolulu?
A. I don't know. I can't speak with any authority. That was before my time.
Q. Who was Foreign Minister and Vice-Minister?
A. Togo was Foreign Minister and Nishi was Vice-Minister. They assumed
office in October 1941.
Q. Would it have been possible for Morimura to have had instructions from
Navy Department to give to Kita?
A. I'm not qualified to answer that question. I don't know anything about
this affair. I can't even say whether it was possible.
Foreign Minister — Togo
Vice Foreign Minister — Nishi
Director American Affairs
(Yamamoto)
Section 1 Section 2 Section 3
(North America) (So. America) (Passports, etc. )
430 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SOURCE DOCUMENTS USED BY NAVY IN COMPILING THE "NAVY
SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR"
Page
1. Japanese Combined Fleet Top Secret Operating Order #1 431
2. Japanese Combined Fleet Top Secret Operating Order #2 485
3. Japanese Submarine Operations (Pearl Harbor Attack) 487
4. NaA'y study "Time Table of Japanese Submarine Operations" 493
5. Translations of Captured Japanese Documents "Japanese Submarine
School Notes Concerning Early War Experience off Hawaii" 497
6. Translation of Captured Japanese Document "Patrol Operations of
Japanese Submarine 1-69 off Pearl Harbor" 503
7. Translation of Captured Japanese Document "The Southern Cross by
Kuramotl, Iki" 512
8. Translation of Captured Japanese Documents (a) "Japanese Sub-
marine School Notes Concerning Early War Experiences off Hawaii",
(b) "Japanese Instructions to Yatsumakl Butai", (c) "Japanese
Places of Military Importance in the Kurlle Islands" „ 525
9. Translation of Captured Japanese Document "Professional Notebook
of an Ensign in the Japanese Navy" 538
10. Interrogation of Japanese Prisoners of War Captured from the Japanese
Submarine I-l which participated in Attack on Pearl Harbor 613
11. Interrogation of Japanese Prisoners of War who participated in at-
tack on Pearl Harbor as member of crew of the (CV) Kaga 619
12. Navy Department Study of Japanese Espionage in Hawaiian Islands
"Pre-War Espionage in the Hawaiian Islands, Report on Pre-War
Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing Coded Information for
the Japanese Fleet" 627
13. Navy Department Study "Sorties by Enemy Sub-Carried Planes and
Sub-Carrier Identification" 649
14. Japanese Battle Lessons on Supply in the Greater East Asia War Sup-
ply Battle Lesson No. 1 (Translation) 653
15. Parallel translation of Source Document 14, supra 667
16. U. S. Navy Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, Volume 1, No. 22, 8 Decem-
ber 1944 704
17. Photostatic copy of original Japanese document captured on Saipan
consisting of notes on fueling at sea of Pearl Harbor Striking Force_ 767
18. Original Japanese document captured by U. S. Navy at Manila, the same
being the original material for the translations appearing in Source
Documents Nos. 1 and 2, supra . 832
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 431
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON
SOURCE DOCUIOENT #1
"JAPANESE COMBINED FLEET TOP SECRET OPERATION ORDER #1«
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"aAVY SUMMARY OP THE JAPANESE PLA^' ,TOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of^ Proceedinge, pages 433-460),
(EXTENDED A8 A PART OP EXHIBIT #3
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)
segr:
'T
PkM
7^'
COiOilNFD FLoJJ .OP oBCKE. OPii.ATIo.^ ohLDv 1
riagBhip .UCATO, ^3^1 bAI 5 Not 41
lAMAMUTQ, iBoroku
Cominnnder In Chief
Coabined Fleet
L45 of 700 eoplee
OOieilB) TLSS ORDBl
Cfablnad ri««t Openitiong in the •.'■ar Agrxlnet tne U-q. a. STATK^.
QREAT BhITAlH aiki the KEriigcLAND^ will be conducted in accoruance
with the Separate Voluae.
79716 O— 46 — pt. 13-
432 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Coabinsu Flaat Top 8*or«t Op«r«tioB Order 1
Sap*r*t« Volua*
f»4* Co3it)ln«cl fla>t Qparatlona In th» War Agaimt th>
2/2 OtltaJ STAIES. GRUT BRITUH and th. ■ETtgRLAJna
COITEVrS
I. Oparationa of th* Combined ri«*t La Cat* Var with th« DRRED STATES,
CaSAT EHIATUI aad th* lETllKRLAIDS Bagin* during tb* China Oporations.
A. Outllna of opara lions
B. Praparationa for var and tha otttbraak of war
1. Praparationa for tha oatbraak of «&r
2. Tha oatbraak of var aad tha uaa of araa th«rat«for*
Pag* C. Pirat Phaaa (DAI ICHI DAM) Oparations
2/3
1. Operation policy
2. Outline of operationa againat A (Tl Aaerioan.) Pleet
3. OutliDa of Southern Area operationa
4. Operation periods
5. Allocation of foroea
D. Seoond Phaae (DAI MI DAI) Operationa
1. Operation polioy
2. laportant polnta enleh auat be defended and adTanee taaaea
in occupied territory
3. Areaa expeotaa to be occupied or deatro/ed
Page 4. Allocation of foroea
2/4
£. Protection of our aea traffic, deatruotioa at enaajr sea traffic,
aad mine earfare
1. Operationa to protect aea traffic
2. Operationa to deatroy aea traffio
3. Mine warfare
P. Co— inJoationa
G. Supfily
U. Operationa other than thoae of the Conbiaed fleet
1. Operationa of forcea at naral atationa and auxili&ry
naval atationa
Page 2. Operationa of tne CHIIA Area Pleet
V5
I. Joint Ani7-lav7 Agresnent (Separate Voluae) (Tl Miaaing.)
II. Operatioaa of the Coaoinad fleet in Caae ffar with RUSSIA Bagina
during tha lar with the OVITSD STATES, GRXAT BFUTAU, the IKTUEaUIDS
aad CmiA
A. Operation policy
B. Allooation of foroea
- 1 -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 433
SECRET
C. Op«r«tlonJ otter tbui thoM of tb* CoabliMd n«*t
1. Op«r«tion« of foroea at Bkral atMtiona and auxUlAry
n*Tml atatlons
2. Op«ratloa« of tba CUIIA Ira* riaat
III. MiaoallajMoaa Ragulatloas
Pa£«
2/6 A. TlM to ba Oaad
B. Cbarta to ba Oaad
C. Idaatlflcatlon of friandljr and •umy forcaa
Paga I. COMBIKO fUXS OPEiaXIOliS !■ CASi: lAii WITH TU£ OIITED STATES,
2/7 GR£AT BRITUI lUD THE HETUfRIOliOS B£GIJIS DURIXG TU£ CUIIU OPERATIOliiS
A. Outllna of Oparatlona
1. In tha aaat tha ABarican 7i»at aiU ba daatro/ad and
Aaarlcan llnaa of oparatlon and auppljr linaa to tba ORLEMT will b« cut.
2. In tha aaat Brltlah MALAZA wUl ba oocuplad and Brltiab
llnaa of operation ana aupply Unas to tha OtUOiT, aa well as tha
BURMA Road, will ba cut.
3. Eoaa/ forcaa in tba ORIEHT vill b« daatroyed, baaea of
oparatlona vlll b« aelsaa, and araaa with natural raaourcaa ■111 ba
oocupiaa.
4. Strategic arsaa aill be aelsad and dereloped] defenaea
alU be atren^tbanad in order to aatabllab a durable baala for
oparatlona.
Page 5. Eneay forcaa vill be intercepted and annihilated.
2/8
6. Victoriea vill ba exploited to break tba enaa/ alll to
fight.
B. Preparations for War and the OutbreoJt of War
1. Preparationa for the outbreak of *ar
a. The eapire la expecting var to break out with the
UHITED STATES, GRZAT BRITAIN and the NeTTUERLANDS. When the deciaion
la Bade to complete over-all preparationa for oparatlona, ordara will
be lasued eatabliahing tba approxiaate data (X Daj) for oooaancaaant
of operationa and announcing "Pirat Preparations for lar* . Tha
Tarioua forcea will act aa followai
(1) All fleeta and forcea, without apecial ordera.
Page alll organiie and coaplete battle preparationa in accordance «ith tha
2/9 allocation of forcea for Firat Period (OAI lUI) Oparatlona of Plrat
Pbaae (DAI ICHI DAN) Operationa. When directed by tba coaaandlng
officera of the varloua forces, they rill proceea at the proper tine to
the pre-operat,lon renaatvoua and wait in readineaa.
(2) All forces will be on atrict lookout for un-
expected attacks oy the American, British and letberlanda forces.
- 2 -
434 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
(3) The coaoikriala,- officer* of Lbe vkrioua foreea
nay carry out, such ifcret raconnaliaance aa la •apeclAll/ Baceaa«r]r
to tha oparatlon.
(4) Purau&r.t to defenae plana, 4th fleat will bSf^a
Mining tlia lAUPO GUNT?.
b. JItien the advance I'orcoa necaaaar/ for c«rryln(; oat
Paj^e the operation have bean dlapatcbua lo the area of operatlona, tba
ii/lO order 'Seoond PreparatiotiB for War" will oe laaueu, and each force
•ill act iB aocordanco with the foUoaingi
(1) Subaarlne forcaa attached bo the Advance
Expeditionary Porce (S£lllii3l iftllil), Striking Force, Coaaerce Leatructloi
Dnit, Sout^iarn Area Porce and Soutn Seaa Force, on oriera fros tha
coBaanuir.i^ offlcera of the varloua forcaa, aill prooeed at tha proper
tiae to the area of opera tlona.
(2) Reaalnin^ forcaa, on ordera froa the oeaaandlng
offloera of the varloua foroea, •ill proceed ao aa to be In poaltion
for tha outbreak, of war.
c. After the required preparation* for war have been
■ade, if tha aituation changes ai^ificantly, apecified foreea May
be returned froB 'Second Preparaticna for Var* to 'Firat Praparatlona
for War".
Pag* 2. Tba outbreak of war and tha uae of araa there tof or*
2/U
a. The tlM for tba outbreak of war (X Day) will ba
given in an laperlal Csnaral Heaaquartera order. The order will be
given aeveral uaya in advance. After OOOO houra, X Day, a atata
of war will exlat. Each force will coaaanoe operationa aooordin^' to
plas.
b. If a aerioua anaay attack la raoaivad before X Day, tba
following aaaaures will be takent
(1) Foreea which are attacked will counterattack
laaediateiy. Before the X Day orJera are iaauej, connterattacka
b/ baaa air foreea will aepend on laperlal General Beadquartera
Oraara.
Paga (2) After the X Day oraar la iaaaad, all
2/12 forces will enter into a atate of war and be^dn operationa without
waiting for special oraera.
(3) Prior to iha lasuance of the X Day order, tha
outbreak of war aill dapei.J on laperlal General Headquarters ordera.
c. After 'Second Preparations for War* has been ordered,
■ilitary force B«y be uaad In unavoidable oaaes aueh aa the followingi
(1) If AB6rlcan, British or Idtherlanaa ahipa or
airplanes approach ihu /icinity of oar territorial waters ami such
action aeeaa to create a danger.
(2) If our forces, wtille on the aove outside our
territorial waters, are Involvea in poaltive actlona which appaar t«
endanger thea by forces of these countries.
3 -
_,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 435
%
SECRET
t. VlMt Mm* (mi tfB Ml)
1. OyanUMfalUr
(n "^tt yiMt" la »«MU.)t tiriklM VVrM (Tfl 'l*t Air FlMt* la Uw
y«iwU.)» •mU Smj Fctm (n "ith riMi* U taw pn«U.)* lOTttera
rww (n ■5th riMt' la latUUbl* pM«U.) «ad Ikia Bodj (Tl ■C—M—i
riMt' la Hw yMoU.) •Ul •ftnU •«tljwt itaa AanrlMa flMt.
(n Pn>tlm of pa«* out o«t and 'AdruM Ixpwdltleauy
For** (sum BOIAI) ....* and ■StrUctac Fotm ...." laMrt*d In bLa*
p«aoU. Aloag with 'South 8«a« roroo" tb»r aro provuMblj- aabJooU of
tho foUovlng a*Dt«ao«.) Th« South Sms For** will oeoupr and doatror
lapertAot aro&a la tb« Tlclalt/ »nd wlU bo roadjr for tho cao^r floot
la thoAOSTRAUA Aroo. Tho lorthora Aroa Foroo olU bo roaponalbU for
Fo«o potrola o«aiaat 80VUT RUSSU.
b. Whllo wilatoinlag loool aaporlority, tho Soutbora
Aroo Foroo (TI "aBd floet, 3rd Floot, Southern Sxpoditlonary FlooU oad
Utb Air Floot* la ladollblo pondl.) oUl onalblXoU onoaF fX**t8 U
tho FHUOPPIIZS, BrlUoh HAiAIA aad lETUERLAIDS IMD1X3 Aroo. At ttaa
aoao tiaa It will oo-oporoto with tho krmj *• followai
(1) Tbo oporoUona o«olaat Brltiah HALATA and tho
FBZLIPPIHES vill bo cowMaood alaultoneouolj, and tho onoay air foreoa
aad flooU la thooe aroaa will bo ropoatodly batUrod bjr air attaeka.
Ara/ adraneo •xpocUtionary groupa (Sn&£N HIIDAI) will bo laadod la
atratogic aroaa of HALAU, tho PUlLIPPDiSS and Brltiah BOfUDD a«
qulckl/ aa poaaibla. Air Forooa will bo aont to rolnforoo air
eporatlooa.
FafO (2) Tbo roaulta of tbo oporatlona will bo ozploltod,
2/15 *ad tho aaia bod/ of Aray Invaaion groupa (H&IOAI) will bo Uodod la
tba PHILIPPIIES and tban MaLAIA la ordor to oeeupy thoir roapoctiro
aroaa qulokl/.
(3) During tho oarly atagoa of tbo oporatlona tto
atratogic aroaa of tto CO^EBES, DUrCH BORIB) aad Southona SOMATRA
will bo occuplod la tbo oraor naaoj. Tho atratagio aroaa of
HOLDCCAS and TIMOR alao will bo occuplod. locoaaair air baaoa will bo
proparod la tbasa aroaa.
(^) Aa tboaa air baaoa ar« eoaplatod, air foreoa
gradual!/ will be aant forward, ana onaa/ air atrengtb in tbo JAVA
Pago Aroa will bo cruahad. N-.on thla la accoapliahod, the aain oody of
2/16 tho Aray loTaalon group (KUDAI) will b« landed la JA7A to occupy It.
(S) After the fall of SXNOAPORK tba atratogic aroaa
of northern SUUAIRA will be occuplea. Oporatlona ag&inat SUPJIA will
bo carried out at tho appropriate tiae to cut off i.he enoay supply
route to CUIIA.
c. If the Aaerlcac fleet attacka, 3rd Fleet and Southera
Expodltio:hry Fleet alll carry out Southern Area oporatlona tsaporarily.
The UiJi of coabat atrangth will neat tba attack.
d. Aa eloaent (TB *2^S*** written in blue pencil.) of
the Cofflbined Fleet will deatroy enoay aoa traffic in the PACIFIC aad
IBJIAB Ocean Aroaa.
e. In orier not to arouae the hoatllity of THAIliAMO
Page and FRUiCH INDO-CiilNA, every effort ■ill be aaae U) aecur? their
2/17 voluntary co-operation. But in the event of hoatllity, obatructiona
to o\ir oporatlona will be eliainated by force.
- 4 -
436 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
8ECBET
a. OtrtiiB* 9t
Urn* M*ia«^ tte iMirl ■■■ t%mi
•pwrAtieM ar« Mt*hli«ted im %te r«llMlB( tata*. 1Mb fvM wiU
•p«r«t« la a««ardaao« with tb* •l*a«lfi«»tloB af oparationa ladiaaivd.
2/18
SITQAnOI
cusamcATioi
or OPBATKHB
onun « oTBATion
At OatbTMk of
(n This portioa out
oat.)
■«r
At Outbraak of
■•thod 2 for opara-
1. Tba Adranea Sxpadltloaary
War (Sltuatloa
tlona a^iaat Aaari-
roroa (SDOCEB BOTAI) will |
coaplloatad bf
oan flaat
raoonaolter aad naka a sur-
ualn^ t«ak
prise attack on tba Aaarl-
foroa for
oan fleet.
attack)
If conditions warrant,
air bases at iCffLAND,
TtmjILA, rUl, etc., will be
attacked witb appropriate
foroas.
2. The Striking Faroe will pre-
pare for the Aaarican fleet.
In Case Aasri-
Method 3 for epara-
1. Tba Adrance Expeditionary
oan Flaat Op-
roroe (SEMKEH BOTAI), Strikixi«
era t«a
1
i
oaa flaat
Faroe, South Saas Foroe
and lortharn Area Force
will operate against tba
Aaarioan task foroe.
2. If naoessary, the Mala
Body will give support.
3. If conaitions warrant, aa
element of 11th Air Fleet mmj.
be teaporarily dlrertad to
the east.
In Caaa Aaerl-
Method 4 for opara-
1. The Advance Expeditionary
oan riaat Pro-
tlona against Aaari-
Force (SiJllZN BUTAI), Strik-
caods to At-
ean flaat
ing Force, South Seas Force,
1 t*ck.
Morthorn Area Force and
Main Body, deployed for
i
1
^
Interception, will operate
aeaiast tha Aaarican fleet. !
Tbe decisive battle strength
of Southern Area Force will
Join lma«Liiataly to aeet
the attack.
Southern Area operations
will oe continueu uy 3rd
Fleet, Southern Lxpeditionarx
Fleet ana fl.jhters of 11th
Air ri^et.
Page
^/19
3> Outline ol' Southern Area Operations
Southern Area Operations will be based on the operation
policy aad on the a^p'^'^nent oetween Cooaander In Chief, Cor.blned
Fle-it, and Coaiaoinuer In Ciiief, Southern Area Arjiy. Tne Soutbera
Area Force Comoanaer will uirect the operations unless otherwise
ordered.
- 5 -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 437
SECRET ^. Ope,
ailor. pt.-loas
rir:iL Pt^se (Liil ICHI bAI) Opera Lions will b« cUsslfl^
as follows. C:-ar,,;fca will ti« o/ special order.
a. Fli-st Porio'J (tAl IKii) 3,jfera-.l:)nst I .is period
will covtfi- oparAlionb froa. the jutorodk ol' war until the culId bodjr
of tno invasion ami/ hac been ianied in the PHILIPPISiS.
0. Secona Period (jAI M KI) Operational In general,
Pag* operations froB tne First Pc-riod (l/Al I.<KI} Operationa until the
2/20 BiiiD oo~iy of cnu invasion aray has Oee.i lanaud in British MAULIA.
c. liiiru P^rioo (^AI SAN KI) Oporatiao^i Operations
from tne end of tue Secor.d (uAI Ul HI) P'iri»^ Operations to tb»
completion of '-h^ occuputioi. of vne NirK.-..-UAI<L:3 &IS2 INIII^.
. 5* Allocation of forces
Allocation of forces -uring the First Phase (UAI ICHI
iikS) Operations «ill tw as follows.
a. Allocation of forces for first Period (DAI IKU)
Oparationa - Separata Taole 1
b. Allocation of forces for Second Period tOhl NI KI)
Operations - Separate Table 2
c. Allocation of forces for Third Period (DAI SAM KI)
Operations - Separate Table 3
J. Allocation of forces for intereeption eparatlona -
Separate Taole 4
Page D. Second Phase (UAI NI DAI) Operationa
2/21
1. Operation policy
a. The Advance Expeditionary Force (SLNK£N BUTAI) will
continue to Bale* recorjiaissance raids on the Aasrican and British
fleets, tnese fleets will be attack<$d by base air forces, earrlar
air forces, etc, at opportune) tines.
b. American and British lines of operation and supply
lines to the O-UICNT will be cut in ordor to strengthen the defenses
of strategic areas.
c. ^neay forces ini>the waters under our control and
raasants of tne eneay in occupied areas will z,e sopped up in order
to secure resources and protect sea traffic.
u. If the Aaerican and British fleets attack, they
Page will be aesLroyed inalvlaually by taking advantage of inner lines
2/22 of defense.
o. Operations to aestroy American and British sea
traffic will be intfinsifieci.
2. Important points which must be defended and advance
bmses in occupied territory
a. Important points in occupied territory which
must be defended are as lollowsi
MANIU, OAVAO, SIN^APOfll, BATAVIA, S0-HA3AJA,
TARAKAN, BALIKPAPAN , MtNADO, MAKASSAK, AMBOB, PENAMG, HABAUL.
(:■ DAVAO and MrXiDO emp^iaaix..^ by blue pencil circles.)
438 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
b. AdTSBM b»Ma la MsaflAd t«rrlt*iT *r« t^ttUi
W b* M e*lXam»t
Ho
2/23 3. Ar««a •i9*«t«d t« b« oe«ttpl«d or d*str«7«4
Th« toXlowiag »r» 4r«*a •sp«et«<l t« b* oo«Vpl*d or
dootrojrod «• (julokl/ «• op*raU.on*l eomUtlono pcraiti
a. Kaatara OR OUIMKA, ■£> BRITAII, fUl aAd 8AM0A
b. ALEUTI1I8 and MiOffAX
0. AIDAIUI lalanda
d. StraUKlc polnta in lb* AOSTRILIA iraa
4< Allooatlon of foroaa
Tha allooaUon of forcaa for Saeond rtm.»« (DAI MI DAN)
Operatlona la aatabliabod la Separata Tabla ).
Tba allocation of foroaa for lataroaptlon oparations
■ill ba based oo Separate Tabla ^.
- 7
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
439
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440 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
2. Operations to dcatro/ ■•& traffic
a. Pollojr
Pag* The Imnedlat* dastruotlon of vital points in tha
2/27 aaa traffic of tba UNITUJ STATES, CHEAT BRITAIN and tha lETHKAUiiDS,
ooablnad with a ohacklng of enaay foreea, will aid our principal
oparatloaa. Ra will andaavor to crush the enaa/ will to fltibt by
gradually Strang thaning our efforts ana by realising our alas over
a long period of time.
b. Outline for execution
(1) Seisure of enesgr stiips at tba outbreak of van
Enaay ships will be seised, provldaa that our principal operations are
not there 0/ Impaired. Close liaison will be oaintalned wltn laperial
Qeneral Headquarters ana with hoaeland coabat forces (NAISrlH BOTAI) .
Sectors of responslDllity for each unit. In observation and seisure
of oneay ships, will correspond in general to sectors of responslDllity
in 1, 'Operations to protect sea traffic*.
Page (2) Tha Coaaaree Destruction Dr.it, as prescribed
2/28 by Its coaaandlng officer and as opportvinitles arise in the South
Seas Area after the outbreak of war, willoperate between ClNPfUL
and SOUTH AMi:,;aCA anu AOSTfUUA. Depending on the situation on
the wast coast of SOUTH AM£RICA, one eleaent will proceed to tha
INblAN Ocean Area and will operate between ADSTRALIA and AFRICA.
(3) According to the progress of operations and
to what is prescribed b/ the Advance HjcpeJitlonary Force (SENKUI
BQTAI) comsiinder, expeaitionar/ forces not exceeoing one subaarine
division will operate off the coasts of CENTRAL and NORTH AllIHICA
to the extent that tha principal operations are not thereby hindered.
Tha Hawaiian Area Force will endeavor to cut rear llnt.-s of supply
at every opportunity.
(4) One eleaent of DesRons 4, 5, 6, and 7 at tha
una of First Period (iiAI IKJtl) Operations of First Phase (DAI ICHI
Page DAM) Operations, will be assl^ed as directed oy Southern Force
2/29 Conusanaer to destruction of sea traffic off the south coast of
JAVA and at tne weatern entrance to the MALACCA Straits. When south-
ern First Ptiaae (jAI ICHI iiAl) Operations are coBpletea, they will
carry out a vigorous caapalgn of destruction of sea traffic in tba
INDIA! Ocean and AUSTtULU Areas.
(5) In tha pause after First Phase {bXl ICHI L-AM)
Operations or whan opportunities arise auring operations, forces
for destroylnf^ sea traffic will be strengthanea and will operata
vigorously with surface ships ana airplanes.
3. Uii.e warfare
Coxoine>^ Fleet mine warfare will oe directed by
Inaiviuual force comiL&n^ars, in a^aition to conformaru;*; with the
following I
Page
2/30 a. Southern area of operations
(1) StanJaru practices in offensive mine warfare -
Appended Table 1
(2) (Stinaara) Suojaary of oases to be protectea by
■ines Ana antisubaarine nets - Appei^ued Table 2
(3) SuBBur/ of mintr ana antisubnarine supplies -
Appenaea Tabla 3
- 9 -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 441
SECBtl
(4) Outline for •■t«bliahlnt; mina barrisra «t
bba mad of Flrat Phaae (UAX ICHI DAM) Oparationa - Appesdad Tabl* 4
b. South Seaa Araa
The 4th Flaet defanaa plan aill be follovad and
offanaivs Bine sarfare will be oarrlea on aa dlraotad by tha South
Saaa Foroe ConiBaDd«r.
Page c. Wlion adnaa are laid or swept, tha fort* comaandar
^/31 in each caaa *ill report positlona of aiicea, navigable aeotors, etc.,
to the proper authoritiaa.
d. Ueclarations conaamin,; tha laying of oinea
Declarationa will be iasued by Imperial General
HaadquArters, after being routed through Conbined Plaat Headquartara|
they vill be iaaueo chielly as a threat to tha anaay.
10 -
442 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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446 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
S55
F. ri,—niiitaatiOM
SECRET
Poller
Coablnad Pl*«t op«rmtloniLl iihimiiiiI 1 1 i arc b«a«l on
n— tlir>1.«« C"^nr^^al^^nM R«'m1.t1nn« and on th* £sla|,
fi^y»fcTT Lrrm,m,nt CnnrmmiTu, Cf^mi\U\^mn in Southara QpratloM.
Xa «ddltlao« th«7 vlll eonfora to the following prorialon*.
2. Dlaposltlona for coanoiioatloox
a. Dlspoaitiona at th« oatbr«ak of war
1^^ 9>ip« auteauria* and kirplan* ooaBonloations - Appended
Jt/lz faM« 1 (tea*) ooaBonloatlona - Appcndod Tabl* 2 (r«far to appended
•tert)
Tbaac dlapoaitioaa will b« obangnd In tha future
%e mtt tettla eoodltlona. Tha reapeetlTa foroa ooMandera will
•kaag* tba dlapoaitioaa for aobaarina and alrplaoa ooainnloatlona
u aaada arlaa.
b. Tiaaa for taking np aaslgnaanta at the. outbraak of
«ar aro aa foUowai
2/Z
2/a
OLASSZrZCAIIOl
TUX
RBUBKS
GoHnaioatloaa
out rii— iiloaUona
2i00 hra.
After 2^00 hra, Z-2 and until
apeolalljr dealgnated, 2nd China
Kspedltlonary fleet aad Hainan
0<MTd Dlatrlet will be in tha
■hip ooaBoalcatlona ayatea.
Ibip Coaaimioatloaa
ZkOO hra,
1-6
Mbaariaa Ci— 1111I-
•aUosa
Alrplaaa C«amnl-
•ationa
2400 hra,
X-3
ni— ■iiloationa for
ApMUlly I>oai«Mt«l
Hon—
By apeoial
ord era
lotMl
1. Tor foroaa whloh auat take ap thalr aaalgnaanta bafora the
tlaaa aet forth la thla table, the reapeotire force ooHaandera will
dotondJM the tlae and report it to the proper authorltlea.
2. la aoae oaaea, one eleaeat will take up Ita aaalgaaent at
a tlaa differing froa that of the reaalnder of the force.
3* CoiBnnloatlona prooodure
a. Broadoaatlng will be the principal aeaoB of ooHiunloa-
tlon wlthla an operational foroe. Aoknowledgaant will be required when
there la uaeertalnty ooncemlng reoeipt of the aeaaage or when oon-
fizaatloB la required beoaiue the aeaaage la eapeclally laportant.
b. lach foroe, at the dlreetlon of Ita ooaaandlng officer,
will ooae Into the ahort-range coasiinloatlona s/ataB of the neareat
eoiBranloatioaa unit (T8 Add *and Into Ita broadcast couninlcations
ajratea. '}i (In oaaea of apeoial neoeaalty. It will ooae Into the
long»raage ooaMunlcatlona ayatan. } CoBaunloatlona deallois with trana-
portatlon, aupply, peraonnel and other ooaounloationa not urgent froa
the atandpolnt of operations naually will ooae under thla
iSdltor'a Hotel Berlaed by 'Errata* Issued by Klag Seoretary,
Coaiblned Fleet as Cc«hlned n.at Too Secret Serial 1 Part 99.
dated 17 loT a, aboard the NAGATO, SAIZI WAN.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
447
ooHUQloatlona V'*tea. Tha Striking foroa, Conaaroa Oastructlon Dnlt
and otbar foreaa oparatlnx on apaolal ■laatona at (praat <ilat«ncaa,
•ban tha/ aat out fro* thair randaavoua, vlll cona under apaclally
daalgnatad ooaaunlcatlona a/ataaa cantarad around iha Tokyo CoBsuni-
oationa Unit (TtTTstT) .
Paga c. All coaaunlcatlona unlta vlll relay to tha proper
Z/lA authorltiaa oooaunlcallona of oparatlonal foreaa within their
raapaotlva araaa. Relay uaually vlll be by broadoaat, and
aoknovlad^senia will b« required vban conflnutlon of receipt la
aapaolally needed. Relays of aeaaagea claaalfled urgent or Idgher
vlll be broadcaat Imiiadlately, other laportant aeaaagea at tha
tiaaa Indicated in Paragraph d, below.
Page
2/46
COMMUNICATIONS UNIT
COMMUNICAIUNS TO B£ HinUr£D
Tokyo CoBHunioationa
Onlt
Coaaunloatlons of Striking Force, Conaerce
Deatruction Unit and other forcua under
specially deaignated ooaaunioationa
ayateas
Takao CoMiunicatlona
Unit
Coaa\inications of subaarina and airplanea
under SouUiern Force
3rd Conunloatlonc Unit
Coiaunioatlona of SubRon 5 and of airplanea
baaed in PALAU vitbin Southern Force
Slat CoMBinlcationa Unit
Cooaunlcationa of airplanes and subaarines
operating in tha SOUTH CUIiLA Sea Area
5th CoMBunioatloaa Unit
CoBmunlcations of subaarines and airplanea
under South Seas Force
6th Coaounlcatlona Unit
CoBBunicationa of Advance Zzpeditionary
Force (S£N££N BDTAI) aubaarlnea
lotai
Frequenciee to be uead in broadoaeta will be aa ahown in d. Whan
there la no danger of Interf erring with tha operational coBSunioatlona
of foreaa, frequencies of shlpa aay be uaed. i
79716 O — 46 — ^pt. 13-
448 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
■I
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 449
Pkg« •. ffh«n tha Main Body it in th« hoaal&nd area, tr«n«-
2/49 ■isaton froa th« flagahlp of Coaaaader in Chlaf, Coabinad Pl««t «1I1
control tb» tranaalaalon facllltlaa of th* Tokyo and Kura Coasuni-
oatlona Unita (TfTSU, KURKTStT) > or t,h« Tokyo Coaaunloationa Unit
(T^TSQ) will be asaignad tbia work.
f. Coaaunloationa outalda tha flaata
Except In oaaea of apaolal urgancy, ooaaunicatloaj
will ba affactau by aaana of tha ooaaunioatlona ayataa throu^^h tha
naaraat coaaunloationa unit.
Paga 4. Safaguardin^ ooaaunicationa ^
2/50
a. Safaguarding fraquanciaa
Coabinad float Top Sacra t Order 177, Standard Control
of rrao'uanoiea Oae4 Uurin.: Qperationa. will be applied.
b. Safeguarding aeaaagea
(1) Coae tablea and oall aigna to ba uaea are »;lven
as followai Coabinea Fleet Top Secret Order 171, Dae of Codeet
Coablnaa Fleet Top Secret Stanoing Order 52, Table of Combined
Flsdt Special Wartiaa Call Si£nai Combined Fleet Top Secret Order
169, AbbreviatoJ Call Sl.tn3 f-.r LKc!>iiD>:e of Stratetiic Inforaatloni
Coablned Fleet Top Secret Oruar 179, Table of Syxbola Indicating
baargency Clasaificationa for Saeclal Coablnoi Fleet Coaaunlcationa.
Paga (2} Methoda of safeguardint; and distln>;ui8hing
2/31 daceptl7t! diapatcbeai Combined Fleet Top Secret Standing Order
49, Methoda of Safeguarding and UiBtlcgulBhin;: Deceptive Diapatchea.
(3) Method of indicating dateai Combined Fleet
SUiidinj, OrJer 51, Table of Coablned Fleet Special Abbreviationa
for Da tea.
450 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
451
- SECRET
^53 ^^ 5. Dtillilag and int«rf«rlng irith •namy coBBnunicatlona
«. Utllltlng en«iiy coonunicatlana
(1) Int«ro«pt squad* attached to each fleet «illl
«tlllB« vmrnj eofOMinicatioaa aa directed by the coonandera in chief of the
rMpeetiTe fleeia.
(2) Intercept squada attached to coonunlcationa
tadta "tn be aaaigned to utilisation of eneny comminicationa in accordance
«iU tlM reUa«ii«i
caaomcAnoKs unit
Tetgro CoHnmieationa
Dait
OUTLINB
The unit will obtain inforaation
chiefly OQ aovements of the American
hooM fleet and airplanes; also on
■orements of Russian forces.
Details to be prescribed b/
Coaaanding Officer, 1 Combined Coiaauni-
cations Unit.
Taku Coaamieationa
O&ii
1. The unit will obtain informa-
tion chiefly on aorefflonts of American,
British and Dutch fleets and airplanes
in the PaR £A3T.
Details to be prescribed by
Ccoaanding Officer, 1 Combined Communi-
cations Unit.
2. Depending on conditions, one
element will come under the connand of
Canander in Chief, 11th Air Fleet.
3. Aa the southern operations
progress, it will proceed to occupied
aactora whenever suitable.
Other Coamaieationa
Onita
Under direction of Caamanding Officer,
1 Combined Comsunicatlons Unit, they
will gather operational information.
b. Interference irith enemy ooainunicatlons will be
diraet«d by the force coananders, except in cases of special orders. Sach
/ore* iin— snilsi (Commanding officer, 1 Combined Coonunicatlons Unit),
conditions are faTorable, will direct comminicitions units in the
(subordinate ccKoinications units) to obstruct enemy connunications.
452 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
Ant^ndad Tabl. 1
zhn
aaS, AIBPUNE AO) SabMAJUU£ CQiaiUHICATIOH&
Pag*
2/58
COMtOtaCATIOILS
COiUIUNICATIOIi& 1 1
SlStHk
DISPOSITIOI
anuhxs
Ship CooBniii-
!• flagship eniiinl oationa
oatlona
■ystaa fraquanoiaa uaad nalnly by
tha flagahlp of tha ooaoandar In
ohiaf of aaoh flaat and by tha
fUgahip of spaoially aatabliahad
aquadrona.
Stnt«glo CoMun-
2. Ordinary ahort «aTa ia
Isationa 2
aaad by tha flagahlp of tha
(2 snsuuA*)
oonanding offlcar of a squadron
and aben aspeoially naadad by
ordinary Tassala.
Frcquanoy ^ataa
3. Fraquanoiaa uaad in ship
3 (DBiPA SSaiTKI)
ooMiunioatlona are OKinly
{3TE«a)
aaployad by Southarn Foroa and
tboB* forcaa oloaal> oonnaetad
with it. Othar forcaa usa than
CoBBonieatlon
for urgant ooHBanioations. Ho«-
Claaaifloatloa 2
•rer, whan tha Coabinad Flaat ia
(2 KUN*) (?la«t
taking up intaroaption (XOGBI)
or f oroa oo-
diapositiona, thair nain uaa will
ordloatad
no longar ba rastriotad to tha
ooaaunioatiooa )
Southarn Foroa.
4. Southam Foroa cuMiitid-
oatlon claaaifioation ia Clasai-
f ioation 3.
^Irplan*
Fraquaaoy HytXvL
CoiMunl eatlona
L (SBiPA SiS&SLl)
(4 TEH*)
Subnarin*
Fraquanoy Syataa
Tha iiiiiwiiiiliiiitlniiri of Advanoad
CoMunlaatlon*
3 (DiaiiPA i£>i>)XSLl)
SspadiUonry Foroa (SEMUM bUTAI)
(3 TE!I«)
auboarlnaa will ba datarainad by
tha coMBanding officara of tha
AdTancad Ezpaditionar^ Foroa
(SDKSN BUTAI).
Motet
The u«« of di
Plaat niralaaa Ri
as with the following!
In tha aaln.
night fraquaooiaa \
fill be uaad. If reliability of
oom&anieatloiu o
innot ba ascpactad of night fraquanoiaa only, dajr
fraquanolae also
will ba usad.
Note*
Tha symbol • indicated the enct BOMAJI tranalltention
of the original LAIU.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
453
i
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454 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECBti
Ann^ndad T»hl« 2^ (ContintMd)
Not««l
1. Th« !!■•• of PL— unloatioix will b« «• usual unl«sa spMialljr
d«t«rmiiMd.
2. Ihvn ■•ndint; and r«e«lTlnt; oondltlons b«t«««n ahips and
•tatlona in the aaas ayst** ar« poor, an Intaraadlat* ooaBunioations
unit will ba raaponaibla for ral*/.
3« Unlaaa otharwiae ordarad, Diapoaitloo 1 «ill ba uaad.
Subaaquant altarmtiona ii. diapoaitiocs or fraquansiaa will b« aa
praaorlbad by tha Co— anrtlag Offioar, lat Coabinad CoHninioation Unit.
i. CoBBuaioationa unit (baaa) oomunioationa in 9«ouplad
tarritoriaa, aonapt whara apaoiallor datarminad, will ba aa praaorlbad
by tha ooBMindiag offioar of aaoh forea.
5* Raaarra fraquanoiaa
5,085 (TA«U)
10,170 (TAn5)
5,325 (T0«23)
10,650 (T0«24)
5,225 (SA*25)
10,450 (SA«26)
4,205 ;iK)*7l)
8,ao (HO«»72)
16,820 (HO*73)
4,030 (aB*ll)
8,060 (RSai2)
16,120 (BBai3)
6,820 (T0»51)
13,040 (T0«48)
4,665 (aA*U)
9,330 (5A«15)
13,660 (SA«16)
Paga 6,150 (TO»43)
2/62 12,360 (T0*U)
Notai Tha synbol • indicataa an anet B0IIAJ7 tmnslitarmtion of tha
original KAJU.
i-i-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
455
H
456 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
vS
SECRET
ajR
5S
z&
C. Supply
1. Supply poliojr
a. 0«n«nll7, •*«>> t^V «111 replenish its fuel when it
fWll* b«lOT 60^ of Mpaolty. If Utile la anticipated, boeerer, every
•ffort vill be aade to aaintaln oapaoitor.
b. Ordnaaoe, aaBonitlon, boabs, rations and atorea will
be repleniabed to eapaolty at every opportunity.
2. OotUae of aupplj
a. The allotBent of faaaea of operationa for the Initial
pariod of operations ia established generally as folloesi
^th Fleet, $th fleet, 6tb rieet - XOKOSUKA
1st Fleet, 2ai Fleet, 1st Air Fleet, forces attached
to Co^biaad Fleet - tO&X
11th Air Fleet, Southern ficpeditioonry Fleet, 3rd
riMt - SASSO
b. The allotaent of bases of operations and supply
polats to the sapply vessels attached to each force is established
gaaemlly as folloesi
Main Body, Striking Force, Advanced Expedltlomry
Foree (SOKSN BOTAI), South Seas Foroe • TCXOSQU, KURX aul vicinity
Southern Force - MAKO, TAKAO, SASE80 and vicinity
lorthem Foroe - IQCOSIKA, CKlNATO and vicinity
CoBMsree Destruction Unit - any suitable place
«. The allotasQt of supply bases is established generally
ai follovsi
lortbera Foroe - PASAMUSUIBO, AXKESIZ, f AKXAIAI,
GHZCHI JUA, MARCOS IsUnA
Sooth Seas Force )
SAIPAI, aAJALEU,
t*'**'/t.2?S2^^??^'^ f ■OTJS.'jAMIT,
Foree (SBKBI BOTAI) } ^ '
TABOA, TBOK, POMAPS, PAUO (Second Period (DAI HI Kl) OperaUons and
tbereafUr)
Southern Foree - PALAD (until First Period (DAI IKKI)
Operations have enled), SAIOOH, CAMaAK
The initial fUll allovanoe for aupply bases and
speeial supply points is as deteralned in Appanded Table 1.
d. As the operation develops, speolal supply points
(special stores departaent and special air depot) aill be set up
In occupied areas. They will be under the direction of the
ecBBandlng officer of the forces in suoh areas. The folloving
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 457
looatlona hav* b«an choa«ni
(1) 0;.VAO
(2) TaKAKJBI
(3) BALlKi-APAN
(4) UANIU
(5) UaKa^AR
(6) SOKilABiiJA
(7) SiNGKPOaE
(8) BATAVIA
(9) PQJANO
Pag* •• Th« varloua forcas will be supplied by supply ships
2/69 attachad to tham.
f. If poasible, supply bases will not be used to supply
other than airplanes and small vessels. In particular, except in
unavoidable cases, supply bases will not be used to replenish stocks
of supply ships.
g. Supplies ajid stores for forces which have advanced into
oaptured areas tii.ll be unloaded and trtLisported by base forces .
(KONXYOCHI) (in "Base forces" changed to "special stores department ." )
in cooperation with forces in the area.
Page h. VAien several forces are to be supplied at the same
2/70 tine, the senior coaaanJing officer present will determine priority.
TAble 2.
i. The asalgnment of supply ships is given in Appended
J. The renaezvous and subsequent movements of supplj;
■hips attaohad to the Coobined Fleet are given in Appended Table 3*
3* Important supply matters
a. As shown in Appended Table 5> the Combined Fleet
Supply Oept will direct the over-all planning of supply for the
Combined Fleet anu will keej) in contact tvith Imperial General
Headquarters aiiu tuxcU base of operationa.
Pag* b. Tlie organization of the supply departnaents of the
2/71 various forces (fleets) will be detenained by the respective force
(or fleet) coooander. The supply departments of the various forces
(fleets) will supply the various forces (fleets) and will maintain
contact Mlth Combined Fleet Supply Oept, each base of operations
and supply pojnts.
e. VVhen a force is supplied by a supply ship attached
to another force (fleet) or by a supply base, a report will be sent
to the comoandiiv; oi.'i'icer of the force to which the ship is
attacned or to the co.umanding officer of the supply base.
d. Aaeii the cooimanding officer of the supply base
furnishes considerable quantities and supplies to surfitce forces
other than those for which he is resjsonsible, he will submit a
report on current stocks to Imperied. General Headquarters, th*
oommandlng officer of the bkse of operations aiid Cotnmander in
Chief, Combineu Fleet.
* Editor's Note: Ravisea by "jirrata" issued by Fla^ Secretary,
Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Serial 1 Part 99.
dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the NaGaTO, SAEKI .VAN.
458 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECfltT
•. Vhsn th« foro* cammatimT oonoamad finds It nsosswrx
to ch&a^a Uia Initial full alloakno* of th« supply ba*« or apcttl*!
?mg9 ■uppl> point, ha will aak* • report to iHparial u«iMral U«adquart«ra
2/72 and CaaMsdar la Chief, Ccabiaad Tl—t «ad will notify tta« ocbmoI-
lag offioar of tha baaa of op«r«tlona. Ifaob aonth report* and
notloaa «111 ba aubaittad in thla aannar ooaoaralag quaatltiaa
aaoaaaary to mplaolah atookCt
f . CooBanding offioara of aupply baaaa aad offlocra In
obarga of apoolal supply points will Baintain a ourrent loraBtoiy
of stodks and raquleition naoassary itaU froa tha basa of operations,
taking Into oonsidaration atooks oarrlad by tha lattar.
g. Force ooaaanders (or ooaaanders in chief of fleets)
will indioaie the quantities and types of ■ilitery stores whioh aast
be carried on the supply ships> Vhen supply ships are directed to a
base of operations or to a supply point in order to restoek, they
will notify the onawamllng officer of the beae (TM Add 'or supply
point. 'n regarding tioe of arrival and quantities and types oi
■nterlel required.
Page h. When stores on supply ships haTe to be replenished
2/73 ^r sappleaented, the force ooaaander (or fleet cosaander In chief)
concerned rill subadt a report Imned lately to laperial General
Headquarters and to Coaaander in Chief, Ccabined Fleet.
i. Each force oceMander (or fleet eoaaander In chief)
will secure froa the eoaaanding officer of the base of operations
the necessary infomntion about the aoreaents of and the types and
qunntitlcs of oateriel carried by supply ships which are dispatched
as replaceaents or additions froa the base of operations or supply
base to tha force (or fleet).
^. Eeplenishaent of supply ships and supply bases
f^g» a. £«ipply will be carried out In such a nanner that the
2/7i Tarious supply ships will not have to be restocked at one tiJMi
Supply ships will be restocked one at a tine at a supply base or
base of operations.
b. ^pply bases and special supply points usually will
be restocked by laperial General Headv^uarters or the eoaaanding
officer of the base of operations.
Special orders will be issued to effect co-operation
of supply ships of a force (or fleet).
The Bonthly replenishaent allowances for supply
bases and special supply points are given in Appended Table /t,
Pnge 5. Protection of ships
2/7$
When supply ships are to be dispatched, tha force
ooeaander (fleet oooaander in chief) concerned will furnish suitable
protection by foraing a convoy, charting the course and providing
escort. Supply ships attached to the base of operations will be
protected in like aanner.
^Editor's Motel Rsrvlsed by "STrat** Issued by Flag Secretary,
Ccabined Fleet as Ccabined Fleet Jltraseoret Serial 1 Part <W.
dated 17 Hov a, aboard the HAOAIU, SAAI IIAtf.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
459
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460 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
i?ii
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
461
462 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
463
LU
GO
79716 O — 46 — pt. IJ
464 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
465
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%
SvooQd period (OaI NI KI) Op«r4tiona aiid thareafUr will b«
ilM MM «• rirat Period (DaI IKKI) Oparationa, axoapt for tha
rello«ti>ci
Strikinc Foroa
Oil Supply
KTOKUrO lUOi
ttun MAiU)
NIPK)N UaHU
No. 2 KTOeJ MABU
Total 6
Soutli SMa
Dill add TQliO UAtiU
Total 22
Soutbam Foroa
Stijipljr forea
Nill add KUriOSllIO
lURU
KOKUYO UaBU
Total 35
(TN Changad
to 36)^
total 13 (W
Chanrad to
12. )1
Mil add 3ilINK0KU
UaRU. TOiU UAHU
(TN Inaart .
3HIRIY« URU.)-*-
nMlter'e Notat Rariaad bjr "Errata" iaauad by Flag Sacratary,
Coablaad Flaat aa Coabinad flaat Ultraaacrat :>arliil 1 Part 99,
dAtad 17 Nov 41. aboard NaCaTO. jaBSI <AN.
Jfe-
468 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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470 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 471
SECRET
Pag* H. OpcraUons Ottwr Tbaa Tboa* of tba CoablMd Flaat
2/96
1. Operations of forcaa at oaTal atatlona and auxUUry
naral atatlona
a. Tbaaa forcaa will atrangthen th« dafana* of
atrategic polnta, protect aaa traffic and co-oparata with th*
Coablned Fleet or China Irea rieet In operations In tba area In
tbalr charge.
b. Air forcaa and otbar necesaar/ forces vlll be aovaO.
to the necesaar/ places as conultlons oeaand. They «ill be placed
unaer the operational coouatLnd of the coBoanaer In chief of ths fleet
concernea or of the coBiiiAncilng offlc#r of the force at the naval
Station or auxiliary naval station In charge of the area concerned.
2. Opera tlona of CHINA Area Fleet
Page a. In general, the fleet vlll continue operations
2/97 against CHIhA with Ita present strength. It will annihilate land
forces and wrest control fro* the*.
b. At the outbreak of war the force of which 2NC CHIHA
Expeditionary Fleet Is the nucleus will co-operate with the Ar«y
to occupy UONGIOMG ana annihilate eneay forces stationed there.
0. The aefenses and security measures within the
occupied areas will be strengthened and sea traffic alon^ the CUItiA
coast will be protectee. At the aaae time every effort mill be siade
to deny the uae of the CHINA coast to eneay ships and airplanes.
d. It will co-operate, as the occasion demands, with the
Coablnad Fleet and Southern Army In escorting Amy surface transports
ana In aef ending asseably points.
Page
2/98 II. OPLRAriOMS OF THL OOHBIH£D FLSET IB CASE WAR iTITH RUSSIA BEGINS
DDRING THE WAR WITH THE OHITED STATES, GREAr BRITAIN, THE NETHERUHDS
AND CHINA
A. Operation Policy
1. The operations against ths OHITED STAPHS, GREAT BRITAIN
aikd the NETHERLANDS will be aodeled generally after the operation
policy aet forth In I.
2. The policy for operations against RCSSIA will oe as
follows t
a. In the ev^nt war breacs out aurlng First Phase
(uAI ICU OAN) OperaUons
(1) For the aost part, 5th Fleet and the homeland
coabat forces (NAISiJi BUTAI) will b« ch&ngea with defense. They elll
protect vital sea traffic along the coast of JAPAN and will protect
strategic areas from air attack.
Pag* (2) Thereafter, as quickly as southern operations
2/99 and operations against the Aaerlcan Fleet peralt, elements of
light forces and air forces will oe alverted to operations M.c&inat
RUSSIA.
The operations described in the above para^aph
ttaas will be strengthened.
40
472 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
SS
2/100
P&g*
2/101
•f rint PhftM (OAI lOMZ DU) OpM«Ueas.
Tte gTMWr part of 5U FlMt aal «m •lM«at of tk*
ll^t fore«« wlU b« ahlfWl to epwvtiona AfUaat EOASXA. Tba
RuaaUa fl««t la tha OUXB will ba lawadUtaly aaalMUt«l.
Praaaura will ba brooght t« baar aloag tha ooaat of Raaalaa tarrltasy
la tha TAB U3t. la ao-apaaraUon vith tba Anij, thaaa foraaa will
daatroy aaaay air atraagth la tha ■ARITIMX Prorlaaa and DSSOU
ProTlBoa, aad oooup^ TLADITOarOt aad othar atratagla polnta la tha
rAB use.
B. Allooatloa of Foroaa.
Saparata Tabla 6 (Ull ba aaat latar) (TM Mlaalag. )
C. Oparatloaa Othar TImd Thoaa of tha Coablaad Flaat
1. Oparatloaa of foraaa at aaval atatlona and aazlliar7
aaTal atatlona.
a. Tha aaral atatlona at KXO£UKA, KURD, SASJBO and
MAIZOEU and tha auzlUary mTal atatlona at OtUNATO, CUIIKAI and
Port ABTUOft will atrangthan aaourlty aaaauraa agalnit Raaalaa
aubaarlnaa and alrplanaa aad will aanlhllata thaa If thay appaar la
araaa undar thalr jurlidlotlon.
b. Whan tho outar ooabat foroaa angaga In aotlva
oparatlona, air forcaa aad othar naoaaaary forcaa will ba tranafarrad
to tha naoaaaary polnta and will eo-oparata In thaia oparatloaa.
2. Oparatlona of tha China Araa riaat
Tha forca whlob haa I China £xpadltlonary Flaat aad 3
China Expadltlonary Flaat as Ita auolaus will ooTar the aoraaanta
of tha Aray forcaa which will ba divartad from oantral and northam
CUIMA. It will ascort thaaa forcaa during tranaport at aaa and
daploy aultably.
III. MISCEUAjra006 RiCDLATIOIS
A. Tlaa to ba Uaad
Cantral standard tlaa
B. Charta to ba Uaad
Charts (charts of allltary plaoas) to ba uaad are as
followai
Page
2/102
CUAfiT (CHART OF ULITAKI PLACSS)
a&K (ON i3ilPi>)
Navy Oltrasacrat 3^7
Chart of Military Plaoas la
PACIFIC Ocaan
For use In general operations
(ships)
Speelal Chart of Military
Placas
1. For use In Joint Aray-Navy
operations
2. For use In oparatlo is la
narrow waters
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 473
^IJRET
2/102 Nof««
ChMrta for general op«rmti>.<n« in the lULAI Ar«a will b«
••tabliahad ■•par<it«ljr. (TN Thl« not* subaequentljr has b««n
daiatwl. r
C. IdcntlfloatioD of friandlgr and •naagr foro«a
Tno laeatlflcii'vlon of friaDdljr and anaay forces will be
Maad on CoabinM yieut Dootrlna asd the folloalagi
IdantiflOMtion between Mavjr ships aod Japanese Barohant
shlp-^iry, (including' transports aikl ships attached to the Aniy) and
between tha warious Amy and Mavj laru Installations (inoludlog
forcei<J will be In acconlanctt with ^^Ijnal Katfulatlona for Identlfioa-
tlon of JaoaMaC ■'AlBB iU ^■BT'tliMi
(T.H Insert "but, In oda-numberaa aon'>.hb ak«tho<i 1 <111 be
follokea. In syen-nunberod aonths tiethoii J.') (TN Add "Identlfloatlon
anoag airplanes will be bnsed on the Joint ArRy-lkYv AgTea«ent
Conearnln.- Idanllfleation or Fri nndlv Military Alrnlanea. "H
-vlltor'i ;ote: '>Tls©d by "Errata* Issued by Flag oeoretary.
Combined fleet, a:i Co»blD>d Fleet Jttraaeoret M.rial 1 Part 00.
dated 17 Hav U, :-.joird the NAGaTO, IIAHILI UkU.
42
474 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
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SECRET
tuBoaum or fusa na nus Fum (>u ui n) arvxttoa or ri n run (lu ion am <
(•» M «« ar MKlkm ttn* Itan Oil icn OU) OvmcUim)
niMOAiBn
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•b katlaUau of
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uinat u
1. COBtlautloa of
3«o:a4 rari-K (DU
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axvlolUX taiUla
2> CoBrq]riB< Bt aoa
ud Uxdlii* of Ik*
a«lB Jira and SWMtXB
iBTaalOB tajaaa
^. OlanpUoB of
tratrio to <ka Straits
of lULlOCl ss< Us
srosa fOBtk of JATs
79716 O — 46— pt. IS
480 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
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484 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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ALLocAiioi ov roscts roB sTcniit) ?iU3t (sai it dai) optiuiKas
:c
(rrOB UM eoDcliuloii of iimUMni ririt Plw» (DAI ICU DU) Opar^Usu n) IT;
roacts
couunma
snsiora
PEiiciPAL son
ORiAnou
lUlD
I«U>lT 1
Sunoort of oatlr* oporatloao.
B0«
1 ne<t (iMi BatDlT 3 «B«
CmSlT 6)
CIbC
2 rint
1. SttP'iort of oporatloai of
? HMt
B«tDlT J
e»rDW »
■ortbora, Soatti Sou and
Southara Tixcaa-
2. OaatraotlOB of aaaiy
0»rrl»r
ClnO
1 Air nti (!••• CaiOlT k)
Air foro»
1 Air
«aak fsrca.
idraaot
ci«e
£ n»»t
Coatlnaatloa of Tlrat Aaaa (DAI
6nM»
ICm DAI) Oparatloaa.
Itlourr
Ttrc»
Bau Air
ClaC
11 Ur »!••« (!••• BO* •!•-
Patrol of aaoaaiary araaa: tea*
Toran
11 Air
n«*«
..Dt)
isio b«tt*lloii> or wmUI
UTrl luBdlsc prrt^.
alx ooakat.
Sn)«b«rB
eiBC
3»l«t
1. iloopla* Of of mng raaaaat*
lorct
1
3 riMt
1 STuthura Ixp«41tloaai7
riMt (n Xiit«r«« la
pnell.)
3 Snitbani lxp««ltli>iiU7
TlMt
SukloD k
ACAXSHl
ASAiU lUBO
n^t twtrol pl«an
nn >««t«llou of aDadal
aaral Uadl>( TxrV
A«AHI
HOBOfO
DM olaaoat of 11 Air nut
ta oocoplod k«r araaa; ohaeklac
of aaaar paaatratloa: dafaaaa and
atablllutlon of lea/ oolata.
?. Dlaraptloa of aaaay aaa traffla
off aorthaaat ooaat of AUSIUIIA
aad U nnilAI Ocaaa.
}. Dapanalac en tha altoatlea,
atiaeka on aaa^ air ftaaaa la
aorthara ASSniLU.
S<n«)>
ClsC
k TiMt
1. Patrolllac aad atrm(thaala«
8m>
?
U flMt
CmDlT 6
of dafaaiaa la 3oath Saaa Araa:
Tors*
3
Airflot 11
2 Oait of 1 Coaolaad
Coaoosloatloaa Malt
aaoarlac aad fffrlaoalac of
osot^lad kar oolata.
2. Attaeka oa ka^ pouta la tha
BIMABfk Ar«blpala<o aad BUTISH
niouinA.
lorthara
OlaC
5Tlf.»
1. PatroUtaf aad a tr<a«thaalac
Fore*
; n*»%
(UM)
CEICai JIMA
CaHOBlMtloaa Oait
(oaiOBimo)
dafaaiaa la larthara Araa.
2. Obaarratloa of aad attaoka oa
kagr polaU U AUDtlAI lalaada.
3. 3tajxHj aaaaana acalsat
WS3IA.
Caas^re*
00 a
* 3"
Oslt
(SIORAI)
Saaa ao Plrat Phaaa (DAI ICB DU)
Oparatl^aa
Cacmnlo*-
» 1
1 Oait (IMO CHIOn
tlm lorea
CoatlMd
Coamil-
WUOU
OBlt
JI'A OaaKmieatloa
Oait) of 1 Coaklaoi
Couaialoatlou Dalt
Attaehta
CUIODA
ToroM
S3«90
Tin"
la««
A»«CMn«
of lapol/ iblix «111 k« utoralai
»d aaparatalj.
fba ayabal •• af tar i> eoaraatloaal alca or aborarlatlsa ladiaataa that thla la am i
that appaarlac la taa orUlaal doooaoat.
•t npradaaUaa af
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 485
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON
SODRCE DOCUMENT #2
ENTITLED
"JAPAHESE COMBINED FLEET TOP SECRET OPERATION ORDER #2"
USED BY IHE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPAMESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages U32-U60)
(FJC TENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT C0NGRF3SICNAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PFJ^L HARBOR)
486 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
2A52
C)afci:iii FLiJiT 'iOP i^hL': OPiiiAilON OliDQt 2
FUjiBhip NAGAiO, ciAQil BAI, 7 Nov. 41
lA;«Aka*X), iBOPoku
Cocsaandar in Chief,
CombiiMd FIset
CO>.h imij KLLJT JKDOi
First proparations for war
Y I>ay vlll ba 8 D«o«nb«r
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 487
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON
SOURCE DOCUMENT #3
(A NAVY STUDY RE ENEMY SUBMARINES)
ENTITLED
"JAPANESE SUBMARINE OPERAnONS (PEARL HARBOR ATTACK)"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING 1HE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FCR THE ATTACK GN PEARL HARBOR"*
(Record of Proceedings, pages Ii32-li60)#
(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CCNGRESSICNAL INVESTIGATE ON
OF Tim ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)
488 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
JiPiMSX SUBMARINI OPEUTIOWS J»/pJARL HABBO^ ffTifKfCj
The operatlonB of Japanese eutomarlnes, both midget and full-eize,
was one of the main factors In the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on
December 7, 1941. Ihe Conbined Fleet Secret OpOrder #1, vhich contained the
basic plans for the Paciflo<>fide attacks which launched the var, contained a
paragraph referring to submarine operations at Pearl Harbor, de text of
this paragraph, as recalled by a reliable Japanese Qiief Teoman who was
attached to. the staff of the late idmlral Tamamoto, CinC Conblned Fleet, read
as follows t
* 7, The Commander of the Surprise Attack Force (Submarine
Force), having the 6th Fleet (Submarine Fleet) as its main
element, will have most of the submarines leave the western
part of the Inland Sea on X-30 Ca^ to attack Pearl Harbor.
Its entire strength will be bo disposed so as to command the
harbor south. It will attack any enemy warsnip ^ich may have
esce^ed from the harbor. It will also carry out reconnale>
eance before the attack, and if the opportunity presents
itself, will carry out surpri8» attadcs on enemy warships with
■Idget submarines. The time for such attacks will be after
the flints of planes have attacked OAHU. Svery possible
means for recovery of midget submarines should be considered.
The organisations participating in the Pearl Ha;rbor attack, on the
' basis of POV and documentary evidence, included Subrons 1, 2, and 3 (Minus
Subdlv 20). This is a total of 20 submarines, not incloding the 5 midgets
carried on the decks of five of the large submarines. Sixteen of the twenty
submarines have been definitely identified as having participated (I>*1,2.3,4,
5,6,7,17,16,18,20,22,34, (1)68,(1)69,(1)74). The other four, ndiich are
assumed to have participated because they were pert of the same Subdivs both
before and after December 7th and are not known to have had other assignjnents,
are the 1-8,9,15. and (1)75. ▲ fairly reliable POW has suggested that the
1*10 was also present, but there is no other evidence to indicate that it w&s.
All of the submarines participating (with the exception of the 454on
midgets) were of the I-type; i.e., over 1,000 tons. Sixteen of them were of
the Long-^ange Cruiser type— over 1900 tons, with a range of above 12,000
naatlcal miles at 14 knots. Of these, five (1-16.18,20,22,24) were equipped
with midget submarines, the five midget submarines which attempted to get Ido
- 1 - SICRIT
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 489
SBCBBT
Pearl Harbor. The remaining eleven Cruisers were plane-bearing eubmarines.
Tour of the twenty were I (1)68 Class Submarines: 1400 tone, 6
torpedo tubes and a range of 8,000 miles at 16 knots.
The midget submarines used in the Pearl Harbor action (which sub-
sequently were referred to as the "Pearl Harbor T^rpe") were 41' in length,
carried two 18" torpedoes, had a range of 175 siles at 5 knots and 13 miles
at 20 knots.
When carried by the mother submarine, the midget sub is secured to
the pressure hull with four heavy clamps and one auxiliary clamp. In access
hatch, telephone and battery-charging leads connect the two submarines. The
midget is launched by releasing the four main clantpa from the parent ship and
the Auziliary clamp from within the midget.
With regard to the anticipated results of the midget-submarines borne
by the 1-16 Claes submarines, it is interesting to note that the Chief of
Staff, Combined Ileet, in clarifying Secret OpOrder #1 is reported by the
above-quoted Japanese Chief Yeoman as stating!
!Qie fidget submarine unit has been studying and train-
ing at thejaevy Yard with the CHIYODA for a year and a half,
but it is still too much to hope that it has reached a stage
of perfection. In any case, the crew members are supremely
confident. Ihe 6th Tleet will attempt to use them in
attacks within the harbor.
PHASES or THE ATTACt
Preliminary. According to the Secret OpOrder #1 schedule, most of
the submarines in the attack force were supposed to leave the Inland Sea
(presumably Sure, the major submarine base) on Z-30 Day (November 18th, Hono-
lulu time). Subron 2, composed of 1-1,2,3,4,5,6,7, is reported by a reliable
POW to have left YOKOSUKA two days later. The Commander of the Sixth neet
remained behind at Sure.
ipparently most of the submarines arrived in the Pearl Harbor are«
a day or two before the attack. The log of the I^l reports that on December
5th (all dates Honolulu time) it was 600 miles from Pearl Harbor. According
to POV»s from the 1-17, this sub arrive off OAHU on the 6th.
- 2 - SECHBT
490 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Before the attack atarted, the tabmarlnes took up icoutlag positlont,
Qie area around Pearl Harbor had heen divided Into rarlous tectora. That,
the I~(l)69 cruiser auhmerged, engaged In aarrrelllanee In Scouting Sector J>,
ahout 17 fflllea Soathvest of Pearl Harbor, according to the Gestured report
of Ita skipper. !Die I-*!?, according to POW^a, took rxp a scouting position \^
Vorth of Honola^ There was also an X Inner Scouting Area: a circle with a
radlua of 8.5 nautical milea* vlth Pearl Harbor aa the center.
.One of the features of the submarine attack plan was to send at least
two aldgets Into the harbor prior to the air attack In order to check on the
ships present and their position. One midget was detected by the USCO COBOOR
at 0350, four hours before the full aerial attack, as It was trailing the USB
ANTARXS, apparently hoping to slip through the net defenses following the
iiriASIS. This peo'tlcular midget was apparently eunk by the USS ViXD In 1300
feet of water. Another midget was sunk in the harbor, probably having slipped
in through the net>gate which had been opened at 0458 to permit the passage of
two aineawcepers and not dosed until 0840, three-quarters of an hour after
the aerial attack, ▲ navigation chart was recovered froa a third midget which
beached Itself and the navigation track ^Ich was charted would have taken
it all around ford Island in Pearl Harbor. (See attached chart) The original
chart was evidently a U.S. Havy H.O. chart, with detailed navigational data
carefully tranalated Into Japanese. Bough notes were scribbled on the chart.
On the reverse side were further notes on navigation, etc. The sub carried
a siiqile code which would have enabled It to transmit its information to the
aaia force awaiting outside.
The Attackt Prior to the full aerial attack which was launched about
0800, the aaln function of the submarines, both fall-siise and midget, was
reconnaissance and surveillance. After the opaning of the attack the full«>
else submarines were svmposed to exploit the situation by torpedoing the
ships which were trying to eseatpe the confineaent of the Harbor while the
sxaiT
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 491
SICBXI
■idgett were 8i;^poted to alip into the harltor during the coafuelon and con>
tribute to the deetruction caused by the carrier-borne atrial bombardment.
Slaultaneoaslj they were aoppoaed to report the damage Inflicted by all
Japaneae efforta back to the Coomander of the Striking Torce. Diia Infoma*
tion was gained not only by periscope obaerration, but also by the aerial
reconnaiaaance of the obaerration planes carried by eleren of the participating
aubmarinea. One of the faetora reatricting the uae of thia type of obaervation
waa the heavy weather which made launching difficult.
ipparently all flTe of the midget auba launched were loat without
cauaing any direct damage. The Japaneae admitted the loas of five midgets and
only flTe midget-bearing aubmarinea (1-16,16,20,22,24) are known to have
participated. There ia no known damage by midget aubmarinea and at leaat three
are known to hare been aunk before they could do any damage. In addition to
the one aunk trying to follow the iKTlEES into the Harbor, before the full
attack, two were aunk in the harbor. One damaged itaelf on a reef to the
rll^t of the entrance channel, and north of Buoy #1. It waa apotted there at
0817 by the USS HiaJt which opened fire. Wiile being fired t^on it ellpped
off the ledge and aubaerged. It waa apparently thia midget which beached it-
aelf at QAEU, becauae the apparatua of the latter had been put out of commission
by reef damage.
The conning tower* of two midget submarines were sighted in the
Vorth Channel, one by the CUBTIS. Thia latter midget waa aunk by the USS
MOHAffiiK. the ready duty deatroyer which rammed It and depth-charged it. Qie
fifth midget waa preauaably aunk in one of aereral eucceaaful a/^ attacka
which were reported by the BLUZ, the RAMSIT and the BS£SZZ. Theae attacka
preaumably accounted for the I-170(wfaich Japaneae documenta ahow aa being on-
reported after December 8th} aa well aa the fifth midget.
Poat-JLttack Phaaet It Is clear that one of the principal function*
of the submarine attack force waa that of remaining In the vicinity of (earl
Harbor to pick off ftaj damaged ahipa which might try to limp back to the
mainland, or any other ahipa which mie^t bring reinforcement a to Pearl Harbor.
- 4 - SECHBT
492 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SEC3BIT
We Icnov that the 1-1, which arrived on the eve of the attack did not leave
the vicinity of Pearl Harbor until January 9th.
One of the most difficult eituatione experienced by the Jspanese
subs was that of the I-(l)69. At 1830 on December 7th it was ordered by the
Commander of the Japanese Submarine forces to shift from Scouting Sector D,
about 17 miles Southwest of Pearl Harbor, to surveillance in the central sector
of Z Inner Scouting Area, a circle with a radius of 6.5 nautical miles with
Pearl Harbor as the center. On the way it was forced down before it could
complete recharging its batteries and subsequently was caught in an anti-sub
net 4.2 miles, 130° off Barbaras Point. It was kept down on the bottom below
its maximum safe diving depth for- 38 hours, but escaped with minor damage.
After December 7th, submarine activity, at least on the part of
those submarines which took part in the original attack, tapered off. About
December 14th the 1-17 left for the Oregon coast. On December 20th the 1-174
left the Oahu area for Kwajalein. Bie I-l which remained until Janrnry 9th,
had an eventful cruise, but little success. On December 10th it sighted a
CT but couldn't attfck. On December 13th it sighted an AC but was prevented
from attacking by x/S activity. On 20th of December it sifted an AE but was
unable to attack. On December 25th it was depth-charged without damage. On
December 30th it shelled the harbor at Hilo. On January let it was sighted
and attacked twice by U.S. planes without damage.
ResultsI In summing up the part played by Japanese submarines in
the attack on Pearl Harbor it is important to note that the Japanese lost
one full-sise submarine (the I-(l)70) and five midgets, while American forces
suffered no known damage from submarines. Balanced against this is the fact
that the submarines served an iinportant scouting function and tied up American
naval units.
- 5 - 3ECB1T
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 493
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON
SOURCE DOCUIiENT 0k
( A NAVY STUDY RE T5NEMZ SUBMARINES )
ENTITLED
"TIME TABLE OF JAPANESE SUBMARINES OPERATIONS"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COIfPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE A TTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages Ii32-U60).
(EXTEiroED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT GONCtRESSIONAL IN^/ESTIGATION
OF 'JHE ATTACK ON PFoARL HARBOR)
18 Nov.
'4.1
20 Nov.
25 Nov.
5 Dec.
5 Dec.
6 Dec.
494 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
TIMETABI£ OF^SUB.'J^INE
OPLRATIONS
Submarines scheduled to leave Western part of Inland Sea
for attack on Pearl ace. to Combined Fleet Secret OpOrd fi^l.
The 1-1,1-2,1-3,1-4,1-5,1-6,1-7 left Yokosuka for Pearl.
Com. 6th Fleet was on Hashira Shima. (KURE)
OHATA, PO, says 1-174 arrived off OAHU at this tine with
15 or 16 others.
I-l was 600 miles from Pearl.
1-17 arrived off OAHU, took scoutinR position 1° North of
HONOLULU.
7 Dec. I-(l)6o, Flag of Subdiv 12, took up surveillance position
17 miles S\V of Pearl, before attack started,
7 Dec. 0350 USCG CONDOR sighted the periscope of submerged sub when
conducting sweeping operations approx 1-3/4 miles SW of the
Pearl Harbor entrance buoy.
0357 CONDOR informed the USS WARD by v isual signal. YlkBD, whJ.ch
was patrolling off Pearl Harbor instituted search.
0458 Net opened to permit the passage of two minesweepers. Not
closed until O84O.
O633 Navy patrol plane dropped two snoke pots near midget fol-
lowing ANTARES.
0637 BARD sighted the periscope of unidentified sub apparently
trailing the BSS ANTARES then enroute to Pearl Harbor.
0640 WARD commenced attack, which is believed to have been suc-
cessful.
0645 VJARD reported to Commandant 14th Naval District, first time
this had been reported,
0732 Patrol plane sank a hostile sub south of the entrance buoy,
according to telephone call of Operations Officer, Patrol
Wing TWO at 0740. This \ia.s later revealed to have been in
cooperation with DD. Presumably this is the same action
in which the V/ARD participated.
0751 The ready duty Destroyer, USS MONOCHAN, received orders to
"proceed immediately and contact the iliiRD in defensive
sea area" and also apparently to close the netgate. See
above.
0755 Navy Yard Signal Tower telephoned Cincpac: "Enemy air
raid not drill." ALnost simultaneously Japanese torpedo
planes attacked the battleships.
0817 The USS HEUI spotted the conning tower of a submarine to
the right of the entrance channel and northward of Buoy #1,
Though Immediately submerging, fire was opened when the
submarine again surfaced temporarily, no hits were observed.
SECHl
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 495
This sub ap -eared to be touching bottom on ledge of
reef and in line of breakers. V^hile still being fired
at, it slinped off ledpe and submerged.
0330 The USS ..iOHOGHAN, ready duty destroyer, vvhich had been
ordered to sea at 0751 but had been temporarily delayed
by the initiation of the enemy action, got under way.
0836 The conning towers of two midpet subs sirjhted in North
Channel; one by CURTIS (AV^i).
0837 The MONOGHaN, having observed an enemy submarine under fire
of both the CURTIS and the TaNGIEH, proceeded at flank
speed and at about 08^.3 rammed; thereafter dropped two
depth charges. The fire of the CURTIS resulted in two
084^3 direct hits on the connin?; tower. This submarine (midget)
was later salvaged for inspection. Before the UONOGHAN
dispatched it one midget fired a torp which was apparently
aimed at the USS RALEIGH but passed under the bow of the
DALE and exploded on Ford Island.
08^0 Het closed. Had been opened at 04.58 to permit passage of
two mdnesweeoers.
0915 USS 3LUE dropped four and two DCs in two successive at-
tacks on sound contact aprroxiinatply four miles bearing
190° from DIA;.10I€) Head Light.
0950 USS BLUE dropped 6 DCs on good sound contact; resulted in
large oil slick and air bubbles over a length of 200 feet.
20° 11' 30" N 157° ii9' 45" W.
1020 Two DCs dropped on sound contact by USS BLUE 6 miles, 200°
from Diamond ;iead light.
1108 .'iJTB reported a periscope to USS BREEZE, patrolling off
Pearl Harbor.
1115 BREEZE dropped two DCs with no results: bearing Barber
Point 297° T, Diamond Head 073 T, Hickham Tower 357° T.
1135 BREEZE picked up sound of submarine in same vicinity (see
1115); dropped DCs, which brought up oil and debris. A
second attack a few minutes later with four ieeper DCs
brought no tangible results.
1204 GAI,1BLE on sound attack dropped 3 DCs 168 T from Diamond
Head, 2.5 miles.
1830 Comnander of the Japanese Submarine Forces ordered I-(l)69
» shift from Scouting Sector D, about 17 miles SW of PEARL
HARBOR to surveillance in the central sector of E Inner
Scouting Area (a circle with a radius of 8.5 nautical miles
with Pearl Harbor as the center.)
PK I-(l)6'^ reports sighting five DDs "during night". Re-
ceived close-range DC attack from thera apparently no damage.
2000
8 Dec. 0U5 (JiONOLULU LOCAL) I-(l)6o surfaced, on course of 300° for
Barber's Point, hxjrriedly charged batteries, while at
battle speed. Sighted 2 patrol vessels, about 3 miles
away.
SECRET
79716 O — 46 — ^pt. 13-
496 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
0536 I-(l)6f5 is forced down by the DD; before it had com-
pletely recharged; DD attacked it with DCs witihout re-
sult.
0910 I-(l)6o Caught in anti-sub net, L.2 miles off Barber's
Point, at 130°
1205? A few minutes after noon RAI.ISEY DCed submarine on ex-
cellent sound contact 11 miles due west of Barber's
Point, bringing up positive oil bubbles.
1225? Ramsey heard sub apain and DCed, deepest about 250 ft.
getting positive oil indications.
° Dec. 1950 I- (1)69 surfaced after "i?, hours submerged.
10 Dec. U\^-'^ si,=-hted CV but couldn't attack.
lis)
13 Dec. I-l sighted<,A0 but waacou|iJ,er-attacked and couldn't
attack. About this tifTfj|j-17, which had held scouting
position 1° North of Oahu, left for the OHEGON coast.
19 Dec. ^J.-{\)lk left OaHU area for mVAJALEIN, ace. to POW PC
OHATA.
iinS)
I-l sighted^AK but couldn't attack.
I-l DCed without damage.
I-l Departed Pearl Area for HILO.
20
Deo
25
Dec.
27
Dec,
30
Dec
31 Dec
1
Jan,
2
Jan
L,
Jan,
6
Jan,
n
I-l attacked HILO harbor, shelllnf prob. DD.
Wi^ (2tJL>
1-3 reached deployment line; received report of CV and
left line to shadow.
I-l sighted by US PLANES, attacked twice; no damage.
1-3 returned to deployment line.
I-l proceeded to ^ast of Oahu and resumed patrol.
I-l made unsuccessful attack on US DD.
1-3 sighted and attacked group o5?7AKs, unknown result.
9 Jan. I-l headed for KMJAI£IN. Q(tj)
|l|Mr'>>f-18 rushed to attack on hearing report of^CV but no
'r'^ result.
11 Jan. 1^1^"" attacked CV Lexin^^on Class; claimed sinking.
3 -
SECRtl
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 497
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON
SfJIRCE DOCUMENT B
(mAJISLATION OF CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENTS)
ENHTLED
"JAPANESE SUBMARINE SCHOOL NOTES
COtJCERNING
EARLY y/AR EXPERIENCES OFF HA','/AII"
USED HY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages U32-U60).
(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)
498 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
« A ■ » r R g ■ » T A T^n
m3ssmm,m.mm.
Or »ai35«ttoii : ^.„
Initl«l 1i>Kt«
Flnsl Dais.
[ It is iw4N£L«)iM to etate that caaiMt whicatioa xatMs corrwot aMsrgiMMf ;
is of sroAt rwcsssitjr, aoc it is «cets>«{ae2;f 2'v<:^rottab}« tiuit t^mr* ha« b&oi
no op: ortomLtjr to g&th<&r mtlSxcietA lafttucdl^ bafoare tbo ^raduatJMi of th«
IXth. puriod spocial courft* students* wine*, i^wersr, ecem aaXeaeials is
ths cet«3oi7 Ox eeKa:;«it laotructlotis has b««i <^t«iiMd with tha snibral in
port «t flG&asriia«S'I-I6 aad X-63 roo»it3f, it has b«en diKSided to iapodiatftljr
ndn»osx«tpb arid '?istribut« it &s siady nat«riel to tMs period *• special
[-eoarsa stud«nta, Althtyigli it is diff-'jolt to juarantea that aaffiftg ths
Itaos heard dirsctljr there &r« no poiata of diff erenca idth actual facts,
it is believv'.' that thar« ara no gi^eat errors ia liie iknstructions obtained* ^^'t
(1)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 499
/ j^ con fTlOi 811 1 1 A 1.
1. Use of aubaarina earri«i plaoas. .
H. Afterihe aun»>ise attack on Pearl Harbor on Dec«ajber 3, ths milHosrixMi
1-7 r«c«dv..d an order to carry out an aerial r«connais»aQce ot Pearl
Harbor when the opportunllT' presented* Altbou^ she attoB!|>tfld to sond
off a plcine from the noigliborhood of lilihau, it was lsjpossihl» to do so
due to the weather. Henco she proceeded 3«ith5«rd tintil In the neij^b(Kr!>-
hood of Haaaii and carried out the aerial recoanaissi^ice,
B, Jken on picket suition, it any bu possible^ dopoading on tbn KJeathor, tho
tnemy's alert condition, terrain and other conditiotu>, to send off ttie
plan-5 carried from s. certain area, but it laay be icipossible to <b> so
from another area, Consoquontly, besides this necesaity of dejAoylng air-
plane carrying si^bnariiKS, therw is also tho nc<5wsaj.ty. of .doplpying'iaBHs?
airplan>; oarrihg 3ub;.tarines,
Since urgent execution of tho above nentioned r-cormaissancc was not
neccsscry, uc sufforad no grs-at disadviiito-ge, but it '..'ouid be of groat
cjisadvixntagc, '.,hcn urjoncy of cxec-ution is required, '
2. Movenent agaiist ena:^^ depth charges.
A. Since xjerica's de-th charge setting, for the most part, has been defin-
itely ascertained to be in the nei. iborhood .of 35 meters by previous in- ,
vestigations, si'b.narines attached to the Sixth Fleet have evaded theas at
depths of 50 to 70 meters, (Soue subs ha.Ye evaded then at a depth of 100
-letetrs). In the case of the I-l,\(70 meters depth), she received tjiree
charges rlirectly over her, but suffered no damage. (Judging from the
opinion that the. bursting charge of Araerica's d pth charges appeared to
be feeble, it is doubtful as to wli«|ther the charges -^ere .directly vr&r^
hesid,^
B, '."hen the safe'subaergins depth is thoiight io be about 20 meters more than tto '
supposed depth setting of depth charges, it is deeced best to assume as far
aa possible a position of 20 cietcrs or nore below the depth charge's depth
setting.
If not, it is doened best to ass'.'r'.s a position up high, but inpossible to b» ^.
Mj. '''
detected, emd as far above as pc£,slble froa the supposed depth setting of _
the r^epth charge
(a) The ISS prljaxal7 used souM list«iing^ petrol /ijifo/t ^^i^f^ ^ ^^ W^J
mn -
500 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
i.r;r; Derisoer>e,
liorceT.f^^J .ftj §\i f-^-^ J
EXHIBITS OF JOIxVT COMMITTEE 501
-"^ COMFIDSMTlAt
X, OiuAxn* Cuzrent,
A, ITw onshore currant in the area of Barber's ^int^ Oahu, ia very strong.
Sines sabBfaTine I~6S padd little attention to this, she si Med 1*«
breakers of Barber's Point ro«f at a irery close distance sftjen site raised
iier periscope up to observe, bat she was able to prevent anj^thiag from
happening bv turning inmodiateSy,
B, Vifhon stationed on observation on the fi-ont lino, it is necessary to take
^ into prtqx^ arij^Lderation the onshore tairrent when close to the shojre,
HO. U, UrttiajVBSpG FOR„,ATTACK
1. Protracted subraergod navigation.
A. (l) In r«g. rd to subraariae I*-68, th;- raaaber of d^s of subinergcd navigation
\ms 30 for an averasc of 14 hoiirs per day. Air porifior chca-oale were
used only onco (20 rsieces) and the cooler was not used.
(2) Although CO^ roachdd 4.6?, 0^ r«aehcd IS^ and the tonjperaturc; rv^achod
32*^0-, there soentd to be no great of fact upon the aen,
(3) Other than being us^ once 7fhen her subraergod navigation continued
for 3i> hours, submarine 1-16- did not use the air purifier. Just as in
the abovs case, iher^ se.med to bo practically no aifc-ct upon the asn.
B. (1) Although there is no.d for the use of air purifiers in a sulsaerged
navigation of sbout 14 hours, there is still a necessity for the gi.thoring
of rtore data for further study.
(2) It is necessary to acctlorate the caaplotion of thca study "ii'ashing
purifior" ZT/T/^ i^^r -^'^ J *"3^ ^'^ iwi'lf-ruas method,
2. .'Javes in the Hawaiian Area.
A» During the operations of autoarinciS of the Sixth Fleet in the Hawaiian
aroa, vravoe were high ovcry day and it has beon reported that submarine
1-16 found it dif ficilt to laaintain Il«^r depth oven at the depth of about
18 saeters and had to use hor standard spvod aargr times, ;
Besides, these apf cared to b>; two or tlirco submarines that revealed their
coruiing to-.<tr in the prosencc of the cnsnor,
B, It is necessary to raai'.ntain the accuracy of the sovmd detector oxcollentlj'
in order to do aivay vd.th any uneaainecs ia :;.«nd detection patrol.
Also, considering this, thu pcricsope should be -lacle as long as possible.
jIbL. •■^m^m9imm^m^»'<J^ ~^
502 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(5)
,:C 0 N F I D :j: W T I A L
aO. S. OOUiJHICAT^GN
1, Undurwat^r ^riLn^loss rocwprticn ability,
A, According t:; the .;xpcriwACtts of tho 1-16, it is r»jportad that sonsitiirity
is 4 *t a depth of IS a ters and 3 at 20 aaters in the Hawaiian area,
(Sendirig etation o.^AIll)
^., .-... iisj JC_si:!CJ7
1, gian^e in vroricLng of the ruclins gims durine operations.
A, •hen 1-16 test fired her nachinc guos without takinc the trouble of claw*
ing, cfter conducting operations for 30 days, of v.-hich 20 days wwo spent
in subciarsed iS»vis:;tion, one machine gun fired without any trouble, irfiile '^
the othOT fired onl:'- one shot. -
i
Z, Dsijares caused by depth ohcjr^e attack,
A. r.iile observing in "a.-aiian- area, subaarine I-6C v/as depth charged. Of
about 100 de^th' clTarses dit>p,3«d, 12 B:q5lode<i v.ltliin, 200 aeters and 2 ^,
e;xlodad directly above. Ths depth charge setting wit .Tithin 35 raters ^
iinc: the sub's dei-th 45 neters. The damage suffered from this attack, for
the aost pert was as follov.-s: . )''^
(1) Of fr.e 172 electric li^lits, 75 v/esre 'anaged. .(Those that '.rere not ^M
li,'-hted 'vere not t'.ariii^ed) .
(2) S.-.'ftll a-oount of lealca,;2e fr«:i ths forward doorCs) of the torpedo tube(s).
(3) Two deptii indicators \>egpsi to functioni incorrectly.
(4) feiisitj.vity of £o\'nd detector bccarie bad. -^K^M
(5) Becariie iepossiblc to use ths tronsroitter of the echo range depth finder.
(o) Leaica-e in the Vd^^'i ressiu'e air val\re group and cd.r pressure 'fithin - -i
'j:\ip iacrcased .:reatly. • _ .*
(7) L. ^J<£j': i.1 .;.c' ^lir.-pton valve of t.he negative buoyancy tank increased, .
(3) Due to the da-i^^e to the 50 wit poi/er supply, tho rudder ordor tclogra}^
vftnt out. Beoause of t;iis,-. the h^Lasaan mistakenly tl^ouglit that the rudder
had be in datiatec.
(S) The accuracy of t;;; ( ? ) anaeter decrsa:.cd.
(10) Ic-ka-e frc«a tl'.s corroded tube(s) of nutiber 1 coolar.
(11) Considerable Icwia^c fron the "constant usa" ajid reserve fuel tanks,
B. (l; Disaaaomble the damaged r'epth indicator and rsuove the sea vfater
betv/tcn thvj ,,'1 and uZ b<?ak» ^ "^'i^ ^
(2) To har» tuRMd o^f as fflaf^ •lACtric li^ts as :x>0sible.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 503
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON
SOURCE DOCUMPINT #6
(•mANSLATTCN Ob" CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENT)
ENTITLED
"PATROL OPERATIONS OF JAPANESE SUBflARINE 1-69 OFT PEARL HARBOR"
USED BY THE NAVT IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK CN PEAPi HARBCR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages U32-l;60),
(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIQATICN
OF TFIE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)
504 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
■PACBOL OFXBiTIOHS 0? JiJPAXXSS SDEMASIHI 1-69 OTV FZJLBL H&5B0S"
N. N. 1. »s— i»a
ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
NAVY DEPARTMENT
JIDENTIAL
INTELLIGENCE REPORT — -^
Serial ^.'ilzbl Monograph Index Guide l(o.'^.57j:M?9_y'_
(Start new series each year, i. e. 1-iO. 2-40) (To correspond with SUBJECT BivefUjels^w^SeeQ^^rlT Index Guide.
Make separate report {or cacn majo title.)
From Op-16-FE, ONI ^t^iashington, D. C. p^te -J^ElLi? ^g
(Ship, fleet, unit, ditftrlet. office, station, or i>er8oa)
Rof.r>.n.a Op-lf-FE Serial Ul-^3 of April U> 19/>3.
(DirecUve, oorrespondence, pi«vioua related report, etc., if applicable)
■K . ' -
Source „ ^- , Evaluation
(Aa official, personal observation, publlcatios, press,- conversation with — (As reliable, doobtfol. anveclfied, etc)
identiir when practicable, etc.) -, ,
SnhjWt Japan ____Nav2: Submarines
(Nation reported on) (Main title as per index guide) (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)
BRIEF. — (Hera enter careful summary of report, containing mibstance succinctly stated : include imi>ortant fBcla. namea, places. daUs, etc.)
CCRRECTION
Tlie reference report, a translation of a captured
documen"'; written by the Commander of Submarine Division
Mo. 12 dealing with patrol operations of the Japanese
submarine 1-69 off Pearl Harbor, erroneously gives the
date of thase f)perations as Dece.i.ber 6-j.O, \'-)L2. This
error occurs in the fourth line of the cover cheet , in
the heading cf the first page of the report , and in the
fourth line of page 1, Tl'.e date in all cases mentioned
should read, "December 8-lC , 19A1".
CO 1FIDL.'TIAL
Dbtil>ali« Bjr Orifiitte .
(8)
Gen'l 3oard
' ar College
::i£ (5)
BuOrd (3)
BuShips (3)
usnc
Comlnch (IC)
ClncLant (9)
Op-lC/11
Op- 12
Op-2C (5)
I;A Chungking
Com 11 (5)
Naval Aide
USJIC
List I
LlFt 11, less q
List III, ff only
Aust, Joint Staff
(2)
N. Z. Joint Staff
(2)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
505
COHglCTIMTIAL
Seria|!|*i-iL
ISSUED BY THE IMTEIXIGENCE DIVISION
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
NAVY DEPARTMENT
INTEIXIGENCE REPORT
(Start new mtrita «m1i jfliic L «. 1-40, S-U)
Monograph Index Guide No.
907-4400
^^^Op-ie-rS. OMI
(Ship, flecrt, unit. dUtrlet. offio*. sUtioa, or p«noa)
Reference
(To coarrespond with SUBJECT Ktvcn bcknr. Sot O. N. L Index Gvk^
Waahington. D.C,'^"'^""1lgi-rf TUT «"•> 4:
- at r ; Date . li
_ 19_
(I>it«etlve, corrMpondenoe, pnrvlooa rdated report, etc.. If apfUi
S«..»JS>P<^ed Japanese Document Evaluation
LE
Subjec^*P*^
^AM offldaJ. penoBal obaervmtlon, publication, praai.. oonvazaatico with.—
Idantlfr Then practicable, etik|L_--
(Nation reported on) (Main title aa per Index guida) (Sobtitlea) (Hake scpazata report Cor each tttie)
BEISF. — (H«r« enter careful nunmarr of report, oontaininjc mbatanoe eoceluetlj ttated ; Inetode Important facta.
, plaoaa, datae, eto.)
The attached report is an abridged translation of a Japanese
captured document written by the Ccimnander of Submarine Division
Ho. 12 dealing with patrol operations of the 1-69 off Pearl Harbor,
Deoember 8-10, /l94|^uring which time the 1-69 was believed to
have been caught in an underwater obstruction.
CONFIDENTIAL
DiMiujUbaQ Dj OiifkiaJar .
laSkf Wi» Mee let aM ia O. N. L
Op- 16
Op-16-1
Op-16-l-F
Arohivea
Monograph
Op-16-FA-l (£
Op-16-P-l
Op-16-P-2
Gen' 1 Board
Uar College
MIS (5)
BuQyd (3)
BuShips (3)
USMC
Comineh (lO)
CineLant (9)
Op-io/ll List II, less q
Op-12 List III, ff only
op-20 (5) A<M*. D**ff wtnar^
M. Chungking LX, Btaff Mliiloa"
Com u (5) q;^ Sf>-uJ- iti "
List I
n
506 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDSMTUL
Report qf 1-69' a Operations off Poarl Harbor, Deo. 8-10, ^94,
The Japanese submarine 1-69, (Flagship of Submarine Division 12),
attached to the 3rd Submarine Squadron of the Submarine Force, was caught in
an underwnteroljstruotion while conducting surveillance of Pearl Harbor on
Deoembar 9, flL94lj but finally freeing herself, was able to carry on with her
specified taViCT
The following is an abridged translation of the report of the event,
submitted with various pertinent conclusions by the Commander of Submarine
Division 12, and officially distributed (Japanese 6th Floot Secret Letter ifZ,
Part .5, Jan. 10, 1942) as reference material of value for training. (Dates are
in accordance with Japanese time),
I. Circumstances, Before the Event.
During daylight on Dooorabor 8, the 1-69 was cruising submerged, engaged
in surveillance in Scouting tJootor D (about 17 miles southwest of Pearl Harbor).
Immediately after the attack upon the enemy by the Striking Force and the
Special Attack Force, we vrero able to hoar easily, by means of submarine sound
detectors, explosions of bombs and tcrpcdoes, and upon hoT.ring the sound of
depth charges, I judged thrit the Special Attack Force was engaged in heavy
fighting.
At 1400 radio orders from the Commander of Submarine Forces were re-
ceived, assigning the 1-69 to surveillance in the central sector of E Inner
Scouting Area (a circle v;ith a radius of 8.5 nautical milos, -with Poarl Har-
bor as the center). The orders further specified the annihilation of the
remaining enemy forces.
After sunset wo surfaced, in an attempt to assist as much as possible,
but during the night vie, sighted five destroyers. Whilo submerging, we received
a close-range depth-charge attack. After that wo hoard onomy patrol boats
coBtinually, and could not surface. I judged that those patrol boats wore
disposed in all directions at intervals of 3 nautical miloi. Just at this time,
the waves were from 4 to 5 (sic), and ... in proceeding awash there was
difficulty in maintaining depth control vd.thout using standard, speed, ana
battery discharge v;as comparatively high,
I felt keenly the need of recharging the batteries that night, judging
that demands, on battery pov.'cr the next day would be great, and recharging
difficult, because of the presence of enemy patrol boats. So, although it
involved arriving at the designated patrol r.TCx somev;hat behind schedule, I
set course (300°) for the area southeast of Barker's Point, -where I thought
the onomy patrol might bo comparatively lax. At 0015 on the 9th, we surfaced, .
making certain that no enemy patrol boats v/ero within close range. On a course
obliquely to the west, and at battle speed, we hurriedly recharged batteries.
We sighted 2 patrol vessels on our port quarter and port beam- respect-
ively, each about 5 kilomctors away, and in about 30 minutes wo reversed
course. Poarl Hirbor shone red in the sky, like a thing afire. It was
already dawn, and although vro operated vdth the land as a background, an onomy
patrol vessel disoovorod us and fired vfhat looked like a green Very flare.
The time v/as 0106 and our recharging was not yet finishcjd (73/? of used power
had boon replenished). In that condition vre immediately submerged, and although
we wore depth-charged by tho destroyer, the distance vris great,
II, Ciroumstancos of Running Afoul of
Undervfator Obstacle end Measures Taken
At 0440 (December 9) v;e experienced a strange vibration of the ship,
and tho navigator ordered the engines stopped. At the time, our course was
80 , 4 motors were running together, and depth was 37 meters. I was in my
cabin resting, and upon receiving the report went directly to tho conning tov.'er.
Upon learning of conditions from the submarine's Commanding Officer, I decided
that wo had been caught in an anti-submarine not, and ordered the engines put
into reverse in order to got. clear. Howcv'^r, the needle of the speed-gauge
did not move, as if the pit log tube vrnre broken. It being difficult to dotor-
mine our movement, I began to Surface tho ship, and increased tho angle of trim,
- 1 -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 507
CONFIDENTIAL
A slight tromor was felt in the ship, ind I stopped hoadwiy. Again I bnokod
it full spocd, but the ship did not move. Tho ship's trim and depth w:!ro not
normal. I ordered "Blow miin tank", and "Regain negative buoyancy." During
those operations wo surfaced, or rose to a point at v/hioh t;o wore awash, throe
times. According to tho obsorvations of tho Commanding Officer of tho SubBiarinc,
taken at tho timo of surfacing, within tho limits of observation of tho periscope
(fonvard of tho forward end of the gun platform) v;o wore not caught in anything.
Two onomy destroyers wore about 5 kilomotors dead ahead. As wo had now reached
a situation in which vie could not continue either submerged or on tho surface,
I decided to lie submerged and to surface at sunset.
At 0454, I stopped the electric motors, but the ship began to sink,
I ordered "Blow main tank". The reading of the depth-gauge in the tower
reached the extreme limit (85 meters), (We actually reached 125 meters). See-
ing this condition, I thought we must be free of the net, and ordered ".■.head
standard" at a depth of 40 meters, but as before there shortly occurred a
slight tremor, headway v;as -lowed, and I ordered "Stop", ^.gain ivo began to
sink. I ordered "Blow the main tank", but before v/e regained buoyancy control,
tho ship slovred to a stop, almost lovol, at a depth of 87 meters. It was
0506 when I realized vie v;oro resting on tho bottom. Our estimated position v;as
4,2 nautical miles off Barber's Point at 130 .
III. Situation and Measures Taken
..ftor Reaching Bottom
Although the sea bottom was bolov; safe submersible depth, (70 motors
for the 1-69), our resting on the bottom was an oxtrcrtoly good thing for us
in our situation. As soon as v;g had bottomed we knevr from sounds similar to
those made by tho destroyer we had previously sighted, that it v/as eloso by;
and from other sounds wo learned of tho approach of other patrol vessels, Tho
onomy vrould stop occasionally, and if vie thought thoy vcro attempting sound-
detection, we exorcised rigid sound control. That is to say, the use of all
pumps oxoopt the oil-prossuro pump, and the movement of all rudders, oleotrio
fans, (jyro-compass and ventilation blov;er wore suspended. I decided to sur-
face at sunset, but though many hours passed there vrere continual sounds of
patrol vessels coming and going, and sinco our position six miles from tho
harbor entrance offered considorable chanco of discovery and consequent battle
to the doath v/cro I to surface at sundovm, I decided to wait if possible till
dusk of the follovdng night, the 10th.
After bottoming, we recorded ovory hour the amount of bilge water,
the inclination, the air pressure and the depth. The fact that the incroase
per hour of bilge water was about one and a fraction metric tons, and prossuro
in tho air reservoir i.vas 90 (kilos), convinced mo that it 'would be possible
to surface at dusk on tho follov;ing day.
jLntioipating that xio would have to submerge after only a short time
on the surface, I charged tho air reservoir vjith high pressure air from our
(6) reserve torpedoes, "jid was able to raise its pressure 25 kilograms. Although
I thought it impossible to uso the high-prossurc air compressor, since, on
account of our depth, v;o could not take in soa water for cooling, - tho engineer
suggested circulating tho bilgewator as a cooling raodiua. ;.fter effecting sound
control and recharging from the reserve torpedoes, I bocomo concernod, as
timo passed, over the lowering of pressure in tho air reservoir, and although
I didn't uso the high-pressure air compressor that day, I did use it on tho
10th, raising tho air reservoir pressure from 105 to 138 kilograms, and re-
ducing the air-prossure inside the ship from 891 ram to 780 mm. Tho additional
air thus obtained subsequently proved most efficacious.
Other measures consequent upon the length of tine on the bottom wore
as follows I
A - Air purification!
To escape detection due to noise of ventilator motors, and to
economizo on electric power, we used air-purifying chemicals threo times ■#hen
we did not hear the onomy in the vicinity (tho amount of air purifier used
was 60 units) over a total period of about twelve hours j oxygon was roloasod
threo timos for o total of 45 minutos. At 0800 on the lOth there was a roading
of 4.5^ carbon dioxido, and just before surfacing v/e must have reached approxi-
mately 5.5J5, and the crow had headaches , A state was reached whore walking
for oven a slight distance, or any oxortion, caused panting.
508 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
B - Stopping of bilgov/ator ciocumulition!
117e tightened propollor-shnft packing by stuffing vdth v/iste and
completely closed all valves to the outside.
C - Meal SI
To prevent rise of air temperature in the ship, and to oconomizo
on power, we used no heat for cooking, but ate biscuits, canned fruit, improvised
rice cakes, etc.
D - Rest:
To chock increase of cr.rbon-dioxide, wo had everyone not specially
employed sleep as much as possible. In anticipation of a battle to the death,
and to incite the desire for a hard fight, v^e served sake to all hands at
supper on the 9th, the first time since leaving base.
E - Defecation:
In the absence of facilities for discharging excrement, we made
use of '.-mpty oil cans,
IV. Situation and Mrasures
Taken Prior to Surfacing
On the 10th we detected the presence of „ncmy p'trol vessels, but not
so frequently as on the previous day. Sunset on the 10th being at 1253 and
moonriso at 1827, I decided to surface \t 1500. My estimate of thj situation
v;as as follows:
A - It was possible that there might be no enemy patrol craft in the
vicinity, since they knov; that the 1-69 was caught underrfatur; and in the
event that 've might be able to free the ship easily and escape to a place of
comparative safety, I decided to withdraw from the area and ascertain by radio
the current state of affairs, before continuing the task assigned.
B - In the event that freeing the ship might require some time, and
that there might be considerable chance of discovery by the enemy, a.nd a conse-
quent battle to the death, I decided upon preparations to make utmost use of
all weapons.
C - The possibilities v.'erc that v;e might be unable to move/ that wc
might have to engage the enemy whether freed or not; that if freed, v;e might
attempt to enter Pearl Harbor, or if unsuccessful in that, to block the channel.
The measures I took with the above estimate of the situation as my
basis, viorc as follows;
A - Preparations for battle:
Made preparations for gun, machine-gun and torpedo action.
(Anticipating action against small ships, put 2-mL'ter depth sotting on torpedoes)
B - Not Cutting Detail:
Arranged a detail of 3 officers, 2 petty officers and 14 men to
take 'charge of appropriate stations, tools, etc.
C - Preparations for Self-destruction;
Povfdor from 10 high-angle gun charges v/as oolloctod and arranged
in the magazine with 2 tins of kerosene. Self-destruction ivas to be carried
out if the worst cane to the v;orst, and would follow the broadcasting of the
mossr.ga: "Wc arc unable to communicate".
D - Preparations for Destruction of Secret Books;
Operational orders and special instructions for use of Codebook A
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 509
CONFIDENTIAL
(trsl. notct K5, in Jipaneso), togocher \dth other p-ipcrs of a highly soorot
chr.raoter w .-re out up, and destroyed by being churnod and pulped in a rcoep-
taole filled v/ith sea water. Such things as secret charts and easily com-
bustible documents vjcre romovcd to the magazine for burning at the time of ox-
plosion. Things hard to bum, and v;hioh would have to be throvm into the sea
wore torn up and weighted, to avoid being picked up by the oneray. The time for
throwing these away was to bo specially designated before the explosion.
E - Disposal of Bilge Watert
Although vje triad as much as possible to prevent accumulation of
bilge water, the amount was very great in the motor room. Since a large change
in trim was naturally to be expected at the time of surfacing, there was groat
concern lest the main electric motors be soaked with bilge water. Accordingly,
the bilge water in the motor room was pumped into the after torpedo tube
compartment, so that, even though the after torpedo tube compartment was flooded
with bilge vfater above the deck plating before surfacing, the main electric
engines would be perfectly safe at the time of surfacing and during subse-
quent dive, in spite of a great inclination. We estimated that, before sur-
facing, the amount of foul water in the ship totaled 50 metric tons, so
prepared to pump it overboard immediately upon surfacing.
V. Circumstances .-uid Measures
Taken at time of Surfacing
Upon completion of all pre-surfacing preparations, I .assembled all
Warreint and higher officers, prayed for a good battle, and drajik toasts with
beer. We then v;ent directly to our stations. The man in charge of listening
gear reported all quiet in the vicinity. At 1457 *fe blew main tanks. Al-
though the pressure in the air reservoir dropped from 138 to 85 metric tons
(sic) the ship did not seem to be rising. The Senior Officer said, "Vfe don't
float". I then ordered "Cut in motors", "Port and starboard motors ahead
standard", and immediately we saw that we were free of the bottom. However,
the change of trim gradually increased, and although we stopped blowing the
forward main tank, this inclination did not change. '<Ve then opened vents
in the forward main tank, and gradually prevented further change in trim, with
a maximum inclination of 25 . At 1520 we surfaced. Our period of submersion
had been 38 hours.
As soon as the surfacing preparations had been completed, the net-
cutting workers had been assembled, and I had instructed them not to be con-
cerned with enemy fire, but rather to concentrate with calm certainty on
cutting tho net. As soon as wo surfaced, the vrarking party went directly out
on deck. The lookout reported no enemy in the vicinity, and immediately
the net-cuttors reported no entanglement above tho water line. Because the
pit log tube had been damaged the previous day, it was pushed out through
the bottom of the ship.
At this point, although I ordered stand-by on main engine, the oil
in th,3 engine room sump tank overflowed, as a result of the previous inclina-
tion, and for a short time it was impossible to use tho engines. Both motors
vfore ordered ahcofd st?.ndard, but the stafboard motor didn't work. I wondered
7.'hether or not the starboard propeller wore fouled in some obstruction, but
when I saw the ship move fonvard I realized this was not so, and was greatly
relieved, inasmuch as we could make out the light of an enemy attempting to
challenge us. Our course v/as 270^. Dra-.ving near to the coast (to starboard),
I headed for other areas,
VI. Circumstances and Measures Taken After Surfacing
As the port engine had been made ready, I ordered port engine cut in,
ahead standard, at 1519^^. At 1533 we sighted an enemy destroyer on opposite
course about 3 kilometers av/ay at 30 to port, and quickly submerged. Immed-
iately after surfacing we had started pumping bilge water and replenishing
air, but about 25 metric tons of bilge water still remained. After diving,
trim was unsteady, varying from a maximum of 55 degrees (sic) down by the
head to a maximum of 35 degrees (sic) down by the stern. We reached a maximum
depth of 75 meters. The pressure in the air reservoir fell to 35 kilograms
and I realized it would be impossible to continue submerged. I ordered tho
ship to surface and fight it out, but after surfacing we did not sight the
destroyer. The time was 1600,
510 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
Again neither engine would run, because of the overflovj of oil in
the engine room sump tank. I ordered both motors ahead, and thenceforth
proceeded on the basis that if we met the enony we v;ould fight a surface battle.
Our course was generally northwest, vrith the coast for a background. At 1630,
both engines voro in shape, and were out in. Vc went to ahead standard,
ahead full, and finally flank speed. IVc wore able to withdraw from the area
vdthout mooting any onemy.
On account of the inclination during the dive mentioned above, the
inside of the ship was extremely dirty from bilgo water, oil and excrement.
In the after torpedo compartment, the torpedo tubes nore inundated at time
of submersion, then v;hen we tilted back the forward bulkhead was covered v/ith
dirty water. Also, the battery fluid from the main storage battery had leaked
out, producing a foul odor, ilony hours ivoro required for cmcrgohoy repair
measures, VJhen our communications apparatus had been repaired, I radioed
a report of our condition.
VII. Doraago
Damage was chiefly to electrical equipment, from bilgo water; and
to outsido' optical and listening gear, frflm long submorsion at groat depth, Wo
v/ore not prevented from continuing our patrol, and v/ero able to carry on our
assigned task.
VIII, VietJs
A. I am profoundly convinced that the 1-69' s .jsoaptj from danger v/as
entirely due to Divine Providence, in thats
1) The depth at v/hioh we bottomed was such that a ship could
remain there for a long time. Just before bottoming vie h:.d sunk to 125 meters,
and although it might ba only by chance th-.t vvc touched bottom at on 87
miter spot, it is certcjinly unthinkable that vro could have stayed submorgi!d
for so long a period at a greater depth,
2) There v/is no onemy nc.'.rby at the time of surfacing, and that vre
woro already free of the underwater obstacle. Had v/o needed a long time ■^o
cut ourselves free, 'ind had there been a very strict enemy patrol in the
vicinity, w.. should certainly have been discovered and ended up with a fight
to the death.
3) At the time we sighted the enemy destroyer at 1533, eind
submerged, we were not lighted by the enemy. VTe wero unable to rig for
noiseless running, and were in poor condition for submerged operation; in
addition , our bow broke water,
B. More research into and improvement of stoppage of oil-leakage in
submarines are needed. .T/e know, from sound detection, that several onemy
patrol vessels were directly above us. That we escaped bc;ing depth-chargod
is due entirely to prevention of oil-leakage,
C. Research and improvement in the field of noiseless running are
needed. Although v.'e vrcre not depth-charged when bottomed, that was because of
an entire absence of sound on our part. At many other times v;hcn we were
running quiet we v/ore depth-charged. This indicates both that the enemy's
sound-detection is superior to ours, and that our being detected was because
of the noise of our equipment,
■ D. The depth ot which the overboard discharge pumps (main and auxiliary),
and the electric power pump in the head can be used is too limited; it needs
to be increased by about 60 meters.
E, There is immediate need of automatic dopth-oontrol gear. VJhen on-
tangled and unable to move, it is nooossary, in order to remain below surface,
to use discharge pumps a good part of the time. The sound of these pumps
might easily load to detection and attack by tho enemy.
Furthermore, night-time charging of batteries is oxtremoly diffi-
cult in patrol areas. At tho outset v;e woro barely ablo to do 735? of o^r rO"
charging. I consider the installation of automatic depth-control gear in
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 511
CONFIDENTIAL
submarines assigned to rooonnaissanoe of enomy harbors an imracdin.te and urgent
necessity,
P. Submarines should be equipped v/ith 4 pairs of net-outting shears
of proper design. The array wire-cutters lent to this ship by the Kure Military
Supply Department would be practically useless in net-outting.
G, There should bo a supply of explosives for self-destruction. V/hen
wo reached our crisis, I ordered preparations for blowing up the ship, but
when I saw the crew panting in the foul air of the ship, and realized they
would have to suffer further while v/aiting for the flames from the ignition-
charge to explode the magazine, I felt that it was an unbearable situation,
H. Morale was excellent.
I. We throw overboard large quantities of waste, sandals, oil, etc.,
upon surfacing. I am not sure whether the enemy, seeing all this in the
daytime, were made to accept it as proof of our sinking. I believe there will
be many cases in which there will be difficulty in determining the effects
of d3pth-chj.rg;o8 or attacks uftor a submarine is caught in a net.
79716 O— 46 — pt. 13 10
512 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON
SOURCE DOCUMENT #7
(TRANSLAnCN OF A CAPTORED JAPANESE DOCUMENT
TELLING THE EXPERIENCES OF A JAPANESE IN THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)
TilNTITLED
"THE SOUTHERN CROSS HY KURAMOTI, Iki"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBCR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages U32-li60).
(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CCNGRESSiaJAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 513
A h Op-16-FE
Tr«nsI''<fcio
2-3 July 19/
THE Z'"' '"' -
by
mM.:on, iki
An «3ccount. -vritten in flo-/i;v;' l".n,"j':!f. of +hc
experiencer of AlTiAl/iOri , Iki in thf ntt-.ck or.
Pearl Karlxir ':nd in vp.rious other ooeritions
in the South Sens in 1912. Itie furhor hie not
been identified but wns probnbly ".n t-nlist-^d
man. InterEpersec! in the :;ccovint ■..'ill U fo'ir.
information of military interest fron 3ihist-,ri
point of vie'.T,
DISIEJH'JuOV
>,_1^-A.3.h
Op-16-'.'
(2)
^"-I^ -Z
x--ij-:t
(3)
J-; ->'-:.
Comincr. r-20
Corincli F-.4
Coriinch r-1
.:AD
U)
. .3 S
(7)
' '3; .0
(3)
F^L.ar;?
(2)
mI.: .:a"y 12 c
i2)
ClrT.pAC
(2)
c..-.iu.._ jLi;
IT
c.^.i'!7r;: rL.:
■T
0 J. .oE'.rE.ilK FJ
L£T
(2)
Cj;J>X.?aC
C - :;notohtr)
,;.-,. -^-l-;_!
'T
- " :a
Adv. Hcutrs
; - ....
/;- :#^456,
cA -?., .
-•- ; " CO
(2)
514 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDEMTIAL
ME SOUTKSRI^ CROSS
INmODUCTION
IVhen, in after years, one looks back on the events of the pest,
the recollection brings tjith it a mood of deep and poetic emotion. Even
the most unhappy events of foroer years are touched with beauty by the
light of the past, and their unpleasantness forgotten like a dreaa.
Just as the sun, sinJdnf^ into the sea, paints the twilight sky
with rosy clouds and impresses the eye of the beholder irLth its beauty as
its majestic form sinks moment by moment below the horizon, so the lind
of man, loving the beautiful and hating the ugly, instinctively transnutes
everything into beauty.
TJhen I look at the moon, I recall an evening; in i^y native village
when I watched it together T/ith a tender companion, in an ecstacy of love.
When I look at the clouds, I think of a dry in nj' childhood ivhen,
scolded by my mother, I flung nyself do.fn forlornly on the bank of e pool
and watched the clouds drifting away into the distant sky, until finally
my grief subsided to a vague sadness and in the twilight my mother led me
home.
TThen I look at the stars, I remember fondly a night when, out of
work and wandering aimlessly, I saw through my tears the weeping Pleiades
twinkling in en alien sky.
With the passage of time, all these memories of the past become
ever dearer to my heart.
Now, in the midst of this preat world conflict of the Twentieth
Century, I have taken up arms in the service of ny beloved homeland, and
have made the dcring voyage to the South Sens, where- shines the Southern
Cross, wy heart is joyful. I shall set down here for future years a
record of these unforrettable days, so that their recollection may bring
ne a Lifetime of delight.
Die Southern Cross.'
^Thether or not that name is a fitting title for this work, I do
not know; but during my voyage to the South Sees that constellation im-
pressed itself, I know not why, unforgettably upon ny aind, and its nane
is indelibly written in my heart. Battles have folloaaa bottles, nnd 1
believe their dazzling nuaber iTill remain recorded for posterity in this
book, Ihe Southern Cross.
KURAUOTO, Iki
.(1)
TU
^7C^
•1-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 515
CONFIDENTIAL
The Great East Asia TJar.' Accursed conflict of nations!
The peoples of this world, seeding to enlarge their countries
to gratify their boundless ambition, have rushed like a raging wave
into q great war such as has never before been ssen in the history of
the vrorld.
Epoch-making conflict of nations J
0 tragic sight I
The ^reak become the victi.Tis of the strong. Those viho hrve
strength are victorious; those who have not strength are defeated. The
victors use the nptural resources and extensive territories talm from
the enemy for the benefit of their o'vn countrj'; and, at the same ti le,
expand their military preparations more and nore in order to prevent
the lies of enemy nations from ever again gainjmg a foothold* Like a
great tree putting donn roots deeply into the ground, they try to
build a firm and enduring Paradise on earth.
The vanquished are driven from their country, and as an
exiled race, gathered together into forlorn companies of the living
dead, drift about aimlessly on a journey without end.
As long as there exist great numbers of people leading a
crovTded life on the limited surface of the earth, will not their innate
passions of self-interest and srabition lead them to seek the means of
living a r.ore secure existence, and thus embroil them inevitably in war
after war? A study of the past history of the world will immediately
make this problem clear.
Houever, the wars of the past have been conflicts between two
nations or at most a few nations only, in -Jhich only a part of the .
world has stood divided. I believe it is no exaggeration to say that
they are mere trifling altercations in co-nparison to the Great East Asia
War, \fhioh may be truly called a '.'orld revolution.
JloiT that we have been s'.jept into this world conflagration, I
shall attempt to set down in tliis book a record of my part in the Great
East Asia 'lar, and. the impressions I have received from the .Tiany battles
in which I have taken part. But first I must express my earnest hope
that, by means of the supreme love for humanity v;hich I take as r.iy slo-
gan, this horrible war nay soon be ended in mutual understanc^inf among
nations, and that the peaceful days of before the war may a'jain return
to the earth.
Wien I write thus solemnly, those who may read this book in
later days may think that I am glorifying the second coming of Christ,
or such a great love as described in the poems of Goethe. However,
as already stated in the beginning of this book, I am an ordinary mortal
born in this twentieth century, and a soldier who has taken part in
this tragic upheaval out of a fervent love for the land of his ancestors.
Ahi when one thinks of it, this is a century of endless
change; he who in the morning is drunk with dreams of glory may, by
evening, know the bitterness of affliction. The world is on the brink
of a great transformation.
While generally praising the holiness of love and mourning
the t'imult of the world, I must yet take up arms for the land of my
ancestors and fight to the last drop of my blood. IJierein lies the
bitterness of life.
What a contradiction!
Below I shall attempt to set down, just as I recollect at
random, a record of my participation in the war.
516 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COAT I D £ J .T_I_A_I;
HA^AII Operation (8 December)
At the time of year 'vhen green leaves turn suddenly to red
in the cool ^nds of approaching autumn, and one begins to feel the
piercing bresth of the North Wind - that is to say, Q^__18 Nc2vcmber l^iJJ. -
fwe Ihft iOrni: harbor and sailaUlor^jhe distailt-JaQrtl:£rii-36as. The pui--
pose i>f this operation was unknown to us.
lie hac* taken on board -.varri clothing, materials for protecting
the guns against the cold, and a great quantity of sea nets, but ve
understood nothing of this.
. Day after day and night after night the ships carried out
I target practice.
In the ne .'spapers that '.le had on board it '.7as said that 'je
Trere to attack DUTCH HAKBOR, but •;o did not believe it.
'Thy did ve not believe it? Consider the .Moderate course of
JaperiesediDloaacy up to that time. It seemed unlikely that Japan aeant
et this time to lift up her hfind against Britain and America, Int'eed,
was there not at that moment a coriferenoe in progress at "Jashington
beti7een America and Japan?
Our hopes vrere betrayed. '7e learneo this -./hen le ■.ont into
port to refuel. Then ue learnt for the first time ho'.: grave the situation
was. Within the bay in that island of the bitterly cold Iforth Pfciiio
the air fleet was gathered. The crews, who every day were busy at con-
ferences and discussions, were in an excited state of mind.
Finally the Navigation Officer, Lieut. Comdr. YAIJO, told us
we were to make a surprise attack on KAIAII. At last Japan .oyld be at
war '-dth Britain and the U.S.A..'
An air attack on HA7AII! A dream come true. That -..-ill the
people at home think when they hear the ne:fs? lon't they be excited i
I can see them clapping their hands and shouting iiith ioy. These were
our feelings. T?e would teach the arrogant Anglo-Saxon scoundrels a
lesson.'
"'e must be inflexible in our course... .'Je could not expect
to return alive. ... Thinking that, for all ie kne.;, -..'e night nov: be
eating and drinking for the last time, v;e gorged ourselves on inrn, and
cakes frou the canteen.
• Finally, early in the morning of 26 ilovembcr, oiU" magnificent .
lair fleet set out through the thick fog and stor.r.y -..'nves. Follo'.ang
\a pre-arranged course it continued on its jay toj'rd PLAKL HAJ;30ri ex-
pecting to destroy the enemy's Pacific Fleet.
The ,'eathej^ gro-7s worse, a gale blovjs, the seas ra.:;c, a dense
fog descends. In this bitter~ 'leather, a shoT/ of actual force, a test
by the gods, though tossed about in their struggle -..-ith the eluai.nts,
the ships continue on their glorious ^.'ay.
In the several days of danger V7hen flags vjere blo'.m a'.ray,
and men vrashed overboard, throughout the storm, the target practice v;ent
on ceaselessly.
Every man was completely exhausted by continuous watches
without sleep, and by the silent struggle with Nature; but our spirits
were buoyed up by the thought that we were to strike the very first
blow in this greatest of all :7ar&.
Behind us there were a hundred million people, amongst them
our own families, who had limitless faith in us. Imagine the joy of
these people on the morning when /e should successfully carry out this
operation.'
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 517
CONFIDE. J T I A L
Soon the fleet crossed the 180° date-line into the Eastern
Hemisphere. About this tine wo received a report that a steanship was
proceeding on the same course as ourselves, from SAiI FRAIICISCO to RUSSIA.
It was most important now to keep a good watch. There could
be no doubt of our success, provided that this operation was not dis-
covered by the enemy. Thereafter the whole crew Vept uatch for si^ht
I or sound of this ship; but fortunately even when near 0 point ■■e had
( cau^t no sight of it. Considering the gcnsc fog, we seeraed to be under
divine protection.
C Finally, on the long-awaited X-Day, 8 December 19A1, at 0130,
we reached a point 300 miles to the north of HATJAII. Ihcn the Impfarial
decree on the great battle was made public.
On this day there appeared in the clear sky a dense iihite
cloud as if it were blessing our passage. Ihen from the decks of the
aircraft carriers, plane after plane rose, flashing their silver \dngs
in the sunlight, and soon there were a hundred and more aircraft in the
^ sky.
Our Sea Eagles v;ere now moving into n great formation. Our
ten years and more of intensive training, during which \ie had endured
many hardships in anticipation of this day — would they now bear fruit?
At this thought a thousa id emotions filled our hearts as, close to tears,
we watched this magnificent sight. One and all, in our hearts, we sent
our pleas to the gods, and putting our hands together, iie prayed,
JJeanwhile . our Sea Eagles, with the drone of their engines
resoundinj^ across the heavens like a triumphal song, turn&d their course
toward PEARL IiARBOh on the island of OAHU and set forth on their splendid
enterprise.
About thirty minutes later the fleet received the first report
that the raid had been successful.
r The second wave of the air attack force, in a lar.je fornation
I composed of some two hundred planes, ttook off in the same way an hour
l_later.
Reports come in one after another: "Enemy anti-^aircraft fire
is becoming more and more intense — we are now attacking agcinst the
main force of the enemy — 're are bombing enemy airfields, the damage
is enormous — "
In this moment we are repaid for all our painstaking labors.
Ihe gods themselves will bear witness to the glory of our great enterprise!
Ihe deck is now transformed into a whirlpool of excitement. As
the glorious battle results are announced one after another by the pipes
of the hurrying orderlies, shouts of joy are raised on all sides, ind
all gloom is completely swept away.
Ct!eam7hile the fleet novos swiftly onward at a high spocd of
26 knots.
About 0900 the welcome shapes of the returning raiders begin
to appear through the clouds. One by one, like fledglings longing for
their nest, they come to rest on the decks of the carriers.
Well done! But have they all come back? At this moment, my
most earnest hope is that our losses may be small.
Within an hour, all the planes were brought aboard. '.7e had
\_lost only 29 plnnes. It was aa incredibly small number 'Then compared ^vith
our glorious battle results; nevertheless, vjhen their heroic end i/as
nnounced, the hearts of the crew were filled with sorrow for those .Tien,
Qind for the fate of our special submrinfes'^
(Ij TOKUSHU SENKOffil f^^'^-^/{f^^
518 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
Suddenly the anti-aircrnft defense signal was sotutded. An
enemy plnne, above the clouds, \?ns insolently following Ih the trail
of our aircraft. Intending to shoot it dovm with one blast from our
ship, we manned our battle stations, but In n oonent the enemy got airsy.
It Mcs rise reported that the enemy fleet wes on our trail;
but this waa only a false r.larm, and all the ships vrithdrew tovardB
0 point.
IQ,
niu3, having inflicted upon America a loss which cannot be
wiped out in a lifetime, we finally _pet out upon our home»7ard journey.
On the \iay, the 2nd MrFlo^ and the Sth OiuDli ^»ere detached
and headed for T7AKE Island r.s /in nttacl force.
C, On ■ morning near the end of the year — 25 December — \re
entered the h.irbor at KUES, -Aich we had long been yearning to see r.gf.in.
On thinking beck, it was a long journey. Uio heroic men v/ho
took part In it, the public excitement at home of vhich we learned by
radio, and the \iilA u-^ves of the stormy Itorth Pacific, are all etched
upon my heart like a vivid dream.
Ah, memorable day - 8 December 19412
(ihis concludes my recollections of the
HAITAII Operation)
(NEU GUINEA) RABArL OperaUons
I had but a short whilf , but nevertheless I celebrated a
victorious Nen Tear's Day in the homeland and enjoyed to the fullest
the taste of ay native lend. Lerving KURE behind, I set out on the long
sea voyage to my second field of operations in the South Seas - to that
southern land -irhich I had longed for and dreamed of since ray childhood.
I stood at my lookout station watching while seas of dancing silver ind
gold waves and naked natives dancing in the shadow of coconut trees
floated before my eyes. At length the fleet passed TAIT7AI! and. entftred
the Itoplcal Zone. At IRUK, the Innd of eternal summer, \7e changed to
our tropical uniforms.
Ihe bright sun sent out blazing rays and it was steaaing hot
Inside the ship, Hiis completely dissipated my cherished illusions
about the tropics. Even so, the squalls which occasionally assailed
us, accompanied as they were witJi cool winds and rain, ameliorated the
heat. Then at night the gentle evening breeze, blowing dro'./sily, gave
delicious coolness to my hot body. Looking heavenv/ard, stars like
scattered gold and silver twinkled here and there in the evening sky.
Ihe Southern Cross, which I was seeing for the first time, glittered
there among them.
Ihe nights in the South Seas roused vegue feelings of longing
for home. Giving consolation for our inadequacies, the rippling waves
broke against the side of the boot like sparkling scatterings of beauti-
ful pure silver, the South Sea vegetation grew luxuriantly directly
down to the benting '.wves and its beautiful contours were reflected on
the surface of the sea. Adding the moon to this, the raid-day boat
seemed n dream.
!7e stopped here for a certain number of days, then \/hen the
supplying was completed, finally turned toward the RABAUL theater of
operations and went forth to the attack. Ihe gun shields were put up,
and lookouts posted as usual.
-5-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 519
CONFIDENTIAL
Slnoe leavlag KOBE Hartior, how many tines have I longed for »
peaceful Bleep in a haamookl Exhausted Iff work during the day, at night
I lay aooog the oachlne guns on the upper deck, never closing my watch-
ful eyes for an Instant. Are the men on the homefront really avrrsre of
these hardships?
Finally, on 20 January, we launched our planes from a point
200 miles north of RABAUL and NEt7 aiNEA. From that time until the
24.th, uhen army units and landing forces carried out a bold Innding in
the fnce of the enemy, «e sailed bock and forth across the equator,
moving northward during the day and southward at night, ^o bombed every
day at dawn for about 10 tiaes. Our beloved plane, the ABUKDUA^IJ also
took pnrt in the bombing, receiving its baptism of fire, ./e did not
see the oaeniy in this operation. Bitterly disappointed at this, vb
returned once agnin to TKUK.
Fort DAR'HH Operations
f Ob 1 February we received word of the appearance of an enemy
(i striking force on the east end of the liAFiSHALL Islands. Our striking
jT foroe, under orders to take and externinnte this oneay immediately,
headed stral^t for the lURSHAU. Islands.
f hea
Bowever, the hour arrived end the enemy was no^ere about, so
there was nothing to do but to sail for the next field of operations,
namely PALAU, where we were to carry out Joint operations with the
Southern Feroe.
PALAU Island boasts of being the most civilized among the
various South Sea lalaads. S>e South Sea Islands Government Ofice is
located here, and both the buildings and the inhabitants are civilized
in comparison wilfc IBUX and other islands.
With its stores, perks, shrines, APAI^^^ elementary schools,
and in the military line the Air Qroup, Stores Department, etc., it
reminded ne of country towns at home.
Here I approached two native girls nnd in exchanging conver-
sation with them on various subjects was amazed at their skill in Japa-
nese, at their sioplielty and naivety, and at the intelligence of their
profiles.
/an
On a oortain day here we were sent out to destroy POPiT DARTIt.',
important port on the extreoe northern tip of hostile AVSffiALIA. Hbe
■>~J planes took off as in the previous battle from a point 200 miles n^;ay,
\and inflicted tremendous damage on the port.
Our stMking force next had to prepare for the JAVA Operotione
in the Indian Ooean. Qiving Chase to an enemy submarine, we sailed
into STARING BAT in the Outah-held CEI£BES, which were now under occu-
pation Ity our pnratroop forces and landing forces.
Indian Ocean (JAVA) Operations
England and Aoeirioa's ambitious lOO-year-oId dream of ad-
vancing into the South Seas and the Orient was finally shaken to its
foundations as defect followed defeat. In spite of the fact that they
were taking their deathbed gasp; still Btubboi>n, they despatched the
(2) APAI 7/>M unidentified.
520 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDEUTIAL
Combined Btitish, Dutch end Ancricsn Fleet, which now hpd no c-pit.^1
ships, nnd continued their throes in the JAVA area, their list defense.
Our striking force, "hich vws to help this enemy across its Irst river,
nctinj in close cooperotion.'.Tith other South Sea forces, weighed nn-
chor in iSTARIMG BAY on 25 Fobrjary and t7»^s on its way to the snlty
Indian Ocean.
The fleet, keeping a strict nnti-subrnprint pntrol in the sea
areas where enemy submarines navigate, advanced between the islnnds
which interspr.rse the CMBAI Straits.
Diese waters, ripple-fi^e as flowing oil. reminded me of the
Inland Sea...(T.H. Remainder of sentence illegible)
Words at such a time fail to express what I feel. TJild ducks
flying together, clouds flor^ting majestically, a great school of dolphins
~ the very picture of peace. Could it be thct a bloody .far was being
fought on such a sea? It is not surprising that we felt a sense of
wonder.
Finally the fleet made its splendid appenrnnoe in the Indian
Ocean. A few hours later the Z+th Cruiser Division(l) separated from
the force as a detached force end left for an undisclosed destination.
The remainder, U r.ircraft carriers, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cniiser,
and several destroyers arrived in the vicinity of CHRlSHviAS ISLAlffi to
-try to sink the enemy's fleet. T7e received reports from the Air Fleet 11
I that one enemy carrier and one destroyer were trying to make port at
' CiI[tIST^'iAS ISli.JD. 7?e approached this isl-nd and sent up a reconnaissance
plane, but it was not able finally to locate any trace of theu, Ilo
doubt the swiftly retreati g enemy had learned of our approach, and had
escaped under cover of night.
Grumbling over our ill luck in being a.i^ain cheated out of an
enga;'7oment, './e changed our course "nd. formation and headed for a supply
base. Suddenly the alarm was given to man our battle stations. '.Jon-
dvring what had happened, we leaped to our battle stations and srrj to
our right n cloud of black smoke rising on the distant horizon. "Hie
big guns of the T0NE(2) opened fire, belching black smoke. Ihe des-
troyers up ahead also began firing.
Soon the enemy merchant ship broke into flames, and in a few
minutes sanlc to the depths of the Indian Ocean.
From this first bombardment by our striking force, I las able
to realize something of the difficulties of artillery warfare; I was
surprised to learn th^t we had fired several hundred shells at a single
merchant vessel. Several hours later we uere again ordered to nan our
[battle stations. As we took up our posts, full of fighting spirit, the
big guns of the T02ffi in the re^r were already firing and shortly there-
after the HIEl(3) also opened fire.
Finally v/e sighted the two enemy cruisers \7hich wore follo'.dng
astern. They at once made -- quick 130° turn and fled into th^ clouds
and mist.
(3) it'f?s_ .
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 521
CON FIDE UTIAL
Apparently it •:ns considered too much trouble to finish then off
Lifith irtillcry fire; so our Sea Er.gles rose vdth one flr.p of their Ings
from the decks of the carriers. In a fer; moments they sent the eaeciy to
the bottom nnd or-me triumphnntly bnck. In a short tine the rO.iC rescued
I members of the enemy ore-.T from the snme ship and returned to its group.
'In the meantime the destroyer AftlAKE(l) cone back '.Tith 27 crewmen :;nd
lother persons from the merohrnt ship v/hich had previously been sunk.
We, who hcd not fired a single shot while wc watched the ar-
tillery fight of the other ships, grieved with vexation beyond descrip-
tion, staring at the sky. In the meantime, off the coast of SQERABAJA
and BATAVIA, our destroyer squadrons opened a day and night battle, and
brilliant battle results followed in quick succession.
The enemy oust have escaped somehow to Australia; not one of
them was caught in our net. Finally, as a lest resort, we carried out a
great bombing attack on a large group of transports that were entering
the harbor of WIUTJAP.
About that time the weather began to get worse, belying the
reputation of the Indian Ocean as the most peaceful of the seven seas.
The wind velocity increased to 20 meters per second, and the ships rolled
with a 20-degreo list to port and starboard. Finally ue gave up taking
on oil from alongside and began to take it stem on because of the heavy
seas.
Afterwards in the midst of the rough T/eather, our force re-
sumed its ceaseless reconnaissance, moving erst and west in irregular
movements in search of the enemy. At that time the stntenents of the
survivors picked up by the TOIIE were made public.
Hiese men knew nothing of the movements of their own fleet;
they did not even know that HAWAII had been attacked. They sei^med to be-
lieve that our fleet was concentr''.ted only in the CELEEES, From this we
could see how America was concealing her crushing defeats in a desperate
attempt to prevent a decline in morale.
England and America, sacred countries of disguise, now your
last time has come. Enemy of mankind, evil spirit of peace, the harsh
blow of heaven has fallen a^^ainst you.
Heaven will by no means forgive you, who for your ovm profit
have planned an unscrupulous attack on Japan, the nation of righteousness,
and on the Oriental people - you, who are trying to subjugate the world
and to make the ^ro^ld a paradise for the white race!
Among the races who have been exploited up till now by the
English and Americans are the Indians, the Malayans, the Chinese, the
Burmese, and countless other ignorant races whom civilization has by-
passed. They have become the victims of the characteristic English-
American policy of "squeeze and take", while the latter line their purses
and nurture their overweening ambition.
They cause GAMDHI to cry out for the independence of India and
far away they carry on an opium \;ar in the Republic of China.
(D^dJ]
522 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COHFIDENTIAI,
All this is a ory from the henrt of the splendid peoples of the
Orient who are trying to escape the pressure which is being brought upon
them by England end America.
However, now the blood of the Oriental peoples has returned ♦•■o
the originpl cherished desire of the Orientals and has been embrpced b/
them. Iheir feelings are shown by the fact that they have pledged the'r
mutual cooperation ind assistance for the great undertflking of Japp.n^ ;he
lep.ding power of the Orient.
Jnpan, vho, fs the leader of the Orient has opposed the powc*
ful countries of England and America, really loves Asia and is laboring
for the peace of mankind.
Our task group was now passing in the vicinity of ADLilHALTY BAI
and on the eleventh tre were scheduled to enter the port of KEHDATJ.
Although scarcely two laonths hnd passed since we left the home-
land, it sec-ned like two years.
In the Indian Ocean, where once the Gernan ship EUDEH played
a spectacular part in the destruction of trcde, there is no,; not a shadow
of the enemy, and an uncanny silence peirvades the surfrce of the sea
where there is a faint reflection of the aoon.
/
Jhc__Indir.n Ocecn (CEYLON)
ITith regard to the attack on CEYLON, v/hich must grace the final
pages of the history of our striking force, every possible preparation
for battle had been completed during the 15 days when we lay rt anchor in
SIARING BAY. Actually it was at the very cr^-ck of dawn on 26 March 19.42
when once again it sallied forth into the fleecy-capped waves of vhe X-, •
dian Ocean. 7e saw, just as we did in the Java operation, the porpoit. =8
playing near the ocean's surface, as if the quiet, gently- lapping waves
of OMBAI Straits were lulling then to sleep.
Ihere is a saying that the Indian Ocean has mountainous waves
and that it is the ocean of the devil. But the Indian Ocean, shining
before our eyes, was like an extremely quiet bay or a gently- rocking
cradle.
Sailing around from place to place like this, a mundane feeling
touched rae. I was reminded of the days ^.en 1 was n young bachelor •.?ith
my pay envelope containing my monthly 50 ¥ converted into pure happiness,
when I was swaggering through the street shops '.ri.th an air of independence
showing on my pimply ffice.
'•hile I MRS waiting, so tense -rith excitenc.nt was I that I might
easily have sold my dearest possession at bargain prices. As the saying
goes, oy duties were like heavy weights on my shoulders.
7e continued to sail siriftly and uneventfully, loadinjj oil
from time to time, standing watch, and keeping anti-subinarine lookout,
tihot strength there is in being vath speedy airplanes.'
/ At daybreak of the day before the attack, 4 April 1942, i^OO
miles from CEYLON, an enemy Consolidated Flying Boat Tib*- na. The bugle
stirringly sounded "aerial attack" and the entire crew took up their posts.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 523
CONFIDENTIAL
Happy dayj My blood rnn fast and my fleoh tingled na the
eneingr planes for which I had been waiting since the outbreak of the wsr
appeared 30° off the port side. The shells nere bursting in the air.
It was nore stiiTing than I had iorgined it would be. Bie enemy tried
to hide himself, using the white clouds as a snoke screen, but to no
avail; our ships' fire sought hin out, and after n few rujiutes of aerial
warfare he came crashing doivn, trailing a long tail of snoke against the
sky. Ahl Diey have exhausted all their secret methods J TThnt feelings
the enemy must have experienced during those few minutes i TThnt a lanen-
table way to spend one's lest few moments of life J
Early on 5 April, for which we had been waiting, our force
reached a point 200 miles south of CEYLON. The ireother was excellent
for good aerial bombardment.
Before daybreak, p. huge formtion of planes set out for the
enemy's Inst stronghold, COLCtiBO in CEILON. "Qiis attack was timed to
take place Just at the tine of an Anglo-Indian conference. Pifercin," the
morning haze like inpetaous falcons, the planes soon disappeared from
eight.
In less than an hour we received our first reports. According
to those, we obtained brilliant results from aerial attacks on an enemy
escorted convoy, on ground installations and airfields, and on an enemy
plane on patrol duty, ihe planes returned to the ships safely.
Ueanwhile, shipbome reconnaissance seaplanes went out to
search for the enemy, looking to the vrest and to the south for ships and
small craft. Presently, we received a wireless message from a plane of
the 8th Cruiser Division to the effect that one carrier and one des-
troyer had been sighted. A carrier bomber unit was despatched instantly
and sank them innediately. (Two enemy cruisers were mistaken for a
carrier and destroyer).
The force, going outside its patrol radius, sailed north and
then south in irregular movements.
Finally, after our supplying was completed, V76 turned to our
next field of attack, IRIMCOLIALCE.
Ue launched the attack from a point 200 niles to the east at
dawn on 9 April, in fine weather. Inasmuch as our Irrgc flying boats
had been shooting dovm enemy craft for some time, ue thought it likely
that the enemy ws expecting an attack on this occasion. However, our
bold and intrepid fliers will turn the tables on the English by using
their own strategy of crushing the enemy vri.th a single blo.v. "Then we
see the enemy, we will shoot hin doim without fail, the enemy faces
the grim prospect of certain death.
Ihe enemy's military installations at IRINCOIaALEE were bombed
until there were none remaining. Furthermore, our fleet dispatched its
reserve forces and in the work of a moment sank the aircraft carrier
HERMES and a destroyer which were cruising in neighboring waters. V?e
seemed to be inspired with superhuman powers.
At this point, an enemy heavy bomber unit consisting of 9
planes audaciously attacked our force; but because the bombs fell from
an altitude of 6000 meters, they did no more harm than startling the fish
in the sea. Our 25 mm. machine guns pursued the planes above the ships
and spurting fire in unison, brought doxm seven of them. This one battle
certainly proved how weak the fighting capacity of enemy planes is.
-10-
524 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
C 0 :J F I D E II T I A
The fnce of the braggnrt Churchill who before the \irr cUsd-ined
r.nd scorned Jrpnn, r.nd the free of the miserable Churchill './ho no:.' stunbles
stnight to defeat, '.vould berr resenblnnce to thi. fnce of rn fictor •..■ho
plrys n double role of sorro\J nnd gloc.
The strikinf^ force in the BAY OF BEIIG/iL pnd our forc< li'll C
esch other; the DAY OF BENGAL force s^id it h-d been c."rryiiij on o>r.' -.ions
for five dcys r.nd hnd obtained grent results.
lost
Hie English sun of military power in India, h'ving finnll;,
its Inst vestige of defense, secned on the point of setting.
The great British Eapire has been shaken to its foundations, r.nd
its dream of .rorld domination has been turned into a nightmare.
The passage of tine has now fulfilled its purpose. Heaven has
sent down its blessing upon the righteous, and crushed the v/icked with an
iron hand. Kow this earth, which \/a.s nade for the generel benefit of rll
mnnlcind, \7ill be wholly transmuted into the paradise that has been the
• cherished hope of Eastern peoples. Japan, at the he-'d, loudly sounds the
knell of tyranny, and Japan, who le^ds the East to rebirth, is most fitted
to bestow the blessing of the pods.
Back to our longed-for mother coiintryi ^'^t long 1-st we return
to our hone port. In frankness 1 admit that I shod a tear as •.;e bade fare-
well to the- skies of the Southern Ser.s. The ship, seer.ing to quiver with
joy, passed throuph the beautiful I.L..LACCA SIR-JIS on a northerly cnirsc.
'.7e were on our ':jry to our distant hoMcl'-nd, our hearts filled
vri.th emotion; loaded v/ith honor, the best gift ',/e coulc take to oij native
land was our glorious victory and our triurjphal song.
./"""N Soon, "S we were approaching the most northerly extre.i:'-';/ of the
/] PHILIPPICS, we received \Jord by radio th-t an enemy tasl" forcv h"'.' svl ■
I denly appeared at a point 750 nllcs south of Tokyo. Our forcu \rs ordcrad
/ ti^ destroy the ener.y immediately, '.'e sped to the attack "t " !ii,;h speed
( of 20 knots, intending to attacl: the ene.my as lonj as oui^ fuel held out.
S By an irony of f"te, hov;ever, before -.rc '.;cre able to reach this -point,
on the 18th of Dece.mber sever-l cities in the TOIIOiOi district of Japan
suffered an air attack on a s.T,all scale.
■7e wept bitter tears and were filled -.ath indignation; but '1-
though T/e continued the search for the enemy, we v;ero unable to find him.
Hov/ever, it could not be helped -■rvi \:o T^lloved the pre-arranged c lurse
that should have led us to the cir\c:vj, until, on the 23th, the i.'hole fleet
dispersed in home waters and we hastened to our longed-for home ports.
Friends and comrades of the strikinp force, for a long time we
have suffered and been happy together: together '..'e have rendered a great
service to our country. Now the tine h's come for us to part; but, so';ner
or later, the day '.Till come v/hon 'fe shall be together rgain. Until then,
enjoy yourselves and be happy.' TThile my heart is grieved at ttiis sad
parting, I shall try to -vTrite n few lines of feeble verse.
(T.W. The "few lines of feeble verse" (eight pages) have been omitted)
-11-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 525
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON
SOURCE DOCUMENT #8
(TElANSLAnON OF THREE CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENTS )
ENTITLED
(A)
"JAPANESE SUBMARINE SCHOOL NOTES
COflGERNING
EARLY WAR ^PERI F:r>[GES OFF HAWAII"
(same aa SOURCE DOCUMENT #5, SUPRA)
(B)
"JAPANESE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE YATSUMAKI BUTAI"
(C)
"JAPANESE PUCES OF MILITARY IMPORTANCE IN THE KURILE ISLANDS"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SWiMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages i;32-U60).
(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL. HARBCR)
526 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
lNTEIU(ffiRCE CBNIER, PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS ♦T iT I
NAVY NUWHai 128' (Offi TWO EIGHT) f X^ '
c/o Fleet Poet Office " -.....-^.^..
San PrBncisco, California
VL/iim ,;"" '"^.-^ ^
CONFIDENTIAL ^ . /W/^/7 ^f 3 f
30 June 19W Serial AS-300921 Q'-'"'**' ' "
/^3
From: Officer in Charge.
To: Distribution List Contain/d lii Paragraph 2.
SubJ: ICPOA Tra;)slatioiyof O^V^^*^ Enemy Documents,
Item No^'^72 ■* "jpubiMirine School Notes Coneeming
Early WaS'^Sqjerienc/s off Hawaii."
ICPOA Tra^jslatioryoy Captured Enemy Documents,
Item No«'473j) "A^qitructions to the Yataumaki Butai."
ICPOA Tr^psl^tion^of Captured Enemy Documents,
Item No^ /»74 V "places of Military Importance in the
Kurile Islsnda.'
1. The enclosures forwarded herevrtth need not be reported and
when no longer of value should be destroyed. No report of
destruction is required,
2. Distribution Is as follows:
Mo. of Copies
Cominch , 2
VCNO (ONI) 5
VCNO (OKI) (For CinC Sastem Fleet) 1
CinCPac 1
CinClant 2
CcanNorPac 5
ComSoPac 10
ComSoT.'esPac , 5
ComSubPac 10
ComOesPac , 10
ComAmphibForPac 3
N2NB 2
'^//If^f^^Ui^^CC-
U. LECTaroRE
By dli'ection
Ends:
1. Subject translations
2. Original Documents #472^ and 473 (to CM only)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 527
C-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L-
CAPTOH3D DOCUMEtlTS - TRANSLATSD BT ICPOA
Original Item it ,ICPOA ttea i'LlJg Tranal.bylCPOA Date 10 June 19^.3
Title of Publication SUIIlutR^HE SCHOOL NOIBS OONCERKING 3AflLY <fAR
JgJimSNCjS. OFF .KAmi
m CAGI! OF DIARY, -R.;COHD, LOG, etc., GIV3 r/RlTiS'S
Or;;anization
Initial Date Final Date
Jsn. 12. 19^1 Instructor MaeshJjja
It is needless to state that combat education in t his current entergenc7
is of groat nooassity, and it is extremely regrettable that there has bten
no op ortunity to gather sufficient matorial before tho graduation of the
11th. period special course students, oince, however, some materials in
the category of coauat instructions has been obtained with the airival in
port of submarines- 1-16 and 1-60 recently, it has been decided to immediately
mimeogranh and 'istribute it as study material to this period's special
course students. Altho'igh it is diff. oult to suarantee that among the
items heard directly there are no points of difference vdth actu£Ll facts,
it is believ-^c' that there are no great errors in the instructions obtaoued.
(1)
79716 O — 46 — pt. 13 11
528 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
— rjy— CONFIDENTIAL
NO •- i.—TACTICS
1. Use of submarine carried planes.
A. After the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 8, the submarine
1-7 received an order to carry out an aerial reconnaissance of Pearl
Harbor when the opportunity presented. Although shu attempted to send
off a plane from the neighborhood of Niihau, it was inpossiblfc to do so
due to the weather. Hence she proceeded southv;ard until in the neighbor-
hood of Haivaii and carried out the aerial reconnaissance,
B, './hen on pxckut station, it may bo possi.blc, doporjding on the weather, the
enemy's alert condition, terrain and other conditions, to send off the
plants carried from a certain area, but it may be impossible to do so
from another aroa.. Consequently, besides the necessity of deploying air-
plane carrying submarines, tharo is aleo tno ncc\^ssity of deplpying many
airplanu carrirtg submarines.
Since urgent execution of the above mentioned r-connaissancc was not
neci'ssrjiy, wo suffered no great disadvantage, but it v.'ould be of groat
disadvantage, ■'.vhon urgency of execution is required,
2, Movement agai ist enemy depth charges,
A, Since xierica's depth charge setting, for the most part, has been defin-
itely ascertciined to be in the nei,"iborhood of 35 meters by previous in-
vestigations, submarines attached to the Sixth Fleet have evaded them at
depths of 50 to 70 meters. (Sorae subs have evaded them at a depth of 100
ijeters). In tne case of the 1-16 (70 meters depth), she received three
charges directly over her, but suffered no damage. (Judging from the
opinion that the bursting charge of America's d -pth charges appeared to
be feeble, it is doubtful as to whether the charges were directly over-
head,^
B, V/hen the safe" submerging depth is thought to be about 20 meters more than the
supposed depth setting of depth charges, it is deemed best to assume as far
as possible ? nosition of 20 meters or more below the depth charge's depth
setting,
-n
If not, it is deemed best to assvune a position up high, but impossible to be
detected, and as far above ao possible from the supposed deptli setting of
the depth chairge
(a) The 168 prliarily used soxind listening patrol /^Spn shokaipii^ B? ^^ fVi -J
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 529
-V^-)- CON^IDEaTIAL
to provent cUiy dooroaso in the efficiency of the listuniaig gear, the. f oL-
lovd.ng.niethod.vfas used iwid no uneasiness. .n'as felt hccause of t-hc saund
listening . patrol.
3. Ubs^rvatr.on patrol.
• A. (l) 3lo\.'cst speed usee'.
(2) VcatiL.tion stopped.
(3) In steering, ..■.ccaaiiical power aas used only for the diving rudder,
v/hile the r.,3t uas all i lan pouer.
(4) Althou:,h it I'as stipulated in the operational order that batteries
should bo c.iar.jec' at ni^.ht at tl.^ o-.tor edge of the p;;.trol zone (about
10 nautical :ail.-s iron haroer entrance), it v/as i;npossiblc to do so.
Hance, b;,-tcrii:s vere o.-.jrct:d at a distcuicc of 40 ;iaut,ical lailos from
the har'jor entrance and after that wo returned to the patrol zone.
B. At night, when piclceting ':iy enemy pr.trol vessels is to be expected, it
is deeraed best to increase the depth of the patrol zone.
4, Patrol method of Ainerican destroyers,
A. It seeins as if .American destroyers are equipped v.-ith accurate and good
sound detectors and they, for the nost part, are e:Lecutins stationary
or slow speed .atrol.
E. -Dven i/hen c.n Anerican destroyer is atationarj', be on guaid.
_Np,.„2,„Cpi3AT DUTY
1, Ir.entixication method of friendly units vfhen returnin.15 to friendly harbor.
A, The i.iethod carried out by I-I6 is as follo.js:
(1) Hoisted a ''Treidth Four" Ensign at the „ip of the periscope.
(2) Spread a "Breadth Four" 13nsi^,n on the ladder to the bridge,
(3) notified the tine of its arrival within the 3OC nautical mile arc,
its osition . nc" course one or t-o days previously to the hont combat
force r;P'9 ^X ^^ f^ J
Aien returning to an -dvanced base, /TioJ took the system of b.aving the
commandant of the -.dvance basp force .indicate the point of passage into
the 300 nautical mile arc.
B. T.iere is aji e;o:mple of submarine 1-68 being .ittacked uith depth charges
by a friendly destroyer v.-ben leavinc; an .'.dvanced ba.^e. Closest attention
sfiould be paid to the identification of frie.ndly units \;hen entering and
leaving a friendly harbor .nd to being r.lert.
Z6I.
530 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-^^*^ CONFIDBNTIAL
No... 3. MAVIGATION. '.YEAT1I3R Aim SSA CONDITION
1. Onshore Current,
A. The onshore currant in the area of Barber's Point, Oahu, is very strong.
Since suhmcrine 1-63 paid little attention to this, she si ,hted the
breakers of Barber's Point reef at a very close distance when she raised
her periscope up to obs^^rvc, but she was able- to prevent anything from
happening by turning immediately,
B, Vifhen stationed on observation 8n the front line, it is necessary to take
into proper coMideration the onshore current v/hen close to the shore,
NO. 4. MANSUVERIMG FOR ATTACK
1. Protracted subnerged navigation,
A, (l) In rog> rd to submarine 1-68, thi number of days of submerged navigation
was 30 for an average of 14 hoiirs per day. Air purifier chcnt^cals were
used only once (20 pieces) and the cooler was not used,
(2) Although CO reached U'^%, ^ reached 16^ and the temperature roachod
32°C., there seemed to bo no great effect upon the men,
(3) Other than being usod once when her submerged navigation continued
for 36 hours, submarine 1-16 did not use the air purifier. Just as in
the above case, there se.med to be practically no offoct upon the men,
B. (l) Although there is no-d for the use of air purifiers in a submerged
navigation of about 14 hours, there is still a necessity for the gathering-
of more data for further study,
(2) It is necessary to accelerate the com])letion of the study ""v^ashing
purifier" ZT/T^ '^r ^^ -7 *'yP"^ ^^^ purifj'lng method,
2, /Javes in the Hawaiian Area,
A. During the operatioiia of submarines of the Sixth Fleet in the Hawaiian
area, waves were high every day and it has been reported that submarine
1-16 found it difficult to maintain her depth evert at the depth of about
18 meters and had to use her standard sp>-cd many times.
Besides, there appeared to be two or tiiree submarines tliat revealed their
conning tov/er in the presence of the enemy,
B, It is necessaiT' to maintain the accuracy of the sound detector excellently
in order to do away with anj' uneasiness in c.iund detection patrol.
Also, considering this, the pericsope should be riade as long as possible.
Ct,)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 531
, CONFIOSMTIAL
(5)
tOv 5., COIHJMICATION
1, Undenvator ititoIoss rocoption ability.
A, According to the oxpcri^iiccs of the 1-16, it is ro^xirtad that sensitivity
IS 4 at a depth of 18 m ters and 3 at 20 meters in the Hawaiian area.
(Sending station UtAlU)
Ml'. P.: (IS, laSSIUGjJ
1. Change in <:orking of the nacliine guns during operations,
A. (hen 1-16 test fired her nachine guns without taking the trouble of clean-
ing, after conducting operations for 30 days, of which 20 days were spent
in submerged iSavigction, one machine gun fired without any trouble, i/hile
the other fired onl;'- one shot.
2. DMjages caused by d'eptli charge i.ttack.
X. .ftole observing in Ilav/aiian area, submarine 1-68 was depth charged. Of
about 100 depth cliarges dropped, 12 exploded within, 200 meters and 2
exploded directly above. The depth charge setting us.& ifithin 35 meters
and the sub's depth k5 meters. The damase suffered from this attack, for
the most part v/as as follows:
(1) Of the 172 electric li:;lit6, 75 were aoaged. (Those that were not
li,';htod vfere not c'.an::ged) .
(2) Sniall cvaount of leal:a2e from tbi forward doorCs) of the torpedo tube(s).
(3) Tvro depth indicators began to function incorrectly.
(4) Sensitivity ux sound detector became bad.
(5) Becarae impossible to use the transmitter of the echo range depth finder.
(6) Leakage in the high i-ressi.u:e air valve group and air pressure within
Eiiip ini;reased t^reatly.
(7) Ls-pJcase in the Kingston valve of the negative buoyancy tank increasea.
(3) Due to the da.mgs to the 50 volt pov/er supply, the rudder order telegraph
vrent out. Because of t;Tis,tthe hfelmSDian mistakenly thought that the rudder
had be in daciaged.
(9) The accuracy of ths ( ? ) ammeter decreased.
(10) Leaka-e from the corroded tube(s) of number 1 cooler.
(11) Considerable leciiage from the "constant use" and reserve fuel tanks,
B. (1) Disassemble the damaged, r'epth indicator and reuove the sea water
betwten the i,'l and i'/2 beaks jf o!±i -T?
(2) To have tiorned o^f as raany electric lights as possible.
532 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
C-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
CAPIURJSD DOCUIENTS - TRANSLATED BY ICPOA
Original It^ d j ICPOA Item #473 Transl.bylCPOA Date 6 June 1943
Htle of Publication INSTRUCTIONS TO IKE YATSUMAKI BUTAI
Orisinator
IN CASs; OF DIARY, RECORD, LOG, etc., GIVE /RITER'S
Or^.anization
Initial Date 14 October 1942 final Date_
The following translation was made from a document recovered from a tivo-
-jan submarine raised May 7, 1943, by the salvage ship, USS ORTOLAN, under the
Command of Lt. Cocunander A. A. Holland. The sub was located in Visale Bay,
N.U. GUADALCANAL. The submarine w.s raised, but on account of a storm, broke
loose and sank again.
October 14, 1942 At Sea
INSTRUCTIONS TO 'HIE YATSlT^Aig BUTAI
1. On the evening of the 14th. after 2300 the midget subs will be lavmched
'fest of Savo Island.
2. JSach unit ivill accociplish its mission according to the plan.
3. In order to avoid confusion with the 8th Fleet and the Transport Group to-
night, you will proceed submerged at a great depth until 0300 on the IJth.
4. ISdget submarines which have fired torpedoes and/or vfhich have insufficient
battery power remaining will proceed inraediately to the shores of friendly
places, if possible, to ICA;i-30.
5. .As there is at present no information for the evaluation of the tme worth
of the midget subaau-ine, it is expected that each man vd.ll, both in the
attack eind the ivithdrawal,€Qcert his overy effort, and in this way (do his
part) in supplying this information.
6. Be confident in th& August Virtue of His Majesty, in Providential Assis-
tance, and in your ability './hich you liave constantlj'- developed.
Go forth uni/aunted.
"Heaven helps those mo aelp themselves".
j;nd.
Comn£jiding Officer of the QilYODA,
HAR'iDA, SATORU (AKIRA?).
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 533
CXMIFIDENTIAL
CAPTURED DOCUMENTS - 'BUNSLA'IED BT ICPCA
Original Item # . , ICPOA Iten # LIL, , Transl. by ICPQA Dato Jufe U. Ui
Titlo of PubUoation PUCES OF tgLITARY IMPORT.UJCE IN THS KUPTT.f: TST./.wy;
Originator Technician of the Fisheries Experinental Station
IN C/iSE OF Dlifflr, HECOHD, LOG, etc., GIVE .miTEK«S
Orcinization ,__^___________________________________— »
Initial Date ^Flnal Dato
TRANSUTtm'S FOTBf/OBD
Itw followinc is a revised translation of r. Japanese docunont captured
in the recent tTTO operations. The ori£;inal translation was nat'e by the
Advanced Int«lllgonce Center, North Pacific Area, The ICPOA Revision
includes the folloiflnc points;
I4 Addition of positions ( in latitude and loncitude) of all
geographical points uontionod in the original docunont.
2* The pronunciations for all coosraphical points in the
follonine revise* translation , arc tha pronunciations
listed in Ijndej; ^ Japar^oso Placo Naqes. Appoarinf; in
Japanese ttYdro/rranhio Publications. , prepared by lii-
tolligenoe Saction, CinC Pacific Fleet, 1942.
3« Explanatory nstes havo b«on added,
(• Minor errors in the orifiinfll translation have boon corrected.
There is disaareonent conceminc the proper pronunciation of inaiy
ptLacer-noEies in the I&irilo Islands, even in Japanese rcferonco natcriols.
For the sake if -unifomity, anrl because it is thought to be the nost
accurate source, the CinCPAC Index has been used to asdertain the correct
pronunciation for the place nanos incluc'.ed; in thc'fe>llotfing**raaBl»W.W»
The CiaPAC: Index contains every ceosraphical point nentionei'. in the
following translation with one e*coption. This exception is GXtnCJCU,
47O09«N, 152°18«E,, on SKU-IUSHIRU Island. The translates have ascer-
tained the position of GITHCUOJ \yith the help of "Jap.inesc Naval Air Chart,"
N0,11 ( V/ar Departoent Map Collection Office roproduction) .
.\ny naterial in the foUovdnc which is not a direct transL-.tion fron the
original docunont is indicated by brackets and the abbreviation "T.N,",
noaning "translrvtor^s note,"
(1)
534 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
PLACaS, OF iaXITARY m-ORIUKS m 1HE KURILE ISLANDS
Notos i>j a technician of the Fisheries Sjqperimental Station
AKATSUKI 6l7t Force
INFOmmnON BULLbXiN
1. This publication contains statements by a technician of the HOKICAIDO
Government.
2. By lir.
■i-iJBe: 1935 - 1940
Season: Jiine to August
Place: Kurile Islands /f .N. - Chishlma Islan4§7
A general invcstigatian of aquatic fauna has bcon oade (salmon, s2dmon-
trout, shark, 9hollfish).
Thg vessel used was a 26.76 ton, 60 HP, seni-dioscx,
raOTiXTJD HARBORS IN THE KUSILE ISLANDS
1. The Kurilost
The Kurile IsliJids arc divided into the Southern Kuriles, Central Kurilos,
and Northern Rurilos.
A. Southern Kurilos: KUNISHIRI Island J^.th KL-NA^HIRI Island U°16« N,
146°00' eJ, iSTORDFU Island ^.N. /v5°04' N., 147^' ^J. (These aro
populated.)
B. Central Kuriles: URUPPU Island ^.N. 45°56» N., I5O0OO' Sj7, CHIRIHOI
Islands /t.N. North CHlfilHOI, l^°32< N., 150°53' 2..; South CHIRIKOI,
46023«-N., 150®49'^j7i SHINCHI Island /f.N. SHUOISHIRU Island, 46°53' .
U., 152°02' 1.7, KiLITOI Island y^.N, K,?rOI Island, 47*20' N., i5-i°30' 2j
USKISIIIiUJ Island /f.N. 47°32' N, 152^49' eJ, R.^H0:,A Island ^'.N.
itASHO^fA Island, 47*'45' W., 153°01'S^, HATSUt.A I-jland /f.N. 48°05' N.
I53O131 jSj7, SHA5HIK0TAN Island ^.H, SHASUKOTAIl Island 48°49' N.,
154*^)6' :L_J, HARU:i;:OTAII island fr.n. 49°07' N., 154°31' i5s7, ONNEKOTAN
Island ^,N. 0N3K0TAN Island, 49°25' W., 154°45' ^ij?.
C. Northern Kuriles: HOROIUSHIHO Island /F.N. PARAiBSHIRU ISLAND, 5O°20»a.
155°50' Zj7, 2Kmaj£HU Island ^.N. SHDJJSHU Island. 50°45'N., lp6°20«Bj7,
AR.'aTO Island, ^.if. ARAIDO Isliind, 50°52' N., 155°34' ^x/, (Populated
during the sui::ujer for fishing.)
(2)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 535
(3) C 0 N F I D S-N T I A L
2. Armanis to be Found in the Kuriles
./alrus, sea-otters, and seals are native. Foxes z.re bred by the Departiaent
of Agriculture and Forestry only in the Central Kuriles. Near the shore,
AaU'Alil, SOIII J^.W. Translation for these f-sh unknovm/, salmon and si-ljnon-
trout (retrning up -the rivers) and BOTAN Shrimp are fo\ind. Cod and
T.iTJiSA Crabs are to- be found off-shore.
3. Plants to be found in the Kuriles:
There are forests as far north t.s URUPHJ Island; but on the islands north
of CHIRIHOI Island, only creeping pines and black alders, no taller than
6 feet,, and weeds exist. There is a type of sea-weed knoim as KAIROPPA,
about 15 meters in length, v;hich has its leaf -sections floating on the
surface. Also there is sea-weed and sea-moss. _^.M. Tlie Japanese term
MCfRI has been tr^Jislated as "sea-moss". NORI, or ASAIOJSA MORI, is an
ediblo red sea-weed. Its loaves are about 10 cm. vri.de and 20 cm. long.
It grows best in --inter. The iveed is made into dried NORI, and is largely
cultivated in estuaries ■-■here the water is brackish. It grows on sticks
vriiich are stuck into the sand at low tide. 'Ae nature leaves are dried.
Yearly production of NORI is valued at 15,000,000 rSS, ranking next after
sardines and herring as a fisheries productj/
4. Sea Routes from OTARU ^.N. Position of port is 43°12' H., Ul°01' Ejjj
HOKKAIDO to the Uorthem Kuriles.
A, OTARU to the SOIA Straits J^.U. W°W M.,,142000« Ej7; heading in a
soutiierly direction along KITAMI Coast /^.W. The area known as the
KITAMI Coast extends along the northern coast of HOKKAIDO from -bout
1/,?°in' ■£,. to lh5°2yZ_J; going from AEASHIRI /t.N. 44°01' U., 1U°17'Es7
toirard DCABANOTSU Point ^.N. 45026 'N,, 147056' E»..7 on ETOROFU Island}
heading in a Northerly direction along the archipelago; passing through
the ONEKOTAN Channel ^.H. 49°50« N., 155*05' S.7; and coming out on
the Pacific side. Distaiice: 360 nautical miles.
B. OTARU to SOYA Straits and direct to the Northern Kuriles. Distance:
800 nautical miles.
5. Protected Harbors,
Harbors suitable f9r sr::all vessels ("*" indicates harbors suitable for
large vessels also) .
(1) ETOROFU Island:
* SHANA area: £i.li. Position of port of SHANA is 45°14' N.,147°53'Ej7
0)
536 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
^ CONFIDENTIAL
Offers good shelter even from north-westerly vd.nds. Tliere is a
\(aterfall suitable for drinking water urposes. There is a salmon-
trout canning factory. Practical Iiaportance: It is a natural harbof j
there are fishin,^ establis::ittants.
aenarkB! On the Pacific ahore, there is the harbor of HITOKAPFU
^-N. ltU°5B' N., U7°41'i: J **ich is suitable for large vessels.
(2) URUPPU Island (
FUTAGOSHHIA /f.H, Small island near S.J. tip of URUPPU, position of
island is 45°38' N., U9°27' ^J: There are shoals between HITAOOSHIMA
and URL'PPO which reduce the force of the brealcers. There is no water
suitable for drinking.
•^lammk Bay-j^.N. i,6**U' H., 150O20' E^Jj a sheltered harbor with
a aan^ bottoou Water from the KAIU&N River /x.N. 46°13' N,, X5(fi
20' S. (position of aaixttijff is suitable for drinking* Saljaon md
Qaloon^trout ascend the KAIli^ Aiver in the fall.
Hwuurlat toBUME Bay ^.H. Position of KOBlIKE port is 45^56' M..
150^12^ ^i7 i-^ o^ '^ho Pacific side. Off the loouth of the Bay, is
WSStBX JSk, 2B laetere lilghy uhloh serves as a good landnai^c for enter*
ii)g tb» Bay« /f.N. TOGABI tfA is & pointed rock, 45°55« N., 150P
12* ij. There is vnter suitable for drinking.
HiF^tKaiaaX Xsl«nds:
^«tBU Bay <^.M. 46°32' M., 150''56« ^J on Northern CHUUHOI Island.
S^ atMf bottoa* Ho drinkuig water*
^ SnrsaiUBJ Island:
fflmaSKIHU Bay ^.N. 1^6^52* N., 1?!°' 51*^Jt It is not a good harbor,
(jut Nta « Baoi^ batten. Nearoy is XSUBJRk ^.N. probably
J^itdLH; position is /,6*52' »., 151*48' eJ' where there is drinking
inter* Bracmw Bay ^.N. 47909«M., 152°13' S,J; A harbor suitable for
tmSX shitw. Hater has entered the craturj and the 4epUi of the
•ater and quality of the bottom Is Sxiitable for mooring in the area
on tho eastern side of a line running from the mouth of the bay to
the Agriculture and Forestry Depcirtmont ' s fox farm.
The mouth of the bay is nari-ow and shallow, and therefore it is easier
to enter the harbor by having sraall boats indicate the shallowest areas,
and having the s'lTiy pass in between them.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 537
(5) CONFIDENTIAL
* (SCUKAKU /F.N. Pronunciation not confirmed. Position is 47*>09* N,,
152018* &.; Do not confuse with GiUKAKU on PARAJflJSHIHU Islandj7«
Althouglj the bottoim is not good, it offers good shelter from N.W.
\«ind8t There is a road connecting tvlth BUBOTON Bay.
(5) UATSUWA Island
There is shelter between YAHATO Bay ^.N. 48°05.» N., Isa^lM Ej7 and
BANJO Island /t.U. 43*^05' N,, 153°n' AJ» Although the bottom is
rocky, the area is botmded by the tvro islands, and the wind and waves
can be avoided. Drinking water is available. There is a naval air-
field.
^ SHASOKOTAM Island:
OrcUE Bay ^.N. US^U&' M., 154°Q<»' eJ. A scadcircular bay with sandy
bottoou It Is not a good harbor because of the wide mouth. Drinking
watar Is available.
(7) ONEKOTAH Island:
mo Bdy ^.N. 49°37' N., 154°W 2*7' I* is not a good harbor, but
hK «ttlt«ble as ahelter from soutb-oasterly winds. There is drinking
m&ar. In raspoct to the nortVweaterly winda, the Pacific aide Is
oC iralu*.
mWJISia Bpy ^.N. 49**26« N., 154<*W sj'- Since KUROISHI Bay ta on
tine IteiMo aide, it is of value irtion^ prevailing \Tind8 ar« fron the
west*
(fit) tiSMBSBim Islands
KABQIABSTSU /"t.M. Position of port is 50°22' N., 155°36' ffj: There
arb harbor facilities and a fine brcalwater.
PABAiOBHIHU Straits j^.N. 50°43' N„ 156°10' E_J aro the straits
betmon PARAUUSHIRU and SHUIUBHU Islands, and constitute the most
valnablo area in the Northern Kuriles. KATAOKA Bay /"t.N. 50*'44' N,,
15(fiJl' 5^, lanUKAllI Bay/f.M. 50044' N., 156*'09' Ej, KASHIV7AaARA
B^ J^. 50°41^ N., 1S6°09' 2«7 ^ canning factories aro located
along the ftraits. There are tupbot ^.N. flatf isli^ in ICiSHTt/ABARA
Bay. The fishing industry flourishes on PARAMJSHIHU and SUBfflJSHU
diiring the summer, and fishery instedlations are located at various
points .-.long the seacor.st.
KAT..OKA Bay is a navel ba&e and lO'iSHrvABiiRA Bay is an ^riiiy base.
^ T.N. The orisinal document v/cs not clascifiodj?"
C5)
538 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINCrON
SOORCE DOCUMENT #9
(TRANSLAnON OF A CAPTURED ENEMT DOCUMENT
DEALING mTH EVENTS IN THE JAPANESE TTAR
COMMENCING THREE WEEKS BEF(«E IHE ATTACK CN PEARL HARBCR
AND CONTINUING THROUGH MANY JAPANESE-UNITED STATES ACTICNS
INCLUDING IHE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR,
GUAM, WAKE ISLAND, THE BISMARCK SEA OPERATIONS, RABAUL,
THE BATTLE OF THE COIAL SEA, IHE FIRST, SECOND AND
THIRD SVA BATTLES OF THE SOLOMONS ISLANDS,
THE JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS IN ATTU AND KISKA ISLANDS
IN IHE ALEUTIANS, ETC», TO 20 SEPTEMBER 19U3)
ENTITLRD
"PROFESSIONAI. NOTEBOOK OF AN ENSIGN IN THE JAPANESE NAVT*
USED BY THE NAVY IN COI^PLILING THE
'»NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages Ii32-U60).
(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PFJIRL HARBOR)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
539
JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER, PACCIC OCEAN AREAS
NAVY NUMBER 128 (ONE-WO-EIGHT)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California
CONFIDENTIAL
25 February 19U - Serial ADM-250829
RECEiVE[>OMI
fcreig:
L uOOM
• 12 C4
Fromt
To :
SubJ:
Of f ioer-in-Charge .
Distribution List.
Translation of Captured Japanese Document -
JICPOA Item No. ii986 - Professional Notebook of an Ensign in the
Japanese Navy.
Source: Captured TARAWA ZU November 1943.
1. Subject translation, forwarded herewith, need not be reported and
when no longer of value should be destroyed. No report of destruction is
necessary.
)
////(^oviO^C
M. LEqpDRE,
By direotlon.
Encls
1. Subject Item No. 4986,
DISTRISnTION LIST;
No. Copies
ARIC -ConfienCenPac, APO 958 2
AC of S., A-2, 7th AAF, APO 953 2
AC of S., G-2, Alaska Defense Command 1
AC of S. , G-2, Western Defense Command 1
CofflGen Hqa., USAFI3PA, APO 502 1
Chief Military Intelligence Service 6
Operations Division, War Department 6
Chief of Engrs., War Department 4
Dir. of Intell. Service, AAF, Arlington, Va 2
Commandant, M. I.S.L. School, Camp Savage, Minn 2
KAVI •Coininch 3
CNO 12
CNO (Eastern Fleet) 1
BuAero 3
ClcCPae 3
CirCPac-2 1
ComSerFor 3
ComBatPao 3
ConCruPac 12
CooDesPao 3
ComSubPac 3
CoaSubTrainPac 1
CooAirPac 3
ComHawSeaFron 3
DIO, UND - A-6 Sec 1
FRUFAC 1
ConCenPac 3
ComFif thPhibFor 10
ConGroupTwoFif thPhibFor 5
ComGroupThreoFif thPhibFor 5
ConfioWosPac 10
Directorate of Intell., Hqs. Allied Air Forces, SoWosPac 3
Director Naval Intelligence, Royal Australian Navy 2
ComSoPac 5
A AKHA 3
v r Dir. Advanced Base Office Pacific 5
. WV ^ U. 3. Advanced Pass Personnel Depot, San Bruno, Cal 5
^\ \^ Acorn Training Detachment, Pt. Huonemo, Cal 5
^ ;>^ W Advanced Base Depot, Pt. Rueneme, Cal 5
\^\ 0-ln-C, Navy Unit, Weat Coast 1
-^ Coamandant, Anqy & Havy Staff College 1
A\ Xa^ Taak Foroe Coanaader 1
(Cootiauad Raven e Side)
540 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
25 February 19U - Serial ADiU-250829
DISTRIBfTJTIOK LIST {Continued);
No. Qoplga!
MUIINES-Connnandant, U. S. Marine Corps 3
CG, First Marine Amphibious Corps 3
CG, Fifth Amphibious Corps 5
CG, Marine Corps Schools 1
CG, Marine Forces, Hi© 2
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 541
CONFIDEHTIAL JICPOA Item ;'/W86
TRANSLATION OF CAPTUHED JAPANESE DOCUMENT,
Captured TARAVJA 24 November 1943
Received JICPOA 6 December 1943
TRANSLATOR'S FOliE'TORD
JICPOA Items #4986 axvd //4986-A represent a complete translation of
the professional notebook of Ensign NAKAMURA, Toshio (^TT^ ^,ifl)> UN.
Although the material in the notebook is of uneven value, it was felt that
a complete translation would bis of interest inasmuch as it represents the
activities of an officer from the time he first boarded ship until shortly
before the GILBERTS operation.
Part of the material in the book seems to have been examined by
some higher ranking officer, and, in some cases, the notation "Not Permitted"
accompanied by a series of blue pencil marks, is found over passage^ which were
thought censorable. However, the notebook itself bears the classification
"MILITARY - VERY-SECRET" (GUNGOKUHI) on the cover, which seemed protection
enough to the writer of the book for including material of a highly confi-
dential nature.
Nothing is known of the circumstances of capture of the notebook
or of the fate of the writer. Since no l^orpedo boat unit was at TARAWA at
the time of the American landing, it is entirely possible that the author
escaped and is still alive.
542 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDSMTIAL
15 i;ovenber 19/4-
15 November
1 December
1 April 19A2
15 April
25 April
1 June
1 June
15 July
15 August
5 September
9 September
23 September (?)
JIC'POA Iteni #4986
Page 3
CHRONOLOGY OF PKfiSONAL HISTORY'
Received comirdssion as Passed Mdshipraan from the Mavy
Department .
Received orders from the Navy Department assigning ine to the
KAKO (CA) . Jurdor Division Officer, 2nd Division, and Uacldne
Gun Fire Control Officer.
Received orders from Navy Department assigning me to the AOBA
(CA). Staff Officer and Look-Out Officer.
Received orders from the AOBA relieving ir;S of duties as Look-
Out Officer and appointing me to Navigation Department, and as
Junior Division Officer 7th Division.
Received orders from the AOBA relieving me of duties to Navi-
gation Department and as Junior Division Officer 7th Division
and appointing me Coding Officer and Junior Division Officer
6th Division,
Received orders from the AOBA relieving me of duties as Coding
Officer and appointing me Comiminications Officer.
Commissioned Ensign by the Cabinet.
Notified by the Navy Department of my assignm^jnt to tho AOBA.
Assignment to AOBA confirmed by Navy Department.
Attached to the DosDiv 9 by the Navy Department.
Notified by AOBA to leave the ship and to take up position
on NOVIAKI (DD).
Assigned to the UDSGUMO (DD) by the Com DosDiv 9.
Assigned to the ASAGUHO as Havigating Officer by tho Co
Desbi'.'.9.
15 November 1941
November
1° November
21 iJov.jmber
23 November
24 Ncvomber
25 Movomber
26 KoViirabor
29 November
2 December
4 December
December
7 December
8 Dcoerabcr
DIARY
Graduated from the Naval College at KTAJIMA. Mado a midship-
maii in the Navy.
Ordered aboard the KAKO (CA) at KURE as Junior Officer, 2nd
Division and Machine Gun Fire Control Officer.
KAKO entered drydock ,;'3 at KURE.
Granted leave and returned home.
Returned to my ship,
KAKO left drydock.
K.">KO left KURE; anchored in HASHIRA SHIMA Channel.
Paid our respscts to the Commander-in-Chief, 6th Fleet, on
Hj.SHIRA SHUIA.
Left HASHEt; SHBU Channel. :■:)
Anchored at IU.UA SUB.Ui,
Ordered aboard the AOBA (CA) as lookout officer (ICIHARISHI) .
Left Hj".HA SHEii'. (to assist the GU/iM Occupation Force).
Imperial Rescript to the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet:
(rendered elsewhere).
The Reply of the Comraandcr-in-Chicf , Combin^-d Fleet:
(rendered elsewhere).
The Commander-in-Chdcf, (lotihincd Fl^ot, to the Combined Fleet,
(rendered elsewhere).
The Emperor has proclaimed war on the UNITED ST/»TES and EliGL/J®.
Imperial rescripts sent to the Ministers of the Army and Navy.
Our striking force has delivered a successful surprise attack
on HA'.VAII.
Results:
Sunk:
Heavily D?jnagcd:
1 CALIFORNIA Class BB
1 C/JLIFORiNi;. Class BB
1 i.L\RYLAIW Class BB
1 M..RYL,Jff) Class BB
] /JIIZONA Class BB
1 NEVADA Class BB
1 UTAH Class BB
1 Cruiser
1 Unidentified Ship
2 Heavy Cruisers
1 Oiler
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
543
CONFIDENTI/iL
JICPOA Item i5'4986
Page 4
8 December 19/*1
(continued)
Moderately Damaged;
1 NEVADA Class BB
4 Cruisers
Our Losses;
9 Fighter Pianos
15 Bombers
5 Reconnaissance Planes
Landings were made by our southern forces at KGTA BHARU,
SINGORA, BATA/iN, ByjJCacOK, and AMBODJA Bay; BA3C0 was occupied.
Our troops entered the International Settlement at SH/JJOIAI.
The British Gunboat, PENGUIN, was sunk there. A detachment
of American Marines at PEKING laid down their arms.
SINQ.\PORE, MIDWAY, VUXE, CL.\RK FIELD, GUAM, HONGKONG, DAVAO
were bombed,
9 December The American sea-plane carrier LANGLEY was sunk (off DAVAO).
10 Docember The Emperor was overjoyed with the results of the HjWAII oper-
ation, sending another rescript to the Commander-in-Chief,
Combined Fleet.
Offensive and defensive alliamc with TE.lILAND signed, WAKE
attacked. The destroyers HAYATE and KISARAGI were sunk by
shell-fire.
Landings effected at VIGAN. One sub-chaser sunk. GUAM,
APARRI, MAKDI, TAR.V,U occupied.
Minesweeper #19 wrecked off the mouth of the CAGAYAN River.
The llth Mr Fleet participated in a naval battle of the
MALAY PENINSULA. PRINCE OF '7ALES and REPULSE sunk.
Tripartite Pact signed. WAKE attacked. Commander-in-Chief,
Combined Fleet, the recipient of another imperial rescript
decl'ring the Emperor's pleasure over the naval battle off
the UI\1AY PENINSULA. GERMANY and ITALY declare war on the
UNITED STATES. Landings effected at LEGASPI.
Pur ship, the AOBA, anchored at TRUK.
Left TRUK.
The main naval force has arrived at HASHIRii SHBLA.
AOBA anchored at ROI.
SHINONaffi (DD) wrecked 15 kms. north of Bj\Ri'iM Point while
on patrol duty off MIRI. The RO-66 collided with the HO-62
and sank,
p;ji;jii;i, costa rica, nicar/.gua, hojduras, DQiiNicAii republic,
GUATQIALA, CUBA and Hi.ITI all declared war on our Empire,
AOBA left ROI (to assist the WAKE Occupation Force).
Landings effected at LING/iYEN.
Occupation of 7/AKE completed.
The (nS: HAWAII) Striking Force has arrived at HASHIRA SHIUA,
AOBj'i returned to ROI and anchored.
HONGKONG surrenders.
Landings effected at JOLO in a surprise attack.
Two enemy subs sunk off LING/lYEN Bay (by the destroyers
ASAK/^ and S.iTSUKI).
KUCRIUG occupied. The SAGIRI (DD) sunk by an enemy torpedo.
Minesweeper #6 and the #2 UNYO Maru (ARS) were bombed and
sunk. The UURi'.SAUE (DD) collided with Minesweeper ^'20 at
TAKjIO. li'.NILA bombed. One enemy destroyer, two subs, and
ten merchantmen sunk. The rv&'JCAZE s&^ik a sub off LING.\YEN.
The American Amy comnandcr in the PHILIPPINES declared
Mi'JIILA an open city, Mj'JIILA was bombed and ten merchantmen
sunk. The NOJIMA (i'lF) was torpedoed and ran aground.
The RO-60 ran aground south of ROI.
The YAtlAGUMO (DD) hit a mine off LINGAYEN Bay,
An enemy sub sank off LAOAG,
1 January 1942 LABU/iN and BRUNEI occupied,
3 January IWIIL/l surrendered,
4 January The MYOKO (CA) was bombed off WdJd^G in DAVAO Ba.y. Has
returned to SASEBO, damaged and with casualties.
5 January AOBA left ROI at 0000, returned at 1000. (A report had been
received that an enemy carrier and two cruisers had left
H/-.'7AII for V.'AKE. We were ordered to leave at night on search
and guard duty.)
11 December
12 December
13 December
December
16 December
17 December
20 December
21 December
22 December
23 December
25 December
26 December
27 December
29 December
31 December
79716 O — 46— pt. 13-
-12
544 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CO'JFIDENTIAL
6 January 19A-2
7 Janiiary
9 January
10 January
12 January
13 January
18 January
20 January
21 January
22 January
23 January
24 January
25 January
26 January
27 Janur.ry
30 Jc:uiu;-ry
31 January
29 January
1 February
3 February
4 February
JKPOA Iten ^'4986
Pai;-e 5
Left RDI at 0200, returned at 1030 on same mission.
Left R0I_for THU^. .• j.
The KAKKO Maru^< ^. ?> '1. ) was torpedoed and sunk in the
DUTCH EAST INDES.
Two more enemy subs have been sunk .
Anchored at TRUK. . .
The LEXINGTON sunk by the 1-6.
TAHAKATJ surrendered.
Minesweepers #13 and #14 sunk off LIHKAS.
The iiinalayar, PRINS VAN ORANJE, sunk.
MENGACHU FORT on LINKAS Island captured.
Left TRUK.
The I-131_sank a 10,000 merchantman north of TBTOFi.
The BApHy^kiary 'V^ '' /- ) hit a mine and sank.
The ASO Maru<^.?^y(^ ) (AP-AK) was severely damaged.
At 1800 crossed the equator at 146°37' E. Lon.pr. going south*
(Fighter planes from the ZUIKAKU shot down an <-;nemy flying
boat that was approaching us. '.'fe spottod fiv<^ of its crow
floating on the water, and picked them up as prisoners.)
One s'wcial duty shio and several of our mcrcliantmen have
been sunk at SIIjGAPORE.
Our forcos attacked an enemy force concentrating at CEBU
and sank several morchantmen.
The NhNA Kiju^glj-J A. ) (AP-AK) was sunk Lin the south).
The kSLCmO (DDrccllidcd with the 01 Uc.r\x/i:r~^ Jf A. ),
Landings effected at the mouth of the SjA!UPAil,\ River .ind the
mouth of KENDARI Bay.
One of our destroyers has damaged six enemy moi-chantmen in
the INDIjVN OCEAIj.
H.-ive reached the southernmost point on our course (4°9' S.,
150°55'30" E.)
Bhth.KA (?) iUrfield on GERIIN (?) Island occupied, -^s the
result of an enemy torpedo attack, the TATSIIKjilil Liarui^
{jf- f^'^ K ) (AK), TSURUGA Maruv^jj '^1 L ) (AK), and the
KU_RET.J<E Maru^l'f, 'i''j il^) were sunk'; the SULiANOUHA Uaru^'
{'M.'^l .^fO '-nd Patrol Boat #37 were heavily liejiiajied.
RrVBAUL occupied.
Crossed the equator at 150°E. t'oing north at 0555. Recrosscd
it going south at 150°5' E. at 1240. The iniTJKEN Marui^
(-frJ/ !? iL ) (AK) was sunk off C-ILI J.i-G. Landings effected
at KEhU.iil and B;iIKP..P,J'.
The T0KEGA'.VA Maru C^'] /f^"! /"J'^as grounded.
Reached the southernmost point on our course at 1430
(4°45' S., 149°52'E.).
The British destroyer, T)-L'JIET, was surik.
Landings made on PAii,iMGK;vT . SAIJBASU (?) occupied.
AOBA c.nc;,orcd i.. .i-'.B;aiL Harbor at 0800.
(Handed over our prisoners.) Loft R,iB.'i.UL at 1730.
KJT„.I occ;r ied.
Anchored in YSh EL PASSAGE.
Our forces have progressed towards SliJGdPCrffi.
Landings effected at aiBOK, RDT.Jl, and ' v:'\.... a.
MINKA'TAN (?) and PONTI^.-.K occupied.
Left Y&'.BEL PASSn(E. is\. enemy striking force appeared in
the Vu.RSH-'JXS Area and we have received reports that- they
are "attacking there, '"c left impiediately for K'.'A J.'^LEIN .
The enemy force is composed of 2 carriers, five heavy (?)
cruiser-ij, and five destroyers.
The Submarine 1-62 sank a 10,000 ton tan>;er off COLOlwBO.
J.iVu SEA Battle.
Enemy Losses:
1 Dutch Cruiser (J,kVA Class) sunk.
1 Dutch Cruiser (DE RUYTER Class) sunk.
1 Dutch Cruiser (jAVi> Class) mediam damage.
1 American Cruiser (U-uiBLSHE-.D Class) medium damage.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
545
COrJFIDEKTIAL
JICPOA Item #4986
Pai?e 6
5 February 19A2
2 February
4 February
5 February
6 February
7 February
8 February
9 February
10 February
12 February
15 February
16 February
19 February
20 February
23 February
24 February
25 & 26 February
27 February
28 F.cbruary
•2 Mr.rch
4 Mr.rch
5 March
8 March
9 March
10 March
11 March
14 March
15 March
17 March
18 March
26 March
27 March
The Submarine RO-34 sank a destroyer in the S\Jl!Dk STRAITS.
0116. Crossed the equator bearing north, 153°50' E.
1C.7AJALEII]. Entered the Harbor at ROI.
KVAJaLEIN. Left ROI. Anchored at the main island at
P/AJALEII.'.
IC'JAJALEIN. Departed from the main island.
The HOYO {'jC-.i ^ '^ Marxi ran aground outside KEBIIJ Bay.
The Submarine 1-124 had a gunnery engagement with an
English destroyer and was sunk.
The NAT5U3HI0 (DD) was sujy< by torpedoes.
The KISOGA'fA ( ^fx "^| ") ^'O Maru wafe sunk off SAIGOH by an
enemy submarine.
Successful landings were carried out at MAKASSAR, AENBATO-
BATO, SURUMI, and GASOATA.
TRUK. Entered the harbor at TRUK.
The YAMATO (BB) becr^-iie the flagship of the Combined Fleet,
SINGAPORE fell.
A message from the throne oa the occasion of the fall of
SINGAPORE. /
The MOKO (,-^-^' i^ -tv ) Maru was sunk off NOIO 3AKI by an
enomy submarine,
TRUK. Departed from TRUK. An enemy task force composed
of 1 BB, 2 carriers, 2 cruisers and 9 c'estroy.irs '..l-.b
appeared at a bearing of 75°46' off H,.BAUL and our force
has set out to capture or annihilate it. It seems thst
the enemy is planning to carry out a surprise attack on
TRUK.
Successful Irjidings were carried out ;.t L-'L.T and KOEP/JJG.
BALI Island has been occupied.
The Submarine 1-60 was sunk, in a naval battle off BAT/JJ'.
4 I'cstroycrs were sunk and 2 cruisers and 1 i estroyer v/cre
badly damaged. The MICHISHIO (DD) and OSHIO (DD) were
badly daaaged.
TRUK. Entered the harbor at TRUK. R^A'^TO (?) has been
occupied.
2 enemy cruisers and 2 destroyers have carried out an attack
in the vicinity of '7AKE Island.
A submarine shelled the American mainland. The subma.rine
RO-63 met with m accident in tlie vicinity of j .■ j.:^
Island.
In a naval battle off S0ERA3AYA, 5 cruisers and 6 destroyers
were sunk. Their force consisted of 5 cruisers and 9 des-
troyers.
The Submarine 1-58 sank a 15,000 ton fueling slap in the
SUNDA STRAITS. The Submarine 1-4 sunk a freighter south
of JaVA.
TRUK. Departed at 1000. Engaging in the Fourth CampaifTi
(SR Operations).
Crossed the equator at 0015 bearing southward, 150 54' E.
An enemy carrier attacked MARCUS Island. The enemy force
was composed of the ENTERPRISE, SjiLT LAKE CITY, NORTHAMPTON,
ind a number of destroyers. Tlie ERIMO (^ '^ ) (AO) was
sunk by torpedoes.
At 0600 entered the harbor at a'.BAUL. Took on provisions.
Departed at 1700.
Successful landing carried out in liENA'')EI Vcl. m s
Swept the sea around KUIM&'iRORj\ (?) and fvnchored there.
The SNLF has landed and are cleaning out the enemy along
the coast. Departed at 1615.
Entered the harbor at RABAUL. Fueled,
Departed from RuBAUL.
Entered the harbor at KUIKK/iROR/. and stood by.
Departed from KUirnO'.RQi:-.
Anchored in MELLE CfUNKEL {''•'-> i- '^'-c- y) .
Departed from MELLS CliANi.'EL.
Entered the harbor at RABAUL. Fueled.
546 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COBFIDENTIAL
28 March 19^2
30 March
1 April
2 April
7 April
8 April
10 April
30 April
5 May
6 H?y
7 May
9 May
11 Mny
12 May
13 May
16 May
17 May
22 May
25 May
26-31 May
29 May
8 June
10 June
16 June
17 June
18 June
23 Jiine
30 June
2 July
5 July
6 July
7 July
10 July
lU July
16 July
18 July
19 July
21 July
22 July
26 July
1 August
7 August
8 August
10 August
17 August
19 August
20 August
JICPOA Item #4986
Page 7
Departed from RABAUL. Engaging in the Fifth Campaign.
Landing at SHORTLAND successful.
Entered harbor of RABAUL. Left the same day.
Anchored in MELLS CH/JINEL.
Departed from MELLE CH/JINEL.
Crossed the equator bearing north, 148*^13' Et
Entered the harbor at TRUK.
Departed from TRUK to engage in the Fifth Campaign.
Entered the harbor at SH0RTL'.ND.
Departed from SHORTLAND.
Attacked by enemy planes. The SHOHO (CV) was sunk at a
bearing of 56°, 52 miles off DEBOYNE Island,
^tercd the harbor at SHORTL'ID.
Took on provisions and departed the sane day.
The 0KIN0SHB1-; {'/f > i, ) (CM) was sunk by torpedoes.
Entered the h?.rbor at KIETA, The SKLF landed. There was
no sign of the enemy.
Anchored at SHORTL'iJD. Took on provisions and departed
the same day bound for TRUK, our destroyer alone.
Entered the harbor at TRUK.
Departed from TRUK, bound for KURE.
Entered the harbor of KUIE at 1300.
Entered No. 3 Dock at KURE.
Had leave. Returned to ship.
Loft the Dock. Moored to land at A Anchorage.
Changed mooring to No, 18 Buoy.
Departed from the harbor on a trial cruise. Returned the
same day. Practiced avoiding torpedods while cruising.
Tested our speed over a measured course.
Departed at 0900. At 1745 entered the harbor at NAG/JliaiA.
Departed from NX;j!.'i.li\ at 0900. At 1745 entered the harbor
of KITSUKI.
Departed from KITSUKI bound for TRUK.
Entered the harbor at TRUK.
Departed from TRUK,
Crossed the equator_(the 9th time) bearing south.
Time - 0230. The HO YD ('^54 ^ ) Maru drew alongside our
port side and we refueled in tov;.
Entered the harbor a^ jilETA. /
Drew alongside the HOYO Maru/'H '-* A ) rjid refueled.
Vfhen wu had finished, we left the harbor.
Anchored in REKAT/. LAGOON.
2 ."estroyers dropped anchor.
Departed at 1200.
Entered MELLE Channel.
Set out for KUINK,J«)RA.
Entered the harbor at KJDiKAROEA.
Departed from KUINK^'J^ORt'i bound for R.£viUL (our destroyer
alone). Refueled and left port the same day bound for
YS/lBEL p..ss/>ge.
/anchored in YSABEL P.JSSAGE. There wore 2 destroyers and
we remained there until the 26th.
Departed from YSABEL PASS/iGS and anchored in ^tkt.t.k CHANNEL.
RABAUL. Departed from RABAUL. /Jichored in MELLE QiANNSL,
Departed from MELLE CHANNEL. Received news that an anemy
task force was attacking TULAGI, we made a forced run to
RABAULj. The enemy had started to land at TULAGI. v/e joined
the CHDKAl (CA),
V/e made a night attack on TULAGI.
The KAKO (CA) was struck by torpedoes from an enemy sub-
marine and sank. (30,500 metres out from MARV/IU Island
at a bearing of 48°; at about 2028' S., 152°11« E.)
Anchored in MELLE CHANNEL.
Left MELL2 CHANNEL.
Anchored in REKATA BAY,
Left REKATA BAY,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
547
CONFIDEKTIAL
JICPOA Item #4936
21 August 19W Joined the CHSkaI (CA_2.
22 August Separated from the CHOKAI and the 2 DD's, anchoring at
SHORTLAND for supplies. Vfl^en finished here, left.
24 August Spotted a convoy. Rejoined the CHOKAI and the 2 DD's.
26 August Anchored at KIETA.
27 August Left KIETA. Anchored temporarily at SHORTLAND.
28 August Left SHORTLAND for the south.
4 September Anchored at KIETA.
5 September Left KIETA. Anchored temporarily at SHORTLAND. Left ship
after supper and reported on board the KOT/AKI (DDJ for dut^T.
6 September Left SHORTLAIID. Headed for TRUK, escorting the TOA Maru /
{% ^ k ) (XAO or AK?).
9 September Anchored in TRUK Harbor at 1400. Vfas transferred aboard
the MBIEGUMO (DD) after supper. _
10 September Left TRUK for the south, escorting the KENYO Maruw(aAO).
«£:^-^ ).
23 September Anchored at TRUK. Left the MINBGUMO and reported on board
the ASAGUMO (DD) for duty.
26 September Left TRUK for SHORTLAND (Apart from being in DesDiv 9,
the ASAGUUO had also been made a part of the SOUTH SEAS
Force (NANTO BUTAI).
29 September iUichored at SHORTLAIrt).
2 October Took on board materiel to be landed at GUADALC/JJAL and left
SHORTLAND. Began unloading at 2058, completed it success-
fully at 2230.
3 October Returned to SHORTLAND for supplies.
f) October Enemy carrier-based bombers attacked us (one bomb dropped
very close: 200 metres on our port beam), but no damage.
We repulsed them. Left SHORTL/iND for the second time on
the "ferry service" to GUAD;iLC;>NAL. Vferc attacked by enemy
planes. The NATSUGUMO (DD), UINEGUMO, and MURASAME turned
back.
(Reinforcement Butai)
26 September The DesLiv 9 (IN: dg) was attached to the Outer South Seas
Force and set out from TRUK.
29 September altered the harbor- at SHORTLAND.
2 October 0800 Depsirted from SHORTLAND on a .;outherly course. Our force
was composed of the DesPiv 9 (IN: dg) and the Desriv 2
(TN: dg) (minus the YUDACFil and the SAiilDARE). Had as
passengers 250 soldiers who were to be put ashore; also
carried provisions and 15 rear-cars which were to be put
ashore .
2048 Arrived at KMBiBO and commenced unloading operations,
2230 Vfork was completed.
2246 Departed from KAUIMBO, following a southerly course.
3 October IO36 Anchored at SHORTLAND.
5 October O63O Departed from SHORTLAND, follojving a southerly course.
Our force was compaaed of the Des'ivs 9 and 2 (TN: dg).
Carried as passengers 650 soldiers who were to 1:« put ashore.
As cargo carried 2 mountain guns, telegraph apparatus, and
tools for laborers, which were to be put ashore.
1505 Were attacked by 10 enemy planes. The MINEGUUO (DD) was
damaged by a near hit forward, sprang a leak and returned
to SHDRTLAI^D escorted by the NATSUGUMO (DD).
1552 Were attacked by nine enemy planes. Our ship was attacked
by 3 carrier-based bombers. Bombs landed 100° to starboard,
distance 50 meters, 50 meters off the bow, and 150° to star-
board, distance 100 meters. Sustained no damage.
1705 The MURASAME (DD), having sprung a leak, because of a near
hit by a bomb, returned to SHORTLAND.
1924 Enemy planes on patrol dropped -lares.
2116 Arrived at TASSAFARDHGA and commenced unloading operations.
2254 Unloading completed.
2257 Departed from TASSAFARONGA, following a central course.
548 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFID^JTI/J.
6 October
8 October
9 October
11 October
12 October
13 October
lU October
15 October
JICt'OA Iteiu #/;986
Page 9
1019 Dropped anchor at SHOPJL-JJD, h".ving entered thu h:-rbor
throuf^h the North Ch;-uinel.
0551 Sei c'.il iroffl SHORTL/JiD, heading dov;n the "Slot". (TO:
CHUO-KORO *'fj|'^i);L5'&). Our force was composed of the De*iv
9 (minus the MINEG'JMO) and the De^iv 2 (niiiius the ULTRASAME
and the SAHIDARE). Carried as passengers 560 r.ien who were
to be put ashore. As cargo, carried 18 trench mortars.
Also carried a LiAIZURU ith Special Kaval Landing Force
Communications Unit and '.fork Unj.t,
1607 V/ere attacksd by 11 enemy planes and our escort planes
joined battle with them.
2056 Reached TASSAFAfiDNGA and commenced disembarkirig operations.
2219 Operations concluded.
2224 Departed from TASSAFARONGA proceec.iig along the "Slot",
0453 V.'ere attached by 11 enemy carrier-'jased bombers and oxir
escort planes joined battle with them.
0506 The enemy's carrier-based bombers attacked us and bombs
landed 90° to port, distance 50 meters, 110° to starboard,
distrjice 100 meters, and 80° to starboard; distance 50
meters . Shot dovm one of the enejny pl^uies,
1120 Dropped anchor, at SHORTLAIID.
C558 Departed from SHORTLAi\ID, Our forco vjas composed of the
I.'ISSHin (CVS), CHITCoE (CVS)^ AKITSJKI (DD), the DeEfiv 9
and the D-s? iv 11 (111: dg) (minus two destroyers). Carried
as passengers 728 :.i-'n vjho were to be put ashore. Also ca-
ried 4 15 cm. hovdtzors, 4 tractors, 2 field guns, 16 cases
(?) of ammunition, 1 antiaircraft gun, 1 fixed radio
(HOTEI-LTJSEN). The above materials were aboard the HISSHB-I
and CHITOSE. The ASAGbHO (DD) ,ind th- D'-sdiv 11 (minus 2
destroy, rs) carried 1 regimental gun, 2 battalion guns, 2
rapid-fire guns, 1 trench .TiortAr, and ten tons of provisions,
2023 Arrived at TASSAFAROIiGA and commenced disembarking op^mtions,
2i23 Operations completed.
213c Departed from TASSAFAROHGA.
2135 Sighted our forces engaged in battle vdth the enemy a
little north of SAVO Island. (The losses sustained by
our 6th Fleet were: FURUTMA (CA), sunk; AOBA (CA), badly
damaged, and FUBUKI (DD), sunk),
2236 Returned to our anchorage. The NISSHIN and CHITOSE had not
completed the disembarkation of the materials she carried,
2304 Operations were completed, and vje changed our coufse to
the south,
0655 Joined the SENDAI (CL),
O85O The MURAKUMO was hit by bombs from enemy planes and was
unable to proceed and the Des!jiv 9 vient to her assistance,
1105 Arrived at our destination where we were assigned to patrol
duty. Tried to tow the SHIRAYUKI (DD).
125s Sighted 2 enemy carrier-based bombers,
1323 Sighted the two planes again.
1343 Attacked by 11 carrier-based bombers and 8 fighters.
1348 The HATSUCHJMO was damaged by a bomb Sind was unabl3 to pro-
ceed, and gradually began, to list,
1415 The MURAKUMO was struck by a torpedo which exploded
1427 The NATSUGUMO sank but the crew was saved.
1445 Uade our escape from this place.
1538 Joined the Des:'bn 3 (sd),
I64O Proceeded to tow the IfJEAKUMO
I85O Arrived at this place.
1850 The SHIRAYUKI was disposed of with torpedoes. (RAIGDKI
SH03UI>:SU).
1909 Started back,
O63O Put in at SHORTLAIiD.
0353 S^;t out from SHDRTLAND via the North Channel.
2021 Arrived at TASSAFARONGA where we changed our anchor.ago
and established patrols.
2350 The CHOKAI (CA) and the KD^JG/iSA shelled the airfield.
0400 A tr.ansport fleet (SENDAI (CL), YUPJ> (CL), and TAT3UTA
(CL), ) completed disembarking operations.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
549
CONFIDENTIAL
15 October 1942
(Continued) O./ij
1604
17 October O3I6
2029
2205
2216
18 October 0446
0930
24 October I6I6
25 October
26 October
30 October
1 November
2 November
1325
0100
0123
0800
2230
2020
2330
3 November
4 November
1540
2330
2357
5 November
2010
2101
6 Ifovtmber
2227
7 November
0941
0800
8 November
2300
1926
8 November
1937
2220
2245
9 November
0554
0850
1500
11 November
12 November
1520
1330
JICrOA Item #498*
Page 10
Started back, following a course north.
Put in at SHORTLAND.
Departed from SHORTLAND, following the northern route..
Arrived at SSPERAI^CE where we commenoed dissmbarking
©perations.
Finished the operations.
Departed from ESPEFcAircE going down the "Clot".
The SENDAI was struck by a torped<i from an enemy submarine
but sustained no damage. Three depth charges were dropped
with unknown results.
Put in at SHORTLAND where we, were attached to the main
Fleet (?) (TN: SHUTM 'i ^i}< ).
Departed from SHORTL/J^ID in order to carry out an all-out
attacl; against GU/DALCAN/X.
Though we occupied one corner of the airfield on GUADAL-
CAiViL, we aid not seize the airfield. Our forces stood
by to the west.
Put in at SHORTLAlNlD.
Enemy planes dropped bombs and 3 landed 50 meters off
the bow.
Enemy planes dropped bombs and 6 landed 4CP to» port,
distance, 30 meters. UCHIDA, ScaTian, 3r-d Class, v;a,s
killed.
The flag of the CinC of the Design 4 (4 sd) was run up
on the ASAGUMO (DD).
Set out from SHORTL/JJO, following the northern route.
Left oui co.-npanion ships and proceeded to the anchorage
of a trans|X>rt fleot. Maintained patrol outside (the
anchorage) .
Stopped disembarkation work aind started back, following
a course north.
Put in at SHORTL^iND.
Set out from SHOuTL.iND, following the northern route.
Enemy planes dropped some bombs 90° to port, distance,
about 1000 meters.
Parted ways with the transport fleet .?jid continued on to
the anchorage whore vie took up patrol.
The lIURASAJiE sighted a torpedo-boat which it illiL-ninated
and shelled.
Disembarking operations were finished ;nd we started back.
The SHIGURE (DD) sighted a periscope (proceeding along a
central course) and dropped depth charges.
Dropped anchor at SHORTL.iND,
The Coriimand Flag was transferred to the TENRYU (CL) vrfiere
it uas run up.
Departed from SHORTLAJID, follov.'iiig the northern route.
Separated and proceeded to our patrol station. V.'ent to
the anchorage of the transport fleet.
The MOCHZUKI (DD) sighted a torpedo-boct and illuminated
it.
The SHIGURE, YUGURE (DD), and MDCHIZUKI went on ahead, '
starting back.
The transport fleet completed the disembarkation work
and started back.
Torpedoes were fired at us by ah enemy subm-irine, which
was proceeding along the "Slot". The SHIRATSUYU (DD) and
YUDACHI -roceeded to attack the submarine and sink it.
Put in at SHORTLATJD.
The DesRon Flag of the CinC of the DesRon 4 (4 sd) was
transferred to the ASAGCM) and run up.
Returned to the Des.on 4, our original unit.
Set out from SHORTLaKD (departing by the North Channel).
Joined the Des! ivs 10 and 11 r^nd set off far the south
where a battle developed off LUNGA,
550 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDO'TIAL
JICPOA Item #4986
Page 11
13 November 1942
14 Nov amber
15 November
16 November
18 November
21 November
26 November
5 December
6 December
7 Deceoiber
8 December
9 December
13 December
15 December
17 December
18 December
20 December
21 December
26 December
27 December
0000
0052
0126
0906
0935
1414
2010
0355
U35
2200
2205
2355
0123
0233
1110
0600
0719
1000
0800
0730
0630
1513
0600
1540
1706
1530
1420
1445
2335
0627
1200
1903
1015
0715
1U5
Torpedoes were fired from starboard but we continued on
our way. V.'e illuroinated and shelled an enemy destroyer
and inflicted great damage.
The YUDACHI was liit by a bomb and was unable to keep
under way.
It withdrew.
Met up with the KIRISHBiA (BB).
Set out to do rescue vicrk at the HIKI (BB).
Stopped rescue work and ti-ied to join the Main Force.
Met up with the Advance Force..
Were fueled by the HARUKA (BB).
Three torpedoes passed underneath our ship. We dropped
depth cliarges. A battle broke out off SAVD Island.
Sighted 3 enemy battleships. A battle in which both
r.orpedocs and guns were used broke out.
Launch jd a torpedo with unknown result.s. Our main bat-
Lories vjere very effective. The KIRISKHIA was hit with
bombs and was unable to keep under way.
Put in alongside the KIRISHHIA. The entire crew abandoned
ship (TI^': the KIRISHBIA).
The KmSHIMA sank.
Ceased rescue operations and withdrew.
Joined the SENDAI (CL) and at 2100 joined the CruDiv
8 (SE). .
Were supplied (with fuel) by the NICHIiil ><Pl ^S ^ ) ^''^^^^
(XAO).
Put in at TRUK, entering by the North Channel.
The Command FL-^.g was transferred to the NAGARA (CL) and
run up.
Entered the dock.
Left the dock.
Left the harbor and carried out patrol to tlie north.
Sntercd the harbor,
Departed from the harbor and carried out patrol while
the SPIGURE had firing practice.
Entered the hai'bor.
Departed from the harbor and carried out patrol to the
north.
Departed by the north entrancLi and proceeded to escort
the CFjTO (ACV).
The CHJYO sighted the UZUKI (DD) off the bow.
Cr.ught. up with her. She turned around and we proceeded
on to IPOJK.
Sighted a submarine on the surface and dropped 6 depth
charges but were unable to determine results.
Put in at TRUK by the North Channel.
Departed from the harbor to carry out maneuvers.
Returned,
L>.-.ft thu harbor, escorting the CHUYO and bound for
TOKOSUKA,
Sighted FUJIYAltA.
Entered the harbor where we were given leave,
Went to TOKYO where 1 paid my respects to the Lnperial
Palace, and worshipped at the shrine of UiilJI, and YASU-
KUNI-JEJJA.
2 January 1943 1545 Departed from YOKOSUKA bound for TRUK escorting the CHUYO.
1700 Left TOKYO Bay.
8 January 0700 Arrived at TRUK via the North Channel.
11 January Were attached to the Southeast Area Fleet and were placed
under the ClnC of the C.-'jfJiv 2.
15 Janu.ary 1200 Departed from TRUK with a patrol unit for an air-craft
carrier force, CarTiv 2 (minus the HIYO) in order to
carry out "C" (HEI) transport operations.
17 January 1140 Proceeded to a place about 200 miles north of '/("EWAK. _
25 fighters rnd 6 attack-bombers took off from the JUNYO.
We headed for TRUK.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
551
COHFIDjJjTIAL
19 January 1943
0712
20 January
21 January
2323
1115
1915
22 January
25 January
0840
0523
2130
26 Janu:;ry
1200
27 January
31 January
1200
0642
1 February
4 February
5 February
7 February
0700
1000
8 February
11 Febnaary
12 February
0130
1S14
13 February
0900
14 February
17 February
19 February
1340
1400
0900
22 February
23 February
1800
0530
24 February
27 February
28 February
1 March
2 March
U50
1250
2255
O63O
JICPOA Itoa #49B6
Page' 12
Put in at TRUK via the South Channel and our escort task
was concluded. Set out to finish off an onemy submai'ine
which a float reconnaissance plane from the TAKAD (CA)
had sighted and attacked at a place 25 kilometres from
the South Channel at a bearing of 155°,
#6C (?) Convoy was attacked by a submarine 286 nautical
miles (TN: " ' " denotes a nautical miLe) from TRUK at
a bearing of 145°. The SURABAYA LIarlM^^ == '^ ^ K ) was
sunk and the M£IU Uaru ('^^'-f A. ) severely damaged.
Proceeded to the rescue.
Arrivjd -.t our destination.
The MEIU Maru sanlc.\/Then turned back for TRUK. Picked
up, however, 13 Army officers (warrant and above) and
419 enlisted men; I46 members from the crews of the tvio
ships; and two N.^vy men.
I'^XC
1420
The KUNIKAVi'A Maru<XCVS) had engine trouble and halted
in her course 300 nautical miles from TRUK at a bearing
of 132°.
Left TRUK to stand by her.
Contact was made with the ship and we took charge of
escorting her. ^^
The repairs on the KUNIICrtV:A Maru having been completed,
proceeded to return.
Arrived at TRUK.
We left TPlUK, as the screening unit for the advance force
(AdB) and main force ijhich were to assist in the "ke" (^ )
Campaign. (TN: "ke" Campaign seems to be a general
Japimese term for an evacuation operation. )
Our ship hr.s been assigned to the Reiiiforcing Force (ZOB)
of the Outer South Seas Force (SMB). ConsE;quontly, wo
detached ourselves from the advance force (AdB).
/jrrived at SHORTLJID.
Lefo t'.-r:re (for our second transport duty at GUADALCANAL).
Retv.i.,-'d to SHORTLAND.
Lox't SHORTLAND (for our third transport duty at GUAD/vL-
CAI^IiX) .
Returned to SHORTL/JTO. Campaign "ke" ( */ ) is finished.
Left SHORTUiND to escort the SENDAI (CL).
Joined the SENDAI and returned to SHOnTUilD. Left there
for P/iiVJ (with the SAMIDARK of Dea'iv 10).
Spotted an enemy submarine. Droppx^c'. depth charges but
results were undetermined. Left the SAillD/JiE and headed
back to Ri'iBAUL to relieve our commander (3iIREI),
Capt, KONISHI relieved our commander and assumed his
ne\v dutie£.
Capt. SATO loft the ship.
Left R^'^AUL for PALAU.
Arrived at ViJJiJ, .
Left P/iLAU for Vffi\«M, escorting the JdTOSUMI Maruv' ^
{% -"^ -^ ), the AIKOKU Maru (XCL)X and the GOKOKU Maru/
{^l 1^ A ) , engaged in Operation #81.
Entered ','ffiW/J( /inchorage. Kept a mobile guard.
Unloading completed. Left the convoy and headed back
to RABAUL.
Arrived at R.'£AUL.
Took on supplies (at KOKOPO) for the ;.niiy.
Left RABAUL (in a transport operation to L/VE).
Came in contact with enemy planes in the evening.
Fought several enemy planes (PBY's and B-17's). The
KYOKUSEI Maru {%%.\A "as so damaged by bombs that
sho sank. Rescued those aboard, however.
Raided again by several B-17's.- Together wij-h the YUKIKiiZE
(DD) went on ahead to L/iE. Supplies wore unloaded for our
troops.
552 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
3 March 1943
4 March
5 March
7 March
2200
0600
1700
8 March
1043
1700
9 March
12 March
1642
1700
13 March
1700
14 March
30 March
0600
1839
31 March
1 April
2 April
3 April
5 April
6 April
9 April
10 April
13 April
20 April
26 April
28 April
29 April
30 April
12 May
15 May
20 May
21 May
25 May
JICFOA Iteni #4986
Page 13
Rejoined the convoy.
0700 Fought off a 100-odd enemy fighters, bombers, and torpedo
bombers, 10 or so of oiir own planes came to our defense.
The convoy was destroyed. Rescued survivors, but dis-
continued this at 1300 ai-Kl withdrew, changing our course
southward and scouting. Able to detect nothing, however.
1640 Arrived at KAVIrHG. Came alongside the SEITOAI and got
some supplies.
Left KAVIiiMG for RABAUL.
Arrived at RABAUL.
Left RABAUL for SHORTLAND (with' the YUKIKAZE, SHIKINAMI
(DD), and URANAMI (DD) ).
Arrived at SHORTLAI©.
Left there through the south entrance (in the KOLO^©ANGARA
ferry service). Completed our unloading there and pro-
ceeded to return.
Vfe separated from the SHIKINAMI and URANAMI.
Arrived at RABAUL.
Left RABAUL for SHORTLAND (with the YUKIKAZE and MINATSUKI
(DD) ).
Left SHORTLAND through the south entrance (in the KOLOM-
BANGARA ferry service). Completed our unloading there
and proceeded to return.
Arrived at SHORTL/tND. Moved supplies, then left again.
Arrived at RAB/iUL.
Left RABAUL for SHORTLAND (with the SAMIDARE, YUGUMO
(DD), KAZSGUMO (DD), and /iKIGUllO (DD) ).
Arrived at SHORTLAND, then left through the south entrance
(in the KODDUBANGARA ferry service). Vfcre in continual
contact with enaray planes, making it difficult to unload.
Abandoned all thought of unloading finally and proceeded
to return,
1700 Left again through the south entrance (in the KOLQUBAN-
GARA ferry service), Comploted our unloading there and
proceeded to return.
Arrived SHORTLAND, leaving again for BUKA. Arrived at
BUKA and picked up fuel,
0500 Left BUKA for SHORTLAND. .\rrived there and found the
KAZEGUMO and a merchantm damaged by a mine, (y/e
suspect magnetic mines had been laid in the harbor.)
1700 Left through the south entrance (in the KOIiafflyiNGARA
ferry service). Complotad our unloading and proceeded
to return.
Returned to SHORTLAND, leaving again for TRUK. One B-25
attacked us, but its bombs went wide of their mark,
0800 Arrived at TRUK.
0600 Left TRUK for YDKOSUKA.
1000 Arrived there, mooring to Buoy Y-17.
Receivijd a furlough and returncxi to my homo at IO3O
(until the 24th).
1130 Left for the (ATAMI) Health Resort.
1000 Returned (i'-.:To YO.ILJ ..) I was now to bo stationed aboard
the USUGUMO (E©).
Left my old ship after lunch.
0954 Arrived at ^MINATO (by train). Went aboard my new ship
the USUGUMO.
The situation in the northern area having changed sud-
denly j_ stopped our present work,
2345 Left OMINATO for PAaUflJSHIRD,
0415 Arrived at the PARAMUSHIRO Straits.
0725 Moving through the north entrance to P.'iRAUUSHIRO, wo
went on patrol duty.
0520 Returned to PARAUUSHIEO.
1630 Left PARi'iMUSHIRO for ATTU. (V/c wjrc to attack the enemy
fleet by surprise, transport urgently needed materiel,
and pick up liaison men,)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
553
CONFIDENTIAL
30 May 1943
31 May
2 June
3 June
5 Jvine
7 June
19 June
23 June
24 June
26 June
30 June
1 July
5 July
10 July
11 July
12 July
13 July
14 July
15 July
18 July
19 July
22 July
26 July
29 July
31 July
JICPOA Item #4986
Page 14
0240 Ceased our operations and proceeded to return.
0825 Returned to PARAMUSHIRO.
0612 Left to clean out enemy subs operating south of
ARAIDO Island.
1100 Ceased this work and returned to PARAMUSHIRO.
Today was the occasion of the national funeral of
YAUAMOTO, Admiral of the Fleet.
0700 Observed his passing with a half-mast ceremony.
The SHIRAKIM) (DD) collided with the NUilAKAZE (DD) 12
nautical miles off CAPE LOP-^TKA at a bearing of 122°.
0115 Headed in that direction to lend assistance.
0355 Joined the SHIRAKIM).
Returned to PARAMUSHIRO, escorting her.
0950 Entered the harbor there.
1125 Left to determine the calibration of our direction
finder .
1455 Having done this, returned again.
0320 Left PARAiiUSHIRO Harbor escorting the IKUSHIi»iA Itoru V^
i>,>(.\,f.t ).
1530 Ceased escorting and left the othjjr ship.
2025 Joined the NITTEI liaru (r? •'^ ^v^and escorted it.
0648 Ceased escorting and entered the harbor (^r ■ ..t .UIA
I-IUSHIRD ?)
1000 Cariie alongside the HjUCKAI iJaru (/ V -,1^ 1l\X, Sqioipped
her with counter-radar (GYAKUTAN) and loaded landing
barges on her.
1155 Left the side of the' HAKKAI Maru.
1700 Received warning to go on watch duty.
1950 Weighed anchor and left port (headed for a spot 23
nautical miles out of BETTOBU NUUA at a bearing of 350°
where a submarine attack had been reported) .
0930 Entered PARAiiUSHIRO Harbor.
1930 Left (to participate in the "ke" Campaign at KISKA).
0205 Planned to make a dash for KISKA, but the weather was
not favorable for it, so at 203O we changed our course
and ivithdrew. ^/^
0550 Joined the NIPPON Uaru*tXAO) and reccoAred oil.
0735 Made a second attempt to dash into KISKA, but reversed
our course again r.t 1520 because of unfavorable condi-
tions.
0240 Made our third attempt.
1703 Gave up again.
2145 Made our fourth attemprt,.
0156 Gave up once more.
1500 Tried for the fifth time.
0430 Gave up again.
0820 Ceased ouf operations and returned to PARAJUSHIRO.
0830 Entored P.-.'iiUiUSHIliO Harbor.
0630 Received an air raid v;arning for the northern KURILES.
0645 Five B-24's bomb^id us but there was no damage.
2000 Left for the second phase of our participation in the
"ke" Campaign.
1750 The KUNIJIRI (CM) and the ABUKUMA (CL) collided (duo to
this, there was some confusion produced in the roar of
the ' formation, and the WAK.\BA (DD), HATSUSHIMO (IS)), and
NaGANa^ (DD) also collided).
1105 Sighted the outline of nn island.
1316 The ABUKUMA sighted the enemy ar^ fired 3ome torpedoes.
It developed that we had mistaken LITTLE KISKA for the
enemy.
1321 The SHIMAKAZE fired its guns.
1350 Dropped anchor in KISKA Harbor.
1405 Had finished taking aboard the men.
1420 The 2nd Transport Unit 1-iad finished.
1427 Departed.
0604 The weather cleared up.
1530 We entered the harbor at PARAMUSHIRO.
554 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONpPEKTIAL
1 August 1943
3 August
6 August
7 August
8 August
16 August
15 Septeniber
20 September
JICPOA Ite:a jl-4986
Page 15
1000 Tho 1st Transport Unit arrived. _
1700 Departed from P.'tRAiiUoHIRO bound for OUINnTO.
0600 Put in at OTARU.
0730 V/ent ashore at YOKOSUKA Naval Base.
lAOO Arrived at YOKOSUKA having received orders to report to
the Commr.ndant of the Naval Torpedo School for duty.
Started courses for torpedo-boat captain.
Concluding my courses.
Received orders assigning mo to the YOKOSUKA Guard Unit
(SHBBITAI) and placing me in command of the Nu'aber 10
Torpedo^Boat.
!^ ACCOUMT OF Tfffi OUTBRKAK OF THE WAR BETOEEN JaPAM AND THE UNITED STATES
7 December 1941 Imperial Rescript to the Conimrjider-in-Chief of the Ccnbincd
Fleet:
"We, by ordering this d'-spatch, delegate you to have the res-
ponsibility of co.Tu;ianding the Canbinod Fleet, The responsi-
bilitcs of the Combined Fleet will be extremely heavy rnd suc-
cess or failure of the matter concerns the fate of the country.
You have mcdo progress by urging ths achievements of Fleet-drill
for many yec-rs, and you must be determined to meet our expecta-
tions by exaltijig 'ini' fofcc rjid authority throughout the vrorld
by annihilrting the enemy."
Reply to the Empuror by the C-in-C of the Combined Fleet:
"I was overwhoLningly impressed by the gracious Imperial Res-
cript, at the outbrealc of the war, and 1 shall carry out his
great orders v.dth reverence. The officers and men of the
Combined Fleet hr.ve sworn to do their utmost and they will
accorapli^ the aim of tl.c despatch. They €ire dctonnined to
accept and carry out the Emperor's Commands."
Orders from the C-in-C to the Combined Fleet:
"The fate of our empire h?.ngs on this vicr. Each man must do
his utmost to fulfil 1 his obligations,"
8 December 1941 The Imperial Edict .-eclrring i/ar c^gr.inst the UNITJD STATES and
ENGLjJ© was issued.
Imperial Rescript to the Ministers of the Army and Navy was
received .
Acceptance by the Minister of the Navy.
Orders to the ilinister of the Navy and his department in general.
Success of the ^^urprise , ttack on HAV/AII by our striking force:
Surface Cr-ft
Sunk:
Seriously Damaged:
Moderately Da'iaged:
4 BB's, 2 Cruisers, 1 Oiler
2 BB's, 2 Cruisers, 2 DD's.
2 BB's, 4 Cruisers.
Aircraft
Seriously Darr.aged:
Razed:
Our Losses:
157 Planes
(sa..e) Hangars
39 Planes
At this time our southern forces started to make landings. Suc-
cessful ones were jnade rt KOTA BlURU, SINGOilA, BATAAN, Bi^NGKOK,
and AJBOINA. The wireless station and airfield at BASCO in the
BaTAAN Islands north of LUZON wore occupied. At SHANGHAI, the
British gunboat PENGUIN was sunk. The international Sett-leraent
v/as entered. At PEICING, the Americ&n Marines laid dovvn their
ar;iis. SINGAPORE was bombed. MIDWAY and V/nKE Islands v;ero
bombed. CLARK. Field and IBA en LUZON were attacked. V.o have
taken over British and American rights "nd privileges in the
southern islands. GUAil was bombed. HONGKONG and DAVAO were
bombed.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
555
CONFIDENTIAL
JICPOA Item #4986
Page 16
9 December 1941 V/AKE and GUAM were bombed. The American seaplane carrier LANGLEY
was sunk (in DAVAO BAY) . An enemy sub appeared off TAKAO Harbor.
10 December
11 December
15 December
16 December
17 December
19 December
20 Deccanber
22 December
23 December
The resiJ.ts of our HA'.VAII Operation were the occasion for joy;
an Imperial Rescript was presented to the Commander-in-Chief,
Combined Fleet. A THAI-JAPANESE offensive and defensive alli-
ance has been signed. WAKE Island was attacked. The HAYATE
(DD) and KISARAGI (DD) were shelled and sunk. Successful land-
ings were made at VIGAN on LUZON; we siiffered the loss of one
sub-chaser. Occupation of GUAM completed. APARRI on LUZON also
captured. UAKIN and TARAV/A occupied. Minesweeper #19 wecked
off the mouth of the CAGAYAN River on LUZON. An English fleet
was attacked off the MALAY coast, and two of the latest British
battleships, the PRINCE OF '/VALES and the REPULSE, were sunk.
Imperial Rescript:
"At the very outbreak of tliis war, our Combined Fleet has displayed
a brilliant strategy and fought bravely. At H^V.'AII it has
heavily crushed the enemy's fleet and air strength. V/e have
received the report of this signal achievement ourself. More-
over, we extviiid our deepest praise to our fighting forces,
officers and men alike. If they should strive harder and
harder, we foresee a magnificent futui-e for our Eupiro.
Establishraent of the ROiaE-BERLIN-TOKYO Tri-partite Pact.
Attack on VJAKE. The results of the naval action off MALAYA
were the occasion for joy; an Lmperial Rescript was presented
to the C-in-C, Combined Fleet.
"The Air Force of the Combined Fleet has crushed the mo.in force
of the English .-^-iatic Fleet in the SOUTH CHINA SEA and has
enhanced our fov-er and prestigo throagho^it the area. V/e are
deeply pleased.''
Ansv;oi- of C-in--C.
Declaration of war igainst AMERICA by IT/iLY and GERMi'iKY.
Success of landing at LEGA3FE.
1 Enemy Sub off ''""KYO Bay
1 Encny Sub in the SUNGO CHANNEL
3 Enemy Subs n-iar CFHiCMJIMA
WAKE £itte.ckw;,
10 E'-'emy jubs near CHICHIJDIA
1 Ene-nv ub near TRUK
3 Eneir.y -ubs at SHIO SAKI (i^J"^ )
The SHINONOMS was lost 15 km north of BARAM POINT while on
patrol off MIRI . The RO-66 collided with the RO-62 tvrenty-f ive
miles w^ni of "JAKE and sank instantly. The RO-62 suffered prac-
tically no damage.
WAKE bonbed.
Dutch cubmarine near PALiiU.
P;-JJAMA, COi;TA RICA, NIC^AGUA, HOITOUa'iS, GUnTEitLU, DO.ilNICAN
REPUBLIC , CJ3A, U^lTl have declared vrar on JkPAK. MEXICO has
broken ofi relations with JAPAN.
Enemy Subm.irin£s: _
2-4 BUNCO Channel
2-4 BONIN Islands
1-2 TAr.VAN STRAIT
2 P/iLAU
1-2
Near TOKYO Bay
KII
M/J'iCUS Islands
HAINAN Island
MARIANA Islands
2-4
3-4
2-4
4-5
Successfully landed at LINGAYEN.
Complete occupation of WAKE. Striking Force arrived at
HASHIRA SHIMA (near KURE) .
556 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL JICPOA Itejii R9B6
Pa,-e 17
25 December 1941 Surrender of HONG KONG.
A successful surprise landing was .Ta.de it JOLO on I£[FDANAO.
26 December The SAGIRI (DD) received a submarine torpedo attack north
of KUCHIMG (oARAWAiO and sank._ KUCHIKG OGCUgied.
The jS'6 Minesweeper and the U^.'YO #2 }ia.r\i\^^'V "A A) were
surik by air banbing.
The MJRASAiJE (DD) collided v.dth the #20 tii.nesweeper at TAKAC.
— December Air attack at liANILA.
1 DD, 2 SS, 10 merchant ships sunk.
The ASAKA2E sank 1 S-S at LIKGaIEN.
27 December The C-in-Ci of the American Army of the PH.ILIPPINiC d-.clared
MAIJILA an open city. fiAMILA was heavily bai-bed.
DETAILED DESCHIPTION OF GUAM (OliliAJIiiA)
(12 December 1941)
Installations:
There are facilitie.s for 1 Naval St.Ation.
There is one land air-base. There is also a seaplane base and dredging
facilities. There is a PAA flying boat base wliichis used as a seaplane
base. Submarine base facilities are being expanded. There are shore
batteries.
Naval Personnel - about 500 men.
Army Personnel - about I6OO men.
Supplies:
Coal - about 6,000 tons.
Heavy oil - thero are 6 heavy oil tanks but their capacity is not known.
There are ammunition storehouses.
Fresh water and provisions - small quantities.
Others:
APRA Harbor is suitable for protection from the islnd all year around.
8 or 9 large warships can put in here. There are no suitable anchorages
for other vessels.
GUAM CCCUPaTIOK FOacE BATTLE REPORT
The GUAM Island Occupation Forces protected the Southern Detachificnt (TN:
Nan SHI TAIif) t^ ^f< ) and began landing at 0500 on the tenth. VWiile they
continued mopping up activities and this force (TNj the GUAM Occupation Force)
and the SNLF advanced to the Liiportant positions i urrounding APRA Harbor (TN:
V^ '^ ) and occupied it caaplctoly. The en^^my lost his fighting spirit because
of the attacks of sevoriil days previous V;* our air forces.
Results of the Battle:
A. We took prisoner the governor and many government employees,
and about 200 iJarines, including their ccm.ander.
B. There was fighting in the streets of .iGANA (TK:)''''] t^ ) . 50
were killed,
C. It was estimated that APRA harbor would bo cleared of mines
and ships able to anchor within ten days. One oil tank, the
gun batteries and powder magazines had been blown up, however,
the oil was still burning after 3 days.
D. A 3jOOO ton merchantman was seized. 100 kilolitres of airplane
fuel was taken, as was much construction material (steel, baubs,
too),
E. The wireless and cable stations were both severely dainr.g.d and
unfit for use.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
557
CONFIDENTIAL
JICPOA Item #4986
Page 17-a
SKBTCH ¥A? OF H/iHA SHIIIA - 2 December 1941
26°40
KARA SHI!i/\
LIT. CHIBUGA
U.2 \ 34 ,, ^
100 Y nvj /;/.; )
^-/..v 43 A°-\0 ?l'TAGO SHIIIA
'. .-. c:C^^-toRA SillMA
f«JKO
SHIiiA
,:<:■'
;i/\RU SHII.IA
o
AN3
SHIIiA '
O
IGI
SlilliA
n©To
sim'A
142° 10' E
OKE.IJRA:
popijlation
1500
Post Office
Sleven transports were in the harbor (part of the GUAJl Occupation Force)
HASHIRA SHE LI — f HAIIA SHIIIA
J) ailCKI SHIIL\
<^ HAHA Stll'Ll,
GUi\l.I
H/iHA SHIM-i — >- GU.U.: 300 miles
558 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item #4986
Page 18
My Opinions:
For about 6 months before it was attacked, construction was in progress
on GUAM: plans had been made on a larpe scale to make the island a sub base.
Looking at the condition of the project after our occupation, I would venture
to say th-t by strenj^thening these installations, the enemy will be unable to
avoid damage by our(TN: submarine) forces a few months later on.
I think the success of our occupation here was primarily due to the enemy's
utterly deficient (defense), and then, too, the bold way in which we carried
out our surprise attack. But I realise that, our next opseration must, at all
costs, be begun as soon as possible.
SUlOtARY OF V;AKE ISLAND
27 December 1941
Military Installations
There is' a base for the Pan-American Ainvays flyir.g boats. Planes draw
up alongside docks. As a base for flying boats, its value is greater than that
of MIDV/AY. There is a v;ireless station.
Supplies
There are some facilities. On FEALE Island are the facilities of the Pan-
American Airwaj^. There is an air-craft beacon, a powerplant, a hotel, ar.d p,
wireless station. It is on the supply line v;hich runs to MIDVJAY and ti.'.7/;lJ ?nd
(going southwest) to GUAM.
Harbors
As a haven from wind and waves its value is greater than that of MIDV/AY,
Work had been proceeding on a channel v/Lich was to be 300 feet wide. At the
entrance to thg ch?jinel, the coral re f was to be cut to a depth of 35 feet
and on the inner side, to a depth of 30 feet (TN: This refers to the channel
under construction at the outbreak of the v;ar. The outer channel was to be
35 feet deep, the turning basin 30 feet deep, and the width of the channel,
300 feet.)
There are no anchorages in the vicinity and vessels tic up to buoys.
OPERATIONAL SUMAHY OF TfE WAKE ISUND OCCUPATION
28 December 1941
1. Occupation schedxilcd for X / 4 day. (Occupation forces began operations
after N .) (TN: Noon on X Dayj X Day - Dectanber 23 ?).
2. Reconnaissance carried out 4 December(T-i-) by 6 flying boats O (from 22nd
squadron (CHUTAI) headquarters) and 12 land-based aircraft (f X U ).
3. 8 December 1000
30 land-attack planes (f'' ) carried out, a bombing attack. (2 land planes
( f" ) out of 9 were probably destroyed, one tank at the seaplane base (l*|
was destroyed by fir^; 3 ^'igiiter planes ( fc ) were sighted, but they did
not engage our aircraft.) (Japanese casualties: 1 Petty. Officer killed,
several planes d'jnaged by shell-fire.)
4. 9 December 0940
A bombing attack was carried out by 26 land attack aircraft (TN: flo)
(5 fighter planes were shot down, the north wing of the barracks was des-
troyed by fire, part of the airfield i>i] ■) was demolished, the seaplane
base ( li] ) radio station v;as baabed. No fljlng boats (fd) were sighted.
Radio communications were disrupted from 1005 to 2145.) (Japanese casual-
ties: 1 Air V.'arrant Officer killed, 1 man slightly wounded, 14 planes
damaged by shell fire.)
5. 10 December 2230
A convoy of eleven merchant ships approached the south coast in a heavy
swell. Landing operations were postponed, waatirig for an improvement in
weather conditions.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
559
JICPO/. Item A986
Page 18-a
«ft^ ® ^g«»-\D
79716 O — 46 — pt. IS-
IS
560 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
6. 11 December
7. 11 December
8. 11 December
9. 11 December
10. 11 DeseKber
11, 12 December
12. 12 December
13. 12 December
u.
15.
12 December
U45
16.
13 December
0530
17.
12 December
0100
18.
13 Decomber
0130
19.
13 December
1010
20. 13 December
21. 13 December
22. 14 December
JKPOA Item fl*4986
Page 19
0645 The 'JAKE radio began transmitting to FEARL HARBOR
(TN: "NHvi").
Jap casualties: The HAIAKAZE (DD) exploded and
sank at 0452.
The KISARAGI (DD) ej?)loded and
sank at a531.
The IXKGO Maru-'UfflL) was damaged by a hold fire.
Rough weather still prevailed in the aftemo*n and
(the landing force) decided to withdraw to K'AJALEIN
to make further plans. At P715, 11 December, 17
land attack planes (TK; flo) attacked the PEALE Is-
land shore batteries . and MG positions, and were
engaged by fighters for 30 minutes. One fighter was
shot down. (Japanese losses: 2 land planes destroyed,
1 reserve 1st Lieutenant, 9 petty officers, and 5
enlisted men killed, 11 aircraft damaged by shell-
fire, 1 man slightly wounded.)
2330 The positions of tvjo naval craft were fixed by RDF
in the viciiuty of 'TAKE Island (the ships w6re
thought to be patrol craft, seaplane tenders or
oilers) .
2050 ^ ^ , y 27 has withdrawn from the VAKE, (attack) force
and is joining the submarine, force. Most of the sub-
marine force is engaged in patrolling "JAUE.
1100 The TSUGARU (CU) and the i>:AIZURU 2nd SrJLF are standing
by for the occupation of 'VAKE. At 0900 12 December
(the attack group) secured from readiness and the .
SI-ILF units re-turrned.
The HOYO liaru^XAO) returned to RUOTTO for supplies.
1000 CnC'iv 6 (TM: So) is to return before 16 Decsr.ter
to RUOTTO in order to aid in the operation of the area.
0840 26 land plan&o ( ;> .: .-.;. c-:' by Lieut. Cor.-r.znr'fiv ^iVTS'JDA)
bombed TMS. (A warehouse and the western S'v;l;ni'
AA gun were demolished. Two fighter pl.-j;os ei^^aged
the attack group.) (Japanese casualties; 1 plane
explod-J, 6 petty officers and 2 enlisted men killed,
4 planes damaged by shell-fire.)
An (American) naval vessel appearing at '.VJ\E radioed
cm 14th Naval District at 0552, 0721, and 0937,
12 December.
The position of the American naval vessel v;hich was
transmitting is — - nautical miles from "AKE at a
bearinp of 115° 60'.
The '7/iKE occupation force has arrived at RUOTTO.
Fifteen land plaiies boinbed '"AKE with undetermined
results. T'.vo"5 place_ flying boats (TN: ? f d x 2/5)
bombed the airfield i^J • There was an air battle,
(Japanese casuailties: 1 fljring boat failed to return.)
COM Gru~iv 6 requested of Chief of Staff, 4th Fleet
to include tho LIAIZUHU 2nd SNLF and the KIYOItA'.VA Uazny
(;iPV) in the 'j-Jc^JL occupation force.
A fighter-reconnaissanco plane attached to Airflot 24
(at 5000 meters altitude) observing through a hole
in the clouds (reported the following): One or two
figiitcr planes in the revetments at the west side of
the runway; no flying boats; one merchant ship carry-
ing out unloading operations.
1800 Cooperated with Striking Forcu (TN: KB).
2320 The gunboat (T;;: C) group has been disbsjided. The
"JkyjL (.occupation) force has been reinforced (TSOTO
Maru^K^PV), KIYOrX'/A Maru->/APV), one company of the
r.'u.lZUm SNLF, 2 DD of Jes iv 24.)
Three 10 place flying boats (TM: f^ x 3/lO) (under
Lieut, Commander TASHIHO) at 0137 and 30 land-based
pianos t.t 0855 under Commander UCHINO bombed '.''AKE.
(Direct hits were scored on the runway, rcv:;tment3 anc
one fighter plane set afire; the vjarehouse was set on
fire, (Japanese casualties: 11 fighters dam£.ged by
shell-fire.)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
561
COITIDEHTIAL JICPOA Item ,,'49b"
Page 20
23, 15 December I6IO 8 flying bor.ts (under the c^nmand of Lieut, Commander
KOIZUKI) effectively bombed the barracks area in the
northern part of the main island,
24, 16 December 32 landrattack pianos (commanded by Lieut. ^U'J:UUSiE)
and one fighter (at 7000 altitude) (reported the
following): About 20 kk mobile guns, and a number
of high-sp'.-ed torpedo boats have appeared, ( A heavy
oil tank, .an ammunition magazine and a warehouse were
set on fire, and the base on PEALE Island effectively
bombed.) (Jap, casualties; 3 land-attack planes were
damaged by shell-fire,)
25, 17 December 1555 8 flying boats boiried the southeast section of PEALE
Island, (Causing explosions at the AA gvin, the hotel,
and ydreless station.,
26, 18 December 0940 Land-attack bombers (I^pe I) carried out reoormaissance,
The southeast channel was blocked up, ^
27, 19 December 0845 27 land-based attack bombers bombed the airfield l?l
on "JILKES Island. 1 fighter engaged them. The anti-
aircraft guns on the airfield on '1LKES Island and
one MG Unit were destroyed. (Japanese losses: One
man killed aboard plane, 12 attack bombers (TN:
here fid) were hit by shells.
28, 20 December 1330 A flight of enemy patrol planes arrived (TIJ:
SHOKAIKI).
COKDITIOK OF THE ZMta
(Based upon .-.erial i-econnaissance cuid sundry jitelligence r-sports)
1.
2,
3.
4.
5.
6.
1.
2,
4,
5.
6.
fferines 300
Civilians imployed by the Llilitary 1000
Dual purpose ^-uns 12 (part with mobile emplacements).
Coast defense batteries, machine gun positions a great number.
Fighters several
Submarines euid torpedo-boats are lurking in the vicinity
OUR FOHCES
/dr Forces of the South Seas Force are carrying out bombing
attacks day after day.
A Submarine force (RO-6O, 61, 62) is caiTying out p>atrols
around the island. _ _
Reinforcement Butai (SORYU and HIRYU) on the 20th cooperated
in landing operations by sending their planes in to attack.
Attacking Force ^JptJi/kV*<X
(Flagship) YUa;RI (CL), SubRon 6i6SS).y
Landing Force - KONGO lianJ^ KDJHYU Maruy Patrol Boats
Nos. 32 and 33;
Combined SI\ILF.
SNLF Headquarters,
1st Company (Company commanded by UCHIDA, li;.IZURB SNLF)
2nd Company (Company commanded by TAKANO, 6th Base Force)
3rd Company (Company commanded by ITAYA, LLAIZURU SIJLF)
Covering Force
TENRYU (CL) and TATSUTA (CL).
Supporting Force
Cru iv 6 (6S).
PRCCEDUBE TO BE FOLLOVH) SHOULD ENEMY (SHIP) BE EIXOUl^TERED
1. The ships which sight the enemy shall oqjend every effort to conceal our
force by lajring smoke screens and by other means,
2, In the event thatj_cn?my surface naval vessels approach, in accordance v.ith
orders, the KINRYUJJaru and the patrol boats shall avail themselves of
every opportunity to retire from the disputed aroa.
The SubRon 6 (6SS) and the Cnf^iv 18 (18S) are to atinihilate the enemy.
562 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL JlCPOi. Item ^4986
Page 21
liAINTEljANCE OF SBCHECY
1. Limted use of radio.
2. Light control
3. Localizad use of lights for signalling at night and, as demanded
bj- the situation, proper control of illuminating strength. May-
be used to determine bearing,
k. Throwing overboard things which vdll float in the water is strictly-
forbidden.
5, Disposal of bilge water which contains oily matter.
OPERATIONS OF THE SUPPORTING FORCE
1. On the 21st at 0800 the Force will lo.ivo UELLU Channel. The landing force
will carry out a landing at 0200 on the sane day. The Force will proceed
to a point about 50 miles to the oast of VJi-jCE Island and thereafter,
shall act as the onunj' situation may warrant.
2. "hen the attack on "'AKE gets under way, the Force shall proceed to a point
about -50 miles to the southeast of the island and patrol in support
(TN: of the attack).
23 December 1030 The occupation of 'JAKE Island has been completed.
SUMMARY OF Ttti BaTTLE
1. Enecgr prisoners: Lt .-Colonel and his co:;imand 430
Skilled laborers 1100
In addition to this, many were killed and we acquired many installations,
gun emplacements, and ammunition.
2. Our Losses:
Killed UCHIDA Company 9
Seriously -'ounded 19 I-fen on Patrol Boat No, 32
Slightly ■ founded 34
In addition to these losses, 2 patrol boats were heavily dajnaged and 1
plane was shot down.
LESSONS LEiiRNED FPjDM THE B^.TTLE
1. Vlhon we think about the lessons that may be leaned from a battle, we
must -view it with the eyes of a critic eind to the end maintain the point
of -view of the other side.
2. Strive to the utmost to learn about the state of affairs of the enemy;
though you may have exhausted every means to learn this, and you may be-
lieve that you know enough about it, you never know enough. However,
after you have learned about the enemy and have made thorough preparations,
there remc>.ins onJLy the necessity for resolute action,
3. '"hen it comes ti.v.o to o^rry out the operation, look at the situation as
the enemy does and try to discover his weak points,
4. Always take into account obstacles that may result from the weather (wind
and waves, and range of vision).
5. Do not be defeated by a multiplicity of plans, j'.ssemble similar plans
into one whole.
6. In the light of the battle, it is foolish to refrain from de3j.vering an
all-out attack,
7. The distribution of militarj' strength sho'ald be considered principally
with regard to the cain strategy. The decision as to the tine of commence-
ment of action must be made carefully.
8. It is essential in an operation that the various types of aircraft be
brought together. _
9. The fact that damage from accidental explosions (YUBriU) of torpedoes and
depth charges was very great should be borne in mind.
10, In war, the chances of success are three to seven. Out of 81 men 50 were
killed. However, sever-il hundred prisoners ■ v;ere taken aod I'c ca;;t:irec" the
whole island. The side that fights well the last five minutes is the
one that wins.
11. "/hen battle is undertaken, the leadership of the commanding officers should
be firm. By no means, may there be any faltering, or hesitation. V/hen
preparations have been made, action should follow.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 563
COHFIDF,NTI/X JICPOA Item n*/t936
Page 22
12. Though it i3 oaey to throw away one's life by being impetuous, when once
it is realized thr.t death is pleasant, to live and do one's duty is
difficult.
13. The idealist and the materialist are coraplimentary. The fallacy of
AMERICA ivhich worships materialism has been exposed.
lA. Leadership in battle: Inform even the engine-room hands who cnnnot see
the enony of the situation. Exhaust all one's knowledge rjid ability
when he is in a fatal position.
15. Acquisition of air supremacy is necessary. However, naval vessels still
fulfill tlisir 'ecOJ-.T _".rpose,
16. In glorious battle, the function of the supporting force i2 a thankless
task.
17. Orders must be carefully considered. Once, however, they have been given,
they should be carried out to the letter,
18. Inventiveness and originality. The most profitable use of new weapons
is the responsibility fo the strategist. (Believe earnestly in certain
victory.)
19. Since the advancement of L\ weapons is vcrj' slow we must fight planes
with planes, and also we must destroy the base Before the enemy can rise,
20. Importance of ir '"ascs (Bases for action). Planes must inevitably have
bases.
21. The capture of the isolated island by occupation operations will be com-
paratively difficult as the whole island is a fortress; and, in addition
to this, operating freely will be extremely difficult,
22. There are opport'onities in battle. Seizing these opportunities wins
victories; when one misses these opportunities he cannot win a victory
no matter what he does,
23. Occupation operations and subnarines. The enemy can only prove a threat
by raerjis of its submarines. It nUst be said that if the enemy were to
conceal even one or two submarines in the vicinity of VJAKE Island, they
vjould be a great menace to cur operations.
24. Operational Directions,
(A) Combined operations (KYODO SjJCUSEIj) are not feasible, as a rule.
If there were a Naval Specirl Landing Force of 20,000 men, landing
operations would be easy. In combined operations there are many
occasions where opportunities are missed for striking s.t weak points
with force. (. JIT3U "0 MOTIE, KYO ''0 UTSU)
(B) Insufficient military stren;;th causes uni'oreseen failure. It is
said that the lion exhausts his entire strength even to catch one
rabbit. _
(C) A force without a central unit (SKUTAI) is not possible. There is
a need for operational leaders to amass (information).
564 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDErJTIAL JICPOA Item #4986
Page 23
THS BISIIARCK SEA OPERATIONS
28 January, 1942
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BISMARCK SEA OPERATIOTS:
1. POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE (FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC):
Foreign: In oirr war with ENGLAID and the UNITED STATES we are bringing
to bear, as might have been expected, economic pressure and we are
dispatching against ENGLAilD in the Orient armies of deliverance. We
shall deliver a fatal blow against AUSTRALIA and shall carry out such
attacks as will uproot the foundations of the British Colonial Qi5>ire
which even now is In the process of disintegration.
Domestic : In roading the history of the sea-girt Island Bnpire of
JAPAN, as is natural, traces of those peerless men who ventured upon
the seas and embarked upon adventures abroad are not lacking. Though
it may be said that it v/as the WAKO (TN: A band of pirates who roamed thi
seas of CHINA and KOREA during the ASHIKAGA period) who revealed the
spirit of the Japanese nation by hoisting the ancient flag inscribed
"HACHUJAN, GREAT EODDHI-SATVA" (TN: HACHDJU^ is the God of 'Jar in the
Japanese pantology; BODDHI-SATVA is the BUDDHA-ELECT) and crossing
the seas, the TOKUGAVJA's closed the country for the long period of
three hundred years (TN: I638-I867) and the overseas expansion
dissolved into nothingness like a dream. The delusion of national
isolation was finally destroyed. Though it may be said that great
strides forward were made during the period of UEIJI, it was a period
of self-examination and development. During the TAISHO era we saw the
nation carried away by the tide of international liberalism and
effiminate ideals of poace. Retrenchment was a mistake.
The present invasion, hov/ever, will awaken a billion people.
Our confidence is unshaken and v;e proceed with the conviction that we
shall smash through the strong points of the enemy by this southern
advance and that we shall bring the campaign to a most successfiil
conclusion. We shall spare not the slightest effort,
2. ECONOIIC SIGNIFICANCE:
The resources of NEW GUIIffiA have not yet been exploited. The mining
industry, especially in the production of gold, is well-known. There
are fisheries. Being an intermediate trading place, its future
possibilities as a relay base for transportation and communications
are enorrious.
3. MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE:
a. A stronghold from which aggressive offensives may be launched.
It cuts the most advantageious South Pacific line of
the American offensive strategy against JAPAN — HAV/AII, HOCIAND
ISUND, SmOk, FIJI, SOLOi;ON ISLAiroS, and BISliARCK ARCHIPEUGO.
b. From the standpoint of defense, it is a buttress against
invasion.
It presents a powerful defensive front aigainst the south.
c. A base from which to carry out blockade;
The sea routes which bind AUSTRALIA to ASIA will lie within
bombing range of ovir planes. The shipping lanes, bays and ports
which lie beyond bombing range may be threatened by our sub-
marines based in ■'..•.' rrj-. ,.^.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 565
COMFIDSNnAL JICPOA Item H^i^o
Page 24
STRENGTH CF TH3 ATTACKING FORCSS;
1. NAVY:
a. Striking and Holdi.ng Fleet (TN: KAKIJCTO- KAKTAl) :
l&dn Units:
liineDiv 19 (OKINOSHIUA Flagshla, TSUGARU, TJ3JY0 kARU,
uogaiiigav:a uxsm)w
SubT.on 6 (YUB/JII Flagship);
DefiTiv 29 (OITji; Flagship, ASAflAGI and TOMAGI);
Dea'iv 30 (MJTSUKI Flagship, YAYOI and liOCHIZUKI);
KIYOKAWA (.%'') i^- ) , KONGO :.i-.-,5th Gun-
boat Squadron, 14th iHnesweeper Squadron, and
Submarine-chaser Dlv 56.
Supporting Units:
CmDiv 18 (TEllRYTJ Flagship, TaTSUTA);
DesDiv 23 (KIKUTSUKI Flagship, UZUO and YUZUKI).
KINRYU ,1-1 (TN: i ^ff. ^ )
MAIZURU 2nd SNIF
HIROSHDU Naval Landing Force, one con^iany.
b. Air Forc'js at TRUK:
YOKOILUlv Naval Air Group (14 flying boats);
CHITOSE Naval iVir Group (9 fighters and 18 medium
attack bombers). ■
e. Indirect Guard Forces:
Supporting Force— -6th Fleet;
TRUK Area Guard Force;
SAIPAN Area Guard Force;
Cooperating Forces:
Car'iiv 1
§^i#3'(half)
2. ARUY:
Commander-in-Chief of South Seas Detachment: i&Jor-General
SORII Toiaitaro,
Infantry 144th Regiment;
Cavalry 3rd Conpany;
Ifourrtain Gun Troops 1st Battalion;
Engineers—— 1st Compare;
566 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item #4986
Page 25
Commissary 2nd Company;
Mobile Field AA 1st Coiapaiiy;
(The above all from the 55th Infantry Division).
(TN: In the original, this to "Navy and Army", is ruled through and
marked "not permissible".)
ESTQIATE OF THE ENEI.iY IN THE BI3iAi?CK AR2As
1. Surface Vessels;
a. Australian Fleet;
2 heavy cruisers, 3 light ciniisers, a few other ships.
Location not clearly known.
b. Anglo-/jnerican Fleet;
5 battleships, 2 carriers, 4 heavy cruisers, unknown na-nber of
destroyers. It is not known whether or not they will engage
in battle (TK: RklKO ^^ f^- ).
2. Aircraft:
Several flying boats; several torpedo-bonibers , Airfield.
Total planes, all types: about 50 (British and Australian).
Total fl^in- boiits: under 50 (American).
3. Submarines :
There is as yet no inforaation concerning the situation of enemy
submarines. There is a great possibility that American sub-
marines have gradually imde their way west, '"'e assume, too,
that British and Dutch submarines have made an appearance in
the BISMilRCK Saa Area.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 567
CONFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item #4986
Page 26
IMPORTANT POINTS ABOUT RABAUL
29 January 1942
I. MILITARY AFFAIRS;
1. Air Fields (TN: 1^ ): RABAUL and VUIIAKAJjAU
2. Defenses: Volunteer Defense Army (1 rifle coupany;
1 MC- platoon). Roving Pati-ols (JUNKEITAI
^^ f>fi. ) abput 172.
Australian soldiers: About 500
Batteries: Under construction at
3 places.
3. Security: 20 miles outside the harbor guard by planes.
Outsiders forbidden to approach the air field
and at night the movements of the Japanese
are watched.
II. ESSEHTIALS OF GO'/ERtJlvENT;
"Territory of KE'.' GUINEA" Government Offices, Customs House, Law Courts
Pojst Office, Vttreless Station, Prison, Hospital.
III. POPUIaTION:
Urban Areas about 4,000
If nearby villsgos are included: about 12,500
Of which are:
Natives 10,300 (majority KICRONESL'JJ)
""nites 1,000
Chinese 1,200
Japrjiese 25
IV. CONDITIONS OF THE HARBOR:
1. It is easy for a formation to enter the harbor.
2. The body of water which lies north of an east-west line drawn through
DAVfAPIA Rocks has a length of approximately 2 miles and a maximum
breadth of 1.5 miles. Mud bottom. Depth of the water is from 84.1 —
100 metres, but the northern half is 47 metres or less in depth. The
anchorage for warships is, for the most ;5art, between 10.9 and 31»5
metres in depth while the anchoraf,e for merchant shipping is 36.5
metres deep.
3. Berthing capacity for the harbor is 5 CruDivs.
4. It affords excellent shelter.
5. "fhenever there in a steady south-cast wind blowing strongly, the
southern heilf is bound to be rough.
6. Sea-defense is easy.
568 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COM='IDENTIAL JICPOA Item #4986
Page 27
METEOROLOGICAL INFOBliATION ABOUT THE RABAUL AREA
(31 January 19h2)
1. GENERAL
Two periods are distinguished — i that of the northwest seasonal wind
which extends from December to April and that of the southeast seasonal wind
which extends from April to November.
In the winter, the northeast tradewinds of the northern hemisphere are
constantly blowing, part of which cross the equator and penetrate into the
southern hemisphere, '''hsn the northwest seasonal winds begin, the southeast
seasonal wind gradually recedes v.ith the fall of the southern hemispheric
high pressure. It is believed that, about January, the area of variable
winds at the cndo of the noriii and south air fronts (TN: doldrum area)
passes over the fcABAUL region. As a consequence, the weather in this area
is generally uncertain.
2. SPECIAL C!-1ARACTBRISTICS OF THE YEATHER
(a) Land and sea breozes are conspicuous.
However, they rarely exceed an altitud* of 500 metres and their area
are generally restricted to about 10 miles including inland and sea,
(b) Windless Nights,
It is said that this phenomenon is nore conspicuous during clear weather
than during cloudj- woather.
(c) Daily change of atmospheric pressure.
The atmospheric pressure, as in the case of the inner South Seas shows
a regular daily change. laaxL'uura highs are at 0900 and 2200 while maxi-
mum lows are at O^iOO and 1600.
(d) Amount of Rainfall,
January has the her.vie'jt rainfall of the year, /in average amount of
oVer 400 mm. of rain fall,
(e) "find.
In January, southerly winds are slightly more numerous, 355^ while
northerly winds rire soraeirtiat fewer - 305?.
However, in February, the southerly minds are reduced to 20^ while nortl^
erly winds are increased to 40?!. Judging from this in January, the
winds alternate north and south with this area as the center of the
doldrums region while in February the doldrums line has moved south.
3. WEATHER FORaCASTING
Judging from various conditions:
(a) In the case of a northwecterly \6.nd, heavy rains accompanying
sudden squalls. -Teather generally bad and continuing for several
days.
(b) In the case of a southeasterly wind:
"Jinds are generally light, "feather in this region probably good,
(c) In the case of the doldrums line s?Jiie as paragraph (Ji),
V/eather bad and uncertain.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 569
COKTIDEKTIAL JICPOA Item #4986
Page 28
RESULTS OF THE "R" CAMPAIOJ
(At tho boginning of the landings - 0000 on 23 January 1942)
0025 Succeeded in unloading at KAVIEMG without mishap. Met no resistance,
0415 Occupied the airfield in the town. The city streets were razed by the
fires the enemy had started. The telegraph office and all its installa-
tions were smashed. Completed sweeping the anchorage for mines.
1400 Occupied VMAK/'iNAU; enemy resistance there. Captured 17 foreigners at
NE"f HANOVER; many heavy and light machine guns, rifles, Jimmunition and
weripons ;vore also confiscated. No defense installations at ttiSUATA.
The mopping up on CREDNER Island is finished,
0250 Town of &i£AllL has been completely occupied. There was a counter-attack
by enomj' planes. ''?e have surrounded and are attacking the enemy in the
"FaLAUR Sector. The inhabitants of (RABAUL)have all flod. Apparently
all the Japanese residents there had beun tsransportcd to SIDNEY on the
14th. 100 prisoners taken. 6000 bombs and 60 drums of plane fuel were
also captured. Our losses were one carrier-ba^ed torpedo bomber and one
carrier-based bomber; The Army lost 14 dead and 15 wounded.
OUTLII\iE OF THE S.N.L.F. LiJlDIl«;
31 January 1942
at YSABEL PnSSi^CE
Flag signals from the commander (SHIREIKAN);
Clean out the area along tlie shore near the anchorage.
I. The Gbjects of the operation.
A. Hostile persons (deserters, recalcitrant white men, etc.)
B. Enemy installations (wireless, gun, rifle installations, etc.)
II. Area to be deemed Out.
The Morth shore of mn HANOVER Island is to be covered rrom 150°20»
E. Long, eastward to 150°28' fi. Long, in sectors of two minutes longitude
each. Our ships are to cover these sectors in reverse numerical order,
III, The dispatched SNLF n
Four platoons commanded by a company commander aboard each ship (1 V/O
or above, 10 rated and non-rated men in each platoon); one command pla-
toon; total personnel, 60 or less.
IV. Landing Boats (HAKENTEI)
They shall be armed, shall move along shore in pace vdth the progress
of the SNLF, and shall stand ready to do signalling and any sudden mustering.
V. Dress
'The usual SNLF battle outfit will be worn.
VI. Unless there are special orders to the contrary, the landing boats will
leave their ships at 0700 on 1 February. They shall have returned by 1500,
570 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONPIDEHTIAL JICPOA Item #4986
Page 29
CONDinCN OF THE SHORffi AIID ANTriORAGBS tJF ISA^ PASSAGE
U February 19/t2
From what we saw v;ith our glasses, the entire island (NEV/ HANOVER) was one
large, dense jungle, upon which no axe had made itu mark since time began.
Here and there alonj' the shore, howevor, were human habitations. The mode of
living v;as not altogether strange; indeed, the general aspect was Occidental.
I was surprised at the blackness of ths natives. Only a piece of cloth was
wrapped about their loins. In general, they were resting in an absent-minded
fashion, as if they didn't know the meaning of work. There was one man among
them scratching his head just lilce a monkoy. They would crawl about when
changing their positions. Their behavior approached that of an animal.
At TSOI KOTO we spotted about twenty natives gathered together. Two or
three persons stood in the center, surrounded by the others. The;- all seemed
to be discussing something. Or cist they were surprised at our anchoring and
had called a meeting.
Living things ws^ _ o.-ei-yiihere. "'e saw only drooping trees soreading out
their leafy branches. If we could have penetrated to the depths of tlie jungle,
we would surely hsve seen many strfinge tilings.
At TSOI KOTO an' Australian r.ianaged a plantation. He had a wostern-style
house.
The natives used a "cc.noc" in movinf: about on the water.
The water's depth at our anchora-^o \v;-.s ;'.bout 15 metres. There was a shallow
spot 10 metres deep, however. The bottom was sandy.
The island had yet to bo exploited c.t all; but with the coming of our
countrymen in the future, I bolicvo it will be gre.^tl;' developed.
SAL;:CA-Li2 OPmiTIOMS:
10 February 1942
"LAE"
Although there is no place vtiich cm be caJ.lcd a natural harbor, buildings
and air fiold installitions I'lpvc been ^jt up; there are docks '.vheri^ 3ta--going
vessels can tie up, and on calm days liners can put in there, lioreover, this
harbor is equipped with 10-ton cranes md lighters with a capacity of 4000 tons
and these transport and unload cargoes on ships which are bound for (TN: or
are coming from) the SOLO-ION Isl:-'^'^.::.
"SALAtiOA"
Because this harbor is the port of entry to HORODE and "GOLDFIELD" (TN: ?)
it is also called NEIT GOLDFIELD HARBOii. As a result of the harbor construction
of 1926 there is a good harbor ";hioh affords shelter of various depths of water.
Ships anchor about 550 metres off-shoro; although small-type vessels can approach
the shore inside the harbor and drop anchor Uiere is nothing of p.^-rticular impor-
tance vit present in the way of harbor facilitie.';.
(TN: The next few lines ■vcro marked "Not Pei-mitted" in original document.)
1. Forces occupying the Si ^roa; •
Flag Dcsfion 6; Dcsgorv 6; Minoswe-p';r Division 14; KIYOKAV«A toru-tAP\^j
TSUGARU (CIJ); TEJnCO •Haru; KII-'RYU KI .ru "OCCL); KONGO Maru i^ffiL); KOKAI U
{^ l^ itff Bth Base Force (TN: Bg) SNLF.
2. Supporting Forces (SHIEN BUTAI)
Flag CraOiv 6; CruDiv 6; CruDiv 18; DocRon 23; TOHO liaru (XAO).^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 571
COMFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item jtk^Qb'
Page 30
3. Submarine Forces
Flag SubRon 7; SubRon 7.
k. Land Based Air Forces
Flag Airflot 24; Airflot 2k', OBORO
5. Carriers-based Air Forces
Captain, dHOHO (CV); SHOHO (CV); HOKAZE (DD).
Conditions of the Enemy: '
1. The Volunteer Defence Forces of the eneny in this area consist of 2 rifle
companies and 1 machine gun platoon.
2. The enemj- air forces are based at LAE and SALAMOA and they are in close
communication with PORT MORESBY and TW/IJESVILLE while operating in the RABAUL
Area (TN: "R" Area).
There are less than 10 planes for each baa« aod their activity is not very
lively; they fly in mobile deployment in eaoh place, however, and it will
he difficult to wipe them out,
3. We doubt that the American striking force vdll restore its operations in
the SOUTH SEAS Area and there is only a possibility that they will strike
in this area.
PORT MORESBY (TN: UO)
Operations and Disposition of Strength 15 May 1942
(TN: In the origfnal document the following lines were crossed out and labeled
"Not Permissible".)
Central Unit (SHUTAI)
Flag 4 Fleet KASHIMA (a) TOKr.'A (CM) YUNAGI (DD) SEISEN Maru (LPV)
MORESBY Striking Force
Flag CruDiv 5 (TN: 5S) (Minus the NACHJ) CarDiv 5 (Sf) DesDiv 27
DesDiv 7 (dg) (minus 1 DD) T0H0>4ILaru (XAO or APV)
MO Occupation Forces:
Flag CruDiv 6; CruDiv 6; DesRon 6 (minus the 1 DD of DesDiv 23); SHOHS;
DesDiv 7 (only 1 DD): SubDiv 21; Minesweeper 20; CruDiv 18lTSUGARU
(CM); KAMIKA'VA Maru<<XCVS);'pY0KA7;A Air Group; KOEI KanvT^ ^ ^ );
i'lZUMASAK Mani»<|^J, ^_); GOYO M£'.ru v(^ 'ii i^/ ) ;■ OSHHU (-^.R) irii^' )',
HOYOMaruy^ •;*.«.); IRO (;.0) {Xj /^ )', '^'
TULAGI Occupation Operations
Flag UinDiv A9; MinDiv 19 (TSUGARU) and TOKT'A (CM) ); DesDiv 23 I DD;
SHOEI Maru>/j§^- ^A.^.
Submarine Forces:
Flag SubRon 7; SubRon 7 (minus SubDiv 21).
Surface Escort Unit 2 (T/J),
Flag Escort Unit 23 Surface Escort Unit (TAI) 2»
572 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDEMTIAL - JICPOA Iteir. #/.986
P.-Ge 31
Conditions of the ^ea^t
1. A,-,erican Air Forces in tho Australian Area presumably 200 planes
(1st line),
2. It appears that considerable strength is concentrated in the PORT DAK/IM
and T0:fflSVILL3 sectors.
3. There is no information about the A crican Strikin,-: Force since (TN: their
arrival), but there is a great possiblility that they are becoming stronger
in this area.
4. Ljoreover it appears that the British U-z.v/ has dispatched a force composed
of 2-3 cruisers and some destroyers vdth a battleship as main strength to
the Australian area.
5. Although submarine activities have rot been very lively, submarines still
exist in the riADAUL area.
6. Transportation of materiel for AUSTTtALIA. Transportation by plane is
becoming gradually more active,
7. Since the activity of eneny reconnaissance planes has increased, it has
become dj.fficult to conceal our plans from themj security precautions are
particularly important.
8. It has become necessary to take especially strict AA precautions.
DEVjXOR.aiT OF THE CORAL SEA BATTLE
Outline of Battle of 4th Fleet.
On 4 iiay information concerning the enemy striking force (TN: KB) which
had attacked TULAGI was not "cry clear. On 6 i'ay at 0830 a YOKOK.UL'x ilir
Group (T1.': HAli/JCU) search plane discovorad an enemy force composed ofi CV, 1
BB, 2 cruisers and 5 DD at SI50 55' E158° 35' proceeding south. This was out-
side our radius of attack and ab.ut O9OO contact with the enemy was lost, Ag
a result while the ilORESBY (UO) Striking Force (KB) was preparing for enemy opera
tions, the IDRESBY (LIO) Occupation force acted in accordance with established
plans (A shipping group left RABAUL (RR) at 1600 on 4 llay).
On 7 -iay at 0600 5 enemy carrier-based planes and at 0622 35 carrier-based
planes, attacked in the area assigned to the IIORESBY occupation force, Reconnaia
sance planes of the CruDiv 6 at O64O sighted 1 BB, 1 CV, 2 cruisers and 7 W
proceeding north at a point S12° 15' 3154° 30', Later, at OcIO it was announced
that there were 2 CV. At 0558 patrol-attack planes of the MORESBY Striking
Force sighted a force v/hioh included a ship resembling an aircraft carrier at at
a point SI50 55' 31570 50'. The pianos i;cnt to destroy tho enemy force with its
entire strength, Hovfevor, a tanker was recognized to the right (this ship was
bombed by part of thj planes j he.^vily managed and sunk). The 'IJfiESBY Striking
Force (MOlffl) hurried touarr! tlic eneijy in the west,
O7OO: The I'JORESBY Occupation Force (TM: "UO" - KORYAKU BUTAI) has
withdrawn its shipping group (TN: S^iiDAIl) to the northvfest and it is continuing
strict AA precautionary measures.
0920 : 52 miles bearing 59° from DEBOYNE approximately 60 enemy
carricir-based bombers an^ fighters attacked us. They concentrated a torpedo and
bombing attach on tho Sti(XiQ{C'\f) . CruDiv 6 (6S) mustered all available force and
tried to protect the SIIOHO but she had been hit by more than 3 torpedoes and 6
bombs. She fought bravely until the voiy last and at 0935 she sank.
The Occupation Forces prepared for a second attack by the oncn^y and with-
drew to tho north for a vfhile. The main force (TN: SHUTAl) retired to the north
to avoid an air attack.
1500: Thvj SA7..V":::i (DD)_whilc preparing for a counter attack at
night picked up survivors of the SHOHO.
1244: Land-based attack-planes from tho Base Air Force attacked thi
enemy Striking Force (TN: Enemy "KB"), sank 1 battleship, and heavily dajnaged
1 battleship.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 573
CONFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item #4986'
Page 32
The MORESBY Striking Force planned to attack at dusk and at 1^20 15 carrier
based attack and bombing planes were sent out, but we did not locate the enemy
because of a sudden squeill over the target area. VJhile searching for the enemy
in that vicinity we were attacked by enemy carrier-based fighters which came from
the clouds and we engaged in an air battle with them. On the way back (TNi to the
base) one gmupdCHI BU) of carrier-based bombers discovered the enemy Striking
Force (TN: "KB") in a squall at 13° South 154° 14' East at 1700, but it could not
attack them on account of the squall and darkness. At 2010 the planes returnfed
and landed. 7 planes failed to return. At about "1800 traekir.g planes lost con-
tact with the enemy and the enemy's movements bectoe urifaifl^n to us. The distance
between us and the enemy was about 300 miles and the ftig^t battle stopped. At
dawn on the 8th the attack was resumed and the day for the occupation of PORT
HDRESBY was postponed until X plus 2 days.
CruDiv 6 (TN: 6s) and 2 DD (TN: 2 D) were added to the MDRESBY Striking
Forces,
On the 8th at 0622 reconnaissance planes from the SHOKAKU (CV) sighted an
enemy striking force con?»8ed of 1 battleship, 2 carriers, 3 cruisers, and 6 des-
troyers at 14° 30' South 154° 40' East. The MDRESBY Striking Force dispatched an
attack unit at 0730, At this time CruDiv 6 (TN: 6S) 100 nautical miles southwest
of SHORTLAND Islands, was attempting to refuel from the IRO (AO) when patrol
planes of the 11 Air Fleet (TN: 11 AF) reported that their and our striking forces
were fighting. The ships stopped refuelling immediately and were ordered to join
the CruDiv 18 and the DesBon 6 (TN: 6 Sd) and advance southward at full speed in
order to cooperate with our striking force (TN; KB).
At 0930 we attacked the enemy carriers of the SARATOGA Class and YORKTO'TO
Class. We hit the SARATOGA Class ship with more than 9 torpedoes and 10 bombs
and we hit the YOHCTCCTN Class ship with more than 3 torpedoes and 8 bombs.
Definitely sjjink. In addition wc scored torpedo hits on 1 battleship.
From 0856 to 1020 more than 60 enemy carrier-based planes attacked the
UOHSSBY Striking Unit 3 times. They scored 3 bomb hits on the SHOKAKU (CV) and
8 noar aisses. I^ ^*^8 impossible to take off or land because fires broke out.
It left the battle area.
At 0830 land-based search-attack planes sighted 1 BB, 2 cruisers and 4 DD
of the enemy at 13° South and 149° East. Although we contacted them we could
not dispatch an attack unit with the Base Air Force because of rain the the
VUNAKANAU Area.
At this point we had to take into consideration the condition of the enemy
surface forces and the difficulties of protecting transport groups with carriers
against enengr land-based planes. We have postponed the occupation of PORT MORESBY.
The group (TN: transport group) will return to RABAUL,
Itoreovor, in consideration of the fuel situation, etc., the Striking Force
was ordered at 1300 to stop the attack and to go tiorth. The MORESBY main force
(SHUTAI) aleo reversed its course and went to fuel. Thus, while the MORESBY op-
erational force (SAKUSEN BUTAI) was prepariiig for the enemy striking force (KB)
the order was issued to fall into position to help the occupation of the NAURU
and OCEAN Areas. At 2045 the C-in-C of the Combined Fleet issued an order to
strike to the utmost to £mnihilate remaining units of the enemy force.
The MORESBY Striking Force (MOKB), the CruDiv 6, 1 DD, Desfton 6, and the sea-
plane scouting squadron (SUITEITAI) were ordered to expedite fueling and to make
attack preparations.
On the 9th most of the float reconnaissance planes fitim the DEBOYNE base,
acting in concert with the Base Air Forco in reconnoitering the enemy searched in
the l«gton to the south. The MORESBY Occupation Force also set out to search for
and pursue the remainirig enemy forces but was unable to follow the movements of
the enemy.
574 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENnAL JICPOA Item )i'4986
Page 33
Results of the Engagement
1. Enemy Strength
(a) 2 BB, 2 cruisers, 4 DD
(b) 1 BB, 2 CV, 3 cruisers, 6 DD
(c) 1 AO, 1 DD
2. Sunk and Damaged
7 May: 1 large type tanker (about 20000 tons), 1 DD sunk almost
certciinly.
8 May: 1 CV, SAIU.TOGA Class. Sinking confirmed.
1 CV, YORKTOWN Class. Sinking corXirmed.
1 BB (Class not certain). Set afire and made to release
heavy oil by a torpedo.
1 Cruiser (Class not certain). After receiving a torpedo fi^an
a carrier-based attack plane, exploded, caught afire and
listed.
(The above results were obtained by CarDiv 5 and an air group (fg).
7 May: 1 BB of CALIFORNIA Class sunk.
1 BB of I'fARSPITE Class. Heavily damaged.
1 CA of CANBERRA Class. Heavily drjnaged.
(The above results were obtained by the Base Air Force.)
3. Planes Shot Down (2 Ma£ - 8 May)
Ship-board fighters - 58 plumes
T^rpe unknovm - 8
aiipboard bombers and :.ttack planes - 32
TOTi'iL - 98 (10 not positive)
4. Remaining Strength
(a) 1 BB (heavily damaged); 2 Cruisers (1 heavily damaged); 4 DD.
(b) 1 BB (medium damage); 3 Cruisers (1 medium damage); 6 DD,
COMBAT LESSONS FROla THE "JAR FOR GREiVTER K,'.ST ASIi^i
SECTION I - AN OUTLINE OF IIi?ORTA^:T BATTLES
CHAPTER I. First Sea Battle of the SOLaiON Islands.
1. (A) Forces which participated:
Flagship (TN:P ): CHOKAI (CA); CrdDlT 6
(Flagship (TN:f ): AOBA (CA), KAKO_(CA), KINUGASA (CA), FURUTAKA (
Flagship (TN:}' ): TEKRYU (CL), YUBARI (CL), YUKAZE (DD) .
(B) Enemy Forces:
9 CA; 1 CL (TN: CXI); 6 DD's.
2. Developments;
(A) On the 7th at O.V35 the TULAGI Communications Base reported that an
enemy striking force accompanied by an occupation force had begun
landing operations at TULAGI and at GUADALCANAL. Our forces have
therefore decided to penetrate their anchorage and annihilate then.
(B) On the 8th at 2100 a search-attack plane with flares took off fron
the ships,
(C) 2120: Commanding Officer formed a single column with his ship at
the head and moved to the attack.
(D) At 2246 and at 2250: Sighted enemy destroyers sailing individual
courses away from us but in order to conceal our plans we
avoided being seen by the enemy and so passed them without
action.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 575
CONFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item #/»986
Page 34
(E) 233I: "All forces, Attack", was ordered; Course 120°, Speed:
26 knots.
(F) 2337: Sifted ACHILLES type enemy ship to the Northeast.
CHOKAI fired torpedoes.
(G) Thenceforth, each ship made a surprise torpedo attack on the enemy-
ships which were making a rendezvous. By 2350 we had blown up and
sunk (or attacked and sunk) 3 cruisers (TN: CX 3) and 1 destroyer.
(H) After the FURUTAKA torpedoed and sank a large typ^ enwsy d6»tPoy«r
at 2346 she was dangerously close to. colliding with a large damaged
enemy cruiser but she changed her ciaorse by porting her rudder and
torpedoed and sank said- large c^uiaer. fflie beo-jne- separated
from the ship next ahead and proceeded with the YUBARI aind the
TENHYU.
(.1) After wo split to the Bast and West the CHOKAl (CA) and CfuDiv 6
(minus the FURUT/JvA), which made up the Eastern Itoit, shelled and
torpedoed the enemy h cruisers and ^ DD's newly sighted to the
Horth. 'I'he FURUT;JCA, TENRYU, and YUBARI, which made up the 'Yestern
Unit, shelled the enemy. The two groups, cooperating, attacked
from both sides and by 0012 they had completely destroyed the
enemy.
(J) YUNAGI (DD) torpedoed and sarjc an eneny cruiser at 2355. Consid-
ering the movements of the YUB/JU she executed a turn- at- a verj' great
angle. Because she vas exceptionally far removed from the main
force she reversed (Tl'J: made a complete turn), and continuing to
battle vath one enemy destroyer, withdrew by herself.
(K) On the 9th at 0200: In order to withdraw from the sphere of cnomy
bombing, the whole force received orders to withdrav*.
3. Results of the Battle:
Blown up and sunk: 2 CA, 1 CL (TN: LCxl), 1 DD,
Attacked and sunk: 1 CA (by torpedo), 2 CA (by torpedo and gunfire),
2 CA, 6 DD.
Damaged: 1 CA (by torpedo), 2 DD.
CH/.PTER II. 12 November. The Third (sic) Sea Battle of the SOLOMONS Islands.
1. Forces which participated:
1 BetDiv {Ttii "US") (Flagship (TN: US) HIEI (BB) and the KIRISHIMA
(BB) bombarded the airfield on GUviDALCAN;!. .
CruDiv 10 (TN: "lOS) (TN: written a second tL-ne and crossed out) (Flag-
ship (in: r ) NAG/Olfi .D'e^iT 61 (TN: 61 dg) (TERUTSUKI) DcsDlv 16
(TN: 16 dg) Divisional Command (TN: P* ? ) YUKIKaZE and the «iL.TSUIJ.ZE
DesOlv 6 (TN: 6 dg) (AKATSUKI, IK;^UCHI and the IN^iUlLO screened the
firing units (SH'.GEKITAI) .
DesRon 4 (TN: 4Sd) D*«)iv 9 (TN: 9 dg) (Flagship: £Wit^J Aa.GUMO)
DftaBiv 2 (TN: 2dg) Divisional Command {TU: f* ?) MUH-'.S.>lffi, SnMID/Jffi,
ruD^cHi, h.;rus;jje.
Minesv/eeping and protection for the advance.
Det^iv 27 (TN: 27dg) (Division Command (TN: A* ) .SIO-GDiffi, SHIRi.TSUYU,
r.nd the lUGURE.) Protecting GU.J)jMCA1;AL and the RUSSELL Islands.
Enemy forces:
LUNGA Area: 4 CA
2 CL
7 DD
6 Torpedo Boats {W: Tx^).
TULi.GI Area: 3 CA
2 DD
1 Torpedo Boat (TN: GYORAITEI X 1)
2, Developments:
(A) O83O. A B-17 flying from the south came- in contact with BatDiv 11
but was driven off by fighters of CarDiv 2 (TN: f c ) .
2sf
79716 O — 46 — pt. 13 14
576 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item #4986
Page 35
(B) At about sunset a Type Zero float reconnaissance plane from the
HIEI (BB) sighted so ne 10 enemy vessels anchored at GUADALCANAL.
(C) 2312: Unable to find the enemy even by taking a firing course
of 130°.
(D) 2343: The YUDACHI and the HIEI sighted the silhouettes of severa
enemy ships and charged with full force and began to battl
(E) The Screening Force (CHOKUEI TAI) and the Firing Force (SHAGEKI TA
fired guns and torpedoas at the enemy from his west flank. The
YUDACHI (DD) conformed with this and doubled the attack from the
dast and one a^ter another we blew up and sank the enemy.
On account of this the enemy gradually retreated to the north; par
of the Screening Force (CHOKUEI TAI) and the Firing Force (SHACEKI
TAI) swept the enemy from the seas firing torpedoes and guns in
succession. _
(F) The laopping-up dnit, before going ahead, fell behind (KORAKU) when
the main force had iraneuverud to retire to the north of SAVO Islaxi*
It came up almost abreast with the main force but passed astern of
the main force at the south side of SAVO Island and went to the
north side of the island. It cooperated with the Screening Force
and part of the Firing Force causing the annihilation of the enemy
forces remaining.
(G) From 2350 to 0034 we destroyed the major part of the enemy power
in the area and we then withdrew to the Horth.
3. Results of the Battle:
Sunk (by torpedoes): 3 Heavy Cruisers (TN: Ca x 3)
1 Light Cruiser (TN: Ca x 1)
Sunk (by gunfire): 2 Heavy Cruisers (TN: Ca x 2)
1 Light Cruiser (TN: Ca x 1)
3 Hestroyors (TN: d x 3)
Severely Da-iaged: 2 Heavy Cruisers (TN: Ca x 2)
5 Destroyers (W.': d x 5)(sank later)
1 Torpedo Boat (TN: t x 1) (sank later)
Medium Damage: 2 Destroyers (TO: d x 2) (sank later)
1 Destroyer (TN: d x l)
CHAPTER III. 14 November. The Third Sea Battle of the SOLCM(»I Islands.
1. Forces which participated:
CpuElv 4 (TN: 4S) (Flagship (TN: 1^ ) ATAGO, TAKAO, KIRISHBIA; bombarded
the airfield on GUADALCANAL.
CBuCiv 10 (Flagship (TN:P ) NAGARA and the Squadron Command (?) (TN:)^
SHIRAYUKI, HATSUYUKI, S/iMIDAHE, INAZU1.'JI.
DesRon 4 (Flagship tod Squadron Command (TN:t^'* ) the ASAGUMO.
DeeDiv 6i (TN: 61 dg) (division command (TN: p* ) TERUTSUKI, Protection
(TI'J: screen) for the Firing Forces.
DesRon 3 (TN: 3 sd): (Flagsliip ( TN: f ) SENDAI ^CU )
DesDiv 19 (TN: 19 dg) Division Command I.TN:F* ) the URAWAMI, the AYANAM
and the SHIKIN.\UI. Clearing the course for other ships.
Enemy Strength:
4 BB, 2 CA; and 4 DD.
2. Developments:
(a) According to various intelligence reports from the planes of the
S-'.NYO Maru (XCVS) and other sources we expected to eD0ounte9 «-vtm
enemy force, it 1940 we withdrew our scrsen (CHOKUEI WO TESSURU)
and moved it forward on the course ahead. At 2010 all forces were
ordered to annihilate the enemy.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 577
CONFIDEI.'TIiX JICPOA Item #4986
Pag>:; 36
(B) At 2010 the tlopping-Wp linit sighted silhouettes of ships to the
northeast of SAVO Island atid gaVo cbasa, It aboiili-.Sll6 they engaged
in battle. The AY/iNAMI iias ordsz-ed to separate (from tho main force)
and to proceed to the LUNGA Point Area via the south side of S/iVO
Islcind. 'flhile proceeding there she blew up and sank one onemy
cruiser viiich she met at the south side of SaVO Island.
(C) The siopping-up Uhit (minus the ASAGUMO and the TERUTSUKI) went ahead
of the «ain force at 2120 and sailed 6-7 kilometres astern of the
AYANi'iUI '/^hile proceeding, it met 1 enemy cruiser and 3 enemy des-
troyers, It destroyed these and then at 2145 it sighted 2 battle-
ships northwest of ESPEH/iNCE. \1hi.le reporting this to the entire
force it tried to attack them, but the destroyers did not have
their guns loaded in time to fire (JIIL.TSU SOTEN liL^IAV/AZU) . After
that the enemy withdrew to the south and -ne pursued them with all
our effort. At about 2340 we overtook them and carried out our
second attack on them.
(D) Just before 2200 C»»iDiv 4 (TN: 4S), KIRISHIMA, ASAGUMO, TERUTSUKI
sighted 4 Battleships in succosAioi cmd attacked and sank 2 of them
by torpedo and gvuifire.
(E) At 2325 the C-in-C of the Second Fleet (Til: £; ) took into consid-
eration the present situation, their and ^ our condition
and the time of day and ordered our withdrawal to the north after
carrying out an attack on enany forces which had been contacted.
3. Results of the Battle:
2 BB's attacked and sunk; 1 BB considerably damaged; 2 CA's blown up
and sunk.
1 DD blown up and sunk.
3 DD's attacked and sunk.
(End of Extracts)
578 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item #4986
Page 37
ACCOUNT OF THE KOHTHEWJ CAIvIPAIGN (May-August 1943)
I. CHH0N0L0GIC.<VL DIVISIONS
1. ATTU Campaign. '
From 25 May to 1 June; cainpaifn ("ke"'T ) against ATTU.
2. PtISKA Campaign.
From 2 June to 26 Jime; first p-irt of campaign ("ke" *>" ) against
KISKA (by submarine).
From 27 June to IS July; first phase in second part of campaign ("ke''
against KISKA (by destroyer forces).
From 19 July to 1 Aurn.-t; second phase in second part of campaign
("ke"tr ) aj,a.'.n."3t, KIS1S.A (by destroyer forces).
II. SITUATION AT ATTU BEFORE THE ENE!ytY ATTACK
On 8 }is.y the enemy issued an official communique on AMCHITKA (monitored by
the radio of the 51st Communications Unit (Cg) ) . In view of this intelli-
gence, therefore, we were certain that the American array and navy had comple
ted an air base and other installatior.s there. On the 9th BICEYATTO Island
in the MALOELA? Grouo was bombarded at 1615, PAGiU^i Island (_in the MARIANAS)
at 1910, and HOROBETSU Villii«9, 15 kilowetres northeast of MUHORAT^, at 2350.
Vfere these bombardments meant to bo made in concert with the TUNISIAN Cam-
paign as propaganda for an aggressive American offensive in the PACIFIC?
Or, they mifiht have been judged as the heralding of a campaign in the NORTH
or SOUTH _ (PACIFIC) . Be that as it may, it should have been considered
in connection with the recent proi.dnence given to an enemy offensive in the
PACIFIC, particularly in t!ie ALEUTI^JIS; and our forces should have been very
much on guard against an enemy counter-attack. Hence, at 2335 on the 10th,
there was the following order from the (HQ), Combined Fleet (GF) :-
"(1) 111 view of communications intelligence (from 6th Communications
Unit?) and the appearance of enemy submarines, there is suspicion
of an operation by an ^^nomy task force.
(2) Maintain a vigilant watch for an enemy occupation (force)
and air attack."
At this time the airfield installations on ATTU were expected to be almost
finished by the ciid of May. But the air-raid trenches, fuel storehouses,
shell and powder magazines, and other projects had y«t to be started, while
their completion had been schednl.d for the first of June. Furthermore,
DesBon 1 (CL KISO, DD SHIR.IKUMO, DD ".'AKABA) convoyed the KIMIKA'U Maru (XCV£
bringing flof.t planes for ATT". The ships left P..RAMUSHIKO at 1200 on the
11th. Meanwhile, th,; K.'.Cill (CA) and the H..TSUSHn;0 (DD) had left YOKOSUKA
at 0014 on the 11th, bound for PAPuJvlUSHIHO. Both groups were at sea then,
when the American attr.ck was m.'^.do, F£.ch of the Submarines I-31> 1-34, and
1-35 was engaged in transporting materiel for KISKA.
III. SITUATION AT ATTU FCLLC'ING THE Et€;,iT ..TTivCK
At 0449 on the 12th the 51st Comraunicutions Unit detected the call signal
"BOU", making its first appearance on a frequency of 4385 K.C.; reception
was extremly good. In the KISKA Area, enemy planes delivered a hour-long
attack at about 0700. Enemy reconnaissance planes were also very active.
From 0200 until 0900 attacking eiieir,y planes invaded the mists of ATTU,
soaring over the island ceaselessly, relentlessly, as they strafed and
bombed it. At this time absurd Ic'uMets urging surrender were dropped in
the CHICHAGOF Harbor cactor. At 1000 the observation crew at HOLTZ Point
spotted enemy boats headed for '.*E3T ARM Point. The Shipping Engineers were
sent out immediately to investig'te from the sea. From them it was confirrae
that the enemy was I'mding at '.VEST ABI.: Point and along the aorthwest coast.
The forces in this sector at once entered upon Condition One as they determi
to prevent the enemy landing even a part of his forces. At 1030 another
enemy landing was announced in MASSj^CRE Bay. The enemy strength here was
about 2000 men; but it seemed as if there were many more in reserve. In th
meantime, enemy ships bombarded our forces with a threatening fire. At the
report of an attack by a largo onemj- force, the ATTU Dispatched Force immcd.
atoly set about burning all its documents save those in Cipher B (OTSU).
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 579
CONFIDEMTIJX JICPCA Item #i9S6
Page 38
The strength of the attacking forces remained unknown because of the poor
visibility at the time. However, judcing frran the noise of the guns, it was
thou6;ht that there was a support force composed of several cruisers and
smaller ships, and having seen the attacks delivered by carrier-based planes,
the presence of carriers in the vicinity was suspected. By 1520 the following
was known about the strength of the enemy force : Ther'.^ were 29 ohipo in HOLTZ
Bay and at ',1EST ARM Point, 2? in I'lASSACuE Bay, and 6 in '.'EST Am Bay. Fur-
thermore, more troops were continuing to land, and poor visibility prevent ;.d
our forces from determining their number; According to communications intv-1-
ligence at the time, a strong enemy force was operating in the Southern
ALEUTIANS.
IV. ORDERS OF THE 5TH FLEET AND STATE OF OUR FORCES FOLLO'VING THE ENEMY ATTACK
(1) Submarines 1-31, 1-34, and 1-35 will cease their transport activities,
and proceed at once to ATTU to attack the enemy transports.
(2) The USUGUMO (DD) will cease its work and hasten to PARA},IUSHIRO to
supply our forces.
(3) The commander of the escort force will attack enemy shipping in the
IMSSACRE Bay Ar ^a^.with pianos from the KILTKAV.'A Maru.
(4) The ASAKA }Aa.r\iJc%;'^ fi ) will sail to AaiORI and pick up for transport
to PARAMUSHIRO s^o arrry reinforcements.
(5) The A'.'ATA Maru (.^^57 5^ ) will stand ready at YOKOSUKA (to transport
naval reinforcements).
The Cormander-in-Chief of thie 5th Fleet, commanding the MAYA (CA), loft
PARi'vMUSHIRO to join the escort force.
At this time, the TAMA (CL) (at i.l^JZURU) also stopped its vjork and v;as cble
to leave on th« 20th; the ASAGUMO (DD) (at YOKOSUKA) was able to leave on
the 21st. The ABUKUM;. (CL) (at SASEBO), however, was able to set out on
the 16th.
Thus, the strength with which wo could counterattack the enemy's assaiilt
was merely one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, and three destroyers.
Moreover, an air force was ordered to go to PARAMUSHIRO; but was delayed
because of unfavorable -veathor.
Summary of the Operations of the Combined Fleet:
A. North .';rn Forces
1. Submarines concentrated in the ATTU Area to destroy enemy shipping.
2. Land-based air forces carried out patrols and attacks.
3. Surface units awaited a favorable opportunity to destroy enemy
fleet units in the ATTU Area.
4. As it proceeded, our task force kept patrols on the enemy tack
force (by observation craft, fishing boats, submarines, and float
reconnaissance planes).
5. An army of reinforcements was being transported to ATTU.
B. Task Force.
Proceeded from YOKOSUK/i on the 22nd. '.Vent through the v«nters east of
the KUPJLES during the last of the month. Its purpose was to crush enemy
fleet units I'sA task forces and to assist oui- Horthern forces.
C. Co.'nbinod Fleet.
Left TRUK on the 17th for YOKOSUKA.
V. EVENTS UNTIL THE FALL OF ATTU
The composition of the enemy fleet as seen from the land on the 13th was as
f olloivs :
In HOLTZ Bay - One CV (no bridge), one CHICAGO Class Cruiser, one OliAH,;
Class cruiser, three DD's.
In M-'iSSACRE Bay - One BB, two <5ruisers, five DD's, ton transports.
About 1318 our submarines attacked the enemy fleet, causing the main body to
withdraw eastward tempoi'arily. About 1900 lights were lit on ships arichored
in U/iSSACRE Ray, apparently for something important which had happened. A
destroyer ran aground near shore.
580 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item #4986
Page 39
The enemy forces that had landed by 1300 on the 14th totalled not less than
a division. Before long the enemy had put his carriers and battleships out
to sea. However, the destroyers audaciously dropped anchor in the bay des-
pite the attacks of our submarines, and observed us. (Thus, the enemy knew
the weakness of our forces from previous reconnaissance.)
An enemy battleship was greatly damaged in an attack by our submarines on
the 14th. In general, however, our ships were checked by the enemy destroy
By the 24th they had only inflicted severe damage on a cruiser and some dam
on two unidentified warships.
19 Medium bombers (CHIJKO) made the first attack by our planes on the l^th.
They returned because of unfavorable we.-ithcr, ho->vever. Thereafter, on con-
secutive days, our plsines were unable to attack due to unfavorable weather.
Finally, on the 23rd, they attacked, destroying a cruiser and a destroyer,
and setting fire to another ship. But on the following day, the enemy
(fleet) had generally witliJi-awn an hour before our attack force arrived.
ricnce, no results could be gained at sea, and our pianos had to confine them^
selves to bombing land targets. At this time, the destroyer force vhich had
at last completed the assembling of a force planned to evacuate our forces
on ATTU Isl.-xd, but though it pat out from PARA.MUSHIRO on the 25th, its
efforts were of no avail because of continuous bad v^eather. In the meantime
the Guard Unit on ATTU Island, although out-numbered, valiantly withstood
the fierce attacks of the enemy, even at times carrying out night attacks an
other operations which were doomed fi-om the start. They waged bitter battle
but, in the end, having received rw reinforcements and having exhausted ever^
last artifice (to the last man), they met their deaths calmly. Finally, on
the 29th ATTU Island fell in honor.
VI. FIRST PART OF KISKA CMCAIOJ
KISICA, of course, was placed in c. helpless position by the fall of ATTU.
Therefore, it was decided to ojvacuato the island. V/e were entrusted with the
task of evacuating the troops from the island by means of 10 submarines runnj
back and forth. Since there were over 7000 men to evacuate and submarines
have very limited capacity, it was not knovin how long it would take to finis)
the evacuation. In addition to this, the patrols around KISKA had finally-
become most strict and daia; ge to our ship had increased. Finally, the 1-7
was lost. No matter how enshrouded by the fog we would be, we would instant
be bombarded, for the offeciency cf the enemy's radar was far superior to vAi
we had expected.
VII. FIRST PHASE OF SECOI© Pijn OF KISKh C/J,ffAlGN
To meet this situation, as a last resort we carried out "kc" (TN:V ) plan
of operations by which we om;^''.oy^d a force of destroyer forceo (SUIRAIBtrTAl),
In order to do t;a.s v.c iiiatalled as quicldy as possible, on the destroyers
counter-radar equipment (TEKI-DEWTjiK NI TiJSURU GY/lKUTAN) and equipment to
take aboard the lending barges to be used in the evacuation. Cti 6 July this
work was, for the most part, completed. Because, however, there was uncer-
tainty about the frequency of the enemy's radar there was some uneasiness
about our counter-radar.
On 7 July at 1930 wo sot out from P/.R;;L/iUSHinO. Our force was composed of
2 cruisers and 10 destroyers. ,.t that time the state of affairs, as seen
by the Grand Fleet (TN: GF), was as follows:
"Regarding the situation, it may be said that the possibility of the
enemy attacking us in the vicinity of KISKA is great,"
But, on the other hand, it wr.s felt that though the enemy had isolated KISKA
he was hoping to starve out the gaa-rison. Only patrols around the island
were strictly maintained. It was felt that an aggressive offensive and
landing were not to be expected. According to intelligence reports up to
the 7th, about the 26th a fleet of transports had departed from the west
coast of NORTH /iMERICA and about the 3rd had reached the DUTCH Hi'kRBOR Area.
Still more, we had received intelligence reports that transports had arrived
at ATTU frequently during June. Furthermore, there was information that a
powerful force had set out from DUTCH HAItBOR on 1 July and had arrived at
AUCHITKA on the 4th, The enemy's northern Submarine force had been making
preparations for battle since the 14th, or S5, and having completed these
preparations about the 30th, had assembled at DUTCH HARBOR.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 581
CONFIDEtiTIAL JICPOA Item #4936
Page 40
A squadron (TAI) of submarines, reinforceraents for the fiubmarine force, had
reached DUTCH HARBOR from the American mainland about June 20th. Again there
was intelligence that at the end of June, transports had arrived at ADAK and
ATTU several times. On the 21st the air strength at AMCHITKA had been some-
what increased and the base for land planes at ATTU was nearing completion.
Atmospheric conditions in the KiacA Area up to the time we set out were as
follows:
On the 2nd and 3rd visibility was good, from 30 to 40 kilometres; on
the 4th and 5th visibility was bad, from 2 to 3 kilometres. On the
6th it was about 30 kilometres.
In the meantime, a number of enemy planes — B-17's, B-24's, B-25's, PBY's,
and others, in formations, singly, or in pairs were carrying out day after
day bombing and reconnaissance missions. Patrol about the island v;as main-
tained by a nujnbcr of cruisers and destroyers.
On the 7th, the destroyer force (SUIRAI BUTAI) set out as scheduled. After
they had set out, a thick fog rolled up and discovery and destruction by
enemy submarines was rendered improbable. Thereafter, until we returned to
PARAUUSHIRO the percentage of fog vias constantly about 85. On the 7th, visi-
bility around KISKA was about 7 kilometres. En^my planes, (aach time a
reconnaissance plane), approached at 0350, 0724, and 0835, and at 1140.
6 (Jruisers and 4 destroyers bearing from the KH approached to a point 15
miles south of GERTRUDE COVE and shelled it. At 14^5 3 enemy ships wore
sighted about 30 kilometres from 3HIR0ZAKI (TN:\t;a.^ ).
The above ships, judging from shell splinters, duds, and shell holes, were
PENSACOLA dlass, 1 ship, HONOLULU class, 2 ships, a nevi class, 1 ship, and
4 Destroyers, On the 8th, there was a thick fog from the morning on ind
during the day visibility was from 1 to 3 kilometres; in the evening about
6 kilometres. On this day no enemy pianos came.
On the 9th, visibility to the SE was from 30 to 40 kilometres andfl-om the
afternoon on clouds covered tho entire sky without a breaik. Though the
clouds were 200 metres high and a thick fog hung upon the sea, visibility
was from 8 to 10 kilometres. One enemy warship was sighted at 0833 forty
kilometres, 220°, from SOUTH HEAD. At 1057 a ship was sighted at 340° off
TAKAZAKI (TNrl^^ ). From 2050 to 2230 GERTRUDE COVE was shelled by des-
troyers on patrol with guns of about 12cm.
On the lOth at 0205 we speeded along our course and though we proceeded
along our way until 2030, tho fog was thin enough to allow airplane flights
and since this was to our disadvantage, we turned back. The weather forecast
from the Headquarters of tho Desion 1 was as follows:
"On the 12th there will be fog rolling up from tho SE at 8 metres per
second with occasional breaks. On the 13th there will bo prevailingly
east winds flowing from 8 to 12 metres per second and thick fog."
'Ve prepared to make a d:'.sh for it on the 13th. Today (10th) there was fog
around KISKA at the end of the day and visibility was from 1 to 2 kilometres.
Enemy planes and also 2 single plemcs {'Ilii^'jf!^' TANKI) cane two or three
times on reconnaissance flights,
11 July: About 0200 visibility was about 20 kilometres and though the sky
was covered with clouds, tho fog was light. Generally, visibility was from
8 to 10 kilometres. At 2006 GERTRUDE COVE and at 2217 LITTLE KISKA were
bombarded. Moreover, according to intelligence reports, the Arraj' Air Base
on ATTU and the airfield for Army heavy bombers at i^iCHITKA and AGATTU were
almost completed. Our observation boats (KAI^iSHI-TEl) based at PARhMUSHIiiO
had discovered that patrols by the enemy to the vjest were becoming stricter
and they were certain that along with the near completion of the land-plane
base on ATTU patrols by the enemy carried out by aircraft, naval vessels,
and submarines would be even stricter.
12 July: At 0735 we sped along our course but the fog was light and at 1520
wc turned back, "/e expect to dash forward on the 14th, Todr.y in the morning
visibility around KISKA was from 6 to 8 kilometres, and though about noon
it was 15 kilometres, the barometer fell. From 1300 on there was thick fog.
Enemy planes, P-40"s, B-25's, PBY's, all on reconnaissance missions came
during tho morning and about 1245 a small type naval vessel was sighted
about 20 kilometres off T/J(AZAKI at 330°.
582 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item #/*986
Page 41
13 July: Having taken in consideration weather around KISKA, at 02i»0 we
hastened along our course. Patrol planes could not take off because of bad
weather at /iMCHITKA and ATTU. No enemy planes were seen around the island.
Only a small type naval vessel was carrying out patrol. However, because
the visibility in the morning was from 8 to 10 kilometres we broke off our
course and at 1703 turned back. Though we made the dash again at 2145,w.tui
'back at 0156 on the l/(.th. The following is the weather forecast given
out by headquarters on the 13th:
"1. Tomorrow the weather around KISKA will not differ much from today'
There will bo a light fog and it is expected that visibility will
be fair.
2. The high atmospheric prussure which prevails in these waters is
slowly shifting to NE or EIJE. Thus, should we proceed along our
course, thcr* is a possibility that the present state of weather
and visibility will prevail as far as KISKA in the same general
direction as the aforementioned high atmospheric pressure.
3. At the same time as this high atnospheric pressure progresses,
the possibility of flights from i<Dl>k is great,
h. . We may conclude from the above that the possibility of success
in our advance is oxtromcly slight and that we shall have to turn
back and wait. Vte may look forward to proceeding on our mission
on the day after tomorrow."
(insert)
According to the communications intelligence report of 13 July new call
signals appeared on the 9th from the places wc had presumed to be naval air
bases; these were presumed to ba a't rPEtar t he island neighboring. New call
signals also appeared from the places wc hcd presided to be army air bases;
we had figured two to be on ATTU and one in the neighboring islands. On
the 11th, 6 army planes flew to ATTU. The total number of army and navy
planes perraanontly based in the jiEUTI/JJS has grovm rapidly since the 9th;
173 planes were, in the ALEUTLJJS by the 10th.
Enemy planes have been -'.ctive on the 9th and 10th. Our patrols in the
PARAMUSHIRO Area are vigilant.
And we have great numbers of powerful fleet units operating in the CENTRAL
PiXIFIC .
According to the communications intelligence report of 15 Julj', a powerful
enemy force has been under radio silence for several days. The number
of enemy ships operating around KISKA is very large. According to the
communications intelligence report 'jf 16 July, one part of the enemy fleet
is apparently operating in the /1£UTI/>N nrea. Liaison activities between
yilCHITKA and KULUf; Bay have bo^n great. The unemy sceias to be concentra-
ting all his efforte in equipping and strengthening ^JilGHITKii.
lU July: In the morning the weather changed for the '■wrso. The velocity
of the wind was XU metres per second; atmospheric pressure was 757mm.
Visibility was about 6 kilometres. In the afternoon conditions improved
and the wind velocity, was from 5 to 8 mata^apwp aacfadr-nd visibility was
5 kilometres. Today 3 or 4 enemy naval vessels were patrolling around
the island. At 1500 we started .viut but there was a statement from head-
quarters :
"The weather in the vicinity of KISKi'. and along the course wc shall
follov; has h.'.d a change for the better. For the present, there is
no prospect of meeting a favorable fog from the sea. V/o shall turn
back now and return to PAR/AfUSHIRO where wo shall plan a second
Dperation."
15 July: ->t 0430 we turned back. Today visibility around KISKa was 10
kilometres and in tjio morning reconnaissance was carried out by a B-25,
a P-38, and a PBY; and a f;.rmation of 7 B-24's and 5 B-25's bombed (KISKA).
At 2202 enemy warships shelled GERTRUDE COVE.
16 July: Visibility — 10 to 15 kilometres.
17 July: There was thick fog in the morning and visibility was 1.5 kilo-
metres. In the afternoon it was 6 k iioaieite'eB at tines Enemy planes wore
carrying out reconnaissance and navax vessels v/ere maintaining patrols.
18 July: At 0830 we entrcred the harbor at P/.jiAUUSHIRO.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 583
CONFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item #it986
Page 42
VIII. SECOND PHASE OF SECOND Pj\RT OF KISKA CIMPklGH
At 2000 on the 22nd we entered upon the second phase.
On the 19th and 20th the visibility in the KISKA Area was 15 to 20 kilo-
metres; on the 2l3t, it was 3 to 4 kilometres. To generalize the enemy's
plans to the situation: There have been seven days out of 21 on which the
enemy did not come over. Since the 9th enemy ships had bombarded KISICA
five times.
Our sorties recently have been an hour later than planned because of the
thick fog. Moreover, it has been difficult to maintain our formation.
In our first change (of position) the relative positions were totally
unknown. Conmunication by telephone is poor. On the 2Uth, while it was
clear and only slightly misty, we looked about and adjusted our formation.
The TAMA, NIPPON Maru (XAO), and KUNIJIRI (CM) were not to be seen. (The
Commander-in-Chief 5th Fleet, was aboard the TAMA.)
At 0800 on the 24th, a patrol plane made a forced landing in Sector #10
on the ATTU patrol line, and dispatchod a special urgent operational
message. Indeed, there were 'several urgent messages to that effect.
A dispatch from the 51st communications unit had arrived, saying that
it was doubtful that the aviator had been located by the destroyer force.
For 30 minutes after 0945 on the 23rd enemy ships bombarded from the
northeast and south. And, as the skies were clsar, formations of enemy planes
strafed and bombed several times. The number of participating planes was
over 96. The enemy employed delayed action bombs, incendiary bombs, and
parachute bombs. The delayed action bombs were sot at 30 minutes, one hour,
15 hours, 24 hours, etc.
On the 25th, it was clear, and formations of from three to nine P-40's raided
KISKA seven times from AMCHITKA; all formations bombed only the landing
field. The enemy bombers at AMCHITKA and KULUK Bay on ADAK, 51 all told,
stood ready, their operating wave-frequencies lengths adjusted. The activity
of enemy patrol planes at both bases was great.
About 1700 the KAZEGUMO (DD) detected an enemy submarine transmitting a
message.
In view of our poor radio interception control, it is doubtful whether the
sub was located.
About 1500 on the 26th we made contact with all the ships save the KUNIJIrll,
and the locations to which our formation had been adjusted again were visible.
Suddenly, at 1750 the KUNIJIRI collided into the starboard side of the tS'J-
KIMA. Damage to both ships was slight, but because of the accident some
confusion was produced in the roar units. The '7AKABA, Hi'iTSUSHnW, and
NAOANAIH (DD) collided, the latter receiving only slight damage. However,
the WAKABA and NAGANAMI were now handicapped for operational cruising.
The 'VAKABA returned to PARAMUSHIRO; the HATSUSHLMO entered the Naval Supply
Unit.
Oi the 27th we set our course south and tried to pick up the lost trail of
an enemy submarine.
We decided to make a dash for KISKA on the 2Sth. Conditions there had been
(none too good) up to now.
The visibility had been excellent on the 26th and hence a handicap to our
operating units; for a total of 46 pianos raided KUKa that day. On the 25th
a similar formation of P-40's liad attacked seven times. Enemy bombers wore
generally in readiness at every base, their operatin;? wave-frequencies lengths
adjusted.
Patrol pianos were active, and a vigilant watch was kept in the north.
Several enemy ships were operating in the waters south and west of KISK/i.
At 1925 there was a night bombing.
On the 27th, it was clear in the morning; visibility 20-30 kilometres, cloud
ceiling at 3000 metres. But the fog appeared around 1800, On this day a
total of 87 planes attacked. 8 B-24's bombed twice; afterv;ards, KISKA was
subjected to reconnaissance for about three houis. At night single planes
bombed three times; afterwards they dropped flares, which seemed strange
cUid purposeless.
The barometer fell gradually during the morning of the 26th; the mist \
thickened, and the visibility was only 8-10 kilometres. Perhaps because
the weather changed for the worse enemy plrjies did not fly over KISKA after
0340. By afternoon the fog had taken in the whole sky; the visibility was
6-8 kilometres.
584 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COMFIDENTIAL " JICPOA Item #4986
Page 43
On the 29th, too, a heavy fog hung over our route. Vfe pressed forward to
KISKA, plotting our course from its radio waves. Vfe only aw£iited the grace
and aid of our gods. At 1105, while it cleared, for a bit, we recognized
the outline of the island. Then th^ inevitable fog again. "Te sailed arounc
to the north of KISKA, but saw no sign of enemy ships. At 1316 the ABUKUli\
sighted an entany vessel and launched several torpedoes, but it had mistaken
LITTLE KISK.'i Island for the enemy.
Again, at 1321, the SHBIAKAZE (DD) mistook the island for the enemy and
opened fire with her guns. At 1325 we set our course to enter the harbor.
Only within tho bay, strangely enough, was the mist completely absent, and
the visibility was extremely good. The clouds were at about 100 metres,
and dense. '.7e anchored at 1350. L-nmediately the landing barges which had
been in readiness came alongside our ship and loaded the men aboard; in two
trips, they had complet-ed their work. The 500-odd men that came aboard did
so in an orderly fashion and in fir.o spirits. By 1420 each of the ships in
the 2nd Transport Unit(YUSOTAl) had completed its loading. '7e left then at
once. The 1st Transport Unit left the harbor a little later. After that
the mist gradually became thicker in the bay. Thereafter, the 2nd Transport
Unit did not see anything whatsoevor of the enemy. Vfe left and went on ahea.
at a speed of 30 knots. The 1st Transport Unit, with the aBUKUMA, spotted
a periscope, northeast of KlSKIi, but the submarine immediately disappeared
beneath the waves and thereafter wasn't seen again.
At 0600 on the 31st the mist had completely cleared, and at 1530 we entered
PARf>MUSHIR0 Harbor. It seemed that the heaven were celebrating our
success (in returning safely). At 1000 on the 1st of August the 1st
Transport Unit entered the harbor; they had not lost a man. The evacuation
of the defense force at KISKA, over 5,000 men, had been a success.
The enemy apparently had not discovered tho evacuation of our troops at
all. Thereafter, for day after day, they bombed and bombarded KISKA,
and on August 15, the landing of ^-'uerican and Canadian troops on the
island was announced.
Truly the height of the ridiculous.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
585
CONFIDENTIAL
JICPOA Item #4986
Page 44
OFFICERS' REGISTER FOR THE KAKO (16 November 1941)
Commanding Officers
Executive Officer:
First Lieutenant (UNYOCHO) and
8th Division Officer:
Gunnery Officer:
Navigating Officer and 7th
Division Officer:
Torpedo Officer and 5th
Division Officer:
Communications Officer and 6th
Division Officer;
Aviation Officer and 9th
Division Officer:
2nd Division Officer and
Officer of the Guard:
1st Division Officer:
3rd and 4th Division Officer:
Deputy Gunnery Officer (SHOHOCHO):
Junior Officer, 1st Division:
Capt. TAKAHASHI, Yuji {^/f^Pi'X)
Cmdr. TA'/JARA, Yasuedao ( -(^ '-^^ -^ ^ :fv )
Lt Cmdr AKUTAGAV.'A, Tadatarft (^ ;»} '"ii-^^^)
Lt Cmdr NISHIUURA, Haruyoslii {^ii^^^ )
Lt Cmdr YAMAGUCHI, Tokio (vU C7 (3^ ^^ )
Lt. YONEI, Tsuneo {^^-^^^Pli)
Lt. KONDO, Nobuichi (ii^.^-^^ )
Lt. SAITO, Yasukuni (.^P^'-^'^f' )
Lt. KAGA, Makoto (/>* ^ 'Jfet" )
S.D. Lt.(jg) MATSUNAGA, Isuke (^Ti'/K.'^^^^ )
Lt. (jg) OCHIAI, Otoichi (jI-'^ Z^'i^ )
S.D. Lt.(jg) MIZUNO, Toru (/K- *ft ^ )
S.D. Ens. OMURA, S6tar6 i^;^'^ ?.^- i^^ H^f )
Assistant Navigating Officer (KOKAISHI) Ens. KIKUCHI, Giichi (1g^^^^)
and Junior Officer 4th Division:
S.D. Ens. DATE, Jiro ('^^-^ ftJl) )
Ens. OMUR/i, Masao CK /f-^ ^ i^ )
Junior Officer, 2nd Division:
Assistant Gunnery Officer and
Jxinior Officer 3rd Division:
Assistant Communications Officer and Ens. ISHIKA'.VA, Takatoshi (><» **■) 7» -^ )
Junior Officer, 6th Division:
586 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COMFIDENTIAL JICPOA Item #4986
Page 45
FACTS ABOUT THE KAKO (1? November 1941)
I. TYPE: Heavy (first-class) cruiser.
Vniere built: At the KAVrASi^JCI Dockyard in KOBE
Keel laid: 17 Novembur 1922
Launched: 10 April 1925
Completed: 20 July 1926
Modification completed: 28 December 1937
II. PRINCIPAL UEASUPlEMENTS:
A. Overall length: 185.2 metres
B. Length between perpendiculars: ' 176.8 metres
C. Maximum beara: 16.9 metres
J. Draft: A. 8 metres
E. Displacement: 7,100 tons
F. Tonnage displaced per cm. of draft: 23.3 tons
G. Moment required to change the trim 1 cm.: 246 metric tons
H. Shaft' horsepower: 103,300 H.P.
I. Speed: 33 knots
J. Fuel carried: 1,842 tons
K. Fresh water carried: 156 tons
Drinking and all-purpose ivater: 66 tons
V/ater, in drums: 90 tons
. L. '.'.'ater evaporated in a day; 244 tons
III. AHMj'^iJENT:
A. Guns;
1. 6 20cm 50 cal. twin-mount guns, 3 year type, Model 2
2. 4 12cm 40 cal. dual-purpose guns, 10 year type
3. UG's: 4 13rjn Hotchkiss MG's.
2 7.7mm Lewis MG's
8 25mm twin-mount MG's, Type 96
4. 179 Rifles, Type 38
5. 43 pistols, ^irmy type
B. Torpedoes;
1. 2 mounts of Type 92 quadruple torpedo tubes each
2. 6 depth bombs
3. 1 set of paravanes
C. Searchlights:
1. 3 110cm searchlights, Tj-pe 92
2. 2 40cm ofc-a.xhli-htj. Type "SU"
D. Range Finders :
2 6-m3tre range finders. Type 14
2 ^ type 6-metre range finders
2^ t^jpe 4.5-nietrc range finders for dual purpose guns
2 -jV^ type 1.5-metrQ range findc-rs
2ifL type 3.5-metre range finders (for torpedo work)
E. Planes ;
Float recorjiaissance planes; 1 in use (1 in reserve)
F. Wirolens Equipment ;
a. Transmitters:
1 500-watt transmitter, Type 91 Mark 4 (Special) Modification 1
1 500-watt transmitter. Type 92 Mark 4 Modification 1
1 1000-watt short-wave transmitter, Tjtdb 95 Mark 3
1 500-watt transmitter, Tj.-pe 95 Mark 4
1 350-w-'.tt transmitter, 'type 95 Mark 5
b. Receivers:
3 receivers. Type 91, Model 1
3 short-wave receivers. Type 91
16 special receivers. Type 92 Modification 3
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
587
COITIDEfTIAL JICPOA Item ^986
Page 46
c. Wireless telephones:
1 ultra short-wave wireless talephoiie, Tj'pe 93
1 ultra short-viave wireless tt-lephone, Type 90, Modification 2
1 ultra short-wave wireless telephone. Type 90, Modification 4
2 wireless telephone microphones. Hark 2, Modification 3
d. Signal strength Indicators (SOKUKU.I) and Cathode-ray Tube Screens
1 ijme 92 Electric "fave Cathode-ray Tube .Screen, Modification I
1 Tj'pe 92 Short Wave Cathode-ray Tube Screen, Modification I
1 Type 92 Short '^ave Signal Strength Indicator, Modification I
2 Type 15 Ko. 2 Cathode-ray Tubo Screen, Modification I
e . Vlireless :
1 Type TM Lir^ht 'Tireless, !todification I
f . liadio Direction Finders:
1 Type 93 Mark I, Radio Direction Finder
IV. El.iGII.'ES:
(1) Main engines "BURAIIKACHISU" Tj'pe Turbine - 4
(screw propellers - 4 )
(cog-v<heel spe^d reduction gear install.ed)
(2) H.P.il. of screw-propellers - (Maximum 360)
(3) Boilers: Fleet Type - Mark "RO" crude-oil fired boilers exclusively - 0
(4) Auxiliary Engine and Electric Engines
(5) Lewis Type refrigero.tion machine _
(6) SEGAR i:,-/^" ) double-ej?fect (FUKKO) type carbonic acid gas iypa ice
machine - 1
(7) Type "UU" (TII:j^ ) 0 "'att Type Air Compressing Puiii?~3
(8) 4 6-pole, compound-wound generators ..Ith interpole
4 compound-wound, D.C. electric motors with megapolc and interpole:
2 3C
)0-I{.'r;., 2 -
135 K.-.'J.
BOATS:
,^e
V/eifht
Lcnf,-th
Beaj-i
Draft
Men Carried
Motor
Boats (2)
4.4 Tons
11 Metres
2.7 Metres
.6 Metres 30
Launch (1)
3. "
9 "
2.5 "
.6 "
35
Cutters (4)
1.5 "
9 "
2.45 "
.4 "
45
Dinghy (1)
.6 "
6 "
1.5 "
.2 "
10
VI. LOCATION, TYPE, AMD 'EIGHT C? AliCHORS:
Bower anchors (2)
Stream anchor (1)
Kedgo anchor (1)
VII. -yiCIIOR CABLES:
Stockless bow; both sides eacli 4.8 tons
''ith removable stock (?) stern; starboard
Navy-type stern; port .5 ton
1.4 tons
Bower anchor cables (2); 57mm. diameter; 15 shots on starboard side for
340.5 metres; 16 shots on port side for 351.4 metres; each cable shot is
22.7 metres
Stream anchor cable (1): 35:'im. diameter; 1S2.9 metres long; of steel wire
Kedge anchor cable (1): 43 mm. diaineter; lt-2.9 metres long; of Manila rope
588 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COIJFIDEnTIAL JICPOA Item 7,''4986
Page kl
HEADQUARTERS STAiT, 6TH FLE2T (1 Jeoamber 19U)
Rear-Ad-niral GOTO, Zonchi (jS- i' ^ ^.'■» ) ; Comr.iandin^
^■-iginesr Captain OMWCI, Jisaku {f\'% 'M^*^ ); Fleet Engineering Officer
Coramander KISHIMA, Kikutoku ^%^^i^\%)'> Staff Officer
Lt. Comdr. MIKiiMI, Iwau ( ^ ^f./T.^ ); Staff Officer
Lt. Comdr. SEKINO, Hideo (j^l 'f j^;?*^); Staff Officer
Eng. Lt. Comdr. ISIIISAKA, Harukictii {%-^^ %'%)\ Staff Officer
'Tarrant Officer IZULiI, Iwao ('^ ^ /ii, ); Attached to Hdq. Staff
OFFICERS OF T!E A03A
Captain HISAIiUNE, Yonejir6 ( ^'v'.^. %. >/"• I'f^ ) Captain
Commander NAKAMURA, Kenji ( ^l^./T^ '^M, 'M ) Executive Officer
Eng. Corr.dr. HI!!^., Kiroloi \^j^ %,-^ i \ ) Engineering Officer
Lt. Comdr. NISHIKOril, Tuji ( ^^ ll^t Ta ) !Javif:ator
Lt. Comdr. DOI, Yasumi (^ ^ "^ ->- ) Ounnery Officer
Lt. Comdi-. (M.C.) hillTU, Ontaro {J- lifj 5J2-/^^j^ ) Medical Officer
Lt. Comdr. L'lYAZAKI, Isai.iu {\^J>^ % ) Torpedo Officer
Lieutenant (sg) ElAUURA, Hashi {/^ -%^ S^) ) Aviation Officer
Lieutenant (sg) IDETA, Hirokuni ( ^'. V^ ys^ I^J ) 1st Lieutenant
Lieutenant (sg) TAKUBO, Tatsuo ( > j? '\ V7(-^'ri^1'^>- )2nd Division Officer
Lieutenant (sg) HOSHINO, Seisaburo (^ ?) 'p\^^Vy ) Communications Office
Eng. Lt. SIIIBATA, Yoshinori (i^, >^ ?5 f '1 ) 10th Division Officer
Lt. (sg) (SC) UAT3UIJAGA, ieiryu ( /f i"- /K. '(i'- ^ ) Supply Officer
.''oecial Duty Lt. (jg) K^JITA, Yoshisaburd ( /l^ \ J7 "^ -^ li^ ) 1st Division Of fie
Special Duty Eng. Lt. (jg) IKCDA, Tada;-.ir3a ( j.^^ I'S?/!- ^ ) 12th Division Offic<
Eng. Lt. (jg) NAKAJIMA, Riichi (*t'^;;;f) -" ) Division Officer
Lt. (jg) YOSHEJIPvA, Goro ("$" /T'^ ^ fc^ ) Division Officer
Eng. Lt. (jg) ilAOASE, Takeshi ( '^ '/,'f ^ ■j^V> ^ Division Officer
Lt. (jg) (M.C.) HOSOKI, Daisabure {,h'<9 '/{^ f\-^\>f' ) Shio's Company
Lt. (jg) N0N03U, Sadasuke ( >t ^^ ^1^ /C'^'^ ) Ship's Company
Special Duty Ens. HASKIOKA, Gihachi (/t?^ 1^ ]%■' '^ ) Ship's Company
Ens. (S.C.) KITAYA, Yoshikichi ( ;IC/^- '<!3 >^ ) Ship's Company
S.D. Ens. YAMA3AYASHI, Tokuji ( J.. "^"^ f'^r >/ ^ ) ship' s Company
Eng. Ens. HAIiAYA, Haruo ( / "I /? "^ A^*- ) Ship's Company
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
589
COIJFIDEOTI/vL
Ens.
Res. Enf. Ens.
Ens.
Ens.
Eng. Ens.
Ens. (S.C.)
JICPOA Item ;/4936
Page 4S
MAErrA"fA, Shinichi ( "fTl ** J ' "' "^ ) Ship's Company
OSHIMA, Magane (-hifl -^ *- ) Ship's Company
SATO, Tadashi {^ii. l-^i- Jt- ) Ship's Company
ODEHA, ShunsaburO ( /^ "^ 1X- -^ l^f ) Ship's Company
KOIZUMI, Yasutaro (,k }f^ '(^n/\^|' ) Ship's Company
'.'.'ADA, Isaiau (yj^r \*? ^^ ) Ship's Company
FACTS ABOUT TIE AOBA
I. TYPE: Heavy (first-class) cruiser
Where built:
Keel laid:
Launched:
Completed:
Jlodifications finished:
II. PRDICIPAL lEASURELIEOTS:
I'lTSUBISHI Dockyard at NAGASAKI
U February 1924
25 September 19.26
20 September 1927
30 October 1940
A. Overall lenrth:
B. Maximum beam:
C. Length between nerpendiculars:
D. Draft:
S , Di s plac ement :
F. Tonnage displaced per cm. of draft:
G. Moment required to change trim 1 cm:
H. Shaft horsepower:
I . Speed :
J. Fuel oil carried:
K. Fresh ivater carried:
Drinking water: 31.04 tons
All-purpose water: 43 •23 tons
Water in drums: 127. tons
VJater evaporated in a day: 200, tons
III. AEJiAlCajT, ETC. (same as the KAKO)
181. 36 metres
15.47 metres
176.70 metres
5.66 metres
11,660. tons (sic)
23.6 kgs. (sic) (TK: tons?)
246.2 kps. (sic) (TKjtona?)
103,000. S.H.P.
33. knots
20,400.
FACTS ABOUT GOIHG ASHOKi aT HOI (iiUOTTO) (12-15-41)
Flag Signal for the AOBA.
1. Vfhile anchored at ROI and up until, the 29th, all hands are permitted to
go ashor-3 and stroll about for three hours.
2. Extent of our liberty ashore; islands in the vicinity, swimrrdng in the
surf, and the wanton picking of fruit are prohibited.
3. For alarins, the AOBA ;vill shoot two flares off in succession, in addi-
tion to its use of the regulatio.n signals,
(1) Liberty ashore every day from O6OO to O90O, and from 1100 to I4OO.
(2) Complement — about 120.
(3) Small boats in use: 1 lighter holding 90-100 men
1 cutter holding 25-30 men
(4) Place — EDGIGEK Island (uninhabited island)
''fernir.gs when going ashore.
1. This island is a breeding place for dengue fever, and the mosquitoes
are extremely numerous here, "hen stripping or when you step into a
thicket you must not be bitten b2'' any mosquitoes.
2. You must not be naked at any time viiile ashore. Further, swimirang
is strictly prohibited.
3. The vianton picking of fruit is forbidden. Nor is it pennissible to
bring aboard ship fruit that is unnecessary.
4. You must bo assembled on the beach 20 minutes before it is time to
return to the ship.
590 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COrTIPEHTIAL ' JICPOA Item A986
Page 48-A
\^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 591
CmFIDECTIAL JICPOA Item ;/4986
Page 49
5. Concerning Alarms:
All hands will always be riindful of their ship, and must be a'ole to
assemble together v hen the alarm is sounded.
Therefore, at an alarm two flares will be fired in succession three
times or more tiues from our ship. You ijust take care so that i;i this
eventuality the conduct of our defense is not ir.periled.
,n2
THE REEFS AT THUK HARBOR (as observed from a 'aotorboat)
(TM: To accompany till)
I. Time and Place
12 December 1941, 1430 (one hour before sunset).
Off the south shore of DUBLOli Isl:...d ^i. the TRUK Island Group.
II. Vfeather; Sea Conditions.
Clear weather. South vdnd, velocity of approxi.;ately 6 meters (Tli: per
secor.d) .
III. Summary of Activities.
'7e were unable to transport the official messen,3er to the Government Branch
Office jetty, and the 15 Supply Departaent workers to the Liunitions Section
jetty at NEBSRAI, but had accompciny us the nine midshipmen on a hydroivraphic
■ survey, '"e -.lere familiar with the Government Branch Office jetty from our
morning's experience. V/e were not familiar at all, however, with the loca-
tion of the Munitions Section jetty. Even the charts we brought with us
were not detailed. At the Branch Office jetty \->e asked people (for details,
but without result), and although uneasy, we s3t out. We proceeded alonr,,
seeing marker posts A & B on our right. Then .le passed two or three moored
large flying boats. From point B v;e proceeded directly towards an object
resembling a jetty. Because of our lack of self-confidence through this
channel and of our loneasiness over the depths, we v;ent alon;; at slow speed,
^'/hen we reached Point C, a rasping sound suddenly rent the air and our boat
was jolted. The engine, of course, stopped at once. The boat, too, stopped,
its bot::om grating on the reef for a while. Vfe felt that the boat vv'as barely
being supported near its center. This was 300 meters frora the shore (to
the right). The wind direction was on the starboard beam. The sun's angle
of elevation was 15°.
IV. Measures Taken.
As stated above in describing the position of the bottom of the bo^ t, it
was aground on the rcaf at the center of the boat and to ths loft, the water
was rather deep and the bow ox the boat vfas slowl; being rocked to tho right
by the vdnd.
Accordingly, I ordered the passengers to draw back onto the stern as far as
possible and haJ four men rock thj starboard bovj to the ri^ht, and, at the
sarTiS time, the aotor was placed in reverse, ''/lien they hcd rocked the boat
tv*o or three tines, we easily drew away from the roaf. After that, we con-
tinued in reverse and -ihen we went sor.ie distance from the reef, we inspected
the engine and gunwale cjid saw that no d.3ma£;o had been sustained. At thft
time we received a .aessar-c by semaphore Trom the shore "Which said: "Do not
£0 there",
I immediately asked for the channel used by boats nc.vigating in tiiat area,
■■/hen we were stranded on the reef and I thought about the Impact I believed
for sure that we must have sustained somo damage. However, .''hen I was told
that there was no damage, in ansv.'er to my inquiry, v.s proceeded ahead.
V. Causes and Lessons,
1. First of all, the foremost cause of this incident is the fact thet we
sat out without knovdng clearly our mission and without Icnowing v.'hcre
we were going.
2. The charts which we had taken along wcrenot clear at all and shoiild
not have been used,
3. It \dll not suffice to guess at the depth of the water by advancing
in the direction of the sun and, moroovor, one jiiust not fail to keep
a sharp lookout at all jnoments and to pay attention to the lar^e fly-
ing boats moored in the vicinity.
4 . 7^e did not take soundings .
79716 O— 46 — pt. 13 15
592 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
JICPOA Item
Page 49-A
/49'6
■^1
.1^.
t
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 593
COriFIDBK'TIAL - JICPOA Item ,'/4986
Page 50
VI. Measures Taken After Our Return to the Ship.
I reported to the Executive Officer and to the Officer of the Day. As it
was sunset I had the launch hoisted aboard. Thus, I was .iresent v.hen the
' launch was hoisted aboard and v.heii tl\e bottom of the boft was inspected,
aside from the fact that the keel plates had separated more or less, the
boat v;as the same as ever, "fhen the coxsvjain and I inspected the bcrt
two or three times, we could discover no dar.iare. Accoroi igl;.', I made a
report to that effect to the Executive Officer, the Officer of the Day, '
and to the Officer-in-Charpe of the Division and thereby com,:J.tted a grave
error. By this I mean that when vie inspected the boat the followin^^ i.iorning
there was a concavity of about 100 square cuntLneters in area on the star-
board keel in the center and uhe bottom of the boat v.as full of water.
The damage, however, had already been repaired with copper plates by the
boat's crew. I immediately notified the Executive Officer, the Officer
of the Day, and the Division Officer.
VII. Observations.
1. V/hen in command of a boat, take full responsibility for matters affect-
ing the boat, and do not listen to the opinions of others viith regard
to measures to be taken when stranded on a reef. I should have relied
upon m^r own opinions.
2. Lookouts should hsve been most strictly posted.
3. ''."hen I did not know how deep the water was, I should have proceeded
at a reduced speed,
4. The exajTsination of the damaged place should have been done more
thoroughly.
"To caution add care".
5. I should have been quick to get in touch i.ith this ship.
(Eiid of narrative)
#10
FACTS ABOUT TRUK (12-13-1^)
A. Waters Suitable for Anchorage.
On the west side of MOEN Island (and in the waters between t,ho north side
and :^UAC).
In the vicinity of TRUK Harbor (i.e., in the viators south of ULIAN Island
and extending to OTTA Island and FAIIAM Island).
B. Shelter from "Jind and TTaves.
Depending on the selection of an anchorage, shelter can be afforded, no
matter which direction the vind may come from.
C. Passes.
Northeast Pass.
1. In the center of the pass are reefs 7.1 meters under water.
T'ley are floating, crimson, circular iiiarkers here.
2. Wien there is a strong northeasterly vdiid, there are great
sv/ells at the entrance to the pass.
3. Tidal current is 2 knots.
North Pass.
1. Fair sailing with northeast vdnds.
2. The coconut grove to the northeast rfikes e good landmark.
3. Channel is sinuous.
South Pass.
1. Navigable bj^ large ships. •
2. There is rather deep water at the end of the reefs on both sides
of the pass. You cannot, however, distinguish the change in the
color of the water.
3. Maintaining j'our distance abeam of FALEU Island, it is easy to
pass through the narrows.
EVERETT (EBARITTE) Pass.
1. Free of obstacias. Navigable by large ships.
D. Supply.
Coal may be had at the naval coaling station on the south shore of DUBLON
Island.
Fuel oil (JUYU) may also be had here.
Fresh water is to be had in containers of 260 and 160 tons (one each).
Daily water allo'vanoe is 200 tons.
Fresh provisions include egg-plants, small melons, sweet potatoes, taro,
all kinds of fish, beef, and pork.
594 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CO^'FIDENTIAL
JICPOA Item #4986
Page 50-A
(Ea-iRITTE)
NORTH P;i£S (sic) ILVERETT P.\SS
7°40'
15
RUAC -f"
^^ ISLAND
V, ^ QUOI
\ V NORTH
F/O^ liORE 0^<^ PAT.
y^
UL-'J^
a.
y UDOTV i^
Ov Eld. d P'^Sf'
F.XLA
Bii»U3TS
I 7020"
151°40'
^-^ V I MEN
'SCIK FEF/iN ] } ^ l)
V i r^ T )
TSIS
^
ViffiST JJJ
IDi'iN
O
^
oll;.n
S;iL.lT /
C^
SKETCH IL\P
OF
rauK
ijesi:gon
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 595
COMFIDE?.TIAL JICPOA Item ,;'4986
Page 51
VARIOUS IIJFCRMjlTION COK'CERI.'IKG SAILBIG Ai«D ALJCHCRACffiS Hi TKS IJU'iDATES
I. IfjFOFAIATION FOR NAVIGATION
1. The use of charts showing swept and sounded areas (30h>:I-S0}.UR-C-F,AIZU).
These island groups are mainly composed of coral atolls. Since the
bottom of the sea is very undulating, sweeping ani sounding r.iust be
carried out evei when comparatively detailed sounding charts are
available in order to avoid uncharted sunken reefs.
2. The carrying out of soundings.
TShen in the open sea and anong several atolls, even though you
may be carrying out to the best of your sibiiity, souiiding of the deep
waters and soundings for hidden reefs, when you have not navigated
throughout the entire_area, it is necessary to continue sounding
navigation (SOKUSHIijKOKO) most strictly.
3. Post strict look-outs.
A good part of the sea in these parts has not yet been sounded
and in order to learn cbout chsmges in depths, it is necessary to
post strict lookouts when navigating around these island groups,
(note) Though recognition of shallov) reefs depends, in the
main, upon changes in the color of the water, great
care is necessary since conditions of light, clL^natc,
and the nature of the sea bottom vary.
Depth of ''Tater
1. Dark purplo-indigo 70 metres t more
2 . Purple-indigo 40 to 70 metres
3. Purplish blue About 30 metres
4. Blue About 20 metres
5. Palo blue About IS metres
6 . Bluish green About 10 actros
7. Bluish yellow 2 to 5 metres
6. Brownish green Under 2 .netros
4. The southern part of these island groups is the region of equatorial
counter currents, renerally from the east. Ho'.vever, around both the
RALIK and RATAK chains the northern equatorial current (from the west)
and the equatorial counter current (froiA the oast)run longitudinally
south an-J north. Hence, the tidal currents and the i.dnds interact
vdth an oxtro. .o coMploxity, and particular caution mist be taixn in
navigfition'.
II. Cautions ".liSN sntssiiig ajp leaving the passes to lagooks
1. *."hen there are large waves on the sea outside the lagoon, and when
their direction coincides uith that of the pass to the lagoon, the
waves at tho ontr-noo to the pass will be rcjiarkably high. But you
must allov; for a sufficient iii^rgin in your estimate of depths,
2. In general, the tidal currents runriir^g through tho passes are strong.
You may iiiake it a general rule to head inward at flood tide and outward
at vbb tide, out you should also maintain a careful watch in steering
your shiip, as the tides luay be irregular, depending on the topo^Taphy
of tho ocean floor.
3. 'Vhcn you are about to enter or leave a long and narrow pass, you must
keep a sharr) o-'-c on tho v/oather lest a squall, proceeding inward,
engulf you. Furthermore, in tho event you arc besot b;' a squ:J.l, you
must have a plan of action ready beforehand.
4. As the markers arc, on the whole, inconspicuous, it is nccossarj' that
yx>\x do take soundings as you anter the pass, so that you na.y ascertain
the positions of the ciP.rker and your ship with room to spare.
5. If you should use small scale charts, you must bear in mind that the
notations on swooping and depths have been oniitted.
596 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COMFIDENTIAL JICPCA Item ifU9^b
Page 52
III, CAUTIOUS IK DECIDIHG UPON AN ANCKOftAGE
1. Throughout the year northeasterly to easterly winds prevail; the
Tormer are genersilly strong. Aside from the period July to October,
when the winds are calmest, you should be careful in the selection
of your anchorage. _
2. Within an atoll there are several reef spots (TEIJSHO). Hence, in
determining upon an anchorage, you should seek a place with an even
depth and conspicuous markers nearby. You should also drop your
anchor to determine the depth.
3. In selecting an anchorage for fueling, especial consideration must
be paid to wind, waves, and tides.
About 1315 on 21 January 1942, a large enemy flying boat was sighted closing
in upon us at 2°55' S. Lat., 149°40' E. Long, Immediately we notified the task
force by radio. Three Zero fighters left the task force in our direction, but
they turned ar'ound at our instruction and headed for the enemy plane. 'Yithin a-
few minutes a trail of smoke was seen in the direction they had flown. Then we
saw the three fighters circling at low altitude. It was certain noM that the
enemy plane had been shot down, '.'e changed our course at once and proceeded in
the direction of the fight. Shortly we saw the fighters flying toward us. "'e
waved our caps in greeting, whereupon they returned our salute by dipping their
wings, ".'hen we reached the vicinity of the place where we supposed the plane
to have been shot down, sure enough, there was a large oil slick on the sea.
We also sighted five of the plane's crow drifting about; we took them aboard as
prisoners. Three of the flying boat's regular complement of eight had perished.
Of the five we rescued, two were officers and the others rated men.
THE TREAB'EHT Oi' PRISONERS OF "lAR
(23 'anuary 1942)
From Lt. HCSHIiJO
I. LA"'S ON THE SUBJECT
A. Regulations for the Treatment of Naval Prisoners of ITar
B. Laws for Aerial "'arfare (Clauses n'ib to ffiS)
C. Laws for Land Warfare
»D, Applicable Precedents
II. "TiO SHALL BE A PRISONER OF "JAR
A. Combatants, non-combatants (personnel in the Medical Corps are not
considered PO'"s)
B. Those in active service at the front (personnel with the Signal Corps
in the field, etc.)
C. Rulers (SHUKENSHA) and similar persons.
D. Responsible government officials, diplomatic envoys, etc.
E. Civilians employed by the military (GUNZOKU).
F. Natives who shall have defended themselves against their captors.
G. The sick and wounded in the rd.litary service.
H. Crews of captured ships and aircraft.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 597
CONFIDECTIAL JICPOA Item n(4986
Page 53
III. THEATIiE:JT OF PHISOfERS OF '"AR
A. A General Approach
It is of course ossontial that prisoners of war not be mistreated.
The idea that aside from necessary restrictions, tliey should bo treated
as military men who have been t."ken prisoner, is ;videly acoeptf;d.
Even though they arc er.emj' officers and men, if it is considered that
they wore all doing necessary service, and that they were sacrificing
their lives for their country, one must feel respect and sympathy for
thCE.
Such springs from a ooinnon essence found in our so-called
"DUSKIDO" (TN: "The '"Jay of the 'Tarrior"). However the handling of
prisoners of war during the first "forld 'Tar was quite harsh and there
were many cases of it not being effected in accordance with previously
existing rulss. _
Our "BUGHIUO" has as its basis the principle "respect for honor",
and the belief that giving a prisoner the opportunitj- to kill himself
is noble treatment,
Sespoct for the enemy on the field of battle rises above the
spirit of combat in response to the enemy's bnivory. It is based on
the belief that the warrior who vicv;3 the battlefield as an exjrcise
ground is plcnsed to have taken an enem;;', regarding him as an opponent
of exercise ground practice. In order to utilize this general concep-
tion concerning prisoners, it is basic that one's attitude should not
embrace any individual adivdration for the prisoner. It is thought that
the differences in '.Vestem and Occidental schools of thought regrxding
"I have done r.y duty" (TI.': In English in original) gives rise to dissia-
ilarities in the concept of prisoners of war.
B. Prisoners of war should be committed to the authority of the Gov-
ernment of the country which has taken them prisoner and they should
be treated huj-nanely. The prisoner may keep anj-thin^ belonging to hijn
other than implements of war, horses, or military documents. There-
fore, the prisoner of war must be given suitable treatment by us.
(It is necessary to act according to the various articles and provis-
ions in question.)
Almost all confiscated documents and articles will be returned to
these persons in view of the fact that Ihey are personal articles.
C. Excerpts fror.i Measures for Treatment of Kr.val Prisoners of V/ar
1. 'Then you have captured a person who shall be a prisoner of war, .
immediately inspect the articles he carries vdth him.
Confiscate weapons, ammunition, and oth-jr military articles
(catalogue the articles). If he has any other possessions
(it is necessary to catalogue the, articles) they should be
carried by this person if convenient.'
2. Only when it is necessary to recognize the dignity of an officer
priscnor, can the naval officcr-in-charge wear his sword. (The
circumstances and the officer's names are to be reported to the
Minister of the Nav^O .
3. A daily account, a list of names, and a catalogue of belongings
should be made concerning the prisoner, including the PO'T's age,
social position, rank, residence, Naval District to which attached
(3H0ZCKU KANSEKCHO '; _. " ).;:...,: . ^ La-.; u wounded,
4. Officer prisoners and non-conibatf.'nt officer prisoners should be
distingiaished from petty officers and men and they should be
treated in accordance vdth their social position and rank, liakc
exceptions for infringements of ttic law or insincerity in answering
questions of name ,and i'ank.
5. "Jhen PO"."s axe disobedient or have plans to escape, etc., the
necessary measures for imprisoaient or punishment cm be carried
out. There will be no objection to the use of armed foi-ce.
6. In connection with a PO'V's attempts to escape or misdemeanors
apply the Ilaval Disciplinary Regulations. The ('isciplinary
authority is a senior nav;il guard officer (GUTEI) who actu:illy
takes in the prisoners.
598 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COrriDSKTIAL JICPOA Item #4986
Page 54
7. The Naval officer in charge shall surrender the POT accompanied
by his various documents and articles to the following:
(a) He shall surrender hin to the Guard District of the NavsQ.
Base.
(b) In unavoidable circumstances he may surrender him to another
Guard Officer(rw": GUNEI)
(c) When he finds it advantageous he may confer with the Army
or the Line of Coranunication (TIJ: HEITAN) Transportation
and Communications Officer and he can surrender the prisoners
of viar to them. (In_3uch instances, the officers, non-com-
batant ofi'icers ( SOTOIOiK 'T? 'Is "? ) , and men shall be segre-
gated and their number reported quickl" to the liinister.)
8. When the PO""s are picked up, a custodiari will be appointed who
shall look after the prisoners under the supervision of a naval
officer.
9. Telegrams and letters will be censored by the supervising officer.
Only the harmless ones will be let through. The franking privi-
lege shall apply. (Ycu r.ust consult the PC'-'s last P.O. first,
however . )
10. ■ A POtl raaj' be pei-mitted to purchase daily necessities or other
articles he ma- like wi-h ]±s own money, only when the super-
vising officer sees no reason why he should not.
11. VJhen a PO'f dies, a funeral sei-vice befitting his station and rank
in life shall bo held.
12. The Last Will and Testaincnt of a PO'T shall be handled as if it
were fro.n a member of the Iraperial Japanese Navy.
D. EiAracts from the General iiules for the Treatment of PO'T's (as estab-
lis'ied in the Laws lo-: land '.'arfare).
1. PO'.''s are obligated not to leave a certain area and may be de-
tained in a fixed place. PO'/'s may be imprisoned as long as it
is neccssar}', as a moosure to preserve the peace of th.- community,
which must come first.
2. The capturing nation ..iay utilize the PCW's as laborers, according
to their ran)' and ability.
Officers may not be employed.
Tiie PO".''s duties shall not be excessive.
The labor shall have no relation whatsoever with the military
strategy and actions of the capturing nation. (This is very
. inexplicit, so that in such matters the capturing nation enjoys
a freedom of interpretntion and may exercise its discretion.)
If worked, the PO'7 must be granted a remuneration comensurate
with th^t given Array personiiel of his rank in the capturing
nation. Thoy say that in tnis present ',var GSiUMJY grants its
POn laborers a renunerction bO/o of what they are entitled.
3. The government of the capturing nation is obligated to feed and
clothe everj'' PO"'. .""hen there is no special agreement between
two warring nations, the capturing state shall treat matters of
food, bedding, and clothing on an equal footing with its own
troops .
4. The POW shall submit to the rules in force. If he does not,
the supervising officer nay take stringent measures. If a P(7.7
shall escape and be cau ht again before he has reached his objec-
tive, ho ohall be punished. However, if ha shall have reached
his objective, but become a prisoner again at a later date, he
shall not be punished in the least for the former escape.
5. The capturi.Tg nation ,'.ay permit a POV/ to talce a prescribed oath
?-nd set hl-n fr.jo; i ut it may not force the PO".' to take this oath.
Moreover, the government of the capturing nation need not accede
to the request of a PO'J to take the oath and be set free,
6. At the commencement of hostilities between belligerents, a neutral
country shall establish a Prisoner of '.7ar Information Bureau, to
be in operation the moment the first enemy nationals are rounded
up on alien soil,
7. P0'.7 mail shall be exar.ipted from the local postage regulations;
presents and relief societ;' boxes addressed to PCTV's shall be
free of import duties and railroad freight charges.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 599
COMFIDEHTIAL * JICPOA Item itU^BS
Pa-e 55
8. Officer POV-f's shall receive the sajne pay that is granted officers
of identical rank in the detaining countrj"-. This oay shall then
be redeemed by the POlV's government.
9. With the single stipulation that he shall abide by the rules
governing order and discipline, as prescriV:ed by the An.ij'- author-
ities, the PO'7 is granted religious freedo.n.
10, After peace is restored, the PWf shrJ.1 be returned to his country
as rapidly r.s possible.
IV. UY a"N VIE."S (CONCERNli.G THE IirTSHROGATION OF POW's)
Throughout the above stipulations, the freedom to interrogate PCTf's to
further the operations of the capturing nation has not been granted.
Kovievsr, I believe that when there are PO'.V's, ae between any warring states,
it should properl' be the conventional thing to. interrogate thoai for infor-
mation on their fightii g forces, xnerefore, I conclude that there .\s no
need to adhere to the rules of international law and to liesitate in conduct-
ing interrogations. Hovtever, if the POT's feelings are not given considera-
tion, results either cannot be gained from the interrogation or will be
meagre indeed.
That is to say;
A. Insofar as possible, PO'7's should be picked up separately.
B. Conversation and communication between PO/f's should be restricted,
C. To help elicit testimony from PC'/'s iraterial recognized to bo of
value (documents, messa-es, etc.) should be gathered and arranged
to the best of one's ability. The principal function- of interro-
gation then, should be the further interpretation of this :Tiaterial,
D. In interrogating, coercion should be the principle. Since in
cases when the PCTT's native language differs from one's own, it
i3 difficult to t;.ks advantage of any slip of his tongue, to
practice detailed examination or to use indirect questioning
(especially at tidies when one lacks confidence in one's vocabulary),
it is easier (TN: for the interrogator) to adopt the formalities
of a consultation.
The feeling that the victor is superior, the loser inferior should
pervade the incerrogation. If necessary, you should depend that
questions and ansi"ers be made in writing.
E. Until the object of the ir.terrogation has been attained, the PO.T
should bu r.ip.de to feel amcious about his fate, should beco.Tie hag-
gard physically. Consideration should be given to the PO'T's
quarters, sustenance, surveillanoo, etc.
ir;TE?iNATIOH/X LAT; IK TTARTUffi
From Lt. HOSKIi'JO
The UNITED STATES dccl?j-ed kANILA an open city (ITJ: "undefended town"
written in Rn^iish). In ans\-er, our imperial forces continued to boj^b it.
Finally, on 3 January they entered the city. Hovj shall our f.ctiou be
explained in tho light of international law?
Vfe had to consider IIAI'ILA a defended city (TN: this term rendered
in English), and hence our attacks were ia.vful.
(Reference ^iaterial:)
A. The meaning of an "open city".
The question of what rdlitary installations and troops consti-
tute a city's defense is one to u c-oi '....'. on fact; (in practice, the
question is whether or not the city is defcndeii). Howcvjt, there is
no explicit authority on the subject.
In generril, the follovdn^- cities are recognized .is "defended
cities":
1. A city surrounded by fortifications.
2. A city in whose vicinity gun batteries and other positions
hav.j been erected,
3. A city in vihich troops are located and attempt to prevent
the entrance of the cncm^'. (If there be a sirt-ll number of
troops, but recognised to have no "ability to resist", the
city shall not be treated as a "defended city",)
600 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CO^^FIDE^iTIAL JICPOA Item ifU9^b
Page 56
4, A cit^'- where the -waters at the entrance to the harbor have
been laid \.'ith (automatic) contact irdnes.
B. VJhat Fhall be selected a^ attack objectives?
There io sono dilTeience of opinion because of the divergenct
of operational methods employed in naval, land, and ilr warfare,
1. Targets in a "defended city":
There is no necesr:it;' to limit the objectives in this
instance to fortificationj and other defensive installations
for troops.
In air varfare (jombing) tjie objectives shall be the
samo as thoss listed, in the next section.
2. Tar^'ets in an "open city":
a. Naval vessels (all ships used b the military services)
b. Trooor; (ix' there are many troops located in the city, it
shall be considered a defended city).
c. Constructions with military possibilities:
(1) Airfields (those which are priv&teiy owned but nuo
be £iven over to iidliL-ary use in the future must b«
included) .
(2) Forts, trenches, obstructions,
d. Jlilitary, n;-.V'l, (and airforce) installations (barracks,
hangars, arsenals, etc.),
e. Storage points for arms and other materiel,
f . Factories and other installations that ma:- be put to
military use. (Privatel:^ owned plants which vdll bo
dofinit^ly turned over to the military ere included.
However, accessory and sub-contract factories arc excep-
tions . )
Railroads, v-ir^-lass stations, harbor installations.
In land v;arfarc, arMss must conduct their operations by
entering cities wi.ich render their attack and bo,-nbardmep
impossible. In naval and air warfare, however, there ai
no obstacles to an attack.
3. An "open city" not resn...idi:ig to levies on its populace (The»
are regulations to K'.eet Li.is situation in n;val warfare onl/
However, the same rules should ap-^lj' m land warfare. In aj
■iiiarfare, the application of such rules would be impossible,)
a. Should a naval force ordor a city to supply it vath the
necc3sary provisions and stores for its irafuediate needs
in a formal dui.iand and the city resist; (For details (
the execution of a levy, consult levj-i.ig orders and the
"Regulations for Levying".)
A lev,-- : "uuld cori-espond to tlic resources of the place
u:-'on which it is made, and n-.ust li--ve the approval of th«
corfi-.ander of the naval force.
Unrestricted levlng by a SNLF., etc., and lev ing done
by each ship is wronj-.
b. Should the city officials fail to submit to. our orders
It is perndssihle to assess all people in the city
form of t<.x, but an "open city" cannot be bombardet
because this levj- has not been collected,
4. '/hen citie:. , towrs, and viliajes \x?:^- be bouibed in air warfare
as objectives (this iricladed "open cities").
a. If a lar; e Joroe is in an area ihur.ediite to the operatic
of the opposing land force (incVudinft; a SiiXF) and is con
centrating it the city, tovm, or village in question,
b. (civilians iray be in danger, hut that canr.ot be avoided.
Hovover, iii such instances all possible steps shall be
taken to reduce the danger to them.)
c. (Bombing \»hich has as its object the intimidation of
civil-i aj-is, the injury of non-co.ibatants, and the des-
truction of non-i.iilitar:'- things is illegal.)
However, there is no objection to destrojans indi\'idual targ»
even if the city at a whole nay not be made an objective.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 601
CCNFIDECTIAL JICPOA Item #4986
P-£e 57
C. Targets which may not be attacked (common to land, naval, r'jid air
vjarf are ) .
1. Religious buildings
2. Buildings used in the learning of arts and crafts
3. Buildings used by charity orgainizations
4. HistoriCi.:l monuments
5. Hospitals, collection stations for the sick amJ wounded, and
hos;jitrl ships.
But if it liad been a&sunod that these things would not be p:it to
military use, and the ene.aj violated this asoumption, there cou].d
not be the slij^htest objection to an attack. Kov-evsr in such an
insi-ance, the existence or non-existence of the breach laust be made
clear and attacks kept to the r.dnimuin necessitated.
D. Is an attack without v.-arning lawful? (a step ttj.en at the outset
of an attack) .
In general, the cit^' officials should be notified beforehand,
regardless of whether the city is defended Or not.
The method of notification is left to i.he discretion of the
attacker. The scrtterinr; of leaflets advising evacuation is one
way. Especially should an attac>; on objects i.dthin an "open city"
be announced, giving its .residents a considerable period of grace.
(The length of this period wiil depend on circui:iEtance3,)
If the situation is urgent, it is not necessarj'' to warn the
city. It viill sufiice iS as nuch c nsiderat.ion as possible is given
to the reduction of inconvenience to the cit"-'s inhabitants.
^Tnsn an assault, surprise attack, etc., is an unavoidable
military' necessity, an attjick vdthout 'vvarnir,;i is not unlawful. And
in air attacks, too, it is not necessar; to v,arn tlie city beforehand,
be it defended or not .
However, an attack provoked by resistance to a levy mrst be
preceded without foil by riOtification.
E. Is it necessary that non-combatants be alicied to sejk refuge out-
side the attack sectors when the city is bcin;- surrounded?
This .say be rearlily refused, for favors based on pit-:' need
not be carried to excess.
II, There is evidence that the PHILIPPINE Govern;:iont employees witlidre'-n from
MANILA on a hospital ship, ''as there an^ "thing to prevent us from subject-
ing this ship to a visit and search and coizLig it?
As necessary, it is possible to take charge of a ship, conduct a visit
and search, and then i^et it on ^n isolated course or deoain it.
However, a hospital ship i.iay not be molested as J.ong as it does not
commit an act agair.st the enemy.
( Reference Material : )
A. Definition of a hosDitsJ. ship
1. A public vessel, private vessel, or ship of neutral registry v;hich
is employed vdth the single purpose of succouring the sick, -.iounded,
and ship—.vrecked.
2. Types and markings:
A flT ' bearing a red cross on a vi'hite field flown \,ith the
nation.Tl flar is accepted identification.
In each a. 1,'aval hospital ships
case, the Painted white -..dth a lateral green stripe of about one metre
states in in '.ddth. Built and outfitted in the country using it.
conflict b. Privately owned hospital ships
with the Painted white with a lateral red stripe of about one metre
said belli- in width. Equipped by a private individual or corporation,
gerent must r-.nd op;^ rated under orders from, the belligerent state,
be notified c . Hospital ships of neutral registry
of the. use Painted white with a lateral red strioe of about one metre
of those in width. Equipped by a private individual or corporation
ships in in the neutral stute, and must have the previous sanction
advance, of the government of registry e^nd belligerent state.
602 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAI. JICPOA Item ,,'4986
- Page 58
B. The Rights a".d Obligations of a Hospital Ship:
1. Ko matter what nationality a ship ma^ be, it may rescue fixjm the
sea the sick and wounded of belligerent pov/ers.
2. Hospital ships may not bf; .itef for military purposes,
3. Hospital ships may not interfere with the transport of combat-
ant troops .
Acoordinglj'', the. varships of beJJigersnt powers may direct
a hospital ship on an isolated course. If necessary, the war-
sliips can exercige the right of search and detention.
4. Hospital ships operate at their ovvn xdsk:
If the sjTabol of the hospital ship is not recognized and it
is attacked, the rcspcnsiblity lies wholly vdth the hospital ship.
C, In cases whort a hospital sl'dp engages in forbidden e.ctivities by
taking advant,i,t,e of its spcciid rights as a hospital ship, such as
engaging in the transportntion of personnel other thmi the sick,
wounded, and survivors of ship-wreck or when it makes available infor-
mation or engages i;. an;, other such militr.ry function, it torfoits its
speoieil rights and may ba co.'.sid irod subject to the treatruent afforded
ordinary ships. (According to British opinion, it xs not permissible
for a hospital ship to return to the functions of a merchantmf-n) .
\7hen we consider, however, those rij^hts wliich internu'cional law per-
mits for the special handling of cases even in sick bays abocrd war-
ships we note that the hoapiU'l ship goes beyond its allotted :oowers
when it takes aboard (fro,ii a varship) sick and wounded. Although it
is permissible to open firo l^-.imediately upon it, except in absolutely
unavoidable cases, it is ■ ilo'..ed to get away.
III. How would you, if you were Comniandor of the V.'AXE Island Occupation Force,
have dealt with the ber\rer ^ j? a -.vhite flag?
Though iha situacion is handled according to the decisions of the
Commander of the Occupation Force and according to the principles estab-
lished for land v/arfare, those .''.rticlos ',.hich treat of the situation in
international Ir.v; are given belov;:
A. What is meant by the bearer of a flag (TN: in Lnglish):
1. He is acting under the orders of one of the belligerent parties
(which indicates that he is represent ng one of the belligerent
parties).
His Duty: To negotiate on behalf of one of the belligerent partit
His Identification: He bears a white flag.
2. The bearer of the flag and the interpreter, drummer, and bugler
w!io accompany'' him possess certain inviolable rights.
B. Treatment of the Flag Bearer:
1. The question of whether or hot to acknovjled^e the flag bearer who
has been sent out is Icfi. to the discretion of the Force Conimande)
and ho is not always obliged to receive him.
(Hovjever, iii the a'oove case, a declaration that the flag
bearer vill not be received is customary.)
2. If the flag bearer takes advantage of his position tc deterrdne
the state of affairs on our side, the Force C ■--•.'■.ander in order
to prevent this may use >iha.t ever means h^ ■?..?",'. <•. ■ e'.3C.ry ,
3. If the enemy has abused the privilege of se;;o^,, r a vj.i.g bearer,
he can be detained for a while.
C. Circumstances in ".Tiich the Flt.g Bearer Loses I'lr, J:.,^iol£ble jiightss
1. TOien he incites treach.ery or \;hen he t.-v ■ ^\j i.c:-.gc of his
special right to furi/i^r Ids own int jr ■^"■.■" ..
V/hen he Joes either of the above art'^. '.\ -■ .-■;:ii?'i .-tol'- f?i-fcits
his special rights ^There should be no i>.i.-c\r-y.-L >-\ aoout t -eating
him a^ : ;i enoiuy) .
2. The fl?.g hearer who has been daniod r.-c ••',•■'. .'.o: t-;a:J. .ij:«:iertiatcly
withdraw but because of this, he dooj.ir;. \i ■:•(.< hi -i :>i: ;.ial lights.
That is to say, because reception has been d«;nied it is not per-
missible to perform immediately a hostile ""* .■^•^a-i] ■=-• the flag
bearer.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
603
COt.TIDEMTIAL
SPECIFICATIONS OF THE NO. 10 TYPE MTB
1. HULL:
Length Overall
Length at Waterline (official)
Beam
Depth
Displacement (official)
" (fully loaded)
" (light condition)
Draft forward
Draft aft
Mean draft
Fuel capacity
Craising Rj.nre (official)
(under special conditions)
Maximum Soeed
JICPOA Item 7/4986
Page 59
32.400 metres
31.770 metres
5.000 metres
2.800 metres
84.600 tons
89.381 tons
68. 2^7 tons
1.104 metres
1,116 metres
1.111 metres
17.000 liters
Speed of 23 Knots
for 410 lilies
Speed of 16 Knots
for 1200 iales
30 Knots
2. ARMAlffiNT:
Type 96 25mm dual-mount machine guns, Liodel 1, Modification 1 1
4
Provisionally tenned 40 kilogram smoke lairing gear
(TN: HATSUEN-K^r fj^-J^Z %. )
Type 99 7.7mm rifles
Pistols
Type 97 Gas Masks
Steel Helmets
Ammunition (25mm)
" (rifle)
" (pistol)
T0RPL350 EQUIPMENT:
Torpedoes Tj-pe 44 (Type 97)
Side Dropping Gear, Uodel 2
Director, Type 14, Kodel 2
Type 95 i}epth Cha.rge (when torpedoes aboard, 10)
Depth Charge Hand Launches, liiodel 2
Air ReseiTToire
5
5
18
15
1200 rounds
1400 rounds
360 rounds
4
4
1
18
6
2
604 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COKTID".imAL JICPOA Item #4986
Page 60
4. NAVIGATING EQUIPMEIIT:
Type 90 Macnetic Compass, MoUel 2, Liodlfication 1 1
Compass for Small Boats, l^odel 2 1
5. OPTICAL ECUIPJ..EKT:
Manoueverable Range-Finder 1
7 Power Prism Binoculars (UOVA, Uoiel 1) 4
Tj-pe 96 Sextant, Modification 1 1
6. ELECTRICAL EQUmETiT:
Prime ry Source of Power:
Gasoline pov.ered 6 !C.' 105 V DC Generators 2
(for steering po.ier and cooking use)
Secondary Source Ox Power:
Storage Batteries, llodel 3 1
(for use in starting and illumination)
Kavigation Light 1
Illuminating Equipmant 1
(including 300V; vvorking lights)
Communication Apparatus 1
7. RADIO EQUIPIffiNT:
Tj-pe 96 Mark 4 Air (TT!: KU 'j- ) V/ireless, sendiiig 1
(and receiving)
Secondary Power Equipment 1
Hydrophones (furnishied by special orders) 1
8. ENGItJES:
Main Engines - fferk 71 Model 6 intcrml combustion engines - 950 HP
Gasoline Engines (VULCAI^; ('t /; y ) speed reduction 4
equipment installed)
Shafts and Scre'.vs 2
Auxiliary En{.,ines, Steering Engines 1
(mis Model 2 Steering Eq'oipment)
9. CHE-T:
Officers and "'arrant Officers 3
Enlisted Men I5
EXHIBltS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 605
CONFIDEIiTIAL . JICPOA Itein //A.9S6
Page 61
10. PRINCIPAL STOieS:
Anchor 100 kilograins 1
Anchor cable - diameter 15nim 1
Hand-operated '.'indlass 1
Fire extinguishirig equipment, crrbon dio:d.de type 1
ventilators (electrically operated)
Training port (SENKAI30) (electrically operated) 3
11. RUDDER:
Balanced Rudder
HEFUELLEIG Ili TUH
1 February 1942
1. ESSENTIALS:
To execute refuelling safely and swiftly at any time and place desired,
maintaining the desired iP.obile strength and preparations for Lwaediate
response to the enecz'.
2. PRECAUTIONS: *
Since refuelling is an operation requiring cooperation betv;een the fuelling
and refuelling ships, careful preparation and investigation are necessary
before the fact in order to insure close intercommunication.
Arrangements .nade beforehand; unitv of rjlannin?.
3. METHODS:
Refue^'-jig alongside: mainly done v.'ith cruisers and destroyers; suited to
a pitching motion; large-scale refue-ing possible; siraole to perform,
Refue.ang in tandem: possible for ships unsuited to refue". jng alongside;
Diagonal refue'-Jjig.
y(S"6 pc)trol ph he)
FURUTAM 1 1 ^^"^ ^ \ K^l<0
/</MtiG/^SA^Ljt)ij/\06A
//?0
rAO)
606 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COrTIDKNTIAL
JICPOA Item #4986
Page 61-A
N|iniber \
Flag
,'| Fender
Derrick
'^^^-^- — ri
fs 127ram Copper m
\A nose sra;.
^
Fender
metres
Brivi,je
Refueling
Ship
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
607
COrJFIDEIJTIAL
JICPOA Item nk')ij(i
Pa^e 62
5. REFt^:ii;.GAL0nGSI3S - DIAGRAM:
(See Enclosure)
6. REFUSLING RECORD:
A. Refueling method: alongside
B. Date: 2k January 1942, 0600
C. Place: (150° E. Long, on the eqaator)
D. Course: 0° Course intersection angle:
E. Shaft Speed: 6 Icnots (dangerous at 10-12 knots) Speed thru v;ater:
6.6 knots,
F. Rudder compensation: 5° outboard
G. T/ind direction: 340° T/ind force: 3.5 metres per second
H. Roll: port 1.5°, starboard 2°
I. Barometric pressure: 758.4 nm Temperature: 25° C.
J. Distance between ships: 30 metres.
K. Pressure of oil pumped; 3 kilograias (TN: per sq. cm. ?)
L. • Oil pumped: 240 tons per hour
M. "teip;hts: 1.5 tons each '.'.'eight line: 24ram S.VJ. (steel wire)
N. Forward rope: 48mm S.W. Mooring Rope: 48 mm S.Vf.
7. HO?r TO CALCULnTE SHORT DISTaICES:
■'^at.h Zt
cK
>
i
) j:i-
As is shoijn by the chart, punct'ore a
piece of cardboard in two places with
large match sticks and then hold the
cardboard in a perpendicular position.
Align the points where the sticks are
visible so that ttie two points and the
waterline of the fueling ship will be
in the sa-ne plane. The bearing on
vjhich the distance being calculated
lies in on the beai.i.
8. PROPER POSITIONS FOfl TIS SF!IPS;
Port to Starboard - Ships should be about 35 metres apart.
Fore and Aft - The number flag flying aboard the fueling ship should
be slightly forward of the bridge on the refueling ship.
VJhen the ships are out of line, the proper position for each will be shown
by numbers indicated on the side of the fueling shin.
9. STAJ!D>>RD SIC-NALS;
V.'hen the refueling ship hoists a white flag "The forward lines have
been secured. No hindrance to putting out the weight."
^Ihen the refueling ship hoists a red flag "The inboard line has been
secured. Ko hindrance to running out the weisht,"
'Then the refuelin;- ship hoists a blue flag "The hoses have been con-
nected. Begin to pump oil,"
V/hen the fueling shi.i hoists a blue flag "Have started to pump oil."
After the fueling ship has started to pump oil, v/hen it hoists a blue
flag "Have ceased pumping oil. Cast off the hose."
V/hen the refueling ship hoists a blue fle.g "Flov* of oil has ceased.
Hoses cast off.".
79716 O— 46 — pt.
608 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
C0;'FIDE1:TIAL JICPOA item #4986
Page 63
Completion of the Operation:
'"hen the fueling ship hoists a red flag "Cast off inboard line."
"■-"hen the fueling ship hoists a white flag "Cast off forward
line<
(For additional communication during the operation, write the message
on a small black board and hold it up (so it may be seen).)
10. CAlITIo^;s to be obssrved ".thek !.iAi.!Euv:.;tii]G the ships into POSIVIOM;
(1) There must be close coordination between the turn and 'the compass.
^'.Tien both ships draw near, there should be proper orientation of the
magnetic compass. ^Tien the shi;js are maneuvering into position,
changes in distances shall os made by the fuelirg ship and because
of the deviations caused by prevalent currents, waves, and other
elements, in the adjustment of positions, allowances shall be made
for these variable influences.
(2) VJhen the angle of intersection of the courses of the ships is too
great, since this has a direct relationship to the process of suction
between the ships, it is dangerous for theTi to approach too rapidly.
(3) VJhen there is a variation in speed because of the displacement of
the refueling ship, weather, and other reasons, this variation may
be decreased when high speeds are involved by means of a standard
rule:
Cruisers Decrease from 0 - 1/4 knots.
Destro;'ers Decrease from l/4 - 1/3 knots,. If the differ-
ences in speed are too great, great strain will
be placed upon the foriivard line and upon the
inboard line,
(4) The angle of intersection of thf; course v.hich the refueling ship
should maintain with respect to the fueling ship should be fixed
by considering the type of the ships, speed, weight, distance between
the ships, influencs of vdnd and waves, etc. C-enerally, 1° - 2^
vdll be suitable.
If the anf:le of intersection is ^reat, there is open space betv.ieen
the ships and if there is not much strain upon the forward and inboard
lines, there is a tendency for the ships to nutuallj'' draw together.
DRY-DOCKIKG OF THE KAKO
(19 November 1941; KU.G)
I. THE SUBORDINATE '7ATCH OFFICER' 3 DUTIES
A. Hereafter he shell mf.nage ths docking operations
B. Vfe olan to dock at 1030. Stand easy until then.
C. He shall supervise the deck crc* in the changiag of the anchor cables
and wire-rope for hawsers fore and aft.
D. He shall prepare to cact both anchors.
E. Using a- cutt.r, he shall chcjiga the wire-rope in the stern for a
hawser, "'hsn finished, he shall supervise the hauling up of the
bower cables.
F. Aftennards, the cutter shaLl be sent ashore.
G. He shall then supervise the securing of the gang 'ay and boom by the
division assigned to the task,
H. Davits shall than be t:-.:-..od inboard.
I. After the men from the Harbor Liaster's Office have come aboard, the
starboard gangivay shall be raised.
J. After 0930 the use of the head is prohdbited.
K, After docking, he shall imn\cdie.tely put into effect the port fire
bill. Each division shall make its preparations,
L. Otherwise^ he shall do such v(ork as is prescribed in the port bill
(SHUTSUNYUKO 3USH0) .
M. Attentionl Carr;' on work at handl
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
609
COKFIDEMTIAL
JICPOA Item ,/49B6
Pa/ve 64
II, (Enclosed a sketch).
Point F\
III, docki::g essentials
First, the wire rope aj't shall be taken in and replaced bj' a haviser,
"fliile paying this out, the wire-rope fonvard shall be t^'.ken in and replaced
by a hawser. Then haul in the anchor cable.
One (150 ton) tu£-boat forward and one on each side airddships and
aft. ".Mle pa^/ing out the forward hawser take in the ones aj.'t and let
go the one forward. The fori'ard buoy wi]-l be chcinged to che starboard
by the tug. When the tug turns at "A" (TN: see sketch) this ship -■sill
aid in turning about by steering of the ship and then jroceed directly
to the dock. Forward there are 2 clear!; visible iiarkers. The officers-
in-charge of the work party are 1 Harbor Mastsr on "top" (TK: h ' "" )
and 1 officer-in-char^-e forward on the forecastle.
There will be hand-flag communication betwe-^n the fonvard and ?.ft
masts.
Just a little before (TK: reaching) the dock the tug-boat changes
course by turning to starboard, and lines are ;-/acsed from the shore to
both sidea of the ship. As the stern approache's the entrance the tugs
let go and lines are .Dasj;ed to both sides of the stem. Then while the
starboard and ;X)r5' lines r.re being hauled the bow is pointed toward the
two markers and the ship proceeds only by this power, (TN: i.e. by haul-
ing on lin^s).
When drjr-docking is complctccj, close the rear gatas and begin drain-
age,
(End)
CONCFI.-fflli.'G DliY-DOCKIIvG
STAHDAEDS OF DHY-DOCKING (Regulations for Construction and Repair of Vessels,
Ite;n 61),
Combined Fleet:
1. Battleships and Carriers (those officially designated as being over
30,000 tons displacement).
and Special Duty Vessels — - Once a year,
2. 'Tarahips: (Battlcfihips, Carriers (as above) excluded)
Tivico -I ;'oar.
Destroyers, Submarines
Torpedo Boats and i.iine-Sweepers
3. Special Duty Boats As necessarj'.
610 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COKFIDEMTIAL . JICPOA Item #4986
Page 65
DAILY ROUTINE ^'JHILE DOCKED
0530 All hands turn to; calisthenics (outside the dock); swabbing
outer decks,
0645 Breakfast
0730 Daily routine; Inspection
0845 Lay to duties
1139 Secure from duties
1145 Lunch
1305 Calisthenics
1315 Commence instruction
1600 Secure from instruction
1615 Begin leisure tinie
1700 End of leisxa-e time
1715 Supper
1745 Fire detail secures
■ INSTRUCTIONS WHILE Hi DRY-DOCK
1. There must be no running about on board ship.
2. Beware of what lies under foot. Take care that you don't fall dovm onto
the dock.
3. A WO or above should be present vihen any heavy things are being moved or
trcQiSDorted.
4. The safety rope naist be used without fail whenever work is being done on
the sides of the ship.
5. Secrecy shall be maintained. Be especially careful of the movement of
laborers.
6. Fires are strictly prohibited. Do any work on the reverse side of a
piece of oil-cloth.
7. The fire bill in dock must be thoroughly carried out.
8. The ship shall be fumigated upon entering and leaving the dock.
WHEN THE KAKO LEA^-ES DRY-DOCK
Preparations for Leavinc the Dock (25 November 1941)
1. Hereafter (the subordinate watch officer) shall conduct the preparations
for leaving the dock.
2. We expect to leave the dock at 1315 • Afterwards we shall moor to buoy jfUm
3. The fore deck crew shall prepare to moor the forward part of the ship.
4. The anchor crew shall prepare to cast both anchors,
5. The division assigned shall prepare to get out both gangways, swinging
booms and propeller booms.
6. The 1st and 2nd Divisions shall prepare to take aboard ammunition.
7. All small boats shall proceed to the mooring place.
8. All hands av;ay from tlieir ship shall return by 1300.
9. Men performing work away from their ship will make certain of their life net
10. Set about preparing to leave the dock.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 611
COWFP)EiTO:AL JICPOA Item #4986
Page 67
Ships and shore stations spotting these signals shall iridicate that they
have received and understood them by hoisting the UNCLE flag or by transmitting
the U (or cancel-U) code Gi£nal,
#3
ADDiGSo BY OUR CAPTAIM UPON KI BOARDU.'G SHIP
by Capt. TAKAHASHI, Yuji (Captain, K;iKO)
16 November 1941
"For three years you have studied your duties diligently. And nov( I
believe that as you stand here, ct thp battle front, your e;notions have been
heightened, as you sense impending action.
PTien you reflect upon it, this is no training suqadronj you have been
assigned directly to the front. Officers in charge of your guidance and their
assistants have been selected; but the fact of the matter is that each and
every one of them has his battle station and shall not be able to devote his
whols-hearted attention to your instruction. You appreciate, I am sure, the
present situation, and vdll not depend on others too heavily. You must under-
take your duties assertively, with a healthy spirit of initiative. Moreover,
at this time special emphasis should be given to the caution, 'Always be at
your station} '. It is extremely important that line officers always be on
the upper deck, and that they observe evo;r; thing, '''hen they are on the upper
deck, they arc able to master anything that comes along.
In short, the present situation is cortainly nearing its climax; indeed,
it is in its most pregnant stage. I earnestly desire from you an uncocimon
amount of determination and effort,"
ADDRESS ON tlS'l YEAR'S DAY, 1942
by Capt. KISAJ'!":", Yonejiro (Captain, AOBA)
"If we put aside our merrL-nent and stop to consider, we find that we have
greeted this New Year's Day, in the 2602nd year of our Empire on the scene
of battle. First, hoiveva- , we shoulc offer congratulations on the long life
of our Emperor and Supreme Conimander. I feel thct it is not only a great honor
for military men to greet the_Nev< Year on the battlefield, but that we shall
long remember partaking of 'ZOKI' (TN: a traditional Japanese New Year's Day
dish of rice cake boiled v/ith ve.-etables and meat), clad in our hot-weather
gear.
"However, our foe is of great strength, too. In particular, it has been
judged that a lar^e American force of cruisers, in conjunction with carriers,
has designs on the SOUTH SEA Islands. This force, v;hich is charged with the
heavy duty of protecting the oCUTK SEAS, must not relax its vigilance for one
second, ''.'e have v;hetted our swords ten years for this one battle. 1942 shall
be the year in v/hich we will exalt our military laight before the world, and
in which we ',jill achieve the object of our sacred war. Let each ;nan strive
his hardest,"
612 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CCNFIDStrriAL JKPOA Item #4986
Page 68
ADDRESS NO. 4 TO THE COIBINED FLEETS
(2003, 23 May 1943)
By the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets
On this occasion we paj' our respects to the memor;/ of a leader of
the Combined Fleet, to a man whom we still remember. YAUAiiJOTO, the late Com- .
mander-in-Chief, died at the front. If we annihilate our stubborn enemy even
at the cost of our lives, we will know that his spirit lives on.
During the past year and a half of this struggle, \:e have smashed
the power of our great enemy snd though vie have, in the main, carried out our
basic strategy, our enemy is striving for ultimate victory by expanding his
preparations for offensive action and by devising plans for the strategic
application of new weapons. Furthermore, taking advantage of the tide of the
war in EUROPE, he is concentrating his main power in the GHiif.T EAST ASIA Area
and is preparing to launch a counter-offensive. IIo matter how nanj'- times the
enemy may advance against us, we shall always welcome combat v.'ith hin and in
exterminating him and securing for ourselves the ultinate victory, we shall
by united effort and perseverance forge for ourselvee a greater and greater
military power. At the same time that wo manifest & relentless spirit of
attack, we shall be prepared to maot.the changing conditions of warfare with
new strategies and new weapons, alviaya keeping one stop ahead of the enemy.
The war is now at its peak, ''fe defend what is ours and the task of
meeting and striking the enemy must be the prerogative of the Imperial Navy.
We shall defend ourselves to the last broath and shall totally destroy'' the
enemy. Should we cross paths with tho enem^' upon the eoas, thiat will be fine.
We shall in our traditional way close in upon him and deliver fierce attacks.
We look forv.'ard confidentljr to seeing our encmj'- vanquished.
If in accordance with this desire we doTote ourselves wholeheartedly
to the utter destruction of the enem;-, being animated by the spirit of the late
Comnander-in-Chiof YAilAMOTO, we shall be united, first of all, with the brave
soul of the Admiral of the rteet and than with those many others now in Heaven,
and shall be able to look forward to the crushing of the anomy and the fulfil-
ment of the great responsibility of the defense of our fatherland.
Let each and every one ponder well upon this task; let us all, by
exerting our efforts look forward to the realization of the Imperial wishes
by carrying to its conclusion this responsibility.
( END )
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 613
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON
SOURCE DOCUMENT #10
(iNTERROGAnON OF JAPANESE PRISO^rER OF WAR
CAPTURED FROM THE JAPANESE SUBMARINE I-l
WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)
ENTITLED
"KUBOAKI, TAKEO, SUPERIOR CLASS ENGINEER PETTY OFFICER,
INTERROGATION OF"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR IHE ATTACK CN PEARL HARBCR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages U32-ii60),
(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)
614 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Aa/(25)
Serlai' 0351
CONFIDENTIAL
Ppom:
To:
Subject:
Bnolosuret
U
tlon and use.
Srora PACIFIC FORCE
07 THE iraiTSD STATBS PACIFIC FLEET
HEADqpARTEaS OP THS C0?£.IA1;D^
mR
2 i9r- ■
The Ccaonander South Pacific Area and
South Pacific Force.
Distribution List.
KUBAAKI, TAI^EO, Superior Class Engineer
Petty Officer* interrogation of.
(A) Subject Interrogation.
Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith for inforna-
DISTRIgJTlOM
COlSSCH - 1
CINCPAC - 1
VICEOPNAV (ONI) ' Z
CDT KARCORPS
COIISOV/ESPAC
ICPOA - 2
COLIAIRSOPAC
KJORD - 1
3D3HIPS - 1
HJPERS - 1
COUAIRPAC -
- 1
- 4
- 2
CTP 11
CTP 16
CTP 18
CTP 62
CTP 64
CTP 67
CTP 69
ComiTHIBPORPAC - 1
COHAI!PHIBPORSCnESPAC - 1
COMGEKSOPAC - 14
COIIGEN Ist LIAC - 2
NZNB - 1
COIJCARDIV 22-1
_fiir[ GHQ, New Delhi, India - 3
^/i/!'
H. D. MODLTON,
Flag Secretary.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 615
SOtnE PACmC FGRCS
WUl'Witij Febrvary 26, 1943.
JSZiiUmTlPK QJCr SOBOAgt. TAEO. SOPSRIOR CLASS SN&IN8SR P, 0»
(Interrogator: Lt. Col* H. D. Harris, U.S.la.C.)
(Interpreter: Gapt. J*. R. ShiTely, U.S.Il.C.R.)
gffy^^ History;
POVf was oaptured from the I-l after liaTine spent 24 hours in
the water« Be was suffering from shark bites on the right heel and
left forearm* POU had oonrpleted 9 years serrioe in Nip Navy; was
28 years old; and had attended high school. The POV/ had a course
at the Me^hanios School and tten finished tin SRbma^ine school and
had returned to Ijechanios School for an additional course* POVf
served aboard 1-4 for 1 year. POV; had been on the I-l for 26 months;
previously to that he was on the KA.TORI from November 1939 to Ootobei
1940. The POW was on duty with the diesel engines on both the KATOR^
and the 1*1.
Identifications :
The POV/ said that the oomuander of the 6th Fleet was 7ice
ASmiral WHPSSU, Vise Admiral SEIL'JW formerly eommanded the 6th
Fleet.
The PO¥ir gave the following names for the officers of the I^l:
Cewnanding Officer > SAKAI-IOTO, Lt. Gomdr*
Znginser Officer • BDTO, Eisao, Lt.
Ounnery Officer •> OUCAWA, Ensign
A8st« Eng. Officer - FITJII^ V/arrant Officer
Electrical Officer - SlAI, ^^arrant Officer
Torpedo Off leer - was a warrant officer • neme xinlcnown
Navigator • was a Lt* (Jg) * name unknown
Operational Infomatiw:
Following repreacDts a chronologioal record of I*X operations
obtained from POW:
1. I3ecesiber, 1941 - operated in Pearl Harbor area,
firing several torpedoes at transport • no hits. 1^1 was
attaeked on 2 or 3 occasions without effect,
2* Jaavarj 13, 1942 - returned to Japan via Marshalls
vdwre I-l refueled. Torpedo supply replenished in Jspan*
3. February 2, 1942 • departed Japan aul proceeded to
Indian Ocean remaining thera 2 months. One merchant Ship was
attaelaed and sunk (probably Australian). The I«l developed
engine trouble (bsoken shaft).
- 1 -
616 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIlENTIAL , r ^3
If April 2, 19^2 * rotumed to Japan for onrerbftiilf re*
nalnlag there 3 months* The ^after gun was removed and ship
rigged to oerry one large motcr landing oraft ( jlIAIEATSU) .
Ship's complamant was supplemented by 3 additional cien to
man landing boat.
5* During Jxily the I-l was In Aleutian waters on a
cruise whloh lasted about 50 days, during ifAiioh no U.S. ships
or planes were sighted.
6* September 10, 19(t.2 • departed Jooan tar Rabaul,
operating in Solomons area without incident until end of
October.
7* November 1, 1942 « returned to Trulc.
&, Novei±er 10, 19Ei-2 - departed for Japan.
9* November 20, 19i|.2 • azrired Japan, renal nlng there
until end of December.
10. Janxiary 3, 19(^3 • departed ICokosuka, Japan, for
Trulc In company with I>17* The liQSASHI and "^CAKATO were ob*
served at Trulc. The HAYATAXA left a day or two later,
11, January XO, 1943 * proceeded to Habaul (ship re-
painted; ei^lne trouble developed (clutch]}. Proceeded to
Guadalcanal.
12 • January 29, 19't'3*- 1*1 vms attadced and destroyed
Jan\xiry 29, 1943, vftiile transporting stores aid supplies to
Guadalcanal.
Technical^ Information;
1. The 1*1 carried 53 centimeter torpedoes - the speed
of which was estimated to be 50 knots. Air pressure was 200
kg. per SQ. cm.
2. The EATORI is powered vdth turbinss, main engines,
supplemented v«lth dlesel auxiliaries. Speed under dle£>el is
14 knots; dlesel and turbines combined Is 18 knots (carries
one plane ) ,
3. The 1-17 is equipped with a monoplane (silver color)
T*loh v4ien submerged Is housed Itorward of conning tower.
4. Class *'I" subt^rlnes carrying planes are the:
7, S, 9, 15, 17, 19, 21 ani 23 (planes were re-
cently removed as battle ^eax from the 1-5 and 1-6).
. 2 .
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 617
COHFIEEWgjq
5. "RO** subs, idilBh are smaller thux the "I" elasa^
do not carry plft&as.
6. Tba "I" class sulmarlaBB oarrylo^ ial<lg6t<<iMi^
narlnes aret
16, 18, 20, 22, 2^.
7« Tbe MDSASHI aid 7AMAT0 (BBs) are apparently tin
same size with 3 turrets of 3 guos eaoh believed to be y^Tf
large*
8» Tbe t«l required about one minute and 30 second ■
to submerge oonq^lstely and did not change course vAiile sub*
merging.
Miscellaneous;
!• Submarine sinkinss developed were on the approzi*
mate dates as follows:
1.63 • prior to Deeeidaer 7» 1941*
1*124 • January, 19<^2.
1*123 - September, 1942.
1-15 - October, 1942.
1*4 * about December 15, 1942.
1*3 * Deoenbor 15* 1942.
2*28 • no date.
Z-1 * Jamary 29, 1943.
2. Temperature rises to 40^ centigrade aboard larger
subs.
3. The following submarine divisions (SEIISUITAJ) are
reputed to be based at Tokosuka:
1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7» 8, and 9.
4* ?our submarines are reported to be under con*
struotion at Yokosuka (interval of construction 3 to 4
months, output * 1 sub per month). No information on
rate of produotion at other yards could be given by POW.
5. Air attack alarms used at Rabaul are:
(a) Siren (Suring day.
(b) Red rockets at night.
- 3 -
618 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
6. An airfield is knov«Q to be on Truk ( Island ct
TAKESnU-lA.) . Service personnel at TruJc is principally
navy (5,000), practically no army. Recreational facilities
are provided.
7« Tbere is a base hospital at Txuk, possibly on
NATSU ISLAND.
8* Following Qonsaents wore also made by POW:
(a) V/bile in Rabaul (January. 19i»3). be did
not get ashore much. However, sake was to be had
aboard.
(b) Believed sub sinkings in general prinol«
pally eausod by depth oharges*
(o) Preference of daty is aboard "I" olass of
aibs* However, has had no experience with "SO** olaeSi
(d) Doesn't consider submarines are partiou-
larly good protection against ensmy subimrlnBS (how*
ever, PO'J has never encountered eneniy subtoarlnes).
9* POTf had heard that HOSEO (CV) was sunk and saw
the SSOKAEd under repair at Yokosuka in December.
10. Repair capacities at Rabaul are limited to th«
faoilitjes carried on the one repair ship stationed there.
- 4 -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 619
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON
SOURCE DOCUMUJIT #11
(iNTHRROGATrCN CF JAPANESE PRISONER OF WAR
ITHO PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
AS A mmm of the cre^.t cf the (cv) kaga)
ENTITLED
"PRISONER OF WAR YOKOTA, SHIGEKI"
USED BI THE NAVY IN COICPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PFJRL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages U32-ii60)
(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATICN
OF THE ATTACK (1^ PEARL HARBOR)
620 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
621
622 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
623
79716 O— 46 — pt. 13-
-17
624 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
•a5 Hi'rOf:;-P'^o
He knew no
i .J ,.ith that of
;.",at he 6^ A nr-" knoi
-■> ^ <•■
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
625
scrub, not higher itan ,':: or 3 1 ■■;t, an-j nc tre-. a could b« seen. Gr:
-■- • "-'■ •••''■>. snow, but' thiirt; wfes nc ice in lay or a9h(3*(::, R} saw :,;. .,: i.,--
Ivcrs cr si«a-aps. thf coastal ar-ia appeared to fcs imlrthabitiad-taKept
■ n «ho Itvua in 3 houses near pier. It was, 'howe-ser, 'impossiblii to
.3: - details of a^ntre or North-Ea&tcnr; side of bay from KhGA, and view fcv-yond
p.i.,r WJ53 obscurt,!;! bj* law iiills srid ari v-ateantet.nt.
■ PH est! ■' of I
(.ntrance and opp. t-a ix
rock close, inshor ...-,„■ . ^.tiira o:
but h.: did not kjaoii e»tct depth.
.;y to bu 6,0C0 actres {>jid diatartoe btstwctn
2,000 s-t-trti. Hii thought thore w!*a ?. large
■—", **"- — "•i'^&par than aost harbcws",
~itor right up to foreshore*
Wind isms ftaa Korth-,Vcst ,
fii''! Pic.r tnd Vicinitv. There
' rn hica of bay. It was coristructed of concrete and stones, about 15
■• .; lor:g, L :i..tr«,g wid^. , 2 to 3 metres high, aixi hsd stvps cut at the end,
: e.,i,jht wf;S 'iifiicult to j^*-5~ ' £ wvas v/t re fairly high alongside;.
; • -ves no crsne or struc-^' Dtpfch of writer at stops w.-;s aboat 5
r s, . Frf hni l-Rd-,d -it te ecci'sioti to burn rubbish, but wf.s not
lovred to ■ inmcdi" t vici-i:..'- . k -suit!! er<y ideal fishcrrfii.n.
■ wss lar'; h , l'!nd ,d.
- .. ij. . eiv to South of
aut CQoLd be- seen -from pier.
eibo-ut 1 JO (10 ft)"hi<^.
3ts (See:-; Sut-Soc (iv)).
•'■*, bat statesd ther.,,- w»s
626 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 627
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON
SOURCE DOCUMENT #12
(A NAVY STUDY OF JAPANESE ESPIONAGE IN HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
GONSISnWG CF
(A)
COlflii LETTER TO CNO SERIAL OOOli WITH ENCLOSURE lUl.T) SERIAL 23li
(B)
CINCPAC-CINCPOA LETTER TO CNO SERIAL 0O07U2
(C)
COIFIFTH FLEET LETTER TO COTIENCH US PACFLEET SERIAL 000179
(D)
COICEN HQ 5th PHIBCORPS LETTER TO COMFIFTH FLEET SERIAL 00037UB
with
ENCLOSURE HQ 5th MARINE DIVISION i;96 CIC DETACH, SASEBO, KYUSHU,
13 OCT li5, MEMO FOR THE AC OF S, G-2,
WITH ACCOJff'ANYING IvIAP AND SKETCH OF KAUI AND OAHU ISLANDS
SH057ING THE LOCAnONS OF ATTACKING JAPAITOSE
AIRCR/iFT CARRirRS, AIRPLANES AND SUBIJARINES)
ENTITLED
"PRE-WAR ESPIONAGE IN THE HAWAIIAN ISUNDS,
REPORT at] PRE-WAR HONOLULU COTiERCIAL BROADCASTS CONTAINING
CODED INFORJXATION FOR THE. JAPANESE FLEET"
USED BY IHE NAVY IN COMPILDIG THE
"NAVY SUMtiARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FCR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages U32-U60)
(EXTE^DED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRFSSIONAL INVESTIGATI Cl[
OF IHE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBCR)
628 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Serial
TOP SECRET
23
0004 J . c.irr
CO^-.T3CI.
NO
tLss:^...
14TH NAVAL DISTRICT
OFFICE OF COMMANDANT
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California
10 November, 1945.
3rd ENDORSEMENT on HQ VPhibCorps
Top Secret Ltr. 091/130, Serial
000374B dated 14 October 1945.
Fran: Commandant FOURTEENTH Naval District.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Svibject: Pre-War Espionage in Hawaiian Islands.
Biclosure: (A) Top Secret Memo for DIO I4ND from Lt. R.H.
Peterson, USNR, dated 7 Nov. 1945, Subject:
Pre-Wair Honolxilu Commercial Broadcasts Contain-
ing Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet;
Report of.
1.
Foirnarded.
2, ihclosure (A) is submitted in accordance with paragraph two
of second endorsement on basic letter.
S.A. TAFFDIDER.-
Copy to:
Com 5th Fit (3rd Ehd. & Qicl (A).
ComGenVPhibCorps (3rd Ehd. & Bicl (A) .
CinCPac/POA (3rd Ehd. & End (A).
>) Rooin205S fM
<•• • ' ; ' -
— im^t
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
629
avrULi 0004
TOP SEGKB
10 lbT«ab«r, 1945.
3yi E3B)0RSm«lff on HQ TPhlbCoxpa
Top SMrai Lfcr. 091/130, Serial
OOOyjkB <Ut«d U Ootebar 1945.
FNat OommaridMit FOURTEENrH Naral Dlstilot.
Tot Chief of Vacnl Operations.
Subject I Pre-war Eepiona^ in HaMdlan lalands.
&ioloeurei (A) Top Seeret Uano for DIO 14ND from Lt. R.H.
Peterson, USNS, dated 7 Nor. 1945, Subject i
Pre-war Honolulu CoMwroial Broadeasts Contain-
ing Ceded Ihfonution for the J^>enese Fleet)
Report of.
1.
Fenwrded*
2. Bieloaure (A) is stitnitted in aeoordenee with paragraph two
of aeoond endorsement on basis letter.
S.A. TAFPINDBK.
Copy tot
Coa 9th Fit (3rd Old. k Ehol (A).
CooGenVPhibCorps (3rd Ehd. ft lihol (A) .
ClnCPao/POA (3rd fod. 6 E^cl (A).
3^fl[i!I)2l)5fi
'*^L.
-^¥
/f^
630 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Coiirtt-r-:-. ^Jovcl D.-itr.:l
6th Moor. Young Hatol,
Honolulu, liiwoii
tmiai t94 Top secret "»/«»•
T9r fig KIT
▼ ■oTMWr It4t
NBtO rORt Tta« Diftrist Zllt«llii«nM Offi«M>.
•abj««t t yr«->ilKr Honolvlu Oa«i«r«ial BroaA«*«tt Oantaialac
Ood«A Znfonuttioa for th« J«|Ma«i« nttt; Rsyort
of.
ftoforoaoo} (a) BQ. fifth Marino Oinoion, 40eth OZO Oote^Mont
T0> SURET Moaoraadua f or tho A0 of S, O-t,
datod IS Oot. IMS. ovbjoott rro-«br toioMgo
la tho lavallaa Ifiandi.
1. Roforoaoo (a) dlooloooo that Yoohlo tilXOA Lt.Ooadr.. UN,
arlator who yartiolpatod la tho Japaaooo attaox on Foarl HarlMr
on 7 Doooabor 19CL, aado tho followlac otatoaonto, la oubotaaoo.
oa 9 Ootebor 104S to Rebort M. Talt, SpoolaX Aeont, CIO, at
Oaura, Kyuoha, Jayaai
(a) That ho bollOToA ^oito itroaf^ that Inforaatloa
ooBOoralag all aoToaonte of ohlpo Into and oat of
Foarl Harbor aao traaoalttod to tho floot throagh
oodod aoooagoo broadoaat oror a Roaolala ooaaoroial
broadoaotlac otatlon}
(b) fhat, la hla oplnloa, tho oodof wtro aanjr and Tarlod
bat that If, for oxMplo. It «aa broadoaot that tho
•oraan attaoho loot oao dog, it aight aoan that a
oarrlor loft Foarl Harbor, and that if, for anothor
osaaplo, tho Oonua attaoho van tod a oook or a
heaaobogrf It ali^t aoan that a battloohlir or oruloor
had ontorod tho harbor)
(o) That tho (forogelag) inforaatloa had boon glTon to
hU br Lt.Ooadr. mfoham MURATA, IJM, Ohlof of tho
Air iqaadron aboard tho flagohip AKAiSI, on tholr
rotam to Jayanj
(d) That tho (forogolng) laforaatien aao oonTojrod on
radio prograao Jaot folloaing tho novo broadoaot
ahl^ (SnOA otatod) aoro at 06S0, ItOO, 1900;
(o) That tho tlao foUovlBff tho 1000 broadoaot aao
frobablr aood, olnoo tho Japaaooo afoato voald thMi
ha^o had an oyportaaity to oonToy Inforaatloa ooo-
.'^-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
631
14KD/AS-2
8«rlal 294
TOP
v^r
TO? agCRKT
0ubjeet: Pr«-War Honolulu Co«n«rol«l Broftdeasts Containing
Ood«d Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.
oeming a whole day's aotlTltlee;
(f) That, on the first Saturday the fores vas st sea,
reports vers reoelTsd that there were onlj one or
two oarriirs in Pearl Harbor;
(g) That, on 6 Oeoeaber 1041, sonetime between 2000
and ZIOO (Hawaiian time) news oame to him regarding
nuabers of ships in Pearl Harbor;
other
(h) That he eould offer no ^eads oonec.' ..r«£ the espio-
nage conducted for the attack than that of the
Honolulu Broadcasting Station;
(1) That, on 6 December 1941, the force was 800 ailes
dus north of Hawaii, end that they then reoeired,
fron the Japanese Havjr Departaent, a wirelee>s
message "Oliab Mt. Niitaka", which was the signal
for the attack.
2. On 90 October 1946, rsi .Honolulu and 0-2(010} Honolulu
were furnished one copy each of reference (a) by the Acting
District Intelligence Officer, 14KD. PBI-flonol^iu, Q.2(CID)
Honolwlv) and Dip-14MP cowduated oheok s of their respective
files with negative results in locating trsJiseriptlons,
continuity scFijlits, or outlines af prograsa lAiioh had eaanated
froa stations t(BfB and KOU for the period of 27 November
throu^ 6 Deoenber 1941.
9. On 91 October and 1 November, 1946, reporting officer
interviewed J. Hoirard WomiAL, i^anager of Station KGMB,
Honolulu, }Aio stated substantially as follows after checking
the files and transcription library of tOHBi
There are no pre-war transcriptions, continuity scripts,
or station logs for news, want-ads, or other local
prograns. Including those which were given in the
Japanese language, in our files or library. Transcriptions
of the Jaoanese orograas were made for many weeks orior
to the mir rl^t up to 7 December 1941. All of these,
with the exception of those for about 1 through 6 Decea-
ber, were cleaned out of our files and destroyed about
tvo years ago following a discussion I had with sither
the Army Intelligence or the FBI. I recall that it was
- 2 •
632 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
»«rial 254 ^ ^ ■■'— -
8abj0Ot: Pr«-Har Honolulu Commcreiid Broadeaats Containing
Ood«d InfomatlMi for th« Japanese fle«t; Report of.
oon««4ed, I think bjr th« fBX, t^iat th«r« vas no reason
yA)j «M ahottld eontinue to keep old mtterial in oar
librury vtwn ve noedod the epaoe mo bedly. All of that
■aterlal uhioh tho krmj wanted had be«i picked up, end
the portion that was left, eoneieting of transorlptione
of the Japanese programs, had been censored before it
went out over the air. To my knowledge there was nerer
anj eorreep<«denoe on the subjeet of cleaning out our
files. )ta have kept no station logs oror two years old;
the rCC rehires that we keep loge about two years before
destroying thea.
The transcriptions of Japans ss jprograas for about 1
tlurott^ 6 "nnRrffbAy IS-II ^Nim turned brer lib ^Jor Henry
G. Ptt^asi of Ansy Intelligence a short i^ile plter the
war started. I recall that Hugh Lyttel (phonetic) and
(fnu7ll1»rlght (phonetic) of Amy Intelligence were
frequently up here early in the war assisting or working
with Major Putnam.
Oeorge FUJITA (George Maauso fUJITA) was in charge of the
Japaneee prograas and HATASniOA (Akiyoshi HaYhSHII^a) went
over the transcriptions prior to their being put on the
air to make sure they contained nothing subversive or
objectionable. HA3fA8HIQA was reooaraended to ue by Mr.
Shivers of FBI as being entirely responsible and trust-
worthy. Material gathered for the Japanese prograa as
well AS the Want-Ads prograa had no direot connection with
newspaper ads; ada which went out over the radio could
have appeared in the newspapers although radio. time was
bought separately froa newspaper space.
Our librarian prior to and during the early part of the
war was Alan LiasER, in ay opinion sntirely reliable,
trustworthy and loyal. LI33SH if presently working in
8an Francisco for station KTRC and would orobably recall
the details of what we had 'and didn't have in the library
during that period.
As a rule, no transcriptions were made of local news or
Want-Ads prograas; such broadcasts were prepared in note
or continuity foni and given direot to the 'aike" by the
• S -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 633
14ND/A8-2
Serial «34
T ft f ^ ^ c Rs y
Subject: Ifm-Tilfkr Honolulu Cosm«reial Bro«deaat* Containing
Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; R«poz»t of«
— ..•...._--.-«..-.._-->-•-.- "'"
annotuieer.
Our Hllo station, KHBC, vas under a similar arranseneBt
vlth reepeet to prograns glren In Japanese. A young
VKKi^R, Miss Kazuho nZGUCIu, an Aiserlean eltlten of
Japanese anoestry, euperrlsed and oensorvd all suoh
progrABs before they went out 0T»r the air; ahe waa
also reconmended to us by Mr. Shivers.
4. On 31 Ootober 1946, reporting officer IntenrlewBd N. A«
MULflbMY, Manager of Station KOU, Honolulu, who atatad tub-
stantlally as follovs after checking his fllea:
I i^tLP"*** ^*^* "* flft not have -tteR_iBontlmilty seripts
or prograi mitllnaa y<Ht *re_loo>lag foir. ~Be~lrM-
•oriptlon£ were iR&t„£f. j|roj?*aas glTvn In Japanese
during the pre->1ffar jpfrisd. He did aaKi~up continuity
aori:ptf for Ihoae programs during that period. Copies
of these serlots were furnished to DZ0-14MD, fRI-Honolalu,
and Amy Intelligence; the copies were translated and
sent back, with cownents, before the prograas went oa
the air. As I recall, all of the scripts In our files
were picked up shortly after ths war started by Aray
Intelllgenoe. Z have the idea that soae were sent to
tfashlngton: none were ever returned to XGU. I don't
recall what person or persons picked up the scripts.
Up until several aonths before the war, rURUKAUfA
(5hlgeo rUKUKAVA) was In charge of the Japanese Sunday
prograa; he was dishonest In his dealings with KOU.
After he left this work, GOTO (Richard Hlsashl GOTO)
was m charge; Jack NAVAIANI (Jack Iwasaburo NANAZaNI)
did the announcing on week days. Material gathered
for the Japanese Sunday prograa case froa subecrlbers
contacted by FUHUKAMA and OOTO; the aaterlal didn't
come fron the newspapers, few. If any, of the prograaa
originating locally, including news and Want-Ads, were
transeribed before being put on the air. NAMATAMI
gathered aaterlal for the dally pregraae.
- 4 -
634 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
14III)/Ae-2 . ^^T^ ^^^^^^
Mrial 8S4 i CV "^ / "^ ET
TO? 3K0REt
Subject t Pre-vfar Honolulu CoBmcreial Broadoasta Containing
Coded Infontatlon for the Japanese rieet; Report of.
0. On 31 October 1946, reporting officer Interrleved L. R.
PAMBON, Superrlaor of Federal CoBnunieationa Coi^ieeion,
Honolulu, \iho stated substantially as follows:
rgQjade no tranijsrlptlons of prograas originating fr<Mi
HonoltuuPEnraadeasting stations prior to the var, exoept
for the period of one week in July, 1941. At that tiae,
looal prograas given in foreign languagee over KOMfl and
K(W were traneoribed at the speelfio request of fCC in
Washington and were forwarded to Washington without
being translated loealljr.
Coanercial broadcasting stations are required to keep
station logs for one year before destroying thea.
Amateur radio stations continued epex^ting right up to
7 Deeeaber 1941. Czoept for speoifio oases iriiich were
Oheoked \3f our aonitors, there were no records or tran-
seriptions laade of aaateurs' transaissions in T.H.
Tn'mix reports of speoifio eases oheoked by our aonitors
ware forwarded long ago to FCC m Vashington.
6. On 1 HoTsaber 1945, reporting officer interriewad Lt.Oel.
WUson 0A0DI9 kOS, Pttbile Relations Office, 02, Port fthafter,
Oatea, aho stated substantially as follows;
Z worked very closely with Major Henry C. Putnaa In the
Public Relations Office, 02, in the early part of the
aar. X do not recall that Major Putnaa STor picked up
transcriptions of any Japanese prograas froa kQHS follow^
lag the war. If he had, they would probably be in the
files here or at a-3(CIU) Honolulu. Z feel certain that
be has none of the transcript ions or continuity scripts
with hia at the present tiae.
After cheaklBg thoroughly In the files here, Z ean state
that no su<^ transcrintions or continuity seripts are here.
Major Putnaa' e present aitdress is Mid-Paolfie Liaison
Offioer. Bureau of Public Relations, War Departaent,
Washington 26, D. C. Major Putnaa will be baok at Port
niafter, Oaha, about 1 Deoeaber 1946.
- S -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
635
14NO/A0.2
Svrlal 234
TCP ,S^CRET
fOP aEOP. ET
8ttbj90tt
Pr«-Mur Hcmolulu Cowmtfrolal BroadMUits Oontalninc
Ood«d Information for th« Japan*** n**t} Report of.
7. On SI Oetob*r, 2 and 9 NoT*mb*r 1946, fll*a of th* HoboI«1«
Star-Bulletin, the Honolulu Advertiser, axtd the Arohivee of
Hawaii vere checlced for infor?Mition pertinent to oode aentionad
in reference (a). Nothing was found under Uant-Ade and other
toetione in either ne>f«T>ax>er for the T>eriod of 27 Movenber
through 6 Deoenber 1941 regarding the Oenaan attaoh* losing on*
dog or the Oeman attache wanting a eook or houseboj.
8. files of the ArchiTee of Hawaii, Konolulu, eh*ok*d on 3
Kovember 1945, dieelosed the following inforaation relative
to times of new*, want-ads, Japane*e isfrogrRms. and other progran*
inmedietely following on stations XQMl) and KQU for ft, 9, and
(aoheduled for) 7 Oeecnber 1941 >
j^^ - Friday. S Deegmber 1941? this sohedul* rcpressntatir*
of other week dajs:
0716 He%rs
0730 Wake Up and LIt*
0630 News
0036 Listen Ladies
0946 News and Vant-Ads Progran (Mrs. Nita BKKCDXOT)
1000 Around the Town Vith Gene Sawgrer
1215 News
ises stock Rotations
1246 Japanese Progran
1415 Columbia's Bohool of the Air (CBS)
1600 News
1605 Plantation Melodies
1736 Mews
1740 Show Parade
1930 Kews
1946 Joto Mesbit's Paasiog Par^kd*
2059 streaalined Headlines
eiOO Anos 'n* Andy
2126 News (CBS)
2130 Here's Morgan
2200 Kews
2215 Swing Koetume
- • -
636 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
t«rlal 234
T9f sfiP^
SECRET
Subject t frt^^lmr Honolulu C<Mvn«x>oial Broadeast* Containing
Coded Inforutlon for tb« Japancs* flaet; Raport of.
the foregoing except for the foil owl
ng:
sane at
1415 Saturday Neva (following Japanese Prograa)
14S0 football fiame Broadcast
1945 80th Oenturj Serenade
2130 South Aaerioan Vaj
0600 to 0830 - Japanese Prograa
0990 Newa
0946 aporte Reporter
1900 New*
1915 Charioteers
2200 Hews
2215 Serenade in the Kifi^t
iS3i r frlflaj. B flfQeia^wr ^flil; this schedule
representative for oth«r week days:
0600 Japanese CoBnaunltjr Prograa
0646 Easy Tunes and Toplos
0700 Shell Transradio News
0710 Persan's Footwear Parade
0800 Shoppers' Qulde
08X0 Sunshine Prograa (C. Dropaan & Go.)
0815 Bulletin Board
0630 Shoppe Serenade
0845 Waikiki on the Air
0950 Shell Transradio News
1000 Musio Sehool
1046 Japanese Prograa
1130 We The Abbotts
1215 Miell Transradio Mews
1226 Oddities in the News
1900 Shell Transradio News
1915 Parker ?aiiil7 (NBC)
2?.56 Shell Transradio News
2300 Ending 6987th Da7 of Broa4east
- ? -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
637
14ND/A8-2 ^
8«ri«i 234 Top s^cfet
yOP SEORST
Subject: Frc-War Honolulu Comcroial BroaAaaata Containing
Codad Information for the Japanaaa flaet; Raport of.
Sc)iedule for Saturday. 6 Deoeabar 1941. aaaw aa
forag^oing axoapt for tha following:
1000 Morning Matinae
1225 Interlude
1715 Beyond tha Nawa
1730 Ranoh Houae Roundup
1915 Band Concert froa A.& K. YWCA,
Schedule for Sunday. 7 Pacewber 1943.;
1300-1450 Japanese Prograit
1930 Shell Tranaradio lieira
1945 Red 3kelton 4 Ooapany
0. There la no record of tranacrlptiona or oontimii^ aeripta
of Japaneae and other nrograma broadoaat by atationa KHBO,
Hllo, Ha;reil» and KTOH, Llhue, Kauai, during the period of
87 Soveraber throui^h 6 Daceaber 1641 in the fllea of the three
Honolulu invdfftipativft agencies or at atationa KGMa and XCKi.
10, While files of DI0-l4JJi) do not contain tranacrlptiona,
continuity eoriota, or outlinea of prograaa of broadoaata on
lOMB and KGU for the period of 27 Hovember through 6 Deoenber
1941, there la oonaiderable highly clansified inforajation in
the filea pertinent to this general aubject, aa followa in
•ubatanoe:
(a) Japaneae programs on atationa K.0M3 and KOU during
the period of one to two weeka orior to 8 December
1941 wei*e monitored by Lt.Comdr, Yale Maxon, UaNR,
and Coadr. Denzel Carr, UiJNH, of i>I0-l4Wa. The
cryptic phrasea liatenad for by these officere
were never heard on Ka.4B or KWJ. Honitorinfr waa
accompli al-ied by liatening direct to the broadoaata;
no tranacrlptiona ware aade of eald broadoaata.
(b) One of the cryptic phraaea lietened for did appear
several times during the oourae of a Tokyo broadoaat
aone hours after tha attack on Pearl Harbor took
plao*. The cryptic phraae In queatlon eane 0T*r
. 8 -
638 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
•ISfi^ Top secret
y gf 119 BIPT
••bj««tt trm-'\ktr Kcmolulu Goanvrelfil Broadtacts Contalninc
Oedad laforaation for the Japanaaa riaet; Rapert of.
•tatian JZX profran {from Tokyo), at aoaa tlao
latar ttiaa 1141 8 Daeeabar 1041, Japan tlaa,
froquonay 9»39 koa.
(a) ror aaajr aoatlia prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor,
«p through 6 Deeanber 1941, Hagao KIT A, Japanaoa
OenaMl-Oonaral. Honolulu, kept the Japaaaec foreign
Offiae auppliet with detailed information ooaoemlng
■ovaaanta of U*8« NaTal Teaaela by seana of coded
. diapctahea eent throu^ bomterolal telegraph
•haaoiala. Of partleiuar note la the meaaage froa
IXTA to Tokyo via K.C.A., under date of 6 Daoaabar
194, idtloh glTea diapoaitlon of shlpa, ete., la
faarl Harbor as of the erenlng of S Deeeaber 1941.
(d) Barnard Julioa Otto KUS3», vith aliaeea, etpioaagc
agent, auteltted a plan to the Japanese Oonaalnta,
Honolulu, on or about 2 December 1941, InTolviag aeo
of a aoda on the KQKB Want -Ada aoming progran
(004ft), as followa:
(1) A Qiiaaaa rug, ete., for sale- spply Fost
Offiae Box 1476; indiaatea 3 or 6
(2) A seaplats tftiskaa fara for sale; indiaatas
4 or ?
(S) Beauty parlor opsrator vented ; indisataa
6 or 8.
Under date of 3 Daoenber 1941 (Honolulu tins), this
sinplifiad aode syaten wae transsltted by QTA to
the foreign Minister, Tokyo. A duplieate »ss«^:«
uns also nddreaaed to Chief of Third Soetion, Naval
Oenaral Stnff, signed rUJXI. Onder date of 9 I>ee«n«
bar 1941 (Japan tine), foreign Minieter TOOO tele-
gmpiMd ta KZTA that he wanted HTA to hold onto
the liat of aode words (presximably an older, ooapli-
eatad aode ayataa), inaludlng those intended for uss
on the radio broadoast, right \xp until the last
nlMitsi ftnrthar, that wton the "break" aame. KITA
- » -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 639
i4o/A0-t TOP S-.CRET
l«rUl W4
■tt^««ti 7n«itor llonol«lu OooMreial BroAdMata Ooataiaiac
Ood0d XnfonMition for the Japmmm n*«ti lto»«r% •t.
to fewa «lM codo iMoAlatoly ond wiro V0«0
tli*% ho hod 4«iio oo.
(•) FBI ogoiito ooiii«iotod an Imrootiffotion to dotor«iM
vbothor OF not thoro hod ho«n any odTortiooaonto
rogording tho Ohlnooo v«c, boaufr opormtor, or
otai^un fom, oto. evor radio otatlon KGMB Mmt-
Ado iwofmn ouboofttont to X Doooabor 1941; nmn^
p«por ano voro aloo tfieokod tor tho oaao laforaa-
titm. Hoeordo of tho KQKB ^taat-AAo aoming
progrwM (0S48} for tho porlod of 24 NoToaoor to
a Poooabor 1W41 wtro oxaMlnod. No Inforoatlon o«o
fowid. In tho radio prograBO or nowpaporo, rogard-
iag tho broftdoaot oodo oyotea in quootlon.
smssL
11. MafptiTa raoalto noro obtainod in looating ^panoorlptiono.
Eiauitr
oootinuiir oqrlpta» or wttinift jBt^JM^aMpaHULjidiijMUM§notod
froa^jgadlo •tatifHML.^P and tW for thfjwrJjA Of.^ Wo^oabor
thr^wigh fi noooaborlSgr-IBgwgfi^ftXThaa Jtot boon peooitto
to vorifir or rofiita atataMato pf Yoahia flHXOA, l.t.aoadr.,
XJX, ao ooatainod in ref or«BOo (a),
18. Japanooo laaguago prograao en KMB and KOU during tho
porlod of ono to too woeko prior to the attaek on Poarl Harbor
vert monitorod bgr IM0.14ND. Although tho purpooo of thlo
aenitoring aao to Hot on for oortaia phreooo ivhioh wtro not
hoard on KQM8 or KOU), it doofl not appoar likoly that aajr
phraooo rogarding the Oeraan attache voold hare been aioood
by tho I>ZO«.l<ti(D monitoro. Thor* vas a Oexvan Conoul in
Honolulu prior to T Doooabor 1641, but ao attache; in tho
OTont, howoTor, that tho ward "attaoho" iforo oorreotly aaod,
1310 iaplioatioa io that tho eoaooroial broadoaot oaanatod
froa Japan.
19. itMi jcotta ^^t«ftii« «ftwi%ng pa^p^m* tar 24 Nwroabor to
8 Deooigborlil^ -ooro ^hooiwr bf yM4toi>olaIu with aogatlve
rooolto in laaatiag-aay oodod ptaraaaa,iragardlJi£ j|,iSlf|no«o
. 10 -
79716 O — 46— pt. 13-
640 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
•«^«i ts4 TOP SECRET
T 9 f g t g Rl T
•tttoj««tt fr^^ytmr Xonololu Ooaai«r«lal llroad«a«ta Oontalnlag
Ood«d InfonMtion for the JaT>iinei« Fl««t; Il«i»«rt of,
ru£. ohl«k«n farm, or iNMuity p*rlor eporator. It app«*r»
onlikely that phrasoa regarding tho aeraan attaoba, hAd
thej appoarod on thla progx**!! during the parlod In quoatloa,
would have g-one unnotioad bjr the ai^enoy oonduetlng that
Inreatlgatlon.
14. It l^_polJttadout^toat th^
•ttoqaaefvC[ljn^!^S]JEyiC1Silan.a4 military InToroation to th«
Japanaae fo»i0iiJ3fflaa.up to and InoludJjQs th^ flth of
Daoenbar X94X.^ means of podtd diapatohea aent throu^^
o«B«areial telacraitliVj; chaanala.
Al6.
V \to I
\^tti
Inaaauoh aa dHI&A'a information waa reportedly giyan
him by another of fleer aboard the AKAGI following the
ttaokf ita aeeuraey la aubjeot to ao«e doubt.
16. The aoeuraojr of the atateaent of /, Howard WCHRJL,
manager of KQMB, regarding tranaeriptiona of Japanese prognuM
for about 1 through 6 Oeeeaber 1941 being turned over to
Major IHitnaa, la doubted in view of Lt.Col. Oaddia' atatwfUMit,
hia aeardh of the filea at Fort %after, and a>2(CID) Honolu-
lu' a aeareh of their filea.
R, H. PCTOISOU
Lieutenant, USNR
- U -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
641
A8-6
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
HEADQUARTERS OP TBE COMMANDER IN CBIEF
Serial!
OQ.':'
6 NOV .945
TOP SECRET
a4 MPPB^agas on
34 TPhltCorpa Top
Secret Ltr. 091/130,
Sar. 000374B dated
14 October 1945.
TQP g^C^gP
From:
To:
Tia:
Subject :
1.
Commander in Chief, U. S, F&cific 21eet
and Pacific Ocean Areas.
Chief of Baval Operations.
Commandant FOUKTEEXTTH IJIaral District.
Pre-Var Espionage in Hawaiian Islands.
Forwarded.
2. Comment is requested from Commandant FOUBTEMTE
Saval I>istriet concerning broadcasts related in basic correspon-
dence and on other material considered pertinent.
C. H. MoMORRIS
Chief of Staff
Copgr tot
Com 5th Fit (2nd End only)
ComOenTXMbCorps (2nd Zod only)
642 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
7Sif
COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE C0MHAND8K
A8-2(2)
Serialr U00179
FIRST ENDOBSEttaiT to
Hq. V PhibCorps Top
Secret Itr. 091/130,
ser. 0OO374B dated
1/+ October 1945.
From: Commander FIFTH Fleet.
To : Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
Subject: Pre-war Espionage in Hawaiian Islands.
1, Forwarded.
0^
24 OCT 1945
h\
^t O^c
Chief Of Staff,
'^ c-'t7r^pg»j»
1^1
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
643
091/130
Ser.000574B
HEADCiUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO
14 October, 1945.
The Commrnding G-eneral. ' — — *
The Commander, Fifth Fleet.
Pre-war Espionage In Hawaiian Islands.
(A) 2 copies subject publication.
TOP SECRET
From:
To :
Subject:
Enclosui'es:
1. The attfched progress report from the 49cth
Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment is forwarded in duplicate
for your information.
2. Additional progress reports of the subject
will be forwarded you as they become available ^o thi|s Headquarters.
'■•T.l'.^ .«.>>«
^>^ik" Sw,
NiMi^'AJi <dei
TOP SECRET
644 COXGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
, , 1
HEADQ,UARTERS ' ' '
FIFTH MARINE 'DIVISI ON
il96th CIC DETACHMQTT
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California
TOP SECHhT Sasebo, I^shu
13 October I945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE AC OF S, G-2t
SUBJECT I PRE-W^ ESPIONAGE IN HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
RE s Interview lulth YosMo SHIGA,
Lt Cmdr, IJN
On 9 October 1945? ti^s agent interviewed Yoshio SHIGA, Lt Cmdr, IJN,
at the lankiso Tea House, CJIDRA, I^oishu. Although difficult, this interview
was conducted without an interpreter as SHIGA speaks some English, Informant
is an aviator and participated in the Japanese attack on PEARL HARBOR on
7 December I94I, 'He lives at Itoyone, YAMAGUCHI CITY, Yamaguchi-Kfen, Honshu,
On about I5 October 1945t ^ is scheduled to fly a Japanese plane (escorted)
frcm CMDRA TO YOKCBUKA. Following this he plans to return to CM3RA, by train,
where he expects to be discharged from the Navy,
On about 1 April I94I, SHIGA said that he was directed to leave his
assignment as instructor of pilots at OITA and report to SASEBO, Upon arrival
he noted that the aircraft carrier "KAGA" was in port. Upon reporting' at the
base he was ordered, by Teigi YAM&DA, Captain of the "KAGA", to go to YOKDSUKA
with 23 other pilots and learn to fly "O's", From about 5 April until I9 April
.the group practiced fl;ydag these planes. On 20 April 1941 they went to SUSUKA,
Honshu, and received new "0" planes.
The group practiced with these planes until the last of April rtien
they were ordered to fly to KDNOYE, Kyushu, En-route SHIGA noted that the car-
rier "EAGA" was anchored off KAGCBHIMA CITl, Following their arrival at
IT3N0YE the group was ordered to practice landings aboard the "KAGA" as it
steamed in and out of the bay. They did this until about 1 July 1941«
About 1 July, the carriers AKAGI, SORYU, and HIRYtT arrived at SHIBCSHI
BAY, a short distance from where the KAGA was anchored. All of the pilots
from the carriers then went to KAGQSHII.IA CITS', In practice the carriers alter-
nated, three at SHIBCSHI BAY and one in EAGCSHIMA BAY. The fliers practiced
carrier landings and dog-fighting. Team work was the essential of this train-
ing period. Two planes fought three planes, then three against six, and then
six against nine. The objective of 9 against 18 was not reached, however.
TOP SECRET
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 645
TOi* SECRET
On about 8 August 1941? all of the carriers were ordered to YOKDBUKA.
On about 10 August, tiie carriers SQRYU and HIRYU were suddenly ordered to
SAIGON, Indo-China, SHIGA, along with the rest of the pilots, was ordered
aboard the HIHTO, The Japanese Army met no opposition at SAIGON. After the
carriers were there for about a week they left for Japan euid arrived at
SASEBO about 5 September l$kl.
After two or three days the two carriers were ordered to SAHEKI,
IJrushu, Upon arrival SHIGA noted the carriers SHOKAHJ and ZUIHVKIJ and the
battleship YAMATO were in the harbor. He stated that he then became suspic-
ious that "something big was going to happen". While there the pilots prac-
ticed navigation, dog-fighting, and carrier landings*
^ On 5. October 19i;l, a meeting was called of all officer pilots of the'~"jV (l
carriers, abcprd the AT^QI in SHTEUSHI BAY, by the Cldef of Staff of the I
carriers. Rear Admiral Rynosuke KDSAM. About 100 attended. They were told,/,)
very secretly, that on 8 December 19ijl (Japan Time), a Japanese Naval air / ;
force would stri!<E the American Fleet at HAV/AII. Grand Admiral of the Japan-i
ese Navy, Isoraku YAMAMCTO, also addressed the group saying that although
Japan never wanted to fight the United States they were forced to because thsy
would be defeated regardleaa, if the United States continued its aid to Chint
and its oil embargo. The U, S, fleet, he said, was Japan's strongest enemy,
so if they could strike it unexpectedly at HAWAII it would be two or three
months before it coiild manuever. By that time occupation of BORNEO, the
PHIIIIPIKES, SINGAPORE, JAVA, and SUMATRA would be complete, '<* -,
SHIGA stated that the consensus of the pilots following this startling
news was, that to get to HAWAII secretly, was impossible. Hence it was a
suicide attack. Also that it wo\ild be best for the Japanese Navy to fight the
Anerican Navy at sea without this attack. All of the carrier pilots were then
granted a 7 day leave. On their return they went to SAHEKI and again practiced
vmtil 17 November 191j.l« On that date the laOA, with 24 fighter planes, 36
torpedo planes, and 24 hell divers went to HITOKAPFU HARBOR. ,,
Upon arrival at HITCK&PFU HARBOR, SHIGA noted the carriers AKAGI , SORYU,
SHOGAKKD, ZUII^/lKU, battleships KONGO, HTEl, heavy cruisers KDKANO, IJUlWlk,
SU2UYA, plus one other, about I6 destroyers, and four or more large submarines
were in that port. He believed that these submarines had midget submarines
aboard. In the carrier force there were about 300 planes plus 9 seaplanes
aboard the battleships and cruisers.
Prior to departure for HASTAII SHIGA said that they were briefed that
PEARL HARBCR anchorages were:' battleships on the east side of FORD ISLAND,
carriers on the west side, destroyers were anchored in northeastern corner,
and heavy cruisers on the HICEAM FIELD side. They were -also told that the U, S,
TOP SECRET
646 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TO? SECRET
carriers trere usually around lAKAINA ROADS, MAUI, during vreek days fend entered
PEARL HARBCR on Saturdays, where they stayed until Mondsy morninesi SHIGA
said that Rear Admiral OiaiDA, Captain of the KAGA, visited the flagship AKAGI J^,|•
daily. Just Tg'y^f' t.o ^r."-fir+iiT*-r7r?in/i .tini ,^ him t.hpt, there were 6 carriers in ,•
Hawaiin waters, that the . SAa^JIOGA. was., on the U.S. west coast, ani that the ^
ZHTEHfffiS'S was two or three days out of Hawaiin vfaters, en- route /from the I
PHILlIPlHES. '
Subject believes the force left HITOKAPFtJ HfiRBCR betwen the 27 and
30 November and at cn.iising speed headed for HAYJAII. They knew, he said,
that U. S. air patrols went 800 miles south of DUTCH HARBOR and i 00 miles
north of MDWAY. Their course vjas right between the patrolled fjneas during
which time, he said, the weather was foggy. They were 800 miles tue north of
HAiVAII on 6 December* They then received, from the Japanese Navy Department,
a wireless message, "CII^3 MT. KIITAEA", (This information corresponds with
that received from a Japanese Navy Yeomen captvired during the SAJ FAN operation]
This was the signal for the attack and at 22j knots they sped sout hweird to with-
in 250 miles o'f GAHU. There the planes took off,
X SHfO* etntnri th^t b& -bolie^eA q^udio o<i3nongly'4;hat ini'ormation concern-/j^i
ing all movements of ships into and out of PEARL HARBCB was transmitted to the!
fleet through poded messages broadcast over a HCNOLULU Commercial Broadcastingj
Station, i^ifcwas certain'*that there was a Kav/aiin Nisei, who was a Japanese '
Naval Officer, aboard the flagship Al^I^^pJ^oae specific job was listening to
these broadcasts and decoding themi' SSSftA^ said "that in his opinion the codes
were many and varied but that if, for exam^jle, it was broadcast that the
German attache lost one dog, it might mean that a carrier left I^EARL HARBCR.
If the German attache wanted a cook or a houseboy, it might mean that a
battleship or cruiser had entered tlie harbor, ''
SHIGA said that this ini'ormation v/as given to him by Lt Cmdr MJRATA,
Ghigeharu, Chief pf the AiV Squadron at^^oard the fla£,sliipi AKAGI, on their re-
turn to .Tapan when SHIGA inquired of hita "who wa^ the heroic Iperson respon-
sible for getting 'the information concerning the ships In rEARL HAHBCR",
. "Tiinfi lin1in"n"-^1i--^ the information was conveyed on radio programs
just following tiie news broadcasts, which he stated were at 623O AM, 12 Noon,/
and 7 PM, He was prone to think that time following the 7 TV. broadcast was i
used cince the Japanese agents v/culd then have had an opport J.ty to convey __/
information concerning a whole day's activities, '•
On the first Saturday when the force was at sea, (which means it had j
to leave prior to 29 November), SHIGA said that tliey received Reports that I
there was only one or two carriers in PEARL HARBCR, Because o^ this the
pilots were disappointed.
TCP SECHE1
3 -
(^ y^ f^'^'^^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
647
TOT SECRET
SHIGA said that on 6 December 19W, some time between about £ and I
9 HI (Hawaiian Tine^ nevra filtered to him that ti:3re were no carriers in j
lEARL r:AR:-:CR, b»± that 8 battleships, and Ij cruissrs were in the harbor, |
No rerort was received concernint' destro^'ers, Th 3re was no set V7ay of his
receiving nevra of tliis type so it was impossible to determine at That tine
the AiaGI mieht have relayed it to the Captain of\-fhe KAGA.
At the briefing, prior to the operation, eich pilot was furnished
with a photograph of a map of PEARL HARBCR, The nemes of the ships in i
rEARL H/'fflBCT were not known and each pilot just laaae rough entries of '
courses and anchorage areas or missions.
Since it was felt that more could be gained if a person versed in
the technical phases of aviation interrogated SHIGA, he was turned over to
Lt W. H. 5EDRICK, S-2, Marine Air Group 22, stationed at OIvIDRA, to fully
deve3op the attack phase, A copy of his report, however, will be forward-
ed to this headquarters.
The rough sketch map concerning the attack, accompanying this re-
port, is preliminary, resulting from the first interview with SHIGA by this
agent.
Concerning the espionage conducted for the erttack, which is of
great interest to the CIC, SHIGA could offer no othdr leads than that of
the HCiroiUlU Broadcasting Station, He said that at/no time, to his know- l^
ledge, were visual land signals used from HA',7AII, j
The only person he could recall being alive from the AKAGI, who
had participated in the PEARL HARBOR attack, was its commanding officer.
Rear Admiral Rjmosuke KCBAKA, He is presently Chief Liaison Officer at
the KCWOra Naval Base,
This agent is p]?esently under orders and awaiting transportation
to EX3N0YE where he will interview KCSAEA in an effort to obtain additional
information.
TOP SECRET
,,^^-
648 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(There is a map accompanying the above report of ROBERT N. TAIT,
Special Agent, CIC, which portrays by rough sketch the islands
of Oahu and Kavii and the Kaioi Channel, and has noted thereon
information obtained ydth reference to the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor and other installations on 7 December 19iil as set
forth in the report. This map is reproduced as Item No. //
in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 649
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON
SOURCE DOCIJLIENT #13
(A NAVY STUDY)
ENTITLED
"SORnES BY SNElvff SUB-CARRIED FUllSS
and
SUB CARRIER IDENTIFICATION"
USED BY THE NA\T IN CO?iPILING THE
"NAVY Sm.{f.!ARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBCB"
(Record of Proceedings, pages U32-ii60).
(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN IHE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL IiWESTIGAncSNf
OF THE ATTACK a^ PEARL HARBOR)
650 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EJiEMY Lisas SORTIES BY» SUB-CARRIED PLANES ( <A^^^)
New information on the enemy's use of submarine-borne aircraft for
reconnaissance is furnished by a captured document (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No.
12,212), which lists a series of sorties covering nearly a year in time and
extending from ZANZIBAR east to OREGON.
During that period, the plane-carrying subs lost 24JJ of the aircraft
which took off—most of thea in landing and recovery accidents.
All sorties listed were flown from ten subs of the "I" class— the
1-7, 1-8, 1-9, I-IO, 1-19, 1-21, 1-25, 1-29, 1-30 and 1-31. A total of 38
sorties were flown bebtween 30 November 1941, and 11 November 1942. This was t
the most active period for enemy sub-borne aircraft. (Hence, no mention is
made of the Jap sub which reportedly reconnoltered PEARL HARBOR in October 1943.
Many of the subs employed have probably been lost during the past
two years. The only identifiable loss among the group listeo above, however,
is the 1-7, sunk at TWIN ROCKS, KISKA on 21 June 1943. This was confirmed
by salvage operations.
The first listed flight, flown eight days before the attack on PEARL
HARBOR, was a night sortie over SUVA BAY.- The document states succinctly
that the plane "did not return". Also noted are flights over PEARL HARBOR
on 17 December 1941, 5 Januarj' 1942, and 24 February 1942, and over the OREGON
coast on the nights of 9 and 29 August 1942.
-2-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
651
The complete listj
DATE Name of Sub
Place
Time
30 Nov.
•41
I-IO
17 Deo.
•41
1-7
5 Jan.
•41
1-19
7 Eeb.
•42
1-25
24 Feb.
•42
1-9
26 Feb.
•42
1-25
1 Mar.
•42
1-25
8 Mar.
•42
1-25
13 Mar.
•42
1-25
19 Mar.
•42
1-25
Not known
I-IO
7 May.
•42
1-30
8 May
•42
1-30
19 May
'42
1-30
19 May
•42
1-30
19 May
•42
1-21
23 May
•42
1-29
24 May
•42
1-21
25 May
•42
1-9
26 May
•42
1-9
27 May
•42
1-19
SUVA BAY Night
PEARL HARBOR Dawn
PEARL HARBOR Nifht
SYDNEY Dawn
PEARL HARBOR Night
MELBOURNE Dwm
HOi-iART Day
WELLINGTON Pre-dawn
AUCKLAND Pre-davm
SUVA Dawn
DABAN( Comment J There is a DABANU on
INOODLARK or VXSWk IS., between Eastern
Wn GUINEA and NEW GEORGIA IS.)
ADiiN Dawn
JIBOUTI Dawn
ZANZIBAR Dawn
DAR-ES-SALAAM Dawn
SUVA BAY Dawn
SYDNEY Dawn
AUCKLAND Dawn
KISKA, AI.rcHITKA
RISKA
"Vfhile making preparations for a nipht
flight on the Northern side of BOr.ORLOF
ISLAND (Comment, Probably BOGOSLOF IS. IN
the ALEUTIANS) an enemy destroyed wasreoognized
and we submerged, badly damaging our plane."
27 May
•42
1-25
KODIAK
Day
29 May
'42
1-21
SYDNEY
Dawn
30 May
•42
I-IO
DIEGO SUAREZ
Nipht
31 May
•42
I-IO
DIEGO SUAREZ
1 June
•42
I-IO
Plane search off coast of DIEGO
SUAREZ
Night
9 Aug.
•42)
1-25
OREGON (State)
Night
29 Aug.
•42)
Night
19 Aug.
•42
1-29
SEYCHELLES IS.(SEISEaU SHOTO)
Day
30 Aug.
'42
1-19
SUDEKO TO
13 Oct.
•42
1-7
ESPIRITU SANTO IS.
Dawn
19 Oct.
'42
1-19
NOUMEA
30 Oct.
•42
1-9
NOU^SA
BOWQ
2 Nov.
•42
1-8
EFATE IS.
"Moonlif:ht
from 0000
0030"
4 Nov.
•42
1-31
SUVA
0100
4 Nov.
•42
1-9
NOWffiA
Dawn
11 Nov.
•42
1-7
VANIKORO IS.
Dawn
11 Nov.
•42
1-21
NOUMEA
Dawn
1-9
ESPIRITU SANTO
Dusk
11 Nov.
•42
652 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Connnentj No mention was made in the document of the 1-17. Tfhen sunk off NEW
CALEDONIA in August 1943, prisoners from this sub claimed that it ha4 reconnoitered
west coast areas by plane in February 1942.
JAP CARRIER IDiJNTIFICATION
A recently captured order (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item Vo. 12, 253) pre-
sumed to have been issued by a Sq'jadron CO of the 121st Air Group, describes
identification markings which appear on flight decks of combatant carriers.
The captured order indicates that markings are to consist of either the
first '.wo or the first and last Kana syllables of the ships' names. The Kana
syllables "2U HO" were already noted in a photograph of the CVL 2UIH0, sunk
on 25 October (see "Weekly Intelligence, Vo. 1, No. 18).
The order states that large white Kana symbols are to appear on the
starboard side toward the stern. The first Kana is to be eight meters (26|-
feet) square, the second four meters square.
-4-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 653
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON
SOURCE DOCUMENT 0h
ENTITLED
"JAPANESE BATTLE LESSONS ON SUPPLY IN THE GREAIER EAST ASIA WAR
SUPPLY BATTLE LESSON NO. 1"
USED 3Y IHE NAVY IN COIfflLING THE
"NA^rr SUMIiJARY OF IHE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR'^
(Record of Proceedings, pages ii32-U60).
(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN IHE JOINT CONGRESSICNAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEAI^L HARBOR)
This is a translation parallel to the
translation stated in Source Dociunent
#15 post of the same captured Japanese
Document.
654 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
#10,678
SUPPLY BASES AND FUELING FLEET UNITS AT SEA
dated 10 June 1943, captured on SAVfAV.
EnTTGR'S KOTS
This document comprises extracts taken from an offlcied.
study of problems relating to supply conpllea 10 June
1943. Recommendations are included for the enlargement
of supply bases and depots at BAKO. UIKaWA V.'AN and KTiRE.
l<:xamples are cited showing the difficulties experienced
in fueling fleet units at sea during the first year and
a half of the war; recommendations call for the installation
of stern refeuling gear on all ships, an increase in the
rate of supply per hour, and the strengthening of hoses
used In fueling. It is stated that the maintenance of
supply lines calls for the construction of two naval
storeships of the IRAKO type. It is possible that keels
for IRAKO type ships were laid before their usefulness
as contemplated in this document was ■■gwtt¥ neutralized
by the Allied advance.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 655
#10,678
Military > Very S«or«t (OUNOOKUHI) Ooamltta* en Invest Igatlon of
Battle Leseons, Supply Section
(BUNKAKAI)
BATTI* LE3S0^S ON SUPPU IN TOE GREATER EAST ASIA WAR
SUPPIZ BATTLE IJB3S0N No. 1
Table 2^ Contecte
^^ Page
I. fcMiig»» Enlargement of Facilities at Supply Bases
II.
Fueling of Fleet Units at Sea.
m. Capacity, Performance, exii Number of Supply Ships
656 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1/ 'ill'.. .... : 10, hi 8
9P moniMi'wa pnei
I. anliirivnent oT >»cllltl-3 nt Supply Bsnaa, .
1. Th«r« has b*«n a suddwi incr«aa* in the operating •fficieney of
ngtn— h~-if'T, piers, and goTemnsnt buildinga being used by the TOKOSUKA NaTal
Dlctrlet in TOKOHOUA. (T0K03UXA Civil &igr Dept).
2. Facilities at Fuel Depot #3 mst be enlarged to penalt the aooring of
two or three 10,000 ton AKs. (3rd Fuel Depot).
3. Loading an)k su. ply facilities at BAKO nnut be ei^wnded. The capacity to
•apply fuel oil Bust be increased to 10,000 tons per 24 hours. (2ad FlAst).
4. Supply installations at UIKAIU KAN are insufficient and require enlarge-
Mot. (1st Fltat).
5. Tbs vuppljr <iuajr\of the KURE Replaeeaent Shop mat be enlarged. It is
frequently found too narrow for supply loading work and^^lay resawsx
(lltb Air Depot).
6. Planes coaf>leted at the lltb Air Depot are operating on flights and as
air transport after being transported by surface to the IK^EDNI Air Group; the
loss in labor and tlae required for this ia great. At least one runway of the
KURK Airfield aust be lengthened and widened. (11th Air Depot).
7. There ai^ bums roos iAptance s/i^mBT t be capacities of local Stores
Depart^nts have been insufficient nd %t6i^ ItHTMet the demands of operating
forces. It is essential to czpaddr installations and place experienced persons
in charge so as to keep on hand /arke aaounts of stores and insore a rapid supply.
(All depts concerned with naraiJ atorik^t
- 1 -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 657
6. In ontor to «zp«dlt« ■up(>lj' to th« varloua forc«8 In tb« farflung
eoabftt ar«««, ■md aluo In coiial<l«Wtion a such things as air r&lcU, It !• a
nccesasTT' to establish branch offl^«a of the local rtorea departmanta or
branch aupply depots with e«eh frooA line force. (All 3tor«a Dapla).
9> Bacauaa of Insufficient supply inatallaitloaa at local ^or«a ^partoents,
hssTy equipment such as DP guns and gerkeratore cannot be unladed, and aoiaa thijifs
cannot be Installed. The handling of torpedfoea and mines la also very difficult.
Not onljr la tbsc* * great possibility of damage to delicate equl potent but there
.are manj Instances when It la not suited to rapid suppljr. The Installatlonf of
plera, cr&nea, cranea on cargo lighters, and trucks la absolutely neceas&ry.
(All Stores Oepta).
10. Acceleration In fitting out Specially Establlahed Naval Stores Oepart-
asnts Is earnestly desired. Ths Ath Naval Stores Oepartioent legally Ig tact-
ically aaalgned to the 4tb Fleet; however, it has a gre^ deal of importance as
a front line supply base even for shlpa of the Coftbined Fleet. Thaz-efore It Is
necessaiy to attempt the speedy completion of Inatallations as already planned
and to equip them wlth'an eye toward our perslatentl|flrlve to the aouth. (2nd
Fleet).
11. At RABADL ther« liTN^ot a siogle aound pier installation, while great
labor la being expended entlr«lX^° loaxUng and unloading. No matter what
other sacrifices a»e made, ^^rt mus^sbe Installed Imawdlately. (lOSth Air Depot).
Conclualoo I^AaM^A^ In order that deficiency in supply Installations will have
no great effect oo naval operations. It Is necessary to determine at the central
/activity/ the urgency of actual conditions in all areas and to foivulate
renedlal measures.
- 2 -
658 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
/O, 6'/S
il» >Wi'lg
Viiri^'^rni-'''
ir. Kiiallnr of Y\ «t Units <(t 39i .
AT <C^— - — : -^
M Th«r« ^r* musj tlaas la operational Mit«r« wfaan fa*l oil e«nnot m
«ttppli*d ualoaa r«fu«liac tnm astom ia oaad.
^ Tha rata of oil raeaivatf bgr ahlpa par boor and tba rata of avppljr to
amll ahipa ffoa larga ahlpa ia inauffieitei. (All Shipa).
It ia naeaaaaiy in all eaaaa to incraaaa tha rata of rafaalinc to 300
■•trie tona par hoar. (BatQlT 3).
Tba maibar of tljMa rafuallad and raaulta during tba yaar alnea BatDlT
3 coanancad operational _
KONCX) HARUMA Arara/ta A«>unt
Froa AO (2 hoaaa aatam) 8 timm 5 tiiMa 160 » tona par hr
froa CD (froB alcogaida) 17 tlowa 22 tiffiaa 110 m tona per hr
The ZDIKAKU (CV) aiailarly- loaded at 160 Betrle tona per boor, taking
on 3^42 ■ tona frcM the HICKITO kARU in 12 boura. An ineraaae to 300 or iiOO
tona ia neeeaaarjr. (ZUIIAXD (CV)),
Conelxtaiop ffyHyb]^ It ia urgently neeeaaarx froa a allitarr ataadpolnt to
put into affect tha following aeaaurea for the auppljr of foal oil at aaat
1. The inatallatioas af atam refueling gear on all ahlpa.
2. A great increaaa in tha rata of auiqply per hoar in order to
abortao the total tiaa required.
-^x.
- 3 -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 659
/o,i7S
1. Uor* th«a t«n hoM« broira during iMrffT*r« on tb« UAIUII Opamtionjand
dorLnf th« INDIAN OCS&N Operation th* boaaa of aa oil tankar war* daMi«ad and
•upply «aa graatly dalajad. (CarDlT 2).
2. Loaaaa froa euttlag and laakaga during towing and rafnaling ar« likalj
to occur. Alao, aiaoo tba boaaa atratch about 10)(, tba part vbloh banda la
likaly to bacoaa conatrictad and graatljr radtica^ tha capaeitx for aupplylng oil.
Tba nonber of tijMi acoidanta happaaad to boaaa froa tba baglaniag of tha war up
to tha and of 1942 ia abown balowt ^BatDlT 3).
KONQO (BB) HlEOItt (BB)
Tlnsa Saaoutad Tlaaa Daaac*^ Tlaaa SsMutad Tiaaa DuMgad
Aatam fro. AO 8 9 (TN: aic) 5 3
Alongside fron
DD 17 3 22 1
3. If tba inndr aarfaca of tha boaa braaka, tha filtar ia likaly to gat
eloggad up. (KERTO UARU, ZUIBO (CVL)).
u^-^'^^^
U, If tha waak pointa of tha 12 Mtar callpphana (Su ^f ^^^ J^ boaa wara
iaproTad upon, it would ba aoitabla for uaa on uval y%»—\». Tan boaaa aigtat
ba aada standard aqulFMot for BBa, raducing «ha obabar of 4.5 aetar boaaa now
in uaa
bosas aoat ba aada toughar.
Concluaion (On4A<^ CaUophana 6(^ ^Ol^*^)
660 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
y. iMFROvaawT oi^gfapsylknxa/^iHiNERi^' nfHwGs and EqpiPMSwr
^ -J— -r — ^— *--^ orNauPEia: opbraiioh3
^
B*ttl» L«»>on
zuuu
1. It la a«c«*««r7 ^o install •qulp«»iit for rcfvMllng from aitam.
(AUshlpc).
2. In tha ease of tankars which auppljr fro* both si<l»s, if aupp^ cannot
be carriad oat froa both aidaa at tha aaaa ti«9> tha transfar of fuel cannot ba
inltiatad. Ii^provaaaota ara aacaaaarj So that aaparata alvpljring can ba carriad
out. (iKSBONO UARU, OasRon 4).
3. Thar* ara instancaa in iriiieh axtremraoua aattar baconaa misad with tha
oil whan rafualing ia baing carriad oat fro* tank era. Rafualiog apyad ia radiiead
aboot one-third and incoaranieaca in loading raaults. It ia necaasary to equip
tankars with changeable filters. (ISS (BB))
4. In riew of tha many inatancas in which hoses are burst «aa-U> /art raaa
praasure caused by faulty operation of the intake Talrea, it ia necaaaazy to
Inatall aquip»ent which will prevejit great pressure, such aa automatic cut-off
TalYes. (TOHOJiARD).
5. Oil intake fwnals should be installed on all fuel tanka. (MIOKO (CA)).
Conditions on the MTOKO
Mo of funnels No of auaciliary linaa So of tank connection Mo of tanks
froa each funnel ralrea f ran each lina
12 1 0 12 .
2 1 2 4
e 2 0 ,16
2 2 48
6 3 ° H
2 3 4 10
4 5 0 20
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 661
/^ 6/<f
6. TtM gr*«t langth of tb* &lr outlvt {dp* on fuel t«nks malcaa iMasMuy
th* •nlArgwMot of tb* pip* lin* to fAellltftt* th« ootlat of air.
UlUs* tbtr* la conddarabl* prtavur* on tha intaka ralva, loa4ia( la
lopoaalbla. (CHOKAI (CA)i, UTOKO (CA)}.
7> FtoB tba atAndpoint of rapid aupply, it ia naeaaaajy to radoea tba nonbar
of fnal tanks' and ijicraaaa tha Mpacltj. (CUOUI (CA)).
8. It ia naeaaaairy to plaea tba containera foV tha f ual intaka Talra, tba
Intake gauga pipa and tba hoa« in plAcaa eomraolant for loading operations.
(CHOKAI (CA)),
9. Nben the TUBARI (CL) is abotit half filled with oil, the upper t&nka
cannot be filled unleaa the batch ia raiaoTed and the hoae directly led in*
Since capacity fueling froa astam la 4Lff lenity and Inconraniant froai an
operational etandpolnt, it la naaaaaaiy to equip each tank with a sain Intake
pipe. Moreover, since funnel foaling of lower tanks requires tlDS, it is necessary
to conrert to pressure fueling. (TUBARI (CL)).
10. Often, large aauunts of oil collect in the tanker 'a hoses at the
tins of refueling and the result is delay in the work of connecting the hoae
(5 large bucketa of oil bare been collected froa one hose (about 0.3 ton)).
(HAllAKAZE (I»)).
11. By reaaon of the hindrance to rapid fueling occasioned by the length
of time required to drain (1.5 hours), it is necessary to increase ft*oa UO tons
to 80 tons the caftacity of the seAmter drainage ejector in the coapensitting oil
tank. (WAKIGUUO (OD)).
12. It is necessary to equip tankers with oil heating equipaent throughout^
In casa of low teoperatures, the effect on the speed of refueling is great.(BatDlv 3
662 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
/o, h/s: _ I
13. It is n«e«sMii7 to InatAll •qiilpa«nt ao tb*t oil mtq/ b« cuppllAd «t
Blfht. (ONTO UAiiU).
lit. It !• helpful If th« t«I«phoa« o«a b« u«*<l bgr both p«rtl«a *a a aMma
of cri—iin1 cation during r«fualiii< oparatlona. Per raaaooa of aacurltf, flara
■ignala ahould not be uaad dnriog rafualliig oparatlona at nlgbt. (EBTTO kARO).
15. It la nacaaaary to proTlcU aTlatlon gaa auppljr ahipa »lth auppljr boaaa
(about 50 ■). (CarUlY 4).
14. AXa anat b« flttad out with hatehaa and darrleka, and tha craws auat
ba wall Inatructad In thalr ua«. (llinaLayarDlT 18)
Soaatliwaj^ two bonrs ar« nacaaauy for the launching of large i»w<<<ng
bargee. There are eonrerted chartered Teasels whose batches are Inconrenlentlj
placed for loading and unloading. (108th Air Depot).
17. S CoDTerted AKs are inconvenient for supplying lubricating oil.
(NiaSHO UAEU).
Attention to ship*s e^aipnent is esaential.
T»tirrttt#iMaaa»anyYt«Tany]|
Conclusion ^4wTV^gblV I^ ^0 necessary to re-ezamine plans for the s^ply
faciUtiee of Tsssels so that supply capacities nay be Increased to the utaost.
\
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 663
^ — — ' ^1_!1I1_! ^0,^78 I
III. Ca^ioltjj_P»rfonn«noe, and Nuisber of Supply Ship*
'^ *Bg"^^^^^^"-n — Bi— ■ra^nnminrTrTn'nT mn o — mnnriMmr
signal flaca ^ vttleh Um tjp* of aupply ship oui>b rMofnlMd at a
glanea gn«t b« adoptad. AHd|iitloa ahlpa hav« baao alck^kaa Ua atorvahlpa. 7
,^<_ — (\^ BaytU Lafon ^fc^l^
It la naceaaazy to aqulp AXa with 40 ton darrlcks fora and aft to ouJca
possible the loading of lighters, large landing bargee and other haavjr objaeta.
(TOKOSUKA Regional Transportation Dapt).
Conclusion Llyt)/V^ It ia naeaaaarj to hara a large nnnbar of AXs which ar«
equipped with haayy dairlcka. .
2. It ia ganarally ^yh profitabla to nJi( a^U, high apya* ahipa ia
sooibara araaa. (Minal^arOiT 10, ato).
/
\
3. Vbao aecc^(liai7lxig a flaat, tba praaant apj^ of 15 knot* is dlffioultj
/ (V
a speed of 20 kp6ta ia naeaaaary for f uliy loaded oilNtankar. (OHTO MARO).
Condoai"" ,^*T)*t^V Good, fast ahipa auat be etaoaan as aapplj' ahipa to aeeoa^aaj
tba flaeU
-i
Battle Laaaoo \J^v^a .
1. ArMMot ia waak) it aust be strangtbaaad. (l(iQal4QrarDiT 18).
2. Cii— iiilcatiooa aquipaaot ia rery dafieiaat; it ia ineonraniant ia
diractii^ aaneurers. (2nd fleet),
3. It is naxaaaaiy to add 2 IC. (Hare at preaent ana 7.7)ao liO aad 7
riflaa). ^.paira of 12oa binoeulara are r^qoirad. (HaTe at praaant dea).
(KKKTD kARn>
664 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
■■■'■■■■- ! /£>,^7S
Ll
4. It la iM««M«i7 to inervAM rlflM bgr two OP gun* tod MB bjr it 12mt
or 2$M UQ«. (EURB Na^ Yard).
5. Thr«« 8ca binoflul*r«, ^ t«la aoont 11 hb UO, and DP gun at* r*qulr«4.
Still anothtr Mcoaduy frwqosney for radAo traniMlaaion la raqulraA. (NICHITO
lUSO).
6. Thar* ara ouaaroua Instaacaa «b«n raqulaltloned ahlpa ar« attaeaad froa
tha sida oppoalta tha gun. In rlaw of aetual elrcuaatancoa thay abould ba
•qulppad with ona gun forward and ona aft. Sballa auat b« Incraaaa^ froa 20 to
orar 50 rounda par gun, and dapth obargaa fron U to 6. (TOK03UKA Raglonal
Tranaportation Oapt).
ConclMJon {CAilk:^Bi^
1, In Tlaw of th« Act that thara ara oangr tlaaa whan aldll in lookout
and araslTa action drtandna tba fata of a ibip, it la profitabla to davalop
thaca eapabilltlaa to tba ntaoat.
2. Although Ai, ASK, and eoaunic^iooa aqaipnant hav* b*«n graatlj
Ineraaaad, wa ballara that tba praaant atandard la lnada<laata.
^^-^. — (y. Battle Laaaon \Bf»>tJ<U
In aplta of the fact that there hare been nuaeroua opportunitlaa for
oslng aoorerted airplane llgfatara, their nuabar has bean Inaufflelant, it haa
the Duaber of large laniting bargea. (11th Air Fleet).
Concluaioo p9f*^*hf)(^ Two eonrerted airplane ligbtera aust ba aaaignad each air
fleet and they auat be aqoippad with I* large landing bargee.
^ -J^ Battle Laaaon p^»al>g)^y^
1. Conditlona are each that aappljr of fuel and lubricating oil in local
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 665
arcM la lapoaaibl* \ak th« i«rp«l*«a aoppllad e«nn«t b« praparad for firing.
Thia la grftduAlljr balng ialMn ^w* of bjr tranafarrlng aaall aacninta froa tha
mppljc of othar ahlpa. SLiMa thia la a graat ftnoonranlanoa, It ■■si b« aada
peaaibla t« gat oil fr«a aaBHoltloa ahlpa or froa all tankara. (KimnA8A (CA))
2. Tha torpadoaa avppUad, onaa adjuatad, go aararal Montha vitboot
im1 nation and readjuataaat) thara tx* Mmjr that ara dafaatlro froa harlng
Wan In aak atoraga a long tlaa. If aa mrm to p*rtlclpata In an oparatloa
fm^tlUkx. liaMiataljr ^tar tha dallTar^ of thaaa torpadoaa, not onljr would wa
find thaa not eoa«}lataljr ra*4r f^i* flrtJig, bu «• would hara aoaa nnaaalneaa
ragardlng thalr acouraejr. (KHfUQAAA (CA)).
JonolaalQC {^Qf^^^t^J
1. rual oil and labrieating ell anat ba ineludad with torpadoaa auppliad
froa aaawiltien ahlpa. (Thia has baan dona).
2, Torpadoaa auppliad auat ba Inspectad at aultabla Intarrala and
Laparfaet ona raadjuatad.
i
Battla LaaaoD {Jl^faijj'^
At praaant, c»ndltions ara auch that with rrsrj poaaibla uaa of tha
KAHTTA (AF), and tha IRAXO (AT), auppl/ Is barel/ baing earriad IKi on.
It Is jToarad that in tha orant of an aecidant to thaaa, aupplj' llnaa
wcMxld ba throan Into diaordar and tha affact on laortLLa and on oparatlona
would ba great. Two nar*! etorashlpa of tha IRAKO typa mut b« conatrjctad \
and put into oparation iamadlatelT- /in ordar to euppljr fraah proTiaiona/.
(2nd riaat).
.1, A ♦. • •■_.,. •-.■ ■ • wv-l n o» . (,ir! 11-
jfr. .
*<
•. 1--
c. .,.
\„' n»
= „..
ll-o
.„„. >^ ....
fonclualon.
, Th"
rmm'ipr ^ n"
le ■...•■
..= . cc
"' .
666 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CINC(^ (.!,.<.: U., lur.) .:
^
l^A^
vt% MwilaM mm^mk tvt m iMg M iwMrtj 4«gr«* (OMften a)*
8. Oil iMrinra oMk k« ncLppad viik i«fri<«Mi«'« Mtf Uetm b« mm^1««
to aap^ frMk yravitloM at «•• «t tto mm ilM ttei i^i^r npfly •U-*
CburiMi).
i* k* Mppll«4 with fTMh provUlau M ito ■«» 41jh m4 plM* tl»i tlM^ •*•
Mppllad witk f«fil aU.
rw)
1^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 0(37
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON
SOURCE DOCmjlENT #15
^TITLFD
••JAPA>reS5 3ATTLE LESSOfJS ON SUPPLY IN THE aREATFlK EAST ASIA V^AR
SUPPLY BATTLE LESSON HO. 1"
UST^ BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SmCIARY OF THE JAPAJIESE PLAN FCR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBCR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages U32-U60),
(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CCNGPJSSIONAL INVESHGATIGN
CF TME ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)
This is a translation parallel to
the translation stated in SOURCE
DOCUMENT 0Jk supra of the same
captured Japanese Doc\unent.
668 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
669
iM»«r«)k and pftipm»X«'iaa t«^ti« }«iMNn«.
2.a»tt«8P» M* Wfti«r tfe4 Jt3Bit»4i«rM.«n oT
e-^tear f(Ql»-««««ltt««»| ,
Kattar* ©oaeemioBg e^jajpftejit relat»d t«
the Teoladjwtl Ds^it
Matt«r« eooceming (?<5piijwieat Te3ja.%M t«
Mattsr* concertjiag ahijis stor»s, <Jo^«
«fttt«r» ceaseoTBing tmlL fi-ftsh imtei- ais.
sM spoelal wsytiae tmppli.^
i»t*«HR«' o«»«rBi3Qg asdioAl «tareis
ItasB r«latSag to Ai«y «aii Ba^y trsiieporU
S^««hiffli«t^ SeJiool
J&mvu. S«na Ster«6
Sad H»v^ iir J^pot
iCSeSDM St«r»» Dw|!t
iOKi Stortse 0«i>t
ICSCBBWKA StoJWie &«
Offlc« I
C aM S School
lOKeSBKi CivU
(KSSCBmJBll)
p«rt«t4«Bi S*pt
Ge!Mml ««!*r?^ Ke.y---^ ' ■*
670 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
.st«ai%?«tot «f Sv^jtSa" %«ttU«Ei»
. f rittd^jpi *M %(fii&0tesi> tttm tj:^
<^ tCM G«Hid1M» ^3uiif!M»
ImmmM^ far jMemmmmI «ftS«i«nirr in ^im
f«Rr it i» •4113.. S«iBf5fi«rf«a*, tik«p«ffflf«, it ♦Hi. b« 'rm««i^dm& Itot «»«»(*
WK«i* mttar «t kual 1« t* «f f»«t » hp«»k Isl t&a BfP»»«it dimaelt iitattfcoa bj-
Ire. i%fmd'i»$.'^mi&'^ 9sp^S.9i:s^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
671
■3d l«glfftie« (Sf »si^t-
i m. 1feHWl*NWw|#l«)
4, Ite ;«i«»;,8i|ii ^mmm-m* «wa^3*»!
«)M> ImMm «f t«wMa« east
'( nMH^ m ikiii^
672 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
673
f '««#faNMMI8&^|Ki-S
#llflt %«^^ fat: #£^iMi)eiMi|ii««i ««.'
^I'TjIHfH"-; 'Jj^im. ^Ijlt^nit^^^^'-
674 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
C C}J«C!'*C-«l«Ci'®A
mtUimmm
^c«Hte4«ii;i.,<^^
'■mm Imm^^tmwm^mA^iemmb^
mSSm^ ':mmmmSm^mtiUm9^
wmm» mm ; ^^m» mm^ m» mm i$m m mm$
«f-HiiHlttWM
fc iiiHiini ml mm.
n U AmiMt^ mmmwa *i»
•ft Kitwaii £er lawMMipnirfe immwr
wmm mm Ur^Mmimamit mat mi\if«nMsmt
imm §m if|niii'<iwiij,litiii- m mmef m^'^ikast
m^4$tima. iaMm mi ■wumwiM^ mem ^mA
^a»M»Mwi ti» irtiiMw m* mmti>m wwt «— rVf
«»«MK ■ *- -«— IP -f ^- -rtTftny liijIHint
>lh«* Mia M toiAfiiiitp,
C HHaTiii'ifWii at )
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
675
iWfeilA fiattM^ ffiaiMilli i
Z&i^JS:
mtI- ftmmm* Umw»mitMm MNpMpte «•
i«iir «• eMtUlwi* «l» Miflgr aT
«i fM' ivUhmp tan iM»i«fe «f IKM «*»• .
fMMlif ■iHnttwi M awn m mx mmmh ■
mm%m3m teJMitei^ f/m<wt^ tm HmmmI
mm iMi g»gwgita ^iM mmfiSm^^ *m**^ i
•107 teff* • §mmmiUi»t MRNwt w «» alfiMl*
mat ISwmJmmi i«i«X«|iii * ms^mi, twtaM^
to 4mmA mmiOw m^.^tfrnimmm '
iM.>ilWi|iliii,;:'«ww> U atai Ite ppMbw»
«(t fWM* SMllto •lTtf1»4.
676 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Bi^tite Tititcn (H<i4M«. )
^oaftlnsion {Og&aXm )
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
«Mt 'y»»! exwMi^SK
At&m •«•» ..lUfc— J' <l«ftl»« iHtw vMmevm % i'-iOimirtvd «MRai««^» OMgiifliMt
iiMip.ai»ii' ta» not topt {Ntw, tii»ni;l)iM Imma , clMwif ImI: 4D «li«»t»' mA jeiimt*-
•ad «loeam!»i! AiUMd t« UMmmWKII «i^ : «t««««, «ai i«
: ite ««Mii4iflB or. SwratI a»a»)(>«l lKi«4 <*«»- ifiihwwt iiwi'>»iijiifm.jBPTt|»>iw
■ mtMlgrt tvmipt mai itmm»m U lOn
It in mm^simA m» iwx^ •Mmatl*! t«
' tjtte •l>«w«MStieia»4 el««t«lfl»d diim— lite | <
'; pabUiimA %. tte Istd eMwrnd 9feainr''Miil -
to tiemeatkrtAm or tte nui«*r xmgitriay msi
678 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
/Ohl^
Coacawlca (Opiaice)
Mct*rials cwrrlitf by •iwel&llv
\fore»a at tb» tlaa of th»lt 4«-
liafasd f«nwt «i tte %im Of tlwlr dafinrt- p«rttt*« far eoabat an** ar* ale
Battla UaaMM (Da
That* la reek tvt fortUtr naaarcti «a
tfea aatariala earriad by iLaiaUr avtab-
«>• for 6<al»at ai«a«* Dmb
tha eeMam of traaapotrtatlon. It
that avoB tfea iMdJbw af acaa^itfltaar at ia aaaantl]^ to llidi ttaav to the
fonrard anaa baa a«t bw» aa ^aixwtf aad aaoaaaary aialBtaa.
aban oim eaaaldam tha 14>«r laraZaad la
wlsaAlqc Is tiiaaa araaa, it m* ba zvocc-
■iaad tbat bayoMt nA faBciag -^ ' '
toli« o*t f o* tlMi f irat tSsM aoatlba kafst
at a nlBteBBi arad aant latar aa aai^Bdary
fooda. Tbarafon, It la aaaastlal t^ iadieata tha
tablaa atMaing i«c«latleB aMvnta of tetar-
iala iB ortor U, iadleato ataadarda fW tha
tlaa of dapartv* and for
( 4.U Storaa papta )
It ia raoocBisrd tbat it ia aaaastl^^ to
aicpadlta M|ttara by f e«nilatii« at eooa \
It la aaoaaaary to aaaad thone
aa^adlta aattara by f ennilatiaK at eooa \ parte of aeeountlBg r»giLUtio(i6
vagulatiofi^or aqaipaant aeoaoitlnK to aan- far •llltary atoiaa vhleh ux9 aat
torm to tba diaraeta|atlea af avlatia* aipliwallnihla M» aviation «qtilp«ent
aqolpaant, t* aia|)llfy tbalr arraaffapant
and fttiUar to elapllfy aqoiiaaiit raeorde.
{ nth Air Dapot )
and to alapHf^'aqolpaBnt racordc
zzHDanqponqpc . ^,
It ia aaoaaaarr to allalitata tba aaad
for obtaining tba lavy Miaiator'a approral
for tba trasafar of eiwii ona plaaa to aaotbar
ahip, ao that tbla oan ba ddia with tba
ivproval of tba CinC.
( lat «lr naat)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
It is ttecess-ry to elliBin?te
'or g«ttin|; the Havy
Minister's sppr
transfer of erea one plaii'
otJjer ship, so ttiat t]g>*S can be i^
Ame With the apgBitJval of the
3t Mr Fleet)
Mhlm spare parts are acarcs
as at present, J »« fcwlieve that
if t.hej- are ordared/^wdndtk,*!! as ' .
either asterl*! or. •quipmont, Uiv com-/
petlUcndHrtnwBwt ■this Tarlotis depots
nflll be- (sltsinated. ^roo'rer, XTj^f
i^ o«5«red -as rsatleiel it will not /
fc» n«c«ss*ry to transfer ii thsQjd*
good« facilitated. ' /
(nth JUr Oepct; /
Or-iers for aircl
, A -
ffltiaebe centrally controlled.
It sKust b« cl««riy;ii
WtX. 8«nt««« goods tiecisMiry for
all troop org-, nizations ii i«rtime
sre to ti» h«ndl8d as i»ril stores.
oStiwirfiac,
we balier^ th*t
»rtlcl«8 difficult te oitain or to
npiSit, o.ice lamped uj\i4sr rone h<sa4,
aJioulii b.e trestsd bo taat'th^
awy ls« delivered as b^cl« supplies
f'|^«|^jbaKl!rHlh} (fflilliaiT stores
' ■"*.£; taiElKIIt})fin<i, «ti«n n""'
ntft h^ndlijcig pf eantsen foods
Kt% ixOiMpmmtiilm to life in
^ 1» kXmsr* ttftiataiiMd nA so that.
MKiurity As not «adaag«r«d, and
a IniaiHing standard fory^ships osust b«
Mrtablishsd.
680 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
^ i^
■^■mm*'^
to t¥.m c«nt,e«os.
I Mll«r tH^ ar« Ukvjjr to .b* VrMtad
1 *
at rUm of ii«eart4^ too,, this i* »
cxJ»«^'U
iMtixxl I* to •«t4bXi«h a •iasX«|
swetl«R(ftiitk«Kt food* tMUon) i^
tb« -JtailtistaNw O^pft to iua^lM tt
•aceluwi'vcdy. lh«r« «r» -■- — — i--
I )M» glvan TiBtko obstaoXM ii «mh
; g«iW7 «ork for ■itm.iy.
; T«at«ti«« iilan* h&T« !
t tomura a stKodard for jji%6£.s, eats
u.£ eatitMB
j good* la 2nd n«ot #31-9
<2»i n»«t}
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
681
682 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
''i3j%*B«B 9^m)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
683
tefrtaOlatiasi* i«*?«3*«ft# ^UMsaM and " J
to <Kpti|>'|l «ltfe- «s :«gr« 4«wwfd «mr ]
I (31) at SKiMwi tli«r«:*» BOt^ * ^•iaift*
I «Ks^ |sl«r te!rt»ll»fei««,#sa.« frwife|l«l5©r
is b«d»i .
jtlraiy (» l(s&iS«f tut
«i)uL&«*tog, »® «»tt«sr ■»teat otbw •fteni'r I
fte«8 »r9 aad«, pi»r» ismt be tostiaiad J
iasas»4i.»t«Xy,
(l«th Mr S«p?t.)
m sA«w« mShwrninr r«fca3-n to JAPAJ?
for «fe«j»» the -Wpiy «f . «*tc«ift
«g«ilsMrnit* ;ilild^l|R»<5t» »8i be
. ©atfittsd with «q;«aii3wmtWd •b« >wae
I (,1st, nth, mA 4tJj Air fttsVaw*
C2) M'trOT alj/tfWi.iwnt th* ' feci
tloail^le'sMh that it i« lap^Saibl*
1 ^: ■
' to.renovat® |)»s««8 ei" to,:t«8li,iK"g9
ftsir pj-pply
or aedioai tjpss. im0m trm Mfm
is alsd difficult' and th«8 sqsraadsiasai-
aScrfaqfjWnct ttesre is ©»e*t aaxiitjr
over opftrati««al flit^t®, ,
^t 8w#i be "kept
loeal *i3? <|»J»*«'
g84 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
^^, -.r-*fS' aHtlelpated ttet
.rrangem«nts will be matie wbfreby
sufficient supivies in the .required
aaoant- van ali/sufaB^rin
submarine !&is4 Ailts
u'»'«" ¥*y»« 1-7} 1
VH
1 ^
S^'
j
^
ii
L..*
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
685
to intm»imi aiedical supplies f;
cr.nr^rt'^ h<>splfcal ships, 1 1 is
regrettably difficult to supply the
rsKjttlred aaoimt ta the req' irea
pariot ©f ti«8 tecsuse of ;h« aove-
watg sf both f?irtl«s MIW rt*»d,
'f'-r«»:5fter " Jargn ma^i 0' iedlea*
ais.triljutM t* Hai
masMxmx&m favspltals |r tfie most
■*"■' "'"i feaseSiSO as to bJ .able to
686 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
irtKUftit-ttfetBatt — tmSiOi HAH'fhx
Caui<t*i!«kX« Aff orU ar* 1
a»d« toBtrd local UXt-m^timui; in
forwtry and *«riealttti« (m{BjtMM^
} akdlek «n woridag io t
M^ «Lth frwh proirUloii* at t mJUi»,
Storaa uaiH iaaerat
i-xs'd.slacdag #120, batfa haw ,
tMUHW and {arodaeias ar«aa la '
tatwKe ttrltlA arwt sorth of
ubA tuerm ttiarttfor* r«J ia*o dif-
fiealUaa. |
Iter UMf^a: I
IB jm* »f laat yaar
Sjb< vapaal tiajISiiliftig'to tiM KSttjgO
ia tiM fonMr Hcltlak pa«—
oortit eaast of kojjmjsu).
It ia Dae«aaai7 to gat ] Bniasioo
fat
to 1a»m fraah ragatablaa lx< a tha
NiSSAA/,
M«MMV iuaa at i'AdAu aod
fraak provialooa aaaiawi^rl "- '■ — '
ansDl'T r
ara bartarad for ,
Ooncluaioo ^.upinion)
A eaatral agroMunt batween the
JUfBjrancl kvrj- t"- ' '
local s«lj^>sttffiei«kex in
provialacu^^ must ba a^a and X^ tha
local a«itiK%ltl»8 ouat ba aadaV-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
687
^it »A--AII e» this n\4e /TAHAKAN/
were to attsflipt 8«Ur-8uftio3©ncy,
ther« would not Vw ervoij^i^ fresh pro-
4^ the 1 ,, .
Yisiems^ tntat aree. Pwsh eseaf and
, ,,1»een v<!;'^tablss «8p<9Cis|lly raust b«
suppl*«d fr«B.»<5m« plaC'SJ like JAVA,
bwt at present a stor«iihip niakes
oiily one or t-wo trips ev4ry two
months from the 102Bd ^'a^ Store*
t)«pt'{30aUBAJA). 1^? Ji!(4to.«r of
storesliip* for local Stores' tJept;;*!?
; 3niEt be i:n.creased; at leaSt two or
For yvBT inforraation,! the aunovnts
aeed«a here- and the *«**> ^t self-
suTsply aee given in the following
b7 all 5ovt . sel|r-sup-
of f i'^es & pl^$
forces here \
(kg i»r day) ^,
tfoUl^
k grMt«i^attal)«r oKaierMbipa
la nMcl«d for
localljr rKUM i^roTicLaM .
fresh
fish
200,000 (5dajs
km \
3,200
3 mo
averase
start-
rresh
meet
160,000 (10<?a;is
1,030-
Hov
1943 '
•resh
600,000 54.5*
S,130
vege-
tables
Sapply for personnel of ■
hit- imvtis i
i» bhe Setttfe .Iduring .the fir fc phase 1
of the war totalling 10Q,D00|
■ - - ■ \
is •
iasufficieat with the storesli
\^''-
used at preaant.
,,
^2n<i Fleet)
688 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
689
^t^i^ -' — TS'wtg, to Tw, . — ,.,-,,,;„^^„
,3t?rrtists.*««ff*
:-?i8;t?«J.iiKit«d .storaje' space
to »«« J«|>ort*sfc pl*B«8 «ad tfe*^ wry
. i*«r^' iaall laiKlai cytit- sweS w
I •supply «lisij>» «B»t >»! fi»«a th» Joe ■
690 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
#/^^'#"/^
piui^ unoro ■»«»! r««{>iui» 5th
^'•^ . 1
(3) liM mrwmrAt of iMwpitAl ahip*
•r* )raz7 liaitwl; thv rtrslr go i«to
ar««a liiMur* mmOI endTt «r« op«r>t^.
H|»») MB* trip* «nc« «»•
twiise * «citii.h and thwtfare ti»ir Jij»di-
t
e«l 9mo«ra mutt \tm maM rvppeaui^L*
for th« mtp^plr ot aadletl wit«rlala
b«t»MM(i.»hlp8. (tAittV moSOKA 6th SHLf)
!lh«n chips sr« gotes to iM>«raaiirJ>«r«
hj tr^mftf^rrlng ma astch of tbotr
poasibX* to
MAreltjr of i»vim,
Sattlo L«*soa(H««aoa)
C^tDiT 3)
trtuaftf or b«t«
cXothinA prortalnu, e*nt««a goods
untj roiloi goo4«i *a4 ' '
wurtiiM kit«\aai*t bo'roguVtod «t
float.Hq ia ow^»r to lMRiro;»8»oot..-
noss and •ffieioifrey.
JRWHR OF SDPPi:
T SHIPS A-vfJ Tf^A^Sf^SfiT^-^r/j.A/
Signal flag* by which th« typo of sup-
ply ship cut b« rooegtklxod at a gX&ae* aast
bo adoirtod. JUmnltl^n ships bsro t>o«a
adstskod for storoships, sad thorohy ^por-
tunitios to load ai^pplio» haro lioon lost.
(OssRon 2)
(1) Higl>-fpo«i, 4SditM typo ships JBUst
i usod in 11,1 tuislBi' **■■*;-:.( 8MP«SMt}er.c.:<
(2) It is gonsarally rsry profitabl* to
Ins* saall, hlgh-«p*od ships in soothsm
lar«M. («■■** 18, otc.) , ^
Conelosioa (toinion)
Signal fla|8 i«leh i2»iU.«st«
the typ* of supp^ijr <ri)ip should b«
y'. •-'■.» -.
Mki*s4l- at «|^pro{Hriat« tinss.
Cosij fast ships sust bo ahoioc
a«9^^ ships to aooo^>w7
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
691
•p^*4f*
knot* i» iri>q>*4r<dj<» *
jfttUy lo«i«4 oil timk«. (iSESrO MAfiU)
rl'i /ir';i=i.'f-rtt is wA, It mst b«
strengthened. i^^HKHf. 18)
(2) CoBSBunioations e-iiif^sent is
,ww deficient; it ia inconvwa'
, (1) In tri«« of tb« f «ct that
ther« ar«^tlwi« i*«n •kill In
lookout aM (UrMl"* t^wwt <t*-
fciMfoLa* th» ir*t« of « »hip.
creased frois 20 to; o«8r 5iv t^^nds per
i-un, acd rl«peh charges; ffw 4 to b\
Dept) .• ■ , ,
f:ict that thera
srttJtBlties for
as V»as been the tiwaber of large
<ioirvsvte4.
TvfOAairpiane liphters imist b«
air fleet a:.d they
uust be aquiced wit;
landing barges.
'- (l)Conditions ars such that sappiy,:
o" fuel- and lubrleating oil in *«*-&««
the
ta .-impossible and, totTsedoe* supplied
cannot be prepared for firing.' this is
-,.ai,, !,i«<\c8a*e of by ti'&sis-
. (Tiiis has be«a don
, "(2) Torpedoes su^jplied ffisst
it, suit -bis ints
692 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sweral EXJBtts *itho«t «xaBa~
tf -s^e -^^jr* to p&r-
■■;■ lt»KJa!^'<i«li'«'ejry.ai' th«»© torpedoes,
fjot fissa«r iK>iiild w» find ti«^ «o^ cm*'
eletely mAij top tiTias, b«t Ictana^
r«g*rdi«g their
sjid imperfect ones readjusted.
,-..„,^-«'-
»s«v<,i*s»iJ.p oijw bs«.wi. o4» far ;*s KASKISA-
tr«r«*ms no gospifcalfsbip at mj^C,
3; a«re «« f«if aoppc rtoaitiss tfor
«syil:aA:ite«!,fa*»ieii&s« «« t% is difficult
1k> **feit to£>& bo^lUl i^ p. lor a atippli' ef
««<tt«&l aatertals, torpwiJ Boats and
of seyloasly wounded are ta be
■ -- -^ Aft«r bbtfi tte 131 W
1 The numbar of hospibtal
idps skst h^- increased knd the
* * 5 of th«*sick f-^ -
:.!aa|facilxtate(l.
eajsacity ifrhogpit.ai
sMm for Jkipplytag iaedic&l materi-
als wtat belincreased. j
gb lighters to 'c«;USs;d
to transfer rfetieats smst he '
Wi«i*d aboard hosfitsd ships.
v§t li,:5ht«rs w«ri borr»*«c
i'ar tr&iigportifsg casualties',
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
693
At pr«wnt wndltions ar« such that
with «v»ry po»slbl« ua* of the UAUItk
(AFj»nd th« mAKOvAF) 6ttj>ply i» barely
b«lag c»rri«d on.
It li feared thai in th» event of
an accident to th«se, sun'i;/ iirias
nfciu.d D « -throxn iato di.onj,*!- and
■ «ii'ect «ii KOT&le and on oners^tior-.:;
Ih« mit»b«r of. 9tor« ships for fi4sh
prorlsions must bs increased.
would be g*«a±.
iA'& tjnp*'
aust be constriici®.. and put into op8rat,4c
C-^eratio^.al isaneuverg inlremote pl8«_es
lest tftree oonths or more eii^ the rapid
I quaatitiss cf storage
goods to forward ar&'.s is ii^sosslble.
Moreotrer, storage facilities for r>ro-
visjons at forward supiuy 'bases are, poor
and craoditions are mch thati ai& forces
stationed in tJies© areas ary- JwawM-y sap-
pliad^ Also, becawj.e other eeuiosnc^ax.
aBasualtion, an* aUcellaneoas goods {-taviB
heen losaied ,indi»criiainatel^ on supply
ships of the Ti»ansportation De-jftTtraent
system wA tii© laoiveraents of these ships
have aot been tinder the direct super-
visioG of.the'Combiued Fleei, the stat-s
of transport fross JlF*.. Sas $e«n sucH thft
*b6 " ? I of first life
x^epid, large- scale supplsf ji*±p opsrafSi
ated iritb the'
,zfrsfl
possible^———" ^■,,,-j *
At least BO iiri>iiiiitinr.t ~ for storege
-revisions (tnclixiing cafiteen goods asid
694 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
fe»ttl« suppltee; nust be attjBChsd
to the Cr«*liloc! ¥}.<
^ lOwl^
(2) .:i#tank«ra isust fee •Cjuipjrtd
with refyig4r«tor» and thaa b« easbled
to supply f ra$h proMsioas at tb« saiw
.ti*e that they sapply oil. 2ad Fleet)
It *oaid t« «r«ll t9 ,'laa «#-
4uSU« mall crai't tueb *• «^Mr
to be «a|q?li»d «itfe fresh i>ro-
▼iaidfl-; »fc tb« MAS tin* lad
place that th«y «re euppli** wltfa
■AIR TEAJSKJST
B»ttle l*8son (Rsasoa.)
{!) Siace it is b«liw«d t3 ba rejry
profitabl* both in th« sapply end traa«f«r
of argentJ^ needed. sj«r« parti., K si^i
tWBBsjjssrt' plsnes shoald be d« i*il«d to all
air d»pot« for their excXasi«» use.
(lltti Mr Depot, i:. 3th Air D«pot)
(2) Fleets or Stores D«|(^ itiwper*
I . -
aMbmmO. ar«&s aaiBt be pi-ovid|d fcpMi«pi>rt.
pl&Tie* suid every effort njost jb© made to
proTide a rapid supply of hi^lj expand-
able light equlpsBent* •
RavRl >
O'OKOsaKA mm- Stores DepI)
(3) In -view of the great |aiaount ot aedi-
cal sup lies requtrint; eare Ija preservation^
and argent goods such as blo4d vaccine and
X-ray fil«. It ie necessary 1* »eet the de-
oand by Ijicraasing air facilities.
ItURK Navy Yard, Si»*»-^a«r|t" j gi^.r) 1
(4) Since it ijs difficulty to eupply
icllitles.
Cooclueion (Oplatoo)
trshspoptsition.
operational centers by eurfae^, aabulance
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
695
»«r«iaa dp«Mlfl«« ,•*«.;: o«t was j>«ti«sta
«aflgs8,-aBWs mt immiimnn^ mv^ steins fmm tm
l»Mrs <»f *a- oil umK^ nars^diuBaiBsd *«i
" • (2): &>»«• :fwi(p, 6«rt,tiii§"iuas XM^aMpg.
^toKUse tasiag ««|- r«fB»li;.g «•• Mksly -to
-,rcar, 4l*o,^ Binc« tha hotes stWftcih about
;,!!:*,«» part ti*tl«Si. beads tsMlcely is. be-
,«(i«ii mmiHeUA luad grM-tiy r»dac*« th«
c*p*«ity fox faj^jjjriat oU. %• aaafcsr of
ti»»s &c«i^«at8 fc«jPF«ae4 tf ;iBM*s fro* ths
b4i|;li»ila|: of %b>i: ma. up to j^' «adt ot I9i&
Viw*fro«
«<1 :«at«d
9(m etc) ' 5
696 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
697
c:i,cr„
QCr ■.: sur. .: 1 /OJ^l.r \
htgrn 30
V«ri«M irtwtlM i» tin* iW4 «n» k«li«
Pmm2mt.m{0^Mm)
«al iribrtlaa cf WU4Ma7 dor**
; Miitoi*4i4. I«*«n«b IMM «bri^
«l9rtliriite t* ^ tarn. «al ««»- -
1
MamlJK iil^Bl«eU«» la ]«driaK.
tattarlM Mri pMkjlag far 1|m fc««wti«
•f wOf 4lMtel«» ttMNMf pirii« «rwM-
fwrtetiait «» st«r«cc« DmhtW is «1m « gmd*
ml inprgwiiit ia Vuvan^ •qsiiaant. Tb»M
>r«il«M liMNad W stiriLUdiia pmm tiaw m>
£tii« MwaMMTr t« wit iq;> wigotmm nmtrtik
i taastmi Hmrmm ti^ }
2). tadiltgr is ]d# i» Iwrtt m«um,
•ad la 'Ohm* vmui, augr wowta mm^XUi
txm Ufa «r» WMHMiUa :4m rMCt^ad. It
»>•• «i1^«Kt wjriac thatltlw i*M«mtleB
jRf thMw it«Mi ia fibtn#BXt.
( IQlat IMl Bqpot^ixUUUI BtukA }
3)» Pry lOaU yhoUtyaiibia jiniiiiiiii fapa
payar .k^f ia atagraga 1^ taoraM saoaa for
tfanw. aeatlH Daaaaaa aafXdjr i^ aaaaot 1m
( l<mh iir D^pat >
i«]fit«rimtt«B la grMt: tea ta Qia aeaai-
aiaa Ja «h» araa. A« a iNMnat, tiia l|la»-
iaatad dlala of aaaaniig JaatxtMsta a«xr-
adaaaa tta iataraal aaitlMEBlaa «ad aoila
ara teakaa we Aaaacadi.
{ ifiettk iiy iH9«« f
698 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
BatU* Immb (Bmumb)
1). Dirf»etlT(i f«rt» «•
tlyfflOBd
CmmbUmUm (OpiBiw)
It i» iMHiwftlii U OM aid?* vilMs tlMt IQmb OlMMifi«
mwiiiite lAm m Imft i£ nm, <*» ww -
taB4]« Hm MM «f tk* «fE«MBt(i» inwiags, .
«e«e jwrtM «i«k IMW IAmI «3<uwifiMti«e ^
wa/btBf aad ylM*
i) aurt te xwtii»MMi
M IBBU ia *A* «rM «aA TCdOCI la
IMI tMdt* or* tanHwrnrrai trm m»
■JarthMT, it I* jMnmaiy faiiriMBag
■fti
•• tlMi a
pcrta «wll^ i» Wff «>r«>^*« that a
^Haaftlw «r yajbia will art rM«l». ^ (yoUo^'Jt^A '>'?'.»*:«$ J> y(
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
699
-v^- AJ47^
C«Me2iMd«i<0|«art««)
f«n>M 4«f«rt StoarM far
•«M«« tnit* la
^- " "- II 'n-' f "i 1 'Ti iiiiiiinimiiiiii ii iinj ii
fill. 9R areonwiiT or shits" hbus, mcajwea. rmnKs asd EOKBTianf
mm-im mjemim m swms (wmawm,
!)• It la BMMMOT t* iiWl&ll OqailMMttt It in BMMVMUT t« wtftrwaBii
far irafMUac firm mmtmm. {Oiom far «3m> at^fOy'lSt^tiM
< AH ildiMi } «f TMNH»la ao that nf^Sjr Mmd
2). £b tlw aam «r tokara abidi «QiI>27 aapwdttaa Mgr ^ ianwuad to
firaa both alAac, if supply eaaaot Im earrlad ttia wfeMMt.
aatt firaa bath «t4to« at th* a«M tdLM»« tba
tnaMftar «r AmO. woMt te IMMatad.
lapretwwita ura aataafaiy ao that aaistrata
tapplarf i>K aaa ba aarrla4 a«t,
( JUOSaCiO MSS, SatfoB I )
3). Ihaira ax* iaataaaaa ia libU^ aoctraik-
aow aattar baeaawa sixad with tlw eU tOM
rafnallag ia b^JnK aarriad oet trm %aaaum.
mat laaaanaBiaaaa la lairflng xvaoXta. It la
aaaaaaax7 to aqo^ taakaan with ^baataabla
( m(W)wm >
4}.Xa -*ia« «f tiia aaagr iaataasaa ia vbiah
H» heaaa ara bwrat <»a ta "
aaetraaw pwwvra aama4 by ftaaty «pairati«B
700 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
C!NC:'AC-C:i;CiOA He
«f the* lirtite -valvM, it in wmmmaef U
lastall <tBil|iwt. iriUA viU ivnmat fxmt
( lMittl0}
5). Oil iuMto ftMM2« UmbU Iw iairUUwt
( KranTceA) }
. CoiditiiBa «s tiw ICtOCp
l9* ttf I*, of andUUUoT Uma l«. «f t«k e«aB*ett«B B». aT tMks
taOMlii trm mA tmml mlw* firca Mwh Um
12 1 0 ?
6). Ite cnMt li^rtti or «b* air ontlat idpa
an f«Ml taaka aalo^a aaoaaaaty tba calaiva^
awnt of tlM pip* liB« to fMilltata tte oat.
latafair.
IhlMS thaar* ia •tKmi&KM33l» pnmmxn m
tiaa iataka valva, iM^iag ia iivoaaiUa.
( cmuiiCA), wxam'iGJk} )
7). rtm tba vtandipoiBt af ra|Kl4 tupg^, it
la aaoeaa«i7 t« ratoaa Xbm aHibcr «f fpal
taaka aad iierMM -ttw aiqpMitgr,
( GSOUKCA} )
8). It ia aaewMHox to plaM tho aavtaiaara
for tba fMl iadaka yXf, tbm iattOu g«i«*
pipa wad tJM hoaa !> siU^oa MawBiattt far
laodlsff MMr*tiaD>. ' C'P ^ f ■^ !^ -^M 1
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
CtNC?AC CIMCrOA Mem » I ^O&i"/^
a«iRsl»iiltn(0|piBl«B)
< tmxLim }
tta «f ail 9<^llM<t
( auuuctai(90) >
U). % nmmm adt 1il» MatoHSM to nq^
< iitllBaHKSD) )
; 12). It !• aMMMHwr7 to cq^ twdnvit «i«lt
702 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3attle Uamon (f»a.mii
ipful i*' th« t.«ieph«ne can
iBcna 'f svsc'rritr, flars^ slrr;4ia
^/£i 71
to r«fuei Mciigsi«te a caj-riftr.
^»i !i?«rricf;s am ti;
srews wsi* OTwt
R«ll in»tr«oto4 . in their stie.
fcxcs, ■ :;.-^{t Irfts^ two hour*- ars n«oessa5~^'
for, tbe laimching of large laodlng b&rgKS
whose hatche'
vsniently placed
for loading an6 unloading,
( lC«th Air 3«pot }
17,!, There are
«s In which cargo
spoil «g« has *^ *3 hi|5h aa y>i due to
i
refrigerators, * ak r«frig«ration, iap«rJ
ect packini-i abb tPot iatoraahips.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
703
ii^/Oh 7t
18), Conv«ri«4 A.a».»r« inoonwnient f
iK^ppljring l.dt»rle«tin| oil.
( SISSi» 1I&S0 )
Att«n!fcl«B to ship's exjjlpKest is
.'OSSRO JTAIU )
It i« ?^c«8*wy t» «<pip Afii with 40
t<»» di«FriokK:foir« «i»l aft te isak« poss-
ible th« lo«4iag «f li^hfe«»» large
l«ndlx^ bargfts and otbw fee«»y ob4««ts-
- -■-- -~-pf-mM^4i^h--4«.-^f^
It is a«c««s&fy to .have & large iMafc'er
of AKa i»hich are e<juiped with h»a»y .*«*
d«rrick«.
l^'
^
704 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON
SOURCE D0CUME2JT #l6
(U S NAVY V?EEKLY INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
VOLUME 1 No. 22, 8 DECEMBER 19hh)
ENTITLED
"UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS,
TWEEKLT INTELLIGENCE"
USED BT TOE NAVY IN COMPILING THE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR IBE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages ii32-U60).
(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK CN PEARL HARBCR)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
705
.iiMi«ii<iy|v/£l>1@i
AFIRE :0N 7 DECEMBER 1941
(see story of PEARL. HARBOR on pQQt 1)
706 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CCWFIOENTIAL
Any material appearing in "Weekly Intelligence" may be reproduced with or
without credit, so long as proper classification is observed.
"Weekly Intelligence" receives wide distribution among fleet units and key
Navy, I'arine and Army Coniiaands. Any requests for additional distribution may be
addressed to Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area.
Note: Starting with the next issue, the regular publication date of CINC-
PAC-CTTJCPOA "Weekly Intelligence" will be Monday rather than Friday. Therefore,
Vol. 1, No. 23 will be issued on 18 December,
CONTEyrS
PKARL HARBOR: The Planning Stage Page 1-22
Sub Situation 23
Jap Ships Sunk in MANILA Harbor 2t - 25
UANIU Strike Results 26 - 27
Probable Conversion of Jap Hospital Ship 28
Increased AA Armament on Jap Freighter-Transport 29
MANIU, PHILIPPINK Islands 30 - 31
KUKA-NATORI Class CL 32 - 33
Long Delay Bomb Fuse 32
Floating Mines in JAPAN Sea % - 35
New Jap Rifle Grenade 3/^
GENYO Class Tanker Victim of PB/»Y 36
Jap Aerial Anti-Sub Doctrine 37 - l^'}
Long-Shafted Ehgino Used on JACK UU - U5
New Army Air Division 45
Jap Airfield Camouflage 46 - 47
Thumbnail Biography of HELQJ 48
Provisional Sketch of GEORGE 49
Sidellglit on Suicides 50
Japs Develop DIDO-CHINA 51-54
Jap Ordnance vs Allied Aircraft 55-56
Jap Anti-Sub Bomb 56
Weekly Photo Coverage 57 - 58
LUZON Airfields 59-62
Enclosures:
"Japanese Infantry Weapons"
Revised Drawing of YAUATO Class BB
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 707
CONFIDENTIAL
PEARL HARBOR: THE PLANNING STAGE
When Jap planes struck clustered U.S. warships and aircraft at PEARL HARBOR on
7 December l^l, the enesay was carrying into effect pio-pointed plans conceived
months in advance and long cloaked in secrecy. Until recently, little has been
known of the planning stage prior to the sneak raid on HAWAII.
The first concrete intimations of early enemy intentions are revealed in the
Interrogation of a Japanese Chief Yeooan who worked closely with top-ranking Jap
Navy personnel during critical months in mi<t-194l. The prisoner, who was captured
on SAIPAN, had access to highly confidential documents as wall as behind-the-scenes
rumors while plans for PEARL HARBOR were being perfected.
The prisoner appears both exceptionally intelligent and cooperativ*. Testimony
capable of confirmation from other soxurces checked closely. Tactical information
(as contained in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol, 1, Nos. 2 and 3) proved reliable,
liost remarkable of the PCW's assets is his memory of details, as indicated in
his reconstruction of the historic Combined Fleet Secret OpOrder #1, of 1 November
1941. This document, reproduced entirely by memory, is believed to be fairly
accurately transcribed, and will be printed in full later in this articl«.
As a yeoman attached to the Staff of CinC Combined Fleet (Adniral YAUAilOTO) ,
the prisoner became familiar with Jap war games. Staffs of the various Japanese
Fleets worked these out on a large game board. Games were held frequently, some-
times as often as twice a month.
Prior tc late August (1941), war games were held at such anchorages as SUKUMO,
SAEKI, KAGOSHIMA, and KANOYA. Close attention was devoted to current experimental
data, which was incorporated in tactics employed. Although the prisoner insists
that enemy countries were not specifically designated during these games, the ident-
ity of possible Jap foes could scarcely have been obscure.
During this period, the prisoner added, there was a constant interchange of
persojinel between CinC Combined Fleet and the Naval General Staff, Uen on these
staffs were reportedly "definitely much keener" than members of other Fleet staffs.
Final planning stages were presaged late in August, when CinC Combined Fleet
ordered all Fleet Commanders and their key Staff menibers to TOKYO for further war
games. Offices at the Naval General Staff at JAPAN'S capital were found inadequate,
and the games were thereafter helc! in the Naveil 'Tar College, The PCW claimed that
secxxrity measures at the War College were woefully inadequate. Classes at the
College conllnued as usual; "any man with a half-official air could easily have
walked in".
On 2 Septeaber the final all-important "games" got underway, with an intro-
ductory speech to all officers taking part. Room? were assigned to the "N" Team,
the "A" Team, and the "E" Team (Nippon, America, and England) and to the umpiree.
The teams, composed of virtually every top-notch Jap Naval officer, were oade up
COVT/M^eO
PAGE I
708 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
as follows:
UMPIRES
NAVAL GENERAL STAFF
NAGANO, Osami
FUCTTOME, Shigeru
UOZUUI, Jisaku
YAliAMOTO, Chikao
UAYUZUMI, Harue
TAMURA, Saburo
, SANAGI, Tsuyoshi
UOZUVI, Yoriichi
NAVY MINISTRY
TAKATA, Toshitane
SHIKI, Tsuneo
TOIBATA, Kurie
FUJII,- Shigeru
N-TEAM
COtXBINED FLEET
TAllAMOTO, Isoroku
ITO, Selichi
KUROJDIA, Sameto
GOTO, Shigeru
ISOBE, Taro
SUGI, Toma
SASAKI, Akira
WADA, Yushiro
NAGATA, Shigeru
WATANABE, Yasuji
ARBIA, Takayasu
SEDII, Ichiyoshi
OTA, Kanai
RANK
Admiral
Rear Admiral
Captain
Captain
Commander
Commander
Commander
Commander
Captain
Commander
Commander
Commander
Admiral
Rear Adinirftl
Captain
CoRBnander
Coanander
Commander
CoDmander
Coisnander
Coisnander
Cotomander
Conmander
Commander
Coonandflr
OFFICIAL DUTIES
Head of Firat Section (War Planes
and Operations) .
Member First Section.
Head of Sub-Section, First Sect.
tiember « ■ ■ ■
Ueoiber of Military Affairs Bureau.
n n H n H
" " Office of Military Supply-
Private Secretary to Navy
Minister (Admiral SHIUADA,
Shigetaro) .
CinC Caobioad Fleet.
Chief of Staff.
Deputy Chief of Staff,
Staff Adjutant.
Staff Engineering Officer.
Staff Gunnery Officer.
Staff Air Officer.
Staff Coanunication Officer.
Staff Navigation Officer.
Staff Operations and Plana Officer-
Staff Torpedo Officer.
Staff Supply Officer.
Meteorologist attached to Staff.
l9t COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (RADIO INTELLIGENCE)
KAKIMOTO, Gonlchiro
ARISAWA, Naosada
Rear Admiral
Conmander
Commander.
Deputy Chief of Staff.
E-TEAM
SECOND FLEET
KONDO, Nobutake
Admiral
Coanander.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
709
CONFIDENTIAL
TANAGIZAWA, Suranosuke
OISHI, 'nanotsu
FOURTO FLEET
INOUE, Semi
FIFTH FLEET
HOSOGAYA, Boshiro
ELEVENTH AIR FLEET
TSUKAHARA, Niohizo
KUSAKA, Jinichi
Captain
CoBmandAT
Vice Admiral
Vice Adsiit-al
Vice Admiral
Rear Admiral
Deputy Chief of Staff.
Staff NaTigaUoQ Officer.
Coomander*
Coamander.
Coomander.
Chief of Staff.
A-TEAtt
THIRD FLEET (Amphibious Forces for Southern invasions)
TAKAHASHI, Ibo
ISHIHARA, Hajime
SIXTH FLEET
SHmiZU, Uitsuml
KANOAKA, Tomojiro
Vice Admiral
Captain
Vice Admiral
Captain
FIRST AIR FLEET (Carrier Fleet)
NAGUMO, Chuichi
KUSAKA, Ryunosuke
GENDA, Minoru
Vice Admiral
Rear Admiral
Ccounander
Coianander.
Deputy Chief of Staff.
Conmander*
Deputy Chief of Staff.
Coamander.
Chief of Staff.
Deputy Chief of Staff.
On 3 September, officers involved studied classified material. PCff was assigned
to "N" Team (CinC Combined Fleet). That afternoon, Coamander WATANABE > Admiral
YAMAUOTO's hard-working, fact-finding Plans and Operations Officer - handed the POI
an outline of conditions under which the games were to be held, and requested fifty
copies. These terms, which set forth a working basis for the games, contaloed the
heart of the forthcoming 1 November OpOrder #1. Extensive preliminary planning
was indicated. The prisoner believed that these plans must have been under develop-
ment for several months. This was the first time that the POH realized that som^*
thing of unusual slgnificajice was in the air.
On 5 September, the POW was attached directly to Commander SASAKI, CinC
Combined Fleet's Staff Air Officer. When he entered the smoke-filled room at about
1000, he found PEARL HARBCB plans under discussion. The Japa apparently e:Q>ected
to catch all major U.S. Fleet units in the Pacific in PEARL HAEBCa as well as units
believed recently transferred from the Atlantic. The prisoner was surprised to
overhear that "N" Team expected to lose one-third of the units participating in
the attack on HAWAII; one AKAGI Class CV and one SORYU Class CV were estimated as
710 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
sxinlc.
On 6 and 7 Septeniber, the conference of "K" Team debated the beet aeans of
assaulting PEARL HARB(%. (The PC*f, who was adept at the abacus - calculating board -
was often used during these sessions to estimate fuel \ised by Fleet units at
varying speeds) . It was during this stage of pleuming that Captain KUROJIllA
(Deputy Chief of Staff) and Rear Admiral ITO (Chief of Staff) differ«l as to the
practicability of conducting an amphibious assault on HAWAII. The cool and precise
ITO was (surprisingly) in favor of an early landing, and YAMAUOTO was inclined to
agree, but the intuitive, tempenttental KUROJBtA won the discussion by pointing out
insuperable logistics problems. The POW believes that ITO's plan was a last-minute,
improvised idea, and that - when KUROJIUA's argtanent succeeded - the basic plan
continued as originally intended.
These early sessions, the PCM said, seeoted confined prijnariljr to two general
problens: first, the details for a successful surprise raid on PEARL HARBOR; and
second, a carefully worked-out schedule for occupying UAIAIA, BURliA, D.E.I. , tb«
PHQIPPINHS, the SOLdlCTIS, and Central Pacific Islands - including (ultimately)
HAWAII. Neither AUSTRALIA nor NEW ZEALAND was apparently considered as immmdlaf
military objectives; the Japs intended simply to cut them off from outside help,
nie POW heard INDIA mentioned only once, when sone senior officer remarked "that's
where friction with GERUANT will begin".
The conferences (and "games") were ended about 13 September. The prisoner
helped carry the notes to KUSE, and thence by launch to the NAGATO, TAUAMOTO*s
Flagship, which waa anchored at HASHIBAJIUA. About half of the Staff were already
on board.
On 15 September, all the Staff with four yeomen (not including PC*f) Journeyed
to the IWAKUNI Air Group to confer with the Anny. The POW remembers TERAUCHI men*-
tioned, but cannot recall other najaes. He insists, however, that TOJO - then still
War Uinister - was not present. It was widely rumored (but never confirmed by other
evidence) that the Anqy conferees at this meeting had not previously learned of' plans
to attack PEARL HARBOR.
The NAGATO remained at KASHIRA JIUA for about six more days. At the end of
September, the main body of the Jap Fleet moved to SAEIQ. There were four revlaiow
of Confined Fleet OpOrder #1 while the Flagship was at SASO, though no major chaogea
were made.
On 1 November, the final printing of the order was started, requiring almost
three days to complete. Two copies were sent to the Anqy. Staff officers of other
Fleet units at SAEKI called for copies in person. In all, 300 copies were distri-
buted. OpOrders #2 and #3, designating Y-Day and X-Day, were issued on 5 and 10
November, respectively.
(Cooxnent: The eneiqy naturally uses East Longitude Time in hie OpOrder - i.e.,
the date of S Deceod>er for the PEARL HARBOR attack is correct ELT.)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 711
CONFIDENTIAL
The prisoner once knew the OpOrder intimately. Over a period of weeks, he has
labored to reproduce on paper as much of the Order as he could remember. This ver-
sion is obviously incomplete and not to be compared vrith the original document, but
in main outline is believed to be substantially as printed. Notes in parentheses
were added by the editor.
Flagship NAGATO, SAEKI WAN
1 November 19/J.
COMBINED FLEET SECRET OPORD #1
The Japanese Etapire will declare war on the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and
the METH5RLANDS.
War will be declared on X-Day,
This order will became effective on T-Day.
GENERAL SITUATION
(a) Policy toward the UNITED STATES.
In spite of the fact that the Qnpire has always maintained a friendly
attitude toward the UNITED STATES, the UNITED STATES has interfered in
all the measures which we have taken in self protection for the preservat-
ion of our interests in East ASIA. Recently, she has blocked our speedy
settlement of the CHINA Incident by aiding the government of CHIANG Kai-
shek and has even resorted to the final outrage of breaking off economic
relations. While senselessly prolonging Jap>anese-American negotiations,
she has continued to strengthen her military preparations. She offers a
threat to us in the form of a concentration of her Fleet in the PACIFIC
OCEAN, thus attempting to exert on us both economic and military pressure*
(b) Policy toward GREAT BRITAIN.
BRITAIN is siding the government of CHIANG Kai-shek and, acting in concert
with her Allies and the UNITED STATES, in interfering with our program of
construction in East ASIA. Recently she has been steadily building up the
defenses of her bases in East ASIA in an attempt to threaten us.
(c) Policy toward the NETHERLANDS INDIES.
Although economic negotiations of a peaceful nature have been underway
with us for a number of months, the NETHERLANDS INDIES has been led by
BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES to reject flatly the continuance of mutually
beneficial economic relations. Recently she has threatened the fortunes
of Japanese which have been built up as a result of persevering work through
long years.
(d) The ports and the vast fertile regions of the coast of CHINA have been
occupied by us and most of her great cities captiired. CHINA, however.
712 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIOENT/AL
supported by BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, has not 7«t awtOcened from tha
deluding draam of "Fight the War and Save the Country" and is attempting
total resistance to JAPAN in the form of a "scorched earth" policy for
all CHINA.
While organized resistance is gradually beccming weaker, the prevalence
of guerilla warfare has obliged us to comiit large nujnbers of troope to
pexvianent garrison duty there. If we are to secure decisive victory,
BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, the powers behind CHINA, must be destroyed.
(e) Policy toward the SOVIET UNION.
The strength of Soviet forces on the Sovlet-Uanehukuoan border Is formldabl*.
The USSR is laaintaining a vlgilent alert, awaiting developments. However,
if the Ekplre does not attack the SOVIET UNION, it is believed that the
SOVIET UNION will not coomence hostilities.
OUR SITUATION
The fourth Fleet has largely completed preparation in the Uandated Islands, as
has the fUeventh Air Fleet (Naval shore-based air) at essential bases In CHINA,
niENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND, The state of repair of our ships and planes
is generally excellent and the efficiency of their personnel has markedly im-
proved.
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
To drive BRITAIN and AllERICA from Greater East ASIA, and to hasten the S6ttl»»
ment of the CHINA Incident. In addition, it is expected that when BRITAIN and
AUEEICA have been driven from the NETHHILANDS INDIES and the PHILIPPINES, an
independent self-supporting economic entity nay be firmly established. The vast
and far-reaching fundamental principle, the spiritual guide of our nation, (th«
"Eight Comers of the World Under One Roof - HAKKO ICHIU ), may be demonstrated
to the world. To this end we will use all the military strength necessary.
STRATEGI
The strategy to be adopted against BRITAIN, the UNITED STATES and the NETHIK-
LANDS will be as directed in the Annexed Vol\m>e. X-Day and T-Day will be
announced later.
If before T-Day the enemy is believed to have been able to ascertain our plans,
the execution of X-Day will be made the subject of a special oixter.
If before X-Day we should be attacked by the encny, his attack will be crushed
with all available strength. All coomanding officers will act in confomanc*
with "Strategy to be Adopted in the Case of an Bhemy Attack".
In the case of the SOVIET UNION, eveiy effort wUl be made to avoid provoking
hostilities. At the same time, every effort will be made to Insure the secrecy
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 713
CONFIDENTIAL
of our plans. If the enenjr should aacertaln our plans, military operations
will inmediately be begiin in accordance with "Ueasures to be Taken in the Case
of an Attack by the SOVIET UNION".
Circulation of this order is limited to Fleet and Force Comnanders. These
Ccananders will take every possible measure to prevent leakage of these plans
prior to their being carried out.
Precaution: Disposal of this order.
This order must be burned when no longer of use. If there is any danger of its
falling into enemy hands as the result of a ship sinking or sorae other untoward
occurrence, the responsible Commander shall personally make imLiediate disposal
of it.
Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #1
ANNEXED VOLUME
1. Joint Army-Navy operations will be carried out in accordance with the "Army-
Navy Central Headquarters Agreement".
2. A Striking Force (Carrier Task Force), having the 1st Air Fleet (Carriers
and Escorts) as its main element, will depart its naval bases or operating
areas about X-16 Day, and will set course, by way of TANKAN BAY (HTTOKAPPU
BAY, ETOROFU ISLAND, KURHES) for PEARL HARBOR, the base of the American
PACIFIC Fleet, where it will deliver a surprise attack.
X-Day is expected to be during the early or middle part of December.
3. Targets for attack are airfields; aircraft carriers; battleships, cruisers
and other weirshlps; merchant shipping; port facilities; and land installat-
ions, in that order.
4. From the time set by the Force Comnander for the Striking Force to leave
port in JAPAN, strickt radio silence will be observed. Conmunications
will be via ordinary broadcast system. The code book to be used will be
"(not certain)". The following communications abbreviations will be in
effect :
"Many warships dn PEARL HARBOR". - "The fate of the Einplre".
"No warships in PEARL HARBOR". - "The cherry-blossoms are in all
their glory".
"The weather is clear and visibility - "Climb Iff FUJI",
good in the region. Suitable for
an attack".
"The time to commence the attack - "The depth of the moat of HONNOJI
is 0520". Temple is 0520".
"All forces attack". - "Climb Iff NIITAKAl".
etc*
714 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
5. Th« course and the dlspoaitlon of the attacking units will b« determined ^
by the Striking Force cooinander.
The Ccmmander of the Striking Force will inform the proper authorities aa
soon as he determines on the course and disposition of the attacking units.
Care must be taken to avoid ordinary merchant shipping routes and to keep
the plans from disclosure under any circumstances whatever.
6. Procedure to be followed in case of discovery before the attack either by
a ship of the nation against which war is to be declared, or by a ship of
a neutral nation (including the SOVIET UNICMJ).
(a) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship ot
a nation against which war is to be declared, make inmedlate preparation
to attack and sink it.
(b) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a
neutral nation, the ship should immediately be detained until it can
do us no actual harm; strict surveillance should be kept of its radio
transmission. In case it should make any transmissions which might
prove harmful to us or give us reason to fear that oar plans might be
revealed, the ship will be seized by a destroyer which will make im-
mediate attack preparations.
(c) In case of discovery by a foreign ship more than 600 miles from the
objective, the ship will be detained £ind radio transmission forbidden.
However, if it seems highly probable that our general intentions have
been guessed, an attack should be made imnedlately, if between X-5 D&y
and X-Oay. If before X-5 Day, the Striking Force commander will decide
the disposition of the ship, depending on the circumstances. In the
case of detention of an enemy ship, "B" method will be followed.
7. The Commander of tae Siorprise Attack Force (Submarine Force), having the
6th Fleet (Submarine Fleet) as its main el«ment, will have most of the
submarines leave the western part of the INLAND SEA on X-20 Day to attack
PEAflL HARBCfi. Its entire strength will be disposed so as to coooand the
harbor mouth. It will attack any enemy warship which may have escapod from
the harbor. It will also carry out reconnaissance before the attack, and
if the opportunity presents itself, will carry out surprise attacks on
enemy warships with midget submarines. The time for such attacks will be
after the flights of planes have attacked OAHU. Every possible means for
recovery of midget subtoarines should be considered.
8. Joint Army-Navy operations should be carried out in accordance with the
provisions of the Central Headquarters Agreement. The disposition of
forces will be determined by the Commander of the Advance Force (princii>-
ally Second Fleet cruisers and destroyers). The Commander of the Advance
Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he decides on the
course and disposition of the attacking units.
The point of departure for the ships of the MALAY and FRENCH INDO-CHINA
Forces will be BAKO and the point of depart\u*e for the PHILIPPINES Occupa-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 715
CONFIDENTIAL
tion Force will probably be PALAU.
9. The capture of Qiglish and American troops and ships in CHINA will be
arranged by the Commander-in-Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet. The occu-
pation of HONR KMfG will conform to the provisions of the Army-Navy Central
Headquarters Agreement and is the respmnsibility of the Commander, 2nd
CHINA Expeditionary Fleet.
10. English and American merchant ships which are in ports under Japanese
sovereignty at the time of the outbreak of the war or which are in ports
which may be taken are to be captured if possible.
SOVIET shipping is to be kept under surveillance after undergoing a
rigid inspection.
It whould be so planned that none of our shipping will be in foreign ports
when the war breaks out.
11 Beginning on Y-Day the Commander of the Ist Combined Communication Unit
will send false messages to give the impression that the main strength of
the fleet is in the western part of the INLAND SEA.
After Y-Day has been determined, the NYK passenger vessel TATSUTA UARU,
which is scheduled to proceed to the west coast of AMERICA, will sail;
arrangements will be made to have her return while en route. (This was
done, and Allied passengers were interned; the same procedure would
have been followed with any trans-Pacific liner scheduled to sail in
this period).
T/hen Y-Day has been determined, the Commandant of the YOKOSUKA Naval
District will allow as many men of his coomand as possible to go ashore
80 that the number of men on liberty in TOKYO and YC»(OHAJiA will give a
false impression. (Another POTf confirms this).
12. The Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Fleet (Mandates Fleet) will expedite the
attack and occupation of British, American and Dutch bases in the North
and South PACIFIC, acting in close cooperation with forces of the 11th
Air Fleet in the South PACIFIC. Ehemy air power within our sphere of
operations will be checked and coninunication between AUSTRALIA and the
mainland of the UNITED STATES will finally be cut.
It is expected that in this manner AUSTRALIA will be isolated and domin-
ated completely. The natural resources of all kinds which the bast con-
tinent of AUSTRALIA boasts will then fall to us.
(The dates for execution of assault and occupation of various British, U.S.,
Netherlands bases were then listed in this paragraph - a few of which follow:)
(1) CajAU about X plus 2.
(2) WAKE about X plus 7.
716 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
conf;oential
(3) (The dates for the invasions of RABAUL and the islands
from the SOLOMONS to the FIJIS, SAMOA, and SANTA CRUZ
groups were all entered.)
13. The date for the seizure of MIDWAY is set as late Spring of 19it2. The
date for the occupation of the HAVfAIIAN ISLANDS is scheduled for October
1942.
Herewith are two of the above referenced documents
THE ARMY-NAVY CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS ACKEEMENT.
The object of Imperial Headquarters, Army Department and Imperial Headquarters,
Navy Department in setting forth clearly the division of duties and command
in joint operations was to promote a maximum display of efficiency, (Accord-
ing to POW, it was issued at the end of October 191*1 • A resume of the contents
follows:)
1. The highest ranking Army officer for SUMATRA, BORNEO, the MALAY Peninsula,
CELEBES, and the PHILIPPINES (including FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND)
will be Field Marshal TERAUCHI, Hisaichi. His command will be called the
Southern Array and its headquarters will be in SAIGON.
2. Plans for escorting large Army convoys and the place, time and date for
landings.
3. Agreements on Aerial Warfare Agreements on the places to be attacked by
both Army and Navy planes and on the places, dates and tines of attacks by
Army or Navy planes acting independently. Agreements on the airfields to
be uses, such as "XX Airfield will be used primarily by the Army and
secondarily by the Navy."
U. Supply Plans.
Plans for the supply of Army landing forces to be effected by Amy ship-
ping and for the Navy's support of same.
5, Communications Flans.
6. Agreement on occupied territories, cities, and resources such as, "The
BANDJERUASIN Oil Refinery will be controlled by the Navy".
MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF A SOVIBT ATTACK.
(PCfW does not remember the date eocactly, but it was the end of October - and
stated in effect:)
"It is believed likely that we shall not be attacked by the SOVIET UNION un-
less we attack first, but in case JAPAN is attacked first, the 5th Fleet
(Northern Force) vrtll counterattack with all its strength and maintain local
supremacy."
YAMAMOTO, Isoroku
Commanding, Cooibined Fleet
PAGE 10
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 717
CONFIDENTIAL
Flagship AKAGI, SA£KI WAN
10 Nov«ab«r 19U
STRIKING FORCE OPORD dO.
1. All ships will completa b&ttl« preparations by 20 Nov«nber.
2. The fleet will rendevous at TANKAN WAN. (HrrOKAFFQ BAT, ETOROFV
Is. KURILES).
3. Inaauch as the plans for the caning operation aust be kept ab-
solutely secret, strict security will be maintained in regard to
them, up to the time they are explained to the crew after port
of departure in JAPAN has been cleared.
4. Break-down of attack plane units.
The AKAGI 1st Attack Plane Unit
Unit Camiander: Lt. Condr XX
Ist Carrier Attack Unit
Etc. (details not recalled by POW).
5. Fleet cruising formation
(Including retiring foraationa)
6. All tx'anamission of messages is strictly forbidden.
Tranaaission and reception will both use the TOKYO #1 broadcaat
coanunl cat ions system,
NAGUUO Chuichi
CoBiaanding
Striking Force
Verbal explanation by the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet of ambiguities
in Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #1,
(Printed versicm of an explanation of details not covered in the
order delivered to the High Commanders in an informal talk.)
1. That the cooing declaration of war against EKQLAND and the
UNITED STATES will usher in a great war of survival with the
two leading naval powers of the world.
That this war Is really one in which our socistence is in question,
one in which we have no choice but to strike with our military
power.
2. That our Navy, in engaging a worthy eneoQr, is about to realize an
ambition which dates back to the foundation of the Imperial Navy
many years ago.
COMTIHJCD P4QE
718 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
3, That the alliance with C2»MANr waa not desired bj the Navy, but
was a project favored by the Amy which thoxight It would hold
the SOVIET UNION in check, (t)
^. That the campaigns In the NETHERIAND INDIES and in the PHILIPPINES
will be preceded by the securing of advanced bases in THAILAND and
FRENCH INDO-CHINA. It is believed that these operations will come
off In eoctremely smooth order.
The Navy will be able to secure sources of oil supply swiftly
by means of these campaigns.
5, In connection with the attack on PBf^RL HARBOR, reports indicate
that a gigantic fleet, which includes the ATLANTIC Fleet, haa
massed in PEARL HARBOR.
This Fleet will be utterly crushed with one blow at the very begin-
ning of hostilities. It is planned to shift the balance of power
and thereby confuse the enemy at the outset and deprive him of his
fighting spirit.
Our objective, however, lies more than three thousand miles away.
In attacking this large fleet concentration it is to be eocpected
that countless difficulties will be encountered in preserving the
absolute security of the plans. If these plans should fail at any
stage, our Navy will suffer the wretched fate of never being able
to rise again. The success of our surprise attack on PEARL HARBOR
will prove to be the "V/ATERLOO" of the war to follow. For this
reason the ^perial Navy is massing the cream of its strength in
ships and planes to assure success.
All of the planes of CarDlv 1, CarDlv 2, sind CarDlv 5 will be
concentrated in the attack on OAHU. If there are any ships which
escape, almost the entire submarine strength of the 6th Fleet will
be in conunand of the harbor mouth and will concentrate torpedo
attacks on them. In addition to these, the destroyer strength of
(DesRon 1) will be deployed in a screen (mainly for night attacks)
and the fast battleships of BatDlv 3 deployed in a fourth echelon.
If the main force of the enemy fleet should escape from PEARL HARBC«
and make for the open sea, it will be waylaid by the Uain Body of
our fleet.
6. The midget submarine unit has been studying and training at the
KURE Navy Yard with the CHIYODA for a year and a half, but it is
still too much to hope that it has reached a stage of perfection.
In any case, the crew members are supremely confident. The 6th
Fleet will attempt to use them in attacks within the harbor.
7. It is clear that even if AMEEICA's enormous heavy industry pro-
ductive power is iianedlately converted to the manufacture of ships,
planes and other war materials, it will take at least several months
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 719
CONFIDENTIAL
for her manpwwer to be mobilized against us. If we insxire our
strategic supren!ac7 at the very outset of the conflict by
attacking and seizing all key points at one blow while A].ffiRICA
is still unprepared, we can swing the scales of later operationa
in our favor,
8. Hearen will bear witness to the righteousness of our struggle.
It is hoped that every man will exert his full efforts toward the
realization of the objectives of this holy war by determinedly
cariTing out our original purpose, in the full realization of the
unparalleled opportunity which this war offers.
Coonunications Plans.
(POW does not know about these; no details.)
Supply Plans, (outline)
The Naval bases of YOKOSUKA, KURE and SASEBO will be rear supply
bases. BAKO, PALAU, TRUK and OMINATO will be forward supply
bases. In addition to these, supply ships will be attached to
each fleet.
5 November
Combined Fleet SECRET OjJOrd #2
Y-Day will be 23 November.
10 November
Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #3
X-Day will be 8 December.
During the actual attack on PEARL HARBOR, the prisoner remained aboard the
NAGATO in the Qnpire with the Flag of CinC Combined Fleet. Details of the Carrier
Task Force which conducted the raid are known from other prisoners and frcm docu-
ments. See, for example, the chart of 1st Air Fleet movements as reproduced else-
where in this issue.
The TF sortied from ETOROFU TO, in the KURILES, on or about 27 November (ELT),
end headed eastward under a heavy front before turning south to the attack. The
composition of the Force, which was commanded by the late Vice Admiral NAGUUO
(CinC Ist Air Fleet) is fairly well established. The enemy had six carriers: KA3A,
AKAOI (CarDiv 1) SORYU, HIRYU (CarDiv 2) SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU (CarDiv 5 less HOSHO);
two BBs: HIYEI, KIRISHIl'A (BatDiv 3, less KONGO and-HARUNA); three cruisers: TONE,
CHIKUKA (CruDiv 8), plus ABUKUUA; elements of DesRon 1; and about twenty. subs.
79716 O— 46 — pt. 13 23
720 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
(Coonent: It la of Interest to note that all six carriers and both battlashlfw
participating are nan Identified as sunk, plvts the CA CHIKUUA; the majority of
other units involved are also believed sunk cr severelj daoaged, although definite
Identification Is not yet possible) .
One of the Japs' chief headaches during the sortie ms the fueling problen.
One well Infonaed prisoner who was a CPO on fueling detail described emergency
aeasures required to keep the speedy SORYU and HIRTU In fuel. These two ahlpw wer«
fueled dally, and drums carried as supercargo were unloaded by bucket-brigade when
the fast dash to the plana-launching point was begun. At that, the SORICU arrived
back at KURE with only 95 tons of oil in her tanks. AGs coming alongside the TF to
fuel units had considerable trouble, and visibility was so bad that "towing spars"
for position keeping were almost constantly In use.
At the tins at the raid, considerable Infomatlon was derived froa documents
taken from crashed planes and a beached midget sub.
Bepredueed on the following page is a proposed track chart of a midget enib
which had planned to transit PEARL HARBOR but apparently failed. This sub beached
Itself the following day on the opposite side of OAHU, and one of the two crew
meabers was taken prisoner. Little was learned from the PCRI, but it is believed
that the sub was damaged on a reef near the entrance of PEARL HARBOR, putting sound
gear out of coanlssion and forcing retirement. Subsequent examination of this sub*s
torpedo tubes Indicated that an attempt had been made to fire torpedoes, but launch-
ing gear fouled.
The original chart, too frayed for reproduction, was evidently a U.S. Navy
R.O. chart, with detailed navigational data carefully translated into Japanese.
Rough notes were scribbled on the chart, in some cases too illegible to translate.
On the reverse side were further notes on navigation, etc. The sub also carried a
rough profile of the PEARL HARBOR skyline. The mission of the sub was both attack
and reconnaissance. The KANA code as shown on the chart is similar to codes r^
covered from aircraft.
At least three Jap midget subs were lost by our counter-actions at this time.
One sub actually entered the harbor; it suffered a direct five-inch shell hit, and
was thereafter rammed and depth-charged beyond recognition. The Japs admitted the
loss of five of these underslze stibs.
Midget sub beached on OAHU.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 721
CONFIDENTIAL
"•I
|: . ^^;i;'"-'"-!! '■ '" ■ -^^' ■^~" '"' '^- "" -----
__^ ,: ' -ir*^-fij)
;, .,
*
Translation of code tables carried by Jap planes. Simple combinations
of two KANA syllables served to report disposition and movemBnts of U.S. Fleet.
722 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIOENTIAL
\ -1
\ <^
,r
(M. J^ ^A)
I b Q-
> J^
Photostat of a doctment from a crashed Jap plane after the ?EkSL HARBOR raid.
Above, code dealgnationa are applied to ship anchorages near FCRD ISLAND. Below,
sectors from UHAIMA (on UAUI, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS) are indicated in code. Codes
presumably to be used for either 'voice or radio transnUslon.
PAGE 18
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
723
CONFIDENTIAL
Novel aid for Jap PEARL HARBOR raiders. Captured fragment above gives name,
frequency, tiine of transmission and signal strength of two chief HONOLUliJ radio
stations.
Chart of torpedo runs, recovered from crashed Jap plane. 6rt>ken lines ii>-
dicate aircraft fron CV KACA. Solid lines denote planes from other carriers.
724 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIOENVAL
■SOU
Is'
o o
• mo
• «S a
9 *'
c « «*
m^^sm-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
725
CONFIDENTIAL
^*3
SS
■H u
ah
Hi
MO.
^9
726 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIOENTIAL
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
727
SUBMARINE SITUATION
NOV. 28 - DEC. 4
CONnOENTIAL
▲ - SIGHTING
0 - SOUND CONTACT
® -R 0/F FIX
IIO'E
S0»
One eneoy submarine was definitely sunk near the Bnpire on the 29th.
Absence of sighting and contact reports between HAWAII and the Mainland in-
dicate the probable return of that sub to the Ekpire.
728 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
JAP SHIPS SUNK IN MANILA HARBOR, ^
THROUGH 14 NOVEMBER 1944 "
It is ••tlut«l that Mor* than 160,000 gross tons ot Japanoss asrchant ahlpplag
hava ba«n sunk In UANIIA Harbor as a rasult of air attacks by the Third Float. This
••tlMitod tonnaca rafars ool/ to MAlfllA Harbor proper and does not Include tonnage
sunk In adjacent areas.
The 31 merchant ships noted to have been sunk consisted of two tankers, four
of the new 6500 gross ton engine-aft cargo ships (see "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1,
No. 21), and 25 freighters or freighter-transports ranging from 2000 to 9000 gross
tons. Ships of less than 1800 gross tons were not CCTnsidered in the above estimate.
In addition to the above merchant ships, two warships were sunk in UANIIA Har-
bor and have been Identified as a light cruiser of the KIDIA Class and a destroyer of
either the TAKANAMI or new KIYOSHIMA Classej.
The sketch on the opposite page shows the ^>proxlinate locations of the sunken
ships, the names if identified, the tonnage and type. The symbol used to nark the
location of each sunken ship also indicates the date of the photograph in which the
ship was first observed to have been sunk.
Of particular interest in MANILA Harbor is a ship of the HOSISAN Uaru Class,
indicated by an arrow. The ship has a minimum of 10 gun positions and extra deck
houses. The excessive AA plus the fact that the ship has remained in the same posi-
tion throughout all photographic coverages suggest that it may be a flak ship.
MANILA Hsji^or photographed on 5 November by TICONDGRAGA aircraft. Note
concentration of destroyers.
PAGE 2 4
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
729
CONFIDENTIAL
730 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
MANILA STRIKE RESULTS
Raoults of Third Fl««t
aircraft strike on MANILA
Harbor IL-H Noranb«r 19Aif.
Ship in f orvgroxind ia a imw
typa 6500 ton freighter, S»>
gar Baker (a), described in
"Weeklj^ Intelligence", Vol. 1,
No. 21.
<=
4 mi
TWo freighters on the
bottom near the breakwater
give testiaonj to the effect'
iveness of the strike.
o
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
731
CONFIDENTIAL
Buroing ahips and
abor« Installationa at
UANQA Harbor.
o
Pier Savon and other in-
stallations showing danage fron
Third Fleet bcobs, 11-14 Mov-
•■tber 1944*
c>
732 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
PROBABLE CONVERSION OF JAP HOSPITAL SHIP
Photographed b«low in MANILA on 21 September is a ship apparently identical to
the BAIKAL UARU, an AH. Still officially listed as a hospital ship, this vessel
has no known sister ship. It was not painted with the prescribed markings for hos-
pital ships and has apparently been reconverted to a merchantman to ease the curr«Bk
severe Jap shipping shortage. Two gun platforss are noted forward and one aft.
Although positive identification of this Teasel as the BAIKAL UARU must await
further confirmation, it is logical to e3q>ect the envaj to reconvert his AHs for
more practical if less humane purposes. Uore than 20 sizeable Japtanese vessels ar«
still officially on the books as hospital ships - a disproportionate allotasnt in
view of his general shipping situation.
i^a^„
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
733
CONnOENTUL
INCREASED AA ARMAMENT ON
JAP FREIGHTER- TRANSPORT
Photographed by planes of the 13th Bonber Comiand on 11 Noveiribar in ORUOC Bay,
the Japanese freighter-transport seen above is more heaviljr araed with AA than any
other ship of this type previously observed.
The unusually large AA platform in the bow mounts four three-inch AA guns. In
addition, there is one 25-om in the gun tub forward, and six additional light AA -
probably single-mount 25-<an - mounted three on each end of the bridge. This anna-
ment is in sharp contrast to the standard one or two AA guns usually observed on
such vessels.
The eneay may be^ expected to bolster his AA defense aboard all types of mer-
chantmen when armament is available, in a further move to counter increasingly heavy
Allied shipping strikes.
734 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MANILA , PK^f
CONFIDENTIAL
Thla striking photograph of IttNUA Harbor and envlroos «aa taken bj planes
frcB the US5 HANCOCK on 25 Nov«nber. Host of the ships seen. Including a KlOU ClaM
light cruiser, are resting on the bottoa.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
735
>I^E
CONFIDENTIAL
ISLANDS
The white governmental buildings are seeo In the right foreground. The largest
pier (number Seven) has a sunken freighter alongside. The PASIG River winds through
the city and enters the sea Just outside the breakwater.
79716 O — 46 — pt. 13 24
736 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CCWFIOENTIAL
KUMA-NATORI CLASS CL ■
Sffectivoneas of Alllad aircraft againat Jap narshlpa has proiqyted a continuoua
Increase in AA armament. Recent photographs of KDUA-NATORI Clase light croisera offer
added docximentation of this trend.
On the facing page are reproduced revised measured drawings. The refitted
cruiaers are now believed amed as followa:
Two 5~inch Ak in twin ahlelded mounta (theae replace the No. 7
5.5-inch guna of the original amament).
Five 5.5-inch guns of the original amament.
Pour 25'-<iB single mount guna.
Ten 25'-iiiB in dual mounta
Three 25-eiB in a triple mount.
Two 13<«in in a dual mount.
Available photographs do not offer a clear view of the well aft of the bridge,
and it is not possible to determine whether the two twin torfwdo tubes mounted
there have been removed to make roon for additional AA. Although possible, this
change is believed unlikely.
The catapult and the crane on the mainmast have been rsnoved. A raised AA
platform now occupying the former catapult base is believed to contain a triple-
mount AA gun.
The old 5.5-lnch No. 5 gun has been reatoved, and twin 25-am added on each
side of its foraer location.
A launch and whaleboat are now carried athwartshlp of the No. 1 and 2 stacks.
LONG DELAY BOMB FUSE
A captured document, (CINCPAC-CINCPCA Item No. 8309 ) disclosed that the Japan-
ese have developed a new long delay bomb fuse. It is designated as E^qserlmental
Type 1 Special Nose Fuse, and Is to be used in the Uodel 3 No. 6 Uark 23 bomb,
Model 1. This bomb is the Japanese 132-lb. delay-type generally used against air-
fields.
Nothing is known of the time delay incorporated in this new fuse, but the
only other Japanese time delay fuse known has three settings, 5 > 36 or 72 hours.
In construction this new fuse is an improvement over the old one.
ERRATUM: In "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 17, it was erroneously
stated both in the text and on the charts of the Second Battle of the
PHUIPPDIES Sea that Third Fleet BBo sank a crippled cruiser on the after-
noon of 25 October. Actually, U.S. light cruisers sank thia Jap warahip.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
737
_j
o
<
< o
i -
Ss
738 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
FLOATING MINES IN THE JAPAN SEA
Data on the chart on the opposite page was taken from a recently recovered
enemy document (CINCPAC-CDJCPOA Item No. 12,0-0). Although dated well over a year
ago, the information plotted offers a revealing glimpse of the extensive Japanese
mining activity in the strategic waters of the JAPAN Sea. Floating mines reported
to Jap hydrographers along the southwest coast of HONSHU wore very possibly brought
north by ocean currents from the heavily-mined CHOSEN Strait. The cluster of mines
reported south of VLADIVOSTOK reflects the use of mines by RUSSIA to protect her
greatest Pacific port area. The total number of mines reported during the brief
two-month period indicates one of the strongest threats to U.S. subs operating in
these Jap-controlled waters.
NEW JAP RIFLE GRENADE
A new type of Japanese high explosive
rifle grenade, embodying several features not
previously encountered, was captured during a
recent operation. This grenade is designed to
be fired by a wooden bullet from the Type 38
and Type 99 rifles. Since these rifles are
standard combat issue, it is believed this
grenade was produced for universal use.
Carrying a main charge of three ounces
of cast TNT and an instantaneous fuse, this
grenade has four fins of light metal attached
to the stabilizer to guide it in flight.
Upon impact, an inertia block is forced
into the fuse body, breaking a brass shear
wire and driving the steel striker into the
percussion cap. The cap ignites a black pow-
der relay which sets off a cyclonite primer.
Then, in succession, the tetryl booster and
the main TNT charge are ignited.
The heavy construction of the inertia weight shear pin indicates that contact
with a soft object might not be sufficient to fire the fuse. However, a notation
attached to the captured grenade warns against dropping or striking the nose of the
projectile. A safety fork, which must be removed before firing, supposedly prevents
accidental detonation.
A complete round of this new grenade has been examined by Mobile Explosives
Investigation Unit Ifk, but its effectiveness has not been determined. The explosive
charge was reported comparable to the KISKA-type hand grenade.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
739
CONFlOENTrAL
CHART OF FLDATING MINES
IN
JAPAN SEA AREA
MARCH 1943 to MAY 1943
JAP SECRET (HI) NOTICE TO MARINERS 1943,
SUPPLEMENT TO NO. 10
LEGEND
OCEAN CURRENTS
WIND DIRECTION
740 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFJOENTiat
6ENY0 CLASS TANKER VICTIM OF PB4Y
'-tS..
*';^^^^
On 31 October, a
PB4Y of the 115th Bomb-
ing Squadron observed
and photographed a
10,000-ton GENYD Claaa
Jap tanker off KUDAT
airdrome In UARUDU Bay
(North BORNEO). The
Allied plane attacked
and apparently sank the
AO with a single 250-
pound GP hit, which rip-
ped an eight-foot hole
in the starboard bow.
A /f-5-8econd delay fVise
was used. Photo below
shows the victim on the
neoct day.
On 1 November
another PB^T observed
the same ship lying on
Its side in this same
location. On the fol-
lowing day it was ob-
seirved on the bottom
in 10-15 fathoms.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 741
CONFIOENTIM.
JAP AERIAL ANTI-SUB DOCTRINE
A detailed explanation of the Japanese Nav7is aerial anti-submarine doctrine
is contained in an unusually lucid and analytical captured document.
Itiis document was sciDewhat nmtilated and its date of publication and Issuing
authority are missing. Its relatively recent origin, however, is established by
the fact that episodes as late as February 19^4^ are mentioned, and its general tone
indicates that it may be one of the series of tactical research studies published
by the authoritative YOKOSUKA Naval Air Group.
Of special Interest are notations referring to the use of radar and magnetic
dvtectors. The tactical doctrine for these devices appears to be still In a state
of development, but their use may be expected to grow. Previous documentary evi-
dence has established the installation of magnetic detectors on JAKEs early last
summer and it is probable that other planes may be so equipped now.
The document, which will be published in full as (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 9979),
shows a full appreciation of the alertness and perseverance necessary in effective
aerial anti-submarine warfare. It contains many combat examples which are not re-
produced in this article.
Aerial anti-sub tactics, says the document in its introduction, niuat be based
on the rapid employment of large numbers of aircraft, even if it is necessary to
make some sacrifice in quality.
"The commanding officer must stand at the head of his troops", it states.
"The present combat conditions, if compared to land warfare, represent not
a battle of confrontation with the commander back of the center, but a final charge
led by the coinnander. In forces having detachments, the commander shovild shift
frequently to the various detachments, and direct activities on the spot.
"Patrol duty requires especial attention to promotion of morale becaxise of
the tediousness of the topography. A patrol which has been lacking in alertness
is nothing but throwing away fuel."
Aggressiveness is stressed.
"It is necessary to attach importance to persistent and thorough sweep attacks.
If we concentrate on defense alone in combat, the eneiny gradually counters with
Increased threats. When we strike a strong blow against them, they immediately
cease their pressure. This is shown by the fact that after the CAURANH Bay Force
(BUTAI), KUSHIMOTO Force (BUTAI), and TATEYAMA Air Group YAMAOA Detachment had
achieved considerable success in combat, the enemy subs in that area lay low for
a while."
Patience and imagination are essential.
"Even though our efforts are not rewarded and success in battle is not attained,
oom-jeo PAGE 37
742 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONriOCNTIAL
we must not become impatient and do anything raah.
"Such things as new tactics should be tried out as much as conditions permit.
In auti-suhoiarine patrol nothing as yet exists which can be called fixed niles.
Biis is especially true under conditions where definite superiority cannot be de-
termined."
In regard to night operations.
"Night training in many cases is not carried out due to the pressure of work
or liberty or the like. However, there is great need for an increase of ability
in night operations, and it is essential to carry this out strictly because of its
special need in reference to the use of radar."
Lack of proper preparation may spoil an attack.
"In the fall of 1943 the CHUTD, about 300 nautical miles southeast of SUNOSAKI
was hit by a torpedo and sank, but a nsdiuffl attack plane of the TATKZA1»A Air Group
patrolling in the area ijosedlately after this sighted a surfaced enemy submarine
and headed for it. The plane was shortly picked up by the radar and when it reached
the spot, only the wake was to be seen. A bombing attack was made and the first
bomb fell with a right-left deviation of 0, seventy meters ahead of the target, but
the second bcob of the run did not drop because of failure of the release. Although
they attacked again after repairing this, the bomb fell short and no results were
obtained. If the second bomb had dropped on the first run, success would have been
8issur«d, but because of poor preparations the opportunity was missed and they could
get no revenge."
Planes must be ready for instant operationa.
"It is necessary to send out attack units iimediately after receiving warning
reports. The sea area requiring patrol increases proportionately to the square
of the time elapsed from the sighting of the eneny to the arrival on the scene
of the attack units. However, since the arrival on the ^ot of attacking vessels
is usually markedly late, it is essential that the air forces consider this matter
so as to remedy the deficiency."
Bad weather must be turned to account.
"At such times there are chances for catching the eneoy. nhen the visibility
on the surface is bad, it is generally the plane that makes the sighting before
the suhmarine does. Instrument flying training should be carried out so that it
is at least possible to fly with safety in bad weather. If necessary it should be
carried out while on patrol at times when vigilance may be relaxed, -even if it neans
sacrificing observation by the pilot. However, assigning unreasonable operations
to untrained personnel and suffering useless losses is condemned. Hence, in weather
in which the ability of the flying crew is not to be trusted, it is best to return
to base without loss of time."
U.S. submarine tactics.
"By always carefully observing the condition of the enerny and knowing his
DARF 38
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 743
CONnOENTIAL
present tactics, strike the first blow, and realizing that the tactics in present
use niJLl finally become historical old tactics, prepare for future combat."
"At present the eneay oakes the utmost use of radar and sonar to catch his
prey, and then carries out accurate firing by exposing the periscope. However,
a shift to completely submerged firing is being planned for the near future,
Counter-meastires must be studied.
"Surfaced submarines sometines use camouflage and deceptive measures. Vlhen
a strange boat has been sighted, she must be reconnoitered in detail. These subs
change their appearance to that of a fishing boat by the use of sails or nets, or
put up false smokestacks, and the like, and disguise themselves as boats of other
types.
Tactics for anti-sub patrol.
"When there are large and small planes at the same base, the large planes will
chiefly carry out day and night long range patrols arcund convoy routes and make it
impossible for enemy submarines to operate on the surface. In addition to making
it difficult for them to approach our strategic places and convoys, these planes will
carry out surprise attacks, taking advantage of the relaxing of the enemy's guard.
The small type planes will have as their chief duty the thorough patrolling of
areas near strategic points and direct escort of convoys. The large type planes,
even though slow of movement, can still obtain favorable coirtiat results.
"Patrol must be maintained day and night with as many planes as possible.
"Continuous neutralizing sweeps only show results when there is no let-up
during the night. No matter how severely subs may be suppressed during the day,
if there are weak points at night it is very easy for enemy subs to flee on the sur-
face . "
Tactics for planes directly escorting convoys.
"When direct escort planes sight torpedoes, they will bonb the spot from which
the torpedo tracks originate and strafe the torpedoes. Depending on conditions
(distance from the ships, muiber of bombs carried, etc.), the torpedoes may be
bombed and a report of this made to the unit under direct escort (escorting vessels).
Patrol altitudes and security.
"Determine the altitude, considering foreaost ease in sighting, and secondarily
the ease of carrying out bombing and/the possibility of/caofillcatlonfl*
"(1). Vftien primarily for visual contact.
"a. Usually ^00-600 wters will be suitable.
"b. In darkness it ia best/to fly at/about 200 asters.
"c. For confirming/sightings, etc/it is best to fly at about 300 mBt«n
"(2). Wien using magnetic detector
"Daytlmi - under 80 meters is best.
***""" f*GE 39
744 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIOENTIAL
"Night time - 80-100 meters is best.
"\1lhen an important escorted convoy is passing it is necessary to report its
movements to the forces responsible for the next sector and niake sure that thera
are no gaps in the escort protection,
"In carrying this out, care must be taken that the enemy is not inforiaad of
the movements of the convoy.
Itie lookout.
"The first step which determines the success or failure of attacks on eneniy
subs is the lookout.
"It is necessary that before boarding/the plane/the sectors of responsibility
be determined, and that there be the will to sight the enemy without fail within
the field of visibility by an alert lookout at all times.
"liiemy submarines do not give up just because o£ the presence of a plane over-
head. If there is neglect in the lookout, aimless flying or the like, serious
results will certainly follow. In all the combat examples relating to the sighting
of enemy submarines, one cannot but wonder whether the flight crews put forth seri-
ous efforts.
"It is necessary to maintain a strict visvial lookout even when using radar,
magnetic detectors and the like.
"The magnetic detector is employed especially in cases when the potentisJ. sub-
marine area is small, as in the early iages after a sighting, and the like, and the
radar is employed especially at night in search of surfaced enemy submarines.
"When it is feared that an enemy submarine has gotten away, it is necessary
to intensify direct escort in the area in Wiich it is most probable that the sub
is operating or lying submerged, and the area must also be swept. Generally Wien
patrol, direct escort, and attack are incompatible, put emphasis on the attack;
and when afraid the enemy has been lost, the emphasis must be shifted to direct
escort without loss of time.
Principles of the attack.
"When an enemy sub has been sighted, take care that it is not bombed in-
accurately in confusion, and irake it a principle not to have to .Take a second try.
Vyhen the aim is found correct, all bonbs must be dropped in one pauss". If they
are not, the second attack generally has lost its target due to the sub's diving
or there may be no results on single dropping due to fuse failure. When it is
clearly recognized that there has been no result, a second attack must be planned.
"However, if circumstances warrant, it may be all right to drop single bombs
as signals.
"The results of submarine attacks, even when the bomb lands well, being uncertain
PAGE 40
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 745
CONFIOCNTIAL
dtM to ftrequentljr having a bad underwater trajectory or exploding at the wrong depth,
it io necessary to attack with as many boiribs as possible. The vinderwater trajectory
of a bomb is generally uniform to a depth of about 20 meters, but beyond that varies
greatly. '.Vfien there is any suspicion of an enemy sub, unless there is fear of
attacking friendly forces, attack and do not spare the bombs.
"Intimidation attacks should be made when the positional error of the enemy
sub is within 6000 meters amd there is necessity for preventing its raising its
periscope and making another attack.
Guiding other planes to the attack.
"The plzme which has sighted an enemy submairine will drop target marker bombs
so that it does not lose track of it, and guiding other planes by radio, it points
the direction of the enemy sub with a small blue flag after bringing them to the
position of the enemy sub, Uoreover, if necessary, it drops more target marker
bombs and carries out bombing operations. It flies, banking toward the true bear-
ing of the enemy sub's position from the bombing splashes and target markers, or
reports the bearing and distance by radio.
■The planes being guided will focus their attention on the direction indicated.
(Jhen the position of enemy sighting or the point of the said direction and distance
is an unknown distance, they wil] bomb a point 50 meters in that direction. If
the planes being led do know the position of the enemy sub, when necessary they
will approach the guide plane, show a nrnftll blue flag and bank.
"VJhen two or moi'e planes have gone into bombing runs at the same time, the
one having the higher altitude will give way and begin over again. When the alti-
tude is the same, the one having the companion plane on its right will break off
and make a second run.
Cooperation of magnetic detector planes.
To cooperate with magnetic detector planes, the bomber should follow the vector-
ing borabless plane - but at the saas time, the bomber should keep a close visual
lookout. (CoEiaent: sicl)
"Method of dropping target bombs.
Nijmber next to circles indicate the
order of dropping.
White are dropped accortUng to detector
signal.
(^reen are dropped when the (>^ area is
reached.
746 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
"When the position of an eneiiiy sub Is deduced, drop a smoke bomb aa near as
possible to that point. £sp>eciall7 are these always to be used Mhen guiding surface
craft.
"The attacking planes will watch the above conditions, infer the movements of
the eneiqy, and attack.
Cooperation with surface craft.
"The secret of cooperation is based on mutual understanding. Therefore, we
must work for perfection of communications, both visuEd and wireless, since they
are a most important means of establishing understanding.
"In establisiiing a thorough-going, unobstructed tinder standing, radio com-
munications must by all means be put to practical use. Even under present conditions,
this is never impossible; and, as the actual experience of the YOKOSUKA Air Q-oup
clearly shows, if both parties have the proper determination, the desired under-
standing can be realized.
"Still, when the nature of the present surface craft anti-suboiarine staff
is considered, present development primarily is awaiting vigorous leadership from
the aircraft section.
In directing surface craft, remember that they are often not furnished with •
sonic gear, that their sighting level is restrictive, and that they are slow. Treat
them as if blind.
Ordnance and equipment.
"New weapons should be quickly mastered. Before new equipment is received,
as much research as possible should be carried out beforehand. Radar, in particular,
has revolutionized warfare, and as it is said of old, "Without a rifle, no infantry",
so without radar, no war planes. In this our country, since it is in the unfortun-
ate position of having started late in this field, requires the utmost endeavor.
"Tt\e No. 6 (132 lb.) bcoib has little power, and so if it does not hit directly,
it can not cause great damage to the enemy. It is best to use the No, 25 (550 lb.)
bomb as ouch as possible.
"The fuse must be set properly. The depth of explosion of auiti-submarine bombs
is better deeper, rather than shallower than the enemy's depth. Depending on trans-
parency of the water in the patrol area, the type bomb used, and so on, a suitable
fuse timing must be used. Usxially the first bomb will be set shjillow, and the second
and succeeding ones should be set for a deep depth to cope with evasive tactics."
(Comment: The Japanese use time, rather than hydrostatic fuses for anti-sub
bombs.)
"Aggressive use of machine gxins must be planned, fitting it to the conditions
at the tine. Although the results of strafing sxibmarines cannot be e]g>ected to be
R&6E 42
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 747
CONROENTIAL
outstanding, by casualties to the officers and other annoyances it can make diving
inpossible. And it can make the submarine show its position by oil leakage, so the
aggressive use of strafing aust be kept in mind.
Maintenance,
"The maintenance of aircraft, due to the inadequacies in the supply of materiel,
depends in great p^rt on the efforts of the Air Group maintenance crews. For this
reason the diligent endeavors of maintenance squad leaders are required."
Conflraation evidence ,
"Tbe oonf ixaatlon of eoabat results Is extraaaly ia|>ortafit for the planning
of future attacks.
"Pvrtberaore, since it is not easy because of the peculiar characteristics
of sutanarines and additionally because enei^y subs are pulling various sorts of
deceptive tricks/confir»ation/is beconing more and more difficult.
"Usually, either because the pilot is personally satisfied of the results or
dislikes the trouble of continuing, the attack is broken off preaaturely. It is
easy to let the ene^jr slip away in the last five minutes so care is necessary.
"Rben the foUowlag phenomena have been noted, cotisldar the sinking conflrsied.
"1. Large aaounis of oil leakage and leakage of air bubbles for over 10
minutes, or, although the period of leakage of air is short, when a
large amount of air is released due to the damage to the inner shell
of the hull.
"2. fhen oU leakage continues over a fortnight.
"3. Mien parts which are Inside the Inner shell of the encmgr sub irtilch
has been destroyed, ccas to the surface."
748 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION FBABL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
LONG-SHAFTED ENGI^E USED ON JACK
The amoothly streamlined cowling of the new Jap Navy interceptor, JACK, Is
made possible by the installation of an uDuaiially constructed engine, thevloqe-
shafted Kasei 23.
Information on the appearance of this new paaerplackt is gained from a recently
recovered document ( CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,606). Data oa its perforuano* bma
appeared in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. U and in other publications,
l&jdmum horsepower is 1820 at takeoff.
The extended, Farman-type reduction gearing penaits the installation of a
highly streamlined cowling and results in a relatively anall frontal aitea. The
cooling profctlem is overcoaie by the addition of an auxiliary fan, fieared to the
propeller ahaft and turning in the same direction at an increase ratio i£ 3.18 to
1.
The Kasei 23 engine is the 20-3eries parallel of the older Kasei 13, which also
has a Farman transmission and ia similar in appearance but lacking the faa.
The 13 does not appear on any currently operational plane, but served its purpose
as an experimental fore-runner of the 23.
The Kasei 23 displays several features of German design influence. Tlie cooling
fan is sljnilar to that employed on the FV/190; in place of a carburetor, it has
a wobble-plate fuel injection system with individual injectors for each of its
Kasei 23 engine, used in JACK.
PAGE 44
Photo from captured document.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 749
CONFlDENT/AL
l/» cylinders, a development aimilar to that used on the German BUW801. Tlie same
device is used on the Ha 112, Model 2 engine installed in DIMAH 3.
This type of fuel system plus the fact that the engine uses 91 octane aviation
gas as well as water methanol makes its performance different from that of the
Kasei 21. The dry weight of the engine, fully equipped, is 1895.95 lbs.
Cf special interest is the duraluminum cooling fan which is nounted on a splined
aleeve on the propeller shaft. The fan gearing consists of a set of planets mounted
on a plate which is splined to the propeller shaft. 'Biese planets mesh with a fixed
internal spur gear and rotate the sun gear which turns the cooling fan in the sane
direction as the propeller.
The sun gear rotates on a sleeire around the propeller shaft in a lead-bronze
bearing. It is lubricated by oil under pressure from the propeller shaft. This
oil is tlirown out from the sun gear auid lubricates the entire assembly. The pro-
peller shaft has been lengthened 13.78 inches and the extended reduction gear housing
is constructed of a lightwei^t magnesium alloy.
NEW ARMY AIR DIVISION
The existence of an 11th Amy Air Division is reveaded in a Jap address book
taken from an Amy twin-engined bomber 3ALLX shot down over SAIPAN on 3 November
(CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,300). The location of this unit is given as OSAKA,
which is also the headquarters of the Central District Army. This association might
indicate that the Uth Air Division has been established to control the air defense
of the ioduBtri&l KOBB-OSAKA-NAGOYA area. The date of organization of the 11th Air
DivlaiOTi is not given, althovigh the 10th is known from transfer lists to have been
organized in JAPAN last Uarch.
An Air Division in the Japanese Army Air Force is a high tactical and admin-
istrative conmand, subordinate only to an Air Army. The 11th Air Division therefore
is presumably subordinate to the 1st Air Army at TOKYO, which is the top Army Air
Coomand for the £kq}ire. An Air Division theoretically consnands at least two Air
Brigades of three Air Regiments each, or about 200 airplanes, Kowewer, in practice
the strength of Air Divisions has varied widely.
750 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COWPIDENTIAL
JAP AIRFIELD CAMOUFLAGE
Jap use of trees and shrubbery to caaouflaga pl&nea on the ground Is Illustrat-
ed by photographs of LIPA ^TEST FIELD on LUZCM. Methods ussd sr* regarded sa fairly
successful; since planes are not easily visible from aediua altitudes. Note that,
contrary to usual Jap practice, nettinx is not used.
LIPA rxST FIELD'S paved runway and trunk taxLuays are not successfulljr toned
doim and stand out clearly. Smaller loop taxiways, extending 650 yards from the rurv-
way, are dirt surfaced euid do not stand out as sharply. Revetments, also made of earth,
have shrubs growing on them and some have trees within their walls. This preventa
sharp contrasts In color or tone in the dispersal areas.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
751
CONFIDENTIAL
Planes in this and the preceding photo are camotiflaged by hiding under trees
and by tying palm fronda and other foliage to the winga and foliage. In most Inatano-
es the tail assembly of the plane has been placed between two palms and the plane
has been pushed under as far as possible. Protruding engines and noses are well cov-
ered with foliage. In a few cases one or two palms have been removed, leaving enough
space to push the plane clear under cover. Even when this is done, foliage has bMo
thrown over the plane to prevent its disclosure by outline or reflection.
Planes camouflaged in this way are necessarily located within one plane-length
of the edge of the taxiway. In sane cases, the best indication of a hidden plane is
the shadow of revetment walls showing between the trees.
There are no dunany planes on the field, but dud planes are left in plain view
even where they partially block taxiways. Mo damaged planes appear to be camouflaged
but several apparently operational planes are left in treeless areas, both with and
without foliage covering.
(Photographs and interpretation by Second Carrier t^k Force).
79716 O — 46 — pt. 13-
-25
752 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
THUMBNAIL BIOGRAPHIES OF JAPANESE AIRCRAFT
HELEN
(Fourteenth in a series outlining the background of ijoporbant Jap)ane8e Aircraft)*
HELEN, the Japanese Anq^'s Type 100 Boaber, has failed to prove in coobat the
extravageuit clains which were made for it at the time of its introduction, but new
deTelopments m&y make it nuch more formidable.
This aircraft, made by Nakajima, is known to the Japanese as "The Dragon", and
was hailed at one time as the plane which would bring the Pacific war to a quick end.
However, it has not appeared in substantial quantities emd its performance to date
has not been outstanding, even though it is among the most heavily armed and armored
of Jap bombers.
The original HELEN, Uodel 1, was powered with 1250 h.p. engines. It was re-
placed in mid-19/t3 by a Uodel 2, with engines of 1450 h.p. Both models are similar
in appearance, being distinguished by a built-up wing section between fuselage and
nacelles similar to that of the British Uosquito.
There are indications that a Uodel 3, equipped with engines of more than 2000
h.p. and with greatly improved performance, is under development, but this version
has not been definitely identified.
Heavily canouflaged HELSi, under Allied strafing attacka. Photo frcn AAF, SHPA.
PAGE 48
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
753
CONHDENTUL
PROVISIONAL SKETCH OF GEORGE
Reproduced below are provisional sketches of GEORGE, new Jap Navy interceptor*
This drawing has been synthesized from documentary evidence, POW statements and
sketches, and two rou^ and incoinplete drawings found in a captured ndjneographed
manual.
No positively identifiable pictures of GEORGE are available, and no specimen has
been examined in the field. The accompanying sketch is provisional and will be super-
seded when better information is at hand.
Characteristics on which available information agrees and which are believed
quite reliable include the squarish wing and tail tips, blister canopy, airscoop at
five o'clock and large spinner*
Both reported variations of armament and wing position are shown.
INTERIM DRAWING (Provislonol)
GEORGE
JAP NAVY FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR
ARMAMENT fA) 2«20MM IN WiNGS
2 I 20 MM BELOW WINGS (PACKAGE)
2«7 7M6 IN FUSELAGE
(» 4x20MMIN WINGS
BOMBS 2x77 Oft 2il32 EXTERNALUr
MAXIMUM SPEED 407MPH OMhnols) at 19,700 FT (HtGHBUMER
CLIMB 4200 FpM AT SEA LEVEL (ESTIMATED)
5 5 MINUTES TO 20.000 FT (ESTIMATED)
RANGE PROBABLE MAX NORMAL RANGE 600 SW OR S2l NM
PROBABLE MAX TACTtCAL RANGE 65%
CEiUNG 40,000 FT (ESTIMATED)
ARMOR a VULNERABU.ITY NO ARhlOR OR FUEL TANK PRO-
TECTION KNOWN FROM CURRENT
INFORMATION, BUT MAT EXIST.
WING LOADING 32LBS PER SQ FT (ESTIMATED)
POWER LOADING 385 LBS PER HP (ESTIMATED)
REMARKS THtS IS ANOTHER OF THE NEW JAPANESE NAVV SHORT
RANGE FJGHTEBS OR INTERCEPTORS IT HAS ASLiGMTLt
MORE PWEHFUL ENGINE THAN JACK' AND WILL PROaftBLV OUT
PERFORM iT ev SO*e FEW MILES PER HOUR AT MOST ALTITUDES
IT IS a DEVELOPMENT OF REJt' THE FIRST MODELS HAD THE LCJW
UID-WING AND ARM/JMENT AS IN (Al THE PRODUCTION MOOCLS
ARE PflOefiar ALL LOW WING WITH ARMAMENT AS IN (Bl THIS
DRAWING HAS BEEN DEVELOPED FROM INCONCLUSIVE SOURCES
AND MUST BE VIEWED
754 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COWnOCNTIAL
SIDELIGHT ON SUICIDES
A JUDY pilot interrogated by Third Fleet after being shot dovm in an attack off
the PHILIPPI^ES provides a sidelight on the nature of the so-called "^AMIKA2E Special
Aasault Force" of suicide divers.
This pilot was a member of 502 Naval Air Group, which he said had been joined
■with several other groups for operations in the PHILIPPirfES. His information is open
to question, but he appeared reliable on matters which could be checked.
Quoting the interrogation report:
"POW stated that his unit had become a "suicide" squadron on the 27th of October,
The designation as a suiciae squad came as a result of the group's coomanding officer's
request for such designation having been granted by higher authority. The prisoner
stated that pilots and other personnel of the group were not questioned as to their
desire to become members of a suicide squad.
"He felt that the order to dive on carriers to one's self-destruction waa absurd
(Bakarashii), but since it was an order he fully intended to carry it out. He did
feel that there had been a needless expenditure of life with very little visible
success to date. The pilot claimed that he had been given no instruction on the best
way to carry out suicidal attacks on carriers; however, he did feel that he would
attempt to hit an elevator in that elevators on a carrier were "w«ak points". At the
tlae he left MABALACAT (his base) there were still 50 members of the suicide squadron
alive but very few flyable aircraft were available. (Subsequent strikes on LUZON by
our carriers may have cut down this number) .
"POW hbls of the opinion that his unit was the only dive-bomber squadron in the
Japanese Navy that had been designated as a suicide squadron; however, he felt that
in the event of carrier attacks being launched on JAPAN proper, suicidal attacks in
large numbers should be anticipated. POW did not believe green and yellow silk flight
clothing reported as having been recovered from the body of a Jap pilot who had made
a suicide attack on a U.S. carrier had any specied significance.
"POW stated that the lack of aviation gasoline had caused the Japs to cut down
on the extent of training, but he had heard of no instances in which offensive missions
could not be flown as a result of a lack of AvGas."
POW's belief that his unit was the only one designated as a whole for suicide
work coincides with other available evidence. From recent Japanese propaganda broad-
casts, it appears that most of the so-called "KAICIKAZE" units are made up more or less
extemporaneously of volunteers from various groups acting independently. The "KAU-
IKAZB" designation appears to be a special mark of distinction applied to einy such
volunteers, rather than the name of a formal organization.
If true, however, the designation of an entire air group as a suicide unit may
mark a significant change in the development of this tactic.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
755
CONFIOENTUL
JAPS DEVELOP INDO-CHINA
The strategic importance of INDO-CHIM to JAPAN has increased as the position
of JAPAK in the PHILIPPINES and her supply line to the EAST INDIS have become
more precarious. The limited railroad facilities of the country are being utilized
to their fullest extent in an endeavor to find safe supply lines. Her ports,
particularly SAIGON and CAU RANK BAI are used for the protection of convoys and
as staging points for military operations. As JAPAN* s sources of supply on the
periphery of her empire are cut off it is to be anticipated that the resources of
IHDO-CHINA will be increasingly developed.
It is estimated that there are at present no mora than 35>000 ground troop*
permanently stationed in the country, plus approximately 2,000 special Navy Landing
Force troops.
There are 6U airfields, ranging from emergency fighter strips to major airports
capable of handling Jap bombers. The larger fields, such as those at SAIGON,
CAPE ST. JACQUES, TOURANE, CAT BAI and HAIPHONG, function not only as combat and
transport plane bases, but also as training centers.
Of the ten seaplane anchorages, the best equipped ones are in the HAIPHONG-
HON GAY area, at TOURANE, CAU RANH BAI, and CAPE ST. JACQUES. The air force in
INDO-CHINA is believed to consist mainly of float planes and flying boats for con-
voy coverage and anti-submarine patrol.
Fl«« 51
756 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
CAT BAI AIRFIELD
CAT BAI A/r, located 3 milee SB of HAIPHONG, has two interoacting hard aurfacaa
runnaya and is reported to be a firaUdaaa nllltary Installation. Included in the
facilities are a radio station, repair shops and A* positions. Revetment areas are
being extended and an atteB9)t is being made to camouflage the taxiways.
Page 52
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
757
CONF/OENTIAL
HON GAY
HON GAT - tb« chief ooallng port of FRENCH IHOO-CHINA, located on the north
shore of the Onlf of TONKIN. Faolllties include a coal treating plant with ateaa
and electric loading devices, concrete piers and axtensive railroad yards.
Page 53
758 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CAM RANH BAY
CONFIOENTIAL
CAN RANK BAY - one of the finest fleet anchorages In the GBISNT. Affording e<ai-
plot« typhoon protection. It «aa a staging point for Jap troopa enroute for the cot^
qoeat of UALAIA and NETHHILANDS EAST INDIBS.
Page 54
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 759
CONFIDENTIAL
JAP ORDNANCE VS ALLIED AIRCRAFT
Improvisation in Japanese ordnance to combat strafing Allied planes continues.
The latest development - the use of implanted bombs - is described in a report
from the Central Pacific dated 23 September 19A4 and forwarded by BuOrd.
Selecting the logical paths of approach of low-flying Allied planes on strafing
missions, the Japanese had burled the bombs in definite patterns on all sides of the
air strip. Particular attention was given to the approaches of revetments and the
main parking areas on the field.
Examination of the bombs revealed they were rigged in the following manner.
a). The nose cavity of each bomb was filled with either Comp>osltion C or dy-
namite. About one fourth of the bomb noses were filled with the plastic
explosive and the remaining three fourths were filled with dynamite.
b). The explosive was tamped into the nose cavity and electric blasting caps
inserted Into the explosive.
c). The electric blasting caps were wired in series and had 2 leads running
to a dugout. The observer, hidden in the dugout, could detonate the
bombs when the strafing planes were Immediately over the mined area. Each
of the five areas had lead wires running to a separate dugout. The bombs
were buried and well concealed with either sod or coconut leaves and would
not be visible from the air.
It is interesting to note that the Japs employed no particular type or size
bouib for this purpose. Over 150 bombs rigged with electrical detonators and ranging
in size from 32 kg. to 250 kg. were rendered safe.
Other instances of Japanese ingenuity in organizing and planning defenses a-
galnst low-flying aircraft are reported in Weekly Intelligence Summary No, ^0, Air
Command, Southeast Asia. A brief resiuae of unorthodox and impromptu defenses en-
countered by airmen in this theatre includes small arms fire by ground troops,
multi-barrelled UG's mounted <» trucks and anti-aircraft guns mounted on freight
cars.
Among the more ingenious devices employed in the Southwestern Pacific area,
wis a BETTY (medium bomber) conveniently parked at the end of a runway offering an
unusually easy target. Unfortunately machine gun pits containing 20 im guns had
been dug in the shadow of the wings. The attacking fighters received a very warm
reception. In other cases of this type, trucks, tanks, huts and barges have been
substituted for the BETTY as bait.
Another type of defense against strafing is the use of wires, strung across
narrow valleys, between large trees and between small hills on either side of the
river. Bridges, railroads and landing strips have been reported as having possible
trip-wires either over them or guarding the open approaches.
Page 55
760 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
Oth«r arsaa hs^e reported the use of a type of 70-an' mortar. The projectile
is reported to burst between 1500 and 2000 feet, ejecting 7 canisters which in turn
release parachute-suspended bomb tubes. These take two or three adnutes to float
to the ground and constitute a definite hasard as they are difficult to see. If
contact is made with one of the suspending cords, it causes the boob to explode
with a detonation described as about twice that of a 20-aB shell.
JAP ANTI-SUBMARINE BOMB
the enemy is having trouble because his anti-euboarine bombs ricochet. In
the case of their 300-4cg. bomb (Type 1, No. 25 bomb, Ifark 2, Model 1, Modification
1) the Japs have attempted to correct this with an anti-ricochet nose attachment.
Photographs of an altered bomb captured on GUAM and examined by MEIU No. 4 show
the steel cylinder which is secured to the nose of the boob by welding. This type
of aJLtaratlon should prove reasonably effective.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
761
I t » ■ I L T
CONFtOENTrAL
■) 949i-Z7«
30,000' 2]J>B-4je21 (BaMpM
30,000* 2ira-^ue21 (lovloai
3A>«
to a^ 1»M>^Mi«m 1 Dill— 1m I ]
* raPqS CU IKXIfKD
•• SOBTIK DISniBinSD
; Jl— t Good vvrtloU. ad obUqus larlUl oovanf* sliowlAc hcmb
OBI
ITWn- ooxi
TMKi.1 p»U1 oxmn" of »»•<» •->
■•vu.
»A)
r. I.
Ut.
Sortl* 90,
Jlop»#
Ikto Tatei
»
15t.»
— ]2,W0'
ajO/35B^U
W25-U
10/31""
am-
Oood •pUt-wrtlMl ud Tartltal omivga of
orou India
Btod.
T
1S.6
B 20,000'
an-UTL
9840-153
9/»9
V
»•
32,600'
ill3/5C-21B (1»>» 4/0)
•K3(KZ22
^3
»
2*'
32,600'
ia3/5C.Jl» (i»oT i/o)
9231-223
^Z
»•
25,450'
1111/6C-211S (J»>T I».)
9232-224
U/I
SiOlt
2*»
25,450'
aX/iC-^US (IBV i».)
«33-225
U/7
T«rt.
«34-225
T
V
29,300'
irA-9R-41 (SbBKlal)
9237-226
7/12
SpUt
U'
20,000*
iiay-ZMM (iao7 Tie. to
9241-227
B/»~
¥«rt.
(1. of a.11.)
9U2-227
SpUi
2Jf
20,000'
4IU>J4ai (Llisrai to
9249-Z2S
Si/*.
?«rt.
SbKlnc)
■B50.22S
Split
V«rt.
24-
20,000'
4110.2401 (OkinkaBdil to
Snltti Tic.)
5051-229
9BS2.i29
9053-229
«54-229
«/»-
Siillt
24"
20,000'
9255-230
8^."
T«rt.
s. of not>i)
9256.230
9057-230
«5»-230
SpUt
24-
20,000'
4)l&>.24a (Swtfl* to
9059J31
l/O-
¥»rt.
1«>tT1o.)
9260J31
9241-231
9B62-231
»
24-
7,300'
21P|.4aB01
(Suiddoaa* - [HaHnn
Il>o in.)
9265-232
9Al""
T
24"
9,000'
21rB~4ia!01 (iBWiifaalai)
«*-233
9/21""
»
24"
14,000'
2inMje201 (CUtlM}
9«ff-214
9/a-
Spf
24-
20,000'
'<ni->Mi (^mj» to
9314-235
?>*»*•
T.rt.
SolUu)
9315J35
SpUt
24"
20,000*
?<ni..tan (iMtln to
9316-236
?/*>.
»•«.
Danrllrtlac)
9317-236
SpUt
24"
20,000'
'Urm ^m^ (iw suabui
931S-237
7/»~
T*rt.
I npctm)
93C19.23T
Split
24"
20,000'
24aK4aia (■ pia<t« to
9»W3«
7/».
T»rt.
31 SmtD to Uirt«)
9ja-23«
SpUt
24"
20,000'
9322-239
7/S».
»rt.
«)23-239
SpUt
«•
20,000'
9324-240
IfiM.
t«rt.
■ UfB)
93B 5.240
SpUt
24"
20,000'
?tr»^M1 (1 Bl^po to
9326-2U
1fi»-
Tart.
■olnhioi^M^)
9307-241
SpUt
V
20,000'
932«42
i/rst.
T.rt.
hoiub}
932»-242
SpUt
24"
1«,500'
9347-243
0-
Twt.
• S.1.^)
934*^43
SpUt
24"
IS, 500'
934».au
V>"
Tot.
to IlMotO*)
93««U
93S-244
9352-2U
SpUt
24"
1«,500'
935>-245
a/7-
T«rt.
PBlaklk]
9354-245
9355-245
9356-245
SpUt
24"
IS, 500*
9357-246
«A-
T«rt.
to 10 U SI liMotoo - 10
935e-246
SpUt
24"
18,500'
9359-247
8A~
▼•rt.
to ai*Q0»a«)
9360.247
SpUt
24"
18.500'
iiai-41U2 (Pnvol to
9361-248
8/7"
Tart.
1-.J)
9362-248
'
24"
18,500'
poi«tiuirio«)
936>249
8A-
Split
24"
20,000'
24qc-4Jfi-tta4 (26° 50- H.
U-r 57' B to 26° 50- I,
9395-250
T.rt.
939fcJ50
U9° 24' t)
SpUt
24"
20,000'
24ae-4if«i4 (240 SO* I,
9397-251
9/17-
Tnt.
Uff» 10- E to 250 42' H,
11^ 53' S)
9398.251
SpUt
24"
20,000'
9J9».252
9A7-
T«rt.
118° 59' « to 260 20' »,
U90 29- E)
940(«S
C-S40.2Ce3-4'U.65
9401-184
11/23"
17,000
B-933-26BO-4-U-65
94<»-185
U/23~
4-OOZ-2tt3-4-U.45
9403-U6
U/23-
l-974-3»S.41130-71
9404-177
U/S4—
B-97>3«3-4IO0-71
9405-188
U/S4""
19,450
C-617-3SBS.4H»-71
9406-lW
11/24'"
4-682-4205
9407-190
11/17—
B.662-US3
1V17-"
0-327-42BS
94W-192
1V17
4-526-819B3-UOO-71
9454-193
U/24~
C-674-819BS.A1I30-71
9455-194
11A4
D-527-81'»S-4M30-71
9456-195
IIA4-
4-873-9883-11-65-780
9457-196
11/23—
S-87&.9883-U-65-7BC
9458-197
11/23—
17,000
09il-9«S-U-65-7K
9459-198
U/53-
200
1-016-431SS-4-U-64
9474-199
UA3—
9475J00
ll/!»~
9476-^01
11/75-
9477-202
U/25—
9478J03
11/25—
TD5-1C
9479-204
11/75-
20,000
105-18
948<V205
U/55—
hab
919>71
U/»-
12,725
4.491-98B5-78C
9194-72
U/^
B.951-9»S-7BC
919V73
11/9-
1-15>431B3.*7
4-661-8iqB8-41l30-53
9197-75
11/6
9196-76
20c
4.016.^31fie-4-U.^
9471-77
U/SJ-
B.22xnas-4-ii.*i
9472-78
8.683.819BS.4H30-71
947>79
u,ooc
9470-80
11/23-
94«1-«1
UA5—
20,000
TI»-2B
9482-82
11/75-
> 6 3/p vu- moe-ia
Good vu-tioBl partial onnafa
of laljnd la oolar.
9U9-261
T 24^ 20,000' TI14-77
T 24" 20,000* Tn4-97
9221-363
92: .264
11/19
llA9
■una - Upo Shoto - Oood oovloto i«rtl>^
t 12" 13,300' 1-996-J921B.UOO-55
T 24" 18,000' 4-<46-«aS-7>C
9199-36
9000-37
9001-38
U/T-
If
13,500'
I«~-131 (T)
t.o-131 (si
9213-83
9214-83
9015-83
9/lJ~
Oood trlMtrofoo lutUl oorwAfo.
v
13,500'
I-..-131 (T)
l-«-131 ip)
9010-65
9/l3~
92U-65
S-ox-131 (si
9212-65
Oood opUt-ivrtJoal oad obUqm oovonga of Kn*» 1
Bdloatod.
24"
Tor
0116.2652 (llulU)
cn6-2653
9263-lS
S064-U2
U/5—
6 }/»*
Vu--
rioo-5 (Hoollo)
9766-133
11/5—
6 VW'
Tloo-6 dtanll*}
9269-134
U/5-
6 3/»
Tor
Tloo-7 (MoBllo)
6 VS"
Vw
Tleo-e (11.1111.)
9271-136
11/5—
6 3/8"
Tloo-9 (Huills)
9272-137
11/5—
6 3/ff
Tloo-10 (Itoall.)
9073-138
11/5—
Tloo-U (lUoll.)
9274-l»
6 3/r
Tor
Tloo-12 (Mull.)
9275-140
11/5—
6 3/»'
Tloo-U (lUnll.)
9276-Ul
U/5—
6 3/r
9277-M2
11/5—
6 3/^
Tu-
9278-143
U/S—
eV4"
Tor
tloo-17 (■wU.)
9279-144
U/6«"
Page 57
762 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
0
«. y^
Tar
CTU-125 (»ortJ» Tip)
«»0-145
10A8**
t 3/^
WU-Ul (Korth Tip)
9281-146
10/18*«
6 3/r
T«r
CTll-1 (lorUi Tip)
9Ca2-U7
1C/18~
0
t }/&•
CT11-U4 {Kartb Tip)
«e3-U8
10/1).-
t }/f
Tar
CTU-126 (Kortl Tip)
9264-U9
10/18**
t 3/y
Tar
CTU-U3 (Wortli Tip)
92S5-1SO
10/lfl—
6 3/8'
Tar
CVU-ltr? (Korti. Tip)
9286-151
10/18~
t 3/C
CTU-112 (liorUj Tlpi
9287-152
10/H-
6 3/«-
Praiik-U9 (Manila B*j)
9288-153
10/18«
0
6 3/<"
Tar
CTU7-201 (Manila Ba;)
9289-154
n/b—
t.3/«-
CT127-196 (MaiYlla Baj)
9290-155
iVs—
6 3/?
CTL27-198 (BauU. Baj)
9291-156
1V5"
6 3/P
Tar
CfWI-2CS (Manila Bay)
9292-157
U/6~
6 3/r
Var
CT127-197 (Manila Bar)
9293-158
U/5~
6 3/«-
CTia7-199 (Manila Bay)
9294-lW
ll/5~
0
t, 3/S-
CV16-2U9 (Manila Bay)
9295-160
1V5~
6 3/6-
Var
cn6-2651 (Manila Bay)
9296-161
iVs"
6 3/r
EIM/.3**
9297-162
10/18—
6 3/«-
Bjmi^367
9298-163
10A8-
0
* 3/»'
'"■
BI»^368
9299-164
ID/U—
BBSt
Oood spUV-rcrUMl oanTft of «rM« Ij^ieata
-1.
SpUt
24'
W.OOO'
2im.4ieU3 (Tatoo i/S
«4>339
9/12~
T«rt.
ll>0d>)
9244-339
srut
W
2<,«X1'
2U%.41i9163 (SUw» l/r)
9245-340
9/12-
T«rl.
9B46-340
SpUt
Uf
29,SO0'
21PII-4I0163 (Taito l/b)
9247-341
9/12—
T«rt.
924»-3a
ItUI SIllBi Good
TarUcal
H'
22,<7n<
(4UKi)(4IB15)<4U-iC3S)
9340-2
11/5—
«•
21;KW
(4t2BO)(4»15)(4M-4a75)
93a-3
U/J..
u-
22,900'
(444BC)(4IB15)(4U-4U«)
9342-4
U/5-
u-
21,000'
(444BC)(4iei5)(4U-l£411)
9343-5
1V5~
v
22,000'
(444SC)(4IB15li4U-»C5a4)
9344-6
11/5-
w
22,300'
(4UBC)iulB15)(444-iaB5)
9345-7
11/5-
2*"
22,300'
(444B0) (4MB15) (444-1U19)
(462ECH4IIB15)(4&2.4C3«2)
•mh-e
1V5-
2*'
21,300'
9364-9
U/5-
24'
(4<£BC)(4IC15)(462-4C5ai)
9365-10
U/5-
|ilBt>
Good
vartlcaj
eowi«(« of ar«aa Indlr^tad
Rancooo)
24'
24,000'
462BC) (AMBU) (462-iC-5Bl
9366-3
1V3"
»
462BC>(4JeU) (462-40329)
9367-4
11/3—
( 462BC (4ieU) (462-4aT9
9368-5
r
IJ"
21,400'
(462Bci (41B15) (462-»C4-;^)
9369-6
11/5—
»
40"
23, »0
(46ac)(4ieiJ)(462-4C444]
9370-7
11/3-
T
(4t2SC)(41BU)(462-4a75)
9364-8
S^
24-
23,500'
(462BC) (41«UH462-1C»3)
9771-9
24"
(462BC)(4>ei4)(462^C461)
9372-10
11/3-
f
24»
(462BC((aiBU)(462 -40506)
9373-11
^.
t
24'
(444Ba) (4ieU) (444-4C4«S)
9374-32
»
2^
22,000'
(444BGHiai4)l444-4CU9)
9375-13
1V3—
f
24-
(444BOH4IBUH4U-4C5SO)
9?76-U
IJA—
4IP
22,000'
(444B0H4ieU)(444-4C524
9377-15
^
T
22,000'
(444BC) (4MB14) (444-4C41J)
9378-16
24-
21,000'
(14PU(4ieU(4«-iC525)
9379-17
1V3—
T
24"
21,400'
(Un.)(4»U)(468-lC494)
9380-18
IV}-
I2»
21,500'
( 14PL) (4ieU) (46S-4CM6)
9381-19
iV>.
41^
21, 200'
(14PL)(4iei4}(46e-4C469}
9382-20
^
T
24'
21,000'
(llFl.){4IBUH40.*C50e)
9383-21
12"
20,500'
(llJx)(41BU)(40-ia52)
9384-22
11/3—
T
I3-
21,000'
(lifl)(41BU)(4a*C574/
9385-23
2/3-
T
12*
20,800'
(im.)(4ieU)(40-lC541)
(TatBgop)
9386.24
1V3-
'
12"
16,500'
(444BC ) (4BU) (4U-4C2CC)
9387-25
U/>»
^mi
Oood wrUe«l cow«g» of U9» l^luted.
'
24-
21,300'
(4UBG) (4iei5) (444-4C5ao)
9388-<
1V5-
CAaoLin ^^g^
£y«S)i
Good TorUcal an]
bllqwa oonra«a of araaa in
dioatod.
24'
u.eco'
28PR4ie-n-l (Babalthuap */>) 9421-475
iVl
4«'
2BPR4ie90-l (EaialUwap l/P) 9422-476
U/5
4<^
13,000'
2BPH4I»94-1 (Babaltlniap 1/F) 942>^4T7
llyV
24*
12,000'
28pl4Jffl82-l (Cantral Harbor 9424-478
U/3
6-
2,500'
28nUIIIS97-l (aprarxi 1>)
9425-479
11/10
41F
15,000'
20'R4»95-1 (UrBkthapel la
9426-480
UA
41^
U.OOO'
2ai'«41IB8(>-l
9427-481
1V5
4<^
10,000'
28nuieiie-l (OnjkUiapal I
) 942e-4«2
11/15
1?
500'
2emjia'rt^ (u.r.Bon« i>
9429-.J3
llAo
V
9430-484
11/9
if
14,000'
28PI«»e3-l (toror la)
9431-485
iiAo
28Pft4iJCBlQ4-l (lyiaali la)
9432-486
12»
50'
28nujffiei-l (Rgareol la)
9433-487
11/2
6 3/r
VIS1J7
9434-188
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Page 58
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
763
CONFIDENTIAL
LUZON AIRFIELDS
These photoa, taken by carrier-based planes, are representative of the Jap-
held airfields encountered by our aircraft on recent strikes against LUZON.
^^--je;;aB#"ia¥«s?^*s^*&s-M!fies3s#iui^
An eacample of the concentration of Jap fields In the vicinity of MANILA. Five
of the six CLARK landing grounds are visible; the sixth is hidden by the cloud in
upper right. Center - the four ANGELES airfields.
Page 59
764 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
■fe-
I
CaUCS PARK Airfield, located In the northern part of MANILA, is a fighter
field. - The new runway is concrete, however, the old runways outlined above are
not paved and are believed unserviceable.
Page 60
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 765
CONFIDENTIAL
LBGASPI Airfield, aituated ij miles north of LEGASPI Town, is a medium booiber
field with an improved runway. Note bomb crater, fallen trees and debris in fore-
ground - the result of one of our recent strikes.
Page 61
766 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
jKT"
Fort STOTSBtBURG, former American Amy Headquartera, now believed to be a
Japanese Garrison Headquarters at least partly responsible for the defense of the
many airfields In this area.
Page 62
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 767
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON
SOURCE DOCUMEUT #1?
(PHOTOSTATIC COPT OF ORIGINAL JAPANESE DOCUMENT
CAPTUTED BY U S MARINES
AT SAIPAN DURING JUNE 19hh
containing
material pertinent to the japanese attack cn pearl harbcr
consisting of
notes on fueling at sea
/Dueling at sea of pearl harbcr striking fcrc^/)
ENTITLED
"BATTLE LESSONS ON SUPPLY IN THE GREATER EAST ASIA WAR"
USED BY THE NA\T IN CO?ffILING THE
"NAVY SUJffliARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FCR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBCR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages U32-U60).
(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #6
IN IHE JOINT C0NGRF5SICNAL INVESTIGATION
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)
The pertinent material in this SOURCE DOCUMENT is
embraced in the translations stated in SOURCE
DOCUMENTS Nos. Hi and 1$ (supra), irhich were used
by the Navy in canpiling said Navy Sxunmary of
the "Japanese Plan for the Attack on Pearl Harbor."
79716 O— 46 — pt. 13 — —26
768 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
769
770 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
771
772 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
773
774 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
775
776 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
777
778 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
779
780 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
781
782 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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79716 O — 46 — pt. 13 27
784 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
785
786 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
787
788 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
789
790 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
791
792 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
793
794 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
797
798 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
799
79716 O— 46— pt. 13-
-28
800 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-* Y'{ ' " ^ '' - ''- .'?"'' 1.1 '<l ' '-*''*^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
801
802 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
803
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805
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
807
808 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
809
810 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
811
812 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
813
814 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
815
79716 O— 46 — pt. 13-
-29
816 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
817
gl8 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
819
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
825
826 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
827
828 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
829
830 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
831
79716 O — 46— pt. 13-
-30
832 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON
SOURCE DOCUMENT #18
(PHOTOSTATIC COPY OF ORIGINAL JAPANESE DOCUMENT
CAPTURED BY U S NAVY
AT f-IANILA FROM THE JAPANESE CRUISER NACHI ON 1 APRIL 19U5
CONTAINING TN PAGES 2-1 THROUGH 2-1^2 ONLY
MATERIAL PERTINENT (OIHER PAGES NOT BEING PERTENEMT)
TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
CONSISTING OF
PLANS AND ORDERS FCR CaOiENCEMENT CF THE ?:AR 70:TH THE UNITED STATES
ENTITLED
••TOP SECRET COMBINED FLEET OPERAnON CRDER #1
and
TOP SECRET COMBINED FLEET OPERATION ORDER #2"
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING TOE
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE J^ANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK CN PEARL HARBOR"
(Record of Proceedings, pages U32-U60),
(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8
IN ■nffi JOINT CCNGRESSiaiAL INV^TIGATICN
OF THE ATTACK ON FFJ^RL HARBOR)
•Hie material in this SOURCE DOCmiENT is embraced in
the translations stated in SOURCE DOCUIiBNTS Nos. 1 and
2 (supra), which were used by the Navy in compiling
said fJavy Smsaary of the "Japanese Plan for the Attack
on Pearl Harbor."
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 833
TOP SECRET
834 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TOP SECRET
DOCUMENT
NO. 2
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 835
DOCUMENT
NO. 2
836 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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