rF
t
, S. i-KNo . K
Given By
\— ' 1 V [^ 1 N l_l I Jk
^
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMIHEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAEL HAEBOE ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con, Res, 27
(79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 15
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 44 THROUGH 87
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
\
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
/c.JOraT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAEL HAKBOR ATTACK
CONGKESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
(79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON I'EARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 15
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 44 THROUGH 87
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946
^ ^- ■^•-' A s
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLBT, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER. Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Mlchi- tive from California
gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin -^
North Carolina J^^ 7 (e']
.A5
Gerhabd a. Gesbll, ChieJ Assistant Counsel . /^
JULE M. Hannafobd, Ansistant Counsel "yo^^ •
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel .
(After January 14, 1946) L^C^-^iA^ <^
Skth W. Richardson, General Counsel
Samdel H. KAcrMAN, Associate General Counsel
JOHN E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel
LOOAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel
COUNSEL
(Through January 14, 1946)
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel
HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Pari
No.
Pages
Transcript
pages
B
1
1- 399
1- 1058
Nov
. 15, 16, 17, 19,
2
401- 982
1059- 2586
Nov
. 23, 24, 26 to
3
983-1583
2587- 4194
Dec.
5, 6, 7, 8, 10,
4
1585-2063
4195- 5460
Dec.
14, 15, 17, 18,
5
2065-2492
5461- 6646
Dec.
31, 1945, and
6
2493-2920
6647- 7888
Jan.
15, 16, 17, 18,
7
2921-3378
7889- 9107
Jan.
22, 23, 24, 25,
8
3379-3927
910^10517
Jan.
30, 31, Feb. 1
9
392^-4599
10518-12277
Feb.
7, 8, 9, 11, 12,
10
4601-5151
12278-13708
Feb.
15, 16, 18, 19,
11
5153-5560
13709-14765
Apr.
9 and 11, and
Hearings
, 20, and 21, 1945.
30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
11, 12, and 13, 1945.
, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
Jan. 2, 3. 4, and 5, 1946.
19, and 21, 1946.
26, 28, and 29, 1946.
, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
, 13, and 14, 1946.
, and 20, 1946.
Mav23 and 31. 1946.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
Xo.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22 through 25
26
27 through 31
32 through 33
34
35
36 through 38
39
Exhibits Nos.
1 through 6.
7 and 8.
9 through 43.
44 through 87.
88 through 1 10.
HI through 128.
129 through 156.
157 through 172.
173 through 179.
180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
Roberts Commission Proceedings.
Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
H
PQ
I— I
(^
O
Q
a:
■75 -^
^ 2
.2 r.
h.
1
03
c
^•0
cc
c
cc
C
cc
C
C
03
C
o
'S
e3
Ph
u
03
03
C
03
03
03
03
cc
03
-J3
"5.
03
03
«5
"H.
03
cc
03
c
03
a
e3
a
03
1
08
a
03
1
u
o
5
03
2
.22
i\ ^
1
•-5
>
■" a:
t—
^
2
"bc
X u
e3
-►i
+s
+3
o
O
1%
"0
5
1—1
11
03 I-
03
03
c
03
u
b£
c
1
fc£
be
03
U
03
2
c -*^
03 C
>-.
'-3
5
03
C
_2
"o
^'
£
03
512
s
c
05
•£
A
a
s
-a
<!
i- 2
_g
'■3
08
£_
S3
u —
cc 03
03 CC
a3
• 03
**- -tJ
u
03
03
(1
(.
03
■4-3
O
a
■c
>.
Si
>
1 .
0) .--
C
4J .
bCC
03 ^
oj.ti
'Jl — •
ii
bC
«
>
6
03
G
»3
,13
S3
s
C
c3
a£
t
>, 03
1|
^ i
£ >
C •-
.2ffl
Si
H
-1-3
«2
o"
>>
c
s
Si
t
<
03
c
03
§00;
C C
T3
-2
-0
CO
IN
(N
03
C
03
tc
2
of
_fl3
bC
a
cc"
—
2S
X
03::
>
Id
1
03
03
Is
b.
03
c
03
XT.
0) ■*
re
(N
6
a:
'0
C
S
s
■^
K
03
>
■3
c8
u
l>
03
C
.2
6C
cc"
03
"O o3
s
2
.£•0
C
"S «
oS
-J
«
5 M
ro «..,■"
Sd .
«^ OJ
c 2 £
«« W5 0)
-tf hC
egg
•2 So
08 a;
^ r
»3 «
^ 1:
^
a;
-3 Sf
t^ _
(S
^ bC
>. c
tsC
a
bC
^-
5
-c
g
5
T3
C
_o
"S.
g
c
03
g
03
-«^
03
73
03
>
2
gt
S..2
^£
>, aT
bC
« c
cc-S fs
•1°
(N o3
0x2
-a g
«-
cT
(N
>
Is
13
1
t
08
-1-3
u
Si
"E
c8
"£
«-'
1-^ S
03
>
c8
'S.
Sec
_C
>
2
o<3«
Oh
1"
a
03
<M
03'*-'
•§
^
-*
t^
00
00
t^
^
_
cc
iC
■«*<
'■2 So
iC
1-H
*wi
cc
01
F^
1— 1
<N
laz
H
(M
CO
M
CO
CO
CO
cc
'^
■*
■*
|2
B <a S
10
iC
u:i
10
iC
10
IC
ic'
iC
"5
10
■*
Tt-
■^
^
'^
■*
■*
■*
■*
■*
■*
1
1
1
CD
^i
2
12
2
gi
«2
IN
i
O5 00
ts. .— 1
O5 00
t^— 1
■cco
1
1
1
'^ 1
1
I
■^ 1
1
1
1
'"' J,
tag
T-H
^
-H
<N
IN
c^
d
s
ic
<
«'
6
J,
(N
CC
•*
iC
cc'
l>
00
at
ci
ok
VI
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
c
<s
a
Irs
o
o
O
O
g
o
2-^
08
en'-'
S 0!
c o
•b o
«•
«
03
■t-5 —
«<- o S
O *s (D
to — Jj
a; e8 CI
C O
OJ C 0)
• S § "IJ
-r) -»J ^
081^
"Sis
OJ 1— I 05
>> 05 '^
■^ S 03
«- *- S
03 03 2J
O -
c2
o
1^
05 o3
§ 3
08 x:
fcH be
_ o
O 43
-tJ
c^
03
Do
g ^~"
P- - -
»-i o C t-
- >.03.S■
C- 03
^" o t-
S S a>
o3 (-,
0) 03 o8
tf
-His
Oi »- ,o
. 3 C
> o o
Z o8 3
TJ C "^
0^ o -»^
"(^ o
45 «3 ?^
- 03 ■*^
tn "O C
03 O
i: M)W
3 c ^
oc .3 T3
^ c S
O *H W
C y -.
J= O bc
,2 i^jO* -C
t>. 3
SS C ,1^
03 2
o
o
■<1^
+i
o:
J^
f-H
OJ
>
CO
03
"—I
03
X
-tJ
o.s
^ c8
3 ^
2 S^
(J3 X!
3 bC'
3 t-
o3X
o
.<
A 08
S m
O C
?o
08
^ o
o
S ^ ^•
^ o >
Bug
03 c o>
w — « -;
03 '^ C ^
-l-s 05 03 05
« 3
03^
T3-
■<* 03
:= D
08 3
rH 03 ^
.3hH 83
3 W
.2 i2_-
■2 ^ 08
3 fe S
2 w be
Ojffi X
o *S
" 03 S
>,c S
•rt aj o
3OO
aj 03 c8<,
^^ 3 S3
-^ C O?
0,^0
§25: -2
S f^
■*■=' tvT '5^_
(- ^ cc -O
03 • 3 3
S^-?^ 03
03 03 '5',
5 o ^ £
S t- 2 o
•3 03 -t^fc
- ^^ e
£-3' M 03
O 3 ^ OJ
+-<- .3 03
C -t, O CQ
o^„
= € o ^
•*
5
rt 03
^ bC
03 3
o S
bC i-
■* 3 3
^ .h 03 03
■.*< - O u
-^ — X o3
03 S X .'3 ^
03 ^ ? >
"n 3 0; 2 98
03 03 03 w ►t'
03
■v44 ^^
2S2-a
(N giNX
.03 -.t:
080^
|-^ 1-5 03
S > 03 3
-S iS -^ O
58 t^ 08 fc.
ro
03
-ti «(-( o3 .
^ 03 GC
+J '3 02
c 3 03
- o >■
3 t.
03"^
O t-
X2 O
08^
W
S2
. £ 08
^ -H> 43
0|3^
_^ O 3
CO^ O
>. « O V
> - bC
03
o
> a
. bT3 t:
^ 3 '^ S
X S+^~03
<v ..S ^
:2.^2
2 > -3
5 O «<r; o3
5 s'S
a".'
w 03
3 03
Xfo 3
> g.«
o . 3
08
5
c^
»
tasg
a 0! 3
•CO"*
«o
CO A
^§2
^7
CO I
CO I
W
Q
ok
' eo
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
vn
05.2
O
73 03 dj
aa ^
^
c
o
>
o
-13 U
■ ■ a
S °
aj CO
■302 55 -g
Ot3 ^ £
O! S O s3
a|HS
S 2 S 2
i« = l
C a> c S
«0:S «^
^■^^.^
>
o
T3rg
*^ o
ss
o
t1 >
<*- t.
e8
O t-
c "^ .
_ -^
o
3i^
^ 03
> o
O +J
-o p,
bCM
c3 .,
a; d?
H
3 o
«^
> 05
C'^
■^ s3
45 -*^
U 03
05
^i ^
01 OB
O D-
a«
o "^
.« o
o »-
. 05
s s
73 o
05 *i
-I
c o
03 «-
"2
"S «*-
a o
IS o5
9-^
"00 Ci.V.
I- ^ ao o
»:
05
^ 2P
^ e3
Ph "^
O; 05
•^ £
O 05
^ O
' o
W
a
08 c
-*^ oJ
05 "*
tH -
CO g
>>!
"Srt 2-
fa >
3 o
05 C
. ^
O 05
ZfL,
T3 C5
12
S £
C bC
g 03
C a:
C 05
a
05 05
"73
05^
a; U
? G
fl .-^ (N ^ 3
05
><-! C
S (-' o
:;^-t3 ^ <N .te
C 03 C • C
05 K o > 3
C o3 «- °— ,
"<■< 3 05 c
J S ^ p 03
■Sm %^. ^
C^ 05 'c »
O 3^ o3 05
° ^.-^ ^- i
1^ is^ 3 a
" "goo
o3 U
, 05 ,■ 03 • JS
'" "^ 05 1-^ -S
S2:'SP^
^2 Cog
So-: -
>^a2 05
^Z g O §
«5-5 i-2^
-c S £ c
*> c 1, S ^
Q.2 Sec £
-t^ 3 05
-e o3-C 3 o
5 £ c o S
4^ !r /* i^ o
- w c
^>2
. - 1, ^
iC O 3
•~r-*ns 05
3 ^ a; •-"
S 35 05
O "^ -, -^
os^ =
''^ 05 05
05 r; 3 05
^2;o5§
^--•^ 3
033 -^^ 05
^5 o ■
CD X -»^
C\! c
ra ^j ->j ^— ,
« 05 03 «
3 05 3 3
log-
05 « 05 -H- t-
w'3 c ag .
il G rt^ »
.^ 3-^ "^W
o ^"-C ^
C +S ^ ■— " -a
O 05
S 05T3 >
d ^ 0) >
2 05 M O
St: 033
"^ o o <*.
a3 O;^
rH—'^ 3
-H 05 ^ g •
mOh-h g_o;
3 OJ -^ ^
<; ^ in fc."3
■*^ >— ' o3 .3
':3'<-"< 05 g
^ cc -f^ .3
+i £,T3 iSJ"
.22 "£2 t^
.^ 5 ^ SfCQ
fc. 1? t- 3_,
PQHQ 2^
^ .Q 03
O 05
05
■— I 05 -4J
05 - — :3 __
'-' JSO
_H 05 WJ
S 05'-'
i 05! w)
7, 3 S 3
la.^-5
^5^3
^02-^^ o
^-•"'-^ 05
O i3 ■* 05
»— ' 05 I
Tj< Z± 05
CO o
S^3.^
o3 ^ M
03 T3
1-5 oS
oc
^•2 -
^ ^ 05 S
*^ 03 3
o3 05 +i «
T3 gCC^
- ST3-05
33 rv+s 05
-ts 05 03
i^^ O 05
■^B.og
.2 IS 05 05
g^p^a
Pi
^
tv
^
ec
■*!
^_^
?o
;d
«
•5
tfl
t^
00
00
00
c^
■*
iC
«
«
C<l
(N
(N
N
""*
^^
'^
"*
1— 1
""^
l«
" 1—1
^ 1
iC
iC
10
iC
»o
ic Hi
•<*<
o>2
■*
•^
■*
-t
■*
"*
■* •*
-7
§c4
57
57
-7
^7
1694
2-15-
2065
2-31-
^^
' '
"
'^
"
ft 1-H
I
VIII
IXDEX OF EXHIBITS
3 «
li
^^
-.^ «::
5s.2
C 53 t-
.X— - c
?x: o
£ PO
c J;
oO «
« u if
o ■*; S
^ '^ •—
OJ
Qi C
>-c
-r ^
o X
xn
t-.
|i
b>
^ "^ ^
05 2 q
^ 5
-2 °"
2 ii
1^
^5
•e
= s c
o '-' "■
i; S K
M 5.5
c ^ a
X p -is — 0- k-J
o3 t. >
-CO
= ^1
O s5 s3
a5< a
5 -C-r
-is 5 (S
02 s
c-
c *i
.2 '^
«.2
> -ki
8 ^
'^ c
bcSa-
S ferO
. C
> 03
e S tc
5 Sr 5:^
w a> J/
= c c
£ o o
3^ S § S
C bc.^ ->^ w — ; ^
03
"C
"^
C3
■r.
CJ
"1
03
"fl
a;
<
lis
.SOD C
"^ C a:
O a:
,rZ °
^ <-( y^
-►^ X"
<^ -tf c
w I ,^^
o3H ■*
■*^ 05
^0 1
O d «3
^ -i-s S3
S'^ "
^ >.-
r.
o3 **" c;
^ o^
c ^ ,^
"< S o
o:
c
!= C-i
««- O u o s
•^ ^ ^ - 03
-S O . 2
:« *^ "t; -^
o3"^'>Tf
02 *? -t:
C O
o~~'
03 "S
o
EC • —
4= tS
022
03
a
o
5
a;
-t^
Q
«
c
o
o
2
3
o" .
e
T3
J.!J=
O «
•-
c
Hi;i
^
H^
.a
05
* ^
a) "O
1
•^
»-»
1—1
05
05
1
o- '4'
ec
1c
2 ai
1
-co
>.Q0
5? u
w
o o>
X! br
Ph
■.C '"'
5c CO
=2s
ST 03
■S.2
fe -
02 02
aj o
JM ^
^^
03
a
03
1-5
•m o
O (N
T. C
c o
■1-2 o3
03 "'
t; nS -t^
x: is
-<■= w
o3 c
a, c;
1^
gco
c£o2
3
U
02
-O
C
03
C
o
O
J2
• — S»_:s.o' raw g
03
5|6
05
iC
C<l
©
o
,_<
CO
10
10
iC
10
;o
r^
05
^
o
o
o
1—4
»— (
t-H
f-H
(N
C<J
CO
CO
CO
CO
CO
CO
CO
CO
|£
lO
iC
iC
lO
lO
^
lO
10
iC
kc
iC
O.C
•*
•*
■*
■>*
•*
Tf<
■*
■*
■*
>*
■*
Pi
00 00
'^ J
CO 1
00 00
-^ 1
«00
^7
^7
£5^
^^^
S7
i^
i^
SS5
i?
S-o
M
c^
(M
^
I-H
"—I
.—1
w§
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
IX
03
'■V o%
a;
■tJ C 02
03 0) <U
■*^ S C
50 5 §
T3 S a
So*
« o3
>; 'n -o
(N 03 —
o **
♦s C «
0-* 2
£ 2 £
x *^ o
« o c
2 ?;
S O) u
^§ =
V
M o J3
• S±
w c «
a; Cx:
S c of
2 S32
■e a^
S3 o ,— T
c, ^
« +J a;
lie
is g
M s «
03 Cg
03 03^^
c"^ -^ 2
2 ^T3-=
&-^ ^-p
a; c -^
i; " &-^
5^ aJ^ 2
C oS^ «
aj a: aj o3
a; cc _c +^
^ 2^-S
bC t-'S -
eS aj t 5
a) o u v>_
fl i3 «3 O
§-§21
o 3 a) T;
"aj
33 2
o c
IS o
?T «;
'-' a
-ex
->^
■^ 03
2 t
o g
■ c
o aj
I i- -T
u
c
>
o
x;
•»
n
T1
fi;
0l
-s
a
S3
(-1 ^
On o;
C'-
.2 ■*
bcC
bC
05 _C
(N aj
+i -
Og
TO O
« • r;
**
T3 aj
-Pi
s =
S 'E
o3 a;
o c
Q<
2 i
o 5
^*
•E >
a> "^
o o
*!C
1:^ 08
CC O
bC
bt >-
C 03
C Oh
c
O 3
£ O
C >i
h5. W
c -^
a> a^
^^
bh??.
■C ^
CQ S
>.-a
^ aj
oTt-
« -
Sa;
3 «
-C C
C 03
03 0<
I" s3
4J O
>i X
^ O
a;.-
a _r C (N 1,
CO t^
4^
03 t
-C.2
T) 03
oW
1°
O O
« -
^ OS S
„^ X
03 -»^ n-
2g^
"^ X t-
^ OS tM
05 C ec
= 2«
O o «
bc— 9^
X s^-'
X '^
a> -
X C o
X C 33
;- S b
03 ^ a;
>5 ?^ C
«* C 0)
s a) ^
ai '^ ^
<*- X . —
+i "^ X
«»-< — c
So*
O o' 03
X o3 x:
O t- -k^
° o. £
■^^
>, a)
^ X
ajt=
a .
X
s =
o a;
- 3
■* O
05 T3
i< 05
= * ^
« c
rf °
a"
1°
aj
OX!
r; o3
O^
■-5 aj
tj a?
o9 a;
^ o
a; «
bfx
X ^
S°
O.S
* s
O.QJ
oS ^
a>
a;
XX
UU
.1^
c
oj
(ji
■^
OB
^<:
bC bC
•S.S
u a
<<
rt 3
.X
CM
a; .
CO ^^
>>P5m
2^ -k^ aj
202 C
_ aj
• aJ -
o C >>
4) gj <-i
GO-3
•« ^-H
o >.3
X I; ^
C QJ »
0) t. OJ
> « c
-^ s
o^-Q
^cci
o c"^
a? o
o — I ^
:6
o
oJO
go!*
§GCCC!
C «-i <t-i
OJ o o
fe c
<.2
ex)
U o
^ a)
. 3
aj ''"
Q-J
-C E
^PQ
08 O
w 2
* a
.2 «
aj-a
00 o
X
2 c
C *
^^
S*
* tc
O. a;
*£
0)
bC >
C;3
•^ 0)
08 73
1^
C o
* O
-a"o
OJ^
h^i *''
¥ bO
~ 08
i X
o a;
a; B
T3^
. <-i
C *
o o<
o,^
« ►
a ^
.5 X
- a)
o ^
2 —
5 o.
St3
>iJ
"•3
ho
X _c
s E5
3 OS
a)
Q ^
T)0 §
_, OS X
£ >2
oN S
t- o
**-05 C
c -o
oz;'-5
^ 2
c
«
«o
"*
»o
OS
o
cc
lO
OS
OS
C<J
cc
w
cc
00
00
OS
OS
OS
o
^
^H
T— 1
CO
cc
cc
cc
ec
cc
ec
cc
■<t<
■*
•*
•*
lO
lO
lO
lO
iC
iO
lO
lO
»c
ITS
iCi
Tj*
■>*
■<*'
■*
Tf
■*
■*
■*
■*
•^
?2^
t^7
?2^
OS I— <
oec
(N 1
00 ^■'
i^
si
i^
00 1
OS 1
OS 1
^7
1—1
c^
c*
M
"
I— 1
"
"
"
1— 1
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
3
<! =
US?
=9
bC
a; I
<! S
O
0)
a cs
"I
•ji
ss
•^^
15.2
o o
2 >
O C
- a
^
.2 X
« 5
OS 45
S o
.20D
2J
CO '3
■SSf
I'
«_«
- o
:: u
5 X
3 E
**« S
'S, 45
o 2£
a> DC o
O «T3
'I'M
O
O D
^5
a 3
05 o
O o
. +i
bC cc
"C a5
«^
^ '^■
z^ ^■
Si 05
-s
« C
-^ O
3aQ
5 »-
So a:
OS
t
o
S 08 o8<S Q
^ S3 ^ W 05
o^o ^i.S Stf
•^-"^ ^S 2^
C 3 *5 . S °
^ o8 "S bc tc *°
cO > e ^ t£
"S 05 ^ cO
■£ S3 d s .
n
o
-H O
, 00 *f
. T3 .2 ;
> OJ^
>2
o
05 -^
•S 3
a o
o «-
&4
.S .2 Tt< « .
C13 0S ,, bC*i
Ih <— I 05 r; o
05 bC W-S^^
05 >Tlh5 -«
gir^ « «3 tf
iS X! =c O O t^
-*j:= 05 £; 5-
aj fl, 3 05 00 S
Cl 05 05 .3 S X
3
02
J
O
n
OD
^ o
o
a
a
4
o
a
OS
bC
3
P3
3
Q
c
03
O
o»
2 ^
10 us
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
XI
o
a
s
o
o
>
<
to
c o
•FN ^
o
S
C
08
O
sS
-^rf!
01
PQ
Q
~ a?
•e-^
>>
►-S
'r^^
a
V
O.C
JS
v
u
H
rt--5
u
<*i
^^>
+»
5
£
22 c
:gj^
c
a.c
^
^■^
10
eo
t^
«
,
e^
10
<o
,_
■<t
00
O)
N
C^
w
eo
ec
ec
eo
•t
■<f
■<»<
iC
10
«o
C:
«
«
:o
«
«5
iO
-.0
CO
t%>i c^i c^T r-T r-i fT r^] 007
gci §^ g-i §;| §^ g,i g^ «^
'-ci* '-^cSi -^c!j ^(^ '^ck ^(^ -^(N -^eii
10
-c^ -c^ -c^ -c!,
XII
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
t
a
O
OQ
Sep
o ^
5 c
•lE
03 U
O -u>
C
II
Id u
u- C
5 o
«<-< I- 1,
-so
^^ 03
^ o
CO C QJ
1< c
^ 1^
o> (^
rl C
CD «
« -
S c.
C
o3 O
E^
CJ o
£ «>
c o
>8
Z c
a.--s .
o « £
-^ 03
fc-S ^
.e t^ -**
pd
3^ >
go a
O &e8
gC/J.OD
-*^ iSi ^J 'Z.
— *- o
c «
. o3 S
0) r 03
T3^ O
* . 6C
to-OCs
c
I CC
O «
1-5 fC
O 03
E ^,
c ^ _ -/J
2 S E
■^flr ^ >
SPho •-
►-5 «8 CLi
E t^ s "
— «
^ *^ o
■Ss
u
03 Si -5
X ^ ^
S 2i£
w 5 = ^
025
• 03
co-c
CO .5
. 03
O
bCo
O
bC
C
0.
bC
o =
> O
0) u
CC o
Ot3
05 CC
^ 03
^ E
P 4)
Pl, «
c 5
H-1 "^
rr;^
x: o
bcg
I
U CC
c3 V
a
OJ
03
o3
O
bC-tJ
.E CC
O CJ
3"^
E 5-2^
O
u •
CC "^
-2<N
■< bo
E =
03 «
il
-'E
2£
iii-?^ i2 o
(N
CC
uiJ O
bC
3 b.
^
"C o3
'^^ •
CJ ^ CJ
«£l
" So
«> 5 e
■£'S aJ
<:h o
u
03 S
bc.O
o3 -»J
- 3 O
O O 3
o ?^ S
>bC^
^ o3 0)
« C-fi
t to r-
o « g
^ 03
CO t*_, ^
o3 005
s ^ -
0«*- 0)
*> Ox
-^ c-*^
C O «4-l
0^ "^ O
%9, E
oT^ J
«S 03 -^
Mia, 1^
^j= u
ii r» ^
E-Sg.
T)
u
<D
^
w
C
B
OJS
a
03
02
-4^
">
c
-►^ _, CC "^
bC O ! <C «; S,
g £ g ^ ^- oj Sg
O 3 S-c- 3
g-S^ §•■= « c ^
03^ « 2 03 2
^^cc.a-ao
Els
03— S
s
v
:o^-o.2.
T* - o3
OS C
03
o3g
T3
3 a?->
03;
a
03
C C
03 -e c
.be-- W)C
^H 3 O 03 4)
bc^ r § 5 - c -
03 2: i §- o S ss
O 08^
fe as?
03 —
T) a«*- O -*3 rv «f ■"
3«.t?|a2H_g o
Q H
rt<
"* I
^ CO
U5-H
^ I
CVI
'- I -Hi
«0 I
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
xin
« -5
^ ■ — ^
Oh ^
S3
C
03
83
> X
33 «
2
"5£
O
b£r-l
c
00 HH 1
S3 V
> OJ
oSQ
O S3
o
a
<
>
33
5 "i^® «"
o
>
2
o
3
^.£
o|
- - 03
.£-*
c^
+3 -
. <N aj
Oh - 3
00 * c
.-H O. M
w *
Si- 03
03 >«
^ c o
■<t o o
'^ -^ -tJ
a:
O
o
Eh
g.S o
T3S|
t> a; C
tlC 03 03
^-O o
03 s3 -»^
O o
c 5
to
■*
""f
t^
00
O
■*
t^
■«f
?o
l^
CO
■*
Tt*
lO
»o
<©
r^
t^
CO
(O
<©
«
1—1
1—1
t*
1—1
t^
1>
t^
l>
00
00
1— 1
00
00
kC
00 '7'
C^ 1
iO
lO
U5
lO
iC
iC
lO
lO
lO
»o
^
•<*
Tf
Tj«
Tt<
•<*<
■*
rf
•>»<
■«1<
Tf<
ow
0"5
O^C
^J.
■* 1
■* 1
■* 1
■* 1
C<lt^
00 1
>« 1
t»T-l
!>,-<
t^r-l
t^r-i
t>-^
t^^
^7
'^'T
t- w
|>-H
ts.^
-c^
-<
1-1 1
^ 1
1-H 1
^ 1
—1
-H 1
^
rH
(N
M
<N
C^
ca
Cfl
ea
C^
C4
I— 1
"
"
i-<
1—1
od
XIV
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
Si
O
bC
'C
3
T3
C
a.
i-s
bC
C
e3
> .
o
C CO
^Q
Q
5
^ -
nr
c*
OS'S
*r 03
1 =
U
il
1:? S -S--
■fit-"
o3 :3
CO
05 -
oc
»0 o3
^ a
3
"C'S
^ (A
C 03
2 «=
3
bC
C
-< a;
5 -^
O V
CC 3
T3 O
6003 2
*-^ c
O W o
c j3 a.
x; ^
■so
bC ^
c 0.2
SQ
3 S
v 03
-IE
O *
"^
cr
.2"*
St a "
5 :^ "Sr^
-- "t= 08 oS
08 o3
bc ^
»=^
0.5
u
■ -^
>>'5
XJ bC
I-
a; v-
aQ
c.2i
03 ^
%t
-t> "-I
C0t3
E'l
« 3
««
Is
o3 C
W) o8 „
«5 C «
y .-I bC
'E 4i 01
^ ** c
03 .S'S
(-1 •'" 00
T; 0( o>
« S c
a. 01 o
G g 5
Oi -
O C
o «a
H 0-
^1
n
CSI «;
OS O
—< U
CM C
2c
"" .^ ^ S
« «
03
O ^
03
o t- S
r; O a
— so
» 01
^ fl bO
2 c's
lU o
^ E 2
U 0) .3
03 c'C
a© c
2 o 03
Q
feci
..2 -^s
Tfl S O
dJ 03 o
03 03 ^
-^ a
o3 a) 00
a© c
.2+^ o3
O C
03
1^
MH tn
>C
CO O
SB
JS
^r^
°2
b®
03 ^
c 2
03 O
sw
.2 03
PL| ^
03
O 3
"S 03
"S 2
8E.S
OS
t-»*" 03
CO. 5
u,
> >>
O 08
>>C
O W
J2
c3
'bC
c
S
o
03
:^
tf
o
® .
a|
03 X
> m
O 08
o|
03 .iJ
CO ^
03
eg <a
03
03
' a
03 03
3 -^
O 03
* s
00 w
§^
S.2
- O
=:!2:
2 «
.2&d
bcS
|s
Et)
8-°
53 C
c «
oS-o
top
> c
^^
XI o3 -tJ
03 o i;
6*00
« «^ S5
X 03 o
a> 4j -J
-tj -ij C
03 S-S
2 2 2
03 3 S
.11^
^2
o
■*
05
^
"^
•-1
(N
r^
""I
3
>>
•-»
n
C
•-9
o
T)
03
n1
J5
TJ
C'
5
«
2
o
^_^
t^
t*
t>.
„
o
O
■^
in
t^
■a SZ
r*
o
O '
cc
CO
■<**
m
<©
t^
t^
00
00
o
o>
I— 1
OS
OS
OS
OS
OS
OS
t-H
a eS 9
•H-S-o
iCi
»c
IC
»«
lO
iCi
lO
iC
in
lO
lO
■*
■*
•*
•*
Tf
-*
■*
Tj<
■*
■<*<
^
got
NOO
^^
2i
00 1
coo
«o 1
t^ 1
00 1
^ 1
00 1
— 1
CD —
CO —
t^ —
t^-
OS —
t*-^
«!-<
00 —
OS —
OSC^
oco
oco
Oeo
oeo
oeo
oco
-H 1
— 1
rH 1
— 1
<N 1
M 1
C4 1
w 1
c^ 1
C^ 1
^1
«
N
(N
C^l
es
M
w
<N
(N
c<
lO
«
t*
00
OS
o
«
w
00
00
X
OS
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
XY
til
e3
m
s >>
■3.2
■Co
(^
- 0!
±»^
§^
26
>> a
rt « E
£.2 >>
O 3 S
Sec 02
' «8
u eg
13 aj
a; s
c o
S^
s «
C bC
t3.S
^^-^
005
wt s
■3 ® 1
>..2 ^
2 « S
I—* ^
--" o ^■"
20 p «8
T3 fe.3
2.5-3
2 £ «=
S S3 «
o
>
c
o
03
^ S
5 C
9; S
.53 *^
•1.2
s «
o w
>-,
u
0}
c «
So
5 Ml
c8 t).
4} P. O
■* c t
'-*x- S
*; > C
cc-o a3
■o o) £
ojx: aj
S c £
S OT!
e « 03
00 S
•-I cc
08 >
> c
08I-I
- c
^§
o-g
ti 03
= 2
o g
.2 §
£ s
V 03
C
w 2cc
•*- 'C O
2-^2
- >-, «8
C *^^
c2^
C Q^ J5
c 5 t-
O 3.S
fc O 5
a; c S
c ° i
(N
>"
O
s
o
o
bC
3
o
6i
>.
-^
u
«
2
c
3i
e3
T!
•-s
6
g
s
S
CO
p
V
_^
C
u
s
« flS
ta
«2 ".
OQ ^
03 gj
O -
r-r b.
^ 01
= •£
3'c
D.C
83 83
O O
n
J2
iS «
OS
03 ^H
03 .
CM
.2^
*i .
c >
m o
^^
^ o
c
*M
s .
.212
.Is
si
1-5 bC
s- c
o-E
02 a
01 "O
^^
•So S
V C
«
i^
r; a
c «
II
as
O
c
2^'
S *
as
O
>'3 "C «
ca t< O 03
Ol^<»-
->^ •♦i 05
.« OJ.- "^ft^
^ -JS > c
to "S t.
? fc « ®
"^ >
^ to "3 08
W § S 2
* >^^'S
-^^ £.2 o
" 05 03 «
«!» fetf
C ^ ^ 55
01 c>0 -fi
> a^' 1 S
^ S o3 a:
oi^l
01 o aj
•- S -fi' >>
o e . S
-ctSc
C OS'S «
OS
t^
rr
>n
«o
ro
t^
00
cs
■^
00
00
^-1
t-H
M
CO
rt<
Tf
«o
OS
^^
CO
•-(
W
M
c<>
(N
w
M
c^
c^
CO
CO
CO
>«
iC
iC
»o
»fl
lei
i«
»o
to
10
iC
•<*
■*
■*
Tt"
■<*<
Tt*
t
rf
tcT
Tt<
Tt<
CC
s; 1
^H 1
S '
SI 1
lO 1
ifi 1
U5 1
"5 1
CO 1
<o 1
OSTt<
Oi-i
OS —
OS —
OS —
05 —
OS —
OS —
OS —
OS —
OS —
OS —
■* 1
^s
§?
g?
§7
oro
<N 1
S7
S7
ST
oe4
CO 1
§7
S7
?ST
M
M
cq
CO
N
CO
CI
eo
CO
2
o S
s
XVI
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
a> a;
o o
'5 c
r' >■,
C C ..
:: cr .
°^ fe
O QJ S3
CC -^"^
-t5
o o
^£«3
s3 03 o
C C; s
o t o
"x O g
— ^ fc.
o 03 a>
X o >>
bc w >
= X e8
£-^ oj
Ct, +s j2
C -^
S 2 >>
xj '-^ "S g
a> C n o
- 05-C a;
£ « X
- .^ - p
03 •
«- > -^
O o .-r •?
oj— St:
c ^ .c c
.to 03 Q, *
a> c s 0)
3K c >
-*-3 . o3 tf
^:§ o e
O 3 ^ .S
^ -o <*, x:
IS
>-, c
= £1^5
03 r -1 ^
^•*i «:.
- J= X
03
c
a2
rf 0J.2 b£
^ o3 o ^
CN o3 bC
_ c c
i^ 2 •- *"
o^^£
►7 o X i;
-S " «- g
03 *,<^ O
^ 2 -
Oi
-5 >
3 i
03
03 ^M
£Sa..§
£==
C
a; a; o
•■;3 >? ^ a
'"^ =
S •-; L.
o
Cirt*
-I
O Ct.
G. o
it"
^ i: -r
> c8
fc> X "
o3 O c
si ^£
S 5
•* o
"|c3-
cj _c« £
03 ■= 0^
*2£
«- X-
a^ 3 S
C ^
a -2
£ a
gg
cW
« "o
03 03
I 5
6 '-*
CO "^
o3 —
Eh c3
£■==
<S
Q-V
X j=
C *j
-t^ 03
O ^
- C
■^ 8
V o
£«^
<J 03-^
-Pi 5°
25
£ g
£
03^
xt;
f £
o6
2; to CO
05 QJ 03
215
x:-- ^
3 ^Frn
C
g
£
o
O
£7
03 ^^ (D • -- r,.
Ph
o
E
g
13 P
03^
'^ C
-O
^^
X! C
aj o3
"^ C
03 K!
« i-T
CI
O c
Si
Plh
03 o
C 00
T3 ':2
'^^
^^
Q
Cjl— I
2 c
03 03
SB
It
kl^ —
3 .«
T3 g
2 E
£1.
5 ^i
o 5
_aj T3 .
O) "Cos
^ > r-l
"J O OJ
S c) g
B O U
g L^
Ml— 1 6C
■> op
(M
•*
■<t
r>.
GO
(M
es
Tt<
00
OS
CO
Tt<
Tf
lO
O
cc
ec
ec
M
t
^
T*<
»*
■^
»o
o
lO
ic
^a-^
W
(N
(N
(N
(N
(N
IM
(M
c^
(N
(N
11
!0
«
t^'*
5|^
ooT
-T
1^
CO
Tj^lij
® 1
•^ihi
^^
5r^
s=^
S^
O
00
05
3-^
w7
e* 1
« 1
(N 1
IN 1
(N 1
(N 1
<n7
(n7
(N
S-o
'-'
'^
'"'
""^
_4
w§
d
'
'
'
'
IZ
1
1
1
1
s
<
<!
PQ
o
x:
t^
00
o>
o
,^
W
ec
1
ec
1
ec
e^
H
s
o
o
^H
1-H
^J
FH
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
XVII
—( o
Il
05 C
II
3^a
.£fc
"^ o
— < cS
li
6 -
03.5 J2
fll
Si >■ Sis
— +j .-'2
03 -^
-HTf o
c .s - «
OQ
bC 03
2 I
c
o
J2
g '*' .-( 00
00 « aj -H
•S o'^ -O
P^ S 93
oo Jii ~
J? w C "C
•-5 o3 O' c3
'^f^^ S
.2 .-c CO
a3T}4 W <^
bCco C
i=l .1-1
o *^ o
cc
0) O
^::
2 "5
C bC
O ai
§•£
- CO
i!
CO
^j _o _c
C bC
O C
O rt -ki C
ccz:
£ s
SO!
c
O c3
S^ o
4) C^ -►^
S 'E !>< -g
"■5 "S ^ o
ills
o
CJ -
P3
• o
& ^
6.5
<• 00
»- 5
*j _
•^ £ bc
c '2.S
O £
" 5
o o
u _
O 05
00 ..
o - a;
I2t
»3 =s
£:=
•3 03
ii O
CO
t; ^
« £
^ o
-*|
m .c
«- c
S o
£§
O c
5 c
c ?
«3 u
-^ •§
> O
IZ C
"4
- c9
o3 u
T3-E
a£
o<J
£v.
o
^ CT3 bC
•- o « c
> X 08 "t^
= !«^
I- G P
S-2^2
o Jh5 «
&> ■ *•-<
•='1 o
03.
£ = • ^ «2
o ..
Oj Ml bC C
CQ'C ^ .2
•% 'C '-5
"^ E 3 ^
c
^ o
"£ ^2
01
£
£
X! *; o 01
05 S o3
^-S"^ 2
,-- o3T3 O-
.^■3 c
o
s
«3 V. O
C3 CK »
0)
> _
O S3
-03
X! aj
73 0)
(U *=
*= -^
■*J S3
£S
c ^
S 03
03^1
?5 C
^, 2 w »i
^.^ c« pO 03
e
T3
a
03
pa
d
d^
•3§
.t £
£t
T3 g
Wi
. 0!
WW
• as
O)
&..J- g S
OJ
o >3
° g-
SO
■&>>
o >
« *
c
03
OJ
h
|i( o
«_2
03 ^
93.23
£«-
o £
£5
3 g
bCP
"* 5
c ^
C 5
01
it.
£ o
O j3
QJ
^^
00
^
CM
1^
I>
00
■*
CO
i-H
t>.
»o
w
!>
r^
t— 1
r^
C<l
CO
w
10
CD
CO
CO
t^
t^
t-
t>-
t^
t-
>•
t>.
CSJ
(N
M
^4
(N
(N
CO
C>1
M
CO
CO
CO
«o
CO
CO
CO
CO
CO
CO
CO
CO
CO
CO
CO
007
si
<^7
«7
"fin
^2
1
ec
1
«^7
si
<^7
C<J
037
si
^7
si
^7
037
si
^7
1— (
CO
CO
i
7
007
00 5^
St
J:
m
-<'
\
■*
iC
J5
CO
i^
t^
00
03
r-l
a
^
^
^
1—1
I— 1
1—1
I— I
'1^
CO
1^
CO
I-H
1—1
7971B O— 46 — pt. 15-
XVIII
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
O
2os
. 29,
ittee
c
o
0.
tp^ g
J2
<ss
a:
-4^
2§.S
"o
a: O
oc
hC 1''-^
J2
3-§ =
O
•< -t^-'"
■»i
C»'C
f?
^
"o'cS
o
d^g.
03
^^^
x:
o ■+^ o
H-g5
C
"2 §5
«
" c ?
7?. cH-
c
^ 5
^=^
J
c3 c
ll
^ £
o 5
a c •
s o — I
.2 Mt
^t ^
^.2 •
^ JV
«<r bc o'^
oi^.2
fe > 3
-^ c
-^ Sit:
I— I .»j
TO O 1^
0.x: 73
^*= c
- 1^ 5
03 w o
Q C
o
C -c
;-^
o >,
03 „
3<N
t- C
" o
o3 C
u •-
O -^
gw
as
i «"
5. • 05
a: ""^ •>-•
t® 3
O'^ to
e8 o
u
0) c
x 3
O <-■
OJ
= -"^
i-"
(-1 03
c^
T3 *
0) M
n
O C
a—
2 >>
o<
^ cc
C 03
'Z •*^
^^
t" ^
u C
D.T3
i^
o a
«s
•a £
0)
o
•5 ^
tf 2
■^ o3 te oj
os^II^O
£ 03W aS
02
3
O
U
>
e3
O
O
o
o3 b
|«
;0 CO O
t^'f QO'f oof
si si J2i
— C» fm
CftT
CO
00
N
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
XIX
e3 .52
T3
§
O
O
H
«
T3
C
S3
O
O
H
hM — .- S
3
x:
<
S -^
93
fa
<
c
bD
'i
o
513
a
o
g S
? .« 05 •-
•"■«*< a; ■«*
aj 35 ,Q 03
aj *s pec 2cc
.ST 03 -03 • I
Z S3 C 43 oj 03'
03 08^^ - O -
fo.S
e3
.'£ ^
.2 *-
03 c8
P
08*0
03 03
■^ 03
s3^
03 +=
U
<» c
OS c3
03
+5 .
3 C 00
o: O .
83^
03 03 -P Id O S3
►C 03 K " «
^ .ti g<ec .22 o
^03 o
S o
■J
s
— C C 2 C 2
Is
s s
s3 -^
t C *■
fe_^-QC 3 g t.5
_ * o
3 73 01
O o S >■
~ - o
^^o1S35S
fc. 03 ^ ^-3 «„'
3 bC O S-S'STt-
>! .2 •£ X S s •
S 5 XI t3 o JTi >
oS as r^ ?^ O
^« Q ^ J. 03 o
c.g.bc'O 2 .^
OO -S os S IZ "
^ 03 £ o,;*T3
g oc 03 O £
03 +^ T3 -i
_S (1-, g 03
03 t/J ■
+-» 14/ E w _^
^ E oz;^'T3^-r3
-^•U c . g ^ -o -4::
■C.5^?5 03
g * 5;
'^ g S "^
3 TO j;
3 ;s " ♦s '
3 ."'"So
X ^
- 03
03 g
43 i3
S^l-S 3-^ ..^
.tf CD X fc- -< 2 03
03 . g O < c
« 0"*= i'O" (- 2 S3
U C, bC-^ ^ S3 S ^
^8|Ht:.2:2^
;30 g.^0,^ 0, t.
;gH 83os^> aa,
43 5 5 — •-"
ofe'a
CO
10 I
MCS ««
XX
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
:t
00 "I*
ro7
I©
CO 00
I
cods
CO
CO
s I
OSt>.
CO I
CO
a>rt<
^ I
« I
CO
ST
eo I
ffl
I
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
XXI
^ s
0/-V
e *
aw
>^ CO
> O
01
>,cc
02 »H
<1)
>
>
ti
c
n.
^
0.
03
>,
r
b
bl)
3
cr
c
c
o
O
i"^
,£
n
£
t*
3
u
cc
U
If
>>05
>
CIt
z
0)
Xi
3
S 02
.05
V o
« „
gee
t3 —
§^
« 3
.2 S
00 0)
o o o S
bC g
C.2
a? >
a> o
» h
s ^
Pl,
.s §
cS
. a
^•°
•^ bC
•^^
••a a;
■^ S
o o
2 I-
o ^
lO" p
oT d
- ej
. O)
Q, S
cc a
-I-: 3
cc i-'
M 83
>^
O Xm
5 3=^
c ♦^ «
3 CCC
Id S
- o
•- .CO
>
•-H to c3
I"
O . ©
a >
3
bC i£
c
3 '^
o S
K
W C
bC
C dj
bc
iC 1^
3
-f c
55 *
•>
rt a
>,
«3
^
>.^
03
■r -o
K
-^ ^
03
.fa a:
S
S a;
I^s
3
» > ^
az3 ►^.s
5 2^ EC
-^■^•** -3 '^
-oo^ .to
dJ fc. «
3 dJ"^
III
—-■3
2 V
c o
O 5^ ;5
« as 3
« * ©
c 4^
5 «
- ar
Sc
3""
-5 bt
. C
03
- .3 «^
-.3 I- «
5:^^ ^<
- £
>-■ o
03O
.is C
o3 O
+j 3
+3 O"
T3.^
• K.-S
fc. C oc
o £::=
«*-i Tl -C
<*- ^ .ti
• ^ x:
1-3 « «
^1 *
f|^
^ « c
t< 3
aj - 5
03 e "*"
3 •- a;
g ?a2
2 c""
S.2x
aj +j Qj
2-c
a o
•*- 2-
O o3
>.£
.te 03
a 3
"7 ^
aj 5
P-^S
a;^ .
o3 w a>
i«°
Q3 ao
«.-i 3.-3
2 3 a)
Bo*"
a)^
5 0= 2
O a) c
— O) ^
!:: P ^
03 K
> 02
OS ^
3 t"
»!::; S3
r^
^ 3
3 gj
id:3
■■3 *
> ^
"o a5
>■. E-^
CO O-"^
ap
dj 05 ^-
*s 1— 1 —
03 .^
S « 3
3 dJ O
5 3 ««
g p P
o 3 >.
33-1?
o
^.£
■5 aj
3^
dj-^
10 P
aj .£
a .s.-s
a:
« &«
W.2 ^
p
^^
dj "O
li
If
ic
5 p
3 *^
p =
a a^
^1
(. o3
C a:
08^
■0--
3a
as^
o3 U
si.2
pS p
"USO
aj ^ p
"is E
p .
0<N
1 >
■3k°
'S-Z
Ho
p ^
5g
o o3
^ 3
"—I s
a)
dJ c
3 (-
3 *>
"I
3 OB
£•0
P 3
d) B
3 ^.fc;
<= 3
bCM
II
a; ►-I
pi
N
C4
M
N
CO
10
1— 1
CO
10
CO
_
ec
eo
CO
CO
CO
CO
lO
»c
CO
CO
CO
■<J*
eo
eo
eo
CO
eo
CO
CO
eo
Tj<
■^
■*
■*
eo
eo
eo
eo
CO
eo
eo
eo
CO
CO
CO
CO
O* ^ OS ^
cj I SJ I
a»r« o>t«
eo I eo I
eo I
S.
(O
i si
eo T
00 T
CO
'c^ ""c^ "S "3
S io
CI
CO
•*
m
CO
t>.
«o
«o
»o
tti
10
"5
XXII
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
00 4^
T--0
.S aj
•3 O
■£02
a
°5
00
O 03
c *
OQ bC
3 O
-2 2
o c
I X
a3 OQ
03 5
O) O
T5
c
o
00
a^
■u •
eS C
p ^
1 =
o "
c ^ •
T3 "
OJ
V
0? o
m 02
o o
"5-5
2| S2 "SS;
> X
•j:;tt!
•SO
CI o
as
2^
03 O
+3 a;
'S bC
So
5 ^
a; ^
5.1
as
o8 u
CO >
2 ®
so
* c
•«. 08
o a
c *
-*i 00 .>
U.2 S
a; sj gj
J3 e.
03 u
"S ^ 08
03 _ M
§ ® U
«2 »a
- o o
goiz;
o
>
O
O
I-}
o
00 -^^
s
•^
0«!
o8 O
Sis
O
O
^
T3 .
Oj T}<
O
I d
O -
32 .
03O
oi c
o -^
a-ti
3r<*
03
0) u
^J
c S
eS 03
93 a,
•^ c
c a
c8 o
Q .2^
flStf
i:s
as
« c
o
03
X 03
e "
a .
oJt3
a eS
2 «
.C3 +»
■»J a!
O o-
"f O
o! S-tf
5r S ec
?^«
■^ a.
^'^ rt
Ct< 03
73 O o
m
t.2Sg
03 IC 03
■§=30
■i-s
S Q
s
^_i
00
w
00
o
■«J<
eo
t>.
eo
00
00
£S)6
■*
00
o
o
(N
eo
■*
lO
Oi
"•J*
T(<
■*
•t
to
iC
tn
iCl
»o
iC
lO
CO
CO
cc
n
00
ec
M
eo
eo
eo
eo
00
eo
II
o
o
o
«o
«
CO
CO
CO
CO
CO
CO
si
"4
rt ■*
oT
52
■"4.
■^■^
«»T
^^
w'T
n7
n7
*2
111
■"4.
"4
"2
'St"
co-L
■"4
Si
"4
■"4.
wg
;
;
;
z
1
1
2
<
1
'
<
1
S
00
OS
o
^
1
M
e!j
eo
tC
lO
x>
H
«o
»c
1—1
«
CO
l-H
CO
CO
CO
CO
CO
CO
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
xxni
OS
£c
V to
08
^ CO WT3 g
3 g 95 3,r!
a |£^ £
eS c b-iS
^ a© 2 c8
-S « g a-a
J-Q5 «*^
a)^ ^ a c
"rt ^^ «3 d 4)
X ..-t^ 14-1
g^ -O S
Si
^H SJ * r.
^ «J o « "^
e aj *= *" T
COS aj Sad c
^ ^^ O ^ CD
« W^ o « si
•g ^ o> ^^ ^
2 > '^ •-< '5 .
^^ .^ <© OS > *
e
c «
•9 -is
S.S
II
-(J
c
•a «
Is
T) a
o.
to
5 «
_ oo
u c
aj o S
§2.2
S^5
i a)^
" 2 S
S O •»•
a) h o
ao-a;
= ««3
O «)03
- £ «
.2§ .
aal
V S3
c aj
OS -e
08 «
"5 <*"
. ^
a
«2
C !>
O) c8
C bC
03 ^
£ 5
S aj
> ^
o «
aj >
«- o
«C
cu
v c
£ *
o ***
0) *s
*i c
"3 S
. o
c o
aj"0
■r^ a)
S3 JC
5E-
x: o
bcXJ
- a;
(. sS
S 03
O a;
C «£
y U C
O 08 ^
08^iJ
S* °-
Sr-' =!
go 03
S3 3
^ bC
K g
U
CTti
S ><
5 a>
«!; -k^
0) o
^T3
bCOJ
C 'C
■- «3
C OS
U -tJ
a> •**
u o8
« c
ca o
aj o
£ aj
t3
o8 S3
a; a,
>
<A .
o «
c ^
S^
E-
32
'^%
o_-
- a;
o£
la
a;
« .
©■*
«®
08""
-b3 >
S30
"O cc
<w ^•
o >
ll
5 o
hi
STa?
^1
z; _
■a .2
c *i
<S 3
^J3
I-
g-o
cc 08
O^
.z aj
^ 3
& O
a s.
cS
a
a)
D
;o « o
"S 0|^
j5 to'a
^ 03 .
^^
:^ ^
u a)2
08 '^
S^ 03 y-
C cQ
E S3
SOS'S
a; .^ T3
■fi o e
S.S" g
^ aj c
2si
O 00 ii
S ^ 5
•a S-ti
^ OS S
-t-s""*
a)
M-S
oi
> ep^
* 1^ (U
>*- o "'^
O o o
>. 50 *^
-e 03 r .
= C fa > c
^ « • 73 3 aj
aj
Oh
a:2
-x:
im from
mitting
tate for
the Prei
c
.2 aj
- 3^ O
C OE «*- IS
'3
£
a;
.5 -3
is
emora
1941,
tary o
State
S
S
« bSo> ^
^2
20
o .
03 00
> OS
08 .
C *s
£ T3
C 03
r- *
o -
s3_
.— S3
Q. >
!^.
-1
2|
a. a)
-"^
* c
C «
*- s
V S3
OQ
oTS,
— GO
S3
CO **"
a; E
£ 3
3 C
w s3
O.t
.•^ 3 a
= i£
S 5 £
o
?S fc- M
Q.2-^
£5
ajs "'^
o s <=
08 O
"-9 «
M
«o
O
OS
M
00
S
o
l«
^
W
»C
o
05
00
■>*
t>.
CO
^H
M
CO
<o
«o
(O
r*
OS
OS
OS
o
^^
F- 1
^^
«
ec
CO
«
n
ec
«
■*
•*
■*
Tt<
ooT
QOT
OS Y
lO'
OS T
\k
os7
S7
ss
XXIV
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
B
o
o
2
nsel
937,
gine
a
o
^
5^ c
Q
05
a
a
1-5
f.S.^
o
""^
i
T3
sn.^
03
CO
t*."
^
PL,
O
'C
u^
V
X
Q
>.
a
t.^-o
IS
3
o
<
C
o >.S
-c 2
>
O
1
«-l
o
b
O
&
•Si
s
coi; 3
^2o
• c
-S c
m"
c
1
Q
c
o
:3 «
ct
^
oj c^
c
S'S
CD
bC
.fl'O
T!
o
a
Q
1
1
^03
-■3
1
o
c^ >>
1!
t
« S
1
-«^
>
OQ 03
03
« a, aj
n 0)
*o
03
u>>
.2
t,*^
M
a
c
cc a
<d
0)
t
C8
u
0! (H S
as 0) £
S c
O 03
>>
4^ -4^
o S o
" O t.
iS
o
S
Cm
4> 3
O
"33
3 «
(^
^
01 03 a;
(aC
>>
1
D
o
o
C
'S
1
1i 0^
'5
01^ «
O 05
CO
1!
T3
X
3
O
1
c
o
c
03 <-
■55
COS
ac o
1
i
.2
■-5 -
c3^
*S Q.C O
o«-r'o3X!
13
'c
P C8
a^
X
s
bC
O
O
1^
S
III
o>
,_
^^
lO
<N
CO
o
■<}<
lO
«
O
«
CM
C<J
IC
lO
t^
t*
^
■<t
■*
■<*<
•*
Tf
is
'>0
«o
«
!0
!0
«
°:.s^
§1
^2
o
■*
^■*
oT
t-7
00^
ass
Cos s
S'g
"5
s
^
2«
"2
n§
d
z
■*■*
A
1
H
00
00
3
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1423
EXHIBIT NO. 44
Copies of Defense Flans
Contents
Item
1. Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Orange (1938)
2. Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 1
3. Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5
4. Extracts from War Department Operations Plan — Rainbow No. 5
5. Extracts from Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision 1940
6. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaii
7. Annex No. VII to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaii
8. Joint Air Estimate, Hawaii (Martin-Bellinger Agreement)
9. 5 November 1941 Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department
10. Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security), Hawaiian Department
11. Extracts from Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5
12. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 20L-41 (Revised) — Security of Fleet at Base and in
Operating Areas ^ , », ,
13. Operations Plan No. 1-41. Headquarters, Naval Base Defense Force, Fourteenth Naval
District
[i] Extracts Fbom Joint Abmy and Navy Basic Wab Plan — Obange (1938)
SECTION I — directi\t:
This JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN— ORANGE— shall con-
stitute the basis upon which all Armj- Plans— ORANGE, all Navy Plans —
ORANGE, all Joint Plans— ORANGE, and all supporting allocations for an
ORANGE war shall be formulated and developed.
section n — assumptions
This Plan is applicable to any probable situation between UNITED STATES
and ORANGE which requires action by the armed forces. The character of the
particular situation that may arise cannot be predicted, but in general it may be
assumed that —
1. There will be a period of strained relations preceding the outbreak of war
with ORANGE, during which period preparatory measures prior to mobilization
can be taken.
2. Active hostilities against the UNITED STATES by ORANGE will be pre-
cipitated without a formal declaration of war.
3. The superiority of the UNITED STATES naval strength over that of
ORANGE will be adequate to permit operations by the UNITED STATES
FLEET to the westward of OAHU ; and any assistance which may be given to
ORANGE or to the UNITED STATES by other powers will not materially reduce
this superiority.
[2] section IV — MISSIONS
1. Joint Mission for the Armed Forces. — To defeat ORANGE by operations
against ORANGE armed forces and communications, while conserving the
resources of the UNITED STATES and protecting UNITED STATES' territory,
sea communications, and interests.
2. Mission for the Army.— To defend the Continental UNITED STATES and
its overseas possessions ; to provide for contingencies which may arise from
either foreign intervention or the ultimate exigencies of the Joint Mission, and
to support the Navy.
1424 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3. Mission for the Nary. — To defeat ORANGE forces, interrupt ORANGE sea
communications, protect UNITED STATES' sea connnunlcations and UNITED
STATES' interests abroad, and to support the Army.
SECa'ION V — JOINT DECISIONS
2. COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE.
*******
b. HAWAIIAN Coastal Frontier— (1) Boundaries.— The HAWAIIAN Coastal
Frontier consists of OAHU and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required
for the defense of 0.> HU.
[3] (2) Category of Defense. — Category D, as defined in Section III,
Chapter V, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935."
(3) Missions — (a) Joint Mission. — To hold OAHU as a main outlying Naval
Base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.
(b) Mis.^ion for the Army. — To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and
air forces, and against hostile sympathizers ; to support the Naval forces.
(c) Mission for the Navy. — To patrol the coastal zone and to control and
protect shipping therein ; to support the Armed forces.
(4) Forces — (a) Army Forces. — The peace garrison, augmented by personnel
and facilities to be obtained locally and by initial reinforcements of about 25,000
troops from Continental UNITED STATES. The reinforcements from Conti-
nental UNITED STATES will be those so designated in the Concentration Plan
of the Army Strategical Plan— ORANGE.
[4] (b) Naval Forces. — (i) Naval Local Defense Forces of the 14th Naval
District, augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by rein-
forcements to a total of about 7,000 individuals, as provided for in the Navy
Basic War Plan— ORANGE.
(ii) In time of Peace, the major part of the submarine and Naval air forces
based on PEARL HARBOR will be retained in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS when-
ever the UNITED STATES FLEET is not in the Eastern PACIFIC.
(5) Joint Plan to be Prepared. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.
***** * *
SECTION VI — SXIPPORTING MEASURES
1. TIME OF EXECUTION.
M-Day is the first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execution
of this JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN— ORANGE. M-Day may
precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy
Departments may initiate or put into eflfect certain features of this Plan prior
to M-Day.
Extracts From Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 1 *
* * * * * * *
SECTION VI — TASKS
* * * * * ■ « *
Joint Tasks
* * * * * * *
7. Joint Task
HOLD OAHU AS A MAIN OUTLYING NAVAL BASE AND CONTROL AND
PROTECT SHIPPING IN THE COASTAL ZONE.
Joint Decisions
a. Botmdaries. The Havvaiian Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu and such
adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of Oahu.
b. Category of Defense: Category D, as defined in Section III, Chapter V,
"Joint Action of the Army and ^he Navy, 1935."
c. Army Task: To hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea, and air forces, and
against hostile sympathizers ; to support the Naval forces.
* Approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy 14 August 1939,
verbally by the President 14 October 1939 ; revlaed by the Joint Board 10 April 1940.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1425
d. Navy Task: To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shifting
therein ; to support the Army Forces.
^ m * * * * *
f. Joint Plan to be Prepared: Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.
* * * * * * m
[2] SECTION "VII — JOINT DECISIONS FOR SUPPORTING MEASTJRE:S
♦ ♦•*** *
2. Titne of Execution. — M-Day is the *irst day of mobilization, and is the time
origin for the execution of this Plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war
or the occurrence of hostile acts. As a precautionary measure, the War and
Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of this Plan
prior to M-Day.
Extracts From Joint Army and Navt Basic Wab Plan — Rainbow No. 5*
****** *
sEx?noN VII — tasks
The Pacific Area
****** •
33. Arnn/ Tasks.
****** *
d. In cooperation with the Vavy defend Coastal Frontiers. Defense Com-
mand Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in para-
graph 47.
****** *
35. Navy Tasks.
****** •
f. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall
Island area.
ff. Defend Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Wake, Samoa and Guam.
h. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified
localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.
*******
47. Categories of Defense.
****** *
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Category D
Philippine Coastal Frontier Category B
****** *
Midway, Johnston, Palmyra Category D
Guam Category E
[2] SECTION IX. — SUPPORTING MEASURES
****** *
53. Titne of Execution. M-Day is the time origin for the execution of this
Plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war or the occurrence of hostile acts.
As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or
put into effect certain features of this Plan prior to M-Day.
Annex I. Coastal Frontiers
Reference: (a) Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.
1. For purposes of this Plan, this ANNEX I to Joint Army and Navy Basic War
Plan — RAINBOW No. 5 temporarily amends Section IV of reference (a), as
indicated herein.
''Approved by the Secretary of the Navy, 28 May 1941, and by the Secretary of War,
2 June 1941.
1426 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2. Change paragraph 33 of reference (a) to read:
"33. Joint Organization and command.
"a. Coastal divisions with geographical coterminous boundaries within which
an Array officer and a Naval officer will exercise command over the Army forces
and the Navy forces, respectively, assigned for the defense of these divisions,
have been established in order to provide a joint organization and to ensure the
effective coordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier
defense. These coastal divisions comprise coastal frontiers, sectors, and sub-
sectors. The system of coastal frontiers includes certain outlying land, island
and sea areas, as well as the coasts of continental United States. The joint
organization, together with the commanders responsible for the execution of
security measures on and after M-day and the necessary peacetime planning
therefor, are stated below.
Note: The preceding subparagraph, for purposes of this plan, modifies
Chapter V, paragraph 26 a. Section 1. of reference (a).
"&. A Defense Command is a geographical area within which an Army officer
is responsible for the coordination or preparation, and for the execution of all
plans for the employment of Army forces and installations lying within the
command boundaries ; where pertinent, a Defense Command includes one or more
coastal frontiers and may include isolated localities. (See map attached showing
defense commands in continental United States.)
[3] "c. Normally a naval coastal frontier includes the coastal zone adjacent
to the coastal frontier. In certain cases, two naval coastal fi-ontiers may be
included in coastal frontier ; in other cases the naval coastal frontier includes
waters which extend beyond the limits of the coastal frontier.
"d. The provisions of ABC-22 may prescribe the extension of the North Atlantic
coastal frontier and the Pacific coastal frontier to include part of the territory
and coastal waters of Canada.
"e. Coordination between Army and Navy forces in coastal frontier operations
shall be by the method of mutual cooperation, subject to the provisions of
paragraph 9 &."
• . * * * ♦ * *
9. Insert in reference (a), the following new paragraphs:
"36A. Hawaiian coastal frontier.
"a. Boundaries.
The Hawaiian coastal frontier consists of Oahu, and all of the land and sea
areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance
of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra
Islands and Kingman Reef.
"6. Commanders.
Army. — The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
Navy. — The Commandant, Fourtenth Naval District, who is designated as the
Commander, Hawaiian naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the
assigned naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and
strategical employment, in cooperation with the Army."
[i]
ExTBACTs From Wab Department Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5 ^
SECTION VII — MISSIONS AND FORCES
• *•••«•
30. Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.
a. Extent.
OAHU and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense
of OAHU.
b. Category of Defense: D (as defined in Section III, Chapter V, J. A. A. & N.,
1935).
c. Missions.
(1) Joint — Hold OAHU as a main outlying Naval base and control and pro-
tect shipping in the Coastal Zone.
> Approved by the Chief of Staff, 19 August 1941.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1427
(2) Army — Hold OAHU against attacks by land, sea, and air forces, and
against hostile sympathizers. Support Naval forces in the protection of the sea
comnmnications of the Associated I'owers and in the destruction of Axis sea
communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located
within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.
(3) Navy — Patrol the Coastal Zone; control and protect shipping therein;
support the Army.
* • « • « • •
[2] SECTION VIII GENERAL PROVISIONS AND NAVAL StjPPOBTlNG MEASURES
40. Oeneral Provisi(fn8.
a. How put into effect.
This plan or any portion thereof will be put into effect on orders of the War
Department.
b. Chemical Warfare.
All necessary precautions will be made for the use of chemicals from the out-
break of hostilities; but the use of toxic agents is prohibited unless and until
authorized by the War Department.
c. Active Air Defense Measures, Continental United States.
(1) Responsibility — The Chief of the Army Air Forces, under GHQ, is respon-
sible for so much of the active air defense of the continental United States as
includes planning and execution of operations of air, antiaircraft artillery, bal-
loon barrage units and aircraft warning service, except:
(a) Local defense by ground units with their organic weapons against low-
flying aircraft ;
(b) When the War Department, to meet an actual or threatened invasion,
activates a Theater of Operations (or similar command) in the United States or
contiguous territory for the combined employment of air forces and ground arms
(other than antiaircraft artillery) the commander of the theater (or similar
command) will be resfionsible for all air defense measures in his theater.
(2) Mission — The air defense mission is stated in terms of priority of areas
vital to national security under varying strategic conditions. Other localities or
installations not named are not excluded from defense measures but are of less
national importance.
(a) Condition A: No threat to vital installations on the West Coast. Hostile
aerial raids probable against vital installations on the Atlantic Coast.
1st Priority : New York-Philadelphia Area.
2d Priority : Baltimore- Washington-Norfolk Area.
3d Priority : Boston-Narragansett Area.
(b) Condition A (1) : Same as A except that threat appears to be localized
in North Atlantic.
Priorities as in (a) above.
[3] (c) Condition B: No threat against vital installations on the East
Coast. Hostile aerial raids probable against vital installations on any part of
Pacific Coast.
1st Priority : Los Ang,eles-San Diego Area.
2d Priority: Puget Sound Area.
3d Priority : San Francisco Area.
(d) Condition B (1) : Same as B except that threat appears to be localized
in Puget Sound-San Franci.sco Area.
1st Priority : Puget Sound Area.
2d Priority : San Francisco Area.
3d Priority : Los Angeles-San Diego Area.
(e) Condition B (2) : Same as B except that threat appears to be localized
in San Francisco-San Diego Area.
1st Priority : Los Angeles-San Diego Area.
2d Priority : San Francisco Area.
3d Priority : Puget Sound Area.
(f) Condition C: Threat to vital installations equally divided between the
East and West Coasts.
1st Priority : New York-Philadelphia Area.
2d Priority : Los Angeles-San Diego Area.
3d Priority : Baltimore-Washington-Norfolk Area.
4th Priority: Puget Sound Area.
5th Priority : Boston Area.
6th Priority: San Francisco Area.
1428 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(3) Forces:
See Sections 1 and 2, Table II, Annex II, Concentration Tables. The Chief
of the Army Air Force or subordinates designated by him will exercise command
functions over all mobile and fixed Aircraft Warning units in continental United
States, and over such other forces as are allocated for air defense except as other-
wise indicated in subparagraph (1) above.
(4) The Chief of the Army Air Force will render such assistance and advice
as may be practicable to communities, installations, military or naval forces not
under his command regarding weaknesses and improvements in the air raid
precautions system. For this purpose he is authorized to consult directly with
the authorities concerned.
d. Logistics.
For details relative to mobilization, concentration, embarkation, admin isti-ation,
military government of occupied territory, intelligence, organization, training,
supply, and evacuation, see Concentration Plan and Annex III — Logistics to this
Operations Plan. ,
[/] Extracts from Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision 1940
section ii — bitfef estimate of the situation
1. a. Missions.
(1) Joint Mission: To hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to control
and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.
(2) Mission for the Army: To hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air
forces against hostile sympathizers; and to support the naval forces.
(3>' Mission for the Navy: To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and
protect shipping therein ; to support the Army forces. ( Joint Army and Navy
Basic War Plan-Orange).
6. Category of Coastal Frontier Defense: Category "D" defense, prescribed
by the War Department for this department, assumes the possibility, but not
the probability, of a major attack. Defense measures specified envision the
employment of seacoast, air, and antiaircraft elements, and the use of a general
reserve. (Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935) .
* * * * * * *
d. Forms of hostile attacks. The basis of the forms of attack listed below is
the War Department assignment of Category "D" to this Department.
(1) Possible enemy attacks against the OAHU area in the order of prob-
abJLlity are:
(a) Submarine — tori)edo and mine.
(ft) Sabotage.
(c) Disguised merchant ship attack by blocking channels, by mines, or by air
or surface craft.
(d) Air raids, carrier based.
(e) Surface ship raids.
if) Major combined attack in the absence of the U. S. Fleet.
[2] (2) Sabotage and Internal Dissension.
(a) It is believed that the Orange population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,
in event of war, will divide itself as follows :
(1) Loyal to the United States. This group will certainly include some
American citizens of Japanese origin.
(2) Passive until developments indicate definitely the probable victor,
when it will join that side. This group will probably include a fair propor-
tion of the aliens and many citizens.
(3) Loyal to Orange (to extent of sabotage and other subversive actions).
This group will probably be small, although formidable.
* * « * « * *
5. a. Basis for Planning.
(1) Missions and Conditions.
(a) All defense plans of Oahu will be based upon the following conditions :
The currently assigned category of defense will be Category D (see par.
1 6).
The defense of Oahu will be joint defense by Army and Navy forces under
the missions as stated in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange (see
par. 1 a).
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1429
(b) Possible and Probable War Situations are:
(i) That sea lanes from, continental United States to Hawaii are
open and, that the garrison of Hawaii will be reinforced from continen-
tal United States.
(2) That the most probable form of attack is a surprise attack con-
sisting of raids, and bombardments by ships' fire and air forces, and
action by local sympathizers.
[3] (3) That the sea lanes from continental United States will be closed
and that there may be an attack by a major expeditionary force. From
the War Department point of view, this contingency is so remote that
it will make no additional allowances of either men or reserves to meet
it. This is commonly referred to as the "cut-off from the Mainland
situation".
(4) The latter contingency forms the basis for our training, as being
all inclusive and providing maximum reality for the troops during their
training.
6. {Conclusion. — To adopt a defense plan adequate initially, to meet an enemy's
maximum effort. This plan is outlined in the next paragraph.
c. Scheme of defense, command organization, and missions assigned to major
echelons upon initial deployment :
(1) The defense of Oahu combines an air, naval, antiaircraft, seacost and
beach and land defense, together with the supervision and utilization of civilian
activities and utilities and, under martial law. their control. To effectively
accomplish this defense, particularly when its elements must be controlled simul-
taneously, the Department Commander decentralizes his command function by
assignment of definite missions of responsibility to major echelon commanders,
as follows :
(a) To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Division:
The beach and land defense of Oahu. (For details, see paragraph 6) .
The beach and land defense is based upon the principle of the "position
in readiness", which permits concentration of forces in critical areas and
assures flexibility to meet external and internal attacks.
(h) To Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery
Brigade:
The antiaircraft and seacoast defense of Oahu and in addition furnishing
the necessary support to the beach and land defense and the naval forces.
(See paragraph 6.)
[-J] (c) To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force:
In carrying aut the air defense, he may conduct independent operations or
may operate in conjunction with, supported by, or in support of naval air
forces, or temporarily under the direction of the Naval Air Force Comman-
der as provided in Chapter II, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, and
will cooperate with all forces in direct defense of Oahu.
Headquarters Headquarters
Hawaiian Department, Fourteenth Naval District.
Fort Shafter, T. H. Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, T. H.
11 April 1941 . 11 April 1941
Joint Coastal Fbontiee Defbnsk Plan — Hawaiian Coastal Fbontieb Hawaiian
Departmbnt and Foubteenth Naval Disteictf Section I — Dikectives
1. Responsihility. This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is prepared, under
the direction of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Com-
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
2. Basis. This plan is based on Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan RAIN-
BOW No. 1, and Section V, page 61, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935
and will constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war pro. ects, joint
oi>erating plans, and mobilization plans are based.
3. Method of coordination. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart-
ment and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have determined that
1430 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation and
that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy oper-
ate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as
prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, para-
graph 9 ft.
4. Planning representatives. The Assistant Chief of Staff for War Planning
(G-3) Headquarters Hawaiian department, and the War Plans OflScer, Head-
quarters Fourteenth Naval District, are designated as planning representatives
respectfully for the Army and Navy Commanders in the Hawaiian Coastal Fron-
tier. (Par. 40 a, page 61, joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.)
5. Joint planning committee. A Local Joint Planning Committee is established
to consist of the Chiefs of Staff, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Nava'
District and such other Army and Navy Officers as may be appointed by the
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, Fourteenth
Naval District (Section VI, page 133, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy,
1935). The Joint Planning Committee shall take cognizance of all matters affect-
ing joint coordination in all subsidiary Plans or Projects constituting the Joint
Defense Plans, Hawaiian Coastal Fontier. The senior member thereof is author-
ized to designate such standing or special sub-committees as from time to time may
be necessary.
[2] SECTION II — DELIMITATION OF AREAS
6. Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. "The Hawaiian Coastal Frontier consists of
Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of
Oahu."
It has been determined that the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier consists of land
and sea areas bounded by arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at
Opana Point, Maui ; Kauiki Head Light, Maui ; Laupahoehoe Light, Hawaii ;
Cape Kumukahi Light, Hawaii ; Kalae Light, Hawaii ; Southwest Headland,
Kahoolawe ; Leahi Point, Niihau ; Lehua Island, Niihau ; Kailiu Point, Kauai ;
and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at Kahuku Point, Oahu, and
the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named.
7. Haicaiian Coastal Zone. The Hawaiian Coastal Zone comprises the waters
of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.
8. Haivotiian Naval Coastal Frontier. The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier
comprises the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier plus the areas bounded by the terri-
torial waters of Midway Island, Johnson Island, Palmyra Island, Canton
Island, and Wake Island.
9. Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone. The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone
comprises the Hawaiian Coastal Zone plus the territorial waters of Midway
Island, Johnston Island, Palmyra Island, Canton Island, and Wake Island.
10. Hawaiian Defensive Sea Areas. WPL-8, paragraph 2201, defines Defen-
sive Sea Areas as of two kinds. In the Fourteenth Naval District of the first
kind — 2201.a.l of WPL-8 — is the Defensive Sea Area of the Hawaiian Coastal
Frontier approved by the Joint Board, Secretary of War and Secretary of the
Navy and will be made effective by proclamation. Defensive Sea Areas of the
second kind — 2201. a. 2. of WPL-8 — have been established by executive order for
Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe.
(1) Defensive 8ea Area of the Hatcaiian Coastal Frontier. The Defensive
Sea Area of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier includes all waters within an area
bounded as follows :
By arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at Opana Point, Maui ; Kauiki
Head Light, Maui ; Laupahoehoe Light, Hawaii ; Cape Kumukahi Light, Hawaii ;
Kalae Light, Hawaii; Southwest Headland, Kahoolawe; Leahi Point, Niihau;
Lehua Island, Niihau; Kailiu Point, Kauai; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius
with its center at Kahuku Point, Oahu, and the tangents connecting these arcs
in the order named. This area when made effective will be given the short
title — Hawaiian D. S. A.
(2) Pearl Harbor — Defensive Sea Area. The Pearl Harbor — Defensive Sea
Area comprises: The area of water in Pearl Harbor lying between extreme
high water mark and the sea, and in an about the entrance channel to [3]
said harbor within an area bounded by the extreme high water mark at the
bearing south true from the southwestern corner of the Puuloa Naval Reserva-
tion, a line bearing south true from Ahua Point Light, and a line bearing west
true from a point three (3) nautical miles due south true from Ahua Point
Lighthouse. This area is given the short title-^Pearl D. S. A.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1431
(3) Kaneohe Bay — Defensive Sea Area. The Kaneohe Bay — Defensive Sea
Arear comprises : All waters enclosed by lines drawn as follows : A line bearing
northeast true extending three miles from Kaoio Point, a line bearing northeast
true extending four (4) nautical miles from Kapoho Point, and a line joining the
seaward extremities of the two above-described bearing lines. This area is given
the short title — Kaneohe D. S. A.
(4) Palmyra, Kingman Reef, Johnston, Midicay, and Wake — Defensive Seu
Areas. These defensive sea areas comprise: Territorial waters surrounding the
islands from high water marks to a distance of three (3) nautical miles from
these marks.
11. Oahu Defensive Coastal Area. The Defensive Coastal Area for Oahu com-
prises all water areas within the area of circles and the connecting tangents
drawn with points as centers and with respective radii, as follows :
Keahi Point — Forty-nine thousand (49,000) yards.
Puu Kapolei — Forty-five thousand (45,000) yards.
PuS^sStion} Twenty-three thousand (23,000) yards.
This area is given the short title — Oahu D. C. A.
SECTION III ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION TASKS AND FOECES
12. Category of Defense. Category "D", as defined in Section III, Chapter V,
Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.
13. The estimate of the situation applicable to the respective forces is found
in Estimate of the Situation, Hawaiian Department, and Estimate of the Situa-
tion, Fourteenth Naval District, Rainbow No. 1.
14. Tasks.
a. Joint task. To hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to control
and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.
b. Arniry Task. To hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and
against hostile sympathizers ; to support the naval forces.
c. Nai^y task. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping
therein ; to support the Army forces.
[Jf] a. Army Forces. The present garrison augmented by personnel and
facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforcements from Continental United
States as provided for in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 1.
b. Naval Forces. Naval Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District,
augmented by personnel and facilities to be obtained locally and by reinforce-
ments as provided for in the Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 1.
c. Overseas Reinforcements. (1) Army garrisons and Naval Local Defense
Forces in the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier will be reinforced at the earliest pos-
sible date ; to the extent practicable, this will be done prior to M-Day.
(2) M-Day is the first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execu-
tion of this plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary
measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain
features of their respective plans prior to M-Day. Such parts of this plan as are
believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War
and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.
d. Civil Organization. A Civil Organization, under the supervision of Army
authorities, and in consultation and accord with Navy authorities, to organize the
Territory of Hawaii for war, utilizing all personnel and material resources of
the Territory of Hawaii in assisting the military and naval forces.
SECTION IV — DEX?ISIONS
16. General.
a. The Commanding, General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District, to provide for the needs of the defense of Oahu in
accordance with the tasks, paragraph 14 above, and submit these plans to the
War and Navy Departments, respectively.
6. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans for the execution of the tasks given
in paragraph 14 above, these plans to include initial deployment and assignment
of reinforcements when received.
[5] c. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in consultation
and accord with the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare plans
79716 O — 46 — pt. 15— — 3
1432 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
for the Mobilization of man-power and material resources in the Territory of
Hawaii and their allocation to the Army and Navy forces in the Hawaiian
Coastal Frontier in accordance with the detailed agreeements covered under
Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document.
d. Army and Navy subordinate tasks are assigned in accordance with Joint
Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, listed respectively, in paragraphs 17
and 19.
17. Army. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, shall provide
for:
0. The beach and land, seacoast and antiaircraft defense of Oahu with par-
ticular attention to the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and naval forces present
thereat, Honolulu Harbor, city of Honolulu, and the Schofield Barracks-Wheeler
Field-Lualualei area. The increasing importance of the Kaneohe area is rec-
ognized.
h. An antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.
c. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands con-
sistent with available forces.
d. Defense of installations on Oahu vital to the Army and Navy and to the
civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage,
except within naval establishments.
e. Defense against sabotage within the Hawaiian Islands, except within naval
shore establishments.
f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the Oahu D. C. A.,
In cooperation with the Naval Inshore P.atrol (see iwir. 18 a.), and an aerial
observation system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the
Hawaiian Islands.
g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea con-
ducted within range of Army bombers.
h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control
post provided for in paragraph 18. e.
i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordi-
nated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed
joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile
intelligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be
governed by "Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940."
[6] j. An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will
gather, evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information
of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the Hawaiian Islands.
k. Counter-espionage within the Hawaiian Islands.
1. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the Hawaiian Islands.
m. Army measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over
communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and
the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.
n. Supply of all Army and civil population in the Hawaiian Islands.
o. Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the Hawaiian Islands.
p. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of
supplies for the civil population.
18. Navy. The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, shall provide for :
o. An inshore patrol.
6. An offshore patrol.
c. An escort force.
d. An attack force.
e. Provide and maintain a harbor control post for Joint defense of Pearl and
Honolulu Harbors.
f. Installation and operation of an underwater defense for Pearl and Honolulu
Harbors. (Hydro-acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and installed probably
will be under cognizance of the Army.)
g. Support of Army forces in the Oahu-D. C. A. and installation of submarine
mine fields in the defense of the Oahu-D. C. A. as may be deemed necessary and
practicable.
ft. Sweeping channels and mine fields.
i. Distant reconnaissance.
/. Attacking enemy naval forces.
k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all
naval shore establishments.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1433
[7] I. In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 i,
a local couinmnication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange
of intelligence.
m. Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over
communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and
the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.
n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counter-espionage, for
the collection, evaluation, dissemination of hostile information.
0. Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.
p. Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities pertain-
ing thereto.
SECTION V — MOBILIZATION
19. Mobilisatkm Plans.
a. General.
(1) Mobilization plans to be prepared under directives of the Joint Army and
Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 1, will provide for the maximum possible
effort to include the variant plan for the possible situation of a cutoff from the
Mainland.
(2) The moltillzation plans will present the detailed utilization of the man-
power and material resources of the Hawaiian Islands, as well as of the rein-
forcements to be received from the Mainland.
(3) Mobilization plans will provide that, where facilities do not exist for
the defense of Oahu, all work possible under current appropriations will be
done to prepare them so that M-Day operation will be possible.
b. Army Plans. The mobilization plans to be prepared for the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, will provide for —
(1) A survey in time of peace of the resources of the Hawaiian Islands in
men, material, supply and installations and a tabulation of those of military
value or necessary for the maintenance of the civil population.
(2) An allocation, in consultation and accord with the Navy, of the resources
of the Hawaiian Islands to the Army, to the Navy, and to the civilian popula-
tion in conformity with Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this document.
[8] (3) Plan for recruitment of Army personnel.
(4) Reception and distribution of Army personnel procured by selective
sei-vice.
(5) Operation of a labor pool, in consultation and accord with the Navy, for
use by the Army, by the Navy, and by civilian establishments in conformity
with the detailed agreements, of this document, and utilizing to the best advan-
tage the Territorial Civilian Effort Plan.
(6) Operation and administration of martial law in the Hawaiian Islands,
except in localities under naval jurisdiction, in event of martial law.
(7) Control and care of the civil population of the Hawaiian Islands (civil
organization (Par. 15 d, above) to assist), in event of martial law.
(8) Operation or supervision, in consultation and accord with the Navy, of all
civil utilities and establishments in the Hawaiian Islands vital to military effort
and civil life, in event of martial law.
(9) Maintenance and hospitalization of the civil population, in event of
martial law.
(10) Operation or supervision of all local shipping facilities on shore allotted
to the Army as covered in Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements, of this docu-
ment, in event of martial law.
(11) Reception, housing or storage, and distribution of all Army reinforce-
ments and supplies received on Oahu.
c. Navy Plans. The mobilization plans to be prepared by the Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District, will provide for —
(1) A survey in time of peace of the Navy requirements in man-power, ma-
terial, supplies, and installations desired from local sources.
(2) Plan for recruitment of Navy personnel.
(3) Reception and distribution of Navy personnel procured by selective service.
(4) Procurement and distribution of local civil personnel needed for naval
employment through the labor pool operated by the Army in conformity with
the detailed agreements covered under Section VI, Detailed Joint Agreements
of this document, in event of martial law.
(5) Operation or supervision of such civil utilities and establishments in the
Hawaiian Islands as are assigned to the Navy, as covered in Section VI, De-
tailed Joint Agreements of this document, in event of martial law.
1434 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(6) Operation or supervision of all civil agencies in the Hawaiian Islands
for the regulation of water shipping, in event of martial law.
(7) Patrol and police of water areas, to include patrol of coastal zone and
protection of shipping therein.
(8) Control of harbor and coastal lights, buoys, and aids to navigation.
(9) Control of all shipping activities in the Hawaiian Islands.
(10) Operation or supervision of all local shipping facilities on shore allotted
to the Navy as covered in Section VI, Joint Agreements, of this document, in
event of martial law.
SECTION VI — JOINT AGREEMENTS
20. The details of the allocation of local resources of man-power, supply,
material, and installations will be determined by joint agreement. Agreements
will cover the following general subjects and such others as may require coordina-
tion from time to time :
Allocation of military and civil man-power.
Allocation of utilities and installations for furtherance of military
operations.
Allocation of transportation, land and water.
Allocation of signal communications.
Allocation of material and supplies.
Allocation of food supply.
21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice
in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until
disapproved in part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Department.
This HCF-41 (JCD-42) supercedes HCF-39 {JCD-13) except that the Annexes
Nos. I to VIII of latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to VII, inclusive,
of this plan.
(Signed) C. C. Bloch,
G. C. Block,
Rear-Admiral, U. 8. Navij,
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
(Signed) Walter C. Short,
Walter C. Short,
Lieut. General, U. S. Army,
Commanding, Hawaiian Department.
[/] Headquarters Headquarters
14th Naval District, Hawaiian Department,
Pearl Harbor, T. H. Fort Shafter, T. H.
Joint Coastal Frontier Defens-b Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth
Naval District — 1939
28 March 1941.
annex no. vii, section vi .toint agreements joint security measures,
PROTIXTION OF FLEET AND PEARL HARBOR BASE
I. General.
1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet
and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air
attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization
for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of the HCF-39,
(14 ND-JCD-13), are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at once and
will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their renouncement
in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to incorporate lessons
determined from joint exercises will probably be both desirable and necessary.
II. Joint air operations.
2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval
Base Defense Officer ( the Commandant of the 14th Naval District ) . agree that the
threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant .such action,
each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make avail-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1435
able without delay to the other coiumander such proportion of the air forces at his
disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be
conducted in accordance with the following plans :
a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the
tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the
Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due considera-
tion to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes
released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain
available to the Navy, for repeated attacks; if required, until completion of the
mission, when it will revert to Army control.
[2] b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of
Oahu will be executed under the tactical c<mimand of the Army. The Naval Base
Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these
missions. With due consideration to the t'actical situation existing, the number
of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maxhnum practicable.
This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or
for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical
situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th
Naval District), and reverts to Navy control.
c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search oper-
ations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the
tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.
d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for
the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will
pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.
III. Joint Communications
• *«***•
5. Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, The Army will
operate an Antiaircraft Intelligence Service which, using wire and radio broad-
casts, will disseminate information pertaining to the movements of friendly and
hostile aircraft. It should be understood that the limitations of the AAAIS
are such that the interval between receipt of a warning and the air attack will
in most cases be very short. Radio broadcasts from the AAAIS will be trans-
mitted on 900 kilocycles. All information of the presence or movements of hos-
tile aircraft offshore from Oahu which is secured through Navy channels will be
transmitted promptly to the Conunand Tost of the Provisional Antiaircraft
Brigade.
6. Upon establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, provision will be made
for transmission of information on the location of distant hostile and friemlly
aircraft. Special wire or radio circuits will be made available for the use of Navy
liaison officers, so that they may make their own evaluation of available infor-
mation and transmit them to their respective organizations. Information relat-
ing to the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which
is secured through Navy channels will be transmitted without delay to the Air-
craft Warning Service Information Center.
7. The several joint communications systems listed in paragraphs 3 and 4
above, the Antiaircraft Intelligence Service, and the Aircraft Warning Service
(after establishment) will be manned and operated during comljat, alert periods,
joint exercises which involve these communications systems, and at such other
periods as may be agreed upon by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department
and the Naval Base Defen.se [3] Officer. The temporary loan of surplus
communication equipment by one service to the other service to fill shortages
in joint connnunication nets is encouraged where practicable. Prompt steps wiil
be taken by the service receiving the borrowed equipment to obtain replacements
for the borrowed articles through their own supply channels.
IV. Joint Antiaircraft Measures.
8. Arrival and Departure Procedure, Aircraft. — During joint exercises, alert
periods, and c«mibat, and at such other times as the Connnanding General Ha-
waaian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commanding Four-
teenth Naval District) may agree upon, all Army and Navy aircraft approaching
Oahu or leaving airfields or air bases thereon will conform to the Arrival and
Departure Procedure prescribed in Inclosure A. This procedure will not be
modified except when a <leparture therefrom is essential due to combat (real or
simulated during exercises) or due to an emergency.
1436 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
9. Balloon harrages.— Reports from abroad indicate the successful develop-
ment and use of balloon barrages by European belligerents both British and
German. Although detailed information is not available, the possibilities of
balloon barrages in the Oahu area are recognized. Further investigation and
study is necessary both locally and by the War and Navy Dejmrtments in order
to determine the practicability of this phase of local defense.
10. Marine Corps Antiaircraft Artillery.— When made available by the Naval
Base Defense Officer, (Commandant, 14th Naval District), Marine Corps units
manning antiaircraft artillery present on Oahu will be placed under the tactical
control of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.
11. Aircraft Warning Service. — The Army will expedite the installation and
placing in operation of an Aircraft Warning Service. During the period prior
to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of Radar and
other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as
may be practicable.
Approved : 2 April 1941.
(Signed) Walter C. Short,
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, V. S. Army,
Commanding Hawaiian Department.
(Signed) C. C. Bloch,
C. C. Bloch,
Rear Admiral, U. 8. Navy,
Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.
[1] March 31, 1941.
Comdr. Naval Base
t)efense Air Force,
Commander Patrol Wing TWO, Commanding General
Naval Air Station, Hawaiian Air Force,
Pearl Harbor, T. H. Fort Shafter, T. H.
Joint Estimate Covering Joint Army and Navy Air Action in the Event of
Sudden Hostile Action Aganst Oahu or Fleet Unts in the Hawaiian Area
1. Summary of the Situation.
(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain
and varying.
(b) In the past Orange has. never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of
war.
(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on
Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific
for a long period.
(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas
organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine
force which initiates hostile action.
(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding
force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelli-
gence service.
I^ Survey of opposing Strengths.
(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or
more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For
such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to
be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better.
Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armoured and armed with 10-8"
guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7000
treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numl)ers and charac-
teristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However the best
estimate at present available is that the small [2] carriers can accommo-
date from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones about 60. Probably the best assump-
tion is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided between
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1437
fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and armament
of planes we must assume tliat they are at least the equal of our similar types.
There probably exist at least 12 eight inch gun and at least 12 six inch gun fast
modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1989)
shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this
area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base
and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating
at sea in the Hawaiian area.
(b) The most diflBcult situation for us to meet would be when several of the
above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-
based air force available to us in a constantly varying quantity which is being
periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also
varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of the
planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for flight.
The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any
extended period, from bases on Oahu, a patrol extensive enough to insure that
an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over Oahu as a complete
surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support sus-
tained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting
at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work.
If present planes are used to bomb well defended ship objectives the number
available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the
continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of
those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting.
Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for [3] com-
batant work, can be used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol
planes. Other types of aircraft, in general, can perform functions that accord
with their type.
III. Possible enemy action.
(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:
1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl
Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.
(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU
would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would
most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach
inside of three hundred miles.
(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more sub-
marines or more planes awaiting, to attack after defending aircraft have been
drawn away by the original thrust .
(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable
undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a
carrier.
(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be deliv-
ered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that
it might flnd us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow
to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from
a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have
all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage
that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the
next day near enough for us to make [4] a successful air attack. The dis-
advantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the
islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be
a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably
will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be
complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the
advantages of the above. After l^ostilities have commenced, a night attack
would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk
attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance
for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with
any air attack.
IV. Action open to us:
(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to
reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but
1438 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a
very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken
unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather
narrow time limits.
(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating
areas or on the islands : i
1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location
of hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present.
2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force
and its dispatch for attack when information is available.
(c) In the event of an air attack on Oaliu, in addition to (b) above:
1. The immediate dispatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to inter-
cept the attackers.
[o] 2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long
range shore based aircraft.
3. The prompt dispatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to
their carriers.
(d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in addi-
J^ion to (b) above:
1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to
counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is inmiinent.
2. Dispatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over
the attack area.
3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius
from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight
period.
(e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack
is known to be innninent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack
develops time will probably be vital and our actions must istart with a minimum
of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, mis-
sions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so
that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when
one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the
necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required :
1. Search Unit.
2. Attack Unit.
3. Air Combat Unit.
Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with
very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying
conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be
desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordi-
nated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task
group commander.
[6] V. Decisions:
1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against
OAHU or fleet units In order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from
a surprise attack and to obtain Information upon which to base coordinated
retaliatory measures.
2. Subftidiuri/ decisions. In order to be in all respects prepared to promptly
execute the above decision :
(a) Establish a task organization as follows by the i.ssue of a joint air
operation plan :
1. Search and Attack Grout) {Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force
(Commander Patrol Winfj TWO)) The following units In accordance with cur-
rent conditions of readiness :
Patrol squadrons.
Shore-based VO-VS units.
Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
Shore-based carrier A'S planes not assigned to air combat group.
Sliore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
Army bombardment squadrons.
Army reconnaissance squadrons.
Navy Utility Squadrons.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1439
2. -.4i7- Combat Group {Commander Hawaiian Air Force) The following units
in accordance with current conditions of readiness:
Army pursuit squadrons.
Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.
Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
One division of shore-based carried VS planes. (Primarily for trailing
aircraft)
(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows:
[7] 1. Search and Attack Group. Locate, report and track all hostile
surface units in position to take or thi-eaten hostile action. Destroy hostile
ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting
ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to : (1) carrier
involved in attack (2) vesels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.
2. Air Combat Group. Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and
report type of attacking aircraft. Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier
and report location to conunander search and attack group. As a secondary
mission suppoit search and attack group upon request.
(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan
when :
(a) An air attack occurs on Oahu.
(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack
is probable.
(c) Information is received that an attack has been made on fleet units.
(d) Define conditions of i-eadiness for use with this plan as follows:
Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and
number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a
condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating
the degree of readiness prescribed foj- that part.
MATfl3lAL BEl&DINESS
A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.
B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for
a task.
[S] C. Approximately one quarter of all aircraft of each functional type
available and ready for a task.
D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available
and ready for a task.
E. All aircraft conducting i-outine operations, none ready for the purposes
of this plan.
DEGREE OF READINESS
1. For pursuit and VF types — four minutes. Types other than fighters —
fifteen minutes.
2. All types — 30 minutes.
3. All types — one hour.
• 4. All types — two hours.
5. All types — four hours.
The armaneiit and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of
i-eadiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory plans and orders
and will be prescribed therein.
(e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be main-
tained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the S?nior officers present of
the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them.
In using the above conditions it should be noted that : CONDITION A-1 requires
a preparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for only a
short time as it is an all hands condition. CONDITIONS B-1 and B-2 require
watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will
decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any condition 1, 2, or 3 will
curtail essential expansion training work. CONDITIONS C. or D, 4 or 5 can
be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.
[9] (f ) In order to perfect fundamental communitions by use and to insure
that prospective Task Group Commanders at all times know the forces immedi-
ately available to them for use, under the plan above, in case of a sudden emer-
gency, provide, for daily dispatch readiness reports as of the end of normal daily
flying from all units to their prospective task force commander. These reports to
state :
1440 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(a) Number of planes iii the unit by functional types such as bomber,
fighter, etc.
(b) Number of each type in commission for flight and their degree of
readiness as defined above.
(g) After the joint air operations plan under subsidiary decision (a) above has
been issued, the task group commanders designated therein will prepare detailed
contributory plans for their groups to cover the various probable situations requir-
ing quick action in order that the desired immediate action in an emergency can
be initiated with no further written orders. To assist in this work the following
temporary details will be made :
(a) By Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol
Wing TWO) an oflJcer experienced in VF and VS operations and planning to
assist the Commander of Air Combat Group.
(b) By the Commander Hawaiian Air Force: an officer experienced in
Army bombardment and reconnaissance operations and planning to assist the
Commander of the Search and Attack Group.
(Signed) F. L. Martin,
F. L. MABrnN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.
(Signed) P. N. L. Bellinger,
P. N. L. Behxinger,
Rear Admiral, U. 8. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air. Force,
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO)
[i] Standing Operating PR0CEa>uBE
Hawaiian De3»aetment
5 NOVEMBIEB 1941.
SECTION I — GENERAL
5. Tactical principles. — * ♦ • The chief tactical principles applicable to the
problem of the defense of Oahu and the air fields on the outlying islands are as
follows :
a. Complete organization of the ground
b. Position to be held lightly
c. Large reserves, held mobile, with motor transportation sufficient to transport
them
d. Automatic counter-attack.
6. Security. — Everj' unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile
ground or air forces.
*******
10. Antiaircraft defense. — a. Antiaircraft defense is a responsibility of every
unit.
*******
d. All unit commanders will be held responsible for the following :
(1 ) Maintenance of air guards to give timely warning of the approach of hostile
aviation.
(2) Adoption of necessary measures to prevent hostile observation and aerial
photography through advantageous use of terrain, utilization of cover, and use of
camouflage.
(3) Reduction of vulnerability to air attack and observation by dispersion of
personnel and material when in bivouac or in position and by increased speed
during movement.
[21 SECTION III — ALERTS
13. All defense measures are classifled under one of the three (3) Alerts as
indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department
order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph 15/ (8) below.
14. Alert No. 1. — a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and upris-
ings within the islands, with no threat from without.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1441
b. At Department Headquarters, all General and Special Staff Sections will
continue with their usual duties at their present stations, pending further orders.
r. Department Troops will carry on their normal training, pending instructions
from this Headquarters.
d. Each Infantry Division will:
(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.
(2) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient
to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.
(3) Protect the Schofield Barracks Reservation and all vital installations
(except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector,
not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.
« * * * * * ■ *
e. The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Conmiand will :
(1) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, .searchlights, observation
and fire control installation.s, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft
defense.
(2) Protect all vital installations on posts and re.servations of the command.
^ ***** *
/. The Hawaiian Air Force will :
(1) Protect all vital installations on posts on Oahu garrisoned by air forces.
(2) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local
base detachments with District ('omnianders. See paragraph 14 g below.
[3] g. The District Commanders, assisted by the air corps detachments within
the districts, will :
Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage,
and maintain order in the civil community.
« * * ' * * * *
i. The Station Complements of Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields, under
command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the protection of all vital
installations on their respective posts.
* * * * * * *
15. Alert No. 2. — a. This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than
Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and air-
craft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.
b. At Department Headquarters, only the G-2 and G-3 Sections will be required
to operate on a 24-hour basis. All other sections of the General and Special
Staffs will continue with their normal schedule.
c. Department Ti'oops will carry on their normal training, pending instructions
from this Headquarters.
d. Elach Infantry Division will :
(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.
(2) Maintain available all units at fifty percent (50%) of their present
strength, except tho.se required under (3), (4) and (5) below.
(3) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient
to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.
(4) Protect the Schofield Barracks Reservation and all vital installations
(except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector,
not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.
* * * * * * *
(6) Place 240 mm howitzers in position, establish the necessary guards and,
when directed, place ammunition at positions.
[4] (7) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155
mm. guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 15 e below.
* ♦ * * • * *
€. The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, and attached Field Artillery,
will:
(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft defense positions, except that
railway batteries will remain at Fort Kamehameha or where emplaced.
(2) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational
control.
(3) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observa-
tion and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and anti-
aircraft defense.
1442 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(4) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command,
except Fort Shatter. For Fort Shatter, see paragraph 15 fc (1) below.
(5) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.
(6) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.
(7) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.
(8) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.
(9) Prot'ect the Rgidio Beacon on Sand Island.
(10) Provide Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.
/. The Hawaiian air force will :
(1) Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this
headquarters. See paragraph 17.
(2) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.
(3) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival
thereat, disperse on fields.
(4) Disperse bombers with crews.
[5] (5) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.
(6) Protect all vital installations on posts on Oahu garrisoned by air forces.
(7) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local
base detachments witii District Commanders. See paragraph 15 (/ below.
(8) In case of surprise hostile attack:
(a) Release to Navy for oj^erational control all bombers in condition of read-
iness "A". The bomber conmiander will report to the Conmiander of Patrol
Wing Two.
(b) Receive all available shore based Naval and Marine Corps fighter planes
in appropriate condition of readiness and release them to the Interceptor Com-
mand for operational control.
g. The District Commanders, a.ssisted by the air corps detachments within
the districts, will : Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against
acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.
ti ***** *
i. The Department Signal Officer will :
(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service
and then release it to the Interceptor Command.
(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy connnunications are in readiness for imme-
diate employment.
}. The Inter<'eptor Command will : Coordinate and control the operations of
pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine
Corps AA Artillery), the Aircraft Warning Service, and attached units, and
will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under
military control, to include :
(1) Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft.
(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in Pearl and/or
Honolulu Harbors.
[€] (3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.
k. Station Complements :
(1) The Fort Shaffer Complement, under the supervision of the Department
Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on Fort Shatter and, in
addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Head-
quarters and Tri'pler General Hospital.
(2) The Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields Complements, under command
of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts
against sabotage, air and ground attacks.
• **•*••
16. Ale?t No. 3 — a. This alert requires the occupation of all field positions
by all units, prepared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations
on outlying islands.
ft. At Department Headquarters:
(1) All sections of the forward echelon * * * will occupy their stations
at forward command post, prepared to operate on a 24-hour basis.
(2) All sections of the rear echelon * * * will continue their usual duties
at their present stations. Blackout instructions will be complied with.
c. Department Troops will remain in condition of mobile readiness at their
permanent stations, pending Instructions from this headquarters.
d. Each Infantry Division will :
(1) Defend its assigned sector on Oahu.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1443
(2) Protect all vital iiistallatioiis (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy
Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home
Gutti'd.
*******
(5) Place 240mm howitzers in position.
(6) Release Field Artillery units manning seacost armament (IHS mm guns)
to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 16 e below.
*******
[7] ('. The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, and attached Detachment
Field Artillery will :
(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft positions.
(2) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.
(3) Prevent approach of and landing fnmi hostile vessels.
(4) Supijort the Infantry Divisions.
(5) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.
(()) Coordinate seacoast defen.se with the Inshore Patrol.
(7) Provide the Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control
Post.
(S) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for opera-
tional control.
(9) Protect all vital installations on posts and re.servations of the command,
except Fort Shafter. For Fort Shafter, see paragraph 16 / (2) below.
(10) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, ob.serva-
tion and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiair-
craft defense.
f. The Hawaiian Air Force will:
(1) Destroy enemy aircraft.
(2) Carry out bombing missions as directed.
(3) Cooperate with Naval air forces.
(4) On Oahu, defend all posts garrisoned by air forces against sabotage, air
and ground attacks.
(5) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local
base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 16 h below.
(6) Arm all planes, except that normally bmuhs will not be loaded on ships
dispatched to outlying islands.
(7) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival
thereat, disperse on fields.
(8) Di.sperse bombers with crews.
(9) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.
[8] (10) Perform observation, command and photographic missions.
(11) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Intercepter Command.
* * * * Hf Hf *
h. The District Commanders of "Hawaii, Maui (includes Molokai) and Kauai
Districts, assisted by the air coi"ps detachments present within the districts, will :
Defend the air fields against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain
order in the civil community.
* * * * * * *
j. The Interceptor Conmiand will coordinate and control the operations of
pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine
Corps AA Artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, and will
provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military
control to include :
(1) Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft.
(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in Pearl and/or
Honolulu Harbors.
(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.
A-. The Department Signal Officer will :
(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service
and then release it to the Interceptor Command.
(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for im-
mediate employment.
(3) Be prepared to assume control over essential civilian communications.
I. Station Complements. —
(1) The Schofield Barracks Complement will protect all vital installations
on the Schofield Reservation.
1444 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(2) The Fort Shatter Complement, under the supervision of the Department
Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on Fort Shatter and, in
addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Head-
quarters and Tripler General Hospital.
(3) The Hickam, Wheeler and P.ellows Field Complements, under command
of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts
against sabotage, air and ground attacks.
SECTION III — CONDITION OF REAUINKSS FOR AIKCK.\FT
[.9] 17. Condition of readiness for aircraft will be prescribed b.v a com-
bination of a letter and a number as indicated in paragraphs a and b below.
The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness
for its assigned task and tl'e number indicating the degree of operational readi-
ness prescribed for that part.
a. Material Readiness. —
A — All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.
B — One-half of all aircraft of e}ic!i functional type available and ready for a
task.
C — Approximately one-qiiarter of all aircraft of each functional type available
and ready for a task.
D — Approximately one-eiglith of all aircraft ( f each functional type available
and ready for a task.
E — A'l aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes
of this plan.
h. Degree of operational Readiness. —
All times listed in this tjible are the maximums allowed for the first plane of
a unit to be in the air armed and prepared to carry out the assigned task.
1 — For pursuit and VF types : Four minutes. Types other than fighters :
Fifteen minutes.
2— All types: SO Minutes.
3— All types : One hour.
4 — All types : Two hours.
5 — All types: Four hours.
SECTION IV — INTEXUGENCE
* * * * ^n * *
20. Measures to obtain information. —
a. Navy. —
(1) Transmit, through the Joint Intelligence Loop, information received fi'om
the Offshore and Inshore Patrols, from any escort or attack forces forme<l, and
from any other Naval Ships relative to:
(a) Location, composition, course, and speed of enemy units encountered,
with particular reference to location of aircraft carriers and transports.
*******
[10] (d) Indications of any hostile aerial activity in strength.
• •*•••*
b. Army.
(1) Hawaiian Air Force.
(a) Observe all waters within an area bounded as follows:
By arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at Opana Point. Maui; Kauiki
Head Light, Maul; Laupahoehoe Light, Hawaii; Cape Kumukahi Light, Hawaii;
Kalae Light, Hawaii; Southwest Headland, Kahoolawe ; Leahi Point, Nlhau;
Lahua Island, Niihau ; Kailiu Point, Kauai ; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius
with its center at Kahuku Point, Oahu, and the tangents connecting these arcs
in the order named.
Report location, composition, course and speed of enemy units encountered.
Maintain continuous contact with major .subdivisions of enemy units. Particular
attention to Ucaticm of aircraft carriers and transports. First contact, material
changes of direction, and definite location of aircraft carriers to be reported
immediately by Joint Intelligence Loop; thereafter on the hour by department
Intelligence Loop.
(b) lieport indications of landing on any Island, giving location, number, type
and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting Naval group.
Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loops.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1445
(c) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops, and installations. Dam-
age to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other ihiportant damage
immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop.
(d) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment, incurred or ob-
served by their operations. Important damage, including damage to landing
fields, and use of chemicals, immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop; otiier dam-
age at 1815 by Department Intelligence Loop,
(e) Report any hostile aerial activity in strength, including number, type,
direction and area of attack or observation, by Joint Intelligence Loop.
• *•**••
(3) Interceptor Command. —
(a) Report immediately any and all information of hostile air force or surface
vessel.
[11] (b) Report, upon completion of action by or with enemy air force, com-
position of enemy forces, direction of approach, time of action, area attacked,
and (lemage to enemy airplanes.
c. All Elements of Hawaiian Department. —
(1) Report presence of parachute troops and assemblies of enemy nationals
or sympathizers and overt acts of sabotage or terrorism, giving location, time,
numbers involved, and probable intentions or damage accomplished.
SECTION V — ADMINISTRATION
25. Supply.
*******
e. Class V Supplies :
* * *• • • • •
(4) Credits of an "initial issue" and of one "unit of fire" are automatically
placed at the disposal and under the control of all major echelon conmianders
whenever an Alert is ordered. Quantities of various types of ammunition included
in the "initial issue" and in a "unit of fire" are shown in Inclosures Nos. 6 and 7
herewith. Load of Aircraft Ammunition per airplane is indicated in Inclosure
No. 8.
(5) At the time Alert No. 2 or No. 3 is ordered, all units will draw such of
their "initial issue" as has not already been drawn, except that for Alert No. 2
the Infantry Divisions will draw initially only Vg of the "initial issues" and the
balance thereof will be drawn after occupation of positions with their organic
and/or sector weapons. Whenever issues cannot be made sinmltaneously, they
will be made according to the following order of priority and according to a
schedule to be mutually arranged between the Unit Supply Officer and the Supply
Point concerned.
Aircraft bombs and ammunition for aircraft weapons.
Antiaircraft 3", 37 mm. and Machine Gun ammunition.
Ground machine gun ammunition — all types.
Other small arms ammunition.
All artillery ammunition, less antiaircraft.
(6) At the time Alert No. 1 is ordered, only small arms ammunition included
in the "initial issue" will be drawn.
[12] (7) Aircraft bombs will not be issued in "initial issue" but will be
held available in bomb storage areas.
(8) Two "units of fire" of bombs and machine gun ammunition will be main-
tained on outlying islands for each airplane operating therefrom.
/. Dumps and Ammunition Distributing Points will be established as directed
by this headquarters.
1446 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(Inclosure No. 6)
[13]
Allowances of ordnance ammunition per weapon (other than aircraft)
for initial issue, Hawaiian Department
Arm or service
Nc
. of rds.
per weapon
AP
Ball
Tracer
Total
Rifle, cal. .30, M1903
CA _
Eng.. - _ . ... _
25
140
40
32
112
28
40
25
105
80
162
28
64
40
48
105
460
560
'" '992'
240
30
525
1,500
3,500
"i.'soo'
4,725
2.100
28
21
340
350
440
240
20
._
32
8
---
24
46
8
16
---
120
60
240
120
60
20
75
250
1,000
1,200
1,800
900
250
2,350
300
"""iio"
60
1,440
720
720
150
240
392
185
40
FA
40
Inf. (Rifle Plat.)
16
4
160
Inf. (except Rifle Plat.) .
40
QM.. .
40
Sig _
25
Rifle, US, cal. .30, Ml
Others
Eng_._
Inf. (Rifle Plat.)
30
48
24
4
150
152
232
Inf. (except Rifle Plat.) - -
40
Ord
80
Sig _
40
MP
48
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30.
Others
CWS
30
150
580
CA _._
FA _
Inf
Ord
60
960
60
680
1,100
1,172
300
QM..
30
150
250
500
4,800
7,200
3,600
250
675
600
80
Machine guB, cal. .30, HB
Others
Eng .
750
2,000
(M1919A4).
Inf
5,000
Tanks or Arnid. Cars
6,000
Machine gun, cal. .30, WC
CA
9,000
(M1917A1).
(AW Bn.) CA (except AW Bn.)....
Eng
Inf
4,500
2,000
6,750
Pistol, cal 45
Others
CWS, CA, Eng., Inf ,...
3,000
28
FA, Ord., QM, Sig., MP, others.. .
21
340
Sig (other than motorcycles)
250
MP
550
Others
300
Machine gun, cal. .50, WC (AA)_
CA (AW Bn.)
5,760
2,880
2,880
600
960
1,568
7,200
CA (except AW Bn.) .
3,600
Machine gun, cal. .50, HB
Others
FA
Inf
Tanks or Armd. Cars
3,600
750
1,200
1,900
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1447
[tSl Weapon
Arm or SerWee
No. of rds. per weapon
AP
Ball
Tracer
HE
Total
Shotgun _- - - -
All
25
Grenades, hand, frag, (per Rifle Co.)-
Inf
150
SisTials, ground (asstd.) . .
Inf
25
Sig. fAvn. or Wg.
Co.).
Sig. (Opn. or Tri.
Div. Co.).
All
5
30
Lights, Verv signal (assorted) . .
24
37nim gun, M1916 .
240
240
37mm gun, \ntitank (M3)
FA
200
l60
180
200
Inf
20
1,620
120
132
18
200
CA
1,800
Inf
120
81mm, or 3" Trench Mortar
Inf
(light)
(heavy)
150
75mm gun, Truck-D
All -.:
""V459
75mm gun, Antitank
FA
1 144
105mm How
FA
1205
155mm How . .. .. ..
FA .
1 117
3" AA mobile
CA
15
12
285
238
300
100
60
300
00mm A k mobile
CA
250
3" AA fixed
CA
300
155mm gun, M1918M1
All
100
240mm How. M1918
FA
60
8" Ry. Gun
CA
85
85
FIXED SEACOAST ARTILLERY
3" gun, M 1903
505
505
6" pin
1,000
350
335
275
300
280
250
1,000
8" gun
266
550
12" gun (Barbette Carriage)
335
275
12" Mortar
300
14" gun
280
16" gun
250
Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept.
Whenever any type of ammunition is not avilahle in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution of
other types suitable for the weapon will be made.
1 Proportions of types (shrapnel, reduced charge HE, and normal charge HE) will be shown on requisi-
tions kept on file at the designated supply points.
79716 O — 46-
1448 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(Inclosure No. 7)
\ie] Unit of fire (other than aircraft) — Hawaiian Department
Weapon
Rifle, eal. .30, Ml or M1903
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30.
Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A4) (other than combat
vehicle)
Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A2 or A4) (combat ve
hide) -.
Machine gun, cal. .30 (M1917-17A1)
Pistol, cal. .45 _
Submachine gun, cal. .45
Machine gun, cal. .50, HB
Machine gun, cal. .50, A A, WC (except in Gun Batteries)..
Machine gun, eal. .50, AA, WC (in Gun Batteries)
Grenades, hand, frag, (per Rifle Co.)
Projector, signal ground (assorted)
Pistol, Very, Mk III
37mm gun, M1916
37mm gun, antitank, M3
37mm gun, antiaircraft...
60mm Mortar ._
81mm Mortar
3" Trench Mortar.
75mm Field Gun..
75mm gun, antitank
105mm How
155mm How. M1918
3" A A gun, mobile.
90mm AA gun, mobile..
3" A A gun, fixed
155mm gun, M1918 MI.
240mm How. M1918
8" Ry Gun
4" Chemical Mortar
4.2" Chemical Mortar. .
No. rds. for one (1) unit of Are
AP Ball Tracer HE
30
150
600
600
720
1,920
960
112
'85
105
525
525
2,100
20
160
150
300
40
180
480
240
(Light)
(Heavy)
[Super)
Tormal)
(Reduced)
(No
120
36
540
400
234
66
36
150
114
39
225
150
285
238
300
38
60
Total
150
750
750
750
3,000
20
200
900
2,400
1,200
150
25
24
120
120
600
400
300
300
300
150
225
150
300
250
300
150
60
85
200
200
Notes
Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept.
Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution
f other types suitaljle for the weapon will be made.
[/71
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
(Inclosure No. 8)
Load oj aircraft ammunition per airplane
1449
Type .\irplane
Item
Bombers
Pursuit
OBS.
(C&D)
Hv.
(B17D)
Med.
(B-18)
Lt.
(A20A)
(P-40)
(P36A)
(P-26)
1 -en-
gine
(0^7)
Ctg. APCal30 - -
Ctg. ball Cal30
480
120
600
60
900
240
1,200
1,280
320
1,600
1,920
480
2,400
1,600
400
2,000
20
300
80
400
400
100
500
10
150
40
200
800
200
1,000
640
Ctg. tr Cal 30
160
Total Cal30# ' . . . «
800
Ctg. AP Cal 50 -
Ctg. ball Cal 50
Ctg. tr Cal50 .
Total Cal 50*
BOMBS
Bomb frag. 30# . .
40
12
4
2
1
10
and
Bomb Demo. 100#
20
14
8
6
4
14
3
6
20
10
32
14
6
4
2
14
3
6
20
7
or
Bomb Demo. 300#
or
Bomb Demo. 500-600#
or
Bomb Demo. 1000-11 00#
or
Bomb Demo. 2000#
PYROTECHNICS
Bomb Photoflash . .
14
Flare M262
1
6
20
1
Flare M 9
5
Sig. AC Asstd
20
Sig. Drift
1 For Reconnaissance squadrons only.
2 Flare M8A1 used as temporary substitute on the basis of 2-M8 or M8A1 flares per M26 flare.
U]
Operations Orders
Hawaiian Department
part vi — field order number 1 ns (naval security)
Field Orders No. — Ins
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Port Shatter, T. H.
(Date)i (Hour)>
Maps: Topographic, Island of Oahu, 1/62,500 (1940 Edition): Terrain Map,
Island of Oahu, 1/20,000 (1940 Edition) ; Island of Oahu 1/180,000 (1939
Edition) ; Hawaiian Islands, Eastern Part U. S. C&G.S. Chart No. 4102.
1. o. (1) For information of the enemy see Current Summaries of
Intelligence.
(2) In the current unsettled international situation, it is assumed that it is
possible that a declaration of war upon the United States may be preceded by a
surprise raid or attack upon the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and ships of the
Pacific Fleet by hostile aircraft, submarines, or surface ships with a view to
the destruction or damaging of naval installations, ships, and facilities. Such
a raid or attack may be accompanied by acts of sabotage committed by hostile
sympathizers.
^ Date and hour this Field Order becomes effective will be announced by orders from
this headquarters. See also par. 3 c (6) (Page 3).
1450 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
6. The Pacific Fleet and the Fourteenth Naval District, while continuing
normal training and operations, are taking certain security measures, which
include :
(1) By the Pacific Fleet :
(a) Daily air patrols of areas in which elements of the Pacific Fleet are
operating.
(b) The organization of a striking force of cruisers and destroyers to
cooperate with Army and Navy aviation in the attack on hostile surface ships.
(c) The organization of a destroyer attack unit to locate and destroy hostile
submarines.
(d) The organization of four air defense groups for the control and
distribution of the antiaircraft fire of all ships anchored in Pearl Harbor.
(2) By the Naval Base Defense Force (Fourteenth Naval District and
attached units) :
[2] (a) Establishment of an inshoie patrol consisting of a destroyer patrol
at Ihe entrance to the Pearl Harbor channel, a boom patrol, a harbor patrol,
and dally mine sweeping operation.
(b) The organization of an air striking force consisting of Patrol Wing Two,
attached Fleet aircraft, and attached aircraft from the 18th Bombardment Wing
to search tor and attack hostile surface ships.
(c) Establishment of a harbor control post.
(d) The placing under the tactical control of the Army of certain land based
fighter aircraft and Marine Corps antiaircraft artillery units.
2. The Hawaiian Dc'partment, supported by Naval Units placed under the
tactical control of the Army, will operate to defend Oahu from attacks by hostile
aircraft and hostile naval vessels, will take precautionary measures to prevent acts
of sabotage by hostile sympathizers, and will support naval forces conducting-
aerial attacks on hostile naval vessels.
3. a. The Hawaiian Division will provide protection for vital installations
on Oahu, except those located within Police District No. 1, against acts of sabotage
committed by hostile sympathizers, will maintain one infantry battalion with
necessary motor transportation in readiness at Schofield Barracks prepared to
move on two hours notice, and will maintain normal training activities with the
remainder of the command.
b. The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, supported by such Marine
Corps antiaircraft artillery units as may be made available, will defend Oahu
against attacks by aircraft, surface vessels and submarines, paying particular
attention to the defense of the Pearl Harbor-Hickam Field area, and in addition
thereto, will —
(1) Provide the Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.
(2) Cooperate with Army and Navy Air Forces in safe guarding friendly
aircraft from the fire of antiaircraft artillery troops.
(3 ) Arrange for such coordination of the antiaircraft artillery fire of naval ships
in Pearl Harbor and the Army antiaircraft artillery defense as may be practicable.
This coordination will include measures to protect friendly aircraft from the
antiaircraft artillery tire of Naval ships anchored in Pearl Harbor.
(4) Pending the establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service, disseminate
warnings of hostile air attacks by radio broadcast.
(5) Unless specifically authorized, railway guns will not be moved from the
home istations of the units manning this armament.
[3] c. The Hawaiian Air Force, in cooperation with fleet aircraft, will
defend Oahu against attacks by aircraft, will attack hostile Naval vessels, and
in furtherance thereof, will conduct operations as follows :
(1) Offensive Action. Conduct air operations against hostile naval vessels.
Bombardment and reconnaissance aircraft participating in joint air operations
will be placed under the tactical control of the Navy.
(2) Defensive Action. Reinforced by shore based fighter aircraft of the Navy
made available, defend Oahu against air attack. Provide antiaircraft machine
gun defense for airplanes on ground on all fields.
(3) Reconnaissance. Conduct reconnaissance essential to the combat efliciency
of the Air Force and to supplement, where practicable, that of naval air forces
in securing information of hostile fleet movements.
(4) Cooperation. In the preparations for and conduct of joint air operations,
close cooperation will be maintained with the commanders of local Navy air
units. Close cooperation will also be maintained with the Hawaiian Separate
Coast Artillery Brigade to provide for safeguarding Army and Navy aircraft
from the fire of friendly antiaircraft artillery.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1451
(5) Conidtions of Readiness. Aircraft and crews thereof will be maintained
in the condition of readiness directed by this headquarters.
(6) Hostile Air Attack. Air operations directed above will be instituted
without further orders from this headquarters by all aircraft maintained in condi-
tion of readiness therefor upon receipt of information of an air attack upon Oahu
or an attack upon fleet units in Hawaiian waters. All other aircraft and crews
thereof will be alerted and this headquarters advised of action taken.
d. The Department Signal OflScer, in cooperation with Naval communications
personnel will insure that, insofar as equipment available permits, the joint com-
munications described in Section III of Annex No. VII, HCF-39 are in I'eadiness
for immediate employment at any time that they may be required.
e. The Department Provost Marshal, in addition to his normal duties, will :
(1) Be prepared to initiate such precautionary measures as may be required
by the situation to insure protection of vital installations within Police District
No. 1, City and County of Honolulu, exclusive of those located on garrisoned Army
and Navy reservations. These precautionary measures will be limited to the
minimum necessary in order to avoid undue alarm and hysteria of the civil
population.
[^] (2) Maintain close liaison with civilian law enforcement agencies to
determine any indications of the possibility of sabotage by hostile sympathizers.
f. The Commanding Officers, Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai Districts, Department
Service Command will maintain close liaison with civilian law enforcement agen-
cies to determine indications of the possibility of sabotage or attacks by hostile
sympathizers, take such precautionary steps as may be required by the situation
within the means available to them, and when necessary, secure the cooperation
of civilian agencies in the guarding of military airfields.
X. (1) All major units of the defense will cooperate with the 14th Naval
District and elements of the Pacific Fleet in all spheres of action compatible
«vith their missions, armament, and equipment.
(2) Hostile surface ships and aircraft will not be taken under fire except under
the following conditions :
(a) After hostile offensive action, such as the use of bombs, torpedoes, mines
or other ammunition, has been observed.
(b) After receipt of a verified report of a hostile attack.
(c) Upon orders from this headquarters.
(3) Instructions will be issued to all sentinel and patrols guarding vital
installations requiring that ammunition will be used only after all other measures
have been employed, without success.
(4) During periods when elements of the command are alerted under the provi-
sions of this order, normal training will be continued to the extent practicable.
4. a. Small arms and artillery ammunition issued to troops initially will not
exceed approximately one-half day of fire. Provision will be made for prompt
Issue of additional quantities of ammunition. Stocks of aircraft ammunition
and bombs will be maintained at airfields in accordance with existing policies.
6. Other administrative details normal.
5. Command Posts :
Hawaiian Department : Fort Shaffer.
Hawaiian Division : Schofield Barracks.
[5] Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade: Fort DeRussy.
Hawaiian Air Force : Fort Shaffer.
Fourteenth Naval District : Pearl Harbor.
By command of Lieutenant General Short :
(S) Philip Hayes
Philip Hayes,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.
Official : ^
(S) R. C. Throckmorton
R. C. Throckmorton,
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-3.
[6] Distribution:
Distributed as a component part of "Army Operating Defense Plans, Hawaiian
Coastal Frontier, Operations Orders, Hawaiian Department, 1938"
1452 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[1] ExTBACTs Fbom Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5
PART III. ASSIGNMENT OF TASKS
Chapteb II. Forces in the Pacific Abea
SECTION 3. THE NAVAL COASTAL FBONTIEB FORCES
*******
3233. The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces (Chapter VIII, Appendix II) in the
Pacific Area are assigned the following tasks :
(a) Task.
Defend the Naval Coastal Frontiers in categories indicated below :
Category D. ♦ * *
— The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier
APPENDIX I — ANNEX 1. COASTAL FRONTIERS
9. Insert in reference (a) (Joint action of the Army and Navy, 1935) the
following new paragraphs :
"36A. Hawaiian coastal frontier.
"(a) Boundaries.
"The Hawaiian coastal frontier consists of Oahu, and all the land and sea
areas required for its defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance
of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra
Islands and Kingman's Reef.
[2] "(b) Commanders.
"Army. — The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
"Navy. — The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who Is designated as
the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. This oflScer also commands
the assigned naval local defense force and will arrange for its joint tactical and
strategical employment, in cooperation with the Army.
Cincpac File No.
A2-11/FF12/
A4-3 QL/(13)
Serial 01646
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, I lagship
Confidential Pearl Harbor, T. H., October H, 19^1.
Pacific YisEBt Confidential Letteb No. 2CL-41 (Revise))
From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To : Pacific Fleet
Subject : Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.
Reference :
(a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CI/-41.
(b) Cincpac conf. Itr. file A7-2 (13) Serial 01221 of 3 August 1941.
(c) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. lCM-41.
(d) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 2CM-41.
(e) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 3L 40 (Revised).
(f ) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 191^40.
(g) Section 3, Chapter II, U. S. F. 10.
(h) Chapter IV, U. S. F. 10.
Enclosure :
(A) Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan showing Air Defense Sector.
(B) Measures to be effective until further orders.
1. Reference (a) is revised herewith. References (b), (c) and (d), are can-
celled and superseded by this letter.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1453
2. The security of the Fleet, operating and based in the Hawaiian Area, is
predicated, at present, on two assumptions :
(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present
existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and
misguided nationals of such powers may attempt :
(1) sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft.
(2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the
Channel.
(3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor,
(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by :
(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
(3) a combination of these two.
3. The following security measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part
in accordance with enclosure (B) or in their entirety as may later be directed
by the Commander-in-Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet, or the Senior Officer Present Afloat
in the Hawaiian Area :
[2] (A) Continuous Patrol:
(1) Inshore Patrol (administered and furnished by Commandant Fourteenth
Naval District).
(2) Boom Patrols.
(3) Harbor Patrols.
{B) Intermittent Patrols:
(1) Destroyer Offshore Patrol:
(a) The limits of this patrol shall be the navigable portion to seaward of a
circle ten miles in radius from Pearl Harbor entrance buoy number one which
is not patrolled by the Inshore Patrol.
(b) Three destroyers to search twelve hours prior to the sortie or entry of the
Fleet or of a Task Force containing heavy ships. The Fleet or Task Force Com-
mander concerned shall furnish this patrol and when a sortie and entry occur
in succession the Commander entering shall furnish it.
(c) One destroyer (Ready Duty) to screen heavy ships departing or entering
Pearl Harbor other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry. The
Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will administer the Ready Duty De-
stroyer for this purpose and issue necessary orders when requested by forces
afloat. Such Ready Duty Destroyer shall be on one hour's notice.
(2) Air Patrols:
(a) Daily search of operating areas as directed by Aircraft, Scouting Force.
(b) An air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force. It will
search that part of a circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel
buoys which is south of latitude 21°-21' N. The Fleet or Task Force Commander
concerned shall furnish this patrol, establishing it at least two hours prior to the
sortie or entrance, and arranging for its discontinuance. When a sortie and
entry occur in succession, the Commander entering shall supply this patrol.
(c) Air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than
described in foregoing subparagraph. The ship concerned shall furnish the
patrol mentioned therein.
(3) Daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines by Fourteenth Naval
District Forces. The swept channel for Fleet and Task Force sorties or entries
is two thousand yards wide between Points "A" and "X" as defined in subpara-
graph (C) (3), below.
(C) Sortie arid Entry:
(1) Reference (h) will not be in effect in the Pacific Fleet during the present
emergency.
(2) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District controls the movements of
ships within Pearl Harbor, the Entrance Channel, and the swept channel.
(3) Point "A" is midway between Pearl Harbor entrance channel buoys Nos.
ONE and TWO ; Point "A-1" is midchannel on a line drawn 270° true from Buoy
No. EIGHTEEN ; Point "X" unless otherwise prescribed is three thousand yards
bearing 153° true from Point "A."
[3] (4) Zero hour is the time first ship passes Point "A-1" abeam for sortie,
or Point "A" for entry, and will be set by despatch. Interval between ships will
be as prescribed by Fleet or Task Force Commanders.
(5) Fleet and Task Force Commanders shall, for their respective forces ;
(a) Arrange with Commandant Fourteenth Naval District for times of entry
and departure, berthing and services.
1454 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(b) Prepare and issue sortie and entrance plans.
(e) Clear the Defensive Sea Area promptly after sortie.
(d) When a sortie and entry occur in succession, keep entry force well clear of
Defensive Sea Area until sortie force is clear. *
(e) Furnish ovpn patrols except as modified by (B)(1)(b) and (B)(2)(b),
above.
(6) Units departing or entering Pearl Harbor at times other than during a
Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, request authority and services as required,
direct from Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.
(7) Heavy ships (including 7,500 ton light cruisers) maintain a minimum
speed of 15 knots vfhen within a radius of 15 miles from the entrance buoys to
Pearl Harbor. During approach and entry, individual units govern movements to
provide for minimum time in waters adjacent to the entrance.
(D) Operating areas:
(1) The Naval Operating Areas in Hawaiian Waters (U. S. C. & G. S. Chart No.
4102) are considered submarine waters. Observe requirements of reference (g).
(2) Ships, except submarines, shall anchor only in protected anchorages.
Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului are considered as such
if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and if ships are so moored as not to
be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor.
(3) Submarines may anchor in the following places: in Pearl Harbor, off
Lahaina, inside or outside Kahului, off Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrols need
be maintained.
(4) Submarines shall not operate submerged in the vicinity of surface ships
except in accordance with prearranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnery
exercises, or for services to other types.
(5) Submarine operations, except (4) above, shall be confined ordinarily to
Areas C-5, C-7, U-1, M-20, M-21 and M-24. Under special circumstances sub-
marine squadrons may request additional areas from the oflBcer responsible for
assigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear of the general area allo-
cated to surface ships and shall notify all Fleet units in the Hawaiian area.
While submarines are operating subtoerged in C-5 and C-7 they shall maintain a
guard ship on the surface to warn approaching surface ships.
[4] (6) Except as specifically directed for exercise purposes, all opera-
tions of submarines other than those covered in sub-paragraphs (4) and (5)
above, shall be on the surface.
(7) Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, shall ensure that commanders
of surface and air task forces are furnished with detailed submarine schedules
and all changes thereto. The latter shall ensure that units concerned, including
air patrols, operating under their command are properly notified thereof.
(8) Ships proceeding independently across the operating areas at night shall
follow neutral zones and area boundaries where practicable. The Task Force
Commander in the vicinity shall be informed of: (a) the route to be followed
using point numbers on the Operating Chart, (b) time of starting route, (c)
the speed of advance. The Task Force Commander shall notify vessels of his
force that may be concerned.
(E) Ships at Sea:
(1) When ships operate at sea from Pearl Harbor they shall be organized as
a Task Force to which will be assigned destroyers and aircraft as necessary
for screening. Each task force shall be organized offensively and defensively.
These organizations shall be promulgated prior to leaving port and shall provide
for the following :
(a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and attack hostile submarines.
(2) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number
of destroyers available, priority in assignments being governed by the following :
Priority 1— BBs
Priority 2— CVs
Priority 3— CAs
Priority 4 — CLs
(c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier (if operating) and destroyers, to co-
operate with Patrol Wings and Army Air Units in destroying hostile carrier
group.
(d) A concentration of own operating submarines preparatory to disposition
as circumstances require.
(e) Inner air patrol for dispositions or formations, when in operating areas.
Such screen shall be maintained by Task Groups, if the Task Force Commander
so directs.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1455
(f ) Inner anti-submarine screens, insofar as pr^icticable with assigned destroy-
ers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screening when thej' are
not employed in plane guarding.
(g) Maintenance of condition of readiness Three oh torpedo defense batteries
and equivalent condition of readiness in destroyers. Supply ready ammunition
and keep depth charges ready for use. Aircraft will not be armed unless
especially dii'ected.
(h) Maintenance of material condition X-ray, or equivalent to all ships.
[5] (i) Steaming darkened at night in defensive disposition either as a
Task Force or by Task Groups as practicable.
(j) Restricting use of radio to minimum required for carrying out operations,
.(k) Maintenance of horizon and surface battle lookouts.
(1) Eneriizing degaussing coils whenever there is any possibility of the pres-
ence of magnetic mines. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided
if operations permit.
(2) Ships towing targets in oi)erating areas at night will show appropriate
running and towing lights, except when engaged in exercises the nature of which
requires them to be darkened.
(F) Ships in Port:
(1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall carry out applicable measures
outlined in references (e) and (f).
(G) Defense Against Air Attack:
(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consi.sts
of several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference
of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the
middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine Defense
Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns are
located both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions.
(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor
plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.
(3) Enclosure (A) defines the air defense sectors in Pearl Harbor and is the
basis for the distributi<m of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire. Hostile
planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships
in that .sector. However, ships in other sectors may augment fire of any other
sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander.
(4) The Senior OflBcer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-
in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so
that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector com-
mensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized
to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers,
and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.
(5) The Senior Officer Present in each sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G)
(3) above, is the Sector Connuander, and responsible for the fire in his own
sector.
(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense
Officer ( N. B. D. O. ) . As such he shall :
(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against
air attack.
(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.
[6] (c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, ar-
ranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air
effort between the Army and Navy.
(d) Coordinate Feet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by:
(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.
(2) Holding necessary drills.
(3) Giving alarms for : attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.
(4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of
attacking aircraft.
(5) Arranging communication plan.
(6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.
(7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness iare prescribed :
CoNDiTicN I. — General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed
by Naval Base Defense Officer.
Condition II. — One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector
manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense
Officer.
1456 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Condition III. — Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at
least one ship in each sector manned and ready. { Minimum of four guns required
for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense
Officer.
(8) Searchlights of ships shall not be used in event of a night attack.
(9) In event of an air attack, the following procedure shall be followed by the
task forces :
(a) Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor.
(1) Execute an emergency sortie order which will accomplish (2), (3), and
(4) below. (This order must be prepared and issued in advance).
(2) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating task
force commander.
(3) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable
sortie.
(4) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie.
(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force
Commander operating at sea, advised.
[7] (6) Task Force Commander operating at sea.
(1) Despatch striking unit. (See (E) (1) (c) above.)
(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining
surface forces at sea.
(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require. (May utilize
unit of (E) (1) (a) for this if not needed for A/S purposes.)
(4) Direct commander of operating submarines to carry out action desired
of him.
(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior
Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks or
hostile planes sighted in the operating area.
(c) Naval Base Defense Officer.
(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not
already blacked out, each unit shall execute blackout when the alarm is given.
(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of
attacking aircraft.
(3) Launch air search for enemy ships.
(4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available.
{H) Action to be Taken if Submarine Attacks in Operating Area:
(1) In the event of a submarine attack in the operating area, the following
general procedure will be followed :
Ship Attacked.
(a) Proceed in accordance with Article 509, F. T. P. 188. Originate a plain
language despatch, urgent precedence, containing essential details addressed
for action to the Task Force Commander in the operating area and for informa-
tion to Commander-in-Chief, Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and
S. O. P. A. Pearl Harbor. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will clear the
Immediate submarine danger area, at best remaining speed, then proceed toward
Pearl Harbor using zigzag appropriate for speed in use.
Ships other than one attacked.
(b) Battleships. Zigzag at maximum speed. Launch aircraft armed for
inner air patrol. Do not approach scene of attack closer than 50 miles during
remainder of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to enable
them to join quickly.
(c) Carriers. Same as for battleships, except place all aircraft in Condition
ONE, armed. (At least one squadron with depth charges when they become
available.) Aircraft for initial inner air patrol may be launched unarmed.
Launch planes other than those for inner air patrol as ordered by Task Force
Commander or as circumstances warrant.
[8] (d) Cruisers. Same as for battleships, except, use one-half available
aircraft (armed) for own inner air patrol. Send the second half to scene of
attack (armed), to attack enemy submarine and to provide patrol for damaged
ship if damaged ship has been unable to provide its own inner air patrol.
(e) Destroyers. Attack unit proceed at maximum speed to scene of attack.
Take determined offensive action. Screening units join heavy ship units to which
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1457
assigned. Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make immediate preparations for depar-
ture. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. Report to Taslc Force
Commander when clear of Cliannel.
(/) Subnwrines. Surface if submerged. Remain in own assigned areas, zig-
zagging at best speed until directed otherwise.
(g) Minecraft. Augment screening units as directed by Task Force Com-
mander.
(h) Base Force. If ship attacked is damaged, tugs in operating areas join her
at best speed, prepared to tow, slipping targets as necessary. Report in code,
positions of rafts abandoned. Tugs in Pearl Harbor prepare for departure.
Sortie on order of Senior OflBcer Present Afloat. High speed towing vessels
proceed at discretion, keeping 50 miles from scene of attack.
(i) Patrol Wings. Assume readiness for search and for offensive action. Carry
out search as directed by Task Force Commander. Prepare to establish station
patrol 220 mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next
succeeding daylight period.
(;■) Shore-based Fleet Aircraft. Prepare to relieve planes in the air over the
attack area, unless Pearl Harbor is also attacked, in which case the instructions
issued by Naval Base Defense OflBcer have priority.
(fc) Naval District. Clear Pearl Harbor Channel at once for either sortie or
entry. Prepare to receive damaged ship(s) for repair.
(1) 8. 0. P. A., Pearl Harbor. Prepare destroyers in Pearl Harbor for sortie ,
and direct the departure of units as requested by the Task Force Commander of
units at sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force Commander
at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys.
(m) Task Force Commander at Sea. Coordinate offensive and defensive meas-
ures. When immediate defensive measures have been accomplished, prescribe
rendezvous and issue necessary instructions for concentrating and forming the
Task Force.
(2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the
presence of more submarines waiting to attack.
(3) It must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate
the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships
accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble
his Task Groups as quickly as the situation [9] and daylight conditions
warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be
located by air search or other means.
4. Subordinate Commanders shall issue the necessary orders to make these
measures effective.
H. E. KiMMEL
Distribution: (5CM-41)
List II Case 1 ■ A X
ENl, EN3, NA12, NDllAC, NDll-12-13-14, NY8-10,
(Al — Asiatic, Al — Atlantic).
P. C. Ckosi.ey,
Flag Secretary,
USS Penn.— 75— 10-15-41— 1,000.
1458 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
^yf
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1459
Confidential
Measukes To Be Effective Under Paragbaph 3 of Basic Letter Until Further
Orders
(A) (1)
(A) (2)
Boom — administered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District with services
furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.
(A) (3)
Harbor — administered by Commander Base Force with services furnished
by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.
(B) (1) (a) (b) (c)
Furnished by Destroyers, Battle Force; Minecraft, Battle Foi-ce; and Mine-
craft, Base Force, and coordinated by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.
(B) (2) (a) (b) (c)
(B) (3)
(C) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (6) (7)
(D) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(E) (1) (a) (b) (c) (d)
Assignments only shall be made. Tlie Task Force Commander will hold one
drill during each operating period, if employment permits, in the establishment
of units prescribed.
(E) (1) (h) (i) (j) (k) (1)
(E) (2)
(F)
The provisions of reference (e).
(G)
Entire article, except sub-paragraph 6 (b), which will be as arranged by Naval
Base Defense Officer with Oommanding General, Hawaiian Department.
[1] File
C-A16-3/A4-3 ( 5 ) /ND14 ( 0164 )
Confidential
Operation Plan No. 1-41
HEADQUARTERS,
NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCE,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
Pearl Harbor, T. H. 27 February 1941.
TASK ORGANIZATION
(a) Inshore Patrol (Commander Inshore Patrol)
Destroyer Patrol (2 DD)
Outer— 1 DD
Inner— 1 DD
Boom Patrol (1 Power Boat)
Harbor Patrol (4 Power Boats)
A/B Boom
Mine Sweepers— Magnetic (KEOSANQUA, YS-86) Anchored (Mine Force
and Base Force Detail)
(b) Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two) In conjunction
with Army.
(c) Anti Aircraft Defense (District Marine Officer) In conjuncticm with Army.
(d) Harbor Control Post (District Operations Officer) In conjunction with
Army.
1. Information. Attention is directed to Pacific Fleet Confidential letter No.
CL-41 of 15 February 1941, to Pacific Fleet Confidential Memorandum No. 1
CM-41 of 25 February 1941, and to 14ND-JCD-13 (Hawaiian Joint Coastal Fron-
tier Defense Plan).
By cooperation in support of the Army, Naval security measures will be
established as necessary for the joint protec-tion of PEARL HARBOR Base in
order to safeguard the Fleet.
1460 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In conjunction with the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, the
Naval Base Defense OflScer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District)' will ar-
range to coordinate joint effort ; to set conditions of readiness ; to hold required
drills ; to make "alarm" and "all clear" signals.
Assumptions.
(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war under existing condi-
tions, by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided
nationals of such powers may attempt :
(1) Sabotage from small craft on ships based in PEARL HARBOR.
(2) Block the entrance channel to PEARL HARBOR by sinking an obstruc-
tion in the channel.
(3) Lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to PEARL HARBOR.
(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by:
(1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in base area — probable.
(2) A surprise air attack on ships in PEARL HARBOR — possible.
[2] (3) A combination of these two — possible.
2. This force, in cooperation with and in support of the Army, will establish
security measures including air defense and surface ship patrol to enforce Presi-
dential Proclamation No. 2375 of 4 November 1939, and General Order one
hundred eighteen in order to protect PEARL HAROR and to safeguard the Fleet.
3. (a) Inshore Patrol. Maintain a continuous patrol of the Interior Waters
of PEARL HARBOR, and the seaward approaches thereto; sweep the PEARL
HARBOR channel and its approaches against magnetic and anchored mines;
operate and patrol the A/B boom ; prevent approach to the channel entrance
of any unauthorized vessel ; maintain continuous listening watch for submarines ;
and report movement of foreign registry ships. Detailed Inshore Patrol Plan —
Annex "A".
(b) Base Defense Air Force. Maintain readiness of shore based Fleet aircraft
for joint effort in conjunction with Army air units against air attack on PEARL
HARBOR area.
Commander Patrol Wing TWO in consultation with the Army will prepare
detailed naval participation air defense plan — Annex "B".
(c) Anti-Aircraft Defense: Defense Battalions of the Fleet Marine Force
present in PEARL HARBOR in conjunction with Army and Fleet units in PEARL
HARBOR, provide anti-aircraft defense.
The District Marine Ofticer will, in consultation with Army and Fleet Officers
concerned, prepare the detailed naval participation anti-aircraft defense plan —
Annex "C".
(d) Harbor Control Post. Establish and maintain Harbor Control Post in
the Operations Office, Fourteenth Naval District. Provide selected telephone
circuits separate from dial system, to Army and. Navy activities necessary
for proper functioning of this post under present conditions. In conjunction
and cooperatitm with Army personnel attached to Harbor Control Post train
officer personnel and carry out duties prescribed in OpNav serial 041230 of 5
November 1940. Detailed Harbor Control Post Plan — Annex "D".
[5] (x) This plan will be implemented by orders and instructions to the tasli groups
concerned incorporated in this plan as annexes. As operating experience is gained, and
conditions change, these annexes will be revised and re-issued as replacements. •
4. Logistics for Fleet details provided by Type Commanders; for District
forces by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.
5. (1) Communications in accordance with Annex "E".
(2) Use zone plus ten and one half time.
(3) Naval Base Defense Officer (Com 14) at Headquarters, Fourteenth
Naval District.
C. C. Bloch,
Naval Base Defense Officer,
^Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District).
Annexes :
A. Inshore Patrol Plan
B. Base Defense Air Force Plan
C. Anti-Aircraft Defense Plan
D. Harbor Control Post Plan
E. Communication Plan.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1461
Distribution-complete with Annexes.
CinCPAC (10)
CG HD (20)
Dist. Marine Officer 14ND
Operations Officer 14ND
Comdr. Inshore Patrol 14ND
Captain of the Yard NYd PEARL
District Intelligence Officer 14ND
NTS 14ND (10)
CO NAS PHTH (5)
CO SUB BASE PHTH (5)
COMAIRSCOFOR (3)
CO USS PENNSYLVANIA (2)
COMBATFOR (15)
[1] File -A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14 (0563)
Confidential
Annex "A" Revised to Naval Base Defense Fokce Operating Plan No. 1-41
COMSCOFOR (15)
Combat ships (17)
COMCRUBATFOR (25)
COMAIRBATFOR (50)
COMDESBATFOR (165)
COMIXBATFOR (20)
COMCRUSCOFOR (25)
COMSUBSCOFOR (40)
COMPATWINGTWO (20)
COMBASEFOR (75)
COMDR. 2ND. MAR. AIR CRP (10)
COMDESDIVTWO (05)
Operation Plan I. S. P. No.. A-1-41
HEADQUABTBaiS,
Naval Base Defense Force,
Fourteenth Naval District.
TASK organization
(a) Outer Harhor Patrol: Senior Unit Commander or C. O. Desdiv Eighty,
TANEY, and Fleet Vessels Detailed.
(1) Picket line: Unit Commander or Senior C. O. Not to be stationed at
present.
(2) Channel Entrance Patrol: C. O. DD detailed. 1 DD, detailed by Comdesdiv
Eighty, or TANEY.
(3) Ready Duty Destroyer: C. O. DD Detailed. 1 DD detailed by Comdes-
batfor.
(b) Harbor Channel Patrol: Senior Boat Officer.
(1) Entrance Channel Patrol: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat. Not to be sta-
tioned at present.
(2) Boom Patrol: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat detailed by Combatfor.
(c) Inner Harbor Patrol: Senior Boat Officer. 4 Power Boats detailed by
Con^batfor and administered by Combase.
(1) Drydock Channel Patrol: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat.
(2) East Loch Patrol: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat.
(3) Middle Loch Patrol: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat.
(4) West Loch Patrol: Boat Officer. 1 Power Boat.
(d) A/B Boom: Lieut. Spear.
Maintenance and Operating crews furnished by Captain of the Yard, Navy
Yard, Pearl Harbor, and boom operated as at present.
(e) Minecraft:
(1) XAMc Division: Lieut. Cmdr. C. D. Kine, D-0, USNR REEDBIRD, CON-
DOR, COCKATOO, CROSSBELL.
(2) YS-86; C. O. Towing Vessel. KEOSANOU, and YT-142 towijig vessels
detailed by Captain of the Yard, Pearl Harbor Navy Yard.
[2} 1. This paragraph same as paragraph 1 of basic plan. No. 1-41 Serial
ND14 (01(>4) of 27 February, 1941. In addition, the following excerpts from
"Joint Action of the Army and the Navy 1935" and "14ND J. C. D. 42 (Joint
Coa.stal Defense Plan)," are quoted in order to clarify the extent and limits of the
Harbor Patrol and to standardize the nomenclature of Task Groups :
"A defensive coastal area pertaining to a fortifietl harbor includes the Outer
Harbor Area, the Harbor Channel Area, and the Inner Harbor Area."
"The OAHTJ Defensive Coastal Area (Oalm D. C. A.) comprises all water
areas within circles and the connecting tangents drawn with points as centers
and with respective radii as follows : —
KEAHI POINT Forty-nine thousand (49,000) yards.
PUU KAPOLEI Forty-five thousand (45,000) yards.
PUUIKI STATION \^ _^ ^v, .v, A,^n^\ ^ »
KAHUKU POINT ^ Tweenty-three thousand (23,000) yards."
1462 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
^"The Outer HarJ)or Area is the water area which extends to seaward from
the outer exits of the entrance channels to a fortified harbor and lies within the
range of the habor defense batteries." (OAHU being a snilall island containing
three fortified harbors, PEARL, HONOLULU and KANEOHE, whose defensive
batteries comprise all the island coast defense batteries, the outer harbor areas
of these harbors merge and complete the waters of the OAHU Defensive Coastal
Area ) .
''The Hkrbor Channel Area is the water area which lies between the Outer
Harbor Area and the Inner Harbor Area, and which comprises all the entrance
channels to the harbor.
"The Inner Harbor Area is the entire water area of a fortified harbor inside
the inner entrance of all the entrance channels to the harbor."
[3] This force will maintain a continuous patrol of the interior waters
of PEARL HARBOR, and the seaward approaches thereto ; sweep the PEARL
HARBOR channel and its approaches against magnetic and anchored mines;
patrol the A/B boom ; prevent approach to the channel entrance of any un-
authorized vessel; maintain continuous listening watch for submarines; and
report movement of foreign registry ships.
3. (a) Outer Harbor Patrol maintain a continuous patrol of the water ap-
proaches to PEARL HARBOR as follows :
(1) Picket Line patrol the outer limits of the Outer Harbor Area (OAHU
D. C. A.) Report all surface vessels, submarines, and aircraft sighted or con-
tacted, and subsequent development and identification reports direct to Army
Harbor Defense Command Posts and to Commander Inshore Patrol by voice
radio on Patrol Group Inshore Patrol fretjuency 3760 2690 kcs. (3702 i« p eace
time) . Escort vessels through Oiiter Harbor Area (OAHU D. C. A.) as ordered.
(Details in Addendum I)
(2) Chayinel Entrance Patrol patrol the seaward area within one and one half
mile radius of entrance buoys. Enforce General Order one hundred eighteen.
Prevent approach to the entrance channel of the harbor by any unauthorized
vessel. If necessary to seize a vessel, i-eport to Naval Base Defense Officer
(Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District) for instructions. See District Or-
der 17-41 (Revised). Report movements of foreign registry ships.
(3) Ready Duty Destroyer moor at normal berth in I'EARL HARBOR or at
discretion I'emain under way in vicinity of harbor entrance, ready to proceed
immediately to re-enforce the Channel Entrance Patrol in repelling hostile
run-in [-i] attempts, submarine attacks, or mining operations; to act as
screening vessel in the area between PEARL HARBOR channel entrance buoys
and outer limits of Outer Harbor Area for Gunnery School Vessels and others
when ordered. Maintain the following condition of readiness : Boiler Power for
twenty-five (25) knots. (If moored in port, steaming and sea watches posted,
engines ready to answer all bells, and ship ready to get underway).
(b) Harbor Channel Patrol maintain continuous patrol of Harbor Channel
waters as follows :
(1) Boom Patrol patrol the seaward side of the A/B boom in order to safe-
guard the boom and prevent damage thereto by sabotage attempts from small
craft or from shore. (Details in Addendum I).
(2) Entrance Channel Patrol patrol the entrance channel from the A/B boom
to the entrance buoy^ and the waters of the Defensive Sea Area of PEARL
HARBOR inshore of the entrance buoys. (Details in Addendum I).
(c) Inner Harbor Patrol maintain continuous patrol of the interior waters
of PEARLr HARBOR in order to control small boat traffic, guard against laying of
mines in the harbor, and prevent damage to ships of the Fleet at anchor and to
Navy Yard waterfront property, from sabotage attempts. (Details in Adden-
dum I ) .
(d) A/B Boom to be maintained and operated at present under the Captain
of the Yard, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.
(e) Minccraft conduct sweeping operations in the seaward approaches to
PEARL HARBOR as follows :
(1) XAMc Division daily, commencing at 0200, sweep a channel one mile
wide on either side of [.5] buoyed channel axis extended) from entrance
buoys to the one hundred fathom curve. Carry out daily operations with fwo
vessels each making single ship sweep, one for moored mines and one for magnetic
mines. Immediately upon completion of sweeping operation, the senior com-
manding officer of the sweeping group will send the following despatch "priority"
in plain language, addressed to the Commandant Navy Yard PEARL HARBOR
and Commander Inshore Patrol, Fourteenth Naval District, "Clear" to mean
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1463
"The sweeping operation at the PEARL HARBOR channel entrance is
completed."
(2) YS-86 conduct magnetic sweeping as ordered.
(x) (1) The following task groups under Task Organization will not be sta-
tioned at present, due to lack of avilable vesselsi:
(a) (1) Picket Line.
(b) (2) Entrance Channel Patrol.
(2) The following task group under Task Organization will be administered
by Commander Base Force in accordance with Base Force Operation Plan No.
6-40 of 12 June 1940 :
(c) Inn Harbor Patrol
4. Logistics as provided in basic plan No. 1-41 of Serial ND14 (0164) of 27
February 1941.
5. Communications in accordance with Naval Base defense
Communication Plan, Annex E.
Use zone time plus ten and one half.
Commander Inshore Patrol, 14ND, at Headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District.
/s/ G. B. Woolley
G. B. Woolley,
Commander, U. 8. N. (Ret).,
Commander Inshore Patrol,
Fourteenth Naval District.
/s/ J. W. Bays
J. W. Bays,
Aide to Commandant.-
Distribution :
Same as Basic Plan.
[i] C-A16-^/A4-3(5)/ND14(0348)
Confidential
Base Defe:nse Aib Force, Patrol Wing Two,
Fleet Air Deh-achment, Naval Air Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., April 9, lO^l.
Annex Bakeb to Commanded Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No.
1-41 Dated Febrttary 27, 1941 — Naval Base De:fense Aie Force Opekation
Plan No. A-1-41
TASK ORGANIZATION
(a) Search and Attack Orotip (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force
(Commander Patrol Wing TWO) )
The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness :
Patrol Squadrons.
Shore-based VO— VS units.
Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air.
Combat group.
Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
Army bombardment squadrons.
Army reconnaissance squadrons.
Navy Utility squadrons.
(b) Air Combat Oroup (Senior VF Squadron Commander)
The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness :
Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.
Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
One division of shore-based carrier type VS planes.
1. Information:
This plan is made in accordance with : The Joint Air Operations agree-
ment approved and promulgated on 21 March 1941 ; Joint Estimate covering
joint Army and Navy air action, addendum I to this plan ; and Pacific fleet con-
fidential letter No. 2CL-41 dated 15 February 1941. An air combat group under
the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Air Force will : Intercept and destroy
hostile aircraft ; Identify and report type of attacking, aircraft ; Trail attacking
carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and
79716 O — 46 — pt. 15 5
1464 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
attack group ; and as a secondary mission support search and attack group upon
request.
[2] Assnmpfions: As in Addendum I of this plan. Antiaircraft gun control
in the PEARL HARBOR area will be coordinated with operations under this
plan. Air traffic lanes and recognition signals will be prescribed as found neces-
sary.
2. This force will locate and destroy hostile forces raiding against OAHU
or Fleet Units in the Operating Areas.
3. (a) Search and Attack Group. (a) Locate, report, and track all hostile
surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships
by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If
choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved
in attack (2) vessels beyond I'each of our surface vessel interception.
(b) Air Comhat Group, (b) Operate as directed by the Commanding General
Hawaiian Air Foi-ce.
(x) This plan is effective upon receipt. It is operative without signal in the event of
a surprise attack on OAHU. It might be made operative by despatch. In the meanwhile
conditiion* of readiness prescribed in Addendum II will be taken as directed by the Com-
manding General Hawaiian Department for Army units and by the Naval Base Defense
Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) for Navy units. This plan supersedes
and replaces Anne.x Baker of Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-41 of 27
February 1941. Units assigned to task groups of this plan shall make readiness reports in
accordance with Addendum II of this plan.
4. The senior carrier commander based ashore at Fleet Air Detachment, PEARL
HARBOR, shall at all times .see that one division of VS planes is detailed to the
Air Combat Group. When all carrier planes are to embark the Group Commander
shall so inform the Commander Second Marine Aircraft Group who will make
the detail required by this paragraph.
5. Communications in accordance with Annex Easy to Naval [3] Base
Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1^0 of 27 February 1941. Use zone plus
ten and one-half time. Operation orders for the search and attack group will
be separately distributed.
Addendum I — Joint Estimate.
Addendum II — Aircraft Readiness.
P. N. L. Bellinger,
Rear Admiral, U. 8. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
{Commander Patrol Wing TWO).
Approved :
0. C. Bloch,
Rear Admiral, U. 8. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Force.
Authenticated :
[Signature illegible]
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.
[i] C-A16-3/4-3(5)/ND14(0348)
CONFIDENTIAL March 31, 1941.
Commander Naval Base Commandi»g General,
Defense Air Force, Hawaiian Air Force,
Patrol Wing Two, Fort Shafter, T. H.
Naval Air Station
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
ADDENDUM 1 TO NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. A-1-41
Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden
hostile action against OAHU or Fleet Units in the Hawaiian area.
I. Summary of the Situation.
(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain,
and varying.
(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of
war.
(c) A succes.sful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on
OAHU might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western
Pacific for a long period.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1465
(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas
organized to take pi'ompt offensive action against any surface or submarine
force which initiates hostile action.
(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raid-
ing force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our
intelligence service.
II. Survey of Opposing Strengths.
(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or
more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For
such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported
to be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or
better. Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armored and armed
with 10-8" guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others
are small (7000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on
numbers and characteristics of the airci'aft carried by these ships is not avail-
able. However the best estimate at present available is that the small carriers
can accommodate from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones [2] about 60.
Probably the best assumption is that carrier complements are normally about
equally divided between fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as
to range and armament of planes we must assume that they are at least the
equal of our similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch gun
and least 12 six inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supi)orts.
Jane's Fighting Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily
capable of projection into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would
be far removed from their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power
to our surface forces operating at sea in the Hawaiian area.
(b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the
above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-
based air force available to us is a constantly varying quantity which is being
periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also
varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of
the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for
flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain,
for any extended period, from bases on OAHU, a patrol extensive enough to insure
that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over OAHU, as a
complete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to
support sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long
range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited
for this work. If present planes are used to bomb well defended ship objectives,
the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view
of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the mis-
sions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be
scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for com-
batant work, can be used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol
planes. Other types of aircraft, in \_3] general, can perform functions
that accord with their type.
III. Possible Enemy Action.
(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:
1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on OAHU including ships and installations in Pearl
Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.
(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on OAHU
would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most
likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach
inside of three hundred miles.
(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more sub-
marines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been
drawn away by the original thrust.
(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable
undiscovered surface force probably comopsed of fast ships accompanied by a
carrier.
(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered
as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might
find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start,
also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second
1466 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day
to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the
carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near
enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that
it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be
observed. Under the existing condi- [Jf] tions this might not be a serious
disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no
offensive action and the only thing that would be lost would be complete surprise.
Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the
above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain
advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably
be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large
success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.
IV. Action open to us:
(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to
reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but
can only be eft'ectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very
short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless
other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow
time limits.
(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating
areas or on the islands :
1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of
hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present.
2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force
and its despatch for attack when information is available.
(c) In the event of an air attack on OAHU, in addition to (b) above:
1. The immediate despatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept
the attackei's.
2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range
shore based aircraft.
3. The prompt despatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to
their carrier.
[5] (d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in
addition to (b) above:
1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to
counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent.
2. Despatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over the
attack area.
3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius
from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight
period.
(e) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is
known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack
develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of
delay. It therefore api)ears that task forces should be organized no.w, missions
assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that
coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of
the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary
immediate action, the following joint task units will be required :
1. Search Unit.
2. Attack Unit.
3. Air Combat Unit.
Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with
very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying
conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be
desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordi-
nated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group
commander.
V. Decisions:
1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against
OAHU or fleet units in oi-der to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a
surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retalia-
tory measures.
[6} 2. Subsidiary decisions. In order to be in all respects prepared to
promptly execute the above decision :
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1467
(a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air operation
plan:
1. Search and Attack Oroup (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Com,-
mandcr Patrol Wing TWO) ) The following units in accordance with current
conditions of readiness :
Patrol squadrons.
Shore-based VO-VS units.
Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.
Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
Army Bombardment squadrons.
Army reconnaissance squadrons.
Navy Utility squadrons.
2. Air Combat Group (Commander Hawaiian Air Force) The following units
in accordance with current conditions of readiness :
Army pursuit squadrons.
Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.
Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
One division of shore-based carrier VS planes. (Primarily for trailing
aircraft)
(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows :
1. Search and Attack Group. Locate, report and track all hostile surface units
in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack.
Priority of targets : (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location
is presented priority should be given to : (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels
beyond reach of out surface vessel interception.
2. Air Co-mtat Group. Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and
report type of attacking aircraft. Trail [7] attacking carrier type planes
to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a
secondaiT mission supi>ort search and attack group upon request.
(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan
when:
(a) An air attack occurs on OAHU
(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack
is probable.
(c) Information is received than an attack has been made on fleet units.
(d) Define conditions of i-eadiness for use with this plan as follows: Condi-
tions of readiness shal be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number
frmo the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition
of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree
of readiness prescribed for that part.
MATERIAL READINESS
A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.
B. One-half of all aircraft of each functioned type available and ready for
task.
C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type avail-
able and ready for a task.
D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available
and ready for a task.
E. All aircraft conducting routing operations, none ready for the purposes of
this plan.
DEOBEB OF READINESS
1. For pursuit and VF types — four minutes. Types other than fighters —
fifteen minutes.
2. All types — 30 minutes.
3. All types — one hour.
4. All types — two hours.
5. All types — four hours.
The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readi-
ness are dependent upon the tasks asigned in contributory plans and orders
and will be prescribed therein.
(e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be main-
tained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior Officers Present of
the Army and Navy as a result of all information curently available to them.
1468 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In using the above conditions it sliould be noted that: CONDITION A-1 re-
quires a preparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for only
a short time as it is an all hands condition. CONDITIONS B-1 and B-2 require
watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will de-
crease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any Condiiton I, 2, or 3 will
curtail essential expansion training work. CONDITIONS C, or D, 4 or 5 can
be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.
(f ) In order to i)erfect fundamental communications by use and to insure
that prospective Task Group Commanders at all times know the forces imme-
diately available to them for use, under the plan above, in case of a sudden
emergency, provide, for daily dispatch readiness reports as of the end of normal
daily flying from all units to their prospective task force commander. These
reports to state :
(a) Number of planes in the unit by functional types such as bomber,
fighter, etc.
(b) Number of each type in commission for flight and their degree of
readiness as defined above.
(g) After the joint air operations plan under subsidiary decision (a) above
has been issued, the task group commanders designated therein will prepare
detailed contributory plans for their groups to cover the various probable situa-
tions requiring quick action in order that the desired immediate action in an
emergency can be initiated with no further written orders. To assist in this
work the following temporary details will be made :
[9] (a) By Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander
Patrol Wing TWO) : an oflBcer experienced in VF and VS operations and
planning to assist the commander of Air Combat Group.
(b) By the Commander Hawaiian Air Force: an officer experienced in
Army bombardment and reconnaissance operations and planning to assist
the Commander of the Search and Attack Group.
F. L. Martin,
Major General, V. S. Army,
Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.
P. N. L. Bellinger,
Rear Admiral, V. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
{Commander Patrol Wing TWO).
Authenticated:,
/s/ J. W. Hayes,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.
[1] C-A16-3/a'4-3(5)/ND14 (0348)
Confidential
Base Defense Air Force, Patrol Wing Two,
Fleet Air DErrACHMENT. Naval Air Station,
Pearl Harhor, T. H., April 9, 1941.
Addendum II to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41 —
Conditions of Rei\diness and Readiness Reports
1. Conditions of readines will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a
number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condi-
tion of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the
degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.
MATERIAL READINESS
A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.
B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a
task.
C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available
and ready for a task.
D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available
and ready for a task.
E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of
this plan.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1469
DKGREK OF OPERATIONAL REii-DINESS
All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a
unit to be in the air armed and proceeding with the assigned task.
1. For pursuit and VF types — four minutes. Types other than fighters — fifteen
minutes.
2. All types — 30 minutes.
3. All types — one hour.
4. All types^two hours.
5. All types — four hours.
2. The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of
readiness are dependent upon the task assigned in contributory plans and orders
and will be prescribed in these.
[2] 3. Readiness Reports:
(a) A despatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day shall be made by each
unit assigned to a task group by this plan as follows :
(1) Units of "Search and Attack Group" to the Commander Naval Base
Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing TWO).
(2) Units of the "Air Combat Group" to the Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Air Force via Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.
(b) These reports shall state:
(1) The number of operating planes in the unit by functional types as bomber,
fighter, etc.
(2) The number of each type in material readiness for flight and their degree
of operational readiness as defined above.
(c) The oflBcer detailing VS planes to the Air Combat Unit (paragraph 4 of
N. B. D. A. F. plan No. A-1-41) shall inform the Commander Naval Base Defense
Air Force and Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force by despatch of the detail
and any changes therein.
ANTIAIBCBAFT DEFENSES
Task Organizations :
(a) Group One: All ships in PEARL HARBOR assigned by Pacific Fleet
Confidential Letter No. 2CLr^l to Sector I.
(b) Group Ttvo: Those so assigned to Sector II.
(c) Group Three: Those so assigned to Sector III.
(d) Group Four: Those so assigned to Sector IV.
(e) Group Five: All antiaircraft units of Defense Battalions of the Marine
Corps present.
1. Information: See Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-^1, Fourteenth
Naval District Operation Plan 1—41 and OCABF-38. Information on special
situations as they arise will be furnished to all units in accordance with the
Communication Plan, Annex "E".
2. All naval forces of the Fourteenth Naval District and those of the U. S.
Fleet in insular waters will support the Army antiaircraft defence of OAHU: (1)
by gun fire, (2) by antiaircraft watches, and (3) by furnishing RADAR service
when available.
3. (a) Groups One to Four, inclusive: Assume defense missions and defense
conditions in accordance with the provisions of Pacific Confidential Letter No.
2CL-41.
(b) Group Five: Report to Commanding General, Provisional Antiaircraft
Brigade for tactical assignment. Conform to conditions of readiness prescribed
.for that brigade.
4. Logistics: Group Five: Classes 1, 2 and 3 Supplies — normal. Ammunition
except for infantry weapons, to be furnished by COM 14.
5. Group Five: Command Post: To be announced later.
H. K. PlCKBTTT,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps.
District Marine Officer.
Approved :
C. C. Bloch,
Rear Admiral, V. S. Army,
Comnmnder Naval Base Defense Force,
(Commandant, 14th Naval District).
1470 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[i] File A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14 (0164)
Confidential
Headquarters, Naval Base Defense Force,
Fourteenth Naval District,
Washington, December 5, 1941.
Operation Plan No. 1-41
Annek "D"
Task Organization
(a) Harbor Control Post District Operations Officer.
1. Information. As in basic plan No. 1-41. The Harbor Control Post has
been established in the Operations Office, Fourteenth Naval District, in a mod-
ified form. The Army has provided telephone connections to the various Army
Circuits listed herein, and will maintain a suitable watch at their various sta-
tions; the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade will endeavor to provide
the Harbor Control Post with a teletype connecting into the HSCAB loop, and
operator for same. Army officer personnel and secretaries for the Harbor Con-
trol Post will be provided from available personnel from HSCAB as needed.
Amy observation (lookout) stations around the island of OAHU will be manned
as required and Army defense units will be placed in the condition of "alert"
considered necessary. The water area under the cognizance of the Harbor
Control Post embraces the OAHU Defensive Coastal Area, with particular inter-
est in the area south of OAHU, and will be known as the Control Post Area.
2. This Harbor Control post will train personnel and operate in a modified
form in accordance with OpNav serial 041230 in the establishment of security
measures as necessary for the joint protection of PEARL HARBOR Base in
order to safeguard the Fleet.
3. (a) Harbor Control Post.
(1) In conjunction and cooperation with the Army and Navy units listed
below, man as necessary and operate the following direct telephone connections :
Harbor Control Post to
Hdqtrs. Haw'n Dept. Ft. Shafter
Hdqtrs. HSCAB, Ft. Derussy
Command Post, Ft. Kamehameha
Command Post, Hickam Field
Commander Patrol Wing Two
SOPE (if at dock)
Navy Yard Signal Tower
Navy Yard Power House
(2) In conjunction with Army and Navy reporting, communication, and intelli-
gence agencies be prepared to "alert" Army and Navy forces against aircraft or
other surprise attack, and assist in coordinating their defense measures. Direct
Yard Power [2] House when to sound air raid and blackout alarms and
the secure signal.
(3) Report promptly any action taken to iinmediate Superiors in Command,
Army and Navy, and keep them advised of all known developments.
(4) In conjunction with Commander Inshore Patrol, Captain of the Yard, and
District Public Works Officer keep the Army Harbor Defenses informed of
authorized ship movements within the Control Post Area.
(x) (1) All personnel of Harbor Control Post will become familiar with the
Communication Plan, Annex "E," and be prepared to direct Power House as to
Signal to be used (See paragraph 6,000, Special Signals.)
(2) Obtain from Commander Inshore I'atrol the day-by-day list of Patrol and
mine sweeping vessels under his command. Maintain up to date data on Army-
Navy defenses and Conditions of Readiness.
(3) This annex will be revised from time to time as operating experience is
gained, facilities are increased, and conditions change.
4. (1) Telephone switchboard watch standers will be provided from the
enlisted personnel of the Organized Reserves on active duty. Until such time
as watch standers are available to the Operations Officer, the necessary officer
watch standing duties after working hours, will be carried out by the District
and Navy Yard Duty Officer.
(2) The following Conditions of Readiness are prescribed for the Harbor Con-
trol Post :
Condition I : Post fully manned and ready to operate in all respects.
I
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1471
Condition II : Post manned by Army and Navy watch oflBcers, telephone
and teletype operators on watch.
Note : Conditions I and II are "Alert" conditions.
Condition III : Normal condition. Telephone operator on watch. District
and Yard Duty OfiBcer on call.
[3] 5. (1) The Harbor Control Post may be called on any of the telephones
listed in paragraph 3. (a) (1). The District Operations Officer may be reached
over these telephones during working hours, and over dial phones 411 and 508 ;
after working hours on Honolulu 75143.
(2) Use zone plus ten and one half time.
(3) District Operations Officer at Harbor Control Post (District Operations
Office), headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District.
/s/ H. B. Knowles
H. B. Knowles
Commander, U. 8. Navy
District Operations Officer
Approved :
/s/ C. C. Bloch
C. C. Block
Naval Base Defense Officer
(Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District)
Distribution : In accordance with Distribution List of Operating Plan No. 1-41
EXHIBIT NO. 45
NovEMBEai 27, 1941.
[Stamped notation:] Nov 28, 1941. Noted— Chief of Staff.
(WBS— handwritten). Noted— Deputy Chief of Staff.
(WBS— handwritten) .
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject : Far Eastern Situation.
1. The Secretary of War sent for me about 9 : 30 a. m., November 27, 1941.
General Bryden was present The Secretary wanted to know what warning mes-
sages have been sent to General MacArthur and what were proposed. I gave
him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24. I then
showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board
meeting. He told me he had telephoned both Mr. Hull and the President this
morning. Mr. Hull stated the conversations had been terminated with the bar-
est possibility of resumption. The President wanted a warning message sent
to the Philippines. I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an
appropriate cablegram.
2. Later in the morning, I attended a conference with the Secretary of War,
Secretary of Navy, and Admiral Stark. The various messages to the Army
and Navy Commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed. A joint message for
General MacArthur and Admiral Hart was appit^ved (copy attached). The
Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum you and Admiral Stark
directed be prepared for the President. The Secretary of War wanted to be
sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to
the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations. He was
reassured on that point. It was agreed that the memorandum would be shown
to both Secretaires before dispatch.
3. Both the message and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of
War. He suggested some minor changes in the memorandum. These were made
(copy attached).
(Signed) L. T. Gerow
L. T. Gebow, ,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of 8taff.
2 Incls:
Memo, for President, 11-27-41
Memo, for TAG, 11-27-41
1472 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 46
?G 14
525P
^*
CABLEGRAl.;
'O-li-C,
Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitiotu BWg.. Washington. D. C.
Nuvia asH 28, 19U1
...k55A-_^...u.
From ft'-f^i' IL'^ PI
IIX?].^^
Tn G£^N'H1'\AL G-£0:1GE C MAP.SHAUj •- -
Pi:^ou.u;r . _ ,'.:Tio;i3 gontainld i:; you?, radio six
. ,^ia :-iLCu;;:.Aiss.i:;::E has bi^i-N kxtended a ,d
^t-D r-i :uHju;jcY±urj with mi. luvf stup ghow.T) ^--^
:,u^'j..j.i:x :-'LA3U:<:iS ItAVL ~ "• - '. IJ;; STOP WITHr; TIE
:.r.;i:'AT:„:;:^ r:;\;;:::D Tu . ;;tate of DL^^LOP'.:Ei;T
w ':i.^s .. , ..-vri-jws hvE.-YTKi;jG is 1:1 headjuess ^
,-.> liii. CwNijUi-X Or .. SUCCESSFUL DZFHvSE ST, P Ll^H.j.TE
i,i.u3o:: A:jn cooPKii^TiJN a:;d co:idial helatiuhs exist
j.^TV.E.:j; ,v.-:.:y Afro navy
.- . „ ^ t-lACARTHUR
46 A S O
•■'^ S ■':-4i
t - vod
«i
X}
liK-i-'
Action Copy
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1473
'l^rtriv. iVpaitiiirnl M
R„„,n ,, Bl.(s-.- \V..v„
;'0';?
/"/^
V
Action Copy
1474 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
WAR DEPARTMENT
orricE. Secretary, General Staff
DISPOSITION SUP
Pulijf'Ct of papfr-
/ ^/3i " / /_^^<^W
To
f i^ c
1^ Tl
Office, The Aas't 8w. of War
Artm. Ass'tSn^'
A r. of 8.. G-i. .
A, C. of S., G-2
A. C. of 8., G-3
C. of 8.. G-^
. C. of 8.. W. P
The Adjutant GeiiiTal
Hudgct A L«')ci»l&tivf PlamiiiiK Hninrh
St.itiBtios Uranch. -
r.xi'outivo for RpjMTvf AtTsirs
r,i..M'iy;</x,
Necessary action Draft of ri'itls .
Prr,>ar^>..;^ofM.j,jv,^ .. Direct «ply.
W Nou- tUiTliftiii . '-^ .^^ Note *nd flie.
ru-iuark ami n«omnicndation.'iaK f'i'c
Coinmeut or eoncurrrnoo. Sipiatiire^
Invitiiijcanpntiontol^i'^'J^I^^^Jufs^r. W»r-^. C.ofs.
i{y i!,aoti..ti nf I). C. of .'Y" '
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1475
fli)V2b m^
act
oin
ommCBO^^^
«#•»•*•
1476 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1
EXHIBIT NO. 47
[Telegram received]
TK. This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated
to anj'one. (SC).
From : Chungking via N. R.
Dated November 3, 1941
Rec'd 8 : 48 P. M.
SECBBrARY OF STATE,
Washington.
435, November 3, 5 p. ra., (Section One).
Reference my 431 not rec'd in Dept. of November 1, 11 a. m.
Foreign Minister has now sent me copy of Generalissimo's message to Presi-
dent which was telegraphed yesterday to Hu Shih who no doubt will make it
available to the Dc-partment. I am forwarding copy by airmail unless instructed
to repeat it by radio.
The message differs in form but not in substance from that originally sum-
marized to me by Foreign Minister.
It is not yet certain that Japan will undertake the difficult invasion of Yunnan
from Indochina but I believe it is certain that in any ease large Japanese air
forces will operate from that base against the Burma Road within China and
against the American or any other volunteer air force when they enter China.
It is true, of course, that a major defeat of a Japanese attack upon Yunmxn
would have very advantageous effects in restraining Japanese ambitions in the
Far East.
If it should be found possible and practicable to send Anglo-American air units
into Yunnan they should be in sufficient force to maintain themselves against
heavy Japanese air concentrations.
Gauss.
KLP
[Telegram received]
DES. This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being comnmnicated
to anyone. (SC).
From : Chungking via N. R.
Dated November 3, 1941
Rec'd 6 : 45 a. m., 4th.
Secretary of State,
Washington.
Priority.
435, November 3, 5 p. m. (Section Two).
Half or token measures would prove disastrous. Mnintenance and supply of
such an air force in Yunnan would heavily tax facilities of the Burma Road,
operation of which would probably need to be under effective military control.
Advance depots of supplies wouhl need to he built up at once. Time factor is
of utmost importance if as the Generalissimo thinks, Japanese are to move in
immediate future.
The successful invasion of Yunnan by the Japanese would probably seriously
affect Chinese morale and deprive China of supplies for continued organized
resistance. I do not believe however, that it would result in any early solution
of Japan's problem in China. Japan would still find herself obliged to maintain
large forces in this country for an indefinite period.
(End of Message)
Gauss.
BB
(Handed me by Mr. Liu XI-4-41. 9: 30 a. m. /s/ SKH)
Telegram from Chungking November 2, 1941
(Rec'd from S File— H. E. F.)
Confidential.
Message of Generalissimo Chiang, Kai-shek to President Roosevelt.
"In view of a rapidly developing danger which threatens to change the whole
military situation in China, I have communicated the following views to Mr.
Winston Churchill :
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1477
" 'Intelligence in which I have complete confidence shows that the Japanese
are determined upon an attack against Yunnan trom Indo-China in order to take
Kunming and to cut China's lines of communication with Britain and the United
States. Preparations are already on foot and the attack may be expected
shortly. This is in my view the first step in their policy of exi)ansion either
northward or southward, and I feel therefore that I should bring to your
notice certain facts and aspects of the situation. Indeed I feel it my duty and
my right to impress them upon you, for much the future lies in your hands.
" 'Once Kunming is taken, the Japanese would be rid of all fear of attack
in the rear. You will, I feel sure, be the first to see that its capture is not merely
one objective of Japan's war of aggression on [^J China but is a first
and necessary step to free herself for fresh enterprises. And you will appreciate
how vitally the coming battle will bear upon the safety of all countries on the
Pacific, upon yourselves and ourselves alike.
" 'You know you may count upon me to do my utmost to defend Kunming,
and believe me when I tell you that my armies can do it. But you know as I
do that I have no air force. And without an air force what can (mr army do
against another that is strong in the airV A glance at the map will show that
if the city falls. China will be cut off from supplies outside, and her armies
will be encircled and deprived of all contact with yours and those of her other
friends. And moreover the morale of the Chinese army and Chinese people will
be shaken to its foundation. Our morale has stood for more than four years on
the eastern fronts where our friends cannot directly reach us. It would be
gravely menaced by a Japanese triumph on the one front where as all the nation
knows the armed forces of our friends are within a hand's reach. For the first
time in this long war a real collapse of resistance would be possible.
" 'For more than four years now China has kept some five million men in
the field and thus immobilizes the [S] man-power of Japan. The impli-
cations of this nuist be clear to you; indeed I think they are already recognized
by yourself and all other friends of China. If Kunming fell, Japan would then
be able to cast all caution away and turn her whole might elsewhere. The
coming battle is therefore not merely a question of victory or defeat of China
but the peace and security of the Pacific hang upon it. Indeed it is not too much
to say that the outcome of the European (V) war may hang upon it.
" 'If China had the air force she needs, I should be making no appeal to you,
because I should feel confident of our ability to defeat the invaders. But we
have nothing that can be called an air force to match against what the Japanese
would bring to bear upon us, for we may be sure that they will use their finest
and their strongest. If however in the battle the Japanese air force can be
checked or even smashed, her power to enter upon what I have called fresh
enterprise will be much diminished. It is true that her navy will remain to her,
but with that slie can do little without the strength in the air without which
there would be an end to her schemes of expansion. From then on her submis-
sion could be brought about by political and economic pressure. Do not let us
therefore make mistakes as they have made elsewhere in this [4] war,
and let the Japanese attack us, as tliey mean to do, one by one, I am not asking
you to declare war upon Japan. I merely wish to leave you in no doubt about
the situation in which I find myself, to make it clear that I am no match of the
enemy in the air, to tell you what this means and to suggest a remedy. The
American volunteer air force now under training is good but very small. Our
only hope is that the British air force in Malaya, with American cooperation,
may come into action and support the American volunteers and the existing
Chinese air force. The British air force could cooperate as part of the Chinese
air force or assume the role of an international volunteer force. The result
would be to save China and to save the Pacific.
" 'You might feel at a first glance that this would involve you in war with
Japan while you are fighting with such courage in Europe and the Middle East.
I see things otherwise. I do not believe that Japan feels that she has the
strength to attack so long as the resistance of Cliina persists. But once she is
rid of this, she will attack you as and when it suits her and whether or not she
is * * * by such action on your part as I have now suggested. It would be
impossible to minimize the importance of British air action in Yunnan, for upon
this the fate of democratic cause will [51 turn. China has reached the
most critical phase of her war of resistance. Her ability to defend landward
approaches to Singapore and Burma now dertends primarily on British and
American willingness to cooperate iu the defence of Yunnan. If the Japanese
1478 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
can break our front here we shall be cut off fi-oni you, and the whole structure of
your own air and naval coordination with America and the Netherlands East
Indies will be seriously threatened in new ways and from a new direction. I
should like to express, with all the strength at my command, the conviction that
wisdom and foresight demand that China be given the plea that I have indicated.
Nothing else can ensure alike the defeat of Japan and the success of the coun-
tries now resisting aggression.'
"I have also discussed the strategic subject matter of the foregoing letter with
Brigadier-General Magruder and have asked him to convey to you what I con-
sider to be the decisive importance of the campaign in Yunnan. In addition I
should like to urge on you my convicticm that Britisli determination in dealing
with Japan waits at present upon the lead and stimulating influence of America ;
if the United States would draw on its air arm in the Philippines to provide
either an active unit or a reserve force in the combined operation. I am con-
vinced that unless Japan is checked sharply and at once, she is on the verge
of winning a jwsition from which she can deal with each of us separately and
in her own time. The opportunity to check her is a fleeting one. You [6]
are, Mr. President, recognized as the leader in the front of democratic nations
fighting aggression. I feel sure that you will move with the rapidity that the
urgency of the moment demands. It is now essential to avoid the errors by
which statesmen of Europe allowed Nazi Germany to divide them and to acquire
a connnanding position, and to prevent Japan from attacking us in succession and
separately and thus attaining the stature of a second Nazi Germany in the Far
East."
(signed) Chiang Kai-shek.
In reply refer to No. Op-16-F-2 Copy No. 1
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Office of Naval Intelligence,
Washinyton, Noveinbet- 1, 1941.
Secret
Memobandl'm for the Director
Subject : Dispatch from Alusna, Chungking, 300850
1. In this dispatch Major McHugh assumes that a Japanese drive from northern
Indo-China to cut the Burma Road is imminent. He further states that the only
hope of blocking this drive would be active participation In the campaign of all
American and British Far Eastern air units which would require foreign (pre-
sumably American) seizure and control of means of transportation and air fields
in Yunnan province.
2. In a message which the American Ambassador states is now being for-
warded to President Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-shek states that the Japanese will
launch a drive to cut the Burma Road within 30 days. He takes a somewhat
less serious view of the situation than does Major McHugh. Chiang says that
he has land forces adequate to defend the road but will need air support. He
indicates that he desires aid from British and American air effectives in Singa-
pore and Manila in a voluntary status. He says nothing about foreign control
of Chinese air fields and Chinese means of communication.
3. Considering the extreme difficulty of the terrain between the Indo-China
border and Kunming, it is believed that the ChitH'nr, if then fi(/ht and are given
some air support from Britain and America, can halt this Japanese drive. The
Japanese now have less than 100,000 men in Indo-China. How many they can
transport there in the next 30 days is problematical, but it is considered that they
cannot maintain their present concentrations (which threaten Russia in the
North), maintain their present garrisons in China, and at the same time spare
more than 200,000 troops for the drive into Yunnan.
4. The real question here is: Will the Chinese fight? In this connection there
have been many rumors that Lung Yun, Governor of Yunnan Province, has sold
out or soon will sell out to Wang Ching-wei. If this happens there is little that
Chiang Kai-shek, the British, or the United States can do to save the Burma
Road. This rumor, however, lacks confirmation.
5. Chinese character should also be taken into consideration. When aid is
promised to them they have a strong tendency to stop fighting themselves, sit
back, and wait until the aid arrives. For this reason it might be well not to
promise them too much. One other point should be mentioned. What Major
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1479
McHugh recommends is war-like action by the United States and Britain against
Japan — in short, de-facto war with Japan. If we are going to flglit Japan, rather
than transporting our men and equipment to far-off West Yunnan province,
thus placing ourselves under all the handicaps of ditficult transportation, it would
seem more sensible to attack the Japanese supply lines and home bases from our
already established bases, thus diverting their attention from the Burma Road.
(Signed) R. A. Boone,
For A. H. McCoLLUM.
Distribution : Original and 1 copy to DNI — Copy No. 1 and 2
CC— Op-lf F— Copy No. 3
Op-1(»/ll— Copy No. 4
Op--i2 — Copy No. 5
File— Copy No. 6
[Copy]
Secret
From : Alusna, Chungking. Action : OPNAV PRIORITY
Date : 30 October 1941.
Tor Coderoom : 1450.
Decoded by : TIERS.
Paraphrased by : REISS.
300850 CR 0531
Active participation all American British Far East air units would be only hope
for blocking invasion Yunnan which Sinos now seek. Supply and protection
available fields however very serious task not repeat not presently feasible under
existing conditions. Transport over Burma Road still insuflBcient and lacking
coordination. Problem possible of solution only if highest home authorities order
immediate action thereby justifying seizure and operating under foreign control
of all available transport including civil air. Believe Chiang will support this also
that general public reaction would inspire voluntary Sino cooperation. Present
indirect methods for timely results totally inadequate.
20 OP File CNO File
Distribution :
16 Action Record Copy 12 18 Bauer File.
Naval Message Navy Department
Phone Extension Number : Addresses Message precedence
From : Alusna Chungking
Released by : OPNAV PPPPPP Astalusna Shanghai
Date : 30 October 1941 CINCPAC PPPPPP
TOR Coderoom : 1433 CINCAF
De/coded by : TIERS COMSOPAT
Paraphrased by : V. TUCKER COM 16TH Nav Dist
Troops arrived daily Haiphong plus steady stream of supplies and materials
reported arriving at Formosa and Hainan indicate possible invasion Yunnan.
Such operation while difficult would be feasible if executed in force. Chinese
contention that it would be turning point in battle for Asia believed correct.
Capture of Kunming would completely crush Sino resistance while penetration
even to Mengtze would close Burma Road. Foreign attaches here agree minimum
requirement is 7 divisions and preferably ten.
Distribution :
16 Action
10/11 12 13 20OP FILE FILE.
[Stamped:] Confidential Top Secret.
79716 O — 46— Dt. 15-
1480 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
October 28, 1941.
NPM 5342 • 2 : 42 P. M.
Filed 0140
Priority
From: CHUNGKING.
To : FOR AMMISCA.
Number 28. October 28th.
Part 1. Especial attention Secretary of War and Chief of Staff. The Gen-
eralissimo, who has been absent since our arrival, received me today, accompanied
by MacMorland. After exchange of messages and amenities he expressed deep
appreciation for the sending of the mission.
In order to get his reaction to the objectives of the mission I outlined my con-
ception of the methods to be employed in making available the assistance afforded
by lend lease material and services. I suggested five different military problems
to which lend lease material was applicable and regarding which our personnel
could coUaberate on the solution. These were : 1, the communications problem ;
2, the aviation project ; 3, the supply of equipment to reorganized army forces ;
4, the supply of raw materials ; 5, the projects for training in and maintenance of
new material.
Part 2. He made a note of these five points and expressed satisfaction with
this method of approach, then quickly singled out aviation as the most pressing
problem. He stated bluntly that he would like the mission to take over the
control and development of his aviation service, disregarding apparently the
Chinese air force and referring to Chennault's volunteer force as the only
aviation that counted.
He requested with emphasis that a high ranking aviation officer be sent to take
over his air force.
[2] I had no opportunity to comment on these points.
Becoming intently earnest he said there was another emergency about which he
wished to ask immediate assistance. More follows.
Part 3. The Japanese, he knew, were preparing to attack Kunming from Indo
China and cut the Burma Road. He expects the attack by the end of November.
By a concentration of his land forces he could resist this attack, he said, but only
if he had air support. Then, queried later, he insisted that he had the resources to
defeat the Japanese if air assistance were forthcoming. The generalissmo
insisted, and rightly, that Chinese resistance would end if Kunming were lost.
In his analysis he argued that Kunming was the key to the Pacific, if it fell, China
would fall, and the attack on Malay Asia would inevitably follow. War in the
Pacific then, was a certainty. If China could hold, peace in the Pacific might be
saved. But China must have air support, he repeated. The British should
reinforce the American volunteer unit. They must be convinced of the necessity
of this course of action. Although not so expressed, it was to be Inferred that no
other assistance would be forthcoming in time. Not once did he mention American
reinforcements of any kind, pleading the critical situation he repeatedly said that
only British air support could save China and i)eace in the Pacific.
Part four. The generalissimo then asked directly that I inform Washington of
the threatening situation at once, and urge that the President intercede with
London to make available the Singapore air forces to support his defense. Also
he requested me i)ersonally to appeal to the British commander in chief in Singa-
pore to the same effect. Para. Quoting some announcement of the administra-
tion to the effect that a movement [3] southward by Japan would be
considered inimical to Americantinterests, he argued that our govt could properly
interpret an attack on Kunming in that light. Even worse, since it would be the
first item in a more effective movement south if Chinese resistance were eliminated
he added that with the Burma Road cut, America's right to trade with China
would be infringed.
Part 5. He then pled that the President be urged to bring diplomatic pressure on
Japan and to appeal as well to Britain jointly to warn Japan that an attack upon
Kunming would be considered inimical to our interests. This course, he believed,
would cause Japan to desist.
In the circumstances, I had no opportunity to turn the interview into channels
in which I was authorized to act. I seized one opportunity to point to the critical
deficiency of operations on the Burma Road that the success of the defense de-
pended upon improving the traffic there whether or not the British gave all support.
I further reminded him that an argument the British might offer for refusing
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1481
support would be their inability to supply their air units with the road in its
present condition. With respect to the road I made clear that the mission was
prepared to offer technical assistance in improving the conditions but that the
political complications would have to be cleared by the Chinese themselves.
Part 6. The generalissimo informed me that he had taken up the question of
aviation support with the British Ambassador on several occasions. Madame
Chiang interjected that the Chinese had given assurances of support of large land
forces if Singapore were attacked, but that Britain refused to give assurences of
air support if Kunming were attacked, unless British territory were invaded.
I told the generalissimo that I could transmit his request to the Secretary of
War.
[4] Previous to the interview I had drafted a radio on the subject of the
probability of an attack on Kunming. Present indications point strongly that
way. If successful, there is little doubt that China's resistance would end. Also
it is doubtless true that without effective air support the Japanese might succeed in
this decisive effort.
Part seven. It may not be an exaggeration to say that Kunming momentarily
has become the key to the Pacific. There is no combat value in the Chinese air
force. The American volunteers alone at present strength and as presently
equipped are ineffective and will not be ready for combat for several months.
Increments of lend lease aviation materiel contemplated will be too little and too
late. Only British forces at Singapore, or perhaps organized units from the
Philippines would be available in time to afford effective support to China.
I have discussed the interview with our Ambassador and he has read this radio.
Magkuder.
EXHIBIT NO. 48
WPD 2917-32 WPD 2917-26-^7 396
Wab Department,
Wae Department General Staff,
War Plans Division,
Washington, November 11, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff :
Subject : Method of Coordination of Command
in Coastal Frontiers.
1. The attached Joint Board case has been before the Joint Planning
Committee since last February. At a recent meeting of The Joint Board,
Admiral Stark suggested that the Army take action on the Navy proposal.
2. The case is divisible into two main subjects — Changes in Coastal Frontiers
and the assignment of Command in the Caribbean, Panama, Hawaii and Philip-
pine Coastal Frontiers. The Army and Navy sections of The Joint Planning
Committee have reached an agreement with regard to changes in Coastal
Frontiers. They disagree, however, as to the service that should exercise Unity
of Command in the Coastal Frontiers.
3. The proposals of the Army and Navy Sections on command are outlined
in the attached Memorandum to you. The Memorandum also embodies my
views on the question of unity command in the Caribbean Area, Hawaii, and
the Philippines.
4. If The Joint Board desires definite action on this case, I recommend that
you approve the attached Memorandum. I believe the Navy will agree with
the solution proposed, which simply means that we will continue to operate
by mutual cooperation. If you do not wish to raise the question of command
at this time I can hold the case in suspense for the time being.
/s/ L. T. Gerow,
L. T. Gerow,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.
2 Incls:
Memo, to C/S, fr.
Actg. A. C. of S., WPD.
JBNo. 350 (Ser. 678)
1482 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[J] War Department,
War Department General Staff,
War Plans Division,
Washington, Novemher 17, 1941-
WPD 2917-32
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff :
Subject : Method of Coordination of Command in
Coastal Frontiers.
I. Discussion.
1. Joint Board case (J. B. No. 350, Serial 678) prescribing coordination of
command is now before the Joint Planning Committee.
2. The Navy section proposes changes in command relations in the following
coastal frontiers :
a. Caribbean.
Coordination by the method of unity of command, command being vested in
the Commandant of the 10th Naval District.
6. Panama.
Coordination by unity of command, command being vested in the Commanding
General, Panama Canal Department except when major naval forces are based
in the frontier for general strategic naval operations in either the Caribbean
Sea or the Pacific Ocean. In this contingency command would be vested in the
Commandant of the 15th Naval District.
c. Hawaii.
Coordination by unity of command as follows :
(1) Command vested in Commanding General, Hawaiian Department when
the most important strategic problem is one of territorial defense of the
Hawaiian Islands and when major naval forces have been withdrawn and not
based in the frontier for general strategic naval operations either in the vicinity
or at a distance.
(2) Command vested in the Commandant of the 14th Naval District when
major naval forces are based in the frontier for general strategic naval
operations either in the vicinity or at a distance.
3. The Army section proposes the following, applicable to all coastal
frontiers :
a. Unity of command over forces assigned to the defense of a coastal frontier
is vested in the Army, except when the United States Atlantic or Pacific Fleet
or the major portion thereof is operating against comparable hostile forces
within the radius of possible support by Army aviation operating from bases
within the coast^J frontier. In the excepted case, unity of command is vested
in the Navy
[2] ft. In a specific operation, unity of command in coastal frontiers may
be transferred from the Army to the Navy and vice versa, when the .senior Army
and Navy commanders concerned agree that such change is necessary and further
agree as to the service that shall exercise such command.
c. Unity of command does not authorize the service in which it is vested
to assign missions that will require the forces of the other service to operate
from bases outside the coastal frontier.
4. The Army and Navy sections of the Joint Planning Committee have been
unable to reach an agreement on a compromise solution of the problem of unity
of command. The Army section does not believe that unity of command in
coastal frontiers is essential. It is believed that the Navy section will agree
to a continuation of coordination by mutual cooperation.
5. The vesting in a single individual of full responsibility for a military opera-
tion is a generally accepted principle for the accomplishment of effective military
action. In theory at least, no amount of personal willingnes.s to cooperate can
eliminate the objections inherent in the committee .system of control of military
forces. The most frequently cited recent example of the effect of such divided
responsibility is that of failure of the defense of Crete as contra.sted with the
successful attack on that Island in which the attacking force presumably was
commanded by a single individual.
6. Unity of command is the accepted method of coordination within the Army
and within the Navy, themselves. However, the many practical difliculties en-
countered in the application of that principle as applied to joint operations of the
Army and Navy have usually led to the adoption of the method of coordination
by mutual cooperation except when specific tasks are planned.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1483
7. The difficulty of determining the service in which unity of command should
vest in the defense of a coastal frontier lies in the inability to determine in
advance when hostilities will begin and the nature and the extent of the opera-
tions. For that reason it is difficult to foresee which service will play the major
part in the defense and will have primary interest. The major resjwnsibility may
well pass from one service to the other during defensive operations. On the
other hand, overseas landing expeditions or land operations requiring support
from Naval forces, such as those in Libya, present problems in which the
service having preponderance of re.sponsibillty can readily be determined. The
time such an operation should begin, as well as terminate, and its nature and
extent can be forecast and the service having the preponderance of responsibility
definitely agreed upon between the two services, thereby indicating the service
in which unity of command should vest. In [3] such operations the
preponderance of responsibility will not fluctuate from one service to the other
as might be the case in defense of coastal frontiers.
8. A fact frequently lost sight of in consideration of the method of coordina-
tion under the principle of mutual cooperation is that, although the major
operation is being conducted under that principle, joint operations subordinate
thereto may still be conducted under the principle of unity of command if so
agreed to by the Army and Navy commanders concerned. This method is par-
ticularly applicable to joint operations by forces having similar combat character-
istics, such as the air forces of the two services.
II. Action rccommevded.
That coordination of joint operations in the Taribbean, Panama and Hawaiian
Coastal Frontiers continue to be effected by mutual cooperation. If this recom-
mendation is approved, such a proposal will be discussed with the Navy section
of the Joint Planning Committee.
/s/ L. T. Gerow
L. T. Getrow,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.
[/] OCS 21278-10
GCM
December 20, 1941.
Personal and Confidential
My dei\e Emmons: Instructions to the Army and Navy were issued a few
days ago assigning unity of command to the Navy in Hawaii. At the same time
unity of command was assigned to the Army in Panama.
For your confidential information, this action was taken in the following
circumstances: In the first place, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of
the Navy were determined that there should be no question of future confusion
as to re.sponsibillty. Further, the efforts I have been making for more than a
year to secure unity of command in various critical regions had been unavail-
ing. All sorts of Naval details, such as the operations of ships and submarines,
the coordination of efforts to locate purely Naval objectives, and similar matters
had been raised in objection to Army control wherever that was proposed. I
must say at the same time that some of the Army staff brought up somewhat
similar objections to Naval control. Both Stark and I were struggling to the
same end, but until this crash of December 7th, the difficulties seemed, at least
under peacetime conditions, almost insurmountable. However, the two deci-
sions I have just referred to have been made and further ones are in process of
being made, all of which I feel will add immeasurably to our security, whatever
the local embarrassments. Also, I regard these as merely stepping stones to
larger decisions involved in our relations with Allies.
I am giving you this information in order that you may better appreciate the
problem and, therefore, be better prepared to assist me by endeavoring to work
with Nimitz in complete understanding.
Whatever difficulties arise that cannot be adjusted locally, should be brought
to our attention here for consideration by Admiral Stark and nayself. These
days are too perilous for personal feelings in any way to affect efficiency.
This is a very hasty note, but I want General McCoy to take it off with him
this mornins.
1484 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
You have my complete confidence and I will do everything possible to support
you.
Faithfully yours,
(Sgd.) G. C. Marshall.
General Delos C. Emmons,
Commanding Hainiiian Department,
Honolulu, T. H.
MY
EXHIBIT NO. 48A
Confidential 2917-32
War Dfr2>ARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Staff,
Wa.shin(/ton, December 5, 1941-
OCS 21278-5
Memorandum for General Gerow :
I would like this matter of Coordination of Command discussed with the Naval
Section of the Joint Planning Committee. However, I think it is important that
a general policy, or what might be called an explanation. sh(mld first be decided
on, expressed in carefully considered sentences, as to the application of unity
command.
A discussion of this runs through a series of paragraphs on your memorandum
and you have covered it orally to me, but no where is it presentetl in a concise
form.
[handwritten] G. C. M.
Chief of Staff.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1485
EXHIBIT NO. 49
SECRET
tJ. S». Serial Oil 512-12 (R)
B.tJ.g.fj)(4173g '■
Short Title ABC-1
VlllTED STATICS - BRITISH
STAFF COir/EF.SATIOKS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
March 27, 1941.
^4f<f -,
Copy No. 9 Oof 125,
'^^^ 9y^'^J^^
-1-
1486 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
?rTr"3erlal 011512-12(R)
B. u. 3. (jl rtn^g —
Short Title ABC-l
UNITED STATES - DRITISK STAFF CONVERSATIOIIS
LIST OP EFFECTIVE PAGES
Cover Page
List of Effective Pages
Report
Annex I
Annex IZ
Annex III
Annex IV
Annex V
No, of panes Change In effect
1 dftTomL
11
ORIGINAL
title page unnvmbered ORIGINAL
pares 2 to 10 inc.
pages 1 to 4 Inc. ORIOniAL
title page unniunbered ORIGINAL
pages 2 to 3 Inc.
pages 1 to 32 Inc.
ORIGINAL
title page unnxunbered ORIOIBAL
pages 2 to 5 Inc.
title page only
(vmnxunbered)
ORIGINAL
Copy Ko,___98f I2fi,
-11.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1487
SECRET
TrrSVSerlal 011512*12(R)
B, P .5.(J)(4n 3g ~-
hort Titioi:ro-i
larch '57, 154T
UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONS
REPORT
GENERAL
1. Staff Convorsctlons woro hold In ?fashlngton froa
Jaquflry gftr ''^*"' *"" ""•''o ti g7 , 19^1 . botwoon a Unitod Stat os
Staff Comnltt oo represontlng the Chief of Naval QperatJona and
the Chief of ^taff of tho Arm v. and a Unitod Kingdom Dologatlon
representing the Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of the
Chiefs of Staff of tho Dominions of Canada, Avistralla, and
New Zealand were assoclatud with tho Unitod Kingdom Delegation
throughout tho course of these conversations, but were not
present at joint modtings.
2. The personnel of tho United Statos Staff
Committee and of tho Unitod Kingdom Delegation comprise the
following:
United States Reprosontativea;
Major-Oenorai S. D. Emblck
Brigadier-General Sherman Miles
Brigcdier-Oorieral L. T. Gorow
Colonel J. T. McNarnoy
Reer-Admiral R. L. Ghonaley
Rear-Admiral R, K. Turner
Captain A. G. Kirk
Captain DeVritt C. Ramsey
Lt.-Colonol 0, T. Pfelffor
British Representatives;
Roar-Admiral R. M. Bellairs
Roar-Admiral V, H. Danckwerts
Major-Goneral E. L. Uorrla
Air Vice-Marshal J. C. Slcssor
Qaptaln A. W. Clarke
PURPOSES
OP TOE
feWCE.
Secretariat;
Lt, -Colonel w. p. Scoboy
Commander L. R. McDowell
Lt.-Colonol A. T. Cornwall-Jones
3» The purposes of tho Staff Conforenc*, as
set out In tho instznictlons to the two represen-
tative bodies, were as follows:
(a) To determine tho best methods by
which the armed forces of tho United States
and British Commonwealth, with Its present
Allies, coiild defeat Oormany rjid the Powers
allied with her, s hovild the Unitod Str^toa b e
compellod to resort to war.
Copy No. ""of 125,
1488 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECftET
n. 3. serial 011S12-12(R)
B.g.3.{ J) (417577 *-^
Short iUle ASa-l
March 27. 1541
(b) To coordinate, on broad lines,
plans for the employment of the forces of
the Associated Poners.
(c) To reach agreements concerning
the methods and nature of Military Coopera-
tion between the tv/o nations. Including the
allocation of the principal areas of resp on-
sibility, the major lines of tna tj l^^hftr v
£ltP&t6^ 7 to be pursued by both nations, the
strenrth of the force s which each may be able
to commit, and the detorralnatlon of satisfactory
command arrangements, both as to supreme Military
control, and cs to imlty of flold command In
cases of strategic or tactical Joint operations*
A PPROV AL 4. The Staff Conference, interpreting the
OF THF " foregoing instructions in the light of the
REPORT * respective national positions of the tv/o Powers,
has reached agreements, as set forth in this
and annexed documents, concerning Military Cooperation between
the United States and the British Conmonv/aalth and its present
Allies should the United States associate itself with them in
war against Germany and her Allies, The agreements herewith
submitted are s ubject to confirmati on by:
(a) The Chief of Naval Operations,
United States Navy; the Chief of Staff,
United States Army; the Chiefs of Staff
Committee of the War Cabinet in the United
Kingdom.
(b) The Oovommotot of the United /^<Ae^
States and His Majesty's Oovommcnt in tho V^t/-/"-
United Kingdom,
5. The Chiefs of Staff will request His
Majesty's Govornmont in tho United Kingdom to endeavor to
obtain, whore necessary, tho concvtrrenco of His Majesty's
Governments in the Dominions, tho Sovernnerit of India, and
tho Govornmonts of Allied Powers to the relevant provisions of
the agreements herein recorded. -> Tho Chief of Navel Operations
and tho Chief of Staff will similarly request tho United States
Oovomment to endeavor to obtain, whore noce3aary,the concurrence
of the Governments of such other American Powers cs may enter
tho war as associates of the United States.
-2-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1489
SECRET
VTTT
B. TT .5.
Sarlal 011512-12(R)
Short Tltio aBC-1
March 5 7 . 1? ^
COLLABORA - 6. Tho High Comncnd cf tho United Stntoa
TIOH IN and United Kingdom 1*111 oollrborato oontlnuoualy
^lannikQ . In tho formulation and oxooutlon of stratogloal
policies and plans which sholl govorn tho conduct
of tho war* Thoy nnd tholr rospoctlvo conmandors in tho floldi
as nay bo appropriatoi will oim^-larly oollaborato in tho plan-
ning and oxocutlon of such oporr.tions as ma;^ bo undort&kon
jointly by United States and British forces* This arrcngomont
will apply also to such plans and operations as vacy bo under-
taken separately, the extent of collaboration required in oaoh
portlcular plan or operation boing agrood mutually when the
■gonoral policy has boon decided*
A33UMP - 7, Tho tern "Asseoiatod Powers" used
^lONS . horoin Is to bo takon as noanlng tho United States
and British ConnonTroalth, and, whon appropriate,
includes tho Asaoclates and Alllos of olthor Power*
8. Tho Staff Con^orence assumes that
when the Unitod States becomes involved in war vTlth Oermany,
It will at the some tine engage in war with Italy* In these
elrcumstancos, the possibility of a state of war arising be-
tween Japan and an Association of the Unitod States, the
British Commonwealth and its Allleo, including tho Netherlands
Bast Indies, must be taken into account*
9* Tho Conference assumes 'that the United
States will oontlnue to furnish material aid to tho United
Kingdom, but, for the use of itself and its other assooiatsi,
will retain material in such quantities os to provide for
security and best to effectuate United States-British Joint
plans for defeating Oermany and her Allies* It is rooognlBod
that the amount and naturo of tho material aid which the United
States affords tho British Commonwealth will influence tho iIbo
and character pf the Military forces which will bo available
to the United Sitatos for use in the war* /Q/t\^lkj
10,
of the AasooJ
Oomany and hor Allies *
THE BIIOAD
STOATgaie
OBJECTIVE .
I OBJECT)
Tho broad strateglo objootlvo (obJoot) CvtuU>\
slated Powe:^s will be tho defeat of '^' '
11. Tho prinoiples of Unitod Btatoa and
British national strategic defense polioloi of
whioh tho Military foroos of the Asioolatod Powari
Bust toke aooount aroi
-3-
1490 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
tJ. g'.Scrlnl 011512-12(R)
5.tl.s.(J)(4TTS^
Short fl tlo AB C-1
March 27, ITIT
(g) United Ststea.
The paramount territorial Intereata
of the United Str.tes ere in the Western Hemis-
phere. The United States must, in aH eventualities,
maintain such dispositions r.s v/ill prevent the
extension in the V/e stern Hemisphere of European
or Asiatic political or Military power,
(b) British Conrnionv/ealth.
The security of the United Klrg dom mtlst
be naintaincd in all circumstances. Similarly,
the United Kingdom, the Dominions, r,nd India must
maintr.ln dispositions v;hich, in r.ll eventualities,
will provide for the ultimate security of the
British Commonwealth cf ITatlons. A cardinal feature
of British strategic policy is the retention of a
position in the Far Inst such as will ensure the
cohesion and security of tho British Commonwealth
and tho maintenance of its war effort.
(c) Sea Communications .
The security of tho sea communications
of the Associated Pov/crs is essential to the con-
tinuance of their v/ar effort
GgJERAL 12. Tho strategic concept includes the follow-
STkATEGIC Ing as the principal offensive policies against
CONCEPT." tho Axis Powers:
(a) Application of economic pressure by ^iL^^^ I '
naval, land, and air forces arid all othor moans.
Including tho control of commodities at their (J/t^^'^^A^^
source by diplomatic and financial measures, ^ — -
(b) A sustained air offensive against
Gorman Military power, supplcmonted by air offen-
sives against other regions vmcler enemy control
which contribute to that power,
(c) Tho early elimination of Italy r.s an
active partner In tho Axis,
(d) The cmploymont of tho air, land, end
naval forces of the Associated Powers, at ovoit^
opportxmity. In raids and minor offorB Ivca against
Axis Military strength,
-4- '
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1491
SECRET
U» S. Serial 0115 12-12(R)
B.i/.s.(JW<tTTro~
Short Tlilo ADC-1
tJarch S?, YWU
(e) The support of neutrals, nnd of Allies
of the United Klnrdon, Assoclntos of the United
Str.tes, r.nd populations In Axis-occupied territory
In roslstanco to the Axis Powers.
(f) The building up of the necessary forces
for an eventual offensive arr.lnst Germany,
(g) The capture of positions fron which to
launch the eventual offensive.
, ^ 13. Plana for the Military operations of the
Associated Powers will likewise be covcmed by the followlnc
(a) Since Gcrnany is the ^.rcdoninant menbcr ^/.
of the Axis Powcrc, the Atlantic ^nd European area
is considered to be the dccicive theatre. The
principal United States Ililitary effort will bo exerted
in tlaat theatre, nnd oporntions of United States forces
in other theatres will be conducted In such e manner
aa to facilitate that effort.
(b) Ov/ing to the threat to the soa comraunica-
tlona of the United Kingdom, the principal taak of
the United States naval forces in the Atlantic will
be the protection of shipping of the Associated
Pov/ers, the center of f-ravity of the United States
effort boinc concentrated in the Northwestern Approaches
to the United Kingdom, Under this conception, the
United States naval effort in the Mediterranean will
initially be considured of secondary importance,
(o) It will be of groat importance to maintain
the present British and Allied Military position in
and nerr the rJcditerrancan basins, and to prevent the
spread of Axis control in North Africa,
(d) Even if Japan wore not initially to ente»
the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still
be neccssRry for the Associated Powers to deploy their
forces in a manner to guard against eventual Japrneso
intervention. If Japrn docs enter the war, the Military
strategy in the Far Uast will be defensive. The United
States does not intend to add to its present .'!illtary
strength Tn the Far TIast but will employ the United
States Pacific Fleet offensively* in the manner
1492 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TrgTSorlal 011512-12(R) '
B.TT.S.(J)(41)50.
Short Title ABC-1
March S7. IMT
best calculated to weaken Japanese economic
power, and to support the defense of the
Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength
away from Malaysia, The United States intends
so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and
Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth
v/ill be in a position tic release the necessary
forces for the Far East.
(o) The details of the doploymont of the forces
of the Associated Pov/ers at any one time v/ill be
dcoidod with regard to the Military situation in
all theatres .
(f) The principal dofonsive roles of the
land forces of the Associated Pov/ors will be to
hold the British Isles against invasion; to defend
the \7estcrn Hoinisphe^o; and to protect outlying
Military base ai'eas and islands of strategic
importance against land, air, or sea-borne attack.
(g) United States' land forces v/ill support
United States' naval and air forces maintaining
the security of the 'Yestern Hemisphere or operating
in the are^s bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to
the availability of trained and equipped organizations.
United States' land forces will, as a general rule,
provide ground and anti-aircraft defenses of naval
and air bases uaod primarily by United States' forces.
(h) Subject to the requirements of the
security of the United States, the British Isles
and their sea cormunications, the air policy of
the Associated Powers will be directed towards
achieving, as quickly as possible, superiority of
air strength over that of the cneny, particularly
in long-ranfie striking forces.
(i) United States P.vmy Air Forces will support
the United States land and naval forces maintaining
the security of the '■Vostern Ilcnisphere or operating
in tho areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to
the availability of trained and equipped organizations,
they will undertake tho air defense of those general
areas in v/hich naval bases used primarily by United
States forces are located, and subsequently, of
such other areas as may -be agreed upon. United States
-6-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1493
SECRET
U. S. Serial 011512-12(R)
6.W.S.(J)(4rr3^
Short Title ABC-1
March 27, 1911
/.rmy air bonbardnent units will operate offensive-
ly in collaboration v/ith the Royal Air Force,
primarily RG^i^st German Military pov/er at its
source,
(J) United States forces will, so far as
practicable, drav/ their logistic support (supply
and naintenance) from sources outside the British
Isles. Subject to this principle, hov/over, the
military bases, repair facilities, and supplies of
either nation will bo at the disposal of the
f'illtary forcos of the other as required for the
successful prosecution of the v/ar.
PRINCIPLES 14, Subject to the provisions of Annexes II
OF and III, and to other agreements made between
COI.!IL\ND appropriate authorities to meet special conditions,
the follov/inc principles will frovcrn the exercise
of cormand of tho Ililltary forces of the Associated Powers;
(n) In accordance v/ith plans basod on \
joint strategic policy, cnch Pov/er will be
charged v;ith the strategic direction of all
forces of the Associated Powers normally
operating in certain areas. The aro'.s arc
defined initially in Annex II,
(b) x.s a general rule, tl^o forces of each
of tho Asaociatod Powers should operate under
their own conmandcrs in tho areas of rasponsibility
of their own Power.
(c) Tho assignment of an ^.rea to one Power
shall not bo construed ns restricting the forcos
of the other Pov/cr from temporarily extending
appropriate operations into that area, as nay bo
required by particular circviristrnccs,
(d) Tho forcos of either Power v/hich are onploycid
normally under tho strategic direction of an
established comnandcr of the other, \7ill, i/ith
duo rcgr.rd to their typo, bo cnployccf as task
(organized) forces charged ./ith the execution of
spoclfic strategic tasks. Those task (organized)
forcos will operate under their ov/n cainandors and
will not be distributed into small bodies attached
to tho forces of the other Power. Only exceptional
Military circumstances will Justify the temporary
susponalon of the normal strategic tasks.
-7-
1494 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
?r"5TSerial 011512-12(R)
B.ff.5.(j}(4rnn
Short 'jltlo ABC-1
March 57, 1941
(o) V/hen units of both Powers cooporato
tQctlcally, command v;ill bo oxcrcisod by that
officer of either Power who is the senior in
rank, or if of equal rank, of time in grade . ,
(f) United Str.tes nr.val r-vintion forces
employed in British Areas will operate vmdor
United States nr.val comrxind, rnd will remain an
integral p.irt of United States naval task forces,
urrangemcnts v/ill be made for coordination of
their operations .vith those of the appropriate
Coastal Conma.nd croups.
UILITAKY 15. To effect the collaboration outll o d in
UISSIOtTS . paragraph 6, and to ensure the coordination of
administrative action and comriand between the
United States and British Military Services, the United States
and United Kingdom v;ill exchange Military Missions. Those
?'issions will comprise one senior officer of each of the
Military Services, v;ith their appropriate staffs. The func-
tions of these missions, the orr^anlzation of which is described
in Annex I, will be as follows:
(a) To represent jointly, as a corporate '
body, tlicir own Chiefs of Staff (the Chief of
Naval Operations being considered as such), vis-
a-vis the group of Chiefs of Staff of the Power
to v;hich thoy arc nccroditod, for the purpose of
collaboration in the formxilation of Military
policies and plans governing the conduct of the
war in areas In which that Power assumes respon-
sibility for strategic direction.
(b) In their individual capacity to
represent their ov.-n indivicjual llllitary Services
vis-a-vis the appropriate Military Services -of
the Power to which thoy are accredited, in matters
of mutvial concern in the areas in which that Power
arsunos responsibility for strategic ditection.
16, The personnel of cither Mission shall
not become members of any i*ef:ularly constituted body of
the govomnent of the Power to v/hich thoy arc accredited.
Their staffs will, however, work in direct cooperation with
the appropriate branches and comnittees of the staff of the
Power to which thoy nre accredited.
-8-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1495
SECRET
^T5T5orlal 011512-12(R)
B.U.S.(J){41)gO
Short Title "TTO-l
Mrrch 57. 1{RI
17, Tho Unltod S]:ntos, r.a ncy bo nocoss'-.ry,
v/lll oxchango liaison offlcors vith Ccnrda, Austrclic, end
How Zoclcnd for offoctuctlnc diroct cooporntlon botweon
XTnltod Stcitcs and Dominion forces.
18. To promote adcqucto collcborntlon nnd
prompt decision, e nillt-ry tronsportr.tion service will bo
established between England md the United States, Ships
Old ?.ifpl:xnco v/ill bo Qsalcncd to this sorvico by the United
States r.nd the United Kinsdon rs may bo found necessary.
IKTBLLI - 19. Existing llilitr.ry intellleenco orcJiniza-
OEKOE. tions of ^ho two Powers will operate as independent
intollificnce cccnr.iea, but will maintain close
liaison with each other in order to onsuro the full end prompt
exchange of pertinent information concerning war operations.
Intelligence liaison v/ill be oatr.blishod net only through the
Military Uisslona but also between all och.-.lons of connr.nd in
the field with respect to natters which r.ffect their operations.
ANN5XES . 20. Agreements aa to tho details of tho fore-
going and as to technical nothods of cooperation rro
annexed hereto as follows:
I, OltOANIZi'.TION OF MILIT/JIY KISSIONS.
IT, RnSPONSIFILITY FOR THE STn/^TEGIC
DIR3CTI0N OP »!ILIT/jrY POriCES.
III. UlilTED STATES - HIITISH COVPAOmnjJjTE
JOINT &',.SIC i";Jl FLAK.
rV. CO!!?.TJNICATIONS.
V, COITTT.OL AlH) PROTECTION OF SEIPPIIIG.
-9-
79716 O— 46 — pt. 1{
1496 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
S''^CRET
TT7"s:rsorl al 011512-12(R)
B.tJ.s.(j)(4r)35
5hcrt TUle~?[lg-l
yjarch ^7, J-^U
S. D. Emblck,
Major-Genoral, U. S. Army.
R. M. Bellalrs,
Rcar-Adniral, Royal Navy,
Shorman Miles,
Brlgadlcr-Gcnoral, U. S. Army.
V. H. Dnnckv/orts,
Rear-Adniral, Royal Navy,
L. T, Gorow,
Brlgadior-Gonopal, U.S. Amy,
E. L. norris,
Major-Gcnoral, British Army,
J. T. McNarney,
Colonel, U. S. Array,
J. C. Slcssor,
Air-Vico Marshal, Royal Air
Force,
R. L. Ghormloy,
Rear-Admiral , U. S. ITavy,
A. V;. Clarke,
Captain, Royal Navy.
R. K. Turner,
Ikfeer-Admiral, U. S, Navy.
A. G. Kirk,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
DG'^'itt C. Ramsoy,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
0. T. Pfoiffcr,
Lt. ►-Colonel, U, S. I.I, C.
-10-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1497
S 5 C R E T
B.U.5.(J){U)3C
ii/d. Serial 611^12-12 (R-Al)
Short Title A B C-1 Annex 7
March 27. l^ITT
UIIITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF COITVSRSATIONS
REPORT
AI3IEX I
ORGAITIZATION OF rULITARY tJISSIONS
DESIGNA - 1. In accordance with paragraph 15 of the
TIOH. Main Report, the tv/o Powers will establish the
follccving:
(q) Tike United States !!ilitary Mission
In London.
(b) The British Uilitary lUssion in
Vteshington.
TIIJE OF 2. These I'ilitary I!issions will be estab-
SSTABLISH - lished and announced as the duly accredited
ISNT OF representatives of their resoective Chiefs of
tJIs5I0l?S Staff vis-a-vis the Chiefs of Staff of the
other Power, inmediately xxjyon the entry of the
United States into the war as an Associate of the British
Commonwealth .
ORGAITIZA - 3. The organizetion of the missions will be
TI^J or ~ 'such as to enable then to carry out their func-
mssiONS . tions, as prescribed in paragraphs 15 and 16 of
the Main Report.
ORGAKIZA- 4. The United States Military lliasion in
TION OF TB^ London will consist of two members and a
XJNI^D S^nfeS staff. The members will be a flag officer
MILITARY MISSIOK of the United States Navy and a general
HT LOHDOBT officer of the United States Amy.
The staff will be apjjroximately as
follows:
(a) The Joint Planning Staff, v*iich
will collaborate with the Joint Planning
Subcommittee of the War Cabinet, will
consist of one naval officer and at least
three assistants, one amy officer and at
least three assistants, and a small
secretariat .
Copy Kol^**of 125. -1-
1498 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
B.U.5.(J)(4l)30
TT. 5. 3erier^l512-12(R-Al)
Short Title ABC-1 /Jinex I
tiarch 27, 1941
(b) The Naval Staff , which will collaborato
with the Adialralty and, as nocosaary, v/ith the
Air Ministry, will consist of the following:
Sections Officer Porsonnol
Operations 6
Planning 4
Aviation 4
Intelll<:^Qnc6 3
Shipping Control 5
Submarine end Anti-submarine 2
ConKmnicQtions (Sicncls) 3
Material 4 ,
Secretariat 3
TOTAL 34
(c) The Amy Staff , which will collaborate
with the V7ar Office nnd with the Air Ministry,
will consist of the following:
Soctloni Officer Porsonnol
Pers onal Str.ff
Aides 1
General Staff
ihlof of Staff
1
0-1 (Personnel)
2
0-2 ( Intelligence )
3
0-3(0rganlzation, Operations,
and Training)
3
0-4 (Supply and Evacuation)
3
Special Str.ff
Aviation
4
/inti-aircraft
2
Amorod Force
1
Artillery
1
ChoQlcel Warfare
1
Engineer
2
Infantry
1
Ordnance
2
Signal (Conmunicfltions)
2
Medical
2
Adjutant General
1
Judge Advocate
1
Quartermaster
2
TOTAL 35
-2.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1499
3EGI1ET
'gTtr:'5T(J)Ul)30
n. S. Sorial §11512-12(R-A1)
short Tltlo ;.rc-l Annox I
March 27. 19^
ORGANIZA - 5. Tho British llllltary Ilisalon In
TION OF 'the '7Q8hlncton will consist of throo nanbors,
BUtTISH c staff, and a secretariat. The mombors
MlSSIOg IN V7111 bo a flag officer of tho British Navy,
WASHlNO'l'g!! , a general officer of tho British Amy, and
en Air Officer of tho Royal Air Force. Tho
staff will consist of the following:
(a) The Joint Planning Staff , which will
collaborate with the United States Joint Planning
Comnlttee, will consist of ono Naval, one Army,
and .ono Air Force officer,
(b) Tho Naval Staff , which will collaborate
with the United States Navy Depnrtnont, will
consist of the following:
Sections Officer Personnel
Oporotlons)
Convoy and Trade)
Protection) 4
Intolligenco 2
Signals (Coonunications) 1
Antl-Subnarine Warfare 1
Ploot Air Arm 1
TOTAL "5
(c) Tho Arny Staff , which v/ill collaborate
with tho United Str.tos War Dopartnont, will
consist of the following:
Sections Officer Personnel
IntolllfTonco 2
Signals (Connunicr.t ions) 1
/antiaircraft 1
Organization 1
Adninistretion 1
TOTAL ~5
(d) The Air Strff , which will collaborate
with the Iftilted Str.tos War Dopartnont and -with
tho United States Navy Dopartnont, will consist
of the following:
-3-
1500 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
S B C R 3 T
I^hort Title ABC-1 Annex T
Itarch 27. 1941 .
Sections Offlper Personnel
Intelligence 2
Signals (CooiBunlcations) 2
Organization and
Administration 1
Training 1
Coastal Command 1
TOTAL 7
(e) The Secretariat will consist of
approximately three officers and a suitable
number of clerical and typing personnel.
(f) The Dominions of Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand will be represented on the
above staff of the Mission in Washington by
their service attaches.
-4-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1501
SECRET
U.S. Serial 011T12-1?( R.AP)
Short Title ABC-1 Annex 2 »
March 27. 1941
UNITED STA TES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONS
REPORT
ANNEX II
RESPONSIB ILITY FOR THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION
OF IIILITARY FORCES
H^^gP !• Upon entering the war the United States will
S^ATBu assume responsibility for the strategic direction
MMS. of Its own and British Ullltary forces in the follow-
ing areas;
(a) The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with
Islands and contiguous continental land areas, north
of Latitude 25" South and west of Longitude 30° West
except: '
(1) The area het\7een Latitude 20° North
and Latitude 43° North which lies east
of Longitude 40° West,
(2) The waters and territories .in which
Canada assumes responsibility for the
strategic direction of Military forces,
as may be defined in United States -
Canada joint agreements.
(b) Th« Pacific Ocean Area, together with islands
and contiguous continental land area?, as follows;
(1) North of Latitude 30° North and west of
Longitude 140° East;
(2) North of the equator and east of
Longitude 140° Sastj
(3) South of the eqxiator and east of Longitude
ICO to the South American ooast and
Longitude 74° West;
except for the waters and territories in which Canada
assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of
Military forces, as may be defined in United States -
Canada Joint agreements. The United States will affor<5
Copy Ho. Qft of 125.
1502 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
U.S. "serial 011512-12 (R-A2)
B.D.s.^M^inQT
ShcT-t Title ABC-1 Annex 2
March 27. 1941
1. (b) ( Cont'd)
support to British naval forces in tht regions south
of the cqoiator, as far rest as Longitude 155^ East.
2. As soon after entering the war as the aug-
nentation of its naval forces in the Atlantic will permit,
the United States will assune responsibility for the strat-
egic direction of its otti and British Military forces in
that part of the South Atlantic Ocean south of Latitude
25° South and west of Longitude 30° "/est,
THE 3. Coordination in the planning and execution
FAR EAST of operations by the 11111 tary forces of the
AREA. United States, British Commonwealth, and Netherlands
East Indies in the Far Ee.st Area will, subject to the approval
of the Dutch r.uthoriti>-s, be effected as follows:
(a) The commanders of the Military forces of
the Associated Povtrs rill collaborate in the
formulation of strategic plf.ns for operations in that
area .
(b) The defense of the territories of the
Associated Powers villi be the responsibility of the
respective commanders of the LLllitary forces concfcffted.
These commanders will mr.kc such arranger.ents for mutual
support as may be practicable and appropriate.
(c) The' responsibility for the strategic direction
of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except
of nr.val forces engaged in supporting the defense of
the Phillppine-s , v/ill be assumed by the British nr.vcl
Commander in Chief, China. The Commander in Ciilef,
United States Asiatic Fleet, will be responsible for
the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting
the defense of the Philippines,
(d) For the above purposus, the Far East Area is
defined as the area from the coast of China in LatltTido
30 Konth, east to Longitude 140° East, thence south to
the equator, thence east to Longitude 141° East, thence
south to the bcimdary of Dutch New Guinea on the south
coast, thence westward to Latitude 11 South, Longitude
120 East, thence south to Latitude 13° South, thence
-2-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1503
SECRET
U.S. Serial Oil 512-12 (R-A2)
b:u:s,u;wIo-
Short Title ABC-1 Annex 2
March 27. 1941
3. (d) ( Cont'd )
v/est to Longitude 92° East, thence north to
Latitude 20" North, thence to the boundary between
India and Burma.
JOINT 4. Responsibility for the stratccic direction
LAIiP of the unitary forces engaged in joint offcn-
0FF"N3IVSS . sive action on land rill be in accordance with
joint agreenents to be entered upon ct the proper time. In
these circunst?.nces unity of conccJid in the theater of
operations should be cstcblishud.
BRITISH 5. The British Coomonwoalth rill assume
COLaiON - responsibll?:ty for the strategic direction of
V/EALTH Associated llilitcry forces in all other areas not
AREAS . described in paragraphs 1, -2, 3.nnd 4 of this
Annex II.
-3-
1504 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
S E C R E 'j.'
b.tj.s.Yjkii
serial 011512-12 (R-A3 )
Tftlfe'l ' ABg-l Annex V
u. s.
ghrcit
UNITED STATES - BRITISH STA7F COHVERSATIOKS
REPORT
A1P-1EX III
UNITED STATES - BRITISH CO^aiOI^VSALTH JODTT BASIC YfAR PLAN
1. This Annex III is the Joint Basic 'Yar Plan Number
One of the United States and the British Commonwealth for
¥far against the Axis Powers. The assumptions and* strategic
considerations on v.'hich this plan is based will be found in
paragraphs 7 to 13 of the Main Report.
2. This Plan is r.rran.ired in the follo'.\ring sections :-
I. UNITIZD STATilS .JU^xTAS
(a) V.'estern Atlantic
(Paragraphs 7 to 16)
II.
(b) Pacific (Paragrapl^l? to 2?)
THS FAR EAST AIQA AIID THE AUSTRALIA AMD
im: Tii^LKsm area ^•■
(Paragraphs 28 to 38)
III. BRITISH AREAS
(a) United Kingdom and Home Waters
(Paragraphs 39 to 52)
(b) North Atlantic
(Paragraphs 53 to 61)
(c) South Atlantic
( Parana phs 62 to 69)
(d) Mediterranean and Hiddle.East
(Paragraohs 70 to 76)
(e) India and the East Ibdies
(Paragraphs 77 to 80)
3. Uncertainties exist as to the stability of the
dtrategio situations in various theaters, and as to the
time of entry into the war of the United States, Japan,
Copy No. .Qj^ of 125. -1'
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1505
3 B C R E T
B.lf.9.m(U)3p
U. 3. Serial 011512-12 (R-A3 )
^ort Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
Ifarch 27. l^g r
aad tlM Netherlands East Indies. The strate^lo deployments,
strengths, and tasks of the armed forces of the Associated
Powers, as hereinafter listed, must therefore be regarded
as subject to final decision in the light of the strategical
situation at the time when any of these three Powers enter
the war.
4. Certain Joint agreements are being drawn up
between the l/nited States and Canada regarding the defense
of the V/estern Hemisphere. The Staff Conference assumes
that those agreements will conform generally to the agree-
ments set out in this Report.
5. The term "United States n&val forces" as used
herein will bo construed as including United States naval
aviation. The term "air forces" will be construed as
including only the United States Army Air Corps and the
Royal Air Force.
6. United States naval and British naval, army,
and air strengths are assigned on the basis of estimated
probable strengths on April 1, 1941 > unless otliorwlse
indicated. Naval auxiliary, coastal, and hafbdr types,
and vessels under extti&sive repair or refit are omitted.
United States Army strengths arc those which it is estimated
will bo avaJLlable on the dates stated herein. See also
Appendix B, 'GenerQl Note on tho Disposition of British
Naval Forces".
I. UNITED STATES AREAS
TjBE VfESTERN ATLAimC
Definition of Area .
7« The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with Islands
and contiguous continental land areas north of Latitude
25° South, and west of Longitude 30° V/est, except the
area between Latitudes 20° North and 43° North which lies
east of Longitude 40° Vest.
-2-
1506 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
S E C R E T
B,U.S. (J)T41)30
U. S. Serial 011512-12 (R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex S
tferoh 57. l^CTT ^^ ^'
Naval Forces
8. Task^
(a) protect the sea comounl cat Ions of the
Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and
patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.
(b) Destroy Axis sea communications by
capturing or destroying vessels trading directly
or indirectly with the enemy.
(c) Protect the territory of the Associated
Powers and prevent the extension or enemy Militeory
power into the V/estem Haicisphere , by destroying
hostile expeditionary forces and by supporting land
and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land
];>08itions in that hemisphere.
(d) Prepare to occupy the Azores and the Cape
Verde Islands,
So far as practicable the naval forces in the V/estem
Atlantic will be covered and supported, against attack
by superior enemy surface forces, by the naval forces of
the Associated Pov/ers which are o<>erating from bases in
the United Kingdom and the Eastern Atlantic.
9. Initial naval Forces
United States British Comaonwoalth
(a) Ocean Escort
(based on Halifax)
3 Battleships 10 Armed Merchant x
2 8" Cruisers Cruisers
2 Destroyors (1850 tons) 8 Submarines x
7 Destroyers .2 Destroyers n
4. Ulnesv'eopers (destroyer type)
9 Destroyers (old)
(temporarily, pending
re-gunning]
K From existing American and West Indies and
Halifax Commands. Subcarines also in part
from Western Approaches Force.
-3-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1507
SECRET
©^
fr.tf.S. u
V . 5. gerial 611512-12 (R-A3J
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex
Ikroh 27. l^ tr .
(b) Striking rorce
(based on Newport, Bermuda
or Trinidad, as required)
2 Aircraft Carriers
2 8" Cruisers KIL.
4 Destroyers
6 Patrol type Seaplanes (Bermuda)
(c) Southern Patrol Force
(based on Trinidad)
4 6" Cruisers (old) 1 Sloop (Dutch)
(d) Submarine Force
6 Submarines (old) NIL.
(o) Fleet Ilarine Force
(based on United States )
1 Infantry Division (7,500
troops )
1 Defense Battalion (900 troops) NIL.
1 Aircraft Group (63 clrplr.nca)
(f ) Coastel Frontiers ;
North Atlantic
12 Patrol type Seaplanes IIH..
Caribbean
12 Patrol type Seaplanes NIL.
5 Destroyers (old)
Panteia
12 Patrol type Seaplanes NIL.
4 Destroyers (old)
-4-
1508 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
FS^s^s^y?!.-,
_L?12-12(R-A3)
Sh ort Title - ABC-1 Ann ei3
STarch 27. l^U . ^
10. It is estimated that by July 1, 1941, the follow-
ing reenforcements will be a^^ailable for this area. The
date on which vmits of the Pacific Fleet can be moved to
the Atlantic, however, will depend upon the situation in
the Pacific.
United States. British Commonwealth .
(a) Ocean Escort
3 8" Cruisers (2 from
Striking Force in paragraph 9b) NIL.
6 Destroyers (1850 tons)
(b) Strlkint); Force .
If 6" Cruisers NIL.
(d) Submarine Force .
3 Subnarines (old) NIL.
(g) Patrol Planes
12 Patrol type Seaplanes
(Assignnent indeterminate) IJIL.
Land Forces
11. Tasl:3
(a) In conjunction with naval and air forces,
protect the territory of the Associated Powers and
prevent the expansion of enemy ailitary or political
povt-er into the \7estern Hemisphere by denying use to
the enemy of land positions in that Hesitsphare.
(b) In conjunction with naval and air forces,
support Latin American Republics against invesion
or political domination by tiie Ajis Powers by
defeating or expelling eneay forces or forces
supporting the enemy in the VJestern Hemisphere.
-5-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1509
S 3 C R E T
B.l-.S. (3-
q. 5. aerial 6ll5l2-12(r>-A3)
S hort Title - ABC -1 Annex "3
ffcrch 27. 1941 .
(c) Relieve, as soon as practicable, British
forces in Curacao and Aruba (subject to the agreement
of the Netherlands Goverrment in London).
(d) Provide derensive garriaons for bases
leased in British territory.
(e) Build up forces in the United States for
eventual offensive action against Germany.
12. United States Land Forces
(a) Continental United States
The Army of the United States now in process
of organization consistin,?; of:
2 Cavalrr Divisions
4 Armored Divisions
27 Infantry Divisions
Appropriate Anay, Corps, and GH<i reserve
units
The above includes a reinforced Corps of three Infantry
Divisions vbioh will normally be iiiaintained as a reserve
for the supRort of overseas garrlscns and the Latin
American Republics. A xasiciuni of four Infantry Divisions
and two Armored Divisions will be trained aM equipped by
September 1, 1941.
(b) Overseas Garrisons on April 1. 1941
Panama Canal - 23,000 troops
Puerto Rico - 12,000 troops
Newfoundland - 1,000 troops
1>. British Canmonwealtfl Land Forces
(a) Field Army
llow In process of organization in Canada)
1 Arnored Division
1 Army Tank Brigade
2 Divisions
-6-
1510 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
B.U.S. (J)(U) 30
U. S. Sorlal 011512-12 (R-A3)
Slijrt Title - AEC-1 Annes ■\
March 27 . 'I'^U'.
(b) Garrisons
Jamaica — One Canadian Battalion
Bermuda — One Company
Curacao — One Battalion
Aruba — O.-.e Battalion, less one Company
Newfoundland — One Canadian Battalion
Air Forces
14. Tasks
(a) Support the land and naval forces in the
defense of the Western Henisphere and in the support
of Latin-Aaerican Repulslics b:' providing for the air
defense of vite.1 insttllRtions , by destroying enemy
expeditionary forces, and by denying use by the enemy
or forces supportins the enemy of existing or poten-
tial air, land, and naval bases.
(b) Support the naved. forces in the protection
of the sea communications of the Associated Powers
and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by
offensive action a^Rinst eneay forces or commerce
located v/ithin tactical operating radius of occupied
air bases.
15. United states Air Forces
(fe) Continental United States
The GHO Air Force now in process of organ-
ization in Continental United States, consistlnf of:
9 Bombardment Groups, Heavy
7 Bombardment Groups, Medium
7 Bombardment Groups, Light
14 Pursuit Groups, interceptor
j Pursuit Groups, Fichter
1 Composite Group
This force includes all units v/hlch may become available
for dispatch to overseas theaters of war.
-7-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1511
SECR E T
B.P.5. (JWU) 30
tt. 5. Serial 611512-12 (R-A3)
Short Title -ABC-1 Annex i
March 27. 19CT r ^--
(b) Overseas Garrisons (now In process of
organization)
Panama Caned -
2 Bombardment Groups, Heavy
1 Bombardment Squadron, Light
2 Pursuit Groups, Interceptor
1 Pursuit Group, Fighter
Puerto Rico
1 Bombardment Group, Heavy
1 Pursuit Group, Interceptor
16. British Commonwealth Air Forces
None except minor forces on the east coast of
Cemada.
THE PACIFIC
Definition of Area
17. The Pacific Ocean Area, together with islands and
contiguous continental land areas, is as follows:
(a) North of Latitude 30° North and west
of Longitude 140*^ East,
(b) North of the equator and east of Longitude
140° East.
(c) South of the equator and east of Longitude
180° to the South /jaoricra cor.st end Longitude 74 Vest.
Naval Farces
18. Tasks
(a) 'Support the forces of the Associated Powers
in the Far East Area by diverting eneoiy strength away
from the Ualay Barrier through tlie denial end capture
of positions in the Marshalls, and throusb raids on
enemy sea communications and positions.
-8-
79716 O— 46 — pt. 15 8
1512 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
C. S. Serial 611512-12 (R-A3]
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
garoh 27. l^Ul
(b) Destroy Axis sea conununications by capt\irlng
or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly
with the enemy.
(c) Protect the sea cooniunications of the
Associated Powers within the Pacific Area.
(d) Support British naval forces in the area
south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155°
East.
(e) Protect the territory of the Associated
Powers within the Pacific Area, and prevent the ex-
tension of eneny Military pov;er into the v/estem
Hemisphere, by destroying hostile expeditions and by
supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy
the use of land positions in that Hemisphere.
(f ) Prepare to captxare and establish control
over the Caroline and Llarshedl Island area.
19. Initial United States Naval Forces
(a) Pacific Fleet (based in Hawaii)
8 Battleships
2 Aircraft Carriers
8 8" Cruisers
5 6" Cruisers
3 6" Cruisers (old)
5 Destroyers {1C50)
kO Destroyers
5 Minesweepers (Destroyer typo)
19 Subr^rines (3 enroute from Atlantic)
U 3ubr::Larlnes (old)
8 Ulnelayei's (Destroyer type)
1 Minelayer
84 Patrol type Seaplanes
(b) Atlantic Reenforcemont
(Available for Pacific oporations
\mtil transferred , vide paragraph 57)
3 Battleships
1 Aircraft Carrier
-9-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1513
SECRET
B.W'.S. fJHuj'30
U. S. aerial OllS12-12(B~ A-^>
hit '?^^^r.- ^^-^ ^«^-
(c)
(d)
Uareh 27. 19i>l
it ff" Cruisers
k 6" Cruisers
6 Destroyers <ie50 ton)
8 Destroyers
Southeast Paolflq Joree (tiAsed in Caiial Zone)
2 6" Cruisers (old)
k Destroyers
Fleet Ifarine Foroe < baaed on San Diego)
1 Infantry DlTlslon <7500 troops)
1 Defense Battalion (900 troops)
1 Aircraft Group (63 planaa)
(•) Coastal Frontierw
Paoifio
9 Destroyers (old)
2 Sutmarines
24 Patrol type Seaplanes
4 Destroyers (old)
20. there will be no British naval forces in this
area other than local naval defense eraft on the Canadian
seaDoard.
21- f ;^j;fflf ?|^y ^'^' ^' '^^ Reenfaro^mi^nf
(a) Paeif ic Fleet
1 Battleship
l.Alreraft Carrier
10 Sutearin*f
I SuhaftrlnA Uiaelayer
Land Faroei^
In oonjunotion «ith the naral and air foreM In
the az9ft:
*10-
1514 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
S S C RET
U. S. S erial 1_7l2-12(R-A3)
SEort Title - ABC-1 Annez 3*
March 27. 1941 .
(a) Hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base.
(b) Defend the Panama Canal, the Pacific Coast
of the United States and Canada, and Alaska, including
Kodiak and Unalaska.
(c) Support Latin -Aneri can Republics on the
West Coast of South America against invasion or
political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating
or expelling enemy forces or forces supporting the
enemy established in this area.
23. United States LfcJid Forces
(a) Continental United States
Included in paragraph 12(a). One
Reinforced Division listed therein is
reserved on the Pacific Coast for the
support of the Latin-American Republics.
(b) Overseas Garrisons on April 1. 1941
Hawaii, 23,000 troops
Alaska, 3,600 troops
24. British Comonvrealth Land Forces
Inclxided in paragraph 13 (a).
Air Forces
25. Tasks
(a) Support the land and naval forces In the
defense of Oahu, the Panana Canal, the Pacific Coast
of the United States, Canada, and Alaska, and in
the supi>ort of Latin-Anericen Republics on the west
coartof South America by providing for the air
deftnse of vital installations, by destroying enemy
eipeditionarj' forces, and by denring use by the oneciy
or forces supporting the enemy of existing or potential
air, land, and naval bases.
-11-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1515
SEC RET
B.U.5. (J (41) 3Q
Short TUle - ASC-I ABTexj
March 27. l^irT T
(b) Support the naval forces in the protection
of the sea comnnmlcations of the Associated Powers
and in the destruction of Axis sea comuunicatipns by
offensive action a^^ainst enemy forces or commerce
lopated within tactical operating radius of occupied
air bases.
26. United States Air Forces
(a) Continental United States
Included in paragraph 15 (a) .
(b) Overseas G-arrlsons (now in process of
or^'.anizp.tion) "
Hawaii
2 Bombardment Groups, Heavy
1 Bombardment Squadron, Light
1 Pursuit Group, Interceptor
1 Pursuit Group, Fighter
Alaska
1 Composite Group, consisting of:
1 Bombardment Squadron, Heavy
1 Bombardment Squadron, !!edium
1 Pursuit Squadron, Interceptor
27 . British Commonv/ealth Air, Forces
None, except minor forces on the \'est Coast of
Canada .
II. THE FAR EAST AREA AND THE AUSTRALIA AI3D N3'.7 ZEALAIID AREA
Definition of Far East Area
28. The Far East Area is defined as the area bounded
by lines from the coast of China In Latitude 30° Forth,
east to Longitude 140^ East, thence south to the Equator,
thence east to Longitude 141° East, thence south to the
boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the South coast, thence
westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East, t-henoe
south to Latitude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92°
East, thenoo north to Latitude 20° North, thence to the
boundary between India and Burma.
-12-
1516 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
B. P. 3. (J) (41)30
TT. 5. 8erlarTCl512-12(R-A3)
Short Title ABC-1 Annex T "^
Ilardi 5 7 . I gJIT
Definition of Auatralla snd Nop Zoaland Area
29. The Australia ond Ne\r Zealand Area conprlsea
the Australian and New Zocland British ITr.val Stations west of
tiongltudo , 180^ and south of the equator. The lixalte of those
Stations aro doflnod In Appendix "A".
Special Comnand Relet ionships
30. Tho dofonse of tho territories of the Associated
Povors in the Par IScst Area vill bo tho responsibility of the
respective Comr.ndors of the Uilitary forcos conooiniod* Those
Conmonders will nako such arrongoinents for mutual support as
may be practicable and r.pprppriate.
31. In tho Per East Area tho responsibility for the
strato^^c direction of tho navel forcos of tho Associated
Powers, except of naval forcos oncrcod in supportinfr tho
defense of tho Philippinos, will be assxaned by the Bi^ltlsh
navel Cotxiander in Chief, China. Tho Coimendor in Chief,
TJnitod Strtos Asiatic Floet, will be responsible for the
direction of naval forces cngancd in supporting the defense
of tho Philippines.
32. Tho British neval Coimandor in Chief, Chine,
is else charged v.'ith rosponsibillty for tho strotoglo dlroc-
tion of tho naval forcos of tho Assoclntod Powors o|>emtlne
in tho Australia end Now Zoaltmd Area as defined in para-
graph 29.
Naval Forces
33. Tasks in tho Far East Area
(c) Raid Japanese sea comaunications and
destroy /ocis forces.
(b) Support tho land end eir forcos in the
dofonse of tho torritorios of tho Associated Powers.
(The rospcnslbility of tho Connander in Chief, Tilted
States Asiatic Floot, for supporting the defense of
tho Phlllppinos remains so long as that dofonse
continues}'*
(c) Destroy /jcls sea comcrunications by
ceptviring or destroying vessels trading directly
or indirectly with the enemy.
-13-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1517
SEC
B.u.S,
RET
. (J) (41) 30
U. s.
Serial 6ll$12-12(R-A3)
Short
Title - ABC-1 Annex 3
March
^7, l^U.
(d) Protect sea communications of the Associated
Pov/ers by escorting, covering, and jjatrolling, and by-
destroying enemy raiding forces.
34. Tasks in the Australia and Hew Zealand Area
The tasks of the naval forces in the Austrtaia
and New Zealand Area are the same as those for the Fsir
East Area.
35. Naval Forces
Far East /jea
United States Asietic Fleet
X
?" Cruiser
1
6'' Cruiser (old)
13
Destroyers (old)
11
Subi-arines
6
Subaiarines (old)
24
Patrol type Seaplanes
Netherlands Forces
2
6" Cruisers
6 Destroyers
11 Submarines
4 Submarines (old)
27 Patrol type Seaplanes (plus 12*)
2 Sloops
*Crews not as yet trained.
Far East Area en d Australia and New Zealand Aret
British forces available for operations
in those areas and the British reenforceaents which may be
sent:
-14-
1518 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
fe.U.S.(J)nri) 30
\i. &. Serial 011512-12 (R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annei
March 27. l^in
Types of
British and
Imffledlate
Ultimate
Ships
Dominion Forces
British
British
Reenforce-
Reenforce-
ments
ments
I.
II.
III.
IV.
Battleships
Battlecrulsers
Aircraft Carriers
8" Cruisers 1
6" Cruisers 3
6" Cruisers (old) 4
Armed Merchant Cruisers
3
Destroyers
Destroyers (old) 5
^5(e)
Flying-Boats
Sloops
(a)
(b)
(0)
(d)
(e)
5(a)
1(b)
_
Kb)
-
lie)
2(d)
3IC)
5(d)
-
4.
27(e)
3 from Halifax Force, one from Force H,
one from vessels \uiallocated .
From Force H, vide paragraph 55.
From Force H and other areas.
Probably from Home Fleet and new construc-
tion.
From North Atlantic Command and other
unallocated vessels, vide paragraph 55
and Appendix B.
Land and Air Forces
36. Tasks
Far East Area
(a) Defend Hong Kong, the Philippines,
the Netherlands East Indies aqil«uch other
territories and Islands as it may be decided
tvoBi time to time to occupy as bases.
-15-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1519
SECR 3 T
U. 3. geri?! 011512-1^ (R-A3:
Short Ti tle - a5C-1 Annex 5
March i57. 19U .
(b) Hold Itolaya, Singapore, and Java
against Japanese attack.
(c) Support the naval forces.
Australia and New Zealand Area
(dj I- conj\inction with naval and air
forces, protect British territory and prevent
the extension of enemy Military power in this
area.
(e)' Support the navel forces in the
protection of the sea communications of the
Associated Powers.
37 . Strength of Land ? orce3 on April 1. 1941 :
Philippines
20,0X)0 troops (Includes Organized Philippine
Army)
Netherlands Bast Indies
2 Divisions
Hong Kong
4 Battalions
Malaya
3(iuivalent of 7 Brigade Groups
Note ; One additional Brigade Group
will arrive late in April, and
a second in M&y, 1941 •
Australia and New Zealemd
Field Arj
ftray
^Ivisl
One Division is foraing in Australia
Garrison
One New Zealand Brigade at Suva, Fiji
Inlands
-16-
1520 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
B.U.S.rj) (41)^0
U.S. Serial 011^12-12 (R-A^)
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex ^
fargn 27, 1941
38. Strength of Air Forces on April 1. 1941 ;
Philippines
1 Conposite Group consisting of ;
1 Bonbardnent Squadron
3 P\irsuit Squadrons
Netherlands East Indies
9 Bomber Squadrons
2 Fighter Squadrons
1 Bomber Reconnaissance Squadron
27 (plus 12) Patrol type Seaplanes
(Also shown in paragraph 35)
IJalaya
5 Uedium Bomber Squadrons
1 Fighter Bomber Squadron
1 Fighter Squadron
2 Torpedo Bomber Squadrons
1 General Reconnaissance Squadron
1 General Reconnaissance Flying-Boat
Sq\iadron
IPII^: A program of reenforcement of
British air strength for Ualaya, vxhich
will bring the total nunber of aircraft
in Joilaya to 336 (i.e. 22 squadrons), is
beinK carried out gradually as the
situation elsenhere permits.
6 General Reconnaissance Squadrons
4 General Purpose Squadrons
2 Army Cooperation Squadrons
1 Flying-Boat Squadron
New Zealand
3 General Reconiiaissance Squadrons
III. ppjEXi^fl AHgAS
UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOtiE WATERS
Definition of Area
-17-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1521
SECRET
5.U.5.(3')(41 ) 30
U. 5. Se r lS"ln'l512-12(R-A3)
&ixOTt Title - ABC-1 Amiex 3
39. (a) Waters to the eastvrard of Longitude 30°
West and to the northward of L«t5tude 43° North.
(h) Land areas bordering on, and Islands In,
the above ocean area.
Naval Forces
hO. Tasks
(a) In conjxmctlon with land and air forces
protect the British Isles against invasion.
(b) Protect the sea oomnmnioations of the
Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling,
and by destroying enomy raiding forces,
(c) Destroy Axi^ sea communications by
capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or in-
directly with the enemy.
41. British Commonwealth and Allied Ha val Forces ;
(a) Home Fleet
3 Battleships
2 Battle Cruisers
2 Aircraft Carriers
3 8" Cruisers )
14 6" Cruisers (includ- ) NOTE 1,
ing some ships armed }
with 5.25"guns )
2 Anti-Aircraft Cruisers
2 Other Anti-Aircraft ships
22 Destroyers
25 Submarines
NOTB 1 , Would be reduced if reenforoements are sent to
the Far East, vido paragraph 35*
(b) Mine Laying Squadron
5 Large Minelayers
4 DestroyoTS
-18-
1522 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRgT
B:Tr:s7(j)(u)3o .
P.3 . 5erUl'5IT512-12(R-A3)
Short Title -_ABC-1 AnnexT
March 27. l^ UT
(c) Northern and \7estern Patrols
8 Ocean Boarding Vessels
(d) Western Approaches Conmand
1 Anti-Aircraft Cruiser
93 Destroyers
49 Corvettes
9 Sloops
14 Submarines NOTE 2.
HOTB 2. 6 of these are Included In the submarines
shown as Ocoan Escorts In peuragrai>h 9(a).
(e) Other Home Commands and Channel And North
Sea Tracle Protection
1 6" Cruiser t old (gxmnery training)
61 Destroyers
7 Corvettes
10 Sloops
5 Submarines
5 Minelayers
42« Initial Strength of United States Naval Toroes
(a) Northwest Sscort Force
Task . Escort convoys In the Northwest
Approaches, acting under the
stratorlo direction of the British
Commander In Chief of the Western
Approaches .
9 Destroyers
18 Destroyers (old)
48 Patrol type Seaplanes
(b) Submarines
Task . Raid onomy shipping In an area to be
designated later, acting under the
strategic direction of the British
Vice Admiral, Submarines.
9 Submarines (old)
-19-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1523
SECRET
¥nr:'5T(j)(4i)3o .
n. a. Sorlal 011512-12 (R-A5 )
Short Tltlo - ABC-1 Annox j»
Hcrch 5 7 . IW r ^
43* Ea tin atod Unltpd Statos Navel Roonforcoments
by July 1. 154^:
(c) Northwost Bscort Force
5 Destroyers
9 Destroyers (old) (from Ocean Escort,
after conpletlon of rogunnlng).
(b) Subnarinos
3 Submarines (old)
(Asslgnnont indotominnte)
Land Poreoa
44, Tasks
(a) In conjimctlon with naval rjid air forces,
hold the United Kln^^don against invasion and defend it
against air attack.
(b) Defend Iceland and the Faroes.
(c) Undertake offensive land ope rat ions as
opportiaiity offers, in accordance v.'ith Joint Unitod Statos •
British plans to be agreed upon at a later date.
(d) Hold forces in readiness to occupy the
Azores and Cape Verde Islands until such time as this
responsibility is asstaaod by the United St-.tos.
45. British Commonwealth rnd Allied Land Forces i
(a) Field Army
28 Divisions (Includes 1 in Iceland
and 4 Independent Bricado
Groups )
1 Amorod Division (plus 4 forming)
1 Army Taiik Brigade (plus 2 forming)
(b) Air Defense
Approximately 10 anti-aircraft Divisions,
-20-
1524 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SEC RET
U. S. Serial 011512-
12(R-A3)
HhbYl Titi6 - ABU-1 Ahh6± j
March 27ri92n: :
46. United States Land Fogces .
V/hen the United States enters the war, It will
provide :
(a) 1 Reinforced Division to relieve British
'forces now charged with the defense of Iceland.
(b) Troops for groxond and anti-aircraft
defenses for such naval and air bases used primarily
by United States forces as may be agreed ui>on at the
time.
(c) Approximately one reinforced regiment
(Brigade Group) in the United Kingdoa.
Note: None of the above will be available before
'' September 1, 1941.
Air Forces
47. Tasks
(a) In conjunction with land and naval forces,
defend the British Isles against air attack and
invasion .
(b) In conjunction with naval forces, protect
shipping against surface, submarine and air attack.
Mote ; TLe execution of Tasks (a) and (b) will in-
volve the devotion of a substantial propor-
tion of the air effort to attack on enemy
bases.
(0) Conduct a sustained air offensive against
German Military power in all areas within range of
the United Kingdom.
48. British Commonwealth and Allied Ala; Forces
These are of the order of I65 Squadrons of all
classes.
-21-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1525
SECRET
3.U.S.(J)(41) 30
U. S. Se v ial 011512-12 (R -A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 Ann e iy""
March 57. 19CT : ^-^^
49. United States Air Forces
United States Air Forces of the order of 32
sqviadrons (Bonbardnent and Pursuit) with appropriate
conmiand echelons, will he available for despatch to the
United Kingdon dxa-ing 1941. Additional vmits will be
provided as resources become available, the number emd
disposition being determined by the Uilitary situation
from time to time. In addition the United States will
provide one Pursuit and one Bombardment squadron for the
defense of Iceland.
«
50. Pursuit (fichter) units operating in the Britisji
Isles will undertake the air defonse of those general areas
in v.'hich bases used primaril" by United States Naval forces
are located, and subsequently of such other eureas as may be
agreed upon.
51. United States Air Bombardment vmits will conduct
offensive operations primarily against objectives in
Germany. Operations to defeat attempted invasion or
Blockade will be conducted as demanded by the situation.
52. United States Army Command Relatioashipa
Administrative command of all United States land
and air forces stationed in the British Isles and Iceland
will be exercised by the Commander, United States Army
Forces in Great Britain. This officer will have authority
to arrange details concerning the organization and location
of task forces (organization of units in appropriate fom-
ation) and operational control with the War Office and the
Air Ministry.
NORTH ATLAimC AREA
Definition of Area
53. The North Atlantic Area is defined as follows:
(a) Northern boundary, Latitude 43° North,
(b) Southern boundary. Latitude 20° North,
(c) V/estorn boundary, Longitude 40° West,
(d) Eastern boundary, the coasts of Spain,
Portugal, and Africa, and Longitude 5°
West,
together with the Islands and land areas contiguous thereto.
-22-
1526 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
B.tJ.5. (J!(U ) 30
^7-^. geriAl Alj?12-12(R-A3 )
Sh ort Title - AEgJ. Annex T"T
Birch 27. 19U
Naved. Forces
54- Taaks
(9) Protect the sea cojliaunlcatlons of the
Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and
Iiatrolllng, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.
(b) Destroy Axis sea conununlcatlons by
capturing or destroying vessels trading directly
or indirectly v/ith the enemy.
(c) Raid Axis sea cammimications, territorlds
and forces in the Western Mediterranean.
55. British Commonwealth Naval Forces
Force H (Gibraltar)
1 Battleship
1 Battle Cruiser
1 Aircraft Carrier
1 6" Cruiser
8 Destroyers
Gibraltar and Straits Force
7 Destroyers
56. Initial United States Naval Forces
(a) Submarines
Tagk . Bald enemy shipping in the
Uediterranean vmder the strategic direction
of the Commander in Chief, Mediterranean,
acting through the Flag Officer Commanding
North Atlantic.
10 Submarines (old) (Gibraltar)
NOTB It is estimated that an additional
i united States submarines (old) can be
assigned to Gibraltar by July 1, 1941.
-23-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1527
SECR E T
fe.U.g. " ^^
erri JNnTl2-12 (R-A3 )
rEIe - AEC-1 Aiinex l -
U. S. S
5Ti ort~ frEIe"
57. As soon as the situation in the Pacific
permits their transfer to the Atlantic , the following
United States naval forces will be assigned the tasks in
paragraph 54, iinless the strategic situation in the
Atlantic at that time dictates a different decision. It
is possible, depending upon the situation in the Far
East, that Force H will have left Gibraltar for the Indian
Ocean or Far East Area before its relief by United States
naval forces .
United States Cribraltar Force
3 Battleships
1 Aircraft Carrier
4 8" Cruisers
13 Destroyers
12 Patrol type Seaplanes
NOTE: Upon arrival of this force, tht
TTnPcTed States submarines shown in para-
graph 56 (a) will be assigned to it.
Special Command Relationships
58. Strategic direction of the United States
Gibraltar Force will be exercised by tfie United Kingdom
Chief of Naval Staff except when he specifically delegates
it for a stated period as follows:
(a) To the British Naval Commander in Chief,
Mediterranean, for operations in the V/estern
Mediterranean.
(b) To the Commander in Chief, United States
Atlantic Fleet, for operations in the Central
Atlantic .
59. Subject to the preceding paragraph, the
Commander of United States Gibraltar Force will^ exercise
strategic direction of the *aval forces of the Associated
Powers which operate in that area. Ho will be responsible
for administrative matters to the Commander in Chief,
United States Atlantic Fleet.
-24-
79716 O — 46 — pt. 15-
1528 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
B.tT.S.U) (41) 50
^7~5. Serial 0TT512-1 2 (R-A5)
Short Tltlo-ABC-1 ."Jinox "5
ticrch 27. ign
Land Forcoa
60. Tr.ak
Hold Gibraltar
NOTE ; This will bo q British rosponsttility,
Tho present garrison nt Gibraltar Is four
battalions.
Air Forcos
61. Task
Support ^ho land and naval forcos.
NOTE ; Thcro is at present a British Flying-Boat
Squndron at Gibraltar which will bo roloasod for
eiaploymcnt olsev/horo v/hcn tho United Statos
Gibraltar Force assumos the naval tasks in this
aroa.
SOUTH atl;>ntic
Dofinition of Aroa
o o
62. (a) Tho area botwoon Latitudes 20 Ngrth end 25
South, bounded on tho west by Eongltudo 30 West and
cto tho east by the African coast,
(b) Tho South Atlantic Ocean, south of Latitude
25° South, botwoon Loncltudes 74° V.'ost and 33° East,
together with tho islands and land arons contiguous thoroto.
Naval Forces
63. Taaks
(a) Protect tho sea cormunicat\ons of the
Associated' Powers by escorting, covering, rjid
patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces,
(b) Destroy Axis sea conriunications by
cr.pt\iring or destroying vosaols trading directly
or indirectly with tho enemy,
-25-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1529
SECRET
B.u.S. (J lTu) 30
U. S. Serial ll 3T2-1 2(R-A 3 )
S hort Title - A3C-1 Anaoz ^
garch 27. 19^ ■
(c) In conjunction with lajid and air forces,
protect the territories of the Associated Powers.
64. British Commonwealth Forces
1 Aircraft Carrier
1 Seaplane Carrier
5 8" Cruisers
76" Cruisers (2 old)
Ik Armed Uerchant Cruisers
6 Corvettes
6 Sloops
Land Forces /
65. Task
In conjTonction with naval and air forces,
defend British and Allied territory.
66. British Commonwealth Forces
British V/est African Colonies
Approximately 2 Divisions.
South Africa
Field Army *
One Division forming.
67. United States Forces
If the United States Navy regularly uses a base
in this area, the United States Army will provide the
necessary antl-^rcraft units.
Air Forces
68. Tasks
(a) In conjunction with naval forces, protect
the sea communications of the Associated Powers.
(b) In conjunction with land forces, protect
British and Allied territories.
-26-
1530 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
E.tJ.S. (J)r41)30
t. S. S er ial 011512-1 2_[R - AJ )
^ort T ide - ABC^T ~i Uinex^
torch i7, l9ur .
69. On April 1, 1941, it will not have been possible
to provide any British air forces to fulfill these tasks.
If the United States Navy regularly uses a naval base in
this area, the United States Army will provide one pursuit
squadron and two light bombardment squadrons there.
THE MEDITERRANEAN AUD MIDDLE EAST
70. The Mediterranean and Middle East Areas comprise
the Mediterranean Sea east of Longitude 5° West, the Suez
Canal, and the islands and countries adjoining them,
including the present theaters of ojjerations in North and
East Africa. The Black Sea, Iraq, and Aden are also
inclxided in this area.
Naval Forces
71. Tasks
(a) Protect the sea conmtinications of the
Assoclatod Powers by escorting, covering and
patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.
(b) Destroy Axis sea communications by
captioring or destroying vessels trading directly
or indirectly with the enemy.
(c) Conduct offensive operations against
Axis sea communications to North Africa and Albania,
and against Axis territory and islands.
72. British Commonwealth Naval Forces
3 Battleships
2 Aircraft Carriers
18" Cruiser
x 7 6" Cruisers (includes some ships armed with
5.25" guns)
2 Anti-Alrcraft Cruisers
23 Destroyers
U Corvettes
14 Submarines
X Oce returns to Far East if Japan enters the war.
-27-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1531
S E C R E T
STfTsT
erial 6ll5'l2-]
itle - ABC-1 ;
U. S. Serial Oil 512-12 (R-A3)
Short Title - ABC-1 AnnexT "
March 27. l^n"
73 •• As described in paragraph 58 , vdien operating in
the Mediterranean area the Commander of the United States
Gibralteur Force will operate under the strategic direction
of the British Commander in Chief, Mediterranean.
Land and Air Forces
74. Tasks
(a) Hold the naval bases necessary for executing
the naval tasks given in paragraph 71.
(b) Defend the British position in North Africa,
Kenya and Palestine, and conduct offensive operations
against Italian overseas possessions.
(c) Support Turkey and Greece.
(d) Conduct offensive operations against the
Axis Powers on the Continent of Europe.
75 • In view of the operations at present In progress
in this theater of war it is not considered desirable to
set out the present dispositions and strengths of British
land and air forces in this area.
76. It is not proposed to employ United States land
or air forces in the Mediterranean and Middle East areas in
the initial stages.
INDIA AND EAST DTDIES
Doflnltlon of Area
77. (a) India.
(b) Indian Ocean, including the Red Soa and
Persian Gulf, bounded on the West by the coasts of
Africa and Longitude 33° East, and on the East by the
westerp boundaries of the Far East Area and the
Australia Station.
(c) The islands in tho above ocean area.
-28-
1532 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
g.U.5. (J) (41) 30„
U. S. SexiarTTi512-12 fR-A3)
Sho rt fltTe" - ABC-1 Aimexj
March 27. ISTT .
Naval Forces
78. Taste
(a) Protect sea conununicatlons of the Associated
Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by
destroying enemy raiding forces.
(b) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing
or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly
with the enemy.
(o) Conduct offensive operations against Axis
territory in the Red Sea.
79. British Commonwealth Naval Forces
1 8" Cruiser
z 5 6" Cruisers (U old)
1 A.A. Cruiser
5 Armed Merch&.-it Cruisers
3 Destroyers
12 Sloops
1 Submarine (ex-Italian)
z One returns to Far East if Japan enters the war.
Land and Air Forces
80. The task of the land and air forces is the defense
of India and of the islands ill the area. The whole of the
Army in India is available for. this purpose. Six squadrons
of obsolete aircraft are maintained for tribal control.
g3:merai
81. In view of the facts that a considerable number
of British Commonwealth naval forces are undergoing repair,
and new vessels are continually coming forward from con-
struction, it is not practicable to present here the
complete distribution of all naval forces of the Brit ish
Commonwealth. A Note by the British Delegation on this
subject is attached as Appendix B.
-29-
I
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1533
SECRET
B.tT.S.(J)(^l)50
g. S. ^orlal C)11512-12(n.A52
Short Tltlo - ABC-1 /Jinc;t 3
ibrch 57, ig^r :
APPEND IX-A
LIIIITS OF AUSTR.'.LIA AIID ITE^iJ . ZKIJ^\ID STATIONS
Tho Australia Str.tlon Is boxmdod on the wost by
LoncltUde 80° Enst south of Latitude 30° South, thenco
throvicli linos Joining tho i'ollov/lng positions:
Latitude Lonfjltude
(c) 30° 00» South 95° 15» East
(b) 13 00 • South 95 15 « East
(c) 13° 001 South 120° 00 » East
(d) 11° 00 « South 120° 00 « East
(o) Southern point of bovaidarj botv/eon
Papvia and Dutch Now Guinea .(Latitude
9g 00» South, Loncltudo 141° Q0« East).
(f) 00« 141° 00« East
(g) 0° OOt 169° 00' East
(h) 1): 00« South 169" 00« East
(1) 1° 00» South 170° 00» East
(j) 32 00» South 170° 00' East
(k) 32°00» South 160° 00 » Ea*t
ronalndor of Eastern botmdriry being Lonfjltu^io
160° East to south of (k) .
Tho Now Zealand Str.tlon la bounded on tho wost by
Er.stcm boxmdary of Australia Station (to position (g)),
thonco through linos Joining:
Latltudo Loncltudo
(g) 0° 00' 169° 00' East
(1) 4 00' North 169 00' East
(m) 4° 00' North 180° 00'
(n) 30° 00' North 180° 00'
(o) 30° 00' North 150° 00' Wost
(q)
0" OOt 150° 00' West
00' 120° 00' Wost
romaindor of Eaatom boundriTy being Longitude
>o
120 V7ost, south of the oquator.
-30-
1534 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SSCRE T
S.tl.g.TDT U) 30
U. S. 5oi- ial 011512-12(R-A3 )
S hort Title -ABU-l Annex 3
March 27. 1941 .
APPENPIX B
GENERAL NOTE ON THE DISPOSITION OF BRITISH NAVAL F0RC3S
1. The foregoing; tentative distribution of British
Naval units is based on the latest detailed inforn^ation
available to the United Kingdom Delegation and anticipated
adjustments to meet the contingency of Japan entering the
war.
2. The distribution does not include certain units
which were still under long repair in January, or new con-
struction. These are listed below. Their distribution will
depend on requirements at the time each comes into service
and cannot be predicted with any certainty at present.
3. It is probablq that new construction cruisers,
and those coming out of repair, would replace cruisers
required in the Far East, or augment the latter strength;
and some of the destroyers shown as allocated in the further
reenforcements to the Far East would have to come from the
new construction program.
Units under lonf^ repair
1 Battleship (under repair: completion date tmcertain)
1 Aircraft Carrier {" " " .in)
U 8" Cruisers (one ready in February; 1 in March;
1 in September; 1 date uncertain).
3 6" Cruisers (one ready in June; others later).
1 Armed Merchamt Cruiser (date \uicertain) .
15 Destroyers (not repaired until April or later).
k Sloops ( n n « II « .1
New Construction
1 Battleship (working up. Probably to Haas Fleet).
1. Battleship, reconstructed, (working up» Probably
to Mediterranean Fleet).
-31-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1535
SECRET
B.U.S.(J)(41)^Q
_^erlal 011?i;
ITS"
•12(R-A^;
Short Title - ABC-1 Annex "^
March 27. 1941
1 6" Cruiser
15 Destroj-ers
32 Corvettes
3 Sloops
6 Submarines
3 Fast Minelayers
1 Aircraft Carrier
4 6" Cruisers
15 Destroyers
30 Corvettes
1 Sloop
8 Submarines
1 Fast Minelayer
Completing before
April 1, 1941.
Completing between
April 1, 1941 and
July 1, 1941.
-32-
1536 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
U.S. Serial Oil 512-12 (R-A4 )
B.U.S.(J)(41)^0 .
Short Title ABC-1 Annex 4
March 27. 1941
UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVETtSATIONS
REPORT
AiniE}: IV
COLUnJNICATIQNS
GENERAL
Note ; The United Kingdon Delegation tentatively accepts
this Annex IV, subject to technical examination by the British
Chiefs of Staff,
1. The United States and the United Kingdom will
establish as soon as possible in London the "Associated
Communication Committee" which is to be constituted as
follows:
(a) A representative of the United States
Army and a representative of the United States Navy,
who will become members of the staff of the United
States Uilitary liission when that Uission is es-
tablished in London.
(b) Representatives of the British Combined
Signals Board in the United Kingdom.
2. The Associated Commtinications Committee will
be the supreme controlling body v;ith relation to inter-
communications by radio (W/T) , wire, visual, and sound
affecting the armed services and the merchant marines of the
two nations,
3. The British Authorities will appoint staff
members of their Uilitary Liission in V.'ashington as represent-
atives to confer with:
(a) The Communication Division of the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations,, U. S. Navy,
(b) United States Army Signal Corps and
United States Amy Air Corps.
Copy No, of 125,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1537
SECRET
U.S. Serial Oil ^2-12 (R-A4)
B.TJ.S.(J)(41)^0.
Short Title ABC-1 Annex 4
March 27. 1941
NAVAL eOtaiUNICATIOMS
4. The United States and British Navies will
exchange the following, as essential for intercommunication
betvfeen the United States Navy auid the British Navy:
(a) Necessary fimdamental instructions
on methods and procedure for radio (W/T) for ships
emd aircraft.
(b) Shore radio (W/T) organi^tion, frequency
plan, and instructions for ship (airpliine) to shore
coQCunications .
(c) Call sign lists for certain shore and
operating units.
(d) Recognition system keys and instructions.
(e) Information as to total wave bands
covered by certain Navy transmitters and receivers,
installed in operating units.
(f) Signal flags and any specif visual
signalling equlpBi3nt, when required.
(g) Conmmnication liaison officers to certain
importent ships and stations, which are to bo desig-
nated later.
(h) Codes and Ciphers for use when inter-
coimnunlcatlng .
(1) Data as to locations and organization
of strategic D/F stations.
(j) Uerchantshlp - Navy communication in-
structions, codes, ciphers, etc.
(k) Weather bi^adcasts, meteorological
information, tine signal data, and other special
broadcasts.
Npte t Some details of the foregoing exchai^gcs have
already been conpleted and others arc now in progress.
-2-
1538 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
U.S. Serial 011512-12 (R-A4)
B.U.S.(J)(41)10;
Short Title ABC-1 Annex 4
March 27. 1941
5. The following principles will be observed
relative to intercominunication of United States and British
ships:
(a) Ships which customarily operate within
the area of strategic responsibility of their own
Power will normally use their own communication
systems for direct communication with their own ships
and shore stations. Vi^hen beyond visual or sound sig-
nalling distance, such ships will normally inter-
comm\inicato with ships or shore stations of the other
Power via their ovm principal bases or shore radio
(W/T) stations; but Khen it becomes necessary for such
ships to communicate directly v;ith a ship or shore
station of the other Porer, they v/ill do so via joint
frequencies and Joint codes assigned for this purpose.
IVhen within 'visual or sound signalling distance, visual
and sound interccmmunicatjjOn will be by International
Code, or in English text using International Procedure,
(b) Ships which customarily operate within
an area of strateric responsibility of the other
Power will normally intcrcoEEunicatc as in 5 (a) ,
unless they usually cnga£c in tactical cooperation with
forces of such Power. In such case they v;ill adopt
the complete communication systems of the Power having
' strategic responsibility, and this Power v/ill supply
then with details of comnxinications, liaison personnel
if necessary, and appropriate codes, ciphers, flags
and special apparatus. Decision as to which system to
adopt will be made on the merits of each case.
Note; The United States Nc.'/y has prepared one hundred
sets of British signal flags for use of United States
Naval ships which may require them.
(c) In nT'^as of Joint strategic sesponslbility,
intercommunication will be via Joint frequencies, codes,
arid procedures if such have been previously agreed upon.
In the absence of previous agrecr.cnt, intercommunication
will be through liaison officers or via International
Code, as may be most convenient.
-3-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1539
SKCRET
U.S. Serial 011512-12 (R-A4)
B.U.S.(J)(41)^0.
Short Title ABC-1 Annex 4
tiarch 27. 1941
5. ( Cont'd)
(d) Communications betv;ccn ships of a
convoy, and bct\7ecn the Connandcr of a convoy and
the escort, regardless of nationality, v;ill be via
the systcn now in use for this purpose by the United
Kingdom v^hich is based on the employment of
International Code and International Procedxirc.
6. The Associated Communications Committee v;ill
prepare the follov/ing, which \7ill be made effective by
direction of the competent authorities when conditions require;
(a) Joint radio (W/T) frequency plan for
intercommxinicatlon.
(b) United States Navy - British Navy
recognition signals in all systems to be used for
aircraft, surface ships (including nercl'iant ships),
and submarines, in order to permit safe joint oper-
ations, and to effect entrance to defended harbors.
(c) Joint United States Navy - British Navy
call signs,
(d) Plan for joint operation of United States
Navy and British Nnvy strategic D/F stations, including
joint codes or ciphers, as may be necessary, and with
intercommunications preferably by landlinc or cable,
rather than by radio (W/T) .
(e) Joint United States Navy - British Navy
plan for radio (W/T) transmissions from certain Brit-
ish shore stations in Africa, Australia, etc., to
United Giates ships opcratinc in the South Atlantic,
Indian Ocean, and the Llediterranoan; and for trans-
missions from United States' stations to British ships
operating in the Eiistcrn Atlantic, if necessary.
(f) Plan for cable and, secondarily, radio
(W/T) point-to-point comciinication betv.'een certain
United States and certain British cable terminals
and radio (W/T) shore stations.
-4-
1540 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
U.S. St;rial 011512-12 (R-A4)
B.U.S.(J)(41)^0 .
Short Title ABC-1 Annex 4
Ilarch 27. 1941
6. ( Cont'd )
(g) Joint United States Navy - British
Navy cryptographic systems.
IIILITABY COinJUNICATIONS
7. In vicv; of the fact that no United States
Army forces, either groxind or air, ar.. expected to operate
in areas whore interconrunicr.tion r.ith British forces is
necessary prior to Scptonbcr 1, 1941, it has not been con-
sidered necessary to define at this stage the detailed
arrangements v/hich vill be necessary.
•5-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1541
SECRET
U.S. Serial 011?12-12(R-A5)
B.U.S.(J)(41)^0
Short Title ABC-1 Annex 5
March 27. 1941
UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONS
REPORT
ANNEX V
CONTROL AITO PROTECTION OF SHIPPING
1. British authorities will issue directions
for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated
Powers within the areas in which BrltisW authorities assume
responsibility for the strategic direction of Military
forces, (vide Annex II). United States authorities will
issue directions for the control and protection of shipping
of the Associated Powers within the areas in which the
United States authorities assume responsibility for the
strategic direction of Hilltary forces (vide Annex II) .
2. United States and British shipping scheduled
to pass from an area assigned to one Power into an area
assigned to the other Power, will be controlled and pro-
tected by agreement betveen the respective naval authorities.
The British Admiralty is the supreme authority in the control
of shipping in the North Atlantic bound to and from the
Uni ted Kingdom .
3. The British Naval Control Service Organization
will continue in the exercise of its present fianctions and
methods in ail regions pending establishment of effective
United States agencies in United Stctes Areas. The Chief of
Naval Operations, immediately on entry of the United States
into the war, will arrange for the control and protection of
shipping of United States registry or charter within United
States Areas. Requests from the British Naval Control Service
Organization for protection by United States forces within
United States Areas will be made to the Chief of Naval
Operations,
Copy No. 98 of 125.
1542 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
Tj. S. Se rial 011512-15
B.U.5.(J)(41T??
Short TltleTSg-g
UIIITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF COIIVSP.SATIONS
AIR COLLABORATION
LIST OF E FFi:CTIV E PAGES
List of Effective Pages
110. ofpages
1 f-
Change in effect
ORIGINAL
Letter to the Chief of title page
Staff, U. S. Army; the lonnurabered
Chief of Naval Operations, page 2
U. S. Navy; the Chiefs of
Staff of the United Illncclom;
of March 29, 1941.
ORIGINAL
Air Policy
title page
unnunbered
pages 2 to 6 inc.
ORIGINAL
.1-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1543
SECRET
TT. 3. Serial 011512-1 5
B.U.3.(J)?41T55
Short Title ABC-2
UflH'L'D STATES - BRITISH STAFF COIIVLRSATIONS
AIR COLLABORATION
March 29, 1941,
To: Ino Chlof of Staff, u. S. Army.
Tho Chief of Naval Operations, U. S. Ncvy.
The Chiefs of Staff of the Unltsd Klncdom.
Sirs:
1. Tho Joint letter of transnlttal forv/ardlng the
report of the staff conversations held in V.'ashlnrton betv/cen
the United St^\tcs Staff Connlttco nnd the United Kln^don
Delecntlon, contains a rccomncndatlon cs follows:
"5. The Staff Confcror.co recomnonds that
Innedlatc steps be taken to provide for
the follcv.'lHG:
( c ) Allocrtl'^n of !!llltr.ry Material
The cstr.blishnont at the crrllest
possible nomcnt of c nethod of procedure
v/hich v^ill ensure the allocrtion of Military
Ma-terial, both prior to and after the entry
of the United States into the war in tho
manner best suited to noct the denands of
the Military situation. "
2. The {general subject of Air Collaboration, in which
the policy pertalninc to the supply and distribution of air-
craft is en essential factor, is considered of such IrariOdlate
and vital Inportancc as to deserve special treatment.
3. Accordincly, a subcoranlttcc of the United States
Staff Conmlttoc and tho United Klnrdon Delegation v;as appointed
to study this svbjcct and to submit, a report. The constitution
of this subconnitteo v/as as follows:
J. C. Slossor,
Air Vice Marshal, Royal Air Force.
DeV'ltt C. Ramsey,
Captain, U. S. 'lavy,
J. T. McNarnoy,
Colrnel, U. S. Army.
Copy No .98 of 125,
"»71« <) — 46 — pt. 15 10
1544 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
tJ. S. Serial 011612-15
4« ?ho roport of this suboonalttee 1»
fonicrdod herewith for considorction*
S. D. Entlck,
Major-Goncral, Ut S. Anny
n. L. Ghornlcy,
Rear-Adniral, TJ. S. Kavy,
On behclf of
tho United
Stntos Staff
CoEcnittoo.
R, li, Bcllnlrs,
Roar-Adnlral , Royal Navy, on bohalf of tho
United Klncficn Delegation.
-2-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1545
SECRET
U.S. Serial 011?12-1? »
B.U.S.(J)(41) 39
March 29. 1941
Short Title ABC-2
UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONS
AIR POl^ICY
1. The general subject of Air Policy, In which
the supply and distribution of aircraft is an essential
factor, is considered of such inmediate and vital importrnce
as to deserve special treatment.
The Air Subcommittee, accordingly, submits
the following report end recommendations.
REQUIRE - 2. United States Naval Aviation is employed in
IIENTS OF naval tasks. It consists of four categories of
UNITED combat airplanes: 1st, those considered as integral
STATES parts of the combctc^nt ships to which attached, viz.,
NAVAL aircraft carriers, battleships, and cruisers; 2nd,
AVIATION long-range patrol bomber airplanes attached to shore
bases or mobile tenders; 3rd, shore-based observation airplanes
for the patrol of coastal zones; and 4th, bombers, scouts, a,nd
fighters for the use of the llcrinc Corps. The priority of
organization and equipment of these four categories is
approximately equal to that accorded to vessels of the United
States Fleets,
The curre'nt United States Ncval Aviation 15,000
airplane expansion program, both for airplanes and shore
stations, ha§ been integrated vith the expansion of the United
States Navy as a whole. Any change in this program v;ill in-
fluence the size and character of the naval forces which v/ill
be available to the United States for use in the war, and for
future national security (See ABC-1 Paragraph 9) .
The proposed allocation of United States Naval
Aviation Units is set out in Table "A" (limited circulation) .
REQUIRE - 3. In conditions under which the British Isles
tfflNTS OF no longer were available as e b4se for air operations
UNITED against the Axis Powers, an air force of 54 combat
STATES groups, plus the necessary personnel and facilities
ARHY to undertake an expansion to 100 combat groups, is
the minimum strength required by the United States Amy for its
proportionate effort in achieving the air security of United
States interests.
Copy No. ^° of 125.
1546 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
U.S. Serial 011?12-l5
B.U.S.(J)(41) 39
Marcl^ 29. 1941
Short Title ;.BC-2
It will, hov7cvcr, in present circumstances,
be the policy of the United States to operate a substantial
proportion of these forces from advanced bases in the British
Isles in the event of United States intervention in the xrar
as an Associate of the British Connom/oalth.
The development and proposed allocation of
units of the 54- Group prograt: are set out in Tculc "B"
(limited circulation; .
REQUIRE - 4. Details of the British Comnonwcalth air
tIENTS strengths and expansion program, which include
BRITISH roc:uirenents for* the sociirity of the British
COtiLIOII'/.'EALTH Corjnomv:,alth and its s,a coninunications arc set
AIR FORCES out in Ttitle "C" (limited circulation).
ALLOCATION 5. The Chief of !I.vval Operations, the Chief of
OF MATERIAL Staff, Unit^-. ZUit^s Arn.y, In consultation with
the British Kilitary Mission in v/caiiinrton, v;ill jointly advise
the President on the- allocation of air equipment among the
United States Navy, the United States Army, and the air forces
of the British Commonwealth in accordance v;ith the requirements
of the Military situation.
The Ci.iof of Staff, the Chief of Naval
Operations, and the Ciicfs of Staff Coirjnittee V7ill be kept in-
formed as to the progress of the aviation expansion programs
of the British Commonwealth and United States. The United
States Uilitary Mission in London and the British Military
Mission in Washington will be furnished v/ith all pertinent
information by the appropriate Military authorities.
6. The rate of expansion of the air combat forces
of the United States and the British Commonwealth largely de-
pends upon the ability of the t\?o nations to provide adeqiiate
eir material. All programs of aircraft construction rill be
accelerated as rapidly as clrcui;stances permit. Deliveries
of material to the United States Na^/y, to the United States
Amy, and to the air forces of the British Conmonw.alth will
be conditionv-d by the ability of those organizations to absorb
material usefully, either for the equipment of operating iinits,
or for reserves of such magnitude as may bvi agreed upon,
according to Military circumstances. The broad policy with re-
spect to the provision? of equipment should be as set out in
the follov;ing paragraphs,
-2-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1547
SECRET
U.S. Serial 0U^ 1 2-33
B.u.s. (jy(4Tm
March 29. 1941
Short Title ABC>2
7. (a) United States Navnl Aviation and Army Air
Corps .
In principle, the United States programs for
the equipment and maintenance of existing and
new units and training cstablishnents-, should
b..' based on total United States Production
less:
(1) Allocations to the British Coninonwcalth as
outlined in subsequent paragraphs, and
(ii) Allocations to other nations that may be
authorized.
(b) British Air Forcos .
In principle, the British Commonv,'ealth programs
for the equipment and "naintenanco of existing
and new units and training establishic*i'nts
should be based on:
(i) The output from production in the British
Connonv/calth,
(ii) The output of the approved British 14,375
and 12,000 airplane programs from United
States industry.
(iii) The allocation of a continuing output from
United States capacity now existing or
approved, in such numbers as the Military
situation nay require and circumstances may
permit,
8. In addition, allocr.tion of output from new capacity
for the production of llilitary aircraft beyond that envisaged
in paragraph 7, should, in principle and subject to periodical
review, be based on the follov/'inc:
(a) Until such time as the United States may enter
T;he war, the entire output from such new
capacity should be riade available for release
to the British.
-3-
1548 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
U.S. Serial 011512-15
B.U.S.(J)(4in9
March 29. 1941
Short Title I3C-2
(b) If th3 United States enters the war,
thereafter the output from such nev/ capacity
should be divided among the Associated Pov/ers
as the Liilitary situation may require and
clrcunstanccs nay permit. For planning pur
poses the United Kingdon should assume that
such capacity will be divided on approximately
a 50/50 basis betveun the United States and
the B^'itish Conmonvcalth,
UNITED STATES 9. The United States should expand its
NAVAL AVIATION Naval Aviation, in the four categories listed
in paragraph 2, on the plan of the 15,000 plane program. This
program is expected to reach maturity concurrently t;ith the
completion of the authorized chipbuildinc program in the fiscal
year 1946. A pilot training program has been initiated which
contemplates an ultlrr.tc yca-'ly output of ,6720 naval aviators.
This program is coordinated vith the expansion of the Nr.v;* as
a whole.
The 15,000 plane program envisages an
operating strength of conbatant airplanv-s as follows:
Observation-Scouting
S54
Fighting
1,272
Scout-Bombing
1,662
Torpedo Bombing
588
Bombing
52
Patrol Bombing
1,540
5,968
Excess primary training capacity will
exist at various United States N^val Reserve Aviation Bases
during fiscal year 1942 which, if British instructing personnel
are available, could Lj applied to British needs.
UNITED STATZ S 10. Subject to the principles set out in the
AKUY AVIATION foregoing paragraphs, and so long as the United
States docs not enter the war, the United Stetes should agree
to defer completing the aircraft equipKunt of the 54 Combat
Group program of the United Str^. t^j Arny except as set out in
detail in Tuule "B" , r.«ovided any additional aircraft, thus
made available, contribute directly to the effectuation of the
policy stated in paragraphs 11 and I3 (h) of the Kain Report.
-4-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1549
SECKST
U.S. Sorial 011512-1?
B.U.S.(J)(41)-S9
Llarch 29. 19^1
Short Title ABC->2
11 » The United States Ar-v should proceed with
the initiction of its pl?.nncd Second Avittion Objective (the
100 Group progran referred to in pr.ragr: ph 4) to include
total training facilities for 30,000 pilots and 100,000
technicians per year, on the basis of a planned first line
strength oft
Clc/ss Airpl-nos
Heavj' Bonbardrnent 1,520
irediioE Bonbarduent 1)059
Light Bonbardncnt 770
Pursuit (Interceptor) 2,500
Pursuit (FiGhter) 525
Observation, Liaison and Photo 806
Tr..nsport 469
Amphibian 150
tot;.l 7,799
The ti:.:v schedule for the conplction of
this prograr. v.'ill periodic.lly bu adjusted to conforn \;ith
deliveries of conbat aircraft to the United States r.adc in
accordance \:ith paragraph 10 or necessitated by v/astagc in
conbat iinits* Excess training capacity resulting therefrom
rrill be nade available for the training of British personnel.
BRITISH 12. The United Kincdon is now developing the
COLiiilOiff'Ei'.LTH progran cutlired 'in Table "C" , The rate- of
AIR FQnCES developr^nt vill depend in the nain on the
rate at \vhich aircraft and trained pilots beconc available.
The allocation of resources as bct\'e<_n the different strategic
Coninands in the United Kin<:dor. and as betrocn the United King-
don and overseas theaters of v/ar vill bo d>-torr.ined in accord-
ance with the ri^quirer^ents of the strategic situation from
tine to tine, and, if the United States enters the v;ar, in
accordance v.ith the joint \,'rr pirns of the .associated Powers.
-5-
1550 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
U.S. Serial Oll^ia-l^
B.U.S.(J)(4lH9
March 29. 1941
Short Title ABC-2
It is thu British intention to build up their offensive power
as rapidly as possible.
J, C, Slossor,
Air Vice Llr.rshal, Roys-l Air Force,
De'Vitt C. Ransey,
Ccrtr-ln, U. S. Navy.
J. T. tecNr.rncy,
Colonel, U. S. krny.
.6-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1551
EXHIBIT NO. 50
MOST SECRET- COPY NO. ^
Classified SECRET
Autti: WDGS
Date: 5 Dec 45
Initials: i^
AMERICAN DUTCH BRITISH
CONVERSATIONS
SINGAPORE, APRIL, 1941
(Sli>rt Title— "A.D.B")
REPORT
Office of the Commander -in- Chief,
China Station,
27th April, 1941.
1552 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tlOST SECRET. A.D.B^
Page 1
AMERICAIT - DUTCH - BRITISH COIIVERSATIONS .
SINGAPORE.
21st to 27th April 19U1.
(Short Title: "A.D.B.")
Page
LIST OP CONTENTS 1
DISTRIBUTION LIST .... 2
LIST OF DELEGATES .... 3
SIGNATURE SHEET 5
INTRODUCTION AND TERilS OF REFERENCE 6
S£P2R£i.
I - Object 7
II - SuDinary of Situation ..... 8
III - Necessity for collective action 13
IV - Action open to Associated Powers 1i+
V - Coninand 15
VI - Plan for employment of Naval Forces .. 17
VII - Plan for anployment of Land and Air
Forces ..... 23
VIII - LialBon and Conmunications 27
APPENDICES!
I - Appendix, to Haval^Plan -initial _ ,
DlspoaiflonB and Functions or Naval
Forces ..... 29
II - Appendix to Air Plan - Syston of Air
Reinforcement . . 32
III - List of Liaison Officers and Observers 33
IV - Copy of telegraphic sumnary of Report 3U
(Not included)
SINOAPORE.
27th April ^^k^.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1553
A.D,E.
MOST SECRET. Page 2
AMERICAN » DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS .
APRIL 19U1.
NOTE ; Copies Nos.U, 7, 13, 29* 32. 36, V*, 52 aM signed
copies.
1.
Admlpalty /
2.
War Office j By Air.
5.
Air Ministry.;
U.
Admiralty )
5.
War Office By All Sea
6,
Air Ministry )
7
- 12.
United States of America.
13
- 28.
Netherlands East Indies.
29
-3^.
Coiiinands9^ii>>Chief, Far East.
32
- 3k.
CoDinender~ia-Ghief, China.
35.
Far East CfioiblJX9d Bureau.
36
- k5.
Australia.
Uk
- 51.
New Zealand.
58
- 55.
India.
56
- 57.
61 !
62.
II:
67.
68.
69.
70.
East Indies,
1554 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MOST SECRET.
A.h.B.
Page 3..
AMERICAN - DUl'CH - BHITI3H COITVUnSATIONS .
APRIL 1941.
LELEGATEa
United States of America .
Captain V/.R. Purnell, U.S.N.
Colonel A.C« LcBride, B.SiA*
Captain A.M.R. Allen, U.S.N.
Lt. Colonel F.O. Brink, U»S.A.
Netherlands East Indies .
tIajor-Generel H. ter Poorten
Captain J. J. A. van Staveren, R.N.N
Captain D.C. Buurman van Vreeden
Lt* Cdr. H.C.W. Moorman, R.N.N,
Captain L.G.L. van der Kun, R.iJ.N.
Major J.M.J, .^egner.
General Headquarters. Far East .
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Robert Brooke-Popham,
G.C.V.O., K.C.B., C.M.G.,
D.S.O., A.F.C. (Secretary
General) .
Group Captain L. Darvall, M.C,
Royal Air Force.
Commander In Chief. China and Staff .
Vlce-Admlral Sir Geoffrey Lay ton,
K.C.B., D.S.O.
Commodore P.E.P. Hutton, R.N.
Paymaster Captain D.H. Dolg, R.iJ.
(Secretary to Gonference)
Australia .
Admiral Sir Ragnar U. Colvln,
K.B.E., C.B..
Paymaster Captain J.B. Foley,
O.B.E., R.A.il,
Coraraander R.F. Nichols, R.N.
Group Captain F.il. Bladin,
R.A.A.F.
Colonel H.G. Rourke, M.C.
commander V.E. Kennedy, R.A.N.
Chief of Staff,
U.S. Asiatic Fleet.
Aest. Chief of Staff
U.3. Military Forces
Philippines.
U.S. Naval Observer,
Singapore.
U.S. Military Observer
Singapore.
Chief of General Staff.
Chief of Naval Staff,
General Staff.
Naval Staff.
Naval Liaison Officer
Singapore.
Military Liaison
Officer, Singapore,.
Ccxnmander in Chief,
Far East,
Commander in Chief,
China.
Chief of otaff.
Secretary tc
Comraander in Chief
China.
First Naval Member.
Secretary to First
Naval Member.
Naval Staff.
Air Staff,
General Staff,
Austx-aiian Iiaperial
Force, Malaya.
Australian Naval
Liaison Officer,
Batavia.
(Contd.) ,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1555
MOST SEQRET.
Page 4<
AtlKRICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERaATI0lJ9 <
DELEGATES continued
New Zealand .
Coraraodore »/.E. Parry, C.B., R.N.
Air commodore H.VV.L. Saunders,
M.C., D.P.C., M.W., R.A.P.
Colonel A.E. Conwey, C.B.E.
India .
Major General G.N. Uolesworth.
East Indies Station .
Commodore A.G.B. tVilson,
D.S.O., M.V.O., R.N,
Chief of Naval Staff.
Chief of Air Staff.
New Zealand Staff
Corps .
Deputy Chief of
General Staff
(representing Defence
Department) .
Chief of Staff.
(Contd.),
1556 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Page 5,
AtJERIGAtt . - UOXCH - BRITISH COiJVEnSATIONa ,
APRIL 1941?
I^EPORT .
SIGNED at Si.ijjoporc this twenty-seventh day of April 1941
(Sd. ) W.R. Purnell
CAPTAIN, U.S.N.
• CHIEF OP STAFF, UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET.
(Sd, ) V. Staveron. (Sd. ) H. ter Poorton.
CAPTAIN. R.N.N. , MAJOR-GENERAL,
CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF, CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, IffiTHERLAUDS EAST INDIES,
tIETHBRLANDS EAST INDIES.
(Sd, ) R.M. Colvin.
ADLIRAL ,
FIRST NAVAL luELIBKR,
AUaTIiALIAN COlvu. 01 WEALTH NAVAL BOARD.
(Sd. ) W.E. Parry.
COmuODORE,
CHIEF OP NAVAL STAiT, IWH ZEALAND.
(Sd. ) G.N. Moleeworth.
I'JAJOR-GEiiERAL,
DEPUTY CHIEF OP GENERAL Sl'AFP, INDIA.
(Sd. ) A.G.B. Wilson.
co^aiODORE,
CHIEF OF srrAtV, EAST I]©IES STATION.
(Sd. ) G. Layton.
VICE-ADMirJUi,
com}ia:ider-in-chiep, china station.
(Sd, ) R. Brooke-Pophan.
AIR CHIEF LiARSHAL,
COUiiANDER-IN-CHIEF, FAR EAST.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1557
MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 6.
AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS.
APRIL 19417
INyRODUCTION AND TERMS OF REFERENCE.
1. Itt;^):;oauctlon .
The following condltlona applyi-
(a) State of war "between Oernlany, Italy and tfapah on
ohe hand, and British Empire with its p*efcent
Allies and the Iftilted 3tates of America (refefred
to herein as the Associated Powers) on the other.
(t) No political conmitment is implied,
(c) Any agreement is subject to ratification "by
Oovernment concerned.
Terms of Reference.
2. To prepare plan for conduct of military operations
in Far East on basis of report of Washington conversations.
3. Particular points for agreement are:-
(a) Plan for employment and disposition of forces in
whole area Indian Ocean, Pacific and Australian
and New Zealand waters before and after arrival of
Far East Fleet, as agreed in Washington
conversations, and summarised in Admiralty
Telegram 1848 of 4th April.
(b) Details of arrangements for co-operation, e.g.
communications, exchange of Liaison Officers, eto.
1558 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 7.
AMERICAN - DUTCH 'BRITISH CONVERSATIONS.
APRIL 194T7
I - OBJECT.
4. Our o'bject is to defeat Germany and her allies,
and hence in the Par East to maintain the position of the
Associated Powers against Japanese attack, in order to
sustain a long-term economic pressure against Japan until
we are in a position to take the offensive.
Our most important interests in the Par East are;-
(a) The security of sea connunioatlons
and
(h) The security of Singapore*
An important subsidiary interest is the security
Of Lxizon in the Philippine Islands since, so long as
dulinarine and air forces can he operated from Luzon,
expeditions to threaten Malaya or the Nethez*land8 East
Indies from the East are out-flanked.
/ (oontd.)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1567
MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 16.
AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS .
APRIL 194iT
V - COMMAND (contd.)
In order to work out operational plans and to
exercise this strategic direction, the immediate
esta"bli8hment at Singapore of a combined staff including
representatives from Dominions and Associated Powers is
recommended.
LAND FORCES.
36. In the particular circumstances the primary task
of the land forces has heen decided to be the defence of the
naval and air bases and the denial of potential naval and
air bases to the enemy. There is little possibility of
strategic offensive action by land forces and a localised
strategic policy is therefore already established for the
land forces. They will continue to be controlled by the
authorities of the territories in which they are stationed
except aa where otherwise mutually arranged, e. g. TIMOR.
AIR FORCES.
37. Air forces have the power to concentrate provided
the decision can be made quickly, the orders issued rapidly,
and the necessary bases and facilities are available
throughout the area. Unless one central authority with
power to direct concentrations is established in advance
the great strategic advantages of this power to concentrate
rapidly to meet particular situations in different areas
cannot be obtained.
38. In effect such central control would only be
exercised over those portions of the air forces of the
Associated Powers which can from time to time be made
available for concentration in the area that is at any time
most Important to the common interest. The central controlling
authority would be empowered to decide the time and area for
the concentration, direct the moves to take place, and
indicate the main task of the forces. The operational
control of the forces thus concentrated would be exercised
by the Commander of the Power in wliose operational area the
concentration was effected.
39. It is reconmended that the authority empowered to
exercise this strategical direction of air forces in the
PAR EAST should be the Commander-in-Chief, FAB EAST, with
General Headquarters at SINGAPORE.
/ (contd. )
1568 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MOST SECRET A,D,Bc
page 17.
ANGLO -.DUTCH - HilTTSH OOITVERSATIOIIS ,
APRIL 194'i.,
VI - H.AN FOR TIffi aiPLOTOKIlT OP I^AVAL FORCES .
Definition of Phase I and F ^ase II .
40. Phade I 18 regardeci sa exiatins from the
outbreak of hostilities with Japan until the arrival
of the British Par Eastern Fleet in the Eastern Theatre,
Phase II refers to oporntions subaec^uent
to this.
OPERATIOiJS AGAIllST JAP AJ i IH THE PACIFIC Altt) lilDIAM 0CEAH3
pl.Ptiro PHASE I.
41. The basic prlncii^le of the strategy of the
Aasooiated Powers is that t la Atlantic end Europe are
the decisive theatre of v^ar. It follows that the
forces employed in other theatres must be reduced to a
mlninwra so as not to impair our main effort in the
deoiaive theatre.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to allot large
forces to other theatres, end such forces Ghould be used
whenever' possible, to inflict the meximuw loss on our
eaemies.
The chief example of this is the United
atates Pacific Fleet, which ic xs 'essential to maintf.ln
in strength at least emusl to the Japanese fleet, in
order to hold our position in the Pacific and to act
offensively against Japanese forces and bases in order
to counter the certain Japanese offensive against the
position of the Associated Powers in the Eastern Theatre.
The remaining navel forces of the Associated
Powers in the Eastern Theatre are so weak that they will
inevitably find themselves very largely occupied with
the local defence of bases and the p.otection of vital
sea ooomunicatlons. Nevertheless, whenever and where-.
Mer they can, they should assume the offensive ejamst
Japanese naval forces and sea communicetiona.
United atetea Pacific Fleet .
42. AS stated in the lieport of the Washington
Conversations, the United atatea Pacific Fleet at
Hawaii will operate offensively ngainst the Japanese
Mandated Islands and against Japanese see cor.imuni cations
in the Pacific. The support tc be afforded to British
forces south of the equator between 155 °Eaat and 180
cannot be defined until further infonnation is received
from the Gcrnmander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet,
as to his intentions.
As the United States Pacific Fleet is reaponsibl
for operations, including the protection of sea
commmications, to the Eastward of 180 , it will be
necessary for Aueti'elia and New Zealand to co-operate
direct with the Coninendex' in Chief of the United States
Pacific Fleet.
(Contd.)
0.)
EXHIBITS or JOIXT COMMITTEE 1569
MOST .iEOR ET: A=I>.B.
Page 18.
■Ai,LBRIGAN - DU'i'CII -• BltniSij COir':;!.oA'VlOi^S .
ArlUL 194J L^-
VI - PLAN FOR Ti:S lJ.rpLOn?I!NT 0? IKY/.L TOItCES . . contd .
ynlted States Asiatic Flae t.
43, Basecl on M:-nila Initiallyo Should
BOvemente of Japanese neval and air foi-cea beoorae threat-
ening, it_ l3_ nrcrioSRii-Ji j; despatch the submarine, destroyer
and lerje ptitrol ;:ilar:e tendei: a_.iLLi d the taytke jip '-o "
"Blngapore before the conunenccinent of bcisljllties o If
hostilities start beforo thes-i avjciiiaiies ore safely
disposed, the corabataia vcasela will escort them^ It
Is estimated that Jap-^n's incat probable ccvirsc of action
will be to :-
«
(a) contain the Aaiatic f'leeC in Loial*
Bay with thr: object of deetroj'ing it
by all- end rcirpeJo stttckB f.ncl f aj line
la chlb, to
(b) looate the fleet at the eerllcat possible
moment and sadocy'^nr to destroy it. by
air, submori-ie or aui'f&cc- vessel attaolcs,
44, The BubmarinR;, r;tval aii- a :d v.«!^»i". local
flefence forces will i:-: drw^jloysd in 3i;pncrt of the Anny
In Ita defence of Lu/.on, ccyi.-j\icti:Hj reconnai&si-nce and
Buoh offensive operatlond u.-sinal Jnpunese sea
conmunloations and naval forces ac tx-e consistent with
that pJlsslon. Hong Xonj will be evaiioblc os 3 A-'Ose
for these operations.
45, The c;r-aiaei*e with ettjohed oviation unite and
destroyers will, when ordered by -C in Asiatic Fleet,
proceed towai'ds Singapore reporting to Conamsndei' in
Ohief China, to operate ijr.de'- his strategic direction.
46, Upon the "Ultirriote Dc-focce Ai-ea'' (which
includea Corrcgidor et the entrance to lisnlla Bay)
becoming um;>3nal}le, all reri'^airiing'na'/ol and na\-al air
forces retaining ccxnbat vela-: -.vili, when released by
Commander In Chief, Asiatic Fleet, i^etire southwai'd*
passing under the strategic dlrectien ej Couaaender in
Chief China.
British HeYsl Forces .
47, Apdrt fi-om the looel defence of besc-T,. v.rltlah
naval forces will be eraployed on the defence of our vital
Bea conmunlcatlona, and the attach on Japanese ses
coimmnciations. It is clear ';hat the forces eivcilable
are tiUlte Inadc.iUote for the in1.*'odncticn of i^enerei
convoy system and that evasive routeir.^': or- seiliii^s uiider
cover must therefore form the nain defence for trade,
Dutch ITaval Forces .
49, These will be employed primarily for the
defence of the Netherlands East Indies and of the narrow
paasagea between the islands.
(Contd.) ,.
1570 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MOST SECIIET . A.D.B,
Page 19.
AiiERIGAN - DUTCH - BRITISH C0NVi:RaATI01'JS .
APRIL 1941.
VI - PLAH TOR THE EMPLOYliiEi^ OF MVAL FORCES. . . cent ,
Dutch Navel Foroee . (Cont.)
49. One cruiser, two destroyers and two submarines
will be available Initially to operate under British
control.
Submarine Operationa .
50. Co-ordinated direction of the operations of
allied submarines is of jreat importance since these
workiuG in conjunction with our air forces, constitute
our moat powerful weapon for attackin.^ JapanOe seaborne
foroee.
51. United States submarines, so xong as they
operate in defence of the Philippines, will operate
under the orders of Coianander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
Upon being released by Commander in Chief, Asiatic
Fleet, they will pass under the control of Commander
In Chief, China, who will be responsible for co-ordinating
their operations with those of the Dutch submarines.
52. The Dutch submarines will principally operate
under the orders of Commander in Chief, ;jetherlands East
Indies, for defence of the channels through the
Netherlands Bast Indies to the Indian Ocean and to
meet any enemy action in Netherlands East Indies waters,
but aa described in para. 49, two initially, and possibly
others at a later stace, will be allotted to ^^eneral
tasks at the direction of the Commander in Chief, China,
These Dutch submarines will operate in the South China Sea
south of the line Joining Cape Padaran and Kudat, all
United States submarines keeping north of this line until
both forces operate under Commander in Chief, China,
DEFENCE OP SEA COMMUNICATIONS .
53. The security of the following must be ensured: -
(a) Reinforcements and supplies to our forces in
Middle East.
(b) Reinforcements and supplies to our forces in
the Eastern Theatre »
(c) Conveyance of vital supplies between the United
Kingdom, U.S.A., Malaya, Netherlands East
Indies, Australia and New Zealand.
(d) Empire Air Traininc Scheme to Canada and U.K,
(e) Empire Air Training Scheme tv South Africa.
(f ) Troop movements to Ambon and Koepang,
(e) Troop movements to Pacific Islands.
(Contd.). ..
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1571
MOST SECPwETT.
Page 20.
AtliiaiCAN - DUTCH - Biai'ISH COITVlIRSA'i'IOI'lS .
APRIL 1941.
VI.- PLAN tXjR TIffl UlPLOYiaElTT OF IIAVAL roROES t > ♦ > cont .
PEFKjICB QF 3EA .CQmHJHICATj[0^ip » t > tBont.
54. The above entails protection to the I'cllowlnr
routes : -
(a) Gape to Aden, Indian Ports, Colombo and Ualaye.
(b) Australia^ to Colombo, Indian Ports and Aden,
(c) Australia and New Zealand to Singapore via
Sunda Strait.
(a) Austi^alia and Hew Zealand to Cape,
(e) Australia and New Zealand to West Coast of
America.
Indian Ports to Aden.
Persian Oxilf to Aden.
Persian Gulf to Indian Ports and Colombo.
Darwin to Netherlands East Indies.
ir.E.I. to the Philippines.
Coastal trade.
55. Methods of protection may be sumnarlsed as
follows :-
(a) Convoy.
(b) Cover.
(c) Patrol of focal and terminal areas by surface
vessels and aircraft.
(d) Routeine of shipping, either evasive or coast-
wise. The latter, when feasible, requires :-
(i) Seaward cover by surface ships
includiae A/S vessels.
(ii) Air cover and availability of
air striking forces.
(iii) Protective minefields.
Convoy .
■ 56. The volume of trade passin_ alon^- the I'outes
denoted in porajra.h 54, the ^reat distances involved and
the number of warships available ^^e.ider impossible the
adoption of a universal convoy system throughout the
whole Eastern Theatre. V/e should therefore be prepared
to. provide escorted convoys as necessary to meet the
following re.iUireiiients :-
(a) important troop movements (capital ship escort
for the more important).
(b) supply ships between Colombo (and Indian ports)
and Malaya.
(c) supply ships from Australia to Siiigapore and
jfctherlands East Indies.
(d) shipping between America, Australia and New
Zealand while in the Tasman area,
(Contd.).,.
1572 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MOar SECRET . A.B.B.
Page 21.
AIviaU.CAN - DUTCH - Ka'i'I3H COIATERqATIOjIS .
APRIL 1941.
VI - PL/uT VOli 'i'Hr; mPLOYluEifx' OF iI/.VAL .PORCES t . . conti
The Commaader in Chief Ox the ototions
concerned will continue to arrance convoy eacorts as
hitherto, with the Commander in Chief, China, acting
where necessary as the co-ordinating authority.
Routejilff t
57* RouteinG of independent sailings should be
conducted on the following .'general lines :-
(a) Shippinc in the Indian Ocean, with the
exception of that to and from Australia
should be routed as far to the North as is
feasible. No shipping to pass South of
the Seychelles Group or at more than 100
miles South of Ceylon.
(b) Wherever feasible, all shipping to be routed
close inshore.
(c) Australia to Aden shipping to be routed via
Durban.
(d) All shipping on Indian and Pacific Ocean routes
to be evasively routed.
Protective Minefields .
58. It is not yet possible to consider the
providion of protective minefields for inshore routeing
in any area of the Lastern Theatre.
Disposition of Naval and Air Forces .
59. Naval Forces and air forces detailed primarily
for defence of sea commuioi cations should be disposed with
the following principles in view :-
(a) prevention of the passage of enemy forces
through the Netherlands ESofl Indies.
(b) cover of focal and terminal areas by both
surface and air forces.
(c) provision of escorts for convoys as in
para-raph 56, without unduly effecting (a)
and (b) above.
(d) rapid concentration of forces employed in (b)
above to deal with any attack on a particular
section of a trade route.
60. A table giving the intended initial dispositions
end functions of the naval forces of the Associated
Powers in the Eastern Theatre, based on the fore-
going principles, is attached as Appendix I, but it
should be understood that offensive operations by the
United States Pacific Fleet may so contain Japanese
forces that it may be possible to release both naval and
air forces allocated for trade protection for ofher
operations.
(Contd.)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1573
MOST SEC:iET . Ji.D.B.
Pace 22.
AI^CRICAN - DUTCH - BRITI JK 'JQUVI.aSATI OJiS.
APIIIL 1941.
VI - PL/-!! jfQ'R 'x'Hi; i^MPLOYMEifr OP ilAV/Jj KlIlCES. .cont.
DKPENCE OP SSA C0I.U;flJNIGATI01]S cont.
PHA3S II . .
61. In Phase II with the arrival of the British
Far Eastern Fleet the balance of strength of naval
forces in the Eastern Theatre will "oe altered considerably
against Japan, and taking the Pacific and Indian Oceans
as a whole, Japan would probably be in a position of
inferiority.
62. The inmediate object of the British Par
Eastern Fleet is to operate from Singapore, While
elcne it is inferior to the Japanese Main Fleet, its
strength should be stiff icient to enable tttf: Associated
Powers to seize the initiative, launch powerful counter-
attacks against such Japanese forces as may have
established their position in territories of Associated
Powers, and intensify the attack on Japanese forces,
territories end sea communications,
63. In the unlikely event of it proving Impossible
for the British Fleet to operate from Singapore, it
will operate from bases in the Indian Ocean v/ith the
object of securing our vital sea corninunications in tlw
Indian Ocean and Austi-alian and New Zealand areas,
disputing any further advance by the enemy to the south-
ward or westward, and if possible # j?eHevinc pres(ruro om
tialaya by operations in the Malacca Straits and ag^in3t
any ener.iy activities on the West coast of Ivlalaya.
64. So many developments must precede the arrival
of the British Par Eastern Fleet that it is not
profitable to examine in greater detail the operations
that would then be possible.
(Contd.),
1574 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MOST SECRET. ' A.D.B.
Page 23.
AI^ERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.
VII - PLAN FOR EI.IPLOYI.IENT OF LAND AND AIR FORCES ,
65. The only land frontiers in the area to he guarded
are those of Burma and Malaya.
66. The northern frontier of Malaya is strategically
weak, and attack across it becomes possible after Japanese
occupation of Southern Thailand, either by moving "■v/n the
Isthmus, or after a landing.
67. In Java, Sumatra, the West coast of Malaya, Luzon,
and Celebes, land communications are well developed. In all
other areas, such communications are almost entirely absent
and could only be improvised with great difficulty.
Movement is chiefly coastwise by ship or by means of native
boats up the rivers.
68. Except therefore in Burma and Northern I alaya, any
enemy land forces moving to attack our territory must be
sea-borne. This involves seizure of bases from which to
operate naval and air forces and from which to advance to
the objective, except that if the Philippines are attacked
only advanced air bases will be required. Adeauate air
support is an essential req.uirement for a combined operation*
69. The most suitable objectives for enemy attack are
the sea and air bases on which the defence mainly rests.
The policy should therefore be to organise the defence system
to give the greatest possible security to these bases. This,
together with the denial of potential air and naval bases to
enemy occupation, will be the primary task of the land forces.
V/e can thus fully employ the mobility of air forces both
independently and in co-operation with naval submarine
and surface forces, to effect concentrations against any
naval forces or sea-borne expeditions during their approach
and landing, to discover and destroy enemy air forces and to
operate dispersed for the protection of sea
communi cat ions .
70. The method adopted to implement the policy set out
in paragraph 69 above, is to establish protected air bases
along the line Burma - Malaya - Borneo - Philippines - New
Guinea - Solomons - New Hebrides - Fiji - Tonga. This line
of bases is supported by a second line from Sinnatra through
the Netherlands East Indies and the East coast of Australia
to New Zealand. At present the n\araber8 of aircraft and land
forces available are below what is considered to be the safe
minimum required, but to some extent the power to concentrate
air forces quickly makes up for lack of numbers. The move
of land forces, in the circimstances, is much more difficult.
71. The Associated Powers undertake responsibility for
air operations, including reconnaissance, in the following
spheres :-
(a) U.S.A.
(1) Pacific area as defined in paragraph 33.
Note. The extent of the United States support to
/ (contd. )
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1575
MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 24.
A^^ERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CCNVERSATIONS.
• APRIL 1941T
VII - PLAN FOR EMPLOniENT OP LAND AND AIR FORCES, (contd.)
the British air forces in areas (d) and (e) cannot be
defined until further information is received from
the Commander-in-Chief, United States pacific Fleet,
as to his intentions.
(ii) Philippine Islands including the Sulu Se.. area
and "bounded on the West hy a line joining Kudat to
Cape Padaran. On the South it is hounded by a line
;)oining' Kudat to Sangi Island, and thence to 4 "
North 140° East.
(b) N.E.I. On the V/est: 92° East. On the North: the
line of the equator from 92° East to 1L3° East, thence
North-East te the frontier of Sarawak and from thence
following the frontier to the sea. The "boundary
continues N.E. along the coast of British North Borneo
to Kudat, thence East to Sangi Island and thence to 4
North, 140° East. On the South: a line drawn along
13° South from 92° East to 120° East, thence Just
excluding the Islands of Roti, Seman, Timor and Molu to
Oape "Valsche, continuing along the South shore of Dutch
New Guinea to its boundary in 141 East, thence North.
(c) British. The area northward and westward of the Dutch
sphere.
(d) Australia. The area southward and eastward of the
Dutch sphere as. far East as the western boundary of
the New Zealand Naval Station and the northern
reconnaissance line from New Guinea - New Hebrides
(Sandwich Island).
(e) New Zealand. The area of the New Zealand Naval Station,
excluding the Pacific area, and the northern
reconnaissance line from New Hebrides (Sandwich Island)-
Piji - Tonga.
AIR RECONyAISSANCE AND STRIKING FORCES IN THE PRECAUTIONARY
STAGE.
72. On the introduction of the "precautionary stage",
air reconnaissance will be intensified throughout the whole
of the Eastern Theatre and co-ordinated with naval
reconnaissance. Air striking forces will be prepared to
attack raiders, naval forces or expeditions,
73. To enable concentrations to take place to deal with
major operations in specially important localities, certain
air base areas are prepared to receive and operate
reinforcements from other areas. Such areas are Burma,
Southern Lalaya, West and East Borneo, South Celebes, Ambon,
Timor, Luzon in the Philippine Islands, and the Australian
and New Zealand areas. It is important that the aerodromes
concerned should be adequately supplied with fuel, bombs
/ (contd. )
79716 O— 46 — pt. 15 12
1576 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 25.
A MERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS .
APRIL l%l7
VII - PLAN FOR EMPLOYMENT OF LAND AND AIR FORCES (ooitd.)
and 3. A. A. for the vise of reinforcing squadrons, rea8onal)ly
eecured against air and land attack and with good signal
communications .
74. As a basis for planning it can be assumed that the
forces available for reinforcing will be as follows :-
Prom Malaya 4 (B) Squadrons.
Prom Netherlands East Indies 3 (B) , 1 (P) Squadrons.
Prom Philippines (in event All available.
of evacuation only)
Prom Australia Up to possible S (B)
Squadrons for the
Ambon - Timor area.
Plying boats are very short in the whole area.
It is impracticable to lay down now from which area or in
what numbers they might be spared for reinforcement, but it
is important that the mobility of flying boats shall be
exploited to the full to make good the deficiency in
numbers.
75. The maintenance of a secure air route, adequately
supplied with fuel, peimitting reinforcement via India
through Burma, Malaya, Netherlands East Indies to Australia,
with a branch to Luzon, is of great importance.
76. The Conference recommends that it should be a
definite object of the Associated Powers to build up the
capacity to operate aircraft offensively against Japan to
the maximum extent in their power with due regard to the
main objebt, which is the defeat of Germany and Italy.
77. Plans will be prepared and co-ordinated for air
bombardment of targets on the Japanese lines of sea
communications in the South China Sea and Pelew areas, and
objectives in China, Formosa and the Pelew Islands. It ,may
be poanlble also to attack targets in Japan from air bases
to be established in China.
OTHER OPERATIONS.
78. (ji) Support to Chinese Regular Forces by financial
aid, provision of equipment and establishment of military
and air missions. A British nucleus Mission is already
established, and a United States Mission possible ccanbined
with the British Mssion would be of considerable value,
and it is recommended that preparations to establish it
should now be made.
(b) The operating of Chinese Guerilla Forces armed,
©quipped and directed by the Associated Powers. Steps have
already been taken by the British Government to organise
such operations. It is reconmended that the United States
Government organise similar guerilla forces.
/ (contd.)
J
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1577
MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Pege 86.
AMERICAN - DUTCH •• BRITISH CONVERSATIONS .
' APRIL 1941.
VII - PLAN FOR EMPLOYMENT OF LAND AND AIR FORCES (contd.)
(e) The organisation of subversive activities,
sabotage and corruption in Japan and Japanese occupied
territories. Activities of this kind are already being
organised by the British Government, It is recommended
that the United States Government should also undertake
such activities and co-ordinate them closely with those
of the British.
/ (contd.)
1578 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 27,
AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CONVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.
VIII - LIAISON. COMMUNICATIONS.
LIAISON.
79. Arrangements for the exchange of liaison
officers and observers are already well under way and the
Conference does not recommend any special extension of
these. It is rocommended, however, that the Liaison
Officers and Observers of the Dominions and Associated
Powers at Singapore should be instructed that, on the
outbreak of hostilities they will be availablis for duty y
on the Combined Staff of the C-in-C, Par East or C-in-C,,
China,
80, A list of the present Liaison Officers and
Observers is appended for reference as Appendix III,
COMMUNICATIONS.
The following Is a summary of the present
situation I- , ^
81, Point-to-point W/T Services.
(a) Singapore, Batavia and Australian W/T Stations
communicate direct by W/T at routine times
dally.
(b) Arrangements have been made for Cavite to Join
in, making a four cornered W/T point-to-point
service (Singapore - Batavia - Cavite -
Australia). Up to the present Cavite has
not taken part. It is considered desirable
that permission should be given by the United ^
States Naval Authorities for Cavite to open
up direct W/T communication with stations
named, as soon as possible,
(c) No arrangements have been made for a point-to-
point service between Australia, Nev/ Zealand
and Honolulu. It is now considered that such
a point-to-point service is required and i/
should be arranged directly by the parties
concerned,
82. Commimications to and from 'Associated' Ships.
(a) The normal method is for ships to pass their
messages to their own shore bases, the latter
forwarding relevant messages (via the servlcoa
in 81 above) to other Commanders-in-Chief,
(b) Ships can, if desired, pass messages direct to
'Associated' shore stations,
/ (contd, ) .....
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1579
HOST SECRET. A.D.3.
Page 28,
MERICAN - D UTCH - B RITISH CONVSRSATIOMS,
■ iJRlL 1941. ^
VIII - LIAISON, GOIj';UIJICATIONS. (contd. )
83. CoinmunlcQtlons between 'Associated' ships
In an operation.
A means Is provided whereby, at a certain stage
of an operation, Associated ships may he ordered to set
watch on a common wave to allow direct commimicatlon
between them.
CODES AND CYPHERS.
84. The following are in force now or will be
distributed and brought into force when available :-
(a) A cypher for use between Flag Officers afloat
and ashore and Senior Officers Commanding Ports,
etc. (Dutch ENIGKA at present in use, with
very limited distribution. A British cypher
is being distributed now and will be brought
into force about the end of May 1941).
(b) A cypher for use betv/een all ships and shore
authorities (In production in England now).
(c) A code (with low degree of security) for use
between all ships and shore authorities. It
also contains Self Evident Code for use bet\T8on
ships and aircraft. (Distributed and ready
to be brought into force nov/),
(d) A code for use between ground stations and
aircraft or ships and aircraft (in production
in Far East now).
(e) A book of Call Signs (in course of distribution
now),
(f) Recognition signals for use between ships,
aircraft and signal stations at defended ports
(distributed and ready to be brought into
force nov/),
85. In addition to the above the following books are
distributed and in force in the Par East for use between
British and Dutch ships and aircraft :-
(a) Code as in 84(c),
(b) Call signs as in 84(e)
(c) Rocogniticn signals as in 84(f).
CONFERENCE OF SIGNAL OFFICERS.
86. A further conference of Communication Officers
will be required and will probably be convened by
Commander-in-Chief, China, about the end of May,
/ ( con,td. ) ....
1580 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MOST SECRET.
A.D.B.
Pace 29.
AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH
COJIVERSATIONS,
APRIL 1941.
APPENDIX I.
LIST OP INITIAL DISPOSITIONS ;.ND FUNCTIONS OF NAVAL FORGES.
SHIP
BASE
FUNCTION
(a) Brit! 3h Commonwealth Forces - East Indies Station*
OLASGOW
r;.nciii
cartil'.ge
icanimbla
Durban
Cover to shipping from Cape
Area tlirough Mozambique
Channel.
SHROPSHIRE
ENTERPRIESE
HERMLS (or
EAGLE)
4 HUNTS (If
availablo)
Seychelles
Ifoobasa
Cover to shipping from N, end
Mazambique Channel towards
Maldives area.
Reconnaissance over Saya de
Malhp. area.
Escort of troop and supply
convoys as required.
1 Cruiser
2 A/S Sloops
Maldives
Cover to shipping to westward
of Maldives to Ceylon.
Escort of troop and supply
convoys in this .area as
necessary.
mERALD
COLOMBO
EAGLE (if
available)
2 A/S Sloops
Colombo
Cover to shipping in Ceylon
area and to eastward.
Escort of troop and supply
convoys to and frow Bay of
Bengal and Arabian Sea as
requisite.
CERES
CAPETOWN
Trlncomalee
Madras.
Calcutta
Cover of shipping in Bay of
Bengal.
Escort of troop and supply
convoys from Indian ports as
requisite in c njunction v;ith
China cruisers operating from
Penang area.
CALEDON
HECTOR
ANTENOR
Bombay
Cover of shipping in •'^rabian Sea.
Escort of troop and supply
convoys Bombay-Aden, Bombay -
Colombo as requisite.
RENO'.-iTI
ARX ROYAL
5 destroyers
(Force "H")
Trincomalee
General cover to route Seychelles
to Aden.
Escort of troop convoys Frem-
antlc - Colombo and onward as
necessary. Escort or cover
of troop convoys in Bay of
Bengal as requisi1*e.
Destroyers A/S protection of
Force H in terminal areas.
^ / (cont) ....
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
MOST SECRET.
A.D.B.
Page 36.
1581
AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CO^rVSRSATIONS^
APRIL 1941.
APPEITDIX I. (cont).
SIIIP I BASE I
(a) British Connonwcalth Forces
PUIICTION
East Indies Station
SE/tBELLE
FALMOUTH
3 R.I.N.
Sloops.
(continued.)
Bahrein
Basra
Khor Kuv/ai
Protection of shipping in
Persian Gulf.
Patrol of Straits cf Ormuz.
3 Sloops
Aden
Suez
Protection of shipping in Rod
Sea. Patrol and convoy cover
in Perim Strait.
(b) British Comnonwealth Forces - China Stati:n.
DAUNTLESS
DURBAN
DANAE
Singapore
and
Penang
Protection of shipping in
Ilalacca Straits and tc
westwa rd.
(c) British Comnonwealth Forces - Australian Station.
AUSTR.^J.IA
CANBERR/i
Operating in
and from S.\7
Pacific.
Act as Hunting Force in
Indian Ocean or S\l Pacific.
Escort of troop convoys to
Middle East as far as
Frenantle.
Escort of supplies Frenantle
to Malaya.
2 6 -inch
cruisers.
Operating in
S.W, Pacific.
Act as Htmting Force in S.TrT,
Pacific.
Escort trans-Tasnan convoys.
Escort trcop convoys to
Tulagi and Vila.
Provide cover for supplies
to islands in S.W. Pacific.
1 6-inch
cruiser.
Note:
Operate in Escort trcop convoys to /mbon
N. Australian and Koopang.
waters. ^ i Escort reinforcements to
Singapore. (T'^.en to be at
I disposition of C-in-C C.iina).
Cruisers in the Tasnan Sea v.'ill provide a
degree of cQver for the east coast trade.
ADELAIDE © Escort westbound shipping from
MTiNOORA nelbourne Melbourne and 'idelaide to
'^STRALIA Frenantle and/or point of
dispersal for independent
route Ing.
© ADELAIDE - effectiveness considered to be that
of an A.M.C. only*
/ (contd. )
1582 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MOST SECRET.
Pace 31 .
AMERICAN - DU TCH - BRITISH CONVSRSATIOIIS ,
APRIL 1541.
APPENDIX I.(cont).
SHIP
BASE
FUNCTION
(d) British
T
Connonwealth Forces - New Zealand Station,
ACHIT.T.ES
LE.ljn)ER
MONOWAI
Auckland
(1) Bscort of troop convoy.
(2) Protection of eastbound
shipping (N.Z. - Panama)
within focal area.
(3) Protection of N.Z.-PlJl-
Vancouvcr convoys. In
focal afea.
(4) Troop movements In
Pacific Islands,
(5) General defence of
territory and shlppins
on New Zealand Station.
= = sr = s = = s: = = :=:j
============================s
(o) Dutch Naval Forces in
Netherlands East Indies.
JAVA
2 destroyers
Sourabaya
Under orders of Corunander-in-
Chlcf, China.
Escort of important convoys.
DE RUYTER
TOOIIP
4 destroyers
6 submarines
Sourabaya
Defence of strr.its and pass-
agccs In N.E.I. , and
general action against enemy
forces In U.S. I. vvaters.
3 submarines
Soiirabaya
Local defence of Sourabaya.
2 submarines
As requisite
Available for offensive
action In S.China Sea south
of line Cape Padaran-Kudat
under C-in-C, China.
sassssssBsass:
s=====s==ss==s:
==r=rrs==B=ssB==rB=B===s=rsBS
(f) United Stat
es Asiatic Fleet.
HOUSTON
MARBLEHE/iD
13 destroyers
(1200-ton
cla^s)
Singapore
Under orders of Comnander-
in-Chief, China.
(1) To attack enemy naval
forces and sea commun-
ications.
(2)*To escort Important
ccjnvoys.
17 submarines
Manila
Under orders of Commander-
in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet.
(1) Defence of Phillpplnos,
(2) Attack on enemy naval
forces and sea commun-
ications.
saa:ss««Ba«ss=d
bbsbsssss'sbssbJ
================= =====3=====
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1559
MQST SECnST. A.D.D.
Page 8.
^'^ miL 1941. *•
II - suiauny o? situation.
5. The war situation is that obtaining on the 20th
April, 1941.
6. The Associated Pov;ers are convinced that any .
action acainst one is of vital importance for the others.
7. JAPAN'S object is ascumod to be to obtain
conplete political and econonio domination of South Sast
Asia and the islands in the Par Zast Area in order to
secure control for herself of the sources of vital war
supplies.
8. Ilnowledco by Japan tiiat a^gressicn by her against ^
one of the Associated Pov/ers would Icunediately lead to f
iinited resistance by all ini;3ht prevent v;ar.
9. In spite of the sir]:nin3 of a Non-A^cression Pact
between Russia and Japan, it ic ccnciclered that the
Japanese will not feci relieved of responsibility for
maintaining considerable forces in the North to guard
against the possibility of a change of policy by "ussia.
Tlie signing of a IJon-Ag^^ression Pact betv;ecn Germany and
Russia lias not led to the grov/th of jnutual trust betv/een
these countries,
10. The influence of China is likely to be
considerable. The Russians declare that they are not
reducing their military support to China, lyothing could
give Chinese resistance more encouragement than if the
Associated Pov/ers went to war with Japan.
Considerable progress has already beon made in
organising British assistance to C'lina. A ssheme for
the operation of Air Forces and Guerilla s con tro ll -d and
advised by the British is already well advanced In the
planning stage.
COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO JAPAN.
11. To achieve her object Japan must assvune the
offensive; she can la\anch attacks against any of the
following: -
(a) S'he Philippines and/or Hong Kong.
(b) Malaya, direct or via Thailand.
(c) Btima, via Thailand and Indo-Chlna,
(d) Borneo or the Northern line of Netherlands
East Indies.
(ei Sea comnunlcatlons in all areas, (including
the establishment of advanced bases).
/ (contd. ).
79716 O— 46— j»t. 15 11
1560 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
PasG 9.
AtlERICAN - DUTCH - BRIT-ISII CONVSRS ATIONS.
APftIL 1941.
II - SUIffiLIRY OF SITUATION (contd. )
12. Attacks on :-
(a) The Southern line of Netherlands East Indies
(Java - Sunatra) and
(b) Australia and New Zealand - l/}^ldl H^f^^*^
are ruled out as initial operations. .^'t.^ "i-^ j.,--i.'U' ^ .-t.
Attack on the Philippines and/or Hong Kong.
13. This would ollninate a serious tlireat to the
flank of further Japanese expeditions to the Southward.
All the other possible lines of attack would be hampered
by an active United States naval and air base at Manila.
It v/ould also be the nearest objective to
Japan and so easiest to cover as regards air support and
lines of conaunlcations. If successful, the attack
would provide useful bases from which further expeditions
could bo launched.
Tlic disadvantage to the Japanese of an attack
on the Philippines is that the economic resources of the
}y>^''\ islands arc of comparatively little value for war purposes,
e^ so that it would be primarily a strategical move towards
Japan's main object.
An attack on the Philippines might well bo
combined with an attack on Hong Kong on similar
principles.
Attack on Malaya.
14. An attack on i!alaya via Thailand v/ould have
to be made in two stages :-
(a) Political domination which would give some
indication of intention;
(b) Military occupation which would take time and
would provide an opport\mity of forestalling
action in the Kra Isthmus.
On the other hand, attack by direct landing
on the East coast of the I-'alay Peninsula could be
undertaken without preliminary warning, but requires
a greater degree of control of the sea and air
comnunications .
15. It must be obvious to Japan that the forces
available for the defence of Malaya have been greatly
reinforced during the last six months, and an attack on
them Is becoming a much more formidable proposition than
it was In October, even taking into account only the
British forces available on the spot. Either line of
jattack. If undertaken before the reduction of Hong Kong
and Manila, involves a long and precarious line of
commvinlcations .
/ ( contd* ) •....«.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1561
HOST. SBCBSI, A.D.B.
FaQo la
/JJERIC/JJ .■ DTTTCH > BRITISH COITVER SAT IONS.
' ■ A.PPTT. 1 QAT ,. , . ,«
APRIL 1941/
II - SUt^IARY OF SITUATION ( contd, )
Attack on Buma.
16. Attack on Burma only bcccoes a possibility
after occupation of Indo-Chlna and Thailand and prior
indication of Japanese intention would be available.
Even after occupation of Thailand the routes to Burma
aro so poor that they severely linit the size of forces
available to attack Burma. The great advantage to
Japan would be the cutting of communications between
Biuna and China, which would have a disastrous effect
upon Chinese resistance. It would also cut the air
route between India and Malaya except for Ions ronco
aircraft.
The principal threat to Burma and Eastern
India would bo of air bombardment on oil refineries and
docks at Rangoon and possibly on vulnerable points in
Eastern India (Digbol, Calcutta, Tatanagar),
Although the immediate economic gains to
Japan of en occupation of Burma v;ould be negligible, ?
the denial of Burma's resources to us would be serious. '
Attack on Borneo or the Northern Line of Netherlands
iiCLSt Indies.
17. Although Kanlla and Hong Kong are on the
flanks of the line of communications of Japan, an
attack launched from an advanced base such as Kamranh
Bay or Pelew on Borneo would facilitate the subsequent
reduction of the Philippines, provide a base for air
attack on Singapore, and assist further Southward
advance. It might also establish control of vifal
sources of oil supplies. An attack on other points
in the Horthefn line of the Netherlands East Indies
would provide useful subsidiary bases for further
expeditions.
The possibility of attack on the oil fields
by landing operations In conjunction v/lth parachute
troops cannot be overlooked and is being provided against.
Attack on Sea Communicr.tlons.
18. Attack on sea communications will certainly ^ .
form part of ajij"- Japanese plan of action and may ' /- )
constitute a ^lost serious threat to the war effort or (^^I'j
the Associated Powers. In spite of the Influence >of
the United States Pacific Fleet, Japan's lo"al naydl
superiority in the Eastern Theatre (paragraph 34j places
her in a position to devote a limited number oTcruisers
and submarines. In addition to a considerable number of
armed merchant raiders, to attack on sea commvmications
in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. Though the distances
involved are considerable, they present no greater
difficulties than those confronting Germany in operating
raiders in the same areas. The problem for the Japanese
»»»« ■ nn^^ a l^ mM-trt hhn u^p, nf Isnlnt-.od harbOUTS
T
1562 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOB ATTACK
MOST sucnzrr. a.d.3.
P^GQ 11.
/JERICA'J - DUTCH - Br .IT IGI-I CCITVZn GATIQ!:S,
AF^nnsiT:
II - ZmZ'JiRY 07 SITUATION (ccntd. )
fuGlllnc basos, and also with tho passage cf Japanese
ships thjrough the straits and narrows of the Iletherlands
East Indies.
19, The Associated Powers nust therefore be
prepared for a greatly increased and sustained scale cf
attack on their sea connunicr.tlons in the Dastorn Theatre,
includinc attacl: by arr.icd nercliant raiders and a liiiited
number of cruisers and submarines, operating singly or
in ccinpany. This v;ill be concerterl with attachs by
Gcman raiders.
20. Active operations by the United States Pacific
Fleot against Japanese bases in the Tlarshall and Carcllne
Islands riay have the effect of considerably reducing the
scale of attacl: on sea comriunicr tlens in the Seuthern
Pacific, at least as regards v/arshlps.
r.Ei'iiRKS ON PosriDLi; JAPAunsE cclt.:es o? actio:t.
21, Until the forces, particularly subnarlne and
air, maintained in the Philippines, are eliminated,
Japan v.-ould be taking great risks in launching csi attack
either V/est cf then on I'alaya or the lletherlcjids Eart
Indies, or Eart of them on the !:etherlands East Indies
or Australia and Ilev; Zealand,
22, The questicn whether Japan is In a position to
laiinch two or more sea-borne attacks simultanocusly is
influenced by the following factors :-
(a) Japan net established in South Indo-China and
Bangkok area-,
(b) Japan established in £_uth Indo-China and
Bangkok area.
23, Under the conditions of 22(a) all Japanese
forces attacking "alaj'-a must be ncved by sea. The
Japanese i,can never afford to ignore the needs of homo
defence against thxC Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, '..lillG
maintaining in Hone waters a force slightly inferior to
the U.S.A. Fleets sh.e can just provide sufficient coverlnc
end escort forces to protect }ier first oxpeditl-n against
snail scale raids by surface craft and subr.iarincs. For
the passage of subsequent expeditions the same warships
could be used but escorts of supply sh^lps would be
additional cotnnltmcnts. In ccnsoquonce, alnultaneous
attacks on more than one of the objectives described
in paragraph 11 can only be undertaken if the Japanese
accept groat risks,
/ (contd. }
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1563
MOST G::cn2T. a.d.b.
AI.tERICA?f - DUTCH - Dr.ITISII COITVSRSATIONS,
AP^.IL, 15417 ^
II - STJiaVJtY or SITUATION (contd.J
24. Undor the conditions of 22(b), the risks
attendant on simultaneous attacks en any two of these
would be reduGod.
25. If it is clear to Japan that the united , forces
of the British Empire, the United States and the Dutch
would neet accression on her part, her imnediate
intervention In the war is unlikely, Tlie only aitur.tlcn
which would be likely to appeal tc her as offering
outstandinc chances would be such a dotorioraticn in our
position In Europe that it appeared probable that all
United States and British effort v/oiild have tc be
concentrated in that theatre for a considerable tlno.
On the other hand, such is the national psycholocy of t!io
Japanese that acts of hysteria which rilr;ht lead to the
plunging of Japan into war nust bo faced. It is for
this reason in particular that it is necessary for
combined plans to bo made by the Associated Powers to
neet tlireats to their Interests which nay occuy at very
short notice.
/ (contd. )
1564 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
P8ge 13.
AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH CX3NVERSATI0NS.
APRIL 1941 ~
III - NECESSITY FOR- COLLECTIVE ACTION.
26. Our collective military strength can only be
developed fully if our Governments agree to act together,
should any of them judge that the Japanese have taken
action which necessitated active military counter-action.
It is agreed that any of the following actions hy Japan
ffovild create a position in which our failure to take active
military counter-action would place us at such military
disadvantage, should Japan subseq.uently attack, that we
should then advise our respective Governments to authorise
such action :-
(a) A direct act of war "by Japanese armed forces
against the Territory or Mandated Territory of any
of the Associated Powers. It is not possible to
define accurately what would constitute "a
direct act of war". It is possible for a minor
incident to occur which, although technically an
act of war, could be resolved by diplomatic
action. It is recognised that the decision as to
whether such an incident is an act of war must
lie with the Government concerned.
(b) The movement of the Japanese forces into any part
of Thailand to the West of 100° East or to the
South of 10° North.
(c) The* movement of a large number of Japanese warships,
or of a convoy of merchant ships escorted by
Japanese warships, which from its position and
course was clearly directed upon the Philippine
Islands, the East coast of the Isthmus of Kra or
the East coast of Malaya, or had crossed the
parallel of 6° North between Malaya and the
Philippines, a line from the Gulf of Davao to
Walgeo Island, or the Equator East of Waigeo.
(d) The movement of Japanese forcfes into Portuguese
Timor.
(e) The movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia
or the Loyalty Islands.
97. The Conference recommends that steps should be
taken to evolve a satisfactory procedure to ensure immediate
decision to take counter-measures. This applies particularly
to 26 (c) above.
i
/ (contd.)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1565
MOST SECRET . A.D.B.
Page 14
AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH COjJVERSATIOHS .
APRIL 1941.
IV - ACTION OPEH TO Tlffl ASSuCIATED POWERS .
28. To ensure that we are not diverted from the
major object of the defeat of Germany and Italy, oiir
main strategy in the Far East at the present time must
be defensible. There, ere, however, certain measures
open to us which will assist -reatly in the defence of
oxiT Interests in the Far East, but which ar\^ theraselwes
offensive.
29. It is important to organise sir operations
egeinat Japanese occupied territory and against Japan
herself. It is probable that her collapse will occur
as a result of economic blockade, naval pressure and
air bombardment. This latter form of pressure is the
moat direct and one which Japan particularly fears.
In addition to the defensive value of
operation sulwnarine and air forces from Luzon, referred
to in para. 21 above there is even greater value from
the offensive point of view in holding this island.
It is therefore recomnended that the defences of Luzon
should be strengthened and that every effort should be
made to maintain a bombing force in the island in
addition to building up a similar force in China.
30. Other positive activities which may be
undertaken are as follows: -
(a) Support to the Chinese Regular Forces by
financial aid and provision of equipment.
(b) Operation of Guerillas in China.
(c) Organisation of subversive activities in
Japan.
31. So far as economic pressure is concerned, the
entry of the United States of America, the British
Empire, and the Netherlands East Indies into a war
against Jopan would automatically restrict Japanese
trade to that with the coast of Asia. Since China will
be in the war against her, and ovir submarine and air
forces should be able to interfere considerably with
trade fiwa Thailand and Indo-China, a vei'y large measure
of economic blockade would thus be forced upon Japan from
the outset.
(contd) ,
1566 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MOST SECRET. A.D.B.
Page 15.
AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH OOITVERSATT ONS .
APRIL 194r7
V - COMMAND.
32. The following arrangements are auTaject to the
right of any of the Governments of the Associated Powers
or British Dominions to withdraw or withold its forces,
provided that prior infomation of such an intention is
passed to the Strategic Commander concerned.
83. The United States will undertake reaponsitoility
for strategic direction of its own and British Forces in
the Pacific area, together with Islands therein contained
and adjacent continental land areas. The_Paciric Area is
defined as area North of 30° North and West "of 140° East:
North of Equator and East of 140° East; South of Equator
and East of 180 to South American coast and 74° West. The
United States will support British Naval Forces in regions
South of Equator as far West as 155° East. The Far Eastern
Area is defined as area from coast of China In 30 North,
Ea8~t to 140° East, thence South to Equator, thence East to
141 East, thence South to "boundary between British and
Dutch New Ouinea on South coast thence Westward to -11°
South, 120° East, thence South to 13° South, thence West to
92° East, thence North to 20° North, thenoe to houndaiy
"between India and Burma.
34. For the purposes of this report the term "Eastern
Theatre" is used to indicate the whole Sea area included in
the East Indies, China, Australia and New Zealand British
naval stations except parts Included in the Pacific Area as
defined in the preceding paragraph.
NAVAL FORCES.
35. In order to attain greater flexibility and
economy in the employment of naval forces in the Eastern
Theatre, it is recommended that the British Cortraander-ln-
Chlef , China Station, should exercise unified ati'ateglcal
direction over all naval forces , excluding those employed
solely on local defence, or operating under Ccmmander-inf-
Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet.
This direction would Include movements of warships
from any part of the area to that point whero the
Comraander-ln-Chlef , China, considers they can test be
employed.
Ir. exercising this direction the Commander-in-
Chief, China, must be fully acquainted with the operations
being carried out from day to day in all areas concerned;
and he will decide which of the regional operations must be
modified in order to deal with a more dangerous situation
elsewhere.
While the Commander-in-Chief, China, will thus
direct the dispositions of naval forces throughout the area
and the general plan for their employment, the Commander-in-
Ohlef of each station would retain full operational jonmand
of forces within that station.
/ (contd. ) ,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1583
MOST SECRET.
A.D.B.
Page 32
AtlERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH COI'ryZRSATIOKS,
APftIL 1941.
APPEiroiX II.
SYSTEM OF AIR REIITFORCSLIENT.
It Is intended that the s^em of air
relnforcemont shall confom to the following General
principles :-
(a) If any reinforcing squadrons are ordered to
proceed to the Philippines in the event of the /
main attack falling on those islands, they will
be found from the Netherlands East Indies
squadrons mentioned in paragraph 74. Such
squadrons will be replaced in the Netherlands
East Indies from Malaya.
(b) If the main attack falls on the Netherlands
East Indies the Malayan squadrons will proceed
to Borneo; initially 2 to Sinkawang II, and
2 to Samarinda II,
(c) If the main attack falls on Malaya, the
Netherlands East Indies (B) and (F) squadrons
will proceed to Malaya.
(d) If the circumstances occur when the evacuation
of air forces from LU20N is required the United
States (F) and (B) Squadrons will proceed tc v
Samarinda II in Borneo, initially for operations
under control of the Dutch Command, The Flying
Boats will proceed to Eingapcre for operations
under the control of the British Commander-in-
Chief, China Station,
(e) The Australian (B) Squadrons v/111 be prepared to
operate as a striking force from /jnbon as soon
as possible after war breaks cut. '"(laen not
required for striking force duties, they will
be based on Darwin for reconnaissance and
striking duties in the Darwin - Timor areas,
Australian land force detachments will proceed
to /unbon and Timor to reinforce the Dutch
garrison at /jubon and to take over military
control of Dutch Timor,
1584 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MOST SECRET . A.D.B.
Page 33»
AKERICM - DUTCH " BRITISH CONVERSATIONS .
APRIL 1941 :
APPEHDIX III .
LISy OF LIAISON OFFICERS Alff) OBSERVERS .
UNITED STATES PACIFIC l-'LEET .
British Observers U.S.S. lYEST VIROIHIA
U.S. 3. BOISE
U.S.S. STERREl'T
Coimnender C.R.L.
Ferry, R.N.
Lieutenent CODomclr.
C.C. Marten, R.N.
Lieutenant Commdr,
Hon. D.C. Cairns ,R.N.
MANILA .
Dutoh Observer.
British Naval Liaison Officer
British Air Liaison Officer
Australia Naval Liaison Officer
Australia Air Liaison Officer
SINGAPORE .
United States of America Naval
Observer
United States of America Army
Observer
Dutch Hswal Liaison Offioor
Dutch Mllltax^OiiQlsoSiOfCioer
New Zealand Liaison Officers
AUSTliALIA .
United States Naval Attache
United States Navel Observer
(Darwin)
Dutch Naval Liaison Officer
New Zealand Liaison Officer
HEW ZEALAND .
United States Naval Observer
COLOMBO .
United States Naval Observer
Commander H.D. Lindner,
R.N.N.
Commander J.B. Heath,
R.N.
Squadron Leader
Watkins, R.A.F.
Commander V.E,
Kennedy, R.A.N.
V/in^ Commander
Thomas, R.A.A.F.
Captain A.M.R. Allen,
U.S.N.
Lieutenent Colonel
F.G. Brink, U.S.A.
Captai&.L.O.L. Van...^er Kun,
^ lioior J.E.J, Wegner.
Group CaptQio L. Dorvftll,
> ^H.Gi,,.R.A.F. .
Cco.;ruidor K.K,H,
St, Aubyn, D. 3.C. , R.N.
Commander L.D. Causey,
U.S.N.
Commander M. Collins,
U.S.N.
Cotmnender G.B. Salm,
R.N.N.
Group Captain T. Wilkes,
R.N.Z.A.F.
Commander Oldlng, U.S.N.
Conmander H.M. Lamners,
U.S.N.
EXHIBITS or JOINT COMMITTEE 1585
EXHIBIT NO. 51
The Joint Board,
Joint Planning Committee,
Washington, August 12, lOJfl.
J. B. No. 325 (Serial 717)
Secret
From : The Joint Planning Committee,
To : The Joint Board.
Subject: Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2 (Short
Title— ABC-22).
Enclosure: (A) Subject Plan (draft of 28 July 1941) with permanent Joint
Board on Defense letter of transmittal, dated : Montreal, 30th
July, 1941.
The subject plan, which was prepared in collaboration with the War Plans
Divisions of the War and Navy Departments, is transmitted herewith with recom-
mendation that it be approved.
(Signed) L. T. Gerow
^ L. T. Gerow,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army.
(Signed) C. J. Moore
C. J. Moore,
Captain, U. S. Nary.
1586 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
J. B. No. 325 (Serial 717) Secret
Canada — United States of America — Permanent Joint Board on Defence
Office of the Secretary
East Block Parliament Buildings
Ottawa
Montreal, 30 th July, IBJ^l.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
The Chief of Staff, United States Army
The Chief of Naval Staff, Canada
The Chief of the General Staff, Canada
The Chief of the Air Staff, Canada
There is submitted lierewith a copy, of Joint Canadian-United States Basic
Defence Plan No. 2 (short title ABC-22) prepared by the Service members of
the Permanent Joint Board en Defence.
(Sgd) S. D. Embick
S. D. Embick,
Major-General, U. 8. Army.
(Sgd) H. W. Hill
H. W. Hill,
Captain, U. 8. Navy.
(Sgd) Forrest Sherman
Forrest Sherman,
Commander, U. 8. Navy.
(Sgd) Clayton Bissell
Clayton Bissell,
Lieut. -Colonel, U. 8. Army.
(Sgd) F. L. Houghton
F. L. Houghton,
Captain, R. C. N.
(Sgd) Maurice Pope
M. A. Pope,
Brigadier.
(Sgd) A. A. L. Cuffe
A. A. L. CUFFB,
Air Commodore, R. C. A. F.
SECRET
U. S. Registered Copy No. 34
[1] J. B. No. 325 (Serial 717)
This Draft includes corrections made up to 28 July 1941. •
Joint Canadian-United States Basic DeIfense Plan No. 2
(Short Title ABC-22)
section 1 — PURPOSE OF THIS PLAN
1. There has been submitted to the Government of the United States and to His
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom a report of Staff Conversations
held in Washington from January 29, 1941 to March 27, 1941. The United King-
dom Government has referred this report to the Canadian Government for their
concurrence. The report, which bears the sliort title "ABC-1", includes a United
States-British Commonwealth Joint Basic War Plan.
2. ABC-1 assumes that joint agreements between Canada and the United States
for common action in war under the concepts of ABC-1 will conform generally to
the agreements reached in the United States-British Staff Conversations. This
plan is intended to supplement those agreements, and to provide for the most
effective use of Canadian and United States Forces for the purposes listed in
paragraph 3, sliould the United States and the British Commonwealth be as-
sociated in a war against Germany and her allies.
3. Under such circumstances, cooperative action by Canadian and United State*
Forces will be required primarily for purposes connected with :
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1587
(a) the protection of overseas shipping within the northern portions of
the Western Atlantic and Pacific Areas;
(b) the protection of sea connnunications within the coastal zones ;
(c) the defense of Alaska, CJanada, Newfoundland, (which includes Lab-
rador) and the northern portion of the United States.
4. The coastal zones are the whole area of the navigable waters adjacent to
the seacoast and extend seaward to include the coastwise sea lanes and focal
points of shipping approaching and departing from the coa«t.
[2] SECTION II — SPECIAL PROVISIONS
5. Except as otherwise provided herein, the assumptions,, concept and other
provisions of ABC-1, where applicable, shall form a part of this plan.
6. Coordination of the military effort of the United States and Canada shall
be effected by mutual cooperation, and by assigning to the forces of each nation
tasks for whose execution such forces shall be primarily responsible. These tasks
may be assigned in Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plans, or by
agreement between the Chiefs of Staff concerned, the United States Chief of Naval
Operations being considered as such.
7. In effecting nmtual cooperation, as provided in paragraph 6, the forces of
one nation will, to their utmost capacity, support the appropriate forces of the
other nation.
8. Each nation shall retain the strategic direction and command of its own
forces, except as hereinafter provided.
9. A unified command may, if circumstances so require, be established over
United States and Canadian forces operation in any area or areas, or for par-
ticular United States and Canadian forces operating for a common purpose :
(a) when agreed upon by the Chiefs of Staff concerned ; or
(b) when the commanders of the Canadian and United States forces con-
cerned agree that the situation required the exercise of unity of command,
and further agree as to the Service that shall exercise such command. All
such mutual agreements shall be subject to confirmation by the Chiefs of
Staff concerned, but this provision shall not prevent the immediate estab-
lishment of unity of command in cases of emergency.
10. Unity of command, when established, vests in one commander the respon-
sibility and authority to coordinate the operations of the participating forces of
both nations by the setting up of task forces, the assignment of tasks, the desig-
nation of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control as the com-
mander deems necessary to ensure the success of the oi)erations. Unity of com-
mand does not authorize a commander <^xercising it to control the administra-
tion and discipline of the forces of the nation of which he is not an officer, nor to
issue any instructions to such forces beyond those necessary for effective coordi-
nation. In no case shall a commander of a unified force move naval [3]
forces of the other nation from the North Atlantic or the North Pacific Ocean,
nor move land or air forces under his command from the adjacent land areas,
without authorization by the Chief of Staff concerned.
11. The assignment of an area to one nation shall not be construed as restrict-
ing the forces of the other nation from temporarily extending appropriate opera-
tions into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.
12. For all matters requiring common action, each nation will require its com-
manders in all echelons and services, on their own initiative, to establish liaison
with and cooperate with appropriate commanders of the other nation. The prin-
cipal commanders of Canadian and United States forces who will cooperate
under this plan are as follows :
Canada United States
Commodore Commanding Newfound- Commander in Chief, United States
land Force (RCN) Atlantic Fleet, (USN)
Commanding Officer, Atlantic Coast Task Force Commanders, United
(RCN) States Atlantic Fleet (USN)
Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Commander North Atlantic Naval
Command (RCAF) Coastal Frontier (USN)
General Officer Connnanding in Chief, Commanding General Northeast De-
Atlantic Command (CA) fen se Command (USA)
Air Officer Commanding Eastern Air Commanding General, GHQ
Command (RCAF)
1588 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Canada United States
Cominanding Officer, Pacific Coast Commander in Chief, United States
(RCN) Pacific Fleet (USN)
Air Officer Commanding Western Air Task Force Commanders, United States
Command (RCAF) Pacific Fleet (USN)
Commander Pacific Northern Naval
Coastal Frontier (USN)
General Officer Commanding in Chief Commanding General Western Defense
Pacific Command (CA) Command (USA)
Air Officer Commanding Western Air
Command (RCAF)
13. Under the provisions of ABC-1 the United States will assume responsibility
for the control and protection of Associated Overseas shipping in the Western
Atlantic and Pacific Areas. Pending the establishment of effective United States
agencies the British Naval Control Service Organization will, in accordance with
ABC-1, continue in the exercise of its present functions.
14. Within the coastal zones of Canada and the United States, responsibility for
routing and protection of shipping is allocated as follows :
[4] (a) Canada will be responsible for routing and protecting coastwise
and independently routed overseas shipping within the coastal zones of
Canada and Newfoundland.
(b) The United States will be responsible for routing and protecting Asso-
ciated overseas shipping except as provided in sub-paragraph (a).
(c) The routing of shipping passing from the coastal zone of one nation into
the coastal zone of the other, will be effected in the Atlantic by agreement
between the Canadian Commanding Officer, Atlantic Coast, and the United
States Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier ; and in the Pacific
by agreement between the Canadian Commanding Officer, Pacific Coast, and
the United States Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.
15. Each nation will provide within its own territory certain base facilities for
use by the other nation. These facilities are listed in Annex II. So far as prac-
ticable, each nation will make available its own bases, harbors, and repair facili-
ties, for use by the forces of the other.
16. To facilitate common decision and action, Canada and the United States will
establish in Washington and Ottawa, respectively, officers of all Services who will
be charged with the duty of representing their own Chiefs of Staff, vis-^-vis the
appropriate Chief of Staff of the other nation. They will also arrange to assign
liaison officers where needed for effectuating direct cooperation between Com-
manders of forces in the field.
17. This plan will be placed in effect by the Chiefs of Staff of Canada and the
United States when so directed by the Canadian and United States Governments.
SECTION III — JOINT TASK OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
18. Protect the sea communications of the United States and the British Com-
monwealth, and defend the territory of Canada, Newfoundland, and the United
States, including Alaska, in order to ensure the ultimate security of Canada and
the United States.
SECTION IV — TASKS
[5] 19. The tasks set forth in this section are those which will be under-
taken Jointly by the armed forces of Canada and the United States, should the
latter enter the war. These Joint tasks are:
JOINT TASK ONE: PROTECT ASSOCIATED OVERSEAS SHIPPING IN
THE NORTHERN PORTIONS OF THE WESTERN ATLANTIC AND PA-
CIFIC AREAS.
JOINT TASK TWO: DEFEND NEWFOUNDLAND AND PROTECT ASSOCI-
ATED SEA COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN THE COASTAL ZONE.
JOINT TASK THREE: DEFEND EASTERN CANADA AND THE NORTH-
EASTERN PORTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AND PROTECT SEA COM-
MUNIC:ATI0NS WITHIN THE COASTAL ZONES.
JOINT TASK FOUR: DEFEND ALASKA AND PROTECT SEA COMMUNI-
CATIONS WITHIN THE COASTAL ZONE.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1589
JOI^T TASK FIVE: DEFEND WESTERN CANADA AND THE NORTH-
WESTERN PORTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AND PROTECT SEA COM-
MUNICATIONS WITH THE COASTAL ZONES.
20 Joint Task One: PROTECT ASSOCIATED OVERSEAS SHIPPING IN
THE NORTHERN PORTIONS OF THE WESTERN ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC
AREAS.
Canadian Tasks
All Services — Support the United States Navy in the execution of this joint
task.
United States Tasks
Army — Support Associated naval operations.
Navy — Protect overseas shipping by escorting, covering, and patrolling, as
may be appropriate, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.
21. Joint Task Two: DEFEND NEWFOUNDLAND AND PROTECT ASSOCI-
ATED SEA COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN THE COASTAL ZONE.
Canadian Tasks
Army — Defend Newfoundland, in cooperation with other Canadian and United
States Services. Cooperate in the defense of United States bases in Newfound-
land.
Navy — Protect sea communications in the coastal zone. Provide the naval
defense of St. John's and Botwood. Support the defense of Newfoundland.
[6] Cooperate with the Royal Canadian Air Force in denying Hudson
Strait to enemy forces. Assist the United States Navy in initial movements of
United States forces from the Maritime Provinces to Newfoundland.
Air Force — Defend Newfoundland in cooperation with otlier Canadian and
United States Services. Cooperate in the defense of United States bases in
Newfoundland.
United States Tasks
Army — Defend Newfoundland in cooperation with Canadian and other United
States Services. Defend Unitetl States bases. Support associated naval oper-
ations.
Navy — Support the defense of Newfoundland and its coastal zone. Patrol
Placentia Bay. Provide sea transportation for the initial movement and the
continued support of United States forces in Newfoundland.
22. Joint Task Three: DEFENQ EASTERN CANADA AND THE NORTH-
EASTERN PORTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AND PROTECT SEA COM-
MUNICATIONS WITHIN THE COASTAL ZONE.
Canadian Tasks
Army — Defend the Maritime Provinces and the Gaspe Peninsula.'
Navy — Protect sea communications in the Canadian Coastal Z3ne. Provide
the naval defense of the harbors of Gaspe, Halifax, Sydney, Shelburne, and
Saint John, N. B.
Air Force — Defend Eastern Canada. Support Associated naval operation.
United States Tasks
Army — Defend the northeastern portion of the United States. Support Asso-
ciated naval operations. Support the defense of the Maritime provinces and
the Gaspe Peninsula.
Navy — Protect sea communications in the United States Coastal Zone. Sup-
port the defense of the northeastern portion of the United States. Support the
defense of Eastern Canada and its Coastal zone.
23. Joint Task Four: DEFEND ALASKA AND PROTECT SEA COMMUNI-
CATIONS WITHIN THE COASTAL ZONE.
Canadian Tasks
Navy — Protect sea communications in the Canadian coastal zone. Assist the
United States Navy in the initial [7J movements of United States forces
between the United States and Alaska.
Air Force — Support the defense of Alaska. Support Associated naval oper-
ations.
1590 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
United States Tasks
Army — Deny the use by the enemy of sea and land bases in Alaska and the
Aleutian Islands. Defend United States military and naval bases and installa-
tions in Alaska. Support Associated naval operations.
Navy — Protect shipping in tlie United States coastal zone. Support the de-
fense of Alaska. Provide sea transportation for the initial movement and con-
tinued support of United States forces in Alaska.
24. Joint Task ii'ire— DEIFEND WESTERN CANADA AND THE NORTH-
WESTERN PORTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AND PROTECT SEA COM-
MUNICATIONS IN THE COASTAL ZONES.
Canadian Tasks
Army — Defend Western Canada. Cooperate with the United States Army
in the defense of the Straits of Juan de Fuca — I'uget Sound Area.
Navy — Provide the naval defenses of Esquimalt-Victoria, Vancouver and Prince
Rupert. Protect sea communications in the Canadian coastal zone.
Air Force — Defend Western Canada. Support military and naval operation,
particularly in the straits of Juan de Fuca — I'uget Sound Area.
United States Tasks
Army — Defend the northwestern portion of the United States. Support the
defense of Western Canada. Cooperate with Canadian forces in the defense of
the Straits of Juan de Fuca — Puget Sound Area. Support Associated naval
operations.
Navy — Protect sea communications in the United States coastal zone. Support
the defense of tlie northwestern portion of the United States. Support the
defense of Western Canada and its coastal zone.
[8] SECTION V
25. The forces estimated to be available for the operations required by this
plan are indicated in Annex I — Military Forces.
SECTION VI
26. The facilities to be provided by the two goverimients concerned for the
joint execution of this plan are indicated in Annex II — Facilities to be Provided
by Canada and the United States.
SECTION VII
27. The general communication principles outlined in Annex IV of ABC-1
shall serve as a guide for this plan, subject to such additional instructions as may
be issued from time to time by the Chiefs of Staff concerned.
[9] ANNEX I MILITARY FOECES
In view of the uncertainties which exist as to the stability of the strategic
situations in various theatres, and as to the date on which the United States
may enter the war, the strengths of forces listed below must be regarded as
subject to change in the light of the strategic situation which may exist when
the plan is placed in effect. The forces now estimated to be initially available
for the operations required by this plan as of 15 July, 1941, are :
(A) ATLANTIC
Ocean Escorts United States Atlantic Fleet
6 Battleships
5 8" Cruisers
54 Destroyers
4 Mine Sweepers (destroyer type)
54 Patrol Planes
North Atlantic Naval Coastal Force (U. S. N.)
5 Eagle Boats
3 Gunboats
4 Patrol Yachts
18 Patrol Planes
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1591
Newfoundland Force (R. C. N.) (Allocated to operate with Ocean Escorts,
V. S. Atlantic Fleet)
5 Destroyers
15 Corvettes
Atlantic Coast Command (R. C. N.)
8 Destroyers
28 Corvettes
4 Mine Sweepers
4 Magnetic Mine Sweepers
11 Armed A/S Yachts
Eastern Air Command (R. C. A. F.)
Headquarters
Maritimes
Three Bomber Reconnaissance Squadrons
One Bomber Reconnaissance Squadron (Partly Operational)
One Bomber Reconnaissance Squadron (Not Fully Equipped)
One Fighter Squadron (Partly Operational)
One General Reconnaissance School Squadron (Partly Opera-
tional )
One Operational Training Reconnaissance and Bombing Squadron
(Partly Operational)
Three Coast Artillery Cooperation Detachments
[10] Newfoundland
One Bomber Reconnaissance Squadron
Newfoundland Base Command (U. S. A.)
Force Headquarters
One Regiment Infantry (Less two battalions)
Two Batteries Coast Artillery A. A., 37 mm Gun (Reinforced)
Two Batteries Coast Artillery A. A., 90 mm Gnn (Reinforced)
Two Batteries Coast Artillery A. A., M. G. (Reinforced)
One Battery Coast Artillery, 8" RR.
One Battery Coast Artillery 155 ram Gun (Reinforced)
One Reconnaissance Squadron (Heavy)
One Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor)
Service Troops
Total Force, 5400
Northeast Defense Command (U. 8. A.)
Headquarters First Army
One Army Corps (Three Divisions)
One Division
Harbor Defense Units
4 Regiments Infantry
1 Battalion Field Artillery (Pack)
Service Troops
Total, 130,000
Antiaircraft Artillery and pursuit aviation units may be assigned
as warranted by the category of defense.
Atlantic Cotnmand, Canadian Army
Atlantic Command Headquarters 65
Maritimes 10, 508
Three Fortress Headquarters
Five Infantry Battalions
Two M. G. Battalions
Four A. A. Batteries
Four G/L Batteries
Harbor Defense Units
Service Troops
Newfoundland , 2,911
Headquarters
Two Infantry Battalions
One A. A. M. G. Battery
Two Heavy Batteries (CA)
Service Troops
General Reserve
One Infantry Division (less units overseas)
Total Force 34,630
79716 O— 46— pt. 15 1:!
1592 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[11] (B) PACIFIC
Naval Local Defense Force, Pacific Northern Naval
Coastal Frontier, (U. S. N.)
5 Destroyers
1 Eagle Boat
1 Gunboat
2 Submarines
12 Patrol Planes
Pacific} Coast Command {R. C. N.)
1 Armed Merchant Cruiser
1 Corvette
2 Armed A/S Yachts
Western Air Command (R. C. A. F.)
Headquarters
Three Bomber Reconnaissance Squadrons (Not Fully Equipped)
One Operational Training Reconnaissance Squadron
One Coast Artillery, Cooperation Detachment
Pacific Command, Canadian Army
Pacific Command Haedquarters 45
Puget Sound Area 4,180
Victoria — Esquimalt Fortress Headquarters
Headquarters Vancouver Defenses
Two Infantry Battalions and Six Platoons
One A. A. Battery
Two Search Light Batteries
Coast Defenses
Service Troops
Prince Rupert 1, 222
Headquarters Prince Rupert Defenses
One Infantry Battalion
One Search Light Battery
One Heavy Battery
General Reserve 3, 717
One Infantry Brigade
One Infantry Battalion
Total Force 9,164
Western Defense Command (V. 8. A.)
Headquarters Fourth Army
One Army Corps (Two Divisions)
One Army Corps (One Division)
Harbor Defense Units .
1 Cavalry Brigade
[12] 1 Cavalry Regiment
5 Field Artillery Battalions (75 mm Gun)
1 Infantry Regiment
2 Antitank Battalions
Service Troops
Total, 100,000.
Antiaircraft artillery and pursuit aviation units may be assigned as
warranted by the category of defense
Alaska Defense Command (U. S. A.)
3 Regiments and 3 Companies of Infantry
1 Light Tank Company
1 Composite Battalion and 1 Battery, Field Artillery
3 Regiments' and 4 Batteries of Antiairrcaf t Artillei'y
2 Battalions and 2 Batteries of Harbor Defense, Coast Artillery
1 Squadron each of pursuit, bombardment medium, bombardment
heavy, and transport aviation
1 Air Base Group
Service Troops
Total, 24,000.
[13] ANNEX II — FACILITIES TO BE PROVIDED BY CANADA AND THE tTNITED STATES
In order to provide for the joint execution of the tasks contained in this plan,
the two governments concerned have agreed to provide facilities as follows,
primarily for use by the military forces of either or both nations ;
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1593
By Canada
At the Newfoundland Airport, facilities for the operation of a composite group
(73 planes) of United States Army aircraft, and storage for 1,500,000 gallons
of aviation gasoline.
In the Botwood-Lewisporte area, storage for 1,000,000 gallons of aviation
gasoline.
In the Botwood area, shore facilities permitting the operation of one squadron
of United States Navy Patrol planes.
Land plane staging facilities at Sydney, Nova Scotia, including radio facilities.
A fighter aerodrome in the vicinity of St. Johns, N. F.
Defenses for the ports of St. Jolins, Botwood, and for other points as required.
Expansion of the aircraft operating facilities in -the Maritime Provinces to
include provisions for the early operation by the United States of one squadron
and the ultimate operation of four squadrons of naval patrol planes (48 planes).
Staging facilities for aircraft en route between Alaska and the continental
United States.
Airdromes on the north end of Vancouver Island and at Uceleulet.
Additional coast defenses at Christopher Point, B. C.
By United States
At Argentina, a defended base for the operation of two squadrons of patrol
planes (24 planes), including storage for 110,000 barrels of fuel oil and 1,800,000
gallons of aviation gasoline.
[14] Staging facilities at Stephenville for short range aircraft between
Sydney and the Newfoundland Aii-port ; these to include radio facilities.
Improvement of the Newfoundland railway and an increase in rolling stock of
5 locomotives and 100 cars to meet United States requirements.
Development of airways and other transportation facilities leading into East-
ern Canada.
Army bases at Anchorage and Fairbanks.
Land aviation facilities at Ketchikan, Yakutat, Cordova, Anchorage, Bethel,
Nome, Boundary and Big Delta.
Naval air stations at Sitka, Kodiak and Dutch Harbor and their defenses.
Airways between Ketchikan and Kodiak, and between Nome and Boundary.
Readjustment of coast defenses in Juan de Fuca Straits to coordinate with
Canadian fixed defenses at Esquimalt.
Aircraft operating facilities at Seattle, Whidby Island, Tongue Point, Aberdeen,
Bellingham, Everett, Olympia and Spokane County.
EXHIBIT NO. 52
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN
WAB DEPABTMENT AND GENERAL HEBRON
CONCEENING 194 ALEBT
Communications between War Department and General Herron concerning 1940
Alert
Date
From
To
Subject
Page'
17 June 40.-
17 June 40..
17 June 40..
18 June 40..
19 June 40..
19 June 40..
19 June40_.
21 June 40..
22 June 40..
24 June 40
[26 June 40.
(27 June 40.
AG
Herron...
Herron...
Herron _.-
AG
Herron...
Herron.. -
Herron...
Marshall-
Herron...
Marshall -
Strong
Herron...
AG
Marshall-
AG
Herron. -.
AG
Marshall-
Marshall.
Herron...
Marshall.
Strong
Marshall..
Ordering immediate alert
Acknowledging alert order
Reporting action under alert
Requesting (unds
Authorizing modification of alert
Acknowledging authorization
Reporting continuance of air precautions.
Reporting Navy not put on alert
Ordering modified alert continued
Reviewing alert developments
Requesting draft of explanation for field on why alert
called.
Submitting draft; recommending not be sent...
[Unused draft
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11]
121
13
1 Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent
pages of original exhibit.
1594 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Communications between War Department and Oerieral Herron concerning 19^0
Alert — Continued
Date
From
To
Subject
1 July 40.
8 July 40.
10 July 40
15 July 40
16 July 40
21 Aug 40.
28 Aug 40
6 Sept 40.
15 Oct 40.
Herron.. -
Herron...
Marshall -
Herron...
Marshall.
Herron...
Marshall.
Herron...
Herron...
Marshal!-.
Marshall..
Herron
Marshall-
Herron
Marshall..
Herron
Marshall..
Memo
Alert status end two weeks
Alert status end three weeks.. ._
Re transportation wear
Alert status start fifth week
Authorizing partial relaxation of alert
Alert status end two months
Inquiry on effects of alert
Reply on effects of alert
Reporting Navy resumption outer air patrol
^ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent
pages of original exhibit.
[i] Sent June 17, 1940 Number 428. WE.
Secret
June 17, 1940.
Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.
Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-
Pacific raid comma to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or
provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver
basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communica-
tion direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge.
Adams.
[2] LW
127WVY
Received at the War Department, June 17, 1940, 6 : 29 P. M.
From : Honolulu,
To : The Adjutant General.
Secret
Honolulu Number 1843. June 17th.
Receipt acknowledged your radiogram 428.
Hebron.
[S]
Received at the War Department, June 18, 1940, 4322, 737 A. M.
W 2
1140 P
From : Hawaii
To : General George C. Marshall
Secret
Number 1. June 17th.
All antiaircraft observations and security of detachments in position with
live ammunition and orders to fire on foreign planes over restricted areas and in
defense of any essential installations. Some local interest in ammunition issues
but no excitement. Navy inshore and offshore air patrols in operation.
Hekbon.
Initialed "G. C. M."
U] Received at the War Department, June 19th, 1940, 12 : 11 A. M.
46-WTJ
From: Ft. Shafter, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General.
No. 1848 June 18th. 426PM. Priority.
Secret
Following funds urgently required for local procurement of services and sup-
plies in connection with your radio 428 seventeenth ; U S and S A, three thousand
doUarg ; S F E, eighty eight thousand five hundi'ed dollars broken down as follows :
Engineer construction materials, forty eight thousand dollars ; rental of motor
vehicles and construction equipment, twenty five thousand dollars; wages, two
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1595
thousand dollars ; transportation of equipment and supplies two thousand five
hundred dollars ; Medical and Hospital treatment, one thousand dollars ; Miscel-
laneous, ten thousand dollars.
Hebron.
[5] Secret
Number 434. Sent 6-1940— MWW.
June 19, 1940.
Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. E.
Concerninjr your 1848, June 18 period You are authorized to modify gradually
measures ordered in our 428 but adequate guards on a semipermanent basis will
be maintained at all critical points period guard detachments may be rotated
at your discretion period In view of above resubmit your request for funds with
concise explanation as to their application under each appropriation subhead
period every efifort should be made to avoid publicity and to place maintenance
of alert as modified herein on strictly a training basis period Acknowledge.
Adams.
[fi] Secret
Received at the War Department, June 20, 1940, 113 A. M.
37 WTJ
From: Hawaii
To: The Ad.1utant General
Number 1849. June 19th.
Acknowledge receipt your 434 of 19th,
Hebbon.
[7]
Received at the War Department, June 20, 1940, 8 : 00 A. M.
Wl
From : Honolulu,
To : Chief of Staff.
Secret
Honolulu dumber 2. June 19th.
Tours of 19th acknowledged. Full aircraft and antiaircraft precautions will
be continued with easing in other lines. Local publicity on maneuvers favorable
and not excited.
Hesbon.
m
Received at the War Department, June 21, 1940, 8 : 47 P. M.
W-27.
From: Fort Shafter, T. H.
To : Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
Number 3, June 21st. Filed 2 : 00 PM
Secret
In interpreting your cable consideration is given to the fact that avy here
has nothing from Navy Department regarding Alert. Navy now tilling over
to Army inshore aerial patrol in accordance with existing local joint agree-
ment. Will not modify Army Air and Antiair Alert before Monday except on
further advice from you.
Hebbon.
[5]
Secret
June 22, 1940.
Memorandum for the Chief, War Department Message Center :
Subject: Defense Precautions.
No. 1. Sent 6-22-40 BFS
The Secretary of War directs that the following radiogratii, in the Chief of
Staff's secret code, be dispatched to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment:
"Reurad 3 June twenty-first. In view of present uncertainty instructions for
the Navy other than local Naval Forces have not been determined. Continue
1596 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
your Alert in accordance with modifications directed in War Department Number
434.
Mabshall."
Geo. V. Strong,
/s/ Gen. Strong
Brigadier General,
ml Assistant Chief of Staff.
[10] June 24, 1940.
General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff of the Army, War Department, Washington, D. C.
This is to report that the Hawaiian portion of your domain is quiet this
morning. I have just come in from seeing the dawn patrols take the air, and
the antiaircraft men roll out of their blankets at the first grey light at the
sound of the claxon and stand to their guns. The Infantry at Walter Dilling-
hams bathing beach on the North shore were standing by their guns and looking
out to sea.
I have been highly gratified by the promptness and precision with which the
planes get off the ground every morning promptly at 4 : 30. It is further en-
couraging to see the discipline and quiet eflSciency among the ground crews. It
is my belief that the Air Corps here comes on well.
A week ago today I gave the command for a surprise alert, which went off
smoothly and efficiently. In view of the disturbing state of the world I thought
that the command might as well get accuistomed to having live ammunition, but
did not realize how much this would excite the post war portion of the Army,
However, they are all quieted down now, as is the city, which buzzed for a
couple of days. Some of the young people thought that M day had come and
two or three young couples that had intended to get married this month hustled
around and did it at once just as in 1918 !
We really worked the young men for the first few days but have now eased
up so that not more than 25% of any command is on actual reconnaissance or
observation at any one time.
Our officer strength ebbs fast and we rapidly approach the day when we will
have but one officer per battery or company. However, with our "maneuver
officers" for combat and the expected Thomason Act officers to carry the adminis-
trative portion, I will have no complaint. It is, of course, unorthodox to contem-
plate using Thomason Act officers for administrative duties but the proportion of
that is heavy and the few remaining UOA] regular officers must be
released to train their companies.
Under existing War Department Directives but little use can be made of
local Reserve Officers without obvious racial discrimination. I am still con-
vinced that the discreet employment of a few orientals will have a tremendous
effect upon the mass and will rally much of the disaffected to our side. I may
soon ask to have War Department Directives entailing racial discrimination
set aside insofar as they apply to Hawaii.
In planning the M day organization of a police force to relieve the command
from guarding our hundred miles of cables we have found that the project makes
a great hit with the Plantation Managers, although they would be asked to
supply the personnel. It seems that the desirability of an increased police force
in war has been a good deal on the minds of some of the managers.
I have turned over nearly everything in the office to the Chief of Staff and
am sjjending my time with the troops, which is one of the things that I learned
from Charles Pelow Summerall and the First Division !
Tour crack that "yesterday we had time but no money and that today we
have money but no time" is good and has made a great hit in particular with the
civilians.
With warmest regards and best wishes, I am.
Sincerely,
/s/ C. D. Herron
C. D. Hebron.
Please pardon typographical error — the mail closes too soon to have this
rewritten. [Handwritten]
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1597
[11] Confidential
June 26, 1940.
Memorandum for General Strong :
It seems to me I should write to both Van Voorhis and Herron something of
what led up to our emergency radios of the other day ; that is, if you think we can
trust to Air Mall for such a confidential message. Personally, 1 think it is reason-
ably safe.
Will you have somebody make a rough draft of what I should say.
(Sgd) G. C. MxnsHALL, Chief of Staff .
[12] Secret
JxJNK 27, 1940
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff :
Subject : Defense Precautions.
1. Reference to your memorandum of June 26, with reference to writing Gen-
eral Van Voorhis and General Herron in regard to the background for our emer-
gency radios ; I am inclined to think that developments of the last 10 days, as
reflected in the press, have given both all the background necessary.
2. Another point to be considered is that air mail may be tampered with, any
reference in the matter covered in your secret code might jeopardize that code.
3. However, if you think that you should write them, I suggest that the com-
munication go by registered mail. Drafts of suggested remarks herewith.
Gex). V. Stkong,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.
Incls.
2 drafts :
1 for Gen. Van Voorhis.
1 for Gen. Herron.
[13] Secret
My Dear Hebron : You have no doubt wondered as to the alert instructions
sent to you on the 17th. Briefly, the combination of information from a number
of sources led to the deduction that recent Japanese-Russian agreement to com-
pose their difl'erences in the Far East was arrived at and so timed as to permit
Japan to undertake a trans-Pacific raid against Oahu, following the departure
of the U. S. Fleet from Hawaii.
Presumably such a raid would be in the interests of Germany and Italy, to
force the United States to pull the Fleet back to Hawaii.
Whether the information or deductions were correct I cannot say. Even if
they were, the precautions you have taken may keep us from knowing they were,
by discouraging any overt act.
In any event it would have been foolhardy not to take special precautions. The
world situation is so troubled and changing so rapidly that I think it wise for
you to keep the command definitely on its toes until I give you the "all-clear"
signal.
Best of luck.
Sincerely yours,
G. C. M.
Not used
[14] Received at the War Department, July 1, 1940, 5: 45 P. M.
W-15.
From: Honolulu, T. H.
To : Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
Honolulu Number 4. July 1st. Filed 10 : 35 AM
Secret
Alert on two weeks today. All quiet locally no ill effects on command except
cumulative hours on plane engines and impaired overhaul facilities due to move
from Fords Island.
Hebbon.
1598 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[15] Received at the War Department, July 8, 1940, 9 : 42 P. M.
W-26.
From : Honolulu, T. H.
To : Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.
Number 5, July 8th. Filed 2 : 05 PM.
Secret
Three weeks of Alert completed today with no unfavorable reaction on per-
sonnel but a good deal of wear on motor transportation. No developments in
local situation.
Hebron.
[16] Secret
No. 2. Sent July 10, 1940. BFS. July 10, 1940.
Memorandum for the Chief, War Department Message Center:
Subject : Defense Precautions.
The Secretary of War directs that the following radiogram in the Chief of
Staff's secret code, be dispatched to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment :
•'Your 5, July 8. Can you not avoid undue wear an motor transportation by
putting present Alert stations on a permanent basis without unfavorable reaction
on convenience or morale of personnel? If this meets your approval submit an
estimate for the necessary construction of temporary type. As to your shortage
of transportation it is expected that l^A-ton types will be delivered by October 1
and other types by December 1, 1940. These vehicles will be placed at ports of
embarkation and shipped as rapidly thereafter as transport space permits.
"MARSHALL.
/s/ Gen. Strong
Geo. V. Strong,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.
ml
[17] Received at the War Department, July 15, 1940, 5 : 47 P. M.
W 14
From : Honolulu,
To: Chief of Staff.
Secret
Honolulu Number 6. July 15th.
Alert entering 5th week. As now conducted is without undue »train on per-
sonnel or materiel including motors. New construction unnecessary. Navy con-
tinues cooperation by outer aerial patrol.
Hbrron.
Memorandum for the Chief, War Department Message Center :
Subject : Defense Precautions.
No. 3. Sent July 16, 1940. BFS
The Secretary of War directs that the following^ radiogram, in the Chief of
Staff's secret code, be dispatched to the Comm'anding General, Hawaiian
Department :
"Your Number 6, July 15. You are authorized, at your discretion, to relax Alert
provisions except that first, precautions against sabotage will be continued on the
basis of instant readiness and second, aerial patrol measures can be reduced to a
training status, but so arranged as to be reestablished on an Alert basis on
short notice.
"MARSHALL."
/s/ Gen. Strong,
Geo. V. Strong,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1599
[19] August 21, 1940.
General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.
My Dear General Marshall : You will be Interested to hear that the evacuation
of Ford Island proceeds on schedule and that we will be completely out oo the
agreed date. Our shops are about set up in hangers and we can get by until the
new Hickam shops are finished, although that time is several months ofif.
In addition, we seem about to complete satisfactorily our local joint agreement
with the Navy. In the original agreement concluded last winter, there were
necessarily some gaps — matters, such as the allocation of local man power, upon
which we could not then pin the Navy Down.
Admiral Bloch, who commands the 14th Naval District, is a fine, upstanding
ofllicer, always amenable to reason and never narrow-minded or stupid. However,
he is a tough guy who plays his cards closely and shamelessly picks up his oppon-
ents tricks, if the latter does not protect himself. But that kind of a game serves
its purpose of dividing up the chips before the joint is raided, and suits me ^s well
as any other kind. I think the Army has lost none of its garments to date, except
Bishop's Point. Foi-d Island ought to belong to the Navy.
Richardson is the salt of the earth and I am devoted to him.
The Reserve Officers begin to come in and to date we have 38. They are alright
and an infinite help.
We have an allotment of funds for the Supersonic Warning Service and hope
to be ready to go the day the instruments arrive, although it will be no childs
play to do the preliminary work on these mountain tops. If the system works,
it will be a major addition to our strength.
[19 A] The Alert has now been on two months. The only present measur-
able loss is in the weathering of the hundreds of miles of field wire in place, large-
ly for anti-aircraft purposes, but that is probably worth while.
I trust that you keep well and do not allow them to drain away in any day
strength that you cannot regain before the next dawn. However acute things be
now, it is not yet war !
Best wishes !
Yours as ever,
/s/ Herron
C. D. Hebron.
[20] Confidential
Washington, D. C, August 28, 1940^
Dear Hebron : I have appreciated very much your letters and notes keeping
me generally advised of the situation.
As to "the alert", what is your frank reaction? Do you think it is imposing
too heavy a tax to 'continue on the present basis? In Panama the condition is
much more different. We have had to give them about $300,000 to construct
temporary shelters for the numerous antiaircraft stations in the high hills. The
rainy season makes life under these circumstances very diflicult, but I do not
feel that we can expose ourselves to the risks of a sudden lunge from some
unexpected quarter. It is a very difficult business and I am deeply concerned
that we do not exhaust the morale of the command by heavy requirements
during what is supposed to be a period of peace, yet a failure would be
catastrophic.
Let me have your frank opinion.
Faithfully yours,
(Sgd) G. C. Marshall.
General C. D. Hebron,
Commanding Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.
[21] Confidential
Kilauia Military Camp,
Hawaii, T. H., 6 Sept. J,0.
Deab Geobge : Your note of August 28th has just reached me here, where I
have come to collect my wits and obtain a little perspective. Wish you could do
the same !
1600 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
My absolutely frank and honest opinion is that "the alert" as now carried
on here does not dull the keen edge, or exhaust morale. I think that our real
power accumulates and that now that the season of individual target practice
and instructions is about over, the maneuvers of numerous small units camped
along the beaches will build up naturally and easily the effectiveness of the alert.
The presence of the fleet here and its frequent putting to sea with absolutely
secret destinations and periods naturally eases the situation very much. As
things now are, I feel that you need not have this place on your mind at all.
The position of this place on the Army priority lists is still all right, for our
essentials can still be quickly supplied when the necessity arises. You know what
they and War Plans can refresh your mind.
Am flying back early tomorrow morning to greet Mr. Knox.
Best wishes !
C. D. Herron.
[All of above hand written.]
[22] Confidential
October 15, 1940.
Secret
The Navy has resumed the outer air patrol at 180 miles, but has not asked us to
take any measures. Having no evidence of marked change in the situation and
with an eye to the conservation of material I have not resumed the Army inner
air patrol at 40 miles, nor the putting of the pursuit planes in the air at dawn.
We now have guards on utilities and highway patrols at times when they will
be observed. There are constantly small maneuvers (company) on the beaches.
It is my guess, however, that the international situation drifts to the left and
that precautions must increase.
C. D. H.
EXHIBIT NO. 53
Correspondence Between General Marsh.kll and General Short
Date
To
Subject
Page I
7 Feb..
19 Feb.
6 Mar--
6Mar.-
13 Mar.
15Mar-
15 Mar
28 Mar.
14 Apr.
1 May.
2 May.
5 May.
15 May
29 May
3 July-.
11 July.
25 July.
19 Aug.
10 Oct.
14 Oct .
28 Oct..
Marshall..
Short
Short
Marshall..
Marshall..
Short
Short
Marshall..
Marshall..
Short
Bry den
Short
(M ar-
shall ab-
sent).
Short
Marshall..
Marshall..
Shcrt
Short
Marshall..
Short
Marshall..
Short
MarsnalL.
Marshall..
Short
Short
Emmons
(to Mar-
shain.
Short
Marshall-.
Marshall. .
Short
Short
Marshall..
Short
Marshall- .
Marshall --
Short
Marshall..
Short
Short
Marshall- .
Marshall .
Short
Advise to Short on assumption of command
Plans for Hawaiian Department
Urging air defense preparations
Expediting of AWS project requested
Short's coordination with Navy approved
Need for clearance with Interior on AWS sites
Report on mea.sures for defense from air attack
Hawaiian defense needs
Strong points & new airfield; forwarding Army-Navy
air defense plans.
Requesting funds for airfield construction
Amplifying request
Acknowledging receipt of air defense plans forwarded
H April.
Statement on projects of interest to Hawaiian Depart-
ment.
Reporting recent maneuvers ^
Recreation camp
Site for new airfield
Army-Navy mutual use of airfields; plans for Army-
Navy air exercise.
Choice of airfield site —
Missions of air units under Short's tentative SOP
Same -
Same.
Note.— Items 1. 2, 4, 5, 6, 13, 18 were classified Secret. Items 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14 were classified Confidential.
^ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent
pages of original exhibit.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1601
[J] Febeuaby 7, 1941.
Lieut. General Walter C. Short,
Fort Shaffer, Territo7'y of Haicaii.
My Dear Short : I believe you take over command today, however, the reason
for this letter is a conversation I had yesterday with Admiral Stark.
He spoke of Admiral Kimmel, the new Fleet Commander, regarding his personal
characteristics. He said Kimmel was very direct, even brusque and undiplomatic
in his approach to problems ; that he was at heart a very kindly man, though he
appeared rather rough in his methods of doing business. I gathered that he is
entirely responsive to plain speaking on the jmrt of the other fellow if there is
frankness and logic in the presentation. Stark went so far as to say that he had,
in the past personally objected to Kimmel's manners in dealing with oflBcers, but
that Kimmel was outstanding in his qualifications for command, and that this was
the opinion of the entire Navy.
I give you this as it may be helpful in your personal dealings with Admiral
Kimmel, not that I anticipate that you would be supersensitive, but rather that
you would have a full understanding of the man with whom you are to deal.
Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the deficien-
cies of Army materiel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred specifically
to planes and to antiaircraft guns. Of course the facts are as he represents them
regarding planes, and to a less serious extent regarding caliber .50 machine guns.
The 3-inch antiaircraft gun is on a better basis. What Kimmel does not realize
is that we are tragically lacking in this materiel throughout the Army, and that
Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army.
The fullest protection for the Fleet is the rather than « major consideration for
us, there can be little question about that ; but the Navy itself makes demands on
us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it diflicult for us to meet the
requirements of Hawaii. For example, as I told Stark yesterday, — he had been
pressing me heavily to get some modern antiaircraft guns in the Philippines for the
protection of Cavite, where they have collected a number of submarines as well as
the vessels of the Asiatic Fleet — at the present time we have no antiaircraft guns
for the protection of Cavite, and [2] very little for Corregidor. By unob-
trusively withdrawing 3-inch guns from regiments now in the field in active train-
ing, we had obtained 20 3-ineh guns for immediate shipment to the Philippines.
However before the shipment had been gotten under way the Navy requested 18 of
these guns for Marine battalions to be specially equipped for the defense of islands
in the Pacific. So I am left with two guns for the Philippines. This has hap-
pened time and again, and until quantity production gets well under way, we are
in a most diflScult situation in these matters.
I have not mentioned Panama, but the Naval requirements of defense there
are of immense importance, and we have not been able to provide all the guns
that are necessary, nor to set up the Air units with modern equipment. How-
ever, in this instance, we can fly the latest equipment to Panama in one day,
some of it in four hours.
You should make clear to Admiral Kimmel that we are doing everything that
is humanly possible to build up the Army defenses of the Naval overseas
installations, but we cannot perform a miracle. I arranged yesterday to ship
31 of the P36 planes to Hawaii by aircraft carrier from San Diego in about ten
days. This will give you 50 of this type of plane, deficient in speed compared
to the Japanese carrier based pursuit, and deficient in armanaent. But at
least it gives you 50 of the same type. I also arranged with Admiral Stark to
ship 50 P40-B pursuit planes about March 15th by Naval carrier from San
Diego. These planes just came into production this week and should be on a
quantity basis of about 8 a day by the first week in March.
The Japanese carrier based pursuit plane, which has recently appeared in
China, according to our information has a speed of 322 miles an hour, a very
rapid ability to climb and mounts two .20mm and two .30 cal. guns. It has
leak-proof tanks and armor. Our P40-B will have a speed of 360 miles an hour
witih two .50 cal. machine guns and four of .30 caliber. It will lack the rapidity
to climb of the Japanese plane. It will have leak-proof tanks and armor.
We have an earlier model of this plane, the P40, delivered between August
and October, but the Chief of the Air Corps opposes sending it to Hawaii because
of some engine defect which makes it unsafe for training fiights over water.
Up to the present time we have not had available a modern medium bomber or
a light bomber. This month the medium bomber will go into prodxiction. if
not quantity production. This plane has a range without bombs of 3,000 miles.
1602 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
carriers 2,000 pounds and has a speed of 320 miles an hour — a tremendous
improvement on the old B18 which you now have. It can operate with bombs
640 miles to sea, with a safe resserve against tne return trip. We plan to give
you first priority on these, planes. I am looking into the question of providing
at least a squadron of Flying Fortres planes for Hawaii.
[3] I am seeing what can be done to augment the .50 caliber machine gun
set-up, but I have no hopes for the next few months. The Navy approached
us regarding barrage balloons. We ha'^e three now under test, and 80 in proc-
ess of manufacture, and 3,000 to be procured if the President will release our
estimates. However, this provides nothing against the next few months. I
am looking into the question of possibly obtaining some from England, but
they are asking us and not giving us these days. The first test of the first forty
deliveries in June will probably be made in Hawaii.
You, of course, understand the pressures on the Department for the limited
material we have, for Alaska, for Panama, and, most canfidentiaUy for the
possible occupation of the Azores, not to mention the new leased bases. How-
ever, as I have already said, we are keeping clearly in mind that our first con-
cern is to protect the Fleet.
My impi-ession of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is
done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing
defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk
of sabotage and the risk involved in a sui*prise raid by Air and by submarine,
constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing
threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.
Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is
to protect the base and the Naval concentrations, and that purpose should be
made clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel, I accentuate this because I found
yesterday, for example, in a matter of tremendous importance, that old Army
and Navy feuds, engendered from fights over appropriations, with the usual
fallacious arguments on both sides, still persist in confusing issues of national
defense. We must be completely impersonal in these matters, at least so far
as our own nerves and irritations are concerned. Fortunately, and happily I
might say. Stark and I are on the most intimate personal basis, and that rela-
tionship has enabled us to avoid many serious diflSculties.
Faithfully yours,
[Stamped.] (Sgd.) G. C. Maesh.^lt..
[4] Feb. 19, 1941.
General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C,
Dear Genlral Marshall: I was very glad indeed to have your letter of Feb-
ruary 7th as it gave us some very definite information on aircraft we did not have.
Since assuming command, I have had two conferences with Admiral Kimmel
and two with Admiral Bloch. I have found them both most approachable
and cooperative in every way. I have told them that from my point of view there
will be no hair-splitting, but that the one thing that would affect any decision
where there is an apparent conflict between the Army and the Navy in the use of
facilities would be-the question of what could produce the greatest combined effort
of thfe two forces. They have assured me that they will take exactly the same
view. From my brief intercourse with them I feel that our relations should be
extremely cordial.
As a result of my short study of conditions here I belif <^ that the following are
of great importance and I am taking steps to carry out the necessary changes :
(1) Cooperation with the Navy.
(2) Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance and
servicing of aircraft.
(3) Improvement of the Antiaircraft defense.
(4) Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery.
(5) Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights.
(6) Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improve-
ment in roads and trails.
(7) Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and com-
munication centers.
(8) Increase in the number of Engineer troops.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1603
Cooperation with the Navy. A series of joint eomniittees consisting of Army
and Navy officers has been appointed with a view to the study of cooperation of
the Army and Navy especially with reference to employment of air and aircraft.
These committees have been directed to report on March 1st. Copy of the letter
creating these committees is attached hereto as well as copy of instructions to the
echelon commanders concerning cooperation with the Navy.
[5] Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance
and servicing of aircraft. Provision has been made for a number of emergency
fields upon the various islands but no provision has been made for dispersion
of the pjanes in the vicinity of fields and other protection by either camouflage
or by bunkers. The emergency fields on other islands will be valueless for
pursuit aviation except possibly on the Island of Molokai. The pursuit aviation
is capable of only approximately one hour's flying with the throttle wide open.
This means that the dispersion of pursuit aviation must take place upon the
Island of Oahu if it is to be able to meet an attack from any direction. The
dispersion and bimkers for the greater part of the pursuit aviation can b<? made
in the immediate vicinity of Wheeler Field by the use of ravines and bunkers.
The maintenance and repair facilities can be placed in ravines under ground
without an exorbitant cost in time or money. Tanks are now available for
the distribution of gas and we are asking for money to install tanks.
The bombers can make use of the landing fields on other islands but it will
be necessary to make provisions for their dispersion in the vicinity of those fields
and also on the Island of Oahu. Their dispersion is more difficult than that of
the pursuit. The repair and maintenance facilities require so much space that
it will be necessary, at least temporarily, to place them above ground protected
by hills. At present the only repair facilities for the bombers are in buildings
on Hickam Field which would undoubtedly be attacked by any surprise raid.
Up to the time that we make runways for dispersion of planes on all the fields
surprise enemy raids would be extremely serious.
Improvement of the Antiaircraft Defense. The major shortages in Antiair-
craft artillery armament are sixteen 3-inch or 90 m.m. antiaircraft guns (six
enroute) 135 37-mm antiaircraft guns, 236 .50 caliber machine guns and 30 sound
locators. The locators are expected in June. The shortage of personnel, how-
ever, is much more serious than the shortage in materiel. Practically all the
coast artillery units have dual roles. If they man antiaircraft artillery the
Harbor Defense Artillery will not be manned, and vice versa. To man the entire
antiaircraft artillery defense project avoiding dual asignments to all but four
Harbor Defense batteries requires an increase in the existing antiaircraft per-
sonnel as follows :
Two regiments of Coast Artillery Antiaircraft (Mobile) T-O 4-11.
One Battalion Gun Coast Artillery Antiaircraft (mobile) (less searchlight
battery) T. O. 4-15.
Approximately 90 officers and 2,000 enlisted replacements to activate three gun
batteries and three 37-mm batteries of the 64th Coast -Artillery Antiaircraft, now
inactive. With the increasing critical international situation at this time it is
urgently recommended that all reinforcements of Antiaircraft Artillery per-
sonnel, [6] both unit and individual reinforcements mentioned above,
together with the shortage in antiaircraft artillery materiel, be furnished to this
department with the least practicable delay.
These reinforcements to the antiaircraft artillery garrison, as well as those
for the Harbor Defense artillery listed below, are required to complete the ap-
proved defense project. No provision of the defense of the Kaneohe Naval Air
Station has been made in the defense project. This problem has been made the
subject of a separate letter, copy attached as Inclosure No. 4.
Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery. There are no major shortages
of equipment for Harbor Defense Artillery. However, about 150 officers and
2,700 enlisted men as individual reinforcements and one regiment. Coast Artillery
(T. D.) T. O. 4-31W are required to fully rnan the Harbor Defense Artillery,
not including the three obsolescent seacoast mortar batteries. It is urgently
requested that these replacements and reinforcements be furnished at the
earliest practicable moment.
As an accessory to the Harbor Defense Artillery, the north shore Railroad
connection is extremely important to give access to railway gun positions on
the north shore.
Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights. The only serious
shortage is in beach defense searchlights. A 24-inch carbon-arc light is under
development ; but the receipt of these lights here may be unduly delayed. This
1604 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
shortage can be overcome immediately by supplying power imits for 42 Mack 36-
inch projectors which are now on hand. The truclis and power units tor these
lights are unserviceable but the projectors are in fair to good shape.
Therje is a shortage throughout of spare parts lor 60inch searchlights, which
were requisitioned some months ago. These would be required for any pro-
longed action. Information from the Chief of Engineers indicates that they
will probably be furnished in the near future.
Provision for more rapid movements of supplies and reserves by improvement
in roads and trails. With the increase in the number of motors available in the
department it is most necessary that roads be provided to make the maximum
possible use of the motors in the movement of reserves and supplies. The Engi-
neers have made a very careful study of the roads and trails which are necessary
for the defense of the island.
There are numerous bottlenecks in the islands where it is not practicable to
construct alternate roads. It these roads are damaged by shelling or bombing
it is most important that they be repaired in tire minimum of time. To provide
for this stores of [7] repair material should be placed in close proximity
to the vital points. It is believed that the Territorial government will cooperate
with the Army in this matter, thus reducing expenses to be charged to National
Defense.
Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and communication
centers. Command Posts, communication centers and items of critical supply
should be bombproofed. This protection of Command Posts particularly should
be done immediately in order that these installations can be trained to function
in these locations before hostilities start.
Increase in the number of Engineer Troops. The protection of aircraft and
the construction of air fields will keep one regiment of engineers employed con-
stantly. The work on roads and trails would be such as to employ one General
Service Regiment constantly. The combat Engineer regiment of the Hawaiian
Division should be left available for bombproofing of Headquarters and com-
munication centers and other tactical work.
Previous recommendations for a regiment of Aviation Engineers, less 1 bat-
talion, and an Increase in enlisted strength of Third Engineers were based on
assumption that some civilian labor would be available. The situation on civilian
labor has become acute, and while it has been necessary to import skilled labor,
the recent increase in defense work is going to necessitate importing unskilled
labor as well. The only alternative would be to curtail activities of the planta-
tions and much of our defense work should not be postponed until that is done.
Communications covering all the above recommendations are being or have
been submitted to The Adjutant General The following are the titles and dates
of letters covering these subjects :
Cooperation ivith the Navy. Joint letter. HHD, 14th Naval District, 14 Febru-
ary, 1941, subject : "Army and Navy Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," copy attached,
Inclosure No. 1.
Letter, HHD to major echelon commanders, 17 February 1941, subject : "Maxi-
mum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," file 354.2/JAX, copy attached,
Inclosure No. 2.
Dispersion and protection of aircraft. Letter Engr. 452, 19 February 1941,
subject : "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft." Copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 3.
Improvement of Antiaircraft defense and of Harbor Defense Artillery. Letter
HHD to TAG, 19 February 1941, subject: "Reinforcements for Coast Artillery
Garrison, Hawaiian Department," file 320.2/55, copy attached. Inclosure No. 4.
[8] Letter, HHD to TAG, 18 February 1941, subject: "Defense of Naval
Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H." file 381, copy attached, Inclosure No. 5.
North Shore Railroad Connection. Letter, HHD Engr. 662/7, 19 February
1941, copy attached, Inclosure No. 6.
Improvement of situation with reference to searchlights.
a. Beach Defense Lights: Letter, Engr. 470.3/6 x 470.3/10. 29 January 1940
with 11 Indorsements, 11th Indorsement AG 470.3 (1-29-40) M-D, 26 August
1940. 12th Indorsement, HHD dated 18 January 1941, to TAG being transmitted,
copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 7.
b. Searchlight Parts. Letter, Engr. 470.3/8, 2 November 1940, to the Chief of
Engineers, subject : "Priority Items, Engineers Status Report, Revision, 1940."
1st Indorsement, O.. C. of E., (381.4) (Hawaii) 10^, 28 January 1941, states:
"Reference Par. 1 c, the requisition for spare parts for searchlights was concurred
in by this office. The requisition now is undergoing review by G-4 and action
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1605
is expected shortly. You will be promptly informed of the action taken." Copy
of 1st Indorsement inclosed, Inclosure No. 8.
Provision for more rapid tuovement of supplies and reserves iy improvement
in Roads and Trails. Letter, Engr. 611, 19 February 1941, subject : "Military
Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department."' Copy inclosed, Inclosure
No. 9.
Bombproofing of vital installations. Letters, Engr. 600.96, following subjects
and dates. (Copies attached) :
1. Bombproof Command Posts, Hawaiian Air Force, 4 February 1941, Inclosure
No. 10.
2. Bombproof Protection, Command Posts, Hawaiian Division, 4 February 1941,
Inclosure No. 11.
^ Bombproof Construction for Magazines at Fort Barrette and Fort Weaver,
4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 12.
4. Splinterproof Protection for Antiaircraft and Mobile Seacoast Batteries, 4 Feb-
ruary 1941, Inclosure No. 13.
5. Bombproof Command Post, Antiaircraft Groupment, 4 February 1941, Inclo-
sure No. 14.
6. Bombproof Gasoline Storage, Hawaiian Department, 5 February 1941, Inclo-
sure No. 15.
7. Bombproof Protection for Signal Installations, Hawaiian Department, 6 Feb-
ruary 1941, Inclosure No. 16.
8. Storage of Defense Reserves, Aviation Gasoline, Hawaiian Air Force, 6 Feb-
ruary 1941, Inclosure No. 17.
9. Department Command Post, Aliamanu Ci'ater, last correspondence 660.9 (S),
copy attached, Inclosure No. 18.
[9] Increase in number of Engineer Troops. Letter Engr. 322.03, 19 Feb-
ruary 1941, subject "Additional Engineer Troops", copy inclosed, Inclosure
No. 19.
Enclosures herewith are made for your ready reference and information.
Sincerely yours,
(Signed) Walter C. Short,
Walter C. Shoet,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.
19 Incls : '
[10] . March 5, 194L
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short,
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, Hawaii.
My Dkar Short: I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the
Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment
of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a
matter of first priority. General Chaney has prepared a report of recent
exercises held in the United States and incorporated therein his views and recom-
mendations based on his experience in these exercises and his observation of
the system and method employed by the British. A copy of this report is being
sent to you.
An air defense exercise is contemplated for the West Coast in the Spring.
This exercise is to include an establishment similar to that which has been set
up in the Air Defense Command exercise in the Northeast and tested during
January. It is highly desirable that representatives from Hawaii be present to
observe the details of this exercise. If this is found to be impracticable, we
will consider having officers sent to the exercise who shortly thereafter are
due for station in Hawaii.
Faithfully yours,
[Stamped] (Sgd) G. C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff.
» Omitted.
1606 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[11] Via "Clipper" Air Mail
General Geobge C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.
Dear General Marshall: One of the first projects which I investigated in
this department was the Aircraft Warning Service which I believe is vital to the
defense of these islands. At the present time the maximum distance an ap-
proaching airplane can be detected is about five miles. The radio detector equip-
ment of the Aircraft Warning Service increases this distance to one hundred
and twenty miles, and in these islands, the use of this equipment is the only
way by which the detection distance can be increased. With the present inter-
national situation it seems to me that if this equipment is to be used at all the
need for it is now here. •
The Navy is vitally interested in this project. At present with the fleet in
Hawaiian waters, there is no adequate warning service. The Commander in
Chief of the Fleet has expressed his concern about this and has communicated
this concern to the Navy Department ; as you know, the Secretary of War has
advised the Secretary of the Navy that the equipn)ent would be received in this
department some time in June and the stations be operating shortly thereafter.
I have discussed this matter with Admiral Kimmel and have assured him that
personnel would be trained and the stations in operation within thirty days after
receipt of the equipment.
All this leads up to a radiogram of 3 March 1941 just received from The Ad-
jutant General regarding the Haleakala installation. A copy of this radio and
a paraphrase of my reply are inclosed for ready reference. The Adjutant Gen-
eral's radio indicates to me that the seriousness of this situation has not yet been
appreciated in the War- Department. It lists certain restrictions regarding con-
struction, and if it is necessary to comply with these, the completion of this sta-
tion will be unduly delayed. The fixed station at the summit of Haleakala is one
of the two most important in the warning net ; its commanding location gives
it greater coverage than any of the others, and its early completion is vital. I
believe that this matter is suflSciently important to be brought to the attention of
the Secretary of War to see if permission can not be obtained from the Secretary
of the Interior to construct the Haleakala installation without the necessity
of submitting detailed plans for consideration by the National Park Service.
[12] Defense of these islands and adequate warning for the United States
Fleet is so dependent upon the eai'ly completion of this Aircraft Warning Service
that I believe all quibbling over details should be stopped at once. This project
was very thoroughly studied by a Board of officers in this department who made
several personal investigations of each one of the sites. Now that basic decisions
as to locations, tyi)es of stations, and general plans have been approved by the
War Department, I strongly recommend that this project be decentralized and
that I be authorized to give final approval to designs, layouts and other details
to expedite its completion.
Sincerely yours,
( Signed ) Walter C. Short
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, Commanding.
2 Incls : '
Radio 3 Mar 1941
Paraphrase
[IS] March 13, 1941
Lieutenant General Walteb C. Short, ^
Commanding, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shatter, T. H.
Dear Short : The progress that you are making in reaching close coordination
with local naval authorities, and so insuring a maximum degree of readiness in
your Department, is most gratifying.
Since the Navy development in Kaneohe Bay has exceeded the project originally
contemplated, I agree with you that the Army should consider assuming responsi-
bility for its defense, and meanwhile defend it within the means available.
The several letters which you have submitted to The Adjutant General request-
ing personnel, materiel and funds are being processed. To avoid delay in initiating
». Omitted.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1607
projects that may be approved, I am tentatively including $3,000,000 in the
estimates now being prepared.
Faithfully yours,
[Stamped] (Sgd) G. C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff.
[i4] Mar. 15, 1941.
Lieut, General Wai-teb, C. Shobt,
Comrflanding General, Hatoaiian Department,
For* iihafter, T. H.
Dkab GriiiRAii Short : The matters referred to in your secret letter dated March
6, 1941, a.'d the inclosures thereto, have been given careful study.
The War Department appreciates fully the necessity for the early establishment
of the aircraft warning service stations in the Hawaiian Department. However,
it will be necessary to comply with certain fixed regulations in those eases where
facilities are to be established on lands pertaining to the Department of the Inte-
rior. The National Park Service officials are willing to give us the temporary
use of their lands when other lands are not suitable for the purpose, but they will
not waive the requirements as to the submission of preliminary building plans
showing the architecture and general appearance. They are also very definitely
opposed to permitting structures of any type to be erected at such places as will be
open to view and materially alter the natural appearance of the reservation.
I have given these matters my personal attention, and have conferred with
officials of the National Park Service. War Department radiogram of March 12,
1941, outlines what appears to be the most practical solution at this time. The
War Department finds it necessary to ask the Department of the Intferior for the
use of many tracts of land in the National Parks, and for their cooperation in the
transfer of large areas of public lands. It is not believed that it would be
advisable to attempt to alter the informal decisions of the Department of the
Interior by carrying this matter to higher authority, or to prolong the discussion
through official channels.
We are as anxious as you to work out a solution for these problems with the
least practicable delay, and I know that I can count upon you for fullest co-
operation.
Faithfully yours,
[Stamped] (Signed) Wm. BRYDfcN,
In the absence of the Chief of Staff.
Distribution :
1 Chief of Staff.
[15] '15 March 1941.
General George C. Mabshall,
Chief of Staff of the Army.
War Department, Washington, D. C.
Deab General Marshall : In reply to your letter of March 5th I shall give you
a brief review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department in regard to defense
from air attack.
DISPERSION AND PROTECTION OF AIRCRAFT
The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability
of both the Army and Navy air fields to the attack. Hickam Field is the most
conspicuous target in sight and the Ford Island Navy Field is not much better.
Wheeler Field is less conspicuous only because it is in the center of the Island.
On all fields the planes have been kept lined up on the field where they would
suffer terrific loss. As I wrote you in my letter of February 19th some work has
been done towards the preparation of emergency fields on outlying islands, but
in no case has arrangements been completed for the dispersion of the planes in
the vicinity of the field or the preparation of bunkers to protect them. I asked
for money and Engineer troops to do this work. The pursuit planes must neces-
sarily be protected on the Island of Oahu on account of their limited cruising
radius.
The Navy is organizing its new landing field at Barbers Point for the use of
the carrier borne planes. They also are well along on the construction of an
air base at Kaneohe Bay to which the 5 patrol squadrons will be moved. From
their point of view this will improve the situation greatly. With the arrival
79716 O— 46 — pt. 15 14
1608 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of the additional 50 pursuit planes Wheeler Field will be so badly congested that
it will be necessary to establish another landing field. Before my arrival this
had practically been decided upon adjacent to the new Navy landing field at
Barbers Point. However, the Navy objected very strenuously to this and I
think rightly so as planes coming in or going out from either field would have to
fly over the other field and constitute a considerable element of danger. We have
located another field about four miles northeast of Schofield Barracks. I think
this is far more desirable from every point of view as we shall not be in danger
of losing planes through the action of small landing parties or of having them
damaged or of having the field put out of use by shelling from enemy ships. The
runway will be about 5,000 feet so the bombers can use it as an emergency field
should Hickam Field be out of action on account of bombing. The Observation
Squadron and the squadron of light bombers is being moved to Bellows Field in
the next few days so as to lessen the congestion at Wheeler Field.
[16] Plans have been made to provide gas and bombs at all emergency
landing fields on outlying islands and for the stationing on Kauai, Maui, and
Hawaii of the Battalions of National Guard which came from these islands for
the protection of the air fields from sabotage and small landing parties. Inci-
dentally these battalions would serve to prevent local disorders. Unless there
is an emergency these troops will not be sent to the other islands until the camp
buildings for one company have been provided at each air field. Part of each
battalion can be quartered in existing Armories on these islands usually at some
distance from the air field.
ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY
In general we have no serious shortage in 3 inch antiaircraft artillery, only
16 guns being required to complete our complement. As far as I know no provi-
sion has been made for 90-mm antiaircraft giuis. 20 out of 135 37-inm anti-
aircraft guns have been received. The exact date of the arrival of the others
is not known. We are still short 236 of .50 caliber machine guns. Perhaps the
most serious shortage is 8 long range detectors (AWS) which are supposed to
arrive in June. Our present sound locators have a range of only 4i^ miles so
they are practically useless. The new detectors will have a maximum range
of 120 miles.
The shortage of personnel is much more serious than that of equipment.
Practically all of the Coast Artillery is assigned dual roles. This means that
much of the Antiaircraft equipment would not be manned if it were essential to
man the Harbor Defense guns at the same time. To man the authorized equip-
ment would require 2 regiments of Coast Artillery (AA) (Mobile) (TO 4-11), 1
battalion, gun. Coast Artillery (AA) (Mobile) (less searchlight battery) (TO
4-15). 90 officers and 2,000 replacements to activate 3 gun batteries and 37-mm
batteries. These were covered in my letter of February 19th.
COORDINATION OF ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE
The coordination of Antiaircraft defense presents quite a different picture at
Hawaii from that existing in most places on the mainland. The island is bo
small that there would not be the same degree of warning that would exist on
the mainland. After the installation of our new detectors we shall have some
warning from the different islands and almost continuous service in the most
dangerous direction for approximately 75 miles. The pursuit aviation, how-
ever, will have to be prepared to take the air in the minimum amount of time.
On account of the congestion in the areas at Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor,
and Barbers Point, the coordination of the Army and Navy aircraft and of the
Antiaircraft Artillery presents a very serious problem. We have had a committee
of the Army and Navy working on this subject. The committee submitted its
report March 1st and it is now being reviewed by General Martin, commanding
the Hawaiian Air Force, General Gardner, commanding the Hawaiian Separate
Coast Artillery Brigade, and Admiral Bellinger, commanding the Naval Air
Station. We have had a number of combined air exercises in the past [17]
month and expect to have a minimum of one each week so we should find out any-
thing that is wrong with the plan.
WEST COAST DEFENSE
If the situation here is such as to make it possible I would like to send both
General Martin and General Gardner to the West Coast Defense Exercise.
Martin is the senior with his temporary rank and probably will command our
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1609
air defense if it appears that such a command is the proper solution of our
problem. Gardner has had much more exp'erience with this subject and I feel
that it would be wise to send him also as he would be able to get all the details.
If it is not advisable at the time to send these two officers I would like Fo send
their Executives as I am sure a lot would be learned from the exercise.
I feel that the question of Antiaircraft Defense against air attack is the most
serious problem that we have to face and I hope that funds and Engineer troops
can be made available soon so that w,e can get definitely on the way on this
subject.
Very sincerely,
(Signed) Walter C. Short
Walter C. Shobt.
[18] Mab 28 IMl
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short,
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department,
Port Shafter, Hawaii.
My Dear Short: I was very glad to receive your letter of March 15 reviewing
the air defense situation in your department.
Your proposal for relieving congestion by the construction of one additional
field and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in protected bunkers at existing
airfields is undoubtedly sound. As soon as you have submitted suflBcient details
to supi)ort the defense of the anticipated expenditures, funds for these purposes
will be included in estimates.
A company of aviation engineers will be sent to you during April, and further
increases in your engineer garrison are contemplated when the necessary person-
nel can be made available.
Antiaircraft and aircraft warning service materiel to complete your project
requirements is expected to be available for delivery as follows: sixteen 3"
antiaircraft guns, December, 1941 ; one hundred and fifteen 37 mm antiaircraft
guns, February, 1942 ; caliber .50 antiaircraft machine guns, in 1942 ; four SCR
No. 268, April, 1941 ; five SCR No. 270 and three SCR No. 271, April and May
1941.
I am hopeful of arranging for the early augmentation of your antiaircraft gar-
rison so as to provide full strength units for the armament available within
your department. Additional Coast Artillery reinforcements probably will be
held in the United States unless the situation in the Pacific becomes more acute.
I approved your proposal to send General Martin and General Gardner, or
their Executives, to the West Coast Defense Exercise. Due to various reasons
that exercise has been postponed till Fall, as you may know.
Faithfully yours,
[Stamped] (Sgd) G. C. Mabshall
Distribution :
1 Copy for the Chief of Staff
[i9] April 14, 1941.
General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.
Dear Genebal Marshall : On April 12th I sent a radio to the War Department
requesting that I be authorized to make leases of 230 separate parcels of land,
none of which exceed 5 acres on island of Oahu, totaling approximately 467 acres
and asking for $10,000.00 to cover the rental. The purpose in leasing this land
is to begin the construction of strongpoints at all places where they are not located
in cane fields and pineapple fields. The greater part of the other land is rock so
the construction of the strongpoints requires the use of explosives and takes a
great amount of time. One company strongpoint on the West Coast is now in the
process of being constructed and the troops have been working most of the time
for seven months. The strongpoint lacks considerably of being completed. 1
feel that it is essential to get these under way at once rather than taking several
months to get the exact metes and bounds and get the approval of the War De-
partment on each separate lease before starting work. At the best I do not believe
they can all be completed before September. Any field fortifications to be con-
structed in cane fields and pineapple fields will be very simple as the nature of
the soil is such that the construction can be carried on without the use of explo-
sives. I am enclosing a copy of the radio sent.
1610 CONGRESSJONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"We have completed the reconnaissance and estimates for the new air field. We
had some difficulty in meeting all the technical requirements as I was insistent
that it should be located somewhere in the interior where it could not be picked
up so easily at night, could not be shelled from ships and would not require a
special guard. We have located a place that seems to meet all requirements and
is exceptionally well located from a tactical point of view. I am enclosing a
copy of the letter of transmittal. The complete document is being sent forward
to the Adjutant General by this same mail. With the great increase in the num-
ber of pursuit planes I feel that it is essential to push this construction as rapidly
as possible.
Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making
in cooperating with the Navy I am enclosing the following agreements made
with them :
1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth
Naval District. Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure.
[20] 2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force
and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Forces, to implement the above agree-
ment.
3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army
the provisions of the joint agreement.
I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral P.loch very cooperative and
we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and Navy
Air Forces to act together and with the unity of command as the situation
requires.
We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air
force and the antiaircraft defense. I hope we shall arrive at something on that
in the near future. The more I go into the details the more I am becoming con-
vinced that it will be necessary for us to set up an air defense command. Some
months before my arrival this matter was considered aAd at that time the con-
clusion was reached that it was not necessary. On this account I am anxious
that both General Martin and General Gardner attend the West Coast Air Defense
Exercise in the Fall.
Everything is going along extremely well although there is a great deal to be
done as rapidly as possible. The Navy has felt very much encouraged by the
increase in our Air and Antiaircraft defense. I shall write you from time to
time as matters come up which I think will interest you.
Very sincerely,
(Signed) Walter C. Short.
Walter C. Short.
[21] May 2, 1941. 4:39 AM.
From : Honolulu.
To : General George C. Marshall.
Honolulu No. 2755. May 1st.
Hawaiian Department has submitted- estimates for construction of airports for
the Hawaiian Air Force as follows: Island of Oahu, Kipapa $4,940,0(X).(X), Bel-
lows Field $2,543,000.00. Island of Kauai, Barking Sands $1,772,000.00. Island
of Hawaii, Morse Field $1,688,000.00, Hilo airport $670,000.00, Parker Ranch
$1,993,000.00, Total $13,606,000.00. Additional estimates will be submitted for
airports as follows: Island of Oahu, Haleiwa $450,000.00. Island of Kauai,
Burns Field $640,000.00. Island of Molokai, Homestead Field $400,000.00. Is-
land of Lanai $1,990,000.00, total $3,480,000.00. It is recommended that provi-
sion be made in the current 1942 appropriation bill for the inclusion of these
items at a total estimated cost of $17,860,000.00.
In addition request that amount of $10,0(X),000.00 be included in estimates for
use in this Department on projects which can not be completely anticipated at
this time. This fund should be available without waiting for future congres-
sional action for projects under construction but lacking sufficient funds to
complete, and upon [22] approval for those projects now under study but
not yet approved including fortifications, bombproofs, housing, military roads
and other structures. Understand fiscal year 42 appropriation bill now before
Senate and recommend inclusion of these general amounts before bill passed and
sent to conference. Clipper letter follows.
Shobt.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1611
[23] Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shatter, T. H., May 2, 1941.
General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff, V. S. Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.
Dear General Marshall : This letter is being written to amplify the requests
made in my radiogram of 1 May to you for inclusion of funds in the Fiscal
year 1942 estimates now before Congress.
I believe that the two requests made in this radiogram are both necessary
to solve the problem existing in this department. The development of adequate
airfields for the rapidly expanding Hawaiian Air Force is essential. An effort
has been made to develop these fields through use of troop labor and WPA. but
this is entirely too slow and uncertain. The projects which have been and are
being submitted at a total estimated cost of $17,086,000 will provide satisfactory
oi)erating conditions. Copies of the project letters already submitted are enclosed
for ready reference. Our request for the inclu.sion of $10,000,000 in these esti-
mates is intended to establish a source of funds which can be drawn upon
to finance necessary projects as the need for them occurs. With the rapidly
changing situation it is impossible to anticipate all our needs and submit
detailed projects for consideration. In addition to this difficulty there have
been several instances in the past six months where projects have been submitted
and approved by the War Department as desirable and necessary but construc-
tion work could not be initiated due to a lack of funds. I think that the situation
has progressed to such a point that we can no longer afford the delay in time
which has heretofore been required to secure appropriations by Congress after
the projects have been approved. I can foresee several requirements this coming
year which must be met. Among these are housing for the increases in the gar-
rison, increased storage needs, work on roads, fortifications, gasoline storage
(both aviation and motor vehicle), and other requirements. As stated, all of the
details cannot be anticipated at this time but some source of funds should be
available for their construction without having to wait for congressional action.
If these funds could be secured it would give us an equal opportunity with the
Navy. The Navy is apparently getting an allotment of funds without the necessity
of submitting detailed projects and as a result they have been able to accumulate
required materials and almost corner the local labor market. There has already
developed a shipping shortage between the mainland and the islands and the situa-
tion in regard to shipping in the present war makes it highly probable that many
of the ships now plying between here and the coast may be transferred to trans-
Atlantic service and this will make the situation serious. I think it is extremely
important that funds be made available without delay for the procurement and
shipment to these islands of the materials required in our construction program.
[24] At the time my radio was sent I understood that this appropriation
bill was still pending before the Senate and speed in obtaining your consideration
of these recommendations was important.
Very sincerely,
/S/ Walter C. Short
Walter-^. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. 8. Army,
Commanding.
7 Incls : '
Letters :
1. Bellows Field (Pusult and Bombardment)
2. Kipapa Field (Pursuit)
3. Barking Sands Field (Bombardment)
4. Morse Field (Bombardment)
5. Hilo Airport (Bombardment)
6. Parker Ranch (Bombardment)
7. Homestead Field, Molokai (Pursuit)
Letters being submitted later :
1. Burns Field, Kauai (Bombardment)
2. Lanai (Pursuit and Bombardment)
3. Haleiwa, Oahu (Pursuit)
1 Omitted.
1612 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[25] May 5, 1941.
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short,
lort Shiifter, T. H.
My Dear Short : Thank you for your letter of the 14th enclosing the joint plans
and the estimate concerning possible air action. It i.s evident that you have
been on tiie job, and I know that the Navy is delighted to have such generous
cooperation.
The matter of locating strongpoints at various points throughout the Lsland
looks sound to me, and authority to go ahead on the leasing of land parcels was
radioed on April 22nd. War Plans and the Air Corps are still looking into the
matter of the additional airdrome on Oahu. and I expect to have an answer for
you in a short time.
I am hoping to leave in the next day or so on an inspection trip to the West
Coast, which will include a visit to Alaska. I think they are doing a fine job
up there and it will be good to get away from my desk for awiiile. Last week
the Appropriations Committee kept me on the stand through the successive ses-
sions of four hours each, which involved an.swering a barrage of questions on
all matters great and small.
It is most gratifying to hear you say that everything is going along extremely
well and do not hesitate to write at any time.
Faithfully yours,
(Sgd) G. C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1613
as,
Q ^ .
a ^
OB E-. **
-f o
O
o o
aj p t< 2 o
c s ^ c "*
c g<^ — c:
.-. ft t. 0^ Oi
^ ca c .o
^ OS w -J r-l
•S t- ^ r- <M
S<M a; 2; «^
c cB a S ^
^ x: -w j3 ti
^- .-0.0 2
• 'o >^ ft
0- _ 5 'J ft
^^'^^ t
_^ ~ CO O .„
c a; "g ." +j Q
V •> c a _^"g
W iL i^ o 3 OJ
- a-c -OH
'^ 52 > § 2 o!
9 S 3; ^ p <t-i
« Q ^ -H a o
S - Q. 5 -uT C
^ :- :m t; g ^
H •S -S^i I, 1. 3^
*- ft ca Q dj
^ ^^ t^ *—
^ ^ P. o
?r^4i
0)
OS a
r a; M , ft„
OS O C c rt =s
ao Oj CS ^
O) w -H '^ 'O
•r^ c 4J =■ C
<H
_r <^
c C OS
Scs s
.L 2 2 «Ji OS ^ es
^•■S o ^ ^ ft «
C3 ^ z: :: a £ -S
o
O)
QO
osR n _
O CO oS I»
I^'k3
:0 -cW s-^
~ l- o
-^ a; ft 2 P-i
- OS
PQ §
Q CS
CO s
C >^'
c2i
OS ii -
C M c
cS
« 2 o -
go
1-1
c o
a CS
*Pr-it:
O MO
OS
o
bt
x:
a
^
1 .
be
&§
s
O <D
'3
C '-^
3
^ (U
"S
^-£
c
s
03
11
^4
0)
o
so
o
-^
3
3
i^
Oh
'Si
&j
0) s
o
a;
O «3
-o
^2
>
o
o >>
ft
o
n3 'S
c
X2 ^
OJ
OS
lA
OJ
OS ft
-r
»— 1
> a*
m
•I— <
CO s:
-*
c
'2
th a
M
K
1
^
II
<
<
k4
S-i
o
"-^
<tH
d
S
CO
^
bi
a^
CO
O
03
>>
>5
o
s
ts
0;
a
^
Xj
c-c
o
.^ o
<
'x
D
1614 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
, c
tc OS ,
^ £ o s
I G^-b
M !» OS
^< 73 "" O
C O
o '^
-- —OP
OJ ^ O .Q
S'O O
» w 5
S c '" *
is 5 »2'5
oo a.s
"W g _^
r go _
CS OJ 2
^ !- 0; -
S o
u ?
■So
c
is
fl.S^
o ?^ -
. ^ fl ■*—
■So
CS IM
'§§
.2 ^
^c S
> 3.2
^ e C3
C t" o
n t- "-^
.5 "^ -"^
c
r-i
o
05
t^
d
OJ
.w
■i^
OJ
03
^
<
■a
o
a
u "O
o -^
Pi
c rt C
cS S-t **<
J- c Jr
OS'S
"=^ °*
o
ftO
^ W)
2 5 LI t- a>
"CO* ti
a 3 p
CD cS a t-' o h '
Z^ 3 OS *
a
a aJ
O CS
c c w " a c;
s Em
8 8
siii
§.2S5
S «-
32 S
eS
a O
^ 0)
CS ij
|^^' c
CO 0) .2
o CS
OJ -< O
== 55
OS
O) OS
<1j
.
t^
-o
"O
s
c
02
HH
;^
A
a;
»o
a
^S(m"'~'c£ cS "^
'O -o CS '»-' 2 5 O
^ F-. J.I be
be
^Hg.
rs
^
^
l"H
d5
£
u
c
r-l
ID
w
tc
^
AtH
'•5
01
OS
es
s
2
^
r-l
0)
<
3
iH
'V
>5
<
^
03
1-1
i
c
03
be S3
(D -o
1^
a
a
i4
cS
a be
OS
^ be
be
^
a
I
1
p— «
CS "
C
c
3 <w
S 03
c
cS
P-i
rH
"1
cS
a
^
•^.'
a
0)
IC
CS
8
cS
t.,
c
l-H
a
■3
Oh
<«5
0)
bi
t4
^
1
s
CS
.2
s;^
ce
T ^^
^ e2o
1;^ ■ ^"
op 23
ft OJ cs
O .— '"I
^rH
<D ^
9^
^
1'7 <^
w o H
^ « ?^
t a
O 4)
<i — _aj
w O o
^i . S-i ""
^-w ft rH
(N ft_ Tfl
■^ Q ^ 00
" ,a rH
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1615
s;
88
cd ;«
- ■ fl
5 ;^
a>
s
I t. "-I
I O S' !h
j= ^ - -3
a:
= ^^
o
a^
m
u t^.°
Q.2i2S
oj ^ "S fr
^JM^
& « h-fi
oj^Qrt
00
e^
m
W) O -
SP 2 Pi
^ "i; c
be M) «'
c c
'x Iri .2
3 5-^
O O :3
CS K (D
c t*
(1> "O
V az
.a a
2
** go
c fe! ..
^ 5~ = S -S
K X C *-
J as G c -<
t- 5S fl 5
J,
w
3'«
Sim.?
CO
Q. _,
cc Goo com c c
u ^ . . . ^ ^
3 ^ CO XI X2 J3 CO K
O - o 3 o o o a-'
00 -^ n Ph pq n n pu n
?S§?
ooo ooc
^ 0> -— ' CO iC c^
^ A O Ol cb ^ 05
iO -^ C^ CS CN CS C^
W
O o q i°
s n ° "s
P5WWtrtS
.^ J< 2 C oj
2 .2 fe af
'O t* o
I- rt O o
<U Sh ly •;
t; 0/ o g<
^8 i
;?8s
'2-
1 ©^/&
p • — -^ "
c 3 7? a
■" ■" .2
OJ q_i -D
goo
U Qi ^
?I £1 —
i g ^-5
s ^ « O)
_ c
c o
i2 oi
— cs "I'
•-< O) o
111
=2
^,
<N
CD
ir><l
(NCO
4' IT
tH tH -^
00 CO m
t- t- M
CD CO I
2
^- so
<<
HH HH J- ;r-
"O TS 2 ff9
CO CO s r
■^^«'^'
1.2^^
ax: -i -t
a o cs CO
-< ■< hJ M
U
T
CD^-t* rH
^^ lA C^ ^
■^ .2 .a ^
Sw.2
^g .
■o .^
|ii
T
o
r-l
Wei
CI
02
c w
■^ IN
gg
1616 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
0) >j 0) rs -*^
^ -2 -fl 9 S
o
"O "O a;
^ ^ CC
S * i
d, !h t
a; 0/ 2
^ ^ a;
a: i
* = J=
0) C C O
> -«a .'
P 2 o f*■.'
« S O G
S- S ^- -
<ijs a ■" •
- c^ i
.2 s i c''"
•c j:
^ <t-i tM i;
.X " K
43 _ K
^ 5;-=
^^ =
? a. ^
C K 3^
C £
c "S b "^^
o 5 " 3,
'Z^ ^" !^ .t:
«^ S-^ =
= -S-f c
■:= =fei:
= XI - _
6r:f
2 ;= =""
a " IT— •
,C O' K t-
r - '^ K
K i^- i 1;
g -o -ti t; -a a; w
g a> c s a> J3 'o
ftc
■- C 02 c
aJQ ■"" •—
?S = -o g ^ t:
5 a>
£ ?! =
o
02 h
1-1 «-. D ,/ !-
=3 1-5
3 a)
« I
5 a ■M i\
5 *9- w Sf
C = S
« '-' S
'C ±5 «M
.■§51
i-l-s
CO — o
t(_i 0, — X
5u t. ^^ ^
s
CO ft
C =3 0)
■a +j — I
1-1
<l-l
^ -
2r «M ^ "C
^ 2
'^ i <M
OJ OJ C3
M Q o
"tt-O
J3 -•
- o
4-1 ~
s ~ tC D i -
i ft
^-m
5^0
— !- «
5, o 3^
S 0)
- 0)
c - = 2 S
- 0. .t: .• s- - ?- .1 (L tc -i- rr! ■*- = '^ i •"
"^ r- c — t- > .a 7-, ■
a 0)
i J2 a;
Sfi:; a- ,
3 i; a 5 i: ^' I S -c t: ** " .-
a^ ^i»^^ -
^ %M— ftTJ
c .i *-• aj
_; i^ &^ '5 1; '
0) -
•— iH
2 Si
> x 5 r -
S' ■•: "c -I- ■»-
►> t< ^ fc. i_, a
*- 3 a.
a itf
a- —
3/ !4_| "4-1 "t^ -^
?"• X-r'C
— :i ^ ._ .t: * t" '■'^
■- 5 a = 2 1^ wa a
iS^
? -r ~ t- — n<w
3. i ~ ^ ^ -
' So;
-to
I ;f 2
a. 3 a ■; a
« li ^ r J-
o ft
^ a
lo a
so-
.M J3 -^ r 5: «^ ;s
-^ X *- 3h ^ —
^ a r; s^ ^
■p c
2 -a "S
a a ^
c3 :« X3
CO
i
a rvi 1-1 rH
rH "2^
^' iM ■* r5
oa°r^
^ M ^ ^ A
5
o
^•3;
"O •=
X a
X ^
> X
~ y.
aa
a ii;
_^ ■^'*. ft a
ft a
.a ijo -ti
CD -
£ a —
I ST
S O rH
1H t— JJ
M O r"
T
_^T_«mC5.J
^.4
ftft^
C a; _i
t,CD
w rH ^ -ta
T^
s^.
rH
r^^JJ
?J % .i
C = 'g
■^Q a5
1H ^^ ~
c m —
a a ^
^Ph 1
c OS t:
"* . c
crgp
X ^-
0-5 '-
r* — X
^5 2
rs in
I— I T-! 5<
IH 05
C ^-
■ H
O
T
CO
rH
>d5
;a5
ftM
a.i
o ^
■S =
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1617
i3 O
a> « Si 0) -=>
5 a^ fe 5 5
03 o a^ iS fli
C jj -C s^ si
-a S-a '^^
05 .t;
^3
; OS
C3
j- o s £: z:
P OJ J- » 0)
,y OS cc o
o ^ o
-o
m
S O
0) lO
a; <i>
■- a o 03 ^^
i; =s c ^ H
02 OJ
o -
Q •;: ft a '-
o . 0) 5: oJ
— Mr- Vi A i^'O
o 2 *^ s t: .H gj
t •- be I- -£ W p
C p p o« r- K ti
^ ^ <i-i ^ _^ i^ js
5< o T3 •<-- r-'.
'O C ''^
5j CO
fe"=;Q
P C
o 3 -^ o s . "<
■-=; ii o 2 1; '^ "^
•S oj c> X^ aj 2 *
■g J R. OS J «
'-' 2 'f^.
3 ®
Sg
03 O
OS '^ ■-? S a
•ii S -o c i
; **■ ffl 'O r/) ^ ^ a;
' " c- .22 <t-i a r-
ji ■ ■ o N • ■ o
es c
CS O '
_, w Wl C c ■
«5 a1.sfa,
frH >J
o
— ft >■ th a oj
CS OJ O ■^ O) ^
-- ^ -^ , '"' o
'-' -w .- '^ o 2 o)
0305-^0'^-' a -r
h? o "^ -o <M .52 §
^ ^ t-' ^ ^ a - -
eo:^;:! ftt; g'S-p
■i. ^ i-i <= OS ft'O S
,-. _rS a; -a 0) o t.
*-' 'O i:^ Sa 4) !-
P c ^ o 5i aj
r; >»e3 ij
ft tl a =s ^ °
^ 03
O O 03 2,
<D rt O
-o F S C
0« CS ^_| OS -^
i 03 " ^ ,
W O
OI'M
0* z;
a 02-SS
■— ■ ij -^ -a ^
5 !N
O
^=«V>|^oos
^ -w Q '^ rH -t-- >,
'^ i- 03 I a cc 02 th
atHoiMaoQj
CS O-rsP^nftOJ OJ a;
r^ . — o a
•^ 73 S l- 2 O -S
O ft 2 OJ g -W
a oi o a i! 2
a— q; O "^
^ -M g .5 J2 3_, OS
i: bjD a 2,"7j ^ ^
"^ 2 > fc ^o 3
.iS -a til a ^ -w "w
^*^ 03 §
a ft.2
b£ b
0) i4 c a -t; o a
-^^
ti •»-,
;i= ^
bo
s
i2'
a ° 0) ^ C5i o) «^;ii
^ o '-' "a ' — ' I
•2 03
5 ft
rH P
3 a
>< 5 !s o) i^ ?:; 5
a; a o -w oj c-i o
.0)^ a _g ^ -^ -c ^
O 'S M) S ^ ^ ^
ax: la ^-oS M
;:2 fee
«s ft
Q
a^
O) cS
£®
bxi 5 , —
bD a
a 2.
.^^^
JH CS
a; w Ji.
TS 03O
o a-r-
a g
o *" .
^ CS a;
i- S a
1618 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-O s-; S3
0} i> o
■c -^ "t:
^ O) 03
.S P es
•<■- o
C c 'O
es "-; Qj
s! a !-
s= S S
3
ws
, h5 =*
H
. c
40 .-. fa-
iW ^ c
g O O)
.2 ^ '5
. £3
t- "2
o c _S
■^ ''^ ^
S r: G
s o ^
o •_2 g
C3 p* c3
r- ,2 &
? I— I
— re ..
^ --• -5 <ri
^ i ^ w
^■pK a
-w -S a °
fl S •" -a
a oj oj .2
s- „ o o
a^ r- -^
a; ^ S 3
Q S !» C3
-"" ^ 2i
iH ^^ i «
a '-C "=■ c
a; 3 fe
m cc IV
s §-
i' •- ::^
"-• re ^
* •" re
sl.s
a 5^
.5 2i '-
OJ ^ c
O «> 05
a; IE
£ •" -fa-
-fc- w c
« 2 5.
lie
O Ut) LO C5 2 c
"ti r-l tH r-l Q ^
o 0) 0/ 0) S -B
5 o o o 27 ^
•-H a —
fe^
e X a
§ii a
=^ tfaj 2
-« c ?
aecojojcc'O'o
— 4) +-' -g t» •" Oi O;
^§§a^s CO
ft OJ ^ •- 'O ^ M
2 0) "*-i E* re .
•i=s a £ fl o g 1^ r:
S..2 f "g - £ li !^
ft . -f5 r-
Oi O o — fl 0^
M C _
ft5i
r2 fl p
t; o c
^o.|
^ -a
c-g ® '^
?^* 2.2
03 IM fl «-|
re«^a-B
fl
"^ 2 ai
-< a
s_a
fl .t; -C a - 02
o3i i
X a ■- ^
IB a; c _
^ » ft.S
< -c —
■w & S -S g" 2
i! - oT '=* -o o
^-glMfl cfl
?£^^§.^
p w)« s g a
S, = 05 2 W) ^
o S a;
<p
CC
S 3J.
3 0)
^2 <u fl —
"Si
X u S
■" ^ o*
l-H fl ^
- S -^ > =^ '^ ftS
fl OS !^ « ^ -^.ii!
csat^^osreoo
Sffl » OJ 0) "^ =J -^
c3re.p-(re®s~?i
flt»fl'-- S-i C'O c
- !> t: ft ft oj 03 cj
fl c a
■^.^ O O s- +-'
, fl _ t- OJ
0) a re fl
re'c 2P9H "J2
r— C fl C r^
S3
•S-co
fl
^ s- 0) bc-=< til -s
=s ffi ij >■ a •'3
re 4^ <i-i 03 ft c^ fl
S a
eS S
a> re
m "^
to .1-,
ft
.— ,
0)
d
Q
C8
fl
fe 03
1 S3
K>3
Sri
C3
o
s
,^
j
c3
o
C
be
m
M
f\
o
c a o
Oi o .
'o a a
BaS
U 9 -t->
fl 0) 03
p ;o "^
^ ^' w re
eH-
^' P ;u C3
M.2^J
,_• <t-i "tH 'r*
08 O OS ^
s-i 23 S
§:2<2i
re| bfW
,-. •- fl
Cfl JS-r-
g re ^ 0)
o c o
OS <t!
^ CO .a
'-' ^ —J fl
•- 05 ^ "^
■^^r"^ ft
ai ? s ^
•^ 0/ aj »
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1619
13
5| ii^ei §2 fi lis =-g::i i:bK
Q-Kiros^ &£ §g^^ "^.s^^a .«ir^^
Q 02 *' t-l \U MS- a^^ ^ <V^ p. s^"^ ^ feC>. ^S^ W SC LC ^ c r , fl t^-B 5 5 ^
1'
Tfl
s
P
P<
o
(t>
o
0)
OJ
u
c
w^
^
es
o
>> CS
o
,
xn
■M
O
o
s
VI
^
^^
OJ
rt
s
"^
«
b()
m
CO
C3
C
^
_e
CS
m
c
Oi
S
a
0;
■^
•c
s
c
!«
c
ctf
a;
s
>1
o
-*^
c
I«
fl
«
'O
0/
.ti
^
0)
OJ
&
Bo
«|
cog
^, a
^
— '
p
o
o
a
a>
'3
bC
J3
«
c
^
^
'S
i>>
.Q
d
£t
^
ai
03
fl
^ ,,:
0)
0)
02
.2
<
O M
.^
c
03
0)
S
m
S*
fi
Lh
OJ
<l-l
a
o
0)
73
l4
<M
p2 /— ^
OJ
0/
^ 4*
03 1
.-, 4;
^;^
1620 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
.2 ">
«= c ^
'a ''^ rH
lis
M o '7'
) . .
^i
j:5
^^~ . xh
c = '-C .i
■^ .£ ^ w
^IS S3
a2<fH X . o
O ft
^
EXHIBITS OF. JOINT COMMITTEE
1621
r c o
O O) «2
"SI ^ -
[/J
^
C3
0)
o
t-i
a
0)
.a
c
o
-o
m
C3
S-i
tx.
1; O
o
s
OJ
Hg
x/i
C
f S
<h
^
.- rH
a;
•^
02
X
•^
i;
a--
•^
^M
— i>
1)
o
rj
C3
5
CJ ^
OJ
,^
•r^
- i
0, ^ 5 ^ «
i; i K P =
be
c '" s 1
1= = s
J 'J a
.SCO
^ a, a
be ?
^ - - Oj =
S ^ 5 >.'^ ,.
«IH t- ^ - P> !-
c r- ;: P o
•- K ai J, = i
2 =3 r ■" s —
K O a^ j^ 1^ -I
<M -I- *-• fM
ti t-
c /M
Ui
>s
9
!S
w
E
s
<r
3
"5
Q
a ^
1622 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[S4A] A. ARMY
Morse Field: 1 paved runway 3,400' long, 300' wide. Gasoline storage 450,000
gallons, construction for 2 bombardment squadrons, total estimated cost
$1,687,530.00.
Bellows Field, Oahu:
1 runway 300' wide, 3,400' long.
1 runway oOvO' long, 30O' wide.
Buildings, 4
1 night bombardment squadron
1 observation squadron
1 pursuit squadron
Gasoline storage, aqua system, 600,000 gallons.
Cast, $2,542,900.00
Neiv Pursuit Field: 3 runways each 5000' long, paved width 200', gasoline
storage of 900,000 gal. aqua system, housing facilities for 1 pursuit group,
cost if land is leased $4,668 950.00. if land is purchased $4,938,950.00
Parker Ranch, Hawaii: 3 runways 5000' long, 200' wide, gasoline storage for
300,000 gallons, housing and facilities for 1 bombardment group, estimated
cost $1,992,600.00 , ,
Lanai Airport: 2 runways each 5000' long, paved width 300'. gasoline storage
200,000 gallons, housing and facilities for 1 pursuit squadron, estimated cost
$1,990,000.00
Barking Sands: 2 runways 5000' long, 200' wide, housing and facilities for 2
bombardment squadrons, gasoline storage for 450,000 gallons, estimated cost
$1,772,220.00
B. Following fields to be improved by Civil Aeronautics Authority. Army
construction necessary for housing and other facilities
Molokai: 1 runway 31000' long, 200' wide; 1 runway 4200' long. 200' wide,
gasoline storage 35'\00f) eaUons, buildings and facilities for 1 pui'suit squad-
ron, estimated cost $407 600.00
Hilo Airport: 3 runways each 200' wide re.spectively 3000', 4000' and 4500' long,
ga.soline storage for 4.50 OOO gallons, housing and facilities for 1 bombardment
squadron, estimated cost $670,140.00
Burn Field: 2 runways 200' wide. 3200 and 2600 feet long, storage for 200.000
gallons gasoline, housing and facilities for 1 heavy reconnaissance squadron,
estimated cost $640,000.00
C. AEMY
Haleiwa Airport: Flying condition to be improved as follows: Construction 1
runway 4000' by 300', installation of 100,000 gallons gasoline storage, no
housing facilities except for small permanent detachment, estimated cost
$450 000.00.
Housing for 1 company of National Guard to be provided at all airports
except Hilo where 2 companies will be housed and excepting Haleiwa where
none will be built.
[35]
May 29. 1941 .
General Geiorck C. Mat?shall,
Chief of Staff, V. 8. Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.
Dear Gener.vl Marshall: I know that you will not have time to look over a
detailed acount of our recent maneuvers but feel that you might like to have a
birds eye view of what we did and the purpose back of it.
The maneuver was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted of
the air action and the actual issue of one days fire and of Engineer Supplies
for Field Fortifications and of Engineer tools. During the air phase our bonibers
acted under navy command in cooperation with the Naval Patrol Squadrons
and actually located and bombed airplane carriers 250 miles out at sea. The
movement of the carrier was entirely free so that the navy patrol planes had
the mission of locating the ship and notifying our bombers and they then made
the attaclv. Pursuit attacked enemy bombers represented by naval planes and
our own bombers when they came in to attack ground defenses. Upon receipt of
the warning for this phase our bombers were sent to fields on outlying islands
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1623
and pursuit planes were dispersed. The Navy cooperated very fully during this
phase and I believe we learned more about the coordination of Army Air Force,
Navy Air Force and Antiaircraft than we had during any previous exercise.
Ammunition and engineer supplie.s had never been actually issued before and
we got considerable data in regard to the time and transportation required to
complete the issue.
Tne second phase consisted of the completion of our plans and the organization
of the ground, including the construction of Field Fortifications. Naturally this
work should have been completed before any warning of enemy landing was re-
ceived. However, it would have been impossible to actually construct field
fortifications until we got authority for the leasing of the ground. Cost of leas-
ing of the ground is going to be extremely low. The whole command dug dili-
gently upon them day and night. We accomplished a very great deal and I
believe shall be able to complete all necessary field fortifications soon after July
1st. Fifty-five bunk >rs for pursuit planes were actually constructed at Wheeler
Field. To my mind the construction of the field fortifications are extremely im-
portant since our plans are .so intimately tied in with the organization of the
ground. My theory of the defense of Hawaii is based upon the following :
1. Comnlete organization of the ground at all important points.
2. Holding of the most important field fortifications lightly.
3. Holding of large mobile reserves centrally located with sufficient motor
transportation to move all reserves at once if necessary.
[36] 4. Detailed plans for the employment of reserves with complete
reconnaissance and reserves actually rehearsed in carrying out of the plans.
5 All troops to be highly trained in delaying action and counterattack.
We have received enough of our new transportation so that with proper
planning I am convinced that we can move all of our reserves. With the comple-
tion of our field fortifications we shall make small changes in our plan so as to
make more reserves available.
Third phase, the maneuver proper — Repelling of a Serious Attack. The
situation was based on the theory that a serious enemy attack against Oahu
would be possible only under the following conditions :
Our fleet would be either absent or very greatly inferior.
Our air force would be destroyed or very greatly inferior.
Five enemy landings were made. The Navy furnished ships to simulate
enemy transports and enemy naval ships. They did not make actual landings
as the Marines were not available at that time. The 27th Infantry was employed
to represent the enemy, being sent to landing places by train and motors.
Landings .were made at widely dispersed places on the island. The situation
was developed so that our forces were rather widely dispersed in driving off
the four minor landings and had to be moved rapidly for a general counter-
attack when the main enemy threat developed. The situation was built up by
the destruction of our large guns so that the Harbor Defense troops in the
later phase of the exercise manned 3" and 6" secondary armament which are
not normally manned on account of the lack of personnel. In the final phase the
Harbor Defense troops were required to take over one sector of beach defense
to release Infantry for the main attack. Likewise air personnel which were
available through almost complete destruction of our planes were used for
anti-sabotage work and finally to take over a short sector of beach defense.
155-mm guns and Antiaircraft batteries were moved from their usual positions
and missions and acted as Army artillery in support of the main attack.
I feel that we put across the necessity for organization of the ground and for
mobility. Some time later we expected to have a maneuver without any warning
whatever to the troops. But will wait until after the organization of our air
defense command, the construction of division, wing and air defense C. P.'s.
which have been authorized, and probably for the completion of the 13 weeks
training of the selectees which will be called on July 1st.
I am sending under separate cover a few photographs of field fortifications.
Very sincerely,
/s/ Walter C. Short
Walter C. Shobt.
79716 O — 46 — pt. 15 15
1624 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[37]
July 3, 1941.
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short,
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shatter, T. H.
My Dear Short : I have examined the proposal outlined in your letter of June
7th concerning the establishment of a training camp in the Koolaus Mountains
which could be used as a convalescent and recreational center, and possibly as an
evacuation area.
With funds at hand or in sight we are having diflBculty in satisfying require-
ments for troops less fortunately situated with respect to recreational and train-
ing facilities. The proximity of the mountains to Schofield Barracks and the
ideal recreational facilities of the beaches on Oahu place your project relatively
in priority. Consequently, I believe that favorable consideration of your request
must be declined.
The oflBcial communication is being returned to your headquarters through
regular channels.
Faithfully yours,
[stamped] (Sgd) G. C. Marshali,,
Chief of Staff.
\38] FOBT Shafteb, T. H.,
July 11, 1941.
General George C. Mabshaul,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.
Dear Geneeal Marshall: On April 14th I submitted a letter recommending
the establishment of a new air field between Kipapa and Waikakalua gulches on
the Island of Oahu. This field is more important to us than any of the other fields
recommended as they were on outlying islands. This field was selected after a
very thorough search of the whole island on the part of the Air Corps. General
Martin considers it the only suitable place on the Island of Oahu. I agree with
him fully. On July 4th I received a wire from the War Department stating that
this site for the field was not approved and recommending the reconsideration of
Kahuku Point. On July 7th I replied to the wire stating that I considered Kahuku
Point impossible from a tactical point of view owing to the fact that it had prac-
tically no protection from Harbor Defenses and would be subject to raids by
small landing parties. This data I forwarded to the Adjutant General a complete
study of all air fields considered, with a map showing existing Army and Navy
Fields, as well as those considered and discarded. I am enclosing copies of all
the correspondence, as well as a copy of the map, in order that it may be imme-
diately available to you. I consider it important that we get a decision on this
matter at the earliest practical moment since General Martin tells me that planes
for the loth Group may arrive at almost any time.
I am afraid that someone in the Office of the Chief of Air Corps who has been
out here is considering Kahuku Point purely fromi the point of view of technical
flying and is giving no consideration whatsoever to its tactical location. I would
not bother you with this unless I felt that it was a matter of prime imporance.
Very sincerely,
/s/ Walter C. Short
Walter C. Shobt.
\39] Fort Sh after, T. H.,
25 July 19U:^
General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.
Dear General Mapshml: Continuing our cooperation with the Navy I have
arranged with Admiral Kimmel to have all Navy air fields on Hawaii and outlying
islands extended wherever possible so as to provide for landing of B-17s. With
very few exceptions this is going to be practicable.
I am enclosing copies of Admiral Kimmel's instructions on this matter and also
copies of our orders and Naval orders to effect the use of Navy fields by Army
planes and Army fields by Navy planes. The matter is a little more simple from
the point of view of the Army than the Navy inasmuch as we can use their bombs
but our bombs cannot be used by the Navy without an additional attachment.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1625
We are now experimenting to see if we can manufacture locally such an attach-
ment. When the fields are completed at Midway, Wake, Palmyra and Johnston
I think it will perhaps be a good idea to send a squadron of B-17s to each island.
I am sure that we can arrange with Admiral Kimmel for the stationing of
destroyers to guarantee the safety of the flight.
Tomorrow we are carrying out an attack exercise with tanks, infantry and
artillery, supported by thirty-four Navy Dive Bombers. It is the first time I have
had an opportunity to see the use of dive bombers directly in support of ground
troops and I think this is perhaps true of all the oflScers here. I am giving an
opportunity to as great a number of officers as possible to see this exercise.
Very sincerely,
/s/ Walter C. Short
Walter C. Shobt.
\40] 8-19-41
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short,
Communding General, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shatter, T. H.
Dear Geneiral Short : Your letter of July 11, has been received recommending
the selection of Kipapa Field rather than the Kahuku Point Field as a base for
the 15th Pursuit Group. The advantages and disadvantages of each site have
been considered. As a result, I feel that the advantages of the Kahuku Point
Field outweigh those of the Kipapa Field sufficiently to result in my decision to
establish the base on Kahuku Point.
The following factors are among those having a bearing upon my decision :
a. Low clouds and gj-ound mist frequently obtain over the Wheeler Field —
Kipapa area, while at the same time on the north shore of Oahu visibility condi-
tions are good. It is believed tactically unsound to place two pursuit groups
in an area subject to the same adverse weather conditions. Pursuit operations
in defense of Oahu would be seriously hampered during such weather conditions.
Selection of the Kahuku Point site places one group in a location where relatively
favorable weather may exist when the reverse is true in the Kipapa area.
6. The close proximity of two Army and two Navy air bases in the Schofield
Barracks — Pearl Harbor area has resulted in a situation under present condi-
tions which necessitates continuous coordination and control of air traffic in the
interests of safety. The addition of a fifth air base in this area will appreciably
aggravate this situation.
I feel sure that the Naval authorities comprehend fully the importance of
adequate air defense of the Oahu Naval installation and [41] accordingly,
will entertain favorably any proposal which will implement the efficiency of such
defense. I hope, therefore, that they will be agreeable to our proposal to estab-
lish an air base at Kahuku Point to the extent of releasing any claim they may
have previously established to any part of the area involved.
With best personal regards.
Faithfully yours,
[Stamped] (Sgd) G. C. Marshall
Chief of Staff.
[42] October 10, 1941.
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short,
Commanding General, Hawaiian, Department,
Fort Shafter, HavMii.
Dear General Short: The mimeographed standard operating procedure for
the Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, has just come to my attention and I
am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units. For instance,
the Hawaiian Air Force, among other things, is assigned the mission of defending
Schofield Barracks and all air fields on Oahu against sabotage and ground at-
tacks ; and with providing a provisional battalion of 500 men for military police
duty.
This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in
Hawaii, particularly in view of the fact that only minimum operating and mainte-
nance personnel have been provided. As a matter of fact, we are now in process
-of testing the organization of airbase defense battalions, consisting tentatively
of a rifle company and two antiaircraft batteries, designed for the specific pur-
1626 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
pose of relieving the air maintenance people from ground missions of this kind
at locations where there are no large garrisons for ground defense, as there are
in Hawaii.
I wish you would give this your personal consideration.
Faithfully yours,
[Stamped] (Sgd) G. C. Marsh aix.
Chief of Staff.
[43] • Fort Shafteb, T. H.,
October 14, 1941.
General George C. Marshaix,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.
Deak General Marshaix: I have your letter of October 10th with reference
to the use of men of the Air Force on other than strictly air duties. At the time
our tentative Standing Operating Pi'ocedure was put out the Air Corps had 7,229
men. Full Ck)mbat details and all overhead required only 3,835 men for the
planes and organizations actually on hand. This left a sui-plus of 3,344 men with
no assigned duties during Maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the assign-
ment was to give these men something to do during the Maneuvers. Another
reason was the belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground attack of
Oahu could come only after destruction of our Air Forces. The fact that our
planes had been destroyed would not mean that all the men had been put out of
action. It is probable that several thousand men would still be left and it would
not look plausible to have them sit down and do nothing while Infantrymen were
detailed to protect them and their air'fields. The training after the first two
weeks takes up only about four hours per month of their time. It seems to me
that they should continue to he trained as Riflemen in the immedi'ate defense of
air fields. As regards their use as Military Police that was not correct. The
plan was to use them for guarding certain essential utilities, which did not re-
quire team training. However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has
just passed the Home Guard Bill, which will go into effect very soon. They will
be able to take over guarding of all essential utilities, highway bridges, railroad
bridges, etc.
If it is not desired to train Air Corps men for their own protection and for the
final defense of the air fields I would like to be so advised.
Verv sincerely
/s/ Walter C. Short
Walter C. Short.
[W October 28, 1941.
Lieutenant General Walter C Short,
Commanding Oeneral, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shatter, T. H.
Dear Short: With reference to your letter of October 14, I can understand
your motives in giving ground defen.se training to Air Corps personnel which at
present are excess for the equipment provided. However, the present rate of
expansion of the Air Force is such that they are having considerable difficulty
in obtaining experienced maintenance men and it is important that they be
permitted to concentrate on the technical training of all potential mechanics,
regardless of available equipment. Also, it is equally important that they utilize
all available time on this specialized training and the men not be left without
assigned duties particularly during the maneuver period.
I suggest that you prepare a separate phase of your alert plan based on the
assumption that the Air Force has been destroyed and a hostile landing effected.
This plan could provide for the use of the necessary Air Corps personnel for
ground defense and afford a means of indoctrinating them in ground defense
tactics. It should, however, for the present at least, be subordinated to their
own specific training requirements.
It would appear that the best policy would be to allow them to concentrate on
technical Air Corps training until they have completed their expansion program
and [45] have their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is
concerned. War Department Training Circular 47, which was i.ssued July 18,
1941, can be accepted as a guide except in extreme situation.
Faithfully yours,
/S/ G. C Marshall,
Chief of Staff.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1627
EXHIBIT NO. 54
Febeuaby 19, 1941.
Notes on Genebai, Council Meeting, 10:00 a. m., Febeuaby 19, 1941
General G. C. Marshall, Chief of Staff
Maj. Gen. Wm. Bryden, Deputy Chief of Staff
Maj. Gen. R. C. Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff
Chief of Infantry, General Lynch
Chief of Cavalry, General Herr
Chief of Field Artillery, General Danford
Chief of Coast Artillery, General Green
Chief of Air Corps, General Brett
Chief of Engineer, General Kingman
Chief Signal OflScer, General Mauborgne
The Adjutant General, General Adms
The Inspector General, General Peterson
The Judge Advocate General, General Gullion
The Surgeon General, General Magee
The Chief of Finance, General Loughry
Chief of Ordnance, General Wesson
The Quartermaster General, General Gregory
Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, Gen. Baker
Chief of Chaplains, Colonel Arnold
Reserve Affairs, General Hester
Exec, for Under Sec. of War, Gen. Burns
GHQ — (Col. Hyssong represented Gen. McNair)
Chief of National Guard Bureau, Gen. Williams
A. C. of S., G-1, Gen. Shedd
A. C. of S., G-2, Col. Smith (Act'g)
A. C. of S., G-3, Col. Twaddle (Act'g)
A. C. of S., G-4, Col. Meyer (Act'g)
A. C. of S., WPD, Col. Anderson (Act'g)
Colonel Orlando Ward, Secretary, General Staff.
Subject: Defense Ob.jectives (Revised Feb. 13, 1941)
• *•••••
To give you a further view of the special circumstances, we have been pressed
by the Navy to provide more security for the Fleet that has been gathering at
Manila. They have added one or two major vessels, old large cruisers, I believe.
Some time back they added some modern submarines but there was not an AA
gun to defend the Cavite anchorage. Not one. And that put Admiral Hart out
there in a very embarrassing, if not careless, position, particularly as the Japa-
nese were coming in with a new plane of remarkable speed, 360 mps and climbing
ability and heavy gun armament, 6 guns, two of which are 20 mm. The planes
out there are well under 300 (mi. per hour).
We have a very archaic plan in the Philippines at the present moment, and I
have described the AA situation to Admiral Hart. Under those conditions we
have abstracted 18 guns, gotten them out of organizations (very quietly) in
order to get them out to the Philippines. That is no complete defense. It is
only a very small fraction but it is something. It has the effect of boosting
morale and of preventing the Japanese planes from just being contemptuous in
their approach. Just as we got it arranged, the Navy wanted equipment for
some battalions to go to Wake, Midway and another island where they have to
have AA. They took 16 of the guns and left us with 2. We have no more deliv-
eries until July, so all we can send out are 4 unless we take them away from
troops, but that is a dilemma.
Out in Hawaii the Fleet is anchored but they have to be prepared against any
surprise attack. I don't say any probab'e attack but they have to be prepared
against a surprise attack from a trick ship or torpedo planes. Our whole Navy
power in general is concentrated there ; they can't cruise for next six months.
We are pretty well off in AA 3" guns out there ; we are not so well off in the
.50 caliber.
But when it came to planes, we onlv had 36, of which 19 could cruise 292 miles
an hour, with only four guns, two .50's and two .30's. With the new Japanese
1628 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
plane you can see the situation there. So we arranged to send 31 more P36's
to reinforce the 16. (Supposed to have 1£0. ) The carrier is to come back on
March 15 and then for the first time we give them the most modern plane — the
P-40D, with six guns, two of which are .50 caliber speed 360 miles, leak-proof
tanks and armore ; not as rapid to climb as the Japanese plane. 50 of those
will go on the 15th on the carrier from San Diego to Honolulu to safeguard the
Fleet.
if * * f.! * * *
General Mauborgne said that another question has to do with change in
priorities ; these pursuit people can't work without their detectors and if the
situation is such that you need guns for the protection of the Navy somewhere
in Hawaii, that you are going to have change priorities and get some aircraft
warning units mobilized.
Gon. Marshall said we are on that right now.
Gen. Moore said that we are making a complete study of that whole question
on aircraft warning and also with reference to priorities and where we are
going to establish this service first. The question came up in connection with
the Alaskan aircraft warning service.
Gen. Marshall said that with reference to priorities, he had put the cards on
the table with Admiral Stark and said, where do you want it. The protection of
the Fleet is of major consideration. He said that Admiral Stark was quite
embarrassed. When the next planes ccme out over and above the .50 mm.
planes, it is a question of where they go, to Panama or the Philippine Islands.
That will be up to the Navy. "I am going to allow them to practically dictate
where those planes should go until we reach a certain degree of security." We
haven't any modern me<lium bombers. They are just beginning to come off the
line. The question is where do they go. That is a Navy decision, for the protec-
tion of the Fleet, and at the present time for the protection of our shores. "I
don't think they want the first ones in Manila. They will probably say that they
want them first in Hawaii. Then how many in Panama. The Navy can almost
tell us. Those priorities will all have to b^^ solved in terms of protection of the
Navy in the immediate situation.
EXHIBIT NO. 55
CONFKRKNCK IN THK OFFICK OK THK CHIEF OF StAFF .\T 10: Of) A. M., TUF,SI>AY,
February 25, 1941
Present: Chief of Staff, General Emmons, (Jeneral Arnold, General Brett,
General Spaatz, General Gerow, Colonel McNarney, Colonel Anderson, Colonel
Twaddle.
Chikf of Staff : In view of the Japanese situation the Navy is concerned with
the security of the fieet in Hawaii, and apparently the new commander of the
fleet there has made a check and reported it to Washington and the Secretary
of the Navy has outlined the situation to the Secretary of War. Their particular
point is the type of air force in Hawaii, particu'arly Pursuit. They are in the
situation where they must guard against a surprise or trick attack. It is neces-
sary for the fieet to be in anchorage part of the time and they are particularly vul-
nerable at that time. I do not feel that it is a possibility or even a prcbability, but
they must guard against everything. We also have information regarding the
possible use of toi-i)edo planes. There is the possible sudden introduction of
Japanese carrier-based planes of the Messerschmidt type which has a speed of
322 miles per hour, armored, etc. The Navy viewpoint is that the whole fieet
is involved and that the sea power of the United States might be jeopardized.
We have already arranged to send 31 P-36 ships there. The Curtis plant has
moved up the delivery date of 50 additional planes to March 10th: the Navy is
.sending a Carrier back for these ships. The issue is the priority with regard to
new equirment. Admiral Hart has six new submarines, one old cruiser, and not
one AA gun. They have now brought up the question of moving some armament
from Corregidor. The planes in the Philippines are of the Swedish type which
the Chinese turned down. If we had a single squadron of modern planes in the
Philippines, it would at least give the Japanese something to think about. Then
we have the question of Panama — no modern planes. I understand that the
P— 40s have some engine trouble which makes them dangerous flying over water.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1629
Consequently, our original allocation will be changed by the Japanese situation.
Also I have a memorandum with reference to a British request for 50,000 air-
planes, to be delivered in 1942. We have a deficiency of 10,000 in organizing the
14,000 program. We are concerned with the reduction of the assignment to the
GHQ Air Force. It was thought to our advantage to have as many as iwssible in
foreign garrisons. I have just been talking about pursuit. We have started a
proposition to fill up outlying garrisons, those close to home aren't so much of
a problem.
Colonel Anderson. We have made a tentative allocation of planes as follows :
First priority: to the Philippine Islands — one interceptor squadron, one medium
bomber squadron. To Alaska — one composite' group. To Hawaii and Panama —
sufficient strength to meet a two-carrier attack. To Puerto Rico — one pursuit
group and two bomber groups. Second priority: The equipment for an emergency
force to South and Central America — three groups of heavy or medium bombers,
two groups of light bcmbers, and two groups of intercept. Third priority: Re-
mainder of the GHQ, minimum training requirements for the remainder of the
54 group program. We will complete training requirements before January
1942; will complete the 54 group in intercept pursuit in January 1942; fighter
pursuit in July 1942 ; heavy bombers in April 1942 ; medium bombers in December
1941 ; light bombers in April 1942.
Chief of Sfaff. What do you think about this, Emmons?
General Emmons. We have little means to accomplish our plans in GHQ Air
Force. We are 850 officers short on the 25 group program and we won't get the
shortage made up until July, then we will only have graduates of training
centers. If we make the normal assignments to staff echelons, we will have
less than 100 officers with 2 years service to distribute over 34 groups. With
respect to planes, we have 500 combat types for instance. With regard to the
P-36 we had to get 31 to send to Hawaii, it took all we had (71) to get the 31 out,
due to repairs, ships on the ground, etc. The backbone of our present airplane
strength is the B-18 of which we have 140. Of the 193 P^Os we now have only
175, many are out of commission for lack of spare parts. We have 50 B-17s,
also 4 P39s and 5 A-20A. We are also short of spare parts. Although we have
on paper about 500 planes, I doubt that we could put 300 in the air.
General Arnold. The 25 group program is supposed to be completed by July
1941 ; the 54 group by April 1942.
General Emmons. With regard to sending equipment on foreign service it
wculd be a mistake to send new planes over-seas until the defects inherent with
new materiel have been ironed out. We have changes on the 50 P-40Bs to go to
Hawaii, probably won't make much difference except with the engine.
General Brett. The engine is improving all the time. The P^OD has a new
engine.
Chief of Staff. How about the Air Depot in Hawaii?
General Emmons. It functions very well.
General Arnold. With regard to this shortage of parts, we are going to have to
manufacture parts in the depots — we used to do it before.
General Brett. The shortage in parts is due to the fact that we have pushed
the plane manufacturers so far the planes that they have been forced to neglect,
in a measure, the production of spare parts.
General Emmons. With regard to organization equipment, we are in pretty
good shape. The only shortage is in cameras and octants. With regard to the
all(-cation, I don't know what to say. With regard to a tactical point, Hawaii
has a peculiar situation — pursuit is of little value at night, at which time — due
to phosforesence in the water — primary targets, dry-docks, the fleet, etc., stand
out on the darkest night. They will have no warning service until they get
detectors and pursuit would be useless. I would have long range bombers and
not send pursuit, but bombers.
Confei'ence adjourned.
1630 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[11 EXHIBIT NO. 56
Wab Department,
War DF.PARTMENT General Staff,
War Plans Division,
Washington, D. C, May 13, JB/fJ.
AG 600.12 (2-19-41)
WPD 4483
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject : Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department.
I. DISCUSSION
1. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, recommends (Tab A)
that $1,565,600 be allotted his department as soon as possible to initiate the
installation of dispersed protective bunkers for 263 pursuit ships and 95 bombers
at Wheeler and Hlckam Fields. The Chief of Engineers concurs (Tab B) in the
principle of providing such protection and recommends an initial allotment of
$1,C(X),000 with a view to providing necessary balances when costs are more
fully determined.
2. The Chief of the Air Corps urges (Tab C) the construction of similar pro-
tective bunkeis, to include gas proofing and bombproof shelters for crews, for
170 pursuit ships and 83 bcmbers. these being the total number of airplanes
presently visualized as an attainable objective in Hawaii within a reasonable
time. The gas proofing visualized consists of an impregnated covering provided
with collective protector units to keep out gas. He states that such revetments
should be located at the "battle stations" of airplanes dispersed at present and
projected airdromes in the Hawaiian Islands. He recommends that $1,955000
for the construction of gas proof revetments in the Hawaiian Islands be included
in estimates now being prepared pending receipt and approval of estimates re-
vised to include gas proofing for 253 airplanes.
3. War Plans Division believes :
a. That the danger of sustained air attack against air fields in Hawaii from
carrier based aviation is not serious. On the other hand, the relatively small
sum required per airplane to provide protection against bomb attack is un-
doubtedly justified in any locality where heavy air attacks are envisaged.
b. That gas attacks against air fields in the Hawaiian Islands are not probable
and, if encountered, reasonable protection can be secured through the medium of
impregnated clothing and gas masks. Accordingly, the gas proofing of revetments
as proposed by the Chief of the Air Corps is not concurred in.
c. That the construction of splinter-proof shelters within the walls of the
revetment for the protection of crews against splinters will be relatively inex-
pensive and should be a standard item of construction where revetments are to
be built. Bombproof shelters for individuals in battle positions are not believed
justified.
n. ACTION RECOMMENDED
1. That the construction of revetments in the Hawaiian Department for 70
four ensrine bombardment, 13 light bombardment and 170 pursuit airplanes be
approved.
2. That the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, be directed to sub-
mit revised estima'^es covering the construction of these revetments incori)orat-
ing splinter-proof shelters for the plane crews.
3. That the Chief of the Air Corps be authorized to include funds in the amount
of $1,358,(X)0 for this purpose in the next estimates to be prepared, subject to
correction in amount on receipt of revised estimates from the Commanding Gen-
eral, Hawaiian Department.
4. That, if approved, these papers be returned to War Plans Division for fur-
ther necessary action.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1631
ni. OONCUBRENCB
A. C. Of S., G-4 ( ) In 5/13/41 Out 5/16/41
/«/ Harry J. Malony
Habey J. Malony,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.
Incls
AG 600.12 (2-19-41) w/3 inds. and 2 incls (as listed on 3d Ind.)
Memo, 4-29-41, to ACofS., WPD from C/AC.
Mat 2i 1941
Appi oved
By order of the Secretary of War
R. C. Moore,
Deputy Chief of Staff.
(Sgd) W. T. Sexton
by W. T. Sexton.
Maj., O. S. C, A<st. Sec. W. D. G. S.
Noted— Deputy Chief of Staff W. T. S.
EXHIBIT NO. 57
May 19, 1941.
CONFEBENCE IN THE OFFICE OF THE SECBETARY OF WAE, MAY 19, 1941
Present :
The Secretary of War — Mr. Stimson,
The Under Secretary of War — Judge Patterson.
The Assistant Secretary of War — Mr. McCloy.
The Assistant Secretary of War for Air — Mr. Lovett,
The Chief of Staff— General Marshall.
The Deputy Chiefs of Staff — General Bryden ; General Moore : General Arnold,
The Secretary, General Staff — Colonel Ward.
He « « * * * *
Subject : Martinique.
General Marshall : In the light of statements made in the Sunday papers with
reference to Daliar and Martinique, I had the plans checked immediately. The
plan provides for 2,8CO Marines, with the necessary landing equipment to make
the initial landing, followed by the 1st Division. The Marines have the necessary
landing equipment for their troops. They will be opposed by 4,(XX) to 5,0(X>, 50%
effective, troops. About 50 oflBcers of the Martinique garrison will tight, including
the Admiral. The G-3 of the force is very pro-American. The French cruiser in
Martinique is a first class cruiser ship with a top speed of 40 knots.
The Secretary of War asked whether she was in good condition, and was in-
formed that she was.
General Marshall indicated that it would take about ten days for the Navy to get
boats for the 1st Division. He further indicated that it w.-^s primarily a Naval
mission, but that Army Air should participate, both for the help it could give and
the experience it would gain. He indicated that the B-18's in Puerto Rico would
be staged at St. Croix. Puerto Rico is almost 4C0 miles from Martinique.
General Marshall then indicated that there were now in the United States
14 B-17's of the most modern type which he thought should not be sent out of the
country in view of the current situation. These had been withheld from the
Hawaiian Department contingent.
The Secretary of War asked if this would affect the impregnability of Hawaii.
General Marshal said that it would not. He further said that we need some
B-17's (but not of the most modern type) in Panama, and that he is recommend-
ing that 9 be sent there. This matter is under consideration.
General Arnold. There are now available 50 B-17's without leak-proof tanks
and without armor.
General Marshall. High bombing is possible in the Caribbean area, due to
weather conditions, and these ships without leak-proof tanks could be effectively
used there.
1632 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 58
CONTENTS
1. List taken from President Roosevelt's appointment book specifying his engagements
witii the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, General Marsiiall and Admiral Stark, for
period October 1 to December 7, 1941.
2. Telephone calls made from outside through White House switchboard on December
ti, 1941, and December 7, 1941, as compiled from operators' notes available.
3. List of dinner guests at White House Saturday evening, December 6, 1941.
4. List showing the President's appointments Saturday, December 6, 1941.
5. List showing the President's appointments Sunday, December 7, 1941.
President Roosevelt's Engagements With the Secretaries of State, War and
Navy, General, Marshall and Admiral Stakk — October 1st to Decembeb 7,
1941
1941
October KtJi—l P. M.
(lunch)
October 7th— 2.15 P. M.
October 9th— 2.30 P. M.
October lJ,th—S.40 P. M.
October 16th — 12 noon
October 16th— 2 P. M.
October 21iit— 10 A. M.
October 22nd— 2 P. M.
October 29th— 3 F. M.
October 31st— 1.15 P. M.
November 6th — 11.15 A. M.
November 7th — 12 noon
November 10th — 12 noon
November 13th — 11.45 A. M.
November 15th— 11.30 A. M.
November 15th— 12.15 P. M.
November 17th — 11 A. M.
Admiral Stark and Harry Hopkins.
Secretary Knox.
The Secretary of War, General Marshall, General
Lewis B. Hershey and Dr. Leonard G. Rown-
tree.
The Secretary of State.
The Secretary of State.
The Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secre-
tary of the Navy, General George C. Marshall,
Admiral Harold R. Stark and Hon. Harry
Hopkins.
Secretary Hull, The Vice President, Senator Alben
W. Barkley, Senator Tom Connally, Speaker
Rayburn and Congressman John W. McCor-
mack.
The Secretary of the Navy.
Secretary Hull.
Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox.
The Secretary of War.
The Secretary of War.
Secretary Hull and French Ambassador.
Secretary Hull.
The Secretary of War, General Robert C. Richard-
son.
Director Harold Smith, General Marshall, Gen-
eral Brown, Mr. Blandford.
Secretary Hull, The Japanese Ambassador, Hon.
Saburo Kurusu.
Nm-embcr 2J,th 4 15 P. IM.
November 25th 12.15 P. M.
November 27th 2.20 P. M.
November 27th 2.30 P. M.
November 27th 3.45 P. M.
November 28th 12 noon
December 1st 11.45 A. M.
December 2nd 12 noon
December ith 2.15 P. M.
December 4th 3.30 P. M.
December Stffi 1 P. M.
December 5th 2 P. M.
December 7th 3 P. M.
[2]
The Secretary of the Navy.
The Secretary of State, The Secretary of War, The
Secretary of the Navy, General George C.
Marshall, Admiral Harold R. Stark.
Secretary Hull.
Secretary Hull, Japanese Ambassador (Nomura),
Hon. Saburo Kurusu.
Admiral Ernest J. King.
The Secretary of State, The Secretary of War,
The Se T'^tai-y of the Navy, General Marshall.
Admiral Stark.
Secretary Hull, Admiral Stark.
The Secretary of War, The Secretary of the Navy,
The Under Secretary of State.
The Secretary of the Navy.
The Secretary of State.
Secretary Hull (Lunch).
Cabinet
Secretary Stimson, Secretary
Hopkins, General George C.
Hull.
Knox, Hon. Harry
Marshall, Secretary
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1633
Telephone Calls Made From Outside Through White House Switchboard on
12/6/41 AND 12/7/41 AS Compiled From Oferator'b Notes Available
Dee. 6
920a Mr. Stettinius eld Mr. McCIoy— OK.
925a Secy Knox eld Sumner Welles — OK.
930a Seev Knox eld Jt^sse Jones — in NYC — nm.
931a Secy Knox eld PMG — OK.
955a Secy Stinison eld AG— Iwc — ok 1000a
1030a Secy Knox eld Secy Stimson— OK.
1030a Mr. Stettinius eld James Roosevelt — OK.
1047a Secy Knox eld Seey Hull— Iwc— OK 1050a
1045a Secy Knox eld Bob Hinckley— OK.
1100a James Forrestal eld Secy Knox — OK.
1138a. Mr. Stettinius eld Mr. Forrestal— OK.
1150a Secy Stimson eld Secy Hull— OK.
1201p Secy Hull eld Ad'm Stark— OK.
1201p Wayne Coy eld Dir. Smith— Iwc— of 1225p
1205p Ad'm Stark eld Gen. Marshall— OK.
1258p Secy Stim.son eld Secy Hull— Iwc— OK 1259p.
lOOp Ed. Stettinius eld Dean Acheson — OK.
105p Ad'm Stark eld Gen. Marshall— OK.
I09p Ad'm Stark eld Secy Hull— OK.
333p Wayne Coy eld AG— hvc— OK 338p.
830p Secy Knox eld Seey Stimson— OK.
845p Secy Knox eld Secy Hull— OK.
847p Secy Knox eld Secy Stimson — OK.
850p Secy Navy eld Oprns WD— OK.
Dec. 7.
1044a Secy Knox eld Ad'm Stark— OK.
1140a Gen. Marshall eld Ad'm Stark— OK.
1130a Gen. Marshall eld Ad'm Stark— OK.
1136a Secy Knox eld Ad'm Stark— OK.
12] Op Ad'm Stark eld Gen. Marshall— OK.
I229p Ad'm Stark eld (Jen. Marshall— OK.
l]9p Secy Knox eld Ad'm Stark— OK.
201p Ad'm Stark eld Gen. Marshall— OK.
205p Ad'm Stark eld Secy Hull— busy— OK 215p
210p Ad'm Stark eld Gen. Marshall— OK.
250p Ad'm Stark eld Gen. Marshall— OK.
305p Gen. Marshall eld Ad'm Stark— OK.
310p Capt. Beardall eld Ad'm Stark— OK.
315p Secy Stimson eld Secy McCloy— OK.
335p VP from NY talked Sen. Hill and Sen. McNary— OK.
445p Secy Hull eld Ad'm Stark— OK.
600p Secy Knox eld J. E. Hoover — talked to Tamm OK.
635p James Forrestal eld Jesse Jones — OK.
845p Ad'm Stark eld Gen. Marshall— OK.
Dinner at the White House Saturday Evening, December 6, 1941 at Eight
O'clock
The President and Mrs. Roosevelt.
Mrs. Breekenridge Long.
Vice Adm. Sir Wilfred & Lady French, Friends of Gladys Hopwood (Wolyche
Whitmore). Sir Wilfred .sent here from England on business in connection
with Navy Dockyard.
Maj. Gen. Blanton Winship.
Brig. Gen. & Mrs. Shelley U. Marietta, Walter Reed Hospital.
Hon. and Mrs. Norman S. Case, Member, Federal Communications Commission.
Mr. and Mrs. Frederick B. Adams, Sr., Friends and house guests.
Mr. and Mrs. Frederick B. Adams, Jr., Friends and house guests.
1634 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Miss Laura Adams, Friend and house guest.
Maj. and Mrs. Clifford Blitch, Walter Reed Hospital, Medical Corps.
Mrs. Grenville T. Emmet, Friend
Mr. Raymond H. Geist, Chief of Division of Commercial Affairs, Department of
State.
Mrs. Charles Hamlin, Friend and house guest.
Hon. Nan Wood Honeyman, Former member of Congress.
Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Le Blanc, Artist.
Lt. Comdr. Garrison Norton, Friend of Hon. Frederic A. Delano.
Mr. and Mrs. Conyers Read. He is head of British Empire Division under
Colonel Donovan.
Capt. and Mrs. James Roosevelt.
Mr. and Mrs. Charles P. Taft.
Mr. and Mrs. Charles Warren, Friends.
Capt. Chester Hammond, White House Aide.
Lieut. Wilkie A. Rambo, White House Aide.
The President's Appointments, Saturday, December 6, 1941
10 A. M. : Justice Wm. O. Douglas.
11 : 15 A. M. : Director Harold Smith.
The Pbesident's Appointments Sunday, December 7, 1941
12.30 P. M.— The Chinese Ambassador.
3.05 P. M.— The Secretary of War.
The Secretary of the Navy.
Mr. Harry Hopkins.
Captain John Beardall.
Secretary Marvin Mclntyre.
Secretary Early.
Miss Grace TuUy.
3.20 P. M.— Gen. George Marshall.
The Secretary of State.
7.00 P. M.— The Solicitor General.
8.40 P.M. — The Vice President and entire Cabinet.
9.45 P. M.— The Vice President.
Senator Alben W. Barkley.
Senator Charles McNary.
Senator Connally.
Senator Warren Austin.
Senator Hiram Johnson.
Speaker Rayburn.
Congr. Jere Cooper.
Congr. Joe Martin.
Congr. Sol Bloom.
Congr. Charles Eaton.
10.45 P. M. — Under Secretary Sumner Welles.
12.00 P.M.— Mr. Ed Murrow.
Col. William Donovan.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1635
EXHIBIT NO. 59
the yUmd of Q>fc Ti. ckie to Its fortification, lt» gorrlsor., and its
ptxytioml ck«^*ct«rlatic», Is bollamsd to b» th« strongest fortrnss In ths
iwrld.
To reciboa Oiiht) th» ansvy must transport oversaas in axpeditionazy
foroa ei^abla of azacuting a. forced lanrilng against a garriaon of anpreatl-
■ataljT 35,000 aac, ■anBlng 127 fSxad aoaat dafonaa guns, 211 antiaircraft
aaapcoa, and morw than 3,000 artillery places and autosaatlc -wisapons avail-
able for baach dafansa. Klthcmt air superiority thia i« an ianjosslble
task.
Mr Cefanaa . Ulth adaqaate air dafanaa aoewy carrier'?, na^al escorts
and transports will begin to ccne under sir attack at a aistance of ap-
proodjMtaly 750 sUas. this attack will increase in intensity until nhen
within 200 Kllaa of tha obJectlTa.tha aneay forces wiU be subject to
attache by all types of boMbarctaant closely supported by our moet Jiodem
ipnrsult.
Hawaiian Air paf ansa « Doeludlog the aoTenent of aviation now in
pvogrsas Hawdi will ba defended b^'35 of our most modem flying fortresses,
35 ■»dit» range boabers, 33 li^it boaberSj 150 pursuit of uhldi 105 are
of over aost sodam type, m addition Hawaii is capable of reinforcement
by heavy bonbara f n« tha aainland by air. IRth this force available a
■ajor attack against Oahu is oonaldarad Ispractlcable .
la point of saquence, sabotage is first to be expected and may,
within a very lladtad tia», causa great dataaga. On this accoimt, and
in ordmr to assure strosig control, it would be highly desirable to set
Tip a atUltaxy control of tha islands prior to the likelihood of our in-
volvaasnt in the F^ East.
1636 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 60
[i] ' SECRET
Mkmoraudum for the President
Subject : Ground Forces.
1. Basic Considerations.
n. National Policy.
Defense of Western Hemisphere.
Preservation of war effort of Britain, Russia and associated powers.
Curb of Japanese aggression.
Eventual defeat of Germany.
h. Requirements.
Germany cannot be defeated by supply of munitions to friendly powers, and
air and naval operations alone. Large ground forces will be required.
(1) Western Hemisphere Security.
Provide minimum garrisons necessary to hold outlying bases in event of sudden
collapse of United Kingdom.
Prepare task forces for prompt employment against Atlantic islands and Natal
I'egion of Brazil.
(2) Western Pacific Theater.
Ru.sh build-up of air power to Philippines, together with small increases in
modern ground army equipment and personnel to restrain Japan from advance
into Malayasia or Eastern Siberia. ,
(3) European Theater.
Prepare security forces for air and naval bases in the British Isles and Ireland.
Prepare task forces to secure, when opportunity offers, additional bases en-
circling Germany. Britain is reaching limit of usable man power. We must
.supplement her forces.
Prepare framework for forces eventually to defeat Germany. Time is required
to organize, train and equip these.
(In handwritins [2] 2. Immediate Requirements.
on Margin:) ^^ j^j^g ^^ Britain stands and her Fleet remains intact.
a. ATLANTIC BASES.
1,500 total this fall (1) Greenland. Authorized 2,500; Now there only con-
struction troops and local guards. Base for staging aircraft
to Britain and patrol base for North Atlantic. Secure de-
fense of bases and cryolite mines essential. Forces must be
dispatched earliest moment.
4,500 total this fall (2) Newfoundland. Authorized 5,500; now there 2,500.
Naval and air bases for protection of Great Circle Route, and
to assist Canadians in defense of Newfoundland. Dispatch
of approximately 1,000 men of the total force can be deferred,
but these must be equipped and available in United States.
2,000 total this fall (3) Bermuda. Authorized 4,000; now there 800. Air and
naval base. Contribute to defense of Atlantic Seaboard. Dis-
patch of about 1,000 men of the total force can be deferred,
but these forces must be available in United States.
350 total this fall (4) Jamaica. Authorized 876; now there 14. Essential
staging field. Ground forces of 350 men required for pro-
tection United States installations. Dispatch of remainder
can be deferred.
Leave (5) Puerto Rico. Authorized and present garrison 21,000.
Advanced air and naval base. New naval base under develop-
ment. Covers approaches to Panama Canal. From mili-
try point of view, reduction in garrison by demobilization of
Puerto Rican National Guard is feasible. Demobilzation
would have adverse political reaction and serious economic
repercussions.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1637
12,000 total this (6) Trinidad. Authorized 16.000; now there 1,800. Naval
fall anchorage. Major air base for protection Southeast ap-
proaches to Caribbean. Jumping off point for prompt move-
ment into South America. Ground forces required for pro-
tection and mobile reserve for prompt movement. Dispatch
of about 4,000 men of the total force can be deferred, but this
remainder must be immediately available in United States.
O. K. (7) British Otiiana, St. Lucia, Antigua. Authorized and
presents 350 men each. Essential air and naval bases and
staging fields.
O. K. (8) Panama. Authorized and present 33,000. Ground
forces essential to protect locks and utilities, and for ship
guards and small reserve for use in South and Central Amer-
ica. Air defense demands continuous alert, necessitating
forces occupying over 300 scattered positions. Ground forces
cannot be safelv reduced.
O. K. b. PACIFIC BASES.
(1) AiasAa. Authorized 24,000 ; now there 16,000. Air and
naval bases covering Great Circle Route to Far East. Iso-
lated. [S] Poor communications. Great distances.
Fleet in Pacific reduces threat. Authorized garrison essen-
tial to reasonable security.
O. K. (2) Hau-aii. Authorized and present 41,000. Naval instal-
Leave as is. lations (Kaneohe Bay) being expanded, requiring additional
defenses. Presence of Fleet reduces threat of major attack.
Reinforcements can be deferred as long as Fleet remains in
Pacific. Reinforcements must be available in United States
to give Fleet freedom of action.
12,000 additional (3) Philippines. Present garrison or enroute 31,000 (12,000
native troops). Critical situation. Japan wavering. Strong
air and naval forces on her flank may deter her or wean her
from Axis. If Japan moves, forces in position to assist Asso-
ciated Powers. No reduction possible, on the contrary rein-
forcements of about 12,000 troops, including air complements,
in prospect. Philippine Army in process of organization
80,000 bv January 1, 1942.
c. TASK FORCES.
(1) Oiganized forces for overseas expeditions. Two forces
especially trained for landing attacks. Complete equipment
and ammunition reserves necessary.
O.K. (a) East Coast Task Force with amphibious training. One
division (reinforced) 27,000 men. Possible use ; Azores, Cape
Verdes, Martinique.
Out but O K. as an (b) West Coast Task Force imth amphibious training.
Emergency Task One division (reinforced) 27,000 men. For use in Pacific
Force or west coast South or Central America. Available for use
in Atlantic.
O. K. (c) Relief Forces. For Azores, Cape Verdes, one division
(reinforced) 27,000 men. After taking Azores, Cape Verdes,
specially trained amphibious task force should be relieved and
quickly reconstituted for additional operations.
O.K. (d) Expeditionary Force. Reinforced Corps (3 divisions
foot ; two divisions armored ; reinforcing units) — 154,000. For
use as required ; Brazil, Africa, Philippines, England, Mid-
dle East. Essential to security Western Hemisphere, for
exploiting success of task forces and for carrying out com-
mitments of ABC-1.
O.K. (e) Iceland Force. One division (reinforced) 28,000 men.
5,000 now in Iceland. Remainder to relieve Marines and
British in spring of 1942.
d. REMAINDER OF ARMY.
(1) Ground Forces:
(a) GHQ Reserve (4 armored, 2 cavalry divisions, antiaircraft) _ 115. (X)0
(b) Two field armies (20 infantry divisions) 465,000
1638 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[Jf] Air Forces.
(a) Combat 60,000
(b) Maintenance 40,000
(c) Schools 150,000
(3) Additional personnel.
(a) Harbor Defenses 45,000
(b) Administrative overhead 125,000
(c) Trainees not assigned to units and instructors 150,000
Total 1, 150, 000
(4) The Ground and Air Combat Forces are essential :
(a) For reinforcement of expeditionary forces — always unpredictable and to
meet the unexpected.
(b) To permit rapid expansion.
(c) For training of new units and reserves.
(o) Armored Forces included are difficult to train. Approximately 9 months
required. Large number of specialists. Cannot be readily created by conversion
of other forces. Any operations against Axis will require high percentage of
armored forces. First two armored divisions about 90% equipped, with 95%
proposed by April 1, 1942. Second two divisions recently organized, about 45%
equipped. Equipment for third two divisions 20% or less. By spring of 1942,
four armored divisions will be 85% or better equipped and trained. The remain-
ing two cannot be ready for operations before the late summer of 1942. No
reduction in armored units should be made..
3. Effect on Defense Aid of reducing Ground Forces,
n. Policy of Defense Aid should be based on :
(1) Task forces equipped 100%.
(2) Overseas forces equipped 100%.
(3) Remaining Army Forces equipped 50%.
6. Task forces require 100% equipment for combat. Any reduction in strength
will reduce Tasks which can be undertaken.
c. A reduction of 25% in the personnel of overseas departments would have
no effect on antiaircraft material and combat vehicles and only minor effect
on infantry and artillery materiel. Similer reduction in strength of Base Forces
would not materially increase the amounts of Defense Aid releases. Excluding
the Philippines, the saving in shipping would amount to some 32,000 tons anually.
d. Reduction of equipment of Remaining Army Forces below 50% is impossible
without seriously lowering morale and retarding development of new units.
Additional Defense Aid materiel from this source can be obtained only by reduc-
tion in number of units.
[5] e. Summarizing, no appreciable increase in Defense Aid items desired
by the British can be realized except by eliminating units of Remainder of
Army.
4. Future Requirements. .
By 1943, Nazis may dominate Europe from Urals to Iberian Peninsula and
from Scandinavia to North Africa. Germany's war machine may comprise 400
divisions. Collapse of Russia, England, offensive tactics by Japan and bellig-
erent attitude in Latin America are possibilities. We must prepare to meet
these eventualities.
Our broad concept of encircling Germany and closing in on her step by step
is the only practical way of wearing down here war potential by military and
economic pressure. In the final decisive phase we must come to grips with and
annihilate the German military machine. Forces deemed necessary at this time
to accomplish role of ground units in supreme effort to defeat Germany com-
prise five field armies of about 215 divisions (infantry foot, armored, motorized,
airborne, mountain and cavalry). If the United States remains committed to
the policy of defeating Germany, making an all-out effort mandatory, then we
must build toward these forces as rapidly as possible. To seize and hold the
initiative we must have forces available for employment at the time and place
of our own choosing, not Hitler's. Any reduction of our present forces may
result in fatal delay. Time is required for the training of forces in the technique
of modern war. We are already late. We must not abandon present gains and
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1639
we should push on with unremitting effort. Furthermore, sudden basic changes
ot policy are seldom justified in prolonged efforts, and are devastating to organ-
ized effort. The "long view" is essential to our interests. In other words, to
shift our national objectives by the reduction of our army at the present time,
might well be disastrous. Certainly the momentary encouragement it would give
the Russian and British governments, would be far outweighed by the positive
indications it would give to the German government, that they need not fear
an eventual onslaught of ground forces.
5. Conclusions.
No appreciable increase in items of equipment especially needed by the British
(AA guns, armored vehicles and ships) will result from any reduction of Army
ground forces, which can be justified by the present international situation.
Chief of Staff.
Confidential
Proposed United States deliveries of light tanks, MS, October 1, 1941, to
completion of contracts
Note: No English Contracts Scheduled
Total pro-
ductions
(2)
Allocations to-
Months
(1)
other
Nations
(3)
United
States
(4)
October
290
300
310
330
360
400
400
400
400
183
180
180
100
110
300
300
300
300
107
November,..
120
December __.
130
January '
230
February
250
March
100
April.
100
May...
100
June
100
Subtotal
3,190
400
400
400
130
1,953
300
300
300
98
1,237
July
100
August
100
September
100
October
32
Totals
4,520
2,951
1,569
79716 O — 46 — pt. 15-
-16
1640 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 61
ARTMENT "Ote^ -
wAM tm'MtnmHr aoixitAi. staffST AU'NKHUI'I <W A. (1. 09 *,, WTO
T)ec»iSb*r 7,
ttlWto' " * "
IffiJCKJLjaXli).'. KS THK ADirjUiiT aEJnSRlLl, Vfta*«"-^!^ 38CP3tar>-, OaWJf.
Subjact: Far 2ast Sitiialion.
Taa Secretary <^f W*r airccw tnat wo i'ojj.''sn.us i.-^sj- pt ■
aecrat r»3 i,My«f«i be sent to ttM CtUBStutding OwcHtral^ O.S, Ar^ "iXom
tJ» Far Sal J Coamanding Gsnernl, Currlbsan Qpfbiws CeawMvif Cxs^^
0«neral, Hftwftliajn I«p8rt«»ntt Coeaaasdiag Qaneral, Siourt'
Jap«iKiee ar* prsiMwting at one pM* S'Uita* . k^^.^»^.^.
tl-n« tscUiy itbet ajaouiits to an ultlnatnsi, nXsa %)r^ ic« vol
orders to dastrcy their Cod» naxMa* IttsiwlUtdly «t«p .?»v
Tfhst «igatfleanc« tfca hour »<!«t say hav» wo do i»t i:.
be oa ftl«rt ecoordtngly atop InfaBR naval jrjtiiarit^ -
this fjnr.Tjr.ir.flt.i i^n.
^Uz. O.CS _
OESCM,
Brigadier Cecaral..
Acting /UMri«t«nt Cinisf ci
^hr Hadioa as folioDW diswitc; *^^ ' Ij
by Code tools, SO.'.' '
/-</7 #529 to CTi, B«*. .^^y.-..
/««•#»' #?i9 to ca, ctHwi. Iter. r-.
■fror
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1641
EXHIBIT NO. 62
THE J0I!:T board
viashinRton
SECRET
MIKUraS OF iiEgriiiG.-WOVniBSR 26. 194i «
The weakly nieetinp of The Joint Board scheduled for
Noveaber 26, 1941, was held today in Room 2003, Muii'ions
Building, at 11:35 a.m.
UEIJBERS PRELiEtiT ;
Admiral H. R. SUrk, U.3.H., Chief of Naval Oi>erations,.
Presiding}
reneral 0. C. Uarshall, U.S.A., Chief of Staff;
Rear Acbniral H. E. Int^ersoll, U.S.N. , Assistant Chief of
Naval Oper
Major General ...- ryden, U.S.A., Deputy GMof of Staff;
iSajor General H. H. ^rnold, U.S.A., Deputy Chief of Staff
for Air;
Rear Adnural H. K. Turner, U.S.N,, Director, '.*ar Plans
Division, Office Naval Operations;
Brigadier General \. T. Gerow, U.S.A., Acting Asai:3tant
Chief of Staff, War Plans Division;
Captain D. p. Ramsey, U.S..'.'., Bureau of Aeroriautics,
in the absence of Rear Admiral J. K. Towers,
Colonel W. P, Scobey, U.S.A., Secretary.
The presi -. '■'•©
meeting of Novembe.'- ,, ' "ere
objections. There were no objections and '< • wt-re
approved.
The Secretary then a;inounced the -^ r th.e .-neet-
ing as follows t
Serial 724 - Priority of A-i-a fi.r Kfidi-jj-. Tanks,
Serial 718 - Constr'^ctlon of Air ir --r.p AlenUan
Islands ar^'. '.he Ala^kari '-■ - •
Action ol '.ne ::':.-ar: on tne two serial:j -'.as ci^ i-._^o....;
Serial 724 -■ Frlority of A-l-a for llediu.'a Tanks . Fol-
lowing a '.Hscus.sion of the Joint Planning Cwntslttee report d'oring
which the Navy menbers annoionced their agree.'^jent to elininate
consideration of the four -engine bomber nrogra.*a in crier to expe-
dite action on the tank prograra, motion was raade and seconded
that the serial he apprcjved. k'otlon was adopted vrithcut
objection,
.".ariai ■". .-ictian of Air ■ -.ne Aleutian
Islands and thfi jl^' . -sula . In the" . the dis-
cxission of this subject ihn n.nsy cembers agrcu-i '..i'-h Admiral Stark
that the work proposed ir; xr.e recoianendations nade in the Joint
Planning Coitaaittee report should not be pushed at the ex|>ense
of other defense construction projects in more vital areas. It
was moved and seconded that the seri;.", V-»^ --inprnved. '..'ithout
obj^ection the serial was approved.
The Board ^^aving disposed c:'
a discussion of professional topics.
1642 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Adsdral Stark raised the matter of United Statee
Rdlitary requiretaente in Braail and read a dispatch from
Aiiairal Beauregiird, the United States Nav»l Attache in Rio *
ds Janeiro, . outlirig the difficulties aneountared in obtaining
Brazilian authority to base Navy patrol planes in Katal and
Uaceio for protecting our shipping* The attitude of the
Brazilian Qovemment, as reported by Acteiral Bea^tei^rd,
if to oppose further aiilitary developaent in Brajsil by the
Uhited States, General Uarshall recounted hie expwience during
his recent visit to Brazil. At that time the Bra«ilian military
chiefs favored U. S. military assistance in Bratil. Since that
time there had been a narked change in their attitude and now
collaboration with the United States had- be«i supplanted by
opposition* The responsibility for this reversal in relation-
ship was attributed largely to Nazi efforts, and should the
deaocracies suffer further reverses, continued and further
opposition to the United States in Brazil sight be eJipected.
No Joint Board acticai was taken on this subject, but Aiiairal
St&ric requested that the Army postpone further requests to base
troops or planes in Brazil until the Navy is fully established
there.
Adftiral stark wanted to know if any «aaterial ha4 been
forwarded by the Army t»o Chiang Kai Shek by airplane or if any
such request had been received. His query was based upon a
request raade by Mr, Currie for the use of one Navy patrol plane
to fly certain critical items «r equipraent from lilanila to
Singapore or Rangoon, General Arnold knew of no laateriala
being forwarded by airplane except soae spares for pursuit air^
planes which had become tiaoessary because of damage to airpianes
already delivered to China,
The Board next engaged in a discussion of the Pacific
situation. The Navy had infomation that Japanese airplanes
had been making reconnaissance and photographic flights over
the United States islands in the Western Pacific. It was felt
that in view of recent deveGLopnents indicating reinforcwnants
and activity in the construction of defense installations in
the Marshall and Caroline Islands, efforts should be made on
the part of the Uhited States to piiotograph the Bore important
of these islands. General Arnold announced that two pdanes
were already enroute fr<»a Dayton to the Philippines with photo-
graphic equipewnt and with instructions to photograph Truk,
Jaluit, and such other Important Apanese islands as require.d.
With reference to this missitai, Admlrml Turner announced that
the Conmander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Hart, had pro-
posed that the Ifcxited States, the British, and the IXitch undej>-
take to photograph all of the islands in the Far East and
Western Pacific, but since the knsy was engaged in the stated
photographic mission, the Navy would like the planes to obtain
certain specific information. General Arnold proposed that
tJhe Army would assist the Navy in obtaining desired data if
the Navy would furnish to him, without delay, a moBccrendum of
exactly what was desired so that instructions could be given
to the pilots engaged on the two j:i\otographic missions.
The Board next discussed the stationing of Anny
pursuit aviation on islanda of Midway and '^ake. The Army ife
willing to locate a squadron of 'twenty-five airplanes on each
of the islands. The Navy membars annoxinced their agreement.
In connection with the operation (^neral Marshall proposedt
1st, that a Navy airplane carrier be used to transport the
Army pursuit units frco Hawaii to their destinations; 2nd, that
- 2 ~
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1643
. - ^ - - ;.cvesT.ent of Arsy *ir units fto the
r.'i-iippijiea by i".*rr.i5i-ijj.g air aund sea protection at Lidway and
./oke Islands, utliitlag patrol planes arid such' ether >iavy
laciltties as availabie. Speaking for the Beard Acfciral Stark
lirected that Actoiral Turner arei General Geroia- get together
a-. • --'■^r •■•f-cessary arranger^ents for the rscvenent, ■'
It. a discussicai on the^develcpaent of an airplane
route acrcss the Pacific f\!rther eastward, the Navy raised
tjie questicsti as to the extent of Amy plans for the development
cf Christnas Island as one of the landing fields un this route.
It was the JSavy's belief that developnents contb.-45lated by the
n.T.y should be made on l^ljayra rather thian Ghristnsas Island,
because the scverei^ty of Shristaas Island, being in dispute
• ■'^n the United States and the United Kincdor., would be
■ i by the British following the v,ar. Sxplainir.g the
:. for the developrsents on Christnas Island, General Arnold
pointed out that in the early considerations for the development
cf an interior southern air rcute, the NaTrad Carsaandant of the
lith district, Raraiian Islands, had given General Short, Gora-
nianding Qsnerai, Hawaiian Department, infomation that the
Palayra developesents could not be completed until August of
1942. A reconnaissance aade by Ars^ engineers indticatcd that
construction cf landing field facilities on Christnas Island
could be expedited and the itininun development for flight oper-
ations could be completed by January I5, 1942. Considering the
nscessity for early ccrspletioB of the field the Concsanding
Ger^ral, Hawaiian D^partr.ent, had secured transportation facili-
tier. and operatLnc eo.uipaent and moved into Christraas Island,
and T.a» ocr. struct ion was well under way, 3c that the Nav;.'
mfflRbers Eight have the full picture of Anay action. General
Gerow read the message sent to the '.I'ar Department by the Cocaaanding
Gerier&l of 'the Hawaiian Department, General Arnold stated that
Cantgn and Christnas Islands were tc be staging fields, and the
pertaanent installations would be kept at a roiniiEua, Frllowing
U-.is explanation Admiral Stark stated that, whereas the Jtevy
ccr.sidered Palayra nore desirable than Christnas, nevertheless
the Navy would not now offer further objections to the develop-
ment and coiapleticn of the Christnias Island project.
Hi«re being nc further business before the Board,
W. P. SCCBEI,
Colonel, General Staff,,
Secretary,
-3 ~
1644 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 63
X
(This Exhibit comprises the Top Secret Report and Top Secret
Memoranda of the Arni}'^ Pearl Harbor Board Investigation and will
be found printed as a part of Joint Congressional Committee Exhibit
No. 157. See Table of Contents.)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1645
EXHIBIT NO. 64
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Memoraiuhiin from General H. H. Arnold for Chief of Staff recommending
change in proposed "Standing Operating Procedure" of Hawaiian Depart-
ment dated 14 July 1941.
2. Memorandum from Col. R. H. Dunlop inviting constructive criticism of the
proposed "Standing Operating Procedure," Hawaiian Department.
a. "Standing Operating Procedure," Hawaiian Department (tentative) dated
14 July 1941.
OCS 197a-62
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1647
RESTRICTED
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON
Ootob»r 7, 1941
liElIORANIfDll POR THE CHIEF OF STAFF i
Sub;]«cti Standi ng Operating Procedure, Haiiallan
Department.
1. Attention is Inrited to the attached letter of
initructlona corerlng "Standing Operating Procedure" of the
HamLiian Department dated July 14, 1941.
2. Thia memorandum proridaa. Page 4 Paragraph 14 d. (8)
and (9) aa followat
"(8) Ee lease to Department Provost Marshal a pro-
Tlaional battalion of four (4) companies totaling five hundred
(500) men, to assist Aujciliary Police Force lAen neoessary,
see Paragraph 14 g. (2) below;
"(9) Defend Sehofield Barracks against ground and
sabotage attacks;"
3. I strongly recommend that these prorlsions be re-
■oinded for the following reasons i
a. The Air Force units in ord«r to carry out their
vissionB must hare 100^ effeotiTe aaohanlo and maintenance
strength.
b. Air Force enlisted men have been trained for
partloular~purposes, emd ia lust oases it has taken orer a
Xsar to train them for these speeialised Jobs.
c. In general, it may be said that these prorisiona
are "puttinig the cai>t before the horse." The ground troops
■hoxild proride protection for the air bases rather than the
air units provide protection for the ground bases.
AHKOLD,
, Major General, U. 3. A., ,
f- \ Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.
,V \ \\ Inoli
^'^ (V-, Rastrioted oy "Headquarters
V y^ Hawniian Departasnt" dated
L ^ \i 7-14-41, mimeographod book,
\ f TV- '^i' "Standing (derating
^ ^' Procedure."
RESTRICTED
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1649
RESTR_ICTED
HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Fort Shafter, T. H.
14 July 1941
Subject I Standing Operating Procedure.
Tof All Offioero.
1. Attention is directed to the Tentative Standing Operating
Procedure, Hawaiian Department, attaahed.
2. Constructive criticism is invited. All suggestions will be
submitted to the Office of A. C. of S., G-3, this headquarters, on
or before 15 August 1941.
By command of Lieutenant General SHORT;
PA^^€1(1.,:A
ROBERT H. DTOLOP,
Colonel, A, G. D.
Adjutant General.
f.
1 Ia«lt
tentative 80P-HD
RESTRICTED
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1651
RESTRICTED
HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN nSPARTMENT
Fort Shafter, T. H.
14 July 1&41
STAOTING OPERATING PROCEDURE
HAIVAIIAN DEPARTMENT
(Tentative)
SECTION I GENERAL
Par. Subject P*g*
1 Purpose
2 Unit Procedures
3 Short Title
4 Department Headquarters
5 Tactical Principles
6 Security
7 Liaison
8 Orders 2
9 llovement 2
10 Antiaircraft Defense 2
11 Sentrle 3
12 Guides 3
SECTION II ALERTS
13 Alerts 3
14 Alert No. 1 3
16 Alert No. 2 5
16 Alert No. 3 &
SECTION III
ARMY ANC tfAVV C(><5PERaTI0N
17 Air Forces 7
SECTION IV INTELLIGENCE
18 Intelligence Standing Operating Procedure ....»• 8
19 Essential Elements of Enemy Infonnatloa 8
20 Measures to Obtain Information 11
21 Measures for Handling .11
22 Reports and Distribution 11
25 Department G-2 11
24 G-2 Forms 12
SECTICT 7 ADinNISTRaTION
26 Supply .12
26 Evacuation IZ
27 Traffic IS
28 Motor Transportation ........... 13
RESTHICTBO
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1653
R E S T R _I £ T E D
STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE
HAWAIIAJI DEPARTMENT
(Tentative)
14 July 1941 •
SECTION I
General
1. Purpose . The purpose of a "Standing Operating Prooedure" is
atated in paragraph 205, FM 100-5, "Tentative, Field Service Regulations,
Operations."
2. Unit Proeedures . Conforming to the Department Prooedure, sub-
ordinate units and staff seotions will develop appropriate Standing
Operation Procedures.
3. Short Title . "SOP HD" will signify this Standing Operating
Procedure .
4. Department Headquarters i Department Headquarters may operate
•Ither as a whole or in two groups. When divided, the headquarters will
oonsist of a forward and a roar echelon, the composition of which ordin-
arily will be as follows i
a. Forward Eohelon i
Cocmianding General and Aides.
General Staff (less G-1 and 0-5).
Engineer Officer.
Signal Officer.
Chemical Officer.
Ordnance Officer.
Surgeon.
Headquarters Comiwndant.
Provost Uarshal.
b. Rear Eohelon i
G-1
G-5
Special Staff (less those in forward echelon).
5. Tactical Principles . The chief tactical principles applicable
to the problem of the defense of OeJiu ond the air fields on the outlying
islands are as follows i
a. Complete organitation of the ground;
F. Position to be held lightly;
o'. Large reserves, held mobile, with motor transportation
•uffiolen~ to trunsport themj
d. Automatic counter-attack.
6. Security . Every unit is responsible for its security at
all times from hostile ground or air forces.
7. Liaison , a. Wf leers t During operations, a liaison officer
with motw transportation will be sent from eaoh of the following units
to Department Headquarters and will remain therout except when on a mis-
sion to their own headquarters!
Hawaiian Divislon(8).
Hawaiion Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.
Hawaiian Air Force.
1
RESTRICTED
1654 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
RESTRICTED
86th Observation Squadron.
Departs5ent Rasorve. (If and when eEtoblished) .
b. Responsibility: Liaison responsibility is from left to
right.
r 8, Orders , a. The Department Commandor will issue orders cov-
ering the action o7 the Divi8ion(s), the ivir Foroe, the Coast iVrtillery
Brigade and all attached troops.
b. Orders issued by the Dep(;rtment (excopt us in _o below)
will bo b7i9f written fieW orders with an -iperution map, Circunstonces
may require the issuunco of fin orul order but this will b^ oonfirmsd
luter in writing.
o. Fragmentary orders, oral or written, nay be issued when
appropriate. Copies of the Uepartmtnt Conintmder ' s decision or direc-
tives, together with a rouglily sketched opisration map, will be sent by
stuff officers to lower units as soon us isfuod in >rder that plans raty
bo initiated prior tr- roop.ipt of the field ord-sr from the Depcrtmont,
d. To expedite issuu fmd to conserve tine, unit commanders
and st6.ff~offioers will dictate their dooisl ms, diroctivos, plijis ond
orders. Competent stenogr'ipher-olerlcs and dr-ftsnen will bo trained
within each headquarters.
9, Movement , a. In general, ull troops »rill be moved by motor.
The maximum space in the trucks will bo utilised for the troops (stand-
ing if necessary) sinci all movemonts are nooessurily for short distances.
b. Trucks will not close up and every efl'ort will be made to
avoid halting in the open. In general, trucks will novo diroctly from
one concealed position to onjther conco^'.lcd position. Maximum use will
be taken of overhead cover, and vehicles oithor in bivouac or assembly
areus will always be dispersed.
£. All truck mov«monts in daylight will be by truck infiltro-
ticn, the distance batwaen vehicles boing not greater than 600 yards nor
less than 300 yards. The nuxinun speed uutiiorired by law will be m'-tn-
tained during daylight hJurs, When necossary, officers' o ontrol points
and route markers (pur. 94, FM 25-10) v.-lll be utilirod.
d. Truck movement s at night will be in ojnvjy with blue lights.
The distance between vehicles will be suffioient to permit the unimpeded
flow of ooEiDisroial traffic.
e. Trucks attached to a unit for a specific r.ission will revert
to oontroT of the parent unit yrhon the specific ciission has been uooob-
pllshod,
10 , nntiuiroraft Defonge , ^, i»ntlairoru.ft defense is a responsi-
bility of every unit.
b. All Infantry units njt oooupying front line positions will
have thei"? automatic weapons habitually in readiness for antiaircraft
defense, and all other units will be prep&roc! llkewisa to engage hostile
aircraft.
£, On marches, all weapons suitablt. for use ag.-iinst aircraft
will bo in readiness for action. Vihen enemy air action la inninent
trucks will halt, troops will detruck, disporso and fir«s on enemy planes.
^, All unit commanders will be held responsible for the follow-
ing i ~
- 2 -
RESTRICTED
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1655
RE_STR_IC_TED
Warning: To maintain air guards to give timely warning
of the approach of hostllo aviation.
Conooalment » To bdopt necessary measures tj defeat both
▼Isual reoonnaisaance and uericil photography through proper choice of
position, utilitatlon of cover, and use of camouflage either iA\en halted
or when In movement.
Dispersion; To reduce vulnerability to air attack and obe-
erra tion by dispersion and increased speed of movement.
Reports I To report to the next higher headquarters witho»rfc
delay each action with hostile aircraft
11. Sentries . Double sentries will be placed at all Important in-
•ta nations and~ui adequate alarm system will be established.
12. Guides . In case of a relief, guides from the relieved organiBa-
tion will meet the incoming unit and remain with it until ordered back
to their organization by the commander of the incoming unit.
SECTION II
Alerts
13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (5)
Alerts as indicated bolow. Operations under any Alert will be initiated
by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack, see
paragraph 17 below.
14. Alert Wo. 1 .
a. Alert No. 1 requires the occupation of all field positions by
all units, prepared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army inatallations
on outlying islands.
b. The Hawaiian Division (s) (less detachments) attached 298th
Infantry, ""will:
(1) Defend Oohuj
(2) Be responsible for all military traffic regulations
•xeopt In the area AIEA JUNCTION - BDUANU PALI - MAKAPUU HEAD.
0. The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade , attached Det,
iith F. a7, nin't
(1) Oppose enen^ aircraft by antiaircraft firej
(2) Support Naval forces within range of seaooast armament'i
(5) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile ressels;
(4) Support the Hawailkn Divlslon(8);
(5) Provide method for protection of friendly aircraft from
friendly antiaircraft fire;
(6) Coordinate all antiaircraft and seacoast Intelllgenoe
ftgenoles;
(7) Coordinate seaooast defense with the Inshore Patrol.
-3-
RESTRICTED
79716 O — 46 — pt. 15 17
1656 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
RESTR_I£TED
d. The Heogalian Mr Force will:
(1) Deatroy eneny aircraft;
(2) Carry ou t bombinj^ ml.T- ' ons as directed;
(3) Cooperate with Naval air •> '-9«?i ««« "»>•- ^T ][• below:
(4 ) Qt oatM. aefwA j^ii sAj^^M^ids..fl^ajjiai.^aiifltft<au.AiJLja^-P^
grmmd attack^
(5) Arm all nlanea i
(6) Prepare bombers for dispatch to fields on outlyin g iatanda
amd disperse on fields;
(7) n^i Bpersfl pursuit planes witl^ ''ri?"^ '*'■'' >'""'^-^'-s.
Mnr^hAl a nrwvifiional tg^jft^^^
8) Release to D^ pytmflrit PyprnRt
4^ oomptmiaa tatal^ ^g five hundr.
ion of four (4) oo mptmiaa tatal^^g five hundpsH (^OtU— a—^Aa-A^c^ j t^ farr«
liiary Police Force when neoessaryT^ge par. H g. (2) below|
■"^*Vo!«^ (^sV De lamL-Sa-hfllield Barracks against gro><id and aaboteuce ^
at tacks;
■"■"^"^ (lo) Perform obserratlon, oommand and photographic missions;
(11) Assist la defense of air fields en outlying islands by «•>
•perAtlon of local base detachments with District C^ignianders, s«« par.
14 £. below.
e. G-5 will be prepared to establish the following:
(1) A Food Administration.
(2) A Labor Proourement Service.
f. The District Cocmanders of Hawaii, Jfaui, and Kaxiftl OiCVl<iis,
assisted % the air corps detachments stotloned within the dis-ttPSiHtBa. will
d'dfend the air fields against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and aBla*
tain order in the civil oonaunity.
duties
e. The Department Provst Marshal , in addition to his nom&l
, WTlli
(1) Cooperate with the Auxiliary Police for the protection of
all vital installations within Police District No. 1, exclusive •f those
on Army and Navy reservations;
(2) Inform Comnanding I'enoral, Hawaiian M.r Force, reference \
^details of provisional battalion, see par. 14. d. (8) above; )
(5) Regultite military traffic within arei AIEa JTINCtlOS -
NUUANU PALI - M/UCAPUU HEAD, see par. 14. b. (2) above j
(4) Bo prepared to assist civilian authorities in all <ilr
Raid Precautions including blackout, radio silence and evacuation of
civiliejis from dijigerous ureus.
li. The Air Defense Command , when activated, vdlli
(l) Assume command of all air and antiairorift defense ItofOMl
on Oahu.
-4-
RESTRICTED
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1657
R E S T R _I C T E D
15. Alert No. 2 .
a. Alert No. 2 is applicable to a condition not sufficiently
serious t'o require occupation of field positions as in AJort No. 1,
but does require the availability ot all times of fifty percent (50^)
of all troops either in garrison or in the field and the guarding of
important Installations.
b. The Hawaiian DiTlalon(« ) (le«s detachments) attached
298th Inffflitry, will:
(1) Maintain available fifty peroast (60^) of all troops;
(E) Ifciintaln one (1) infantry battalion with motor trans-
portation sufficient to transport It, prepared to movo on one (1) hour's
notice;
(3) Protect all vital installations and regulate trufflo as
provided in paragraphs 16 b. (3) and (4), Alert He. 3;
(4) Place all 240nni howitrers in position, establish
necessary guards, und place ainmunitlon ot positions, if dlrooted.
0, The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brlytde wlll i
(1) Maintain available fifty percent (50??) of all troops;
(2) Be prepared to put fifty percent (50^ of the armament
Into action without delay; •
(3) Protect all vital installations as provided in para-
graphs 16 £.(1), (2) 4 (3), iUert No. 3;
(4) Place the fire control units in position.
A. The Hawaiian Air Force wlllj
(1) Maintain available fifty percent (SO^ of all troops;
(2) Be prepored to place one (l) squodron of each group
In operation without delay.
(3) Protoot all vital installations on air fields and bases;
^ (4) Be prepared to furnish the provisional battalion, s
/pur. 14. d^. (8) above.
e. The District ComBonders will;
Assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts,
defend the air fields and vital instullations thereat against acts of
sabotage, and maintain order in the olvil ooomunity.
f. The DepartMsnt Provost Marshal wlllt
Be prepared to assuao his responsibilities without delay
under Alert No. 1.
c. The Air Defense Command , when aortivated, will;
Assume oomond of all air und antiaircraft defense forces
on Oohu.
16. Alert No. 3 .
a. Alert No. 3 is a defense against acts of sabotage and up'
risings within the islands, with no particular threat from without.
-5-
EGSTRICTED
1658 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
RESTRI_CTED
b. The Hawaiian Dlvision(8 ) (leas dets) , attached 298th
Infantry ,~wi 1 1 :
(1) Suppress all civil disorders Inoluding sabotage except
in Police District No. 1;
(2) Maintain one (l) infantry battalion with motor trana-
portBtion suffioient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's
notloei
(3) Protect all vital inatallationa, except in Police Dis-
trict No. 1 and on garrisoned Army and Navy reaervationa, as followsj
No. Ij
KANEOBEi
CoBBiand and fire Cjontrol Cable System, see inclosure
Railway and Highway Bridges, see inclosure No. 2;
Water supply for Sohofiold Barracks;
Radio station at PUU HANAKAHUAj
Telephone Exchange at WAIPAUD, TCAHIAWA, KAILUA. LAIE ond
Electric aub-stations at WAHIAIfA. KiaLUA, PHULOA, WAIPIO,
PBaRL city emd ERA, and electric power llnea from YIAIPIO - WAiffAWA - SCHO-
PIELD BikRRaCKS, Inclualve, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive, from KOOLAU
switch station • BELLOWS FIELD, see inclosure No. 3;
(4) Regulate traffic except in Police District No. 1.
(6) Release the 11th Tank Company to the Deptirtment Provost
Marshal i
(6} Be prepared to assist the Navy in guarding thu pimping
stations at AIEA and UjiIaYiA.
£. The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade wlllt
(1) Protect all saaooast and antiulrorat^ armament, search-
lights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements
of the eeaooast and antiaircraft defense |
(2) Protect all vital inatallutions on posts and reaervu-
tiona of the Brigade j
(3) Protect tho Territorial dump and radio beacon f>n Sund
Island.
(4) Provide u guard for th-.; roar echelon jf Department
Headquarters and Tripler General H'>6pital.
d^. The Hawaiian rtir Foroo wllli
(1) Protect all vital installations on air fields and basest
' (2) Release tho provisiinal battalion to Department Provost /
Marshal, see paragraph 14. d. (8) above. j
£. The District Conwiandera willi
(1) Assisted by the air corps detachments within the dis-
tricts, defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against
acts of sabotage, and maintain order in the civil oonraunlty.
£. The Department Provost Marshal willi
(l) Be responsible for the protection of all vital instal-
-6-
RESTR_ICT£D
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1659
RESTR_I£TED
lations within Police District No. 1, exclusive of those on /irmy and
N&vy reservations;
(2) Inform Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, when
ho desires the provisional battalion, see paragraph 14. d. (8), and
Coawanding General, Hawaiian Division, when the 11th Tank Company is
desired.
(3) Regulate military traffic within Police District No. 1.
SECTION III
ARMY AND NAVY COOPERATION
Air Forces. In case of hostile attack all available shore
based NaTal and Marino Corps fighter planes in eppropriato condition of
roodiness pass to Army control, 'xnd all Army bombers in condition of
readiness "A" pass to Navy contril and the bomber commander will report
to the Comi.'ftnder of Patrol Wing TWO.
b. The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade , supported
by all avtTilable Marine Corps antiaircraft artillery, will defend Oahu,
and I
(1) Provide personnel to cooperate with the Navy in the
operation of the Harbor Control Post.
(2) Provide method of protection of friendly aircraft from
friendly antiaircraft fire.
(3) Disseninate warning by radio broadcast of the AAAIS.
£, The Department Signal Officer will insure that joint com-
munications are in readiness for irnaediate employment. Special arrango-
Bients will be made to traneait to the Navy information from the A.Vl.S.
d. Conditions of readiness .
(1) Conditions of readiness will be proscribed by a combin-
ation of a letter and a number from the tables below. The letter indi-
cating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its
assigned task and the number indicating the degree- of oporatinnal jreadl-
no88 presojrlbed for that part.
(2) Material Readiness .
A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready
for a task.
B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type
available and ready for a task.
C. Approximately one-quurtor of all aircraft of each
functional type available and ready for a task.
D. Approjcimntely one-eighth of all aircraft of each
functional type available and ready for a task.
£. ivll aircraft conducting routine operations, none
ready for the purposes of this plan.
(3) Degree of Operational Readinaea .
All times listed in this table are the maximums alloirod
for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and proceeding with
the assigned task.
-7-
RKSTRICTED
1660 CONGRESSIOXAI. INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1. For pursuit and VF types - four minutes. Types
other than fighters - fifteen minutes.
2. All types - 30 minutes.
3. All types - one hour,
4. All types - two hours.
5. All types - four hours.
SECTION rv
INTELLIGENCE
18. The intelligence stunding operating procedure indiooted below
Is applicable generally to ^11 Alerts.
19. Essential Elements of Enemy Information ;
a. Will the enemy attempt to destroy or noutrulite NAVAL BASE,
PEiiRL HARICR, KilJlEOlE B.vy", and air fields on OAHU with the object cf
denying their use to the United States withiut occupation? If »o, will
his air attacks be accomplished by Naval bombardment lyid bljokncllng op-
erations?
b. Will the enemy attempt to capture OAHU by expeditionaiy
forces with the; object of utilizing the HftVftL BASE, PE/JIL avRBCR, KANEOIffi
BAY, and air fields thereon? If 80, when, whore, and with what strength
will he make his main attack?
c. V.ill the enemy attempt to capture any other of the principal
islands oT tho Hawaiian Group with the object of utilizing the air fields
and establishing bases thereon?
d. Will the enemy military operations be accompanied by acts of
sabotage and terrorism on the part of resident sympathisers?
20. Measures to Obtain Infomntion :
a. HAVY .
(1) Trsuismit, through the Joint Intelligence Loop, infomo-
tion received from the Offshore and Inshore Patrols, from any escort or
attack forces formed, tmd from any other Naval ships relative to;
(a) L' edition, composition, course, and speed of enemy
units encountered, with particular reference to location of aircraft
carriers and transports.
(b) Indications of landings on any island of the main
Hawaiian Group, with particular attention to the number and type of
landing boats, and the oonposition of sup-iorting Naval units.
(o) Indications of attempts to block HONOLULU and
PEARL Harbors.
strength.
(d) Indications of any hostile aerial activity in
(e) Report damage infllctec" on hostile vessels, troops
and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital
ships, and other important cUmago immediately.
(f) Report damage by hostile Navnl and air bombardment,
incurred or observed. Important diimage, including damage to landing
fields, and use of chemicals, immediiitely.
b. ARMY .
(l) Hawaiioa Air Force .
(a) Observe water area corresponding generally to the
-8-
RESTRICTBD
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1661
"Defensive 5ea Area" for the HA^iaIIaN COASTAL FRONTIER. Report loca-
tion, composition, courae, and spaed of enemy units enooimtered. Uain-
tftin continuous contact with major subdivisions. Particular attention
to location of aircraft carriers and transports. First contact, mater-
ial changes of direction, and definite location of aircraft carriers i;o
be reported immediately by Joint Intelligence Loop? thereafter on the
hour by Department Intelligence Loop.
(b) Report indications of landing on any island, giving
looatlon, number, type and formation of landing boats and composition
of supporting naval group. Report, when observed, by Department Intel-
ligence Loop.
(e) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops,
and Installations. Damage to air craft carriers, transports, capital
ships, and other important damage immodifktely, by Joint Intelligence
Loop.
(d) Report damage by hostile naval tint', air bombardment.
Incurred or observed by their operations. Important damage. Including
damage to landing fields, and use of ohomioals, imnediately, by Joint
IntoUigence Loopj other damage at 1815 by Department Intelligence Loop.
(e) Report any hostile aerial activity in strength,
including number, type, direction and area of cttuok or observation,
by Joint Intelligence Loop.
(3) 86th Observation Squadron .
(a) Observe water urea corresponding generally to -ttie
"Defensive Sea Area" for the HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER. Report loca-
tion, composition, course and speed of enemy units encoxmtered. Main-
tain continuous contact with major subdivisions. Particular attention
to location of aircraft carriers and transports. First contact, mater-
ial changes of direction, and definite location of aircraft carriers
to be reported imnediately by Joint Intelligence Loop.
(b) Report indications of landing on any Island, giving
location, number, type, and formation of landing boats and composition
of supporting naval group. Report, iriion observed, by Departnont Intel*
llgence Loop.
(o) Report damoge inflicted on hostile vessels, troops,
and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital
ships, and other important damage imnei3 lately, by Joint Intelligence
Loop.
(d) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment,
incurred or observed. Important damage, including damage to landing
fields, and use of chemicals, immediatoly, by Joint Intelligence Loop;
other damage at 1815 by Department Intelligence Loop,
(e) Report any hostile aerial activity in strength,
including number, type, direction, and area of attack or observation,
by Joint Intelligence Loop.
(3) Aircraft Wfaming Service .
(a) Report immediately any and all information of
hostile air force or surface vessel to Mr Defense Cormand, when,
aotlvated, thence by Intelligence Loop.
(4) Hawaiian Di.islon .
(a) Report location, number, type, and formation of
transports and landing boats tqu* compoBltion of supporting noval group.
Report when observed thereafter l|Ou«CLy, on the hour, by Department In-
telligence Loop.
(b) Report enemy fron lines and boundaries between
units. Report immediately any significant change. Otherwise report
every two hours, on the even hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.
"9-
RESTRICTED
1662 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(o) Report Incition of oiwn front lines . Report evary
two hours, on thfe even hour, by Depdrtment Intelligenoe Loop.
(d) Report (ill identifications. Infantry identifioa-
tlons are most important. Report, when observed, by Department Intel-
ligenoe Loop.
(e) Report indications of landing of artillery, in-
cluding caliber of some, and tonka. Report, when observed, by Deport-
ment Intel 11 gonee Loop.
(f) Report doruige by hostile nuval and air bombordment.
Important damage imnedittoly; other damage at 1830, by Department In-
telligence loop,
(g) Report time, place, kinds, and method of employment
of chemicals. Report, when observed, by Deportment Intelligenoe Loop.
(h) Report weather and surf conditions on all favorable
landing beaches. Report at 0300, 0700, 1200, 1700 and 2200, by Depart-
ment Intelligenoe Loop.
(5) Hawaiian Sepurato Coast Artillery Brigade .
(o) Report irmedlatoly, by Department Intelligenoe
Loop, initial contact with enemy units, giving location, composition
and course of formations.
(b) Report immediately, by Dapurtmont Intelligenoe Loop,
when an action is begun by either hostile airoruft and vessels or by the
seaooast ortlllery and and antiaircraft, giving location of naval ves-
sels or airoruft, locality being attacked, and units engaged.
(0) Report upon completion of any oction, by Department
Intelligenoe Loop, damage inflicted on hostile oapltal ships and trana-
ports.
(d) Report upon completion of any action, by Department
Intelligenoe Loop, importunt domage from hostile naval and air bombard-
ment, and report the use uf chemicals imediately. Other domage at 1900
by Department Intelligenoe Loop.
(e) Report, whan observed, by Department Intelligenoe
Loop, location, number, type, and formation of landing boats and com-
postlon of supporting naval force.
(f) Report, whan observed, by Joint Intelligenoe Loop,
Indications of attempts to block HONOLULU HiJlBQR, PEaRL HARBMi, or
KAHEOHE BAY.
(g) Report, upon oonpletion of aotlon by or with en«E|y
air foroe, composition of enemy forces, diroction of approach, time of
action, area attacked, and damage to enemy airplanes.
(h) Report as eooa as praoticable Important damage to
ground installations, including domage due to use of chemical agents.
(1) Report visibility at 0400, 0700, 1200, 1700 and
2200, by Department Intelligence Loop.
( J ) Any of the above reports may be transmitted by
telephone when neoossury to avoid delay.
(6) Hawaii District Copgnander , report when observed, by
radio to Hawaiian n.ir '^orce, thence by Department Intelligenoe Loop»
(o) Nature of hostile activity, including number, type,
direction, and ores of ottock or observation;
(b) Damage by hostile navril and air bombardment;
(c) Location, number, type, and f ormcti >n of landing
boats and composition of supporting naval group;
(d) Enemy front linos and boundaries between unite;
(e) All identifications. Infantry identif icutlons are
most important;
(f) Time, place, kinds, end method of employment of
ohemlcals.
(7) Kauai District Commander .
Same as Hawaii District Commander above.
-10-
RE S T R I C T E D
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1663
RESTRI^CTED
(8) Maui Dlstrlot Comraander .
Soma as Hawaii District Commander above.
(9) Department Signal Office ,
Radio intercept and gonionetrio eervioe. Report
whan obtained.
o. ALL .ELEMENTS OF HAWAIIAN DEPARTM2NT AMD NAVY .
Report assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathleers and
overt uots of sabotage or terrorism, giving location, time, nuatbers ln«
volved, and probable intentions or domage accomplished.
X. MISCELLABEOOg .
(1) TranBmlBsion of G-2 Information .
In the absence of specific instructions as to trans-
mission, or in the event of failure or overload of specified channels,
G-2 information will be transmitted by direct line, where available,
or by the most expeditious routing over the circuits set forth in cur-
rent Signal Operations Instructions.
21. MEASURES FOR HaWDLING .
a. Prisoners t Sxaminutlon stotlons will be Inoateu at all
Prisoner "ot War collection points.
b. Documents and Captured Material .
(1} Documents will be sent to G-2's of Departjnent or
Division(s), with the minimum of delay, by regularly scheduled mesAsn-
ger service.
(2) Reports cf captured material will be sent to the sane
statl >ns by the suae means.
(3) Documents and mtterial identifying orgunisations or
Indioatintr the use of chemicals are of major importance. They will bo
f.lven special priority in shipment to examination stations and will be
reported to Department G-2 by the most expeditious neons.
JO. Maps . Maps will be supplied initially by the Department
Bnglneer.""
22. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION .
Distribution of reports from Department Headquarters t Summaries
of Intelligence at OSCO, 1300, 1800 and 2300.
23. The DEPARTMENT G-2 will;
a. Establish a counter-espionage service that will not only
guard a^aTnet the subvareive activities of the external enemy, but will
also enable The Department G-2 to keep the Department Commander con-
stantly advised as to the attitude, trend of thought, and probable course
of action of the civil population particularly that of alien extraction.
This service will maintain close liaison with the Provost Marshal, with
a view toi
(1) Pumishlng the Provost Marshal with all information
gained through the counter-espionage service of value in the prevention
of civil disorders, sabotage and incipient uprisings.
-11-
RESTRICTED
1664 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
R E_S T E _I £ T aD
(^ Roceivlnf. and evaluating InforniAtion relative to the
internal situation oollected by the Provost Uarslial throug-.h his agencies
set up for the aotital control of the civil population.
b. Colleot, evaluate, unci disseninata information relative to
assemblieT of enemy nationals or sympathisers, and overt acts of subo-
tcge and terrorism.
o. Prepare propaganda and publicity for the enoourn^^oment of
the loyalty and support of the civil population, particularly that of
alien extraction.
?4, G-2 Forms }
a. Estimate of 'the Enony Situation, sec Inclosure No. 4.
b. Periodic Roport, see Inclosui-e No, 5.
SECTION V
yLD^aNISTRATIOH
25. SUPPLY .
a. Classes I, II, III and IV, see Pars. 75-77, FM 100-10.
The existTng system of supply for items of Class I, II, III and IV will
be continued during- all alerts, except that a standard menu ration will
be initiated for /.lert Bo. 1.
b^. Class V (/innunition )
(1) Supply points remain unohanf:ed. Dumps and mmnunition
Distributing Points will be established as directed by this houdquarter»»
(2) Credits of an "Initial Issue" and of one "Unit" of fire
are automatically plined at tht^ disposal of all units whenever an Alert
is ordered. Quantities of various types of ammunition included in the
"Initial Issue" and in u "Unit" of fire are shown in Inclosure Nos.
6 and 7, herewith.
(3) VJhen Alert No. 1 or No. 2 is ordered, unless ominunition
has already been drawn, all units will draw their "Initial Issue".
Wherever issues cannot be made simultaneously, they will be made accord-
ing to the followinf ordor of priority:
Aircraft bombs and ammunition for aircraft weapons.
Antiaircraft 3" and 37-mm ammunition.
Ground machine gun ammunition - all types.
Other small arms ammunition.
All artillery umnuniticin, lejs AA.
(4) When Alert No. 3 is ordered, only Small arms omaunltlon
included in the "Initial Issue" will be drawn.
26. EVACUAnON .
o^. Casualties: No change in present procedure.
b^. Salvage: No ohcn^'e in present procedure,
2_' Prisoners of War.
(1) Collecting Points - Sohofield Barracks, Fort Shafter,
Port Ruger, Kaneohe Bay. To bo established and operated by Department
-12^
RcJSTRICTED
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1665
R E S T R I_ C T E D
Provost Marshal, assisted by Provost MarshalCs), Hawaiian Divlsion(8).
(2) Prisoner of Vfnr Inclosures - Eatablislment and operation
by Department Provost Marshal, as directed by this headquarters.
27. TRAFFIC . Present rogul'^tions ond procedure will continue in
effect .
28. MOTOR TRANSPORTATION .
a. Hhen Alert No. 1 is put into effeot, lill attached motor
transportation is automatically released t.- parent organization.
b. Motor pools will be ^stabHshed by tho Hawaiian DiviaionCs)
and the Separate Coast «rtillery Brif^ade. These pouls will consist of
all available tactical vehicles uad odraini strati ve vehicles, the latter
obtained by reduoin;; to a niniraum adninistrative requirements.
c. The assiipiment jf notor vehicles for one spooifio purpose
will be the exception. All actors will be used to the maximun for all
purposes.
d. Current novoment and louding tables will be raalntained by
the Hawaiian Division(s) and the Separate Coast Artillery Brigade ts
follows I
(1) Nuirfjer of vehicles, tactical and administrative in the
pool shoning the number of men and taaount of impedimenta that can be
noved initially into position, see par 9 above.
(2) Nximbor of vehicles, tactical ijid udninistrotive, sub-
sequent to move into position which are available for movement of reserves,
the number of men which can be noved.
By command of Lieutenant General SHORT a
PHILIP HAYES,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Stulf.
OTPICI
TER C. PHILLIPS, ^^''^V-
Lt. Col., G. S. C,
Aotg. Aast. C. of S., 0-S.
7 Inoloaur«s»
-13-
RESTRICTED
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1667
EXHIBITS OF JOIXT COMMITTEE
1669
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
aSSTRICTSD
1671
iBolosure No. 2
RAILROAD BRIDGES
Location
, TVM
( Eeifjht
Dumber
1 ^enta
i Girders
( Spe« t
1
1 0.9 ml.
W of Honolulu
1
s Concrete pile
i'rimber
4.0'
( 100' 1
2
1 1.0
ml.
W
of Honolulu
1 Concrete pile
(Concrete
6.0*
1 32' 1
S
t 1.9
mi.
W of Bonelultt
J Concrete pile
(Timber
4.5*
1 160' 1
4
1 2.4
mi.
W of Honolulu
» Concrete pile
(Timber
5,0'
(160' 1
S
1 2.8
ml.
V/ of Honolulu
1 Concrete pile
(Timber
5.d'
• 22 > 1
6
2.6
mi.
W of Honolulu
t Concrete pile
(Tljiber
5.0'
1 12' 1
9
0.7
ml.
E
of Alo*
1 Concrete pile
(Timber
1.3 •
( 208' 1
10
0.2
ml.
W
of Ai«a
1 Concrete pile
(Timber
4.5'
{ 48' t
11
0.3
ml.
E
of Kalauao
1 Concrete pile
Timber
4.0'
» '96' 1
12
0.2
ml.
E
of Kalauao
iConorete pile
Timber
3.5«
t 28* 1
13
0.4
mi.
W
of ?:alauao
iCoocrete pile
Timber
4.0'
1 lie* t
14
V»l
lu Station
iTlnber pile
Timber
3,5'
1 27' 1
16
0.2
ml.
W
of Waiau
jTlmber pile
Timber
1.5'
t 32' 1
16
0.3
mi.
W of Waiau
1 Concrete pile
Timber
2.0'
t 32' 1
17
0.4
mi.
;v
of Vlalau
1 Concrete pile
Timber
6.0'
( 32' ,
18
0,3
mi.
It
of Pearl City
1 Concrete pllo
Tlnber
5.6'
1 160* r
19
0.8
mi.
W of Poarl City
1 Concrete pile
Timber i
3,0'
1 16' 1
20
W&ipahu
tTimber Trestle
Timber i
6.S»
t 63* «
29
1,3
ml.
W
of Gilbert
(Timber Trestle
Timber
10. 6»
i 64* 1
36 1
2.2
ml.
S
of NanaJculi
iTlober Trestle
Timber i
12.5'
1 64' 1
40 1
0.6
mi.
S
of Nanakull
jTiaibor Trestle
Timber (
10, 8«
t 96' t
42 1
1,0
Mi.
N of Nanakuli
sTlmber Trestle
Timber (
8.S>
1 64' t
43 i
2.5
mi.
S
of Waianae
jTlmber Trestle
Timber (
7.0'
1 64* (
44 1
1.1
mi.
S
of Waianae
(Timber Trestle
TiAber (
12,0'
I 96' 1
47 1
0.5
mi.
N
of Waianae
iTimber pile
Tinker
7.0'
1 99* 1
60 1
3.3
mi.
N
of Waianae
iTimber pile
Timber (
7,0'
{ 64' 1
61 1
3.4
ml.
N
of VTalanae
jTimber Trestlei
Timber
10.6'
1 60' •
57 1
0.2
mi.
S
of Makua
jTimber Trestle
Timber
10.5'
( 62' 1
66 1
0.1
mi.
S
of Makua
(Timber Trestle
Timber
8.6'
( 114' (
74 1
0.7
mi.
V» of Kokuleia
(Concrete pilo
Timber
8.0'
( 60' 1
n
0.5
ml.
W of Mokuleia
(Concrete pllo
Timber
9.2'
1 112' 1
77
0.6
mi.
W
of Waialua
(Concrete pilo
Timber
7.0'
( 448' «
78 1
Hel
im
(Timber Trestle
Timber
e,o»
1 224' 1
81
2.1
mi.
N of Haleiwa
(Timber Trestle
Tiiber
14.0'
1 96' t
84
0.7
mi.
S
of Waimea
(Concrete pllo
Timber
20,0»
• 272' 1
87
0.7
mi.
N
of VYatmea
iTimber Trestle
Ti*ber
15,0'
( 60' t
88
1.0
mi.
N
of Waimea
(Timber Trestlo
Timber
13.0
( 90' .
89
2.2
mi.
N
of Waimea
(Timber Trestlo
Timber
20.0'
1 96< 1
90
2.9
ml.
K
of Waimoa
(Timber Trestlo
Timber
14.0«
( 75' •
92
4,0
mi.
N
of Waimoa
iTimbor Trestle
Timber
10,5'
1 128' •
101
0.6
mi.
N
of Waipahu
(Concrete arch
Timber
23.6'
t 96' 1
102
2.0
mi.
N
of Waipahu
(Wood Trestle
Timber
22.0'
t 144' 1
103
4.1
mi.
N
of Waipahu
(Wood Trpstlc
Timber
11.0'
1 64' t
104
3.4
mi.
s
of Wahiawa
(Wood Trestle
Timber
22.0'
1 224 • I
105
3.3
mi.
s
of Wahiawa
(Wood Trestle
Timber
[ 20,0'
1 160' I
106
2.7
mi.
s
of Wahiawa
(Wood Trestlo
Timber
30.0 •
: 320' I
107
0.6
mi.
s
of Wahiawa
(Wood Trestlo
Timber
75.0'
, 272« 1
108
0.4
mi.
N
of Wahiawa
(Wood Trestlo
.Tiaber
115.0'
( 608' »
109
2.0
mi.
N
of Vt'ahiawa
(Wood Trestle
;Timber
I 107.0'
t 448* i
lie
2.3
mi.
N
of Wahiawa
(Wood Trestle
(Timber
( 55.0'
1 272' 1
111
0.2
ml.
N
of Brodie JunetioniWood Trestle
iTimber
( 13.0'
1 112' 1
lUCL, NO. 2
RZ3TSICT2D
79716 O — 46 — pt. 15 18
1672 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Incloeure Ho, 2
R»-JSTniCT£D
IIIGHVv'AY BRIDGES
Priority
Number:
Location:
Coordinates:
52- Kam Highway over Walawa Stream 01,95 - 8A,12
49 Kam Highway over IClpapa Stream 98.25 - 82,99
17 Kam Highway over S, Fork Wahlawa Reservoir 96.46 - 95.68
16 Kam Highway over N, Fork Wahlawa Reservoir 96,37 - 96,75
9 Kam Hlciiway over Anahulu R. Halelwa 87,98 - 07.98
74 Kam Highway over Walmea R., Walmoa 92,82 - 13.52
15 Kam Highway over Poemoho Gulch 95.27 - 98.92
45 Old Kam Highway ovor Kaukonahua Gulclj, Schofleld 93.72 - 96,96
Barracks
Priority II
Number;
Location:
Coordinates:
13
12?
7
6i
99
160
161
57
109
Kan Highway ove.T at 'Vaialua 87.78 - 06,33
Kam Highway at Euapa Fond (Kbko Head) 32.45 - 70,22
Between Walalua Elll and Halelwa 86,06 - 04,57
Between Walalua Mill and Haloiwa 86,12 - 05,76
Between Walalua Mill and Halelwa 86.52 - 06.20
Dillingham Blvd. at Keehl Lagoon 11,76 - 76,55
Kam Highway at Kalana Bay 14,34 - 03.25
East Range Road over S, Fork Wahlawa Reservoir 97.79 - 95.34
Waipahu cut-off over O.H. & L. RR at Walpahu 98.56 - 82.46
New Kam Highway over Halawa Stream S. of Aiea 06.82 - 80.30
Kam Highway at Heoia fish pond 21.04 - 89,11
KCL. NO. 2
RESTH1^£T_^D
-2-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1673
ilililll
1674 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
RESTRICTED
Title
SSTIMATg OF THE ENEMY SITUATION Place
Date and hour
1. SUUUARY OF THE XNEUY SITUATION.
&• Snenty Naval Oporatlona.-Uov-oments (by fleet or groups) •
bi Enemy l&nd operations •
!l) Enemy octiritios in forwr.rd areas and nov identifications*
2) Movoaontsi concootrations and establishments in rear oroast
(3) Sabotoge.
(4) Torroin» weatheri visibility and surf as they affeot tho eneoyi
2. CONCLUSIONS.
^. Enemy cupabilitios.-An enumeration of lines of action open to
the enemy vAiieh 'Oay affect accomplishment of the mission of tho
command.
b. (l) A Btatamont of the relative probability of adoption of the
foregoing li^ios of action when such statement can be Justified*
(2) Reasons Justifying any statomont node in (l) above*
Chiof of Boctico*
IHCL06URE NO. 4
RESTRICTED
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1675
RESTRI5TED
Trcai (Date and hour)
To.- (Date «nd hour)
PSRIODIC RSFORTS
I^sulac unit
Place
I}ftte and hour of isaue
Ne.
Haps . (Those needed for an undervtanding of th#i report*)
1. EKEMY SITUATION AT END CF PERIOD.
a. Enemy front line (or nearest elements) .location and nature.
^. Defensive organisation. - Trenches 1 aoplacements 1 observation
posts I command poets, obstacles) etc*
c. Units in contact.- Composition of units, with idontiTicatione
if knowiij location of their flanks, estimated combat efficiency (strengtl^,
training, physical condition, morale, and other pertinent factors).
d. Artillery.- Location and calibers.
£. Reserves and other forces capable of intervention.- Location,
rtrangth, composition, dispositions, estimated cooibat efficiency, and
\7here and when they probably can be employed.
f . Supply and evacuation ss'cabliahnsnts.- Location and nature.
2. ENEMY OreRATIONS DURING PBIIOD.
a. General sunnary - action of enemy forces as a ^lole.
b. Operations of cooponent elanents.
(1) Eneray Naval (derations.- Movements (by fleet or groups).
(2) Enemy Land Operations.
(a) Landings. (By areas. Each ezrtry to show, for that
area, the front lines and identifications).
(b) Operations of Land Components.
1. Antiaircraft artillery.
2. Antitank units.
3. Armored forces.
4. Artillery.
5^. Aviation, combat.
6. Aviation, observation.
7. Cavalry.
8. Chemical warfare.
9. Engineers.
10. Infantry.
11 . Tanks.
12 . Administrative elements.
c. Sabotage.
d. Miscellaneous.- Such enemy activities, movements or changes
since last report as are not conveniently included in b above.
3. MISCELLAHEOUS.
a. Estimated enemy casualties, including prisoners.
b. Morale.
e* Supply and equipment.
d. Terrain not under our control.
e. Enemy's probable knowledge of our situation - observation,
reconnaissance, prisoners and documents lost by us, inhabitants, etc.
f. Weather, visibility and surf, by areas.
g. Any enemy intelligence not specifically covered by headings
of this report.
4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.- A discussion of each of the lines of action
open to the eneny which may affect tiie accompllshmant of our miss ion » in
the order of their possible iaminence. For each capability, the effect
of tioe, space, terrain, present known dispositions, and othor factors
in the situation should be evaluated. The earliest estimated tljno at
which the enemy can put each into effect should be statad. \7hen ap-
plicable, the possible result of the adoption by the enomy of any copa-
bility should be included.
AC of S, G-a.
mCLOSlJUC NO. 5
REj82aiCT££
1676 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
RESTRICTED
ALLOWANCES OF ORDN.JLNCE AiWUNITIOK' PER WEAPON FOR INITIAL ISSUE
H.V.V;,IIAN DEP;jl'n.ENT
WEAPON
Rifle, CQl. .30, M1903
Rifle, U.S., cal. .30, VH
Rifle, cutomc^tic, cal. .30 (r.H)
Uachine gun, cal. .30, ground (M1917)
Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A4)
(other than combat vohicla)
Machine gun, cal. .30 AA {La917)
Machine gun, cal. .30, AC
Machine gun, cal. .30 (Tank or Armd. Car)
Machine gun, cal. .50, \TC (<V0 (AW Bn)
Machino gun, cal. .5C, WC (/lA)
(othor than Automatic Woapons Bn)
Muchino gun, cal. .50, Aircraft
M'-chino gun, cal. .50, IB (ground)
Machino gun, cal. .50, HB (Tank or Amd
Pistol, cr.l. .45
Shotgun, riot typo
Gronadoa, hand, frag, (por Rifle Co.)
Signals, ground (assorted) or
Lights, Very signal (aescrtod)
37 mm gun, M1916 (inf.)
37 mm gun. Antitank (Note 1.)
37 mm gun. Antiaircraft (Note 1.)
60 mm Mortar (Note 1.)
No. of rds. por Weapon
AP BALL TRACER TOTAL
10 100 10 120
25 250 25 300
40 320 40 400
500 4000 500 5000
150 1200 150 1500
Car)
250 2000 250
600 2400 600
4800 1200
2880 2880 1440
1440 1440 720
120 840 240
960 240
1568 392
21
Iffi AP SHR.'J
200
100 100
1620 180
120
81 mn Mortar
3" Trench Mortar
75 nm gun (Note 2.)
155 mm Howitzer, M1918
3" AA Oun, Mobile
3" AA Gun, fixed
155 mm Gun, M1918 Ml
240 mm How. M1918
8" Ry Gun
FIXED SSACOAST ARTILLERY
3" gun, M1903
6" gun
8" gun
12" gun (Barbette Carriage)
12" gun (Disappearing Carriage)
12" Mortar
14" Gun
16" eun
(Light)
(Heavy)
lao
30
122
300
300
100
60
28
85
505
1000
200 350
267
272
300
279
250
2500
3600
6000
7200
3600
1200
1200
1900
21
25
150
25
24
200
200
1800
120
150
150
300
150
300
300
100
60
85
505
1000
550
267
272
300
279
250
Mote 1.
No service ammunition for this weapon on hand in Hawaiian
Department at present.
Note 2. - Proportion of types (Shrapnel, reduced charge HE, and normal
charge HE) to be as shown on requisitions keprt on file at
the designated supply points.
INCLOSURE NO. 6
RESTRICTED
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1677
EXHIBIT NQ. 65
[Copy]
[1] SECBET
Op-12-VED
(SC)A16-1/RF13-13
Serial 075112
Secret Ju^Y 3. 1941.
From : The Chief of Naval Operations, and The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
To : The Special Naval Observer, London. The Special Army Observer, London.
Subject : Comment on the report of the American-Dutch-British Conversations,
Singapore, April, 1941. (Short title "A. D. B.")
References: (a) United States— British Staff Conversations, ABC-1.
1. You are directed to advise the British Chiefs of Staff that the Chief of
Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff regret that they are unable to approve
the subject report, because in several major, as well as numerous minor, partic-
ulars, it isi at variance with reference (a).
2. The major differences between the two reports may be summarized as
follows :
(a) The Singapore report contains political matters which must be omitted
from this military agreement. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief
of Staff are unable to recommend approval, as being beyond the scope of their
authority, such political proposals as are contained in paragraphs 6, 8, 25, 26,
27, and 78. These should be taken up by the political departments of the gov-
ernments, should these departments deem it possible to arrive at definite agree-
ments.
(b) The scope of the naval strategic matters discussed is too broad. The
Singapore report aims to set up a new intermediate command not envisaged by
ABC-1. The "Eastern Theater," and the "Commander in Chief, Far Eastern
Fleet," though not mentioned in ABC-1, form the basis for the naval strategic
concept in the ADB Report [2] Under ABC-1, the United States proposed
to commit its Naval forces in the Far Eastern Area, except such forces as were
operating in the defense of the Philippines, to British naval strategic direction
only for employment in the Far Eastern Area. The United States has not agreed,
and does not at this time propose to agree, to enter into any commitment for the
employment of the naval forces of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet in areas outside of the
Far Eastern Area, except as to limited operations having a direct relation to
those in the Far Eastern Area. Should it become necessary in the future to
retire from that area, further plans may then be concerted. This subject is dis-
cussed in detail in a subsequent paragraph.
(c) There is apparent a failure by the Delegates to appreciate the great
strategic importance of holding the Netherlands East Indies, and particularly
Sumatra and Java, and preventing enemy use of and Loubok Straits. It
will be impossible to hold Singapore if these Dutch Islands are captured by
Japan.
(d) At. British insistance during the ABC conversations the following was
inserted in paragraph 11 (b) of the Report:
"A permanent feature of British strategic Policy is the retention of a
position in the Far East such as will insure the cohesion and security of the
British Commonwealth and the maintenance of its war effort."
In other exchanges during the ABC conversations the British Delegates empha-
sized repeatedly their view that the retention of the general line of the Malay
Barrier was vital to the continued security of the United Kingdom itself. Never-
theless, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff note in Appendix 1
of the ADB Report that, of forty-eight British naval vessels available in the
"Eastern Theater," only three British vessels are to operate in the vicinity of
the Malay Barrier. No British vessels whatsoever are committed to the naval
defense of the 'Barrier against Japanese naval forces advancing southward, nor
to offensive operations designed to close the passages of the Barrier to the pas-
sage of Japanese raiders. All British naval forces are assigned to escort and
patrol work, most of them at great distances from the position which the British
Chiefs of Staff have asserted to be "vital." It may be pointed out that the naval
defense of this position is entrusted, by the ADB Report, solely to United States
1678 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and [3] Dutch forces. EJven the British Force II would not be placed
in a position to operate offensively. It would only be during Phase II, which
contemplates sending a strong British Fleet to the Far East, that British naval
forces would be employed in a manner which might support the defense of the
Malay Barrier. Since the eventual despatch of a strong British Fleet to the
Far East is considered problematical, the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Chief of Staff advise you that, until such time as a plan is evolved whereby
British naval forces take a predominant part in the defense of the British posi-
tion in the Far East Area, they will be constrained to withdraw their agreement
to permit the United States Asiatic Fleet to operate under British strategic direc-
tion in that Area.
(e) The ABD Report contravenes the agreement set forth in paragraph 14
(f) of the reference. The Chief of Naval Operations cannot agree to permit
aviation forces of the United States Navy to operate for other than naval pur-
poses, or to be placed under other than naval command. It is particularly im-
portant, in the case of a naval force of inferior strength, to have available naval
aviation units which are well trained in naval operations.
(f) After conclusion of the ABC conversations the Chief of Naval Operations
and the Chief of Staff advised the British Chiefs of Staff of their desire that, as
soon as practicable, delegates be assembled in Singapore for the purpose of
drawing up a practical operating plan for the Far East Area in accordance with
the ABC agreements. Their view was that a plan should be gotten ready for
immediate use in case of eventualities. The report of ADB conversations can-
not be considered as a practical operating plan. In it, proposed United States
operations in the Philippines are clearly outlined. Dutch plans are fairly defi-
nite. British plans may be approximately deduced only from the deployment
proposed in Appendix 1. There is no strategic operating plan set forth for oper-
ations in common by the three Powers involved. The ADB Report cannot take
the place of such a plan, and the opinion is entertained that, until such a plan
is drawn up, the cooperative effort of the Associated Powers in the Far East Area
will be largely ineffective.
[4] 3. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff can see no
particular advantage in establishing the "Eastern Theater," and appointing a new
British Commander termed the "Commander in Chief, FAR ELASTERN FLEET."
It is suggested that the same purposes could be served by giving appropriate
authority to the British Commander in Chief, China, and have that officer, familiar
with the general situation, continue to exercise direction even after the arrival
on that station of additional British naval forces. It is agreed that there is no
objection to giving this officer general strategic control of the various British
naval stations in the Indian Ocean and the China Sea, but the establishment
of an officer in a superior echelon, in command of all is considered of question-
able value. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are disposed
to discuss this matter further, if so requested by the British Chiefs of Staff, but
question the present utility of such discussion, in view of the length of time before
it would be practicable to establish such an office.
4. Details of the subject report which either vary from ABC-1, or appear to
be unacceptable for other reasons, are indicated below. The numbers referred to
are the paragraph numbers of the report.
3 (a) : The operating plan should be confined to the plan for the Far East
Area, rather than for the "Eastern Theater."
4 : This paragraph does not give sufficient emphasis to the security of the
Dutch position, nor to the necessity for the greatest possible degree of offensive
operations. Attention in this connection is invited to the naval tasks set forth
in paragraph 35, Annex 3, ABC-1. It is not agreed that Japanese expeditions
against the Netherlands East Indies can be outflanked from Luzon if such ex-
peditions go south via the protected line of the Pelews. This latter remark applies
also to paragraph 13.
13: As indicated in previous correspondence, the usefulness of Hong Kong
depends on its ability to contain Japanese blockade forces, as that base Is
unlikely to be usable for naval base purjjoses.
17 : The opinion is held that, if the Pelews line of southward movement is
taken by the Japanese, the early capture of Borneo and the northern line of
the Dutch Islands is essential to a serious Japanese attempt against Java.
[5] 29 : With respect to strengthening the defenses of Luzon, the conference
apparently failed to give appropriate importance to paragraph 13 ( d) of reference
(a). Because of the greater needs of other strategic areas, the United States is
not now able to provide any considerable additional reenforcement to the Philip-
pines. Under present world conditions it is not considered possible to hope
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1679
to launch a strong offensive from the Philippines. The United States is taking
steps to strengthen the defenses of the Philippines through improving the quality
of native troops, and by providing additonal modern material.
32 : This subject was discussed during the ABC conversations, and decision
reached to forego inclusion of it in the report, as the right is sovereign. Reference
to it should be omitted from the ADB Report.
35: (last subparagraph) — The establishment of a combined staff, (presumably
for all Services and all Pov^-ers), in Singajwre is not considered advisable, there
being no agreement, nor possibility of agreement, for a single commander of all
of the military forces of the Associated Powers. Appropriate liaison should, of
course, be established. Existing liaison for the purposes indicated is considered
adequate, so far as the United States is concerned.
38 and 39: These paragraphs cannot be accepted as to United States naval
aircraft, for the reason given previously.
41 : This paragraph should be omitted as it has already been covered by refer-
ence (a). It differs in certain respects from that reference. The United States
does not agree that the United States Pacific Fleet must under all circumstances
be e<iual in strength to the Japanese Fleet.
42 : The matter of cooperation in the Tasman Sea between the United States
Pacific Fleet and the British Naval Forces has been clarified in other cor-
respondence.
45 and 46 : This is not in accord with ABC-1, which requires that the Associated
Powers, except in an emergency, will exercise command over their own forces.
United States Naval Forces would not be "released" to British operation, in the
sense in which paragraph 46 is construed, but would be assigned appropriate
strategic tasks, derived from those listed in ABC-1, under the strategic direction
of the British Commander in Chief, China.
47 : As pre\ iously indicated, the small part which is proposed for British Naval
Forces in the Far East Area is not acceptable. This and succeeding paragraphs
should be clarified.
[6] 53, 54 and 55 : Since this plan should apply particularly to the Far East
Area, the details listed in these three paragraphs cover too wide a scope.
57 : This paragraph seems rather indefinite.
61, 62, 63, and 64 : It is suggested that reference to Phase II might be omitted
from the present consideration, since plans as to operations in that Phase must
necessarily be highly speculative at this time.
Appendix II : United States naval aircraft should be listed under the United
States Asiatic Fleet. Subparagraph (d) is not acceptable as regards United States
naval aviation.
5. If further conferences are to be held in Singapore for drawing up an operat-
ing plan for the Associated Powers, it is suggested that the conference would
have its work simplified were its deliberations to be guided by an agenda which
had been agreed upon in advance between the United States, the United King-
dom, and the Government of the Netherlands East Indies. Therefore, you will
inform the British Chiefs of Staff that, after they have had sufficient opportunity
to give further study to this matter, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief
of Staff will be pleased to entertain suggestions which they may have to offer
with respect to such an agenda.
(Sgd.) H. R. Staek, (Sgd.) G. C. Mabshaix,
Chief of Naval Operations. Chief of Staff, U. 8. Army.
Jul 25 1941.
Out OCS
Copy to :
Cincaf To CNO for dispatch
Cincpac To CNO for dispatch
Room 2055
Serial #261
Comdg. Gen., Philippine Dept. Reg. No. 9(K)051, 7-26-41
British Jt. Staff Mission in Washington
2 Copies to C. N. O.— Rm. 2055
1 Carbn cy accompanied original to S. P. O. B. (checked him)
7-26-41 acw-rlc
1680 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 66
H»WWBMI«MW«|HiWWWWWWWii lWiMIMIjpi l lil ll l l i l l HI I, I l l Jl l iJ— wpiW
I
a:^
is It
#fci^s m 0151
mfmi m mm miu *n mnp mm^f »iTx cscstr «f
ikm 10 l€$?1lflP» 0->4$ tiMITH, i#^2# CAST ?t3 HSUtS UlW»«
*U 91 C«Ui{ S8 l€8T. .nmt *SSITt8!l*l SHIPS |^-«± JlMTH
i^ lAST *T f«45, OetJRSE «i#. THIS SMSJCAItS «!! rtJWS «tU
WSIP COPIES 12, . _ -- . .ni€,..
1
, r^i
m cE » i>
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1681
^
1
^^fcH»-i-wS'r-"T omcotim.
^^^^^^^^^H
H
■pC^^ET ■ ■
1
^^^K*' Jfeinorar-'un f:,r Tt .-^p te. .-.rtncrtt .
i
1
^^^^^^Kf
]
!
V
^^^^^HHk
-..
"~
^^^^^v two hours later. .-:■"./■. on c:-.-
^^H^^ ships in Lat. 07 - 51 North. I .
^^^^^^K- course 310^ , thin indicate:.
^^^^^^^^K Kohtron in Lat.
^^^^K^^ Coianander in ChieT Asia-. -
^H^H^^^ ha.s .sighted 30 shir;;; anc
^^^^^^Hf- Camranh Bay.
/
O
ft
•'"• S
(w M
i^^-
1682 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 67
To : foK^o.
17 Aueuot 1941
(iMrpl*)
#70? ( Probably aa error for ^1^706 )
Ttii« afternocea, in spite of the faot
tli&t in WB8 dunday, I called, at liis personal request, oh tlie
Preaideat, who had just rituraed to WasiilngtoD this cioraing. {Smt
retary Hull v/as also present J. Upon our arriyai, he read two
papers, the contents of which is belag seat to you as my aeeaage ' -^
#707* (t^« sist of which was that if Japan makes further ageressicm
througn the use of force of arms, the United States will take aay
end all aeceseary steps iimaediateljr to prot&ot the interests of
the United States and of United States oitizens), and my iieseage
^708** (the gist of which is that In conneotlon with Japan's pro-
posal to conduct a saeetiag of leaders of the two countries, the ./
Oiaited States v;auld like to be advised of the aims of the Japanelitl
OoirermaKBit ) .
Af t*r readlBg thea, he requested ma to
relay the eontents to ay home goirerimant. He added th it the two
papers were not to be considered as oral statemonts, but were to
be given the status of only refe|>«Qoe material. As such, he 8«id»1
he had bad the State Oepartment prepare th«&. I aaoepted the
papers on condition tJi&t they would be t<xt ozily my information.
I sm sending you tha gist of our talks
and the opinions exprvcsed in subeeqttent messages*
•Jivit 4672
21225
-It 4S7X
(JOi) »j»y Tran*. 8»a0HU>
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1683
#707 CXb 2 Tfr%*t 9tmplm%*}i.
of tk« l7ait«A 3ta%— aad of JapHK, tturcragb tf atertwf of 3tet«
fta4 tha Jt^ajus* AadMussafier la VaablsstoB, luiv« «aei««& la pi««
tra«t»d coav«r«atlooa aimetvd toward expi«3^Lxkg tli« posalbilltjr
of raaoMag a aouad baala for ni^otiatloaa b«^t>«»«!a tha tiro ooun-
triaa ralatlra to tba maintoaaao* of paao* witb ordar aad Justlo^
In tha Paoiflo. Tba prlaeiplaa aad poUciaa wbioh war* uader <H»*
ouaalon la tbaaa ooatarsatlozui praoliadad pcuraalt hj eitbar govanv-
isaat of objaotlvaa of azpanaloa by forea or b7 tjuraat of foroa«
Oa July 24 last tiia Prasldaat of tb0
Oaltad Jtataa lafomad tha J'apaaaaa CktfarmsBt tbrougb tlta Japa&MW
Ambaasadogr la Vasuloetoa thst h* waa willing to auggast to tf
goTanmanta of Oreat Britain, of tne HatJiariaada and of CHloa ttot
th«y makjo a binding and aolaan daolaration that tJaay bad no ag*
graeaim inteatlona witn regard to Iado~Ciaaji <aad Ibat they would
agrae that tna maiiiata and raw laaterials of Indo^Cbina aixould b«
availabla to all powara on aqual tanas. Tlie Frasidant atatad
further that ha would ba willing to suggaat to tJie powars mentionad
tJiat thay nadortaka thia deolaratloa, in wnion the United States
wotild ba willing to join, upon the understanding that the govam-
mant of Japan would be disi>08ad to make a Biailar declaration
and would be further disposed to withdraw its military and naval
foroes from Indo China. Hotwithstanding these efforts, the gOT-
emaent of Japan has continued its military aetivitles and its
disposal of arawd foroes at Taxious .olata in the Far Bast and
has eeoupisd Indo-Chlna with its allitary, air and naval forces.
The gOTeroBsnt of the Uxdted Statss is
la fitll sygmathy with the desire expressed t^ the Japsaese Govem-
Bsat that taerv be provided a fresh basis for amioable and mutually
profitable relations between our two countries*
This goireriffiMmt's patlenoe in seekiag
an aooeptable baais for such an understanding has bean demon-
strated tine and again during recent years and espeoially during
recant ooatha. This gorenunsnt feels at tha present stage that
nothing short of the most oo]iq;>lete candor on its part, in the light
of avi&enoe end indicationB which coi^ to it from uany sources,
will at this moaent tend to further the objectires sou^t.^
3ueh being thd case, this goremiBsnt
now finds it necessary to say to the goTeromant of Japan tijst if
the JapaiMse Government takes any further steps in pursuance of «-
^1^1: 46 7P (ooatii»MA} Havy Transi 8-20-41 (2)
1684 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
poaioy ox progrwB of ailltajqr domiiiation by force or tJireat of
fore* of aslgEborin^ oonatries, tiia govemaant of the ttolted State*
will b« oompelled to take ismediately aay and all steps vhlcli it
Easy 4»em naoessary toward safegtiardlae tue legitimate righta
end interests of the Vnitad states aad Aiusrioan nationals and
toward iasuriag tie safety bM seeurity of tlie United states.
21226
l^ty Trans, 8-20-41 <2)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1685
Prom: WashlB^ton (Hcanur*)
To : Tokyo TGalsudalJin)
(Puppla)
17 August, 19U
lf| ^•^^
•aaipii»r»fl Iji
#708
Part 1 of 8
(Strlotljr Coofldaatlal)
Roferenoe is made to the g.ue8tlon n^aich th« Japa-
neaa Aabaasador raisad on 8 August duzjag a oonversatioa wltb
the Secretary of State, whethar It lalgirt not be possible for tli*
responsible heads of the Japanese GoTsroment and tha Ck>T«min.snt
of tiie United States to meet witb a view to disousslag means
vrherebjr an adjustment in relations between the United States and
Japan mieht be brought about. The thought of Prinos Konoye and
of the Japanese GoTemiaent in offering this suggestion ia «ppre»
oiated*
Reference is also made to the desire expressed by
the Japanese Ambassador during a oall on the Secretary of State
on 16 August, that there be resumed the informal ooQTeraations
which had been in progress between the two goTemments toward
ascertaining whether Wiere existed a basis for negotiations rela-
tive to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation.
Part 2 of 8* ^ ;
Part 3 of 8
On two occasions offic«a>8 of the Departaant of State,
pursuant to instructions frcci tha Secretary of State, called on the
Japanese Ambassador to indioete oonoem orer the reports th&t Japan
intended to ac(iutre by force or threat of force military and na»al
bases in French Indo-China. Subsaquently, On July 20 and July 23
the ^Voting Secretary of State raised with tha Japanese Minister and
with the Japanese Arabassador the question of Japan's Intentions with
regard to 7renoh Indo-China and pointed out that the government of
the United States could onljr assume that the occupation by Japua of
French Indo-China or the acquisition of military and naval base*
in that area constituted notice to the United States that, Japan had
taken by forceful means a step preparatory to embarking ori' furtber
movements of conquest in the south Pacific area. The Acting Sao-
retary pointed out further that this now laoTe on Japan's part was
prejudicial to the procurement by the United States of easential *fw
materiala and to the peace of the Pacific, including the Philippine
Islands.
Part /». of 8
The government of the united States accordingly had
no alterntive but to inform the Japanese Aabassador that, in the
2133<^
ivi
%G3e
(eoatinued) Bavr Trans, S->21-U. (2)
1686 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
oploloa of this gorarmmat, tbe measures tima. bslae tak*n hf tiki
Japan««« 0<yr«raBS&t had sarrvd to roBOVs tlie basis for fiirtjMr .
converse tlons ralative to a peaceful 8«ttX«saaa1i la tke Faelfl« '^
InfozmaX dlsousslons between the Japcnsse ^TeaiMBt
and tbe Gk>TerBa»at of the United States directed toward asosrti^-
in£ whether there existed a basis for negotiations relatire to *
peaceful settlffiowit oorering tJiQ entire Bsioific sitxiation would
naturally envisage the worsting out of a program attainable by
peaeeful laethodst It goes without saying that no proposals or
suggestions affecting the rights and privileses of either the ^^ted
States or ^apaa would be oaaeidejred exeept as they might be in <M>li-
formity with the basio prinoipXes to whioh the United States han
Xoa& besn eeamitted.
Part 5 of 8» ~ -
Fart 6 of 8
If suoh a progrea bes^ upoaji peaeeeble and eon*
atruetive prinsiples were to be adopted for the I^oif io and if
there«ft«r any of the oountrias or areas within, the Paoif io weve
Btssaeed, the policy of aiding nations resisting aggression «9tt2A
oostiiKM to be f oUonivd by this goveriBBeat end this goremiuuit
would eooperete with other nations in ezt«ffidlng assistanee to eajr
country threatetwd*
t]M«r s«oh a prograffl for the Pacific are* ^apan wemiA»
in the opinion of the goTernoent of the United Statee, attain «21
the objeotirea which Japan affira that it is seeking* This pr0<»
gram would not enable any country to eartend its nilitary or pellV
ical control over other peoples or to obtain eoonoaio rights of
a definitely monopolistic or preferential ehoraoter. ^
ftirt 7 of 8 V.
In t hose areas where the production and distribution
of essential ooomodities are vested lA noaopaXies, the governaeBt
of the United states would expeet to use its influence to see that
all countries are given a fair share of the distributi<m of the
products of such monopolies and at a fair prloe*
If the JapoBWM Ooveriment is seekiiig wl»t it afflnui
to be its objaotivesf the Oovemsffisit of the Uaited States mels ttiat
the program above outlined is one that can be counted upon to osoare
Japan satiafacticat cf its eeononio needs and legitimate aspirations
^th much greater certainty than could aagr other program*
In cose the /epaneee government feels that
six»« and is in position to suspend its expajftsienlst oetivl
»^te readjust its position, and to trnTaxk ii^pflat a |ff««efttl p:
JTO'l; (e.sitttuMdj Iptar 1^^^ $o2X'
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1687
tk« P««lfi« kl«Be tte ULjuis of tlM presrajK uid prlAoipXss to
til* Unlt*d States im qonalttAd, -Om gprcrutadcit oT tJtw United S£«1
nouU b« prepared to oo&eider resimptloa of tiis Infetraal eccploretoxf
diaoussiozui utiiaJb. were Interrupted ut Jtily and eould be glad to m
eadeevor to arrenge « eultable time asd ple.oe to exohauge vieinN -m
Pwt 6 ot $
The goremaeDt of tiM Doited States, bowerer, feel*
tiiMt, ia Ttew of tlje eiray»ot«»ce« attending tim iatorruptioa of
the iaf canal eoarereatio&s between th.e Imd goireriB&eats, It <c«ould
be helj^ta to botb ^▼enasents, before ooterlog a reeq^tioei of
mxob oonTersatioae or proeeediag wltii plaua for a iseetiag, if tbm
Japaitsee QorennBaQt would be ao good aa to fumioti a elearer
•ta.tawnt tbaa hsa ret been fumialied as to its present attitude
and plaas. Just as tMs goYemment lias repeatedly outlined to
tlie Japaswe* Gorerimont its attitude «»1 plens*
^itarts 2 and 5 not STailal^ei
21334
JIVl!
JbOET fmas. S** 21-41 (I
T9716 O — 46— pt. 15 19
1688 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From: Washington (Noimira).
To t Tokyo.
17 -augxist 1%1
(Purple)
( anKllafa tert. ^aolpharQd In Purple )
./708
Part 2 of 8
Mii8ii"tii6 "iapsaese iteibaBBadcr brou^xit up tixe sug-
gastious, tha Secretary of St&te reminded the -aabasaador Ui&t; tiie
govei-njLient of tiie United otates had aiown groat patience iixiQ had
been prepared to continuo in tixit course of pi^tieaoe so loru^ as
the Japanese GovSrnrafiat r.anifested a desire to follov/ courses of
peaee. It was pointed out tu the /ambassador thJit waile proceed^; nj^
along this course this goverament had recaivad reports indictttlaii
clearly. th;.it the Ja-aceae Goveraaant xvas ado.>ti.. _oours3s oiroctly
the oppor.ite of l.^oso on v.-hich ths rociHit coavarovitions catvfeea
tho A.'nbassador aad tae secretory of otcte h&d been preaicatad. It
vms pointed out also th«t the Japanese press was beiaj:, ccotantly
Btimulated tt) ".rieak of encirclans.it of Jr.pan 'cy the United Jt;-tas
and v.'as beiUj- o":'ici:.lly inspired in waya cclculated to inflarie
public opi:don, ..ae -iaorstary of ^t-ute i-.^de it clear tnat au did
not see no\, coavors.-itioriS betweeu thd t-'. " . = co-ld uso-
fully be pursued or proposals be discus.- ..ese official
apolcQaiaen -lad the Jo'aeaese press coiiteade . nlted ..it=;:tes
v.'as endeavorin,^, to -ancirclc Japan end carried on ;» ca,:psl;:n ar:. inet
the United Jtatee.
Part 5 of 8
The prograai envisaged in auch inforr-al discuasions
vfljuia involve the applioj'tion in the e.itire i'acific area of the
principles of equality of cc-aaercial opportunity ;.ad treatajnt.
It viould thus laake posaible sccesa by all countries to raw xaaterlels
and to ail other esaential cojaraoditios. Such a prOt^ran ^.ould en-
visage cooperation by all nations of the Pacific, on a voluntary
and peaceful basis toward utilizinr all available resources of
capital, techniciil skill, Lad progressive economic lauderaaip for
the purpose of building up not only their owa ecoaoalea bi^t also
tkKi. tho econoiilo« of reGiona =vhere productive Ci.pacit/ caa be
iiaproved. The result viould be to increase the purcuasiat; povi-er
of tite nations a.ad peoples coaceraad, to raise 3ti,fldards of liv-
iac, aad to ornate coaditioas conductive to the »..aiutcn£.nc8 of
peace.
JD-1:
<avy Truaa. 8-22-41 (X)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
EXHIBIT NO. 68
1689
•anjt
'^ -m^
UNJTED STATES SHIP -iiOIiS..
,_jai»^b|» ~^Sr-~»oM^a^s^~-
E DeaortfPTiow _r- Ai-
RCMARKS
to i.
Stemming In oanron^' »ltfc ■Male "roup Io.«, on coar»« 257°T aed t>gc, 2oS'i>8c, •t "psf*
13.8 Imota, (1<2 rvmj . Boilers #5, #«, •ol »7 In us«. Ship iSarkenoiS ena la S»t-
•rl«l Conaitlon ?«k-<r. Jonflitlon of Seaainess Thras set troughoiit ttie ship.. Arer^*
rteeo 484. e. Aversi^ rpa. 148.1. /• ■
•« to 6. lieut«t»ot {is), V. 3. ?«Ty.
I Steeisln^ •• before, oa
Areni;* rp«. 141. S.
Steeisinc: as before.
Sl<(.>!t«a -l«r.e t>sar!i
Ion«;)tua«: 16AO -15 .
end tec, et IS.P knot*. Airerega Bte»»,*25.
HeuteMnt. V. 3. »yy.
et Msterlsl 5ondltlon Beker ebOT* tblr* d«5!r. 0715
roeltioa of cowoy: Ijititotle: 80° OC' OO" S,;
tertsge «t«»!B 426.6. Average rpa. 14E..6.
- rru ^,-r
sisji, D-rio), rr.S.fj.i.
8 to 1£.
Steenjing as hefcire. 0815 '/ustereJ oro» st quarters; ebseirteoa, nose. 091J Set j
Veterlsi SooiJitlon Qaltor. 0930 Zour.iei "(eneral ,ti»rt«rs fop iJaaage control arlll.j
0931 Set Material :in<! }tlon ijlrm. 1037 Oneet i»t»rial CjiBaitloa Aflrm, 1040 3«f-
onrei from general quarters. 1042 Set Joadltioc of Re«iitr>e»» III. 1159 Position !
of conirov by latitude and loaiiltaae Itidloetor; I*tltu«la: ,19° 58' 00" S. ; toagltufJe:
IS?" 11' 00" E. Kada Sally laapeotion of aai^azlnea end s^kaleat powdar taaalas, I
Coaililona noraal. A»erea[a staait 4S4.6. *7«ra«e rpa. 143. t. 1
*. ". TPOHAS, jr.i
iS to 16. i-.-.slM, S-V{-1), U.S.S.R. I
, '^teaalng »e before. 12a8 ''heij^ed eoursa
'145 rovolutlons per tslnute. 1440 Cn sla
; to 256°T. .1511 Shifted 9',«9riij« control
ic-ntrol t5'aa»iKatl-r. bri(!ao. A»er8«e s
le to
le.
Ste'i-s
IW »?
before.
steaa
4*S.
A.erace
18 to
sc.
Ste^-ic
3#! as
before.
20 to
24.
StMaim; aa
before.
to 267 T. 1300 Chengei 6r«ed to 13.8 icnotir,
al fros S.S. ISKSIDSST 5RANT 0t8n««« oourie
to atesrlng aft. 1544 Stlftud 8te«Pio« j
osffi4 3Q. ;,»erage rpm. 144, e. i
"SiaigB, O-TiS'
-.■•ition Baser. i''l6 Dar:-
A»«r»ga ateaa 450. 4««r»«« rpa. 141.
i.l»at«a«iTit iHU 0« 3. S»»T.
itti^l^^
l.iftat«a»Qt C'
4.«l»r«t--ttiK'«HVi«K«l«MW* M I
1690 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP
S» Te»rl HsTtpn, T.ii. i
PAaSAQE"
- - .BOLiE — — _ a.«7 _
rV*aM fill in lH K»MW)
tig ou
— be at ou ;IIL-
^,- a fou. nh .^tg _B 1— S,
i,-j:. Ul_-ou i_SE _-a ._2.
1' _b£ lj.t. nil SK i-A .
-*. lia_ I cu , US
ijQ j cu- I JE
i ^^ f» n^-
- ^^ ^L^ hO-Loii , "^
7Sjj::a ail -^ Icn iih_i
7S , 7jl(£1 i__im.
i_LaE —
iJ-HS
, Sii- aonAXtinn- 11_ iirlll .
ijiun. '
'.a In. A ii loaiMite, - firin g » r< ft»l
■ gjght.nxt-tinj, p.Ht.nl rnr—
• flflntXiiL* trjifiK- npTffW^ln*.
^ in* CrJJJL. ia:ttn»r»a_-lHr!t,iir4
-KRi*, I'ojrc lYlfllifll npftm ^^ng fnr 2j3d fllgl !t1
diili. _ |liiiislaa«l_Lifc
_ Jiniri.r irlf^n Supply AtTttjUiaO—ijl.
' 1^ irlXX tar tarretj ._S»fai_tBrajL,.
<pM«rmM |L nx^ 4 -lafiilltlaM I
alt, - . Bakar.
TnnT.rucit.lnnJ
sEiE^fl-lS-^ 12-.* 2i6-
.4.4'9:Sfl.
;£fl ,7i,Bii_ii! Lcii JliLLJ
1.23 '7iiilEi= l-^ aJliJ
120 7a.8l]_3 piu.,al >. 1
^ iZj-jal, aq I cii. at i J
_!23 ^ziJbl ea Qu.nft ;
4^8 JZi.aa-Lfla. L^.at i: i
iSO 7aJB£_Lca -i^oiiJiSj. 3
79 J4 a£ Q4 I i:u._3ii.j.J
-J HE .
. iSL a i-JO-
GnwIertjlepU. ^ — ;
(Onctaal ortttooiMka
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1691
r
UNITED STATES SHIP
zoNc oeacRirrion *IX . ^
REMARKS
stesBlaa on c?urs« 256°? »nii p«o, Z^Opso. In oolifwny »ltJi "^alt Torti% 15.4. Ste»!^-
Inc '13 Sil'.cra »S, 46. »t! =i7, gt «p««d 1».9 Hoots, 143 rja, {st»nflBr<l »pe«a 15 .
scnota) . Shi? darkened. In v»terS»l Condition '•Her and In -oadltloa of Headlr.eas j
TTT. Ar«raze staan 426.6. Avaraiia rpn. 14S.4.
»QAS<S,
Liautana.it (!?5, I>-V((5), 'J.S.»1.S.
er*.;e rpa. 141.8.
Lleutanant { Jg) , n.S. Nlaiy.
I. K05RIS,
5i<!n, D-V(fj , U.3.f!.S.
; otJMirion!' aorjBi. Areraga
Knsli!n, r. S. 'l>»y.
s*. 'Ire :?rlll. 14?." J'lrst 3traa« of
i' '»H«d »»a7 rira oid rasoue party.
;-.v-rl.ng 8ft tnok stasrlrig <j<>nt«-ol. 1537
s,iiT%i-< staam 4P5. Avarage rpm. 142.
A. :. yox,
ir. to 18. toalgn, 0-T(3), C.S.P.s.
St«a«tB« aa ba.'ore. 1712 Get Vaterlal Co.nd It ion Baiter aiwva tha thlri' daok.
. 174£ Carkened ship. A'araga ataas 423. Avaraxa rpc. 141.9.
ataan 420. Avaratca rT«. 141
.Tltaaaiinj? ps tefora. 1435 ixarclssc ^
, fcatar. 1443 lejcured froa; flra dri::.
14i; Secured frora .general drills. 1.
■avi,?»tlon brld^o took stearins acntr
-I
SO to 24.
StaaalnA aa ^aror
--: .'5 T and p^c, at 13.6 Knots. Average ataao 4?2.S.
Llaatamiit, U.S. NaT;./
ATer«j;e ataaa 421. Asaraga rp«. 141. S.
''^^■^^3f%S5'Alffie, ,'r.,
Lleutanant, U. 3, f!a»x.
-. . F. '-O^ISSOS, /'
talr, o. s. >ta»y,
OdlBS.
u>,fiuJ4jj,
^M«ar4 3. Paaraa,
Lleutwunt
1692 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
105"?
UNITED STATF •
j -ontact
KfcL rvt Ai-x t
C«rt«la. 0. s.
JQstraeii41n«,
i^^
i vi *^w9^S 0Jt ^'T i ti ockidf*: '
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1693
-lasa
ADDITIONAL SHEET
- ^
to i:4 , i .ont. inued)
--OVSJtttifcX /*-Al-
'. '504 Cut la fcollt.-s 'd and
':. Set '-st^rsel :,v-.iltl!^n
->7 , £530 'J.eSii.Tiei cour?«^
■iS.B.3. AvfCa^e rps. j
Ilcutsrmct, Tt. 3. I»iry.
?'zUa !<*•* «a l«« ««da^ «0.«3C"MM r
*i ii^famirtiii iiii»iiiiiwjsnb^M"^JMm*
1694 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
i06h
i UOG Of
'^; STATES SHIP
_ ;S^2si*»i.
^
' i t '■
^
i^ lj_ i jJE -
.A -SSB
If Lrtftwto — iI2_
arun>AM» Ua>
I !u«*™d, Naa« j
■> ty rtr<n tlM _fi}r"-3"«naT
«_a£i.aix_aiiii-ies, _tAl.!ia_ia.5toiaUjQi
sr.u.-,.a rn i .UL_Aii la flcaaaUi .avA-
6 la ti.ffry aan- i C re *,ij£^tiil4
7 _iil tlan- III- : -li^ipi*iat.
8_.iiat.cii. i;a!_a_i.| jiieejTias ciauili;
Aoi, 3-Uti.r,«Btt.,).;J8.) .2aailtlJ!ii --_
:-• na dri n . : --»y«r.tBXfi. -Caa-
for a< jn»it»-n ! ^aailtiaii, 11
[.Aniitiiixl T.1 nn . RupFr-ji - I'stclLfia.
rirtn f<M- f^.r■-a^1 ___
ITT. .ln«t.n>nt!mi| .
fnr i, ^ gun ni"«>« ti :
iji^ nrxt
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1695
1061
■^
UNITED STATES ;
REMARKS
• tesElna ,jr, course 249^
9IHSOTX vo a ^onTCT cor.sl t^t -:;« -■: ,-. ...t -■ -
' X'WRT, con»oy gui^e. 3or.Tt>y In llrje division
4«rf;er.e«, In aetsria; .-,->n-it".or Ssicar, la Sc:
•taan 430. ;,»er« r
; StesKln^ as fcefor>!. 0605 Llmtid ailp; 3>!t
I Cor^ltloQ of Readiness 11; set Contfillou or
!AT«ni'.« rpa 14C.''.
?:tlng »s
, OOWl !MT1,
5XDENT
9. Ships
B to 17.
>. ?. ?l*.TRA»fA
)Lle^jle.-,aat, r.i
s»»
Stawnlcg S3 Oefo-e. cwp -.' "n,i;ed a.iesd to 12 kniia. 093? aesged Sffi to 13. P
knots. 1400 2f Sov^iber, 1941, tie Ssftain hel4 ssast »na sssi^^e^ the rollostoi;
runlshBsnts: nOKSR, }.''.., Se«?5, nneaeisenllite aoB'Suot, xhro»ln« llgMed oli^rette ;
on llnolsuE Seek; 4 hours extra dctj.. 30O0, J.M., KAttSo, il! heviiw snother '
ma's olothlm; in cls rosslssion; U( asrltisg snothsr taan's clothing »lth (lis aM>«;
t- liBfS sol'.tarT confinem»n-i. KIEfKi, T.ff., 8eiiSo, SEokloi; Jurlna ^eners) ^usrterflj
S days restrietion. »Iti3Sa, -H.F. , 'KZc, silo»liig « asn to saoke durln/? fseoersl
qasrters] 5 deys reitrlotjon. n^lC-Y, I.F., S»s4o, eeieer on lookout »steh st 0100;
|ll/*5/«; Beo* "ourt. T2STI, T.L. , Sea2c, s.i'.eepon lojkoot wstoi st 0100, ll/eS/4i
• Dsok Court. 1055 "^utln boiler *8. Ua9e islly Inspection of aagsjlaes end snioke-;
lees poMder semnles; Conditions normal. Average steals 426. 7. Arers^e rpa 157. 7. j
jl« to le. Saslgo, B-T(P! , U.i.v.s. I
StMaliu; as before. 1300 Zaamtrai^sg offloer oonduotea Insjactioa of ^oar iecss,
llSOO 7«rlous courses sad spes<:a laancbln;; tuo slroraft for renor.neiesBrice ; ,' t.
(jg) B0A3., -.'.S-S., in ch9r<e. Aversse .it-ae 4E6.«. Aseraste rws Ifl.E
le to 20.
, Steac :
1 qusrt* - -
abea£ a;" i-L
Ul nooalti;;.
1743 Slanted
to IS knots.
8ija». 1?62 iov - .
; tHitveaa sblr eit^.t
jtyp*, stasela* itr
) feursed to course a
GOOfSltlon *?!=»,
jaruieer bearing C
.-:cuB courses at various sreed*^. 1&I4 Secured frota fltf^ht
-' l*o 8lrer8*t, Cn Vsrlous (^oerses resuming •'osltico
'"'jmed eourse 249^T taC soevc li.B knots. 1703 SefMstar-
' ' Ll^tei off bolisES #3 sod .<4. 1733 OarkeneiJ sslp. •
5£5*r, ball down. Ofcsoged oourse to E60°T, ohecs'ed speed
s stations. 1750 Oat Is toilers #S end 04 on »ala stesa]
i: .-.?i!W. Ob »sr!ous courses at ntrloos speeds keeplcg
1743 sod ooiAof. Ship sppearea to *« fi.I.J.s.S. "ATSOO"
St 14 knots ou rsrlous courses tonar* oooTOf. 1800 Ship
»Q°T. 1604 Ob fsrlous courses oloelftg oOBTof. 1P56 Daaati
a Tsrloue ooersiM In reer of con»o)r, B«»ln5 lost JspSBSSe !
«vere«e steaa 4n.2. ATerrge rpifiSe.?.
'^^mi^
tleutsTwnt,
r:
1696 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Pafr _ _
i LOG OF THE UNSTEO STATES SHIP -
! AT ■...■'.-.•'-■ -:
Pacsaoe
uM*
l^iioiaj £ J_i,2 1-5411 f>Ei^ -dQ jaa 36.
SC "£ so (-If- c- ^
lol "2 82 111. _u ai
'ai '£ a^ _-
-ita 73—.
Lai 53 a-
tS2 2£ _
. , Kt i
* _I2 — I
, -its -J
-ti.t— siat
juiol-*. MS- I
so.
2SS. i
Ji. JO.
A be
ji las
- . -r.a gi!3;ia3l-i a«gr flanlta Ins-J
i,,; -. ^.ZLliX. i-pefliiaou — _j
> -£7.»fl26 , t.t,h Battf-rj. i-toi_&gflann>i I a>i«nije
i26»SJ£- j s. "Qnaitlag_IIX-J -^iant r/innrurr— i
:-J
ri*^
. .-:-;.?'ii.i,i3.s: atflll— .jSiT
.; £,13,S! JSaJSrS-J^UiS
l3iJi^6Sii» _ij!u.-a&..ja -^ -i^4-jt.-J sat
J.flS:7-IIS«4J»-. _Iil-5AasS_45 .-l^tIII.4JISK_
Jii57ia erh o— ,M ai > IKE 6—118— jt-Jlgl
<^,78le2,l^s ci at tSf
,:_;i3
<Oiictut mi ifc l w n T «i twss
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1697
1G6-
UNITED STATES SHIP
ZONC oescmpTioN
i P to 4.
St«a»lF!» it,--
REMARKS
<i«, eat .
»otiag sl
1 third iiec!{ an<l set
i«990T, fllstont SB
tor F02S13SST XttVT.
u . , uniiet Mater; .
-•aiaess ill. 06«s iSi^Bte
•3flea(3«« to take 3t» clon 83
tai<E7.5. ATera;!!' rpn. 145.
'aker sbove the
» Island bear Ins
3S0C yaras sh«'o
^^^/■y,.
-•i orew at -ju
-i^ ESO°T, 31:
?olnt LJaht!
_ -S3 powder a?
%/
:St«SBin« aa befor*
joraft. 164»i :i«ro» ■
'sroeds ♦airing ^t«*:
-..Tsst ".'et;
vov. l-"!?
catira?* at vw-ViiJa
4^ aixS psc sre^d
!st9«ain5 85
l^uartera an'
Istsaa 433.3.
|20 10 i*.
fetaaalivs o a X trt
A. T. fUTR*«*T, . /
Li«ut«nant ( 'g) . ". S, <i«iry
ta Ou >i — u MT M»v^3c»»lon aann>U»1
1698 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP
-SQilUIptLlII.
Jjnoaitiac-Saicr .
;7i. I ^'^..jLiiZSuJii. kg.ia.ks
14. 7| i*,4£U^,EX,. 17 £9L:7ai. -»SE 7&jaS
Ts ijrS..n!4. .iJis.!ia-£S:.7ai ^''" --■ "-•
io:u;..»l is.* .. .jse_ ..iit^SiazL
_ 5_i3i2i-£74...Ii2EE..i-L3J2a:-a5L
al-fiUa aL£74 anLi.-L2 .ssies}-
17.4 _ BNK ! la. E8J.S5;
.35 JJMLiZO SHtlJ-K iSUSS,
._-2. lai ssEiii
4 iia -*....,»:
1 1^^" r;I
attfcoii.tr— y«rt mi l > «|W»»>«— «!« ■ ■■«■■ . «<»
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1699
ftr
iOflgiJiAa U»i»t>oa>
1700 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1^
UNITED STATES SHIP ^^_- l&y ^^
to *.
■ D»ov oon'riclinn :'
MKSli™!* USA&KR. PC
Uer» lii, #6, .f' ar.:
-itjon of R«»ain<!»9 -
A. T, lA^taiVAY, /
Il«utett»nt {jgj, I'.S. 'J«
St- V : tad »l!lr, Joset Sondltlon asicer •bc»e thlrf ^■
on'' -'j;© 'tesic 43C. ATerage rp/c.
y> * "' '
1 700 We
..ran sfi««(i of FRSSID2NT •JSAJfT snd ast
;, iJS rpm. 1706 Secure)! from lenor*!
3t-if. «7eriiy^e A««£B 430. Av
A. T. HATf'A 'AY, 7^
tleutomot U*!; , <-'■ S. '!«»y.
9t98i5 4iO. Arersge rpoi. 139.4.
i*«ut«a«nt, 0. SO'Savfi
I .i5-'-:)0. A»«!r«fl;a rp">« 139.9. „• ,
Lleutenitt
A. T. FATHiiWAY,
U8). C. S. »t/.
h. B. ROtiT-JSOH, / MMird S. I>e«r«»,
Coflanaas^in^. _ _____^_
~^iori«>>>d (riHtani ow (if U»> mat W IW MM «• H il l m l •* WwH n U l ii I
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1701
LOG BOOK
i?^.-
}
u. s. s.
Rate,
COMMANDED BY
•ll
;. .. .csu.^v:,. iiu^i , U. S. Navy,
I :^.-..='rr ...vii.oi. ...at: _ Division,
Attached to i ;oru.s=';:t;r ;ra;;irs.v LLia.^ZitJs , Squadron,
I .- :-:i.-ui ..t.t.3 ii;..ixic,..-i.£t Fleet,
Commencing fleoeihsx i , 194i ,
and ending- _ , 194i ,
<TJU« p«C« to be vent to Hnx>«aa ot N»TlflmUoa xaanxtalr vHtii Log ■!!•«(••>
1702 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
UNITED STATES SHIP
ZONE DEaCRlPTK
REMARKS
t»'„(j;^^,» for - -i;
i ' .. .-
i;r :'
-■^■"■".
2hC?'va-^s e-' ' o
Aver=
^^^
?r..
4 to 6.
leutsna.-;-.
C-
. »!avy.
nteaxln* as terore
A»er»?5
Sta63!
430.
Averse
: rrT.
Hi .
c^^-^^f^ />^iJU^ '^
.. -.. Ycx,
„isl.-:n, :-ViS! , u.s.x.a.
-it6*2t-iii; as before. CSIO ;.u»rter5. for x:j;^ter ^n^. r-vslcal dr:ll; no ecsent-'-fl,
i":20 ">s(;e i^iilv irSTectlon of n)a.rfi7lnes en-: sx^keies' rowl'^r samples. Conditions
I aorital. ^^.Ters-'e steec 431.6. A»ers»e ryt. 139.3.
"tsaalns; as bef .-?. iSOZ :bBr.«eii speed tD IS knots to take station K ailles area-* ,
of coniov. 1-! '•; "r'inic^ course to :15''?. 14.>S Catapulted tuo aircraft for sooct-i
atean; IfC.l. .-.verogf rr-a:. 148. 6.
^.
nsl^r.,
t<i»2^^T. >*vera^e
•law!
1
t«:a,- •- . Iflo :hBnt;ed course to S75°"" to talc- atetior a ,T.iles uSsaa of,
::or.o-' vertfl tvio aircraft. Lt.ilil "..;-'. ■•/i'T'S, Jr., :tSK , senior rUot.
1713 - •_ ■_-. 'on^ltioi Baker. l"!' .^■i~^-. = ~' tB^e !;oiir.:e S-ti'^", stsa.l 1:5.8
knots, 5lancar'l Lsres'J lo knots, • ". ^nd '^ i:\ jse, In stetloo
SbOO varaa ei-ea'' of "^KIDr.'" 1''44 "8--er':1 s' i- . in4S Sat
Condition or :-;eaiiin«BS II. Ave. nserase roc. 14?. 9. j
'^^^.
18 to 20. i-leutenent, 'J. S. Msjy
SteamiM as oefore. Avero.'e >it>8ir4.3C. *ver«»e ryw. 139.7.
20 to 24.
3teeE.iii«, aa before. Average ateaiB 42e.7. .-verai^e ri-fs. I3f.2
A. •". ".iT.AWAT, /
Lleuteoant { te,) , I'.S. S»»-y.
Lleuteoeint , tr. S. ?«e»y.
' - , ^ ,_, .,
HO«!INSON,
Carta In, f. S. .Sary,
^OoooBOfli ng ■ . „
(CMl^nal MKtnW <mm — (Ma I
Lieutenant Cocimsa^cr, p *.jr,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1703
IJ". -
ADOiTIONAiL SHEET
•tat e-.»»!i Mi. 2, ,1-ttif Ttz.
to ?C.
7S^^
n . '^.s.N.s.
"k
I ,T,"-«iia]; »» Str^r*. le'' L«t fires ale -.tier toller *7. 1=35 ai» a^d cour«« to 840°
*, »f«e4 11 k-ot«, forsla? IXC T«ril» netera of co--»sy eolu=a. 1?4« St«»i51«« lOOOi
/tr".'! »«ten! of ;03Toy ^oluan on -.oarae 2590", bj eeil IJ.E knots. 1951 F>sa«<'
B>toir Islsad ll«n •»«««; to fort, -!i£t«rt 13 tiles. iv«#;te stesi 430. AT'eng*
rr.!'.. IS4.9.
24. Lleutea»nt, r. 5. J*tj.
"t*»-5ln» »« te'ore. :^'t»ln on the brl^lee, S045 ratog ilgtt on qu»rt«r, be«rla« !
124**, -*l!t«nt le.'.. Tllet. 210S Ttaoi?**! ?pee<! to 2/3 at*od«r« spee4 . 10 knots.
2119 •.ttnirta s-esl to 13. t knots. SIZt Slssted S«o "^ernsdlno I.l*t ^e»rln«[ StfT, 1
•51»t»nt 21 tiles. 2145 :ut In re';«u«sln<! i?«»r on course SS*"*?. 2145 astos; Light •
4Up«<!, beerlnj? IC"™. 'iZ' zt'ntrt''. -ours* to 25T<>f. 224C 3h»n««d course to 255°f.
2?4S '.tenrtl course to £S0°-. 2?50 _lia-.UK) >t:ul Ll«.ht fcesrl-w 21»Ot, distant 19
illesi cr.on?ei) course to 245 T. 2252 "heaged course to 240**?. 2263 7t-j»n%»i >pt»i
to n knots, 22".; ':^.9^^ed course to 230°T. S258 Jhaniefl course to 220*". 2304
"tan^ti eourse to 215°T. Set DeOausslng gesr on course 212°?. 2315 ^enged ?ours4
to 220*r. 25*0 ".ttrvfei spee« to 1J.2 knots. 2325 Chan:?»a course to 230O?. - "333
".hanice course to ZlXjOT. 2340 Chsngwl ■50ura<5 to 215">T. Arermgo stma 430. ATfr-
o(;e rrm. 12'.' " '
A. r. HAT?»A*AY, 7
Lleutewnt ( Jg} , 0.S. lfc»y.
S. B. BOBIMBOB,^^-
OpUls, 0, 8. Rrrjr,
Oe— «aaim.
^
«RZ?-
dw«r4 3. P««rce ,
'MM W^wMMW •• l*aiVWMHBMMMBMi1MM4<M'ihM»t'
79716 O— 46 — pt. 15 20
1704 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAKL HARBOR ATTACK
'%r5ijr
yNKTeO CTAinBE SMIII>
amx '3itaKmtrr--m^ ■
'Sir*''
REMARK*
4 ««■
; Salts'* ist"*-^
.r-i'
?r» r,v
(•^W.
cloc>-f Vpik a.i« ti; boor to »J»>« -
flrcr«f. , Tt.-.V :..». S'J.^V-S'S, . r. ,
JT.stj^sJ sife*". Vc It itr-ot*. lOiT .^fco'wc*; »
various C3itrsi?f •••d *;f<».^s r««>v*rl!-^ m\r^
All ^OK'nee ?tjip»<^. ;.iror*rt o*!'"'*** •''
Irw full. U4; '.a**?** »t«rbo»rd thM,.r »h
nod •ii«in« »r«e<!» lo r»oo»«r r^r^cnno; oi^t
»t»«3-, 43?. /'.»»r»(!« rp«i. liS.l.
oa* noror . .
.^^
lCn»i,tn, ■.-<'(!».
U»in* to. If 1» H»<JOV»r«<!
knota, to taK«» powHIon on
«t »»rlou» coura»» xni? ar**
0.'. VAn^rs, "r., In eh(ir.!»
«S9*r. 1M5 SMftui* iMln »
Av»rBJ« rpr. I4i .f .
16 to IP.
oii»oy. !.«4 :ti«B4w<) .• t
». l-»4-< ;«i»i-u;t«<" t«i'
«1n»i' tc «ru!ii\tv« fnwhlr
'.^♦•itl'K'
ol'OltK 4»i>,d,
Ca*t«a, t'. S. »*«,
St««irin« a» b«for». 1400 C)'ia«»il itHKii] to 14 iiiivt*, iiO rr^, 1^04 91«|»%M ihMMIf
m»jtn< b^rlo« ^.-l"', «l»wno« 40 mll*». 1«U a»i»ti(|«S ■»••< W> »«i»tifleP(i, A« »«<«%«
1615 Slsht»< •moke sl«aiil b«»rl« EW'hf. « latino* »T« «ll««. iWO A% HS8 Uiil
«9t« r.OMBOU. r>.*.. s«»?<!, out hi« l»f an liaM «lr» «hll« tUtine "« Set *t tw-
tatoa*. rvoelirin;; l*o«r»tioii 3 iBShsa Is l«a«ih cm e*H »f rta^^ 4>t«' Mm*
p!r-proiiMit«« with tSsi «uv*r»» slid p»ti«»t nl»«»4 OS •!»* H*» lyf KoAlttlffS. 4tOi ,
H>lo, tJSU. 16?8 Ob »»ri<>«« seurMs »t T«rlou» •^•4* P<»iiv«rli)« two «ic#l««if%, '^■.
Vethoi. leao 3»t M»t«rl«l Sonilltlcw 't^kor. «?«eev«r»<i i»o ntfOMfl. »"« Ms***);
1&28 Ob various sourMi* at vartoua aixMii* tairliM t^oattton mi%t\ iicmYoy, i IMDM
riraa unaar boUsra *! «a« itt. l-JOO r.at Ci>niim«n ef ti»t><iitm*m Ij, Oatnh 1j. «'
Darkenaa aelfi. 1717 noUara nil a»9 #1 a<tt ia o« laala ataaai Itna. I'lwa <M.ri ^fo:
xm-nim, ;w«f irrya, AVIRJCAK l^ArKS a»«aufar«« to for* aeliuue, offlar nf tatMli!;
^■^^^r^-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1705
iU".
UNITED STATES SHIP _
~ to 4.
tfSaiSna 'a
jakT, on 5
18 n -profiil'
ieef*
«' in '^ij'tion
.9 c urse= J I 12 Icr.oTS, ."
t-"1 1, ' .1. , "Uh oo-.v
T -t-T ^a^ T tl- f I "'-'■(, r-, ■
BollT-! -1, , -1, >-, apd •'=1 in u«e
to 14 k"ota. "1 lilted "elaitos la "r
tl-i- rlna. OTSa 'e--^-' ' -.u I?la-i; 1
^- JicMor "I, !niJ -aterisl "laiMt' la
"5u-''C to ?14^
rsrt, -"l.-Tt '.
31«H«<) Jarker.ea s ' > r 'liv; '"3"^, i'stjtt ^ t11->i. O'' "' ZYa le' :-.i,rsf to PS'sg
0110 -rnnsei "ojfqo -^ 'fr°-n -n' -v-„„j,a , -,, t^ -,,-0.,, -,,-17 '««■=,<> -«le itod
'^31- ^7-t»'* o ' T- •"■1
to 21 knota. O'fO 'Aariei sr
on rort beam. JMp's nsae-
course to ?70°T C342 Ihpni"
245. t't. CJ4r '= »e-5 cjur-e
3, 1 il rpin. u
04r4 ^hanired cj
'~44-
a;ee
?.l"
IT', If - -1 c-iu!-»c to ■ S 1
»?. - 'ona;tij,i ':; ^e
»ek»r e?ove i. -■ 'e"!:. lCb4 C i -i
to 18 knots, atPeriiff ot "0 krot9,
293°pac. Airerace "team 430. -var
e to 12
ellTiKOd atrar.ije a"!'
snota. 033O 3^elae
Ift-ted "ugul rolTt lliT-t bearStg
>< 1- '. UlcI li.'h' "fei-T to ro^t
14J.£.
ed
Steemlnff «s bc'^rf
knots, 3t«ird!n<r ur
on oppoalte "ou'-se
T^TI , "<»rnon T
aleeplnc uror ■■ '
end to o"" *<i 11
IIP. or „ -0 ei
'loort n ♦ -xi^
for-
I 1941; of'enae =l-5r ff
I tuentv {^ ) -Iwvo and fo
! total lo " of nf S?4
' "^haogo^ course to 8i=!7°T.
; broad on port bow, distance 7.7
I 6.7 nlles. Aierngt steem 43.T.7
jr'ty
ir r J
I' I'i •etcn
r>-f V? '■0 f-r
rjroTed b/ -onvenlna i
10?,S :;hBnge< couraa to 2
nten^e
aon of
141 Tugbun^an
Avera*^ rps. 88.7.
"4''6 i;bs~£!Bl cnur'Je to 2P0°T.
.' ' 5'?a-i to rort, -"Isfi-t 5
ris ^e -ut uTi«!- bolicrs -1 a^l
> ► cn^Pt vs'«ripl ' r.<!;tlon
;0-_ C7-1. '^pr^ad etend«-d
- Jfl3 : >,-r-e to .90°- and r--,
!.jt» sit (j" S. >ar<v.
; Q t ■; BTijr ajeed , S.f
"^Z ^ raffled f'beas) to port
•A ^e^k "->u-t In the "oee of
i^d overbpr 27 1941; o'fanaer
• r s n H f fifteen (15) t^j
• f " Tor^tbg f^ttl loss Of pair
,<i «41 3fi jtltobad Deck
-.»a8o , trle^ ^oveaber 27,
:o be eonflred 'o- a parlod of
- a pay 'or a p<Tl-.ti ^f s .lontb
lutbortty ovenbar 29, 1941. lOOJl
1103 Tugbungan Point
rort, lilstaaae
12 to 18.
Lleutanaot,
Steanln? •» before. 1305 5!?htsd Beltasar laland light bearing 31i'>T, dl»t«BO» 8
miles. 1340 Sighted Duaail Folnt light bearing 261°T, distance 16 mllee. 135«
Hsltasar Iflaod light abeam lo starboard, dlatanoe 3 lElles. 1402 Changed course
2890? and pgc. 1405 ::ti8c«ed courae to 300 T and pgc. i4ie. Ot-an^ed course to
and pgc, JOB psc. 1508 'niaeU Fnint ll^jht abeam to port, dlatanoe 10 mllea. At
8r«i?« ateam 426. A»«r«)?e rpa. 7<(.7.
SOiOfr
Lieutenant ( ig) , O.a. ?a»y.
'leptain, n. 3. Netjr,
Snard S. Pearce,
Llautsnaot Caaauoder, v.
1706 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
107-5
ADDITIONAL SHEET
Ic to iO.
-:tt»»!in<r 6 9 herore. leOO »biw»i1 course r.o .MSO-, r i-^r "':<:'■ . •'■flS"ree. !««? "?!;!§''
V«3»bri«o ^olrt Ll?ht besr;n« 3ia°-. 16.^3 nheni(*>l four»e to »03"-^, SWr'tRe, we'
rso. 16»5 Set Vsterlal Condition '"■flier. I'OO Set .-.on.Mtl.Ti of •?*»'<1n*«« **«,
••■ateh "Sio. 1750 -rsnged ffourse to JOl*', rM^r't-?"! .''i'>'l"r«'^. Iff* •t!«ht«<' '^•'•
loroeo Ll>?Dt ieaiat, 3P1«T. 1P30 ::>-»n^ed course to *- -t, PCSOi ?«■'■<•. "«!
Cut In boilers «1 end <S on aaln ften- Hie. lO^" oU';ht«'<< OeUrsn light b»«rln|
199°-", distant r allea. 1915 J^e^u!ea course to r-E"-, reri^f'tu", •'Pa''r«i'. 1»*"
Calaran Llijfct abaan to rort, aSatant 4^ tllea. 1940 L.lnhtai two aectten*'^ ehlpa
bearing 1S0°T, distant 8 mllea. 1943 Sighted ahir besrln^ SSfT.
4S8. Average fpa. 74.1.
l«0fe
Kteaa
80 to 24.
, VT*. K. BOAL,
Llaiiitanant (J<(), tt.
3. K»»lf.
larloua oouraea. 2019 olnhttd tui* to*ln<| a bafne bearing
2100 Ohanj?«d oourae to 315 T, l-ior<)»a«d apead to 9 Knota
ElOE fasaad Ssooroso [olat light abaaoo to port, dlatant £.3 mtlaa. E189 ahaiin»8
•read to 7 knots. 2141 Sighted ahlp beer-lni? 300°?, dlatant « miles. R«00 Turn«4
on navigation llghta. 8207 Ssoured fires under boiler* *1 and #1!. 8E11 tufnad off
running ll;?hts. 2812 Sighted S«ntla*?o mint Untit h««r!n« S07.7OT. rcia r»»M«
staamar abaaai to starboard, dlatant 1700 yards. 8SE3 SlKhtad auhaMflne l>«firl»i| 30'..
T, ZS39 Turned on navitjatioa llnhta. >'.f40 Turned oT' runnlns; 1 t«hta, fSI^ Ohal-
len«ed 9ubm.«rin» on starboard bo». 830r. :3ubti»rine paused abeam to «ta>hd«fd,
distant 1.5 mll'aa. Avarega steam 430. Average rp-n. 7n.O.
Lieutenant (Jul, t', '^, •!.»»,
"^rii^ttS^Biil
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1707
UNITED STATES SHIP
T!L.»X3iaj i D»i;«i»J«£
REMARKS
^flo ~-'~
UOW 1ATI, ;A! ?. "A! ■
use. Shir -Jarkene*
IK'ht sbesm to ^te-
Tortun* Tsl« M 1 i /:- 1 . ^ ^ , i - : . . ^ .
Islona iieht basri.-.^ "Oi^T, distant .J-l
ind t'C- """i* '^S'.ijed eourne to ,^9?°?
IS-H 'ssrlii? OSl'''', ;l3tBnt ?1 nllts.
«t■^r^os^d !..■ illef. o:'?'9 -.Lagged ecu;
4L^0, Aver8»5e rrffl. ^6.9.
4 to
. --.i-II'SN'T -.,j!-T,
. 00 .W .Itl. Sonllsto
sie'^T. ofo SI;'.'''"*
urse to 0OO''T, pgo
20 3Ui,teJ >tia;lo :
il^M uoeam to:
Lieutananl ; J^) , n.
04i;0
Ste«ittin>; ns fce'ore. 0410 ')hai.K»<3 9p^ ed to alx Icaotd.
knots. 0*e6 "hengeid speed to ~ knots. 051S 0|-,a.n*!«(J c
pBc. 0518 :hea.;e'i sf eed to 4 h'-.ota. Ot)?:*; On varloua
off ':orrigldor lalaod '5um*5 er;tr«ncts of th« convoy Ir.
Seourad from Oonriltlon of ■ieedjnesa IT; set Condition
>jnti-airor«ft bstterv. Set y.odirie.' ■■a-erlal Jor.d'. ito
to 04oOr. '^■?^? ilgr.teo of boilers si nnd ^8. 0730 ;
various oourses at verioua S!:>!9d8 atandln<j up toxard "
In boilers »1 sud *Z on main steao line. i>7s:- stopped
ATsrage steam 428,7. Averaiie rpa. 4.9.
'^ to IS.
3teamia»; ^a before, spproachlQ^ ;.(aoil8 ^/ sntra.-ice
aboard, 5t'?o-ln; -t v^irious cjurses lAd apeaos pa.^
entrance a raa . 182? ^osijleted tassaga trirou*?!, sine-
T aad r«o. yhari^ad speed to 10 knots, '.^85P Ohun«ed o
All engines storped, 0S?5 Dropped pilot. 0S27 Ohar.gei
Jban^ad speed to 13 knots. OS.lo ^^Bn^ed speed to 3 k-i
1" Icaota, "hs-.ied course to 06';°T end pgo. 1001 San
board, -llstsnce J rr.r.es. 10:50 .-, teamln!? «l »arl:.iis jou--h3
anobor»i;e, 1114 Ancnor-."! It Certh A-S, Va-illo '-err'-.r, i.
mth 45 fttlions of ch.oln out to tae starboanl a lohor. -ii
lllary purposes. SMps present: v«rlou» units or Asiit.;
patrol, Senlo:: Officer rresent ..float. 1.23 ,»uur«3 »i;.
degaussing ':»SIe. Yede Jsll:; Ir.spection of iM;;a7.1a83 fer.d
Conditions nors*!. A»«ra«e steam 430. Ajera^e ."ri. ii .6 .
12 to 16. i leLtoiier.t 1 jg) , ".
r.i{ed 3( eed to Si I
40°? and I j.c. . G.37>i
If yllot oeaa
;nsnnel la GBln<
;.*4ad ooursa to 090'
u-so t; 0470? and x,i<i . di'V
QOi.TRK to O'i;*' and pgo,
ts. 0»40 c;h«agad spaad to
lofolss ilKfct acaaic to stai-
->-i u .d spoeds a|)pro*or.lrig
\ .1. . 1.1 'if-, feet -it iMtar
-^iier /r_ in use for auj
. ; >leot. ;oiiiMinder raa^rtle
1;. ei^ines. ill:S iecgre«
ess pottder sasarle
Anchored t< befor*. 1339 TEOOS stood la cod aooHorad
left the »Hp on 4 (-'ays laara. 160C atSWCVa, i., OS
In aecordascs alUi orders of tte oo:iaMndln;i offlc;er,
the ship or. lei^orarr duty as aHo.-e petrol In Ksnlia,
yAJdt S.F., aac; ~ai.-:-,»lS! , f.¥., VHZ<\\ SO-S, H.B.,
A. a., 3«!e; KTSr, <?.?., '»:3c.
ABotaorad as bafor*. 1700 h»:cii'J&,
•■•"IJTOR.'IIL ftood In »nd anehore4.
1440 <ll-:Oi-.;«. -,., oac,
, left sMr on 4 dajra !«•««.
• folloalr.rf n>Tn«d »<^' ; e't
20 to «4.
Anohorad ^y tefora, __
a, p. ROBlflSQR, '
Oaptdn, n. 3. ^ayj,
0aamn4 inn.
1708 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
UNITED STATES SHIP
lieodBter . t» *i
■chors'l In ^«r
re:marks
:_i
1 -, , ■ !•.;« Sy
transferrefi
ni'STjetS win.
!t, ions norni.
returtvetS i
rriaoner 't \
0" : j-aucnt ;
Lieutenant '.Ik';, '.'. .'. Nav/.
' asandl-,.- o-rioe.-, i';c -olloni"..; r^ar^d 3--. were t ro,.3f s.-ra ) t;j ttt. : OLU S'E ror 9ssl.
i mem iv Ocwxi?n-Jer Suomarlr.e Asiatic Fleet: ".•2CS~H:i, S. :. , f30C-04-S2, 3i3o, In
c>:9rff.«; :.':\. :i., l.i., f3;7-35-eD, .;r3o; «lUiJfl3, S.A.,. i£68-ta-91 , 08.'3c; r'AFi'Jl^,
:.F., .J8i- -S'-. J,'L-: :: ■■'I','. ::.';.. r34;,-«f-'i, FEc; Kin3?'K.'iN, T. . «30.?-4S-51,
- - .; acooun-.s ecocmpaniefl -nen. 1330
-IT, the folloKla^ na.T.ed cen were
- -^ :o(TC.e'"i»r ratrol Alni: 10;
''•.eJ oat two
. 1 yers o^sr
5i,»--:.oBra ijiae, at't.; .: le: .err'-iier ... "-uiAi, ir. -•arso. i^nt, ' »'-;s stood
f In, 1500 .'omrleted diving operatlnj?*, Hawlrw; olesne!) and Inspected stsrhoerd
rrofellera. 1515 J^olsted In aircraft. 1S<: S'ULi IS stood In. Ii42 J»n^ end
" 3ton« In. IS.'^S le-Tf^CK ^■\l •>».(>.->:» ?r. .
Lieutenant, r. s. >^vy.
ifeajera. iDio i'Oisieo in aircrart. 1:
;-» 3too« Iri. 15S! JPirroSUl stood i:
t «■•«( «W>-»— >«■»■ 11 •>
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1709
IQ-^i.
ADDITIONAL SHEET
lir . 5. .B«»es.*«? ,i> *!•
so to E4. (Oontlr.ueiJr .
b» shore v'trol, report to foilo
RoBiasos,
0«pt»la, D. S. NiTy,
gwnrttMU
J
1710 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
UNITED STATES SHIP
' ZONE one
C to 4.
REMARKS
of chelr out -c gta"bO'9r:; o^!'.^o^.
Ofricer '■-resent Afloet, Comrxinder S
Shirs nresent: ..sietlc Tleet l«ss
OSlc, rf'turne<; to sMr, on reoell.
Tor cvt,;> or rfne en(^ foreT' n/*?r; cfl
Kith f,»io sutures. rresslnK aoplipd
■'..„ . , "vt. , ' ;?'- , t-e
!na= in;- 'or ir^ert" hort. I.-eS8'n,- anfiif
If; ftccor'^unrt* •.•.}- conanundi nit oflcer'e r.i
sjer. rpt^jmer" fror temrjorarv shore petr-~-l '
r:?^.; : "'Tsi , >.:., iiac, tisr; cox, r. . -.•
.-.:., :oi., -:;!■•, and -^O. :», -..t., ?J(3r , -
4 to 9.
ftnchored es be'ore, CS^C liv
for ccttlnr LDvenmv. O'l ■ ;■
OKEc , US'! retumwl from shore
sen aetaii. O6E0 Teatetf issiE
on Teriaus courses 6t verioLS
."O-SO,
reete'l
r-jrifisted
-•,'i^). c.s.r.R.
-* rr«n8r«tlpn
»-4v
; to tlongsiae
2 «BTS :eere.
'e to IS.
"OS.
er.cca ru-!)
«:s>rF
:!euteTiBnt, r. S. "»vv.
Vooref! •B b«fore, -ortsiae to ' .. , :-. "
,&AK-0N1. E., CSE^, recslle." 'rwi lee^e
returned «b?«r4 fror. t»o dsrs lesTe or
;»long3i'?e to Et«r«!08r«. 09^7 -iT'OVTV, -.. , <?
; le«ve on tlie. ,T34C T rov Islontn^ IlffM'*- "^^
.C»pt«in left t-he ship. 095O r pt' "fl !- '
lAZ, rh.llllj-lne I'teamer; st<w] in. It^'
Inspection of aa.^zlnes en-" sxokeless r-
HeoelJed the following froo ian yiguel '-rf«»
'mess; ins^eotd ss to juallty ty Lt.(.'<l J.c
icjuantlty by h.nsl«n >-.',. -.Kim-, 30-Tia) , rs>m
1055 Lighted flrea under <5 aiv)
Iretijrned aboard. 1115 stationed
, ^ut not returne-^ .
time. ^^S.W 1 TOviji
, return*'*
;'.ir
'. rs st-od In. lOCi
"2 ronaal . 1045
jr" «iiois Ice cresE for ^eriePBi
•OJfs^.R, i^-:), • SW, aid Es to
-- lOfO crj7l3;:.n lU'ter left ship
e tiailars for booatlin j-urp-iees. lias Captain
stall, illf- Jlosed sU watertl«ht
11?0
idoora. IIEO Cut In ifi and ^»6 bo!l"!rB '^n iiain atear I'.ne. 11?0 Te.ter- -ain snainsi
|U31 Lighted flrea under ^fl toller. 11^3 Lpt ko all Hies, fi-Tlna rec-lTed T'il
j666 gallons of fuel oil ut eo^F. 1H5 aat oourae S'BOT. 1146 Ohanned course to
|2S0OT, SS«<»psc, 2420 pstijo. U53 "lut In ^b holler on main steam line. US'' Shamrla
ioourae to «550t. Average 4 team 430. A»ar<)s5a rpa. 163.3. ...^ ^ ^^^ ^ • t.
t ^■^i B. SiXsctia, Jr.,
:12 to 18. Lieutenant (](?), U. 3. I»«»y.
St««.lD4 •« befora. 120S 3«t Visdlflad Maverlal 3orad Itlon BaHer. 1806 Shangad
oour»a to 250°T. 121E 3haa«ad oaufsa to tiS^f. ISSS «li« San Nloholaa 3hoSl Ll«n
•ba<ui to port, distant Z.-ri eilaa, ohaD««<l courae to Z470f. 1SS4 Thanitad oooraa
to 843°T. JL£5S Otangaa nottrae to «4»ot. 185S 3li(tit4a oorrlaldor Island Lletithouai
bearing 23**r. IZX Ctmast spaed to 2/a ataadar* (paaa. 1845 By order of th«
ecmuiOlas offlear, WZBEB, B.8,, )aa4. Ma ral««*«* f»*i oouf inement . lesa *aa« «
«ow»a to »*»*?. 19E3 ab«ii«a(3 •ovraa t» E70OT. 1538 C»mib««4 oourae to 240°^ IM™
iCl!«Bg»d apaa« to staq^ari) sp«*<] IS knots, 150 rpai. Chea«ei5 sourse to ISlOf, "1355"
■7lMra«!ia« eonrse to lMP*r. ISSS with ^aballo H*ithoo*« Searing 078.5<'T, dlsUat 4 (
■Has, n Fralle tii^tt-.cmM b«arln« 330°T, distant •*»1««, 1* M«nJ« tl^thoaaa bat r
lag JSO°T, distant a alles, too* dapartare for leko, T.i. 13SP CUiangaa soars* to
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1711
I OS J
ADDITIONAL SHEET
12 to 16. (;ont!no86) . (
?20°T ana r'c snd Incressed sr>eei^ to full sr^eed , SO Kiots, :'0 rpi. 1359 'at J:i
lielausslrw i^ear. 140C Set ::ondltion III In. the antl-o'.rorsf t baf.ery. 1408 3fan^ea
course to IflO"-" an* p^o . 14S3 Chao-ed course to 174*T aniS pno, 173°r3c- 1*34
L!i?hte(i fires under fcoUera «1 and -^2. 143' :iit boilers jX and «i2 In on rcala steam
line. 1449 leased Fortune Island Lighthouse abeem to Ftb<L, distant i.« Qllea.
1305 Sifted 3or.lla»o Llzhtfcouse bearing 147'>?. 1522 Zr.ensiee courae to 140=T and
pito, 141°p3c. 1533 Changed eourfe to 145°r. 1.36 Oha -j;ei3 course to la70T. 1543
Changed course to 1E4°T and ri;c. Average steam 42R.7. Average rya
16 to IB.
Steanlng as :erore. 1631 Changed course to 110°". lS3o
1636 Ohsr,,a;ed course to 0»0OT. 1640 Sighted ItlbrUo Llgl.
Sighted Sscorceo Light bearing 13e°T. I6--0 ;et 'aterisl
r^hanfi-ed course to 133*r. 1717 Changed speed to io knots
20 Knots. 1726 Darkened ship. 175E '^rred on din nasth
Averaae steem 425. Average rpi. 20P.9.
Lleuteaaat !Jg), U.
Secured De'^auaslng gear,
bearing C90OT. 1644
londitior. »Kar. 1718
1720 Changed speed to
9d end side lights.
COUI>!S, Jl
Srslgn, ". S. "tevy.
Steaming as before. ISOO Set Condition of ">ead:neps for Actios 31. ■31o»ed to 2/a
standard speed, 10 knots. 105 rpm. 1605 Changed courae to 128 " and pgc 1807 I
Secured boilers .»1 and (i2. 1820 Sighted Tumel 1 Light tearing 14C.50-'. 1624 3i«htM
Trea Hevea Island Light bearing 104*r. 1840 Changed course to i31°T and p-'.e.
Average steam 438.5. Average rrr:. 1D4.5.
Lieutenant, r. sVHavy.
80 to 24.
Steaming os before. 8020 Changed course to 174°'T', pgo and pgs. 204C passed Dumall
Light abeair- to starboard, distant 3.0 slles. Average steam 432^.5. Average rpn. f
A. T. ^ATl'-i'HA'; , I
Lieutenant (Jg), 'J. S. Vavy.
S. P. so?i\son/
Ceptaln, U. S. *vy,
QirmnniiBt.
a»«ra 3. Pear
Lieutenant Coeiuoder,
fTfcia pag * <o >* — * *P 1
> or KaMaMXm I
Btur Xtk liOc ahMU)
1712 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
REMARKS
. S. Ti"i?DS;^r
/^:
XL^^£Z^~0-^-
T^^rr
^
-1//^./
3t5aT.'.r.4 «s ts'ore. ISOC Jet :;on<3iHon II. Avers ^b Ltet;-
js: to r4. Lleutenent (],?;, '!.3. "»
Steemiai? as bafora. ?033 •^jrnsd off novli^Etion I1r>:»s. ArerRge 3ts"
I U»^raee rpo. 80.
Z. B. S03I!530S, ' 3<f»iara S. Fearos,
3. B. S03I!530S,
3art«ln, r
SonaanAla g
Lleuteaant CoaiE!e3i!«r , r x .v . >-.«^u,.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1713
LIST OF OFFICERS
AttKhrf to wd OB boMd o« tbe U. S, S. 'iOT'n^ i r . AT ,
by
■i -^^^T'^SR^:. :a-.;mD _, U. S. N., during tit pmod eonrad by thfa Log Book, with date rf
reporUat (or d»ty, drtachmeat. tnmsjer. or d«ath. from J.^i>SSSStMZ . IB ^1, to _?i-2e<iaa»«r-. ,19 * 1 •
1714 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PE\RL HARBOR ATTACK
(The remaining portion of Exhibit 68 consists of a map
reflecting the Disposition of U. S. Pacific Fleet, 7 Dec.
1941 together with typewritten table reflecting the posi-
tion of the U. S. S. Boise at the times indicated. These
items will be found reproduced as Item No. ^5 7,, .in
EXHIBITS - ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of 5Stot Committee)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
EXHIBIT NO. 69
1715
Si
l^
^
9^9.
I
^
iz*
^R
«^
^
±t
i
i 8
u
t I
1716 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 70
CKPARTMENT CT STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTER** AFFAIRS
August 18, 1941
tfflMORANDUK FOR THE PRESiaSHT
There le attaohed a draft telegraaa to the S^basay
at London containing a proposed message froa you to^
the British Prime Minister. If you approve of the
dreft I will arrange to have the nessa^e transmitted.
c
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1717
Sent
Wofffoatbtotixt iif H^tafa g
MMSSKBABBt
August 18, 194X
TRIKJS PMORI'SY.
sscftsT fsc>a T^ F R E si Dgi r g i?w d^pckui-.
ftOOTE Wittt r«irereno« to ear dl«o};ksl©aB in r©s«erd to
■Sha »J.t)Msti?R in ^b* Far East, upon my r#t«m to WgmhJ^toft
I X«8rc«<l VOAX th« «r«9«a*«« iyik>a0eA<l$>r l»a on August 16
appPiJaetwA tS» Seeretwry of Stat* with & jt|8«itt»«t*for a
r*6«i«ption of ti» iiUTdipial oOBTerfcationa %(fet';»i tba Ast-ass^dor
and tl» 3««rat«ry sf State had tpsen boldiag 41risotB<l tvv* ■
sjrplomiig th« pd«slMllty ©f p«aoh3.B|c a W^la foi' ne^-^t.-'
,.-, ragar* to «j|»«e«tr)£l aettlaaatit in th» ;?«olf.'
tiiat tLis 3«at*«tar? of B\atJ« iAkI 1e r«ply donfiii'-
. i
toftha ossaatiar eonveuaatiaps.
tlMi iS^oretary cr SuAts aj:a I m&lvi-t .
a at»t«»«nt eoverlj'4 the pealti^i. -.■-' '
leimv^ .
1718 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TcLCGftAM Sent
W^^wrixastxt ot SktKbt
Ouiytts
-a-
dtr»QtioB of ailp«3?y Acadjastioa by foro« alocg the/ line*
of the profKSWRd gtetesMmt ««©k «» ymi aed I Siaa. «li»o«i#«d,
Tb«.-«ti|«t«!8«!st X aad« to him ir&» no X««« ▼igs^ous thauB «i^
wa« sabetftstially elacilw to the stuteaent v« tm& disousa^d.
?he Affib»c»ftdor j*«neK9d the r^daest o&fis tsjr Ma to tl%e
S«or«t»ry of lst»t« In reg»rd to the i»«iuai5p»tioii of/oonveriwi-
tiea«. I reglted by re-rfiWltig %im J«it«n«»e Oeireyfaieat • e
a»t|.on ift actively puraalng « oouree <^ oon^a«st an4 ia
••■*pflrxnf tfc* Ji^a^eee prees to attselt tjaie 6to-»er»»#ati
aw«it o» tjw isnaal5»lefl of peatoUfol, iswful Mid joet
n-t;«rBati?|imi r«l«tiose wHioh thia Q©T«r«Ben« ha« e^pjitssti
'•'d'2 su^««*e4 th*t if the ^0pmna»9 Qoveraaeat iji prep^ed
■-gr«is taifl (■■js^^raaent w®ul<l ^
■■>-)nT«r»atiep -
»t«t9t««AT,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
EXHIBIT NO. 71
1719
TO ^ -
jfull '»te
Ctttaet {0»y (»<ter
lMf;«t !ett«r
Ckwg* Oepjitmenti
Full tstt
0»)t letUf
IHf M letter '
Ckirgi! to
$
Bppartatiptit of #tate
I.O'KONI'lOeHTlAH. COD«tx
J^
5/"
J rri' inr ri" nrfsv i t ^^r-a ...ya v..^i»»«4-^>^ >wm^ for rraftior.' ZvS -
■«». 4-->>v^^«.-ti-:;i r''*---»f j<»=i?~/ ^--*-r- — ■"--i-ot/riBr'
■n Prime I'-l'd -^t-rj Churchjlll' g 'rp-llc i^a,drt>HS /?/; * '•%>>,
extract fron
.- .jTMiifi iW"! Ti ^^fr^*m»-
i'ai:4» tig-^jB I
. /
EnclphtrtJ iy .
5enJ *sr (iperafew
79716 O — 46 — ^pt. 1{
-21
1720 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CcliMt j 0«y i«tt«f
INigM lettw
Full rale
Day letter
Ni^t letter
Clierge to
S
Telegram Sent
-2- / Weahsn^on.
TC M T«AM«MirrtU>
C9NrioeN-r iai. com
MUNOMrnxEMTtAi. coot
PAMTAM
HMm
will be mtv-i© lu,' secure.- a ipeaceful /settlementi,/' The Unl^-d
States /are ^aborlnp with infinite /patlenc^ to prrlve •■* .
* '' I f
fair and' amicable .settlement/which will r^lv.-:
utmost/ reassurance for her lefr-ltlmrte intereets. We
eprneetly hooe thepe'.nee;otiatlons /v.'lll Bucceed/ But t::l&''
I must eayt That If thecff ho^esf should fall we shall/
of course., rar^e ourselves unheal tatln?ly lot the side of
tne United States.. UNtiUOTE
FE:GC:MHP ^ Fj^
H^^
^
^..ai>
PA/H
V!
1
EiK^ihml iy ■
Smim wg UptrtKOf .
M..
. . W..„
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
EXHIBIT NO. 72
1721
Telegram Sent
CoIImI (jBV'-'Ur
Chugt Drp,r!m<-M:
Fuil riih-
Dili:::-!
"Btpartment of l&tate
TO BE TftANSMirrED
coNrtOFNTiAL. cooe
NOHOONFIDCNTIU. COOE
Wathinfjim,
AuGust 1, 1941.
Knciphfrd htj
Sent hy optretor .
1722 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Telegram Sent
Btpartinent of ^tuU
Washington,
TO at T«*N4«t1Ttl>
^'O^
i i.i*»;
EntiphrrcJ f>s/ ._„ „
^enf iy ofxrcdcfr , il^f..
1^^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1723
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
1724 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
; muot be
■ .-.4
Sec '■■:,
HUSH .
Tvo.,
v\ew with the Torelm '■'iniGtor-
'1 !;i.:uiT>' arran;"
coraniunlcwte furth
f" t»-ie AmerlcAn Govcriunen''
tho (Uirpoee of th? .Int- rvl.ew v.
option of the Jap<\ncae Ooversu-'
•v! t'f'' rc.j-f>rcl to tho pror'^jtltlon
interview mlfj-.t be usv
Ko sal<1 that the i.rov.osl t '.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1725
DEFASHMZirr OF STAXE
OinSION 0? CUBBENI IKFOHMAflOB
Badlo Bulletin Ho. 186 Aagttst 6, 1941.
NOTEj This digest has been compiled from press and other sources and is in no
wajr an expression of official opinion.
Press Conference . Questioned again today whether any credence could l)e placed
in reports of a possible meeting between the President and Prime Minister Cfaurchillt
the Secretary said that he had nothing more to say than he had said yesterday mom^
ing.
A correspondent asked whether the Secretary could say \Aat Mr. Duff-Cooper's
mission to the United States was about, Hhe Secretary replied that as far as he
knew Mr. Duff-Cooper tod not as yet landed. Ho added ttot ho had heard a report,
which he could not vouch for, that during the next few days Mr. I>iff-Coopor mi^t
pass throu^ this country on his way to the Par East, ^gked if ho e:qpected to see
him, the Secretary said that if he came by and proposed to call* he supposed ho
would see him as ho did other important and prominent people \dio come to this
country.
A correspondent mentioned ttot there wore increasing indications that Japan
was making demands on IJiailand and he referred to Mr. Eden's speech In the House of
Commons to the effect ttot anything that threatened the security and integrity of
Itoiland was of immediate interest to Britain, and ho wondered ^rtiettor tto Secretary
would care to say anything on the situation in regard to our own policy* The Sec-
retary said ttot he thought ttot wo tod many times discussed the question of con-
quest by force on the part of certain countries, and ttot it included the Pacific
area. He said ttot we tod made very clear our concern and our interest in respect
to steps carrying out ttot sort of policy. He pointed out ttot Mr. Welled Just a
few days ago tod occasion to give the correspondents a statement on ttot general
question as it related to the Pacific area.
Asked if he could say whether this Oovernment tod tod occasion to express any
viows to the Govemmont of Ttoiland concerning the present crisis out ttore,
Mr. Hull said he could pot go into details now because it was not at a stago wtore
he could be very definite. A correspondent pointed out ttot certain stops followed
the occupation by Japan of Indochina and he inquired whether it was fair to assune
ttot certain other steps would follow the occupation or attempted occu^tion of
Ttoiland by Japan. The Secretary replied ttot it was fair to tore Increasing con-
cern about a movement ttot would include the step to ^ieh ^e correspondent
referred.
Asked if tto correspondents oould infer ttot this Oovemment tos increasing
concern about events over there, the Secretary said ttot ttot was <Aat to was try^
ing to say. He added ttot anything ttot Mr. Voiles tod said regarding the Pacific
area and Indochina would tove especial application to Ciailand and the present
situation.
A correspondent mentioned ttot the Japanese tod also made some demands upon
the Ecuadorans, and he asked whettor we were going to do anything about ttot. Ibe
Secretary said ttot we tod nothing on ttot subject except wtot appeared in tto newa-
I>aper8. Ho added ttot he tod not heard from Ecuador nor from our representatives.
A correspondent asked whether ttore tod been some indications ttot Ttoiland
had been offered wtot amounted to a protectorate ovor Malaya as well as Indoch i na
80 ttot the Japanese would tove a protectorate similar to ttot of tto British
CoBDonwealth of Rations over Canada, of which Canada is a part. Sie Secretary
said ttot he tod not been advised on ttot subject. He mentioned the maltiplioity;
of xunors and reports coming from ttot area lately and said ttot we were observing
all of these as closely as possible.
A correspondent, with reference to an article in a Hetherlands Indies paper
ttot there was no question ttot the United States was behind the Netherlemds Indies
but the question was how far behind, asked whether we had any indications of a wea)»>
ening of ttoir attitude towards Japan out ttore. The Secretary said ttot he had
nothing now on ttot subject.
to
1726 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-a-
fo a question of whothor tho United Statos had had any change In relations
with WnlaPd, tho Secretary said that there had teen nothing especially now on that
recently.
Asked whether he had any report or definite assureince fron Vichy on Admiral
Leahy's conversations, tho Secretary said that he had not yet heard from hint.
A corrospondont asked whether there was any developnent on the question of
evacuating inerlcans out of Japan. The Secretary said that there vas nothing
ospoclally new. Ho said that wo bad not had ai^y eonnunications yet from any of
tho persons who were refugees if we night call than that or fron our consuls. He
added tLat at the sane tino we are giving every attention to tho wbolo problon.
A correspondent mentioned that there was a private group. Including several
Bepublican loaders, who issued an appeal last night to Con^^ess (see holow) to put
a stop to the step-^-stcp projection of tho United Spates toward an undeclared
war and he asked for the Secretary's connent on that. Mr. Hull said that ho would
repeat his statement to the Committee on foreign Affairs in tho House of Represen*
tatives in January in support of tho Lend-lease Bill in which he sought to state
the issues confronting us in the international situation.
Paraguay . The Department of State today made public a translation of a
letter dated July 28 to the Acting Secretary of State from tho Minister of Pnra-
goay eoqpressing the appreciation of the President of Paraguay and Sonera de
Nor£nigo for the courtesies shown in the United States to Senora do Morfnigo and
their eon. Tho letter said that tho general health of the child has improved
notahly and that the difficulties have hegun to give way with the treatment applied.
(See Eftdio Bulletin Ho. 172 of July 21).
Chile . Senorlta Magdalena Potlt, distinguished authoress and musician from
Chile, will arrive in Hew York on August 11 on an invitation oxtondod 'by the Depart-
ment of State to visit the United Statos.
Mai W. Thomhurg . The Department has announced the appointment of Max W.
Thomburg as a Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, to act as consul-
tant to the S^ate Department on intomatlonal petroleum matters. Mr. G^omturg
has heon assigned to the Office of the Adviser on International Economic Affairs.
COHOHBSS
Defense Soizure . The House yesterday voted 241 to 136 to adopt the Property
Boquisitioning Bill. The House added three amendments to the measure as passed by
the Senate, thus necessitating its going to conference to iron out tho differences.
(See Badlo Bulletin Ho. 173 of July 22)
Hi^way Defense Program . The Senate today over-rode by 57 to 19 tho Presl-
dent's veto of the $320,0007000 hi^way defense bill,
Iho measure will now go to the House for consideration (Sec Badlo Bulletin
Bb» 185 of July 5).
DJSfjaUSE
H&val Bases . The Havy Department will establish six additional section bases
for refueling and minor repairs for small ships at Key Vest, Tla.; Mobile, Ala.;
Corpus Ohrlsti, Tex.; Boosovolt Roads, Puerto Rico; Monterey, Calif.* and Heah Bay,
Vash., as soon as funds are available. The Department said that additional section
bases would also be established in AlpSka.
Airplane Deliveries . The OFM reported that its Director Gonoral Enudsen,
Bear Admiral John H. Ibwcrs, and Under Secretary of the Havy Forrostal would
leave tomorrow on a three-day tour to Inspect Sast Coast Airplane factories with
a view to possible speeding up of deliveries to the Army, Ifevy and the British.
Haval and Aircraft Bqalpoent . loderal Loan Admins trator Jones announced
that the Defense Plant Corp., at the request of tho Havy Department, had author-
ized a lease agreement with Revere Copper and Brass, Inc.', H. 7. C. to construct
and equip a plant at Baltimore, Md., costing $3, 100, 000, to be used for naval equip-
aant production.
The Defense Plant Oorporeitlon also authorlted a lease agreement with Ball
Alrozaft Oorporationi Buffalo, to construct and equip a plant at Hiagara JIbiUs
Airport
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1727
EXHIBIT NO. 73
DRAR TELEQSAN
October 16, 1941.
(Draft no. 2)
His laperial Majesty
Hirohito,
Eaperor of Jc^an.
I hare Just been informed that the Cabinet of Prince
Kono7« bas tendered its resignation. As Your Inperial
Majesty is aware, discussions hsTS been carried on during
the past few veeks between high officials of the Oorernaent
of the United States and high officials of the Ooremaent
of Japan directed toward working out a basis in principle
for a meeting between the Premier of Japan and myself i^ich
«• both hoped would be contributory to maintenance and
preserration of peace throughout the Pacific area. The
original messages 1 receired from the Premier of Japan
on this subject were Tery gratifying. Unfortunately, the
concrete proposals subsequently presented by the Japanese
OoTemment seemed to present a naurrower concept than I had
anticipated. The Secretary of State therefore on October 2
nigsested to the Japanese Ambassador here that we return to
thm original concepts and endearor through re-examination
of those eonoepts to erolre general lines of action which
1728 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-2-
would be clear manifestations of the high purposes we have
in mind and thus might be expeoteA to establish a durable
and fundamental peace in the Pacific area.
The procedure which the Government of the United
States and the Government of Japan have been following
during these past weeks has not oroduced the results
hoped for. In view of the fact that, as high officials
of your Government have repeatedly stated, time presses,
I suggest to Your Imperial Majesty that there be a meeting
between the Premier of Japan end myself and the Chairman
of the Executive Yuan of the National Government of
China, General Chiang Kai-shek. I believe that such a
meeting, to be held as soon as arrangements therefor can
be completed, furnishes in present circumstances the best
hope of maintaining and preserving peace in the Pacific
area.
I have not as yet consulted General Chiang Kai-shek
in regard to this, but I shall be pleased to do so imme-
diately upon receipt from you of a favorable reply.
FE:MMH:HE3
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1729
' DRAFT TELE(»AN
October 16, 1941.
Hlfl laperlal Majesty
Hirohlto,
Emperor of Japan.
I hare Juet been informed through newa reports that
the Cabinet of Prinoe Eonoye has tendered its resignation
to you. As Your Imperial Majesty is aware, disoussions
hare been carried on during the past few weelcs between /
high officials of the OoTemment of the United States
and high officials of the OoTernment of Japan directed
toward working out a basis in principle for a meeting
between the Premier of Japan and myself which we had both hoped
would be contributory to maintenance and pre serration of
peace throughout the Pacific area. The original messages
I received from the Premier of Japan on this subject were
Tery gratifying. Unfortunately, it seems to me that the
concrete proposals subsequently presented by the Japanese
OoTsmment seemed to present a more narrow concept than I
had anticipated (tlym that conveyed by the Premier's
message). The Secretary of State therefore on October 2
1730 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
■ttCg««t«A to th« Japan*!* Aabaaaador hara that «• ratam
to th« original eoaeapt csaA aaAtaror tbrooCh ra-
axaalnatlon of that eonncpt to arelra gaaaral llaaa of
action «hloh would b* oltar ■anlf*ftatloas(of tha laftj
eonoaptt) of our original oonoapts and thui alght ba
azpaoted to •stabllth a durabl* and fondaaantal paaoa
In the Paolflc area.
The procedure whloh the Ooremaent of the United
Statee and the OoTemaent of Japan hare been following
during these past weeks has not produced the results
hoped for. In view of the fact that, as high offlelala
of your OoTemment hare repeatedly stated, tine presses,
I suggest that lour laparlal Majesty signify approral of
a meeting between the Premier of Japcui and ayself and tha
Premier of China. I beliere that such a meeting to be
held ae soon as 8a*rangements therefor can be coapleted
furnishes In present oireumstanoes the beet hope of
maintaining and preeerring peace in the Pacific area.
I hare not as yet consulted General Chiang Kai-shek, th*
Premier of China, in regard to this, but I shall be pleased to
do ao immediately upon receipt from you of a faTorable reply.
FE:MMH:HES
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1731
9^
Ootob«r 16, 1941
nun OP A PR0P08SD 10C88A« FROM THE PRliBIDnT
TO TBK mPKRCA OP JAPAl — 8DPKRSCDB0 BX A LATIR
DRAFT DAXSD OCTOBXR 17, 1941.
THIS ORAPT WAS NOT USED.
1732 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Adviser on Political Relations
October ld^l94i."~
yjT , Ha.iilton does not recommend taking the proposed
fction. i-r. Balliuitine feels that it is preaature to
coae *to any decision oa tiie asatter. I feel strongly
tnat this proposed aessage ii; the form in which it
stands should not at this time be sent.
A re.iraft is submitted here attaoiied. The important
paragraphs are, cr ooarsrs, Lh>r lust two. Vfe all feel
ttiftt cCre-it care s.iO ild be exercised to avoid malcin^ any
too bTOf.A coaraitaent or any too emphatic thraet. 1 ^ayself
-hintj; that implies coontenanc-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1733
\ t i V e <•
. - 1 ..r-:^
'•■-^n to tr:
TV. rir
e vnr .
^.t re'ort
ja.pane'^e ^ryeni-nent Is
1734 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIOJsf PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
J ii e s H n y p t\.> c e d nr •. • : a <•' s t .
It . -I'l iiK.e to see peace be".
' K^ to Sep f raedo-n of ~. - ■ -id
^1" O'&paxi cc . o^-i witn »: 'rserve
pe'^c* ir. th-ri Pacific we wo.^id be only too tiaj-py to resiae
NDiaaiercial relatioas, with the sole excertion of
certain nrticles which we must Vaeep >- ■ own
defouse and that of all of the Americas againat possible
aggression froi-i abroad.
If on the other hand J'lpan were to start new military
-ns, ttxe United States, in accordance with her policy
of peace, v/ould be rery seriously concerned.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1735
EXHIBIT NO. 74
TELSORAM SENT
AO
This ttlegraa aust be October 6, 1940
olosel/ parapbraMd be-
fore being ooaatmioated 2 p. a.
to anyonr;. (Br)
ANEKBA..3X
TOKYO (JAPAM) VIA SHANOHAI (OKI HA)
mrO: AMEKBA33X, OHUNOKIlia (OBIIU}
AKEMBAS3T, PEIPINa (CHINA)
AMERICAN CONSUL, BONO KONO
981.
The contlnuanee of en ebnoruuL eltaatlon in the
Tmr Eeat whioh hae in widespread areas disturbed and
interfered with the legit iauite ooamercial, cultural »
and philantliropio aotirities of Aaerloan oitiiens and
Khioh has adrersel/ affected eonditions of ot^ler and
general liTing oonditions has iapelled the Departaeat
to the oonolusion that the tiae has come for it to
adopt with x^ferenoe to China (including Manchuria),
to Japan (Including Kwantung Leased Territory, Korea,
and Poraosa), to Hong Kong, and to French Indochina
an attitude toward passport control and withdrawal of
American oititens therefroa siailar to that whioh has
been adopted for some tiae toward these (jueBtions with
reference to disturbed areas of Europe. The Departaent
aeoordingl/ desires that its diploaatio and consular
officers in China, in Japan, in Hong Kong, and in Prenoh
Indochina quietly repeat quietly infora Aaerioan citisena
la their respectire districts of the substaaee of the
preaediag
79716 O — 46 — pt. 15 22
1736 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
- 2 • 381, Oototoor 6, 2 p.m. to Tokyo
»
preoeding ■•nt«no« and tuggett vlthdimvala Insofar aa
is praotloabla from the areas In question to the United
State a. This applies espeoially in regard to woman and
ohildren and- to men whose oontinued presenoe in China,
in Japan, in Hong Kong« and In Frenoh Indochina is not
repeat not oonsidered urgently or essentially needed.
There should be pointed out to Aaerioan oitltens the
adTisahility of their taking adraaH^age of transportation
facilities whilst anoliir^iioilit is s are available, as it
goes withp^t f^yj^ngthat no one can guarantee that suoh
faoilities 1^^^" ifWia jorailable indefinitely.
In order, t^t this instruction be not reoeat not
VIToonsirued in any qa|rter, it is desired that effort
1be~iMde to aroid publicity in regard thereto and that
endeaTor be made to preclude the reading into it of
sensational implications.
The Det>artaent would appreciate reeelTing from you
and from Peiping, Shang^hai, Bong Kong, Saigon, and other
interested offices an estimate of the number of Americans
who will be inclined to heed these suggestions. Tokyo
should instruct consuls in Japanese tsrritory and Peiping
ahould instruct those in China.
The Department will expect shortly to issue further
instructions embodying Tarious administratiTs considerations,
Sent to Tokyo Tia Shanghai. Repeated to Peiping,
Chungking, and Bong Kong. Bong Kong repeat %• Saigon.
rsiaA:BS3 n pa/b s '^''^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1737
WiU.li
Cotl«t {Dir iMtw
latcktMtw
Ckvf* D*ptrtm«i«s
Mint*
Nl(4rt l«nw
CkuftU
Heleoram Scnt
i>M t-tL ; I -M 5 56
m:
■ntmmmmm..
MmagNriMtMrtM. «eaa
MUITAItl
"Br* •***»
/
February 11, 1941
AU£UBASST»
Torro (jAPAs)ir -c'
URGEHT. ^ ^ ^ ; , , g-^/ ^^-- — ■ -.
Detjartnient ' 8 381, October 6, 2 p.m., withdrawal of
American citizens.
It is desired that the Eabaesy at once Instruct
American consulates In Jaoaneee territory to renew, Im-
mediately and quietly and with effort to avoid- any
sensational oubllclty, to^Ajnerlcan cltisens, especially^
women and children and men whose continued oreeence in ;^i
• A G
Jaoan Is not highly essential, this Gtovernment ' s Bupp-estlonsQ
that they withdraw to the ^ited States. In so doing, the
imbaasy and the cor^eulateB are to understand and should ''
explain to American inouirers that this Government Is making
r-> reoeat no aseuaption that a situation of flcute physical
aanc-er to Atu ricen nationals is Ira^ninent, but that this ,
■Joverrr.r-nt , In the lirht of obvious trends in the Par
situetion, deeiree to reduce the risks to which
-ir interests are exooeed by ,
-hroup'h the orocese of vrith-
- _ ■'I, to iTOTOve its lositlon
-oclemF which nay 3t any time te t
Enclphtrcd hy
1738 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Telegram Sent
soMriOKMTiM. eoH
HcweoHrEoumu. «SM
nWTAOl
firfinti
Omf 0«|»rtm«iti
Niftt l«ttM
of affording maximum apfaroprlate protection to those -oersons
Ctarg* ts
S
who are not, in position to withdraw, those interests which
cannot be abandoned, and thoee principles and those rights
to which it is the duty of the American Oovemment to give
all appropriate support at all tiraes. This instruction
and the advice to be given under it is not repeat not scant
It
to be alarmlet, but Is a further and necessary precautionary
measure. -Ve do not repeat not wish to impose imnecessary
hardships upon any American nationals, but we ask that those
whom you address shall reslize that there are real risks,
that we wish to reduce these risks, and that uhis advice
is ceinp «-iven in the interest both of tne aafety and con-
venience of the American nationals addressed and in the
interest of national security.
. ^
The Department is eendint- siaillar instructions
to Peipinr, Hontr Konp, and Indochina.
The Department does not repeat not contemplate sending
a special vessel or soecial vessels to assist in the with-
drawal and American nationals who maice inquiry In this
■Darticular connection should be advised zo take advantare
of such
tat ion facilities as may be currently available,
5^
•tt
I^vjOO^'
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
TELEGRA^Jt SFNT
1739
iepattnwnt of ^tatr
Enc^iteed hi
Sjid iy opttaki-
1740 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Collect Lljy ipttw
•J 'H (stter
Telegram Sent
Bippartmpjtt of ^tate
COWlOCNTlAL coot:
H'asA^njf^on,
EnciphtrtJ ty
Sent hy opcrai&i
p.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1741
EXHIBIT NO. 74A
DEPARTfTENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
December 4, 1941
PA/H--Mp»-He'FHbe«k; No objection. Do not clearly perceive a
need, SFH
te Mp-r-Haekw©Pth: No objection, G^VH
SD Mr. Green: It would appear highly desirable to take
such a step immediately. J.C.G.
A-L Mr. Long: I agree. L.
U Mr. Welles: I agree. SW(?)
S Mr. Secretary:
Mr. Hayter, First Secretary of the British Embassy,
called on an officer of this Division this afternoon and
stated that the British Ambassador in Tokyo had raised the
question whether endeavor should not be made to effect
an arrangement with the Japanese Government xinder which,
in the event of British- Japanese hostilities, British and
Japanese officials and nationals in the* territory of the
other would be withdrawn or exchanged, ?lr. Hayter did
not know whether the British Ambassador in Tokyo had in
mind an arrangement designed also to be effective as
regards Manchuria and Japanese-'Occupied areas of china,
Mr. Hayter stated that the British Foreign Office, before
acting in the matter, desired that the British Embassy
discuss it with the Department with a view to learning
o\ir views.
Although it is possible that the Japanese Government
would not be willing to enter into such an arrangement,
especially with regard to Manchuria and occupied areas of
China, it is believed that, for the sake of the personal
safety
1742 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-2-
safety of American officials and other American nationals.
It would be advisable fo3f this Government as well as the
British to attempt to make stich arrwn^ement* Such atten^pt
might, at this^ time, be advisable also In that it would be
definite indication to the Japanese Government of the firm-
ness of the American position in the present crisis and
would be one means of impressing upon the Japanese Government
the seriousness with which we view the present situation.
It is our opinion that, if endeavor is made to effect
such an arrangement, earnest effort should be made to have
included within its scope both the occupied areas in China
and Manchuria, It seems to us that there is a fair possi-
bility that American officials and other nationals in
Japan would, in case of hostilities between Japan and this
would
country,/ receive reasonably correct treatment (although
such treatment in the case of nationals placed in concen-
tration camps would naturally, because of the lower standard
of living In Japan, involve much more physical discomifort
than would be the case in this country). On the other hand
it is likely that our officials in Manchuria, who have
no official status vis-a-vis the "Manchukuo'» regime,
and our nationals there as well as our officials and
nationals in occupied areas of China, might receive extremely
harsh treatment especially as the Japanese military
authorities in control of those areas are to be classed
in
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1743
-3-
in general among the extremists and are in general
anti-American.
The proposed agreement would seem necessarily to
envisage assent on the part of this Government to the
withdrawal from United States territory of a number of
Japanese subjects many times as great as the niimber of
American nationals in territory controlled or occupied
by Japan,
The officer of this Division on whom Ilr. Hayter
called informed Mr. Hayter that the matter would be
brought to the attention of the high officers of the
Department and that the British Embassy would be informed
as soon as it was possible to reach a conclusion. It is
STiggested that, if it is decided that endeavor will be
made to effect the suggested arrangement, the American
approach to the Japanese Government be made independently
of the British, M.M.H.
AS the making of such an approach would be inter-
preted by the American public as a definite indication
that this Government
*©/ expects war between Japan and the United States, the
Secretary may wish to speak to the President in regard to the
advisability of this Government's making such an approach at
I
j this time. !I.M.H.
FE : A tcheson: ALM/MJF
1744 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 75
[foil r«««
Cellect 0«y l«tt»r
iNlfM liittw
Clv«rg* Department!
Full r>le
D«y !«tter
NIgM lettei
Cl!«([« to
$
a}-:e;«sba3SY,
TOKYO.
Telegram Sent
TO Bt TRANtMITTtD
X CONflOCNTIU. coot
NONOONrsQINTtM. (!(»>■
PAKTAIR
"SC HJ.,H
November 25, 1941
.M^
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR AOT THE
COUKSfiLOH ONLY,
I called In the JaBanese Ambassador and Mr, Kuruau
In t)ie afternoon of November 26 and gave them two documents-
pn or.nl ■ r.tatei'-er.t and draft outline of s proposed ba8l<=
for a bro.id a^'reetnent coverlni^ the entire Pacific area.
A summary of tliesp documents follows In a subsequent
telegram.
to
M
SI
(0
>
FE:MW3tMJF
Eml^JienJ ig
Smt iy optratat .
Ft;
M..
.... 19..
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1745
Telegram Sent
/r«ti ttti
Collttt ii^itttw
iNlftit HttK
riHI fmtt
Oiy l<tt«r
Ckirgt to
S
AMEMBASa^,
TO H ruANMtrmo
XconriocKTiAi. cooCC
NONCOMriOCMTIAL OOOC
>CAIH
Btpattmfnt at #taf»
M PI8TRIBUTI0K Watklnfian.
November 26, 1941
'smidTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THg/niilj,llffli|, IW i|>W|JaXBA3SAD0R OJILS^
Ths Japanese Aisbasaador and Mr. Kurusu called at
my reauest November 26.
I handed the Jaoeneee Ambaaeador an oral atet-fment
■ubstantlally aa foil owe:
It is believed that some nrcgreaa hae been made In
reference to the genersl Drlnolpl* which we have been
("leouSBing for tVic oast several nontha In Informal and
exploratory oonversstlona In an effort to reach a settle -
aeot of nrobleme of the entire Pacific area. Included
among thoae orlnclples are the principles of reliance uoon
International cooperation and conciliation to improve world
conditions through peaceful ways and means and to orevent
and solve controverelea, inviolability of territorial
integrity and sovereignty, no interference In Internal
affaire of other nationa and the orlnclole of equality.
Mention la made ■:;f the oro-^osale of the Japanese Government
received on November 20 end recent atatemsnts of the
Japanese Ambassador that hia Oovernaent desires to continue
Earipiutd h —
i&mthfpin*^ ■ ^- ■■>* 19 , _-.
(0
to
(0
CD
I
>
a
1746 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-tsV^^j!
TO as THAMttlTTIS
Tel£QRAm Sent coi«rioomAt.ooo«
(f uii r«t« ^ «o»«c«wi>ie»imAL ooec
mg*,Mt« Bepartm^nt of #tate ~""
mgkt leftOT
Cbsrge to
i these convereetlona ari'^ that a aodua yXvendi would be
heloful towfird creating a oropltloua ataosphere.
This GoTernment moat earnestly desires to further
the promotion Bn& maintenance of peace In the Pacific
area and to rrovlde full onnortunlty to continue dla-
cusBlons with the Jaoffnese Oovernasent loolilng to the
a-
worklng out of broad crogrnia^ of neace. In the opinion
of this Gk)vernment the Jacpnese croposale of November 80
In some way? conflict with the fundamental principles
t-" vhlch each Government has committed Itself and would
n"t be lllie^-y to further our ultimate objectives. It
'. s flugz^sted t.^iBt further efforts toward resolving
divera-ences of vlcvs on the practical abdication of those
principles be ir.pde. There la therefore offered the
Jp-i nese G^vernaent a draft nlan as one practical nianlfeata
tlcn of the aort -f urogram this Government haa in ailnd
t- te v-r'sed out during further discussions. The hooe
Is ex-^ressed that there thu« may be expedited progress
towpro o r,e tln^r -'f tnlnds.
-•ji-.-sal for p IT- a^^;-flu>'e ae* le inent
Va*^ ' «(' ^ y fl R f •^■' ^ vp :
'r,-' f ■ _'■ - *.<sioec! s irpft mutual declaration
Stnthop"'^ - M., .19
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1747
LI. IH<He»Tt WKSTMES TELEGRAM SENT ^ "* ™**»"'"^°
ffufi r>t< C«ir!0.»T,AL COM
C»ll»Cl J0»f IgttV — •OKOW.^.MKTIAI. OOOt
Bi^arimf nt nf B\sAs
fu(! fat« ,
0«y Wter ~*^ H'tUI^A'^en,
MIftit l<ner
Cotff« t« -^
In which there was embodied an affirmation by both
OcTernmente that their national pollclea have as their
objectives extensive and enduring oeace throughout the
Pacific area, thet both (kivemnients are without territorial
designs, that both have no intention to threaten other
nations or to use aggressively military force and that
accordingly they will give active sunoort and practical
appllcction to certain fundamental principles. (There are
then listed the four principles which are mentioned above
in the oral ststem-'nt. )
to
Both Ocwernment* agree ^ practically/apply and actively
auDoort five economic prlnclolea in a orogram to eliminate
^T.i*^ to prevent recurrent polit'.cal instsbllity, economic
collapse and to orovide a basli for oeace. Those prlnclplee
call for (a) the establishment of international financial
institu'ions and arrsngeraents designed to aid essential
enterorifies end continuous development of all nations
and to utilize oroceesea of trade to permit caynients
consonant witn the welfare of all n8tlon3; (b) non-
dl<5crlminatior. in com.T.ercial relationa between nations;
fc) non-51scr". -.instory pc -ess t'^ raw materials; (d) abolition
EnttfiktnJ h
SatI iy opnahr _ ,Vf.. , /9
1748 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
r
Telegram Sent
TO »e Tn*N«)»ITTtl>
'■o^tnot HtvAL coot
cownoeNTiAi. coot
rutTAM
©epartmrnt af ^fett?
of ex'^^•"<^3l-^n8 of extreme nstl^nsMam sjch »" exoesslve
tr«dp re9tr'ct\-ng anrt ororootlon of Intern tlonal
economic coooerst Ion; (e) full rotectl'in of consuming
c^untrles' and ootjulatlona' Interests |9pr the oneretlon
of Internfltl-'nfll commodity agreements.
Th? second section of the drsft nroooaal calls
r ten etepe to be taken:
1 . Both Governocents to exert their Influence to^MSS
bring sbout other governments' adherence to and practical
aoollcfitlon of the basic nolltlcnl and economic principles
set forth^
2. Both Governmenta to seek the conclusion of a
multilateral non-aggreaalon pact among Thailand, China,
the British Eniire, the Netherlands, Jaoan, the Soviet
Union and the United States.
3. Both OcvernmentB to agree that no agreement already
concluded by either with any third power or powers will be
Intertj-eted so as to oonfllet with this agreement's
fundamental puroose — establishment and areserratlon of
peace In the entire Pacific.
4. Both at>vernBents to seek the ocm elusion of an
a^eeaent among the Netherland, Thai, Aasrloan, British,
«, , 19 , ^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1749
tjii r,,'.
Day l.-!l.r
$
Telegram Sent
- 5 - Waihington,
Chinese, 8n3 Jn':!'ne8e Govprnuient'
loj. j(» -n the part of ench
territcrlsl lnt*».-''' tv r.^-
or
?ct Indochlnn ' s
:? that
consul tnt* on
integrity devel-
/ ii I I ' l l i ' i 1 1 -nr-riir-n n- -n o nry wnri ni JTl n n bl n t i o iias t
t ' teot tton a at ii a n.yi too O w tc ei/ . ouch Pgreement to irovlde
als- thflt.e«:ch / ^ uMifr e i ^ luld not re- -st not accept or
?eeK oreferer.tlfll ecnomic or comrRercinl treatment In
Inrtochlr.p snd epch s 'Kn^tory would exert 'ts Influence
*.nwRrd obtaining for all slgnstorlea equality of treet-
ment Ir those mq*ters.
5. Janrn to withdraw from Chlnp and Indochina all
oolice, air, navel and mlllt^iry forces.
6. Both Sovernnjents to give up ell extraterritorial
rights In China and rights and Interests In and with
rep-ard to concessions. International 8ettlem< nts and
rights under the Boxer Prot-coV, both Q-overhments to •
seek to obtain from other govsrnmenta, Including the
British, an agraeaent to give up all similar rights in
China.
7. Both ftorernmente to undertake negotiations toward
oonoluelon of an Aaerloan-Japenese trade agreement on the
^/Klflmniha~-
Smt ht aptnlar M.. ... t9 ^
1750 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Telegram Sent
[futi r>la
GsllMt I Day letter
INlgfit i«n«
QMff« Depsrtm«nti
foil r«u
0*; l«tler
Mli^! Ien«r
Ckirgp to
-6- Waahinifian.
TQ M TDAttWUmS
eCNrHMHTIAL OOM
MCMooNfteiMTiM. eoot
MMTAM
MJUN
baflls of mutual reductlcnn of tariffs. Including
an Amerloan' undertaking to bind raw silk on the free
list and of reciprocal snost-favored-natlon treatment.
fl. B-^th Sovernicenta to remove their fr-^'eilng
restrictions on ep-ch other's func'-s.
9. Both GfTi^ernnients to Pgref upon a dollar yen
rt>te stabilization olan, each allocating one-half of
the funds adequate for th«>t ourxiose.
10. 3oth Governments not repeat n-t to sup-ort —
economics^. "I y, o llt'eally, mlllterlly — any government
nr resrlme In China except the National Governsnert
l-i-oted temporarily ft Chungking.
An account of the converaetlon will be sent
In a later telegrpto.
re
EniipierrJ iy .
Salt hi/ epatOoT
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1751
Telegram
[fill! f»»»
C«ll*ct jOty I«t1«r
CiMrgt 0«furtl«*«t>
rull rit»
Oij l«tler •
Nlit<il i«t1«r
Chugt to
S
Beporimf tti of ^tat^
SowMsumM. «oatx
MOnooiwiMumM. BOM
■MrrAM
•30*
lloTe«b«r E7, 1941
t»9 ps^TRiByy^gM
.^
AMEMBAS3Y ,
TOKYO (JAPAN).
/ ' ■
STRICTLY CCNKIDENTIAL FOR TKE AHBASSADOR AND THE
COUNSELOR ONLY.
Reference Department* • 784, Noveaber 26, 9 p.m.
After reading the dooumente eumaerlsed In the Depart-
ment's telsgram under reference Mr, Kurueu asked vher.her
th3»e docuaente reoresented the »*eply of this Government
to the Jaopneee oroooesle. The Secretary said that Just
l,»e Jnpan had to deal with a domestle political situatlor,
X^.\<^ Government also had its Internal nolJtlcel oroble^a
^_, .._.,. »j^p s'agg°5"-- --r^telTed in the dccumente he Kafl
" AfflbassH ■ : ■ • ifnted all that we eoula do et
Ir, the llsht of the Jpnrnese oropoaals. The
w^-nt on nsd
(0
fa
(0
03
W
C
79716 O — 46 — pt. IJ
-23
1752 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TeuEQWAM Sent K,Mt.««-.mo
>•<.<»>.•.«• ><-»n «««.ii I ISOI^tOtMTIU. coot
. ^ 1!^' r^ ■'- ' " • XOIWOtWIBSHTtM. OOOe
b«j^^ »*ii«ri»wtitiii#t«f» t::
Mt|«t tttttr
Oivg* te
S org&nlcfttlons ss the baai« for hie objection to the proposed
multilateral non-s^greeslon pacta. He added that China had
received the wrong Impreeslon from the Waehlngton treaties ar^d
had used then adTftntageouely to flaunt Japan's rights. He said
that if this proposal represented the ideas of the Amerloan
Ooverniaent he did not see the possibility of any agreement and
added that he did not see how the Japanese Oovernment could con-
sider tPhe proposal that Japan withdraw all military, naval, air
and police forces from China and withdraw all support frooi
regimes or governments In China except that of Chiang Kal-ehek.
The Secretary inquired whether we oould not work out these
questions. *
Mr. Kurusu suggested that as his Oovemment would be likely
to throw up its hands at our proposal and as the document was
merited tentative and without commitment, it iclght be the wiser
course further to discuss It informally before sending it to the
Japanese Qovemment.
The Secretary suggested the Japanese might want carefully to
study the documents before further discussion. The Secretary
aaiii that with the public having lost its perspective it was
necessary to present a complete picture of our position. He
mentioned the acute public feeling on the oil question and
EmipiknUt^ . _..
Sn(<v<«Mn*r .__„„ M^ - , 19 .
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1753
_ TO •« T(l*(«»»llTT«0
Telegram Sent
CONf ICWMTlAl. coot
NONCCNrioCNTIJU. COOI
PAHTAtH
ftAIM
-^ Wajhington,
% realnded the Jnofinese of the great Injury being done to us by
Jficn'fl Immobilizing large forces of democratic countries Id
»•» furies nenr Indochina and Indicated that should Japan pour
- inti Indochina the American people would have mleglTlngs
PS t'> the Toi-ilfcle menace In countries south and west of Indochina
f>nr! t- "ur i-".rect tnterests.
Mr. Kurusu offered specious and unconvincing arguments on '-'^^
Jso«n's difficulty In renouncing support of Wang Chlng-wel and
observed that the standing of the Nanking regime wea a matter of
opinion.
V
The JaTDn'".e<»e clearly Indicated their dlsapoolntment ovar our
response to their proposal and their feeling that we had reached
»n end. They asked whether we were not interested in a aodus
Vivendi , whether any other arrangement was not possible and
whether they could see the Preaident.
The Secretary replied that we had explored the question of a
modu s v iver\d,l , and, in response to a further inquiry as to whethar
our Inability to consider a aodua Vivendi waa because of tha attituda
of other powers, he added that he had done his beat. Ha aaid that
the President would undoubtedly b« glad to aea tha Japenaaa (an ap-
pointment for such a maatlng haa baen arranged for MoTeaber 27).
FE:MWS:HNS/HE3
&«< h tpMti, M ».
>
1754 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 76
[Translation of Document 1881-PS, Office of U. S. Chief of Counsel]
[1]
Notes Fueh 20/41
NoTKS Regarding the Discussion Between the Fuehrer and the Japanese
Foreign Minister Matsuoka in the Presence of the Reich Foreign Ministbb
AND of the M.nister OF State Meissner in Berlin on the 4th of April, 1941
Matsuoka further mentioned, that he was induced to make those endeavours
for peace particularly in view of the personality of Cardinal CASPARI.
Furthermore he had endeavoured to convince the POPE, that the United States
and particularly the American President prolonged the war in Europe and in
China. It was not the question to determine, if America or its President were
right or wrong. They certainly had their definite reasons for their policy. Not-
withstanding the question of right or wrong one had to state the fact, that they
prolonged the war in Europe and in China. In regard to China he tried to
convince the POPE, that Japan was not fighting the Chinese or China herself,
but merely the Bolshevism which threatened to spread in China and in the
entire far East. It is regretful that America and England sided with Bolshevism.
The FUEHRER interrupted that both countries also sided in Spain with
Bolshevism.
Matsuoka then also expressed the request, that the FUEHRER should instruct
the proper authorities in Germany to meet as broad-mindedly as possible the
wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in need of German
help particularly concerning the U-boat war fare, which could be given by mak-
ing available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest
technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do her utmost to avoid a
war with the United States. In case that the country should decide to attack
Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the
United States, because in that case America probably would side with Great
Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed, that the United States could be
restrained by diplomatic exertions from entering the war at the side of Great
Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst situation, that is
with war against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would
extend for five years or longer and would take the form of guerilla warfare in
the Pacific and would be fought out in the South Sea. For this reason the
German experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan.
It was a question how such a war would best be conducted and how all the
technical improvements of submarines, in all details such as periscope and such
like, could best be exploited by Japan.
To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that the
proper German authorities would plai^'e at the disposal of the Japanese those
developments and inventions concerning navy and army, which were needed T>y
the Japanese.
The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered a
conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allow-
ances for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the opinion that America's
contributions depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this
again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany's war against tonnage,
however, means a decisive weakening not merely again.st England, but also
against America. Germany has made her preparations so, that no American
could land in Europe. She would \2] conduct a most energetic fight
against America with her U-boats and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior
experience, which would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would
be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact, that the German soldiers
naturally ranks high above the American.
In tlie further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out, that Germany
on her part would immediately take the consequences, if Japan wou'd get involved
with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would
first get involved if with Germany or with Japan. They would always try to
eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the other
country subsequently, but to liquidate this one ,1ust the same. Therefore Germany
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1755
would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between
Japan. and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in their
joined action, their weakness would be if they wouid let themselves be bearen
individually.
Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the Fuehrer might give the
necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities wouid place
at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and inventions, which
are of interest to them. Because the Japanese navy had to prepare immediately
for a conflict with theUnited States.
As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained further that
he has always declared in his country, that sooner or later a war with the United
States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In
his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His organization
went on, why should Japan, therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment
and take the risk upttn herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she
perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance in
the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate to follow
those trends of thought. Matsuoka was considered in those circles a dangerous
man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated, that, if Japan continued to
walk along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway and that
this would then be under less favorable circumstances than at present.
The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of Matsuoka,
because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of the Riiineland,
declaration of .sovereignity of armed Forces. He too was of the opinion that he
had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow unavoidable
flght at a time when he himself was still younjj and full of vigor. How right he
was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not
hesitate a moment to instantly reply to any widening of the war, be it my Russia,
be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to
them, but who will bravely face them.
Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather their ruling politicians had
recently still attempted a last manoeuvre towards Japan, by declaring that
America would not fight Japan on account of China or the South Seas provided
that Japan gave free pas.sage to the consignments of rubber and tin to America
to their place of destination. However, America would war against Japan the
moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the intention to assist in the
destruction of Great Britain. Such an argumentation naturally did not miss its
effect upon the Japanese, because of the education oriented on English lines which
many had received.
The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of America did not mean
anything but that the United States had the hope, that as long as the British
World Empire existed, one day they could ad- [3] vance rfigainst Japan
together with Great Britain whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire,
they would be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan.
The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans precisely under all
circumstances wanted to maintain the powerful position of England in East
Asia, but that on the other hand it is proved by this attitude, to what extent she
fears a joint acti(m of Japan and Germany.
Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give to the
Fuehrer an ab.solutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan. For this
reason he also had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he (Matsuoka)
in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not utter in
Japan itself a single word of all that he had expounded before the Fuehrer and
the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his jilans. This would cause him seriors
damage in political and financial circles. Once before, he had committed the
mistake, before he became Japanese Minister for Foreign affairs, to tell a
close friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread
these things and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which he .as Foreign
Minister had to oppo.se energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth.
Under these circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon he could report
on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier (h- to the Emperor. He would
have to study exactly and carefully in the fl'-st place the development in Japan,
so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of
his proper plans towards the Prince Konoye and the Emperor. Then the decision
would have to be made within a few da.vs, because the plans would otherwise be
spoiled by talk.
1756 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof that
he is lacking in influence, in power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities.
However, should he succeed, it would prove that he had great Influence in Japan.
He himself felt confident that he would succeed.
On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the Empror, the
Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been
discussed ; he would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.
Besides this Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in the matter
of Singapore because he had reason to fear that by cabling something might leak
out. If necessary he would send a courier.
The Fuehrer agreed and assured after all, that he could rest entirely assured
of German reticence.
Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortunately
could not say the same of Japan.
The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal parting
words.
Berlin, the 4th of April 1941.
Signed: Schmidt.
Certificate of Translation of Document No. 1881-PS
4 APRIL 1941.
I, Eknst M. Cohn, Pfc, 33'}25738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant
with the English and German languages ; and that the above is a true and correct
translation of Document 1881-PS.
Ebnst Cohn,
Pfc.
S3925738.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
EXHIBIT NO. 77
1757
TELEGRAM RECEIVEB
Tnis meBSa^'ie must be
closely iarajAirascd be-^''°'^
forr being conmunicateii
to anyone , (BR) > , ,
'• ->\>'^
Secretary of 8ta'-
Wafchington.
Pelping via N. R.
Datrd AugMet 31, 1940.
Rco'd 9:35 p.m.
K
I
/V/f> — '
300, August 31, 3 p.m.
Ur. A. T. Steele, Far Eaetern corrcepc>..dEnt for
the CHICA50 DAl LY NFW8, returned last week from home
leave in the Ur.ited States spending eomc days in Japan
and Meuichuria before coTi.n^ here. Ae Mr. Steele is an
experienced and able observer the Embassy asked hi-
to prepare a statement of hl8 impreesione tuid a summary
thereof ie respectfully submitted brlow as of interest
to the Department.
(Begin surmary) Returning to Japan liid Manchuria
after an absence of four roonthe I noticed many striking
oh'-ngee. J-ip-ui is moving toward totalj-tarianism at a
faster pace than at any t irr.e Bince the comae nee roe nt :.f
the China hoetilitiee. The Yo.vii Doverniecnt which -^s
a neeitly balanced arrv.genent of pro-Anglo-AjEericaii g-'id
pro-Kazl i.jfluen^E hae been fcxlowed oy a re£ir::e bared"
on the expectation »nd hope of an •--^rly ^ernan victory
over 3rr'
(ei;-
sect;
CKB
a
'CD
o
o
(0
C:
1758 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
This tcWUEGBAM RECEIVED
closely PiurapKras Ed be- Ptlping via N.R.
forr bring coramuTiicatcd
to anyone. (BR) Dated August 31, 1&40.
From
Rrc»d 11:59 p.m.
SEcrFt-->ry of State,
'■''acting ton.
300, August 31, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO)
This ,/haB aede no BEcret of its intentione to profit
in every pOBPible way frora that victory, if it coraen.
Four ffionthe ago Japaneee agrlouitural Intrrcpte, bueinEres-
mrn and liberals -were still acting as a brake againet
prrcipitatr actf of agprFFFion and opportunlen, but
three elru'.rnte havr been nomentaxilv eubmerged undrr "he
currr;-* t:;.--^ of pro-AxiE enthoEiaec. Japan has gone
fr r..-: --rkly "rc-,liF tic" .
!;rrmnnp in Tokyo, and they •'.rp numeroue, arc never-
* ■^r.tirt- y eatiPfieci with the p^ce "t vrr-icb
.;,., „. .c ^urni;.^ toward the AxiP, rapid though it Bteas
to outBidrre. Strwan iirwrpapfr men with ■when I hwr
t -j-fd cc . ie.ii. t.:-:^. tr.E Japanrpc errm prone to delay
■j^ - ; they arr ijuitc cpxtaln of ultimate Srrrr.an
:--; . clai.-r; that Otrcan diplo-satr have ro i tc -
f Japar.rpe that the quicker they -akf "^'i
■' , f ; E • ' j '- -rr-rroiie the "iticanr will be
in the
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1759
Paj-t 2, So. 300 from Pclpir^, Section two.
Ir. *hr firial reckoning.
I irrip lot ablr to IcRrn whr <■>.<• r ' "rrraans want f
J-^pftr.tec ftF sc* iVF allirp in :.'':.<■ rurjp*«ji conflict o
rhrthcr they arr nrply rcck.r.r ; ;^ r kind if a riip'
aiirncrnt which 'w<xilj give thr Japar.f cr a frrr bti*.
prnacr.t hf-r.i a>-air.pt thr Sritirh ir. thr Tar "aet,
{~':.z SiCTi:: TWO)
{•) Appar-n: -r,sss::r:, 2-^*^"
1760 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
ThiE trlrgrain axist be
?loerly paraplir&Sed br- Pcipirj-:' via N.R.
:ort beiriir co^rwunicRtFdF'ROM
!;o anyone. (BR) Date-. Au.-uet 31, 1940.
Rrc' J 1:45 a. B. Sep. 1
- , uf State.
I, p.r-. (StOTIOii THHrr)
■ ■■•an nrKspaper ■:-' ' " .> l.at the
■;■- : ■ s in any posi- ■jrnt be-
iiny and Japaji •vould be: :i. r) c.rfi- r assur-
ance s O'riina
I jMOu 0"i' <-■■ .-rjice and
other Scuth Sea proble-^e in whic^ ha" a deep
-^yprc illy ccon-T;ically, e) utilization
C- -•■-" -- ■! -"'u'F of ketpiiip: ti;t Unitrci 5*^''-'!
'" ,jreOccupled with p-cifl-;
: "aaajiy would have a free: -uxope.
Very few of the Ccriaane with whoE I uave Talked are
pro-Jnpanepr a? ■:i--a7-i- ov,-; c i^- =• -v^ ' 'i-ibtl'ul of the extent
to ■.«r. Ich *: .. Uoet of thEta
' " .'-cognize that at ^asSBfe the Js.panepF would hnv^
a cert?.!.'. : ".rriBany would thc-rrfore like
to make ^*; _- " foresee of -;ur.«T that
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1761
Page 2 No. 300, from Pclping (Srotlon Three)
Japan' p excluPionlet' policy in the Orirnt will bt applied
to all white pcofjle Including thcmetlvER in thr long rim
if and when Jap»ui becomep strong enough to enforce it,
(END SECTION THREE)
SMYTH
EMB
1762 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TELEGRAM RECEi>l>D
.i'BOM .
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1763
1764 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TELEGIIAM RECEIVED
"''^^ P.ipm.- -ia K.R.
iBf.) Dt;- ■'- :<1, 1940.
■ioo, All . (SlGTIo;: "i--c)
■ . s Fx:,rci'.:- -■ul': T'O.Tition I
'"■ . - .n .'iO ; o- \ • -- ' ;t time
" * ul war a^or.r d States
ot Russia vi. ■ th a.llrs h' i pcsitior. ?: -uld of
■ou:;:^ -he: .^jwcvtr, that th.: majority
iU Japa-n a: ■ ^.^^/.-as of -^•-"•'' nrr a conflict
with the Hi.. I might a. .'. ffiy recrnt
•0 the I' ■• itEd Stat;>--K I was struck with thr r-U'ribcr
of pEOi ■■ istakf-nly trlirvs that any ptro:,., b-ijw of
s------ ..i United St=-'=- -"^.'il- ■•^ij + -' -*ica--ly piuiu:E
tn^ States _into via - . ta'it the
JapanrsE know wr ferl this way and ar? raaiing the most
of it by flouriehing thr war scar-- \:-'. our facee. Actually
I believe the Japanese have no intention of fitrhtiiir ue
except ap a last reBort; in the face ot tr.ic attitude
I believe that firmnerF ir ti.E eoun ''jr-t and eafePt
American
».
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1765
htgt a lo. .300 froB Fclplac fcotlOB n.«.
Imtietn H«val policy* tfc« risks iawl-wd arc madt less
thao Is ooMKmly supposed in the Qaltcd Stntcs. Of
ooorsc if Otvmt Brltsia is «rfcatcd then •■ emn czpcet
tbK JftpsAcsc \o bcoQwc aerc teliigcrcat.
(«D seoTiOi rivt)
SHrTH
CMB
-I
1766 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
^-1*?
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
Ma „ .
This tEitfrram roust bt
clo!-rlv uaiaphra,ecd be- Pripln^- v. a II. R.
.: ■ ; 'Jiisnunicatcc! From
(BR) DatF-" Aufrlit-* 31, 1940.
Reg'-I 5:45 a.T,. Srpt. 1
Sf ■ ;• Of Statt,
.i-tcnB.
''■-"'' -— - ''I, 3 p.m. (sectid;; six)
, ., i' J- ,rar to bf eo corfidFr.t of a "fertaan
victory aiii ar^ eo , rlul tha^ ruc ■ a victory •
~ ' ' • ■ ir ^ Acia *' .=<t it
.-1, ■•, ^.tfR at the prcBcr.t
'. rciy f,»lt- , rr -f %; pr r^,- l ir.rnt Or
fri'i, :■ f.ict zl.t rrcfption that hap bcFn accorded
' ■ -•- ^^ .■,■*• • ' f-howe that ■":;-
. ' ■ • '" . "^ ■ : F ar and wrak-
nrrs". f.'o forr.. of ap.i- ► 'iCr r'-;.' rhort of .w.-Tican rr -;;>.; -
t.' . ' ' „ ' • ■ w orler :n *,'■.!, F "'irt
"'if t"ip!ait:^'- af " "r ' ■.'. ' ..-'• L ouF ly
" ' rrnpt to I ;-a: ;:. ■■'•■: ' -.■_ t un " . 1
- '" of 'Ytntr 111 ^ "TFi oi^".r. If .^rr-t
u^ -V-nF* >.r'a^-.y :.*rary to prcrrnt
• *: ■.' ." ■ ' .,; \"" to Tf: oor.si^cr
, , :, ■ • T. W);oec po j-i cy
"■'■':' «- ■■'pt '■ilcncy. (f^nd SuTr'^^ry)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1767
-jiB
79716 O — 46 — pt. 15 24
1768 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 78
Despatches on Kea PEmNstiXA Aleet
Despatches on KRA Peninsula alert {1941)
Date
From
Action
Page'
28 Nov --
C0M14
OPNAV
CINCAF...
CINCAF...-
CINCAF-
CINCAF
CINCAF
CINCAF--.
CINCAF...
OPNAV
CINCAF
OPNAV..
OPNAV
OPNAV
OPNAV
CXM CINC CHINA.
OPNAV
OPNAV
1
30 Nov -
2
SONov- .-
3
1 Dec .
2 Dec ----
2 Dec ...
4
5
6
2 Dec -
7
3 Dec
8
4 Dec --- ...
9
1 Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent
pages of original exhibit.
[i] Top Secret
28 November 1941
From: Com 14
Action : Opnav
Info :
280240
Following received by British Consul from usually reliable source. Japanese
will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on 1 December without ultimatum or
declaration in order get between Bangkok and Singapore. Attackers will pro-
ceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main landing to be made at Songkhla.
[2] Top Secret
30 November 1941
From : Opnav
Action : Cincaf
Info : Cincpac
300419
Indications that Japan about to attack jwints on Kra Isthmus by overseas
expedition X In order to ascertain destination this expedition and for security
our position in the Philippines desire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh
Bay on three days commencing upon receipt this despatch X Instruct planes
to observe only X They must not approach so as to appear to be attacking but
must defend themselves if attacked X Understand British air forces will
search arc 180 miles from Tedta Bharu and will move troops to line across
Kra Isthmus near Singora X If expedition is approaching Thailand inform
MacArthur X British mission here informed X
[3]
Top Secret
30 November 1941
From : Cincaf
Action : Opnav
Info :
301135 ♦•
Only 1 small cruiser and 1 auxiliary were disclosed by todays reconnaissance
in position approximately 14-00 north 110-00 east.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1769
U] Top Secret
1 December 1941
From : Cincaf
Action : Opnav
Info : Cine China
011140
Results of today's reconnaissance negative even including the close vicinity
Camranh Bay : Reference Opnav's dispatch 301709.
[5] Top Secret
2 December 1941
From : Cincaf
Action : Opnav
Info : Cincpac
020730
Bearing 070 from Saigon distant 180 miles 3 type 1-61 submarines in cruising
formation headed south 15 knots. 21 tran.sports anchored Camranh Bay with
six planes patrolling overhead.
Comment: This is in position Lat 11-50 N Long 109-29E, 690 miles from
Manila, /s/ EW
[6] Top Secret
2 December 1941
From : Cincaf
Action : Opnav
Info : Cincpac
020345
Patrol plane sighted 9 submarines speed 10 course south at 0230 Greenwich
L-at 13-10 N, Long 110-00 East.
[7] Top Secret
2 DECEMBER 1941
FROM: CINCAF
ACTION : C X M
CINC CHINA
INFO: OPNAV
021636
No results of significance today's reconnaissance other than as reported before.
The 9 subs were line abreast 5 miles spacing. Ships in Camranh are mostly
large, several probably cargo only. Our planes have been sighted on Indo-China
coast three successive days have discontinued search for the present of that
locality.
[8] Top Secret
3 DECEMBER 1941
FROM: CINCAF
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO:
031400
No results from reconnaissance today.
[.9] Top Secret
4 DECEIVER 1941
FROM: CINCAF
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO :
041315
Negative results from Dec. 4th reconnaissance.
1770 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 79
Despatches
ON
Dutch Al1':rt
Despatches on Dutch alert (19^])
Date
From
Action
Page
21 Nov
OPNAV --
CINCPAC, CINCAF
OPNAV
1
CINCPAC
SPENAVO, LONDON ...
CNO
2
22 Nov -
OPNAV
SPENAVO
3
23 Nov
4
23 Nov
CINCAF
OPNAV
5
24 Nov
OPNAV.--- -
SPENAVO, LONDON. ...
OPNAV -
6
25 Nov
CINCAF
7
3 Dec
SPENAVO, LONDON. -
SPENAVO, LONDON ....
CNO
OPNAV -. ----
8
OPNAV --
10
6 Dec -- -
SPENAVO, LONDON--.
12
Note.— Despatch from Dutch Legation is in exhibit 21.
[i] Top Secret
21 November 1941
From: OPNAV
Action : CINC AF CINC PAC
Info :
211833
Have been informed by Dutch Legation that tiiey have received a despatch as
fllows qnote according to information received by tlie Governor General of The
Netherland.s Ea.st Indies a Japanese expeditionary force has arrived in the vicinity
of Palau X should this force counna strong enough to form a threat for The
Netherlands Indies or Portuguese Timor comma move beyond a line between the
following points Davao Waigea Equator the Governor General will regard this
as an act of aggression and will under those circumstances consider the hostilities
opened and act accordingly unquote Inform Army authorities of foregoing X
request any information you may have concerning development of this Japanese
threat against the Dutch East Indies and your evaluation of foregoing information
12] Top Secret
22 November 1941
From: CINCPAC
Action: OPNAV
Info :
220315
Have no info which substantiates your 211833 other than your 211755. Indica-
tions are 4th Fleet may move Palao. Third Base force there increasing traflBc
evaluation Dutch report rating "B"
13] Top Secret •
22 November 1941
From: Spenavo London
Action: OPNAV
Info :
221122
By Vice Admiral Furstner, Minister for Marine in the Dutch Government in
England and CINC of all Dutch naval forces. I have been asked informally to
present the following to you and request your informal reply. Dutch Govern-
ment has received reports to the effect that Japan is concentrating an expedition-
ary force In Palau. Dutch state it is difficult to ascertain veracity of this infor-
mation but they consider that this point does not ab.solve them from considering
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1771
what should be done by the Dutch in case this iep^)rted concentration leads to an
expedition crossing the Davao-Waigeo line or the Equator east of that line (see
PARA 26ADK April 1941). Dutch Government are inclined to consider that any
such expedition could only be regarded as a direct menace to Netherlands East
Indies and therebly as a non direct threat to the territories and interest of the
United States and Great Britain and that tlierefore it would have to be immedi-
ately countered by force. Dutch state that before definitely making up their
minds in this respect, they would like to have the views of our C. N. O. The
possibility of an individual Japanese commander acting against the intentions
of the Japanese Government should be taken into account and also the fact that
in case of that nature, the Japanese Government has the tendency to back up
the commander in question considering that otherwi.'^e the Japanese would lose
face. Dutch have received information that 4.000 laborers have left Japan for
Palau.
I suggested the possibility of confusion between the movement of laborers with
the reported movements of expeditionary force.
Biddle requests this be passed to State for information.
U] Top Secret
23 November 1941
From: CNO
Action: SPENAVO
Info:
222040
Your 221122 introduces political questions upon which the CNO is not in a
position to offer advice but you may express my views concerning the importance
of the Pelews for the defense of the mandates and for offensive operations
against either the Philippines or Nei. OPNAV questions accuracy of informa-
tion concerning an expeditionary force near the Pelews but is aware that land
and air forces and facilities there are in process of expansion. CINCPAC and
CINCAF are cheeking on recent Japanese movements. Will advise you further.
[5] Top Secret
23 November 1941
From: CINCAF
Action: OPNAV
Info: CINCPAC
221150
No information here supporting Dutch report in your 211833. We have not
detected presence in mandates of any men of war other than those normally
assigned Fourth Fleet and although all units of latter have not been positively
identified since 1 November it is probable that they are all in mandates but no
concentration these units is apparent. There may have been an increase in
number of transports and marus but this is hard to establish with certainty.
The concentration of marus in Saipan area which has been apparent since about
20 October and numbers between 35 and 40 continues. CINCFOURTH is at
Saipan and AIRON 24 may be. TraflSc association between units combined
fleet and mandates mentioned in COM 16 0916 of 27 October continues. One
BATDIV and two carriers may be preparing to proceed mandates but no such
movement has been detected. We continue to watch closely.
[6] Top Secret
24 November 1941
From: OPNAV
Action: SPENAVO London
Info:
250100
CNO advises as follows after studying special reports from CINCAF CINCPAC
and Guam on tlie subject of my 222040; — you are at liberty to disclose the info
to Vice Admiral Furstner and the British CNS. None of these special reports
show any info supporting the Dutch report. Unquestionably activity in the
mandates has increased both as regards warships and merchant types. A con-
1772 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
siderable number of garrisons are being strengthened. CINC Fourth Fleet is
in Saipan and some units of fleet plus merchant types are fairly well distrib-
uted throughout the mandates. Air force submarine and patrol craft activity
is increasing but as a general proposition Japanese emphasis is chiefly on the
Truk and Jaluit areas. The CNO does not believe that any large Japanese
aggressive force is now prepared for any immediate move from the region
under discussion but he is concerned over southward troop movements from
Shanghai and Japan to Formosa and also apparent preparations in China
Formosa and Indo China for an early aggressive movement of some ehracter.
There are no clear indications at present as to the direction or strength of
such a movement and the situation should be carefully watched.
[1] Top secret
25 NOVEMBER 1941
FROM: CINCAF
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: CINCPAC
250623
Shipping Adviser Batavia informs that Dutch report concerning Palau orig-
inated with Army in Timor. Portuguese Timor was named as objective of the
alleged expeditionary force. Info was classified as very doubtful and has had
no confirmation.
IS] Top Secret
3 DECEMBER 1941
FROM : SPENAVO LONDON
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO :
031411
Part 1 of 2: I have kept Admty informed regarding my 221122 and your
222040 as Admty has discussed same subject with Dutch authorities. Further
suggested to Admty that it might now be necessary for Dutch authorities to
declare area south and west of Davao-Maigeo-Equator line to be dangerous to
shipping in order that Dutch forces might be free to take prompt action against
suspicious vessels crossing from north and east. Admty informed declaration
from naval point of view would constitute useful defense measure. Essential
lor political reasons that one should be declared in as unprovocative form as
possible and should further be represented as a defense one rather than dangerous
one. Admty informed Furstner they also doubt accuracy of this info. In view
Dutch proposal involved matters of high policy, it was recommended Dutch take
question up with Foreign Office thru Dutch Foreign Minister. When Foreign
Minister visited Eden, his proposal went beyond that of Furstner as it invited_
joint declaration ef defense.
(See page two)
[9] Top Secret
3 DECEMBER 1941
FROM: SPENAVO LONDON
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO :
031411
(Page Two)
One by A or B Powers. After consulting Admty Eden replied to Dutch Foreign
Minister as follows ; A. That during the continuance of the present negotiations
between Japan and the US in Washington, it was undesirable that any declaration
should be made unless there was the plainest evidence that Japanese were pre-
pairiiig an expedition against Netherlands territory. The State Department
would be particularly likely to be influenced by this consideration. Part Two
follows.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1773
[10] Top Secret
4 December 1941
From: SPENAVO LONDON
Action: OPNAV
Info:
031413 (Part Two Baker)
That it therefore seemed better to make no declaration at all until there
was evidence more definite than was at present available of concentrations of
Japanese forces constituting a threat to Netherlands territory. (C). His Maj-
esty's Government recognise the military value that the declaration of a defense
zone would have if definite evidence of such concentrations was obtained but
that they consider the declaration would be less provocative to Japan and less
prejudicial to the Washington negotiations if it were confined to a unilateral
declaration by the Netherlands East Indies of a zone manifestly designed as
a defense measure for their own shores. (D). That in similar circumstances
His Majesty's Government had been compelled to make a unilateral declara-
tion of a defense zone on the open seas off the coast of Johore when the Japanese
concentrations on the northern border of Indochina began to constitute a threat
to Malaya. The declaration of this zone in waters adjacent to British territory
was plainly a measure only [11] of defense and was at the time accepted
as such by Japan without serious criticism. (E). Mr. Eden therefore sug-
gested that if a declaration proved necessary the Netherlands Government
should declare that a certain military and naval defen.se measures have been
taken in the area south and west of the Davaowaigeo-Equator line and that
accordingly all vessels intending to enter this zone must notify the Netherlands
naval authorities of their intention and call at specified ports for routing in-
structions. Such a declaration would be analogous to that made by His Maj-
estry's Government off Johore and would not be likely to increase existing
tension. Winant and Biddle informed. Please inform State.
[12] Top Secret
5 December 1941
From: CNO
Action : Spenavo London
Info:
042230
While CNO agrees with you that November reports of a Japanese concentration
in the Pelews were unfounded, the possibility of an attack by the Japanese
from that region against the Philippines or Nei cannot be ruled out. This
replies to your 031411 and gives CNO views as to the military aspects of the
Dutch project to declare areas south and west Davao dash Waigo da.sh equator
line dangerous to shipping in order that Dutch forces might attack suspicious
vessels entering from north and east. Were this area declared dangerous to
shipping the prohibition would apply to all merchant shipping of whatever
nationality -and to naval vessels of the United States and United Kingdom as
well as to those of Japan. Large amounts of shipping traverse this general
area and it is questionable if Dutch could set up promptly a naval control
system that would obviate excessive delays of shipping most important to the
United States and particularly shipping carrying United States naval and army
reenforcements to the Philippines as all United States shipping between west
coast of United States and the far east area is now routed via Torres Strait.
If NEI declares this large area closed it would be quite a different matter
from the British closure of the Jahore area which is a very small one. Japan
would be free to close Okhotsk Sea, the Sea of Japan, and all the western
portion of the South China Sea and the Gulf of Siam. Were the United States
to acquiesce in the Dutch declaration it would have few grounds for objecting
to a Japanese declaration of the same character. At present I'liited States
defense aid is going to Russia via the Okhotsk Sea and the Sea of Japan,
and the Unite<l States, United Kingdom, and Netherlands East Indies are
executing extensive reconnaissance measures in all directions considered dan-
gerous. Shipments to Siberia and reconnais.sance measures ought to continue
and CNO is convinced a declaration by the Dutch closing the area in question
would be most prejudicial to naval and military interests of the three powers.
If Dutch authorities consider some warning sliould he given Japan CNO believes
it should take the form of a declaration to Japan that in view of the current
situation Japanese naval vessels or expetlitionary forces crossing the Davao
Waigeo line would be con.sidered hostile and would be attacked. Communicate
these views to the admiralty and the Dutch naval command in London.
1774 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 80
NAVy DEFARTMENT
Office of Chief of Kaval Operations
, Office of N'avaJ Intelligence
Washineton
COrfFIt)£Nl-IAL
Copy No ,
Serial No'
iP-
]■'
December 1, 19til
FOFT'OG-riT SWatARY OF CURHEMT NATIONAL SITl'ATIONS
.'.xls Belliperents
:3tion due to
_._ _ . ;y mail.) ■
~y'Kt--"-rr^k:_ r^^-ur.^
>r ■.) tfu;3 purjiicat: on.
'7?n>^'vg</C
CCNTIDENTIAL
3
1
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1775
:>v
rial
'-'■
cenbe
ituat
lonc
COKFIDENTIAl.
Fortnightly Suaciary of Current National
A. The Diplomatic Situation
1. Japan
Unless the Japanese request continuance of the con-
versations, the Japanese-American negotiations have
virtually broken down. The Japanese Government ai.d
press are proclaiming loudly tha^ the nation must ca:-ry
on resolutely the work of buildinp, the Greater East
Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The press also is criticising
Thailand severely. Strong indications point to an early
Japanese aidvance against Thailand.
Relations between Japan and Russia remained strained.
Japan signed a five-year extension of the anti-comintern
pact with Germany and other Axis nations or. November 2S.
2 . Germany
Members of the German Armament Commis.'^iur. in
Casablanca are now authorized to wear unifurnb and make
arrests. General Schaltheiss of the Air Force, ticad cf
the Conrussion, is reported to favor a Gertnan military
occupation of Morocco.
There is evidence that Oensany, -now virtually in
control of the governments of Spain and Portugal, has
impressed upon these governments the necessity of main-
taining friendly relations with the United States and
with Britain. It is Germany's expectation that such a
policy will increase the resources of these two cou.-.tries
with materials which eventually can be turned ajjain.st
those who have supplied them.
Turkey still is being subjected to diplomat i-
pressure to join the Axis or "take the consequer.,.-s5. "
Ge;-na.ny's representations have had no apparent '»ffect.
According to a press report from Berlin, 'sever,
more nations have signed the anti-comintern pact. ?^-
new signatories are Finland, BerL-iark, Bulgaria,
CiOyakia, Rumania, and the Nanking Government i:
This r--'-* ^^/-.n ^ r,,* i;,^ confused with the Tri-r...ft .
Acco; . iTiy. Japan incl Italy were the
origi: xnd t^i which Rumania, H-ang.^ry,
BulgnO-ii :>jvi ;ug.^fi£i-- i „-.:-: luently adhered.
cont:ie?.tia..
^
•j? ^^sm^i:::.<-^T:J' . "'■'-' ^:im^!^^>s^' f^vy^fmisi:^^.
1776 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The repurchase of war materiel sold to Italy by
the French is now the subject of conversations being
held by a French delegation wtiich arrived recently in
Rome. These conversations were initiated by Italy and
were based on Italy's urgent need for foreign exchange.
These negotiations are not expected to meet with par-
ticular success.
The visit of the German Minister of Economics
(Dr, Funk) to Rome in October apparently was motivated
by the serious concern felt by Germany over the steady
climb in Italian prices of exports to Germany. Dr.
Funk threatened to raise the price of coal shipments
to Italy, but it was agreed finally that Italy would
not raise prices, and that Germany would increase the
yearly exports of coal to Italy from the twelve million
tons previously agreed upon to eighteen million tons.
Previous shipments of coal from Germany barely reached
two-thirds of the Italian national requirements. This
was demonstrated by the recent laws restricting heating
this winter.
France
France m^ved a step closer to the "new order" in
Europe on November 18 when Marshal Petain, under con-
tinued pressxire from Berlin and the pro-collaborationist
elements within the Vichy government, announced the
"retirement" of General Maxims Weygand as delegate-
general and military commander of French North Africa.
That strategic area henceforth is to be administered
from Vichy under the direct control of Vice Premier
Darlan. Lieutenant General Alfonse Juinj until June of
this year a prisoner of war of Germany and later com-
mander of French troops in Morocco, succeeds Weygand
as military commander in North Africa. The military
conmand of French West iLfrioa goes to General Jean
Barrau, formerly in command of troops at Dakar. Vice
Admiral Fenard was named pentianentTSecretary General of
French Africa, and Yves Chatel is the new Governor
General of Algeria. Additional concessions to the
Germans may be announced following the meeting of Petain
and Darlan with Reichsmarshal Goering which is scheduled
for the near future. There are indications that this
meeting may be followed by a conference with Adolph
Hitler, with the possible attendance of Premier Mussolini.
-2-
COKFIDENTIAJL
^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1777
CONFIDENTIAL
The Reich is -said to be attempting to persuade
Vichy to provide" naval convoys for Italiar. supply vessels
and to have requested that French Anny divisions replace
Nazi troops between Nantes and Irun. Germany, meanwhile,
ie reported to Y^ve cut the occupation cost levied
against France from f8,CXX),000 to $6,000,000 a day,
retroactive to May 10, 19U1.
France's concern over the situation in Africa is
manifested by the sudden departure from Vichy of Admiral
Platon (Minister of Colonies), General tergeret (Air
Secretary) and Adstral Auphan (Chief of the Naval General
Staff) to inspect t>» defenses of North and West Africa.
During the absence of Platon and Bergeret, Adsdral Darlan
will act as interim Secretary of Colonies and Air.
Additional powers have been granted Darlan by placing
under his National Defense Ministry all services under
the Franco -Gemian armistice fomserly administered by the
War and Foreign Ministries.
Following the dismissal of General Weygand, the
l*»ited States Department of State announced that trade
with North Africa would be suspended and that Franco-
American relations were to be studied in the light of the
new developments. At the same time American lend-lease
aid was extended to the Free French of General Charles
de Gaulle.
On November 26, General Catroux (Free Frertch Com-
mander in Syria) proclaimed the independence of Lebanon
and the termination of the mandate in the name of France.
The nen government will be headed by President. Alfred
Macache .
France is understood to have protested to the
Japan«se {jovernment ovc-r th>? sii'.o of the mission, number-
ing 3$0 political and economic exper-ts, accompanying
KenJcichi Yoshizawa, new J^pa-nes? Ambassador to French
Indo-China.
Despite rumor;
Soma"! Hand rejr,-i_
on November 21 '
than four to six •
blockade .
".ul^tion, thf: situation iri French
^ radio announced
old out longer
1 British
..COKFIDK.TlAl
1778 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
:JKFIDEti'TIAL
Latir. America
Koosev<5lt has noir.inat,ed the present Ar-
bEss&dor i-u ^ub&, George S. Messorsmith, to succeed
Jescphus i-ianiels as Anbassador to ifexico. The new
British Ambassador to Mexico, Ciiarles Bateman, is ex-
pected to arrive in pdd-Decembor,- which is about the
same time that Mossero-; *■,). ;-rnbably will take up his
new duties.
oeen
of a
liy. (3)
'xjpart, r;j. ^ ai.i.^ui.cec an agreement has.
h Mexico providing: (1) The settling
pricf; for American properties taken
experts or through further diplo-
Ucxico teadurBd $9,000,000 in
iym.-r.t. (2' '• •■ -•-• ■^'■'^ egrtirian
xico to pa;, Tuil
-'-s alr^adj, , , . on these
,000 upiii cx'.hUKj;^, of rr.tifi-
- =ov!.rirLg thcni. T>ic rcrii^ining
..... .. ...^ -. L tho rutc of 12,500,000
A rcciprocul trade tigrctnu.nt t*:! bo
n'^c . (U) The tfni ted £tu*' r- wi 1 1 pro-
:. •-ubilizt.tic : --.-In the peso
(5) The Ul pur-"
-,--0 ounces of . ... :. >'. c'.n
Tho Expcrt-Inport Bank has cstiublishcd n ;30,-„'00,000
credit for the c-jvclcpnicnt of rocds L;nd highways. Thr
cr "".;♦ A-i I . L -V iiabie Ir. V'_c.rlv ir.cr. m.nts ix: to
'■'■'-'■ ramcnt
able frojn
Costa Rice
El 3:-lv^;.iQr
.,;r.-..xiy -j^r.CL, p,.y-
- ,-tcd iiis jffcr of Itmding
the United St^.t^^, '-s
Tens-, .
Pro-Axis Chief of Fc..
placed by pro-Ally Colonel
1 Merino h-as been re-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1779
coNFiDainjo.
Llttla progreaa Is noted In the new govemB»nt of
Panaita towards consolidttion of Its gaijaa. The second
decimate to the preaidenoy is named Uinister to
Thahington; the third design te, Anibal Rloa, is In
Colombia, ond will be orrested if he retuma to Ponsjaa,
where a number of hia eupportere have been Jtlicd. Bny
posltiona still a ro occupied by Arlarlatas, although
there is a eordlal disposition to cooper-te with t ho
Ikilted States. The extreme n&tioaaXlstio luws possod
by Ari&s are not repocled, but ulroady their /»pplicti.-
tion is lupaing. The govomiaont is ualilcoly to do any-
thing that will frighten off U. S. tourist or businoss
dollars.
Argon tlna
There uro raai y indications thut u eccri-t.under-
stiundlag tiB to the joint dofunsc of tho Straits of
Itigellun hts been £»stt.bli8h<id between Argentina --r.c
Chllo, The recent doath of the President of Chile
probcbly will reopen discuaalons on dcfonso in th:»t
urea, Ihoro have boon expressions of annoyuncc on tho
part of high Argentine officials over staff discussions
betwcon tho Obi ted Stutoa and countries adjacent to
the Argontino, uid over the U.S« land-io^sc uid promised
to Paraguay, Uruguay ond Bratll. Tho view is held that
the Argontino is an Interosted party to all suoh dis-
cussions and dispositions.
A now political party, of Fascist ch^rt.ctur, called
Patria has been launched in Bucnoa Aires by tho pro-Axis
BanuoT Frisco. Observers note a new student's purty,
or "Young J^rgcntinc" party, in prooecs of fcrnt-tion. It
is a coalition of redic-l nation-list j^roups.
German influence in the Argentine is v^.ry low, the
Russian war having aliem-ted moa y former sup;.?ort^rE.
There is doiaund for u moro vigorous attitude tow-rd the
Axis than that exhibited by Vice-President Castillo,
and !*n intensifies. tion of the Ti-borde Cosmitti.o cctivitioa
may be cxpcct-._d.
•A'hile t
the Arg-nti:
signs of treublt
rfill be critie.-j
in
e
19
1780 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
.TtrS^IAL
politics, seems firrJy ir. control of th« Army, In the
•^enu-te, the nationalists and the Oemooratio fuotlons
have reached an impasse, A coalition of nationalist -
or totulitcrian - fiictione, under a strong ler.der,
probubly would maun the otrerthrow of the present govern-
ment.
Bruzll
During tho period under review thure have beer,
some clarming reports from vt-rlous sources in Brazil,
forocusting trouble botwci.n Vurgas cxnd tho explosive
elements in his Eovcmmont. To duto, however, nothing
serious has occurred. Br^-iii is meeting, with some
hcsitution, her commitmi-nts in homiaphcro dofi^nse, end
cooperating in the novcmcnt of U. S. troops to Surinam
by sending a militury mission to Puruamribo, and strcngth-
Ing her border forces in that nreuT Currently, General
Goes is denouncing U. S. aims us imperialistic in South
America, and his good fuith in staff discussions should
be uccoptcd with gr-vc rcscrv^-tlons.
Chile
The sudden death of Present Aguirro Ccrda, from -
bronchial affection, has ouusod considerable unrest
in Chile, end rtsponsivc uneasiness in that country's
neighbors. Don Tinto, as ho was ^.f fectionatoly cal led,
bcc-usc of the red wlno for which his vineyards were
furoouB, heuSed the only popular front government, but
was generally rcg;.rdcd as u friend to Deraocr^-cy. He
has preserved for some yours on uneasy equilibrium
between highly antagonistic and immoderate f;.etionE,
His successor pro tempore is a noted conciliator, Jtosf
observers believe that the govommont will remain stable
during tho sixty-day period before the election of a new
President,
Colombia
The Colombian Scn-tc has rejoctcd th.- U. S. Black
List of Axis firms in tho V/estern Hemisphere, on tho
grounds that, in a matter of such mutual intcr^-st to
the ivmoricun R.,publics, all their govi,rninunta should
have been consulted.
Tho Colombian press condemns articles on tho
country by Benjamin Wolles and John Gunthcr, terming
them "Amb^-ss^dors of lU-Jfill." It is not realized
-6-
CONFIDEKTIAL
f
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1781
CONFIDHKTXAL
in th«»UnLt«d iitates to what a high degree th6 Lelir-
Amerioa press i« sensitive to criticism of nationtil
custom and usiige. The sum tott.1 of U. S. litorary
coaanent on the I^tin i^merioas is undoubtedly hurmful
to Pun Amcrici-rt accord.
BoliTia
A U. S. ivrmy Air Mission has beon established in
La Pat.
Tho notorious and able Dr. Kuhno, suspactod Nozl-
agent in Quito, hus been b:.nishod t.-: . small town on
the Ecuador-Colombian border, b^c .^r; _,f ^^tur.tion foe.
»n him by the writer John 0, GUcther.
Peru
Early in the period obscrvcrB in Peru reported
widc£preud populur resentment over Peru's foiiure to
receive ccrti.in airpii.nc6 and materiul, cnibi.rgocd by
the U. S. Dcpurtmcnt of 5t»tc ponding Ejttl-mciit of
the Ecuador-Peru border dispute. Cor. ■ -.v-,
been raado in the procurement of non-c .'P-s,
ond the excitenont is subsiding, kfl'-.,:.. ^■:. '.:\c border
are quiescent.
In Limo, tho Aprista Party irjiour;c;.-s the poEcibil-
ity of the resignution of President frcdo, bec-use of
popult-r dissatisfaction with the border situation.
Gonerol Urotn, the hero of the Ecuadorcan w&r, is ^^
strong Presidential possibility, but he is s;.id to h^-vo
no desire to guin tho office by unconstitutional -^'.-nE.
Uretc is pro-U.S. and ^nti-Aais,
general
Tho ABC countries ct Icrgi-
disillusionment and -xh-usted ;
of Icnd-lcQSc nc,ti.rial. Much r.
most literally nothing has baen
even to'iccn dciivi,rl., r, , would ha-
th is time.
CONFICa-TIAL
'^t
'O
1782 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CQKrtDJSTIXi
Trends
Military and Maval
Mexico. The jiavol l>udgot for 191*2 h»8 been set
«t 35i'900.5cX} peeo«, or Bb»ut 18,000,000. Thi« la
twloe the 19UX budget, '
South Aaerloa . Sothiag to add to »\aa«iiry of
Movenber 1^,
EoonoaAe •
The porlod under revlow h&e been ohtxroctorliad
by nuiaeroue oonplcinta la the prose ot th« Anorlcaa
Republloe, and in reports froai Turlous looctl sotiroes,
over the jrowing dearth of laoterlule eateoticl to the
support of Industrlos. Deprived of Europeua export aeur-
Icete, the Amorican Sepublles look to the tinited States
for variety of heavy aotorlale, noithor produced nor
BicLnufacturcd south of tho Rio Oroondo. Xanodlt.to ob-
stoclcs arci The auttur of priorities, and tho uvail-
abllity of shipping. Boro, bs In tho lond-looso mllltory
and ni»Tul BifcteriQl, tho pctlcnoo of tho I.atln-Asiorlc!:>e
is about exhausted, tmi thoir oonfldenoo in U. S. good
fclth Is dotorloratlng. Few Lb tin AnorlccAS appreciate
the Ku^Qltude now of tho dutaonds xq>on U. S< industry.
Aids to Britain, to Russia, and to Chino, ond oonfuslon
In U. S. production, are widely cdvertlsod. Oppononta
to U.S. und to Pan Anorioon policies arc blort to
take udvuntugo of ourrent clrcuiostanoes. As c> mousuro
for tho future, no leas thon for lomodluto benefit,
tho ullotmont to La%ln iuaarioui trude of certain
priorities, however liinitod, and of shipping, appours
urgently doslrc^blo.
//
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1783
OMEriDHfriAL
B. The Jt^aneae Military Situation
Japanese troopa, suppliea and cquijawnt ware pouring into
Indo-China during the paat fifteen days. Unite landed at Haiphong
Here aent south by rail, to Saigon. Troops ■were moTed quickly
through Saigon towards the interior and the Thailand border. The
arrival of relnforceaenta continuos. Js^aneae amty atrongth now
in Indo-China Is bellevod to be about 25,CX)0 In Tonifklng province,
and between 70,000 and 100,000 in south Jndo-China,
Naval craft and aircraft also moved south. It is estimated
that there are about 200 Japanese planes in Indo-Qilna and roughly
the same number on Hainan Island.
C. The Japanese Naval Situation
Deplpyaent of naval forces to the southward has indicated
clearly that extensive preparations are underway for hostilities.
At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring con-
tinually down f^o* Japan and northern China coa#t ports headed
south, apparently for Fr«ich Indo-China and Formossi ports.
Present aoveaitmts to the south appear to be carried out by small
indi vidua! unite, but the organization of an extensive task force,
now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper forre in the
next few days. To date this task force, under the cOianand of the
Coamander in CSvlef Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into
two major taak groups, one gradually concentrating off the
Southeast Asiatic ooaot, the other in the Mandates. a»ch con-
stitutes a strong atriking force of" heavy and light cruisers,
unite of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine
squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be
assigned, the major capital ship strer^h remaine ^n home waters,
as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.
The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment,
including landing boats in considerable nuafi>ers. Activity in
the Mandates, under naval control, consists not only of large
reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but also of
construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc.
^' The Chinese Military Situation
The Chinese are concentrating troops to defend the Bursia Road.
In position, or moving up for this duty, are about 185,000 men,
including China 'I only mechanised units. Skirmishing was reported
dto-ing the period in north Honan, south Hopei, Shantung, south
Anhwei, near Shartghai and near Canton.
CONFIDENTIAL
/z
79716 O — 4R — r>t 1.
1784 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
. . ic:;'..-I i-'^a iivisionr- ,. i:-
• y<:t ready for field drity.
i ;'.s roady for nctiv'n nervic
iiist.ribuiicr
•,i,ii; Front It t.i2 16f? (iiiclud;
N'Ttbern Group -i r.'tr,^
C-'Titral Group *r
rMiuriicrrv !<roup '■!
: t:.d oast Pmsiiia
Kir.iaf.d
Ocrrvir.y .iiid \.i".Lria T!
liollAud, Bcici"™ 3^<i >' ranee 27
"orwHv '^
IS
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1785
■j»-r
Following the fr««Blng of the ground, Qerman offen-
sive opera tiwis have been resuaed.
Flnnleh Sector - There Is evidence of renened
pressure towards i&inoansk, Kandalaksha and the V/hite
Sea. N«ie of these objectives has been reached to date.
The situation along the Svir River and In the southern
Karelian front remains unchanged. There has been a
resu«53tioo of artillery action at Hangoe.
North-Central Sector - The siege of Leningrad con-
tinues with no apparent change in the situation. The
Kronstadt batteries are reported to be still active
against the Finnish right flank on the Isthajus and
against the German left flank engaged in the siege of
Leningrad .
Russian counter-attacks have prevented German
forces at Tichvin, Just east of the Volkhov River, from
effecting a junction with ■ Finnish-German units in the
Svir River section. This leaves the Russian route to
Leningrad via Lake Ladoga still open.
The Russians claim to have carried out counter-
attacks in the vi,cinity of Novgorod. These attacks have
had no visible results to date.
Central Sector - German assault against Moscow has
been resumed during the past 6^10 days. Despite bitter
Russian resistance and incessant counter-attacks, the
Germans have made same headway north and south of the
city. At Kalinin no appreciable shift in the lines has
been ap^jarent. Southeast of Kalinin the Russians have
admitted fighting near Klin, and the Germans have offi-
cially claimed the captuxe of Solnechnogorsk, indicating
considerable German penetration northwest of Moscow.
The Russians admit being forced back in the Mozhaisk
sector. Another threat is developing at Tula, where
the Russians report great German pressure.
South-Central Sector - Gradual German advances
along the Orel-Kursk front, which have been hinted at
for some time but not substantiated, are confirmed in
the reports that Tofremev (on the Lose ow- Yelets rail-
road) has been captured and that advance units, profjress-
ing toward the iwportsnt center of Voronezh, have reached
Tim, 40 miles cast of Kursk.
-II-
/^
?f
1786 CONGlft:SSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
Donett Basin Sector - The Russians claim deep
advances in a coiinter-attack on the "Donefcz Plateau",
but fall to mention the recapture oX any Inportant
industrial centers. Axis reports have enphasised
gradual progress along a broad front, but ha'** been
vague as to details.
Rostov apparently haw been capttired, although the
Soviets insist street fighting is still in progress.
A crossing of the lower Don River and the pursuit of
retiring Red forces towards the Caucasus is reported
froB Berlin.
Crlae an Sector - According to reports, all of the
Crisea except Sevastopol is now in Oersian hands. The
defeat of Russian forces in the central Criaea, the
breaking of strong defense p(JSltlona across the Kerch
Peninsula, the capt-ore of Korch and of the western
shore of Kerchinski Straits have opened up another
avenue for the invasion of the Caucasus.
Sevastopol is isolated and under siege, and
apparently has lost Its value as a base for the Red
Blaak Sea Fleet.
Personalities
General Kurt von Briesenwas killed in action on
the eastern front on Noveaiber 20, 19iil.
NavaJ.
Distribution
\ Ship
Date
Same
fype
Location
TIRWTZ
BB
NovpBiber 9
Kiel
SCHWWfflORST
BB
November 21
Brest
aiE^ENAU
BB
November 21
Brest
SCHL£SVfIG-HOLSTEI N
OBB
November 9
Hamburg
SCKLESIEN
OBB
-12-
October 7
Central Baltic
CONFIDENTIAL
/S
^?y
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1787
CONniENTIAL
A,'>
Ship
Date
'
Name
^ype
Location
(Continued) .
QRAF ZEPP2XIN
cv
Prior Nov. 16
Departed Stettin
ADMIRAL SCHEER
ca'
Kovember 19
Swinenuende
LUET2CW
a
November 9
Kiel
s'eyulitz
CA
October 12
Bremen
PRINZ EUGEH
CA
November 21
Brest
, .kVULHAL HIPreR
CA
November 5
Off Sassnitz
NUERMBERG)
LEIPZIG )
CL
CL
(
(November 5
(
One of these
two ships off
Sassnitz
KOELN
CL
September 29
Gdynia
EMDEN
CL
November 9
Kiel
4 Unite
5-7 Unite
1 Unit
3 Units
2 Units
ReiBaining Units
DD
W
DD
DD
DD
DD
September 24
Septei!i>€r 24
September 24
Septesaber 24
October 24
Northern Korway
In the Baltic
Bergen
North Sea ports
■ Cherbourg
Unknown
150 Units (oatlaated) SS
Operating out
of German,
Norwegian and
French Atlantic
porta
Operationo
A smaller nujnber than usual of Genaar. submarines
were encountered during the period Kovesnber 6 to November
13. Two forces were operating: one off the Portuguese
coast, and one off the southern coast of Greenland.
British October shipping tonnage lossos vrere less
than 7535 of the Septepbcr, 1941, losses.
^99
-13-
CONFIDEOTIAL
/^
1788 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COHFItENTIAL
- me XRK RDYilL was attacked and sunk by ^*» ^f,"*"
Ger«a« submrtnes just «*«t of 0^^^^ ,2LS^f^ri
iQ/i It is not oerum irt^ether these submarinas wre
SrlttS o^t of ^e usual French West Coast bases, or
gi n^^stablished bases In the todlterranean.
In the light of available Inf ormaUon l^-J^P^*^"
practSaSy ceftain that all R«i»anla^ ^ ^J^.^^.r
Black Sea porta are being P^pared by «*« ^^= J^^^^
use as baaes for offensive operations. The «*'*^^°««'
^ve been destroyed or otherwise neutraU«ed.
It is reported that kxis Black Ses. forces have
been Jeenforc^ by five '-^J^^f^rf.^^ ^
the DMube. A sixth ssadl 0-boat is to follow.
K Shortage in available Axis Black Sea shipping
■ay be IndOcated by the recent sinklne of a X200-ton
Zga^iafriver .^or vessel. This ship «» "^P^^^f
tT^e been carrrin* sunltions for Axis land forces
aM was sunk by a mine IB the Black Sea.
H.M.S. OSVOHSHIBE (CA) encountered «id sank a
converted Qer»a co«!roe rtiider on Sovostoer 22 In the
S^H'Ifla^tlT The Axis raider, ^eliovod to h^o been
the TAiSESIS, W bloro up by a laagaaine «Plo«i«^
thirteen ai^uUss following the coonencofflent of the
engagement.
According to belated evidonco, it is not ta^^y
certai^ that the Oer«n 6.000-ton light cruiser KOELN
^rengagt3d in operations leading to the capture of
the BalUc (Oesel) Islands six wsoks or so ago.
Personalities
Lt. Reschke and Lt. Ouggenbcrgcr were in Oo«and
of the two Oer«m aubwodnos credited with tte ^^g
of the ARK ROYAL. Rcschko entered the Navy 1» 192^
!nd^ggenbcrger in 193A. Neither officer had beon
^cvi^^ly ncntioncd In connection with submarine
operations .
-U-
CONFUENTUL
//
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1789
CONFIQEirriAL
(
Captain Bernhard Rogge was in coaiaand of the
raider reported sunk by H.U.S. DEVONSHIRE. Captain
Rogge entered the Navy in 1915 and was advanced to
his present rank in W^O. He has been awarded the
Knight's Cross of the Ir<xi Cross.
3. Air
Strength and Disposition
According to a recent reliable report, the dis-
positicm of the Geraan Air Force in Russia is aa
follows :
South of Finland &
Leningrad Moscow Kharkov-Kiev North Nonmy
Long range bonbers 90
200
ZAO
40
Bomber reconnaissance 30
30
45
10
Dive bombers
90
60-75
30
Single-engine fi.-^ters 30
180
130
30
Two-engine fi inters 30
35
10
Totals leO
535
475-490
120
Grand Total - 1310-1325
A previous report from the same source estimated
that, as of October 1, 1941, the Germans had almost
exactly twice the above number of planes on the Russian
front. This reduction in air strength niay be due to
sone, or all, of the following factors: (a) reported
withdrawal of some 560 bombers and 150 .single -engine
fighters from the Russian front to Central Gennany
for refitting; (b) losses; (c) shift of air strength
to the liediterranear., which >;as recently been reported
from several sources.
In the Mediterranean, prior to the beginning of
the recent British offensive in Cyrenaica, Geraan Air
Force distribution was reliably reported as fDllows:
-15-
C0NFIDE)*7IAL
/^
1790 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTUL
Dive Recor,-
Borobers Bombers Fighters caissance Coastal
Cyrenaica
•
30
70
75
5
-
Sicily
10
-
-
-
-
Crete
-
20
10
-
-
South Greece
60
-
-
20
25
Total -
325
This represented a slight decrease in Ocr;,:
€trength in the Mediterranean from the last prev^: . ,.,
reported figures .
Operations
west - RecoPinaissance coritinucs to ]be the chief
German aerial activity in this theater, operations
being carried out over the British Islen ani -vcr ','-.-
sea approaches. A sinall nunbor of bomber:
ly in action, and activity 'j!' rinfi-layinp
reported occasionally.
Russian Front - Accordin™ to Gtr . ;, the
German Air Force has been very active or. th>=- Kaslcrn
Front. Leningrad and 'loscow were bonbed regularly
during the past two weeks. The northern part of the
city of Leningrad is now in ruins, the Germans report.
Genaan boobers also are aaid to have jpiaid particular
attention to railroad cownunications; namely, the
yards near iloscow and the lurroansk railroad at and
north of Vologda.
The Luftwaffe also claims r^ny successes in
pounding the Russians in the Crimea at Sevastopol
and at K^rch.
lip to November 1, Cterman sources claijr. that
ej,iX)0,000 pounds of supplies in 30,000 flights had
been carried- to the front, by Gerraan air transport.
On November 21, the Oc-mians claimosi fiirthor
that, to that date, 15,877 Russian r ; ■
been destroyed.
cowide:jtul
/f
J-ff
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1791
CONFUErriAi
Modlterrmnean - Geman activity in this theater
has be«n Itieited largely to defensive operations. It
has been reported that Gonaan air units In Libya have
recently vainly requested reenforceinents of troop-
carrying planes.
Persona li ties
During the last fortni^it, the Oerman Air Force
has lost its greatest technical expert and its leading
ace. Col. Gen. Udet was killed -while testing a new
secret weapon. It. •C<?1. Uocldcrs was killed when a
transport plane in which he was a passenger crashed
near Brcslau on November 22. Uoelders was returning
to the front after attending Bdot's funeral.
-17-
ZP
y;
1792 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
F. The Italian Military, NavaJ. and Air Situations
1. Military
Libya
At dawn, Tuesday, November 18, the British launched
thatr long-await«d offensive against the Italian and
German forces In the Libyan Desert. The British have
been preparing for this drive for many months, and a
steac^ 8tre«» of materiel has been flowing to the Middle
East. For the first tiiae British forces are meeting the
Germans with an^le equipment and air superiority.
The main spearhead of the attack began south of
Sidi Omar, fifteen miles from the coast at Solium, and
branched northward to Bir el Gobi and Sidl el Rcaegh.
At Mr el Gobi, the Italian 132nd Ariete Araored Division
apparently was badly mauled by the British. At 83.
Rezegh, Imperial forces captured the airfield, including
planes and personnel. Further south an Isperial Uotorited
Force, starting from Oiarabub, raced across the desert
to Gialo Oasia and captured the *l-t*llan outpost of El
Augila.
Since the initial thrust a tank battle, between
German and British armored forcesi ensued at EL Rezegh
where both sides lost heavil;r In mechanized eqnip^ o Mt.
To date the f4.ghtlng is still fluid, and no decision
has been reached. However, the British are now in
possession of Resegh; Gaabut i»nd Sldi Omar Nuovo (the
main supply bases of the Oermfen armored forces ) have
been captured, and the Tobruk garrison has made a
juncture with the main I]i!|>erlal forces at Ed Duda.
East Africa
Gondar, the last strorghold of the 'Italians in
Ethiopia, is expected to capitulate within the next few
weeks. The beleaguered Italian forces are entrenched
on a mountain top north of Lake Tana where they have been
cut off from supplies for tha past sevan months. Britidi
forces are closing in now an< are only seven miles from
Gondar.
(Mote: Since the prapai^tlon of this report, the
fall of Gondar has been announced.)
-16-
COKFIDEKrlAf
z/
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1793
OOWriDENTIAL
•1 )
•♦ RuaBlin Front
It&llan ground llnee of coBBunication are being
obstructed on the Russian Front and air transport is
b«lng used to* supply the troops. Italian difficulties
are due to mined and mired roads, lack of transportation
facilities and the refusal of the Germans to repair the
railroads in that sector. As a resiilt, Italian forces
in the Stalino area have been directed to exploit what-
ever local resources are available.
2. Naval
The Italian Navy Is demonstrating its Inability to
protect convoys to Africa. In the attack on an Italian
convoy November 8 by the British, the two Itadlan 8-inch
gun cruisers stayed beyond the range of the British
6-inch gun cruisers during the entire action. Seven of
the ten ships sunk in this convoy contained German
troops. Again on Novenijer 21/22 a British auhmarine
attacked another Italian convoy escorted by three
cruisers and three destroyers in the Straits of Uessina.
One cruiser and a destroyer were hit. On the night of
November 22 the convoy was again attacked by British
aircraft off Cape Spartivento in which hits were claimed
on another cruiser and several merchant ships.
German submarines are basing now in the Mediter-
ranean. Reports indicate that the principal German
submarine base In the Mediterranean is located at Capri.
Permits to visit Capri are almost unobtainable, even for
persons of Italian nationality. A German submarine base
also is being established on the West Coast of Sardinia
which will accommodate seven submarines.
Air
On November 15 a serious shake-up occurred in the
Italian Air Force when General Rino Corso Fougier
succeeded General Francisco Pricolo as tftider-Secretai^
for Air. First reports of the ousting of General Pricolo
indicated that he had failed to protect Italian cities
from British air attacks because his interest lay in
bomber and torpedo plauies.. It was believed that General
Fougier, y&io is a specialist in pvirsuit aviation, would
relegate bombers to second place in favor of the aanu-
facture and use of pursuit planes, ffowever, subsequent
reports state that th6 Germans have taken over complete
control and coranand of the Italian Air Force because of
-19-
CONFIDENTIAL
2Z
2f^
1794 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CCNFlnENTIAL
the sinking of the bj g convoy en November 5 when r.any
German soldiers irere dro-wned. Mussolini was said to
have acquiesced to the Gemjan demand and, rather than
submit, 'jeneral Pricolo resigned.
General Fougier is only a figur«-head, and it is
reported that he is not respected by the Air Force. He
was a protege and satellite of the late General Balbo
and commanded the 3rd Italian Air Fleet.
CONFir'EOTIAL 2J
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1795
•; A V , -, T K i :; ?
jffice of r'nlef of 'Javal Oporatior'.y
Office 5f ;;aval Intelligence
7.'ashi.ie*on
' . on by mai 1 . ,
in tne tcx*
-,r the cor;-
trarrrci t*r
•itUT" of
• raation
ruSE, a;;:;
T,-</-j'./
''i
./^
1796 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONTIDENTIAL Serial No. 2tj.
November 15, 19lil
Fortnightly Sunwary of Current Hati onal Situations
A. The Diplomatic Situation
1. ^££52
The approaching crisis in United States-Japanese
relations over-shadowed all other developments in the
Far East during the period.
Saburo Kurusu, former Japanese ftii^assador to Berlin,
is flying to VTashingtonwith coraproadse Japanese pro-
posals. No one apparently expects his mission to succeed, the
envoy himself reportedly expressing extrame pesstinism.
(Unerican spokesmen, including Secretary Knox, have indi-
cated that the United States will not budge from her
position. Prime Minister Chxirchlll warned that if war
breaks out between Japan and Ajnerica, Britain will
declare war on Japan '•within the hour." The United
States is preparing to withdraw the marine detachiaents
from China. The Japanese press continued to rail at
Britain and the United States.
Japan protested to Panama against treatment of
Japanese subjects in Panamanian territory. Panama
rejected the protest. Japan also protested to Russia
against floating minee in the sea of Japan which sank
a Japanese passenger vessel in Korean waters.
Russia and Japan reached agreement on demarcation
of the Uongolia-Manchukuo border in the Lake Sulr Nor
area.
2. Germany
/
In accordance with traditioi^, Hitler returned with
prominent neitfbers of his Party tp the Buergerbraeukeller
in Munich on November P, 19til, to celebrate the l8th
anniversary of the Beer Hall Putsch. In his speech.
Hitler declared that he had ordered the Qerman Kavy to
fire on American thips only after being attacked. Orders
have been issued, however, to torpedo any ships carrying
war materials to Britain.
In a recent magazin-:? article, Dr. Goebbels tells
the German people that it is coinparatively unimportant
wfien the war will end and ail-important how it will end.
The .^irticle ie calculated to steel the nation to endure
further hardships arvd to be prepared for a continuation
-1 -
CC.f/lX-BOT IM.. C
'J ''
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1797
CONFIDEWriAL
of military effort for an indefinite period, the tew
York Times calls the article "a. rare concession of the
possibility of defeat."
It has been reported that eighty per cent of the
Iranians are pro-Axis and would welcome Geraar inter-
vention as a means of securing liberation from Russian
and British control.
Karl Sohnurre, Itinister in the German Foreign
Office, returned to Stockholm early In Novenber. His
retiim was followed by a report that Sweden had ac-
ceded to the wishes of the Reich and would not permit
ten Norwegian vessels in Swedish ports to be returned
to Norwegian owners.
Germany is pressing Bulgaria to assume police
duties in Serbia and thus release the two or three
German divisions engaged in putting down the Serbian
uprisings.
Construction of a new highway and railroad line
between Harab\irg and Copenhagen, via the Islands of
Fehmem and Laaland, has been commenced. This new
line will shorten the distance between Copenhagen and
Hamburg by more than eighty kilometers and will reduce
travel time materially between the two cities.
3. Italy
The Brazilian Foreign Office announced on
November 7th that the proposal for the purcbase of
Italian ships in Brazilian ports had been accepted
by Italy. SXf^t ships ars involved in the trans-
action for which Italy will receive a non-negotiable
credit in the Bank of Brazil, which, when the war
ends, will be liquidated, no transfer of funds being
involved. The CONTE GRANDE, 23,861 tons, and three
other Italian vessels, which have not discharged their
original cargoes, were not included in the proposal.
On October 31st, -the Yugoslav vessel TOMISLAV,
which has been at Shanghai since April, was boarded
and seized by a con^any of Italian Marines. The
master and crew menbers were tJu-eatened with pistols
and forced to abandon the ship and their personal
effects. This is the second incident involving the
vessel, the first occurring last April when the
Italians seized the ship, claiming it had been
-2-
CONFIDEhrriAX
memamamm.
1798 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
:C>iFIDENTIAi
purchased by Lloyd Triestino. This attenpt failed,
however, ■when the Japanese intervened. Since the
second seiz'jsre, the Italians have beer, busy removing
the last vestiges of Yugoslav o-wiership and the funnell
is being repainted with the colors of Lloyd Triestino.
In connection with the reported purchase of the vessel
by Italian interests, a Japanese naval spokesman stated
that under the Chinese Maritime code, the trajisfer of
the vessel would not be valid unless it was duly
registered with the Chinese Ciovernment .
Because of the intolerable conditions existing in
Croatia, the Duke of Spoleto (King Ainione of Croatia)
has abdicated the throne of that country.
France
The reprisal executions of FVenchnen, followed by
Marshal Petain's appeal to the people, appear tc have
had the desired result, -the only recent act of terrorism
being the suspected sabotage of an Orleans passenger
train In a Paris station. Little progress has been raade
in Franco-German collaboration, however, and It is
reported that Adolph Hitler has become dissatisfied with
wriat he characterires as the "aEbitruous" attitude of the
Vichy government. It is thought that under renewed
German pressure France must agree both to adlitary and
naval collaboration in French AXrica and to the early
retirement of General Weygand from his Morth African
coraaand. This latter d«tiand has the support of Admiral
Darlan and Uinister of the Interior Pucheu. Petain,
attempting to gain time, sent General ihintziger, Minister
of War, to Africa to make a survey of local opinion,
but it is felt that the Marshal taust. yield eventually
and agree to Weygand's recall. De Leuss, personal
representative of Weygand in Vichy, already has been
removed from his post.
(Note: General Kuntzlger was killed in a plane
crash on November 12, 19lil, while returning to Vichy
from this mission to Africa. )
IndicatiGn.s point to aji increase of German activity
ir. Tunisia. Two reputedly fi\)cajiian engineers have been
in that colony --'<-• --n-veys of the general terrain,
highways, bri and the JYench Resident ileneral ,
Ad.'airal Estev •. . to Vichy for consultations.
-3-
CCNFITjENTIAI
\y
tr
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1799
CONFIDHJTUL
The Vichy Governaent has «nnounc«d that French
Sonaliland officials had agreed to negotiate with the
British regarding the use of the port of Djlbuti and
the railroad linking the port to Addis Ababa. Howrrer,
Colonial Secretary Admiral Platon, after a hurried trip
to D Jibuti, stated that the harbor works and railroad
would be blown up before the port wna surrendered to
the British.
Diplomatic relations have been conaleted by the
United States with Great Britain for sending a
$1,000,000 Red Cross cargo of milk, clothing and
aedicines to unoccupied france. Arrangenants »till ,
must be co^leted with Germany and Italy for 3*fe con-
duct of the vessel.
The Vichy govemnent has protested to London against
the capture of a convoy of five R-ench merchant vessels
en route frois Uadagascar to France. The British action
was believed based on the poeatbiltty that the vessels
carried tin and rubber from French Indo-Chlna destined
for the Naais. Vichy, however., denies that there was
contraband aboard. The li, 576-ton freighter SEWNEVILLE
was reported damaged by Royal Air Force planes on
Noreaiber 3, while in Tunisian territorial waters.
It has been reported that the BB RICHELIEU is now
looked upon_ as one of the fixed defenses of Dakar and
that there is no Intention of having it undergo trial
runs.
5. Latin America
Mexico
The Mexican Government apparently is alt«ipting to
take advantage of the desire to eliaiaafce all existing
differences between the United -States and Mexico
quickly. In order to force acceptance of a pettleaent
on the oil coayanies. Various high officials ()f the
Mexican Govemuant have issued thinly-veiled threats to
the oil coDpanies to agree to- the negotiated settleiaent,
"or else."
Reports have been received of several Supreme Court
decisions which Indicate a conservative trend. One
decision held that an expropriation of property -was in
violation of constitutional guarantees in that no payment
CONFtDWTIAL
.>>
79716 O— 46 — pt. IE
1800 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
catms'smiKL
was made of "proupt and fsir eoapsnoation . " Thia is
Considered as another indication of government trend
away from the leftist policy of the Cardenas adfcinistra-
tlon, as the. Supreme Coiirt usually reflects the ricwe
of the ftdraini strati on, its decisions being in effect
dictated by the executive.
ConservatifflB is gradually replacing the former com-
munistic policies in the Cepartaent of EAication, under
the new Minister, Bejar Taaquez.
Acceptance of policies regarded as desirable by the
United States is apparently greatly Inpeded by the presence
in high governmental posts of officials under Apcls in-
fluence or ootirated by Anti-A»erlcan sentiments.
Four hundred additional Spanish refugees from
Casablanca, Morocco, among then Alcala Zamora, ex-
President of Republican Spain, are expected In Vera Crus.
Sinarqulsmo and Acclon Nacional, two fascist
organizations attaining significant' strength and numbers,
which are apparently under Nazi Influence exerted both
directly and through the Falange and Spanish-dcwiinated
Bentoers of the Catholic clergy, constitute a potential,
danger to intprnad order in Jfexlco and to ifexican-United
States relations. If recent Information that such
figures as ex -President Fortes Gil and Abelardo Rodriguez,
and many other influential lieocicans, are working behind
the scenes in these organizations, proves correct, the
danger is eyen more serious tiian had previously been
thought.
Guateaala
flonaan propaganda has affectively used Guatemalan
econ<»aic problems arising fvQm blacklisting of German
coffee producers to produce friction between President
Ubico and the American Legation. A campaign to discredit
the American Military Missi.on, and have it replaced by
a Spanish Mission has been started, but little success
has been noted.
Costa Rica
Under discussion, according to a recent report, is
legislation to permit the registry under Costa Rican
flag of Ar.arica.n merchant %'«ssels. Little opposition has
COffFIDENTIAl
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1801
CONFIDENTIAL
appeared, and sentinent trends toward permitting the
arming of such vessels. Foreign Minister Echandi of
Costa Rica, only pro-German cabinet menber, went to
Panama, apparently to secure permission of that country
for ex-President Arnulfo Arias to live in Costa Rica.
Panama
♦ Arnulfo Arias is now in Ifexico City. It is reported
that he has been offered refuge in Canada, provided that
he stays for a Biniimun of three months. It is doubted"
that he will accept this offer, as most of his feminine
contacts appear to be in Latin JUaerica, a factor which
has radically influenced his asovements hitherto.
The new government in ParJfflia is still somewhat
under the control of the national revolutionaary party
organised by Ar.nulfo Arias, and contains a number of
high officials friendly to Arias, which inspires some
doubts as to continuous satisfactory cooperation from
the new regiine.
AnibSLl PJ.OS proposes to return to Panama to assert
his claim as third designate to the Panamanian n
presidency.
Colombia
A ccnraittee of the Colombian Legislature published
on November 9 a report on the American Black List and
specified that the report itself should be brought to
the attention of the foreign officers of the other
American Republics., The report is said to have asserted
that the United States GoveriBBent criticized the Black
List in the World War as being in violation of the law
of nations, and implied that bribery and espionage by
foreign service officials were involved in the coBpila-
tion of the Blark List and that the lists themselves
are based on ?.cquisitive ambitions.
Ecuador
Ecuador has agreed to allow American naval vessels
to operate from her waters, but has not publicized
the agreeacnt, merely stating that patrols by United
States vessels in Eouadorean waters had been authorized.
~6r
CONflDENTIAL
^^f
.^^.
1802 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CCNFIDEJrriAl
Chile ■ •
The President of Chile requested leave of absence
d'je to illness, and designated Jeronimo Mendea, head of
the Radical Party, as Acting Vicp President to adiainister
the f>xec!.iti\'e powers in his absence. The Radical Party
is the largest element in the Popular Front Govemraent
which elected Aguirre Ceirda to power. Upon first re-
ceiving nerms of the change it was feared that the Popular
Front would be broken up by secession of the Comrrunists,
or that the new Vice Pre.sideht would swing so far to the
right as to side with the Masi Coriservalives, inasjriuch
as his Radical Party is the Kiddle of the road element
and farther to the right than any other part of the
Popular Front which ssupports the present povemment.
However, aa the Conaruniat press has regist«r«d approval
of the change and reccmsnends increased watchfulness
against the Rightist conspiracies of the Nazis, while
Consej-vatlve meMbers of the legislature have attacked
the Acting Pi-esidoi!t, it is believed that the Popular
FVont will remain intact and Acting President Jfendes
will not favor the Nazi -dominated Conservatives.
Tljerefore, It would appear that the change would result
in greater unity of the forces opposed to Nazism.
Peru
Dr. Rafael Larco Harrera, Vice President of Peru,
arrived by plan© froa Rio in Buenos Aires on November 11.
It seems significant that he has visited on his current
trip the three countries which offered their good offices
to re-establish peace betweei. Peru aiid Eciiador. It is
reported that he intends to remain several days in
Buenos Aires and conXer with Acting President Castillo,
the Foreign Ittnieter, and other prominent officials.
Vice President Larco provides s deoocratic window-dressing
for Peru to cover up the "behind the scenes" totalitarian
methods employed against Ecuaijor. It appears reasonable
to suppose that by his current visit to the three countries
offering to mediate in the dispute, that he is trying to
discover what fate lies in st6re for Peru in ca.se media-
tion Is forced upon her. Mexico was prob^ly the first
country. to suggest that steps be taken against Peru du«
to her invasion of Ecuadoraar. territory. It is inter-
esting to recollect that Mexico dispatched her Minister
to Panama on a swing around the circle of South American
capitals lanediately after the expropriation of the
oil fields, probably in order to ascertain what would be
the result if consultation ware invoked against Mexico.
CONFIDENTIAL ,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1803
• lacking that now, as then, ocxisulta-
-^fTican nations nculd res«lt in
: the "aggressor" nation.
Argentina
a;
•?florts
bors ir ..
!■ !;;t er-pear aistcrrcd, hower^r, but say
.,. -^,j,! .,,, ... ^} _^,. :^.^,;. , , ,;<oinc and p^
ti* ei.e\
Jfendez to the Acting Fresidency in
Chile «ri joint Argentine-Chilear; defense cl"
Brazil
:■ Aranlia was que
.aj'ing that Brajj
"ler Aaerican natioji *
to the. newspaper, "'.^
1804 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ccNrr&cstUL
Current action of the Brazilian •;,• vi»r ".»■.«•»>• -n
facilitating uoe of Braslllan airportw '
planes and by reinforcing garrisons i.'i
indicate that President Vargas has dec-
to throw his influence to Pan teerlcaj-i
The opposition may become desperate, tr ■■ cause
open disorders as a result.
Trandg
Military a nd Naval
There is a marked trend towards m:' i
cooperation by the southern countries <
for amtual defense of their territories
plified by the JoL-jt maneuvers of the Paraguayan aj...',
Argentine navies and the plans for Joint Argentine-
Chilean defense of the Straits of Stegellar..
Economic
The economic trend is towards incr"asert inter
change of comtnoditiee between South Ajnerican *■ p
in an effort to supply the necessities and d
surplusses amongst themselvea. There appeal
Biuch hope for considerable success in this d
surprisingly enough, in normal times the ten
export and obtain manufactured articles in :>
Europe, but little •conanerce was condui-*"" "
selves- Now It has been found •'hat siar
fomerly obtained from Europe can be Ov
neighboring South Aaerlcan countries wiu -h ; ro iuce tiwsri.
When projected iisprovements in communications betweeti
South American countries are completed, still Ajrther eco-
noBdc interchange will become possible.
Totalitarian Penetration
Arnulfo Ariaa, ex-I¥esident ri Manag^^a
manifested a strong desira to get . ?fi ','• a
G.TTi;an Treneral in Argentina. This woei
/vrias also had been involved in contacl
A.:f' t ina, as had the Honduran exilps .
V "'lennann had promised assist/*.
't against the present cnverrv , indo
; I a
'i''^
i'
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1805
B-J ' h
(purt
strori
;t o:.ly i'ror. H.iii^:, ■,: .;
uiii'ta riorciilly sho^t-^
1 iubZc.
lion ir. g_ricr;il rum.ir
.!#
1806 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1. Milltury
Strength
tfui Surr^.
^•^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1807
COirFIT)S;TIAl,
?fcr-ch-;er.',r&l Spctor'- The siegs of Leningrad continue*.
Both Rusilkns and 3era«in!S claim to have repellBd ona another'*
i.ttucks. A reliable source reports famine conditions inside
Lenin jrisd. A aove to cut ofi" c. Soviet routo of 'supply to tho
city {viu the Vologda Raiiwi.7 to Lake Ladcvf^u, ;-n<J vie this
lake to the oity) vus ur.a«rti.kon by t;.e Q&rixj^e . Itoving
e,;itwijr'i ''rcir their bri'jf •ihH-.is ucrcsc tr.c V~;khov River,
■ ■ ■ ' '-1 jimotion
C-ati.
to b richvln.
:-asic s;tu..t .JVEOow
appc ?hunged dur v two to
thrv -.-Eblo flC;"-. 'nt appears
to :•;. - V3lokola.-nBi:
Eucc -.; So vi ..■*£■)
to ;. ■■ ^r con-
por-
■civod.
priBK
- --.:.. It
jseibio, h- oi,an buey
•no the r ax- rry them
A'/j- ^
I
1808 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COKFIDa:tlj.L
The to(jai .•ncbilized strength of the Buijjoriaii
>>nny now is reportsd to hnvo reached 270,000 men, in-
cluding 6,000 now in process of loobilltction. Two
HftZl SE DiTisions, hitherto ostipied to the forces of
occupation in Tugoaiavia, cro now reported being ro-
lleTTsd by Bulgsrion Army wiit». It i« not known
whare th« two SS Division* are to be sent.
South - Ail unconfirmed report ututea that the
Oaraians aro organising tour light armored and 10 ootor-
ised divisions for troplct.1 service, /jrsothcr report
cluims that 150,000 young Gcraun i^ray recruits oru being
trained laid iicoliiButcd for tropical servioe i" the ,
Bordotiux-Hendtiye aroa.
A reliable source reports th» transit of Gsnaan
colonial forces to Italy, estine.ttid ut 8 divisions.
A recent unconfirmad report from supposedly reliablo
sources claims thi.t Genntji forces tn North ivfricn ht-vc
boon increuscd from UO.OOO to 70,000 snca. Light tank
units aro also s&.id to hove been moved into OroKCo by
wcy of Yugoslavia, for evuntuj.1 trunsport—tion by plcno
to Libya,
»f:.val
Distribution
SKlp
D; to
Si-iso
t>rpc
Loc-tion
TIRPtIS
BB
November 9
Kiel
SCSUBJJH.3HST
BB
October 27
Brest
GNi-n.SENn.U
BB
October 27
Brest
SCHLESWIG-HOtSTEtS
OBB
Novcabcr 9
Ut-Btbur g
SCa-ESIEN
OBB
OctoboT 7
Ccntr'^1 Bt.ltic
aif.F ZEPPa.is
C/
October 12
Stettin
Ar-MJKjiL SCHEJ^R
c---
November 7
Swir.oBasende
L-JETZOW
C;.
November 9
Kiel i
SKT!X.rT2
CA
Ootobi-r 12
Brcaon ,f
PtilUZ BJG-cXi
CA
-15-
October 2?
Brest
CaKFIDHSTIAL
/
/•
^v
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1809
co?r
riDssn^
'
.vDMIfUvL HWPER
Cn
-: v.:~h, r 5
Of;- Su!-.nv
OTERlIBa?G
CL
^)
Oie or thci
LEIPZIG
CL'
Nov'jnbcr 5)
EMDEK CL
I4. Iftilts DD
X Unit T)X>
5.7 UnitB DC
•5 Units DC
2 OnltB CD
Remaining Ift-.its DD
15« Units (esti.mjtfcd) SS
Sontenbur 29 Gdynia
JJoveRb',-r 9 KiCil
October 21,
Cherbourg
UrJcjiovi-n
Oponiting out ci" Gcrrij!,
Korwcgiiin saio Frunch
Atlantic ports.
Opi-rutions
Two Cornta subncrincs an '1 to W
oport-ting in tho Jic^joo'-n. Cerra-^'. -.
patrols in Greek m-tcrs arc eaid t
On Novoiubor i;, sobio 1,100 Gormtj-. :.;.■/
reported stationed ut H&plco. Hotul Sopo
pyatzo. Bacctidiloono, Rome, Is now GcrBirj; s
hticdqunrtors, which will control Gonncn subny^rmt
entering the Kedltcrrnncan,
Stro-ngth cjid Diapositlon
No further inf orav-tion rcf;ari
strength and jiroduotion h
tion of the last Fortr.i
rMCJi ovt,rJ!ull pit
■ since dlrt,r;'--j-
A reliable report Just received puts Ifczl air
strength in the Ifcdl tcrrQn-.un, ou October 21, ct:
-12^
^ ^xf
COiiFlDB-.flkl,
.__:^
1810 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CsaJPIDHtTIAL
Cyrennloa
50
70
80
10
S. Greece
80 ■
-
-
25
Crete
.
20
10
-
Sicily
-
-
10
-
Dive Coa«tol
Boinbare Bombere rishtera Reeoaaulgijioe jtirofcft
25
The total nuaiber of SenatJi plunes urcilubl* in tho
Medlterrune:--. area is tstint.tcd t.t 5S2.
Operutions , -
West - So substaitlcl change in Gortaas. uir ojoritioa*
hcs beeii noted sinoa difltribution of the lest Fortnijiitly
Sumoury.
Efts tern Front • rhore is reason to infer th_.t '^ho
Nazis may be {;<'t*i°g reudy to ourtuil opcr;,tioEa ulong
tho MoBOoir ecotioa of tho front during the winter*
A Bhortcgo of gi.soline at forward sti..tione of
OennUn fighter eonaauads is holding up fifjitcr o;)tr,.tions
uV»i«l(l Roitov. ThcB'- forw.ird st-tions re supplied
by oir tri-nsport.
The »trt,-ngth -. s.j fupporl Icon
kept up well. R.'t 1 - V ; Ivor; n_-j.- ta
thcec units, eeVi-ral of wiUch havt gohc* into action ^bovo
their normr.l strength-
k^£ been fcriour..
From ijcrtrsjn sourcos eomc
air action:
(1)
(5) ^*. i...^ ...,--=. ....^^.,(. ..^.s. r 9: 1 wr.rship Eunk
17 trcjiaports Euak
2 v.';.rship6 drjK:.g6d
29 racrchrjitmcn dancgod
COHFIDS; n«i.
^■■/A
,d
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1811
:C«F1DB«TAL
Mcdltcrrcnour. - !;o infori«.tion oT a cfwagc In the
ba»ie~a,ir sitiu-lion h-» boon rtcolTcd »lncc the iu£t
Fortnightly bwaiury.
PcriiQoalltloli - Scrauny's So, X flyi;r, LieiUcnijjt
Colonel Ifoeldiire, until rt.ccntly in Rueeia, h^.s \tm
tont to Greece nod Cr..to to a«»umo otorgo oi" largu eci-io
oporution* u£t.in»t the Sue, C-45aX , ;a(ixijniriu _aa tht
British !fedlts;rrcjie...n Floet, t-ccordlng to a rv,cc«.t report.
The Fiylcg Corp* of Liouti-Tuint Gcsoeral PflugbcU
is reported tukiag p;-.rt In the offoneivo in tho CriaKxi.
^^^ p^
1812 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
;OriFIDEJITIAl
liar.
'. ^lilltary. Naval and A.ir Situ ations
Military
No unus'jal military operations nave taken place
in the V.estern Desert area. Patrol activities continue
ajud there are indtcationr that the Axis have increased
substantial!:* tneir forces in recent -weeks.
East Africa
British forces in Abyssinia have encountered soRe
opposition i'roa native Torocs who have been harrasslng
their line of corammications along the Sardo-Dessie
road. Lately the riatives shifted to the northwest
toward Alorato and coranunications have been reestablished.
Recently three Italian battalions were jroved out
of the Gorgora-Ceiga sector 5»est of Gondar, eastward
to the line of hSeldiba-Deva.
Russian Kront '.
Four Black Shirt battalions entrained at Rome on
Ncwenber 3 for the Russian front, l^iese were apecially
--- ,-,,^ j^^j^ ,jj(j,g have recently underf^one a period of
'-"aining in Italy so that their tf^clijucal-
efficiency is at present considered high.
Tiii force wears the insignia "M" and are known as the
"tiussalini Eattalions", The greater fjart of thor aj-e
veterans of the Italian caBspaipis in East Africa,
Spain and Greece. _
The siiany reports of 1,^300, OCX) raen, 350,000 raen,
25 divisio,".?, etc., being sent to Russia, can be
boil'jd dovim to the L ciivisions already at the Front,
the above token Black Shirt force and tha 4 divisions
earaarked, which nay or ray not actually luave.
Maval
On th>-- nigVa of r ." t'/9, an Italian convoy,
consisting of ten n.C;icnant ships and an escort of 2
10,000-ton, 8-in5h g'an, TJlEtiTO class cruisers and i
destroyers, was attacked bj' a British naval foixt; of
-17-
CONFXiE:'rrui
A9f b\
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1813
CCN'FIEEJJTUL
two light cruisers and two destroyers. )•
action, r.ine Italian raerchant ships rero s„:.,,, .
tanker left burning and abandoned, and two Italian
dest:'c;-ers were sunk. On the foiloaiiig night, a
Brit.-h submarine sank one destroyer ai-.d daaajed
another, -sast of Messina.
The b3d)y damaged Italian battleship CA'/Oiffi
i£3 now i> the water of:r the Eastern Drydock Arsenal
of LI ,;•' T-i stino at Trieste. The I0,000-t<m
cniiji." PJl-.-fiO, r/hich »>as damaged seriously in
knfr^■. t. i'.: r,-v» undergoinc repairs at Genoa. The
bat^ -' -—-'-:-■:--■'- ■^■^)RXO VfifffiTO »re still
at : IlIO are at taranto.
Tht . . .AVCIA is at ha. Spezi-i
underi5>_-:. . -r 1- '," : t^-.e t'^-en ty- three submarines
■which v.-2re o.^slnr roce'.'ly at Bordeaux, only six
are left, tn-- balance having returned to Italy.
3. Air
The latest :i
.isposition of the
Italian
Air Force
is aa follows:
Tj^pe
Libya
Aegeain
Balkans
Sardinia
Total
Fighters
230
AO
110
60
uo
BoB±>ers
60
16
25
50
151
Torpedo Enrr, r .
10
10
Boiaber
Re c oriTia i K s a nc fc
50
^0
?0
110
Dive Bombfirs
20
20
Rcco.-matcaance
" 30
BO
10
120
Transport
_JJ:
25
TOTilL
- ^25
96
ris
l.iO
876i*
* Serviceabil
^^J-
^'
1814 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
C z©'' .. /, ^-
KAVT BEPARTHEKT
• Office of Chief of Hsrml aparatiORo
Offie« of Ssval Irvt«»llli«mce
. CJopy.S*. ^^
Serial Jto. #3.
i.
Sor«Bb«!r 1, 1^
-/^-^^
pc'RTsism.Y smatAHT of ccmosTr katiosal sitcations
{ Information concetning Anti-Axis Bclligerente
is omitted frcm this publication due to
its iiide (ii3s«jKln»tlon by sail.)
T'^il --atur" 1 *)-°
♦bp inforsa* t^^ "^
val lTtPlli<-^->c ,
it i.j upriropri s*.e f.o v" ♦ srt cular a^t'onti-^'- to
the CC^KFIDESTIAl chsr^ctpr -'• thl? puMic-tnn
T. S. '.Vilklnson
Captain. D. :". Navy
;ctor ?f ''.'avcl Intel ligonc**
COMFIDETUL
M7 x^^ ^^.^ ,. . ,. _^ (j
i
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1815
CCNFIiDEHTIAL Serial Mo. 23
--—~^—~~ November 1, 19hl
Fortnightly Su.iroary of C\;rrent National Sltwatior.r
A. The Diplonatlc Situatlcm
1 . Japan
Prince Konoye's Cabinet resigned en October -6.
Lisvitenaiit-General To jo, Kcnoye's Minister of "Tar,
formed a new cabinet in »ihich he holds the pests of
Preaier, Ministpr of Wax, and Kinister of Hone Ai'f.:'lrs.
He also reshuffled the rembersHip of the ponerftil
Cabinet Advisory Council to enewre that this body would
cooperate with tha governraent. To jo has thuo concentra-
ted enormous powers in his own hands, far raor; than 'Jiy
Premier of nodern times. He is Jingoistic and fnti-
• 'foreign, particularly anti-Russian. He has strong pro-
Ajcis leanings.
Tojc stated that Japan -nrould seek settlement -f "tc
China incident, strengthen hor ties with the ■ocie. ^..r:
continue her policy of building the GreattT Eae*. ..sin
Co-prosperity sphere. An early Japanese attack upon
Siberia is predicted by R.any observers, a drive i.gr.:..-.rt
Thailand by others. Still .others thdnk an ^cJv.-'-nce Into
Yunnan to cut the Burroa Koad is iCTsinent. .'iovfe7er.
General To Jo announced that Japan-United St'.t- ■ ccrvpr-
satior.s will continue. This, together wit^ -
that a special five-day session of tlie Die*
called for November 15, makes it appear pr.
.Japan will not lasinch ai^y new attacks at 1^
after raid-Novaober .
2. Germany
Since the beginning of the Russli-' - - ' " :-■■,-._
have been indications of grosring unr- -
civilian population tn Gerriany - pari _ -.e
Baltic littoral. k% Danjig, military forces h'c -_o be
called upon to. assist the police in restoring order.
Workmen are reported to have thronn pieces of iron at
the soldiers, who thereupon fired into the crowd. It
must not be sssuased, however, that -onrest has reached
serious proportions. Blind faith i.-i .hitler is still
widespread, and signs of internal dissensions are, as
yet, only slight. Incidents like ths Danzig affair are
isolated a.nd showld not be considered indicative rf a
general trend.
-1-
COHFIDgNTUL
m,^7
<mm>v'silt:f^tsmi!)mvfi)%»^mmm m i »^muii ^»u.^imi'>t'9»^:^^^s'
(!^
79716 O — 46 — pt. IE
1816 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
specia- -,
appoiiited
Nanking.
Gcrmsr '"-
Oener;
other sour '■
: no Geraar.
,a^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1817
CONFlDEMriAL
Dr. Fxink ■
Italy's p.
undisputed cart '^ jitcrrrj:;:xn - L-r-.v.-J-;
course, she fur -iv^jice the wen r>i\d Irtor
Gcmsany Is d.,rr, . 'hor one- of th< o.irr. if
dlscussioi' . rosrran.ganient r-
to emljrac - trade with Gerr
bet.w'j""- "" ■ •'^'-■, '" -■•■'"'! • '■ '
3ur-
new It-als — Rura-
delegation is s:
detadls.
hea"
Ital^ .. _,.. '..:.. ^- .
Foreign V- von Hihber.t. -
of thir r, ..■. obscure', ', .^
that plaaf ar-e -x-w.^ rr:aae for a new dipic-;?.- .c •-■■v-j
ained at Turkey.
A treaty fixing the borders between Croatia and
Hontenegrc was signed ir. Zagreb October 27 by Italian
and Croat officia; a. "-.- • n^r '-ordfr staitr ^r--- ^^5
2oae of Dobricf"
follows roue;h] >
Austro-fer~~-
reaching 1
the border
The jxil'->Q Grana Ku'"» . -^ J ■" i^.r,
Husseiml, his rj*; ivf» ' . <^-- , - " -.■ --'-=1
in Iran. ^? s
propaganda wea'^
world again K» •
fled fro!-
attonpter
COfJnDEiTIAL
,-.lf
1818 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
oomtssmuL
ypoffl Syria, the Itafti wmt to Iraq when tho TrvntM wer»
about to sQlea hla, and In Baghdad he directed tho Iraqi
revolt, which the British had to pot dtxwi laat May.
A;fter the British occupation of Iraq, tha Qrand Uofti
sought shelter in Iron, froai •nrhere he niyatorlouely disap-
peared when the British and Russians oaterod Teheroa.
France
■Rse termination of one year since the Montolre meet-
ing of Adolph Hitler and Marshal Petain, at which the
foundation for Franco-German collaboration was laid,
finds France moving slowly into the Axis orbit. Sco-
noiBic collaboration Is well under way, and political
collaboration is expected to follow under ranewed Nasi
pressure. With a slowing up of Ocrroan militri^/- opera-
tions In Russia during the winter, now dovclopBionts aro
expected in the negotiations betwoon France and Germany
vjhich may detonnine whether this policy ie to survive.
A strong effort is being Bade to return Pierre Laval tc
a position in the French government, in order to remove
existing obstacles to collaboration.
While a state of war exists between France and
Germany, normal diplomatic relations cannot he restored.
However, an agreement has been reached for establishing,
on a reciprocal basis, Nasi consulates in the French
unoccupied zone and French consulates In tho Reichi.
Krug vo.i Nidda has been named German representative to
Vichy and' Georges Sc^i.nl, present Vichy negotiator
concerning war prisoners, is expected to be the French
envoy to Berlin.
In reprisal for the assa.?sination of two German
frdlitary authorities in France, 100 French hostages
have been ejcecuted, bringing to 136 the total to date.
The execution of an additional IGO hostaeos, sentenced
to be shot unless the assassins of the German officers
were found, has been postponed in-iofinitely.
Contrary t- rujBor, Gaston Henri-Haye will remain as
French Arabassador to Washington *-'■: a'onointroent having
been extended in July for anot , - . r,thE, The renew-
als for six nonths of the risf:. ....-sLassadors
Francois Pietri tc Kadrid and Leer i'erard to tho '.'atican
have been announced also.
General Gamelin, .3X-Pr«>mier,5 Daladier, Bl'ojri and
Reynaud, and former Sinister Mandel hevo boon ordered
CG??IDENTLU.
^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1819
COSFIDEWr
i
conflafld in the Pyrenees fortress of Poiirtalet by
Marshal Petaln uncl«r the ch»rge of haring failed In
official duties and engaged Prance in the war 'inprepared.
This sentence is independent of the proceedings of the
Suprame Court A RioB, iihich is attempting to fix
responaibillty for «ie Prench defeat.
rVench Float
'I ■
So recent aoveaante have boen reported amonf
units of the Vichy fleet. The disposition of the ves-
eels is as follows t-
Toulon
Morth Africa
Casablanca
Dakar
Madagascar -
West Indies -
Indo-Chlna -
Unroported -
French Colonies
North Africa
Gc-rmany is bringing strong pr: r:'jr.
Vichy Govcrnmoitt for the ouEtor of
as French pro-Consul for Africa ',r.\
by CSencrpJ. Henri Dcr.tz, who direct.
defense of Syria. , Weygand, upon his r-.:
fron Vichy, declared that the governpor .
has n'ade no decisiSn on charging thp -^r^-
of France's African possessior.s am' t'-a'
CCIJFIDE.TIAL
BB STRASBOUPG, 03B P?CV^.:'CZ,
CVS COMKAfHJAjrr TESTE, I CA's.
3 CL'6, le DL's, 17 DCs,
?3 SS'6, and Ih PO's.
BE DUNKEHQUE (damaged), 1 DL,
h VID'B and 10 SS's.
BB JEAN BAST (772 corr.pl ot-:),
2 CL's, 2 Dt's, 6 DD's, 12 Sr's,
and 6 PC's.
BE RICKSLIEU C-aroaced), ? CT.'r,
L BL's, 1 DD, 10 SS's, and
k PG'E.
3 SS's and 1 Pj.
CV BEAM, 2 CL'6, 1 PC. ana 1 XC
1 CL, 12 PC's and PP.s.
1 SS and 1 PG.
^97
\J^
1820 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONTIDBNTIAL
P
been granted the Axis for the use of air
.;. , ...;.;■-- .ases in Africa. In accordance with the
agreement, between Vichy and 34rXin, Oernar. corisu-
labf'E will be established in Algiere and '.Morocco,
and an agreement between Darlan and Gei-many
authorizes t7»o Nazi "cultural mlcsions," each
consisting of about ten raasibers, to Jiorocco and
Algeria.
French SotTialiland
According- to a Vichy announcement cf OctobT 2li
two "Anglo-de Gaullist" lighr col'jnns o^ 3CG nen •
invaded French Somaliland, c-rossi.-.^ the border fron
Eritrea. Two days later It was announced that tl:o
troops had been withdrawn, "o British cr Free
French cowsent has been made.
Syria
It was announced in London on October 22 t.bat
Great Britain formally recognized ths indspendence
of the Syrian Republic,
-6-
COMFIDEtglAI
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1821
cof-nisaiTiAL
Latin A--nftrle»
Relations '.-.ave beer. ren«v.<;d bctivenn '.'.<:xiro ar.d Jrsat
Britain. The British iltnister to Itexico will bo Charles
Harold Batsman, Char.cellor of the Brit* '"■- r----*^- ■•
Cairo since 1937- '^'^ Mexican '.'.inisX'-
be Alfonso de Roseniweig Diaz, iiot» liir. . c
Uaxico ar.d CoioE,bla raised tholr rcspc- . n
to enbassiea "through the dosiro to tighter. •
acre cordial U.e relations bttwoon the two c. „• _:. s."
Guatcnala
Or Monday, October 20, a report oraar-ating froia
Berlin, but first hotrd in Guatemala ivc-r stt-i-r. KOEI
of San Francisco, stated tha tteited Stutcs ;■. . 1 ; -
livered an ultimutam to Guat^Trals us f-)l\cv.T; Wl»>-:.-'-wal
of Serraan ydnisttr Reinebect -
iations with Gsrasuny; insiF- =
vrould not purchase & sinjle
Ciud a dotneiid thtt tho firae on the Ur.it-d ;-
ciciaied blaclcllat be forced out of buaincsi .
wns widely rc-broadosist throughout Control -^ '-\
many vciriations us to the ti.rra» of tho -11 , ^~.
A varif..tioB he«rd froo a Costt Rio-n s ■
th^at Gonacji coffue v.-s-s buu-.od froa the Ihir ^-
kcts, end thut the Ibitcd Stutcs durtj.dcd t
b:jiking firms in Ouctcnilc bt closed. On 1 - i-
21, the Gut.tciEilan GoTcmratnt' officicliy iz.
nu<j r.c^iv'.i -nv vl tine tun from the ^i.it-,-: : -.-
■ .-^-nts in G., • -
'-r,in- t^c In ..
Ib-rgucn, hud coll:.bc-
tiic subject. Th; G-. r-- ro
ir.cnt firms to -- ; ir 'pp^oy...E S;.
KovcEibcr, indie. .o-c being oxert>.!l -d
St;^to5 GoTi,mj!)cr son for this ucti-v- .
-7-
-2^9/
\^^
1822 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Cor.71 Dir. TIAL
Hoadurcs
y/
COKFIDUrriivL
tfc
^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1823
.-.rf-i.nti.-i;.
ir. the- ,.tl,ritU,
it-j'-ll-n i.r,;...
hi 6 tor;/ ■-
co'jntri'i
Br-zil
jr J ..-nv.;. i.,-.>: i>J.-<
be inrr.
■■'-rir.g siuci. r.^
-r.u aroicr-
-5-
1824 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONHDa-'TI/i
Cuba
The Cuba...
-
rosolution to
af hoetngfcs i:.
tho Lutin Antr;-,r.
:-^;-
Trends
Ltilitary rjid 1
;;L.vr,i
ins
St-t-,r, ♦.
fuisc ur
Ecor.jrjc
St..ti,s Bl-cklist to Gi.rm-n economic
the ~-un*Ti '6 ron'; m d.
icaci it^xico $Jv,>-CU,000 for r. .viOUc-i
.•a.:nts, i.t the r.tc of tXO, 000,000 c~
L free corunerc!
—via ■xni El S: ;
J^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1825
it is balieved thar; the Latin American nat.io.is will pro-
ceed in a ntuch rsc're efficacious and expeditiouE joanr.er
to rid tho.TxscZTBe of ,'_jt;;£ activities thcxr. t^:r<i^ in r thfit
they have p. ■ ■ - ■
rot-dy defi
is belifcvw- .... . .....
with the possibie exc
Costa Rics. told ?oru.
bj-l.-ncing cot or. " »T,iic sr,- ci-Lri.
cqut-lly boti- to • tic ur,d Ilcvti-Fusc
vfith Lcuc-aor ir.
Vice President i;
screen of dcnocr . ,, .
"he Japangso !/llltury bit-.ir tXT.
d 1.1 nor--:
--inp itr^!.
The
J-p.
t.„8c forci.s ,
disposed
for
ztt-ck upon K
increased to
6eij,ooo. At
in Indo-China
and it is b-.
is to be
i.nc r
.;..£ud frir. ^.
lurgc no-
The Ji.p„
Jupv.n.;sc
A minor -
suffered
J..p..i:..-sc.
The .; .3.
The
Spokffi.-r.
pU:.
but
units, however,
y^.rix>S'-, The ;
continues to r-
ti^ns. Althou.'
cowncffiiiia-
^^7
M
1826 CONGRESSIONAL IN\'ESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Cffl.'nDBlTIAL
D. The Chlaeta Mllittry Situation
On October 1}, after three (iays of Indecisive street f.^htinj,
the Chinese attackera vithdrew froB Ichang. Since that tlr.c r.ot:-.l;-.g
^t sporadic Bkimishlng has boon reported in this arou. Skirnushlng
also occurred in southern Shar.si, in north Honan un4 noir Cir.ton.
Russia hus aotifiod Chungking that she is \«i:.ble to continue
shipacnts of wur supplies to China.
-1?-
?7 '<x:Tiha;nJd. y.^^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1827
CONTISSOfriAI,
Tha Oeraan kllltar/. :;av*X and Air Si tuations
1. ttLlitary
Strength
So new inforaation r»garding the strength of the
German Artcr has been received since the Ust Fortni^.tly
Sustaarjr.
Pictrlbutlor.
ilccordii^g to a reliable- so-jrce, the
of the Gernan kncj on October 8, i9il, •s^s ■....
■ ■ to l)e ae follows :
Total rKiKber -■'->^';-'?.
Location of Divisions C.:ecKanize'J) ,1 otor.7>.-d;
Ruse la
iiorthem Qroup - 31
Central " 77
Southern " 59
167 (Iv) (3'0
8 (1)
Finland
Poland/East Pr-jssia 10
Balicana U
Italy - Ubjra 3 (2)
Holland-Frai»ce-B«lgiao 30 '
Norway
7
Dennark ^
Oemany and Austria. 19 (2)
(exclusive of E. Prussia)
The Tani: Arny, coBoanded by Colonel-General Hoeppner,
has been transferred from the Kortherr. to the Central
Group of German Arrdes or. the Russian Front.
Ope rati or. 3
::jstem Front - The second half of October saw
the large Oenaan offensive slowed down by strong local
-13-
-^77 1'
1828 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COilFlDENTIAl
Russian opposition and inclepient vieatlier.
Finnish Sector -• Following the capture < _
zavodsk, on Lake Onega, Finnish forces have been ac. arc-
ing northward alon.3 the Leningrad-! urr^nsk Hallway, n
Finnish coluan operating eastward out of Centra.! l'ir.la.-id
has joined forces with the column pushing north fron
Petrozavodsk at a point near the northwest tip of ta!:e
Onega. The Finns are vvaiting for Aill vrinter vmat>.cr,
prior to resuming a vigorous offensive.
The Finns are reported conteaplatir.r. cessation
of offensive operations upon reaching and securing
the folloT/ing line:
V.Mte Sea to Lake One^a.
Lake Onega - Svir River - LaKu Ladoga
Lake Ladoga - Karelian Xsthinus - Gulf 51 ?xr.la
A partial desiobllization of .the Finnish Antsy is
to be carried out, as dwindling Russian resistance
releases more and core Finnish rsilitary nan po-./cr.
The Finns have apparently assumod a dcfonsivc
attitude on the Ksu-ollan Isthmus facing Leningrad, at
the Soviet-held island fortress of Koivisto and at
Kangoe.
North-Central Sector - Dajjoe, last Rus
hold in the Baltic Islands, nas taken by t.
week ago. Siege operations continued at Lc-
no appatrcnt change in the local situation.
leaguerod Russians still obtain some suppli;-
enforcements by water via Lake Ladoga. Thic G'-nvins are
reported to have established and enlar^i'-d a brid^eheic;
across the Volkhov River, v*ilo a Gorcan divinion,
farther east, crossed the Svir River and advanc .d soirc
20 Kdlcs to the 80uthtra.rd. Those Gcraan op-^rations
may be designed to eliminate the ranialning Russian-
held shore lino on Lake Ladoga. -Strong !?ussi3n
positions still exist in the Valdai Hills soctor.
It now appears that the Germans have r^dc no progress
easti»ard from the lino: Lake Ila»on - Seliger L.ake.
Central Sector - The Germans officially claiaod
to have eliBiinatcd the bulk of i^arshal Tlnoshonko's
Group of Field Annies in the doublo-cncircleir«;nt
battles of Vyazroa and Bryansk. The Soviets denied
-14-
CONniENTUL
Af?
6 i
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1829
:ONFIDENTH:.
these claims and jraintain t.hat tiie main strenjln of
these annies fell back tc new positLona closer to
V.OSC0W. The northern flank of the Oennan force ad-
vancing along t::e Loscow-Snolensk highway branched
north friw: Vyazna, took Rzhev, and drove on to lialinm,
where It was apparentlv stopped by Russian counter-
attacks. Near lioiriaisk, west of lloscow, the prir;^^^!
German advance was halted, fij^tinj spreading north-..a: i
to Volokolamsk and Eo\ith-.rard to !-aloyarcslav€:tr. . "
forces, :oalng byway of Hryansk, captur-ad Ore.
Kaluga, and pushed up tov.-ards Hosco'.v as I'ar as . -
fordnak. ^vere Russian resistance and inclenent
treather, -which bo»ged down mechanized equipiser.t and
supply trains, slov/ed down and st.--pod th., 'Xrmaj.s.
"ath freezing y/eather hardoT-Lir.r
the Oerrars rwy regain a irr«at
So'at.nerri Sector - "*■.;• Ocrc»s.n ar..
Donctz ifiduslrlal area has b-:jen rrl;,
Severe local " ^ " '
arc bel:.evL>d
Kraoatorsk, Stal.no aji-. '.'^^.^ .r:r ,ig.
severe f ightint; is roport'-'d 20 Tile .
In a battle bcglrjiing October ". .
officially dociaro to have broken t; -
defense lines just south of the PcrCi',:,,, --».„:
15,000 prisoners. Farther west, Odessa foil to
by CktrwiTi and Rujoani^.n forces . Tho Russians cl:
'- ^---.. - - ^ - -,-<■,.--.- --- - , , tv.o -arrio-'- " '
German SS Panz.-r ti-ocrr, in t-o;
recently seen for t
Berlin. Ine-s!ir.:ch i.
troops aj-e selected w^. ,i^,^., ,.:.. ,.
assault unit-:-, these r>GW SS f orr^ti ■
cation cf cor.tf raplatt^d off':n«:iv.- op.
in the loviEr I ' ' ' .
East, or peri.
Arnpr ?ersoi-:illti-;
General cf Aviators
General von S
1830 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
IS reported to be in coBBi»nd of three Gcnaan Divisions
in Yugoslavia, these forces axe being employBd to
out down the rebellion.
2. Naval
Distributian
Shi?
iiame
TIRPITS
SCHAjTfflCaST
QJffiXSENAf
ORkF ZEPFELi;;
ADHfUl -SCiiEEH
LICTZO-
e;i?ztg
1^1
lAte
Location
BE September 29 IJaniij feaj-
BB October 13 . Brest
BB October 13 Brest
OBB Prior >>ct. 17 leparted Kiel
OBB October 7 Central Baltic
CV October 12 Stettin
Ck Prior v>ct. 24 Departed Har.burg
CA October 17 Kiel
CA October 12 Brenen
CA October 13 Srest
CA Cictober 17 Kiel ,
CL Sopterbcr 29 Gdynia
;jcto"ix!r 20
Off coast
nf ".icl
Viytiia
Norway
-^97
q^^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1831
CONTOENTIAI.
Operations
A Gerinan official coisnanique on Octob«T 21, i'Ml,
announced the conclusion of operations in ute Baltic
and along the Estonian littoral. Sea forces -jj-^^er
the coBT-arvd of General Admiral Carls are creUited v.-ith
contributing decisively to the conquest of the Balti:
Islands. Units of the fleet transported troo;i£ eind
broke up sine fields, and naval personnel partloi'jvatod
in oneratlons on land.
Qrand Adciral Reader has not jivcn whr •■-■^•■*
approval to the all-out submarine cai^-ai^:
■"by Vice Adadral Doenitz, Cosr-ander of Ofr .<.
Admiral Hadder is believed to havo recnme.-if.c.- 'nir,
Oennany concentrate hor naval efforts jn the Baltic,
the Blaiclc Sea, and tho Uodltcrrancan and rcdaco hvr
scale of operations in the Atlantic.
Approximately 20 submarines hav.i be, n nr, »-a-i...
recently west of longitude 30 and h<:'-
50 and 56. Sons siibDarines havo bec.-
far west as lon/ritudc 53. ?ivc or s.
continue to patrol the water in the '.
Azores and of the Canary ■'•slands. Ct
known to have been operating rec-intiy
to the '.rnito S.a.
P.rsuiir.cl
in;;!".
Gcr:-.i
"■ rrcscncf; of lioutonant-CosnanfiLr'
:ion' 0." C"::rman U-boats indicate:. ■
J^';• i.-^ reaching out ir.to tr-: cl ■' ■
at officer nateria"
th.it yoianger offi .
■ tho:.; of 1=535 ..
j>,:;,"r»i A^n-.iri- Oar_;
in tiie vcmai". hav/-. '..hll.;
•2^
-17-
COUFIDEI.'TUL
1^
^P'
79716 O — 46— pt. 15-
-28
1832 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
;oi4FirKNiiAL,
cruise, Admiral Cirls, as Ccaranar.der-in-Chief "Gnippe
\.e3t", directec the course of the EISJjiSCK fror. shore-
Alr
Strength and Dispos ition
Genaan air forces isere reliably reported dis-
posed as follo'ra on October 1:
"v/estem PY. Russian Fr. Mediterranean Central Oer. Total
103"- 25i5 3fcO 5£3 Af^C
liore than half of all Kali planes in Ru' '
to l>e concentrated in the drive on l.osc-:
Estiratsd total air strer.gUj arid rionthly plane
production remains as shovm j.n the laat Fortni,';Jitl7
Sunnary - 2900 planes of all types and 2200 monthly
production.
Operations
West - There has been no substantial change as
regards Gemaji air operations over the British Isles
and in the 'nestem approaches since the last Fortr»i<^tly
Svunmary.
Eastern Front - German reports make ttr- foil >win.'^
claims regarding air activity d^xring tr.t ii^st:
(1) hits on iiUmansk railwa-r;
(2) troops short of su irea
provisioned by air,
(3) isuch of Colonel Gener.^'* I-eller's a:.r
forn.arly employed in the Latvi3.-nstorai-L<iKo
Peipus section, liberated for action oiso-
*rt".ere ;
(A) sank 30,000 tons c: :;>pin3 in the
evacuation of OdesL--.
^fP ^
^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1833
COJJFIEENTIAL
Xf7
'i-edlterranea^ ■> Until recently General Oeissler
maintained air headquafters In Sicilv for -: '■* —
in the vicinity of l-alta\ The bul!; of hi;;
now been transferred to 3reec^ ".vhere he "n-
Nazi air activity throughovt the icditerranea-,.
Geman air forces have been relieved of the air
defenss of Bardia by the Italians .
Persona lities
The -\/;-ier Gcman Air Attacnp in Lonr" _
of Aviator- ..'^nninger, is nuw or ":- -* '
Larshal vor. Sperrle, Coimnander
■srtiich is o:-,-ratlng against the i
shipping in the Atlantic.
-19-
;oM?rx>rui
1834 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CQRFi;i.JKTIAL
F» Xts.l\'.:. .••III'.-.:/, l>^:-Ll ij-.d Air Situsitltarws
bo; 15,
Llory
1 •inp>»l:-tiori
CCaTIPEKTI^a,
^^^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1835
cjn'f: cojti^l
3 C.-V0-R5
S'^ troy re ; 91
-.t thi? St. rt
I CQKFIE>EH?I>X
2V /|^l
1836 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
".':.e gei»ral i,s:v> no eTi-
cenoe that t.h« no rule c Ixuliaa
pilote is poor. Cta thr T;plo
proof that ia aotu&l cc ■ *^...w- ... . jutclcsscd
fraquontiy by the supo; ritiEh pilots and
Dircrcft. The It.li^.r! :;s been hiinpcnd by
laodoquatc truinlr: ■ .ncs.
jTnc cstlr.'.. * spositlon of th:
Iti.lian n.ir .
• Soctcr 332
159
188
.ritraa I30
Itily suffer
October 21 whon t
r.jurs, ExtLT.Elv^. r. . :?.'. ., ;..i.,l.
ri.jwor contor «hlch hu6 , . Bitirc
strtcts of buildings w. '.nc indus-
trial section :rotind th San C-loni.wi a
Ti duccio wue rrzcd und rJcs nocr GrojiCili were
hit. In spite of th.. rru.-, tl.crc wrr>.
V, ry few civil iir ;:5nfiiitd
■.stircly to mli*
^f/
Si^
^y---f
tJ
1
|;
' i
? ^>; i
vi.W
H
1
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1837
EXHIBIT NO. 81
O. N. I. Ho. UT
NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of Naval iNTEU-iGENce
WASHINGTON. D C
Memorandum for
. .y?.?. . P:i-xe.^^4f.'.
41
Assistan't Cirector
anii Ciphers" by Japaneae ti3'beg»3(»M »^
I was ir.forr.pd froir. a reliable sourcfi last
evening that the Japanese have destroyed by
burning their confidential and secret ctxies and
ciphers.
It is probable thfc- tne Japanese F-nbasey has
retained one copy of one secret or confidential
code for esereency use.
hespectmily, ^
1^
QrJi^h^X'Jl
fr\}'^-^(^^ ^ f-x \*jM^
1838 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ore -3 a 'n
'■;.n(;ls.v-
(isprox.
/« 2
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1839
Copy No. 7
NAVY KKPAiw-tsrr
In reply to Wo. Office of the Chief of rif.val Operations
Op-i6.F-2 orrxct or nav,u isteixioixe
wAssiSGTor;
Dececbor 1, 19U1.
Ksncrandiun for tho Firoetor
1. flttsichod hereto li -l - : ine of tho outstqndlrig tall'tru-y,
naval ajiA political moTea made ^ ;' " ' ring the P'JSt tvo aiontha . ^fo
effort le made to draw concluelor JoBtince Sut a Tlew of the gen-
eral BltuRtion would Indicate thfi r'pal preparatory effort has been -
directed by the Japanese looking tov^c-ln , flrat: «i event -jaI control or occu-
pation of Thailand followed alnost lamedlately by an ett"xk agp.Uiet British
poesesslona, possibly Bunas and Stn^japora.
A.E. McColi'ia.
Distribution:
Copy Ho.
1 - CNC
Copy Ho.
:•• - rrrc
Copy r
Copy ::
Copy ;,
Copy Sc.
L ■v^
zv-
1840 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Z^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1841
arid »r, I'^a.^t c;„'' <• .-.' th- . ;P''>i *» »i;»t,.'
ZG
1842 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In French lato-Chlivi the Japmieae cUlltary hae * " ' " - rjmj
police futietlooa. Many Chlnoes ami Anrif-Qoae fire 'be'. y "JH-^e'^i
At th» and of KoTomber Japineae ;>"iMb<isaador Yoshliawi ' -< ,-TTer:i-
aont as to whether hn find hla staff should take over the g.->VM,-infiatal
fuactlons of French In4o-Chln« or continuo to funi^t!on tiirouf.h th« front
of the French OoYemwent Onoral.
The Coanul General at ;:hnri6!i.".i .V-^- Ipj'ortmvi his goremnwnt that all
preparatlonn Kce coaplote for taking over ill physical property In Chtna
■belnngln^ to British, ,«jiiorlca:ia ."-nA othor enemy rintlonals.
Ths Artay General Staff aent urgent reaiiests* for Lnfonaatlon for
U.S. and Dutch troop and pla.ie strengths and dlspoBltlona In the Phlll-
pplnea and Netherlande East Indlae.
Special Anbaasador Kur'jou ion'- .o Ihe "Jjitted Stated to cond ic t nego-
tiations w'th the tfatted Stated.
^/
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1843
o?-i6-r-
HAVy DEPARTMENT
Offlca of tho Chief of NaTal Operations
Offlco of Haval Intelllgance
Washington, E.C.
BoTsmber 1, I9UI
Menxjrandura for the Director
SUBJaCT: Dia?aV:h from Alusna, Chungking,
1. In thlJB dispatch Major McHu^ aaauniBa that a Jap'uisse drive from
northern Indo-Chlna to cut the Bunas Hoad la lamlnent. He further states that
the only hope of hlociin^ this drlr© woald be sotlre partlelpatioa In the cam-
pp-lgn of all Araerlc?!n .and Brittah Far Eaotem air unite vhtch wo-old require
forel^a (preau-Tv-hly Ajsorlcan) selrure and control of means of trans portat ion and
air flelde In Yunnan proTlnoo.
2. In a meaoage which tho Asiorlcan Anibassador atatea is aov ■faeing
■forwarded to Presidant I^ooaorelt, Chiang Kal-ahek states that the Japeonose will
launch a drlre to cut the Buroa Boad vlthln 30 daya. He taires a somewhat leas
serloua view of the sttu-vtion than doea RaJ!or McHugh. Chiang aaya that he hJsa
land forces adequate to defend the road hut will need air support. He indicates
that he dealrea aid from Brltlah and Ajaerlcaa air effectiYos in Singapore and
Manila in a voluntary atatua. He aays nothing ahout foreign control of Chinese
air fields and Chlneao aetaxs of coarainlcatlon.
'. Cons' ierU^- the extreme difficulty of the terrain between the Tndo
Chi".'', border ani KvaxT^in^,, it is boliered that the Chinese, if they fi£ht and are
given some air support iVoa Britain omd ^.-:;erica, can halt this Japanese drive.
The Japanese now have leas than 100,000 mem in Indo-China. How ^-my they can
transport thsre in tho next ;C days is probleniatical, but it Id conaldered that
thoy cannot ra-alntala their present concentrations (which thre^tan Russia in the
Rortb:, siat'^tain their proaant garrisons in China, and at the same tlEe spare
acre than rcv?- .'>X t:^x)pa for the drive into Yunnan.
k. The real <lueation here is: Will the Chinese fight? In thle
connection there have beam :aany rancrs that Li^ng Yun, Govaraor of Tu-nnan Province
has aold out or S'>3n w:ll sell out to W'tng Ching-wel, If this happone there le
little that Chlaao; }.r l-s'no'.:, the British, or the Ifeited !?t,?teo can -do tc save
tho BixriTiri Po^-i. Thlc I'.i'iijr, however, lacKs conf Iraatlon.
5. Chint' '■ - v^.-i .1-- vo t^oj, Into conn Id-^^ ■••'"" . '■•'hen
aid 1b proslsed to ency to atop fl.^ :veB
sit hack, and wait - "ble reai?5n It ■/ not
to proaiae thejt to:- ~^i~t . :ri" ••'^^er ivo^r.* sh-j.
Kc3\i^ rec03i!a»ndB ie --.-"j-lUre action by the Tto'
jiT a^^-eady
^a'
1844 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
0p_lfc-F-2 - j^.^yy DEPARTMENT
OFFICE or THE tHIKF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASiUNOTON
October 21, i9U.
MBiORANDUM
SUBJECT: Summary of the Far Eaatem situation,
1. The ultra-nationalistic element of Japan has seized
control of the Gtovemmcnt and is prepared to puah collaboratioa with
the Axis powers and the opposition to the democracies to the ultiaate
extent.
2. At the preser^t time Japan has about 68^,000 troops In
Uanchukuo, Korea and Inner Mongolia in a position to attack Siberia,
There is every evidence that due to the recent weakening; of Russian
forces the J^anese have the position and strength to attack Siberia,
The Japanese araiea in China are bogged dom and a ataleiaate has re-
sulted with neither side capable of obtaining a decision,
3. Economically food is not a problem for Japan b(it In
order to supply her war industries which are essential for her present
war effort Japan must have access to over-seas markets or must open up en
over-land supply rout* to Europe through Russia, Failing in either of these
two alternatives, she aust face a situation in which she will see her
total war effort graiiually decline which must eventually result in her
eviction from the Asiatic continent and her decline sa a world power.
Distribution:
'Jp-16-F - Copies 1,2, i 3
Fl le - Copy No, 4 4 5
Zf
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1845
Op-l6-F-2
N'AVV Depaktment
vrrKF. OF Tiu: < uny m navai, •'i-i.iivTi
WASHIMiTON
October 21, 19U
MeaorandmE for the Chief of Utiifel Operatlona
SUBJECT: Far Eastern Situation.
i« The Political -altuation - Japan
■Sith the advent of the Tojo Cabinet Japan aminga back to
closer Axis ties under the aogia of the Jingoistic military clique. Al-
though Tojo's Cai>ir<et retains a balance between the comparatively con-
servative Navy members snd the more radical Amy there are remaining a
number of old wheel horse politicians. The report that General Tojo Is
filling the Home Ulnlstry and War Portfolios in addition to the Preclep-
shlp indicates clearly however that the Amy intends to take the reins
of the (Jovemaent, and such oeing the case, the inliaation is clear that
positive action detrimental to United States' interests aiay be expected.
2. The Sconoadc Situation - Japan
The basic weakness in Jean's economic situation is her lack
of raw materials to feed her war industries. She depends on overseas im-
ports for 63% to 1005f of her supplies of nickel, cotton, rubber, niolybde-
nuffi, alumlnuffl, lead, aercury, oil, tin, mica, iron; this depenience is
partij' offset by stockpiles, particularly oil, atolybdenua and alu-iiinum,
but existing stocks of other items are not sufficient to meat current
requirements for more than six months, A basic restriction on e;<pansion
of Japan's industries is the lack of machine tools, precision instniments,
refinery installations, and workmen skilled in producing aid installing
these iteas. The living standards of Jean's industrial and agricultural
workers reflect the condition of Japan's foreign trade, particularly the
export of silk and the import of industrial raw materials. The steady
decline of foreign trade has caused the living standards of the entire
nation , to deteriorate. On the other hand, Jj^an is 9?/t self-sufficient In
basic food items; In recent weeks, however, the government has completed
elaborate plans for Increased restriction of food consumption and for ad-
mixture of substitute and synthetic foods and drinks; plans have been made
"also for nationwide distribution of 150,000,000 pieces of canned goods and
for distributed storage of rice, biscuits, canned fish, and vegetables. In
brief, Japan is not prepared to feed her war industries for a period exceed-
Injj six months if a blockade closes her main overseas routes; she is pre-
pared, however, to provide for an Indefinite period staple food supplies.
3P
1846 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3. Tha miliary Situation - Japan
There sre relis,bl"3r reported to be 6'i!.,000 Jai:!ane3e troops in
Manchukuo, Korea and Inner iion^olitt. These forces are itlsposed for an
attack upon Siberia* Eussian strength east of the B*ikal Lake la believed
inferior to toese Japanese concentrations.
There are slightly over half a million Jap.aneae troops in
China Proper. Three Had ted objective Japanese offensives have been carried
out or attempted in China during the last month, J^snese planes continue an
Intensive bombing <^ points in unoccupied China. Japan shows no Indication of
giving up any laiportant points in China or relaxing her efforts to crush the
Chiang Kal-shak regime.
There are roughly fifty thousand Japanese troops In Indo-Chlna.
These units are not disposed for an attack on Thailand. It is reported,
however, that Japan plans to double this force in the near futiire and so.-aB
of these reenforcajaents may have already arrived at Haiphong.
The dry seaaon in Thailand begins in November and lasts until
npril. Japan launched her 1904 war arainst .tussia on February 1 and attacked
Uanchoukuo in late Septeaber. The Nipponese seeo to prefer winter campaigns
in this area. Ttina, both to the north and south, weather conditions are
favorable to oilitary operations. In Japan FToper, training of reserves con-
tinues. The maxi.nuni of JapMiese itanpower is being placed on a war footing.
• i. The .Naval Situation - Japa n
The naval forces of Japan aiay now be considered zo oe fully
mobilized for Licinent action. Ail forces not urgently required in the
Mandates and the Asiatic continent have been called back to home waters and
during a period of recent markad inactivity extensive personnel changes have
been carried out and Bofclllzatlon plans probabljr completed.
5. The jU.l itary situation - Cnina
Chiang Kal-'Jhek has at least one Jtillion nen unaer arms. There
are almost half as aany guerrillas back of the Japanese lines. China's army
lacks aLuost everything except nanpower and small <»ni5fl. It has practically
no offensive striking power, but possesses considerable defensive strength,
for almost three years the 3ino-Jap<ine3e war has been a stalemate broken only
by occasional limited Japanese offensives desiifned to break up Oiinese corxen-
trations close to Japanese lines. The stalemate is likely to continue for a
long ti.iie oecajse:
•
^i) Japan carinot annihilate the Chinese aray.
{2) Ti-.e Chinese cannot drive the Jafanese back.
(3) No mutually satisfactory basis for psace has been
s i : -6 3 ted.
he '_f,i ti .-'■ i •■ -, ■•- icaie now plajined *
,rj -, -.: =u ■- ^ re t: ■ i;;:/^ . i's war of attric.
poss-.ciiity 3f a Chinfse jffe-is.ve actual.../ r-/--i. turirirX terr.
held is, hoYfever, still far -Listant,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1847
6, french , Indo-CKlna
VlchjT and th* Coionlal GovenuMnt are beginning to reslet
Japanese demandB. It le not believed that they idU oe succeseful in
these efforts, and Indo-China m^y be considered virtually under Jaj^aneae
doni nation.
7.
ThailKid
The Thai Gcvernraent is reSisting Japanese pressure and will
probably fight If the Japanese invade the country. They have an ansy of
about 70,000, backed by some 200,000 reserves. Their air force and navy are
negligible. However with British help they could give the Japanese a lot of trou{>le.
At least it is believed that the conquest of Thailand, aided by the British,
irould develop Into a major military caopaign. It is not beJiieved that Japan
has the strength to carry on major campaigns in the north and the south siaul-
taneoualy.
Op-16
Oj>-16-r
Pile
3Z
79716 O — 46 — pt. 15-
-29
1848 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
NWY DKI'AliTMiM
^"'\ ^^^- 5^^^ v*. 'W^ M^'i^'^
J«pt«ob«r 25, 19U.
a:iij{Lv>;jJM to ^uihax. T..:i>;ra
SUSjr CTi r«r EaaV«m ciitu«U.on/
As untsljr«i( of alX aviillutoXa raporta lnJlcut«s thiit thar* or* in i^^iehoukuo,
Koran tnd Inner Uon^li* ktxnit 500,000 Jkpanass trcxipa. UorMaont of J<4<arMS« unita
froa Jt^tD and China to Umm tarrltoriea contlnuea. Ithln the terrltoriea fevar-
l«h ffiovaaenta at avn and aupplla*, daal^ad to pli>o« forcaa in position to attack
HuBala, hdve bean procaedin^; aiiMsa ahortljr after tha outbreak of the .'tuaso-Oenaan
hoatilitiaa. .lecant ral<uc&tlon of raatrlctiona, pendttirvj^ aona railroad travel
by clviliana, leuda to the belief that sAHtor?' prapoTcitiona ure noorlng comple-
tion. .<iuaaian strength a<Jit of l*ka Baikal ia believed to be leaa than thaaa J^pua~
Ma concantrationa.
In Indo-China there ure rou^hl/ 50,CXXI Jiipitneae soldicrfl. The J&poneso ar«
ttren^henln^ their poaitioiia here uui working on lonj rang* plana to occupjr tha
rmgion perauinently, but they are not ready to attixk Thailand, nor ure they ituJcU^
■ound loflatic prnparationa for auch an iuttock. The forthcoming Japanaae nu^neuvera
near the I'hai border are believed aore of a political th&n « siilltory geatura.
Half a cillllon J^panaaa troope rsoain in China ;:roper. Jap.^ ia at present
oonduetlng threa aizabla offenaivea o^^r:at -hlon^ Kcd-ahok'a liOn and during the
loat two iaontha haa greatly Intonaified her bocbir;^ r.J.de. it le plain, tJiercf ^re,
that Japan intenda neither to ^ve up any laporUmt pol.ita in Oil.m nor to ral^ijc
her af forte to destroy Chiang's re;,"!:*.
Tralni..f; of rcseznroa contlnaea in Jap«Ji. The muxlmuc of Japanese aon power
1» b-^ing pluCed on a Wij- footing.
The JafKineae i-jnsff la, in brief i-
1. veody, or nearly ready, to strike at l-uiuia.
2. L;ontlnuln(f th« cwcpoign in Chin*.
3. !'ot in poaitlon for i. aouthward drive.
U. Preparing for u aoxioun effcrt.
Sacenl dispjaitions of the JapiJiese aavul forces t.float hove shown a i-rked
tri»nafer of intarast frco the ^outh, in waters aff !an,> ..id I ilo-^'.ina, to :,:i:m
waters. Th« entire ?hlrd rieet has bean wlthlra«n from blockade duty off the rnin*
c 3ust Uick to ha^e ports, ith tha exce tion of cortuir, Ljnor op^r<i--io;.3 of li --ht
cr^ft In the Jt. on ..e» ijnd aore recent subtaarlne opsTiitioria off tha southern co„sts
of Ji>piin, the OT-^dned not-e ileet h.-8 beeii inictive, undergol:!,; ext" .alve ..ersorJiol
chiv-.-jea, Thla ;>-rso!inel roorg^-ui^tion wriich ia not nort.al f^r x.r.:,^: U-ie -if .uj",
Qoy b« Interpreted to .-jein •-.-.-t prep-iTctiorui J^ bci.^ . .^ie f ^r _-. ".-t: r--i-:.cy
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1849
r«n<^i*^^ aoployRMnt of all ru.Tal forcea. .lam&lnlng In China «et«rai and off
Iivlo-Chln* DOW axv orvljr th« r^guXArly stationed Ist (Central}, 2nd (^34uth) vut
3ril (North) !uxp«divlonAi7 KI.««ta« ou^Mntad by the ao-callsd ^p*aii>.l !j(peditionury
fl««t oonsittinjf prlnelp*lljr of huxUImtI** ••rrlcinc th* occupation foro** in
Indo-Qiin*.
Htcrtl •hipbulbUnc rMBiklM ahrowdad In ••eraojr, b\it it hai« b*«n vuaofuMj
wall aatkbliahad thut tao {?) naw cairlara hara baan or &ra b«dng coBMiasioaadf
ana Il^t eruiaar hua ra«antljr baan uddad to tha foroaa aflobt, «nd aithin tha
paat yuar firt daatroTara and A Xaaat ODa mxaurism hbV« baan oooplstad. Laek
oC a&tarlaXa ha* in tha raeant piiat roUirdad tha building pragrta and ia undoubW
adljr «n inoraaalnj; hondloap. Cha na« bi>ttlaahlp uigr ba naarlr^ coDpIetionf but
thara la no oonoluaiva avldenoa to thia affaet.
Counting provlnclbX forcaa ^ind Hada, Chlaiv has at le^iat ona cdlXlon man
undar arcm, Thara <.re ulosat hulf aa oan/ i^uerrlXlua back of tha Japtunaaa Xinaa,
Chlna'a uvy Xaoka ainoat avarythlAf axcapt auji power (>nd mttll araa. It htia pr««»
tlcall/' no offanaiva atriidUvg pcmar but poaaaasaa conaiderabla dafanslva atron^fth*
OolaiM tha Japonasa grai^tl^ Incra&aa thair forcaa, thay «ill not b« dbla aithar to
driva to i^wadnc "^ o^ ^* Jurat Roiid or to c<j(>tura Chun^;kli^. It la doubtful it
tbay could ot^Jtura Chur.gkiiy in any av*nt. Chlnasa aklU In guarrlUa oparatlona
and attrition aarfkra la aucb that Japan cannot aaaaurabljr raduea har praaant
gaJTlaon In China without ahortaning har Ilnsa and ^ving up taxrltoiy.
For iLlBost thraa /aara tha Slno-Japanaaa war haa baan a atalaoata, brokan onljr
tagr oceaalonal lloitad Jupanaaa offenalras daai^nad to braok up Chlnaaa conoantr^
tloni oXoaa to J«panaaa linaa, Thaaa offanaivaa euocaad, but tha concantratlotia a]/-
wajrs rafora. Tha Japataaa ara at praaant anfa^ad In auch m offanaiva la tha I'atai
Uoufitaln dlatrlct at Shanal, - thair Z>th drlTa In this araa.
Tha atuXaaata ia likal/ to contlnua fcr a lon^ tiiaa boa<iuaai
I. The Japi.naaa cunatA annihilata tha Chlnaaa araiaa.
Z, Tha Chlnaaa cwinot drlTa U» Japanaaa back*
^ No KutUiklljr aatlaf ACtor/ baaia for paaca h^a baan auAgaatad.
U.S. help to China on tha aoaXa noa plamad i^ XI graatly ralaa Chlnaaa oorala
and aaka »Qra affactira China** war of attrition. A Chlnaaa oiTfenaiva aetuall/ f»>
capturing tarrltocT' atrongl/ hald la, hoaanrar, atlll far dlataot.
Far SvST toutic.iwauT/ii-";::;>Jc ^rra-Tiox
All phnaaa af Japanaaa aoono^/ hava baan or un rojAdljr balr^ pl^cad on a
totalltarlKi war footing. The Japanaaa urcgr and n&vj ur« praparlr^; for auprai
ganolaa. ay taking virtual control of tha arojr tha nparor suj^ be aithar (a) In-
aurli^ eoc^xiratlon of tha bray alth the foralgn policy of tha ^veraoiant or (b)
taking tha final step to prepare the nation for a total! turlui mllitury effort,
^/ gattlng rid of Uatsuoka, Inltiuting ne^tiatlona idth the U.S., wid ippointing
tao conaarvativea, Canada, and Toyoda^ aa head of the ara}' and foreign oanrlc* ra*<
pactiraly, .'<lppon ia iriclining w^ froa the ,'od.o aid toworda tha deoocraclaa,
Japan acquirad Indo-Chin* partly aa a reault ct ^.oinlag tha Axlo and the Axi»
nAtlona hr.va raoognlzad li&nohukuo tnd Hanking, ToK-yo c y rauaon that the jtla haa
nothing aore to glv» her and c*n now b« droppad. t ^
1850 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
>1h«t JcpMi idll do dapand« on a nuabar of fuotora, shi«f of ahioh aj^t
1. iVorreaa of flgt-itlnjt on this .!^8>>-Q»na« front, if .iuosia, <3<}11^«»«
Jftpul would b« oU'onily UhpUkS to U>ke ;-t*^iJ.i8a .jxi the liwritla* Ppovlr>o««. Oet^
BUknjrU miccm»*9M In the 'JScralno ht.v« atrwtgther.od tho pro-'Jcla jfroapo in Japan,
2. J^f>«<\*a acongwic ai tuition . She nust ar«t b*9ie wfajr iUiitarial*, including
oil, iron <ir», ocrsp iron ar.d cotton, iisr aioet ianBiiiita serioxia ohorta^, rub'oer»
has t>«en <ill»viat«d by her coajueBt of InAu-Cliln*, It ie b«lisy»cl thut Japnn'a r»-
••i^e stocks of other :»t.t»rluX8 will pensit her to »it on the fence between the ;jd*
«nd the Ziaaiocruoiaa { >r ssverj. raor.thi.
3. Xh« \->ro T9»» of her U.-i. ne.r)tiatlon(i . Xt ia .».", believed t>iat Japan
will ij?re« to with irww her forcea from Ctdna on u fixed iate, or from Indo-Oilna
&t aLX.
4. The broTeaa af the nt:VtiJ, war In the --tl-^tdc . The ir«>sis«nt'a "ahootlnu
onler* ooc«dtte4 strong unite of the jtoerlcan fleet to oierktions in the ..tlintic.
Thla delighted the JapiJiese "ho would like to a*« the entire 'J.S, fleet coamitted
thera. If in future we ore coopalled to transfer tkdcUtlon.J. veaaele to the Atlantic
■• cuy »r.tlclpete th&t ei^h auch trtoiafer ndll be follo-wod by it. stiffening of Japun'*
attiUkla toHunts ua.
5. ./eitlier Condi tiona . «Jjj!«n atarted hor c^npiklfpn (iguinat Unnchukuo in
;3«pteaber <>£>d her 1904 w^j o^oiast liuaala in Fabruhry. In ^>it« of Bona obvloua dia-
adTunt«trs« the J^jtijwaa seaa to prefer winter cacipuigna in this urea, prob«hl/ b»>
eauaa the f r^Mao ground rji^kaa widespread operations possibla.
In Thtvllond tha dry seuaoo lusta fron November to rpril, the wet
aaaaon Tr<m «uy to October.
Thus both to the north and aouth winter CitOfitdgna are r< asibla.
Tha undersigned bell uvea thi.t Ji^ian wllli
1. Continue the negotliitiona with tha U.~>., but not yield on any polnta
wtileh aha considers wxild endon^^ar tha "V.hat /jsla oo-prosperlty sphere".
2. •'atch closely the riuaao-Oenaan fighting and the narhl wurfupa In tha
Atlantic.
3. If Hussia coUiipaaa, attack Liberia.
4. If tn«) bulk of the 'J.o. fleet ia withdrwcj to the Atl-ntic, strike
south. Jhe does not expect this javalouaent b>^t cci^ ouict^ j ^ eaclolt it .
5. If iuasiii is still reoiotlr^ stron-jly by Dfc^sbsr, wait, nt lei.st
until lata next spring, before ttkijx^ jiny decisive motion.
jiatrioutiont
AdniTul Turuer - Coj^y .'lo, 1
)p-lj6 - Copy :«o. 2
C^16-F - Copy !lo. 3
File - Copy No. 4
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1851
O'er.o attacr.va from Japt.. Kirk f
"This 'las i-e&n .-_
xii-Lt, events.
t jj'.e tiov. .
,uNI; need
u ttJvSiice
J^
1852- CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(^'^>
m
la mf/tf nCx to No.
Offio» or Vk* Chiex of NavA'' cfisr&tione
QmcB OF Naval InTEixiCBjiCE
WASHINGTON
July 2, 1941.
Memorandyga for th« Director
SUBJECT:
PoBsibllity of Early Ag^esaivo Action by Japan,
a
1. The CQBimand«nt of the 3rd Naval District reports that
a reliable ijofonaant close to Japanese industrial interests has stated
that these interes,ta expect Japan to aake an aggressive move against Rusai*
on JuJly 20th, Too much credence should not be placed in thie report as
in the past the Japanese industrial and buainees community in New Tc»rk has
not proved to be a very reliable barometer of Japanese govemfflerrt action.
NeverthelesB the following factors would seem to indicate that saae sort
of action probably distasteful to the United otates may be planned, naaelyj
(a) Since about June 25th there has been sn absence of saiL-
inga from Jepan of merchant vessels beiuid for United States East
coast and gulf porte and if this trend continues, in about two
weeks there will be no Japanese merchant ships in the Atlantic.
(b) Simultaneous recognition by toe Axis po»foi*8 of the Japanese-
sponsored Wang Chlng-Jwai government of China tusy have been procured
by Japen's prooiise to take aggressive action against the non-Axis
powers.
(c) The announcement today that the Japanese government had de-
cided on Its policy in regard to the Husso-Oerman war, coupled with
the fact that publication of any policy whatsoever or coranent on any
stich policy has been deferred, suggest the possibility that the policy
may be other than the often publicized southward advance policy.
(d) Japan has for many years coveted the pre-Amur provinces of
3ibei-ian rtussia, both as a secujrity measure and for the natural re-
sources of these areas,
2, The present disposition of the Japanese amved forces would
seem to preclude the possibility of any suddnn thrust against ftuasia. Their
disposition and composition sppear to be such that if any sudden aggressive >
action at all is planned, such action would be in the direction of further
minor action against the South China coast or possibly directed towards
seizure of additional bases in French Iralo-China. Nevertheless the naval for-
ces in particular may be re-Ortented in a very short interval of time and
the situation is such that the possibility of Japanese action against rtussia,
though still considered unlikely, cannot be ruled out entirely,
CC -Op-16-F
Op-10/11
Op-12
Op-33W
5 ^i-
37
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1853
/ ^
'■^jemir'r:- .
3B
1854 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
^In reply nim
O0-I6---:
Op-16-r-2
NAVY DEPARTMENT
. _- of the Chlaf of Ka7cil 0;.-.
Officb op Naval Inteujcewck
WASHISCTOrC
pffioe of the Chlaf of Ka7cil Operations
April 17, 1941
Konoror.dujn for the Director
StBJECTi Bri^-isn-ctpttii-jaB Crisis.
1. Oe April 16, 1341, the Dome. , ,V;9!"'Cy
reported fron Baiy^kok that repeated attacks ';,,• sritisr. troops en
That territory alor^ the Thaiiand-Lalaya frontier caused the thai
government to lodge a protest with Britisn authorities. Domei saia
the protest was axmouncec by the Thai Forei.^r; Kinistry, and addei
that no fu!-ther details regarding these attacks \>ere -ivoii.
2. for some months past the Japanese have been concentratinp;
troops at ForxvosR, Hainan Island and Kyxishu. There has been a r'-edv.3
shortaninr of lines in Control China, eind movenont of troops i .
area to Fomosa and Hainan Island. There has been also a Jfi
tion of Japai.ese troops ir. Kortn China, which were in sone i-
replaced by Iilanchukuo levees. Within the last two wetlts
nese troops, 3,sO0 of whom had received special ir.atruc-.
warfare, left ' Indo-China for unariTourced destir.ritir.'^ .
same period, sone 11,C'CC fresh troops fror. Japan a r
China, and 11,0C>0 veterans left Central China for V ^ - e:
Fleet is in home waters. A strong force is near the t^. ;•,
is probable that In case of a drive on Singaporo, a str<
force would be mstirtulned ir. the'Palau Island area.
i. A report from the Kavml Attache, Tokyo, ■ e
are -"rsistant nmors in Toityo that Japan plans ar: : -.
Sin-R.;;'cre. .\lthou.-!'. the Ja-onese deny this, credence ii
b;- Iho above facts, asd by the severe blows 8U2iered by
nallra-'.s. Britai::'s r'erchs.nt tonnage is sufferin;^ so he; •
usstion of Ar.ericar. convoys is coni:;;; pro-inently to t;
Move to keep the AiTiericar. Fleet in the Pacific sirrl thus
si'.n of any Anoricen stren^-th fron the Pac^Iic
Atlantic woulc see;n lo;ioiii for x'r.e Axis to •
■i. Tfhen to eli this is added Japar. 'e
:<us3ia, v.n^jreby she ap;^<ire:.tly has a .-Russian
(^ /^
-^.,A
-rj
3?
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1855
begirmir.,:;- of a Japar^ose
•spore.
Nerwfspa:
often preceded Jacar. f> s f <
v^Vrs, &-
z r.??-.-rspi
invariably rre-^irt ■
:c - op-i6-i
Op-16-f-
1t^ ff
flX»4>U.
p£e^. d^M^^—
uj^ Ax-f--r^
oJUjb .
CA<~
. ■^'. /^
c:;x-<:.
•;?f^
7 • 6^ V
'c£.
f
1856 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
^, \ In n>ply ref*^ i
Op-lS-S-7
NAVY DEPARTMENT
T Sural Ot
."TTBIXlCBWt
Office of the -Chief of Sural
Umcs or Naval I.v
April 17, 1941
IGaiORAyptm for the Direetor
Bvaouation of J*jpane«e S*tiQn«l« fro " P*"*"*
The CoiBiiftiid&nt Eleventh Kevkl Distrlot (DIO)
in k report of April 4, 1941, to OSI atetee e« followei
'The Los Angeles Japanese press under s Tokyo dateline
of April 5, 1941, states that a large number of the colony
of 800 JaptLuesa have been foroed to e-raouate Panaiaa due
to that Republlo's dlsorlminatory laws against Japan.
The Japanese Qovernment is reported to be riewlng the
PsLnama Republic's attitude with great oonoern aoid is
oonsidering counter -measxires.
"The item farther states that it is apparent that the
Dnited States is behind the Panaaa Republic's anti-Japanese
policy in an effort to hit at the Axis nations. The ite»
also bitterly mentions anti-Japanese actions of the
-OTernmonts of Peru and Bratll, stating that the Japanese
GoveVnnent has attempted to keep the facts secret and avoid
outbursts of public opinion In Japan."
Ja paaese Armed Merchant Men
Kecent unoonfirmed reports Indioate that the
Japanese OoTerniaent is aminK sone of its best merchant ships
with four to six inch guns. Specifically mentioned ar» the
TAWATA MARH," NITTA VAHT) and KEIAN MARU.
The CosBnaodajits, Twelfth and Thirteenth Haval
Dist^ricts, have been requested to inspeot these ships upon
arrival In their respective ports to asoertaln the facts and
report.
Japanese Oil Shipments from West Coast Ports
CoBnandant Kleventh NaTal District (DIO) reported
on April 9 that the Japanese are now purchasing t^uantltles of
petroleum- products in drums and 5 gallon tine and shipping
same on oargo vessels to Japan.
i^f})
f/
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
■
0p-l»-B-7
April X7, 1941
1857
- '•'-^.-lM '^'^' J»p«»»»« Oo-vernmant has orderad «11 Jkp&neas tanker*
OON^W-''"'^'' to lo*d oil h»re»ft«r at M«tt Coast porta foragoing
trtps to Carlbbaan and Oulf of Maxioo ports.
Captain, U.S. Nary
^i-
Ht
1858 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Qfflca of Chlwf ot Smr*! Opmrutioa*
SKgiWy situation BrUfa
S«rUl »o. 1
KiibruAry 15, 1941
xsKoatXDoai for the oiiorroB or kar pijus oivisiai
SUBJiECTi Brl*f» oni
°(a) Jap«TMB« Mlaalona to Berlin, Rom
(b) Japanegs Cbaarrstion of United Sta.t«a
Navil lloreiMflta
(c; Gonoiin oabtjarlnea aad .SAldara In th«
PMlfie
3/ tjjrectioa
Copy toi
It.Coadr. H. H. Mc&ollua -
^3
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1859
.:aT)an«Bo Cr— ■
jiorlSn an'! r<^rrfi
t^Mder dat
.'oiQro rape-
lal?v announced
cncslselona pro
IW;, tho •;
•j.eae C'.ven
• ; al, all; uiry
vho Ai'b pact; w
appoin'.r»nt to Berlin has toen wldsl^.' interpTBlod
vtnv'iCat'.on ol" Ger.sral ".-;-.' ra '.- >i"t Ion In iir^'r^;
pTl!C7 on Japan .
it«r <Tn yotruarj*
;'.«poa; ^Icn of the
ii Berlin an-: h
-bers of f-.e 3-.i
■ra. ..A.-'.ttn;;
■•»1 "osura
.'..eter J'toitBiioi.a
^V-
1860 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
cf .TiaXir^' !i ■ T-pr-ehenni v<; r.- ii;' o: ; .
latest aviation tochnlcal develor>™»n:.:
f<r\\\ t" raivs been tir-, ■m-.-.fin' -j' r. • a 'xf--
TKe ..'apar-r. ■■■v;!)por*, .\;"-i
,Ta?an on January i6th iabon. Per ub
Panama Canal an rebrii-..- nuA on boe,;" ■■■e
riaval oiBolcn '.o Bail' Jan heade;. I; '.Ja-eo ^^6al•-
Arinilraln, two of ther: eihr. : cal ria'.-al euglneerlr^
Ihe TiaTai niisEjon le Larfiely technical In -
to obtain InfafaB'.ion concerning Geraan tec;
J/S
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1861
Jar^r""- "■ -ar-.atl^n of ■Jr.'.tea. .--.ites Saval m^- "T'>- - -
Japaneeo ror.oulates irtpoughout the ...X
its p:ss©fioiona have l>een InBtruotei to niake dlspa^cn rorort.-a con-
cerning 'J.S. nai"ai ooveosnta. Tne .rapaneee Conaula alonj the West
^■^a^' i,-!^. at ";•."-. V; have ■;e»»r. -lartlcjlirlT active :r. ::3P.r,ln^ thaao
nar'.nes vera supplied :'r apan-
ose naval ^arJcora at eee. - aovlng
between Japan and the w : ",« 'jnlf?! C"=.'- --ad and
It vas fovind tiiat 308t 'ed through a pol; -.a
n.irthvard of tiie Hawalls.- -ind In this aaao :^ era
?eo:sei •- 3a;<e very slrv r^r^^eas r.>r a day or two -
?re9;n:r-' t: that It .-as in this general locality th..
::^le retvoen •"'■ -'. = ■>—■•■- j --.,--.-.•>'< <.-^^ ^'a'- c ■ .
area vas 3e.rc .-sse
6-ib!»r-'.r.«>o v^i • '.-Iv
rr:_nt •..-le ./apaneee ai .;na;-
riastfi of ^ and the Saval'.^i.-
-. ''£.• -'"-^ .re ^f doV.tf-" "-
y6
] 862 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
•3 liare b«c
Indicatlr.fo Uiia; ti.e vap^i.
with 8ubaar!n»ie. i"iu"th»:-
.■a-.,i;c a.. a "2.1 y- ^o 4 !!tro;\- p''* • - in:; * : v\ v.:ti.':, ■
r&id'iTB arc b . Ir;;; s^uppliod I'roa Japa^ise aourco.
reports liidlcfttf; that those raiders Wferri opei-a'.
baaoa in the ,.'apan',.a-i Kandata Isiando arid >
Ifco southward of this gunsral area. Guvtr ■
tares have boen aado and so far nom if (
b«;!-;n Bliminatbd. At least on.
tanior Old Jacob, In charge of
at Kobe, Japan aad sailed the :ii,-i-, ua.. a. ,>•■ una-.a.-ji; ;i^
prlsoaers to tbr Gemar. ini;rch«nt aiilp SclAmhorst which has
ba-n m Kobft Earbor a'.nco the outbreak of the war. Th'i ••■«".-
dc:iC8 BO far Indicates that Japaj-. Is willing to famish eup-
plloB to Canaan raiders oporatlng In the pacific but this
action has bt^n taken with great clrcu.T:3peot lor. ari.-i hie btvun
carefully concealed. No raider sinl:':
Pacific have c-'on notc-d during the p-.
3. Since early in 191*0, thyrt hav
r-xaorn, ejsanatlnfi (so it eventually app»;ai-;
aaE» or parallel source, that Cemans verr; trnr.tjport ;..
fabricated subaar'ne parts to Vladivostok for f.rsctlon at
that port; that &«rDan officers wer? procugdln^ via Ti-ai-.s-
S:berlar. to aar. O rnar. submirlnes at Vladivostok; that
Ofiraan off Icors w^-rtj procj-odlng to Vlailvoatok to instract
Russians In a'lboarlne wajrfare and In ♦•^•- on.-™- 'r-.- ,-n' f. ,> -
aarlnes; and, finally, that Geraan n.
of warrant and p'Jtty officers, were t
for DBnn!ng gabiiiartn"S, presumably eiT,£i.-y ^;r!so.-
rcusslan or Japan-sso. . At the tine of the recelp-.
various roporta and ruaiDrs, there was no evident
substantiate or definitely contradict a.ny of thi's, ex^-^^t
that two reports (o.ne proceeding froa British a.-id another
froa i-iother source considered by the Consulate at
^7
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 18' 63
.s„;«j;v(K' wo have "bean reilaile) vhoa ftoolly Ini'astJgated,
vare found to 'bo without substwoce.
k. There haa 'baan no ovidasocs, either dlrect.or
indic&zire , of aoroan submarlrvo ictlTltj, either erection
of eubaartaea or training of crove ty Geraan offlcere, <»t
VlAdirootolc or at snjf othar port Ui the Siberian loaritiiB©
proTlnceo .
¥^
79716 O — 46— pt. 15 30
1864 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 82
Intelligence Division (OP 16)
16-1. Duties:
(a) The Foreign Intelligence Branch will:
(1) Secure all classes of pertinent information concerning foreign countries,
especially that affecting naval and maritime matters, with particular attention
to the strength, disposition, and probable intentions of foreign naval forces.
(2) Evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable.
(3) Direct the activities of U. S. Naval Attaches.
(4) Maintain liaison with Naval Missions.
(5) Maintain liaison with foreign naval attaches accredited to the United
States.
(6) Maintain liaison with other Government Departments for the exchange
of foreign information.
(b) The Domestic Intelligence Branch will:
(1) Secure all classes of pertinent information pertaining to naval and
maritime matters, with particular attention to potential enemy, enemy agents
and sympathizers.
(2) Evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable.
(3) Maintain liaison with and cooperate with other Government Departments,
particularly with the Military Intelligence Division of the Army and with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice in the collection
and dis.semination of such information as will assist in the protection of the
Naval Establishment against espionage and subversive activities.
(4) Except as otherwise specifically provided for, prepare security letters,
instructions on policy, rules, regulations and instructions on Naval information
to assist the Naval Establishment and interested Government agencies in safe-
guarding the general .security of Naval classified matter.
(5) Regulate the visits of foreign Nationals to the United States Naval
Establishment and to commercial concerns engaged in production for the Navy.
(6) Maintain liaison with those Government agencies charged with the con-
trol of travelers, ships and shipping with a view to assisting them in preventing
the travel of persons engaged in activities inimical to Naval interest ; the move-
ment of ships and shipping harmful to Navy interests ; and sabotage of shipping
of value to the Navy.
(7) Maintain cognizance of the general Naval interest in safe and unobstructed
building and production for the Naval Establishment and prepare pertinent
directives and advisory matter in connection therewith.
(c) The Ptiblic Relations Branch will:
(1) Prepare and present to the Public in cooperation with Bureaus and other
offices of the Navy Departments, pertinent information not incompatible with
military secrecy, regarding the United States Navy.
(2) Maintain for the Press representatives, a point of contact with the
Navy Department.
(3) Act on inquiries for information concerning naval matter received from
the public and the press.
(d) The Cen^wrship Bra»nch icill:
(1) Provide detailed plans and personnel for the censorship of the inter-
national radio and cable communications of the general public.
(2) When national censorship is established, and until the Administrator
of Public Relations takes office, conduct censorship of the international radio
and cable communications of the general public through the agency of the
Joint Army-Navy Public Relations Committee.
(3) Prepare regulations for Naval Censorship of personal communications
originating within the Naval Establishment.
(e) The Historical Branch will:
(1) Administer the Navy Department Library and Archives.
(2) Select, index and file the most important Naval records in such manner
that they will be available for reference and printing.
(3) Receive, record, classify and distribute as necessary photographs of cur-
rent or potential strategic or historical interest.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1865
(4) Prepare for issue to the Naval Establishment necessary instructions
covering the preparation and disposal of War Diaries,
(f) The Administration Branch u-ill:
(1) Handle matters of administration for the Division of Naval Intelligence.
(2) In conjunction with the Bureau of Navigation and with the Naval Re-
serve Policy Division procure, administer and train Naval Reserve Officers,
Class I-V(S).
16-2. The Intelligence Division has membership on the following Committees :
Joint Board Sub-committee on Rules concerning Press Releases.
Joint Board Sub-committee on Special Joint Army and Navy Public Relations.
1866 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 83
m::^i
vasB
»~'''^^^— -*tS!fc -f^ /;-;
»«*«'-
fr't.t f,* .>.««»fl; 559*
'■ n*
OPSilf
:aac?*c
,, ?.S, «ii:lrjs»n
■«<csfc«r >, l#4i
•A K tt a f » wf « f
Hia«.y asUABUE iKromxrioH mao bssk iasKiyss that CAHSocuac «© OJKaw?
ZRmumoMS «ib son rssnxitx to jafaj&se oifijoiuTic am cohsolas
lasts fr BONGKMO z si)«'-,AK^<fi: x Bii^nA x axiai* i musmmrm im uMtrn
to sEsnoT uosT or txexa cooes um ciphebs at cmce i^ ?o su» au. omiat
us-oRTAur QounoisimAi. «» sscwr ooctMSMts x ^aai-fuwMiMw iirBM wxTTieflii
r um r i »f Aifftw w ae wi'i» < w M i l*
«|»-16-^
IBUlT
■S/gM.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1867
EXHIBIT NO. 84
(Handwritten note:) Telephone conversation of Dec. 3, 1941 between a citizen
in Honolulu (Japanese) & a military or naval officer in Tokio. Translated &
available to Military Intel. Hawaii, Dec. 5, 1944.
IC (J) Hello, is this Mori?
(H) Hello, this is Mori.
(J) I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much.
(H) Not at all.
(J) I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points.
I would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at
present. Are airplanes flying daily?
(H) Yes, lots of them fly around.
(J) Are they large planes?
(H) Yes, they are quite big.
(J) Are they flying from morning till night?
(H) Well, not to that extent, but last week they were quite active in the
air.
(J) I hear there are many sailors there, is that right?
(H) There aren't so many now. There were more in the beginning part of
this year and the ending part of last year.
(J) Is that so?
[2] (H) I do not know why this is so, but it appears that there are very
few sailors here at present.
(J) Are any Japanese people there holding meeting to discuss US-Japanese
negotiations being conducted presently?
(H) No, not particularly. The minds of the Japa- here appear calmer than
expected. They are getting along harmoniously.
(J) Don't the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese?
(H) Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This
fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated or despised. The soldiers here
and we get along very well. All races are living in harmony. It appears that
the people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There
are some who say odd things, but these are limited to newcomers from the
mainland, and after staying here from three to six months, they too begin to think
and feel like the rest of the people in the islands.
(J) That's fine.
(H) Yes, it's fine, but we feel a bit amused.
(J) Has there been any increase in ... ? ... of late? That is, as a result
of the current tense situation.
[3] (H) There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war
building boom.
(J) What do you mean by enjoying a war building boom?
(H) Well, a boom in many fields. Although there is no munitions industry
here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army
personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various
sorts. There are not enough carpenters, electricians ^nd plumbers. Students at
the High School and University have quit school and are working on these jobs,
regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work.
(J) Are there many big factories there?
(H) No. there are no factories, but a lot of small buildings of various kinds
are being constructed.
(J) Is that so?
(H) It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year.
(J) How large is the population?
(H) The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy
personnel and workers from the mainland.
(J) What is the population?
( H ) About 2(X),000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000 people.
(J) What about night time?
(H) There seem to be precautionary measures taken.
(J) What about searchlights?
(H) Well, not much to talk about.
[4] (J) Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night?
(H) No.
(J) What about the Honolulu newspapers?
1868 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(H) The comments by the papers are pretty bad. They are opposite to the
atmosphere pervading the city. I don't know whether the newspaper is supposed
to lead the community or not, but they caiTy headlines pertaining to Japan daily.
The main articles concern the US-Japanese conferences.
(J) What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii?
(H) A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind, and he
was very adept at answering queries of the press.
(J) Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate Hawaii?
(H) There are almost none wishing to do that.
(J) What is the climate there now?
(H) These last few days have been very cold with occasional rainfall, a
phenomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly, a
very unusual climate.
(J) Is that so?
(H) Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian ambassador to the
United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he enplaned for the mainland
today. He made no statements on any problems.
(J) Did he make any statements concerning the US-Japan question?
[5] (H) No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the US-Japan
question, he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war.
It appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement.
(J) Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu.
(H) Yes.
(J) What kind of impression did Litvinoff make?
(H) A very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet and
a gentleman.
(J) Did he stop at the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu?
(H) Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian overnight. He has already enplaned for
the mainland.
(J) Do you know anything about the United States fleet?
(H) No, I don't know anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid talking
about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet. At any rate, the
fleet here seems small. I don't all of the fleet has done this, but it seems that
the fleet has left here.
(J) Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?
(H) Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. How-
ever, the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now.
*( J) Does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn't know.
(J) Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation
of Japanese goods?
[6] (H) Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japanese
soy, and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are
enough foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year,
at any rate it is a big inconvenience.
(J) What do you lack most?
(H) I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the freeze
order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods are
having a hard time.
(J) Thanks very much.
(H) By the way, here is something interesting about Hawaii. Liquor sells
very fast due to the boom bere. The United States, which twenty years ago
went under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors
are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a stand-
still due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in liquor
manufacture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese
sake here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland.
*(H) explains that the Japanese s ke brewed in Honolulu is called "Takara-
Masamune", that a person named Takagishi was the technical expert in charge
of the brewing; that said Takagishi is a son-in-law of Grand Chamberlain
Hyakutake, being married to the latter's daughter; and that said Takagishi
returned recently to Japan on the Taiyo Maru. He adds that Japanese here and
the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J) that Japanese chrysanthemums
are in full bloom here, and that there are no herring-roe for this year's New Year
celebration.
(J) How many first generation Japanese are there in Hawaii according to last
surveys made?
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1869
[7] (H) About fifty thousand.
(J) How about the second generation Japanese?
(H) About 120,000 or 130,000.
(J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the
United States Army?
(H) There aren't so many up to the present. About 1,.500 have entered the
army, and the majority of those who have been di-afted into the army are
Japanese.
(J) Any first generation Japanese in the army?
(H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese.
(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army?
(H) Yes. that is true up to the present, but may increase since more will
be inducted in January.
(J) Thank you very much.
(H) Not at all. I'm sorry I couldn't be of much use.
(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife.
(H) Wait a moment please?
(J) Off phone.
1870 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I
EXHIBIT NO. 85
/'ho)
o E G n <^ .
Cp-lf,.F-2
November J,, 1941.
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT !
Japanese Fleet Loca'lons.
(Ncte: See 0p-16-F-2 CNI Se-ial #5-i-il, dated
C'c*cber JC, 1941 for the new crganization of th«
Japanese Fleet).
OJtsrs
LOCATIONS
area
Fir?t Fl^e^
In Kure-Saekl
(1)
bB • NAGATO
In Kore-iaekl
area
(1)
BB - ^^TSO
" " n
«
«
BB - YA'JASHIRO
At Yokcsuka
BB - FC3C
In Kure-Saeki
area
(1)
BB - ISE
« » «
«
«
BB - HYCGA
R » m
m
«
BB - HIYn
• « «
•
«
BB - KONGO
At MalTurw
BB - KI=ISHIIJA
In Kure-Saekl
ar^a
(1)
BB - HAKINA
Undergoing repairs
(2)
10
BB
4
CA
In Kiire Saeki
area
(3)
2
CL
» • - ■
K
/f
27
DD
" " "
"
"
Second Fleet
la Ktire-Saeki
area
12
CA
In Kure-Soekl
area
(»
1
CA
In Yokcsuka
U)
2
CL
In Xure-Saeki
area
(3)
28
DD'
* » "
«
Thjrd F}?et
J>ear Wsiiuru or Saeebo
1
CL
Hear k'aliu-u
i
CM
• ■
12
kV
<i «
12
PC
R «
1
CL
Near Sasebo
12
DD
■ n
1
AS
It w
6
S£
>• «
2
CM.
• »
6
XPC
" "
46 AF or AK
m m
^. ^ r*y /^/J
/i)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1871
' ""OffiS
iWATIOfl
fwrtb n^t\.
itandatad Island
:•
L CL
In Tnik-Jonap«
arv
8 DD
» , It «
"
1 AS
" '" "
"
3 SS
» " "
■
8 XPG
• " »
"
8 AP or AK
n R •
■
2 C»«
Near Salpan
1 DD
« •
3 XPG
K >
11 AP cr AK
II »
4^'.SS
• Pal«o
I. XPG
« It
17 AP or AK
K «
1 Surrev Ship
• Jalult
•'
1 AS
* ■
i, XAM
» «
3 PC
■ n
1 AP or AK
n *
1 CK
In hoiw waters
7 SS
N«ar Sssebo
^
2 SS
Near iialmni
f^m nvi%
1 CL Iteliuru (6)
(Thfi eoKi^oaUlcn cf tha Fifth Fleet i« still unVnown)
§l>tb ,Ofn
CV - AKAGI
CV - KAGA
CV - SCRYU
CV - HI RYU
CV- HOSHO
CV - KORTU
CV - KASCGA
CV - MTOJO
CV - ZOIKAKU
CV - SKOKAKO
L CL
2 AS
1 AP
la SS
k DD
11 DD
In Hcne »8*eris
S. Kyushu - Takao
S. Kyushu
N
- (?)
f (?)
Takao area
S."X3r«8Ru
^G
1872 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
JLmZl O kJ
FLEETS
I AV
1 AV
1 XAV
1 lAV
1 XAV
Kur«-S86kl ar««
T«k»e
Gwlf of Tcngkong
Near Sasabo
Coablno^ Fleet Train
4 AO
2 AO
1 AO
1 AO
1 AC
1 AF
2 AH
1 Ice BreaVer
] Ta'-£!«t Ship
Japanese Naval Foroee In QUai
1 OCA
1 PG
3 DD
pentral China or let Bxpeaitlcpary Flget
i PG
10 Ft
1 AP
Scattered
In Kure-SsBkl area
Mairunj
Takao (8)
Beer Yap (9)
« ■
Kure-Saeki area
" " f
Saghallea
Kure-SRekl area
Left Chef 00 October 3 rd
Shanghai
Between Wuhu and Ichang
South China or 2nd Expeditionary Fleet
1 CA
3 CL
/i TB
1 PG
2 AM
13 Wise.
Ncrth China or 3rd Expedj ticnsry Fleet
1 CCA
i DD
8 TB
1 AF
Sasebo
Canton-ticngkong area
(IC)
(10)
Ta'. n^-ac
Southern ExreiJ ticnar'.' Fie"
1 CL
1 CK
Fr»rich Indo-Chins co63*
-3-
6^
■^P
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1873
MOTBS t
(1) The Coablned Fleet has been located sorT«wh8t more exactly than before,
in the Kure-Saeki area. Thla includes the western portion of the
Inland Sea, between the western parts of Honehu and Shikoktr, and the
northern part of Kyusha.
(2) Earlier in the year, the R?.RONA was reported underf^oing major repeira.
Since the HARUNA hae net been apecifleally mentioned among the active
battleships for sob» tls*, it is believed that the ship is still under-
going repairs.
(3) It ie believed that the various crulpera and destroyers In the Ccii>bin«d
Fleet, which were fonrwrly divided between Y-okcsiika, Kure and Sae^bc,
have ncm |«jolned the main body of the Fleet in the Kurp-SseVl area.
U) The TAKAO (CA) is in dry-dock at lokoeuka.
(6) The Fifth Fleet has its fla^ in a light cruiser at Maituru, but ncthing
else is kno»n about the force as yet. It is possibly the nucleus of c -,
Japan Sea Fleet.
(7) No new information concerning the location of individual submarines ie
at hand, so that the detailed survey given l8s+ week nc longer holds
good.- Hcwevfer, cprtaln units of the submarine fleet have been active In
tke Chichi jlme-Stercus-Sslpan area, south and southeast of Honshu.
(8) The SATA has moved front Canton to Takao.
(9) The SHIKETOKO, previously reported in Jaluit, has moved near Yap.
(SO) The detached tbrpedo boats and irine sweepers in the Soi.'th China
Fleet ere believed 'o have rejoined ^he main force in the
Hongkong area.
Distribution: CNC - Copy No. 1
DNI - Copy No. 2 •
Op.l2 - Copy No. 3
Op-38W - Copy No. 4
Op-l^-F - Copy No. 5
^^ ^P
1874 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
/-»(»■>
:, H'll
FLirrs
?■
Irst Fleet
Bb -
SAGATC
EB -
MCTSU
Bb -
YAMA2HIR0
BE -
Fl'SC
BB -
ISE
BB -
HTDGA
BB -
KlYEI
BB -
KONGO
BB -
KIMSHIVA
Bfa -
-HARUNA
$^con<i Fleet
Third Fleet
V.-! V '-.aN." u
Flee* Lcc8*lcn8
LOCATIONS
Tn Kure-GeeVi
area
In Kure-Safckl
area
B B B
n
A* Yokcsuka
In K^re-Ssekl
area
t> m K
"
It' n «
•
* n n
H •
At Maliuni
In Kure-Ssekl
area
Undergoing re:
pairs
10 BB
t CA
In Kiire-Saeki
area
2 CL
» • "
"
27 DD
» II K
«
In Kure-Saeki
area
12 CA
In Kure-Sseki
area
1 CA
In Yo"'r.s'!ka
2 CI
In K\;re-3aeV5
a-ea
2" DD
« n n
"
Near i'.alzuru
cr ?a
1 CL
Neer Vslzuru
I Ck
" "
12 kV
" "
12 PC
<i n
1 CL
Kea- Saseko
12 DD
" "
1 AS
" "
6 SS
« »
2 Ck
" "
6 XFG
" "
^6 A? cr AK
" "
2/ r^. ^ >
^J)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1875
^JAb n^f\
CV - AKAGI
CV • KAOA
CV - SCRTC
CV - m9xv
CV - HCSKO
CV • KCRYU
CT - KASUGA
CV - R-n;jo
CV - ZCIKAKU
CV - SKCKAKO
)
SEC
Mandated I aland
a
< CI,
In Tnik-Ponap*
area
e DD
« « «
a
1 AS
■ • *
■
3 3S
n n H
"
6 XPG
• " "
"
? AP or AK
» ■ m
"
2 CM
Near Sal pan
1 DD
• »
3 XPG
« "
n AP or AK
n »
I SS
" Fslao
/, XPG
n •
17 AP or AK
If ■
1 Survey Ship
" Jalult
1 AS
« ■
/, XAie
" "
3 FC
n m
1 AP or AX
n n
1 CM
In Heme Waters
7 SS
Near Saseto
2 SS
Near K85r^J^u
:t
1 CL Maimru
(The ccTpoalMcn of the Fifth fleet Is still unknown)
^ CL
In
Hone Waters
2 AS
■
" "
1 AP
•
* R
a SS
*
II ■
S.
K Tjahu - Takao
s.
R'TlBhU
Takao area
Kure-Sar^eto area ^xj
Takao ar*8 (7)
i DD
11 DD
S. K'.nishu
-/
fc/)
1876 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRE
CQ»blned Air Force
L AV Kure-Saiki area
1 A^f SAiebo-Kure ar«« (1)
2 X&V Saaebc-KuT* area (2) •
1 117 S8lgon-Ca»"TraTih Bay area (3)
Conblnad F14«t Train
I AO
Scattered
In B>:r«-Sa«kl area
Mal«uni
Takao
Near Yap
n «
Kure-Saakl area
1 AC
1 AO
1 AC
1 AF
2 AR » » ■
1 Ice Breaker Saghalien
1 Target Ship Ktare-Saekl area
Jaepn??? t'^gTil f°nf?? ;tn ?^lpf •
1 OCA
1 PC
3 OD
Left Chefoo October 3rd.
Shanghai
k PC
10 PR .
1 AP
South China or 2nd Eypeditlonarv Fleet
1 CA
1 CA*
i, TB
1 PC
2 AM
13 Miec,
Between Wuhu and Ichang
Saeebe
Cantcn-Hcngkbng area
Moftb China or ?rd Rxcedlticnary Fleet
1 OCA
1 DD
8 TB
1 AP
Taingtao
§9'i^t^-?'-n jbcp^^ttjonary F;i?et,
1 CL
1 cy
French Indo-China eoaet
-3-
(./
7D
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1877
> > secre!
HOTES :
■ Tb« fleets hs'o* remained in the same opereting ereaa as
prerlcualy reported. Several alner changes In the positicn
of aircraft carrlere and seaplane tenders have been obserreds
(1) The ZniRAKU (CT'J and the KCTORC (AV) have moved from
the Fonrcsan straits tc the Dure-Saaebo area.
(2) Two auTlllarv seaplane tenders are now In the Sesebo-Knre
area. Cue of these was formerly In the Gulf cf Tongklng.
(3) The KEHJC MARU (XAV) has moved south from Takao to the
Saigon-Ca!!3"anh Bay area.
Dlstrltutlcn: CKO - Copy Sc. 1
DM I - Copy No. 2
Op -12 : Copy No 3
OJ3-38W - Copy Mc. i
Op-16-F- i-cpy No. 5
c/
a^
1878 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
cp-16-r-^
'."ovember 18, I94I
ip3CRA!a)Ui;
'B JK:T :
jt.it.nf.r'e Fleet XochMoTis.
Firct fleet
LOCATIONS
In Kure-saeki eree
In K-JJ'e- seek! ereo
At yokosuka
In Kui-e-3&ekl aree
^^i - k::::uc
A1
Maizuru
2B - OBTailLA
m Kure-saekl area
SB - HAJrJT;^
Uidertioliig repairs et st^fibo
10
BB
4
CA
In Kurc-Sft;ki arefc
^•
CL
• • • •
27 DD
• • • *
second Fleet
In Kure-saeki area
11
CA
In Kure-Saekl ar<.a
2
CA
in TokoeuJca (1)
1
CL
In Kure-£»eki area
1
CL
in yokosuka area (2}
^■6
DD
In Eare-0aeki area
T.-iird riset
Near iplzurxi, sacebo, end Ba
<i.
CL
Near Ueizuru ■
<♦
<X
• •
12
AU
• •
12
PC
i
CL
.
2
DD
;;■.-_- ^..-. . ^4,
1
A£
t
S£
2
CK
£
XPG
^
A? or Ar;
■3
DD
tJaiz-jTa (^)
7
03
BBko-Tekeo (4)
^T ^r (<///.^
9J>
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1879
J-oart.j f ^^t t
4" CL
':■ DD
il AP -'!• AK
c!^r n&'-i-f-i'. v;>y
n aoi^ *i-t'
!:c: ." lii- -r -
Fiftt. r-- <^
/^i>
79716 O— 46 — pt. 15 31
1880 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Co.';.bi;!ed Ai-' Force
C'Ji£-bir.cU F-eet Trtin
ioCATicrs
^ AV
K-^rf-SfceKi £ . (, H
1 AV
iji-sebo-F JPe t,rei-
- XAY
SefeL.-K^-re hx'tt.
1 :i„v
fiiifc-'jU-Ct-;.^* r,a B'-j
Cxt.ltered
t AC
In K.are-;3fceh.l &- eti
i AC
},:fclzui-u
i AO
7aKfco
- /. :
r.cbr YtJ
jfajtue.'^e KfcveX foicee n, C"ii-e
uc-''' c 1 £irea
i OCA Lcf*, C;-a^''oo October Jri
1 FG
3 DD
10 m . . » .
- AI,:
Soat.-i'-rii fuj eii il -;j.-:'. F-^el
I'.d.3-Ct.^n.. s:.tift
//2^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1881
NOTES ;
(1) Tho CHf'KAl (CA) Is in Yckomika. The TAKAC is F*ill in drydock et
YokoBuke.
(2) The HftKA (CL), Flagship of Dearon I., is 8* yokcsiika. The des* rovers
ir Desron 4 sre stlD In ♦he Kiire-Saeki «res.
(3) The NATCRI, Flseehl^. cf Deercn 5, saHed Amcy Nrv*.Ti:»- /.th.
li) "^en of the 12 destroyers in Desron 5, formerly a* Ssseto, h8-"> teen
shifted - 3 to "eizuru, inr '' tc fiakc.
(5) Three of ♦he " (ies^royers Ir Desron 6, for^'e'-lv in the Tmk-Fonape area,
have rc'-ed to Essfbo; and 7: tc Saipen.
(6) The flagship of +he Fifth Flee*, an unidentified CL, has -^ved from
yaijxinj to Yckcsvka;
(7) Many of the unite cf ♦he 6th Fleet have been located '•ore exactly.
(P) The RYi'JO has returned to Kr;r«< f'~cw Taiwan.
(9) The ISUZD (CL) , teirpcrarv flarship of ♦he ~nd (or Sr«th) China Ex-
peditionary Flee+ , has Tcvftd frcr Hnoc;k6ng 'to Foochr*.
Distritutlcn: CNC - Copy No. 1
DNI - Copy Nr. 2
Op-12 - Copy Nc. 3
Cp-3?^ - Copy Ho. -4
■ Op-l6-F - Copy Nc. 5
/£!>
1882 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
oECRET
0P-16-F-2
»>T«Bib«r 25,
1941
KEUpRAKDUtf
SUBJECT «
FLEETS
Japanese riMt Locatioas
LOCATIONS
rirsi Fleet
Hcune HBtere
BB - N^GATO
NeeJ icure (1)
BB - KUTSU
> •
BB - YAliUuSHIRO
At YolcosuJut
BB - rjso
Near Eure
BB - ISE
a «
BB - HYUOA
• •
BB - HIYEl
Near sasebo (2)
BB - KONGO
Near uaizuru
BB- KIFISHTKA
Near Kure
BB - HAHUNA
10 BB
3 CA
Near Kure (1)
1 CA
Near saeebo (4)
2 CL
Hear Kure (1)
27 ro
• •
Socood Fle«t
in Hoioe Hate re
11 CA
I««ar Kure
1 CA
11 TokoeuJta (3)
1 CA
near sasebo (6)
1 CL
Near Kure
1 a
war yokosukai
13 DD
Near Yokoeuto(7)
15 DD
Near Kure (7)
Talrd Fleet
ttaebo and B^ko ai
1 CL
Bear saaebo (8)
5 CM
(8)
12 AH
(8)
12 PC
(8)
4 DD
• (8)
1 AS
6 ss
6 XPG
46 AP or AK
1 OL
Bi«8 Bay (6)
7 DD '
Near Bako
1 CM
• •
i W
i
lear ik
klzuru
^/ C^//j
/3J>
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1883
i"""^ r".
IPurth fl— t
4 a.
3BC
1 AS
9 ss
8 XPO
16 ikP ear IX
2 CD
1 SB
JL Surrey tfU.^
3 SO
X7 AT or iJE
4aB
k XK>
30 AP or AX
1 AS
4 XAM
3 PC .
13 AP or AX
1 CM
3 to
1 SB
1 SS
ZB Truk>poa«ii« ar««
(9)
MMor s^pu (9}
NMdr 8Kip«B (9)
lIBur SKipu (9)
palao
(9)
jaluit
m yokoaulca
NMr saaebo (8)
At l»i3uru (9)
At xure (9)
Fifth yl»»t
1 CL CMohlJlaB (1.0}
(TiM eotgwdtlos of th* pifth rl««t is still uoknotra)
2
ex.
max taix»
2
CL
■ a*a«bo
^^■t
1
AS
• Xur*
Hi
1
AS
Sa«ebo
^■'
1
AP
yokosuJce
7
8S
ToicoauiGa
i_
12
SS
Eur*
23
88
Z& saacbo and otlier BCMt v&ters
C«rn«r plMt
CT - AEACI
S. xyuaiw
CT - Ktrj,
(
cv - aoimj
X«r» (il)
CT - Hunro
• (11)
cv - HCfiBO
• (11)
CT - Koirro
8* IQ^uahu
cv - KASOGA
"
CV - BtUJO
Eure
CV - ZUTKAKU
rur«
CV . aaoKAKU
KuPe (11)
10 DD
5 DD
^/ .2
S> xyuahu aod KUre
Tolcoauka (U)
/^J)
Hg»» 3 c«g3fcirrag '
1884 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
Yli^-fS
liOCATIONS
CoBbined Air Force
* i, AV
Near Kure
1 AV
Truk (12)
2 XAV
Near Saeebo
1 XAV
Saigon-Caniraxih Bay Area
Coabined Fleet TtkIp
2 AO
Near Yokoeuka (13)
2 AO
Near Kure
1 AO
Near Saeebo (13)
1 AD
Near Malzuru
^W, 1 AO
Near Saipau
HK 1 AO
Near Yap
■^^ 1 AC
Near Saipan (13)
1 AF
Near Yokoeuka (13)
2 AR
Near Kura
1 Ice Breaker-
Saghallen
1 Target Ship
Saeebo
i§fP*f\f»sJvf^l. T^nsft ip. PbiPft
1 OCA
Shanghai (U)
1 re
Shanghai
3 DD
•
7 AK or AP
(15)
Central China or let Exceditiopary Fleet
J, PC
Between Wuhu and I c hang
10 PR
n n n ti
1 AP or AX
n n n »
§Wlrl},„fhiP* 9r f^.3iiS^<}Xy,°BAU Jl^P\
1 CA
Sasebo
1 CL
Foocho»
U TB
Canton-Hongkong area
1 PG
n n «
2 AM
n » . a
13 Kiiec.
It « H
About 30 Ap or AK
South China eoaet (15)
Sortb China or 3rd ExDeditiocary Fleet
1 OCA ■
Teingtao
1 DD
"
1 TB
"
1 AP
Tslngtao
Southern ExDeditionarr fleet
1 CL
French Indo-China coast
1 CM
" » « »
•/
- 3 -
"^
ECREt
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1885
(1) The Kur* «*»• lj>eln*«« th« •hole Inland Se* area, together with tb«
Saeki area, which coctrola the itraitB between Honshu, Kyrxshu and
Shlkoku.
(2) the KIIEI (BB) hae noved to Saaebo froa the Kure area.
(3) The KAfiUNA (feB), fomerly unrierg^^ng repairs at Sasebo, hae rejoicod
the fleet ae flagehlp of Pfitciv 3.
(i) The FTOUTAKA(CA) Is at Saaeoo, 8epe.rat->d frois the other CA of the
division which are near Kvire,
(5) The TAKAO (CA) haa left the drydcck at Yokosuka, and rejoined 2nd Fleet
units near Kure.
(6) The SU2liYA(CA) shifted from the Kure to the Sasebo area.
(7) The 13 of the 28 destroyers in the 2nd Fleet have been reported near
Tokostoka. The other 15 are still .near Enre.
(8) The Third Fleet hae reduced the niuEber of ite units near Malzuru, and
increased the rnuaber in the Foraosan Straits. The NATCRI, which sailed
froB Amoy on Kot. ith, is now at anchor in Ei&fi Bay.
(9) The Fourth Fleet hae beer, augmented by the addition of 6 divisions of
ex-»erchantment !, about 32 shipe( , Increased activity has been noticed
aiEong other units of the Fourth Fleet, but except ;"or the shift of 6
Bubo&rlnes to Truk, the total number of fighting ships in the iiandates
hae not been increased.
(lO)The Fifth Fleet has sowed from Yokosuka to Chlchljlaa, with certain por-
tions possibly near Marcus Island.
(ll)The eircraft carriers SORYl, HIRYU, and HOSHO have noved froii South Kyushu
to the Xure area. The SHOKAKO has moved fron Takao to Sure. The plane
guard destroyers have shifted slightly.
(12) "Vhe KAM.OI (AV) Is near Tnik.
(13) The Combined Fleet Train has made a nueber of sinor shifts.
(U) The IZUMO- 18 aesuaed to be in Shanghai,
(15) Ten transports left Shanghai between the l^th end 17th, with troops,
supplied and landing boats; seven transports are still there. In addi-
tion, 17 transports, southboiuid, were sighted between Hongkong and
Shanghai between the 10th ano li.th. Over the week end, 18 transports
sailed up the Pearl River, and 12 downetreaai.
Distributions
CNO - Copy Ko. 1
DKI - Copy Ko. 2
Op-12-Copy Ko, 3
Op-38!V - Copy No. 4
Cp-16-F - Copy Ko. 5
SECRET
/h^
1886 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ISSUED BY THE INTEU-iCENCt iVISiON
OPPICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
NAVY DEFARTMENT
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
MylOKTuf,]. hit.. I.,u,i, N ^ 901_200
Waat-inf-Vin.D.C. jj_^,_ Not, ic.
H».Ung "A"
Fiesta
,,,a
The foIlo»diig irLforsittlon tv»s bean au naitted by the l4th NaTal District
CoiaBuni cation Intelligence Unit*
Since the latter part of October, the Coranunder-ln-^hief of the SSCOHD
Fleet h»s been forailng & Task force oonsiating ofs
SBCC«D Fleet,
THIRD Fleet, (incliiding First and Second Base Forc«8,
and Firet Defense 01 vision),
Destnjyer Squadron THHBB,
Suoaarloe Souadron FITE,
Coicblned Air Force,
Air Squadron SOim,
and possibly vessels of the THISD Battleship division
in the FIRST Fleet,
thira Fleet units are Deliavod to be Qoviij^ in the direction of Takao
«ni Bako.
It ippears that th* SEVEJfTH Cruiser Division, and the THIHD Destn:>yer
Scjuadron are an advance unit, «nd oay bo enroute South China.
The Coiabiiwd Air Force has assembled in Takao, and indications are that
son* of It has already noved on to Hainan Xdand.
It seesa that the SSCOND Base Force is transporting equipment of the
Air Force to Taiwan. *- "
a«dio callB for the jftu^ China Fleet, the French Indo-China Force,
and the Naral Stations Kt(3»<^ Bako, urid Takac appear alao in headings of dla
patches coticemlng this TaalTForce.^
The Soaldent Naval Officer Palao, and the ThI?J3 Base Force at Paiao
hare cooamrdc ate<J extenalveljr «lth the Coofflander-ln-Chief of the SFXOKD VtaST,
OnbnbirfiMi Br OnfM^
iSSSl
"A
..,L, -fc- -czi '■-" ,z^. "1-^ ....
-" - -^
..,
-
■""I*" *■:<»- - : ^ i-sr
_(Sho»}
<\ U
0, a » 1.
/7i>
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1887
f
2 CL
12 DU
/3D
1888 CONGRESSlbNAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Althc J, h t:l
I'litt wit.: f
/'//"^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1889
laSUEO BY THE IPrTElXJCENCb DIVISION
OTFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
NAVY DEPARTMENT
INTELUGENCE REPORT
Son.] ../.66 ^- Mon..|:r,i|.l. In,i« Oimlc N.-. 90>«»
U^« t»p«r»t» iTt«n ■>» mHi wa.'i uu> :
From (V-1/-J»-P, nwT ^^ f«»hlnet<m,DC IVii. JfOT*. 27, , iSil
Ref.-r^-
Source . Ki^ia^ TutnXLXgws* Kv»:i,i:i.^, a«tijag "i"
Subjo.-l J&bUD N»TT Qrgnni 7,At.1 ja FljJBtS
Ib« roiXowiag Infotaaiior. ns« bean aatmlttod cy til* loth Bbt*!
Dietrict CoBsunicttion Intelligeac* Unit In coonent on the report of
the Uth N«T»1 0i«trict glnn In Q)f^l6-F-2, Serial # 65 d»t»d Not.
26, 1941,
Daring the past lew d^rs traffic onalyeia has shonn that the
ClaC 2nd Fleet ma directing unite of the let, 2ai and 3Pd Kleet*
and a sutamarlae force coaprlalog a loosely Smit taak force *ich n>-
peare to be divided into t*© groupa.
In order to clarify the situation unite which ape expected to
aESrate_iE_tl'« SeMil»-Cflin» are* are refeired to. a» Task Group # 1, unite
which nay be expected to operate in the Uandatea, Taak Group J 2,
tlie coiaposition of Taak oroup # 1 ia estijaated aa followsi
CrudiT 7
Jkirron 6
Defense Diy 1
Dearon 3
Subron 6
Task Group i)> 2 as follows i
CrudiT 5
CardiT 3
RKUJO and 1 Kerch antffian
Desrons 2 and 4
Subron 5
DesdiT 23
1st Base Force of 3rd Fleet
3rd " " at Palau
5th " "at Saipan
Ulscellaneoua unidentified units
Va/'
Although CrudiT 6 and BatdiT 3 arc possibly included in Task
Groupe # 1 and # 2, respectively, their status cannot be accurately
detemitied at present.
The statue of thoee XLiits of the 3rd Fleet not Bsentioned above,
including Dearon 5, is doubtfxil Iwt it a.ay be assuoed that they will
take station in the Straits of Formosa or furtiier south.
There are slight iiidicatioris today that Desron 3, Cruaiv 7 and Subron
6 are in Takao area. ,- '"
LXrtriSwtw 8. Onr>.t.»
Aiie Army
to Pres. War
' iho«) Jclcfns
1890 CONGRESSIONAL IN\'ESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CoiEoliMd Air Force units froa th* J*parm99 Sqpir* sr« locstad
ftt Pakhol, Kolhow, Saigon, Tnkao aad oth*r bases lii Fomoss and th«
CSiln* Cosat. (Pskhol is on ths Chin* Coast in the Oulf odT Tonkin^,
Holhow la the principal port In oorthsm Haija«n> 3aicDa is in souit^
•m French Indo-Otioa, Takao Is on the sauthnertem coast ct Formoea)
There is no confinaation of the presence of carriers sod a sub-
■arlns force In the ilandatea.
Our best Indications are that all knota 1st and 2nd Fleet car-
riers are atlll In the 3a*ebo-4Cur« area, and that the' ClnC Ccnblned
Fleet is In the SAOiTO, CinC Ist Fleet in the HYUGA, and CtlnC 2nd
Fleet in the ATAOO in the Sure area, the ClnC 3rd Fleet In the ASHIGAHA
In the 3asebo area, CinC 5th In the Bonln Islands area, Coonander 3iib-
■arlne Force in the KASKIMA In the lokosuka area althoo^ this last Is be-
llered unrellsble*
The South China Fleet seaoB to haTS been strengthened b^ units frosi
Central or North China, probably toxTpedo boats.
The Southern Kxpodltlonarj Fleet is apparently belnf reinforced by
oas Base Force unit*
DlrectlTes to this taak force, if it is such, are directed to 1»-
dlTldual units and not to ooaplete groupe. Special calls usually precede
the fomation of task f ufu ss used in area operations.
The CinC 2nd, 3rd and Southern Sxpedltloaar7 Fleet ^spear to have
major roles.
Traffic froa the Harry Minister and the Chief of the Naval Oaneral
Staff to the ClnCa of all fleets appears nontal.
The evaluation of the above is considered reliable.
Ccwent
The forces enuoterated in this report sre sunaarlied as folloas:
TASK fg figS
Taak Oroup | j >^ v.<JC. !.' U— -^ -- —
Crudlv 7 - 4 CA
Alrron 6 - 3 XAT
Defense Div 1-Miseellaneous saall craft
Desron 3 - 1 CL, 15 »
Subron 6 - 1 CL, 6 SS
CnsUv 6 - 4 CA (possible)
I ^ »..«. ( ^< <■— '
Taak jjtoup # 2 \x^*-r^ ♦^
Crvidiv 5 - 3 CA -^
Cardiv 3 - 2 CV, 4 DO
■ 1 CV, 1 XC7 or XAT
Oesrons 2 It 4 - 2 CL, 24 DD
Subron 5 - 1 CL, 6 SS
Desdlv 23 - 4 DD
lat Base Force - 3 CU, 12 AM, 12 FC, one ex-aerchantoun
3rd * ■ - 4 SS, 4 XKt, 6 exHSerchantisan
Jth " " - 2 CU, 3 ZPO, oiscellaoeous snail craft.
BatdlT 3 - A BB (possible)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1891
siaauug Of ttbb iw task roacB
J, SB (pcsalble only)
3 CT
U CA
5 a.
a DO
16 SS
S CU
4 XAV
12 Mi
12 PC
7 XPQ
7 ex-corchantaien
UiscelXan«ous aaall craft.
Although there are variations la the stren^lJie esticated by Com lU
and Coa 16 the principal confliction of opinion seecs to be in the actual
locations of carriers. In general Coo 16'» estimate cppeara to place
units of the taiA force in not as ad-ranced position as did Coq Ij,,
The fact that ClnC, 2nd Fleet reaains in hooa waters and the cod-
posltion and reported locations of the task groups indicate individual a»-
sigrwients rather than concerted operations, at least for the present.
This repca-t tranandtted on Novecber 26th by Coo 16 was adiressed
for action to CJjnav, CinCPac, Com lA, CinC AF.
Forwarder ty
L^lhJti
C4. Cos.,1r. , M:ti
<^<;^5)
1892 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
fe
ISSUKO BV TUF HVTELL-IOKN J'VISION
OFKICt. OF CHIEF OF NAVAI, OPtRA r!<>NS
NAVY DIJ'ART.MENT l
INTELLIG VM1-: RFPOR r
::: M
(^-i'^y-2
Ttx following infonaation has been suttaitted by the LbtJn Naval
District CoKBavini cation Intellit,-eric« Unit cooaaenting on Astalusna,
Shanghai dispatch e70830«
The lauZU (CL) was in the Forjosan otralts Sunday, 'toveiueer
23rd. The sub tender and four suboarines are probably Suoron 6 and
the Si^XJYA IJL^U as tender. The last sentence la believed to refer to
the SENDAI and tiio destroyer divisions. There is no cooment on other
iteo*.
TVie folloulng additional infonaation has been received, NlTTA
lOaU is sailing f roc ifokosuka to Takao on the ??th with military
supplies, T»o senior construction officers and 4,0CO men i*ioee status
is not knoim have bean ordered to the Uandates,
An unidentified ship, believed to be a light cruiser, appears
to have relieved the KASKll (CL) as flagsnip of the jouUieni Expe-
ditionai7 Fleet, This ship is now in C»iranh Bay in the iaigon area.
Comment t The above dispatch has been sent for action also to dnC
Pacific end Coci 14,
Forwarded by
Uajor, ■-■....i!.C
;^32)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1893
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAI. OPFJiATlONi" ~4 (>U IJ
NAVY UEFARTMENT
INTELUGENCE REPORT
-w V1-*. ., at fashingtonj E.^.
^^i6-F-i. Serial. # 66 «f Horejiber .??» isa
Uq InteHigeacB F.valit
lapan Havy QperatlODP. ..
V w m inii;/ iu;«U, kHjuOC M-fcH^».
Th« fallowing has beon subroitted by the 16th Naval District
Ooansuiiication Intelligence I'nitt
The foUoodng encrypt«d addresses ha-sre been noted in the past
two daj'3 traffic!
"Conmander First Patrol Force"
"Fifth Air Battalion"
"French Indo-China Billetdng
Dotachoent"
"Third Fleet Headquarters"
"Coocander Airborne Troops"
Headquarters apparently in
lokosuka or Palao.
At Takeo
In Sai^n Area.
Probably at I'okoauka.
Location undetcmined.
Conitander-liv-Chief THI3D fleet shifted flag from the ASHIGAHA (CA)
to ttM NAnAHA (CL); Coomandeiv-in-Chief Southern ExpeditlonaiT' Fleet shifted
flag frorc the KASKII (O.) to a unit tentatively identified aa the CHOKAI(CA).
New arrivals in the Takao Area that aiay be placed in Task Group # 1
of the Task Force saentioned in refeirence report! Destroyer Squadron FOUR,
Air >iuadron SVJl^, ;*id one coticnand that appears to be a jubnarine Squadron*
The HIJEI (BB) and KON'GO {B3} now appear definitely associated with these
units in First Section but no aujvaoent noted by them.
The Coonandei^in-Chief SF-OO.'-iD Fleet indicates he will shift conmuni-
cations fron the Kure Coaituaicaticn :ione at 0400,29th; froa the Sasebo
Coasnunic ation Zone at 0000, iat; and enter .the i^ako Gojar.uuication _one at
000-0, *^id, thus iiLpiyin^ a move frotu Japan proper to the South,
Ctxaiaent t
^ince the ClnC, 2rd .'"ieet is tee Conuaar.der of Tr»- - -; sruth-
ward •his movements aa given in the last para£ra,'h arf -■■<. l-~
portance. There is no kno-iWi definite i^I;;.--atior; of t: . jn Uunes
mentioned.
i)e3ron 4, consisting of 1 tX . ir; 2nd Fleet.Alron 7 cor>-
siste of three (3) oodem nsw A?. I - - - .i the Contir.ed Air Force
previously operating with the 1st Fleet.
Hist {3B) and KONGO (B8) are in" Batdiv 3 which In the reference re-
port w*^r*^ ^ven as jiossibly a part cf Task Orcup ^ 2. I'his hoB now oeen
/ ')
1894 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
cbtiogvi to T»»k Group # 1 indicating juovament U> nat«rB off S.S.
Aalit rather thuD the Hiinlates*
honrarded c? A.H ^ UcCol iua,
COQdlr. , :iSll,
^^i>
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1895
SE
K^ l\
Op-16-F-2
SUBJECT:
Dece«t«r 1, 19^1.
J8i..anese ?leet Loeatlcns.
?1EET§
LOCATICNS
First Fleet
Home Wate-o
BB - NAGATO
Near Kur«
BE - MUTSD
« •
B8-- TAJJASHIRO
At YokoBuk*
BB - FUSO
Near Kura
BB - ISE
« «
BB - HYtWA
« •
BB - HITEI
Near Sasebo
BB - KONGO
Near IteJisuru
BB - KIRISHIIJA
!«e8r Ktire
BB - HARUNA
10 BB
« «
3 CA
Near Kure
1 CA
Near Sasebo
1 CL
Near Kure (1)
1 CL
Near Sasebo (1)
27 DD
Near Kure
S9c?a<J £l«.9t
In Hoipe Waters
10 CA
Near Kura (2)
2 CA
Near Sasebo (2)
•
1 CA
Off Cemranh Bay (3)
1 CI
Near Kure
1 CL
Near Bako (Z)
i DD
Near YoVosuVs {L,)
12 DD
Near Kure (-4)
Ihirt F^MV
Sasebc and Bako area
1 CL
Near Sasebo
5 CH
* , "
12 AM
n »
12 PC
" "
. A DD
i» »
1 AS
■ ■
6 SS
« •
6 XFG
R *
l(> AP or AK
" «
1 CL
Bias Bay
1 CV
Near Bako
1 DD
Near Itelzuru _^ _
/^ (^ J
^-) ;2^J>St
79716 O— 46 — pt.
1896 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
FLSSTE
iskk.
UM
A CL
3 DD
1 AS
9 SS
f XiG
16 /.P or
2 DC
1 S£
1 Sy-ve
3 XPG
17 AP or AK
i. SS
I XFG
30 AP or AK
1 AS
4 XAK
3 PC
13 AP or AK
IICK
3 DD
1 SS
1 SS
•hip
Msnd*t«d Islands
In Tnak-PcMipe area
Near SslpHr.
" Palao
» Jaluit
In Yokcsuka
Near Sasebo
At Malzuru
At Kure
1 CL ChicMJlma
(This coirppsltlon of the Fifth Fleet la still unknown)
?;xth Ftaet
2 CL
Near Kure
2 CL
Near Saaebo
1 AS
Near Kure
1 AS
Sasebo
1 AF
(XAS)
Bako (5)
i. SS
Bake (5)
5 SS
Yokosuka (5)
12 SS
Kure
21 SS
In Sasebo anii other Home watersiS)
Carrier Fleet
C7 - AKAOl
CV - KAGA
CV - SOHYU ^
C7 - HIRYU
CV - HOSHO
CV - KOSYU
CV - KASUGA
CV - RYUJO
CV - 7;i;iKSKU
AKU
30 DD
S. K•'^!shu
Kure
S. K-.-uahu
«
Kure
S. Kytjshii and Kure
TcV-C8uka
yo
a7J>
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1897
' jiiwawi^MSiWMiw^i
Corcbirt-d Air Force
Co.T.biiied rieet Trtin
LCCATTOIB
3 AV
t;ear Beko (6)
1 AV
Near Kure (6)
1 AV
TTuk
2 XAV
near sesebo
1 XkV
Saigon-C6i;^t.iia Bay eree
2 AO
1,'efcr yokosuka
2 AC
i;c-6r K-ire
1 AO
Ifeur sesebo
1 AO
t.'e&r Meiziii'ii
1 AO
i;etr a£jij..an
1 AO
i:etr yep
1 AC
Near saltan
1 AJ
Ileer yo-Koeuka
2 AR
IJetir Kui"©
1 Ice
Bretker .
- SBohal'i en
1 Terj
set
Saip
sesebo
japajiese Xii-vtjl yjrcfeg ir ciiifie
3 DD
7 Aiv or Ai-
Central ctiJ-J'6 or let L ^^^ e U ;. -. : onary ZTleft
7^
^eJ>
1898 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
f^, — ^ r-f f^
?
KQTSSi
~~ ri)(CL) SElxDAI noved fror, Kure to sesebo
(2) T"e ATAGO (CA), Fla^jsiiip of the 2nd Fleet, has moved iron Kure to sesebo.
Further soutaward movements are e3qjecte;d,
(3) T^ie CHOKAI (CA) iias probabl;/ become fleiisiiip of the soutnern Expeditionary
yleet, off judo-caina.
(4) Desror. 4. consisting of tiiC IIAKA (CL) and 12 no have iMved to B^Ko
C5) The iJiGOyA MARU afld t;ie 4 Mneleyina SS of gubron 6 (1-121 - 124} ere
now near s»ko,
(ii) Airrcn 7 '^s moTed from Kurr- to Beko.
(7) At leact one division of Torpedo Bofcts liave moved to s^^nta C"ina.
Dletributiont
CKO - copy No. 1
DKI - copy Iio. 2
OP- 12 - copy Ko. 5
Oi-53w,- copy NO. 3
Op-lb-F - copy IX>. i.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1899
-*• , C y Ho. ,^ ,
tSSUED BY THE [NTeLLJCENCk. OIVIM
r-_') Aik'^ft OFFICE OP CHITEJ- OP NAVAL OPERATION*
r A. U';a«v navy department
INTELUGENCE REPORT
SeruU ....l,.5-. .... M>.m.i:rn!-1. IlXjer Onidr N" ''*",-^'*..._
From ...flprsU^rJJ, O.NI «t .I»*4JWtoq»»C, D^to . t)«<:f i» 19 41
<«.», aw, tiiiii. OWU" t. ^«!^i^ M-ilw'. « p«aiH
Kofereac« _
Source ...Rtrtift-Xat.^Uigftac* - Ev, :.,!■., Hating "A«
Subject .. i?l»«n ,. Hmj Opcrationa
U«tu-- kUw« tatK tantui tu^-tuicy v< n
The foUowlae haa been suoLitted by the 16th K«t«1 Eletrlct Oosk-
ffiunlcatlon Intelligence Uniti
The folioning arrlTed la Tatcao during the paat tuo d«y»»
OoBaaider Destroyer Squadron FIVX in NATORI
NiKA to join Destroyer Squadaon FOUR
Unidentified unite cf Hunber T»» Base Force
CKOOn which is considered to be tender for two
divisions of subnarlnea.
All of the ^xrft unita are now under the coanand of CcoBazider-ia-Clilef ,
THUU) Fleet.
CoBBandeiv-iivOilef SSCOJO Fleet in KtiiX) shifted from Kure to Sasebo
Conounication Zone, ippareittly enroute South China natere.
All OEiKaE serrice radio calls for units afloat were changed at OOOO,
1 Doceabor 1941.
CINCAF, CIKCPAC aal CCli FCUHXKEK have received the above information.
Coaaentt
The Boveoenta reported above are still of anall unita. All of Desrona
4 »xl 5 are now given as located at Xakao. -iubdiva 9 aid 13 have already
'oe«n reported at Takao.
Although the dnC, 2t«3 Fleet is in coessand of the entire task force,
the organization of the subortiinate coramanders has not yet been clarified.
Apparently CinC 3rd Fleet cccmands a n&,1or subdivision.
^^-'-< Forwarded b y </■
::cni:\&ixi9T,
Dt>tnl>u{im R« Oi.. ■<»>'«
,„j Aide Army
»,. '-0 War
(■res. Plan*
■..,..
J^2>
J 900 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Copy No. 1
INTEIXIGENCE REPORT
'The follo«riiag has been auhialtted by the 16th n'»v«l District
CoB«mmicatioa Inte3iLt;ence Unitj
COEsaandere-in-Chlef, SEOOND and THIiJD fleet plus CoBDsnder
Soathera Ej:peditionarj' Force are in the Takao Area,
Bronicasts to fleet ludts arc now being sent by Tekao or
Bako Radio in adtUtion to Tok^FO iiadlo,
Tii« Japtinese Ambaasador at San^ok on Uie 30th requested pemisdion
to .i«st.rcT all Djt & ltad--ed :iu;\.'.>vT of codes.
m have received the above ir^ona»-
Qpsnenti Th» asseobUn^ of units in ttae Takao area la be^nning to
iiidicate a concentration in this area.
FoBwarded by_
Cc/adr. , U3M,
i«^ rlana Pre:,
J/i)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
EXHIBIT NO. 86
1901
SiittlaEr.ipa
6 {&)
6
Cj)
5 (e)
Aircraft Carriors
.
>
i (h)
Heavy Cruisers
4
4
(o)
4
Light Cruisers
4
11
(ci)
3 (i)
Dss^rowrs
15 (98t.
)
^4
>»
52 (J)
Subff'/ij-ir'.'is
160 (efit.
)
77
(r)
• 58
(a) Includes 2 c
(f) IT.
1902 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
t; l'rf4i.
-'attlaships
Ajrcrfti't C&rrlors
lie&vy Crui»«?s
Light Crui8«rs
0e8t*oysr»
bXtbniariaes
Sir)
eg
S5
30if •
66(f)
kwm:in.no¥s
•^'TA
.
r^s'
.
10
l(k)
22
2(1)
41
li(m)
2a9
lS(n)
141
Ioolu<i«8 3 b«ttlo orul8«ra,
Xsclud«a S b&ttleshlps d»ra«gftd md und«r rppulr.
iaoludst 1 eaoort carrier,
lacluae3 1 largo carrier daaaced and under repair.
Includes 5 h«avy oruis«r« (Jaasftgad and lunier r«pair.
Estimated, ne accurate figures available at this fclm«.
Inolutias Z loase ships asd
IcterBed at Alexa^iiria.
Iciolud«« 4 laoomplet« tsxd
lnolud»t 1 iKcoW'iete an-"
liicludes
Includes
Inoludee . _ ,
Includes b
subiT.sritie.
1 iEternftd at Alexandria,
iaterned at Alexarjdria,
tnt«meil at Alexandria^
.- , _ .. ,.-iaa, sn.' 2 Fcliah lestroyers.
Dutch, 1 tiorwBgio-n, i ioli$h fuxd 1 /u'-osla-rian
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1903
■1^
1 , ' *-
&
■^
^""
V
^^^^^^■K^^^^^^
^
V >»r :>/ .
•i_, i , i J » I .
^H^H
t^m'
AXIS
■
w
jA«u;
VICBY m»>7(TS
TOTALS
1
i»+tl«»»hip»
.r-.*ft C»rrlor«
16
-
iv
18
1
-.rul8«rs
u'K^r Lrif-a
17
100
66
1
IS
100
70
m
3
r
16
TOI'AIS
10
4
17
27
92
70
4^^H
:»ttle8hip»
Aircraft Carriers
.«fcv/ Cruis', ra
'..iKht Cruisers
>Btroyere
ubmarlcos
S
S
1
X
1 Ho.)
" 13(i>)
lo 8(b)
Zii -(o)
(a) IncludM 1 un5 1
(b) £«ti»sito<i, no nc
(c) Bimtber unksoim.
d6r.af,«d and under repair.
c\irat« figures fcyailabia,
y.ct eiicRigi-. dat» for eotiaata.
]
'
^
1904 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL AaRBOR ATTACK
'Voeaber "^ ,
(a) Inolud«s 2 oT4rmge b»
(b) Includes CAVOUH heav;
(c) Iaolud«a iar.aged BOLL-
Includ** d*s»'«d D'AC.
.jt M-lca*.
>lua46 i Uutv
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1905
DOHJ
IU.»JU, v>^-.oA.IlBT STSiEli-- ,
.w.,..^r /, l»4l.
•JKITiO
jHSST
sstrss
ESIlAlK
rKK£ ■
im^Mhifi
6(*)
iZ («)!.'
PlJirwft Z&TTiwa
4<bJ(o)
»(e;'-.
Itoi'M Crvitser*
6
ij(i)
., _,
Lie)--* -"-uxsar*
8(4)
2s(::;
I ( 1 ,(
Oestr'j «-r'-
92
££e(j)
llU/
3u{nwrlae»
5a
eo(.t;
Sir,)
Qr-f?st
^JS^ATICBS
rctjL
.
21
.
12
llo) .
2i
2(?)
J5
U(q)
j:&
i«(r;
ui
'»} ry.ea cot laclud* HCHTb CAODLIHA mnd XASHrsCTOf both on trial*.
" /o» not Includ* BC£SKT oq trial**
-:lud«« use TSU£I> (Iceort CMrrier).
•^' •. ATU'-a, SAJ: DlrOC and CiK ,rCAK carried on Atl&r,tic rie*-.
.^t wer* no* cc- :..■-*"- -! o- rcamitBiao^d asd are r.
t 1 taaxtlo cr'-'i5';r.
-n^-,-!«is on* canai-ai ba^ti88hlp under repair,
;) Icclusea 2 Escort Carriers.
r.) Ir.-l^'Scc ? -ar-i.-ei t.r-;r::t carrier* laidar repair,
'iera un-ier repair .
te available.
/L, ;-...utt-5 i jisi; I..,, -. 1 jiterned at Alexantiria.
Interned e>.t AlAzanttria.
lEoludes 4 iacoiBpltte, 5
Inclu-'JeR 1 itoor;
Icelu'leB ^-JreeK - ■
- 6 ireoic,
^3 & Greek,
'rrud aod 1 repalrlxig.
-ed at Aleztkodrla.
iTRA.
"Jcrwegiaa, and Z Polish destro^rB.
liorwegiaa, 1 Poli»h, and 1 Yo^slaTiaa
1906 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
S&7AI, COK;
•e tseSAS. a« or D«««a>«r 7, 1941.
JtJ»H
AXIS
VICHY FRA.SCE
ALUKS
T0TMJ5
B^ttloships
10
^
10
Aircraft Carrier*
9
-
9
ifeSLVj- Cruisers
18
-
18
light Cruis«r»
17
1
18
D^stroyar*
103
-
105
:iuUmarir»s
74
1
75
8fcttl«8hips
Aircraft Carrier*
Boav;/ CiSiisera
Iiight Crui8«r«
Osetroyer*
Subaaurinec
Pacific - Aaiatio
12 i
10(a) 1
54(bKe) 13
25(d) 23
OSSJkt
BRItAiy,
4(e)(f)
Ks)
17(h)
13(h)
-(i)
Ol'TCH
rOTAIS
.
15
.
4
-
17
3
SI
7
88
15
68
(a) Include* BOISE irihich at tr,at iAwte was uscortiag in Asiatic waters.
(b) Inolud«r» 4 do«tro;^r» asBigned 14th Kaval Biutriot.
(o) I>o»» not iQcluda aeatroy rs assignod other Ifcat Coast Baral Dietrlcta,
(d) Statius of two subcsarines not olear.
(9) laoludos I, battle oruisfti*.
(f ) Inoludias 1 daaaged battl««hip tmder rspt-ir.
(s) Riis aircraft carrier dasiaged and und«r repair.
(hj isstiaatad, no aoourate figures available,
(i) Nianber uojcnown. Hot enough data for ostiaate.
BH
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
EXHIBIT NO. 87
1907
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON. O.C.
Room 14D757
The Pentagon
18 December 1945
MEMDRAKDUM FOR MR. MITCHELL:
Inclosed is a memorandum prepared by General Strong
on the subject "Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments
on 17 June 1940".
HARIDN DUNCOMBE
Lt. Col., GSC
Incl.
1908 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
15 DscMber 1945
MEUQBANDUlf FC£ GENERAL UHRSSkUit
SaJBJSCTi Al«rt of panaaa aod Banailan Departments on 17 Jtine 1940
1. In eomMction with yxrar testimony before the Joint Conaittee
on the Inrestigp-tion of the Pearl Harbor attack you nere asked repeated-
ly for the reasons idiich pranQ>ted ycfa to alert the Panaoa and Bavailan
Depertnents on 17 J6ne 1940. As your Assistant Chief of Staff, mx
Plans Division at that tioe, I «as responsible for advising the action
you took, and I feel that it may coo^lete the story (in ease it is not
self -evident to the Conmittee from a review of contetqjoraneous historical
events) if I suamarize the sittoitlon leading to the alert irtilch I re-
ccBDiended and you approved.
2. You Hill recall that Axis ascendancy in Vaj and early June of
1940 gave tus cause for gravest concern. The British had evacuated
Donkizk by 4 June, and on the 17th Petain waited upon the Nazis for
surrenler texns. Oennaoy had a good chance of acquiring the French
fleet intact. Russia Appeared to be cooperating with the Axis; on 12
Jtms she moved in on lithuania; on 16 Jtme she demaoded a change of
goverment in Esthonla and I^tvla. On 10 June Russia and japan signed
a treaty fixing the lianchukuo-Outer Uongolla border, and the Inference
waa that these two had ccmposed their differences with a view to negotiat-
ing a neutrality pact. The Ji.paaese navy would then be free for any
adventure. Japanese land forces were concentrating in Hainan, Formosa,
axxi Kyushu, apparently for further aggressive action.
3. Tou may remeniber a conference held in your office at 0830 on
17 Jtine 1940 at which I was present, along with General Andrews and
General Uoore. Ifo believed at that tine that Gezman control of the
French fleet would create a very serious situation in the South Atlsintie.
SboxOd Great Britain fall, a hostile move toward South America was far
frcaa unlikely. Anticipating a desperate need for troops in Brazil and
Uruguay, General Andrews and I reconmended at this meeting that the N&-
tional Guard be ordered into Federal Service. That was our freme of
urinrt on 17 Jtme 1940, At the conclusion of the conference you directed
us to consider the questions which had been xciised.
4,. In looking to our own security I apprehended the nuost immediate
threat to be a raid or major sabotage effort which would effectively
close the Panama Canal. Evidence of sabotage plans existed; certain
specific evidence is mentioned below. 'In the event of a raid, a diver-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1909
8ix>nar7 attack in the Hawaiian area could not be ruled out, since a
large pairt of our fleet -sas based on Petri Harbor. Accordingly, on
17 June 1940 I reconmended placing these two Departoients on an alert
status. The docunents directly bearing on my decision do not tell the
story nearly so irell as does a vivid recollection of Axis eapabilltles
and American neakness at that time irtien the collapse of France was
iominent and the fall of Britain by no means iiiq>os8ible. However, I
cite and sumnarise below a few significant papers which reflect those
tines and give some indication of what was in our minds during those
late spring days of 1940.
a. State Department 793, 94119/640, dated 25 Uay 1940. Ifr.
Grew discTiases »a flurry of official activity* in Tokyo. Although he
sees no reason to expect an attack on the Netherlands East Indies he
acknowledges that preparations for such an attack "would presumably be
guarded with the utmost secrecy." (This, to our minds, did not exelude,
but rather drew our attention to, the possibilities of attack or raids
elseidiere.)
b. State Department 711.94/1518, dated 3 Jtme 1940. In
surveying the Japanese situation lb>« Grew states in diplomatic terms
that "a cooQxLacent view of the future would no longer be warranted."
He cites the opinion of Jbipenese militarists that their fleet had
nothing to fear frcoi the use of force and expresses his own belief that
Jbtpan "may be tenQited to resort to desperate courses."
e. State Departasent 811 F. 812 FHarBCTI0N/l65, dated 10 June
I940. The Navy furnishes information obtained by Brazilian sailors
from the Japanese crew of ARGENTINA IttRU that all Japanese ships have
orders to scuttle if in the Panama Canal when the United States "declares
mobilisation."
d. Utir Department WED 3730-18, undated. ]jtifoni»tion fltai a
Navy source describes how a German sailor, under influence of liquer,
revealed to an American petty officer on 1 May 1940 at Eureka, Califor-
nia, some specific and detailed plans to blow up the Panama Canal if
our entry into the war "became imminent."
e. Ktr Department WD 4326, undated. In an unused draft of
a letter prepared for your signature at your request, the Coogaanding
General, Panama Department, was informed that "the background of the
instructions (for the alert of 17 June) has doubtless been oade clear
trca. matters that have appeared in the public press", and that "the
increasing tension zad uncertainty in the world situation, as affecting
Canal security, enphasized the necessity of a continuous and vigilant
alert basis for some time to come." (This letter remained unsent en
1910 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
By recoBBienEiatlon, largely becaase I amaidtand the reasons for the
ali«rt to be obTloos, as Indeed they imre.)
5, I can thiok of no more eonclQaive -my to sunaarise the situa-
tion as of 17 Jane 1940 than to point oat that the factors iiMch gilded
vj decision to recommend alerting these overseas bases iiere essentially
those vhlch oade it necessary for the President of the United States te
issue his ProclABaktion of 27 June 1940 (F. B. Dee. 40-2639), vbLch ex-
tended the scope of the national energeney proclaliMd 8 Septsd^er 1939
and gave additienal and exceptional authority in xpgard to safegoarding
the Panaaa Canal,
Inels (v/ori^ only)
la listed in par 4 abcnre (eys)
F.R.DOC. 40-2639 (ey)
GEO. T. arRONQ
MBiJor Oeneral, TSSk (Retired)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1911
576, Hay 85, 7 p.j», ^cRAY) '*'*"^
The follovdng aCPlcs or Events bAS led to uneas;,-
apEO'il8*io" 5r foreign oirolEs herE:
(Ons) -_'C8tEi-Hla5- asnEral Toiao, Jtlnlfitgr of QvtratM
Affairs, called on the Prl'as Miftlatcr Just before the
cablnEt wEEtir-L; and Is reported in the press as havj.ns
diaouaaEd "a Tl'cal laauc" aad as having mdt "an impor-
tant rceomi^endafclon to the PrcniEr In oonnEOtlon with thE
acttlEmEHt of tht ChJ.m Blf&ir",
(Two) Lsst niybt l^e apokEsman of the Foreign Office
delivsircd the radio address reported In our 375, Uey 35,
.-^ a.n,'
(thres) niia morning the H&vy HinlstEr caUsd on
the Prir.E lUnlster at S:17» The PrteE Minister went to the
EapETor at 10 o»clo«k and after the audUncc oallee o
YuBsa, Lord Privy St&Utm) CRAY)
(Pom-) COKFIDEKnAL, ''matEver step If ftny Is rr^sa:
this flurr? of official setlvtty there appeal's to^e '
good reason to beliefs that it envisages a deaocnt a^^t^
riEtherla!^
<0
79716 O — 46 — pt. 15 33
1912 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1913
1914 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
/
TELKGRWI KECKIVEI)
.. ^
■•-•^ . 'J- f
■X
to
01
ast
a
CD
c.on*Mnn
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1915
fent in the
Irtu.-: combii.cc. v;i;:.}i ^^^^^^^^^^ utrr^irth
L'Esucnts in tlvis covuntry f^^^^^KI^^- ~r- i-v/
.lizE tK' : .' ^ar»*^^^P^<K(iic v:ell-
bov'.-'-' -Ui- ouonic and thErcfor
Xtcd StctC"! aiz'l the
■ontiis of
ba ry sue c ;
vi E ■.• of ^ -
3f:C' ION OilE)
.- r-ho ar-E -:
• Jid J:pan. ;
;11 no Ion: ,r, I* 'be
1916 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1917
p _ #4O0, S\mt 5, noon from Tokyo
such rrnp.jn'O- -o Japan Iftst autvwsn and fnnt Japan
loirtn, Infonnants have told 'as that. Russia
; ly renewed the proposal, desiring- r. free
c.pE With cvEntualltiea In Evtrope, Inclivilnc
the ralkans and !;hc poasiblllty o£ e\'En<;\mlly I'.avlnp
' thz acrmana for control of the Baku oil f3i;lin,
.'r,'- nrnr coloHEl has filTEBdy arrived In
•; r„ mromanta look for frrdtlon of
{lis -ichDTin b-
tost- ■-■"
iMn : '!«•
113 a v.'ColE, :" ■ -rtcrs o '" ' ~c:t.
; curopr. v/.U-t^i i:iVL '.i L.rr
i ■■callre tliat economic :
• c '' be '"need 'o"t
.,■ ever been destroyed t .
■ "■' " •■" •"', "'hey di .■
• i '. -:' :'t n* re ;.
ir. any case t,' Tea
the ' • '^ . ■ i" faction, v/Iilf^h l:--. :
r. bcu'„ ', ' " -5 ,.r t.' . i%-"ir)Ent Japancj,. .
lu'^'^r^n, ' --bi-ra r:f the vt
irrioero in the MTiy and 1:
' '' ~:K
auf.v'crtrd
1918 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1919
TKLKGUAM HKCKIVKI)
n'\^^z•■.a\'^■\
^^^XSMk(tmmmm
_ ^ , r.3-pEcla3 ly-
re a ncr*'ian vic^.or;' 5r. i-nror;, Vr," ■. "hnt;
■-hlng fr'v- ■ ■: • . ' ;'r:iticc uud
that
1920 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1921
1922 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TKLK<;K\M KKCKrNKI)
I
3tTlC.}i,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1923
1924 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
rKLK(;HAM KKCKUKIl
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1925
1926 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1927
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
JT
Thia tElcgrom %/os oent In
Naval Code and muat bE
olo3Ely pr.r*aphra3Ed be-
fore being /sommunicatcd to
anyone.
PROIi; OPNAV
From Reo'd June 10, 1940
6:37 p,ra,4\
INPO: st,:te DEP;.RTI-IENT
ACTIOIi COIJELEVO* PASSED BY COJ'ELEVEK TO CflF"
AirD OPiJ-.V FOR IKPO
PRIORITY, • f W^
10 June, 1940, For Captain E..i:, Z".ch>rS-
T-knc, S,S* SANTA :L\RIA former S^S, V.V.R'nCA C[.l^-: ', ^
sailed & June for Balbca \/lth Prar,lli-in cretr. Urgent
brouglit tn Pedro by ARGENTIHA VS\^^'\ 3r.-.cij.i .n crew
learned frcra .T^ipanese crew of .iflfJElITIK.. UAR"' all Jr.paner.t
Til-iipr have orders to scuttle If in Panana C:v.-ial 'v'acn
United St-.r.tca of .jiierica declares mobillz-'ition.
C£
■n
n
o
i ml"
I
r
79716 O — 46— pt. 1!
-34
1928 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
mmKW^Sj^asg^f^sjs^^^^^SSlSKSBiiS^S&MBXBK-
^'-W^
mKmmmKmammmr^.. .,.
^^^^^^B TELEGRAM KECEP.T.f)
^^^^^^^^H FnohA
•^
^^^^^^^^^^^m
f
I^^^^^^H^p^ 11
^^^^^^^niFO: opi{AV
»-.
^^^^^^^K
-1
^^^^^^^^^^F<
r>
^^^^^^^^^B'
-
*T-
I^^^^^^^^^^^Br.. .
■;/""
-^
^^^^^^^^^^fea 'r ' r. Briziitar! orcw. Crew brovicht;
,')
^^^^^^^^Hp^OeUTXt^ crcvr IcftrnEd fr--
—I
f^^^^^^^^Vc: ail Japanese ships hu-r.
■..■:; ;..
g
^^^^^^^^H? .'.a Ca.nal vrhcn U.S.A. declares
:bili2&-
'^
^^^^^^^^^^P^ °'^ *
en
^^^^^^^HPD
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1929
June 17. 19^
Uotes of conference In office of Chief of Staff, 8:30 A.M.. June 17, I9U0.
SUBJECT! Defense Problems.
P££S£I{'l': General Marshall General Andrews
General Strong GenereJ. Moore
The Chief of Staff remarked that in going over the various possibilities
it eeems that we may suddenly find Japan and fiussia appear as a team
operating to hold our ships in the Pacific, If the French navy goes to
Genially and Italy, we will have a very serious situation in the South
Atlantic. Germany may rush the South American situation to a head in a
few weeks*
Are we not forced into a ouestion of reframlng our naval policy,
that is, purely defensive action in the Pacific, with a main effort on
the Atlantic side. There is the possihility of raids with resultant
public reaction. The main effort may he south of Trinidad, with any
action north thereof purely on the basis of a diversion to prevent our
sending material to south America. This seems to indicate that we are
reaching a point where ve should mobilize the National Guard.
General Strong stated that the Havy reports that they have a definite
information that the French fleet has already been turned over to and
incorporated in the British fleet. (BOTE: Later information from the
Navy Department indicates that this is Questionable.) If this is so, and
if the next move of the Germans, possibly through Ireland, results in the
capitulation of Great Britain oroper, the combiasd Atlantic fleets may
move to the western hemisphere. In this case, they must operate from our
ports as there are no others adequate. From this point WPD and the Navy
disagree on action. WPD believes in defensive operations only in the
'•;
79716 O— 46 — pt. 15 35
1930 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Pacific and concentrating everything in this hemisphere.
The Chief of Staff commented that if the British and French fleets
come here the Havy point of view is OK; if not, it is all wrong* We
have to he prepared to meet the worst situation that may develop, that is,
if we do not have the Allied fleet in the Atlantic.
Thinking oat loud, should not Hawaii have some hig homhers. We have
36. It is poseihle that opponents in the Pacific would he four-fifths of
the way to Hawaii hefore we knew that they had moved. Would five or tan
flying fortresses at Hawaii alter this picture?
(reneral Andrews stated that this small numher would he overwhelmed
hy hostile pursuit. We are weak in pursuit and any small force would Iw
destroyed. He helieves we should not split our forces hut should send more
cv
•«tt none. He also believes that if we could get our reserves of ammunition*
homhs, etc. to Hawaii, we could put hig planes there in three days if
necessary. The Chief of Staff remarked that three days might he fatal.
General Strong thiziks we would have less than 2^ hours notice.
We have a comhined Army and Navy Air force of kfS combat planes in
Hawaii. Japan at present can har'ly bring more than UOO because of the
small size and number of her carriers. Merchant ships can be converted
for launching planes, but the planes cannot land again on the ship.
In response to a question regarding the use of the 3<i Division in
Alaska, General Strong thought this premature. A landing field is being
put in at Kodiak.
Both General Andrews and GenereJ Strong recommend ordering the
National Guard into Federal service. General Strong anticipates a
desperate need within 60 days for troops in South America, (Brazil and
Uruguay.) The Chief of Staff thought that although we cannot at once
send expeditions, we might be able to guarantee to ^ome of the South
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1931
Aa«rican goTenuwnts th« oecapatioa and holdiag of certain key porta*
With respect to farther equlpsAt for the Allies as per the
President's statement, we hare scraped the 'bottom so far as the Army
is concerned.
General Andrews wishes to motorize the Uth Division. He wants an
air-ground team In training, preferably at Jort Benniiig.
The Chief of Staff directed consideration of all questions raised
during this conference by the heads of staff ClTisions present.
W.B.S.
'f
1932 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
iKi.i:<;i{A\i KF:<:Kf\i:j)
CM
01
(0
en
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1933
COPY COPY CPencilled: fr 3730
~ ~ ~ Panama )
From: Commaader, San Francisco District.
To: Commandant,
Subject: Sabotage, Panara Canal, allegpd method to be used by Germans.
Inclosures: (1) Sketch,
1, Lieutenant Commander S, 3, Johnson, upon an inspection by
him of the ??unboldt flay Lifeboat Station on 1 May, 19hO, was informed
by Chief Boatswain (1) Churchill that a personal friend of Cliurchill's
in the town of Eureka, California, had met a Geniian who had been drink-
ing, Churchill's friend was invited t.o have a drink Tdth the Gernan,
who bragged about a plan to blow up the Panama Canal if the United States'
entry into the war became imra.nent. Churchill's friend plied the German
with drinks £ind appeared to drink with him but in fact spilled his drinks.
The German did not identify ni'sself other than that he had been in tlie
country one year. The German said that a small vessel would be fitted
out, with mines secured to the vessel's bottom, detachable from inside
the sMp, The mines would be operated by a timing device set in motion,
apparently, when detached from the ship. To prevent an obvious change
in the water line of the vessel .when the bombs were released, special
tanks wer° to be fitted inside the vessel to take in water in a location
and weight to counteract the effect of dropping the load of mines,
2, Two sketches were made by the American to describe the method
by which mines w^re attached and tanks distributed in the vessel. These
two sketches are on the tracing, inclosure (1;,
Sigied; Stanley V. Parker,
Typed: Stanley V. Parker,
Copy:
FBI,
ONI, 12th Naval District.
G-2, 9th Corps Area Hq,
COPY
CONFIDHflTIAL
COPY
1934 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COPY
liy dear Van Voorhis:
special* recently*
The /instructions/sent you eese-lQ-iayB-age were based
on infor'ation which we had here and upon consultations between
the State, War and Ilavy Departments, The background of the
instrjctions has doubtless been made clear from matters ttet
have appeared in the public press. I only want to add that
the increasing tension and uncertainty in the world situation,
as affecting Canal security, emphasized the necessity of a
continuous and vigilant alert basis for soma ti-ne to come.
I trust that the instructions in question did not
cause you people to lose too much sleep.
Best of luck
Sincerely yours.
G. C. M.
(Pencilled: Mot used)
» Pencilled notations
SBCR^
COPY
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1935
COPY (Pencilled: File in WD
COPT Hi Fr
"Arned guards on public
vessels transiting
Panama Canal"
THE PRESIDENT 1>U$-1 '
6-27-UO Panama )
COITROL CF VESSELS IN TERRITORIAL
TIIATE3S OF THE UNITED STATES
BY THE PRESroaiT CF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA
A PROCIAiaTiai
1
WIEREAS, A proclamation issued by me on September 8, 1939, pro-
claimed that a national emergency existed in connection with and to the
extent necessary for the proper observance, safeguarding and enforcing
of the neutrality of the United States and the strengthening of our
national defense within the limits of peace-time authorizations, and
that specific directions and authorizations would be given from time
to time for carrying out these two purposes,
WHEREAS, The continuation of the conditions set forth in said
proclanation of September 8, 1939, now calls for additional measures
within the limits of peace-time authorizations,
WfEREflS, Under and by virtue of section 1 of title II of the Act of
Congress approved June 15, 1917, UO Stat. 220 (U.S.C. title 50, sec. 191),
it is provided as follows:
"SECTION 1» Whenever the President by proclamation or Executive
order declares a national emergency to exist by reason of actual or
threatened war, insurrection, or invasion, or disturbance or threatened
disturbance of the international relations of the United States, the
Secretary of the Treasury may make, subject to the approval of the Presi-
dent, rules and regulations governing the anchorage and movejient of any
vessel, foreign or domestic, in the territorial waters of the United States,
may inspect such vessel at any time, place guards thereon, and, if necessary
in his opinion in order to secure such vessels from damage or injury, or
to prevent damage or injury to any harbor or waters of the United States,
or to secure the observance of the rigjits and obligations of the United
States, may take, by and with the consent of the President, for such
purposes, full possession and control of such vessel and remove therefrom,
the officers and crew thereof and all other persons not specially authorized
by him to go or remain on board thereof.
"Within the territory and waters of the Canal Zone the Governor of
the Panama Canal, with the approval of the President, shall exercise
all the powers conferred by this section on the Secretary of the Treasury."
AND, WHEREAS, It is essential, in order to carry into effect the
provisions of said Act, which are quoted herein, that the powers conferred
^ U F.R. 3851.
1936 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COPY
therein upon the President, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Governor
of the Panama Canal be' at this time exercised, or available for exercise,
with respect to foreign and domestic vessei.
NOT, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United
States of America, by virtue of the powers conferred upon me by the pro-
visions of the said Act of Congress quoted herein, do hereby declare the
continuation of the conditions set forth in my proclarnation of September
8, 1939, and the existence of a national emergency by reason of threatened
disturbance of the international relations of the United States,
AND, I therefore consent to the exercise, with respect to foreign and
domestic vessels, by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Governor of the
Panama Canal, of all the powers conferred by the provisions of said Act,
IN TTITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal
of the United States to be affixed.
DCWE at the City of fashington this 27th day of June in the year of
our Lord nineteen hundred and forty and of the Independence
(SEAL) of the United States of taerica, the one hundred and sixty-
fourth.
FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT
By the President:
CORDELL HULL
Secretary of State.
(No, 2Ul2)
(F, R. Doc. U0-263?J Filed, June 28, 19hO} 10:05 a.m.)
copy/it
COPY
TVNews
OpenLibrary