/m
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE TEB
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEABL HAEBOE ATTACK
CONGKESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
(79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 14
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 9 THROUGH 43
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
V
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
-s^-aOINT COMMITTEE OJ^ THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAKL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
(79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 14
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 9 THROUGH 43
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79716 WASHINGTON : 1948
C^v)
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEABL
HARBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARELEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from
SCOTT W. LUCAS. Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Mlchl- tive from California
gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin
North Carolina
COUNSEL
(Through January 14, 1046)
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel / y ^ie
Gebhasd a. Gesell, ChieJ Assistant Counsel
JDLE M. Hannafoed, Assistant Counsel x^Jb /^
John E. Ma'sten, Assistant Counsel ^"'^ " ^
(After January 14, 1946) C-OiJty^ t^L^
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel ^ '
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel
Logan J. Lane, Assistant Counsel
HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
Pages
Transcript
Xo.
pages
1
1- 399
1- 1058
2
401- 982
1059- 2586
3
983-1583
2587- 4194
4
1585-2063
4195- 5460
5
2065-2492
5461- 6646
6
2493-2920
6647- 7888
7
2921-3378
7889- 9107
8
3379-3927
9108-10517
9
3929-4599
10518-12277
10
4601-5151
12278-13708
11
5153-5560
13709-14765
Hearings
Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19
:N'ov. 23, 24, 26 to
Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10,
Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18
Dec. 31, 1945, and
Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18,
Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25,
Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1
Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12
Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19,
Apr. 9 and 11, and
, 20, and 21, 1945.
30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
11, 12, and 13, 1945.
19, 20, and 21, 1945.
Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
19, and 21, 1946.
26, 28, and 29, 1946.
2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
13, and 14, 1946.
and 20, 1946.
Mav 23 and 31, 1946.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
No. Exhibits Nos.
12 1 through 6.
13 7 and 8.
14 9 through 43.
15 44 through 87.
16 88 through 1 10.
17 111 through 128.
18 ' 129 through 156.
19. 157 through 172.
20 173 through 179.
21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
ni
i- o ■
O
C
C
C
■" Xi
oS
93
8J
n
c
C-
a
Sffi
03
o
^
^
-t-* —
&
SJ
0)
a)
c
c
c
■n
a
a
c8
r-'>-
ea
*-5
■-s
o
o
VI
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
«
n
c
-<->
Oj
a
o
o
Oi
4>
c3
00
o
O
S 0)
.- o
2«
03
03
■^ Is
-efi. .2
c2
o
g2ii
0J_;
c o
t£ S
c 6
iiC o
cK
rdinp;
utant
the al
CQ
ill
1 bC
■5.E
_ o
O aj
*3 t.
r^
S o
»- ►- S
eS <3 g
0*0 5
«J — ■
CC
>>
o
P-2 ^ a;
«- o C fc.
**" «- 03 o
■^ !>, i^
C 03,-,
.-^ OJ) ^ —
4^ = ^
03 t- C u
tH t- C i
« 03 o3 X
,s >
O o
Si c
o.s
T3 =
a; 03
5*0
"C:S
> O O
O S^
-o C '^
S <^ '?
X "O -
CJ O
x.S-O
o c c
03.2.
U Cj
^^ ^
0) X +^
,c o lie
■> -3
s« °
■a S*-
S =« ^•
t: bC"c
i^ e o
^ o >
S^2
I- I
^ —I !? ^
dg
■^ '*' S 5;
" c o?
cfe
3 "O
-t.h
lent
1941
Plan
ield
^<
^. ^
-tj tC a;
« • C c
r-^
§"-S^^
^i
aiia
ter
itie
Fo
Haw
to let
1 Froi
e Air
.''^ . =-£ Q 03
^ C
^ a
05 c
rt o
o
(N t
O
3 «' =
< o 0)
03 t, «S
•«:<&
cj .3 03
E||
.- 03 ^
-E^
c E
.2 i^_-
^S OS
03 -J- ^
= S 2
w aj XT
o SS
•a <E o
-►J
^j_. 6"-'
->^-P ^ it
• S "^ aj C
3 5^ "o
3 ^ ht E.
E- OJ.S o3
■* 3 3
^- .b U 03
T3 33
T.^< i
^ a;
s o3 X :s -2
i- 3 a; 2 *
i5 a; o « >^
:so3e6
".2 "J
• s -■
So s
O > 0) 3
-S 03 te o
03
■*^ 'in "J
32 "3 O)
2; 03 C
O ?!
° S OJ 3
+i c >"^
3 ,t. O t-
(u **- x; O
<s2 E
OJ -+^ ,—
. £ 03
OogPH
, O 3
O TS.^ O
O e3 c «
^2>|
i] a ca 3
1-^ *" "^ rr;
a 3 v..^:
« .-i 03
S'^Et, 3
^'* -
'^.2'P
3 Xi 9i
3=5=^
3^- it
OS'S a
x '-I 3 a>
-3 ec S _, 33
'^ . 3 "S a;
§,= 0,3 *
s
_
^
iC
CO
o
CO
CO
o
o
IM
£Sd
(N
(N
o
o
•-H
^-<
■*
■^
^s^
■^
o
o
c
e
o
o
K
rings, page
date intro-
duced
iC
IC
iC
lO
lO
lO
lO
CD
■*
^
Tf
■*
Tt^
't
■*
2480
-5-4
^7
go
^7
05 J,
^1
Sfi
IS
rf 1
m —
T— ^
f— i
T-H
•-H
^H
f— «
^H
""^
'^
"
'"
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
vn
c
S 2
+3
CO
c
>
o
1-1 cS
--a
■00 «
«3
*-■ — "2 t-
00 — O s
: "m «::
5 «H S
g S S 2
o g-g o
S oj c S
o ^"-S •-=
03 C
a) o
— o
fl i^
>
O -u
o
W5
£^
o
t- >.
<*- t.
03
O Si .
'I' c "P
_^ Q 03
O
3^ .f^
— ' 03
> o
O -iJ
T3 S
t^ <-
<^ 83
TO ft
-1 ^
-o ft
S C
OJ 03
« •
aj 5
O ft
ft 03
>-' .
03 ^
"C o
a; ^
«3-=
3 O
« o3 ;2
bC aj,
ii -a
j:b
c o
aj t~
u 03
ft, cc
•^ (/:
a; «
■^ 2
t-T3
o o
«*« CO
^ O
3 (^
"^ ft
03 C
t^
^ j~
O 1/1
■^§
^ -5
^rt 2^
*^Pm
^ o3 C -^
ft, -ts .5
SS £2
02 -
3 O
OS M
T3 a;
3<*H
g 03
O a:
S 2
03
ft
1-5
W
o,-'
o .
o ^
fc. a?
Ph bC'
03
S (/.
O a;
^ ft
„ o
50 ^"
I r; ~ • aj
O '7 0> ai
;s'--a '^ (N .t;
C 03 c . c
a; ce o > 3
C cS t- ►S — '
-g^ «;z; 03
sr**^ s <u 3
OJ "^ a: ^ cj
■J^ -E "^ H-;
02 ^ ft S
O C «^ r-^
3'= ^ 3 -
^ E'S 3 ft
o3 O BQ O
tzi Jis ^ a^
l^-f^^ 3
i« . • 3 -f^
'^"' 03
•V 3
s
bC 3
«'^2S3
Q|2ln
bC
a ■?.
o3-0 S w
o: ;- 3 3
a; 0}
0} ^. JX
- 3 2 X <«
y o 2 « ti
cj « aj +-■ c
o'^ c ftg .
ftg ©t; w S3
.22 3 -g -^Ofd
3^^1-3
O c3
3-3
iC o 3
•-r--|T3 a>
C O. cc •-
QJ CO ^ if
2^j2i
OS ^ c
'^ aj D
osr! 3 a^
3 ^ ^-
o he O
■■:3 s o o
« aj o3 o
•3 tH o •«
C W-3 "S
3 a> 3 3
302 3 *
S o 25
, u o bC
0 3 S
^ d a; ?
S 0 oi O
^•^ OS
ft 1- ft o
TJO «i X
"^1^2
-I'-'+i 3
-* -1^ o02
05 3 2 ^
1-1 0 w >i
"— ' 0 ^ 3 •
. t-Oi 5 d
bcO.-^ Si^
3 01 -^ =''
^ t3 ^ 03 .2
03 2 50 2
'^'*'*< 0 2
„ CO -ki .3
««i bc aj -t^ Dh ~^
t- p d 3_
^^ _X3 03
03 a^
.^ I— I +»
. *
-1 O) -w
-s-
ill
^02^ o
03^0 c
^_ 01 1—1 ■ 03
o b ■* aJ
T— t a^ I
•* C I a;
2^3^
c3 03 d
Kr cc ft O
< -5 tc
a; < *J ^
"c4 4J^ 2
-c ^a2<t:
- s-o <u
= ^P ft
*=■ SJ «^ '^
3 += "" -.
-^ ^ O 01
.2 o3 O OJ
g^Pi2
^^
r^
^
CO
^
^*-l
CO
CO
C<l
(M
CO
t^
GO
00
00
0
(M
■*
10
CO
0
0
0
0
0
(N
C^
<N
c^
IN
'"'
^
^
^^
'"'
■"^
'"'
iO
CO
«o
lO
iC
10
iC
iC
iO »c
Tf
=^2
•^
^
■*
■*
tP
Tf
-* •>*
1^
§c4
°2
iH
55;
°2
1^
Is
^ 1
1694
2-15-
2065
2-31-
f-l r-*
VIII
IXDEX OF EXHIBITS
Si a;
•C ^
OJ O
>'C
S 03
u
c c
■^ 3
c c
O O"
est:
s: c o
est"
.2-r a
^•c o
oO «
*^ •_ »^
.■'^<
SS ^
^■^•^
So
c*^ bC
3 C c
>-- w
•" > o
O - C
05 fc- -s
2!^ e
3 'C •*-'
o3 t- l>
X!£ -
-CO
30 «
-O « "^
Q 1^ «3
•^ a; C
3 C r
aj
bC
05 C'C
.~ C o
O 03 '
Km
•a
etc,
OtD
£ 3^
i.H
§^
u si
^^
C -^
.2 ^
03'
0.2
> -^
= 1
05 3 i:
3 cc
3 t- *-
S S 55
° 3 3
S O O
a> « o
. C
> 05
O 3
^^
"g '-
-2 C
03 -C
■C 03
- a:
» 83
X s
bcCO-
3<< aj "= o
■!« ^
3 n -*^
■C-= 03
*- c :r
. 3
> 03
O 3
t; 83
bC_o
a; 3
9. a
^ >
' o
.3 02 c;
•^ C !/:
aT^ rv
«3-*f 2
O 1 .S
>.= -
o3H ■*
-s^ ^
«ii 1
OJ ^- '^
i^si S<
^ +i 03
u , OS
_o > -£
o ■
.■s —
Q
c
o .
..a
Si
a
H-§ E: "^^
o
«"*: c
5'3<«
<! g o^-
S ^- §
3 £ 5 S
Si <-^"^ 3
, o3 ^
' K ^ aj
- C bC' c
Qj i-
-2 o . «
o3*^'>-r}<
^3 ©2
1%
-CO
>,00
^ bC CL, -^^
•<T) bCM
. U
"I
-«J 03
83 W
02 XJ
.t; aj
OQ
"^ tr«t-
T3 >,
aj o
^t;
3 -:3
bC o3
o^
a; oj
_g ^
02 ;D 2
^ .2 *-■
3
03
&
o3
-§■
v> o
0(N
CC 3
3 O
■i^ 03
o3 W
-k^ c^ c
g 3
a a;
CC bC
a.
o
.s
. a.
03
a
e3
*i 'i,. o: 03 w 2
3 i:^ a -s'^ —
w
05
iC
(N
o
o
i-H
^5
iC
»c
lO
iC
£S6
to
t^
CJ
o
o
O
o
1—1
^-1
«-^
.^
(N
N
(N
fO
CC
CC
ec
ec
CC
CC
ec
"^
'"'
'"'
li
iC
lO
iC
lO
lO
iC
iC
lO
lO
IC
iC
•*
•^
■>*
•*
■^
■<*
■*
Tf<
-*
rf
•*
d eg 9
00 00
00 00
^ 1
00 OD
^4
^7
is
is
§^
is
S-o
(N
(N
c~<
—'
'-'
»-<
.-(
l-H
Wg
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
IX
f£ <-
s c
a^
** c
2 08 X
S ac
5 «.2
"C - "a;
r. <^. "-
5c ^
^ c; 0)
^ I 5
5 O o3
■=-3 i
^ * cS
o aj«^
^3 a;
05--P
«.. . s
*s c c;
I? I
2 £ n
X
T! bC
•'- .£ 'w
O u ►-
> fc- o
s s; c
OP Q hJ
tCo3 «-
OJ C r:
^ S -^
ill
"^■^ S
«5 c
Q^c
S § S?
•- S-£
"3 "H'H
^ o3 S
S §.5
ic S
S3 «3^ ^v
> r- ^ V.
see. .n
= * «
J; y- 4i =3
ii' " .£ '■/■-
^5 Hi;
«3 c ■£ 5
c; c; «<-
S i; '^ =
s fl3 <5 „
"*■ -- '^ —
= -§ 23
■|| i|
c
.S "-
5^
1 'f
5: tc
93 ri:
^ o S ■=
^ =S
2 "- *- o
1—1 «
0"£
I- "7^
- u 03
o 2 C. 2
OS c
-88
ea Si
^2
^5
2 5
a; »
C >■.
.2 -■ -2
== bc?:
c
>.5
bC
'/-:/• C^-' •-•— ^r- •-«-*-
0/^. .— ^ — o3 — "- !/•—
5 t
o s
>*."
^ o8 <*H
05 CM -i
>■ , •- c
CCS 1)
c o c/ a
sl ^
" *^ u
r. c c
— 2-^
"3 sa:
~ 3 03
;- M (-
03 . t
03 ^ ~
h «3 Q
"5-8
^" e8 - o
« - 33 ij
d -^ X 2^ 5 •£ i:
:§"E
« is
e3 =
St
-J;^ 03
-^-' f-
= 5 = ^
c3 ^— ^ fl3
»- o3 t- J-
•c^S
* a; ^
"x ^^
X
;j
X
^
2
«
«
kZ
rt
8
•^
o
■^
r-
w
J2
^
ifl
o
-1^
s s
2 S..2 — ^ ^
Sa2
3Q
p C
- .> - M
>C 05
— 7 = 03 ^
<;<
i: -3 <<;
as O
5 .bcO
II
2^
^ c
r ' 3
.J S3
. ji
COO
o; .
^^ c
«
o3 C3
« O
bC X
X ^
X
£ =
S5
o!^
M.«^
0-<N
ojOO
= sc;5t;
g d 09
2O2 0C
03 O O
^ o! t-
202 C
"" _ C3
• «^ ^-
u C >>
C3 03 ^"
CO-3
o >>S
X S; ^^
- 03 -
03 t, o
> « C
C 33 5
l£^
^ 03
OS k
^ 03
."^
. 3
. ^ /"^ X
08 O
« 2
♦J c-
.2 X
03x1
2f o
o5 cc
a 03
03 C
03
bC>
_5'0
o8 o
C 05
O C
2 .5 *
■rf o c c
?s IS-
o-s >^
o! O
2o
oi^
■ bc
SOS cc
. 43
ocq £
t-r O
««os c
s - o
S . b.
i^ O S
Q ^
o
«
'S"
o
OS
o
CO
lO
OS
OS
(N
CO
^H
N
f<3
oo
QO
OS
OS
OS
o
o
CO
cc
CO
M
CO
CO
CO
CO
Tt*
■<*
-^
■"t
"3
lO
o» 1
^7
s^
IN 1
OS —
oco
<N 1
(N
^7
i^
si
OS
(N
w
(N
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
3
o! 3
• o
!?; 05
.2 5
3O
bC I
^^
05
o-
O
05 g
2S
OJ o
o o
:s >
o c
- p
05
" t.
5^
'-s-O
«x:
2 o
.2 -j:
■*^ c
Ho
E "-^^
■1^ o5
T3 E
S o
^1
.202
2|
g 05
X T.
<v c
■-c'S
3 bC
o-is
O d
-SO.
.2£
.s V
^^
„ o
:; «
3 ?
05 b.
Oh S
3 B
<u
O 3
a oT3
6 sic
^ o
V T. o
•^ ft «
ftS_^
P3
^ .s
O J)
0)
•- ft
3 3
03 O
15 5
C 3
3iZ2
"13 _
2"^
3 05
£
o
O § O
o
ftft
.S! 3
ft O
o >-
OtJ-
Oh
J g-E fta; S o^
«n=.2f3tf 2p
Om o 3
Sj3^-a^,
— 05 - e O
-g S-0 05^^
=: i^<2 2
c8
'"''•'•' c5 -5 3
> «jj3 >c:
0,3 5 t.^o
-kJ -*^ iS 5
S ft^ O -k^ (N
■3 .a ■«*< « ^
3T3 05 ,, W)-J
tn 1— I 05 r; o
05 bC W-3o
X « ° "S ,3 oS
^'.ti ^«- S5
3 X! 3 f-'*' ^
-^"^ 3
* « = 05 00 S
Sw,
£V 05 05.3S^ 03
ft^EQ^S
"5 = "^
o
o
o
^-^ S -^
«5 x;
PQ
cc
05
4^
08
02
T3
05
+3
'3
10 ^
ft
o
ft
08
bC
OQ
r>r
Q
c^
05
s5
S
2
T3
05
s
<
•<->
d
<t-l
T)
0
-*J
.^
li
u
0
0
ft
ft
Pi tf
2 I
1—1 (M
Of
10
s4
10
ec I
OM
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
XI
CQ
<
a
1—1
o
■^
o
05
"^
:s"
QO
cJ'-^
C^l
8!^
■*3
K2
O
c:?
<- o
« 4J
_ a)
Si
o *
is
c »
Q
a;
«S
C
eS
5
e X
OD
a 9)
T)
c 5
O M
33
If «8
c^
^ a
a; ^
a
-tJ o
IW ^
^p
1-
c
.2
aj-a
^ a;
« 2
08
C
OS
aj ^
3««
2 ^
c
go
CO S
o
St
9-2
^-5
8^
■o'S
-*2
cc»
c a;
■♦a
C
'-5 bc
.22
08 S
o3 ■<-:
Q
ft£
•ftS
P.
S g
goc
^
6
©■^
U
2 fo
3
a; ^
O O
s .sp;
o3..
SO
o
bc«*-
c -
aj o
lis
rti >>
3 aj
"? £
c3 ^-
^ 03
2 ^
c a;
ex)
— aj
cc ^
08 S
;:: s
ft CO
9 o
bcgi
O^
-ID
o
S'ft
«*- CO
° s
w.
fp
o> ^
«
o
^ 08
n
'^ .
CO
-s-g
'^ c"
a)
C gS
•-' bC
a; o8
5.2
_ o
aj.t:
r% ^
O X
:: «.«•
«*-! "O 'S
o aj S
+j ftJE
c fc o
to 5
a; e "^
::§^
_ CO «
2. CO ^j
05 a> -ti
I> J, *J
. a; C
w C «^
Qt) O
o a)^
3 o
'"' O 4)
O rtj o!
sl«
CO .^fl _J
o8t^ »
^ aJ y
C i; CO
^ O C
+s^ ai
£ =« ft
S ¥ ft
" CO ^
-►J 3 «
fl O CO
a) >c .
S^o
g t« OD --
ft. .iS — <
•^ -t^ ..
*tS CO ^^
+S Oj 05
:S ««
o
-n
fS
«
?'
S
o
«
S
o
c — ,
"3 •♦*
08
|1<
.2 «*-
o
>
<!
a>
bC
73
<D 3
.2 ^
2 %
o8
08
> ©
o pa
©
S3
©
>>^
m
H&
<;^
o
*^j3
Hj
t +=
a>
ftC
43
a? ©
H
rt'5
«-i
^V.
o
00
^
S
s ©
cc «
C
ftC
k-l
© —
»o
eo
o
l^
(»
o
^
N
««
to
o
»-(
"*
00
o>
o
c><
(N
CO
CO
CO
eo
CO
■*
-t
■<**
U3
1— 1
iC
«o
«
to
«o
1©
1-H
(O
«o
to
to
to
to
I— (
»c
««
iC
lO
»c
iC
lo
lO
lO
I©
»o
I©
ooo
»© 1
o4
o4
§2
^7
1-^
^2
-c^
^2
.— 1
'^(N
^2
^i
"^
1-1
XII
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
>-> ^^
a
O
be
_C
-3
c
08
(U o"^
-s o
si
S =
>- c
83
.S 00
o o
€^
O
Ah .
bC
R =
^<
l§
to o
1^ en
a; „ -g
bCg
be
C) ^'
c
^-;
^*f
OtJh
» 0
-COS
a;-C
0 L.
:§
I"
<; bc
2<
6 =
e3_g
03.2
„ o a>
«i 5 e
s 5 «
■<H o
o
ID .»^
- a !U
O O 3
>>-S =?
o S' S
bC S
^ S3 o)
£ oj-^
^ 00 —
o| g
5 ^^
"O 83
e3i-s _r
o3 005
iC o
IM
bc^
;:: (-.
T3
T 83
O
M
to fc 2
0«{- 0)
«-S o
S >=3
£ «
S^ ►-
i> ^ *"
05.5 g
c5
o'SHt3T5 o
83^ « 2 * 2
^2^-s'^c^-
i-'ti CO £ t« . 2
">— I -tj CO eS T3
^ .«2 bi)^ .^ ««
^ -i^ |j S a O S Sg
X;-o w e3r^ *-&•-"
"S ^--CQ Z ,, St o. «*
T3 &«« O -P Cu 05 >-'
- g; ° X J C Q «
I"); W3aga;t8§
5 H
5<N
t^
N
t*
C 0! 3
ng
^ CO
^ I
(N i
10 !
to -^
0J»0
® r-l
•I I
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
xin
>
e8
s >
^ o
o «
V
O)
«2^
a)
^^
56
fc> o
go
O CO
^ (1)
<= s
O o3
>'-5
.fci &
<3 £
e.2
as *■
o8 ««^
K o
u o
(g bO
2 =
T5"E
-ffi
B bC
93
OC
2SS
S oz:
.s «
X e8
J«! (S "
O tn flj
CO ej ^
03 "-s *s
<^ ^
^ o S
— , «
= * o
->i —
9J C C
•* o C»
> -tr
. o
a: ° ■*;
o3 a) P
X S ?:
E-i
Is
>
c a> "SO.
c :=
32
=5^
C CO
o ^-^
■702
.S 5"^
oj-C O
0) S3 —
C X M
C L, a;
O 5 t;
1^5
♦^ -^ /^i
C EC
4) £T3
C t.
ro^ O
.S £ OT!
■2 H-= &
as -
■'- '^ QJ _«
So ^ 2
o ^
^" « .5
f- o3 -C
2-a i2 S
« c "" -a "t;
I- z f-
2.-5 ^^
- 03 K^ C
-a 3Q0
S =" o*^
03 bC bC a
^.5 go
.*i •- -^
> X
03 "W
03*^
-" c
o
(^ 5
I- .a H-
^ ^ i^
2? =c I
bCr-
■71 Oi
O
<
CB
<A
-^
"C
30
S3-
c3
a
S'
^
(-
.'J
c
1
"5
a
0.
z
0
« ^ t;
o^-
is
>-.
0
?=^
p
o-^
*■
0"S
.a
T.S
a
S3 3.
>-<
i
Tf ^
a
--T3
"C
1^5
53
0 ^
u^
3
- x
0
U a
a
^ 0
0
r* «
T'
Sh ^
;■? 03
'^^
^
- c;
fc «
<; c
-^
Z2 -^^
«
02;
c >
ef
Ph -, a
o o
c a
-^ o
2|§
ec id
O-s ^
r-< a c
T}< O O
2i.i:
'^ *j -ki
g.So
Col
■c s i
O 4) C
■§:= >>
■^bcS
03 Xt;
^1 =
c
■*
3
0
,__
^
f^
w
-a
aj
(1)
a
0
^
*"
c
a;
s^
X i
u
h
>o
^
■*
'*
t^
00
0
rt<
t*
■*
«o
t^
CO
Tf
■*
iC
iC
CO
t^
l>
eo
«o
0
<o
t*
t*
t>.
t^
t^
t^
t*
t^
00
00
00
00
id
10
007
m
lO
iC
lO
10
lO
10
»o
0
«fl
^
•^
■*
■*
Tl<
■>*<
•*
•<*<
■*
■*
rj*
eo 1
lO 1
a. 1
IM 1
■* 1
■* 1
•<* 1
■* 1
00 1
rf 1
»o 1
o««
si
0"3
o»o
-H m
(Nt^
(Nt^
<N t^
(Nr^
Nt^
«ct>.
I>t^
t^^
Or*
"^T
t^r-.
t^--
is.,—
r^^
t^r-
t^ —
^■^
t>.-H
'^ 1
-^c^
>-< 1
^ 1
<-< 1
^ 1
^
— < 1
cq
f-H
<N
<N
<N
c*
(N
(N
<N
N
"
1—1
oc)
XIV
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
J3
O
a:
<0
3
Q
■s.s
3
-c
Tf
03
:: X
^ ^'
bC
*C
3
T3
a
> .
03 O
li
p
a: C
.2 „• ^05
- -^ 3
E-o H
S3 eg
cc o a;
C/2 3
>T3
o;
T3
UD 9^
X
O
u
(U
n1
O
03
cs:
-u
■^ a;
^ a
a;
gc
03 iS
3 cS
"S 03
5 S
2 c
ajPn
s
°-5 i
O <N
'■*^ I
cO
03^
bC r-
0.2
=> B
U 03
-rT CO
C.2
CO 13
- a;
O 3
P5 g
o '^
.— CO
+J IK
03 C
S c ''
« •-
Q to
s s
hC
C .
bC te
O 22
o t.
^ a
5C1
o
bC
o
^ £
5 S-H
S<1 =
^ »- 3
aj CO .i5
t- 03
a; 0} CO
"S "^ «
co-is'g
aj t- S
o a'
■^ 3 O
- C
- bC
>. o3
^ bC
3 C
22 -^ C w
5 rt* C -
-Is
* £3
o a; .3
^ «■?
O. O 3
.CO « o3
O 3
C o
0) O
Sffi
0) o
o s
co2
O 3
E.£
OS
M .5
> >>
--03X CO S
Tt< 3 O 2 3
CO "
S to"
... to"
OS o
s o
;o" '-
. "^ CO
a; ^ Vm
o —
035
a; aj o
03 aj 05
GO o
ao c
.JO ^ 08
C1..3
<»-■ .3
O o3
>^3
& O
o «
« c •
J2
tf
ss
CT3
O to
> to
O rt
C5|
to *'i
3 05
as
a; o3
o^
25
3-^
St?
o OJ
^^
b. ^
o ^
T3
<3 2
- O
50" O
> c
bC CO *^
00 2 o
-tj +j r»
0^ £-2
w oQ aj
a; S «
05
■^^
bc2
Is
s >^
O o
o2
M
>>
•—I
3
>>
►-»
-1
3
1^
0
3
0
DO
T3
4
91
A
T)
s
s
20
Q0O>
00 -r
00 I
eoo
05 C^
CD I
OM
IN I
co.,-1
on
<N I
10
00 I
CO r^
OM
<N I
t^ —1
t^ r-H
OM
OM
<N 1
(N 1
(N
N
-H I
O CO
« I
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
XV
03
'3 «
o
OJCL
£ a
' 03
°i
W 03
. C
c o
6^
3 c
02 *
« CO
13 .S
o o
>
3X) '
^ie
08
s§
S; c" w
005
^ aj
^^'^^^
>,.2 «
15 ^'
c
03
+; CO
^ O >>,
« a u
CO - -
Zxi T5
5 S
2 « —
SOQOC
03
"^ 03 tac
O C C
a ^A
03
o gS
be
c
«^
01
03
2:^
>,
x:
c
a;
0
0
■fi
0
03
^ 3
■a C
c w
= 9
•IS 03
03 10
Si a
Xhw. S
c :;^
►-^ «:
cS >
> C
03 HH
^-
- c
o «
^2
SJ c >
O S 3
(N
« 0) ^,
■o a> S
«JS 03
S c^
^ji a
° § a
a V
« t-
o
to 5
V 03
•*- "E o
»-^ 0; 3
Tt f- 03
2^ a
00 x;^
*• 3 is
3 ^
r- C C
" 4) 3
- ca o
lis
o 3.3
^ »-N r?
■g o a
**- r/;
Eh
o" <^
>
o
a
o
e: 5
02
o
bC
o
1^
«
0
T3
2i
3
03
C
03
T!
i-s
s
s
a
a
CD
?.
0
0)
u
w
_,
3
0
>!
01
a
X!
bC
^ «
OS aj
2 P
53^
OQ
° ~ .2
to SC
§^ "b
as .2
o3 * ^
^a '^
^3 53
si
O O
a.fci
3m
(U o
^ o
c _r
l^" 1
^o ■ g
3 c "«
^^ =
O aj
3.2 &
"-5 bC 2
*4-i 3 a^
M 3 0)
01X3 -*
s a;
■-5 3
"^ s
a) s
3 5
■3 o
to
O
W
> 08 u «
* rt? 2 *
aj^s-i
>.0^ o
-2 -U OB
3
* OS
tc bC 3
-*i ^ *^ V-4
_bC,— o
to "S t-
o "^ >
03 g. 5'^
K* a_g
« b . o
4* S; a:
H-( ^ 3 I,
4^ 2^-2 2
" a; « 0^
G ^ ^ii
■> obI^
*^ 3 o3 «:
o
Oi.S 3 «
+i O w ^
§-°|
3 C^
i o «
^2 c 5
aa
S •*2 03^
3 03-3 O
s o.a^
Ci.flJ-5^
^<%
a>
t^
TP
>«
<S>
CC
l^
00
M
0
"*
00
QO
0
(N
0
^H
(N
■*
Tf
o>
0
0
0
0
0
t-H
^-l
1-H
^H
M
M
M
cq
(N
M
(N
(N
IN
(N
(N
M
»c
10
iC
»o
10
10
iC
iC
IC
•C
iC
Tt
Tf
■*
■^
■*
■*
•*
■*
■«»<
^
•*
«C
1-1 1
^ 1
CC 1
"* i
lO 1
10 1
IC 1
»o 1
"3 1
«5 1
0 1
o> ■*
Os^-i
Oj '-<
OSr-l
OSrH
05 r-l
05.-I
05^
05 —1
05^
05^
0>-H
■* 1
o«
oco
OCC
000
OM
OCO
OM
ow
OCO
S'?
S*?
?ST
e^ 1
(N 1
0 1
(N 1
M 1
M 1
M 1
(N 1
IM 1
M 1
CM 1
CM
(N
M
M
M
(N
(N
M
1—1
(N
IN
s
B
XVI
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
o o
"2 c
r" =«
r- O
C .
c; ~ —
~ =« C
3 «« .
s >;^
1- = ^
^■^ is
>-' t. 03
~ S «
■^ 02i
"*" O .
>-, ?'*"
(-1 '^ -^
S aj rt
« ot:
^t 5
— ^%J w
O o
• - O C
«^ o
^ -*- 03
~ — <_
o; 03 o
X o £
xi "-^ "o "=
a; c o o
C ^ c a;
oj • tr5 ^-
o o:r: 5
C t. CI.
O 03 ai
r, *^ r>
= a; 03
^ >^
fc -^ —
O 03 1-^
2 0) -
15"^
a 2
.> = "3
2 o es —
s; c S 01
JK c >
-^ , ^ tf
03 t- _ x:
^S c g
S^, <^'^ ^
Tf< ^ t; c
<■ ^ 03 -
^ 03
03^,»3 o
£-oi
■M ^ £ *
is£.£
a) — : x:
IS
CC -5
o —
/^
a; '^ *^
_J <t
-y: -
_x o a;'
rr. J^ O
D-tP
■3 E
'^' 2
2 ^
a;'?
^^
*3 a.
aj 'u
> -k-
^03
o a.
•-•7 i-
y .St;
03 "^ <^
3
2 =>
P «3
53 r
- u
5
■7^ o
03
w a^
i"
i=
-ij
0
«T3
0-
oc
x:
aj
OJ
r1
•0
*J
03
03
s
TJ
s
S
0
u
(N
Tt<
05
b
'■^
0
te
04
^ s
■3 8
«a2
^ aj ~
< 03"^
£ g
oco »-
2: CO (»
o> aj es
2'SS
XJ So
S Sx;
f-< (-^ c
« s s
is:
2^
r-T 2
2^
i=
- o
.13
X! C
« o3
^ P
•0.2
a) +5
o3 N
>S
_ t;
i- ■— '
— • u
_03 C
•^ «*-
a; a)
o «
1^
•a «
II
aj J=
o 5
aj ^
i ^ 2'i"'*
*o.2
aj 02
Eg
PL,
2 -*^ fl
S a; C
S o S^
>.^ «
o -Q
TIM'S
to
"> So
e
to
CO
C^
^
■<*<
t^
X
(N
es
■tl
00
o>
fCI
■*
■<t
iC
ir^
0
ec
CO
CO
CO
Tf
■^
Tf
Tt"
Tf
iC
L';
10
iO
kO-'^
(N
(N
C^
<N
(N
(N
C^
w
M
(N
w
1=
CO
5C
cc
3*^ r-l
CO
CO
CO
^* 1
CD
C « 3
l> 1
<© !
t^ 1
t* 1
^i
S2
S2
§2
■*,ii
rriO
cot
TflC
Tf 10
^ eo
■ceo
«N 1
<N 1
<N i
(M 1
^ 1
(n7
(n7
M 1
N 1
eo7
g-o
"■^
~^
"-'
'"'
^H
wg
'
d
1
'
1
1
1
;
2
'
1
1
1
1
1
1
s
<
«
!
<
«'
d
1
«
05
0
^
(N
ec
1
CO
1
P5
i
0
0
0
^
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
XVII
.2fe
ss
CO • 5-"
.3 o
-fi '-' ^
fc
^ o
«°
_ o
-^ We.
I i-i c
« o
c «
O Oi
£« .
O « W
02 O
05.HS
T3fe
3^
83
<*~ S3
o
iC
c ?
03 t.
> OJ
^ c
-.03
03 «
^- 5
o
c
O
Pi
o
X
«
bC
o
hJ
c
Pi
^ CO M)
> to * ■*^
bC ^ is
^ C ^ S
« .5
o< ■ *»
Sole
SO
C
W c .£ .2
"o - "« S
0)
>l 03 ,
^ ^03
a
OS -f^ t
-I 03-0 CI.
05 S
^ O
.P^'3
« .
o3 O
•Pi
t-l?
_. . _. o
03 T3
■^ OJ
.£ -S
£ 2,
s
T3 0)
*> if
.Qx3
3 a;
^'■§
« -=
c ^
§ *
si
o Cu
P3
d
■^ a;
■ C
■S A
. <a
T3 «
o 2
CO o ^ '
o >
I"
Is/I C
..-£
c
O o3
c
M • —
-S.ti ^"
o3 !C O
T3 0.0
fl 02 *
"O ^ ■*
eij i: o3^ 2
2 S 1^ '^
O *Ph^-K
1 = 1^- §
g.2
03 £
£g
OQ
3 S
3 C
^'£
W ?^ T "
-t -^ «
c «
S o
ox
03
^^
03 -•
03 C « 03
,20
00
^
CM
t^
O
r-
00
■*
«2
^
r^
lO
o
o
t^
t>.
o
o
CM
CM
CO
»o
«
«
«
t^
t>.
t^
t^
t^
I>
t^
t^
CM
CM
CM
CM
CM
CM
c^
CM
CM
CM
CM
CM
©7
eg'
CM
05T o>T ojT
MSab "250 '2co
CM I CM I CM I
si si
CM
<
P3
I
lO CO
I
79716 O— 46— pt. 14 2
XVIII
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
u o3
^ 83
a s
D.
= -- cc a;
c; ^ «^ >
'^'^
83 g;
- c .
.2 bC^t
5-c
PI
'T +J 05
> >■, «
fe > 3
M «- J
O 03
2v._
•*---» *: -2
C
* o flJ
G.*- 83
o c
> s s
e3 o O
^-fi' 83
Q =
' -- a; N
oi? ■"
83 g
83 g
C T3
c
83 .
S(N
4J ~
^2 (N
03 —
c; 83
O
t- <— »►-
3>-H
O >-
r-c -1-3
5;!
3 .,
-o *
CO
O C
a—
2 >^
-^ ■/:
o3 C
■5^ -s
.— o
« • -tJ -y,
d o 5 1^
5^ S S
bC-C ° °>
5-^a^^
= c e 83
~ 3 b. II
-^ ^-^ «^ri ^
to 05
o3 C 4i '-
o; -so
83 -"C 5^
^ CO 83 _
S 'oil
c c o S ^
^ cc
0) C
C 1^
"502 c^
c
o _•
^ 5
T3
c; .
5 03 a;
^, — CC 83
^ § OOQ
W s *- —
_ C »- u- •
"C o o o fe
«- bC
« c
la
>>S3
> -^
.5 ^ ils-~
K.bcO
^H ?=
-5^ o
o -ii^ -e §
S 83 S x
Pill
■ >- C
c
^ u
>
_ = Tf -^ 2
•2 -.^ >>
« cos C 5*
^ o3(N D, tX
02
K .
— 13
03 fc'
J; 83
3 o
l»
^ c
>>*
cffi
o^
s »-
■^^'^
to
iso
«o
CO
a
^4
(N
r^
o
iO
,—1
CO
CO
■*
■*
o
CO
tc
1^
I>
■*
■<t
-az
r^
N.
J>.
«
oc
oc
00
«
OS
OS
c^
N
(N
c^
IN
<N
M
c^
M
«
w
So
^^
CO
IC
«c
CC
^
o
«>
CD
CO
CO
as 8
Si
2l
S7
(n7
ii
(n7
<n7
oo7
<n7
Si
00 ri
(n7
is
%n
(N
■— !
I— 1
.>4
w§
d
z
S-
]
1
ec
ec
>*
IC
«o
i>
00
Oi
d
I-l
<N
C<l
w
1— c
w
CO
CO
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
XIX
83 ,2
O ^
>> «
c
S O
5 H
§ .2
o
O
H
^ i
o i.
o-r
- QJ
ll
S3
ca
S -2*
c
o
1^
O
lU
« — <
C ,
^1
°-3
OS S3
n-^M
2 5
C 00
o .
T. « C « OJ » 93
S3
Oh§S
"c 5"* *-'
eS -»^T3 to
-3 c c *
o o 2 —
«^ 2 a
IS
O 93 g^U
*f o S J- >.
*- ^ C! ^ ^
88 5 ee ^ '-S
2S2a."
=-'-rbt^ S3 o
S-55 50^ «3 5_-
Si ^
5< '=0
33
O o c
> o
„ c ^ _
S c^-i ^ c i
j: o S ^ o ~
fc- aj ^ ^ •:: « „■
~ ^ o
►2^
i: ?
< 2
03 c
S bC
I '^ x: +j o
11
o
11^ %o
c.S'SP'2 c -5
--^X! O 83 2 -
© « t- -^X 83 ®
.CD S
*3 5j qj __ EC ^
"'ts J-
03 C "
fc< •- B, -» e 03 w i
■^ ^ S^oo H c c
.s"^ o . S 5 c
i: — 03 S* 83
— §^Z 03^, '^•J-
®«*7& =03
.- ^ -C .t — S 03 ^
'^- ^ ^ ^ ^ •= ^ o
;§H do — > aci,
ec
CO
CC
■*
^^
l^
t*
lO
■*
Tf
lO
(N
t^
(X)
00
OJ
C5
35
o
i>-H
r^
^-1
^H
^^
C<1
(N
<M
M
CO
CO
n
eo
CO
si
CO J,
I
<NCS MW
<
eo
JS
eo
XX
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
a
4
99
c
c .
»— I 4J
■*- §
CO D
S3 bC
o! O
o
'■3
I
O
a
3=
a;
u
c
gt^
01
_2
3
a
in
5
0)
03 03
o
'-
02 qT
u
;>
^
a;
■3 a
CO
5
o
^
r
c .
a ^
4):;^
rT"?^ 5^
2 5 45
<N<;
o .,A— ;
"O
•C 03 03
SIj
i:^
03 .S t
4JS
'^^-^
o, •
« 03 i^
T.t^
t M 03
01 .
f mem
charg
and re
1^
co'c
i;u
OT3 -
o .
election
propose
Genera
H
w
^ >
Si
O o3
c g.Z
^ .2c
CO -*^ Ol
4^ CO U
S n S
= C.5
S.2
1^
EL, .
-"I
.2g
^a
aj o
SO
-ti 00
c c
o
c ii
> -fj
CQ bC
. c
03
u
' ^ OS
• a
2
'C
a;
e3
o"
o
p
oi a) c
•S ^-^
s oT'C
CO S CQ
ago
s M a
03 o
"SCO)
c c
2 >
-t-3
u c3
si:-
*^ o®
""So
a; Q
« CO o
"0 03°
O
2^
IB
2 *^
bC 0)
C to
05 h^
-a
03
6 X
S5-S=^-
0>
«4-§ -^
"a; S od
a;
O
aj '"' ;s ^
C CO c
'-' 05
05 a;
I s ?^ ^
- 5 bC "^
-^'z ^
O iC
M 03 C
o mo
■»5 a; ,_-U
X!
S
a
ajo
^ bC
i|
N
o
as
d .
03 ^
03 >
(1 OQ
o3 O
02
s* ~-:
S a;
^-
5 aj
!= 2
§•«
2 =
§0
1-00
0
>>2
S
J2
3e<i
cr--
im
0
c .
fc- c3
03
p;
HHJ2
<J
0^
a; u
53
^
. — ^
<4-i 05
u- 3
b
0
iC
" rt
OCL,
2
03
N
Sj-^
03 <«.
w,
Si
SCO
r.
c +^
.s ^
53 .
X}
■3
"O 03
•a s
"^-^
a;
?
n^-l=i
SX!
2 I
oeo
1
-*S wop
(N I
cods
«c to
l> I 5 I
CD ■* t^ ift
CO i CO I
O •* 05 Tf
CO I CO I
CO 1
5
«
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
XXI
5 S
^;6 1
CO cS
DCS '"'
aw
>> 00
> O
g
S 02
>.a
CO-*
0)
o o
C.2
O (A
.Ph
^8
^ I— I
O -
::<
a; o
gee
■H o
* J:;
» 03
« 3
> C
-^
o8
la
IS
ll
^°
>>C
-^^
« o
lO o
■^-^
^ c
US
cc a
,-< w
>^
O >*i
2 *
III
3 c5^
CD 'O
DDa
.S 1^
So
o »-i
C 01 ^
O . m
o +s
bC
*^ o
c ..
r/i *-•
3W
O. oj
z2
02
!^s
a;
a oQ
w
« a
o.
3
>- .M
'^ 5^
-2 >>W
» > rt
2aj2
>,^^
O) fc. S
3 (D*^
lit
p. '-'^^^
43 ^ .S
■fi _ 5
^So
<p 0) S
« 03 O
gTSO
Ph
r-; bc
2^
05"<
-^ e
so
'^ o
£ as
d o
u «=
3j CD
-u —
W S
"* 5
>.^
3T3
S «
► aj
.5 "
3 -t^
-^
>i aj
tT.!: *^
u a s
«« "O *"
• T3x:
J aj «
^ « c
T3-^g
■a ■'^
s +i a;
S > 4^
g >a2
9 ="^
M.S CO
aj -jj aj
3 u bG
'^ 2 «
X ■■ ""
2-^
G +i
O <M
« O
"« S"
O 93
>>s
•te 03
O^
a> c
,G 03
-tJ ^
Gi:-
•~ a
^ 3
■^GO
>.>*" "^
*•? .
bc i3 o
c8 g a)
SwQ
« o-g
2 c 01
•2k2
*<:
as-
h c
^ 3
GOD
o3
§1
03 l^
"•3 iS
> ^
3 ■*^
03 a^ '^
o3 I*^ 03
S3-2_2
a> G.3
'^ £ -
a> »HH
-►^ .-I ^
03 -3
13 t^ —
S o c
2 aj o
•oQffi
O 3 >.
s-s
3 » 01.3 «;•
s-r.
;o
^- .t:
G -G
aj-^
05 73
Q g
1i
GM
01^
bc
3
03
J
g'
O
■a
c
Id
W.2
• J3
aj 13
= i
1^
^ 03
1-2
•^ 3
aj a;
G S-
Is
a «
aj^
lh o3
c
G gT3 »^
n S? a; "«--H
a3 a;
03 U
"O 03 .
^- ^ S
"ajTjt
CA
GO
o ^
O
— o
"Sic -05e. u-
&0
w
(N
CSI
c«
M
to
iC
^_l
ec
O
lO
to
,_
eo
CO
ec
ec
CO
cc
lO
m
ec
CO
CO
rt<
m
CO
w
w
ec
CO
CO
ec
■<f
■<}<
•*
Tj<
eo
CO
ffO
cc
cc
cc
ec
ec
ec
ec
CO
CC
cc t>- !0
OS Ttl Oi Tf 05 Tt
5J I ej I gj I
OS t» OS !>• OS t»
ec I ec I ec I
c< N N
§<
00
^ '^
wit ^M ^^
got
si
ecT
CO CO o
oo7 <^>T -^"T
si 2o S-i*
§^ :J5^ ^7
ei> c^ ■*
XXII
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
xxni
cwj-S
SJ2;§£|
p. § s
>7, Q-
^ £ w 2 ««
^Is
oiS-t^ s »-
"O ^ ^ «3 08 4)
g^ -^-s I
S3 a; i—i ?;
0.05 03 Sc5 c
CO '■^ O "^ OQ
^C^^ O 03 a
■g _ OS JV ^
S > "^ •-< 'SS ,
^£
C W
e3 3
a.s
II
'^ c
« S
I- 5
c8 "^
_ <o
u C
•3 03
03 O S
**"« 03
g2.2
a^5
03 c8
e *^ a
» 2 S
S O <*-i
03 L. O
SO- 03
= "2
o be*
.2§
l£^
00
|2l
S-g
c; 43
u ^
-£ o
« o
1 «
B 03
OS
a
03 •
032
c *>
■»:> C
03 03
•°«
* c
U 03
S 0)
%^
8^
OJ >
*- O
03 C
.•=: 0)^
£'•5 o
-t^ c
. «
c o
OJ "O
• A 03
4^ .^
03-3
03 03
13 ^
*i -^
s «
t. o8
OJ ■<-»
c *
O X
«2 £
_03 ^
;C C
o .
Bs 6
l^^
^.•^
S 03t-.
p.S c
5 rt —
« p o
■^ o
Jil
•"SCO a
P--' 3
tS I-
« J3
S X
5 33
•t «
2^
a; o
W)03
•-: u
B eS
h. .*^
03 *2
u o3
a °<3
'^ c
aj^
<a o
03 03
03 a;
>
O S3
is
a 03
S-
sS
§-a
Z^
o_-
§1
or'
Sa
a^
08"
o80
o >*
^1
o3 •
dj 03
> 2
s3i:
^a
T3.2
a *5
sJ 3
u5
sJ h
03 S
M 08
O^
.5 03
_g 3
O. o
o "*
O
S ■€
^
S3 ^ ^
£ .-§
o
o
S3
a.
03
O
s«
S3 5
Is «i"a
|S2
<- sJ >
^«2
03 «
S3
orti
'3 ■"
S
03
S3 .2
I!
0)
w
e eQ
a a5_^
fc * 03
>« c -^
03'St3
e _^ a —
a - a
03 .S (S
'^ 03 C
2si
-£ S
. 0373
u 50 ?.
I^ OJ ►"
03 til;
S3
•o
> £B-
"S <13 fl.
-S 03 ir
03
03
S
— 9 '2
"03 C^
03 ^i
> c
3 o;
OJ-—
*" *j o> oj
is35
a a!>*-«ii
s5 O
S_r 03
a 3^ ^ "?
Oj'-'.SOQ
«
c<
CO
CO
Cs
IN
00
»o
o
m
^
£2
kO
CO
o
00
t
l^
00
ec
1-H
c^
CO
CO
CO
CO
t^
O
05
05
o
»-H
^H
^^
€0
fO
CO
ec
cc
ec
ec
•>*
■<ti
■<*<
^
« T
05T
IC'
CO
OS 7
J>
CO
os7
CO
CO
CO
XXIV
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 923
EXHIBIT NO. 9
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Selected Letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral J. O. Richardson
1. 18 January 1S40 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
2. 26 January 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
3. 16 February 1&40 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
4. 8 March 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
5. 11 March 1940 to Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
H. Ifi March 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
7. S April 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
8. 7 May 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
9. 13 May 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
10. 22 May 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
11. 22 May 1940 fr«m Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
12. 27 May 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
13. 22 June 19-'0 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
14. 22 June 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark (with enclosures)
15. 18 September 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark (with enclo-
sures )
16. 24 September 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
17. 1 October 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
18. 9 October 1940 memo from Admiral Richardson for Admiral Stark
19. 22 October 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
20. 12 November 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson (with enclo-
sures )
21. 22 November 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
22. 28 November 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
23. 17 December 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
24. 23 December 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson (with enclo-
sures )
25. 80 December 1940 from Admiral Bloch via Admiral Richardson to Admiral
Stark
26. 7 January 1941 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
27. 25 January 1941 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark
28. 10 Februarv 1941 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
18 Janttaby 1940.
Dear Joe: As of possible interest to you I am enclosing the General Board's
report on organization of the Navy Department. Will be glad to get your com-
ments if and when you get time.
I will drop entirely the question of Captain Smith coming to the PENNSYL-
VANIA for the purpose of acquiring CincC background on war plans.
Before he starts East I will ask him to ask you for an appointment so that
you may send back any general thoughts you may wish to of a confidential
nature which would be u.seful to all of us. In this connection I have a letter
from Tommy Hart, just received, in which he thinks the situation in the Far
East is very serious and that this year may prove to be a crucial and critical
one. As I have written Bloch, and as you undoubtedly know, I have continually
asked him to bear in mind what is going on to the Westward which in this par-
ticular period in this old world's history may be far more important to us than
the troubles in Europe, especially if something should break and break quickly
and without warning. It is something, in my humble opinion, for which you
should be mentally prepared. Anything in this wide world I can do to help, of
course I will ; that is my only reason for existing here. Incidentally by officer
messenger or otherwise, I would be glad to know what your thoughts are in that
connection so that I may be in harmony and may be able to transmit them to
higher authority if they should be asked.
HoTpe the Army Maneuvers have been greatly beneficial. The President is
Intensely interested in our working closely with them in all ways, and the pull-
together here in the Department is very close.
Best wishes to you all as ever
Sincerely,
/S/ Beitt.
Admiral J. O. Rtchardson. U. S. Nary,
Commander in Chief, V. S. Fleet,
924 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COMMA NOER-IN-CHIEF
UNITIO ST*T(S rillT
J • • riNH*TlV*NI>
■?Cx-<. B.^^^^iL^ 2r .«!:c *«*^ .«5^ ^J;^ ^ X^-^^.**A^
^Z" -'cu!^:»«^,<u. ...^ -^(^ '•*-^ •^r'*-' A.-*. -«-~ -^-*«d»^^ ;i«2^ *-,/ V.^.»X^
•^ ^»^~u '*^^*^ ^^^^y^ ^^^'x^ ^^'^^'^ f^ w^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 925
-•-*~^^ '«^^ '-'v-^-Ly <^^4i^ ^v-...--<. ^.K.*,.,*-/. i-.v-»..»^ >'^ a^u^^t/*
926 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
UHITCD (TATCS fLClT
U. S ■. r(HN*TlVANI*
yV;M/
^0, ;zl^ :^^
"A»-» A»-»"«»^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 927
COMMANOER'INCHIEF
UNITtD »T*TC» rtCCT
U S t r(NNS1LV4NIA
<J-^ />l^,^ ^.^^ ^-,.<,.,w*^ .— «- ^y^^^^^^J^
e-*.^^ .^.^ z:;:;:^ c^v^^ ^*y^w^ -v,-^ Kp^^^UoC y^
y<-
928 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
^ .t^2X /^i--^ 75l— ^
Ji>J^ ^^ '^^^^
L^^ 7^^ -^^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 929
CinC File No. UNITED 8TATB8 FLEET J,
U. & S. PENNSYLVANIA. FlaoUp f\Qr
AgMAIL
PERSONAL San Pedro, California
CONTIDgNTIAL 16 rebmary 1940
Y
Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S. Nary
CMef of Naved Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.
Dear Betty:
Today I received a despatch from Andrews, a copy
of which is enclosed, urging that the information in regeurd
to the chemge of home ports of vessels of the Hawaiian De-
tachment be released for publication. This is requested in
order that the maximum number of unoccupied houses and apart-
ments at Honolulu may be overhauled and made available for
oooapemoy. I felt constrained to reply negative.
The delicacy with which you must handle thia mat-
ter is fully appreciated; «md the reasons for yovir negative
reply to my previous despatch requesting that the security
classification of the despatch changing the home ports of
these ships (Opnav 031811 of February 1940) be lowered are
fully understood.
It seems to me, however, that the provision of
acceptable living accommodations will be highly conducive to
contentment and morale. Therefore, I request that the re-
striction on publicity be eliminated as early as you deem it
advisable, and that Andrews and I be informed by despatch.
It may be of Interest to you to know that the fact
that the home ports of these vessels have been changed .appeared
in the Los Angeles Times of .4 Februeo-y under a Honolulu date
line, and was subsequently copied in Long Beach and San Diego
papers as shown by the enclosure.
It appears that this matter is widely known now
but in view of the restrictions on publicity Andrews probably
feels that he can not officially urge private interests in
Honolulu to prepare houses for the occupancy of Naval personnel.
V/ith kindest regards and best wishes.
Sincerely,
sincerely.
J. 0. RICHARDSON
930 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[i] United States Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
San Pedro, California, 8 March 1940.
Personal
Confidential
Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
Dhiar Betty: I am forwarding today, by air mail, my recommendation regard-
ing a relief for the U. S. S. AUGUSTA. I find, in making this recommendation,
that I am in a position in which I frequently find myself, in that I do not know
all the points that should be considered in reacliing a decision. For example :
(a) I do not know what considerations led to the assignment of Commander
Scouting Force to command the Hawaiian Detachment, but if there were reasons
controlling at that time there probably has been no change.
(b) I do not know why we have a Hawaiian Detachment, but if it has any
relation to existing plans as stated in my oflScial letter I think it should be com-
manded by Commander Cruisers.
(c) I do not know how much weight is attached to the necessity of having
a cruiser available for the President, and I do not know whether he insists on
having the HOUSTON so available, or whether another ship would be equally
acceptable.
Andrews recommended that Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force, shift to the
HOUSTON and remain in command of Cruiser Division FOUR with the Hawaiian
Detachment, and that the present Commander Cruiser Division FOUR shift to
the LOUISVILLE or CHESTER in command of Cruiser Division FIVE, and re-
turn to the West Coast with that division, and that the AUGUSTA be assigned
to Crudiv FIVE.
It does not seem logical to me to have both Commander Cruisers, Scouting
Force, and Commander S.-outing Force, in the Hawaiian Detachment. As things
now exist. Commander Aircraft. Scouting Force, frequently sends recommenda-
tions to me in order [2] to save time, with copies to Commander Scout-
ing Force, and Commander Scouting Force frequently makes recommendations
affecting the cruisers without having the recommendations of Commander
Cruisers, Scouting Force.
Any number of solutions could be suggested and any one that you select wiU
be acceptable to me because I have made what appeared to me to be a logical
recommendation, but I have no personal pride in it, and any solution will work.
However, the easiest one that would not disturb existing conditions would be to
send the HOUSTON out as temporary relief of the AUGUSTA, and have the
AUGUSTA return to China after her overhaul.
In any event, there will be no heavy cruiser with the Fleet for several months
this summer while Cruiser Division FIVE is undergoing overhaul, and I know
that both Bloch and I feel that there should be two divisions of heavy cruisers
with the Fleet.
I do not know why Cruiser Division SEVEN is retained with the Atlantic
Squadron. Consequently, I have made no recommendations or requests that
that division rejoin the Fleet. Neither have I recommended that one of the
divisions now in the Hawaiian Detachment return with the Fleet.
With kindest regards and best wishes.
Very sincerly yours,
/S/ J. O. Richardson.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 931
CfalC nh Na. UNITBD STATn riMMft t
U. S. & PBNMSTLVANIA. IkgaUr
PEK30!7;j. San Pedro, Cedifornia
COITnp-i^TIia. 11 March 1940
Dear Betty:
In «;oln6 over the meiaorandum you enclosed with your
letter of 12 February (Subject: Defense of the Fleet against
attack by aircraft) , my first reaction was somewhat similar
to Admiral Bloch's, that is, no harji can come from letting the
Oeneral Board consider the comprehensive agenda contemplated -
although at the same time there arose in my mind a question
as to how much cood mifiht result from such an undertaking. In
Justice to the serious thoutjht that has Pone into the prepara-
tion of the meraorandura and its enclosure, I have given the mat-
ter detsiled study and my general conclusions are as follows:
(a) The Oeneral Board is v/ell within its intended scope
in studyiHci; all matters relatinfr to iaprove.iients in arm-
a-U'-nt. I believe that it has senerally been understood
that the Oeneral Board would deal principally with major
characteristics, although it is understandable that full
treatment of aajor characteristics ;,iay re'^uire varying
der.rees of consideration of details of ))atteries and fire
control eiuipment.
(b) In my opinion the General Board \.ould be stepping out-
side its Intended scope if it were to consider matters
i-inediately connected with details of traininf? and operation
of cxistinc personnel, ships, and eiuipaent. I say this
with the realization that article 402 of the Navy P.egula-
tions uses the very words "or{',anization, maintenance, train-
in.-, and operation", v/hich ^rht be invoked to refute my
opinion. Fov/ever, I choose to believe that the terms "system
of principles" and "general terms" used in the same article
do not cchte-ivolate treatn^nt of all of the phases and de-
tails ificluded in the pro->osed ar«nda.
Applyinr; these f',eneral conclusions to the several sub-
heads of the proposed a.-;enda, I consider items to be matters
"ippropriate or otherwise for the Oeneral Board's specific con-
sideration and reco.taendation, as follows:
The Fleet »
Treatr.ient of none of these items by the General Board
is either necessary or desirable. All are actively under
con-sideration within the Fleet. As you will know, the re-v
-1-
1 Subsequent pages of this letter, upon investigation, appear not to be in existence.
79716 O— 46 — pt. 14-
932 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Confidential
15 Mabch 1940.
Dear J. O. : I am somewhat at a loss as to just how to answer your questions
(a), (b) and (c) in your letter of 8 March.
I do not know whether Bloch left his personal file of correspondence between
him and me, for you to read over or whether he talked it over with you. The
background for sending the Hawaiian Detachment was for the most part con-
tained in this pei'sonal correspondence.
One of the first questions which was brought to me after I took over this job
was the possible reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet which had been requested
by Admiral Hart. This reinforcement was to be preferably, according to Hart's
request, a division of heavy cruisers. His second ciioice was a division of light
cruisers. The situation in the Shanghai Settlement in regard to control of that
area was tense. The situation in Tientsin, especially in regard to British Japa-
nese relations, was critical. The war in Europe was breakinji. We wanted to
do what we could for Hart, strengthen the State Department's hands, and at the
same time not weaken our own position.
I looked into the question of our War Plans, especially as to the Commander-in-
Chief's Operating Plan for an Orange campaign. This seemed to meet a strategic
situation in the Pacific in a manner by which Hart would be supported by naval
deployment, and the Commander-in-Chief would still have close control over
all units of the Fleet.
The result was that on 8 September I wrote to Bloch and made the suggestion
of sending a detachment to Hawaii, but only after I had talked it over with the
President and the okayed it one hundred percent ; as did the S^nte Department.
There were several despatches back and forth (Opnav 0022-1815, 0024-1225,
CinCUS 0023-1255, all of September), and also one or two telephone calls. Bloch
recommended that Andrews be in command ; he also recommended that my first
suggestion of moving the submarines to Hawaii be held up; I concurred in both
recommendations. Admiral Bloch was opposed to sending any more cruisers
to the Asiatic. They were not sent.
We did reinfoi'ce the Asiatic by one tender, one squadron of patrol planes and
six new submarines. The Hawaiian Detachment fits in with the Commander-in-
Chief's Operating Plan Orange.
When the time came for the Hawaiian Detachment to go, a proposed press release
as drawn up showing the reason to be "For the purpose of facilitating training
operations." The President finally said : '"Do not release it to the press."
Hardly had the Detachment arrived in Hawaii when the question of rotation
came up. After a good deal of correspondence back and forth we took the bull
by the horns and sent out our directive in regard to this question (CNO Serial
938 or 4 January 1940). Of course the question of home ports and transportation
of dependents was a big item in arriving at the final decision.
My original ideas in regard to the Hawaiian Detachment wei'e that possibly,
in fact probably, the Commander of this Detachment would be able to carry out
the regular schedule of gunnery firings and for training would be able to visit
the various island possessions in the Mid-Pacific area to familiarize himself with
these possessions and their potential uses in time of war.
I still think that the decision to send the Detachment to Hawaii under present
world conditions is sound. No one can measure how much effect its presence there
may have on the Orange foreign policy. The State Department is strong for the
present setup and considers it beneficial ; they were in on all discussions, press
releases, etc.
I find that in the above I have more or less covered your paragraphs (a) and
(b). I cannot he^p but f^el that a Vice A('miral should be in command of the
Hawaiian Detachment. He would probably command the above force prescribed
in War Plans. Administration may be difl5cult but it will be more diflacult in war
and means should be developed to rflfset this difficulty.
In regard to your question (c), of course I don't know whether the President
will go to the Coast before his term of oflSce expires or not, but I think the chances
are that he very probably will ; in fact he intended to go last October and couldn't.
At that time he told the people in San Francisco that he would try and come at
a later date. My guess is that if world conditions will permit his leaving Wash-
ington you will see him sometime before Winter on the West Coast with the desire
for a fishing trip, or more possibly a desire to go to Alaska which he has so often
expressed. A cruiser force flagship or its equal will be required, because the
President will doubtless want to take someone with him. When he went to the
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 933
Canal Zone in the TUSCALOOSA he was comfortable but he had cut down his
entourage to the minimum.
In regard to the relief of the AUGUSTA, I have received your oflScial letter and
we are now making a careful study of it from all angles and hope to find a solution
which will be satisfactory in the main to both ends.
The decision to retain one division of CAs in the Atlantic was made after con-
siderable discussion with the President. Some would have two divisions. I held
one division is enough, supplemented as it is by a couple of CLs. With the general
requirement of two cruisers in the Caribbean and two on the North Atlantic Coast,
we cannot well do with less. For the time being at least we will have to retain
one division of CAs on this side.
I will be glad to get your reply to my letter on the CL Force Flagship. Person-
ally I do not see it — but I am prepared to do what you want.
Every good wish as always and best of luck.
Sincerely,
/s/ BErrrr.
Admiral J. O. Richardson, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. 8. Fleet,
US8 "Pennsylvania,"
San Pedro, California.
P. S. — Mr. Edison expects to leave Washington on 26 March and join the Fleet
1 April ; leave Hawaii in NASHVILLE 15 April, arrive San Francisco 20 April ;
inspect San Diego about 24 April and return to Washington about 28 April. I do
hope you can acquaint him with the Navy on this trip. Deyo will take up the
details on his arrival in the West, etc. and you will be acquainted with them later.
8 Apeil 1940.
De'K JO: I have jiist been glancing over your letter of S February to Admiral
Nimitz to check my memory on one of your questions as follows : I did it because
of some information which came in this morning.
(a) Is "CinCus facing trouble in the Western Pacific" so surely as to war-
rant giving that consideration greater weight in the preparation of the flag
slate than the usual peacetime considerations of training flag oflBcers for
higher command : If so, the best should be kept at, or ordered to sea.
I believe Nimitz answered your letter but was not able to answer the above
question. I want now to answer that question with an emphatic aflarmative.
I believe the situation in the Far East is continually deteriorating so far as our
relations with Japan are concerned. I may be unduly pessimistic but I do want
to communicate my thoughts for what they are worth and I might add they are
backed by some pretty concrete evidence. I think you should continually keep
uppermost in your mind the possibility of trouble in the Orient, and the means
to meet it.
The President has been troubled with a bad cold and we are about two weeks
overdue in an appointment with him ; however, we are hoping we will have it
within the next few days and after he has agreed to the topside slate we will send
you his desires for your further recommendations lower down.
I am also in hearty accord with the last paragraph of your letter and to save
you the trouble of checking I am quoting it :
"If the eminence of trouble does not outweigh other considerations, I think that
the most promising material for high command should be given adequate sea
experience at the expense of the less promising, and that a long range plan should
be prepared with a view to having the best possible available with recent Fleet
experience and with adequate time to serve when those now in high position in the
Fleet step out of the picture."
Here's hoping the Maneuvers are highly beneficial from every standpoint.
Every good wish as always,
/s/ Bettt.
[Copy of Mr. Edison's letter of 5/7 enclosed]
Confidential Mailed 5/8/40 to catch clipper of 5/14
7 Mat 1940.
Dear J. O. : Just hung up the telephone after talking with the President and by
the time this reaches you you will have received word to remain in Hawaiian
Waters for a couple of weeks.
934 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
When the Fleet returns to the Coast (and I trust the delay will not be over two
weeks, but I cannot tell) the President has asked that the Fleet schedule be so
arranged that on extremely short notice the Fleet be able to return concentrated
to Hawaiin Waters. This will present somewhat of a problem in lugging around
more oil with you perhaps than usual and keeping more provisions on board
because if action is wanted it will be wanted quickly. As far as I can see, your
proposed schedule meets this requirement and unless you hear to the contrary
you may assume it okay.
I am glad you want to run East to have a talk in the Department. Had you not
suggested it, I would have myself. We have been making some close examina-
tions into the War Plans recently and I remarked at the time I wished you could
have been present. I trust your arrival here will not be delayed over about two
weeks, beyone what it normally would have been.
Of course you know the thought behind the above and that is that the Italian
situation is extremely delicate, the two weeks ahead regarded a^ critical; then
- - - ????? nobody can answer the riddle just now.
I am still hopeful that our Expansion Bill will go through. The Appropriation
Bill has also to be acted on. Other than these two items nothing of particular
interest that I can think of for the moment from the Fleet standpoint.
I hope to get money for elevation of the NEW YORK, TEIXAS and ARKANSAS
guns. My feeling is that these ships are of little use as is, and that even if they
have to be out of the Fieet under overhaul at a critical time, we should go ahead
with them. Do you concur?
Am also looking into the question of one or two more flag oflScers in Atron
which I believe you desire.
Am delighted you are able to give War Plans your personal attention. Per-
sonally I think it is one of our most important jobs.
I don't know how you teel about it, but 1 have always felt that CincUS was
loaded up with too much in the way of material matters and administration ;
and that in general material matters should not go beyond type commanders, at
least as far as routine items are concerned. For example if Combatfor wants to
find out something about his destroyers, he can .send for Conidesbatfor tell him,
or better still, let Comdesbatfor write him or see him frequently enough to keep
him in general touch. It seems to me force commanders should not have to sign
or even think about the thousand and one material details which must detract
from their more important duties ; let the type commanders do this.*
I know you have a tough job in submitting the names of six rear admirals from
among whom three may be ear marked for furlough. I have got to do the same
myself. If you and Peck agree it will automatically make it easier. I just men-
tioned to the President the advisability of appointing the three of us to constitute
a board to actually meet and make this recommendation. This would take away
any political repercussions so far as the President is concerned. However, he
didn't take to this idea and said all he wanted was to be told verbally the names.
With best wishes as always
Sincerely,
/s/ Betty.
Admiral J. O. Richardson, USN,
Vomniander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "Pennsylvania," Pearl Harbor, T. H.
•This is just thinking out loud — but I would like to talk this over with you when you
are here.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
935
daCFOiNa
UNITBD STATES FLEET
U. 8. 8. PENNSYLVANIA. FUgihlp
f
Pearl Harbor, T.
Kay 13, 1940
H.
■Dear Betty:
".(■hen Hill was detached last January he took
v/ith him to V/ashlngton some Ideas, largely Blooh's,
as to what mi^t be acceptable to the C ommaader- In-
Chief , (under the assumptions then made), to serve as
a start from which Op-12 vrould develop basio assunip-
tlons to be officially transmitted, \/ithin a few
weeks, to the Commander-in-Chief for use in making
plans.
During a recent conference in the Twelfth Naved
District it was broxight out that we were woefully
short of 5"-38 caliber ananunit ion at liare Island.
I am unable to grasp the meaning of Opnav dis-
patch 112130 sent at 1630 last Saturday, but we are
guessing that the Department has tentatively ap-
proved, with minor exceptions, the contents of the
mamorand\im prepared for me by Hill, and that the
Department will correct the ammunition situation at
!C»re Island.
The assximptions luider \diioh the Hill memorandum
was drawn up and under which all other operations In
the V/estem Pacific have previously been considered,
are today all different. Previous assusiptions and
estimates of the situation no longer hold .
I It seems that, \inder present world conditions,
the paramotint thing for us is the security of the
'.Vestern Hemisphere. This, in my opinion, transcends
everything — anything certainly in the Far Bast,
our own or other interests.
I South America is the greatest prize yet remain-
ing to be grabbed. Until the outcome in Surope can
' be more clearly seen, security in the 'iVestem Hemis-
phere seems to be the most important consideration
for us.
936 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CM rot na. imrrBD states flbet
U. 8. 8. PBNNSYLVANIA. FlMaUy
I feel that any move west neans hostilities.
I feel that at this tine 'it \/ould be a grave nis-
talce to becoBe involved in the './est \/here our in-
terests, although inportant , are not vital, and
thereby reduce our ability to nalntain the security
of the iestern Hemisphere v/hlch is vital.
If the Fleet is to go vrest it can only start,
properly prepared, fron the '.lest Coast v/here it can
be docked, manned, stocked and stripped, and a
suitable train assembled.
Rest assured that although I am entirely v;ith-
out information I realize your position, and I v/ant
you to know that if the situation becomes such that
higher authority decides '.;e should go .-'est, all of
us are ready to give all we have .
These are some of the things I wanted to talk
to you about, and since I can not see you, I feel
that I am duty bound to write you.
V/ith kindest regards and best wishes,
Very sincerely yours,
' ■ / — to — A*-<,/*.* 1^
Please acknowledge receipt by despatch.
Admiral H. R. Stark, U, 3. Navy
The Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
V/ashington, D. C.
J
/9C
'
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 937
CtaC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET
U. 8. 8. PENNSYLVANIA, FU(sUp
P. 3. On 9 April I sent Andrews with a detachment In to
simulate a raiding force against Pearl Harbor, to serve as
an» object for attack by our patrol planes and Army bombers.
Andrews reported sighting llavy patrol planes, but he did not
see any Army bombers.
Today we were picked up by our patrol planes about
0630, but we did not see any Army bombers. However, our
submarines made several successful attacks from fairly short
ranges. We had a heavy swell with white caps so that it was
difficult to see the submarines.
'.Vhile the Secretary was on board, one of the SARA-
TOGA'S fighting planes had a forced landing close aboard.
The plane sank, but the Reserve Ensign was recovered with-
out his even getting his feet wet.
Today one of the LEXIN:>T0N bombing planes (SBU) had
a forced landing. The plane sank, but the pilot and passenger
were recovered with slight injuries.
The PENNSYLVANIA should anchor in Lahaina about 1700.
^. J >— <vr
tt
938 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
H. R. S.
Serial 013212 22 Mat 1940.
Secret
Dear Joe : When we sent our dispatch it looked as if Italy were coming in
almost immediately and that a serious situation might develop in the East Indies,
and that there was a possibility of our being involved. However, the recent
"blitzkrieg" events in Europe have certainly altered the picture for the time
being. Personally I think it has made more remote (for the moment at least)
the question of a westward movement of the fleet. I agree with the tenor of
your letter and you will be glad to know I had already so expressed myself. I
also realize events may change this picture and possib'y over night.
With regard to the specific questions raised in your letter of 13 May, the Joint
Plan for Rainbow Two is about complete, and a copy of it, including the studies
upon which it is based, will go to you shortly by oflScer messenger. This Joint
Plan embraces in general all the basic assumptions listed in the memorandum
Hill brought East. The joint tasks of this plan will require the operation of the
Fleet in general with the fleet tasks set up in Hill's memorandum.
I think these assumptions are about the best upon which a basic plan of this
nature can be promised, although in any preliminary operating plan which you
may prepare at present, I think you should assume the present strength and dis-
position of the Fleet, in order to develop the problem from a practical basis.
As you get time in these strenuous days, I believe it would be advisable for you
to go ahead with the preparation of a tentative Fleet Operating Plan for Rainbow
Two, as we are most anxious to have the benefit of your detailed study of the
difficulties involved, and the logistic and other I'equirements.
I wish you would keep constantly in mind the possibility of a complete collapse
of the Allies, including the loss of their fleets. A very probab'e development of
such a catastrophe is visualized in the Rainbow One Plan. Should the Allied
fleets pass into the hands of the Germans, however, an entirely different, and far
more serious situation wcmld exist. I would appreciate your views regarding the
best disposition of fleet forces in such an event.
Regarding the 5 inch 38 caliber ammunition we have realized the deficiency,
and, as you probably know, Ordnance has now arranged for shipment of 20,000
rounds on the PYRO. We understand that this will complete the first increment
of the mobilization supply on board and will give some room for target practice
ammunition. It is my understanding that there will still be enough on shore on
the West Coast and in Hawaii to meet mobilization requirements. I would be
glad if you would confirm this.
I find that the 6 inch 47 caliber reserve supply on the W^est Coast is not what it
should be. There are 6,000 shells out there and I have requested the Bureau of
Ordnance to send a like quantity of powder by rail.
W are taking up the question of another Flag Officer in ATRON which you
suggested. We hope to put this in elTect in the near future ; the idea being to
assign this officer as Commander Destroyers Atlantic Squadron. Present plan
is to rig up something on the DENEBOLA for him to use as an Administrative
Flag Ship and then assign ad interim one of the new 1500 ton destroyers as a
Tactical Flag Ship with the idea of recalling from the Fleet the SAMPSON
(which seems most logical choice) or another 1850 destroyer to take the place
of this new 1500 tonner tentatively assigned. On account of the antiaircraft
armament on the 1500 tonners I feel that the 1500 tonner wou'd be more valuable
to you than the SAMPSON, and at the same time the SAMPSON would give a
little more room for Flag Quarters and Operating Staff accommodations. I do
not want to tie up anotiier cruiser as a separate Flag Ship. I sometimes feel
there has been too much of this already. This seems to be the best solution for
the problem, unless you can suggest a better one.
In regard to the disposition of cruisers I feel that the ST. LOUIS and HELENA
should joint the Fleet as soon as they are out of the Yard. They should get Fleet
Training. They are valuab'e units to you. If we take them out of the Atlantic
and send them to the Pacific I must replace them. Under the present situation
the reduction in cruiser strength as it is, should, if anything, be augmented.
There are two possible solutions: one, to assign Rowcllff and Cruiser Division
FIVE to the Atlantic. This would give two heavy cruiser Divisions in the
Hawaiian Detachment and two in the Atlantic. The other is to send Fletcher's
Division, Cruiser Division THREE, to the Atlantic which would give one heavy
Cruiser Division and one light Cruiser Division in the Atlantic, but would reduce
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 939
your Light Cruiser strength by one Division and would give you a total of three
heavy cruiser divisions in tlie Pacific. Of course as soon as the TRENTON comes
home from Europe we will have her overhauled and she will be available for
duty where most needed in the Atlantic or Pacific in case either Cruiser Division
THREE or FIVE is sent to the Atlantic. Please let me have your perfectly frank
reaction to the above by dispatch (supplemented by air mail if you so desire).
You may draw back at the thought of reducing your cruiser strength at this
time in the Pacific. This I can believe might well be your inclination, — as it
would be mine. But, as I indicated above, the changing situation may push the
decision one way or the other. In fact the picture may change by the time you
get this letter to the extent that it may be necessary to send a real component
of the Fleet to the Atlantic much as we would hate to do so and thus divide our
forces.
The ST. LOUIS is due to be completed in Norfolk 15 July. The HELENA in
New York, 9 July.
Th situation in some of the Southe American countries gives real cause for
concern — and I say this advisedly. If Germany should win — then whatlll'i
Wish I could see you — and if the pressure here — day and night ever lets up —
I hope to fly out.
Keep cheerful.
Sincerely,
/s/ Betty.
Admiral J. O. Richardson, VSN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
U8S '"Pennsylvania," Pearl Harbor, T. H.
P. S. Please acknowledge by dispatch.
Have literally lived on the Hill — State Dept. — & White House for last several
days. Thank God yesterday I finally swung support for 170,000 men and 34,000
marines. Lots still in the mill — but I hope coming.
I hope to commission the remaining 35 DDs, 3 AOs & 36 SS — another per-
sonnel nightmare for the fleet — but I simply couldn't do it before.
Here's hopin.
Betty.
^^
940 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I., / / (^-^ ■■•*■-■ ■ 1"^
CinC File No. UNfRD STATES FLMT
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FUoklp
CONFIPaCTIAL Lahalna Roads, T. H.
22 May 1940
Dear Betty:
As you no doubt well appreciate, I now nust plan the
Fleet schedule and ejiploynient for the next few months. To do
this intellicently, however, it is necessary to knov/ more than
I know not about why we are here and hov/ long we will probably
stay. I realize that the ansv/er to the second question is
lar^iely dependent 'upon the first, and probably also upon further
developments, but nonetheless I should have something to go on.
?or instance, carryinc out even a curtailed gunnery schedule
will require wholeasle movements of targets, tugs, utility planes,
etc., from the Coast, The following are pertinent questions:
(a) Are we here primarily to influence the actions of other
nations by our presence, and if so, what effect would ^
the carryin;; out of nor Tin 1 training (insofar as we \y^^
can under the lialtatlons on anchorages, air fields, ''
facilities and services) have on this purpose? The
effect of the emergency dool:ing program and the conse-
quent absence of task forces during the training period
laust also be considered,
(b) Are we here as a stepping off place for belligerent , -'•
activity? If so, we should devote all of our time and *• ,
energies to preparing for war. Tliis could more effective- v'"'
ly and expeditiously be accomplished by an iunediate re- ,.
turn to the './est Coast, with "freezing" of personnel,
filling up couplenents, dookin,-^ and all the rest of it.
■./e could return here upon completion.
As it is now, to try and do both (a) and (b) from here
and at the sa:ne ti.ie is a diversification of effort and purpose
that can only result in the accompli aliment of neither.
If we are here to develop this area as a peacetime
operatin;;; base, consideration should be given to the certain de-
crease in the efficiency of the Fleet and the lowering of morale
that ;aay ensue, due to inadequate anchorages, air fields, facili-
ties, services, recreation conditions, for so large a Fleet. If
only peaceti:Tie training is involved should the Bureau of Naviga-
tion and I not be advised so we may remove restrictions on officer
details?
-1-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 941
CioC File No. (JNITBD STATtS FLBBT
U. B. S. PENNSYLVANIA. FUf^P
COITFIDENTIAI.
y
The answer to your rroposal to retnin the ZITfTPT.ISS
at San Dleco Is drjpendent upon the answer to the above rue;tions,
I aji returnlny to. Pearl Harbor with the Fleet on 24
ilay to renain until 10 June for upiceep. Durinc the first week
of this period, on the assumption that v/e are here for norraal
peacetLne trainins, I will coiplete a survey of what is available
and what are the ainimu-n additional requireaents in the v/ay of:
Auxiliary air fields Aiiplane services
Targets Athletic fields and facilities
Tugs Provisions
Utility pianos ?uel
Upon oo.apletion of this survey I may recom..iend a re-
duction in the number of carriers to be .laintained in tliis area
and I will probably request the allocation of funds for immediate
work on auxiliary air fields and athletic fields and facilities. .
Based on this survey and additional infomation fro.a you,
I may modify ny orders regardin.-; the shifting of tugs, tenders,
targets, and utility planes fron San Die^o to Pearl Harbor.
At present the followins are under orders to proceed to
Pearl Harbor leavlnj; the V/est Coast in June (except UT/JI, BOGGS,
and LAMBEKTON, which are to coae upon completion of overhaul in
July or August) :
(a) Bntlro utility wing, including drone squadron, less Atron
units and less .iiinimuiii base units for continued overhaul,
and for aooeptanoe of new units (chiefly new drones).
This amounts to approximately 40 planes and 300 personnel.
The sufficiency of present facilities for repair and opera-
tion of these is questionable. However, without practic-
ally all the utility wing present in this area it is cer-
tain that the gunnery schedule of the Fleet will be
seriously curtailed.
(b) Three battle towing targets and four series 60 high
speed sleds, and a number of seiM.es 40 high speed sleds,
are to toe towed or carried to the Hawaiian area by Base
Force tu^s and other tes« Force ressels noted in (o) and
(4).
(o) MXDDSA, lISLVIlUtj wlHTKIY, DWaBY, ELLIOT, and UTAH,
B006S, aoA liUBXRTOM, oa aoaplatlon of overhaul.
lU,
942 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
i
CinC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA. FlacaUp
co:tI3:^ti/j.
(d) One oil bar^e and one garbage lir^ter, and five tugs.
If the Fleet is to reraain here and carry out normal
peacetime training it will be conducive to efficiency of adminis-
tration, to the carrying out of eji-loyaent schedules and to the
most effective use of services and operating areas if the ships
and services of the Hawaiian Detaclx-aent are incorporated under
their norjial type connanders. Unless advised to the contrary by
you before 30 May, this will be done.
In any event and \.hatever the future holds, we serious-
ly need additional enlisted personnel. V/e should no longer be
content to operate v;ith any vacancies in peacetime allowance
materially below our needs and our complement. With so aany
• ships building and other ships to be recoramissioned, we must have
. ' many additional trained men. It will take a long time to train
." them. I urge that all training stations be operated to full
<'\ - . capacity. Trained men are fully as important as additional mater-
'* • ^\>' ial and equipment.
■» > If we are in the preliminary stage of preparation for
f )' belligerent action our ships should be fully iianned by the most
competent available officer personnel. Peacetime shifting of
officer personnel should ce<ise. With my laclc of knowledge of the
Department's purposes and intentions, I feel that we may work at
cross purposes,- and the whole matter of officer personnel changes ,s*"
may become most confused. y' ^
.'. ' iv^'"-^
With kindest regards.
Sincerely yours, jJ^'
Admiral H. R. Stark, U. 3. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
'■Yashington, D. C.
UK.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 943
/Secret ' 27 May 1940.
Deab jo : Yours of the 22nd just received. I shall endeavor to answer It para-
grapii Dy paragrapa. Fuse, nowever, 1 would liJce to say tliat I know exactly
wiiat you are up against, ana to tell you, that here in the Departmeut we are up
agaiusc tiie same imug.
Wuy are you iu tne Hawaiian Area?
Answer : You are tiiere because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your
presence may have on tne Japs going into the East indies. In pievious leiiers I
have hooked this up witii tiie Iiaiians going into tne war. The conuection is that
With Italy in, it is thought the Japs might teei just that much freer to take inde-
penueut action. Vv'e believe botii ine ijeimaus and the Iialians have told tne Japs
tuat so far as they are concerned she, Japan, has a free hand m the Duicu Jiiast
Indies.
Your natural question may follow — well, how about Italy and the war? 1 cau
state tliat we have had Italy going into the war on 24 hours notice on several
diuerent occasions auring the last two weeks from sources of information which
looked authentic. Others have stated that it would occur within the next ten
days. I have stated personally that cold logiC would dictate Ler not going in for
some time. It is anybody's guess. It may be decided by the time this reacnes you.
Events are moving fast in Northern France.
The above in itself shows you how indefinite the situation is.
Along the same line as the first quesiion presented you would naturally ask —
suppose the Japs do go into the East Indies? What are we go>ng to do about it?
My answer is that is, I don't know and I think there is nobody on God's green
earth who can tell you. I do know my own arguments with regard to this, both
in the White House and in the State Department, are in line with the thougnts
contained in your recent letter.
I would point out one thing and that is that even if the decision here were for
the U. S. to take no decisive action if the Japs should decide to go into the Datch
East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul, as by so doing we would completely
nullify the reason for your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just remember that
the Japs don't know what we aie going to do and so loing as they don't know they
may hesitate, or be deterred. These thoughts I have kept very secret here.
[2] The above I think will answer the question "why you are there". It
does not answer the question as to how long you will probably stay. Rest assured
that the minute I get this information I will commun.cate it to you. Nobody can
answer it just now. Like you, I have asked the question, and also — like you — I
have been unable to get the answer.
I realize what you are up against in even a curtailed gunnery schedule. I may
say that so far as the Department is concerned you are at liberty to play with
the gunnery schedule in any way you see fit, eliminating some practices for the
time being and substituting others which you may consider important and which
you have the means at hand to accomplish. Specifically if you want to cut short
range battle practice and proceed with long range practices or division practices
or experimental or anything else, including anti-air, etc., etc., which you think
will be to the advantage of the Fleet in its present uncertain status — go ahead.
Just keep us informed.
We have told you what we are doing about ammunition ; we will attempt to
meet any changes you may desire.
We have given you a free hand in recommending ships to come back to the
Coast for docking, etc.
You ask whether you are there as a stepping off place for belligerent activity?
Answer : obviously it might become so under certain conditions but a definite
answer cannot be given as you have already gathered from the foregoing.
I realize what you say about the advantages of returning to the West Coast
for the pui*pose of preparation at this time is out of the question. If you did
return it might nullify the principle reasons for your being in Hawaii. This very
question has been brought up here. As a compromise, however, you have authority
for returning ships to the Coast for docking, taking ammunition, stores, etc., and
this should help in any case.
As to the fret zing of personnel : — Nimitz has put the personnel problem before
you. I will touch on it only to the extent that I have been moving Heaven and
Earth to get our figure boosted to 170.000 enl'sted men (or even possibly 172,300)
and 34,Oro marines. If we get these authorzed I believe you will be comfortable
as regards numbers of men for this coming year. I know the convulsion the Fleet
had to go through to commission the 64 destroyers and some other ships recently.
944 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I am thankful that convulsion is over. I hope the succeeding one may be as light
as possible and you may rest assured that Navigation will do everything it can
to lessen this unavoidable burden on the Forces Afloat.
I had hoped your time in the Hawaiian area would have some indirect or inci-
dental results regardless of anything else, such as —
(a) Solving the logistic problems involved, including not only supplies
from the U. S. but their handling and storage at Pearl Harbor.
(b) Training, such as you might do under war conditions.
[3] (c) Familiarity of Task Forces with the Midway, Aleutian, Palmyra,
Johnston, Samoa general area, in so far as may be practicable.
(d) Closer liaison with the Army and the common defense of the Hawaiian
area than has ever previously existed between Army and Navy.
(e) Solving of communication problems involved by joint action between
Army and Navy and particularly stressing the air communications.
(f ) Security of the Fleet at anchor.
(g) Accentuating the realization that the Hawaiian group consists of
considerably more than just Oahu.
You were not detained in Hawaii to develop the area as a peacetime operating
base but this will naturally flow to a considerable extent from what you are up
against.
As to the decrease in the eflSciency of the Fleet and the lowering of morale
due to inadequate anchorages, air fields, facilities, service, recreation conditions,
for so large a Fleet ;♦
I wish I could help you. I spent some of my first years out of the Naval Academy
in the West Indies, — I remember the last port I was in after a 22 month stay
and where we didn't move for 6 months ; and there was not even one white person
in the place. The great antidote I know is WORK and homemade recreation such
as sailing, fishing, athletics, smokers, etc. You can also move Task Forces around
a good deal for seagoing and diversion ; just so you be ready for concentrations
should such become necessary. We will solve the oil situation for you for all the
cruising you feel necessary.
In my letter of May 22nd I mentioned the possibility of moving some units of
the Fleet to the Atlantic. This might be a small movement, or it might grow to
a modified Rainbow No. 1, — modified as to assumptions and as to the distribution
of the forces. In other words, a situation that we might be confronted with
would be one in which the Italian and German Fleets would not be free to act,
but might be free to send a cruiser or so to the South Atlantic. In such a case
there would be no need to send very extensive forces to the Atlantic, and the con-
tinuance of the Fleet in the Pacific would maintain its stabilizing influence.
Units that might be called to the Atlantic, under such a modified Rainbow
situation, to provide for conditions that now appear possible, would be a division
of cruisers, a carrier, a squadron of destroyers, possibly a light mine layer division
possibly Patrol Wing One, and possibly, but more unlikely, a division of submarines
with a tender.
If you desire to have task groups visit the Aleutians, and the islands in the
mid-Pacific and south Pacific somewhat distant [^] from Hawaii, the
possibility of such a call being made, — for the detachment of such a force to the
Atlantic — should be borne in mind.
Also, it should be borne in mind, in connection with any movements of Navy
units to the southward that a situation might arise which would call for visits to
French or British possessions in these areas. We will strive to keep you informed
on these points as the situation changes or develops.
I believe we have taken care of your auxiliary air fields by granting authority
for leases and I may add that we are asking for authority to do something perma-
nent in this connection in bills which we now have pending before the Congress
and which should be acted upon within the next two weeks.
Fleet Training has recently sent you a letter with regard to targets and target
practice facilities in general. We will do everything we can to assist you in
this situation and I trust that something permanent will come out of it so that in
future situations of this kind the 14th District will be much better off.
Regarding the carrier situation, we are prepared to go along with you on
whatever you decide is best after you complete your survey.
Regarding splitting the Hawaiian Detachment back into its normal type com-
mands:— We will naturally leave this matter entirely in your hands. If a part
of the Fleet is brought to the Atlantic Coast, or if the main part of the Fleet is
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 945
recalled to the West Coast, It may well, In any case, be necessary to formulate a
task force for retention in Hawaii different from the composition of the present
Hawaiian Detachment.
This letter is rather rambling and practically thinking out loud as I have read
yours. Incidentally it should be read in connection with my letter to you of
22 May wherein was outlined the possibilities of having to send some ships to the
Atlantic ; and which you had not received when you wrote.
I would be glad if you would show Admiral Bloch this and also my last letter —
as I want to keep him informed.
Rest assured that just as soon as I can give you anything more specific I will.
Meanwhile keep cheerful and with every good wish as ever
Sincerely,
/s/ Betty.
Admiral J. O. Richardson, TJ8N,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
U8S "PENNSYLVANIA," Pearl Harbor, Haumii.
P. S. The European situation is extremely critical. Italy may act by 5 June
which seems to be another deadline drawn on information which once again looks
authentic. However, it still is a guess.
946 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Secret June 22, 1940.
Dear JO : Ynur trip to Washington was held in abeyance because of uncer-
tainty as to tiie movements of the fleet in the immediate future. Tentatively
decision has been made for the fleet to remain for the present where it is. This
decision may be changed at any tinie. It rests partly upon the question as to
what happens to the French fleet. On this last there is no definite and final
information as yet.
So all 1 can say is that the fleet must stay in a condition of complete readiness.
By now you will have received my last letter, in which in reply to your question
I stated I thought it would be best for you to concentrate your planning energies
on a distribution of task forces to provide for the problems of Rainbow 1 modified
by those set up in Rainbow 4. This picture is as yet unchanged.
The floating dry dock from New Orleans has recently completed the transit of
the Panama Canal, and is being reassembled for towing on to Pearl Harbor as
originally planned. A few days ago the question was brought up as to whether
or not this plan would be carried out. After giving it some reconsideration, we
decided to go ahead and take the dock on to Honolulu as it would be needed
there to care for the forces that nnist be maintained in the Honolulu area in any
case.
Guaritanamo is receiving considerable development. In addition to air
fields on both sides of the Bay. we are increiising the gun defenses by four 6"
guns and four 3" antiairciaft guns. In the near future we will send about 105
additional Marines, and somewhat later, when its training has been completed,
we will send down a Marine Defense Battalion of about 750 men.
I am also endeavoring to get two transports ready for the use of the Marines
in the immediate future, one for the Atlantic (probably Caribbean) and one for
the Pacific. We plan to load these transports with combat units of the Fleet
Marine Force .so that they will be strategically ready for innnediate use,^ — such
a tran.sport full of Marines and equipment can be dispatched to a needed task
in the same manner as we now dispatch a cruiser.
We recently, as you read in the papers, introduced a bill expanding the Navy
suffciently to provide for major tasks simultaneously in both oceans, and of a
strength that will peiinit us at all times to have strong forces in each ocean.
It is not our intention to have a permanent Atlantic fleet somewhat disassociated
fi'om the permanent Pacific fleet. However, there will necessarily be some de-
centralization in fleet command. We can talk this over when you come East.
AiK)ther subject to take up with you is the question of basing the fleet units
that might be brought to the Atlantic — using Caribbean bases, primarily — Cris-
tobal, Guantanamo and othei'S.
This is the first of an attempt to write you a weekly letter. Hope they may
l)rove to be of some use to you.
All good wishes.
Sincerely,
/S/ BETTT.
Admiral J. O. Richardson. U. S. N.
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
U.8.8. "Pennsylranin." e/o Postmaster,
San Francisco, California.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
947
Lahaina Roads, T.H.
82 June 1940
Dear Betty:
The enclosures are self-explanatory, and caused
me to send confidential despatch 220603,
To clarify the situation, I flew to Pearl yes-
terday and held a conference with Andrews, Bloch, and
General Herron, conLuandinc the Hawaiian Department.
Briefly, on 17 June, due to the "Alert" froin the './or
Depart lent, the Army issued live aMiinition to all
posts iricludinG A. A. batteries, etc., and established
a patrol and -uard over all critical areas, which are
considered by then to be, all landing beaches, land
areas (bridees, roads, etc.) and Fearl Harbor (Marines)
Their directive included a proviso that all despatches
were to be sent in cole via cable to the Chief of
Staff and that the public in Honolulu were not to be
excited, hence no Army was stationed at waterv/orks,
electric light plant, gas or telephone companies, but
extra precautions were taken by these latter.
I The navy increased their distant Dl>»ne patrol
fro.a 130 miles to 300 miles and enlarged the sector
being covered to include from 180° to 360°, as well
as establishing a 30 mile inner patrol.
Two days later, the Army received word to "ease
up on the Alert", but to maintain guard on all criti-
cal areas on a seni -permanent basis. V/e did not
know aliout this, until General Herron mentioned it
at the conference in reply to my query as to how long
the Alert would continue. General Herron stated that
he niicht, on the 24th, further modify his present
interpretation of the "nodified alert".
As a matter of interest, Herron said he had
been asked if he could store crude rubber and tin
to the extent of 600,000 cubic feet (his ficures)
and furtlier that no such storage space was available.
//«-
79716 O— 46— pt. 14-
948 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
/
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
Adi.iiral Stark - 2
The Array "Alert" and action taken caused me
some concern though I felt positive that any Array
intellisence bearing on the above would be avail-
able to and evaluated by the l!avy, with information
to lie. Of course, anythinc of this character tends
to a^-ravate the tenseness of the situation and to
Interrupt training, as the Fleet Is operating from
Lahalna and Pearl by single ships and groups and
without the full screening and scouting which a
more serious situation would necessitate.
As a similar situation may again arise, I
believe a remedy would be to insure that where
possible, when Joint action is involved, even in
drills, that the Comianders of the Army and Navy
be jointly informed, with definite infora tlon to
rae as to whether the alarm is real or simulated for
purposes of training.
With best regards,
J. 0. RICIiARDSOU
Admiral H. R, Stark, U.S.N.
Navy Department
V/ashington, D. C.
tct
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 949
"copy
S2CRET
U. S. S. IIIDIAI'IAPOLIS, M
^"^ . Pearl Harbor, T. H. W^
y •,,,-— . Tuesday, 18 June 1940. '^ i/
Memo, for Co."unander-in-Chief , U, S. Fleet,
Rear Admiral Bloch visited me yesterday stating that he
had just been informed by General Herron, in secret, that he
(Herron) had just received orders from the /Var Department plac-
ing Army in this area on the "Alert". This nws done with special j
e.-phasis on possible carrier and plane attacks. He asked Bloch J
for a distant air patrol and inner air patrol.
I explained to Bloch your present patrol plan and informed
him that I would establish im,Tiediately an inner patrol which I
did at 1300 yesterday and aa continuing same. General Herron
desires that a VP patrol be established covering western semi-
circle with Oahu as center instead of present VP patrol from
Lahaina which as you know covers from 220 to 335 distance 180
miles.
I agree with Herron and I have VP to establish such a
patrol which must begin at dav/n each day.
I have discussed this matter with Fitch who is ready to
start when you give the order.
I have also informed Rear Admiral Calhoun In secret.
If you desire this patrol established in lieu of present
patrol I suggest that you send Combasefor a message "Affirm
patrol" and this new patrol will be started tomorrow. Such a
patrol is pictured as below:
o
lt^-^jP.,,,JL
'no
Sector to be searched daily - V/estern semi-circle. The Army will
cover night patrol, leaving us day patrol only.
Calhoun and I are awaiting instructions.
Respectfully,
I . jr V # »/ /■/ Adolphus Andrews ^j^^.
I J^jL*^ /^^fC^^ ;A«u3W ^ A.,.U%€^ *-^ >*-^ 0fn4j,^p
950 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
AJ~^Z2p0 (LOCAL TIME) ON 18 JUNE, |940, SENT THE FOLLOWING
TO COMMANDANT, ^T*TtiJlAVAL DISTRICT:
SEC£ET^~-~~^
"■.VOULD LIKE TO KNO.V .VHETHER REQUEST OF COMMANDING GENERAL
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT FOR ADDITIONAL AIR PATROL IS" A PART OF
ARMY EXERCISE OR IS IT BASED UPON INFORMATION FROM THE WAR
DEPARTMENT"
AT 09»5 (LOCAL TIME) ON 19 JUNE, 1940, THE FOLLO.VING
REPLY WAS RECEIVED:
CONFIDENTIAL
"REQUEST OF COMMANDING GENERAL .VAS BASED UPON A DIRECTIVE
FROM THE WAR DEPARTMENT X HE HAS NO INFORMATION AS TO
WHETHER OR. NOT IT IS AN EXERCISE"
IW/
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 951
SECRET and CCMMANDAOT .(i>V^
PERSONAL FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT V^ ,-,
PEARL HARBOR, T.H. fV'
20 June 1940
Dear Rlohardson:
This will aoknowledee receipt of your letter dated
£0 June, reoelved by pleine this morning; I note the contents
thereof and will oarrj out your wishes expressed therein.
General Herron received a dispatch from the Weur De-
partment the other day which stated in substance: "Alert your
forces against hostile oversea raid. This must be done in such
a way as to prevent newspaper publicity or notice of foreign
intelligence tcents. Department suggests that you do this on
a maneuver basis in order to accomplish the above." General
Herron brought this dispatch down to me and told me he was tak-
ing the necessary action and hoped that the Navy could see its
way clear to have an off-ohore patrol each day and do anything
else in its power. I consulted Andrews and an off-shore and in-
shore patrol around Pearl Harbor has been arranged concerning
which you have been advised by Calhoun. I have no idea of how
Ion; this situation will exist, nor as to the gravity thereof;
for two days I had out the Fleet Marine Foxoe and their anti-
aircraft guns with eunmunition. I called them in. yesterday inas-
much as it was necessary to keep their aramunltlon under tarpaulins
in the vicinity of the guns and this did not look like a very
safe practice inasmuch as they were deployed in the heart of the
navy yard. My idea is, if something more definite is not heeu'd
by Monday, I will probably put them out again on Monday and on a
distant station somewhere near the Army guns.
I have many things of relative importance and unimportance
to discuss with you. Everything goes along smoothly and busily,
I took the liberty of telling Eddy that I thought he should go
back with Rucker in the plane today without giving him any reasons.
With my warmest regards.
Sincerely,
/s/ C. C. BLOCH.
Admiral J. 0. Richardson, U.S.N. ,
Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet,
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship.
CCB;lrt
/f^
952 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CinC Pile No. UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. ENTERPRISE. PlacOip
AIR :. AIL
P^jQWAL :ionolulu, T. i;.
C0::7IJ'r::TIAL 18 Septenber 1940.
D«ar 3etty:
While the Secretary v;as on board the 2I«TEaruISS he
said to ne, "Adiiral, v;ill you co.ie to ./a::'.ilnjton in early
October while you are on the Pacific Coast?". I replied, "I
can not cone to Jashlnjton except under orders, but if Stark
wants to see r\e I suppose I ■.»ill be ordered."
Just before leavinc Fearl Harbor the Secretary said,
"Ad.ilral, I will tail: to Stark and it is ;>os3i"-^le that we riay
•..ant you to coae to ./ashinctoa for a conference." I replied,
"I v;ill be jlad to coie any tixe I a-: wanted."
I do not know of any benefit to the IJavy that would
accrue froa ay coMn- to .»ashincton as I fully and fran'cly ex-
pressed nj' views to the Secretary on all points where I felt
that such expression .li.'rlit help the !Iavy or the Uation. I also
cave hin a aenorandai v/hich covered the .r.ore important points
discussed -./ith hi:n. Nevertheless, if you or the Secretary want
.-ne to CQsie I v^ill be pleased to do so.
During the past six aonths the Tleet has been visited
by two Secretaries. Durine the last visit the Secretary made a
aost favopaMe Lipression upon the officers and aen of the Fleet
and I hav« frequently heard officers say, "I hope that Colonel
kQOX renains as Secretary regardless of the outcojie of the elec-
tion."
In the Fleet we did all we could to show both Secre-
taries what wc are, what we are doing, and ..hat we are thinking.
Recardleaa of whether we aade a ^^ood impression on the Secretary
I believe that it v;ould have boosted our spirits a "it if, upon
his departure, he had sent a dispatch to the Fleet in these
vmters or to Cincus enpressinc sane appreciation of our efforts
to sha* our wares or approbation of our endeavors to maintain an
efficient Jleet. Personally I feel that the Fleet aade a ,-ood
inpreasion, and that a dispatch would have been sent had the
Secretary been aoooapanied by a conpetent aide.
Flcase tall lliaitz that hio letter of 30 August re-
Cardine six-year enllstaents was delivered to at by the Secreteury's
Aide on llonday afteraoon a fev/ ainutes before the Secretary left
-1-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
953
CinC FiJe No.
v;o:.'.-:3-;tiai
UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. 8. ENTERPRISE. rUgaklp
fhe iiSt^r;! "" "'''' ' "^' ^-^Tletei r.y serious talks with
■.lit;, iiiadest rc-.-sir-'s ar.;" ^ect v.iEh -s.
Gincercly,
/J ,. ... /
J. c. ■.ic;;a:.
c.'.ier of i:aval Operations,
l."avy Depart. ;tnt,
.•asLlnjtor., D. C.
xlC
954 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
^ ■■■■.;
CinC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET \ '/
V. S. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship
At S««, .-•
18 3«pt«Bb«r, 1940. *'\.^^.
4
0-^
/
MBIORANDDU TOR THE SBCRgTARTl
1. lb* following not«s wr* aubalttod os tb« points «tiloh
we dlaouated In my effort to meet your wlahes to know offloera,
learn about ablpa and find out how you oould aaalat tbe Fleet 'a
preparation for war,
s. psr3onki;l
(A) Offloera.
(a) Promotion by Mleotlon best method yet derlaed* ''^
(b) Uembera ahould be allowed to serve on two suoeesslTe /
boards if oirouastanoes render it adTlsable (requires
ehange by Oongress).
(o) Sea duty assignments should be based on ability; t&e /t„^'T'
most proaising officers should be giren preferenoe. -
This would tend to oreate a dlTision of offioers into J'{
two olasses, the most proaising and the least promis-
ing, or an A and B liat.
(d) Tbe abuses of retirement for physioal disability and ^
the retention on active duty and delayed retirement of
the physically unfit ahould be corrected.
(B) toll sted Personnel «
(a) While the enlisted strength increased ll,3i9 between
25 May and 15 August, the Fleet in the Pacific made /V<-^'
a net gain of only about 600. Our enormous expendi^ \$ ■■
turea for material may prove futile unleas there is •] , a'
prompt and commensurete personnel expansion.
(b) The bottleneck of the training stations, limiting the
rate of acceptance of new men, ahould be eliminated
at once and emergency expansion should begin now with- ^
out awaiting deficiency appropriations. We have not '
waited for specific appropriatlona in providing material
ezpanalon, and it is difficult to underatand or explain
to the Fleet why we are unable or unwilling to meet
even more vital problems of personnel (involving the
imperative necessity of raaklng ready what we already
have as well as training .-aen for new construction)
wTEE equally direct and effective action. I estimate
-1-
:,l^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 955
CinC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship
th« time nooessary to oak* • modern maa-of •war* ■'•oaa i
•t 4 years. Tou oan ese the neoeeslty of getting (
itarted on thla training right away.
(C) Separata Air Corpe.
(a) UnquestlonaDly a higher degree of cooperation will
exist between our Naval air ana and other Ilaral arms
if all of them continue to be intimately bound to-
gether in one Navy.
(b) .ifltb a separate air corps there is bound to develop /
a loyalty to the Corps rather than to the Navy, a
Jealousy between the Corps and the rest of the Navy,
many perplexing problems of supply, personnel, ad*
ministration, and above all a serious loss in effeet-
iveneas.
(o) I kxiow of no advantage to the Navy or the Nation that
would accrue from the creation of a Navtil Air Corps.
3. UitERia.
(A) Surfaoe^l^e.
(a) I believe new construction la bein^j expedited as much 'i-'--"1
aa Doaaibla. ^Inalavars are naadad for /Ltlantlo aoaat:. i.^r''
as possible, minelayers are needed for Atlantic Coast.
/"
(a) Aircraft.
(a) A tremendous expansion in this field conplioated by n / O
foreign orders as well as by our deaands. Airplanes, ' /c^-^
either for sale or for training, should not be obtained k/^
at the expense of the active Fleet, fleet planes mnst
be replaced as rapidly as possible, with new planes,
but old planes cannot be taken off until new ones are
on hand.
(C) Aiynunition.
/ (a) Build up the maximum reserve possible of anti-aircraft i^
aoLnunltion.
4. 0PgR/Vri0N3
(A) Retention of the fleet in the Hawaiian Area.
(a) From a purely Kaval point of view there are many die* y "■-
advantages attached to basing the fleet in this area, '*-'-"'
some of which arei A^:-
956 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
line File No. UNITED STATES FLEET
I'. S. S. ENTERPRISE. FlaRship
(1) Difficulty • delay and ooat of transpor^xim m«a,
munitions, and suppllaa.
(2) Inadequaoy of Labalna aa operating anohora^e dua /
to laok of security.
(S) Inadequaoy of Pearl Harbor as operating anchor- <
age due to difficulties of entry, berthing and
departure of large ships.
(4) Congested and restricted operating areas, la the ^^
air and on the surface. '"•^
(B) Inadequate facilities for fleet serrloas, train- V^ -^
^ - - Ing, recreation and housing. o->.~^>^~'' -^,-/'"Z '^"
'' (6) Prolonged absences from mainland of officers *nd^J^>rs
/.../.
V
man In time of peace adrersely affects morale. *C^'
In case of war, necessary for fleet to return to
fflOblllBatlon ports on v/ast Coast or accept partial
and unorganized mobilisation measures resulting
in confusion and a net loss of time.
hi <> (b) If the disposition of the Tleet were determined solely
by Naral considerations the major portion of the Fleet
ahoiU.d return to its normal Pacific Coast bases becausa
such basing would facilitate its training and its pra»
paration for war.
.1. ..
(e) If factors other than purely Haral ones are to influa&at
the decision as to where the fleet should be based at
I this time, the Baral factors should be fully presented
/ and carefully considered, as well as the probable af-
fect of the deciaion on the readiness of the fleet. la
other words, is it more important to lend strength to
diplonatic representations in the Pacific by basing
the neet in the Hawaiian Area, than to facilitate its
preparation for actire service in any area by basing
the major part of it on normal Pacific Coast basest
(d) In case our relations with another Pacific Ration de-
teriorate, what is the State Department's conception
of our naoct moreT Does it belicTe that the rieet is
now mobilised and that it could embark on a campaign
directly froa Hawaii or safely, conduct neeesaary traia-
ZfC
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 957
CinC File No. I'MTKO STATES FLEET
I S. S. ENTERPRISE, FlaRship
Ing froQ the Inaeoure anohorai3e at Lahalna which li
2000 miles nearer ena^y eubaiarlne bases than our ,'
^_ normal Paolflo Coast bases? J
5. SHORE ESTAJLISHtraiT
(•) I hope you will be constantly on guard not to have the
position and purpose of the Shore Establishment orer-
•mphaslzed. It has only one purpose - the support,
malntonanoe and auguientation of the fighting 71eet. ^
It oannot, of Itself, damage an enamy. It is onlf
human that some of those in Washington and long re-
fflored from the active Fleet, (predominantly staff corps)
frequently fail to Tieuallze the correct priority of
obJectlTes.
6, MATY PUBLICITY
k^.-^
Practically all Nary Publicity, hearings before com- -rf-*^^
mittees, speeches in Confess and handouts from the Nary Depart- j**^^
ment hare stressed one or more of the follov^ing ideas i c*-*j'^
(a) The Navy is built for defense. ,^^1^^ r^
(b) A so-called adequate Nary will keep us out of war. ♦— -^l
(o) With an adequate Navy we can impose our will upon the Jh''~'~-
Nations of the earth with little danger of becaaia^ /
inTolTed in war.
(d) In the unhappy erent of war the 71e«t is a kind of
mobile Uaglnot Line behind which the people »an reside
in peace with no obligation to their Oountry ezeept
to promise that their descendants will some day pay
for the NaTy.
(•) The Tleet is fully oaimed, fully trained and raady to
fight at the drop of a bat.
(f) Tbe ecraparatlTe sttangth of navies is aaasured solaly
by oaterial thing*.
(g) Aviation is a cheap aeans of defense and that largo
nuabers of planes and pilots will render the nation
seeure.
(h) Outlying Haval bas*s and air fields, In theaselves ar«
weapons of defense*
Z/t
958 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
.CinC RIe No. UNITED STATES FLEET
V. S. S. ENTERPRISE. Flagahip
"Ri* tfp* Of publlolty a*ntlo&«4 •bora is wroac iB
that It tKOda to lull the publia Into a false Mna« of ••eurltr*
Zt turda to «aakan thalr aoral fibra and to oraato an uahaalthy
national aorala in a ooimtry ubioh amj ba drawn Into war on yrj /
short notice, for a people, who may aotually ba InrelTaA in Y
war in a oooparatlTely short tiae, to ba told that tliay ean riak
war without danger or wage war without riak, aay be fatally
datrlnaatal to the determined proseoution of the rery war to*
wards whioh sueh oonoeptlona ineritably lead. At the baeinning
of the present war, the JPreneh and British had just these ideas,
with the present result.
7. cggi^giojr^DgT.yeKW exkcot^ve. 3T/.ct. war m^ navt
(a) Whether Justified or not, I ean not escape the feeling '^^
that the coordination and mutual understanding Isetween the above i^
dapartnenta of the Rorernaent is not as close as la^eoessary for
affeotire action. 2^-3^; ^.'^^ '; -^.'^'7-'^^^: ^ ,i^'J:.?ik^-i ri^^J^^.-
(b) Before reaching a declalon aa to the disposition and moTe« '^'-
nents of the ?laat, or units thereof, is the Navy Department oon« y^.
•ulted, are ita tIcws frankly and forcibly prasentetl, and are its ^^
representotions^horoushly understood and considered?
(c) Present policy arpears to be headed towarde forcing our ,^:-— .
will upon another laoiflo ration by diplocaatic representations >' ''■
^ ' y aupported by-«oonr>uio maasut'es, a large loaterial iiaTj' in process/ <-'-'.'
'' , > of construction, and the disposition of an inade<iuataly manned '/"'' ''
■/-'
Fleet in beinr.. Can this be done and are we prepared to face LI—
war or the inevitable lose or preatice if it cannot? HaTe the
objectiveb of buo^ a war boe:i foraulated, and its costs con-
sidered and caapared with the rulue of victory? Oaa auoh a war
be won by defensive measures or by a people trained to believe
that the ITavy is for flefenslve puri'Oaeo only, and that their
whole oblicatioit to t'.eir country can be met by the payment of
taxes?
(d) the Couoander-in-Chief haa no responsibility for the
form«U.ation of national policy, but he has a definite responai-
bility for the efflolenoy of one axra upon whioh thr novernmant
relies to enforce llatlonal policy, whon Its alms can not bo se- ^
cured by diplomatic moans. !:e aust be conoarned over the question
as to whether the strength and efflolenoy of the I'leet are coq-
mensurate with the a/^sreBolve policy of the adninletration in
the Pacific. Especially so if thero Is a possibility that this
•8-
;t&
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 959
CinC Fil« No. UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. ENTERPRISE. FUfiklp
polioj will r«auir« lapl«iMnt«tiOB«
(•) if ebJ«otiT«a b«liie fomulatfld aad pitas- auBt for eov
•otlT* partlolMtion In tb« Iurop««n w%x1 -ff* eumot lon« r«aaiB
h«lf in and half out of luob • «wr. Wo ohould dooldo now on 4»*
flnlt* objeotlTOS and piano and ahoold not aaauaa that «• will ^
fight tfaia on* Ilka wa did tha laat, i.o., by aandine arlatiOB ly^ i
and light foroaa for aotlra partleipation and utilliing our ^^v-^^v
baary ahlps, In seoura hoaa baaaa, largaly aa training ahlpa* "^^^^
Suoh a oouraa would ioaobiliie our baary ahipa, whlob ara mo»% /^C^^-*^
aortalnly going to ba naedad althar in tha Atlantlo or tha ?»•
olfle, dapending on tha prograaa of tha war.
^^.,,—JU--/jL<J^.<LA~sU-^
•ft-
Z7(
960 . CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
v.. t
DSPiRTr.an' of thk navt
OKFICS OF THE SBCRBTART
WA3HIKCT0N
I
{.aeORANIXK. FOR THK SKCRXTUnr
Important itams to b« discussed in the Dvparteent.
Uedlterran«an Study. -^ '
Joint Board, (idnlral Start) " - ^ ' ■■*
Dafaiisaa and dsTelopmants for new bases. Atlantic. '^^ ' -•/' "-f '
UUlarground storage, auxiliary landing fields, eto.
Will defense be entire responsibility of Navy or
will irmy be inTolTsd? — -^ >- >•■/ *->-— '■^■•- tL.
(Idmirel Stark. ) 77- ---/">' ■ -^
Personnel inorease. >" >■ <*■ ■■ - ."t r<^'-'- J- > *»'"■♦'••' *"
(President, after dlsoussion with idmlral Staik,
idmirel Nialts.)
.1.:.
<:«.
4» Fleet n«lnlng. Present training too elMnentsry sad
oautlous. What steps to make more adTaneed?
(idmlral Stazk)
S. Oreater target practice, SBBunltion allowance 'y<(.j- ^ .;tl\ i'
and more drone praetioe. Ships with war aoinunitlon
allowance cannot carry sufficient target practice
annunition. idditionsl ajmunition ships urgently
and constantly needed. — 3- '"»-^- / ♦^^ : - -*•-•"
(idmlral Stark) /t^ v. >.vv i /•-■ -^
6. Great weakness in fast auxiliaries. What steps for -<J,>-'^ ''"r"'^^
early procurement of fast and adequate numbers of (\t-i ''■'-/ ^' '
suxliiaries to cover all probable Fleet anployment?
(idmlral Stark - idmlral Bobinson) *
- 7. Mine laying by airplanes. What Is oontaaiplated? -/■> 'v.; •>-.-/ '-'-^^»
(iteiral Towers - Admiral Staiic) ^r^t^-x-'-tA^'^""' -^
x^c.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 961
24 September 1940.
Deab jo : I am working on a letter for you but will send you a copy of luy
letter to Pei-k ; it is self-explanatory.
I meant simply to mention Faulkner but got into something a little more
serious.
Frankly, I do not like the look of things any too well. Spent over three hours
in the State Department yesterday — something over two in the morning with
Mr. Hull, Welles and Hornbeck, and then again in the afternoon over an hour
with Mr. Welles. I believe had you been present you would have been in agree-
ment with what I did and I pushed my thoughts home just as hard as I could.
I may say that the same general picture so far as our attitude is concerned still
holds, although I would not be surprised, confidentially between you and me,
to see an embargo on scrap but this too would be along the lines State has been
working on.
I strongly opposed, and I believe carried my point, an embargo on fuel oil for
reasons which are obvious to you and with which I may say I think the State
Department is in concun-ence. I believe Mr. Hull brought it up to get a thorough
discusson of the subject and Mr. Welles said he was in complete agreement
with me.
Hope to get a letter off in the next day or two with a coverage of some of the
thoughts that I have been playing with and, as you know, my mind is com-
pletely open to you. almost to simply thinking out loud.
With every good wish as always
Sincerely,
/s/ Bettt.
Admiral J. O. Richabdson. USN,
Commander in Chief, U. 8. Fleet,
US8 "New Mexico," Long Beach, Califimia.
P. S. Just received yours with regard to your coming East and will take it up
with rhe Secretary. Unless there is something you feel you want to talk about
or that crops up after your arrival on the Coast, I will tell the Secretary I see
no need of your coming East, at least for the moment.
I am sorry the message was not sent to the Fleet. I have felt that was an
Aide's job. When with the Secretary I always sent them ; in the last case when
I visited Hawaii T sent them for the Secretary not only to the Navy and to the
Army but to the Governor as well. I will tell Mort Deyo to be on guard against
these slips hereafter.
Perhaps a letter from the Secretary now would be helpful. I will talk to him
about it.
25 SBaT"EMBEB 1940.
P. S. to my letter of yesterday.
After my note to you of yesterday I spoke to Mort Deyo about telegrams back
to the Fleet or other activities after the Secretary's visits.
Mort told me that the Secretary was preparing letters himself as a result of
his visit out there so you may expect to hear from him.
My feeling is that a letter sometime after a visit can never take the place of
an appreciative despatch and I have so told Mort. Of cour.se in the last analysis
the Secretary is the Boss but I have given Mort the thought — here's hopin'.
Until you wrote I had not seen the sheet which placed officer and enliste'd per-
sonnel under the Assistant Secretary or at least that particular item escaped
my attention. It was not in the original suggestions I made to the Secretary.
I immediately took it up with the Secretary and it has been changed ; personnel
now coming directly under the Secretary which is the same as it has been. Of
course you know that BuNav and OpNav usually settle these things pretty much
themselves.
/s/ Bettt.
Admiral J. C. Richabdson, VSN.
1 October 1940.
De.^b J. O. : I hated to send you the despatch last night that the house would
be full when you got here. Kit had not intended to return until two weeks from
next Sunday when Harold Gillespie from Honolulu expected to be with us. How-
ever he has been again delayed ; will not he here when planned, and as the only
reason for Kit remaining at the Lake was for his coming, and his coming now
being indefinite, they decided to come down this week. By they I mean Kit
and Kewpie (our daughter) and her two children and nurse girl which will fill
the house to about 100 percent complement
962 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Secretary wants very much to see you. I told him of your letter. How-
ever, one of the things he wanted to talk to you about is the possibility of sending
a detachment to the Far East; it is being urg^d here by some. I have opposed
it and so has Ingersoll. Your thoughts are likely to be determinative.
The question of where to hold the Fleet Problem will also be on the agenda.
In addition the Secretary says he would just like to talk to you anyway ; so
there you are.
I more or less took the bull by the horns with regard to getting more men
aboard ship quickly and while we had written you about it the Secretary took
it up with the President before we had time to get your reply, that is, with
regard to cutting the training period to three weeks. I felt I was on fairly
sound ground in bringing this up as my feeling is that it is in accord with your
wishes. I would prefer to get twice the number of men In a given period and
get them quickly rather than have them spend an additional five weeks or so
at the Training Station.
Frankly I do not like the trend of things and I would not be surprised at any-
thing happening any day. Your statement that we can not stay half in this war
and half out sizes up the thing pretty well and I have long felt that it is only a
matter of time until we get in.
I am writing the District Commanders a letter pointing out the gravity of the
situation as I see it and will send you a copy. In this letter I made no attempt
to go into much detail — my objective being that they get the spirit of the sit-
uation as I see it which would leave no stone unturned towards our immediate
readiness. God knows I hoi)e I am wrong because I realize what a little addi-
tional time would mean to Us but sometimes things get out of hand either from
the other fellow's action or our own.
Personally, I am looking forward as always to seeing you. I will keep the
decks clear and will arrange our evenings according to your desires. The fem-
inine part of my family are good soldiers on retiring upstairs and turning over
the downstairs to stag get-togethers which I And are so beneflcial these days.
For next Tuesday, 8 October, I am tentatively slating the following for dinner :
The Secretary, Comdr. Murphy, Admirals Sexton, Robinson, Nimitz, Ingersoll,
Towers, Furlong, Moreell and General Holcomb.
I am sorry that you will not be putting up with us as our quiet, late evening
talks helped me so nnich when you were last here.
With every good wish as always.
Sincerely,
/s/ Betty.
Admiral J. O. Richardson, USN,
Commander in Chief, V. S. Fleet,
US8 "New Mexico," San Pedro, California.
P. S. I see no reason in the world for any secrecy with regard to your coming
to Washington.
JOB/clp
Confidential 9 October 1940.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Points covered in talk with the President
1. Go ahead with assembly of Train.
2. Have we fuel oil in Samoa adequate to fill four (4) old light cruisers?
3. Give me a chart showing British and French Bases or possible bases for
surface ships, submarines or airplanes in Islands in the Paciflc, east of the Inter-
national Date Line.
4. The British Ambassador stated that Ghormley was busy transmitting to
the Department information regarding technical materials, and the British
Admiralty felt that they should have officers prepared for staff conferences.
5. The British believe the Germans will attempt to occupy Dakar from Spain
over land through Africa.
6. I (F. D. R.) can be convinced of the desirability of retaining the battleships
on the West Coast if I can be given a good statement which will convince the
American people, and the Japanese Government, that in bringing the battleships
to the West Coast we are not stepping backward.
7. The President indicated that he might approve sending a Division of old
Light Cruisers to visit Mindinao as a gesture. He did not appear favorably
disposed toward sending a stronger force.
/s/ J. O. Richardson.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 963
ciac rs* Ht. umiiv ctatm vur
O: I. S. MBW MBZKIX ~
A1«/01TM
0. 3. Hbtt Tt»«, BraMrtoa, VMh.
OotObBT M, 1»40 ..^'''^
fMBi The riwniMItT In "MTf U. 3. FlMt. «
Tot ItM Chl«f of ««»«1 CpwatlOM.
stftjMt: War Flaaa - Status nl rMftiaasa of la vlaw oe
of tha «arr«Bt tot«»atlooal oltuatloa.
^1. SlBoa tha ratvn ot tha CoMaaaar-ia-Chlaf , | li^
O. 8. naat. «»o« hla raaaet aeaf«r«Ma In w*«blii«ton, and In \-^^-—
Tlav of tha ooBvaraatloaa that took yUoa thara. adaitlooal
thootfit Mtf atvdr hcra baan civ«B to tha atetua aod raadlnaaa ,
of tha U. 8. naat for «w oparatlooa. Aa a raarat of thla |
atody, tha rn—nflar In f*Mrf , V. 3. Float, faala It to ba j|
hla aolaaa Auty to praaaet, for tha oonaldaration of tha I
Ohlaf of Haval Oparatloaa, aartala fMta and ooneloaloas In I -,
ordar that thara aay ba no de*t In tha alnda of bl/^ar : i^*^
authority aa to hla ooarrlatlOBa In ragrd to tha praaont \y^
altuatlea, aapaelally In tha Paalflo.
1S>A
8. In ordar to brine oat aora elaarly all tha
aapaeta of thla altoatloa. It la naaaasary to fotIow oortaln > '
faatera affaotlne It and to dlaeuaa thaa In tho llcbt of '
praaaot avanta* I
8. On tha oooaaloD of hla flrat Tlalt to Waablngtoij, ao
In 7«ily, and In paraonal lattars to tha Chlaf of Raral Opara-
tloaa, tha OoMMkada^ln-Chlaf atraaaod hla firm oosYlotlon •
that aalthar tha HcTy ner tha oountry «aa praparad for war «ll|h "^^
Xopan. Ba polatad oat that aash an arantuallty ocmld only
raault In a lone draam out, ooatly war, with doubtful pro8<
paata of ultlaata auaaaaa. Ba laft Waahlneton with thraa dla-j
tlnat lavraaaiona :
flrat. That tha float waa ratalnad In tha
Bamailan araa aolaly to aupport dlploB»tla
rapraaaatatlona and aa a datarrant to
'apanaaa aser«**ivo aatlon;
That thara waa no Intantlon of
on aatual hoatllltlaa ar.nlnat
JTapan;
</.
-6c ^"f X^^.
79716 O— 46— pt. 14-
964 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR Al'lAUK
ctoc rito Ntt. oi«rr«D btatb flbr
V. & & mw UKBoa, ~ '
AX6/ea708 ^ 8. ■«»y TM*. Br«Mrtca. ««.&.
Oatc»«r *8, 1940
3ubj««ti War Plan* - Statoa aad rtAlamtm of In ▼!•«
of «h« «niT«Bt iBtanatioaal •itoatloa.
^
njjljl. That tha iMMAlata Hlaalon of tha
riaat waa aaaalaratad iralAlnc and abaorp-
tlon of turn paraonaal aad tha attalsaaat
of a T*— ■- aeadltloB of ■atarlal aad
paraooaal raadlaaaa aoaaiataiit with Ita
rataotloa la tha BanallaB area. "
4. Ob tha oaoaalea of hia aaooad vlalt to Vaahlagtok
MO, aa aatlraly aiffaraot U^raaslon waa ob-
i
la Ootobar, 1940
talaad. It la tma that tha Irtaraatloaal alt«iatlon, hatwaaa
tha t«o Tlalta, had aatarlally ohaacad, prlaolpallr la that
tha daacir of laYaaloa of tha Brltlah Xalaa ««a ocaaldarably
laaa liadaaat, with eeaaaquant radooad ahaaoaa of tha loaa or. ..
eoatroaiaa of tha Brltlah 71aat; la that tha Unltad Stataa had
■ora eloaaly Idantlflad Itaalf with teaat Brltala; in that
/apaaaaa agsrsaaloa had progroasad to tha dcniaatloa of Indo-I
Chlaa aad sava alffu of furthar prograaa toward tha Dutch Saai
ladlaa; and, la tha opaa alllaaoa batwaao Oamaay, Italy aad i
7apaa, raportadly alaad at tha Oaltad stataa. | ^
B. Aa a raault of thaaa ehangaa. It now appaara tha
Bora aotlva, opaa atapa alaad at 7apaa aT9 In aarlous oontaB'
platlon aad that thaaa atapa, If takan now, nay laad to
aotlTa hoatllltlaa. It la la oonaaotlon with this oTantualltt
that tha Coanaadar-la-Chlaf la oonatralaad to prasant hla ;
praaant vlawa.
e. . Iha praaaat 0-1 Flan (oraMCS), :nv3r 44 and
^"Usr 49, In tha light of tha praaaat latamatlonal sltuatlouk —
la ballavad bayoad tha praaaat atrangth of tha V. 3. Float an| a
bayond tha praaaat raaouroaa of tha U. 3. Nary. This la ba-
llarad trua for tha followlag raaaoaa: I ~ ~^
I 76
(a) Tha praaaat atraofth of tha u. j. Float la |
not aufflol«it "tc astabllah, at tha '
aarllaat praotloabla data, tha Unltad ^
3tataa Joist Aalatlo Poroe In tha Uarohall- —
Carollaa Islanda trat la atran^th auparlor ^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
965
AXt/OlTOt
V. & ■• mW MIIIWK
o««ok« aa, IMO
War TXmB - Statu mM r— !!«•■■ of la vlwr
of tbo MR«Bt laUnaAlooAl sitwtioa.
Ji't'lC
^
to %ha% of cauma taA r^aly fotr farthar
•lv«M« to th« WMt«rm PMlfU Sb ooadl-
IB tbat
V/
(b)
(o)
tioa to oywato offanalToly
Vhtlo TCOOcOalBC tiM q:nAlif7liic
phr*M *at tho oarlioct prMtlaablo dato,"
it la flMly tallavad that «• oaanot, at
tbia tlaa. mnta with <kr«at Britain aa-
aodas raspoaaiblllty for oar Atlantis
intaroata, Aaoula that ooaan of auffioiaat
foroaa to protaot oar ooaatal traAa and to
aafaffoarA oar BBro vital lataraata la
Sooth Aaarioa. >or aan wa aaglaot tha
protaatioa of oar oaa and tha Intardiotioa
of Joaaaao trada la tha Sonthaaatora
Paaina. with thaaa enilf wta adaquataly
aarad for, oar r—lnlng fooraa la baraly
aoparior to ORMRS ft tha btSLflftiAS of oar
— at— rd aaapalA. xt will uadoubtadly ba
aabjaet to attritian loasaa aa rotita.
Tha trmr la aot aow proparad aad will aot ,
la tha uaaadiata fotora, ba proparad to
aupport oar waataara advaaaa. Aia FXaat
¥0iaa Toraa la aot aaffioiaat to aupport
tha aaoaasary oparatioaa aloaa. 1^
Xha oaptora of BASS OKI la a aajor military
oparatloa raqiolrlnc datallad kaowladga of
tha araa, datallad planning baaad on auoh
kaowladga, aid tha taklag orar, ooaTaraioa,
■aaaiag, tralalag aad orgaaizatlon of a
larga aui<>ar of aarohaat ahlpa. nia aatab-
liahaaat of tha BASI, aft ar its oooopatlon,
ra^^iiraa: (a), tha traasport of larga
ouaatitiaa of natarial; (b), ths organiza-
tion , traaaport and Balntananoa of oonstruo-
tion onits oapabla of aoooiqtllshlng tha
Z'
i:^'
It-A
19
20
20-A
21
22
29
75
96
•^
^7
3/C ^
7^
966 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
AXt/oifoe
CtaC ra* H%k UHITBD ITATIB FLBCT
u. a. a. NEW MszKa ~
0. S. Ii«*y Ti»*, Br— rtca, ■••h.
Ott*«r BS, IMO
8Aj««t: Var Flaas - statu* and raaAlnass of In t1«v
of tho o«r«it latmuttloiul Bltoatton.
BMosMrr d«T«lo$a«Bt; and (o), tho
A«f«Ba* and aupply of tba baaa during
tha oenatruotion period. Tha Plan
r««alraa tha ee^latlon of thla BASS
forty-flTa daya aftir tha arrlral of
tha flrat aatarlaJL at the alta.
Va do not, at praaant, hare tha
datallad knowladca of tha araa roqul-
alta for propar planning of tbaaa
walfold MtlTltiaa. It la trua that
•oaa knowladga, poaalbly aufflolaot
for inltiatloB of oparmtlona and
ttntral rTt'"'<''i for tha attaok, wmj
ba obtalnad bjr raaoanalaaanoa aftar
hoatUltlaa hara er— in^ad, and tha
Plan proTldaa for aooh oparatlona.
Eovarar, It la not now knovn, nor oan
It ba dataomlnad, until if^ir aotual
oaaivatlon, «hathor or not tha hydro-
graphy of tha araa parolta the estah-
llahaant of a float anohoraga, idiat
oonatruotlon la poaalhla on the land
araaa undar oonaldaratlon and whether
or not adaquata dafanalTa Inetslla-
tlona, particularly air flalda for
laad-baaad aircraft, oan be aatabllshed.
(Irantlng that tha base aalzed offers
possltillltlea for the oatahllshrMnt of
these faollltlas, It appears certain
that the aaseoibly of naterlal and tha
organization for oonstruotion nuat
await the actual occupation. 7o the
knowladee of the Concandar-ln-CMef ,
no material has as yet been assectolad
for this purpose, nor have any but tha
ragueat Ideas for the <iltliiate aoeoc-
pllahnant of this objective bean
advanoad.
-4-
^
^
X
21^,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
967
OiCnbNK
AIC/OITOS
UMIUU (TAT
V.M.M. raw lODDOa
V. 8. Mtcn Tart, Mimwfc
0««ato«r M. IMO
Walk.
SObjMti
War Plaaa • Siatva aad raadlaaaa of la ▼!«
of tha eomBt latanatloBal aitvatioa.
Ptiatt nmt vlaaa. Aoa ahlatly
to laak «f a«trial«t laovlaaca aa a
baaia, aad partly to tba praeaatvatiaa
of ataffa of faraaa afloat «ith
reotia* aattara of aiBlalatratioa aad
tralalac, hava baaa aoat caawal la
aatara aad haiva accaadad ahlafly to
tba aaalgnaaal of taaka aad foroaa.
Only taatatlva idaaa.(baaad laraoly oa
vaaovpartad aaawtloaa) for tba aataal
■■■nmlliliaaijl of tba obJaotlToa, taanra
(d)
Tba tlaa olMHat, la tba praaaat Flaa,
la ballarad 9«atly oat of proportloa
to tba taaka to ba ■umi^llibad. WbUa
a daflalta tlaa llalt deaa aot aotoally
opaar (axaapt for tba fortT-flra day
llalt aaBtloaad abova). It la atroB«ly
iMllad la tba tablaa la Appaadlz ZX of
MPL 14 aad tbroo^oot tba 0-1 ?laa lt>
aalf , tbat tba oparatloaa nauallaad ts
to tba aatabUrtiaaui of Basi orx ou ba
aoooapllabad la a parlod of aoaa aUty
to nlaaty daya aftar Boblllaatloa.
It la tba flra baUof of tba
CoBBaador-la-^blaf , U. 3. riaot, tbat
OTon If aaareatlo, alado-purpoaa atapa
toMTd tho flrat obJootlTa (BA3Z OBK)
of tho Plan vara Inltlatad pronptly. a
parlod of aooa alz aoatba to oaa yaar
would ba roq:alrad for Ita aooocvllab-
aaat. './1th tba kaovladea now avallabla.
tha tlaa raqulrad for aubaaq:aaat opara-
tloaa oaa aot avaa ba guaaaad at. It la
baltarad to ba of tba ordar of yoara
ratbar tbaa aoatba.
1^
^
^7
s?3C,
968 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CioC nk Na
Aie/01708
SubjMt!
UNITBO STATCB rUtlT
U. 8. a NBW MKZlOa rta^U0
V. a.
Mutt Tard, BroMrtfla, Waoh
Ootebar U. 1940
\^
Wat Plans - Statu* and raadlaaaa of ia ▼!•»
of tba onrrant latanatioaal altoatloa.
-' (a) Z kBow of no fXac offloar «ho «aeia-
haariadly anAeraaa tha praaant OUHOB
Plan. It la tha cwaral aoaoaption
that tha Flan had Ita laaaptlen pri-
■arlly In tha daainbllltr of hariac
a jBUtna dlraatlra for tha Aaralop-
MBt of tha aaral l«t«hUataHBt to
■aat any intasvatiaaal attuatlon that
Bl«ht ha throat iq,aB It. It la ^r
baUaf that tba l^praotloabUltlaa of
tha CS.MI(B Plan, la tha abaanoa of a
battar ona, hava baan parlodleallx
OTwlaokad In ordar that tha Dapart-
■Mit might hava for budgat pvrpoaaa
and praaantatloa to Concraaa tha
■artwa Jaatlfloatloa for tha naaaa-
aarr anlarsoMBt of tha Rary. In wff
opinion, tha daralopaiant of tha Karal
Katiibllahaaat haa not yat proaaadad
to tha point aaaantlal to tha sua-
<i«8afal proaaoutlon of tha Plan, y^t^
7. In addition to tha CRMOS Plan, tha CooMndar-
In-Cblaf haa arallabla to hla an approvad Hairy Baale Var
Plan, Rainbow Bo. Z, and a tantatlra draft, not aa r«t ap-
prorad, of a 7olnt Artof and Rary Bealo War Plan, Ralnbov
Ho. II. Tha aaataytlona of naltbor of thaaa Plana ara ap-
plloabla to tha praaant altuatlon, nor, to tha knowladga of
tha CoBaaadar-ln-Cblaf, la tha aaalatanae fros alllaa tIau-
allsad In tha tantatlra draft of Rainbow No. II a llkalT
poaalblllty.
0. Tha foragolng oonaldaratlona ara aat forth In
aooa lan^th In ordar to fooua attantlon upon tha faet that
tha Comaandar-ln-Chlaf flnda hlaaalf , In what ha la lad to
ballara aay auddanly baaooa a aritloal altuatlon, without an
appUaabla dlraetlma. Ra oanikot, In tha abranaa of a alaar
-6-
i^
IS-A
It
ao
aa-A
21
22
M
N
\a^
-'7
Jt<f
EXHIBITS or JOINT COMMITTEE 969
cue nt Maw v»an» 9t Aim riMMt
ViU^u, mwimioQb
V. 8. l«Ty TtfA, Br— Miwi, Wuk. ^^
Q9to»« as. IMO ,!k^
\^^~ —
8abjM%i Wi» Plaa* - statu* nA r— aiaMt of la ▼!•* Of
of tiM oorroot latonatloaal altaatioa.
•oy- ■ —
plctoro of aatloanl foXioy, aatloaal onitf tto ana ootioaal -
obJootlvM, fevBolsto his 9m plau othor than for ^vloua X^'^
— — IM of ■■■uilty aoA «•(•■•• nA for oooolwotoA pr«par«-lx^^
tia« fov f«rtk« •wkwAitio*. ■• la of tbo flm boUaf
tkat aMoosafal opavatioas la wKt omi raat oalj on aeoad u
plaasi a«ar«fta ■paaifla yrofovatloa «d vlfloroaa vvosaavtloa I
feaaat «p«a aeafiiflMa la tta antoaao of tho aooraa baiac
i
•. Thar* la aa iataatioa or Aaalra oa tho part of
tha Cii— MHi In ffhiaf to avatfl hla laeitlmta raapoaai-
blUtiaa war is it Aaairad that anythlac la thia lottor bo
aoaatmad. Xt la f>d.ly raaliiad that ao plaa oaa foroaoo or i
provlto for avaary peaaibla aitoatloa, aad that aAJastaaata
aa4 ra-aatiaatas aast ba aaia to fit tha aotaal sitvatlon
praaaatai. At tho ava tiaa, it la aeat atroasly baUovaa
that tha nij^iiiai In mil if aaat ba bottar laforaad thaa ha '
is BO« aa to tho Dapartaaat's plaaa aad iatoatioaa if ha la
to paifora hia Pall Coty.
10. Iho foro«ola« la briofly amaiarizoa aa follona:;
(a) VasuitabUity of caotOt Plaa In proaoat
aitaatioa aad proaoat dorolopoMit of
■oTal Istabliafcaaat; I
(b) XaapplioabUity of othor Flans arallablo
to tho OoKaador-ln-Oblof , T7. o. Flaat
(Rainbow Hoa. Z and ZDi
(o) Tltal Boooaaity for (1) now dlrootivo
(poaalbly Raiabow Ho. Ill) baaad on
proaoat roalltioa, national objootires
aad oonnltaanta aa far aa thoao era
kaowB or oaa bo prodlotod at tbo proaont
tiaai (8) ooordlaatlon of plans daralopod
with national Folloy mi. atopa to bo
takaa to laplanont that polioy4
(y.
^7
y3S<^:
970 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CiaC nh Ktb,
A16/01T0S
MbjMti
UNITBD BTATtB VVm
O. 8. 1. NSW MBHOA
U. 3. Mterj TarA, BrcnrtoB, WMb. ^^
Oototvr U, 1940 J>
War Plana - Statsa aoi raadlnaan of in t1«w
of tba oumraat iataniBtlanal altuation.
J^
U) Za tha li^t of lafonMtlea bow arallabla
to blB, tba 0aMMB4ar-lB-Otaiof la of tba
•onrletlOB tbat tba al«MBta of a raaliatlo
plan abo«ld aiAoAji
(1) BaaurltT taA Aafaaaa aaaavrao of
tba Waatan BaBla^bara;
(S) Loac-raBoa latardlotion of aneiqr
oooMxaa;
(8) ttaraata aaA ralda a«alaat tba
•amri
(4) txtaoalon of oparatlona aa tba
calativa atraacth of tba Naval
latabliabBaat (nay be Influaaoad
by alliad atranetb aoA fraedon
of aetion) la built up to sup-
port tban. /"L-
11. Plaaaa aaknowladga raoaipt of this lattar by
daapatab.
IX. It ia baraby oartif ia: that the orlrinAtor oon-
aidara it to ba ij^raotioabla to pLrase t]ii6 docucant ic
aoab a Baanar aa will parsdt a olaaairtoatiob othor tban
aaarat.
IS. Tba axlsaney of delivery cf ttls locuaent is
auab that it «rlll not reach the addreeaae ii. tiso by tbe
next arailable otfloer oouriv. tlie orl^inAtor, therefore,
autboriaaa tbe traaaaiealon of thia doounaat by reciatarad
^1 witbln tbe oontlneatnl liadta of tb* United Jtataa.
IB-A
1* •
20
20-A
21
22
23
75
J. C. aiCKUiDSCK
J6C^o,.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 971
[1] Secret 12 November 1940.
Dear J. O. : You may think I have been unusually silent for the last couple
of weeks, — and so I have. Truth of the matter is that a great part of this time
was spent in making up an estimate of the international situation, together with
a number of officers in Naval Operations and two from the General Board. As
a start on this I sat down one early morning and drew up a twelve page rough
estimate, working on up till two o'clock the next morning, this in the effort
to clear my own mind, as I sometimes do by drawing up a paper. After I finished
the rough notes, I then got together IngersoU, Turner, Savvy, Charlie Wellborn,
Forrest Sherman, Hill, Sexton, Moore and Oscar Badger and we went to it,
day and night, Saturdays and Sundays, for about ten consecutive days. The
product which no one claims is perfect is now in the hands of the President. I
am hoping he will give some definite pronouncement on it in order that I may
send you something more authoritative than I otherwise could do.
You know that we have no definite commitments. Perhaps none can be made.
The direction which things finally take may be forced upon us.
For example, as you stated in a recent letter : — Upon your first visit here you
found us of the opinion that in the event of war, we should not become involved
in the Pacific and that any major effort, we might make would be in what we
considered the most vital theater, namely, in the Atlantic. I have never changed
my viewpoint on that and I may say that so far as I know, neither has the State
Department. I believe the Secretary of the Navy also holds this view. But no
appeasement.
Nevertheless, we can not afford to neglect the possibility of hostilities in the
Pacific and that is why in so many of my letters I always mention keeping a
weather eye to the Westward.
I think the study which was made when you were here, has been highly bene-
ficial; studies of this sort always ai-e, whether or not they are implemented.
I had hoped before this to get to you the Navy end of RAINBOW III as a more
thoroughly considered directive to meet the possibilities of the present situation
In the Pacific. This RAINBOW III plan is nearing completion now and I expect
to send it to you in a few days. I trust that you will find the tasks assigned to
you are [2] within your power. We will await your comment.
We are pushing District preparation and degaussing work with all the speed
we can command and if by any chance I could have until 1 April on this I would
give a good deal. One January should see degaussing well along; one April
much essential work accomplished in the Districts. Please do not construe that
statement to mean that we might get into the war tomorrow, as I have nothing
but my own thoughts on this. Nevertheless, you know I have felt right along
that it is only a matter of time before we do get in (though I can not say this
out loud). The chief question that concerns us is where we get in, and whom
we will fight — and "tomorrow" or perhaps "today" is what 1 am working towards.
You have received the despatch directing the sending of submarines to Manila.
There are no plans at present to send anything more in that direction. But
present conditions are far from static, the Japanese appear to be making prepa-
ration for a definite move of some kind, and the answer we will give, if any, to
the steps they may take in the future can not be predicted at this time.
Your letter regarding the retention of a part of the Fleet on the Coast beyond
the date of its intended departure, and also holding another part in Hawaii, ar-
rived at a time when the election prevented my presenting this question promptly
to the President. Since the scheduled departure of the units from Hawaii was
the day following my receipt of your letter, there was nothing for me to do other
than to radio you to carry out the approved schedule. As you know, the matter
of withdrawing the Fleet from Hawaii is delicate, and could hardly be accom-
plished without a certain amount of preparation in Washington. It does not now
appear that we can withdraw it without some good pretext.
Regarding this Winter's exercises there is no question as to the desirability
of training both the Fleet and the troops in expeditionary operations which will
simulate war as closely as possible. Therefore, I believe we should go ahead
with the essential features of such a plan. As I understand the plan, you pro-
pose to assemble in Pearl Harbor an Expeditionary Force comprising most of
the Fleet, plus transports in which are combat-loaded the west contingent of the
Fleet Marine Force, plus tankers and supply ships. This expeditionary Force
will then set out from Hawaii and will simulate the actual capture of an island,
using Christmas Island or some other, perhaps San Clements for example — I
have not received a copy of exactly what you plan to do and therefore this con-
ception may be at fault.
972 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
We have all been greatly pleased over Churchills statement of recent British
action against the Italian Fleet. Also we are more than pleased over the suc-
cess of the Greeks, — even though it may prove in the end to be temporary. We
have nothing more official to date on this than newspaper reports.
[5] Regarding the German claim that they had sunk every ship in the 39-
ship convoy in approximately longitude 32, latitude 58:- all but 6 of these ships
have safely reached port.
Am expecting King to relieve Ellis shortly after the middle of December.
Hope the enclosed to Tommy Hart and Ghormley will be of some interest to
you.
Best wishes as always.
Sincerely,
/S/ Betty.
Admiral J. O. Richardson, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. 8. Fleet,
USS "New Mexico," c/o Postmaster,
Long Beach, California.
[U Secret 12 November 1&40.
Dear Tommy : We are pushing ahead as rapidly as possible on the prepara-
tion of material and personnel for any eventualities. While there is much still
to be done (a condition that will continue to exist for years) I can not say that
matters are unsatisfactory, so far as concerns things under my control. But we
do not yet know the direction which attairs may take.
For the past three weeks I have been spending many hours, together with a
group of officers particularly concerned, in developing a broad estimate of the
material situation as it affects possible naval war operations. This estimate, or
study, is now in the hands of the President. I do not expect any immediate de-
cision, but do hope that it will serve to clarify matters so that, at least, those in
authority will be fully aware of the implications of any particular policy that may
be adopted with respeet to the war.
Ghormley tells me the British expected us to be in the war within a few days
after the reelection of the President — which is merely another evidence of their
slack ways of thought, and of their non-realistic views of international political
conditions, and of our own political system. They have been talking, in a large
way, about the defense of the Malay Barrier, with an alliance between themselves,
us, and the Dutch, without much thought as to what the effect would be in Europe.
But we have no idea as to whether they would at once begin to fight were the
Dutch alone, or were we alone, to be attacked by the Japanese. Then again,
the copy of the British Far Eastern War Plan which Thomas obtained at Singa-
pore, shows much evidence of their usual wishful thinking. Furthermore, though
I believe the Dutch colonial authorities will resist an attempt to capture their
islands, I question whether they would fight if only the Philippines, or only Sing-
apore, were attacked.
The Navy can, of course, make no political commitments. Therefore, we can
make no specific military plans for an allied war. However, as I told you in my
despatch, you can perform a useful service by laying, with the British and pos-
sibly the Dutch, a framework for a future plan of cooperation, should we be forced
into the war. I rather doubt, however, that the Dutch will talk freely with you.
If they do my idea would be that you would explore [2] the fields of:
Command arrangements,
General objectives,
General plan of cooperative action, including the approximate naval and
military deployment.
You are, of course, committed to assist the Army in the defense of Luzon. But
with allied bases to fall back on, your direct support of the Army might well fall
short, in degree, of the support you would afford were we alone to fight Japan.
I do not believe Japan will attack us if she can avoid doing so. In fact, I be-
lieve she will go far to avoid hostilities with the United States. It is even doubt-
ful if she wishes, at this time to fight the British or the Dutch. It seems more
likely that she would prefer, while maintaining a position in readiness, to con-
solidate Indo-China with her positions further north, and to begin a more or less
gradual economic penetration of the Netherlands East Indies and Siam. Should
we refrain from imposing additional economic sanctions, present conditions, in-
cluding the recent 1,800,000 ton oil contract, might be stabilized over a consider-
able period of the future. Our State Department, as you may know, had a hand
in the execution of that contract.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 973
But we never can tell. Should a war develop between Japan and an alliance
of British, Dutch and Americans, I believe that Japan will plan to :
(a) Occupy Guam, and reenforce the Mandates with troops, submarines,
and some air ;
(b) Establish naval control of Philippine waters by destroying our naval
and air forces, basing her main fleet in the Pescadores and a strong, fast de-
detachment in Halmahera ;
(c) Capture Luzon with troops now based in Formosa and Hainan;
(d) Capture Borneo, to be followed by a campaign against the Dutch di-
rected from East to West.
I believe that the allied objective should be to reduce Japan's ofifen.sive power
through economic starvation ; the success of the blockade would surely depend
upon allied ability to hold the ma.ior iwrtion of the Malay Barrier. Your own
action would, of course, be based upon your view as to the most effective method of
contributing to the attainment of the ultimate objective.
One thing (and this is for your ears alone) you can depend upon is that we would
support you, probably by sending a naval reenforcenient to you at Soerabaja or
Singapore, and by other means. I would be glad to get your views as to the size
and composition of such a reenforcement ; but in making your recommendation
I trust you will keep in mind that our Navy must hold in the Mid-Pacific, that
we may also be in the war against the other two Axis Powers, and that the col-
lapse of Britain would force us to a major re-orientation toward the Atlantic.
You may will appreciate that I do not welcome such a war (British Collapse).
The naval part of the War Plan, Rainbow III, for this possible war is about
completed, and will be on its way to you within a short time. We are hoping
to send naval attache's to Singapore, Batavia, Soerabaja, Balikpapan, and Cey-
lon ; possibly one of these officers may bring this plan to you via air transportation.
We are all delighted to be able to put over the dependent thing for you. The
State Department strongly supported us. I can appreciate the coals that must
have been heaped upon you when it was learned that, while we were forcing
our dependents home, the Army was sending dependents out.
You know how glad I always am for any opportunity to assist any or all of
the Little Harts, as well as the Big Hart, in any way in which I can.
Keep cheerful.
Sincerely,
/S/ Bettt.
Admiral T. C. H.\rt, TJ. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.
P. S. Am sixty today. Here's hoping ! The first three score are the hardest !
18 NOVEMBEB 1940.
Admiral, Hart :
P. S. Admiral Brownson's name is being submitted to the President on the list
going over to him for consideration in connection with the new destroyer. Here's
hoping.
[1] Confidential November 22, 1940.
Dear Jo : While you were here in early October we sent a despatch to Com-
fourteen to a.scertain from Admiral Bloch whether or not the protection being
afforded to the vital elements of the Naval Establishment in Hawaii was satis-
factory, this in order that, if required, we could make representations to the
War Department to direct more thorough protection on tb.e part of its Hawaiian
Department.
Admiral Bloch's answers to this despatch and to a second despatch on the
same subject were not very definite, and did not provide basis for further action
by the Department.
Since the Taranto incident my concern for the safety of the Fleet in Pearl
Harbor, already great, has become even greater. This concern has lo do both
with possible activities on the part of Japanese residents of Hawaii iind with the
possibilities of attack coming from overseas. By far tlie most profitable object
of sudden attack in Hawaiian waters would be the Fleet units based in tliat
area. Without question the safety of these units is paramount and imposes on
the Commander-in-Chief and the forces afloat a re.sponsibility in which he must
receive the complete support of Commandant Fourteen, and of the Army. I
realize most fully tliat you are giving this problem comprehensive thought. My
974 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
object in writing you is to find out what steps the Navy Department and the War
Department should be taking to provide additional equipment and additional
protective measures.
For instance, it is desirable to place torpedo nets within the harbor itself? I
will appreciate your comments and those of Comfourteen on this question.
Antiaircraft protection can be provided first by units of the Fleet actually
in Pearl Harbor with tjuns ready at all times ; by stationing about the Navy Yard
of Army A. A. defense measures including mobile batteries ; and possibly by utiliza-
tion of Marine Defense Battalion Antiaircraft Units now available in the Pear'
Harbor areas, or that could be made available. Also by keeping carrier fighters
squadrons alerted and ready to go.
[2] Another aspect of local security which prompted the Department's
original despatch was the security of the oil tanks against attack from the road
passing near by.
I would like to have you take up the whole question upon your return to Hawaii
with Comfourteen and with the Army, and let me know of any deficiencies which
will require remedial action here in Washington.
Much is being done by the Army, and by the Navy in support of the Army, to
maintain security of the Panama Canal. Of at least equal importance Is the
security of our Fleet against sudden destructive attack. And the Fleet is, as
usually must be the case, in a more exposed situation.
I have been in somewhat of a quandry whether to write this letter to you or to
write one on similar lines to Admiral Bloch to take up with you and Army. It
really is immaterial so long as we get the answer — but after all the Fleet — your
command — is the subject. I am sending Admiral Bloch a copy.
My best to you both and to "all your works" —
Sincerely,
H. R. S.
Op-12-VED
Serial 050312 ( SC ) A16/FF1
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 975
CinC FUt No. UNITED STATES FLEET v
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagriilp (V^ ^
Lon'7 Beach, California
/ Kovember 28, 1940
Dear Betty:
Your last tv/o letters, touching on the security of the
?leet v/hile operating In the Hawaiian area and the prospec-
tive operations of the Second Brigade of the Fleet llarlne
Force v/ith the Fleet during the third quarter have been
received .
, -/ith regard to the first of these Ciatters, I v/ill take
I this up v/ith Bloch on ny arrival back in Kav/aii. This
\ feature of the problem does not give nie a great deal of
\ concern and, I think, can be easily provided for. I think
I torpedo nets -./ithin the harbor are neither necessary nor
^ practicable. The area is too restricted and ships, at
I present, are not noored vrf.thln torpedo range of the
entranc e .
The security of the units v/hile carrying out routine
operations gives me greater concern, because to provide a
reasonable degree of security calls for en^loycient of a
great nuLiber of Fleet units for security alone, v/hlch v/ill
consume both time and effort that could, otherwise, be v/ell
directed toward training and Indoctrination. I feel that the
Fleet must operate on either of tv/o assumptions, i.e., (a)
that v/e are at peace and no security neasures are required;
or (b) that v/ar time measures of security must be carried
out. Heretofore, we have carried out limited security
z^easures largely as a basis for training and on the assump-
tion that no foreign pov/er would choose to bring on a war by
an attack on the Fleet, but that some misdirected or fanati-
cal nationals ml^ht undertake individual and Irresponsible
I attack on Fleet units. How, hov/ever, in the lieht of your
concern over these matters and in vlev/ of your better In-
formation and position to evaluate the possibilities, I have
come to the conclusion that I must operate on the basis of
' (b) above. I enclose a tentative draft of a directive v/hlch
il plan to issue upon arrival at Pearl Harbor. It is bound
/{to result in the curtailment of badly needed basic training
'I of nev/ personnel, particularly in destroyers and planes, and
I some degree of extra discomfort, but under the assumption,
Itbis v/ill have to be accepted.
A
/7t
976 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACH:
CIbC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. & NEW MEXICO, Flairiay
In regard to the operations with the Seoond Brigade,
Fleet Karlne Force, we had originally planned on a tentative
date, cf January 20. This was based on the readiness of the
transports by January 1 and the Department's desire, as I
understood It (See Cooke's mamoranduia- to you of October 10)
to fit these exercises Into the international and diplomatic
picture. I do not, of course, know to what extent the pic-
ture has been altered or how these exercises now fit in. As
you will see later, this makes a great difference in their
conception.
According to our Information, the last of the "dTT"
transports will not be completed, at the yard, until January
23, with a fitting-out period of seven days at a navy yard
on top of that. This, with the other fovir "CTTY" class and
the EXOCHCRDA, will give us six transports by February 1, If
tbe dates now set are met. Allowing for an Indoctrination
y6nd 8hakedo\«i period, it does not appear possible to embark
the l^arines prior to abcnit March 1, with the exercise actu-
ally starting in the Hawaiian, area around liarch 10. By that
tine, the Uarines inform ma, they will have about 12,000 man,
which would, if we took the whole Force, require at least six
more transports. This brings up the question of the objec-
tives of the exercise. As I originally understood them, they
v/ere to be a full dress rehearsal of an Island attack, with
the possibility that they night turn into the "real thing."
Under this conception, we would, of course, want to carry the
entire Force and all their equipment. Including organic trans-
portation and ground unit support for their aircraft.
1/
If, however, they are to be larcely training exercises,
with definitely limited objectives, we can accomplish much
needed training for marines, transports and supporting forces
by limiting the numbers of men and the quantity of equipment
to the facilities provided by the six transports, organizing
the units into more or less complete combat teams — one on
each transport, '/e could, under this assumption, start the
exercises much earlier (that is, earlier than waiting for six
more transports) and perhe^is follow the first ones with a
second series applyine the lessons learned the first time but
utilizing the remaining troops.
Until a decision is reached on the foregoing, I can do
little except study the problooi and general planning.
:t^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 977
CinC Pita No. UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. 8. NEW MEXICO, FkgaUp
Preliminary discussion along this Una brings out the
follo\vlng:
/
L
(a) Thd Uarlnos vflll have only two squadrons of
planes. These oan be embarked on carriers, "* ^° ~ .'^^
but, depending on the scope of the operations,
a separate ship or ships (probably a cargo
▼essel) nay be needed to acccmnodate the ground
troops and equipment.
(b) If the scope of the exercises Includes readiness
for further eventualities, at least one and
probably two, extra cargo ships will be required
to carry organic transportation, 90 days'
ammunition, and supplies.
(o) In any concept, something will have to be done
about landing boats. I assume that all trans- "y.^
ports v/ill carry the boats listed in your con-
version letter. These will provide, roughly,
abcxit 500 boat spaces per ship, whereas 1100 are
reouired per combat team. The remainlne 600
boat spaces per transport must either be pro-
vided fron the supporting ships (manifestly
undesirable) or be carried into the transport
area by special cargo vessels or boat carriers.
I believe we should convert q special boat
carrier for this purpose, similar to ones used
at Shanghai by the Japanese.
(d) Transport crews should be ample to provide boat
crews for boats carried, boat officers, and or-
ganized beach parties. A boat carrier, if pro-
vided, should carry the necesseiry boat crews as
part of its complement,
(e) Transport equipment should include either
special tanks for fresh v/ater capable of being /
carried ashore in boats or sufficient drums to
carry water for troops transported.
{t\ If further eventualities are to be provided for,
/ I would v/ant the A'liinCAi: SZJCJd: (liritime
J Comr.ission traininc shipl especially eo.uipped as
I distilling ship) taken over and made available.
3fC
uill
978 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CinC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET
' U. S. S. NEW MEXICO. FUgdUp
(g) The Marines' aannunltlon situation Is critical.
I feel sure this Is known at Jlarlne Corps head- i.^— V 'v,
quarters, but it cannot be over-emphasized. ' • [
\/^ They also need pack hov/itzers, to replace their
present heavy and unwieldy guns.
(h) An able, energetic Transport Group Commander
must be assigned as soon as possible. This is
a man-sized Job, requiring ability to work with / _, - i «
/ the Marines. There are many details which can ' ^~* ^-^
^y be worked out only by close cooperation. It is
my present intention to operate the transports,
as soon as each is ready, in the San Diego area,
training in loading, eiii>arkii]g, debarking and
landing exercises.
(i) To be ready for real service we will have to have
bombardment amnunition, preferably at Oahu, v;here
/it can be intsrchanged with service ammunition if .^
found necessary. The only such ammunition now on //,<^s^
the ./est Coast, to my knowledge, is 14''/50, eVSS
and 5"/51, which would limit the gunfire siq>port
to BB's and CL's (7500), whereas CA's, CL's
(10,000) and OO's are indicated for this typa
work.
I have told the Marines , as a basis for their present
planning, that we will take only so much of the Brigade as
can be conbat loaded on the six transports, and that these ^^
should go prepared with what can be carried, ready for any
operations that might be possible Sast of the 160^ East
Longitude.
VI V/e have no reply, as yet, to our letter of October 31,
relative to diplomatic arrangements for reconnaissance of
CHRISTMAS and MAEIIN Islands. Of oourse, deoision as to the
suitability of CHRISTMAS must await reconnaissance, ecd
special diplomatic arrangements will have to be made if the
landing is to be held there. General Upshiu: rather favors
an exercise on Oahu or similar large island, where oppor-
tunity will be afforded for maneuvers after landing. This
question, however, cannot be settled now.
yot
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 979
CinC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. NEW MEXICO. Flacriiip
As I see it, the possibilities as to locale include:
Christmas Island — if found suitable
Palmyra Island — probably will limit force
that can be employed to
less than that available
in six transports.
One of Hawaiian
Islands
^
Please let me know as soon as possible your decision
as to the concept and scope of the exercises. I would also
appreciate being infoimsd as to the progress made in the con-
version of the transports, the provision of landing boats,
boat carriers, etc.
•Vlth best regards, j /r- d t '
Sincerely,
Admiral H. R» Stark, XJ. S. Navy
The Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, 0. C.
y
79716 O — 46 — pt. 14-
980 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
. Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Navai. Operations,
Washington, Dec. 11, 1940.
Secret
From : The Chief of Naval Operations.
To : The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Subject : War Plans — Status and Readiness of in View of Current International
Situation.
Reference: (a) Cinc's Secret Letter A16/01705 of October 22, 1940.
1. In reply to your recommendation in the above letter that a new war plan be
issued, you are informed that Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 3 (W. P. L.
44) has recently been completed. Four advance copies have been forwarded to
you by oflScer messenger. The finished copies of this plan, plus such revisions
of WPL-42, Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 1, as have been found desirable
for making parts of that plan usable with Rainbow No. 3, will be distributed as
soon as practicable through the Registered Publication Section.
2. War Plan Rainbow No. 3 is designed to provide against the most imminent
and difficult war situation which may confront the United States in the near
future. It is, therefore requested that the Commander in Chief prepare as
soon as practicable the operating plans for a war envisaged by Rainbow No. 3.
3. The Chief of Naval Operations has, in the past, kept the Commander in
Chief advised as to all matters within his own knowledge which related to
current national policy and pending national decisions. This past practice will
be continued in the future. However, the Commander in Chief is doubtless
aware that the changing world military situation will continue to affect policy,
and thus will influence plans for^the war operation of the naval forces. It is,
of course, impracticable to draw up and to issue new Navy Basic War Plans
when merely miner changes in policy occur. The Chief of Naval Operations
considers that Rainbow No. 3 is, in its major aspects, suitable for all probable
situations which may arise in the near future where the principal portion of
the national effort is directed westward. Under study now by the naval and
army oflScials are plans based on assumptions requiring the exertion of the
principal portion of the national effort to the eastward (Rainbow No. 5), and
also a plan, somewhat similar to Rainbow No. 1, involving the defense of the
entire Western Hemisphere against attack from both the east and the west
(Rainbow No. 4). So far as now can be foreseen, these three basic plans should
be adequate to guide mobilization, initial deployment, and initial operations
under all contingencies which are foreseeable at present.
4. In view of the above, it is believed unnecessary to comment on the present
applicability of the Orange War Plan, as that Plan was drawn up to guide the
prosecution of a war under circumstances which do not now exist.
5. The urgency of this document is such that it will not reach the addressees
in time by tlie next available oflScer courier. The orginator therefore authorizes
the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental
limits of the United States.
/s/ H. R. Stark.
[1] Oi>-12A-fhg
Secret 23 December 1940.
Dear JO : Your personal letter of November 28th, headed Long Beach, Cali-
fornia, arrived here on the l^th of December. While Murphy was here he spoke
of this letter as liaving been prepared before his visit to Washington, but we
were unable to locate it. Apparently it was not actually mailed until after the
arrival of the NEW MEXICO in Honolulu.
In the meantime undoubtedly Murphy has given you oral answers to some of
the questions brought up. However, I have had prepared a memo covering some
of the points set forth in your letter, from which I will quote later on.
First, in regard to security, I endeavored to outline to Murphy my idea as
to the extent security measures should be prosecuted, namely, that while the
extent of security measures required is increasing, it has not yet reached the
demands of full war time security. As I discussed with Murphy, there will
be an advantage in making occasional sweeps by aircraft and surface craft
but it is not yet necessary to make these continuous. I agree with you that
the wear and tear on equipment ,and the detrimental effects on training, of
full security measures should be given due weight.
In regard to the objective of the training exercises, the picture, of course, may
change at any time. At present the main objective is the purely training aspect.
I feel that it is desirable to conduct the exercises in an area sufficiently distant
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
981
from bases, such that the difficulties of the problem are concretely and un-
avoidably present. It is also desirable that the exercises be conducted on
beaches where our probable problems are most closely paralleled. In addition,
the islands utilized should provide suflScient area for the maneuvering of the land
forces involved.
We desire, of course, to avoid conducting maneuvers which would appear
unduly provocative to our friends across the way. On the other hand we also
wish to avoid any change in our dispositions which would indicate a walking
back of our position in the Pacific. Taking these various factors in mind, I
think the use of San Clemente for the final full scale exercises would not be
so desirable. One solution that suggests itself is conducting some of the exer-
cises on the island of Lanai, and other part on Christmas or Palmyra, depend-
ing upon the results of your reconnaissance of Christmas.
Due to the delays in the transport program it appears necessary to carry out
these exercises during the fourth quarter. We have encountered much difficulty
in getting transports. The only ships that we have been able to acquire ate
very old ships — ships with machinery not in the best [2] conditon, and
in which conversions bring to light structural corrosion and defects which
necessitate additional work in effecting satisfactory conversion. Consequently,
completions in all cases have been delayed except in the case of the EXOCHORDA,
the present HARRY LEE, which was the only fairly new ship. The following
table shows the estimated readiness-for-sea dates of the transports now under
conversion. (This includes a two-week period for fitting out after the com-
pletion of overhaul) :
Name
Readiness for sea
at Navy Yard
GEORGE F. ELLIOT. _.
HARRY LEE
HEYWOOD
ANTHONY P. BIDDLE
FULLER
NEVILLE.
HARRIS.
ZEILIN
24 January..
3 January..
15 February
15 February
1 March...
28 February
31 May
31 May
Norfolk.
New York.
Puget Sound.
Mare Island.
Puget Sound.
Puget Sound.
Puget Sound.
Puget Sound.
Six APD's will be ready for sea on 3 January. The MANLEY, McKEE and
STRINGHAM are scheduled to depart Norfolk, on January 6, and the Canal Zone
on January 15, and will then report to Commander-inChief, U. S. Fleet, for duty
in the Base Force.
It appears that the HARRIS and ZEILIN will not be ready, even for exercises
in the fourth quarter.
Referring to the various points in your letter designated by letters, the situa-
tion is about as follows : ( I quote from memorandum giving me data in some
instances) :
(a) Problems involved in having the Second Marine Aircraft Group participate
have undergone some change in view of the pending transfer of the group from
San Diego to Pearl Harbor. By the end of the third quarter all three combatant
squadrons of Group 2 should be available at Pearl Harbor with effective tJT)es of
aircraft. It seems practicable to distribute their combatant aircraft among the
carriers that will be available. VMJ-2 will also be in Hawaii.
The memorandum submitted on this question states "It is estimated that if
planes are carried on CV's there will be 61 officers and 180 enlisted men on board
the latter, and that there will be 9 commissioned, 6 warrant officers and 456
enlisted men to be transported by other means. The material required, exclusive
of aviation gasoline and oil, will be 460 tons (22,925 cubic feet) of general cargo,
and 268 tons (7,320 cubic feet) of high explosives."
[S] In regard to additional ships to carry ground crews and equipment, and
to meet the requirements set forth in your paragraph (b), we may have a few
cargo ships available for employment during the latter part of March, which may
fit in for use in these exercises. It seems, at present, that the ammunition ship
recently taken over will not be available before June, because it will be hauling
ammunition from the East Coast to the West Coast.
(c) Availability of boats. — It now appears probable that all transports will be
equipped with landing boats at the time the ships are ready for sea, although it
may be necessary initially to substitute 30' boats for 36' boats. In any event, it
is anticipated that the boats will be delivered by 1 March. Tank lighters, how-
ever, will probably not be delivered before the middle of March. It is expected,
however, that Artillery lighters (non-self-propelled) will be completed at Puget
982 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Sound Navy Yard in January, and that these can be substituted for tank lighters
until the latter are delivered.
(d) Ships to act as boat carriers. — ^There are no ships at present available to
carry excess landing boats.
The question of a special boat carrier was discussed with Murphy during his
last visit. Such a vessel, or such vessels, would be useful. However, we continue
to encounter the usual diflBculty of obtaining funds for the acquisition of auxil-
iaries of any kind.
(e) Quoting from memorandum: "Fresh Water Facilities for Marines. The
Second Marine Brigade has adequate facilities for getting water from ship to
shore storing and distributing to troops.
This includes :
For movement ship to short : Tank and artillery lighters, double bottoms
5 gal. water cans.
For storage ashore : 14 canvas tanks — 3000 gal. capacity.
For distribution to troops : 10 water carts, 5 gal. water cans.
The Brigade also has the necessary pumps, hose tittings, etc., for handling this
water.
Also — they have one water purification unit for purifying water found ashore,
if any.
[4] In addition, the Marine CJorps has on order, four evaporating sets for
experimental use — with the capacities as follows :
1—5000 gal. per day.
1—1000 gal. per day.
2 — smaller, exact capacity not yet determined.
If satisfactory this equipment will be made standard and provided to Marine
Brigades."
In addition to the above there are being procured and placed in storage, with
other advanced base equipment, well-digging equipment and 13 sets of evaporator
and water purifying apparatuses distributed as follows :
5 at San Francisco.
4 at Charleston.
4 at Panama.
This information can undoubtedly be obtained in the detail desired from the
Fleet Marine Force at San Diego, California.
(f) Use of the "American Seaman" as a distilling ship. — The ship is at present
at St. Petersburg, Florida, and is currently engaged in training personnel for the
Maritime Commission. A sister ship, the AMERICAN SAILOR, will be completed
about the middle of February 1941. Although these ships are suitable as dis-
tilling ships it is not desired to divert them from their present use in training
merchantseamen unless a major emergency develops.
(g) Your statements about the Marine ammunition situation are well founded^
We have been making strenuous efforts to remedy the Small Arms Ammunition
situation, not only for the Marines but also for other Naval Small Arms, aircraft
and ship, for many months. The situation has been brought to the attention of
the Secretary many times. No satisfactory remedial action in the near future
appears possible, but we will pry out of the Army all we can.
It is estimated that there are now between 5 and 10 units of fire of various
calibers available on the West Coast.
The organization of the Second Marine Brigade calls for 12 — Pack Howitzers or
(75 m/m guns) for each of the two battalions. They have
12 — Pack Howitzers.
12—3" (75 m/m) guns.
There is some shortage of fire control equipment, but the units can operate
without it.
[5] (h) Captain Braisted has been designated by the Bureau of Navigation
for duty in command of the Transports in the Pacific. He is due to report about
January 3.
(i) The Bureau of Ordnance has been requested to provide in OAHU at the
earliest date practicable, the following bombardment ammunition :
14' ' — 500 rounds, loaded and fused.
8" — All available rounds of the 1000 now on order.
6" — 1000 rounds, loaded and fused.
5" — 5000 rounds, loaded and fused.
4" — 5000 rounds, loaded, fused, and assembled.
The 14" ammunition is now on order and it is expected to be available about
May or June.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 983
The 8" ammunition is also on order, but delivery is not expected before the
latter part of calendar year 1941. — In connection with bombardment however, you
have available quite a bit of 8" ammunition still fitted with instantaneous fuses.
The situation in this respect is as follows :
No. of 8" projectiles fitted
Ship or station : with instantaneous fuses
ASTORIA-l 110
INDIANAPOLIS 66
NEW ORLEANS 110
NORTH HAMPTON 126
PENSACOLA 105
MARE ISLAND (Note: Some fuses may have been
changed) 324
OAHU 999
HINGHAM 1, 000
Note. — These projectiles can be used in either the long chamber or short
chamber.
The 6", 5", and 4" ammunition will be shipped to OAHU by the NITRO or the
LASSEN in February or March.
The present estimated availability of bombardment ammunition is as follows:
14"— 307 East Coast ; 151 Mare Island.
8" — 1000 rounds on order — Delivery from 6 to 10 mos.
6"/53— 2657 East Coast; 300 Mare Island; 379 Puget Sound; 1989 Cavite.
5"/51— 36,000 East Coast ; 2000 Mare Island ; 1300 Puget Sound ; 167 Pearl
Harbor ; 777 Cavite.
It should be noted that the 5"/25 and 38 caliber service ammunition is con-
sidered to be suitable for use as bombardment ammunition.
[6] In regard to CHRISTMAS or MAKIN Islands— The State Department
did not wish to ask permission to visit Christmas Island for fear of jeopardizing
our claim but suggested that we proceed with the visit without permission and
they would bear the brunt of any repercussions. However, we decided as a matter
of courtesy to inform the British Naval Attache. The British Government
replied by note to State saying the visit was agreeable but that it would in no
way reflect on their claim which was unassailable. You therefore have permis-
sion to make a reconnaissance of Christmas Island. In the event that your
reconnaissance indicated the suitability of Christmas Island for landing exercises,
decision can be made later as to whether it is advisable to use Christmas Island
and as to just what steps should be taken in advising with the British authorities.
Permission was obtained for reconnaissance flight over Makin on about No-
vember 15. However, we questioned the advisability of taking such an open
step — a step that might indicate our future intentions. Therefore we did not
communicate this permission to you. We postponed answering the letter because
of the protracted correspondence regarding Christmas. There is, of course, a
certain amount of information available in the Naval Air Pilot, H. O. No. 184,
and in charts 2179 (consecutive 1632), and No. 121 (1(531) which have been
furnished you.
Murphy's visit was extremely profitable to all hands. I trust that on his return
he was able to give answer to many of the questions that have arisen in your
mind.
If there is anything which you have asked for and which is not included in this
letter or supplied by Murphy — other than the answer to the Pye memorandum
concerning which you will receive an answer in the near future — please let me
know, and I will supply the answer if I can. We are continuing daily bulletins
to you and have received the first semimonthly summary.
There is little that I can add which is not repetition, but I shall repeat just
the same that every 24 hours past is just one day nearer to actual hostilities and
that your flag officers and captains should be completely in the frame of mind that
we will be in the fighting business most any time, and purely as a guess on my
own part, I would say at any time after the next 90 days. Our heads and our
hearts and every ounce of energy that we have should be devoted exclusively to
the business of war and keeping fit — and I don't mean maybe.
It may come anytime. All good wishes.
/s/ Betty.
P. S. Referring to your recent dispatch on the subject, it does not appear on its
face that the Captain of the destroyer concerned followed up his contact to the
nth degree or even asked for additional help to locate. However, we will reserve
all judgment on this espisode until we hear further from you.
984 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[1] Op-12A-(lrc
Secret 23 December 1940.
Admiral Thomas C. Hart,
Commander-in-Chief, U. 8. Asiatic Fleet,
U. 8. 8. "Houston," Flagship, Manila, P. I.
Dear Tommy: Your letter of December 4 containing Purnell's report of his
conference with the British arrived a day or two after McCrea's departure, en
route for Honolulu and Manila. McCrea will be able to give you the answers to
some of the questions raised in your letter. However, I will refer to them herein
even though I may be duplicating.
I agree with the two big points in the situation that you outline. The location
of the "command post" wouid, however, depend, in my opinion, very much on
the conditions obtaining.
Purnell's report gives me an interesting and valuable atmospheric background
for the consideration of the situation in that area.
To follow your letter on down, the Department realizes very acutely the limited
capacity of the obsolete equipment at Cavite. Measures are under way to improve
the situation by giving you better equipment, and i^erhaps more equipment.
The planners in the War Plans Divisio.. and in the Districts Division are giving
very close scrutiny to the problem of laying an anti-motor boat boom in 25
fathoms of rough water, and are looking int't the question of supplying the large
amount of material that will be required for nets, etc. [2] It is apparent
that not only will it be a job to get the material to you, but also you will be
confronted with a job of getting it put together and laid down.
The mine plan from Manila Bay has been recently received here and in the
War Department, and is under study. In reaching an answer the planners will
undoubtedly be guided by your requirements for ingress and egress of ships
through the entrance.
In regai-d to your next paragraph, I am completely with you and have sought
at every turn to improve the security of Manila Bay and the Philippines. I might
say in this connection that opinion in general, in regard to how far we should
go in maintaining oiii ijosition in the Philippines seems to be changing upward.
While such a charge is going on, it is not always practicable to be definitely final
on questions that arise. In the mean time we will send you all of the material
you ask for to the extent it can be made available and can be shipped. — Inci-
dentally, send me a sample of your "britches". I'll send you a bale of cloth for
their eidargement. More power to you !
We have already requested your advice as to sending out division of birdboat
mine sweepers. The division will be fitted out for magnetic mine sweeping in
late January or perhaps in February.
In regard to your various recommendations on air matters, I will say that I
perhaps in at least some of the instances would have made recommendations
similar to yours had I been in your place, with the knowledge then available to
you and your staff. However, the recommendations from the ASIATIC must
be considered in the light of our expanding aviation program as well as that of
foreign countries, and in the light of our plans not only for Manila and the
Philippines, but also for the rest of the naval establishment. For some time we
had had it in our minds to increase the submarine force in the ASIATIC and to
make this force more effective by adding to the patrol plane strength. An addi-
tional requisite, of course, has been an increase in the tighter strength of the
Army. Only recently has the Army gone along with us on this [3] point.
I might add, parenthetically, that as we have increased the patrol plane strength,
we have decreased the amount of overhead per plane. Altogether, I hope that we
have made available to you a substantial increase in your power to carry out
ix»ssible war tasks.
I can thoroughly appreciate your difficulties in regard to the movement of
dependents; and if the pressure on you gets too heavy just pass the responsibility
for It on my shoulders. I could even with the babes yet unborn were on their
way home.
I presume this letter will reach you before McCrea's departure. His orders
indicate his remaining with you for nine days. However, you and he may find
it desirable for him to remain S(mietimes longer, in which case I will of course
be glad to have him extend his visit.
/s/ Bettt.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 985
0-AlA.m/A1_9/HnlA OKHCK OK rilK COMMANU.VNT
^^jjjj/ «/««X* FOURTI'.ENTH NAVAI. DISTRICT
MAVT YA«». PKARI. HARBOR. lUWAlI. USA fv r\C (* ^ ^ /^O
CONFIDENTIAL ^^"^^
I OOHkateBt, rwirt««nth SmyX Dlatriet.
Si I Ttm Oklaf «f a*wml Op*x«tioa«.
VU I Cfi«M1»i Im-Chlmt, Qnlt*d 3tatM flMt.
ftifejMti •ItiMtioa OoManlag tb* SMorlty of tlk« n««t ud tli*
f>«aaKt Ability of tho Loeal Dtfoaoo roroM t« Moot
Ouiyriao Atuoko.
BofoxwMMi (a) OVMT 41ap«toli 09aU5 of Oetobor IMO.
(b) OpuT diapatoh letUa of Oetebar 1»40.
(•) Chiaf of Mbt&L OpantiwM* potmbaI lottar adOrMaod
to CIMCDS AaUd IS lior«Bbor 1940 (oojy out to Htm
(A) COB 14 diapotoh IMOM tf Oetobar 1940.
(o) OOB 14 AiapaUb S80t30 Of Ootobar 1940.
I. la n,tm of ttio iB(iairiaa ooateiaod in roforoaeea (a),
(b) aaA (o), Z eoaoiter it doainblo to writ* thla lottar to aot lortk
tko praooat abilitjr of tha fOurtoaath Naral Diatriot to aaat aurprlea
bMtila attaoka of aa abaajr aitb tho oq^uipaaat aad fenaa at band.
\J Alroxmft att«okln<! tba basa at Paarl ILirtor wUI undoubtea-
1/ ba brengtit by oairiara. Tharafor*. thara ara two aaya of repoilio^i
attaak. Pirate by looatiog and daatroylne; the carrlar prior to luuncb-
ia« plaaaa. Sooood, by drlTln« off atUoklAi bocbera irltli tintl-ulrcraf t
(uaa aad fi^Ura. Ilia mry ooaponant of tha looul dafanaa foixras lata
ao planaa for diatant raeoBnalaaanoa with which to iooate acony carriers
and tha only planaa balonglats to tha looal dafanae foroaa to utUiok
9^rrt.»n whan looatad' would ba tha ajay boobara. rha Angy has li tha
Hawaiian araa fifty-aina I^IB bonbara. All of thaaa ar« oluaslfled aa
bainti obaolata. The aodal la alz yaan old and tho planea thaaaelrea
ana flTa yaara old. ItiarBfora, It la ay oplalot that noltior nirubera
Bor typaa ara aatlafaotojy for tha purpoaee Inteadad. t.'aw bosbla
planaa ara axpactad aoaatlaa In tha futuia. Uoverer, not bafoia July
\ 1941. Tor diatant raoonnaiaaanoa , rat^ulatlon would have to be made on
tha foroaa afloat for auoh aa eould be aparad by tha Pleat.
% dnra off boablntk planaa after they have bean launchao
■ill raqulra both fl^ihtlnK planaa and antl-alrcral't runa. Tho ^isoi' 1'^:.
in tha Hawaiian araa thlrty-alz purault planes, oil of which ara cl„ci:il-
fiad aa obaolata. Sana of thoa dira alz yauxs old and aorae of tl.tui <>ru
four ya«ra old. In nuobara and oodala, there la a aerloua daflul^i.cy
•xiatiag. Maw fi^^Ura axa axpactad whan tha l«-40 la ia productloi: to
986 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
. . OmCR or TH« OOMMAHDANT
0->A14-1/At*t/IOL4 FOURTEENTH NAVAI. DISTRICT
COrTlr I DENT I All****"- '"^^ "*■*•■• "*•*"•«"*• „ro ^o&Q
■*jM«i utaaUM OMCMsiM tiM awwrttr t «W n—t Ud tte
rvwwt AbilltT af U* Uoa MTWM Momm to 11m«
««M aei «nMur to b* iBoteblc k«f on th* «>d «r XM1| this awbor «om
CU Mnr la •kMB«4 wlU th« yrotooU«a mt Mm Tmrl Rubor
loM kf MU-oiMJOft COM* tteio OM U HmmII tw—ty ■!» fUod
>>laBh coo uA fortr-fottr BObUo S>tMh chh. ttorc or* |iojMt««
*nm.^-tmut mm, «o bo AoUtoioA U XMl. IMvo oro bo Sf-otiUlMtor
•mA •air IM .00 oallbor o«% of «)m pi«Joo«o« UO s^iaiUiMter ood
9M alO oollbor ■Mhlao cwm. tho Aiagr yHoao bo floeo tho szoobor
furt «r bko ^laob c«M oiwaU ffborX Rubor ob« aOy o (oo mu othor
■ftUbuT «kJ«oUvM. Za mr «»iaUa, lb olU bo aoowMty bo laorooao
bko aabon of iwa arooad Marl Rubor cioably bo havo aar aaablaaao
or artl-4lnaBfb «af«oo. IMrblwaoM, Z oavrcao ar daabb aa bo tho
•maaay oT a S-Uok gaa albk a tl aoe«aR faoo tat drlTlM eCT kl«b
alUbato bwfcin. n» Aagr baa aUa ao flaaa fHr bto aaM-alrtsaft
diCaaaa at Laalaalol or Tiinbn ftarbhaaaaro. It wUl bo aoooaaarr to
tevo a watHwblt ooMoabiabloa at aaU-alruaf t com to dofoad tho
ahl>gda« bamtaala aad haibo* af Hoaalola la ardor bhat llaoo at eos-
—ilMUua aar bo kof t ofM. nth a Uiatod kaaaladc* if bho daaltgr
at aabl^-alnxafb banaiaa ahioad. I oa oT tho oflalaa that at loaat
800 COM at- ada^aata alaa aad loaca wUl bo *o«arod for tho offlolaat
diToaao of bho naaallai arta* VOa waAar lo la addltioa to Vf-iOlllaotor
aad .00 ooUbor aaahlaa gwa.
Za addltioa to bha Aovo, bho abv haa plaaaad aa alravafb
aaalas oovrloo abloh alU ooMlat of oUht Radar otatlaaa. Ihroa of
thooo otatlaaa aro flaod aad f Ito art aobllo* Ihm oaoslotod at aa
tadtf lalta blao la tho fataro, thla aaaal^ aot ahoald bo ado«aato.
J 8. mnma i<uz»rr oturtmr.
tho Uoal drfoaai aaatMt ■abatrliiii aoald ba ooadaatod by
yatral Toioola aad alroaaf t aoaklw la ooajoaatloa. &o dlotrlot haa
•a alronfb for thla yarvooo. RMoably, thna hava arrlTod hoio throo
rmntla at Saatrcvar unaloa nOBXT i*loh la imI^I bo tho IomI
daftnaa foiooa. fboao Ttaatla havo llataatM •M' dad, ahaa ropalrtd
od raa^ for ooivloo, alll bo a valaablo ooatrlbatloa for aaU-
■lilBiilii aad Ml art aook. A lazia na^or of yatral voaaala alU ba
i««al>id far aabtf-oabaarlaa wvtt U tha nolalty af Oaha aad tho othor
- ■-
nc
Vi«v«-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 987
0»Al6-l/A7-2/ln)14 OKKICK OK TBK tH»«>« \N1>.^!^T
(62J) Foi'nTi;ENTn navai. district
AHD
i ^ I ^ , • I 13 '■_ t "J i i'M'X X^">- rE*"- UA'.ICOn. HAWAII. U. ». A.
aibjaeti Situation Coaaamlnc Xbm Smourlty of tha fl*«t mad tlu
FTMMt Abllltjr of th« Lo«al DafoBM roroM to MMt
iiarprtxo Attaaka.
island*. At proeMt, th* diatriet has bob* aad ivquoot •mXd baro to bo
aada oa tb* Fleat for auob raaaala and planoa aa eould ba aparad for
Uila Boat ijaportaat verk. No aati-aubaarlBa aata ar* pLaaaad, aer ara
any ooDaidarsd daaiiubla. Antl-torpado aata ara ptvjaotad t9r tba
antronaas of Honolulu aad I%arl liurbor. Tb»j will probablj b* dollTaoroA
about 1 ifereh IMl. Ilk* aat depot aill b« ootplctod ■!»— hat lator. ^ >
vj 4. parjiy.- ..jAm^T uuas.
Th* diatrlot haa raea&tljr built aad aqulypad oa* pa*«y bare*
and tbraa tt«a ar* baiag *iiulpp*d for tovlag aad «aa>glalBg th* aell.
Ibia barga can probably look out for Boaololn aad Marl Harbor oatU
aueh tijie aa It is sarloualy iajur*d. Iha dlatriot baa ao wm»m§iL»
BTallabla for uaa aa awaopa for aa*h*r*d alaa*. A mabar of aiaa
aaoapors ax* baiag built or farobaaad, bat tbair dallTory dataa bora ara
uncertain. A large nvabar of avoopsra irill b« reiiulrad ia erdor to koof
ttie barbora of Paarl harbor, Honolulu aad Kanaob* elaar aad, ia addittaB*
lUlo on ik^aali, tt^hului and Uibaiaa oa Maui, aad I^rt All** aad MavHiwUl
en Kauai; Kith the delirety of avaapara ae« being bollt or pnwhaaaA,
tlM genural aituation vill b* iaproved iJHaaaurablj.
5. Dijiatdi. ti:.aicT flo>>a*raiicjn.
Pu* coaat dafeaaaa of the Aiajr are oonaidersd ado^uat* aaaapi
tyait .voneoho raoalTea raiy littla protaotioa froa tb* battarlaa* '^
rUere are t«o taak fasaa, tb* upper aad th* laaor. Tb* loaor
is aatiTel>- contained In. lita tjOTamaent reaarvatloa and, by tbe uaa of
roTlne patrols, is eonaider*d rwasoaably aeoure. Iha ivpar turn la
adjaoant to a public biabaar. Tb» faxa ia auzreuaded by aa iiaal laabla
fense and aaeb tank with an earth bssx. Ita ehlsf *i(peaur* la alda*;
th* hi^baay. To eountax«ct thla, thr** •l*Tat*d aaatiy atatloaa bava
been ereoted, eaah equipped with aaarahllKhta . Ihla eaablea aaatrlaa
to k**p a eoatinuoua lookout eror th* *atir* f*ae* 11a* day aad alckti
th* uppar fara ia eonsidared fairly aeaure.
7. JATJ-. Hi'j) mcmc jqrmr.
Haeently, a guard bouae b«a beaa araotaA aad M4MI«lgaB*at
988 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3U0LC IS40
romriEBrni natal vamet
CO N r" I D El N T l«iin,>MR »UBt a«Haft,«unB. V. 1. A.
*mm aalak «to Mirtaw •ItaMatiw *ltk «to Aiagr« fW
A ■—<■■» c«ui !• kit* «■ «to •tMtala iMWlr Itaw «kn(«li
ihtek «itel«« ya««r to >— i*^n*«
kUM la U •»••%, aMS* mm vnr 8,000 MtU aurto* flir—
late tJM yu* Mak ter< >i aMltlaB, %kn« an abovt 9,000
af alTlllaa aaataaatea* aad aaraiml tkawaaad wllata* aaa*
la alKliii te tba aWva, Uaia to a aaaataat atn« tt tswka ai«
vaktolaa af all aaaarlptlaaa aanyiac aaypUaa, atoa<aa, at —tmwm, X%
to lipiiilbU te aatotato abaoluto aaawtty wltkaut AlazivtlaB of tka
va* af tha yard. Bovarar, aoiyvtaa aaazohaa «■! parladto atepa, aft
aatoaa, ara to affaat to avdar %b*t tka alaxt ■■/ b« laikaalaaA* tta
■ato gate haa baaa atrw^thiad te ^araat xuahlosi ttera kava baan taa
OitUji far tka fwrpaaa af sl^las awrprlaa txmtolag te tte yaz<A ganrtoaa
to tka amt af a aaxyrtoa Hat to tka yavt. Xa aMlUaa te tka akawa,
a aoTfay kaa baas aaAa aat oaly aT tte raz« bat af all aC tte aatlylas
atettoaa, aid araqry affart to balac aate te aloaa holaa aad atop gapa*
■hUa tte Ci—iiifliiit la aat aatlaflad, ha faato ttet tte yraoautlana
takaa ara raaaaaably affaatlva but ttet tk^r axa aoaaaptlbla te layMva*
■aat, wklak will te aate aa aaoaaloa aairaate.
ff. It ahoold te bacaa to atod ttet until ooapazatlvaly raaantly
aoaa af aa to tkla oeaatiy ted vair amah oeaoaptloa af aliat aaaauraa
vara aaaaaaary aad atet prarlaloas wmf daalxabla In orimr te affaot any
aaaaura of prataetlon acalnat alxanift, agalaat aubaarlnaa, against
Blaaa and agatoat aubvazalra alia«nte. Tba offlaara and am of ttito
aoaaaBd hi^rm baas alart, aaalooa and Tlgllaat to azaouttog all aaaaozaa
uadar ttelr aontrel to ordar te proparly prapaza tte dlatrlot far any
axlgaaelaa.
10* It should ba aaauaad ttet tte ter Oapartaant la folly umra
af tte situation bars and ttet tkqr ara proeaadlag rlgorooaly with a
Tloa te orarsealng daflolanolaa. It aay bs ttet iter tera fallad te
raaognlsa tte aaoaaalty for larsa niHtera of antl-«lroraft guns and
pursuit plsnaa. I suggaat ttet tte Chlaf of Itaral Oparttloaa aaka
In^uliy froa tte aar Oaparteant as te atet ttelr plans ars and on wtet
dataa ttey pradlot ttet thay all! te aeooapllshad aad than, if tka
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 989
evnoB or tri ooimamd/.kt
ii.. «#»««>. TOURTBBNTH NAVAL DISTRICT
^AY-'2/IB14 AMD
ty) MAVY YA«0, PIAltL UAQOOn. HAWAII. U. S. A.
CONrlDLNTlAl 30D
>»iMit Abilltjr et tbm Leoal 0«f«B*« roroM to U»«t
auyrla* Atteoks.
wabavi »mA imXmu ar* not ••tl«f«otoz7, tlMa« fwituiwa any be dlscucaed
U* It la o«aal4*r*d highly uad«ali«bl« fren mj point of view
t)>*t tlM >kr DapartBant ahouU In aajr wty oo(m to l>eIl«T« thut ti>«i«
la laak of agi^iiot bataaaa th« kxmy authorltla* sad tiary authorities
haxa, or that Uia offlolala of tbo rouxtoanth Maral IHatnot t>re preas-
lac Um Umrj Dapartaaat to do aeMathln«( la ratvird to Ainy oattexs.
C. C. aJOGA
tf^ ■'- "H^?.
990 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CNZTBD STATS FLXCX
A16/ U.S.S. NXS USnCO, Flagship
Jerlal 022.
raauary t, 19
/^S
Pearl Harbor, X.H. ,
Co:^IDB>TIAL
FIR;>T EriiXK5iy.ENT to
Com 14 Cont. Ltr.
C-A16-1/A7-2/ND14
(629) of 30 Dec. 1940.
From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet
and the Present Ability of the Local Defense
Forces to k'eet Surprise Attacks.
1. Forwarded. '^The Coicmander-in-Chief has conferred
with the Comcandant Fourteenth N'aval District anV) the
Conmandlne General of the Hawaiian Department. As a result
of the conlerence v^ith the Commandine General, Hawaiian
Lepartment, and un inspection in company with him, infonia-
> tion was furnished the Commandant Fourteenth Kaval District
who prepared the basic letter. The Commander-in-Chief
concBlls with the Commandant Fourteenth N'aval District in
the opinion that the present Army Pursuit Squadrons and
antiaircraft batteries are inadequate to protect the Fleet
and Pearl Harbor against air attack. Uihen establiahed the
proposed pursuit strength will be adequate-. The proposed
total of 68 mobile three-inch guns for this area is not
considered adequate. With the almost continuous high ceil-
ing prevailing in this area a materially greater number of
larger and longer range antiaircraft guns are necessary to
counter high altitude bombing attacks on Pearl Harbor.
2. AS neither the increased antiaircraft batteries
nor the augmented pursuit squadrons will be available for
an extended period the defense of Fleet units within Pearl
Harbor will have to be augmented by that portion of the ^
Fleet »4iich may be in Pearl Harbor in event of attack by ^-^"^mo tcA^dta4j
hostile aircraft. Plans for co-operation with the local " yJ^^. -'
defense forces are being made. At present the continuous a.L^^ - "^ '
readiness of carrier fighter squadrons or antiaireraft q^"^*^ ^^
batteries is not contemplated. The improbability of such C^'^^ ^yf^— A
an attack under present conditions does not, in the opinion
of the Connander -in-Chief , warrant interrupting entirely
the training required by Beet Air Units which wotild have to be
largely curtailed if constant readiness of a fighter
squadron were required. / - ^ . *9 ^v
y SecrM^::.! Oi.«r ^ '** '
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 991
QBTS STATIS VUR
Ale/ Q.8.8. HnriOBEEOO, ria«ihlp
S«rUl 022.
8abJ«et: Situation Conoernli^ th« Stouritjr of th« n««t
and th« Present Ability of the Local Defense
roroes to Heet Surprise Attacks .
8, Tbere does not appear to be any practicable nay
of plaeins torpedo baffles or nets within the harbor to protect
th« ships aoored therein against torpedo plane attack without
Crtatly liaitinc tha aotlTities within the harbor, particularly
t^a aoTaaents of larse ships and the landing and take-off of patrol
S^oadrons. Inasaaob as Pearl Harbor is the only operating base
•▼•liable to the Fleet in this area any paasiTs defense measure*
tha\ will further restriot the use of the base as such should be
•voided. Considering this and the improbability of such an
•ttaok under present conditions and the unlikelihood of an eneny
baing able to advance carriers sufficiently near in wartime in
the faoa of active Pleet operations , it is not considered neces-
sary to lay saoh nets.
4. The defense against subaarlnea and mines are con-
sidered adequate under present peace time conditions, but early
Installation of underwater sound -submarine detection system
should be made. Alao the delivery of the required ships to the
fourteenth Naval Diatrict Defense forces should be expedited,
particularly ships for sweeping aagnetic and anchored mines.
5. In this oonneotion, it is urgently recommended
tlMt Local Defense foroes, adequate for the protection of naval
installations at Pearl Harbor and the Fleet units based thereon,
be provided the Commandant fourteenth Naval Diatrict. In order
to provide freedom of action for the United States Fleet, and
further, to avoid the necessity for detailing important Fleet
units (becauae no other ships are available) to tasks requiring
only port of their full capabilities, it is considered that the
foroes provided should be sufficient for full protection and should
be independent of the presence or absence of ships of the U.S.
risat. It is further considered that the provision of adequate
992 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
xanrxD statb nnr
u.s.s. nnr laaaco. riagship
StrUl oat.
MDjcett situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet
and the Preeent Ability of the Local Defense
7oroe8 to Meet Surprise Attacks.
Looal Defense ?orce8 for the Fourteenth Naval District should
t9 glTCD higher priority than continental Naval Dlatricts, where
both the possibilities of, and objectives for, attack are much
l«aa. fi/
J. 0. RICIIAnDSON.
Copy to:
Com FOURTtSN
^...jA^-rt.^-^^P""
!^ '- ■ ++£?
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 993
CinC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET 3BCRBT
U. 8. 8. PENNSYLVANIA. FUxship
A16/0129
PoaPl Harbor, T. H.
January 25, 1941
From: Conmander-lD-Chlaf , TT. S. Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Flan DOG.
References: (a) Opnav secret despatch 212155 of
January, 1941.
(b) Opnav meaorandum for Secnav Op-ls-oTB
of November 12, 1940.
1. Keference (aj was received by the Commander-
in-Chief, U. 3. Fleet, one day prior to the arrival of
Commander UoCrea at i'earl Harbor en route to Vne Navy Depart-
ment . It is considered desirable to take advantage of his
retxirn to inform the Chief of Naval Operations of the vievra
of the Commander- in-ohief as to the new situation.
S. In view of reference (a) and some degree of
urgency implied therein, it is considered that study of the
new situation and the preparation of plans therefor should
take priority over the preparation of plans for Kainbow No.
S. Unless advice to the contrary is received, this will be
done.
V 3. The new situation, as visualized by the
Cosmander-in-Chlef , alters the assumptions and concepts of
Hainbow No. 3, principally in that the major offensive ef-
fort of the United States is to be exerted in the Atlantic ,
rather than in the Pacific, and in that a "waiting attitude"
will be taken in the Facific, pending a determination of
Japan's intentions. If Japan enters the war or commits an
overt act against United States' Interests or territory, our
attitude in the Pacific will be primarily defensive, but op-
portunities will be seized to damage Japan as situations
present themselves or can be created.
4. Under the foregoing general conception, it is
deemed desirable to outline as briefly as possible, certain
tentative assumotions, upon which the actions of the U. S.
Fleet in the Pacific will be predicated, 'i'hese are:
(a) The United States is at war with Ciermany
and Italy.
(^ "" "''^'" ^•.•'^'': ...... ^^'^-rr -7^^
«.
996 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CinC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET SBCRgT
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA. Flagship
A15/0129
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
January 25, 1941
Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOG.
(4) rrotect United States' ahippinc. This will require the
following:
(a) Provide escort for important ships.
(b) Houte allied and United States' shipping in
the Fleet Control Zone.
(c) Base cruisers on Saxjoa to cover shipping in
the South Seas.
(d) Despatch the Southeastern Pacific Force.
(e) Bstablish escort and patrol ^roup between
Kav/ail and the '.('est Coast.
(f) liaintain striking group to operate against
raiders (search for raiders might afford
opportunity to reconnoiter the I.^rshall
Islands without provokin::: Japan) .
(5) Protection of outlying islands. This will require the
following:
(a) establish defense battalions at ..idv/ay and
janoa and siaaller units at Johnston, './ake,
Jalnyra and u ant on.
(b) Maintain subiiarine patrols at all the above-
nentloned islands, except Samoa.
Ic) ZJespatch two subiaarlnes, plus the UUTOLAN,
for the defense of Unalaska.
(6) .-Adjust 'J. o. Fleet training to war conditions.
^^ St^iH<
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 997
CinC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET
A16/0129 "• ^- S- PENNSYLVANIA, Fi^ship ^sgRgr
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
January 25, 1941
Subject: Chief of Haval Operations' Plan UOG.
Additional t..ea3ure3 if Japan enters- ..'ar
(7) llake Initial sweep for Japanese merchantnen and raiders
In the l^orthern Faciflo. h,
(8) Establish submarine patrols in the I^shall islands,
withdrawing them from own outlying Islands as necessary.
(9) Uake early reconnaissance in force of the liar shall
Islands. Thereafter conduct a general su'nreilleaice of
that area and make raids on forces, material installa-
tions, and communications therein.
(10) Uake periodic sweeps toward the l^larianas and Bonins.
y
6. it will, of course, be realized that the ef-
fectiveness with Trtiich the tasks set forth above can be prose-
cuted is dependent upon the forces available, especially after
the withdrawal of the Atlantic reenforcements. If a carrier
is to be included in the Atlantic reenforcement , one of the
LZ^UvGTON class should be selected due to difficulties of
handling in Pearl Harbor. There is, however, definite need
for all four carriers under the tasks assigned this fleet.
7. in connection with the -execution of the forego-
ing tasks, and with partlcvilar reference to the early initia-
tion of offensive operations, it must be pointed out that the
existing deficiencies in the defenses of Cahu and in the Local
Defense ^forces of the Jfourteenth Naval District is^ose a heavy
burden on the fleet for purely defensive purposes. Ideally, a
Fleet Base should afford refuge and rest for personnel as v/ell
as opportxinity for maintenance and upkeep of material installa-
tions. V/hen Jfleet planes. Fleet guns and irleet personnel are
required to be constantly ready for defense of its own Base,
the wear and tear on both men and material can not but result
in impaired readiness for active operations at sea. The most
outstanding deficiencies affecting this readiness of the iileet
are:
^ /^
^»fc-
998 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CinC File No. UNITED STATES KI.EKT
A16/0129 ^' ^- ^- PENNSVLVANIA, Flai^ship
i earl i. arbor, .'.
J&nuery 2C, 1'j41
Subject: Chief of Laval Operations'" i-lan JU'
(a) The critical inadequacy of A. A. j\ans avail-
able for the defence of learl Harbor, neces-
sitatinr constant mannlne of ships' A. A.
Guns while in porv.
(b) The snail nunber and obsolescent condition
of land-based aircraft, nedessitatlnc con-
stant readiness of atrikins groups of Meet
planes and use of J^'leet planes for local
patrols.
(o) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for
the fourteenth Naval District, necessitating
detail of fleet units to this duty. The
detail of ifleet units to this duty not only
results in loss, to the J^leet, of the avail-
ability of important vessels, but also re-
sults in the forced employment of ships
whose more valuable characteristics v/ill be
largely wasted due to the nature of their
tasks. This is particularly true where de-
stroyers nust be diverted to local A/3
patrol, off-shore patrol and local escort.
These duties could better be performed by
submarine chasers, converted gimboats and
converted escort vessels.
(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore.
6. It is considered Imperative that immediate
measures be imdertaken to correct the critical deficiencies
enumerated above. It Is further believed that these
measures should take priority over the needs of continental
districts, the training program, and material aid to Great
Britain.
<\^
SSC
1
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 999
CinC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET
U. 8. 8. PENNSYLVANIA. FlanUp
A16/0129
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
January 25, 1941
Subject: Chief of NaTal Operatloos* Plan COG.
9. It la reooimnended that the Alaakan and Hawaiian
reenforeemanta referred to in paragraph S103(a)(5) of W.F.L.
44 (adranoe oopy) be despatohed aa aoon aa poaslbl^ In order
that neeesaity for beary eaoort may not esbarrasa the XJ. S.
Paeifle Fleet in Its later operations.
10. This letter has been prepared in oollab oration
with the prospeetiye Coisinandar-ln-Chlef , TT. S. Pacific Fleet,
Rear Admiral H. S. Kimmel, U. S. N. It represents his, aa
well as my own, rlews.
J. 0. RICHARDSON
Copy to;
Rear Admiral E.Z. Kijmel
COPY
S6C
1000 OQNGRESSIONAt INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Op-12-CTB(SC)A16(H-S) Serial 014412
Navy Department,
Office of The Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, 10 February WJfl.
Secret
From ; The Chief of Naval Operations.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject : Chief of Naval Operations Plan D.
References: (a) Cine, U. S. Pacific Fleet, secret Itr. A16/0129 of January 25,
1941.
(b) SecNav secret Itr. to SecWar, Serial 09112 of Januarv 24,
1941.
1. Receipt is acknowledged of reference (a).
2. Since the plans to be prepared under the directives of WPL-44 will be
applicable to a large extent to the situation presented by Plan D, the Chief of
Naval Operations desires that planning under WPL-44 continue to have the
highest priority.
3. The general concept, the assumptions, and the tasks under a Plan D situa-
tion, outlined in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of reference (a), are in accord with
the views of the Chief of Naval Operations.
4. In connection with the initial sweep for Japanese raiders ih the Northern
Pacific, mentioned in paragraph 5 (7), a suggestion may l^ere be in order. The
Chief of Naval Operations believes it possible that Japan for some time main-
tained a ve.ssel about 500 miles north of Oahu. Indications are that Bome
similar vessel is now stationed about 1,000 miles southwest of Oahu. In con-
nection with reports of unidentified submarines near Oahu, Panama, the Mexi-
can coast, and in the open sea, it may be surmised that the vessel mentioned
above is a submarine tender, and that Japan may plan during war to ba.se
submarines on tenders in the open sea. It is conridered inost inadvisable that
we indicate too much curiosity in this respect for the tinje being. It would be
well, however, to keep track of such vessels, and to talje immediate steps to
sink them on the outbreak of war.
5. With reference to paragraph 7 of reference (a), the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations is cognizant of the condition of the defenses of Oahu, and, in view of
the inadequacy of the Army defenses, the responsibility which must rest upon
the fleet for its own protection while in Pearl Harbor. In this connection, yo«r
attention is invited to reference (b), a copy of which was furnished to the
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. The War Department is taking steps
to remedy the situation, but the Commander-in-Chief should constantly press
the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to make all the im-
provements that lie within his own power.
6. It is noted that no provision is made in the Naval local Defense Force
plans of the Fourteenth Naval District for the employment of Vessels as a part
of an aircraft wai-ning net in the waters to the northward and southward of
Oahu. It is suggested that in coordinating the plans of the Commander-in-
Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District,
this matter be given consideration. It is possible the large sampans equipped
with radio might prove useful for this purpose duri»i: war.
7. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach
the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator
therefore authorizes the trahsmission of this document be registered mail.
/s/ H. R. Stark.
H. R. Stakk.
EXHIBIT NO. 10
Op-12B-9-McC (SC)A7-2(2)/FFl
Serial 09112
Secret Jan. 24, 1941.
My Dear Mr. Secretary: The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in
Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under re-
newed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past sevel*!
weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased grav-
ity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of
successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war
eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1001
Initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl
Harbor.
In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or
naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will
increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the
character mentioned above.
The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are con-
sidered to be :
(1) Air bombing attack.
(2) Air tori)edo plane attack.
(3) Sabotage.
(4) Submarine attack.
(5) Mining.
(6) Bombardment by gun fire.
Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been
provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devolted principally
to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution
of which I consider to be of primary importance.
Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively,
simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated.
The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons,
and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of
carriers and their supporting vessels.
[2] The counter measures to be considered are :
(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels
before air attack can be launched ;
(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their
objectives ;
(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire ;
(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke ;
(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.
The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite
possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without
warning prior to a declaration of war.
Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required
for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit
aircraft are at present in Oahu. and that, while the organization and equipping
of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modem fire control equipment
is in progress, the present system relies wholly on visual observation and sound
locators which are only effective up to four miles.
Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate if judged by the
standards of the war in Europe. There are now in Oahu 26 — S" fixed anti-
aircraft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor),
56 mobile 3" guns, and 109 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft bat-
teries are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of
the sea coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a
gun bombardment, one or the other countering fires would suffer from lack of
men. If the prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of the
anti-aircraft guns m'ght be inadequate against high altitude bombing attack.
By late summer the defenses will be considerably strengthened by additions
in guns, planes, and radio locators. It is understood, sixteen additional 3"
Mobile, twenty-four 90 mm., and one hundred twenty 37 mm. guns will be on
hand; the pursuit aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149; the
new radio locators will have an effective range -of 100 miles. Although the
caliber of the guns will still be small for effective action against high altitude
bombers, this augmentation will markedly improve the security of the Fleet.
It does not, of course, affect the critical period immediately before' us.
[3] The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e) might be of the
greatest value in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon barrages have demon-
strated some usefulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on the ground
might prove most advantageous.
To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals :
(1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit air-
craft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in
Hawaii.
(2) That the Army give consideration to the questions of balloon barrages,
the employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving the defenses
of Pearl Harbor.
1002 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(3) That local Joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval and
military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against
surprise aircraft raids.
(4) That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of
joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids
against Pearl Harbor.
(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu
for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long
as the present uncertainty continues to exist.
Your concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementing of the meas-
ures to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the security
of the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the i)art of the Navy
Department.
Sincerely yours,
Secretary of the Navy.
The Honorable The SECRirrABy of Wak.
Copies to : CINC, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Com 14
Op-22
Op-30
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1003
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON .
Subject: Air IJefense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
Tot The Secretary of the I.avy.
1. In replying to your letter of January 24, rej^airlinR
the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Baso
at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concunrence as to the
importance of this matter and the ui-gency of our makinc every possible
preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department
is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues
to hold a high priority for the compl»»tion of its projected defenses
because of the importance of ci^inB full pi^tection to the Fleet.
2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and
forty-ei£:ht pursuit planes. There ai^ now in Hawaii thirty-six
pursuit planes; nineteen of these are p-36's and seventeen are of
somewhat less efficiency, I am arran[dnc to have thirty-one F^36
pursuit planes assembled at 55an Die^'O for shipment to Hawaii within'
the next ten days, as a{-reed to with the Navy Department. This
will bring the Arry pursuit ci^^P in Hawaii up to fifty of the p-36
type and seventeen of a somewhat less effic5-ent tjTie. In addition,
fifty of the new P-40-3 pursuit nlmes, with their (funs, leakproof
tanks arid modem armor will he acsrimtled at 5an I'ieco about March
15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.
3« There are at present in the Kav.'siian Islands eighty-'
two 3- inch AA guns, twenty 37 mm '^P. junrt (en rt)Ute), and one hundred
and nine caliber .50 fj. machine cuns. *he total project calls for
ninety-eight 3-inc>i AA ^uns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns,
and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns.
A» With reference to the Airornft Warning Service, the
equipment therefor has been ordered and vrill be delivered in Hav.^ii
in June, All arrangements for installation will hcve been made by
thft tine the equipment is delivered. Inqniri' developr. the infor-
mation that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be ir.ade at
an earlier date.
1004 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SE CRET
5* The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is
being directed to give iraiediate consideration to the question
of the emplpyment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in
protecting the Fleet and base Tacilities. Barrage balloons
are not available at the present time for installation and can-
not be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present
there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured —
forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by
September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for
two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The vaj.ue of
smoke for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial
subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and geographic
conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable
for large scale screening operations* However, the Coninanding
General will look into this matter again.
6, With reference to your other proposals for Joint
defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply
to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depazi;ment, and am directing
him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those
measures effective*
r^£i4A^ A^^^l^^c^
SSc
cretaiy of War.
-2-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1005
(2-8-41)
Op-12B-McC (SO A7-2 (2)/FFl
Serial 015712
D-27446
Secret Fm. 11, 1941.
From : The Chief of Naval Operations.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.
Subject : Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
Reference: (a) SecNav Secret Let. to SecWar, (SO A7-2 (2)/FFl, Serial 09112
of January 24, 1941.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of SecWar Secret Let. to SecNavy dated February 7, 1941
in reply to reference (a).
1. In connection with reference (a), a copy of which was forwarded to you,
there is forwarded herewith as Enclosure (A), a copy of the reply of the Secre-
tary of War to reference (a).
Copy to: Op-22
Op-30
Via Air Mail Febettart 7, 1941.
Subject : Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
To : Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
1. Attention is invited to the inclosed copy of letter from the Secretary of the
Navy to the Secretary of War of January 24, 1941, relative to the above mentioned
subject, together with copy of reply thereto from the Secretary of War, February
7, 1941.
2. It is desired that you cooperate with the local naval authorities in making
effective the measures for joint defense, referred to in paragraph 6 of the reply
to the Secretary of the Navy.
By order of the Secretary of War :
Wm. W. Dick,
Adjutant General,
Reg. No. 900270, 2-8-^1.
2 Inclosures —
Inc. 1 — Copy, Itr. from Sec. of Navy to Sec. of War, 1-2-41.
Incl. 2— Copy, Itr. from Sec. of War to Sec. of Navy, 2-7-41.
13 Feb. 1941.
Subject : A. dse. o. ph. hwi.
Received of The Adjutant General, letter, February 7, 1941, subjectras indicated
above, together with two (2) inclosures noted therein.
(Signed) Carl Grosse,
Cakl Gkosse,
Major, A. G. D., As.'iistant Adjutant General,
Office: Headquarters, Hawaiian Department.
[Stamped notation :45 AGO Feb 24 1941 Received!
Note: Please accomplish promptly and return to The A. G. O.
1006 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 11
CinC Flic No.
Aie/oifte?
UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. H. NEW MEXICO. Flilifcly
Lon« B«aeb, California
Oo lobar 16. 1940
01
Tot
Subjaot:
Baoloauraat
CooMndar-ln-Cblaf ,
CoBoasdar-lA-Chlaf ,
3. riaat.
3. AaUtio Tlaat.
Zatamational aituation
tha Aaiatio Flaat.
Raanforoamant of
(A) Copy of aaauB^tiona.
(B) Copy of tantatlra oparationa.
1. Durioe ^^* raeant Tlalt of the aosaaandar-in-
Chlaf, n. 3. Flaat, to .Vaahin^on and on Cotobar 10, tha
3«oratary told tha Coomandar-lii-Ohlaf that tha Praaldant
wna oonaidarlne, in oonuaotion with poaalhla retaliatory
Baaaurea taken by Japan aeainat Oreat Britain upon open-
ly of the Boraa Road, tna frllowln^:
(a) Raanforoenent of the Aaiatie Fleet aa a
peaea-tina mora.
(b) Daolaring a oampleta asfcarso on ahipnanta
to and from Japan.
(e) Atteoptia? to atop a^l trads batwaan
Japan and the A&erioaa. To aooocnliah thia
latter neaaura, he (tha Ireaident) propoaad
aatabliahmant of patrol linea of liciit
foroea free Honolulu westward to tha Philip*
pinaa and a aecond lino rourhly froc Sanoa
to Singapore, "in aupport of" the firat line.
The impraotio ability of thia and other s\x£-
gaationa waa explained to the 3eoret(iry,
and, after some further oonvorsationa deal-
ing v/ith erentualitiea and at the direction
of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Co?::-
Band«r-in-Chiaf , and his War Plant. Offioar
in oonjunotion with the War Plana DiTiaion
of the Chief of HaTal Operation's office,
aiibaitted a Damorandun (Cnoloaura A) of
aaaunptions outlining the sitrmtion prcscoted
by th-) Jeoretary and a brief outline sketch
of operationa (Enclosure B] by tha U. J.
Fleet to neet the isaur-tlona In a tiore proc-
tic-.ble Conner. Thia wq3 aubmittcd to the
Chief of iiavH Opoyatlcr.c o;. ctober 11 for
06
06
12
16
16
18-A
19
20
20-A
21
22
23
75
96
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1007
CinC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET
LoBC B«aoh, Calif ornic
Ootobcr 16, 1940
05
06
Subjaot: Xntamational altuatlon - Raanforoenent of
the Aaiatlo Flaat.
■uboiaslon to the Sooratary and the Iroaldent
•IS to what the Navy proposed to do If dlreoted
to proceed on the proposed aaaumptiona and "
tentatlTe deolsions.
£. To date, the Comnaader-lii-Chlef , U. J. Meet, '^
has had no further word in regard to the nanornndur. re-
farred tc aboTe. but reoeived u despatch today froi:. the ]5
Chief of Naval Cparations dlroctint^^ that a copy be for-
virarded to you via the IKUalVJH. It is believed that —
further atudy in the Departzoant and in the Fleet v/ill le
result in sooa nodifioations in the operations proposed
for the Fleet, particularly oa ret^ards Uistribiitlon of
patrol planes and oruiaers. 18.A
9. The further operations .ndicntod In paragraph
9 of Snolosure (B) are owasures for the reduction and o- 19
oupation of the Llea-ahall Islands, or a feint in the L'id-
Faoifio «fhioh will be inltintod \ft.on o train is assembled
and transports are ready. Due to the situation in the 20
Atlantis, the Oepartnent did not fori that our oain Fleet
should get too for in the lacific, 03 it r<l ht be neces-
sary to call it book on short notice. It vma felt, 20-A
hov/ever, th.qt aotlvo operationa acalnet 0;jAi"«CE possessions
rJ. ht have a deterrin effect on afVtfl6& f^jll scale oporn-
tions in the South China Sea and putoh £-iat Indies.
21
2.3
4. It v/ill be noted that the nb:'ve on«r."tl-ns
'^orellel very cl08«ly the present 6lOVM€ Pknn , tlloiiflc'. by
tT'B 'eopatch of on \dv moe "oroc *a tho A'>ittic ■si\
further nodified by the rostrlctl Jii 1" malt Fl%at r>"ora-
tions to tho r.i4-Pncl"'lc ar.vi.
5. I './as rirt'.or tcld, Ir. th-> Oepartmeirt tK»t ^c 7-,
Ar;-v f .rsos ^rouia tc av.llabls onA t):'i'. '^.? flri*. Is- had
a-raed to t?io '.'nit-' States' 'xao of Sl:.(sp«re.
95
6. Ir. the 3vcnt thit thi asouwptj . : as«. tutT
r';2lizcd fX\Ott'o albooi" Jin MT.ry 1, 19^1, ■;'i.-l. ij
not r^'M.-.'iZ •-.: :l-dr?t3h tho Advance Oct'.;: :..?.. t ief«r« •iAftt 96
1008 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ClnC FUe Na UNITED STATES FLEET
U. & & NEW MEXICa rtrngakip
416/01667
Lone Bcaeh, Oallfomia
Ootobar 16, 1040
3ubJ«ct: International situation - Raenforoaaant of
tha Aalatie riaat .
tijM. tbara was diaeussian of aa8aat>linc a train and trana-
porta in «a*t Coaat porta and holding a full draaa ra-
haaraal of oparatioaa asainat an atoll, as a Flaet azaroiaa,
utilisia« Chriataaa laland aa a alta. Stapa ara bain«
takaa for tha aoquiaition and oonraraion of tha naoaaaary
traaaporta, ate., to be ready around that time. If tbia ia
dene, tha reenforeaaant of tbe Aaiatlo Fleet Bay take plaee
ooineidently with thla axaa^oiae, tha idea being that J^apan
will be iapreaaad by this aridenoe of United Statea de-
teoTBinat ioo to proteot ita intereata. I presuaa you will
be further inforaad of this erentuality aa plana are sore
fully derelopad.
h'r
7. My aaoret aerial Al6/016e3 of thia date, cover- *^^
ia« the ooi^aition and preparation of the tentatire de- — - —
tashaaat elated for reenf ore eaant of the Asiatio Fleet , 1 ..
aaaa suoh a aove ia ordered, was forwarded to you by
elippar loekad box, a oopy being sent on the EOtTSTON with
this letter. 20
e. It ia hereby certified that the originator
eonaidara it to be iiQ>r actio able to phrase this docuioant in 20-A
•ueh a ■aai.er aa will permit a olassifioation other than
a«eret.
21
J. 0. lilCKARDSOH 22
Cotpif To: (. a /»> "^W*! \)
\<il0O9 of Oct b
23
76
96
j:XHIBITS OF joint' COMMITTEE 1009
Oi>-l2B-2^MoC 19-11-40
USaSUR&S Kia OPaMTiOtIS TO BB VHDERTAKZti BY HIE tf.S. FLEET
1. Mobili^o U.S.ri««t, In aooord&aos with Oraiv^a ?l«n.
2. Rd4iapos« forcoa .-lOw in tn* Atlaatic as followat
j^.Mova 2 iiactvy oruiiiars and une divlaion of 4 ^^^ Daatroyora to
Soutbarr. Brazil - Uruguay, and /Vr^antlne porta, baalns looally
or oa yalhlan<l lolaslda In ordar to iotar<iiot Oa/i.'CE trado and
protaotlon of U.S.&hippiots.
^.MoTa 2 heuT/ oruioara, 00a aircraft oarrlar, and U dastroyera
(froa i-acifio) to oovar waat ooaat porta of South Aaerloa, baaing
looally or at fonaoa*
2» 0(oTa 18 Old Daatroy«r5 to paoifio for looal dafanaa and protaotioo
of U.S. Shipping SB folloicu:-
9 to Pucat Sound and Alaai:a
5* to San /ranoiaoo
4 to Hawaii
j^.Mova ona airoraft oarrlari one iig^it oraLaor, two tr;in;«port«,
on* daatroyar tandar, all new daatro/ura, one Jaatroyvr tranaport,
plus lat Marina Brigada (noW at Ouantanamo), and thrae n«w
auhoiarinaa, an^ thraa old aubouirinaB to {i/eal iJoaat.
jB.Mova Patli^ine J* ( plana*) with tand^ra to San i>l«0o Tor looal
oottital defense (relieve Paivliiga 1 and ^) .
1010 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
IC^U-J^
), T«f« .'M«aur«t for dafrn** of Ala*K« •• toilem»:
g, pi«p«ten too su)*ikarina< *ni ■.Mil taiiiar to ^icfi Har^r.
t{. IU«nrt>rca kkrln* gsirlaon at Uuteh Harbur by r«nki.i^cr •( ^cfana*
battailJn, houainc thaa In vaaaala c:i«rt«r«d for ike purpose.
2« Oispatcn one at^uadron (6 piaiiait^ af P«ir#l fl»na«, ^Iw:. taftdttrV
to Outeh Harbor, and on* aquadron (4 pla.ea) vt-i ien4«r f* Ktditl^
d. Prapara a dataewant for poaalbia d^a^teh to Cast lnd)a/«r««y
canalatlnff oi « CA, 1 CV, V DO, 4- AMD, (Daadiv 91;, 1 AC, i ««. \tM5 r^rce ai^l
raani'orea U.S. Aalatlo flaat unit* ahloh will hava ratlreu ti i.Ma araa, tn^ Bill
oparata in eonjunetlon vlth ■rltlan »ni Outoh Namil rjrua*. Upon arrival ^aiatlc
•atara, thla forea «111 rapert to tha Co«b>>nd«r-l.-v-C:il'-r, ASliZlC FUtT. ilknt:'
It dafMiaain* and ethar ■eblllBation aaaauraa itava not baan eo*plat«d prior i.o
daparuurv, thla haaard will rMy* to ta »eca(ft«u, uni «atarla;.a rm^ir*^ w'^ii
hava to ba fomartfad at a iatar dato. In add^'.lor,, ir aant pr;or to tr>e cojt-
platlen uf roadlnoaa aoaauraa fur t.-.o e^r«tl»n of thm maik h»dy in ilm iMd^
Paelfic. it aiat b« r«aiitad that Mar aajr raault with tkt* y*tu*l»i« farco c^-
poaai and unauopartad. Tha aaaa la trua of tna Adatle fiaat.
). Plapateh proaptljr fro* Haa*ll » d«tac>i««nt e»n«i(ting »4
e«rrii^r, erulaara, ami daatroyara to a«aap North /'acific w^iTt betwaai Ha'^aK
$(\ii 41uatlana for Japarwaa eosaorea, or Japanaaa raldara. T* b« fittai m w%*i^
iBObillaation radulrcmanis.
^ Aaaaiabia tranaporta aiid trai;) anC a«bark 2n<i R«anf»rc«d
librlno Bri^a^a inmr*t Coaat ports.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1011
Ti Ttka •••aurat f^r dtfam* af i'keiric iMixnS* as foUova: -
^ lUanforc* MlO«/*T Mlth raoalnaar of Nf«n«« fWttaXlon, 2 P»tr«na,
^. OparAt* Z tS tor d«r«ria« of WaKE.
c. JD«rat« 2 SS and 1 PAlron vilh tcnOar frun JOHNSTON JSUt/O,
provide aaali Uarln* ilatanlnf poii.
J. Jpamt* 6 VP, i AVP, and 2 i>S for Amtmnf ot CAVTON I&L/WO.
£. Clapatch 2 OSa for dcfana* of SAMOA.
r. Oia/i«tch Z Patrana «f Patwlnf OlC to HAK/aII (24 Plane*) uftar
raU«f ty Pf.twla< flVB.
9. Siapa'.en raaalrvlar of Subrooa FOUA Mod SIX (Approxiaataly 2,^ SS)
to CA/lOUHES arid MAiiSHALLS for prailAlnary raconnalaa^nca op«ratio;ia.
9« Upon eoauiotlon of aoblllaatloii praparKtiona, aaaauhXa fleat
In Hawaii praparad to Inltlata furt.ivr «a»suraa as tt* 9..*.uuLlo:. ra^uLiaf.
10. ^»si»\. In dafanaa of U.S. Ship^^-t b/ iric Jataii of wartain
fia«t Fercaa to Coaatai Fr.intliir forc«a.l<'fP lh« i'ujlf'.o Ihla nli... b«
cPiKprisa: -
J» m to MAVAII
9 OCL to PMlfie CoMt«l Proatlar.
79716 O— 46 — pt. 14 8
1012 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SeCtLiT Oot*ker 11, l*j4tO
II « *tfFT DiBDoaltlona and OpwratloaB to aeoV •poolBl
"*ftM»tIon In ««.t«rn Paolflo.
A&SUM1>T10N&.
1. Th« Gravity of tha alta(it.iun uistlns today Is Intensified
by tb* opsaiafT of ttim Burma Aoad by Oraat ^xritala.
2. Tba Japactee anjiouaoa or iadiouta that the o^eulna uT t^a
BuriM Ro«d la an aet unfriaadly to Japau.
3. Tti* Japaneaa und«rtaka rataliator/ fflasiaarea to anforce oo-
oparatioa wltb Japan b/ Oraat Britain in tba far Xaat.
4. Japan undartaKes positivD ag&rujsive aotlcn to enforce foil
oooparatioa by the Outoh I^ot ladiea.
>. Tb« Unitad Sttttas pruol.ulma oonplete embargo on ifilpaeota
from tb« Unitad utatAS or United States pObseaaions to Ju^a:. and noQ»
lataroourae with Japan.
6* Tb* United Statea andartak«3 by,di;l&ji«tLc a:id naTnl aotion
to pravant Japaneaa trade, in Japanese uMps and ic ahlpe of other
oatioos, «itb tbe Vaatarn U«Alaphare.
7. Tha Unltad Statea will support British forces xc t.'-.e lastem
Paolflo,- in Australia and Singapore,- and Cutoh Foroes '^u tt.e Dutob
£ast Indies in stopping Japaness trade south ef Chica Sea - Celebes
Sea area.
6. Tha Unitad States is prepared to acsept war if the measures
taken oausa Japan to declare «ar.
9, Great Dritaln will prevent aay odval aefjeisloi) i.e\ the
Uastsm Atlantic aaalnst the Western Haalaphere by the 4xis Powers.
l&.Tbe sltu'ati:,i.a and deoisiocx b/ the Ucited Statos assaaed
haraia oay arise 17 Ootober, 1940.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
EXHIBIT NO. 12
1013
U Vmmimr X%5
.Son* fr&ak B. K»«r«,
Ifcihinttton, D. C.
Tfy dMr Mr. S««f«t
pristiocs for tlM jTMor* 1932 to 1941 SntHiuAm to bo MiMrtltatod f m*
tlw MM moloMKi with tb* 8«er«t«i7 of tbo Navf *• lottor iMtst yew oa
1hi« rovisod •tatoaont hm proparod aftor ooll«bormti<m botivowa
Mli» Mff loo and th« Bctroau oi tbo Budfoi in otuidrisg tiM roeords of
fiw yooro In ci^«tloa» and the flguroa ai^joarlag thoroon will agi«o
idth tJioflo foztdahod you t^ tho Soroait of tha Bodgst. Viilo tho
roeoirda oooeoraiog tho rognilar KavaX IppropariAticn BllU f cr oaeh
y»«r nor* cwa^loto, inforaatlm oooeoming dafleianejr and PH^loaontal
<»8tiBat«a roqfiMiatod by t^ Marsr DojMUiafKit »aa l&cking 4s suu^jr caaoa
«Qd roqairod ioctondad aaareh tliKme:h tha filoa for the jeara in
q!aaatl<m.
Slnearoljr youra.
:>■{
Baarlidaiirai, U. S. iiavy,
Oiroetor of Budsat axid Saporta<
1014 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Appropriations, tfavy. Department, fiscal years 19S2 to 19Jfl, inclusive
Fiscal year
Appropriations
requested by
the Navy
Department
Budget esti-
mate of
appropriations
submitted to
the Congress
Amounts made available by
the Congress
Appropriations
Contract
authority
1932
Annual appropriation act.
$354,809,746
0
$347, 794, 248
0
$358, 262, 123
0
$7, 700, 000
Supplemental and deficiency appro-
priation acts
0
Total-. ---
354, 809, 746
347, 794, 248
358, 262, 123
7, 700, 000
1933
Annual appropriation act. - . . _
399, 139, 886
10,000,000
341,677,450
10, 000, 000
317,583,591
10,000,000
5,715,000
Supplemental and deficiency appro-
priation acts
0
Total
409, 139, 886
351,677,450
327, 583, 591
5,715,000
1934
Annual appropriation act ..
352, 717, 786
0
308, 669, 562
0
308, 669, 562
0
8,100,000
Supplemental and deficiency appro-
priation acts..
0
Total
352, 717, 786
308, 669, 562
308, 669, 562
8,100,000
1935
Annual appropriation act
Supplemental and deficiency appro-
priation acts
318,324,414
17,086,504
335,410,918
286, 332, 392
17,075,257
284, 658, 799
17, 075, 257
2,800,000
0
Total
303, 407, 649
301,734,056
2, 800. 000
1936
Annual appropriation act
502,855,817
23,931,725
485, 443, 847
23,931,725
458, 684, 379
23, 915, 851
6, 590, 000
Supplemental and deficiency appro-
priation acts ...... ...
0
Total . . .
526, 787, 542
509, 375, 572
482, 600, 230
6, 590, 000
1937
Annual appropriation act
585, 010, 984
1, 921, 300
549, 591, 299
1, 921, 300
529, 546, 532
1,921,300
13, 000, OUO
Supplemental and deficiancy appro-
priation acts..
0
Total
586, 932, 284
551, 512, 599
528, 467, 832
13, 000, 000
1938
Annual appropriation act
594, 269, 223
4, 766, 000
562, 425, 709
4, 766, 000
516, 258, 808
2. 881, 000
15,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appro-
priation acts. . .
0
Total
599, 035, 223
567, 191, 709
519, 139, 808
15, 000, 000
1939
Annual appropriation act.
629, 665, 104
89, 714, 905
564, 406, 461
85,839,950
546, 866, 494
76, 659, 700
15, 000, 000
Supplemental and deficiency appro-
priation acts
0
Total
719, 380, 009
650,246,411
623, 526. 194
15, 000, 000
1940
Annual appropriation act. . . . .
788, 775, 549
288, 602. 340
790, 342, 453
186, 088, 316
773, 049, 151
170, 326, 098
20,000,000
Supplemental and deficiency appro-
priation acts
2, 450, 000
Total
1,077,377,889
976, 430, 769
943, 375, 249
22, 450. 000
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1015
Appropriations, Navy Department, fiscal years 1932 to 19^1, inclusive — Continued
Fiscal Year
Appropriations
Requested by
the Navy De-
partment
Budget Esti-
mate of Appro-
priations sub-
mitted to the
Congress
Amounts made available by the
Congress
Appropriations
Contract
Authority
1941
Annual appropriation act
1, 384. 442, 202
3. 862, 187, 700
1, 337, 311, 577
2, 224, 094, 342
1,274,171,138
2, 275, 212, 207
148,741,612
Supplemental and deficiency appro-
priation acts.
797, 356, 500
Total.
5, 236, 629, 902
3, 561, 405, 919
3, 549, 383, 345
946,098, 112
Total asked. ..
9, 434, 271, 533
2, 006, 031, 343
857, 694, 198
7, 428, 240, 190
7, 256, 8%, 276 1,029,038 112
1934-1941 inclusive:
Budget cut requests..
Total
8, 285, 934, 388
Congress executed budget by..
^
1016 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
\^/An D E. F^An r M e: N T
Honorable Frank B. Keefe
House of RftpresflntatlTea
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Keefe:
Attached !■ a •tatement which contains fo** the War
lepartnent MHltar:^ Establishment, data on amoiinta req-iested
of the Bijreau of the Budget, araounta aporoved by the Bureau
of the Budget, and funds and contract aithorliailona made
available to the War Department for the fiscal years 19.1?
through 1941. These data were requested by you on October
19th for use as a member of the Pearl Harbor investigating
comalttee .
Insofar as can be determined, there Is no copy In the
files of the War Department, of a speech delivered by the
President of the Philippine Islands, Mr. Quezon, In Manila
some time In November, 1941.
Sincerely yours.
•-'V»^-— ^
ROBERT P. PATTERSON
Secretary of War
Incl.
Stmt
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1017
55
S2
05
■^ffl I
55"
o> —
000
cogs
-H 00
.2t3
2- .
2q.
go-
I"
a"
s- ;
aS
-a 2
03 JJ t-l
S a
•<JoQ
a*
a^j
an
0) 03
•3t3 ^
as
"3 P« (-1 rS
§§
^a
2a
s« ;
ag «
So-
2 a
5 =^
1018 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I I
3S
»-< 00
00 h-
93
§i
.-iin
*O0
3^
55 ■*
•♦to
«3 t*
'-OS
^1
Is 1
So.
■<CD
|S 3
eS g O
•as f^
■<00
J5S £
l3 J :;
■ ^ o o
11
•<oo
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1019
EXHIBIT NO. 13
HIADQUARTKRS HAWAIIAN AIR FORCS
Off )M af th« Air Fero* C«inmaiitftr
HICKAM FIELD, T.H.
(T-3)
lar*pl7r«t«rto: 20 Aogost 19la
SUBJ-'OT: Study of the Air Sit\i«tion In ftawall,
TO « CommancUjig Ooneral, Army Air Forces, Washln^^ton, D, 0.
THHII I Coinmandiitg Oeneral, Havmllan Dopartmant, Port Shafterf T, H.
1. In ooD^llance vdth copy of oorreoted ownorandon for the Cooauidtn^
Oenaral, Aivy Air Foroes. CCS 1723U-25, from tha Secretarjrt General
StaTf , dated July 17 » 19lil, "that a stucfy be made of the air sltoatlon la
Hawaii", there is attached for consideration of the Mr Department a plan
for the anployrwnt of long-range bombardbnent aviation in the defense of
Oahu, This plan olaarly presents the air defense of the Havallan Islands.
Attention Is called to the reoomnendations therein.
2. No Increase in personnel of the permanent air garrison of
IhvMtii Is nece3nea*y to bring the actual heavy bombardhnent strength to on*
group. Under provisions of Table of Basic Allonances No* 1. Mr Depart-
ment, dated December 1, 19ljO, foui-teen additional heavy bombarthnant aiiv
planes, wil 1 be re'ulred txj provide a total strength of one group of
thirty-five B-17D type airplanes. This force is so small for the mission
to be performed that it is considered entirely Inadequate.
3. Then the RDF installation is coii7>leted and the 15th Pursuit
Clrdup has its full complement of 80 fighters no further increase for
pursuit aviation is considered necessary. Provision should be made to
maintain at all tines the Hith Pursuit ^Ving at full combat strength of
ftO fighters and 105 interceptors. It is contenplated that pursuit avia-
tion >rlll perform its normal mission in the defense of these islands by
Intercepting and destroying enen^ aircraft in the vicinity of or over thft
island of Oahu. This is considered an adequate force to perform the
pursuit mission in the defense of those islands.
Ii. A combination medium bombardment-torpedo force is considered
highly desirable in order that attack can be made under conditions of
low vislbiJ ity when horizontal bombing is not feasible and is therefore
recommended as a component part of the Hawniian Air Force. (See Study
No. 2 in attache! plan).
5. On the assumption that there is a possibility of enengr s urf ace
craft reaching the shore- of Oahu, one squadron of dive bombers is
uV
1020 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Subject: Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii, cont 'dj
conoidered necessary to assist the ground forces in withstanding an
invasion effort by concentrating on denying the enemy any opportunity to
establish beach heads. The quick and accurate striking power of dive
bombers makes them particularly effective for close-in support on the
gro»ind forces and this prenise is borne out by information contained In
Intelligence reports received on the war in Europe. Dive bombers would
also b* employed against hostile surface craft and subraarines which had
penetrated close to the shores of Oahu.
6. With the addition of the force of medium bombardment-torpedo
airplanes and one squadron of dive bombers no further increase in the
number of light bombardment airplanes is required
7. One additional observation squadron should be assigned the
Hawaiian Air Force to supplement the new ground organization of the
Hawaiian Department which is being re-erganlted into two triangular divi-
sions. The ground forces of the Hawaiian Department should be provided
with three observation squadrons. At present there is assigned one
observation squadron (C&D) and one light bombardment squadron which could
b« diverted to observation duty.
8. To Increase the number of aircraft In the Hawaiian Air Force aa
outlined in this letter and in the attached plan it is estimated that
approximately 3,871 additional men should be assigned. A minimum of 216
combat crews and 180 maintenance crews are necessary to pperate 180 B-17D
type airplanes. Sufficient personnel are now present in the Hawaiian Air
Force to man 70 combat crews and 70 maintenance crews for heavy bonbardofsnt
aircraft. Additional personnel equal to the difference above should
be assigned to the Hawaiian Air Force to meet these requirements. Further
personnel increases should be made to activate two medium combination
bombardment-torpedo sqxiadrons, one dive bomber squadron, one additional
observation squadron and five air base squadrons. The five air base
squadrons will be used to maintain the outlying fields tabulated below
which win house heavy bombardment squadrons as indicated. The two Air
Base Groups (S) are to be used to maintain Bellows Field and the site
selected for the station of the 15th Pursuit Crroup.
Barking Sands 2
Uorse Field 2
Hllo 1
Lanal 1
Parker Ranch 1
9. The dive bomber squadron and three observation squadrons with
allied services will become, in effect, air support command and will be
stationed at Bellows Field.
- 2 -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1021
Subjeott Study of the Air. Situation in Hawaii, Cont'dt
10. Tables of Org;a'i< ration prcsoribe five enlisted men for
heavy bombardment comiat crew. For continuous dally op«ratiaai m. wn.
of fourteen men will he necessary for eaoh heavy malnt«iume« orerw. Usln^
these figures as a basis, personnel requirements have been oonputed mM
shoim in Inolosure No. 2.
11. Thert) Is at present available, under ocnstruotion and evKlting
approval of the War Department, housing for 12,286 enlisted men. This
stuv.y will require housing for a total of 12,813 men to provide for all
Air Corps and assooiated personnel. This leaves but 525 men to be oared
for in a future yroji'-t which will be submitted when this study has been
approved. Kor detailed analysis of housing see Inolosure No. S.
12. It Is my oonvlntion that by inoreeslng the present strength of
the Hawaiian Air Force by one observation squadron, a mlnifflUB of one dlT*
bontber squadron, two squadrons of combination medium bombardment-torpedo
airplanes and by increasing the strength of long-range bonberdnent to •
total of IbO airplanes a posltire defense of the Hawaiian Islands oan be
assured W. thout any assistance whatever from the naval foroua glylng the
Navy complete freedtH of aotlon*
P. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Araiy,
Inols- Connandlng.
Inol #1 - Plan for the anploy-
ment of Long-Kan^e
Dombarditient Aviation <
in the Defense of OaJiu.
(In triplicate),
Inol ifZ - Personnel Requirement Recapi-
tulation. ( In trlplioate^.
Inol ifZ - Air Force Housing Kacilitles,
(In triplicate).
■^l\tx^Mui\Lj.^^l. P
<'
1022 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
PLAM FOR THE EUPLOYttBiT OF BCMBiiRIKfWT hVIhTIOW IN THtT DEFEWSE OF OAHU
I. GENJglAL;
1. The key to this plan i3 found in the provision for first, a coi»-
plote and tiiorou^ search of the Hawaiian ar«a daily during daylight;
secondly, an attack force ;available on call to hit a known objective loca-
ted as a result of the search and thirdly, if the objective la a carrier,
to hit it the .lay beforo it could steam to a position offshore of Oahu
where it could launch its planes for an attack.
2. The most difficult problem presents itself when it is necessary
to search through 360°. This night occur daily and it is the only one
considered in this study. It is possible, of course, that intelligence
obtained from advanced naval buses and ships at sea mi,':ht iiiqf>lement this
plan and reduce the search area to 270°, 180° or even 90°. In this case,
the striking force would be augmented by those planes not required for
search.
3. All computations in connection with air operations under this
plan* are based on the B-17D airplane. This type of airplane is consider-
ed available for either a search mission or an attack mission and conae-
quently no reference is made to reconnaissance or bombardment aviation aa
such but to the search or the attack forces. The combat crew training
of both will be identical and search and attack misaiona will be rotated
for the pi^pose of resting crows and ciaintaining aircraft.
II. THE PROBLaii
1. To analyze the mission of heavy bombardment aviation in the
defenae of Oahu with a view to prooulgating a plan in accordance there-
with.
III. FACTS BEARING ON TOE CASE;
1. Facts;
a. The Amy mission ia; "To defted the Naval B*ae of Qkhu"*
b. The bombardment mission iat
(1) When Navy roconnaiaaanca is aduquatet
"To attack and destroy onany surface craft
within radius of action."
(2) Vftion Navy is absent or not present *d.th
equipment in Numbors or Quality;
"To soRTCh for, attack and destroy jneagr
surface craft within radiua of action."
c. «Capftbilitio8 pf B-17D typo airplanoa arot
Gal Fuel Ullea
(1) Search at i.5< P°*y at 3.000' Altitude yed flown
(No bonDa-2500 gallona fuel)
One hour full throttle operationa (»32 214
Two hour fuel ruaerve 272
Climb 30 10
Cruiso at 143 knota at 136 gal/hr
Radiua of Action in nautical milea
- 1-
n
^^»l
Gal Fuel
Uilos
used
flowi
432
2U
272
30
10
2100
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1023
Plan for the Ktaploynent of Boabardnent Aviation in the Defense of OahUfContM:
(2) Search - Attack at U5< at 5.000
[U - 600)f boabo - 2100 gallons fuel)
One hour full throttle operation
Two hours fuel reserve
Climb
Cruise at 1X^3 knots at 136 gal/hr
Radius of Action in nautical miles
(3) Attack at 65iC Power - Return at U5%
Power at 15.000'
U - bOCHf bonbs - SIM gallons fuel)
One hour full throttle operation
Two hours fuel reserve at U5% power
CliJii)
65* Power - 193 knots at 208 grd/hr
U5% Power - 150 knots at 136 gr.l/hr
Radius of Action in nautical ndles
(4) Attack at 65i? Power - Return at k5%
Power at 15.000'
(8 - 60Cit» bonis - IW gallons fuel)
One hour full throttle operation 432 236
Two hours lUol rosorve at U5% power 272
Clijii) 90 27
65* Power - 193 knots at .208 golAr i»85 450
U5% Power - 150 knots at 136 gal/hr 408
432
236
272
90
27
687
643
612
643
15^
I^
Radius of Action in nautical miles 170^^^^581
*Mote— The above capabilities were fJton froo curves
in the B-17D handbook and checked by actual
flight tests.
d. To perform its missions, the Fleet nust have freedom of action
without responsibility for the defense of its base.
e. If the solution to i problem is dosignod to meet the most
adverse eonditions, any loss idrorso condition will facilitate the solution.
f . Army Air Force units at present are not charged with the
reconnnissonee mission for the dufonsc of Oohu.
£. The combatant force having the longer range weapon has a
basic advantage, other f vctors buing equal.
h. Tho bombardment lirplane is i,t\t: longest range weapon which
ths Deportment Coanander his at his disposal.
2. Assumptions t
a. Tho following arc the assumed or kno*n maxinum capabilities
of unoiny equipment t
(1) Sane of his carriers can Btuam at 30 knots for
at least 24 hours. (Best r vnilablc intelligence
indicates GRANGE has tJirue carriars with this
perforraoncc),
(2) His carrier bombing pianos havci 600 mutical miles
range and cniiso at 180 knots (basud on porfor-
- 2 -
1024 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Plan for the Employmont of Bombardmunt Avi>'>tion In tho Dofonsc of Otvhu, cont'd!
nnncc; data of the U. S. Navy carrier planoa
and no 'vllowance la mftdo for tr.ko-off, rally
after att'tck, full throttlo oporation nnd
landing).
b, Tho following r.ro tho assumed probablo cap.-\billtios of enomy
oqulpmunti
(1) His carriers stoara at 27 knots for 24 hours,
(28 knots is tho moun top spood of his
carrlors; 1 knot reduction ia rar.de for fou^
bottoms).
(2) His carrier bombing pianos havo AOO nnutical
miles rango and cruise at 180 knots (reduc-
tion in r-.ngo from 600 to 400 nautical mllos
is la-^.do to allow for tnkj-off, rally aftor
attack, full throttlu oper'>tion and landing).
Note: In the discussion thrt follows it is assumed that hostile
earriora operating under conditions a and b above once committed to action
will steam atraif;ht in to thoir launching radius. Any maneuvering by tho
enemy whan within our soirch r.roa will aimplify our problem for it will
give tho search force mon^ tino in which to locate the .momy.
c. The Hfiwaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with tho
dostructlcm of hostile carriers in this vicinity before they approach with-
in range of Oahu where they can launch thoir bonbardmont aircraft for a
reld or an attack on Oahu.
d. An onomy will not venture an att;.ck against the Hawaiian
Islands until control of ooa lanes of conmuniCitipn is obtained. Then aa
the enony fleet approaches those islands, raids by surface vessels, sub-
nvarines and cr.rrier-baaod aircraft, may be nxpectod.
c. Our most likely oncray, ORANGE, can probr.bly employ a maxl-
nura of 6 carriers agjiinst Oal-iu.
f . A 25-milu visibility is assumed. This assumption Is based
on standard U. S. Navy search end p'ltrol methods employed in this area,
£. For tho purpose of this problem the Jay is divided into 13
hours of daylight and 11 hours of df.rkncss. Theso assumptions are based on
the follcwing computations t
(1) June 22, 20° N. Lat., Sunrise
Sunset
Hours of d-iylight
Add: Uorning Twilight
Evening Twilight
Total houri- of daylight
(2) Doctinber -''1, 20° N. Lnt., Sunrise 0630
Suns3t 1750
Hours of daylight 1120
Add! Morning Twilight 24
Evening Twilight 2/^
Total hours dr.ylight 12:08
Average (1) und (2) 13:09
- 3 -
CONFIDENTIAL
h
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1025
Finn for tho Employment of Bombardmont Aviation In the Defonae of Oohu, cont'di
ly.^ISCUSSICMi
Part 1: Tho Search;
1, Tho only manner In vrtdch the Hawiiian area can be thoroughly
searched for enemy surface cruft, particularly aircraft carriora, in tho
event of a situation roquirinf; such action, ia to provide a sufficient
number of aircraft to conduct u daily soarch of a dosirud aroa during day-
light hours with lOOjt covoragu through 360°, A method of searching 5°
sectors through 360° to a radius of 833 reiutical milos from Oahu amployw
Ing 72 B-17D airplanes is indicated in Chart No. 1. It ndll be noted that
the outside lines of visibility for the diverging tracks cross at tho 600
nautical mile circle, the overlap aroa inside of that distance becoming a
non-covorod area boyond that distance, Tho width of the non-covorod area
increases -is tho distance increases boyond 600 nautical miles with the
corollary that tho probability of finding tho targot decroasos as the
soarch continues out, Howuvor, as can bo soim on tho chart, each search
plane on the search bock covurs tho crea not covorod botwoon any two planes
on the search out and, in addition, covers the area previously searched by
the plane on its loft on thu search out but uncovered on tho search brok,
lOCSt eovorogo of tho area is, therefore, obtained on tho search out and
back,
2, In order to hr.vo availfiblo for ready roforonco a nuans of dotor-
minlns coverage and non-coverage of areas on the soarch out using 3°, U°
and 5° sectors, there is attached Chart No, 2. The raothod of construct-
ing tho curves th^roon is indicated on tho chart. It will bo observed
that, with the assumed visibility of 25 miles, lOOjJ covorago on tho search
out is obtained to a radius of:
a, 600 nautical miles with r.irplones in 5° sectors.
b, 750 nautical miles with airplanes in U° sectors,
c, 1000 nautical miles with r.irplanos in 3° sectors,
3. Under any givon set of operating date for the search pianos and
on«ny carrier, tho radius of ;\ction of tho search force is determined byt
a. Rate of closure of tho carrier .''.nd so;irch planes,
b. Miniimim distance tho carrier can bo offshore and allow the
search force to moke interception and relay the infom.tion to tho attack
force,
c. Uininum time required for the attack force to make intercala-
tion beyond the radius of action of tho currier planes,
U, In developing this plan, Jill soarch aircraft take off at day-
ll^t. They might t.•^ke off during darkness in order to bo at a certain
location at dawn if definite information as to the movomonts of enemy
surface vessels is reported from some source such as our soarch of a
previous day, friendly surfac** vessels or Navy p^itrol.
Part 2; This part of the discussions deals with tho maximum capa-
bilitios of enemy equipment namoly, his carriers steam at 30 knots and
his bombing planes have 600 nautical miles range and cruise at 180 knots.
See Chart No, 3.
1, Section No, It
a. An onomy should be prii.«irily interested in obtaining tho
maidnun cover of daritnoss for his carrier approach. This section illus-
- U-
£ONLI£ENTlAi
1
1026
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
PjAa for the L-ployrr-.K-.r.t of Bcrtb' rdr.'-nt rtVi--'tion in thv D^f"nsc of Oihu, cont'd;
tr'-t'-c four poc^ibl usos of -r.rkricss by -n ..nimy to cover his .ip-.'ro'.ch.^
In .--.ch c J i-r, ■ ; st'.ncc out '\.r ',usk -ind d'.v/n is corsput'-J fror. t.h>.' nost
r.ist.-.nt :.iicr-.ft l-.ur.chinK circle, or 3S-0 rv utic: 1 rdlcs. Tiiis figure ic
bas-d on the f .ct t.h t -ifter Ivanching, the c.rrie-r pl.-.ncs will be in th>j
-iir 3:-C -nd Jurinj^ th't time the crrier ctcv-ins in IX nr^uticJ. ndlcs to
r'.cov -r its pl-.r.cs.
b. Lk shov.s \ r rri r 1 . .-iC, .r:,^, ^ Vi '.ircr'-ft .t radriii'ht, 3tt' ck-
in*', nd rTcovcnnr, -,^ri;-' 1 .'■ sao',.;; 1 h', 1 uiicSir.^; t .: k vdth
th-.;' :tf'Xk M.o r.cov , y .n.,- -;; IC : .rjv/n t,-..,- l-unchLrir t nt-on
Viith the :-.ti ck -r.J "-.cov ry o'ur.ng i-^ylip'-t; -.nd ID snows tt. I-tincr.ing
at dfwn •.'ith the •:ttick 'rd r,cov-ry during aiyli,-ht.
c. It vd.ll be noted thit o-ch tirse ^chouulo haa .-; d-.yltght period
within thT r dius of "ction of th- t-.tf.ck force but th".t ID peraits the
leist tine iiit';rv J. for our forces to op^ r t^. 4:-.inst ^n oricray -;nd requires
it to --.tt ;ck 't ih . lo-i.-^ePt r-iir.o. The ■, rly r.ornifv. '-ttck is. therefore,
the bjst plr.n cl' xtion cr-;n to th ..ne-ny ,
d. It is -h ; opinion of .-:...- ii. ix-. iiinla th.".t -. l-'.t'. • ft-;rnoon
itt '.ck is~hichly prob-.blc since it p-.n-ltc n e-nei.Tj' c-.rrier to escape
under cover of d^rkne-ss. This pr-suppon.n rh' t c ■-rch oper-.tions -^re irv-
pr' ctiC'blc, This he-rqu- rtera cnnot oubsnribe to this opinion for the
follov/ing re.-.sons:
(1) A ninor aurprise r id such '■.:, a slngl .■ carrier
ii; not ■■. logicj. Tttthod of -ttriCk to reduce
the d< fens 0 3 of Ohu,
(2) It pemits us to oper'ite ■ c-lnst him for ■■■- long
period on D Day .it clos.. r'^.ngo.
(3) The enery vdll be nor" coricern^jd vdth deliver-
ing .:. successful r.ttr.ck tlir.n he vdll be with
osc-.ping -.ftur the -.tt-'.ck, H«' will h-:ive c.-.re-
fully consider.'] the coi't of 'he .nttrprise,
will prob.-.bly iiako n dete-minod -.tt.ck with
.■Tv.xir-Tun force '-nd vdll v.llliri<;ly ''CCept his
losses if iii.s :.tt-ck i; succoiirful.
2. Section No. '^:
c. This rcction illustr-too m I'^utin. ci ily Se-.rch by the rjc'.roh
force which will be ru'de in ord..r to prevent an .'iieniy fron mking -jt. undetec-
ted appTCach on 0-'hu»
b. Specific'-lly, v.-it:. t.h.: crri'T ■ ppi'-'' thing -.t jO <not3 -\nd the
sciirch force f'king off m g-:v;-,, ir.t-i-cepti'.n nust be n-de no closer to
OThu thin i.35 r-.utic.il nrdlos ■ nd ne I- t' r *.h-in 3:'j3 '-ft-r d.\wn on D Dny.
Thl3 perraits /,' ainut s to aoa' .' r -Uo .•.ier.i.-.f e '.e th ; hone bise and got
tho r.tf'ck f ' Ir "-n.l ^::10 for it to intercept nnd deliver its
attack befor -. -r cr.n Iranch its plr>nes. The atfick force will
strike- the c :. ^-. ■. .. its d^-.wn plus 5!34 D D.iy, 359 nnutic.-J. nilos out,
c. On a time dliit-'nce h-sin, diwn D D'.y for i cirrier is 526
nnutic'.l mile'S from O'.hu; dusk D 'My-1 is B5fc nr.utic-il niler. out '\nd dawn
' D D.-.y-l is 12U6 n-'.utical niles from 'y^h--^. Solvin,' the r-te of closure
probleri for the trio forcec l?i.6 nauticl rdl^ia ip-.rt, it is found th.'.t
conU.ct \fiil be nude at 1030 iii.utic-.l niles fron CfJwx •->.t c".rrier's d".wn
plus 7:12 on D Day-1,
d. It niu^t be pointed out thnt this solution is tho naxinun
rrdius of~action for the se-.rch force, yet not necessarily the nost diffi-
cult nroblen pn.-s.-r.tcd to our att ck f'.rce, Vftiil -•. crrier arriving at ^
_ 5 - - Q'
ecu FIDE NTIrtL '.'
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1027'
Pl.in for the Eniploynant of B 'v ibirdn-nt avI- tlon in thu Defense of 0-\hu, cont'dj
the 1030 nauticr-i ailo cLitlo t 'i.vtr. pl-as 7:12 on D ?>■'.•/-! c-.nnot b.-;
p.tt?ckod t.l.-t ii y, it en b.. -.tt-cki'i '':w following i-y 's .-hovai in b
•ibovt -.vtion it rust come within cisy r.-.nf','- of th "*.t. ck force if it Ts to
'.ttunpt to stcvon to ^.itliin its launching, r'ldius,
3. Stction Mo. 3?
n. This Section illustrates the nost, difficult probler.i 'vhich
the at-.ck force h\r, to jolve. It is the :■.-■-. pr< 'oler: th.'.t is illustra-
ted in Section No. ID. TKo criticr'l point lH;r. i3 th- c-.rri^r's position
•It his liunching rdius .t d-'.wn. Under th'.;;. circur,;-,tr>.nccs ho is •■ble to
l.i.unch his ircr- ft before we intercept hin :.n;s deliver ^n .'itt'.ck at^iinst
hiia on D Diy» Tlier^for«.'. wo nu.-t lUt hijti D D-iy-l, or the d-iy before.- he
nrrivcs -.t this position.
b. Specifically, if his d.^wn position D Day is 350 a-iuticil
rules frors O^hu, his iusk position D D^y-1 -lUst be 680 n.'.utic-J. inilos out
rj\(i his d-iwn pc.sition D 0 .y-1 nust be 1070 ly-utic-.l i.iiles out. If ho
nakcs t;ood this bchcdulc, inUrception by tr.' so'-rch force v<ill be nr.do at
98/, nautical miles out -it his J-.v.ti plui" 6:11 on D D-'.y-l. Allowing UO
nunutes to tr^nsnit a !r,cs.v.?,(. ind to ivt v!^ tt'.ck forc%. in the air, the
att^-'.cking force v/ill strike thv cr.rri r \ ': ts : ;.vn plus 10:/»3 D Day-1 at
a di5:tancc of 7/.ft"n;;utic-'l r.ile- from O-Jiu • r.d en operate -.j^-dnst it during
the roiTt'lning 2:16 befor . du^k. Und-.r ?t.'. n.ost I'lvor-blc condition for the
cncnyy. th'.: enuwy crrier c-n '■>- yublectod to attack by our attacking force
during ■•- p^.riod of 2; 16 on D Day-1.
L, Section No. 4; This section shov;s th: r i lus of -.ctian of tho
B-17D type airplane with fuU ioo.d of bonbs and 1700 f.r.llons of fuel.'
5. Effect of Visibility (Sec Chart Ho. 2);
h. To cover thij r^rjulreJ :;<-'.rch :.:•• a unH. r th -:'ti' v. -v-nrtitions
120 airpl.'^.nes, ■„.- ch cov.rin^; . 3" sector, w^uld t, n^ jdc : » j jr,.:r tc to
a distance Df 1030 rnutic:.l r.ilvs. This n-or.bir e:" pl-n.s %/oula p..rait
lOOSK cover^ce n;" the vnttre 36c" r>n the m.arch out.
b. enviously any dvcrv -•.■;' in ■^ht nui.A. :■ -f pi .n<-0 e.\;ployed v/ill
incr-.a:>'. the '-..-ct.or t' t. :,i.-.rched ty .r;. ;i-:n^ -iid Vr,\ r .£'.,r' reJuceS
th'' prob' bllity of fir.dinc th'' t-'ri^et. A.'.y imc; v T-'.-d • f.- ' '/.ould, however,
with a I'jsser nuisber of s<..';rc.h {Ixnes b'. c^ v r^ 1 >n th' i.e irch back, .-'nd
'dep.ndiri*^ upon th'. loc.ition of thi' carrit.r .aa! i r. . ho'jr ^f thi day, rdght
pernit ■J'l tt .ck to be ma'ic or, D Day-1 or D '■'•.y,
~ P'.rt 3? This part of th.. 'Ix.'.;e\is3.;.cn (' ..'.Is -'Ith the i3:^um*-d probable
capabilities of t.'nemy e':jui{i-.i>.nt (s .-e Ch.irt 'U;, i,) , It ia bvll_.v;d that
his rr.axir.Tur:! capabilities .rill t . r-.iucd f t- .'• th-. ':.. '.5 3u/ii..,d for Sections
1 tc /., inclusive, (Ch-irt Ho. ') by t;. .' 11 v. : : ,■ ! ictorS!
1. His ■'.vra^e carrl'-r i.; ypi. ^ i ..ill * '■ 7 knota. This st.at.A'.iimt
is tr'.'liCited upon the fct th.i* th. ."r .r * '{.■ ipt.'..! -if OflnNGE c.'.rricrs
is ?n knots, - nd th.. b' 1 i ' f 'r.'' on hi. r.ir. .nr. :'" th.. P.-..cific, foul
bottoi.TS will prohlily ru.-V', r :■ 'luoi hi.-; :i ■. 'l,
2. The cruising r n/' f i.i'; carrier -.Irci- I't will b'.- iOO n.autiosl
lilies, IJo allowance is r.Vi'l.. In [.:•' va^us ^nnput.at.i.; ns foi- full throttle
op>;r'>tion, for fuel r- .i- rv.', r f„r tine r. quired to t".ke off fro;,i, • nd
land rio^rd, ih . carrier.
3. H',. will not h V . unii.Mit.^d ^ un- r, ( !' approach f'jr his -.ttack,
n. H ^u.'.t iV'ii;! th': :,hippinc. !. .n .r. to av(yi^-e d. t'-ctlon,
c u :; F I D i. IJ 1 I .» 1 /
79716 O — 46 — pt. 14-
1028 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Finn for th- !->^ploynent of i'--t. r-i- nt ,,• • ■■ Ocfcnse of Oahu, cont'd:
..sst of ths 158th
ik! thw: proh'billty
■,n3 ttv.t his most
nm 0° count( r-clockwisc to
1 .i.-.dr.-.nt ISC'" -- :-• --clock-
not the jfily ijourcc
' .Hi/5>-nct;, surDiCo
. - iccpt rinrt proposed
. iu;:: gonoral locstion find
• . ' f rccs.
_;. ■' "V.! - r,! '. •- k. th«; shor^ : ♦, lir.t'.ncc t... his objoctivo,
•silth.^Uf^h t; ■. nor considt;r.itit.ii if hi;: r:nf[c is sufficii^nt
to fk rrlt h . /rch,
Z». StiCtiog No. 5i
a. "^ ' ' rs ir'-.v.-n to r>Hc\i c:n« possibif plan of
ntt-.ck nf~t;. 'iir.od protebie c.-'.prbilitics. H<;rc cansid-.-r-
p.tion h."s b l rs i..n'a.'Kr t>-d in r> r .graphs 1, 2 'tnd 3
irnr.udintttly result t^ • r-ct- ristics
h-ive bctin T' . is spi;<-d f ' 1*00 n'ritic.-.l
niles r^.ngi; l- i- ;i:.s irpi .icS, Under Lr;<_5v ciiaitirnB it will bu nuci.'S-
sary for thu cr.rri' r tr^ -.ppro.ich within 233 niuticnl rdlGS of Oihu before
it can launch its iircr.ft; rocovcry would be rvide it 167 nautical riles.
Accordingly, the r-.dius of Eo-.rch co.n bt; r- duced to 833 avatical railes
and still pt, rmit the scnrch force to locritc the currier md tho att-.ck
force rnfike its ntt'ick befor*i the cirrior-based ',ircr"ft cxn bu If.unched,
These f.ssuncd characteristics can r,,duci,' thv required search r-.dius to 833
ncutic'l rdlfs and still p. rrdt the c-.rri.-r bein^ attackod before it
reaches the position fron which -drcr-irt c-.n h.. launch<'d.
b. If on D Day-1 ' .r force is .t ■. ■iistr'nce of 991
nauticf.1 niles stivarrin^ in :3 and the search force t.'ikes off at
dawn, int'jrci,pti:n will, occ .. "-.rri-'r's daivn plus 5:^9, 833 nauti-
cal miles ■ 'A' .xir-.'jj.i r .aius -jf search under these conditions.
»llcvdng U' :-r-i^r th, attack force out >nd 3:1*2 for the flight,
the carrier c .n do attacked it its davm plus 10:11 D Day-1, 715 nautical
riles out and can optratc "igainst it during the remaining 2:1*9 before dusk.
c. Further, should the carrier be missed an D Day-1 there still
r ;~.-.iny an v^pportunity to r;ttack it on D Day, Interception nust be riade
by the search f- - rer than carrier's dawn plus 2:02, 288 nautical
railes out on D L" . t.^ :ri.ake -.n att-ack prior to launching. This
attack would ecu; rlus 3:56, ,?37 nautical niles out.
5. Section No. 6; Ti nur^; is the sar;;e as that sh<wn in
paragraph 3, Part 2 abov^^, i.'.. , tr. ; rtest fav;irable plan of action open to
an ene.^y, With the carrier PvOking good its tLrne schedule to arriv,; at its
airplane launching position at daylight, interception by the se-arch force
will bo rvade at dawn plus 5:11 "'f c-rriur's B Day-1, Allowing 1*0 rdnutos
to transmit the mossnga tc> th- h-ne b."se and for tht attack force to take-
off, the attack force en reach the carrier at -.'.awn plus 9:08 if carrier's
D Day-1 and can operato • f; inst the carrier during the reaaining 3:42 before
dusk. Under the nost pr':bable plan of action of an oncry carri'^r, > B-l'it!
att.ackj.ng force en operate ■ ,ninst the carrier f -r 3:^2 of th..- day prior
to his atf'Ck :>n Oahu.
6. Effect of Visibility:
a. In Section N-^, 5, a 5*^ search spread should give adequate
Cov.cr5ge. The scrrch time schedule is such that if interception is not
nadc on the search out it can be nade on the search bick in tine to trans-
nit the infor.T.ticn and t deltv'^r -an attack by the striking force before
- 7 -
CONFID^NTIkL
\o
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1029
im for tiM lipaAfaMA 9t no«fcir*wr<t Aviation in Mi» I>«foM« «f Okha, eoniU)
daak «o 0 Dajr-l* Th«r« it lit oov«r&c« at 800 iiMtioal ailea on xi\* awurfih
out, hit on the aoarch out and b»ck thoro i» XOOJt covoracc 72 airplanaa
wouid bo UBOd for tho aoaroh.
b. In Soction No, 6, with 5° ««croh •oetora* tho probability of
findli« tno targot at 740 nauticrj. miloo ia 85$ for the search out tmd aa
•tatod in ^ above, IOCS for the aoaroh out and back. 72 airplanoa would
bo Buffioiont for ooBf>loto covorago in thia coao, for if interooption ia
not aado on tho «a/ out, it can bo node on tho aoaroh baok in tiao to tram-
Bdt inf oRMtion and dolivor an attaok*
1« Aotion bQT unosqr oarrier-<baaod booblnc plonoa againat Oahu ahould
1)0 fiipirod on tho baaia of thoir huving 400 nautical niloa range and a
•pood of lao knota.
2. «^. H» ooat favorable plan of actlcn opon to tho anonjr, and tho
jlotioR upon which wo ahouXd baae our plane of operation, ia tho earljr
aoming atta^ in which tho ononor nuat fflaieo good tho following tlaa
•oheduloi
(X) Croaa circle 860. nautical niloa fron Oohu at
dann of tho iay bofor« tho attack.
(2) Croaa circle 530 nautical ndloo from Oohu at
duak of the aoy before tho attack,
(3) lAunch hla planoa 233 nautical niloa froas Oahu
at dawn tho day of tho attack.
(4) Recover his planes 167 nautical milea from Onivx
2i30 aftor dawn the day of tho attack.
^. Any variation f roa tho above tine achodulo perrdta our attcusk
force to strike the onenisr during daylight of th<J day before hla att&ek
over ti groator time interval nnd at a ahortor range; or, ponnita our
attack force to strike hia during delight of tho day ho attacks but
boforo ho ia within his radius of action of Onhu. If an enoRQr carrier
•vceoodod in slippir^ in undetected k^r our search force rjyi launehod aa
attack, we could and would, of courae, attack aa soon aa pooalble in ordor
to doatroy or dioablo tho carrior prior to, or during, tho rocovory of tta
|Vlanea«
3. The croa botw«an tho circles with radii 530 nautical ailoa and 933
nautieiO. iilos from Oahu is thu oporrting aroa for the aolutiun of thio
probloQ under its most advurso condition.
4. a. With the Aray Air Forco rospcnslble for its om rocoanoiaaaace,
72 B-17D airplanes will be roquirod to search dftily the aroa within tho
circle of 833 nautical niloa rcuiiua froa Oahu, e,-.ch plane covoring a 5*
•octor.
b. Based upon the ".ssumption of visibility uaod in thia atudy,
72 airplanes afl^oyod to soarch a 360° sector should result in 100)1 cjvon-
ago with sonc overlap to 600 nautical nilea, 85!S coverage at 700 nautictJ.
mil OS and 75$ covurage^at 800 nautlctd ndlos in the search out. In every
case, tho search out and in would poroit 100$ coverage within tho tine
interval which would allow the launching of tho boohing attack prior to
dusk on D Day>l.
5. If a siidlar search could be conducted from Dutch Rirbor, Uidwoy,
Johnston or Paljnyra the possibility of unony surface ships approaching
Hawaii and the west ooast of tho United SU.tos undatoctod would be prrcti-
ealXy non-exiatcnt.
- 8 -.
u
CfiliF iD SNIi Ai ^^,
1030 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Plan for the BK^oyraent of Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu, cont'd:
6. Search must be conducted during daylight hours because of the
extrene difficulty of locating i*at will be an unlighted objective proceed-
ing under cover of darkness. The B-17D airplane is capable of searching
for, anl attacking, an eneny force the day prior to its arrival vdthin
its striking distance of Oahu.
7. With this plan in actual operation the defenses of these islands
can be assured without assistance from the Navy. This will pernit complete
freedom of action of the Pacific Fleet.
8, The B-17D airplane is capable of operating beyond the combat range
of any knonei eneay carrier-based aviation.
9, Attack tnust be conducted during daylight hours because it is
considered impracticable to locate and borafc a raaneuverlng precision taiN-
get during darkness.
10. Based on the worst situation that could arise, i.e., the eraploy-
nent of 6 enetay carriers against Osihu simultaneously each approaching on
a different course, an attack force of 36 B-17D's would be rocjuired to
disable or destroy the carriers. It is expected that 6 &-17D'8 with bomb
loads of seven 600# botnbs v;ould be sufficient to accon^lish the desired
result (see Study No, 1). It is contemplated that this attack force will
be augnientcd by 36 additional B-lTD's of the maintenance and reserve
force If in coranission,
11. This attack force should be further augmented by a ndninuia of 36
long-range planes of the B-26 or similar type, capable of carrying tor-
pedoes to be usedUas the striking force under conditions of low ceiling
and visibility when high altitude level borablng technique Is not practi-
cable. (Sqb Study No. 2).
12. A reserve of 72 planes »/ill be needed to provide for maintenance,
replaceaent and rtscrve for both the senrch and attack forces. As was
stated in paragraph 10 above, 36 of this nunber may be eraployed as part of
the attack force if in conmission.
13 « In order to operate the above number of B-17D's, a minjjauo of
216 coaivat crews will be needed as indiccted in Chart No. 5.
vi^ RBcaasNDATiote!
1. It is recommended that the v;ar Department give Immediate considera-
tion to the allotment of 180 B-17D type airplanes or other four-engine
bombers with equcd or better p«rfonaance and operating range and 36 long-
range torpedo-carrying aedlum bombers to the Hawaiirui Air Force for 'the
performance of search and attiick missions In an irea bounded by a circle
whose radius is 833 nautical miles and center is Oahu, as follows!
72 for daily search missions.
36 for -ittick missions (these airpltnes will bo in readi-
ness daily, fully armed and loaded »dth boniss, for
a mission),
72 for malntenrjice and reserve from wtiich 36 may be used
to augment the attack force.
T^ total B-17D's,
36 torpedo-carrying medium bombers of the B-26 or other
suitable type,
2, While this number of bombardment airplanes could not be accommo-
dated at Hickam Field and there are no other suiuible bases avnllablo on
Oahu, It Should bo only ?. ra>3tter of time until projects submitted to the
War Department for the construction of airdromes on outlying islands of
- 9 -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1031
CONFlD-iNTIAL
Plan Tor th'.. Sraployr.-nt rf rciara- nt n'.oation in the Defense of OcJiu, cont'd:
the Hawrdim group are completed which, with Hickan Field, will be ado-
qur-.te for optr'^tions of the r.bovj naibcr of piar.es. Easting plans for
the dispersion of th- 13th Bonsbaror-nt Wing (H) provide- for units of one
and two STuadrons to opor?tu froia disp.jrsod ;iirdronies, Uodificrtion of
the plan to "pply to op^ritionr thorefroB "re anticipated and will be
nade ,
3. It is fufth r ri co.-iT. ;;n<1c i that in siking future allotnents of
officers and cnliit^d ncn to thv Hav/j-.iian Air ForCw considcrution be given
to providing a lainiraua of 216 B-17D combat crews a;id 36 medium bonbcr-
torp5do combat cr--w3. In this conn^action, sjc pa.riigraph 8, basic letter.
U. Our l''-.ding t-.cticians -n.: stratsgists hsrt concur in the opinion
that this plan will solve the dcfe-ase cf tho Hav.tiiian Islands -uid that to
their knowledge it is tt.: best and only njans that can be devised to
locate cneay carriers and r.akt attacks th,.rvor. b'.forc said carriers can corae
within launching di static c cf Cahu. T'ne s<^l3 par rose of the existence of
the nilitarj' ost iblish.Mont on Oahu, gj-cund xid air, is for the defense of
Oahu as an outlying navel base. Th'i bost defenso is an aggressive and
well-organized offense. The basis of thic plan is offensive action. We
have hrd clearly denonf. rate-d to us in Europe- t;;e fallacy of depending upon
passive mc .sviros of d.-fense, W:- mat not base our plans of action en the
"Def:.:nsc of Hawaii", but rather upon a vagcrous offensive, h'e nust ferret
out the cnjciy and destroy hla before- he c-ji t^.ke icticn to destroy us.
It has b«--en said, and it is a popular belief, that Hawaii is the
strongest outlying aaval base in th-. world and co-did, therefore, withstand
indefinitely att' cks and atfanpted invasions. Plans br.sed on such convic-
tions arc inherently w^ak ind tend to cr.ate a false sense of security with
the consvquent unprup«.ri:dness for offensive rction.
In order to initiate offensivu action, the Hawaiian Air Force
laust h.ave at its iraaediate corjnr.nd wall-organized, equipped and trained
conJbat crews. It should be reaembered that while reinforcements fron the
Uainland can be- nadc. -vail-ble on -hcrt notice their expeditious presence
here will not solve th.' prohlea. Upon their arrivl they aust be given
an o.-'portunity to undergo a ccrtrin ano-ant of indispensj>ble indoctrination
and training in tho pl.an of action cf the Hawaiian Air Force, If this
plan is to be effective the force recoaraended above niist be nade a
reality v.nd naintained in exist-^ncc in Hawaii for conbat at any tine. With
the United States living Tid working under a condition of unliidted
National £rifcrg-:ncy, Japan raaking its southward nxivonent nnd the world in
general in a coa.pl --le state of turnoil we misX. be prepared for D Day at any
tine, ReinforCQr.-.:nts, then-fore, nust be consiri- red fron the standpoint
of rcplacer.onts for losses only. Any delay in placing this plan in oper-
ation, such as would be necessary for tho above reasons, would ruti^atc
against its success.
It is bellov-jd that "- force of 180 fcur-notored aircraft with
36 long-range torp'j-io airplanes is a srvall force when co.'aprrod with the
inport-ance cf this outpost. This force c^-Ji be provided it less cost to
the GovLTnnent than the cost of one .•aadcrn battleship. It is further
b<:'lieved that, this force nhould bo r.ade 'vailable -.s soon as possible oven
at the expense of oth.r units on tho Eainland.
- 10 -
\t
1032 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
STUDY OF TOE BaSS RKQUIREU TO DIS^BI£ aN kIRCR.>FT CARTER
1. It is ass'a;:icc'. tlv't two ilirect hits by 500 lb, or 600 lb, demo-
lition bonbs will be sufficient t;: lisablo an f.ircrift carrier,
2. Fr.n th'.- V.bloa ::f prt-b'.bility cf I'ircct hits by bontiing,
results btrint'". by units 1" the H-^.w'Aii ji .dr Force in bonbinc sleds Umed
y,-,, K' ^f.■ :i;rrf . '-" ft Mil from prcvivjus uxpcrioncos by borabarcliers who
i; •, is nr>turc, it is j'ctcrained th'it '.'out 90ji
pi -. :ct hits rciy bo cxpcctc i from 6 D-17D's -yr similar^
typ- .irpl--acs -.t'.ackinj^ n oincuvcring c^rilor from 15,000 feet, each
r-r-.ppin^; seven 600 lb. birabs in train. Bo!-ib-\rdiors c-.rt ."^.ssmaed to bo
c-xn.-\bl(j -^'f nt I'jast a 20 iiil -^.cciir-icy.
3. In -irrivdng t the nunib ;r f btjwbs .'jni irpl-.ncs required,
sovor.'l moth -'ri f ■ "t ck '.re c -nci^'.-rcd:
K. Att-;ck by in 'ivi iual lirplanos frcia liffcrcnt -directions,
-tt." ckini^ in cl.-so succ-.s.'-i n.
b. ■■ n '.'^- c\:s by thr,;e pi'.ne clei.ients from r'ifferent
''.ir'.cti-ns - :uccer,si ^n.
c. Forri-.tion •-\tt-ck in •■ 6-pl-.nc flight.
In • 11 CIS-:- npe-: in tr-in by er.ch r.ir-
plT,>- v.lth The number .^f bontos (42)
■\n-\ • irpl.-.r.-- v-/ •■ • ■■ - ■ - ^ y^ - -ility ;f two qffoctive
hits wvi 'ieternine'' t. y the s-'.r.c f^r e-'.ch type .f atVvck,
. 1
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1033
CONFIDENTIAL
-" — " — — ■""■"""""""■" \tr:'- ■
n\-yn VCR TORPEDO PUMES IN TH£ H^YJhIIAN nIR FORCE
1. ^. Any or all of the following factors ':ould be expected to
jjartially or wfiolly prevent the auccesaful accomplishment of the bombard-
ment mission;
(1) Inability to find enemy force (navigation).
(2) Lock of bombing accuracy.
(3) Enerny fighter action.
(/*) Hostile anti-aircruTt artillerj- fire.
(5) Weather obscuring the objective,
b. Consideration of these factors:
(I and 2) Navig>itional and bombing accuracy
are primiirily nvatters of training and
. practice. Efficient standards can be
and .Hre being attained by the training of
combat crev/s in the Hawaiian Air Force,
(3) The critical altitude, high speed and defen-
sive armament of the present heavy bombard-
ment aircraft is such as to provide excel-
lent defense .-gainst enemy fighters. It is
not believed that carrier-based fighters
vdll be very effective against the B-lTD's
at high altitudes,
{U) Reports from abroad indicate that anti-air-
craft fire will bo only partially effective and
will not prevent the accomplishment of the
mission,
(5) The -..■^.-ather of the Hawaiian Islands is probilly the
best in the world from a standpoint of flying
conditions inrl yet i. vcty definite percentage
of bombing missions fail because of overcast
conditions which obscure the objective. Heavy
bombardment as such is useless against surface
cnifr ■*- - 1-v ceilings (200 - 1,000 feet)
pr' • '. is doubtful if it could be
use ! , JO feet without prohibitive
losses frc.T. anti-aircraft fire before reach-
ing the bomb release line. Enemy surface
craft may be expected to take full advantage
cf all cloudiness conditions and even to wait
until such conditions occur before launching
an attack. At present tfie Hawaiian Air Force
has no weapon to effectively combat surface
craft under such conditions.
2, The following is subnittcd as a solution to this problem:
a. The most efftctivi- action "igpinst surface craft under poor
woather conditions is believed to be a torpedo attack from low flying
aircr-i't. This is substantiated by results from abroad, i.e., Bismarck
sinking, Taranto attack, etc.. A torpodo plane flying just off the
water can op<>rate under a very lew ceiling and with guar.-intced accuracy
- 1 -
£21iEISENTlAL
\i
k
1034 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
N'.--'d for Torpedo Planes in the Hawiiian Air Force, cont'd:
against all surface cr-ft. The torpedo pli-ne should to Icnd-basod, of
long range, fast ;xnd capublo of b.3ing nccuratoly n-.vigrit3d. It should
operate in con.lunction i:iti"i h...r.vy bonbcvrdriont.
3. a. Tho orJ.7 type -airplane thet co ill be ■ -i.-.pted to this pur-
pose 't present in U-.e Hj^ii-Piian Depart.T.ont is the A-^'CA. It is b^li'jvd
that this -icapftion can be r.-.di.- and the prcblon is under considt r.tion
and tost -t present,
b. It is believed th t tha r.cdiura bcrib-^ri- ;nt r.irplar.o of tho
B-26 type vd.Il be even rTiOr.. Latisf-xtory b cause of its longer range,
c. It is reco-ai-i-ndod that . iajf tion of ie.-.e .;uch airplane be
mcde, preferably in such ' r.annr '■' net t: ir.t-rf r. vdth the norr.al
bombardnent adssion.
C C » F 1 D :•. ;: T I A
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1035
(In addition to the foregoing sections of the Study of the Air Situa-
tion in Hawaii dated 20 August 1941, Exhibit No. 13, there are included
in the Exhibit the following charts :
Chart 1. A Method of Searching 5° Sectors Through 360°
to a Radius of 833 Miles from Oahu Employing 72 B-17D
Airplanes.
Chart 2. Relation of 25 Miles Visibility to Distance.
Chart 3. Radius of Action of B-17D Airplane Under Various
Load Conditions in Relation to Possible Plans of Action of
Carrier Group Attacking Oahu, Assuming Carrier Speed of 30
Knots and Carrier Planes Performance 600 Mile Range.
Chart 4. Radius of Action of B-17D Airplane Under Various
Load Conditions in Relation to Possible Plans of Action of
Carrier Group Attacking Oahu, Assuming Carrier Speed of
27 Knots and Carrier Planes Performance 400 Mile Range.
Chart 5. Schedule for B-17D Combat Crews.
The above five charts are reproduced as Items Nos. 20, 21, 22, 23 and
24 respectively in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings
of Joint Committee.)
1036 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(/. Ir Corps Troopt. CTily7
Aul}i Aclu
Total liq Kav/'n <■• ir • orco
50C 365
130
Zira bomh Sq {';,)
^ 'P (;;)
4<irici Bomb i>q (li)
50th Reooim Sq (ii)
Hq * i'.Q Sq 17th AB Op (R)
Idth AB Sq
!=.pt
■L)
Total
i738 4 ICC
14 th Pur sii i t
46th Pur Sq (F)
47th Pur Sq (K)
(F)
ir>ti
14:
£04
20;
175
17S
175
^J
■^^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1037
Auth Actual Over Siiort
., ..4 ..^ 1 th Vxxr Jn (Int.) -04 1;.? 1?
Gtii '-'xxr '-'4 \l- t) i:.7 ICl <l
r,/t!i .^ur oq (Int) li,7 ' irC 2
•1.: M. .', .!• ..I. f ;nt^ If; ;
'ase ar (;,)
Total 14th f'xir ,;r, a!:u ,,heelar .'ielJ
i;.7 v/j 13
14:
'■I.: '- 1
1 "^
1038 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
;sr lDb>i «.^--
3T.<Ei;";rH -o-; ••^a^.WxS
216 oombst cr?iwr> (Ions 70 row pr»38nt) 146
180
14.f.
mainti!inani;o crews (less 70 now
present)
oor.bat cr-s .a « 5 men each
110
730
110
maintonaiico crowa ;; 14 men e«ioh
1540
z
me iij.n ',-ombardrit:nt-t-or;'cdo
r.q'i»^'!rons f-M 217 ir'jn eaoh
434
5
air !»u3f' squadrons C- 145 ::ie.i ea
ch
725
1
• IV , or ; _ , . •: n
)
L*;-3 .-retien*-- ov .-- ~: t-,h
Total
155
210
^50
470?,
881
3071
o
1
, V
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1039
so.inel
7,];>2
.■5, "71
' - ' ■
0 250
Total
r?,5i'3
Pcr:",tx.»^r t
■ob
U1r.«tion
T.-f-l
?>,Z'' ^
i.'as
•1 , ?.-'0
l,;i37
141
1,978
l,o08
1 ,008
■> (Klpapft j\\\
ch)
1,294
i,2y4
Pi-id
;Fi«l<3
.Field
I -s ; ot:;er i'risj. is; -lov; •■ein',
>ori:;trncto j ■ r projecteH, 3,218
3,218
Grand Total \i ,Zm
('jiffarenoo) Mousiaf; to b* ;;rovidod 525
Inolosur* #3
IP
-^:>J
1040 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 14
HEADQOARTERS HAWAHAN DE?AatMENT ,:
OPFJCE OF THE OEPARTMEHT COMMANOEB
roRT SMArTER. T. M; -*
Subj&ct: Air D»fiins« of Poari Bs-riior-
?oi Th» Adjutant Seaeral , feehirigtoa, 0. C
1. RaJoraKCs ia Wit«d. to ascrat l«tt«r froa the Mjufcsat BmmmX
to •idadquartera Hwfti.i«n Departaect, aboT© subject, dated T Fsbruary 1941 j
fiJe Mi 3R1 (l-24-4l)M. There ar» inclosed beyewitb for yotar information
«opi3s of th« princijile dirsctives, orders, and ssrtlaatsa which hme feaes
iasusd, in coop«r*tioa with th« local natred &ttthoriti88, to prorid* for
the joint d9f«HB« of the Peart Kao-bor KaY«l Basoi aad ship* of tba Pacific
n««t in I'jwaiisuts mtsrs agaiast ourpris* raids or aix attaeks.
Z, fcclosurs 1, JoiBt l«rtt«r iWO - 14tii KD, dated 14 y#t»rBary 1941,
LTitiatad ths study by joiwt coiSBoitteae of Array and Hawy offtc«r« of Ihs
jftrtt jjrobleffia of tba <iefoB»« whicto were (se'ntioned i» tlie conreaporidaaca
batTOSri tVid 3««ret&rl«9 of Wjir and Kayy, incl«»«Ki in th« lett«r referred
to Ir. p«ragr«pli 1 aboTs, and also iecltMed study of additional problems
ahich sar« raised by ildairal KSsmml, C<s!ffland»r in Chief "of the. f&cifle
neot. ■ ■ '
3. iBclosure 2, Annex Ho- VII to the Joiirt Coastal Frcaitier B«f«ri8e
Pltsn (HCF-39} is a new joint a|;reecant «ith the local navA awthoritiea
.ynich pertaijis to joint security aeaanres. Attention is .p«rtic«larly is*
vitad to Section It of this docua«nt 'shXeih relates to joint air operatioisa.
This joint agresjaaat eovigrg the aajor .poiats •sljich nera studied fey the
ioint"c0i2aiitt«eB organieed ±a inclo.aure 1. Iiicloaurs A to this .A^wsx
Ko. VII has not yet oeeu coc^leted, however teafe* are no* being conducted ,
to daterrnine the most effective aseans of joaitive identification of
friesidly aircraft and insure ita protection from aatiaircraft artillery
4. Inclosure 3, Joiat Sgtisiats KawaiiiiB Air Force and'Pwtrol Siag
>0 (N'aTea Base Defense Air Force) ia self e;g!laKatory ajid -sfill serre as
» basis of joint air ope"ratio»s orders to be issued in the "wear future.
ia the coa-
of air operations, aircraft of one
rol of tho" other sonrioe.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1041
1042 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 15
t^^
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
From
ID
This .tEltgram oust be
olOBcly paraphrased be-
fore being comaiunioated
to ,inyone, (D)
eccretnry of State,
IBaehlngton,
Tokyo
Dated January 27, 1941
Beo'd, 6;38 a.m.
.-4t tU
125, January 27, R p.m.
Hy Peruvian Oolleogue told a mrisber of my
8t'->Jff thn.t he hid heard from meuiy sources in-
cluding a Japancne eource that the JaP'-^iicse
military forces planned, in the event of trouble
with the Itoitcd States, to attempt a surprise
attack on Pcaxl Harbor using '>J.l of their rnilitary
facilities. He added that although the project
crcmrd fantactic the fact that he had heard it
from nany sources piomptcd him to i>aee on the
information.
GREW.
CO
^1
..sk'^'!: »•' itis-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1043
^ ^,RA..i: g J. OJl
Althosg^ th« folXo«laf rv^ort s««s»4 to th« ftMYl^n
p*«t«4 It to • »iwib«r of nj tt^ff b*o«s«« h* h«a h»ard
It tnm so aany 4iff«r»at tourevs, iReludULR^ » J«pan«a«
ItforMUlt. Th.* r*port vaa to th« efftot thnt ah^uld
*tr««bl«* bi>««lc out b«t«««n J«p*n and th* Col tad Stataa
tha «7ap«iiaaa Intandad to aaJca * aurprlaa cttaok on ?aarl
K«rb«r. aa aaaaa. Thay would aaploy In thia attacks thair
•atiro ailitarjr acittlyaiaitt.
l/^r
79716 O — 46 — pt. 14 10
1044 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"ffice of the "ihifef of }^r^vrl Oofrr-tinns
Seri Tl ■■o. og'^ie
T'eb, 1, 1941
C"!"TT:'"^'""T 'T. 10465
FroTi: Chi-f :^f ■" ,v 1. ^'y.c- r: '. iGt:s
To: C.:--:;'V :--r- :--:;. ^ ■_*■, •- -i f ic TL^at
1. 'hrj I'c 11 o'.'. i r --^ Ir f oi-.v-r^i/d for your ir.fornntion.
'•p.'i.r Cit-.' of i:" J-2"U''ry tl:-i r-.^ri^TP nb-^ssniior -a Tokyo
t. ' -r ■ ;--,i 'Aie St-te 1 r r-^rt-^:,. nt to the followintr effect:
"T:ie ^
-.:-hor of
n-.y St-:
■ ; r •:; . s ,
ircluc.
evtnt
of tro
■ tvi Status
.^nd .T">
surnrisc
, + . . , >
•if i :
;;• iT'.rl hnrhcr :
,• i +. 1
■' 1 1 of th>, ir
,- ^.T-t :',T^
; M'pl -vinff -11 0-
f "^ ''i
; r L c-iip";f:nt .
7 hi; ~':-:
ru\-i ■ ;
'!l ::i;- -'jp cone; "■
ru-'iCrF
f •':::* ■'' L^
•■ V r'h.vUss h.
-■■i thon- of
suf f ; :■-
■■-■', ;
r: r.rt.-.r;^o to cci.'
7 J y I
', ; s information
to - >
,.
"f ~y st-ff."
~>
iv- Plvision
-
■ -r 1 li^-,!,-.^s r)l3i
cre'^eno'"' '
•n t.h-:
'^•:, Tur':Ors. "
• , ■' ■■,^' '^ -ri know:
rep^;r ' '
rnv-a
ImirAr.^-x.i.. .
.-...-, - ■ . A .. - ;.■ :
. .-'i .-. ,
■ ^ - ^ y I' ^ : - ■ ,
Oi-lf^-F .rules J-n-T.,
py fiireotiori
Cp- 16 -]■'-:: ~:--^:- i .'[,. .31,1941
n ■ ■ T i ■:; ut . Cono r . ;, . H . " 'cCc 1 luni
Tyned Vv ■'. ..hT---
CC - Oc.Ti 14 10466
(30) .•,16-3/iT3''
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1045
//i-
,'i
>.<. ...^,,^''L. /- -l^i^^ ■ t.Vi
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
BAS
Thle t'-l^gram must b""
clos'"ly p^raphrasfid b""-
forc b-lng communicated
to anyonr, (SC)
-Tokyo
Dated Nov^ober 3, 1941
FROM
""Rec'd 6:06 a.m.
Srcrrtsry of Staf, ? • ' ' '
'A-aehington,
/ ,
1736, Nov-mbrr 3, 5 p.m. (SECTION %W.)
STRICTLY CONFID'%NTIAL FOR TH^ S^CR'^TARY A«p
UKD^R S'^CP'^TARY ONLY.
One. I fl^-Kraphra t^xtually on Nov^mbTr 1
(pleas'- SC" "vijibaesy' s 1729^ Nov-ab^r 1, 4 p.m.)
a translation of th': Iradlng article in that morning's
NICKI NICHI which under th«- banner headline "Empire
approach"^ 8 Its greatest crlele" pr'^ceded a New York
d'-spatch summarizing a etafment reportedly given
to the NTW YORK TIMES by the Japanese E'mbaBfly at
Washington with regard to the need for putting a
stop to the economic ws* between the Onlted States
and Japan, That article and the paper's editorial
rlao telegraphed textually (Embassy' s 173, NoTcmber
1, 7 P.O.) closely reflect the ataosphTC now pre-
vailing In this country as we sens'- It.
Two, There Is nothing to add to my snalyeea
as pr^'sent'^d in the telegraais over the past several ^
•ontha of the factors which affect Japan'* pollcyj
C
t
s
1046 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-2- #1736, NovrmbTr 3, 3 p.m. (SCCTION ONE) fro» Tokyo,
nor db I ezK nerd for dubetantlally r*-vl8lng thEm,
I b^'llrvc that Japan's position can conclusively
be *:8tlni«t€:d by applying,
GR«:W
HSM
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
1047
F€V Tokyo
This telegram must be •
clo3Ely paraphrased be- FROfjIjtEd NovE-iber 3, 1941
fore being COTtrunlcat Ed
to anyone. (3^) Rcc'd 10:29 a.m.
Secretary of Stote,
Vfashlngton. f
1736, November 3, 3 p.n., (SECTION T*!C)
to the situation ^vhich now see*", to be sh-^.plng up
cert-^, In consider". t Ions na follows:
(n) Japan cannot dlssoclntc either herself or
the China conflict from the Exxropean vrir ■■ nd its
fluctuations .
(b) Hnllke public opinion In the denocr- r,i e 3
where there Exist-' ■ '\r^ .■ :zrizo\x;^ ■'^cdy oV principles
directin;-; or inflxiE-.c ■^ "j ''-r'^:.. : llclc3 ■ nd "'riere
dirfEren^r.;: . - o- : - • -■ ■ r^ Ukrly * -^ v'^r-E
ciplen puMic opi nl--: In /■ p' - ••■.trt. poll^lo'I
^houf/ht •'■.■r' i3 :■ i^r—l'-v- ^o liber-lisr ia
.; V --' /.■•-.■ ]^y ^' ■.• --np -'ven tire only
^' ^t ::^;hfri r '^ Uiou-ht predonln •(.' '.hl'^h is
br' -p ■ ' "' ' ■ ■: ' y p the inpi.ct of cor.c'. '
•.■.■! event,' r-ntnide the oountr". T* '■';-:: the i -•-
■ 'er-i^in vi^'or' , • • .vn f/'n'-cpe
p .' ' ' 1 oh brc ' : ' * ' ' " ■ ■ •-•--■■■
1048 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1756, !TcvE-;^'i:r .
ele-Ents ; *.}.f: : 1 ;..
thereby cre-itln^; ioubl
tc:ry of GEr-ony,
RR
GRET-v
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1049
'I
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
Tv'L
Russia ,
Ax*
f crv;-:.r : .
FROM
China, re? .... px^^cA. I
f.vrcr. It .ttE'npt shr . . " . if Oer-
"T : - » 1 lock
*.f 3LE -. fin--: : . nt of .'
"ht Axis.
T' . '"r c'H'' Ti'l by inanv of our
leading econor;!;:' ion -.nd ever. r.u'xl
Exhaustion of econo- ;ncir:l rcsour'- es
would
1050 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOJNT COMMITTEE 1051
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
1052 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
=1' ""i-.'-' ■■ From
for- t^-i
to ^'nvor; . , „ . . .-Ti
<
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1053
1054 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
.v^-
t, November 3, 3 p.m. (S'^CTICN SIX)
uncertain J^ypothcsiP upon which to brnc the con-
sldtrcd policy « nd wt; -Jtrts of tt e United Stftes,
CKir own view is ttct avch r course If tr i<en would
not (repe.'t not) cvrrt wtr.J Ncvcrthtle -s bcth
Views ore no I'orc thtn opinion, nr.d It Is thrrrforc
our bellrr tix t it wculd br corit»ry to •>uf m tU'.rl
intcresta tc pcstulrtc tic correctncia of eifhrr
otlnlon rnd to rr'rct thereon r dtfJnitlvr pol'.t-y .
To clo 30 woiOii be to pi-t- the cert bcforr tie hfr.ir.
The r.rlr;t.ry po\i.t fur dcf.ision wor.ld f pi r.- r' tn ii.-
vclvr the I'u rati -n r .-. to wnet'irr < nr n! Uir,.. 1 nei 'i,
i-icllcJca : ncl objective:; jualily «• r wltli Jr,;<-!i ii.
tir cvnt tlj t d-. pi-"-': cy, on iirv.\. ll'-.t f.l p.- ti i-
1 nt:i'r.n-^t,, 3lc< hi ftil, fir > nly on t.t.r 1 -it^ .t
ch (ircUilf ^ ci ■■
■ r- ,^ i 1 vr;-l f:i .■;
1^1
dr^Inl nt f^
r r-.i ) v;
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1055
-«- <^*1"37, Novrr-brr ?>, 3 p.-n. Tn n- T^ kyo
tc be irrcvccfblE, )\t..i -Irc'dy brrn '" " ' irb- tr i
/: nd rdoj!trd, for the n.-nnn .' r • r\nui'.! i ■',
FIVE. llr.: -u- vf: lizf Ih; t i :, - ...^.■; : ;
tciffl. v;; t h t : n ..fl' ' . ru n tT" I' - ' ,< t • . :.I
tionr. tbri-f'-n • rri tJ^rt it in 'cf : >■
tt^ lr,}ply M • r
1056 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TELjEGRAM RECEIVEP
FU'OM
el;--''. . ' ■ . .
>■)'■■■■
sulcl-al c wU.h thr Unlf^d Stntr^:,
8nr.l*:y w -ulu ilctnt'- v n.t , I
rsr ?"nli,y cannot bi^' "■.'"aeur'^d by cur own
logic. Wc n'^F' not br ov^ r-c )nc'^rntd by liF pr^ pr ^^t
"bKllicQ^F. tor.r and subst.- ncf :if th.r JapRn^pt jrrse
which has nttackrd th":: Unltcti St'tCF/.n r'^curr^nt wnvca
of Ir.' urlng the past ecvrr'^l yf-ira, but it would I
be shortelghtec'. to undf r'^stlmp t*^ Japan's obvioup ■
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1057
-2- *^1V/- , . ■. ' -S ' p.n:.. k- • 3"VEN) from Tokyo
■'rations for a prorr^- • • ■ -■
ait '!'r. '■>!,<. vr croP'r'fis f '>"' , *. would hr.
siTdlarly shortslr- '
llrf thfn th'-sr rT"-i :*ratlor.t: - r^ ^y 1 -
of spb'^r rpttline- th^ rxcl'JFlvr pur
Qoral support to Jrrpn's "■'"psui-f" iliplomacy,
Japan's resort t'^ ."Fa=;-ur="s w, war with thr
Unlt^"!;! Statf^s In'vltably nay ccr-'X witn dramatic and
dang'^rvOus suddgrrnr ^f,
{~ND OF MaSSAC^) ^
CSB
1058 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
NOV 18 1941
.¥>'
9his tdegrea mmt be
„ _ _ Tokyo ^fejWMfgJ^^ "P^
to nayom. isS; ||„n a,g, p,^
Stortttay ot ftlM
>fftahlngton.
NOV 1 8 1941
1941
1814, Horeabcr 17, 8 p.«i«
OMDEP. KCBETAKSr OHM.
RcfErcnor ecibass7*ii I'Sa, NoTEaber 3, 3 p.m.,
Ir.Bt eentcnoc.
In cmphaBiting need for guarding againgt
sudden nllltary or nnval ftctlona by Ji^nn in
nrcr.s not nt prcocnt involved in the China oon-
fllct, I «U3 taking into fioccunt ns r. probability
that the Japancac would esqploit nil nvnllnble
tr.cticnl advanttigtc, including these of initia-
tive ".nd Guxprl«c, It it inportant, hovevcr,
that our Oovcmncnt not (repeat not) place upon
uo, Including the nllitnry and naval attaches,
•2ftjir rcspcnsibllity for giving prior warning.
The c-;ntrrl in Japan ovtr nilitary Inf-rnntlon,
b.-th -irlnr.ry and eEcondary is extrenaely efftrctlve,
-n' WE ;-Lnvc nc expectation that any advance In-
fcrr..ntlon w:uld be obtained cither through the
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1059
-2- #1814, NovEmbEr 17, 8 p.m., from Tokyo
przsa' tfT.trom personal contaotn with Japanese;
the few AraErlcans lEft in Japan arE mostly con-
cEntratEd In Tokyo, Yokohama and KobE, and arE
m no position to obsei^E military taovEmEntef
and thE absEncE of AraErican r.nd other forEign
vEssEls in adJacEnt waters almost assurEs to thE
JnpnnEsE the ability to dEspntch troop trans-
ports in various dirEctions without foreign
obsErvntion, RecEnt rEports from our consuls
at Taihoku and at Harbin DOint to Japnnese
trcop concEntrations in both Taiwan nnd Man-
churia, and rdl. other available ir- ' ' ons
are that einc' the gEnernl mobilization of
July Irst, troop ^Itlons have brren m.^de
to enable new opErr.ticni. to 'oe c.nrrled out on
the PhortEst poGC-lble notl-ce In either Siberln.
or the southwest Prvclflc cr th,
We fully reaJ-ize thnt pu^:,iol:/ our ":ost
icr-cvtnnt duty -t this time lo to vntch for
rtr.-.onltory inai cations ■ 'v'
• ^lons which' ml fijht be f .. I'Vjicr., .
79716 O— 46 — pt. 14 11
1060 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
~5— #1814, i'^ovE;;r.c cr 1'', '1 ■- ♦ n, ,■ fror. Tckvc
field of - • Men is
:'orE, c\d\'i2Z th:^t our T/:y/zrn-
from ■'■ "" cQUti -s
'."Die to glvt
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1061
EXHIBIT NO. 16
Secret War and Navy Department,
Serial 0130012 Washington, November 5, 1941.
Memorandum for the President:
Subject : Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation.
The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have reexamined the
military situation in the Far East, particularly in the light of messages recently
received from the American Ambassador to Chungking, the Magruder Mission, and
the United States Naval Attache. These despatches have indicated it to be Chiang
Kai-Shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming is imminent, and that
military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States
and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The Secretary
of State has requested advice as to the attitude which this Government should
take toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road.
There is iittle doubt that a successful Japanese offensive against the Burma
Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese Central Government. The
result might even be the collapse of further effective military resistance by that
Grovernment, and thus the liquidation by Japan of the "China incident". If
use of the Burma Road is lost, United States and British Commonwealth aid to
China will be seriously curtailed for some months. If resistance by the Chinese
Central Government ceases, the need for Japanese troops in China will be
reduced. These troops can then be employed elsewhere, after the lapse of time
suflScient to permit their withdrawal.
Concentration of Japanese troops for the contemplated oflCensive, based in
northern Indo-China, cannot be completed in less than about two months, although
initial offensive operations might be undertaken before that time. The advance
toward Kunming over nearly three hundred miles of rough country, with poor
communications, will be extremely diflBcult. The maintenance of supply lines will
not be-easy. The Chinese, on favorable defense terrain, would have a good chance
of defeating this offensive by the use of ground troops alone, provide^ those troops
are adequate in quality and numbers.
The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have
taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in
undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to pre-
vent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations,
however well-disguised, would lead to war.
At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the
Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the
Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by
withdrawing all ^ naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to local
defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tre-
mendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now
considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of naval and
merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to" lose the Battle of the
Atlantic in the near future.
The only existing ^ plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct
defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the
Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now
being reinforced. The present combined naval, air, and ground forces will make
attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of December,
1941, United States air and submarine sti'ength in the Philippines will have become
a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The U. S. Army
air forces in the Philippines will have reached the projected strength by February
or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased to a point
where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the
areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional British naval
and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The general defensive
strength of the entire southern area against possible Japanese operations will
then have reached impressive proportions.
Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended to Chiang-
Kai-Shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These
measures ai'e : continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying increas-
1 Preceded by handwritten Insertion "practically".
*Two preceding words struck out, and handwritten word "current" sabatituted.
1062 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ing amounts of munitions under the L^nd-Lease, and continuation and acceleration
of aid to the American Volunteer Group.
The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the
following conclusions :
(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-
British Stalf conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two
nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain
undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited
offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would
greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most
dangerous enemy.
(b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building
up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly
threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great im-
portance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or
more of the following contingencies :
(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or
mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the
Netherlands East Indies ;
(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100°
East or South of 10° North ; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the
Loyalty Islands.
(c) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines
of existing war plans ; i. e., military operations should be primarily defensive,
with the object of liolding territory, and weakening Japan's economic position.
(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into
Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not
justify intervention by the United States against Japan.
(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to
the Chinese Central Government.
(f ) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated
action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in
common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and tlie Netherlands
East Indies.
The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the
United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.
Specifically, they recommend :
That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against
Japan in China be disapproved.
That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia,
Great Britain, and our own forces.
That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to
the maximum practicable extent.
That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.
Chief of Staff. Chief of Naval Operations.
The Joint Boaed
washington
Secret
Minutes of Meeting, Novembeb 3, 1941
At the call of the Senior Member, the weekly naeeting scheduled for November
5, 1941, was held today in Room 2003, Munitions Building. The meeting was
called to order at 3 : 40 p. m.
Present: Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations, Presiding;
General G. C. Marshall, U. S. A., Chief of Staff ; Rear Admiral R. E. Ingersoll,
U. S. N., Assistant Chief of Naval Operations ; Major General William Bryden,
U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff; Major General H. H. Arnold, U. S. A., Deputy
Ch'ef of Staff for Air; Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, U. S. N., Chief of the Bureau
of Aeronautics ; Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, U. S. A., Acting Assistant Chief
of Staff, War Plans Division ; Captain O. M. Read, U. S. N., War Plans Division,
Office of Naval Ojierations, in absence of Rear Admiral R. K. Turner ; and Colonel
W. P. Scobey, U. S. A., Secretary.
EXHIBITS OP JOINT COMMITTEE 1063
Additional Officers Present: Major General R. C. Moore, U. S. A., Deputy Chief
of StafiE; Colonel C. W. Bundy, U. S. A., War Plans Division, War Department
General Staff; Captain R. E. gjhuirmann, U. S. N., Office of Naval Operations;
Commander F. P. Sherman, U. S. N., Office of Naval Operations ; and Lieutenant
Commander A. H. McCoUum, U. S. N., Office of Naval Intelligence.
The Presiding Officer directed the minutes of the meeting of October 22, would
stand approved unless there were objections. The minutes were approved.
The Secretary then announced the agenda for the meeting as follows :
Serial 693 — Delivery of Aircraft to Great Britain.
Serial 732 — Revision of Paragraph 109, "Joint Action of the Army and the
Navy." Communications between Ship and Shore.
Serial 665-11 — Allocation of Mechanical Time Fuze M43A2 to the Army and
the Navy.
Serial 725 — Coordination of Local Defense Measures in Bermuda and the
West Indian Islands where United Sates Ba.ses are being Established. — Re-
vision requested by the British.
Discussion — Action of the United States in the Far East in support of China.
Discussion — Alternate Route via Canton Island for movement of airplanes to
the Far East.
Action taken on the several subjects was as follows :
Serial 693— Delivery of Aircraft to Great Britain. Following a discussion of
this subject, during which General Arnold stated that the development of air-
plane ferrying facilities to the British Isles was provided for in Serials 683-1 and
723. the Board approved the Joint Planning Committee report of October 23,
1941, and directed that the subject be stricken from the calendar.
Serial 732 — Revision of Paragraph 109, "Joint Action of the Army and the
Navy. The Joint Planning Committee report was approved.
Serial 665-11 — Allocation of Mpchanical Time Fuze M43A2 to the Army and
the Navy. The Joint Planning Committee report recommendation of October
30, 1941, was accepted and the Committee of Experts' report was approved.
Serial 72.5 — Coordination of Local Defense Measures in Bermuda and the
West Indian Islands where United States Bases are being established. The
Secretary announced that the Joint Planning Connnittee report before the
Board, recommended certain revisions in the United States — United Kingdom
initial agreement, which was approved by The Joint Board on September 19,
1941; and that the revisions now requested by the British had been accepted by
the United States representatives. Following a properly seconded motion, the
Board voted to approve the Joint Planning Committee report of O^'tober 29. 1941.
Action of the United States in the Far East in Support of China — At the
request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action
taken at the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, November 1, at
which a discussion was held on the Far Eastern situation. Captain Schuirmann
states that the meeting was occasioned by messages from Chiang Kai-Shek and
General Magruder, urging the United States to warn Japan against making an
attack on China through Yunnan and suggesting that the United States urge
Great Britain to support more fully opposition to Japan. He pointed out that
on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with
Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would
be neressary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese
aggression. He further stated that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was
no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up, and
he desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support
further warnings by the State Department. A second meeting was held at the
State Department on Sunday, November 2, at which time it was proposed that
the British should send some planes to Thailand and that Japan should be warned
against movement into Siberia.
Following Captain Schuirmann's presentation. Admiral Stark read a Navy
Department estimate of the recent dispatches received from Chungking. Admiral
Ingersoll, gave his personal review of the situation. A summary of this revie'w
was that :
. a. The decision on the Far Eastern situation, made several months ago, is to
make the major effort in the Atlantic, and if forced to fight in the Pacific, to
engage in a limited offensive effort. This policy was stated in the U.S. -British
Staff Conversations Report ABC-1.
6. A major war effort in the Pacific would require an enormous amount of
shipping, which would have to come from the Atlantic and other essential areas.
1064 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
c. A U. S. war in the Pacific would materially afiEect United States aid to
England.
d. The requirements in tankers alone for support of a Pacific war would
create a serious oil shortage in this country, and the United States flset cannot
be supported in the Pacific without auxiliary shipping and adequate supplies.
e. The shortest line of communication is flanked by Mandated Islanus, and is
vulnerable to Japanese attack. Two other routes are available for communica-
tions to the Far Eastern Theater : one via Australia ; the other via Cape of
Good Hope.
f. Assuming that the fleet could be moved to the Far East, no repair facilities
are available at either Manila or Singapore; while there are docks, nevertheless
the necessary machinery and facilities for making repairs are not present.
g. Manila is not as yet a secure base for the Fleet due to the lack of adequate
antiaircraft protection for the anchorage.
This review pointed out that Japan is capable of launching an attack in five
directions; viz., against Russia, the Philippines, into Yunnan, Thailand and
against Malaya. Considering that Japan might initiate one or more of these
five operations. United States' action should be: In case of Japanese atttack
against either the Philippines or British and Dutch positions the United States
should resist the attack. In case of Japanese attack against Siberia, Thailand
or China through Yunnan the United States should not declare war. The study
concludes that the United States should defer offensive action in the Far East
until the augmentation of United States military strength in the Philippines,
particularly as to the increase in submarines and army forces, becomes available.
Discussing the situation Admiral Ingersoll pointed out that the fleet strength
at the present time is seriously handicapped by the absence of certain naval units
of major category which are in the repair yards, and it was felt that the present
moment was not the opportune time to get brash. Explaining further the State
Department conferences. Captain Schuirmann stated that the State Department
did not feel that it was necessary for the United States to take immediate action,
even if stern warnings should be issued. In this connection, he read Mr. Horn-
beck's statement. Admiral Ingersoll felt that the State Department was under
the impression that Japan could be defeated in military action in a few weeks.
General Marshall felt that the main involvement in the Far East would be
Naval and that under this assumption, due consideration should be given to the
fact that the Navy was now fighting a battle in the Atlantic. It was his informa-
tion that the Japanese authorities had not as yet determined the action to be taken
under the present situation. The information which he had received indicated
that the Jaj-anese authorities might be expected to decide upon the national- policy
by November 5. He then read General Gerow's analysis of the strength of the
United States forces in the Far East and emphasized the danger of moving Army
AJr Forces away from their present station in the Philippines. It was his belief
that as long as the augmented Army Air Force remained in the Philippines, Japa-
nese action against the Philippines or towards the south would be a very hazard-
ous operation. It was his belief that by the middle of December, the Army Forces
in the Philippines would be of impressive strength, and this in itself would have a
deterrent effect on Japanese operations.
Admiral Ingersoll gave a summary of naval reinforcements scheduled for
the Philippines. A stated number of submarine units en route to tbe Philippines
were now in Guam. Other submarines scheduled for transfer to the Philippines
were about to leave Hawaii. With reference to Japanese decision on National
policy he felt that United States forces and shipping now being moved to the
Philippines might be in danger If a decision adverse to United States interest
should be made on November ftth. General Marshall emphasized the point that
Japan could hardly take the risk of military operations with a powerful air and
submarine force directly on the flank of their supply lines, and that when
United States power Is sufficiently developed In the Philippines, we would then
have something to back up our statements. Until powerful United States forces
had been built up In the Far East, it would take some very clever diplomacy
to save the situation. It appeared that the basis of U. S. policy should be to make
certain minor concessions which the Japanese could use In saving face. These
concessions might be a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar trade
restrictions.
Following these discussions the Board adopted the following proposal sub-
mitted by Admiral Ingersoll and amended by suggestions made by Admiral Stark
and General Marshall :
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1065
War Plans Division of the War and Navy Departments would prepare a mem-
orandum for the President, as a reply to the State Department's proposed policy
in the Far Eastern situation. The memorandum would take the following lines :
Oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan.
Oppose U. S. military action against Japan should she move into Yunnan.
Oppose the movement and employment of U. S. military forces in support of
Chiang Kai-Shek.
Advocate State Department action to put off hostilities with Japan as long
as possible.
Suggest agreements with Japan to tide the situation over for the next several
months.
Point out the effect and cost a U. S.-Japanese war in the Far East would have
on defense aid to Great Britain and other nations being aided by the U. S.
Emphasize the existing limitations on shipping and the inability of the U. S.
to engage in a Far Eastern offensive operation without the transfer of the major
portion of shipping facilities from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
On the question of gas and oil for the Philippines' Army Air Forces, General
Arnold explained that the military authorities were building up reserves and
were investigating reports that the Dutch East Indies were capable of supplying
all United States and British requirements.
At this point. General Marshall presented a list of items of equipment con-
sidered necessary by the China Mission to enable China to maintain her war
effort. He pointed out that the War Department was beset with many trials
and difficulties in the allocation of Lend-Lease items as related to Great Britain,
Russia, Dutch East Indies, China and other countries. In the case of Russia,
a large amount of equipment allocated to that country would have to go via
Archangel, Vladivostok or Basra. The shortage of shipping, the long lines of
communications, and the difficult transport situation ^rom the ports of debarka-
tion might cause an inability to make prompt delivery of all equipment to its
final destination. Under some conditions, this would mean piling up unused
equipnaent at various localities, while at the same time other localities would
suffer from shortage of equipment. The matter resolves itself into a question
as to whom Lend-Lease material should be released. It was General Marshall's
opinion that control of Lend-Lease distribution, and diversions incident thereto,
is a strategic decision which should be made by The Joint Board. Since the
matter of ocean tonnage is a critical feature in the delivery of Lend-Lease items
and is related to the strategic situation. General Marshall felt that Admiral Land
of the Maritime Commission should be called in to sit with The Joint Board in
deciding matters of this nature. The Board agreed that Admiral L''-nd should
be asked to detail a member of his department to work with the Joint Planning
Committee on reports involving the disposition of Lend-Lease materials. Navy
members agreed to take the necessary steps to inform Admiral Land of this
request.
Referring to the merchant shipping situation, Admiral Stark felt that merchant
tonnage is so short and prospective requirements are so great that an effort should
be made to get the 1942 merchant vessel construction program moved up to an
A-l-a priority.
At the direction of Admiral Stark, Commander Sherman then read a report
from War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations, to the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions concerning the movement of airplanes to the Middle East for ultimate
delivery to Russia. This report recommended that the Normandie be acquired to
meet future requirements for transporting aircraft; that three additional sea
trains also be acquired and placed in service without conversion ; and that de-
livery of aircraft to the Middle East be effected by the use of these three sea
trains plus the two sea trains U. S. S Kitty Hawk and U. S. S. Hammondsport,
already acquired and converted for Navy use. Copy of this report was furnished
to the Deputy Chirf of Staff for Air.
Alternate route via Canton Island for movement of airplanes. — Following a
discussion of this subject the Board instructed that the following directive be
given to the Joint Planning Committee :
It is directed that the Joint Planning Committee submit a report as to the action
to be taken to complete the establishment of an additional landplane route be-
tween Hawaii and Australia, less vulnerable to hostile interference than is the
existing route via Wake Island, and as to the defenses of additional airdromes
and landing fields acquired.
W. P. SCOBET,
Colonel, G. 8. C,
Secretary.
1066 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
November 3, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff :
Subject: Far Eastern Situation.
I. Discussion.
1. A conference was held at the State Department during the morning of
November 1, 1941. Present were Secretary Hull, Under Secretary Welles, Mr.
Hornbeck, other lesser State Department officials and Captain Schuirmann,
U. S. N. The subject of discussion was the action which should be taken on the
Magruder radiogram of October 28, 1941. Question arose as to the strength of
U. S. forces in the Far East as affecting diplomatic pressure on Japan. Measures
were discussed, such as sending U. S. Army Air Forces to China, which might
lead to immediate involvement in war with Japan. Apparently, the statement of
Chiang Kai-Shek, that an immediate Japanese attack on Kunming threatened and
that this could be defeated only by the intervention of air forces, was accepted.
2. fl. The War Department G-2 estimate (Tab A) does not support Chiang
Kai-Shek's conclusions as to immediate initiation of a Japanese move toward
Kunming. G-2 believes that : the movement if contemplated will not be initiated
in less than two months ;the movement will be vei'y difficult over nearly 300 miles
of roadless, broken country ; the Chinese, in favorable defense terrain, can defeat
this offensive by proper concentration and use of ground troops alone.
&. Gr-2 (Col. Bratton) agrees with the Magruder statement that with the
fall of Kunming, Chinese resistance to Japan would be very seriously affected.
c. The G-2 estimate also covers the broader viewpoint of expected Japanese
action.
3. An air estimate of the Far Eastern situation (Tab B) brings out the follow-
ing : the most effective air aid to China can be given by units based in the
Philippines ; there are at present, many shortages in ammunition and gasoline
supply which will militate against a sustained effort ; logical difficulties, aside
from general policy, make it undesirable to undertake operations of United States
Army Air Force units in China.
4. The status of the Lend-Lease program for China is shown in Tab C.
5. The status of ground troops and defense reserves in the Philippine Depart-
ment is shown in Tab D. The garrison has not reached the effective strength
desired by General MacArthur. Deficiencies are being overcome by the dispatch
of personnel and supplies from the United States and by accelerating the train-
ing and equipping of the Philippine Army. The present combined air and
ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. The
dispatch of any considerable portion of the air garrison to China would leave
Luzon open to serious risk of capture.
6. Informal contact with officers of the local British Staff Mission indicate
that the British have incomplete air forces for the defense of Singapore, would
refuse to allow units of the Royal Air Force to snpiwrt Chinese troops in
Yunnan, and are of the firm opinion that the British Chiefs of Staff would
strongly disapprove any action in China which might bring on war with Japan.
7. War Plans Division is strongly of the opinion that :
a. The policies derived in the American-British Staff conversations remain
sound, viz :
(1) The primary objective is the defeat of Germany.
(2) The principal objective in the Far East is to keep Japan out of the war.
(3) Military counter-action against Japan should be considered only in case
of any of the following actions by Japan :
(a) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the Territory or
Mandated Territory of any of the Associated Powers. It is not possible to de-
fine accurately what would constitute "a direct act of war." It is possible for a
minor incident to occur which, although technically an act of war, could be
resolved by diplomatic action. It is recognized that the decision as to whether
such an incident is an act of war must lie with the Government concerned.
(b) The movement of the Japanese forces into any part of T^hailand to the
west of 100° East or to the soutij of 10° North.
(c) The movement of a large number of Japanese warships, or of a convoy
of merchant ships escorted by Japanese warships, which from its position and
course was clearly directed upon the Philippine Islands, the East coast of the
Isthmus of Kra or the East coast of Malaya, or had crossed the parallel of 6°
North between Malaya and the Philippines, a line from the Gulf of Davao to
Waigeo Island, or the Equator east of Waigeo.
(d) The movement of Japanese forces into Portuguese Timor.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1067
(e) The movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or the Loyalty
Islands.
b. Germany must be defeated. If Japan be defeated and Gerpiany remain
undefeated, decision is not reached. The means to defeat Japan (Army. Navy,
and tonnage), must be withdrawn in quantity from the effort against Germany.
To defeat Germany will require the utmost total effort.
c. It is desirable that large Japanese forces be kept involved in China. How-
ever, from the larger viewpoint, prospective Chinese defeat would not warrant
involvement of the United States, at this time, in war with Japan.
d. Political and economic measures should be used wherever effective to deter
Japanese action.
e. Most effective aid to China, as well as to the defense in Singapore and
the Netherlands East Indies, is now being built up by the reinforcement of the
Philippines. The safety of Luzon as an air and submarine base should soon
be reasonably assured»by the arrival of air and ground reinforcements. Strong
diplomatic and economic pressure may be exerted from the military viewpoint
at the earliest about the middle of December, 1941, when the Philippine Air
Force will have become a positive threat to Japanese operations. It would be
advantageous, if practicable, to delay severe diplomatic and economic pressure
until February or March, 1942, when the Philippine Air Force will have reached
its projected strength, and a safe air route, through Samoa, will be in operation.
/. Material aid to China should be accelerated consonant with the studied
needs of Russia and Great Britain .
ff. Aid to the Volunteer Air Force in China should be continued and accelerated
as far as practicable.
II. Recommendations.
Substitution of the words "War Department" for "War Plans Division" in
paragraph 7 above and approval of that paragraph as a statement of the War
Department's position on the Far East situation at this time.
L. T. Gebow,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.
6 Incls.*
#1— Tab A— G-2 Estimate
#2— Tab B— Air Estimate
#3 — Tab C — Lend-Lease Program for China.
#4— Tab D— Ground Troops & Def. Res. Phil. Dept.
#5— Tab E — Ground Reinforcement, I'liil. Dept.
#6— Tab F— Rad, fr. Gen. Magruder (10-28-41)
•Tab A is included in Exhibit No. 33 ; other tabs not included.
1068 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1069
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
r
I
1070 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
'^
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
v----iIJiit
November 10, 1941.
Kg.HCRAM)UH FCR iH£ PRESIDSNT
i- consideration a draft
•'lleeimo Chiang Kai-ahak
■ of Novi»taV:'«r 2 vhtch wiaa
N-^vf ..ber •). by the Chinese Amb««««aor. If
oval, it Is Buggeated
- :'"f to call and
■-.dor vitn :;he
!* *- r to CrenerRllsfllaio Chiang
m«98»^e .
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1071
1072 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I h*if« for •oM Akj^» 1ia4 bsfsr* m fms' »»»«*,,
SovMilwr S w&isJi wms &«llT»r»« %o »• tnrouffe year ite*«*
»• ^T« tiM for ««»• tl«» 'r«ry s»»h la alsd %*.» ■
•SftlASt Iti«Bt8« froa XrAo«1»1iui to lAiielt yeti eall ifp#igia.i
<Uwr t« fir* j»»#rti»« Kaa a)>g«»% «©a«i«w«6itMi %p $3.1 *»'
mm WeMP ««u' Mi»«la«i«a tiiat, ««£!« it «9«1A tMr a
• Itmk Muipy^n mrnlMt S«M«&i« b»& a«Tiia««« %» ft {nkI^*
muL^ wiit< i»fti«*t« ys>efeaM« H8^^.u*» s,wrt»»a«« «f m
as;
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1073
*^ -ii*^ ^-1 J»anaa, *a ir.v««tcn of that prmXae*
P^^P'' '^ • :t«r«iir« ?jp«r»t'i.on«. At tb« C4Ui« tls«
*• '■■ *•• '»«t It la laiportuit that yo«y far«««
^ " ar««, eq«lp|M»<! nM <li«j>o««d is all
br&«<*-'«. ai»a»p •Klatinf •ir«us«tui«««, tadtlnt Into
«»R8'!3 «))• world attit&tleci is itt pelltlMa,
*i'^i^ -coBonle «kat«»1sa, wa f««l xh«t th« ae«t
•ffa«s. ■ 'ributloe ifJaleh we e«fi auk* m% tM» ••Mat
la «l»:i« a.» llwa ©f apcNlinx up tit* flew to taiiu of
•ur l,«R<^--,«iiaa nuitarUla cad fasllitatlnf th» bwllitjig
•f) «f %h^ Amrima ▼«l\«ta«r adir fvrM, ts«th is paraoa-
■•I «»£ la ttwipwmt. !• atr* ««¥J«««i»A at praa«a«, »•
rem Icadv, f aawaada flran aftajr tuart*r« moA in aaAj^
«««n«e«l«.a». *• art (Wndlag aMilwrt*!* '■«« •»ljr t9
dttiiai aaa firM« Brltato, U«t to tJ» lHit«A, tl^a i®»l«t
6)a«« HMi MHM twmtr •tter aviMtrlas that «>• •alllRg
wPCMttr for Mpipmnit fer Mlf^Asfviim. Zk •ASitten,
•»r ^r«fPM r»r evor «m. t«f»sa«, •^^••iailjr tin a«*4«
•qp&IMmt 1» i«pv« iwMiit aM wltk trtttt iMPea»tMM.
t«v«rtiMl»sa. I «h*tl 4
IMNULtiiM Of ia«NMk«ll«
tttlKMt tWHMTd MMVVlat tX.
stfl ef aatarial f«r yosr «••.
1074 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
m
ef 0rf»rt* m tis»
Sir* *»• f
fer^'"»
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1075
f»#3 — *mfi
79716 O — 46 — pt. 14 — —12
1076 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1077
EXHIBIT NO. 16A
THt WHITC HOUSE
A_
1078 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WAS H I NGTO N
October 30, 1941
My dear ^ir. President:
The enclosed >aesr>ag;e from Ganeral
Chiang Kai-Shek has just been handed to
me at 11:15 o'clock this morninr by i.'r.
T. V. Soong.
Yours sincerel;;',
y
yjy
The President,
The Vvhite House.
^ ^ RBSOEIVED, ^ \
MAR 1 5 1944
^\-6.
^'^,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1079
CXTOBEr. SO.
DEFINITE iiiy .T::jri.::: ?i;^:;;}.L ;.:}. .'apa:^'.?. jesi ;.. ,; ,
YUNNA:^ in NO'Tl-frER (STOP) TrlS V.C)\1. IIAY POSSIBLY BE
AVERTED IF ^:F:FICA i'AKLS IM;.5,DIA'!T: ACTION hY INFOR}<INa
";.?AN THAT AT':'ACK Y^'NNAN "hFDT'-'; I'JDO-CHINA W{.)rLD PE
VIE-.-.T.D =^' ^\:^:-.IOA A3 DEFINITE STF.? IN 30ITn\VAF.I) KXPAhSIO.N
a::I) t-at America ta-^nc" f-r'Ai:; indiffeket^ (stop)
SIMULTAM013LY :.'ILITAPy PPJlFAr^TIOXS S'-^OULD BE ^'APE TO
.V.-.ET n-:i3 E\i:;*T"ALITV (STOI') I WS'^ E\THASinE THE
CRITICAL :;ATmRE of THE n'NNAN SITUATION SINCE IF Ynr;AN
IS L03T AND UST LIFE LINE FO-l WiTEKIAL:^ YKOV '"IW. <iUToII)E
7<0hLD SEVERED THE CHIIIE^IE PEOPLE AM Ai-}.T MATEhlALLY
AND MORALLY "^OULI- RE 'IjaHIJ TO Oj-i-Kk FURTHKR AKiED
hEoI3TA;.CE (G'^OP) I AM CONFIDE!^ WITH FORCES IN Yl^iriAI^
Aril' AVAILA^Lh NEARPY CHI-n-SE A^Lh TO HOLL^ "^hKIR (Wi WZ
rliHTlH'; IF REI')FORCED AIRWARD (STOP) COLOIiKL Cm^hUl''
■'".-S o'iLY 4? PIT,0"-S Go.NSEQlT.IJTLY STRoN'; AIR HEirFOr.CE??E:r
^ :iE;.TL.L (JTGP) urge AilRICA 1"SE STROfi^ PRESSURE ON
--.ITAli. TO .;E..D 3I.*"AR0!J- AIR FORCE TO O^^PEFA'^E VrlTH
COLONEL CIIIRNA^T.*^ IN ORDER SAVE DEMOCRATIC POSITION; IW
FAR EAST (STjP) Pkl'^AlN rJID Ai-T' I''A EOT AII.V CONCET'IEI)
1080 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
- 2
TO PREVENT LOSS OF Y^I.xiiAN A3 C'lril'SE }«ECAc3E IF JAFA:ii::>E
OCCUPY YUNIUN TKEIR I.-EXT STOP V/OrLD i:,"-.:r,T ;.^^ACK ON
BRITISH FAR EAST COLONIAL PO.iSKSSL'-, ; a:.1 PKKCiriTATE
WAR IN THE PACIFIC (STOP) IF nri-tEDIATE nCTION T'AJSN ^Y
BRITAIN IN SE-TjIN(1 AIK REIliHsRCKTlEHT '^?:E:-;E FOJSEnsiONS
WOULD BE SAVED AT A FRAC^I;);, OF ^-i;" COST THAT TKEIR
DEFENCE WOULD INVOL\-E LATK:- ' ' PACIFIC PKO-IFM '.VmULD
THUS BE SOLVED (STOP) JAPANESE ■./ILL C ACF/.TRATE LAHOEST
AIR FORCE IN INI)0-CHI!.'A AND IF DESTRO^'ED COirt^InED AIR
FORCES THREAT TO FAR EAST FIia.LLY Ii:;.'OVED.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
EXHIBIT NO. 16B
Telegram Sent
1081
X (ONf lOf NTiAL COOK
NONCON' lOCNTiAL COUt
Brpartutriit of -^tatr
H u}hington,
N- ■.■•..: -: 7, i;-)-u.
'oC"
iKiSi-:;?:^^ FKc.-:
-M' •-
Af,.
1082 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TO M TKANWIirTCO
TELEGRAM SENT co«..oc«T.-a coo,
(Full rite
C«ll*et lOtf fetttt
NOMCOHFIOCNTIAL COOC
^, „ . . department of ^tate
0»r iKttfr _P_ tVasklnflcn,
NIfilit IfHor
Chirftr to
* talcing, tngeth<*r vith continuing efforts to ntrengthen our
defenaea In the PhlllD-^ln** Islnnda, -eralleled by alnllar
ef forte by you In the Slng^nore ares, vill tend to increase
Jaonn'a healtptlon, whereas In Jnppn'n r)r(?<!ent rr.ood new
formalized verbnl wftrnlnr t remonstrances ml^ht -hpve , vl th
''t leant even ch«>rce, pn '^.o-^-^pS ' " eifect.
T.hrn wh.>le orobl-n- v^ i 1 Jirve our cortlnulnr nnd
errnegt a tt<T.*.l ",1 , Rr;Jy nr.c offoi-t.
1 shall orobftly not I'Lent not .i.n'f- e/-,re. -■ jeoly
'■o Cnlm^' K»l-^(,'-/. l-fnv Hi" fl'«t. of next \.»»:<. Fierce
^^^o», ,, . . V, . ^ ,.,„ p.,.- r> ;>..(,^ ,1" y-,_i^ rlose -mc'rl r'.rcle
fLAil
/.?'
Untl/thneJ iij
Sent iy ofKralni
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1083
EXHIBIT NO. 17
November 27, 1941.
MEMQRANDtrM FOB THE PBIESIDENT
Subject : Far Eastern Situation.
If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack: the
Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines;
the Russian Maritime Provinces.
There is little probability of an immediate Japanese attack on the Maritime
Provinces because of the strength of the Russian forces. Recent Japanese troop
movements all seem to have been southward.
The magnitude of the effort required will militate against direct attack against
Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies until the threat exercised by United
States forces in Luzon is removed.
Attack on the Burma Road or Thailand offers Japanese objectives involving
less risk of major conflict than the others named, and clearly within the means
available, if unopposed by major powers. Attack on the Burma Road would,
however, be difficult and might fail. If successful, the Chinese Nationalist Gov-
ernment might collapse. Occupation of Thailand gains a limited strategic advan-
tage as a preliminary to operations against Malaya or the Netherlands East
Indies, might relieve internal iwitical pressure, and to a lesser extent, external
economic pressure. Whether the offensive will be made against the Burma Road,
Thailand, or the Philippines can not now be forecast.
The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to gain
time. Considerable Navy and Array reinforcements have been rushed to the
Philippines but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. The process of
reinforcement is being continued. Of great and immediate concern is the safety
of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine Corps' convoy jiist leaving
Shanghai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000 are due to sail from the United
States by December 8, 1941, and it is important that this troop reinforcement
reach the Philippines before hostilities commence. Precipitance of military
action on our part should be avoided so long as consistent with national policy.
The longer the delay, the more positive becomes the assurance of retention of
these Islands as a naval and air base. Japanese action to the south of Formosa
will be hindered and perhaps seriously blocked as long as we hold the Philippine
Islands. War with Japan certainly will interrupt our transport of supplies to
Siberia, and probably will interrupt the process of aiding China.
After consultation with each other. United States, British, and Dutch military
authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against
Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens
the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Common-
wealth, or the Netherlands East Indie, or should the Japanese move forces
into Thailand west of 100° East or south of 10° North, Portuguese Timor, New
Calenodia, or the Loyalty Islands.
Japanese involvement in Yunnan or Thailand up to a certain extent is ad-
vantageous, since it leads to further dispersion, longer lines of communication,
and an additional burden on communications. However, a Japanese advance
to the west of 100° East or south of 10° North, immediately becomes a threat to
Burma and Singapore. Until it is patent that Japan intends to advance beyond
these lines, no action which might lead to immediate hostilities should be taken.
It is recommended that :
prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military, counter-
action be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States,
British, or Dutch territory as above outlined ;
in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United
States, the British, and the Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines
indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition
be undertaken ;
steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch
for the is.suance of such warning.
/S/ G. C. Marshall /S/ H. R. Stabk
25-66654-200
1084 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 18
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Draft Suggestions (Nov. 11, 1941) to the Secretary of State prepared by Far Eastern
Division concerning proposed "Modus Vivendi." No action was taken on these
suggestions.
2. Memorandum dated Nov. 19, 1941 from Mr. Hamilton to the Secretary of State con-
cerning an attached revision of a proposal by Secretary Morgenthau for an agree-
ment between the United States and Japan.
3. Memorandum dated Nov. 24, 1941 by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow for the Chief of Staff
concerning the "Far Eastern Situation."
4. Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1941 by Admiral H. R. Stark for the Secretary of the
Navy concerning "Outline of Iroposed Basis for Agreement Between the United
States and Japan, of Nov. 19, 1941 (See Item No. 2, supra).
5. Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1941 by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow for the Secretary of
State concerning the "Par Eastern Situation."
6. Pencilled memorandum given by the President to the Secretary of State (Not dated
but probably written shortly after Nov. 20, 1941).
7. Tentative draft (not used) dated Nov. 22, 1941 of a proposed oral statement and
Modus Vivendi to be handed Japanese Ambassadors.
8. Tentative draft dated Nov. 22, 1941 of an "Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement
Between the United States and Japan."
9. Memorandum dated Nov. 22, 1941 of a conversation between Secretary Hull, British
Ambassador, Australian Minister, Netherlands Minister and Chinese Ambassador
concerning "Japanese Prof>osal for a Modus Vivendi and suggested reply."
10. Tentative draft (not used) dated Nov. 24, 1941 of a proposed Modus Vivendi.
11. Tentative draft dated November 24, 1941 of an "Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement
Between the United States and Japan."
12. Memorandum dated Nov. 24, 1941 by Secretary Hull for the President with an at-
tached draft of message from the President to the British Prime Minister describing
the Japanese proposal for a Modus Vivendi and a suggested alternate Modus Vivendi,
and closing sentences added by the President.
13. Memorandum dated Nov. 24, 1941 of a conversation between Secretary Hull, British
Ambassador, Chinese Ambassador, Australian Minister and Netherlands Minister,
concerning "Proposed Modus Vivendi for Submission to Japanese Ambassador."
14. Tentative draft (not used) dated Nov. 25, 1941 of a proposed Modus Vivendi to be
submitted to the Japanese Ambassador, and attached "Outline of Proposed Basis
for Agreement Between the United States and Japan."
15. Message dated Nov. 25, 1941 from Owen Lattimore, Chungking, to Lauchlin Currie.
16. Copy of Message from General Chiang Kai-Shek transmitted to Secretary Stimson by
Mr. T. V. Soong, under cover of a letter dated Nov. 25, 1941.
17. Memorandum dated Nov. 25, 1941 of conversation between Secretary Hull and British
Ambassador concerning "Suggested Changes in Modus Vivendi," and an attached
memorandum from the Ambassador commenting on the Japanese proposal (of Nov.
20,1941).
18. Memorandum dated Nov. 25, 1941 of conversation between Secretary Hull and the
Chinese Ambassador concerning the "Opposition of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek to
Modus Vivendi." with attached copy of telegram dated Nov. 24, 1941 from Minister
Quo Tai-Chi, Chungking, to Ambassador Hu Shih.
19. Memorandum dated Nov. 25. 1941 of conversations between the Chinese Ambassador
and the Netherlands Minister, and Stanley K. Hornbeck.
20. Memorandum for the President dated Nov. 26, 1941 from the Secretary of State sug-
gesting withholding Modus Vivendi, and proposes handing Japanese Ambassador "a
copy of the comprehensive basic proposal for a general peaceful settlement."
21. Memorandum from the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, handed to Secretary
Hull on Nov. 27, 1941.
22. Memorandum of Conversation dated Nov. 27, 1941 between the British Ambassador
and Sumner Welles concerning "Japanese-American Relations."
23. Memorandum of Conversation dated Nov. 27, 1941 between Secretary Hull and the
Australian Minister concerning "Proposed Modus Vivendi."
24. Message dated Nov. 27, 1941 from Secretary of State to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo.
25. Memorandum of Conversation dated Nov. 28, 1941 between British Minister and Stanlev
K. Hornbeck.
26. Message dated Nov. 28, 1941 from Secretary of State to United States Ambassador,
Chungking, China.
27. Memorandum of Conversation dated Nov. 29, 1941 between Secretary Hull and BritlBta
Ambassador concerning "United States-Japanese Conversations."
28. Memorandum handed to Secretary Hull by the Chinese Ambassador on Dec. 2, 1941.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1085
DRAFT SUGGESTIONS (NOVEIiBER 11, 1941) TO THE
SECRET/ HY •• STAT-. !!0 ACTION WAS TAKSi; OIJ THESE
SluuiCSTLiIlS. iX-.lAHED III FS.
a
S L@ '^
1086 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
If, aB Beans aliBost oertals, th«re 1a.jqo poBeiblllty
, at tha present time of reaohlog with Japan a oomprelienslTe
settlement covering the entire Paoifio area. It is highly
probable that after a certain point further efforts to
ireoonoile differences on the essentials of such a oompre-
hensive settlement will lead only to a rupture of the
oonrersationa followed by a further and perhaps sudden M
deterioration of relations. Such a prospect prompts the
question lihether it might not be possible to propose some
tentative or transitional arrangement the very disoussion
of whioh might serve not only to oontinue the oonversatioaa
pvaAlag the advent of a awre favorable situation, even If the
]^:«poMl is not aventaaHy agreed to« but also to provide
the entering wedge toward a coaprehenelve settl«MRt of
laie nature soac^t providisg t^e proposal is aoeepted by
Japan and provided farther that Qhina is able to obtain
satisfftotory terms from JepaA.
With ti»ee thoo^te la Mad* thero is saggeated for
eoaaldoratlos a proposal along th9 lloea of the attaohed
draft.
Xt la probable thai tb» Jlapaaeae will not agree to
the attaohed proposal ae it staada wltboat ooaciderable
medlfloatlon, au& It i» even more probable that aegotlatioiM
betw«i«ai Japan aad Shlaa a&der these olroaaatanoea will
oome
i
a
®
St
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1087
-2-
come to nothing. NeTerthelasa, It la hop«d that a pro-
posal along the auggeated linea might offer a baala vhloh
■Ight keep oonveraatlons going for aometliBe longer than
othervlae, and If aocepted by the Japaneae might lead to
an eventual oompreheneiTe aettlement of a nature ooapatlbla
with our principles.
It is suggested that the foregoing proposal wotild
have more chance of reoeiTing oonslderation by the Japa-
nese (and of thus gaining time) if it were presented to
them before feelings had beoome further aroused over
fruitless discussion of natters we assume will not be
agreed upon.
In presenting the proposal to the Japanese wa might
say that we offer it with reluctance as we realize that
it is of a patchwork nature and imperfect, but that we
feel that under the circumstances it is better to have
something on which we can hope to build in the futui^
than to end with no agreement at all, as would aaem to
be otherwise inevitable in view of our present dlvergentag
of views on certain fundamentals.
If the Jepenese should decline to consider such a
proposal we should te no worse off thaji we otherwise
would have been. At the saune time, it is believed that
by presenting a proposal of this sort, we shoiild make
clear
1088 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to obtala oil Ktmmv «h«a ©oatfla^att-- . - , ^ , .
In 3Mt£«ur<t to tfaat point, it M^t b» poiMR£l>l« %« tio3%-
out «a *s>r«sg«iH»xit viiereby w« ootil^ allov tSb^R to hgmi
p9trol9xm in aSKmsts e<|tti.Tsa«nt to amoaj&t» at p»%r?^lmm
prodaota r«l«ased in Supan tor aonaal |^iio«ti«e eocSsia^tlQa.
fhio would safc« possible tfe» noraai faaotloatng 4» iJ«|)aa
of buees; ooiBBeroial tmoks, taxia axA priirat* atttosobllos
as veil as JapaQeso fishing XttaaolMic and «orararol«X boat*
and would aai^xasise to tb« fTiQ>anefle pablio the advaatas**
of conditions of peace.
~»
}
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1089
(DRAFT)
I.
A. The G-overnmente of the United States and of
Japan accept Joint responsibility for the initiation and
conclusion of a mutual unQer8tai:dlng and QeclaraJtlon of
intention and policy for the resumption of traditional
friendly relations.
B. Without reference to specific causes of recent
estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Govern-
ments that the incidents which led to the deterioration
of sunicable sentiment between their countries should be
prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unfore-
seen and unfortunate consequences.
C. It is the eernest hope of both Governments that
by cooperative effort, the United States and Japan may
contribute effectively toward the establishment and
preservation of peace in the Pacific area.
D. Both Governrnents affiriu that their national
policies are directed toward the foundation of a lasting
peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal
confidence and cooperation between the peoples of both
countries.
E. Both Governments further affirm that in their
national policies they will actively support and give
practical appllcetion to the following fundamental prln-"
ciples upon which their relations with each other and with
all
1090 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
llity of territorial
" ' " .1.1 one,
- ty
red by
. re- ,. .. : \. li. order to
-, Irrdnf-te chronic politlcel
i^ilUy :-,crlf con^rre, t>-ey will
:tivel" -;■--:- - ,. fcllov.1.'.
v:lth p.- r
•r natic; :
" ( rinciple of non-cll scrlmlnatlon in inter-
" ' ' ' ^"elations.
K. .: ■ • •rn«tional economic ■; -/
"1 :' extrerre nationalism ;• •
TV. '^ ■- '• •-Motions.
inte;rests
•hrDUf?h
orocesses of
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1091
(In oraftln^.; the acstract princlp.lrp on vrhieh comr.;it-
:?:.ts ai-e to ce pxchanfVfd, pr. effort h^'S been '"-cl6 to enibody
! ^-■les to whlc'.. It i
read' in^- to pgree. y
*re
II.
A. ri.5 init_ '
practical -^'r; -lie- •.! :;,. ;:" tr^' I'ur'i t e.t-:
U;Von, "; : t -ovrr..;.e- ^ ;„•":.
-cf^?ure:r :
l' ? Gover/r.ent -.f t'e Ur.ited Stst-:^? v;l^. -St
to t'.e -jvern'.ents of C'l-..: ;. ., t t '. istely
enter i ,tj oircct "nicr'' - tion for -- • •
'- "" :- t. elr uif'-er'^-::'--? .
\1.': oi"f erl:. - to ':■:■'"" - - . . y .
Js'v :ere i-overn":e:.t * ', ->.-
r' - - t'-" - -'-■^•'leii.e.xt ,. ; ..i . er'':.cF = ,
' to tel ir ^■^trce ter.r
. ^ , - .li a DOSiw^. - - ^' ' ^' ft C:;i!:.-
'- : :-- J-. .-^Ins no Irr.' _ ar^prov
• : ..rse mij; : " ■ : ■ •- -ue
■ r if aid to c i^pF-
rlc- ; ■ : t if t.-.p r
.. er.. o;. ' r"c .1
V ; --.^ joveriir^e .t 0.' - th, -iov-
er:i-e::t of -^.:in - ;. ri'dstice duri ' eriou of p"ic-~l-e
r., -.-otir tlon.
(.5, - - : ■ -", _ ." -- :..• '':.ited ~t^te'^ (.'url;.
79716 O — 46 — pt. 14 13
1092 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-4-
(4)
•*i:".«een China and Japan
' ey ._ce s'".lpnient of
irr cter to China.
u ; 1,, t .e Ci.'urse of
^hina under an '^
.:•*. y reenf orcement of Its
■: Indochina and
■ '. ^ r '■ Ellitpry
co.iCi-.stun
'•re — - .,
r..ent of no
nese ndlit
-Tovlcl
of cert
Ya^.^';tz^'
of cle s *; ,
for tr.e rfsu,-. r-tion of
- - - - - ' " e- e^t ue-
:ent whereby
■; ■ s c ^ 1 e
s froci
?tion of Japanese tn'Tcu- iion
'hin? or Ghlnp Fcut:: f ti;e
• en h. ve cert--^! itles
= oil rtna iron.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1093
In z'r.-^ .'.c jtl'.tiorii for <'•■. im""oul te roEun. tlor: of
lirriif^cV trice in co'nr.o. i t/, " r tlirn wrr sunr,lier-,-
:<e .-.. .ulC .• ve in .T.ind xl'. urpose of settirii^: Jav-
f 'Ct^ries r-nc shiool.-;, ' r .:-_._:-■ ^ to r^roc^uctio;; : - >,_
vices vhicli vould ■ i.'-^ i . -_ . our prescit a*'- ;lci
Chlr." ^- " '-e ■ ...-■-
:uch Japrnere ;r*:-uuct • ruch ?•'. cnane
.ol, ccr-phor, pyref.rur, flover:^, plriit
-int:, tna snd ootterl-s : .r A;.-,ericn;i crov.ucts fuch
■; : ertilizers, foodstuffs, - - r .-^ceuticals, cotto:. ..d.
tobaco). >«.rraiv:ementB :ni ' ; oe m- ue for th':^ ch.-^rter
01 J: / . ese ves.-cis, if . ^ to JaprTn, .-.nu for the
c 3 ..;t r-.c^^ ;ri of vesse^: * - - order in J;-
..1: . , with Rtecl ^ : :^1 ?1 . 3Upolic-
■-■ .te jT J' • .. ■ . : ■" " lt"0
it- t-- -.--.ly -o. -./■■- ^ .-..-.' - ■ . . r-t
Fi.'.'.' y^/u 'iiL : LJH
11-11-41.
1094 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
I. Commitments to be 'given mutually by the Governments
of the United Stat^p and Japan.
(a) The (Vovernment of the United States and the
Government of Japan subscribe to and actively support
the following principles and the practical aryollcatlon
thereof as the foundation upon which their relations
with all other nations are based:
(1) Respect for the territorial integrity Bnd.
the sovereignty of each and all nations.
{?.) Support of the prlnr^lple nf non-interference
in the internal affaire of other countries.
(3) Support of the principle of equality,
Including equality of commercial opportunity.
(4) Non-disturbance of the g.t^gitug aj^g except
®s the .states fliia may be altered by peaceful means.
(b) The Japanese Gorernment and the Governmsnt of
the United States hereby mutually pledge themselves
that Japanese activity and American activity in the
Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and
In conformity with the principle of non-dlacrlflslnatlon
in international conunercial relatione. In pursuance of
this policy, the Japanese Q-overnment and the Government
of the United States agree to cooperate each with the
other
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1095
nref '^^ :
II. '■ rhe oart of th^- • ' - '■■ "at.
cessa-
it^ama»m:S'iS'^*iS!^^a^x9s.sf^t^'^,
1096 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-5-
«?*
'J
restoration of all of the noraal actlrltlea of national*
of the United States In China and Manchuria and for the
progresalre relaxation and remoTal of all restriction*
on the actlTltles of nationals of the United States In
China vh' ch hare been Imposed directly or Indirectly as
a result of Jananese military activities In China, and
will complete this program as rapidly as possible In '
order to provide full Implementation and practical
application of the principle of non-dlscriminatlon In
International commercial affairs.
III. Commitments on the part of the GoTernment of the
United States.
The GoTernment of the United States will, pari
passu with the removal or alterations of those condi-
tions and slturtlous In the Pacific area which gave
rise to the taking by It of certain -oolltical and
economic measures, alter or discontinue those political
and economic measures.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1097
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
:xove:;.ber 15, l^W..
>Ti J CTUY cc:tidzntial
T ere 1.- <'=•:•: a ■■-.";. ■ ■^e.,jfij'ppo8Pl vlilch ^'
'•■.'"'■' - r.-.e proposal stiii '~
r ther rev'glon and elaboretlon. ) ^
^ropQsai is the aost co-.£5truc-lve
r
-e orooosal 9
1098 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
STRICTLY CGKFIDSMTIAL :£K?ATIV£.
OUT LI IS
^*
FROFC
5£D
BASIS
FOP AaR;
l-Ei*:
ZKT ■ 5£
«^.,-r-.
z:, IHE
UNITED
O*
AT'.d A
rx
JhPAI-*'
A
On it- _ / the Gov'rnnient :. . ^- States
oroposee to ta'sce the folloxvlr.j; steos:
1. To reduce to p mr.Tial footl .': var. navel
forces nov In Pacific vaterB, wltho^.^'. of co.Tse liiLlt-
lig- in fry ;;p- 'I'le freed' ^ * ' of
the v^ov.-'r'naent of the Ur.'tea States vith re,?ard. to the
' ' ' '.lor. of naval fi-rces cf the un' ted States.
*
r. To n£'-otlate c multiltaterel non-a£::-rp<^rion r.act
'■ - ■- , China, t;-.e 3.if sh Empire, -s,
Tliailan- -.oviet RuBBia.
£. To - ;■ to the Clilr.eee Go\- rnr;.ent end. to the
J^r'sneae G-ovJi^,,ent tliat those G-ovein.-.'-jnts enter into
peacef."' - ' • '_ -h recarci *:o the future statue
of .-.Anch.r-ia.
4. To enter i -tlptionB • - B-!"lt'-h,
concl.; ■; •;ch 3f t-f- Jov-
■;lf t,3 , "orial
i . : ch Indoc-
■•-; develo-. < : -jrial In-
tei-frity of Indochina, to enter Into i.-n-ediate consulta-
tion vlt:-; a vlev; to taking such measures as ir.ay be
e
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1099
deeded necessary ^n.- "avl<=acl? to neet t..e f-rent in
Question. Such - re .-..t would -;>rovlde --leo Ihr.t erch
of the 3-overn~er.ts . rt , to the r,tree:r.ent v;ould -.:.t
seek; or ^-^cceT^t t^ref erer.tirl treat^.ent in its tr'-^e re-
lations with Ind^ochinp and would u.-^e its influence to
obtain for each of the si»-:iptories niost-f avored-natlon
treatment in trade pnd comnierce with French Indochina.
5. To give up all extr.-^territorlal rights in Ghin?,
Including rights and interests in and with regard to th.
Internationai Settlexents at Shanghai and Amoy, and
rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
To endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British
Government to give up British extraterritorial rlthts
in China, Including rights in International settler^ents
and in concessions and under the Boxer rrotocol of 1901.
To use its influence toward causing the British
Ooveraisent to cede Hong Kong to China. (This provisio
might talce the form of an undertaJcing to use our influ
ence with the British G-overnraent to cause the British
Government to sell Hong Kong to China, the purchase
price to be loaned China by the United States.)
n
6, To reconmend to Congress enactment of legislation
to amend the Immigration Act of 1924 so as to place all
peoples of all races on a quota basis.
7. To negotiate a trade agreement with Japan, giv-
ing Japan (a) raost-favored-nation treatment and (b) such
concessions on Japanese imports into the United States
1100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
- " ■ ' \. ^:>ill; .:'d, Incluulng
'■iit t'--, I •■ ' •■■ ^ : re f* "; ist.
lo (■•liter Into r- ' '- ''^ .--4.,,„,^j., ^.^^g
United Strte? '>nd J:i-'-!.> v;ll,. i>'-..;rr • ..,'^,t_ policy
olonr the llno'^ of the '.iraft i.nadeJ '. i-^-^e Aa^bas-
sridor on November 15.
3. T > -.1 to J/.^'in p ^2,000,000,000 20-year ■
•3^ ■ ■'ro':-t , '' ■ :■■■..' ■ t the
ro ■ • . -^OOO ') I'epT €•:■■ ; th
npprovnl of tho Prerldent of the United Stnt'-^p.
{::0T£: T'--^ United Statec -should be ■ >d to
extend - r-l^nllnr credit to Chin-i.)
(IXTh: f^ovlslon nreBu:r-uly viulu reoulre
:. :■ vol.)
p. Ti <^:-t un P 5"0::;,000,00: '=t i: ilisation fund
n^ilf ^' I . "■ : , :•;' "nlted Sf^tee,
to be use<'i for "t" . 1.1 i.r->tio:. r-yen rate.
(nOTi:.: T.>- Unlied Stnte?^ /;. .- -■ ired to act
pl'^dlnrly in r'^-'->r.i to Chlnr.)
{■:0T.:.: "h-ls : ro vision m-y r^^^ulre C ._-al
'•onrovnl. )
10. To rerove "^ ■ '■ •^:'lr, rp - trictloMP on Jaooneae
fund 5 in the Unit f^- ' - 1 1 1 •? s ,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1101
B
On its part the Gove'-r;!.' -,* -f Janan proposes to
toke the follcving ste^s:
"I. Tc withdraw all allitsry, navel, filr and poirce
forces from China (excl-.Klir.g r'.anchurla — eee Separate
provlrlors) pn^ froa Incochlna.
?.'Tc vithdrav all : ^ — xilltary, political,
econoM. ic — froT, or.y :ovfi.\..':'." r regi i.e i". Or', na ether
than the G-ovei-niiient of the- ' c of China
vith car.itpl \f
^. To .- : -::c^ 9- ■■- : e
a^Teec uoor". - ■^urlep of . • ^
^•■1* • .. - ze^= all J;
«ci 5 -. , yer. , .e note? cij ^ - . .
t. io ■ Ive up all extraterrl toilal • in China,
i-ci ■■ ' ■gi'-ts ir, international pertb .,.r,.t,e «nd con-
cxif.f \ ' ^ - . - . ■(■-:.
fro:r. kpnchurin
exct-' '. for r - -"acp"^
1102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Up to cO ':ei^cent zt J/ ^f-.'f Ow-'-r.t - ; r ,■ ■' :
IncluLlnfc ;.?.vp] : : . . _ . ■ - - ,
perce;;t be si 3 ns '...-" U, " 1 - .' c *. : e '? ,.r y . : ; . ,
undex'stooc Z'r.p'.. : ";" U:.l^c,: o".-:v;? 'Ill ."'fll J-- -
rav: .r.eterielp rs i: ...r,/ le r.ece3i-f-ry f:.- J: ;.. t-
for tl;e = e -^ur:-? -^i.
7. To negotiate 0 :^ultll£ '.erel r.or.-s. .-. r. '-si _.
vlth ihe urilted SteceT, Cr.inr., rl.-^ i,it',v
Nethex'lpnds, Th8il?nG P!-,r. oovl.t R^s.-la.
8. To remove the freezing- regtrlcti:;.-.t= en A..
funds In Jaosn.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1103
NOTEMBEB 24, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff :
Subject: Far Eastern Situation.
A conference was held in the State Department at 9 : 45 a. m., November 21,
1941. Present: Secretary Hull, Dr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton, Admiral Stark
and General Gerow. Secretary Hull requested the Army and Navy representa-
tives to express their informal views from a military standpoint on a draft of a
tentative outline of a basis for agreement with Japan. (Tab A). He explained
that the outline was in a formative stage and had not been adopted by the State
Department.
The various provisions were discussed. Both Admiral Stark and General
Gerow were of the opinion that, in general ; the document was satisfactory from
a military viewpoint. They requested, however, an opportunity to make a more
detailed study of its possible effect on the military situation. It was agreed that
comments would be submitted early the same afternoon.
The comments of Admiral Stark (Tab B) and my own (Tab C) are attached. I
informed Admiral Stark verbally that I regretted the reference to Army forces in
the Navy comments on provision A 1. I feel that no restrictions should be placed
on Army's preparations to make the Philippines secure.
I informed the Secretary of War and General Bryden verbally of the confer-
ence.
L. T. Gebow,
Brigadier Oeneral,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.
3 Incls :
Tab A.
' TabB.
TabC.
[Pencilled notation :] Enclosures not reed in Records Sec for recording. JRB.
[Pencilled notation in margin of first paragraph :] Gen. Marshall was out of
town. (Initials illegible.)
1104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ShtHET
Op- 10 Hu
Navt Department
OFflCE OP THE CBICT OF NAVAL OPEBATtONS
WASUINGTON JTsovwaber 1941
MBMORANPUM FOR THB SBCRETABY
'1^
Sub^aoti Goauaeat oa "Outllae of Propos«d Basis for
Agreement bstvieen the United States aa&
Japan, of November 19, 1941.
I respectfully submit the following. Reference la
made to aimilarly numoered sections and paragraphs. Where
paragraphs are not mentl ned, concurrence is implied.
far. A-l» i'arther study of this paragraph 'comf iras
the feeling I expressed to you this morning that it is
unacceptable. It commits the United States to naval re-
strictions wtttiout imposing compensating naval restrictions
on Japan. I .think under no ciroomstanoes the word "reduoe"
should be employed, since oar naval forces in the Pacific
are inadequate and should not have t6 undergo additional
loss of strength. I again note that this paragraph makes
no reference to lend or air components j I assume this was
intentianal and of course I wish we could get away with
it but I doubt It. If some such paragraph is necessary
I suggest a wording approximately as follows:
"Hot to increase United atates com-
batant nf5v.:l (and military) forces in the
to
w
i
m
01
OJ
^ i;iv.j.aied the (and military) in case they
brin^.' the point up and we have to acquiesce. I strongly
hope that present pl'^na for rwrmy increases in planes,
which will be largely carried out by 1 t.;aroh, could be
excluded from any liratation agree.-^aent but this too mis-cht
have to be aocepte;.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1105
Q»
Par. A-g. As I mentloaed this morning I just don't 5
like the idea of our buying Hongkong from the British and '.
giving it to China. Ir this is to be done I think the
British at least oai=;ht to make tiiis contribution to a
cause more important for the British Commonwealth than for
the United States. Portugal should likewise give up litocao.
Par. A-8 & 9- This is somewhat out of K'avy province but
I assume that in view of the present unfavoraole financial
status it has been considered these two paragraphs should
be Inserted. I can realize their great importance and the
desire to have them form an inte.yal part of any agreement
that nis^t be reached.
Par. 3-1. Change the period to a conma and add the
words "including Hainan, ..lacao and the ialanis of the China
Sea to the southward of Formosa." This 'would include among
others the highly important opratley Islands.
Par. B-2. Suggest the following addition to this paragraph:
"To refrain from estabxishlng or supporting
any government or regime in Indo-China, other
than the regularly established French Government."
This is to make clear our objection to any
puppet regime, etc.
Par. B-$. I doubt the usefulness of this paragraph
believing that it would prove unacceptable to both Russia
and Japan. This morning I expressed it - "If I were a
Russian I would not trust them." If good faith could be
assured there aicht be something to it. I believe it lalgJit
better be left out.
Par. B-6. I confirm ay comment this morning. I do not
believe Japan could accept it and certainly not with regard to
their naval vei.sels; it would be a humiliating procedure from
their standpoint; I would not mention it. There might be some
chance of utilization of some of their present shipping if
world conditions present their full utilization of it. nowever,
this merchant shlppin.s is an inte- ral part of Japan's economic
system and naa built at gr^at expense and difficulty. At the
most the only proposal I woul'l sulwit would be to buy a
specific total of merchant 3hij> tormage; this might refer only
to future construction if present construction could not be
obtained. Chartering, as mentioned by some one this morning,
might be considered.
Qeneral. Hot in the paper. The provisions of the paper may
be aasumei to abrogate the tri-partite treaty on the part of
Japan, out ii' it could ue specifically so stated it would be
helpful on tile side of the water.
,. yV7^Ci^w->f.
1106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3S^K.'S'>' Sia^SS*"16# mJiJi.'Vji:&^\.
WAR DEPAFTTMENT
SECRET
WAH PLAN* DtVi«Km
WASHINGTON
HoTomber 21, X941.
V^
MKHORAHDUK FOR THE SECHETAffY CF STATE j
Subject J F«r Eaatem Situation.
i
War Pliuia Di'vision has made » h*sty study from a military view- •
point of your tentative "Outline of Proposed Bases for Agreement be- <£.
tween the United States end Japan," and perceives no objection to its 4^
use as fi basis for discussion. The adoption of its provisions would
attain one of our present major objectives ~ the avoidance of war I |\)
with Japan. Even a tesiyortiry peace in the Pacific, would permit us to j CJ1
complete defensive preparations in the Philippines tind at the same tiae ' ■(*.
insure ooDtlnuanee of material assistance to the British — both of O
which are highly ifflportont. I
The foregoing should not be construed as suggesting strict ad- 4^
, iT herenos to all the conditions outlined in the proposed aKrecroent. "Kar *^
Plans Division wishes to emphasize it is of grave importiince to the OJ
*: ' suoeess of our war effort In Europe that we reach a Bodus Vivendi with 05
Japan.
War Flans Division suggests the deletion of Par. B. - S. The
proposal contained in that paragraph would probably be entirely un-
acceptable to Russia. The geographical lay-out in the Uaschurlan-
Siberlan area ia such that military time and space factors are all in
favor of Japan. Furthermore, it would be most difficult to reach an
agreement as to what are "equivalent forces" and the measures to be
taken to insure that no unauthorimd increases are made in those forces.
Such an arrangement would Increase the vulnerability of the Russian
position, particularly in the Karitine Provinces, and at the sane tiae
remove the very real threat to Japanese cities of the RusEian Air based
therein. From the V. S. viewpoint, it ia greotly to our advantage to
have the possibility of access to Siberian airfields securely guarded
by a pot«itial ally.
The paper has been considered as a whole. If major changes
are made In its provisions, it Is requested that the fim- Dapartaent
be given an opportunity to consider the military aspects of such - '"'
changes.
SBCRii.x
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1107
:it;.' hiid cons<-nuf>ntlv this
.c erf- '.ion. Apr Pls-as
. » nt' rifrws exrr en *•»<:;
k/ -r^ <^,
79716 O— 46 — pt. 14 14
1108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
PaWILUE) ICBIORANDtJll OITBK BT THB
PBSSIDSRT TO IHS SB0B3TABY Oy STATK
(HOT DATED BUT PROBABLY WRITTSN SHORTLY
arm hotsmber zo, 1941}
M
O!
o
I
to
04
01
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1109
/.
''■V jXi'-
^f
-'■ /.
Oi'^'^'^/.ue J/.M ' '"
y
1110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
IT fl<n V tWKWt nSMVT u
'4 i.^/.^>ii W.VjTOii y^k
t^U^'
Tsmimm
loTSB^r es. 1941.
#lM i^tprcflcmtatlvvt of Xh» %vwrtaiMmt of tlw
9mito4 ft«t«t Mid ef th« OoTtntttrnt of Japoa taaTo taoa
(Munri'lac oa durlnf tlM past atvoral ■eatho lafonul aad
txploratorjr oearoraatleao for %ho parpooo of arrlTlag
•% a MtUoaoat if pooolMo of tho qmootioao rolatlac
to tlw oatlro Paolflo aroa teao4 upon tho prlneiplot of
lav aad ordor and fair doalliy; aaong nations. Thoto
yrtaalploa inalado tiM prlaoipla af iaTlolaMlity of
tarrttorial latogritr and ■ovaralffnty of oaoli aad all
a*%ioBi2 tho priiiolpia of noa^lntarforonoo ia tteo Ia-
tarmal affaira of othor ooontrloa; tho prlnoiplo of
oqaallty, Ualttdlag o^aality of oooMroial opportuaity
aad traatMsti aad tlM i^riaaipla of rollaaoo apoa ia-
taraatioMl oa^oratloa aad ooaoiliatioa far tm pr#-
voatlaa aad paalfla aottloaoat of aaatravaraioa aad far
lapravottoat ef iatoraatloaal ooaditloao ^ poaoafal
a«tlMda aad praaaaaat.
9m
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1111
On lloT«Bb«r 20 tlM Japaa^tt AstettiiAor iadi««t«4
that tti* doTcnuMBt of Japaa !• d*«lrott» 9t folaff •!»•»&
with fttoh a prograa; that tb* AoMattle polltiMl •!««».
tioR within Japan la oztr^nt; and that, in orAar to flTO
tha Japan* so OoTanmant eppartttaitr to doTtlap aaA pra«
aot« public aontiaaat in Japan in auppert of a amt^o-
honalTe and liboral profraa of paaaa tuah aa hat baan
undor dlfiouaalon batvaan oar tvo SoTamaanta, it aeald
ba halpfvl if thara aould 1m takan aoaa Initial stapa
toward raaoaptlon of trada and noraal Intaraoaraa ba-
twean Japan and tha Unitad Stataa. At that tlaa tha
Japanaaa Aabaaaador ooaattnieatad to tha Saeratary of
Btata propoaala in ragard to mmtigva^* to ba takon r«<-
apaetlvaly hj tha CbTamaaat of Japan and b]r tha (loYam<»
aant of tha Dnltad fltataa, whlah aaaauraa ara aiidar-
atood to hara baan daaignad to oraata an ataoaphara
faTorabl* to puraulng tha oonvaraationa tmioh hava baan
takinj^ plaoa. Thaaa propoaala oontain faaturaa vhi«^
froa tha point of Tlav of tho OoTamaant of tha Unitad
Stataa present diffioultlaa in T9tmrmn99 to tha broad-
gauga orinciplaa tha praotioal applleatloa of i^loh r«p-
raeanta the dOHires of both (Hsrernaanta aa aanifaaiiad in
current oonYoraationa. In aa auoh as tha Sovamaaat of
tha
1112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
t^ li«l%#A itftt«e ft««ty«» lf# mn%r%m%% te tm p^mm «f
thm ?*«irid ikr«« abA to «ff©r« fr^ry «pp«rt«Mty %«
tfe« »iilt«fl St«t«ii 0rf»i*« f&r th« »@»«t«.#r*ti#r
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1113
-4-
H0IHJ8 VIVENDI
1. Th« OoTemmont of th« United St<it«« and th«
&oTernm«nt of Jftpan, both b«ing solioltou* for th* p«&9*
of th« Paoiflo, Affirm that th«lr nattlonal pollol«« «r«
dlrootvd toward lasting and axtonalYa p«ao« throughout
tha i'aolflo araa and that thay hav* no territorial daiilgnt
tharaln. Thay undartaka raolprooally not to maka by foro*
or threat of foroe» unleee they are attaoked, any adTanoe-
ment, from polntu at vhloh they have lallltary eatabll8hinenta«
noroee any International border In the Paolflo area.
2. The Japanese Oovejmment undertakea forthwith to
withdraw its armed forces now stationed in southern
Frenoh Indoohlna, not to engage In any further reilitarx
activities there, Inoludlng the construotion of military
facilities, and to limit Japanese military forces in
northern French Indochina to the number there on July 26,
1^41, which number in any case would not exceed 26,000
and which number would not be subject to replaoenent.
3. The Government of the United States undertakes
forthwith to remove the freezing reetrlotions iriiioh were
placed on Japanese assets In the United Statee on July 26
and the Japnnese Oovernment agrees simultaneously to re-
move the freeilng measures which it imposed in regard to
Amerlonn assets in Japan. Exports from each oountry
woulci thereafter remain subject to the respective export
control
1114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
eontrol rpo^suran whloh ©aoh country -'"y h'-np In effect for
reasons of national ^»f«ns».
4. "^e Oov®rru8«»nt of the Hnit*^ States und#rtr,,\<»«
forthwith to pT»pro«oli the Bpitl<»h and th« Dutch Ocvern-
ments with « viet-r to thoffe <>ovemf»»nt8* taklnp-, or. a
bftsie of ywplprcolty with Jf-pan, meneur^B similar to thoit
provide*^ fnr In p^racr.-*?*! thr*«» abovw*
5, Thp OoTwwiment of the United ^itrtfti would not
look vlth di.efpvor upon tb« Inr'ugumtlon of oonvartatloni
batween the &overnmftnt of Chlnp rn<* th© C>ovemi««nt of
Japan fllrect»rt toward ?» p^jreful Eottlement of their
aifferenc#B nor woul^ t^e OoTernfjient of the United 9tat«i
look vith fll«fpTor upon i»n rrmlttlce <!urlng th» period
of any puoh <11(«o«»mlonj». The fundpnMrntRl interest of the
^vtrnm«nt of the 0nlt«4 Ststee In reference to eny tuoh
dlsou88lone ie slwply that they be beeed upon and exeaqpllff
the funflomentnl principle* of reace %rtiloh constitute the
oentrel spirit of the current oor.Terertione betiwen the
Sovernraent of Jep«n and the ftovernfflent of the Unlte<i
States.
In 08B« pny auoh di«cuB8ion« are entered Into between
the Government of Jsp*%n Rnd the Govemaient of China, the
aovernffient of the United States 1» agreeable to euch dle-
ouseione teklng plaoe in the PMllppine Islands, if so
deeireA
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1115
d«8lr*<l by both China anA Japan.
6. It la tmuaratood th&t thla iactftyyl yi^*nai la of a
temporary natura and shall not ramaln In affaot for a
'period longar thifiti thraa months unlaaa ranawad by oowaon
agraamant.
1116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
i&sji mnwttiisi^i
mwmmv m, it^i,
IXMM ^.mmmam wamm fm,
m£Mj*mmmiMMmm.M:immMtMm:
KCHiwl 1 fiii.¥i8fftifcriJrWlBMtftl*wlt.i,Sn ffiWiiiiiiiB»i
««at of impmrn teoth iNiLug «©liQlt«ni« f»3r tJNr |»«at«« ®r tii#
?»@iri« mftirm thAt tl»«lr a«tl©a«a i»oIl«l«» me* S4r«e%#4.
4Mr*«, that t)Msr h«¥« no ttrritarial S«8liii» la lli«le;. «r«m,
that %h»f hm'W9 no ii^ttfttlon of tt!r**t«aliif Qtirnr ootuk-
praetieal *pplle«t;io« %® t&» follevlnf fa»awi««%iil
prinei " •<$» whlth tli»ir relation* with amtik @%h»r
•nd V.;..- «... .^thsr f0v«rtai«Bt« »p« b«««dj
.^ »cT«3*«lf35ty of «aefe ana all smtloai.
f a©«~lattrf#i^R»« Iss th« iattnuOL
...-r «s©uatrl«f.
j"h« prlnel'olif af ©duality, ineluAiaf: •quail tf of
C4)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1117
-2-
(4) Tta* prlnelpl* of r«llait«« upon intoraatioaal eo<-
op«r«tion and oonelliatioa for tht pr«T9ation aaA
paoifle tottlomaat of eoatroTar«i»s and for la>
proToaent of Intamational ooadltiona by paaoafal
aathodt and Droeattat.
Tha OoTemaant of Japan and tba OoTerwiant of tha
Unltad Statas ha^a agraad that toward allalnatlnc ahronla
polltieal Instability, prtTanting raeurraat aaoaoaie
eollaoaa, and proriding a bail* for paaaa, thay vlll
aatlTOly auppert and oraotlaally apply tha follovlns
orlnelplat In thair aeonoale ralationa vlth aaah othar
and vlth othar nations and paoplat:
(1) Tha prinaipla of aon-ditarlaiBation In intar-
national ooottarelal ralationa.
(?) Tha prineipl* of intamational aaoaoaie ooopara-
tion and abolition of aztraaa natlonaliaa aa ax«
Drattad in axoaaaira trada raatriotioaa.
(5) fha prineipla of non-ditarlalnatory aoaaaa by
all nations to rav aatarial auppliaa.
(4) Tha prineipla of full protaetloa of tha intar-
aata of eonsuaini; eoontrlaa and populationa aa
regards tha operation of intamational ooaaodity
agreeaenta.
(6) The rrlneiple of astabllalniant of aua^ lnatittt>
tions and arrangaaenta of interttational fiaanea
aa Bay lend aid to the eanantial enterpriaea
and the oontinuoua deraloptaant of all oountriea
and say perait payaenta through proeesaea of
trade conaonant with the waif are of all oountriea.
1118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
■3-
Saotlon II
3t»P9 to b> Tmken by the ^Qvemniant of th» Unlf^
A
Th9 Ooverruaent of th« United -'t-^tes proposes to take
eteps as followe:
1. To endeavor to conclude p multilateral non-«ggre«8ion
pact with Japunt China, the Bfltleh Kapire, the Netnerlande,
Thailand and the Soviet Union.
2. To suggest to the Chinese OoTemment and to the
Japcneee GoTemment that those (Joyemments enter into
peaceful negotiations with regard to the future status
of Manchuria.
3. To enter into negotiations with the British,
Chinese, Dutch, Thai and Japanese Qovemmenta for the
oonolusion of an agreement thereunder each of the C^ot-
emments would pledge Itself to respect the territorial
integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that
there should develop a threat to the territorial integ-
rity of Indoohlna, to enter into iareediate ooneultation
with a view to talcing euoh measures as may be deeaed
necessary and advisable to meet the thz^eat in question.
Such
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1119
SKieh acreestnt v^ulA provide also that •»©h of th« Skj-r-
•rna«nt« party to th« a^«««eR% wouia not ••«!( or ««««pt
pr«fer«nti»l tr8«t«»Rt In lt« tr»«« or »eono«l® riil«~
tlon* with Indoehlna «ina would ui»» It* laflu«ne» %& ob-
tain for eaeh of the «ignctorla« aqualitjr of traatsant
ia trad* ikn<\ comaerca with Franeh Indoohlna.
4. To flva up all extratarrl torlal right* In China,
Including rights and lntar#it« In and with regard to t.<,
International Sattleaenta at Shan^^hai mnd Aaoy, and
rights under the Boxer Protoool of 1901.
To endeavor to obtain th« agreement of the British
and other govemaents to give ud extraterritorial rlghta
In China, including rights In international settleaenti
ani in eonceeeions and under the Boxer Protocol of 190l.
5. To enter Into negotiations with Japan for the
conclusion of a trade agreeaant between the two caun-
triee, "based r ■•>oal mo at- favored- nation treat-
ment and reduniion of trade barriers by t«>th oountrlee.
Including an undertaking by the United States to bind
raw «tiiR on tiie free list.
6.
1120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
6. To Agi»«© «poR « pl&n for th« stabllitation of
th« dollar-f«n rat*, irlth the allooAtlon of ftin^i «p to
f500,CXK),000 for thif -purpotff half to be •upFli*^ by
Japan and half by th# Unitad Stata*.
?» To reaioYt th» fr««iilng rastriotions on Japaiiaaa
fundi In th« Unitad 3tat««.
S. To taka staps, upon the eoneluaion of thii
agre«sant and, upon the signing of tha jEultllataral aon-
aggrasslon paot fsantionad und«r item on* abov«, dlrtotad
tewartl tarmlnation of th« Nine pQwmr traaty ralatlng to
Frlnoiplcs a.m rolioi«« oonctj*nlng 3hlna ilgnad at
Washilngton, February 6, 1982.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1121
-6-
B
The •■Government of '~opo"<»8 to t.">-«» et"^
follows :
1. To w*thf'rnv ill -illt«ry, n«T«l, nlr nnd pollo«
forc»« from Ch.inp ('•■^olvKUnF M.onohurla -- se* p«-pr.r"t«
nrovlulon A-g) ' nd frose Int"!oohln>».
2. "^o withdr=!w <-4jl Rupport — .Tllltf ry, po31tlc^l,
"oonomlc — fron' f*ny government or r«gl«« In Chln^ a''h<»r
than the National C>overnment of the Hepubllo of Chin»
vlth cwpltsl temDorftrlly nt Chungking.
3. To give up '11 extraterritorial rlghte in China,
Incluc'lnp- rlghtp in intern-'tlonfll settl^^-'-nt « «nd oon-
oeeslorx «n<' rli-fht« under t're Hoirer ^'rotoool.
^, To ♦^ndeovor <"■-> '^-'•'C'^ Md" " ^ 1 "--t^r*! non-
. . I •^'' el 0,'; ■ «f"^ -.it ..the
British ■^mp.lr'^', '-fiet
Hnlon.
5. To r> rf>stri''tlon«i on Aaierlo/in
funds in J«r»ri.
' ;. • .• .'.*■ * .-n-
olude- ■ temb*»r 2'!^, 1^40 n ,->'-"!!-' -■'n.r'-.n. snd
Itrl., - ..';11 not be interpreted
Htere€.:.u..t, the astaj-il^hrr:.?' ^ "<»3-rTatlon of p«moe
throughout the J'Aciflo ares.
1122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
DEPARTMENT OF STATE """"
— ^^'
Memorandum of Conversation
DATrKOVSiBSH 22, 1941
SUBJECT: JAPANESE PRDPOaAL FOR A MODUS VIVEHDI AND SyOQESTBD REPLY
PARTICIPANTS.- SSCr2!SAK£ Hlrt^L, THE BRITISH Ai-IBASSADOR, LORD HALIFAX,
THS AUSTRALIAN MIIIISTSR, RICHARD S. CASEY, THE
I.'ETHERUUJDS MINISTER , DR. A. LOUDOK. AND THE
CKi:;S3S AiiBASSADOR, DR. HU SHIH
', f '.
COPIES TO: /-
r
The British Ambassador, the Australian ;:inl8ter and
the Netherlanda Minister called at my request, the Chinese
Aabassador Jolnlne us later on. 1 enuraerated the high
points In the conversations which I have been carrying on
with the Japanese officials here since the soring of this
year. They are fully set forth In records of my oonveraa-
tlone during that time and need not be repeated here.
' I concluded with an account of the Japanese proposal
for a modus vlvendl . I showed It to them to read, with
the exce;3tlon of the Chinese Ambassador who had not yet
arrived, and then pi^oeaded to outline my proposed reply
in the nature of a substitute for the Japanese proposal.
There seemed to be general agreement that a substitute
w»e
to
ro
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1123
was more desirable than a speolfic reply to the Japanese
proposal, section for seotlon. The substitute reply was
substantially what le contained In the present final draft,
which I am conalderlng handing to the Japanese. Each of
the gsn'^lea'en present eeeraed to be well pleased with this
preliminary report to them, except the Chinese Aabassador,
who was soiaewhat disturbed, as he always is when any ques-
tion concerning China arises not entirely to hie way of
thinking. This reaction on his part is very natural. He
did not show serious concern in view of the provision in
our proposed modus Vivendi which would block a Jananeae
attack on China in order to destroy the Purma Hoad. He
inquired whether this would comnit the Japanese not to
further invade China durinc the coning tliree months, to
which I replied in the negative, addl<ig tlmt this was a
question to be decided under the pennanent agreement now
receiving attention. I made it clear that this proposal
was made by the Japanese and that there was probably not
one chance in three that they would accept our reoly even
though it does provide that this proposed temporary
arrangement constitutes a part of the general conversa-
tions looking toward a general agreement on the basic
questions.
C.H.
S:CH:AR
79716 O — 46— pt. 14-
-15
1124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HZl^iA'xl'iE
jKlif ''-
Ko veinb e r 24, 1 ". 4 1
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1125
1126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
, cc:j-
;i i
'•■ i-C". =■ c' } -•::'..■ -it ,.■ ;■ .-ec' ':'".., Z:J''^ Lz Ir co "'■■1 1;:;':^; .
ri;p ■'•.\''-- • »: of ';;;e I'nltec 3trit;"'i' ': ear^nrrtly
cerirc ■' r,^ - : :,rl.lut-^ to tii^ "■'■'o~ -- tion : • . -■ l-iten-^nce
of ■~«- ce 1 r. ■.:::^^- ppclflc area r-r.d tc rff or," tW'r;- c^ ortunlov
for ul.-'- cci.tlriii.- noe of v. 1 ecus si on? '■•It,:, t.:-- J^ ;;.-:■
5overr;"C' t; vlirffitei" tov^-Tw '•'orkiri ' our, :■ l:r'0"'^: :m--c ~ro~
^^~ of -e.-ce t;:r-:;u -l-.out t'e Frclflc rr»-^a. '.'/ith these
ends in viev;, the Scverri-^ent of I'-.c UnluPd States offers
for tLe conpluerptlon of the Jni-'neje 3overn-:ient an
ftlternptlve su,c"-cstion for a terc^'^orpry t. o clu s vlvendl . -
" S foil O'-'t' ".
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1127
. IV£wDI
1. The 3-overnment of the United Strtes. nnd the
C>overn.T. -tit of Cjinoi':, t..ot;. L-sir. - pollcltoufi for the peace
of tiie Pacific, r<f:'lrm * • ' _ ir n;!tional policies pre
directed towprd lastin;^ rnd extensive peace tixrout'hout
the Pnclfic area snc th.^t they have no terrltorlsl designs
ther>eln.
C. Th'-y undertr>.' reclTorocolly not to make from
re, lor.v in whic:i they hove military eets lishments any
r.J;v.".nce ly force or f.:rent of force into any areas in
3 i:.;' ;:-nE*:ern or lioi-thv.-eotern Asia or in the southern or
*.:.;' :.'--thern Pacific prea.
.'' . Th'^ •^r---. J-overnment undertakes forthwith to
withdraw its -.r-ed 'orces now str-tioned in southern
Freno;. In--3:..i:.a or.: r.ot to I'enlace those forces; to re-
duce trx- to'.rl of i'e forces in French Indochina to the
naT.ter th<^re o.. dul;; .IC, 1941, which number in any case
nirll not ex.^eed 2. ,000; and not to pend additional forces
to Indochi;.'-' for rooj.ace"ents or otherwise.
4. Th.; 'j-jvoi^nm^nt of the United Strtes undertpjtee
f orthv.'ith tc modify the noolic- ".ior. of its existing
freeiiin-" oni export restrictio..? to the extent necees.-ry
to oer:-it txie follov;!-. - r'':;u.mTDtlon of trcde hetveen the
United
1128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-5-
United States and Japan in articles for the use and
needs of their peoples:
(a) Iir.porte from Japan to be freely permitted and
the proceeds of the sale thereof to be paid into a
clearing account to be used for the purchase of the
exports from the United States listed below, and
at Japan's option for the payment of interest and
principal of Japanese obligations within the United
States, provided that at least two- thirds in value
of such imports per n.onth consist of raw silk. It
is understood that all Araeri can-owned goods now in
Japain the movement of which in transit to the United
States has been iriterrupted following the adoption
of freezint: rneasurep shall be forwarded forthwith to
the United Ststes.
(b) Exports fro- the United States to Japan to be
permitted -.s fcllowc:
(i) lies for ^'■esFels engaged
^r and for such
•ecFels in other tr?des as the two
^ 0 '• •
(ii) - roducts from the United
3t;!tet -t. to such limitationn as the apnro-
T)rtf-te -ut;. r-tles .xay prescribe in rescect of
commodities
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1129
-e-
cor.-.odltles Ir s.orl
--]■• \- '- - U'lt-'-d States.
(ill) Haw cotton fro t . -,.:-- -trtef to t?^e
extent o-f .,5':3,'./JC in value ner T.-nth.
(iv) Medical and ohariHRceutlcpl suodII' r sub-
ject t^ cucn llmitrtlonc ?:■ the ---roori- te
ou" .'.rl* -^'s lary ■'prescribe In resnect cf co:r.-
r;.o_..^'-- m ?:--ort Bun-nly in t:'if> United States,
(v' Fetrol'^um. Tne United ^tr-tes •.■:■-.'- ^ .■ .it
the ex'^ort to J?'nsn vf '-'■^troleuir. unon a monthly
bar^lf ■^or civilian ne^^ds, th'-- -oro-nortionote ar.ount
of -," ;, • - -x-^orted fro-n tne United St<!te8
for ^uch n-^eds t. b.> deter::iined --rter cor.sulta-
tion wit . the British pv. ' '- .f" 'Jute:; -iov^ern-ents.
It i6 understood th,'»t by civilirn needs in Jaoan
Ir ~ -int pucn rvurnoseE nr t .e onerptioh of the
:■ '. 'y "" *;■•:.•• ort rv^tPrr;, l'.:*:lr.:-,
-■''■' 1: I'^r'Tl"'! ■ :' ^ cul tur."! Ui-''-'S, .''ad
ot:.'-r Giviii,';n uses.
(vi) Tne p.ov- -i -.r^ ■! "-ounts of '^X'jorts m,-^y
V,:. «,•,.., ,v!'^fd ; .. . • : r^onr:^0;li* ICF a ded
, 'T.t :,etv . *. ■ ■ •.'•-■rar.iente rs" it
■, .- . ■ - -ion of thlK
aK'ree.aent i." furtherln-- the neacefjl pnd eouitahle
solution
1130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-7-
eolution of outBt; iiCiin. ■ ,roble:r.s la the
Ppclflc prer.
5. Tiie Joverrii..ent of Jpnan uacert' >er f ort-n-.-lth
to moclify the .-^pDllcptlon of it'^ frl?tlw. rrc-rl:-)- mo.
export resti'lctioris to the extent cecevcpry to permit
the refiunption of trade betvreen Jnpan and the United
St^^tten "S provided for in nr.r?.L'i'"Ph four above.
G. The Government of the United States undertakes
forthv;ith to n^;proach the Austrrllrn, ::;rltish and Dutch
Govern-T.ents v:ith r, view to those G-overnn-.ents ' taking
rnenFurec- Bin-.llar to those i^rovided for in paracraph four
above.
7. With reference to the current hostilities between
Japan and China, ti.e fundamental Interest of the Govern-
ment of the United States in reference to any discusBlons
vhich rnr.y be entered into betveen the Janpiiepe ana the
Chlner-e G-overnir.ents Is simply that tr.ese dlpcussions and
any settlement reached ae t- result tr.ereof be based upon and
exenolify the funuamental prlnclpleF of peace, Inw, order
rnd Justice, which constitute the central spirit of the
current conversations betveen the Government of Japan
and the Sovernment of the United States and which are
rpplicable uniformly throughout the Pflcific area.
8. Thle mpdus Vivendi shall remain in force for a
period of three months with the understanding: that the
two
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1131
I't'cr r- : ;■ co'ifs^r ■ ■<.-' of eltrer to
. . ' i-: ... v.et.icj' X: f :i-:h.,QClr :>•; reacin, a ■ eaceful
ftetliPHPnt c-->vrrl ^ . .a^iii'e i-"clfic area .'ustify
^^S llIS^AL ^'^ :' furtr.er period.
1132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
STRICTLY GONPIDSNTIAL ,
November 24, 1941
OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOR AGRSEME?IT
Section I
Drart Mutual DQclar&tlon of Policy
The Gavei'nxaertt of the United States and the Govern-
ment of Japan both being aolicitoua for the peace of the
Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed
toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific
araoi, that they liave no territorial designs in that area,
that they havo no intention of threatening other coxon-
tries or of usin/^ military force ar.greaa .vely agairsst any
neighboring natiun, and that, ac.-.ordingly, in their na-
tional policies they will actively 3upi ort and give
practical application to the following fundaniontal
prlncip-f'3 u;." II v.-liich tlioir rel ■ ;■
and wl ih
iiity oj
^-r 4-
.r; alra uf ci.:
1 1
S)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1133
(?) Z)\Q .rincipltj of e.iuality, i:icludln^; equality of
coia'.orciul oi-portunlty and troatncnt,
(4} The principle oi' relijinco upon ifitornai i' i.ul co-
o;;oration and conciliati n for the prevention aid
■uicli'ic settler.ient of controversies and ''or iin-
provoment of international conditions ';/ r>oricoful
;Tv.:titod3 an-, proceasoa,
-he -JOve mninnt of Japan and the r/ovornnet.t of tlx
nited Jta'en have a(:r.;- d tliat. t.wari eiiminatinij chronic
;:!0.itical ir:s tab! li ty, ; r • vontinf'; r>^curront ocononlc col-
la] ue, an.; ■ - -i . > baa^.s for;£;ace, Ihay w'll i-tivoly
sup. ort; "ally a]- ly tlie followin- principles in
thc'l: oach other arid with other
of non-d iiicrininatio
n €-::co33lv-
1134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Se^ctlon II
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1135
1136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to the C'r. 1*. PRP
thfl'. thnpe '^o\"
-5-
'-ited Ststep will ^ufreet
np 1 1 ' r. tre s *
both co'jrtr'
*f tr»de bRrrl«"rf bv
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1137
1138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
DEPARTMENT C STATE
f
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1139
Telegram Sent
iruii tii«
Collfct jO.y Wtfc
[mjiht letter
Ct»r^e Ocpartmentt
Full rale
0»)f l»ttlT
Nipilt l«tt«r .^- A,
Qi^O
Bppartntent of ^tatr
TO Mt -mAMMITTEf)
X conriocHTiAi. coot X
MOMCOMriDCNTIAL 0OO«
runum
njkii
1k« rtk't
• ■-•i, 1941
3. "AVAL P2H30N.
-■ner.e AT.'.:''S3;'.lor oommunlcntftd to
vcnii. ': •■■■'^re-'entsd t-^t
i::ii Xill- ■■ ■ t Ive t':i? J'-o-nc;
• ~ - .Ic pcntiment In Jaonn
Ive orotTf.'. of "jeroe
;,r:f do-Tietttic 5.vlJ.t,lo?l
-' to rende:- ur -en ', s't-.e
■ >-osnl. " - • 1
Sfnf ^y opfraim
79716 O — 46 — pt. 14 16
1140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
_. ^ TO BC TKANSMimO
TELEGRAM SENT «)wipeim«. coot
1f»tl r»t« : liONCOWIOCMTIM. COO*
0*} latter punMn
!.*<.» !,«« ®Miarttt«nt of #tate ~..-
Ckvf* 0«|»rtin*ntt '
0«y letter '^ rr»««.««wfc
Ntglit letter
Ctiarge to
J toward obtaining goods reouired by either In the Netherlands ■
East Indies and to restore comraerclal relations to tnoee
prevailing prior to the ado-otion of freezing measures.
This Government proposes to inform the Japanese G-overn-
ment that in the opinion of t-.l? ^^overniBent the Jawaneee
proposals contain features not in harmony >ix^.ir tr.e fundamental
principles which underlie the nroposed :-er.errl settlem.^nt and
to w:;ich each Governmpnt has declared thp* i' 1? comEltted.
It le also DFoposed to offer to the Joppne e ^overnmen^ an
alternptive tsropoeal for a mod^ifj vi vi?-..li v.-;:l"r. will
mutufl -^It'i. •- ■ '•' -^---.---^ ' • -' - . ' • -. - ■-^- ■
not • .. :,. ..-L ^ rr.: _.:,,■
northeastorn Asia ' nd t'..e nort.-.ern i'nclflc ■:;■»:•', &ut.^- ;-*
Asia and the southern Fr-clfic ->rea, :■ ■■
to witndraw Its tor-c" ♦■''■--• <- ■;•:■■. --r ■ - ... , .-.
to rr-plpce t:iOg« f- - ; r- In.lochlr.B
t:, the number tn'-T ''^ . .
.S',-n( h ••ptruUr.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1141
Telegram Sent
Drjjartnti'iit of .^tatr
^ent hi/ optratuT M., ./*?..
1142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
i'^T^^MJU^^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1143
■
Dk^'ARTMENT OF STATE
{
i
t-
Memorandum of Conversation
DATi
!SSIIIH
Sur.jccT
fl
COS-lfc i TO
r, ^
1
--
CO
>>
.I'lH.
1144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
not reco,';iiize t.xe rlgMt of Japan to keep a sinj-le soldier
in Inrtochlna, we wsre strivin;: to reach tnis proposed
temporary agreement primarily because the neads of our
Army ai^n :.avy ol'ten emphasize to me tiiet time is the all-
importfcin _-te.tio.i for tiien, t>nd tiie t it is necessary
to be more fully prepared to deal effectively witn the
situation in the Pacific area in case of an outbreak by
Japan. I also empnasized the point tiiat, evon if we
a,.3ree that tae chances of sucli an outbreak eri; not great,
it must be adrriltled tuat taere ar.j real pcsdiolllties
tnet sucr; tin outbre^K may soon occur - any aay ai'ter
t.ily vi/f-ek - r,-ii. ■ ■ f tc-T.ion- '■•/ hi-rBu.-":'\('.nt ia e.'I'ected
t.'iat. w : 1 "I ■ ' ■. fi-ItHted s!i:tf! ■: .ill' ' ■ i - •. t.o
:■• ,r ■ .■ :. 1 >'
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1145
1146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
^H
t.i* aiodus Vivendi proposal. I tnen inaioated that I
was not sure tnat I would pi*esont it to the Japanese
Ambassador witxiout knowing anything about the views
and attitude of their Governments. The meeting broke
up in this fashion.
There were other details discussed but they were
not of major consequence nor did they constitute any-
thing new in the record.
C.H.
S CH:MA
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1147
>eace.
1148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
It If. ,;e";leved that In our dlscueslone soce proj^reee
the entirp Ppclflc -ecently the <-' _r
vernment 1b desirous of con-
tlnul - ■ ■ ... ,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1149
■ont->ln
1150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in ■
force I'
Ir..
on Jul.
forcep
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1151
1152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-6-
commodltles Ir. short supply in the United States,
(ill) Raw cotton from the United Stetes to the
extent of $500,000 In value per month,
(iv) Medical P.ri& p.harmaceutlcel supplies sub-
ject to euch llmltptions as the appropriate
authorities mey nrc scribe Ir. respect of com-
modltles in short suoply In the United States,
(v) Petrc ■"."•■■■ - "^'".e United States will perrclt th«
excort tc : petroleum, within the cate-
gcrlee permitted general ex-ort, upon a monthly
basis for civilian needs. The proportionate '
amoun* -be exported froa the
■:-.'*- _,. -J- -•;^^^ -- -^-termlned
'■- : ' ■ : * ■ '■ 'he
Dutc.. inderetoc -
civ* ; ■ • 5s
al
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1153
1154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
two Dartl?3 shell confer at th'-> Inet-^nce of either to
cacerteln whether the wrosoects of re-'Ching a peaceful
settlement covering the entire Pacific area Justify
en extension of the modus vlvendl for a further period.
There Is attached In tentative form a plan of a
coiBor.ehensive peaceful settlement covering the entire
Pacific area as one oractlcal exemplification of the kind
of proeram which this Sovernaent has In mind to be worked
out during the further conversations between the Govern-
ment of Jaoan and the Govern:aent of the United States while
this modus vlvendl would be in effect.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1155
stoic tly confidential.
TIjIOTa'i'IVjs and V/ITHOUT
C01/iIIT^ENT
Novenber 25 » 1941.
OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOR AGREEMENT
^yy/BJgN Ms UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
Section I
Draft Mutual Declaration of Polloy
The Governicent of the United States and the Govern-
ment of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the
Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed
toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific
arefa, that they have no territorial designs in that area,
that they have no intention of threatening other coun-
tries or of using military force aggressively against any
neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their na-
tioiial policies they will actively support and give
practical application to the following fundamental
principles upon which their relations with each other
and with all other governments are based:
(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial
integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal
affairs of other countries.
(3)
79716 O — 46 — pt. 14 17
1156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-2-
(3) The principle of equality, inoluding equality of
oooimercial opportunity and treatoent.
(4) ^e principle of reliance upon international co-
operation and conciliation for the prevention and
pacific settleoient of controversies and for im-
provement of international conditions by peaceful
methods and processes .
The Oovernment of Japan and the Government of the
United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic
political instability, preventing recurrent economic col-
lapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively
support and practically apply the following principles in
their economic relations with each other and with other
nations and peoples:
(1) The principle of non-discrimination in interna-
tional commercial relations.
(2) The principle of international economic coopera-
tion and abolition of extreme nationalism as ex-
pressed in excessive trade restrictions.
(3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by
all nations to raw material supplies.
(4) The principle of full protection of tne inter-
ests of consuming countries and populations as
regards the operation of international commodity
agreements.
(5) The principle of establishment of such institu-
tions and arrangements of international finance
as may lend aid to the essential enterprises
and the continuous development of all countries
and may permit payments through processes of
trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1157
-3-
Section II
Steps to be Taken by the Government of the United
States and by the Governjient of Japan
The Government of the United States and the Gov-
ernment of Japan propose to take steps as follows:
1, The Government of the United States and the Gov-
ernmexit of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral
non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China,
Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and
the United States.
2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among
the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland
and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the
Govornments wjuld pledge itself to respect the territorial
integrity of French Indochina aiid, in the event that there
should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of
Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a
view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary
and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agree-
ment would provide also that each of the Governments party
to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential
treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina
and
1158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and would use Its Influence to obtain for each of the
signatories equality of treatment In trade and oommerce
with French Indochina.
3. The Ctovernment of Japan will withdraw all mili-
tary, naval, air and police forces from China and from
Indochina.
4. The Government of the United States and the Gov-
ernment of Japan will not support -- militarily, politi-
cally, economically — any government or regime in China
other than the National Government of the Republic of
China with capital teaporarlly at Chungking.
5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial
rights In China, including rights and interests in and
with regard to International settlements and concessions,
and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agree-
ment of the British and other gpvernments to give up
extraterritorial rights In China, Including rights in
interna tlonad settlements and in concessions and under
the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
6. The Government of the United States and the
Government
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1159
-5-
Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for
the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a
trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-
nation treatment and reduction of trade beo-riers hy
both countries, including an undertaking by the United
States to bind raw silk on the free list.
7. The Governmeht of the United States and the
Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the
freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United
States and on American funds In Japan.
8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the
stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the alloca-
tion of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be
supplied hy Japan and half by the United States.
9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement
which either has concluded with any third power or powers
shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict
with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the es-
tablishment and preservation of peace throughout the
Pacific area.
10. Both Governments will use their influence to
cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical
application to the basic political and economic principles
set forth in this agreement.
1160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Lauchlin Currie. Chungking,- November 25, 1941.
After discussing with the n-eneralissinio the Chinese
Ambassador's conference with the .Secretary of <^tate , I feel you
should urgently advise the President of the '"reneralissimc 's
very strong reaction. I have never seen him really agitated
before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dan-
gerously increase Janan's military advantage in China. A relax-
ation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China
would dismay the Chinese. Any "Wodus Vivendi" now arrived at
with China would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and
analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently
destroyed British prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would
instantly exploit the resulting disillusionment and urge
oriental solidarity aeainst occidental treachery. It is doubt-
ful whether either past assistance or increasing aid could com-
pensate for the feeling of beins deserted at this hour. The
Generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's fidelity
to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the
Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation
together if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined
by renorts of Jat5an's escaping military defeat by diplomatic
victory .
Lattimore .
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1161
1162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation
-^v^.
:vs v:v:::di
OAii liCViilrEr". '.'h, 1' 41
Sr^CrJ^'iAF.i nULL k'.'.J l.::':'. ";-.-.:. I9H AI^zASSADOK, IL?2 : ALIF/vX
COPIES TO:
hereto at-t,»ic;,ec . -vj
CO
^rltl: ..: ■ ;;-•.! 'lor '-il";rr. 't -.ip ri>'iu08t and
H rne'.)orar,du' 1, n r^ -
I -• * -'f-f^y on the ' ' '^ '.
. , ■ ,- 8 1 V e
cou"a^ outBldp of C^s" no ^ro'or fLiriri- trjp nf'-<t three ^
• -; (1. ' ■ idcr triP aUvir.tHp-es 3>
f ■ ■ resnect t'^ t.,'- . ..'"in foflc ant'. '- -'■■]»
dPt;tr-;Ci: :i. ,'!-. - " ' ■ . -" ' '■ '«'"'-■ ->'"->^'i
on '.r^a wr!lc;4 - . ' ' aovni?tf!f-e
rltaln, ^. ^^^
ri- ^:lted 3tftt. " -ir ".'. . . •
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1163
I emphasized tliat this vrononed r.odus Vivendi wae
really a part of what t;u; Jananese claliaed to be a con-
tinuance Tf tjie eaae convertsatlone held heretofore rf»la-
tlve to a oeriaanent agreement on a peaceful settlenent
for the entire Pacific area. I also pointed out the
utter luiMractlcablllty of requeetlni; ri BUF-.enslon of
further -illltary advances !n China In addition to the
preceding- .Hsaurances.
Tiie Anibaeeador referred to the -rovlelon In the
nrcnosed draft if a aodua v,lvendl_ limiting- the Japanese
troops in Indochlria to "5,000 and urged that that ntimber
brt reduced in our draft, I said that we would do the
best we could in the .Matter, that our Ar-'iy and liax'y
experts feel that 2S,000 In ■Jcrti; I:uioc!-.lr.i would not
be a menHCo to the Burma Road, and that even double tnat
number would not be a serious :.'ienace.
C.H,
S:GH::iA:A-H
1164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
,Iw ,jfinf"it^ ;/ri)po.:il i;-, fli^nrly ur'iccftptable «nd the
inly lUest.i r> •., ;►(.:■,. f. i he ., ' f liif.-r : -
( ., , .•■■jt'ct it tiva (■•.hlle ;,iMkln-' it i-Aenr thiut u
Iii,it''i": «.. Tf^t'iert i? not, ritl-^d out) 'to leave it to the
.''.;. -r." ;■•- to p'^n.'i^f •■ Y>»*tfr aff'f^r, or
,"T h.'ive fo.'.;l^fe ,;<ini i >T o*^ Iri .„r. 'i'jll'r> hiin<!linK _
• t' fie .<■ P'^- '.'ti"' 1 n. ■.;.; n-^ i; ill Llie be: t !jo;;ition to judge »
(0
: •••• • ■.• • :■-■■... 1 . 'Tot-iI.CS ; ■. . ! L:
'••p. ,!■. ■ .; iriter ;p>,.iS!il -ve rtill ru.;'Oi't t!;!;-. ijoursie.
i; -i?.'- '.'ii 1 tr-y to [^
.. . , -N
• itingers o: uelby. ,^
'nii- Int.i jgc -I'l* "i" f"el,-i it best to put
:. ..!• fft»l, b-^ regarded
. ■ •■...)■.-(-: i-.it. v.;. It puts
*! ■■ rrice Ht H ninlmui'i.
• :.i, :•.-,.'. t, .,at this
; " " • cs shi-ialci be
(/)
>
.i " ;..n'al .f ,,«rel,. "th>: rjUi/." i.I' .Ji.Mnttif trCvU'S
:•.; ';.:■:•■ .. .1: <illo. * o .»!.,►' "t l.-!u.h--le. I*, is
ill li ...■*,■•■ ,.- . ■i. :1 : ^ ■■ ^ i-*^r:i'C lit >. :-cej't in;.' thii- fi 6
"..-•■ 'V •.-, -il. ;>>o:^ 1- i ---■,:tin. 11. /.vj^.rt froin the
rMV'.llt,^. .}■: Itc'ui-K- ft oii-^lrr jP !i-.' >iitil higher tUftn i*e .:sny
I'l, it see.-i.'- -acv 1 .,tjr i " I'roi . tni' ;hiT:';3'' »iP~l-; so to frai'ie
• ' :r.c*r..'- , . ■ M ty o;' 'iiiy a'.tacr: on Kuaiilr'.f:
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1165
n til;- Vi^s '■ ..
of thf . •
shSulc stipulate ^op ; *;•
■ ■■■ ' of '■■he • •■
^■i\-i ,.. ,, ^ Oii t of .'u: ■-. . .
their e^iiii; :i<-rt >,■ •; frr
• oii^i: ;■ .i.- est, : -,r
ret'iTc i.n~ ot nr
it.nltecj ;•
c I V i , i
t'-.- .. -
re 1 ■;■.•; t i i
,« i th ' r-i*fj i
e/p-M-t in
,- : ■ r if
' " ' '■r'.
1166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1167
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Convenathn
SUBJECT: OyPOJlTlOK cr o>» rtlULI iJOlMO CHIAJIO .<Al-3KiiK TO M0PCKJ>tVi3<D^
PARTICIPANTS;
»..CKw7A-'lY KULL tUij^gfifc CHINK3E -VKHAOIADOn, Dn. jfU 3H1K
COPliS TO:
\A
/
The Chlnts* '>Bba«s«dor sailed at hli request. He
30t^(ht Xo Bako profuse. pj*«llainary s^lanations, stating
a.u')r%- other things that the Forelf?) Minister of Cl\lna
ttsuorstoou fry well the broad inteimatlonal aspaets of
the 'apanese situation as it relates to several oountrles,
Inolv .ln£, China and the United itates, but that the
oenerallssl»o vss not so veil aoqualnted with the situa-
tion, ail . henee his reiiorted oppoaltion to our aodue
Tlvendl. la then handed ae a telegraa, dated HoTeaber 2<,
1.>«1, fPo« .Is rorelfin ..inlster, a oo-iy of wnloh is here-
to attaahad.
I replied that in the firet place the offieial
heads of our hmj and Nary for eoae weeks have been r«ost
earnestly ursla, that we not s«t in^^ ^v with Japan
until
1168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
untll th«7 have had an opportunity to inoraaa* further
th«ir nlans and methods and aoana of dafanaa In tha
Paolfle araa. In the aaoond plaoa, at tha request of
tha ^ora paaoafal eleaenta In Japan for oonTarsatlona
with tuie i>ovsFraBant lookine toward a broad paaoaful
aettlei&ent for tha entire }'aoifie area, ve have bewi
earrylnj; on oonvarsatlone and cuiklng aoae >rogre»8 thus
far; and the Jatmnasa are urginp tha oontl nuance of
theae ganervl oonTeraatlone for the >urpoee of a broad
Paoifio araa aettleaant. The situation, therefore, is
that tha -(roposad modus TiTai^i is really a part and
paroal of the efforts to carry forvard theae general
oonversations for the reasons that baTe been fully stated
froQ tiae to tiae, and recently to the Chinese Aabasaador
and to others. *
I said that Tery recently the Ueneralissiao and
:.adacia Caian^; Kal-ahak aJlBOst flooded Washington vith
stronf7 and lengthy cables tallinr, us ivov extrenely dan-
gerous the Japanese threat is to attack the Buraa Hoad
tnrou(^h Indochina and appealing; loudly for aid, whereas
practically the first tlilnt; tais nreaent -ronosal of aine
and tha j resident does is to require the Japanese troops
to be taken out of Indochina and thereby to protect the
hunsa load froa what Chiang al-shek aald waa an i I'-inent
danger. mv, i added, Chlan<: ' ai-ahek If-nores that
situation
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1169
-3-
■Ituatlon vbtoh «• ha.r» t«K«n ear* of for hilB and InTolf^s
loudly about anoUxar aattor relating to th« relaasa of
eartaln oovRoditlos to Japan oorraipondlnc to ths r^ronreas
■ad* vtth our oonraraationa oonoomlnc a f^anaral paaoa
a(r««B«nt. Ha alae oTorlooks th« faat that our proposal
vottld raliare the aanaoa of Japan In Indoehlna to tha
vbola '.iouth Paolfie araa, including r^lni^apora, tha Methar-
lands ijiat India*, Australia and alae the United states,
with the rhlllpplnas and the rubber and tin trade routes.
All of this relief froa aenaae to eaoh of the oountrles
ifould continue for ninety da/s. One of our leading
a4Blrale stated to oe reeantly that tha Halted amount
of oere or less Inferior oil ,>roduots that we alf^ht let
Japmn havs during that period would not to any appreolable
extant Inerease Ji4>aiiese war and naval preparations. I
said that, of oours*,^we oan eaneel this <->roposal but It
Bost be with tha understanding^ that we are net to be
otaarged with failure to send our fleet Into the area near
Indoehlna and Into Jar>aneee waters. If bT **^7 ahanae Japan
•akes a Bllltary drive southward.
The Aabassador was very Insistent in the Tlew that
be would send baak to his Oorerrasant a fuller explanatloa
whioh he hoped islght relieve the situation more or leaa.
Our oonTeraatlen was, of ooorse, Vn a friendly eplrlt.
CM.
2i>CHiHA:AB
1170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
V < .: sit. -,Al>wi. aO .liU
K«ir«r«no« is taMAm to your t*l*gr*a of Jlove»i»«r 2;.'.
Aft*r r««c^ix]^ 70ur t«lsf,r«.v:, UiO JMicrftliatilao saow«d
r«th«r atroiig reactiwi* H« >;ot Ui« l;ipr»eh^oii that Um
l>nlt*<l : tatas Jovamaant ii*a .ut aaida tha ^liluaa* ^uas-
tlon III ita couvaraation alt-i Japaxi l^ataaa of aockiiit; a
aolutlon, and is atlll iuclinad to appsasa Japen at tao
•x.p«na« of vhixia. i aibva axplalnaA to ^ai th«t Uia ao-
ratar/ of ^tato iiaa aX««/a ttad tua f.r**taat raapact for
tua fuQuaaiantal principlaa, ana that i baliava h« ita*
'aada no coiicnaaXon to Japaa. Ttia fact tiini h* Inri liraa
of ttut po- aibllity ol a aodtta vlvaqdl ahowa ttiat ua t4*a
aot ..at ravaalad inythln,; lo txta Japanaaa. 'e aro, aow^
•WTf firaljr oppoaad to t-nj aaaaura wiiich rut./ .lava tha
affaot ox Incrcaairvr ^2ilua*a difficulty In ua: «ftr of
raalatanca, or of atx>anKtu«nlAe Japan** powar In hor
•g.-raaaion a^alnat ^nlna.
Plaaaa Infom th« Saoratazy of r>t«ta*
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1171
DEPAFH-MENT OF STATE
Alefltoranc/ufn of Convenathn ^ ''-
DATE: November i5, If-*!,
PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Hu 3hih, Chinese «.?.>> 'lo'^. ad or. '
l-'.r. Stanley K. Hornbeck.
Dr. A. Loudon, Newierlsnde. Mlni^Wr
Mr. otaniey K. Hornbeck
i.el: ;,
. 1 1: 1 ^ -
. e c " i'' I
ubrr "'d >r ciip.' oi :i.e ''."'■t evening, Pt
"" referred t,o tne conference v;:".ioh hnd
r
,o..-e '•'.:".•/ pftern . \'i ri v.liicji the Secretary of State p'
; reprc-entr-tlvep jf ti.e r, C ? iic" 0 oovers of "^
'f.-r;-; -f:it^ lp---^in~ t'-r'-nr'"! -O'^rlfcle conduF^-m
:.i'." 3t''P'- ■ iJ J' ,-r; -f - ;1ag Vivendi.
r ' «1' tj.vt * •= J '•' - V*"-;- r*^-^! a-.i irpcl-'t Von of
ne-'- an" ■U""lc It., -f tii- ■r-ble.T. vlilch confront?
•". C-?vern-'=nt -'nd s rncf^i-n^- -^]j the countriep ''
; r.r. ..e eyrrfi--e.i -i rocjTtlon of the pttltude '^
-t-r;, -)f St'-te Ti" cor.oletf conflOp.ioe tii^t tiie
•.•:-;■ , .tr.t ■•.;.!, yle]:. ..'.thlnr In the I'leld of
sirincloljis y
:^
79716 O— 46— pt. 14 18
1172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-S-
prinolples and pursue no oouree of "appeasement*. He said
the he wished, however, to repeat to me what he had said
In the conference regarding articles II and III of the
American draft proposal. Article II, he said, prerumably
does not apply In reference to the conflict between Japan
and China: It presumably leaves Japan free to continue her
operations against China; and, article III leeves Japan
free to maintain ae much be 25,000 troops in Indochina and
to conduct operations agalnet China from Indochina. He
went on to eay that In the conversations thflt vere helfl on
Saturday, the Secretary had spoken of permitting the Japc-
nepe to malntpln in China "a few thouBPnd" trooos; and that
in hie reoort to hie Oovernment he np.cl aeed thft eyprcolcn,
ar.Q he understood that the other reprepentative? had rerorted
in the samp terme to their Oovernment p. Now, it speired to
hioi, a force cf 25,000 Javir.epe trc^oe in northern Inc'.cr.lna
w-uld ccftlt'ite a ..e.nr.ce to CMnn. Supio^e, he rsid, the
jj^.fr.pp? Fh •■■Ir', prr;' i^-.^sly live uo t'j the :'_etler cf this
.'.rovl = ion--wr.lcn, If they c"!-',, v-uld be <^iir..»'l plnr.- - ; pr:d
ou-- .or" tr.ey '--er^ tc c?n;^° t-'.-t niLtt^r of tri-.p tc cj Pl6t
tprrely '.t r.ot altogether of : (^c: io.nl c, enclnf-TP snd
r.vlntl?'. -,i;-t<-, — puc;. - f icp r ." : ^■^r'-'.'^ly r<^r.'rce the
c'..:-. -^ ' ■ r , t prri '.^ "'■''•:- r '■■' '~ r. ! .e ' F '_'-r.S' f-rcp'- jn
■/'.-i.'.Hn. If ti-.p- Jr. -;.«>-» ^r. \.' ' cl~i ^f- t -J c "induct I'.riO
"■yerptions
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1173
■ n- -.f
•— - ■
. , .f
'_..■•.:-.' ■- r. T;i«=
• : . ' V !
._. . . , .. .
': ., ~ . .
,. -, f -.
■-' "-t jt, -.;,e irrloc.'.iiia ?lt.-.t:tr.
T-.
r ■- i'..-
- ■.■ "^
- \- ^" •: ,: •■
;i. .■■ t.v--^- 'f ■■':;il..-apnt fir
.■,:l.lvv
r-t-t\
,: ^ -f it' - ' -
• i;;.-, t;.e ^:.r-.^ ac-rl, ti o
■/
• . ', r v^-
.jci; if .•■ vU
• •; 1 . . >i r.-nc.p t: It oc"
,- r •;, e
in?«?rn t / ti.
.-..■,: • ■ • ! t '■■
'. . -.I'l via th.'. t R..-:. . Hr
the
1174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
je Jap'TiPrc *'. sagpen?e for arother three nonthp, but he
Soubted vhetner thpt ^-lulci be rcnle-vffrt. He concluded v.'.th
^an aseurance thet he would try to co.u<;'? his Government to
je the .problem In the light In :.'hlch the American Grovern-
lees It, He exprensed hipe tbr.t, if he t?ld not succeed
Jiipletely in that effort, ve would realize th.-^t aifficultieg
which confront China inevitably look eomewhRt different
vhen vieved from Chungking than when. viewed from YJaehington.
Lftter in the evening the Neth^rlnnds Minister drooped
In on me. He made vith regard to article III obpervatione
not dieslmllrr to those vhich the Chinese Ambr.psador had
made, as regarding the queptlon of the number of Japanese
troops that might be left in Indochina. He alco raised a
question whether the matter of materiel might not be quite as
Important a? -r even more important than the queption of
the number of troops. He eaid thrt he had on Saturday made
a long report to hie Government, thet he h?d received since
then Bfcveral telerrame, and thcit he erpected to pend to the
Department tcc^ay two or three ireiioranda.
Z'^*^,
PA/H:SJtHtFLB
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1175
0«?T OP
M. IMl ,
/
£
1176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
^t --^ik
NOTMb«r 26, 1«41 (
IWi referono« to oar two prooosaJL* prap-wert for
(laUnisfilan to the Japan* s« OoTorraattnt, natMljri
(1) A proposal In the wa/ of « draft &i;r*«a«nt for
a broad baalo p*ae«ful aflttloaflnt for the Paelflc area,
whlr^h 1« h«ne«forth to t>e aad« a part of the g«ner!il
oonTonatlonn nov colnc un and to b* oarried on. If
agritatibie to both JOTemBants, with a Tt'^w to a {^onurftl
agraonant on this aubjflot.
(^■) The Aoeond propowil i« raalljr olosfsly onnnaotad
v/lth the oonvaraattona looking; temrd a f^anAml {3.|rr««->
aont, whl<^h 14 tn tha nntura of a y^^p vlTondl intandad
to an^e 'nor- feasible th« oontlnuanea of thn <;onT0ra»»
tlr^nii.
In vlaw of thfl op oaltlon of tha Chln««« OoTarnaent
and althr tha h«lf-honrt«td jup ort or the aotitfil opj«o«l-
tlon of the iiirltlnh, thc^ ><at')<irlnnKla and thA Australian
^overmanta, and In vtaw of the wlda publlalty of tha
o. oaltlon and of the a-l^ltlo-ml op "iltlon that vlll
naturally follow throuf^b utter lack of >»n undvratandlng
of ths v«9t laportanae and va-ue ntijorwlsa of the
»od»^f yjyand^.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1177
■odna yivadi. wltiMut In aoiy wmj d«pwr%las fras iqr
Tlaws about the nXaAom ^aA ui« banaTit of ttxls at*p
fco all of Um countrlaa oppoaaA ^ ttaa asgrasaer na-
tlona vijo ara Intaraatad la tha Paelfla araa, I daalra
vary aamaatl/ to raeeoyMud Utat at tltla tlaa Z oall la
Uia Japaaaaa Aabaaaadora aad laand to tbmk a eeyy of
taa ooaprataaaalva baalo pr»peaal for a gaaar*! p««o«-
txil aattlaaant, aad at tlia aaaa tta* withhold Um
aodua tlTandl propeaal.
1178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Department of state
Memorandum of Conversation
1179
.Ler ;,7, 1-j41
PARTICIPANTS:
1180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
V
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1181
.^
1182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation
rARTlClPANTb
COPSES TO;
Tlie :,'.lni'itft;- ol Austri.llii called « ( • .^al. .
ilis pai'pnf;!^ was to Inquire wrietnei' trie p : • ra-is
Vivendi haa beeti abana.iiieu :.'f,:r ,v.ii'"itly , to »;,• iCii 1
replied tlifit I so considered it. tif; ax-.n'e: see .^reat.
concern and desli'ed ■■ 're !>oo-at iue movements
oi' Culan,;, r^ai-ansrc aru. iat,e!v.'ied to disooursge
trie iurtiiex' conaidoi'atiou ol' tlie tnoaus Vivendi . 1 re-
ferred to CO rltl-'-h cotm-ituil '::stions on the sub-
ject, adJiii i,n«,. ii.iii,Ljas3!i(Jt,,»' .iCiiirax was sti'oaij; Tor ti
ij.-opossi all tno w&i and tiuit i sympatiiizsd wiui iiis
sitoBtloii but I did not i'eci tnat the co.tun'unications
from Cnurctiill and Lden, witn qualil'ications such. 6s
were
X'
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1183
were in the:n, wouIg tie very neipl'til in a bitter fifiht
that would be projected by Ciilan_3 Ka'-ahek and carried
ror*8rd ay all oX t;ie malcontents in tue iJfiited States,
alt.'iiju .1 1 lolt unreservedly that Churchill end Eden,
like l,.ie -Titian /ciiaaaaaQor nere, womIu be lor whatever
we mi -at ao, evon t.vou^h not entirely to their llkln,!;
ir-, :■ inquire
l' •^asioo.fj ro ' SAe up *ii.i-, .: •'.•?r iiU't..--.r
.. ; -.r.'iB^ *»nu i replied i;.>.: 1 :.i'\ nol thlnic so,
- .; ofir.ar.'iea. j. lattuAna t,i.'t ...ii.^jtcrr lor
;.-■ :oopert.i ioii anu tn'.t oi hlr> JoV' ■. •■ .' .
1184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
* ■ ^:i.Jf> ■ - - .
\ ' - • >
t whTX^^JKS-. telegram StHT , y^m-m*mmmm
(full t«t»
Co«»etJDtylrt1»f »««ioo»ii«irrM». ooo«
c...lrr Bepartm.ntrf»tate , ^^
Fall nU ^^
Nlf*t letttr *"
Cktnt.to ^^ loTember "Sj^ 1941.
TOKYO (JAPAN).
* AKEKBAS3Y,
7^5
CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBAB3AD0R.
In the light of the attitude of Admiral Nomura and ""
,.vi Mr. Kurusu when they were handed on November 86 for con- *
_\V elderatlon the document described In a separate telegram -^
and of such Indlcetlona as we have cumulatively had of 1^
the general attitude of the Japanese CJovernment, It ap- *^
peare that the dlecuBSlons up to the present time have ^
not repeat not yet afforded any basis which gives much
promise of e satlefaetory comprehensive settlement. It
Is of course too early to eciopt any definitive opinion
whether the dlscuselonp will continue or will lapse,
but the orobablllty that they may lapse should not
repeat not be lost sight of.
The existence of such orobablllty makes It appear
advisable that we give soTie advance consideration to
varlo'is orobleme wh' ch msy as a consecuence arise In
connection with -lur Forel^r. Serv'.ce estsbllshment s in
Jnpaneae territory. As lar-se of the conversatl'-r
EnclphertJ hy
Stnt it/ optraiur M.. . 19 .
to
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1185
TEUEGRAM SENT r,n...,.m„-,,.,
fMlftt* comw»tm»t.ate€
6#MT Pij |>(tii ■OKOOwuwtn-mt ooM
«^isr: »«it«rfiiwttiiif #firf» "r:
f •"'»»• ... .
Ok»(a to
t Bight r«aalt 1b vlthar««««l of our dlploawtlo «od eonsu-
lar rttpr«««ntatlon froa Jupac, It tmuld •«•« to a* that,
without may Intention of to«ln« al«r«l«t or of too
h*«tlljr •nviCRgli^ sarlou* oontlQg«noi«>«, thl» question
•hvttld b* broui^ht to rowr Attention «r> th«t yon wqr
h&T* it w«ll iB Bind in o««« It should bcooiM ncoataary
for th« X>*partB«nt to oonsalt you In r«giirA to the aak-
Inf of arrimgMBvntt for th* paokln^ of offlolal and
paraonal •ffvota and the •^q^Krdltlou* handling of otbtr
aattara which would ba InvolTad In tha eloalng of our
Imbasay and Oonsulatea. It la, of oourae, daalred that
all phaaaa of tha oMttar ba oonaldeirad confldantlal and
that discussion of It ba kapt to a alnlauK.
^\
nS:GA:HES f% PA/H . -T
1186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
\^
Mtmoranelum of Conversation
DATE; November 28, 13-rl.
PARTICIPANTS:
T of tha British Subasay
'Jr. 5.,-nley K. Hornback,
/
-4
I-?. x,:\-^ course
•Ti'int nor t;,^
e-'. on tne »« nl? request. ^
;v..r-i :;;.'!:. ;.e ;.larer tfK.t trie yj ^
■■.■■v-,eii ^lovn" , It nov boco aes
.9 truaxi on> to trie -TTied lorces;
.:s to in-ulre of us
ascl/;red 07' lnii;;-<ted 4
■ ' t.. ■ t I -r.rxB not In
. tt?l lited ■^- any : ;
. ^* „
illon^ ■i:--<vf;- -'t'T-oken U'J
•■ovn" .
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1187
79716 O— 46 — pt. 14 19
1188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Telegram Sent
TO *m T]|AttflM(T*rr
•tONtONf :OtMTlAt OCTt
^tpBxfmtnt ni #tatr
!
MO m^: Wmhirr
!
i
'•a
o
o
rc'iriieu Frenc.
r>
>
M . ./?...
Charge D^-paftm^^t:
Sent A;. „t.„^-jr
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1189
Telegram Sent
Scpartmrtit of #tatr
1190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Telegram Sent
U'^partniPiit at S'tatp
. ( f < r- o>"»
Waskingion,
'.'Jf; \fct Zr re-
«ir forofB *
' a . ihl '' jf;v
r.srma-
rsw co'.t:,". up to
■ * • ! n
nee^s.
i i
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1191
1192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1193
Bcparlmritt v
1194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
PARTICIPANTS:
COPIES TO:
■■^- K
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Convenation
•^\
Tiie i.rltlsa Ainbart^ec. -3 requesi and
i soor; uisccvereo UiRt lio
to ciiecK on tnu afteriiiati. .- . i... .....Li.: .:! ,
tae. President auG mysell er.ci tise. Ca.'&iif.si wli,
rofei'enc© to the uuusticn ox tae propoi-<?a :;:oqv;? vlvendl .
liiia caused me to reinerk .Iti a i . :r_, -^.u j tuRt \:.e
-nechanlcs for the carryln.- on .. „ :.., <!.; rKiatioiis
between tiie ^'oveitiment s resistii' .'.,: re.=>.sor iu.t Ions Si'c
so complice ' ©d that it. is noeriy iiapoi.;; iole to cai'iy .
such relatlojis in t. maruie;- at aXi sfclV
and sound. X referred to tiie fact t .^ ,.>: I-f i.e^: ,
I'cr
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1195
1196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
zeal as the Japanese and the Sermans are displaying
instead of weakening 8n*i telling tne Cninese people
ti»at all of the friendly countries were now s:riviri^;
primarily to protect tbemaelves and to force an aijree-
ment between Cains ana Japan, every Chinese shoulc
understand fro:r such a procedure that the best possible
course was .j^-ii, ■ jui-sued anu tiiat :, ^ lor reso-
lute fiB;htin,_^ aiitll tiie liii-.-erl- . .r .< - e »ei-T cv
peace negotiations w;,! ■ _'^ ". ... .. , . .c-j..e vn v.i- ..c
obliged to enter Int ; .? .
X expressed tae viev. ■ i t- of
oui- relatic- ^ - :'.rt^ti-^ij '- ' :i«
inettf.- *!:• " .,_ ,.l.:luls cf 1... -: . ' .le
: "■ .hV>- Ifelked arc to who.;; . uPvu -ivsjr.
mv views for wiit- ' ai .'l:.. i r^- i- ."-t.!
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1197
;> 'WR:»i/».
1198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
M^
HimdM me by the Chinese AabaBBsdor,
Oecember 2, 1941. ^.-.— -*'
\7
in threti i.'jle :r .i:i.; uulea i.cweraber 27 uini ^d, ^r. ^uo
■i'al-c.;l ...J Jciiertlisdiiuo >- j.ii' I'li -;3l. t.,. t.: if l,.; j Cv. t > Ir
coaVl ufc.! .e in t'.c ^rusiaoiit ^:ij>^ t;.t .ccrtt ..-. jl ' L^te and
in im, f ana allien t.vl i-r j :icj ule j oi t.-.tir itrti -:i jj^jUc/.
..olii u t!:er:i ivve dtu<:if<i n.v ion- telt x- i ... oi . oviiPiorr
i,4 r^yorlij Ine ji aoui -t>lui<3 ueti-nie.i t-^e ecr-.t.i'.y tirni Uie
four cavo^.s lit t'* o;fice ui t:.o ..ecre t-.r.,-, and ulso my
riTiJort of U:e conver-satj uu oet'.vet-n t-.>. t;cr<,tir.7 ujid .'lyself
in nia ■.ptii-t::ii.nt on li.t cvenin: o: t ,e ^fai::. _oth ti, e
jeiier '.lidai. .0 ^um li.t :orei .'n ijiiol-.r .>rft rtiiyaux-ea uy
ti .e d.. ..i>>a ti.eti c iiuu n._li.-t:,l Cj irit uiiJtrl.vin ,; tneae coiivcrsationa.
» .t .,■ *ici.fet. .. -. to ucint oat ti. t^.ti nitea -tutes jovtrn-
■r---.it t.,-; lulio . .1 , .uc;tii v.iCi., i-.cu.d', oi Vfcj\.' .-rf.it a f -; l.?;f:ce ,
• i---.t 1^1 ;ii:vt MCt; li. lo-j iipii-'. oj -1-. a o . t.. ii. .ijc oi' t,.c
0 c ei.n :
!i) ^ .tt iii.;,OBt iuc.-eai uly ;;r«'»t faitn o" toe
iyi.iii«;a<; Mi-vj'lt iu -.c tiLic;-.c oV K. fe '.conuraic
p»c^L- J.--, oa ' .1 i t-.At. ;.■ ..ic." . I' get.! In I'Oi'ce
lor t-ie i-jat lou.- .^., Ui. i.j o. ci. -,. ..i i..c mere
ruiiio.' V >.■ J-...V i^a.iol 0 1 1 'i t.. o it rel^i:, ilioa iias
nli'tuvj' ot ; ;n ti.' proviuct ,- tr .1.' i ..'iic.y fcel-
iii-; liii-.' J--. ■-' .1 ^ .i iS.
(_t ,;.-,.. '-..ji 'J ..' f -ir: i. ., l t tii C'jl.at;d
(,i.rti.. .,; v c ..■ >-• ■ i'-; -ii ■■ ••■ic .. aur, ,. t;. e
p-'.al • ,c.. J ■ - ■ i i;.' on . ove.iJur -. ; ■-•/ ,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1199
I'el. :.L-t . 0 u ;f--_ .. -- '..•>-.. t .-fcSlr; c 13 01.3
t..- ,:; . Ci-J l:.;; ui .'I ■ l..!,t cil < .. .- . .'^ ....LrL>/-.e aOt
to -C'/r. ^ c- ; t, . •_ r ; t» ixj I .t. t t. tr iilt.',a '„'! tes
.vui-ild uot i..lt.-fe:'u . • ' • .■ In ...;:.'...
(. ) Vi.t.- wj.ult vjucdtiu. ^^ ( i ,;c .1. lo -• c ii i-„a
Bpiritat^l: It it H .question o' t. e .T.oj'-.le of
a wiiole" f.fco pli wiica as ut-t i li-aliu a very
ijard wur 5 ':r ii. ir ,:en^-.-- >,(.' t ..il'', t. c; .,. Ic,
In its i.'-.ruj:.i p ani Icr: • ., .::-ri;. ;, i.-- ,lr,nea
It.-) .<i.'eut ni-t-t u;i t..t-, i.,"-crii:.t o.. j situation
turaiii- ill (-■ .r Xt-vor ■ . .^..■-.^■, un trie
eco;i<j(r,ic w^tiitiCo t.i I t • •-. jc.:., c n, "., c .j/z'^ra
;.;xVt: Dte -.Oil Ic LUl it.lv iC/i'-c a. riff t ..fc
it.il ;::-': -:. , it J :; .lO exa rtrft. li u». l^^ s-.. t;.at
I,:. is laest^oa . i.injUii.erjtiill,, afi'ccts l^.i. ^ -irit
o: ouj- .i •i.t.it. 'orces ui,^ i. ;. ;.< ople .
(■») Xi. i :; t-rlt-ri. X .'.. , t.t. _.rcJ-:i ..;iiatcr
telle -icr •...■ I ,..<, C.'- " .. . . _■ ll"-. t.;:at
a C'-rttii;i ltu.;ejc- in ti.e ..ort„ i^.l-I i.tclfita by
na~ie) ::ii •.•] l u-. so yua^fed l,. c ice. ; u, , -.t,-, .;e;;ing
o; our i;.tor.,a', :i^> ..i.I ^'.iuc.i t_. *. " -_.- ,i>'.'tB
uetri -.t ,1 .
r«c' . 3 1'.» .ce.
. c. tio:i o; c r .var o-i"
1200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
t, ,t I0.1 • .v:ii- jti ^-Ai
^v1.. -rtjic-r 1 i ,■ ■ ■ . 1- :,
COr.V'j; .0 '- .': ,r _/ ■. i
oy I'.T '.-..inorsic ;.r - . . i-n o ; v • • ; , • .■ 'it
s.-fe ctnaot '■::';.•: '.- ;'it-i. a ■.•r .1 . 1, ij T' ■ * ..■ v:-l
po.vttre.
IZI U. l':\>o", L- - -.■;-•: ' .' ^. .-. .l . -• ■ o Teat
«r4i tii i •. -I I o . . I..'; ii.i,...t .f ,1 ^ I t..' I r,, to t-'-.fc
t;...ija j-jii t'-.l ;'f 1 .ici !'i-.£' r iit,-;."... •-:. ..ci' t-, j l. i .< .,ii-
•;t.-it«;ii jo.' trjirae nt .
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1201
EXHIBIT NO. 19
1202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
■&
There is attfechf*
Congress ,
thfi off.toor« of t;
tlone, *:,'■:; *':vv
pot>»»d message.
r oX' tlse pro-
>u toda:y It has not b«en
' - irsft a socr.'i' •' • ,,
to read it, «■ ■
r thfl week-end and
tiOJiS,
I also onclo"-" "■ -'»•'»■ -;■ -■ •■ '^'■■r ; b «.•-;.« ^, -, ■ . > , < ,, •
of a possible mes; -. - r,.,
Jr'y p"rso:;Rl view continues ea or; yesterday tc b« ttifit
Its sendin- «111 be of doubtfv
fur; oae of riakirif* a r^-corc, Tt 5!i.;;-.i. ev?;.. cs-.iSf- such
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1203
79716 O — 46 — pt. 14 20
1204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1205
1206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
\. t ft
that 1-
worl<5
In the PhlllDpl' f
acquainting an Asia* --ith the f tsersoaal
freedo.-n .' self-government that -»d
by our own Rec-iablic, Our oonr-'
the Filipino people inl ind©pender'.t
cosn nonwealth. At the B^me ri-sri, t-jB ''trst.ntf'd experiment
has bern and la of f * •?- to ua ,
other people!". It is i , ■ .
of the Unit'?C "'..t^a l.. -IeI lii • ^rn
Pacific a nation frlenaly ' ■ , - c^'
a?TOci^tlon rtn^l -—-f « - .-.^-^ - y^^ , ,-..,.-,^
the Orient tr.^ ; ,« n--3^t.\:- -if*
good r^-'px:*.^ • . ■•
and to Ptabl . • • . . ■ In genet- ., . •
ree'i*^'^*
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1207
at lone
.>nt
_,.,-, ...,-i of interests in the
,f -,,_,,, ,^,, ^ »v,,. '!rated states B'Tiov,^,
. . :"he a'll-
•■■.fc'T^'nc--' wTs .-nalntenftnce
envlsai. ■ ; act Ion of
-tlon of co-Bp*'tltion In the Pacific
1208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
i
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1209
entere-
.hem»«iv
''OTTfi O?
1210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1211
?nd!
1212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1213
1214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and ■■ ■ . I
!r they
/ s e 8 .
= "attacked"
-rr s Hies
oonj.T.lc, political
leaders declare
Ions under this
■ deer, beet suited
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1215
-11-
"a-^ -Tfl q ♦- > n p ^ -^T~, p <■ ^ ■>• ', Tfl ■•<■'' t "^1 -• t ft '"• '
y-v /.o-^o^^ oonfl^t, of ■'* f^r^'"'''! 1 p^— no-.-'
wn-' expc-itn' -nro^roa 5l vp Infiltration, '->pn«='trMr j on and
enclrc"" e'lont ^-r^n-h which '^ne natl'^n a'tpr Bn^Vr.r^r is
'ubdiiP'"^ an^ onfli.ivetl e'th^r bv PCtu^l force o-^ ty
fv.pcq*ci r)f fore?.
Aft«>r this fwhlon orn^ ^urouln-r thlp nolicy of
connurPt bv "^orce, Tanan estsbli'^hed herself in 'forea;
v'orked her vay into pnfl ■*"', n«il Tv spi''ed Mfinchurl?; has
^.'^Mrr-ht for t>^e '-last four ami a half year? to subjuc^ate
''^hinn; has, flurln"' th» ne~^ ofl of our nesrsti't ions '«'ith
her, invidec* Tn-iochlna; pnr" now, threatens with Imiilnent
attac^*: v-^riou'^? nel<7>hborl n.-/ area** lnc''u<1inff' even the
Phillnnlne <^ .
This situation, t>recir>itatef^ solely bv Jaryinese
ao'B:re?='ion, hol<1?! unmistakable threats to our interests
eq-oeci-^lly our interest in neace and In •peaceful trade,
RTir^ to our reorionaibility for the sectirity of the
Phllinoine Archlr>elairo. The " puccespful defense of the
United <?tate8, In a military sense, la der>eni3ent uron
1216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-12-
suonlles of vltnl materials which ve I'^^nrr-t in l^rge
ouantit'.»=? from t^: 18 r»rl on of th^ world. To rif»rmlt
Ja-nane?e domjnation an^^. control of thf» r-a.^or Pources of
worln gu-ir>"'J^8 -^f tin a n-^ rubber nnfl +:unf«t'»n would
Jeopardize -our safety in « manner nnd to sn px'i"«>i.'" ^>-:-i*
cannot bp tolerated. Aion*^ '-rit-h rhi=' vou'''^ to — .ract"lc?l ■
Ja-^anese C''>ntrol of th'^ Pacific.
r'nlp-'a th*^ -nresent course of cvpnt? in t^e Far "n^t
Is halted and consir'er-'tl on<^ of ,'u3tlce, humanity '^nd
fair denlini^ are restored, v^ vrill vritn«> "=! in thpt r^pp-ion
of the v;orld precisely what hi? alr^Tdy trnnp-ired
throu-^.o\'t t:~.'^ continental lif^lt'^ of "urone %*iere ^Itler
8ee'<fi domln' on by ruth"'?'"!^ ■^orce.
A nroc-rsm on the -oert o-f sny country for publue-atlon
and ex-ololtatlon of a hu«re oonuTRtion and a vn--'- '^ortio^
of the world i« of incfll cul^ ' 1 e concern to every other
nn t i on .
'^nrou'-''" '^'■.t the-- period in vVsirv .■^a-sn hap be^n ToVin''"
it clcr th Bt such le- her n-^o n^nm , the H-ov^rn'ri'^nt of
the United St "tea had endeavored to •n'='r=!uade thf^- "rovprnwent
of Jaran thp ■^ 'a-^-^n'" 'f^^t 'nr^r^'-'^'^ Me in maint-i ni nr
and cul^lveti.nc friendTv reV'>:ion" w' th the ''n1 ted "t.-tA?
and vlth a"" 1 other countrlet' t'^ "- ~ Ipvp in r^r-r'a-r'^- v ^^nd
•oeaceful nrocesaea.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1217
-13-
^ov the ^5Bt f* c-ht •TT^nth", conversations have been
carT\fr* on ■'-*»-->--"n the SecretaTn"- of 3tPte and the
pr.po«^ont^ on behalf of •■>-..-• ■•-.i*-p-^ ^i-oi-pa, pfid the ''orels^
Vln'_''tpr p Tf? r>-nc~'PT o' 'n-^-n, for t^ f^ -^u-n-^ope of 8rrlvia<^
'^^ov •"' rn "po * -• .
"^•"ou.-h ^M^ t'^io f:,r,<^ij.n 'i-'t'. -ir*^ th" "Tovorr. Tent of the
-^'nlt-ori 3':.^*-p^ h"° "-pc^ c. -^ - - - f-- ..-^ >^^^ ^ «- ^ ?uo>->ort of bapic
orlnclnXP'' v*-'ch s'-o-.j''" ~ -.,-.>--'; j ?.*>-■ rn' t ^onnl rel'tion".
"^h? -r". n?*oie- '"-■r v'-- \r'- -.-o ^-^v^^ stoid In theae ^-1 «< cur plans
ffi°y be =u'^ ~ni"l "prl rp •'"r'-o''---.
1218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
•14-
:--The principle of iuviolabillty of territorial lnt.v:rlty
and sovereignty of each axid all notions; the principle of
non-interference in the internal affairs of other
countries; the principle of ei'iality, i. = ;' .::'t:,y
of comiaercial opportii.iity aud treat'iifat ; i:., j-ple
of reliaiue upon international cooperation mal j-..- . • i ^xa-
tion for the prevention and pacific settleaent of contro-
versies and for iiaprovdiaeat of international conditions
by peaceful methods and processes, basically ti.ese are
the principles of peace, law and order and fair oealing
anong nations.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1219
'.i vjltjn r'jpture,
- , •' : -: n :,TP-'.'^riiod to" t.As country alon,/
.t^r-douiln -tpd movem'-nt
• f vorl'.i concueat In that of r,nlf-def enr,c,
Th'^ fundament-* '- ry onr Ja.-. n
ilffTent froiiithe fundr!m»^ntal Issue between
tnls
79716 O — 46 — pt. 14 21
1220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
/L
this country ; r.d ]1bz1 Gernaany. Concleely strted, It Is
an Issue of autocracy versus self-0eterniln8tlcn, en
Issue of master and slave relationship amon^: the peo^^les
of the earth versus independence of nations and freedom
of peoples.
The whole vorld is presented vith the Ipeup v.hether
Germany, Italy and Japan are to conquer and rule the
earth or are to be dissuaded or orevented, by whatever
procerreB may be necessary, fium pursuit of pollclec of
com^uest.
The question immediately presented in our Far Eastern
affairs Is vhether the United States is or la not to
stand by vhlle Japan goes forward with e program of
conuueet by force*-ln dipret;r.rd of lav, In disregard of
treatle'-, In clpret^rd '^f others' i'lf;,hts and Interest,
In disregaiNi of any and all conventions or conslderptlcns
of morality and of hurLanity--now in -^-otfrn Apia on^. the
"ectern Pacific, ultl.Ti tely furthnr -.:'l ". ,. ^r. our own
councils there are a d^itummmkiy -.ni -: • : . - ^^ lapueo:
There are IsaueD bptwe*^
between confldenc-" ' ' '"far; i. p ■ •■;
brtveen clear un %-. ■: • .
between wlsdoii :na :o..-,, .,._l.-.' ;. ,. ^;,-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1221
-17- .
bei ir s:i:T' , netw^aen the concept of peace at any
price ■•■:- - f peace at a price coimuensiorate with
the rnVrn -^f rs'-ce; between accur:;te -^ppriisal and
inf: ar cvn .; bet.veen full
use • . : "^r ■ r.erial and morMl resources.
-•;icn which is
liy utterly destroyed
the i.or'" ipied by Jaoan the peaceful and
I'itsbl" -.ations whicr. the United States had
■.?ly en: ■- -•. Sevrtstated a natioa v.-r;lch
- many cent'.. . • devotion to the arts- of peace ..r.-,!
-.•r''luence vn the we.'rt^ "n
ireaten ■ nsrorrn a
.. c-:nt ' .v_ oae dc .incited b- .litary and
• ' ' . ' ■ / -of war .
1222 CONGRESSIONAL IN\'ESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-18-
of the Fil- ::cw depends. It would ruin the lifelong
efforts and iav«3taients of thouaauda of American citizens
who have transferred their homes and busi^ass activities
to the Philippines on the faith that A-aerican principles
of freedom and A.'aerican methods of government would contiau*
in those Islands. It would forever terminate the prestige
and influence of the United States which the American
experlieent in the Fhilirnine Islands has been establishing
throughout the Orient.
If the Japanese should carrj out their now threatened
attacks upon and were to succeed in conquering the regions
w ich they are menacing in the southwestern Pacific, our
comaerce with the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya would
be at their mercy and probably be cut off. Our imports
from those regions are of vital Importance to us. We need
those imports in time of peace. V/ith the spirit of exploi-
tation and destruction of commerce which prevails among the
partners in the Axis Alliance, and with our needs what they
are now in this period of emergency, an interruption of our
trade vdth that area would be catastrophic.
V/e do not want war vdth Japan, and Japan does not
want war with this country. If, however, war should come,
the fault and the responsibility will be those of Japan,
The primary cause will have been pursuit by Japan of a
policy
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1223
-19-
, olicy of f-.-.',i^,Te .;:ion--in t;.
-lilitant inilitLU'lstic leadership iies . ■•,
violated tre.iti ■, . i- : i . r- _: :■ ; -.'r.' -u aeatroye:* ■ -ty
and lives of cur nrtior.als, inflicted ho-rible suf f eT-i:i-'.:3
upon peoples who are our frit-nds, interfered with our
trade, ruined the lesiti-nate bu.^ine.-s cf r.iany of our
nationals, compelled us to make h': • ■ r.dituren for
defensive armament, made threats :^^,■-^ir\.^t us, put and kept
many of our people in a constunt stftte of anxiety, and,
in general, made Japan a world nuisance and nude of Japan
a nenaoe to our security and to the cause of peace, of
freedon and of justice.
Our policy in relations with Japan should be and is
influenced net by fear of what attacks Japan, acting
ujilawfully and with resort to force may make upon us
but by determination on our part to 7ive the ut-.03t support
of v/hich we are reasonably capable to the fundamental
principles of order and security and justice to which we
have been and are cc:-'jTiitteQ, with confidence that it is
within our capacity tc withstand any attack wnich anyone
may make upon us because of our pursuit of that course.
1224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
8TRICTLX CONFXPEWTIAL NoT«mb»r 29, 1941
PROPOSED HKSSAaE FROM THE PRSSIDKNT TO THE
EMPEROR OF JAPAN
Almost a oantury ago th« Pre8ld«nt of th© Unitvd
States addre8>«d to tha Eaparor of Japan a masaaga
extending the offer of friendship of the people of the
United Statea to the people of Japan. That offer waa
aooepted, and in the long period of unbroken peaoe and
friendship whioh has followed, our respective nations,
through the virtues of their peoples, the sound
ohar&cter of their respective Inatlttitlons and national
structures, and the wladoaj of their leaders and
x*ulers — espeolally in Japan your illustrious grand-
father the Emperor Melji — have proapered and risen to
a position of being able substantially to Influence
humanity.
Only in situations of extraordlnery importanoe to
our two countries need I address to Your Majesty
messages on matters of state. I feel I should now so
address you because of the deep and far- reaching
emergency which appears to be in formation.
I>evelop»©ntP are occurring in the Pacific area
which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all
humanity
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1225
-2-
huraanlty of the benaflolal infXuono* of th« long p«ao«
between our two countries. Those deTelopoents, oontaln
traglo poBilbllltlee,
The history of both our oountrlee affords brilliant
examples In which your and my predecessors have, at other
tlMSB of great crisis, by their enlightened deolslons and
flcts, f-rrefited trends nnd directed national polloiea
plong new onri better oourses — thereby bringing bless-
ings to the rvftoples of both countries and to the peoples
of oth«r lands.
fftelin£^ cleanly concerned over the r- re sent trend of
events, I nddreas rnyself to Your Majesty nt this isoment
in t' p fervent hopfi thnt Your Majesty may, ns 1 mm doing,
thouKht to w.^yp of dispelling the dark clouds which
over the relations between our two countries and of
T^ntorln.- '>n'-l -^Int'^inlnF thf trn^dltionil etpte of amity
'.''herein t.'Oth our people g rr^-^y contribute to lasting peace
nn«l es^c-.jrlty thrnu|£;hr)ut the Pacific Ter^.
1226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 20
COPY OF A MiCMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT COVSRINQ
A PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TC THE
EMPEROH OF JAPAN, THIS MEMORANDUM WAS 3ENT TC
THE PRESIDENT ON OCTOBER 17, 1941. T'rit. PHCP03ED
MESSAGE WAS NCT oEN'i a:: J N' FUKTHH-K ACTIC'N WAS
TAKEN.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1227
Cctob«r 17, 1941.
KEH.CRA.NPIIM rOR THE F'^Ka^DEilT
Th«r« IB attachtd » virmTX of your prooof^id aeo-
In Tls-* of («) the ettltui* ehevn by th« Jnonntn*
Mli'.sttr h«r« In a two-hour oonva/'aatlon lust »r»nlng
*rlth Kr. Wall»3 and ■ytalf, i.nUo«tlng that t;ia Jaoaneaa
<JoT»rfUi«n": lailre? to oontlnu* lt» exoVorj»tory conreraa-
tt-n* v'lth u«, ccu-Ve '-Ith ■-h'? f«ct tnat the Jaoansna
Mn'Bt»r '^, at his requeat, ooatn^ to call aipsin thla
wftemocn for a further extonflad d^lacuflalon, (b) tha
■•^•aga rpct'ved by Aitbaaaador Orew fr-^a Prince Konoya
(through I'lirce Kcnoye'p crivnte sacratary) (raportad In
Mr. Orev'fl tela^r^m- 1«4«, October 17, 11 a.m.) that tha
new J».r»r\fe cabinet vi^uld be -sne alnearaly daslroua of
ImnroTlng rel»tl-na with the United Stetea and of oon-
tlnulog the •xclor^tory oor.vsrsatl.T.a, and (c) tha word
■'9 t\!i¥t tb-t O^ri'trsl Tojo. • <ono>e adnerent and a
*»oderata".
1228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-e.
"■odtrat**, ha« b«*a d*«lj{n*t«A hj th« Eaparor to fora a
ntw oablnat, w» inolln* to th« tIbw that It *iould ba pra-
■atura to aand tha px*opoaad aasaag* to tba Eaparor pand-
IRC furthar elarlfle'^tion of the tltustion in Japan and
of tha probabla attituda of tha aaw goTemaant.
balMMT*:
ll««i«ft af
prayoMd
fiswiiin ' ^- J ^*'^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1229
FHOPOJiD MJt:ioAa* FROM TH^ ]?Rk.'olJmf fO THE
^HF'£HOh or JAl^AM
Only ono« and in person <n4 on -"n «»iB«r{'enoy »ltu«tlon
hft»« I. nddr*afl«d ^our lapsrlal Kajtsty on mstt«re of 'tnt«.
I f»«l I should <igftin sdcrtSB Your Majesty because of •»
fieeper find ipore fur- reaching eaergency which appears to
be In the prooene of foifwatlon. As Your Majesty knows,
conver«»".tlone nnve been in progress between reprefisnt-tlTes
of iur two OoTernments for irany rsonths for *•'? '•urr.oee of
preventli t; »ny prtenslon of .irc«d conflict In the I "lolf lo
aren. Th^t hae ^ esn our tjre«t ourpose ea I think It h«8
equally been the ►re t purpose of Your ^<-'Je8ty.
I reraonally would h.nte been h':-)'->y even t ■> tr-'vel
thousands of miles to meet with your Prime Minister, If
In Hd»Tnce one or two b«3lc nccorda -^ould h'^ve been
realized so that the suo'ceas of siiich r. oonfererce ''CJld
hj»ve teen sfceured. I bope<^ th- t f ,-■ p : f-orc'e v'ulc! be
re«ched. ""hr fir-t rel tef' * p '■ *' r!t. f H^lns
'iiiC the seccnt re! 'teC to . It p^^^-er Jftf^an
r.or t'e Hnlted 3t tes voi.: . , - ' to
the f-'clflc :rei.
If T'ereistent reports are true tjv t the .'-r f«-ae
Governii.ent la cci.Qideri;i(i arred t'c-s »t:lr.8t the
-ovlet "i-lon or r.galnrt i^rltlp} or -utch or Incependent
territory
1230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
fwrifrf i« tk* wmHk, «Im •kAriimi 99mX% wmIA, •#
FMlflA «»•«. liMii AttMk* WM134 ■••••Mirlljr i»f«iv«
fh* 0«i««A itatM oppoaM uy fnrmiayt ^f oeAMMt.
It «9«14 lik* to ••• |Ma»« iMtwMa •'^NM •«• 0Ik&««. 2t
«9«ia Ilk* to ••• t9—4k9m of tho Mfto wtatid— i aai
tra4« eon4«oto« o« « fikir buoio. If J^aptti MMlA |«i«
vith «• to pFosorvo poaoo tii tho famltf «• «m1« %• i
001/ too totppy to ronuM aonMl ooMOMNiial p[a«ti«M« v&tll :!-;
tho oolo oxeoptlM of eortoitt ortloloa ittiXth w wot kMV m
•t ho»o for ottr ova dofonoo tni. that of oil ml tho p
Aaorlooa agMlnst potolblo «(iTO«clon froa oMiPoA.
If on tho othor hand Japna «or« to otairt now atU-
tary opanttlont, tho 0nlto4 Stntoo, la •ooordaaoo vttli
her policy of poaeo, wowlrt ho oory oofioaoly AOft««NMt
ana ifOtt!.<5 h«Te to aotlt, by taking «iny and nil otoyo
Khioh It Blgit 4oon neooaamry, to wporvnt «(iy oirt*noi«a of ^f
auch oondltlon of war.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1231
D«e«Hb«r 6, 1941.
USMOMSDW FOR TH£ PRESIPgHT
Purduaat to your request, th*r« la aeat you here-
with a dreft of e ■eeea^e froe fou to the Eaperor of
Jepan.
I uBderetend that, prior to eendlrig the seaeege
to the Eaperor, you here In alnd aendlng e oieaaaige to
Chleng Kal-ahek in vhlch you vould, vithout quoting the
text of the aeeaeee to the Emperor, outline to hla the
aubatenoe cf the "atand-atlll* airrengeaent vhleh you
oonteaplate propoalng to Jepeo.
Trom point of view of enauring the eonflAentlel
nature of ysur aeaaagc to Chiang Kal-ahek, It la aug-
geated that you eight eare to call la the Chlneae Aa-
beaaador and i>r. doong, to leoreaa upon both of thee
the urgeaoy and eecreey of the atatter, and to aek the
Aabaaaadnr ta ooiuiunloate to Chiang Kal-ahek, by his
•oat aeoret coda, your aeaaaga.
Kneloaure :
Draft neB»a<;e to
the Eaperor of Japan.
1232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
D«e«ab«r 6, 1941 .
IP THE mimpf m0
I f*el X should «ddr«sa Xour Majssty b«oaus« of th*
d«*p and f«r-r»aehlng •acrgcney whloh appear* to b« In
foraatlon In relations between our two countries. Con-
▼ereatlon* imrm been In progreee between representatlTes
of our t»fo (JoTernaieHte for aany aonthe for the purpose
of preTentlng any extension of armed conflict m the
Pacific area. It hae been ay sincere hope that *hl«
would be aehlered and I aa sure that It has equally been
the alneere hope of Xour Majesty.
Deyelopaente are now occurring In the Pacific area -
which threaten to deprive eaoh of our nations and huswin-
ity of the beneficial Influence of the long and unbroken
peace which has been aalntalned between our two coun-
triee for al«io»t a century. Those derelopaents are
auggeetlTe of tragic ooseiblllties.
In theee olrouastarces, where continuance of pres-
ent trend* Imperil the now tenuous threads which still
hold our two countries In ansloable rel«tlr^n«hip, I feel
that no possibility should be oTerlooked which might
serre
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1233
Bsrr* to relieve the lme(!l«t* situation and thue enable
our tvo Oovernnents to work out In a oalmer ataosrihere a
■ore perjuinent eolation. I mm eure Your Kajeety will
share asy feellntrs in thle regard.
The hlstorj of both our oountrles afforda brilliant
ejouaplee in which your and »y oredeceaeore have, at
other tiaae of great oriaia, by visa decisiona and en-
lightened aote, arreeted harmful trends and directed
national oolleiea along new and farelghted ©oufsea —
thereby bringing bleaelnge to the people* of both ooun-
triea and to the neoplee of other nations.
With the foregoing considerations in Mind I propose
now the conelualon of a teaoorary arrangeaent vhleh
would envisage cessation of ho9tilltl«s for a period of
ninety days between JaD<*r and China and an undertaking
by each of the OoTernaents aost concerned in the Paoifio
area to refrain froa any aoTeisent or use of ar»ed force
against any of the other parties Suring the period of
the teoBTjorsry arrsngeasent . If the Jaoanese OoTernment
is favorably disoosed toward conclusion of such an ar-
rangement I would be glad oroBiptly to approach the other
SoTernments concerned with a view to obtaining their
assent and oo^ltsent.
In
1234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-?-
In order to glTO thone aovernaent* an Ineentlrt to
•nt«r into this arrangement, I further "roisoae that,
toward rallerlng existing aprirehensions, Jaosn reduce
har arsad foroes in French Indochina to the nuaber
whioh, Japan had there on July r-6, 1941, and that Japan
agree not to eend new oontingenta of tin&^i force* or
■atarlel to that area during the ninety-day neiioCi of
the taaoorary arrangeaent .
If the coiunltwents abore entleaged can be otatain«<!,
1 wouia undertake as a further part of the general ar-
rangeaent to auggeat to the OoTemment --^f J«t^«n find to
the Oovern«ent of China that those Oorernaenti enter
Into direct negotiations lookln»T to a 'peaceful settle-
ment of the difficulties wh' ch exlut between them. Such
negotiations might taJke plaaa In the Phllloplne Inlands
should the Japanese and the Chinese OoTernmants «o desire.
In as mueh as the Chinese Ckivemaent has be6n cut
off from Its orlnolpal Industrial areas, I believe It
equitable that during the temporary period of the pro-
posed arrangement the United States should continue
sending matarlal aid to China. I may add that the
amount of material which China le able under urenent
conditions to obtain Is email In comoarlaon with the
ajaount
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1235
•■ouBt of uitcrlal that Japan would tava through Alaoon-
tlnuanea of oparatlona for a parlod of thraa sontha.
It la my thought that whlla thl* tasporary arranga-
aant would ba In affaot our two Oovernaanta eould oon-
tlnua thalr oonvaraatlona looking to a paaoaful aattla-
■ant In tha antlra Paalflo araa. tha k.lna of aolutlon
I hava had and oontlnua to hava In alnd la ona In whleh
Japan, on tha Itaals of apr>llcatlon of tha prlnolnla of
aquallty, would ba provldad thiv>ugh aonatruotlTs and
paaoaful nethoda opoortunlty for tha fraar aece**! to raw
■atarlals and msritata snd ganaral axohsni?" for
tha IntarohAnge of Idaae, and for tha davelopaant of tha
talanta of har paopla, and would thus t>a anablad to
aohlere tho«« national airlrationn whtch Japan's laadara
hara of tan proelalaad.
In aaklng thlt proposal, I exoraas to tour Msjasty
tha farrant horsn that our two {JoT^rnaanta aay find waya
of dl»p«Hln« tha dark olom** which loo» orar tha raia-
tlona betwaan our two countries and of reatorlng and
maintaining the tradlt'nna"! condition of aalty KharaVn
both ■''- "■-■-■-- --•■ ---trlhuta to laatlng . neaca and
aaeurS.- . aolflo araa.
.aMiiiiiifiiii^^^^
79716 O — 46— pt. 14 22
1236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1237
1238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAKL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1239
1240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1241
1242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1243
1244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1245
''....//.. JfA^
f**ii-
1246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 21
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
to-^
-::::/
/
-4
O
O
m
x
JmA,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1247
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
T|
1248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR
:s5
ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1249
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memoran<ium of Conversation
U .,
PARTICIPAN !
o
o
o
COPIES TO:
V^
o
o
si'-.-
Ainbasfiadcr oRiii^o &t nls re j^uest fend
ompanyln- memory ndum, wnloh is sell-
wp f- veij' doEirour of asoeit^iliil:.: was
veiTi.T.ont v.oalc do il tn« :rltisn
asiOF.f; ujiCerthkliii/ to ostahllsh a
•u«. . 1 Rsld that the President vff:
••r;ifi- aiio tnot. i. v,oal.. In. »-il
-'foj'e nl:
: ■ ■ "C to
^^
(7)
-J
>
1250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1251
O
o
O
-0
c
>
CD
79716 O — 46 — pt. 14 23
1252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Royal Netherlands Legation
washington
-^
^ )
O
>
o
Tl
o
o
G)
01
v.»« rtX-^*^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1253
Collect 'D«y Sctv.
iMljjitl.ltr-
fuil tlte
Day lettf
Telegram Sent
Bepartnimtt of ^tatr
O »€ TBAN»W!T7eO
JftwA in^^ofi.
.V?
~t<.
EncifAtnd is .
Stnliy <^m(d<x
.A.
c /Oi- erv*^ r.iJr7 0. dX^t-c
il^
f^
i^V
1}
>
o
:i3
■"1
1254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 22
(Seal of Prime Minister)
10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.
Draft of Parallel Communications to the Japanese Government
Declaration by V. 8. Government that:
1. Any further encroachment by JAPAN in the South West Pacific would
produce a situation in which the U. S. Government would be compelled to take
counter measures even though these might lead to war between the U. S. and
JAPAN.
2. If any Third Power becomes the object of aggression by JAPAN in conse-
quence of such counter measures or of their support of them, the President
would have the intention to seek authority from Congress to give aid to such
Power.
Declaration by E. M. O.
Same as above, mutatis mutandis, the last phrase reading : — "* * * their
support of them, H. M. G. would give all possible aid to such Power."
Declaration by Dutch Oovernment.
Same as that by H. M. G.
Keep the Soviet Government informed. It will be for consideration whether
they should be pressed to make a parallel declaration.
August 10, 1941.
U. S. Naval Communication Service
N. C. S. 387
From : The President
To: OPNAV "160115"
SRS
RESTRICTED
For Secretary Hull X I land Saturday afternoon and hope to reach Washing-
ington Sunday morning. I suggest you come to White House about eleven or
eleven thirty Sunday and that you ask Nomura to see us at White House about
four thirty in afternoon. All well best regards
Rooseivelt.
121645
Atlantic Fleet
Secret Secret
Outgoing
Routine
It seems highly desirable that you and I should see Nomura as soon as I get
back X Please ask the Ambassador to be ready to come to the White House
either Saturday or Sunday X I shall let you know the exact time as soon as
possible X White Twenty X For Secretary of State from the President.
TOD:
From:
AUGUSTA
Date
Aug 12, 1941
Originated
Released
Action:
OPNAV, Washington
Routine:
Priority:
All Despatches considered DEFERRED
Unless Originator Checks Higher Class-
ification.
Formation:
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1255
Draft of a proposed ooBinunloatlon to
the Japanese Ambaas&dor brought to
the Departaent by Mr. Welles following
conference between the President and
Mr. Winston Ohurohlll
NOTE
This draft was not given to the Japanese
^baseador. See cowaunloatlone Riven
by the President to the Japanese
Ambseaador on Axiguat 17, 1941.
m
M
1256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1257
1258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1259
1260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1261
1262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 22A
to tb« <2oT««isis«n%s of 3rei
mSi of Cbim that thftsr ««.'
tion thftt '18I»^ bftA M «gfT«»eH^ 3.n*#ftt*c'-
to IndO*lRl^MI OKI thftt ^sea^ •vma^'K^ Hgr'--^<t^ t^^"
«na' rav Materials of lisdooMndE alNBOlJ M ^^sst'^
all poy/mro on equal t«ni#, Th» Prt«i<?l«v5t et;
that ha mmla b« vUling to «igg«8t to t£% pc'^;^r':
tionad that timf ttndartaJca t^a ^adaratlss,
tha Ohltad Stataa would be isllllEig tc .Ics
unAaFatandit^ that th« (h/rmvxxmni ot v«p£-
dlqpoaad to sake a aisllar dadlaration and waald
ftti'thar disposed to witbdr&ir Its silXtery «?!■•
foroee froa Indoohlna.
3
'i
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1263
■ '. ass S'i a.1. x iS'i
1264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-3~.
..u the southwestern J^clfto areas ezoept ■'^
n.a' tits Japanese troops -now
in ??enoli ladocfc-ina will i?e witMrawii fostb'l
th c -ileitieiit of tiae <JhlRft Ir.cldeat".
«t months the Owemaenteof tlie Ucited
of Japs.n, frurou'-'b tjae Secretary of State afiyA^^
Japmieoe AialbaEr-ict'.-_ ^, - v^ii^iiinj^to?:, have angaged _«, .„.-^„
'pi'otyaottd conver8.atlons. "Riese conreraatioris had
vltlniate r'-achiflr 't a;rr<=>fn}<5nt» Isfteed upoa M
.>'-:^ J V jj laoiplas and
3B tjis
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1265
1266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
.^•BOtt IS* the ?ap8ae»» ^toir».waaes£t Jm« la .©^«fflpl«ti©a am^
.&»» »t®pa auoi «« tJuiti whl^k it M« 3r*««atX3f talt^ji -si^
regflupd to Indoohisa <«> it It i&t«Me to ium tbe fOjslti«a&
wliioli it )»■ attalatd la t»4oo£dfi« la f«£tlH»r«i&B# of Ss&stil^'
«otl<»i «gal3ut flueqr oelgb^oria^ atml; aad afecnild s«e& 90a,«
▼ematiocui a®ftta b# •atered up<m« tho Oovc^aBeat osf t}i«
l&tlted St«t«0 ivoaXd, in ««•« t^ rajMrnttso doTeniwiat i^^^s
lJBdi«ation of * oootrftry lat«tttlosi» te »<mj^XXmii immi3M%*l:sr
to witbdrav fron tli« mild eocsTarnfttlcnut.
AasuirflAo«8 o& t]ies» point* ^ tb« aor«xi3i&»at of Jft^t»
«](>• 3*9gard«d ^ the Oov«7ia«nt &f t&« tZalttd 3t«t«« as ka
indispettseble pr9r«<3iuisit3 to •atry ^«& aajr disousslo^ of
aasr new proposals v^tioib tbe rapanese tSorsngnoHBtt wKf f»eX
oored to aike Ioold.»e tomrd eo&oXusion of tm. m$x9matmt for
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1267
i,i»« ^d^ &S£^^etu?&%«Ml tlitee aM tiss atjSiaJ.& ifio^x^ s$c«jst
weM, 'ti^o%&^l^ «d simj^Um; ^««at iKnesto* 1% bftlirrts li^t eol$r
ft policy «f -ertt^sraft of BdliiMury SQaiis».tiote T&t fafi* OS-
««iatXAa& ^ Asia? ^^to €kr7d3(>3;si«at of tiu» "Qftli^at SS4)t«« xAM W
79716 O— 46— pt. 14 — —24
1268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1269
EXHIBIT NO. 22B
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 'r'
' Mtmorandum of Conversation
/v
Sunday, August 10, 1941
SUBJECT: Brl tl sh-A-Tierl Can Cooperation. At sea.
PARTICIPANTS: 31^ Alexander Cadogan.
The Under Secretary of State,
COWE8TO:
I'.lnlster was giving for the President on the PRINCE
I accomnatiled the President this raorninp to attend ^
o
the religious services and the lunch which the Prime O
OF WALES. Sir Alexander Cadogan told me before lunch ^Sb
01 3<
that in accordance with the conversation which was had ''
between the President, the Prime ::inl8ter. Sir Alexander
and ayoelf at the President's dinner last night he had
made two tentative drafts covering oronosed oarallel
" ■ J,
and simultaneous declarations by the United States and
British Governments relating to Jaoanese nollcy In the
Pacific and of a proposed Joint declaration to be made
by the President «uid the Prime Minister when their *P
3
present meeting was terminated. The two drafts read
CO
1270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-2-
ae followe:
"Draft of Parallel Comrnunl cations to the
Japanese Government.
"Declaration by the United States Government
that :
"1. Any further encroachment by Janan in the
Southwestern Pacific would produce a situation in
which the United States G-overnnent would be compelled
to take counter measures even though these nilght
lead to war between the United States and Janan.
"2. If any third Power becomes the object
of aggression by Japan in consequence of such
counter measures or of their aupfort of them, the
President would have the intention to seek authority
from Congress to give aid to such Power."
"Declaration -by His ITaJesty's Governnent that:
"1. Any further encroachcient by Japan In the
Southwestern Pacific would produce a situation in
which Hie Majesty's Government would be compelled
to take counter measures even though these might
lead to war between Greot Britain and Japan.
"2. If any third Power becomes the object
of agt"res8lon by Japan in consequence of such
counter measures or of their support of thez, His
y.ajesty ' e
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1271
Kajesty'e Governjient would £:lve all possible- aid
to such Power."
" Declaratlor. V;y the ;.ethKj-land s Government:
"1. Any further eiicroaci'.i.ent by Jar)an In the
Southwestern Pacific would '.roduce a_ situation in
vi.lcr. r.cr ..ajeaty'e GovernT;ent would be coa;.elled
to talce counter -aeaaures ever thourli these ;nlght
lead to war between the ::etiierlari'fip and Jar.an.
"C. If .'^.'ly tiilrd rower becoijes the object
of a(.-;f^,re88lon by Ja'^an In consequence of such
counter .'caeures or of their eupnort of them, Her
'-'.ajesty's ^vemnent would plve all rosBlble aid
to puch Power. "
■'een the Soviet ioverr.aent Informed, It will
be for consideration whether they should be pressed
to :r.a}-.e a parallel declaration.
The draft of the proposed Joint declaration
reads as follows;
"The President of the United States of America
and the Prlt.ie :'.lnlater, Xr. Churchill, represent-.
Inr ;:i8 ..ajesty's Governaent In the United Klnf;-dO!i:,
belnij .^et together to resolve and concert the
means
1272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-4-
meana of providing for vhe safety of their respec-
tive countrlti s in face of Nazi and German aggression
and of the dangers to all peoples arising therefrom,
deem it right to make known certain principles ndilch
they both accept for guidance in the franing of
their policy and on wMch they base their hopes for
a better future for the world.
First, their countries seek no aggrandizement,
territorial or other;
Second, they desire to see no territorial
changes that do not accord with the freely ex-
pressed wishes o:' the peoples concerned;
Third, they respect the right of ell peoples
to choose the form of government under which they
will live; they are only concerned to defend the
rights of freedom of speech and of thought without
which such choosing must be illusory;
Fourth, they will strive to bring about a fair
and eqxiitable distribution of essential produce
not only within their territorial Jurisdiction but
between the nations of the world.
Fifth, they seek a peace which will not only
cast' down forever the Nazi tyranny but by effective
Intemational organization will afford to all
States and .peoples the means of dwelling in security
within
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1273
-5-
wlttxin their own bovuads and of trevarslng the seas
and oceans without fear of lawless assault or need
of getting burdensome armaments."
A.S I was leaving the ship to accompany the Presi-
dent back to his flagship, Mr. Churchill said to me
that he had likewise given the President copies of these
documents. He iiqpressed upon me his belief that some
declaration of the kind he had drafted with reapeot to
Japan was in his opinion in the highest degree important,
and that he did not think that there was much hope left
unless the United States made such a clear-cut declara-
tion of preventing Japan from expanding further to the
south, in which event the prevention of war between
Great Britain and Japan appeared to be hopeless. He
said in the ao^t emphatic manner that if war did break
out between Great Britain and Japan, Japan immediately
would be in a position through the use of her large nuB-
ber of cruisers to seise or to destroy all of the
British merchant shipping in the Indian Oceaii and in the
Pacific, and to cut the lifelines between the British
Dominions and the British Isles unless the United States
herself entered the war. He pled with me that a dec-
laration of this character participated in by the United
States, Greet Britain, the Dominions, the Netherlands
and
1274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-6-
and possibly Uie Soviet Union would definitely restrain
Japan. If this were not done, the bio* to the brltlsii
Oovernment might be almost declalve.
Sumner Welles
U Sfi.ltM
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
EXHIBIT NO. 22C
1275
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Convenathn
Brltleh-A;aerlcan Cooperation.
Monday, August 11, l'?41
At see .
PARTICIPANTS:
COPIES TO:
The Preslrent.
The British Prime iClnlBter.
Sir Alexander Cafogan, British Permanent Under
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Monoraijle Harrj Honklns.
The Uncer Secretary of State.
The President rec^-lver Ur. Caurchlll this morning
on the A'J'jUSTA at li:00 a.m. Tt«re were present at the
aeetlng Sir Alexander Cadogan, Harry Hopkins and myself.
O
o
I
(A
01
s
rt.
The conference oonienoed with the sut Jeot of
Portugal. The President read to Mr. Churchill the
letter ai^dressed to the former by the Prime Minister
of Portugal. It was agreed by both that the content*
of the letter were nlghly eatlefactorj' and made poaslU*
without any difficulty the carrying out of arraa6«a*B««
for the occupation of the Asores as a means of •••az
t.^-tat the Islands would not be occupied by Oermany.
Miu.
•-yV-
3
CO
1276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
- 8 -
;.'r. Churchill statec that a highly secret operation
had been «>t»tiiaBf. upon by the British G-overrment , namely,
tr.e occupation of the Canary Isljnde curing the days
inmediately after the September full moon. This date,
as Mr. Churchill remembered It, woulc be about the
15th of September. The British Orovemnient were under-
taking, thla operation with full knowledge that tiie
iBlands had been recently heavily for-tlflec and that a
very large numbei' of German officers were en^_ag.ec ttiero
In the training and precaratlon of the Spanish troops.
It wae iindertaken with the further i^alizatlon that this
etep would almost Inevitably Involve a Spanish attack
either In conjunction with or upon the Instigation of
German military forces and that such attack would render
untenable by the British Navy the harbor of Gibraltar.
The British Government, however, had decided upon the
step In view of its belief that the situation In Spain
fron the British standpoint wae goln». from bad to worse
and that Hitler almost Inevitably would undertake the
occupation of Spain and Portugal with the subsequent
penetration of North Africa If any collapse took pl*oe
on the part of the Russian Army or even If a winter
stalemate resulted. In that event Mr. Churchill st*t»d
Gibraltar would be Isolated anjTray and the occupation
by Great Britain of the Canary Tslanda was of the utmoet
Importance
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1277
- :^ -
importance in guartHn*; a gouthem Atlantic convoy route
Into the British Islee.
In view of this opei-atlon, the British Government
would not be In a position conveniently to carry out
the commltaent they had mace to the Portu>;ueee Govern-
ment to aesist in the defense of the Azorea.
In view of the contents of Dr. Salazar's letter to
the Pi-eeirient, it was tnerefore ag.reed tl-at the British
Government lasmec" lately upon the return of Mr. Churchill
to London woulc notify Dr- Sala:ar that the British
Govemaient could not conveniently undertake to assist
m the defense of the Azores and would further Inform
Dr. Salaiar that they therefore desired him to request
the United States for auch assistance. It was agreed
on the part of tne P-ealcent that i.^medVately upon the
receipt of such notification from Pr. Salazar the United
States would send the necessar-y forces of ocoupatior. to
the Azoree anr ttBt tl.e Brazilian Governi.ent would be
simultaneously requested to send at least a token force
to take oart in the expedition.
T.-.e P:-eEident stated to V.r C-iurchill that i:. view
of our present njiXitary situation if the United States
undertook to occupy the Azores it would not be in a
position in the near future at least to undertake the
orotectlon
1278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
protection of the Cape Vev6e I<-. lands. Mr. Churcnlll
stated that t.he Brltleh aovprmr.ent would be In a posi-
tion to occupy the Cape Verde Isla.Tcs with the unfier-
Btanolng that It would later turn over the protection
of those Island e to the United States at such time ae
the Unltec States was In a position to take those
aseasures. Ur. Churchill further state'? that during the
tliue that the Unltec States was landing the necessary
forces in the Azores, the British Navy would ;:.aintaln a
l".rge force between the Azores and the mainland of
Pprtugal In order to render imposaltle the sending of
any Gennan expeditionary forces snould Portuj^al at that
time be already occupied by Oermany.
II
The Prime Minister then said that he desired to
discuss the situation In the Far East. He 'na.^' with nlm
a copy of a draft memoranDum, of w'-.ich he h.ac already
given the President a copy and which suggested that the
t'nited States, British and Dutch Oovemments simultaneous-
ly warn Japan that further military expansion by Japan
In the South Pacific would lead to the ta/.lng of counter
measures by the countries named even though such counter
measures might result In hostilities between them and
Jaoan, ar:d, second, provided that the United States
declare to Japan that s-.ould Great Britain ko to the
assistance
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1279
asBletance of tP NetherlPnrs East I.-.c.es ae a result
of a^, re!?8lon «<.galr,st t-.e .atter on trie oart of Japan
the Freeicent woulo reaueat from the Conftrese of the
U;.ltec States antriorlty to assist the British ano Dutch
G-overnmente In their defense against Japanese afijjreselon.
7;;e Preeldent cave ;^r. Churchill to read copies of
the two etatemente handec to Secretary Hull by the
Japanese Ambassacor or. August 6.
The Prime Minister react theE carefully sine then
resarKec that the implication was that Japan, r,avlnt
al;'ead> occui'lec' Incoc.ilna, sale that BT.e would move no
further provider t.'.e United States would abandon their
eoonoiElo and financial sanctions anr take no fu^'ther
allltar.y or naval defensive xeasures anc further agree
to concessions to Japan, ir.clucln^ the opportunity for
Japan to 8t;-aRfcle tne Chinese Governiiient, all of which
were particularly uriaooeotable.
The Freslnent rerllec tJ-at that was about the
picture as ne saw It, tnat he felt very strongly that
every effort shoulci be made to prever.t the outbreak of
war with Japan. Me stated, tlftt what he Intender" to do
was to request Secretary Hull b.. r»dlo to inform the
Japanese Aatbassador that the President would return to
ffashlng^ton next S&turv;ay or Sunday and desired to see
• th* Ambassador lasmed lately upon his return. The
Freslf'ent
1280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
- 6 -
Prceiaent stateci that Ir. that inteirviaw he woulti Infona
tr^e Japanese A.-Lba3sacor that pnDvlded the Jaoft'iese
Government wouia give the commitment cor.tainea In the
flrat para-'.raoh of the proposal of the Japanese G-overn-
ment of Au^; wt 6, namely, thst the Japanese Govern.aent
"wli: not further station its troops in the 5out-iwe?tem
Pacific areas, exceot French Indo.chlna, and that the
Japanese troops now stationed in French Indochina will
be withdrawn" , specifically and not contingently, the
United States iovernr.ent, while Miking it clear that
the other conditions set forth by the Japanese Govern-
ment were In general unacceptable, the United States
woul-i, nevertheless, In a fr'.endly spirit seek to ex-
plore the Dosslblllties inherent in the various pro-
posals made by Japan for the reachlni.- of a friendly
understanding between the two ioveriwents . The Presi-
dent would further state that should Japan refuse to
consider t/ils procedure and undertake further steps
in the nature of "1 Itary expansions, the President
desired the Japanese Govern.aent to kno-* fnat in such
event In nls belief var_oue steps would have to be
taken by the U.dted states notwithstanding the Presi-
dent's realization that the taking of such further measures
might result in war between thp United States and Japan.
Mr.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1281
- 7 -
Mr. Chur<Shlll Imnaciiately declared that the pro-
oedure eufegesteo appearec. to him to cover the situation
Afery well. He said it hao In It an element of"faoe-
savlng" for the Japanese and yet at the eaaie time would
constitute a flat United States warning to Japan of the
oonaequenoes Involved in a continuation by Jaoan of her
present course.
There was then discussed the deairablllty of In-
fonain*', Russia of the steps which would be taken as
above set forth and of ooaslbly including in the warn-
ing to Japan a statement which would cover any aggressive
steps by Japan against the Soviet Union.
I stated that In oiy Judgnent the real Issue which
was Involved was the continuation by Japan of Its
present oolloy of oonouest by force in the entire
Pacific region and regardless whether such policy was
directed against China, against the Soviet Union or
against the Pritlsh Dominions or British colonies, or
the colonle? of the Netherlands in the Southern Pacific
area. I said it seemed to me that the stateiaent which
the Preslrent intended to make to the Japanese Govern-
aent nslght acre ftdva:itag'>ouel..- be basec; on the question
of broad policy rather t'lan be prenlsed solely upon
Japanese moves In the Southwesteri. Pacific area.
The
1282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
- 8 -
The President and Mr. Churohill both agreed to this
and It was decided that the step to be talcen by the
President would be taken In that sense.
The question then arose as to the desirability of
the President's makln^J reference in his proposed state-
ment to the Japanese Ambassador to British oolicy In
the southern Pacific region and specif loally with regard
to Thailand. The President said that he thought it
woulo be advantageous for him to be in a position at
triat time to state that he had beei. inforaed by the
British Government that Sreat Britain had no aggressive
intentions whatever upon Thailand. Mr. Churohill said
that Ir. this tie heartily concurred.
I askec wheth<^r it would not be better for the
Presicent to be in a position to state not only that
Oreat Britain hac no intentions of an aggressive charac-
ter with regard to Thailand, but also that the British
Groveraiient had Inforoed the United States Qovemnent
that It supported wholeheartedly the President's pro-
posal for the neutralisation of Indochina and of Thailand.
Mr. Crturchlll stated that he agreed that it would
be well to aiaie an all-inclusive statement of that
character with respect to British policy, that he trusted
toat fie President would, therefore, l.nforQ the Japanese
Ambassador tiiat he had consulted the British Govern;nent,
and
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1283
and that the BrItlBh Goverriraent was In ooiaplete accord
with the neutralization r^t^oooaa.!, n.nc that It had ll'/.e-
w'.se Infonaec the Presicent that It woulrt In no event
undertake any Initiative In the oocuyatlon of Thailand.
It was agr'^ed that Sir Alexander Gadogan, after
further consultation with '.'r. Ciurchlll, would jclve me
In writing; a statement w.'.ch the Pritlsh (}ovem::ient was
preparer to make with re»'arc to tr.ls Issue.
Tiie Prenlcent exoreesed tne belief that by adopting
t.-dB course an./ further move of agc^resslon on the part
of Japan wnich iil.:.ht result in war could be held off for
at least thirty days. Ur. Cnurchill felt that if nego-
tiations or conversations aotua.ly took place between
the United States and Japan on the basis which had been
formulated, there was a reasonable chance that Japanese
po.lcv sir ht be modified and that a war in the Pacific
alght be averted.
Ill
y.r. ChurcAlll then said that he desired to bring
up for discussion the pz>3->08ed Joint declaration by the
President and hlaeelf.
The P.-eaicent s^ld that he believed the best solu-
tion of t is problem was for an identic statement to be
aade in London ane in the United States, probably on
Thursday, August 14, to the effect that the Prime
lUaietjsr
79716 0—46 — pt. 14 25
1284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
- 10 -
Minister and the President hac met at eea, accomoaniefi
by the various members of their respective staffs; that
these members of the two Governments had discussed the
question of aid under the terras of the Lease-Lend Act
to nations resisting aggression, and that these military
and naval conversations had in no way Involved any
future co^iunltiiients between the two Oovernments, except
as authorized under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act;
that t;ie Prims Minister and the President had between
them discussed certain principles relating to a better
future for the world and had agreed upon a Joint de-
claration whlcn would then be quoted verbatim.
Mr. Churchill dissented very strongly from the form
In which the President had desired to make It clear that
no future commitments had been entered Into. The Presi-
dent statec that t.iat portion of the proposed statement
was of extreme Iraporta.nce from his standpoint Inasmuch
as a statement of that character would make It Im- •
possible for extreme Isolationist leaders In the United
States to allege that every kind of secret agreement
had been entered Into during the course of these con-
versations.
Mr. Churchill said- that he understood that side
of the question, but that he believed that any cate-
gorical statement of that ohai^oter would prove deeply
dlscoursiglng
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1285
- 11 -
dlecouraKln*; to the populations of the occupied oountrlea
and would haVe a very serious effect upon their morale.
He likewise made It clear that a similar effect would
be created by BrAlsh public opinion. He aaKec if tne
Btate.'aent coulr not be worded In s loM a way ae to make
It poeltive rather than negative, namely, that the rne.uberB
of the staffs of the Prime Minister and of the President
haa solely dlecuesed questions relative to the furnishing
of aid to the countries resisting aggression under the
terms of tne Lease-Lend Act. The Pr-eeldent replied
that he believed that the statement could be drawn up
In that way and that If he then were queried In the United
States he neejci merely reoly that nothing had been dis-
cus aed or a^reec unon oth«r than that which had already
been inclcated i.i iiis public 8tatem>-'nt.
I then gave t.ie Presld ent.Mr. Churchill and Sir
Alexander Cacogan cooles of a redraft which I had made
this morning of the proosec Joint declaration before
'j.r. Churchill hao arrived and nac had an opportunity of
going over It with the Preble ent, '^n'-- the latter had
aporoved It. Mr. Chu.-^chlll then co:-iT.enoed to read It.
He suggested that t-ere bp Inserter^ In the text of the
third DOlnt before the word "self-governraent' the wor^e
"sovereign lights and". This wa's agreed upon.
!!r.
1286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
- 12 -
Mr. Churchill then read th« fourth point irhloh read
&8 follows: "Fourth, they will enoeavar to further
the enjoyment by- all peoples of aoceea, without dle-
orlmlnatlon and on equal terms, to the markets and to
the raw materials of the world which are needed for their
eoonoralo prosperity."
He imraedlately Inquired whether this was meant to
apply to the terms of the Ottawa agreements. I replied
that, of course, it did, sir.oe the policy which the
United States OoverTuient had been pursuing for the
better part of nine years had been addressed primarily
tqwards the removal of all of those artificial
rcBtriotlons and controls upon International trade
w.loh had created such tragic havoc to world economy dur-
ing the past generation. I said I understood fully the
Immediate difficulties which this occasioned him, but
I pointer out that the phraseology was "they will
endeavor to further" and that this naturally did not
Imply a formal and Itamcdiate contractual obligation on
the part of his Government. The President stated that
he believed the point was of very great Importance as
a measure of assurance to the Clerman and Italian
peoples that the British and the United States Govern-
ments desl.-ed to offer them, after the war, fair and
•eoual opportunity of ajn economic character.
The
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1287
The Prlne T.'.lnlster said mat, of course, he was
without any power hlaself to agree upon this point.
Ke set forth In considerable detail the position of the
United r.ln,-dom vis-a-vls the Dominions and eBiphaslzed
his Insblllty, without tije arreeEent of the i^onlnlons,
to enter into the proposed declaration insofar as tills
point was concerned. !!o said t:;at Insofar as he himself
was coicerned the Issue was one with which hla own per-
sonal life hlstorr vtaa conrjected. He referred to the
rial's at the outset of the centurj' when Joseph Chaaberlaln
first brought up the proposal for Er.pire preferences and
the predoninant part which this issue had played in the
political history of Great Britain during the past forty
years. He said that he felt that the proposal as now
phrased would have the enthusiastic support of all the
liberals evorj-where. He said that he himself was hearts-
lly in accord with the proposal and that he himself had
always been, as was well known, emphatically opposed to
the Ottawa ajjreements. He said, however, that It would
be at least a week before ho could hope to obtain by
tolccroph the opinion 6f th3 Dominions wltJi, recard to
this question.
Harry Hopkins then suxested that Sir Alexander
Cadocan and I be requested to draft new phraseology wliich
would take care of those difficulties and prevent the de-
1288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
- 14 -
lay of which Mr. Churchill spoke. Ke said It was Incon-
ceivable that the Issuance of the joint declaration should
be held up by a matter of this kind.
I aald that In m^' own Judcpnent further modification
of tl»t article woulJ, destroy completely any value in that
portion of tJie proposed declaration. I said that It was
not a question of phraseology, that It was a question of a
vital principle which was Involved. I said tluit If the
British and the United States Governiaents could not agree
to do everythinc within their power to further, after the
termination of the present war, a restoration of free and
liberal trade policies, they mlgjit as well throw In the
sponge and realize that one of the greatest factors In
creating the present traj^lc situation In the world was go-
ing to be permitted to continue unchecked In the post-war
world. I said that the trade policies of the British Ha-
plro durlnc the latter portion of the nineteenth century
had, I felt, contributed enormously t: the sane and pros-
perous condition of the world at that time, and that, of
coxirae, I realized tliat the tariff policies pursued by the
United States and many other countries during that period
had played an Important part In the creation of the evils
which had sprung up after the last war. I said, however,
that it seemed to be imperative that we tiry to agree
now upon the policy of constructive a&nlty In world
economics
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1289
economics as n func-sunei-.tal factor in the creation of a
new a»d better world anc that except throug,h an aigree-
"ment upon such a policy by our two govern;. ente there
woulr be no hindrance whatever to a continuation later
to the present CVennaii pmctloes of utllltliig their trade
and financial policies In orcfer to achieve political ends.
Mr. Ct.urchlll agreed ver,,- eaphatlcally to thle
policy. He anc Sir Alexancer Cadogan both agreed that
It was not a qurstlon of p.-.raseology, but that they were
up against a material obstacle which Ur. Churchill had
already Incloated. The Do.'lnlons would have to be con-
sulted. It ml^ht well be that an agreement could r,ot be
had froa the Dominions and that conBcauently the pro-
popec J -Int declaration could only be issued sone time
after newF of the meeting between the President and the
Prime Minister had been ►;lver. out. Mr. Churchill
euggeeted t.-at the Inclusion before the phrase 't.aey
will endeavor to further" of the phrase which would
read "with due regard foi' our present obligations"
xlfht eaee the situation.
The P:'eElt ent suggested', ani ''r. Chu.-cnill agreed,
tliat the latter would try snr draft sciae phraseology which
would .-Dake tnat situation easier, ar.c it was arranged
t^At I woulc call later In the f*fter:.oon upoi. the Prl„.e
-'.In'.eter aiio Sir Alexander Cadogan to go over with them
such redraft as they might have In mind.
1290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL .HARBOR ATTACK
- 16 -
Jlr. ChurohlH was In entire aooord with points
five ana 8lx.
He then reafl point seven amd after dlscueelon at the
meeting of this point It was agreed that the phrase
"to use force* be replaced by the word "a^jgresslon" In
the eecono sentence of the seventh point.
ar. Churchill aald that, of course, he was heartily
and enthusiastically In favor of this point seven,
which had been initiated by the President. He Inquired,
however, whether the President would not agree to support
some kind of ■effective international organization* aa
suggested by the Prime Minister in hie original draft
of the proposed Joint declaration.
The President replied that he did not feel that
he could agree to this because of the suspicions emd
opposition that such a statement on his part would
create in the United States. He said that he himself
would not be In favor of the creation of a new Assembly
of the League of rations, at least until after a period
of time had transpired and during which an International
police force composed of the United States a.no Great
Britain had had tui opportunity of functioning. Ur.
Ch srchlll sale that he did not feel that he would be
candid If he old not express to the President his
feeling that point seven woulc create a great deal of
opposition
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1291
- 17 -
flODOsltlo:. froa the extre-e intemntlonallPts. The
Preslcent reollec that he reallzec that, but that he
felt that the time had ooae to be realistic and that
In his Jucr'-'-ent the aualn factor In the seventh point
was C3aDlete real lam. ."r. Cr-.urchlll then remarked tliat
of course he waF wholeheartecly In favor of it and
shared the Preslcent 's vle».
The meeting then broke up anc I arranged with
the Preslcent that I woulo drop hy to see him after
my conference later In the afternoon with the Prime
.''Ir.lster. Tne latter statec that he would not be able
to leave until at least 5:00 p..ij. , toa-.Tow, Auj^ust 12,
an(. that as he felt It of Importance to reach a com-
plete meetlmi of minds with the Prei=l6ent upon all of
the Issues Involved, t.'\at he woulc be willing to spend
an additional twenty-four ':ours snoulo trat be neces-
sary.
Sumner Welles
U SV.OK'.
1292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 22D
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation
I
/
/ '^ DATE:
/ Uonday, August 11, 1941
At aes
SUBJECT: BtI tiah-Ani«rlc8n Cooperation.
PAFmciPANTS: Sir Alexander Cadogan.
Tii6 Under Secretary.
O
o
•si
Ol
1 went by arrangement to aee Slv Alexander Cadogan
on the PhXNCb OP WALES this afternoon. He gave me to
read memoranda which he had already completed on the
conference between the Prime Ulnlater and the Prealdant
tbla morning and, with a few changes iblch I Indicated,
they appeared to be a correct preaantatlon of the dls-
cuealon and of the agreements reached.
With regard to the draft of the joint declaration, ^
Sir Alexander told me that the Prime Minister had already -j,
TJ
radioed to London the text of the proposed Joint dec- (^
laration Incorporating therein modifications of polnta
four and seven. Sir Alexander gave me the revised text
to read. Inasmuch as the Prime Minister's draft of
point
\
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1293
point foul" was far broader and more satlafactoiTr than
the mlnlmuBi «blch the President had Instructed me, after
our conference of the morning, to accept, I raised no
objection thereto, and with regard to the proposed change
In point seven I stated that while It was completely
satisfactory to me and entirely In accord with my own
way of thinking I haid no idea what the President ■ s de-
cision might be. I said that I would have to submit It
to nim.
^Ir Alexander stated that the Prime Ulnister felt
very strongly — perhaps exaggeratedly — the opposition iiiiich
would be created on the part of a certain pro-League-of-
Natlons group in England to the contents of point seven
declaring for the disai'mamant of nations which undertook
aggression outside of their frontiers. He went on to say
that while he believed there would not be the amount of
opposition which the Prime Minister -anticipated he
nevertheless thou£>ht that It would ue a tragic thing
to concentrate solely upon the transition period after
the war was ended when some kind of Joint police power
would have to be exercised by the brltish and by the
United States Oovernaients and omit any reference to the
need oi the creation of some effective and practicable
Intemetlonal organization which would Amotion after
the transition period was concluded. 1 said that as
I
1294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I tuid already indicated while I was in full agra«n«nt witb.
hi a own views th» natter would bave to be determined
by the Presidents
We discuaeed the deoirablllty of informing the
Chinese Oovernaent of the steps which the United States
Oovemment in the person of the President was taking
with regard to Japan. I said that while I felt very
definitely that every effort shoiad be made to keep
China closely informed of what was being done in her
interest by Oreat Britain and by the United States I
wondered whether telling China of idiat the President
Intended to state to the Japanese Oovernment at this
particular moment woula not mean that the Oovernment at
Chxugkin^ for its own interests would make public the
Information so received. If publicity resulted, 1 stated
I feared that the extreme militarlatic element in Tokio
and that portion of the Tokio press which was controlled
by Germany would immediately take advantage of the sitiia-
tion 30 created to inflame sentiment in Japan to such
an extent as to make any possibility remote, as it might
anyhow be, of achieving any satisfactory result through
negotiation with Japan. Sir Alexander said he was
entirely in accord and would be governed by those views.
He said, of cotirse, 1 realized how terribly persistent
the Chinese were and that the present Ambassador in
London
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1295
london, or. Tielllngton Koo, would undoubtedly press
htm day in and day out to Icnon wnat aad transpired at
tx.e meeting between tiie Prime Itlnister and the Presi-
dent wlt/i regard to Cnine. He said taat he felt that
tue best solution was for him mt^rely to say in general
terms that the two governments had agreed that every
step should be taken thet was practicable at this time
for uhlna and its defense and avoid going into ajiy
details.
1 subsequently went to see the President. The
Presiaent said that he was entirely in accord with
the redraft of point four which was better than he had
thought llr. Churchill would be willing to concede. He
also accepted without question the amendment made by
Mr. Churchill to point seven and the President said that
it seemed to him entirely desirable since the amendment
made It clear that once the war was over a transition
period would have to taJce place and thet the permanent
internal loual organization would only be set up after
Uiat egcperimontal period had passed. He iiad Jotted down
certain minor changes in the text of the proposed Joint
declaration, most of itlch were merely verbal changes
for the purpose of clarification.
I said I felt it necessary for me to aak him
whether he did not believe that a very considerable
opposition
1296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-5-
opposltlon on the part of extreme isolationists In the
United States would result from that portion of point
seven which declares in the Judgment of the United States
that it is essential that &g£;veaBOT nations be dlsarced.
I said that if a great Power like the United States
publicly declares that somethinf^ le essential, the .
inference la that that Power is polnp to do something
itself about it, I said It appeared to me more than
likely that the isolationists will insist that this
public statement by the President leant that the United
States would go to war in order to disarm not only
Oem^any but even possibly Japan and theoretically, at
least, even the Soviet Union If that country should
later once xore embark upon aggression on its neighbors.
The President replied that the whole Intent of ooint
seven, as he saw it, was to make clear what the objec-
tive would be if the war was won and that he believed
people in the United States would take that point of
view. He further said he felt the realism inherent In
article seven was one which would be apparent to the
er.onuous majority of the American oeople and that they
would enthusiastically support the need for the dls-
anneuiient of aggressor nations,
I said I also had been surprised and somewhat
discouraged by a remark that the President had casually
aiade
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1297
nade In our siorning's conference — If I had understood
nltr. correctly — which was that nothing could be ir.ore
futile tl^ian the reconetltutlon of a body euch ae the
Asdeaibly of the League of Nations. I eald to the
President that it seemed to me that If he conceived of
the need for a transition period upon the terr.lnatlon of
the war during which rerlod Jreat Briteln and the '.'nlted
States would undertake the pollclnfe- of the world, It
seenied to me that It would be enomiouely desirable for
the smaller Powers to have available to them an Aasenibly
In walch they would all be represented and In which
they could nake their co ..» lalnte known and Join In
recocmendatlons aa to t!*.e policy to ^ nursued by the
siajor Powers w.ho were doing the r>ollce work, I said
It seemed to le that an orpanlsatlon of that kind
would be the :..ost effective safety valve that could be
devised.
The rrealdent said that he agreed fully with what
I said and that all that he had Intended by the re'.ark
he made this uornlng was to xa>-.e clear his belief that
a transition oerlod was necessary and that during; that
ti-analtlon period no organizations such as the Council
or the rvsse.-.bly of the Lea^^ue could undertake the oowers
and 'prerogatives with which they had been entrusted during
the existence of the League of '.'atlons.
I
1298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-7-
I further eald tJiat while from the praotloal
standpoint I waa in agreement that the United States
^ and Great Britain were the only Powers which could or
would exercise the police trusteeship and that It
seemed to me that It would be Impossible If such a trus-
teeship were set up to exclude therefrom the other
American republics or for that matter the countries at
present occupied such as ;<orway, the Netherlands, and
even Belgium. The President said that he felt that a
solution for this difficulty could probably be found
through the oster.elble Joining with Great Britain and
the United States of those Powers, but It would have to
be recognized tnat It would *>e ostensible since none of
the nations mentioned would have the practical means of
taking any effective or, at least, considerable part In
the task Involved.
I said that It seemed to me that now that the text
of the Joint declaration had been agreed upon, since I
assumed from what ;:r. Churchill had told me that the
British Ck)vernment would suprx>rt his recommendations
with regard thereto, all that was left to do In the way
of drafting was the preparation of the brief statement
which would be Issued simultaneously In London and at
'.sari.-lr.gton announcing that the President and the Prime
Minister had met, referring to the discussions under
the
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1299
-8-
the Lease-Lend Act and the Inclusion at the termination
thereof of the text of the Joint declaration. I said
that ;-.r. Caurcnlll had told ae that he had cabled hi a
ijovernnent ti^at he was iiot leaving Argent] a until
■.I'edr.esday afternoon and said It seetaed to ne that every-
thing; could be definitely agreed upon and cleared un by
1:00 p.. -a, toraorrow, and I could see no practical reason
for waiting another twenty-four- hours. The President
agreed and said that he would try and get a decision
reached In that sense when he saw ;:r. Churchill this
evening,
Sumner Welles
'J sw.aA>:
79716 O — 46 — pt. 14 26
1300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 23
HM : This telegram must be i)araphrased before being communicated to any-
one. (SC) London
Dated November 26, 1941.
Rec'd 12 : 55 a. m.
Secbettary of State,
Washington.
Triple Priority
5670, November 26, 6 a. m.
MOST SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PER-
SON.
' Your message about Japan received tonight. Also full accounts from Lord
Halifax of discussions and your counter project to Japan on which Foreign Sec-
retary has sent some comments. Of course, it is for you to handle this business
and we certainly do not want an additional war. There is only one point that
disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai Shek? Is he not having a very thin diet?
Our anxiety is about China. If they collapse our joint dangers would enormous-
ly encrease. We are sure that the regard of the United States for the Chinese
cause will govern your action. We feel that the Japanese are most unsure of
themselves."
HM WiNANT.
EXHIBIT NO. 24
CJ: This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated
to anyone. (SC) London,
Dated November 30, 1941.
Rec'd 1 : 28 p. m.
Seceetaey of State,
Washington.
5770, November 30, 4 p. m.
PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM FORMER NAVAL
PERSON.
"It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war
between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or pub-
lic as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead
immediately to the gravest consequences. I realize your constitutional difficul-
ties but it would be tragic if Japan drifted into war by encroachment without
having before her fairly and squarely the dire character of a further aggressive
step. I beg you to consider whether, at the moment which you judge right which
may be very near, you should not say that "any further Japanese aggression
would compel you to place the gravest issues before Congress "or words to that
effect. We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share ifl a joint
declaration, and in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize our
action with yours. Forgive me, my dear friend, for presuming to press such a
course upon you, but I am convinced that it might make all the difference and
prevent a melancholy extension of the war".
EDA Winant.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
EXHIBIT NO. 25
1301
f ■
TEiLEGRAM RECEIV^.
Toitye
f%>
1302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
EXHIBIT NO. 26
1303
l^
TEtEGKAM RECEIVED
-SEP? 11940
f
l^]
^\^
t5
1304 COXGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOIXT COMMITTEE
1305
1306 CONGRESSIOJC AL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1307
T!:li:giiam received
1308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1309
1310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
<- «k^
TELEGR.\M RECEIVED
^
fROM
,
1
\
^
^
4
^ •
*8
CI
T!
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1311
ia clear
1312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1313
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
o
!5
1314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1315
EXHIBIT NO. 27
"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", Intro-
duction (Pamphlet edition, 1942) Department of State Publication
1853^
(Xot reprinted by the Joint Committee. For sale by the Superin-
tendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington,
EXHIBIT NO. 28
"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", In-
troduction and Documents (Cloth edition. 1943) Department of State
Publication 1983.
(Not reprinted by the Joint Committee. For sale by the Superin-
tendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington,
EXHIBIT NO. 29
"Foreign Kelations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941", Vol-
umes I and II (1943) Department of State Publication 2008.
(Not reprinted by the Joint Committee. For sale by the Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D. C. )
EXHIBIT NO. 30
"Ten Years in Japan", by Joseph C. Grew; Simon and Schuster
(1944).
(Not reprinted by the Joint Committee.)
79716 O — 46— pt. 14 27
1316 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 31
EMBASSY
UNITED STATES Of
'^■"'''^C---*
.t^irftXT''^^^^''^'*' -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1317
AiR Mail.
1318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Ito. '' ■ . ^ ,
flu •(MlWtarr 9t St«t« •aalos«s for th* atriatljr
•ottftAsatlal laferawtloa of th« Jmrnrismn ABtwastuaor a
•opy af • A*«pa««)i (m. 971) ot April 4, 19U. froa tlx*
AaariMja AalMaaaAor «t 1.1m la r«satr4 to tha attltad*
of tlM Tmrmwlmm a»T«raamt In tli« •▼•at thAt tli« United
8««%Mi wiA /apaa b««<Mi« la:TolT«A la tiut war oa oppoalag
•Um.
lB«l0««X«t
BMfAMh (a*. 971) *
•f April 4, i9U.
1 "^ '
f »j»R '.e*?
fltGoTOJL 11 4«j^4a
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1319
1320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
•ri';i,!':cf?\M hw:1':jvI';i»
y^.
m
i
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1321
1322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
raaPABTllBlT 0» BTATB
STRICTLY CONnDENTlAL
COHPlDSaSfTIAL
PAHAPHEABE
Teiegran no. £00 Dated: 9-11-41, 6 p.*.
trofflj B«>m Reo'd: 9-11-41, 2:46 p.
It is reported by Levis that he secured the folloM^
Ing from a oontaot conneoted with the Intelligence
Section of the Army of Swltserland: By the end of
October, Japan will have gone into the war, and by the
end of the saoe month, Oermany will hare begun a campaign
In Africa with the two hundred fifty thousand troops
of Poawiel increased to a million. A part of these re-
enforcements who have now finished training have been
recently noted in Strasbourg, Karlsruhe, MainE, as well
as in other districts. Likewise, there hare been received
reports of troops around Bayonne. Simultaneous morsmente
will be made against Cyprus, Turkey, Blzerta, and Dakar.
Once the Japanese are involved in the war, it is figured
by the Germans that the United States will be busy in
the Pacific Ocean and will ba incanable of sending an
expedition to Dakar.
It is requested by the Military Attach* that the
above infonnation be communicated to the War Deoartment.
HARRISON
U-L:SM:MPM
9-12-41
Copies to Major Dusenbtary.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1323
1324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
iruH rate
ColUct jOay letter
I Night letter
Cftsrge Department;
Full rate
Day letter
Nljtlit letter
Charge to
$
Telegram Sent
Brparttttient of S>tate
IVashinfton,
OWf IDENTiJkL COOC
lOCKTiAL COOC
PAflTAPK
/r/
,
-
o
/
o
^u*
NOV e J MiPM
EnclphatUji
Stathyop*"*"
. M., .n.
,-,«, .........
"■"'■"-•"-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1325
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
U)
to
G
9
_j
>^
c;
>
S '2
s .^^
i-» F
3 ;J
05 1
« ^— '
Pile
-•^^•s- "
."■,','
, » ^ <-
1326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 32
Messages Between Wab Department and Hawah
From July 8 to September 7, 1941
rAU dates refer to 1941)
Date
From
To
Subject
Page
8 July
Adj Qen... . .
Short
Japanese Policy
1
25Jnlv ..
CNO
Kiramel et al.
Kimmel et al
Economic Sanctions against
Japan.
Japanese cabinet range
Estimate of Japanese situa-
tion.
Warning of surprise aggres-
sive movement.
Reconnaissance mission
Warning
2
16 Oct
CNO ... ...
3
20 Oct
Adj Gen
Short
4
24 Nov .. .
CNO
Kimmel et al
5
26 Nov
Adj Qen
Short
6
27 Nov .
Marshall
Short...
7
27 Nov
Marshall
Western Defense Com-
mand.
MacArthur
Warning
8
27 Nov .
Marshall
Warning
9
27 Nov
G-2....
Q-2 Hawaii
G -2 Warning
10
28 Nov
MacArthur
Marshall
Reply to Marshall warning. .
Reply to Marshall warning. .
Sabotage
11
27No\
Short .
Marshall
12
28 Nov
.\dj Gen ."..
Short
13
28 Nov
Arnold
Hawaiian Air Force
Marshall
Sabotage
14
28 Nov
Western Defense Com-
mand.
Caribbean Defense Com-
mand.
Short
Reply to Marshall warning. .
Reply to Marshall warning. .
Reply to Adj Gen sabotage
cable.
Reply to Marshall warning. .
Reply to Arnold sabotage
cable.
Japanese weather code broad-
casts.
Japanese ultimatum..
15
28 Nov
Adj Gen
16
29 Nov
Adj Gen
17
29 Nov . .
Caribbean Defense Com-
mand.
Hawaiian Air Force.
G-2
Adj Qen
18
4 Dec
Arnold
19
5 Deo. . . .
G-2 Hawaii
20
7 Dec
Marshall
Short . .
21
[i] Secret
94 WAR BC 207 WD
CO
Washington, D. C, 152A, July 8, 1941.
Hawn Dept., Fort Shaffer, T. H.
Nine two four seventh AGMC for your information deduction from information
from numerous sources is that Japanese Govt has determined upon its future
policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military
groups period This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving
probable aggressive action against maritime provinces of Russia if and when
Siberian Garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident
that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia period Opinion Is
that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and
development of naval army and air bases in Indo China although an advance
against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out period Neutrality
pact with Russia may be abrogated period They have ordered all Jap vessels
in U. S. Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first August period Move-
ment of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant
vessels are being requisitioned '
Adams
334P/720P/8
Priority
[■2] Drafter: Op-12.
From : Chief of Naval Operations.
Rleased by : H. R. Stark.
Date: July 25, 1941.
Addressees
For Action
CINCPAC
CINCAF
CINCLANT
COM 15
SPENAVO LONDON
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1327
252023
This is a joint dispatch from the CNO and the Chief of Staff US Army X Ap-
propriate adees deliver copies to Commanding Generals Hawaii Philippines and
Caribbean Defense Command and to General Chaney in London XX You are
advised that at 1400 GCT July twenty-sixth United States will impose economic
sanctions against Japan X It is expected these sanctions will embargo all trade
between Japan and the United States subject to modification through a licensing
system for certain material X It is anticipated that export licenses will be
granted for certain grades of petroleum products cotton and possibly some
other materials and that import licenses may be granted for raw silk X Japa-
nese assets and fund in the United States will be fros^en except that they may
be moved if licenses are granted for such movement X It is not repeat not
exi)ected that Japanese merchant vessels in United States ports will be seized
at this time X United States flag merchant vessels will not at present be
ordered to depart from or not to enter ports controlled by Japan X ONO and
COS do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of
military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may
take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventualities X Ac-
tion being initiated by the United States Army to call the Philippine Army into
active service at an early date XX This despatch is to be kept secret except
from immediate Navy and Army subordinates X SPENAVO informs CNS but
warn him against disclosure X Action addees this dis are Cincpac Cinclant
Cincaf Com Fifteen Spenavo London XX
Secret
[3] Drafter : Op-12. Addressees Priority
From : C N O. For action
Released by : Ingersol. CINCLANT
CINCPAO
Date : October 16, 1941. CINCAF
(Acknowledge)
162203 CR 0534
The resignation of the Japanese cabinet has created a grave situation X If a
new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti
American X If the Konoye cabinet remains the effect will be that it will
operate under a new mandate which will not include rapproachment with the
US X In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibil-
ity X Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present
desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these
two powers X In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions
including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention
nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X Second and third adees
inform appropriate army and naval district authorities X Acknowledge XX
Secret
[4] Secret
8 WVT BC 47 WD
Washkt., D. C, 1234P., Oct. 20, 1941.
20th Following War Dept. estimate of Japanese situation for your informa-
tion stop Tension between United States and Japan remains strained but no
repeat no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy api)ears imminent
Adams
1037A
[5] Sealed Secret
Drafter: Op-12. Addressees
Frwn : Chief of Naval Operations. For action
Released by : Ingersoll. CINCAF
CINCPAC
Date : November 24, 1941. COM 11
COM 12
COM 13
COM 15
For information
SPENAVO LONDON
CINCLANT
1328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
242005 CR0443
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X This
situation coupled with statements of Japanese government and movements their
naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive
movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possi-
bility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action adees
to inform senior army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order
not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action X
Guam will be informed separately.
Copy to WPD, War Dept., and to
Oi>-12 but no other distribution
[6] Secret ' November 26, I941
RCA 831 US Govt
Washington, D. C, Nov. 26, 194I. 1149P.
Commanding Geotbral,
Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, T. H.
Four Six Five Twenty Sixth
Reference two B dash twenty four airplanes for special photo mission Stop
It is desired that the pilots be instructed to photographic Truk Island in the
Caroline group Jaluit in the Marshall group Stop Visual reconnaissance should
be made simultaneously Stop Information desired as to the number and loca-
tion of naval vessels including submarines comma airfields comma aircraft
comma guns comma barracks and camps Stop Pilots should be warned islands
strongly fortified and manned Stop Photography and reconnaissance must be
accomplished at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the
vicinity Stop Avoid orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and
speed Stop Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their
power for self preservation Stop The two pilots and copilots should be in-
structed to confer with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain
his advise Stop If distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great
comma suggest one B dash twenty four proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back
to Wake comma then Philippines by usual route photographing Ponape while
enroute Moresby Stop Advise pilots best time of day for photographic Truk
and Jaluit Stop Upon arrival in Philippines two copies each of any photo-
graphs taken will be sent to General MacArthur comma Admiral Hart comma
Admiral Kimmel comma the Chief of Naval Operations comma and the War
Department Stop Insure that both B dash twenty four airplanes are fully
equipped with gun ammunition upon departure from Honolulu
Adams
f7] Secret
Priority
Priority November 27, 1941.
Commanding General,
Eawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. E.
No. 472
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical puriwses vrith
only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and
offer to continue Period Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile
action possible at any moment Period If hostilities cannot comma repeat can-
not comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first
overt act Period This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed
as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense
Period Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such
reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures
should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population
or disclose intent Period Report measures taken Period Should hostilities
occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain
to Japan Period Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to
minimum essential oflBcers
Mabshaix
War Department message center : Please send same radiogram to : Command-
ing General, Caribbean Defense Command, Quarry Heights, C. Z.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1329
[8] • Priority
November 27, 1941.
Commanding General,
Western Defense Command,
Presidio of San Francisco, California.
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with
only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and
offer to continue period Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action
possible at any moment period If hostilities cannot repeat cannot be avoided
the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act period This
policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action
that might jeopardize your defense period Prior to hostile Japanese action you
are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem
necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm
civil population or disclose intent period Report measures taken period A
separate message is being sent to Q dash two Ninth Corps Area re subversive
activities in United States period Should hostilities occur you will carry out
the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan period Limit
dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential ofllcers
Mabshatj,
[9] Priority
November 27, 1941.
Commanding General,
U. S. Army Forces in the Far East, Manila, P. I.
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes
with only barest possibilities that Japanese Government might come back and
offer to continue period Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action
possible at any moment period tt hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma
be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act i)eriod
This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you
to a course of action that might Jeopardize the successful defense of the Philip-
pines period Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to take such
reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary period Report meas-
ures taken period Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned
in revised rainbow five which was delivered to you by General Brereton period
Chief of Naval Operations concurs and request you notify Hart
Marshall
Secret
[10] Secret
P 2 War WD Prty
Washington, D. C, November 27, 1941.
G-2 Hawahait Department,
Ft. Bhafter, T. H.
473-27TH
Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate stop Hostilities may
ensue Stop Subversive activities may be expected Stop Inform commanding
general and Chief of Staff only.
MlLE^S
144PM
[ii] November 28, 1941.
453 AM
From : Manila, P. I.
To : General George C. Marshall
No. 1004, November Twenty-eighth.
Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio six two four air recoD'
naissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy stop
Ground security measures have been taken stop Within the limitations im-
posed by present state of development of this theatre of operations everything Is
in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense stop Intimate liaison and
cooperation and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy.
MaoArthck
Secret
1330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[12] NOVEMBEB 28, 1941.
557AM
Secret
Priority
From : Fort Shafter T. H.
To : Chief of Staff
No. 959 November 27th
Report department alerted to prevent sabotage period Liaison with Navy
reurad four seven two twenty seventh
Short.
[13] Secret Priority
114 War Kr 189 WD Prty
Washn D. C. 842P Nov. 28, 1941
CG
Hawn Dept. Ft. Shafter T. H.
482 28th critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately
against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War
Department paren see paragraph three mid SC thirty dash forty five end paren
stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures neces-
sary to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and
equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against sub-
versive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop This
does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop Pro-
tective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoid-
ing unnecessary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission iden-
tical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not
affect your responsibility under existing instructions
Adams.
Secret
[14] secret
Priority
Commanding General. Sent No. 484, 11/28.
Hanvaii Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.:
Attention Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force period That instruc-
tions substantially as follows be issued to all establishments and units under your
control and command is desired colon against those subversive activities within
the field of investigative responsibility of the War Department paren see para-
graph three mid SR three zero dash four five paren the present critical situa-
tion demands that all precautions be taken at once period It is desired also
that all additional measures necessary be initiated by you immediately to pro-
vide the following colon protection of your personnel against subversive prop-
aganda comma protection of all activities against espionage comma and pro-
tection against sabotage of your equipment comma property and establishments
period This does not repeat not authorize any illegal measures period Avoiding
unnecessary alarm and publicity protective measures should be confined to those
essential to security period Para it is also desired that or on before December
five this year reports be submitted to the Chief Armiy Air Forces of all steps
initiated by you to comply with these instructions period signed Arnold.
Adams.
A. F. No. 461
Secret >
U5]
Secret
Received : November 28, 1941.
11 : 18 PM
From : HQ WDC Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.,
To : General George C. Marshall
November 28th :
Report following measures taken as per your radio Nov twenty seven : Your
radio paraphrased to Commanding Generals ADC, Second Air Force, Fourth Air
Force, Ninth CAD, Pacific Coastal Frontier Sectors, Ninth Corps Area and Com-
mandants Eleventh Twelfth and Fifteenth Naval Districts. All harbor entrance
EXHIBITS OP JOINT COMMITTEE 1331
control posts continuously manned. One gun battery each harbor defense con-
tinuously alerted. Protection against sabotage and other subversite activities
intensified. Six infy battalions and necessary motor transportation alerted so
as to be instantly available to CG NCA to carry out his missions under Rainbow
Five. Constant contact being maintained with corps area and naval district com-
manders and full cooperation assured. PCF, sector and subsector plans Rainbow
Five practically completed and necessary reconnaissance being made to carry out
defense of critical areas. Two rifle' companies furnished CG SF P of E for guard
duty and one company furnished to CG NCA for internment aliens at Angel Island.
Paren in connection this report see my radio to CG GHQ Nov twenty fifth which
recommended that WPL five two be extended to include Pacific coast and Jap-
anese vessels and which outlined steps taken by me in preparation therefor. As
Air Forces as well as other Army forces will be involved in the execution of WLP
five two or the preparatory stage of Rainbow Five it is strongly urged that I be
authorized to direct operations of Air Forces in defense [J5A] of the PCF
or that instructions be issued specifying air action and that I be furnished a copy
of such directive. Should hostilities occur this command now ready to carry out
tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan except for woeful
shortage of ammunition and pursuit and bombardment planes which should be
made available without delay.
DeWitt, Commanding.
[16]
Secret
Received, November 29, 1941.
346 AM
From : Panama.
To : The AGO.
Panama No. 509 ; November 28th :
Reurad four six one November twenty seven signed Marshall report requested
being forwarded air mail. CDO six eight seven.
Andbews.
[17] Secret Priority 29 November 1941.
The ADJUTANT General
War Department, Washington D C
Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth comma full precautions are
being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative respon-
sibility of War Department paren paragraph three raid SC thirty dash forty
five end paren and Military Establishments including personnel and equipment
Stop As regards prelection of vital installations outside of military reserva-
tions such as power plants comma telephone exchanges and highway bridges
comma this headquarters by confidential letter dated June ninteen nineteen forty
one requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in
him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides comma in effect
comma that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval
forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress
lawless violence comma invasion comma insurrection etc Stop Pursuant to
the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal
written demand on this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish such
adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma and lawless
violence in connection therewith comma being committed against vital installa-
tions and structures in the Territory Stop Pursuant to the foregoing request
appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations
Stop In this connection comma at the instigation of this headquarters the city
and county of Honolulu on June thirtieth nineteen forty one enacted an ordi-
nance which permits the Commanding [17 A] General Hawaiian Depart-
ment comma to close comma or restrict the use of and travel upon comma any
highway within the city and county of Honolulu comma whenever tlie Command-
ing General deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense
Stop The authority thus given has not yet been exercised Stop Relations
with FBI and all other Federal and Territorial officials are and have been
cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters.
Short
79716 O — 46 — pt. 14 2S
1332 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[iS]
Secret November 29, 1941.
Subject : Measures Taken for the Defense of the Caribbean Area.
To : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. In compliance with radiogram No. 461 from the Chief of Staff, dated No-
vember 27, 1941, report that the following measures are in effect for the pro-
tection of the Caribbean Area :
a. Naval Measures. At the present time, it is believe that the defensive meas-
ures for the Caribbean Defense Command center largely around the Panama
Canal ; however, a plan for furnishing Army support to the Navy has been worked
out and coordinated with the various Naval commanders in the Caribbean
Theater. In the Panama Sector, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District
is conducting continuous surface patrol of the area included within the Panama
Coastal Frontier, supplemented, within the limits of the aircraft at his disposal,
by an air patrol. In my opinion, the Commandant of the 15th Naval District,
does not have sufficient aircraft or vessels within his control for adequate
reconnaissance.
b. Measures for the Defense of the Panama Canal. No additional measures
other than those already in effect, have been taken for the defense of the Panama
Canal, except to increase Inspections in order to insure the alertness of troops.
Measures, in effect are :
(1) Earhor Defense. Troops are on a continuous alert. Harbor defense
is coordinated with the naval defense.
(2) Aircraft Warning Service. The two detectors installed are on a 24-
hour alert. Seven observation posts have been established at various places
in Panama with direct radio communication to the Aircraft Warning Service
Information Center. Within the means on hand, every effort is being made to
complete the installation of other detectors now available within the Department.
(3) Antiaircraft Artillery. All available antiaircraft equipment is installed
and on a 24-hour alert.
(4) Anti^Sabotage. Locks and other sensitive areas are continuously
guarded, and all approaches tp the sensitive areas are covered by mound bunkers.
Approaches to bunkers and between bunkers were practicable are covered by
patrols. Transit guards are placed on all vessels transiting the Canal.
(5) Counter-espionage. Active counter-espionage measures are- being taken
continuously.
[18A] (6) Counter-s^ibversive activities, with the cooperation of the Re-
public of Panama, are in continuous operation. Plans have been prepared with
the cooperation of the Republic of Panama, for the internment of aliens, and a
list of those who should be interned ujwn the outbreak of hostilities has been
prepared and is in the hands of the American Ambassador, to be transmitted
to the Panamanian Government. The Canal Zone itself has already been
cleared of any known suspects.
(7) Air Force. A portion of the pursuit is on a continuous 24-hour alert.
The Bomber Command headquarters maintains a 24-hour alert. This latter
applies to the whole Caribbean Area.
c. In Caribbean Theater, other than Panama Canal Department.
(1) Air Corps units with from three to six B-18 or B-18-A medium bombers
have been stationed at St. Croix, Antigua, St. Lucia and British Guiana. The
9th Bombardment Group (less squadrons in St. Lucia, British Guiana, and Suri-
nam), with six B-18-A medium bombers, has been stationed at Trinidad. These
units have a reconnaissance mission -in the vicinity of these bases and a mission
to support the Navy.
(2) A composite squadron with six (6) B-18-A medium bombers and eight (8)
P-40 pursuit planes will arrive in Surinam about December 3, 1941.
(3) The ground elements of Force "A" consisting of Headquarters and Service
Detachments, three composite companies of infantry and three antiaircraft
platoons (each with six .50 Cal. machine guns) are enroute to Surinam. Entire
force should arrive by December 5, 1941.
(4) One battalion, 33rd Infantry, with certain service elements, will be moved
to Trinidad, departing Panama on December 3 and 13, 1941. One pursuit
squadron will be moved to Trinidad as soon as transportation is available,
2. The efficacy of the measures taken for the defense of the Caribbean is
qualified by certain deficiencies which exist in the Caribbean Defense Command.
These deficiencies are :
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1333
o. Harbor Defenses: Less than one complete manning detail available for the
harbor defense armament.
6. Aircraft Wa7-ning Service is totally inadequate in personnel to supervise
the installation of detectors on hand and in personnel to man the equipment
when installed (see 1st Ind., these headquarters, dated October 17, 1941, to The
Adjutant General, on AG 320.2 (8/23/41) M(>-C, dated September 2, 1941, subject :
"Air Defense Organization" ) .
c. Antiaircraft Artillery has insufficient personnel to man armament now
being installed in the Canal Zone, and inadequate protection against low-flying
aircraft, particularly at night, since it has only sufficient ammunition for one
minute of fire per gun for its 37 mm guns, and no barrage balloons. There is
also a lack of proper searchlights to light field of fire of automatic weapons.
[18B] d. Air Forces. No night pursuit. No VHF radio equipment with
which to direct pursuit in the air. Only eight modern long-range bombers and
twelve modern light bombers are available within the Caribbean Defense Com-
mand. No 37 mm cannon for P-39's.
e. The situations in Puerto Rico and the Base Commands are so new, and
their major deficiencies so well known that no attempt has been made to
enumerate them.
F. M. Andbewb,
Lieutenant General, United States Army, Commanding.
im
Secret
11 WTJ
1251P/4th
Beceived Decsicbes 10, 1941
124 P. M.
From : Ft. Shaf ter, TH
To : Chief Army Air Corps.
No. 1033, December 4th.
Following report in compliance with instructions contained in agwar four
eight four dash twenty eight colon cinstructions contained in subject radiogram
issued to all establishments and units under control of Hawaiian Air Force on
twenty nine November Stop Entire subject of protection recently received
comma and continues to receive comma detailed and comprehensive attention as
result of three reports prepared by special inspector during June and July for
one Stop Para additional steps initiated specifically to comply with subject
radiogram substantially as follows colon assembly of intelligence officers of
major subdivisions of Hawaiian Air Force twenty nine November Stop Per-
sonal inspection of stations and activities by air foix;e commander one and two
December Stop Increase in size of guard where desirable Stop Instructions
issued to expedite overhauling of pass system comma civilian and military comma
now in progress Stop This entire department is now operating and will con-
tinue to operate under an alert for prevention of sabotage activities Stop Para
secrecy discipline being given all emphasis practicable through official and quasi
official agencies Stop Work has actually been begun on essential protective
fencing and flood [19 A] lighting projects Stop Para with reference to
counter propaganda comma the problem is educational rather than regulatory
and at present is being dealt with through the medium of squadron talks Stop
Need is felt for a War Department publication paren possibly in form of develop-
ment and expansion of foreword to soldiers handbook comma FM twenty one
dash one hundred paren suitably arranged and worded for use of relatively inex-
perienced personnel comma dealing with status of soldier as citizen comma ideals
and doctrines influencing founders of American Government comma structure
of government eomma place of military establishment in the structure comma
national objectives comma both domestic and international comma together with
discussion of those forms of government inimical to democratic form Stop
Signed Martin end
Seobt.
1334 CONGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[20]
S6cr6t
Sent No. 519, 12/5
December 5, 1941.
Assistant Chief of Staff Headquaetebs,
G2 Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Territory Haicaii.
Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval
District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.
Miles.
[21]
1549WS Washington DC 74/73 RCA USG ETAT 7 1218P.
C G
Hawn Dept Ft. Shatter, T. H.
529 7th Japanese are presenting at one pm eastern standard time today what
amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine
immediately stop just what significance the hour set may have we do not know
but be on alert accordingly stop inform naval authorities of this communication
Mabshaix.
EXHIBIT NO. 33
MruTABY Intelligence Estimates Pkepared bt 6-2, Wab Depabtment,
Washington, D. C.
Military Intelligence Estimates, 1 July-t December 19^1
Item
Date
Subject
1
2
7 July...
llJuly
Estimate of the Eastern Siberian Situation.
Strategic Estimate of the Situation.
3
17July -
Japanese Movement into French Indo-China.
4
17July
Mobiliiiation of -Additional Japanese Manpower.
5
ISJuly
New Japanese Cabinet.
6
ISJuly
Strategical Estimate of the Situation.
7
25July
Sanctions against Japan.
8
SOJulv
German-Japanese Relations.
9
16 August
Developments in the Far Eastern Situation.
10
11
20Au?ust.-
2 September
Chinese Resistance.
Conversation between the Japanese Military Attache and the Chief,
12
5 September
Far Eastern Section.
Brief Periodic Estimate of the World Situation.
13
11 September
Political Developments in Japan.
14
17 September
Combat Estimate, Japan.
15
18 September.
Strategic Estimate of the Situation.
16
23 September.
Crisis in Japan.
17
2 October
Jacarese-American Relations.
18
16 October .
Fall of the Japanese Cabinet.
19
17 October
Japan's New Premier.
20
21 October .
Kwantung versus the Siberian Army.
21
1 November
Possible Japanese Drive into Yunnan.
22
2 November
G-2 Estimate Far Eastern Situation.
23
13 November
Possible Japanese Drive into Yunnan.
24
25 November
Far Eastern Situation.
25
26 November .. ..
Japanese Naval Task Force.
26
27 November .. .
Recent Developments in the Far East.
27
29 November
Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941-March
28
5 December
31, 1942.
Supplementary Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December
29
6 December.-
1. 1941-March 31, 1942.
Estimate of Japanese Strength in Indo-China.
30
6 December
Estimate of Japanese Air and Groimd Forces in Indo-China, Hainan
and Formosa.
Note.— Items 2, 6, 8, 9, 12, 15, 17, 22, 23, 25 26 were classified Secret.
Items 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30 were classified Confidential.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1335
I. B. 93
July 7, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject : Estimate of the Eastern Siberian Situation.
1. Eastern Siberia, that is to say, the region lying between Lake Baikal and
the Pacific Ocean, is a distinct entity quite separate from the other portions of
Siberia and old Russia. Remote and lying behind the Lake Baikal-Lena River
barrier, its terrain is not that of the swampy railway-dominated wilderness of
Central Siberia but admits of normal troop deployments and operations. It
is economically distinct in its mineral deposits, its fisheries and its self-contained
economy. Politically and psychologically it is distinct, little changed from Czar-
ist days. It thinks for itself and will act for itself first, and for the rest of
Russia only secondarily.
2. It is quite within the range of possibility that should Stalin and his com-
munist regime be driven out of Russia the retreat would be to this Far Eastern
Region.
3. The Russian forces in this region are a homegenous army of 51 divisions,
2,500 tanks, 1,600 airplanes, 94 submarines and 220 coastal boats as opposed to
Japanese forces of 10 divisions, 1,000 tanks, 300 airplanes and a balanced neet.
The distribution and relationships of these forces are shown on the accompanying
map.
4. This region is potentially a sufficiently homeogeneous one to constitute an
effective buffer-state between the Bering Sea Region and the Axis powers, Ger-
man or Japanese.
5. A German occupation of Eastern Siberia would require the employment of
combat forces of such size as to be very difficult, if not impracticable, of accom-
plishment at the end of a 2,000 mile single railway system. The Axis alloca-
tion of this region, therefore to Japan is the more likely procedure, though sup-
ported perhaps by German air power and political pressures.
6. With the memory of the Russian superior fighting ability demonstrated in
the border affrays of 1938-39, the Japanese are unlikely to take aggressive action
against Eastern Siberian land forces. This is confirmed by evidence from other
and highly authoritative sources of reluctance to change from their present south-
ern orientation to a northern one. This, however, does not preclude increasing
Japanese pressures through Outer Mongolia towards Verkhneudinsk, of naval
blockades of the entrances to the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk and possibly
Bering Sea.
/s/ C. H. Mason,
C. H. Mason
Colonel of Infantry, O. 8. C,
Chief, Intelligence Brcunch.
Distribution :
The President
Secretary of War
Chief of Staff
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Inteligence
G. H. Q.
General Embick
Mr. McCloy (Record Section)
I. B. 103-2
JlTLY 11, 1941.
Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
Subject: Strategic Estimate of the Situation.
1. At your informal request there are attached revised data on the foreign
situation. These data supersede those furnished by 1st Indorsement, May 26,
1941, to your memorandum W. P. D. 4510, May 24, 1941.
Sherman Miubs.
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, Q-2.
1 Inel. — G-2 Data for W. D. Strategic
EJstimate of the Situation.
1336 CO^NGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Data fob Wab Department Strategic Estimate of the Situation
1. summation of the situation
a. Germany, possessing a central position and ground and air forces superior
to any individual opponent, has exercised her initiative by attacking Russia.
This attack will be at least so successful that, subsequent to the fall of 1941, Ger-
many will have regained her ability to strike outwards from a central position.
b. The British Empire, widespread, with superior surface sea power, but de-
ficient in man power, organization and battle leadership, is necessarily on the
defensive. To her, the German attack on Russia affords a breathing spell in
which she can buttress her home and Middle Eastern defenses. Assumption
of the strategic offensive in any theater is beyond her power.
c. U. S. S. R., ill organized but formidable because of her size, is exposed
to the full vigor of German attack. The most that can be expected of her is
that she will remain in being in her distant fastnesses after the German on-
slaught has been spent. However, the German attack has cancelled out Russia
as an Axis source of supply from the short-term viewpoint.
d. The United States, with a superior navy in one ocean, but without effective
.weapons and with but few combat organizations, is committed to opposition
to Germany, is providing limited material support to the Axis' enemies, but
lacks the means to take overt battle action against Gefmany in her own or
anyone else's behalf.
e. All other countries are but the fringing satellites of the four great powers.
China, Italy and Japan have some military, but indecisive potency. The others
are themselves trivial, or of importance only in combination with others.
2. SITUATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL POWEatS
a. Oermany
(1) Germany is now engaged in a major war with Soviet Russia and has
launched an offensive on the very broad front from the Arctic Ocean to the
Black Sea. In this offensive, her armies are supported by the armed forces of
Finland, Slovakia, Hungary and Rumania.
(2) A large part of the German Army of 260 divisions is engaged in this Russian
offensive, although some 60 divisions remain on guard in Western Europe and
Norway against the possibility of a British attack in the West.
(3) The bulk of Germany's 20 armored and 20 motorized divisions are also
thought to be engaged in this Russian campaign.
(4) A large part of the German Air Force of some 11,000 planes in 850 com-
bat squadrons, and organized into seven or more air fleets, is conducting of-
fensive operations against Russia, while at the same time there has been held
a considerable number of air units in Western Europe and the Mediterranean
as a defensive precaution. Around 5,000 planes in combat squadrons are believed
to be participating in the campaign against Russia. To provide this operating
mass of aircraft, the air forces in the Western European and Mediterranean
Theaters have necessarily had to be greatly reduced below the levels prevailing
in May, 1941.
(5) The German Navy, much inferior in tonnage to the British and recently
weakened by the loss of the "Bismarck," is conducting an aggressive submarine
campaign against British shipping with about 150 submarines. An unknown
number of German auxiliary cruisers are also aggressively active against British
seaborne commerce.
(6) The political and economic situation in Germany is sound. The "Hess
affair" does not seem to have affected adversely the will of the German nation
to continue the war.
(7) German-French relations are Improving as the two nations draw closer
together. Already the economic resources of France are beginning to play a
considerable role in the German war effort.
(8) In consequence of this major offensive against Russia, no German offensive
operations are to be expected in any other theaters of war in the immediate
future. In particular, no invasion of England or of Iceland is probable during
the remainder of 1941. Germany's ground forces will, undoubtedly, remain on
the strategic defensive in both the Western European and Mediterranean
Theaters until she can spare troops and aviation from Eastern Europe.
(9) In case of victory over Russia during the summer or fall of 1941, one may
expect as logical further German moves :
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1337
(a) The consolidation of the German hegemony in Europe (less the British
Isles).
(b) The expulsion of Britain from the Mediterranean.
(c) The continuation of the war of attrition against the British seaborne
commerce.
(10) The complete entry of the United States into the War would probably
not change the plans of the German High Command nor affect for the present
Germany's military, political and economic position. It would undoubtedly de-
press somewhat the war spirit and morale of the German people. It would so
stimulate the morale and hopes of Germany's subject populations as to increase
greatly the Reich's problems in controlling them. On the other hand, our entry
into war would cause Germany to activate her existing fifth column arrangements
in Latin America.
b. Japan
(1) Military Situation. Japanese forces are deployed over a wide area from
Karafuto in the north to Indo-China in the south. The Chinese, in spite of
internal friction, continue to resist passively any advance by the Japanese forces.
Japan has for some time been gradually assembling an expeditionary force,
originally for a possible movement into southeast Asia, but which now may
eventually be used in an attack upon the Maritime Provinces.
(2) Economic Situation. Japan is economically weak because she lacks es-
sential war materials, adequate foreign exchange, suflBcient foreign trade ; she
is also encumbered with financial problems connected with the war in China.
Economically Japan will be no worse off than she is at the present time unless
greater obstacles are placed before her economic progress. Availability of Ger-
man technical advice and the acquisition of war materials from Thailand and
Indo-China will improve her economic position. Japan is increasing her im-
ports of oil from the United States instead of decreasing them. Japan could
not be thrown into bankruptcy under present circumstances ; if she undertakes
a war with a major naval power, much greater obstacles would immediately be
placed before her economic progre.«s.
(3) Political Situ<ition. The Japanese will support any decision made by the
Japanese Government. The military and naval authorities continue to be the
predominant influence in Governmental decisions. It is believed that the naval
authorities, and business interests will exert every effort to avoid a conflict
with the United States regardless of the latter'.s participation in the European
War.
(4) Psychology of Japanese. The intense patriotism, the remarkable recuper-
ative capabilities and an indomitable tenacity of purpose along with a frugal
and low standard of living have enabled the Japanese people to accept and
even support the frightful cost of the indecisive war in China.
(5) Lines of Action. Japan has the following alternatives :
(a) Maintain status quo in China.
(b) Withdraw her armed forces from the area south of the Great Wall, make
peace with Chiang Kai-Shek and use only economic penetration into south-
eastern Asia.
(c) Withdraw sufficient forces from the Chinese mainland to facilitate an
advance :
(1) Southward.
(a) Contain or isolate the Philippine Islands and Hong Kong, attack
British Malaya via Thailand and Indo-China or by direct attack by land, sea,
and air.
(b) Contain or isolate the Philippine Islands and Hong Kong, and attack
the Netherlands' East Indies or Borneo.
(c) Reduction of the Philippine Islands and Hong Kong prior to movement
to the south.
(2) Northward against Russia to secure the Maritime Provinces Japan
has long regarded as indispensable to her security.
Actions indicated in (1) are all contingent upon the success of the Axis
forces in the European War.
(6) Mo.<it Probable Action. Japan will probably continue to assemble, by
gradual withdrawals from China, a field force for possible employment either in
Southeastern Asia or against Russia. Her hopes of empire are bound up with
an Axis victory and she is subject to strong German pressure to attack Russia at
1338 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
once; nevertheless it is believed that she vs^ill avoid precipitate action and ■will
continue her policy of avoiding war with Russia on the one hand and wth the
United States and Great Britain on the other. If forced or if electing to choose
between action against Russia or to the Southwest, she will be influenced by
Germany's success against Russia, particularly as regards possible Russian troop
withdrawals from Siberia, and by America's action, particularly as regards the
distribution of United States' naval strength, and as regards attempts to send
supplies to Russia through Vladivostok. Should the choice be the southward
advance, it will probably consist of a containment of Hong Kong and the Philip-
pine Islands while attacking British Malaya via Thailand and Indo-China.
c. British Empire.
(1) The British Empire, at war, is on the defensive; its army, naval and air
strength dispersed on exterior lines, with the United Kingdom, a theatre of
combat partially encircled by hostile assault positions, absorbing the principal
effective military strength. The Imperial Forces are composed of an equivalent
of 84 divisions, 233 squadrons and some 360 war ships. The Army has suffered
severe reverses in the past year but its morale is still high. There is a great
shortage of supporting weapons, tanks, antiaircraft and antitank guns and am-
munition in the Army in all theatres. While the Navy has lost several important
vessels in the Atlantic, the Home Fleet has had several valuable additions. The
Mediterranean Fleet was severely damaged at the Battle of Crete. Economically
the condition of the Empire is not satisfactory ; unless more severely restrained,
German attacks on the vital sea lanes could make the United Kingdom's condition
critical in less than six months. Politically the Empire is intact ; so far, no
important territory has been lost to the enemy. Psychologically the whole people
have developed a will to win, and an increasing application of all energy to the
war effort is noted. At present the Empire is not able to assume the offensive
except in air raids of limited depth on the continent of Europe and in minor
areas such as in Syria. Forces in the United Kingdom have limited capacity for
raids against the German-held coast line of Europe. In spite of many defeats the
spirit of the people is unperturbed and morale is unbroken.
(2) Great Britain still faces a possibility of invasion. Some 40 divisions and
an estimated 180 squadrons of first-line airplanes are in a state of readiness to
repel a German attack. The Army forces are well-trained and continuously
exercised ; the air forces are, in fact, constantly engaged in combat. The Army
is supported by a well organized and partially armed Home Guard and an effec-
tive civil organization to counter the probable German efforts to create confusion
before and during invasion. The Royal Air Foi-ce has successfully restricted
large scale German air attacks on England to night operations. While it has
not been able to prevent German air raids on shipping, it has become increasingly
effective in a narrow zone on the Continent during the pre-occupation of the
German air force in Russia. The principal mission of the Fleet at present is
to reduce shipping losses due to German attack on vital sea lanes. A readily
assembled naval force is a vital factor for the defence of the British Isles against
invasion. The promptness of action and effectiveness thereof will be inci'easingly
influenced by the measure of relief from distant patrolling which might result
from American naval patrols east of the 30th Meridian. The reduction of ship-
ping losses is one of the keys to the situation of Great Britain. In addition to
the importation of raw material^ (some 30,000,000 tons) to keep industry going,
the United Kingdom must import an absolute minimum of 10,000,000 tons of food-
stuffs, per annum, for human consumption.
(3) In the Middle East (Mediterranean area), the British have available
some 16 divisions. They have finally dispo.sed of all Italian forces in East Africa
but they have lost their previous gains in Libya. A beleaguered British garrison
at Tobruk, some 30.000 strong, is in a precarious position. A recent British
offensive with one of its objects to relieve that situation ended in defeat. It is
expected that the Germans will concentrate on an effort to reduce the British
position. A British offensive is not possible although there may be a desperate
effort to fight their way out. A small British force has put down the uprising
in Iraq and has cooperated with other small British and the Free French forces
in consolidating Syria. The British defeat at Crete was a severe one, especially
for the Royal Navy. Repairs to individual ships and small reinforcements have
enabled the fleet to participate in the Syrian campaign and to continue in a lim-
ited fashion its attack on Italian and German war communications. The Cretan
campaign has definitely proved that the Mediterranean Fleet is no longer free to
operate at will in that sea so long as German and Italian shore-based aviation
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1339
are maintained in their respective positions in effective strength. The opportu-
nities for the Fleet and its future usefulness are therefore bound to more and
more restricted. Already the supply of the British troops in Malta and Tobruk
is a very serious matter and the supply of British troops in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean area must now be undertaken through the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. The
withdrawal of the Fleet from the Mediterranean is likely, especially if there is
sufficient warning of a resumption of a major German threat in the Eastern
Mediterranean. The Royal Air Force operating in the Aliddle East consists of
approximately 30 squadrons. The principal key to the Middle East situation is
the receipt of supplies from the United States. It is problematical if these will
arrive in sufficient quantity or time to enable the British Command to arm and
equip sufficient forces to maintain the defence of that area.
(4) In the Far East (Singapore area), there are approximately 41/2 divisions,
2 Indian, 1 Australian, and the remainder made up from local forces. At Hong
Kong there is approximately a brigade of British troops and a few local units.
The Royal Air Force has about 13 squadrons in this area. There are also minor
naval forces.
(5) Lines of Action :
To continue on the strategic defensive in all theatres until such time as unfore-
seen events will permit the offensive, and to seek by every possible means to
bring the United States into the war at the earliest possible moment.
d. Italy
(1) Italy, although previously defeated in the Mediterranean, has now emerged
a tarnished victor as tbe result of active German support. While her East African
colonies must be written off, she has acquired considerable Balkan territory,
including the strategically important and long-desired Dalmatian coast, and
her North African colony, Libya, is again almost in her possession.
(2) The Italian Army, which must be considered second rate, consists of
approximately 86 divisions. It is estimated that trained man power is available
for an additional 64 divisions, provided Germany could and would furnish the
necessary equipment. Thei-e are about 1,500 so-called first line planes in the
air force which are inferior to those of Germany and Great Britain in performance
and armament. Pilots are not well trained. The Navy has, to date, made a
sorry showing ; however, it still must be reckoned a potent force with its present
strength of 4 battleships, 11 cruisers, 75 destroyers, and 72 submarines, especially
If supported by ground-based German aviation and operating against a weakened
British Mediterranean fleet.
(3) Italy lacks practically all essential raw materials, including oil and steel,
and was prepared for a war of only a few weeks' duration. Due to the British
blockade, she has become dependent on Germany for most of her supplies, food
excepted, which is resulting in German control of her industries. With rationing,
she has sufficient food for her needs and is able to furnish a certain amount to
Germany.
(4) The general unpopularity of the war, coupled with disastrous military de-
feats, resulted in rather open criticism of the Fascist Regime, together with
considerable discontent. However, recent German-assisted victories and the
fact that if Mussolini goes, the Germans will take over completely, have strength-
ened the position of II Duce and have bolstered the morale of the mercurial
Italian.
(5) Italy may be considered a second-rate military power that is a potential
threat as long as she is backed by German military might. She is now in the
position of a satellite of Germany, to be employed in any capacity that Hitler
believes will further his aims. In this connection, the obvious and almost certain
lines of action open to Italy are : ( 1 ) to maintain the defensive Axis position in
the Mediterranean until the completion of the Russian campaign ; (2) to provide
the garrisons for the recently conquered Balkan countries; (3) to send a con-
tingent of troops (probably a "token" one) to participate in the Russian cam-
paign ; and (4) to assist in the warfare on British shipping.
(6) The entry of the United States into the war should have no immediate
effect on Italy other than causing a certain lowering of Italian morale due to
the fact that a longer war is presaged.
e. France
(1) Metropolitan France, politically subservient to Germany, economically
impotent and faced with possible starvation this Winter, hating the Germans and
Darlan and beginning to criticize even Petain, has an Army (94,200 men) and an
Air Force (273 planes) of no combat value.
1340 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Fleet (1 Battle Cruiser, 7 Cruisers, 34 Destroyers, 30 Submarines) has poten-
tial value. It is conceivable that Darlan might order it to aid Germany, Divi-
sion of opinion among oflBcers is accentuated by Vichy's decision to collaborate.
The recent creation of the Croatian kingdom under Italian suzerainty tends to
free France from the traditional Italian claims in Nice and Corsica and so re-
moves one of the f^rench fears of further Axis aggression.
The long-range possibility exists that growing hatred of Germans and of the
Darlan regime, fanned by food shortage, will produce an internal crack-up with
obvious repercussions in other occupied countries.
Conclusions. Ground and air forces will not fight for Germany and cannot
fight for Britain or even for themselves.
If ordered to aid Germany, some fleet units would be scuttled, some would
run for North ( or West ) Africa, some would follow orders. Potential value
of fleet as such would be destroyed.
US participation in the war would not alter the situation except to hasten
the internal crack-up — especially if accompanied by wise radio propaganda.
(2) Syria, has just been conquered by British and Free French forces. Con-
quest of Syria by Britain will strengthen Allied geographical position in Near and
Middle East but will increase administrative responsibilities and will require fair
sized force for occupation and police, in other words, dispersion of military forces.
(S) North Africa, best governed of French territories, is short of food and
other supplies, and is subject to intense Nazi propaganda. It has 8 incomplete
Divisions (80,000 men), lacking mechanized equipment and short of munitions for
major operations. General Weygand is much respected and strongly dislikes
Germans and Darlan. Air Force has 286 planes ; Navy has — Algeria ; 7 Destroy-
ers, 13 Submarines — Morocco : 1 incomplete Battleship, 7 Destroyers, 2 Cruisers, 4
Submarines. The Navy is less anti-British than the Toulon Force ; the navy
commander is strongly pro-Ameriean. Combat value of the troops is high.
Conclusions. Weygand will make every effort to prevent extension of
collaboration to Africa but lacks means for aggressive action and can defend
only if assured of prompt and adequate aid. He would not accept British
aid initially,
US participation, if accompanied by materialization of prompt and ade-
quate aid, will enable Weygand to hold North Africa.
(4) Dakar is the headquarters of the West Africa Government, Anti- American
feeling is current there now due to unwise press and radio references to Dakar.
A vital strategic location, with excellent port and air facilities, well defended
from sea and air, it has successfully withstood one attack from the sea. West
Africa has 6 Divisions (70,000 men), 96 planes, 1 immobilized Battleship, 8 Cruis-
ers, 2 Destroyers, 10 Submarines. Dakar is vulnerable from land side — forces
landing at St, Louis (186 miles North by good road and railroad) and Bathurst
(162 miles South by good road and ferry).
Conclusions. Dakar will resist British attack. Navy would resist strenu-
ously any US Navy attempt to take it ; Army and Air Force would resist in-
itially and half-heartedly; public would welcome US effort if wise radio
propaganda prepares the way.
(5) De Gaulle has 2 completely equipped Divisions and a third in process of
formation. Majority of his forces are with the British in East Africa and Egypt ;
1 Division is operating in Syria,
Conclusions. Vichy collaboration will accelerate increase of Free French
forces. Wise radio propaganda will step up the acceleration. Reported
that Weygand dislikes de Gaulle personally but it is believed that — in the
event of US participation — an offer by de Gaulle to place himself and his
forces under Weygand's orders, to regain French independence, would be
accepted. But all these forces are too inherently unstable and weak to form
the predicate of any American plan.
f. Netherlands
(1) Western Hemisphere possessions:
Surinam: 950 troops, mostly black and mostly at Paramaribo; inadequately
armed and equipped. The threat from 6,000 criminal prisoners in adjoining
French Guiana is faced by 50 Dutch Marines on border.
Curacao: 1010 troops, including 618 British Infantry.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1341
Aruba: 899 troops, including 612 Cameron Highlanders (Flanders veterans).
Bonaire: 50 Military Police.
Conclusions: It is believed that, preceded by proper diplomatic negotia-
tions, U. S. occupation, in trust, of Netlierlands possessions in Western
Hemisphere would be welcome.
(2) The Netherlands East Indies, well governed, prosperous, untroubled by
native difficulties or unrest, has about 80,000 men under arms, mastly on Java
but with garrisons at important centers on Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes. The
Island of Java and main centers on other islands are well fortified, harbors are
mined, oil properties are adequately prepared for quick destruction if necessary.
Navy has 3 Cruisers, 7 Destroyers, 13 Submarines, 40 auxiliaries — all modern.
Air force has about 450 planes, mostly American and with large proportion of
bombers. Continuous reconnaissance flights are made over the whole archipelago
constantly. Defense plans are coordinated with those of British at Singapore
and the Dutch have a firm determination to defent stubbornly.
Conclusions: The Netherlands East Indies will ofiEer stubborn defense to
attack. If the atack is determined and sustained, outer islands will have
to be sacrificed, after destruction of oil properties, and defense will concwi-
trate on Java which can be held until adequate naval aid arrives from U. S.
forces. It is not believed that Britain is in a position to give the required
aid alone.
g. V. 8. 8. R.
The U. S. S. R. is now engaged in a defensive war with Germany and has
available for operations the following forces :
(1) Military Forces. — 180 infantry divisions; 44 cavalry divisions; 79 tank
brigades; 39 air divisions (total number of planes, 6,600). It is estimated that
5,000 planes are physically present in the western and sothwestern frontier dis-
tricts. General effectiveness estimated fair.
(2) Naval Forces. — Are considered a negligible factor in this war effort.
The definite policy of the Government is to pursue a defensive course and
provide adequate armed defense forces in the critical areas of the Soviet Union.
Active participation in offensive operations as acts of aggression are not the
policy of the Regime; however, in areas where U. S. S. R vital interests and
defense demand that aggressive military operations be undertaken, such action
has been taken and will follow.
(3) Economic. — Major effort within the Soviet Union industrially is to pro-
vide for the immediate self-suflSciency of the nation in munitions and war sup-
plies. Transportation and production are inefficient, due to faulty production
methods, inadequate supply of high-grade machine tools, and a lack of qualified
technicians.
(4) Morale. — Morale within the Red Army is good; morale of the population
is satisfactory in spite of the low standard of living, purges, etc.
(5) Political. — The recent pact with Japan indicates definite agreement with
respect to the Far Eastern situation. A declaration on the part of Great Britain
supporting Russia as an ally in the Russian-German conflict has again given
Russia a definite place in European affairs.
The Comintern through the Soviet Regime is striving for a world revolution
in the interests of Communism. Unless the U. S. S. R. emerges one of the
victors in this war, Communism will definitely be on the way out in Europe.
The U. S. S. R. has the following lines of action open in case the United States
entered the war as an ally of Great Britain and Russia: (1) Vigorous offensive
conduct of the European confilct. (2) Continue a defensive war as at present
until offensive operations can be conducted, assisted by British-U. S. support.
(3) Continued withdrawal, if necessary, to the Urals to avoid decisive defeat to
lengthen German supply difficulty. It is believed the U. S. S. R. would adopt
action (2).
h. Latin America.
(1) The Latin American republics, while able to defend themselves against
internal aggression, cannot do so if the subversive elements are given direct sup-
port by the German air forces. These countries, due to their geographical and
economic situation, their insistent demands for military assistance have become
liabilities to the United States.
(2) The German military successes have increased their reluctance to permit the
United States to establish desired military and naval bases.
1342 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(3) The necessity of U. S. bases in Latin America has become not only essential
but urgent.
(4) The establishment and occupation of bases requires, at least, several
months.
(5) The time has come when the United States must make specific requests for
immediate concession of bases at Natal, Brazil ; the Galapagos Islands, Ecuador ;
Buenaventura, Colombia ; and Acapulco, Mexico. Further postponements, par-
ticularly as regards Natal, might prove disastrous if the Germans seize the French
naval base at Dakar. The American Republics must be shown that further delay
in the concession of bases might not only be interpreted as an attitude of non-
cooperation, but that it will also jeopardize the defense of the Western Hemisphere
and the integrity and independence of their Sovereignty.
July 17. 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject : Japanese Movement Into French Indo-China.
1. As was made known to the Chief of Staff July 15, 1941, the Japanese Govern-
ment on July 12, 1941, delivered what amounts to an ultimatum to the Vichy
Government, the terms of which, among other items, provided for the occupation
by Japanese armed forces of eight air bases and two naval bases in Southern
Indo-China (see attached map).
2. It is the considered opinion of this Division that this Japanese movement as
planned, while opportunistic in conception, was also strategically defensive in
character and designed primarily to prevent British and American influence from
shutting off supplies of rubber, tin and rice from Thailand and Indo China which
are badly needed by Japan.
3. The French were given until July 20th in which to comply with Japan's
demands. Military preparations were initiated by the Japanese, but no military
pressure had been put on Indo-China up to midnight July 15-16.
4. On July Iftth the Japanese Cabinet resigned en masse. It is too early to
attempt a detailed explanation of this act. For the present, it must be taken
as further proof of the fact, known for some time, that there was an element
of violent discord in the inner government circles of Jap^n-
5. Until the personnel of the new Cabinet is announced it would be futile to
attempt a prediction as to Japan's possible change of policies. One fact seems
evident, however, and that is that Vichy will be given a breathing spell and the
expedition to Indo-China may be deferred or even abandoned.
SHimMAN Miles,
Brigadier General, V. 8. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, Ch-2.
Enclosure 1.
cc: A. C. of S., WPD.
July 17, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff :
Subject : Mobilization of Additional Japanese Manpower.
1. Prior to the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet, July 16, 1941, a large
scale mobilization was started in Japan under unusual conditions of secrecy.
This mobilization is continuing.
2. The Military Attache in Tokyo reports that a part (strength unknown) of
this new force is being shipped to Manchoukuo to join the Kwantung Army.
3. In view of the fact that the major part of the Japanese Army is pinned
down in China without a large mobile reserve and the further fact that the
Siberian Army is about twice the size of the Kwantung Army (20-30 Divisions
to 12), the strengthening of the Japanese force in Manchoukuo appears to be a
logical precautionary procedure.
4. Whether she moves south or north Japan needs more men.
5. In the opinion of this Division the first aggressive move, if made, will be
into Indo-China to deny this region to a DeGaulist Pro-British, Pro-American
faction steadily growing in power there. Japan, while building up her strength
in Manchoukuo, will then await the outcome of the German-Soviet War. If
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1343
and when Germany crushes European Russia and the Siberian Garrison de-
teriorates in strength or morale, Japan will probably move in to seize the long
desired Maritime Provinces of Siberia.
Sheibman Miles,
Brigadier Oenerai, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, Ch-2.
Copy to War Plans Division.
I. B. 99
July 18, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff :
Subject : New Japanese Cabinet.
1. A United Press dispatch from Tokyo dated July 18, 1941, states that Prince
Konoye has selected the key men for a new and highly militaristic Cabinet.
Vital posts are reported as follows :
Premier Prince Konoye
War Minister General Tojo
Navy Minister Admiral Oikawa
Home Minister Baron Heranuma
Foreign Minister Admiral Toyoda
2. The first four named above are hold-overs from the former Cabinet. Admiral
Toyoda replaces former Foreign Minister Matsuoka.
3. Admiral Toyoda was a protege of the former Admiral Baron Saito
(assassinated in 1936 while Premier) and is regai-ded as a moderate. He is
known as a clever, able oflScer, a specialist in Ordnance, and as having had con-
siderable experience in diplomacy, particularly with the British.
4. The new Cabinet may be regarded as strongly nationalistic, and while
probably more moderate and conservative than would have been the case had an
Army Officer been given the portfolio as Foreign Minister, it may be that added
impulse will be given to Japan's Southward Advance. In this connection, it
must be remembered also that Admiral Toyoda has just completed a tour as
Minister of Commerce and Industry, and is fully aware of the deplorable con-
dition of Japan's foreign trade and internal economy. He may be expected,
therefore, to take steps, as Foreign Minister, which will improve foreign trade
conditions since such trade is the life blood of industrial Japan.
Sherman Mtt.es,
Brigadier General , V. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of ^taff, 0-2.
Distribution :
Secretary of War
Chief of Staff
War Plans Division
GHQ
ONI
General Embick
Mr. McCloy (Record Section)
Jtn.Y 18, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff :
Subject : Strategical Estimate of the
Situation.
1. The following estimate has been prepared as requested in Memorandum
from the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD. 4570, June 6, 1941, which requested
information on the Axis Powers as of July 1. 1941. July 1, 1942, and July 1, 1943,
as a basis for the War Department STRATEGIC ESTIMATE. Specific data
requested in paragraphs 2 (1), (2) of the Memorandum cited and (3) on Axis
naval, air and field forces are enclosed.*
2. Estimate of disposition — military, political, economic and psychological,
a. July 1. 19jl.
Germany, with the initiative, was employing the mass of her ground and air
forces against the U. S. S. R., without, however, relaxing her campaign against
shipping .serving the British Empire. Elsewhere the military effort of the
•Omitted.
1344 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
European Axis was at a minimum. Japan, her army practically contained by
China, was contemplating action against Indo-China, but her policy was domi-
nated by the uncertainties arising from the Russo-German campaign and the final
outcome of the whole war. An Axis political offensive was in full swing with a
view to consolidating a "United States of Europe" to include Spain and Portugal
and the French, Spanish and Portuguese possessions in Africa. Axis propaganda
was being used effectively in Latin America and throughout Islam and with less
effect in the United States and India.
b. By July 1, 1942.
( 1 ) The following are envisaged :
(a) German defeat of U. S. S. R. and re-establishment of German military
initiativa
(b) Participation of the U. S. in the war under Rainbow 5.
(2) Under the foregoing the following are estimated to be the Axis disposition
and capabilities :
[2] German occupation of the U. S. S. R. to Lake Baikal and possibly to
the Pacific. Possible Japanese occupation of the Maritime Provinces of Siberia.
Axis control of Africa, roughly north of the line Fernando Po — Djibout is either
accomplished or imminent. Continuation of the aerial and naval siege of the
British Isles. German attempt to invade Great Britain or (more probable) a
broad strategic movement through the Middle East toward the Indian Ocean,
possibly in conjunction with a southwestward advance by Japan. The political
consolidation of Europe under German leadership will have been accomplished,
but the political cohesion of this entity will be low. Germany and Japan will
be obviously war-weary. Economic exploitation of the U. S. S. R. will have
barely begun. While still debarred physically, militarily and economically from
Latin America, the Axis will have achieved a considerable amount of political
disunion in that area by intrigue and propaganda. German propaganda will
tend to hve become less effective in India, the United States and the Moham-
medan world.
c. By July 4 iO'fS. Axis dispositions and capabilities are estimated as follows:
Germany will still possess superior ground forces. The invasion of the British
Isles, if not already achieved, will now be impracticable. Germany will have ex-
tended her penetration southward in Africa and will still be able to renew the
offensive in the Middle East. Japan, if not irrevocably committed to war on the
side of the Axis, will tend to stand aloof. German economic exploitation of Russia
will have progressed, but the general economic condition of Europe will be low.
Axis morale will be generally low and war-weariness will be rife. There will be
no real political cohesion in Europe. The Axis propaganda effort, centered on
Latin America will be losing ground.
Sherman Miles,
Brigadier Oeneral, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, Q-2.
EJn closure
Distribution
War Plans Division
G. H. Q.
General Embick
Mr. CcCloy (Record Section)
dya
July 25, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff :
Subject : Sanctions against Japan.
I. Discussion.
1. On July 12, 1941 the Japanese Government announced that it had decided
to take over control of the nation's capital funds which are to be mobilized in
the interests of the state. The new policy apparently discards the past economic
set-up and calls for mobilization and distribution of capital at the will of the
government in order to attain maximum production as well as to bolster the
defense structure.
2. The new policy is obviously a belated attempt to improve the deplorable eco-
nomic conditions in Japan — conditions pointed out in confidential Economic Esti-
mate, Japan, May 27, 1941, compiled in the Far Eastern Section, this Division, a
copy of which is attached hereto as Tab I.*
•Omitted.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1345
3. This centralization of capital, which is merely an extension of the control
which the government has already secured over industry and other branches of
Japanese economic life, will undoubtedly bring about a more efficient control of
Japan's internal structure, but will contribute nothing toward the acquisition of
critical and essential raw materials so badly needed by Japan's war industries.
4. A step toward this latter end is Japan's current move to occupy southern
Indo-China. In the opinion of this Division this will be followed by an exten-
tion of Japan's control to include Thailand. Further aggression by Japan after
consolidating her position in these new points d'appui will be predicated upon the
outcome of the European War.
5. For some time, the policy of our government has been based upon a desire
to restrain Japan by moral embargoes and export control, neither of which were
stringent enough to drive Japan into further aggressive action toward Malaysia
and the Netherlands Indies.
[2] 6. A discussion as to whether this policy was sound at the time of
its adoption is immaterial to a study t)f the current situation. The fact stands
out, however, that Japan has now burst through these mild restraints imposed
by the United States Government and is now embarked upon new aggression which
endangers the safety of all the areas in the southwestern Pacific, including the
Philippine Islands.
7. Under these circumstances the last reason for withholding effective sanc-
tions against Japan has been brushed aside.
8. Attention is invited to the last sentence on page 61 of Tab I which reads :
"The United States is today in a position to wreck completely the economic
structure of the Japanese Empire." This statement is as sound today as when
it was written in May, 1941.
9. Effective economic sanctions against Japan imxwsed by us, today, would
not, in the opinion of this Division, force Japan to take any steps in the way
of aggressive action which she does not plan to take anyway, when a favorable
opportunity arises, nor would they precipitate a declaration of war on us by
Japan. Such action on our part need not and should not distract our attention
from the main theater of operations. On the contrary, by adopting such a
policy we will be able to conserve for Britain and for ourselves supplies which
from the viewpoint of our national defense, are being worse than wasted when
we place them in Japanese hands.
Shebman Miles,
Brigadier Oeneral, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2.
1 Enclosure: Tab I.
Copies to :
Secretary of War
Secretary, Joint Board
Deputy Chief of Staff
War Plans Division,
dps
[Pencilled notation:] This memo was written prior to receipt of information
regarding embargo decision.
S. M.
H.
JTJLY 30, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff :
Subject : German-Japanese Relations.
I. Discussion.
1. The American Ambassador to Japan in a telegram to the Secretary of State
dated July 23, 1941, points to a trend in Japanese public and private oponion
indicating that Japan is no longer a happy partner in the Tripartite Agreement.
He states that there has been a gradual weakening over a considerable period of
time of the ties binding Japan to the Axis Powers. He further states a feeling
he has had for some time that if the Germans ran true to form they would sooner
or later overshoot their mark in Japan, and that the praud and sensitive Japa-
nese people would eventually realize the fundamental contempt and scracely con-
cealed arrogance of the Germans for the Yellow Race.
2. According to the Ambassador there is a growing feeling among many Japa-
nese that Japan is being treated as a satellite, if not as a dependent, a feeling
1346 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
which has been developing as the result of the increasing influx of Nazi oflBcials
(including members of the Gestapo) into Tokyo, the efforts of these oflScials to
exercise a controlling influence in matters of domestic concern and in many
aspects of Japanese life, and the constant interference by the German Ambassador
in trying to regiment Japanese newspapers along Axis lines.
3. The Ambassador remarks that as usual, the Germans have overshot their
mark.
4. The Ambassador reported in a telegram to the State Department dated
July 27, 1941, that Former Foreign Minister Matsuoka informed the Turkish
Ambassador that he had cabled Ribbentrop 48 hours in advance of the Nazi
attack on the Soviet a.sking if there were any truth in reports of such an attack
and Ribbentrop replied with a categorical denial.
5. Our Minister to Thailand in a telegram to the Secretary of State dated
July 26, 1941, reported that the Prime Minister had informed him that Lt. Col.
Scholl, German Military Attache, had called and warned him (the Prime Minis-
ter) against "going too far" with Japan,, "because", said the German Attache,
"you cannot trust Japan". The German Attache stated further that "Germany
will settle with Japan after she has won the war in Europe."
6. In view of the conditions depicted above, the time appears ripe for the
judicious use of information which will have as its aim the dissolution of the
Tripartite Agreement. Any action on our part which will make Japan an even
more reluctant Axis partner weakens our potential enemies, enhances our own
prestige and authority and materially and favorably affects our national defense.
II. Recommendation.
That the Secretary of War confer with the Secretary of State with a view
to placing the information contained in paragraph 5 above in the hands of the
Japanese Ambassador.
/s/ Sherman Miles
Shebman Miles,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, 0—2
Distribution :
Secretary of War
Chief of Staff
War Plans Division
G.H.Q.
General Embick
Asst. Sec. of War
L B. 112
August 16. 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject : Developments in the Far Eastern Situation.
1. It is believed that the Japanese Government, with the sanction of the
Emperor, has decided upon a foreign policy whose objectives are as follows :
a. Adherence to Tripartite Pact.
b. Establishment of a Greater East Asia sphere of co-prosperity (under Japa-
nese domination and control) regardless of other developments in the world
situation.
c. Disposal of the China Incident.
d. Expansion southward for reasons of economic and strategic security.
2. In implementing the foregoing policy, it is believed that Japan proposes
to take steps as follows:
a. Increased pressure on China from various points in the south.
b. Seizure by Japan of all Foreign Concessions in China.
c. Politico-military pressure on Indo-China and Thailand to facilitate Japan's
southward advance.
d. Preparation for an attack on Siberia, but to be made at her own chosen
time.
e. A resort to every means available to keep the United States out of the
war.
3. Since the adoption of the policy outlined in paragraph 1 above Japan has
secured military and economic control of Indo-China, is in a position to enforce
her military and economic demands on Thailand and to threaten the vital
Burma railroad and road, and has increased the strength of the Kwantung
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1347
Army (in Manchoukuo) to about 600,000 officers and men as opposed to a Russian
force, east of Lake Baikal, of about 400,000. The following factors, however,
unfavorable to the successful implementation of Japan's aggressive policy, have
been injected into the situation :
a. The German time-table for the subjugation of the U. S. S. R. has gone
awry.
b. The United States and Great Britain have frozen Japanese assets.
c. Great Britain has announced an embargo in exports to Japan.
d. The American, British and Dutch armed forces in the southwestern Pacific
have been materially strengthened.
e. Great Britain and the United States have pledged aid to the U. S. S. R.
and additional aid to China.
f. The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain
have announced accord on an eight point program which, while not mentioning
Japan by name, presents a long-range threat to her position as an Axis Power
and to the retention of her conquests.
4. The great danger in the situation lies in the fact, so often proved, that
Japanese military and naval authorities are not under the complete control of
their Government. We have seen for the past year an extraordinary example
of discipline and self control exercised by the German military in conformity
to their Government's decree of avoiding any possible armed clash with the
United St^ates. We can, unfortunately, expect no such self denial and restraint
on the part of the Japanese military. We can only hope that they will at
least follow for a time the policies of their Government.
5. There are clear indications that, in spite of the decisions outlined in Para-
graphs 1 and 2 above, the Japanese Government is willing to take extraordinary
diplomatic measures to keep the United States out of the war, at least temporarily.
There are indications that Japan is unwilling to commit herself to the extent that
Germany would like to see her committed. There are indications that Japan
realizes that she must make some concessions to the strong political stand now
taken by the United States, even though those concessions consist largely in fur-
ther conversations and negotiations.
6. Considering all of the above, this Division believes that forceful diplomacy
vis-a-vis Japan, including the application of ever increasing military and economic
pressure on our part, offers the best chance of gaining time, the best possibility
of preventing the spread of hostilities in the Pacific area and of the eventual dis-
ruption of the Tripartite Pact. The exercise of increasingly strong "power di-
plomacy" by the United States is clearly indicated.
Sherman Miles,
Brigadier General, U. 8. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, Gf-2.
Distribution :
The President War Plans Division
Secretary of War OflBce of Naval Intelligence
Assistant Secretary of War General Embick.
Chief of Staff
dya
August 20, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff :
Subject : Chinese Resistance.
1. General Chu, Chinese Military Attache, called on me today at his request to
discuss the general situation. He was evidently worried because China was not
specifically mentioned in all the discussion with regard to the conference be-
tween The President and the British Prime Minister. He seemed to feel that
China is being forgotten for the moment. I told him of course that China is and
will remain a pivotal point in the war, and that although not specifically men-
tioned in regard to the conference, the situation in the Far East, including China,
was undoubtedly carefully considered.
2. General Chu then pointed out that much has recently been said about halting
Japanese aggression both to the south and to the north, but nothing specific on
stopping Japanese aggression in China proper. He went on to point out the pos-
sibility of Japan concentrating all of her efforts on crushing Chinese resistance
79716 O — 46— pt. 14 25)
1348 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
if she considers herself stopped by the Anglo-American front from further ag-
gression to the south and to the north. He said, rather pointedly, "You know we
cannot hold out indefinitely." I pointed out to him that the present emphasis on
aid to Russia was probably due to Anglo-American belief that the Russian crisis
was an immediate one, a question of holding her in the war for the next six weeks,
until winter comes to her relief. Chinese resistance on the other hand would not
appear to present so pressing a time factor, considering the long period of four
years in which they have successfully withstood Japanese pressure. General Chu
admitted this, and in answer to my questions as to the duration of Chinese re-
sistance he said that undoubtedly the situation would hold throughout this
calendar year. I pointed out to him that Japanese's present extension of her
forces both in the north and in the south precluded the possibility of her con-
centrating her efforts against the Chinese at this time. He admitted this, but
stated that he believed Japan must continue her aggressive policy, and that it
was possible for her to regroup her forces against China if she were barred from
the north and the south. He said that he feared that the Anglo-American policy
of holding Japan in the north and the south might force her into a last desperate
effort to overcome Chinese resistance. In his opinion Japan cannot stop, and in all
questions of major policy the Japanese Government must bow to the decision of
its military forces. He cited the Chinese proverb, "He who rides on the tiger
must go where the tiger goes."
3. General Chu professed to have little information on the Russian situation,
but said that what he had was encouraging. He thought the outstanding thing
was that Russia had successfully taken the first shock of war. He remarked
that the first few months of the Sino-Japanese war were by far the hardest,
and after that the Chinese had settled down to a long resistance.
4. General Chu's visit undoubtedly indicates what we have had from other
sources — that the Chinese here, and presumably also in Chungking, fear that
they are being left out of the big picture, that we may not be firm in our present
stand vis-a-vis Japan, and that aid to China may become more difficult in the
future.
5. This Division believes that considerable morale aid might be given to China
in the form of public statements emanating from high officials of the Government
on our deep interest in Chinese resistance and our policy of aiding it. An oflBlcial
anouncement of the forthcoming dispatch of a military mission to China is
suggested. It is realized however that such morale aid would have to be con-
sidered in the light of its effect on the critical I'elations now existing between
Japan and the United States.
/s/ Sherman Miles
Sherman Miles
Brigadier OeneraJ, U. 8. Army
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2.
Copies to :
Secretary of War ONI
Assistant Secretary of War Mr. Currie
Chief of Staff General Magruder
War Plans Division
Septembeb 2, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject : Conversation between the Japanese Military Attache and the Chief,
Far Eastern Section.
1. Coincident with the Japanese Ambassador's call on the President on the
morning of August 28, 1941, Major General Saburo Isoda, Japanese Military
Attache, called by appointment on Colonel R. S. Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern
Section, Intelligence Branch, this Division. The following are notes of Colonel
Bratton on the visit :
"I have known General Isoda and been associated with him under varioUjS
circumstances for eighteen years. In consequence, our conversation was friendly,
informal and entirely 'off the record.'
"General Isoda stated that, like the Ambassador, he was exploring ways and
means to relieve Japanese-United States tension and bring about better relations
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1349
between the two countries. During the course of a conversation which lasted
for an hour and a half, General Isoda made statements to the following effect :
a. Due to restrictions imposed by our export control, the Japanese have begun
to use a portion of their war reserve of petroleum.
6. He, the Naval Attache, the Ambassador and the entire Embassy Staff are
in accord in an earnest desire to better United States-Japanes^ relations.
c. Japan made a great mistake in joining the Axis.
d. The Army frequently gets out from under control of the Civilian Government
and has to be restrained by Imperial Command.
e. Japan has her back to the wall. She can be pushed just so far, then will
have to fight us to save her national honor and integrity, though war with the
United States is the last thing desired by Japan.
' "When asked flatly my opinion as to what assurances on the part of Japan
would be acceptable to the United States Government at this time, I told him
that Prince Konoye, if he comes to talk with the President, must come with
Imperial sanction and armed with authority to speak for and on behalf of the
armed forces of Japan as well as on behalf of the Civilian Government. I said
that, in my opinion, nothing short of this would be productive of lasting results
or be acceptable to the President.
"General Isoda received this statement of opinion on my part with entire
good will, expressed his pleasure over the opportunity of having a frank talk,
and stated his desire to have other and more frequent talks in the future. I, in
turn, assured him that I would be glad to meet him in a private and unofficial
capacity at any time."
2. General Isoda's visit clearly parallels the conversations now in progress be-
tween the Japanese Ambassador and the State Department. In effect he speaks
for the Japanese Embassy, the entire staff of which is sincerely working for the
betterment of Japanese-American relations. He obviously did not feel empowered
to speak for the Japanese Army.
Sherman Miles,
Brigadier Oeneral, U. 8. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, Ch-2
Distribution :
Secretary of War
Chief of Staff
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence
I. B. 122
Septembeb 5, 1941. .
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff :
Subject : Brief Periodic Estimate of the World Situation.
1. This estimate covers the period September 3-December 1, 1941.
2. In this period the dominating elements of the situation will be :
a. The preoccupation of Germany with the U. S. S. R.
6, The inability of Great Britain and her associates to take the strategic
offensive.
In consequence a militarily decisive phase of the war will not be reached.
3. Axis:
a. Germany (see Tab A) will be immersed in the conflict with the U. S. S. R.,
either in terms of combat or of large-scale military reorganization. Victories
over the U. S. S. R. may tend to raise her national morale ; but on balance her
morale should be lower, because of losses in Russia and because of the certainty
of prolongation of the war. Economically she will continue strained but stable.
Specifically :
(1) She will be unable to invade the British Isles.
(2) She will be unable to attack in the Middle East. (See Tab B).
(3) She is and will be able at will to occupy French Northwest Africa, but
probably will not do so. (See Tab C).
(4) She probably will be in a position to intensify her warfare against shipping
as compared with its present reduced level. (See Tab A).
(5) The policy of the United States, backed by growing armaments, particu-
larly in terms of sea and air power, will be an increasing factor in her calculations.
6. Subsidiary European Members of the Axis. — Their subservience to Germany
will increase and their influence in world affairs will continue to diminish. Italy
1350 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In particular will garrison the Balkans and provide Axis communications with
Libya. (For Spain, see Tab C)
c. The Conquered and Occupied Countries of Europe may develop still greater
unrest; but this element in the total situation will, for the time being, remain
of little net influence on the general situation.
d. Japan (see Tab D), beset with uncertainties, may do nothing, may attack
the Maritime Provinces, may seek to expand to the Southwest ; it is even possible
that she may withdraw from the Axis. Japan also has the capability of concen-
trating her newly augmented forces against China and seeking a decision there.
No indication er likelihood of this is seen. In the general picture and excluding
China, where she must continue to fight, her most likely, but by no means certain,
course is inaction.
4. Turkey, the most practicable land corridor between Europe and the Middle
East, will find her position increasingly precarious ; but in this period she probably
will evade choice of definite alignment with either the Axis or the Anglo-
Russian bloc.
5. Anti-Acris:
a. U. S. 8. R. (see Tab E), with limited and decreasing ability to pass to the
oflfensive, faced with the loss or dislocation of most of her war industry and with
inadequate conununications to the outside world, is destined to continued military
reverses, while exacting a significant toll from the German armed forces. Her
only hope is to bring about German overextension and exhaustion. Destruction
of her armed forces and overthrow of the Stalin regime within this period are
possible but not yet probable. (See also TAB A for Russia vs. Germany and
Tab D for Russia vs. Japan. )
6. Great Britain has a continued respite to perfect her home defenses, build
up her air force, consolidate her Middle Eastern and Far Eastern positions, and
to a limited degree improve the defense of the Atlantic sea lanes. She will have
neither the ability nor the opportunity to take the strategic offensive, other than
by limited air attacks on Germany's European position. She has the opportunity
to launch a limited offensive against Libya. ( See Tab B. )
6. Latin America is momentarily less concerned with the war, since its center
of gravity has shifted to Eastern Europe. The Axis iwwers, on the whole, are
losing ground before Democratic pressure, political, psychological and economic.
Shebman Milbs,
Brigadier General, V. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
5 Enclosures : Tabs A to E Inclusive.
Distribution :
The President
Secretary of War
Secretary of State
Assistant Secretary of War
Coordinator of Information
Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
Director of Naval Intelligence
G. H. Q.
Major General Embick.
Under Secretary of War
1. Tab A— GERMANY— omitted
2. Tab B — British situation in the Middle East — omitted
3. Tab C — A German drive to the Southwest — omitted
4. Tab. D.
JAPAN
1. Lines of Action Open to Japan
Japan has the following alternatives :
a. Continue to withdraw her armed forces from the area south of the Great
Wall with a view to attacking Siberia.
6. Make peace with Chiang Kai-shek.
c. Disregard American action and opinion and occupy Thailand.
d. Attack Burma and the Burma Road via Thailand.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1351
e. Take or isolate the Philippine Islands and Hongkong and attack Singapore.
f. Contain or isolate the Philippine Islands and Hongkong and seize the
Netherlands East Indies.
g. Reorient their whole foreign policy by withdrawing from the Axis.
h. Seek a general settlement through American mediation.
i. Bide their time, wait for a better opportunity for the pursuance of any of
the above lines of action, hoping that time will be in their favor.
j. On the basis of the neutrality pact with Russia as a "face saver", enter into
an understanding with the United States and Great Britain in regard to terri-
torial expansion and economic penetration in southeast Asia and the southwestern
Pacific area.
2. Most Probable Action
Japan, beset with uncertainties, will probably "buy" time by entering into
negotiations with the United States. A cabinet upset in Japan, a not unlikely
event, will change the whole picture. The present cabinet, however, will initiate
no additional aggression on the part of Japan until all diplomatic means of
relieving pressure have been explored and exhausted. This does not preclude
independent action on the part of Japan's armies in the field,
3. Japan — Combat
Japan has an active army of about 2,000,000 including an air force of 55,000
and a trained and partially trained reserve of 3,500,000 men.
The active forces are deployed over a wide area fi-om Karafuto and Manchou-
kuo in the north to the Southern French Indo-China — Thailand border in the
south. The estimated number of active divisions or their equivalent is 68, plus
15 depot divisions in Japan Proper. Japan has recently mobilized approximately
5C0,000 reserves which have been utilized as replacements and in forming new
units included in the above estimate.
Japan has been withdrawing a considerable number of her troops from China
and despatching them to Indo-China and Manchuria. Some of these have been
replaced by Manchurian and Wang Ching-wei's puppet troops. Since the out-
break of the Russo-German war, the forces in Manchoukuo have been increased
from 8 to 19 divisions with auxiliary troops including 4 tank regiments and 4
cavalry brigades, totalling about 500,000 officers and men. The Japanese army
is well trained and an efficient fighting force. Officers are well qualified to per-
form their various duties in peace and war. The staflf has functioned well during
difficult tactical operations in China. The enlisted men, although somewhat
lacking in initiative, are well trained, experienced in combat, well disciplined,
courageous and aggressive to the point of recklessness. The Japanese have been
consistently successful in China from a tactical point of view and only combat
with a modern army can determine Japan's relative efficiency compared to mod-
ern occidental armies. Japan's army is physically hardy and psychologically
inspired by loyalty to the Emperor, devotion to duty and a fanatical patriotism
which make it a dangerous foe on the Asian continent or nearby islands.
The Japanese Army and Navy air forces have made rapid progress since 1937.
Personnel strength of Army and Navy air forces is 55,000 officers and men and
the two services have a combined plane strength of approximately 3,743 combat
planes. The Army squadrons number 114 and the Navy has 124 squadrons.
Plane design has lagged, but lack of formidable opposition has left them undis-
puted air superiority. Four years of continuous air operations have increased
the efficiency of Japanese aviation in no small degree. Recent acquisition of
German planes and technical advisors has contributed to Japanese air pro-
ficiency.
The Japanese Army is the best equipped army in Asia. Its equipment, how-
ever, is inferior to that of any of the modern European armies. The shortage
of raw materials and production capacity will limit the number of new divisions
which can be organized, even though Japan's partially trained manpower is ample
for her anticipated needs. Personal equipment appears to be sufficient and in
good condition but there is a shortage of organizational equipment such as tanks,
and other mechanized equipment, antiaircraft weapons and modern artillery.
Japan has a navy consisting of approximately 180,000 men and officers exclusive
of about 20,000 in the naval air corps. Naval strength comprises over a million
tons already built and nearly 500,000 tons building. The navy is divided into two
main divisions: the Combined Fleet and the Japanese Naval Forces in China.
The latter consists of the North Central and South China Fleets. The Combined
Fleet is based in home waters.
1352 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Japanese naval personnel is well trained — a training equal to tliat of the
British and American navies. The Japanese navy is modern, well balanced, and
ready for prompt service. It is relatively strong in aircraft carriers and tenders ;
it would be a formidable opponent to the navy of any power or those of any
combination of powers attempting offensive operations in the western Pacific area.
Japan, because of her geographic location blocks all sea approaches, north of
Haiphong, to the southeastern coast of Asia ; flanks all routes from the east
to the eastern and northeastern coast of the mainland ; and is in a remarkably
strong strategical position for defense against any distant naval power. Further-
more her geographic position is such that her navy, on the strategical defensive,
could from time to time successfully assuiue the tactical offensive.
4. Japan — Political
The political cauldron of Japan has been boiling furiously since Matsuoka was
relieved as Foreign Minister. During the time that Matsuoka was Foreign Min-
ister and under the leadership of Premier Prince Konoye, Japan set up its own
version of totalitarianism last fall called the "new national structure". Political
parties were disbanded and the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, designed
to unite all the people in assistance to the Throne, was hastily whipped into
shape. The Association was not a political organization like those controlling
Italy, Germany, and Russia because of the Japanese theory of the Emperor as
the supreme head of the state to whom all Japanese yield obedience and service.
The vaguely stated aims of the Association were too diffused to meet with
general approval ; as conditions are at present, it is clear that the "new structure",
movement — so far as its basic purpose was concerned — has entirely miscarried.
In its major tests, provided by the efforts to regiment industry and "reform" the
Diet, it merely stirred up severe controversies. The original hope that the
Imperial Rule Assistance Association could "unify all phases" of Japan's national
life has long since disappeared.
While the outward totalitarian structure has weakened, the domination exer-
cised by the army clique for nearly a decade continues. Practically every phase
of life in Japan has been placed under governmental control.
The whole political machinery is geared to preparation for expansion into
the maritime provinces of Siberia, for further expansion in southeast Asia and
the southwestern Pacific and to the solution of the China "Incident." Without
their previous enthusiasm and behind uncertain leadership, the Japanese are
continuing in the path to what they believe is their "divinely appointed destiny"
without being too sure as to where that "destiny" will take them. As a matter
of fact, there are indications that the people of Japan are becoming more and
more alarmed and apprehensive ; they fear that the present course will take
them into a major war. There is increasing dissatisfaction with the secretive
nature of governmental policy. If Japan goes to war with a major power, her
people will enter it desperately rather than confidently.
In September, 1940, Japan concluded a Tripartite Pact of Co-operation with
Germany and Italy which by implication requires Japan to attack the United
States (or any other power except Russia, not involved in the European War at
that time) should it attack either of the Axis partners. Although Foreign
Minister Toyoda. Matsuoka's successor, has said that there is no change in the
foreign policy of Japan, and that Japan will adhere to the Axis Alliance, there
are indications that Toyoda's sincerity in making such a statement is entirely
different from that of Matsuoka. In other words, the advantages and value of the
Tripartite Agreement are at present being very seriously questioned. But
Germany, through her representatives in Japan, is doing everything within her
power to keep Japan "in line." Thus Japan is most anxious to confer with the
United States, "looking toward a peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues
between the two countries," which means recognizing Japan's territorial and
economic gains in Eastern Asia. The chief obstacle is that even if a conference
were convened by the two governments, there could be no guarantee of the
results of such a conference unless the Japanese Army and Navy were directly
represented. Although a request for such representation would be unprecedented,
G-2 is of the opinion that unless such representation is obtained, a conference
at this time would be without lasting results.
Japan has boundless ambition in East Asia, but she finds herself in a poor
strategic position to take advantage of the opportunities the present time affords.
Japanese leaders are aware of the perils of further military commitments before
the stalemate in China is broken. One of the factions in Japan fsCvors making
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1353
a final effort to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to conclude a peace as soon as possible ;
another taction favors fighting the issue to a conclusion. The stalemate is about
as far from decision as it has been.
In the maelstrom of Japanese indecision, one thing stands out clearly — that
is, that the Japanese do not want the United States to become involved in the
war, but they want the United States to stay out of the war primarily to enable
Japan to retain a free hand in advancing the Co-Prosperity Sphere in Asia.
Another fact which is almost as clear is that Admiral Toyoda is a stop-gap
Foreign Minister, appointed temporarily with the idea of making a more perma-
nent appointment when Japanese policy could be more coherent and concrete.
5. Japan — Economic
Because of the ever-increasing stringency of the embargo placed on Japan by
the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, the economic
situation in Japan is slowly but surely becoming worse. The Japanese have
always lacked war materials, adequate foreign exchange and sufficient foreign
trade ; the embargo has served to increase the deficiencies in these categories.
These deficiencies are serious but are not likely to become dangerous before
December 1, 1941. The fact that Japan is also encumbered with financial
problems connected with the "incident" in China prevents any curative steps
being taken.
The technical assistance which the Germans have been giving to Japan over
a period of six months is no longer as welcome as it was before Germany's
attack on Russia. That attack has precluded the possibilties of Japan's re-
ceiving machinery and implements of war from Germany. As a matter of fact,
the Japanese are beginning to question whether the Tripartite Agreement has
not brought far greater economic disadvantages than advantage to Japan in
carrying out her plans for a "Co-Prosperity Sphei*e" in Asia. The Pro-Axis
leaders are finding great difficulty in justifying the alliance with Germany.
The "Co-Prosperity Sphere" is anything but prosperous. Because of the diffi-
culties of labor shortage, lack of sufficient transportation facilities and lack of
cooperation among the people who have been brought into the "sphere" by force
or persuasion, the "sphere" is about to fall apart.
The action of the Netherlands East Indies in joining with the United States
and Great Britain in embargoing goods to Japan was undoubtedly a severe blow,
both economically and in prestige. The economic competition going on behind the
scenes in Thailand, between Japan on the one hand, and Great Britain and
China on the other, will be increasingly significant. Recent information, how-
ever, indicates that Japanese banking interests are asking for a new loan of
25,000,000 Bahts from Thailand bankers, (supplementing a loan of $3,750,000
actually made to Japan early in August in order to pay for commodities pur-
chased by Japan in Thailand). The influence of the Chinese, the traditional
financiers of Siam, cannot be overlooked here.
The processes of economic warfare are so slow that, even if the status quo ante
were to be established in China by way of settlement of the Sino-Japanese con-
flict, Japanese economic predominance in the East Asiatic area would still be
so firmly established that several months would have to pass before the effects
of the economic embargo would in itself infiuence Japanese action in the Far
East.
The effects of the embargo will compel Japan to strive to obtain more assist-
ance in East Asia as well as to try to persuade Great Britain, the United States
and the Netherlands East Indies through threats and promises to soften the im-
pact their embargo has caused. Japan obviously does not want to go to war
with the United States to achieve her economic ol)jectives, but at the same time
she feels that the achievement of these objectives is an essential part of her
foreign policy.
The fact remains that Japan lacks essential raw materials to support either
her manufacturing industries or a major war effort. To procure them she must
have foreign exchange ; in order to obtain foreign exchange, she must have
foreign trade, which, at present, is seriously curtailed. The stoppage of trade
is reducing Japan's raw materials drastically — raw materials which are vital
to the organic well-being of Japan and to her ability to wage war successfully.
No other country even approaches the United States in importance to Japan's
econemic welfare, both as a source of raw materials and as a market for the
exports of Japan. Thus through the advantage the United States has gained
through the embargo, Japan finds herself in a very poor bargaining position.
5. Tab E— U. S. S. R.— Omitted.
1354 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I. B. 124
September 11, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff :
Subject : Political Developments in Japan.
1. A United Press dispatch from Tokyo dated September 11, 1941, gives the
following information :
"Emperor Hirohito today took direct command of Japanese Army Head-
quarters and moved to assure close Array collaboration with Premier Fumi-
maro Konoye's Government, which appeared to be trying to keep Japan out
of war even if that meant drifting away from her Axis ties."
2. Major developments are reported as follows :
a. Establishment of a new Defense General Headquarters under General Otozo
Yamada. Yamada is personally responsible to the Emperor and becomes virtual
Generalissimo of the Army superseding previous emphasis on General Staff
control.
b. Appointment of F\imio Goto, former Home Minister, as chairman of the
Central Cooperative Council of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, replac-
ing Admiral Suetsugu.
c. Entertainment of the Cabinet at luncheon by the Emperor, "in appreciation
of its outstanding services to the State."
3. A proper evaluation of this news is impracticable at this early date but a
definite trend seems indicated — a trend away from the Axis and toward better
relations with the United States and Great Britain. The new system is inter-
preted as an effort to strengthen the civilian government, check militaristic
domination of Imperial Policy, and erect a barrier to possible dissatisfaction
among the militarists with the future course of events.
4. General Yamada is a conservative, of great energy and ability. It is
reported that he stands high in the Emperor's favor. Goto is likewise a con-
servative and replaces one of Japan's worst jingoists. The action of the Emperor
in taking direct command of the Army and his giving prestige to the Cabinet by
inviting it to luncheon, and publicly thanking it is unprecedented.
5. Barring a massacre of the conservatives by the militarists, an event deemed
unlikely in view of the Emperor's action, it is probable that Japan will find a
peaceful way out of one of the greatest crises in her history and seek a means
to realign her foreign policy in an anti-Axis direction.
(signed) Sherman Miles
Sherman Miles,
Brigadier General, U. 8. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2.
Distribution :
The President Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Secretary of War Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD
Under Secretary of War Coordinator of Information
Assistant Secretary of War "Director of Naval Intelligence
Secretary of State G. H. Q.
Chief of Staff General Embick
[Note by General Miles : ] Original copy given to Gen. Watson for the President.
(signed) S. M.
September 17, 1941
Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D. :
Subject: Combat Estimate, Japan. (With map showing disposition armed
forces.
In compliance with verbal request, this date, from the Assistant Chief of
Staff, W. P. D., there is attached hereto (Tab A) a brief Combat Estimate
on Japan, with a map showing the disposition of Japan's armed forces and the
Asiatic area at present occupied by the Japanese.
Shebman Miles,
Brigadier General, U. 8. Army.
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2.
Incls.-2
Tab A
Map'
' Omitted.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1355
'L^AB A — Combat Estimate, Japan
Japan has an active army of about 2,000,0()0, including an air force of 55,000,
and a trained and partly trained reserve of 3,500,000 men.
The active forces are deployed over a v^'ide are0 from Karafuto and Man-
choukuo in the north to the Southern French Indo-China-Thailand border in
the south. The estimated number of active divisions or their e<iuivalent is 68,
plus 15 depot divisions in Japan Proper. Japan has recently mobilized approxi-
mately 500,000 reserves which have been utilized as replacements and in forming
new units included in the above estimate.
Japan has been withdrawing a considerable number of her troops from China
and despatching them to Indo-China and Manchuria. Some of these have been
replaced by Manchurian and Wang Ching-wei's puppet troops. Since the out-
break of the Rnsso-German war, the forces in Manchoukuo have been increased
from 8 to 21 division.s with auxiliary troops including 4 tank regiments and 4
cavalry brigades, totalling about 500,000 officers and men. The Japanese army
is well trained and an eflScieint figliting force. OflScers are well qualified to
perform their various duties in peace and war. The staff has functioned well
during difficult tactical operations in China. The enlisted men, although some-
what lacking in initiative, are well trained, experienced in combat, well disci-
plined, courageous and aggressive to the point of recklessness. The Japane^se
have been consistently successful in China from a tactical point of view and only
combat with a modern army can determine Japan's relative efficiency compared
to occidental modern armies. Japan's army is physically hardy and psychologi-
cally inspired by loyalty to the Emperor, devotion to duty and a fanatical patri-
otism which make it a dangerous foe on the Asian continent or nearby islands.
The Japanese Army and Navy air forces have made rapid progress since
1937. Personnel strength of Army and Navy is 55.000 officers and men and the
two services have a combined plane strength of approximately 3,743 combat
planes. The Army squadrons number 114 and the Navy has 124 squadrons.
Plane design has lagged, but lack of formidable opposition has left them undis-
puted air superiority. Four years of continuous air operations have increased
the efficiency of Japanese aviation no small degree. Recent acquisition of Ger-
man planes and technical advisors has contributed to Japanese air proficiency.
The Japanese Army is the best equipped army in Asia. Its equipment, how-
ever, is inferior to that of any of the modern European armies. Shortage of
raw materials and production capacity will limit the number of new divisions
which can be organized, even though Japan's partially trained manpower is
ample for her anticipated needs. Personal equipment appears to be sufficient
and in good condition but there is a shortage of organization equipment such
as tanks, and other mechanized equipment, antiaircraft weapons and modern
artillery.
[2] Japan has. a navy consisting of approximately 180,000 men and officers
exclu.sive of about 20.000 in the naval air corps. The naval vessels have over
a million tons already built and nearly 500,000 tons in the process of building.
The navy is divided into two main divisions: The Combined Fleet and the
Japanese Naval Forces in China. The latter consists of the North Central and
South China Fleets. The Combined Fleet is based in home waters.
The Japanese naval personnel is well trained — equal to that of the British
and American navies. The Japanese navy is modern, well balanced, and ready
for prompt service. It is relatively strong in aircraft carriers and tenders;
it would be a formidable opponent to the navy of any power or those of any
combination of powers attempting offensive operations in the western Pacific
area.
Japan, because of her geographic location blocks all sea approaches, north of
Saigon, to the southeastern coast of Asia ; flanks all routes from the east to
the eastern and northeastern coast of the mainland ; andl is in a remarkably
strong strategical position for defense against any distant naval power. Fur-
thermore her geographic position is such that her navy, on the strategical de-
fensive, could from time to time successfully assume the tactical offensive.
September 18, 1941.
Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
Subject. Strategic Estimate of the Situation.
1. The following data are furnished in response to your memorandum, above
subject, WPD 4994, September 17, 1941. The succeeding paragraphs are num-
bered according to the questions propounded therein.
1356 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"1. Do you see any beneficial effect of America's war effort with respect to
Great Britain maintaining her control over Singapore?"
America's defense effort, in terms of political, military, and economic pres-
sure, has already contributed materially toward curbing Japan's advance to
the southwest. This restraint on Japan tends to become stronger as time passes
by.
"2. If Great Britain were driven out of the Mediterranean and Middle East
Area, could she retain control in a remunerative sense in India and Malaysia?
What are the capabilities of Japan with respect to this situation?"
Yes, provided the Trans-Pacitic sea lanes are secured. In such an event Japan
would be sorely tempted to attack to the southwest. Such an attack could be
blocked only by the use of large U. S. Naval forces and considerable U. S.
ground and air forces.
"3. If the Russian military forces were defeated in European Russia, would
the Maritime and Siberian Areas continue to resist? What would their capabili-
ties be in the premises?"
Yes, but on the basis of a purely passive defense. Resistance could be organ-
ized more effectively in eastern than in western Siberia. The degree of resist-
ance would depend in large measure on material assistance from the United
States and Japan's position in the then developing situation. The amounts of
material furnished by us would be conditioned by the shipping situation, the
means of land transport available on the Asiatic mainland and by the attitude
of Japan.
[2] "4. What would the effect be of a successful German drive to the south-
we.st including the north and northwest African Areas?"
Sucii a move would have two major disadvantages for Germany : military
overextension and an increased economic problem with reference to Spain and
Portugal. It would give her tlie following major advantages: consolidation of
western Europe and north Africa ; increased opportunity for naval raiding by
.ships and aircraft based on northwest Africa; opportunity to extend her in-
fluence in Latin American and perliaps to infiltrate there physically. Such action
by Germany would necessitate the promp occupation of the Natal area, Brazil,
by the United States and the prompt occupation of the Azores and the Cape Verde
Islands by the Democracies.
"5. What would tlie effect be on the situation if the Germans make a success-
ful drive southeastward through Turkey, Iran and against the Suez Area?"
Such an event would entail disastrous British losses and a profound shock to
British morale. It would throw the British back against India and Kenya.
It would require the reorganization and protection of sea communications be-
tween India. Malaysia, Australasia and the Democracies. (See 2 above).
Shekman Miles,
Brigadier Oenerah U. 8. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, 0—2.
I. B. 131
September 23, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff :
Subject : Crisis in Japan.
1. This Division has information from a highly reliable source to the effect that
the Japanese Cabinet is confronted with a highly critical and explosive situation.
The Emperor's recent gesture in support of the Cabinet notwithstanding, certain
pressure groups in Japan are making threatening gestures toward the Premier.
2. The point at issue is whethei' or not the Japanese Government is to en-
courage, authorize or permit a nationwide celebration on the anniversary of the
signing of the Tripartite Agreement. Genuine Government anxiety over this
point is obviously being used as a red herring in the road to national objectives
in the hope that the United States Goverimient can be rushed into making con-
cessions designed to strengthen the authority of the present Japanese Cabinet.
This on the theory that if the current Japanese Cabinet falls there will be no one
left in Japan with whom we can deal, satisfactorily.
3. Attention is invited to the fact that in all of her recent proposals and
counter-propo.sals Japan has carefully avoided giving any definite assurance that
she will not attack Ru.ssia.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE ^ 1257
4. The present agitation, tlierefore, on the part of Japan to exti'act an imme-
diate agreement from the United States to some or all of her proposals tor a 'con-
ference of leaders" may be motivated by a desire to cover preparations for an
all out attack on Siberia timed with the expected Russian collapse in Europe.
5. A lessening of pressure at this time would be considered as appeasement
by the Japanese and would be highly deterimental to the advantage that the
United States has gained by the policy initiated when Japanese funds in this
country were frozen and reaffirmed when a strict embargo was placed on oil
going to Japan.
[2] (S. The celebration of the .signing of the Tripartite Agreement by the
Japanese on September 27, and the extent of that celebration is a matter entirely
within the control and jurisdiction of the present Jjipanese Government. The
United States can and should judge only by the acts and not by the words of that
Government.
7. This Division still believes, as stated in I. B. 112. dated August 16. 1941, that
forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis Japan, including the application of ever increasing
military and economic pressure on our part offers the best chance of gaining
time, the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the Paciiic
Area, and also the hope of the eventual disruption of the Tripartite Pact. The
exercise of increasingly strong "power diplomacy" by the United States is clearly
indicated.
Sherman Miles,
Brigadier General, U. 8. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2.
Distribution :
THE PRESIDENT Chief of Staff
Secretary of State Assistant Chief of Staff. W. P. D.
Secretary of War Director of Naval Intelligence
Under Secretary of War General Embick
Assistant Secretary of War
fb
I. B. 13n
OcTOBEaa 2, 1941 .
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject : Japanese-American Relaticms.
1. The crisis in Tokyo brought about by the anniversary of the Tripartite Agree-
ment has been weathered by the Konoye ('abinet through a somewhat perfunctory
celebration involving speeches by the German and Italian Ambassadors, Prince
Konoye, and others, at luncheons given in honor of the Axis on September 27,
1941.
2. This Division has information from a highly reliable source to the effect
that at 4 : 30 p. m. on September 27th after completing the ceremonies celebrating
the anniversary of the Tripartite Pact the Japanese Foreign Minister asked the
American Ambassador to call on him, and urged him to strongly recommend to
his home government an immediate meeting between Prince Konoye and President
Roosevelt.
3. The Japanese Ambassador in Washington was advised as to the gist of
Admiral Toyoda's conversation with Ambassador Grew. Admiral Nomura also
was urged by his Foreign Minister to do everything in his power to prevail upon
the President to meet and confer immediately with Prince Konoye.
4. The fervor with which the Japanese, over a period of many months, have
been agitating for this "meeting of leaders" has been matched only by their
reluctance to make connnitments <m two points, i. e. withdrawal from China, and
preparation for an attack on Siberia.
5. This Division is of the belief that the present Cabinet in Tokyo does not
yet feel strong enough to enforce any order for withdrawal of Japanese troops
from China, even though under pressure from the United States, it might be in-
clined to do so. And, as a matter (»f fact, at this stage in the execution of our
national strategic plan, a cessation of hostilities in China followed by the with-
drawal of twenty-one Japanese divisions, 20 independent brigades, and 1,000 air-
craft therefrom would be highly detrimental to our interests. Such a force if
returned to Japan would be potentially of such an explosive nature that only a
military oligarchy could control it. These militarists would submerge or destroy
the moderate element in Japan replacing it with a restless Chauvinistic element
possessing neither the ability nor the inclination to continue diplomatic relations
with anv of the Democratic Powers.
1358 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
If the Japanese force in China were transferred to Indo China or Manchoukuo
it would undoubtedly overflow into adjacent regions and our interests would be
even further jeopardized.
It seems evident that the Konoye Government lacks confidence enough to make
any promises in regard to restraining the Kwantung Army, even at its present
strength, from launching an attack on Siberia. With its forces augmented by
nil or a part of the troops now in China, the home government would be helpless,
for the Kwantung Army since 1932 has been completely independent of the
various cabinets appointed in Tokyo and, reinforced by elements from China,
would undoubtedly attack when it felt assured that such action was opportune.
The opportune moment will be coincident with or immediately following a Rus-
sian collapse in Europ)e, or if and when the Russian force becomes numerically
inferior because of withdrawals from Siberia to reinforce the European Armies.
6. From the foregoing it seems imperative, for the present at least, to keep
as much of the Japanese Army as possible pinned down- in China. In other words
we must cease at once our attempts to bring about the withdrawal of Japanese
armed forces from China and must give to China whatever aid is possible on our
part in sustaining the Chinese power and will to continue to contain and occupj
the bulk of the J'apanese Army.
7. The initial feeling of revulsion over this apparent utilization of China as
a cat's paw in our plan of strategy will be alleviated by an examination of the
situation of the anti-Axis powers in the light of cold reason. Our objective is
the destruction of Naziism, and all out aid to those powers actively engaged in
resisting its aggressive drive for world domination. Russia is, as a matter of
expedience, an ally in this cause. We must, among other things, do what we can
with what we have at our disposal to aid Russia in her struggle with Germany.
Any action on our part, therefore, which would liberate Japanese (pro-Axis)
forces for action against Russia's rear in Siberia would be foolhardy.
8. The eagerness on the part of the Japanese Foreign Minister for a "meeting
of leaders" is probably based on a strong desire to strengthen the position of
the cabinet with respect to the internal situation in Japan. Such a conference
would: (1) Strengthen Prince Konoye's position with his people, (2) Extend the
tenure of the present cabinet at least through the sessions of the conference.
(3) Increase the belief of all Japanese leaders that we would not meet with
them unless willing to make concessions. In other words, a conference to them
will mean concessions on our part. If the President of the United States can
be persuaded to loosen the economic restrictions now in force against Japan,
Prince Konoye can then go before the Japanese people with a fait accompli such
as no other man has been able to produce in the last decade. Economic conces-
sion, it must be observed, is the one essential which the Japanese military leaders
recognize as necessary to be obtained before another major war can be fought.
Once the conference is convened the Japanese will be in a strong position to
demand some economic concessions, pleading the certainly of the collapse of
the Konoye government if he goes home empty-handed.
9. From the point of view of the United States, a conference of leaders at this
time, might serve to give this country additional time in which to prepare more
adequately for any eventuality. Definite understanding, however, should be
established, prior to such a conference, with Great Britain, Russia, China, Thai-
land and the Netherlands East Indies. Through cooperative and unified action
with the powers named, we have obtained the economic advantages we now hold.
It is the opinion of this Division that these advantages should, under no circum-
stances, be sacrificed unless concessions can be gained from Japan which will
benefit all the non-Axis countries of the Pacific area ; otherwise the very objective
this country has sought so long to attain, that of unified anti-Axis strength in the
Pacific, will be lost completely.
10. This Division is of the opinion that neither a conference of leaders nor
economic concessions at this time would be of any material advantage to the
United States unless a definite commitment to withdraw from the Axis were
obtained from Japan prior to the conference. The immediate objective of the
United States is to weaken Hitler in every way possible. A Japanese guarantee
not to attack Russia in Siberia would free Russia, psychologically and militarily,
for stronger opposition to Hitler. With this in mind, a definite condition prece-
dent to such a proposed conference should be a complete withdrawal by Japan from
the Axis and a guarantee, backed by substantial evidence of sincerity, not to
attack Russia in Siberia.
11. Since it is highly improbable that this condition can be met by the Japanese
Government at the present time our course lies straight before us. This Division
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1359
still believes that forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis Japan, iDcluding the application of
ever Increasing military and economic pressure on our part, offers the best
chance of gaining time, the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities
in the Pacific Area, and the best hope of the eventual disruption of the Tripartite
Pact. The exercise of increasingly strong "power diplomacy" by the United States
is still clearly indicated.
Hayes A. Kkonee,
Colonel, General Staff,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Distribution :
The President Chief of Staff
Secretary of State Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D
Secretary of War Director of Naval Intellig,ence
Under Secretary of "War Major General Embick
Assistant Secretary of War
October 16, 1^1.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff :
Subject : Fall of the Japanese Cabinet.
1. A United Press dispatch states that the three months old Konoye Cabinet
resigned on October 16th under nationalistic pressure for termination of Jap-
anese-American peace negotiations.
2. This resignation was the logical result of Foreign Minister Toyoda's failure
to secure a relaxation of the economic' pressure on Japan by the U. S. Government.
3. It is impossible to predict the next move on the part of Japan until the
composition of the next cabinet is known. It is highly probable, however, that
the trend will be toward the Axis, with the Army, rather than the Navy, exercis-
ing the controlling influence. This Army element will not be slow to take ad-
vantage of any weakening of the Siberian Army brought about by Russian reverses
in Europe.
Sherman Mrr.Es,
Brigadier Oenerah U. 8- Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2.
Distribution :
Secretary of War Coordinator of Information
Under Secretary of War State Department
Assi.stant Secretary of War General Embick
Assistant Chief of Staff. WPD Director of Naval Intelligence
GHQ
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff :
Subject : Japan's New Premier.
1. The United Press reports that Lieutenant General Hideki Tojo, War Minister
in the late Konoye Cabinet, has been designated Premier and ordered to form a
new Cabinet.
2. General Tojo was born in 1884, the son of a Samurai. He has held several
high offices in the Army, notably that of Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army,
Vice Minister of War and In.spector General of Aviation.
3. He has been called the father of modern Japanese Army strategy and is
known to be anti-foreign, with a particular dislike for the Russians, and an open
admiration for German methods. He created a sensation in 1938 when, as Vice
Minister of War, he predicted that Japan would have to fight Russia as well
as China. He also warned that America would have to be watched. When the
Axis Alliance was signed in September 1940 he said that the road Japan would
follow had been "definitely decided" and there was no turning back. General
October 17, 1941.
1360 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Tojo is regarded by his associates as a man of unshakable determination. He
cites reverence and filial piety as the two most important attributes of a Jap-
anese soldier. He has little patience for arguments or other other people's views.
4. Any cabinet selected by General Tojo may be expected to have Axis leanings,
but will be otherwise anti-foreign and highly nationalistic.
Sherman Mti.bs,
Brigadier General, U. 8. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, 0~2.
Distribution :
Secretary of War G. H. Q.
Under Secretary of War Coordinator of Information
Assistant Secretary of War State Department
Chief of Staff General Erabick
Assistant Chief of Staff. W. P. D. Director of Naval Intelligence.
October 21, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject : Kwantang versus the Siberian Army.
I have prepared this copy of the above study for submission to the President.
Inasmuch as it points out the desirability of certain action by the United States,
it is requested that you decide whether or not it should go forward.
Sheeman Miles,
Brigadier Oenei'al. U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
I. B. 144
October 21, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of StaCf :
Subject : The Kwantung versus the Siberian Army (For Situation Map see Tab A. )
1. The best information available to this Division indicates the strengths
of the Siberian forces east of Lake Baikal and the Japanese Kwantung Army in
Manchoukuo to be approximately as indicated below :
Kwantung Army Siberian Army
Infantry 25 Divs. (450,000 men) ___ 31 Divs. (540,000 men).
Cavalry 4 Brigs. ( 12.000 men) — 10 Divs. ( 75,000 men).
R. R. Guards 36 Bns. ( 72 000 men)_. _
Tanks 7 Regts. ( 1,7W tanks) ___10 Brigs. ( 1,600 tanks).
Air Corps 7 Regts. ( 500 planes) — 10 Divs. ( 1,677 planes).
Army Troops and overhead— 150,000 men 25,000 men.
Total Man Power 684,000 men 682,000 men.
2 It is to be noted that the Siberian Army is relatively strong in cavalry and
in planes at present. However, the Japanese inferiority in the air could be quickly
altered by shifting from China (where Japan is practically unopposed in the air)
the bulk of the Japanese air forces operating with the ground forces in tUat area.
3. Although the quality of the present leadership of the two opposing forces
has not been tested, the consensus of opinion here is that the leadership in the
Siberian and in the Japanese forces is the best in their respective armies.
4. In general, the materiel and equipment in neither force is comparable to
the latest types in use by the German, British and American armies. Russian
medium and heavy tanks are believed to be superior to similar equipment in
the Kwantung Army.
5. Weather conditions during the fall and winter months give a slight advantage
to the Siberian Army, inasmuch as the Japanese, as a ijeople, have not had time
to be come inured to the rigors of the extreme cold prevalent in Siberia during
these months.
6. Neither the Siberian nor the Kwantung Army lias a sufficient superiority
over the other, at present, to warrant an offensive. This situation may change,
however, in the near future if the Siberian force or any large part thereof is
moved westward to strengthen the forces in European Russia. The Kwantung
Army, on the other hand, has doubled in strength since July 1, 1941, and it is
fairly certain that Japan will continue to strengthen this army with whatever
men and equipment she can spare from China and Japan Proper.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1361
7. If and when the Kwantung Army feels that it has a combat superiority over
the Siberian army of 2 to 1 it is highly probable that it will take the offensive
regardless of the policy and intentions of the Tokyo Government. When this
ratio rises to 3 to 1 or better the probability will become a certainty.
8. This being true, it is very much to our interest, so long as Russia continues
to offer active resistance to Germany, to take whatever steps may be possible to
maintain the present Russian equality in combat strength vis-a-vis the Kwantung
Army. Two such practicable steps immediately present themselves :
a. Increased aid to China, to enable the latter to continue to pin to the ground
in North, Central and South China the bulk of the Japanese Army.
b. Increased aid to the Russian armies both in Europe and Siberia.
Sherman Miles,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Enc. : Map.^
Distribution :
The President
Secretary of State
Secretary of War
Under Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War for Air
Chief of Staff
Coordinator of Information
Director of Naval Intelligence
Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
G. H. Q.
General Embick.
I. B. 148
NOVEMBEB 1, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject : Possible Japanese Drive into Yunnan. (For map see Tab A).
1. Recent developments in the international situation, and particularly in the
Pacific, indicate the possibility of a Japanese invasion of Yunnan Province in
an attempt to cut China's life-line, the Burma Road.
2. Factors which indicate possibility of such a line of action by Japan :
a. The political and economic situation at home and pressure from the Axis
demand action.
6. If she moved on Thailand, or elsewhere to the south, Japan runs grave risk
of war with the ABD countries — an event which she wishes to avoid, at least
for the present.
c. Japan's plan for conquest of Eastern Siberia would obviously best be served
by a policy of watchful waiting until Russia is much weakened.
d. A drive from Indo-China into Yunnan would most probably not involve
Japan with any third nation.
e. An offensive elsewhere in China could have no such decisive effect as the
stoppage of supplies entering China over the Burma Road. This operation, if
successful, might force capitulation of the Chinese.
3. Factors operating against such an offensive:
a. Japan is already extended in China where she has the equivalent of some
30 divisions spread so thinly that withdrawal of any troops for concentration
elsewhere would seriously endanger her present lines. This was clearly shown
in the recent operations at Changsha and Ichang.
J). Japan has perhaps 33 divisions in Manchuria and adjacent area.s. To with-
draw any considerable force fi-om this region might cause her to "miss the bus"
when her chance comes for invasion of Siberia.
c. Japan has the equivalent of some 3i/j divisions in Indo-China as garrison
troops and to secure the Thai borders. Continuance of the bulk of these troops
on this duly is necessary.
d. Similar considerations apply to the concentration of the Japanese air forces.
e. Estimates of the initial force required for invasion of Yunnan, from various
sources, British, Chine.se, Russian and American, vary from 5 to 10 divisions,
and all agree on the necessity of using strong air forces. Thus, a major effort
would be necessary, including the use of many transports, supply ships, etc.
1 Omitted.
1362 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
f. If Japan became involved in a long campaign in southwest China, she would
be seriousiy nampered in opeiations elsewnere.
4. Physical difficulties in tne way of a Yunnan invasion are considerable, the
most important being the terrain. The best corridor is that followed by the
Yunnan meter-gauge railway from the border at Laokai to Kunming. This is a
tortuous route along the sides of deep gorges, from an elevation of 305 feet at
Laokai to 4,500 at Mengize on the Uiinan plateau in a distance of 110 miles.
(Airline, about 75 miles.) The dozens of bridges and tunnels have presumably
been destroyed ; the Chinese report that they have completely demolished the
railway including the roadbed for a distance of 50 miles north of the border,
and partially for an additional 15 miles. There is a trail about 30 miles west of
and roughly parallel to the railroad, but there is no road south of Mengtze. Only
two other cori'idors exist, according to the^Chinese Minister of War: one, an old
road parallel to and about 30 miles west'of the railway; the other about 125
miles east of the railway. The same source says that lateral travel between
these routes is impossible because of the ruggedness of the terrain, and that the
Chinese have rendered impassable all three routes of approach. Possible use of
the valleys of the larger river appears remote.
The Red River flows from the Tali Lake, just north of the Burma Road 250
miles west of Kunming, southeastward into Indo-Lhina at Laokai. It is not
navigable north of Laokai. There is a trail running northward along the river
to a point 60 miles above Laokai, where it branches northeast to Mengtze. A
footpath extends on up the river all way to Tali. The terrain is extremely
rugged. From the scanty information available, the valleys of the Black and
Makong Rivers would be even less accessible.
5. Chinese preparations against an invasion of Yunnan from Indo-China include
the demolitions mentioned above. For some time, two group armies have been
stationed in southeastern Yunnan. These are:
1st Group Array : 6th Army Corps of 2 divisions ; 60th Army Coi*ps of 3
divisions.
9th Group Army: 52d Army Corps of 3 divisions; 54th Army Corps of 2
divisions.
Plus 2 independent divisions. These are regular troops, but the bulk are
Yunnanese, who have not previously demonstrated superior fighting qualities.
The commander of the troops in this area is General Kuan Ling-shenk who took
part in the successful Changsha defense of 1939.
The Chinese lack artillery, are very short of ammunition, both artillery and
small arms, and to all practical purposes are devoid of an air force.
The Chinese have lightly organized a position 20 to 40 miles in depth, with
the main line of resistance along a generally east-west line about 50 miles north
of Laokai. Their line of observation is along the border. Two other positions
south of Kunming are being organized. The southernmost is about 30 miles south
of Kunming.
6. It is estimated that at the present rate of Japanese reinforcement of their
troops in Indo-China, a period of from one to three months will be required
before they can have a sufficient concentration for an offensive against Yunnan.
7. The rate of Japanese advance on Kunming once the border is crossed, will
depend on the degree of Chinese resistance, especially in their defense of the
extremely rugged terrain between the Indo-China plain and the Yunnan plateau.
8. A Japanese offensive into Yunnan from Indo-China would be an extremely
difficult operation but if it were successful in closing the supply route from
Burma it would be a serious blow to China's power and will to resist.
Shearman Miles,
Brigadier General, U. 8. Army,
Bnc. : Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G~2.
Tab A.'
Distribution : Chief of the Army Air Forces
The President Mr. Lauchlin Currie
Secretary of War Division of Defense Aid Reports
Secretary of State Director of Naval Intelligence
Under Secretary of War Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
Assistant Secretary of War G. H. Q.
Assistant Secretary of War Chief of the Air Corps
for Air Air Corps
Chief of Staff General Embick.
Coordinator of Information
» Omitted.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1363
NOVEMBEB 2, 1941.
Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D. :
Subject: G-2 Estimate, Far Eastern Situation. (For situation and communica-
tions maps see Tabs B, C, and D. ) ^
In compliance with verbal request, Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., this
date, the following is submitted as a Gi-2 Estimate of the Far Eastern Situation :
1. After four years of war in China, Japan is militarily over-extended on the
mainland of Asia, economically weak, and psychologically aware of the fact that
her economic strrjture is crumbling.
2. For obvio'S reasons both Germany and China would like to embroil the
United State in a large scale war with Jaimn. While Japan is reluctant to
go to war '.nth us, her political and economic situations demand action. She
has the following alternatives :
a. Attack Siberia to neutralize the threat on her flank and rear.
b. Occupy Thailand as a base from which to launch an offensive against Burma
or Malaya.
c. Contain or isolate the Philippine Islands and Hongkong and seize the Nether-
lands East Indies.
d. Launch a direct attack on Singapore.
e. Make a determined effort to bring the war in China to a close by cutting
China's last supply route, the Burma Road.
/. Bide her time while disposing her forces from north to such in such a way
that she will be able to seize the opportunity for successful aggression in what-
ever direction it presents itself.
3. A Japanese attack on Siberia is unlikely as long as Russian resistance in
Europe continues, and as long as the Siberian forces are not materially reduced
in strength. Action under 5 above might, and under c or d above would cer-
tainly bring Japan into armed conflict with .ABD powers — a situation which
Japan, at present, wishes to avoid.
4. A drive from Indo-China into Yunnan wouM probably not involve Japan
with any Third Power. Although an extremely diflicult operation for the Japa-
nese, requiring elaborate preparation on their part, a successful drive into Yun-
nan and across the Burma Road, even if it did not cause China's early capitula-
tion, would nevertheless, be a terriflc blow at her chances of holding out. It
would not however, have the effect of immediately releasing any considerable
Japanese force for use elsewhere, since long-drawn out mopping up operations
would probab'y be necessary.
5. Because of the ruggedness of the terrain in southern Yunnan, and the
almost complete lack of communications, the Chinese, if determined, could put
up a very strong resistance even with the means now at their disposal. Such
a defense would further deplete Japan's meager resources and immobilize her
remaining reserves. (For a description of the terrain see Tab A.)
6. Japan's most probable line of action, therefore, will be to continue her
efforts to secure a relaxation of American economic pressure while completing
her plans and arranging her forces for an advance in the direction which will be
most fruitful of auick results.
SHEaiMAN Miles,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2.
I. B. 148-1
November 13, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject : Possible Japanese Drive into Yunnan.
1. Reference is made to memorandum of this Division to the Chief of Staff,
I. B. 148, November 1, 1941, subject : Possible Japanese Drive into Yunnan. In this
memorandum emphasis was placed on the principal avenue of advance, Laokai-
Kunming. Since its submission the question has been raised of the possibility of
a Japanese advance against Kunming and the Burma road through Kwangsi
Province, in conjunction with a penetration up the normal avenue of the Yunnan
railroad, Laokai-Mengtze-Kunming.
» Omitted.
79716 O— 46— pt. 14 30
1364 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2. The axis of the route thi-ough Kwangsi is the course of the Yu river, 150
miles northeast of the Yunnan railroad and roughly parallel to it. (See Map,
Tab A.) This river rises in the mountains of eastern Yunnan and flows through
southwest Kwangsi Province to its confluence with the West River near Nanning.
It is navigible for river junks as far west as Poseh. To make use of this cor-
ridor the Japanese would have to move north from Hanoi to Caobang, thence
across the Chinese border to the vicinity of Poseh, whence they could launch
their attack up the Yunnan escarpment toward Kwangnan on the plateau, 150
miles southeast of Kunming.
This would be an even more difficult operation than a direct attack along the
Yunnan railway line, since the supply problem would be enormous. - Fron?
Caobang a fair road for light motor traffic runs 185 miles north to Poseh. Most
bridges on this. route have a capacity of only li^ tons. Also it is probable that
since the Japanese occupation of Indo-China, the Chinese have destroyed the road
near the border.
Poseh can also be reached by the Hanoi-Langson-Nanning road, and thence
northwest via Wuming and the Yu valley. Somewhat better roads exist on this
route but the distance from Langson to Poseh is about 260 miles, as compared
with 185 from Caobang to Poseh. Here also, the Chinese have demolished the
highways near the border, and also the railway line which was under construc-
tion before the Japanese occupation of Nanning in 1940.
Arrived at Poseh tlie Japanese would be confronted with practically the same
difficult terrain conditions as at Laokai, on the frontier. Poseli has an elevation
of 525 feet ; Kwangnan, 4.515. The air distance between the two is approximately
100 miles, and there are no motor roads in existence. (The Chinese have been
surveying a highway from Kaihua, east of Mengtze on the Yunnan railway,
through Kwangnan to Poseh, but latest reports indicate no actual construction
on this route.) The terrain is almost as rugged as that north of Laokai.
The only apparent reason for use of this route would be in the event that
the Japanese plan of campaign called for a "pincers" movement on Kunming.
However, it would not be a true envelopment as initially it would be directed
against Chinese forces not allotted to the defense of Kunming. Ab.sence of lateral
communication inside China would be a serious handicap to such an operation,
to say nothing of the long line of conmiunications through a hostile territory.
3. a. For defense against a movement through Kwangsi Province, there are
available in the Fourth War Zone (Kwangsi and western Kwangtung) the
following troop^
16th Group Army: 31st Army Corps of 2 divisions: 46th Army Corps of 2
divisions.
35th Group Army : 64th Army Corps of 2 divisions.
These are regular troops, largely veterans from Kwangsi and adjacent areas,
of excellent fighting ability. The Zone Commander is Chang Fa-kuei, a very
capable oflicer of long experience.
b. The Chinese lack artillery, are very short of ammunition, both artillery
and small arms, and to all practical purposes are devoid of an air force.
4. An attack on Kunming through Kwangsi Province is only conceivable in
conjunction with an advance up the Yunnan railway. It is estimated that this
would require at least an additional five Japanese divisions, or a minimum
total task force of 10 divisions.
5. It is estimated that there are now available in Indo-China for an expedition
against Kunming a maxinuun of 40,000 troops, probably less. At least 160.000
troops would have to be brought into Indo-China through Haiphong for a double
envelopment, and at least 60O(X> for a single direct attack. ONI estimates
the capacity of this port at 2.(X)0 fully equipped troops per day. On this basis,
under the most favorable circumstances, at least one month would be required to
concentrate a sufficient foi'ce for the direct attack up the Yunnan railway.
Between two and three months would be i-equired to make the concentration for
a double attack up the railway and up the Yu river valley.
6. The rate of Japanese advance on Kunming once the border is crossed, would
depend on the degree of Chinese resistance, especially in the defense of the
extremely rugged terrain between the Indo-Chinese and Yu river plains and
the Yunnan plateau.
7. A Japanese offensive into Yunnan from Indo-China would be an extremely
difficult operation but if it were successful in closing the supply route from Burma
it would be a serious blow to China's power and will to resist. In this connec-
tion it is interesting to note that the British War Office concludes that such an
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1365
offensive would be rendered "most diflBcult" by reason of the supply problem
alone, while the French Military Attache at Tokyo ridicules any idea of an
attack on Yunnan from Indo-China.
Sherman Miles,
Brigadier Oenera], U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chi^f of Staff, 0-2.
Enclosure :
Tab A/
Distribution :
THE PRESIDENT Mr. Lauchlin Currie
Secretary of War Division of Defense Aid Reports
Secretary of State Director of Naval Intelligence
Under Secretary of War Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
Assistant Secretary of War G. H. Q.
Assistant Secretar-y of War for Air Chief of the Air Corps
Chief of Staff Air Corps
Coordinator of Information General Embick
Chief of the Army Air Forces
November 25, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff : ^
Subject : Far Eastern Situation.
1. The following are extracts from cables received in the Offtce of Naval
Intelligence together with G-2 comment thereon :
a. From Shanghai November 21. Intense activity at Woosung since the 15th.
Unusual number of ships present including former merchant craft 10,000 tons
and up. Wednesday 10 transports sailed, eight of which carried troops. Same
day 32 additional ships, similar type, anchored in lower Whangpoo. Landing
boats included in outgoing equipment. On decks of three outgoing ships was
observed a number of creosoted heavy timber trestles in sections each approxi-
mately 60 feet long and 8 feet wide. Several merchant vessels recently taken
over observed installing machine gun mounts. One thousand troops departed
from Swatow last Saturday.
0-2 Comment: Movement of troops from Central China believed directed
toward Hainan and Indo-China. No evidences of heavy concentration on
Taiwan (Formosa).
ft. From Guam November 23. Increased naval activity Truk, Saipan area.
Indicated increases base forces in Mandates. Additions to fleet; — Palao, one
division Marus ; Truk, two divisions Marus ; and two seaplane tenders, also
shore command (possible landing force). Saipan, two divisions Marus; Jaluit,
three divisions Marus and three unidentified shore commands, also two seaplane
tenders. Air force activity increasing. Eleventh Air Group believed in Palao.
Airon 24 concentrated in Marshalls. Fifth Fleet apparently at Chichijima,
portions possibly at Marcus. It is estimated that 70 itinerant ships arrived or
departed from Mandates since November 1 with emphasis on Truk and Jaluit
areas.
Cf-2 Comment: Marus are small cargo or passenger vessels requisitioned
by the Navy for use as trains, supply vessels and tenders. A Dityision of
Marus consists of some two to four vessels.
The Eleventh Air Oro-ihp is something a little larger than an American
Squadron. The Fifth Fleet consists of odds and ends of vessels not useable
by the Combined Fleet. Airon 24 consists of one old carrier (Kamoi) and
one converted carrier.
2. From information available in the Division the Japanese strength in the
mandated islands is believed to be as follows :
15,000 ground troops. 8 destroyers.
100 aircraft of all types. 9 submarines.
4 light cruisers.
3. The Navy Department have supplied the following connnent on November
24th regarding Japanese activity in the Western Pacific :
"Apparent establishment by Japan of combined air and surface patrol over*
shipping routes U. S. to Australia. Daily aircraft patrols observed extending
1 Omitted.
1366 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
over Gilbert Islands from Jaluit. Surface craft believed covering area extending
to Ellice Island. Fishing fleet reported cooperating with patrols. Fishing fleet
divided in three sections : one in vicinity of Bathhurst Island, one near Arnham,
one near Thursday Islands. Fishing fleet expected to appear around Dutch
New Guinea. These ships equipped with long range radio."
(signed) Sherman Miles
Sherman Miles,
Brigadier Oeneral, U. IS. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, Ch-2.
Distribution :
Secretary of War
War Plans Division
GHQ
November 26, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff :
Subject: Japanese Naval Task Force.
The following information was received from the Commandant 14th Naval
District through the OflBce of Naval Intelligence at 12 : 45 a. m., this date :
1. The Japanese have been organizing a naval task force for the past month
comprising :
a. Second Fleet: Under the command of Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet.
(The Second Fleet corresponds roughly to our Scouting Force, consisting mainly
of strong Cruiser Divisions).
6. Third Fleet which formerly was the China Coast Command Force including
its first and second base forces, constituted by miscellaneous small vessels.
c. Combined Air Force consisting of all large carrier forces.
d. Also destroyer squadron 3, air squadron 7, submarine squadron 5, and
possibly 1 battleship division from First Fleet consisting of 3 battleships.
Summary of Above : 14 Heavy Cruisers, 4 Light Cruisers, 10 Carriers, 3 Light
Cruisers. 2 Destroyer Squadrons (24 destroyers), 2 Submarine Squadrons (18
submarines), and possibly 3 battleships.
2. The combined air force has assembled in Takao, Formosa, with some units
believed in Hainan Island. The Third Fleet is believed moving in direction of
Takao and Bako, Pescadores off West Coast of Formosa, from home waters in
Japan. Units from the Second Fleet are at present possibly enroute to South
China as advance scouts. Strong concentration of submarines and air groups
in the Marshalls. Present location, other units of this task force are not known.
3. The evaluation put upon the above information by the Commandant, 14th
Naval District is that a strong force may be preparing to operate in Southeastern
Asia, while component parts thereof may be expected to operate from Palao and
the aiarshall Islands.
Sherman Miles,
Brigadier General, U. 8. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2.
Distribution :
Secretary of War
Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
I. B. File
Far East Section
Record Section
November 27, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject : Recent developments in the Far East.
1. It has been reported on good authority, that between 18 and 24 Infantry
Divisions and 8 Armored Brigades from the Russian Far Eastern Army have
been identified on the Western front. If this is true, between 24 and 18 Divisions
and 2 Armored Brigades remain in Eastern Siberia. Thus the possibility of a
Kwantung Army offensive thrust against Siberia is increased, although such
a move is not believed imminent at present.
2. Certain Japanese troops have been withdrawn from North and Central
China within the last three weeks — 24,000 of them sailed from Woosung (near
Shanghai) between November 15 and 23. The transports carried 184 landing
boats. Several other ships left during same period, number of troops and cargoes
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1367
unchecked. A special landing craft carrier left Shanghai the 18th of Novem-
ber and was sighted of Wenchow on the 23th sailing southwest.
3. A Naval Task Force which was reported by the 14th Naval District (Hawaii)
as organized and concentrated at Taiwan and Hainan appears, according to
a November 27 radio from the 16th Naval District (Manila) to be a loosely
organized force on its way to an unknown concentration point. According to
the latter dispatch it consists of:
3-4 battleships (possibly only) 5 mine layers
3 carriers 4 converted seaplane carriers
11 heavy cruisers 12 mine sweepers
5 light cruisers 12 patrol motor boats
47 destroyers 14 others
16 submarines
It is apparently not yet ready for concerted action as its Commander is still in
home waters and the force concentration has not yet taken place.
4. The Japanese land forces in the Mandated Islands have been gradually
increased in the last 6 months from 5,000 to 15,000 men, and they now have about
100 combat planes of all types, plus the 4th Fleet, a mixed naval force of second
class units.
5. Reports from Bangkok indicate that the Japanese Foreign Office officials
there expect hostilities to break out in that region in the near future.
6. According to British i-eports, the Japanese have made and will continue to
make aerial reconnaissance over British Pacitic Islands, especially the Gilbert
Group, Nauru and Ocean Isands ; also over the Northern portion of British
Malaya.
7. Reliable information has been received that the Japanese Foreign Office
officials in North French Indo-China expect military movements in and through
that region in the near future.
8. In Tongking, the total number of Japanese troops remains at about 25,000
(ly^ Divisions), with about 90 planes. Since November 21st, additional Japa-
nese troops have been moving into Southern French Indo-China : 10,000 from
Tongking (which have been replaced there by other troops), and some 20,000 by
sea. Conservative estimate of number of Japanese troops now in southern Indo-
China is at least 70,000. This is approximately SVj Divisions. The number of
Japanese planes has also been increased by 82 (London, Military Attache report,
November 25) , bringing the total in the south to not less than 157. There may be
more than this number since observation is limited. A large quantity of equip-
ment has been landed in Indo-China in the last 60-70 days in amounts far in
excess of current needs for the force believed there at present. Totals (mini-
mum) :
At Saigon : 300 side cars
90 Tanks (under 5 tons) (Bren gun 20 road rollers
carriers?) 5,000 collapsible rubber boats
42 Tanks (7 to 9 tons) 500 horses
About 30 other Armored vehicles 3 locomotives
(Type not specified) 500 light railway freight cars (4
60 75-mm. guns. wheel)
230 Guns — various calibers 1,500 cases gas masks
1.030 trucks 14 ambulances
200 motorcycles 52 armored cars
At Hanoi:
900 Trucks.
Large quantities of railway material (type not specified) oil and aviation
gasoline (quantities not mentioned). Tanks and artillery (quantities, types,
calibers, not mentioned).
9. According to a i-eliable report of November 17, there ig a concentration of
approximately 50,000 troops on the Island of Hainan. The air bases on the
southern part of this island are capable of holding several hundred planes which
can be flown from there to Tourane in Indo-China and from that point to Saigon,
which is only about 400 miles from Tourane.
10. A reliable source reported on November 25 that an unconfirmed report to
the Hanoi government indicated Japanese plans for an invasion of Thailand
1368 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
about Decembei- 1, including seizure of the Isthmus of Kra. In connection with
this last item, the Japanese are reliably reported to have been working on a
naval and air base at Kompongson Bay on the Gulf of Siam, since September 27,
1941. Also Japanese reconnaissance planes have recently been seen over northern
Malaya.
11. Up to the evening of November 26th, the Japanese Ambassador had been
unable to make the Secretary of State yield to Japanese proposals and demands,
and in consequence the Japanese hopes for an appeasing settlement by the United
States are very slim.
12. There is good evidence that the Japanese are prepared to use chemical and
probably bacteriological warfare whenever and wherever they deem it necessary
or profitable to do so.
13. A press dispatch of November 21 quotes the Chinese military spokesman,
Chungking, as accusing the Japanese of starting germ warfare. He said that on
November 4th Japanese planes dropped food and clothing at Changteh, Hunan
Province and that persons who made use of these were taken ill and died with
symptoms similar to those of bubonic plague. (The Military Attache Chungking
is investigating this report).
14. From the foregoing it appears evident that the Japanese have completed
plans for further aggressive moves in Southeastern Asia. These plans will prob-
ably be put into effect soon after the armed services feel that the Kurusu mission
is a definite failure. A task force of about five divisions, supported by appro-
priate air and naval units has been assembled for the execution of these plans.
This force is now enroute southward to an as yet undetermined rendezvous.
15. This Division is of the opinion that the initial move will be made against
Thailand from the sea and overland through Southern Indo-China. It is further
believed that the Japanese are uncertain of the reaction of the ABD powers to
this move and therefore have organized in suffioient strength to cope with any
opposition they might initially encounter from those powers in the South China
Sea.
Sherman Miles,
Brigadier General, U. 8. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of l^taff, 0-2.
Distribution :
Secretary of War •
Assistant Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of "War for Air
Chief of the Army Air Forces
Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
Director of Naval Intelligence
G. H. Q.
I. B. 159
November 29, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff :
Subject: Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941-March 31.
1942.
I. Oenernl.
1. This estimate is addressed to the objective of Nazi defeat. Its purpose is to
examine the factors of strength and weakness and of strategic positions of the
Nazis and of their opponents, in order to present the military possibilities and
probabilities during the period December 1, 1941 to March 31, 1942.
2. a. During that period Germany, though weakened by her losses in Russia,
will remain the only power capable of launching large scale strategic offensives.
Her success In Uussia and the advent of winter make disposable a larger portion
of German land and air iwwer than at any time since the beginning of the Russo-
German war. On the other hand, the price she has had to pay for her Russian
success and the width of the wasted zone behind her Eastern Front Indicate that
a considei'able period of time would be required for the reorganization and
redisposltlon of lier major forces. The German conduct of war, so far, has been
characterized by a thoroughness and delibei-ation in this regard. Between the
end of one campaign and the launching of the next there have been considerable
periods of time. In the present case, if Germany should decide to shift the
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1369
theater of war, all indications point to an even greater necessity for a consider-
able time lag than has so far existed between her successive campaigns. Large
scale German strategic offensives are therefore not to be expected outside of the
Russian theater within the period under consideration. It is much more prob-
able that Germany will continue her attack on Russia, particularly in the
Ukraine and the North Caucasus plain between the Azov and Caspian Seas during
the winter and early spring.
ft. Japan also has the strategic initiative, but to a much more limited degree
than is the case with Germany. Japan, already extended militarily, has a multi-
plicity of strategic objectives; but for a variety of reasons, she cannot concen-
trate the required forces to attack any of them on a large scale and with assur-
ance of success. A possible exception to the latter statement lies in the
contingency of a serious depletion of Russian forces in eastern Siberia. But even
in this case, a large scale Japanese strategic offensive against Siberia during
the period in question is somewhat doubtful in the light of present politico-
military situation and of the rigorous winter climate in that region.
c. Great Britain is pressing a limited strategic offensive in Libya and has taken
the aerial offensive over Western Europe. She, too, is extended militarily and
more extensive ground and aerial action is beyond her means.
d. All other belligerent or potentially belligerent powers must be considered
incapable of large .scale strategic offensives during the period in question. The
United States, committed to the defeat of Nazi Germany, is an increasingly impor-
tant element in the situation. Our influence is exerted in naval and aerial partic-
ipation in the Battle of the Atlantic, in the supply of material and technical assist-
ance to the four land theaters and in psychological, economic and political action
against the Axis throughout the world. But all this does not sum up to a large
scale strategical offensive. We have only a means of strategical maneuver — our
ability to make available more or less material and technical facilities and in their
allocation to those theaters where they will be most advantageously employed.
e. Neither the economic nor the psychologic situation in Germany indicates any
possibility of weakening the Nazi power to a critical extent during the period in
question.
/. From the above it must be concluded that, during the period in question :
(1) Neither the anti-Axis nor the Axis powers can force a decision.
(2) The anti-Axis powers will have a period of at least four months in which
they may strengthen their position in one or more of the four important theaters
of war, and in which they may decide upon a regrouping of forces, subject to
certain physical limitations, con.sonant with their chosen long range strategy for
the defeat of the Nazis.
II. Brief Estimate on the Theaters of War.
1. The British Isles. This theater is the citadel of the Anti-Axis Powers. Its
security is, therefore, so essential to Nazi defeat that it must be held. The
groimd, sea and aerial defenses of the islands have been and are being materially
strengthened.
For reasons given previously, it is not believed that Germany will be in a posi-
tion to attempt an invasion of the islands during the period in question. It is
probable that an invasion, if attempted, will be delayed until mid-summer of
1942. An attempt made at that time will probably be unsuccessful. As for the
present, after a short delay for reoi'^anization and transfer, Germany can launch
large-scale air attacks on the United Kingdom at any time that she is willing
to move the necessary forces from the Russian front. In view of the improved
Britisb defenses and of the weakening of the German Air Force, however, it is
estimated that in the period in question such attacks cannot reach the intensi-
ties of those of the winter of 1940-41.
From this theater the only British offensive capability lies in the air. It is
to be expected that strategic bombing of Germany and the occupied territories
will continue; but that this action will be indecisive.
Material aid from the United States has been an esential element in the re-
sistance and survival of the B''itish Isles. Continuance of this aid is still essen-
tial. It is, fortunately, the easiest of all the land theaters for us to aid.
2. The Atlantic. The Battle of the Atlantic is essentially a struggle for the sea
lanes radiating from the United Kingdom, this conflict is now trending against
Germany. Sinkings by the Axis are decreasing and ship construction in Britain
and the United States is increasing. It is now probable that replacements have
1370 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
overtaken losses. Figures on ship and tonnage losses during 1941 are as
follows : —
Losses (British, Allied and Neutral)
:
Total
Monthly average/
Ships
Tonnage
Ships
Tonnage
January 1 to June 30 (6 months)
628
285
2, 755, 242
1, 000, 990
105
63
459, 207
June 30 to Nov. 15 (4^ months) - -
222,442
During October over 4,200,000 tons of goods were imiwrted into the United
Kingdom, as compared with a monthly average for the year of approximately
2,500,000. The October imports were received after the United States Navy
began convoy duty in the Atlantic. As the weight of the United States Navy
continues to increase, success in the Battle of the Atlantic should be assured.
Since Germany's means of attack (surface raiders, long-range planes and
submarines) are of limited use in other theaters, it is to be expected that she
will continue the offensive in this theater, regardless of results or of operations
elsewhere.
The United States is contributing powerfully to the decision in the Battle
of the Atlantic by direct naval action and by the building of cargo vessels. Con-
tinuance of this action is essential to the defeat of Germany.
3. Eastern Theater. By a series of relentless offensives Germany has occupiei^
vast stretches of terrain, including many of Russia's industrial regions and has
inflicted grave casualties on the Red Army. But Germany has suffered great
losses in men and material, and has not yet attained her basic objectives of
destroying the Russian armies and the Stalin regime. While Germany could
transfer her principal military effort to other theaters this winter, it is esti-
mated that she will continue to concentrate on the attack on Russian. Specifi-
cally she will :
Seek to destroy the mass of the Russian armies.
Continue the seige of Leningrad.
Attempt to cut the Russian supply lines to Archangel and Murmansk.
Seek to seize the general line of the Volga.
Attempt to overrun the Caucasus, thus obtaining oil and securing a jump-
off position for an eventual advance into the Middle East.
The most serious German threat is southeastwards to the Caucasus, and her
goal is oil. Axis forces are extending eastward north of Rostov toward the
Don. They may capture Stalingrad and gain control of the Volga south to
its mouth at Astrakhan. Russian defense of the North Caucasus will probably
eventually fail, after substantially delaying the Axis advance. With sufficiently
determined and prompt allied aid, the Germans may be kept from occupation
of the Trans-Caucasus and control of the Baku oil fields.
The U. S. S. R. is weaker, relative to Germany, than at the outset of hos-
tilities. Her political structure has remained stable and her armies, while
depleted, have not been irreparably defeated. Russia is favored by the follow-
ing : The extreme cold of winter is a deterrent to operations, and Russian
training and technique in severe winter weather is considered better than that
of the invaders. While the Soviet situation is critical, ready availability of
manpower resources is in Russian favor. Defense industry is in operation at
approximately 60% of pre-war volume. British and American material assist-
ance is being received ; increased and continuing allied assistance is urgently
required.
The following considerations are unfavorable to the U. S. S. R. : The uncer-
tainty of the Far Eastern situation causes concentration of efficient Soviet
ti^oops along the Manchukuo frontier, not available for use in the western theater.
The Soviet Army has shortages in tanks, all weapons, probably in all ammuni-
tion. The shortage in tanks is especially serious ; that in small arms and small
arms ammunition is less marked than in other weapons. The means of supply
from the outside world are difficult and precarious. To date no British opera-
tion elsewhere has been sufficiently strong to cause any withdrawal of German
troops from Russia.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1371
Aside from surrender, which seems unlikely, Russia's only feasible line of
action is to resist stubbornly in the hope that attrition, climate and lengthened
communications will eventually bring her assailants to a standstill. By the
spring of 1942 it is estimated that organized but depleted Russian armies will
stand behind the Volga and perhaps even as far west as Moscow. It is also
probable that Russian forces will hold the Caucasus mountains and Trans-
Caucasia.
With her industry dislocated, Russia is in extreme need of material assistance
from abroad. She requires raw materials, machine tools and munitions. Un-
fortunately, the avenues of entry are vulnerable, limited in capacity and very
awkwardly located. Aid to Russia has been planned on the basis of a total
import capacity of 500,000 tons per month. It is by no means certain that this
figure will be reached. Russian requirements can only be met by the United
States and Great Britain. This relatively small contribution at the crisis of
the Russo-German war appears to be the total material means available to the
Democracies to influence the struggle within this theater.
4. Middle Eastern Theater. In this theater, extending from Libya to the
Caspian, only the western segment is active. In Libya the British are engaged
in an offensive the issue of which is still in doubt. Farther to the east, Syria,
Iraq and Iran are shielded from the war for the time being by neutral Turkey
and by the Russian forces in the Caucasus.
Because of the Russian campaign and certain great logistic diflBculties, there
is practically no danger of an Axis major offensive in this theater, from the
north, before the spring of 1942. Even a British defeat in their current Libyan
operations would so exhaust the Axis forces in North Africa as to free Alexandria
and Suez from the threat of a thrust from the west. A British victory in Libya
would probably force German entry into Tunisia and their occupation of Algiers
and Morocco. But such an eventuality would be more apt to delay than to hasten
an all-out German offensive, from the west and the north, against the Middle
East Theater.
Even if successful in their current Libyan offensive, it is not believed that the
British will be able to advance through Tripolitania without a considerable
delay for reorganization. It is therefore probable that from the British point
of view this theater will shortly become a defensive one, with a minimum of
.several months available for the completion of its organization.
In the eastern sector of this theater ( the Levant, Iraq and Iran ) , the British
are gradually building a substantial force to meet any Axis threat to the area
through Turkey or the Caucasus Mountains. In the Levant, there are three
Australian divisions with other troops, and General Wavell told our Military
Observer in Iran that he expected to have at least ten divisions in Northern
Iraq by March of 1942.
The United States is committed to providing great masses of material to the
Middle East, and is undertaking vast construction projects to facilitate supply.
Except the British Isles, the Middle East is the most accessible of the important
active theaters to us, and our lines of supply to it, though long, are the least
vulnerable.
We are building up an influence on British military policy in the Middle East.
Further American commitments, including probably the eventual employment
of our armed forces, will be necessary in this region.
5. The Far Eastern Theater. Here the initiative rests with Japan in spite
of her military overextension. She has the following lines of action open to her :
c. Attack Siberia.
h. Attack Yunnan Province to cut the Burma Road with a view to an early
end to the war with China.
c. Occupy Thailand.
d. Through Thailand, attack
(1) Burma and the Burma Road,
(2) Malaya.
e. Attack the Philippines and Hong Kong, preparatory to a movement on
Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies.
f. Contain or isolate the Philippines and Hong Kong and
(1) Attack Singapore
(a) directly by sea;
(b) by sea in conjunction with a land attack through Thailand
and Malaya.
(2) Attack the Netherlands East Indies.
1372 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
g. Bide her time, wait for a better opportunity to pursue any of the above
lines of action, hoping that the course of events will turn in her favor.
h. Seek a general settlement through American mediation, including an under-
standing with the United States and Great Britain as to political and economic
penetration of southeast Asia and the southwestern Pacific.
i. Raorient her whole foreign policy by withdrawing from the Axis.
(h) and (i) are impossible, short of a complete overthrow of her governing
forces.
The most probable line of action for Japan is the occupation of Thailand.
The forces of all other countries in the Far East are on the defensive before
Japan. The British Commonwealth, the Netherlands East Indies and the United
States are in consultative association for the defense of Maylasia. To date
this association has been effective in slowing down the Japanese penetration to
the southwest. China is containing the equivalent of 30 Japanese divisions.
The U. S. S. R., hard pressed for troops in European Russia, has reduced her
Siberian garrisons to what she estimates to be the minimum necessary to deter
Japan from attacking to the north. So far she has been successful in this effort.
China, aided and encouraged by America, will remain in the war against Japan
and will continue to contain important Japanese forces. * The effective use of
China's unlimited manpower, as an anti-Axis potential, depends entirely on the
extent to which she is able tiO equip it, particularly in artillery and aviation. For
this, she is entirely dependent upon the United States. The stronger the Chinese
become, the more Japanese troops will be pinned down in China, thereby releasing
further Russian strength for use against Hitler.
Although China is receiving an increasing amount of equipment from this
country, a major offensive by the Chinese cannot be expected during the period
ending March 31, 1942.
The British Imperial forces in Malaysia and at Hong Kong occupy a purely
defensive role. The forces in Malaya have recently been re-enforced by addi-
tional troops from Australia, New Zealand (air), and India, while those in
Hong Kong have been augmented by the arrival of Canadian levies. Both of
these localities present a very strong defense against any possible Japanese
attack.
The people and government of the Netherlands East Indies have continued,
aflBrmatively and constructively, to function practically as a sovereign state, loyal
to the mother country. As evidence of Dutch spirit, they (a) have reorganized
their army, (b) are actively at work manufacturing needed army equipment, (c)
are actively training reserves, (d) have expanded their system of air fields
throughout the islands, (e) have cooperated with the British and United States
governments in preparation of extensive plans for defense, (f) have refused to
renew their commercial treaty with Japan, (g) have delivered to Japan only
10,000 tons of oil since January 1, 1941 — said delivery having been on an old
contract still in force.
In the Far East the United States is concerned as a possible belligerent and
also as a prime source of war materials for China, the British Commonwealth
and for the Netherlands East Indies. We are in process of sending a few mili-
tary airplanes to Thailand. But this theater will be a secondary one from the
point of view of supply. ITnder all circumstances we will continue to be able
to supply Australasia, the Dutch East Indies, and probably also China, though
somewhat precariously, through the Burma Road. Siberia will becT>me completely
cut oflf if Japan attacks Russia.
Our influence in the Far Eastern Theater lies in the threat of our Naval power
and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents against
Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner. If we become involved in
war with Japan we could launch a serious offensive against her by Naval and
Air forces. But such an attack would fall short of a major strategic offensive
because it could not be decisive within a reasonable time, and still more, because
it would be a diversion of forces away from rather than toward our objective,
the defeat of the Nazis.
III. Morale.
The outstanding feature of the war in 1941 has been the rise in anti-Axis and
the decline in Axis morale.
The anti-Axis powers have been heartened by the failure of the German air
attack on Britain, the decreased German success in the Atlantic, the continued
resistance in the Middle and Far Eastern theaters, the drain on Germany of the
Russian Campaign and of her conquered territories, and probably most of all,
by the continued progress of America from neutrality towards participation in
the war.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1373
Even more notable has been the decline in Axis nioraJe. In Italy and Japan
the reasons are obvious. Both are weary of unsuccessful war and economically
distressed. But Gerniany presents a true paradox. Here is a warrior nation
which has made colossal sacrifices to build war power and has had unprece-
dented success in war — and yet is wholly apathetic. No enthusiasm prevails,
only the desire to see it all end.
In any given period, a nation at war generally finds itself in one of three mili-
tary situations. To each of these situations there should be a corresponding
moral reaction. These situations and reactions are :
Military Situation Moral Reaction
1. Superiority of strength. Pose.ssion 1. The elan of victory — fighting with
of initiative. Unbroken success. confidence of success.
2. Approximate equality in strength. 2. The grim struggle — fighting to gain
Initiative doubtful. Ultimate success .success.
still in balance.
3. Inferiority in strength. Strategic 3. Their "back to the wall" — fighting
initiative lost. Ultimate success doubt- to prevent defeat.
ful.
Perhaps the most fundamental fact in the war situation today is that Ger-
many is, and has continuously been in military situation Number 1, while the
moral reaction of her people is. and has been for some time rather lower than
Number 2.
Tlie morale factor in the war will be affected by the outcome, probably within
the next month, of the operations in Russia and in Libya, and by Japan's de-
cision. But there is no reason to believe that the trend of 1941 in German
morale will be reversed or even materially reduced in the period under dis-
cussion.
In this factor lies the germ of Nazi defeat.
Sherman Miij;s,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Distribution :
The President Assistant Chief of Staff, G-i
Secretary of War Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
Secretary of State G. H. Q.
Under Secretary of War Chief of the Air Corps
Assistant Secretary of War Director of Naval Intelligence
Assistant Secretary of War for Coordinator of Information
Air General Embick
The Chief of Staff. Record Section
Chief of the Army Air Forces I. B. File
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
dya
I. B. 159t-A
December 5, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Suppleraehtarv Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December 1.
1941— March 81, 1942.
I. Oeneral.
1. This estimate is addressed to tne objective of Nazi defeat. Its purpose is to
examine the factors of strength and weakness and of .'Strategic positions of the
Nazis and of their opponents, in order to present the military possibilities and
probabilities during the period December 1, 1941 to March 31, 1942. It supple-
ments and amplifies the Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December 1.
1941-March 31, 1942, issued by this Division on November 29, 1941, and is
believed to be more suitable for planning purposes than the previous estimate.
2. a. During that period Germany, though weakened by her losses in Russia,
will remain the only power capable of launching large scale strategic offensives.
Her success in Russia and the advent of winter make disposable a larger porti()n
of German land and air power than at any time since the beginning of the
Russo-German war. On the other hand, the price .she has had to pay for her
1374 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Russian success and the width of the wasted zone behind her Eastern Front indi-
cate that a considerable period of time would be required for the reorganization
and redisposition of her major forces. The German conduct of war, so far, has
been characterized by a thoroughness and deliberation in this regard. Between
the end of one campaign and the launching of the next there have been con-
siderable periods of time. In the present case, if Germany should decide to
shift the theater of war, all indications point to an even greater necessity for a
considerable time lag than has so far existed between her successive campaigns.
Large scale German strategic offensives are therefore not to be expected outside
of the Russian theater within the period under consideration. It is much more
probable that Germany will continue her attack on Russia, particularly in the
Ukraine and the North Caucasus plain between the Azov and Caspian Seas during
the winter and early spring.
6. Japan also has the strategic initiative, but to a much more limited degree
than is the case with Germany. Japan, already extended militarily, has a mul-
tiplicity of strategic objectives ; but for a variety of reasons, she cannot concen-
trate the required forces to attack any of them on a large scale and with assur-
ance of success. A possible exception to the latter statement lies in the con-
tingency of a serious depletion of Russian forces in eastern Siberia. But even
in this case, a large scale Japanese strategic offensive against Siberia during
the period in question is somewhat doubtful in the light of present politico-
military situation and of the rigorous winter climate in that region.
c. Great Britain is pressing a limited strategic offensive in Libya and has
taken the aerial offensive over Western Europe. She, too, is extended mili-
tarily and more extensive ground and aerial action is beyond her means.
d. All other belligerent or potentially belligerent powers must be considered
incapable of large scale strategic offensives during the period in question. The
United States, committed to the defeat of Nazi Germany, is an increasingly impor-
tant element in the situation. Our influence is exerted in naval and aerial par-
ticipation in the Battle of the Atlantic, in the supply of material and technical
assistance to the four land theaters and in psychological, economic and political
action against the Axis throughout the world. But all this does not sum up
to a large scale strategical offensive. We have only a means of strategical
maneuver — our ability to make available more or less material and technical
facilities and in their allocation to those theaters where they will be most advan-
tageously employed.
e. Neither the economic nor the psychologic situation in Germany indicates
any possibility of weakening the Nazi power to a critical extent during the i)eriod
in question.
/. From the above it must be concluded that, during the period in question :
(1) Neither the anti-Axis nor the Axis powers can force a decision.
(2) The anti-Axis powers will have a period of at least four months in which
they may strengthen their position in one or more of the four important theaters
of war, and in which they may decide upon a regrouping of forces, subject to
certain physical limitations, consonant with their chosen long range strategy for
the defeat of the Nazis.
11. Morale.
The outstanding feature of the war in 1941 has been the rise in anti-Axis and
the decline in Axis morale.
The anti-Axis powers have been heartened by the failure of the German air
attack on Britain, the decreased German success in the Atlantic, the continued
resistance in the Middle and Far Eastern theaters, the drain on Germany of the
Russian Campaign and of her conquered territories, and probably most of all,
by the continued progress of America from neutrality towards participation in
the war.
Even more notable has been the decline in Axis morale. In Italy and Japan
the reasons are obvious. Both are weary of unsuccessful war and economically
distressed. But Germany presents a true paradox. Here is a warrior nation
which has made colossal sacrifices to build war power and has had unprecedented
success in war — and yet is wholly apathetic. No enthusiasm prevails, only the
desire to see it all end.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1375
In any given period, a nation at war generally finds itself in one of three mili-
tary situations. To each of these situations there should be a corresponding
moral reaction. These situations and reactions are:
Moral Reaction
1. The elan of victory — fighting with
confidence of success.
2. The grim struggle — fighting to gain
success.
3. Their "back to the wall" — fighting
to prevent defeat.
Military Situation
1. Superiority of strength. Posses-
sion of initiative. Unbroken success.
2. Approximate equality in strength.
Initiative doubtful. Ultimate success
still in balance.
3. Inferiority in strength. Strategic
initiative lost. Ultimate success doubt-
ful.
Perhaps the most fundamental fact in the war situation today is that Germany
is, and has continuously been in military situation Number 1, while the moral
reaction of her people is. and has been for some time rather lower than Number 2.
The morale factor in the war will be affected by the outcome, probably within
the next month, of the operations in Russia and in Libya, and by Japan's
decision. But there is no reason to believe that the trend of 1941 in German
morale will be reversed or even materially reduced in the period under
discussion.
In this factor lies the germ of Nazi defeat.
III. Brief Estimate on the Actual and Potential Theaters of War.
1. The British Isles. This theater is the citadel of the anti-Axis Powers. Its
security is, therefore, so essential to Nazi defeat that it must be held. The
ground, sea and aerial defenses of the islands have been and are being materially
strengthened.
For reasons given previously, it is not believed that Germany will be in a
position to attempt an invasion of the islands during the period in question. It
is probable that an invasion, if attempted, will be delayed until mid-summer of
1942. An attempt made at that time will probably be unsuccessful. As for the
present, after a short delay for reorganization and transfer, Germany can
launch large-scale air attacks on the United Kingdom at any time that she is
willing to move the necessary forces from the Russian front. In view of
Improved British defenses and of the weakening of the German Air Force,
however, it is estimated that in the period in question such attacks cannot
reach the intensities of those of the winter of 1940-41.
From this theater the only British offensive capability lies in the air. It is
to be expected that strategic bombing of Germany and the occupied territories
will continue ; but that this action will be indecisive.
Material aid from the United States has been an essential element in the
resistance and survival of the British Isles. Continuance of this aid is still
essential. It is, fortunately, the easiest of all the land theaters for us to aid.
2. The Atlantic. The battle of the Atlantic is essentiallv a strusgle for the
sea lanes radiating from the United Kingdom, this conflict is now trending
against Germany. Sinkings by the Axis are decreasing and ship construction
in Britain and the United States is increasing. It is now probable that replace-
ments have overtaken losses. Figures on ship and tonnage losses during 1941
are as follows :
Losses (British, Allied and Neutral)
January 1 to June 30 (6 Months).
June 30 to Nov. 15 (iH Months).
Total
Ships
628
285
Tonnage
2, 755, 242
1,000,990
Monthly average
Ships
105
63
Tonnage
459, 207
222,442
During October over 4,200,000 tons of goods were imported into the United
Kingdom, as compared with a monthly average for the year of approximately
2,500,000. The October imports were received after the United States Navy began
convoy duty in the Atlantic. As the weight of the United States Navy continues
to increase, success in the Battle of the Atlantic should be assured.
1376 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Since Germany's means of attack (surface raiders, long-range planes and
submarines) are of limited use in other theaters, it is to be expected that she will
continue the offensive in this theater, regardless of results or of operations else-
where.
The United States is contributing powerfully to the decision in the Battle of
the Atlantic by direct naval action and by the building of cargo vessels. Continu-
ance of this action is essential to the defeat of Germany.
3. Eastern Theater. By a series of relentless offensives Germany has occupied
vast stretches of terrain, including many of Russia's industrial regions and has
inflicted grave casualties on the Red Army. But Germany has suffered great
losses in men and materiel, and has not yet attained her basic objectives of
destroying the Russian armies and the Stalin regime. While Germany could
transfer her principal military effort to other theaters this winter, it is estimated
that she will continue to concentrate on the attack on Russia. Specifically she
will:
Seek to destroy the mass of the Russian armies.
Continue the siege of Leningrad.
Attempt to cut the Russian supply lines to Archangel and Murmansk.
Seek to seize the general line of the Volga.
Attempt to overrun the Caucasus, thus obtaining oil and securing a
jump-off position for an eventual advance into the Middle East.
The most serious German threat is southeastwards to the Caucasus, and her
goal is oil. Axis forces may capture Stalingrad and gain control of the Volga
south to its mouth at Astrakhan. Russian defense of the North Caucasus will
probably eventually fail, after substantially delaying the Axis advance. VTith
suflSciently determined and prompt allied aid, the Germans may be kept from
occupation of the Trans Caucasus and control of the Baku oil fields.
The U. S. S. R. is weaker, relative to Germany, than at the outset of hostilities.
Her political structure has remained stable and her armies, while depleted, have
not been irreparably defeated. Russia is favored by the following : The extreme
cold of winter is a deterrent to operations, and Russian training and technique
in severe weather is considered better than that of the invaders. While the
Soviet situation is critical, ready availability of manpower i-esoures is in Russian
favor. Defense industry is in operation at approximately 60% of pre-war
volume. British and American material assistance is being received; increased
and continuing allied assistance is urgently required.
The following considerations are unfavorable to the U. S. S. R. : the uncer-
tainty of the Far Eiisterh situation causes concentration of eflBcient Soviet troops
along the Manchukuo frontier, not available for use in the western theater.
The Soviet Army has shortages in tanks, all weapons, probably in all ammuni-
tion. The shortage in tanks is especially serious ; that in small arms and small
arms ammunition is less marked than in other weapons. The means of supply
from the outside world are diflicult and precarious. To date no British operation
elsewhere has been suflSciently strong to cause any withdrawal of German troops
from Russia.
Aside from surrender, which seems unlikely, Russia's only feasible line of
action is to resist stubbornly in the hoi)e that attrition, climate and lengthened
communications will eventually bring her assailants to a standstill. By the
spring of 1942 it is estimated that organized but depleted Russian armies will
stand behind the Volga and perhaps even as far west as Moscow. It is also prob-
able that Russian forces will hold the Caucasus mountains and Trans-Caucasia.
With her industry dislocated, Russia is in extreme need of material assistance
from abroad. She requires raw materials, machine tools and munitions. Unfor-
tunately, the avenues of entry are vulnerable, limited in capacity and very awk-
wardly located. Aid to Russia has been planned on the basis of a total import
capacity of 500,000 tons per month. It is by no means certain that this ficrure
will be reached. Russian requirements can only be met by the United States and
Great Britain. This relatively small contribution at the crisis of the Russo-
German war appears to be the total material means available to the Democracies
to influence the struggle within this theater.
4. Middle Eastern Theater. In this theater, extending from Libya to the
Caspian, only the western segment is active. In Libya the British are engaged
in an offensive the issue of which is still in doubt. Farther to the east, Syria,
Iraq and Iran are shielded from the war for the time being by neutral Turkey
and by the Russian forces in the Caucasus.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1377
Because of the Russian campaign and certain great logistic difficulties, there
is practically no danger of an Axis major offensive in this theater, from the north,
before the spring of 1942. Even a British defeat in their current Libyan opera-
tions would so exhaust the Axis forces in North Africa as to free Alexandria
and Suez from the threat of a thrust from the west. A British victory in Libya
would probably force German entry into Tunisia and their occupation of Algiers
and Morocco. But such an eventuality would be more apt to delay than to
hasten an all-out German ofiEensive, from the west and the north, against the
Middle East Theater.
Even if successful in their current Libyan offensive, it is not believed that the
British will be able to advance through Tripolitania without a considerable delay
for reorganization. It is therefore probable that from the British point of view
this theater will shortly become a defensive one, with a minimum of several
months available for the completion of its organization.
In the eastern sector of this theater (the Levant, Iraq and Iran), the British
are gradually building a substantial force to meet any Axis threat to the area
through Turkey or the Caucasus Mountains. In the Levant, there are three
Australian divisions with other troops, and General Wavell told our Military
Observer in Iran that he expected to have at least ten divisions in Northern Iraq
by March of 1942.
The United States is committed to providing great masses of material to the
M'ddle East, and is undertaking vast con.sti uction projects to facilitate supply.
Except the British Isles, the Middle East is the most accessible of the important
active theaters to us, and our lines of supply to it, though long, are the least
vulnerable.
We are building, up an influence on British military policy in the Middle East.
Further American commitments, including probably the eventual employment
of our armed forces, will be necessary in this region.
o. The Conquered Nations. The conquered countries will continue to rally
somewhat more strongly against their conqueror. While effective revolts are to
be discounted, maintenance of order will divert some 40 German and some 25
Italian divisions. The economic contributions of these countries to the Axis
war effort will fall below German hopes and will tend to decline. Germany's
failures in administration, in organization of production and above all in recon-
ciliation to her hegemony of Europe will become an increasing drain on her
strength.
6. The Far Eastern Theater. Here the initiative rests with Japan in spite of
her military overextension. She has the following lines of action open to her :
a. Attack Siberia.
6. Attack Yunnan Province to cut the Bunna Road with a view to an early
end to the war with China.
c. Occupy Thailand.
d. Through Thailand, attack
(1) Burma and the Burma Road,
(2) Malaya.
e. Attack the Philippines and Hong Kong, preparatory to a movement on
Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies.
f. Contain or isolate the Philippines and Hong Kong and
(1) Attack Singapore
(a) directly, by sea;
(b) by sea in conjunction with a land attack through Thailand and
Malaya.
(2) Attack the Netherlands East Indies.
g. Bide her time, wait for a better opportunity to pursue any of the above
lines of action, hoping that the course of events will turn in her favor.
h. Seek a general settlement through American mediation, including an
understanding with the United States and Great Britain as to political and
economic penetration of southeast Asia and the southwestern Pacific.
i. Reorient her whole foreign policy by withdrawing from the Axis.
(h) and (i) are impossible, short of a complete overthrow of her governing
forces.
The most probable line of action for Japan is the occupation of Thailand.
The forces of all other countries in the Far East are on the defensive before
Japan. The British Commonwealth, the Netherlands East Indies and the
Ujiited States are in consultative association for the defense of Malaysia. To
date this association has been effective in slowing down the Japanese penetra-
1378 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tion to the southwest. China is containing the equivalent of 30 Japanese divi-
sions. The U. S. S. R., hard pressed for troops in European Russia, has reduced
her Siberian garrisons to what she estimates to be the minimum necessary to
deter Japan from attacliing to the north. So far she has been successful in this
effort.
China, aided and encouraged by America, will remain in the war against
Japan and will continue to contain important Japanese forces. The effective
use of China's unlimited manpower, as an anti-Axis potential, depends entirely
on the extent to which she is able to equip it, particularly in artillery a;id
aviation. For this, she is entirely dependent upon the United States. The
stronger the Chinese become, the more Japanese troops will be pinned down
in China, thereby releasing further Russian strength for use against Hitler.
Although China is receiving an increasing amount of equipment from this
country, a major offensive by the Chinese cannot be expected during the period
ending March 31, 1942.
The British Imperial forces in Malaysia and at Hong Kong occupy a purely
defensive role. The forces in Malaya have recently been re-enforced by addi-
tional troops from Australia, New Zealand (air), and India, while those in
Hong Kong have been augmented by the arrival of Canadian levies. Both of
these localities present a very strong defense against any possible Japanese
attack.
The people and government of the Netherlands East Indies have continued,
aflSrmatively and constructively, to function practically as a sovereign state,
loyal to the mother country. As evidence of Dutch spirit, they (a) have reor-
ganized their army, (b) are actively at work manufacturing needed army
equipment, (c) are actively training reserves, (d) have expanded their system
of air fields throughout the islands, (e) have cooperated with the British and
United States governments in preparation of extensive plans for defense, (f)
have refused to renew their commercial treaty with Japan, (g) have delivered
to Japan only 10,000 tons of oil since January 1, 1941 — said delivery having been
on an old contract still in force.
In the Far East the United States is concerned as a possible belligerent and
also as a prime source of war materials for China, the British Commonwealth
and for the Netherlands East Indies. We are in process of sending a few
military airplanes to Thailand. But this theater will be a secondary one from
the point of view of supply. Under all circumstances we will continue to be
able to supply Australasia, the Dutch East Indies, and probably also China,
though somewhat precariously, through the Burma Road. Siberia will become
completely cut off if Japan attacks Russia.
Our influence in the Far Eastern Theater lies in the threat of our Naval power
and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents against
Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner. If we become involved
in war with Japan we could launch a serious offensive against her by Naval
and Air Forces based on the Philippines and elsewhere in Malaysia. But such
an attack would fall short of a major strategic offensive because it could not
be decisive within a reasonable time, and still more, because it would be a
diversion of forces away from rather than toward our objective, the defeat of
the Nazis.
7. Northwest and West Africa, a. Northwest Africa. Although valuable as
a base for aerial operations, northwest Africa cannot provide an anti-Axis
offensive theater of operations. Any anti-Axis ground force that had occupied
this area would be face<l with the crossing of the Mediterranean, if it should
decide to conduct operations on the European mainland. Its prime value,
therefore, to anti-Axis forces lies primarily in denying its occupation to Axis
forces. Paragraph 9, Tab A, outlines the potential opposition to Axis occupation
and shows clearly that German forces would meet with little resistance. Time
and space factors, as well as potential enemy resistance, clearly indicate that
Germany can occupy this area ahead of an anti-Axis force.
On the other hand, enemy potentialities are not as favorable with regard to
the occupation of the Azores. With control of the Atlantic still in the hands
of anti-Axis forces, the Axis could hardly be exi^ected to span one thousand
miles of ocean to reach the Azores. Should the Azores be prevented from
falling into the hands of Axis forces, the advantages gained by the Axis occupa-
tion of Northwest Africa would be partially nullified.
6. West Africa. West Africa is of value to the Axis in providing submarine
and airplane bases from which to operate against Allied shipping and influence
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1379
Latin America. Axis occupation would also deny the direct bomber ferry service
from the United States to the Middle East Theater. The theater is one which
would be extremely severe, due to climatic and disease factors, to all but native
troops. With France committed to collaboration with Germany, time and space
factors and potential resistance would make undisputed occupation by the Axis
difficult but p<issible. Cape Verde, on the other hand, could be occupied by
anti-Axis forces and the occupation would limit the encroachment of Axis
forces towards South America and reduce the scope of operation of Axis sub-
marines and planes.
c. The probability of German occupation of Northwest and West Africa during
the period December 1, 1941-March 31, 1942. is contingent on the possible outcome
of the present campaign in Libya as well as on the plans of the German General
Staff. The preceding sub-paragraphs show that Germany can occupy Northwest
Africa at will and West Africa with some delay. On the other hand, success
by the Axis in those areas, would probably invite anti-Axis occupation of the
Azores and Cai^e Verde. It .seems more likely that this German action in Africa
will be postponed, but if it is launched it should surprise no one.
8. M'esteni HcDiixphcrc. During the period December 1, 1941 to March 31,
1942, it is not expected there will be any significant change in the Western
Hemisphere theater.
The twenty Latin American republics all have individual problems. Most
of their political difficulties are due to economic strain and jockeying for power
between the "ins" and the "outs", the "outs" always being supported by the anti-
American forces. They are all extremely conscious of the world situation and
the two powerful antagonists, and are not anxious to make any enmities with
the potential winner. Military power impresses them mightily, as few other
matters do.
In this area, no direct war effort can be seen during this period, and Germany's
line of action and organization will be to perfect and extend her present influence
in each of the countries by propaganda, bribery and coercion. Subversive activi-
ties will be kept under c<»ver and the Axis influence will not emerge in any large-
scale version in this area until a more propitious circumstance arises which
will be determined by the progress of events in Europe and Asia.
In other words, the Axis threat in the WVstern Hemisphere theater is potential
during this period, with possibilities of political upheavals, sabotage and sub-
versive actions only if it is to cause a diversi(m of American forces and attention.
SHERMAN Miles,
Brigadirr General, U. 8. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Enclosure:
Tab A
Distribution :
Chief of StMff Eastern European Section
Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D. Far Eastern Section
G. H. Q. Latin American Section
Air Corps Southei-n European Secticm
Dire<-tor of Naval Intelligence Western European Section
Air Section Record Section
British Empire Section I. B. File
Central European Section
Tab a — S.i:pportinc; Estimates
1. The British Empire — Omitted.
2. U. S. S. R.— Omitted.
."?. The Philippines — Omitted.
4. German^- — Omitted.
5. Italy — Omitted.
(5. Japan
7. Thailand
8. Turkey— Omitted.
9. Iberian Peninsula. N«»rthwest Africa — Omitted.
70716 O— 46— pt. 14 Z\
1380 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION I EARL HARBOR ATTACK
(j. Japan.
a. Comhat. Japan has an active army of about 2,000,000 including an air force
of about 65,000. She now has increased her trained and partially trained reserve
to approximately 4,750,000. The estimated number of active divisions is 62 ;
of independent brigades, 22 ; of cavalry brigades, 5 ; and of tank regiments, 13 :
plus 15 depot divisions in Japan proper and Korea, and garrison troops and rail-
way guard units in Manchuria.
The active forces are deployed over a wide area from Karafuto (Sakhalin)
and Manchuria in the north to the French Indo-China-Thailand border in the
south. According to the latest reports available, the distribution outside Japan
proper is approximately as follows :
Divs.
Ind.
Brigs.
Cav.
Brigs.
Tank
Regts.
Manchuria and Adjacent regions.
North China
30
8
10
2
2
1
3
6
6
6
1
4
1
7
1
1
Canton and South China Coast
1
1
1
1
This wide deployment creates immense problems of supply and communications,
and requires the use of a large number of transports and supply ships. Reliable
information indicates that as of October 1, the .iapanese forces on the continent
south of the great wall had reserve supplies and nuinitions for not more than six
weeks, this in spite of extensive use of vessels of the Japanese merchant fl^et
withdrawn from the Pacific trade. Since October 1, of course, this situation has
probably been alleviated, but the problem of supply still exists. Any hostile naval
or air action against the lines of communication to the continent would put the
Japanese forces in Central China and all areas to the south in a very critical
position.
The Japanese army is well trained and has proved an efficient fighting force
against the Chinese. The staff has functioned well during diflScult tactical opera-
tions in China. The enlisted men, although somewhat lacking in initiative, arc
well trained, the bulk experienced in combat, courageous and aggressive to the
point of recklessness. The Japanese have been consistently successful in China
from a tactical point of view ; only combat with a modern army can determine
Japan's relative efl[iciency compared to modern occidental armies. Japan's army
is ph.vsically hardy, and psychologically inspired by loyalty to the Emperor,
devotion to duty, and a fanatical patriotism which makes it a formidable foe on
the Asian continent or nearby islands.
Except for the Russian forces in Siberia, the Japanese army is the best equipped
aimy in Asia. Its equipment, however, is inferior to that of any of the powerful
European armies. The shortage of raw materials and production capacity will
limit the number of new divisions which can be equipped, even though Japan's
partially trained man power is ample for her anticipated needs. Individual
equipment appears to be sufficient and in good condition, but there is a shortage of
organizational and other equipment, such as tanks, antiaircraft weapons, and
modern artillery.
The Japanese Army and Navy air forces have made rapid progress since 1937.
Personnel strength of both is about 100,000 oflBcers and men, and the two services
have a combined plane strength of approximately 5353 combat planes. The Army
has 136 squadrons and 2362 planes; the Navy 159 squadrons and 2991 planes.
Plane design has lagged, and many old type planes are included in the totals,
above, but lack of formidable opposition has allowed the Japanese to maintain
undisputed air superiority. Four years of continuous air operations have in-
creased the efl5'jiency of Japanese aviation in no small degree. Acquisition of
German planes and more extensive employment of German technical advisers has
probably contributed to a further increase in efficiency Present plane production
is currently estimated at 200 per month, for all combat t.vpes, both army and navy.
Japan has a navy consisting of appoiximately 180,000 men and officers, exclu-
sive of about 35,000 in the naval air corps. Naval strength comprises over a
million tons already built and nearly oOO.OOO tons building. The navy is divided
into two main divisions: the Combined Fleet, and the Japanese Naval Forces in
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1381
China. The latter consists of the North Central and South China Fleets. The
Combined Fleet is based in home waters.
The Japanese navy is modern, well balanced, and ready for prompt service.
It is relatively strong in aircraft carriers and tenders; it would be a formidable
opponent to the navy of any power, or to those of any combination of powers,
attempting offensive operations in the western Pacific.
Japan, because of her geographic location including her bases on Formosa and
Hainan, tianks all sea approaches to the southeastern coast of Asia north of
Saigon ; lies athwart all routes from the east to the eastern and northeastern
coast of the mainland ; and is in a remarkably strong strategical jwsition for
defense against any distant naval power. The Formosa base is the key to this
position; neutralization of Formosa would imperil all her troops and installa-
tions south of Japan proper. However, Japan's geographic position is such that
her navy on the strategical defensive could from time to time assume the tactical
offensive. Japan's greatest weakness lies in the vital necessity of keeping open
the water lines of communication to her forces in central and south China and
Indo-China over routes that are vulnerable to underwater and air attack from
hostile bases in the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, and China.
b. Political. A year ago, under the premiership of Prince Konoye, Japan set up
its own version of totalitarianism, called the "new national structure." Political
parties were disbanded, and the Imperial Rule Assistance A.ssociation, designed
to unite all the people in a.ssistance to the Throne, was hastily whipped into
shape. As a political organization, however, the Association does not control the
country as do the Nazis in Germany or the Fascists in Italy, since such control
would be conti-ary to the Japanese theory of the Emperor as the supreme head
of the State, to whom all Japanese yield obedience and service. The stated aims
of the Association were too vague to meet with general approval, and it is clear
that the "new structure" movement has not been a success since it has not been
able to "unify all phases of Japanese life."
While this attempt to create a totalitarian structure has been going on, the
domination exercised by the army clique for nearly a decade has continued. The
whole political machinery is geared to preparation for expansion into the mari-
time provinces of Siberia, for further expansion in southeast Asia, and the south-
we.stern Pacific, and to the solution of the China "Incident".
The Tripartite Pact which Japan signed with Germany and Italy in Septem-
ber, 1940, by implication requires Japan to attack the United States, or any other
power, except Russia, not involved in the European war at that time, should
it attack either of the Axis partners. The strong Russian resistance to Nazi
attack has, however, been a damper to Japanese enthusiasm for her Axis obli-
gations. Although Foreign Minister Togo, who succeeded Toyoda, has announced
that there is no change in the foreign policy of Japan, and that Japan will adhere
to the Axis alliance, there is evidence that in order to secure a better position
for herself, she might disregard her obligations, and even withdraw from the
Ax:is. Japan has boundless ambitions in East Asia, but in view of the increas-
ing American and British strength in the Far East, and the continued stalemate
in China, she finds herself in a more and more unfavorable strategic position
to realize these ambitions. Japanese government leaders are aware of the
perils of further military adventures ; they want to avoid a general war in
the Pacific. They wish by every means possible to inveigle the United States
into an agreement "looking toward a peaceful settlement of all outstanding
issues between the two countries." This simply means recognition of Japan's
territorial and economic gains in Eastern Asia. The result of these conflicting
desires is a state of almost desperate indecision. The fact that Japanese
newspapers have come out with their most bombastic bluster during the begin-
ning of Mr. Kurusu's conference seeking a peaceful settlement with this country
is the best indication of the lack of coordination, the indecision, and the confused
general political situation in Japan. There can be no doubt that the army hot-
heads, the Black Dragon Society, and other intransigents will oppose most stren-
uously any major concessions by their present government leaders. Thus the
chief obstacle to successful negotiations by Mr. Kurusu or any other envoy, has
been the fact that although Premier Togo is an army man, he cannot be said
to control the army, the navy, or the ultra-nationali.'Jtic secret societies. Until
such control is assured, no agreements through negotiations can be successfully
carried out. The Kurusu conference can now be said definitely to have ended in
failure because of the extreme position taken by the Japanese Government in
regard to concessions which they felt could be made in the Far Eastern Area.
1382 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Without their previous enthusiasm and behind uncertain leadership, the Jap-
anese are continuing in the path to what tliey believe is their "divinely appointed
destiny" without being too sure as to where that destiny will take them. As a
matter of fact, there is evidence that the people of Japan are becoming more
and more alarmed and apprehensive; they fear that the present course is taking
them into a major war with not just one power, but with a combination of
powers. In her present situation, if Japan goes to war. her people will enter it
desperately rather than confidently.
c. Economic. Because oi the ever increasing stringency of the embargo placed
on Japan by the Unittd States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies,
the economic situation in Japan is slowly but surely becoming woi-se. The
Japanese have always lacked war materials, adequate foreign exchange, and
suflBcient foreign trade ; the embargo has served to increase sharply the de-
ficiencies in these categories.
Germany's attack on Russia has cut off the supply of military and industrial
equipment and machinery from Germany to Japan. The Japanese are finding
that economically, as well as politically, the Tripartite Pact has serious dis-
advantages to them. The pro-Axis leaders are having more and more difficulty
in justifying the alliance with Germany.
Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is anything but prosperous.
Labor shortages, lack of adequate and sufficient transportation facilities, guer-
rilla warfare and, most of all. lack of cooperation on the part of the people who
have been brought into the "sphere" by force or the threat of force, have pre-
vented Japan from realizing the economic benefits which she has so often and
so loudly proclaimed would result from her scheme.
The firm united front of the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands
East Indies in enforcing the embai'go has put Japan "on the spot" economically.
Even little Thailand has been encouraged to resist .Japanese pressure for economic,
as well as political, concessions. The effects of the embargo will compel Japan
to strive to obtain more assistance from the regions under her control in East
Asia, and to continue her efforts to persuade the ABD powers through threats
and promises to relax the embargo. If she goes to war to achieve her economic
objectives, Japan faces ruin; but at the same time she feels that achievement
of these objectives are vital to her existence.
Japan lacks essential raw materials to support either her manufacturing in-
dustries or a major war effort, even continued effort against China. The stop-
page of trade and freezing of credits has drastically reduced Japan's supply of
raw materials, and has caused her to begin using her reserves. Many of her
industries are suffering from .shortages, rationing has been extended and intensi-
fied ; in short, economically Japan is in perilous plight. The situation calls for
strenuous measures ; yet, if she goes to war, she may use up her i-esen-es,
especially of oil and steel, before she can force a decision favorable to herself.
Thus her economic situation contributes largely to the indecision of her leaders.
This is a problem which she must solve within the next few months.
7. Thailand.
a. The contributions of Thailand toward the defeat of the Nazi or Axis forces
has been for the most part negligible. H")wever, beginning in the late summer
of 1941 there have been evidences of her growing will to resist any encroach-
ments on her sovereignty. This is supported by the facts that Thailand has
been strengthened both in military force and diplomacy to a position where
the Thais could make a very real contribution to the common cause.
6. Thailand, or Siam, a weak buffer state between colonies of Great Powers,
has traditionally played one off against the other while leaning toward the
dominant one of the moment. The fall of France, accomranied with her replace-
ment in Indo-China by aggressive Japanese troops on Thai borders, compelled
the Thai government to reorient her policies. The obvious weakness of the
Democracies throughout 19^9. 1940 and the first half of 1941 made Thailand's
foreign relations appear pro-Japanese. And thei*e is no doubt that several
Thai Cabinet Ministers and other influential leaders including P»'inces of Royal
blood are pro-Japanese. However, the Prime Minister and Field Marshal, Luang
Pibul Songgram, for all practical purpo.ses the supreme ruler of Thailand, is
positively pro-Thai to the exclusion of all foreign ties or bias. The key to the
situation may be that since August 1941 Songgram has devoted almost all his
efforts and his considerable abilities to the reorganization and strengthening of
Thai armed forces. The Thai army is unquestionably loyal, and with their
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1383
morale high from recent victories over the French forces, they can be counted
on to follow the person and leadership of their Commander-in-Chief.
c. The formation of the ABCD coalition and the strong position recently taken
by the United States have effectively altered the political and diplomatic out-
look. Thailand is now distrustful of Japanese designs and fearful of invasion.
A guarantee of Thailand's territory and independence after the war, and imme-
diate, substantial, material aid and supplies, would greatly sti-engthen Thailand's
will and power to resist the Japanese.
d. With reference to Thailand, a great contribution that could be made to
the defeat of Nazi foi-ces would be to prevent this country and natural base of
operations against the Burma Road, Malaya, and the East Indies from falling
into Axis hands. The Thai army and people will fi.?ht bravely to defend their
independence, but with little or no outside aid, probably could not withstand a
determined attack in force more than two weeks. Thai forces are deployed along
the long Mekong River frontier, but first line defense units of less than 40,000
reliable combat troops — especially with insignificant mechanized units and woeful
weakne.ss in antitank and antiair forces — could not block for long the logical push
from northwest Cambodia west along the railroad to Bangkok and the heart
of Tliailand.
c. Thailand's resistance may be disastrously affected under heavy enemy
bombing, unless fighting planes and antiaircraft units are made available to
Bangkok in time. If supporting outside forces could assume the protection of
the entire Malay Peninsula, up to and in contact with Bangkok, and give some
naval aid in the (iulf of Siam, Thailand could concentrate her entire force
against the major threat from the southeast to her distinct advantage. With
relatively small quantities of military supplies and equipment, but particularly
air force, antiair, and antimechanized elements, medium artillery ammunition,
and technical or military advisers arriving in time, Thailand might hold out
indefinitely.
THAILAND'S ARMED FORCKS
40,000 Regular Army — well trainetl and equipped, organized into 5 Corps (8.000
each) of 15 Inf. Divisions (2,500 each).
8,000 men mobilized in newly organized 6th Corps.
2,500 in Marine Division.
20,000 police force and border guards under military organization.
20<),000 partially trained reserves not mobilized and lacking in equipment. Only
2,000 trained reserve rfflcers.
Mechanized force of 95 tanks and 150 motorcycle trooi)s.
Anti Air defense — about 12 light guns, 8 75-A.A. and 8 searchlights.
Country wide air defen.se warning system.
Air Force
200 airplanes of all types organized into 5 Army wings and 1 Naval wing.
600 trained pilots but no reserve planes.
Thai Naval Force consists of 4 heavy gunboats, 16 medium and small torpedo
boats, 12 motorboats and 5 small submarines. Sufficient trained personnel.
There is an arsenal in Bangkok with means for pro<lucing considerable small
arms and light artillery ammunition.
Decembee 6, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff :
Subject : Estimate of Japanese Strength in Indo-China.
1. It is estimated that there are 107,000-115,000 Japanese troops ashore in Indo-
China, 25,000 in the north and 82,000-90,000 in the south.
2. Analysis of the foregoing:
a. Tong King:
Initial garrison 6, 000
Landed prior to Oct. 18 5,000
Landad since Oct. 18 14,000
Present Total ♦25, 000
•Exclusive of about 13,000 troops landed at Haiphong and moved south by rail.
1384 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ft. South Indo-China:
(1) Known to have landed.
Garrison Nov. 1 32,000
Nov. 3-18
By sea 2, 000
By rail 3, 000
Nov. 18-29
By sea 30, COO
By rail - 10, 000
77,000
Since Nov. 29 (est.) 5,000
82,000
(2) Reported by Manila, December 21 — 21 transports in Camrah Bay — esti-
mated 18,000.
(3) According to various reports, there is an undetermined number of trans-
ports enroute to Indo-China.
Shfeman Miles,
Brigadier Genera], U. S. Aruiif,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
liistribution :
Secretary of War.
Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD.
mid
Dex:ember 6, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Estimate of Japanese Air and Gro\ind Forces in Indo-China, Hainan
and Formosa.
1. Indo-China.
Japanese troops in the theater 125,000
In the North 25,000
In the S:)utb 82,000 .
On ships in harbors ^-_ 18,000
Total 125,000
(Other troops, number unknown, are in transit tow.^rd Indo-China.
south of Shanghai)
Planes (bulk in the south) 450
2. Hainan.
Japanese troops 50, 000
Planes (approx. ) 200
3. Taiiran {Formosa) .
Japane.se troops 40, 000
Planes (approx.) i 400
4. B'lsis of the foregoing: Reports by M. T. D., O. N. I., State Department
nnd British Intelligence.
Shermais? Miles,
Brigadier General, U. 8. Arnii/,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Distribution :
Secretary of War.
A.ssistant Chief of Staff, WPD.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1385
EXHIBIT NO. 33A
WAR DEPARTMEKT
WASMtlMTON
I. B* 13S Octoljei? 2, 1941 «
MiMOBAHDOll KSi SHB OSUEf OS* SCtfTt
X« 3?h« crisis in SJokyo brottght atK>ut Ijy tb« aJ»>lT«r«ar;f of •
the Tripartite Afir^eoeat hoa beea veathsred V ib« Eoao^re C«his«t
tkr9u^ a weamvhAt x'srfanstQX? ceLe'bratJLon Involvlas ig;»«eoh«« 1>jr
the (renaaa «ad Itsli&n iabft«sadU>r«« Prin«e Xocc^e* and ot&rrti,,
at luncbeoas giren la hooor of the Axis oe Septeastser 2'?» 16'
2« Shis Sivleion has Ixiforitation frca & big^jr r«Xia'oii?
aQUcrco to the •ffeet that at 4t?K} p»a« on Septcsiher STtli «ft«£-
ecapl«tiB£ tha fteramoal«e e«l«hratiag th» iuailr«emtery of the
Srlpartite Faet the Js^aaase i^oraign ^lidetar ss^id. th» 4a«»ri&aa
AalDaasador to call on hi»» aad \ir£«d hiss to wtt^sgiy roc^^vam&. tc
hie hoaa gorernne&t an iaaedlste a4«tlxi^ h«tv«8&i I'rlr;.Ct» 3«n03^ ^tnd
Presidast Soo«eT<at.
3* The Japanasa Aai>ttn9sA.<sT in Ifad&iis^toa was adrioed a« to
gist of Adsirel ^;^da'« cosnrersation vith iahastbsidor 0r«ir«
Adalral Sbanra aXsc was urg»d bjr hla Toraigo ^ul«tay to do inrtXTf
thins ia hi» powar to prevail upoa tb« Pretildant to «*«t juid ar.af«r
Ittaedi&taly with Prlnco Eoaoje*
4, The farror with which tha J^aaesa, avar a. period of
oaasy moatha, hava heen agitatlag for thia "uaatiag of lattdare" haa
hcaa aatehed oaljr 'by their relu^aaoa to aake eottdtacsta oa two
poiats, i.e. nfithdraafal froia Chiaa, aftd pr«ipar»tioa for aa attaafc
s^iheria. ' ^ ' """*"• ■ ^~"
5« This DiTisioa i» of the halief that the preeaat Oahiaet
Ih Teltyo doaa not yat feel strong eaou^ to eaforaa any ^rd«iir f»r
vithdraval of JaptuMse troops from Chiaa, area Ibhoa^ xa&me ^rasaure
froa the Unitad States, it aight he iacaiaad to (to eo» Aad, as a |
mattar of fact, at this sta«e ia the eacaoutioa of our aaticasl I
strategic piaa, a oessatioa of hostilities la ChinA fcliov*«!'. >~
1386 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
:
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1387
vxtkf siraBS* 'itoddf-^
t» ,%i» tat
Lass «r!>UlB^- ^'9
«>i»<w«*i«x»» Itts[%h«r w>i
1 seta eswi»«<Aa»» o^ "S«3LJa^» I^^Rm*
u<}ir'la4§S9«4r «9idsat
Srtn9« XoQsjv e«ft
HSR? ftiilti
vill 1>« la « slMToa^ po«ttlo« to
«fiOjec«lc ^i«ae««sSj»ait, pl»»5ia« ««i e«r*«la%3r ef tb« <w3.1ap«« of t
JCes^^r^
It If h* S&4S
«Rpt?^h«ad»d.
eoafarexuMr
^« fr«B tb* poitrt of •»!•» of tfa» t&»it«a, 8*»t«B, a
.»j|«r# ftC tM» tt»»» iiii«h* *«CTB *o glT* this «^Ty additioael 1:
%X3a ia «§iiefi t& psM^fiW* «xr* «&»9MJMa.7 for aasy •TBotaality.
«B<& fii o©ai'«r«3W*^» «3-«ii te»«t Br4ti«A»» aa»«ta, <M3», fhallauA and
tb« »»th«irl»»a« aawt XnAl*tR« rasea^ ooep*ff»ti're and lailfled action
vitfe til© jKWWrs swawA* *• Siaw oMwdatd the eeooowle adTsntc^cc i«
aov iJoXU* Xt i» tb« epiaioa 9f tM» Sirisloii that t}>««e adiraatagaa
riwoid. usaAB- SIS circsBMtaBe**, *« «a»ifl«a4 xaa««» ewae4fi»9ion»
eec "be gaiasd froa Jsosa wiJi<S» *111 Iwasifit ail tls« aoa-^AxiB iJao»trl«a,
■ »f th« B*ssiflc ar«a; oti»rvl«8 the i^tarf eb;J««ti¥» thie coanwy haa
fltM^t w i«a« »« attain, th&* ef -fflalflwt wlfci-Axla atrangth in «»
3PB$4fi«s, «in b« l»ai ooapletely.
10, 'Sika Blvifiioa i« of the orpialoa that xtalthMT a ceafareace
©f laedssrs aor acosiomic ooiice0aiotte at tWla *la« wrold *• of ajy
aafiarlal »*«racKtaeB to tSa TJjalt«d Stataa tadac s a dafiaita coasait-
aaist to withOrav fr«a tha Jad* lemr* oMaiaad fr<a Je^aa prior to
tba caaf««BOa* »» i«a»diat» oT>^etiT« of tba Uoitad Statas Is to
Maac«si Hitlar la wrary way xwaBlbla. A Jgptjat»9 gviaraatae not tc
attaek &w«ia in St1>«ria wnld fr»« Suasla, pv^^iologioaHy end
ailitarliy. *«* «tron«er oppoaitlon to EltXar* With thl« in alad,
a a«tfi»it« oofiditica, pr«c#dBnt to wich a proj^oead coaf«r«ne« should
ba a eesplate wi.trljara»fal hy J'a^aa froa tlia Axis and a e«i»rant«&,
baaiBad "by «o3>«tantlal arideace of siBoarlty, not to attack HuaelB
itt Slheria.
11» Sine* It is hlfl^y iflgflrobabla that this condition oaa he
sset hy tha Japanesa OoTarBaHsot at the presaat tlae ot» ceuraa lias
-^
■■I
1388 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1389
EXHIBIT NO. 34
[Copy]
October 18, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Resignation of Japanese Cabinet.
1. The Navy dispatched the attached message on October 10. Our G-2 does
not concur in the situation pictured by the Navy. War Plans Division agrees
vvitli G-2.
2. Navy dispositions may require adjustment and a special alert. This is not
true for the Army.
3. Rcco}ntuendotion.
That the Secretary of War direct that secret radiograms, as follows, be sent
to the Command General, United States Army Forces in the Far East and the
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department ; C. G. Western Defense Command.
Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your in-
formation. Tension between United States and Japan remains strained but
no repeat no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent end
/s/ L. T. Gerow
L. T. Gerow,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.
Concurrence.
A. C. of S., G-2 (Bratton) concurs.
Incl.
Naval message, 10-16-41.
1390 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 35
January 31. 1942.
[i] Meruorandum for the Record:
Subject : Warnings sent to Hawaii prior to Dec. 7. 1941.
Before leaving the Military Intelligence Division I am preparing this memo-
randum for record should it ever be needed. It covers the information now on
hand concerning M. I. D.'s part in the warnings sent to Hawaii before December 7.
1. Noi-. 27, 1941. Secret telegram from W. P. D. to the Commanding Generals
of the Hawaiian Department and the Caribbean Defense Command. This tele-
gram was numbered 472 and was sent out at 6:11 p. m. on the 27th. It stated
that Japanese future action was unpredictable and that hostile action was pos-
sible at any moment. It directed the Commanding Generals to undertake, prior
to hostile Japanese action, such reccmnaissance and other measures as they
deemed necessary, and to report measures taken. The contents of this dispatch
was known to me at the time, though J do not remember to have seen an exact
copy.
2. Nor. 21, 1941. I sent a short telegram to the G-2"s Hawaii and Panama and
to all the Corps Areas. The telegram to Hawaii was numbered 473 and sent at
6:59 p. ni. This message stated that hostilities may ensue as a result of a
practical stalemate in Japanese negotiations and that subversive activities may
be expected. It was sent because of the obvious seriousness of the situation
and the great danger of sabotage everywhere, a point which was not specifically
covered in W. P. D.'s telegram referred to in the paragraph above, and with
which this Division is specifically charged under the President's directive of
June 1939. This telegram was sent after consultation with W. P. D., and my
recollection is that they recommended the inclusion of the direction that the
G-2's would inform the Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staffs only.
3. Nov. 27, 19.1(1. The Commanding General, Hawaii, replied in a short tele-
gram to the W. P. D. telegram referred to in Par. 1 above. This telegram was
numbered 9r)9 and recieved in Washington at 5 : r>7 a. m., Nov. 28. It specifically
refers to the number of the W. P. D. telegram of November 27, and therefore is
an answer [2] to that telegram. It states, however, that his Department
was alerted "to prevent sabotage." It further stated that he had liaison with
Navy. Being an answer to the W. P. D. telegram of November 27, this reply from
General Short was sent to and seen by the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff
and W. P. D. It was not sent to or seen by this Division. I do not remember
to have been informed of this message in any way.
4. Nov. 28, 19^1. At some time during this day, I think in the morning. General
Arnold told me that he was extremely worried about sabotage of planes. He
stated that a number of bombers had been received from different points in one
of the western depots, all having a certain defect which indicated sabotage.
He told me that he proposed to .send out drastic orders to all air forces at home
and abroad to take all precautions against sabotage. I told him that a general
warning on sabotage had been sent the previous day to the Gr-2's. He was not
satisfied with this, and insisted that specific directions be sent by his staff to
all Air Corps commands. This directive was written by Major C. R. Blake, chief
of the Counter Intelligence Branch, OflSce of Chief of Air Corps at the direction
of Greneral Martin Scanlon, A-2. It directed inter alia the air commands to
"initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for the pro-
tection of your establishments and equipment against sabotage, protection of
your personnel against subversive propaganda, and protection of all activities
again.st espionage." I strongly objected to this message going out to air forces
only. I was in complete accord with the Air Corps in believing that sabotage
was a real danger and that the necessary precautions should be taken, but I did
not believe that the Air Forces alone should be given additional warnings, or that
so broad and general a directive should be given to so many different commands.
1 feared all kinds of drastic measures against civilians which would have dis-
astrous repercussions. I knew that the policy of the Chief of Staff was not to
alarm the civilian population, as indicated in the W. P. D. warning message of
November 27. My objection to the proposed Air Corps directive finally resulted,
late in the afternoon on the 28th, in a staff conference in General Bryden's office
attended by General Gerow, General Scanlon and, I believe. General GuUion.
The result of this conference was the approval of a message drafted by me but
containing also the sentence quoted above from the Air Corps draft, modified,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1391
however, by a prohibition against illegal measures and a reference to the delimi-
tation of responsibility in subversive activities as between the Army, Navy and
the F. B. I. This message as approved in the staff conference was sent by The
Adjutant General to the Commanding Generals of all Corps Areas and overseas
departments. The message to Hawaii was numbered 482 and sent at 8: 37 p. m.
It was also agreed at the above mentioned staff conference, at the insistence of
the Air Corps, that identical messages would be sent by the Air Staff to all air
commands, and this was done. The message that went to Hawaii was numbered
484 and sent at 9 : 23 p. m.
[3] 5. November 29, 19^1. The Commanding General, Hawaiian De-
partment, replied by reference to the Adjutant General's cable #482 of November
28 (the message referred to in the paragraph immediately above as having been
sent by The Adjutant General as a result of the stall" conference in General
Bryden's oflSce). This message stated in detail the precautions which General
Short had put into effect in Hawaii against subversive activity. It was sent by
The Adjutant General on December 1. 1941 to the Secretary of the General
Staff, and bv the latter disseminated to the Staff, including of course M. I. D.
It was considered by this Division as a satisfactory answer to the message which
it purported to answer, i. e. the message of November 28 which resulted from
the Bryden staff conference on subversive activity.
6. On the morning of December 7, 19Jit, having received certain information
that morning that the Japanese negotiations would d( finitely be broken off at
2 p. m. that afternoon, and being convinced that this might well be timed with
a planned Japanese attack somewhere, I went to the Chief of Staff's cflB -e and
urged him to send a warning message to the overseas departments. While I
was there General Gerow, Col. Eratton of this Division, and Col. Bundy of
W. P. D., came in. They fully concurred in the necessity for such a message.
It was written by the Chief of Staff, sent by the hand of Col. Brctton to the
Message Center, and the Message Center stated it would be in the hands of the
recipients within another half hour. Col. Bratton so reported to the Chief of
Staff. It was not delivered in Hawaii until after the attack began.
7. Summary. There are obviously three points of outstanding interest in
regard to these messages :
a. Greneral Short's message, number 959, of November 27, specfl ally stated
that it was an answer to the W. P. D. message number 472 of the same date.
It was a wholly inadequate answer to that message. It was not, however,
referred in any way to this Division, nor was its contents made known to this
Division. Even had it been made known to this Division, the responsibility of
determining whether or not it was an adequate answer to the W. P. D. message
number 472 clearly lay with the latter Division.
b. The repetition of sabotage warnings contained in the M. I. D. message num-
ber 473 of November 27 and in T. A. G. message number 482 of November 28.
The latter message resulted in the insistence of the Air Corps that further
sabotage warning be sent, and I fully concurred in the sending of such warning
provided they were sent to the responsible Commanding Generals as well as to
the air commands, and that they contiued precautions against unlimited action
on the part of many relatively junior air commanders.
[4] c. The failure of the Signal Corps to get the message of December
7 through promptly or to notify the Chief of Staff or any Division of the Staff
that it would not go through promptly.
[s] Sherman Miles,
Sherm\n Mit.es,
Brigadier General, U. 8. Arm^y
Assistant Chief of Staff, 0~2.
Enclosure :
Memo from Lt. Col. C. J. Barrett, January 29, 1942 on the background on
the Air Corps message of Nov. 28, 1941.
J.\NtTART 29, 1942.
Memorandum for General Miles :
Subject : Interview with Major Blake.
The following information was obtained from Major Charles R. Blake, Chief,
of the Counter Intelligence Branch. Office of the Chief of the Air Corps:
On the morning of November 28, Major Blake was called to General Scanlon's
office and directed to prepare a message addressed to the commanders of all Air
1392 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Force activities, both in the United States and foreign possessions, directing them
to take the necessary steps to prevent sabotage, espionage and the execution
of any other threat to internal security. Major Blake wrote in longhand in that
oflSce a draft copy of which is attached, marked "Enclosure 1". Later he wrote
a Clearer copy of the same draft, still in longhand, copy of which is attached
marked "Enclosure 2". The message was then typed with several carbon
copies and delivered by Major Blake to General Scanlon, standing in the door
to General Arnold's oflBce. Another oflBcer, believed to be Colonel Vanaman,
was present, but since Major Blake does not know Colonel Vanaman, identity is
not certain. General Scanlon took the message to General Arnold's office* and
left a short time later with the statement that the message was to be coordinated
with G-2.
No reason for the preparation of this message was given to M">jor B'ake at
the time. He states, however, that he was later informed unofficially that it
resulted from a conference attended by the Chief of Staff, the Chief of the Army
Air Forces and the Chief of Naval Operations.
/S/ C. J. Barrett
C. J. B.VRKETT,
TA-eut. Colonel, Oeiieral Staff.
Enclosures :
Cpy. radio 11-28-41 '
Cpy. radio 11-28-41
End #1
11/28/41 12 : 02 P. M. Secret
^^^ A. C. of AS-A2
Auth: €fe ef At €t
Date: 11-28-^1
Initials: CRB
Copy No. 2 of 6
The world situation requires immediate atten. to the problem of sabotage,
subversion and espionage prevention in all echelons of the AAF.
You are directetl to initiate forthwith all addit. measures nee to provide for
the comple prot of your establish and equip against sab, prot of your pers against
subv prop and prot of all activities against esp.
It is further directed that reports of all steps init by you to comply with these
instr be sub to CAAF on or before 12/2/41.
End. #2
Secret
Auth : €«T el At €t
AC of AS-A-2
Date: 11-28-41
Initals: /S/ CRB
Copy No. 2 of 6
To : Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command.
Chief of the Air Corps.
Commanding Generals of all Foreign Air Force Activities.
1. The world situation requires immediate attention to the problem of sabotage,
subversion, and espionage prevention in all echelons of the Army Air Forces.
2. You are directed to initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to
provide for the complete protection of your establishments and equipment against
sabotage, protection of your i)ersonnel against subversive propaganda, and protec-
tion of all activities against espionage.
3. It is further directed that reports of all steps initiated by you to comply
with these instructions be submitte<l to the CAAF on or before Dec. 2, 1941.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
EXHIBIT NO. 36
1393
1394 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXJIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
EXHIBIT NO. 37
Basic Exhibit
OP
Despatches
Basic exhibits of despatches (19^1)
1395
Date
To
Action
Page
1 Apr -
OPNAV
COM ALLNAV DIST
1
4 Apr
18 Apr
3Jul
OPNAV
OPNAV
CNO.
CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 1-16
ALUSNA, PEIPING, ASTALUSNA
CHUNGKING & SHANGHAI.
CINCAF. CINCPAC. CINCLANT C0M15
(AIRMAIL) SPENAVO LONDON.
CINCAF, CINCPAC
CINCAF _
CINCAF
2
3
4
3 Jul -.
OPNAV
OPNAV __
OPNAV
OPNAV
OPNAV....
OPNAV-.
COM 16 -
COM 16
5
7ju1
7Jul
6
7
ItJul-
17 Jul
19JU1
CINCAF..
CINCAF
CINCAF
OPNAV.
OPNAV PRIORITY ROUTINE— CINC-
PAC, CINCAF, COM 14.
LIST OF ADDRESSESE CINCPAC, CIN-
CAF, CINCLANT, COM 15 SPENAVO
LIST OF ADDRESSEES
8
9
10
19Jul
11
20 Jul
12
25JuL.-. _
CNO
13
25Jul
CNO
13
25Jul
CNO
CINCPAC, CINCAF, CINCLANT, COM
15 SPENAVO LONDON.
CINCAF, CINPAC, CINCLANT
14
14 Aug
OPNAV
CNO
CNO
15
28 Aug . . -
CINCPAC, COMPAN NAVCOAST
FRONTIER.
U. S. HOLDERS WPL52
16
90ct
17
16 Oct - -
CNO
OPNAV . . .. .
CINCLANT, CINCPAC, CINCAF
ALL MERCHANT SHIPS --..
18
16 Oct
19
17 Oct -.-
OPNAV.
OPNAV .
NAVSTA TUTULA SAMOA CINCPAC,
CINCAF, COM 11-16.
CINCAF, C0M12
20
17 Oct
21
17 Oct
CNO
CINCPAC
22
23 Oct
OPNAV
C0M12, 14, 16 CINCPAC, CINCAF
CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 11-16
CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 12, 14
23
4 Nov . . .
OPNAV
24
18 Nov...
OPNAV
25
20 Nov
OPNAV -
CINCAF, COMPACSO NAV COASTAL-
FRON.
CINCPAC, CINCAF
26
21 Nov
OPNAV .-
27
22 Nov
CINCPAC
OPNAV
28
22 Nov
OPNAV
CINCPAC
29
OPNAV
CINCPAC
30
23 Nov
COM 12
OPNAV
31
24 Nov
CNO -
CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 11. 12. 13, 15...
CINCAF
32
24 Nov
OPNAV . .
33
25 Nov . .
OPNAV.....
OPNAV38S
COM 12
34
27 Nov
COM ALNAL COAST FRON COM 14, 16,
CINPAC. CINCAF
CINCAF. CINCPAC
35
27 Nov
CNO
36
27 Nov
OPNA.V
COM 1-13, 15, NAVY Y\RD WASHING-
TON, GOV GUAM & SOMOA.
COM PNNCP, COM PSNCF.
37
28 Nov
CNO
38
^Dec ...
OPNAV
CINCAF ...-.
39
^ Dec
OPNAV
CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM 14, 16
40
3 Dec
OPNAV
CINCAF, COM16 ..
41
4 Dec
OPNAV . .
ALUSNA TOKYO, BANKOK ASTA-
LUSNA PEIPING, SHaNGHAL
CO MARDET PEIPING CO MARDET
TIENTSIN.
NAVST.\. GUAM
42
4 Dec
OPNAV.
43
4 Dec
OPNAV
44
6 Dec
OPNAV
CINCPAC
45
6 Dee
COM 14 . ..
OPNAV
46
[1] Top Secret
1 April 1941
From: OPNAV
Action : Com all Nav Districts NY Wash Governors of Guam and Samoa
Info:
012358
Personnel of your Naval Intelligence Service should be advised that because
of the fact that from past experience shows the Axis powers often begin activities
79716 O — 46 — pt. 14-
-32
1396 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in a particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the
country concerned, they should take steps on such days to see that proper watches
and precautions are in effect.
[2] Top Secret
4 April 1941
From: OPNAV
Action : CINCPAC CINCAF Com 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Info: CINCLANT COMBATFOR COMSCOFOR COMBASEFOR COMDTS Navy
Yards Boston, Poi-tsmouth, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Charleston, Mare
Island, Pearl Harbor, Puget Sound, NAD Puget Sound, Mare Island, Oahu &
Cavite.
041700
Except DESDIV 50 (S-27, S-28 and NTS) vessels on routine supply trips fill
allowances and obtain supplies required for mobilization.
At discretion fleet commanders will accept final increment of mobilization
supply ammunition.
Strip ship in accordance with orders action ADDEES.
Ships assigned availability for drydocking at ADDEES discretion.
For this purpose ships of the Pacific Fleet are not to return to mobilization
ports on the continent.
\3] Confidential
18 April 1941
From: OPNAV
Action : ALUSNA Peiping ; Astalusna Chungking ; Astalusna Shanghai.
Info : CINCPAC ; CINCAF ; COMSIXTEEN.
1815X1
Include CINCPAC as information addressee in all despatch reports also fur-
nish one copy of all intelligence reports plus present distribution dirert to
CINCPAC. Send them by way of issuing ( fl3cer Comsixteen for secret and
confidential and through Fleet Postoff Pearl for other.
[-}! Top Secret
3 July 1941
From : Chief of Naval Operations
Action: CIXCAF-CI\CPAC-ClNCLANT-COM 15 (Airmail) SPENAVD London
Info:
031939
[Paraphrase]
The unmistakable deduction fi'oni information from numerous sources is that
the Japanese Govt has determined upf)n its future policy which is supported by
all principal Japanese political and military groui)S. This jwlicy probably
involves war in the near future. An advance against the British and Dutcli
cannot be entirely ruled out. however the CNO holds the opinion that Jap activity
in the South will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval,
army and air bases in Indo China. The neutrality pact with Ru.ssia will be
abrogated and major military effort will be against their maritime provinces
which will probably be toward the end of July though attack may be deferred
until after collapse of Eui'opean Russia. They have ordered all Jap vessels in
US Atlantic p<irts to be \^est of Panama Canal by 1 Aug. Movement of Jap flag
shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are
being requisiti<med. Using utmost secrecy, inform principal Army commanders
and your own innnediate subordinates except Ghormley. Also British Chiefs of
Staff and Ambassador.
Copy to
COS, US Army
OP-12
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1397
[5] Top Secret ,
3 July 1941
From : OPNAV
Action : CINCAF CINCPAC
Info: CINCLANT COM 11-12-13^14-15-16; ALUSNA London: ALUSNA
Tokyo; ASTALUSNA Shanghai
032130
[Paraphrase]
Definite information has been received that between July 16 and 22 the Japa-
nese Gov't has issued orders for 7 of the 11 Nip vessels now in tlie North Atlantic
and Caribbean area to pass through the Panama Canal to the Pacific. Under
routine schedules three of the remaining ships will move to the Pacific during
this same period. The one remaining ship, under routine movement, can be clear
by July 22nd. Briefly, all Nipponese merchant vessels will be clear of the Carib-
bean and North Atlantic areas by July 22nd. In Jap business communities strong
rumors are curreivt that Russia will be attacked by Japan on July 20th. From
unusually reliable Chinese sources it is stated that, within 2 weeks Japan will
abrogate neutrality treaty with Russia and attack. The present strength and
deployment of Nip Army in Manchuria is defensive and the present distribution
of Jap Fleet appears normal and that it is capable of movement either north or
south. That a definite move by the Japanese may be expected during the period
July 20th dash August first, is indicated by the foregoing.
[6] Top secret
7 July 1941
From : Opnav
Action : Cincaf
Info : Cincpac
070224
Tokyo to Washington 1 July 329:
Japan directs eight Marus on East Coast United States rush cargo handling
and proceed Colon Pass through Canal to Pacific between 16 and 22 July on
following schedule: 16th, Tokai ; 17th, Amagisan; 18th, Awajisan; 19th, Tosan;
20th, Kiyosumi ; 21st, Kirishima ; 22nd, Norfolk and Asuka X.
Tokyo to Berlin 2 July 585: (English text note to Ribbentrop in part)
"Japan is preparing for all possible eventualities regarding Soviet in order
join forces with Germany in actively combatting Communist and destroying
Communist system in eastern Siberia X at same time Japan cannot and will
not relax efforts in the south to restrain Britain and United States X new
Indo-China bases will intensify restraint and be vital contribution to Axis
victory."
Berlin to Tokyo 2 July 825:
Oshima delivers above note and tells Ribbentrop in part, "Matsuoka will soon
submit a decision X if you Germans had only let us know you were going to
fight Russia .so soon we might have been ready X We were planning to settle
South Seas questions and China incident hence decision cannot be reached
immediately, but Japan will not sit on fence while Germany fights Russia."
[71 Top secret
7 July 1941
From : Opnav
Action : Cincaf
Info : Cincpac
070243
Tokyo to Berlin and Vichy 16 June 519:
Matsuoka requests Ribbentrop's aid in demand on French for following naval
bases: "Saigon and Camranh"; and following air bases in southern French
Indo-China: 'Saigon, Bienhoa, Piinompenh, Kompontrach, Nhatrang, Soctrang,
Touraine, Simreap" X Japan determined acquire above quickly, diplomatically
1398 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
if possible or by force if necessary in order expand and strengthen them X
Chief reason given is to prevent British moving in.
Berlin to Tokyo 21 June 739:
Ribbentrop reluctant to force issue now.
Tokyo to Berlin and Vichy 22 June 549 and 2^6 respectively :
Matsuoka will negotiate directly with French X Repeats determination get
bases soon.
Tokyto to Vichy 28 June 258:
French Indo-China base question this date receives Imperial sanction.
30 June 252:
Japan now considers it absolutely essential to force France accede to demands
for above bases.
[8] Top secret
15 July 1941
From : Opnav
Action : Cincaf
Info: Cincpac
151924
Summary of Tokyo to Washington fifteen July three six eight X Relayed to
London X Quote within next day or two Japan Vichy commercial negotiations
begin X Japan will propose in name of mutual defense taking over southern
French Indo China naval and air bases outlined in Jonab dated seven July X
At same time Japan will attempt to station necessary army navy air forces in
that area peacefully with French agreement if possible X If French object
Japan has decided to use force X Japan does not intend move further south
or interfere with colonial government X Move necessary to guarantee supplies
from colony and Thailand and prevent Syrian type British action X Tokyo
wishes avoid friction with Britain and particularly the United States if possible
but risk is necessary unquote.
[9] Top secret
17 July 1941
From : OPNAV
Action: CINCAF
Info: CINCPAC
180300
Tokj'o to Vichy twelve July two seven four and two seven Ave list six terms of
ultimatum to be an.swered by twenty July x Japan will send necessary army navy
air forces to southern French Indo China x French turn over naval and air bases
listed in Jonab of seven July x expeditionary force to have right to maneuver and
move about freely x French withdraw forces at landing points to avoid possible
clashes x Vichy authorize French Indo China military to arrange details with
Japanese either before or after landing x colony to pay Japan twenty three rail-
lion piastres annually to meet cost of occupation xx Tokyo to Vichy fourteen
July two eight one army now planning advance on or about twenty July xx
Tokyo to Saigon and Hanoi sixteen July circular one five one eight formal
demands presented to Vichy on fourteenth x reply asked by twentieth x Japan
intends carry out p'ans by force if opposed or if British or United States inter-
feres X Kanju Maru being held at Saigon to evacuate all Japanese there sailing
early dawn twenty four July x burn codes x Japanese in northern area evacuate
or move into Hanoi.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1399
[10] Top secret
19 July 1941
From : OPNAV
Action: CINCAF
Info : CINCPAC
193230
Purple fourteen July Canton to Tokyo two five five quote information from
military oflBcials to attaches in Canton follows x one x the recent general mobiliza-
tion order expresses Japans irrevocable resolution to end Anglo American as-
sistance in thwarting Japans natural expansion and her indomitable intention
to carry this out with the backing of the Axis if possible but alone if necessary x
formalities such as dining the expeditionary forces and saying farewell to them
were dispensed with to avoid alarm and because we wished to face this new war
with a calm and cool attitude x two x immediate object will be to attempt peaceful
French Indo China occupation but will crush resistance if offered and set up
martial law x secondly our purpose is to launch therefrom a rapid attack when
the international situation is suitable x after occupation next on our schedule
is sending ultimatum to Netherlands Indies x in the seizing of Singapore the
Navy will play the principal part x Army will need only one division to seize
Singapore and two divisions to seize Netherlands Indies x with air forces based
on Canton comma Spratley comma Palau comma Singora in Thailand comma
Portuguese Timor and Indo China and with submarine fleet in Mandates comma
Hainan comma and Indo China we will crush British American military power
and ability to assist in schemes against us x three x occupying force will be reor-
ganized as twenty fifth Army corps of four divisions and also thirtieth Army corps
consisting of South China forces to be assigned special duty with airplanes
tanks and howitzers x General lida in command will set up headquarters in
Saigon x preparation complete x expedition will soon proceed from here unquote
parenthesis note by Opnav it should be noted that above is not a directive but
appears to express thinking and opinions of Canton orange military parenthesis.
[11] Top secret
19 July 1941
From: COM SIXTEEN
Action: OPNAV
Info: CINCPAC CINCAF
191514
Tokyo to met number fifteen sixty of nineteenth in prep affirm code states that
although cabinet has changed there will of course be no departure from the
principle that tripartite pact forms keystone of Japans national policy and new
cabinet will also pursue policy of former cabinet in all other matters.
[12] Top secret
20 July 1941
From: COM 16
Action : CINCPAC ROUTINE, CINCAF ROUTINE, COM 14 ROUTINE, OPNAV
PRIORITY
Info:
2013356
Tokyo to Vichy number two nine five purple of nineteenth XX army has all
preparations made XX have decided to advance on twenty fourth regardless of
whether demands accepted or not X orders for advance will be issued on July
twenty third Japanese time X remainder of message contains instructions to
ambassador regarding exchange of official documents in case of accentance X
Instructions regarding notifying Tokyo of Frances reply etcetera.
1400 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[13] Top secret
25 July 1941
From : Chief of naval operations.
Action : Addressees as per attached list.
Info :
251600
At twelve hundred get July twenty sixth 1941 execute wplol except the ninth to
eighteenth words inclusive of task baker of paragraph seven the word United
States being considered as one word X The excepted words will be executed at a
later date after necessary arrangements have been made
Addressees for despatch concerning execution of wpl-51
By rapid communication means to :
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet (require acknowledgement from
this addressee).
Commander, Battleships, Atlantic Fleet.
Commander, Battleship Division Three, Atlantic Fleet.
Commander, Cruisers, Atlantic Fleet.
Commander, Cruiser Division Two, Atlantic Fleet.
Commander, Destroyers, Atlantic Fleet.
Commander, Aircraft, Atlantic Fleet.
Commander, Patrol Wings, Atlantic Fleet.
Commander, Submarines, Atlantic Fleet.
Commander, Support Force, Atlantic Fleet.
Commander, Train, Atlantic Fleet.
Commander, Transports, Atlantic Fleet.
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newfoundland.
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Bermuda.
Commandant, Tenth Naval District.
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, Cuba.
Special Naval Observer, London.
U. S. Naval Attache, Ottawa, Canada.
By registered air mail to :
President, Naval War College; Commandant, First Naval District; Comman-
dant, Third Naval District ; Commandant, Fourth Naval District ; Com-
mandant, Fifth Naval District; Commandant, Sixth Naval Di.strict; Com-
mandant, Seventh Naval District; Commandant, Eighth Naval District;
Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.
By registered ordinary mail to :
Commandant, Eleventh Naval District ; Commandant, Twelfth Naval Dis-
trict; Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District; Commandant, Fourteenth
Naval District.
1 14] Top secret
25 JXJLT 1941.
From : Chief of Naval Operations.
Action : CINCPAC OINCAF CINCLANT COM 15 SPENAVO London
Info:
252023
This is a joint despatch from the CNO and the Chief of Staff US Army X
Appropriate Adees deliver copies to commanding generals Hawaii Philippines
and Caribbean Defense Command and to General Chaney in London XX You
are advised that at 1400 GCT July twenty sixth United States will impose eco-
nomic sanctions against Japan X It is expected these sanctions will embargo
all trade between Japan and the United States subject to modification through
a licensing system for certain material X It is anticipated that export licenses
will be granted for certain grades of petroleum products cotton and possibly
some other materials and that import licenses may be granted for raw silk X
Japanese assets and funds in the United States will be frozen except that they
may be moved if licenses are granted for such movement X It is not repeat
not expected that Japanese merchant vessels in United States ports will be
seized at this time X ITnited States flag merchant vessels will not at present
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1401
be ordered to depart from or not to enter ports controlled by Japan X CNO
and COS do not anticipate inunediate hostile reaction by Japan throngh the
use of military means bnt you are furnished this information in order that you
may take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventualities X
Action being initiated by the United States army to call the Philippine army
into active service at an early date XX This despatch is to be Itept secret
except from immediate navy and array subordinates X SPENAVO inform CNS
but warn him against disclosure X Action addees this dis are cincpac cinclant
cincaf com fi teen spenavo London
(Deliver one copy to War Plans Division U. S. Army)
I ri I Top secret
14 August 1941.
From : OPNAV
Action : CINCAF, CINCPAC, CINCLANT
Info : COM 11-12-13— COM 14-15-16.
142155
Indications that orange ships formerly in N<n-th Atlantic and those on South
Atlantic routes returning Japan via Magellan comma 4 tankers only A-essels on
Pacitie coast, none enroute to USA, none North Atlantic, estimated 17 w^est coast
of South America, none Los Angeles to Panama. Japanese rapidly completing
writhdrawal from world shipping routes. Scheduled sailings cancelled and ma-
jority .ships in other than China and Japan seas areas home-ward bound. Re-
sumption of shipping services indefinite result of USA, British and Dutch pres-
sure through refusal of transit of Panama Canal, export control restrictions, re-
fusal of bunkering and port facilities and fund freezing.
\16] Top Secret.
28 August 1941.
From: CNO.
Action : CINCPAC Connnander Panama Naval Coastal Frontier.
Info: CINCLANT; SPENAVO. LON : Commander Pacific Southern Coastal
Frontier ; Commander Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier & COM 11.
282121
(Paraphrase)
Certain operations prescribed for the Atlantic by WPL .51 are hereby extended
to areas of the Pacific Ocean as described herein in view of the destruction by
raiders of merchant vessels in the Pacific Ocean within the Western Hemi.«phere
neutrality zone as defined in the declaration of Panama of Oct. 3, 1939. Formal
changes in WPL 51 will be issued but meanwhile action addressees will execute
injmediately the following instructions. CINCPAC constitute the Southeast
I'acific Force consisting of two 7500 ton light cruisers and dispatch it to Balboa.
For task purposes this force will operate directly under CNO after entering the
Southeast Pacific sub area as defined in WPL 40 para .3222 except western limit
is longitude 100 degrees west. Witliin the Pacific sector of the Panama naval
coastal frontier and within the Southeast Pacific sub area the connnander Panama
naval coastal frontier and connnander Southeast Pacific Force will in cooperation
and acting under the strategic direction of the Chief of Naval Operations execute
the following task colon Destroy surface raiders which attack or threaten United
States flag shipping. Interpret an approach of surface raiders within the Pacific
sector of the Panama naval coastal frontier or the I'acifiL- Southeast sub area as
a threat to United States flag shipping. XX For the present the forces con-
cerned will base Balboa but CNO will endeavor to make arrangements for basing
on South American ports as may be required XX Action Adees and commander
Southeast Pacific Force infonn CNO when these instructions have been placed
in effect. XX
Distribution :
Copies to 12, 16, 20, 30, 38, 38W ; WPD, U. S. Army; Brit. Nav. Staff in
Washington.
1402 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[17] Top Secret.
' 9 Ocax)BEB 1941.
From : CNO.
Action : All U. S. holders of WPL fifty-two outside of Navy Department
Info:
082335
(Paraphrase)
On October 11th at 0200 GCT cancel WPL 51 and place WPL 52 in eftect.
[18] Top Secret.
16 OCTTOBER 19«.
From : CNO.
Action: CINCLANT CINCPAC CINCAF (Acknowledge).
Info:
162203
The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation X If a
new Cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti Ameri-
can X If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under
a new mandate which will not include rapprocliement with the US X In either
ca.se hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility X Since the
US and Britain are held re.sponsible by Japan for her present desperate situation
there is also a posibility that Japan may attack these two powers X In view of
these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory
deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative
actions against Japan X Sec<md and third Adees inform appropriate Army and
Naval District authorities X Acknowledge XX
[19] Top Secret.
16 October 1941.
From: OPNAV.
Action : All merchant ships.
Info:
162300
(Paraphrase)
The following despatch is for all United States merchant ships in the Pacific :
There is a possibility of hostile action by Japan again.st U. S. shipping. United
States merchant ships at sea in the Pacific proceed now as follows: In Chinese
waters. China Sea or Dutch Indies waters, proceed immediately to Manila, Singa-
pore, or a North Australian Port. In North Pacific westbound, except those
bound to Vladivostok, proceed to Honolulu unless close to the Philippines, in the
latter case proceed there. Ships bound for Vladivostok, proceed on voyage. If
Honolulu bound continue voyage. If in North Pacific eastbound, continue voyage.
If in South Pacific, continue voyage. Vessels operating coastwise off of South
America or between the United States and the west coast of South America,
continue voyage. All coastwise shipping eastern Pacific, continue voyage. Usual
trade routes should be avoided.
[20] Top secret.
10/17/41.
From: OPNAV.
Action: NAVSTA TUTUILA SAMOA COM 11, 12. 13, 14 NAVDISTRICTS
CINCPAC CINCAF COM 15, 16.
Info:
162239.
Attention invited to OPNAV warning merchant vessels 162300 this date X
Routing instructions will be .sent you later.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1403
\21] Top secret.
10-17-41.
From: OPNAV.
Action: CINCAF COMi 12.
Info: COM 11. 15, 13, 16, 14 CINCPAC NAVSTA TUTUILA SAMOA ALUSNA
Melbourne and British Admiralty Delegation Washn.
162258.
(Paraphrase)
Effective immediately route all trans-Pacific U. S. flag shipping to and from
the following areas Far East area plus Shanghai and India and East India area as
defined in WPL 46 thru Torres Straits keeping to the southward and well clear
of Orange mandates taking maximum advantage of Dutch and Australian patrolled
areas X Make arrangements with Australian naval board for Torres Straits
pilots.
[22] Top secret.
17 October 1941.
Fi-om: CNO.
Action: CINCPAC.
Info:
171458.
(Paraphrase)
Because of the great importance of continuing to reenforce the Philippines
with long range Army bombers you are requested to take all practicable pre-
cautions for the safety of the airfields at Wake and Midway.
\23] Top secret
23 October 1941.
From: OPNAV
Action: COM 12 COM 14 CINCPAC CINCAF COM Kl
Info : COM 11 COM 13 COM 15 NAVSTA GUAM.
222250 ^
[Paraphrase]
Until further orders all army and navy transpacific troop transports, ammu-
nition ships and such- others with .sufficiently important military cargo will be
escorted both ways between Honolulu and Manila. Authorized route slow ves-
sels in above categories which would unduly prolong voyage via Torres Straits
without escort. To insure minimum demands for escort from Pacific fleet sched-
ules must be arranged so that these ships proceed in company. "CINCAF should
take over escort when and where practi<'able as arranged between CINCPAC
and CINCAF. General escorting^ other transpacific American flag shipping
not considered warranted at tliis time in view of routing prescribed in my
162258. Where cargo in mercliant bottoms for Guam is involved normal routing
is authorized.
Cargo for Guam should be so assembled and loaded that a minimum number
of sh'ps be required to make that p<u"t. Reference COM 12 despatches to
CINCPAC Nos. 212352 and 212358 and CINCAF confidential serial 01633.
[24] Top secret
4 November 1941.
From : OPNAV
Action : CINCPAC ; CINCAF ; COM H. 12. 13, 14. 1.5. 16.
Info:
041800
Japanese merchant vessels complete withdrawal from Western Hemisphere
waters appears in progress. Ships in area have departed or are preparing to
depart except Naruto presently completing run from west coast of Mexico for
South American ports. No ships presently repftrtefl en route from Japan.
1404 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[25] Top secret
18 November 1941.
From: OPNAV
Action : CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 12, 14
Info:
181705
[Paraphrase]
In convoy with American flag vessels, placing of Bloemfontein is authorized.
Until international conditions on and .subsequent to 25 Nov. become defined and
clarified however any further direct or great circle routing between Hawaii
and Philippines should not repeat not be used. Until further advised by Dept.
routes south of mandates should be prescribed.
[26] Top secret
20 November 1941.
From: OPNAV
Action : CINCAF, COMPACSO NAVCOASTAL FRONTIER.
Info: CINCPAC COM-14, COM-16
192235
Routing proposed by COM-14 150118 satisfactory. CINCAF and Comdr. Pacific
southern naval coastal frontier coordinate routing to avoid congestion.
127] Top secret
21 November 1941
From: OPNAV
Action : CINCPAC, CINCAF
Info : Com 14, Com 16
211755
Reliable reports indicate the recent establishment by Japan of a combined
air and surface craft patrol covering shipping routes from the U S to Austral-
asia X Daily aircraft patrols have been observed extending to the Gilbert Islands
from base at Jaluit X Surface craft believed to cover area reaching Ellice
Islands X Japanese East Indies fishing fleet also reported coordinated in patrol
operations X Present indications this fleet divided into three groups now in
areas vicinity Bathurst Island X Arnhem and Thursday Island in Torres
Strait X They are expected round Dutch New Guinea operating from base in
Palau and are equipped with long range radio sets X
\28] Top secret'
22 November 41
From: CINCPAC
Action: OPNAV
Info: CINCAF Com 12, 14, 16
220417
Manila convoy consisting Coast Farmer Admiral Halstead Chaumont Meigs
Republic Holbrook Bloemfontein reporting Com fourteen with conflicting rout-
ings X Due depart Honolulu twentyseven November ten knots X First three
ships have cargo for Guam and Chaumont personnel for Midway Wake X Last
two cannot use Torres routing because limited fresh water radius X Only one
cruiser detailed escort X In view above and information OPNAV 211755 con-
sider route via Guam no adidtional hazard X Unless otherwise directed will
instruct Com fourteen route all via northern route Chaumont departing two days
early and joining convoy in vicinity Wake thence via Guam and San Bernardino X
No escort for Chaumont as far as Wake considered necessary at present X Re-
quest CINCAF arrange escort Guam ships to Manila if delays discharging neces-
sitate splitting convoy at Guam
[29] Top secret
22 November 1941
From : OPNAV
Action : CINCPAC
Info : CINCAF Com 12 Com 16 Com 14
221805
Urdis 220417 X Pacific situation unchanged comply my 181705 X Guam cargo
should be sent Manila then transshipped for Guam X Make other arrangements
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1405
personnel in Chaumont for Midway and Wake X Bloemfontein and Holbrook
obtain water en route at Tutuila Suva or other port as expedient
Ref : ll-(564. Manila convoy consisting reporting Com 14 with con-
flicting orders for routing X
Ref: 11-533 Placing Bloemfontein in convoy . . . direct routes not to be used
between Hawaii and Philippines
[30] Top secret
23 November 1941
I'roni : OPNAV
Action: CINCPAC
Info : COM 16-12-14, CINCAF
221801
My dispatch 181705 and 192235. IMove Point Baker further to south of Ellice
Islands. Refer last sentence first mentioned dispatch routes south of mandates
means through Torres Straits.
1^21 Top secret
23 November 1941
From : COM 12
Action: OPNAV
Info: CINCPAC
230258
[Paraphrase]
Department dispatches apparently do not take cognizance of magnitude of Army
troop movement directed by War Department from San Francisco by December 10
involving about 22 vessels including largest liners. Aside from troop transporta-
tion about 12 merchant on scheduled voyages ready to sail trans Pacific. Seven
vessels already sailed. Com 12 organizing 17 knot convoy to depart San Fran-
cisco by December 8. Also planning 10 knot convoy to assemble Honolulu by
December 15 routings prescribed eastwiird of Ellice Islands thence Torres Straits.
Watering necessary practically all vessels esp?cially troop transports. In view
reports Japanese patrolling this area believe it vulnerable. Subject to further
study believe routing south about Australia impracticable. If troop movement
must be made at this time recommend great circle course to San Bernardino Strait
with adequate fleet protection.
[32] Top secret
November 24, 1941
From : CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Action : CINCAF CINCPAC COMll C0M12 C0M13 C0M15
Info : SPENAVO London CINCLANT
242005
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X This
situation coupled with statements of Japanese Covernment and movements their
naval and military forces indicate in our opinitm that a surprise aggressive move-
ment in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility X
Chief of staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action adees to inform
senior Army oflBcers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to
complicate an already ten.se situation or precipitate Japanese action X Guam will
be informed separately.
Copy to WPD, War Dept. and to Op-12 but no other distribution.
[33] Top secret
November 24, 1941
From : OPNAV
Action: CINCAF
Info : COM 16 ALUSNA, CHUNGKING, ASTALUSNA, SHANGHAI ; ALUSNA,
TOKYO ; CINCPAC
242239
Orange naval movements as reported from individual information addresses are
often conflicting because of necessarily fragmentary nature X Since Com 16
1406 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
intercepts are considered most reliable suggest other reports carefully evaluated
be sent to Com 16 for action OPNAV for information X After combining all
incoming reports Com 16 direct dispatches to OPNAV info CINCPAC based
on all information received indicating own evaluation and providing best possible
continuity X Request CINCAF issue directive as necessary to fulfill general
objective
13^] Top secret
25 November 1941
From : OPNAV
Action : COM 12
Info : CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 14, COM 16
252203
Route all transpacific shipping thru Torres Straits. CINCPAC and CINCAF
provide necessary escort. Refer your dispatch 230258.
[35] Top secret
27 November 1941
From : OPNAV 38S
Action: Commandants all Naval Coastal Frontiers, Com 14, 16 CINCPAC,
CINCAF.
Info : CINCLANT
271519
On account of fact that existing and subsequent merchant ship codes may be
compromised the use of secret positions in assi£;nment of routes for merchant
ships will be initiated as rapidly as possible and instructions for their use given
to masters as this will enable directions for diversions to be given without dis-
closing to axis nations the location of our ships.
[36] Top secret
November 7, 1941.
From : Chief of Naval Operations
Action: CINCAF, CINCPAC
Info: CINCLANT, SPENAVO
272337
This despatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an
aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number
and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces
indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or Kra
peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment
preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46 X Inform district
and army authorities X A similar warning is being sent by War Department
X Spenavo inform British X Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take
appropriate measures against sabotage.
Copy to WPD, War Dept.
[37] Top Secret
27 November 1941
From: OPNAV
Action : Coras 1-8-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-15 Navyyard Washn Governor Guam
& Samoa
Info:
272338
(Paraphrase)
Commandants will take appropriate measures for security against subversive
activity and sabotage due to critical status of orange negotiations and imminent
probability extention orange operations X Publicity to be avoided.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1407
[38] Top Secret
November 8, 1941
From : Chief of Naval Operations
Action: Com PNNCF Cora PSNCF
Info : CINCPAC Com PNCF
290110
Refer to my 272338 X Army lias sent following to commander western
defense command quote negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all
practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Govern-
ment might come back and offer to continue X Japanese future action unpre-
dicable but hostile action possible at any moment X If hostilities cannot repeat
not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt
act X This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a
course of action that might jeopardize your defense X Prior to hostile Japanese
action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures
as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat
not to alarm civil population or disclose intent X Report measures taken X
A separate message is being sent to G two Ninth Corps Area re subversive activi-
ties in United States X Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks
assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan X Limit dissemination
of this highly secret information to minimum essential oflBcers X Unquote XX
WPL52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in effect in that
area except as now in force in southeast Pacific sub area and Panama naval
coastal frontier X Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an
overt act X Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL46 so far as they
apply to Japan in case hostilities occur
[39] Top Secret
2 December 1941
From : OPNA V
Action: CINCAF
Info:
012356
(Paraphrase)
President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and within
two days if possible after receipt this despatch. Charter 3 small vessels to form
a "defensive information patrol". Minimum requirements to establish identity
as U. S. men-of-war are command by a naval oflBcer and to mount a small gun
and 1 machine gun would suffice. Filipino crews may be employed with mini-
mum number naval ratings to accomplish purpose which is to observe and report
by radio Japanese movements in west China Sea and Gulf of Siam. One vessel
to be stationed between Hainan and Hue one vessel off the Indo-China C5oast
between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jacques and one vessel off Pointe de Camau.
Use of Isabel authorized by president as one of the three but not other naval
vessels. Report measures taken to carry out presidents views. At same time
inform me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at
sea by both army and navy whether by air surface vessels or submarines and
your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures.
[40] Top Secret
3 December 1941
From : OPNA V
Action CINCAF, CINCPAC, Com 14, Com 16
Info :
031850
Highly reliable information has been received that cat^oric and urgent instruc-
tions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong-
kong X Singapore X Batavia X Manila X Washington and London to
destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important
confidential and secret documents X
1408 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
141} Top Secret
3 December 1941
From : OPNAV
Action : CINCAF, Com Sixteen
Info : CINPAC, Com Fourteen
031855
Circular twenty four forty four from Tokyo one December ordered London X
Hongkong X Singapore and Manila to destroy Purple machine XX Batavia
machine already sent to Tokyo XX December second Washington also directed
destroy Purple X All but one copy of other systems X And all secret docu-
ments XX British Admiralty London today reports embassy London has com-
plied
[^2] Top Secret
4 December 1941
From : OPNAV
Action : ALUSNA Tokyo, ALUSNA Bankok, ASTALUSNA Peiping, ASTALUSNA
Shanghai
Info : CINCAF, ALUSNA Changking, Com 16
040330
Destroy this system at discretion and report by word Jabberwock. Destroy
all registered publications except CSP 1085 and 6 and 1007 and 1008 and this
system and report execution by sending in plain language "Boomerang".
\43] Top Secret
4 December 1941
From: OPNAV
Action : CO MARDET Peiping, CO MARDET Tientsin
Info : CINCAF, Com 16
040343
Destroy this system at discretion and send word Jabberwock when this has
been done. All registered publications except this system must be destroyed im-
mediately by Mardets Peiping and Tientsin and reported by word "Boomerang"
in plain language. Use discretion on all other confidential papers.
U',] Top Secret
4 December 1941
From: OPNAV
Action : NAVSTA Guam
Info: CINCAF CINCPAC Com 14 Com 16
042017
Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter
except that e.ssential for current purposes and special intelligence retaining mini-
mum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with
CINCAF CINCPAC Com 14 Com 16 and OPNAV X Be prepared to destroy
instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain X Report crypto
channels retained
[^51 Top Secret
6 December 1941
From : OPNAV
Action: CINCPAC
Info: CINCAF
061743
In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying
Pacific islands you may authorize the destruction by them of .secret and confi-
dential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency X Means
of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence
should of course be maintained until the last moment.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1409
U6] Top Secret.
December 6. 1941
From: COM FOURTEEN
Action: OPNAV
Info:
060114
Believe local Consul has destroyed all lint one system although presumably not
included your eighteen double five of third.
EXHIBIT NO. 38
[Copy]
Drafting Section :
Administrative
Drafting Officer
T. J. B.
G-2 File Number:
PARAPHRASE OF AN OUTGOING SFXRET RAOIOGBAM
No. 40. Sent Dec. 3, 1941
Date: December 3. 1941
To: Military Attache, American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan.
Memorize emei-gency key word #2 for use of SIGNUD witliout repeat without
indicators, destroy document stop SIGNNQ, SIGPAP and SIGNDT should be
retained and used for all conunuiiications except as last resort when these docu-
ments should be destroyed and memorized SIGNUD used stop destroy all other
War Department ciphers and codes at once and notify by code word BINAB stop
early rupture of diplomatic relations with Japan has been indicated. State
Department informed you may advise Ambassador.
Miles
EXHIBIT NO. 39
Decembeb 15, 1941.
Memorandum for Record :
On Sunday, December 7, 1»41, about 11 : 30 A. M., E. S. T., General Marshall
called me to his office. General Miles and Colonel Brattim were present. General
Mar.^hall referred to the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had been directed
to deliver a note to the State Department at 1 P. ]M.. December 7, 1941. He felt
that the Japanese Government instructions to deliver the note at an exact hour
and time might have great significance. The pencilled draft of an alert message
to be .sent at once to CG, U. S. Army Forces in Far East ; CG Caribbean Defense
Command: CG Hawaiian Department; and CG Fourth Army was read aloud by
General Marshall and concurred in by all present. Colonel Bratton was directed
to take the pencilled draft of the me.s.sage to the Message Center and have it sent
immediately by the most expeditious means. Colonel Bratton returned in a few
minutes and informed General Mar.shall that the message had been turned over
to the Message Center and would reach destinations in about thirty minutes.
The pencilled draft was typed later during the day and formally made of record.
(Signetl) L. T. Gerow
L. T. Gekow,
Britjddirr General,
Aeting Assistant Chief of Staff.
December 15, 1941.
Meniorandiim for Record:
The attached message was taken personally by direction of the Chief of Staff
to the War Department Message Center by Cohinel Bratton. G-2, wlu) gave it
in person to the Message Center Chief, Colonel French, at 11 : 50 a. m., Decern-
1410 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ber 7. It was typed in Colonel Brattou's presence and delivered to the Code
Clerk. Time of recoi'ding on the Message Center records is 12 noon, December 7.
Colonel Bratton asked Colonel French at this time how long it would take
before the message was on the way. Colonel French replied that it would be
on the way in ten minutes and that it would be in the hands of addressees within
30 minutes at the latest. Colonel Bratton reported these facts to the Chief
of Staff.
The following is the log of the message :
Honolulu
E. S.T. Time
Filed War Department Message Center 12:00 noon 6:30 AM
Sent Western Vtiion 12:17 PM 6:47 AM
Received RCA, Honolulu 7:33 AM
Delivered to Signal Officer, Honolulu 11:45 AM
Delivered to AGO, Hawaiian Department 2:58 PM
The Message Center reports that a check from Honolulu indicates that on
receipt this message was lianded to an oriental messenger (statement Colonel
French to Colonel Smith, Secretary, General Staff) for delivery by hand to Army
Headquarters.
(Signed) W. B. Smith,
W. B. Smith,
* Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.
Dexember 15, 1941,
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject : Sunday morning, December 7, 1941.
1. Mj' recollection of what occurred in j'our otfice on that morning is as follows:
I found you alone in your office at about 11:25 a. m. We were almost im-
mediately joined by Col. Bratton, wlio brouglit in the Japanese reply and the
Japane.se directive that the rejily be given to Secretary Hull at 1:00 p. m.
that day.
You then read aloud the Japanese reply, whicli was of considerable length.
You then asked what Col. Bratton and I thought should be done about it, or what
it signified. We said that we believed there was important significance in the
time of the delivery of the reply — 1 : (M) p. ui. — an indication that some military
action would be undertaken by the Japanese at tliat time. We thought it prob-
able that the Japane.se line of action would he into Thailand, but it might be
any one or more of a number of other areas.
I urged that the Philippines, Hawaii, Pniiama and the West Coast be informed
immediately that the .Tapane.se reply would l)e delivered at one o'clock that
afternoon, and to be on the alert. You tlien picked up the telephone and got
Admiral Stark. You told him you tliouglif we sliould send out warning as
indicated above. After Admiral Staik replied, you put down the telephone and
said that the Admiral did not think any further warnings necessary, since
all the forces had already been several times alerted. Col. Bratton and I never-
theless urged that warnings be sent.
I'ou then wrote out the warning message. There was some discussion as to
whether the Philippines should be included or not, but I am not quite clear
exactly when this discussion occurred. You again got Admiral Stark on the
telephone and read the message to him. He apparently concurred, and asked
that the naval forces be informed. You added iliat at the bottom of the message.
At about this time General Gerow and Col. Bundy arrived. You asked us in
succession, beginning with me. what we thought the Japanese reply and timing
meant. I said that I thought it probably meant Thailand, but that the timing had
some significance and warning messages shouhl he sent. General Gerow and
Colonels Bratton and Bundy concurred. The me.s.sage in your handwriting was
then given to Col. Bratton to take innnediately to the Mes.sage Center. (There
was a little di-scussion here as to whetiier it sliould go to (Jeneral Gerow's office for
typing first, but time was then pressing and I gave it to Bratton for immediate
delivery. General Gerow said as Bratton was leaving, "Tell them to give first
priority to the Philippines if there is a qtiestion of priority" or something to that
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1411
effect.) Bratton returned in a few moments and you directed him to find out how
long it would take for the delivery of those messages. Again he went to the
Message Center and returned and reported to you that they would have them
encoded in three minutes, on the air in eight, and in the hands of the recipients in
(I think) twenty.
Col. Bratton states that he looked at his watch on delivering your message to
the Signal Corps, and the time was 11 :.50 a. m. He further states that the
Message Center gave him no intimation that all four messages would not go over
Army radio direct to the four Army Headquarters.
(Signed) Sherman Miles.
Shekman Miles,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
June 8, 1942.
Memorandum for Brig. General W. B. Smith:
In connection with the request General Surles sent to you, I am sending you two
files ; one is the Log, which shows the record of messages received, etc., on Decem-
ber 7, 1941 ; the other file includes statements by different officers covering their
recollections of occurrences on that date.
I understood from you that what Mr. Lindley was particularly interested in was
what the situation was at the time the first word of the attack was received. Inas-
much as I was the only officer present in this office at the time, I present you with
the following statement :
"On the morning of December 7th, I was on duty in the Office of the Chief of
Staff doing some special work that I had been directed to do by General Marshall.
He arrived at the office at about 10 : 00 o'clock or shortly thereafter and had a
series of conferences with staff officers from G-2 and the War Plans Division. At
about 12 : 00 o'clock he called me to his office and informed me that he expected to
see the President that afternoon at about 3 : 00 o'clock and for me to arrange to
keep the office open and have some of the commissioned and civilian personnel
report for duty.
"At about 1 : 30 P. M. an enlisted man from the Navy rushed into my office out of
breath, with a pencil note which was supposed to have been a message from
the Navy radio operator at Honolulu and which said, as I recall : 'Pearl Harbor
attacked. This is no drill.' I immediately telephoned General Marshall at his
quarters at Fort Myer where he was having lunch and told him of the message.
He directed me to contact Hawaii if possible and verify the message. Before I
could do this another and more official message came, indicating the correctness of
the first message that had been received. General Marshall was in his office
within ten minutes after I telephoned him and after remaining in the office for a
short period he went to the White House where he stayed until about 4 : 00 P. M."
Miss Nason does not recall a particular chronological record of events having
been prepared or filed, but if the data I have furnished you here is not sufficient,
I suggest that you talk to her and perhaps she will recall what you have in mind.
These files of course are very precious from the historical ix)int of view and
I would appreciate it if you would return them to this office just as soon as you
have finished with them ; also that you do not release any information contained
in them until it has been cleared by the Chief of Staff.
(Initialed) JRD
J. R. Deank,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.
Incls.
Secret folder on Hawaii
Log— Cpy #1
Memo, to "Gen. WB Smith fr.
Gen. Surles 6/3/42
79716 O — 46 — pt. 14 3.3
1412 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 40
ca
CLASSIftO/ffZOIft
SiXnRST •> OOKFOEKTXAL - RESTRIOTI^
rmut oTsoAr
TOt OPNAV
IHFOt OtVO PAC
TCETBRSm^ NO.t 070645
MOMTHt PICO, XKAR^U^a^
LSARR mm 8DOAP0RS «S HAVE ASSORKD BRITAIN
ARMED SOPPORT UNDER THREE OR Ft}UR imilTUALZTIES X
HA7R REOWnr^) HO OORRraPOHDIHtt IKSTROCTIONS
TO? SEORET
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1413
EXHIBIT NO. 41
Information From Documentary Evidence on Messages No. D 901, 902, 907, 910
Note: Information based on documents in Navy files indicated by "(N)"; infor-
mation based on documents in Army files indicated by "(A)".
No. 901 (pilot message; Exbibit 1, p. 238)
Washington Time
Filed by the Japanese 8 :56 p. m. 6 Dec. Tokyo time ( A & N) 6 :56 a. m. 6 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S (Bain-
bridge I.sland, Washington) 121.5-1220 GMT 6 Dec (N)_ 7:15-7:20 a.m. 6 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N & A)
Teletype sheet ct)ntaining Japanese code received by Army
SIS from Navy (A) 12:05 p.m. 6 Dec
Decoded, translated and typed at Army SIS (A) 6 I>ec
No. 902 (14 part memo; Exhibit 1, pp. 239-45)
J'nit 1
Filed by theJapane.se 10:00 p. m. 6 Dec Tokyo time (N) 8:00 a. m. 6 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S ( Bain-
bridge Island, Washington) 1303-1310 GMT 6 Dec (N)_ 8:08-8:10 a.m. 6 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
Received in Japanese code in Navy Dept. 1649 GMT 6 I>ec (N) -_ 11 :49 a. m. 6 Dec
Decoded ' and typed up at Navy (N) 6 Dec
' All parts of the message were in English, so that translation was not required.
79716 O — 46 — nt. 14 S4
1414 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[2]
POf'* * Washington Time
Filed by the Japanese 10 : 30 p. m. 6 Dec. Tokyo time (N) __ 8 : 30 a. m. 6 Dec
Intercepted by Navy Station S 1337-1343 GMT
6 Dec (N) 8:37-8:43 a. ni. 6 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
Received in Japanese code in Navy Dept. 1649
GMT 6 Dec (N) 11:49 a. ni. 0 Dec
Decoded^ and typed up at Navy (N) 6 Dec
Part 3
Filed by the Japanese 10 : 40 p. m. 6 Dec. Tokyo time (N) __ 8 : 40 a. m. G Dec
Intercepte<l in Japanese code by Navv Station S
1349-1358 GMT 6 Dec (N) 8:49^8: 58 a. m. 6 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
Received in Japanese code in Navy Dept. 1649 GMT
6 Dec (N ) 11 : 49 a. m. 6 Dec
Decoded and typed up at Navy (N) 6 Dec
Part 4
Filed by the Japanese 11 : 55 p. m. 6 Dec Tokyo time (N) 9 : 55 a. m. 6 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S
1505-1520 GMT 6 Dec (N) 10:05-10: 20 a. m. 6 Dec
Teletyped in Japane.se code to Navy (N)
Received in Japanese code in Navy Dept. 1649
GMT 6 Dec (N) 11:45 a. m. 6 Dec
Decoded and typed up at Navy (N) 6 Dec
IS]
Part 5
Filed by the Japanese 11 : 59 p. m. 6 Dec Tokyo time (N) 9 : 59 a. m. 6 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,
1540-1546 GMT 6 Dec (N) 10: 40-10: 46 a. m. 6 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
Received in Japanese code in Navy Dept. 1951
GMT 6 Dec- (N) 2 : 51 p. m. 6 Dec
Decoded and typed up at Navy (N) 6 Dec
Part 6
Filed by the Japanese 12 : 30 a. m. 7 Dec Tokyo time (N) __ 10 : 30 a. m. 6 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,
1618-1624 GMT 6 Dec (N) 11 : 18-11 : 24 a. m. 6 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
Received in Japanese code in Navy Dept. 1951
GMT 6 Dec (N^ 2 : 51 p. ra. 6 Dec
Decoded and typed up at Navy (N)
Part 7
Filed by the Japanese 1 : 07 a. m. 7 Dec Tokyo time (N)— 11 : 07 a. m. 6 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,
1605-1618 GMT 6 Dec (N) 11 : 05-11 : 18 a. m. 6 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
Received in Japanese code in Navy Dept. 1951
GMT 6 Dec (N) 2 : 51 p. m. 6 Dec
Decoded and typed up at Navy (N)
Part 8
Filed by the Japanese 1 : 07 a. m. 7 Dec. Tokyo time (N) ___ 11 : 07 a. m. 6 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,
1640-1658 GMT 6 Dec (N) 11 : 40-11 : 58 a. m. 6 Dec
"Actually the decode was on the basis of a teletype from Navy Station N (Cheltenham,
Maryland), apparently received before teletype from Station S was received.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1415
Parts (Cont'd) Washington Time
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
Received in Japanese Code in Navy Dept. 1951
GMT 6 Dec (N) 2:51 p. ni. 6 Dec
Decoded and typed up at Navy (N) 6 Dec
Part 9
Filed by Japanese 11:55 p. ni. 6 Dec Tokyo time
(N) 9:55 a. ni. 6 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,
1530-1536 GMT 6 Dec 10:30-10:36 a. m. 6 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
Decoded by Army SIS (N)
Typed at Navy (N) 6 Dec
Part 10
Filed by Japanese 11 : 59 p. m. 6 Dec. Tokyo time
(N) 9:59 a. m. 6 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code l)y Navy Station S,
1517-1525 GMT 6 Dec (N) 10:17-10:25 6 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
Decoded by Army SIS (N)
Typed at Navy (N) C Dec
Part 11
Filed by the Japanese 12 : 31 a. m. 7 Dec Tokyo
time (N) 10:31 a. m. 6 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,
1607-1616 GMT 6 Dec (N) 11:07-11:16 a. m. 6 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
Received in Japanese code by Navy Dept. 1951
GMT 6 Dec (N) 2:51 p. m. 6 Dec
Decoded and typed by Navy (N) 6 Dec
[5]
Part 12
Filed by the Japanese 12 : 49 a. m. 7 Dec Tokyo
time (N) 10: 49 a. m. 6 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,
1600-1608 GMT 6 Dec (N) 11:00-11:08 a. m. 6 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N) .
Received in Japanese code by Navy Dept. 1951
GMT 6 Dec (N) 2 : 51 p. m. 6 Dec
Decoded and typed by Navy (N)
Part 13
Filed by the Japanese 1 : 25 a. m. 7 Dec. Tokyo
time (N) 11 : 25 a. m. 6 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,
1635-1652 GMT 6 Dec (N) 11:35-11:52 a. m. 6 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N).
Received in Japanese code by Navy Dept. 1951
GMT 6 Dec (N) ^__ 2:51 p. m. 6 Dec
Decoded and typed by Navy (N) 6 Dec
Part 14
Filed by the Japanese 4 : 88 p. m. 7 Dec Tokyo
time (N) 2 : 38 a. m. 7 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S,
0805-0810 GMT 7 Dec (N) 3:05-3:10 a. m. 7 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N)
Decoded and typed by Navy (N) 7 Dec.
1416 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
No. 907 (one o'clock message; p. 248 Exhibit 1)
Filed by the Japanese 6:18 p. m. 7 Dec. Tokyo Washington Time
time (N) 4 : 18 a. m. 7 Dec
Intereepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S
(Bainbridge Island, Washington) 0J)37 GMT 7
Dec (N) 4:37 a. ra. 7 Dec
[6] (Cont'd)
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (A)
Decoded by Navy (A)
Sent by Navy to Army SIS
Translated and typed by Army SIS on basis of Navy decode (A) 7 Dec
No. 910 (code destruction ; p. 249 Exhibit 1)
Filed by the Japanese 6 : 44 p. m. 7 Dec Tokyo time (N & A) 4 : 44 a. m. 7 Dec
Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S (Bainbridge
Island, Washington) 1007 (J MT 7 Dec (N) 5:07 a. m. 7 Dec
Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (A)
Decoded by Navy (A)
Sent by Navy to Army SIS
Translated and typed by Army SIS on basis of Navy decode (A) _ 7 Dec
EXHIBIT NO. 42
•AR 10-15
1-2
Army Regulations War Deipaetment,
No. 10-15 Washington, August 18, 1936.
GENERAL STAFF ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL DUTIES
Paragraphs
Sectiox I. War Department General Staff 1-13
II. General Staff with troops 14
Section I
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
Paragraph
Chief of Staff, general duties 1
Deputy Chief of Staff, general duties 2
Secretary, general duties 3
War Department General Staff, general duties 4
Communication ; general procedure 5
Issuance of instructions 6
Organization ; designations 7
Personnel Division, general duties s 8
Military Intelligence Division, general duties 9
Operations and Training Division, general duties 10
Supply Division, general duties 11
War Plans Division, general duties 12
The General Council 13
1. Chief of Staff, general duties. — a. General. — The Chief of Staff is the immedi-
ate adviser of the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the Military Estab-
lishment and is charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development,
and execution of the military program. He will cause the War Department
General Staflf to prepare the necessary pans for recruiting, mobilizing, organizing,
supplying, equipping, and training the Army of the United States for use in the
national defense and for demobilization. As the agent, and in the name of the
Secretary of War, he issues such orders as will insure that the plans of the War
Department are harmoniously executed by all agencies of the Military Establish-
ment, and that the military program is carried out speedily and efficiently.
*This pamphlet supersedes AR 10-15, November 25, 1921, including C5, July 2, 1927.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1417
[2] b. As Commanding General of the Field Forces.— The Chief of Staff
in addition to his duties as such, is, in peace, by direction of the President, the
Commanding General of the Field Forces and in that capacity directs the field
operations and the general training of the several armies, of the oversea forces,
and of GHQ units. He continues to exercise command of the field forces after
the outbreak of war until such time as the President shall have specifically desig-
nated a commanding general thereof.
■ 2. Deputy Chief of Staff, general duties.— a. The Deputy Chief of Staff will
assist the Chief of Staff and will act for him in the War Department in his
absence. The Deputy Chief of Staff will report directly to the Secretary of War
in all matters not involving the establishment of Important policies.
His office is charged with the preparations of plans and policies in connection
with legislation and with military estimates for funds; with processing budgetary
matters in the General Staff; with reports concerning legislation and requests
for legislation that come witliin the purview of The General Council or that are
referred to the General Staff; with public irhitions to include all forms of pub-
licity;^ and with such other duties as the Chief of Staff may prescribe.
b. In addition to his other duties the Deputy Chief of Staff is charged with su-
pervision over the activities of all the divisions of the War Department General
Staff.
3. Secretary, general duties. — The Secretary of the General Staff will maintain
an office of temporary record for the Chief of StalT and the Deputy Chief of Staff.
He will transmit to the proper destination in the War Department, all papers
emanating or returning from the Chief of Staff or the Deputy Chief of Staff.
Under the supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff, he will collect statistical
information of military importance for the Secretary of War and the Chief of
Staff.
4. War Department General Staff, general duties. — a. The War Department
General Staff is charged with the preparation in time of peace of the plans out-
lined in paragraph 1. In a national emergency it is charged with the creation
and maintenance of the necessary and proper forces for use in the field. To this
end it will, under the Chief of Staff, coordinate the development in peace and
war of the separate arms and services so as to insure the existence of a well-
balanced and efficient military team. Assisted by an appropriate number of
National Guard and Reserve officers (as prescribed in sec. 5, act June 3, 1916
(39 Stat. 167), as amended bv sec. 5, act June 4. 1920 (41 Stat. 763), as amended
by sec. 2. act June 15, 1933 (48 Stat. 153) (U. S. C. 10:38; sees. 1258 and 1339,
M. L., 1929)), it will formulate all policies and regulations affecting the organ-
ization, distribution, and training of the National Guard of the United States,
Officers' Reserve Corps and the Organized Reserves, and all policies and regula-
tions affecting the appointment, assignment, promotion, and discharge of Reserve
officers. It will perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by
law as may be from time to time prescribed by the President, and will render pro-
fessional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff.
• [3] b. The divisions and subdivisions of the War Department General Staff
will not engage in administrative duties for the performance of which an agency
exists, but will confine themselves to the preparation of plans and policies (par-
ticularly those concei-ning mobilization) and to the supervision of the execution
of such plans and policies as may be approved by the Secretary of War.
c. All divisions of the General Staff, and all other agencies in the military
service, are charged with the collection and transmission to The Adjutant Gen-
eral for the use of the historical section, Army War College, of such military
records and historical data as become available incident to their work.
5. Communication ; general procedure. — a. The chiefs of the several arms,
services, and bureaus of tlie War Department and of the several divisions of the
War Department General Staff, or of subdivisions thereof, are authorized and
expected to communicate informally" with each other concerning matters over
which they severally have supervision, fe«t fermal opinions ©f ^Pfee J«dge Adve-
«ft*e GcnGral ohouM fee obtained through 54ie A4j«%ftfl* GeneralT The Secretary
of War, Under Secretary of War, Assistant Secretary of M'ur, Chief of Staff, or
any Assistant Chief of Staff may directly request and receive an opinion of The
Judge Advocate General, but when such an opinion is requested by the chief of
an arm, service, or bureau of the War Department, the opinion when rendered
will be sent to The Adjutant General?
' WD Cir 81, 30 July 40.
» WD Cir 77, 19 Apr 41.
1418 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
b. Approved memoranda, or excerpts therefrom, establishing policies will, ex-
cept in highly confidential cases, be furnished by the chief of division of the War
Department General Staff charged with supervision over the activity covered by
the particular memorandum to The Adjutant General, who will furnish copies
to other interested arms, services, and bureaus.
c. When a case arises which is covered by an approved policy, the proper
office will take appropriate action on the case in accordance with the policy, and
it will not be referred to the War Department General Staff for decision except
in cases of unusual importance or when an exception to the established policy
appears desirable.
[4] d. Papers requiring General Staff action which reach the office of The
Adjutant General will be sent directly to the division of the War Department
General Staff concerned.
6. Issuance of instructions. — The Deputy Chief of Staff and the assistant
chiefs of staff, in charge of the divisions of the General Staff hereinafter pro-
vided for, are authorized on matters under their supervision to issue instructions
in the name of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff.
7. Organizations ; designations. — a. The War Department General Staff will
include the following divisions, each division being under the immediate control
of an assistant chief of staff:
(1) Personnel Division (First Division).
(2) Military Intelligence Division (Second Division).
(3) Operations and Training Division (Third Division).
(4) Supply Division (Fourth Division).
(5) War Plans Division.
b. For the first four divisions the abbreviations G-1, G-2, G-3, G-A, respect-
ively, are prescribed. The prescribed abbreviation for the War Plans Division
is WPD.
c. The chiefs of the several divisions of the War Department General Staff
will be designated as assistant chiefs of staff ; the prescribed abbreviations will
be A. C. of S. followed by the prescribed abbreviation of the division.
d. (1) The interior organization of each division will be prescribed by its
chief in such a way as to facilitate the performance of the functions assigned
and the easy transition from a peace to war status.
(2) The War Plans Division will, in the event of mobilization of General
Headquarters, be increased by one or more officers from each of the other
General Staff divisions, so as to enable it to furnish the nucleus of the General
Staff of the General Headquarters. The necessary General Staff personnel, in
addition to the above required for General Headquarters, will, insofar as
practicable, be obtained from personnel with General Staff experience and
personnel of the Army War College, which will upon mobilization temporarily
suspend its course. In carrying out the above provisions care will be taken
to insure that no disruption of the War Department General Staff, or of any
division thereof, occurs due to the excessive removal of personnel therefrom.
8. Personnel Division, general duties. — a. The Personnel Division is charged,
in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate
to the personnel of the Army as individuals.
[5] b. The Personnel Division is specifically charged with the preparation
of plans and policies and the supervision of activities concerning —
(1) The procurement, classification, assignment, promotion, pay," transfer,
retirement, and discharge, in peace and war, of all personnel of the Army of
the United State.s, including; the Regular Army, the National Guard, the Organized
Reserves, the Officers' Reserve Corps, and the Enlisted Reserve Corps.
(2) Measures for conserving man power.
(3) Replacements of personnel, in accordance with priorities formulated by
G-3.
(4) Army Regulations, uniform regulations, and such general regulations as
especially concern individuals or matters of routine not specifically assigned to
other sections.
(5) Decorations.
(6) Religious, recreational, and morale work (except that all programs of
time allotted will be arranged in agreement with (}-3).
(7) The Red Cross and similar agencies with the exception of such part or
parts of said agencies as may be wholly devoted to hospital and medical relief
work.
< C 2. 10 Oct 39.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1419
(8) Enemy aliens, prisoners of war, and conscientious objectors, including their
security.
(5) Mobilization of military police units as part of station complements for
local security^
c. The Personnel Division is further charged with furnishing G-4 with infor-
mation as to the amount and location of shelter necessary for activities under
its supervision.
d. The functions of the War Department General Staflf with reference to the
selection, assignment, etc., of General Stafif oflScers will be performed by the
Personnel Division, subject to the proviso that no officer will be assigned to, or
relieved from, either the War Department General Stafif or the General Stafif with
troops without the personal approval of the Chief of Staff or the Deputy Chief
of Stafif.
[6] 9. Military Intelligence Division, g;eneral duties. — a. The Military Intel-
ligence Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department
General Stafif which relate to the collection, evaluation and dissemination of
military information.
b. The Military Intelligence Division is specifically charged with the prepara-
tion of plans and policies and the supervision of all activities concerning —
(1) Military topographical surveys and maps, including their acquisition*
reproduction and distribution (except special situation maps prepared by G-3).
(2) The custody of the General Staflf War Department map a:«4 pbe^ograph
collection.'
(3) Military attaches, observers, and foreign-language students.
(4) Intelligence personnel of all units.
(5) Liaison with other intelligence agencies of the Government and with duly
accredited foreign military attaches and missions.
(6) Codes and ciphers.
(7) Translations.
^ OT X UUlll/ 1 L< P U I iUll») TT? TlJUXuU^ CCXl lUI llliS XTT UtlWiX^lvT • in^^ TTTT U^JU I \J\J ,
(9) Censorship in time of war.
(10) Safeguarding of military information.*
10. Operations and Training Division, general duties. — a. The Operations
and Training Division is charged, in general, with those duties of the War
Department General Stafif which relate to the organization, training, and opera-
tion of the military forces, and which are not hereinafter expressly assigned to
the War Plans Division.
b. The Operations and Training Division is spepifically charged with the prep-
aration of plans and policies and the supervision of activities concerning —
(1) Organization, including Tables of Organization, for all branches of the
Army of the United States.
[7] (2) Assignment of units to higher organizations.
(3) So much of Tables of Basic Allowances, Tables of Allowances, and Tables
of Equipment as relate to the allotment of major items of equipment to units and
the distribution of such items within units.
(4) Distribution and training, including educational and vocational training
of the Army of the United States, including the National Guard and Organized
Reserves ; location of units of the Regular Army and Organized Reserves.
(5) All training and tactical publications.
(6) The United States Military Academy; special service schools; The Com-
mand and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth. Kansas ; and The Army War
College.
(7) Military training in civilian institutions and in civilian training camps.
(8) Consultation with G-^ on types of equipment, and on major items such as
guns, rifles, tanks, etc., consultation with WPD.
(9) Priorities in assigning replacements and equipment, and important priori-
ties affecting mobilization.
(10) Movement of troops, to include those necessary in the execution of the
approved plan of strategical deployment prepared by the War Plans Division
(movements of supply, technical, and labor troops not employed as combat units
to be made on request of G-4).
»WD Clr 81. 30 July 40.
< C 2. 10 Oct 39.
» WD Cir 152, 31 July 41.
1420 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(11) Military police. Mobilization of military police units, zone of the interior^
(12) Tlie system of military publications.
(13) Maneuvers, command post exercises, terrain exercises, and staff rides,
including joint antiaircraft and air exercises and joint Army and Navy exercises.
{Exercises involving tests of war plans will be planned in collaboration tcith the
War Plans Division.)'^
11. Supply Division, general duties. — a. The Supply Division is charged, in
general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff which relate to
the supply of tlie Army.
b. The Supply Division is specifically charged with the duty of prepsiring basic
supply plans in such detail as will enable the several [8] supply arms and
services of the Ainiy to prepare detailed plans for the accomplishment of tlieir
several missions and with the adjustment of such basic plans to meet the chang-
ing military needs and the limitations of appropriations or procurement
possibilities.
In the development of the detailed plans the arms and services will request
decisions on military questions from the Supply Division, General Staff, and
decisions on business or industrial questions from the Assistant Secretary of
War.
c. The Supply Division is aLso charged with the preparation of plans and
policies and the supervision of activities concerning —
(1) Distribution, storage, and issue of supplies.
(2) Transportation by land and water, including ports of embarkation and
their necessary auxiliaries.
(3) Traffic control (the police of roads and routes to be ordered by G-3 on
plans formulated by G^).
(4) Tables of Basic Allowances, Tables of Allowances, and Tables of Equip-
ment, the quantities and types of military supplies required for the use of the
Army and essential to the military program, time and priorities of delivery
pertaining thereto, types and priorities to be determined in agreement with
G-3 and in the case of major items in consultation also with WPD ; Tables of
Basic Allowances, Tables of Allowances, and Tables of Elquipment to be in
agreement with G-3 insofar as concerns allotment and distribution of major
items.
(5) Inventions.
(6) Leasing of War Department facilities and issuing of revocable licenses.
(7) Hospitalization and evacuation of men and animal.s, including such
agencies or parts of agencies as may be wholly devoted to hospital and medical
relief work.
(8) Distribution and movement of supply, technical, and labor troops not
employed as combat units (orders for movements to be issued by G-3 on
request).
(9) Property responsibility and accountability.
d. The Supply Division is further charged, in coordination with other
divisions of the War Department General Staff, with the determination and
statement of plans and policies governing the preparation of estimates for
funds for military purposes and priorities pertaining thereto, and, when neces-
sary, with the restatement of such priorities to govern the expenditure of all
funds appropriated.
[9] e. The Supply Divi.sion is also charged with the formulation of
policies and projects governing —
(1) The procurement of real estate in connection with the training, shelter,
and housing of troops, and with the storage, distribution, and issue of supplies.
(2) The procurement (not involving procurement of real estate), con.struc-
tion, repair, maintenance, and disposition of buildings and all utilities connected
therewith (except insofar as relates solely to procurement).
12. War Plans Division, general duties. — a. The War Plans Division is
charged, in general, with those duties of the War Department General Staff
which relate to the formulation of plans for the use in the theater of war of the
military forces, separately or in conjunction with the naval forces, in the
national defense.
b. The War Plans Division is .specifically charged with the preparation of
plans and policies and the supervision of activities concerning —
(1) Location and armament of coast and land fortifications.
» WD Cir 152, 31 Julv 41.
« WD Cir 33. 28 Feb 41.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1421
(2) Estimate of forces required and times at which they may be needed
under the various possible conditions necessitating the use of troops in the
national defense.
(3) The initial strategical deployment (plans and orders for the movement
of troops to execute the initial deployment to be the duty of the Operations and
Training Division).
(4) Actual operations in the theater of war.
(5) Consultation with the Operations and Training Division and the Supply
Division on major items of equipment.
involving ««tte feigfeei' ihtm eta ftfiwyr jei«t Army ft«4 Navy excrciocQ, »«d cxor-
C13CQ lOVOiVHJg TJCoto Or Tnr lir pitUi".
13 The General Council. — a. Creation and function. — For the purpose of
periodically reviewing and proijerly coordinating all major War Department
projects, and passing on matters of current policy, there is hereby created under
the Chief of Staff, The General Council.
b. Composition.
(1) The General Council will be composed of the Deputy Chief of Staff, who
will be president of The General Council, the [10] assistant chiefs of
staff, and the executive officer of the Assistant Secretary of War.
(2) The Adjutant General, the chiefs of arms and other .services, the Com-
mandant of the Army War College, the Chief of tiie National Guard Bureau,
and the Executive for Reserve Affairs, Office of the Chief of Staff will be
directed to sit as members of The General Council during the discussion of any
important subject bearing upon their individual responsibilities. They may
elect to sit during the discussion of any imijortant subject in which they are
interested.
c. Secretary ; records. — The Secretary of the General Staff will act as secre-
tary for The General Council. No reciuds will be kept except those necessary
to record dates of meetings, otlicers present, questions cimsidered, and action
taken. In the absence of the Deputy Chief of Staff, the senior assistant chief
of staff present will preside.
d. Recommendations. — The General Council will report its recommendations
to the Chief of Staff.
e. Relations with the War Council. — When important matters of General
Staff policy are brought before The War Council, the Chief of Staff will present
the recommendations of The General Council thereon.
Section II
General Staff With Tboops
Paragraph
Organization ; distribution of duties 14
14. Organization; distribution of duties. — {As chipujeil by C /, April 16, 1938.)*
The general staff at each headquarters will be organized into four divioieas
sections.* The duties performed by these diviei««e sections * will be similar
to those performed by the first four divisions of the War Department General
Staff and are prescribed in Staff Officers' Field Manual, -Pa** Ofter' For war
planning, see AR 160-10. Mobilization planning is a function of the General
Staff general staff * as a whole and not of any particular divieion section * thereof.
[A. G. 320.2 (5-25-36).]
By order of the Secretary of War :
Malin Craig,
Official: Chief of Staff.
E. T. CONLEY,
Major Oenei'al,
The Adjutant General.
*C 2, 10 Oct 39.
• WD Cir 33, 28 Feb 41.
1422 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 43
Serial 011512-3 27-1-41 Secret
Statement by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff
1. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army of the
United States are aware of tlie advantages that will accrue to both nations
in the prosecution of any war in which the United States and the British Com-
monwealth may participate as associates, should tentative understandings be
reached in advance concerning military cooperation. Therefore, they have pre-
pared this statement in the hope that it will clear the way for the discussions
which are to follow.
2. As understood by these two officers, the purpose of these staff conversa-
tions is to determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United
States and the British Commonwealth can defeat Germany and ihe powers
allied with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war.
3. The American people as a whole desire now to remain out of war, and
to provide only material and economic aid to Great Britain. So long as this
attitude is maintained, it must be supported by their responsible military and
naval authorities. Therefore, no specific commitments can now be made except
as to technical methods of cooperation. Military plans which may be envisaged
must, for the present, remain contingent upon the future political action of both
nations. All such plans are subject to eventual official approval by the two
Governments.
4. The present national position of the United States is as follows :
(a) A fundamental principle of United States policy is that the Western
Hemisphere remain secure against the extension in it of non-American military
and political control.
(6) The United States has adopted the policy of affording material and diplo-
matic assistance to the British Commonwealth in that nation's war against
Germany.
(c) The United States by diplomatic means has opposed any extension of
Japanese rule over additional territory.
5. If the United States Government decides to make war in common with the
British Commonwealth, it is the present view of the Chief of Naval Operations and
the Chief of Staff that :
(a) The broad military objective of United States operations will be the defeat
of Germany and her allies, but the United States necessarily nmst also maintain
dispositions which, under all eventualities, will prevent the extension in the
Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic political and military power.
(b) The objective of the war will be most effectively attained by the United
States exerting its principal military effort in the Atlantic or navally in the
Mediterranean regions.
(c) The United States and British Commonwealth should endeavor to keep
Japan from entering the war or from attacking the Dutch.
(d) Should Japan enter the war. United States' operations in the mid-Pacific
and the Far East would be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate the exertion
of its principal military effort in the Atlantic or navally in the Mediterranean.
(e) As a general rule. United States forces should operate in their own areas of
responsibility, under their own commanders, and in accordance with plans derived
from United States-British joint plans.
(f ) The United States will continue to furnish material aid to Great Britain,
but will retain for building up its own forces material in such proportion as to
provide for future security and best to effectuate United States-British joint plans
for defeating Germany.
6. The scope of the staff conversations should preferably cover the examination
of those military efforts which will contribute most directly to the defeat of
Germany. As a preliminary to military cooperation, tentative agreements should
be reached concerning the allocation of the principal areas of responsibility, the
major lines of the military strategy to be pursued by both nations, the strength of
the forces which each may be able to commit, and the determination of satisfactory
command arrangements, both as to supreme control, and as to unity of field
command in cases of strategic or tactical joint operations. Staff conversations
should also include an examination into the present military situations of the
United States and the British Commonwealth, and also into the probable situations
that might result from the loss of the British Isles.
7. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff would appreciate it if
the British Staff Representatives could furnish the United States Staff Represen-
tatives with an estimate of the military situation of the British Commonwealth as
a preliminary to the staff discussions.
rnriTT Kr. 01 nf 9?i OPS /I SI ."^0-149
BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
, lllllllllllliil
3 9999 06314 028 7
Live Music Archive
Librivox Free Audio
Metropolitan Museum
Cleveland Museum of Art
Internet Arcade
Console Living Room
Books to Borrow
Open Library
TV News
Understanding 9/11