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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BSFORB THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAKL HAEBOR ATTACK
C0NGBE8S OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27 and 49
(79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 16
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOB. 88 THROUGH 110
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attadc
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
-8^^*5J0INT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAKL HARBOE ATTACK .
• CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27 and 49
(79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 16
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 88 THROUGH 110
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79716 WASHINGTON : 1946
3^ , I laj^i .^
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARELBY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Repreaenta-
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michl- tive from California
gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin
North Carolina
COUNSEL
(Throngh January 14, 1946)
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel / y ^C^
Gebhard a. Gesell, ChieJ Assistant Counsel
Jdle M. Hannab-ord, Assistant Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel
Samuel H. Kadfman, Associate General Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
EuwARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel
Looan J. Lane, Assistant Counsel
HEARINGS OP JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
No.
Pages
Transcript
pages
1
1- 399
1- 1058
2
401- 982
1059- 2586
3
983-1583
2587- 4194
4
1585-2063
4195- 5460
5
2065-2492
5461- 6646
6
2493-2920
6647- 7888
7
2921-3378
7889- 9107
8
3379-3927
9108-10517
9
3929-4599
10518-12277
10
4601-5151
12278-13708
11
5153-5560
13709-14765
Hearings
Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19
Nov. 23, 24, 26 to
Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10,
Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18,
Dec. 31, 1945, and
Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18,
Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25,
Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1
Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12,
Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19,
Apr. 9 and 11, and
, 20, and 21, 1945.
30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
11, 12, and 13, 1945.
19, 20, and 21, 1945.
Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
19, and 21, 1946.
26, 28, and 29, 1946.
2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
13, and 14, 1946.
and 20, 1946.
Mav 23 and 31. 1946.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
No.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22 through 25
26
27 through 31
32 through 33
34
35
36 through 38
39
Exhibits Nos.
1 through 6.
7 and 8.
9 through 43.
44 through 87.
88 through 1 10.
Ill through 128.
129 through 156.
157 through 172.
173 through 179.
180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
Roberts Commission Proceedings.
Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
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XXIV
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1937
EXHIBIT NO. 88
War Plans Division (OP 12)
12-1. Duties:
(a) Policy and Projects Section:
(1) Development of policies and projects in support of war plans.
(2) Collaboration with the War Department in preparation of current plans
for joint action of the Army and Navy, and in the solution of current problems.
(3) Collaboration with other Government departments on policies and projects
affecting national defense.
(4) Study of subjects referred to the War Plans Division by the Chief of
Naval Operations.
(5) Action in advisory capacity in current administrative matters referred
to the War Plans Division.
(b) Plans Section:
(1) Direction of war planning.
(2) Preparation of designated war plans.
(3) Review of Operating Plans and Principal Contributory Plans.
(4) Collaboration with the War Department in preparation of Joint Basic
War Plans.
(5) Collaboration with other Government departments on plans affecting na-
tional defense.
12-2. The Director of the War Plans Division is a member of the Joint Board
(General Order No. 7).
12-3. The War Plans Division has membership on the following committees :
Joint Board.
Joint Planning Committee.
Joint Aeronautical Board.
Joint Air Advisory Committee.
Shore Station Development Board.
12-4. The War Plans Division is nonadministrative.
EXHIBIT NO. 89
Responsibility for Defense Against Air Attack in Hawaii
[7] 1. The broad responsibilities of the Army and Navy in
Hawaii were contained in Army and Navy war plans prepared and
issued to the Army and Navy Commanders in Hawaii. These re-
sponsibilities were expressed in the various plans in terms of joint
missions and separate Army and Navy missions. With the exception
as indicated below, these missions are stated identically in all war
plans current in 1941 as follows :
JOINT MISSION
, To hold Oahu as a main outlying Naval Base, and to control and
protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.
NAVY MISSION
To patrol the coastal zone and to control and protect shipping
therein ; to support the Army forces.
1938 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ARMY MISSION
To hold Oahu against attack by land, sea and air forces and against
hostile sympathizers ; to support the Naval forces.
2. In the most recent plan the phrase in the Army Mission "to sup-
port the Naval Forces" was deleted and the following was substituted;
"Support Naval Forces in the protection of the sea communications
of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea com-
munications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce
located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases."
[2] 3. It should be noted that in all cases the missions called for
mutual support.
4. Based on these broad missions the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department, and the Navy Commander in Hawaii agreed
to accept certain responsibilities for defense against air attack. These
agreements are to be found in the various local joint plans and the
separate plans of the Army and Navy in Hawaii. The basic current
plans in Hawaii on Dec. 7, 1941 were: The Joint Coastal Frontier De-
fense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, 1941, and the Army and
Navy Operations Orders and agreements based thereon. These plans
and agreements contain the following major provisions pertaining to
defense against air attack :
(a) Antiaircraft De.fen^t^
Responsibility
Source
ARMY
NAVY.
(1) "Shall provide for: a. The
defense of OAHU"
* antiaircraft
(2) Army Antiaircraft, "supported by Naval Units
placed under the tactical control of the Army,
will operate to defend Oahu from attacks by
hostile aircraft."
(31
(3) The Army, "Arrange for such coordination of the
antiaircraft artillery fire of naval ships in PEARL
HARBOR and the Army antiaircraft defense as
1 may be practicable."
"The Pacifie Fleet and the Fourteenth Naval Dis-
trict * • * aie taking certain security meas-
ures, which include:
(d) The organization of four air defense groups for the
control and distribution of the antiaircraft Are of all
ships anchored in Pearl Harbor."
"In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the
Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-
based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense."
[4]
"The
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District
• • • shall: (a) exercise with the Army joint
supervisory control over the defense against air
attack, (b) Arrange with the Army to have their
antiaircraft guns emplaced."
(d) Coordinate Fleet antiaircraft fire with the base
defense."
Par 17, Joint Coastal Frontier
Defense Plan Hawaiian
Coastal Frontier, 1941
Par 2, FO No. 1 NS (Naval
Security) Hq. Hawaiian
Dept.
Par. 36 (3), FO No. 1 NS (Na-
val Security)
Par. 16 FO No 1 NS (Navy
Security) Hq. Hawaiian
Dept.
Par. Zg. (2) (6) Pacific Fleet
Confidential Letter 2 CL-41.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1939
Conchmon: The orders and agreements on the ])art of the local
Army and Navy Commanders lead to the conclusion that primary
responsibility for antiaircraft defense rested with the Army but that
the Navy had a secondary responsibility in conection therewith.
(b) Aircraft Warning Service
Responsibility
Provisions
Source
Army
Navy -
(1) The Army "shall provide for: • * * 6. "An
antiaircraft • ♦ • intelligence and warning
service."
"During the period prior to the completion of the AWS
installation, the Navy, through use of RADAR,
and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give
such warning of hostile attacks as may be prac-
ticable."
Par 17, Joint Coastal Frontier
Def. Plan, Hawaiian Coastal
Frontier, 1941.
Par. 11, Annex VII Joint
Coastal Frontier Def. Plan
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.
Cnnchision: The Army had primary responsibility for the establishment of an
aircraft warning service. The Navy, however, agreed to furnish such means
as it had. pending the installation of the Army facilities then under construction.
(c) Aircraft
(RECONNAISSANCE PHASE)
Responsibility
Provisions
Source
Army
Navy
(1) "Shall provide for:
« * *
Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters
of the Oahu DCA in cooperation with the Naval
Inshore Patrol."
(1) Navy "shall provide for: a. An inshore patrol.
b. An offshore patrol * • * i. Distant recon-
naissance."
(2) "When naval forces are insufficient for long distant
patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft
are made available, these aircraft will be under
the tactical control of the naval commander
directing the search operations."
Par. 17, Joint Coastal Frontier
Def. PlanHCF.
Par. 18, Joint Coastal Frontier
Def. HCF.
Par. 2c, Annex VII, Joint
Coastal Frontier Def. HCF.
le]
(DEFENSIVE AIR)
Army.
Navy.
"b. Defensive air operations over and in the immedi-
ate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the
tactical command of the Army."
(1) "Each commander will • • * make available
without delay to the other commander such pro-
portion of the air forces at his disposal as the cir-
cumstances warrant."
(2) "With due consideration to the tactical situation
existing, the number of fighter aircraft released
to Army control will be the maximum practic-
able."
Par. 26. Annex VII Joint
Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan
Par 2 Annex VII
Par 26. Annex VII
(OFFENSIVE AIR)
Army
"g.
Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive
Par 17j;. Joint Coastal Frontier
operations at sea within range of Army
Def. Plan
bombers."
Navy
(1)
"Shall provide for * • • j. Attacking enemy
Par 18, Joint Coastal Frontier
Naval Forces."
Def. Plan. Par 2a Annex VII
(2)
"Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will
be executed under the tactical command of the
Navy."
1940 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[7] Conclusion: The Navy was primarily responsible for close and distant
aerial reconnaissance and offensive air operations against hostile snrface craft.
The army was primarily responsible for defensive air operations. Regardless of
the service primarily resp<jnsible, the opposite service was charged with support-
ing the operation within the means available to it.
To summarize, it will be seen from the at)ove analysis that :
(a) Definite plans and agreements existed in Hawaii for defense against
aircraft ;
(b) Although the Army had the primary responsibility for antiaircraft defense,
aircraft warning service and defensive air operations and the Navy had the pri-
mary responsibility for close and distant reconnaissance, and offensive air opera-
tions, each service was charged with augmenting the forces of the other with the
means available to them in order to provide the maximum effective defense.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1941
EXHIBIT NO. 90
ffoiiii' Telegram Sent «onc.:
ColKct {Oty l«tt«r
iNWrtlrttw w.. A...
c>.,r^o^^.^x. ©ppartnmtt of ^tatp ^, ,„
Full rit« ^ ,^ ,y j:'L,f_TN'
0.ylet1.r Jf .^\ '
Ch.r,K to Department ^ ^ ' "^O > r
» '0*^ December lA , IQ^i
AMERICAN LEGATION , 0
BERN
J ^ r
AMERICAN INTERESTS.
Please express to Sv-dss Govenmant this Goirarnaeat 's
appreciation of its message expressir;g willingness to
undertake the representation of American interests in
Japanese-occupied territories and, waen necessary, in other
regions of the Far East.
Department would be grateful if Swiss Government would
by telegraph circularize to its representatives in -
East, for the information of such American diplomat i
consular offices as may by reason of the present si _.
find it impossible to carry on their functions or to coir-
municate v.-ith the Department, the following messafi^e {in
substance already communicated to Embassy
endeavored without /repeat without^ success z ; r:;, o i
to the offices concerned):
iUOTE One. In the event of a sudden ei;.er
when communications with the Doport:.ient are
broken
EjKll>htTtJ iy ._
Sent by opcraior
1942 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TELt.GRAM Sent
Drpiirtinciit of ^tatr
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1943
ro BC 1H*N»MiTttO
,, TELEGRAM SENT .JZ r::: ^
Collect {0»y letter - - — fartair
I HiRht letter piaim
Ch«Ke Department. iSepartHtPnt Of ^tfltC
Full rate
Day letter Washinilon,
NighMetler
CKar^e to
reco-,:aro- i:
calend-.r ys. r, l
ci.oala be ter;airi-'ted {■
Enclphttti iy .
Sml iy eptrolor •'' •
1944 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Telegram Sent
Brpnrtmrnt nf *tatc
H ashington.
Enci/jhertJ hy
Sfnt iy opfielor ' M.. !'>
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1945
r,»nnotNTi*t coot
Telegram StNT . .o«oo.r,oe«T,«. code
D rpartinr nt of ^tatt
- - '■'i luhingtcn.
79716 O — 46— pt. If
1946 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Telegram Sent
Day !.•!!-
Qrpartmriit of ^tatv
Washington,
Stnt by Ofjtrul'ir M ,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1947
HrparttmMit uf *tnli*
Stnl tj,' ,jf,e,iUi-' M.. ,19.
1948 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TELtGRAM Sent
Qrpartiurut of #tatr
ii'ii}hinil:m.
•*^
Sent by opinjtor M.,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1949
Drp.
. , ,_ ., / .e Swiss
■'i'ioers charged with the repre-
j.'9i>t3 in.iBBte .mifiiit be authorized
their c- - '.0, Pie-.
;t.
1950 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 91
EMBASSY OF THE ' j
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
Tokyo, December 15, 1941.
oL'BJT.CT: DESTRUCTION CF CUDE=, CIlHEItD AND CIPHER
DEVICSa.
v^ •
T^^
j^'
^
A^^'l
1/
The HonortJblB
Th« ,~->ecr^tfrv of otate,
..ashii-ton.
6lr:
I have the honor to enclose herewith for the
Division of Coi-aa.r.icftJ.ns and Records a list of
the codes, -.i.-hers and ci.her devices which were
burned or destroyed under standing instructions on
December &, 1941 on the outbreak of war between the
united otates and Japan. This list oom;rises all the
codes
r:;
/*i6»»l
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1951
codes, ciphers, cipher devices and other material
pertaining to codes in possession of the Embassy.
As provided by regulation, this statement is signed
by the two officers in whose presence they were
bui-ned. The true readings of all telegrams in
confidential codes were likewise burned on December 8,
1S41 in the presence of the same two officers.
Respectfully yours,
Joseph C. Grew.
Enclosures :
1/ List of codes, ciphers nnd cipher devices.
lie. 2
CL'2:gch
Oririnnl ; u-; t.,o oo. is-s to Depai-t.-ont .
1952 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1953
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
■ Si
.:i7IJ:-;::tial
A
\^^
7lM
///'/^^
1^",
K.
1^
:^f
Ol
CO
^ir:
>ocrjtrjry of jtate,
.'aahin'-ton.
I .xiVQ Li:e honor to rc-ort th-it; just rj-ior to tiie
catbr-3ak of v.-r •)ef..t,'en z.a Unitod ^t-t-is ".i^ J' ; ur. t.'ie
jii'oasj:' received, \yj poucL fro:.. t..e ^- ^. '
ro.-istore-- st-)'aled j.-ivelopec f.dCre^oCi l.. - ■...
;;n3Ulate
f^'^
1954 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
- '^,<;^ . -<-^^^'l.-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTSE 1955
, o;::;o,
1956 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
No. k'-jI'c
,<!>'
•3, roi^rur-.i
W-
*
tc
01
1/
The Honorable
SrcreZhrj of St^te
Waehlni^-ton
Slr:-
I -r.-av^ -.'p noRor to ^iK.slt ;>';'*-'-i :
tne .-.eEtr.ctlon of t ;e fllua of Vr.e fiecortl:
S.ctlon -f t .?v.
^.espectfully vo'JU^e,
File : 0. 1?~ .2
itiied
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1957
Enclopure ho, 1 i j'. 31^
"t .ed Feuruary 1-5, i3-i£ ',
-'.ajasfiv pt ToXyo
-r 3ECTI>.i;'3
■-uld
■'C^ric Tr
"^ — '
1958 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EMBASSY OF Ti-.E
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Tokyo, Maroh 25, 1942,
SUBJECT: DKSTRUCTION OF STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FILES.
-r:^^^
'0^
a' 1 .
IV)
to
4w
0>
4)^
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.
Sir:
1/ I hare the honor to enclose a list of the strictly
confidential material in the files of the ICmbassy which
was burned in accordance with Section 7 of the Department's
und?ited "Instructions to .-di;'=ric ;n Diplomatic and Consular
Officers in Japanese Occupied Territories and other Regions
of the Far East" received in January 1942 through the
Swiss Lei'ation in Tokyo.
In addition to the strictly confidential material listed
on the enclosur'? to this despatch, all true readin^-s of^
-' telecjrams in confidential code were burned on December 8,
1941, as reported in my unnumbered despatch dated December 15^
1941.
In
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1959
-2-
In conformity v,-ith the Department's instruction,
non-confidential bound and current correspondence was
not in /general destroyed, but was stored in the Embassy
vault for safe keeping in custody of the Swiss repre-
sentative, and only such material contained therein
v;hich might have proved compromising to any individuals
in areas under Japanese control was removed and burned.
Respectfully yours,
Joseph C. Grew.
Enc losure : \^^^ \ V-
1/ as indicated.
CEB:.-h
1960 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 92
'I )1.>1': 0\' I < AtM' iN;
;^ have so lai
•.■;it rendition-"
Mii or jHisonalitif ^ (i{ the (i.v, ,
iii.- luart's cuiUvui. ^ubi, 1 < ..
i
; 1 • ! I <
rc:v;;n
.- ■ \'. V r .1 ■
(>:mnitlr
>t the C"
pT«'tc>t
ill I; t l:i!' iiuiuuiial Ki'U
;■, and that when- any
onviiition i^ observed a
i> madr to the enemy
-eriud
1 JH i ..nl Trivv Seal Mr. AUlci
r countries have iii-titi:
_;; , : ,!i to sustain -n-h ,i \
whWr 'A'.-y :ir.- fii:htinu; f< r th. ir iiv<-
I (AM it !i' the Hou<;e to i \pl lin (,,
wh.tt hi- Kd me to a?k for th^ r ,
tioi.al si'.pport at thi« x\nn\ It ha^
V, ;_■.,:, «'rd that we -hnnhi hiivi- ,
a,V.' p. hate of tl':- k\uA in wl-,, ■
M.'ti.in U'l
• : <■ ("rown at thi;
\t U'|>tt<.! trom the pruvisions
OrJer (Sttings of ih»"
1 think that it would uuet the lon-
.... .' .1, J 1 ..... ;i ..... V » i,.,l ii,.
th:it may b«> , j^j ^ve should >epara:.
>ion. In this ease sc
whieh are )io«tile — an
\\hoi-<- hostiUtv i-i !
,le. '.ue th.it the Gover
\U. \'.:l
ipply
WAR Sm ATION.
! Question proposei
.h- ;:n\v atliourn."
the matt'
hi- rtintir.'H r^
!, h.- t'..!shid
•'k-V aie
icht at!.
1 he I'rinu \":
r Mr. Churchill
■ ■ -^,it;:,. D.v.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1961
- , ^'^ Situation 27 JANUARY 194^ War Situatton 594
Uo have harl a gnat deal oi bad news The Prime Minister: A vote under aU
ill, iy from the Far East, and I think it the conditions which hitherto have made
hi-iilv probable, for reasons wliich I shall the conduct of Farliamentary povernment
l>,i-.(iitly explain, that we shall have a possible. Surely the hon. Gentleman' is
.ir.it deal more. Wrapped up in this bad not the man to l>e frightened of a Whip?
The House of Commons, which is at
present the most powerful reprtscnlative
Assembly in the world, must al^)--! am
sure, will also— bear in mind tlic effect
produced af)road by all its proceeding's.
We have al^o to remcmbei how oddly
forei.[;ncrs view our country and its way
of (ioiof^ things. When Rudolf Hess ilew
over here some months ago he firmly
belicvtd thai he had only to gain
access to certain t ircies in this country
tor what he dcscribcci as " the ("hurchill
clique " —
Mr. Thorne (Plaistow): Where is hr
now?
The Prime Minister: When he ouu'ht to
be — to be thrown out of fK>wer and for a
Government to be set up with which
ffitler could ne^'oti.ite a maunanimous
peace. The only importance attaching to
the opinions of Fless is the fact that he
was fresh from the atmosphere ol Hitler's
intimate table. Hut, Sir, I can assure
you that since I have Ijt i n back in this
country I have had anxious iiujuiric^ from
a dozen countries, and rcpc>rts ol enemy
propaijanda in a score ot coiuitriis, all
turnini; iijicai the juiiiit wlieliu r His
Majcstv's j)i.s.iit r,iiv,iiirni-nt is to In dis-
r;a--i(l hoin {x.wii <! ii<it. This may
si. til -illy tu us. hut in tlic>sc irsouths
abio.id It is hurtiui and iiu.m lui vous tu the
conuiiiiii i-tfurl. 1 am not asking; lor any
spcuaJ, jKr^,on.il tavours in thcsr cirtuni-
stjiKrs. t>ut i am sure the lIoi;.s.,- wnuid
wisii lo make itj positioii clear, thciclore
1 stand by tlic au'itul, con.-iiUitionaj,
Parbanu nl.iry doituiie ul tree dcoatc and
laithlul vutuij.;.
. .in to till acaouiit of the wjr,
s^ .:tu!i s lik . 1 lini 1 luake tor tiie
,oul i,ouhui i.' I .'I the House.
r tour montii^ .11; -.w had to copj
,,, w, will be many tales of blunders and
.i;,,rl^omin.t!S :K)th in foresight and action.
\(. ene w,' pretend lor a moment that
-!crs .Kc ilit-se occur without there
iicen faults and shortcomin:;s. I
: tins rolling towards us like thc
ri a storm, aini that is another
i \v)iy 1 require a formal, solemn
: <_"• »ij<le!j(e from the House oi
is, wJiich hitherto in this stru^j^le
..r iimclied. The Hou^c would
:s duty if it did not uisi-t upon two
lirst, free<iom of- debate, and,
. . a clear, honest, blunt Vote there-
i laii we ^hall all know where we
•u! ,dl th. s,- with whom we have to
' i. ■•';:, ,i;iij aUioad, friend or foe,
v where we .ire and where they
1: Is beeai;s( we are to liave a tree
(), .. le, in whi<h perhaps 20 to 30 .Mem-
;•, •- .in take part, that I tiemand an ex-
' >n of opinion from the VX) or 400
iefs who will h.r.c .sat silent.
j- 1-; In-ae.-c tiiir:cs ha\'c ;.;orie barlly
. ■■ (ifse > 'o -'rtie ih 't ! dt m md a Vote
I -f'-iiii. e. i'Ms will he pl.a ' (i <ei the
• ■ ' ■ 'I'v. to ! e 'IV \<r! at a ;..♦. r st i-e.
' ■■'■ w'i'c :}■(;- -hfiili hamper aiiv-
J:.: ii-io'i:! critit isjn..
ke. iT t ••■r]i
ls!( I. that 17!,
• v\ith thiiikin
"- 1 re
that
;r<. ti.
IhiKm;
.'Ce
triinistr.ition. su, \
m r( -pe. ( ot
1 as it is, !r' nii.cht
• :; ■! i:'n <.^. !M- Hut il an
. i,' (he Cj'A ,_ niiiient
' it! th<,- public in-
htokcn cp, he
<•(! t.i t, silly hl-s
I. ole. . i hue IS no
ni-et!;..! il! delate.
belt!;.;
^! the
tai |[ litllp ?l. lo lOU-
'.■I \'-\u^ h may be set
i.:-e . ;,,!■ IK bate. liiit no
la ;n aiy-ici.aithed in debate,
:ie ihoaid be chitken-hcarte>l in
i have voted ni;aitist Govern
have been elected to support,
1:11,' back, I have sometimes felt
that I did so. Everyone in
h times must do what he thinks
Mr. Shinweil (Seaham) : A free vote?
I iiree
with the toUowiiiji; ^itiiatjua 1 iie (jcrman
i'lvaders were advancmt;, blasting their
way thioufjh Russia. 1 he Russians were
resiAtinj.; with the utmost heroism. But no
oni- could tell what would happen,
wliether F.eninj.;nid, .Moscow or Rostov
would fall, or where the German winter
line would be established. No one can tell
now where it will be e.stablished. but now
tKe boot is on the other Ivg. We all agree
that we must aid the valiant Russian
79716 O — 46— i)t. 1<
1962 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
593
H'ar Stluatton
HOUSE OF COMMONS
iVar Situation
596
[The Priint- Minister.]
Armifs to tin.- utmobt limit of our power.
Hi.s ,M.)jt?!v''s Government thought, and
I'arliiiiiK lit upon roilcction agrt-ed with
l.iim, that the best aid we could give to
Rii'-ia \va.- in sujiplics of many kinds of
raw m.ittria!? and of mimitions, particu-
laiiy t.iiks and airrraft. Onr Forces at
h,,ui and alToaU iiaii for loni; been wait-
iUj.; ihir-tily for thise weapons. At last
i.iiy Will oihini; tu liand in large nnm-
bcrs. A; 1h>;ih we liav ahvay^, the danger
of inva-icn to consider and to prepare
a.: Ki-t. 1 will speak about the situation
ill ;l; Ni idle Kast presently. Ncverthe-
! at i^remicr Stalin -for that ]
•w 1k' wishes to iv addre-.-i-d:
ai ,1,1 I, i:i;il is tiie form in which he tele-
grc.phs to nil- e.xactly what he asked for.
!''i! wholi- quantity was promised and
^i ;it. Tlitre has been, I am sorry to say,
I sni.ill Uv^ due to bad weather, but it
will he made up by the early days of
I'elriiary. This was a de< ision of major
str.;te,'4y and policy, and anyc^ne can see
thrv. it was ri.^ht to put it first when they
!i tile wiuuh'rfnl achievements, un-
!; .! for, undreamed of by us because
Wi- liiitr ku'w the Russian strength, but-
.ill till' nsore t^lorious as they seem — the
woi; hrful .uhitvi-niei:;^ of the Russian
.•\r:!ii- -. (>:ir ii!im!!i":i> were of course
only .1 ' "ii'ri!'iitinri to the Russian victory,
b'lt 111. ■. v,(T" an enrnuragement in
•••'■■■ :kt-l hour. Moreover, if we
'■.Ml a loyal effort to help our
,1; ,1 hi .i\ \- :-a< rifue to our
the oil which they are beginning seriously
to need, but it would have involved the
destnu lion of the Russian Fleet and the
loss, ol the command of the Black Sea.
It would have affected the safety of
Turkey, and it would, in due course, have
exposed to the gravest dangers Persia,
Iraq. Cyria and Palestine, and beyond
tlu).■^e countries, all of which are now
uiiiliT our control, it would have
(hreattried the Suez Canal, F,gypt and the
.N'ik- \all<y. ,\l the same time as this
nicnicc (jcfinefl itself with hideous and
iri' rr isini; rcaiity as it seemed, Cieneral
vol! i\o;nni(l. svilli his array of 10 Ger-
;!i !i uid It.'li;in divisions rnlren< hed in
!:;- '.itifHtl positions at and behind the
Ii:!i'.'\M P.-.--. w.is prepariu'^ to make a
lit-, i^ive :■.'':• k on Tohruk as a imlimin-
ar\' in a r'. iiewed advance uy>on Fgypt
from the West. The Nile \',i!!ey was
therefore menaced simu!tanet>iislv by a
direct att.irk frc>m the Wisi .tiul !n' a more
remote but in some \va\s uiorr deadly '
attack from the \orth. In sis h circum-
stances it is the classic. 1! rule of war,
reinforced by endless e.x.imples — and
soific exceptions —that von (irrpare to
I'lcht a (^elaviui: .-n tion .njain-t one c>f the
fun attacks and cotKentr.;!!. if possible,
)MrwlielTTiii:
• i C
stren'.^tli
• tt.i. k.
•lal Ar.<
■lin.l
We
[una
the other
Iherefore
• for
..ist
jn.in Sea,
1 e\ant-
^'•.priis to th( ( .'
I rr).i\- I,. II 111
. and prep.irip.q in-t-ill.itions,
ornrnnniv'atioi!- npon which
.'iihi li: li.i~;(l, .;^ liinr ;ind
v..-,; On tl'c nthrr flmk,
! ny u< ■>]:i'.
tr >.\-.-- Iir. . -- il .1 ail
.1. .i. We
.!:■ 1 (he im-
. :.. ,., '^:].,.-l. H'!t
!M> Ul-
a I tu ■ I -Kill we
v. •■'. wh. M we -11 liiiw i\i-iits, whjili
']'■'•. r.,^ k and faMt\- hu-n.m effort
'.<] Ji - jn, have -haped tlu'in-i Ives, I am
le lliw wa- a ri^^ht decision.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1963
597
War Situation 27 JANUARY 1942 "'«'' 5«'««''<"» 59^
much more than doublt- as -troii^.
Therefore, it seems to m^ that this heroic,
epic struggle in the (ie-'ort. though there
have been many local reverse--: and many
ebbs and flows, has tested our manhood
ill a searching fashion and has proved
not only that our men ran die for King
and country — everyone kiKw that— but
that they can kill.
I cannot tell what the p.i-ition ot the
present moment i- on the \V<-^tern front
in Cyrenaica. We havr a vers' ilaiin- and
skilful opponent a.cainst us and. may I
.sav arnjss th- hav'oi nf v\ar. a great
Ceiu-rai. He lia., tertainly r.t.-ivcd r<-in-
fon ein<'iit<. AiK.ther liattle i- ev( n rxnv in
prijgrts-, and I make it a rule ne\<r to
tjy and proph.-N\- h.-fnrfhand how h.ttilrs
win turn <uit. I al\\a\> rejciie tli..! I ha%e
made tlsat rule. fAs uus. Mimbm;:
" What alxxit the Skaggerak ? "' 1 hat
wa- lurdlv a Uattle. NaturalK'. one df, >
not -a\- iii'a < aM- hk- that that \vi' liavt riot
a .iian.r, l.iTau-o tii.ii i^ a[>1 to in- vn-
touiagiii;^ to thi ,:umy and di'pre"in^ to
tair own fnciids. In the .ctnrr,!! i;|>-hot,
the tait r>'rn:iit)s that. when, a.- a "-iar a,co
thr C,frit)aiis svin- tclliu.u; a!i tli-- iiruirals
lt;at thi \- uotild \>v in Sue/ bv Maw >vlun
General Auchinleck had demanded five
months' preparation for his campaign, but
on i8th November he fell upon the enemy.
For more, than two months in the desert
the most fierce, continuous battle has
raged between scattered bands of men,
armed with the latest weapons, seeking
each other dawn after dawn, fighting to
the death throughout the day and then
often long into the night. Here was a
battle which turned out very differently
from what was foreseen. All was dis-
persed and confused. Much depended on
the individual soldier and the junior
officer. Much, but not all: because tjiis
battle would ha\T been lost on 24th
November if General Auchinleck had not
intervened himself, changed the command
and ordered the ruthless pressure of the
attack to be maiiitained without icqarfl to
risks or consequences. But for this robu-t
decision we should now be back on the okJ
line from whi< h we liad started, or per-
haps further hack. Tobruk would po.;-il)lv
have fallen, and Kommel miqht he uian h
ing towards the Nile. Since then the battle
has deel.ire<] it.-elf. Cyrenaica has bet u
regained. It has still to bf held. We h.iv^'
not sucfeeded in d< -troyitig Ronirnil'i
army, but nearly two-thirdi of it an'
woimde<l, prisoner^ or dead.
If of
the
-a\'
Perhaps I may giNc th. Hi^'Ui - :■
House. In this ^trani;<\ -rnnbrc l),ilt
the de.serl, where our nnu i\.t\e mi't
enemy for the tir-^t tini' ! do no.t
in ever\' n-^pect. bi-( aii.-v tlii-rt ar.- -"mi'
things which an- no! .ill that \m had fioj- ']
for — but, upon tin wlifile, h.t\r nut hiii:
with ecjual weapotis. we lia\t l<;-t in
killed, wuundrd and capturtd al:^)::t I'^.ooo
ofti> ers and men, of whc>rn the Ljrcatcr p.irt
are B^iti^il. We have in our po--. --ion
'.;t'»,5no [uiioners. includin- niaiiv
wounded, of \sb,oni 10,500 air fnrmai!.-
We ha\a' killed ,uid \voinnKd at iv.t-t
Itaii.ii!- in
■ xaMlv. of
.1 ni.i.-- oi
i,i\ e
or to tli.-
n^.ii.v. <)f
s'lUie pti'i
a ( >( rinan
p> e.ple \N-
htormvd ,
V.dley. (
Ue ]\j\, ■
a.:,ai;!-t lii
w.u'!, iiiti
),iT!-on, o
til. in ut
iulv ha- 1
!i< i'allli
alk-d <A
enl upon
po->-iliilit\' ol
iul, and manv
[m:; upon
< ;ii ■ t
1 iiurii
hitji i
not ~;i
u-t
laid.
app
)Ulited for
lerr- is ai:-
if wiiotu
1 1,500 Cierman-
,.:11 ' .. lota.l, .u-
(>i,ooo men. Therf- is
eneni\' wounded, .-nue
been evai uated to the
Westward- 1 eannr.t tell
the forces of which (m rural Ko'iuiiel di-
posed on i8th November, little more than
one-third now remain, while ^52 (ierrnan
and Italian aircraft have been de-troy d
and 3 ;'j dernian and Italian tank- Dur-
ing this battle we ha\a ne\t r ii.el in .u ;i' n
more than .45,o«x) men, a-iui-t .-nemy
forces — if they could be brou^h.t to bear —
(ii.ink.-
Na-. V.
11, 1- :
Wiht:;.
niu-i, li
!hou-li
hi;:i)U
laiuh.
to th.
Zeal.ind
x,Idi. r-
plaved
.-,tu!)l
the
s
l-i..
JUd ,
their part Hi It
rn, .steadfast and
In-, ii.in.
-,ii!..r-.
.li-!)
1964 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
599
War Situation
HOUSE OF COMMONS
War Siituttion
floo
[The Prime Minister.]
of Tohnik by Australian and British
tro()|i> was an fssential preliminary, over
s» vtii hard months, to any success which
nKi\- haw- bei-n achieved.
Let u-, bte what has happened on the
()ti;ir Hank, tho Northern llank, of the
Nilf V'aik'V. What has happened to
Palestine. Syria, Iraq and Persia? There
we must thank Russia. There the valour
(»f the Russian Armies has warded off
dangers which wc saw and which we un-
doubtedly ran. The Caucasus and the
precious oilfields of Baku, the great
Anylo-Per^ian oilfields, are denied to the
enemy. Winter has come. Evidently
We have the time to strengthen still
further our Forces and organisations in
those regions. Tlierefore. sir, I present
to you. in laying tlie whole field open and
bare and sur\-eying it in all its parts, for
all are r«lated. a situation in the Nile
Valiev, both West and East, incompar-
ably easier than anything we have ever
seen, since we were deserted by the
French Hordeaux-V'ichy Government and
were set \ipon"by Italy. The House will
not fail to discern the agate points upon
whi<h this vast improvement has turned.
It is only bv the smallest margin that we
)ia\ c -lu CI I'tled so far in Iwating Rommel
ill ( \i. iiaica and destroying two-thirds
'I !ii- tnr. OS. E\ery tank, every aircraft
-qii.ul'i .n was needed. It is only by the
\ K t' ru - on the Russian flank on tlu-
r.l.u K >t.i nM«-t that we have been spared
the (A.mmninu oi all tho^e vast lands
tioU' {'::>■ I. IX iiii ti> the Caspian, which in
tiini ii\. .ti.i-> to India, Persia, the
I'li-i.r.: (.'lil. ih.- Nile Valley and the
Sllr.' i\'\'..i]
1 'lu -li !\- nf these
'' -' ' li ni!i(,'i>. will SCO
\s iKiiii ".slv 1 ill n^'.'urcrs havr
i:ic-(i aii'i ti\- V, h i! ;: --iiMn inar^in
■l l'\- wiial ^Ui'ki - III rurtuiif !"r
uliii!) \vc ( i Min tin I n (lit wc lia\c --ui
\ iv ' ' • • ■~\ ' .{ r< >h('iiUl wt h,->\i-
i I ' : '.i wr had yicltU-d
\" - isi' h ua> M> loud
Ihl. .■ ..I l..;i! ; ;ii it v.c vhoidd
in\ .h;i ! ; ;.> , '. ( oiMiim •-. \\'.-
C.t;; ■ n:t illr' iipll'll,
■■ > \\!n. tii.l 11.. t
ji I ; 'ai! Mli.KjJK'
V. i; , hi. i' ll \^.'
\).-,\ .u . ' -^ttl-.O
l'\. l\ !. 'ntlli.i.
,\il% a. ; ■ -.!. .■L.:U (ll (HIT
Ai!n\
d .v.A v^ou!d i..-
fighting for life on the French shores «»
on the shores of the Low Countries. AH
these troubles of the Far East and the
Middle East might have sunk to ia-
significance compared with the question of
another and far worse Dunkirk.
Here, let nne say, I should like to pay
my tribute to one who has gone from us
since I left this country, Mr. Lees-Smith.
who, I remember, spoke with so much
profound wisdom on this point at a
moment when many opinions were in flax
about it. His faithful, selfless and wae
conduct of the important work which he-
discharged in this House was undoubtedly
of great assistance to us all, not only to
the . Government but to us all, in the
various stages of the war. His memory
as a distinguished Parliamentarian ■wifi
long find an honoured place in the recol-
lection of those who had the fortune to
be his colleague.
Sometirfes things can be done by say-
ing '.' Yes," and sometimes things can be
done by saying " No." Yet I suppose
there are some of those who were vocal
and voluble, and even clamant, for a
second front to be opened in France, who
are now going to come up bland and
smiling and ask why it is that we have
not ample forces in Malaya, Burma,
Borneo and the Celebes. There are times
when --o many things happen, and happen
>(> quickly, and time seems to pass in such
a ua\ that you can neither say it is long
(II >hort. that it is easy to forget what you
have said three months before. You may
fail to connect it with what you are advo-
cating at the particular moment.
Throughout a long and variegated
Parliamentary life this consideration
luis led me to try and keep a
wati^liful eye on that danger myself.
\ .111 IK \< r can tell. 1 here are also people
>,\1;.. t.dk and hvar tln-insf-ives as it they
h.td [ucpaH-i! tor this war with great'
.iiiiiatui lit-, and long, careful preparation.
P.tit th..t i.■^ not tnu-. In two and a half
yi.u.-- o| tightuig wc have only just
ni.'.n.iced to keep our head> a!K)ve water.
\\h<-u 1 w.i-^ i.dle<l upon to be Prime
Miii!>t(i. iiiiw iieaily two years ago,
th. u v., u ii.'t 111. my appHiants tor the
j'.i). > 1. ■ tii. li, perhaiis. the market has
in;,':.!^.' Jli spite oi the shameful
nr.:\''~.< ■■- • . si'.-- niiid'Jtt-.. blatant incom-
pi-ti ;n ! , 1 1! ipl.ii <-iicy, and lack of organ-
i-iu-; povMi -.^hich ire daily attributed to
lis ;iii-l li.':i' whi', h chidingv we endeav-
nlU ti: ]>!■!!;: \\i- .ife fiecHining tu see
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1965
H'ar Sttuiilwn
27 JANUARY i.j4i
War Sltudli'
602
our way througli. It looks as it we weif
in for a very bad time, but provided wc
all stand to^tlher. and provided wc throw
in the last spasm of our strength, it also
looks, more than it ever did before, as
if we were going to win.
\\'Tiile facing Germany and Italy here
and in the Nile Valley we have never had
any power to provide effect i\tly for the
defence of the Far East. M\ whole argu-
ni«nt so far has led up to that point. It
may be that this or that might have been
done which was not done, but we have
never been able to provide effectively for
the defence of the Far Ivast against an
attack by Japan. It ha.s been the policy
of the Cabinet at almost all costs to avoid
embroilment with Japan until we were
sure that the United States would also be
engagied. We even had to stoop, as the
House will remember, when we were at
our very weakest point, to close the Burma
Road for some months. I remember that
some of our present critics were very
angry about it, but we had to do it.
There never has been a moment, there
never could have been a moment, when
Great Britain or the British Empire,
single-handed, could fight Germany and
Italy, could wage the Battle of Britain,
the Battle of the Atlantic and the Battle
of the Middle East — and at the same time-
stand thoroughly prepared in Burma, the
Malay Peninsula, and generally in the
Far East against the impact of a vast
military Empire like Japan, with more
than 70 mobile divisions, the third navy
in the world, a great air force and the
thrust of 80 or 90 millions of hardy, war-
like Asiatics. If we had started to
scatter our forct- o\er these immense
areas in the Far East, we should have
been ruined. If we had moved large
armies of troops urgently needed on the
war fronts to regions which were not at
war and might never be at war we .should
have been altogether wrong. We should
have cast away the chance, which has
now become something more than a
chance, of all of us emerging safely from
the terrible plight m wfn'ch we have been
plunged.
We therefore have .lain — I am putting
it as buntly as I can — for nearly two years
under the threat of an attack by Japan
with which we had no means of coping.
But as time has passed the mighty Ignited
States, under the leadership of President
Roosevelt, from reasons of its own interest
and safety but also out of chivalrous
No. 24
regard for the cause of fnedurri and
denKK-racy, has drawn ever neiirer to the
conhnes of the struggle. And now that
the blow has fallen it doe^ noi f.ili on us
alone. On the contran', it
united forces and iinitcd u.iti.
upon
which
luring
mil
tvcr
are unquestionably cajiab!'- <■'
the stn);;;;lc, of retrieving;
of prcvcntint,' aiiothi-r sn.
Ix'irtL; <li-li\'ti<-(l a;;;iin.
There is ,ui ..umhu. nt with ulii. !i 1 will
deal a^ I p.- .ilong to pursnc n)\- thein<^.
It is ^;.wl l.\' Mini<-. " If "'iK' \"" ^''l?'
orii,ini.-.<'.l till- inunitions produitK^n of this
.nu:itr\- jnopcrls' and had had .1 Mini tr
of Pn)dti. (ior\ (and that is n<it .1 oi'>"'''"f»
which >ho,)ld be dn-niatisol uji-;! rithir
way) it wciuld have made t viivlhiuj.; .ill
right, 'llun- would have !v. n .non^h
for all needs. We should h..vc had
enough supplies for Russia, eno\i:;li well-
equipped squadrons and d;\ i-ii'H- to
defend tlie British Islands, to .-n^t.un tlie
Miiidlc Ea.st and tn ann the F.ir [•',.i-t
eff'Ttivtly." But that is really not true.
As a matter of fact, our munitions output
is g!i:;uiti<', has tor .s(!nie tunc hou \<Ty
lar;;e indted, anrl it is boundin.: ::;' ;ii a
m<v-'t ninnrkatile manniT. In t'l. l,t-t
ye.ir. io.|T, although we were at •>>.ii c- ■-<>
m;in\- the;ttres and on so inan\ fi";i:-., we
h.iv.' prwdnccd more tliari doulilc the
munitions equipment ot the (.'in'ed States,
wnii!'. was arniint; heavilw tliouK'i r>f
cour.-»e a lap fiehind on the road. ibis
conditirai will naturally be rapidly re-
moved as the full power of Atnerican
industry come into full swing. V,ai. Sir,
in the last si.x months, thank- to the
energies of Lord Beaverhrook m.l the
solid spadework done by hi- predecessors
and the passage of unv^ — lie p.irticul.irly
a ks nie to say that — [An Hos. ME.\i-
bkk: " Who did? "]— Lord Beaverhrook;
I should have said it anyway — our muni-
tions output has risen in the following
re.spe(!.>. We are producing more than
twice as main' far more compile ati'd guns
ever\- month than we did in the p-ak of
1917-18 war period, and the curve is ri-
ing. The guns are inhntely more compli-
cated. Tank production has doubled in
the last SIX months Small arms produc-
tion is more than twice what it was six
months ago. Filled rounds of ammuni-
tion have doubled in the last si.x months.
I could go on with the catalogue, but
these are not doublings from early very
small totals, they are doublings from the
totals we boasted about, as far as we
C 2
1966 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
603
War Situation
HOrSK OF COMMONS
War Situation
[lh<- Pririu Miiiisttr.l
tlarid. six mmiths a^o. There has betTi
an iinnn use K-.ip forward. In aircraft
prodiK li.in thfi- is a steady increase not
only in thf numbers but also in the size
and <iuality of the aircraft, though I must
»ay there has not been all the increase
which 1 had hoped for.
But ail this has nothing to do with the
preparations it was open to us to make
«n Mala\a and Hurma and generally in
the Far Kast. The limitiuf^ factor has
not been troops or even equipment. The
Imutin.i; factor has been transport, even
assuming we had wished to take this
measure and had had this great surplus.
From the time that this present Govern-
ment was formed, from the moment it
was formed I may sav, every scrap of
shipping we could draw away from our
vital supply routes, everv U-boat escort
we could divert from the Battle of the
Atlantic , has been busy to the utmost
capacity to rarrv troops." tanks and muni-
tions from this I>lan(l to the F.ast. There
has l)een a cea.seles.s flow, and as for air-
craft they have not only been moved
by sea but by every route, some very
dangerous and costly routes, to the
Eastern battlefields. ' The decision was
taken. a> I have explained, to make our
contribution to Russia, to try to beat
Komnnl and to form a stronger front
from the Levant to the Caspian. It
followed from that decision that it was in
our pu\x(, only to make a moderate and
partial pro\i>ioii in the Far East against
the h>potlutical danger of a Japanese
onslaught. Si.vty thousand men. indeed,
were ( onceiitrated at Singapore, but pri-
ority in modern aircraft, in tanks, and in
anu-aircrafi and anti tank artillery was
ac<ordcd to the Nile Valley.
l-or this dt■ci^ion in its brcvad strategic
aspe.t-.. ;uh1 a]^>() in its diplomatic f>olicy
in rii^anl to Ru>sia, I take the fullest
personal rc'sjwnsibility. If we have
handled onr resources wrongly, no one is
so nil!, h to blame as me. If we have not
got iarce nuKlern air forces and tanks in
But nil and Malaya to-night no one is
more a., oiimabie "than I am. Why then
should 1 l)f called upon to pick out scape-
goats, to throw thi- blame on generals or
airmen or sailors? Why, then, should
I 1:h" callwl upon to drive away loyal and
trusti'd colleaguis and friends' to appease
the clamour of certain .sections of the
British and Australian Press, or in order
to take the edge off our reverses in
604
Malaya and the Far East, and the punish-
ment which we have yet to take there?
I would In ,i>tiamed to do such a thing
at sucli a time, and if I were capable of
doiiii.; it, hiii.vc me, T should be incapable
of reiideiing this country or this House
any further service.
] say that without in the slightest degree
seeking to relieve myself from my duties
and responsil)ility to endeavour to make
continual improvements in Ministerial
positions. It is the duty of every Prime
Minister to the House, but we have to
be quite sure that they are improvements
in every case, and not only in every case
but in the setting. I could not possibly
descend to, as the German radio re-
peatedly credits me with, an attempt to
get out of difficulties in which I really bear
the main load by offering up scapegoats
to public displeasure. Many people, many
very well-meaning people, begin their
criticisms and articles by saying, " Of
course, we are all in favour of the Prime
Minister because he has the people l:)ehind
him. Hut what about the muddles made
by this or that Department; what about
that general or this Minister? " But I
am the man that Parliament and the
nation have got to blame for the general
way in which they are served, and 1 can-
not serve them etlectively unless, in spite
of all that has gone wrong, and that is
going to go wrong, I have their trust and
faithful aid.
1 must linger for a moment on our
politkal affairs, l)ecause we are conduct-
ing the war on the basis of a full de-
incKracy and a free Press, and that is an
attempt which has not been made before
in such ciicunistaiue:,. A variety of
attacks are made upon the composition of
the Government. It is said that it is
loniiid ii{x>n a party and political basis.
But io is the House of Commons. It is
silly to extol the Parliamentary system
and then, in the next breath, to say,
" Away with partj' and away with
politics." From one quarter I am told
that the leaders of the Labour party ought
to be dismissed from the Cabinet. This
would be a return to party Government
pure and simple. From opj"»osite quartets
it is said that no one who approved of
Munich .^hoult! be allowed to hold ofhce.
To do that would be to cast a reflection
upon the great majority of the nation at
that time, and also to deny the strongest
party in the House any proportionate
share in the National Government, which
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1967
605
Wf Situation
Wmf SituaHo*
«o6
again, in turn, might cause inconvenience.
Even mv litjht hon. Friend the leader of
the Liht ral {>art\'— [An HoK. MEMBER :
" Who is he? "]— the Secretary of State
for Air, whose help to-day I value so
much and with whom, as a Ufelong friend,
it is a pleasure to work, even he has not
escapeti unscathed. If I were to show
the slightest weakness in dealing with
thest> opposite forms of criticism, not only
should I deprive my-elf of loyal and ex-
perienct-d colleat^Mu.-, but I should destroy
the National Govt riimcnt and rupture the
war-time unity of I'arliament itself.
Other attacks are directed against in-
liividital AI;!\i-ter->. I have been urged
!•> rn.ik, u .A.nrplc of the Chancellor of
till' Diuhv c.\ Lancaster, who is now re^
tu;-r.in^ fiom his mission in the Far East.
Thu-. \\v would be made to bear the
blame f. .r our misfortunes. The position
of thr Ch,u;cf'l!or of the Duchy of Lan-
' i of the Council which
'.Ml ted to form at Singa-
'•'•r<d obsi)lete by the de-
i r. t. iml with the President
-(.t up a Supreme
,in ti-iiting zone in
! lu -.\ ,.i<ic lonceptioii ol
■■iiiiiuindt ! !■ ih.;t. under the
<iu I ,. \.. i;u:uul- hi' ^-cfvc-,
hi !. I ot ,',',1 aiitiiorilie.-- in
''■■ ' ■ ' iiim. Ihi:? would
!t;
«1. ;
\
V. .;
I.i: .
,1-
n!i;. li u..r<. t
voi:r wis!ie>
The out?tandu
tlie Houx- >hoiil<
tile puq-io- ~ of
tht
.■i tin-
■h.-. 1
iniialili-
thtin, " 1
'•ratifv
iifion svliii, ii
j'iiii^THt lit tor
impending Division
97 JANUARY i94»
is whether His Majesty's Govermnent
were right in giving a marked priority in
the distribution of the forces and equip-
ment we could send overseas, to Russia,
to Libya, and, to a lesser extent, to the
Levant-Caspian danger front, and
whether we were right in accepting, for
the time being, a far lower standard of
forces and equipment for the Far East
than for these other theatres. The first
obvious fact is that the Far Eastern
theatre was at peace and that the oth*
theatres were in violent or imminent war.
It would evidently have been a very im-
provident use of our limited resources — as
I pointed out earlier—if we had kept large
masses of troops and equipment spread
about the immense areas of the Pacific or
in In>lia, Burma and the Malay Penin-
sula, standing idle, month by month and
perhaps vear by year, without any war
of( iirring. Thus, we should have failed
in our engagements to Russia, which has
meanwhile 'Struck stich staggering blows
at the Gorman Army, and we should have
lost the battle in Cvrenaica. which we
have not yet won, and we might no%v be
ftghtini; (](ftnsi\"elv well inside the
Ejzvptiau frontier. There is the question
on whi h the TTous<- should make up its
mind. We had not the resources to meet
all the perils and pressures that came
upon us.
But thi< quc-tion, mtious and large as it
is by itM-lf. (anuot Ix- whollv decided
without some attempt to an>\ver the
further question — what was the likelihood
of the Far F.astern tlu.iln- be^.i^ thrown
into war h\- a Japanese attack'' 1 have
( vpiai'iecj how ven," (Ulicat< Iv we vva!k<-d,
.'i!(l iiow painful it was at times, how very
lareful 1 w,is evers" time that we -hould
not he exp-,):, kJ bin.;!ehandi (! to this
iiii-l o;"ht vvhiih we Wt re iitterl\- incapable
..:. But it >ee!in<l iM.'tioiia! to
i'i.it in the la-^t ^^.ix months — which
1- v-iiii ! a:n prin< ij'ally tieahiiL; with —
thi- I ipane-<-, having thrown av. ,t\- their
(ij>p'.r'i:iiii\- of att.ukini; u-. in the
..i.tiinn; I't lo^o, wlirii wt,' Were >o much
N'.'.ikii so mui h ]■■-■- will-armed. .ii\il all
aloMi-. -h'.ii!<l ,ti ihi- peiitKl ha\'e pluir.'ed
i:it<> ,i <lf -.perate struuj^le a.cain>t tlir (.,m-
hin. li l-Mrc <,f the Bniish ICn.inr. and
i'i< I -utrd States Neverthel» -s. nations.
like individtials, commit irrati<uiai acts,
•;! th<r<; were forces at work in j.ipan,
'.:•■'. nt. niiiriKinus, fanatical and ex-
plosive fortes, which no one could
measure.
' ii
WUn t)(;
:j!.'.nes
:u:iK
>; = - --li.
ir u Is.
uiiic
h \s<.i;
U be
Hid
i:av<-
t<' W
.1 ~
(uir-s-
-Wire
1;; i\:
:'.'■ i\i>\\
.■! t.h-
1968 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
607
War Situation
HOUSE OF COMMONS
War SituatioM
608
On the f)ther hand, the probability,
since th. Atlantic Conffionce, at which I
discusM'd thf-se matters with Mr. Roose-
velt, that thf United States, even if not
hcr><lf attacked, would come into a^war
ill the Far Hast, and thus make final
victorv sure, seemed to allay some of these
anxieties, ("liat expatation has not been
falj-iiied by the events. It fortified our
British dteision to use our limited re-
.sources on the actiial fighting fronts. As
time went on, one had greater assurance
that if Japan ran amok in the Pacific,
we should not fight alone. It must also
lie n in- ::i!Hr<-<l thnt over the whole of the
r ! ihi -1 en,- l)roo(]<-d the great power of
the rnited States FJeet, (oncentrated at
Hawaii It seemed very unlikely tfiat
Japan would attempt the distant invasion
»>f the Malay Peninsula, the assault upon
Singapore, and the attack upon the Dutch
Fast Indie-, while leaving b<>hind them
in their rear this great American Fleet
However to strengthen the position as the
situation s<x-med to intensify we sent the
" Prince of Wales " and the " Repul.se "
to form t!u' .sp<-ar-point of the consider-
able battle forces which we felt ourselves
at length .ibie to form in the Indian
Ocean. We reinforced Singapore to a
considerable extent and Hong Kong to the
extent which we were advised would be
sufficient to hold the island for a long
lime. Beside^ this in minor \^,^\■•^ w.
took wl-ai prii.n.ti.
On ,7t!l Hrrrniix I
-uiiHt-n ittai k. .:
>p< !1 to l:
their
.t Wa-
lime luiiij.
f..r,
the seas, a local command of the air which
will render their expulsion and destruction
a matter of considerable time and exertion.
Here I must point out a very simple
strategic truth. If there are 1,000 islands
and 100 valuable military key points and
you put 1,000 men on every one of them
or whatever it may be, the Power that
has the command of the sea and carries
with it the local command of the air, can
go around to every one of these places in
turn, destroy or capture their garrisons,
ravage and pillage them, ensconce them-
selves wherever they think fit, and then
pass on with their circus to the next place.
It would be vain to suppose that such an
attack could be met by local defence.
You might disperse 1,000,000 men over
the>e immense areas and yet only provide
more prey to (he dominant Power. On
the other hand, these conditions will be
reversed when the balance of sea power
and air power changes, as it will surely
change.
Such is the phase of the Pacific war
into which we have now entere<l I can-
not tell how long it will last. All I can
teli the House it that it will be attended by
ver\- iieavy puni-shment which we shall
have to ' :v,!ur<', ruui that piesently, if we
I -,ii.! ju-t now about the
perse V. it
Kiissi.ii; tioiit, th
odier it ■. That
" ' . .I'.iselves to
; place has I
, ... . Hu- ultimate
M(i\l(i( il
boot will be on the
, win' we should not
it rattled bciause this
■en capture<i. because,
pow( r of th<- I'nited
! luouuht to b. ar, the
\i!| be broUL'ht into play,
orward rt u •<■:.-■. !.-..>ly to
,)1, pr.Ai.liil tll.'.l we per
tisat »<■ li.L;hl ^^;th ih.
1 Ifii.ii it\-, ati:] provided,
remain united.
liki to e\prr-N. in the
to expri
(Iniir.itiori o!
(|iia!it\ witli
.\nny. undt r
-ti(l l)rilli<uitl_\
i.!-. t'l, hor<i.--
Iuirl<-1 .:i,iin-'
t n:;. .1 St.,;.':
M-(!her, No,
!!i the iiauie oj
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1969
'99 ^"' ^*^*'''*^
the House, to the Dutch, who, in the air
and with theif submarines, their surface
craft, and their solid fighting troop, are
playing one of the main parts m the
struggui now going on in the Malaysian
Archipelago.
We have to turn our eyes for a moment
to the hard-fought battle which is raging
upon the approaches to Singapore and m
the Malay Peninsula. I am not going
to make any forecast about that now, ex-
cept that it will be fought to the last inch
by the British, Australian and Indian
troops, which are in the line together, and
which have been very considerably rem-
forced. The hon. Member for the Eye
Division of Suffolk (Mr. Granville) had a
very sound military id^i the other day,
when he pointed out the importance of
sending rcmforcements of aircraft to assist
our ground forces at Singapore and in
Burma. I entirely agree with him. In
fact, we anticipated his suggestion. Before
I left for the United States, on I2th Decem-
ber, the moment, that is to say, when the
situation in Singapore and Pearl Harbour
had disclosed itself, it was possible to make
a swift redistribution of our Forces. The
moment was favourable. General Auch-
inleck was making headway in Cyrenaica;
the Russian front not only stood unbroken
but had begun the advance in a magnifi-
cent counter-attack, and we were able to
order a large number of measures, which
there is no need to elaborate, but whith
will be capable of being judged by their
results as the next few weeks and the next
few months unfold in the Far Ea.>.t.
War SitMoHon
6io
When I reached the I'nitui States,
accompanied by our principal officeri, and
large technical staffs, further impt)rt:int
steps were taken by the President, with
my cordial assent, and with tiie best
technical advise we could obtain, to move
from many directions everythin;^ that
ships could carrj' and all air power that
could be Hown transported and serviced
to suitable points. The House would be
very ill-advised to suppose that the st-vtri
weeks which have passed since 7th
December have been weekj> of apathy and
indecision for the English-speaking world.
Odd as it may seem quite a lot has been
going on. Hut we mu^t not nourish or
indulge light and extravagant hopes or
suppose that the advantages which the
enemy have gained can soon or easily be
taken from him. However, to sum up
%Jb»d and.t^q ^o(^ toggtJiec^ in sgi^jf ^
«7 JANUARY .1942
the many tragedies past and future, aod
with all pity tor those ^ho hare suffered
and will suffer, I must profess my pro-
found thankfulness for what has happened
throughout the whole world in the last two
months.
I now turn lor a short space— I hope I
am not unduly wearying the House, but I
feel that the war has become so wide that
there are many aspects that must be
regarded—to the question of the organisa-
tion, the international, inter-Alhed or
iuter-United Nations organisation, which
must be developed to meet the fact that
we are a vast confederacy. To hear some
people talk, however, one would think
that the way to win the war is to miake
sure that every Power contributing armed
forces and every branch of these armed
forces is represented on all the coimcils
and organisations which have to be set up,
and that everybody is fully consulted
before anything is done. That is in fact
the most sure way to lose a war. You
have to be aware of tiie well-known danger
of having " more harness than horse," to
quote a homely expression. Action to be
successful must rest in the fewest number
of hands possible. Nevertheless, now that
we are working in the closest partnership
with the Inited States and have also to
consider our Alliance with Russia and
with China, as well as the tonds which
unite us with the rest of the 26 United
Nations and with our Dominions, it is
evident tliat our system must become far
iT.oi;- cornpU-x than heretofore.
1 had many discussions with the F'resi-
dent upon the .Xnglo-American war direc-
tion, t specially as it affect., this war
against japan, to which Rns.sia is not yet
a partv^ Tlic physical and geographical
difficulties ot finding a common working
centre for the leaders of nations and the
great staff^ of nations wlinh cover the
whole L'lobc ATv insuperable. Whatever
plan IS rn.uie will be open to criticism and
man\' \alid ol)Jectlon^. Tlurc is no solu-
tion th.it .an t>e fuiiud where the war can
be .liMU-.^.-d in. ID d;iy to day fully by all
the le;?d!!ig militarN' and political aothori-
ti.'. ,.Mh erned. ! have, liowxver, arranged
with l're^idellt Roo>eselt tiiat there should
he a bo<ly m 'Washington called the Com-
biiietl Chiefs of the Staff Connniltee, con-
si-ting of the three United States Chiefs
of the Stall, men of the highest di^tinc-
tion, and three high otliccrs representing
and acting under the general instructions
1970 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
6n
War SiiuattoH
HOUSE OF CX>MMONS
Wmr SittuMom
9xa
[Thf Prime Minister.]
of the British Chiefs of the Staff Com-
mittet' ill London. This body will advise
thf PR'.^idont, and in the event of diver-
gfnr«> of vit'W between the British and
Amcritun Chiefs of the Staff or their
representatives, the difference must be ad-
justed by personal agreement between
him and me as representing our respective
countries. We must also concert together
the close-^t as.'^fKiation with Premier Stalin
and (loin raiissinn) Chiang Kai-Shek as
wcil .i> with the rest of the Allied and
Associ:ilt<l Powers. We shall, of course,
also remain in the closest touch with one
anoflicr on all important questions of
policy
!n order to wage the war effectively
nL'.iiii^t japan, it was agreed that I
sIkh'M ]"ropose to tho.-e cotirerned the
-ettiiKM'ii of a Pacifu- Council in London,
on (he Ministerial plane, comprising Great
Britain, \ii-tralia. New Zealand and the
Diitrh C,n\(rnmeiit. ,^s«isted by the
British Chit fs of the Staff and the great
staff> ort;.uiisitions beneath them, I was
to trv to form and focu- a united view.
This w.iiilil < iial>lc the British Common-
Wf.ihh ;,> ;i( t as a whole and form part
of Ti!:ip- pI.mi- whif-h are at present far
ad\MM.e'! for r.'.ll.ihorttio'i at the appro-
priate I«viK ill thi- -pheres of defence.
foreii;ii Cnr- .in.l .>iM->p]\-. Thus the
unitrd \ . ■.>. -.f tfic Britis!) Commonwealth
and thr Dui, h woul'l he transmitted, at
first, on the Chiefs of the Staff level, to
f t'u- St.iff Com-
i""ton. Ill the
t'vi CM thi rnemhers
onoot-.. (li.>seti-
his reply. I am not, therefore, in a pooj.
lion to-day to armounce, as I had hap«A,
the definite and final arrangements for Qm
Pacific Council.
I should like to say, however, that
imderlying these structural arrangement
are some very practical and simple fawis
upon which there is full agreement. The
Supreme Commander has assumed control
of the fighting areas in the South-West
Pacific called the " A.B.D.A. " area—
A . B . D. A — called after the countries
which are involved, not the countries
which are in the area but the countries
which are involved in that area, namely,
America, Britain, Dutch and Australasia.
We do not propose to burden the Supreme
Commander witfi frequent instructions.
He has hi^ general orders, and he has
addressed himself with extraordinary
buoyancy to his most dif&cult task, and
President Roosevelt and I, representing,
f.>r my pnrt, the British Government, are
detirniined that he shall have a chance
and a free hand to carry it out. The
action in the Straits of Macassar under-
takei) by forces assigned to this area
app.ircntly has had verj' considerable
stKees^, of the full extent of which I am
not \i t advised. The manner in which
«.>i.ni'r,d Wavell took up his task, the
sj). (.1 wall whith he ha.^ tlown from place
to place, ilie telegram^, which he has sent
lii-.-ifibinj; the methods by which he was
i;iappliii^ With the situation and the form-
infj ol tile ( enlral organism which was
liiidid to cieai with it— ail this has made
;i iiiti-l ;a\oiirabie iniprea_-,ion upon the
hif;li oliiurs, military and poiilicaJ, whom
I nut in the L'luled State.-j, This is all
etjiii-; oil. (Mir duty, upon wiiii,ii we have
t>(.vii I ■- iii.-la!iil_\' eiigagf'd ior some lirue,
is I., p.i.-o leiuioreenieiu? oi every kind,
<.-pi' i.iti\' air, inXu the new war zone, from
iMiv ijuarler and by (very ineaua, with
tlie liliiiost .".peed.
Ill i.jiiir to I .Ktend the -)>lein oi unified
i <..,ii.i. Hti \siiiiii h...-. iKfti set up in the
■ .\.l*.l >,.-\." .in.;- thai i?. to sa>', the
\<.l I'atilii — wiieie th.e actual
1- ;-'oiii< oil. in order to extend
tli.il ■,-iri:; 1. 1 ail ar^•,(^> ill wliii.!, the
iMr< I ■ o! i:.'i!c than one oi the I'liiied
.\.iii.in^ \k< aiiM- th.d is the term we have
.i-loMN..! will in ..juralint:, the i';a.stvv.ird
a}ipin.nle- t<. .xu-tralia dwd New Zealand
h.nt hi t'!i -t\!'d liie An/.ic ana, and are
under liiitcd State- eoiumand. the com-
nniuieatioiis lietween the Anzac area and
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1971
6x$ r«r SUuaUon tf JANUARY 1942
America are a United States responsibility,
whUe the communications across the
Indian Ocean and from India remain a
British responsibility. All this is now work-
ing, while the larger constitutional, or semi-
constitutional, discussions and structural
arrangements are being elaborated by tde-
Hrams passing to and wo between so many
Governments. AH this is now working
fciBy and actively from hour to hour, and
it must not. therefore, be supposed that
any necessary military action has been
hfOd up pending the larger structiual
arrangements which I have mentioned.
Now I come to the question of our own
Empire or Commonwealth of Nations.
The fact that Australia and New Zealand
are in the immediate danger zone rein-
forces the demand that they should be
represented in the War Cabinet of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland. We have .
always been ready to form an Imperial
War Cabinet containing the Prime Minis-
iets of the four Dominions. Whenever
any of them have come here they have
taken their seats at our table as a matter
of course. Unhappily, it has not been
possible to get them all here together ?.t
once. General Smuts may not be able to
come over from South Africa, and Mr.
Mackenzie King could unfortunately stay
only for a short time. But Mr. Fraser
was with us, and it was a great pleasure
to have him. and we had a three months'
visit from Mr. Monzies, which was also
a great success, and we were all very
sorry when his most vahiable knowledge
of our affairs and the war position, and
his exceptional abilities, were lost. For
the last three months we have had Sir
Earle Page representing the Common-
wealth Government at Cabinct.s when war
matters and Australian matters were under
distmssioii and aj.so. in similar rircum-
stancrs upon the Defeui f Commiltee,
As a matter of t:tct this l!a^ .ilways been
interpreted in tin- m<)•^t lirnad and elastie
fashion. The ,-\ii.-tralian (jnvernment
have now asked .-jieciheally " that an
accredited rtpresenlative of the Common-
wealth Government should have the right
to be heard in the War Cabinet in the
formulation and the direction of policy."
We have of course agreed to this. New
Zealand feels bound to ask for similar
representation, and the same facilities, will
of course be available to Canada and
South Africa. 1 he presence at the Cabinet
table of Dominion representatives who
have no power to take decisions and can
War Sititatum
614
only report to their Governments evidently
raises some serious problems but none, I
trust, which caimot be got over with good
will. It must not, however, be supposed
that in any circumstances the presence of
Dominion representatives for certain pur-
j>oses could m any way affect the collec-
tive responsibility of His Majesty's Ser-
vants in Great Britain to Crown and
Parliament.
I am sure we all sympathise with our
kith and kin in Australia now that the
shield of British and American sea power
has, for the time being, been withdrawn
from them so unexpectedly and so tragi-
cally and now that hostile bombers may
soon be within range of Australian shoteS^'-
We shall not put any obstacle to tfci«
return of the splendid Australian trooj^
who volunteered for Imperial service to
defend their own homeland or whatever
part of the Pacific theatre may be thought
most expedient. We are taking many
measures in conjunction with the United
States to increase the security of Australia
and New Zealand and to send them rein-
forcements, arms and equipment by the
shortest and best routes. 1 always hesi-
tate to express opinions about the future,
because thiujLjs turn out so \er>- oddly,
but I will go so far as to sav that it m.iy
be that the fapane.M-, whose game i^ wliat
1 may rail " to nviks' hell while the .-un
shines," are more likelv to oeiupv the.m-
seives in se> urinj,' their litli pri/i- in tlu-
Philippine-, tile L)ut<. h V„,>< liulu- orl
the .Malawm .Ai. hipel,)g.i .'IkI hi . ■ : i 1
island b.i^e,-^ for (i< Icnsive purpo '■■ ' .1
att;e k M'hi' h ir, (■•l)\i<iii:.'\' < fuu!;
them ai iv> t.M'e;a i!i-ta!.i . d !;
nieudfiii- 'iii-:,i-:clil whi.!'. v. iii ■ '.i'a: ..: .k-h^--
the futurr in ni\2 and i'<.}.v -^'i H<)N.
MtMlu-.u: ' 104} .uid 104s? " Ni'. I di>
not think we i.tii -tret- ii our \ ie\\ - I- ','';!'i
tlii'-r iI.iN ~. inil. ai;.un, v.e
ini;-t >i e
how s\e t^o. I thmk tiie\' aie inia ii in-'p
like'y t" be atraii.L;!U,t; tlu hi-iIm .- in \\«--i.
di>tri<-t.^ \shi<h tiii\- ha\ t !ii ,1 la ir.-
likely to take than m imd. itak-, .1 -e:>'i!-
ma.-b invasion of Au-traiia. That would
seem to be a very ambitious overseas
operation for Japan to undertake in the
precarious and limited in'er\-.d before the
IJritish and Anurii
they must eertainh i
new building tb
either rea-sonv-
mand of the 1',. iw
everything iti hiiman
r
- regain — a>
ilirough the
,'. and for
ble com-
,'fnwev.r,
that we '.\n
do to help Auatr.dia. or pcr-.uide ,\ineri<:a -
1972 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
615
War Situation
HOUSE OF COMMONS
War Situation
616
to do, we will do; and meanwhile I trust
that rtpro.ichL-ii and recriminations of all
kinds will be avoided, and that il any
are niadi.', we in Britain will not take part
in them.
Let me, in conclusion, return to the ter-
rific changes which have occurrtxJ in our
affairs during the last few months and
particularly in the last few weeks. We
have to consider the prospects of the war
in 1942 and also in 1943, and. as I said
just now, it is not useful to look further
ahead than that. The moment that the
United States was set upon and attacked
by japan. Germany and Italy— that is to
say, within a few days of December 7,
1941 — I was sure it was my duty to cross
the Atlantic and establisli the closest pos-
sible relationship with the President and
Government of the United States, and also
to de\(lop the closest contacts, personal
and professional, betwt>en the I^ritish
Chiefs of Staff and their trans-Atlantic
deputies, and with the American Chiefs of
Staff who were there to meet them.
Having crossed the Atlantic, it was
plainly my duty to visit the great
Dominion of Canada. The House will
have read with admiration and deep
intertst the speech made by the Prime
Mini-ter of Canada yesterday on Canada's
i:reat and growing contribution to the
common cause in men, in money, and
in materials. A notable part of that con-
trihutinn is the litiancial offer which the
CaMidiaii (".(ivcrnrnent ha\c made to this
conntr\-. The sum involved in oik' billion
Canadian dnllir^, about (jjs, 000,000. I
kiK.w the !li':'-r wil'i wi-h nic to iimvi-y
tn thi- (..'A ( I !i;:u at of ( aiiada our liv<!\-
ij'pir. i.itioii di tlnir limi-l\- aiul most
^(■.I'lii;,- olv.r. Jt i- uiu.ju.dji'd in its
-. .ir ill til.' wlu'lv hi--iiir>' ut the Brit!-.h
l.!i:i!iri\ .iIk] It ]> .1 (iiuvinung pruof. ol
'Av (i< li nr.iMitioii of C'.Uiacia to niai<r lu-r
:n,'.\!in!Mn (.oatrilMitiort towards the >uc-
if~--iii! proMA utiiin of tin war.
!>':riii._; tho-i tlinr nvih'k. uiii. b I -p< tit
iii Mr. Kt.(i-.-\i ir-> hoiiii- an.l laimK . I
.-; .r)!:-!u'a \sitli hint ri!atn>;,... ;i>'t <■:,];- .<i
I ')u;:.' A -!iij>. biii, i iliiak 1 iiiav .-<i\'. lu
friiii'I-liip. \Vr lai; .-.av aiuthin;.; to ' .n h.
olh'.T. h"Wr\-(r painful. W lim wi [vnu-.i
he wniii;; ii^y hand, .sa\;)!-, " \\i- vvill
tsciit this thmui'li •.. !!),■ bilter end, wliat-
c\cr the (ci-t iiM\- h.-." I'alntid him ii->--
th»' ,i.;i'^,,uiti' atnl 'aithirtn uniiiohih-i il
gii^antic p<i\srr ,,', thr p..-npl._- ,.f the Cuit. ij
States, canning with them in their life and
cieath struggle the entire, or almost the
entire. Western hemisphere.
At Washington, we and our combined
staffb surveyed the entire scene of the war,
and we reached a number <^f important
practical decisions. Some of them affect
future operations and cannot, of course,
l>e mentioned, but others have been made
public by declaration or by events. The
vanguard of an American Army has
already arrived in the United Kingdom.
Ver>- considerable forces are following as
opportimity may serve. These forces will
take their station in the British Isles and
face with us whatever is comirtg our way.
They impart a freedom of movement to all
forces in the British Isles greater than we
could otherwise have possessed. Numerous
United States fighter and bomJ^er squad-
rons will also take part in the defence o^
Britain and in the ever-increa.sing
bombing offen-i\'e a< liiist Germany.
The I'nited States Navy is linked
in the mo.st intimate tmion with
the Admiralty, both in the Atlantic
and the Pacific. We shall plan our Naval
moves together as if we svcre literally one
people.
In the ne.xt place, we fr,rmed this league
of 26 United Nations in which the prin-
< ipal partners at the prev«Tit time are
Gnat Britain and the British Kmpire, the
Uiiited Stat. .-, the Union of Sex i.ilist Soviet
Ki publics of Ku.<sia. and the Kepiiblic of
China, tnL,'ether with the <f out hearted
pit. h-, atid the represent, iti\t's of the re.>t
of the 2h powers. This Union is based
<.;i the priueiples of the -\i!antic Charter.
It ..ini-. at the (ie-trui tion of Hitlerism in
;,i'i 'I- f'Tins and inanifestatiotis in every
ii.i::.r "f th.e '.;lol)e. We will march for
vvar-1 together until ev« r\' vestige of thi-j
\in;iin\' lias been e.\tirpat< (i from the lift-
ol the'woric!.
ThitdiN', as 1 li i\c I \ji!,m:u il at some
]■ nuth, \\e addn-ssed ourseh'es to the war
acai'i-t Japan and to the nva-ure- to In-
t.ike'i to <lefend .-Xu-tr.dia, X' w /• .ihui ',,
the Netlietluids l'"..i-t Indie-, M.ilaya,
Pairni.i, ;iMd India a^Miiist J.it>iMi< >. ,it<,i( !;
or iu%a--ion.
!• Mirtiiiw v,e h.ive e^taMi~hed a vast
. oiinno;) 1' .! Ill \se ipit;i~ ;ind minutions,
of r.iw ••! • r> il- ,iiui oi shipjiim,', the out-
lii)', of u';:, '1 :i,t- ;>i ( n -it forth in a -< rics
ol iiii!iior.t;ii|.i '.shi\}i I h,!\e itnlialled
with th" I're-'il.;!! ] had a talk with
fiiai la -t nu:h! ■■:. lii'- telephone, as a result
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1973
617 War Situation ij JANUARY 1943
of which an announcement has been made
in the early hours of this morning in the
United States, and I have a White Paper
for the House which will be available, I
think, in a very short time. Many people
have been staggered by the figures of
prospective American output of war
weapons which the President announced
to Congress, and the Germans have
affected to regard them with incredulity.
I can only. say that I^rd Beaverbrook
iind I were made acquainted beforehand
with all the bases upon which these colos-
sal programmes were founded, and that I
myself heard President Roosevelt confide
their specific tasks to the chiefs of
American industry and I heard these men
iccept their procfigious ta-sks and declare
that they would and could fulfil them.
Most important of all is the multipli-
> ntion of our joint tonnage at sea. The
Aniorican programmes were already vast,
■f h»y h.ive ))een inrreasrcl in the propor-
tion of TOO to nearly ifx). If thev are
computed, as completed I bt-licvo they
will he, \vc shall be able to mo\-e acros.s
the o-ean spaces in 1043 two, thrf"° or
even four times as laref annir-s as the
considerable forces we .ire able to handle
It SC.-1 at the present time.
I expect — and I have mnde no s<cr>t
of it -that we shall both of us re. ei\<-
severe iU-iis.itje at the hands of the
• Japanes" in 10^2, !)iit I believe we shall
ircsr-nflv ret'ain tin- n.ival rf)mm<ind of
th.- I'.i; ifir itirl l)e;.;in to fst,i!)h"sh an affec-
tive- supf-riority in the air, and then later
on. wit!i the great basic areas in
Au.^tr,il.i>ia, in India and in the Dutrh
Flast Indies, we shall b" able to set about
our task in good style in 1043- ^< i^ no
doubt true that the defeat of Jap-i'i will
not necessarily entail the defeat of Hitler,
whereas the defeat of Hitler would <iiable
the whole forces of the united nations to
be conrentrated upon the defeat of Jap.in.
Hut fix re i^ no .j'ustiun of r'-e.irdiiK' the
war in the P.i< iti< as. a secondary op.ra
tion. The orilv limitation .ippliecl to it-
visoroiK proM-i ntion will be the shippiiii:
available at anv f,'iven time
it i.-. !no?,t impijrtant that wv should not
overlook the enormous contribution of
Chiud to this >trug^!e for world freedom
and democracy. I{ there is any lesson
I h,ave brought ba< k from the United
Statc^ that I < onld ixpress in one word,
it would be • ( hina '■ f That is in all
their minds. When we f.el the sharp
military qualities of the Japltnese soMk ry
War Stluation
618
in contact with our own troops, although
of course very few have as yet been en-
gaged, we must remember that China,
ill-armed or half -armed, has, for four and
a half years, single handed, under its
glorious leader Chiang Kai-shek, with-
stood the main fury ot Japan. We shall
pursue the struggle band in hand with
China, and do ever5^hing in our power
to give them arms and supplies, which is
all they need to vanquish the invaders of
their native soil and play a magnificent
part in the general forward movement of
the United Nations.
Although I feel the broadening swell of
victory and liberation bearing us and ail
the tortured peoples onwards safely to the
final goal, I must confess to feeling the
weight of . the war upon me even more
than in the tremenilous summer days of
IQ40. There are so many fronts which
are open, so many vulnerable points to
defend, so many inevitable misfortunes,
so many shrill voices raised to take ad-
vantage, now that we can breathe more
freely, ol all the turns and twists of war.
Therefore, 1 feel entitled to come to the
Houst; of ('oinmoii!-, vvlio-c servant 1 am,
and ask thcin iiot. to press me to act
against my cousin n( c and better judg-
ment and make s<.a[)<.7^oats in order to im-
pro\c my own po-ition, not to prcas me
to do the things which may be clamoured
fur at tile moment but which will not help
in our war et'tort, but, on the contrary,
to ^.^ivc Mir th" ir ( ncouiagement and to
give ine their aid. 1 have never viiitured
to prediti the future. I stand by my
orji^inal pro^^rauniic, blood, toil, tears and
sweat, which i> :iil I have ever ottered,
to which I adcird, five months later,
many slujrtconun^s, rmstakes and dis-
apjKjintmi lit.-.." Hut it is because 1 see
the light gleatnui^ behuid the clouds and
br(/adeninf4 on (jur p..ll;, that I make so
bold now :1^ to (iifnani!
t. orilidcni e ot thr }](»!.. -!■
aii .uldition.il wiMjii I! in
Uil inil!( li 11 llll 'I! ^.
.1 (le< laration <>i
ol < DinuKJUs as
tin ainioury ol
Mr. I'clhick- Lawrence lulinburgh,
Ma^tj : 'llie I'rinir .Mini.-iet lia- drawn, iji
Jus own inimil.iiil' nunnu, a compre-
hensive picture ol what ha-, been happen-
ing all ovi r the world during the last six
\\eek>> while he lias been away from us,
an<l ot all tiie di-poMtimis tiiat have beer,
made for the major tontroi of the war. I
have no inteati<in of .itn . i| .:;n.; t(j em-
l•t■!li^h. ^till Ir-.-, ' , -, • 1 ,t piiture.
Willi 1 p!(i(>o-i itenipt to
1974 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 93
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1975
EXHIBIT NO. 94
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON. D. C.
Room 4D757
The Pentagon
18 December 1945
JdCRANDim FOR MR. iCTTCHELL:
Pursuant to your request there are inclosed herewith
the Magic messages from the Japanese Ambassador in
Washington, transmitting the documents handed to him by
the Secretary of State on 26 November 1%1.
15 1^
HARJDN DUNCCMBE
Lt. Col., GSC
Incls .
1976 CONGRESSIONAL IN\^STIGATI0N PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1
K '•"r-i ; -L . , ton (.lonura)
■; To; yok/o
MoreiBber ^t, 1941.
': i\xrple. ( n, Ush text)
,1192. (.art 1 or 4)
if Orftl .
1' tricil, ^,
■ "ov^embcr ,.'l, ly^l.
:i- rf Tfs.-nt Liv-s >r trc ov.r :iBrat cl t.
^^W
HF
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tl- r! ,-ip^. 0 - • .
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r> tries:
1 ■ 1 . •■
. MS
ARMY
Sfr.RFT
wLuI\l 1 - • -. ...
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1977
SECRET
frmn VMixingUm (Iwwur*)
Toi Takjro
Mm— b«r U, 1941
IlirpX* (AacXii^ T«Kt)
(.tattrmmHj Orgwat)
#UM. nurt 2 «r 4.
It 1* b«li»««4 ttalt in our dia«u««loo» »ow
yrwBT— > !»• >««D ai^* to r«f«r«M« «• th« o«>or*l prlsalplaa
wilUh MMtitwt* tiM bMla ar • pmrntrntuX ••ttUMnt •«wrla&
«to aatlr* H^rlfl* *r«a.. teawttly th* J»pUM»M ital)a«Hutor
))»• HMit** that tha Jkp«ii*»« OvrvrnHnBt la Aaalrou* ot iitm-
tlasdae Um aomraraaticoa 41r«ctod toiMurA a eonprahassaiT*
n4 pmmttmX tmi^lmmnt ia tt« flMifla araat tlMit it would
te halpftol taw.rd araatlac an ataaai^rc tttror^hlm to tha
aaaaaaaful aotaaata of tha ooirraraatlciea Lf a taaiporary
Vw^wa Tl-vvadll* aauld tw agraad opeu to ba ^ eiTfaet ta^la
tlM aamraraatlau laak&Bg to » yaaeaful ••ttlaaMnxt i th«
Main* «ar« aastinuiac. Qb ttmmbmr 20 tfaa MpuauM Jriba^aa^ar
■ I— iiialiata4 t« tfaa taarwtary of Stata ' prapoaada la fg>fa^ to
'tan^arafT' aaaao i<aa to ]>a tmkaa raapaatiTalj' hf tba OovaroBaat
af Jbyaai aM4 Iqr tka OovamaMBt of tha Otltad Stataa. vhloh
■MLata^aa ara mdaratood t« hKra haan immig/ufi to aootnpiiah
tba ywrpaaa abava lJtdlaa.tad.
AMIY SECfiET
79716 O — 46 — pt. 1(
1978 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
Toi Takjro
fun. part S af 4.
To ta bmtM.mA la ^iiiimm* ••A*.
Sm OgrwwKnt of t)M aat«« Mft«M mm*
•MiiMtly A«ai.r«M to ««B«rl)Mtt« to tsto prmmatlmk tmi wmiMf
toaMw* af p— ■ aa^ vtobiUty Im tlw ^AlTla WWk, «i4 to
•Lff«r< tnrary initwlty far tlw ■wtlwiiw «t <i«tiMirti«M
vith tit* Jh^MMM fliiiii— > 4ir«*tad %mmr* — ittn^ atfk *
tr— 4 ^Maii prttcru* «f yiti t>irwn)i>Mt tlM tmalXIm ••*•*.
flw wrop^saXft irtittfh wmtvp BVWMwtoA tar tli0 JhiMMMMi JiriMUMMAMF
«k IiiiMfcii ■> •oatoiJM AMw f— tfw iridLak. Sa tft» cfdadUM
•f tlila (liMi— r>, MBfUvt vitki tk» f ■iiiwOrt iV&wtpiM
«kiak f«« » fHrt af to* gimarml m*fi*\mmm% tmtmr »mta€tm»ttm
mtt to iriO* CMk DUirMiwI 1mm 4m»lmtmA thn* t% «« •mmtMmt •
Sm 0«««naHMMk af tto \hi^-rl Stota* toiiavM tlHrit Mm siMtlMk
•r Mwk fr>ya« mmSU ■■« to litaijr t» mbMIMNi to tlW
ulttaMto ak^JaatlTn «/ iin— lim y«MM aMMr tai^ iwipr 4NhI
Jaati** te tto ItMiTta *r«w •»* it m«pmM) Itmk tW'Wwi
•ff art to ■■*> to rMwlT* ««r tUmrnHWM «r I'iw ia
s%4Hi;M (»l
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1979
SECRET
Iki 'Salqw
P«arpl». (2aKll>li t«t)
#U«t. (lartrMNljr «r«Mrt) (fmrt * .f *)
■11* tWUi •«>>•% ia ▼!«« tiia OortmuMit «rf Vam QBlted StatM •ff«r«
ftr «)M tf>mtfUmrmUam of th« JaiMMM Gov«niM«t « fOMM «f « te«wl bat
nmtm* «ni% dHTLng Mar fiirtiMHe' marwrMUoaa.
»• iOm k«ar«iji raggMttod i«pr«MMi« *u •! fart to Wldg* %tm fMp
tetMNMi Mr 4r«f% •£ Jm 2I« 1943 «m1 «• Mptmm** dntf t «f S*ptiirib«r 25tk
*ar — ftWK « "w »i»pr<»*^ to tiw watlid preUMc «A4«r]arlii« * ami^vhm-
tdv* 9wi£l» — M-ltmint* IMs jpXmk ooitalas j«>«nl«im» ^MOii^ «l«[i the
|««4rtiiMa. Ai^pUeaUai tf ttw fwciMMtfJ. ^rlMdplM «td«li m tmen fern** t»
me MHnn«»««l«M WMuUtate Uim oaljr anad bfuU f<a- imitMDll* tatMmativMO.
»»J«IA«wi. •• Imp* tti*t la tfat« way pirAgrMs tomurd r«.««*l!»s a watUc aX
ifcadii tetwa«i «w im> Qvnmmmit* wmjr %• aa:p«dlt««.
t l3.Hl^4:l (a)
1980 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
hr ,;. 1 .•;Ci!n, t-vn ("n'—r-n)
vo'/e.Tb'r 26, 1'<1.
»im. C jitr -vsly urc-at) ' %rt 1 of 2)
.'ie:iar»'y irlr«.
To »>• handled li. '~'>TTn«^Tit 0'1«,
' trlctly confidential, tentktlT* and without coaml tar-nt .
>■■3r^^r^l^r 21, )0/,l.
'AjU'i* of propoecrl b»8l» for »{r««a«nt b«twe«n Um> 'liTlt«d ?tat««
and Ja,jftr..
t.ectl'^n 1.
Draft putM»1 -loclsr-.ti on of nollcy.
Thr '.>OT»mnBnt of the IM t«d - t«t<i« and tha OoTemaent of JaoMi
both being Kollcitous for i^'t <)«ae« of tbn I'aclflc afflrr- thft t^iPl^ nation-
al rx^Ilcl«>a arc dlrvotcd toward Ikatln^; and wxi»nMi.rt peaoa throughout th«
Pacific ar«a, tlmt thf^r i.bt« ro territorial de»lrn In that area, that thay
nsvr no Vr.tantlor. of tt-rra-trninr other oimtrt'^B or of ualnp nllltar^ totom
ai. jjretBlT' ly aealnat any nelghbarlnc nAtlon, en' that, Bcoordln»-ly, In
ti'f Ir rational j)ollcl«a they will aetirely Kupport and giva practical a{>»
jilicatlon to the follopr! n, fundaivntal prlnciplaa upon w^-lch their rala-
Unnii T-lt> ^ach oth»r a-^d with all other Fpr^mnmntr are baaadi
r\\ -»,,. iTlnclple of Inrlolabllltar of territorial Intagrltgr and
aovareignt^ o. (<ach and all natlona.
'?) The principle of non-lnterferanoa in the internal affaire
of ot!:c>r countriea.
(3) The principle of eqaaUty, including equality of e«Mar«laI '
opportunity and treataeat.
ARMY SECRET
Trane. U-?9-^ fl) i
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE IQgl
SECRET
li»t r^kym
tkmmbmr a6, IMX.
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|ir«wnt Ite f>iiiiiw'i—B*i fif Jftpoi «Mt tlw a**wnMMit af Hm tliiitMl
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UNIT «11X Mrftlvilr MppMrt nrf i«nMitt««U7 *pply tk« f*U*«liig prtJMi-
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(4) n» lalMlia* af l^iU. pr»1mmU.tm. »t tim latMrMrts «« mm-
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1982 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRH
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SECKT
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1983
SECRET
ProBs .aahli^ion (NoBur*)
Tte: Tokyo
November 2o, 19^.
f\a-pLe. (rjj^l«h t«xt)
1119*. (-itrwtly uTEBirt) (Part 1 ot 4)
S««p«t fir*.
To b« handlpd In Jommaant Coda.
Soetlon 2.
Stap* to b« taiava by the dorartment of the United 'tatea au-id by tha
GoTartMsnt of Japan:
Tlie Ooremnant of the United -tatea and tba Oovemaant of Japan
propose to take step* as foll««ti
1. The k>Y«rtnaE!nt of the United states and the jortinamnt of
Japan will endearor to conclxide a saJtUatttral noo-aggreaslon pact aaong
irltlah ' r.plre , Ohina, Japan), the Wethf^rlanda , the Soviet Union,
Thailand and the Inited rtates.
■ 2. ?oUi jorernmenta will endeavor to condode araoag the Aaerioaa,
Sritlsh, i;hir»8e, Japanese, the fSetherlaad and Thai Oorenawnta an agree-
aent whereunder each of the oovemaanta would pledge Itaelf to respect ttoe
territorial integrity of French Indo-Chlna and, in the enent that there
si.ould develop a threat to tf e t**rrltorlAl Inegrlty of IndO'>Chlna, to
enter Into L-anedlate consul tatlon with a rlew to takintj: tnjch eeasures as
sa/ te desaed necessary and adrlsable to neet the tiireat In question.
ARMY
SECRET
Trans. U-29-<l (I)
1984 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
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1*1 T»ky»
mmmbmr 3(>, 19U.
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■•»•■ «i.tii Kraaok ijkd»-CnUw.
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lOr MMl p»ll«» ifcr>— Xiwi UijUm Mad CnM Iidt CliiM»
4. ite Ur««tiHMit sr tta* (M.tod &«*«•• mhI «b« Uaremrw« U J^pB
will o»i Bigjpart » aiUuuriajrt ]WllUo*Ujr> — owttalafciiy — »mf Qmtammmt
or r»«lai i« UblJMt uUwr U«m> Uw BftUoBAl fiftm— t a£ tte wimMta •f
^^ ^^'^ »««, la^wna a)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
1985
SECRET
rrvmt nMtalactoB (Mmuo-a)
tktymtibor ;:c, 1941.
i^irpX*. (ji^atUafa text}
l'U94. (P»ri 3 •! 4)
5. Bwth ^ranuMuit* will gir* Ki> all MtrateifTl torl*i rtght*
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teool «f 1901.
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tiMi arlUah and vXixmt OototrmtatB t© alvi, up extmterrttsvrlal rlcihla
lj» Ghti», lnolwtUii; rlgbt* In iat«rnaU«irt MtU««»i»t» tutd In coiwmmUm
•»< widsr XlMt Qmmr PToiamX «t 1901.
*^?M will Mt«r IntD immtUUatm tor %im ootwiMlon bet»««n tte CkHtad
St«*M *>d J*|)M «t « tnuki AgnMamt. bftMM upon nMslprac*! Mwt
r«««ra4'.«iaUMi tTMtMHit «iad ntdaaUoa «f inwte bMYt«r» by totti oou-
trt««, ijMlaOiat M» MdBrt*fcU« by Ui* Balt«d SiatM ta Mad nar «llk
'• tSw QwrwiMBBrt of *&• Untied '"-UtM ia>4 tte« flowitswrni of
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*M»d« la th« United . t«tMi sad <m Mmriam fud* la J»pM.
AltMY,.
SECRH
nww. U«39-<1 (2)
1986 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
PrMii WMAiiagiMi (ItaBsr*)
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^hmmimr 26. VHi.
fvrpU. (SaglUh t«zt)
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&S Um dollKr-TCO rKtw, with tb* •U.«««tl«B sT ^a■Ml• aidwi«*t« f«r lliia iimpm,
)mir to b* wiypIUd by Apan Nri HAlf br «M tW.1Ml SU«m.
9« Bottt Orirwi— iito will agrM ttat iw AfpracMnrt «lilete (dtlMr iMM «■•--
ttludsd «!•> MiT^ tMLrd pwiwt atMll b* liit«rpt«t*di by It ia mmab « «9 lui t*
maniet with Um tmiimimmial paen^oM •< thl« »(pemmma%, tiM —♦■WlrtMwwt
•nd tjr<— rftAaa af pM*« UiwuKhwtt Hw Pa«lfl« nrM.
10. 9«t!] qrwi'i—to wlU taM thalr tiinainM t» ■wiw «tter flwi'— tw
to adfanv t* mti to stv* prMtlMl «i»pUaatt<Mi ta th* htmim prnXXtlml
tmt •MigraBi* jirlaBlpStM ••% ftrth 1« this ayi iiw>..
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE " 1987
EXHIBIT NO. 95
(Handwritten note:)
Memo
Hornbeck is anxious to have you read this. The high ranking oflScer mentioned
is Adm. Richardson.
I think the paper is slightly Academic.
/s/R. E. S.
I have read.
/s/ HR8.
I feel that in the evolving of the thought of which record is made in this mem-
orandum, I have brought into clearer light than any in which I had seen it before a
point which is, I feel, of fundamental importance in connection with any and all of
our deliberations regarding courses to be taken in the field of major policy in regard
to the Far East : a point which has to do with something that is definitely and
inescapably fundamental. I am sure that you will not begrudge the time which it
will take for you to read the memorandum.
( Stamped : ) CONFIDENTIAL
(Hand printed note : ) Return to Op-13.
July 12. 1940.
In the course of a conversation yesterday with a high ranking officer of
the Navy, there was put to me this question: Is there an irresolvable cmi-
flict of interests and policies bettveen the United States and Japan?
I replied to this effect : There is today a fundamental conflict between the
United States and Japan as regards major objectives and the policies which
prevail, respectively, in consequence thereof and in regard thereto. This con-
flict can be resolved only by an abandonment on the part of one country or
the other of those objectives and policies which it envisages and by which it
proceeds at the present time. The United States has as its objectives: preva-
lence within and between and among nations of peace; prevalence of rules and
provisions of law ; prevalence of practices of justice ; prevalence of practices
of order ; procedure by commitments and respect therefor ; prevalence of equality
of opportunity in terms of fair treatment ; respect for rights of nations and of
individuals ; and due regard for interests of nations and [2] of indi-
viduals. Japan (the Japanese military leadership) has as its objectives today;
spread and extension of Japanese political authority and economic control into
and over areas outside of and beyond the boundaries of the present Japanese
Empire (some of which areas are inhabited by independent nations and some
of which are dependencies of other indepndent countries — but in none of
which there is a Japanese population at present of more than a comparatively
insignificant minority) ; a setting up by whatever means, positive or negative,
may seem likely to contribute thereto, of a Japanese hegemony in eastern Asia
and the western and southern Pacific; the working out of a "divine Destiny"
which in the minds of not a few Japanese envisages first a vast Japanese empire
in the Orient and ultimately a world supremacy for Japan's "Divine Emperor"
These objectives are in fundamental conflict, globally and in detail.
In the case of the United States, tlie objectives stated are the objectives of the
whole American ijeople. In the case of Japan, the objectives stated are those of
an essentially feudal leadership, the "military element", which comprises prob-
ably less than ten i>ercent of the naticm, which includes probably a majority of
those Japanese who are descendants of the fighting men (the Daimyo and the
Samurai) of the pre-restoration (1867) era, the spearhead among which is a
considerable number of chauvinists among \S] the Army officer personnel
and to a le.ss extent among the Navy officer personnel, which leadership makes
the nation's decisions and carries the nation with it.
The policies which are those of the United States are representative of the
fundamental thoughts and beliefs and attitude of the people of the United States
during the whole century and half of our national existence. Their roots run
far back into the past. They run back to the days of Magna Charta, the days of
John Hampden, the days of Oliver Cromwell, the days of the Pilgrims and the
Cavaliers, the days of the P>oston Tea Party and the Declaration of Independence,
the days of Washington and Jefferson and John Paul Jones and James Monroe
and Andrew Jackson ; the days of the French Revolution ; the days of emigration
from Europe of the German liberals; the days of the Civil War; the days of our
1988 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
liberation of Cuba ; tiie days of our participation in the World War with popular
enthusiasm for the ideas of fighting to end wars and to make the world safe for
democracy : they are policies which in a general way express the thought and the
aspirations, inherited by and developed under conditions of freedom in the minds
of practically all of the 130 million persons who constitute the people of the
United States. The policies which are those of Japan have no such universal
and no such [4] deep-rooted acceptance in and among the 90 million per-
sons who constitute the people of the Japanese Empire.
There is warrant for a belief that the conflict between American and Japanese
objectives and policies is not irresolvable. There is warrant for belief that one
or tiie other of the countries might in course of time give up its present objectives
and policies.
Where does the greater possibility, as regards relinquishment, lie? In giving
consideration to that question, thought should be given to the comparative quali-
ties of tile two sets of objectives and policies. Which of the two is the more
sound? Which of the two is more fundamental from i>oints of view of human
nature, of morality, et cetera? Then, consideration should be given to historical
facts. It is a fact tliat the attitude, the obie<'tives and the policies of the Ameri-
can people are a product of a long course of forward-looking evolution. It is a
fact that the Japanese nation made in 1867 a substantial break with its own
past, and that during the last eight decades the outlook uimhi life of the Japanese
people and many of the practices of the Japanese State have undergone substan-
tial change. To make a long matter short, is there not warrant for believing
that a change in objectives and in policies by and on the part of Japan would be
much easier and is much more readily conceivable than would be and is a change
of the objectives and policies of the United States?
[5] How would (could) a change on Japan's part be brought about? If
Japanese armed forces succeed in conquering China, taking Indochina, taking the
Netherland East Indies, taking the Malay States, taking Thailand (Siam) and
Burma, ultimately taking the Philippines, et cetera, et cetera, no change is
likely. The conflict between Japanese interests and objectives and policies and
those of the United States would ccmtinue and become intensifie<l. But if
Japan's eflforts in China were to fail, if Japan's pff )rts to establish a great em-
pire in the Far East were to be thwarted, if Japan's military leadership were to
be in course of time discredited in the eyes of the middle classes and the common
people of Japan, it is conceivable that the Japanese nation might work out a
modification or even a reversal of Japan's objectives and policies.
It should be remembered that three centuries ago a great Japanese leader
started out to conquer China and that ultimately the Japanese nation gave
up that idea. It should be remembered that not long after the Japanese
Army and Navy had witlidrawn from Korea, another great Japanese leader
decided to make Japan an isolated and secluded hermit nation : l>e forbade,
to all intents and purposes, political, economic or cultural intercourse between
Jap in and the outside world.
[6'] The present conflict between Japanese and American objectives and
policies is not irresolvable. There is little possibility, however, that the ob-
jectives and policies of the American people will be given up. Moreover, an
abandonment of them would not resolve the conflict— for, an adoption, by
the United States, in substitution for them, of objectives and policies similar
to or identical with those of Japan would be impossible, and, if not impossible
and if made, would merely c.eate greater conflict. But an abandonment of
Japan's present objectives and policies is a thini by no means impossible ;
is a thing which, if made, would admit of an adoption by Japan of policies
similar to those of the United States, which adoption, if made and if lived
up to, would resolve the whole conflict.
Surrender of the American objectives and policies in favor of Japan would
serve no useful purpose. Maintenance of the American objectives and poli-
cies, patient but unremitting resistance by the United States and by other
countries to Japan's efforts at conquest, has within it the possibility of an
ultimate resolving of the conflicts between the objectives and policies of
Japan and the objectives and policies of the United States (and those of
several other countries ) .
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1989
EXHIBIT NO. 96
July 16, 1940.
It is my thought that you might find interesting the papers here
attached. If so, and if you should feel so disposed, perhaps you would care
to send the memorandum on to the Chief of Naval Operations.
You will note that there are on these papers no identifying marks. I think
that it woidd be well to give no indication of source. The material stands or
falls on its own merits without reference to autliorship or location of the
authors.
(Stamped:) CONFIDENTIAL
(Hand printed :) Return lo Op-13 Room 2058.
Reflections on Certain Features of the Far Eastern Situation and Certain
Problems of U. S. Far Easte:kn Pojcy. Jui.y 4, 1940.
I. Ocneral Obser-vations.
The situation in the Pacific is one in which, on the one hand Japan and China are
engaged in armed hostilities in the course of which Japanese armed forces have
been and are doing violence to American lives and property and the Japanese
Government by official acts is impairing American rights and interests, while on
the otl^er hand there is constant, though not now acute, tensicm in relations
between Japan and the United States; it has been and is the policy of the United
States to discourage and to oppose the course which Japan is following ; it is gen-
erally agreed that diplomatic representations by the American Government,
together with the termination of the treaty of 1911 upon this Government's
initiative, and the moves which this Government has made in disposal of its
naval forces, have exercised some restraining influence upon Japan ; it is now
notorious that a strong element in Japan's leadership advocates a move by the
Japanese armed forces toward seizure of French Indo-China and/or the Dutch
East Indies, and that the said element has strong support among the Japanese
populace; it is the estimate of various observers that the presence of the U. S.
Battle Fleet at Pearl Harbor weighs heavily in Japan's deliberations with regai'd
to the question of the Dutch East Indies and other new moves of [2] ag-
gression ; the most effective opposition at the present moment t(» Japan's program
of imperialistic expansion is the resistance which is being made by the Chinese;
the Government and the people of the United States desire that the Chinese
resistance be not overcome and the Japanese effort to gain control of China be
not successful; and the policy and the acts of the United States during recent
years have given encouragement and support to the Chinese policy of resistance,
have strengthened Chinese morale, and have contributed to the facts that the
Chinese have refused to negotiate a compromise settlement and the Japanese
have not been able to gain an undisputed control of China or any part of China.
For seventy-five years the Germans, acting politically and as a nation, have
given evidence that those elements which exercise decisive leadership of the
German people believe in and rely uiion force as the most effective and the
conclusive instrumentality in international relations. For forty-five years the
Japanese, acting politically and as a state, have given evidence that those
elements which exercise decisive leadership of the Japanese people believe in and
rely upon force as the most effective and the conclusive instrumentality in inter-
national relations.
[3] Modern Germany was brought into existence in 1870 through Bis-
marck's success in pursuing his policy of "Ei.>ien uiid Bluf. The present Jap-
anese Empire has been developed since 1867 by a profess of accumulation under
threat of force and/or application of force: first, seizure of nearby islands; next,
war upon China and acquisition of Formosa and the Pescadores; next,
war upon Russia and occupation of South Manchuria ; next, gradual occupation
followed by sudden annexation of Korea ; next, seizure of Shantung and the now
Japanese Mandated Islands in the Pacific; next, the occupation of all of
Manchuria and Jehol ; and now the effort to conquer China.
During the last ten years Japanese leadership has given ample evidence, for
all who are willing to divest themselves of preconceived theories and natural
prej\idices, of their high regard for force and low I'egard for moral principles.
1990 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
legal precepts, and/or constractual obligations, in international relations. Since
lifSS Nazi leadership lias done the same — hue wiih greater intensity.
In 1931 the Japanese resorted to the use of force against China. Neither the
League of Nations nor any of its members were willing to take any forceful
effectixe steps toward stopping the Japanese. Nor was the United Stales willing
to take any such stepvS. The Japanese went ahead, and, [4] by use of force,
attained not only their objective but more than what they had had m contempla-
tion at that stage. In 1934 the Italians resorted to use of force and found that
neither the League of Nations nor any of the world powers, including the United
States, were willing to use force to stop them. The Italians achieved ail that they
had set out to achieve. In 1937 the Japanese decided to take the next step in a
program to which their leadership has long been committed in principle, another
step in a program which envisages many more steps extending far into the tuiuie.
They att».cked China. They occupied considerable portions of China. Neither
the League of Nations nor any great power has .seen tit forcefully to oppose them.
The only resistance by force that has been made to Japan's program of use
of force is that which has been and is being made by the Chinese.
In 1932 the British Government asked the Japanese Government for a pledge
that the Japanese Government would respect the principle of the "open door" in
Manchuria, and, having been given by the Japanese Government that pledge,
the British Government declared itself satisfied. In 1935 certain British and
French statesmen collaborated in .secret and were prepared to make to Italy a
proposal for a compromise in regard to Ethiopia. World opinion ruled that
[5] proposal out. Had l^iat proposal been made to Mussolini, there is little
reason lor anyone believing that it would have been accepted. Had it bsen made
and been accepted, there is little warrant, in the light of subsequent events, for
any suiiposition that Mussolini would later have been restrained by his acceptance
of it. In 1938 Mr. Chamberlain made an agreement with Herr Hitler. Almost
immediately Hitler completely disregarded his part of the agreement and went
foi-ward with steps in a program which is conceived in terms of force and is
being carried out in terms of force.
The Government and the people of the United States are committed by a
long tradition to the principle of opposing conquest. They are likewise com-
mitted to the principle of supporting international law. They are committed by
a considerable number of treaties to the principle of respecting the sovereignty
and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. They are committed
both by treaty and by unilateral declarations (of several Administrations) to the
principle of respecting the rights and interests of all concerned in and with
regard to China. They are committed by declarations of the last preceding and
the present Administration to the principle of refusing [6] to recognize
(i. e. to give technical recognition to) certain types of change brought about by
certain sperifl-d methods in the situation in the Far East.
The situation in the Far East, as between Japan and China, has for some
months past been developing along the lines which tend to confirm the estimates
upon which United States policy in this period has in large part been based.
Chinese resistance has been maintained ; the Japanese have been un: hie to bring
matters to a conclusion at any point ; processes of attrition have been affecting
the Japanese more adversely than the Chinese ; the Japanese people have devel-
oped doubts; Japanese resources have become cons^^antly more slender; the
possibility of a gradual dissolution of the Japanese effort to conquer China has
constantly ircreased. If the United States and the British Government will
but permit "Nature" to take its course, with a little help by giving some assistance
to China and withholding some assistance from Japan, there is more than an
even chance that the present Japanese effort to conquer China will be brought to
an end, adversely to Japan, by processes of attrition and concomitants thereof.
[7] II. Retention of U. S. Fleet in the Pacific.
The Battle Fleet is at present in the Pa'^-ific. It is based in major part on Pearl
Harbor. Th^ U. S. Asiatic Fleet is in the Far Eastern Waters.
An order by the American Government for the U. S. Battle Fleet to leave the
Pacific would be equivalent to a notification to the Japanese and the Chinese
that the United States substantially abandons, for the time being at least, its
effort to influence the course of events as between Japan and China. It would
tremendously strengthen Japanese morale and (probably disastrously) weaken
Chinese morale. It would give assurance to the Japanese Army in China that
opportunity exists for it to go as far as it may be able with not only the Chinese
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1991
but also American and other foreifjn nationals, foreign properties, foreign rights
and foreign interests in China. It woulld give assurance 1o the Japanese Navy
that opportunity exists for it to go as far as it may be able with foreign terri-
torial possessions in the Pacific. It would encourage the Japanese tovpard think-
ing seriously even of closing in upon Singapore and of stirring up trouble in India.
It might resolve such doubts as many Japanese "entertain of the advisability of
a closer association with Germany. It would make Japan the one and only great
power exercising effective influence in the area of the [81 Pacific and the
Indian Oceans, in the whole area westward from the Panama Canal and east-
ward from Suez and the Cape of Good Hope. It would leave the United States
exposed on the West Coast ; it would leave Mexico and Central America exposed ;
it would leave the whole west coast of South America exposed. It would make
it difficult if not impossible for any countries other than the United States to
venture upon exerting of economic pressures against or in resistance to Japan ;
, and it would increase such dangers to the United States as are or might be
involved in the exerting by the United States of such pressures or resistance.
But, assume the order to have been given, assume the Fleet to have left the
Pacific (with the flow of consequences which its departure would have), assume
that the tran.sit of the Canal to have been made successfully, — What disposal
would be made in the Atlantic of this Fleet, and what necessary and useful
purposes would that disposal b" expected to serve? Would the expectation be
that the Fleet be sent to European waters? Would the etxpectation be that, if
sent there, itwould be used for combat purposes? Would the expectation be that,
the Fleet being kept in American waters, the mere presence of the Fleet in the
Atlantic would in any way deter the Germans and Italians from the courses
which they are pursuing in Europe or would in any way be of assistance to the
British in their resistance? Would the [9] expectation be that the pres-
ence of the Fleet in the Atlantic would deter the Germans and Italians from
launching attacks in the near future upon some part or parts of the Western
Hemisphere? Would the expectation be that the Fleet would soon be needed
for the purpose of defending this Hemisphere against such attacks definitely
launched?
It would unquestionajjly be detrimental to the interests in the Pacific of the
Allied Powers and their benevolent associate (the United States) for the United
States to withdraw its Battle Fleet, at this early moment, from the Pacific. But
mere transfer by the United States of its Battle Fleet to the Atlanic would in no
way benefit the cause, at this moment, of the Allied Powers and the United States
in connection with and in regard to the present phase of the armed conflict
between the British and Germany. The German menace to the United States,
while very real, is not yet direct, and it cannot short of several weeks or months
become a physical reality. The United States Fleet has been and is needed in
the Pacific; it is not yet needed in the Atlantic; and, if moved from the Pacific
to the Atlantic at this moment, it could not in the Atlantic serve purjwses equiv-
alent to or more important than those which it has been and is serving in the
Pacific.
[.9rt] Hitler still has some fighting to do in Europe. It is possible that
within a short time England may, following the fate and the example of France,
have to sue for peace. It is possible that the Briti'^h Navy will be sunk. At the
worst, Hitler may possibly gain complete control of Great Britain and acquire what
remains of both the French and the British fleets. That, however, will not have
happened by tomorrow morning and is not likely to have happened by the morning
of a week from tomorrow.
The logical course for Hitler and Mussolini to follow is : Pursue to the end
their armed conflict with Great Britain; make sure, either by diplomacy or by
armed force, of the security of their rear, that is, make solid their relationships,
for better or for worse, with the Soviet Union ; consider and deal with what-
ever problems may remain as regards Sweden, Switzerland, the Balkans, Turkey
and the Mediterranean; meanwhile, reorganize and improve their battered
though victorious armed forces ; consolidate administratively their position in and
over the areas which they have conquered; recondition whatever implements
and munitions of war they [f)b] may capture ; take care of various economic
and social problems which are already acute and bound to be more so, such as the
feeding and the clothing of the people of Germany and the peoples of the con-
quered territories; make adequate prepnrutions for an ultimate attack upon
iwints in the Western Hemisphere, which attack, if prematurely made, would be
almost sure to be challenged by the United States and would absolutely ensure
1992 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
embarkation by the United States upon an enormous program of armament;
meanwhile, wage a diplomatic and propagandist campaign, based upon and cen-
tered in assurances that Germany and Italy are sated and are satisfied, have no
further territorial objectives, are prepared to maintain peace in Europe and to be
at peace with the rest of the world, and are in no way whatever a menace to the
security or the prosperity or the general welfare of the Western Hemisphere and
least of all to those of the United States.
Neither Hitler nor Mussolini nor both are going to [10] attack Latin
America or the United States in the near future — certainly not within the next
few weeks. If by any chance they should send over some sort of an expedition,
their having done so would be "all to the good" so far as effect upon public
opinion in this Hemisphere, and especially in the United States, is concerned. It
would help to wake up a lot of people who are still only half awake and some
more who are still sound asleep. From the point of view of general and particular
political effects, we should welcome the making by Hitler or Mussolini of such
a mistake. They will not make it.
Unless we are prepared to take the offensive, in support of Great Britain, in
Europe, against Hitler, or unless we would expect to be so prepared before or by
the time that our Fleet could arrive in the Atlantic, there does not exist today any
good reason, in terms of use to be made of our Battle Fleet, for moving that
Fleet today or tomorrow from Pearl Harbor. — Should an unforeseen and un-
foreseeable emergency develop, the Fleet could be moved from Pearl Harbor
to Panama, at a practicable speed, in 13 days. And transit of the Canal requires
P^o <lays.
If and when Hitler and Mussolini finish off England, and if and when the
British fleet is sunk or is surrendered, the moment will then have arrived for
reconsidering, urgently, the question of a better (than now) disposal of [11]
our Fleet. Meanwhile, our Fleet stands on guard, as it has for some time past
stood, in the Pacific — at Pearl Harbor, a highly strategic point. The presence of
that Fleet there has exercised and is exercising a restraining influence upon
Japan, discouraging new adventurings by Japan which would be adverse to
American and British and French and some other countries' interests and encour-
aging continuance by the Chinese of their resistance to Japan. Whenever that
Fleet leaves the Pacific, its departure will not only remove an obstacle to further
adventuring by Japan but will actually encourage embarkation by Japan upon
such adventuring ; it will give Japan free rein in the Western Pacific, in the
Southern Pacific and in the Indian Ocean ; it will give Japan opportunity to place
herself in full possession of vastly important natural resources and highways ; it
will enable the Japanese to complete their blockade of China ; it will vastly
strengthen Japanese and vastly weaken Chinese morale ; it will probably mark
the beginning of the end as regards China's resistance to Japan ; it will enable the
Japanese to send vast amounts of material to Germany and Italy ; it will prepare
the way for full cooperation by Japan w-ith her Axis associates.
We may have to move our Fleet from the Pacific, and take those consequences —
in due course. We do not have [12] to do it today. To do it now when
there has not yet come real need for doing it would be tO|indicate that we are in
a state of panic, not to say hysteria, that we are driven into that state by the
mere thought of a jwssible risk of a possible attack upon some point in "our"
Hemisphere; that we, not having gone to the aid of democracy in Europe, are
ready to abandon the one country (China) which is "opposing force" in Asia;
that, although we may be able at sometime in the future to fight, we are not able
now to hold even a diplomatic position. If we were ready, now, to fight, and
if we would, now, fight — to prevent the destruction of the British Fleet — ^we
should at once move our Fleet, move it at full steam toward Europe. Not being
either ready or willing, now, to do that, we should still leave our Fleet where
it is until there comes a time when we can do more with it elsewhere than we
are doing with it now where it now is.
If and when we do move the Fleet out of the Pacific, we should sinniltaneously
do something substantial in the line of giving further assistance to the Chinese.
We might well do some more of that momentarily and frequently. The Chinese
Government has for several months past been urgently asking us for assistance.
The President, in his Charlottesville address, said : "* * * we will extend to
the opponents [13] of force the material resources of this nation . . .".
We can no longer give assistance to France. We should be all the more in
position, so far as our resources are concerned, to give assistance to China.
Only Great Britain is opposing force in Europe today. Only China is opposing
force in eastern Asia today. In assisting Great Britain — in whatever way — we
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1993
work for our own security. In assisting China — in whatever way — we work
toward the same end.
There is little that we can do about Europe now. But we can still, if we but
will, do a good deal about the Far East. Unless we are prepared to fight Hitler
in Europe, now, we practically abandon our position in Europe, now, because of
our not being prepared to act toward safeguarding it. Our abandonment of
Europe is automatic. Question then comes : Not, shall be abandon our position in
Asia in order to defend our pf)sition in Eun pe, but, our position in Europe ali-eady
having been abandoned automatically, shall our position in Asia be abandoned
by our own deliberate action — for tlie sake of safeguarding and strengthening
our position in the Western Hemisphere.
Defense of and strengthening of our position in the Western Hemisphere does
not require abandonment of our position in Asia, and the objective of defend-
ing and strengthening [I4] pf our position in the Western Hemisphere
would not be best served by such an abandonment.
The unanswered question which this country must consider today is not the
question what will Hitler do in regard to the Western Hemisphere after he
has made himself supreme in Europe. It is what will Gemianu and Japan do,
if and after Germany has become supreme in Europe and Japan has become
supreme in the western Pacific and eastern Asia.
It is an axiom of military strategy that "the best defense is offense".
The soundness of this axiom is being demonsti'ated on an unprecedented
scale in what has gone on in Europe recently and what is going on in Europe
today; in their uxir plans, the Germans have built for offense; the British and —
even more — the French built for defense ; the Germans have taken the offensive
and the British and the French fought a losing defensive battle — on French soil
and with terrific defensive lososes^
The vital problem which the people and the Government of the United States
should be considering today is that of ways and means whereby Germany and
Italy and Japan can be [l^a] stopped rather than that of ways and
means whereby the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere may
become prepared to defend this Hemisphere in a world in which, Germany and
Italy and Japan not having been stopped, those three powers and their satellites
will begin (in due course) directly to make assaults upon the economy, the
political setup, et cetera, et cetera, of this Hemisphere — with each of those three
countries feeling that it cannot be secure as long as the United States remains a
great power and feeling that the common objective of the three should be to
render impotent or to dt stroy the United States.
We should keep in mind the fact that for practical purposes the world's great
powers are today divided into two camps: on the one side are three aggressor
nations — in combination : Japan, Germany, and Italy ; on the other side are
China, Great Britain — and the United States. (Russia is in a sense a, not dis-
interested and not unbia.sed bystander, temporarily associated with but not
very actively assisting the three active aggres.sors, and capable of becoming a
liability or even a belligerent enemy to them.) The United States has not
become a belligerent, but it also is not an impartial neutral; its interests lie on
the side of Great Britain — and China; it will more and more give assistance to
Great Britain — and .should do the same for China ; it is opposed To the three
aggressors; it will be regarded more [1-ib] and more by each and all those
aggressors as definitely and distinctly an enemy state: if the aggressors win,
the United States — whether actively a belligerent or not — will thereafter be con-
sidered by the winners as having been for practical purposes an ally of the
defeated powers and as a power remaining to be dealt with and disposed of
(adversely) as such.
The United S(;ates has not been able by diplomacy nor by measures — including
gestures — short of war to restrain Germany or Italy ; but it has thus far exer-
cised some restraining influence upon Japan and it is capable of continuing to
exercise such influence.
The United States is not today in position to take tlie oflfensive (with use of
force) — in the Atlantic. The United States is today in position to di.scourago,
and to render diflBcult if not impossible, a move by one of the aggressors which,
if attempted and if unchallenged, would place that aggressor (which is closely
.associated with its fellow aggressors) in undisputed control of a huge area in
which there are very substantial British and French and Netherland and Ameri-
can ix)litical and economic interests and very substantial resoui'ces — in the
Pacific.
79716 O — 46— pt. 16 6
1994 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
If the United States wishes to contribute with niaxinmm effectiveness, within
the limitations under which we now work, toward !<t(>pping Germany and her
aggressor associates, [^^c] and tliereby toward assisting the British and
improving our own position as regards long swing security, the one area in
which we might operate at present by disposal or use of force is the Pacific.
A course based on the principle of merely conserving and adding to our stock
of weapons — while and notwithstanding tlie fact that the Nazis and the Italians
win in Europe and the Japanese take iiossession of the we.stern Pacific and the
Indian Oceans — in order that we may now guard and later defend the Western
Hemisphere, will not make the world safe for the United States. It will merely
mean, if the British are defeated, that we, not having gone to their aid in the
Atlantic or the Mediterranean, and not having safeguarded their position and
ours in the Pacific, we, having let the rest of the world go under to Germany
and Italy and Japtin, will in the not distant thereafter have to take up arms
by ourselves (with possibly .some aid from some Latin American states) on the
defensive, against as.saults by (»ne or two or three — but all working together —
of the successful aggressor nations, those nations having then at their disposal
unlimited resources, vast mat<?riel, and a combined population of their own of
200,000,000 men and reservoirs of supplementary man power in the countries
which they would have subjug.ited.
The best defense is offense. The next best defense is preparedness to use such
weapons as one may possess toward preventing one's enemies from being strength-
ened and prevent- [14d] ing one's friends from being weakened. The
poorest strategy of defense is that of simply building fortifications while per-
mitting one's position to be completely encircled by a hostile combination the
various units in which are daily becoming stronger and the combined forces of
which will ultimately be overwhelming as regards re.sources and man iK)wer.
The United States could today either throw its forces in on tlie side of the
Briti-sh toward defeating the enemy combination in Europe or stand guard in the
Pacific and prevent Japan from gaining control of the western Pacific, eastern
Asia, and the Indian Ocean. If it does neither of these things, and if G''rmany,
Italy and Japan win. the victorious aggressors will have before them and will give
their attention to three tasks: they will have Russia to dispose of; they will have
Latin America to dispt)se of; and they will have the United States to dispose of.
If they attack Russia first, the United States will do nothing about that. If
they begin assaults upon Latin America first, the United States will not be soon
enough and full enough i>repared to ensure against aggressor successes there.
If they attack the United States first, we will be poorly equipped to .stop them
without initial and substantial losses to ourselves — and we would have prac-
tically no help from Latin America ; we would be fight ivg alone against a combi-
nation which can attack both from the east and from the west ; and we have only
a one-ocean Navy.
me] This country could today make a substantial contribution toward
making the world safe for the United States — and for other democracies. The
United States can do little today toward preventing Hitler from becoming supreme
in Europe. The United States could do much today toward preventing Japan
from b'^coming supreme in eastern Asia. The United States can (may), of course,
fall back upon and fortify its pf)sition within the Western Hemisphere. If it
chooses to do this, and only this, the probability will be that, before long, weak-
ened economically and ciit off from valuable markets, especially those from which
various essential raw materials are derived (in the Far Eist), the United States
and its American associates will be confronted bv material pressures, including
those of armed force, not from the east alone but from the east and from the
west — not by Germany alone but by Germany and Japan.
Net being ready and willing now to fight toward stopping y51 Hitler in
Europe, we surely should refrain from giving him the aid and comfort of making
to him a free gift of assured access, through Japan, to the natural resources of
the Far East.
III. "Making Friends'' with Japan.
On May 30 the Chicago Daily Tribune published an editorial entitled "How to
Double the Fleet in a Week" in which the idea was advanced that the United
States and Japan can and should "come to a friendly understanding". In this'
editorial the Tribune said: "The best defense iK)licy of the United States could
be written within a few weeks in a renewed trade treaty with Japan. ... In
effect the strength of the fleet would be doubled by cutting half its problem away."
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1995
On June 3 the Xeic York Daily News published an editorial under the same
title as that of the VliUayo T/zT^Mwe's editorial of May 30. In this editorial the
News stated that, while it by no means always agrees with the Chicago Tribune,
the hitter's editorial under reference "interests us greatly". It expressed the
opinion that "by making friends with Japan" the United States can avert finding
itself "menaced with urgent trouble in the Atlantic and Pacific at the same time"
and "would in effect d-^'uble the strength of our (its) fleet".
[16] Oa June 6, Mr. Lippniann in an article of that date advanced the
view that the United States and Japan should "enter immediately into friendly
and conciliatory and candid negotations . . . for the avowed purpose of preserving
peace in the Pacific."
On July 1, Rear Admiral Yates Stirling (Retired) expressed in an article
of that date the view that the interests of the United States "lie in reaching a
friendly understanding with Japan, if one can be attained." Admiral Stirling
said that "history would indicate that they (the Japanese) can be stopped only
by sui^erior military force". He advocated the beginning by the United States
of "negotiations for a new basic treaty with Japan" and an attempt by the
United States "generally to normalize Japanese-American relations". He con-
cluded the article with the statement that "it would seem but the part of wisdom
to assure the safety of our Pacific flank if we can do so with honor."
The fallacy in the line of reasoning which leads to the conclusions thus
advanced in terms of suggestion or proposal by such analysts of international
relations as propose that the United States should pursue a policy of appease-
ment toward Japan lies in the assumed — but not stated — major premise. What
such analysts assume is that a country which is bent upon and is engaged in a
major [/7] program of predatory acquisitive activity (Japan) and a
country which is opposed to and is menaced by that kind of activity (the United
States) can merely by the conclusion by their governments of an agreement become
"friends" ; and, further, that if the United States and Japan would thus "become
friends" the United States could expect Japan to respect and to safeguard
American interests (and principles) in the Far East and the Pacific. — The
authors of this suggestion — and assumption — apparently believe that two strokes
of a pen on one piece of paper by two diplomats will transform a predatory nation
overnight into a contented, peace-loving and peace-supporting power ; also, that
a treaty can take the place of and do the work of a Battle Fleet. — In the case of
Mr. Lippniann, we find a writer who on June 4 had expressed regarding "the
conquerors" (Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy) the view that ". . . we cannot
buy their good will by tryiiig to appease them" expressing two days later with
regard to Japan the view that we can not only gain Japan's good will but can
make of Japan a friendly and to-be-relied-upon associate by a process of appease-
ment. Query : Do any of these protagonists really believe that Japan's objec-
tives and methods are today so unlike those of Germany t^at the United States
and Japan could be "good friends" whereas and while the United States and
Germany [18] cannot possibly be friends; that the United States must
in the interests of its own security oppose Germany but at the same time not
only should not oppose but should aid and support Japan?
Mr. Lippmann affirms that "Japan and the United States have nothing to gain
and a very great deal to lose by going to war — or even by standing opposed as
if they might be going to war" and that "it follows that there is no conflict
between Japan and the United States which is not reconcilable by diplonaacy",
whence — that the United States has nothing to gain by opposing Japan. By
the same tokens, there were not long ago those who, notwithstanding all of the
evidence which was available to the whole world regarding the objectives and
the methods of the Nazi leaders of Germany, contended that Great Britain and
France had nothing to gain by standing opposed to Germany. By the same
tokens, all conflict between Nazi Germany and Great Britain could be recon-
ciled by diplomacy. (An effort based on that principle was made at Munich.)
By the same tokens, all conflict between any "have" nation or nations and any
"have not" nation or nations could be reconciled by diplomacy. By the same
tokens, all conflict between capital and labor, and all conflict between political
parties, and all conflict between the law-abiding members and the predatory
members [19] of any con>munity could be settled by diplomacy; the con-
flict between Japan and China could be settled by diplomacy ; Japan's desire to
possess the Netherlands East Indies could be disposed of by diplomacy ; and
"fifth column" activities anywhere and everywhere could be disposed of by
diplomacy.
1996 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The essence of Mr. Lippman's proposal is that the United States should enter
upon a "negotiation which might lead through a new com/mercial treaty to a
political understanding", which would leave the American and the Japanese
navies "free to maintain order and stability in their respective spheres of
influence".
From 1911 to January 26. 1940 the United States and Japan had a commercial
treaty and they had a nun>ber of other treaties — including the Nine Power Tx'eaty
and the Kallogg Pact — which collectively were intended to regulate contacts, to
ensure fair and equal treatment, and to maintain peace. Nothwithstanding the
existence of these treaties, Japan embarked upon a procedure of conquest and
did all sorts of violence to American nationals, American property, and American
rights and interests in general. The American Government protested and pled.
Japan went right on. Finally the American Government denounced the com-
mercial treaty in order that it might have its hands free to take, [20] if and
when it saw fit, retaliatory action by measures short of war. For the first time,
the Japanese becamie alarmed and began to show some respect for American
rights in the Far East. Treaties had proved ineffective. Entreaties had proved
ineffectual. Fear of possible material pressures finally had, and has been
having, some influence. What the Japanese leadership today wfints now above
all things is to be relieved of all possibility of pressure from the United States —
in order that Japan may "go the limit" toward completing her conquest of
China and taking possession of various great storehouses of natural resources
in eastern Asia and the western Pacific. The conclusion of a new commercial
treaty at this time would be of tremendous advantage to Japan and would give
the Ignited States nothing comparable in diplomatic or economic value.
A division of the Pacific into a United States "sphere of influence" on the east
and a Japanese "sphere of influence" on the west would, it is true, leave the
Japanese Navy ''free" in the thus-created Japane.se "sphere", but it would not
in any way ensure that the said navy would "maintain order and stability" in
the said "sphere" or that Japan would respect in that area American, or British,
or French, or Netherland. or Soviet, or Chinese rights and interests.
In passing, attention may be called to the fact that [21] the Japanese
Navy was "free to maintain crder and stability" in the Far East in 19.31; the
Japanese Navy has been "free" to do that thing ever since; it is "free" to do it
today ; and it has not done that : it has done just the opposite.
The Japanese have today no higher regard for a diplomatic arrangement, an
international commitment, or a treaty provision than have the Germans. Some
of the Japanese leaders may talk of or may make commitments, their Foreign
Office may negotiate treaties, but the objective of their real leaders, the Array
and the Navy within the "military element", is expansion of Japanese political
authority and economic power — and Japanese armed force will move on and
will take where it can, when it can, and as it can, being checked only by opposi-
tion to it of material obstacles which are or which it fears to be too great for
it to overcome.
It is not "the truth" that "there is no conflict between Japan and the United
States which is not reconcilable by diplomacy". The United States stands for
peace on a basis of law, of order, of security, of justice, et cetera. Japan is bent
today upon driving occidental interests out of eastern Asia and the w-^stern
Pacific, and is bent upon establishing in eastern Asia and the western Pacific
by whatever processes may contribute thereto a Japanese hegemony or a
great and constantly greater .Japanese political empire.
[22] There is no need or occasion for the European war to come to the
Pacific — unless Japan chooses to bring (put) it there and the United States
permits Japan to do so. There is no need or occasion for war to come between
the United States and Japan — ^unless Japan goes further than she has already
gone (which is too far) in moves of aggression and of general disregard and
destruction of the rights and interests of the United States (and of the world
at large). While the United States is in position to use economic pressures
against Japan and to use a Fleet against Japan, there exist material obstacles
which tend to restrain Japan's leaders. If the United States were to conclude
with Japan, now, a new treaty ensuring Japan against economic pressures,
and/or if the United States removes its Battle Fleet from the Pacific, one or
both of those obstacles will thereby haA-e been removed, and the temptation to
Japan's effective leadership ("the military") to make the most of the oppor-
tunity thus presented will have been increased. Mere concluding of agreements
at this moment will not suffice to convince the Japanese leadership that "friendly
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1997
relations" [2S] with the United States henceforth are preferable to the
gathering in of s^wils rendered, by the coneludinji of agreements, the more readily
available now and immediately available.
We should, of course and by all means, try to prevent consummation of a closer
association by Japan of herself with the axis powers. But, we should do more
than that, we should try to prevent advance by Japan toward further acts of
aggression and acquisition by herself on her own account and for her own
advantage — all of which acts, when and as engaged in, will contribute toward
the working t)Ut of the plans of Nazi Germany. We have already done much
toward restraining Japan. Simultaneously, ourselves exercising a great measure
of self-restraint, we have been endeavoring to lead the Japanese to see that a
course of aggression will in the long run be not profitable where as a course of
procedure by peaceful means could be highly prolitable. We have talked con-
sistently and constantly of the imjwrtance of principles. Should we now make a
wholesale abandonment of the said principles — thereby conceding that, not force,
but mere frar of force is mightier than principles and mightier than professed
devotion to principles?
Reduced to simplest terms, what the advocates of an appeasement propose is
that we abandon our Far Eastern policy [24] of a hundred years' standing,
that we abandon the idea of the integrity of sovereignties in the Far Bast,
that we abandon such responsibilities as were and are ours under those which
remain in effect of the Washington Conference treaties, that we give up the
idea of befriending China toward resistance to Japan and thus toward defense
of various of our principles and interests, and that we accord Japan, deliberately
and by process of agreement, what would amount to a free hand in the western
Pacittc and eastern Asia. Now, if we wish to make these various abandonments,
and if we wish to give Japan a free hand, we can do both very easily and without
going to the trouble of or incurring the disadvantages which would accrue from
doing so by concluding an agreement ; all that we would need to do would be
to announce on our own part that we abandon the field, to withdraw by our
own orders the few ships that we have in Far Eastern waters and the few
marines that we maintain at three points in China, and to move our Fleet from
the Pacific into the Atlantic.
Assume, for the sake of thorough exploration, that it were granted in principle
that we should negotiate some kind of an agreement with Japan. What might
the provisions of that agreement be? What should they be? By answers to
these two questions the appeasement thesis might be and [25] should be
tested. These two questions should stand at the beginning of Mr. Lippmann's
statement of that thesis. They should be answered before he proceeds with
the contention that the problem of Japanese-American relations can be solved
by diplomacy alone and that the action for which he contends would produce
the solution.
The whole of the appeasement contention rests — for whatever else it may be
worth — upon an a.ssumption that, promises having been given by the United
States and promises having been given by Japan, the United States could there-
after assume and e-'pect that Japan would live up to or perform within the limits
of her promises. In the light of the history of the past forty-five years, no
such assmuption could with warrant be made, and reliance upon any such
assumption would be folly.
Japan has it within her power to ensure the peace of the Pacific. The United
States does not have that within its power. Japan needs only to desist from
certain courses in which she is engaged and to refrain from certain courses
toward which she is inclined — and there will be peace in the Pacific. This means
that the problem is a problem not of giving pledges, it is a problem of action,
a problem [26] of behavior, a problem of performance. Action gives
evidence and proof of intention. Assurances of intention constitute neither
evidence nor proof.
The conflict which is raging today is between two great groups of major
powers, is between two ideologies, is between tho.se nations which have and
which wish to hold and those nations which are out to "take" — and this conflict
is world-wide.' On one side are China. Great Britain,. and the United States: on
the other side are Japan, Germany and Italy. The conflict is raging not alone
in Europe but also in the Far East. The three powers of the to-have-and-to hold
group are menaced not alone in Europe and on the Atlantic but in eastern Asia
and on the Pacific. Whatever any one of the to-have-and-to-hold group loses is
a loss for all members of the group : and whatever any one of the "take" group
gains is a gain for all members of that group.
1998 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The United States, as a party to this conflict, must function not on one front
only but on tivo fronts. In the event of our "abandoning" any angle of our
western fi-ont (that is, the western Pacific and the Far East) — and of Japan's
gaining thereby, and of China, Great Birtain, et cetera, losing thereby — bj' just
so much will the position [27] of the "have" group of which the United
States is a member be weakened and the "take" group (Japan, Germany and
Italy) be strengthened.
"We cannot buy . . . (the) good will" of the Nazis or the good will of the
Fascists. Nor can we buy the good will of the Japanese military leadership.
"We can (could), however, earn their (the Nazis' and the Fascists') contempt"
and we can (could), by like efforts of attenipt to "appease" them, "earn the
contempt" of Japan's military leadership. And more, we could also earn the
contempt of the British, the contempt of various of our own "neutral" associates,
the contempt and resentment and bitterness of 4(X) million plus Chinese, the
contempt of the whole world of today and of tomorrow.
[28] IV. Encouraging China to Make a Compromi.se or Adverse Settlement
with Japan.
The Chinese do not wish today to make peace with Japan on the basis of any
compromise which would leave Japanese armed forces in China. The Chinese
are war weary, but no more so than are the Japanese. The Chinese are not
confronted with any imminent necessity of making an early peace with Japan.
Given a free held, the Chinese have at least even chances of outlasting the Japa-
nese in a struggle which is highly burdensome to each of the two countries.
It has been demonstrated during the past three years that the Japanese belief
and representation that Japan is capable of creating in China conditions of peace,
law, order, and stability are not well founded : the Japanese have shown them-
selves psychologically unqualified for the performance of that task. A "peace"
settlement concluded between China and Japan now and under existing circum-
stances would have no solid foundations or anchorage. It would be inconsistent
with American relation.ships and with U. S. objectives in relationships with the
Far East, and it would not on balance profit the United States.
[2.9] Excerpt frym letter by a Chinese business man to Mr. Walter Lipp-
mann, dated June 6, 1940
"Carried to its logical conclusion, your thesis undoubtedly means that China
should surrender and, like Denmark, Holland, Belgium and Norway cooperate
with the aggressor. It would also signify that China's three years of desperate
resistance in the name of democracy, with its unprecedented sacrifice of human
lives and property, should be halted because of a European conflict which may
affect America. In ca.se any ('hinese leader follows your logic and leads his
people into the arms of Japan, what assurance woiild America have that the
Japanese war machine, with the cooperation of 4r)0,(X)0,000 Chinese who have
proved themselves sterling fighters, would not wage war on all Pacific countries?
Does such an eventuality relieve America?
* * * * * * «
"As I view the desperate world situation, there is no easy short-cut to a peace-
ful settlement. Short-cuts no matter how sincere and well-intended, as amply
demonstrated by the Munich agreements, only prolong the agony. The United
States cannot fight aggression in one ocean an4 condone it in the other. To do so,
simply destroys America's traditional foreign policy to no practical purpose.
"The Chinese during the past few years have successfully [SO] resisted
the aggressions of a mechanized army considered second only to Hitler's in
striking power. They have done this with little else but their human flesh,
indomitable spirit and courage. Thus far, they have demonstrated that vitality
and spirit can count for ju.st as nmch as mechanized material in modern warfare.
They have kept the Japanese so occupied and exhausted that Japan today dares
not move as rapidly as she would like in the direction of the Allied and American
possessions ill the Pacific. Japan, I assure you, cannot be placated by momentary
measures of appeasement, and she fears nothing more than the Chinese will to
continue their undying resistance. America's greatest assurance in the Pacific
is the maintenance of this Chinese will to resist."
[31] Excerpts from Chicago Daily Netos editorial, June 10, 1940.
"a deal with japan ?
"In order to make a deal with Japan today, we would have to condone, openly
or covertly, its treaty-breaking invasions of China. We would have to betray
not only our Chinese friends, but also more than a hundred years of American
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 1999
policy in the Far East. We would be imitating, in effect, the worst and most
dangerous aspects of Britain's 'appeasement' efforts.
"And once we had made the deal, of what use would It be? Japan has de-
liberately broken one solemn treaty with us. Why sliould it l<eep another, any
longer than its own interest required? What guarantee would we have that, at
the first opportunity, Japan would not gang up against us with the rest of our
enemies? ♦
"No, there is only one way for us to be secure. We must make ourselves able,
by combined sea and air power, supported by a sufficient army, to wage war, if
need be, both in the Atlantic and the Pacific. No diplomacy, no scheming, no
wishful thinking, no device, nothing whatever can save us now from this painful
necessity, sl;ort of a miracle — the miracle of an Allied victory over Hitler."
[32] Excerpts from article by Raymond Clapper, published June 13, 1940.
NO DEAL WITH JAPAN
"Because we are afraid, we should try to appease Japan. How? By selling
out now. By turning adrift to the tender mercies of the yellow race Australia,
New Zealand, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and all way stations.
"In ord^r to buy Japan's friendship and supiwrt, we would put the seal of our
approval upon such a betrayal. We would scuttle on every. international ideal.
For our treachery we would gain nothing but a Munich, to last until the day
when Japan wanted something else that had not been included in the bargain.
Then Japan would take whatever it was that she wanted and pay no more heed
to her deal with us than she paid to her treaty pledges wlien she went into
Manchukuo, into China proper, or when she fortified the mandate islands in the
Pacific.
"If Japan is determined to extend her domination in the Far East, at least
let it not be done with our approval, as part of a deal with us. Let us not be a
party to it in a craven act that would instantly be a tip-off to the totalitarian
powers that we had lost our nerve as completely as the British lost theirs in the
early 1930s, when [33] Japan went into Mancliukuo, or as the French
lost theirs when they permitted Hitler to reoccupy the Rhineland.
"Don't think that a deal wiih japan would not be recognized as a tip-off to all
Latin America, a tip-off that the third great democracy also was on the run.
Are we to invite every Latin American country to begin saying of us, as the
little nations of Europe did of Britain, that they cannot depend upon us? Are
we to give them that encouragement to rush into deals with Hitler as the new
rising force that is to replace the United States as the protector of the Western
Hemisphere?
* * « * 41 « *
"When France and England have been crushed, only the United States and our
system on the Western Hemisphere, plus what we may take over from the
British Empire, will be left standing in the way.
"In this situation we can trust nobody but ourselves. We can trust only our
own force. We want none of the false sense of security that a deal with Japan
would give us, a deal that might prove as treacherous as Munich. Japan is
playing the same game as the other crowd and we should be foolish to deceive
ourselves. We must make busy b?ing the strong neighbor in the Western
Hemisphere. No neighbor now is a good neighbop unless he is strong. We need
guns, not treaties."
[34] Full text of Chicago Daily News editorial, June 17, 1940.
"THE APPEASEBS
"The agitation for appeasement of Japan's ambiti<ms in Asia by American
concession^ is growing among those who seem determined to force the United
States into the fatal course taken by Britain under Neville Chamberlain.
"The proponents of this idea seem to think that Japan wcmld be reasonable
in its demands, and that, having signed an agreement with the United States,
Japan would abide by it. Chamberlain had the same delusions about Germany
and Italy. We have had agreements and treaties with Japan before. But they
have been honored in the breach rather than in the observance.
"The philosophy behind this agitati<m is exemplified by a thoughtful editorial
that appeared in the Chicago Tribune of May 30. Excerpts from it are cited here-
2000 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
with. Accompanying them in italics are excerpts from the speeches of Neville
Chamberlain :
" 'The United States aiul Japan can come to a friendly understanding. There
is no obstacle in the way except the determination of some Americans to domi-
nate Japan's policy in China. •
" 'And yet whatever differences there may be between [S5] us and other
nations on that subject, do not forget that we are all members of the human
race. . . . There must be something in common between us.
" 'Japan needs peace with the United States.
"'There is not a country or government that wants to see a European war.
" 'Japan would be disposed to be more reasonable if Chinese ports, and forts
were not in European hands.
" 'If we can bring these four nations into friendly discussion, into a settle-
ment of their differences, ice shall have saved the peace of Europe for a
generation.
" 'The Japanese are more willinjr now than ever to come to settle.iient in
China. * * *
"'Before saying fareircU to Herr Hitler * * ♦ he repeated to me icith great
earnestness what he had already said at Herehtesgaden, namely, that this was
the last of his territorial ambitions in Europe and that he had no wish to
inHude in the Reich people of othn- races than Oermans * * * that he wanted
to be friends ivith England.
" 'America may be able to aid China a great deal more effectively if it isn't
quarreling with Japan than it can by keeping up a futile bombardment of threats
and hard words. * ♦ *
" 'What we did was to save her (Czechoslovakia) from annihilation and give
her a chance of new life as a new state. * * * Therefore I think the govern-
ment deserves the approval of this House for their conduct of affairs in this
crisis which has saved Czechoslovakia from destruction and Europe from
Armageddon.'
"The italicized paragraphs exemplify the Chamberlain philosophy of appease-
ment and delusion. The alternate piiragraphs exemplify the philosophy of
those who would follow the Chamberlain program here. We know how falla-
cious the (^hamberlain philosophy was in the case of Britain. We should know
liow fallacious it would be if applied to our own affairs."
[37] Excerpts from letter by Carl Crow, dated June 14, 1940, published
in Lynchburg, Virginia, News, June 17. IIMO.
"No sensible per.son can disagree with the argument of Mr. Walter lappniann
that peace between the United States and Japan is highly desirable. But in
his contention that we should hasten to conclude an amicable arrangement
because of the dangers which threaten us Mr. Lippmann ignores consideration
of facts which must be better known to him than to most Americans.
"The most important of these is that, as has so often been -emphasized by
Japan, the oidy basis of friendship she will recognize is based on approval of
her iK>licy in East Asia, involving the (•on(iuest <»f China. Unless we are pre-
pared to do that anything else we might do would be as futile as Mr. Cham-
berlain's appeasement policy at Munich. Any move we might make toward the
conclusion of a new trade treaty woidd be interpreted by the war lords who
rule Japan as an evidence of weakness and instead of making relations better
would only make them worse. It would only encourage them to further aggres-
sions and would be a disservice to the Japanese people who.se progress is halted
by their own war lords.
*******
[38] "Mr. Lippmann appears momentarily to have forgotten that Hitler's
attack on Europe, Japan's invasion of China and Mussolini's sword rattling were
all preceded by the so-called "anti-Comintern pact" whereby the three became
partners in a program which was not officially disclosed but has been made
clear by actions. It was as a result of that pact and supplemental agreements
that Mussolini is helping Hitler. The only reason Japan is not playing the
same part is that she is bogged down in China and the American fleet is in the
Pacflc. Give Japan a free hand and she would at once abandon her policy of
non-involvement — a policy that has been forced on her by her inability to carry
out any other. With the open or secret aid of Japan to Hitler the chances of
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2001
an Allied victory would be greatly lessened. Indeed we might face much graver
dangers than those which inspire Mr. Lippmann's fears — a victorious Germany
on the Atlantic, a victorious Italy in the Mediterranean and a victorious Japan
on the Pacific, all bound together by a secret agreement and each inspired by
the same conviction that democratic government should be crushed.
"Faced by a menace of that seriousness, what further measures of appease-
ment could Mr. Lippmann suggest?"
[39] Excerpts from article by Major George Fielding Eliot, published
June 27, 1940.
"major E3LI0T TAKES SHABP ISSXJE WITH MOVES TO APPEIASE JAPAN
"There are some voices in this country now raised in favor of an American
'understanding' with Japan, as a means for freeing our hands in the Atlantic.
Why there should be any more virtue in a Japanese signature on a treaty
today than there was on certain previous occassions of historic note it is
difficult to understand.
"If we are compelled temporarily, or permanently, to abandon certain of our
Pacific or Far Eastern interests by the necessity of concentrating our strength
in the Atlantic, then we must do so. But let us be perfectly clear in our minds
about what we are doing. Le us be sure that what we are abandoning is not
worth more than what we can save by making any drastic changes in our dis-
positions.
"We must do the best we can, with a critical situation and inadequate military
force, but let us not commit the crowning folly of again putting our faith in
scraps of paper bearing totalitarian seals and promises."
\40] Excerpts from Oakland, California, Tribune editorial, June 19, 1940
"firmness in the far east
"What the United States' policy will be in the event of new Japanese aggres-
sion we do not know. But this much is patent on the basis of past experience :
Any appeasement of Japan on the part of this country will defeat its ends by
encouraging the Tokyo chauvinists, by giving the impression that we are weak,
and by undermining our prestige with South American States who look to us
for protection. It also is clear that we cannot stop Japan imless we are pre-
pared for a protracted naval warfare in the Pacific and unless we use the great
British naval base at Singapore; Whatever happens, we must be uncompromis-
ing in our opposition to the pilfering of Franco-British territory in the Far
East."
\41] Excerpts from article by Barnet Nover, published June 28, 1940.
"china fights on"
"The spirit of appea.sement is not dead ; it has merely shifted its habitation. It
is being urged that the United States come to terms with Japan in order that our
fleet might be free for any eventualities that might occur on this side of the
hemifjphere. It may be that, faced by threats from botli Asia and Europe, we
shall have to abandon Asia and concentrate our force to resist incursions from
the other side of the Atlantic.
"But let us be under no illusions as to what that would mean ; it would be a
capiti^lation to Japan and a capitulation which, in no sense, would add to our
security.
"At the moment when she is still very vulnerable we would be permitting
Japan to become invulnerable: at tlie moment when Japan is still at our mercy
we would, b.v a policy of appeasement toward her, be placing ourselves at Japan's
mercy. And at no tiive can we for a moment forget that the German threat from
the Ea.st is paralleled by the Japanese threat from the West.
"As long as Great Britain fights on, the Nazi danger to us is limited; as long
as China fights on, we have relatively little to fear from Japan. But China,
like Great [^2] Britain, is fighting our battles which is why out of selfish-
ness no less than out of sentimental considerations, we must give whatever aid we
can to both and desert neither.
2002 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"It is always the counsel of wisdom when facing grave emergencies to limit
one's risks; but nothing is gained and much is lost when, in an attempt to limit
risks, we stand a real chance of multiplying them."
[43] Excerpts from La Crosse, Wisconsin, Tribune editorial, June 22, 1940.
"no appeasement heee"
"Loss of prestige is one of Great Britain's chief liabilities at the present
moment. With each concession, with each step backward, with each attempt to
stave off danger, England lost face. In the case of the island empire, ill pre-
pared as events proved, there was little else to do.
"But the United States is not now in a situation where it need proclaim to
the whole world it is afraid. The nation is unprepared admittedly to fight in
two oceans. But there is no doubt that if this country gears itself for defense —
and it is gearing itself for defense — It can meet any challenge.
"It will not do to announce to the world that the last great democracy has
lost its nerve. South America must have faith in the integrity of the United
States and in this nation's ability to back up the Monroe doctrine. Japan will
be less a menace if she fears America that if America fenrs her. Any agreement
with Japan which revealed this nation's desire for protection would be tantamount
to an invitation to attack.
"The Fascist nations put practical considerations before [44] ideals or
principles. A treaty based on the fright oof the United States would remain in
effect only so long as Japan found it profitable.
"The world has been shown with terrible clarity the effects of such a peace
as the Munich peace. Let not this nation make Great Britain's mistake."
[45] Excerpts from an article by Robert North in Amerasia, July 1940.
"AN AMEBICAN-JAPANESE AXIS IS PROPOSED
"Appeasement of Japan and withrlrawal of the United S^^ates naval forces from
the Pacific is urged by the Chicago Tribune, the New Yo''k D^Uy News and Walter
Lippraann's column in the New York Herald Tribune. They propose negotiation
of a new commercial agreement and diplomatic alignment with Japan.
" 'Be nice to Japan now, and we may well be able to double our fleet's effective
strength by making friends with the Japanese Navv,' says the News. 'It seems
to us the time has come for us to try to shut our back door, so to speak, before
sending our best fighting men, guns, planes and ships out our front door to try to
win another war for the Allies,' it says editorially. So it recommends that we
'insure ourselves against a two-front war if we can. by renewing our trade treaty
with Japan and soft-pedaling the moral indignation over Japan's aggressions in
China for a while.'
"These proposals, if carried into effect, would leave the defense of our Pacific
coast to the Japanese Navy, instead of our own. San Franc'sco, Spo*^*^'*^. Los
Angeles. Portland would be protected by Japanese promises. So would Hawaii,
the Philippines, and our trade and investment position in [46] the Far
East, not to speak of Alaska and the Pacific approaches to Canada, Mexico and
all points south in this hemisphere.
"These newspaper strategists give us for defense against Japanese aggression
the Japanese Navy. On its decks will stand J-ipanese admirals, beaming friend-
ship because civilians at home have signed another treaty.
"Why not go the whole way, gentlemen, and shut the front door on the Atlantic,
also, by making a similar agreement with Hitler? Let bygones be bvgones with
him. as with Japan, and while we are at it treble our navy by adding the German
and Italian fleets to ours along with the Japanese. Then with Hitler protecting
us against Hitler onthe East, and Japan protecting us agairst Japan on the West,
we could get away from all this bother about national defense. We could use
our new trade agreements to strengthen our new allies for our own protection.
We could build them up economically, just as the Allies built up Hitler, and hope
for the best."
• ••••••
"If Japan should emerge from this war with her industrial machine intact, she
would no longer be a competitor merely in knick-knacks, toys, light bulbs and
other small consumers' goods. She has shifted the center of gravity of her pro-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2003
duction from ligbt to heavy industry. The capacity of her heavy industrial plant
has more than doubled since 1931".
• •••**•
[.^7] "Chinese resistance has not only prevented the proposed development
of Chinese cotton, but has compelled importation of foreign growths for Chinese
mills. But if, with the help of a new American trade agreement; Japan should
succeed in subjugating China, or even in establisliing a firm foothold in North
China alone, the first condition for complete independence of American cotton will
have been met. China is the third largest cotton producer.
"Success of the New Order means not only that Japan would be lost as our
third largest customer by obtaining new sources of supply of the things she buys
here; it means that she would be equipped for cut-throat competition in those
very price markets, Latin America and Asia, which offer us the only opportunity
for substantial expansion. At a time when the European market appears about
to be closed to our goods, this would lead toward American export strangulation.
The effects on our entire economic s.tructure are incalculable."
[48] Full text of article by Walter Lippmann in New York Herald Tribune
of June 6, 1940.
TowABD A Peace With Japan
Although the attention of the Americas is fixed upon Europe, they must never
forget that the American continents are a great island set amidst the oceans
of the world. On the west the ocean washes the coasts of Asia and of the
island empires of the east.
The only Navy which the American hemisphere possesses is now in the west-
ern ocean. In that same ocean there is the Japanese navy. As betweea the
United States and Japan, two nations which have never been at war, there has
developed in recent years a growing opposition of policies, interests and diplo-
matic principle. Their relationship today is obviously unstable. The naval
treaty has lapsed. The commercial treaty has been abrogated. In respect to
China the two countries have taken positions which are in theory irreconcilable.
In respect to the Netherlands Indies their public declarations promising respect
for the status quo are ambiguous, and in the light of conceivable developments,
exceedingly precarious.
To put the matter more plainly, the two countries confront each other across
the vast expanse of the Pacific, each having taken a position where untoward
circumstances or an uncalculated overt act might plunge both of them into
a prolonged and exhausting struggle. In such a struggle l-iSa] neither
Japan nor the United States would be serving its vital interests. Both nations
would be sacrificing them. The Japanese, already suffering from the Chinese
war, would by engaging and exhausting themselves still further make them-
selves vulnerable to the only great power, namely Russia, which can strike by land
and by sea and by air at the very heart of the Japanese empire. The United
States, by drifting into, such a war, would be engaging the Navy for years to
come in a confused and indecisive campaign on the other side of our world ; yet
at that very moment the security of the American continents may require the use
of the whole Navy to guard those strategic points in the Atlantic Ocean which
must be held if this hemisphere is to be defended.
It is now a kind of suicidal madness for the two nations to contemplate even
the possibility of letting the existing tension and the existing conflicts of interest
and principle de^'elop into a war. For in such a war both would be sacrificing
much greater principles than they were upholding and both would be jeopardizing
fatally interests which are infinitely more important than those they were
defending.
♦••*•••
Some, perhaps, will feel that to express this candid view of Japanese-Ameri-
can relations is to display a deplorable weakness at a time when only strength
and firmness are good currency in international affairs. I do not think it is
weakness to make the plain truth the basis of national [48b] policy.
The Japanese know their own strength and their own weaknesses and they
know our strength and our weaknesses ; and we know the same of them and of
ourselves. Neither they nor we can afford to bluff. Neither we nor they can
afford to provoke the other. This is the truth. And on the truth we shall both
do well to found our policies.
2004 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Lest this opinion be ascribed to a sudden fear engendered by the critical state
of Europe, I hope I may be pardoned for saying that many of us have held
and expressed this view for a long time, ever since the outbreak of the European
war was manifestly inevitable. For it has been clear to us that whatever our
sympathies and interests in the Far East, a great European war for the domi-
nation of the Western World would affect directly and vitally the security and
the independence of this hemisphere. We have held that, by comparison, our
interests in the Far East would prove to be secondary, however important they
might under more normal circumstances appear to be. We have, therefore,
l;e!d that it was perilous and in the highest degree unstatesmanlike to let develop
an irrec(meilable conflict with Japan, to conceal from ourselves the immense
gravity of such a conflict, to exacerbate the tension by threats and by declara-
tions that are too absolute to be negotiable.
* • • • ' • • «
We have held that this provocative attitude was downright folly especially at a
time when the country was doped and duped by a notion of "neutrality" in Europe
which might compel it to stand by and risk the collapse of Allied sea iK)wer. We
have argued that the policy of the majority of the Foreign Relations Committee
of the Senate during the month of Jul.^' a year ago was a classic example of how
misguided men can imperil the security of a nation.
For in that fatal month the committee challenged Japan in the Pacific by sup-
porting, and even by inciting to, the abrocration of the commercial treaty, and by
brandishing the threat of an embargo; in the very same weeks when it was pro-
posing to risk a war with Japan, the same committee was refusing to lift the
embargo on the sale of arms to the Allies on the ground that what happened
to them was no concern of ours. It was a most awful case of not letting your
right hand know what your left hand is doing, an almost incredible case of being
blindly provocative in (me ocean and blindly supine in the other ocean. And
unhappily the Administrati(m, which knew better, acquiesced in this utterly un-
statesmanlike policy of challenging Japan in Asia while we were forbidden to
support the Allies in Europe.
*******
The situation today is, of course, worse than it was then. But still the funda-
mental interests involved are the same. It is still true that Japan and the
United [4^d] States have nothing to gain and a very great deal to lose
by going to war — or even by standing opposed as if they might be going to war.
It is still true that our interests in the Far East are secondary to our interests
in this hemisphere; because this is true, it follows that there is no conflict be-
tween Japan and the United States which is not reconcilable by diplomacy. We
should, therefore, recognize this truth and shou'd, I submit, enter immediately into
friendly and conciliatory and candid negotiations with the Japanese for the
avowed pur{)ose of preserving the peace in the Pacific.
• ***•**
This is not a time for bluffing and this is not a time for indulging that false
pride which causes men to cling to an untenable position. We know that we must
defend our security and our very independence in this hemisphere and in the
Atlantic Ocean. We know that Japan has a greater interest in Asia than we
have. Let us recofnize the fact. On the other hand, the Japanese position in
the Far East is at least as difficult as is our position in the Western Hemisphere.
Japan is at war with China. Japan has Soviet Russia for her nearest neighbor.
Her commerce with this hemisphere is of critical importance to the standard of
life of the Japanese people.
In these considerations there are the essential elements of a negotiation which
might lead through a new commercial treaty to a political understanding based
on the principle [-'fSe] that the European war, which is also a European
revolution, is not to be extended to the Pacific. We should aim high and aim
far — at a new order of things in the Pacific in which, having adjusted our
secondary cor.flicts, the two navies will cease to confront each other as potential
antagonists and will be free to maintain order and stability in their respective
spheres of influence.
*******
I have no way of knowing whether the Japanese nation will respond to such
a change of American policy. My belief is that they might, that they do not
regard themselves as our enemies, that they respect the power we are capable
of developing and that the best of the Japanese leaders and the mass of the
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2005
Japanese people desire peace with the United States. Even if this is not the fact,
we shall never, I believe, regret having tried wholeiieartedly to preserve the
peace in half the world.
U9] Full text of New York Herald Tribune editorial, July 7, 1940.
"japan's appeasement"
It is rather amazing at this juncture, when the character of the totalitarian
response to Mr. Chamberlain's appeasement policy is so familiar to every Amer-
ican, and seems so inevitable in retrospect, to note that there is some agita-
tion in Washington and elsewhere for the appeasement of Japan. It is suggested
that we make concessions to the Japanese point of view and negotiate a new
commercial treaty with Japan, so that we can turn our backs on the I'acific and
give all our attention to the menace from Europe. These suggestions, which
have had Senator \ andenberg's support, must be borne of ignorance of the
Japanese point of view, of the workings of the Japanese military mind and of
Japan's record of bad faith.
It can be stated, without condition or reservation, that no price in terms
of appeasement which this country could pay would buy Japanese good will or
good behavior in the Pacific.
To get even an empty promise of security from a Japan whose policies are com-
pletely controlled by the uniformed expansionists, this country would have to
recognize the justice of Japan's alienation of Manchuria and the martyrdom
of China: recognize the legality of whatever position Japan can acquire in
China through a campaign of indiscriminate slaughter and bestial savagery;
recognize her police rights and special interests throughout eastern Asia, the
adjacent waters [49(t] and the East Indies; and agree to withdraw all
armed forces f : om that part of the world and leave to Japan's discretion what
access we should have to markets and sources of supply between Hawaii,
Singapore and the Aleutian Islands. And what would the pledges bought with
SUCH concessions be worth in a crisis, if the fleet were withdrawn from the
Pacific and if Nippon's militarists discovered that it was Japan's heaven-
appointed destiny to expand in this direction? All pledges would then become
as "in applicable" to Japan's mission in Hawaii, California, Alaska, or witherso-
ever weak defenses invited her, as the nine-power treaty of 1922 is to con-
tinental expansion. Remember that among Asiatic totalitarians, as among
Europe's Asiatic-minded despots, a leaning toward appeasement is irrefutable
evidence of weakness and fear; and remember that, when the gods have de-
livered the weak into the hands of the strong, it is a breach of faith with divinity
to keep faith with weakness.
Those who contend that we should buy security from Japan contend that the
President, Mr. Hull and the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee have made
a bungle of our relations with Japan. This is untrue. The powers of the
United States government to check Japane.se aggression and to resent flagrant
breaches of faith have lieen limited, because of the nation's aversion to over-
seas entanglements and its fear that strong measures would bring reprisals,
and reprisals, war. [-i-^h] With such powers as it has had, Jiowever, it
has put the only effective check on Japan's intense craving to profit by British,
French and American preoccupation with the European situation.
The denunciation of the commercial treaty a year ago brought to an end the
campaign of persecution against Occidentals in China, just when it was being
extended to American citizens. Japanese presistence in that campaign would
have meant war. The .Administration's refusal to renew the treaty, since its
expiration in January, and its retention of the right to impose disabilities upon
Japanese trade which would have ham.strung the Japane.se Army have kept the
militarists in as placatory a mood as any influence could have short of the pres-
ence of an overwhelmingly superior army. The presence of the fleet in the
Pacific has been the only sedative in the world that has restrained Japan's naval
expansionists from adventures that would have brought the war into the
Pacific.
2006 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[50] Full text of Chicago Daily Tribune editorial May 30, 1940.
"how to double the fleet in a week"
We are talking excitedly of armaments and congress is voting the money in
billion dollar bills. War material is coming out of the mills on Capitol hill, but
it is not coming out of the factories, and for a long, long time it will not b^ com-
ing out of them. In the meantime we are neglecting to improve a situation
affecting our Pacific frontier. The opportunity is there, and if this nation would
make u.se of it it could double the power of its fleet and do more in a short time
to increase the strength of its defenses than it can do in a year of production,
even on a 24 hour day and a 7 day week.
The United States and Japan can come to a friendly understanding. There
is no obstacle in the way except the determination of rome Americans to dominate
Japan's policy in China. Japan needs peace with the United States. Japanese
statesmen may be looking at the future with as much uncertainty as prudent
Americans. In a world rapidly changing from its old historical trends and
whirling off its old historical foundations, Japan may feel quite as dubious as.
the United States. Many overtures have been made by Japan for an under-
standing which would deal with what is real in the relations of the two countries
and avoid what is superficially confl'cting.
[.Wa] The United States at this time cannot afford to conduct its foreign
relations wholly on moral preconceptions. America may be able to aid China
a great deal more effectively if it isn't quarreling with Japan than it can by
keeping up a futile bombardment of threats and hard words which have done
the Chinese no good and can do America a great deal of harm.
This country cannot afford to have an enemy in the Pacific. It is not necessary
to have one there. Peaceable trade can be resumed and a peaceable understand-
ing can be had. That understanding would rest upon material advantages which
Japan would obtain from friendship with the United States and therefore would
have the promise of an enduring understanding.
Japan need not be driven into the German-Italian camp. If events progress
as they have been doing in Europe the British and French interests in China will
be canceled out. Japan then will have won a major campaign. Its policy has
been, in a way, a duplicate of our Monroe doctrine. Japan has objected to the
entrenchment of powerful European nations off its coast, just as we would object
to the same thing in relation to our national life.
Japan would be disposed to be more reasonable if Chinese ports and forts were
not in European hands. China itself will be better satisfied to know that the
foreigner [oOb] is out. The Japanese are more willing now than ever to
come to a settlement in China which will relieve them of a protracted and expen-
sive war. That may not be possible at once, but an understanding between the
United States and Japan might do more to conciliate the Chinese question than
can be expected from the present bellicose attitude of the American government.
If we intend to keep our Pacific front bristling with threats the Japanese will
look for their associations in other quarters and we know exactly where that
will be. If the people in Washington who are rushing to arms in fear of a
danger to the eastern front are sincere, if they mean to take precautions and
provide against the future, they'll protect the western flank by making a friendly
arrangement with the power which controls the far east. They won't so manage
American affairs that trouble in the Atlantic will be accompanied by trouble in
the Pacific. While they ai'e passing a billion dollar appropriation for the American
navy they won't continue to make it necessary to keep the battle fleet on its
Honolulu base.
By accepting the Japanese overtures they can double the strength of the fleet
immediately. The best defense policy of the United States could be written
within a few weeks in a renewed trade treaty with the Japanese. That peaceable
treaty would immediately enable the United States to use its [50c] fleet
in the Atlantic if that's where it is needed. It would not be tied as now to the
Pacific. In effect the strength of the fleet would be doubled by cutting half its
problem away.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2007
EXHIBIT NO. 97
DEtPABfTMENT OF STATE,
Adviser on Poutical Relations,
September 21, 1940. ,
Mr. Welles : You state that both you and the Secretary feel that at this moment
it would be undesirable for the Department to oppose the plans of the Navy to
which the underlying memorandum relates.
Vou ask for my reaction. ,
The proposal is susceptible of discussion from two points of view: (a) policy
in foreign relations or (b) policy in relations between this Department and the
Navy Department.
There arises in my mind at once the question of which is more important,
service of our objectives in the field of foreign relations, or service of some
objectives particularly regarding wnich are not known to me in relations between
this Department and the Navy Department.
On the face of Mr. Chapin s memorandum it appears that the Navy Department
is advancing merely a tentative proposal and that it is seeking in good faith
our opinion of the proposal on its merits. If there exists some particular and
good reason why we should regard this as a definitive "plan" of the Navy and
why we should advance no expression of view unravorable to it, I am not aware
of such fact. Again reverting to Mr. Chapin's statement [2] of the prob-
lem, I am compelled to assume that Admiral Stark will wish to discuss the
matter with you on its merits.
The proposal calls for a withdrawal of the Fleet from Hawaiian waters and
its engagement in maneuvers southward from San Diego for a period of approxi-
mately 60 days. The objective is stated to be Fleet training. The problem
involved would be apparently a problem of defending the Panama Canal against
a naval attack.
As you know, I have contended constantly and consistently during recent
months that, the situation in the Far East having been and being what it is, the
most advantageous point at which to hold our Fleet is Pearl Harbor. I believe
that the presence of the Fleet at that point has rendered the Fleet more useful
that would have been its presence at any other point, so long as disposal of the
Fleet is simply for guard duty and general defense. I do not today share the
view which I heard expressed a few days ago that the presenc*e of the Fleet at
Honolulu no longer exarcises any restraining influence as regards the situation
In'the Far East. I believe that withdrawal of the Fleet eastward would diminish
our diplomatic influence as regards that situation — even though it be announced
that the withdrawal is only, temporary, et cetera, et cetera.
[3] That the Fleet must have training exercises is axiomatic. Announce-
ment that the Fleet is engaged in a problem relating to defense of the Panama
Canal against a naval attack would tend to emphasize the fact that our policy
is essentially a policy of defense in our own waters (only). The suggestion is
made that the problem be kept very secret. I do not believe it would be so kept.
Whether there be or not be an announcement, and whether there be or not be
secrecy, the Japanese would learn enough about the Fleet's whereabouts to enable
Japanese naval experts to draw inferences, and their inferences would be that,
as always suspected by them, we have no intention of having our Fleet operate
in the western Pacific.
I doubt the need at this time for training on a problem of defense of the Pan-
ama Canal against a naval attack. In my opinion the Japanese have no thought
whatever of any possibility of a launching by them in any near future of p. naval
attack against the I'nited States or the Panama Canal or any part of South
America.
In Mr. Chapin's memorandum it is stated, presumably as an observation ad-
vanced by the Navy Department, that there might be an alternative: "a minor
Fleet problem could be conducted if necessary in waters adjacent to Hawaii". —
In my opinion it would be preferable at this time that training of the Fleet be
achieved througli such [^] an exercise than through the Pacific Coast exer-
cise under reference.
The Navy is at present engaged in an operation involving the sending of the
vessels of the Fleet, one-third at a time, from Pearl Harbor to San Diego and
return. There arises in my mind the question why, in the light of that fact.
2008 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
contemplate at tEis time a bringing of the whole Fleet again back to the West
Coast at about the moment when that operation will have been completed.
In principle, I would always doubt the advisability of sending the whole pack
of one's watchdogs to a hospital or to a training school at a time when there are
an unusual number of ugly prowlers in one's neighborhood or in the neighbor-
hood of one's outlying estates. My mind reacts adversely to suggestions which
seem to me to involve such a procedure, just as it does to suggestions for the
making of gestures without the accompaniment of definite and decided-upon
objectives and at least tentatively decided-upon intentions.
In these days, we have almost ceased to give consideration to questions of ex-
pense. I would point out, however, that Fleet movements cost money. I for
one would rather see such money as may be spent upon the Navy and its opera-
tions spent in greater proportion upon construction of new planes [5] and
of new ships than upon maximum possible expansion of training operations.
/s/ SKH.
PA/H : SKH : ZMK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2009
Department of State
the under secretary
September 20, 1940
PA/H - Dr. Hornbeck:
Tlie Secretary and I both
feel that at thle moment it
would be undesirable for the
Department of State to oppose
the plans of the Navy which
are obviously baaed on what
in the judgment of the Navy
is required by national defense.
Please let me have your
reaction.
U:SW:IJ
79716 O— 46— pt. 1(
2010 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Department of State
THE SECREJXFTY
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2011
IJ
U't-
2012 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2013
2014 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 98
November 26, 1941.
Memorandum for the President:
Subject : Japanese Convoy Movement towards Indo-China.
About a month and a half ago we learned through Magic that the Japanese
Government informed the Vichy Government that they proposed to move ap-
proximately 50,000 troops into Indo-China in addition to the 40,000 already there
by previous agreement.
Today information has accumulated to the effect that a convoy of from ten
to thirty ships, some of 10,000 tons displacement, has been assembled near the
mouth of the Yangtse River below Shanghai. This could mean a force as great
as 50,000, but more probably a smaller number. Included in this ship concen-
tration was at least one landing-boat carrier. The deck-load of one vessel con-
tained heavy bridge equipment. Later reports indicate that this movement is al-
ready under way and ships have been seen south of Formosa.
The officers concerned, in the Military Intelligence Division, feel that unless
we receive other infojmation. this is more or less a normal movement, that is, a
logical follow-up of their previous notification to the Vichy Government.
I will keep you informed of any other information in this particular field.
(Signed) Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2015
EXHIBIT NO. 99
Department of State,
Office of Far Eastern Affairs,
September 26, 19U-
Top Secret
There is attached a page from the Congi-essional Record of September 21, 1944,
in which there is a statement by Congressman Church in respect to the delivery
of a message to the State Department on December 7, 1941, by Lieutenant
Commander Kramer of the Navy Department.
Our recollection of the matter is as follows : At about 10 : 00 a. m. on Decem-
ber 7 Mr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine came to the outer ofla.ce
of the Secretary of State to discuss the general situation of relations with
Japan. They were shown by Mr. John Stone, a Foreign Service officer then
serving as an assistant in the office of the Secretary, a document the contents of
which were pertinent to the subject of what they were going to discuss with the
Secretary and which had then been delivered to the outer office by Lieutenant
Commander Kramer, then on duty in the Navy Department. Lieutenant Com-
mander Kramer was present in the room. The document contained no reference
to any Japanese military movement Mr. Hornbeck, Mr. Hamilton and Mr.
Ballantine are positive that no statement was made in their presence by
Lieutenant Commander Kramer, as alleged, to the' effect that "this looks like a
surprise attack upon Pearl Harbor and a midnight attack upon the Philippines-"
The conversation in the Secretary's outer office was intermittent and scat-
tered among those present in the room- In other words, each person was not a
party to all of the conversation- Mr- Hornbeck has a distinct impression that
there was brought up Japanese naval disposition with specific mention of most
recent advices of Japanese naval movements in the Gulf of Siam-
Mr. Hamilton recollects also that Lieutenant Commander Kramer remarked
on that occasion, in reference to the matter of an appointment for the Japanese
Ambassador to see the Secretary of State at 1 : 00 p. m. on December 7, that the
naming of the hour might mean that it was the hour for some Japanese move-
ment. No mention was made of Pearl Harbor or of Hawaii or of the Philippines.
With regard to the statement that Lieutenant Commander Kramer then went
to the White House and delivered the message, they have no knowledge whether
this was a fact.
/s/ JWB /s/ M. M. H.
FE : Ballantine : HST
2016 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 100
CMTBO SftAmU l»ACinC FUBBT
r, s. & wtJWiVLVAKU. n«««fc«»
8, WAX
«rf NLUn ruaa tUa mnmIac. Im Uhwa |[dL«»iar t«r th« l«r
Mi« 1* biM (* tmt mmnm t«r (MUmI FlfdUlw. The •ttXmm r»-
U tiUi nwiilm Urn 4D«r'« «ai«MliVMi ar AaftOim
1. ■• ■«» MriMM frai * rMtf tM aiU aff BallHH
rwM.
2. ■• ami uio(h«r aftLocr «««« th« only wibw
«r a taB-MH «HtaMrlai. Tte rvtMa fbr him oapiiii« wm
tlH* tw WM Mw^tlng up an ifc'at te than^it to ba a aai*-
Ual ahip ««l Ln avdw to iMr»l«aU ha hai %• a^a Um
ha^^ «f Uta MfeMaiiaa - abaNt^oa aaftar aaaa Into tha
hA«h moA imniirt ih« aator. la Iharai^paB 4HitmA «mb
tba raaf . Thla »rflaar vaa Gav««to ani larlfaUir. Tha
«ib«r aTtloar h«a iMl baan naaiwad. XaCbnMtloa la»>
dlaabaa tNtt thara ara anr* of Utaaa aaall aataauurlaaa
la tba vialnitr aad Um* tbtr aaa« biwtglit hai« trm mm
tyya oJT a MMIiar ahi». Tha lOlaanar 414 atata tb«t ha
bad to iwrtiaO a dlatanaa oT a taanlrad allaa baf»i«
rwnLv acfwud apaa tba raaf. it tba tl«a at hla aap-
t«x« tba af flaar «a*a a ataip aatah arauHl bi« aaak ablab
■toppa4 nuBili« at 0010. It la nat knoNH ab1*iar tbla
la OCT «r WT, Altbaatfi ha <B.d not «!«• th» anaar'a
f araaa or diapoaltiaa ba «t«tad tbat aa far aa ba baa*
tba aUaak ••• » diaappaAntwit In tbat tbagr aaqgaatad
• paraXrsinc bloa to our fl»at.
3. Xa aaaoi^anea aitt) tha aaaurl aeda thlo pria-
onar haa racjuaatad ttet ha onl/ bo allaaad to rw— U
milolda.
It -a oTiaant t.h2L Uho orfloor appTMlatad tba traateant aftordad
hla bjr th» n«val quMrtianora to that at tha Uw, and tt ia fait
Uttat with pttpnr handllm, Airlhar InTorMatloa i^jj^ bgr darlvad
mw tbla ottiJtmr.
^- J^^^- '~' t. T. unoi.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2017
IfS^V,^*
1.
~'m4, a.
;«d UiMJr h»l, —
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iiul>-;.l«ut«'ts»ir.' 1
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FOURTTENTH NAVAL DWTHUT
DteltU-i lMa«H«MiM OCln
flfatk n«». Tmumt IU*^ , ,. /i^
fl«MNdM» 8, 1 CI
MBKMu>an ro%t riMt . .lcmm« rriMv
IT/ wu ft graduate of Um I>9*rtal
2. -JL Mci kit .out ele«ftUN{ at Wy kilul, and aMtwl
111 ■ ohalr «r-< -^^4 in mu »rn:f blitntutt. Btfova vM«ttflblB« ••« •t«rt*<l
. «•• iMunwd ■■)>kt -.^ila .'ri«<.n«r ««• UUmi aa tik« V*«*ti 'tt telXaaa
. ;^. That n* .id •«u.. ax^or« and had arouaA wX* naeic, en a iM^ara,
..'I - wiit«Ii vhla.. :jaj ttmlt, anitar lAaMa of It. ?!<« v«t«»i va« •tox:j^«C
»0. Ttm wtiian wait Utaorlbwi on taa r«vara« In Ja^waaaa atiarMt-
' i . '— Inir.alatad aa roU.o«rai "Vatak iMi oloek, T/pa 1, lla*y 4i'yc. >-c'.-
I A o. .>>«ui7l.' T la ouu atatod that l«a ■•« »£ offlaar of t&a
^u««u<oae av akd nvr la o«na a* lUjUo J.JUL«JU of OkJl/a.^ iT«f*a*.ur -
*;;'" «» 'ad lv»-. e* ct a ooo* at two In a ub'airlcia Milcttt had nir. ■«.«.. ore
'3f* ^ < raaf u. .rTOKtsMtai: ao« nXl* r>t~t UaJUa . .'laid. Hki atatatf ua>t
'^» ' - le t.ia JoAAOillr.: . ."loer of the a ana tha BaTlitKtor •lh-.
V.^.l ..la a.l.JAta wds t a «u_lne»r— •; t !■ - -«» oocjiistatl cf .1 i' »
and »!.« sMpnata. fia Motilttad that t.ia » .outxiat y«s of > tt.i..
x^ioh oparnxad r««a • nA:iar ahl^ tait rafuaad U> .l«a Uw imww oi
'.^nika,:* o. t„r. lotl^r a:.!; or tha Aiatanaa at aaa ot Ma .Uaaiittor ;-
atliM. tix. . .. «' ..uUior 3:.lp. .<:•& )i«bt...uei! ns to «^iet ^r t^ . . .-
oxlte »4j 4«1,aal or aieolrlo proTwlia-i i^e rer.^oj to ruiawcr. <
•t itad .lit m .ui! uavi i>fca4 *r>ore V.hu ..-~re<l r.tlaa' nraii. is.!^^
li t..c '. ;..tiueo Kara aa lus^ aa or>e . .in^rad llaa. Tco ouoA «ra>^e. c«
' ould ..ot be : iaoad li> Uila aAaaar n» le oiiTii.ual ra«i.la*d j« ■%&>
belli- :uapad. .ia atatcd t&at .« wlal^ tc oocaiilt auleltla mt& .laA w^x.
'..■U-. M, at tt» tina at laodla.: oa auura '^ecuuoa of Uuri ;.«aalblJfty *. Isl.
re V. l.-.ts>i I.', jiuxiz^ !i1j o3«a>>« aad rrJ«l£.Lag t.^ic Ji>;«Qeaa haCTj . -.jt
:>' <.<!j . '.V >.c tad new baan dla.;raaa(! iu4 did i..ol v.aat ila nwaa or ils
> i. i._ur.ntlc:; aact baas to Ja^jon. .li^i. uoe^jkll '«ntod au \,tm tiuooaaj
ul I Ic. .Id l.aT»Ll oocxHiUtj hm! u^Jc t«v1r nttaak, .le ataVad tliat It
.^vl teoi. ..iich lesa auocaasrul t. iir. \>my Uau antlol>at«d. R« ax^-raatyau
<.ur: rlaa ut I.. is aixi i<e vaii aiiiicd « .at thay orl .l->all, axpaatad to
RCCk,., llau, lo ra^iila.1, 1;. affwat, a loioalc-out blow tc y.-xir Iiavy.
j. .It .ted t .at off .alloMS ~i«lu ti.itt «nil&g
■j<:«'. -x ,ru..a-.x/. . ca ttnl litlp but t...it \.:gs dur^saaa aaa »o
. ;.o -. . t .. T ..'. fcraad to ojiaii t.ls ouucib: tooor and ataol m
c. x:^..^^
2018 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In th« opao .Atah ».tl« iMmiln- haif mutmtr,;»A ii/m^rA* hi* tnro
;«t. »a a raault of VU« aMwaTar In t2i« ahAirpy •••, Urn abippad o
-;r*at d*al of wnUir doaa tha !Mti«h Alah trlpplod hi* notor «d4 t'<i»
•otor fallura r««ili*4, of sour**, lo Ui« loMi of atjotrvl of t)i«
•ukaaLTtiM) HiU ala balA« d»«x>«4 liit<. ■ fmt oT«r /.mi bIIo froi 'wl-
lov* ricid. »!• Aiul hlM r«llo* of near strls'Fad, 4iv«4 lat« t .•
o«*«n aaa aVtcayibNl t« vflA ashor*. 'I* ataiad ii«t ft* Xa«t ••■
hi* ahtpKata lo Uia :iaiv aurf. ■!» a'lnlttad ti.a .oaulblilt/ that
Ul* i*mrj aVcikt anr>liu» t..a sulxnarlua, kMelt <iit^1 run ob U-e rnof
(baoauaa :io aua not axare L. nt •.•ivai : liutaa .uk^. mibae ; ;aritly
twhad and auiU lita miUnarlimi , ■>» atatad tiiat U.T9 <• ra no
papara In tUa aabHarlDn <«,] aJultfcad t.i«t t.ila t> pa of auboarUia
rapvaaautad oaaaatiaili> a aort of arilars^ad v^rlatloo of a oaa
nan torpedo. :!« atatad ',j :roa«iA -.iataka was baUu? aapturad.
Thla la tha rirat llii« 1 lave ftll».. j-irasc >. . ot adTliie Ja.'i;.
about tiild. i I> a^c .;;il o.* Jurll: ' t .n c^^uriMi -! thta ^a^tlon-
liiS, aiUoit aaa It* -uu b^ ti<o ui>l of L^o eaapoXtuX, lotar. .-''tara, 1'
davalojiad Uuit t..l« <uu..,. ofilcor Ad txiaa knoHlad.ra of i^ac^Xla..,
atiloii iia at firui dU oot ilacXoae. Latar on ba axplaluvd bla
L»ax;^artaaaa L:. thia Uii..-ua. a \jj aayln-. tual., K.'.lla la tha .iiMIa
aahool, bm h>^ jtudla<^ .r. ■.■ui, but In tha ^i^adangr, la axpaetatlor.
of duty in tlia Ciilna ^aaa, 1m mi aalaatad Siilaaaa.
i.. ^ .;raj»lj>', of a pattr offlaar'o : ht. rUot'a
l&alKUla wad iaada b/ al.. aat :ia ox lalnad tina altailf Icanca uf Via
trarluua iatalXs ct V..ia tlarlaa.
'j. Ti4.are re.jalua tiia ix^iulbillty , If tha .'^aval
autUorltlaa ii Vttjlra, t.ml I. la aubnarloa uiy /at ba loeatad aod
ralaad ''or a»n liwiLlti, or ^co _.uloiil .latalls, av.c.
-. J. 0.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2019
Subject I
1.
hundre('. /urda fro;
KolJ. At the tt,
p.ncej ».ero eaju •'
'Ive 3r fifty pou;
ilr«ot hits v.er" i
to 1 .-..l within ri:
jub.'.frliie eld not
jj>03ltlon»
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irxoTvieyifl -..'■ <'
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jli.ce
■rm^
HUHtABOni SQCAIMKIIf ftXni
U. a «. AaOOHADT. Wniti»
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n«tt Intrllije:.ce Or'ioer.
Invodtlgttlon of Japsinete 9uln^ rln« ^Vcirouad In
?.i>3 .^b..r'nc w.i»ii Tir.-'- iljijt.?:.' •■vaB Lbout nix
i \'.\et b«B:!., oft" -'e e.T^ c ." t' e run-way ut B«llows
ie o.- n;^' w ;•: 1 ' ' ■■ ^i^' '., tiJ-e« Nary Utility
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. ; b-'. ■■ ■ ■ : .^ftfl in pu1r ;. Ho
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t , ••' . • feit-rred Its
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be stfcu fro.i ■>...
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. ■" ' .-- -j .11 blaci: \.-ith
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^.- ■ 11 j.eriscope pro-
;;e'-rta * : te periscope 3ha«r8.
■ " Df all '^ub;j '-i:je'i anl there-
o. . At Lhe tlue, the subioferlne
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•, L."ti;-a of 1.16 \.i,ves. Jud^ln^
T I .--.■ .:.rcl bottom, v/hloh could
1...: .,ye re: to be drlftinjj in to-
ll.' "^.-t '..ll.: :..e xjialaw. auour.t of
towed in uwi lefec'.ed.
l/J^
Li€Utn:.i-;;t, U.S. ITcivy,
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2020 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
£ 2 £ I
To • i;©m-r.. rfVctri
nroa JspmcM Sawl Offtow
lUUOO SAIUIUKZ
I th«i»W yau for thm klndlj wUlt of y»tmr6»y . torn I
will write low:, jrour r^q^awat* of :y««t«rda7 In Japan«»«. ri««««
{mrdor. ay p joif vrltiog and oOMposltl^n.
1. BhI-.K Prihh^NAL !?:?TORY
In A'CHitt XJ¥) X «•• gra<lu«t*d from th« Naval Acadvqr
and toacaaa a rldahlpiMn. In April of ti.la yaar I «aa com-
■lial .n«c1 a rJ^- Ilaatanant In Uia navy, my praaant rank.
8. REOiX li' PATTI E
To^oT Monorab'. o "^lave" • ;ntry InatltutoJ; en acDnoMlo
blockada ui" Ja;«n, ■ "hiiva njt" country, rafaaln.- to aall ua
otl, cottar. a:i3 t.io ".Ike, until wa had no choVoa bat natural
eollai;ao. Socauio of thla »• ^ai^an aioloaatVo na^:otl:iU lona
wltii yojr cjuntr'. ^t tinto at^dad In /alxura. 7:er-iroro,
wltn a frland, I aat out : or Venri iiarosr wltn *.!.»* pur^/oaa ol"
• li-.ltlnp a battloahlp, &ut a la to «ccU:ent. althou-h
ae ••!■« abio to raucn tha ■oath of tha ftar&op cy oraaplnrf
ondameatn yojr boaba falling ilka rain, a Inca t;.-:
BCCl>:ent waa I'ltal to taa aubmarlna, we detar»ln«:' • • F^ceecT
with^jt •sealt.ation on tha aurfaca of tha watar, m. .'.•.
li)t<j t'.e aarbor, and cllJi*tn« the iran^-way laddar, ."O •.
lea; - t t:ia aaok a«3 dla almultanaoualy with bl^w:-. i
ar.airj ..-rahi? Juat a* In oLdai tUwa, dorli;- -ho ko- •
alor. , rir Ta lya Kawano lowerad tha laaat lt! r. nrdad t-"
anamy Bt.ip •lt^: It. HowaTsr, oecaaaa of t;;»j a- -Vdont
a'uiT«ioa s. t t^l«ll hsrb.r •• o t\ . *« struO k roar wfeich ijlvan
tor. »«, . s »e w, ::d ve safoly claared. Ky first atrntn em
;.»... t"n'.l<-C.. •••'■,^ t..l. 'irforei.ce oi" ter. ^oc r.-ts the f«te wo:,
deo'.ce , > r.a j;.e >. t:.e warohlpa of your c5-;.try »aa Ba«*d .
L^oli-.f- tr.fi auccesB of our t.l»tar— Jutautflnea .nd tha
aplar.dltl ro . le vementa of our air forca , I If ^ the MOgth o.
U.e hartor, compelbid to do ao dua to my ai^marine *^eI3vg dls-
• hiad. ',ator, finally being unable to do anythln.; with the
•^i-^rrarlne, I saaa. tnroui^ th* ooaan and raachad a-. snMiy
airrort. :>Jt.» to my axhauatlon, I aaa captorad without haTln-
tliBB to even flpht. And thua my aeU fate haga.i.
Due entirely to my Inaxpart navigation and strategy, ^y
honor as a aoliiler haa fallan to the ground. T-iua : !>atrayad
the 9X7«ctatlona of our 100,000,000 (paopla) and bacpne a aad
rrlo'irier of war dla loyal to my country.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2021
■• 9m talk I had with an jnrl*rBt«juUn. n«va! orCXcmr In th*
hoa> of an aniy oaii In ^otiol Um' ••• rmry pianaant. 9a««'.ta«
I thouftit about tha tr<ou)>la I aoaXd oauaa your otaitry latar ■■li,
and bacauaa : aaa 'uMt^l* tj aiidiira nij ahai •«, ; -mi t. t'ur, ' ilclda
or balrxK ahot to daat)t ^mcnna '.mpoaalbla, ..i» ' ,aa 'jarni; "• • "'^
llf* m» m prl aorjar oi war. tlom tiiot t'lln « . n co-»io to ni-.)-.
• paaa^ I huvm atartad tha lire a paaca.' tl J« •. ^.b-i naval '. : t c
abldlntt by tha rulaa of tntamatlc'iiai imm.
Za Old*n tlMsa, Makul and Itukuaai j> ^.tuu. rarualnr>; to
oat oilllat or • furalt'n land, want Into tno mjuitalna ht.-^ ata
KTaaa (T) untl i they atarvad, but :, al-i.e I '.«,•*'•. <»atli. • y>ji
oountry 'abraad, h«i»» thou^t w»,»t < ;a iu« .' .;■ ..r.H-'o «••.• ir)»
tt la.
Althoii^ I ^uiT« oauaad y .>•: mauti m.
thins r'^t^it aio;. acoordlti^; t j ih'iitoj
Inoldants aa Uiat Miloti happanad yaatarda? wMcK
ny«
/tjr, aaoii
rjT.. t t«
has »->»>an cont'nuad. Uy
r yjar c ' ^ntry with .ra»
bL aa or,.". r.Bf'.o t f ,:"ru'.
u rtaatii wtilc. t :■-.': i.c
atandp.lnt oT your oointr;, n tiatt tr.ln
rlc^titaounaaahaa nada ao^r«a oC lae:. >.
•11 day lox^ «ltti Utalr ma p ilntod
but aa a raoult or t!ila, I mu^t . .ica
too plaaalng.
My •lllltvJ'.oka to ..l« iwad t.o', hft awntion*"* : t < ?; ::i';d
by ona or y^jur bullets oi' ;• .xr c>^jntry snail mar.o aio vin- a;;?.
I pray .or y >ui- r. .antry'? i«>atlng nllltMry -uccasa.
An uprli.-, ite> is i^latol h«a baaf. iiln»od at ma. T;'.? In ly
and. Oood-bya.
•5. To the Japariiisa pa<p"3, as; u -. n ^^ .• ', ■• -> ir-
aalvaa, baojmln' a prisoirtr o: *m. ; .. '..;oa,. 'irae,
•hethtir or not there Is ii r.;c^ra >;' t.ie ViCluor.v .--t, I
will coBuilt talclda a.x»n r (•jtam ■ r.j n/<tlv*. Inr.... '^Tr*n
thou^'ti wo ara ananr.ed, to ■ '■ wit.. •; ■. * aiv*. Cl,:^it to ti-.« Inst
la tnm Jipa-iasa aplrtt.
I pray t:i>t a.y ..e«tr. »:,. . ,,.• •. .,-. -._• .ell'juroa
tnd I pray *^ir.t ■■ ■_• .»■ li-lt wll. o« a..., ,i • .c. ^ ■ .• ' m^ ^cunl
U'yu'lnai .
j'iaaso :'oi-
1 s tr :c - . .
; arr'. veJ Mt «
I ."LB va : . oA ,
tunlt 5. ^t^■.;
rit, .t'.
-.1
Buval ■>*ib-lle itene'
2022 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
rem covFosB) amowq vu uxma (oa m vwraKTiriUTx iw
BBCAMc k naaonx op mar)
nhttrry bloaaoaa r«II,
Ut thWB CmXli
Dr«noh«d arc th« Ita branohaa and Isavaa
With tha aorrov of today!
9« I Ilka b«»t "DOW* -ms TORPSDO" astX "AMOWO THK ; riOTS
TtlROUan ns K/IJOAKKT*. I axpar l.*tio«(l all tbaaa things In thla
Ourr«nt battla »rvlah la tha (oal oC all naval aan'a ambition,
and I aanlfaatad tha Yasato 0«Aaahll (Japanaaa aplrlt). Laat
oll^t, acain aooraa or bayonata and aaissT'ja vara pointad at
■* fro* tha front door and froai t'le window and froa abova
1^ baad. Soaavar, rlght*ouanaaa won. And alttiou^ as a raault
of thia a raerattabla altooatlon >- n« about. I b»p« th«t all
•ould ; a forglwan with wf da«th. On tha •«• of- my "fairly
daath' laaantln^ tha laany aaortfloaa oT your ooantry dua to
^ 'oall of rljhtaouBnaaa', X aarnaatly hopa Uhat thla will
b« olaarlT undaratood, that aupraaa daalra and Joy In dying
aa a vldlar by your oountry'a bulXata.
I appraolata your many Vclndnaaa ahown ma up to now,
and I pngr for your aucoaaa In tha war.
Roapaotfully ,
Kasao 54
COPT
e. X-^2^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
EXHIBIT NO. 101
2023
2024 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
AVI
LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP
At ':i-\'-,- rard.lgarl llarbor.
Passage
lone oescription -'a,^8 av?
it6_
fS!
II!
OOVMt
Or* —
u» —
SASOVmB
TKUrCSATCM
: 'Vh;fe..
.'iffiu^.^.
ji I.iMJgftjdt
h
Lnil((it..>
'l{
c
V p. '
r.
«.E
Srror__
Dovlniioi)
MAGAsuta TzMreai^rfx'*:
«
1 .
IfVriiKiaal <rt tjtiryni ^«H** "' tfalfi T»--<r* '-"^ '^^ tv??*
1
m
'Sa,vltfAt!<)U n^oi^tblr) »..jiii *~%^M||ttii^^^H
1
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2025
79716 O— 46— pt. 16 8
2026 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2027
UNITED STATES SHIP
l(/W^.-
^Ort^i'vAl i,»ji»{vjrt
2028 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Pagt
^-UiC
LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP
ZONE DESCRIPTION ~—£lJyl—l£9
4 '. Ixiogitwig
o-S^-f^jr ^
K 11 288-50
^ fig' z
^3.Tr,a. -a2»Q_t= |L2fi_e.c.
j rE*Mtv«i
"1 loalaod- JJ&^Ui..
__Ji.
Miaiimiu
I [gyle !- j 82178 1- rio_.
-TV — nr*r
ti •< \C iSBliil 1
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2029
ft./'
ADDITIONAL SHEET
XlB {Coutln««d)
|0osBn«n4iii|i Offio«r, LECO.'OTON, the following naiiftd uen rooortftd aboard for dut
■jsportation lod tessporary d:jty on LEirroT-:; In ocuBectlon vrtth g«tter»l court
Ufti It oiMBi;>l««*d. CCAZXXt, v",H,, a-;l ^0 74, 36a.23,'j.j.:-'., ana oocsKR, «r.y,,
/?^ ^/^,^L*n^»^f
ve. 16S5 iAiiii'S •iiidorway. i'",iO i-oc«iivea ou board for us«)
IJ.owlaa fr*«a prc-visions: from Harmon Cc, Ltd.; Hoaolul'j,
,' sdX. laOp«Cte4 s.B to Cuant.i1,v t" A«ting i«y Cleric .7_ ' .
;i as to quality ty j-i^sutf, ■ tower, (ITC
.;iAH •tandlag in. 1823 BIU . -s, ia.
•ra, £805 3C1D*4<&^*, U.I-., B.-,S»,v'«ji^;, Wqb rat.uiTivc* tf tu«|
-■.*fira under ol»6.r4;os of oreaticg a distttrbaaoe, figi(tir*s at
OJjarges to tolJnw. h<u rj-'ipMer at large by order of t5i<
writer* ease 231:9, s,i?,, ?■'- rapoytsd aT>oar! upon conjlotlc
Says leare, an tiiae.
A
f, psj^orara . Srsi
ir.n.r.;
2030 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2031
UNITED STATES SHIP
R\ZM,
.1 starboara. side to bertb 3-S, Kair/' Yard, Pearl
!i.-A;.Xiu. iin.>8, 5 wlrft breftsts, and 2 wire cables. ^ocoiviHg li
j telephoas. sejr/ico iroa. the doalc. Ko. 4 boiler in use for aval
IjMte presert, Trjirleus •iri.ts of thw '.'.S, Bleat-. dlst.rlct aw? y
,.C? .^/j;i^. V, ^„ ^ ,'^^:«
es btf^-re. ;-'!S:^'i rec-'vt-o Oij board
BvtSlone • -•-.t.loE, ita
by ^t .-.teoer, t".
"HigJitower, ^oris gruiSe
S. SteYfpJt returned frcoi aine days lea^-
•HOC ii._i,^. ;..i.:^,ti5Siib'a:-
liji aooord-r.c* v/ith 3-a'^aV
'lit.;.. : ..- -ijtritt ?oi- te
■.andant
16
L'oor«d 6S before,
gton, U.;;.
""aval I>i;
iiiaiidant 1
Qttarfl Tenter, v
report Ootadt. 1
pureiiant of<av":-
left tbf ■
385 79 6^,
atood la.
>^ctober 20, 1041, i-.
E.'ti. , 295 52 56, 3©-
0 ori . ajj d 1 sig Otric&r .
1345 aeoured ic
pursuant ordajb
Jiego, Culiforr/ia for torsporary dat/ arS farther traasfe-ij
Oistyict, -iftr .rsiiiilf , "\ J" . -"s * • * , ' ..ra-ea
and, Calif v'l ilft. -".u
junats as xesTs,. i: 31
t&^^i.iiaj (Hbteofj) Mt/r of i^j« j;».«r ro be »cr,t tu aur-o
2032 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Pate
LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP
f !i!lf|jl!!|i&^| j [i'l il il!j4l*fii|
T "! II ! . t a i>
s=|[
1
^i !vr^iil-|
0-.
t On t».i 50,COC
.S Di»Kf«'4..
I Drift •»!.__
• r. f
^: tiiia jwae »o ti« &*»? t<j Biii-v*f
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2033
ADDITIONAL SHEET
.-..SSfSO-if-
- to
, aooxe* e9 1>9for«. 16C5 CHAVES vnderway, shiftier berthd. 1613 F.
W*rw(V wiA standing out to ae.a, 1025 ORIDLSy »}sde-n»ay tfwl standing .■
ktacCKT ttnd«r*«y. 1735 C»^ai<v5o iu'ervi-y. 1745 pujsuant, to orders of «,&«
!,£>iSing arricei' datbd £7 r j7«i.ber l^.: :jJ<TIH, j., Jr., 265 <3Q 09, lUAtt.ic,
V.3."> was roleasad fr«a ooufla«j,«iit ond jlacoS uiiaisr araea guar'l foi- transfe:
■ t& lEXISfliTOK
TTT to KavsU. I'rJ.coB
1600 Ttift following liea l»f 4
iDXta. ;■,'! 337 V;
i£«, :{., Jr., '%v' •
. iiarw Veu'S, ■ijt'e ialunft
5. tbo siilp with OT'd'sra t,i
0«i.f>
1 r«i ort
;« for oo!iflne-|
the «L-ra2ie.u4-
JHTBOTJa. F.C, i07 £1 ?.C, G,k.£c>, '. .
scnxiTAjT. W.P., c5o t', £1, cai.r.lia. ,
SXSKASD, S.C., Z'i'/ Oi 90, *,} .,;,2c, '
VHIilPOTf, i.S., ^,74 5U3 CC, T.-.Ss, :.
ffi-wiSKiDOi, a.:.. -i74. ?i PA. ».s:.ss, ' =
\ .. (.:■ IP, c.i:.^. (ii)
'.'tie fcLiswlK^ -.ei.
:. .FM to
.i%"j?T to
:: Jisgo, Caiif, f^r
2034 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2035
' phontj s«r?ic6 from too 4oo>:. Kc. 4 boiler in i\3o for auxiiiaxy purpos-;
ar!^ i;<j41c5l •'•.sfsrd it- this shin, Sl4p8 jvyftsfiiit- fir« various WKlts of TF..
SOP io c- ""- ■ ■ ,' -- - — ........ .^»->-... ...... ^ ... '
A., 0S5 • ~- •--'. -.-;..~^
259 30 . ^ ^
{ 01soruc
:v3.as? pcffj
\ ^m^%
2036 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
h\^h\i^\ f^i p
■
IH-f-fhH
M^M^;
ijl jQ ' -E-^
Sttjtotao \LkQ. Coj<>«'
s. K._ L_jaa'_
Dnfl for'c'
g. --[ ?ifll J.
13 J.S-ii'
■ 14 ISfciV
17-lfifi^i;
to 5iLjiiis-i
i :i ICO. o' 1-3. '^
■i .OIL ._BS-
I
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2037
f'.EET
..mtsssKi&i
ttouM* to 2'7&*T. snd pdcj. iiS7*,S «»«, end ££^".3 psto. Ohaiifed .
2038 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2039
2040 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
_jxza
or THE UNITED STATES SHIP
f lllljfllfi^l 1
f! h i^i
"lilillll I J^H
e:
"^^^^^^^1
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2041
79716 O — Hi — pt. 16 9
2042 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2043
■-. oojETiaJiy witii Task ?cr^
i'^"" nsvG la oruisiag disposition 3-V. •iTifci.aAr-i t-i-'SiiC i:j :a;o.^ = , c^^i-tiii-a; u
m"?: ne,tsp«^ 18 toots. Plaae'g«ara3Tr^rT-j «a ax?- in i'-.?*':,««t':-
.Barlna 8or«eii 1-A. Jdl v»ss«l3 stealing ^t.
T«88Ql. ATerege steaa 4iO, Avei-sies rpta 1
prep.
last
i
{ icto
} Appr*.
It..
wind.
1000 ju;^^r!<J, orw.- •;•
0100, " ov3jfc«r 7, 154:
^, 1941. 'lada daily •
ndit;i,3na noraal. 1x5
•ers.p;e rpB 156.9.
■ Aircraft, kgv ■
.939 first r.l'aa?.
r.g i"or plaao tf.-
landed on boar:
psBd t.j 13 knc
.Y, IM... 3sa.£o,t!.
left to
St9&di«5
Sea. 2c,
3(? r<.',^,'-
Joia fleet
.'.(': R- iOa lislited fire
_ 1540 . J socurad. IS*.'"
«p«i€kd» to Icji'/j'.! ond ";ard airorai't. 1-iOi; 1',
to S'/o'S. and pec, «Se' x>so, 253' ?■«■""♦ Cljssagsi
r©ll6T€Jl nX!?? en otn^i-u Ic. : - v- a:;-^'. -^ ;:■>;-&? 1:
the E
Bud ?■
1, wn *
V'
a. w.
Li si; t, -v.
a/ ti!U oiM« t« h» Mint tt> »l»«>a d ^fll»lS»tSon
2044 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
LOG OF THr
— ,2lt 3(aJiL-45'S4i3SSL
•f^--aS#--^»^i^*«-^'
isfseAuMi <i«i^.__
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2045
ratf
ADDITtONAL SHEET
PO - 84
14
2046 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2047
steaming on cours© S70*?, aad pga, aSS" nst-eo. i55S' P-io, at 18 toots, iu
■^aay with Tafllc ?cro« Kight in oruieiag ftisposltion 6-7 : V'.i\t\: «zia 270'f . ,
.PRISB guide. Ships daT!j.6as4. Boiielw IIos. C, 4, 6, ' ' use.
■■ra I?08. 1, 3, 6, one! S liglkte^J off anfl ii strjiA-'by - lard oposd
j.>y «..aots. Tiro oontrol, siiip control aai air ooatrci ''. "■;>A;'iir.*"-!)i
III. liatorl&l Condition "B" set below aeooua d«c:<.
Averat^e rpja 160. ^ -,^/h /
„„--^. »!.,;, «s before.
pr«j>ftnitory to launohiiis «
last plane, rssuoed 1)886 <
set 2ou4itioa of Seaiiness .. -. .
Average steaia 410. Average rta-a \bX>.-
:fe4 froa ?,enor:<.
„4 flr« -..-.r.1-.-.^rl .
^:
e - 12
Steatili-g aa before. OSot
ing aircraft, Stearaipg s^* vaxi-.^.^ ^e,--*--*
laaQotad lest plane. 095? laiLdwd first piase.
oouree tc E7e°T. an«l ?go. 207°. 5 peo, 256° psto -
16C rjlB. ••^.'^r- '■f'f • n«-.P,-. ••-.: r,.i p ..-r.>»-.f>-.c5K n
Gor.ditioEG
IS - 16
ctea . ,
itiga arii _t.c-"
Senteroe: '"auf
Eostij; Ki^^',
of his ;%, f f
guilt:'. '■" '-«-
ST2r?2>2, '.0.,
S03 /i Ji.i^'jJ./,
Ive dwys jtid 1
'^c 0-' to "i.osr^stV
"Jays and to lose ^9 a aoath of uls pay lo
Of Coaiiaaading Officer, .STSVa^S '.C, iea,
0,3. r;, were oonflaei for a poriod of five j,. ^ j, .
Court, isai) o^&agsd course right into wind treparii
Approxisiate oourse 062";'. Ave. speed 15 tacts, 134
XM« landed last plane. Ohftnged speed to le fe.^"*--
^, 1352 ohaoged eourse to right iato wind :■.■
plane lauded . 1400 laat plane landed. V
■■A hsne course 270*T. i"-.,— ~- -,r^,... .-,-,
le - IS
steaming as before. 1653 Boil^
oo;4aezioed steeming on various oouafl^^ ... -.^
plane landed. Changed eoursa -co left to :;
Changed speed to 18 toota. 1735 ehanfed e
1750 dariiienea eI-Itj. ii-npr-.-je atean 410. A'
readlnees
hoar to L
aoured frrf.
'■trol and :'
..i^, li.S, Ha-pj ,
>ndla«.
-^ <liMMM3u oapy of tKit- pa>tfi> tu Vc 3<r:
2048 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HC UNITEtJ S-^ATES SHIP
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2049
2050 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
iE UNIT'.D
bewail la:
f '^!V!!!?fen""l"^Y'!^l^iT^^ f i
!«j^=' i I
Lflg&.'Si S7PI SSE'ia'
li I
pT-lj-sii.
•:»iieig«
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2051
pre I- ji rai-
ls JmotB.
rijgJi 6 to . t %
Quarters. I'/J
2052 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2053
>r.'- 1 a.~ ,t
^^-.y'^Zy^
2054 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
THe Un!TEO STATEg «i-.-.
w
11
' ifh ' i-"
viijti jew LJ» iU~. ) Jj, , , -..ii..., i»
ri n 4 "/O 1 <■ , -X, '
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2055
AODITlONAt, SHEE
18 - 20
.Steanilag as
rw^dtHsas thr«9, wai..^.: :.u....
tiae, Avara^« steara 410. Av-
/.J. 0. I-. D(Sa??T, lieut-r
f
•
2056 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2057
0^
79716 O — 46— pt. 16 10
2058 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1.00 OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP
I xoMt tMawwimow. Mlaaa .XL
rr
IS' 5 £«L4JBSS{ie .JS0fi4x=_l«llM4■
"' i!«, i .084.... ,X-.-,4Jja -socai- f flfi I'S
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2059
2060 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2061
2062 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
LOG Of TK£ UNITED ST*iTES SHIP . ,..M2S^^SIZ£
&X*
r ■ '
,ah
1 ^
f f|i ii iPW'i^itii f ! -" i^! lip Hit
j -niifi fJ^-
S5ia
^sssrutMcTI
j» |LsauE|?-k. '.'imisliafl- .
■•:Ji«.,*3art,.«3i .Tliiht %nsJtiiT:'
^-Mj^QQ^-
'" Bja^.
Ji-M
■ mai% ;v> a»»»«.ij trf K»vtKt«*euii iaaatJrty
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2063
2064 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2065
fage^JHiShL.
UNITED STATES SHIP . g>TOgH.I3B: , Jriaay 5 ae^^^i , 19 41
zoNec>e«!mPTioN„lIiSa§-J2 RE: MARKS
0-4
3tea;..iiig on course 084'T. and pgc, 076". 30' psc, 079*^ pstgc, at aD kr.ot3,
186 r.p.~. in conpany v/ith Task Force Sleht in special cruising disposition 9-7
(niKht), course and axis 084'T, Plane guards T^:'^:ii:o and OJUVa; in iiner ar.ti-
subniarine screen. Boilers L'os-. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 in use. Ship daricer-ed.
Ship control, fire control and air control in condition of readiness III.
Condition "^i" set below second deck. Avera^^e stean 410. Averase r.p.s. 166.0
',;. C. K£.3tJHY, lAgntCjg), O.3.:..
4-8 (J
Steaiiins as before. C500 sounded flight quarters. 053c sounded ,^>eneral
quarters. 0500 changed course into wind to launob aircraft, steaiiing at various
courses and speeds. Approx. course 095'. C605 xirst plane launched. 0516 last
plane launched. O^iaaged course to 064°T, speaid 20 laots, 186 r.p.a. 0035" secure^
fixnii general quarters. Set condition of readiness III, '.;atoh II, ship control
ard fire control. Lighted ship. Average steasi 410. average r.p..-. 182.7,
A. HOUSS, iiisign, V.3.:
8-12
iteajilnii as before. 0922 steaiiing on various courses and speeds to launch
aircraft. C925 launched first piano. 0924 launched last plane. Changed speed
to 15 lOiots, lo5 r.p.x. . 0932 landed first plaae. 0940 lbx.ded last plane.
Changed speed to £.0 ;aiots, 189 r.p.;-. Changed ooiorse to OSCT. and pgc, 080" psc
084' psto. ;:ade daily vi^sual exaj-i:i:ition of all magazines and apoiieless powder
aetiples. Conditions nor_;al. ;..ade v.'eeicly test of Eiagazine and shell rooa floodinj;
and spriniliag eyst^a. Conditions noraal. Averase steaa 410. Average r.p.r..l64
Lieutenant, U.SJi.
12-16
Steasing as before. 1215 secured degaussing coils. IX 313313?, v.S. , Sea. 2c,
U.3.-'., 3rd. Division was injured vjhile standing in s.ess line for dir.ner, when he
fell dovm unguarded hatch. Diagnosis: Hesiatoaea left shoulderj was ad:iitted to
siol: bay. 1300 went to flight quarters. 1338 changed speed to 10 Isots, 89 r.p.:
Chan.-^ed course into vdnd preparatory to laiinching aircraft, approximate course
oeo'T. ApproxiKate speed 10 knots, 89 r.p.ii. 1341 launched first plane. 1346
launched lest plsme. Changai course right to ogCT. and pgo. 1550 changed coiirse
left into vdi-d to laiid air group. Appror.ir:ate course 080°?. Approxinate speed
10 kiiots, 89 r,p.:i. 1353 first plane landed. 1354 last plane landed. Changed
course right to OgC'T. and pgc. Changed speed to 20 imots, 1S9 r.p.n. 1413
crave; and DlCriA? exchanged stations in disposition. Averuce stear; 410.
Average r.p.-.. 181.5. ^;^
.^^^f^WSSSTV , Lieutenant, -.i.:..
16-16 <y
Steaaing as before. 1632 oorr^.enoed steaaing on various courses and at
various speeds preparatory to landing aircraft. 1634 first plane lar.*"i. .1640
plane 6-5-4 crashed into barrier, no Inijuries to personnel. 1554 last olane
landed. Changed speed to full speed, 20 Jcnots, 189, r. p. w. Changed course to
090'T. and pgo, 080' psc, 084" psto. 1710 sounded general o^uarters. 1715
darkened ship, average stean 410. Average r.p.E. 175,7.
^^ ##^4r^t(..g). U,a.l.. .
5teai2lng as before. 1617 secured fror. general quarters , set cc.:.iiitiou of
readiness throe, v.-atch two. ..ivera,;e steaE 410.^^AverQf:e r.p..-. 189.0.
/yj. A. hCL;.33, -nsign, U.S.I. .
20 - 84 (/
iStcaning as before, ^vverage steaii 410, ^ej^e r.p.a, 169.0
18 - 80
?i3v2fr
Approved:
Car-tain, Z.i, havi^ Lieiit-Ooadr. ,
Co J. a;.ding.
r. 5. .V...VaW/«tM>.
(Original (ribbon) oopy of Uii« pas* to be aant to auraau of Narlaatlon monthly)
/3
2066 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Pate i.J|i4
LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP
•awalian OperatlOK Area ■
Passage
zone description-- lus 12
paft.B-tw^ r. J. Ml*. CommmdiKi.
artujoaKv mix mt»— «o»iiiSii«»«
• I
I
1
4 (S
- -— •
GruaUat ilcptK
.
(OrlKliuil (ribbon) copy or thla page to be spnt to Bureau or XAvlgatlon moutttl;')
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2067
NITED STATES SHIP
c,er.-ar".l luerters.
l745 fli -ht :-jarteiv
R E: M A R K '-
lo'".a:i2aa spead to i^O
^^^f^tt^'
"'44.-
"ol -^uid iire 'ooa
Senteact
.dollars.
o:saax.dgr ..
to iaucct
^rin;: to ".
p-e.iercano;,'
IS - 15
Stei. ., :-rore. IE
tuelve rxilcs. IvOg aaaeu- -
Sioldlns? flight oparation;.. .
stea:- -ilO, ^.,
^^
"7 y^ ^-■•/V
1 first plaae.
..•j^re rail- --j-j 1
z/'/a,*-
a of^ Navtgwtto
2068 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP-
At :-Iawallaa Qparatlng Area .
ZONE DESCRIPTION 2i?ii_ii_
PRISE
.„ ^576 _
Crdmnawttoa Nazatw^
0. p. U3R5AY, gaptaln, r. a. *«», eo»».««ito((.
1 1 1 BMcrind 0
i( uutodo SJJ ZZ'^ 45" H .| ?| Exi-uwi SI, 074
rs^
0* 10' w
BsroftK LduviMO PoftT
Draft foi'd
Draft aft
CompM. Na__J54£24
S. H O??" 30»
m
Dniftlor'd
D?mft«»t.
(Oricm<^ Crtl>lx>n> copT ol tfcta pttse to b« s»ixt to Boreaa ot Narlcstlon loosClUy)
y/
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2069
UNITED STATES SHIP .
ZONE OESCBIPTION i lUS^JJ-
re:marks
0-4
3teo;iine darkened in company v/ith task force eight in sj/eoial cruising
disposition 9-V on course 09C'T. and pgc,077'°.5 psc, and 060° pstc. 3peed 15
;aiots, 139 r.p.r.;., using tioilors "os. 2, Z, 4, 5, 7 and 8. Fleet course and axis
OgCT, fleet speed 15 knots. Fleet guide, i.O.V.A., and C.T.C. in tiis vessel.
Task force iii condition of readiness three, a-ver-jce stea:a 410. Average
139.0. .
CV23, Lieutenant, ...5..
4-6
-tea' ir.c as before. 0525 went to e^neral quart srs. 0632 lir.iited ship
secured frou general quarters; set condition three watcU four. 0'?40 siifte
steering units. X-ort unit nov/ in use. ^i-veraj;;© scea;ui 410. .^vavj-ie r.p. ..
O^lti^UWa*^
JORSiilT, Lieutenant; ■-.
12
otecing as before. 0600 ..uatered orevj on staiions. Absentees :3iiS0L, '
gea.:io,'..3.. . , ACL fron 0100, ;;ove:.iber 7, 1941, and STACEY, 'P.L. , Sea.2c,"J.3....
aOL fron OICO, .oveiber 0, 1941. .lade daily inspection of magazines esnd s~okeli
po',.-der sajj-'les, conditions nonaal. average ateaii 410. -average r.p.i.. 159.0.
12
16
Jte
eut(Js),
fore. 1200 Eoimded flight (quarters. ISSCynaneurering prepara-'
ir^:raft. 125u lauaolied first plane. 1304 launched last :-iane.
alont;."'.de starboard' side for fueling. 1343 passed first line \o
enced psri^pinf: fuel oil to i:C CALL. 1443 stopped p'^aping fuel
C CALL. 1452 ::C CALL cist off; all engines ahead standard 15 iiots, 139
1505 ::aneuverinc to regain position in center of foiciatioa. 1516 ch
tory to la'.i:ic:..:i,j
1340 '-'C CjilX ca-;in
..C ^ALL. 1S49 00:1;
oil to
course to 093*T. and pgo; all engines ahead 2/3,(10 knots, 83 r.p. 3.). 1530
sounded flight quarters. 1532 all engines eihosd standard, 15 knots, 139 r.p
Average stean 410. Averase t.v-u. S9.5.
16
■.. HOLl.Sa, 2nsign, U.S.r.
18 " '
•ate- 'fore. 1627 stea.:ins at various courses and speeds Dreparatory
to landi:. .. 1635 landed first plane, 1755 changed speed to 15 knots,
139 r.p. . : course to cgO"". 1710 sour»ded general auarters. Ihsaged
course to liiid aircraft, reduced speed to 7 knots, 66 r.p.:.;.' 1716 first plane
landed. 1716 last plane landed. Changed course to 093 'T. and pec. ;hin--ed ssead
to 15 knots. 1710 riect a.-.d ship speed changed to 18 knots, 166''r.r..:.
.kver? :c stesc^ 410. , 127.1.
Z. E. OTCH. 1
E. OvSH. Lieutenajit, r.3.".;.
18-20 '
Jteaning as beCore. 1618 secured froa genersil quarters; set condition
r»toh four. 1835 Stationed fire v/atoh for blovdns tubes, ^..verage steaa 41Q
Averaee r.p..i. I08.O
F. DOHSETT, Lieutenant,
20 - 24
c>tea;-ins us before. 2000 changed to Zone plus ten and one-half tine
oh3j;ged SDeed to 16 icnota, 149 r.p.-;. average steam 410. Avera,5;e r.p.
:i:.
2200
J. 44. 2
'4^<:d^^
Approved:
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Cau.uiiding.
'X>rt«lnal (rlbboo) eopr of till* pace to b» Mnt to Buraku of N«*%itUcm monthly)
V7
2070 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP
3CC
090
-
1 On hjn.1
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2071
16-18
Steaaing aa bsforo. 1610 sighted unknown vessel boarins 071"!, distance
18 miles. 1018 sighted ComTask Foroe 3, 3-CA, 1 CL and 12 DD's, broad on port
bow. 1631 sounded flight quarters. 1640 observed anti-aircraft fire on port
beam. 1641 changed course left into wind preparing to launoh aircraft, approx.
course 061*T., average speed 16 loiots. 1642 first plane launched. 1G59 last plai
launched, 1702 first plane landed. Submarine reported bearing 305", distance appro-
«,C00 yards. Chan^,ed oourse right to 120*1. All engines ahead flank. 1704
ohaaged course left to ogCT. 1706 all engines ahead standard, 15 knots, 139 r.p^
1720 sounded general (juartors. 1721 set material condition Affirm, Task yoroo
Sight leas S!TSRPRI3E and plane guard a0"s joined 'Task Force i'hree. 1735 first
plane landed. 1726 last plane landed. 1736 reeumed landing aircraft. Gi;3LS
joined tills vessel for soreening. 1743 all engines ahead 1/3, 5 knots, 47 r.p.n.
1744 changed oourse left to avoid tanker. 1747 all engines ahead full, 20 knots,
169 r.p.Q. Ch6uiged course left to 270''T. Average steam 410. Average r.p.ia. 146l9,
'. A. HOuaSS, £ns
I, ir,
18-20
jteaBing as before, 1803 oo:jaenced steaming at various courses and sjieeds
to l*ud aircraft. 1609 landed one plane. ISIO changed oourse to 270'T. Chani-;ed
epeed to 12 knots, 1813 changed speed to 15 knots. 1827 secured from CJeneral
<^iarters. Set oonditlon of readiness II. Set material condition Baker. 1904
changed oourse to 180*T. and pgo, 1981 changed oourse to 090°?., and pgo, 079*30'
p»tgo. 1948 planes sighted bearing £00°T, distant 5000 yards. 1951 flight
quarters. Average steam 410, Average r.p.a. 181.9.
;{jg), U.3.K,
20 - 24
Steaming as before. 2004 turned on lights required for flight operations.
2009 changed course left into the wind to recover aircraft. 3teai.iins at various
apeeds as necessary. Approx. oourse 075*1, 2010 turned on breakdovjn lij^.ts,
2017 first plane landed. 2036 6-T-13 crashed into ::o, 1 barrier, no dair^ge to
plane or personnel. 2044 sighted IIULL bearing 142, 5*T. 2045 iruiL joined
fomation. 2113 last plane landed. Changed speed to 15 knots, 139 r.p,m.
2115 oo;:inenced zigzagging according to plan :.o. 6. 2116 changed speed to 20 loiots
189 r.p.a. 2117 changed speed to 15 knots, 139 r.p.ii. 2114 stopped all engines.
2119 changed Speed to 15 knots, 139 r.p.a. 2125 turned off running ligiits.
Average steam 410, Average r,p.a. 122.7,
A. II0Xi33, Snsign,
fim
>^*^
Captain. 'J. 3. Kavy,
Cocnandlng.
R. V/. HL"B1J-;, ■
(TIUs p«a« *o b« WBt io BonwB of NkTt(»Uuii znoothly ot1U> Loc shveCa}
2072 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2073
UNITED STATES SHIP
ZONE DESCRIPTION i'l'J'i Ip?
1941
REMARKS
0-4
3t;ear..lr.G in c ■ -eaU i'orce 9-Y on course 093 T. and pgo, c
062° psto, under bo.^ ...; -r 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 6, at X6 kaats, 149 r.. .
Fleet course 093'', fleet -axis 020, fleet speed 16 ia;ot3. Plane guards VC :*J.L -iXid
ti'JIJLir in iaaer-anti sub:aarlne Doreen 1-i. Fleet guide, C.T.C:., aiid 3.&.P.A. in
tuis vessel. Tag): force in condition of readiness three. All vessels of tils
force steai-iing darkened. CS15 cticxn.jed s^^eed and fleet speed to 16 knots, ie9 rya.
Avere^^e steas 410. a.-jeru,,;e r.i- — i5£«5. ^ „ /O/^ /
C4
;;ci.:
oe
3tea;.i.ii: es before. 0415 c:ia.\$ed speed to 20 itnots, 189
;eaeral cuar*ors. udlii cnaii ;ed spaed to 15 iaiots, 139 r.p.Si.
■iSign,
r.p.n.. 0525 sounded
C615 oiinjad -course
j into tiie ' " ■ '-..•■..--.»-■-- *r ■>■■
I ^622 oiie:,
i launoiii.--
! speed to k,.. ._.l.-j, ^,r i. ... ..
I of readiness ■cares, vetch tnrse
! 0716 chan.~ed spoud to £C iaiots
-■.ill-: aircraft. 0618 first plane launoied.
.'jai-lns at various courses and speeds v&ile
•3 launched. Changed course to 093'?. ahi::S9d
.. secured from general quarters, set condition
070£ o;--an.5ad speed to 22 iajote, 2C8 r. p. :-'..•
1B9 i.^.-z. C730 Canged course to 090'?. ar.d p o,
«<«
078'
079'. 5 pato. ^vcrace steaa 410. Av9ra~s r.p.a. 183.5
/ :/. ?.. CTiE, Lieuten
enant, ^'.j. . i
.rse C-7t;'. ^^-pproxiiiate speed 14 .-2iots, !
...ic^.^i. .... v^ jauji-j^^.,.^ .i.iOi«.ii,. ..^vw lauf.ched first plane, 0603 launched last ^
i plane. u«ie landed first plane. Obl9 6-2 reported siip bearing 320, distant 7& sUjles.
jce22 ship reported bearing 050, distant £5 i:.lles. 0834 last plane landed. 0835
i, „. ,„A , ._,, . ,. .,, r,c ::-.an3ed STieed to 12 iaota. 0647 Cliocsed course to a:>proz.
ft. CH350 first plane landed, 0851 last plane landed, 0$55
OSCO On radio orders from Seoiravy, executed '.('ar L-lan
•aiprovoked air raid on tearl Harbor at 0800 this date.
. C90C changed speed to 15 knots. 0952 sigated s_;oj£e
; and JAH7XS joined foriJAtion. 1022 ceased zigzagging,
approx. to launch aircraft. 1026 launched place. 1032
1049 oo:;i'.ieDoed zigzagging. 1055 ceased zigzagslag.
jChanged course to OtSO'T. to launch aircraft. 1101 laxmo':ied first plane. 1103
launched last rlar.e. 1125 la:iQed first pl2j;e. 1128 landed last plane. 1151
c: .i;.;;ed ccur.-e ^; l.O'-', '..7-' psc, 079°. 5 pstc. Averaj'e steas 410. Average
;r.r ico.i.
0904 03 ^leiicei
jboaring C15'7.
jjteadied on cou.nc ^ov^ j.
changed to course gcO'T.
J. 0. F. 30H3STT, Lieutenant, V.
12-10
taai-in-: as before. 1229 oo-.:enced steaning at various courses and speeds
to la'wuach and Ixid aircraft. 1^54 last plsne landed. 1257 changed course" to 120'T
and pi;o. 1511 c;:i;.".2ed course tc 170'T. and pgo. Oaan<:ed speed to £C Imots..
1321 chrji.^ed course to 120'.\ and pgo. Changed speed to 15' knots. 1543 co;..;eneed
steanin,^ at various courses ..nd speeds to launch aircraft. 1347 changed course
to C90'T. 15£: - ■-'■ nouree to fleet course ISO'T. 1358 co..,.er>ced steaiung at
various cours-- is to land aircraft. 1406 Itst pli:ae landed, a'-.^nged
course to CfC .:^n;:,ed course to 107'T, 095' 30' psc, 007' 00' pstpe.
1424 secvjed .- I iuarters. Set condition of readiness II, 15vo oiianred
coarse to 07i.' .enced oteaiiing on various courses and speeds to launch a^
land aircraft. _.ched last plane. ISr.o set ::;aterial condition 3ajcer. 1532
last plane lar.uca ;ed course to 120'T, and ngc. 1540 chan.t?ed course tc 107'rt
and pgc, 095' psc, OSS'- pstgc. average steaa 410'. .average r.B.i. 141.8. '
Q
eut(js), ".3.
Appn
vou;
txamined: ^,» ^
(Oriftfnal (ribbon) copr of thla pn«« ta be «cnt to Bur«4U of NavicAtlon monthly '
3/
79716 O — 46-
2074 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
H-
tdJ:
(Original (ribbon) copj or thl» psg« to bo scat to Biireau of Navigation luonthly)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2075
\ y^-> -^
po.y,c^^cyy^<^Y
2076 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
AppTv
red:
i-:»wi)ued:
'
" S.X.Xantolt^
- -4
-"■
""
(Tills pase tf> be an
nt to Kar«^u ofNttviffatlf*!! tn
ninthly.)
5/
»-,. ,.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2077
UNITED STATES SHIP
ZONE DESCRIPTION .'JJJS 10,
acc jra.
pStC, £'.
read ice
oourso,
accorti ■
0230 o:
ip in con
ced zi/^za
>.vera~e r.::
4-6
336' pstc.
aooordir.~ to
quarters, l..^
a/prox. l?^.. , J
aircraft. «. prox
launched. obl':
20 l-anot?, ■ '
220'?.
aud Pr':o,
r.?.:-.
Headine. .
6.4 , 1'-
lo '.'j-.ots .
?gc. C:.
alroraf I ,
^vei\L :-j- r.. . . >
■■fore. 0405 oiiOn^sd course to 350'!.
:i course ri;-,;it to llO'T. aiid pgo. 0.04 a; i
0455 souiided fli{;J:t quarters. C515 so;^.'
..rial Jo.:aition J%Stira.' 0545 Task roroe L.-. . -e
. '.^uit IC .uiles, 0555 chaased course loft into v,-ir.d t: li-js-c;-:
course 036' r. 0657 first plane launched, 0559 last plane
;i '•zag O'Sursc, 0605 c^ia;.~ed course to ri^^ht to liOT, s'ifced
1 coasod zii5za;;;ins. "OSIO sighted destroyers bei-rir.i
j-;royer 'oe=irir.2'£40'?. 0020 ciianged course left to ;._
G79.5' pstc. All eagiaes ahead standard,' 15 imots, 1: r
!.p. 0630 scoured froa Jeneral Quarters, set Qoaditioa of
. oet ;.<.terial Condition 3a:rsr. 0635 Joined Task Force
..Ispositien 8-7, fleet course 090'T. and pge, fleet speed
.;: ruide. 0746 changed oo-arse and fleet course to OOO'?." a /.
■ J© DoSaussing sqs.t. 0755 cl.ansed coarse into v/ind to la -:, :
■ jiirse 07&'T., approx. speed 14 knots. AYarase steaja 410,
ri:.|
a.Q^U^
[^.' J. A. HOI-jS, inaisn, r.S.-.
■ as before. 0603 last pljine launched. 0634 last plane landed, 0635
aajfcd opeed to 12 :mots. Oi.anged ocorse to 000*^7, 345' psc, 345' patge, 0847
;^.enced steajr.ing ^;t various courses ar.d spseds to la:;d aircraft. C351 last plane
landed. 0655 ch'^njed course to SiiO'r. -md P3C, £68* psc, 269' pstgo. 0904 ooii:.eiiqed
ziSzaG-r'n- acoordiiic to plan ;;o, 2, Changed speed to" 15 laiots. 0938 3LUS and
JASVIJ Joined fon^ation. 10i2 ceased zigzagsing. Changed course to 060'?, 045'. 3C|'
psc, 049' pstgtt. lOi.3 oo;_jeno©d stea:-.!!!,- at various courses and speeds to launch
aircraft. 1032 last plane lau, : i-T-od course to £80'?. and pgc, £68' ?so,
269' pstgc. 1049 oo:-.-:enocd z;. ;oordir.,5 to plan "'o. g. 1055 oasiiged cours
to 060'r. 1057 co.-.enced ste;- .rious courses and speeds to laxmch~^aircraftj,
1103 launched last plane. 11C5 o..an-ed course to 050'?. and zigc. 1121 oo-^enoed
steanin^ at various courses and speeds to land aircraft. 1126 last plane landed.
Changed speed to 15 .a-.ots. Oliunjrel course to CoO'T. and pgc. 1151 changed ocurse
to 090'T, 076' psc, C79°5C' pstjc. :.ade daily inspcctlon"of magazines and s:i0ke-
less ?o\vder saziplos. Conditions norL-.al, .v/eraje steaa 410. ...verage r.p.::;, 129,2,
^^^^^■'-'-r^O^^C::r\
ifore. 1219 oa-.enced zl~::
12£. lUoad full, 20 iaiots, 189 r.
course left tc C2C"i', and pgc, 1241 ctianjed c; eed t.o li -..qIs, --
1247 changed course into \vind to launch aircraft. .1. pr.-ic. course
various speeds. 1249 first -..-lane launched. Icl7 last vlane landc
strean paravanes, uslrig various sreeds. 1413 atreaned paravanes,
streajied unsatisfactorily. 14_2 chan-ed course right into v;in4 t_
recover aircraft. .%;;■;;:. :;; a'?e j7u'.. , -...-ing vi'.rious sreed?. :
landed. 1444 1447 cut 1:
Approved:
^.
Y.\
,:/
Oaptaiii, I .
Oo;.. XtTtdir.^' ■
(Oiifdnal (rtbboiu
I Burrau of Na
Si"
2078 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP
AT i;.A.S., .'-,.:t1 ":x:'b r, :". .. .
ZONE DESCOIPTION
H.
D \ P-.RO>
! ■ ' i. r
7 &&a^f£i
9 535.1 15 V l".a C£:
10 14£'.XJl&.
1! 'liilc'lG.
14 4
14'_5
1516
54C
020
020
, ; -e9_7§i,..35. .,
,: CO. ?41-.^_Ea^
7SL C n^ a c
h-,1'-
1=1
D«ll_l_S AND EXEHCISETS
;l Longitudi- 157- ■ 23 '. A5"
I IxjiKjr.id,- 157° OP.'- c>a-
1 Tarpeao 3ef anae, :'ll.^;^itl quarters
jo' 33' C0'1 it ! lonhniid
U !i^.[v«H . .. P '■ 3 Plight auartgra
—40.716
132, 6Sg-
StA.VOilU
D sua, Cour
"" '
S. H.
trm
VuiiatKl.
Deviation
-l: -iX'-
_.,
Uraft fur'l_
Di»ft »<t._
:J164_5P.C!1-
i1
■ 15- uiifeiaxi&Lijiia .ja-Li-
10 J.40,4iS-^P^3L5L! QS.-
1- lK'.qit!Sil3.E! OC-.-
18 J.25*3J.i,.2|l2,3J 02'-
19 JISJ .Aj( J.4 . 3 1 12 3i C£C
■1,- I 1 ",- r, • _■ ■:'•.. ■ r '•
5000 -|74 '/Q'TSi^ a eu
2001., - !75_ _70=,76( _JCj^ L^ou
(Original (rlbboa) copy of IUI» pa^e to Ti* i
L or NavlguUon. niouiUly)
-r^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2079
Page
ADDITIONAL SHEET
Pale 9 -a»o«Bttb»r w. ...41
12 - 16
3tea-'.lag as before, 1£06 oeased aigzac irn;. ..esuiiied base course OUO'T.
aiid pgo. 1224 foKued cruising disposition lOV, fleet course 020'T. and psc,
fleet spijed 13.5 iciots, li;6 r.p.u.. K.Ti:KPRI3E guide. 1226 submarine reported
sigiited bearing C30'T, 1^27 TxnlSr. attacked with two depth olmrKes, l.'i29
all eiigines aiiead full, 20 icnots, lu9 r.p.m, 123C all engines ahead full power.
1233 all engines aliaad 13,5 knots, 120 r.p.x.;. 1303 co. .-.euoed ziszac'-itxc; ttooord-
ing to plan '.'O, 2., speed 15.1 loiots, 140 r.p.a. 1315 subnarlne reported dead
atead. 1316 ehaa^ad course emergency left to 355"!. All enginow <i -=• 'i r, 1 1
20 knots, 139 r.p.u. 1318 all engines eUiead eriergenoy. Ceased .
1320 cl.anged course loft to 020'T, and pgo, All engines ahead 0
14C r.p.;i. 1330 ooaiienoed zigzagrlng according to plan "o. 2, 1.^,^ ..^\,.,.^x.
dropped a depth charge bearing from the ii.T^ru-KJdS 159' relative, lb3'/ sounded
flight quarters, average steam 410, average r.p.is. 139. S,
-.). C. IXilHY, Lieut (.
;Y, ^eut
-.tea.. ins as before. 1508 Chciced speed to 10 knots, 93 r.- . -i
: course rij;;t into vdnd to recover aircraft. ■. ^-^ -, '■.-.. "„a ,..-.,:■
j plane landed. 1012 last plajie landed. Ohi..
I Ohanf;ed speed to 20 .aiots, 1S9 r.ju;.. 1617
j 162l'o' - ■ ---rse to 335" ?. c:;-^ --'■. .aoti
1631 e rse left eaerge:; - 1 r.?.-
" 1655 .. rse right to 345 . . . , IB45
j returii'- ^ ... , course, 020°?. u..^ ;. .. .^^..^ i,^ ..^a .lui^. .-^.juji.:. •
course 0^0" i. 170C Task Toroe One It .. ^'ask 7oroe ^-isht for.ae.l
j cruising disposition 9-V, 1710 couad „uarters. 1711 darkened s;..
I Av^r6!;;e steaii 410. avut?. -e :•.'-.•., l-ii.....
, A. hoi;.':3j,' liisigii, u.s.i,.
18 - £.
::.„^.....v _., before. 1812 SBCured froa .general Quarters, set condition \>t
readiness II. 1823 secured boilers :;os. 2 and 4. 1825 secured boiler , j. v.
Aver'i;-;e stean 410. average r.p..... 126.
... C. :i:.:;!^",/Lieuti,':: , , ... .
.20 - 24
jtoaaing as before. 2030 Observed long oil .. j aboard port side.
S052 warning report surface craft h^r^v'--'- '• ■'-'•. aii^a.i.,-^ ^.5 -.iles. • .; "
ocs.;»encea zigzagging according to pis,-. .'jif.ed spelh to 15 kr.o .
1 r.p.ra. Avei-age stean 410, .kVor.^--e r. . .
J, A. "a'0L.2J3, Jri:;_ . .
^-
i r , , u. B. jf.. yKHt»t9r.
unttaly wltb Log HheoUi)
^7
2080 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
iff '"^Mj-'f*.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2081
UNITED STATES SHIP SlIT^iR} EI3E
20NF DESCRIPTION .lU:^ iC, REMARKS
. oorcd starboard aide to r^erth F-9, learl liarbor, -.. ., v;ltn 5 ..aaila :
2 wire oaoles and 4 breast wires, joiler Vo. 2 in use for a'oziliar;/ purpo:.
boiaers on two "aours notice. Jhips present: various units ol ^he 1.3. nsc„.
SOi'A is Cii;oi-ao at subuarine baee. 0015 coriMnced fuellas ship. Draft for-.vara
23' •J" aft 38' 5". 0055 00 j^enoed receiving gaaslir.e. OSCO started preparation*
for sett ;- underway. 0315 stopped fuelins, ar:ount received 463,000 gallons
fuel oil rd 61, LOO callona of ^asolirje. 0353 :;e03:-;0 uader.'/ay frozi alongside. ■
^'}. "^ "\ lieuteaant, V.o.:.. ^
4 - c 1
-jr..d as before. 040S boiler .":,. i out in aara line. 0410 boiler i
oc -aaiii staa., line. C4CS tir;at rart re .r.v',i f roa along port side, ■
fro.u berth F-9, ; earl Harbor, ;.-., for operatit-.cs as directed. i
, 1 to ;,o. 9 inclusive in uee. standard speed 15 knots. Oaptais, i
'^xec -Xi'.'e ,.rioor, i.avisjator and pilot on bridge. Captain ooiuiing. :t&terfal
Condition ,iaker set. oii;5 tugs oast off. Co:ir..snced steaEiag on various courses |
a:.d s'.eeds, oonforriii,:- "^o Oiia.-nel to clear aarbor. 0520 Torpedo defense. 0551 j
"left ship, 0550 passed ei.trar.oe oi.&nnel buoy ::;. 1 abea^i to port, 3'aan-ed
to IS*'!* ^OJiansed speed to 20 iaiots. 0600 ciiaasei oouxse to 14C'?.
jueral ^viarters. 0o£C o.^a^sed course to OOO'T. 0629 lighted sirip. C53E j
3-oured fron (Jenaral Quarters. 3et condition of readiness II. 0535 c;.anged couBse
to 070'T. 0640 chained course to 160'T. 0640 ohaaysd oour«e to 07C'T. 0649
ojianssd cour&e to 130T. 0055 ohangod coiirse to 070*T. 0727 onanged ccurse to
OSO'T. 0745 i'ligjit q.uapter3. «vera£e stean 410. .^-verage r.p.a. 121.2 J
itiis). ''.-5.;:
12
3toa:_iug as before. 0fc02 liestroyer on starboard quarter reported a sub:".arin«
sis'nted bearing 190* trcsa tliem. 0815 changed course right into v.ind to recover aip-.a
craft, approi. ooi;rse OoC'?,, steaizing at various speeds. 0618 first plane
landed. 0820 last plane la:ided. O&il fQSJse4 »5«oiai cruising disposition 9-7.
0827 ohan'-,ed course, fleet course and fleet axis to Cf.C^T. ouid pgo. 0S37 changed
spared to 10 imots, 9C r.p.a. 063B cr.anr-.ed course rij^ht into wind ^o launch airoratft.
n various sp.cds as nfccei.sary. .-vrpros. course 077''2, 0840 first jiine laonched.t
0641 l^st plane larjichedi (>&42 first plsne landed. 0917 ceased lajiding airoraft.l
Choji^ed speed to 20 imots, ISO r.;.:-.. -h'^r. ~ed csurse to right to 170"^. and ?gc. '
Subr.arine contact reported b; . '. .-' changed course to left into tte wind
to resune recovery of planes. contact reported false. 0?25 last
plane landed. Changed speed . ~ .' r.p.... Jhan ad course left to
02C'T. 0950 OHIDLST reDoi-ted sub.:.:riuf, contact." Ohaaged course left to 290'!.
0959 cUant;ed course left t« 015*T. and pgc. 1003 chaiiged course left tc Z-iS";. Ib04
BSi'jj; reported fi~."ited torpedo. 1010 ohan;-.ed ec'urse ri,--* int; ---■ -.■ir.i t: iaunop
aircraft. Ct. various s^eodK as necessar:'. .■>. :ro:u;. o:u;- "'". xClC
LjiLCil report -inc on her starboard bow, 1017 z^C:: a;.:,..
1016 launohc, .n.e. 1019 ll^t plane launched. :^-u".r2il s- .;2ots,
189 r.p.;:. .• turaeti to base course C2C'T, aaj .ggc. iO:.r " -e tc right '
into \iiiid to recover aircraft, at varloua apeeSs as ne . course ,
083'r. 1027 first plane landed. 1C34 observed pi£j;e . leas Ic. to i
water. Changed speed to Z5 ^r.ols, 1236 r.p.:;;.). J.;Dx.i-Bd course ij r-ght to 175'?^
1041 cnanged speed to 20 i;iots. Ohai:.:ed course to ri.:iit to 21C'T. 1C42 o.an.jed '
course into the v/ind to resa-ue recovery of aircraft. 1045 G-j-1 ^irorjua ..essa^e j
on deck. 1046 :;icy Control reported, Aif^^NAS *"i»fcl"»e ^laaa (sussy bo:;iber; bearing
345'T., distance tfpprox."' 20 sill«8. 'ib¥9 first plane landed, 10c2 last rlane !
landed. _ C-.un <^d s; eed to 20 .:..ots, 1S9 r.p.~., C2i.'T. .ind p,;c. 1053 o..an:;ed
speed to 15 knots, 15; r.i ,_. 13 C' ' ^peed to fleei. bpeed, to 13.5 i>.ot3, I
1126 r.p.a. Co._auoed zigzasr:!:;'- -.j ;ia:. 2. 1107 0i;an6«d s'-^eed t; IG i
toots, 140 r.. ..-.. li.rc ;■:-'. -i :ie bearing OiC"?., d^stir:o 14 ".iler.
j Average Jte " '. ■. -^ y^ C "i ^ ^
Api*rv>v«ii:
■ Exajnioed: y^ jA
0, D. llJBHiy, . -~ S. ',/. ."•.r..L„,
Ja-..tain, U.S. i:nv>-, Lit-ut-Cor^ur. , ■
Co..™andinG.
copy of tM» pa(c to b« •••>< to Bureau of NiMi«Btion monthly)
i-f
2082 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
LOG or- THE. UNITED STATES SHIP
,.i!v,.
,':,..
!
'-'»
hi
■•;-..,.
i
*^
4 :
0
i; CO
14
l->\v
lat
13fi.O
14
7
,13 i 5
fcv'.
140.0
15
14 U;
:,>.c
^ L, 'd'O
140.0
IG
14 ?
iiUt
£:k 27
140. 0
15
1:5 19
;>00
i ;,4
143.0
lo
i'
14 '9
Cl>5
ii ii.6
147.9
16
8
14 1;:
£00
i^.i; 124
141.).i
10
0
}\^
020
i:,ii I23\
i [19
137. S
15
5
C^O
14f:.l
16 ■,
15 i;
0<..0
H *29
15; .7
15-7
14 t.
020
h: 125
4
li) 5
004
. ? . 18.
df u.it«to 23l.5,§' .0P"„ i;
J( IdUtudn ii5 ' 5t ' 00 "
XI i-m«iii,.k- 166' 00* 45"
bJ LAitlut^.
1^7" .-.4', X-O" '.f
I On liand
KtpMKlRl.
On luin.1
UKFMKi: Li
)l«ri torM.
11,0;
3:., 100
,75,00c
i
5
2c
k5
-•-
.-o,e
■" 1
1 :'iiiiiL.,jiartcri; '
•I - Oiiii tion. _;-.;;i;r
7 jtueral. .^uarterl
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE • 2083
ADDITIONAL SHEET
> liecamtiar , /». .4JL
18 - 16 (Oontiiiueii)
1356 oeased zigza^J.-jiag ar.i lOt jr;.t;-, to 1;»:!P c.nurr.e or .'■lC :'. !':■(, •" >'.- .-rt-.r
hydro v:'. one oontaot of e |
ahead flank, 25 icnots. i
left rudder to oourse Jv _, _ ,., _ . - - ^.^- .a '
fleet oo'irse tc SCCT. and i'leet cipeed to lo ^ois, i-iio ocuurod ixxju viejieraJ !
Quarters. 3et aonditioa of readineaa 'ft/o, viatoh tv;o. Set .>nteriol Condition i>.'"j;eb.
1421 oo.-.euced zlgzaesiag aocordi!\3 to plan;..:-. J;. >^i i 6-<-:.,r. .. „-.„ ,i r;,ii r .[^^
189 r.i).... 1508 surface lootouts aft report. bg
ahead flank spaed. Jhan-sed course rigi*t to
left to raiU" ;■. anri r:;.-c;. 1520 Ohanreti s .►•^':i
zigza(- ■ , sd oouroe ;-' i
rijtht 1 ver airorai
1527 i-i... , -;. lB.i:^ o., ^^
sigiited 3'j.U.<»i'ijj>3 'ceari ipsa
i left to C45*?. and ?go,
k-i.ots, 108
•arious ooursea aiid speeds, lu.v.
r.-o.i... 1558 chaiined oourse lei
/L-C^,i/4nfX>^
10-18
j 3teanilng as 'before. ICCC subiiurine sif^hted dead ahead,
emergency full. Ohanged course left to iiSS*^!. and '^'-•, i.-
{full, £0 laiots, 168 r.p.n, 1606 chause^ course 1-:
I zigzagging ascordiug to plan !«o. 2. 1640 oeased ;
I'o.-'.'p, -,-.rt r -f. . r-,H::.red speed to IS iar.ots, 108 r.
.. sounded General -.uartei-s.
course right into tlie vd/i-'
il'/\.V Sii) Cv'Uurui .'
iei^errenoy flani.
... :, . z:r^V'SSi, lAout(jg), u.-i.".
; jt-: _ --i;orsj Set cou.iiticn of
readine.- . , - ■ . ;. 1850 or.t . ■; l-oiier
lOff t.'ie aaiu stox. liftt . boilers off th'- ". line.
'Average steaa -Ht. AV'.-.
to be •< 11 1 !■. liur.'aa of NavlgjiHon montblx with Log »lie«t»)
2084 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2085
UNITED STATES SHIP
REIMARKS
2086 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP
i
At
zoNe
1 CS
pit jllf
Mm-
-.>.
K-IN-IJ
«AK"-.:tlER
is
1 f
jp , :? s' i~ 1-5 ' 1 '»" ' fvI?-
, 1
4
fi
6
7
a
0
Id
l; .
XGt:.0
ico.o
i; ■- 'i-
la em
ifrHfiv
iCr..O
1V1.5
1. ""■
- :? •;i 7;:
L-C 1. a_c-j. : - . :;
•-,1;^
-T C9_ GO 74) 33 j a ou . rz _ 1 i 251
to 01' 72! ''0 ' 1 ou '.~ 2 ' S5'
lu6.1
17i.7
le - ii'" -
IOC
^ IK ^ " "^ '" ' "■ '
19^311B-T
' C90
'^T-'Hti-
i::i'i--5
TOCT
-', 71 C5 '.':■. ::c 1 - ■
- 71 55 73 C 3t
III
„. „„, ;^.,..,
DRII-L.S AND exERCisea
' •
if-4j.90§..
■ i.vr. I'.'urr'
t'jr-
""' , UrJt.
Diafl
'■j"- -^ -^
Ermr,
a/t.
Com
lldSM ^l■
I>rc
J.
P.,
1
i
> "'
\
Cr,rr,!.;t .l.-,,iL
i
_J
(Orjjjii.ui iriiilKjiii copy of this p&ge to Ixi sent «o auroaii of Niivlgatloii momhl.v)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2087
Pat,
ADDITIONAL SHEET
IJ jecemlieE... , /9.,il.
1^ -
iS before. 1235 co;2a6aceii ;.aiieuv
to avoid yei-drteJ subnarine contact. 1229 chan.^od. u„:r.-o tj 'j'.O".'. x:l
oaansed speed to IB knots. 1256 cj. -ionced luaneuveriji^ at various courses
speeas tp" avoid i-oportoj s'b:r;r'-e ccnt:ict. lE-1.? c'va— -ed c;r-T;e to CCO"'.,.
course t,: ,9C'.'. i;^.d ; .;c . J:.ii;.;ci s_.<Ljt3a to !■- 'ji-;..
eccordlnn to plan ; t-. 2. 1439 oouieuced ;.an6UVoriu-
speeds t.3 av^ld roportod 3 .';. .-.r'ne o:^r:tc3t, 1413 c:
pgc. -;.<eed to lb -
145i .aneuveri:.;
i^ri;. .... 1500 oiia::
1507 c- e..c€Q zigzagi^ing aocc;-d:..,;; Cj ^i
i.ounts by firing, 1552 ocsji.enced jlaneuvtr
avoid i-eported subi^arlne contact, jiverar.c
-^ft^^.^^-,
report i- :;
acoordi;:^'
Jtead.-l.-i
.i::ed course into
Ici^ded. J.7C1 ac r
,i to
. oours«
(:<-■-, e xz- JJ>^' :. 1M5 SAJ ■
;.■- OaLL. .:c ;all attackeo - . . ■ . ,
Co:.:.;-eLoed zigzagc.ijag to avoid roEiiblo tori-edoe^. 173S retunioU tc
C9G'T. Chai'.:ed speed to 18 knots, 166 r.p.». ISOO -secured froia ;eii
iet condition of readiness 'IHvo, v.'atoh one. 3et ijsterial ocr.">itloii
Average steeci 410, /..vera^Je r. . . 176.5.
le - 2C
jcea- ir.,~ a3 before. 1600
readiaeas -'".;o ai.d ;..att3ri.ai coai
IQlcj secured boii V .. ;. ...
1 /:Z' <2,^ZtJi.<i^
/ :.
:;aT,taln,
front of dlspo
.■•iccd front of :
„ ,_ . u-„ .Cuir. , 0. 4. A-.A-artfaair.
(Thl« |mxt- ( M b ■
1 or Navlgsclon ujoDtbJ; with \ja\i Bb««ta)
^.^'
2088 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2089
UNITED STATES SHIP
REMARKS
, 1941
''.4.
. k/3t plane .
■4 . 0f-.2(J
1 opeeJ to
0 ^i xu^j^ui,^-
/-
^.^^^.^<'. _
»r.iiiii<vl .ril>t>ot«j copy of thU pAgr to »>«• •ent to Bur««u of NjivlgMtwn nvmthly*
79T16 O — 46 — pt. 16 12
2090 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
At
Pas
-
r
v
^Sm
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2091
ADDITIONAL SHEET
i la
I ace
j tut.
roc
15:v
.-Ill
Xi5£;
fife.
y. ^ /j^
'i^€.i /
%^ ^'JlU
ct
2092 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
II
C S. ^.., Xmii^i^o' .
^nckXa p»«<? to be sfnt t« Bureaa ot Navtgat ion ontnt Wy.)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2093
UNITED ST A'
ZONE DESCRIPTION . . '. X'ili- -
REMARKS
0-4
Jteu::ir^
tion 0-7 in
course i;.d c
-)n course
ea
-, 237°
Juide
.1 r -.e;
'.r.ots
in Co
(.•C&4 c
'.-iiti
..varc
-e
r
;..'., 1
:'i-..
leut, , .
speed ti
; routine
aooordi.
410. .-.-.
,154
'0 sounded Oeneral <.uarter3. 3et .;aterial Condition
^ior on tae :.ain stea.. line. Qv5E c.un-el course
^Ii'oraft. atea-.inc at various speeds as necessar;.-,
, lane lauiichfcd. 0613 last plane lauriCl~.ed.
'^ r,D..... Ciian-ed course right to 250*T, and
. ._ _ . jordine to plan "o. 2. C534 32;rjw; re-orted
■bo£.rd. 3ii£ji,;ed speed to 25 Idiots, Z5b r.?.:j. >jir:eavering
an^ed oourae ri-z'-vi to i;90'T. 0635 Cfsanijed course to ^50'T.
T c.-'.^-n-.ed course to 14C'T, 0541 returned to 'oasc oourae
.::-0t3, lot r.:.--. - io .-ed froc general quarters.
■,:c, vKitca ti;o. 5: . itcrial Condition 2a;;er. 1646.
to plan : , .. .7.. 3 ceased zlssaggin;, rs3;.-ii
; disoo6-ti,ji^ ri -.lit to 34C'T. ti:;d ?gc, ?:7' r-so,
■.t of disposition r;,;iit to CcC^l'. and p^c,
. .^; reported torpedo v.'a^e to r.er star'^tard.
^36 r.p..... :;:-.:in;:ed course to left tO' 270°r.
r.p.i... ohaii^ed course left to 030'?. and
; units. >ort unit now in use. Co;^.encc'- __ _-
Chan'^ed speed to le Ixots, 16o' r...... .^^V-ri -6 ;--.ejO_
■ . 9 .
8-12
otoa.ing as befcro. Z'&Zi, 00 .i.cKced stea-ding at various courses aad speec
to avoid reported Ei;"^--arine contact. ^B38 o-ian^ed comrse to 03C°T. and »go.,
OlG'.:; ' ■ '^ , 'In' ' .r. :-n. ; ,;:.-er' s . eed to IS i:nots. 0646 o-anged course to
CeS4 5o_..enced i;aneuveri:i~ at various courses
.irine c;ntaot. 0902 o.-.ar-ed c-urse to 12C't". a.-.
' ■ " ■ ■• ^-'"- ••1^'' " ': •' . ' ^ '■ ' ;.~ed oo'urse - ■
. occ, 1C7'
Oft:
CO.;:
10;
var
id ro-ori
;3. lOoo -
.e contact.
steau.n.p at
;erir.g at vario
,ods. 1114 last piaixe la:iaed.
■ s, lliiS CO. ..er.oed zigza/;.:in?
u'se
-lanj
'Jcb<^
^
1
\
\
\
1 ■ i;ain, ' . :. P...p
Kmi:
""■'
iieut-;.x:-.ar'. ,
r. j..v,.v
;■,-,•■ :•
(Original Cribbon) copy of thU fmo to >>■ Mat t* BuTMUt of NaTi^stion moottity)
7}
2094 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Pair
LOG OF THE UN
ZONE DESCniF
le'o
lis"!
IIP'!
.6 \::
« i--
^-.
i..
q
l-C
io
...
IV
10
ICc
It
9
17
1)
ceo
i'
cZ
2
21
^4v
:,22 '-
Itjy
090jj
o&oj ;
170 '..X ...
170 CO :?•.
Ivo ei 74
?4
70 a 74 :
- ,^1 c2 74 .
; __,_h\ jc^^ - '70.r>il .^ii y^-
3Q2g_J-_T7J^j62_?AJ._y..
3021 -171 :01 74l,C
;t. ■- . - I?:
if Uliudc--
15?^ 45'
50" ;:
30" V.' ■
II'
ijj htM\.i>A<
*llx>n|rlt« i
"■•'
( IUc«ivcd_
r Outukd j?t^,9Q4
ij RetfJtcd 0
*| El|«fnd«i ,52 , 069
lonh.nd .l&2,55t
8. H _
i. c.g 19
C
16-.
■• :rc ir
^
1? :
Run No. (Sci
TillU! I.) »iil.r:
(OrS^lluii (rlbbou) copy of tUls pugo to l>e stnt to Huronu of Navlj^llou J
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2095
2096 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Pa0«
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2097
UNITED STATES SHIP
ZONE O68CRIPTI0
qS^Tl^
r iolj.or -.0. i. -— •! i^.^^^a ,
;r boiler :'o. 1. 0535 ier.eral 1
ilers 1 to 9 inclusive on aain 1
'.' :::i.3t'HT, /Lieut (JG, . ..-,.-.
. O':^' -^-- loft fjr^ation to investigate
■" - . -.3 L-:;-rii. . it^'^T, oroisiii; fr'-" "*---.--=-; to
-Joined. c9o9 i:.!.!.-,? reported .;:■ .licatell
•:-ed flank, ?5 rtiots, 23 5 r.p.:-- i to I
Lit.. : - --■■ •■.-:•:::.---■•■- accordiuG . . " . ■
:tei-s. IC. :' iaiots, 2l
■:":ed, ^3- course le'""
. ocurse u-^i ' ■' • - . - -
,;t plane 1 :■. " . .
t to hv-.S':
-ug acoordl
/%W^/t^
^^-^^
1-:
1
1 '" ■ >
:.ove..eiits oi' cru-
otea.ainr ".t vari
ifc <-■/-,:. <■ ^•
(Oriabutl (ribbon) «af>y or thi* pace to b« xnt to Burcaa at Narlgntlon monthly)
2098 CONGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
{DljtlOed.
RKKit-nl Q
o«b.nj, 73^000.
BsrOKS LCATIS-O POXT
DraCfoc'd
Drift aft
Error _ ^
'__„0_C' 30" 2
^TAXnjkMD
Bi*o. Coiiru«
54C94
« H
346'
Errr*
14* Z
Vftfiatioji
13- 15- i.
DtyiiMix
C 45' 2
Arm Emut
Di»fl tM'i
Dmft a/t
Ttoe to 81. ;
Onatwt d :
(Ort(limi (ribbon) copy o( tikis pace to be »eiit to Btu«au of Navlestloa xuomthly)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2099
ADDITIONAL SHEET
14 liiicoiuber ,. 41
£0 - C4 (Coutinued)
1:.:' pao, 191'30' pstgc. Average staaiu ilO. Average r.p..-.. 168.
L'HY^^.leu-.i
aptaln, I'.?. -
Co;..';ar:dlr.c:.
(Ttala paffe to b« seat U> Bun^a of Nav1ar»tlon mouthly wltb Ix>f Nh««Ui)
r;^
2100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2101
.!! course CCOT, ^nd pgo, 346" jisc, 54V* pato, In oonpany v/lth Task
special cruising disposition 9-7. C.r.C. and for:;:stioa guide, 'Jid
.ISPrJSE. otar.dQrd- speed 15 knots, 139 r-p.n. Jteaiin:; at stoxidard
^..^v.^ v..^.. .,-ilers :;o3. a, 5, 5, 7, 8. Ship darkened. ."' - •I'f-o;. of readiness
i'wo and .^terial Condition Baker. Avei-ace stean 410, .^v . 139.
^■•fore. 0515 soxk^o'
:on Afirm. 063;
Ji designated".
.^t,ion of readiness
3UBx.^.
ieut( jg).
4-6
3tea-- "
jSet „;at<:.
, executed
. quarters, . .
■ C653 oo._enced zis/M-s^lns to hold position on ori|i3ers durinj fueling prepara
j;:o definite plan used. 0749 oiiSEjed course into v/ind to launch aircraft. \:
'course 505'T. jpeed 15 knots, 139 r.p.:;. Ayerage stegn 410. .»vera.;;9 r.p.-
quarters. 0540 sounJe'i
urse left to 29C'T, :,■
ed ship. 0650 sooure;',
;:i two. ..ct r aterial c^,
/^ • :/^>^^iZjeo-
luar-tters.
44
ral
..airer
ti ons ,
prox.
139.
£ - la
1 :tea:.i;!,; as '.t-fore. C-^^ c" ar.Red speed t
course left to CIO' T. and p^c, to close 6aXii I-^... -.-^ --.- .^.. . . . ,,».... .
(1115 3tea.;-nc at various oo^xtsgs to rejoin position ane:-;: oi cruisers, .jpuod
!l;: .n.ots. lliC co.-.ei.ced zi=;za,- inc to hold position or. cruisers during faolinc-;
jOper-tlcns. -tcu-.ir.c on various sourses at 12 sxo-s. 1200 counded fli;i-.t quarters
|:;ada daily inspection of cagazines and si^okelecs pov^fier sa'-iples, condition r.orjaal.
Livera^o steaia 410, .-jvera;;;© r.p.H. 123.&..
.-.'. i. H2S.3USY,
5Ut(Jc),
X2 - --•■
s before. 1E44 secured i:o, 9 boiler, 1249 secured ;.:.'. 1 b'.lic-r.
1£5' :. 9 uoiler. 1251 clanged course left into t:.e -v.-lnd to recover
eircr— -. ,.,,.i-jx. course 340'T. and pgc, approx. speed IS loiots, 11£ r.. ..
1252 landed i'lrst plane. 1ES7 DU'LAP, seven uiles astern, reported contact •.vlo).
subiiarine. leased lar.din^T -iircrcft . is,5t olianf;;ed speed to 10 ioiots, S5 i- . -.-..
1302 sent the f,-.'o rey.aini- - - -' — '■ »• • - - -.^ oir to aiR ^'^ ■ ■ "Vi in attao.':ir.'-
rcporttd s •:>. -rine. 130" . 13C5 C--< ' to IL .aiO'^;;,
112 r.p.. , liji ceasod '.. ,urse left . to recriie 1. ,
rcraft. .o:ri:c. course ^^.^ .. ~ .:.^\,... _.,„i;d 12 laiots» ^^^^ -^o^aaed landir..",
aircraft. 1359 last plane landed. Jaanpod course ri -.ht to 065"T. 1347 changed
course left to 160'?. 1358 ezecuted si^-j.al
left to 15C'T. and ppc. 1405 forLeJ = -■:-■ i
tfront of disposition rivht to ItC'T.
speed and fleet speed to 15 loiota, _
changed speed and fleet speed to 16 ■^^, ^
speed to 15 iaiots, 139 r.p..-::, Averace steat-
16 - 18
Sl'.it.
152.
cease present ezerolsfes". Zi-.-.i:. :<i<x coutse
Tuisi-.-; dis.iosition 9-V. 1407 'c:.?n'op
lie,' pso, ...J i:.7' pstc. Ohan'^ed
1453 . jcur'-a 0. 6 boiler. 1;>::.9
V. r.p.r... 154-i oaanred speed and fleet
41C,. .ivera-j^^.p.:,. 125.8.
?fore. 1700 general quarters, set ^
- speed to IP laiots, ICB r.p.r . .-.vor-
itea-. 'ilt
mW^^^--^
lo -
^*v, --3 before. 1608 secured fro::: ,-eneral s^-iurter.
readiness Vw>, v;ato;; tv/o. 3et i;:aterial condItl«kn .jaiwr.^^veriicc -t,v;»...
ivsraie r.p.:.. Ica. V- ^- S^S^^ifxit.
(^. . ^, J-;Ci;X3, Ir^l-::,
- :;4
Jtea,..inr; as before. 2o0C oL£.r:i;ad course to fleet ccurso, , ' '.
(uriTTTT?T) .[; .rinTTTOIIiiT vr,;Yl4^.
Sxunioed:
Saptain, ..5. ;''uv;
3o avding.
R. v/. .iu-^a.,
Lieut-Oo;;idr. ,
V. I. jr., Xtetlnttr.
(Origiiwl (ribbon) Ban •* *>><• P»W to bo Mnt to Bonaw of N«Ti«*tton monlhlr)
11
2102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(Original Cribboa) copy of this page to be nant to Bureau of Navtgattoc monttUy)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2103
9/9;.^^
-lit.
1727
before. IS?
oa one. S-.
boiler. ..
<i$
loB' psc, ajid
PGO, 126 psc.
J .yj.; --ry,; ,:■■-,.... port to
■So ^40'''?. ..e.r.euveriag
2C34 returned to base
00 ohartged front of
33C0 olianged front of
:3to. flkVerage steam 410.
'/C.Qmr.^
..xitv.
>. jr., ffnttof.
t.> Horeaa of NsTlaatkm mouttal^ wttb Los >Imk<u)
2104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2105
RfcfviARiKS
18 :-?;?fr;,,fl:-
. In this r3sr<~
■-rags r.i
79716 O— 46— pt. 16 13
r>««n «r MMtfuHon i
2106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-ES SHIP-
i>. 1
] 'if'*" 1 . ""
bfcBuU:fct;jl. iIfcWj-i*lAtv»»
!jilNll,iiJ_^KlU
t utmNft
U-
,.5.15 ^3l
might auaxtoal
, Urr.l »ll-_ .
•.i.^ J-..v,!.,i--,.
■ •f,b->'jai •.
HH^^^^^^^^I
■Sriimiti^t^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B
"^H^^^l
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H
:>l^^^^^^^^l
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1
^^^^^1
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2107
EXHIBIT NO. 102
rW?ti*
2108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
UNiTXe flTATES SHIP ».fi..S. UTTSTtCiV. ^^fl«> gj^ — »««1lter " ' '""*
lOMOMimaM-llfil REMARKS
00 to 0^ "
ItoorAd port .side to aoorloe flmttoraa >-9-«, wil F-9-S, For* Island, l>««rl Har-
bor, T.B., In 7k fathoms of wat«r with th« followioc lines In bs«: Ax 10" asBlls
htrwssrs, on* B" *inlla baw»«r, four 1-5/8" wire hswsars, and throe 1-5/8* wlrs
brsests. Boiler Uo. *% and rorward nMohlnery s^cae ^Ln use for ts tulllarjr purposes.
SitlpM present: a<i;.i:cfiH:,<» (SC?^>Con3atFor) and rarlotis units of tb« U.S. l>«oirlo
fleet and yard and district oraft. l^resb enter taitt: telapUone -serrloes being re-
selved frota the shore. 0020 Plsoonr.ected fresh water line i'ro^ shore. 00)0 The
fcllcwlne nen returned titosrd having completed tei3!>orary duty with shora ostrol
detail at Honolulu are*: HEILLY, J.a, , TClc; VHS^SR, W.O., mac; XJUIMO, ::•.>'..,
30««, and Oli,',, s.h., vJClo. 01?o a;'3;o, /.;., J^felo, having roturced from llbtrty
ta a drunken end disorderly oonditlon, was plsokd in e^.flneaent for 8ttrekec;tiine.
0035 tJDXX, •'.E., Co*, was re* -ne'J to ship under ari'est by shore patrol aiid ess
Bade a prisoner at Inrj-e by order of tht Cote, r.' Inf Officer. Ohbr^rL.; Dlsotedianos
of safety orders of beaoh eoard patro-j^
1.1. Eoiiaaa, oayum, vsn:.
04 te OB
0^05 BiiOHO, F.J., je^2o, returned t»^3«nt ov-rr' leare jsIb j > ■ '■ - J«<t», sad*
a j^rieouer at Iwrfe by order of tJie Cots* aline Oftiosr. 0/,10 jrur9u«at"V> iS«WiaT '
orders of 7 I^vember, 19i»l, 'lodlflcl, l-leoteaant C.U«£. UjAkOSaH, MiM. was de-
tstchod ana uidircc to duty at UaTal ^ir ;»t<ition, ;)uoas«tt I^iat, khods Xslaad.
04J,} i.islit«a Ilres uo!' r toilers lios. 1,6,10,12, -tnd 15, <y>t>i:ittuM*=d ■«arnln,£ up
**• atid "J" units; eotx:.er.oel preparations for (^ettin^j u/jdurway. iJji,5 Tested laala
sngiottH, hll departncnta ready for gettizi£ uadsxvajr. 06^0 iilot OTi'Tft.JCll aai.e ^
aboard. 0705 i»erelzed deijBunsl:^ oulls. 0726 4ot underway li; aoeora«noe with *j|i-
roTed opei^ting ashedule. Japtaln coOLlnfi, i^xeoutive Of. lo«r, and ^vi^atort ana.
Pilot on the brl'l^. . 07J5 Joii;.on;L;0 ateeria£ various oourses at varloue speeds,
standing uut of JPearl Barter chsnael, 07$0 Went to tor;»do del«DS« ^usrturs. The
followlne ship r.ovenent3 occurud during the wstoh: Stood out: foSBnOt, Ituk^U,
40PKI»S. SClTiiiJUS), DBATruti, ZtaCJOO, lOKlij^'VLXK, AUtOaiA, rORTUMD, aad UMAM-
jBOLIS. ATor.C'- stes'i: 2f5 . ^vera^e r.?.B. 54^0.
W, Lieutenant, U.a. Hayy
0« to 12 ^
0006 Fasaed ohannel entrance buoye abefni to port end starboard. 0610 CttMSgad
apeed to 6 Imota, $3 r. p.m. 0?12 3treaaed paravanes. Jteaislng on various courses
at various speeds to olear deiensive sea <>r«a at ohannel entrcnoe, 0S27 3eour*d
froa tornedo ^afensa, sat oonditlon 111 in the anti-airoras't tettary. 085? tt»'
trlaved -aravaneB and aaoured for sea. 0900 Xent to JT^i^t qunPtara, 0901 All
an(;ln«;. stoopad, shifted to low apewd U. pole ocabioatlou . All engines aheaA I/3,
6 toots, 5? r.n.B. Steanlnc on various ooUrses at various speeds fcr fU^A ^9*^'
etlons. 0937 ill en(^liie« stopped, out Out tht two aiboard shafts, all •*Bglft«s
ahead i/3, 6 knots, $3 r.p.s. 091,0 i,«nded eisbteea VSB planes of lk>rlu« Sooutio^
ruadron 3SI. 1011 All ei^laes stOPiWd. Cut In all stiafts, all ecelnes Atead t/3,
knota, 61 r.p.a. IO30 LiXU.OlOM Joined /Task lorce 12 In disposition 12|J as ft>r-
aatloa e^lde with the following units of the I'uciric ileet: CHIiJAOO (OOBi£aojPorl»
fMOUND, A$TCiiU, sad Destroyer Division Mne plus POffnS on fleet oaurae UTO* M
apaad 1? loots, 149 r.p.a. IIO3 teft fonoatlon to land elr group. Coajenos'! aaC*
auverinc on various eoursaa at v^^rious speeds fcr fligbt operations. 112i %rf'15
erasiedflnto the barrier: aIXAJC, J., AlS^lc, ;l'v<t of the pl&ne reoelvbd ell^cnt
facial lacerati«M. ^^k.^^^Sh^T*^'^'^
12 to 16
1202 Changed speed to 6 knots, $S r.p.a. 1210 Having aoiapleted landing IXXlh^^-^U
Ult Oroup ehan^fed eourse left to 270* T. , 25i,* patf, 253* pao. Changed spaed to 1?
knots, U9 r.p.a. 1220 HI anginas stop, out out "C* unit. 1221 All m^m* «*••#..
I6j knots. 145 r.p.a. 1222 Co:3aeuoed zigzag In t. record totoe with ataJMlare slfaac
jii^ plaa. 1^ Cbaneed spaed to I7.6 knots. IH r.p.a. Averaee staas 18$. Av«ra«a r.j
^ U.^^'^iipji£r^1SkAl)«llt ConsBod^
Captain. Q,s. Bavy,
i^oamuidlngA
..siiKiB^
^i^^^ JiSt
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2109
^
¥
m:msm
AOOITiONAL SHEET
i
..LJiOhJluU...
Datt ...ptcarahw — -$ <■" — 4X'
lo to 18
X62i. Caused zlgwi.cglnij »nrt r«8UJaed base coufs« 270* T., 255* patg^t 253* mc.
Bhnngea dpwd to 16.5 Knota, 14; r.p.u. 1623 oi^ii^Bd Jloet «xie to 285* T.^o}?
Coatsr.cec zlgiiu^riiio li aO'oraance wltL staudarci plan, baa© course 27C* T. atblias*>
sp*ed to 17.5 knots, 154 r.p.m. 1732. D«irkt.r..>fl b-M^. Average ate&a: 285. *van»g«
H.-.». iiOSi*D, Ueutaaant ijg), li. J. Kavy.
to 20
._. 1800 C<»tir,e<3 zi:'zaftCin^ t>uc. rKr,\x:^fL '-aac i;ourse, CliLi^oa speed to loi kaots,
lU r.p.S. 1930 CJiaoeed oouras to 265' T., and Pd^, 274* pat^c, 274* pac. 19J5
Hoottrla«, oonraenoad zlgz«ei"lar; changed spe«4 to 1?^ 'axota, if>} r.p.jn. At 1400
this date nXHTSMH, L.S., 250-46-31', Flo, surfer«d -i eoaix.und lr-..-lure, third
r !»)<!•'*• *«lien th« roll of tno ship aaused a door to flioflfl v6 tti« i'lnj^er. Trafttad:
with Soott'3 solution, »a3(ill;i« t^nuze itjPaastrif ,itic <5-'->Uot. P»»t-i'^fit w^^ ■%,* ..■•■itt-i^
t« the alak ilet. Avoraee ateea; 2S5. Av*--- ' , . .
• •• Intersiltteiit li^tfBt rela SiuaUa. «."' ■ • -.; 2o,'. uvaj-«g6
«Mluuuiar, u.irr K ^v** *
>«««BttiMi aMMhlr vrttk tog ah*
2110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ir.lfoir «• /
LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHiP -.
12 ii:.
r.
10
17
18
16
1:2. a 1 '
Hub No. tlianalj —
TUm to Mt>a»it«
(Oi<<lMa<i«>lKm}«o|^orUiteViNI«toM«WK»laB«rMMiofM*<i(|»a^ «-«> ...n. mm
H
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
^111
,, 1285 •^
UNITED STATES SHIP i^,.. ...i.:
iONf [>t»CM(PTION .*l;Oi.„_
,i)0 to 5/.
3t8".Bln« under tellers Nob. 1 . '
-^r.bln«tl;,r. , 00 bei8«> oour«e 285*
-.nots, 153 «".>•■•, enroute fotirl .
rusk Foroe HI, ?«oiflo Fleet, CU
i.'lpet ffulde la UtnUOTCN; aXl »h!
!: renorl^ ed plan, A««rft«e etea;:! 2t
REMARKS
iCW to 12
o«r>n ijuater
^ - ■ .r9« -?^- ' i . , .;■; •' . -
1 zlfZHg lr.£. ChHiigf"-
■*n»s and 8tici<?l«8B JK
...w-rv- r.p.T.. 15).
|12 to 16
12;jO Ceau'd zl; i«»i;i:lne, r
,«;, "liS fle^t «p*ed 10,^ 'it»
■;c. U20 >/.
17J-; I>«srkisi.«'1 all,.
18 to 2
! No r*!
.r. r
i20
I !.-
•i^y^!!!:^-'
AitprovMi: ^SJmXUmU^ (t_
Kith
T. . snd Mi, .,
slder.tif led
J 0 cur 3 9 to
, ar.,'. pgo",
sr, U.S. BaV]
Rsvy
YBZDS«ICK C. SHXaUB,
CapUln, C.S. ItaTy,
" Bdlae.
■^ ***Mt Mvr «( au» *^i» *• to iMt *•
2112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2113
UNITED STATES SHIP JJ.A^. UmOKTCJ: ^pikS^..^..JhMmi^ I9ja
lONB o€»cRiPTioN .-_*lQi_ REMARKS
00 to 04
StMUtlM in OOTipany with Taak force III in apoelal cruieing fllaposltloc 12S,
vaAmr boU«r« Hos. 1,5,6,10,12, and 15, "A" \mlt, at etondard apacd l?.i knota,
153 *'.p.«-. on course 285» T., 271* petge, 272* i»o. LSHNOTON i» r< raatlon guida i
oantar of roraatloc, OTC and ComTaaltKoroe XII i» In CHXC^'iO (SCFii-CoaOmScoror ) .
Sbtpa darkaned, condition of readiness HI sat In the antl-alrtwrt battarlaa and
danaga control, Ararage ateaa 265. ATeraga r,r,.«i. ^2«
sTlRESjriJajiEns Ign , V.a. fciTjr
04 to 06 ^
06W Want to £enar«i 'i««rt«r8. 0645 0'BHYA.K, P.M., 287-26-70, SC2e r«oe!v«d eoa-
tuaion rl Hbit fourth finger while woriciiig on powder hoist In No. II turret, wtitn
f lager w&a caught between two powder ease. Z-ray showed no fraoture. Tiaoture of
»«rtblolat« antiseptic and dry dressing applied. Im not stoitted to sick li»t.
07i0 Set condition, of readiness III in the antl elrorait batteries aad daiwe^e ooQtjft
ATsrage steam 2t!>. Average r.p.B. IJJ-ii-^^-'^ " /
-^i^Z^ECoC^^lMt^ot iW, U.S. Kary
08 to 12 ^-^
0615 Mustered crew on sttttions,^>(![Os'bsentees. 0621 Went to geaer«l quarters is |
or^er to aet oonditioD IX, on sigimi Iroa OTC. <XyO Hecelved signal froa Cin^ao,
"Bostlllties with Jfapan ooa.^enoad with air raid on fearl". Coanenoed zig£ag,^lc£ '
in aooordance with standard zigzag plan on signal froa OTC. 0«I35 Went to fli^tht |
quarters. 0830 Secured fros general quarters, set oonditios II, starboard «Kt«A. i
0915 Lighted lires under boilers Kos. 2,4,9.16,5,7,11,13, •»« 14. 09*1 Msneuveriis^ •
on rsr ious courses at various speeds Into wind iaunohiie scouting grdup sad cn^ii'ii
sir patrol. 0925 Cut in "B" usit end boilers Nos, 2,4(9,16, on ti^e aain steara lU^-
0936 Completed riight operations, reauned zlgzagrring. 0951 Weat to gwueral qasrt*
on signal froa OTC. 0953 Cut in "C" and "D" unit*, boilers Hob. 5,7,11,13, *Pd :..
on the aaln ateara line. 1012 Changed speed to flenk, i24 knots, 210 r.p.m. on el.- <■ .
froa OTC. 1013 Maneur«>ring on various courses at varioua SpiMds laun«faiuc air «■
1020 Coapleted flight operations, resvsaed ztgzaggiDg. IO43 Maneuvering am tnuritii..
courses at various speeds launching air group. 1059 Coaaletad flight operation*!,
ehan^ed fleet course and axis to 102* T,, 094* pso, 093' stg, on slpaal from OT
1115 Secured froa general 'Quarters, se](^onditiori HI, section III . Average stmtM
265. Average r.p.a. 174.7.
V.
fl to 16
i2l6 Xnoreased speed to 20 knots, 17^ r.p.a. , full speed. U - -sk
lag at various speeds on various ooutms to leuseb alreraitt. i>
•l«3»^ed on flight deck and right la^tfiag gear gave awajr. Pilot 1 .
'OMtcleted flight operations and '^i^t ahead full speed, 20 knots, x/>
|102* T., 094* stg, 093* pso. 1320 iXOSSfflleft foraBtion to lovostl^
|r«»uit8 negative. 1353 aH engines stopped.- Coouenced BMki.euverirv «'
ma various courses astern for stern aircraft operations. 135? Coai-.^.
jslz relief and ooabet patrol over the stern and went ebmtd on course
jst«, 093* P«c, at 20 knots, 175 r.p.«. I4OO Secured boilers Kos. 3,<.
•j*«, ' on 30 ainutes standby. 1427 Slowed to 15 knotn, 130 r.p.a. ant
eraft. 15i4 Coapleted aircraft operation, havir.c launched aeoond' day
,Md went ahead full speed 20 icnots, 175 r.p.a. Uide dally Inspection
■nd aaK>keIes8 pointer sui^lea. Conditions nornal. xremgo stet^a ^s5. ATersg«
162.9. V, ' "-^'"^ A a . _
LTSt 'JTcJiBTT, £Ml«n. O.S. K»vv
l« to le
1*20 Changed course to 210* T. , 197* pstgc, 195* P»«. 1633 Ooaa6i«n.!e<5 nt .
various spetrds on various courses in eonnectlou with rsQovcrla^
Osesed night oper&tlons, caae tc course 210* T. , 197* pttgu, ;.
knots, 193 r.p.a. 1720 «8TH>, «.L.- 3«l-27-68, ^3«, reo«lved j -^
fourth aetecarpai. Injury sustained when petlent fell rrois boa »•!...
readlivR and cauctt linger in looker door. Traatasnt: l*»fcbillah-; = i-
Ireaslng. X-ray ah^wa fraoture. iSTEF was net adaitted to siei i ■. - ''■■'
lltion Toke on and belo* tLe stcu^ iiv.:u, ve;.-. tiation systeaa t
9smer, ^«.? steaaing on various oouMes ao^ speeds Xor recovery
Steea 285. Aver»ye r.p.a. iai.9. ' ' "'
F&iDiKlOK C. BBXmt2'.,
Captain, O.S. Kavy ,
ZatmaAioe..
■ rftllsli I OOtiieJ mwy ml
2114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ADDITIONAL SHEET
Ap^..« HI,^^,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2115
~T*^.. ••
— .—
.•
•
«
%Mltek •kW)
'.f
_iL_
^«M«>»
,
;
^l9m0tM (itf»M). •ofr of t>to p— • <» »<M|> » Ifcw^ »r |Ui»itf»«ton moiMaNin
.jnu^ . ittsnumz/aa
2116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
.mmjsat.
UNITED fTATES SHIP .
mrrtiftTnH
*i*i^
:}&Q«c.b«r . 19 41
«iM»c»«c"<»^toH — rum~- REMARKS
00 M 04
StMDBioc M yert of Tksk 7oro« HI
ISaXA* OH •osrw 170* X., X63* P«to,
, OTG (ComCruSocior-aOPA) in CHIOfcOC. LBIBraTOI
162* psc, spe«d ii krots, 193 r>P.B. Hollars
iios. i,Sl,4,5,7,9.11,13,U, »nd"l6 ial vmits "A","U"7C", and "D" on ttje 11m.
Stilp In «ondltion of rMdiiMM II. A^ertt&a ataaci 26^. Avertigo r.p.a. 193.
04 to 08
0$1$ Uj^ted rire* under boil«ra Ros. 3,6,^,10,1^,15, «nd out XL^u In od the mill
at««lB line at 05 30. OJJO Want tc ni^t quwtars. 0.-1 1 W'siit to ganeral ;jertar».
0642 ContMoead 9taaalu£ en varlcua eouraes and apeatta lu conaectlou «lt:> launchine
a*>rnlcg air patrol. 070O Caasad flight operatlonr. anl aet course 170* T. , it>«.*
pateo, 163* pto
aaetloD I. 0728 Soimeucad BBneurerlti^ or. vtirious covu-aes eai
oraft. 0735 -*aa»«3 lUrht oparutl'-ns and :i. i oourae 1?0* T. ,
foil apa«d 22 Knots, 193 r.p.a. Aver i.' »r^5'ioam^.;e'>._Ajer«e*
0715 {Joeurad fron genaml quertara; sat condition of raedlDaaa UIJ,
apaads tc raaOTar alr-
■r.a. i"v.o.
16?
pso.
d. tXIiMMrilU), clualcn, U.6. Navy
06 W 12 '
OSOO Kuatarad oraw Ob atationa, oo absentaas. ;S04 CLuj&cad apaad to ii, uiota,
aw r.p.«. and •ouraa to 174 T. , lo7* stf, 16«» pec, 0840 llbna 2-o-7> iHD-3.
UautecABt (J<5) J.^. ffCHTER, IBK , pilot and lANO, i..y. , 326-61-48, AMiao, craslied
lato tba «aa. Latitude 15 30' North, Uineltuda loo* 50' Weat. Fllot and paaaeogar
took t« c\xXi^*f collapslbla bout. Di<AY70M lai't formation tu tUalr aaalatazioa. 0935
Bl^tad IKDIAMaWUS, dlataut 15 allaa, 194* T. 1010 iiOIiUii»yoU^ Jwtned ton...tioo
kdA tocA coaaand of Task Foroa £U« ,1050 oat all oloolia back ^ nour to &caa *l\ tiai
1027 iilowad apaad to 22 Ksota, 193 r. p.K; and coastanoed zle;£at;tcli'
atafidard plan on basa ooursn 170* T. , 164* stg, 163* pae. 1110 Cet - ii ,n<j
lod slowed epead to 15 knots, 130 r.p.H. 113^ Jonaericwrt rtiifuver li.,
s<&uraas lor launol-lng aircriiit. 1142 CoEs>platad launcbibs ulrcroit and j,r«ip«.-»' to
4siid airaraft. 2toda dally In&^aotlon of ua^azlnas and auoKaleai pow'«r J.^aplae.
PotJ'V.rjona n^raual. Avara/t staaa ■iP5. %JK(f«gefjf.pji. 19^^.6.
ljU7 Ccwplatwd rligut optirationa, all planas returned ejieapt 2-y-7. lUta pl-iua '
Was reported down 200 r;llpv Jpoq the BUi,\ ^ilct slid radloaan were rwpcTtad aabark-i
aid safalf In roboar boat b;. tic^onpSny .i.*- pl&naa. Case to couraa OoB* T., 055* stg,
f>4* j»c. 1250 iCitidi ui«l ?0H7L»»HD lei t the tornutlor. but took courst to weatwnrd.
130 Oo signal froa O.T.C. (soaoanoed zigzagt^^lng in aeoordtinae with staudaird zlij-
>,'«« plan. 1352 ItAHAN raportnd sutoRarine. iitMtCi I'iXi. lorR'l^lor,. to sanroa toe aub-
aM.,rlna. Hant to lllrut ju- rlars, aentiwd all rotrmti^ statlon*i*Xxaeut*d aaargency A^MI
tlg.Tal from O.T.C. I4O3 Secured boiler Hy. 5. 1405 On signal fr-ju O.T. . raauaad
riset oooraa 068* flaat apeid if* K,!.ota. 1411 Cn sl^nsi frciia u.T.C. r«8-«i*?d il^;-
M#«lni<t Vi saoordanoa wltli standard plan. 142'j v^neu7«<rlne: or^ various oouraes at
jrarlous speeds launohln/f aritl-subasriao patrol and pl'ines of fh-^ to i'»«lat la 1
faaroh for p* ' '"-' ' ->7. 15u5\yAHAJI rejolnei foraatlon. 152o Coapietad fllglJ^
per&tlcjic. Aoggtng at lo kosta. 15?9 Ceased ?ir?e?jFin« - "'.-t,?.! fro«
t.T.v, , otan • 15 M»t*, 1 ■> .' r.p.a. 1537 iomt& orulsinn Uiapvaltl..o
fl2S* on sigttrt* *. - .I.e. l';39 .'ff-' ■- rll^bt qu'iptera. 154" Ke'-ftvBd ra-^--
tr pla»a« reported as e. r.^ froc. " : '.i^, V>44 iif^iH-:"^ 1 1 •- * f"*!'
s&l. AvanMTS e'ei- .<!-". ATera,-- r.
|»t<?sa
.rt<
Hfe- to 18
i6lj «?9D« to g.-u-jrai
1 640 aaeurftj fr-ja ganaral ^u
JLoa Toka below th»- pac^nd d«-
lor l*UAohlnf - " ■ - " '
.'-^#ji<»*.d to
loiilBf •
l^lOQ and .iis«;i>.i-^o . -• •• ' !■
tor the pnrvlvor.i of i-i-',", i-iaut«i(«nt
^VJr.enoed wneuvi.: . ~. , . -...,.. .*. .
•. :.Jltloii of reeainesp n. 1722 «m;
r von* P •loR. l''4i, Co:'.t,l»:tv i ~-»nev.
tc .>ofc T. , ^5S* pstc, ;; r^.
:.d K.'TSK i-.iv'-d tearing ^ f,,
1,13, Anrt 0HI;,9C f! tha f..r-
i.»- »<- Hi ' ■ """ ' r raft
iji*{). J.C.
JS uns<fc«asful. \Vfrir-- staausi, i'>>'-. Av«r«~'e
Captalu. U.S. S«yy. CcactsOKSfer, U.S. navy.
kv.
Jl
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2117
2118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 103
./
I ; •
)
' ■ ..(■' 1 . '.■.'
..ial
Frwn:
T ;
At J-,'u
: . .'v; .• Z-.Tvii'iP.d.SS Ail- Gnnu. •
Sv.oi ■.•',: .(..-jrt of A'^tii-r. •.it;i .]-\finna kxf force
Ht'oa-V.. T.?l., Ducof..u.ir 7. 1941.
.iiu'jrarice; (a) Artic^. s ll'i and 874. U.S.». Begulations.
1. At ot.lj DjcwJiber 7. 1941 I took off fro..x
ENTZiiPRISZ, wnosc (.osition at that ti.^ was approxinately 215
:iilaa •■ue v.o5t of Oahu, with n laission of searching a sector
^.58*-095* tru« fv.r i distance of 1^0 n.ilei, and then to
proceed to ?ord Islin-.i. Ensign P. L- Tuaff, U3N in airpl&ne
'■ -S~2 accoapaniwd .ne. ky passman ,«r was Liout"*Cc»adr. Bror^ield
r^icnol, USif. Tictical Of.'iser attached to tJw staff of Co-^iander
Air-^raft, Battle Force. >(ho hiad been ordured to report to the
>'or- in-Ci'itf. P^oafic Fleet Ju.i..ediat6ljr after lay arriiral
' ■ .ni Islanri.
At about 0720 I sighted a tanker to starboard,
. roceoding on an eastorly coursj. which upon investigation
provod to bt the "PAT IXXE»v*Y" of Los Angelos, belonging to
the Hichfiold Oil Go. Continuing on i.-j track of 09*3' 1
si^atvd and passed the U*S-3. THr6£S;i£tt acconpaniod by tho
' -S-S. LITCHFIELD at about 0740. At about 0810 I passed iUt^na
Point abtja.. to .cort aistanc-j 20 nil-is. At 0820 paasod
Barbjr's Point to seaward and .at this tijjo I noticed apprcoc-
L'-Atoly a 8 .uaJron of planes circling Swa Field in coluaa%.
aclioving thoii to b. tj. S. An-/ pursuit pl«»sJS i gars theo a
■.'ido borth, d.!cr*.asin^ kv altitude to about 800 fowt and
■otitlnucd toward Ford Islvad Fi-ild. At a point mid-way
D-t„.,-n Ewa Field and Ford Island I notic<3d considerable "AA"
fir..- in.jad. At ■iL..ost the- sa..^J instant i was att&ciced oy
J tp'^n_st wlan.,? frot:. the mar without warning" ftaoognizing
-1' omj plane; tivat had ccupl-ted a dive on tm -
.. jv ; tov.'ard the ground zig-zagging. ky
:n.». .lav,' ::urf iciont ti^.ii to . lan tho f ivo ^n-
■ cr; lo-.dcd and ohar^wd out X had no opportunity
T.i-.. .l-Tiyj tnat attaCKod r.w appearoa to be loi«-
i fi ..torfi with nitmotablc landing gear. ..y
'.ttack«.:d at tao s-u*. ti^c but v%s not hit -ind
.^ ..-.;! wi'^h -.J, circlin,:. low ovur a cano fiald to the Morth
>: •■-".rl C-ty. It was ioac;di".toi;.' evident that I was under
AA Tiro r'-gardl^ss o: v.hich direction i • .nu. 1 did not have
sufficient fuvi.to return to tho ship had I bean able to get
• ..• - CtrOiT, thy ialareJ. Hoping that I would bo rec<^ni»ed as
fria-.-ily J docidod to .-akj -. lew appraach to Ford laland field
th.
in/^i ■
r. I \
I -.-•.
, . di-r
L-.iIy
f>ai.s
'-■'('.'-•'
:.i.-
U, f
ix.j
,;uns
to U30 ti.
i;;:..
i.'ing
nonopl -jY
'■in.-"
;.ian
'.^'as
i illULU
-i- ssTsaPHisE jon <mm>
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2119
..•*>»;■ rt ( (•
1 »;^
In:-.
7S-6 and VB-^0 1 ..is ^irdev
2120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CaAG/Al6/Pb/
(S7v)
Go:"Fi:/-.. :-iAi,
^^•■: i:' r >u-i-. , ' '*:•.■ A , ■ , . : ' .... I.: ;'i r- . i •
:.::.•.;->:' !-•■
i Lui'.-L'. iiKJ t;.f ii< i.:^ LT .U-or., ...
onl^ -..ii'icor detaiiedi to dut;
o2 the tr insiiiitter iii tiw tc'..c. » .-.^^ .u ..- ■. .. . '-••
with, cither. Tiie licK of proper joza'-iutuc-itio.-: ;"ic i
telepiione nd mdiOi wore • contributory cuU86 to<t..
4 lirpl inos of VF-o, which were shot down by our own AA ^xr...
during the night. I atteupteu to tr.insndt liiidinr Ins t r.! -t ions
to then via the towor, but they wore umblo to ne ^r. Jt v.
necess^rj- for thoa to land due to the Lack of x'uel. ? -
bIx 1 inded safely. I then itto..pt«d to cum..unic:ite -..iti. t..,.;
2OTEHPKISE via the tower voice set in order to rocorjnond ■•. :. .t
no ;nore plin«s oe sent in to Ford Isi'\nd, withoMt suoc-f- . I
then learned that the reiaainder of tne sji^uj' i:..' , .
launched had returned to the ship.
5- Lack of irufonaation that hosti.;.it i.. , .- -
ed with Japan, proper cofjriAinic itions, th^ ina:; i
ground and ohi board forces to reco^^nize I'ric!
know the proper r>icognItion signals uerc the ooiit,riaui.wr.,
causes for the loss of jjeraonnol ind airpl"nes of the Jlcri;.%i".'J.w^
Air Group.
6. No pi »nt,s wero e-u^pp-jd ..it.i s^lf ik;LJ... •. .-i/;.-;
or an/.or - \11 :'yir\s were fully -ni-cd.
7. The suddcness and laagnitude or t..- ^•. .-'■,. -^.'ix:,:
caused such a stunning effect u^on ^round an<J ^..i .-.r. :i-.';I
Uiat all aircraft were fired upon regardless of i.ieir ;'>>..>.
friendly. I was under fire until ray wheels twiclx-j •..;•., ■r-.-unc
on ford Island - soiae of the oms boin^ not r.ore tiian !!-•.■
yards distant frcsti ..ic. The ijuportance of soi.ie :.ieans oi
positive identification of own airplanes, other \,r.\:: visual
signals cannot be over emphasized. Tho loss o:~
fi^nters of '/F-6 triat ni-jht is a .:oo<:; sxaii^ple -. .. .^..-.s
unless proper cooiaxmications anu oieans of controlxi;. ; \.id
identifying aircraft in tno air is available-.
8. I then received <jrders to rejoLn t.ie SilTE.-'J.dSE
at sunrise the next n.ornin^ viith our reraainias pi.n. r. Just
prior to the tis.u of our sc.viduled take-off, i uti.,../ . lar;.
(JRS) toolc off, and w^s iruiaediat^i;/ x'irea on b,-.- 5.. is ru
other sliore batteries. I had n'sviously arran-i.-u "...at v- ry
means available be taken to notii'v all hands of our s^..r;Juied
->-
. i,?*!'
5
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2121
Su:\=vct:
it Oar.u.
nocoss.-ixv t^
continuous
10. :
........
oJg-.,
JV"-
■ -iS
for:
:■ :; ..t .". ;
;", "'. r^ ■'
•;>:, :.^:^ .-./ to
t;l ;'. .-x.-iiiLui
another .'^ ..;. ,n,.
/' A ' ■ ■
^►'■•rv;.: i <. •- ".t.
At this :.x.M .... . r
rr. .'r- r.' t Kiiovm
to iiis su x:rior:) .
■ ..!.■• - .■ M-:
to iiiyone at tne •-
■ IS- .1
■i/lr..' ■■ ■''.
. )- ,;.ju:-t .-,
St in.ina. devotior, -
: logic -ui
; .-o^'^:;-. :^3 in
action. It is r^j
rficvT IX'
.V •:. in fri.:i-il
couiiondition for ._
H. L.
YulIXi
i
.. .££M»».:y&^^i&
i^UtiU.
!i^in«B£I«<IS»i>',-
79716 O— 46 — pt. 16 14
2122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 104
from 4>'ari ' wr jvv ,
r.l If p fro/t yidwi) '.
(riarehi:). ^
-.roll •' , ' < "•
powi tloi urn 1" • . ..
course ^i'" m-.I "f"
;>i Otv. ■: g
To c i :
mer.c <•('
cscc
At, OMC ■'■ent
K . or CO
t 400
01 ,
.HOC
-' -C 'of
Tttr:;
in.
ti roceol t- '. T' threap*. ". bfl or«"".'.
<?or.;-vt -fi tro 1 . .'it 1 Ifl lav.; cJ-f-ii 11
•e ' rod
■ocee ■■
p •■, -_(--(■>■' . ,
■a detfl.j.- were , ' ;. war
t,r. .■.-.-^- .. ;\Rf,^ "ctor to
Lcn •; tude It
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2123
SKCH.T
Dc ■ -
» i i
^•41 iC4iit'dJ_
1 1 i_
' . A-
042
Scouts a i.
Latitude .L - ;' ,, ^
at estL .ated ap^ed ■">»
with a red i :•.>!« w'
' ,.
•k"
. 1 1 r 1 li
.•3« 2.30"
:• "K" on StB
Task Fo.'ce T(.LLVL ..
■.•ce; teO
^\ic.h .
prottitle :,,osit! );t,h
jf ^Mirl at n.)....
n^axlauia apped of L': .-,.. •,. j an^i aireu:. :, ,.;;i ^'O..
to intercept anl dti?^. r ; t'lon.
At 1630 C , . )r;^-tij!. . '^rst t ■ :'1(!^ a i.
At 1840 (dusk) oo:;.ileted . .uC.u.- ill riunes. At Ih44
formation courat v*is cViastjed tc 170^.
FRi.CER Cr- C . y .. . AK ,
Captain , , J. .. . ,
Cuu^rjund i; - .
Dftce .-'-r '',, --'4^ '
Stea- - ander
orders t :
as tanie ". ■^■
approi
jf i ea:
.vL ...... - vy (f ; -..-r •>■■ ^_ .; ,
to 31L r_il'-s. , . , . r32 rort 3-
that -, . ..t "2..^ •
'•L:j'7-' ; L..jt .
Pilot .1:- ras ei,;8r r V bl^er DO-xt. .!ie
2124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
fd)
For
A - osa.! -e .' ^- 3.'. yorcr ' '' '_ • * nt
'ui\ iae'' " t;:'t' .rawn fi ' r
^- ■ . *. ; ,e
At 1140 relieve • "
At IZLl ron.pl eted i : VJ .rr
At U.3v set C'.n.rsf 068*^ at 15 knots.
At 12.^1 J. oat 3:^-;:l of 0RT1A^■T snd . 'In.? 2680
(T), PORTLAND lein»- delayed wiilie hDRinf :■: .ft.
A«- T>j.o 'V-- ■-•''raed by OTC that CinC ,. . .xA^erei
s. r.w' retirer.ent towar -
'• V3 aiTied with
-autriBriiie natr
in- er
"Kany
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2125
UNITED MAUS PACIFIC FLtEl
AIRCRAFT. BATTLE FORCE
sr:-. ' r. a •'
10 -n.
At ig:
cruiser di.
Ovm ^i.';hter
f ^ r ed on bv
i> _: I
A 174G c
subnwrine putr
raa e uj.succes; ,
took course Or
At ::055 the report o:
At 2140 L'" , ■ -
raa t ; ; to ,' 'ir
227 ;;. rv/'^er
.>ecer. : ei
rrJDiA-'APt: . .
were about 25
and LJIiO?' were .-«
south southwestwer
070" speed 20 k:o'
At 0617 1" . 'it patro .
DTDIAIIA? LIS, CIICAX. A. TC;-. ..;. , K)HTi..'J D ar.r; Hv. .Jir
bearing 260°
2126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
U.S.S. LSXIKOTON iiAR DIARY
3ZCTU-:T
D^cetuacr 9. 194X (Cufit'd)
At 0624 launched IC V8B and 6 V7, Scouts to search a
circle to IBO r.llea rndLua.
At 0755 lliLIJC MvLlij and cniisers irtiv.ou ly 8igh*44
joined LKXItNOTON and t:i« force took oraiair^t-; disposition 12V,
ooume an axis 070°, fleet spead 15 iciinta, zigzagging.
At 1£11 launched 4 VF relief combat fatroi and 14 VdB
of Bombing Squadron TWO to •earoh a ••ctor frori 1250 position
bearing 083'' to 117° to 180 miles.
At 1230 landed 4 VT of corabat patrol, and 12 73B of
first scout group one of which (2317) wnet oTer the aids to
starboard and orasi.ed, slrkint; Im^.sdiately in Lstituds
19O-00l5» N. Loneituds 163O-40.8* W. Pilot Snsign H.J.H.
Wslnzapfel , U.a.N.R., not recovered, iasser ,;er reooYsrsd by
U.S.S. FLU Siffl.
At 1326 landed last of rirst search. Results of sesroh
nsfiutlTS.
At 1610 landed 14 V3B of second search group. Rssults
of seai^h rersal-jd onlj one ship; the Coast Guar', vessel
At 1830 lan<led coirbat and intl-subrjarins patrol
ncDracK c. ^imirAS,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Coonanding.
DecefflLsgr 10. 1941
Ctotinued stear,in^ us part of Task Force TVfELVI, operating to
soutnwest of OAJH; wW'^Ifcstruotions to intercept and destroy any
•osmy ship in the vicinity of Pearl ilartor.
At 0130 set all clocks ahead j hour to zone plus 10| tioi.
r
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2127
At, ,'j..; laur.c.-itjd -i VT ua ca,. ii', ^^11-0!, 4 vai- ua inner
:iir T,".'.r I, i^ V-...; as so., 'it 3 : s«a;-c 360*^ (T) to 60 :T!il«8;
831
VT to 3.
A*
ml ;
aitt .-a.. >ir
At 060 V lu.UwC:.e!i 4 Vlii' "is ir.:.«r
til
'415
2128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
UNITED STATES PACIFIC fUfcET
AIRCRAFT. BATTLE FORCE
U S. S LEXINGTON
U.S. 3. I.- ■■■ • -
SBCRgT ' '— ■ . ... .„,. ......
Alr.a78 *149, 1ft, ; '1 were receive'
And Itflly hi^f" ''ftplfi'- *•,^.A ' ,i' ted 3tti',.-; e
Rrvv was to exeri t« • ■/ L 4ri ap'>'ir?t German:' an
addition to Jaor .
At 062fi irSO:::;:. .-—..-.. aud DesRon ONE Ibp- \ : : ....;t
alighted bearinM C70°. Foraiatlon ^uide wi»s 3>^f*e(' to :t;:caGO
and fueling disposition "ISF" was taker vHh a*- OSn n./i
course 070°.
At Oftifl launched 14 VSc for inner i^'l lnt«»rin»'11"5te ^ir
patrol, Inndin- the dcwn patrol of 4 7S" at 0707.
At 0713 took course 06C<5 ^^^^ fCSOGl'C
aloupside. I^e nea wrjs vfrr rou^Vi an-l ■' '
Icnots frofl! OfiP°. A speed of (3 knott- on oour<5e 0'35° w;i^' '.aKen
and, although -1 attempts were raade to ?«pn th»» tov lin<":, *>e
weather prerented completion. T^re*» time:; tho "-.oorcr-er
parted and on the fourt! attempt the tcwin-r lino -^^s ja '*<'. ' ut
the towinff block tuJtbled anl could not be richto(3.
At 1140 oT'lers were recexv6<i to poatpone T'.:nl in ■ e.'!' rts.
NXOS'O cast off towtnsr line and ships 9e'7''-q*'»d . T
12 knots. Orders were intercepte.^ froc C3nCP< r> to
toward Midway pending more tnvovfbXf v/cath- ' .
At 1247 launched the relief lir patr Is, A .'5, for I' ner
and 10 \'3 3 for icterc-ujoi ■•i»'.
At 1321 lande-l the forenocr. - (14 BE ed
course to 390° (T) e>t 15 ki-otp.
'• At 1800 Ct'lCAOO reported si'♦^ tinf two '-
liQoreasec spet- '" '-.i
to invest iga ^ .
At 1832 resumed fleet speed.
At 1908 changed fleet eourca to OOC^ and a^
and ^RDKK rejoined from the routhecst.
At 210C changed course tc 2900 (T) from :,1"0 to -147
received Radar reports ol one avrchaft w' ' c^ passe*? to eastward
of the force on reported course about 2£0 at 165 knotr.
FRKDIRICK C. SFEHMAi'.',
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2129
U.S. 3. LEkD.'OTON WAH DIARY
Jece.i.ter I^^ 1S41
Cvontinued operatii:?- aa part of Task Force T'^VELVB in
a general sxithweaterly direction frju. OA.iU , withdrawing
toward Kidwav While secLing suitalie weather and sea
conditions tJ refuel the force fro:a NSOSMO.
At 0547 0 .anged fleet course to north.
At 0616 launched 14 VSB to form inner and interaediat*
air patrold voaiie fuelirig. Fueling course 050° speed 8 knots.
Took radic direction finder oejaring on a patrol plane
reported landed on the water southwest of Barbt-rs Point, At
0745 ASTORI4 and DRaYTOK left the formation p rooesdliig toward
south southeast V At 0«13 CalCiGO ecanmencsd refuAllng from
IvTSOoHO. 1006 launched relief air patrols, 12 VT, and landed
first patrols at 1100. At 1151 IKDIAKAJOLIS reported sighting
a torpedo wake, maneuvered to east at flank speed for 9
minutes when vesuaed station. At 1210 PORTLAND rsportsd
sighting a submarine bearing £00 from LZUNOTON. Hsaded to
east at flank speed for 5 minutes to avoid area. A searoh of
areas by destroyers and aircraft failed to locate any subaarins.
At 1235 attenipts to refuel the force were discontinued due to
temvorary damage to fueling gear when CHICAGO cast off hurriedly upon
report of submarine activity.
At 1334 launched relief Intersediate and inner air
patrols and at 1350 landed second patrol grou!>a. At 1530
PORTER, lAllSOK, and MAHAN proceeded toward Pearl Uarhor. At
1749 landed all planes (14 7S3) of third air patrol group,
the force withdrawing to southward and »outhwestward. At
2310 course was changed to 135° and at 2535 to 080'*.
raiDIRICK C. SaSRKAN,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Coibmandii^ .
2130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
UNIILD blAltb PACinC FLEET
AIRCRAFT. BATTLE FORCE
-,^ -g,U
: ' • ,.• r.ic of T's.^k .'orce I'-.^LVE operatLnn to
v,-o.;t. oT . .roo**- n-' tnw«rd Tearl Jarbor at 20 kr.ota,
..t 0615 l«iu'.ol ad 14 T atd out«r air patxol.
At 1138 ooaraenood l^vmch'nr the air <?TOup aroad with
GOO 111. jonba on ". ;, to^^e.'ofls on '.'^, «nd I'O lb, boabo on
for ferr;' to Ford Islat^d, coapletlng 'launch at 1211*
Ti'9 ". was nbout to anter the swept ohannel to th«
ex.'r«nce >• - ^ • re 'ere raoeiveu not to enter and to renala
to southward. T! e forca proceeded southward and westward .jitil
14r^0 vfhen tie approach to enter was oonnenced at 25 knots.
At ICiil 0 plane on patrol Lndloated a subnarine about 2
rjIIks to eastward of Ll:.7.II rjTD.' » Destroyers dropped 6 depth
cr^r as in tl is area while IJ»XIJ;oTO?I oor.tlnu«d at S5 knots to
eiitrpinoe.
.'it 1549 pnssed entr' nee buo/ to Pearl llarbor, proceeded Id
Jerth y-9 w^rere oonpleted noor, crt aide to nt If. r^3.
;t 1930 a subnnrine alarni In harbor Caused some disturbance
out lo.?Istie refuellr.;-, -ind re-plenlalin,^ ?nsoline tanks, and
rev iotunlllr. - oontlr.u*' 1 .
f.liI)ERlCK C. ;:rEKliAK,
Ctptaln. V.O, f-avy,
Comr-.andlng
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2131
UMH 1' SI \!l N i Vv II It t i M I
SECRET
At i:..
pre«9ui-a on ..A-
7^x ;■ ■•
:..ei
3 -se
■rt rtvei, f orce-
in, f^
or t ..- LI.:.;
3£ ^
Shi, . .
to font T:^3k Force
: , 1 -ir.dedi u . ,-1
t3 Ircluded ,
' '745 wh«ji u.^e
i ng Shi pa
IICDIAi;.
ooiv.a-
rORTL-..X'
. h'ewtur; , USN)
1]
2132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
UNITED blATtS HACiflC FLtET
AIRCRAFT BATTLE FORCE
U S ^ I tXIN ,roN
I-;41
Cor.tinued •«-»*» •^a t "n,- v.lrh T- v -^orce
t.^ the aouthwenlvv . I. from o;jl . .cronr •■■<.' ' e t
with interRlttent rain e^iuails snii vflrlp: . . t
0618 Inucched 1? "S • to seorcJ. the aerai-f.r •; • -
forxnation to •» distnnce of IOC r.lles Letveer
and 330O.
At 0757 n contact re. irt -m.: recelve'l r- ■
Ensi'^c Wittier pilot, that eneiay cnrrier bore '10" l: •_
95 .T'iles from tie 0745 porltion of ;.olnt o^tl' . . 'o
aaiplifyirwr reports were receied and it w '.e
in oontact had been ::yot down. A.t 0.*;13 "1
patrol and at 0924 launched Bttflifik ^^roup -
7 \T 'inc' 13 VT. \' 093" landed 2"j£ ^ni ':
course about 205 at very slow speed. . iio*
lb, bombs but outh niissed. The po-sitior • '
Lonfltude 165O-10":. Furtl er luestioninr -
vvB ro "nti-aircrr.ft fire tl.at nc ixr' tl
s^lp seemed dead in tl.e water. it v.f e
olrjert rej.>orted was probnbly a bT'-e " it
reported Adrift or. Decenjber 6, 3-" - of tie
oor.tpct . ■?-'■■■ attack <?Toup failei: ject,
returne -. .d wi^, recovered at 13' roup of 10
YZ'l 'Are^-e : ^r.cheil to locate Iho c , - ;■ cont-jnt e'! but
wer<= ."• ■ Ir; to 1 r-' '.e '.t. A f'r.'Tfr >
'.!:'*■' i ■•- ', V o 1'. ..^-.iv.'j -er: "r-'^rj- ' ■
diute air -^atrol ^ro'i j.;jOO unt : l : t
rpon eontnct the NKOi; C had been oruerec
courrte .";40<^ ' t V3 kiiOtrs \-* -lo ■'-'^ e ron'^in-'er
uper'Bitft. on e^' ..tL'' *in!,l sou-warlv courses. .. coirt^e to
the K£0 :; 0 wf R *,iken at 120 ki.uti'.
••^'i
FRSD^RIC:'.
i;a?t«> i: , '
Cot and ii..
H
EXHIBITS OF JOIXT COMMITTEE 2133
i!LRK7
we.'
08S0 ^-1 'T' '; : r.e-Fn e ■ o. : • i
VmsilO. : wa? adviped ha j"e P.IV'
41 nlles. 10 VS- took j ...ate air
At !,.<. 0 laur,c;.:)a If VS. ■ -c;. a ?.f.C^ -
ffiile.'» for • ;,e :;.-X>Si:0. a* 1"1'' landed ••■
re:^orteJ no y-i ■).■! oi" !:n !;0,
Deoenber l?--. l.---.!
Con' l'^:'-"^ ■^'ith 7n?k Fcc^ I V.:; 'ov.a d po-!-'-*- <-'»(rd.
At 061S - , HCTtO on . .--m bea:'ln ■ 01 I-IO
launch-.^ . '.o searo'. r. pen.l-ciT-rl "n
'--©arlngs l-O''-' and 260*^ -"'00 "ook courr-e llO''
into wina Vor fuelin' a:. cr- •■ lor. -ri 'lo
Btarboard • I j.9 for fviall-. . ;.• O..''
and '.'Ok In'emedia'e al" -a'rol. .x 1 ■ 1
a f iu I u rxae i^ i e ■ " ' •■ f; - " . « - .
100 .'•.11 8 F re
took ; laoe <
caet o r "^ a \
patrol ■*f\-= : . .
Ja?ane.«f- a.i o c - iu -. a in ■
inland La' a "Yokal.nna" ■ JOO
t-cn „V • . at . ut a -•'•-■•'. . '• - «
Lave bee .;d; -^o'
at Jalai ;i -
and CarDiv ix ,, oi^ . "; • -''.I'".
. -.avy,
2134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
*• " ■ AIRCRAFT RAT i
aiCRgr
Laoaii. b«r l'>. 1941
Continued Alti. Taar. yorct ilEVai vaatward from
liawailtii. lil^nd*. Lau.-.c. ed 11 VoI> to .e ««8terQ
»«j:.i.-clrcle to 300 11 ■ ^ reHfter i\nin'viiiiied Intenaedlate
air itatrol. At •an:' took cuurae 100° Into wind
wl'.lia PORTWfD flu* C ICAGG refuJed froir MXjSP.C . At 1300
launched 12 VSH tn search t! e weatam aard-clrcl e to icO milea.
Thtf r ad Ionian ui nne plare re.jrted aighting. w^^t iie ti.cxitht waa
a strance jlune In 1 itltude 7*^-L0«. K, Longitude 170°-50« W. At
14D0 zone ; laa 11 tlma on c-iuraa about 255°. T'lls report was
unco-xflmied by the pilot and was conaidered unreliable. At
1553 dlacortinued air patrols af.d landed all ;. lunes. At 2C30
refueling of tb.e forcb havlutj boen coiLpleted, jroceeded to
west-8out!.westwhrd at 17 i.nota; :,E0S}10 left rr,rr..ation.
Received '*brnln<j as to fishing veaaela rendering aii to
eueny forces, with dlreotioxia to oia.i.ine, del^e or alr.k veaaela
entagir.^ ir. such activities, A ceasage was received t:.hit Task
?oroe SIGHT (iKTSRPHI^) left Pearl liarLor at 1000 to /roceed
to westward of Jojyiston Island as a support group,
FRliDERICi: C. ^.:SRi-^,
Csptuin, L.^. wavy.
Coi;^.->andixig,
Decen.ber ^0. 1941
Contiauad v«i.tf. Tuak Force ELEVSN ] rooeedlng to west
south, est for conducting raid on Jaianese fjroea in karsLull
■.. j/or ailuert Islands. At 0616 launched ! vs„« t^^ search to
rd between uearint^s li>C to 330 , .i.es, ai.d to -.ct
.:-e4i.te ,ir iutrcl. At 1340 lu .. .i .:terr...jn fiit^iit
«dinte bir latrul tuiU ascircu of iu9 v.e8L«rn
..iiea.
At 1600 a 2;e33at;e : Force LIEVEN
;n-;.: -.^.A \» Inteutioj.^ . . v ,-.,'. . ....I „.c«ok plan "A" at 0500
.a on Londay, 2*; Dacecber 1941. This involved
i'anesfc foroes tit Eakin and Tarawa Islands by
iJ.^Ii.-ii'Vi. ^i;- virovir. .-.• orders vvere received ti.at preaent
SBC RET
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2135
UNHtU SIATLS I'ACIHl H (LI
AIRCRAFT BAini I JHCL
U.b.3. LEklNGTON nUi DxARY
Peoer.Ver .,0. l.<41
mission •.*«8 cancelled and t\at present tt ick orde- .. ^-,< 1.0
longer in effect. A later despfito!! adviswd that ClncPac
reported strong air reinforcbn.ent« possiti^ Inoiudi.v two
carriers were being sent to the Larshulls; tiiat. the ^oagiMllti
of surprise attack ty tl.ls force was iniprobable , and t.iat
CinoPac ^ad directed t .is force to proceed to a position to
support Task Force roURTEEK (S.-AATOOAJ^ .
The afternoon searoii group was recovered at i7b4. Fleet
oo^rBe was set 350''(T) speed 16 Icnots at 173f). Chaiiged clocks
to zone plus 12 time at 1900,
rSEDKRICK C.
Captal; , '".■.. Nmvv,
Coffina; , , .
Decer.ber 21. 1:11
Continued with Task Force ElEVSJ," to north-northweatward
to reach a posit lor. to «<u|>rort Tnsk Force FvL"RTE]^c .
Weather at i&w: ■ ■ ..nguil-ible fo,-
usual 15C E-ile searo.. .. ,3 r.odified to
patrol wiiich was niair.tained t'-roughout
}-r;derick C.
Cocj-iandi^
2136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
UNIICD STATtb H\CIHC H-EET ^
AIRCRAFT BATTLE" FORCE
U '-
. . . :^Lai:^-.
GECP.irr
Continued uS tetzTO. k> ' 400 <■. n.e8Stii,;e fro:.. Cor;.i»axider-iD-
. iaoific edvised -^r •- ttacked by carrier type
;rt at 13 X on Decc: - i . 0544 fleet courae was cuaxv;e<l
rro;- o:-t>" to 297° t:rA speed was iiicreaaed to IP knots. At 0622 ;^
twelve VoL were launched to 3e£:.rc;i the -Aeaferri aerdi-circle to >
It' r.jles, results recative.
At 0€!5C a r ea3H<?« wag recelTOd f]?or the Tusk Force
Conaandor t!:at the Force wiia directed to retire toward Tearl.
Upon tLe return of the forenoon search group at 1000 the Force
rd course to 004° heading for a rendezvous with the force
. , t.:.u;,;:0, and escort WOPJ)EN, in latitude leO-OO* N.
io;., :?. ide !'■ 0-00' W.
A sii jluno co'ubat patrol was 2iaintalned between 1030 and
1400. At 1340 twelve V3B were launched to search the northern
se/i.i-clrcle to IL" -lies. These returned and were landed at
1700, results of search: NEOSHO and WORDEi; located to ZNE,
FREDIRICK C. 3;:KRliAK,
Captalfi, 'J.>. lavy,
Co.-'.: andlng
y
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2137
UNlUD biAll
• M„IFIC fLtET
AIR. ' •'
ML FORCE
• 'N- li^N
JSCUE^'
1941
Coi'.tinvied 'vitli Msk }• rce ;: "." t.- no: *
rendezvous wlt'r. ?']*■•. i T^rker, ' ■ ^ , .'- Cf 1
VS"< for seHTC) , f ir- • '^T.C repo:*- ' •'''•en t.
cover tie noTtycrr. - • . 10' mil , rrturi
- • - 1100
v.''r ; "'■•■■Inr, V"v;l'! ' • ■. ■'-■ -f left, c^arT'e'i vO C7C°
to In.unch nnd lar.d :1 :" . _ ...c'.ed 0 '■' j'.i > edJate
".nd '" 7T a<? inner nir .'itrol nul landed the . ■'enrch
•lid f^»itrol '^•rou;;. At 1.00 ta-llne to .'-".^031'' ' ;p to
ro'.i -^ Vr^ather. Dl;ico;.t '. irued effort.! to ref - •
At i:51C received report that rlnne ;: -16 ,-a. cr-iFl-
about fourteen nilen to r.orth of LIT'IiriT' .
(Jfc') J. A. Davis, jr., ".. ).!.'. and :ki ?,?-«;.'■(. ■■
R.M.3c,, r.r.!.'., were not .ti"' • «' ■ "»
-sank. Tosition of cms! l.st : * -4;" . ;
177'"-22' v.. Accompan • I: -• : " •• i- ret i
2 '16 -, pg testing it? - -' :"\
on 3 i. ive ; t^ at n; •<:■ . , 1 -
tre w-ter. The plar -^ t.ir t <-; ck ■
nJnutej ••'*>, no r:'~r occuvnr
with i .. • ; ,ii( 'j11 si Of..
crash, foimd i.othiap ani ; -ration.
* , - ' ■
'■-t.
;t,
itude
orte.^
that
-f^r
-hed
• fe
At 1400 r.tit Flee
o
Laurohed 8 VS.: for inter: ^rd r" "' -.trcl,
".r.d at 1440 l-nc'" ■ '
At 1640 landed af terr.o!.': ' ; .
FREDERICK C. ::!:K^:.'Al. ,
'Captain , ". ' . *'rv;- ,
Corrriard ' : .
79716 O — 46 — pt. 16 15
2138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-"h .'^ .k
J : a sic :
L9»nch>icl 12 VSt', I'or reerc!. o. jlrcul'. niler fror
firtev ce:.:,er. La-xricl-.j: )i:. . &;:.',6ir. air
.fti'rol * .'.rouf'hou' •;..' -ar.e -e 'c .-f afer
.T.alr no or on ^1 ahb. -. >-..aiie . o an
Of"tiffi.a*ed 30 kr.o'a. Flee coL.r.'« 0-: elr.-
•Qinfcd. A" 1000 launc:.ed : '.T sf Ir. 1
h.-. > lat. ded .'.orriir. • EearcJ. r.u . /%• 1: do/, ar.
ev-i>^ln- JO ». re ^o ".he rou'r. for 4 ril' or'ed
s ..r.eri-od o jecl loca'ei ;., bu. er^o:. '. -c 1
.■^•iarcJ.oc v.i'', no.-a" Ive "eB-i'.p. Ar 1 ¥3.
for seercl. of clrc-ilar area 'o IOC z.L a:
A IvOC • ;.e force r.ook ar. evj;. co . •
4 r.iles w.er. i il.XI'S repor'ei ; . .f:r- f^
F.;er?orilc. Inner air jatrol ^enrr^.T :
s.'narlrie. «• IVuO landed • r.e aT'err 1
\ i
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2139
... i.:i:xi!/v:x)r; .a , di . .t
SJSCRET
^cd:.:.ar 25. 1j41
As before cruslni' wl;.. .apk Jforce
085° af •» roachin..: Jt oorl Harbor. At 0:-30 re io r - o
plus 11 t-lne. At 06';4 launched 12 VSB to ."ua;- . a jir
area to 100 r.iles. At 1022 a PbY v,a« ?i -^ ' el 10 • 11 f
weptwar-: r, -lUf' from sou'h '.-o rior'L . air.'al;. i v..
Internie-lia* e ai- va'.rol usin;- VF fron 1030 'o 1''00. I^
iearch grou; a' 1100. A meppare fror. Cor.r.an.dGr-lr.-
OpNav war In'erce 'ed anno'aiij Ir, • ' .\e a- rival of r.e"
C, V.'. Nini'z. a* . arl ilarbor. At lb4'J. took evr
4 sllef no'., dui. 'o a pw. or r nic. cor.'ac* r-j or
At 1830 flee' co.-rpe v.ap c':ian^.-i;; :i 'o 110°.
frsdsri:k
C a . ■ a i r. , l
vO:. •■ . 1:.
2140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 105
SECRET
Paeaphbase of Code Cablegram Received at the War Department at
14:33, October 21, 1941.
London. Filed 19 :20, October 21, 1941.
JAPAN
1. It is thought that Japan will not advance southward, except possibly into
Thailand, because of the danger of becoming embroiled with the United States
and Britain, especially in view of the tirm stand taken by the U. S. However,
Japanese troops will be strengthened in Indo-China as follows : 36,000 there
now ; an estimated 20,000 enroute, and an additional 20,000 included in Jap-
anese plans.
2. Agreement among all previously divergent opinions in the army and
navy in order to make certain of their assistance in any future projects
launched is one aim of the new cabinet, which is unquestionably geared for
war. The new Premier is wholly pro-German. It is believed that the Japs
will advance on Vladiavostok and the Maritime Provinces the minute Soviet
disintegration appears imminent. In the mean time, speeches by the new
cabinet should be viewed as obscuring their real intent. The Russians are
still believed stronger in Siberia in spite of possible transfers of troops to the
other theaters, but the Maritimes and Vladiavostok unquestionably could be
captured by the Japs.
3. The above comments were received from the Chief of the British Far
East Intelligence.
RUSSIAN theater
1. The head of the British Mission is now stranded in Kuibishev and is not
well in touch with the situation.
2. Budyenny is apparently relieved of command in the Ukraine if news that
Marshal Kulik has been made commander at Rostov is true.
3. The Germans have extended their front approximately 12 miles north
of Taganrog. An advance from Kalinin toward the north has been begun
by the Germans, possibly directed at Vologda and the railroad running south
from Archangel, according to dependable secret reports. Otherwise, there are
no important developments in this theater which have been verified by British
official sources.
4. The above cable is for General Miles' personal attention.
Lee.
I. B. #5, 10/22/41.
Distribution :
Under Secretary of War State Department (2)
Assistant Secretary of War for Air Director of Naval Intelligence (2)
Assistant Secretary of War Record Section
Chief of the Air Corps (3) Section File
Chief of the Army Air Forces Situation Section
A. C. of S., G-3 EE
A. C. of S., WPD CB
G. H. Q. FE
Paraphrase of Code Radiogram Receivho at the War Department at 14 : 09
NOVEMBBai 9, 1941
London, November 9, 1941 (filed 5: lOp) (1045)
The most likely spot where Japanese may be expected to strike is in the
Netherlands East Indies. This opinion, from the British Ambassador to Tokyo,
holds that as Japan already controls what she needs of the resources of French
Indo-China and Thailand she will not proceed against the latter country. To
attack British Malaya would be a difficult operation and the rumored Burma
Road drive would also be too much of an effort. The Netherlands East Indies
could be assaulted secretly from the Mandated Island, and would provide the
oil which Japan needs. The source reverses his previous view and now believes
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2141
Japan no longer feels that she must make every effort to avoid war with the
United States and this contemplated <)i)eration would confront the United States
and the British with an accomplished fact.
Lee.
IB #4 11/10/41
Distribution :
Secretary of War China Mission
Under Secretary of War Office of Lend-Lease Administrator
Assistant Secretary of War G. H. Q.
Assistant Secretary of War for Air State Department
Mr. Lauchlin Carrie Chief of the Air Corps
Chief of the Army Air Forces Situation Section
Director of Naval Intelligence British Empire Section
Assistant Chief of Staff, (J-3. Far Eastern Section
Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD
G-2 Comment on November 9 Cable From London
(IB #4 11/10/41)
1. Gr-2 is of the opinion that while an attack on the Netherlands East Indies
is a possibility, it is by no means probable in view of: (1) the action to be
expected of the United States and Britain before even a surprise attack could
be driven home: (2) the great danger to Japan of trying to by-pass the Philip-
pines and Singapore: (3) the knowledge Japanese uuist have that the Dutch
have prepared their oil installations for immediate demolition, so that it would
be a year or more before they could get the oil anyway.
2. It is significant that the Ambassador has reversed his former view and no
longer believes that Japan will do everything possible to prevent war with the
United States. Such a development is not unexi^ected.
Paraphrase of Code Radiogram Received at the Wak Department at 22 : 42,
November 21, 1941
London, November 21, 1941 (tiled 0045 p. m.)
In order that the source may be protected do not reveal to the British that
you have received the following information.
The estimate given below represents the con.sensus of all British intelligence
services as to Japan, on the basis of all information availabli? up to November
18:
Whether or not the government at Tokyo has decided once and for all to take
the chance of war with America and (Jreat Britain is still n(»t certain, but
Japan's economic situatitm is making it necessary to cinne to such a decision.
By initiating the present talk, Japan had hopes of discovering some soluti<m to the
problem. Now that she has sent her special envoy, the conversations are com-
ing to a head and the chances are that she will make a basic decision of the
policy she will follow.
As things stand now, the only action .she can take without danger of war
with America and Great Britain is to settle the China incident and her alterna-
tives here are (1) block the Burma Road; (2) come to a peaceful .settlenient
with Chungking. Fr(»m the best available information at present, it does not
appear probable that Japan will launch an offensive against the Burma Road.
In the event the current talks come to nothing and if .she then makes a deci-
sion to go ahead without regard to the con.sequences of war with the ABD
powers, Japan has the altei-natives of offensives against (1) Thailand. The tin
and rubber producing areas are in the vicinity of the Kra Isthmus which would
no doubt be defended by the British so that economically, Japan would not get
much by occupying Thailand, and she stands to lose much of what she is already
getting from that country.
(2) Malaya. Japan will'certainly occupy Thailand before attacking Malaya,
but any drive on the latter country would certainly involve Japan in war with
Great Britain and very likely with America also.
2142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(3) Netherlands East Indies. It is estimated that Japan has enough oil
supplies to last for only nine to twelve months of large scale operations, so that
seizure of the Netherlands East Indies would solve a most urgent problem for
her. But such a move would not be sound naval strategy and furthermore
Japan must know any such attack would bring on war with America and Great
Britain. The British believe Japan would occupy Thailand before moving on
Netherlands Borneo anyway.
(4) Soviet Siberia. Here the main consideration is that Japan is not yet
strong enough to start an attack which would undoubtedly cost her plenty in
casualties and materiel, and might take a long time. In spite of her offensive
preparations, including increa.se of troops in this area from eleven to 29
divisions, Japan will probably not attack the Maritime Provinces unless and
until Russian strength is considerably diminished there.
The estimate concludes that :
(1) In the event of failure of her last attempt to get America to come to a
general agreement, Japan will have to make up her mind as to whether she
should chance the war which would likely follow further aggressive action on
her part ;
(2) Japan will probably not attack Siberia at pre.sent ; she will wait until
Soviet strength is decreased ;
(3) Japan will continue the war with China except in the event of a
general agreement with the United States ;
(4) Japan's movement of troops from Tongking to the south indicates that
she does not intend at present to try cutting the Burma Road ;
(G) From the Japanese viewpoint, her best move, the one with least chance of
bringing on a general war, would probably be occupation of Thailand. Securing
bases in Siam would al.so pave the way for later movement against Malaya
or the Netherlands East Indies. Furthermore, a Japanese drive into Thailand
is indicated by her recent movements.
Lee.
IB #18 4 : 15P 11/21/41
Distribution :
Assistant Secretary of War State Department
Assistant Secretary of War for Air Mr. Lauchlin Currie
Chief of the Army Air Forces Office of Lend-Lease Administrator,
Chief of the Air Corps O. E. M.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Director of Naval Intelligence
Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD Situation Section
G. H. Q. Air Section
4th Army British Empire Section
China Mission Far Eastern Section.
[Pencilled notation :] Return to C of S. HLS.
[Pencilled notation :] To Secretary of War. GCM.
British Embassy Annex,
Ohservatory Circle, Washington, D. C, 22nd November, 1941.
Subject : — Japanese Intentions.
Sir: The Joint Staff Mission has received from the British Chief of Staff the
following telegraphic summary of an estimate by the Joint Intelligence Committee
in London of Japan's probable intentions.
We are instructed to invite you to draw the attention of the United States
Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations to this appreciation.
Respectfully,
(Signed) R. D. Coleiridge,
Commander, R. N.
R. F. G. JAYNB,
Major.
Joint Secretaries,
British Joint Staff Mission in Washington.
Commander L. R. MoDoweli.,
U. 8. Secretary for Collaboration,
Room 2724, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2143
Enclosure
Summary of Estimate by J. I. C, London, of Japanese Intentions
1. It is not certain that Japan has reached a decision to risk conflict with
Britain and U. S. A., but events are driving her to early decision. Japan hopes
that present conversations in Washington may provide a way out. The climax
of the conversations now reached by KURUSU'S arrival and fundamental decision
on policy is likely to follow their outcome. Meanwhile only course open to Japan
which she may think would not involve a risk of war with us and United States
is to try to finish war in China.
2. To end China war Japan must either make peace with CHIANG-KAI-SHEK
or stop his supplies by cutting BURMA ROAD. Two routes of attack possible.
Shortest is from TONGKING to KUNMING, but terrain makes this a very diffi-
out operation. Longer route westward of KWANSI province feasible but oper-
ation would take longer time than Japan prepared to give. Latest intelligence
indicates that soutliward movement of forces from TONGKING and CANTON
suggest major operation against BURMA ROAD unlikely at present.
3. If Washington conversations fail and Japan decides to proceed irrespective
of risk of war with Britain, U. S. A. and Netherlands Eiist Indies, she may
attack —
(a) THAILAND,
(b) MALAYA,
(c) NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES,
(d) MARITIME PROVINCES.
4. THAILAND. Japan's infiltration into THAILAND and building of com-
munications in Indo China, construction of aerodromes, work on Naval base
at CAMRANH BAY, indicates preparation for move into THAILAND. Japan
would consider this move least likely to involve action by ourselves and U. S. A.
Main strategic advantage only gained if KRA ISTHMUS occupied simultane-
ously with land move from INDO CHINA. Little economic advantage to Jajmn
in occupation of THAILAND but object of attack would be to secure important
bases for further move south.
5. MALAYA. Occupation of THAILAND leads logically to attack on MALAYA.
This would be certain to involve ourselves probably U. S. A.
6. NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. Capture of Dutch BORNEO would rem-
edy Japan's most urgent shortage i. e. oil. Operation would however be stra-
tegically unsound from naval point of view and Japan would think it would
involve conflict with us and U. S. A. We believe attack would be preceded by
occupation of THAILAND.
7. RUSSIAN MARITIME PROVINCES. Since beginning of Russian campaign
Japanese forces facing Russia increased from 11 to 29 Divisions. Only interest
Japan would have in attacking Russia would be the removal of traditional enemy.
Operation would be long and expensive if Russian resistance were maintained.
Japan now lacks sufficient superiority to make offensive operations against
Russia probable unless Russian forces are weakened.
8. CONCLUSIONS.
(a) Japan will make last effort at agreement with U. S. A. Decision whether
or not to take aggressive action involving major powers would follow failure
of conversations.
(b) If such decision is taken THAILAND will be first probable objective
involving least risk of major conflict. Occupation of bases in THAILAND includ-
ing KRA ISTHMUS is a sound strategic preliminary culminating in operation
against MALAYA or NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. Recent military move-
ments support opinion that THAILAND is next objective.
(c) Action against Russia likely to be deferred until position of Russia in Far
East is seriously weakened.
(d) Operation in China will continue in absence of a general agreement
with U. S. A.
(e) Early attack on BURMA ROAD is unlikely in view of latest information
of diversion of forces southward from NORTHERN INDO CHINA and CANTON.
2144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 106
Section A: Admiral H. R. Stark's Letters to Admiral H. E. Kimmel (Pages
2144 to 2225).
Section B: Admiral H. E. Kimmel's Letters to Admiral H. R. Stark (Pages
2225 to 2257).
Section A
Confidential
13 January 1941.
Deae Mustapha : There are things to be said in here which are strictly entre nous
and therefore I suggest you destroy this letter after reading.
I have given you a few days to let sink in the news of your becoming CinC, U. S.
Fleet. I would have given my eye teeth to have seen your expression and to have
heard your exclamation when it happened, but instead I was just sitting behind
the scenes congratulating you and the Navy. I confess it came sooner than I
had anticipated but that it should come, I liave long had in the back of my head
and while rejoicing with you I realize fully the enormous responsibilities placed
on .your shoulders in one of the most critical periods in our history, and where the
Navy more than any other branch of the Government is likely to have to bear
the brunt.
I would give a good deal to sit down and have a chat with you. I am hoping
J. O. will turn over the personal letters I have written him. They give all the
slants here that I know and they show the urgency as I see it. In my humble
opinion, we may wake up any day with some mines deposited on our front door
step or with some of our ships bombed, or whatnot, and find ourselves in another
undeclared war, the ramifications of which [2] call for our strongest and
sanest in*agination and ulans.
I have told the Gang here for months past that in my opinion we were heading
straight for this war, that we would not assume anything else and personally I
do not see how we can avoid, either having it thrust upon us or of our deliber-
ately going in, many months longer. And of course it may be a matter of weeks
or of days. I would like to feel' that I could be perfectly complacent if some day
some one opens the door of my ofiice and reports that the war is on. I have been
moving Heaven and Earth trying to meet such a situation and am terribly impa-
tient at the slowness with which things move here. Even though I know much
has been accomplished, there still remains much to be done.
My estimate of tlie situation — J. O. R. can give you this — McCrea also has a
copy — ^which I presented to the Secretai'y and Rainbow 3, both of which you
should have, will give you fairly clearly my own thoughts. Of course I do not
want to become involved in the Pacific, if it is possible to avoid it. I have fought
this out time and time again in the highest tribunals but I also fully realize that
we may become involved in the Pacific and in the Atlantic at the same time; and
to put it mildly, it will be one H of a job, and that is one reason why I am
thankful that I have your calm judgment, your imagination, your courage, your
guts and your head, at the seagoing end. Also your can do — rather than
can't.
In King, I believe you have the very best possible man to handle the situation
in the Atlantic and that we can give him a free rein. He will lick things into
shape and he knows the game from every standpoint and of course in this war
it will be [3] fought from every standpoint. On the other side — in
Tommy Hart — I feel equally confident.
I believe in Walter Anderson you have a good man to handle the Battleships
but I do not commit myself one inch beyond that. Any future advancement
beyond that position will depend largely on your recommendation but he should
fight a good fight right there, whether or not he goes up. It is unfortunate in
some ways that we could not get the additional stars and rank we wanted in the
Atlantic but we could not and consequently the accommodations had to be made
in the Pacific. With this you are familiar. Of course Andy feels disappointed
but he is a good soldier. However, when we mentioned the possibility of his
i-elieving Snyder next June, I informed him that I would not commit myself and
that I could not think of committing you, and incidentally, and very incidentally,
and in all cases, the White House finally decides. This, of course, is White
House prerogative and responsibility, and believe me, it is used these days.
I hope Wilson Brown does well. He is fine fiber, as you know. Frankly, I
had some misgivings about his health and had him brought to the Navy Depart-
ment for a thorough checkup by the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. It is not
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2145
necessary that anybody, beside you, should know this. Medicine and Surgery
gave him a perfectly clean bill of health but I do think he should be watched
while under strain and if there is any sign of his not being able to stand it, he
should be relieved. Again, I am giving just you my tiioughts. The President
knows that I initiated this physical checkup because of my doubts, but beyond
just a few of us, it is not known.
[^] What I'eck Snyder's final reactions will be, I don't know. We wanted
to run this whole schedule differently but our hand was forced. I have always
regarded him with a good deal of admiration because of a feeling that above all
things he was loyal and would play the game in the last analysis as it had to be
played and as you and I have to do. Here's hoping.
I am sending you Savvy Cooke and I feel like I am losing one of my arms. That
boy has one of the best brains I have ever run into. I put on his eflBciency report
that I would make him an Admiral immediately, if I had the authority and believe
me, if he were one, I would not consent to his going. I am sending him to sea
to protect his promotion chances and am sending him to the Fleet Flagship be-
cause of his intimate knowledge and personal handiwork in all that we have done
in War Plans and in all that we have been thinking. I feel that he should have
a year in command, although were I going to sea myself I would be strongly in-
clined to take him on my staff. Where we put him he should be available to you
in both capacities. His capacity for work is almost unlimited and in addition
to all his other fine attributes, I have formed a very strong affection for him, as
we all have. He is just as likeable as he can be. Siiould his ship go to the Navy
Yard and you would like to keep him with you during any such periods, it could
be arranged.
I am also enclosing a letter to you which I wrote to Tommy Hart and which I
am pleased to say he stated gave him a clearer picture of his own situation than
even he himself had formed on the spot. That is my excuse for sending it.
Murphy, who is on Richardson's staff, has been with us on three different
occasions and is likewise pretty familiar with [5] our thoughts back here.
I have directed McCrea to stop and see you on his return from the Philippines
although he can probably add little to what Murphy can tell you. On the other
hand I would be glad to have you have a long talk with McCrea that we may get
from you any first-hand material you w^ant to send.
Nimitz has written J. O. with regard to several matters which explain them-
selves so there is no need for repetition on my part.
J. O. has been thoroughly acquainted with the personnel situation. He knows
that it has been one of my first thoughts ever since I have been there, as well as
Nimitz, and that I have put more time and struggle on it in the White House and
on the Hill than on any other one subject.
I am home at the n)oment laid up with "flu" and have been busy with Mrs.
Hull a good share of the afternoon, it now being ten minutes of six and Charlie
Wellborn just came in with the mail so I will close. Were I to write you volumes
and I feel like it, I doubt if I could add much that you will not realize without
my writing.
Just remember that I consider the only I'eason for my being alive and kicking
at the present time is to do everything within my powej" to serve the Fleet, and I
want you to write me fully, frankly, critically, and just think out loud on all
subjects wherein the Department can be of help. Nimitz and I are absolutely at
one in our common desire to serve and I wish you all the luck in the wide world.
[6] Finally you will be glad to know that there is a great deal of fine and
favorable comment on your selection from all sides. I have had letters from
Admiral Senn and Admiral Craven among others, not to mention the reaction
here in Washington.
Again good luck and keep cheerful and God Bless You.
Betty,
You know how I believe in conferences — keeping your key people informed —
taking them into your confidence, and thrashing out common problems — no bulk-
heads— and here again, I know you will accomplish much.
Again good luck.
Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, USN,
USS HONOLULU,
c/o Postmaster Fleet Post Office,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
2146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Dear Mustapha : The following Is a te/ephone call to one of my Aides when I
happened to be out :
"Admiral Train said that the Navy Belief has received no money from the
Fleet during the Year 1940. He wondered if it might not be a good idea for
you, as President, to ask CinC whether or not a sum may be expected, in view
of the necessity of making up the Society's Annual Report."
Can you give me the answer?
Of course you probably have all the "ins" and "outs" by this time of Snyder's
stand with reference to his being detached and on which he insisted.
It is over the dam and I won't say anything more about it.
However, you have Pye in his place. I hope the change is an acceptable one to
you. Personally I think he may be of even more assistance to you and I told
the President you might even want to keep him on after July.
I have always thought Pye one of the soundest strategists we have and when I
worked under him during my last cniise. which I often did at one end or the
other of the line, I thought his handling of tactical situations outstanding. Par-
ticularly were his orders a model of clearness, brevity and effectiveness.
Who gets the Battle Force next .Tune will be largely dependent upon your
recommendations. Of course Andy is much interested but I told him flatly that I
would promise him nothing, that he was getting a great job where he was going
and that the future was largely in the lap of the Gods and Admiral Kimmel.
It always sort of hits me with a thud when people are planning ahead and
looking for something in advance rather than giving all they have to the job
iu hand. Andy happens to be one of those fellows who does give all he has
to the job in hand, but my feeling has always been that the job should seek
the man rather than the reverse. Thank the Lord that Nimitz agrees with me
and if people understood that it has to be that way in the last analysis, it would
save a lot of corresixjndence and delicate situations here.
One of the biggest kicks I got out of your present job was that it Was a
complete surprise to you and has the overwhelming approval of the Service.
I confess my own job here was something I had not dreamed of. Incidentally,
I told Bloch when I expected to stay at sea and he was talking to me about
getting three stars' or more, that if I was of use anywhere it would be another
year right in the billet where I had trained for a year, and as far as I was
concerned the only thing that should count was the best interest of the Fleet,
that was also would be my best interest, and that I would serve cheerfully
anywhere under anybody. That is the kind of a gang I hope you have around
you.
Started this just to send you Train's remarks and have gone into something
else. Lord, I wish I could see you, or better still, that I could be with you.
I would take most any old job down to the lowliest division in the outfit.
Every good luck in the wide world and "keep cheerful."
As every sincerely,
/S/ Betty.
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, V. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA, ,
Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
In reply refer to Initials and No.
Navy Department,
Office of the Chiep- of Naval Operations,
Washington, 29 January 1941.
Dear Mustapha : This is really a P. S. to my note of this morning.
I just want to let you know I am pressing all I can to take over the Coast
Guard and that at last pressure is beginning to tell and I am hopeful I may
be able to after the Lend-Lease Bill is out of the road. Please don't mention this
to anyone but just keep it in the back of your head as one of those things which
might be coming along.
The above is incidental to what I did want to tell you and which you might
mention to Bloch and that is I have asked Waesche to exert unusual and con-
tinuing vigilance in searching all fishermen, both on home coasts and in the
islands, under the guise of looking for narcotics ; actually to insure against
any secreted Japanese mines.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2147
Am still fighting for personnel — I shouldn't have to — but I am —
When I think what I have to go through for almost every additional man
for the Navy — and the Army building up to IVa millions — it just doesn't make
sense —
/S/ Betty.
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, £7iSA',
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
V8S PENNSYLVANIA,
Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
Navy Department,
OflBee of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, 30 January 1941.
Dear Kimmel : Take it for vi'hat it is worth.
Copies also to Admiral Bloch, Blakeley, Hepburn, Freeman, King, Hart.
KD
Tokyo
Dated January 28, 1941
Rec'd. 7 : 10 a. m.
Secretary of State,
Washitigtoti,
131, January 28, 8 p. m.
Press reports radio address yesterday afternoon over station JOAK to Japa-
nese in North America by Admiral Nobucasa Suetsugu. Concluding sentence
quoted as follows: "Japan dislikes war but if United States persists in its mis-
understanding Japan is fully prepared. I ask all of you as Japanese subjects to
serve the country in your various positions."
Grew.
TFV
Secret
In reply refer to Initials and No.
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, 10 February 1941.
Dear Kimmel : Thank God for Sundays. It is my only day for quiet study and
work, and even then I have to kick somebody out of the office, because they long
since have learned my habits.
First I want to congratulate you and J. O. on your perfectly splendid letter of
28 January, serial 0140. It is extremely helpful to us all and I hope you will
continue in future communications of our similar searching analyses. Just for a
moment refresh on your paragraph 3 ; and permit me to say "check and double
check."
I continue in every way I possibly can to fight commitments or dispositions that
would involve us on two fronts and to keep from sending more combatant ships
to the Far East. I had a two hour struggle (please keep this absolutely secret)
in the White House this past week and thank God can report that the President
still supports my contentions. You may be amused to know that the Secretary of
War, Colonel Stimson, has been of very great assistance to me in this connection
in recent conferences. Mr. Hull never lets go in the contrary view and having
fought it so many times I confess to having used a little more vehemence and a
little stronger language than was becoming in fighting it out this last week for
the nth time. Present were the President, Stimson, Knox, Marshall and myself.
I mention this just to show you that the fight is always on and tiiat some day
• I might get upset. But thank God. to date at least, the President has and con-
tinues to see it my way.
Here's hoping. Replies to your letter of the 28th (0140) and to J. O.'s letter
of the 25th (0129) are just signed.
I continue to press Marshall to reinforce Oahu and elsewhere. You now know
that he is sending out 81 fighters to Oahu, which will give that place .")0 fairly good
ones and 50 of the latest type. I jumped to give him the transportation for them
in carriers when he requested it. I hope too, you will get the Marines to Midway,
Johnson and Palmyra, as soon as you can. They may have to rough it for a time
2148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
until barracks are built, and the water suppo, if inadequate, will have to be
urovided somehow just like it would be if ♦^hey hod captured an enemy atoll.
Speaking of Marshall, he is a^ tower of strength to us all, and I couldn't
conceive of a happier relationship than exists between him and me. He will go
to almost any length possible to help us out and sometimes contrary to his own
advisors.
I am struggling, and I use the word advisedly, every time I get in the White
House, which is rather frequent, for additional men. It should not be necessary
and while I have made the case just as obvious as I possible could, the President
just has his own ideas about men. I usually tinally get my way but the cost of
effort is very great and of course worth it. I feel that I could go on the Hill
this minute and get all the men I want if I could just get the green light from
the White House. As a matter of fact what we now have, was obtained by my
finally asking the President's permission to go on the Hill and state our needs
as I saw them at that time and his reply was "go ahead, I won't veto anything
they agree to". However, the struggle is starting all over again and just remem-
ber we are going the limit, but I cannot guarantee the outcome.
Regarding the MK VI Mod I Exploder ; we have distributed them to the outlying
stations and will leave the decision up to you as to whether or not they should
be put aboard ship.
Every good wish in the world.
As ever sincerely,
Admiral H. E. Kimmbx, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
P. S. I just realized that a letter I had roughed out in reply to yours of the
27th had not been sent so here is just another Sunday cleanup job along with
one or two other things.
First, I had another hour and a half in the White House today and the Presi-
dent said that he might order a detachment of three or four cruisers, a carrier
and a squadron of destroyers to make a cruise to the Philippines; perhaps going
down through the Phoenix and Gilbert or the Fiji Islands, then reaching over
into Mindanao for a short visit and on to Manila and back.
I have fought this over many times and won, but this time the decision may
go against me. Heretofore the talk was largely about sending a cruise of this
sort to Australia and Singapore and perhaps the N. E. I. Sending it to the
Philippines would be far less objectionable from a i>olitical standpoint but still
objectionable. What I want you to do is to be thinking about it and be prepared
to make a quick decision if it is ordered.
Spent an hour this afternoon going over your personnel situation with Niniitz
and Kilpatrick and the Doctors and you will hear from Nimitz on this. A couple
of weeks ago. even before I got your letter, the President told nie I was over-
crowding our ships and that they would be neither healthy, happy or sanitary
with increased complements so we may have to ask for the doctors' opinion
regarding the new complements.
Regarding your setting up a place on shore where your staff can do planning
work ; anything that you can arrange with Admiral Bloch will be perfectly satis-
factory to me. I don't know just what the Submarine Base facilities are but you
may be able to put up some additions which would eventually be needed because
of the expected increase in the number of submarines. I will have Moreell go
into these additions if you will forward to me a sketch lay-out in case you need
our help. No one could say just what the public or political reaction might be to
your shore arrangements, because it might be misrepresented and might be
misunderstood. That is the reason I suggest any additional facilities be labelled
additional facilities for the Submarine Base. It would not actually be a mis-
nomer because undoubtedly they will be when the Fleet some day bases back
on the West Coast.
I also take it that you can arrange satisfactory communications with Admiral
Bloch.
Regarding a set of quarters for yourself, it would seem that the best solution
and perhaps the only one would be for Admiral Bloch to divert one of the new
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2149
sets of five houses now building to your use. Will you please communicate this
to Admiral Bloch?
I want you to know that we are doing everything possible to reach full agree-
ment with possible Allies. If and when such agreements are concluded we will
inform you of them.
I wish we could send Admiral Bloch more local defense forces for the 14th
Naval District but we simply haven't got them. If more are needed I aee
no other immediate solution than for you to supply them. I am moving Heaven
and Earth to speed up a considerable program we have for small craft and
patrol vesels for the Districts but like everything else, it takes time and "dollars
cannot buy yesterday".
I think I previously wrote you that I hope to be able to take over the Coast
Guard after the Lend-Lease Bill is on the Statute Books. Of course if war
eventuates Admiral Bloch can commandeer anything in the Islands in the way
of small craft and I assume he has a full list of what would be available.
All good wishes.
Keep cheerful,
/S/ Betty.
Secret
In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu
Na\'y Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, 25 Fehruary I94I.
Db:ar Kimmel : I suppose by this time your staff is working smoothly on the
beach. It is most important, as I have indicated previously, that as soon as
possible you get your Operating Plan for Rainbow III in the hands of Admiral
Hart and your own subordinate commanders, including those in command of the
Pacific and the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontiers. Then we can get ready the
subordinate operating plans and the logistic requirements, the latter being of
special importance to you in your advanced position.
Particularly in connection with your logistic planning, some of us here have
wondered as to whether or not you might also put the Commander Base Force
and his staff ashore in a status more or less similar to your own. However, this
is your job and I just mention it en passant.
Even if we fight this war according to "Plan Dog," we have so designed Rain-
bow III that a shift to "Dog" (.see my despatch of January) will (at least at
first) require only minor changes in the tasks of either the Basic Plan or your
Operating Plans. The force we would move to the Atlantic possibly would not
go at once, and the force left with you will still be great enough to perform
both the offensive and defensive tasks assigned you. Of course we all could
wish for more.
In making your plans for the more important offensive raids. I hope that
you will not fail to study very carefully the matter of making aircraft raids on
the infiammable Japanese cities (ostensibly on military objectives), and the
effect such raids might have on Japanese morale and on the diversion of their
forces away from the Malay Barrier. Such adventures may seem to you un-
justified from a profit and loss viewpoint — but, again, you may consider that
they might prove very profitable. In either case (and this is strictly SECRET)
you and I map he ordered to make the, so it is just as well for you to have
considered plans for it.
I hesitated to take the chance of upsetting you with my despatch and letter
concerning a viait of a detachment of surface forces to the Far East. I agree
with you that it is unwise. But even since my last letter to you, the subject
has twice come up in the White House. Each of the many times it has arisen,
my view has prevailed, but the time might come when it will not. I gave you
the information merely as a sort of advance notice.
Secret
The difficulty is that the entire country is in a dozen minds about the war —
to stay out altogether, to go in against Germany in the Atlantic, to concentrate
against Jai>an in the Pacific and the Far East — I simply can not predict the
outcome. Gallup polls, editorials talk on the Hill (ami I might add, all of
which is irresponsible) constitute a rising tide for action in the Far East
if the Japanese go into Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies. This can
not be ignored and we must have in the back of our heads the possibility of
having to swing to that tide. If it should prevail against Navy Department
2150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
recommendations, you would have to implement Rainbow III, and forget my
later despatch concerning "Plan Dog". This would mean that any reinforce-
ment to the Atlantic might become impossible, and, in any case, would be reduced
by just so much as we would send to the Asiatic. And that might be a vei'y
serious matter for Britain.
I am perfectly delighted over getting some modern Army airplanes in the
Hawaiian area and jumped at the opportunity to transport them. I wish they
would make me a similar offer for the Philippines, in which case I would also
make available a carrier, properly escorted, for the duty.
I know little of further interest to bring up for the moment. Our staff con-
versations (and thank the Good Lord thei'e has been little no public leak that
they are taking place) are nearing their conclusion and we hope will be finished
in about ten days. Of course we will make you acquainted with all decisions
reached just as soon as we can.
I am sending copy of this letter to Tommy Hart, whose mind you now know
pretty well with reference to his job in the Far East. I have been out of the
oflSce for a few days and I haven't seen Hart's "Estimate of the Situation", but
I do know that War Plans is delighted with what he has sent, and of course I
alway.s have been because of his grasp of the entire picture.
I am enclosing copy of a memo which is self-explanatory showing you our
best estimate of the Far Eastern present situation. Please note the governing
sentences where it is stated that a reestimate may have to be necessary at any
time, but it still looks to us as though this estimate, at least for the moment,
were sound.
Keep cheerful.
All good wishes and Good Luck
Admiral H. E. Kimmet., U. S. N.
Commander in Chief, U. 8. Fleet,
U8S PENNSYLVANIA,
[s] Betty
[1] Sent to W. H. by Capt. Callaghan
Draft
Memorandum fob the President
11 February 1941.
Since your thought yesterday morning of the possibility of sending a detach-
ment to the Phillippines via the southern route consisting of approximately 4
cruisers, a squadron (9) destroyers and carriers and jterhaps to permit a leak
that they were going out there just for a temporary visit and then to return,
I confess to having pondered a good deal on it last night during the wee small
hours because, as you know, T have previously opposed this and you have con-
curred as to its unwisdom. Particularly do I recall your remark in a previous
conference when Mr. Hull suggested this and the question arose as to getting them
out and your 100% reply, from my standpoint, was that you might not mind
losing one or two cruisers (we have 2 out there now), but that you did not want
to take a chance on losing 5 or 6. Frankly, I breathed a great sight of relief
and thought the issue pi-etty definitely closed.
You al.so called it a "bluff" and questioned it from that standpoint. Obviously,
if we permitted a leak about their coming back, there would be even less, if any,
bluff, and again if we did not permit a leak with regard to their coming back,
we would then certainly look like turning tail and I'unning if somethng hap-
pened and we did come back. I beliete it pretty thoroughly agreed that we do
not want that force in the Philippines in case of sudden attack, and that even
were we to consider in emergency increasing our forces in the Far East, we
would not send them to Manila Bay but rather to the southard or into Dutch
East Indies where they would be better supported and not so open to attack.
[2] As I reported yesterday, recent letters from Hart state he is simply
up against it for facilities to care for what he has and only recently have we
acquired a vessel to make available to him later on to help take care of his
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2151
submarines which are in urgent and inunediate need of a Mother Ship. Likewise
he is taxed to take care of his Air Force but we are improving these facilities.
Sometime after July I want to send him another squadron of bombers. We expect
to send four minesweepers (bird class) out in March.
Specifically : —
Sending a small force would probably be no deterrent to Japan and would
not increase Japanese difficulties in advancing southward. I feel we would be
exposing our force without compensating results.
There is a chance that further moves againf Japan will precipitate hostilities
rather than prevent them. We want to give Japan no excuse for coming in in
case we are forced into hostilities with Germany who we all consider our major
problem.
The Pacific Fleet is now weaker in total tonnage and aircraft then the
Japanese Navy. It is, however, a very strong force and as long as it is in its
present position it remains a constant serious and real threat to Japan's flank.
If any considerable division is sent to Manila it might prove an invitation to
Japan to attack us in detail and thus greatly lessen or remove our serious naval
threat to her for a considerable period to come. I believe it would be a grave
strategic error at this time to divide our Pacific Fleet. We would then have
our Fleet divided in three parts, Atlantic, Mid-Pacific, and Western Pacific. It
is true we only contemplate a visit out there but we might find recall of this
additional detachment [3] exceedingly embarrassing or difficult.
If we are forced into the war our main effort as approved to date will be
directed in the Atlantic against Germany. We should, if possible, not be drawn
into a major war in the Far East. I believe the Pacific Fleet should at least at
first remain strong until we see what Japan is going to do. If she remains
quiet, or even if she moves strongly toward Malaysia, we could then vigorously
attack the Mandates and Japanese communications in order to weaken Japan's
attack on the British and Dutch. We would also then be able to support spare
forces for the Atlantic.
Right now, Japan does not know what we intend. If we send part of the
Fleet to the Asiatic now, we may show our hand and lose the value of any
strategic surprise. We might encourage Japan to move, rather than deter her,
and also we might very well compromise our own future operations.
I feel we should not indicate the slightest interest in the Gilbert or Solomon
or Fiji Islands at this time. If we do, the Japanese might smell a i*at and our
future use of them, at least so far as surprise is concerned, might be compromised.
The Japanese could take steps to occupy some of them before we could because
she has had long training and is ready for amphibious operations; we are not.
If we lose the element of surprise or begin to show interest, for example in the
Gilberts, such previous warning may delay our later operations because Japan
would well consider nullifying our efforts in this direction.
I just wanted to get this off my chest to you as I always do my thoughts and
then will defer to your better judgment with a cheerful Aye, Aye, Sir, and go
the limit as will all of us in what y<m decide. I do think the matter serious.
[.'/] The establishment of Marine Defense Battailions at Samoa, Palmyra,
Johnston and Midway is now in progress. I have not authorized any leak on this
because I have questioned such a procedure but if you feel it advisable we could,
of course, do so. If Japan occupies Saigon, I am considering recommending
we plan our mines in Manila. a.ssume a full posture of defense in the Philippines
and send the Fleet Marine Force from San Diego to Hawaii.
Finally I want you to know I am notifying Kimmel to be prepared to send a
force such as we talked about yesterday to the Philippines, in case your final deci-
sion should be to .send them.
I have just read a paraphia.se of a telegram of 7 Feb. from the American
Embassy at Tokyo, which the State Department has furnished us. In it appears
the following:
"Risk of war would be certain to follow increased concentration of American
vessels in the Far East. As it is not possible to evaluate with certainty the
imponderable factor which such risks ccmstitute, the risk should not be taken
unless our country is ready to force hostilities."
You undoubtedly have seen the entire despatch and obviously I am picking out
that portion which supports my view.
[s] H. R. S.
2152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Op-12-CTB
Secret
Febbuaby 5, 1941.
Memorandum for the President.
Subject : Analysis of the Situation in Indo-China.
1. The despatches from the Naval Attache in London concerning prospects
of an immediate crisis in Indo-China and Singapore seem to be a re-hash of the
story by Douglas Robertson in the New York Times of February 2d. I have
been watching this situation with extreme care and see no present reason for
alarm. We knew in advance the Japanese were sending some ships to Thailand
and Indo-China to enforce cessation of hostilities between those states. This
has been accomplished. The transfer of peace negotiations on the NATORI
to Tokyo indicates to me two things.
(1) The demands by .Japan will be far-reaching and
(2) The February 10th date is too .»<(>()n for an attack, as the negotiations are
likely to be rather long-drawn out in Tokyo.
2. A careful study, including an evaluation of information from many sources,
leads me to believe that the following is the general plan of Japan :
(a) She has some fear that the British and the United States will intervene
if she moves into southern Indo-China and Thailand. Therefore, she wishes
first to obtain a full legal right to enter those countries, by getting the consent
of the governments to give her concessions in the ports and on shore.
(b) The size of .Japanese land forces in F<)rmosn and Hainan is insufficient
for occupying Indo-China and Thailand, for attacking Singapore, and for keep-
ing an exi>editionary force ready to use against the I'hilipi)ines. So far as
I can tell, an insufficient number of transports is assembled for a major move.
Upon a successful conclusion of the peace negotiations sfie will assuredly
occupy Thailand and southern Indo-China, establish defended naval, land, and
air liases, and get ready for further eventualities. She may build up her land
forces in Indo-China in readiness for iiftion against Malaya and British Nortli
Borneo, or may retain them in Formosa and Haiiuin. I question her readiness
to attack the British before .lune, but this belief is subject to levision.
(c) Japan desires to move against the British, the Dutch and tfie United
States in succe.ssion, and not to take on more than one at a time. At present,
she desires not to go to war with the United States at all, in order that she can
continue her imports of materials useful for war and for her general economy.
If Japan gets a favorable opportunity, and believes the United States has then
definitely decided to remain out of war altogether, she will move first against
Malaya and possibly Burma, hoping the Dutch will not participate. Her pres-
ent economic conver.sations with the Dutch indicate .she may be playing for time,
and even may intend to conquer the Dutch primarily by economic and political
penetration.
(d) Japan is unlikely to undertake hostilities against Britain until she sees
the results of Germany's next attack on the British Isles, and of Germany's
success in the Balkans. If tlie Germa^is succeed in conquering the British
Isles, Japan will at once move into Malaya, and possibly into the Netherlands
East Indies. If the German attack against the British Isles fails, I believe
Japan may await a more favorable opportunity before advancing beyond Indo-
China.
3. The above are my present views. They will change if we get information
that will warrant change. So far, everything leads me to believe that Japan
is playing for a secure advance without too great an expenditure of military
energy. The recent reenforcement of her defense in the Mandates indicates the
seriousness with which she views the threat by the Pacific Fleet, so long as it
remains strong and apparently ready to move against her eastern flank.
H. R. Stabk.
Orriginal set by Clipper Lock Box — Confirniation by Capt Lammers 2/28/41
Secret
27 Febbuaby 1941.
Dear Admiral Habt: Admiral Stark is leaving Washington today for a
short trip to the Caribbean, expecting to be back on the job about 13 March.
I have just brought to his attention certain information which he has asked
me to give to you.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2153
As you know, we are having Conversations here in Washington which we
hope will be completed in from two to four weeks. I'pon completion of these
Conversations Rear Admiral V. H. Danckwerts, R. N., one of the participants,
will proceed, I expect by air, to Singapore and possibly Australia and New
Zealand to inform officials there and also British CinC, China, of the results
of the Conversations.
Admiral Danckwerts has expre.ssed a willingness to stop in Hawaii to talk
to Admiral Kimmel and in Manila to talk to you in regard to the same. Admiral
Stark thinks this is an excellent plan. He wants me to inform you of this
fact and to say that I think Danckwerts is very clever but honest. IngersoU
says he thinks it best for you to listen and talk little.
The Department will inform you of Admiral Lanckwerts' movements and
prospective date of arrival in order that suitable arrangements can be made
for meeting him.
I expect to return to London as soon as Conversations are finished. Will
you therefore acknowledge by radio to Admiral Stark receipt of this letter?
With kindest regards, I am. Sincerely,
R. L. Ghobmley.
Admiral T. C. Hart, USN
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet
U8S HOUSTON
(Duplicate to Adm. Kimmel)
Nav-HH. Navy Department,
Burb:au of Navigation,
Pemwuil and Conftdentinl Washington, D. C, 3 March 1941.
Deab Kimmel: Your letters — references —
(a) Confidential, official— #P16-3/(0217), of 7 February 1941, subject-
Recommended Complements.
(b) Secret, personal, of 18 February, 1941, to Stark, on various matters,
and
(c) Confidential, personal, of 16 February 1941, to Nimitz, re Ordnance
P. G. and various matters.
have been read carefully considered in the light of the situation which confronts
the Bureau of Navigation. No enclosures were received with Bunav copy of
Reference (a), nor have such enclosures been received in C. N. O. office so far
as I know.
The Bureau of Ordnance is so far behind the requirements of ordnance
materials, and is continuing to fall further behind, that drastic measures are
necessary if our. fieets, even at present strength are to have the necessary ord-
nance supplies to carry on a war. That drastic measures have already been
Initiated may be surmised from personnel changes already made.^
Soon to be superimposed on our Navy ordnance problems through the
administration of the Lend-Lease Bill is the task of procurement, inspection
and delivery of enormous — almost astronomical — quantities of ordnance sup-
plies for the British Navy and any allies which may survive to fight the Dictators.
I do not know if you have been informed of all the new ordnance plants that
are being erected in various parts of the country to start from scratch the
manufacture of various items of ordnance.
Furlong can give you some idea of these developments when he reports. He
should have had the help long ago of many of the Ordnance postgraduates in
the Fleet, and he endeavored to obtain their services but was denied by my
Bureau on the weli-founded theory that even though many of the Ordnance
P. G.'s in the Fleet were not working at their specialty, they were usefully
employed, and the Fleet should be saved as much as possible from changes.
With the appointment of a new Chief of Bureau of Ordnance the Secretary
directed me to give Blandy all practicable aid in the form of competent officers
to assist in producing ordnance supi»lies. The Secretary is fully aware of
Blandy's requirements in personnel and the necessity for taking a considerable
number of ordnance post graduates from the Fleet. I will add also that Stark
is fully informed on this subject.
In a recent dispatch to you I informed you that Crawford would soon be
ordered to the Bureau of Ordnance. He is specially needed to synced up torpedo
production, and it is unfortnaiite that Py^ nnist lose this office from his staff.
The designation of the remaining forty or so officers is being left to you with
79716 O — 46— pt. 16 Ifi
2154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the idea that you will so arrange detachments and re-allocations to minimize
the damage to fleet efficiency. 1 will be glad to approve such reassignments
within the fleet as you consider necessary. The Atlantic Fleet also gives up
a number of Ordnance P. G's.
I note your warning against the detachment of considerable numbers of
qualified oflScers from the fleet and the enormous risk therefrom. I yield to no
one in my anxiety to have the fleet i-eady at the proper time and you can rest
assured that I am always ready to bear full responsibility for my acts. I am
fully cognizant of the great responsibility which you bear and it is my firm
intention to support you to the maximum extent possible.
As you well know, this country is confronted with a most diflScult problem —
that of determining just how much of our total output shall go to Britain and
her allies, and how much to keep for ourselves. A wrong guess may well make
our own problem insoluble. The minimum help needed by Britain is, of course,
that which will keep her actively flghting while we are building up our strength.
No help at all or too little help to Britain resulting in her defeat will greatly
increase and complicate our problems of the future.
The situation i-egardiiig aviators is not unlike that of Ordnance P. G's.
In order to build up our aviation we must of necessity have the services of qual-
ified aviators to get all our air training stations going. We know the new
aviation officers lack a great deal of being ready to serve the fleet when they
first report, and we also know you will do your best to provide the additional
training and experience needed.
If you will grope backward through your memory as a budget officer you will
realize that the serious shortage of aviators which now confronts lis can be
charged largely to our failure to operate Pensacola at maximum capacity during
those years when we used only a fraction of that station's capacity to fill the
pilot seats in the Fleet. I remember also our efforts to obtain funds to give
active duty to a few hundred naval R. O. T. C. ensigns. While it is idle to
speculate on what might have been, the present situation is not without its
ironical aspects.
Now for a discussion of the enlisted personnel problem. You are no doubt
aware that Stark and I have fought stubbornly and constantly to increase the
authorized number of men in the Navy and to bring ships' complements not only
to 100% but to 115% in order to train in advance of the readiness of new or
acquired ships the key men for them.
[3] Just about the time we thought we were well imderway to that objective,
the President received information from several sources that our ships were
being seriously overcrowded. It was obvious that his informants were in or
had been in the Fleet. Recently, the Captain of the TUSCALOOSA reported that
his ship was overcrowded and asked for detachment of about 50 extra marines
which had been placed on board. His Division Commander, Pickens, by endorse-
ment confirmed this opinion and further stated that the same comment applied
to all heavy cruisers.
As the President had cruised in the TUSCALOOSA fairly recently, both
he and his private physician. Rear Admiral Mclntire, were definitely of the
opinion that there were too many men on the TUSCALOOSA for health and
comfort. I have taken steps to ascertain how many men were on board during
the President's cruise and at the time Pickens recommended the removal of the
extra marines.
Recently some bluejacket wrote Senator Downey, of California, a complaint
of intolerable conditions in the PORTLAND due to overcrowding. When the
matter was referred to me I asked CINCUS to investigate and give me data
upon which to base a reply. CINCUS's, reply, which you should get from your
files and read, confirmed the overcrowding in the PORTLAND and further stated
that the number of men in the PORTLAND at the time of the complaint was
less than was being proposed by the Fleet Personnel Board.
You will agree that if the President also receives such comments (and no
doubt many bluejackets or their families write him) Stark and I will have
a hard time selling him the idea that ships' complements should be increased
as you recommend in reference (a).
Our recruiting may be prejudiced by similar letters from afloat as indicated
by the following quotation from a letter written by an Inspector of one of our
Major Recruiting Divisions :
"From underground sources it appears that the ships are so crowded that
men hesitate to ship over. I have had personal letters arid contacts from good
men to that effect. A relative of mine — a farmer boy from Maryland whom
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2155
I advised to join the Navy six years ago — is a patternmaker first class on the
ALTAIR. He writes me for advice about sliipping over as living conditions
on the ship are almost unbearable. I mention this because it seems to me
a matter of concern even though it's none of my personal business."
However, to offset the above unfavorable picture of overcrowding, Commander
R. W. Gary, U. S. N., recently executive officer of the CHICAGO, gave me a
memorandum of changes made in tliat ship to increase her living accommodations
without apparent overcrowding. I enclose a copy of his memorandum, marked
"A", and 1 will urge on the C. N. O. and Chief of Bureau of Ships to [4]
provide the funds and equipment you ask in paragraph 11 of reference (a),
not because I believe the President will approve increased complements to fight
your ships, but primarily because I believe that every combatant ship should
be ready to carry on board as many excess men as possible for training for
new construction.
The President now feels so strongly that we will make our ships unhappy
by overcrowding that Stark and I will need every bit of assistance and assurance
that you can give in order to obtain his consent to carrying more than the present
100% complement on board.
I recently sent you a draft of a proposed letter which should help a little in
retlucing unexi^ected detachments. I enclose another copy, marked "B" and
request your suggestions.
The failure of many of our men to reenlist when discharged from ships in
Hawaiian waters is understandable but very disturbing. While many men
may leave that area with the intention of reenlisting after leave in the States,
I am afraid we lose a large number of trained mechanics to industry when they
come home. The remedy for this is both y<)Ur problem and mine, and I welcome
your suggestions ^'or increasing reenlistments afloat.
I appreciate receiving your letter re broadening the employment of negroes
aboard ship. Your suggestions are sound and will be followed here as long
as we can withstand the pressure. Two negroes have been appointed to the
Naval Academy for the class entering next summer.
Legislation has been initiated asking for 232,000 men in the Navy during
normal times, with a limit of 300,000 for emergency. Prospects for passage are
favorable. Stark and I wanted to ask for about 500,000 but were turned down
by the President who insists on a year by year program. Present Operating Force
plan for 1942 will require about 290,000 men.
Legislation has been initiated for going to three-year Naval Academy course,
commencing with the class of 1&43, which will be scheduled to graduate in
June 1942. The Class of 1942 will graduate in February 1942. Pro.spects for
passage favorable.
Before closing this already too long letter, let me assure you that when we
get the report of youf Personnel Board with its recommendations for increased
complements, we will give it serious and sympathetic study, particularly if
your Medical Board of Survey of Living Conditions on hoard indicates that
more men can be accommodated without prejudice to health and comfort.
Referring to the large numbers of young Reserve Ensigns being ordered to
duty afloat, I know that you will do all in your power to continue their naval
education and training. These young men will be useful and valuable in direct
proportion to the effort made by our regular officers to train them. [5] We
must lean very heavily on them to help meet the requirements of new construction.
In order that the Fleet may comprehend the personnel problem confronting
the NaTy as a whole, I shall publish to the service in the near future a circular
of information as to how we plan to meet the personnel needs of our two-ocean
Navy. In spite of anything we may attempt to do ashore we realize that it is
on board ship that the most important training must take place.
If you or any of your officers have a formula for manning new construction
with nuclei of ship-trained men without getting them from the Fleet, — by all
means, let nie have it !
With kindest regards and best wishes, I am,
Sincerely yours,
/S/ C. W. NiMITZ.
End.
Admiral H. E. Kimmet., U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chici , U. 8. Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. Pennsi/lvania,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
2156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Navy De^'abtment,
Bureau of Navigation,
Wtishirifftnn, D. C. 28 Fehruary 1941.
From : The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.
To: Comiuander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet.
Subject : Transfers to Shore Duty.
Reference: (a) BuNav Manual.
1. The Bureau will furni.sh to the Commander-in-Chief. United States Fleet,
Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, Commander Base Force, Pacific Fleet, and
Commander Train, Atlantic Fleet, the waiting lists for shore duty maintained
in accordance with reference (a), Articles D-7024t6). (7), and (8).
2. The shore duty waiting li.st will be revl.sed and issued quarterly. It will
contain only the top men on the list who.se transfer ashore may normally l)e
expected durinj; the succeeding twelve months. Fleet Reservists will appear sep-
arately on this list as the Bureau will continue to give preference to Fleet
Reservists for transfer to shore duty.
3. The Conunander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and C<»mniander-in-Chief,
Atlantic Fleet, are requested to place men in training as reliefs for men on the
shore duty lists so that the latter can be transfeired on short notice.
In reply refer to
Initials and No. Op-30C-MD
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Navai- Operations,
Washington, February 20, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation
Subject : Accommodations for Increased Complements of Heavy Cruisers.
1. In accordance with your request, I am supplying the following information
gained from my experience as Executive Officer of the CHICAGO in regard to
acconmiodating the increased complements of heavy cruisers.
2. When I left the fleet on December 21), 1940, a complement required for heavy
cruisers of the CHICAGO class had not been worked out to the last man, but
it appeared to be very close to llOO men necessary to man the additional batteries
installed, and maintain the rate of fire required by modern war conditions. I
note, since my arrival here, that the Fleet Personnel Board recommends 1099 men
for this class of cruiser.
3. To meet the berthing, messing and other accommodations necessary to
accommodate our estimated number of 100 men, the CHICAGO obtained addi-
tional bunks and lockers while at the Navy Yard — a sufficient number to bring
the total up to 996. This installation was done principally with the ship's force.
The arrangement for installing, these bunks and lockers was done entirely by the
ship's personnel under the supervision of the First Lieutenant who gave it his
careful attention and succeeded in getting these in without violating the standard
spacing between berths in any one tier of 21", and without finding it necessary
to utilize any of the messing compartments. To accomplish this it required an
almost complete rearrangement of berths and lockers in each compartment.
When this installation had been completed, it was found possible by utilizing office
space and other miscellaneous spaces large enough to take from one to three or
four berths plus what space was left available in the berthing compartments, to
install 113 additional bunks and lockers. This number had been requested from
the Bureau of Ships, but I am advised that no action [2] as yet has been
taken on that request. If it is approved, and the bunks and lockers are installed,
there will be a total of 1,109 bunks and lockers on the CHICAGO.
4. Up to the time that I left the ship, we had had a pt-^ak load of some 1,050
men on board. The cafeteria system of feeding this large number of men has
proved to be satisfactory. The over-all messing time for this number of men
was less than it had been under the old messing system for a lesser number of
men, but the actual serving time was slightly longer, amounting in all from
30 to 35 minutes. The mess hall space required was reduced to two messing
compartments in place of three as previously used, by the fact that the rate
of serving corresponded very closely to the rate of eating by the men, so that
as the latter part of the line was served, the earlier part of the line had eaten
and cleared the tables. The important feature of the satisfactory operation of
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2157
the cafeteria system on any ship, but particularly ships with complements con
siderably larger than originally (lesigned for, is the organization for the service
of the food.
5. Additional washroom and toilet facilities are also required for an increase
in complement. This was accomplished in the firemen's washroom, while the
ship was at the yard last summer, by a rearrangement of existing installations
which permitted the installation of two additional showers, two additional bucket
troughs (acconnnodating about 8 men each), two additional head tnmghs (approx-
imately 5 sejits each), one additional urinal. A similar eliort was underway in
the deck force wash nxmi at the time I left the ship, but I do not know the
extent of the additional facilities this would provide.
6. We found it essential in the tropics to take steps to increase the ventilation
of some <tf the berthiufr compartments and the mess hall where the steam tables
were located. This was accomplished by the ship's force, but it is probable that
additional ventilating equipment will have to be installed in view of the recent
decision to blank off all air ports on the second deck and below, as well as some
on the main deck.
7. The effect of the increased number of men in thei berthing compartments
on the health of the crew was consideied by the medical officer not to be a serious
menace, up until the time I left the ship, provided that we were a little more
meticulous in the observation of sanitary measures. This involved a careful
watch for the aitpearaiice of bedbugs, cockroaches and other germ carrying pests
and special care in the sterilization of mess gear after meals. It also included
the prompt segregation of personnel showing signs of colds, flu and other
nose, throat and chest diseases. Although there were two mild epidemics of flu
in the fleet during the past Fall, tlm <"HI('AGO had comparatively few cases in
spite of the fact that I believe it was more crowded at the time than any other
ship in the fleet.
•S. From my observation of other ships which have had additional berthing
facilities installed together with information received from the First Lieutenant,
before I left the ship, we were of the opinion that they had not been as successful
in the arrangement of their berthing .space as we had been on the CHICAGO.
This appeared to be due to a failure to plan the arrangement with the same
care that the CHICAGO had used.
/s/ R. W. Cart,
Commander, U. 8. N.
♦CHICAGO Complement 872
TUSCALOOSA Complement 876
[1] In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-lO/Dy.
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval OPEaiATioNS,
Washington, March 22, 19/(1.
Secret
Dear Kimmel: Your letter of February 18th was Handed to me upon my return
from an inspection of N. O. B., Norfolk, Fajardo, Vieques anchorage, Pillsbury
Sound, St. Thomas, San Juan, Guantanamo, various Bahama Islands, Key West,
Miami, Jacksonville, Pensacola, Charleston, and Parris Lsland ; — literally, a
flying trip.
Ingersoll wrote you to acknowledge receipt of your letter. We have now
received answers from the interested individuals here in the Department to
the "questions you asked. I will take up your letter, paragraph, by paragraph,
here goes : —
The Checks for the Navy Relief and Red Cross have been received. You must
have had acknowledgments by this time.
Chester Nimitz in his letter to you of March 3 — a copy of which I have —
seemrs to have answered all your questions on personnel so that I need not
comment any further on that subject : except that, with regard to the Bureau
of Ordnance requirements for post-graduate ordnance officers, I can fully under-
stand your point of view in not wishing to have those officers detached from the
Fleet. The procurement situation in the Bureau of Ordnance is critical. We
made the best decision we could with the picture confronting us. You may
expect a similar effort to get legally trained officers in legal jobs.
2158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
With reference to the Marines at Palmyra and Johnson you must, by now,
have received my confidential serial 019612 of February 26th on the subject of
permanent Marine defense force at Johnson, Midway and Palmyra Islands.
Of course personnel stationed at Johnson and Palmyra islands should not exceed
the number provided in paragraph 4 of the letter of the 26th until satisfactory
arrangements are made for providing the minimum requirements of food, water,
and other essential supplies. We concur in your recommendation to send 100
Marines to Palmyra and none to Johnson for the present.
No comment seems necessary on paragraph 8 in view of the fact that the
detachments have already gone to Australia and New Zealand.
[2] In paragraph 9 you request one Squadron of PT's and one of the new
PTC S at the earliest possible date. At the present moment I can not give you
an answer to this question because the demands of the British are such right
now that I can't even make an estimate of the number of PT's and PTC's which
might be available to be sent to you. I have an order now to give them 28|
immediately.
You also speak of the probability that the Coast Guard will be taken over
shortly. I hope to do that as soon as the 7 billion dollar appropriation is passed
by the Congress and signed by the President.
Completion of the quota of small craft allocated to the 14th District is being
pushed as rapidly as their conversion and readiness for service can be accom-
plished. You probably know the TAMAHA and an Oil Barge are now en
route to Hawaii in tow of the KANAWHA.
With respect to paragraph 10; Admiral Blandy furnished in his letter to you
of March Hth, the shipment dates of the remaining bombs to be supplied to the
Oahu area. It will be noted from Blandy's fetter that all requirements will be
completed either in the May, 1941. voyage of the U. S. S. LASSEN, or the
ammunition trip about October, 1941. With respect to the bomb supplies in
Oahu, a letter is about to be signed increasing the bombs designated for that
island and a.sking you to assist in transporting them frons the mainland to Oahu.
Dump storage of bombs in Oahu has already been authorized in advance of the
availability of magazines.
I believe you have received information on the incendiary bomb situation ;
5,009 are being procured from the Army and delivery is expected shortly.
The answers to paragraph 11 of your letter are contained in our confidential
serial 05038 of March 18, to the effect that it is the present intention to substi-
tute PYRO for LASSEN upon the conclusion of PYRO's next voyage to the
Fleet.
As you know, the Department has taken steps to acquire two more vessels;
Class C-3 cargo ships (Now building at Tampa, Fla.), for conversion into
ammunition ships but it is impossible to tell at this date when these vessels may
be ready for service.
Referring to paragraph 12 of your letter, need for destroyers in the Atlantic
Fleet right now is such that we probably will not be able to help you with addi-
tional destroyers for sonse months, if then ; in fact we may have to take some
away soon.
[3] In connection with your comments in paragraph 14 and 15 relative to
complements recommended by the Fleet Personnel Board, the following pertinent
comment from the Director of Fleet Maintenance is quoted :
"(a) The Bureau of Ships for some time has been calling attention to the
continued weight increases, which have been taking place on all t.vpes of ships
since commissioning, having reached such proportions that effect on military
characteristics is now serious. The recent weight additions, made necessary by
improved A. A. defense, D. G. equipment, splinter protection and increased
ammunition which could not be compensated for by weight removals in accord-
ance with the policy established several years ago, have greatly accentuated the
overweight situation to such extent that no further uncompensated weights
should be added until the results of the weight removal survey now under way
ore obtained.
(b) The Bureau of Ships estimates that for each additional man and his
personal effects 300 lbs additional weight. To provide bunk, locker, mess gear,
sanitary and other requirements, the total additional weight per man is approxi-
mately one-half ton. The average increases recommended by the Fleet Personnel
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2159
Board over the Force Operating Plan represents rather sizeable weight additions
as shown by table.
Over RfKuUing
increase men weight added
BBs 286 143 tons
CAs 228 114 tons
CLs 136 78 tons
DDs 57 28.5 tons
(c) While the decision against reconnnended increases was based on weight
and stability conditions more than on space and cost, the further restrictions
on berthing space introduced by sealing of airi)orts on the lower decks has made
the space component of more importance than formerly.
(d) The Operating Force Plan has taken into consideration and has allowed
increased complements for the additional Ax\. batteries installed.
(e) The Operating Force plan represents the policy of the Department on
the number of men which can or should be assigned to the various ships by types.
[4] (f) On a comparative basis the coniplenieiits now allowed are 10-15%
greater than those assigned by the British on similtlr types of ships.
(g) Correspondence is at present before the Bui-eau of Ships requesting com-
ment on the maximum niuiiber of men which can' be accommodated on the various
types of ships within acceptable limits of space, weight and stability considera-
tions. The reopening of the case deiiends largely on the Bureau of Ships reply.
P. S; The report of the Fleet Personnel Board is now in. It Is anticipated that
it will be reconnnended for approval to maximiun extent permissible within space,
weight and stability reconinieiidations of P>uShips.
Paragraph IS of your letter referred to the supply of modern types of planes
throughout the Fleet. In this connection Towers states the impression that the
Bureau of Aeronautics is relegating fleet aircraft needs to a position of lower
priority than the general expansion program, is in error. He says that the Bureau
of Aeronautics has exerted and continues to exert every jwssible effort to provide
the Fleet with new replacement airplanes for the old models at a rate oidy limited
by the productive output of the contractors and diversions instituted by specific
directives to the Bureau of Aeronautics. It is believed appropriate to point out
that the Navy Department in the face of long and determined opposition has been
successful in establishing the highest priority for the following types and models
of naval airplanes now on order for the Fleet. This priority (A-l-b) is higher
than that accorded any Army aircraft, except the temporary priority given the
P40B's which are being sent to the Hawaiian area.
VP PBY5 197
VSB SBD-2 & 3 202
VF F4F 324
VSO S03c 260
VSB SB2c 70
VTB TBF 108
1,221
Your paragraph 18 recommends acquisition of two more "sea-train" vessels.
Acquisition and conversion of 4 APV's. 2 New .lerseys. 2 Manhattans, was recom-
mended. The President cut out the Manhattans. Acquisition of the 2 New Jer-
seys as you probably know was appi-oved by the Secretary of the Navy on January
15, 1941, but funds havemot yet been made avdilahlc. The New Jersey type is
now used for ferrying lodded freight cars from the East and Gulf Coast ports to
Havana. The conversion contemplates the removal of numerous [5]
stanchions and use of three decks for the loading of aircraft. Capacity of this
type after full conversion is estimated to be approximately 60 assembled air-
planes of the .scout bomber size. No flying on or flying off facilities are involved.
I might a<ld that "plans" for the conversion of the Manhattan type contemplating
the installation of hangar and flying off deck with an offset island bridge and
stack arrangement are being pro.secuted. No provisions will be made for airplane
landings aboard the Manhattans. Estimated carrying caiwcity for the Manhat-
tans is 80 planes of the scout bomber class when the entire flight deck is loaded ;
under these conditions the planes could not, of cour.se, be flown off.
In answer to your connnent in paragraph 20 on the necessity for additional
stores ships and transports, the following obtains :
2160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
On 15 January. 1941, the Secretary of the Navy approved recommendations for
three additional store ships (AF). The I'resident cnt it to two. The status of
legislation authorizing and appropriating moneii for these two vessels is indeter-
minate at the present moment. It is hoi>ed these vesels will be acquiretl some-
time during the current fiscal year.
The six transports intended for assignment to Base Force are being converted
and made ready for use on the West Coast. It is expected that all of these vessels
will report for duty by June or July, 1!)41. In addition to their intended employ-
ment for training Marines in landing operations, it may frequently be nece.ssary
for forces afloat to u.se one or more of those tran.sports to meet ti'ansportation
requirements between Hawaii and the Island Bases. In addition to these ships,
negotiations ai'e being completed now for the charter of the Matson Line ship
WEST CRESSEY. She should be available within a short time and ComTwelve
is being instructed regarding her loading. It is planned to keep her under charter
for transportation of supplies to Hawaii until the CAPE LOOKOUT is completed
and ready for service.
With refer<-nce to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and
i-esponsibility for tlie furni.shing of se<'ret information to OincUS, Kirk informs
mo that ONI is fnliy awai-e of its responsibility in keeping you adequately in-
formed concerning foreign n.itions, activities of these nations and disloyal ele-
ments within the I'nited States. He further says that information concerning
the location of all Japanese merchant vessels is forwarded by airmail weekly
to you and that, if you wish, this information can be issued more frequently, or
sent by despatch. As you know, ONI 40 contains a section devoted to Japanese
trade routes, the commodities which move over these trade routes, and the
volume of shipping which moved over each route.
[6] This chart was corrected in the Spring of 1940. The dale appearing on
the chart is the date 15)39, which was the last complete year for which export and
import data on conunodities was available at the time the chart was revised.
Every good wish as always.
Keep Cheerful.
Unload all you can on us.
Give us credit for doing the best we can under many conflicting and strong
cross currents and tide rips — just, as we do you — and.
Best of luck,
/S/ Betty.
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, USN
Commander-in-Chief. U. K. Fleet,
U. S. S. PEWSYLVANIA,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
/
In reply refer to Initials and No. 11932
Secret
Navy Department
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, 4 April 1941
Dear Kimmfl: It has been sometime since I liave dropped you a line, but like
.you, have been literally .sawing wood seven days a week and there has been noth-
ing of real importance that I could tell you until the Staff Conversations were
over. Yesterday I sent an official letter to you and to King and to Tommy Hart
covering this subject.
I made a two weeks in.spection trip in the West Indies and our activities in
the Ignited States South of Washington, and just abcmt as I got back the President
shoved off, so I had had no close liaison with him until his return this week.
Spent over three hours with him day before yesterday and another hour yesterday.
My official letter on the staff conversations had some thoughts in it as a result of
that Conference. I may tell you and Hart and King, in the strictest confidence,
and I mean by that, nobody but you and Hart and King, that I read to the Presi-
dent the official secret letter which I mailed you thi-ee yesterday and received his
general assent to it.
I realize that you all, just as much as I, are vitally interested in the matter
of "timing". Something may be forced on us at any moment which would pre-
cipitate action, though I don't look for it as I can see no advantage to Mr. Hitler
in forcing us into the war unless, of course, Matsuoka agrees to fight at the same
time. On the surface, at least, the Japanaese situation looks a trifle easier, but
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2161
just what the Oriental miUif plans, none of us can be sure. I have had several
long talks with Admiral Nomura and unless I am completely fooled, he earnestly
desires to avert a Japanese crisis with us. We have been extremely frank with
each other.
I am enclosing a memo on CiOnvoy which I drew up primarily to give the Presi-
dent a picture of what is now being done, what we would propose to do if we con-
voyed, and of our ability to do it. It concerns you directly in the detachment
from your command of what I believe to be necessary for King to have, to do the
job. I feel it is only a matter of time before King is directed to convoy or patrol
or whatever form the protective measures take.
You may not agree with me on this move. I can only hope that I am right.
The situation is obviously critical in the Atlantic. In my opinion, it is hopeless
except as we take strong measures to save it. The effect on the British of sink-
ings with legard both to the food supply and essential material to carry on the war
is getting progressively worse. Without our giving effective aid I do not believe
the British can much more than see the year through, if that. The situation is
much worse than the average person has any idea.
Our officers who have been studying the positions for bases in the British Isles
have returned, and we have decided on inmiediate construction of 1 destroyer
base and (me seaplane base in Northern Ireland. We are also studying Scotland
Iceland buses for further support of the protective force for shipping in the
northward approaches to Britain.
I am also enclosing a memorandum, which I regard as vitally secret and which
I trust you will burn as soon as you have read it, covering the President's talk
with Ghormley and me yesterday.
I hope and I b?lieve that the foregoing gives you the picture pretty much as
I have it to date without going into the Balkan situation, labor troubles, bottle-
necks and the million otli-er things which you undoubtedly can glean quite well
from the press.
I might add that I am thoroughly in accord with your recent letter to Nimitz,
can assure you of Nimitz' support, and that the letter was helpful from every
standpoint.
We handed the State Department and the Attorney General something
to unravel when we took over the German, Italian and French ships last week-
end. I had about as busy a 24 hours and about as interesting as I have had for
sometime. I find that I stuck my neck out only in taking over the four Danish
ships in the Philippines, but at least we have them and even if there was no law
to support my action, I am glad I did it and the Big Boss, when I "fessed" up,
approved. As a matter of fact, most of it was in hand before he knew about it.
This letter is really long enough or I would tell you how we startetl the ball
rolling and what a splendid job the Coast Guard did on short notice. Of course,
the pity of it is that we could not have done it months ago before the sabotage
took place. We have been pressing to do it for sometime and when I got word
SatHrday afternoon of the sabotage on a couple of ships, we jumped the gun.
Am sending copies of this letter to King and to Hart, although King is pretty
familiar with affairs here because of his proximity and an occasional visit
which is a great help.
I just realized I had not touched on what we refer to as "practice cruises"
which detachments from your force have recently made to Australia and New
Zealand. I think there will be more of this to come; my hope is they will be
confined to positions on the Jap tlanks and that they will have some of the bene-
fit which the President and the State Department expect from them. Of interest
to you is that we are directing King to make similar visits to Cape Verde, the
Canaries and the Azores ; of course with a very few units.
Coast Guard has just been directed to turn over to the British 10 of its 250 foot
cutters.
Rainbow 5 should be on its way to you all shortly.
Keep cheerful. All good wishes.
Sincerely,
Bettt.
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. .S'. Pacific Fleet,
U. S. -S'. PENNSYLVANIA,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
2162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
11932
Secret April 1941.
OcKAN Escort in Wkstekn Atlantic
(West of Longitude 30° West)
HALIFAX CONVOYS BP:F0BE FEBKUARY !">, 1!M1
Usual British Escort ; 1 XCI., — occasionally augmented by 1 BB or 1 CC or 1 C.
Last Summer Ki'itish occasionally augmented the 1 XCL by 1 large SS.
Westbound traffic has had no ocean escort.
Ships over 12 l<nots go it alone.
Ships under 12 knots put in 9 or 6 knot convoys.
BERMUDA CONVOYS BEFORE FEBRUARY 15, 1041
Without escort until they join Halifax convoys some hundreds of miles East of
Halifax.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
About February 1.1th Britisii Chiefs of Staff stated that hereafter all convoys
from Halifax must be escorted. Minimum strength of ocean escorts either:
1 BB or
1 CC or
1 CA or
1 XCL plus 1 large SS
This st;itement was made before the recent cruise of GNEISENAU and
SCHARNHORST changed the picture.
U. S. NAVY PLAN
Our concept ft>r the minimum strength of ocean escorts, so long as danger from
GNEISENAU and SCHARNHORST or similar vessels remains, is:
1 BB plus XCL plus 2 to 4 DDs.
If BB be not available substitute 2 CAs.
Obviously this escort might be weaker than German attackers, and therefore
covering operations in the general area by heavy ships and carriers are necessary
at times.
To keep present flow of traffic moving, 2 to 3 convoys a week, 7 escort units are
necessary.
In the Staff Conversations the British stated they will make available to the •
United States for assisting in the above work:
10 XCL
2 DD (Old)
8SS
The proposed war deployment of the Atlantic Fleet, as at present constituted,
is:
(a) Northwest Escorts, based in Northern Ireland (Admiral Bristol) :
9DD
18 ODD
42 VPB (possibly 54)
(b) Ocean Escorts, Western Atlantic:
3 BB
2CA
2DL
TDD
4,0DD
4 DMS
(c) Striking Force, based Bermuda:
2 CV
2CA
4 DD
6 VPB
(d) Southern Patrol, based Trinidad:
4 CL (7500 ton)
Several 327 Coast Guard cutters
(e) Gibraltar Submarine Force :
12 OSS
(f ) Bay of Biscay Force, based England :
9 OSS
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2163
(g) North Atlantic Coastal Frontier:
12 Vl'B plus Canadian corvettes of an unknown number,
(h) Caribbean and Panama Coastal Frontiers:
1 PG
9 DD
24 VPB
8 OSS
At the present time 1 BB is under regular navy yard overhaul, and one is under
emergency repairs ; these are due for completion respectively 19 May and 28 April.
The RANGER must go under tliree months overhaul April 17tii. From 5 to 10
DD and 1 or 2 cruisers must remain under overhaul most of the time.
Consideration of the above shovi^s that the Atlantic Fleet is unable to provide
the minimum ocean escoit considered necessary. Shortages will be especially
bad until June first. With the GNEISKKAU and SCHARNHORST at large, I
consider 2 carriers, at least 2 cruisers, and 4 destroyers the miniimim for an
effective striking force.
To provide a proper degree of safety for convoys in the Western Atlantic, and
to provide an important striking unit for catching raiders, the following rein-
forcements in the Atlantic are necessary :
3 BB (IDAHO. NEW MEXICO, MISSISSIPPI)
1 CV (preferably LEXINGTON)
6 DL.
12 DD
4 CL (new), (although this Division might come later).
If this movement is made, it should be done with the utmost possible secrecy.
The possible effect of this transfer as regards Japan is realized, but must be
accepted if we are to take an effective part in the Atlantic.
Secret 12212
In reply refer to Initials and No.
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Navai. Operations.
Washington, 19 April 1941.
Dear Kimmei.: Recent correspondence regarding cruise to the Northwest;
Detachments for the Atlantic ; Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 1 ; etc., etc. ; — well
I can sort of visualize and hear you saying "Why the Hell doesn't Betty make
up his mind on what he wants to do?"
First, I will put at this point rather than at the end of this letter.
"Keep cheerful" and help me to keep my sense of humor which is a little taxed
sometimes.
And again : —
Just remember "We are doing the best we can."
I wrote you about the Australian Detachment. The President .said (and
Incidentally when I open up to you this way I don't expect you to quote the
President and I know there is nobody who can keep things secret better than you
can) ; "Betty just as soon as those ships come back from Australia and New
Zealand, or perhaps a little before, I want to send some more out. I just want to
keeji them popping up here and there, and keep the Japs guessing." This, of
course, is right down the State Department's alley. To my mind a lot of State
Department's suggestions and recoinmendations are nothing less than childish
(don't quote me) and I have practically said so in so many words in the presence
of, all concerned, but after 13 months they finally got it going. Of course I
recognize some m^'rit, if exercised with some discretion — and that is where Navy
has to count on F. D. R. for reserve ; .so we did not have to send ships into
Singapore and we did keep them on a flank to be in iwsition to go to woi'k or to
retire if something broke..
Interruption — The thought just flashes across my mind that Savvy Cooke is
now with you. He has much background. I know you will talk to him freely,
just as I always have.
To that extent, namely, more or less in position if something broke, I acquiesced
in the Australian Cruise with far nnore grace than I would have otherwise. I am
not insensible to the advantages of a cruise of this sort, as well as to the disad-
vantages of interruption in training.
Now when the question of "Popping up everywhere" came and having in
mind keeping on the flank, I said to the President: "How about going North?"
He said ; "Yes, you can keep any position you like, and go anywhere."
2164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
There was a little method in my madness as to the Northern cruise; I thought
for once, if I could, I would give the State Department a shock which might
make them haul back, and incidentally, that Northwest cruise has many good
points. It still conforms to the flank, and a detachment on an occasional
sortie up in an unexpected direction might be good ball, and if you ever want to
make such a cruise yourself on your own initiative, don't hesitate to ask. Of
course you can see what a striking force of the composition I gave you, and
known to the Japs, would mean to them, in view of their unholy fear of
bombing. This striking detachment would have been right in position for most
anything.
I had a broad inward smile when the State Department in effect said ; "Please,
Mr. President, don't let him do if ; or words to that effect. It was a little too
much for them.
The above very briefly touches the high points of this episode and gives you its
inception and its calling off.
I realize sometimes it might be less upsetting to you mentally not to tell you
these things and then have them called off. On the other hand, I never can
prophesy just what will come and in order that you may be prepared, I endeavor
to keep you informed as we go along. You can just assume, or begin to guess,
what goes on sometimes in between drinks.
Now let's take up the letter we sent you regarding the Detachment coming
to the Atlantic and without checking up, I believe it was 3 BB, 1 CV, 4 CL and
2 squadrons of destroyers. This was the first echelon for the "Battle of the
Atlantic." The entire world set-up was gone into very carefully and this detach-
ment was one of the first means of implementing what we had every reason to
anticipate here. It was agreed to, authorized and directed in its detail by the
President. It was also cancelled by the President, and he gave the specific
direction to bring only the one CV and I division of destroyers, with which you
are now familiar. The reason for the change was that the President did not
want, at this particular moment, to give any signs of seriously weakening the
forces in the Pacific, and it is my opinion tiiat this will hold xintil there is some
further clarification, incident to Matsuoka's return to Tokyo and this further
illumination on the Russo-Japanese Treaty. Don't interpret this in any sense
as a change in the general idea of Plan Dog which the President again recently
reiterated to me, and which still holds. He does not, however, even while
adhering to that Plan, want to give Japan any encouragement or lead right
now as to our intentions. I am telling you, not arguing with you.
You have received the word with regard to the 4 minesweepers.
We are starting the "T" Cla.ss submarines, now in the Atlantic, into the Pacific.
You will have to look out for them some way or other until a Tender is ready,
which we anticipate will be sometime in August,— the USS PELIA8.
The foregoing is just to give you a little inside information on recent events.
I have really nothing new to add. The situation here is a little more hectic than
usual, particularly because of the effect on the public of the situation in the
Balkans, and the Near Plast. Your estimate of this situation probably will,
differ little from ours ; that it is critical is obvious.
For months I have been making recommendations along some lines now much
in public discussion. To those who have final authority and responsibility the
time seems not yet ripe for their adoption.
Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 1 specifically implements the President's
thoughts which he has been debating in his own mind for sometime. Whether
or not it will actually be put into effect, or altered, I cannot say. King is in
this morning. His order is ready. The President is examining this situation
further today as a result of conversations with Mr. Hull, who is counselling
something less aggressive. I will add n P. S. when this ts typed Monday.
I had hoped that with the passage of the Lend-Lease Bill we could look
forward to some unity on Capitol Hill but just at present there seems to be
far from that desired unity on vital issues. What will be done about convoy
and many other things, and just how much a part of our Democratic way of
life will be handled by Mr. Gallup, is a pure guess. From that you might think
I am getting a little bit cynical, but believe it or not, that is not the case, and
I am sawing wood as usual and am still cheerful.
The President has on his hands at the present time about as difficult a situ-
ation as ever confronted any man anywhere in public life. There are tremen-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2165
dons issues at stake, to which he is giving all he has got. I only wish I could be
of more help to him.
Hoping you are cheerful and' with all good wishes, Sincerely,
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA.
P. S. I am sending copy of this letter to Tommy Hart, King returned from
Hyde Park and as a result Hemispheric Plan No. 1 goes by the board, and a
substitute, with no teeth, is being prepared today.
Betty.
In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-lO-Dy.
Navy Department,
Office of the Chiet' of Naval Operations,
Washington, April 26, lOJfl.
Dbiab Mustapha : This is just to get you mentally prepared' that shortly a
considerable detachment from your fleet will be brought to the Atlantic.
You will recall from my last letter what that detachment was and what the
President cut it to, but only for the time being, awaiting some further clue to the
Japanese situation.
Not only do I anticipate the reinforcing of the Atlantic by the 3 BBs, 1 CV,
4 CLs and 2 squadrons of destroyers, but also by further reinforcements.
King has been given a job to do with a force utterly inadequate to do it on
any efficient scale.
I am enclosing a copy of his last order which implements the changed Hemi-
spheric Defense Plan No. 1 and is now known as Hemispheric Defense Plan No. 2
or WPL^9.
Even the Press and those who wanted to go all out in the Pacific are now round-
ing to and clamoring for an all out in the Atlantic. You know my thoughts with
regard to this which were set down in my Memo about what is now known as Plan
Dog and which will shortly be covered by Rainbow 5.
Action on the above, that is transfer to the Atlantic, may come at any time and
in my humble opinion is only a matter of time.
No other news for the moment and this letter is the result of a long conference
yesterday in the White House.
I am sending a copy as usual to Tommy Hart.
I am just in receipt of your letter. We will send you the Public Relations Offi-
cer. I shall also go over the personnel situation again with Niniitz. I think we
all see eye to eye in what we want to do and I agree with you that key men just
should not be removed short of extreme emergency.
Sincerely,
[ S ] Bettty.
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, USN
Commander in Chief, U. 8. Pacific Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA.
In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu
Navy DepabtmeiNT,
Office of the Chief of Navat. Operations,
Washington, 15 May lO^l.
Confidential
DE.VB Kimmel: This is in reply to your letter of May 5, 1941, which it was a
pleasure to receive.
The present plans for the Secretary's trip are briefly as follows: The party
will consist of the Secretary ; Captain Frank E. Beatty, U. S. N.. Aide to the
Secretary; Mr. Rawleigh Warner of Chicago, Illinois, a personal friend of the
Secretary's; and Mr. John O'Keefe, private secretary to the Secretary. It is
expected that the party (if Secretary can get away) will leave here May 24,
1941, and, accompanied by Rear Admiral A. W. Fitch, U. S. N., will depart from
San Francisco at near dawn in XPB- 2Y-1 on May 26, 1941, reaching Peai-1 Har-
2166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
bor, T. H. late the same day. The Secretary is looking forward with much antici-
pation to the trip. As you know, he is keenly and intelligently interested in the
entire Naval Establishment, and the Fleet in -particular. I am sure that both
the Secretary and you will profit from the visit.
The above arrangements are, of course, only tentative. I am informed that
the President will speak to the country on May 27, 1941. In view of this, I have
a mild suspicion that some change in the Secretary's plans may be necessary.
All of us here are aware of your difficulties in connection with the loss of so
many of your experienced men. Our proposal to automatically extend enlist-
ments during war knd national emergency was introduced in the Senate by
Chairman Walsh on January 14, 1941, but has not been introduced in the House,
as Mr. Vinson is apparently opposed to it. The matter is not as simple as it
appears on the surface. The Selective Service Act provides that a man inducted
in the Service for a year's training must be discharged at the end of that period,
unless the Congress meanwhile "has declared that the national interest is im-
periled." Nimitz feels, and I agree, that Congressional action to freeze our
enlisted personnel can best be accomplished by basing our demands on the same
grounds provided for in the Selective Service Act, i. e., when "the national interest
is imperiled." Accordingly, we are introducing legislation which will provide
that whenever the Congress shall declare that the national interest is imperiled,
all enlistments in the regular Navy or Marine Corps which are in force at that
time and which will terminate during such emergency shall continue in force
during the emergency, and that men detained in the Service in accordance with
the above shall, unless they extend their enlistment, be discharged not later than
6 months after the date of termination of the emergency. At the same time, the
legislation, as proposed, [2] provides for a suspension of Section 1422
of the Act of March 3, 1875, which provides for pay and a quarter for men
retained in the Service beyond the normal expiration of their enlistment.
Meanwhile, you have by this time the Department's dispatch about the provi-
sions of revised statutes of Section 1422. Act of March 3, 1875. It is hoped
that this will help relieve the situation to a certain extent.
On May 6, the Bureau of Navigation issued circular letter No. 55-41, having
to do with the subject of transfer of enlisted personnel in forces afloat. In this
letter, it was stated that, until further notice, the tsansfer of enlisted personnel
from forces afloat will, in general, be by rating and not by name. This contra-
venes Navigation's policy, which has been in effect for some time — that of order-
ing men from sea to shore duty, using length of Sea Service as a basis for such
transfers. The change will permit you to retain your experienced men and
transfer those whose service can best be spared.
As to nucleus oflBcer personnel. Navigation advises that it is often difficult, on
account of urgency in issuing orders, to request nominations from forces afloat,
but every endeavor is being made not to detach experienced officers where it can
be avoided. We will be glad to receive your ideas on the subject of nucleus
crews when they have been prepared, as you suggest, "in a more definite form."
Your plans for the landing at San Clemente have been received in the Navy
Department. Fleet Training has studied them with interest. I have had a
brief of the intended operations submitted to me, and I think the exercise will
be of much value to all concerned. Needless to say, we are pressing preparations
to the end that our landing forces will be well equipped ; shortages remedied, etc.
Your remark about the use of AKs in connection with landing oi)erations is
concursed in. We have been able to get two craft suitable for this purpose from
the Maritime Commission. Unfortunately, the conversion of these ships cannot
be completed until the fall of 1941.
As suggested, I have informed the material bureaus of your ideas about
availing themselves of shipping facilities between the coast and Pearl Harbor.
I have done this by furnishing personally each of the Chiefs of Bureaus concerned
with a copy of your letter. I am sure you can count on their active cooperation
in this imiwrtant matter. Yards & Docks, for one, shares your concern about
the matter of transportation, particularly to the outlying bases. Two old Panama
Railway Steamships— the Ex-ANCON and Ex-CRISTOBAL— have already re-
" cently been acquired and are to be operated for our account by the Matson liine. .
They will help but not solve the problem. How do you feel about families of our
personnel (and Army) continuing to remain in Hawaii.
At the moment, there are no additional patrol craft that can be furnished
the Fourteenth Naval District. As you no doubt know, effort is now being made
to acquire a number of sampans, which should be of assistance in this regard.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2167
DesDiv Eighty (80) is at Pearl Harbor, and 4 AMCs are going forward from
San Diego under e.scort of the TIPPECANOE. We are also giving consideration
to supplying some 165' coast guard bots for this duty. I must confess that our
preliminary survey in this regard does not appear to be promising. I am keenly
aware of your anxiety to save wear and tear on your destroyers, as well as
releasing them from patrol duties for the mose important duty of perfecting
themselves in other phases of their training.
All of us in the Department are bending every effort to be prepared for war
when and if it comes. I know you are likewise using your best effort to make
the Fleet seady for all eventualities. Acquaint me with your troubles — I will
do what I can — always wishing it were more.
All good wishes — keep cheerful.
Sincerely,
[S] Betty.
Admiral H. E. Kimmex, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, V. S. Pacific Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Fleet Post Office, Pearl Earhor, T. H.
In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu
Secret
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, 14 May 1941
Memorandum
For Commandant, First Naval District
Third Naval District
Fourth Naval District
Fifth Naval District
Sixth Naval District
Eighth Naval District
Tenth Naval District
Eleventh Naval District
Twelfth Naval District
Thirteenth Naval District
Fourteenth Naval District
Fifteenth Naval District
You will recall my previous letter of 3 October 1940, in which I stressed
readiness and not to be taken aback should somebody suddenly start depositing
mines on our front doorstep, etc. etc.
I might add that I have no inside information as to what is going to happen
or when, but it seems to me now, as it did then, that it is a case of only
when?
The trend of events, and public opinion certainly all tend increasingly this way.
If and when we do get in, my hunch is that Hitler would certainly, if one
way or another, attack our shipping wherever he thought it would be profitable,
either from a material or psychological standpoint.
I am cognizant of how the sweeper-small craft-net program has lagged, am
doing what I can about it ; but it never seems enough.
This is just again to remind you all of the seriousness of the present situation
and of the necessity of our being ready, to the utmost extent, to use what we
have or what we can improvise, should the issue suddenly be drawn.
Plans and machinery for convoy are pretty well in hand but here, too, there
may be hitches or slips which, in the last analysis, may only be found by actual
practice. However, convoy games on paper by those who must handle the
details should be good mental exercise, and may bring to light certain correctable
deficiencies.
2168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
What will happen in the Pacific is anyone's guess ; but here, too, there is only
one safe course ; that is to be prepared, so far as humanly possible. Though the
danger of mines, I'aiding and diversions, and even of sporadic or stunt air
attack, may be more remote in the Eastern Pacific, we cannot discount it, and
hence should likewise be bending every ounce of effort of which we are capable
not to be caught napping in that area. Japan may come in the second Germany
does — possibly preplanned joint action. Russia is still a ?
I might add that some months ago (and less than that) our studies here
in the Department indicated that if we did not get into this war by March we
would be fairly well off in the local defense picture ; later it was put at April
with assurances that in any case I could feel fairly comfortable by the first
of May. Now I am told the latter part of May or maybe some time in June
or the first of July. It continues to be just "Ai'ound the corner." I think the
time is here now for even more personal strenuous effort by all of us, in
responsible positions.
Keep cheerful. Heap all the abuse you want to on my head, if it will help
any to achieve our common objective.
I trust you are all constantly checking ways for speeding up readiness in
every department.
[s] H. R. Stark
H. R. Stark.
Copy to Admiral King, Kimmel, Hart
In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-lO-Dy.
(Received 2 June)
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, May 24, 1941.
Secret
Dear Kimmei. : I recently saw your letter with regard to ammunition. Regret
the holiday in training caused by non-delivery and hope we can prevent recur-
rence.
We appreciate fully your personnel troubles. I have gone over them with
Nimitz and trust your thoughts regarding non-disturbance of key personnel can
be complied with.
I am sending you a secret despatch this afternoon with regard to occa.sional
visits by small units of your Fleet to the west coast in the interests of morale.
While you have not suggested this, my hope is that it will be conducive to con-
tentment. Of course how clo.sely an approved schedule for this could be followed
in these times I do not know. I have just finished talking to the President about
it and you can rest a.ssured that so far as possible we will see it through. We
would leave any press releases on this subject to you, as it is something for which
yoiir gang should look to you.
You have probably been surprised over the movements of transports, Marines,
hospital ships, etc., to the east coast, which you have, or will have shortly received.
Please keep the following with regard to it highly secret, known only to your
trusted few whom I assume you keep informed regarding such matters. In
this I include Bloch.
Day before yesterday afternoon the President gave me an over all limit of
30 days to prepare and have ready an expedition of 25,000 men to sail for, and
to take the Azores. Whether or not there would be opposition I do not know but
we have to be fully prepared for strenuous opposition. You can visualize the
job particularly when I tell you that the Azores recently have been greatly
reinforced. The Army of course will be in on this but the Navy and the Marines
will bear the brunt.
I know your reaction will be "Why didn't we get the transports and assemble
such a force months and months ago." My only answer to that is that such
thoughts are water OA'er the dam, and I am confronted with the problem as is
and not one as I would like to have had it, and for which I would like to have
been ready long ago. I simply could not get authority to acquire and prepare
the necessary train.
King of course is active and operating in connection with Atlantic problems —
our own and the Briti.sh. He has nothing like what he would like to have or
what we would like to give him if we had it to give. I do not contemplate
for the moment ordering anything additional to the Atlantic except auxiliaries
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2169
In connection with the Azores task and except possibly later four CA's as per
Rainbow 5. However, I am not the final "Boss of this show".
In the last 48 hours we have been following the situation closely in Crete;
and yesterday and last night the Naval situation to the eastward and southward
of Greenland.
My personal feeling is that it is only a matter of time until the British hold
on the eastern Mediterranean is very much confined or non-existent.
Only history will throw a full light on the Crete incident. Criticism will be
rife but without full knowledge of the facts or at least more than we have at
present I am withholding final judgment.
German raiders (as you probably will have learned before this) both surface
and sub-surface are now working well inside the generally accepted limits of the
Western Hemisphere, in fact to the westward of the 40th meridian. The British
escorts therefore get thinner and thinner. The situation is not good. Last night's
naval engagement and its train of events will come out in due time.
We are immediately confronted with taking over a considerable number of
merchant ships for the Azores task — something I wanted to do as long as over
a year ago. Also the Army is asking me to man 26 of their ships. I have been
in touch with Admiral Waesche for the last 24 hours and that fellow has come
across 1007o and is agreeing to furnish 18(X) men and 100 officers, which is liter-
ally a God-send from our standix»int. These men will include surfmen. The
lot should man about 5 transports depending of course on the size of the trans-
ports selected.
We have an expedition of flying boats going to Iceland for temporary basing
and for reconnaisance of the east coast of Greenland.
In addition we are sending three arctic ships to the Scoresby Sound area to .
look for German meteorological or radio stations and to remain there during the
Summer, besides two other vessels and an Army contingent which are proceeding
with the construction of an air field and plane base on the southeast coast of
Greenland.
The Army also has an expedition studying Labrador with a view to the possi-
bility of flying planes to that point then to Britain via Greenland.
The anununition situation on which we are depending on the Army for supply,
is bad. Even getting enough for the Azores is a problem. It promises not to
get better before P^'all.
The Force which we are preparing to go to North Ireland and Scotland on
the outbreak of war is coming along in good shape so far as the Navy is concerned
but the Army has neither the equipment, the amnnmition nor the aircraft to
defend these bases; fall again being the earliest date when they can do this
for us. Meanwhile we will try and find some way of solving it with Marines and
British help if we are in the war before that time. God knows what will hapi)en
if we are not in by that time though personally I give the British a longer time
than do most people here in their ability to hold out. I most emphatically do
not believe they can hold out indefinitely without effective aid from us. We are
being pressed for ammunition and material from the South American Republics : —
not a happy situation — and not to mention British requests for more DD's etc.
The above are rambling thoughts for a few minutes conversation with you,
Tommy Hart and Admiral Bloch. I will not try to put them in more logical
sequence or dress them up further, simply assuming that you can straighten
out the picture yourself as we more or less see it here.
Keep cheerful,
Sincerely,
P. S. When I last wrote to you I indicated by doubts as to the Secretary
leaving at this time. Personally I couhln't see how he could. He came to that
same conclusion himself and you have been informed.
Tell Bloch that I knew it would raise "H" with towing barges to Palmyra
and other islands when we ordered the two tugs to the Canal Zone but that
they are essential for the Azores operations.
Referring to your letter of l.'i May 1o Admiral Nimitz of which I have a copy : —
I am quite in agreement with your thoughts. The despatch about holding men
over-time was not with the idea of telling you to do it but with the idea that
if you found it necessary you would have department backing. I think your
own estimate is quite correct.
As regards freezing men for the duration — this is something which for years
I have thought the Country should have on the statute books and during the
79716 O— 4&— pt. 16 17
2170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
present emergency I have brought the point up many times but without success.
I am not through trying but I doubt if we can get in a period short of war.
/s/ Betty.
Admiral H. E. Kimmex, U. S. N.,
. Commander-in-Chief,
United States Fleet,
U. 8. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship.
Navy DEa>ARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Op-IOD- Hu Washington, 20 June 19.il.
Deab Admirai, : At my conference this morning with Admiral Stark he said that
he knew just as soon as you left he would think of something which he meant to
tell you while you were here.
I think what he wanted was simply to plant the thought in your mind of smoke
screen around Pearl Harbor in case of an air attack such as has been used by the
British around some of their Scotland shipyards or closed harbors.
From what I understand it is something similar to the California smudge pots
and leaves a black blanket and a very uncomfortable one, according to Captain
Kirk, over the area innuediately concerned.
The Germans did this at Brest, thereby preventing any accurate bombing or
even vision of the targets.
The Admiral asked me to get this ofiE as he had to go to conference and wanted
to catch you before you left San Diego ; also to give you his best wishes in which
all of us here join.
Respectfully,
/s/ J. L. McCkeia.
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
% Commandant, 11th Naval District,
San Diego, California.
In reply refer to Initials and No. HRS/clp
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Opeirations,
Washington, June 26, 194i-
Delar Kimmel: Colonel Maas is going to report for duty with you shortly.
He was just in to say goodbye.
He was one of our staunchest supported and strongest friends, particularly in
opposition to a single air force, for the United States.
He will fly from San Francisco to Hawaii in one of our 4-engine bombers. We
were all glad to have him do it and give him a good picture of that type of craft
which he has so strongly supported.
He is not asking for any favors because of his Congressional importance.
Nevertheless, I wanted to let you know he is coming and feel that his services with
the Staff to Comairbatfor may be very helpful from many standpoints.
We had a very interesting talk yesterday afternoon from Jimmy Roosevelt. All
agreed it was well done. As you may know, he just completed a thirty-five
thousand mile flying trip with Major Thomas of the Marine Corps.
This afternoon Wellings is talking.
Am asking Lee to take down the interesting points of both talks to send to you.
Some of them, I feel, will be useful and you should know.
You were made an information addressee on our despatch to Tommy Hart with
reference to the next move which Japan might make. We feel strongly here that
her attitude, at the moment at [2] least, will continue to be one of "watch
and wait".
Our information on the German-Russian operations are so uncertain at the
moment that it would be useless to give them to you. We feel it will take
at least a few more days to give any sort of picture.
Every good wish, as always,
Sincerely,
/s/ Bejtty.
Admiral Husband E. Kimmeil, U. S. N.,
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
V. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA.
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2171
In reply refer to Initials and No. Oi>-10 Hu
(Received 9th July)
Navy Dbpaetmbnt,
Office of the Chief of Naval Oper.\tion8,
Washington, 3 July 19Jfl.
Secret
Dbab Mustapha: Have just written a letter to Tommy Hart and think the
following from it might be of interest to you :
"I am still lioping you will be able to put over your thoughts about denying
passage of the Japanese through the Eastern part of the Malaya Barrier; but
I know from experience in the last War, as well as in this one, that what you
say about 'trade and raider consciousness' is very pertinent.
"After a careful study of the ADB report we find that we are unable to
approve it. Army and Navy War Plans are drawing up a letter to the British
rejecting it, and requesting a new conference be held that will give a practical
and realistic operating plan to carry out the purpose of ABD-1. The report has
all the faults you mentioned, both in your official and your personal letters, and
I do not believe it necessary for us to accept any such ineffective plan. Of
course, I will forward you a copy of our joint letter to the British, which should
be ready within a few days."
Have just finished a Budget session and am hoping to give you some of the
things you want.
I really have no interesting news other than has been communicated to you
by radio.
Keep cheerful.
Sincerely,
Admiral H. E. Kimmeil, U. S. N.,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
U. 8. S. PENNSYLVA'NIA,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
P. S. It looks to us at the moment as you will judge by a despatch you will
receive ere this as though the Germans had persuaded the Japs to attack Russia
within the next month. It is anybody's guess and only time will tell.
/&/ HRS.
Navt DE3»ABTMENT,
Secret Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Op-10 Hu Wushinnton, 7 July 19.'fl.
Deue Mustapha : Referring to the last sentence, paragraph 4-E :
I think if I were the skipper of our cruiser and a foreign man-o-war told the
Dutchman to stop I would tell the Dutchman to disregard the order of the
foreign man-o-war. Moreover I would lay my ship fairly close to the Dutchman
and between the Dutchman and the foreign nian-o-war, and let tlie latter do
his worst.
This is not an order ; it is just a thought which I wanted to transmit to you.
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N,
Commander in Chief, U. 8. Pacific Fleet,
U. 8. 8. PENN8YLVANIA.
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
P. S. Your imagination may produce something better. I hope it can. My
imagination just now is almost beyond the elastic limit. It was working over-
time last night in the White House conference, and will again before the night
is over.
Keep cheerful.
2172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Op-IOD-MD
July 10, 1941.
Memorandum for Admiral Hart, Admiral Kimmeh^ Admiral King, Commandants
OF ALL Naval Districts
In an excellent paper which I recently read, I was struck by the paragraph
quoted below and am sending it to you for further circulation or such use as
you care to make of it.
"It is to be noted that the unity and effectiveness of effort that has character-
ized German operations has been due not only to the organization of the Higher
Command and to careful planning and training. /« a large measure, it appears
to be due to the fact that the personel of all ranks, including the highest, is imbued
with a spirit of soldierly subm^crgenoe of self in the accomplishment of the common
undertaking. It is suggested that it might tend toward the removal of some
sources of friction in our Services if a secret letter on the subject were issued
to oflBcers of the higher ranks, down to and including the grade of Colonel in the
Army and Captain in the Navy."
The lines italicized particularly struck me.
I am not aware of sources of friction in our Services at the present time.
While differences of opinion are bound to crop up, not only between the dif-
ferent Services, but between forces of our own Service, they are, so far as I
know, being ironed out. Certainly there is the will here in Washington to pull
together which is bearing fruit, and which should ever grow stronger in purpose
and effectiveness.
There are many leaves which we can take out of the German book — as well
as many not to take,
H. R. Stabk
In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu
Navy Department,
Office OF the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, 24 July, 1941.
Secret •
Deiar Mustapha : Haven't much to write about ; as a matter of fact the letter
I dictated to Tommie Hart this morning contains what little I have and it is
darned little I admit.
This is more just to let you know I am thinking about you than anything else.
We are pushing recruiting just as hard as we can and for budgetary purposes
you will be glad to know the President has okayed a figure of 553,000 enlisted men
and 105,000 marines. Please give us a "not too badly done" on that. But what a
struggle it has been. If we could only have gone full speed two years ago but
that is water over the dam and I am only hoping and praying we can take care
of what we have in sight to man.
I have asked Blandy to acquaint you with the trouble Tommie Hart has had
with his mines firing after having been down several hours.
Believe it or not, except for a day or two of scorching heat, we are having de-
lightful summer weather in Washington. However, my fingers are crossed as
it is only July.
Am sending under separate cover a copy of the August number of "Coronet".
Be sure to unfold the picture of the mountain mirror on page 86. Mrs. Hull said
I should make sure you did not overlook it.
All good wishes.
Sincerely,
/s/ Betty.
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. 8. Paeific Fleet,
VSS PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2173
Secret
Oiv-10 Hu 24 Jui.Y 1941.
De:ab Tommie: Things are happening out your way and according to schedule
from dope we have had in the last couple of weeks.
Yesterday, before Nomura went to the State Department, I had a two-hour
talk with him ; very interesting, as my previous talks with him have been, and
of course he is worried. I believe him to be genuinely sincere in his desire that
Japan and the United States do not come to an open rupture. Of course, I have
that same desire, but there are many flies in the ointment, and in my talks with
him I have not minced matters one particle, or minimized the difficulties, or in
any way condoned Japan's present course of action, or hesitated to discuss per-
fectly frankly the shallowness (»f some of the reasons she is putting out in defense
of her actions. We have had very plain talk. I like him and, as you know, he
has many friends in our Navy. Nomura dwelt at length on his country's need
for the rice and the minerals of Indo-China. My guess is that with the establish-
ment of bases in Indo-China, they will stop for the time being, consolidate their
positions, and await world reaction to their latest move. No doubt they will use
their Indo-China bases from which to take early action against the Burma Road.
Of course, there is the possibility that they will strike at Borneo. I doubt that
this will be done in the near future, unless we embargo oil shipments to them.
This question of embargo has been up many times and I have consistently opposed
it just as strongly as I could. My further thought is that they will do nothing
in regard to the Maritime provinces until the outcome of the German-Russian
war on the continent is more certain. If Russians are well beaten down, I think
it highly probable that they will move into Siberia. Meanwhile, they are merrily
going their way and just where it all will end I do not know.
I had a talk with the President after the Cabinet meeting last Friday and
again yesterday after my chat with Nomura, and have succeeded in securing an
appointment with the President for him today. I hope no open rupture will
come, particularly at this time, but it would be wishful thinking to eliminate
such a possibility or to think that conditions are getting better rather than worse.
However, we can still struggle for something better, and I want you to know that
I am.
[2] Tour people who have been laying mines must have had an interest-
ing time, but just what the Devil the cause is is a conundrum still. BuOrd
went to work on it and did not stop for several hours. I hope the despatch sent
you might give some clue but, of course, we shall be very apprehensive until
we know. I mentioned it to Admiral Moore of the British Navy who was in
here yesterday, and he said that they had the same trouble some time back and
found the cause in a defective joint which permitted salt water to set up electro-
lytic action with sufficient current to fire the mine, and had to recall all the
mines that were made in that particular lot. Of course, our mines had not pre-
yiously had that trouble, and I hope the trouble will be found in faulty assembly
which can be readily cured. Any way, here's hopin'.
I was disturbed no end to learn that some of your net equipment had not
arrived at Cavite. As soon as we got your despatch, I immediately put Ray
Spear on the job. He got in touch with Johnny Greenslade and found that
eight (8) carloads of the flotation barrels had been loaded in the Navy Cargo
Ship HERCULES (This ship is being operated by the Matson Lines as agents
for the Navy Department.), due to depart from San Francisco July 20. He also
found there were seven (7) carloads of barrels en route, by rail, due to arrive
in the San Francisco area on July 20. Arrangements were made to delay the
sailing of the ship a day in order to load this additional shipment on board.
This has been done, and the ship sailed on July 21 and is due to arrive at Cavite
on August 10.
With the arrival of these barrels, you will have all but 250. which are destined
for the 16th Naval District. The Bureau of Ordnance is doing its utmost to get
these moving. The contractor (a firm in Conshohocken, Pennsylvania) has
fallen down on deliveries. They undertook to deliver 100 per day. So far, they
have only been able to deliver about half that number. Ordnance informs me
that the 250 drums will leave Conshohocken some time this week.
You are now undoubtedly familiar with the Iceland situation, and I am glad
to say the Force is back, and just when the next contingent will go has not yet
2174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
been decided. In both the Far East and the Atlantic, there is plenty of potential
dynamite.
I may say that the State Department still agrees about the gunboats remain-
lug in China, but of course, it is my understanding that they could not well be
removed at this season anyway.
I wish I had more small craft to send you for District service, and that goes
for practically every District we have. The small boat program was one of the
most difficult I had to get authorized and to get money for. We have several
hundred District craft under construction but, like everything else, time is a
vital factor. We are just doing the best we can with this proposition. The
craft we have converted have been expensive, costly of upkeep, and not too
satisfactory, though I am hoping they will get by until replaced by better
material.
[S] I think I previously told you I have been pressing for months to take
over the Coast Guard, but Morgenthau has successfully resisted until finally he
has given away in certain spots ; for example, he has just consented to turn over
the Coast Guard in the Hawaiian Area to our control. Also, we hope to get
seven of their large cutters, which will help a great deal in the Atlantic where
King is pressed to the limit to perform the tasks given him. I am trying to
get their 165-foot craft which also should be of assistance in the 14th Naval
District. Waesche, Head of the Coast Guard, sees everything from our stand-
point and is a great help. Mr. Morgenthau in many ways has been more than
helpful to the Navy Department, but when it comes to letting go of the Coast
Guard, he draws in. However, we shall keep on trying.
I am late now for a conference, and I don't know if I had a lot of time I
could really give you anything worth while, but I feel a little remiss if I don't
drop you a line.
Harry Yarnell is here and said he saw Caroline recently and that she is fine.
My little brood are all well.
With every good wish in the wide world to you as always.
Sincerely,
Admiral T. C. Habt, VSN,
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
V8S HOUSTON,
c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California.
In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-lO-MD
Secret
Navy Depabtment,
Office of the Chief of Naval Opebations,
Washington, July 25, 1941.
Deab Kimmel: I forgot to mention to you yesterday that you may be called
upon to send a carrier load of planes to one of the Asiatic Russian ports. I don't
know that you will, but the President has told me to be prepared for it, and I
want you to have the thought.
We spent a great deal of time on the letter which you will shortly get, relative
to the training of pilots. Before sending it, I had King's complete Okay. As a
matter of fact, he didn't change a word of it. I hope it will be equally satisfactory
to you.
Sincerely,
Admiral H. E. Kimmeh:.,
V. 8. 8. PENNSYLVANIA,
Fleet Post Office, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
Secret Rec'd. 8 Aug. 1130
Op-10 Hu
Navt Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval, Operations,
Washington, 2 August 19^1.
Deae Kimmel : I am grateful for your letter of the 26th of July. We shall go
after it paragraph by paragraph but it may take a little time. It is a good sum-
mary and we are glad to get an occasional check of this sort.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2175
Also would be glad if you could give us occasionally a little personnel interest
as well as material and I would more than welcome a little conversational "think-
ing out loud" on how the morale of the Fleet is holding, how the visits to the
West Coast are working out from that standpoint, how the target practices are
coming along, etc. etc.
We nor the British have no one at the front in the Russian-German war
though both the Army and Navy have made every effort to this end. From the
press, therefore, you have about as much information as we have. There is no
doubt they are willing to pay the price where the stakes are worth it. The next
month or six weeks should clarify the picture.
I have written to Savvy Cooke who has been good enough to write me occa-
sionally giving me his ideas which, as you know, I value so highly having gotten
the habit when he was heading War Plans here. I am always glad to hear from
him. I have asked Savvy to show you my letter if he thinks there is anything in it
worth while. Am enclosing copy Bloch might find something interesting. Good
luck
Keep cheerful.
Betty.
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, V. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
Tell Ad. Bloch — I have just directed sending him 12 P. T's — 40 knot-craft.
HRS.
Copy Adm. Kimmel
Secret
Op-10 Hu
31 July 1941.
Dear Savvy: I am grateful to you for your letters and hope that regardless
of the unsatisfactoriness of my answers or my failure to answer, you will con-
tinue to write ; — it seems like old times.
This is going to be short and general. I think you should burn it after show-
ing it to Kimmel.
Some of the things that you have asked, and some of the things which Kimmel
has recently asked, and which I will answer as soon as I can, are things for
which I have been striving to get answers in Washington. The press on many
of these points really gives you as much information as I have.
Within forty-eight hours after the Russian situation broke, I went to the
President, with the Secretary's approval, and stated that on the assumption that
the Country' decision is not to let England fall, we should immediately seize
the psychological opportunity presented by the Russian-German clash and
announce and start escorting immediately, and protecting the Western Atlantic
on a large scale; that such a declaration, followed by immediate action on our
part, would almost certainly involve us in the war and that I considered every
day of delay in our getting into the war as dangerous, and that much more
delay might be fatal to Britain's survival. I reminded him that I had been
asking this for months in the State Departmsnt and elsewhere, etc. etc. etc.
I have been maintaining that only a war psychology could or would speed things
up the way they should be speeded up ; that strive as we would it just isn't in
the nature of things to get the results in peace that we would, were we at war.
The Iceland situation may produce an "incident". You are as familiar with
that and the President's statements and answers at press conferences as I am.
Whether or not we will get an "incident" because of the protection we are giving
Iceland and the shipping which we must send in support of Iceland and our
troops, I do not know. Only Hitler can answer.
The Far Eastern situation has been considerably changed because of the
entrance of Russia into the picture.
Personally, I threw into the arena that we consider along with the British a
point protectorate over the Dutch Ea.st Indies, as a move calculated to prevent
further spread of war in the Far East. It is a debatable question. Certainly
there can be no joy in our camp over the occupation of Indo-China. I think it
is fairly safe to say [2] opinion here in general holds that Japan will
not go* into the N. E. I. Incidentally, we are not nearly so dependent on raw
materials from the Near East as the Public envisages. The real problem is a
British one — and hence our consideration.
2176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
As you probably know from our despatches, and from my letters, we have felt
that the Maritime Provinces are now definitely Japanese objectives. Turner
thinks Japan will go up there in August. He may be right. He usually is. My
thought has been that while Japan would ultimately go to Siberia, she would
delay going until she had the Indo-China-Thailand situation more or less to her
liking and until there is some clarification of the Russian-German clash. Also she
may concentrate on the China "incident". Of course, embargoes or near embar-
goes may cause any old kind of an upset and make a reestimate of the situation
necessary.
Regarding the Philippines, as you know, even since I came here I have urged
increasing their defenses. The Navy's contribution has not been great, but it has
been about all Hart can handle with the facilities he has or which we have been
able to make available. S'till, the increase is a factor, namely 28 PBYs and 11
modern submarines.
We are delighted with the Army move putting the Filipinos in harness ; we
recommended this. Also it is being supplemented by a considerable number of
planes, fighters and bombers. The Philippines are not too easy a proposition to
crack right now, and in a couple of months the Army will have 50,000 odd men
there under arms. But that is two months away.
As for sending the Fleet to the Far East, I still have literally to fight for every
auxiliary ship 1 get. Tonnage now making the British Isles is less than they need
for their maximum effort. There just isn't enough shipping in the world to go
around. If we cannot proi)erly support the Near East and the British Isles, it is
obvious we could not support our Fleet in the Far East, unless we very greatly
slowed up in the Atlantic.
Our trade with South America has been greatly restricted and the pressure
from there is another thing I have to contend with.
Recently we asked for some small ships of very moderate draft to supply our
forces in Iceland. We simply had to get them, but were told we would have to give
up an equivalent tonnage from our recent acquisitions with which I think you
and Kimmel are familiar and among which, for example, are the four transports
to train marines on the West Coast plus AKs, AEs, AFs, etc., etc. Thank the
good Lord, I was able to get the President to hold this in abeyance pending a
chance for Jerry Land and me somehow or other, to work it out without taking
anything away from the Navy.
Whenever we have a tanker available for ten days or so, we immediately try and
help Maritime out. If we send something anywhere and the ship is coming back
with any space available we offer Maritime the spare cargo space. The world
shipping situation is plain [3] rotten. Sometimes I wonder that with the
opposition we have had, (and it is good, intelligent opposition) that we have
gotten as far as we have. If any of our cargo ships are coming from Hawaii to
the Coast light, we should offer the space to Maritime.
The pressure, incidentally, to give what we have in ships, guns, ammunition,
material, and what not, to those actually fighting is constant, and increasing.
Several times recently I have been approached for destroyers and the Lord knows
what not. Marshall's troubles in this respert are legion and of course the fellow
at the front wants frequently what we most lack, particularly such things as
50 caliber ammunition, anti-aircraft weapons, patrol vessels, fire control, guns
for merchant ships, etc., etc.
Do not think for a minute that I am not terribly disturbed about our lack of
Radar on which I started pushing the scientific gang before I had been here a
month, and also the production gang, so that I should think they would hate to
hear me mention the subject.
Mike Robinson called me up this morning and said he was sending me a twelve
page explanation of what they have done in the last year. From the Fleet stand-
point and mine, and of course from Mike's too, we all want more tangible evidence.
The fact that our new aircraft carriers will not be available until 1944 is some-
thing that is awfully hard to stomach, and I confess to considerable indigestion
because of it, but whether or not there is a suitable remedy, I do not know.
The converted LONG ISLAND is promising for her size, in fact better than we
had hoped for. We have six more converting which will have much longer decks
and be superior in every way. We are keeping at this as a stop-gap but here again
it was not easy to get the ships. They will, in all probability, go to the British,
if we are not in the war when they are completed. In fact we are doing the work
on Lend-lease.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2177
I have been much distressed over the oi)eratiiig troubles we have liad with our
new planes. Of course tiiey are gradually being eliminated but it takes time.
I still am glad for the 200 I'BY rei)eats we early made and which are coming
along. Of course they haven't got what the later ones will ha»ve in range and
performance, etc. Also, performance will be handicapped by armor and protec-
tive features ; but we will have them, and they have not delayed the newer models.
Towers will have given you all the picture on the air game. He went out a
good deal at my insistence. With regard to the air, I know also that the training
situation has been a good deal of a niglitmare. If anybody can convince us of a
better solution than the one we recently sent out, we would be glad to get it.
To some of my very pointed questions, which all of us would like to have
answered, I get a smile or a "Betty, please don't ask me that". Policy seems to
be something never fixed, always fluid and changing. There is no use kicking on
what you can't get definite answei-s. God knows I would surrender this job
quickly if somebody else wants to take it up and I have offered to, more than once.
Some [4] generous souls have been charitable enough to ask me to stick.
I shall, as long as I think I can be of use, or rather that they think so.
We are doing what we can for China and taking unheard of chances on neu-
trality; or rather unneutrality. This along with sanctions on Japan make her
road certainly not less easy.
Reverting to Japan again and to her holding off in Siberia until the Russian-
German situation somewhat clarifies, I also think it possible, if not probable,
that one of the reasons for Indo-China, and her pressure on Thailand, is a better
position for an "all out" to clean up in China. I take my hat off to the Chinks.
As to the war and what people in this country are thinking; I hesitate to say.
However, I believe that the proportion of our population which feels we should
enter this war is relatively small, and that with the majority it is still more
or less an academic question, perhaps largely because of its distance from us.
Whether or not that sentiment might change over night, I don't know.
We are somewhat of a volatile people but I am afraid that the many events
which have happened with no resultant definite action on our part, are having
their effect. Had the Tutuila been hit and sunk it might have created a wave
of public opinion which would have meant something. As it is, nobody seems
to give much of a damn about it, although the principle involved is the same,
even though there was no loss of life, or sinking. On the other hand, I believe
the people would follow the President in any positive action — such as escort —
which he might take.
We shall give aid to Russia. However, nothing, to date, has shaken my original
estimate that the Germans will take their limited objectives. She is having
much more diflSculty than she anticipated. Of course I could hope the cost
will be crippling. Only time will tell.
I have urged propaganda wherever we could use it, particularly in South
America, in France and in Africa. French Africa still has a semblance of inde-
pendence against anyone who may attack it. There is no doubt in my mind that
the Germans could have cleare<l up in the Near East had they gone in that direc-
tion instead of to Russia. What will follow the Russian campaign is still a
question mark. Certainly British strength is far from what it should be in
the Near East area.
Believe it or not, I am still keeping cheerful, doing the best I can; chafing
that I can not do more and wide open to suggestion.
Before you destroy this letter I would be glad, if you [5] think there
is anything of interest in it, to have Admiral Bloch as well as Admiral Kimmel
look over it; in fact I was going to write Kimmel, so will let tbis partly serve.
Will not attempt to edit this "thinking out loud" on a busy morning. Please
be charitable as to its lack of continuity., etc. etc.
With all good wishes and good luck.
Sincerely,
Captain Charles M. Cooke, Jr., USN.,
USS Pennsylvania,
% PoHtmaMer San Francisco, California.
P. S. I apologize for the "short" in the second paragraph. Just got to rambling.
P. S. #2. On second thought, I am enclosing an extra copy of this for Kimmel
which he can show to Admiral Bloch, though I confess one fellow's estimate is
as good as another and I really wonder whether this letter is worth while, but
anyway, as you know, it comes with all good wishes and good luck to you all.
2178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Obviously, the situation in ttie Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one
thing that is factual.
Keep cheerful.
One more P. S. — I am sending Kimrael the copy of this letter. When I got
to thinking out loud I was really talking to you all including Admiral Hart, to
whom I am also sending a copy.
H. R. S.
[J] In reply refer to Initials and No.
Navy Department,
Office of the Chibt of Naval Operations,
Washington, August 21, 1941.
Personal & Confidential
Deab Kimmel: I have your despatch giving your reaction to the personnel
requested from you for the comniLssioning of two new squadrons of patrol planes
and the squadrons for the HORNET, plus certain additional men required for
Kodiak and Dutch Harbor. This picture is set down on the enclosed sheet.
We know how tight the personnel situation is ; also the seriousness of the
Pacific situation which continues to deteriorate. We have tried to look at the
whole situation as it exists at present and as it will continue to confront us, war
or no war, with the expansion now taking place in planes for the Fleet (or
if you will, call them replacements, because losses are bound to occur once we
get in).
The training problem we have already gone over with you.
The greater part of the burden of supplying personnel for the squadrons now
forming has been placed on the Atlantic Fleet. We have the Atlantic Fleet
practically at the elastic limit with the demands just made on it which are
greater than the demands made on you, and in a situation where they are now
operating, in many respects, on a war time .schedule — keeping the routes to and
from Iceland under surveillance as one example.
As we see it here, after complying with Bunav's despatches, you would be left
with 112% of your allowance of aviation machinist mates, 119% of aviation
metalsmiths, 118% of aviation ordnance men and 105% of all radiomen. This
is an overall picture of numbers in each rating group from the Base Force report
of 30 June. We realize that the distribution of ratings in each rating group
leaves considerable to be desired.
[2] The shore establishments, including four main flight training centers,
have only 61% allowance of aviation ratings, including radiomen. Further reduc-
tion there is just not practicable. Rather must the complements of the flight
training centers be increased to approximately 100% in numbers, by January,
in order to maintain the training schedule of those stations, and to permit the
stations to function at maximum capacity, which they must do to meet their pilot
production schedule necessary for your needs.
To man new squadrons we recently called on the existing units in the Atlantic
for 298 aviation ratings. In addition the Atlantic Fleet is supplying 105 aviation
ratings for advanced bases.
Manning these new squadrons is of paramount importance and we feel must
take precedence over duplicate flight crews for existing squadrons. Duplicate
crews will come in due time, provided we do not neglect training now, but will
never came if we continue to curtail the training program. Intensive training
in aviation ratings and radiomen (qual-air) must be undertaken afloat to assist
in supplying trained personnel for the expansion program. The same is true
of all ratings.
Now here's another shock : Patrons 91, 92, and 93 will be formed the last of
this calendar year and additional rated men will have to be supplied for them.
Tuck it in the back of your head.
Taking up Comairscofor's despatch of 18 August :
1. We are complying with his recommendation (a) that insofar as possible
we recruit from Patvvings Atlantic.
2. We will not reduce your qual-air radiomen below one per patrol plane.
In making this concession it is necessary to ask that you increase the rate at
which radiomen are qualified for duty in patrol planes in the Pacific Fleet.
3. Due to the installation of special blind landing instruments it is considered
that radiomen with aircraft experience should be assigned to Dutch Harbor and
to Kodiak.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2179
[3] 4. Comairscofor's recommendation (d) applies with equal force to either
coast. Inasmuch as Patron 84 will be stationed in the Atlantic, we thought it
better to organize it in the Atlantic. Of course this picture might change. We
can only handle it as far as we can see.
I wanted to give you the above and then ask you to transfer yourself to my
seat and what I am up aaginst here, and tell me whether or not you think our
original order the best all-around solution to an obviously vexing and difficult
problem.
The Atlantic Fleet is worse off in aviation ratings than the Pacific due to the
greater demands which we have made on it. The Atlantic continuously lighting
fog, long hours, and night work. Many of the Atlantic units are operating from
advanced bases along the northern route — Iceland, Newfoundland and New
England, with some operations in Greenland.
Nimitz is sending you a despatch today holding up execution of Bunav's
serials 1450, 1394, 1397 and 1406 of August 11th until September 15th.
Please acknowledge receipt of this letter by despatch. I would be glad to get
your reply at the earliest practicable moment. We shall endeavor not to renew
demands on you prior to 15 September.
It is a time when a "feller needs a friend", no matter where he is sitting, in
the Atlantic, in the Pacific or in Washington.
I am just back from the meeting in the Atlantic. Am wading into a mass of
mail which accumulated during ray two weeks of absence. Will drop you a line
giving you the best picture I can in a day or two. Meanwhile, many thanks for
your letters which I found waiting, which were extremely interesting, and which
I shall circulate to all concerned. Particularly did I enjoy the interesting news
in your letter of 12 August.
[.^1 I have just dictated the above in the presence of and with the help of
Nimitz, Forrest Sherman, Brainard and Ramsey (Towers being away ) . Ingersoll,
J am glad to say, is getting a much-needed vacation. All join me in sending you
good luck and best wishes to all hands.
Keep cheerful !
Sincerely,
/s/ Betty
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N.,
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, •
V. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.
2180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2181
(Rec'd. 3 Sept.)
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Opekations,
Washington, August 22, ]941.
In reply refer to Initials and Nos. HRS/mjf
Secret
Deak Kimmel: When I left I asked Ingersoll to reply to your letter. The
enclosed draft I have just inherited. In order to get it off to you in the next
clipper, I am sending it along as is, except for some pencil notes (both red and
black) which I have just added.
I know you want results, not excuses. So do I. I am doing everything from
pleading to cussing with all the in-between variations and hope the picture
presented is not too unsatisfactory.
I realize that in addition to this letter I have two more of yours to answer
which I shall try to get at the first of the week, if I can clear up urgent, current
material now on my desk. Still wading into the pile I found on my return.
There is much doing in the Atlantic in the formative stage. Thank God we
should have things in full swing before long and with plans fairly complete. It
has changed so many times — but now I think we at last have something fairly
definite — may-be.
To your own situation I am giving every thought I know how. You may rest
assured that just as soon as I get anything of definite interest, I shall fire it
along.
My best to your fine District mate, (Admiral Block) and to all with you,
and as always —
Best of luck — wish you were close by
Sincerely,
/s/ Betty.
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N.
VS8 Pennsylvania, Flagship, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
2182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SSSaiL . iUgut 19i 1941
Dear Muitapha: .■ ^ -r- /. ^ Z. ^^'^
Your letter of 26 July 1941 arrived i^ the Navy Department
on the eve of my departure for dietant parts. It was fine to hear from
you, and I appreciate your laying before me so frankly the thoughts that
are gois^ through your mind.
My reply to you has been delayed for two reasonet
1> there was unsuffictent time between the receipt of
your letter and my departure to prepare a reply, and
2. So mai>y of the points you raised I had hoped to have
the answers ^<^upon ny return to the Navy Department.
I can readily understand your wish to kept informed as to
the Department's policies and decisions ejid the changes thereto which
must necessarily be made tc meet the changes In the international situ-
ation. This, we are trying to do, auid if you do not get as much Infor-
mation as you think you should get, the answer probably is that the
particular situation which is upoermost in your mlad has Just not Jelled
sufficiently for us to give you anything authoritative.
So far as the Russian situation Is concerned, and the degree
of cooperation that will prevail between that country and ourselVes If
and when we become ectlve participants In the war, little can be said
at the moment. Some slight aid is being sent to Russia. Five bombers
and 200 B-40's have already been allocated. The bombers will be flown
to RussIp via Iceland and the British are supplying bottoms for the
fighters and naval escorts for sane. On 11 .August 1941, the Russian
Mission, headed by Ambassador Oumansky, and assisted by a Lieutenant
General of their Jtrmy ead a Captain of their Navy, was received by
Secretary Knox. The Ambassador stated thpt his country had pressing
need for all manner of military supt)lie8( pl&aes - and sjiti-aircraft
guns in particular. He announced that "quantities" of bombs, ammunition,
and machine tools were needed. The Secretary explained to the Mission
that the material they needed was largely of Army origin, and thfi.t there
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2183
were no ri,s>-rvu stocks in th>- country frcra v/hich to draw. The Socr^tarj'
summarized his r<.marks by saying that, since the President had made
the decision to give aid to Russia, the Navy could be counti^d upon to
cooperate to the utmost.
You are correct in stating that "the new situation opens up
possibilities for us ivhich should bo fully explored." This v.lll be done.
The conversations v.-hich took placc^bctween the Chiefs of Staff on 11-12
August soraewhat helped to crj^stalize thought on the matter. Specifically,
no decision vras reached cs to v;hether or not England rrculd declare war
on Japan if the Japanese attack the Ilaritine Provinces. Neither can I
forecast rrhat our action w.uld be if Enrlind declared var on Japan as
a result cf the latter' s attack en the pro'/inces in question. -t/XMuyot-C ^jjJ ^
Of course, Japanese action against the Iiaritinc provinces re-
mains a decided possibility. The results of such aggressive action,
of course, lies in the realm of conjecture. Hov/ever, it is mj' ov/n
thought that if Japan gets embroiled vdth Russia over the Maritime prov-
inces, such action could hardly react other than to sonev/hat relifc-\%
the prt-ssure novj- being exerted by Japan to the southward.
If England declares war on Japan, but v;e do not, I very much
suppose that we would follow a coxirse of action similar to the one vre
arc now pursuing in the Atlantic as n neutral. It is, of course, con-
ceivable that wc would lay down a '■'estem Tonisphero Defense plan with
reference to the Pacific. ^^:)', ^u>i /.o ■ >-(. cnt, - tit',^ .a^,'^ ^■^rM-ur V
'7e are in coapl..te agreer.^nt about developing Guam and bolster-
ing the defenses of the Philippines. The Arr-ij'- is Sundinc; everything it
can out there. As you know, we are sending Tomm^'' some PTs. Ilorc aid ^
would be sent him if it were possible to do so. I fear, however, that
it is pretty .late tc start on Guam anything more than V7e already have
in hand. Tfe will make all the progress v;e con, remuTibering that "Dcrllars
Cannot Buy Yesterday."
2184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
In discussing the priorities in connection '.-rith pn-paration
for a Pajific V/ar, for your convenience, I shall quote the paraf3raphs
fron youFyjlettcr andyyComment.
Paragraph 2(a) of your letter. Transports and Light Destroyer
Transports. During the Commander-inChief 's visit to '.Tashincton,ali
the transports, including the light destroyer transports, v.-ere trans-
ferred to the Atlantic. The nec«-S3it3'- for this is recccnized. Never-
theless, We still ni.:cd transports in the Pacific and the need is even
greater ncvf (in point of view of tine particularly) because inost of ■
our trained marines T/^nt vTith the transports and v^e are faced with an
inncdiate training problen in addition to a possible vrar situation.
The Department has initiated action to co-plet^^ th^ M/'JIRIS and ZlilLIi!
and to acquire and convert four nore trcJi?;ports for the Pacific, but,
so far as is Inoivn, has done nothing about replajing the li-'ht destroyer
transports (APD's). Those vessels vfero jriginally conceived and devel-
oped foi- a Pacific canpaign. T)-.ey arc especially suitable for use. in
attacks on atolls and roay be the only i.-.^ans of readily attaokj.ng those
positions. Y.Tiile by no moans discounting tlieir usefulni-ss in the Atl.'-Ji-
tic, the need for then in the Pacific is paranoimt. If at all possible,
they sould be retum>-d to this ocean at once. If this cannot be done,
and only if it cannot be dont, additional destroyers must be converted
as soon as possible. V.'ork on the large trcjisports nust also be eiipedited
and completion dat>..s anticipated if possible.
Comment. Ti'e all recognize that the APD's were dev>. loped
vrith a Pacific campaign in mind. Vi'o vdthdrew them to the Atlrjitic with
great reluctance, and you can count on their being returned to the
Pacific at the earliest opportunity. Like^vrise, work is being pushed
on the HARRIS and ZEILH'I. I must confess that progress' on those r.hips
has not been wholly satisfactory.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2185
SECRET
ROUGH DR.'JT FOR .\DI.:iR.'J. KULiEL'S LETTER August l6, 19U1
Paragraph 2 (b) of your letter - Marine Equipment. The Sixth
Defense Battalion docs not now have its full equipment, particularly -U
guns and .30 and .$0 caliber machine sj-ons. The remaininc units of the
Second Marine Division were stripped of much of tlieir equipment to fit
out the reenforccd regiment that went East. There is practically no
marine ammunition now on the Vfest Coast. It is practically certain that
these units will fight before the /jTiiy Mdll and their needs must be given
priority. We can't fight an amphibious v/ar in the Pacific without ammu-
nition, for the marines.
We are going ahead with the preparation of a camp in
Oahu for five thousand marines. V/hen they come, they should be fully
equipped for -Tinphibious warfare. The transports etc., should be psady
at the same time. ^Vn estimate of v/hen the needed equipment and men will
be available would help us in our planning.
Comment. In reference to the 3" -U pins, and the .30 caliber
machine guns of the Sixth Defense Battalion, reports received at Head-
quarters, Marine Corps indicate that that organization has had all of its
initial allowances in those weapons since 7 Jiily 19lil; that is, 12 - 3"
iU guns, and 30 - .30 caliber machine guns. The shortage in .^0 caliber
X.\ machine guns should be remedied by SepteiTiber, 19Ul.
^\n outline of the present situation in reference to
Marine equipment and related matters, as well as an estimate as to when
this equipment will be available is contained in CNO Serial 083312 which
•Jas forwarded to the Commander in Chief, U. 3. Pacific Fleet about 2^
July l^lA. It is "jelievGd that this presents as complete a picture as
is possible at thi.s time. The bulk of the shortages in equipment and
ammunition lies in items which must be procured from the .tony. Existing
stocks in the United States arc at prcscint much too low to meet the re-
quirements of all Services. Proportionate allocations of new equipment
for all Services have been made by the Joint Board, and the Navy and Mar-
ine Corps may expect their proporti6n to be delivered from the manufactur-
ers more steadily and conc-istcntly in the future than heretofore.
The general shortages in ammunition for the Marine Forces are
likely to exist for some t?jne, however, mainly due to the fact that
quantity production will not obtain until late in the present calendar
year. In the event of an acute emergency, it is believed that sufficient
ammunition to fill immediate reqtiiremcnts of the Second Division .
79716 O — 46 — pt. If
2186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET „
as it exists today may be specially obtained from the ^Irmy. -t^Q^mif -atta^
The present outlook indicates that sufficient person-
nel vfill be available by 1 October 19l*l, to form for expeditionary duty
a reinforced regiment from the Second Marine Division, and also leave
within the Division a nucleus for training of ix.s remaining units. It
is hoped that the Second Division can be completed in personnel by Janu-
ary, 19li2.
Parngraph 2 (c) of your letter - .Ammunition Facilities, The
condition of ammunition handling and stowage facilities ashore are in
general satisfactory at the present time. Stowage facilities have been
completed, are in the process of constiniction, or are about to be started
to handle assignments of service reserves of gun ammunition, bombs, mines,
and torpedoes. This includes igloos already completed and others now
under construction at Westloch aid at Lualualci,
New construction authorized and about to be undertaken
includes four powder magazines and four shell houses at Lualualei,
and barricaded stowage for live mines, two new mine anchor buildings and
a new mine assembly building at "Jestloch.
New construction needed to conqjleta stowage and liand-
ling facilities includes extension of Westloch dock to a maximum of two
thousand feet and the construction of four powder magazines and two shell
houses at TTestloch to accomodate target practice anrounition which cannot
be stowed in vessels of the Fleet, This latter construction has been
recommended to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District in recent
correspondence and wc have no word yet on i^at action he has tdcen.
Comment, The Bureai of Ordnance has had all anraunition storaige
items requested by the Commander-in-Chief provided, except:
(a) Extension of ammunition pier at West Loch, Funds
have been obtained to extend the antnunition pier from 600 feet to 1^00
feet. Since no authorization vdll be required to extend the pier from
1500 feet to 2000 feet, the Bureau of Ordnance expects to divert the
necessary funds temporarily from other projects for this extension, to
avoid delay. Tlie funds required are $2$0,000, which v/ill eventually be
obtaLnod from Conycss to repay the project robbed,
(b) llo fxinds are available for the construction of
four poT.-der magazines and tvro shell houses at V/est Loch. No authoriza- ,^
has been obtained for the constnaction of these magazines. The Bureau uv^
of Orrlnance will have these magazines included in the next authorizaion
bill toyypresented to Congress and will have the necessary funds requested
for their construction. The funds required are estimates as at $210,000,
2,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2187
SECR2T
The following was supplied by the Chief of the Bureai of Yards
and Docks:
"The construction of four powder magazines and two shell houses
at Westloch is a new item not previously presented to the Department and
we are awaiting word from the Commandant as to his recommendation. The
construction of these buildings will necessitate the purchase of additional
land. "
Paragraph 2 (d) of your letter. The importance of building
v^) Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to the point conteinplated by the Greenslade
Board. For the present Navy Yard, Pearl' Harbor should be regarded pri-
marily as a "restricted availabiltiy" yard. Overhaul of ships here should
not include battleships and cruisers or other ships for extensive regu-
lar overhauls. The facilities of the yard should be confined to emergency
and low priority overhaul, regardless of overhead costs.
Comment. -Jujldtng up Ma^'y Yay'd, P&ap^j^fg'te^r-. The Bureau of
Ships shortly expects an appropriation from Congress (Supplemental 19U2)
to take ere of, among other things, all navy yard facilities necess.ary
to repair and maintain the 19U6 fleet in war. Pearl Harbor is funded in
the anount of ^0,000,000 for this purpose, which includes the cost of
an additional major battleship dock. This dock, together with the other
facilities which will be accor^lished with the money, will bring the yard
up to the point conten^lated by the Greenslade Board Report. The time
involved in expanding Pearl Harbor to the extent indicated above is as
follows :
12 months for $0% of the facilities.
18 months for the remainder of the facilities,
22 to 2U months for the dry dock.
Note: -The Commander ip Chief , N^acifi'c Fleet, >ind Fleet Main-
tenaice - Operajdons control maJctng ships available for ovewvauls and
™_ u ^ --^ / \
set the priority for work at the Na.\'y Yard yearl Harbor, / \
/ \ / \ / \ ^ \
The Bureau of Ships has increased the special stocks at this
Yard of spare propellers and shafting - it has under procurement, addi-
tional stock in tubing for boilers, condensers, superheaters and heat
transfer apparatus; additional stock of generators and ice machines.
2188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
The Shore Establishments Division intends to ducnent the vrorking
force as the capacity and Trork load arc increased.
Relative to the repair facilities at the Pearl Harbor Yard, the
Bureau of i'ards and -^Dcks has issued instructions to ex;3editc all of
this T/ork to the greatest practicable extent.
The reconnendation to confine the activities of the Wavy Yard,
Pearl Harbor to energency and low priority ovi.rhauls crai be acconplished
by transferring regular overhauls of Battleships, Carriers, Cruisers, and
Destroyers to 'Jest Coast yards but this recoinnendation is not concurred
in for thi, follovring reasons;
(1) The Greenslade Board report, approved by the Sec-
retary of the Navy on iiay lU, l^i^l, reconnended that ihc Pearl Harbor Navy
Yard be built up to take care of 20 per cent of the fleet in the Pacific
when the two-ocean navy was in existence and that the yard be capable of
handling "full overhauls and damage" vath simultaneous drydocking facili-
ties for 2 Battleships, 1 CR, 1 CB, 1 CA, 1 twin DL and a DL marine rail-
way. Pertinent to this is a letter from the Assistant Secretaiy of the
Navy (Shore Establishments Division) uatcd June 26, l^iil in regard to
building up the facilities at Pearl Harbor and noting that no Battleships
or Carriers were scheduled for overhaul at Pearl Harbor in 19li3- The
third paragraph of this letter is quoted hercvdth:
"It is believed it is necessary that capital
ships be overhauled at Pearl ^^rbor if that Yard is ex-
pected to perform the war "task that has been assigned.
It is, therefore, recommanded that in the next revision
of the availability schedule, a start be na.de tov/ard an equit-
able diversion of the overhaul of Battleships rjid Carriers
from Puget Sound to Pearl na.rbor."
-¥fce Sir&e^fe©-?y F-l^et— I'aintonancu Divi&i-cn-^bclieved that only by
actual overhaul and repair of Capital Ships, Destroyers, and Cruisers can
the Pearl f'arbor organization be trained and made capable of rop-iring 4»
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2189
those ships in cjti cr.ercuicy, toguthcr v,'it!i d^vclop-.i^nt of n^,cossary
facilities.
(2) Runr.irs to BritisJi ;.'cv-l v.,s^uls, p.-.rticu-
larly the larj^^r typ^s o2 ships, is cbsorbinr; r. lai'gc
percentage of th^, r>-pair facilities of continental U.S.
yards and it is ^xp< cted that tin- demands "'Till increase.
East Coast yards arc being used prii.iarily for this -iTCrlc
but it has bt;i,n found necessary - due to full schedules of
these yards - to send some British ships to Furiet Sound
and i^arc Island.
If these latter yards arc fully schwdul^d v-'ith
our o'-Tn ships (as can bu (jxpuct'^d if all Battleship,
Carrier, Cruiser, and D;jstrcyv,r overhauls are transferred
to them from Pearl '.'arbor) it is ^-^roble.viatical v:hether
British ships can be repaired and ov^-rhauled at the rate
that this is no-.: bcin~ undertaken.
The fori-goinr-, ccmLier.t -by— I'-iU^^ ^aint ^-'i a-ne e is substrjntiolly
in accord vrLth your letter L9-5 (50) ov^r L9-3 Serial 01176 of 1 Aufrust
Paragraph 2 (c) of "our letter. Provide more and more per-
sonnel to the fleet for training. The p-rsonm-l situation has been
presented to the Bureau of i'-aviration and that ^ureau is thorour.hly
familiar vdth cur roquirer.iunts . ".'e cannot provide experienced personnel
for ncvr censtrud ion next year unless ve obtain recruits and train
them intensively at once. I realize that recruiting has fallen off ajad
that the Department is doing all it can but re are losing trained nen
faster than 'je are getting neT; recr.dts. ^s I stated in a recent letter
wc could use 20,000 more rien in the Pacific ?'lect rirht novf. - «3 ^oec.^-.^ -
Comment. The present rate of recraiting is about 9j300 men
a month, "-ccording to the best estimates, about 12,000 recruits arc re-
quired in order to meet the requirenen-'.s of the service on June 30, 19l|2
based on present allowanc>-s. (This estimate is subject to variables
such as changes in dates of coamiscioning si-.ips and stations.) Therefore
the Navy vn.ll lack a proxiior.tely 32,000 men necessar:/- for I-avj-- require-
ments on "^une 30, 19li2. It is estimated that this rail bt^ enough men to *
2190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
fill conplcncnts rnd allov;ancc;s on that dcitt, to an average of about
92^, Thci i-locts aro nov; fillod to about 9\^o of conplcr.(,nt£ . This per-
centage vdll drop due to large recent increases in aviation squadron
allowances. It is estiniated that Navigation can replace losses in the
Fleets vdth recruits to maintain then at about the sane percentage of
men aboard to complti.'.onts as at present. '^^-"^''•**- /«•o-^
The recent large vfithdrawals f ron the F ieots have been due
to the necessity of supplying the crows for the large number of auxiliary
vessels rccoitly acquired and for the assembly of men for iidvancod De-
stroyer, Submarine, and Aviation Bases. These demands wi-r^, superimposed
upon the di-nands for the regular building and usual purchasing program.
The above e5ti:;:ates are based on a monthly rate of recruiting
of 9,300. Recruitin,7 is now on the increase end additional men over
the 9,300 monthly •in be furnished to the Fleets./y^o^iJT"-^'"^
Paragraph 2(f) of your letter. tJecd for a hospital ship in
the Pacific FTe>,t and for completion of ne^T hospital at Pearl Ilarbor.
Comment. . It is contei:iplated assigning the SOLACE (i'lUS), Ex-
IROQUOIS, to the Pacific Fleet upon readiness for service, which should be
in the latter part of "-ugust, 19ltl. ?uither, it is contaaplate-d
transporting Ilobile Base Hospital IIo. 2 from Kew York to Oahu in the
U.S. 5. PROCYOM (AK19) departing New York early in October; she is a
l5-knot ship and will call at San Die_-o to debark some personnel and
stores there en route.
So far as the nev/ hospital is concerned, the contract for
this has been let and presumably the v/ork is underv;ay.
Paragra h 2(g) of your letter. Urgency for sv.i
ith llaval District for patrol purposes, to reli
i.iall craft in ,
the Fourteenth llaval District for patrol purposes, to relieve the load
on our limited number of destroyers.
Comment. The project is now underrray to send twelve PT's to
the lltth iJaval District as scon as the boats con be prepared and trans-
portation provided. This shipment -.Till follow the six ilTB's going to
the l6th Naval District via the GUADALUPE scheduled to depart from New
York Yard about 15 August or as soon thereafter as practicable.
jt^t) - -/<^ -«'** -*-!*. ..^to*^ .^Cjtt. /~44^C^^-e. yejt^n. . /U^^t.^ w>>«-*.»v ^-<^/t-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2191
SDcru:!
,'d for acquiring :idvanccd
base ;;uitt;ric
Paragraph 2(h) of your lettur. The need
il and assciiibling it at ''.are Island.
Commtint. ■^ho project of assuiibling advance Base ilaterial has
been raised to an A-l-a priority, and the asscaiibling of this naterial is
t\r
g' ing ah^ad satisfactorily
axM,
^L^fJL^t
t^-Au£ «^-<.4>'<^
&A.
2192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Para[;rr.ph 2(i) or /our letter. Correspondence hcis rone TcnTard
urrin:. that all available licht craft in the Pacific be fitted vdth depth
charges, listening c<--r, etc. This is important.
Corjient. In this connection, I quote vcrbatira the ruinarks of
the Fleet Maintenance Division in order that you nay have the entire
picture:
The status of placinc depth charges and under-water sound equip-
ment on li ht craft is as follo\7S (taken up by classes);
Pi Is and DtiSs - These vessels have depth cJu'.rgcs and echo-ranring
equipment authorizsdj some have the equipment installed rT.d tjiosc ships
that have not yet received thuir echo-ran^inf; equipment vdll rtt Tod^l
X Series commencinc in September 19lil. .A«*l, -5/^»— ^ ^^r^y. ^ ^
f f
AVDs - Stabilitj' conditions on these ships are not cood and the
addition of depth charres, racks, sr Y-oms, and echo-ran ^in[T equipment
T.lll necessitate compensating ^7ci;^•ht removal. It is xinderstood that the
desired equipment can be installed providing the toving reel on tl.e fan
tail is permanently removed. "A lii^'htiTei^ht echo-ran-_lng ane listening
gear cquipn^-nt, Ilodel 'TZii'^, has been developed v>-hich weighs about 1300
pounds, vrith deliveries connencin^ in October l^Ul.
The follovTing are the requirements for the V/E/i equip-
ment :
(a) power supply 115 volts D.C.
(b) Head room required for hoist train equipment
about 70 inches.
(c) At least 2U inches betv:een frames of ships to
accomodate pedestal.
(d) Remote control of train by means of cables and
sheaves, using hand wheel at operating position.
The above equipmi-nt is suitable for any installation
in jUis (Bird Class) and in most converted yachts . Additionally, this
equj.pm-nt can be installed in any ot'.ior t:,pes of eliips having adequate
space and power supply.
A lightweight listening equipment (I'odel JIT-9), about 1300
Dounds, has been developed and contract avrarded for 230 setsj delivery
7.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2193
s3c?-":t
cor.iincnccs in ^uf-ust 19U1 at c rate ol' 10 i_ach v;^ck. 'i'hc follo-::in;^' aro
the requirununts for installation of the JIC-9 uquipmi-nt;
(a) Power supply 115 volts D.C. or 21* volts D.C.
(Two tj-pcs of motor cuncrators available,
producing 11$ volts, A. C) Overall dimensions
of motor generator set 292 x 13^ x 11-3/ii inches.
(b) I.Iaxiraun head room required for hoist train
laechanisn abcut 96 inches.
(c) Onlj' limitation or frai.io spacing is that is
pass the ii-inch projector shaft.
(d) No remotu control - hand hoist ond train
directly connected to projector sheift.
This equipnont is for listening only (no echo-ran(i-
ing feature) and is suitable for use in any type of ship havirig adequate
space and pov/ur pupply. Space allotted to the equipment must provide
for the hoist-train equipment (overall dimensions 7' -9" x 26| x 20"),
receiver (overall dimensions 19" x 12" x l$-l/C") cjid sufficient space
for the operator.
APDs - The APDs have the depth charge tracks installed and noTf
carry 2'n - 300 pound depth charges. The stability conditions of these
ships is so unsatisfactory that they vdll require ^0 tons of fixed ballast,
'^he installation of the V/EA echo-ranj-ing equipment, descrived under AVDs,
above can be accomadated in these ships.
/i.Is and AVPs - Thu question of installing dt-pth charge and
echo-ranging and (or) listening equipment on these types has bucn referred
to the bureau of Ships for study and recommendation as to the practic-
ability of accomplishment.
It should be pointed out t! at draft and stability
conditions of these vessels is critical and instructions arj about to be
issued limiting their displacements. Informal information from the Bureau
of Ships indicates that corapunsatory wuirht reducdon must be y;ade on
practically a pound-f or-po nd basis in order to install the desired equip-
ment, '^'he installation of echo-rani:ing, or listening equipment is de-
e.
pendent upon the delivery schedule as outlined above under AVDs,
2194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECK^T
It is to be noted that the liglitcst depth charge rack
now developed (carrying six 300 pound depth charges) weighs about 1500
poxuids. As each depth charge with its equipment weighs U20 pounds, the
total weight of depth charges and track to be compensated for will be
about liOOO pounds. The weight of the lightest underwater soxind equipment
is sdoout 1300 pounds as is explained above under AVDs.
PEs, Pes, FYs, and YPs. .Vll these vessels have depth
charges, the ninnber depending upon the size of the vessels. Some of
these vessels are equipped with both depth charge racks and Y-guns,
Echo-ranging and (or) listening equipment has been
authorized and yrill be installed as soon as the equipment can be provided.
Paragraphs 3 and 3 (a) of your letter. Communications . The
supply of communication, radio, and sound equipment to the fleet and the
Shore Stations leaves much to be desired, although a great improvement
has been noted in the last year.
Specifically it is noted that the Kaneohe Air Station
was acqilred, built, commissioned, and actually operated prior to the
receipt of any radio apparatus, except some which we diverted from its
intended advance base use.
Comment, Here is quoted in their entirety the remarks of the
Chief of the Bureau of Sliips:
"During the fiscal year 19U1 the Bureau of Ships
placed contracts for radio and so\ind material amounting to aqpproximately
$110,000,000, The material contracted for included all of the material
listed in the 191^1 and 19U2 Communication Inq^rovement Plans issued by the
Chief of Naval Operations and a large amount of additional material required
to meet previously unanticipated needs. The funds included in the regular
19lil budget were made available in an appropriation bill which became law
on June 11, 19U0, but the bulk of the funds utilized during the year did
not become available until passage of a supplemental appropriation a ct in
mid September 191*0, Considering the time when the necessaryfUnds became
available, and the tremendous increase of procurement effort necessary, it
is felt that the prosecution of the entire program has been as rapid as
could reasonably be expected vinder the circiimstances. However, it is recog-
nized that many needs of the service are of great urgency and that any delay
9.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2195
SECRET
at all in effecting deliveries after needs have been determined is object-
ionable. Difficulties in obtaining critical materials and con5)onents have
in some cases caused serious delays in deliveries under contracts but
by use of increased facilities all contractors involved have increased
rates of production to a considerable extent. It is expected that most
of the serious needs for radio and sound equipment will be taken care
of v»ithin the next few months.
Funds for the initial allowance of radio equipment for t he
Kaneohe Air Station were included in the regular IJiil appropriation act,
which became law on June 11, 19U0. Initiation of procurement of radio
material for Kaneohe was commenced immediately afteB the funds becsme
available4 Funds for items later axided to the allowance became avail-
able in September, 19l|0,
The tabiilation below indicates the present situation as regards
radio equipment for the Kaneohe Mr Station:
jectcd Remarks
aVllowed equip- Installed To Be Shipped Exp'
raent ' D
_____ ate
2 TBM 1 1 Jan.l9ii2
2 TBP 2
1 TBU 1 Mar.l9U2
6 TBff 2 Sept.l9l4l
h Jan.l9ii2
2 TCA 2 Sept.l9la 1 TBO-1 in use
2 TCB 2 N0V.I9I1I
1 TCC 1 Aug.l9la 1 TBR-1 installed
h BBX/RBB/BBC U Indefinite Mew type-other
receivers avail-
able if urgently
required
6 RAS . 6
1 DY 1 11 Aug.l9ia from IH Tfash
1 DP 1 11 Aug, 191a IDN from NYIil
1 Inst. LDG Equip. 1 Sept.l9U2#U0 on priority
list; deliveries
start Sept.l9iil
1 RAU 1 Oct.l9l4l
in 1 Jan.l9U2
There are available in the Pearl Harbor pool several more TBR-1
portable equipments which may be utilized to take care of immediate needs
at Kaneohe if required. These TBRr-l equipments are not necessarily reserved
or intended for advanced base service, but are availabc for any use at
}i
the discretion of the CJoramandant or the Commander in Chief,
10.
2196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2SCRET
Paragrayh 3(b) of yoiir letter. It took BuEnc two years to put
"Chinese copies" of NRL's Radar on six ships.
Comment . Here follows the remarks of the Bureau of Ships and
the Director, Naval Communications Division^-n. .^-t^^i^ ^fi-m**^ •
"The Model X^F R.IDj\R equipment developed by Naval Research Labor-
atory was installcl in USS NET YORK 12-18 December, 193C,and was tested
at the same time as the Model CXZ Radar equipment developed try RCA }l\£gt
Co., and installed in USS TEX.'iS. These tests continued through March
1939. Report of tests was received from Commander Atlantic Squadron
8 April 1939. As a result of these tests, the equipment v/as returned
to Naval Research Laboratory for modifications indicated as necessary.
For example, the equipment had no calibrating feature installed. A
conference was held with representatives of all interested officers of
the Department as a rcs'ilt of which it was decided to proceed with the
procurement of a limited number of these equipments. The size and weight
of the equipment were at the time important factors in the decision.
Conferences were held with contractors without delay and a specification
was prepared. The requisition was issued 28 July 1939 and the contract
was awarded 16 October 1939 to RaV Mfe. Co. The time between the date
of requisition and date of contract was utilized by the RCA Mfg. Co.,
to inspect the model, work up estimates, submit bid and by the Bureaus
of Ships and Supplies and Accounts to make award. The first equipment
was shipped by factory May 21, 19^0. It i-dll be noted that the time
for dilivery of the first equipment by contractor v/as approximately 13
months from the date of completion of tests in U35 NET YORK and 7 months
after date of contract. The last equipment vjas shipped by contractor
on June 20, 19ll.O, The dates of installation of this equipment were
dictated by the dates of availability of the vessels concerned, A
matter over which this Bureau does not have control. According to the
records of this Bureau, however, installation of the first equipment
was completed August 2U, 19U0, and the last on October la, 19U0, and
the last date being approximately 18 months after the receipt of the
report on NSf YCSRK tests.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2197
" The Model X.'lF Rlill\R, built by Kaval Rcscr.rch Laboratory', was
tested afloat during the late v/inter and early spring of 1939. This
test indicated that additional equi-p;n<^nt should be purchased for trial,
A study was made to dctemine the practica' .bility of installing the
equipin;,nt afloat; this study isclosed that only ten (10) ships could
accomodate the large antenna array vrithout first making extensive
alterations to ships or without experiencing serious interference to
the radio bean from the ships' stracturcs. ^hief of llaval Operations
requested prccur<-nent of ten (10) production models of the Xi'kF. The
earliv,st that funds could be obtained to manufacture the :'odel CUc'. (copy
of JniL :;odel X;j) was during fiscal 19liO, Due tc the hi:her unit cost
of the equipr.-.ent and the extraordinary expenditures of radio funds in
connection vdth "neutrality enlcrcer.cnt", the Uureau of Ships could manu-
facture but six (6) complete uniLs. ''Iricn additional funds were nade
available by emergency appropriations, fourteen (lii) Model CJL'^'-l's v^erc
ordered as "stop-gap" equipnv.nt pending completion of development of
an improved detector - the Ilodel SC." ^^ •^fU*^^ ,.»,^ x^^<^ /St.,^^^ ,
Paragraph 3(c) of your letter, "or years BviEng prevented re-
search by NRL in anj'' form of radio recognition device and hence retarded
the production of such apparatus. The Fleet is still \7ithout it thoufh
it is under manufacture.
Comment. In this connection, the '-'hiof of the Bureau of Ships
stat<^s:
" The need for a satisfactory reccgnition device in the fleet
has been recognized by the Bureau of Ships as being the single greatest
one since tlie time of the last war and ev.^ry id^^a advanced by th^. flee*,
the Naval Research Laboratory'' or other laboratories tiat appeared to
offer proma.se has been thoroui:hly investi; ated. This research has fully
covered the fields of ultra violet, visible, infra red, radio and sound
speitrums. Many systems vfhich .vcre developed tc a point v/hich warranted
service tests have been tested in the Ilect and all have been reported
unsatisfactory by the fleet eVen after modification by IJIIL and other
12.
2198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SSCRET
laboratories in accordance vritii the r.lshcs of the fleet, '■'■heru has boon
no lack of funds in this connection. I'he IIRL has been engagi-d centinu- ^
ously since its ustablishment in efforts to dcv-,lop ^ recognition s^^stein. j y
That portion of the statement relating to the preventing of research by »
NRL in any form of radio recognition device is not one of fact." *^ ^ t^
It can be concluded that very substantial additions to Fleet wr^
Radar installations rrill be nade before the end of the cr.lendar year, i*-^"-*-
Paragraph 3(d) of your letter. T/e riust have the IFF (Identi-
fication, Friend or Foe j for aircraft" aT"once. The program lags and on
June llith cnly 56 v;erc on order from Canada -Jri-th indefinite delivery
date. See "Aviation" betow.
Consent. In regard to the forecoing, the Bureau of Aeronau-
tics remarks as follov/s: / /y^jKrt^^f'"''^*^'^ - '^"^out^,*/*-*^-**^- /iry^^j^ ^m*^>^-
"Currently, y(Jhe Bureau of Aeronautics is concentrating on the
earliest practicable devolopn^-nt and procurcn-^nt of suitable RADilH equip-
ment for aircraft. Recognition equipment '.^-ill be installed in all service
aircraft at the earliest opportunitj'. One hundred (100) iS>L (/jaerican
recognition) sets are nov: due for delivery, and they ^vill be distributed
to the fleet in the most effective manner possible, liatcrial is being
assembled for 1500 American ABA sets which ttiI]. be put in production by
General Electric as soon as a satisfactory ser'/ice test is completed. fC**^A^
356 British I.F.F. sets have been ru^uestedj 56 of these sets are being
delivered to the Atlantic Fleet and delivery is rapidly being completed."
The tentative plan for initial R/iD/Jl installations in a,ircraft
is as follows:
A brief summary of nomenclature is:
a. /iSV ;!K II - Dritish search equipment suitabl'- for VPBs.
b. ASA - iUnerican search equipment including high altitude
altimeter, suitable for VPB's.
c. ASB - Ami-rican search equipment, expected to be suitable
for 2 and 3 place planes,
13.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2199
d. ;^V - lacil (Fleet ..ir am nodiricd) , British socrch
equipment for usv, in larce single engine planes,
c, IlBI^ - jinerican r^cornition equipnent,
f . IFF - British rccornition equipment,
g. AYA - /jaerican hich range altimeter,
h. AYB - /iDerican low range altimeter.
i. AI - I.3( IV - British Interception equipr..,nt - multi-place
airplanes.
Search equipment (long range British i,.SV or ;jnericrji ASA) vfill
be installed in all PBY-5 and subsequent VPB models. Initial installa-
tions arc being made.
It is expected to install ASB (snail search equipment) vdth a
low ranee altimeter in one plane of each section of VT3's. All T3F
airplanes irill have space reserved for this. It is expected to reserve
space in all nev/ VSB and VSO airplanes for the ^iinerican ASB, and rfhere ^
practicable install this equipment in current typos, \^*f
Initial installation is now being -made of the experimental rj^
model of the ;lSB in an SBD airplane. If successful, a number of these
planes vrlll be made available as soon as the equipnent is provided.
Steps liTiVe been taken to obtain models of the British I.X II
ASV equipment (modified for Fleet ^ar Arm) for reproduction purposes.
It is expected to supplement manufacture of ijnerican ASB equipment vrith
an /jnerican version of the modified 1.0C II.
Radio Altimeter (high altitude) will be installed as part
of thfc /jnerican search equipr.ient in all VPB airplanes. It is plamiod to
equip one airplane of each section of VTB's trith hirh altitude altimeters
and another airplane of each section of VTB's ^fith a lor; range altimeter
for use with the ISB equipnent (as indicated in poragraphs above re
search equipment. ) .
Recoenition equipment vrLll be installed in all service airolrjics
at the earliest opportunity. The iirst 100 jjnerican i'JiA cquipnents are
now due for delivery. 14.
2200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Inturcfaption equipncnts. Provision Tor thusi- oquipnonts vn.ll
be nadc in r. ccrt:iin nvmbcr of I'liU "irplr.ncs c:s soon as tliL. d^v.,lopri^nt
in the United Stc'.tcs rjid r.broc.d ox nodols suitr.blc lor use in single
t-nf:inc, sinfic place .lii^ilcncc permits. Pending this JcvLlopnent, c
tt-st installr.tion is being made of a British I3C IV cquipr.^.cnt in an 5BD
airplane. If successful, a number of tl:esc planes T/ill be r.v.dc available
for us^ as- interceptors as soon as this cquipnent crjn be obtained frora
-ither British or ijnerican source.
Projects have been initiated to deEi.::n search and interception
antenna structures v/hicb are most readily duaountable and which are
strea::ilined as much as practicable. Developnont of i'lncricaji search ^ / ,ojnrJt~
■gJ>^2,X -
and interce-ition equipnent vrill stress read;;,'- reiuoval provisions in o.^Ji£ r^'^-
order to result in maxinun of operational flexibility. '**'*^
Plans for further installation of Radar in carrier and cruiser
airplanes are dependent on installation difficulti.s and initial per-
fomiance. .. more conprchensive plan nay be expected to be published
about Januairj'-, 19ii2. . ,,
'Deliveries liave begun on lOh l.odel .'J;.. ITT" equipnents for
aircraft tccether Tdth 32 nodel BE/B? eq'iip:,:_nts for shipboard use.
These vlll be ^^iven service tests in the ^lect tccether vdth 3 '-f;del
BI equipments for shipboard use. The first BI equipment is due at KRL
September 22, 19lil. The contractor is asses.ibling material for l500 ad-
ditional .Ji.i equipments and further production vrill be authorized just
as soon as tests justify the step. ^.11 of the above is of .j.ierican
design but because of desi;n and operational fv,atures it vdll not oper-
ate vdth corresponding British ship, shore or ?.ircraft throes. To pro-
vide for this contingency two each of the latest British ship, shore
and aircraft equipnents are being flovm to tlie United States and vrill
be modified for production iji the United States and supplied to all forces
likely to operate vdth British forces. These srjnple equipnents are due
within a fev; days according to advic^^s fron the I'avrJ. Attrirht', London.
The 56 equipnents nentioned in the paragraph to 'vhich tliis .or-r::ent is
directed are for Support Force Aircraft and ei^ht are ncv; in the process
of being installed." 15*
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2201
SECRET
Paragr^h 3(e) of yoxu- lottcr. Radar equipment for submarine
is highly important. I am not informed as to exact status of this but
understand development is not entirely satisfactory. There is evidence
that German subs are equipped with Radar,
In general, Naval shipboard radio and sound equipment is so
ej-aboratc that it cannot be manufactured expeditiously, BuEnc should have
type plans for apparatus of such a nature that they can c^t results from
industry and not make each new piece of apparatus a research job, ■^^^■^^
Comment, /\n omni-directional aircraft detection equipment
was tested in CSRiVYLING on 2 Aucust 19U.. Although the results of the
test were somewhat discouraginc, the equipment showed sufficient promise
to warrant its manufacture. It is believed that the development of a
directional antenna system will jpreatly improve the performance of the
submarine equipmontj this project will bo prosecuted, /
Contracts have been awarded for the manufacture of 10-cm sur-
face-ship detection equipment for submarines. This equipment is due for
delivery about January 19U2, The equipment which is being desicned for
making ni{^t attacks while the submarine is surfaced, is expected to be
capable of taking accurate ranges and bcarinf;s on capital ships at dis-
tances in the order of 10,000 yards.
In order to expedite the manufacture of radio and sound equip-
ment, the Bureau of Ships has frozen on current designs. The delay in
procurement of radio and so\ind equipment is n2>t entirely due to the "elab-
orate" design; the "priority ratings" for raw materials that the Navy De-
partment is assigned greatly affects the production of equipment. The
Bureau of Ships also is procuring modified commercial radio equipment.
It has not been conclusively determined that the German submar-
ines SXQ equipped with Radar, It is, however, highly probable that they
are so equipped because it is known that these craft operate with much
facility at nij^t.
Paragraph U(a) of your letter. Pre-Fleot Training. Two units
under the Fleet at San Diego, one for patrol squadrons and one for carrier
squadrons. Moro pilots for battleships and cruisers, for traini:ig on
board ship. Particular emphasis on double complements for patrol squad-
rons j anticipation of snlisted personnel numbers and training in all
categories, particularly patrol squadrons; building up the supply of spire
airplanes; accomplishing the training without any further drain on combat
readiness of active sqiiadrons,
16.
79716 O— 46 — pt. 16 19
2202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sscRia
Comaente. In this connection, the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronau*
tics refflarka:
"On 26 Jxily, 2 signed a letter that embodied meaaures for the
improvement of aviation training of pilots and other nemhere of flight
crews in the intermediate stage that occurs between primary school and
fleet Bfuadrons. I hope the effect will he salutary and beneficial in
the irnnediate future. VP-13 will be held at Sen Diego to launch an ii>-
tensive transitional training program in combination with the Training
lest and Acceptance Unit already in operation for patrol planes. It is
recognized that further drains on combatant squadrons are undesirable
but the training centers must continue to function or the supply of
pilots for the organisation of new squadrons will not be adequate. Every
experienced aviation officer in the training establishnent ashore will
be released for duty in fleet squodrons as soon as he can be replaced.
The majority of the expansion of the aeronautical organization afloat
will be accomplished without disturbing pilots already in fleet squadrons.
▲side from transitional training in the larger ps.trol planes,
pilots and enlisted members of flight crews must be trained in fleet patrol
squadrons whose primary task is their nreparation for duty in active coi*-
batant squadrons. Althotigh every squadron on the West Coast may be
assigned this duty, it will be necessary for Patrol Wings OND and T.iO
in the Hawaiian Area to absorb pny excess in personnel that cflnnot be
trained effectively because of insufficient numbers of aircraft and quali-
fied personnel.
There will be an advanced carrier training organisation at
Snn Diego in accordsjice with my letter of 28 July, Additional new VO/VS
pilots will commence re-oorting to the Fleet during August, Any of these
pilots who cojinot be trained expeditiously on boprd ship should be retained
in the advanced carrier trpinlng squadron at Spn Diego for more flying,
particularly gunnery, at the discretion of the Fleet.
■ 17.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2203
SECRST
The priority pccorded to the Amy end British heavy honter
orogracs has l)een the cause of oxtr nost urgent attention. The flnftl
action on priorities was decided at a conference 'between the Secretary
of the Navy and the Secretary of War which was attended by representa^
tives of the Amy ji.iT Corps, the Bureau of Aeronautics and the Office
of Production Management. The net result was an A-l-t award to anproxl-
nately 2,000 (plus or ninus 500) additional naval aircraft, and hrings
a total of 3,596 naval aircraft into the highest nriority classification
given to aircraft. One hundred per cent spare ai^tcraft are now planned
for fleet carrier and ship-based squadrons, and fifty per cent spare
aircraft have heen recpiested for petrol squadrons.
In connection with the foregoing, the Chief of the Bureau of
navigation renarksJ
"The Chief of Naval Operations in his confidential letter^
0p-23-B5,(SC) Pll-1, Serial 081322 of July 28, 1941, directed Coraandeiw
in-Chief , Pacific Fleet end Comnander-in-Chief , Atlantic Fleet to es-
tablish as quickly as practicable within their respective fleets, the
following unite;
(a) Advanced Carrier Training Group, Pacific and Advanced
Carrier Training Group, Atlantic— for the Pacific Fleet, in San Diego
and for the Atlantic Fleet, In Norfolk, Virginie^-^Purpose of these
groups is to give advenced carrier training to newly graduated naval
aviators, fresh fron training centers, prior to assignment to carrier
units in the two fleets.
(b) Transition Training Squedron, Atlsntic and Transition
Training Squadron, Pacific — Pui^ose of these sqiiadrons is to give advpnced
patrol plane tr?ining to newly graduated naval rviators, fresh fron the
training centers, prior to assignment to Patrol plane units in the two
fleets. These squadrons eJ.60 train experienced aviators in the operation
of the model EB2Y airplanes in the Pacific Fleet and the r.odel P3M air-
planes in the A.tlantic Fleet. 18.
2204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECK5T
Experienced Naval Aviators hpve plready been ordered to report
to these training groups pnd equpdrons when they are forned by Comnander-
in-Chief, Pacific and Conraander-iB-Chief, Atlantic. These aviators will
oversee and administer the training of the personnel ordered to these
units.
By the letter referred to Pbove, Chief of Naval Operations
has indicated that during the months of August to Decenber, 1941, inclu-
sive, a total of 130 additional pilots for battleships and cruisers will
be ordered to bothtfleets. Also, for the spne period, 334 carrier Dilots
and 598 patrol plane pilots will be ordered to the above jnentioned.
training units for assignnent to each fleet.
After January, 1942, the training centers will be turning
pilots out at such a rate thPt »>t all tires therepfter, we will always
have sufficient pilots under advanced and transition training or in the
operating aviation units to noet all the fleet requirenents, including
double complements of petrol squadrons.
Based on present estimates, the output of Class "A" Group IV
Schools trainigg aviation ratings aiid radiomen (qualair) will be approxi-*
nately 27,096 enlisted men (Navy) from August 1941 through June 1942,
Sixty-five (65) nercent of the graduates of these Class "a"
Schools have been narked for Pensacola, Corpus Christi, Jacksonville
and Miami, until about 8,170 grrdxiates h?ve been fed Into the flight
training centers, filling their allowances (in total numbers) by pbout
January 20, 1942.
This will leave an estimated bp lance of 18,926 Glass "A" School
graduates for the Jorces Afloat and other shore establishments by June
30, 1942.
The allowances of patrol nlane squadrons have been increased
220^3 over the 1941 allowances.'
Paragraph 4(b) of youy letter. New Torpedo Planes. Highest
priority — A-l-a — instead of present priority which is A-l-b, There
are only half enough torpedo planes now and they are obsolescent, while
war reports demonstrate that there nay be no single item of greater
naval impoatance.
19.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2205
SECRET
Comiaent. The A-l-a rating for torpedo plpnes wrs aot BRtis-
fftctory to the Wpr Depprtnent and^the JOffice of Production Mftixagenent ^
without unP-coeptRtle reduction in priority of other wvpI pircrpft. \V»
There is good reason to question whether a higher priority for torpedo ^
plpnee would hp.ve expedited their delivery. The Hpvy DepPTtnent will j
continue to exert naxinun effort to expedite the production of TfTB for J
the fleet.
Coment. The conversion of the U.S.S. ■AKEFIELD pnd
incor- jVk
Ppragraph 4(c) of your letter. CGnversions for Carrier Land- .^
ing Trpininp. Auxilipry pircrpft carrier conversion was dropped hecpuse .^
of tine pnd cost factors. These cpn l>e greatly reduced by reouiring ^
only the characteristics needed for landing talnlng. The need for these Vvf
ships is extrene. Aircraft carriers should not, and in w?r cpnnot, be a
used for this purpose, while new -nilots nust he properly trained hefore ,J
Joining pxtive squadrons if conhat readiness is not to be Jeopardized. \
U.S.S. ^J
. x^
J *s
porated is contenplated. Steps are now being tpken to procure naterial -? -S
and equipment. The actual conversions will be initiated whenever present ^ V^
services of these vessels as transports can be concluded. It is probable J j
also the the U.S.S. WEST POINT will be included in the pbove cptegory, -"
Paragraph 4(d) of your letter. A.S.V. (ioiti-Surface Vessel)
Equipment. This is of the highest potent ipl vplue. apparently none
will be available for p8.trol planes until Decenber. It can be cai;:ried
by other planes, as shown by reports of British toi-pedo plane operations.
It shotild be provided for every plane that ceji carry it aiuL laueh earlier
deliveries are essential.
There is an aircraft BjJiMR project set up in the Bureeu of
Aeronautics with the objective of providing all necesspry equipment that
can be carried and operated efficiently in aircraft with due considera-
tion for other essentipl equipment. The training of lUHAE operators is
underway so that by the tine the equipaient arrives there will be trained
personnel who are essential for its successful operation. aSV sets will
be provided as alternate installptions in p11 carrier -olaJies that can
accommodate them and all pa.trol ulrnes will be ASV-equipped, Every possi-
ble source of supply, including British pnd Canadipn, is being investi-
geted to accelerate the progrpn. Three hundred Canadian ASV equipment
sets are expected at the monthly rpte of one hundred sets corjnencing
1 October, 1941. 20,
2206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SjiCBJiT
or Joe J flomittii!^. Ihia la Absolutely conplementary to and esostifU
for effective u«e of the Bftdar for Aircraft defense of the Tleat, with-
out it, the Rada* eaanot differentiate between friendly and enei^ airplanes.
There is no definite infomation on deliveries, Ko delay whate(ver is
acceptable.
SSMSal* This subject h»s been discussed elsewhere in this
letter. However, it should be remarked that the Interior Control Board
is setting up essential requirements for BAQAH equipment on boaxd ship.
The Board has been Pdvised to incorporate the identification feature In
ship control ajid flrec control sets since t'h>»» Is ga^A aneMfla te boiiieve —
-«»»- Identification is a very necessary pprt of the BADtsE Installation.
^fffPff-pPh at) 9f y9Vr ^ontr- gngines f9r Haw Patrol Planes
ifiatgjj.. Hose section failures have been occurring. Every effort Is
^eis«_»ede to find and cure the trouble. This should be continued, for
it will be no help to the Fleet or to any destination of these planes to
get new planes that can't fly In place of older planes that can.
Comnegt. The Bureau of Aeronautics and the engine manufacturer
have been advised of the no«e section failures In the engines of VP-14,
The loose-coupled shaft In these engines will elininate the restrictions
on operating the engine within the -oresent critical speed range. However,
this does not apply to VP-14 but this sciuadron is being supplied new heavier
nose sections which the bureau believes will correct present deficiencies
If engine speeds are kept outside the critical range. Only thrfee planes
outside VP-14 have encountered failures In the light nose sections. The
Heavy noses will be shipped from the factory at the rate of ten per week
beginning August 11, 1941, with first deliveries to VP-14.
Paragraph 4(g) of youp latter. Landplane Tield at Johnston
Island. This wa^ removed from the project by the Department. It should
be put back. It is needed not only as an adjunct to local defense but,
more importantly, as en aid to defense pgainst expeditions headed east-
ward and as a stepping stone for lendplane support of expeditions headed
westward.
Comment:. Funds in the amount of $750,000 for this project are
available and the necessary construction work has been authorized.
Paragraph 4(h) of your letter^ K^ehl Lagoon Developcent.
This will be of very great value to patrol plsnes in the He\/aiian area.
It is the best location for operations of these planes and no other place
Is suitable for planned patrol plane expenslon In this area. Inclusion
of facilities for Navy patrol squadrons in this develoiaient should be
undertaken iEDediptely,
31.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2207
Cocpgnt. The Navy DapArtment hae included Eeehi Lagoon as one
of fch9 Vavyo-tponsored developments for cOEBeroial seaplanes in the Hawaiian
N area in its reconnendations to the Oep^rtnent of Cotuserce. The War D^-
/j
partment has aa appropriation of approxiciitely 83,300.000 for this project
. ^ and arrangements are 'being made for additional funds for the dredging
^^ vhi«h la expected to ooonence very sooB* Vfcry patrol plane facilities
are not Included in the provpeotive plans for ttis location. Any special
facilities for naval patrol planes for the present at least must "be of
a temporary nature.
?wag>ift Ml) 9f ygK l^Hn* ffgT^towfflt tf m Pn»^gf
Bf^>t9y's foifl^. This approved developcant is very urgently needed,
there is a strong tendency to turn down many aviation shore facility
items in this area on the hasli that thay will be available when Barber's
point construction is finisbsA« This mates it more thPA ever mandatory
to e::pedite the work.
^. Tour eeomeat on the need f<tr this development is
supported who^e»heartedljr in the Department and will receive the most
careful attention until it meets the Fleet's need, ruads for Barber's
Point in the amount 9f 618,605.000 will be available in August and work
begun immediately If the bill, now pending in Congress, is passed by the
Senate and signed by the President. The bill has already passed the House
and has been approved by the Haval Affairs Committee of the Senate,
I have gone into the subjects you raised in some detail because I
want you to be fully advised. Don't hesiliate to tell us hew you think
we can help. We want to be of all assistance possible, end helpful criti-
cism is always in order.
lou no doubt have seen in the press about otu: conference at
sea. Aside from being a most historic occasion, it was mdst helpful.
It Is to my deep regret that time and distance precluded your being pres>
•at«
with all good wishes r 1 «ml^ CT yr
r ^ Sincere Iv.
J , ' - Sincerely,
O** /S/ Betty
2208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(Rec'd. Clipper 3rd Sept.)
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, 28 August 1941.
Secret
In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu
Dear Mustapha : Have been trying to get a letter off to you for a week, al-
though what I have already sent you covers fairly well our situation to date.
I do, however, want once again to thank you for your splendid letter of August
12th which has been so thoroughly enjoyed by everybody. It gave us a great
close-up of the Fleet which was more than welcome.
As of today we have about 262.000 men. Reenlistments for the year to date
average something over 70% and the same is true for the month of Jaly. Our
advertising campaign for men is bearing fruit and we hope next month to get
at least 10.000, and our best hopes might realize 11,000. Our goal is not less
than 12,000. Tommy Holcomb expects to reach his allowed 75,000 in March.
The goal for enlisted men (Navy) is all I can get, regardless of deficits or
what not.
I shoved off the letter on RDF just as it came to me and with the rough notes
I had made, and I really should apologize for its form, but the substance was
there and that letter, together with the previous table which had been sent out
by BuShips will, I believe, give your people the best picture we have.
I note what you say about not resting until you get the' patrol vessels you
have requested in official correspondence. I might add "neither will I". You
know I am keenly alive to your needs. At present we are constantly fighting
material shortage and priorities. You are thoroughly familiar with the building
program and the dates of completion so no need to comment on it. We are
ahead of schedule at present but the steel situation grows more critical daily
and at last I believe the blocks are going to be put on unnecessary civilian needs.
Our small ship program was the most difficult to get started. I was pei'fectly
delighted the other day when some one told me they had tried to buy an electric
refrigerator but it could not be had. Another example: I ordered an electric
heater for the cottage at the Lake direct from the Westinghouse wholesale
people here in Washington, who inform me it is well I got my order in when I
did because it was the last one and no more would be manufactured. It has
taken a long time to get the psychology started. I say started, because the
country still is to a considerable extent, asleep to the efforts required.
[2] I am perfectly delighted with your reaction to the recent directives from
the Office of Fleet Training relative to target practices. Of course, Lee was tickled
to pieces over your enthusiastic comment.
I have talked not only to Nimitz but also to Carpender, who came down to see
me after I had given Nimitz your notes with regard to personnel. You will have
heard from Bunav direct.
I am delighted also over your comment about the reaction facilities and hope
the good work in this connection may continue to expand until the situation is
satisfactory.
I am told an official letter was sent to you on the Defense Battalion situation
so will not repeat here.
Once again, thanks for the human side of the news.
With regard to the general situation in the Pacific about all I can say is the
Japs seem to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods. I can only
intimate to you that some very strong messages have been sent to them but just
what they are going to do I don't know.
I told one of their Statesmen this morning that I felt another move, such as
one into Thailand, would go a long way towards destroying before the American
public what good-will still remained. As you know, I have had some extremely
frank talks with them.
I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I could wish
the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender.
There is much talk of the Japanese barring ships carrying anns to Russia. I
am delighted that when Admiral Hart asked us to make the Sulu Sea a closed
area we did not do it although there was some pressure here for it. One of
my principal reasons against doing it was because of the precedent which it
might establish, and thus give the Japs something to hang their hat on if later
they wanted to make a similar pronouncement regarding the Sea of Japan.
We have to go through one of those holes in the wall to get to the Russian
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2209
Maritime Provinces. This also brings up the case of the so-called neutrality zone
encircling the Western Hemisphere. But that, like the recent closing of the
Canal to Japanese ships, is water over the dam and I won't bother you with my
troubles on those pronouncements.
Regardless of the will to do all you want in the line of permanence of per-
sonnel, please keep in mind the tremendous expansion we are up against, and
the many ships which have to be commissioned. Notwithstanding the fact that
at least some of us foresaw that, regardless of our efforts, there just has to be
considerable compromise in the arduous task of building up and manning the
so-called Two-Ocean Navy, not to mention all the other stuff from AKs and APs
to AMs and ATs.
[3] Not in the way of an excuse, because I am not making any, but just
giving reasons, I checked up on one of the battleships in the last war which had
been in commission about a year. It has a complement of 65 officers, but of this
number had only 13 regulars, including paymasters and doctors, in the entire
outfit. The other 52 were all Reserves and temporaries. Nevertheless, 1 am told
those 52 filled their billets very well and that they had a fine ship. I think histoiy
has got to repeat itself, and the only thing I see to do is loyally to attempt to
solve our present situation and do the best we can with what we have, and I know
of no one better than yourself to tackle the job. That is why you are where
you are.
I expect all the kicks and forceful reasons you can send me for change and
help and I will go just as far as it is humanly possible to do and so will every-
body else in the Department.
We all know that Naval personnel will rise up and do better under great diffi-
culties than they will when things are easy and serene (if they ever were).
You will be glad to know that the vibration troubles which, to put it mildly,
were cause for concern in the WASHINGTON and NORTH CAROLINA are
uearing solution.
I am delighted the West Coast visits are proving so helpful. I hope they will
not have to be stopped but only time will tell.
I do not recall for the moment whether or not in previous correspondence I
acknowledged receipt of your letter of 30 July regarding using one of your
carriers for ferrying planes to the Russians. This is just one of the headaches
we have here.
Mrs. Hull ought to be reminding me that she has a mother for whom she has to
get dinner because it is 1830. My day is just beginning.
Keep cheerful and as always every good wish in the wide world to you all and
best of luck.
Sincerely,
/s/ Betty
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
V8S Pennsylvania,
c/o Postmaster, Sati Francisco, California.
Op-lO-MD
Secret
September 22, 1941.
De:ae Tommy : Considerable has happened since I last wrote to you.
So far as the Atlantic is concerned, we are all but, if not actually, in it. The
President's speech of September 11, 1941 put the matter squarely before the
country and outlined what he expected of the Navy. We were ready for this ; in
fact, our orders had been issued.
In addition to the incidents cited by the President, other and probably equally
compelling reasons lay behind his decision. For some time, the British have
found the problem of getting supplies across the Atlantic a difficult one. They
have never had enough ships suitable for escort duty. Their forces are thinly
spread and, as a result of casualties, the spreading has had to be thinner and
thinner as the campaign has progressed. If Britain is to continue, she has to have
assistance. She will now get it openly. King's forces, too, are thinly spread,
working as he is from 20 South to the Iceland area.
In a nutshell, we are now escorting convoys regularly from the United States to
points in the Iceland area, where tb^se convoys are picked up by the British and
escorted to the British Isles. In addition to our own escort vessels, t^e Canadiaris
2210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
are participating. Both forces (Canadian and our own) are operating under
King's direction.
This will be a boon for the British. It will permit them to strengthen their
forces elsewhere, both with heavy and light ships, particularly in critical areas
through which convoys for the Near East, via the Cape of Good Hope, must pass.
It will further help the British to meet the ever-present threat of a raid on troop
or merchant ship convoys by heavy units, in that it will narrow the area in which
the British heavy units will be required to be resp«nusible. Moreover, ships for
other possible activities, such as duty in the Mediterranean, etc., will thus be
released.
[2] The area which we regard as "our ocean" is roughly outlined as follows :
all west of a line 10° West Longitude to Latitude 65° North, thence by rhumb line
to a position 53° North, 26° West, thence south on 26°. Unless the Axis powers
withdraw their men-of-war from this area, contacts are almost certain to occur.
The rest requires little imagination.
The GREER incident created quite a stir. Senator Clark (Missouri) pushed a
resolution through the Senate which called for the log of the ship. This, we will
not furnish. Mr. Nye (North Dakota) submitted a resolution calling for an
investigation by the Naval Affairs Committee into the whole incident. The
enclosed is a statement I propose to make — and pretty well gives you the story.
Iceland has, of course, in recent months, taken on much significance for us.
Since the President's speech, it lias taken on added significance. Since July, we
have had 450(J marines there, and on Monday last we landed some (3000 Army.
While this Army convoy was enix)ute, the Germans had by far the strongest con-
centration of U-boats that they have ever had in the North Atlantic. It was so
strong and so active that it raised the very devil with a British-escorted convoy,
the Germans claiming 28 ships sunk. About half that number is more nearly
correct, and admitted by the British. Our own Army troop convoy was in the
immediate vicinity of the attack and had to be re-routed by despatch several times
in au effort to avoid the area of action. At that, seven SS contacts were had.
We should have gotten at least one SS, which was attacked under favorable
circumstances.
As to conditions in your part of the world, Mr. Hull has not yet given up hope of
a satisfactory settlement of our differences with Japan. Chances of such a
settlement are, in my judgment, very slight. Admiral Nonuira is working hard
on his home government and, while he appears to be making some progress, I am
still from Missouri. It looks like a dead-lock; but I suppose as long as there is
negotiation there is hope.
The press is making much at the moment of the way the Far Eastern situation
has apparently quieted down. One cannot help being impre.ssed with the
optimistic note of the editorial writers and columnists in tliis regard. For my
own part, I feel that false hopes are being raised. While on the surface the
Japanese appear to be making mme effort at reaching a satisfactory solution, I
can not disregard the possibility that they are merely stalling for time and
waiting until the situation in Europe becomes more stabilized. If Russia falls,
Japan is not going to be easily pried away from her Axis associations. [5]
She will no doubt grab any opportunity that presents itself to improve her position
in Siberia. If Russia can hold out (which, at the moment, hardly appears pos-
sible), I feel that there might be more hope of some sort of an agreement with
Japan.
The same sort of false hopes are being raised in our press with reference to
the German-Russian situation. There is no question but that the Greece and
Crete incidents delayed Germany's move on their Eastern front. I think it
quite probable that they intended to move against Russia earlier in the year.
If the delay incident to the two campaigns noted above have introduced sufficient
delay in their time table, which, coupled with Russian resistance, will permit
the Russians to carry on some sort of a front this winter, then possibly those
two debacles were not entirely without compensation. The Hun is after the
Buss Army. It has proved far more of a stumbling block than Hitler had
imagined. However, the Germans are making steady progress. The Russian
losses in men and material are great, and production of essential war materials
is being much lessened. 'When the Harriman mission returns from Moscow
(Admiral Standley is our senior Navy meml)er), we will pi'obably get some real
news. Harry Hopkins saw only Stalin. The Russians Military Mission that
is now in the United States has presented very large requests for war materials,
and it makes our own planning an ever changing affair.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2211
You now have our reply to your oflScial recommendation concerning the with-
drawal of the Marines from China. We recognize the soundness of all your
arguments, pro and con, and we put some weight on those questioning withdrawal.
We feel that a complete withdrawal of our forces from China would create a
reaction in that country and in Japan and in our own, that would be bad.
So, for the moment at least, we will hang on. 1 know you will open it up again
by letter or despatch if you consider it should l)e again reviewed; and it very
well may be — there is little that is static in this old world at present.
I would be less than frank if I did not tell you that I am not fully supported in
the above view. Tommy Holcomb wants to withdraw, lock, stock, and barrel.
I can easily see his point of view. He wants to avoid, if at all possible, "blood
letting". In this, he is supported by Colonel Peck. That officer feels that all
or none of the marines should come out. Peck is against leaving a "token
force". He feels that to do so, we are inviting trouble and that the "token
force" can be of little support to the local police. In that, I agree. But,
something bigger is at stake. So far as China is concerned, we have "our foot in
the door" — the door that once was "open", and if I had the say to, it would
remain there until I was ready to withdraw [4\ it — or until the door
opened to such a point that I could gracefully withdraw if and when I saw fit. I
agree that proper timing may be extremely difficult. You may be right that
they should come now. I hope I am right in holding on. Ultimately, I hope
we may both see alike. I don't enjoy not being 100% with you.
You know how I have long felt about reinforcing the Philippines. The enclosed
memorandum shows what is in the wind. Personallj', I am delighted, and I am
sure you will be, too. I thuik it should have a pronounced effect in prevention —
or, if not, then in execution.
We are awaiting with interest your reply to our despatch about additional
aircraft for you and our proposition about giving you some additional long-
range submarines. It is, I take it, largely a question of your upkeep facilities.
Take care of yourself. Keep cheerful ! And every good wish in the wide
world.
Sincerely,
[s] Betty
Admiral T. C. Habt, USN
Cotnimander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet
% Postmaster, Asiatic Station,
San Francisco, California.
Secret
Memorandum for Admiral Stark :
Septembeb 12, 1941.
Dear Betty : You asked me about what we are doing for the Philippines :
August 26: There sailed from San Francisco part of a regiment of antiaircraft
troops and some reserve supplies.
September 8: There sailed from San Francisco the remainder of the anti-
aircraft regiment, a tank battalion of 50 tanks, 50 of the latest pursuit planes,
and the personnel to man them, which brings the modern pursuit planes in the
Philippines up to 80.
September J 8: 50 self-propelled mounts for 75 cannon to be shipped from San
Francisco, and 50 more tanks.
Today The squadron of nine Flying Fortresses landed in Manila after suc-
cessfully flying the route Midway, Wake, New Britain, Dutch East Indies.
September 30: Two squadrons (26 planes) of Flying Fortresses will leave San
Francisco for Hawaii en route to the Philippines.
October: A reserve of pursuit planes will have been in process of shipment,
about 32 in October, rising to a total of 130 by December.
November: Probably a reserve of six to nine of the super Flying Fortresses,
B-24 type planes will be transferred to Manila. The.se planes will have an oper-
ating radius of 1,500 miles, with a load of 14,000 bombs, which means that they
can reach 0.saka with a full load and Tokyo with a partial load. They have
pressure cabins and can operate continuously 35,000 feet for bombing.
December: Another group of Flying Fortresses, some 35 planes, goes to
Manila.
A group of dive bombers, some 54 planes, also goes.
2212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A group of pursuit, some 130 planes, along with two additional squadrons to
build up the previous pursuit group, will be dispatched.
A 50% reserve is being established for all these planes.
You may have had word of this already ;
I gave original to Mr. Stimson.
G. C. M.
Chief of Staff.
(Rec'd 4 Oct.)
Navy Depaktment,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, 23 September lO^l.
In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-10 Hu
Secret
Deab Kimmel: This is in reply to your letter of 12 September. I have sent
you a copy of my letter of 22 September to Tommy Hart which gives some of
the picture as I see it up to that date.
At the present time the President has issued shooting orders only for the
Atlantic and Southeast Pacific sub-area.
The situation in the Pacific generally is far different from what it Is in the
Atlantic. The operations of raiders in the Pacific at present are not very wide-
spread or very effective. Most of the merchantmen in the Pacific are of United
States or Panamanian flag registry. Instittuing any steps toward eliminating
raiders outside of waters close to the continents of North and South America,
might have unfavorable repercussions, which would not be worth the cost to the
United States in the long run. The longer we can keep the situation in the
Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned.
One of the things you did not mention is what action the United States and
the United Kingdom would take were Japan to attack Siberia. The policy of
either government under such circumstances has not yet been clarified. In the
meantime we are preparing an agenda for staff conversations with the Russians.
In reply to question (a) your existing orders to escorts are appropriate under
the present situation. They are also in accordance with Art. 723 U. S. Navy
Regulations ; no orders should be given to shoot at the Present Time, other
than those clearly set forth in this article. I believe there is little possibility
of an Italian or German raider molesting a naval ship, but there might be an-
other "Robin Moore" incident in the Pacific, in which case the President might
give orders for action in the Pacific similar to those now in effect in the Atlantic ;
but that is something for the future.
Art. 723, U. S. N. R. reads as follows :
"The use of force against a foreign and friendly state or against anyone within
the territories thereof, is illegal.
The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to States as
well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protection of the
State, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens
against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, [2] whereby the State
or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the
application of the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but
must be left to the sound judgment of responsible ofllcers, who are to perform
their duties in this respect with all possible care and forbearance. In no case
shall force be exercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application of
the right of self-preservation as above defined. It must be used only as a last
resort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish
the end required. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment
for acts already committed."
Regarding question (b), we have no definite information that Japanese sub-
marines have ever operated in close vicinity to the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska
or our Pacific Coast. They may have been near Wake recently. The existing
orders, that is not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea
areas, are appropriate. If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is
obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States terri-
tory, then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such sub-
marines would appear to be our next stop. Keep us informed.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2213
We have no intention of furtjier reducing the Pacific Fleet except that pre-
scribed in Rainbow 5, that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month
after Japan and the United States are at war. The existing force in the Pacific
Is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your fieet, and new construction
will not make itself felt until next year.
The operations of the Pacific Fleet ought not to be considered separately
from the operations of the Asiatic Fleet and the British and Dutch forces in the
Far East. Furthermore, the Japan-Soviet situation requires considerable
attention from Japan's naval forces. While offensives by the Pacific Fleet in
the Central Pacific may not draw important Japanese naval forces in that direc-
tion, they ought to have an important effect in pinning the Japanese Navy to
northern water, or to bases in the Western Pacific, and thus divert them away
from the Philippines and the Malay Barrier. By copy of my letter to Admiral
Hart you now know that the Armiy is building up its Philippine Garrison, and
plans important increases in Army air forces in the Philippines. Dutch and
British air and land forces are also gradually increasing in strength. We are
now informed by the British that thej plan to send the Battleships ROYAL
SOVERIGN, RAMILIES and RESOLUTION to arrive on the East Indian
Station by late December ; to retain there the REPULSE until relieved by the
RENOWN in January ; and to send one or two modern capital ships to the East
Indian Station early in the new year. These, with one carrier, and a total of
four eight-inch cruisers and thirteen six-inch cruisers (seven modern) ought to
make the task of the Japanese in moving southward considerably more difficult.
It should make Japan think twice before taking action, if she has taken no action
by that time.
[3] I may be mistaken, but I do not believe that the major portion of the
Japanese Fleet is likely to be sent to the Marshalls or the Caroline Islands under
circumstances that now seem possible.
The NORTH CAROLINA and the WASHINGTON are not as yet finally com-
pleted and have had no target practice. We ought to put aside any thought
that these two battleships will be of any practical use to us before the end of
next March, and I would consider it most unwise to reach any final decision
now as to which Fleet they ought ultimately to be attached. At present, the
need for them is far greater in the Atlantic than in the Pacific, particularly if
we are to make possible the movement of British naval forces from the Atlantic
to the Far East Area.
With regard to the first and last paragraphs on page two, I believe that, in all
probability, the Pacific Fleet can operate successfully and effectively even
though decidedly weaker than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly can
be concentrated in one area only with the greatest diflBculty.
The following despatch has just been brought to my attention. You no doubt
have seen it but I will quote it as a reminder.
"Rear Admiral Toshio Matsunaga Retired in interview published in Hochi
States Japanese should face future with calm confidence in ability Army Navy
repel air attacks x Japan need not worry about weak ABCD powers encircle-
ment plans X quoted as stating he has fiown over Guana total sixteen times once
this year without sighting single American plane x American air power Far
East negligible x prior retirement Matsunaga served twelve years as aviator
Commander Ryujo Acagi Tateyama Air Station now Director Japan airways."
In connection with the foregoing would it not be possible for your force to
"carefully" get some pictures of the Mandated Islands?
Keep Cheerful.
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N.,
Commander in Chief, U. »*?. Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o postmaster, San Francisco, California.
P. S. I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked
me to hold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying that conversations with
the Japs have practieally reached an impasse. As I see it we can get nowhere
towards a settlement and peace in the Far East until and unless there is some
agreement between Japan and China — and just now that seems remote. Whether
or not their inability to come to any sort of an understanding just now — is — or —
is not — a good thing — I hesitate to say.
Copy to Admiral Hart.
29 Spetembeb 1941.
P. S. #2 : Admiral Nomura came in to see ine this morning. We talked for
about an hour. He usually comes in when he begins to feel near the end of his
2214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
rope ; there is not much to spare at the end now. I have helped before but
whether I can this time or not I do not know. Conversations without results
cannot last forever. If they fall through, and it looks like they might, the situa-
tion could only grow more tense. I have again talked to Mr. Hull and I think
he will make one more try. He keeps me pretty fully informed and if there
is anything of moment I will, of course, hasten to let you know.
Our transports which recently landed a contingent of Army in Iceland will,
God willing, in another day be clear of the submarine concentration through
which they have had to run and we will breathe easy with regard to them. How-
ever, it is a continuous game now and yesterday I am glad to state we delivered
our first big convoy to the British after having gone through safely from New-
foundland well into the Eastern Atlantic. We also have a combatant force
going up to strengthen the Iceland situation for the next few weeks because of
the British situation and the possibility of a sortie of a German contingent
which is under surveillance.
I saw a photograph of your picture. It looks great and I think it is a fine
thing to have it recorded ; the boys will be proud of it always.
[s] Betty
Secret Received 23 Oct.
Op-10 Hu Navt Depabtment,
Ofeice of the Chief of Naval Opekations,
Washington, 11 Octo1)er 1941.
Deab Kimmex: Things have been popping here for the last twenty-four hours
but from our despatches you know about all that we do.
Personnally I do not believe the Japs are going to sail into us and the message
I sent you merely stated the "possibility" ; in fact I tempered the message handed
to me considerably. Perhaps I am wi-ong, but I hope not. In any case after long
pow-wows in the White House it was felt we should be on guard, at least until
something indicates the trend.
If I recall correctly I wrote you or Tommie Hart a forecast of the fall of the
Japanese Cabinet a couple of weeks ago after my long conference with Nomura
and gave the dope as I saw it.
You will also recall in an earlier letter when War Plans was forecasting a
Japanese attack on Siberia in August, I said my own judgment was that they
would make no move in that direction until the Russian situation showed a
definite trend. I think this whole thing works up together.
With regard to merchant shipping it seemed an appropriate time to get the
reins in our hands and get our routing of them going. In other words, take the
rap now from the Hill and the Press and all the knockers, so that if and when
it becomes an actual necessity to do it, it will be working smoothly.
We shall continue to strive to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How
long it can be kept going I don't know, but the President and Mr. Hull are
working on it.
The stumbling block, of course, is the Chinese incident and personnally without
going into all its ramifications and face-saving and Japanese Army attitude, civil
attitude and Navy attitude I hardly see any way around it. I think we could
settle with Nomura in five minutes but the Japanese Army is the stumbling block.
Incidentally, the Chinese also think that they will lick Japan before they get
through and are all for keeping going rather than giving way anywhere. A nice
setup for not sounding the gong.
Kitts was in this morning and I shall have a long talk with him before he
goes back.
Off hand without going into the "ins" and "outs" I see no reason for your
stopping your normal visits to the Coast. The ships concerned constitute self-
contained task forces. We have left it up to you and I am just giving you
my reaction.
We have no other news yet regarding the torpedoing of the KEARNY except
that she was hit and is proceeding slowly to Iceland. She was deflected from
an American escorted convoy to a Canadian escorted convoy which was being hard
pressed. Of course losses are bound to be in order. My hope is that they can
be kept to a mininmm with the curve ever favoring our end.
In August for the first time there was a slight net gain in shipping. Our
effort, of course, is to have that confirmed in subsequent months for two reasons —
accelerated shipbuilding and better protection to convoys with results — decreased
sinkings.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2215
I know how you and Admiral Hart must be pleased with the Army increased
air In the Philippines. The Island of Wake is a vital link in this connection.
If it is put out of commission it stops Army air reinforcements. I hope we can
maintain the integrity of these Island bases and push as fast as possible their
completion. You have all the dope that I have on this and know the studies that
are being made for alternate routes.
You will be glad to know that recruiting is still on the increase and I can assure
you I have your personnel situation always on my conscience as well. as most
every other situation affecting everything afloat.
Keep cheerful !
Sincerely,
Bbttt.
Will add a P. S. in the a : m., want this to make the clipper.
H. R. S.
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. 8. Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.
P. S. Very little news from the Kearny, and we are asking her nothing, feel-
ing that she will notify us as soon as she can. Radio silence may be essential.
All we do know is that she was torpedoed in the forward fire room and is now
making 8 knots. Not a thing on casualties or beyond the bare facts given above.
I will release everything to the press as soon as I can, so you should know almost
as soon as I do.
Pinky Schuirmann made up an estimate for me yesterday on the Jap cabinet
situatior\, which sums up my thoughts better than I have been able to -set them
down. He and I see very much eye to eye on this. I am enclosing copy of what
he gave me.
Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of a recon-
naissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider
attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure
against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that,
while we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid
on any of these Island carriers in the Pacific might be diflBcult to detect. How-
ever, we are on guard to the best of our ability and my advice to him was not
to worry.
He also thought it advisable that I release him at this time from the aerial
photographs I wanted him to get of the mandates, stating that they might be
detected and might complicate the international situation I agreed, and he
stated that he would endeavor to make them later.
I have nothing else for the moment.
I will send copy of this to Tommy Hart as usual, and I assume also, as usual,
that you will show Bloch.
H. R. S.
In reply refer to Initials and No.
NAVT DEa'ARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, October 17, 19J/1.
Memorandum for the C. N. O.
I believe we are inclined to overestimate the importance of changes in the
Japanese Cabinet as indicative of great changes in Japanese political thought
or action.
The plain fact is that Japanese politics has been ultimately controlled for years
by the military. Whether or not a policy of peace or a policy of further military
adventuring is pursued Is determined by the military based on their estimate as
to whether the time is opportune and what they are able to do, not by what cabi-
net is in power or on diplomatic maneuvi^ring, diplomatic notes or diplomatic
treaties.
Prince Konoye has been Premier and Konoye Cabinets in office for the most
of the last five years. Time and again he and his Foreign Ministers have expressed
disapproval of the acts committed by the Japanese Military, but remedial action
has not been taken.
Konoye was Premier when the attack on China began, he declared Japan's
policy was to beat China to her knees.
2216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The most that can be claimed for the last Konoye Cabinet is that it may have
restrained the extremists among the military not that it has opposed Japan's
program of expansion by force. When opportunities arise, during the coming
months, which seem favorable to the military for further advance, they will be
seized.
At the present time the influence of the extremists goes up and down depend-
ing on the course of the war in Russia.
The same bill of goods, regarding the necessity of making some concession to
the "moderates" in order to enable them to cope with the "extremists" has been
offered to the United States since the days when Stimson was Secretary of State
and Debuchi Ambassador.
Present reports are that the new cabinet to be formed will be no better and
no worse than the one which has just fallen. Jai)an may attack Russia, or may
move southward, but in the final analysis this will be determined by the military
on the basis of opportunity, and what they can get away with, not by what
cabinet is in power.
/S/ R. E. SCHUIRMANN.
CW/vt
Secret
October 27, 1941.
My Dkar Admiral Kimmel: During Commander Kitts recent visit here, he
and Admiral Stark discussed the enclosed secret memorandum for the Secretary
of State. Admiral Stark wished the enclosed copy to be forwarded to you and
has directed me to do so because of his own ab.sence from the city in connection
with the observance in Chicago of Navy Day.
Very respectfully,
Charles Wellborn, Jr.,
Conntumder U. S. N.
Aide to Admiral Stark.
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N.,
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
% Postmaster, San Francisco, Cal.
[i] Secret
HRS/HU 8 October 1941.
Memorandum for the Secretary of State
This morning you asked me what I thought would be the advantages and
disadvantages of abolishing the combat zones around the British Isles and
elsewhere. You also inquired as to the possibility of United States naval craft
escorting all the way across the Atlantic ; also as to the disadvantages and
advantages that would occur should Hitler declare war on the United States.
The chief advantages to abolishing the combat zones, would, as I see it, be:
(a) It would permit American flag vessels to enter British ports. This would
be of some importance now but of much greater importance as the United
States Merchant Marine increases in size. The United Kingdom is handicapped
for man-power. Any great increase in their Merchant Marine might mean
reduction In their output of munitions. Therefore, there can be no question
but that it would be advantageous from the war effort standpoint if the United
States flag vessels, manned by American crews, could increase the shii>ping
both to the British Isles and to other military areas. Moreover since our ships,
particularly those which we are now building, are generally faster than British
cargo ships, submarine losses might be expected to decrease.
(b) It is impracticable for the ocean e.scorts based in North America, whether
United States or British, to make the entire trip across the Atlantic under
normal circumstances. Furthermore, due to the fact that a large number of
submarines have been operating in the Western Atlantic Area, no United States
escort vessels could now be sent to the British Isles unless they were replaced
in the Western Atlantic Area by British escort vessels. Were some of our Ships
to operate in British waters it would have the advantage of raising British
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2217
Morale, encouraging resistance to the Germans liy subjugated peoples and
peoples in fear of subjugation, and would give the American people a stake in
the decisive war area.
(c) A special feature of the situation discussed iir subparagraph (b), would
probably be the deterring effect on Italy with relation to a further war effort,
and the encouraging effect on the French to resist German demands.
[2] (d) The effect on the German people might be to lower their morale
and thus reduce their wor effort. This, of course, might be offset to considerable
extent, if, in the near future, they were to succeed in completely defeating the
Russian Armies.
(e) It seems probable that Germany would declai'e war on the United States.
The possible disadvantages of this are referred to in the succeeding paragraph.
The advantages of declaration of war would be that the United States would be
given a free hand in the operation of its armed forces; it would gain important
belligerent rights over neutral shipping and commei-ce ; and is would permit the
Pacific and Asiatic Fleets to be employed for eradicating German raiders in the
Pacific Ocean. It would give encouragement to resistance to the Germans by sub-
jugated peoples and peoples in fear of subjugation. The United States could take
appropriate action against enemy subjects, spies and agents within its borders.
It would also permit specific offensive plans to be made by the United States Army
and Navy. It would tremendously enhance the war effort put forth by this
country and we could plan well into the future for the defeat of Germany with
some assurance which we cannot now do.
The disadvantages would be :
(a) Until the present strength of the armed forces is materially increased
by the programs now under way, the results which would be immediately apparent
might be disappointing to the American and other peoples.
(b) A declaration of war by the United States against Germany unless Germany
had previously declared was against the United States, might bring Japan into
the war as an active belligerent. This would be without question a decided dis-
advantage because the United States would then be engaged in actual hostilities
on two fronts ; something we may have to accept, but every effort should be made
to avoid this situation. I might add that I believe efforts in this behalf will best
be served by our continued strong stand against Japanese aggression.
(c) It is questionable if sentiment in South America will actively support the
United States until this country is in a position to make a much stronger effort
by land and sea than it is now able to do and until the results of its participation
are apparent.
(d) A declaration of war would cause the loss of many of our contacts for
information which we now have in Germany, Italy, and elsewhere in Europe.
This, however, should not be a determining factor. I simply set it down, as one of
the disadvantages.
[S] It has long been my opinion that Germany cannot be defeated unless
the United States is wholeheartedly in the war and makes a strong military and
naval effort wherever strategy dictates. It would be very desirable to enter the
war under circumstances in which Germany were the aggressor and in which
case Japan might then be able to remain neutral. However, on the whole, it is
my opinion that the United States should enter the war against Germany as
soon as possible, even if hostilities with Japan must be accepted.
It must be recognized that if Germany declares war on the United States and
if the United States in consequence declares war on Germany, the United States
must at the same time declare war on all nations who are Allies of Germany. This
is particularly true in the case of Italy, as no distinction could be made at sea
between German and Italian vessels. Such action probably would have a very
marked effect on the morale of the Italian people. It might be possible not to
declare war on such nations as Finland where the possibility of United States
forces coming in contact with Finnish forces are remote. However, there are
Finnish merchant vessels in oi)eration in the Atlantic Ocean. I do not include
Japan as an Ally of Germany — at least — Not Yet.
The foregoing has been hurriedly set down following your call. I thought it
better to write it than to give it to you over the phone.
I might finally add that I have assumed for the past two years that our country
would not let Great Britain fall; that ultimately in order to prevent this we
would have to enter the war and as noted above I have long felt and have stated
that the sooner we get in the better.
79716 0—46 — pt. 16 20
2218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
P. S. I did not set down in the attached notes what I have mentioned to you
before, namely, that I do not believe Germany will declare war on us until she is
good and ready ; that it will be a cold-blooded decision on Hitler's part if and
when he thinks it will pay, and not until then.
He has every excuse in the world to declare war on us now, if he were of a
mind to.
He had no legitimate excuse in the world (except to serve his own ends) to
invade the countries he has.
When he is ready, he will strike, and not before.
Secret '
Op-lfr-MD
November 4, 1941.
Memorandum for —
Admiral King.
Admiral Kimmel.
Admiral Hart.
I am just about to get out something like the enclosed and thought you might
be interested.
With regard to the Salinas, she was hit by two torpedoes, one fairly well aft
and one about half way between the first hit and the bow. The submarine then
came up on her quarter and tired three more torpedoes, two of which went
astern and one ahead. At this time the Salinas fired at her — thinks she hit her —
and the Dupont is believed to have finished off the submarine. This information
came by despatch. Detailed reports are noi >ei in. we are, oi cvuro^, o^^it-
pedaling any materiel news and have mentioned nothing regarding any sinking
or alleged sinking of submarines. We are constantly making submarine contacts,
they having concentrated in our part of the northern passage for some time past.
One of the destroyers reported getting a great deal of oil to the surface after
a bombing of a submarine, but her written reports likewise are not yet in.
Regarding the REUBEN JAMES, she went down so quickly that we know
little. A despatch states that she was hit forward about abreast No. 1 stack.
The explosion was so violent that it is possible a magazine was set off. The
whole forward end of the ship was detached and sunk almost immediately —
and the aft part about 5 minutes later.
When the stern sank, a number of depth charges let go, adding to the number
of casualties. Rescue operations were greatly hampered by oil, darkness, pres-
ence of submarine, and cold. We published the casualty list this morning.
[2] We have a report that the safety pins on the depth charges had pre-
viously jarred loose. This, of course, is being looked into by the Bureau of
Ordnance. The above is about all I know at present.
Lessons learned will, of course, be communicated after reports are in and study
made.
My best to all hands.
. Keep cheerful !
H. R. Stabk.
November 4, 1941.
A release announcing the torpedoing of the SALINAS has just been made, she
having safely arrived at St. Johns.
The SALINAS was torpedoed on 29-30 October 1941, the day before the
REUBEN JAMES was tori^edoed. Initial reports showed her speetl to be re-
duced to 5 knots and she had a long voyage to make the nearest port. Obviously,
to have made public her damaged condition would have meant a direct invita-
tion for further attack on her in the submarine infested waters through which
she had to pass. Secrecy, therefore, was essential and every effort was made
to maintain it.
Relative to the above, the following incident occurred :
One of the girls employed in the Navy Department reported to the OflScer in
Charge of the Office where she worked that she heard two officers telling about
the torpedoing of a naval vessel, the SALINAS. She said she could not help
but hear them and wondered if it were true.
It should be unnecessary to elaborate on this. Loose talk in public places,
over the telephone, in the home, at a party, or anywhere else, except in strictly
oflBcial circles, may bring disastrous results, the magnitude of which could only
be weighed by what happened to be at stake.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2219
It should not be necessary to add that this must stop. Any one worth his or
her salt must realize the potential danger of carrying outside his or her office
to anyone, ichose husiness it is not, anything regarding naval plans or operations,
movements or damage to ships, etc.
This memorandum has been intentionally withheld until the SALINAS ar-
rived in port.
(Mimeographed and distributed to Department.)
Secret 22408
In reply refer to Initials and No I.p-IOD-MD Received via clipper
14 Nov
Navy DEapABTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, November 7, 1941.
Dear Mustapha: This is in reply to your letter of October 22, 1941. It was
fine to hear from you and to learn that you are in a fine fettle.
Ok on the disposition which you made in cormection with the recent change
in the Japanese Cabinet. The big question is — What next?!
I note the great desirability of man}/ things for the Pacific Fleet — particularly
destroyers and cruisers. We just haven't any destroyers or cruisers to give
you at the moment, nor is the prospect bright for getting any for you in the near
future. I fully appreciate your need for them. We could profitably employ
twice the number we now have if they were available. I will not burden you
with a recital of King's troubles, but he is up against it for DDs for escort —
and defense against raiders.
The NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON are not expected to be avail-
able before March. As pointed out in my letter of September 23, 1941, I do
not think any permanent assignment of either, or both of these ships can be
made at this time. We are assigning them to King now in the interest of train-
ing— arriving etc.
With the possible exception of one division, it is our intention to send the long-
range submarines to the Pacific as they come along. As you no doubt know,
twenty-seven (27) of the 1525-ton SS are due for completion in calendar 1942.
Due to the urgency for providing the destroyers of the Atlantic Fleet with
high-spee<l anti-submarine searching equipment, 27 of the 29 Model QC retractile
domes and projectors have been diverted from mine craft of the Pacific Fleet
and Local Defense Force destroyers in the Pacific to the Atlantic Fleet. Inas-
much as the power stacks, controls, etc., for the 29 QC equipments need not be
installed in the Atlantic Fleet, it will be necessary for the manufacturer to
produce only 27 additional retractile domes and projectors in order to complete
the QC equipments required for the ships from which the equipment has been
diverted. The Bureau of Ships is being requested to expedite procurement of
the additional domes and projectors. This additional procurement should not
require a great deal of time since the manufacturer is tooled for this production
Two of the original order of 29 complete QC equipments will be delievered to
the Pacific Fleet. Additionally, two preliminary models (one at Mare Island
and one at Norfolk) can be made available to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
as soon as installation plans for this new type of retractile dome equipment can
be completed by the Navy Yards concerned.
I note your criticism of the Gunnery Radar. The Model FA fire control RADAR
is the first production equipment for the Navy. This equipment is unsatisfactory
because of its low-power output and the short life of the vacuum tubes. Only
ten production models were manufacture<l ; these were manufactured for the
purpose of tooling the shops for later and improved models could be developed
and manufactured. The FA equipment was installed in eight HONOLULU
Class Cls, WICHITA, and Radio Materiel School, Bellevue.
The improved fire control equipment is the Model FC. This equipment employs
magnetron generators and has a very much higher powered output. It should
be understood, however, that because of the high frequencies used by fire control
RADAR, long ranges on aircraft cannot be obtained. The long range aircraft
detection equipment is intended to be used for the purpose of tracking aircraft
until the aircraft are within range of the fire control RADAR. Fire control
RADAR will detect and range on aircraft at ranges greatly in excess of the
ranges of the antiaircraft guns.
2220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Relative to the two Seati-ain vessels which we i-ecently acquired and which are
now undergoing conversion for use in transporting Aircraft, they now have
readiness dates of December 2nd and December 16th. It is our present intention
to assign one to the Train of the Atlantic Fleet and one to the Base Force, Pacific,
but if we have to send planes to the Near East, we may have to use these ships
for this purpose. We are also going to take over the remaining other 3 vessels
of this type and propose to use them un-converted for anticipated transport of
planes to Europe-Russia-China-? May have to charter them rather than take
them over — in order conserve Navy personnel.
You asked about merchant ship conversions for carrier landing training opera-
tions. The field from which to get ships for this purpose is, as you know,
extremely limited. However, the best of these have been earmarked for conversion
to AVG's as soon as they can be made available. Right now the ones we have
in mind are engaged in an important duty. Conversion will take 12 to 15 months.
[3] Your study of the Installations and defenses of Wake. Midway, John-
ston, and Palmyra arrived in the Department yesterday. It is being routed to
War Plans for study. I had an opportunity to skim through it hurriedly, and it
looked like a very good paper. It will be of much help to us.
In connection with the aircraft routes to the Orient via a southerly detour,
I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I write to Admiral Bloch.
Admiral Lyster. the Fifth Sea Lord, recently visited us. He is quite a chap
and impressed us as knowing his job, and being a very able officer. I am enclos-
ing,, as being of possible interest to you, copies of the notes which he gave to
us as a result of his observations on the manner in which we employ our aircraft.
In addition, I am .sending a copy of the notes made by Captain Lord Louis
Mountbatten as the result of his observations in the fleet. He, too, impressed me
as being a very capable officer. I am sure much good will i-esult from the observa-
tions of both of these officers.
Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when
it will break, no one can tell. The principle reaction I have to it all is what I
have written you before; it continually gets "worser and worser" ! A month
may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies can not go on
forever — particularly if one party can not live with the set up. It doesn't look
good.
All good wishes.
Sincerely,
/S/ Betty,
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N.,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmas'ter, San Francisco, California
British movement of BB to far east area— I hope — will be completed in
December.
Secret 22915 received Clipped 20 Nov.
In reply refer to Initials and No. Op-IOD-MD
Navt Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, November 14, 19^1.
removed conf. letter 182
on Fortification Guam
Dear Mustapha : This is in answer to yours of October 29, November 6 and
7, 1941. It was fine to hear from you and to learn that you are going strong.
I have not been able to get very much definite information about Mr. Hallet
Abend. I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum which Public Relations had
given me about him. I am told by an officer who recently returned from the
Asiatic Station that he enjoyed a ffood reputation as a correspondent out there.
This same source stated that the Jaips had beaten him up in Shanghai and de-
stroyed a manuscript of a book he was about to submit to his publishers.
I had previously seen the clipping from the New York Times, which you sent
me, the authorship of which is credited to Mr. Abend. The way the yarn was
written, one could easily spot it as a "phoney".
Just what we will do in the Far East remains to be seen. Attached hereto is
a copy of our Estimate, which was recently submitted by General Marshall and
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2221
me to the President. You can see from it our ideas on the subject. Whether or
not our advice will be followed remains to be seen.
If Mr. Churchill's speech of Monday last, given at the Lord Mayor's house, is
the expression of British policy, it would seem there might be considerable truth
in the information given to you by Mr. Abend.
Your estimate of the Japanese bases and forces in the Mandates has been
received in the Department. It will be carefully studied. From a hasty exam-
ination, it appears to be a very complete paper.
I have taken up with Van Keuren the subject of the listening gear for ships
you listed in your letter of November 6. Like Radar, the delay in getting this
gear was caused by getting or, rather, not getting into production. At last, we are
"over the hump" and [2] listening gear is coming on rapidly. Deliveries
are underway, and four (4) or five (5) sets will go to Pearl Harbor by each
ship from now on. By mid-December you should have received about 2i: sets.
Of course, you can divert these for installation as you see fit.
With regard to the VSO's going to the Asiatic. These will go out, orated, in
a merchant ship. Instructions to do this have been issued to Com. 12. You
should receive a copy of the order to do this in due time.
Regarding your comments about the desirability of having fight deck merchant
.ships for use in training aviators for carrier duty : — I agree with you 100%.
The trouble is that we just can't get the ships to convert into carriers. The
converted SS MORMACMAIL (now the USS LONG ISLAND) is far from
satisfactory. She should have twenty (20) knots and actually hasn't sixteen
(16) knots. She just doesn't have speed enough. She can be operated if con-
ditions of wind are such as to give her the required apparent wind across the
deck. Unless this condition prevails, she is almost worthless as a carrier.
Incidentally, five (5) of this type are being converted in our yards for the
British under Lend-Lease. The large fast ships which we now have and which
cottid be converted for the duty you have in mind are currently engaged in an
important mission (transporting British troops to the Middle Kast— obviously
most secret) and will be so engaged for a number of months. I would give a lot
if we had those ships noiv converted to carriers and fully equipped for combat
purposes.
The only other ships under U. S. registry out of which we could get twenty
(20) knots (if we had them) are the four (4) Matsons and the three (3) Moore-
McCormicks now engaged in the South American rim. We have had our eye
on the NORMANDIE. Thus far. State Department and President are adamant.
I suppose they think that to take hei- over would, in some way, drive Vichy closer
to Germany. All in all, a dismal picture for the converted carrier idea prevails.
The General Board has recently completed a study on Guam. I am enclosing a
copy of this paper for your study. I would appreciate getting your reaction to it.
Of course, if Guam were fortified and developed at the moment, we could make
much use of it. One item to which I have liec-n giving much th(>ught and upon
which I would like your advice — what do you think of going ahead now with
the construction of a landing field out there? The thought I have is that we could
construct such a field which might be of .service to us. To be sure, we might lose
it, but we could build into it provisions for its at least temporary destruction.
[3] The next few days hold much for us. Kurusu's arrival in Wa.shington
has been delayed. I am not hopeful that anything in the way of better under-
standing between the United States and .iapan will come of his visit. I note this
morning in the press despatches a listing of a number of p<^)ints by the Japan
Times and Advertiser upon which concession by the United States was necessary
for the "solution of the Pacific Crisis." Complete capitulation by the United
States on every point of difference between the Japanese and this country was
indicated as a satisfactory solution. It will be impossible to reconcile such
divergent points of view.
With all good wishes ! Keep cheerful.
Sincerely,
/S/ Bm-TY.
Admiral H. E. Kimmel. U. S. N.,
U. S. 8. PENNSYLVANIA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.
2222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[i] Secret
Serial 0130012
Wak and Na\'y Deipabtmeint,
Washington, Nox^ember 5, 19Jfl.
Memorandum for the President :
Subject : Estimate concerning Far Eastern Situation.
The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have reexamined the
military situation in the Far East, particularly in the light of messages recently
received from the American Ambassador to Chungking, the Magryder Mission,
and the United States Naval Attache. These despatches have indicated it to
be Chiang-Kai-Shek's belief that a Jai>anese attack on Kuming is imminent, and
that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United
States and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The
Secretary of State has requested advice as to the attitude which this Government
should take toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road.
There is little doubt that a successful Japanese offensive against the Burma
Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese Central Government. The
result might even be the collapse of further effective military resistance by that
Government, and thus the liquidation by Japan of the "China incident." If use
of the Burma Road is lost, United States and British Commonwealth aid to
China will be seriously curtailed for some months. If resistance by the Chinese
Central Government ceases, the need for Japanese troops in China will be reduced.
These troops can then be employed elsewhere, after the lapse of time sufficient
to permit their withdrawal.
[2 J Concentration of Japanese troops for the contemplated offensive, based
in northern Indo-China, cannot be completed in less than about two months,
although initial offensive operations might be undertaken before that time. The
advance toward Kunming over nearly three hundred miles of rough country, with
poor communications, will be extremely difficult. The maintenance of supply lines
will not be easy. The Chinese, on favorable defense terrain, would have a good
chance of defeating this offensive by the use of ground troops alone, provided
these troops are adequate in quality and numbers.
The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have
taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in
undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to
prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations,
however well-disguised, would lead to war.
At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the
Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the
Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by
withdi-awing practically all naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned
to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would i*equire
tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdi-awn from services now
considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of Naval and
merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose the Battle of the
Atlantic in the near future.
[3] The only current plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to
conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense
of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are
now being reinforced. ' The present combined naval, air, and ground forces will
make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of
December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will
have become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The
U. S. Army air forces in the Philippines will have reached its projected strength
by February or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased
to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations
in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional British
naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The general
defensive strength of the entire southern area against possible Japanese operations
will then have reached impressive proportions.
Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended \to Chiang-
Kai-Shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These
measures are : continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying in-
creasing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and
acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group.
The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the
following conclusions :
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2223
[4] (a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United
States-British Staff Conversations remain sound. The primary objective of
the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan l>e defeated and Germany
remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an
unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a
war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany,
the most dangerous enemy.
(b) War between the United States and Japan should'be avoided while build-
ing up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or
directly threatens territoi-ies whose security to the United States is of very
great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only
in one or more of the following contingencies :
(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or
mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the
Netherlands East Indies ;
(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100° East
or South of 10° North ; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty
Islands.
[5] (c) If war with Japan can not be avoidetl, it should follow the strategic
lines of existing war plans ; i. e., military operations should be primarily de-
fensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic
position.
(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into
Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not
justify intervention by the United States against Japan.
(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended
to the Chinese Central Government.
(f ) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated
action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in
common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands
East Indies.
The Chief of Naval Oi)eration8 and the Chief of Staff recommend that the
United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.
Specifically, they recommend :
That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan
in China be disapproved.
That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia,
Great Britain, and our own forces.
[6] That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated
to the maximum practicable extent.
That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.
Chief of Staff.
Chief of Naval Operations.
Secret
In reply refer to Initials and No. HRS/Hu Sec #6
received 3rd Dec
#23593 Clipper
Navy JDEPAETMEnvx,
Office of thk Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, 26 November 19Jfl.
Dear Mustapha :* This is in answer to yours of 15 November. If I didn't
appreciate your needs as well as Tommy Hart's and King's I would not be work-
ing almost literally eighteen hours a day for all three of you.
We have .sweat blood in the endeavor to divide adequately our forces for a
two ocean war ; but you cannot take inadequate forces and divide them into two
or three parts and get adequate forces anywhere. It was for this reason that
almost as soon as I got here I started working on increasing the Navy. It was
on the basis of inadequate forces that ABC-1 and Rainbow 5 were predicated and
which were accepted by all concerned as about the best compromise we could
get out of the situation actually confronting us.
I agree with you for exami)le that to cruise in Japanese home waters you
should have substantial increa.se in the strength of your fleet but neither ABC-1
or Rainbow 5 contemplate this as a general policy. After the British have
strengthened Singapore, and under certain auspicious conditions, opportunity for
2224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
raids in Japanese waters may present themselves, but this will be the exception
rather than the rule.
It might interest you to know that King strongly recommended his taking the
destroyers which we now have in our West Coast ports, and the Secretary was
sold on it ; however it has been successfully resisted to date. King said that if
they were out with you on the firing line he would not make such recommendation,
but where they were he thought they were legitimate pi'ey. He, too, you know
is up against it for suflBcient forces to perform his tasks. Just stop for a minute
and realize that into his heavy routine escort work he has added at the moment
large U. S. troop transports for Iceland on the one hand, British on another in
Northern waters, and still another of 20,0G0 which have been brought over and
are now on their way to Cape Town and possiblj' to Durban because of Bub-
marines operating off Cape Town. Obviously these troop movements are highly
secret. We are at our wit's end in the Atlantic with the butter spread extremely
thin and the job continuously increasing in toughness.
Regarding personnel, we have at last succeeded in g;etting the President to
authorize our use of draftees. I have been after this for months. Now that
I have got permission it will take some time to get it through the Congress as
we have to have special [2] legislation to use our funds for this purpose.
It has been ray hope to use draftees wherever possible in District work and Air
Stations, tugs, net la.vers. mine layers, mine sweepers, etc. etc. Navigation is
working to see just how many such men can be replaced, thus releasing men to
the Fleet.
Believe it or not, the REUBEN JAMES set recruiting back about 15%. We are
increasing our advertising campaigns extensively ; not only that, but Navigation
is hiring civilian managers to assist in recruiting. Draftees however constitute
something sure and I only wish I could have gotten them months ago. The Presi-
dent in giving final approval said he just hated to do it ; but sentiment is fast
getting out of my system, if there is any left in it on this war.
Regarding permanence of personnel I have been over with Nimitz in detail
some to the recent changes and he will write you the details. There is a problem
here as well as elsewhere ; and while we expect you and want you to hammer
away on your own difficulties, just occasionally remember that we fully realize
our only existence here is for the Fleet and that we are doing the best we can
with increasingly vexing problems.
Your letters at least give us ammunition, if not much comfort.
I asked Nimitz last week to give me the figures showing the percentage of inen
now on board on the basis of the old complements. Enclosed is a table he has just
handed me. It may be poor consolation but at least it is something to know that
the Fleet has more men now than at any time since the last war. I do not have
the data for the last war. This does not mean that we are at all satisfied with
it, but it is something I have been following. I assure you every effort is being
made to improve it. It is steadily improving, but all too slowly to satisfy any
of us.
One thing I forgot to mention was your "the Pacific Fleet must not be con-
sidered a training fleet for support of the Atlantic Fleet and the Shore Establish-
ment." I'll hand that one to King. Once in a while something happens which
gives real interest. I think I'll have a gallery ready to see King when he reads
that, particularly after a recent statement of his that he noted he was getting
fewer men and had less percentage of complement than did the Pacific Fleet,
etc. etc.
Keep cheer/ul.
Sincerely,
[S] Betty.
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U8N,
Commander in Chief, U. 8. Pacific Fleet,
USS PENNSYLVANIA,
o/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.
[3] P. S. I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr.
Hull today. .1 have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after
a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing
the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the
President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2225
many angles 'an attack on the Philipi)iiies would be the most enil)arrassin}i thing
that could happen to us. There are s<»nie here wlio think it likely to occur.
I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strojig
feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not
time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather
look for an advance into Thailantl, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most
likely.
I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will
be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may
do most anything and that's tlie only thing I know to be prepared for ; or we
may do nothing — I think it is more likely to be "anything".
/S/ HRS. .
Summary — Nov. 25, 1941
Type
BBS
CVs....
CAs
CLs
DDs (1850 Ton)
(1500 Ton) (8 at 192)
(18 at 191)
(4 at 196)
(Sat 178)-.
(10 at 187)...
(12 at 200)
(1200 Ton) (Asiatic).
(4 at 132)..
(33 at 126)..
SSs (4at29)
(22 at 39)
(22)
(6at54)
Patrol Vessels
OOLALA
ISABEL
Totals..
Comple-
ment
fiscal
year
1939
19, 351
6,990
12,164
11,490
3,119
1,536
3,438
784
1,424
1,870
2,400
1,644
528
3,906
174
858
1,203
324
1,062
282
84
76,631
Comple-
ment
recom-
mended
by fleet
BD
26,583
7,602
18,508
15,860
3,900
1,920
4,392
1,000
1,952
2.480
3,000
1,898
584
4,626
192
946
348
Present
comple-
ment
22,244
7,258
15, 878
14,156
3,119
1,536
3,438
784
1,424
1,870
2,364
1,716
536
4,209
180
858
1,203
324
1,078
320
84
84,849
Number
onBD
19, 870
6,902
14, 067
12,896
2,826
1,346
3,138
728
1,312
1,717
2,171
1,673
446
3,704
230
891
1,390
375
1,109
290
82
77,163
% on BD as of Oct. 31
where available other-
wise September 30
To 1939
comple-
ment
102.68
98.74
115.64
112.23
90.60
87.63
91.27
92.85
92.13
91.82
90.46
101. 76
84.46
94.82
132.18
103. 84
115.54
115. 74
104. 42
102.83
97.61
103. 39
To present
comple-
ment
89.32
91.68
88.59
91.09
90.60
87.63
91.27
92.85
92.13
91.82
91.83
97.49
83.20
88.00
127.78
103.84
115.54
115.74
102. 87
90.62
97.61
90.94
[i]
Section B
Commander Cbuisebs, Battle Force
UNITED STATES FLEET
Confidential
U. S. S. Honolulu,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., January 21, 19^1.
Dear Betty: I received your letter of 13 January. You may be sure that
I will keep you fully, frankly and probably even critically informed of the
situation out here.
During even the brief time that I have had to survey the situation, I am
particularly impressed with the lack of Army equipment, for the task of defending
this base. This matter has been fully covered in recent official correspondence.
I think the supply of an adequate number of Army planes and guns for the
defense of Pearl Harbor should be given the highest priority. I will expand on
this later. It Ls sufficient at this time to state that a secure base here is of
paramount importance. I have discussed this matter fully with McCrea and
he has taken notes on my ideas, and I am sure that he will present them fully.
2226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
We have been together long enough so that I am sure you are quite familiar
with my methods of doing business. You know how I appreciate the value of
conferences. I agree that it is essential to keep the principal subordinates within
the command, fully informed of the circumstances as they develop. I shall
follow such a policy.
As you know, the Fleet Personnel Board, with Theobald at the head of it,
has been giving long and careful study to the personnel requirements of the
ships of the different types. I shall probably be required to make recommenda-
tions on this subject shortly after I take over. It appears wise to now fill
all ships with personnel to capacity, both on account of the needed increase in
complement to man the ships, and to train men for new construction.
[2] I now come to a point which I have discussed fully with Joe and with
which we are in complete accord. Richardson believes and recommends that
under present conditions I should move ashore with my staff. I believe, from
my conception of what a campaign in the Pacific under present policies will
amount to, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and his staff should
be quartered ashore in the Fourteenth Naval District, at least in the initial
stages of the campaign. Facilities on the Fleet flagship are not suflScient to
provide living and working accommodations for the personnel required on the
staff. It is neither desirable nor practicable to scatter the staff through other
ships of the Fleet. As I see it, the only solution lies in having them assembled
ashore in the district. I have looked into this matter to a certain extent and
believe that existing facilities within the district, particularly at the Submarine
Base, are such that the staff can be quartered there. It appears that certain
modifications and additions to the present communication set-up will have to
be provided, in order that a complete communication set-up will be available.
Facilities for oflice space, quarters for officers and enlisted men of the staff
can be made available with little rearrangement of what now exists in the
Submarine Base. Of course, that would be of a temporary nature. As soon
as I have investigated this whole thing more fully and have had an opportunity
to visualize the picture more completely, I believe that the correct solution to
the whole problem will lie in the erection of a separate building to house the
complete requirements of the Commander-in-Chief's staff ashore in the Four-
teenth Naval District. I am not prepared to give you the details of this at
this writing. Incidentally, in connection with the requirements of the
Commander-in-Chief, I believe that he himself should be assigned to one of
the official quarters now in the Fourteenth Naval District.
You appreciate, of course, that this question of housing the staff ashore, has
not passed much beyond the preliminary investigations. As you know, however,
I have already obtained quarters for the War Plans Section in the Submarine
Base and that section of four officers and all the files necessary for their work
will be moved into those quarters very soon after 1 February. If further study
of the Pacific set-up, as I visualize it, [3] substantiates my present ideas,
and if the quarters I have in mind in the Submarine Base show that they can
take my staff, I shall move from the PENNSYLVANIA to those quarters as
soon as they can be made ready. In that connection, of course, you understand
that the present facilities on board the PENNSYLVANIA will remain intact
and that I shall arrange matters ashore so that my entire staff and myself can
move on board the PENNSYLVANIA within a few hours. I shall, of course, be
on board the PENNSYLVANIA whenever tactical exercises ai"e conducted and
during any other times when I feel the necessity for it. My staff battle organi-
zation will require training on the PENNSYLVANIA, and I shall embark on
that ship for enough fleet work to keep them trained for any emergency.
If I move ashore and find that the arrangement as I now visualize it is the
correct one, I shall have plans drawn up for a permanent Fleet Center ashore.
I shall submit the plans to the Bureau and request funds for its immediate
construction.
Things are buzzing around here, and I am taking every opportunity and a
lot of Joe's time, to get his points of view on many vital questions that are
involved in this job. I was sorry to hear that you had an attack of the fii^,
but happy to know, from the press reports of the arrival of the KING GEORGE V,
that you were able to get to sea in the Chesapeake to greet the new Ambassador.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2227
That seems to be about all for this time; but I am sure that I shall have a lot
more to tell you in our continued correspondence.
My kindest regards and best wishes to you and your good wife, as always.
Most sincerely yours,
s/ H. E. Kimmel.
H. E. KlMMEL.
Admiral H. R. Stabk, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
[i] CinC File No.
United States Fleet
Secret U. S. S. Pennsyi-vania, Flagship
Peabl Harbor, T. H., 18 February 19^1.
Deab Bettt : Your letter of 29 January reached me on 14 February, and your
letter of 10 February arrived on board on 16 February. You will note that the
delays were due to interference with clipper schedules.
A check has already been sent to the Navy Relief for $39,000.00 and one to the
American Red Cross for $9,900.00. This was done by Richardson just prior to
his detachment. I trust that the Navy Relief has received it by now.
I will inform Bloch in regard to the search of fishermen and think it an ex-
cellent idea. I believe this search has been in effect here for some time.
Nimitz has written me to put not more than 100% complement on any type of
ship. I will pass this along to Calhoun, but with the present rates of supply and
attrition I see small chance of exceeding 100%.
I wrote Nimitz today in regard to the Bureau of Ordnance requirements for
post graduate ordnance oflScers to be employed on shore, and asked Nimitz to
show you the letter when he receives it. You will note that I took occasion
in this letter to reiterate the need for additional enlisted personnel in all types
of ships. From my standpoint there is every urge to train just as many men as
is possible. This is in addition to the need for men in existing ships. The new
construction program will, in a reasonable time, make inordinate demands on
the Fleet. I would repeat here what I said in my letter to Nimitz, that the con-
dition of the Fleet within the next few months may be of much greater im-
portance to the Nation than the completion of the two-ocean Navy in 1946.
I was delighted to learn about the Army fighters. The first contingent is now
on its way, together with certain equipment for the outlying islands. In addition
to the fighters I believe it of the highest importance to send just as many Army
bombers and adequate supplies of bombs to Oahu as the Army establishment
can support with the greatest effort. The need for Army anti-aircraft guns
should also be stressed. Active and immediate steps are being taken to coordi-
nate the Ai'my and Navy air effort as well as the ground crew defenses of Pearl
Harbor. [21 I had a couple of interviews with Short and find him fully
alive to the situation and highly cooperative. I recommend that you keep con-
tinuous pressure on this question of Army reinforcement of Oahu.
The full complement of Marines has landed at Midway. We utilized Crudiv
EIGHT, Desdiv ELEVEN, and the ANTAR£:S to transfer troops, baggage,
equipment, etc. You will have received our statement of the conditions existing
at Johnson and Palymra. In this I tried to give you a complete picture, together
with the only possible solution I see with the forces available. The transfer to
these islands of the maximum numbers you indicated may carry with it very
difficult complications, as a sudden call in the midst of the operation might
involve serious consequences. As I gather from researches, the orders involve
a drastic change from the original conception of the forces to be supported at
Johnson and Palymra. I think our recommenadtion to send 100 Marines to
Palymra and none to Johnson for the present, should be accepted.
Will study, prepare plans, and be ready for a quick decision in case orders
are received for a detachment of cruisers, destroyers, and a carrier to make the
proposed cruise to Manila or elsewhere. From my standpoint this appears to be
a most ill-advised move. Our strength in destroyers and cruisers is already lim-
ited. A carrier can ill be spared if we are to carry out other poposed plans.
While my political horizon is limited, I believe we should be prepared for war
when we make this move.
2228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The detail of local defense forces for the Fourteenth Naval District will have to
be made from the Fleet. This is a further drain on our small craft. In this
connection I am recommending in separate corerspondence that you send out one
squadron of PTs and one squadron of the new PTC sub-chasers at the earliest
possible date. I presume Bloch has his plans for commandeering local craft, but
I will check with him and also inform him of the probability that the Coast
Guard will be taken over shortly.
Bill Halsey has been bombarding the Bureau of Ordnance in an attempt to
get an increased supply of bombs. The copy of their reply, which I think you
should read, leaves us with very little hope for early alleviation of this most
unsatisfactory condition. In separate corerspondence, which will go forward
at the same time as this letter, we are recommending the shipment of these
bombs to Oahu in advance of the preparation of regultaion proof stowages. I
think we must accept the hazard and possible \,i\ deterioration which
may ensue from shelter stowage. The total lack of incendiary bombs should be
remedied at the earliest date.
The subject of reserve ammunition for the Fleet has been covered in various
letters. I feel that the number of ammunition ships in commission and being
converted is still entirely inadequate to handle the situation.
I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is
a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage
Inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force will pay. We need anti-submarine
forces, — DDs and patrol craft. The two squadrons of patrol craft will help when
they arrive.
After a thorough investigation, we are pr(»ceeding to fit existing facilities at the
Submarine Base to permit shore basing my staff and my.self. Just when I will
move ashore deiwnds upon the supply of essential equipment. I have only one
object, that is to so place myself and my staff that we can best accomplish the
task before us.
To revert once more to the question of enlisted personnel, Theobald's board, in
my opinion, has contributed more to the Fleet than any single factor in a very long
time. It did a most excellent job and, in the absence of positive evidence that
they are wrong, we should accept their recommendations. I have ordered the
Medical Board, the members of which represent all tyi)es of ships, and have told
them to expedite their proceedings. I propose to give you their findings by
despatch.
Before the report of the Fleet Personnel Board reached your office, I sent you a
despatch outlining the minimum complements prescribed by the Board for each
type of ship. In reply I was informed by despatch that the complements recom-
mended exceeded those assigned in the Force Operating Plan for 1942, and was
instructed not to install bunks, lockers, and messing facilities in excess of the
complements already arrived at by the Department. I am go convinced that the
complements recommended by the Fleet Personnel Board are the minimum re-
quired to serve the ships in a campaign, and that the findings of the Medical Board
will not declare the larger complements to be contrary to standards of health and
comfort, that I sent another despatch last night asking for a reconsideration of
your decision. Bunks [4] and lockers do not add greatly to the weight of
a ship and are not unduly expen.sive. It is my frank opinion, as stated in the most
recent despatch on this subject, that even if complements are not increased imme-
diately to the limit recommended, it is better to install bunks and lockers now
rather than do so in the confusion of mobilization, for I am convinced that if we
take part in this war we shall most certainly have to build up our complements as
recommended by the Fleet Board.
The Bureau of Navigation has forwardeed me a long list of officers of post grad-
uate training, now afloat, wanted by the Bureau of Ordnance for duty ashore.
These oflScers occupy important command, gunnery, and staff positions. I realize
the necessity for expediting ordnance projects and I want to help in every way I
can. But the number of experienced officers in the ships at the present time is
dangerously low. I can not view the detachment of additional experienced officers
but with the greatest concern. I have asked the Bureau of Navigation to give
me an opportunity to comment on the detachment in each case of officers with
ordnance experience, prior to final action.
T also hope that drastic steps can be taken to stop the continuing turnover of
personnel, particularly qualified personnel. The detachment and changes of
qualified enlisted men concerns me almost as much as the detachment of qualified
and experienced officers.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2229
I come to another question of the highest Importance, — the supply of modern
type planes throughout the Fleet. I am forwarding under separate cover a copy
of a letter written to the Bureau of Aeronautics on this subject. I have gathered
the distinct impression that the Bureau of Aeronautics is primarily concerned
with the expansion program and that the supply of planes and itersonnel to man
the Fleet takes a secondary place. Obstacles are offered to most of Halsey's
recommendations. I cannot subscribe to these views. We must have the most
modern planes in our csirriers and other surface vessels, in fact in all the aero-
nautical organization afloat. I realize of course the necessity for personnel
ashore, particularly in the aeronautical organization, to train new personnel and
to produce the material. But the balance should be maintained, and in any event
the latest type planes should be supplied the Fleets. The forces afloat have
repeatedly recommended the acquisition of two or more "seatrain" vessels to
transport airplanes. I am not familiar with the technical difl8culties involved,
but if it is at all possible to do so — and Halsey in- [5] sists that it is — I
think this work should be undertaken at once. The recent required use of carriers
to transport Army planes to Oahu illustrates the necessity for providing some
means for aii-plane transport. Transporting planes and equipment by carrier is
highly expensive, both in lost training of flyers and non-availability of carrier for
other duty.
We are going ahead with Plan Dog and RAINBOW THREE. Prior to the
receipt of the letters received in the mail yesterday we had given priority to
Plan Dog, but as you state you wish priority to be given RAINBOW THREE, we
will do so.
The necessity for additional store ships and transports is accentuated by plac-
ing Marines on the outlying islands and I hope nothing will stand in the way
to promptly supply those now planned, and to further increase them as soon as
practicable.
I shall decide upon the distribution of the exploders after consultation with
Withers and Draemel.
With kindest regards and best wishes.
Sincerely,
/S/ H. E. KlMMEL.
Admiral H. R. S?tabk, U. S. Navy.
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
P. S. We receive through radio and other intelligence rather reliable reports
on the positions of Japanese merchant ships, but we have no definite informa-
tion on the important Japanese trade routes. Can you send us the latest informa-
tion you have on this? I am initiating separate correspondence on this topic.
I have recently been told by an oflScer fresh from Washington that ONI con-
siders it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in-Chie|f with
information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the
responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of ONI.
I do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose
responsibility it is to keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent
reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix
that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?
HEK.
[1] CinC File No.
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
Unitej) States Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
TJ. 8. {'suibmarine \Base,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., April 22, 1941.
Deab Betty: So far I have not felt the need for a Public Relations Officer
on my Staff. Situated as we are, the majority of this work has beon Miery
succ-essfully handled by the District under Admiral Bloch. We have been in
perfect accord as to what should and should not be released. From the stand-
point of the newspaper and publicity men the situation may not be as satisfactory
as it is from my standpoint. I can see where the services of a man like Waldo
Drake could be of great value to the Service. So my answer is that if you can
2230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
send Waldo Drake out here to serve on my staff, I will be very glad to havb
him. An individual with less experience might do more harm than good.
We have been very much gratified at the responses to the items I enumerated
in my letter of February 18. However, there is one outstanding deficiency that
still exists in the Fleet — namely, permanency of personnel. The detachment of
oflScers and men continues. I have written at length to Nimitz on this subject.
I understand in some degree the personnel problem that confronts you and
Nimitz. I feel that the establishment of a nucleus of trained and experienced
oflScers and men in each ship of the Fleet is vital. This nucleus should include
the Captain, Executive OflScer, Heads of Departments and as many other key
officers as the Bureau feels they can retain in the ship for the duration of the
emergency. For the enlisted personnel the same principle should govern, particu-
larly as regards Chief Petty Officers and Petty Officers First Class. We cannot
produce a satisfactory state of battle efficiency unless we have some degree of
permanency in this nucleus of personnel. We must have on board a certain
number of officers and men who know the ship, know the organization and who
can whip the new personnel into shape by guiding their effort.s. I know that you
and Nimitz are doing all that you can but I cannot refrain from calling your
attention to it once more.
Is it not ijossible to obtain legislation which will stop the discharge of qualified
men and i)erniit them to remain in their present billets?
I have now been established in my office on shore for some little time and things
are working vei*y smoothly. I am of course prepared to move aboard ship on very
short notice.
[2] I know you are cognizant of the condition in the Carriers, as I have
detailed it in various official correspondence. The effect of detachment of a
carrier or any light forces from this command will affect the operations out of
all proportion to the apparent fighting strength of the forces detached. This I
know you will understand and in anything that you do I know you will carefully
weight all the factors involved.
Admiral Danckwarts spent a couple of days with us and gave me considerable
information which is of value. I did not, however, commit myself in any way
and tried to avoid talking too much.
My kindest regards find best wishes to you.
We are all cheerful.
Most sincerely yours,
H. E. KiMMEL.
p. S. I must urge you once more to do all in your power to fill the ships
with enlisted personnel to the limit of their capacity. Our ideas on this subject
have been submitted in great detail. The last submitted about two weeks ago
was the report of our medical board on this subject.
/s/ Kim MEL.
Admiral H. R. Stark. U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
[1] Confidential
Via Clipper Air Mail
Commandek-in-Chief
United States Fleet
U. S. STn?MARiNE Base,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., Ma/y 5, 19^1.
Dear Betty : I have your despatch in regard to the proposed visit of the
Secretary. I am forwarding an official letter on this subject in this same mail.
I think we will be able to give him an interesting time out here. I indicated
the time that he might spend at sea if he so desires. I imagine, however, when
we make up the final schedule he will probably want to spend more time in port
than I have indicated in my official letter. There are a great many developments
in and around the Pearl Harbor area that he should see and in which I am sure
he will be very much interested. A perfectly enormous amount of work has been
accomplished in this district and it is all going ahead full blast at the present
time.
We had planned rather extensive tactical maneuvers for Task Forces ONE,
TWO and THREE which involved a trip to Midway by Task Force ONE and to
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2231
Palmyra by Task Force TWO. When I received your letter in regard to certain
ship movements we decided to curtail these operations and to maintain Task
Forces ONE and TWO in the immediate vicinity of Oahu. I do not want to be
caught short in the event of any sudden demands.
Tell the Secretary that I will be very pleased indeed to see him. I am
endeavoring to keep you informed primarily by official correspondence of the
needs of the Fleet. I believe you are fully cognizant of all the problems. As you
know, our principal problem out here is one of supply, i)articularly to outlying
bases. Our food ships, store ships, oilers and ammunition ships are barely ade-
quate now and this would be the cause of concern in the event of hostilities.
I know you are doing all you can along this line. The transports are coming
along very slowly. Brown goes to the Coast with a minimum force, starting
in a few days to look over the progress of the landing force needs and to conduct
the scheduled exercise at San Clemente. It looks now as though King's estimate
that an AK will be required to accompany each division of transports to transport
equipment, particularly landing boats, is absolutely correct. I feel that in any
landing exercises that we may undertake, it should be done only when we have
ample equipment and personnel to pursue our objectives tx) a successful conclusion,
even in the event of the loss of very important units. In other words the
landing should not be attempted until we have what amounts to an overwhelming
force capable of a simultaneous landing.
[2] We are losing quite a percentage of experienced enlisted men who, upon
the expiration of their enlistment, go into civil life to accept the high wages now
prevailing. This is a cause of concern and I repeat again something should be
done to retain these men. The only method I can see is by congressional legisla-
tion of some kind. We are attempting to use every bit of Fleet transportation
from the West Coast to Honolulu to bring personnel and supplies out here. I
believe you might help things if you would indicate to the material bureaus the
shortage of shipping in order that they might go out of their way to meet our
demands as to cargo such as bombs and ammunition. The type of incident I have
in mind is the shipment of the supply of bombs from N. A. S., San Diego, which
we finally straightened out with the Bureau of Ordnance after the exchange
of several despatches.
I hope Nimitz is taking our idea of nucleus crews seriously. This applies to
officers as well as men. We must have sufficient experienced men in key positions
in the ship who know the ship in order to properly train the young reserve officers
and the recruits. Of course, this is over and above the urgent necessity to keep
these ships in a condition to meet an emergency. Briefly I think if some twenty
percent of the complement could be considered permanently assigned to the ships
that it would help things enormously. I shall send forward our ideas on this sub-
ject in a more definite form shortly.
I know the demands upon you for patrol craft of all descriptions but I must
again bring to your attention the urgent need in this area for some patrol craft
fitted with listening gear and carrying a few depth charges. The demands upon
destroyers would then be somewhat relieved and they fould have time to perfect
themselves in other phases of their training.
My kindest regards and best wishes to you alwbys.
Most sincerely yours,
/s/ Kimmel.
H. E. Kimmel.
Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
Air Mail
United States Pacific Fleet
[i] Cincpac File No.
Confidential U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Pearl Harbor, T. H., May 16, 1941.
Dear Betty: The ammunition situation continues unsatisfactory and is a
source of concern to me in regard to gunnery school and target practice ammuni-
tion as it effects training, and mobilization and reserve service ammunition as
it effects the general readiness of the Fleet. The problem as we see it here is
2232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
chiefly one of transportation, since in general the ammunition is available but not
where we can get at it.
Late in the winter I asked that giumery school ammunition be delivered to
the Hawaiian Area not later than 2 June, 1941 and that certain target practice
amunition be delivered here for use early in the gunnery year. Action on this
request was an order to assemble gunnery school ammunition at N. A. D. Mare
Island by 15 May 1941, with' the request that it be delivered to Pearl Harbor
by vessels of the Fleet since no other transportation was available, and an order
for shipment of a large part of the requii-ed target practice ammunition by PYRO
and LASSEN from the East Coast by loading various vessels of the Base Force
with gunnery school anumition as it is assembled at Mare Island during this
month, we are in a fair way of getting enough of it here by 2 June to commence
gunnery school firings.
In view of the fact that PYRO and LASSEN were not sche<luled to arrive before
the end of July I requested by despatch that target practice ammunition be
shipped by rail across country .so that it too could be transported here by vessels
of the Fleet, stating that we could u.se this ammunition as soon as delivered. This
request was not approved for reasons best known to the Department. Since the
LASSEN is now .scheduled to arrive here about 21 July, with a part of this ammu-
nition, and the PYRO about 11 August, with the remainder, there will be a period
of approximately two months during which the Fleet will be deprived of gun-
nery training except for gunnery school firings.
Since PYRO and LASSEN are already loading on the East Coast no further
action to expedite shipment of target practice ammunition appears feasible, and
we shall have to accept the handicap in training imiwsed by the lack of this ammu-
nition. This is already water over the dam and I mention it only because I feel
the time has come when the long haul of ammunition between the Ea.st and West
Coa.sts by amunition ships should cease and full use be made of rail transporta-
tion to place needed amunition at West Coast ports where we can get at it. Ob-
viously in the event of hostilities water transportation of ammunition from the
East to the West Coast will be too slow and risky.
The shortage of machine gun ammunition, particularly .50 caliber, has placed
us in a very serious position. Upon the urging of the Department I recommended
a cut to the minimum possible allowance per gun for annual training and pro-
posed to transfer all type gunnery school machine gun allowances to the Fleet
Machine Gun School. Type gunnery [2] school allowances of machine
gun ammunition have since been eliminated entirely, and we now find ourselves
in the position where the Fleet Machine Gim School has only enough ammuni-
tion to last until 10 June. On that date we shall be forced to close down the
Fleet Machine Gun School unless more ammunition is made available.
I stress the urgent need for early delivery of target ammunition in ample
quantities because the turnover of personnel continues high and I can see no
improvement in the near future. The only way we can counteract this and give
adequate training to large masses of green personnel is to provide ammunition
for frequent firings.
I have stressed gunnery school and target practice ammunition because up to
the opening of hostilities they may be considered our first requirement, and we
can only hope that the last increments of mobilization supply, which are on their
way, arrive in time. So far as mobilization supply is concerned the battleships
and heavy cruisers are well fixed. The light cruisers and destroyers are still
short, particularly in 6", 5" anti-aircraft and depth charges, although am-
munition orders indicate that by midsummer deficiencies will be made up. In
this connection it is suggested, when forces are moved from the Pacific to the
Atlantic, that the Bureau of Ordnance be informed as early as it is practicable to
do so, in order that final increments of mobilization ammunition, and target prac-
tice ammunition for that matter, loaded in ships for delivery to Pearl Harbor may
be diverted at West Coast ports and not brought out here.
The situation in regard to reserve service ammunition is entirely unsatisfactory.
Here again I realize it is largely a matter of transportation and that reserve
service ammunition must come after mobilization ammunition. When PYRO
becomes available as a ship of the Base Force she can be used in shuttle trips
to the coast to bring up our reserve supply. We are making every effort to trans-
port ammunition of all kinds in vessels of the Fleet, and I am happy to note
that the Naval Air Station San Diego was permitted to give up some aircraft
bombs for transportation out here in ENTERPRISE. Also an order to ship 1,000
depth charge from Howthorne was a great help. These will be transported in
ships of the Fleet.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2233
Once we are over the mldsunimer hnnip we shall be in a much bettei" position,
provided the inevitable d(»es not happen first. Even then, lujwever, the supply
of reserves will be critical and the use of rail transportation urgent.
With kindest regards.
Sincerely,
H. E. KiMMBX.
Copy to Rear Admii'al Blandy.
United States Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYI.VANIA, Flagship
CinC File No. A16/0828
Secret 26 May 1&41.
From: CinC
To: OpNav
Subj : Survey of Conditions in Pac. Ft.
I. PERSONNEL.
(a) Stahiliti/. A most important, perhaps the most important factor in the
day by day readiness of the Pacific Fleet is the question of stabilizing personnel —
both officers and men. The Fleet is doing all it can, and is making good progress,
in absorbing new men and training new officers, but facts are facts and neither
the Fleet nor the individual ships can be a coordinated war machine if the
present rapid turnover of personnel is continued.
(b) Permanency of Officer Personnel. Regular and experienced officers have
been detached at an alarming rate. Cooke, for example, who came to the
PENNSYLVANIA the latter part of February, is fourth on the list of twelve
l)attleship captains in time on present billet. Executive officers are going, if
anything even more frequently. The situation is no better in cruisers. There
appears to be a tendency to give priority in importance to shore duty over sea
duty ; witness, transfer of officers skilled in fire control and gunnery to produc-
tion and inspection jobs ashore, and the all too frequent detachment of com-
manding and executive officers and [2] heads of departments from ships
■of all types. Expansion of the Forces Afloat does call for sacrifice in per-
manency of assignment in the Fleet, but we cannot afford to replace our ex-
perienced officers with reserves, most of whom are untrained, if we are to be
ready for serious business. It does seem that much can be done toward stabil-
izing the experienced personnel we now have. Ordering captains, executives
and heads of departments of the various types, well knowing that they will
be eligible for selection and promotion within six months is an example of a
condition readily susceptible of correction.
(c) Permanency of Enliafed Personnel. The situation is well known to the
Department, as indicated by a recent directive to take full advantage of the
law and retain men whose enlistments expire outside the continental limits of.
the United States. The drastic trend in reduction of reenlistments in the Navy
as a whole in the month of April is of serious import to the Fleet. Even in
the Pearl Harbor area the wages offered ashore are so attractive and the
jobs are so many that skilled men whose enlistments expire are tempted not
to reenlist. A recent survey of Battleship Division THREE indicates that of
the men who.se enlistments expire between 1 June and 31 August 1941, 68.9%
do not intend to reenlist. This is in line with a recent report of the Bureau of
Navigation showing a reduction in reenlistments for the month of April from
83.09% to 09.53%. The Commander-in-Chief has requested the Bureau [3]
of Navigation to initiate legislation to hold for the duration of the war all
men now enlisted in the Navy. He does not look with favor upon the directive
mentioned in the first sentence of this sub-paragraph. It is discriminatory and
does not apply equally to all Fleets or even to all ships of the Pacific Fleet,
since some ships overhaul on the Coast while others overhaul at Pearl Harboi.
The Fleet must and gladly will train and provide men for new construction and
outlying stations to the limit of its capabilities, but it should be unnecessary to
assign to shore duty so many experienced petty officers as we now find ashore.
There is an urgent necessity that a continuous supply of recruits be furnished for
training. It should be pointed out that since September, with new meti started
coming in in large numbers, all vessels have had to absorb recruits in a large
proportion. In the Fleet as a whole, complements are now made up of over
25% of men with the maximum of a year's service, and in some ships the
79716 O — 46 — i)t. 16 21
2234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
figure approaches 50%. In the case of newly acquired transports, cargo ships,
tanliers and the like, the complements are almost 100% reserve, with little previ-
ous Naval training. Present conditions are worse rather than better when new
ships in large numbers are added to the Navy. The situation will be extremely
acute if we are then at war. It is obvious that there are limitations on the
capacity of active ships for supplying the large numbers of officers and men
required to man the Navy now building, unless the immediate [4] fighting
capacity of the ships is seriously crippled.
Long range plaiming, with reasonable foresight as to future needs, is an
imperative necessity. It would appear that training activities ashore must be
greatly expanded, as the physical capacities of the ships limits the number that
can be trained in the Fleet. The possibility that we may have to provide and
quarter, ashore, a pool of trained men for new construction should be carefully
examined, and provision now made for it, if found necessary.
A problem of immediate importance is brought about by a recent letter from
the Bureau of Navigation which states that between now and September some
3.080 men, more than half of whom are rated, will be taken from the Fleet for
new construction and for this purpose allocations are made in the ratio of 72%
Pacific Fleet to 28% Atlantic Fleet. Unless a readjustment is made in these
figures to correspond to the recent readjustment in the relative strengths of these
Fleets, the Pacific Fleet will be seriously stripped of experienced men and may
be unable to furnish some of the ratings demanded.
(d) Health and Morale. The desirability, if international conditions permit,
of health and recreation trips to the Coast by Task Forces, each of which shall
be no more than one-fourth the strength of the Pacific Fleet as now constituted
must be given serious consideration.
[5] (e) Assif/nment of Flag Officers. It is particularly desired that Vice
Admiral Pye be retained as Commander of the Battle Force. Admiral Pj'e is
able, vigorous, and loyal ; and is an oflScer whom I would select, above all others,
as Commander Battle Force.
(f) Uniform. There is too much change and experimentation at this time.
It is not important whether rank is shown on the sleeve or on the shoulder of a
khaki uniform, nor is it important whether tho eagle of the cap device faces to
left or to right. As for the khaki working uniform the Commander-in-Chief is con-
vinced that it lessens the dignity and military point of view of the wearer and
has a tendency to let down the efliciency of personnel. Reports from the aircraft
squadrons are to the effect that from any considerable altitude they are unable
to detect the color of the uniform on ships at sea.
IL AVIATION.
(a) Aviation Training. The following requirements for aviation have been
urged but favorable action has not yet been taken : —
(1) Newly graduated pilots for carriers, battleships and cruisers should first
be ordered to San Diego for indoctrination in Fleet squadron work and familiariza-
tion with latest types of planes.
(2) Replacement carrier groups should be built up at San Diego, for indoc-
trination of new graduates and for rotation with groups already in carriers.
[6] (3) The rating of Aircraft Radioman should be established.
The following requirements are in process of correction but progress is too
slow :
(1) The level of experience of pilots in the Fleet is very low and the total
number is too low.
(2) The level of exi^erience of aviation ratings in the Fleet is low and the
allowances are not filled.
(3) The rating of Aircraft Bomber, though approved, has not yet been
established.
(b) Aviation Material. The following items which apply to aviation are in
process of correction but progress is too slow :
(1) Carrier torpedo planes are obsolescent and spare carrier torpedo planes
are too few.
(2) Replacement of other carrier planes with more modern types is not yet
completed and the replacement planes are not yet fully modernized.
(3) There are not yet enough spare carrier planes of the new types and
the stock of spare parts and engines is too low.
(4) Deliveries of ordnance and radio equipment for new planes have been
too slow.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2235
(5) Cruiser planes are obsolescent and deliveries of replacements have been
too slow.
(6' Modernized patrol planes are not yet available in quantity. There are
none in the Hawaiian area and there i.s no early [7] prospect for replace-
ment of those of the older tyiie now in the Hawaiian area.
(7) There have been no deliveries of special radio equipment for patrol
planes, corresponds to RADAR for ships, which will enormously increase the
potentialities of these planes.
(8) There is a serious shortage of aircraft machine gun ammunition.
(9) No armor-piercing bombs, antiaircraft bombs or aerial depth bombs are
yet available.
(10) There is a very serious shortage of aircraft torpedoes and of equipment
for their maintenance and overhaul.
(11) Completions of new carriers and new patrol plane tenders are too slow.
(12) Provision for bombs and for refueling planes at outlying bases is
sketchy.
(13) There has been serious delay in deliveries of equipment under the
cognizance of other Bureaus than Yards and Docks in connection with the
construction of new air stations and bases.
In addition to the afore-nientioned items the following have been urged but
favorable action has not yet been taken :
(1) Aircraft overhaul at N. A. S., Pearl Harbot, now limited to patrol planes,
should be expanded to provide for all planes now based in this area. Transfer
to and from West Coast for overhaul is impracticable.
(2) Additional barracks should be established at N. A. S. Pearl Harbor.
L&l (c) Separate Air Force. This ever present question is again being
brought to the fore, in view of Mr. Scrugham's recent utterances. It is vital that
the Navy's air service remain as it is. Our naval aviation is generally recog-
nized, throughout the world, as being the best equipped, best trained, and most
advanced of any naval air service. This has been brought about by the mutual
recognition of the intimate relationship between air and surface sea forces,
particularly in far-flung operations distant from established bases. Effective
cooperation, in naval operations, between air and surface craft requires the closest
kind of coordination, predicated upon precise knowledge of each other's capabili-
ties, limitations, and tactics. This can only be attained by day-by-day operations,
association, and exchange of ideas* as an integral part of one organization. It is
vital that this relationship continue, even at the expense (though this feature is
greatly exaggerated) of some duplication of effort between the Army and the
Navy. Mr. Scrugham's chief complaint, which deals chiefly with duplication of
facilities at coastal air stations and the proximity at those stations to each other,
is not a valid one. The services perform separate functions ; the Army in extend-
ing the range of coastal batteries and the Navy in extending the mobility and
coverage of ships in off shore search. The proximity of the fields to each other is
largely a matter of the vagaries of Congress and the [5] availability of
land. The United States, due to its physical separation from its most probable
enemies, has less need for a concentrated, offensive, air striking force than other
nations. The present GHQ air force, however, amply supplies this need. It may
be noted, in passing, that, in spite of the fact that the Air Corps is a part of the
Army, the strong tendency within that Corps for separation, has prevented the
development of effective cooperation between ground and air forces. A separate
air corps w-ould make the situation much worse — for the Navy it would mean the
death of naval aviation.
The British have found it necessary to place their coastal air command under
the direct control of the Navy. Aside from discoordination of operations, this
command was suffering from lack of proper types.
HI. MATERIAL, GENERAL.
(a) Priorities. The Navy is at present suffering from a shortage of material
and is experiencing difficulty in having this shortage corrected. The principal
items, and those that directly affect our early readiness, are (1) small arms and
machine gun ammunition for airplanes and the Fleet Marine Force; (2) airplanes,
esi)ecially those equipped with modern armor and armament; (3) close-range
antiaircraft guns, especially a 1.1", Bofors, and Oerlikon ; (4) ammunition in
general, particularly adequate reserves, and bombs of all kinds. Our ability to
correct these deficiencies is [/O] limited by two factors, (1) aid to Great
Britain, and (2) rapid expansion of the Army. Both of these limiting factors are
admittedly of great importance and are entitled to proper weight in any system of
2236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
priorities, but, from the point of view of the Fleet, it appears that there is a
tendency to twerlook the time factor. A priority system based on relative quanti-
ties needed by the three comiieting agencies. Britain, Army and the Navy, will
prove fatally defective, if the time of beginning active operations is overlooked.
As the situation appears now, the Navy may be called on for active operations in
contact with well equipped opposing forces, yet is prevented from obtaining vitally
necessary needs by the magnitude of the needs of Britain and the Army. If we
are going into action first, our needs must be filled ahead of the Army's and those
sine qua non needs such as small arms and machine gun ammunition, modern
airplanes, and modern close-range antiaircraft guns, must be filled ahead of
Britain's. There is a minimum need for the Navy without which it can not fight
at all. Irrespective of how small that need may be I'elative to the quantitative
demands of others, it must be filled first.
It is important to bring out this point now, since it is understood that tlie
Army is basing its procurement program on a 4,000,(X)0 man Army. If alloca-
tion be based on relative quantities, under such a program, the Navy will get
little consideration. The [11] imminence of active operations should be
the criterion. Of course, the Navy Department is in a better position to judge
that than we are, but we've been led to believe we were pretty close to war on
several occasions, but we still didn't get the items we need.
(b) RADAR Equipment. Such excellent results are being obtained from the
few RADAR'S furnished that we should install now the equipment which will
work, and not wait for something better to be developed. Delivery of RADAR
should be accelerated.
IV. COMMUNICATIONS.
The need for establishment of confidential call signs is urgent. With the
present system of calls the text of a message may sometimes be inferred from
the radio calls used. The danger of the present system is that codes may be
compromised, as well as information disclosed. The cryptographic aid section
of opNav should immediately get out confidential call signs and more crypto-
graphic aids.
V. OPERATIONS.
(a) Fleet Operations. With the recent detachment of many of the most mod-
ern and effective units, the adequacy and suitability of the forces i-emaining to
accomplish the tasks to which they may be assigne<i is very doubtful.
In the Pacific, our potential enemy is far away and hard to gjet at. He has
no exposed vital interests within reach of Pearl Harbor, and has a system of
defense in the Mandates, Marianas, [12] and Bonins that requires land-
ing operations, supported by sea forces, against organized land positions sup-
ported by land-based air. This is the hardest kind of opposition to overcome
and requires detailed preparation and rehearsal. It also requii'es a preponder-
ance of light force and carrier strength, in which we are woefully deficient in
the Pacific. Our present strength is in battleships— which come into play only
after we have reduced the intervening organized positions. They (battleships)
will have to be used to "cover" the intervening operations and prevent interference
therewith, but their real value can not be realized until the intervening oppo-
sition has been overcome and a position obtained from which solid strength can
be brought to bear. The Japanese are not going to expose their main fleet until
they are either forced to do so by our obtaining a position close enough to threaten
their vital interests or it is advantageous for them to do so by our having "broken
our backs", so to speak, by going up against their land positions and attrition
operations.
The foregoing discussion is brought out to emphasize that the role of light
forces, and particularly carriers, in the Pacific, is far more important than a
casual evaluation of relative strength would suggest. Under RAINBOW 5,
the Pacific Fleet (perhaps justifiably, in view of the Atlantic situation) is so
reduced in light force and carrier strength that its capabilities for offensive
[13] operations of a decisive nature are severely crippled. Quick results
may only be hoped for — common sense dictates that it is largely hope, based
principally upon the idea that Japan will make a fundamental mistake, and
that bold action may be able to take advantage of it.
In the Pacific, with enemy vital interests so far away, and no bases of our own
within striking distance, the logistic pi'oblem is acute. We have not, at present,
suflBcient ammunition, provisions, cargo ships or tanks to support active oi)era-
tions in the Western Pacific — where the real battleground will be. We are having
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2237
difficulty, even now, supi)<»rtiiig the construction and defense activities of our
own outlying bases. More auxiliary vessels are needed, now, for that purpose, and
future needs must be anticipated to allow for acquisition and conversion of the
ships. Our past experieJice, in this regard, has not been a happy one — the lag
between acquisition and entrance into service being six months to a year. Repair
and maintenance facilities at advanced bases can not be created overnight, nor
can the Fleet remain long without them.
(b) Fourteenth Naval Diatrict. The defense of the Fleet base at Pearl
Harbor is a mater of considerable concern. We should continue to bring pres-
sure to bear on the Army to get more antiaircraft guns, airplanes, and RADAR
equipment in Hawaii and to insure priority for this over Continental and
expanding Army needs.
\H] The naval forces available to the Commandant are meager to the
point of non-evistence. A Fleet base is a place of rest, recreation, and resus-
tenance and must afford protection of the Fleet at anchor and during entrance
and egress independent of the units of the Fleet. If units of a fleet must be
employed f(u- its own defense, in its base, its freedom of action for offensive
operations is seriously curtailed — possibly to the point where it is tied to the
base by the necessities for defense of that base. The need for patrol boats and
other small craft, especially those equipped with listening devices, is urgent.
The Fleet must be relieved of those functions which properly belong to the
District. The Fleet does not have the desti-oyei-s or other vessels to take over
those duties. The situation has been brought to the Department's attention by
letter. It is now much more serious as many destroyers have been detached
from this Fleet.
(c) Marine. The necesity for closely coordinated training of Marines and
the ships which will support their landing operations is readily apparent. Opera-
tions of this character require detailed training and realistic rehearsal. At pres-
ent, the Marines and their ti-aining ground (San Clemente) are in one location
and the ships in another, 2000 miles away. We need a training ground for landing
operations and a camp for a substantial portion of the Fleet Marine Force in
the Hawaiian area. This need will be worse, if we get in war in the Pacific,
because we will not only need a training ground and [15] large camp
site for Marine.s, but also must train and rehearse, as the campaign progresses,
Army forces as well.
Kahoolawe is practically undeveloped and can be used as an Hawaiian San
Clemente. A camp site for 5,000 Marines has been selected and recommended for
acquisition. This program should be pushed.
The Sixth Defense Battalion should be brought to Hawaii now in order to
relieve the Seventh Defense Battalion at Midway where the latter has been
stationed for some months. Equipment for this battalion should be provided as
soon as possible. Other defen.se battalions now in the Hawaiian area are being
used for other outlying bases.
(d) Loffistic Support. Ships to transport men and materials to and fi'om the
Coast and to supply the outlying islands is urgent.
There is similar urgency in the need for ships to transport aircraft. Aircraft
carriers should not be used for this purpose in peacetime and cannot be so em-
ployed in war. Action has repeatedly been requested.
VI. NATIONAL POLICY.
(a) Although largely uninformed as to day-by-day developments, one cannot
escape the conclusion that our national policies and diplomatic and military
moves to implement them, are not fully coordinated. No policy, today, is any
better than the force available to support it. While this is well recognized in
[1€] principle, it is, apparently, lost sight of in practice. We have, for ex-
ample, made strong expressions of (mr intention to retain an effective voice in
the F'ar East, yet have, so far, refused to develop Guam or to provide adequate
defense for the Philippines. We retained the Fleet in Hawaii, last summer, as
a diplomatic gesture, but almost sinmltaneously detached heavy cruisers to the
Atlantic and retained new destroyers there, and almost demobilized the Fleet
by wholesale changes in personnel.
We .should decide on what we are going to do about the Philippines, now, and
provide for their defense, if retained. It is easily conceivable that 50.000 troops
and 400 airplanes on Luzon, might prove a sufficient deterrent to Japan to
prevent direct action. We should develop Guam and provide for its defense
commensurate with its state of development. It is foolish to develop it for some
one else to use.
2238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The military branches of the government should be told, by the diplomatic
branch, what effect it is desired to produce and their judgment as to the means
available and the manner of its accomplishment should be accorded predominant
weight.
Our Hemispheric Defense policy must comprehend the fullest cooperation be-
tween participating nations and our commitments limited by our available force.
A strong component of that force is bases. No Hemispheric Defense policy that
does not provide for our free use [17] and development of South American
bases (and local military and logistic suport) can be effective.
Vn. INFORMATION.
(a) The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difQcult position. He
is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing
situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy,
reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to
evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what
force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting
his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturb-
ing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that
singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary
to the conduct of military operations.
It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international
picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge
of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of
timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked
improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies [18]
and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible
courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable
to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of
a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of
interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet
impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and
time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation,
particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development,
thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.
It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as
they occur and by the quickest secure means available.
VIII. PUBLIC OPINION.
(a) As preparation for war, the current mental and moral preparation of
our people, as reflected in the newspapers and magazines, is utterly wrong. To
back into a war, unsupported or only half-heartedly supported by public opinion,
is to court losing it. [19] A left-handed, vacillating approach to a very
serious decision is totally destructive of that determination and firmness of
national character without which we cannot succeed. The situation demands
that our people be fully informed of the issues involved, the means necessary
and available, and the consequences of success or failure. When we go in, we
must go with ships, planes, guns, men and material, to the full extent of our
resources. To tell our people anything else is to perpetrate a base deception
which can only be reflected in lackadaisical and half-hearted prosecution.
/S/ H. E. KiMMEL.
Navy DEyAKTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, 4 June 1941-
Confidential
Memorandum for Admiral Stark
The agreement entered into betwixt the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, and the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in regard to joint action
of the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii provides :
(a) That in activities in the defense of Oahu and the other islands against
enemy bombing attacks the command shall be vested in the Army Air Corps as-
sisted by Navy fighters which may be available.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2239
(b) That in a mission which involves bombing of enemy ships the command
shall be vested in the Navy Air Commander in charge of the Base. Briefly, when
an alarm is sounded the Navy patrol planes take off to locate the enemy ships
and when located in the Navy directs the efforts of the Army and Navy bombers
in the offensive action which they take against the enemy ships.
The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satis-
factory and weekly drills in air raid alarms with the two services acting in
unisoji are held. These drills have developed many weaknesses but the condi-
tions are steadily improving and it is felt they are in much better shape now
than they were a few months ago. The conditions will continue to be unsatis-
factory imtil certain equipment has been supplied and the personnel drilled in
its use.
There are about 140 light Army planes (fighters and light bombers) and 21
heavy bombing Army planes now in the Islands. These in addition to some
obsolescent bombers and fighters. It is believed that the number of Army bomb-
ers in the Islands should be at least four times the number that they have there
now and it is felt these planes should be sent out as soon as it is practicable
to do so.
There are not now a sufficient number of Army pilots to man all the Army
planes in the Islands.
[S] H. E. KiMMEL.
[i] Commander-in-Chief
United States Pacific Fleett
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Secret Pearl Harbor, T. H., July 26, lOJfl.
Dear Betty : When the proposed visit of the Under Secretary was announced
my staff prepared a list of topics which might be of interest for discussion while
Mr. Forrestal and his party are here. Not knowing the punwse of Mr. For-
restal's visit or whether he is informed concerning the general nature of our
war plans and our problems I decided it better to combine these notes into a
letter to you and believe quicker action can be obtained in that way. Following
•are the principal items of which I have been thinking:
(1) The importance of keeping the Commander-in-Chief advised of Depart-
ment policies and decisions and the changes in policies and decisions to meet
changes in the international situation.
(a) We have as yet received no official information as to the U. S. attitude
towards Russian participation in the w.ir, particularly as to the degree of
cooperation, if any, in the Pacific, between the U. S. and Russia if and when
we become active participants. Present plans do not include Rusisa and do not
provide for coordinated action, joint use of bases, joint communication systems
and the like. The new situation opens up possibilities for us which should be
fully explored and full advantage taken of any opportunities for mutual support.
Pertinent questions are :
( 1 ) Will England declare war on Japan if Japanese attack Maritime Provinces?
(2) If answer to (1) is in the affirmative, will we actively assist, as tentatively
provided in case of attack on N. E. I. or Singapore?
(3) If answer to (2) is in the affirmative, are plans being prepared for joint
action, mutual support, etc.?
(4) If answer to (1) is negative, what will England's attitude be? What will
ours beV
(5) If England declares war on Japan, but we do not, what is attitude in
regard to Japanese shipping, patrol of Pacific waters, commerce raiders, etc.?
(b) Depending upon the progress of hostilities, the Russian situation appears
to offer an opportunity for the strengthening of our Far Eastern defenses, par-
ticularly Guam and the I'hilippines. Cert.iinly, no matter how the fighting goes,
Japan's attention will be partially diverted fi*om the China and Southern adven-
tures by either (1) diversion of forces for attack on Russia or (2) nec-essity
for providing [2] for Russian attack on her. It is conceivable that the
greater the German succe.ss on the P^astern front, the more Russia will be pushed
toward Asia, with consequent increased danger to Japan's "New Order" for that
area. In my opinion we should push our development of Guam and accelerate
our bolstering of the Philippines. The Russo-Axis war may give us more time.
(2) Priorities in connection with preparation for a Pacific war: —
2240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(a) Transports and Liffht Destroyer Transports. — During the Commander-
in-Chiefs visit to Washington, all the transports, including the light destroyer
transports, were transferred to the Atlantic. The necessity for this is I'ecog-
nized. Nevertheless, we still need transports in the Pacific and the need is even
greater now (in i>oint of view of time particularly) because most of our trained
marines went with the transports and we are faced with an immediate training
problem in addition to a pf)ssible war situation. The Department has initiated
action to complete the HARRIS and ZEILIN and to acquire and convert four
more transports for the Pacific, but, so far as is known, has done nothing about
replacing the light destroyer transports (APD's). These vessels were originally
conceived and developed for a Parifie campaign. They are especially suitable
for use in attacks on atolls and may be the only means of readily attacking
those positions. While by no means discounting their usefulness in the Atlantic,
the need for them in the F'aciflc is paramount. If at all possible, they should be
returned to this ocean at once. If this cannot be done, and only if it cannot be
done, additional destroyers must be converted as soon as x)«ssible. Work on the
large tran.sports must also be expedited and completion dates anticipated if
possible..
(b) Marine Equipment: Tlie Sixth Defense Battalion does not now have its
full equipment, particularly AA guns and .30 and .50 caliber machine guns. The
remaining units of the Second Marine Division were stripi)ed of much of their
equipment to fit out the reenforced regiment that went East. There is practically
no marine ammunition now on the West Coast. It is practically certain that
these luiits will fight befcue the Army will and their needs nmst be given pri-
ority. We can't fight an amphibious war in the Pacific without ammunition for
the marines.
[3] We are going ahead with the preparation of a camp in Oahu for five
thousand marines. When they come they should be fully equipped for amphibi-
ous warfare. The tran.sports etc., should be ready at the same time. An estimate
of when the needed equipment and men will be available would help us in our
planning.
(c) Awnmnition Facilities: The condition of ammunition handling and
stowage facilities ashore are in general satisfactory at the present time. Stowage
facilities have bepn completed, are in the process of c(mstruction, or are about
to be started to handle assignments of service reserves of gun ammunition, bombs,
mines, and torpedoes. This includes igloos alrejtdy completed and others now
under construction at Westloch and at Lualualei.
New construction authorized and about to be umlertaken includes four powder
magazines and four shell hou.ses at Lualualei, and barracaded .stowage fctr live
mines, two new mine anchor buildings and a new mine assembly building at
Westloch.
New construction needed to complete stowage and handling facilities includes
extension of Westloch dock to a maximum of two thousand feet and the con-
struction of four powder magazines and two shell houses at Westloch to accom-
modate target practice ammunition which cannot be stowed in vessels of the
Fleet. This latter construction has been recommended to the Commandant of
the Fourteenth Naval District in recent correspondence and we haVe no word
yet on what acti<m he has taken.
(d) The importance of building up Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to the point
contemplated by the Greenslade Boatd. For the present Navy Yard, Pearl Har-
bor should be regarded primarily as a "restricted availability" yard. Overhaul
of ships here should not include battleships and cruisers or other ships for
extensive regular overhauls. The facilities of the yard should be confined to
emergency and low priority overhaul, regardless of overhead costs.
(e) Provide more and more personnel to the Fleet for training. The personnel
situation has been presented to the Bureau of Navigation and that Bureau is
thoroughly familiar with our requirements. We cannot provide experienced
personnel' for new construction next year unless we obtain recruits and train
them intensively at once. I realize [4] that recruiting has fallen off and
that the Department is doing all it can but we are losing trained men faster
than we are getting new recruits. As I stated in a recent letter we could use
20,000 more men in the Pacific Fleet right now.
(f) Need for a hospital ship in the Pacific Fleet and for completion of new
hospital at Pearl Harbor.
(g) Urgency for small craft in the Fourteenth Naval District for patrol pur-
poses, to relieve the load on our limited number of destroyers.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2241
(h) The need for acquiring advanced base material and assembling it at
Mare Island.
(i) Correspondence has gone forwanl urging that all available light craft in
the Pacific be fitted with depth charges, listening gear, etc. This is important.
(3) Communicatiomi. The supply of communication, radio, and sound equip-
ment to the Fleet and the Shore Stations leaves much to be desired, although a
great improvement has been noted in the last year.
(a) Specifically it is noted that the Kaneohe Air Station was acquired, built,
conimissi<med, and actually operated prior to the receipt i>f any radio apparatus,
except some which we diverted from its intended advance base use.
(b) It took BuEng two years to put "Chinese copies" of NRL's Radar on
six ships.
(c) For years BuEng prevented research by NRL in any form of radio recog-
nition device and hence retarded the production of such apparatus. The Fleet
is still without it though it is under manufacture.
(d) We must have the IFF (Identification, Friend or Foe) for aircraft at
once. The program" lags and on June 14th only 56 were on order from Canada
with indefinite delivery date. See "Aviation" below.
(e) Radar equipment for submarines is highly important. I am not informed
as to exact status of this but understand development is not entirely satisfactory.
There is evidence that German subs are equipped with Radar.
[5] In general, Naval shipboard radio and sound equipment is so elaborate
that it cannot l>e manufactured expeditiously. BuEng should have tj'pe plans for
apparatus of such a nature that they can get results from industry and not
make each new piece of apparatus a research job.
(4) Aviation Requirements. These items, all of which have recently been
taken up with the Department, are summarized briefly :—
(a) Pre-FIeet Trainiuf/. Two units under the Fleet at San Diego, one for
patrol squadrons and one for carrier squadrons. More pilots for battleships and
cruisers, for training on board ship. Particular emphasis on double comple-
ments for patrol squadrons; anticipation of enlisted personnel numbers and
training in all categories, particularly patrol squadrons; building up the supply
of spare airplanes; accomplishing the training witiiout any further drain on
combat readiness of active squadrons.
(b )Netc Torpedo Planes. Highest priority— A-l-a — instead of present priority
which is A-l-b. There are ordy half enough torpedo planes ni)w and they are
obsolescent, while war reports demonstrate that there may be no single item
of greater naval importance.
(c) Conversions for Carrier Landing Training. Auxiliary aircraft carrier con-
versi(m was dropped because of time and cost fa<'tors. These can be greatly re-
duced by requiring only the characteristics needed for landing traiiung. The nee<l
for these ships is extreme. Aircraft carriers should not, and in war cannot, be
used for this purpose, while new i)ilots must be properly trained before joining
active squadrons if combat readiness is not to be jeopardized.
(d) A. S. V. {Anti-l^urfact Vessel) Equipment. This is of the highest poten-
tial value. Apparently none will be available for patrol planes until December.
It can be carried by other planes, as shown by rejiorts of British tori)edo plane
operations. It should be provided for every plane that can carry it and much
earlier deliveries are essential.
(e) /. F. F. (Identtfieation. Friend or Foe) Equipment. This is absolutely
complementary to and essential for effective use of the Radar for airciaft defense
of the Fleet. Without it, the Radar cannot differentiate between friendly and
enemy airplanes. There is no definite information on deliveries. No delay what-
ever is acceptable.
[6] (f) Engines for New Patrol Planes (PIiY-5's). Nose section failures
have been occurring. Every effort is being made to find and cure the trouble.
This should be continued, for it will be no help to the Fleet or to any destination
of the.se planes to get new planes that can't fly in place of older planes that can.
(g) Landplane Field at Johnston Island. This was removed from the project
by the Department. It should be put back. It is needed not oidy as an adjunct
to local defense but, more imjiortantly, as an aid to defense against expeditions
headed eastward and as a stepping stone for landplane support of expeditions
headed westward.
(h) Keehi Lagoon Development. This will be of very great value to patrol
planes in the Hawaiian area. It is the best location for operations of these
planes and no other place is suitable for planned patrol plane expansion in this
2242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
area. Inclusion of facilities for Navy patrol squadrons in this development
should be undertaken immediately.
(i) Development of the N. A. S. Barber's Point. This approved development
is very urgently needed. There is a strong tendency to turn down many aviation
shore facility items in this area on the basis that they will be available when
Barber's Point construction is finished. This makes it more than ever mandatory
to expedite the work.
My kindest regards and best wishes always.
Most sincerely yours,
/S/ H. E. KIMMEL.
Admiral H. R. Staek, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
Cincpac File No.
Secret
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Pearl Harbor, T. H., July 30, 1941.
Deab Betty: In acknowledging receipt of your letter of 25 July as to the
possibility of using a carrier for transporting a load of planes to one of the
Asiatic Russian ports, I want to give some of my own views as to such aoi
undertaking.
Whether or not planes are to be supplied to the Russians may be outside my
province, but I do remain keenly aware of our own deficiencies in aircraft. It
is quite an undertaking for the United States to supply planes to any quarter of
the globe in which fighting against Axis Powers may occur.
My views against diversion of carriers from their proper duties to act a^
aircraft transports are well known. If planes must be sent from the United
States to Russia, the question of flying them out via Alaskan and Eastern
Siberia fields should be most fully inquired into. That appears to be the
most logical method of effecting delivery.
Should it be finally determined to use one of our carriers as a transport, the
time chosen should be one in which all three Pacific Fleet carriers are available
for operation. This is essential in order to minimize the danger to the carrier
transport.
The port of destination should certainly not be to the westward of the Japan-
Kurile-Kamchatka line.
I entertain no doubt that such an operation, if discovered, (as is highly
probable), will be tantamount to initiation of a Japanese-American War. If
we are going to take the initiative in commencing such a war, I can think of
more effective ways for gaining initial advantage.
A carrier sent on such an operation manifestly must be protected. After
careful consideration, I am constrained to feel that the minimum escort and
covering force provided should be the entire Pacific Fleet. I also feel that
combatant air or naval forces of a potential enemy encountered should be
engaged at once rather than wait for them to gain an initial advantage through
destroying any part of my own fighting strength.
In short, it is my earnest conviction that use of a carrier to deliver aircraft
to Asiatic Russian ports in the present period of strained relations is to invite
war. If we have decided upon war, it would be far better to take direct offensive
action. If for reasons of political expediency, it has been determined to force
Japan to fire the first shot, let us choose a method that will be more advantageous
to ourselves. Certainly an operation such as that proposed is far less likely to
bluff Japan into acquiescence or inactivity than it is to disturb her to the point
of hostile use of bombs, torpedoes and guns.
Sincerely,
H. E. KiMMEL.
Admiral H. R. Staek, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2243
[jf] Cincpac File No.
Confidential
United States Pacific Fleet, U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Pearl Harbor, T. H., August 12. 1941.
Dear Betty : Your news about the approval of 533,000 men and 105,000 Marines
for the Navy is good news. I agree with everything you said in your letter on
the subject and I certainly give you and Nimitz full credit for getting them under
the conditions which exist. We should lose no time in getting* our ships filled
up. I am ready to accept draftees if we cannot get them by voluntary enlistments
quickly.
I forwarded to Furlong all the information you gave me about Tommy Hart's
trouble with mines. We are waiting for Blandy's report, which I have not yet
seen. I should like to have it at an early date.
Thanks very much for the copy of Coronet which you sent to me. I turned
to page 86 and was somewhat shocked at the appearance of the photograph on
that page. However, I sent it on to Dot and know that she will be pleased as
I was to receive it. Please give my regards to Mrs. Hull.
I note Ghormley's views on the importance of RDF, or RADAR as we call
it. I think I can assure you that the oflScera of the Fleet are fully alive to the
importance of this development. We have stressed its use in every exercise
and are constantly drilling and training with it. We have had men tran.sferred
to the ships so equipped to the limit of the capacity of ships having them. Army
personnel have been trained aboard ships. I think you understand fronr our let-
ters as well as from my verbal remarks to you on this subject how important we
feel this development to be. I believe the numbers of the equipment in the Fleet
is far behind what it should be. I shall permit nothing to interfere ^ith its
installation in the ships as we receive the gear. It should be given the highest
priority in manufacture, supply and installation. We have not yet received any
purely g;unnery RADAR. In this connection, stress should be laid upon what
the British call "IFF" (Identification, Friend or Foe) for installation in ships and
planes; to the ASV (or RADAR in a plane to spot surface vessels) ; to the AI
(RADAR in a plane to spot other planes). I don't know when we can expect
these various types of RADAR but I do know that we need no urging in the
Fleet to do anything within our power to get and use all the various' types of
RADAR that have been developed.
Many thanks for the news about the detail of the twelve PT's to the Four-
teenth Naval District. This is a good start but neither Bloch nor I will rest
easy until we get the various patrol vessels we have requested in oflScial corre-
spondence. I do hope you will impress on the Secretary the vital importance of
this [2] matter. We need more ships of all types for a successful Pacific
campaign but I believe we need submarines, destroyers, carriers and cruisers even
more than we need battleships. This is a vast ocean.
You have approved our plan for putting guns and anarines on Wake. The first
detachment of 165 Marines, one battery of 5" and one battery of 3" are now on
their way. We will send the additional guns when transiwrtation becomes avail-
able. A recent survey of the men required to man the defenses of Wake plus the
other outlying islands indicates the desirability of forming another defense
battalion for service in this area. I feel that there is no doubt that an additional
defense battalion to provide periodic reliefs and replacements will be necessary.
We will give you an oflBcial letter on this subject shortly.
We have received the Department's plan in regard to the Marine Division and
transports and your ideas as to the composition of the 5,000 men to be stationed
in Oahu. We agree in general with all the plans but we would like the men,
equipment and transports now. I know that you also would like them and will
get them just as quickly as it is humanly possible to do so. I find that some of
the defen.se battalions already out here are shy in equipment. The anti-aircraft
guns for Wake are not equipped with directors. The battalions are short in .30
caliber and .50 caliber machine guns and ammunition. I do think that the few
machine guns required by these battalions should be spared from other activities
and I hope that the ammunition situation will be remedied very shortly.
The recreation facilities at Pearl Harbor are coming rapidly to a state where
they can and are being used by the men of the Fleet. Baseball, Softball and foot-
ball fields, though by no means entirely adequate have been commissioned and
2244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
we have large numbers of men who occupy these fields daily. The swimming
pool at Aiea is filled to capacity at all times. We can use at least two more pools
of this same size. The Fleet Recreation Center was partially commissioned on
the first of Aujjust and will be in full operating condition within another week.
It has been crowded with men from the day it was oijened. The facilities in-
clude a very larire soft drink and sandwich stand, an enormous bar where beer
is servefl, and a large number of chairs and tables in a very pleasant surround-
ing. It includes ten bowling alleys, eleven pool tables, a reading and writing
room, all of which have been in commission from the first ,of August. The
stadium will be* in commission within the week. It is suitable for boxing and
wrestling tournaments or ship's entertainments and for the movies. It will seat
approximately 6,000 men and movies can be shown to approximately 4,000 men
at one time. About a thousand families are now living in the houses built for
that purpo.se. All of tbe [3] remainder will be in commission by the
first of January. These houses are being finished daily and are occupied as soon
as completed. Bloch is going a great job.
The visits to the West Coast have been very successful and have, I believe,
helped all hands. The are worth while and I believe should be continued as long
as the international sitmition permits. I have watched the internatitmal situation
in relation to the crui-ses to the West Coast and shall not hesitate to cancel them
if, in my opinion, the situation so warrents. Y(^u will probably have informa-
tion sooner than I do which will warrant the cancellation of such cruises and I
shall of course expect advices or orders from you on this subject.
The Honolulu people have been very fine in their continued efforts to entertain
the officers and men of the Fleet in their homes and on their plantations. The
entertainment of enlisted men by the Honolulu i)eople has been on a scale which
taxes their capacity and is still going on. They deserve great credit for every-
thing that they have done, except the increase in rentals.
We recently submitted a letter dealing with the permanency of detail of
Captains and Executive Officers of battleships. This letter was prepared by
Admiral I'ye at my instigation. I forwarded it with my hearty approval. The
letter strongly recommends that no officer be assigned as Captain or Executive
Office of a battleship unless it is reasonably certain that he will remain in that
billet for not less than two years. Specifically, it recommends that no officer
coming up for selection within the period of his detail be assigned to either
of tlie.«e two billets. I consider this a matter of first importance. If you read
the letter to the Bureau of Navigation you will see that no Captain or Executive
Officer now in these ships has been there for as long as a year. The exact times
are set forth. We cannot 'expect satisfactory progress unless we make the tours
of duty of our officers sufficiently long for them to give something to the job.
I know this is an old story but it is an old stoiy which is much to the discredit
of our service. The recommendations from battleships apply with equal force
to heavy and light cruisers. In these ships the Captains in general comply with
the specifications set forth because they are taken from the more junior ones.
In the case of Executives I fear the situation is about the same as it is in battle-
ships. Brown is now making a survey of the Captains and Executives in cruisers
and I expect to forward that shostly to the Bureau of Navigation.
In another recent letter to the Bureau of Navigation we made specific recom-
mendations in regard to the Commanding Officers of destroyer divisions and
squadrons. I am happly to say that Nimitz has informed me that he will can-y
out our recommendations in regard [4] to the destroyer division and
squadron commanders. I wish to add that I have not yet had time to hear from
the Bureau of Navigation in regard to the battleship Captains and Executives.
I feel that gunnery in the Fleet is better than we have any right to expect
considering the enormous changes in personnel and the lack of permanency of
the officers. We have of course stressed battle procedures above everything else
and you well know how much more experience and training it takes to be pre-
pared fos battle than for a target practice. Recent reports that have come to
me on the firing of SRP "B" are very encouraging. The reports are fragmentary
and I hear most about the ships that have made high scores. For example, the
LOUISVILLE has three "E" turrets, six "E" five-inch giuis and one "E" three-
inch gun. I know this because I went aboard the LOUISVILLE a couple of days
ago. Other ships are doing very well indeed.
Recent directives from the Office of Fleet Training have put our target prac-
tices on a much fore realistic and practical basis. We feel that in the event of
hostilities we will be forced to make very few changes, if any, in these directives.
We are scheduling our services and area assignments in accoi-dance with these
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2245
directives now and I hear from all sides that it is considered much more satis-
factory than anything we have ever had before.
To summarize, I feel that the morale of the officers and men of the Fleet is
very satisfactory, that eveyoiie is working to the limit of his capacity, that we
are never ^^oinj; to be satisfied ; but that we all feel that we are making progress
and beginning to get some dividends from our efforts.
What we neefl more than anything else right now is men. I have recently
written Nimitz that this Fleet can use 20,000 additional men today. I will not
go into that further at this time because I know that both you and Nimitz know
this just as well as I do.
Keep cheerful. We are ready to do our damnedest.
Yours as always,
H. E. KiMMEX.
Admiral H. R. Stark. V. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Departmemt,
Washington, D. C.
United States Pacific Fi^eet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania (Flagship)
Pearl Harisor, T. H., 2^ August 1941.
Personal
Secret
Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
Dear Betty: I mailed today an official letter on the condition of the material
readiness of the fighting squadrons in the Pacific Fleet. I wish to call your atten-
tion particularly to the un.satisfactoi-y conditions disclosed in this lettei'.
We now have on hand and operating from carriers 41 F4F-3 and F4F-3A
fighting planes (of which 6 are currently luider overhaul or major repair) and
17 obsolescent fighting planes. Tills makes a total of 52 fighting planes available
for 3 aircraft carriers and 2 Marine fighting squadrons in the Pacific Fleet. Our
operating allowance, not counting spares, is 90.
I think you should take some drastic action to remedy this deplorable condition.
My kindest regards as always.
Most sincerely yours,
/S/ H. E. KlMMEL.
12 September 1941 Admiral Stark wrote the following note on above letter and
returned to Admiral Kimmel.
Dear Mustapha :
See our serial 0136723 of 12 sept.
Best we can do.
Keep cheerful.
/S/ BEnrT.
[i] United States Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Peabi. Harbor, T. H., August 26, 1941.
CinC File No.
P16-l/MM/(96)
Serial 01342
Confidential
From : Commander-in-Chief, Unite<l States Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject : Expan.'^ion Program — Personnel for.
References :
(a) CinCpac Conf. disp. lS23r.l of August 1941.
(b) BuNav serials 1386, 1394, 1397, 1406 and 14.50 of August 11, 1941.
(c) BuNav Conf. disp. 201824 of August 1941.
1. Transfer orders dated August 11, 1941 from the Bureau of Navigation to-
Commander Base Force Subordinate Command, as enumerated in references (b),
2246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
require a total of 222 rated men from the Pacific Fleet for transfer to U. S. S.
HORNET squadrons, two new Atlantic patrol squadrons and the Naval Air
Stations, Kodiak and Dutch Harbor. The Pacflc Fleet has only a bare minimum
of such ratings to meet present operating requirements. Similar ratings are
needed for advanced training groups now in the process of being formed in the
Pacific. The Commander-in-Chief has had no previous warning of this heavy
demand upon the Pacific Fleet. As indicated in reference (c), transfer of these
ratings is being held in abeyance pending departmental reconsideration.
2. Of these 222 rated men a total of 88 radiomen qualified in aircraft is required
and a total of 61 aviator machinist's mates in the experienced class namely chiefs,
first and second class is required. In order that a bare minimum of one qualair
radioman be assigned each operating plane requiring such a rate for the per-
formance of its mission, a total of 437 such ratings is required in the Pacific
Fleet. According to the latest available figures there are a total of 324 such rat-
ings in the Pacific Fleet and the transfer of 88 in accordance with reference (b)
will leave a total of 236 or 54% of the minimum needed for safety and ability
to carry out the mission of all operating planes requiring such ratings. Figures
in regard to aviation machinist's mates indicate a total of 988 chief, first and
second class allowed, whereas there are only 722 now holding these rates in
the Pacific Fleet or 73%. Removal of 61 such ratings as required in reference
(b) will reduce the percentage to 67%. These percentages will be further reduced
by the transfer of such ratings to the advanced training groups now forming
in the Pacific. These ratings of qualair I'adioman and chief, first and second
class aviation machinist's mates must be considered key personnel in the aero-
nautical organization. Safety of operations and ability to carry out the mission
depend on such ratings. The reduction of the percentage of these key men will
adversely affect readiness for war of Pacific Fleet aviation.
[2] 3. The Commander-in-Chief has repeatedly pointed out to the Bureau
of Navigation the increasingly serious situation which is resulting from rapid
expansion of all phases of Naval activities without sufficient increases in avail-
able men in the Fleet to train for purposes of meeting the personnel require-
ments of this expansion. The current practice of constantly withdrawing
trained men from the Fleet cann()t continue if the Fleet is to remain in a satis-
factory state of readiness. The huge building program, both aircraft and surface
vessels, will require more trained personnel for manning than can possibly be
obtained under the current program of draining already under-complemented
Fleet units. At least two years are re<iuired to train acceptable petty oflBcers.
The consequences of continuing along the present apparently unplanned path will
be dire. The critical shortage with which the combatant air units of the Fleet
will be faced if the subject transfers are made is merely the beginning of a
deplorable situation which will certainly develop unless there is adequate plan-
ning for training personnel to meet the demands of expansion. The Pacific Fleet
can and will train the required ratings if given the material. Class "A" schools
must be immediately enlarged to cover the entire program. Induction of recruits
must b^ enormously increased.
4. The Commander-in-Chief is convinced that the building program and the
training program are not synchronized. Unless intra -departmental coordination
and review of the entire question of supplying personnel for the expanding Navy
are effectively undertaken, the current condition cannot be sensibly improved.
5. It is therefore most urgently recommended :
(a) That, in meeting the immediate demands of expansion, the distribution
of available personnel in the Navy be reviewed ^nd a program be established for
the acquisition of required ratings from the forces both afloat and ashoi'e in such
a manner as to avoid the depletion of any ratings below an acceptable minimum
in any combatant organization ; this review to form the basis for the reconsidera-
tion, requested in reference (a), of current orders for transfer of aviation ratings.
(b) That the entire expansion program be reviewed in order to determine in
detail the rate at which personnel will be required properly to man the new
units.
[3] (c) That, through the immediate and adequate expansion of Class "A"
service schools and the supply of additional recruits to the Fleets and shore
stations, the training of men be undertaken now in suflBcient numbers to meet
the maximum demands as they occur.
/S/ H. E. KlMMEZ^
Copy to :
BUNav
BuAer
Combasefor Subcom
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2247
[1] Cine File No.
Personal
Confidential
United States Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Pearl Harbor, T. H., August 26, 1941.
Admiral H. R. Stakk, U. S. Navy, .
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
Deab BETrry. I have your letter of 21 August dealing with the question of avia-
tion personnel required to man new patrol plane squadrons and the squadrons for
the HORNET plus certain additional men required for Kodiak and Dutch Harbor.
I have some appreciation of the problem which confronts you and I wish to state
that I yield to no one in my desire to be of the maximum assistance to the Navy as
a whole, but my immedkite responsibility is the Pacific Fleet. You must bear with
me if I present the viewpoint and opinion as viewed from where I sit. I know
that you have never wanted anything else and you can rest assured that you will
never get anything else from me.
In the first place, the orders for the transfers directed in the various Bunav
serials left no time for consideration and to make the best distribution of transfers.
The situation changes so rapidly in i)ersonnel and almost invariably for the force
that I can see no answer except to make my protest and gather the facts based on
the very latest figures. As we set forth in the oflScial letter which is now on its
way to you, we now have in the ratings of aviation machinist's mates : chiefs, first
class and second class, just 73% of complement. When transfers directed by the
serials in question are completed we will have 67% of complement in these ratings.
The excess is entirely in third class ratings. We can spare these ratings with least
resultant harm to the organizations. We have been trying to build up these
ratings against the time when we could look forward to double crews. You know
full well that the chiefs, first class and second class, are the men that bear the
brunt of maintaining the planes and insuring their safe and efficient operation.
I think when you lump the third class ratings into a picture to indicate an over-
complement the picture is not accurate. We make no protest on the transfer of
third class ratings and will be glad "to comply under the existing circumstances.
[2] On the basis of one (qualair) radioman for each plane, we now have
74% of the number required. After transfers are completed we will have 54%.
I note in the directive for transfers to the HORNET that 16 (qualair) radiomen
are required for the Utility Unit.
Transfers required take long-time men, leaving us with all the short-timers
which is an added handicap. We are now attempting to organize our pre-Fleet
training units at San Diego who require most of all the ratings I have just
mentioned.
Our percentages deduced from the Base Force reports of 30 June vary by some
II to 16% from the figures given in your letter and they are uniformly lower than
your figures.
If after you have read this letter you still feel that we should make the transfers
required by Bunav serials 1386, 1394, 1397, 1406, and 14.50, we can complete the
transfers from the Pacific Fleet by 30 September, with the bulk completed consid-
erably earlier than that and at the same time insure the ratings are taken from
activities which will result in the least harm in the various organizations.
If you can assure me that we wont be fighting the Japs within the next six
months I will gladly make the transfers without the least protest. We can, will,
and have been, training men in this Fleet just as rapidly as the existing facilities,
including the number of recruits supplied, permit. I will not say anything further
about the need for additional men because you have my views In a great many
communications on the subject and I know you are doing everything within your
power to improve the situation.
I will take steps to insure the preliminary planning necessary to an exi>editious
execution of the orders contained in the various serials and will give the order to
go ahead just as soon as you indicate by dispatch or otherwise what your judgment
dictates.
With kindest regards and best wishes.
Sincerely yours,
H. E. ElMMGTT..
2248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[1] CinC File No.
Secret
United States Fleeh
U. S. S. Pennsylvanha, Flagship
Peael Harbor, T. H., September 12, 1941.
Dear "Betty" : We all listened to the President's speech with great interest.
With that and King's operation orders, of which we have copies, the situation in
the Atlantic is fairly clear. But what about the Pacific?
I noted that BidwelTs Southeast Pacitic Force has shooting orders for surface
raiders east of 100° West, which seems to clear that up as far as raiders are con-
cerned, but just how significant was the restriction, limiting offensive action to
"siu'face raiders"? Of course I know that the possibility of German or Italian
submarines in that area is slight and Japanese improbable, but the question arises
as to just how much we can discount the threat of Japanese action. This uncer-
tainty, coupled with current riuuors of U. S.-Japanese rapproachment and the
absence of any specific reference to the Pacific in the President's speech, leaves
me in some doubt as to just what my situation out here is. Specific questions
that arise are:
(a) What orders to shoot should be issued for areas other than Atlantic and
Southeast Pacific sub-areas? This is particularly pertinent to our present
escorts f(»r ships proceeding to the Far East. So far. my orders to them have
been to protect their convoy from interference; to avoid use of force if possible,
but to use it if necessary. These orders, at least by implication, preclude taking
the offensive. Shouldn't I now change them to direct offensive measures against
German and Italinn raiders? In view of the delicate nature of our present Pacific
relations, with particular reference to their fiuidity, I feel that you are the only
one who can an.swer this question.
(b) Along the same lines, but more specifically related to the Japanese situa-
tion, is what to do about submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and the vicinity.
As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts, but not to bomb unless
you are in the defensive sea area. Should we now bomb contacts, without wait-
ing to be attacked?
[2] The emphasis, in the President's speech, on the Atlantic also brings up
the question of a possible further weakening of this Fleet. A strong Pac-iflc Fleet
is unquestionably a deterrent to Japan — a weaker one may be an invitation. I
cannot escape the conclusion that the maintenance of the "'status quo" out here
is almost entirely a matter of the strength of this Fleet. It must be reduced,
and, in event of actual hostilities, must be increased if we are to undertake a bold
offensive.
Our present shortage of carriers, cruisers and destroyers gives me much con-
cern, as it is these types that must bear the brunt of our early operations. Later,
we'll need a superiority in all types, as, according to reports, new Japanese
BB's, CV's and CA's are coming out and the balance is going against us. We can-
not carry the war very far into the Pacific until we are able to meet the Japanese
Fleet on at least equal terms. Pertinent to the maintenance of the "stitus quo"
and, if necesary, later hostilities, is the disposition of the NORTH CAROLINA
and WASHINGTON. I feel that their moveiuent to the Pacific, now, would have
a tremendous effect on Japan and would remove any impression that all our
thoughts are on the Atlantic. If we can't do it now, we should at least be pre-
pared to do it later if the situation deteriorates.
When we get into a shooting war with Germany there will be an increased
demands for escorts in the Pacific. In view of the immense distance involved
and the character of probable opposition, this, in the main, means cruisers. We
may need additional cruisers and I cannot see how we can handle the job prop-
erly if our cruiser strength is reduced. We now have three cruisers on escort
duty to Manila. My orders are to escort to Manila but not to escort on the return
trip. Bidwell in the Southeast Pacific has two cruisers.
I feel better now that we have gotten something at Wake. The success of
the Army flight has re-emphasized its importance, and, while by no means
"impregnable", its present defensive strength is considerable and will require
the exposure of quite a force to capture it. It is even possible [3] that
should its capture be an early objective of Japan, such an effort might be
supported by a substantial portion of their Combined Fleet, which would create,
for us, a golden opportunity if we have the strength to meet it. Do not misunder-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2249
stand me — I don't discount the Atlantic problem — but from where I sit, I discount
the Pacific problem even less. Until we can keep a force liere strong enough to
meet the Japanese Fleet we are not secure in the Pacific — and the Pacific is still
very mucli a part of the world situation.
I IvJiow you have these thoughts in ndnd and share my concern, but I am
not sure but that there are some in Washington who might be inclined to overlook
them.
Please let me have your views on the questions raised herein. With regard to
offensive action against raiders in the Pacific and submarines off Hawaii, etc.,
I presume I will get official orders, if any change in present policy is desired.
Sincerely,
/S/ KiMMEL.
[1] • COMMANDKR-IN-rHIF:F
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Pearl Harbor, T. H., October 22, 19A1.
#1
Secret
Dear Betty : On receipt of your despatches following the change in tlie Japanese
cabinet we made the following dispositions :—
Continued to maintain the patrol of two Submarines at Midway.
Despatched twelve patrol planes to Midway.
Despatched two submarines to Wake. They will arrive there on 23 October.
Despatched the CASTOR and two destroyers to Johnston and Wake with ad-
ditional marines, amnuinition and stores.
The CURTISS arrives at Wake on 21 October with gas, lube oil and bombs.
Prepared to send six patrol planes from Midway to Wake, replacing the six
at Midway from Pearl Harbor.
Despatched additional marines to Palmyra.
Placed Admiral Pye, with the ships making a health cruise, on twelve hours
notice after 20 October. . i
Had six submariries prepared to depart for Japan on short notice.
Put some additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside
Pearl Harbor.
Delayed the sailing of the WEST VIRGINIA until about 17 November when
she is due to go for an overhaul to Puget Sound and deferred final decision until
that time.
With minor changes I propose to continue the health cruises to the Pacific Coast '
until soJuething more definite develops. The despatch in regard to the submarines
for Manila went forward to you today.
I previously pointed out to you the great desirability of many things in the
Pacific Fleet. If you will bear with me I want now to repeat some of them
once more. The urgency for additional patrol craft in this area is as great as
ever. Such craft are not [2] worthwhile unless they can operate in
trade wind seas which result from winds from 15 to 35 knots blowing almost
continuously. The 12 PT's which you sent to us I fear will be of very little use
in this area. We sent them on an average day to make a trip from Os<hu to
Molokai. The reports of this trip have gone forward officially. They were prac-
tically useless in this sea and could not make more than 10 knots. Several of
them had to turn back and a few personnel were quite seriously injured from
being thrown about. We need something much more substantial to be of any use
out here. In this connection I noted that the Department diverted the listening
gear allocated to the four-stackers (DM's) in this Fleet to Atlantic destroyers
and we will get no listening gear for these craft until a new c(mtract is made.
I had fondly hoped that all these craft would be fitted with listening, gear by the
first of December.
In order to get anything like the capabilities of the heavy ships of this Fleet
made effective we requiie at least two more squadrons of destroyers. Every
exercise we plan we find the destroyers are lacking. You can well understand
of course, that two squadrons is, in my opinion, a very modest request. We can
use many more.
I have been struggling with the availability of battleships and am concerned
about the long interval between overhauls that will result if we continue to have
only one battleship overhaul at one time. I am loath to reduce the operational
79716 O— 46— i»t. 16 22
2250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
forces by more than that particularly as the interim availability further reduces
the number available for operations. Two more battleships out here, particularly
if they could be the NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON, would ease the
situation enormously. We have indications that one new battleship has been
commissioned by the Japanese and rumors that an additional one will s6on be
placed in commission. Such a contingency will further disturb the balance of
power in the Pacific.
We can use all the Jong range submarines that you can send us. They can
be most effective in keeping destroyers and other patrol craft occupied near the
Japanese bases, homeland, and trade routes.
We should have more cruisers because we can expect that Jap raider activities
will result from employment of a considerable number of converted merchant
types as well as old cruisers in this work. Then, too, our own planned offensive
operations require cruisers and more cruisers. The least you can do for us
is to leave us with the cruisers we have. I can easily keep three or four more
divisions profitably occupied when war breaks.
The type of operations we have planned in the early stages of the war puts a
premium on aircraft operations from carriers. We [5] have only three.
One of them is occupied part-time in training activities at San Diego. I note
in a letter signed by Ingersoll and received today that the chances of getting
a merchant ship converted to a carrier for training purposes at San Diego are
very poor. I feel that this matter shoiild be pushed ; that we should have
at least one such vessel in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific. Uiitil we do get
such a ship we are required to occupy a considerable time of a carrier at greatly
increased cost, diversion from active operations and reduction in the efficiency
of the carrier. These carrier training vessels will be useful so long as the war
lasts and will pay for themselves many times over.
We had information some time ago that you were converting two sea train
vessels for use in transporting aircraft. What has become of them? Are they
operating in the Atlantic and so you propose to send a carrier to San Diego to
ferry planes.
I feel that the training in the Fleet is coming along very well. The shooting
so far has been very good by any standards. We are developing the use of radar
and our principal handicap at the present time is lack of material and lack of
trained personnel. Both are being reme<lie(l at a satisfactory rate. We have had
no experience yet with the use of gunnery radar. The first sets are now being
installed. The gunnery radar installed in the HONOLULU Class is a bitter dis-
appointment. Thel have been able to get surface ships at ranges not in excess
of twenty thousand yards, on a big ship, and around twelve thousand on a
destroyer. This radar is apparently useless for the detection of aircraft. Luckily,
this type is being installed in the HONOLULU Class only. It is useful only for
short range work against surface craft at night or in low visibility. I presume
steps are being taken to eliminate or radically improve this type of radar.
The radar installed in the battleships and carriers is well worthwhile and
we have got highly creditable results from its use.
The new big drydock here has been pumped out and the contractors' forces
are now in process of cleaning it out preparatory to finishing off the bottom. I am
informed that an emergency docking will be possible any time after about the
15th of November, although the dock will not be entirely completed until some-
time later than that.
The recreation facilities are being added to and I believe the men are in much
beter shape now than they were a few months ago. The shooting has, I believe,
served to increase their confidence in themselves, to a considerable degree.
[4] I sent forward to you today an exhaustive study on the installations and
defenses of Wake, Midway, Johnston and Palmyra. I hope it will be of assistance
in deciding what you want done out here. I feel that a comprehensive plan is
essential if we are to get coordinated results in the shortest time. This we tried
to give you.
You will note that we recommend two full defense battalions over and above the
requirements of the Islands now occupied in order to provide two balanced forces
to occupy any desired location on short notice. Until such time comes these
personnel can be used to rotate the defense battalions at the various permanently
garrisoned islands.
The investigation of an alternate land plane route to the Eastward of the
Marshalls and on to Australia has my hearty approval. We may be able to get
some quick results from the expedition to Christmas Island sufficient to permit the
routing of four-engine land plane bombers from Oahu to Christmas to Suva to
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2251
Noumea and on to Australia. Additional stepping stones are, of course, highly
desirable. In this connection, however, it must be remembered that there are not
enough ships now available to handle our own island developments. Without
greatly augmented shipping facilities we cannot possibly assume the additional
burden for the Army.
My best regards to you always.
Most sincerely yours,
[S] H. E. KIMMEIL.
Admiral H. R. Stabk, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.
Commandeb-in-Chief
united states pacific fleen* — flagship
Secret
Peabl Harbob, T. H., October 29, 19 U.
Drab Betty : I had Mr. Hallet Abend for lunch with me today. He has just
completed a tour for the Reader's Digest and his travels took him to Singapore,
Manila, Java, Dutch East Indies, Australia and New Zealand. He gave us some
very interesting information. The most vital information was information which
he had received from oflGlcials in Australia and New Zealand that if Japan attacks
Russia the British Empire will declare war on Japan. He was also assured that
the Dutch East Indies would follow Great Britain and that the dutch are anxious
that the war start. They feel that the present set-up in the world gives fhem a
better chance now than they will ever have again, so long as Japan has her bases in
Indo China.
At the present writing it appears that the most probable direction for Japanese
adventures is to the Northward. If they do embark on such an adventure and
Britain and the Dutch East Indies declare war on Japan, what will we do?
I have no means of knowing the accuracy of the statements. It may be that the
idea was planted with Mr. Abend as a propaganda measure and he was told by the
oflScials who informed him that he could pubish it after he got to the United States.
I am informing you in order that you may run it down, and also in the hope that
you may give me some inkling of what we will do in such a contingency.
My kindest regards and best wishes, always.
Most sincerely yours,
[S] H. El KiMMEL.
P. S. The officials told Mr. Abend that this information came from the Privy
Council but he was not privileged to use this.
Admiral H. R. Stakk, V. 8. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.
[i] United States Pacitic Fleet
U. S. S. Pennstlvania, Flagship
Cincpac File No.
Personal and Confidential Peabl Hakbok, T. H., November 6, 1941.
Dear Betty : I have just signed a communication to you setting forth our
estimate of the Japanese bases and forces in the Mandates. This estimate
represents meticulous observations, principally by radio, over a long period of
time with what* we conceive to be reasonable deductions therefrom. I think
there can be no doubt that the Japanese have expanded very large sums and
much effort in their attempt to strengthen the Mandates and provide numerous
operating bases for submarines and aircraft. The numbers of aircraft are of
necessity an etsimate, but with adequate operating bases for both submarines
and aircraft, additional forces can be very quickly moved into the Mandates,
depending upon the situation.
2252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
You will note, of course, that our estimate differs considerably from the one
prepared in the Navy Department. I doubt very much if the Navy Department's
effort has had the care expended upon it that we have given to the one we
submitted.
I must call your attention again to the anti-submarine effort that will be
required in this area and at sea if our operations are to be carried on with rea-
sonable security. You have approved installation of sound gear in the DM's,
in the AM's, the AVP's, certain AT's, and the AVD's. At the present writing,
the following vessels of these classes are lacking in sound gear and we have been
furnished no date from the Department on which we can expect deliveries of
same.
DM's: PRUITT, TRACY, PREBLE, SICARD, DORSEY, LAMBERTON,
BOGGS and ELLIOT.
AVP's: TEAL, PELICAN, SWAN and AVOCET.
AM's: BOBOLINK. GREBE, KINGFISHER, RAIL, ROBIN, SEAGULL,
TERN. TURKEY, VIREO.
XXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXX
AT's: NAVAJO and SEMINOLE.
AVD's: HULBERT. BALLARD, THORNTON, WILLIAMSON, GILLIS and
McFARLAND.
[2] In other words, we have in this area 2f> ships which can be fitted with
sound gear and which are not so fitted. This is a very large number of potentially
useful submarine hunters.
I note that you plan to send 24 VSO's to the Asiatic Fleet in January. I pre-
sume that you now plan to send those VSO's crated, in cargo vessels. Unless
the situation changes materially I strongly recommend against sending them in
a carrier.
I have frequently mentioned the very great desirability of having a flight deck
merchant ship for use in training aviators for carrier duty. On reflection, I
have changed my mind to the extent that instead of providing one carrier of this
type for each coast, we should provide about ten such carriers for each coast.
Such ships operating in conjunction with cruisers or even destroyers, have a very
great i)otential value. Of course, the mercantile aircraft carriers I am now
recommending should be fully equipped for combat puri)oses — something that
I did not contemplate when we recommended the carrier for flight deck training
only.
My kindest regards and best wishes, always.
Most sincerely yours,
H. E. Kim MEL.
P. S. I have forwarded today by air mail the comments of Com-14, the C!om-
manding General, and myself on the subjiect of a combined operating center for
the Army and Navy in Oahu. You will note that we have presented several
objections and feel that in any event the Commander-in-Chief, Commander Sub-
marines, Scouting Force, and Commander Base Force have no place in such an
operating center. I feel that the quarters and buildings we have requested for
these agencies should be proceeded with forthwith ; no matter what decision
is finally made in regard to an operating center the buildings we have requested
will be necessary.
Admiral H. R. Stakk. U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.
[i] United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Cincpac File No.
Secret Pearl Harbor, T. H., 15 November, 19J^1.
Dear "Betty" : In repeated correspondence I have set forth to you the needs
of the Pacific Fleet. These needs are real and immediate. I have seen the ma-
terial and personnel diverted to the Atlantic. No doubt they are needed there.
But I must insist that more consideration be given to the needs of the Pacific
Fleet.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2253
In case of war in the Pacific we shall have a problem difficult of solution under
any circumstances; one requiring ^i major effort to bring the war to a successful
conclusion. During preparation for such an effort we must be in a position to
make Japanese operations costly and of limited effectiveness. The strength
of this fleet limits our freedom of action and lack of modern equipment in
ships we now have limits their effectiveness.
We must be in a position to minimize our own losses, and to inflict maximum
damage to Japanese fleet, merchant shipping, and bases. We should have suffi-
cient strength in this fleet for such effective operations as to permit cruising
at will in the Japanese Mandated Island area, and even on occasions to Japanese
home waters. We should have the strength to make any enemy operations
against Wake a highly hazardous undertaking. To do these things substantial
increase of the strength of this Fleet is mandatory.
Greater permanence of personnel is required to obtain tl^at ship, unit and fleet
efficiency so essential for readiness to fight. Reduction of changes to a minimum
especially in key positions, must be accomplished. Detachment of officers and
men has already dangerously reduced efliciency of this fleet and they continue.
Well qualified officers are in many instances, detached to fill billets much less
important, in my opinion than those filled in this fleet. Battleship Captains
must be chosen for proficiency regardless of seniority.
This fleet requires approximately 9,000 men to fill complements; it can utilize
an additional 10.000.
[2] If this fleet is to reach and maintain a satisfactory degree of readiness
for offensive action, the foregoing requirements must be met ; and it must not
be considered a training fleet for support of the Atlantic Fleet and the shore
establishment.
With best wishes,
H. E. KiMMEL.
Commander-in-Chief
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Ser. #8
S-e-c-r-e-t
PE1A.RL Haebor, T. H., December 2, 19^1.
De.\r Betty : We had your despatches in regard to reinforcing the outlying
islands with Army pursuit planes and Army personnel. With regard to the
u.se of Army pursuits on the island bases, some time ago we investigated the
feasibility of putting some kind of fighters on the outlying islands and decided
at the time that our best chance of quickly reinforcing the i.slands and to make
the minimum demands upon the supplies in the island that we should send a
minimum number of ground crews to Wake and Midway in order when the
time came, to be in a position to fly off the Marine planes from a carrier or to
send them direct from Pearl to Midway in the case of the SBD's. At the time
your despatch in regard to Army pursuits was received we had the WRIGHT
at Wake discharging the Marine ground crews and she arrives at Midway
tomorrow, December 3, to discharge Marine ground crews there.
Halsey, in the ENTERPRISE, with three heavy cruisers and a squadron of
destroyers, will fly off 12 Marine fighting planes for Wake tomorrow morning
after which he returns to Pearl. We have been covering his advance by 2 VP
squadrons operating from Johnston, Midway and Wake. Upon the completion
of the movement we now plan to return one VP squadron to Pearl and leave
the other one at Midway awaiting further developments. I will hold the Marine
SBD's at Pearl awaiting further developments as they can fly under their own
power from Pearl to Midway.
During all the period that I have been in command the question of the
development of supply and defense of these outlying bases has been a very
difficult one. We cannot expect to supply Wake quickly and expeditiously until
we have a space to put a ship alongside for loading and unloading. The Com-
mandant of the District has been and is exerting every effort to obtain this
objective. As you know, ships have been delayed in unloading at Wake for as
2254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
long as 28 days, due to bad weather, and it is not unusual for a ship to take
as much as 7 or 8 days. This, in the face of any opposition, presents an impos-
sible situation. Present facilities at Wake must be improved, particularly as
to storage of fuel oil, aviation gas, food and ammunition. This work should
not stop and the 1,000 defense workers at Wake are essential to keep this work
moving as rapidly as material can be supplied. A recent estimate by Bloch sets
the time for the completion of the ship channel to about the first of May. I hope,
and so does he, that this date can be anticipated. At the present time we cannot
support more personnel on Wake than we now have there. As you will remember,
we put six 5" guns and twelve 3" [2] anti-aircraft guns, together with
a number of machine guns on the island, well knowing that we did not have
suflBcient marine personnel to man them. However, I think good progress has
been made in organizing the defense workers to assist in the manning of the
battery at Wake. In, case the present situation should ease, we can readily
withdraw the Marine fighters from Wake in order to decrease the demands upon
the facilities there and also in order to keep up the training of the pilots of
these planes.
The situation at Midway is somewhat better than at Wake. You will note
from our report of the defenses submitted today that we have shipped three of
the four 7" guns to Midway. Also we have shipped, or are shortly shipping, four
of the 3"-50 anti-aircraft guns to Midway. These, in addition to the batteries
already installed there, which comprise six 5"-ol's and twelve 3" anti-aircraft.
You will also note from our oflQcial letter submitted today that the defenses of
Johnston and Palmyra, while not what we would like to have, are nevertheless
not entirely inadequate.
Your despatches in regard to the use of Army personnel and the organization
of Army defense forces to be used in outlying islands is being given earnest con-
sideration. I know you appreciate the difTiculties of mixing Army, Marine Corps
and Navy personnel in a small island base. I believe you will subscribe to the
principle that all these outlying bases must be under Navy command and the
forces there must be subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief without
any qualification whatsoever. I anticipate some difficulties along this line when
Army personnel is injected into the picture unless a very clear directive is isssued
jointly by the War and Navy Department. On inquiry and conference with the
Army I find that the Army in Hawaii has no guns, either surface or anti-aircraft,
available for outlying bases. They can supply some .30 caliber machine guns and
rifles. I have frequently called to your attention the inadequacy, of the Army
anti-aircraft defense in the Pearl Harbor area with particular reference to the
shortage of anti-aircraft guns. So far, very little has been done to improve this
situation. With nothing but .30 caliber machine guns and rifles the replacement
of Marines by Army at outlying bases now will result in an increased number of
Marines in Oahu with no suitable equipment as Army would require all of the
Marine equipment now in the islands. The Marines in the outlying islands are
trained, acclimated and efficient beyond standards immediately obtainable by the
Army even if they took over the present Marine equipment. We cannot appreciably
increase the number of military personnel in the outlying islands unless we re-
move the defense workers. We cannot afford to remove the defense workers if
we expect ever to reach a satisfactory condition in the islands. Essential items
include, as I have previously stated, \3] provisions to berth a ship at Wake,
completix)n of air fields at Palmyra and Johnston and completion of fuel, gaso-
line, food and ammunition housing at all bases. I am proposing in official cor-
respondence that: (2) the Army organize 3 defense battalions of approximately
800 men each ; that steps be taken in Washington to supply them with guns, both
surface and anti-aircraft ; supply them with 37mm or .50 caliber machine guns ;
to make up a well balanced defense battalion ; that prijor to the time the equip-
ment of these organizations is supplied that they drill with the five inch guns of
the Fourth Defense Battalion now at Pearl as long as the equipment is available
here. If it is decided to supply these battalions with some other caliber of guns,
that sufficient number of guns of the type to be used be shipped to Oahu to be
utilized, for training puriwses. (b) that these Army defense battalions be held
in readiness to (1) furnish replacement to presently occupied islands (2) to re-
lieve battalions in presently occupied islands (3) to garrison islands to be
occupied.
The Marine garrison's now at Midway, Johnston and Palmyra should be re-
tained there for the present. They will not be withdrawn until arms and equip-
ment for the Army defense battalions have been received and the Army trained.
At this time a decision can be made according to the situation then existing.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2255
That the Army organize three 18-plane pursuit squadrons and keep them in an
expeditionary status; maintain the ground crews organized and ready to man
them ; maintain the planes ready to be transported by carrier when ordered.
The Array has orders to defend C'anton and Christmas. We are turning over
to them two five-inch 51 guns for use at Canton. These they will man with
Army personnel and supplement with some obsolete anti-aircraft guns and
machine guns. The expedition is now due to leave here on December ninth.
The Army is also sending some obsolete guns and a garrison to Christmas. I
will let you know more definitely what they sent when I find out exactly.
I feel that we cannot determine the defenses of Canton and Christmas until
we find out how much personnel can be maintained there. Meanwhile the Army
is sending some forces there.
[4] In view of the foregoing I am unable to understand the reason for the
despatches from the War and Navy Department directing us to utilize the Army
in the defense of the outlying bases, as we can hope for no relief from this quarter
until they have been supplied with suitable equipment.
I feel the wiser course is to continue to organize Marine defense battalions
and supply them with the necessary equipment. I believe we can train Marine
defense tmttalions just as rapidly as the Army can do so and probably as
rapidly as the equipment can be supplied. If there is any prospect of the imme-
diate supply of considerable quantities of suitable equipment I can see some
reason for injecting the Army into the picture.
I think it would be well for you to read the despatch sent by the War Depart-
ment to the Commanding General on this subject. It dififers considerably from
the one you sent to us in that the War Department says they will take over the
defense of some outlying bases from the Navy in accordance with an agreement
to be reached by the Commanding General and myself. Your despatch left me
with the conviction that the Army was to reinforce the Naval and Marine forces
on the outlying bases in case of necessity. I feel that this should be clarified.
We have one transport in commission which, due to a delay in the sailing of the
WHARTON we are now obliged to use for one trip to transport essential Naval
personnel from the West Coast to the' Fleet. The other transiwrts, to a total of
six, are in various stages of completion. The Marines at San Diego are in urgent
need of transport training and will not be ready to come to Hawaii until some
time in February. I can see very little chance for any overseas expedition even
on a small scale until that date. Eventually this war will require a much
greater number of transports and supply ships in the Pacific. We are working
on an estimate of the requirements. This estimate, in addition to some thirty or
forty transports and an equal number of supply ships must also include a thirty
to fifty i)ercent increase in the fighting strength of the Fleet before we can occupy
the Mar.shalls and Carolines in an advance across the Pacific.
With these considerations in mind I am at loss to understand the considerations
which injected the Array into the picture.
[5] My kindest regards and best wishes, always.
Most sincerely yours,
H. E. KiMMEL
P. S. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Detachment made the
statement in conference that his pursuit planes could not operate farther than
35 miles from land. If this be the case, I can see very little use for Army pursuit
planes in nn outlying island. This, added to the inability of this type plane to
land on a carrier, makes them practically useless for an overseas expedition of
any kind. Except for the four-engined Anny bombers, we must depend upon Navy
and Marine Corps planes to support any overseas expedition and to man outlying
l)ases. This is and has been one of my reasons for urging the supply of all types
of carrier planes.
P. S. You will note that I have issued orders to the Pacific Fleet to depth
bomb all submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area.
H. E. K.
Admiral H. R. Staek, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
[61 P. S. In connection with the development of outlying bases by the
Army, I must invite your attention to the fact that when the War Department
issued orders to the Commanding General out here to develop these bases they
authorized him to charter ships and to take all other necessary steps to insure
2256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the early completion of the project. He has already taken over three large
inter-island vessels and has caused some army transports and other shipping
to be diverted to the supply of Christmas and Canton. He has also chartered a
number of smaller vessels such as tugs and sampans.
I feel he has done an excellent job. I feel that the Navy personnel in this area
with equal authority would have their efforts much facilitated. I do not know
the considerations which pronipted the Navy to turn over the development of
the island bases to the Army I do know that it has complicated our problems
considerably.
The Conmiandiiig General is keeping me informed of what he is doing but
frequently the information is s<> late that I have been unable to plan adequate
protection. I am sure it is no fault of his because he informs me as soon as he
himself is informed. I have nothing but the highest praise for the way General
Short has taken hold of this problem which dropped in his lap.
H. E. KIMMEL.
[7] P. S. From correspondence which General Short has furnished me
I note that the Army is engaged in developing air fields in Fijii and New
Caledonia. This will involve questions of supply and protection both of shipping
and the fields themselves. The Australians I understand are loath to assume
the protection of the field in New Caledonia. The Navy is bound to be involved
in these affairs. I fear we may l)ecome so much concerned with defensive
roles that we may become unable to take the offensive. Too much diversion
of effort for defense will leave us an inadequate force with which to take the
offensive.
With regard to the escort of convoys by using a single cruiser to escort not
to exceed 8 ships, we endeavor to limit the number of cruisers so occupied at one
time to four. We now find that routing via Torres Strait to Manila, we are going
to have seven crui.sers continuously occupied with convoy duty. This without any
consideration for such protection as may eventually be required from San
Francisco to Oahu. I realize of course that the demands for trans-Pacific escorts
may decrea.se if it becomes impossible to route ships to Manila but it will still
be necessary to supply the Asiatic Fleet and our allies in the Far East.
/S/ H. E. KIMMEL.
[1] Ser. #9
Secret
Com MANDEB-i N -Chief
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Peabl Harbor, T. H.. December 12, 1941.
Dear Betty : Thanks for your letter. The Secretary is here and I have given
him verbally as complete an account of the action last Sunday as 1 could. Pye,
Bloch and General Short were present during the interview. ~ Briefly, we had
considered an air raid on Hawaii as a very remote possibility, particularly at
the time that it occurred. There were 10 VP's in the air that morning but they
of course could not adequately cover 369° of ai'c and their primary effort was
directed against the submarine menace which everyone fully recognized. In
our endeavor to avoid wearing out both . personnel and planes, we had made
periodic sweeps to the Northward and Westward but none were made on the
morning, in question. You, of course, are familiar with the exchanges of VP
squadrons and the teething trouble that such new squadrons always experience.
Full precautions were taken by all ships at sea and I am happy to state
that no casualties were incurred by any of them. The submarines were promptly
and I hope effectively, dealt with. We believe that since the action started we
have accounted for several submarines. A task force commanded by Newton,
including one carrier, was between here and Midway and about 400 miles from
Midway, South of the line of islands. This task force included 1 carrier, 3
CA's and a squadron of destroyers. Brown, in the INDIANAPOLIS, with 4 DM's
was in the vicinity of Johnston Island. Halsey, in the ENTERPRISE, with 3
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2257
CA's and 9 DD's was about 200 miles west of Oahii. The MINNEAPOLIS, with
4 DM's, was in the operating area to the Southward of Oahu.
The approximate locations of these forces are shown on the chart and in the
statement enclosed herewith. The Army anti-aircraft guns were not manned.
The condition of readiness of their planes is being reported by General Short.
The ships in harbor opened fire very promptly but the first attack wave was
practically unopposed. The fact that all ships were able to open fire so promptly
during the breakfast hour indicates that the ships in harbor were alert and
prepared.
No amount of explanation can alter the results which are included in a letter
which I am sending along to you today, giving in such detail as is now possible,
the damage sustained. Prompt and vigorous action was taken in an attempt to
intercept and destroy the attacking force. The Fifth Column activities added
great confusion and it was most difficult to evaluate the reports received.
[2] We gave Halsey, Brown and Newton our best information and estimates.
Our first estimate, based on very meager information indicated a carrier might
be to the Northward. Halsey had hardly steadied on a course in that direction
when he intercepted a message as to strong enemy forces approaching Barber's
Point and promptly diverted his ship and search to the Southward. A false report
of a transport landing troops at Barber's Point was picked up by an lenemy
ship and rebroadcast.
For a time, indications seemed to point more definitely to a carrier, to the
Southward than to the Northward and I advised the forces at sea that enemy
carriers might be in both directions. Radar information was conflicting ; but that
indicating planes to the Southward was strongly supported by R. D. F. bearings
(not bilateral) of two Japanese calls showing carriers in that direction. Probably
they were made by enemy ships planted there for the purpose ; although some
possibility still exists that a carrier may have been there.
We will endeavor to give you a complete account of our efforts when time
permits. Up to now we have been far too busy in handling taatters of the
moment and planning for the future to collate and analyze the vast amount
of conflicting matter that came in at the time.
I am enclosing an estimate of the situation, which will show you our present
ideas on what we hope to accomplish. Needless to say we have been up to our
ears in getting re-oriented ; so much so that we have scarcely had time to feel
the terrific shock.
The Secretary is taking with him photographs of the type of submarine which
entered the harbor. This submarine 74' x '^Y/, bolted together in 3 sections
and capable of 24 knots submerged, can pass under or around most nets. The
Pearl Harbor anti-submarine net was down at the time the raid started. The
submarine carried photographed silhouettes of Oahu from every angle of ap-
proach ; and, among other things in its locker, it had an American Ensign. I
shall forward shortly, considerable detailed information of this vessel.
Charts and other things from crashed planes, as well as information gained
from the submarine prove that this raid was planned for months. Details had
been worked out with the greatest care. Each pilot, judging from material from
unburned or partially burned planes, carried a book of silhouettes of our ships.
The charts of Pearl Harbor in planes were as good as anything we have. [3]
They showed the berths for all types of our ships. I entertain no doubt that the
loss of the OGLALA was entirely due to the fact that she was in the PENN-
SYLVANIA'S normal berth.
The inspiring thing in all this business is the conduct of officers and men.
During the action it was magnificent and their efforts since have been untiring
and effective. As destroyers were clearing the harbor, they were boarded by
men from sunken ships anxious to do their part. Numerous instances have been
reported to me of mass volunteering from sunken ships to go to sea in ships that
were left. Marines, hearing of attacks on Midway and Wake, have insisted on
being sent there.
Morale of all ofl^cers and men is high. They have but one tliought and that
is to be able to get at the enemy.
My kindest regards and best wishes to you always.
Most sincerely yours,
/S/ H. E. KiMMEL.
Admiral H. R. Stark. U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
2258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 107
CONFIDENTIAI,
APPENDIX TO NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE AT NAVY PEARL
HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS
(Reports (formerly Top Secret) advisory to the Secretary of the Navy in Navy
Pearl Harbor Investigations. See Narrative Statement of Evidence at Navy
Pearl Harbor Investigations, Vol. II, for official Navy action (formerly Top
Secret) on the reports)
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
COMMANDEB IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES FlEET, THIRD ENDORSEMENT TO REPORT OF
Further Pearl, Harbor Investigation by Admiral, H. K. Hewitt, U. S. Navy
[i]
United States Fleet
headquarters of the commander in chief
Navy Department, Washington 25, D. C.
FF1/A17
Serial: 002008
Top Secret
Third Endorsement to Adm. Hewitt's Report to SecNav dated 12 July 1945.
From : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject : Report of Further Pearl Harbor Investigation by Admiral H. K. Hewitt,
U. S. Navy.
1. I concur in general in the remarks and recommendations of the Judge
Advocate General as expressed in the second endorsement. In answer to the
specific questions asked in the first endorsement, the following opinions are
submitted :
(a) I am of the opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to warrant trial by
court martial of any person in the Naval Service, in that the evidence will not
sustain the charges required by the Articles for the Government of the Navy.
(b) With regard to tlie sufficiency of the evidence to warrant other proceed-
ings, I am still of the opinion, which I have previously expressed, that Admiral
Stark and Admiral Kimmel, though not culpable to a degree warranting formal
disciplinary action, were nevertheless inadequate in emergency, due to the lack
of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with
their duties.
(c) Appropriate action appears to me to be the relegation of both of these
officers to positions in which lack of superior strategic judgment may not result
in future errors. The action has been taken in the case of both Admiral Stark
and Admiral Kimmel. No further action is recommended.
[2] (d) For the reasons stated by the Judge Advocate General, I consider
it impracticable to bring Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, or either one of
them, to trial prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan, nor are court
martial or other proceedings (prior to the termination of hostilities with Japan)
advisable because such proceedings would almost certainly involve disclosure of
information which would be detrimental to current military operations and to
national security measures.
2. I concur in the opinion of Judge Advocate General that the Navy De-
partment is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel to trial before a General
Court Martial, should Admiral Kimmel so insist. However, this action should
not be taken until after the completion of hostilities with Japan.
3. I concur in the suggestion of the Judge Advocate that this record be made
available to Admiral Kimmel and his counsel ; that Admiral Kimmel be informed
that he is free to make public anything contained in this record and prior records
as goon as that may be done without prejudice to security; that if- Admiral
Kimmel insists, a General Court Martial will be convened to try him for alleged
offenses he may have committed on or before December 7, 1941.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2259
4. As to Admiral Hewitt's deductions from war experience — paragraph 28, page
180-— I am unable to concur fully with (a) thereof but do concur fully with
(b) thereof. Nor am I able to concur fully in his paragraph 29 (page 180) —
which parallels his paragraph 28 (a) — for the reason that he himself sets forth
in substance at various places in his "findings" and "conclusions", namely, that
while the system of command was that of mutual cooperation it was, in reality,
incomplete and inadequate implementation of that system which was at fault
There is the further fact that, given the information which was available in
Washington, it is reasonable to assume that the system of mutual cooperation
would have been fully alerted and made to function effectively.
[s] E. J. King
E. J. King.
The Judge Advocate General's
Second Endobsement
ON
The Re^pobt of Fubtheb Pbabl Habbob Investigation
BY
AoMiBAL H. K. Hewitt, U. S. Navy
[i]
Depabtment of the Navy,
Office of the Judge Advocate Genebal,
Washington, D. C, 10 August 1945. '
Top Secret
Second Endorsement
From : The Judge Advocate General.
To : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and
Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject : Report of further Pearl Harbor investigation by Admiral
H. K. Hewitt, U. S. Navy.
1. Subject report clarifies obscure points and supplies omissions in the earlier
investigations. It is considered that this and former investigations, taken
together, present as clear a picture of the pertinent facts as will ever be adduced.
With this report, therefore, I believe the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack
should be considered completed.
2. Admiral Hewitt's report brings out and confirms a distinction which
impressed me at the time of studying the earlier investigations, a distinction
which does much to clarify thinking on the question of placing responsibility for
the Pearl Harbor disaster. It appears that there was no lack of appreciation
on the i>art of any of the responsible officers that war was coming, and coming
quickly, during the critical period immediately preceeding 7 December 1941-,
The point on which those oflScers failed to exercise the discernment and judgment
to be expected from oflScers occupying their positions, was their failure to
appreciate, from the information available to them, that Pearl Harbor was a
likely target for aerial attack and their failure to take the necessary steps to
prevent or minimize such a surprise attack. Elach of these officers, in estimating
the critical situation, demonstrated a poor quality of strategical planning, in
that he largely ruled out all possible courses of action by which the Japanese
might begin the war except through an attack in the Western Pacific.
3. I do not believe that the lack of more complete understanding and
co-operation between Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short had any
great affect on the ultimate result; for it is abundantly shown that they each
entertained the same fallacious views, and closer understanding would most
likely merely have strengthened those views. Likewise, I submit that the impor-
tance of information from Japanese sources has been overemphasized ; for had
more basically sound principles been observed, the Pearl Harbor disaster would
not have occurred. The security of Pearl Harbor was the very core of our
2260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Pacific strategy, a fact which did not receive suflScient consideration in the
strategic concept of responsible oflScers.
[2] 4. In answer to the specitic questions asked in the first endorsement,
the following opinions are submitted :
(a) As is more fully developed in the answer to question (b), it is not believed
that there is suflBcient evidence to warrant conviction of any of the oflScers con-
cerned of any offense known to naval law.
(b) Under the facts of this case, tliere are only two offenses which are worthy
of consideration: (1) Neglect of Duty and (2) Culpable Inefficiency in the
Performance of Duty. Under either charge it would be necessary to define the
duty of the officer concerned, and to show that it was his duty to follow a course
of action other than the one he did. In my opinion this would be impossible, as
the acts of omi.ssion of the.se officers do not rise above the status of errors of
judgment. No clearly defined duty can be established which was neglected or
improperly performed. As stated by Fleet Admiral King, in his endorsement on
the findings of the Ccmrt of Inquiry, the evidence in the case boils down to the
fact that the acts of the officers in question "indicate lack of superior judgment
necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their
assigned duties, rather than <-ulpable inefiiciency." "Lack of Superior Judgment"
is not an offense triable by general court-martial.
(c) The charges and specifications for any court-martial proceedings must
be filed not later than a date "six months after the termination of hostilities in
the present war with Japan as proclaimed by the President or as specified in
a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, whichever is the earlier."
Public Law" 77 — 79th Congress, approved June 7, 194rt. There are serious doubts
as to the constitutionality of this and the earlier extensions of the Statute of
Limitations enacted by the Congress since 7 December 1941 and applicable to
trials arising out of the Pearl Harbor disaster as a violation of the Constitu-
tional prohibition against ex post fncto laws. Admiral Kimmel has executed
a waiver of the Statute of Liniitati<ms for a period of six months past the end
of the present war, and therefore the question of the validity of the Congressional
extensions is not controlling in his ca.se. However, as it has become apparent
since the time that Admiral Kinnnel was requeste<l to execute this waiA^er that
other officers are also blameworthy, it is my opinion that the Navy Department
would be acting in an inequitable manner in instituting any proceedings against
Admiral Kimmel on his waiver, unle.ss Admiral Kimmel himself so requests.
[S] (d) The requirements of 39th Article for the Government of the Navy
and Section 346 of Naval Courts and Boards pertaining to the rank of members
of a general court-martial will make it most difficult to constitute a court for the
trial of the officers here concerned during war time or during a period of six
mxjnths after the cessation of hostilities. Many of the officers of appropriate rank,
both <m the active and the retired lists, would be disqualified because of interest
in the subject matter^ the probability of being called as a witness, or by virtue
of having been connected with one of the investigations into the matter. If more
than one of the officers in question are brought to trial, an entirely new court
would be necessary in each case, as members who had tried a former case arising
out of the Pearl Harbor attack would be subject to challenge. The Summoning
of the necessary witnesses would result in temporarily removing from their duty
Statiotfs many of the key officers in the naval organization. For the foregoing
reasons, I am of the opinion that any such court martial proceedings prior to
the end of hostilities with Japan is highly impractical and wotild be detrimental
to the war effort, and further, that any such proceedings during the six months
immediately following the end of hostilities would seriously impair the efficiency
of the naval service.
5. Notwithstanding the difficulties pointed out above, I am of the opinion that
the Navy Department is morally obligated to order Admiral Kimmel tried by
general court-martial should Admiral Kimmel so insist. In August 1943, Secre-
tary Knox sent Admiral Kimmel a memorandum from which the following is
quoted, "I feel that it would be to the best interests of all concerned if you should
now agree not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial upon my assurance
that the trial will be had. at the earliest practicable date." And in Admiral Kim-
mel's waiver he agreed. "I will not plead, nor permit any attorney or other person
on my behalf to plead, the statute of limitations in bar of my trial by General
Court-Martial in open court for any alleged offenses with which I may be charged
relating to the period on or before Dember (sic) 7th, 1941, should my trial be
held during the present war or within six (6) months thereafter."
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2261
6. I suggest that this record l)e made available to Admiral Kimmel and his
counsel ; that Admiral Kimmel be informed that he is free to make public anything
contained in this record and prior records as soon as that may be done without
prejudice to the public interests; that if he insists, a general court-martial will
be convened to try him for alleged offenses he may have committed on or before
December 7, 1941 ; and that his decision be abided.
/s/ T. L. Gatch.
T. L. Gatch.
The Secretary of the Navy's First Endorsement on the Report of Further
Pearl Harbor Investigation by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, U. S. Navy
The Secret^-ry of the Navy
Washington
First Endorsement.
To: The Judge Advocate General.
Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and
Chief of Naval Operations. '
Subject: Record of proceedings and Report of further Pearl Harbor investiga-
tion by Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN.
1. Forwarded for comment and recommendation.
2. The endorsement by the Judge Advocate General will include his opinion
(a) as to the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant court-martial or other
proceedings, (b) as to the offense or offenses which might be made the subject
of court-martial or other proceedings, assuming the sufficiency of the evidence
concerning such offense or offenses, (c) as to the date prior to which any such
court-martial or other proceeding must be in.stituted, and (d) as to the practi-
cability of any such court-martial or other proceeding prior to the termination
of hostilities with Japan, particularly in view of the regulations concerning the
comiK»sition of a court and in view of the necessity of obtaining testimony from
witnesses engaged in operaticms against the enemy.
3. The endorsement by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and
Chief of Naval Operations will include his opinion (a) as to the sufficiency of the
evidence to warrant court-martial or otiier proceedings, (b) as to the practica-
bility of any such court-martial or other proceeding prior to the termination of
hostilities with Japan, particularly in view of the regulations concerning the
composition of a court and in view of the necessity of obtaining testimony from
witnesses engaged in operations against the enemy, and (c) as to the advisa-
bility of any such court-martial or other proceeding prior to the termination
of hostilities with .lapan, particularly in view of the po.ssihility of disclosure of
information relating to current and prospective military operations and to
national security.
Forbestal,
Report of Further Investigation Into the Facts Surrounding the Japanese
Attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941, by Admiral H. K. Hewitt,
U. S. Navy
12 July, 1945.
From: H. Kent Hewitt, Admiral, U. S. Navy.
To : The Secretary of tiie Navy.
Subject: Report of further investigation in the facts surrounding the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.
Reference :
(a) Report of Commission appointed by the President to investigate and
report the facts lelating to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7
December, 1941.
(b) Record of examination of witiies.ses having knowledge of the facts in con-
nection with the Japanese attack cm Pearl Harbor, conducted by
Admiral Tlwimas C. Hart, USN (Ret.).
(c) Public Law 339, 78th Congress.
(d) Precept appointing Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, 13 July 1944.
2262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(e) Record of proceedings and report of Naval Pearl Harbor Court of
Inquiry.
(f) First Endorsement, dated 2 November 11)44, by the Judge Advocate
General, and Second Endorsement, dated 6 November 1944, by Com-
mander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, to record
of proceedings of Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry.
(g) Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 20 October 1944.
(h) Letter 3 December 1944 from Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief
of Naval Operations, to the Secretary of the Navy, on report of Army
Pearl Harbor Board.
(i) Procebt 2 May 1945 appointing H. Kent Hewitt, Admiral, U. S. Navy, to
conduct further Pearl Harbor investigation.
(j) Memorandum 18 May 1945, concerning the scope of the further investi-
gation and approval thereof by the Secretary of the Navy.
(k) Precept 6 July 1945 amending reference (i).
Enclosure :
(A) Report of further investigation into the facts surrounding the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941.
(B) Record of proceedings of this investigation and exhibits therein.
1. Tlie precept of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 2 May 1945, reference (i)
as amended by reference (k), directed that Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN„
make a study of the previous investigations, that such further investigation as
might appear to be necessary be then conducted, and, that upon completion of
the investigation a report be submitted to the Secretary of the Navy setting forth
the findings and conclusions reached.
2. Review of the previous investigations disclosed that various matters of
Importance, principally concerning intelligence, had not been investigated thor-
oughly. The subjects proposed for further investigation were approved by the
Secretary of the Navy on 21 May 1945.
3. Counsel in this investigation was John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Navy. Also assisting were Lieutenant Commander Benjamin
H. Griswold, III, USNR, and Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR. The re-
porters were Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR, and Chief Yeoman Raymond E.
Reese, USNR. These men took a special oath to maintain the security of the
information developed during the investigation.
4. During this proceeding, which commenced 14 May 1945, the testimony of
38 witnesses, some of whom had testified previously, was taken on 26 day, at
Washington, D. C, at San Francisco, and at Pearl Harbor. 81 exhibits were
received.
5. Delivered herewith are the report of this further investigation (Enclosure
A), and the record of proceedings and exhibits therein (Enclosure B). In pre-
paring this report, an effort has been made to present, in one document, the essen-
tial facts within the scope of this inquiry which have been developed by this and
preceding investigations.
H. Kent Hewitt,
Rbi^rt by Admiral H. K. Hewitt on FtrETHEB Pearl Harbor Investigation
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction. Prior Investigations and Scope of this Investigation. Page *
A. The Roberts Commission 1
B. Admiral Hart's Investigation 4
C. Naval Court of Inquiry 4
D. Army Pearl Harbor Report 11
E. Findings of the Secretary of the Navy and further Investigation 14
F. Witnesses in this Investigation 15
G. Exhibits received In this investigation 18
Seeton I. The War and Defense Plans.
A. U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five 23
B. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, Orange
14NB-JCD-42 31
C. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan 34
D. Joint estimate covering Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden
hostile action against Oahu 35
E. Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-41 and Naval Base Defense
Air Force Plan 37
F. Pacific Fleet Letter on security of the fleet at base and In operating areas 39
G. Execution of Plans prior to 7 December 1941 41
H. Admiral Kimmel's Views as to the possibility of a surprise air attack 42
I. Adequacy of forces to carry out tasks assigned 44
J. Command Organization 45
Findings 49
' Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages
of original exhibit.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2263
Section II. Japanese Espionage at Hawaii. Page '
Espionage Reports 53
FindiugH 21 59
Section III. Naval Intelliffence and Events Preliminary to the Attack.
A. The organization of Naval Inteiligence in generai ; sources of information,
and relations with the Paeilic Fleet 60
B. The approach of war ; intercepted communications available at Washington
and messages sent by CNO to Admiral Kimmel.
1. The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and October 16th dispatch 62
2. Japanese messages concerning German attitude ; Nomura's desire to
resign g3
3. Action talcen by Admiral Kimmel 64
4. The tirst Japanese deadline message ; Japanese interest In American
ships 65
5. Arrival of Kurusu ; Stark and Marshall recommendations as to ulti-
matum gg
6. Further and final Japanese "deadline messages " III" _~ I 66
7. The November 24th dispatch to CincPac and others I__II 67
8. Dispatches concerning reenforcement of Wuke and Midway 68
,?• Intercepted Japanese communications of November 26th and 27th 69
10. The State Department note of November 26th and Japanese reaction
thereto ; the war warning of November 27th 70
11. The dispatch of November 28th 73
12. Intercepted diplomatic communications, November 29 t« 6 December
1941 y^
13. Intercepted Japanese espionage messages between 29 November and 6
December 1!)41-
82
14. Intercepted message advising of fourteen-part reply by Japanese and
,K ^ hrst thirteen parts of reply — 6 December 1941 8''
15. Communications intercepted on 7 December 1941 83
16. Delivery of part 14 and the 1 p. m. message and action takeii 85
17. Messages sent to Admiral Kimmel between 29 November and 7 December
18. Admiral Kimmel's failure t~o transmit informat^onfo subordinate com"
manders o-
9: ^^^ interception of Japanese telephone and cable messages ~__ 88
D. The "winds" code and the alleged "winds" message.
1. Prior investigations grj
2. The basis o'f the previous findings that there was" a "winds" "execute
message prior to the attack 9Y
3. Evidence obtained in this investigation concerning "winds" message 100
B. Information concerning the organization of the Japanese Navy b - v
1. ONI report of 25 July 1941 __ ^(^^
2 Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41 I-I-I"--~II~"I""" 107
F. Information concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces
o Information available at the time of the war warning 110
2. Admiral Kimmel's source of information after the war warnlng___ 111
Flndln ^°'*''"™*t'*'° received by Admiral Kimmel after the war warning I 112
Section IV. Reconnaissance'. ^~^
A. The Responsibility for Long Distance Reconnaissance _ 1^4
B. Reconnaissance Conducted from Oahu_-_ __"__!_ ~_ 1^^
C. Proposed Army Reconnaissance to Jaluit I IZ_I__IIIII 136
S" mu Direction to Execute an Appropriate Defensive Deployment _ 137
S- Z^^ Reconnaissance that could have been flown i^T
F. The Sectors which would have been covered __ ' " iqq
Findings " jjn
Section V. The Attack on Pearl Harbor. ~
A. Japanese submarines on 7 December 1941 143
B. Suspicious submarine contacts prior to 7 December 1941~ I_~" 148
C. Detection of Aircraft by the Army Radar System ~ 140
D. The Air Attack _ __~imZ"~I 140
E. Location of Pacific Fleet Units " "" {I?
F. Condition of Readiness i^4
G. Reaction to the Attack I I~IIIII~IIIII"II~IIII 153
?-rJ^°™i?°**'*^'<'" '^"'I ^o^<'">^°ts of the Attacking Force I_ _ ~ " ' 155
I. The Casualties and Damage - __ i^^
Findings r ;:_:: ::":—:": — : :- Js?
Section VI. Findings and Conclusions. ~ ~ ~
A. Restatement of Findings __ _ _ 150
B. Conclusions I ^ J jjg
of or^^nal'^exhTbit *° ^^^ Indi^-ated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages
[1] INTRODUCTION — PRIOR INVESTIGATIONS AND SCOPE OF THIS INVESTIGATION
A. The Roberts Cormnission.
Pursuant to Executive Order dated December 1941, a Coininission, headed
by Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts, conducted an investigation into the facts sur-
rounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harl)or. The Commission reported its
findings on 23 January 1942 and concluded :
"1. Effective utilization of the military power of the Nation is essential to
success in war and requires: First, the coordination of the foreign and military
policies of the Nation ; and, second, the coordination of the operations of the
Army and Navy.
2264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"2. The Secretary of State fulfilled his obligations by keeping- the War and
Navy Departments in close touch with the international situation and fully advis-
ing them respecting the course and probable termination of negotiations with
Japan.
"3. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy fulfilled their obliga-
tions by conferring frequently with the Secretary of State and with each other
and by keeping the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations informed
of the course of the negotiations with Japan and the significant implications
thereof.
"4. The Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled their obliga-
tions by consulting and cooperating with each other and with their superiors,
respecting the joint defense of the Hawaiian coastal frontier; and each knew of,
and concurred in, the warnings and orders sent by the other to the responsible
commanders with respect to such defense.
"5. The Cliief of Staff of the Army fulfilled his connnand responsibilities by
issuing a direct order in connection with his warning of probable hostilities, in
the following words: 'Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to under-
take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.'
"6. The Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled his command responsibility by issu-
ing a warning and by giving a direct order to the connnander in chief, Pacific
Fleet, in the following words:
" 'This despatch is to be considered a war warning.'
and
" 'Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the
tasks assigned.'
[2] "7. The responsible connnanders in the Hawaiian area, in fulfillment of
their obligation to do so, prepared plans which, if adapted to and used for the
existing eniergency, would have been adequate.
"8. In the circumstances the responsibility of these commanders was to confer
upon the question of putting into effect and adapting their joint defense plans.
"9. These commanders failed to ccmfer with respect to the warnings and orders
issued on and after November 27, and to adapt and use existing plans to meet
the emergency.
"10. Tlie order for alert No. 1 of the Army command in Hawaii was not ade-
quate to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning messages.
"11. The state of readiness of the Naval forces on the morning of December 7
was not such as was required to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning
messages.
"12. Had orders issued by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations
November 27, 1941, been complied with, the aircraft warning system of the Army
should have been operating; the distant reconnaissance of the Navy, and the
inshore air patrol of the Army, should have been maintained; the antiaircraft
batteries of the Army and similar shore batteries of the Navy, as well as additional
antiaircraft artillery located on vessels of the fleet in Pearl Harbor, should have
been manned and supplied with ammunition; and a high state of readiness of
aircraft should have been in effect. None of these conditions was in fact inaug-
urated or maintained for the reason that the responsible commanders failed to
consult and cooperate as to necessary action based upon the warnings and to
adopt measures enjoined by the orders given them by the chiefs of the Army and
Navy commands in Washington.
"13. There were deficiencies in personnel, weapons, equipment, and facilities to
maintain all the defenses on a war footing for extended periods of time, but these
deficiencies should not have affected the decision of the responsible commanders
as to the state of readines to be prescribefl.
"14. The warning message of December 7, intended to reach both commanders
in the field at about 7 a. m. Hawaiian time. December 7. 1941, was but an added
precaution, in view of the warnings and orders i>reviously issued. If the message
had reached its destination at the time intended, it would still have been too late
to be of substantial u.se, in view of the fact that the commanders had failed to
take measures and make dispositions prior to the time of its anticipated receipt
which would have been effective to warn of the attack or to meet it.
[3] "l."). The failure of the officers in the War Department to observe that
General Short, neither in his reply of November 27 to the Chief of Staffs message
of that date, nor otherwi.«e. had reported the measures taken by him and the
transmission of two messages concerned chiefly with sabotage which warned
him not to resort to illegal methods against sabotage or espionage, and not to
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2265
take measures which would alarm the civil population, and the failure to reply
to his message of November 2!) outlining in full all the actions he had taken
against sabotage only, and referring to nothing else, tended to lead General
Short to believe that what he had done met the requirements of the warnings
and orders received by him.
"16. The failure of the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, and the
commander in chief, I'aciflc Fleet, to confer and cooperate with respect to the
meaning of the warnings received and the measures nece.ssay to comply with
the orders given them under date of November 27. 1941, resulted largely from
a sense of security due to the opinion prevalent in diplomatic, military and
naval circles, and in the public press, that any immediate attack by Japan
would be in the Far East. The existence of such a view, however prevalent,
did not relieve the commanders of the responsibility for the security of the
Pacitic Fleet and our most important outpost.
"17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action,
transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7, and the
obligation under the system of coordination then in effect for joint cooi)erative
action on their part, it was a derelection of duty on the part of each of them not
to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the
warnings, and the appropriate measures of defense reuired by the imminence
of hostilities. The attitude of each, that the was not reuired to inform himself
of, and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry
out the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions of the plans
then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the
responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as commander
in chief. Pacific Fleet, and commanding general, Hawaiian Department.
"19. Causes contributory to the .success of the Japanese attack were :
Disregard of international law and custom relating to declaration of war
by the Japanese and the adherence by the United States to such laws and
customs.
Restrictions which prevented effective counterespionage.
Emphasis in the warning messages on the probability of aggressive action
in the Far East, and on antisabotage measures.
14] Failure of the War Department to reply to the message relat-
ing to the antisabotage measures instituted by the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department.
Nonreceipt by the interested parties, prior to the attack, of the warning
message of December 7, 1941.
"20. When the attack develoi>ed on the morning of December 7, 1941, the
officers and enli.sted men of both services were present in sufficient number and
were in Ht condition to perft)rm any duty. Except for a negligible number,
the use of intoxicating liquor on the preceding evening did not affect tJieir
efficiency.
"21. Subordinate commanders executed their superiors' orders without ques-
tion. They were not responsible for the state of readiness prescribed."
B. Admiral Hart's Investigation.
Pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy dated 12 February 1944,
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), conducted an examination of wit-
nesses having knowledge of facts in connection with the Japanese attack.
Admiral Hart completed his examination on 15 June 1944.
C. Naval Court of Inquiry.
Public Law No. 339. 7Sth Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed the Secre-
tary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith to
investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to com-
mence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify.
A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin (}. Murfin, I'SN (Retired),
Admiral Edward C Kalbfus, USN (Retired), and Vice Admiral Adolphus An-
drews, USN (Retired), with Commander Harold Biesemeier, USN, as Judge
Advocate, was appointed by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944. The
Court was directed to convene on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter as prac-
ticable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the
attack made by Japane.se forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7
December 1941 ; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its
79716 0—46 — pt. 16- 28
2266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
findings a full statement of the facts it might deem to be established. The
Court was further directed to state its opinion as to whether any offenses were
committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in
the Naval service, and, in case its opinion was that offenses had been committed
or serious blame incurred, to recommend specifically what further proceedings
should be had. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 31 July
1944, and submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944.
[5] The Court of Inquiry concluded:
"Basetl on finding II, the Court is of the opinion that the presence of a large
number of combatant vessels of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on 7 December
1941, was necessary, and that the information available to the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any departure from his operating and mainte-
nance schedules.
"Based on Finding III, the Court is of the opinion that the Constitutional
requirement that, prior to a declaration of war by the Congress, no blow may be
struck until after a hostile attack has been delivered, prevented the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from taking offensive action as a means of defense in the
event of Japanese vessels or planes appearing in the Hawaiian area, and that it
imposed upon him the responsibility of avoiding taking any action which might
be construed as an overt act.
"Based cm Finding V, the Court is of the opinion that the relations between
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. U.S.N., and Lieut. General Walter C. Short, U. S.
Army, were friendly, cordial and cooperative, that there was no lack of interest,
no lack of appreciation of responsibility, and no failure to cooperate on the part
of either, and that each was cognizant of the measures being undertaken by the
other for the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base to the degree required by
the common interest.
"Based on Finding VI, the Court is of the opinion that the deficiencies in per-
sonnel and material which existed during 1941, had a direct adverse bearing
upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor on and prior to 7 December.
"Based on Finding VII, the Court is of the opinion that the superiority of the
Japane.se Fleet over the U. S. Pacific Fleet during the year 1941, and the ability
of Japan to obtain military and naval information gave her an initial advantage
not attainable by the United States up to 7 December 1941.
"Ba.sed on Finding VIII, the Court is of the opinion that the defense of the Pearl
Harbor Naval Base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that the Navy was
to assist only with the means provided the 14th Naval District, and that the
defense of the base was a joint operation only to this extent. The Court is further
of the opinion that the defense should have been such as to function effectively
independently of the Fleet, in view of the fundamental requirement that the
strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured demands that the defense
of a permanent naval base be so effectively provided for and conducted as to
remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of the base, or for that
of the vessels within its limits.
[6] "Based on Findings IV, VIII and IX. the Court is of the opinion that
the duties of Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U.S.N., in connection with the defense
of Pearl Harbor, were performed satisfactorily.
"Based on Finding IX, the Court is of the opinion that the detailed Naval
Participation Air Defense plans drawn up and jointly agreed upon were com-
plete and sound in concept, but that they contained a basic defect in that naval
participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to
and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December these
plans were ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that
there would be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within
narrow limits of time, which was not the case on that morning.
"The Court is further of the opinion that it was not possible for the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to make his Fleet planes permanently available
to the Naval Ba.se Defense OflBcer in view of the need for their employment with
the Fleet.
"Based on Finding X, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's action,
taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect comprehensive
instructions for the security of the Pacific Fleet at sea and in the operating areas,
is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet,
and that the steps taken were adequate and effective.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2267
"Based on Finding XI, the Court is of the opinion that, by virtue of the informa-
tion that Admiral Kimmel had at hand which Indicated neither the possibility
nor the imminence of an air attack on Pear Harbor, and bearing in mind that he
had not knowledge of the State Department's note of 26 November, the Navy's
condition of readiness on the morning of 7 December, 1941, which resulted in the
hostile planes being brought under heavy fire of the ships' anti-aircraft batteries
as they came within range, was that best suited to the circumstances, although
had all anti-aircraft batteries been manned in advance, the total damage in-
flicted on ships would have been lessened to a minor extent and to a degree
which is problematical ; and that, had the Fleet patrol planes, slow and unsuited
for aerial combat, been in the air, they might have escaped and the number of
these planes lost might thus have been reduced.
"The Court is of the opinion, however, that only had it been known in advance
that the attack would take place on 7 December, could there now be any basis
for a conclusion as to the steps that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects,
and that, beyond the fact that conditions were unsettled and that, therefore,
anything might happen, there was nothing to distinguish one day from another
in so far as expectation of attack is concerned.
[7] "It has been suggested that each day all naval planes should have been
in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all anti-aircraft guns manned.
The Court is of the opinion that the wisdom of this is questionable when it is con-
sidered that it could not be known when an attack would take place and that, to
make sure, it would have been necessary to impose a state of tension on the
personnel day after day, and to disrupt the maintenance and operating schedules
of ships and planes beginning at an indefinite date between 16 October and 7
December.
"Based on Finding XII, the Court is of the opinion that, as no information of
any sort was at any time either forwarded or received from any source which
would indicate that Japanese carriers or other Japanese ships were on their way
to Hawaii during November or December, 1941, the attack of 7 December at
Pearl Harbor, delivered under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable
and that when it would take place was unpredictable.
"Based on Finding XIII, the Court is of the opinion that the action of the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in ordering that no routine, long-range recon-
naissance be undertaken was sound and that the use of Fleet patrol planes for
daily, long-range, all-around reconnaissance was not possible with the inadequate
number of Fleet planes available, and was not justified in the absence of any
information indicating that an attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area
within narrow limits of time.
"Based on Finding XIV, the Court is of the opinion that the shore-based air
warning system, an Army service under the direct control of the Army, was inef-
fective on the morning of 7 December, in that there was no provision for keeping
track of planes in the air near and over Oahu, and for distinguishing between those
friendly and those hostile and that, because of this deficiency, a flight of planes
which appeared on the radar screen shortly after 0700 was confused with a flight
of Army B-17s en route from California, and that the information obtained by
Army radar was valueless as a warniTig, because the planes could not be identified
as hostile until the Japanese markings on their wings came into view.
"Based on Finding XV, the Court is of the opinion that by far the greatest
portion of the damage inflicted by the Japanese on ships in Pearl Harbor was due
to specially designed Japanese torpedoes, the development and existence of which
was unknown to the United States.
"Based on Finding XVI, and particularly in view of the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations' approval of the precautions taken and the deployments made by Admital
Kimmel in accordance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16 October
1941. the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's decision made [8]
after receiving the dispatch of 24 November, to continue the preparations of the
Pacific Fleet for war, was sound in the light of the information then available
to him.
"Based on Finding XVII, the Court is of the opinion that, although the attack
of 7 December came as a surprise, there were good grounds for the belief on the
part of high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and on the part of
the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin in the
Far East rather than elsewhere, and that the same considerations which in-
fluenced the sentiment of the authorities in Washington in this respect, support
the interpretation which Admiral Kimmel placed upon the "war warning mes-
2268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sage" of 27 November, to the effect that this message directed attention away from
Pearl Harbor rather than toward it.
"Based on Findings XVIII and XIX, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral
Harold R. Stark, U. S. N., (^hief of Naval Operations and responsible for the
operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in
that he did not transmit to Admiral Kiramel, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important information
which he had regarding the Japanese situation and, especially, in that, on the
morning of 7 December, 1941 he did not transmit immediately the fact that a
message had been received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic
relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be
expected soon.
"The Court is further of the opinion that, had this important information
been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action
he would have taken.
"Finally, based upon the facts established, the Court is of the opinion that no
offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of any
person or persons in the naval service."
[9] Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, commented in detail on the findings
of the Court of Inquiry in the Second Endorsement thereto. He concluded, in
part:
"Despite the evidence that no naval oflicer was at fault to a degree likely to
result in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the Navy cannot evade a
share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident. That disaster cannot be
regarded as an "act of God", beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. It is
true that the country as a whole is basically responsible in that the people were
unwilling to support an adequate army and navy until it was too late to repair
the consequences of past neglect in time to deal effectively with the attack that
ushered in the war. It is true that the Army was responsible for local defense
at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, some things could have been done by the Navy
to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow. Admiral Stark and Admiral
Kimmel were the responsible oflicers. and it is pertinent to examine the possible
courses of action they might have taken.
"(a) Admiral Stark was, of course, aware that the United States was primarily
concerned with its own possessions, and the most important United States posses-
sions in the Pacific were the Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands. His
attention should have been centered on those two places, as the Pacific situation
became more and more acute. He had been informed by Admiral Kimmel, in his
letter of 26 May 1941, that Admiral Kimmel felt the need for early and accurate
information as to the general situation, and that he needed to be informed of all
important developments as they occurred by the quickest and most secure means
available. This letter should have emphasized the obvious fact that Admiral
Kimmel was in a difficult position, that he had to use his initiative to keep his
Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the situation, and that in order to do
so he had to have an accurate running picture of the rapidly moving course of
diplomatic events. In my opinion. Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral Kimmel
an adequate summary of the information available in Washington, particularly in
the following respects :
"(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Department's note of
26 November to the Japanese. This note was a definite step towards breaking
relations.
"(2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of certain intercepted
Japanese messages inquiring as to dispositions of ships inside Pearl Harbor,
which indicated a Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor as a possible target,
"(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the "Winds
message". Admiral Stark says he never got this information himself, but it is
clear that It [10] did reach Admiral Stark's office. This, together with
the handling of other matters of information, indicates lack of efficiency in
Admiral Stark's organization.
"(4) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of the '1:00 p. m.
message' received on the morning of 7 December, although the implications were
appreciated by at least one of his subordinates. It appears that had this
message been handled by the quickest available means, and with due appreciation
of its significance, it might have reached Admiral Kimmel in time to enable him
to make some last minute preparations that would have enhanced the ability of
the ships in Pearl Harbor to meet the Japanese air attack.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2269
"(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such information as Admiral
Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. • They do not convey in themselves the sense
of Intensification of the critical relations between the United States and Japan.
"(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark
to keep him fully informed, nevertheless did have some indications of increasing
tenseness as to relations witli Japan. In particular, he had the 'war warning'
message on 27 November, the 'hostile action p<issible at any moment' message
on 28 November, the 3 December message that Japanese had ordered destruction
of codes, and the messages of 4 and H Decemi)er concerning destruction of United
States secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands. These messages
must be con.'sidered in connection with other facets of the situation, and Admiral
Kimmel's statement on this phase of the matter must be given due consideration.
After weighing these considerations, I am of the opinion that he could and should
have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which the Hawaiian
Islands were exposed. The following courses of action were open to him:
"(1) He could have used patrol craft which were available to him to conduct
long range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors. Whether or not this
would have resulted in detecting the approach of the Japanese carriers is proble-
matical. However, it would have made the Japanese task more difficult.
"(2) He could have rotated the 'in port' periods of his vessels in a less routine
manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have predicted
when there would be any vessels in port. This would have made the Japanese
task less easy.
[//] "(3) If he had appreciated the gravity of the danger even a few hours
before the Japanese attack, it is logical to .suppose that naval planes would have
been in the air during the early morning period, that ships' batteries would
have been fully manned, and that damage control organizations would have
been fully operational.
"The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were
faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question,
they indicate lack of superior judgment necessary for exercising conmiand
commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable
inefficiency."
D. Army Pearl Harbor Report.
Pursuant to Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, an Army Board conducted
investigation into the Japanese attack, and on 20 October 1944 submitted its
report to the Secretary of War. The Army report discussed, among other
things, various matters involving the Navy, such as the Navy's command rela-
tionships at Hawaii, the "tapping" of the telephone wires of the Japanese con-
sul in Hawaii by Naval Intelligence, information secured by Navy I'adio intelli-
gence as to the location and movements of Japanese naval forces, the Navy's
responsibility for long range reconnaissance ("The heart of the defense of Oahu"),
and the entrance of Japanese submarines into Pearl Harbor on and allegedly
prior to 7 December 1941. The Army report commented critically as to (a) the
Navy's failure to conduct long range reconnaissance, (b) the Navy's failure to
advise General Short of the presence of a Japanese task force in the Jaluits in
late November 1941, (c) the Navy's failure to advise General Short of certain
messages, relating to the destruction of codes by the Japanese during the first
week of December 1941, and (d) the Navy's failure to advise General Short of
the sinking of a Japanese submarine on the morning of 7 December 1941, prior
to the air attack. The Army report included a finding that relations between
General Short and Admiral Kimmel were not satisfactory, as a practical matter,
although cordial. Concerning intelligence generally, the Army report stated,
at page 232 :
"The Japanese armed forces knew everything about us. We knew little
about them. This was a problem of all our intelligence agencies. This should
not come to pass again. Our intelligence service must be brought in line with
the part which we are to play in world affairs.
"We must know as much about other major world powers as they know about
us. This is an absolute condition precedent to intelligent planning by those
charged with formulating our international policies and providing for our se-
curity. Our intelligence service should be second to none in its efficiency. It
must not be inferred that this is the exclusive function of the M. I. D. It is a
national problem.
2270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[121 "In the past our intelligence service has suffered from lack of funds,
lack of interest, and legal obstacles and regulations. Steps should be taken to
correct all of these."
After consideration of the Army Pearl Harbor Report, Fleet Admiral King, in
a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, dated 3 December 1944, stated in part:
"The Army Board finds it difficult to understand the relations between the
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, the Commander Hawaiian Sea Fron-
tier, the Commandant. FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the local Air Com-
mander (Rear Admiral Bellinger). The Board makes the comment 'The Army
had a difficult time in determining under which of the three shells (Kimmel,
Bloch, or Bellinger) rested the pea of performance and responsibility.' My
comment as to this is that there are some unavoidable complexities in the Com-
mand relationships between a fleet, a frontier, and a fleet base in the frontier.
However, in this case, there was no possibility of misunderstanding the fact
that all naval forces were under Admiral Kimmel. He and General Short
should have been able to work out better arrangements for cooperation than
they did. The reasons why they did not have been discussed in paragraphs
4 and 5 above.
"The Army Board stresses the point that General Short was dependent upon
the U. S. Navy for infonnation as to what the Japanese Navy was doing and for
estimates of what the Japanese Navy could do. This view is obviously sound.
It was a naval responsibility to keep not only General Short but also the War
Department fully acquainted with the estimate of the Japanese naval situation.
There was some failure to pass on to General Short and the War Department
information which should have been .given to them by the Navy, but the basic
trouble was that the Navy failed to appreciate what the Japanese Navy could,
and did, do.
"The Army Board reports on three matters which should be further investi-
gated by the Navy. These are :
"a. It was stated that the War Department received information from some
naval agency that on or about 25 November radio intercepts had located a
Japanese task force, including carriers, in the Marshall Islands. About 1 De-
cember it was reported that this force assumed radio silence. It is noted in
the Record that this information never got to General Short. There is some
reference to this incident in the Record of the Naval Court, but it was not
followed up, presumably because the officer who was Director of Naval Intelli-
gence at the time was not called as a witness. The matter is probably not of
importance, since even if there actually was a Japanese force in the Marshalls
it apparently had nothing to do with the attack on Pearl Harbor. However,
for the sake of completing the naval Record, this matter should be pursued
further.
[13] "b. The Army Board is of the opinion that Japanese midget submarines
operated freely inside of Pearl Harbor for several days prior to the 7th of Decem-
ber, for the purpose of obtaining information. This opinion is based on the testi-
mony of an official of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who apparently
reached his conclusions by a study of certain captured Japanese charts which
were made available' to F. B. I. by Naval Intelligence. So far as is known, there
is no real ground for the supposition that Japanese submarines were able to roam
around Pearl Harbor at will, but since the allegation is made in the Army Record,
it is advisable to clear up any doubt that may exist by further naval investigation.
"c. There is reference to the fact that information was obtained from naval
and F. B. I. espionage over telephones and cables in Hawaii, but no record of
what this information was. This should be cleared up.
"The Army Board finds that the Chief of Staff of the Army was at fault in
that he failed to keep General Short informed of the international situation and
that he delayed in getting critical information to General Short. In these respects,
the Army Report parallels the Naval Court findings as to the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions. The Army Board further finds that General Marshall was at fault and that
he failed to keep his Deputies informed of what was going on, so that they could
act intelligently in his absence ; in that he did not take action on General Short's
report on 28 November that he had established 'Alert No. 1' ; and in that he
lacked knowledge of conditions of readiness in the Hawaiian Command.
"The Army Board finds that General Short was at fault in that he failed to
place his command in an adequate state of readiness (the information which he
had was incomplete and confusing, but it was sufficient to warn him of tense re-
lations), in that he failed to reach and agreement with local naval officials for
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2271
implementing joint Army and Navy plans and agreements for joint action, in
that he failed to inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnais- .
sance being conducted by the Navy, and in that he failed to replace ineflScient
staff oflBcers.
"I find nothing in the Record of the Army Board to cause me to modify the
opinions expressed in my endorsement on the Record of the Naval Court of In-
quiry, except in relatijon to the cooperation between Admiral Kinnnel and Gen-
eral Short. In view of the extensive and explicit Ascussion of this phase of the
matter by the Army Board, I am no longer of the opinion that cooperation be-
tween these two oflScers was adequate in all respects. The cordial, but informal,
contact which they maintained evidently was not suflScient to coordinate the
means at their disposal to the best advantage. However, as already pointed out,
this fault was part and parcel of the [I'f] general blindness to Japanese
potentialities in the Central Pacific which was the basic cause of the Pearl Harbor
disaster. Tlie many details discussed by the Army Board and the Naval Court
are useful in showing how this blindness redounded to our disadvantage, but
they do not, in my opinion, prove anything more than that the two naval officers
in the high commands concerned — Admiral ^tark and Admiral Kimmel — failed
to display the superior judgment they should have brought to bear in analysing
and making use of the information that became available to them.
•'I recommend that the Secretary of the Navy cause further investigation to
be made in the matter referred to in paragraph 8 above ; namely, the alleged radio
contact with a Japanese force in the Marshall Islands, the alleged presence of
Japanese midget submarines inside Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December, and the
substance of information obtained by naval and F. B. I. telephone and cable in-
tercept^. I do not think it necessary to reconvene the Court for this purpose,
The proposed investigation could be made by another Court, or by an investigat-
ing officer, for attachment to the Record of the original Court of Inquiry."
E. Findings of the Secretary of the Navy and Further Investigation.
Upon review of the previous investigations, the Secretary of the Navy found
that there were errors of judgment on the part of certain officers in the Naval
Service, both at Pearl Harbor and at Washington. The Secretary further found
that the previous investigations had not exhausted all possible evidence and that
the investigation directed thy Public Law 339 of the 78th Congress should be con-
tinued until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts should
be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted. The Secretary stated that his
decision would be reviewed when the investigation was finally complete, in the
light of the evidence then at hand.
The precept of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 2 May, 1945, and amended 6
July, 1945, directed that Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, make a study of the previ-
ous investigations, that such further investigation as might appear to be necessary
be then conducted, and that upon completion a report be submitted to the Secre-
tary of the Navy setting forth the findings and conclusions reached.
Review of the previous investigations disclosed that various matters of im-
portance, principally concerning intelligence, had not been investigated throughly.
The subjects proposed for further investigation were approved by the Secretary
of the Navy on 21 May, 1945.
Counsel in this investigation was John F. Sonnett, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Navy. Also assisting were Lieutenant Commander Benjamin
H. Griswold, III, USNR, and Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR. The re-
porters were Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR, and Chief Yeoman Raymond E.
Reese, USNR. These men took a special oath to maintain the security of the
information developed during the investigation.
[15] F. Witnesses in this Investigation.
At Pearl Harbor in 1941:
Captain Edwin T. Lay ton, USN, Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet. (R. 182)
Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, In charge of Communications Intelligence
Unit, Fourteenth Naval District. (R. 43; R. 541)
Vice Admiral Willian W. Smith, USN, Chief of Staff, CincPac. (R. 335)
Vice Admiral Charles H. McMorris, USN, War Plans Officer, CincPac. (R. 293)
Rear Admiral Walter S. DeLany, USN, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations,
CincPac. (R. 163)
2272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Patrick N. L. Bellinger, USN, Commander, Hawaiian Based Patrol
Wings, Commander, Patrol Wing Two, Commander, Task Force Nine, Commander,
Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor. (R. 471)
Captain John B. Earle, USN, Chief of Staff, 14th N. D. (R. 451)
Mr. George Street, Manager, RCA, Honolulu. (R. 411)
Rear Admiral Irving H. Mayfield, USN, District Intelligence Officer, 14th N. D.
(R. 554)
Captain Thomas H. Dyer, USN, Cryptanalytical and Decrypting, Fleet Radio
Unit, Pacific Fleet. (R. 418)
Captain Joseph Finnegan, USN, Translator, Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet.
(R. 554)
Commander Wesley A. Wright, USN, Assistant Comnninications Officer, Cinc-
Pac, on temporary duty with Com 14 Cimimuni cat ions Intelligence Unit. (R. 442)
Lieutenant (jg) Farnsley C. Woodward. USN, Cryptanalyst, Communications
Intelligence Unit, 14th N. D. (R. 541)
[16'] Colonel Alva B. Laswell, USMC, Translator, Communications Intel-
ligence Unit, 14th N. D. (R..541)
Captain William W. Outerbridge, USN, Commanding Officer, USS W^ARD.
(R. 87) '
Lieutenant Commauder Monroe H. Hubbell, USNR, Commanding Officer, USS
CONDOR. (R. 428)
Richard W. Humphrey, RM3c, USNR, Bishop's Point Radio Station.
Lieutenant Oliver H. Underkofler, USNR, Communications Office, 14th N. D.
(R. 465)
Lieutenant Donald Woodrum, USNR, District Intelligence Office, 14th N. D.
(R. 376)
Commander Harold S. Burr, USNR, Com 14 Liaison Officer at General Short's
Headquarters. (R. 376)
Brigadier General Carroll A. Powell, USA, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Depart-
ment. (R. 387)
At the Philippines in 19J,1:
Captain Redfield Mason, USN. Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet. (R. 68)
Commander Rudolph J. Fabian, USN, Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence
Unit, Corregidor. (R. 68)
At Washington, D. C in 1941:
Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, USN, Director of the Office of Naval
Intelligence. (R. 389)
Captain Arthur H. McCollum, USN, In charge of Far Eastern Section, Foreign
Branch, ONI. (R. 10)
Captain Laurence F. Safford, USN, Communications Security Section. (R.
97; R. 529)
Captain Alwin D. Kramer, USN, ONI and Communications Security Section.
(R. 128)
Mrs. Dorothy Edgers, Research Analyst, ONI. (R. 511)
[17] Lieutenant Commander Fi-ancis M. Brotherhood, USNR, Communica-
tions Security Section. (R. 143)
Lieutenant Frederick L. Freeman, LTSN, Communications Security Section.
(R. 149)
Lieutenant Commander Allan A. Murray, USNR, Communications Security
Section. (R. 433)
Lieutenant Commander George W. Linn, USNR, Communications Security
Section. (R. 140)
Lieutenant Commander Alfred V. Pering, USNR, Communications Security
Section. (R. 148)
Other icitnesses:
Captain William R. Smedberg, III, USN, now Assistant Combat Intelligence
Officer, Staff, Cominch. (R. 4)
Lieutenant Commander Leo Reierstad, LTSNR, now in charge of a translating
unit in Op-16-FE. (R. 158)
Lieutenant (jg) Joseph M. Conant, USNR, Translation sub-section head in Op-
]6-FE. (R. 1.58)
Commander Walter Karig, LTSNR, Lieutenant Welbourn Kelley, USNR, authors
of "Battle Report." (R. 80)
Lieutenant Commander Gilbert E. Boone, USNR, head of Op-20-GL. (R. 554;
R. 607)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2273
[18] G. Exhibits Received in this hiveittiiiation.
Received in this investigation were the followiiifr exlul)its :
Precept convening investigation ._
Modification of precept, directing report of findings and conclusions
Narrative statement by counsel of previous Navy investigations...
CinCPOA Weekly Confidential Intelligence Bulletin of 8 December 1944, relating to the
attacking forw.
A translation of a captured Japanese submarine chart, showing courses and location of
U. S. ships in Pearl Harbor.
CinCPOA Confidential Intelligence Bulletin of 20 October 1944, containing description of
Japaese midget submarines.
OXI document "ONI 220-J, Japanese Submarines". .
Berthing plan at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941 (Ex. fiO of Naval Court)...
Photostatic copies of Conil4 and Coml6 dispatch estimates of Japanese fleet location and
movements, 26 November 194i.
ONI Bulletin of 1 December 1941, Japanese fleet locations.. _
McCollum memorandum estimating situation as of 1 December 1941
"Battle Report" _
FCC radio intercepts regarding "winds" code (Ex. 65 of Naval Court)
Collection of intercepted Japanese dispatches —
i Photostatic copies of captured Japanese submarhie chart, showing courses and location of
U. S. ships in Pearl Harbor.
Collection of intercepted Japanese dispatches (Ex. 63 of Naval Court).
Copies of dispatches sent from RI unit, Corregidor, regarding Japanese fleet movements...
Photostat of captured Japanese submarine chart used for Plate V of "Battle Report"
Log of conversation between WARD and CONDORon the morning of 7 December 1941
Tentative copies of Communication Intelligence Summaries, for 1 November 1941 to 6 De-
cember 1941, at Pearl Harbor.
Message from Tokyo establishing the hidden word code
Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin of 27 November 1941 concerning composition of Japanese
Navy.
Daily Communication Intelligence Summaries, 14 October 1941 to 5 December 1941, given
to Fleet Intelligence Offlcer (Captain Lay ton) for delivery to Admiral Kimmel.
Memorandum of 1 December 1941 from Fleet Intelligence Officer to Admiral Kimmel, esti-
mating Japanese ship locations.
November 21th dispatch from CNO to CincPac (Ex. 15 of Naval Court)
"War Warning" (Ex. 17 of Naval Court)
Lay ton Intelligence reports from 6 October 1941 to 2 December 1941
Paraphrased copies of dispatches from various intelligence agencies delivered to CincPac
Memorandum from Fleet Intelligence Officer to Admiral Kimmel regarding proposed Army
aerial reconnaissance of Mandated Islands.
Intercepted Japanese consular dispatches delivered to Fleet Intelligence Officer about De-
cember 10th.
Two Japanese panorama views of Pearl Harbor with Japane.se log on reverse side, recovered
from submarine (returned to Captain Lay ton).
Photostat of Japanese log on reverse of exhibit 30
Translations of exhibits 30 and 30A..
Panorama sketch of Pearl Harbor from position five miles south of Pearl Harbor, recovered
from submarine (returned to Captain Layton).
Photostats ofexhibit31
Original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from Japanese midget submarine (re
turned to Captain Layton).
Photostat of exhibit 32
Original Japanese chart of Pearl Harbor recovered from Japanese submarine, showing defen-
sive installations (returned to Captain Layton).
Photostatic copy of exhibit 33
Staff Instructions, CincPac, 1941
U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-l, Rainbow
Five) (WPPac-46).
Letter of 9 September 1941 from CNO to CincPac, approving Pacific Fleet Operating Plan
Rainbow Five.
Letter of 25 July 1941 from CincPac to CNO, submitting Pacific Fleet Operating Plan
Rainbow Five.
Photostatic copy of schedules .setting forth utiliz.ation of patrol planes of Pacific Fleet from
17 November to 31 December and approved 22 November 1941.
Transcripts of intercepted t('lei)hone calls of Ja[)anese Consul and Vice Consul in Honolulu
from October to 2 December 19)1 (Consul's marked 38A; Vice Consul's marked 38B).
Copy of intercepted "Mori conversation"
ONI Summaries of messages sent by Japanese Consul in Honolulu from 1 December to 6
December 1941.
F ile of work sheets on Jap d iplomat ic t rafl^c (incorporated in other exhibit)
Paper showing part of decryption process of Japanese "P.\" code
Duty Officer, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, information sheets
Extract from signal log of gate vessel of 7 December 1941
2274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
118] G. Exhibits Received in this Investigation — Continued
Received in this investigation were the following exhibits — Continued
Description
E xtract from quartermaster's log of gate vessel of 7 December 1941
Extract from log of Signal Tower, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, of 7 December 1941
Collection of documents, containing Annex VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements, to Joint
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.
Collection of dispatches regarding submarine contacts at Pearl Harbor in November and
December, 1941.
Bellinger "Estimate of Situation".
Letter from ComTaskFor 9, to CinC, 20 December 1941, on recomiaissance prior to attack.
Despatches cited in exhibit 50
ComTaskFor 9 letter of 22 October 1941. file 0026
ComTaskFor 9 letter of 16 January 1941
ComPatWing 2 letter to CNO, of 11 December 1940
Watch and duty schedules of Patrol Wings One and Two prior to attack..
RCA Communications, Inc., statement, listing certain Japanese cable messages from
Honolulu in November and December, 1941.
Coded messages from Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via RCA, among those listed
in exhibit 55, received by Navy 5 December 1941.
Pages 7 to 12 of exhibit 56, containing messages not decrypted until after the attack
Coded messages from Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via RCA, among those listed
in exhibit 55, received by Navy after the attack.
Coded messages from Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via RCA, received by Navy
on night of 7 December and subsequently translated.
Collection of dispatches from Naval Communication files relating to Japanese fleet move-
ments and locations during the period 27 Novfember to 7 December 1941.
Collection of Japanese plain language news broadcasts
Collection of memoranda relating to messages received at Naval Communications in
various Japanese code systems.
Memorandum of Naval Communications, surveying work sheets processed by Navy of
Japanese purple system.
Report from DIO, 14th N. D., to Director of Naval Intelligence, of 19 April 1942, relating
to coded dispatch traffic of Japanese Consul General, Honolulu.
Certified collection of documents relating to anti-torpedo bafSes for protection against
torpedo plane attacks.
Copy of Itr. from Secretary of War to Secretary of Navy, dated 7 February 1941, relating
to air defense at Pearl Harbor.
CincPac secret letter of 7 August 1941 relating to the organization of the Orange fleet
Map showing the location of ships present at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941
Telephone log of radio unit at Pearl Harbor, showing calls made and received on 7 December
1941 as to Jap fleet locations.
Photostatic copies of memoranda relating to questioning of captain of Japanese captured
submarine.
Pacific Fleet Weekly Intelligence Bulletin for 11 June 1945, containing description of midget
submarines and method of transport to Pearl Harbor.
Selected collection of Pearl Harbor dispatches, miscellaneous subjects, taken from CincPac
Headquarters.
Collection of dispatches relating to proposed Army reconnaissance in November of 1941...
Collection of dispatches of December 7 and 8, 1941, from CincPac
CincPac secret letter of 12 December 1941 reporting damage to ships at Pearl Harbor as
result of attack and other details.
Photostatic copy of War Diarv of Com 14 from 7 December 1941 to 1 January 1942 —
War Diarv of USS WARD; War Diary of 0-in-C, Net and Boom Defenses, 14th N. D.;
War Diary of USS CONDOR; excerpts from diary of 0-in-C, Net and Boom Defenses,
14th N. D., WARD, and CONDOR.
Photostatic copy of 1st and 2nd endorsements on Com 14 letter of 30 December 1941 relating
to early morning submarine contact on 7 December 1941.
Collection of correspondence relating to combined operating center for Army and Navy...
Typewritten translation and copy of intercepted Japanese communication contained in
exhibit 20, and notes relating thereto.
Photostatic copy of page 44 of volume containing translations of files of operations orders,
orders, memos, and serials dealing with Japanese Navy plans, recovered from Jap CA
NACHI.
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater _
Collection of photostatic copies of ONI memoranda dealing with organization and loca-
tions of Jap fleet as estimated during November and up to December 1, 1941.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2275
[23] I
THE WAR AND DEFENSE PLAA'S
A. U. 8. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Ruinhow Five.
On 26 July 1941, U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan- Rainbow Five (Exliibit 35)
was distributed to the Pacific Fleet by Admiral Kininiel. This plan was designed
to implement the Navy basic war plan (Rainbow Five) in so far as the tasks
assigned the U. S. Pacific Fleet were concerned. It was approved 9 September
1941 by the Chief of Naval Operations (Exhibit 36). The plan provided, in part :
"INTRODITCTION
CHAPTER IV. MOBrUZATION
"0401. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually
mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl
Harbor ba.se. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can
be ready for active service within four days of an order tor general mobilization.
To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which
hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is de.signated throughout
the Plan as W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated
J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day."
"CHAPTER 11. ASSUMPTIONS
"1211. The general as.sumptions on which this Plan is based are:
"a. That the A.ssociated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the
British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments
in Exile, China, and the 'Free French' are at war against the Axis powers, com-
prising either :
"1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
"2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.
"Note: As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia, and
the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of the
Axis but not necessarily against Japan." * * *
[24] "CHAPTER III. INFORMATION
"1314. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth in ABC-1 is as
follows :
"Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis
Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their
forces in a mariner to guard against Japane.se intervention. If Japan does enter
the war, the military strategj- in the Far East will be defensive. The United
States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East
but \yill employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best
calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and- to support the defense of
the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The
United States intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean
areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a jwsition to release the neces-
sary forces for the Far East."
"CHAPTER m. INFORMATION.
"Section 3. Estimate of Enemy Action
"1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be
limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and po.s.sibly with an occasional
pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.
"1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows :
"a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of
Malaysia (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.
"b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American
and Allied .sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean,
and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.
"c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.
"d. The principal defensive efforts to be :
2276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.
"2. Holding positions for their own use nnd denying positions in the Central
and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced bases.
[25] "3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.
"1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action
will be toward :
"a. Capture of Guam.
"b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and
the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced
bases, and by the destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces
in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.
"c. Capture of Northern Borneo.
"d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas
area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light
naval forces to reiluce the strength of the United States Fleet.
"e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval
forces.
"f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying
United States positions.
"1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows :
"a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong
concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the Carolines,
and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.
"b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position
(possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the
Mandates.
"c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probable main
base in Halmahera).
"d. Suflacient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces
in that area.
"e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the
Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there.
"f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and sub-
marines in the Hawaiian area." * ♦ *
[26] "Part II. Outline of Tasks
"chapter I. TASKS ASSIGNED BY NAVY BASIC PI.AN — MISSION
"2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks
within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet :
"a. Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting
enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture
of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications
and positions ;
"b. Prepare to capture and establish cont ol over the Caroline and Marshall
Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet: base in Truk ;
"c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trad-
ing directly or indirectly with the enemy;
"d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the Equator as far west
as longitude 155° east ;
"e. Defend Samoa in Catagory 'D';
"f. Defend Guam in category 'F';
"g. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting,
covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy
raiding forces ;
"h. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific Area and pre-
vent the extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemisphere by
destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying
the enemy the use of land jwsitions in that hemisphere ;" * * *.
"chapter II. TASKS FX)RMUI^TED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED MISSIONS
"2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are
based upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formu-
lating tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption al and
divides the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows :
[27] "a. Phase I — Initial tasks — Japan not in the war.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2277
"b. Phase lA — ^Initial tasks — Japan in the war.
"c. Phase II, etc., — Succeeding taslcs.
"2202. Pha.se I taslcs are as follows :
"a. Complete luobilization an<l prepare for distant operations ; thereafter main-
tain all types In constant readiness for distant service.
"b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
"c. Transfer the Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered.
"d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.
"e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific southern and
a similar force to Pacific northern naval coastal frontier, on M-day.
"f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific northern
naval coastal frontier on M-day.
"g. Protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers and
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by
patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by tlie action of striking groups
as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the equator
as far west as longitude 155° East.
"h. Esfablish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.
"i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible raider
bases in the Japanese Mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Department.
"j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway,
Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.
"k. Continue training operations as practicable.
"1. Move the maximum practicable portion of Second Marine Division to Hawaii
for training in landing operations.
"m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.
[28] "Phase lA
"2203. Phase lA tasks are as follows :
"a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k.
"b. Accomplish such of the tasks in 2202 c, d, e, f, and j as have not been
completed.
"c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and
tenders in the northern Pacific.
"d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the Asso-
ciated Powers, and of the naval coastal frontier forces, chiefly by covering
operations.
"e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands.
"2. If available cruisers and other circumstances i)ermit, make cruiser raids
against Japanese shipping in waters between Nan.sei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto.
"f. Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against
Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland.
"g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and
outlying bases.
"h. Escort important shipping, including troop movements, between the Hawai-
ian Area and the West coast.
"i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established.
"J. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian naval coastal frontier
as necessary.
"k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the
Second Marine Division.
"1. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Island area."
"Pabt III. Task Assignment
"chapter I. PHASE I
"Section 4. Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force)
"3141. Task Force Nine will perform the tasks assigned in the following para-
graphs of this section.
[29] "3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol plane.s and two tenders to
each of the Pacific southern and Pacific northern naval coastal frontiers. Con-
tinue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.
"3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex
I)." ,• * ♦
2278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"Part V. Special Provisions
"CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS, PHASES I AND lA
"Section 1. Phase I
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date
"Operation Plan No. 1-R5." ♦ • *
"I. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II, and III
of Navy Plan O-l, Rainbow Five.
"2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea com-
munications of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces
south of the equator as far west as Ix)ngitude 15.t° East, while continuing
training and guarding against attack by Japan." * * *
"Annex I
United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date
"Patrol and Sweeping Plan." * * *
"1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III
of this Navy Plan O-l, Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dispositions,
estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be furnished by
the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution.
[30] Phase I.
"2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communi-
cations of the Associated Powers by :
"(a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Ha-
waiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-
Pacific westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.
"(b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.
"(c) Covering.
"(d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.
"(e) Routing shipping." * ♦ *
"3. (d) 7'asfc Force ^me (Patrol Plane Force).
"(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and unkeep planes and
for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against
enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.
"(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At
discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of
Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities
thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.
"(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander Task Force Three, to transfer
one patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South
Pacific.
"(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.
"(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.
"(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval
Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.
[31] " (7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged
in sweeping during initial sweep of Phase lA.
"(8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned In
Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan O-l ) ." * * *
B. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, Orange IJfND-
JCD-42
The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian
Department and FOURTEENTH Naval District (14ND-JCD-42), was signed and
placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, and by the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District (Exhibit). The
plan was based on the joint Army and Navy basic war plans, and was to constitute
the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2279
and mobilization plans would be based. The method of coordination under the
plan was by mutual cooperation which was to apply to all activities wherein the
Army and the Navy would operate in coordination until and if the method of
unity of command were invoked. The tasks asigned were as follows :
"14. TASKS.
"a. Joint Task. To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to control
and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.
"b. Army Tusk. To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and
against hostile sympathizers ; to support the naval forces.
"c. Navy Task. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping
therein ; to support the Army forces."
The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone was defined as "The Hawaiian Naval
Coastal Zone comprises the waters of the Hawaiian Costal Frontier" (Oahu and
such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for the defense of Oahu).
The plan provided that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and
the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, should provide for the follow-
ing:
"17. ARMY. The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall
provide for :
"a. The beach and land, seacoast and antiaircraft defense of OAHU with par-
ticular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present
thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD
BARRACKS— WHEELER FIELD— LUALUALEI area. The increasing import-
ance of the KANEOHE area is recognized.
[32] '"b. An antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.
"c. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands
consistent with available forces.
"d. Defense of installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the
civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage,
except within naval establishments.
"e. Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within
naval shore establishments.
"f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU
D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18.a.), and an
aerial observation system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service
for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
"g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea con-
ducted within range of Army bombers.
"h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control
post provided for In paragraph 18.e.
"i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordi-
nated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed
joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile
intelligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be
governed by 'Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940'.
"j. An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather,
evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of
activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS.
"k. Counter-espionage within the HAWAIIAN IS'LANDS.
"1. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS.
"m. Army measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship
over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army
and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.
"n. Supply of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
[33] "0. Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS.
"p. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of
supplies for the civil population.
"18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall pro-
vide for :
"a. An inshore patrol.
"b. An offshore patrol.
"c. An escort force.
"d. An attack force.
2280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"e Provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of PEARL
and HONOLULU HARBORS.
"f. Installation and operation of an underwater defense for PEARL and
HONOLULU HARBORS. (Hydro-acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and
installed probably will be under cognizance of the Army.)
"g. Support of Army forces in the OAHU-D. C. A. and installation of submarine
mine tields in the defense of the OAHU-D. C. A. as may be deemed necessary and
practicable.
"h. Sweeping channels and mine fields.
"i. Distant reconnaissance.
"j. Attacking enemy naval forces.
"k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all
naval shore establishments.
"1. In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 t., a local
communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intel-
ligence.
"m. Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over
communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the
Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.
"n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counter-espionage, for
the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.
"o. Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.
[34] "p. Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities
pertaining thereto."
C. Annex VII. .S'c(7/(»? VI, to the Joint Coantal Frontier Defense Plan.
Annex VII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian
Department and Fourteenth Naval District, dated 28 March 1941, and approved
by Admiral Bloch and General Short 2 April 1941, (Exhibit 47), dealt with joint
security measures and protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor base. It stated
that in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet
and for the Pearl Harbor Naval ba.se for defen.se against hostile raids or air
attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war, and before a general mobilization
for war, there were adopted the following agreements :
Paragraph II, in re.spect of joint air operations, provided that when the Com-
manding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid
or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander
would take such preliminary steps as were necessary to make available without
delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal
as circumstances warranted in order that joint operations might be conducted in
accordance with the following plans: (a) joint air attacks upon hostile surface
vessels to be conducted under the tactical command of the Navy; (b) defensive
air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu to be executed under
the tactical command of the Army; (c) when naval forces were insufficient for
long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made avail-
able, these aircraft would be under the tactical control of the naval commander
directing the search operations.
Paragraph III provided for joint communications, and, among other things,
that all information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore
from Oahu secured through Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to the
Command Post of the Army provisional Anti-Aircraft Brigade and the Aircraft
Warning Service Information Center; that subsequently, when the Army aircraft
warning service was established, provision would be made for transmission of
information on the location or distance of hostile and friendly aircraft, and
special wire or radio circuits would be made available for the use of Navy liaison
officers so that they might make their own evaluation of the available information
and transmit it to their respective organizations.
Paragraph IV related to joint anti-aircraft measures, the arrival and departui'e
procedure for aircraft, balloon barrages. Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery, and
Army Aircraft Warning Service. It provided that the latter service was to l)e
expedited in its installation and operation by the Army and. "during the period
prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of Radar
and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks
as may be practicable."
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2281
[35] D. Joint Estimate Covering Army and Nary Air Action in the Event
of Sud(le)i Hostile Aetiwi Against Ouhu.
Oil 31 March 1941. Rear Admiral Bellinger, Coiuniander Naval Base Defense
Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two), and Major General F. L. Martin,
Commanding Hawaiian Air Force, prepared a joint estimate covering joint
Army and Navy air action in flie event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or
Fleet units in the Hawaiian area (Exhibit 49).
Paragraph I of the estimate included a "Summary of the Situation," which
indicated that relations between the United States and Orange were strained,
uncertain, and varying ; that in the past Orange had never preceded hostile
action by a declaration of war ; that a successful sudden raid against our ships
and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our
forces in the western Pacilic for a long period; that a strong part of our fleet
was constantly at sea in the operating areas, organized to take prompt offensive
action ; and. that it appeared possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange
fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from
our Intelligence Service.
Paragraph II of the estimate embraced a "Survey of Opposing Strengths,"
indicating, among other things, that Orange might send into the Hawaiian area
one or more submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers
supported by fast cruisers; that the most diflBcult situation to meet would be
when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinating their
actions; and that the aircraft available in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain
for any extended period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure
that an air attack from an Orange carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a com-
plete surprise.
Paragraph III of the estimate dealt with "Possible Enemy Action." It stated
that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise submarine attack on
ships in the operating area, a surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and
installations in Pearl Harbor, or a combination of these two; that it appeared
the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack,
most likely launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach
inside of 3(X) miles. It was further pointed out that a single attack might or
might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes waiting to
attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust ;
that: "(d) any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of consider-
able undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of fast ships accompanied
by a carrier" ; and that in a dawn air attack there was a high possibility that it
could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrol that we might
be using.
Paragraph IV of the estimate considered "Action Open to Us." It was stated
that it would be desirable to run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward
through 360°, but this could only be effectively maintained with present person-
nel and material for a very short period, and. as a practicable measure, could
not therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence [36] indicated that
a surface raid was probable within rather narrow limits of time. Reference was
made to other types of action open in the event of a surprise attack on ships in the
operating area or on the islands, and pointed out that none of the outlined courses
of action could be initiated by our forces until an attack was known to be
imminent or had occurred.
Paragraph V contained "Decisions." The primary decision was that the
Naval Base Defense Air Force would locate and attack forces initiating hostile
action against Oahu or fleet unis in order to prevent or minimize damage to
our forces from a surprise attack, and to obtain information upon which to base
coordinated retaliatory measures. A number of subsidiary decisions were made,
including decisions for the establishment of a search and attack group, an air
combat group, the assignment of missions to the groups, and definitions of condi-
tions of readiness. The search and attack group was to he under the Commander
Naval Base Defense Air Force-Commander Patrol Wing Two, and, in accordance
with current conditions of readiness, included patrol squadrons and Army
bombardment and reconnais.sance squadrons.
[31] E. Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-J,1, and Naval Base
Defense Air Force Plan.
Admiral Bloch. as Naval Base Defense Officer, issued his Operation Plan No.
3-41, on February 27, 1941 (Exhibit r>3 of the Naval Court). The Task Organiza-
tion prescribed was: (a) Destroyer Patrol (Commander Inshore Patrol) con-
sisting of two destroyers, a boom patrol, d. harbor patrol, and an A/B boom
79716 0—46 — pt. 16 24
2282 CONGRESSIONAL IN\'ESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and minesweeper, (b) Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol "Wing Two)
in conjunction witli tlie Army, (c) Antiaircraft Defense (District Marine Officer)
in conjunction with the Army, (d) Harbor Control Post (District Operations
Officer) in conjunction with the Army. This plan directed 'attention, among
other things, to the Hawaiian Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, and stated:
"By cooperation in support of the Army, Naval security measures will be estab-
lished as necessary for the joint protection of Pearl Harbor Base in order to
safeguard the Fleet.
"In conjunction with the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, the
Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) will
arrange to coordinate joint effort ; to set conditions of readiness ; to hold required
drills; to make "alarm" and "all clear" signals.
AssuDiptiotis.
(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war under existing con-
ditions, by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided
nationals of such powers may attempt :
(1) Sabotage from small craft on ships based in PEARL HARBOR.
(2) Block the entrance channel to PEARL HARBOR by sinking an obstruction
in the channel.
(3) Lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to PEARL HARBOR.
(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by :
(1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in base area — probable.
(2) A surprise air attack on ships in PEARL HARBOR — possible.
(3) A combination of these two — i>ossibl(?."
Annexed to Operation Plan 1-41 were: A detailed Inshore Patrol Plan, called
Annex "A ;" a detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, called Annex "Baker ;"
a detailed Anti-aircraft Defense Plan, called Annex "C ;" a detailed Harbor
Control Post Plan, called "D ;" and a detailed Communications Plan, known as
Annex "Easy."
Annex "Baker." the detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, dated 9 April
1941, was prepared by Admiral Bellinger and approved by Admiral Bloch. It
divided the Task Organization into (a) Search and Attack Group, consisting
of patrol squadrons and other planes, including Army reconnaissance squadrons,
and (b) an air combat group. This plan was made in accordance with the Joint
Estimate, dated 31 March 1941, which is digested above. The Naval Base
Defense Air Force was, according to this plan, to [38] locate and destroy
hostile forces raiding against Oahu or Fleet units in the operating areas. The
plan was effective upon receipt and became operative without signal in the
event of a surprise attack on Oahu. It might be made operative by dispatch.
In the meantime, conditions of readiness, prescribed in Addendum Two to this
plan, would be taken as directed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, for Army units, and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (ComFOURTEEN)
for Navy units. The condition of material readiness was to be signified by a
letter, such as "E." signifying that all aircraft were conducting i-outine operations
and none were ready for the purposes of this plan, and the condition of operational
readiness by a number, such as ".5," signifying that all types of available planes
would be ready in four hours. It was also required that a dispatch readiness
report, as of 1500 each day, be made by each unit assigned by this plan to a
task group, stating the number of planes and readiness.
[39] F. Pacific Fleet Letter on Security_ of the Fleet at Base and in
Operating Areas.
Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41, from the Commander in Chief,
Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet, concerning the security of the Fleet at base
and in operating areas, was issued in February, 1941 and reissued in revised form
on 14 October 1941.
This order provided that the Security of the Fleet was predicated on two
assumptions :
(a) That no responsible foreign power would provoke war under present
existing conditions by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible land
misguided nationals of such powers might attempt (1) sabotage on ships based
in Pearl Harbor from small craft, (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by
sinking an obstruction in the channel, (3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the
approaches to Pearl Harbor ;
(b) That a declaration of wav might be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on
ships in Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating
areas, (3) a combination of the two.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2283
Security measures were prescribed covering :
A. Continuous patrols, inshore, boom and harbor.
B. Intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol and an air
pfttrol. The destroyer patrol was to consist (a) of a patrol to 10 miles from the
entrance, (b) three destroyers to search 12 hours prior to sortie or entry of Fleet
or Task Force, (c) one destroyer (READY DUTY) for screening heavy ships,
other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, to be on one hour's notice.
The air patrol was to consist of daily search of operating areas, as directed by
Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, an "air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a
Fleet or Task Force, an air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at
other times. There also was to be a daily sweep for magnetic and anchored
mines.
C. Sortie and entry.
D. Openating areas.
E. Ships at sea.
F. Ships in port.
The security provisions covering defense against air attack (G), described the
principal Army anti-aircraft gun defenses of Pearl Harbor, and directed that
Marine defense battalions would assist the Army in manning them ; and provided
that in the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in harbor, plus all
fleet aviation shore based on Oahu, would augment the local "air defense; it
prescribed air defense sectors and a berthing plan in Pearl Harbor. It further
provided that the senior oflScer embarked, exclusive of CincPac, should insure
berthing so as to develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire ; and that
ComFOURTEEN, as Naval UO] Base Defense Officer, should exercise
with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack, and
take other action, including supervisory control over naval shore based aircraft,
arranging through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the
joint air effort between the Army and the Navy, and coordinate Fleet anti-air-
ci-aft flre with the base defense by advising the Senior Officer Embarked (exclu-
sive of CincPac) of the condition of readiness to maintain, and by holding
drills, etc.
Three conditions of naval base defense readiness were prescribed. Condition
III read as follows :
"Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one
ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each
.sector.) Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer."
The procedure to be followed by the task forces in the event of an air attack
was also set forth : the Senior Officer embarked was to execute an emergency
sortie order, .sending destroyers out and preparing a carrier and heavy ships and
submarines for sortie; the Task Force Commander at sea was to dispatch a
striking unit, etc. ; and the Naval Base Defense Officer was to give the alarm
indicating that an attack was in progress or imminent, inform the Task Force
Commander at sea of the attack and type of attacking aircraft, launch air search
for enemy ships, and arm and prepare all bombing units available.
The action to be taken if a submarine attacked in the operating area was set
forth. It was provided that the ship attacked was, among other things, to origi-
nate a plain language dispatch containing the essential details; various actions
were to be taken by other ships ; and the Patrol Wings were to assume readiness
for search and for offensive action, to carry out search as directed by Task Force
Commander, and to prepare to establish station patrol at a 220 mile radius from
the scene of attack at one hour before daylight of the next succeeding daylight
period. The shore based fleet aircraft were to prepare to relieve planes over the
attack area, unless Pearl Harbor were also attacked, in which case the instruc-
tions issued by the Naval Base Defense Officer would have priority. It was fur-
ther provided that "It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not
indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack," that "(3) it must
be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of
a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a
carrier. The Task Force Commander must, therefore, assemble his task groups
as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be pre-
pared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other
means."
l-in G. Execution of Plans Prior to 7 December 19Jfl.
(1) The Pacific Fleet Ojierating Plan Rainbow 5 provided that the day of
execution of the plan was to be designated as W-Day, and that the day upon
2284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
which hostilities opened with Japan would be J-Day. which might or might not
coincide with W-Day. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, W-Day had not
been designated.
(2) The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan had been signed and placed
in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
and by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. It will be recalled that
under this plan the method of coordination of Army and Navy effort was "by
mutual cooperation" and not "unity of command." It will be recalled further
that under this plan the Army task was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea,
land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers ; and to .support the Naval
forces ; and, that the Navy task was to patrol the coastal zone and control and
protect shipping therein ; and to support the Army forces ; and, that the Navy
was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance.
(3) Annex VII, Section 6 of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which
provided for joint defensive measures for defense against hostile raids or air
attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war (including joint air operations
and for the use of Army aircraft by the Navy for long distance patrol when
Navy forces were insufficient ) , was to become effective when the Connnanding
General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack
was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action. No such agreement was made
prior to the attack on December 7th.
(4) The Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, which provided for an
Inshore Patrol consisting of two desti-oyers, a boom patrol, a harbor patrol,
and an A/B boom and minesweepers, a Base defense air force, anti-aircraft
defense, and a harbor control post, although effective as to the inshore patrol
was not in operation as to the base defense air force.
(.")) The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, dated 9 April 1941, which was
an annex to the Naval Base Defense Force Plan and which had been made in
accordance with the joint estimate of Bellinger and Martin, dated 31 March
1941, was effective upon receipt. It was to become operative without a signal
in the event of a surprise attack on Oahu and it might have been made oper-
ative bv dispatch. It was not made operative until the attack on 7 December
1941.
(6) The Pacific Fleet Letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operat-
ing areas, which recognized the possibility of a surprise attack on ships in
Pearl Harbor and which set forth security measures including patrols to be
conducted both by destroyers and by aircraft, was in effect during 1941, and
in revised form after 14 October 1941.
[^2] H. Admiral KimmeVs Vieira as to the Possibility of a Surprise Air
Attack.
It appears from the War and Defense Plans, above summarized, that it was
believed that prior to a declaration of war there might be a surprise attack
by the Japanese on ships in Pearl Harbor or a surprise submarine attack on
ships in the operating areas. The possibility of a surprise air attack on ships
in Pearl Harbor had been expressed as early as 24 January 1941 by the Secretary
of the Navy, in a letter to the Secretary of War (Exhibit 64), a copy of which
was received by Admiral Kimmel shortly after he assumed command of the
Pacific Fleet. In that letter, the Secretary of the Navy wrote:
"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities
would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl
Harbor . . . The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and prob-
abilities are considered to be: (1) air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane
attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment
by gunfire."
In his testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry, Admiral Kimmel indi-
cated some confusion as to his agreement with and his evaluation of the above
letter by the Secretary of the Navy. He testified that he had felt that the most
probable form of attack on Pearl Harbor was by submarine, and that a bomb-
ing attack was the second most probable, but that he had been of the view
that there was no danger of an air torpedo attack because the water was too
shallow. He ther\ corrected his testimony, characterizing his previous testi-
mony as erroneous, and stated that hie had regarded an air attack as no more
than a possibility.
It appears clearly that Admiral Kimmel at all times during his command of
the Pacific Fleet was of the view that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was
a possibility. Thus, in a letter by Admiral Richardson, prepared in collaboration
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2285
with Admiral Kimniel, on 25 JuDuary 1941 (Exhibit 70, Naval Court), it was
stated in part that the security of the Pacific Fleet would be predicated on cer-
tain assumptions, including an assumption that Japan might attack without
warning and the further assumption that Japanese attacks might be expected
against shipping, outlying positions, or naval units, and that surprise raids on
Pearl Harbor were possible. Again, in a letter of 18 February 1941, concerning
the adequacy of local defense (Exhibit 30, Naval ('ourt). Admiral Kimmel
stated, "I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl
Harbor is a possibility." And, as previously pointed out, the Fleet Security
Letter, reissued on 14 October 1941, predicated the security of the Fleet on
two assnmptions, one of which was that a declaration of war might be preceded
by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor. This, Admiral Kimmel testified
before the Naval Court, referred to a surprise air attack.
In connection with Admiral Kimmel's statement before the Naval Court of
Inquiry that he thought there was no danger of an air [^S] torpedo
attack on Pearl Harbor because tiie water was too shallow, several letters from
the Chief of Naval Operations shoidd be noted:
On 15 February 1941 (Exhibit 49, Naval Court), the Chief of Naval Operations
wrote to CincPac regarding anti-torpedo baffles for protection against attacks on
Pearl Harbor. This stated that the shallow depth of water limited the need for
anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor and the congestion and the necessity for
maneuvering room limited the practicability of the present type of baffles. The
letter indicated that a minimum depth of water of 75 feet might be assumed
necessary successfully to drop torpedoes from planes and that the desirable height
for dropping is 60 feet or less. There were various other considerations stated.
The recommendations and conunents of the Commander-in-Chief were especially
desired. A similar letter was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Com-
mandants of various Naval Districts, including the Fourteenth, on 17 February
1941 (Exhibit 54, Naval Court).
The reply to the request for recommendations and comments was made on 20
March 1941, in a letter by Admiral Bloch. stating that the depth of water at Pearl
Harbor was 45 feet, and for that and other reasons, he did not recommend anti-
torpedo baffles. CincPac agreed, until such time as a light efficient net were
developed.
In June, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent another letter to the Com-
mandants of Naval Districts, copy to CincPac and others, referring to recent
developments, and to experience at Taranto. which stated that no minimum depth
of water could be assumed safe as regards torpedo attack if there were sufficient
water around a ship to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to
arm the torpedo, but that such an attack in 10 fathoms or more was more likely
than in shallow water (Exhibit 55, Naval Court). The torpedoes at Taranto,
it was .said, were launched in thirteen to fifteen fathoms although some may have
been in eleven.
Admiral Kimmel testified that on this correspondence he based his opinion that
there was no chance of an air torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor — and that even
after the June letter, he did not think that torpedoes would run in such shallow
water. He pointed out that the Navy made no effort to place such nets in Pearl
Harbor. He later stated that he did not think an aerial torpedo attack would be
made because he did not think such torpedoes would run in Pearl Harbor and did
not give this a great deal of consideration for that reason.
[44] I- Adequacy of Forces to Catry Out Tasks Assigned.
The adequacy of forces assigned to the Pacific Fleet for carrying out the tasks
assigned in the war plans was the subject of testimony before both Admiral Hart
and the Naval Court of Inquiry. From the testimony it appears that although
there were shortages concerning which Admiral Kimmel had extensive corre-
spondence with the Chief of Naval Operations, there was general agreement by
the witnesses to the effect that the Fleet was considered adequate to carry out
the initial tasks assigned in the war plans. The initial tasks, it will be recalled,
were primarily defensive in nature. As will appear subsequently in this report,
the number of fleet patrol planes in the Hawaiian area was not sufficient to enable
a 360 degree reconnaissance to be flown daily from Oahu for more than a few
days, but was snifflcient for air reconnaissance of the more dangerous sectors to
have been flown for at least several weeks. To this extent, therefore, the patrol
planes assigned to the Pacific Fleet were a limiting factor as to the Fleet's ability
to carry out one of the initial ta.sks assigned in the war plans, namely, to "main-
tain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches of Oahu . . ."
2286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan stated that the Navy through Com-
FOURTEEN, would provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu. Admiral
Bloch had no air forces assigned to him and had to rely upon the Fleet planes,
which were under the control of Admiral Kimmel, for the accomplishment of this
task. Thus naval patrol planes could be and were used for long distance recon-
naissance from Oahu only when they were made available by Admiral Kimmel for
that purpose.
[45] J. Command Organization.
(1) Methods of Coordination Between Army and Navy Commands.
According to "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935," (Exhibit 6, Naval
Court), the operations of Army and Navy forces were to be coordinated by
one of two methods :
(a) Mutual cooperation, or,
(b) The exercise of unity of command.
(2) Coordination Betiveen Army and Navy Commands in Hawaii.
The command organization in the Hawaiian area was designed to function
through "mutual cooperation" between the Army and Navy. This was the
normal method of coordination according to Joint Action of the Army and the
Navy (Exhibit 6, page 5), and applied to the defense of Pearl Harbor as well
as the entire Hawaiian area.
(3) Desirability of Unity of Command.
(a) Unity of Command for Haicaii considered in Washington. Admiral Stark
testified before the Naval Court that, prior to 7 December 1941, he had given
much thought to the question of unity of command in Hawaii but that no satis-
factory solution or decision had been reached as far as the Navy Department
was concerned. It had been the topic of many conversations with the Chief
of Staff of the Army, but it was anticipated only for amphibious operations
(page 29, Naval Court). He and the Chief of Staff of the Army could have
placed unity of command into effect at Hawaii, subject to the approval of the
Secretaries of War and of the Navy (page 39, Naval Court). However, "Joint
Action of the Army and the Navy" (Exhibit 6, Naval Court) does not indicate
that the approval of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy would
have been required.
(b) Unity of Command foi- Hawaii considered at Pearl Harbor. Admiral
Stark testified that Admiral Kimmel, as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
Fleet, in mutual agreement with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, could have placed unity of command in effect in Oahu (Naval Court,
page 39; Exhibit 6. page 5). Admiral Kimmel testified (Roberts Commission,
page 538; Naval Court, page 296) that he had never had any discussion with
the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on the desirability of
putting unity of command into effect in the Hawaiian area, but did state that
where command is vested in one agency, much better results can be obtained
than when responsibility is divided.
Admiral Kimmel testified that so far as the authority of ComFOURTEEN to
accomplish unity of command was concerned, ComFOURTEEN did not have the
authority without reference to him and that he would not have approved this
nor accepted the responsibility for Army action without reference to the Navy
Department.
[46] Under the Naval Base Defense Plan (Exhibit 53, NC), unity of com-
mand was vested in the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force over all
offensive air operations and under the Army Air Commander for all defensive
air operations, but only after the plan had been activated.
(c) Weakness of "Mutual Cooperation."
(i) Air Command. Admiral Bellinger testified that the weakness of the air
defense plan was that there was no one officer in command until after the plan
was activated. The Bellinger-Martin estimate (Exhibit 49) he believed to be
sound, but said that it lacked sanction and that the missing sanction was unity
of command.
(ii) Recommendation of Joint Command Center. In an endorsement dated
6 December 1941 from the Director, Radio Liaison Division, to the Director,
Naval Districts Division, advocating a combined operating center for the Army
and Navy at Pearl Harbor (which was not established prior to the attack).
Admiral Hooper stated "The most perfect set-up for command is one in which
the supreme commander is exercised by one officer best equipped of any for the
task . . . Because our defense is under two officers, Army and Navy, we must
try and arrange matters so that when component parts of the commands are
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2287
interwoven these two can function as nearly as possible as one." (Exhibit 77.)
The recommendation for a Joint Command Center in Hawaii was originated
by a dispatch from OpXav to ComFOI'RTEEN on 15 October 1&41 (Exhibit 77),
requesting that consideration be given to the construction of a combined oper-
ating center .sutficient in size and facilities to accommodate in time of emer-
gency staffs of all essential operating activities of both Army and Navy in
Hawaii. An informal joint working committee had been formed in Washington
to endeavor to improve cooperation of Army and Navy shore defense activities
by the formation of joint command centers. A reply to the above-mentioned
dispatch strongly recommending against such a move is contained in a letter
from ComFOURTEEN to CNO, via CincPac, enclosing a letter from General
Short to ComFOURTEEN and an endorsement by CincPac.
General Short stated that while he was strongly in favor of combined operat-
ing centers for equivalent units of Army and Navy forces, he did not believe
that all of the operating centers should be combined into one single building,
because it was necessary that Army headquarters be located in separate com-
mand posts for efficiency of individual operation. It was also undesirable from
communication and security standpoint. He suggested that, as an alternative,
additional space for Navy units be constructed adjacent to the existing command
posts for equivalent Army units.
[//7] In the basic letter (Exhibit 77) ComFOURTEEN recommended that
no steps be taken to concentrate the Army and Navy in a common building and
believed that the best interests of the CinC Pacific Fleet would be served by one
building with only agencies of the Fleet therein.
The CinC Pacific Fleet in his endorsement to this letter stated that the mission
of the Army and the Fleet were considerably different, the operation of one being
defensive and local, while the operations of the other were offensive and far-
flung. Strategic, rather than tactical, cooperation was indicated and therefore
the necessity for rapid receipt and exchange of information and arrival at quick
decision was of less importance. He was of the opinion that the establishment
of a combined operating center for the Army and Navy in Hawaii was not only
unnecessary, but definitely undesirable.
(4) Disagreement concerning Unity of Command at the Outlying Islands.
The evidence in the previous investigations and in this investigation indicates
that there was some consideration of unity of command at outlying islands dur-
ing the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941. This occurred as a result
of dispatches by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincPac on 26 November 1941
(Exhibits 18 and 40, Naval Court), in which it was advised that the Army had
agreed to reenforce Midway and Wake with Army personnel and to station 25
Army pursuit planes at Midway and 25 at Wake provided that Admiral Kimmel
consideretl this feasible and desirable. It was stated that it would be necessary
for Admiral Kimmel to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to
Midway and Wake on aircraft carriers, that the planes would be flown off at
destination and that the ground crews would be landed in boats. Admiral
Kimmel was directed to confer with the Commanding General concerning this
matter, and to advise as soon as practicable.
It appears that this subject was considered at some length in conferences held
by Admiral Kimmel on and after 27 November 1941. The discussion of unity of
command as to these islands was summarized by Vice -Admiral Smith in his
testimony in this investigation. He said that Admiral Kimmel asked the Army
what he could expect of Army fighters at Wake, and that General Martin of
the Army Air Force replied that the Army did nor allow such planes to go more
than l.T miles offshore. Admiral Kimmel then stated that the Army planes
were, therefore, no good to him.
General Short stated that if he manned those islands, he must command them
and "Kimmel replied, 'Over my dead body. The Army should exercise no com-
mand over Navy bases.' General Short replied, 'Mind you, I don't want these
islands. I think they are better manned by Marines. But if I must put planes
and troops on them, then I must command them.'" (Page 352, record of this
investigation).
[Jf8] Admiral Kimmel's concern over the question of command at the out-
lying islands was indicated by his dispatch of November 2&th to the Chief of
Naval Operations, advising of the proposed reenforcement of Midway and Wake
with Marine fighter planes and that he would investigate more thoroughly the
feasibility and practicability of relieving them with Army planes. In this dis-
patch he stated, "All outlying forces must be exclusively under Naval command"
2288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(Exhibit 76, Naval Court). Similarly, in a letter of 2 December 1941 to Admiral
Stark (Exhibit 50 of the Naval Court), Admiral Kimniel advised that the dis-
patches in regard to the use of Army pex'sonnel were being given earnest consid-
eration, that he believed Admiral Stark woiild subscribe to the principle that
all these outlying islands must be under Navy command and the forces there
subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief without any qualifications
whatsoever, and that he expected some difficulties along this line when Army
personnel were injected into the picture unless a very clear directive were issued
jointly by the War and Navy Departments.
It appears that Midway and Wake were reeiiforced with squadrons of Marine
planes, and that therefore, unity of command under the Navy, actually existed
at those islands. No solution of the command problem, in the event of possible
future inclusion of Army forces, was reached.
[Jf9] Findings
1. T^e basic assumption of the Rainbow Five War Plan was that the United
States and her Allies would be at war with the Axis Powers, either including or
excluding Japan.
2. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned various offensive tasks
to the Pacific Fleet, including the capture of positions in the Marshalls and
raids on enemy sea communications and positions, and various defensive tasks,
including the task of protecting the territory of the A.ssociated Powers in the
Pacific area and preventing the extension of enemy military power into the
Eastern Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions.
3. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned to the Fleet
various initial tasks, including the maintenance of fleet security at the bases,
at anchorages, and at sea, the protection of the communications and territory
of the As.sociated Powers by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, the
establishment of defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway, and guard-
ing against surprise attack by Japan.
4. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) and annexes included
among the initial tasks to be performed by the patrol planes the maintenance
of the maximum patrol plane search practicable in the approaches to the
Hawaiian area.
5. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan was to be put into effect on W-day, which,
it was stated, might or might not coincide with the day that hostilities opened
with Japan. W-day was not fixed prior to the attack.
6. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, was based
on the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans. It constituted the basis of
subsidiary peace and war project.s, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans.
The method of coordination under the plan was to be by mutual cooperation until
and unless unity of command were invoked.
7. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the Army's task was to
hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces, and against hostile
sympathizers, and to .support the naval forces. The Navy's task was to patrol
the coastal zone (which included Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas
as were required for the defense of 6ahu), and to patrol and protect shipping
therein, and to support the Army forces.
8. One of the specific tasks assigned to the Navy in the Joint Coastal Frontier
Defense Plan was that the Commandant. FOURTEENTH Naval District, should
provide for distant reconnaissance.
[50] 9. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was placed in effect on
11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the
Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District.
10. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was
an agreement between the Conunandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, and
the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, as to joint defensive measures
for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Hai'bor Naval Base against
hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war.
11. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan pro-
vided, among other things, for joint air operations and provided that when naval
forces were insufficient f(»r long distance patrol and search operations and Army
aircraft were made available, the latter would be under the tactical control of
the naval commander directing search operations.
12. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan also
provided that the Army was to expedite the Installation of its aircraft warning
service, and that prior to the completion of that service the Navy, through the
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2289
use of radar and other appropriate means, would endeavor to give such warning
of hostile attacks as misht be practicable.
13. Annex VII, Section VI, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan pro-
vided that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTKEN agreed that
the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant
such action, each commander would take steps to make available to the other
the air forces at his dispo.sal, in order that joint operations might be conducted
in accordance with the plan.
14. The Conxmanding General and ComFOURTEEN did not effect any agree-
ment prior to the attack that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently
imminent to warrant placing Annex VII. Section VI, in operation.
15. The Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan provided among other
things, for a Base Defense Air Force in conjunction with the Army. One of
the assumptions was that it was possible that a declaration (»f war might be
preceded by a surprise air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, that it was probable
that there might be a surpri.se submarine attack on ships in the base area, and
that a combination of both forms of attack was possible.
16. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin stated,
among other things, that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu
would be an air attack that would most likely be launched from carriers which
would probably approach inside of three hundred miles. The estimate also
stated that any single submarine attack miffht indicate the presence of con-
siderable undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of [51] fast
ships accompanied by a carrier. This Estimate came to the attention of Admiral
Kimmel and Admiral Bloch.
17. The Naval Base Defense Air ForcePlan was prepared by Admiral Bellinger
and approved by Admiral Bloch. This plan, which was designated Annex
"Baker" to the Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, made specific provi-
sion for joint air operations by the Army and Navy. The Plan was effective upon
receipt. It was to become operative without signal in the event "of a surprise
attack, or might be made operative by dispatch. In the meantime conditions of
readiness for aircraft were to be as directed by the Commanding General, Ha-
waiian Department, for Army units, and by ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base
Defense OflScer, for Navy units.
18. The Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating
areas, which was reissued by Admiral Kimmel in revised form on 14 October
1941, provided that the Fleet's security was predicated on several assumptions,
one of which was that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack
on ships in Pearl Harbor, a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating
areas, or a combination of the two. This letter also stated that a single sub-
marine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably
composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.
19. The Pacific Fleet security letter prescribed security measures, injluding
provisions for defense against air attack. It provided, among other things, that
ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army
joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack and that he should
take other action, including supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft,
and arrange through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the
joint air effort by the Army and the Navy.
20. Under the Pacific Fleet security letter, the security measures were to include
intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol, and an air patrol.
The air patrol was to consist of daily search of fleet operating areas as directed
by Aircraft Scouting Force, one covering the entry or sortie of a fleet or task force,
and one during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.
21. The only local defense plans in effect and operative prior to the attack of
7 December 1941 were the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, under which the
Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance, and the Pacific Fleet security
letter, under which the only aircraft patrol from Oahu was a daily search of fleet
operating areas, a search during entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and during
the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.
[52] 22. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five), approved by the
Chief of Naval Operations, in estimating probable enemy (Japanese) action,
visualized that one of the enemy defensive efforts would be "destruction of
threatening naval forces" ; that initial action would include "possible raids or
stronger attacks on Wake, Midway, and other outlying United States positions" ;
and that the initial Japanese deployment would include "raiding and observation
2290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and that submarines in the Hawaiian
area. . . ." (Underscoring supplied.) The possibility of an attack on Hawaii
was, therefore, included but in no way emphasized.
23. Admiral Kimmel was of the opinion, throughout his tenure of command of
the Pacific Fleet, that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility.
Neither he nor the key members of his staff appear to have considered it as a
serious probability.
24. The method of command established in the local plans was that of "mutual
cooperation." The relations between the responsible commanders were cordial.
However, there was not in existence, prior to the attack, any permanent operating
setup which could ensure the constant and timely exchange of information, deci-
sions, and intended courses of action so essential to the efficient conduct of joint
operations, particularly in an emergency. A recent proposal looking to the estab-
lishment of a Joint Command Center had been the subject of adverse recommenda-
tions by the responsible local commanders, both Army and Navy.
25. In accordance with "Joint Action," unity of command for the defense of
Oahu could have been placed in effect by local agreement between the Command-
ing Oeneral of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the FOUR-
TEENTH Naval District. The latter, however, would naturally not make such
an agreement without the approval of his immediate superior, the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The question of unity of command for outlying islands
was discussed between Admiral Kinnuel and General Short in connection with a
proposal for reenforcement of Wake and Midway by Army planes. General
Short's position was that if Army forces were involved, the command must be his.
Admiral Kimmel maintained that the command of naval bases must remain with
the Navy. The islands were reenforced i^ith Marine planes.
[5S] II
JAPANESE ESPIONAGE AT HAWAII
The center of Japanese espionage at Hawaii was the Japanese Consulate
General located in Honolulu. As a matter of regular routine, information was
collected by the Consulate General concerning the location and movements of
United States ships in and around Pearl Harbor and concerning defense
preparations. This information was forwarded by the Japanese Consulate
General to Tokyo and elsewhere in coded messages sent via commercial com-
munication companies. A collection of such messages, which has been decrypted
and translated, appears in Exhibit 13 of this investigation and in Exhibit 63
of the Naval Court. This collection of messages does not include every such
message, but does fully illustrate the type of espionage reports which were
made. Subsequent to the attack, the incoming and outgoing message log of
the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu was recovered and translated.
These logs indicate the nature of all of the communications to and from the
Japanese Consulate General and show the frequency with which espionage
reports were sent by the Consul during 1&41. A copy of the log is set forth
in Exhibit 62.
It is to be noted that the espionage reports submitted during 1941 by the
Japanese Consulate General became increasingly more detailed and, in the
first week of December, 1941, indicated the likelihood of a surprise attack on
Pearl Harbor. The possession of all of those messages by the American
intelligence services prior to the attack would have been of inestimable value.
Some of them, as will appear later, were obtained prior to the attack. Those
obtained, however, although indicating Japanese intere.st in the location and
movements of ships in and from Pearl Harbor, did not include those messages,
particularly during the first week of December, 1941, which indicated the
likelihood of an air attack. It may also be noted at this point that those
Consulate messages which were obtained prior to 7 December 1941 were
decrypted and translated in Washington but not at Pearl Harbor.
illustrative of the type of message sent earlier in 1941 is a report from
Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 10 March 1941, which describes various vessels seen
in- Pearl Harbor (Translated by Navy, April 5 — Document 1, Exhibit 13). The
Japanese interest in the location of ships in particular areas of Pearl Harbor
is demonstrated by a dispatch from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 24 September
1941, requesting reports of vessels in five sub-areas of Pearl Harbor, and
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2291
requesting reports of warships and aircraft carriers at anchor and tied up at
wharves, buoys and doclis. Particular request was made for mention of the
fact when there were two or more vessels alongside the same wharf (Army
translation, October 9 — Document 2, Exhibit 13). The Japanese Consul at
Honolulu established a code to refer to the location of vessels in particular
areas (Navy translation, October 10 — Document 3, Exhibit 13). Tokyo on 18
November 1941 requested a report on vessels anchored in certain areas and
it directed that the investigation be made with great secrecy (Army translation,
December 2 — Document 9, Exhibit 13). A report was sent by Honolulu to Tokyo
on 18 November 1941 setting forth the warships in the harbor in certain
areas, commenting on the [54] presence or absence of aircraft carriers,
and describing in detail the course of certain destroyers which were observed
entering the harbor (Army translation, December 6 — Document 10, Exhibit 13).
On November 20th, Tokyo requested a comprehensive investigation of the Fleet
bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation (Army translfi-
tion, December 6 — Document 7, Exhibit 13).
On 24 November 1941, Honolulu reported to Tokyo concerning the Fleet prac-
tice of leaving Pearl Harbor, conducting maneuvers, and returning, that the
Fleet had not remained for a long period of time nor conducted maneuvers at
Lahaina Road, that destroyers and submarines were the only vessels anchored
there ; that battleships seldom entered the port of Hilo, Hanalei or Haneo ;
that virtually no one had observed battleships in maneuver areas ; and, stated
that the Fleet maneuvered for one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or
to the southwest and pointed out that aircraft carriers maneuvered by them-
selves. This also mentioned the times when cruisers and other ships left Pearl
Harbor and how long they were away, and generally how long they remained
at Pearl Harbor when anchored there (Army translation, December 16 — Docu-
ment 23, Exhibit 13).
On November 28th, Tokyo requested intelligence, which was described as
being of major importance, concerning the movements of battleships out of the
harbor, pointing out that if such movements were reported but once a week,
the vessels could have traveled far, and that Honolulu was to use its own
judgment in deciding on reports covering such movements. As to capital ships,
it was requested that reports of the entrance or departure and length of time
at anchor from the time of entry into port until departure be made (Army
translation, December 8 — Document 13, Exhibit 13). On November 28th,
Honolulu reported to Tokyo concerning the B-17 planes at Midway and range
of anti-aircraft guns, observations of maneuvers by tr(K)ps, prospective rein-
forcements of troops at Honolulu during December or January, and advised
of the presence of a carrier usually about 15,000 feet south of Pearl Harbor
and one or two destroyers at the entrance of the harbor (Army translation,
December 8 — Document 16, Exhibit 13).
The messages sent by the Japanese Consul during the week of 1 December
to 7 December 1941, are of particular significance. A message of December 1st
reported on ship maneuvers and described the place where maneuvers were
held as about 500 nautical miles southeast of Oahu, and stated the reasons
why that conclusion had been reached. This message set forth the "usual"
schedule for departure and return of the battleships and stated that they left on
Tuesdays and returned on Fridays, or left on Friday and returned on ^Saturday
of the following week, and that all ships stayed in port about a period of
one week. In view of their importance,' five other messages sent during the
first week in December, 1941, are quoted in full :
From: Tokoyo (Togo)
To : Honolulu
December 2, 1941 ( translated by Army 30 December 1941 )
J-19
#123 (Secret outside the department)
In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane
carriers, and cruisers is of [55] utmost importance. Hereafter, to the
utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether
or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are
any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the
warships are provided with antimine nets.
2292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From: Honolulu (Kita)
To Tokyo
3 December 1941 ( translated by Navy 11 December 1941 )
(PA-K2)
#245 (in 2 parts, complete) (Military Secret).
'From Ichiro Fujii to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.
1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following :
I. Arrange the eight signals in three colunms as follows :
Meaning
Signal
Battleship divisions including scouts and
Preparing to sortie. . . ....
5
screen units.
Preparing to sortie
2
Bnttleship divisions
All departed between 1st and 3rd
3
Several departed between 1st and 3rd
4
All departed between 1st and 3rd
5
Battleship divisions..
-Ml departed between 4th and 6th.-
6
Carriers
Several departed between 4th and 6th
7
Carriers
All departed between 4th and 6th
8
2. Signals.
I. Lanikai Beach House will show lights during the night as follows :
Signal
[56] One light between 8 and 9 p. m 1
One light between 9 and 10 p. m 2
One light between 10 and 11 p. m 3
One light between 11 and 12 p. m 4
II.
Two lights between 12 and 1 a. m 5
Two lights between 1 and 2 a. m 6
Two lights between 2 and 3 a. m 7
Two lights between 3 and 4 a. m 8
(Part 2)
III. Lanikai Bay, during daylight.
If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it Indicates signals
1, 2, 3, or 4.
If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.
IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House will indicate the following :
Times Signal
1900-2000 3
2000-2100 J 4
2100-2200 5
2200-2300 6
2300-2400 7
0000-0100 8
V. K.G.M.B. Want Ads.
A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.
B. CHIC . . CO farm etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.
C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P. O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8.
3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from
Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium at
a point halfway between Lower Kulu Road and Haleakala Road (latitude
20°40' N., longitude 156°19' W., visible from seaward to the southeast and south-
west of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your
EXEX signal is received :
[57] Times Signal
From 7-2 3 or 6
From 8-9 4 or 7
From 9-10 5 or 8
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2293
From : Honolulu
To: Tokyo
5 December 1941 (translated by Navy 10 December 1941)
(PA-K2)
#252
(1) During Friday morning, the rith, the three battleships mentioned in my
message #239 arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.
(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.
(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:
S battleships.
3 light cruisers.
16 destroyers.
Four ships of the Honolulu class and were in dock.
From : Honolulu
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941 (translated by Army 8 December 1941)
PA-K2
#253 Re the last part of your #123.
1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage
balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered
four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the
use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as
Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood
of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they
selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any
training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present
time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult
to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have
actually [58] made preparations, because they must control the air over
the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor,
Hickam, Ford and Kwa, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor.
I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take
advantage for a surprise attack against these places.
2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are
not known. I will report the results of my investigation.
From : Honolulu.
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941 (translated by Army 8 December 1941)
PA-K2
#254.
1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port
were and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at
anchor on the 6th :
9 battleship.s, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in
addition there were 4 light crui.sers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy
cruisers and airplane carriers have all left.)
2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.
Findinffs.
[59] 26. Japanese espionage at Pearl Harbor was effective and, particularly
during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941, resulted in the fre-
quent transmission to Japan of information of great importance concerning the
Pacific Fleet, the movements and locations of ships, and defense preparations.
27. Certain reports .sent by the Japanese Consul General via a commercial com-
munications company at Honolulu in the week preceding the attack indicated
the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.
2294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
28. It will appear subsequently that various coded messages sent by the Jap-
anese Consul General at Honolulu, which did not indicate the likelihood of an
air attack on Pearl Harbor, wei'e intercepted by Army and Navy radio intercept
stations and were decoded in Washington, D. C. prior to the attack ; that others
which were obtained at Honolulu by Naval Intelligence prior to the attack were,
with the exception of a few unimportant messages, in a code which could not be
decripted there before December 7th ; and, that three messages intercepted by
Army radio intercept stations at Hawaii and at San Francisco, which indicated
the likelihood of an air attack, were forwarded to the War Department for de-
cryption but were either not received there prior to the attack or were not
decrypted prior to the attack. If the United States intelligence services had been
able to obtain and to decode and tran.slate promptly all of the espionage reports
sent by the Japanese 'Consul General during the period 27 November to 7 Decem-
ber 1941, the information so obtained would have been of inestimable value.
[60] III
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE AND H:VENTS PRFXIMINARY TO THE ATTACK
A. The Organization of Naval Intelligence in General; Sources of Information,
and Relations with the Pacific Fleet.
The Office of Naval Intelligence, which was under the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, consisted of two main branches — Domestic and Foreign. The Domestic
Branch had to do with internal espionage and other subversive activities of for-
eign nationals or organizations inimical to national and particularly naval wel-
fare. It maintained branch offices in various of the principal cities of the United
States, including Honolulu. The Foreign Branch was organized into a number of
sections, of which one was the Far Eastern Section. The Director of Naval
Intelligence was Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Jr. The officer in charge of the
Far Eastern Section of the Foreign Branch was Commander Arthur H. McCollum.
The primary sources of information which the Far Eastern Section had were
Naval Attache reports from Japan and China, observers' reports from various
ports in the Far East, reports from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet
and from the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, including reports as to
radio intelligence, and reports of investigations conducted by the domestic branch
of ONI, particularly from Honolulu, and State Department reports at Washing-
ton. A most important part of the information provided to the Far Eastern Sec-
tion was supplied by a unit at Washington known as OP-20-G. This was under
the command of Commander Laurence F. Safford and supplied information
obtained from communication or radio intelligence. This section was staffed
both by Communication officers and Intelligence officers. The information
received by OP-20-G was supplied to Lt. Comdr. Alvin D. Kramer of ONI, who
was working with that section, and was transmitted by him to the head of the
Far Eastern Section and to the Director of Naval Intelligence.
The section known as OP-20-G was concerned with the interception, decryp-
tion, and translation of Japanese messages. In addition it was responsible for
furnishing the Navy's own codes and ciphers and for the supervision of the, secur-
ity of the Navy's own communications. Japanese messages were intercepted by
various methods, including radio interception by a number of radio intercept
stations located in the United States, which transmitted the Japanese communi-
cations, as intercepted 'by them, to OP-20-G for decryption and translation. In
addition to reports from intercept stations located in the United States, this sec-
tion received reports from communication intelligence units- located at Pearl
Harbor and in the Philippines. This unit was concerned with the plans and in-
tentions of foreign governments, principally Japan, and with intelligence relat-
ing to naval operations in the Atlantic. The communications intelligence organ-
ization at Pearl Harbor, which had subsidiary stations at Oahu, Midway, Samoa,
and Dutch Harbor, was concerned primarily with the dispositions and [61]
plans of navel forces in the Pacific and with surveillance of Japanese naval com-
munications. The communications intelligence unit in the Philippines, which was
located at Corregidor, was concerned with Japanese naval communications and
Japanese diplomatic communications. The Officer in Charge of the communica-
tions intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor was Lt. Comdr. Joseph J. Rochefort. The
officer in charge of the communications intelligence unit at Corregidor until Sep-
tember, 1941 was Lt. Comdr. Rudolph J. Fabian. He remained thereafter assisting
that unit.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2295
Japanese diplomatic cominuiiications were in various codes, such as the code
known ase "purple" code, the "red" code, the "J-19" code, the "PAK 2", and the
"La." code. The so-called "purple" code contained the most important Japanese
diplomatic messages. Messages in this and in other diplomatic codes were inter-
ceptt'd and read at the Philippines primarily for the purpose of local information.
They were sent, as intercepted, to the Navy Department in one of the Navy's own
codes. All intercepted diplomatic traffic was sent to Washington whether o;r not
it was deciphered and read at the Philippines. None of this information was sent
from the Philippines to Pearl Harbor. The unit at Pearl Harbor was intercepting
and decrypting no Japanese diplomatic traffic. It had been directed to concen-
trate on Japanese naval systems. The unit at Washington was charged with the
general control of the units at Corregidor, Pearl Harbor, and at Washington, and
handled the Japanese diplomatic systems and also handled some Japanese naval
systems.
Intercepted Japanese diplomatic traffic received by the Washington unit was
pooled with similar traffic intercepted by the Army and was decrypted and trans-
lated by the Navy and the Army on an alternate day basis. The resulting infor-
mation was distributed daily by ONI to the Chief of Naval Operations, and to
(tthers in the Navy Department. The President and the State Department simi-
larly were furnished this information daily.
It appears that, although the Navy enjoyed considerable success in decrypting
Japanese diplomatic communications, the Japanese naval codes were not being
read. Information obtained by radio intelligence, therefore, from Japanese
naval traffic was based almost entirely on so-called "traffic analysis" and not
upon reading of the message themselves.
The units at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines advised the Washington unit
of the results of their traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and of
the estimated location and movement of Japanese naval forces, and also ex-
changed information with one another on that subject. The units also exchanged
information on technical subjects, that is, pertaining to codes and ciphers and
keys for decyphering codes.
Information developed from the reading of the "purple" messages was not
sent to the Pearl Harbor unit as such. It does appear, however, that various of
the warning messages and other dispatches sent by the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based upon information
derived, from the Japanese diplomatic messages.
[62]' Thus it appears that the knowledge of the Comander-ift-Chief of the
Pacific Fleet as to the status of diplomatic relations with Japan depended pri-
marily upon the messages sent to him by the Chief of Naval Operations. The
information received by the radio intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor as to the
location and movement of Japanese naval forces was, however, brought directly
to the attention of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet daily by the
Fleet Intelligence Officer, as was other material of an intelligence nature.
B. The Approach of War: Intercepted Communications Availahle at Washington,
and Messages Setit by CNO to Admiral Kimmel.
It should be noted that the Japanese communications which were intercepted
and decoded and translated by the War and Navy Departments, as set forth in
this section, were not sent to Admiral Kimmel. Various of the messages sent to
Admiral Kimmel by the Chief of Naval Operations were based on these Japanese
communications.
(1) The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and October 16th dispatch.
On 16 October 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a di.spatch to Cinclant,
CincPac and CincAF (Exhibit 13. Naval Court), reading as follows:
"The resignation of the Japanese cabinet has created a grave situation X
If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti
American X If the Konoye cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate
under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the US X In
either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility X
Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate
situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers X
In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such prepara-
tory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative
actions against Japan X Second and third adees inform appropriate army and
naval district authorities X Acknowledge"
On 17 October 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 38, Naval
Court). In this letter, Admiral Stark advised that things had been "popping"
2296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
here for the last twenty-four hours, but from the dispatches Admiral Kimmel
knew about all that they did. He said, "Personally, I do not believe the Japanese
are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the 'possibility ;'
in fact, I tempered the message handed me considerably. Perhaps I was wrong,
but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House, it was
felt that we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend."
[63] Admiral Stark continued that Admiral Kimmel would recall that in
an earlier letter, when War Plans was forecasting a Japanese attack on Siberia in
August, Admiral Stark had said that his own judgment was that they would
make no move in that direction until the Russian situation showed a definite
trend. In this letter he said that he thought this whole thing worked up together.
He stated that efforts would be made to maintain the status quo in the Pacific.
How long it could be kept going, he did not know, but the President and Mr.
Hull were woi'king on it. ,To this letter was annexed a postscript, stating in
part, "General Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some
sort of i-econnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake,
a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that
we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely im-
probable and that, while we keep track of Japanese ships as far as we can, a
carefully planned raid on any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be
difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my
advice to him was not to worry."
Also annexed was a memorandum of 17 October 1941. by Rear Admiral Schuir-
mann, estimating the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet. The sub-
stance of this analysis was that the military would determine Japanese action
whether to attack Russia or move southward, and would make this decision on
the basis of opportunity and what they could get away with, and that it would
not be determined by the cabinet in power.
(2) Japanese mcn^agcs conceiniyui Gernmn attitude; Noniina's desire to
resign. — On 18 October 1941, the Navy translated an intercepted Japanese com-
munication from Berlin to Tokyo, dated 1 October 1941, which stated that the
Germans were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with Japan's postion, particu-
larly because Japan was not advising Germany of the negotiations with the United
States, although the United States was advising England (Document 4, Exhibit
63, Naval Court).
A Japanese message from Tokyo to Washington, dated 16 October 1941, was
intercepted and translated on 17 October 1941. In this Toyoda advised Aomura
that although he had been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors
in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-United States
negotiations, he had, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been
declining to do so. However, early in October, following the Gennan attacks
on American merchant ships and the consequent revival of the movement for
revision of the neutrality act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese
Government submit to the American Government a message that if the Roosevelt
Administration continued to attack the Axis powers, a belligerent situation
would inevitably arise between Germany, Italy, and the United States, which,
under the Three-Power Agreement, might lead Jai^an to join immediately the
war against the United States. It was indicated that such a message was
being considered and there were reasons which would not permit of postpone-
ment (Document 3, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).
[64] On 22 October 1941, Nomura sent a message to Tokyo which was inter-
cepted and translated on 23 October 1941. in which he said that he was sure that
he, too, should go out with the former cabinet ; that he knew that the Secretary
of State realized how sincere he was and yet how little influence he had in
Japan ; that there were some Americans who trusted him and who said that
things would get better for him, but that their encouragement was not enough;
that among his confreres in the United States there were some who felt the same
way, but they were all poor deluded souls ; that the instructions could be carried
out by Wakasugi ; that Nomura did not want to be the bones of a dead horse ; that
he did not want to ocntinue "this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people;"
that he was not trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor, that
was the only way open for him to tread ; and that he sought permission to return
to Japan (Document 5, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).
On 23 October 1941, a message from Tokyo to Washington of the same date was
intercepted and translated, which stated that the efforts Nomura was making
were appreciated ; that, as he was well aware, the outcome of those negotiations
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2297
had 11 jrreat l)earinfc upon the decision as to which load the Inii>erial (ioverninent
woiUd proceed; that as such it was an exceedinj^ly iinpoitaiit matter; that they
were placiuj; all of their reliance on Nomura's reports for information on this
matter; that for those reasons they hoped that he would see tit to saci'ifice his
personal wishes and remain at his post (Docuinent (5, Kxhihit (53, Naval Court).
(3) Action tdkcn by Admiral Kiiinnrl.
Admiral Kimmel advised, in a letter of October 22nd (Exhibit 14, Naval
Court), that the action talcen included maintaining two submarines for patrol
at Midway, dispatching twelve patrol planes to Midway, prepai'ing to send six
patrol planes from Midway to Wake, and to replace the six at Midway from
Pearl Harbor, sending two submarines to Vv'ake, and sending additional Marines
and stores there, dispatching additional Marines to Palmyra, placing Admiral
Pye and his ships on twelve hours notice, getting six submarines ready to depart
for Japan on short notice, putting some additional security measures in effect in
the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor.
On 7 November 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 74,
Naval Court) in reply to Admiral Kinunel's letter of October 22nd. He stated,
among other things, "O. K. on the dispositions which you made in connection with
recent change in the Japanese cabinet. The l»ig question i.s— what next?!" Also,
"Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it
will break, no one can tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what I have
written you before ; it continually gets 'worser and worser' ! A month may see,
literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies cannot go on forever —
particularly if one party cannot live with the setup. It doesn't look good."
[6o] (4) The first Japanese deadline message; Japanese interest in
American ships.
On 5 November 1941, the Navy translated a message from Tokyo to Washington,
reading as follows :
"(Of utmost secrecy).
"Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all
arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of
this month. I realize that this is a diflBcult order, but under the circumstances
it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the
problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condi-
tion. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.
"This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only."
During the first half of November, there were translated in Washington
various intercepted Japane.se communications concerning ships and planes at
Manila and Seattle (Documents 1-8, Exhibit 68, Naval Court). According to
one of these messages, which was dated ■"> Noveujber 1941, the Navy General
Staff wanted investigation done at Manila as to the conditions of airports, types
of planes and numbers of planes there, warships there, machinery belonging to
land forces, and the state of progress being made on all equipment and
establishments.
(5) Arrival of Kurtisu; Stark and Marshall recommendations as to ultimatum.
The situation existing early in November was .summarized by Nomura, in a
report to Tokyo, dated 10 November 1941, intercepted on November 12th
(Document 8, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) by reference to a report from the legal
advi.ser to the Jaiianese Embassy, who had conferred with Senator Thomas and
Secretary Hull, that the United States was not bluffing, that if Japan invaded
again, the United States would fight with Japan, that psychologically the Ameri-
can people were ready, that the Navy was ready and prepared for action.
Nonmra ahso reported that he had a conversation with "a certain Cabinet
member" who had said that Nomura was indeed a dear friend, that he would
tell him alone this: that the American government was receiving reports that
Japan would be on the move again and did not believe that Nomura's visit to the
President or the coming of Kurusu would have any effect on the general situation.
Nomura .said that he had explained how impatient the Japanese had bec-ome since
the freezing, how eager they were for a quick understanding, how they did not
desire a Japanese-American war, and how they hoped for peace until the end.
The Cabinet member replied, however, that the President and Secretarv of
State believed "those reports." [60] Nomura also said that his friend
had stated that the United States could not stop because if Japan moved, some-
thing would have to be done to save the "face", of the United States.
Admiral Stark w-as not hopeful that anything in the wav of better
understanding between the United States and Japan would come from Kurusu's
79716 ()— 4() — i>t. 1« 25
2298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
visit. His opinion was that it would be impossible to reconcile the Japanese and
American views. Admiral Stark so advised Admiral Kimmel by letter dated
14 November 1941 (Exhibit 39, Naval Court). With this letter, Admiral Stark
also sent to Admiral Kimmel a copy of a memorandum, dated 5 November 1941,
by Admiral Stark and General Marshall, for the President. This was concerned
with the belief of Chiang-Kai-Shek that a Japanese attack on Kumming was
imminent and that outside military support was the sole hope for the defeat
of that threat. The memorandum considered whether the United States would
be justified in undertaking offensive operations against the Japanese to prevent
her from severing the Burma Road. The memorandum stated that the Fleet in
the Pacific was inferior to the Japanese Fleet and could not undertake an unlim-
ited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. It pointed out that by the
middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the
Philippines would become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south
of Formosa. The recommendations were in general that all aid short of war
be given to China and that no ultimatum be given to Japan.
(6) Further and Final Japanese ''deadline messages."
At this time, information was received in Washington that the Japanese
Government had established a further and final deadline for the completion of
diplomatic negotiations. This consisted of two messages from Tokyo to
Washington, which were intercepted and translated by the Army, as follows :
(a) A translation on 17 November 1941 (Document 10, Exhibit 68, Naval
Court), of a dispatch, dated November 16th. the highlights of which were:
"* * * The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few
days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.
"What you say is of course so * ♦ * but I have only to refer you to the
fundamental policy laid down in my #725 (in which Togo says that conditions
within and without Japan will not permit any further delay in reaching a
settlement with the United States) * * ♦ try to realize what that means.
In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain
patient * * * the situation renders this out of the question. I set the
deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736, and there will be
no change. Please try to understand that. You see how [67] short the
time is ; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay
the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our
proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution."
(b) On 22 November 1941 (Document 11, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), a transla-
tion of a dispatch of the .same date, reading in substance :
"To both you Ambassadors.
"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736.
You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed
policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution
we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to
settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or
four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans ; if the signing
can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you — twenty ninth) ; if the
pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great
Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have
decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline abso-
lutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen.
Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever
have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassa-
dors alone."
(7) The November 2Jfth dispateh to CincPac and others.
On 24 November 1941 (Exhibit 15), a dispatch (which before the Naval Court
Admiral Stark said was based in part on the "deadline" intercept — page 775),
was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincAP, CincPac, ComELBVBN,
ConiTWELVE, ComTHIRTEEN, and ComFIFTEEN for action, reading:
"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X
This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements
their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive
movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possi-
bility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action ad-
dressees to inform senior Army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary
in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese
action X Guam will be informed separately"
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2299
[68] On 25 November 1941 (Exhibit 47, Naval Court), Admiral Stark wrote
to Admiral Kimmel in response to his letter of 17 October 1941, on the inadequacy
of local defense forces in Hawaii .(Exhibit 4(), Naval Court). Admiral Stark
stated that CincPac had taken cognizance of his responsibilities in connection
with tasks pertaining to the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier and that the forces avail-
able in the Hawaiian area, both Fleet and local defense forces, and the actual
operations of our own and hostile forces would indicate the numbers of Fleet
Vessels or aircraft required to be assigned to local defense tasks. Admiral
Stark's letter continued by summarizing the situation in regard to increasing
the local defense forces and, among other things, pointed out that the Depart-
ment had no additional airplanes available for assignment to the FOURTEENTH
Naval District. A marginal note on a copy of this letter, apparently written in
Hawaii, stated, "In other words, look to the Fleet. They seem to forget that the
Fleet has offensive work to do."
On 25 November 1941 (Exhibit 16, Naval Court), Admiral Stark also wrote a
personal letter to Admiral Kimmel stating, among other things, that Admiral
Stark agreed with Admiral Kimmel that, for example, to cruise in Japanese
home waters, Admiral Kimmel should have a substantial increase in the strength
of his fleet, but pointed out that neither ABC-1 nor Rainbow-5 contemplated this
as a general policy ; after the British strengthened Singapore, and under certain
auspicious occasions, opportunity for raids in Japanese waters might present
themselves, but this would be the exception rather than the rule. A postscript to
this letter stated that both Mr. Hull and the President confirmed the gravity of the
situation indicated by the message which Admiral Stark sent a day or two before.
It stated further that neither the President nor Mr. Hull would be surprised over
a Japanese surprise attack ; that from many angles an attack on the Philippines
would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us ; and there were
some who thought it likely to occur. Admiral Stark further stated : "I do not
give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among
some people. You know I have generally held that it was not the time for the
Japanese to proceed against Russia. . I still do. Also I still rather look for an
advance into Thailand. Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely * * *
I won't go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I will be
damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do
most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may
do nothing — I think it is more likely to be anything."
(8) Dispatches concei'ning reenforcement of Wake and Midway.
On 26 November 1941, a dispatch (Exhibit 40, Naval Court) was sent by the
Chief of Naval Operations to CincPac stating that the Array had offered to make
available some units of infantry for reenforcing defense battalions now on sta-
tion, if Admiral Kimmel considered that desirable ; also, that the Army proposed
to prepare, in Hawaii, garrison troops for advances bases which Admiral Kimmel
might occupy, but was unable to provide any antiaircraft units. Admiral Kimmel
was instructed to take this into consideration and [69] advise when prac
ticable the number of troops desired and recommended armament.
Also on 26 November 1941, another dispatch (Exhibit 18) was sent to CincPac
which stated that in order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing
available for expeditionary use. OpNav had requested the Army, and the Army
had agreed, to station twenty-five Army pursuits at Midway and a similar number
at Wake, provided CincPac considered this feasible and desirable; that it would
be necessary for CincPac to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu
to these stations on aircraft carriers, and that the planes would be flown off at
destination ; that ground personnel would be landed in boats and essential spare
parts, tools and ammunition would be taken in the carrier or on later trips of
regular Navy supply vessels ; that the Army understood that these forces must
be quartered in tents; that the Navy must be responsible for supplying water
and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies; that the stationing of
these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army
bombers to the Philippines; and, that additional parking areas should be laid
promptly if necessary. A question was raised as to whether or not Navy bombs
at outlying positions could be carriedby Army bombers which might fly to those
positions in order to support Navy operations. CincPac was directed to confer
with the Commanding General and advi.se as soon as practicable.
(9) Iniertepted Japanese communications of November 26th and 27th.
On November 26th and 27th, there were available in Washington additional
intercepted Japanese messages, all of which had been sent from Tokyo, as follows :
2300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(a) A Navy translation on 27 November 1941 (Document 14, Exhibit 63, Naval
Court) of a message to Nanking, dated 15 November 1941, in the so-called "Purple"'
code, addressed to "Naval authorities" which stated :
"We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached
an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer?) for
a while."
(b) A Navy translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 13, Exhibit 63, Naval
Court) of a message to Washington, dated 19 November 1941, stating that:
"When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the
•following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:
"(1) if it is Japan-U. S. relations, 'HIGASHI',
"(2) Japan-Russia relations, 'KITA',
"(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.), 'Nishi'.
[70] "The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and
end. Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco."
(c) An Anny translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 9, p]xhibit 68, Naval
Court), of a message to Manila, dated 20 November 1941, in the "purple" code,
marked "Strictly Secret" and stating :
"Please advise immediately the results of your investigations as to the type
of draft — presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay." (Near
Manila, P. I.)
"Furthermore, please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as well as
to Tokyo."
(d) An Army translation on 26 November 1941 (Document 12, Exhibit 63,
Naval Court) of a message to Washington, dated 26 November 1941, in the
"purple" code, which stated :
"To be handled in Government Code.
"The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too
long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations
to the minimum and, on occa.sion, cjiU up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American
Bureau on the telephone and make your request to him. At that time we will
use the following code:" (Codes were then set fiu-th.)
(10) The Stute Department note of November 26th and Japanese reaction
thereto; the irar irarning of November 27th.
The diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese representatives, Nomura and
Kurusu, came to a head on 26 November 1941. At that time, the State Depart-
ment presented a proposal to the Japanese and that Department reported to the
Navy Department,, among others, that it had no further hopes of composing
matters with the Japanese. The Japanese reaction to this proposal api>ears
from dispatches which were subsequently decrypted and translated. They are
as follows :
(a) An Army translation (Document 17, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a mes-
sage from Washington (Nomura) to Tokyo, dated 26 November IJMl, in the
"purple" code and marked "Extremely urgent," which stated:
"At 4 : 4.^) on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with
Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.
"HULL said, 'For the last several days the American Government has been
getting the ideas of various quartei'S, as well as conferring carefully with the
nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on
[71] the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree
to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and
without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal
of June 21st and yours of September 25th.' So saying, he presented us with the
following two proposals :
"A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called 'four principles.'
"B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggressive treaty between Tokyo,
Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.
(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands,
China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of
economic treatment in French Indo-China.
"(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French
Indo-China.
"(4)Japan and the United States both definitelv promise to support no regime
in China but that of CHIANG-KAI-SHEK.
"(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.-
"(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the
United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2301
"(7) The mutual rescimliug of the Japanese and American freezing orders.
"(8) Stabilization of yeu-dollar exchange.
"(9) No matter wiiat sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has
contracted with third countries, tiiey both definitely promise that these treaties
will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the
maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supi)osed to emasculate
the Three-Power Pact.)
"In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said
we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued
back furiously, i)ut HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United
States have to propose such hard terms a.s theseV Well, England, the Nether-
lands, and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging
them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in
speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. More-
over, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us
complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two
hard proposals, or we think so."
[72] (b) An Army translation (Document 16, Exhibit 63, Naval Court) of a
message from Washington to Tokyo, dated 26 November 1041, in the "purple"
code and marked "Extremely urgent," message #1180, reading :
"From NOMURA and KURUSU.
"As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having
them consider our 'B" proiK)sal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situa-
tion remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will
inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our
failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving
the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that
President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that
Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in
the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will nego-
tiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you
in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere,
but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and
the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their
protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we
should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-
China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President
ROOSEVELT prop<ised the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)
"We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily
mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we
said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England
and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them
would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel
duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would.
Again, you must remember that the Sino- Japanese incident would have to wait
until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.
"In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have
to express, so will Your excellency please be good enough at least to show it
to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him ; then we hope that you will wire
back instantly."
(c) An army translation (Document 18, Exhibit (>3, Naval Court) of a message
from Tokyo to Washington, dated 28 November 1941, in the "purple" code,
reading:
[73] "Re your #1189.
"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of
this, the United States has gone ahead and pre.sented this humiliating proposal.
This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Govern-
ment can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a
report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal
which I will send .vou in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto
ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impre.s-
sion that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are
awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are
not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imi)erial Government
has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of
peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering
2302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been
unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since
things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180
and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely
unsuitable. From now on do the best you can." (Note: The man is the Navy
Minister. )
On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from CNO, which
has been termed the "war warning." It read :
"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an
aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The num-
ber and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces
indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines (printed in ink,
"Thai") or Kra Pennsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an approprate defen-
sive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 X
Inform District and Army authorities X A similar warning is being sent by
War Department X Spenavo inform British X Continental districts Guam
Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage"
(11) The dispatch of November 28th:
On November 28th, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a copy of a dispatch
to CincPac for information which was received on November 29th (Exhibit 19,
Naval Court), which repeated a dispatch which had been sent by the Army to
Commander, Western Defense Command, as follows :
[74] "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical pur-
poses with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come
back and offer to continue X Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile ac-
tion possible at any moment X If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the
United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act X This policy should
not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might
jeopardize your defense X Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed
to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary
but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil
population or disclose intent X Report measures taken X A separate message is
being sent to G-2 Ninth Corps area re subversive activities in the United States X
Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five
so far as they pertain to Japan X Limit dissemination of this highly secret in-
formation to minimum essential officers"
The Navy dispatch continued that WPL-52 was not applicable to the Pacific
area and would not be placed in effect in that area, except as then in force
in Southeast Pacific Sub Area, Panama Coastal Frontier. It stated further :
"Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act X
Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply to
Japan in case hostilities occur"
(12) Intercepted diplomatic commiMications. November 29 to December 6,
191,1.
On 30 November 1941, there was a Navy translation of a message from Tokyo
to the Japanese emissaries in Washington, dated 29 November 1941 (Document
19, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), requesting that they make one more attempt to dis-
cuss the situation with the United States, and to state that the United States
had always taken a fair position in the past ; that the Imperial Government could
not understand why the United States was taking the attitude that the new
Japanese proposals could not be the basis of discussion, but instead had made
new proposals which ignored actual conditions in East Asia and which would
greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government ; that the United States
should be asked what had become of the basic objectives that the United States
had made as the basis for negotiations for seven months ; and that the United
States should be asked to reflect on the matter. The emissaries were directed ia
carrying out this instruction to be careful that this did not lead to anything
like a breaking off of negotiations.
[75] Also on 30 November 1941, there was a Navy translation of a trans-
Pacific radio telephone conversation from Kurusu in Washington to Yamamoto
in Tokyo, in which a telephone code was used (Document 20, Exhibit 63, Naval
Court). This indicated that Kurusu expected a long message ("probably To-
kyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals'') ; that the President was returning appar-
ently because of the speech of the Japanese Premier which Kurusu said was hav-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2303
ing strong rei^ercussions here; that Kurusu said that unless the Premier and
others used greater caution in speeches, it would put the Japanese emissaries
here in a very difficult position ; that care should be exercise'd, that Yaraamoto
said that they were being careful ; that Kurusu wanted the Foreign Minister
told that the emissaries here had expected to hear something different — some
good word — but instead got this (the Premier's speech) ; that the Japanese-
American negotiations were to continue; that Yamamoto wanted them to be
stretched out ; that Kurusu needed Yamamoto's help to do this, and that both
the Premier and the Foreign Minister would need to change the tone of their
speeches and that all would have to use some discretion ; that Yamamoto said
the real problem that the Japanese were up against was the effect of happen-
ings in the South.
There were four significant Japanese communications intercepted on 1 De-
cember 1941, as follows :
(a) Navy translation — (Document 21, Exhibit 63, Naval CJourt)
From : Tokyo
To : Washington
1 December 1941
(Purple CA)
#865 Re my #857
"1. The date set in my message #812 has come and gone, and the situation
continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States
from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others
that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United
States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your infor-
mation.)
"2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador
to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124. Please make
the necessary representations at your end only.
"3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital
is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President
did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please
make investigations into this matter."
[76] Army translation — (Document 22, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
From : Tokyo
To : Berlin
November 30, 1941
Purple
#986 (Strictly Secret (To be handled in Government Code)
(Part 1 of 2) (Secret outside the Department)
"1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April this
year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that
period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance
as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the
international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between
Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely
within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United
States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying
through these negotiations.
"2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view
of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis,
has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views
and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotia-
tions rested (they demandetl the evacuation of Imperial troops from China
and French Indo-China), were completely in opjwsition to each other.
"Judging from the course of the neogtiations that have been going on, we
first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional
idealogical tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her
fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried
on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive
of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the
establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in
the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long
as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could
be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States
2304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a
tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-
partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say
that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has be-
come gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no
longer [77] continue negotiations with the United States. It l>ecame
clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental
to our cause."
(Part 2 of 2)
"3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude
of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that
no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not
be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely
the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-
Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war
at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Ger-
many and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others,
makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations.
What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred
with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China — they did so repeatedly.
Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those
nations and has decided to regard Japan, along ~\vith Germany and Italy, as
an enemy."
(c) On 1 December 1941, the Army translated an intercepted message from
Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, dated 30 November 1941 (Docu-
ment 6, Exhibit 13), which in substance statetl :
The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured. Say
very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that war
may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan, and that
the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anybody
dreams. We will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for the time being
would prefer to refrain from any direct moves on the north. . . . Impress on
the Germans and Italians how important .secrecy is.
(d) Army translation — (Document 23, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
From : Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 28, 1941
Purple
#1214 To be handled in Government Code.
"Re my #1190.
"So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United
States ; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and
headlines like [78] this are appearing in the papers: 'Hull Hands Peace
Plan to Japanese', and 'America Scorns a Second Munich.' The papers say
that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four
principles, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon
Japan.
"This we must carefully note."
On 3 December 1941, there was available the Army translation of a report by
Kurusu and Nomura to Tokyo, dated 2 December 1941 (Document 25, Exhibit
63, Naval Court), which stated:
"Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-
Secretary of State WELLES. At that time,^ prefacing his statement by saying
that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he
turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233. Thereupon we
said : 'Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning
the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representa-
tions directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never con-
sidered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals
of November 20th.' The Under-Secretary then said : 'I want to to know that
the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all
parts of the world.' Thereupon we replied : 'The United States and other coun-
tries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japa-
nese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2305
forceful aggression.) We haven't tht> time to argue the pros and eons of this
question or the rights or wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic
pressure, and 1 want you to know that we have hut the choice between sub-
mission to this pressure or breaking the cliains that it invokes. We want you
to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves
as the result of the four-year incident in China ; the President recently expressed
cognizance of the latter situation. Furthermore, I would have you know that
in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving
the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do
with our national destiny.' Under-Secretary WELLES said : 'I am well aware
of that.' I continued : 'We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan
is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new- American pro-
posals as they now stand. Our proposals proferred on the 21st of June and the
proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on
the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of
both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to
give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for
a smooth and speedy settlensent of the negotiations. Recently, we promised
to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in [79] the event of a
settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace
in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the
question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve.' The
Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said : 'The American pro-
posals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position
of the United States because of the internal situation here.' Then he continued :
'In regard to the opinion that you have expressed, I will make it a point
immediately to confer with the Secretary.' I got the impression from the
manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American
proposals of the 26th would leave this much room. Judging by my interview
with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is
clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current
difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about ai speedy
settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations
our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire it 1233."
There were various intercepted Japanese communications of interest available
on 4 December 1^1, as follows :
(a) Navy translation — (Document 26, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
From: Toyko
To: Hsinking
1 December 1941
(Purple)
#893
"• * * In the event that Manchuria participates in the war * * * in
view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in
the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and
America that this country will take in case war breaks out.
"A summary follows:
"1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as
having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code tele-
grams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However it is desired
that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable
to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in
Japan.
[80] "2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property,
private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that
accorded by Japan.
"3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular
offices and interests will not be recognized.
"However, the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equita-
ble and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.
"4. Tlie treatment accorde<l Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to
the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exer-
cised not to antagonize Russia."
(b) Navy translation — (Document 27, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
2306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From : Washington
To: Tokyo
1 December 1941
(Purple)
#1227
(This raised the question of a possibility of a conference between persons in
whom the leaders have confidence to have the' make one final effort to reach some
agreement. The meeting to be held at some midway point, such as Hono-
lulu * * * It was said that this last effort might facilitate the final decision
as to war or peace.)
(c) Navy translation — (Document 29, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
From : Tokyo
To : Washington
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#875 Chief of Office routing.
"Re your #1232
"Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:
"There seem to be rumors to the effect that t)ur military garrisons in French
Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been an
unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-
French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have [81] increased our
forces in parts of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some
movement of troops in the southern part a.s a result of this. We presume that the
source of the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing
so, we have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French
joint defense agreement."
(d) Navy translation — (Document 31, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
From : Washington
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#1243
"If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is expected that
the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should
be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the consuls."
On 5 December 1941, there were available translations of additional inter-
cepted Japanese communications dealing with the diplomatic negotiations, as
follows :
(a) Army translation — (Document 33, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
From : Washington
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#1243
"Judging from all ipdications, we feel that some joint military action between
Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a
definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand."
(b) Navy translation — (Document 34, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
Prom : Washington
To : Tokyo
1 December 1941
(Purple)
#1225
(This is a report of conversations held by Japanese representatives with Secre-
tary Hull on December 1st, which referred to the Japanese Premier's speech,
the President's return, Japanese troop movements, and apparent agreement as
to the impossibility of reaching an agreement.)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2307
[82] (13) Intercepted Japanese espionage messages between 29 November
and 6 December WJ^l.
During this period there were available to the Navy and to the Army in Wash-
ington translations of intercepted Japanese espionage reports concerning Manila,
San Francisco and Honolulu. From these it appeared that the Japanese were
interested in the movements of ships to and from those ports. The messages
relating to Honolulu were as follows :
(a) On December 3rd, the Navy Department translated a communication
from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 15 November 1941 (Document 24, Exhibit 63,
Naval Court), which stated that since relations between Japan and the United
States were most critical, the "Ships in the harbor report" should be made irregu-
larly but at the rate of twice a week and that extra care should be taken to
maintain secrecy.
(b) On December 5th, there was available at the War Department a transla-
tion of a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 18 November 1941, i-equesting
reports on vessels in certain areas of Pearl Harbor, and directing that the investi-
gation be made with great secrecy (Document 37, Exhibit 63, Naval Court).
(c) Also available on December 5th at the Navy Department was a translation
of a message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 29 November 1941, stating that re-
ports had been received on ship movements, but in the future Honolulu was also
to report even when there were no movements (Document 36, Exhibit 63, Naval
Court) .
(d) On December 6th, there was available at the War Department a transla-
tion of a message from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 18 November 1941, ( Document
40, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), reporting on ships anchored in Pearl Harbor and
in certain areas of the harbor, and pointing out that the Saratoga was not in
harbor and that the Enterprise or some other vessel was in a particular area.
This message also reported on the course of certain destroyers which had been
observed entering the harbor.
(14) Intercepted message advising of fourteen-part reply by Japanese and
first thirteen parts of reply — 6 December 19Jfl.
On 6 December 1941, the Army translated an intercepted Japanese communica-
tion (Document 38, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), from Tokyo to Washington, which
read :
"1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the
26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the
United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).
[83] "2. This separate message is a very long one. I will .send it in four-
teen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure.
The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please
to keep it secret for the time being.
"3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States,
I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime
to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the
Americans just as soon as you receive instinictions."
Also on 6 December 1941, the Navy translated the first thirteen parts of the
Japanese reply (Document 39, Exhibit 63, Naval Court), which had been sent
from Tokyo to Washington in the Japanese diplomatic code. It may be noted
that the translations of parts 8 and 9 of the reply which were originally indi-
cated as Navy translations were corrected so as to indicate that they were trans-
lated by the Army. These 13 parts which are not set forth here, but particularly
part 13, disclosed that the Japanese were of the view that the American proposal,
viewed in its entirety, could not be accepted by the Japanese as a basis of negotia-
tions.
The message concerning delivery of the Japanese reply, and the first thirteen
parts of that reply, were received in the Navy Department by 3 p. m. on 6
December 1941. After decryption and translation by about 9 p. m. on December
6th, they were distributed by Lt. Comdr. Kramer to the White House and to the
Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary of War and Secretary of State apparently
also received copies and a meeting was called of the three Secretaries for ten
o'clock on the following morning.
(15) Communications intercepted on 7 December lO^l.
The Japanese communications which were translated and available on the
morning of 7 December 1941 included the following :
(a) From: Washington (NomuraJ
2308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
To: Tokyo
December 3, 1941
Purple (Urgent)
#1256. Re your #875
"I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply was
a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States Gov-
ernment is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially since
the President i.ssued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among the
journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be war
or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what
the United States Government will take a bold step depending [H^] upon
how our reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive
at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy
them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to — even if your reply is
made for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in view
of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President
on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression
of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this question with
this in mind and wire me at once."
(b) From: Washington
To: Tokyo
December G, 1941
Purple (Urgent)
#1272
"In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and
HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having
close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential
(because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this
point strictly secret). Up until this mcmient we have the following to report:
"(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised
him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the 'introducing' at
once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known
what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President
is his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with
LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advice
of these individuals.
"(2) Those carrying on IMan "B" Included all of our proposal of November
20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections in the
United States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advan-
tageous to us (MESSAGE INCOMPLETE) "
(c) From: Budapest
To: Tokyo
December 7, 1941
LA
#104 Re my #103
''On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country
a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break
out on the 7th.
"Relayed to Berlin."
[85] (d) Navy translation— (Document 39, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
From : Tokyo
To : Washington •
7 December 1941
(Purple-Eng)
#902 Part 14 or 14
(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part,
appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")
"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with
Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establish-
ment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially
to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China
at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present
negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust
Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the
Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2309
"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American
Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot
but consider that it is imiJossible to reach an agreement through further
negotiations."
(e) Army translation — (Document 41, Exhibit 63, Naval Court)
From : Tokyo
To : Washington.
December 7, IWl
Purple (Urgent-^ Very Important)
#907 To be handled in government code.
Re my #902.
"Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government ( if possi-
ble to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1 : 00 p. m. on the
7th, your time."
(16) Delivery of Part 14 and the 1 p. m. message and action taken.
The evidence indicates that Part 14 of the Japanese reply, which required
decoding but not translation, was received between 030."> and 0700 on 7 December
1941. and that it and the first 13 parts were distributed [86] by Lt. Comdr.
Kramer to Admiral Stark's office between 0900' and 0930, and then to the White
House and to the State Department. The "1 p. m. delivery message" was not
distributed at this time. Ki-amer testified that he returned to the Navy Depart-
ment at about 10 : 20 and found that message and certain other messages, such
as a message which directed the destruction of Japanese codes, still on hand and
another which thanked the Ambassador for his services. This material, Kramer
testified, was delivered to Admiral Stark at about 10: 30, and then to the White
House and to the State Department.
The evidence indicates that the "1 p. m. message" was decrypted and was avail-
able in Japanese in the Navy Department prior to 0700 on 7 December 1941, and
that because there was no Japanese translator on duty it was sent to the Army
for translation at about 0700. It is not clear when the Army returned the
translation of that message. Kramer stated that it was not in the Navy Depart-
ment when he left to distribute the fourteen-part reply between 0900 and 0930
that morning, but that he found it upon his return to the Navy Department at
about 10: 20. It would appear, therefore, that the Army returned its translation
of the "1 p. m. message" some time between 0900 and 1020 on 7 December 1941.
It further apiiears that several hours' advance notice of the contents of that
message may have been lost because there was no Japanese translator on duty
at the Navy Department on that Sunday morning, and because it was necessary
to wait for an Army translation.
Prior investigations developed the fact that, after consultation with Admiral
Stark that morning. General Marshall sent a message to various Army commands,
including the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. The message read:
"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what
amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine
immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not
know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this com^
munication."
The prior investigations also developed the fact that the Army radio was
unable to raise Hawaii that morning and accordingly sent that message by com-
mercial cable in code. The message, according to General Short's prior testi-
mony, was received by the Signal Ofl3cer at Hawaii at 1145, and decoded some four
hours after the attack.
Whether or not the Army message would have reached the Commanding Gen-
eral. Hawaiian Department, prior to the attack if a Navy translator had been
on duty on the morning of 7 December 1941, or if the Army had immediately trans-
lated and returned the "1 p. m. mesage," is speculative. It is, moreover, also
speculative as to what action might have been taken by General Short or Admiral
Kimmel had they received that Army message prior to the attack.
[87] (17) Messages sent to Admiral Kimmel between 29 November and
7 December 1941.
The messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel dur-
ing this period dealt primarily with the destruction of codes by the Japanese
and with the advisability of destruction of United States codes at Guam. The
messages are discussed subsequently in this report.
2310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(18) Admiral KimmeVs failure to transmit information to subordimite
commanders.
It appears from the testimony secured by Admiral Hart in his investigation
that Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor on 5 December 1941 with a piowerful
force consisting of the Lexington, Chicago, Portland, and five destroyers, to
deliver a squadron of planes to Midway. He testified that on that mission he
gave no special orders regarding the arming of planes or regarding preparation
for war, other than the ordinary routine. He said that he never saw, nor was
he ever informed of the contents of the October 16th dispatch, concerning the
resignation of the Japanese cabinet, of the November 24th dispatch advising
of the possibility of a surprise aggressive movement by the Japanese in any
direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, or the November 27th
war warning. He said that except for what he read in the newspapers, he did
not learn anything during the period November 26th to December 5th which
indicated the increased danger of hostilities with Japan.
Admiral Bellinger, who was consmander of Task Force Nine, consisting of the
patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet, testified in this investigation that he never
saw nor did he learn the contents of the October 16th, November 24th, or Novem-
ber 27th dispatches from the Chief of Naval Operations.
[88^ C. The Interception of Japanese Telephone and Cable Messages.
It appears that in Washington, D. C, the Navy was receiving information
obtained from intercepted Japanese telephone and cable messages. For example,
on 30 November 1941, the Navy decrypted and translated a trans-Pacific radio
telephone conversation in code between Kurusu in Washington and Yamamoto
in Tokyo (Document 20, Exhibit 63, Naval Court). And, on 10 October 1941,
the Navy decrypted and translated a cable message from Honolulu to Wash-
ington, in which a code was established for reporting the location of vessels in
Pearl Harbor, which message had been photographed in the cable office in
Washington and thus obtained by the Navy (Document 3, Exhibit 13).
For many months prior to the attack, the Office of Naval Intelligence at Hono-
lulu had been tapping the telephone wires of the Japanese Consul and of the
Japanese Vice Consul. For a period of time also the home telephones of these
officials had been tapped. The taps on the lines of the Consulate were removed
on 2 December 1941 by direction of Captain Mayfield, who was then the District
Intelligence Officer. The evidence indicates that he took this action because
he was fearful that the existence of such telephone taps would be discovered
by the Japanese Consul. His fear arose from the fact that an FBI tap on the
lines of a Japanese official of the NYK Line had been detected by a telephone
company employee who had advised the District Intelligence Office of this. A
representative of the District Intelligence Office subsequently had informed the
local FBI office. It was learned tha.t the FBI office had complained to the tele-
phone company concerning the disclosure of its tap. In light of this situation,
Captain Mayfield directed that the Navy taps be removed.
It appears that no important military infornsation was intercepted by means
of the Navy Intelligence taps on the lines of the Japanese Consulate General.
Exhibits 38A and 38B of this investigation consist of photostatic copies of the
notes made of the telephone conversations over the Japanese Consul General's
line and the Japanese Vice Consul's line during the period 1 October 19il to 2
December 1941.
Subsequent to 2 December 1941, the Federal Bureau of Investigation appar-
ently continued its telephone taps and in this fashion on or about 5 December
1941 learned the contents of a telephone conversation between a man named
Mori in Hawaii and a person in Japan. The fact of this conversation was
brought to the attention of the District Intelligence Officer, and on 6 December
1941, a transcript of the conversation was furnished to him and arrangements
were made for a representative of the District Intelligence Office to listen to the
recording of the telephone conversation ; this, however, was not done until after
the attack. A transcript of the telephone conversation, with marginal notes
made by the District Intelligence representative after the attack, in Exhibit 39
of this investigation. It may be noted that it appears from prior investigations
that this conversation was brought to the attention of General Short [8P]
on the evening of 6 December 1941, and apparently nothing could be made out of
it and no action was taken concerning it. There is no evidence indicating that
this telephone conversation was brought to Admiral Kimmel's attention prior to
In the conversation, there was mention of the flights of airplanes daily, the
number of sailors preseat, the attitude of local Japanese, the local construction
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2311
projects, the size of the local population, the precautionary measures taken at
night time, the use of searchlights at night, the emphasis in Honolulu newspapers
on the southern advance of Japan into French Indo-China, the visit of Kurusu,
the local climate, the visit of LitvinofE, the Russian Ambassador, the recent
return of a Japanese from Honolulu to Japan, and the number of Japanese in
the United States Army. The person in Japan inquired for information about
the United States Fleet. Mori stated that he knew nothing about the Fleet, and
that since they tried to avoid talking about such matters they did not kniow
much about the Fleet. He said he didn't know whether all of the Fleet had
gone, but that the Fleet present seemed small, and it seemed that the Fleet had
left. The person in Japan then inquired whether that was so and what kind of
flowers were in bloom in Hawaii. Mori stated that the flowers in bloom' were
the fewest out of the whole year, however that the hibiscus and the poiusettia
were in bloom. He later stated that the Japanese chrysanthemums were in full
bloom.
There is some reason to believe that the statements concerning flowers in the
Mori telephone conversation were the use of code words indicating the absence
or presence of ships in Pearl Harbor. In this connection, the Operation Order
for the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 3) provided
for the use of a radio broadcast code in which the statement "The cherry blos-
soms are in all their glory" would signify that there were "No warships in Pearl
Harbor." This lends support to the theory advanced by representatives of the
District Intelligence Office in their testimony to the effect that the primary
purpose of the Mori telephone conversation over the trans-Pacific radio was to
provide information to Japanese Fleet units which would be listening in on that
frequency.
The espionage reports submitted by the Japanese Consul at Honolulu have
been previously discussed. It will be recalled that in those coded messages
considerable information was given of the movement of ships and location of
ships in Pearl Harbor and of defense preparations at Oahu. Certain messages
sent during the first week of December, 1941, indicated the likelihood of an
attack by air on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu
transmitted its messages via commercial companies using the various communi-
cations companies alternately. During the month of November, the McKay
Radio Company handled the messages primarily, and during the month of
December, 1941, RCA was transmitting the messages.
[90] Prior to December, 1941, efforts had been made by the District Intel-
ligence Officer to get access to the files of the communications companies and
thus to secure copies of the Japanese Consul General's messages. These efforts
were without success, in view of the legal prohibitions against the disclosure of
such messages. During a visit by Mr. Sarnoff, President of RCA, the District
Intelligence Officer requested him to cooperate with the Navy by making such
messages available, and pointed out the importance to the country of giving the
Navy access to such messages.
On 5 December 1941, RCA Communications, at Honolulu, turned over to
Captain Mayfield, the District Intelligence Ofllcer, copies of some messages which
had been sent by the Japanese Consul via RCA on the third and fourth of Decem-
ber. These messages, with the exception of a few unimportant plain language
messages, were in code. Captain Mayfield turned them over to the FOUR-
TEENTH Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit, headed by Lieutenant
Commander Rochefort, for decryption and translation. That organization Had
not been working on Japanese diplomatic trafl5c Efforts were immediately
made to decrypt and to translate those messages. The messages so received
by Captain Mayflejd and turned over to the FOURTEENTH Naval District
Communication Intelligence for decryption and translation were not identified
in any record made at the time. Lieutenant Woodward, who did the decryption
of them, has identified, to the best of his recollection, the messages received on
December 5th as those set forth in Exhibit 56 and at pages 7-11 of Exhibit SOA
of this investigation.
Various Japanese codes were used in the messages, including the "LA" code,
which was the simplest and evidently the least important. The messages in
that code, and the plain language messages, were decoded and read prior to the
attack. The "LA" code messages so read are pages 1-5 of Exhibit 56. They
contained no important military information. One, for example, reported the
departure of a transport and another related to the cost of sending families
home to Japan.
2312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The testimony of Lieutenant Woodward, who decrypted the messages, of
Colonel Lasswell and Captain Finnegan, who translated various of the messages,
of Captain Rochefort, who was in charge of the unit, and of Admiral Mayfield,
who was District Intelligence OflBcer, indicate that no information of military
importance was obtained prior to the attack from any of the Japanese Consul-
ate's messages. It has been testified that various of the other messages received
on 5 December 1941 were in a Japanese code known as the "PA" or "PA-K2"
system and that efforts to decrypt these were not successful until after the
attack. The messages, as identified by Lieutenant Woodward, will be found
at pages 6-23 of Exhibit 56 (supplied by the Radio Intelligence Unit) and at
pages 7-12 of Exhibit 56A (supplied by the District Intelligence Office). They
were as follows :
(1) December 3rd to Tokyo — Advising that a freighter in military service
departed on the second and that a named ship arrived on the third (p. 10,
Exhibit 56A).
(2) December 3rd to Tokyo — Advising that the WYOMING and two seaplane
tenders left port. The balance of the message was not recovered (p. 8,
Exhibit 56A).
[.9/] (3) December 3rd to Tokyo — In connection with the handling of ex-
penses for steamer passage to Japan.
(4) December Srd to Tokyo — Advising of a change in method of communi-
cating by signals, .so that each of the numbers one to eight had a certain meaning
as to departures and dates of departure of ships, wliich niuul)ers were to be
communicated by lights in beach house-s, by the use of a sailboat, by certain want
ads to be broadcast over a local radio station, and by bonfires at certain points
if the previous signals could not be made ( p. 12, Exhibit ~)6).
(5) December 3rd to Tokyo and elsewhere — Regarding money taken in for sale
of tickets (p. 16, Exhibit 56).
(6) December 3rd to Tokyo — Advising that the WYOMING and two seaplane
tenders departed the third (p. 22, Exhibit 56) .
(7) December 3rd to Tokyo and San Francisco — Advising that a transport had
sailed for the Mainland and that a ship had arrived from San Francisco (p. 20,
Exhibit 56).
A photostatic copy of the December, 1941, bill of RCA Communications at
Honolulu, covering the Japanese Con.sul General's messages in November and
December, 1941, was received from the District Intelligence Office at Honolulu
(Exhibit 55). This indicates that there were four radiograms sent on November
2nd, two on November 13th, four on December 1st, and two on December 2nd.
The testimony concerning these is to the effect that they were not received or
read prior to the attack, that they were received later and were thought to be
in more complex codes, probably machine codes, as there were no indicators by
which they could be identified.
It further appears from Exhibit 55 that there were various other radiograms
charged to the Japanese Consul General for December 4th and 5th, and three for
December 6th. The testimony concerning these indicates that none was obtained
prior to the attack.
The two messages listed on the RCA bill for December 4th, according to
Lieutenant Woodward, were among a group of messages received on the night
of December 7th (p. 4-5, Exhibit 56A). It was later learned that one advised
Tokyo that an English gunboat arrived on the third and departed and that the
sailors had come ashore and had received mail at the British Consulate ; the other
advised that a light cruiser had departed hastily on the fourth (Exhibit 57).
The five radiograms listed on the RCA bill for December 5th were received
after the attack and were actually two messages to Tokyo, the second having been
sent also to San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington, D. C. The first message
reported the arrival on the morning of the 5th of three battleships, which had
been at sea for eight days, also that the LEXINGTON and five cruisers had left
the same day, and that eight battleships, three cruisers, and sixteen destroyers
were in port. The second message has not been translated. It relates to funds
of the Consulate peneral (Exhibit 57).
[92] The three radiograms charged for December 6th were actually two
messages in the "PA-K2" code (Exhibit 57). The first, which was translated
after the attack, was sent to Tokyo and to Washington at 6 : 01 p. m. on 6
December 1841. It set forth the ships observed at anchor on the sixth and stated :
"* * * 9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers,
and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the
heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2313
"2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air
arm."
The other message of December fith, which was filed at 12 : i)8 p. m. that day,
was, after decryption, translated by Joseph Fiiuiegaii, now a Captain, IT. S. N.,
who reported for duty in the radid intelligence unit on the 9th or 10th of Decem-
ber, 1941. He translated that message (Exhibit ~>1) as follows :
"From : KITA
"To : F. M. TOKYO 6 Dec. 41.
"Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123
"1. The avmy ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camj) Davis
NC on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicai)ility
of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the
vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any prepara-
tion for constructing moorings. No evidence of training or personnel prepara-
tions were seen. It is concluded that their installation would i)e ditlicult. Even
if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby
Hickam Field, Ewa Field and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have
been dropped.
"2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the nonuse of nets for torpedo
defense of battleships and will report further."
Captain Fiiniegan admitted in his testimony that the last sentence of the first
paragraph of his translation was an incorrect translation. As appears from
an Army translation of that message (Exhibit 57), that sentence, correctly
translated, was as follows :
"I imagine that in all pi'obability there is considerable opportunity left to take
advantage for a surprise attack against these places."
As previously noted, among the messages turned over to the District Intelli-
gence Officer and to ConiFOURTEEN* Communication Intelligence Unit for de-
cryption and translation on r> December 1941, was the [93] message fron\
Honolulu to Tokyo dated 3 December 1941, which established a system of signals
to be used from Oahu by means of lights at beach houses, the use of a sailboat,
by want ads on a radio station, and bonfires. This message was in the possession
of the Radio Communications Intelligence Unit from "> December to 10 December
1941, at which time it wsa successfully decrypted and translated. The Japanese
Consul General's signal message of December 3rd was not only in the possession
of the Navy at Pearl Harbor prior to the attack, but was also in the possession
of the Navy Department at Washington prior to the attack. A copy of that
message as contained in the Op-20-G files at the Navy Department, indicates that
it was translated on 11 December 1941, and that it had been intercepted by an
Army radio intercept station at Fort Hunt, Va. (Document 22, Exhibit 13). In
fact, however, that message was decrypted and translated in rough form prior to
1 p. m., 6 December 1941, by Mrs. Edgers, a translator assigned to the Op-2()-G
Unit, Navy Department. She testified that she believed that it was shown that
afternoon to Kramer and that he examined it in rough form. Kramer did not
recall this but did recall going over the message thoroughly on December 8th.
Evidently further work on this message was deferred on December 6th because
of the pressure of work on the thirteen parts of the Japanese fourteen-part reply
which were being decrypted that afternoon and evening.
It should be noted that a message from Tokyo to Honolulu dated 2 December
1941, was intercepted by the Army radio intercept unit at Fort Shafter, Hawaii
(Document 24, Exhibit 13). This message stated that in view of the present
situation the presence of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers was of utmost
importance, that there should be daily reports, that there should be reports
whether or not there were observation balloons above Pearl Harbor, or an indi-
cation that they would be set up, and whether or not the warships were
provided with anti-nnne nets. The message apparently was forwarded from
Fort Shafter by mail to the Army. The Army translation of the message bears
a note that the message was received on December 23rd and translated on 30
December 1941, by the Army. It has been testified by Brigadier General Powell,
Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, that no decryption was done at Fort
Shafter, but that all intercepted traffic was forwarded to Washington for decryp-
tion and translation.
Finally, it appears that the two highly significant messages sent by the Japanese
Consul General during the afternoon of December 6th were both intercepted by the
Army intercept station at San Francisco and forwarded to the Army in Washing-
ton by teletype (Docs. 14, 15, Exhibit 13). Both of these were in the Japanese
7971(5 ()— 46— pt. 16 26
2314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
code known as the "PA-K2" code and are indicated to have been translated by
the Army on Monday, December 8, 1941. According to Captain Safford, the
longer message, stating that there was "considerable opportunity left to take
advantage for a surprise attack" against Pearl Harbor, and that the battleships
did not have torpedo nets, could have been decrypted in about an hour and a
half; and the shorter message, which stated in part that no air reconnaissance
was being conducted by the Fleet air arm, could have been decrypted in less than
an hour.
[94] D. The "Winds Code" and the Alleged "Winds Message."
In the latter half of November, 1941, the Japanese Government by messages
to Washington and elsewhere established two codes to be used for communication
between Tokyo and elsewhere. The first has been referred to as the "winds code."
In that code certain Japanese words were to be added in the middle and at the
end of the daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcasts and could also
be used ili Morse code messages, which words would apparently be weather
reports. Thus, the Japanese words "HIGASHI NO KAZEAME" which meant
"East wind rain," would actually mean that Japan-United States relations were
in danger. Words were also supplied for Japan-Russian relations and for Japan-
British relations. The existence of this code was brought to the attention of the
Navy Department late in November through the interception and decryption
of Japanese messages establishing the code, and also through information to
the same effect received from other sources such as the United States Naval At-
tache at Batavia. It appeared that the use of the code words would indicate a
breaking off of diplomatic relations or possibly war between the countries
designated.
The Japanese also established, late in November, 1941, a code system which
has been referred to as the "hidden word code." This code was not discussed in
previous investigations. The establishment of the code was first learned through
the interception and decryption in Washington, D. C. of several Japanese diplo-
matic commimications which had been sent from Tokyo on and after 2 December
1941 (Documents 6, 8, 12, 17 and 20, Exhibit 13). This code was intended to be
used, when telegraphic communications might be severed, as a means of inform-
ing Japanese diplomats of the situation concerning the country in which they
were located. Thus the word "KODAMA" meant Japan, the word "KOYANATI"
meant England, the word "MINAMI" meant United States, and the word "HAT-
TORI" meant that relations between Japan and another country, to be identified
by a code word, were not in accordance with expectations. It may be noted that
the meaning of the last word, as set forth in the Navy translation of the "hidden
word code," differs from the meaning which the War Department cryptanalyst
testified should have been given to the word. According to his testimony, the
word should have been translated as meaning that relations were on the verge of
crisis or that hostilities might commence.
Prior investigations conducted by the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the
Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry resulted in findings that prior to 7 December
1941 there had been a "winds code message" by the Japanese in which the code
words relating to the United States were used, and that this message had been
intercepted by the Navy Department prior to the attack and communicated to the
Army, but that no copy of it could be found in the Army or Navy files. It appears
that these findings were based primarily on the testimony of Captain Safford and
of Captain Kramer of the Navy Department.
It should be noted that a Japanese message using the "winds code" words
relating to the United States, if received on 3 or 4 December, or at any other
time prior to 7 December 1941, would have conveyed no information of im-
portance which the Navy and War Departments did not already possess. Such
a message would have indicated either a break in diplomatic relations or possibly
war with the United States. That both the Navy Department and the War
Department, and Admiral Kimmel as well, were already aware that a break
in diplomatic relations or war with the United States was imminent, is clearly
established by the [95] November 27th "war warning" to Admiral Kimmel,
and by the repetition on November 28th by the Navy of the Army's warning
dispatch to General Short.
In view, however, of the findings by the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Army
Pearl Harbor Board that a "winds n\essage" relating to the United States was
received about 3 December 1941, and that no copy of it could be found, further
investigation on this point was deemed necessary.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2315
(1) Prior investigatio'nx.
(a) The Naval Court of Inquiry:
In the "Addendum" to its findings, tiie Naval Pearl Harbor^ Court of Inquiry
stated concerning the "Winds Code" as follows :
"From 26 November to 7 December, 1£;41, there was much diplomatic dispatch
traffic intercepted between Tokyo and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington
which had a bearing on the critical situation existing and which was not trans-
mitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. A message dated 19 November, 1941,
Tokyo to Washington, translated on 28 November 1941, and referred to as 'The
Winds Code' was as follows :
" 'Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergejncy.
"'In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and
the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be
added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.
"(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO
KAZEAME*
'"(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KOTANOKAZE KUMORI.**
"'(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.***
" 'This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast
and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy
all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.
" 'Forward as urgent intelligence.'
[96] "The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, on 28 November, 1941, sent
to the Chief of Naval Operations, information to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet ; Commandant 16th Naval District ; and Commandant 14th Naval District,
substantially the same information as outlined above. On 5 December, 1941,
the United States Naval Attache, Batavia, sent to the Chief of Naval Operations
substantially the same information. These messages stated that at some future
date information, would be sent by Japan indicating a breaking off of diplomatic
relations or possibly war between countries designated.
"All oflScers of the Communication and Intelligence Divisions in the Navy
Deipartment, considering the expected information most important, were on the
lookout for this notification of Japanese intentions. On 4 December an inter-
cepted Japanese broadcast employing this code was received in the Navy Depart-
ment. Although this notification was subject to two interpretations, either a
breaking off of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United Stateis, or
war, this information was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, or to other Commanders afloat.
"It was known in the Navy Department that the Commanders-in-Chief, Pacific
and Asiatic Fleets, were monitoring Japanese broadcasts for this code, and
apparently there was a mistaken impression in the Navy Department that the
e\xecute message had al.so been Intercepted at Pearl Harbor, when in truth this
message was never intercepted at Pearl Harbor. No attempt was made by the
Navy Department to a.scertain whether this information had been obtained by
the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and by other Commanders afloat.
"Admiral Stark stated that he knew nothing about it, although Admiral Turner
stated that he himself was familiar with it and. presumed that Admiral Kimmel
had it. This message cannot now be located in the Navy Department."
(b) The Army Pearl Harhor Board:
The "Top Secret" and separate portion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board's re-
port referred to the "Winds Message." The report stated that a winds execute
mes.sage reading "War with the United States, war with Britain, including the
Netherlands East Indies, except peace with Russia" had been received in the
Navy Department on 3 December 1941 ; that the Navy admitted that that mes-
sage was received prior to December 6th ; that the War Departnvent files con-
tained no copy of the message. The report referred in this connection to testi-
mony by Captain Safford, who stated that such a message had been received
by Commander Kramer, who had been [97] notified by Brotherhood of
its receipt, and that it had been seen by Safford at 8 :00 a. m. on December 4th.
Safford stated that no copy of the message could be found in the Navy Department
files.
The Army report further stated that on December 5th, Admiral Noyes called
Colonel Sadtler, at 9 : 30 a. m., saying : "Sadtler, the message is in." Apparently
based on Sadtler's testimony, the report also stated that Sadtler did not know
•East wind rain.
••North wind cloudy.
•••West wind clear.
2316 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
whetber this meant war with the United States, but believed it meant war wit!
either the United States, Russia or (ireat Britain ; that he discussed it with hi»
superiors and was instructed to confer with Admiral Noyes; and that he tele-
phoned Admiral Noyes, who said that he was too busy and would have to confer
with Sadtler later. Sadtler then saw various officers in the War Department, all
of whom did not think that any further information should be sent to Hawaii.
It also appeared that the Army Board had received testimony on this matter
from Colonel Bratton, who said that Sadtler, acting on behalf of Colonel Bratton,
had arranged for the FCC to monitor Japanese broadcasts. Apparently Bratton
testified that no information reached him before December 7th which indicating
a break in relations with the United States and that he did not think that any
such information had reached anyone else. He referred to an FCC intercept
which was not the me.ssage for which they had been looking.
(2) The basis of the previous findings that there was a Winds Execute mes-
sage prior to the attack.
The basis for the Army Pearl Harbor Board finding that a "winds message"
relating to the United States had been received appears, to the extent known by
the Navy, in the above sununary of the top secret i>ortion of the Army Board's
report. That indicates that primarily the basis for the finding was the testimony
of Captain Safford. In addition to Safford's testimony, there was apparently
testimony by Sadtler ()f a conversation with Admiral Noyes in which he referred
to a "winds message" but not to the contents of that message.
Captain Safford .testified before Admiral Hart and before the Naval Pearl Har-
bor Court of Inquiry. His testimony was the primary basis for the Naval Court
of Incjuiry's findings that a "winds message" relating to the United States had
been received. In addition to his testimony, the Naval Court of Inquiry had
testimony from Captain Kramer bearing on this subject which tended to support
the finding.
In his testimony before Admiral Hart. Captain Safford said :
"On the 4th of December, 1!)41, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning
message to the Commanders in Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, summariz-
ing significant events up to that date, quoting the 'Winds Message', and ending
with the positive warning that war was inuninent. Admiral Wilkinson approved
this me.ssage and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my [,98] presence.
I was gven the message to read after Admiral Noyes i-ead it, and saw it at about
three p. m.. Washington time, on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked,
'What do you think of the mes.sage?' Admiral Noyes i-eplied, 'I think it is an
insult to the intelligence of the Conmiander in Chief.' Admiral Wilkinson stated.
'I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man, with a lot of
things on his mind, and he may not see the picture as clearly as you and I do. I
think it only fair to the Commander in Chief that he be given this warning and
I intend to send it if I can get it released by the front office.' Admiral Wilkin-
son then left and I left a few minutes later. At the time of the .Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor, I thought that this message of warning had been sent, and did
not realize until two years later, when I studied the Roberts report very care-
fully, that McCollum's message had not been sent. In order to clarify the above
statement and my answer to a previous question, it is necessary to explain what
is meant by the 'Winds Message'. The 'Winds Message' was a name given by
Army and Navy personnel performing radio intelligence duties to identify a plain-
language Japanese news broadcast in which a fictitious weather report gave
warning of the intentions of the Japanese (iovernment with respect to war
against the United States. Britain (including the N. E. I.), and Russia. We
received a tip-off from the British in Singapore in late November, 1941, which
was immeditely forwarded to the Navy Department by the Commander in Chief,
U. S. Asiatic Fleet, with an information copy to the Conmiander in Chief, Pacific
Fleet. We also received a tip-off from the Dutch in Java through the American
Consul General and through the Senior Military Observer. The Dutch tip-off
was handled in routine fashion by the coding rooms of the State Department,
War Department, and Navy Department. The Director of Naval Intelligence re-
quested that special effort be made to monitor Radio Tokyo to catch the 'Winds
Message' when it should be sent, and this was done. Froin November 28 until
the attack on Pearl Harbor, Tokyo broadcast schedules were monitored by about
12 intercept stations, as follows : N. E. I. at Java; British at Singapore; U. S.
Army at Hawaii and San Francisco; U. S. Navy at Corrigedor, Hawaii, Bremer-
ton, and four or five stations along the Atlantic seaboard. All Navy intercept
stations in the continental United States were directed to forward all Tokyo
plain-language broadcasts by teletype, and Bainbrldge Island ran up bills of sixty
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2317
dollars per day for this material alone. The 'Winds Message' was actually
hroadcast (luring the evening of I)eceniber 3, 1941 (Washington Time), which
was December 4 by (ireenwich time and Tokyo time. The combination of fre-
quency, time of day, and radio propagation was such that the 'Winds Message'
was heard only on the East Coast of the United States, and even then by only one
or two of the Navy stations that were listening for it. The other nations and
other Navy C. I. units, not hearing the 'Winds Message' themselves and not
receiving any word from the Navy Department, naturally presumed [y.9]
that the 'Winds Message' had not yet been sent, and that the Japanese
Government was still deferring the initiation of hostilities. When the Japanese
attacked Pearl Harbor, the British at Singapore, the Dutch at Java, and the
Americans at Manila were just as surprised and astonished as the Pacific Fleet
and Army posts in Hawaii. It is apparent that the War Department, like the
Navy Department, failed to send out information that the 'Winds Message' had
been sent by Tokyo. The 'Winds Message' was received in the Navy Department
during the evening of December 3, 1941, while Lieutenant (jg) Francis M. Broth-
erhood, U. S. N. R., was on watch. There was some question in Brotherhood's
mind as to what this message really meant because it came in a different form
from what had been anticipated. Brotherhood called in Lieutenant Commander
Kramer, who came down that evening and identified the message as the 'Winds
Message' we had been looking for. The significant part of the 'Winds Message'
read: 'HIGASHI NO KAZEAME. NISHI NO KAZE HARE. The negative
form of KITA NO KAZE KUMORI'. The literal translation of these phrases is :
'EAST WIND RAIN. WEST WIND CLEAR. NEITHER NORTH WIND NOR
CLOUDY'. The meaning of this message from the previously mentioned tip-off
was : 'War with the United States. War with Britain, including the N. E. I., etc.
Peace with Russia.' I first saw the 'Winds Message* about 8 : (X) a. m. on Thurs-
day, December 4, 1941. Lieutenant A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., came into my
office with a big smile on his face and piece of paper in his hand and said, 'Here
it is!" as he handed me the 'Winds Message.' As I remember, it was the original
yellow teletype sheet with the significant 'Winds' underscored and the meaning
in Kramer's handwriting at the bottom. Smooth copies of the translation were
immediately prepared and distributed to Naval Intelligence and to S. I. S. in the
War Department. As the direct result of the 'Winds Message,' I prepared a total
of five messages, which were released between 1200 and 1600 that date, ordering
the destruction of cryptographic systems and secret and confidential papers by
certain activities on the Asiatic Station. As a direct result of the 'Winds Mes-
sage.' McCollum drafted the long warning message, previously referred to, which
was disapproved by higher authority, but which the Navy Department C. I. Unit
believed had been sent. Both Naval Intelligence and the Navy Department C. I.
Unit regarded the 'Winds Message' as definitely committing the Japanese Govern-
ment to war with the United States and Britain, whereas the information of
earlier dates had been merely statements of intent. We believed that the Jap-
anese would attack by Saturday (December 6), or by Sunday (December 7) at
the latest. The following officers recall having seen and having read the 'Winds
Message' : Captain L. F. Saflford, U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brother-
hood, U. S. N. R., Lieutenant Commander A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., and Lieu-
tenant ( jg) F. L. Freeman, U. S. N. The following officers knew by hearsay that
the 'Winds Message' had been intercepted but did not actually see it themselves :
Commander L. W. Parke, U. S. N.
Lieutenant Commander G. W. Linn, U. S. N. R.
Ensign Wilmer Fox, U. S. N.
Major F. B. Rowlett, Signal Corps Reserve * * *."
[100] "The 'Winds Message' was last seen by myself about December 14, 1941,
when the papers which had been distributed in early December were assembled
by Kramer, checked by myself, and then turned over to the Director of Naval
Communications for use as evidence before the Roberts Commission, according
to my understanding at the time."
Before the Naval Court of Inquiry, Captain Safford repeated in substance his
prior testimony and stated that Lieutenant Murray or possibly Kramer brought
him the message ; that he couldn't determine from what Navy intercept station
the me.ssage had come ; that he had a vague recollection of a second "Winds Mes-
sage", but had been unable to find any trace of it until he testified before Admiral
Hart ; that since that time he learned that the FCC had intercepted a "Winds
Message" at Portland, but that he did not recognize that mes.sage. He did not
recall any of the FCC intercepts contained in Exhibit 65 of the Naval Court of
2318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Inquiry, none of which indicated a break with the United States. He stated
further than despite repeated search since November, 1943, no copy of the "Winds
Message" could be found in the tiles ; that Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood
had told him that he knew the disposition of them, but did not care to tell Safford.
Also Safford said that he knew what had happened to the Army copies of that
message through very "second hand and devious sources." He also repeated his
prior testimony to the effect that about the middle of the first week in December,
1944, Commander McCollum had drafted a long dispatch which included informa-
tion about the "Winds Message,'' and which dispatch had not been sent out.
Commander Kramer in his testimony before the Naval Court, said that on
December 3rd or 4th he had been shown a "Winds Message" by the watch officer
and took it immediately to Captain Safford, who took it to Admiral Noyes. This
was a plain-language message and, as shown to him, contained the phrase trans-
lated as "East Wind Rain" which meant strained r^ations or a break with the
United States. The message had been on teletype paper and indicated that it
had come through an USN intercept station.
Among the witnesses before the Naval Court of Inquiry who testified that so
fjar as they knew there had never been a 'Winds Message" relating to the United
States were Admiral Stark, General Marshall, and Admiral Noyes. Neither
Admiral Wilkinson nor Commander McCollum, who were alleged by Safford to
have had knowledge of the "Winds Message," was a witness before the Naval
Court of Inquiry, as both were at the time actively engaged in combat operations.
(3) Evidence Ohtahied in this Investigation Concerning ''Winds Message."
(a) Testimony of Captain Safford:
Captain Safford testified that in the Fall of 1943 it appeared that there was-
going to be a trial or court martial of Admiral Kimmel. He realized that he
would be one of the important witnesses and that his memory was vague. Accord-
ingly, he began looking around to get [101] information in order to pre-
pare a written statement which he could use in his testimony. He noticed that
in the Roberts report there was no reference to the "Winds Message" or to the
dispatch which McCollum had drafted. Safford then began talking to everyone
who had been around at the time to see what they could remember, and to see if
they could give him leads so that it would be a matter of fact and not a matter
of memory. He talked the thing over with various of the Army people.
Safford testified that he had written to Brotherhood and that Brotherhood
had written back saying that he didn't care to tell Safford about the disposition
of the copies of the "Winds Message," but when Brotherhood returned to the
United States, Safford asked him about it and found out that there had been a
misunderstanding. Brotherhood had been referring to the false "Winds Mes-
sage" (Document 2 of Exhibit 65 of the Naval Court), which apparently related
to Russia, but which was a genuine weather broadcast.
Safford stated that he had information "third hand" concerning the Army's
copies of the "Winds Message," and that he thought it might be confirmed in the
testimony of Colonel Sadtler before the Army investigation. He stated that his
information from the Army came through W. F. Friedman, a cryptanalyst in the
War Department, and that the information was that the copies of the "Winds
Message" had been de.stroyed in the War I)epartment by then Colonel Bissell on
the direct orders of General Marshall. Safford also stated that Colonel Bratton
of the War Department had had some question about the message and had asked
Admiral Noyes by telephone for a copy of the original of the "Winds Message,"
but that Admiral Noyes had refused to comply on the grounds that the Navy
translation was correct. This, he said, .should appear in Colonel Bratton's testi-
mony before the Army investigation. He also stated that a Captain Shukraft of
the Army knew thqt the "Winds Message" had been received.
Safford testified that he had talked with Kramer shortly before his testimony
during this investigation, and that contrary to his earlier impression, Kramer
told him that the "Winds Message" and various other intercepts relating to Japan
had not been turned over to the Roberts Commission, but about 9 December 1941
had been collected and shown to Under Secretary Forrestal, during the absence
of Secretary Knox. He also said that Kramer told him that he did not recall
the "Winds Message" specifically. Safford also stated that the reference in
McCollum's message to the "Winds Message" was very short and was the last
item in McCollum's draft dispatch.
Safford testified that it now appears more likely that the "Winds Message"
was received early in the morning of December 4th, Washington time, rather
than the night before, because the watch officers who were on duty recollected
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2319
only the false "Winds Message/' and not the "true 'Winds Message.' " The
vagaries of high frequency radio, he said, resulted in the message being inter-
cepted only on the East Coast of the United States, and that such conditions were
not unusual. He pointed out that they had to call on Corregidor to cover the
Tokyo-Berlin circuits because the combined efforts of intercept stations on the
East Coast, [102] West Coast, Hawaii and England could not provide
better than about fifty percent coverage. Although he had no knowledge as to
which Naval station allegedly intercepted the mes.sage, his first guess was the
station at Cheltenham, Maryland, and his second guess was Winter Harbor,
Maine. He stated that the logs of those stations and of the Navy Department had
been destroyed during one of the numerous moves and no record had been kept.
Referring to the message telephoned by the FCC to Lieutenant Commander
Brotherhood at 9: 05 p. m. on December 4th (Exhibit 65, Naval Court), he said
that this was the "false" message which appeared on the surface to use the
"winds" code words relating to Russia, but which was a genuine weather broad-
cast. This message, he said, Brotherhood telephoned to Admiral Noyes and
later Kramer took one look at it and said it was not what was wanted and threw
it into the waste basket. He said that that message was received twelve hours
or more after what he referred to as the "true winds message."
Safford identified Document 4, Exhibit 65, as a true "winds" message relating
to England, which was intercepted on 7 Decen^ber 1941 after the attack on Pearl
Harbor.
Safford testified that he had been advised that the Dutch had been monitoring
for a "winds" execute message, but that prior to the attack they had intercepted
no such message.
(b) Captain Kramer's testimony:
Captain Kramer said that he had testified previously concerning the "winds"
message but wanted to go over that previous testimony in the light of thinking
it over since that time. He said that he had had no recollection of a "winds"
message at the time it was first mentioned to him, the spring of 1944, but after
receiving from Safford some of the details of the circumstances surrounding it,
he did recall a message some days before 7 December 1941, about the middle of
the week, and did recall being shown such a message by the watch officer and
walking with him to Captain Safford's office and being present while he turned it
over to Captain Safford. Captain Kramer thought that that message had been
a "winds" message, but did not recall the wording of it. He said it might
have been one using the code words referring to the United States, as he previ-
ously testified, but he was less positive of that now than he had been at the time
of his previous testimony. The reason for this revision of his view was that on
thinking it over, he had a rather sharp recollection that in the latter part of the
week preceding the attack there was still no specific mention of the Unitefl States
in any of the Japanese traflBc. For that reason he was under the impression
when he testified during this investigation that the message referred to England
and possibly to the Dutch rather than to the United States, although it may have
referred to the United States, too. He just didn't recall.
Captain Kramer testified that on the morning of December 7th, a Japanese
"hidden word" code message was received and was hurriedly translated by him
as he was about to leave the Navy Department 'to deliver other messages. The
message as translated by Kramer was, "Relations between Great Britain and
Japan are not in accordance with expectations" (Exhibit 20). In his [103]
haste, Kramer overlooked the word "MINAMI ' which was contained in the
Japanese Message and which referred to the United States. He testified that
after he returned to the Navy Department and shortly before 1 p. m. on December
7th, he discovered his mistake and made a penciled correction on the file copy
of the translation. He testified further that he believed that he made several
telephone calls about fifteen minutes before the attack and advised the officer in
charge of the Far Eastern Sec-tion of ONI and an officer of G-2 of the War
Department. The copies of the translation in the Navy Department's files do
not disclose any correction of the translation (Exhibit 20). Kramer testified
concerning this that a number of copies of the translation were made at the time,
and that undoubtedly Jiis correction was made on another copy which has since
been discarded.
Cap'tain Kramer also stated that he had been under the impression until he
testified before this investigation that the "hidden word message" of 7 December
1941 had been a "Winds Message," but now recognized it as a "hidden word mes-
sage." He stated that he thought that the "hidden word message", which he
identified as having been received on 7 December, was among the group of mes-
2320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sages shown to Mr. Forrestal about 9 December 1941, when he hastily reviewed a
folder of that traffic for Mr. Forrestal. This was done, he said, because of the
fact that previously Mr. Forrestal had not seen such material.
(c) Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood's Testimony:
Lt. Conidr. Brotherhood testified that he was one of the four watch officers who
were on watch in Captain Safford's section during the first week of December,
1941. He said that he had never received an intercept or message wherein the
"Winds Code" words relating to the United States were used. He said that About
December 4th, he received a telephone message from the FCC in which the words
apparently relating to Russia were used ; that he called Admiral Noyes, who com-
mented that tlie wind was blowing from a "funny" direction, and that he, Brother-
hood, did not think at the time that it was an actual "Winds Message." Brother-
hood stated that shortly before he testified in this investigation, he had had a
conversation with Safford who stated that Brotherhood had called him about
December 4th or 5th and had told him that such a message had arrived. Brother-
hood said he did not recall the telephone conversation and that he believed,
therefore, that he had called Captain Safford at that time.
(d) Lieuteniint Comnuinder Linn's Testimony:
Linn testified that a 24-hour watch was maintained in Captain Safford's
section; that he was senior officer of that watch, and was one of the four officers
who stood that watch during the first week in December, 1941. Any intercept
which had come into that section, he said, would have had to come through one
of the four watch officers. He was familiar with the "Winds Code" and he never
saw any intercept [lO'i] prior to 7 December 1941 in which the "winds"
code words relating to the United States were used.
(e) Lieutenant Commander Pering's Testimony:
Pering testified that he was one of the four watch officers standing watch
during the first week of December, 1941, in Captain Safford's section. He knew
of the existence of the "winds" code and he never saw any intercept using the
code words relating to the United States.
(f) Lieutenant Commander Murray's Testimony:
Murray testified that he was one of the four watch officers standing a twenty-
four hour watch in Captain Safford's section during the first week in December,
1941. He testified that no "winds" code execute relating to the United States
ever came to iiis attention during that week. He said that after the attack, Linn
had told him that a "winds" message had come in on 7 December 1941.
(g) Lieutenant Frretnan's Testimony:
Freeman testified that he was in a .section which disseminated to ONI intelli-
gence receive<l from the field radio intelligence units ; that his unit worked very
closely with Captain Safford's unit, and that every effort was made to monitor
for a "winds" message. Freeman was one of the officers mentioned by Captain
Safford, in his testimony before Admiral Hart, as having personal knowledge of
the receipt of a "winds" message relating to the United States. He testified that
he never knew of any intercept of a "winds" message relating to the United States.
(h) Captain McCoUum's Testimony:
Captain McCoUum testified that he had been familiar with the "winds" code;
that he had no knowledge of any message transmitted which contained the words
relating to the United States ; that the message which contained the words ap-
parently relating to Russia had been received during the first week of December,
1941, but that in his opinion that was a bona fide weather report. He said further
that during the first week of December, 1841, he drafted a dispatch summarizing
the situation which he wanted to have sent out ; that he remembered no reference
to any "winds" message in that dispatch ; and, that the dispatch was based on a
memorandum of his dated 1 December 1941 which did not refer to a "winds"
message (Exhibit 10). He did not know whether or not his draft dispatch had
been sent out. It had been submitted to Admiral Wilkinson.
(i) Admiral Wilkinson's Testimony:
AdmiralWilkinson testified that his only recollection of the "winds" code was
that some time after the attack, some one, possibly Commander McCoUum, had
mentioned to him that a message using a "winds" code had been received. Pos-
sibly, he said, it was the message received on the 7th using the words relating to
England. He did not recall anything about the long dispatch which McCollum
had drafted and which [lOo] Captain Safford had testified Admiral
Wilkinson had endeavored to have sent out.
(j) Captain Mason's and Commander Fabian's Testimony:
Captain Mason, who was Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet, and Com-
mander Fabian, who was in the Radio Intelligence Unit at Corregidor, both testi-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2321
fled that intensive efforts had been made there to monitor for any Japanese broad-
casts using the "winds" code, and that nothing was received wlierein the words
relating to the United States were used. In this connection, it should l)e noted
that it was the view of the Navy Department that the unit at Corregidor. because
of its geographical location, was in a niucii better position to intercept Jap-
anese radio broadcasts than were the units at I'earl Harbor or Washington (see
Exhibit 8).
They also testified that close liaison was maintained with British Intelligence
services in the Philippines, that the British had been monitoring for a "winds"
message also, and that had such a message been receive<l by the British, they
most certainly would have been advised of its receipt, but that they received no
information from the British as to the receipt of a "winds" message prior to the
attack.
(k) Captain LaytorCs Testimony:
Captain Layton, Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, testified that he had been
familiar with the "winds" code; that efforts were made to monitor for the use of
that code; and all available Japanese language officers were placed on continuous
watch on several circuits and were to c<n'er all known news broadcasts emanating
from Japan; that he checked up each day with Commander Kodiefort and that
no "winds" intercept was received prior to 7 December 1941, nor did they receive
any dispatch from any source stating that such an intercept had been heard.
(1) Captain Safford recalled:
Captain Safford was recalled and testified that he never had a conversation
with Colonel Sadler concerning the existence of a "winds" message. He stated
that he could not recall distinctly whether or not he received a call from Brother-
hood about December 4th in which Brotherhood advised of the receipt of a mes-
sage apparently using the Russian "winds" code words. He had had a vague
idea that there was another "winds" message, and. he said, the FCC intercept
seemed to fill the bill. He said further, however, that until 1944 he did not recall
having seen, or knowing of the FCC intercept in which the words relating to
Russia were used.
(m) Mr. Friedman's Testimony:
Mr. Friedman, a cryptaiialyst of the War Department, stated that prior to 7
December 1941 he had no information as to whether or not a "winds" message
had been intercepted. He said that he had had several conversations with Captain
Safford concerning the subject, the first one about a year and half ago, and none
later than six months prior to his [lOG] testimony in this investigation.
He said that SalTord had indicated in the course of the early conversations that
there had been a "winds" message, but that no copies could be found in the Navy's
files, and that his theory was that it had been intercepted by a Navy East Coast
station. Mr. Friedman also testified that about a year and a half ago he had a
conversation with Colonel Sadler, who had indicated that a "winds" message
had come in on the 4th or r)th of December; that he had been notitied either
directly or by somebody in the Navy, possibly Admiral Noyes, that the message
was in ; that there had been some question about the exact Japanese words which
had been used, and that Sadler had not seen the message himself, and Mr. Fried-
man thouglit that Colonel Sadler also told him that they had tried to get a verifi-
cation from Admiral Noyes but had not been successful, whereupon the G-2
authorities simply passed the matter over since there was apparently nothing to
substantiate the existence of the mes.sage. Mr. Friedman said that he had asked
Sadler whether he had ever seen a copy of that message, and Colonel Sadler said
that he had not, but that he had been told by somebody that the copies had been
ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall. Mr. Friedman testi-
fied that he regarded this as highly inconceivable, but that in conversation with
Captain Safford he probably just passed that out as one of those crazy things that
get started, and that he had lio idea that Safford would repeat that statement.
Mr. Friedman had no knowledge, directly or Indirectly, concerning the existence
of a "winds" message relating to the United States, apart from his conversations
with Captain Safford and Colonel Sadler.
(n) Captain Rochefort's Testimony:
Captain Rochefort, who was in charge of the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl
Harbor, testified that they monitored for any "winds" code message, covering
all known broadcasts from Tokyo on a twenty-four hour basis, and that results
were nil. He testified further that he had made an exhaustive .search into all
available Navy records and could find no trace of any "winds" message prior
to 7 December 1941.
2322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL. HARBOR ATTACK
[i07] E. Information Concerning the Organization of the Japanese Navy.
(1) ONI Report of 29 July 1941.
On July 291:h, the Oflace of Naval Intelligence issued a revised report, which
had been prepared by Commander McCollum, dealing with the organization of
the Japanese Navy. This stated that, as a result of information which had been
received, it was possible to give a much more complete picture of the organization
of the Japanese Navy. It stated that the Japanese naval forces afloat were or-
ganized into two main commands — the Combined Fleet and the Japanese Naval
Forces in China. The Combined Fleet included :
(a) First Fleet, or Battle Force.
(b) Second Fleet, or Scouting Force.
(c) Third Fleet, or Blockade and Shipping Control Force.
(d) Fourth Fleet, or Mandated Islands Defensive Force.
(e) Submarine Force (also called the Sixth Fleet).
The Combined Fleet and First Fleet, under the command of Admiral Yamamoto,
consisted of various BatDivs, a CruDiv, three CarDivs and two destroyer squad-
rons. BatDiv 3 (KONGO, HIYEI, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA) was included. The
carrier divisions were CarDiv 3 (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU) ; CarDiv 5 (RYU JO,
HOSHO) ; and CarDiv 7 (CHITOSE. CHIYODA, MIZUHO).
The Second Fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral Koga, included various
cruiser divisions, two carrier divisions and two destroyer squadrons. (CarDiv 8
(CHIKUMA and TONE) was included. The carrier divisions were: (CarDiv 1
(AKAGI and KAGA), and CarDiv 2 (SORYU and HIRYU).
The Third Fleet included CarDiv 6 (NOTORO and KAMIKAWA MARU) and
various minelayer and minesweeper divisions, a base force and sub-chaser
squadrons.
The composition of the Fourth Fleet or Mandates Fleet, and of the Submarine
Fleet and of the Japanese Naval Forces in China was also given. (Exhibit 81.)
(2) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin Number 45-^1.
On 27 November 1941 (when the "war warning" was received), the Commander
in Chief, Pacific Fleet, distributed Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin Number
45-41 (Exhibit 21). This bulletin dealt with the organization of the Japanese
Navy and with Japanese Forces and installations in the Mandated Islands. It
was a revision of the ONI bulletin above summarized and replaced that bulletin
on the subject of the Japanese Fleet. This stated :
"The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet com-
mands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane
tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of special task forces in con-
nection with the southward advance into Indo-China. The regrouping has
resulted in a notable \.108'\ specialization within the various commands,
as»shown below :
Major Fleet Commands
I. Combined Fleet
1. First Fleet (Battle Force) 3 Batdivs, 1 Crudiv, 2
Desrons
2. Second Fleet (Scouting Force) 4 Crudivs, 2 Desrons, etc.
3. Third Fleet (Blockade & Transport Small Craft.
Force)
4. Fourth Fleet (Mandate Defense Force). 1 Desron, 1 Subron and
many small units.
5. Fifth Fleet ? ?
6. Sixth Fleet (Submarine Fleet) 6 Subrons
7. Carrier Fleet (Aircraft Carriers) 5 Cardivs
8. Combined Air Force _ (Seaplane tenders, etc.).. 4 Airrons, & shore based
planes.
II. Japanese Naval (Staff Headquarters) 1 PG and 3 DD's
Forces in China.
1 . First China Exped. (Central China) Gunboats
Fleet.
2. Second China (South China) 1 CA, 1 CL and small
Exped. Fleet. craft.
3. Third China Exped. (North China) Torpedo Boats, etc.
Fleet.
4. Southern Exped. (Saigon) 1 CL, transports and mme
Fleet. craft.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2323
The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service than ever
before. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and the line
between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the time. The
base forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly
increased the strength of the Navy, which is on full-war-time footing."
The Combined Fleet and First Fleet as listed in this bulletin included three
BatDivs, among which was BatDiv 3 (HIYEI, KONGO, KIRISHIMA and
HARUNA — as to the latter it was stated that it had been inactive during 1941
and was probably undergoing major repairs). Also included was a cruiser
division and two destroyer squadrons.
The Second Fleet included four CruDivs and two destroyer squadrons. One
of the CruDivs was CruDiv 8 (TONE, CHIKUMA).
The composition of the Third, Fourth and Sixth (Submarine) Fleets was
given in some detail in this bulletin. As to a Fifth Fleet, it stated "The com-
position of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown. The flagship has been reported
at Maizuru."
[109] The composition of the Carrier Fleet, with the KAGA as flagship,
and consisting of ten carriers and sixteen destroyers, was listed as follows :
CarDiv 1: AKAGI, KAGA (F) and a destroyer division.
CarDiv 2: SORYU (F) and HIRYU and a destroyer division.
CarDiv 3: RYUJO (F) and HOSHO and a destroyer division.
CarDiv 4 : ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU and a destroyer division.
CarDiv-: KORYU and KASUGA (MARU).
As will appear subsequently, the forces which attacked Pearl Harbor on 7
December 1941 included six carriers, the KAGA and AKAGI (CarDiv 1), the
SORYU and HIRYU (CarDiv 2), and the ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU. The
latter two carriers had been identified as CarDiv 4 in the Pacific Fleet Intelli-
gence Bulletin, as CarDiv 3 (annexed to the First Fleet) in the earlier ONI
bulletin, and as CarDiv 5, in Exhibit 3, which sets forth the composition of the
attacking force.
Also included in the attacking force were the HIYEI and KIRISHIMA (two
of the battleships of BatDiv 3 ) which had been listed in the intelligence bulletins
as assigned to the Combined Fleet and First Fleet, and the TONE and CHIKUMA
(CruDiv 8) which had been listed in the intelligence bulletins as assigned to the
Second Fleet.
[110] Information Concerning the Location and Movements of Japanese Naval
Forces.
The evidence indicates that there were no formal arrangements whereby the
Navy communicated to the Army estimates of the location and movements of
Japanese naval forces. OflBcers of the Far Eastern Section of Military Intelli-
gence at Washington had access to charts maintained in the Far Eastern Division
of the Office of Naval Intelligence showing such information, and had access to
radio intelligence information available in the Navy Department, and the situa-
tion was discussed with them. At Pearl Harbor, an intelligence officer of the
Hawaiian Air Force received some general information concerning Japanese
movements from the Fleet Intelligence Officer.
(1) Information available at the time of the "War Warning."
The procedure for handling radio intelligence information concerning Japanese
movements was set forth in a dispatch of 24 November 1941 from OpNav to
CincAF, information ComSIXTEEN, CincPac, ALUSNA Chungking, ASTALUSNA
Shanghai, and ALUSNA Tokyo (Exhibit 8). This dispatch stated that Japanese
naval movements as reported by the individual information addresses were often
conflicting because of their necessarily fragmentary nature and that since Com-
SIXTEEN intercepts were considered most reliable, it was suggested that other
reports be carefully evaluated and sent to ComSIXTEEN for action and to
OpNav for information and, that after combining all incoming reports, Com-
SIXTEEN was to direct dispatches to OpNav, info CincPac, based on all informa-
tion received and indicating the ComSIXTEEN evaluation.
The Japanese naval situation as estimated by ComFOURTEEN on 26 November
1941, was set forth in a dispatch of that date to OpNav, information CincPac,
CincAF, and ComSIXTEEN. This dispatch stated that for the past month the
Commander of the Second Fleet had been organizing a task force consisting of
Second Fleet and other units and, after discussing various other units, stated:
"There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air groups in
2324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the Marshalls which comprise Airon 24. at least one caiTier division unit, plus
probably one-third of the submarine fleet. Evaluate above to indicate strong
force may be preparinjr to operate in southeastern Asia while component parts
may operate from Palao and Marshalls."
On the same day, ComSIXTEEN sent a dispatch to CincPac, OpNav, Com-
FOURTEEN and CincAF, discussing in considerable detail the estimate of Com-
SIXTEEN concerning the location and probable movements of Japanese Fleet
units (Exhibit 8). This stated that traffic analysis for the past few days had
indicated that the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Fleet was directing some
units of the First, Second, Third and Fourth Fleets in a loose-knit task foi-ce
organization that apparently would be divided into two sections. One section
expected to operate in the South China area, was referred to in the dispatch as
the "first .section." The "first section" was estimated to consist of CruDiv 7,
AirRon 6, Defense iJivision 1, pesron 3, and Subron 6. The "second section"
consisted of units expected to ' [111] operate in the Mandates. The "second
section" was believed to include Crudiv ;">. Cardiv 3, RYUJO and one MARU. It
was indicated that BatDiv 8 might be included in the "second section," but that
this could not be clarified yet. The dispatch further stated : "Cannot confirm
supposition that carriers and submarines in force are in the Mandates X Oiir
best indications are that all known First and Second Fleet carriers still in
Sasebo-Kure area." The evaluation was considered to be reliable.
During this time, the Oflice of Naval Intelligence was issuing fortnightly sum-
maries of current national situations. The summary for 1 December 1941 (Exhibit
9) was distributed by air mail. The statements therein as to the Japanese naval
situation, which portion was prepared by the Far Eastern Section of ONI, were
based upon information which had been received at least three or four days prior
to the date of the document. This stated :
"Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that
extensive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time troop
transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern
China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan
ports. Present movements to the south* appear to be carried out by small
individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely
indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date this
task force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears
to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the
Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong
striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Con>bined Air Force,
destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also
may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home watex'S, as well
as the greatest portion of the carriers.
"The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment, including landing
boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control,
consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but
also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc."
(2) Admiral KimmeVs sources of information after the "war warning."
The ComFOURTEEN communication intelligence unit continued the practice,
which had been followed for some time past, of preparing daily communications
intelligence summaries for submission to Admiral Kimmel via Lt. Comdr. Layton,
the Fleet Intelligence Oflicer. Photostatic copies of the communication intelli-
gence sununaries from 14 October to 14 December 1941, [112] constitute
Exhibit 22 of this investigation. Lieutnant Commander, Layton, who presented
these summaries to Admiral Kimmel, also prepared daily intelligence reports
which were distributed to various members of CincPac's staff. The intelligence
memoranda were not given to the Admiral or Chief of Staff because they saw
the basic material upon which the reports were based. The intelligence reports
by Layton for the period 6 October to 2 December 1941, constitute Exhibit 26.
None was prepared after December 2nd. according to Layton.
The daily communication intelligence summaries together with the dispatches
received by Admiral Kimmel from other organizations during the period 27
November to 7 December 1941. constituted the only sources of information which
he had during that period concerning the location and movements of Japanese
naval forces.
(3) Information received by Admiral Kimmel after the "war warning."
The critical period commenced on 27 November 1941, when the Japanese force,
which was to attack Pearl Harbor, secretly left Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island and,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2325
in radio silence, proceeded undetected toward Pearl Harbor. The Japanese force,
which included tliree of Japan's Carrier Divisions, CarDiv 1, AKA(jI, KAGA ;
CarDiv 2. HIRYU. SOKYU; CarDiv T), SHOKAKU, ZCIKAKU; BatDiv 3, first
section, HIYEI, KIKIS'HIMA ; CruDiv S, CHIKl'MA ; and other lighter vessels,
cruised for ten days to a point 20o miles north of Oahu, where the phmes were
launched for the attack on Pearl Harbor.
It will be recalled that the Novenil)er 2'4th dispatch from CNO in part had
stated that the diplomatic situation and statements of the Japanese Government
and movements of their naval and military forces indicated that a surprise
aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or
Guam, was a possibility. The "war warning" of the 27th had stated that an
aggressive move by Japan was exi)ected within the next few days and that the
number and equii»ment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task
forces indicated an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai,
or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.
The information which Admiral Kimmel subsequently received as to the
location and movements of Japanese naval forces was as follows :
28 Not-ember 19. ',1:
The Naval Attache at Shanghai reported in his dispatch 270855 the sightings
by the master of a foreign ves.sel, which had left Hong Kong en route to Shanghai,
of many transports proceeding south singly or in small groups.
\lhi] The November 27th ComFOURTEEN radio intelligence summary de-
livered on November 28th, stated that in general trathc volume was a little below
normal, due to poor signals on certain frequencies and that the Tokyo-Takao
circuit was unreadable on mid-watch. Some tactical traffic was heard, inter-
cepted from carriers. Bako, Sania and Saig(m were active as originators. Tlie
main Tokyo originat(»r was the intelligence activity wliich sent five dispatches
t(» the major commanders. The direction finder activity was very high. As
to the Combined Fleet, it w'as said that there was still no evidence of any further
movement from the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet
originated several messages of general address he had been fairly inactive as an
originator. The Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, originated many messages
to the Third Fleet and other units. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated that
there was nothing to indicate any movement. As to the Fourth Fleet Commander,
it was said that he frequently addressed dispatches to the defense forces
in the Mandate, and also that there was no further information on the presence
of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates. The Commander Submarine Force,
it was stated, was still in the Chichijima area. C<mcerning air forces in general,
it was indicated that an air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatcli to the
KORYU and SHOKAKU and that "Carriers are still located in home waters."
This simnnary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.
It appears, therefore, that as of this time the ConiFOURTEEN, ComSIXTEEN,
and Washington radio intelligence units were of the opinion that the ma.1or portion
of the Japane.se carriers were in "home waters;" that ComFOURTF'EN was of
the opinion that a carrier unit was in the Marshalls, and that ComSIXTEEN
expected CarDiv 3 to optn-ate in the Mandates. The evidence disclosed that
the term "home waters" was understood differently by the Far Eastern Section
of ONI, which prepared the 1 December 1941 ONI estimate, and by the Fleet
Intelligence Oflicer, Pacific Fleet. Captain McCollum testified that the term
meant the normal cruising grounds of the Japane.se Fleet, roughly west of the 180
meridian of hmgitude and north of the southern end of Formosa, and included
the Kurile Islands but not the Aleutians. Captain Layton, the Fleet Intelligence
Oflicer, testified that "home waters" meant to him, and was understood by Admiral
Kimmel to mean, the drill grounds of the Inland Sea and approaches to Kyushu,
the coastal offshore area, the li^ei Bay Area in general the waters surrounding
Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu, but not including northern Japan and the Kuriles,
to a point about 60 miles east of Japan.
29 November 1941:
On November 28th, the Chief of Naval Operations .sent a copy of a dispatch
to CincPac for information which was received on November 20th (Exhibit 19,
Naval Court). This repeated a dispatch which had been sent by the Army to
Commander, Western Defense Command, as follows :
[llJf] "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical
purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might
come back and offer to continue X Japanese future action unpredictable but
2326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
hostile action possible at any moment X If hostilltizes cannot repeat not be
avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act X This
policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action
that might jeopardize your defense X Prior to hostile Japanese action you are
directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem
necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not alarm
civil population or disclose intent X Report measures taken X A separate
message is being sent to G-2 Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in the
United States X Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned
in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan X Limit dissemination of this
highly secret information to minimum essential oflScers."
The Navy dispatch continued that WPL-52 was not applicable to the Pacific
area and would not be placed in effect in that area, except as then in force in
Southeast Pacific Sub Area, Panama Coastal Frontier. It stated further :
"Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act X Be
prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply to Japan in
case hostilities occur"
On the 28th of November, ComFOURTEEN addressed to OpNav, information
CincAF, and stated:
"Following received by British Consul from usually reliable source X Japanese
will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on One December without ultimatum or
declaration in order to get between Bangkok and Singapore X Attackers will
proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa X Main landing to be made at
Songkhola X" (Singora)
ComSIXTEEN in a dispatch of the 28th addressed to CincAF, OpNav, CincPac,
ComFOURTEEN, stated that an unidentified ship believed to be a light cruiser
had apparently relieved the KASHII as flagship. Southern Expeditionary Fleet ;
that this ship was now in the Camranh Bay-Saigon area.
OpNav, in dispatch 281633, addressed CincAF, info CincPac, ComS^IXTEEN,
ComFOURTEEN, and supplied information from State Department, from Saigon,
dated November 26th, which stated that five days previously U15] Orange
troops and supply vessels began to put in at Saigon, taking up all available
quay space ; that 20,000 troops had landed and that 10,000 had arrived from the
north by rail during the same period ; that the total troops in South Indo-China
totaled 70,000. It observed that there was an estimate of some 128,000, but
considered that too high. It reported that many trucks had landed and were
moving troops and supplies to the interior. It observed that this movement is
of large proportions and indicates ho.stilities against Thailand may begin soon.
It also forwarded information from Hanoi, also from the State Department,
dated November 26th, that said supplies and military equipment, particularly
railway, rolling stock, gasoline, landing at Haiphong even recently augmented
and are being transshipped south. Among recently landed artillery are anti-tank
guns ; that the Japanese had recently purchased a considerable number of native
boats along the coast of Tongking Province. It was reported they desired to
purchase 500. These boats were being sent south. Further reports from Hanoi,
dated November 25th, said that the American Consul had received reliable infor-
mation that the Governor General had ascertained from an agent that around
1 December, without either declaration of war or ultimatum, Nippon Navy will
attack Kra Isthmus. Simultaneously the Army would advance on Thailand;
that great increased troop landings and movements were noted south ; that during
last few days about 4,000 men have landed. On November 25th and 26th, 1,500
would go south by special train ; that in Tongking there were approximately 25,000
Jap troops and at Gillam there were approximately ninety airplanes. Dated
November 26th, Hanoi, was the report that on early November 25th the Haiphong
mayor had advised all interested persons that the Japanese intended to sequester
all freight en route to China, that the Japanese had demanded keys to all ware-
houses by noon November 25th.
The ComFOURTEEN radio intelligence summary of the 28th, delivered the
29th, stated generally that traffic volume was normal, communications to and
from South China and between the Mandates and the Empire were very heavy.
No tactical traffic was seen. The suspected radio intelligence net was very
active and was becoming more so. Much traffic was directed to the Tokyo
direction finder command from various stations and this command also originated
messages of high precedence to the major fleet commanders. It was said that
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2327
"This activity is interpreted to indicate that the radio intelligence net is operating
at full strength upon U. S. naval communications and IS GETTING RESULTS."
As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that there was no indicatio^i of movement
of any of its units. As to the Third Fleet, there was little activity from its units
save for the Commander in Chief. The bulk of the Fourth Fleet was said to
be still at Truk. The Commander in Chief of the South China Fleet originated
more traffic than usual and addressed his fleet collectively for information to the
Commander in Chief, Second, and Commander in Chief, Third Fleets. There
was little indication of submarine activity. This summary was initialed by
Admiral Kimmel.
[116] The ComSIXTEEN communication intelligence unit sent a dispatch
on the 2yth noting various recent developments from radio intelligence, such as
various encrypted addresses noted in the preceding two days traffic, that various
additional units now appeared to be associated with the "first section" (South
China area), referred to in ComSIXTEEN's November 26th dispatch, that the
Hiyei (which in fact was en route to Pearl Harbor) and Kongo appeared to be
associated definitely with the "first section," but no movement from the Takao
area had been noted, and, that the Cine Combined Fleet was to leave the Kure
zone that day, the Sasebo zone on December 1st, and enter the Bako zone on
the 2nd.
30 November 1941 :
On 30 November 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch to CincAF for action and to
CincPac for information (Exhibit 76, Naval Court), which advised in part:
"Indications that Japan about to attack points on Kra by overseas expedi-
tion X * * * Desire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on three
days commencing upon receipt of this dispatch x * * *"
A second similar dispatch was also sent on the same day (Exhibit Tt, Naval
Court) requesting a daily report from CincAF, even if there were no contacts
and the information were all negative.
The communication intelligence summary of the 29th delivered this day stated
generally that traffic volume was above normal, and that the traffic to South
(^hina was still very high. A good share of the traffic was made up of messages
of an intelligence nature. Tokyo intelligence sent eleven messages during the
day to major commanders both ashore and afloat, while the radio intelligence
activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the major commanders. In addition
to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo radio Yokosuka (near Tokyo) sent
in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The
direction finder net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with
much activity. The Navy Minister originated his usual AlNav, and the naval
general staff addressed Commanders, Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Air
Force, and the South China Unit. A unit which had been addressed as the 103rd
air group originated one dispatch whose address was composed entirely of
enciphered calls and it was apparent that he had no navy call list. One address
was "Eleventh Air Fleet." Since this had appeared before, it was evidence that
the use of Kantai was intentional in making positively known the existence of
an air fleet. Its composition was unknown. The dispatches indicated that
various units were under the immediate command of the Commander in Chief,
Second Fleet, including Cardiv 3, and the Third Fleet.
Associated with the Third Fleet were two battleships but their assignment
was not yet definite. Various messages were sent by the Commander in Chief,
Third Fleet, and he held extensive communication with [117] the Com-
mander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Bako. The Cine Fourth Fleet was relatively
inactive. He was still in the Truk area. There was some traffic for Commander
Submarine Force, who was at Chichyima the previous day, and also some traffic
from the Commander in Chief, China Fleet.
1 December 1941 •'
A copy of a dispatch by CNO to CincAF, 301709, was received by CincPac, re-
ferring to the previous dispatch which had directed an air search on the line
Manila to Camranh Bay, directing that a report be made daily even if the in-
formation were all negative (Exhibit 77, Naval Court).
A dispatch from OpNav. dated 1 December 1941, was also received referring
to a Thailand-Japanese intrigue aimed at forcing the British to attack Thai as
a counter-move to a Japanese landing in Kota Bharu, whereupon Thai would
declare war and ask Japanese help.
A dispatch of 1 December from ComSIXTEEN advised of radio intelligence
information indicating that various units under Cine Third Fleet were in the
2328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Takao area and that Cine Second Fleet had shifted from Kure to Sasebo ap-
parently en route to South China waters.
The communication intellijjence siunmary for November 30th, delivered on
December 1st, stated generally that traffic volume was less than for the past
few days, that the traffic consisted largely of dispatches bearing old dates. No
reason could be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the high
volume of traffic for the past few days had prevented the repetition of dispatches.
The number of dispatches originate<l on the 30th was very small. The only
tactical circuit heard was one with the carrier AKAGI and several MARUs.
As to the Combined Fleet and First Fleet, it was stated the Chiefs of Staff of
those Fleets were in Kure. In the same message, the Chief of Staff, Second
Fleet, was not listed in any location. Other traffic indications were that he was
at sea. The Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, sent one dispatch to his usual
addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force, but also included the
KONGO and HIYEI, which it was said placed them as members of his task
force. (The HIYEI was actually en rtmte to Pearl Harbor.) As to the Third
Fleet, it was said, "No information obtained as to the location of the Com-
mander in Chief, Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is
underway." The Fourth Fleet was believed to be still in the Truk area. It was
said that the continued as.sociation of Jaluit and Commander Submarine Force,
plus his known progress from the Empire to Chichijime to Saipan made his
destinati<m obviously the Marshalls; also that since one of his large units ar-
rived in the Marshalls some time ago, that unit could not agree with Com-
SIXTEEN that there was not a sul)marine c<mcentrjiti<>n in that area. "Every
evidence points to a concentration, not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines
there, but al.so a good proportion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine
Force." It was also said that "the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers
Indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, alth(mgh this
has not been confirmed." This communication summary was initialed by Ad-
miral Kimmel and Admiral McMorris, the War Plans Officer.
[//8] A dispatch was re<'eived from ConiSIXTEEN, addressed to OpNav,
information CincAF, CincPac, and ConiFOL'RTEEN, to the effect that a reassign-
ment of all JaiKinese naval calls had occurred jit midnight.
2 Dccenihcr I'J-'fl:
On 2 December 1941, ConiSIXTEEN reported that Ciiic Second and Cine
Third Fleets were in the Takao area, and, that broadcasts to tteet xunts were
being sent by Takao or Bako in addition to Tokyo. Also reported was the fact
that the Japanese Ambassador at Bangkok had requested i)ermission to de-
stroy codes.
CincAF also reported that a patrol plane had spotted nine submarines on a
southerly course in the South China Sea betwo(>ii Camranh Bay and the Philip-
pines. Also that three submarines were sighted 070 from Saigon, 180 miles,
heading south, and that twenty-one transports, with air patrol overhead, were
at Camranh Bay.
A report from the Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, advised of the arrival
of 14,000 trooiis sailing from there the week ending the 22nd.
The communication intelligence summary for the previous day stated gen-
erally that all service radio calls of forces alloat changed promptly at 0000 1
December. Previously service calls had been changed after a i)eriod of six
months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November 1041. The fact that
service calls lasted only one month indicated an additional progressive step in
preparing for active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three
days prior to the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of dis-
patches from one to four or five days old. It appeared that the Japanese Navy
was adopting more and more security provisions. A study of traffic prior to
0000 1 December indicated that an effort was made to deliver all dispatches
using old calls so that promptly with the change of calls there would be a mini-
mum of undelivered^ dispatches and consecpient confusion and comprimiise.
Either that, or the large number of old messages may have been used to pad the
total volume and make it appear as if nothing nnusnal were pending. It should
be noted that the sentence in the above summary reading "The fact that service
calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in prepar-
ing for active operations on a large scale" was underscored in red pencil com-
mencing with the words "service calls." Captain Layton testified that to the
best of his recollection this was underlined by Admii-al Kimmel at the time.
The summary further stated as to the First Fleet "nothing to indicate that this
fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire waters." As to the Second Fleet,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2329
it was stated "This fleet is believed proceeding from tiie Kure-Sasebo area in
the direction of South China and Indo-China ;" Takao did not appear to play
an important role in the traffic ; consequently, the assumption was made that
this fleet was passing up Takao. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated there was
"nothing to report except that the [//.9] same associations of Second,
Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China Forces
continued. As to Fourth Fleet, "No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates
area." As to Fifth Fleet, "Nothing to report." As to submarines, it was stated
a large number of the Submarine Force was believed to be in the area eastward
of Yokosuka-Chichijime and Saipan. As to Combined Air Force, it was stated
"No change." As to carriers, it was said "No change." This summary was
initialed by Admiral Kimmel.
In accordance with the request of Admiral Kimmel, Layton, the Fleet Intelli-
gence Officer, prepared a memorandum for the Admiral dealing with the loca-
tion of the Japanese Fleet. This memorandum was prepared, according to
Layton, on the evening of 1 December, and was submitted by him to Admiral
Kimmel on 2 December 1941. The original memorandum is Exhibit 23. The
memorandum bears certain notations in red pencil which, Layton testified, were
inserted by him on December 2nd prior* to submission of the memorandum to
Admiral Kimmel, and which reflected the later information received after
preparation of the memorandum on the night of December lst-2nd. It also bears
certain lead pencil notations which Layton identified as the handwriting of
Admiral Kimmel. This memorandum, according to Layton, summarized hia
best estimate of the location of the Japanese Fleet, based on all information
available to him and to Admiral Kimmel up to and including 1 December 1941.
Layton's estimate stated that from the best available information, units of
the Orange (Japanese) were "thought'' to be located as listed in the memorandum.
In the Kure-Sasebo area he listed the Commander in Chief of the Combined
Fleet and Commander in Chief, First Fleet, with six battleships, "(?)", and other
units. He listed the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, at Nagara initially and
then corrected it in red to indicate that it was at Takao. Also in the Kure-Sasebo
area he located Cruiser Division 8.
In the Shanghai area, Layton's estimate located the Commander in Chief,
China Fleet, the Shanghai base force, and an air group.
In the Bako-Takao area, Layton listed Third Fleet submarine squadrons and
various destroyers and the Commander of the Combined Air Force with numerous
air groups and the KASUGA MARU (thought to be a converted carrier with 36
planes). He estimated that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, had been
en route to Takao (this he corrected in red pencil to indicate that he was at
Takao) with a cruiser division, destroyers, and with "Cardiv 4 — two CV and
four DD; Cardiv 3— two CV and 3 DD; Batdiv 3 less HARIJNA— 3 BB (maybe
2 BB)" and, he added in red pencil, certain cruisers and Destroyer Division 2.
In the Hainon-Canton area, Layton located the Commander in Chief of the
South China Fleet and various cruisers and destroyers and transports. In the
French Indo-China area, he located the Commander in Chief of an Expeditionary
Fleet with various ships including 21 transports and some base forces among
others. In the Mandates area, he located at Palao an air group [120] and
base force ; at Truk, the Commander in (^hief of the Fourth Fleet with cruisers
and destroyers, and a base force and an air group. At Saipan, he located the
Commander in Chief of the Submarine Force with possibly submarines and
various air groups and a base force. In the Marshalls area, he located various
air groups and the carrier "KORYU? plus plane guards", and several submarine
squadrons and base force.
Layton's memorandum did not make any reference to the location of Carrier
Divisions 1 and 2 of the Japanese Fleet (which in fact were en route to attack
Pearl Harbor). According to Layton, on 2 December 1941, during his conference
with Admiral Kimmel, the Admiral noticed and commented on the absence of
information concerning Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. In his testimony, he
described the conversation on this point as follows :
"Mr. SoNNETT : Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said,
as best you recall it?
"Captain Layton: As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, "What! You
don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied,
'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they
are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then
Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern
countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean
79716 O — 46 — pt. 16 27
2330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?'
or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before
now,' or words to that effect." ...
"Mr. Sonnett: Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising
out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye when he spoke.
What I am trying to get at is this : Was the discussion about the absence of
information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious or jocular one?
"Captain Layton : His question was ab.solutely serious, but when he said,
'Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?' and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must
estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't
heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished opera-
tions only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle in
his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or
words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete
ignorance as to their exact location.
"Mr. Sonnett : He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information
about those carriers?
[121] "Captain Layton : This incident has been impressed on my mind. I
do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement
to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't
so indicated their location."
S December 19. ifl :
It will be recalled that on December 3rd dispatches were sent by CNO to CincPac
and others advising that Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong,
Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London, had been ordered to destroy
the "purple" machine and most of the codes and ciphers.
Layton testified that at the time Admiral Kimmel asked him what the "purple
machine" was; that he did not know and made inquiry ; that he advised Admiral
Kimmel that it was the Japanese diplomatic electrical coding machine; that he
did not then know whether or not the Japanese consul at Hawaii had such a
machine ; and, that he subsequently learned that the Japanese consul there did not
have such a machine.
The communication intelligence summary delivered on the 3rd, covering the 2nd,
stated generally that the most prominent factor in the traffic was the apparent
confusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet.
There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it
had appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao radio received the
same dispatch that it had previously sent. It was stated that ComSIXTEP^N had
reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area, and that Takao radio was broad-
casting traffic to these fleets. The broadcast, it was said, was not uncovered at
ComFOURTEEN and contrary to the location report, there was one indication
that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several instances, Takao radio
forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. It was said that "Summing up all
reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of Second, Third
and First Fleet units, has left Empire waters, but is either not close enough to
Takao for good communications or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao."
It was further stated, "The change of calls on December 1st has prevented this
office from making definite statement as of this date of the units now in the south-
ern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai radio handled a consid-
erable amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined for units
in the Takao area." Also it was pointed out generally that "There was a very
high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat
and Tokyo." As to the First Fleet, it was stated that despite the lack of positive
identifications, the First Fleet appeared relatively quiet and that "from inconclu-
sive evidence, it appears as if there may have been a split in the original or normal
combined fleet staff and that these may be two supreme commanders with staffs.
As an example, traffic routing indicates one combined fleet call associated with the
Second and Third Fleets, and apparently in company, while another combined
fleet call appears not associated with the Second and Third Fleets." As to the
Second Fleet, it was stated "No units have stood out prominently in [122]
the last two or three days. This is probably due to lack of new identifications, but
contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is under-
way in company." As to the Third Fleet, it said there was nothing to report.
As to the Mandates, it was said that the association of submarine force and Fourth
Fleet continued.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2331
Concerning carriers, this summary stated, "Almost a complete blank of infor-
mation on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this
lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially
identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has
been recovered, it is evidence that carrier traffic is at a low ebb." This summary
was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.
// December J 941:
On 4 December 1941, OpNav sent a dispatch (Exhibit 21, Naval Court) to
NavStaGuam for action, and to CincAF, CincPac, ComFOURTKEN, and Com-
SIXTEEN for information stating:
"Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified
matter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence retain-
ing minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with
CINCAF CINCPAC COMFOURTEEN COMSIXTEEN and OPNAV X Be pre-
pared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain X
Report crypto channels retained."
ComSIXTEEN advised, in a dispatch received on December 4th, that seven
transports had been sighted off Saigon on 15 November 1941, and on the 20th a
seaplane carrier northeast of Amoy.
The Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, advised, in a dispatch received 4
December, that several large liners had been carrying supplies and personnel to
the Carolines, that 3.(X)0 laborers had landed at Jaluit and that certain islands
were being specially developed.
The Naval Attache, Tokyo, advised in a dispatch received this day that a trans-
port loaded with aircraft and another with naval personnel had left Yokahama on
27 November 1941.
The previous day's communication intelligence summary stated under the head-
ing "General," that traffic volume was normal with receiving conditions good.
The present state of call recovery did not permit much detailed information to be
obtained. The extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slowed up
identification of even these units. Very few units had been positively identified
so far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long dispatches to
the Commanders in Chief, Combined, Second, and Third Fleets. Tokyo intelli-
gence originated nine [J 23] dispatches to the same addresses. It was
stated that the presence of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, in Taiwan
waters was not revealed by radio traffic. It was stated that it was the impression
that both the Second and Third Fleets were underway, but that this was not veri-
fied by radio intelligence means. It was also stated that there were some Fourth
Fleet units in the ^Marshall Islands but their identity was not known. It was
stated also that there was "no information on submarines or carriers." This
summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.
5 December 1941:
Tliere were no dispatches of an intelligence nature received by CincPac. The
previous day's communication intelligence summary stated that in general traffic
volume was normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao radio instituted a fleet
broadcast system using the prefix UTU in heading so that there were two fieet
broadcasts now in oi)eration. So far only a few jiiessages had been placed on the
Takao broadcast. There were a large number of urgent messages, most of these
from Tokyo to the major commanders. Tokyo intelligence originated messages
to the Chiefs of Staff. China Fleet. Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China
Fleet, French Indo-China Force, and same. In all, this activity sent twelve mes-
sages to the major commanders. As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated "The
outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the Commander in
Chief, Second Fleet, and Commander in Chief, Third Fleet. These previously very
talkative commanders are now very (juiet. While the fleet calls are not yet well
identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be a.scribed to that.
These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that
the Commander in Chief. Second Fleet, is in the vicinity of Takao and that the
apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broad-
cast, which CincSecond Fleet is still copying." As to the Fourth Fleet, it was
stated that the Commander in Chief sent a message to various units and that no
further check could be made on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls
and that Jaluit appeared many times in the day's traffic, being associated with
Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo radio and an oil tanker. As to South China,
it was stated that Bako continued as an active originator addressing many mes-
2332 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traflSc between South China commanders,
all units in that area were quiet. This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel.
6 December 1941:
Several dispatches dated 6 December 1941 were found in the CincPac files, but
it does not aiJpear whether or not they were received prior to the attack. One
was an OpNav dispatch authorizing CincPac to direct the destruction of secret and
confidential documents at our outlying islands "in view of the international situ-
ation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands." (Exhibit 22,
Naval Court). Other dispatches dated the 6th, from the Naval Observer at Wel-
lington, advised of Japanese destruction of codes ; from the Assistant Naval
Attache, Shanghai, advised of the departure south of Japanese troops and increase
of Japanese gendarmerie force in Shanghai ; and, from CincAF, advised of a
[124] 25-ship convoy, a 10-ship convoy, and 3 ships, off Saigon, French Indo-
China, all of which appeared to be headed in a westerly direction, also 30 ships
and a cruiser were sighted in Camranh Bay.
The radio intelligence summary for 5 December, which was delivered on the
6th, was the last summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel before the attack. It
stated in general that traffic volume was hevay. All circuits were overloaded
with Tokyo broadcasts going over full 24 hours. Tokyo Mandates circuit in
duplex operations. These were .several new intercept schedules heard. It was
noted that some traffic being broadcast was several days old which indicated the
uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio organization. There were many
messages of high precedence which appeared to be caused by the jammed condi-
tion of all circuits. A plain language message was sent by the captain of the
OKAWA from Tokyo to Takao, probably for further relay, addressed to the Chief
of the Political Affairs Bureaii saying, "In reference to the Far Eastern crisis
what you said is considered important to this end, but proceed with what you are
doing, specific orders will be issued soon."
As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that neither the Second nor Third Fleet
Commanders had originated any traffic. They were .still frequently addressed but
were receiving their traffic over broadcasts. It was stated that "They are un-
doubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly
all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force
has been see^i either."
There was no traffic from the Third Fleet, but some traffic to that fleet. There
was also some traffic to the Fourth Fleet addressed at Jaluit, strengthening the
impression that the Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet, was in the Marshalls. As
to South China, there was much traffic addressed to the Commander in Chief,
Second Fleet, by Sama. Bako continued as an active originator with many dis-
patches to the Second and Third Fleets. The Commander Combined Air Force
appeared to be busy with the movement of air corps, several of which were moving
probably to Indo-China.
[125] Findings.
29. Naval Intelligence was effectively organized to acquire information from
coded diplomatic messages between the Japanese Government and its repre-
sentatives. Through the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages and their
decryption and translation in Washington, D. C, prior to the attack, knowledge
was obtained on the Government's actual views concerning the diplomatic
situation, of the Japanese Government's intention to wage war, and of the fact
that hostilities were impending and imminent.
30. The information acquired in Washington through the interception of
Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately and promptly disseminated at
Washington by Naval and military Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, to the Army Chief of Staff, to the State Department, and to the President.
31. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had to rely upon the Chief of
Naval Operations for information as to the status of the diplomatic negotia-
tions with the Jaj)anese, and had requested to be kept fully informed on this
subject.
32. The Japanese diplomatic messages, acquired by Naval Intelligence at
Washington were not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as
such. Reasons advanced for this course of action were that the Japanese might
intercept the naval messages and learn of the Navy's success in decrypting
Japanese (^odes; that the volume of intercepted messages was so great that the
transmission of them, particularly during the critical period, would have over-
taxed the Navy's communications facilities,; and, that it was the duty of the
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2333
Chief of Naval Operations to evaluate such information and to advise CincPae
of the important facts learned.
33. Various of the warning messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operations
to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based on the information ob-
tained from intercepted J'apanese messages.
34. The warnings sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during No-
vember (particularly the "war warning" of the 27th) and early December, 1941,
indicated in unmistakable language that the diplomatic negotiations had ceased,
that war with Japan was imminent, and that Japanese attacks might occur
at any moment.
35. The Chief of Naval Operations did not advise the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, of certain intercepted Japanese messages indicating interest in
the location of ships ifi Pearl Harbor. These were more specific than other
intercepted messages indicating Japanese interest in the movements of ships
to or from other ports.
[126] 36. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was not fully advised of
certain other information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages after
the November 2f7th "war warning," which made further evident the termination
in fact of the diplomatic negotiations and the Japanese intention to wage war.
S7. On the morning of 7 December 1941, there was brought to the attention of
the Chief of Naval Operations an intercepted message in which the Japanese
(government instructed its representatives to present to the State Department
at 1 p. m. the Japanese Government's final reply terminating the diplomatic
negotiations. Mention was made of the fact that 1 p. m. Washington time was
about dawn at Honolulu and about the middle of the night in the Far East,
No one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor.
38. This so-called "1 p. m. delivery message," which consisted of one sen-
tence, had been intercepted at a naval radio intercept station at Bainbridge Island
in the State of Washington and forwarded to the Navy Department by teletype.
It was decrypted and available in the Navy Department at about 0700 on
December 7th. It was sent to the Army for translation because there was no
Japanese translator on duty in the Navy Department at that time. The trans-
lation, which could have been done by a qualified translator in a few minutes,
was not received from the Army until after 0900.
39. Although he was in possession of this highly significant information sev-
eral hours before the attack, and there were available means whereby the
information could have been transmitted to Admiral Kimmel immediately,
including a "scrambler" telephone maintained by the Army, Admiral Stark
initially was not disposed to, and did not, send any message to Admiral Kimmel.
Instead he relied on the transmission of a message by the War Department to
General Short, which was to be furnished also to Admiral Kimmel.
40. Admiral Stark has previously testified that he did not consider it nec-
essary to telephone to Admiral Kimmel on the morning of 7 December and
that he had not telephoned at any time previous to the attack, but that one
regret which he ha3 was that he had not telephoned a message that morning to
Admiral Kimmel or paralleled the Army message on the naval radio system.
41. The message sent by General Marshall on 7 December 1941; which was
received after the attack, advised that the Japanese were presenting an ulti-
matum at 1 p. m., that they were under orders to destroy their code machine,
that it was not known just what significance the hour set might have but that
the addressees were to be on the alert accordingly, and that the naval authori-
ties were to be informed.
42. The warnings which were sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific -Fleet,
Indicated, as to the possible places of Japanese attack, on November 24th, that
"a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the
Philippines or Guam, is a possibility," and, on November 27th, that "an aggressive
movement by the Japanese is expected [127] within the next few days.
The number and equipment of Japanese troops and organization of naval task
forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or
Kra F*eninsula, or possibly Borneo."
43. Although the warnings which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations
to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, drew attention to probable Japanese
objec'tives to the southward and southeastward of Japan, and did no* specifically
mention Pearl Harbor, both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were aware of the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor. They did not regard such an attack as probable.
2334 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
44. The Japanese established several codes in November, 1941, which were to
be used in radio transmissions to convey to their representatives information
concerning the status of relations between Japan and the United States, and other
countries. These were known as the "winds" code and the "hidden word" code.
The "winds" code was designed to indicate a break in diplomatic reUitions, or
possibly war, with England or the United States or Russia by the use in weather
broadcasts of certain Japanese words signifying wind directions.
45. The interception of a "winds" me.ssage relating to the United States during
the first week of December. IWl, would not have conveyed any information of
significance which the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, did not already have.
46. No message in the "winds" code relating to the United States was received
by any of the watch oflBcers in the Navy Department to whom such a message
would have come had it been received in the Navy Department. No such message
was intercepted by the radio intelligence units at I'earl Harbor or in the Philip-
pines, although intensive efforts were made by those organizations to intercept
such a niesage. The evidence indicates further that no such message was inter-
cepted by the British or the Dutch, despite their efforts to intercept such a
message. Neither the Fleet Intelligence OflBcer of the Asiatic Fleet nor the Fleet
Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet nor the Intelligence Officer of the Far
Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, recalled any such message.
The Chief of Naval Operatiohs. the Director of Naval Connuunications, and the
Director of Naval Intelligence recalled no such message. Testimony to the
effect that a "winds" code message was received prior to the attack was given
by Captain Safford, in charge of Op-20-G, a connuunications security section at
the Navy Department, who stated that such a message was received on December
3rd or 4th, that it related to the United States, and that no copy could be found
in the Navy or Army files. In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain Safford
named, in addition to himself, three other officers who. he stated, recalled having
seen and read the "winds" nies.sage. ?]ach of those officers testified that he had
never seen such a message. The only other testimony to the effect that a "winds"
message was received was by Captain Kramer, an intelligence officer assigned
to Op-20-G, who said that ho recalled that there was a message but could not
recall whether or not it related to the United States or England or Russia. It
may be noted that until he testified in this [128] investigation, Captain
Kramer erorneously thought that a "hidden word" message intercepted on the
morning of December 7th had been a "winds" message.
47. On the morning of December 7th. the intercepted "hidden word" code mes-
sage was translated by Kramer. In his haste, due to the necessity of delivering
other messages, including the "1 p. m. delivery message," he overlooked a code
word relating to the United States and translated the message as meaning only
that "relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expecta-
tions." He testified that he later discovered the error and a few minutes before
1 p. m. on December 7th, he telephoned the correction to his superior officer in
the Office of Naval Intelligence and to an officer of Army Military Intelligence.
48. Except for the omission of the United States, the "hidden word" code
message was literally translated and did not sufficiently refiect previous diplo-
matic interceptions which indicated that the message was to convey the idea of
a crisis involving the countries in question.
49. The sources of intelligence as to the Japanese which the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, had prior tu the attack included, in addition to the Chief of
Naval Operations, the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval
District, and the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet.
50. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the FOUR-
TEENTH Naval District, the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General and
the Japanese Vice Consul at Honolulu were tapped for some months prior to the
attack. These were discontinued on 2 December 1941 because the District Intel-
ligence Officer feared that the existence of such taps might be discovered, result-
ing in undesirable complications. No information of military or naval signifi-
cance was obtained by means of the telephone taps.
51. On 6 December 1941 the local representative of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation at Honolulu delivered to the District Intelligence Officer a tran-
script of a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation between a person in Hono-
lulu named "Mori" and a person in Japan,. This was examined by the District
Intelligence Officer. It was decided that the conversation should be further
studied by a Japanese linguist of the District Intelligence Office, who was to
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2335
listen to the recording of the conversation. This was not done until after the
attack. The transcript furnished on December Gth indicated tliat tlie person in
Japan was interested, among other tilings, in the daily llights of airplanes from
Honolulu and in the number of ships present. During the conversation, refer-
ences were made to flowers, which, it now appears, may have been code words
signifying the presence or absence of ships, and a method of conveying informa-
tion to the approaching Japanese ships, which presumably would have been
listening in on the conversation. Prior investigations indicate that the "Mori
conversation" was also brought to the attention of General Short on 6 December
1941.
[129] 52. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the
FOURTEENTH Naval District, copies of various cable messages from and to
the Japanes»e Consul General at Honolulu, via a commercial communications
company, were obtained during the tirst week of December, 1941. This was
the first time that such messages had been obtained. The messages were in
code and efforts were made immediately to decrypt and translate them. Some
messages were decrypted before the attack. These contained no information of
particular significance.
53. No information secured at Oahu prior to the attack by means of the
telephone taps or through the interception of messages of the Japanese Consul
General indicated the likelihood of war or of an attack on Pearl Harbor.
54. One of the Japanese Consul General's messages, which was obtained by
the District Intelligence Officer and turned over on 5 December 1{>41 to the Radio
Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation, was a message dated December
3rd. This message was in a Japanese code known as the "PA-K2." It was
decrypted and translated by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor after
the attack. The message was one in which the Japanese Consul General advised
of a change in a method which had been established for communication by visual
signals from Oahu, whereby lights in houses on the beach, the use of a sailboat,
certain want ads to be broadcast over a local radio station, and bonfires, would
convey information as to the presence or absence of various types of warships
of the Pacific Fleet. Although the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor
was unable to decrypt this message prior to the attack, the message was decrypted
and translated in rough form on 6 December 1941 by a civilian translator in
Op-20-G of the Navy Department in Washington. That section had received
the message from an Army radio intercept station at Fort Hunt. Virginia. Cap-
tain Kramer testified he had no specific recollection of having seen this transla-
tion prior to the attack, but the evidence indicates that the rough translation
was shown to him on the afternoon of December 6th and that due to the pi-essure
of work on other important Japanese diplomatic messages, no action was taken
on the translation until 8 December 1941.
55. On 2 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu received a
coded message from Tokyo which stated that in view of the existing situation,
the presence of ships in port was of utmost importance, that daily reports were
to be submitted, that the reports should advise whether or not there were
observation balloons at Pearl Harbor, and whether or not the warships were
provided with anti-torpedo nets. This message was intercepted by an Army
radio intercept station at Fort Shafter. Hawaii, and apparently was forwarded
by mail to the War Department for decryption and translation. The translation
supplied by the Army indicates that the message was translated on 30
December 1941.
56. On the afternoon of 6 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at
Honolulu sent two messages in the "PA-K2" code which indicated the likelihood
of an air attack. The first reported that there were no signs of barrage balloon
equipment at Pearl Harbor, that in all probability there was considerable oppor-
tunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, Hickam,
Ford, and Ewa, and that the battleships [ISO] did not have torpedo nets.
The second message reported on the ships at anchor on December 6th, and
stated that it appeared that no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the
Fleet air arm. These messages were not obtained by Naval Intelligence at
Honolulu prior to the attack. They were, however, both intercepted by an
Army intercept station at San Francisco and were forwarded by teletype to the
Army. The translations of these messages furnished by the Army indicate that
they were translated on December Sth. They could have been decrypted and
translated in the Navy Department in about an hour and a half.
2336 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
57. There were no formal arrangements whereby the Navy communicated to
the Army estimates of the location and movements of Japanese naval forces.
Officers of the Far Eastern Section of Military Intelligence at Washington had
access to charts maintained in the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval
Intelligence showing such information, and had access to radio intelligence
information available in the Navy Department, and the situation was discussed
with them. At Pearl Harbor, an intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Air Force
received some general information concerning Japanese movements from the
Fleet Intelligence Officer.
58. The War Department had information which led that Department to
believe that Japanese naval forces were In the Marehalls in November, 1941.
This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General
Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic
reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information,
among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The recon-
naissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.
59. On 27 November 1941, a Pacific Fleet Intelligence bulletin was distributed
by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to his command. This bulletin set
forth the available information concerning the organization of the Japanese
Navy. It revised an earlier bulletin on the same subject and pointed out that
the principal change was a further increase in the number of fieet commands.
This arose from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into
separate forces. The bulletin stated, among other things, that the Japanese
Carrier Fleet consisted of ten carriers which were organized into five divisions,
each having two carriers.
60. Current information, derived from traffic analyses, concerning the location
and movements of Japanese naval forces was obtained by the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer, who received it primarily from
the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor. Such information also was con-
tained in dispatches from the Radio Intelligence Unit in the Philippines and
from the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence in Washington, D. C.
61. Fortnightly Intelligence bulletins were issued by the Office of Naval
Intelligence and mailed to the Pacific Fleet, among others. These included sum-
maries of the information concerning Japanese naval forces which had been
received from the Radio Intelligence Units at Pearl Harbor and at the
Philippines.
[131] 62. On November 26th, ComFOURTEEN sent a dispatch to OpNav,
information to CincPac, CincAF, and ComSIXTEEN, which summarized the
information as to Japanese naval movements obtained by the Radio Intelligence
Unit at Pearl Harbor during the preceding month. The dispatch indicated that
the Commander Second Fleet had been organizing a task force comprising units
of various fleets. This dispatch stated that there was believed to be a strong
concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls, which included at
least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a carrier), plus probably one-
third of the submarine fleet. The estimate was that a strong force might be
preparing to operate in southeastern Asia while component parts might operate
from Palo and the Marshalls.
63. The radio intercepts by the radio Intelligence unit located in the Philip-
pines were considered by OpNav to be the most reliable because of the location
of the unit. On 26 November 1941, the radio intelligence unit in the Philippines,
in a dispatch to CincPac, OpNav and others, commented on the above dispatch
of ComFOURTEEN and stated that traffic analysis for the past few days had
indicated that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, was directing various fleet
units in a loose-knit task force that apparently would be divided into two sections.
The first section was expected to operate in the South China area. The second
section was expected to operate in the Mandates. It was estimated that the
second section included "Car Div 3, RYUJO, and one MARU." This dispatch
also stated that the ComSIXTEEN unit could not confirm the supposition that
carriers and submarines in force were in the Mandates, and that their best
indications were that all known carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. It
was stated that this evaluation was considered to be reliable.
64. From time to time after November 27th, there were sighting reports from
the Asiatic Fleet and other observers, copies of which were received by Admiral
Kimmel, which confirmed the movement of important Japanese naval forces to
the southward of Japan. These, however, did not report the movement of
carriers.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2337
65. After November 27th, the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor con-
tinued the practice of preparing daily summaries of the information received
through their traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications, which were
submitted to Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, for transmittal to Admiral
Kimmel on the following morning. Admiral Kimmel received and initialed these
summaries daily on and after 27 November. On December 6th, he initialed
the summary dated December 5th, which was the last one he received prior to the
attack.
66. On November 28th, Admiral Kimmel received a communication intelli-
gence summary dated November 27th, which stated, among other things, that
there was no further information on the presence of a carrier division in the
Mandates and that "carriers were still located in home waters." The next
day, he received the November 28th summary which indicated, among other
things, the view that the Japanese radio intelligence net was [132] operat-
ing at full strength upon U. S. Naval communications and "IS GETTING
RESULTS." There was no information set forth in the summary as to car-
riers. On the following day. Admiral Kimmel received the summary dated
November 29th, which, among other things, indicated that Carrier Division 3
was under the immediate command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet.
On December 1st, Admiral Kimmel received the previous day's summary which
stated as to carriers that the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indi-
cated the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this had
not been confirmed.
67. The December 1st summary, which Admiral Kimmel received stated that
all Japanese service radio calls of forces afloat had changed promptly at 0000
on 1 December ; that previously service calls had been changed after a period
of six months or more and that calls had been last changed on 1 November
1941. This summary stated, and was underscored by Admiral Kimmel, that
"The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional
progressive step in preparing for operations on a large scale." It also stated,
among other things, that a large number of submarines were believed to be
east of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan, and as to carriers that there was
"no change."
68. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel examined a memorandum which
Layton had prepared on December 1st at his request. This contained Layton's
estimate, on the basis of all available information, of the location of Japanese
naval forces. This estimate placed in the Bako-Takao area Carrier Division 4
and Carrier Division 3, which included four carriers, and the "KASUGA MARU"
(believed to have been a converted carrier). The estimate placed one carrier
"KORYU ( ?) plus plane guards" in the Marshalls area.
69. Layton's written estimate made no mention of Japanese Carrier Divisions
1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission was deliberate. The reason
was that Layton considered that the information as to the location of those
carriers was not sufficent to warrant a reliable estimate of their whereabouts.
70. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Layton had the following
conversation :
"Captain Layton. As best I recall it. Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You
don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?" and I replied,
'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where
they are. The rest of the.se units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then
Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern
countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean
to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?'
or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before
now,' or words to that effect." * * *
[133] "Captain Latton : His question was absolutely serious, but when
he said, 'Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?' and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but
if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since'
we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they
fini.shed operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a
twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond
Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my
complete ignorance as to their exact location."
"Captain Layton. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not
say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to
me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't
so indicated their location."
2338 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
71. The December 2nd radio intelligence summary, which was delivered to Ad-
miral Kimmel on December 3rd, stated as to carriers : ■*
"Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of
identitication has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since
over 2lK) service calls have been partially identified since the change on the
first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that
carrier traffic is at a low ebb."
72. The radio intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December
4th stated, in part, "No information on submarines or carriers." The summary
delivered on December 5th made no mention of carriers. The summary delivered
on December 6th stated, in part, "No traffic from the Commander Carriers or
Submarine Force has been seen either."
[134] Confidential
IV
RECONNAISSANCE
A. The ResponsibiUiy for Long Dii^tarwe Reconnaissance,
1. The Navy's obligation. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan
(Exhibit 80>, which was in effect prior to the attack, the Navy was responsible
for long distance reconnaissance.
Annex VII, Section VI, to the joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan made
provision for joint air action by the Army and Navy for defen.se against hostile
raids or air attacks to a declaration of war. Under this agreement, if the
naval aircraft were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations
and Army aircraft were made available, the Army aircraft were to be ustf^
by the Navy. This plan was implemented by the Naval Base Defense Air Force
Plan, under which Admiral Bellinger would command the Navy and Army patrol
planes. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defen.se Plan and
the Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan were not operative prior to the attack.
An agreement between the Coiunianding General and ComFOURTEEN that
threat of a hostile attack was inuninent was a prerequisite to the operation of
Annex VII, Section VI. No such agreement was made prior to the attack.
2. Control of the Pacific Fleet patrol phines. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes
were actually under the control and operating in accordance with the orders
of Admiral Kimmel. Thus, on November 22nd he approved the schedules for the
employment of those planes, which remained in effect up to the time of the
attack. His responsibility for the operations of the patrol planes, which were
under the command of Commander, Task Force Nine, of the Pacific Fleet, is
further indicated by the fact that he directed search oiierations by those planes
at Midway and Wake.
Admiral Bellinger, who commanded Task Force Nine, which consisted of Patrol
Wings One and Two of the Fleet, was under the counnand of ComFOURTEEN
only when the Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was activated for the purpose
of drills.
The responsibility for the employment of the fleet patrol planes was, as Admiral
Kimmel testified before the Naval Court, his responsibility and was accepted
by him. He testified further that Admiral Bloch had asked for the dispatch of
patrol planes for a search if he had felt that it was necessary. In this connection
it should be noted that on October 17, 1941, Admiral Bloch had asked for certain
Fleet utility planes to be used for inshore patrol and that they were not made
available to him (Exhibit 46. Naval Court). It should be noted that ComFOUR-
TEEN had no planes assigned to him.
Admiral Bellinger testified that he was responsible for the operation of the
Fleet planes in accordance with the orders of Admiral [135] Kimmel.
He said, however, that it was not his responsibility to decide whether or not long
range reconnaissance should be conducted. Rear Admiral A. C. Davis, who was
the Fleet Air Officer on CincPac's staff in 1941, testified before Admiral Hart
that his duties were primarily, if not almost entirely, concerned with technical
training and logistic matters .
3. Conferences after 21 November 19^1 concerning reconnaissance. There is
no evidence that on or after 27 November 1941 the necessity or advisability of long
distance reconnaissance was specifically discussed between Admiral Kimmel and
any member of his Staff or Task Force Commanders. Admiral McMorris, the
War Plans Officer, testified that he thought the subject was discussed, but that
he could recall no specific conference dealing with this subject. Admiral Bellinger
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2339
testified that there was no such conference in which he participated. Admiral
Kimniel's testimony before the Naval Court was to the elfect that on November
27th he decide<l not to conduct long range reconnaissance. It is signiiicant that
Captain Layton, who was the Fleet Intelligence Officer, stated that he did not
tell Admiral Kinunel prior to December 7th that aerial reconnaissance from Oahu
would be advisable in view of the available intelligence because he knew that
reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet patrol planes. He said that he
was not familiar with the extent of the reconnaissance, but definitely believed
that reconnaissance was being conducted. Neither the Chief of Staff nor the
Assistant Chief of Staff and Operations Officer could recall any discussion of the
advisabili*^y or necessity for long range reconnaissance from Oahu between No-
vember 27th and December 7th.
B. Reconnaissance Conducted from Oahu.
Although the schedules for the Fleet patrol planes (Exhibit 37) did not pro-
A'ide for any reconnaissance from Oalm, the Fleet Security Letter (Exhibit 8 NC)
directed that there be a patrol of the Fleet operating areas. The Fleet operating
areas were thirty miles to the south of Oahu.
During the period 30 November to 7 December 1941, certain searches were flown
from Wake and Midway. The extent of these searches api)ears in Exhibit 50A
of this investigation. One squadron had been sent to Midway on the 3()th of
November and searched en route; another squadron had been sent from Midway
to Wake on the 1st of December and returned to Pearl Harbor prior to the attack,
searching en route (Exhibit r)0, 5(»A).
Prior to 7 December 1941 the last daily long distance reconnaissance flown
from Oahu was in tlie summer of 1941. According to Admiral Bloch's previous
testimony some time during the sununer of 1941, on the basis of some intelli-
gence or information which he could not recall, lie asked Admiral Kimmel to direct
reconnaissance on a section towards Jaluit and this was done for several days.
Admiral Kimmel recalled that such reconnaissance had been rtown for a few
days on the line from Jaluit to I'earl Harbor and stated that they had in mind
that they might catch a submarine on the surface out there and perhaps any
other vessel there. Despite thorough examination of the available records of
I'atwing Two, of the CincPac opei-ation files, of the ComFOURTEEN files, of
the CincPac secret dispatches for 1941 and confidential and restricted dispatches
for June, July, and August. 1941, no record of this reconnaissance could be found.
None of the witnesses examined recalled the reconnaissance or the reasons for
it.
[J36] C. Proposed Arm]/ Reconnaissance to Jaluit.
In the Army report it was stated that on November 26th the Army directed
General Short to send two B-24's to Jaluit on a reconnaissance mission to look
for various things, including ships. However, the Army report does not state
whether this reconnaissance actually took place.
Before the Roberts' Committee, (ieneral Gerow said that reiK)rts had been
received of Japanese concentrations in the Mandated Islands and they assumed
that every effort was being made to identify any Japanese movements in that
direction. He stated that those two B-24's were sent out with an idea of trying
to confirm information that had been received from other soui-ces. If no recon-
nai.ssance at all were done after the Army's me.ssage to General Short which
directed such recomiaissance as he deemed necessary, General Gerow said that
would have been considered a failure to obey orders.
The status of this leconnaissance has been quite definitely confirmed by Cap-
tain Layton's testimony in this investigation. In the latter part of November,
1941, Captain Layton stated, either Admiral Kimmel directed him to establish c(m-
tact with the Hawaiian Air Force pertaining to this reconnaissance or else his
opposite number. Colonel Haley, came to him with the infoi-mation of the pend-
ing reconnaissance and requested his assistance towards delineating the api>ro-
priate objectives and to furnish the pilots and crews with intelligence material for
briefing. He was also ivquested to assist in the projected recomiaissance. The
reconnaissance mifortunately never materialized, he stated, because only one
plane arrived and there were delays due to uncomi)leted camera installations.
He was never informed that one plane had arrived, but later learned that it was
destroyed in the attack on Hickam Field. The Navy was extremely anxious that
the reconnaissance be made at the earliest possible date, and Admiral Kimmel,
2340 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
upon receipt of Captain Layton's ineniorandupi concerning information he had
obtained at the conference, asked him how soon the reconnaissance might be
expected. Captain Layton relayed Colonel Raley's answer to the Admiral to
the effect that the delay was due to non-installation or non-completion of in-
stallation of cameras and the time was still not definitely fixed. A photostatic
copy of a memorandum of November 2Stli from Captain Layton to Admiral Kimmel
concerning this reconnaissance api)ears in the record as Exhibit 28. l\irthermore,
Oaptain Layton was questioned as to hi>! knowledge of any discussion concerning
the possibility of the use of Navy pla'ies for this recoiniaissance. Captain Layton
replied that it was not discussed with him, but he thought that PBY '•Catalinas"
could not be used because their appearance over the Marshalls would have been
an overt act, wiiile the Army planes, on the other hand, would have been flying
ostensibly from Wake to Port Darwin en n>ute to the Philippines. Captain Layton
was particularly anxious that this reconnaissance be carried out to check on his
information as to the presence w absence of air strength and carriers and sub-
marines and naval concentrations in the Marshalls area, including Truk. This
was an ideal opi)<»rtnnity t(» establish the reliability of existing intelligence on
Japanese naval dispositions and developments in the Mandated Islands.
Admiral Bellinger recalled nothing concerning the proposed Army reconnais-
sance flight over the Mandated Islands.
[137] D. The Direction to Execute an Appropriate Defensive Deployment.
Among the tasks assigned to the Pacific Fleet by the Basic Navy War Plan
was to protect the tei-ritory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area by
destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying
the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere. It will be recalled
that the Pacific Fleet War Plan, which was designed to implement the Navy
Basic War Plans, provided, among other things, that in the event of war with
the Axis Powers, including or excluding Japan, the patrol planes of the Pacific
Fleet were to conduct the maxinuun recoiniaissance possible of the approaches
to Oahu. The Pacific Fleet Plan was not ordered to be executed prior to the
attack. On the 27th of November, however, in the war warning, which advised
that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within a few days, the Chief of
Naval Operations had directed Admiral Kimmel to "Execute an appropriate
defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."
On tlie following day, the Chief of Naval Operations, in his dispatch which
repeated the Army dispatch advising that hostilities were possible at any mo-
ment, had directed that Admiral Kimmel was to "Be prepared to carry out the
tasks assigned in WI'L-46."
Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court that as the result of the
"war warning,'' he continued the security measures already in effect (supra,
page 64) ; carried out the planned movements of carriers to Wake and Midwa.v,
with reconnaissance en route; carried out reconnais.sance at Midway and Wake;
increased security measures in fleet operating areas southward of Oahu ; and,
on November 28th, issued an order directing extreme vigilance against subma-
rines in operating areas and depth bombing of all contacts, suspected to be
hostile, in certain of the operating areas (page 5, Exhibit 70). There is no
evidence of any other specific action taken by Admiral Kinunel after 27 No-
vember 1941, in order to carry out the direction contained in the war warning
or the direction in the message of November 28th. It does appear that so far
as the Fleet patrol planes at Oahu were concerned, their training continued
along the same lines which had been followed prior to the "war warning."
,The testimony by Admiral McMorris, the War Plans Officer, and others in
this investigation, is to the effect that the establishment of long distance air
reconnaissance from Oahu would have been an "Appropriate defensive deploy-
ment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46."
It is interesting to note that the memoranda prepared by the War Plans
Ofiicer on November 30th and 5 December 1941, setting forth the action to be
taken if war developed with Japan in twenty-four or forty-eight hours, con-
tained no provision for the establishment of reconnaissance from Oahu (Ex-
hibit 69A and 69B, Naval Court). As Vice Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff,
testified, what they were thinking about in the Pacific was not the defense of
Pearl Harbor. They were thinking about the Fleet and the readiness of the
Fleet.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2341
E. The Reconnaissance that Could Have Been Flown.
A review of past reconnaissance during Admiral Kimmel's tour of duty sheds
no light on this problem because he testified that he had never attempted to
cover any large sector by long range reconnaissance and that a patrol out to
300 miles was almost useless unless as a Kuard against an air raid, although
any patrol has some value as far as surface ships are concerned. However,
his predecessor, Admiral Richardson, had established a distant patrol, "in view
of the fact that constant and repeated warnings were received of the possible
outbreak of the war in the immediate future" (p. 1053, Naval Court). This
patrol, he said, was designated to cover [138] a given sector adequately
and was rotated daily. The sector which was primarily covered more ade-
quately and frequently than any other was from 170° to the westward to about
350". That to the eastward was not covered.
Admiral Richardson also testified that this patrol would not have been ade-
quate to positively detect an approaching combat force having as its intention
the delivery of an attack early in the morning, but that it certainly would have
made the attack more difficult. These patrols were discontinued when or
shortly before Admiral Kinimel relieved Admiral Richardson.
Admiral Bellinger's testimony on the reconnaissance that could have been
flown during the critical period is obviously the most valuable on the subject.
He stated that after October 28th, while there were 107 VP assigned to all
units of Aircraft Scouting Force, only eighty-one were available. Of these,
fifty-four had just arrived and were the PBY-.j type, with limited available
spare parts. The number of plane crews did not quite equaP the number of
planes available. If one could consider eighty-one planes available, and assum-
ing that there would have been none lost because of breakdowns requiring spare
parts, it would have been practicable to use one-third, about twenty -seven planes,
for daily patrol. Each plane could cover a sector of eight degrees with a radius
of 700 miles, totalling approximately 216 degrees daily. This, however, would
have been the absolute niaximnni because of the lack of sutRcient crews and
spare parts. 144 degrees could have been covered daily based on the use of
eighteen planes daily of the fifty-four new PBY-5's. Actually, on 7 December
1941 there were in all only sixty-one planes available at Oahu, one squadron
of which had just returned from Midway and AVake and required overhaul.
This left forty-nine planes actually available, one-third of which would have
been able to cover 128 degrees.
Admiral Bellinger testified that if he had received a directive from Admiral
Kimmel during the first week of December, 1941, to conduct 360 degrees recon-
naissance with the available Navy planes, it would have been possible to main-
tain such reconnaissance for not more than four or five days. His estimate of
the duration of the daily 128-degree search was that it could have been flown
until the failure of planes and the lack of spare parts reduced the planes to such
an extent that further reconnaissance was impossible. It appears that such
reconnaissance could have been carried on for an indefinite period and Admiral
Bellinger's "^'ague" estimate was that it could have been carried on for several
weeks.
Admiral Davis testified before Admiral Hart that : "There were not enough
planes and pilots to establish and maintain a long range, 360 degree search
indefinitely, or even for more than a limited time. There were., however, enough
to approximate this by using relatively short range planes in the least dan-
gerous sectors, and by obtaining some assistance by available Army aircraft,
so that I think it could have been undertaken, had it been considered essential,
on the basis that reenforcements could have arrived before personnel and
materiel fatigue set in. Unless reenforcements arrived, it could not have been
maintained."
[139] F. The Sectors Which Would Have Been Cornered.
Had partial .reconnaissance been flown from Oahu during the first week of
December, 1941, it appears that the northern sectors would have been covered.
Admiral Bellinger testified that he considered the northern sectors as the most
dangerous sectors primarily because of the prevailing winds which would facilitate
carrier-ba.^ed plane operations in that sector. He stated that had tlie normal plan
been carried out after the attack, on December 7th patrol planes would have
searched the northern sector, and that some few planes did search that sector.
But there had been searches made to the south because of information received
from CincPac to the effect that a radio bearing indicated that the attacking force
was to the .south.
2342 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[I4O] Findings.
73. Other than radio intelligence and sighting reports from other sources, the
only practicai)le way by which the Comniander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, could have
obtained information as to the location or movements of Japanese naval forces
from 27 November to 7 December 1941 was by long distance air reconnaissance.
74. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the Navy had the obligation,
through Com 14, to conduct distance reconnaissance, and under Annex VII, Section
VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, naval forces were to be supple-
mented by available Army aircraft if the naval aircraft were insuflBcient for long
distance patrol and search oi^eratlons. As previously pointed out, the latter plan
was not in operation l)ecause an agreement between the Commanding General
and Com 14 that threat of a hostile attack was imminent was a prerequisite and
no such agreement had been made prior to the attack. Tlie Naval Base Defense
Air Force Plan, which implemented the agreements for joint Army-Navy air
action, similarly was not operative prior to the attack.
75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only
Navy planes .suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific Fleet patrol
planes.
76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral Kimmel,
and he had the re.spon.sil)ility for their utilization. They were operated after 22
November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by him at that time, which
were not revised prior to the attack. The" schedules stressed training operations.
They did not provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu.
77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he decided
on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.
78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral Kimmel
and members of his staff on or after the receipt of tiie "war warning", as to the
advisability or practicability of long range reconnaissance from Oahu. The War
Plans OflBcer thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could recall
no si)ecific discussion. The Connnander of the Fleet i>atrol planes, who had not
been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral
Kimmel had no such discussion with him.
79. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger, Commander, Fleet Patrol Planes,
and General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, which was used
as a basis for the joint Army-Navy agreements, was prophetic in its estimate
that in the event of attack on Hawaii, the most likely and dangerous form of at-
tack would be an air attack to be launched at dawn from carriers about 200 miles
from Oahu. This estimate stated that the action open as a counter-measure
included daily patrols as far as possible from Oahu. to sectors through 360 degrees,
to reduce the possibilities of surface or air surprise. It further stated that such
[Ikl] patrols could be effectively maintained with the personnel and material
available at the time (March. 1941) for a very short period and that such
patrols were not practicable unless other intelligence indicated that a surface
raid was probable within narrow limits of time. According to Admiral Bellinger,
it was realized by the responsible oflBcers of the Pacific Fleet that another course
of action which was always open was to fly a patrol of less than 360 degrees,
with the available aircraft, covering the more dangerous sectors.
80. A daily search of the Fleet operating areas to the southward of Oahu was
being carried out prior to the attack, in accordance with the provisions of the
Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in oijerating areas.
81. No distant reconnaissance was flown from Oahu during the critical i)eriod
27 November to 7 December 1941. The last previous distant reconnaissance
flown from Oahu appears to have been for several days during the summer of
1941 on a sector toward Jaluit. This reconnaissance had been directed by Admiral
Kimmel at Admiral Bloch's request.
82. Late in November, 1941, the Army planned to conduct a reconnaissance
flight from Oahu to Jaluit and Truk, with the Navy assisting by providing intelli-
gence. The reconnaissance was not flown because the Army planes were not
made ready prior to the attack.
83. The Navy Basic War Plan assigned to the Pacific Fleet the task of pro-
tecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area by destroying
hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy
the u.se of land positions in that hemisphere. Under the pi'ovisions of Pacific
Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, when that plans bt^came effective, the Pacific
Fleet patrol planes were to maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy
forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area, having due regard for time
required for overhaul and repair of planes and for conservation of personnel.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2343
84. In the war warning of November 27th, which advised that negotiations with
Japan had ceased and that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within a
few days, the Chief of Naval Operations directed tht Admiral Kimmel "execute
an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks
assigned in WPL-46."
85. The dispatch of November 28th repeated an Army dispatch, which, among
other things, advised General Short that Japanese future action was unpredicta-
ble but that hostile action was possible at any moment. The Navy dispatch
directed that Admiral Kimmel was to undertake no offensive action until Japan
had committed an overt act and that he was to "be prepared to carry out tasks
assigned in WPL-46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur."
86. The establishment of long distance air reconnaissance from Oahu would
have been an "appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the
tasks assigned in WPL— 46."
[1-^2] 87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding
the attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance daily
for more than a few days.
88. Prior to the attack, requests had been made by the Pacific Fleet to the Navy
Department to increase the number of patrol planes assigned to the Fleet. Some
new replacement planes had been sent to the Fleet during October and November,
1941. Additional planes, as evidenced by the prompt arrival of reenforcements
after December 7th, could have been made available by the Navy Department, but
at the expense of defenses in other areas. The Ntevy Department presumably knpw
that the number of planes available at Oahu were not sufficient to conduct 360
degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days. The evidence in prior
investigations indicates that after November 27th, responsible officers in the
Navy Departmeent thought that reconnaissance was being conducted from Oahu
to the extent practicable with the planes available there.
89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available at
Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several
weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees to a distance of about 700
miles.
90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the most likely
sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese were to attack
Pearl Harbor.
91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27 Novem-
ber 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors probably would
have been searched.
um V
THE ATT.\CK ON PE.\RL HARBOR
A. Prelude: Japanese Suhmarines on 7 December 19Jil.
At 0342, 7 December 1941, the USS CONDOR, a minesweeper, sighted a sub-
marine periscope off the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor. This was in a defen-
sive sea area where American submarines had been restricted from ox)erating
submerged. When sighted, the .submarine was proceeding toward the entrance
Buoys. It was about 100 feet from and on a collision course with the CONDOR,
but turned sharply to port. The CONDOR simultaneously turned to starboard.
The CONDOR reported the incident by blinker to the* USS WARD between
0350 and 0358. The WARD was a destroyer of the Inshore Patrol then engaged
in patrol duty off the entrance to the harbor. The CONDOR then continued
on its assigned mission. The message to the WARD read :
"Sighted submerged submarine on westerly course, speed 9 knots."
After receiving this visual signal, the WARD made a sonar search for about
an hour and a half, without result. It then communicated by radio with the
CONDOR, asking:
"What was the approximate distance and course of the submarine that you
sighted?"
At 0520 the CONDOR replied :
"The course was about what we were steering at the time 020 magnetic and
about 1000 yards from the entrance apparently heading for the entrance."
In response to further inquiries made by the WARD between 0521 and 0536,
the CONDOR advised again that the last time it had sighted the submarine
was at about OSHO and that it was apparently headed for the entrance. On
receiving the message giving the submarine's course as about 020 magnetic, the
2344 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
captain of the WARD realized tiiat his searcli had been in the WTfong direction.
He then continued searching, but again without result.
The CONDOR made no report of the incident, except to the WARD. The
captain considered that the identification at that time was not positive enough
to make a rewrt to other than the Senior Officer Present Afloat. The Senior
Officer Present Afloat, Lieutenant Commander Outerbridge, who commanded
the WARD, made no report to higher authority. The captain of the WARD
thought that the CONDOR might have been mistaken in concluding that it had
seen a submarine.
The radio conversation betweeVi the WARD and CONDOR was overheard
and transcribed in the log of the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, a radio
station then under the jurisdiction of the Commander, Inshore Patrol, 14th
N. D. (Ex. 18). Since the conversation was solely [H4] between the
ships and was not addressed to the Section Base and no request was made that
it be relayed, the Bishop's Point Radio Station did not relay or report it to
higher authority. The loudspeaker watch on the same frequency, which was
maintained in the Comnmnications Office, 14th N. D., did not overhear or inter-
cept the WARD-CONDOR conversation.
At the entrance to Pearl Harbor there was stationed a gate-vessel charged
with opening and closing the net at the entrance. This anti-torpedo net was,
according to Admiral Bloch's previous testimony, 45 feet in depth. The deepest
part of the channel was 72 feet. A Japanese submarine subsequently recovered
was about 20 feet from keel to conning tower.
The instructions of the Captain of the Yard were that the net should be kept
closed from sunset to sunrise and opened only on orders from him, from the
Assistant Captain of the Yard, or from the Yard Duty Officer who could be
reached via the signal tower (Exhibit 43). The log of the gate-vessel indicates
that the net was opened and closed a number of times during the night of
December 6-7. At 0458 on the 7th, the gate was opened and the CROSSBILL
and the CONDOR stood in. It was not until 0846 that the gate was closed.
The Commanding Officer of the CONDOR testilied that at 0532, when the
CONDOR came in, conditions of visibility were very good and were "approaching
daylight conditions."
The log of the signal tower for December 6-7, 1941 records the closing of the
gate at 2250 on 6 December, which was followed by an entry at 0600 that the
ANTARES was reported off the harbor (Exhibit 46).'
The USS ANTARES, with a 500-ton steel barge in tow, arrived off Pearl
Harbor from Canton and Palmyra at about 0605, when it exchanged calls with
the WARD. At 0630 the ANTARES sighted a suspicious object, which appeared
to be a small submarine, about 1500 yards on its starboard quarter. The
ANTARES notified the WARD and asked it to investigate, and several minutes
later, at about 0633, observed a Navy patrol plane circle and drop two smoke
pots near the object. (Exhibit 73)
The WARD complied and at 0640 sighted an unidentified submarine one point
off its starboard bow, apparently following the ANTARES in to Pearl Hai'bor.
General Quarters were sounded and all engines ordered full ahead, increasing
the WARD'S speed from five to twenty-five knots. At 0645 she opcnetl fire
with guns 1 and 3, firing one shot from each gun. The attack lasted only one
or two minutes. The first shot, at a range of approximately 100 yards, passed
d' ectly over the conning tower ; the second, from No. 3 gun, at fifty yards or
less, hit the submarine at the waterline junction of the hull and conning tower.
At about this time, the ANTARES, observing the fire of the WARD, also noted
the Navy patrol plane appeared to drop bombs or depth charges at the sub-
marine. The submarine heeled over to starboard and started to sink. The
WARD ceased firing and then dropped depth charges. A large amount of oil
appeared on the surface. The submarine went down in 1,200 feet of water.
(Exhibit 74).
[145] At 0651 the WARD sent a radio message to the Commandant, FOUR-
TEENTH Naval District (Exhibit 18) :
"We have dropped depth charges upon subs operating in defensive sea area."
The captain of the WARD, after reflecting that this message might not be inter-
preted as showing a surface submarine contact, at 0653 sent the following supple-
mentary message :
"We have attacked fired upon and dropped depth charge upon submarine oper-
ating in defensive sea area."
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2345
This message was received by the Bishop's Point radio station, relayed to the
Officer in Charge, Net and liooni Defenses, Inshore Pati'ol, and delivered by the
Conununications Watch Officer, FOURTEENTH Naval District, to the ConiFOUR-
TEEN Duty Officer. The Duty Officer notiiied the ConiFOURTEEN Chief of Staff
at 0712 and, at the hitter's direction, tlie Duty Officer of the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, at 0715.
The ConiFOURTEEN Chief of Staff informed Admiral Bloch. Because of
numerous previous reports of submarine contacts, their reaction was that the
"WARD had probably been mistaken, but that if it were not a mistake, the WARD
and the relief ready duty destroyer MONAGHAN, which was dispatched, could
take care of the situation, while the Commander-in-Chief. Pacific Fleet, to whom
they had referred the information, had the power to take any other action which
might be desired.
The CincPac Staff Duty Officer was given the report at about 0720 by the Assist-
ant Duty Officer. After several attempted phone calls to ascertain whether
Admiral Bloch knew of the report, the Staff Duty Officer received a phone message
at 0740 from the duty officer of PatWing 2 that a patrol plane had reported that a
submarine had been sunk in the defensive sea area; sinuiltaneously, another
phone call from FOURTEENTH Naval District advised the CincPac Staff Duty
Officer that Admiral Bloch had been informed of the sinking and had ordered the
ready duty destroyer out to assist the WARD and the standby destroyer to get up
steam. The Staff Duty Officer then phoned Admiral Kimmel and gave him both
messages and the information as to the action taken by Admiral Bloch. About
this time. Captain Ramsey, of PatWing 2, phoned again and the Staff Duty Officer
suggested he make his search planes available in case the Admiral wanted them.
Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court that between 0730 and 0740
he received a report that a submarine had been attacked off Pearl Harbor. He
said that he was waiting for an amplification of this report when the air attack
commenced. He also stated that the officer who reported the sinking of the sub-
marine should have broadcast in plain language, but that he had reported in code,
w'hich caused delay. Admiral Kimmel also testified that after 27 November
1941, there had been about a half-dozen of such reports, and hence amplification
of the report was necessary.
[146] The evidence indicates that the reports by the WARD were in plain
language but that a request for verification by the WARD was later sent in code
by the ComFOURTEEN Communication Officer at the direction of the ComFOUR-
TEEN Duty Officer. The WARD's reply to that request was also in code and was
deciphered at about the time when the air attack commenced.
A .Japanese midget submarine entered Pearl Harbor and, after the air attack
had commenced, fired both of its torpedoes, one of which exploded on the beach
of Ford Island, passing between the RALEIGH and*'the CURTISS, and the other
buried itself, it was believed, in the mud near the berth of the UTAH. This sub-
marine was sunk by the CURTISS and recovered from the harbor some weeks
after the attack. It had been so thoroughly destroyed that nothing of intelli-
gence value could be obtained from it. Whether or not this was the submarine
which had been sighted by the CONDOR could not be determined. No other
submarine was detected in the harbor.
Another Japanese midget submarine was beached off Bellows Field, Oahu, and
captured on the next day, along with its commanding officer. Various documents
were recovered from this submarine including a chart of Pearl Harbor, on which
was laid out a course into the harbor, anmnd Pearl Harbor, and out of the harbor
(Exhibits 32A, 33A). On this chart (Ex. 33A) were indicated the positions of
various ships in the harbor. The charted positions differed substantially from
the actual berthing arrangements on December 7th. This fact led the Army
Pearl Harbor Board to conclude that the submarine had been in the harbor for
reconnaissance prior to December 7th.
The conclusion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board that the Japanese midget
submarines "nmst have been in the harbor a few days before the attack and evi-
dently were moving into and out of the harbor at will" (Report, Army Pearl
Harbor Board, page 155) is based wholly on the legends appearing on the Japanese
njaps (Exhibits 32, 32A, 33, 33A) captured in the midget submarine that was
sunk off Bellows Field, and on the testimony of Robert L. Shivers, FBI Agent in
charge at Honolulu on 7 December 1941, which, in turn, is likewise based solely
on the legends appearing on the same maps (Rep. APHB, page 155). At the
present time, Mr. Shivers is Collector of the Port at Honolulu, and is in a pre-
carious physical condition due to a serious heart ailment. Mr. Shivers was inter-
79716 O — 46 — pt. 16 28
2346 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
viewed in Honolulu during the first week of June, 1945, and he stated, as also
appears in the Army Pearl Harbor Board report (page 155), that his conclusion
that Japanese submarines had been in Pearl Harbor prior to the attack was based
on an examination of the maps in question, and that he had no other information
to sustain his C(»nclusion. Mr. Shivers likewise had no further information to
supply in respect of the intelligence situation or the intelligence information that
was available in Honolulu prior to 7 December 1941, except to say that he was
mystified that the ONI tap of the telephone line of the Japanese Consulate at
Honolulu was lifted on 2 December 1941, pursuant to an order issued by Captain
(now Rear Admiral) Mayfleld, the DIO. Since Mr. Shivers' statements were no
different from those given by him in his testimony of record before the Army
Pearl Harbor Board, and since the basis of his, and the conclusion of the Army
Pearl Harbor Board, are shown to be erroneous by a careful study of the legends
on the maps in question, on which those conclusions were based, and since his
health was so precarious, it was deemed not necessary to call him as a witness.
[i^T] For the following reasons, it appears that the Japanese midget sub-
marine from which was obtained the chart of Pearl Harbor was not in the
harbor on that day, and probably had not been there on any prior occasion :
(a) The following facts lead to the conclusion that the recovered chart was
an attack plati rather than an actual track and log of events :
(1) The characters marking certain points on the chart (Exhibit 33 and 33A)
were in Chinese ideographs which give no indication of tense. For instance,
the notation which has been variously translated as "Enemy ship sunk" and
"Attack and sink enemy ships" could have been the future meaning. Similarly
the notation translated as "Fixed position," could mean "Position to be fixed,"
a natural course of action before entering the channel.
(2) The times marked on the chart were unquestionably Tokyo time ( — ^9).
This is confirmed by the computation, on the back of the chart, of the time
of dawn and sunrise at Pearl Harbor on December 8 (Tokyo time).
(3) Based on (2), times along the track were all in daylight, commencing
at the channel entrance at dawn.
(4) The northwesterly portion of the track, to the northward of Ford Island,
passed through an area which was, and had been, occupied by a number of
ships moored to buoys, and could not have been followed by a submarine.
(5) The courses and notations were much more neat and meticulous than
any that could have been made during the passage of narrow and crowded
waters by the navigator of a two-man submarine.
(6) The major Japanese operation plan for the Pearl Harbor attack, as re-
cojistructed by a captured Japanese yeoman, and confirmed generally by cap-
tured documents, provided that the midget submarines were to enter the harbor
and after the initiation of the air attack were to attack with torpedoes. The
times on the chart were in conformity with this, since, converted into Hon-
olulu time, there was a waiting period inside the harbor entrance from 0545 to
0840 and the turning point south of Ford Island was timed 0900.
(b) The submarine had its full allowance of two torpedoes when recovered.
(c) The submarine commander, on interrogation, stated that he had failed in
his mission (Exhibit 68).
(d) The information on the chart was of a nature that could more readily
be obtained by civilian observers from the area surrounding Pearl Harbor than
by dangerous submarine reconnaissance. As has appeared earlier, the Japanese
Consul General had been communicating just such intelligence to Tokyo.
(e) Notations on the chart indicate that the submarine commander received
intelligence reports as late as December 5th.
[1^8] Intelligence information recently received indicates that the midget
submarines were carried by and launched from mother submarines (Exhibit
69). They were carried on the main deck abaft the conning tower and secured
to the pressure hull by means of heavy clamps. The midgets used in the Pearl
Harbor attack were 41 feet in length, had a reported cruising range of 175 to
180 miles at their most economical speed of 4 to 6 knots, did not have a radio
transmitter, and carried a crew of two men. They were armed with two tor-
pedoes and apparently carried the same designation number as their mother
subs. The exact number with the Japanese task force is not definitely known,
but there is substantial proof that there were at least five.
The midget submarine beached off Bellows Field from which the chart was
recovered bore the designation of "1-18," apparently that of its "mother." In
the recovered chart, at various points along the sides of the entrance channel
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2347
from Hammer Point to Hospital Point, are notations in faint pencil, "1-16,"
"1-20," 1-22," "1-18." "1-24." From information received, it is now known that
these are the designations of the submarines which carried the five midgets
known to have been present. The times on the recovered chart indicate a wait-
ing period in the narrow harbor entrance area from 0115 to 0410 (0445 to 0840,
Hawaiian time). It therefore appears to be a logical assumption that the five
midget submarines were to lie in wait in the narrow entrance channel, approxi-
mately in the positions indicated, with the object of torpedoing ships attempt-
ing to sortie, thus blocking the channel ; and that after the initial air attack
had been completed, they were to proceed around Ford Island and complete the
destruction. The midget submarine which was sunk west of Ford Island appar-
ently followed just such a plan. Confirmation of this assumption is found in
a captured copy of the Japanese Plan for this operation, wherein the following
initial task is assigned to the Sixth Fleet (Submarine Force) : "Will obsei've
and attack American Fleet in HAWAII area. Will make a sufprise attack on
the channel leading into PEARL HARBOR and attempt to close it. If the
enemy moves out to fight he will be pursued and attack."
B. Suspicious Submarme Contacts Prior to 7 December 19^1.
It was suspected in Washington for some time prior to December 7th that
our Fleet based at Pearl Harbor was being kept under observation by Japanese
submarines, there having been, over a period of six months, reports by our
destroyers of such contacts. The Fleet also received reports that Japanese
submarines were reconnoitering the approaches to Pearl Harbor. The number
of such reports at Pearl Harbor prior to the attack was placed by one witness
at from ten to fifteen, several of which occurred in the immediate vicinity of
the entrance to Pearl Harbor. The contacts were on underwater sound con-
tacts, which were not confirmed by sightings.
A search of the files of CincPac has resulted in locating dispatches that refer
to three suspicious contacts during the five weeks preceding Pearl Harbor:
(1) On 3 November 1941, an oil slick area in latitude 20-10, longitude 157-41
was observed by a patrol plane, and crossed by Task Force One ; an air search
of a fifteen mile area bv the patrol plane, a sound search of an unspecified area
by the USS WORDEN and an inwstigation by [im the USS DALE
produced negative results (Exhibit 48; dispatches 031920, 032035, 032133, 032330,
040042).
(2) On 28 November 1941, after the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had
issued an order requiring extreme vigilence against possible hostile submarines,
restricting submerged submarine operations to certain areas, and providing that
all submarine contacts in other areas suspected to be hostile were to be depth
-bombed, the USS HELENA reported that a radar operator, without knowledge
of the CincPac alert, was positive that a submarine was in a restricted area
(Exhibit 48; dispatch 280835). A search by a task group with three destroyers,
of the western border and the northern half of that area, pursued from 281050
to 281845, when abandoned by 290000, produced no contacts (Exhibit 48; dis-
patches 281050, 281133, 281704, 281845).
(3) During the night of 2 December 1941, the USS GAMBLE reported a clear
metallic echo in latitude 20-30, longitude 158-23, which was lost in a change of
range, that was evaluated to have been too rapid to indicate the presence of a
submarine (Exhibit 48; di.spatch 022336). An investigation, ordered to be made
by Desron 4 (Exhibit 48; dispatch 030040), apparently was negative.
C. Detection of Aircraft by the Army Radar System.
It appears from the prior investigations that about 0702 on the morning of 7
December 1941, two Army privates on duty at a mobile radar unit on the northern
part of Oahu discovered an unusually large response on the radar in a northerly
direction and from about 136 miles. This information they reported, at about
0715, to an Army ofllcer on duty at the Army Information Center. The Army
oflBcer stated that he had some information to the effect that a flight of Army
B-17's was due in that morning, and he thought that the planes detected by the
radar were those Army planes. He did not suspect enemy planes and made no
effort to report to his superior.
The evidence indicates that neither this information nor any other informa-
tion as to the direction from which the planes approached or on which they
departed was transmitted to the Naval authorities on the day of the attack.
2348 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
D. The Air Attack.
The Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor, according to most observers, started
at 0755. It l)egan with dive bombing and strafing of the Naval Air Station at
Ford Island, and at the Army's Hickam Field. This was followed at Pearl Harbor
by attacks on major units of the Fleet, launched by torpedo planes and dive
bombers, and was accompanied by strafing- Next there occurred two distinct
horizontal bombing attacks from high altitudes, the last immediately preceding
a final intensive dive bombing attack. Almost simultaneously with the raid on
Pearl Harbor, the Japanese attacked [JdO] the Kaneohe Bay Naval Air
Station and Bwa Field at Barber's Point was strafed. Approximately 150 planes
took part in the attack on Pearl Harbor. The raid is reported variously to have
ended at from 0940 to 1130 and some Japanese planes are known to have been
over Oahu after 1200.
The CincPac Staff Duty Officer learned of the inception of the air raid during
his second telephone converstion of the morning with Admiral Kimmel, when
he was advising of a report by the WARD, after its submarine repoi-ts, that it
had detained a sampan. He immediately told the Admiral of his receipt from
the signal tower of this message:
"Japanese are attacking Pearl Harbor X This is no drill."
E. Location of Pacific Fleet Units.
At the time of the attack, the forces of the Pacific Fleet were, according to
Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 73), disposed partly in port and partly at sea as
follows :
(1) In Pearl Harbor:
(a) Task Force One, Vice Admiral Pye commanding (less one battleship, one
light cruiser and one destroyer) comprising five battleships, four light cruisers,
seventeen destroyers, two light cruisers, and four mine layers.
(b) Task Force Two (under the command of Vice Admiral Halsey, who was
at sea with units thereof constituting a separate task force — Task Force Eight)
comprising three battleships, eight destroyers, one light cruiser, and four mine
layers.
(c) Task Force Three (less detached units under command of Vice Admiral
Brown at sea, and less a separate task force — Task Force Twelve — which was
at sea under Rear Admiral Newton's command) comprising two heavy cruisers,
and four mine layers which were under overhaul.
(d) Five submarines and the submarine tender PELIAS of Task Force Seven.
(e) The TANGIER, HULBERT, CURTIS, and THORNTON, and Patrol Squad-
rons VP 11, 12, 14, 22, 23, and 24 (a total of about sixty planes) of Task Force
Nine.
(f ) Marine Air Squadrons VMSB 232 and VMJ 252 (a total of twenty planes)
at Ewa, Oahu.
(g) Two destroyer tenders and the Base Force, consisting of the ARGONNE,
plus auxiliaries and repair vessels, and planes of Base Force Aircraft Squadrons
VJ-1, VJ-2, and VJ-3, as follows : 19 J2F, 9 JRS, 2 PBY-1, 1 J2V.
(2) At Sea:
(a) Task Force Eight (Vice Admiral Halsey commanding) consisting of one
aircraft carrier (ENTERPRISE), three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers, lo-
cated 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, standing to eastward, was returning to
Pearl Harbor after landing a Marine Air Squadron at Wake Island.
(b) Task Force Three (Vice Admiral Brown commanding), less units in port,
consisting of one heavy cruiser and one mine laying squadron, less two of its
divisions, was exercising with landing boats at Johnston Island.
[i52] (c) Task Force Twelve (Rear Admiral Newton commanding), ordi-
narily a comjKjnent of Task Force Three, consisting of one aircraft carrier (LEX-
INGTON), three heavy cruisers, and fyfe destroyers, located about 425 miles
southeast of Midway, was proceeding on a westerly course to land a Marine
Air Squadron on Midway Island.
(d) One heavy cruiser and one mine laying division, ordinarily a part of Task
Force Three, were engaged in "normal operations" at sea southwest of Oahu.
(e) Four submarines of Task Force Seven, somewhere at sea en route to Pearl
Harbor.
(3) At other places:
(a) At Midway Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and Patrol Squad-
ron VP-21 (consisting of twelve planes) of Task Force Twelve.
(b) At Wake Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and a Marine Air
Squadron.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2349
(c) At Johnston Island (in addition to Task Force Three, undergoing exercise),
two Base Force PBY-1 planes.
(d) At Mare Island, Ave submarines of Task Force Seven.
(e) At San Diego, four submarines of Task Force Seven.
To sum up : At Pearl Harbor, there were eight battleships, two heavy cruisers,
four light cruisers, two old light cruisers, one old cruiser mine layer, eight
destroyers, five submarines, twelve uiiiie layers, two destroyer tenders, one sub-
marine tender^ four aircraft tenders, various auxiliary and repair ships, and
111 aircraft of various types, of which nine were under overhaul. At sea, there
were two aircraft carriers, eight heavy cruisers, fourteen destroyers, four sub-
marines, and one mine layer squadron less one division. At other places, there
were thirteen submarines, fourteen Navy Patrol planes and one Marine Air
Squadron.
Except as to Task Forces Eight and Twelve, which were on special missions to
reenforce Wake and Midway Islands, the dispositions of Pacific Fleet Units as
noted above were in accordance with a previously worked out fleet employment
schedule.
[153] F. Condition of Readiness.
(1) The ships in port:
The testimony in previous investigations showed some confusion as to the
condition of readiness which was in effect on ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl
Harbor at the time of the attack. It appears, however, that whether or not
Condition III, as prescribed in the Pacific Fleet Letter on security of the Fleet,
was in effect, the condition aboard the battleships was in excess of that condi-
tion. Each of the battleships had two 5-inch anti-aircraft guns ready and two
machine guns manned. While the Fleet letter on security fixed responsibility
on the senior oflBcer present in each air defense sector for fire control in his sector,
no particular damage control organization was prescribed in that letter or func-
tioning on the ships in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. The evidence
in prior investigations indicates that the anti-aircraft batteries of the ships were
quickly manned and, considering the circumstances, were effectively used against
the Japanese attackers.
(2) The aircraft of the Pacific Fleet:
The condition of readiness in force as to the Fleet aircraft was Baker 5
(50 per cent of the assigned aircraft to be ready on four hours notice) with
machine guns and ammunition in all planes not undergoing maintenance work.
Three squadrons (one at Midway, one at Pearl Harbor, and one at Kaneohe)
were in condition Afirm 5 (100 per cent assigned aircraft to be ready on four
hours notice). This was augmented on December 7th by specific duty assign-
ments which required six planes from Patrol Squadron FOURTEEN and from
Patrol Squadron TWENTY-FOUR (at Kaneohe) and from Patrol Squadron
TWELVE (at Pearl Harbor) to be ready for flight on 30 minutes notice. On
the morning of December 7th, three patrol planes of a squadron based at
Kaneohe were in the air on morning security patrol armed with depth charges,
three were ready for flight on 30 minutes notice, and four on four hours notice;
and four planes of a squadron at Pearl Harbor were in the air conducting tactics
with submarines and one plane was ready for flight on 30 minutes notice.
G. Reaction to the Attack.
The hostile character of the attacking planes was not recognized until the
bombs fell, but there followed an immediate and general realization of that
fact, and a prompt application of such defensive measures as were then cajjable
of being carried out. General Quarters was sounded in all units ashore and
afloat and, as has been pointed out above, anti-aircraft batteries were manned
and, considering the damaged condition of the ships, employed to the fullest
possible effect. There was, however, an unfortunate lapse of time before damage
control measures on the ships in Pearl Harbor could be carried forward, result-
ing in the suffering of much damage that might otherwise have been prevented
or minimized. The damages so quickly suffered included a partial breakdown
of the oominunication system, preventing an accurate interchange of necessary
information, including radio direction bearings of the attacking force. The
futility of the attempted countermeasures in locating and attacking the Japanese
striking force was due, in [134] large part, to a flood of wild and con-
2350 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
flicting reports as to the location and strength, and probable intentions, of units
of the Japanese force.
The evidence obtained in the previous investigation demonstrates clearly that
the officers and men of the Pacific Fleet met the attack, individually and jointly,
with great heroism.
[155] H. Composition and Movements of the Attacking Force.
The chief source of information concerning the Japanese force which attacked
Pearl Harbor is a Japanese prisoner of war who was captured on Saipan during
the Mariana.s Campaign. The POW was a chief yeoman in the Japanese Navy,
attached to thg staff of the Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, Admiral
Yamamoto. The reconstruction by the POW of the events preceding and leading
up to Pearl Harbor has been substantiated and verified by other information,
including that contained in a copy of Japanese (^ombined Fleet Operation Order
No. 1, recovered from the Japanese cruiser NACHI that vpas sunk in Manila Bay.
The prisoner's reconstruction of the orders to the striking force is contained in
Exhibit 3.
The movements of the striking force were provided for in the Japanese Secret
Operation Order No. 1, dated 1 November 1941, wliich stated that war would be
declared on the United States on X-Day, expected to be in the early or middle
part of December, and that on or about X-16 Day the carrier task force would
depart its base and proceed by way of Tankan Bay (Hotokappu Bay), Etorofu
Island and the Kuriles for Pearl Harbor, where it would deliver a surprise
attack. Japanese Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 3, dated 10
November IJMl, fixed as X-Day 8 December IWl, B. L. T. (Exhibit 3).
The Japanese striking force actually left Saiki Anchorage near the Bongo
Channel some time between November 20 and November 22, 1941, East Longitude
Time, and proceeded to Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island. At the latter place it
assembled and fueled, and departed on or about 28 November 1941, E. L. T.,
and heade<l eastward under heavy front. The force proceeded in an easterly
direction heading on course about 085°, to a point in longitude about 170° W. ;
then turned southeast on course about 135 degrees, and proceeded to a i)oint
northwest to due north of, and approximately 200 miles from, the island of
Oahu, where it arrived early in the morning of 8 December 1941, E. L. T. From
that position the Pearl Harbor attack was launched. Following the attack,
the striking force retired initially to the northwest, on a heading of about 300°,
to a point about longitude 170° E., thence to the southwest, irregularly on varying
headings to a point near 140° E., and thence northwest to Kyushu (Exhibit 3,
page 16).
The striking force consisted of three of Japan's five carrier divisions, the
KAGA and AKAGI (CarDiv 1) ; HIRYU and SORYU (CarDiv 2) ; SHOKAKU
and ZUIKAKU (sometimes referred to as CarDiv 3, sometimes as CarDiv 4
and sometimes as CarDiv 5) : the HIYEI and KIRISHIMA (two of the battle-
ships of BatDiv 3); the TONE and CHIKUMA (CarDiv 8), and of various
destroyers and submarines.
Cooperating with the foregoing striking force was a large part of the Japanese
Sixth (Submarine) Fleet. That fleet left the Japanese Inland Sea about 18
November 1941, E. L. T. At the time of the attack, many Japanese submarines
were concentrated at the mouth of Pearl Harbor for the purpose of making
torpedo attacks on any United States ships that attempted to escape from the
air attack in the harbor. As previously pointed out, the evidence indicates that
only one midget submarine succeeded in entering the harbor.
[156] I. The Casualties and Damage.
The facts as to the casualties and damage appear fully in the record of the
Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry :
(1) An examination of reports in the Bureau of Personnel showed that there
were 3,963 casualties as a result of the Japanese Pearl Harbor attack, of which
896 were wounded and 3,067 were either killed, dead of wounds, or are missing
and declared dead.
(2) The damage to fleet units in Pearl Harbor was extensive. The Battleships
ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, OKLAHOMA, and WEST VIRGINIA were sunk and
the NEVADA beached to prevent its sinking. The auxiliary vessels UTAH and
OGLALA were also sunk. All other battleships in the harbor, PENNSYLVANIA,
MARYLAND, and TENNESSEE, the Cruisers HELENA, HONOLULU, and
RALEIGH, the destroyers SHAW, CASSIN, and DOWNES, and the auxiliaries
CURTIS and VESTAL, were seriously damaged.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
(3) The damage to airplanes was as follows:
2351
Type
Patrol - ---
Fighters. ._
Scout bombers
Torpedo bombers
Battleship and cruiser planes
Utility and transport planes.
Totals
No. present
Dec. 7
301
No. on hand
after raid
No. usable
after raid
52
[157] Findings.
92. On the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly before the air attack on Pearl
Harbor, there were reports of suspected and actnal hostile submarine activity.
The second advised of a surface and depth charge attack on a submarine. Only the
latter report reached responsible officers. Due to reports on previous days of
sound contacts with submarines, conlirmation was sought. The action initiated
by CoiuFOTJRTEEN, in dispatching the ready duty destroyer, was in accord
with the provisions of the Fleet security letter.
93. Confirmation of the report of the sinking of a submarine was not received
by Admiral Kimmel or by Admiral Bloch prior to the air attack.
94. There is no evidence warranting the conclusion that a Japanese submarine
entered Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th. The one midget submarine
known to have been in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7th was sunk
after making an ineffectual attack.
95. Evidence of the approach of a large liight of planes from the northward,
obtained by Army enlisted men operating a radar installation for instruction
purposes, was not communicated either to the Navy or to responsible Army
commanders.
96. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and ComFOURTEEN had no previ-
ous warning of the air attack, which was initiated by the enemy at 0755. The
attack was skillfully executed, and resulted in serious losses of life and damage.
97. The battleships each had two 5" anti-aircraft guns ready and two machine
guns manned, which was in excess of the requirements of Condition III as
prescribed in the Fleet Security I>etter. As to Fleet aircraft based at Oahu,
seven were in the air (3 on morning security patrol armed with depth charges
and 4 engaged in tactics with submarines) ; ten were on 30 minutes notice; and
the balance of forty-four on four hours notice.
98. As a result of adherence to Fleet schedules which had been issued in
September, 1941, the Pacific Fleet battleships, with one exception, were all in
IK)rt and were etitlier sunk or damaged. Due to the fortunate coincidence which
resulted in the aircraft carriers being at sea, they were uninjured.
99. It has been learned, since 7 Deceml)er 1941, that the Japanese task force
which attacked Pearl Harbor left Saiki Anchorage, near the Bongo Channel
sometime between 20 and 22 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded
to Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island, in the Kuriles. The force then assembled and
fueled. It departed on or about 28 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and
proceeded in an easterly direction to about 170° West Longitude, then southeast
to a point about 200 miles from Oahu.
100. The Japanese striking force included three Carrier Divisions, among
which were Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. Five days before the attack, the Fleet
Intelligence Officer had advised Admiral Kimmel that he could not reliably
estimate the location of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2.
[J58] 101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 20O
miles due north of Oahu.
[159]
VI.
A. FINDINGS
1. The basic assumption of the Rainbow Five War Plan was that the United
States and her Allies would be at war with the Axis Powers, either including or
excluding Japan.
2. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned various offensive tasks
to the Pacific Fleet, including the capture of positions in the Marshalls and raids
2352 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
on enemy sea communications and positions, and various defensive tasks, includ-
ing the task of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacitic
area and preventing the extension of enemy military power into the Eastern
Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions.
3. The Pacific Fleet Oi)erating Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned to the Fleet
various initial tasks, including the maintenance of fleet security at the bases, at
anchorages, and at sea, the protection of the communications and territory of
the Associated Powers by patrolling with light forces and ^trol planes, the estab-
lisbuient of defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway, and guarding
against surprise attack by Japan.
4. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) and annexes included
among the initial tasks to be performed by the patrol planes the maintenance of
the maximum patrol plane search practicable in the approaches to the Hawaiian
area.
5. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan was to be put into effect on W-day, which
it was stated, might or might not coincide with the day that hostilities opened
with Japan. W-day was not fixed prior to the attack.
6. The Joint Coastal Frontier Detense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, was based on
the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans. It constituted the basis of suboiuiaiy
peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans. The
method of coordination under the plan was to be by mutual cooperation until and
unless unity of connuand were invoked.
7. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the Army's task was to hold
Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers,,
and to support the naval forces. The Navy's task was to patrol the coastal zone
(which included Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for
the defense of Oahu), and to patrol and protect shipping therein, and to support
the Army forces.
8. One of the specific tasks assigned to the Navy in the Joint Coastal Frontier
Defense Plan was that the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, should
provide for distant reconnaissance.
9. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was placed in effect on 11 April 1941
by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Commandant,
FOURTEENTH Naval District.
[160] 10. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan
was an agreement between the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, and
the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, as to joint defensive measures
for the .security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against hostile
raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war.
11. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided,
among other things, for joint air operations and provided that when naval forces
were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and Army aircraft
were made available, the latter would be under the tactical control of the naval
commander directing search operations.
12. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan also
provided that the Army was to expedite the installation of its aircraft warning
service, and that prior to the completion of that service, the Navy, through the
use of radar and other appropriate means, would endeavor to give such warning
of hostile attacks as might be practicable.
13. Annex VII, Section VI, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided
that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat
of a hostile raid or attack was suflBcicntly imminent to warrant such action, each
commander would take steps to make available to the other the air forces at his
disposal, in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the
plan.
14. The Commanding General and ComFOURTSEN did not effect any agreement
prior to the attack that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently
imminent to warrant placing Annex VII, Section VI. in operation.
15. The Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan provided, among other
things, for a Base Defense Air Force in conjunction with the Army. One of the
assumptions was that it was possible that a declaration of war might be preceded
by a surprise air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, that it was probable that there
might be a surprise submarine attack on ships in the base area, and that a com-
bination of both forms of attack was possible.
16. The joint estimate bv Admiral Bellinger and General Martin stated, among
other things, that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would
be an air attack that would most likely be launched from carriers which would
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2353
probably approach inside of three hundred miles. The estimate also stated that
any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undis-
covered surface forces, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.
This Estimate came to the attention of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch.
17. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was prepared by Admiral Bellinger
and approved by Admiral Bloch. This plan, which was designated Annex "Baker"
to the Naval Base Defense Force Operation l^lan, made specitic provision for joint
air operations by the Army and Navy. The plan was effective upon receipt. It
was to become operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack, or might
be made operative by dispatch. In the meantime, conditions of readiness for
aircraft were to be as directed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, for Army units, and by [161] ComFOURTEEN, as Naval faase
Defense Officer, for Navy units.
18. The Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating
areas, which was reissued by Admiral Kimmel in revised form on 14 October
1941, provided that the Fleet's security was predicated on several assumptions,
one of which was that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise
attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, a surprise submarine attack on ships in the
operating areas, or a combination of the two. This letter also stated that a
single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable surface
force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.
19. The Pacific Fleet security letter prescribed security measures, including
provisions for defense against air attack. It provided, among other things, that
ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army
joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack and that he should
take other ^ction, including supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft,
and arrange through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of
the joint air effort by the Army and the Navy.
20. Under the Pacific Fleet security letter, the security measures were to
Include intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol, and an air
patrol. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of fleet operating areas as
directed by Aircraft Scouting Force, one covering the entry or sortie of a fleet
or task force, and one during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other
times.
21. The only local defense plans in effect and operative prior to the attack of
7 December 1941 were the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, under which
the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance, and the Pacific Fleet
security letter, under which the only aircraft patrol from Oahu was a daily search
of fleet operating areas, a search during entry or sortie of a fleet or task force,
and during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.
22. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five), approved by the Chief
of Naval Operations, in estimating probable enemy (Japanese) action, visualized
that one of the enemy defensive efforts would be "destruction of threatening
naval forces" : that initial action would include "possible raids or stronger attacks
on Wake, Midway, and other outlying United States positions" ; and that the
initial Jananese deployment would include "raiding and observation forces
wAdely distributed in the Pncifie, and that submarines in the Hawaiian area. * * •"
(Italics supplied.) The possibility of an attack on Hawaii was, therefore,
included but in no way emphasiz«^d.
23. Admiral Kimmel was of the opinion, throughout his tenure of command of
the Pacific Fleet, that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was a possihility.
Neither he nor the key members of his staff appear to have considered it as a
serious probability.
21. The method of command established in the local plans was that of "mutual
cooperation." The relations between the responsible commanders were cordial.
However, there was not in existence, prior to the attack, any permanent operat-
ing setup which could insure the constant and timely exchange of information,
decision.s. and intended courses of action so essential to the efficient conduct of
joint operations, particularly in an emergency. A recent proposal looking to the
establishment. of a Joint Command Center had been the subject of adverse
recommendations by the responsible local commanders, both Army and Navy.
[162] 2f). In accordance with "Joint Action," unity of command for the
defense of Oahu could have been placed in effect by local agreement between
the Commnndine Generfil of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of
the FOFRTFENTH Naval District. The latter, however, would naturally not
make such an agreement without the approval of his immediate superior, the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The question of unity of command for out-
2354 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
lying islands was discussed between Admiral Kimmel and General Short in con-
ueciion witii a pioposal lor reenforcement of *vake and .Midway by Army planes.
General Short's position was that if Army forces were involved, tiie command
must be his. Admiral Kimmel maintained that the command of naval bases
must remain wiih the JNavy. 'ihe isiands were reenforced wiih Marine planes.
26. Japanese espionage at Pearl Harbor was eirective and, particularly uuriug
the critical period 2/ November to 7 December 15M1, resulted in tlie frequent
transmission to Japan of information of great importance concerning the faciiic
Fleet, the movements and locations of snips, and defense preparations.
27. Certain reports sent by the Japanese Consul General via a commercial
communications company at Honolulu in the week preceding the attack indicated
the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.
2S. It will appear subsequently that various coded messages sent by the Japa-
nese Consul Geiieral at Honolulu, which did not indicate the likeahood of an air
attack on Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by Army and Navy radio intercept
stations and were decoded in Washington, D. C. prior to the attack; that others
which were obtained at Honolulu by ^\aval Intelligence prior to the attack were,
with the exception of a few unimi.ortant messages, in a code which could not
be decrypted there before December 7th ; and, that three messages intercepted
by Army radio intercept stations at Hawaii and at San Francisco, which indi-
cated the likelihood of an air attack, were forwarded to the War Department for
decryption but were either not received there prior to the attack or were not
decrypted prior to the attack. If the United States intelligence services had been
able to obtain and to decode and translate promptly all of the espionage reports
sent by the Japanese Consul General during the period 27 November to 7 December
1941, the information so obtained would have been of inestimable value.
29. Naval Intelligence was effectively organized to acquire information from
coded diplomatic messages between the Japanese Government and its representa-
tives. Through the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages and their
decryption and translation in Washington, D. C, prior to the attack, knowledge
was obtained of the Japsinese Government's actual views concerning the diplo-
matic situation, of the Japanese Government's intention to wage war, and of
the fact that hostilities were impending and imminent.
30. The information acquired in Washington through the interception of
Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately and promptly disseminated at
Washington by Naval and Military Intelligence to the Chief ^f Naval Operations,
to the Army Chief of Staff, to the State Department, and to the President.
[163] 31. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had to rely upon the
Chief of Naval Operations for information as to the status of the diplomatic
negotiations with the Japanese, and had requested to be kept fully informed
on this subject.
32. The Japanese diplomatic messages acquired by Naval Intelligence at Wash-
ington were not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as such.
Reasons advanced for this course of action were that the Japanese might inter-
cept the naval messages and learn of the Navy's success in decrypting Japanese
codes ; that the volume of intercepted messages was so great that the trans-
mission of them, particularly during the critical period, would have overtaxed
the Navy's communications facilities ; and, that it was the duty of the Chief
of Naval Operations to evaluate such information and to advise CincPac of
the important facts learned.
33. Various of the warning messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operations
to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, w-ere based on the information obtained
from intercepted Japanese messages.
34. The warnings sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during No-
vember (particularly the "war warning" of the 27th) and early December, 1941,
indicated in unmistakable language that the diplomatic negotiations had ceased,
that war with Japan was imminent, and that Japanese attacks might occur al
any moment.
35. The Chief of Naval Operations did not advise the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, of certain intercepted Japanese messages indicating interest in the
location of ships in Pearl Harbor. These were more specific than other inter-
cepted messages indicating Japanese interest in the movements of ships to or
from other jwrts.
36. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was not fully advised of certain
other information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages after the Novem-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2355
ber 27th "war warning," which made further evident the termination in fact of
the diplomatic negotiations and the Japanese intention to wage war.
37. On the morning of 7 December 1941, there was brought to the attention
of the Chief of Naval Operations an intercepted message in which the Japanese
Government instructed its representatives to present to the State Department
at 1 p. m. the Japanese Government's final reply terminating the diplomatic
negotiations. Mention was made of the fact that 1 p. m. Washington time was
about dawn at Honolulu and about the middle of the night in the Far East. No
one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor.
38. This so-called "1 p. m. delivery message," which consisted of one sentence,
had been intercepted at a naval radio intercept station at Bainbridge Island in
the State of Washington and forwarded to the Navy Department by teletype.
It was decrypted and available in the Navy Department at about 0700 on Decem-
ber 7th. It was sent to the Army for translation because there was no Japanese
translator on duty in the Navy D;'partment at that time. The translation, which
c(tuld have been done by a qualiMed translator in a few minutes, was not received
from the Army until after 0900.
[164] 39. Although he was in possession of this highly significant informa-
tion several hours before the attacli, and there were available means whereby
the information could have been transmitted to Admiral Kimmel immediately,
including a "scrambler" telephone maintained by the Army, Admiral Starlt ini-
tially was not disposed to, and did not, send any message to Admiral Kimmel.
Instead he relied on the transmission of a message by the War Department to
General Short, which was to be furnished also to Admiral Kimmel.
40. Admiral Stark has previously testified that he did not consider it necessary
to telephone to Admiral Kimmel on the morning of 7 Dacember and that he had
not telephoned at any time previous to the attack, but that one regret which he
had was that he had not telephoned a message that morning to Admiral Kimmel
or paralleled the Army message on the naval radio system.
41. The message sent by General Marshall on 7 December 1941, which was
received after the attack, advised that the Japanese were presenting an ultimatum
at 1 p. m., that they were under orders to destroy their code machine, that it
was not known just what significance the hour set might have but that the
addressees were to be on the alert accordingly, and that the naval authorities
were to be informed.
42 The warnings which were sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
indicated, as to the possible places of Japanese attack, on November 24th, that "a
surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philip-
pines or Guam, is a possibility," and, on November 27th, that "an aggressive
movement by the Japanese is expected within the next few days. The number
and equipment of Japanese troops and organization of naval task forces indicate
an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula,
or possibly Borneo."
43. Although the warnings which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations
to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, drew attention to probable Japanese
objectives to the southward and southeastward of Japan, and did not specifically
mention P^'arl Harbor, both the Chief of Naval Oj^erations and the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were aware of the possibility of a Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor. They did not regard such an attack as probable.
44. The Japanese established several codes in November, 1941, which were to
be used in radio transmissions to convey to their representatives information
concerning the status of relations between Japan and the United States, and
other countries. These were known as the "winds" code and the "hidden word"
code. The "winds" code was designed to indicate a break in diplomatic relations,
or possibly war, with England or the United States or Russia by the use in
weather broadcasts of certain Japane.«!e words signifying wind directions.
45. The interception of a "winds" message relating to the United States during
the first week of December 1941, would not have conveyed any information of
significance which the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, did not already have.
[165] 46. No message in the "winds" code relating to the United States was
received by any of the watch oflScers in the Navy Department to whom such a mes-
sage would have come had it been received in the Navy Department. No such
message was intercepted by the radio intelligence units at Pearl Harbor or in the
Phillippines, although intensive efforts were made by those organizations to inter-
cept such a message. The evidence indicates further that no such message was
2356 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
intercepted by the British or the Dutch, despite their efforts to intercept such a
message. Neither the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Asiatic Fleet nor the Fleet
Intelligence OflScer of the Pacific Fleet nor the Inteligence Officer of the Far
Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, recalled any such message.
The Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Communications, and the
Director of Naval Intelligence recalled no such message. Testimony to the
effect that a "winds" code message was received prior to the attack was given
by Captain Safford, in charge of Op20-G, a conmmnications security section at
the Navy Department, who stated that such a message was received on December
3d or 4th, that it related to the United States, and that no copy could be found
in the Navy or Army files. In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain
Safford named, in addition to himself, three other officers who, he stated, re-
called having seen and read the "winds" message. Each of those officers testi-
fied that he had never seen such a message. The only other testimony to the
effect that a "winds" message was received was by Captain Kramer, an intelli-
gence officer assigned to Op-20-G, who said tha.t he recalled that there was a
message but that he could not recall whether or not it related to the United States
or England or Russia. It may be noted that until he testified in this investiga-
tion, Captain Kramer erroneously thought that a "hidden word" message inter-
cepted on the morning of December 7th had been a "winds" message.
47. On the morning of December 7th, the intercepted "hidden word" code
message was translated by Kramer. In his haste, due to the necessity of deliver-
ing other messages, including the "1 p. m. delivery message," he overlooked a code
word relating to the United States and translated the message as meaning only
that "relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expecta-
tions." He testified that he later discovered the error and a few minutes be-
fore 1 p m. on December 7th, he telephoned the correction to his superior officer in
the Office of Naval Intelligence and to an officer of Army Military Intelligence.
48. Except for the omission of the United States, the "hidden word" code mes-
sage was literally translated and did not sufficiently reflect previous diplomatic
interceptions which indicated that the message was to convey the idea of a crisis
involving the countries in question.
49. The sources of intelligence as to the Japanese which the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Feet, had prior to the attack included, in addition to the Chief of
Naval Operations, the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval
District, and the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet.
[166] 50. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the
FOURTEENTH Naval District, the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul Gen-
eral and the Japanese Vice Consul at Honolulu were tapped for some months prior
to the attack. These were discontinued on 2 December 1941 because the District
Intelligence Officer feared that the existence of such taps might be discovered,
resulting in undesirable complications. No information of military or naval sig-
nificance was obtained by means of the telephone taps.
51. On 6 December 1941 the local representatives of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation at Honolulu delivered to the District Intelligence Officer a tran-
script of a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation between a person in Hono-
lulu named "Mori" and a person in Japan. This was examined by the District
Intelligence Officer. It was decided that the conversation should be further
studied by a Japanese linguist of the District Intelligence Office, who was to listen
to the recording of the conversation. This was not done until after the attack.
The transcript furnished on December 6th indicated that the person in Japan was
interested, among other things, in the daily flights of airplanes from Honolulu
and in the number of ships present. During the conversation, references were
made to flowers, which, it now appears, may have been code words signifying
the presence or absence of ships, and a method of conveying information to the
approaching Japanese ships, which presumably would have been listening in on
the conversation. Prior investigations indicate that the "Mori conversation" was
also brought to the attention of General Short on 6 December 1941.
52. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the FOUR-
TEENTH Naval District, copies of various cable messages from and to the Jap-
anese Consul General at Honolulu, via a commercial communications company,
were obtained during the first week of December, 1941. This was the first time
that such messages had been obtained. The messages were in code and efforts
were made immediately to decrypt and translate them. Some messages were
decrypted before the attack. These contained no information of particular
significance.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2357
53. No information secured at Oahu prior to the attack by means of the tele-
phone taps or through the interception of messages of the Japanese Consul Gen-
eral indicated the likelihood of war or of an attack on Pearl Harbor.
54. One of the Japanese Consul General's messages, which was obtained by
the District Intelligence Officer and turned over on 5 December 1941 to the Radio
Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation, was a message dated December
3rd. This message was in a Japanese code known as the "PA-K2." It was
decrypted and translated by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor after
the attack. The message was one in which the Japanese Consul General advised
of a change in a method which had been established for communication by visual
signals from Oahu, whereby lights in houses on the beach, the use of a sailboat,
certain want ads to be broadcast over a local radio station, and bonfires, would
convey information as to the presence or absence of various types of warships of
the Pacific Fleet. Although the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor was
unable to decrypt this message prior to the attack, the message was decrypted and
translated in rough form on 6 December 1941 by a civilian translator in Op-20-G
of the Navy Department in Washington. That section had received the mes-
sage from an Army radio intercept station at Fort Hunt, Virginia. Captain
Kramer testified he had no specific recollection of having seen this translation
prior to the [167] attack, but the evidence indicates that the rough trans-
lation was shown to him on the afternoon of December 6th and that due to the
pressure of work on other important Japanese diplomatic messages, no action was
taken on the translation until 8 December 1941.
55. On 2 D^^ember 1941. the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu received a
coded message from Tokyo which stated that in view of the existing situation,
the presence of ships in port was of utmost importance, that daily reports were
to be submitted, that the reports should advise whether or not there were obser-
vation balloons at Pearl Harbor, and whether or not the warships were pro-
vided with anti-torpedo nets. This message was intercepted by an Army radio
intercept station at Fort Shafter, Havaii, and apparently was forwarded by
mail to the War Department for decryption and translation. The translation
supplied by the Army indicates that the message was translated on 30 December
1941.
56. On the afternoon of 6 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at
Honolulu sent two messages in the "PA-K2" code which indicated the likelihood
of an air attack. The first reported that there were no signs of barrage balloon
equipment at Pearl Harbor, that in ail probability there was considerable oppor-
tunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, Hickam,
Ford, and Ewa, and that the battleships did not have torpedo nets. The second
message rejported on the ships at anchor on December 6th, and stated that it
appeared that no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet air arm.
These messages were not obtained by Naval Intelligence at Honolulu prior to
the attack. They were, however, both intercepted by an Army intercept station
at San Francisco and were forwarded by teletype to thQ Army. The translations
of these messages furnished by the Array indicate that they were translated on
December 8th. They could have been decrypted and translated in the Navy
Department in about an hour and a half.
57. There were no formal arrangements whereby the Navy communicated to
the Army estimates of the location and movements of Japanese naval forces.
Officers of the Far Eastern Section of Military Intelligence at Washington had
access to charts maintained in the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval
Intelligence showing such information, and had access to radio intelligence in-
formation available in the Navy Department, and the situation was discussed
with them. At Pearl Harbor, an intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Air Farce
received some general information concerning Japanese movements from the
Fleet Intelligence Officer.
58. The War Department had information which led that Department to
believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November. 1941.
This appears from a War Dopartn^ent dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General
Short, information to Admiral Kimniel, concerning a special photographic recon-
naissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information,
among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The
reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made
ready.
59. On 27 November 1941, a Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin was distributed
by the Commander- in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to his command. [168] This
2358 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
bulletin set forth the available information concerning the composition of the
Japanese Navy. It revised an earlier bulletin on the same subject and pointed
out that the principal change) was a further increase in the number of tleet
commands. This arose from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane
tenders into separate forces. The bulletin stated, among other things, that
the Japanese Carrier Fleet consisted of ten carriers which were organized into
five divisions, each having two carriers.
60. Current information, derived from traffic analyses, concerning the location
and movements of Japanese naval forces was obtained by the Commander in
Chief, Pacific Fleet, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer, who received it pri-
marily from the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor. Such information
also was contained in dispatches from the Radio Intelligence Unit in the Phil-
ippines and from the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence in Washington,
D. C.
61. Fortnightly Intelligence bulletins were issued by the Office of Naval In-
telligence and mailed to the Pacific Fleet, among others. These included sum-
maries of the informtfition concerning Japan€>se naval forces which had been
received from the Radio Intelligence Units at Pearl Harbor and at the Philippines.
62. On November 26th, Coir.FOURTEEN sent a dispatch to OpNav, informa-
tion to CincPac, CincAF, and ComSIXTEEN, which summarized the Information
as to Japanese naval movements obtained by the Radio Intelligence Unit at
Pearl Harbor during the i)receding month. The dispatch indicated that the
Commander Second Fleet had been organizing a task force comprising units of
various fleets. This dispatch stated that there was believed to be a strong
concentration of submarines and air groujps in the Marshalls, which included at-
least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a carrier), plus probably one-
third of the submarine fleet. The estimate was that a strong force might be
preparing to operate in .southeastern Asia while component parts might operate
from Palao and the Marshalls.
63. The radio intercei)ts by the radio intelligence unit located in the Philippines
were considered by OpNav to be the most reliable because of the location of the
unit. On 26 November 1941, the radio intelligence unit in the Philippines, in
a dispatch to CincPac, OpNav and others, commented on the above dispatch of
ConiFOURTEKN and stated that traffic analysis for the past few days had indi-
cated that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, was directing various fleet
units in a loose-knit task force that apparently would be divided into two sec-
tions. The first section was expected to operate in the South China area. The
.second section was expected to operate in the Mandates. It was estimated that
the second section included "CarDiv 3, RYUJO, and one MARU." This dispatch
also stated that the ComSIXTEKN unit could not confirm the supiwsition that
carriers and submarines in force were in the Mandates, and that their best in-
dications were that all known carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. It
was stated that this evaluation wa^ considered to be reliable.
64. From time to time after November 27th, there were sighting reports from
the Asiatic Fleet and other observers, copies of which were received by Admiral
Kimmel, which confirmed the movement of important Japanese naval forces to
the southward of Japan. These, however, did not report the movement of carriers.
[169] 65. After November 27th, the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor
continued the practice of preparing daily summaries of the information received
through their traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications, which were
submitted to Layton. the Fleet Intelligence Officer, for transmittal to Admiral
Kinanel on the following morning. Admiral K'mmel received and initialed these
summaries dailv on and after 27 November. On December 6th. he initialed the
summary dated December 5th, which was the last one he received prior to the
attack.
66. On November 28th. Admiral Kimmel received a communication intelli-
gence summary dated November 27th, which stated, among other things, that
there was no further information on the presence of a carrier division in the
Mandates and that "carriers were still located in home waters." The next day,
he received the November 28^h summary which indicated, among other things,
the view that the Japanese radio intelligence net was operating at full strength
upon U. S. Naval communications and "IS GETTING RESULTS." There was
no informal tion set forth in the summary as to carriers. On the following day.
Admiral Kimmel received the sunsmary dated November 29th. which, among
other things, indicated that Carrier Division 3 was under the immediate com-
mand of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet. On December 1st, Admiral
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2359
Kimmel received the previous day's summary which stated as to carriers that
the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicated the presence of at
least one carrier in ihe Mandates, although this had not been couflim-id.
b7. The December 1st summary, which Admiral Kimmel received, stated that
all Japanese service radio calls of forces afloat had changed promptly at 0000
on 1 December; that previously service calls had been changed after a period
of six months or more and that calls had been last changed on 1 November 1D41.
This summary stated, and was underscored by Admiral Kimn:>3l, that "The fact
that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step
in preparing for operations on a large scale." It also stated, among other things,
that a large number of submarines were believed to be east of Yososuka-Chichi-
jima and Saipan, and as to carriers that there was "no change."
68. On 2 December li>41, Admiral Kimmel examined a menaorandum which
Layton had prepared on December 1st at his request. This contained Layton's
estimate, on the basis of all available information, of the location of Japanese
naval forces. This estimate placed in the Bako-Takao area Carrier Division 4
and Carrier Division 3, which included four carriers, and the "KASUGA MARU"
(believed to have been a converted carrier). The estimate placed one carrier
"KORYU( ?) plus plane guards" in the Marshalls area.
69. Layton's written estimate made no mention of Japanese Carrier Divi-
sions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission was deliberate. The
reason was that Layton considered that the infornaation as to the location of
those carriers was not sufficient to warrant a reliable estimate of their
whereabouts.
70. On 2 December IWl, Admiral Kimmel and Layton had the following
conversation :
[170] "CAPTAIN LAYTON: As best I recall it. Admiral Kimmel said,
'What ! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?'
and I replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not
know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their
location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with
somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his ey^ ftnd
said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you
wouldn't know it?' or words to that effect. My reply was that, '1 nope tuey
would be sighted before now,' or words to that effect." ♦ ♦ ♦
"CAPTAIN LAYTON : His question was absolutely serious, but when he said,
'Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?' and I said,, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must
estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kuro area since we haven't
heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished opera-
tions only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle in
his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or
words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete
ignorance as to their exact location." * * *
"CAPTAIN LAYTON : This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do
not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement
to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't
so indicated their location."
71. The December 2nd radio intelligence summary, which was delivered to
Admiral Kimmel on December 3rd, stated as to carriers:
"Alnaost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of
identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since
over 2'^0 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the 1st
of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that
carrier traffic is at a low ebb."
72. The radio intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel on Decem-
ber 4th stated, in part, "No information on submarines or carriers." The sum-
mary delivered on December 5th made no mention of carriers. The summary
delivered on December 6th stated, in part, "No traffic from the Commander
Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either."
' 73. Other than radio intelligence and sighting reports from other sources, the
only practicable way by which the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, could
have obtained information as to the location or movements of Japanese naval
forces from 27 November to 7 December 1941 was by long distance air
reconnaissance.
[171] 74. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the Navy had the
obligation, through ComFOURTEEN. to conduct distant reconnaissance, and under
Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, naval forces
2360 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
were to be supplemented by available Army aircraft if the naval aircraft were
insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations. As previously pointed
out, the latter plan was not in operation because an agreement between the Com-
manding General and ComFOURTEEN that threat of a hostile attack was immi-
nent was a prereQuisite and no such agreement had been made prior to the attack.
The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, which implemented the agreements for
joint Army-Navy air action, similarly was not operative prior to the attack.
75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only
Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific Fleet patrol
planes.
76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral Kimmel,
and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were operated after 22
November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by him at that time, which
were not revised prior to the attack. The schedules stressed training operations.
They did not provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu.
77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he decided
on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.
78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral Kimmel and
members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the
advisability or practicability of long range reconnaissance from Oahu. The War
Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could recall
no specific discussion. The Commander of the Fleet planes, who had not
been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral
Kimmel had no such discussion with him.
79. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger, Commander, Fleet Patrol Planes,
and General Martin, Commanding General. Hawaiian Air Force, which was used
as a basis for the joint Army-Navy agreements, was prophetic in its estimate that
in the event of attack on Hawaii, the most likely and dangerous form of attack
would be an air attack to be launched at dawn from carriers about 200 miles from
Oahu. This estimate stated that the action open as a counter-measure included
daily patrols as far as possible from Oaliu, to sectors through 360 degrees, to reduce
the possibilities of surface or air surprise. It further stated that such patrols
could be effectively maintained with the personnel and materiel available at the
time (March, 1941) for a very short period and that such patrols were not practica-
ble unless other intelligence indicated that surface raid was probable within
narrow limits of time. According to Admiral Bellinger, it was realized by the
responsible oflicers of the Pacific Fleet that another course of action which was
always open was to fly a patrol of less than 360 degrees, with the available aircraft,
covering the more dangerous sectors.
[172] 80. A daily search of the Fleet operating areas to the southward of
Oahu was being carried out prior to the attack, in accordance with the provisions
of the Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas.
81. No distant reconnaissance was flown from Oahu during the critical period
27 November to 7 December 1941. The last previous distant reconnaissance flown
from Oahu appears to have been for several days during the summer of 1941 on a
sector toward Jaluit. This reconnaissance had been directed by Admiral Kimmel
at Admiral Bloch's request.
82. Late in November, 1941, the Army planned to conduct a reconnaissance
flight from Oahu to Jaluit and Truk, with the Navy assisting by providing intelli-
gence. The reconnaissance was not flown because the Army planes were not
made ready prior to the attack.
83. The Navy Basic War Plan assigned to the Pacific Fleet the task of protecting
the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area by destroying hostile
expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of
land positions in that hemisphere. Under the provisions of Pacific Fleet Operating
Plan Rainbow Five, when that plan became effective, the Pacific Fleet patrol
planes were to maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the
approaches to the Hawaiian area, having due regard for time required for over-
haul and repaid of planes and for conservation of personnel.
84. In the war warning of November 27th, which advised that negotiations with
Japan bad ceased and that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within a few
days, the Chief of Naval Operations directed that Admiral Kimmel "execute an
appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned
in WPL-46."
85. The dispatch of November 28th repeated an Army dispatch, which, among
other things, advised General Short that Japanese future action was unpredict-
able but that hostile action was possible at any moment. The Navy dispatch di-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2361
rected that Admiral Kinimel was to undertake no offensive action until Japan
had committed an overt act and that he was to "be prepared to carry out tasks
assigned in WPL-46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur."
86. Tlie esiablishment of long uistance air reconnaissance from (rntiu would
have been an "'appropriate deiensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the
tasks assigned in WPL^6."
87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the attack
were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more
than a few uays.
88. Prior to the attack, requests had been made by the Pacific Fleet to the Navy
Department to increase the number of patrol planes assigned to the Fleet. Some
new replacement planes had been sent to the Fleet during October and November,
1941. Additional planes, as evidenced by the prompt arrival of reenforcements
after December 7th, could have been made available by the Navy Dvipartment, but
at the expense of deienses in other areas. The [ITS] Navy Department
presumably knew that the number of planes a\ailable at Oahu were not suft^cient
to conduct 360° reconnaissance daily tor more than* a few days. The evidence in
prior investigations inoicates that after November 27th, responsible officers in the
Navy Department though that reconnaissance was being conducted from Oahu
to the extent practicable with the planes available there.
89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available at
Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several
weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128° to a distance of about 700 miles.
90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the most likely
sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese were to attack
Pearl Harbor.
91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27 Novem-
ber 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors probably would
have been searched.
92. On the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly before the air attack on Pearl
Harbor, there were reports of suspected and actual hostile submarine activity.
The second advised of a surface and depth charge attack on a submarine. Only
the latter report reached responsible officers. Due to reports on previous days of
sound contacts with submarines, confirmation was sought. The action Initiated
by ComFOURTEEN, in dispatching the ready duty destroyer, was in accord with
the provisions of the Fleet security letter.
93. Confirmation of the report of the sinking of a submarine was not received by
Admiral Kimmel or by Admilar Bloch prior to the air attack.
94. There is no evidence warranting the conclusion that a Japanese submarine
entered Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th. The one midget submarine known
to have been been in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7th was sunk after
making an ineffectual attack.
95. Evidence of the approach of a large flight of planes from the northward,
obtained by Army enlisted n»en operating a radar installation for instruction
purposes, was not communicated either to the Navy or to responsible Army
commanders.
96. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and ComFOURTEEN had no
previous warning of the air attack, which was initiated by the enemy at 0755.
The attack was skillfully executed, and resulted in serious losses of life and
damage.
97. The battleships each had two 5" antiaircraft guns ready and two machine
guns manned, which was in excess of the requirements of Condition III as
prescribed in the Fleet Security I^etter. As to Fleet aircraft based at Oahu,
seven were in the air (3 on morning security patrol armed with depth charges
and 4 engaged in tactics with submarines) ; ten were on 30 minutes notice; and
the balance of forty-four on four hours notice.
[n/f] 98. As a result of adherence to Fleet schedules which had been issued
in September, 1941, the Pacific Fleet battleships, with one exception, were all in
port and were either sunk or damaged. Due to the fortunate coincidence which
resulted in the aircraft carriers being at sea, they were uninjured.
99. It has been learned, since 7 December 1941, that the Japanese task force
which attacked Pearl Harbor left Saiki Anchorage, near the Bongo Channel,
sometime between 20 and 22 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded
to Tankan Bay, Etorofu Islaod, in the Kuriles. The force then assembled and
79716 O— 46 — pt.
2362 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
fueled. It departed on or about 28 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and
proceeded in an easterly direction to about 170° West Longitude, then southeast
to a point about 200 miles from Oahu.
100. The Japanese striking force included three Carrier Divisions among which
were Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. Five days before the attack, the Fleet Intelligence
Officer had advised Admiral Kimmel that he could not reliably estimate the
location of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2.
101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 30O miles due
north of Oahu.
[115] B. Conclusions.
1. The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were de-
signed to meet, with the available means, various types of attack, including an
attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war plans and the local
air defense plans were not operative in time to meet that attack. The Rainbow
Five war plans presupposed the existence of a state of war. The local air defense
plans presupposed agreement between the local commanders that an attack was
imminent. Neither of these was the ca.se prior to the attack.
2. The system of connnand in effect in the Hawaiian areq was that of mutual
cooperation and not unity of con)mand. Cooperation between the local Army and
Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence of attack, which pre-
supposed the possession and exchange of information concerning Japanese inten-
tions and movements of Japanese naval forces.
3. A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective exercise of Joint
Command. While there was a considerable exchange of information between
various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there was no organized system to
ensure such exchange.
4. Current and detailed information which was obtained by the Japanese as to
the location and movements of American naval forces and as to the preparations
being made for defense against an attack on Pearl Harbor contributed to the
success of their attack.
5. Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United States Navy
and Army intelligence organizations in Washington, concerning the Japanese
(Government's actual views as to the diplomatic negotiations, and its intention to
wage war, by means of interception, decryption, and translation of Japanese
diplomatic messages.
6. The information which was obtained in Washington by the War and Navy
Departments from Japanese diplomatic messages was fully exchanged. The
information which was obtained by the Navy Department as to Japanese naval
movements was available to intelligence officers of the War Department in Wash-
ington. The War Department had information which led that Department to
believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This
appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short,
information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a .special photographic reconnaissance
to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other
things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was
not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.
7. Although the Japanese (iovernnient established in their diplomatic messages
a code, known as the "wind.s" code, to be used in radio broadcasts in order to
convey information to its representatives as to the status of relations between
Japan and other countries, no message was intercepted prior to the attack which
used the code words relating to the United States.
[nO] 8. The information obtained by the Navy Department from intercepted
Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately disseminated within the Navy
Department.
9. Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that he be
kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and as to all important
developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not communicate to him impor-
tant information which would have aided him materially in fully evaluating the
seriousness of the situation. In particular, the failure to transmit the State
Department message of November 26th and to send, by telephone or other expedi-
tious means, information of the "1 p. m." message and its possible import, were
unfortunate.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2363
10. Admiral Klnimel, nevertheless, did have suflacient inforiuatior. in his posses-
sion to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and that important
developments with respect to the outbreak of war were imminent. This included
the 'war warning" message and similar important messages whfch were sent by
the Chief of Naval Operations.
11. The available information in the possession of the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the "war warning" mes-
sage, was not disseminated to all of his important subordinate commanders whose
cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus Admiral Bellinger, who commanded the
patrol planes, and Admiral Newton, who was at sea with a carrier and other units,
were not informed of this and other important messages.
12. Despite the fact that prior to the attack the telephone lines of the Japanese
Consul General at Honolulu were tapped and that various of his cable messages
were secured at Honolulu, no information was obtained prior to December 7th
which indicated the likelihood of a Japanese attack. The legal restrictions which
denied access to such cable messages were a definite handicap to the intelligence
agencies in the Hawaiian area.
13. Although various messages of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu,
which indicated Japanese interest in specific locations of ships in Pearl Harbor,
were intercepted by radio intercept stations of the Army and Navy and decrypted
prior to the attack, this information was not transmitted by the Navy Department
to Admiral Kimmel. Certain other messages which were intercepted by the Army
prior to 7 December 1941, indicated the likelihood of attack on Pearl Harbor but
were not decrypted or brought to the attention of the Navy prior to the attack,
apparently because the Army did not have sufficient i)ersonnel for such work.
14. The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel could have secured
information, after the receipt of the "war wfirning," as to the approach of the
attacking force, were the aircraft warning service, traffic analyses of Japanese
naval communications, and distant air reconnaissance from Oahu.
[/77] 15. The aircraft warning system was being operated by the Army
during certain periods of the day primarily for training purposes, and, although
not fully developed, could have served to give some warning of the approach of
Japanese aircraft.
16. The principal basis for estimates of the location of Japanese naval forces
was the intelligence obtained by the Navy from traffic analysis of Japanese naval
comnmnication.s.
17. A carrier attack could not, with certainty, have been prevented, for the
following reasons :
(a) Certain prevention of such an attack requires interception and destruc-
tion of the carriers before attack planes can be launched.
(b) The forces necessary to insure such interception and destruction, any-
where in the vast area which would have had to be covered, were'not available,
and could not have been expected to be available.
(c) If the Japanese task force had been detected at nightfall, the probability
of its successful interception and destruction prior to the following dawn would
liave been small.
18. Prior warning of an impending air attack, even as little as one half hoiir,
would have served consideral)ly to reduce the effectiveness of the attack, for the
iollowing reasons :
(a) Ships' antiaircraft batteries would have been fully manned and ready.
It is to be noted that the antiaircraft fire was more effective against the subse-
quent attacks than the initial air attack.
(b) Enemy dwracter of the approaching planes would have been immediately
appreciated and they would have been engaged at once.
(c) The maximum condition of damage control readiness would have been set,
thus facilitating the isolation of damage received.
(d) Many planes could have been in the air. in readiness.
(e) (Jround disi)er.sal of planes could have been improved.
1!). The only adequate means of a.ssuring detection of an approaching carrier
attack was by 3(^)° distant air search from Oahu. Suthcient planes were not
available to carry out an all-round distant air reconnaissance daily for more
than a few days.
[/78] 20. A thorough appreciation of the danger, the capabilities of the
available planes, and the importance of the defense of Pearl Harbor might have
justified the allotment by the Chief of Naval Operations of additional patrol planes
2364 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to the Pacific Fleet. Although the additional planes, if assigned, would not have
been sufficient for a 360° daily search, they would have increased the area
which could have been effectively covered and might have acted as an induce-
ment to such employment. Admittedly, in making over-all plane assignments,
it was necessary for the Chief of Naval Operations to weigh the prospective
needs of the Pacific and the Atlantic, where hostilities with Axis submarines were
already in progress.
21. Partial air reconnaissance, covering a sector of some 120 degrees, could
have been maintained daily from Oahu for a considerable period of time with
the Fleet patrol planes controlled by Admiral Kimmel and could have been
designed to cover the most probable approach bearings from which an attack
might have been expected. Such reconnaissance would have had a reasonable
chance of success.
22. Neither the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, nor the key members of the latter's staff, seem to have given serious
consideration after 27 November 1941 to the possibility or probability of an air
attack on Pearl Harbor or of its possible effect.
23. The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to the
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of forces to the
southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the probability of Japanese
attacks on the Philippines and Malaysia. The information which was received
by Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December 1941 indicated, however,
that on December 1st there was an unusual change in Japanese radio call signs ;
that, on the basis of all information up to December 2nd, no reliable estimate
could be made of the whereabouts of four of Japan's ten carriers, and that there
was no information as to any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of positive
information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement
which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas
of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack
should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to
reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. The measures which reasonably
were open to him were :
(a) Establishment of long distance air reconnaissance, covering the most
probable approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably permanent basis,
with available planes and crews.
(b) Establishment of a higher condition of anti-aircraft readiness, at least
during the dangerous dawn hours.
(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness by ships in
port, particularly during the dangerous dawn hours.
(d) Installation of antitorpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in port.
[179] (e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept
possible attack forces.
(f ) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry into port
at irregular intervals.
(g) Checking with Army as to readiness of antiaircraft defense and aircraft
warning installations.
24. Admiral Kimmel's estimate as to the probability of submarine attack in
the Hawaiian area was justified by subsequent events.
25. Throughout his incumbency as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral
Kimmel was energetic, indefatigable, resourceful, and positive in his efforts to
prepare the Fleet for war. In considering the action which he could have taken,
it should be noted that :
(a) Establishment of the maximum plane reconnaissance would have meant
the stoppage of aircraft training which was of great importance to the naval
expansion program, and might have resulted in wear and tear on planes and
crews which would have reduced their later effectiveness.
(b) Higher conditions of readiness would have interfered with the rest and
relaxation residable in port for the maintenance of personnel efficiency.
(c) Failure to install antitorpedo nets was influenced (i) by information from
CNO which made it appear that effective drops of -aircraft torpedoes with the
depths of water and length of run available in Pearl Harbor were not probable ;
(ii) the interference such nets would have caused in harbor operations due to
crowded conditions.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2365
(d) The presence of two carrier task forces at sea at the time on necessary
ferry trips did, in a way, provide striking forces and some reconnaissance.
(e) In view of the submarine menace and the concentration of antiaircraft
batteries, it was questionable whether ships were safer in port or at sea.
26. The attempt to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off
Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have been effected in plain language.
Adequate naval action was taken in sending out the ready destroyer. This in-
formation was of no immediate interest to the Army unless it in fact indicated
imminency of an air attack, an assumption which was not necessarily logical.
In any event, confirmation was not received until the air attack had commenced.
[180] 27. More effective action would have been taken both before and
after the attack on Pearl Harbor had there been in existence in the Hawaiian
area a suitable operating agency for the adequate exercise of joint command
functions. This omission was the fault of no one person, but of the existing
system.
28. War experience has shown that :
(a) The responsibility for final major decisions must devolve on one person;
that is, there must be "unity of command."
■(b) In planning and executing joint operations, responsible commanders of the
different services, who are to act jointly, and the principal members of their
staffs, must be in close physical touch, and not entirely dependent on telephonic,
radio, or similar communications. In no other way can a full exchange of
information and ideas be assured nor the possibility of misunderstanding be
prevented.
(c) Command organizations which are to function effectively in an emergency
must be in active operation prior to .such emergency.
29. Based on the foregoing, military command of outlying stations, such as
Hawaii, should, even in peacetime, be established under the principle of "Unity
of Conmiand.'-' The commander exercising such joint command should be assisted
,by a joint staff, capable of advising him in the functions of both services
concerned.
H. K. Hewitt.
Sbceetary of the Navy's 3bd Endorsement (on Naval Couet of Inquiry )
Department of the Navy,
Ottce of the Secretary,
Washington, 1 December 1944-
Third Endorsement to Record of Proceedings of Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry.
Subject : Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed
forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941,
ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944.
1. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion and recommendation of the
Court of Inquiry, the Fir.st Endorsement of the Judge Advocate General, and the
Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I find that the
evidence obtained to date indicates that there were errors of judgment on the
part of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark. I am not satisfied, however, that
the investigation has gone to the i>oint of exhaustion of all possible evidence.
2. Further investigation into this matter will be conducted by an investigating
officer, and, in addition to the subjects recommended for further investigation
by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet in the Second Endorsement, will include
the taking of the testimony of Rear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum,
and such other investigation as may appear to be necessary in order to ascertain
all of the relevant facts relating to the Japanese attack. Pending the completion
of the necessary further investigation into this matter, I withhold decision as
to the institution of any proceeding against any naval oflBcer involved.
Forrestal,
Secretary of the Navy.
2366 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COMMANDEB IN CHIEF U. S. FLEET 2ND ENDORSEMENT (ON NaVAL COtnEW OK
Inquiry)
Cominch File
[i] United States Fleet
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D. C, 6 November, 19^4-
FF1/A17-25
Serial : 003224
Top Secret
Second Endorsement to Record of Proceedings of Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry.
From : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Opera-
tions.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed
forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, or-
dered by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1941.
1. I concur in the Findings, Opinion and Recommendation of the Court of
Inquiry in the attached case subject to the opinion expressed by the Judge Advo-
cate General in the First Endorsement and to the following remarks.
2. (a) As to Facts I and II (page 1156), the routine practice of rotating units
of the Fleet, so that each -vessel had approximately two-thirds of its time at
sea and one-third in port, was usual and necessary. Definitely scheduled upkeep
periods in port were required, not only for keeping the ships in good mechanical
condition, but, also, for giving the personnel sufficient recreation to keep them
from going stale. Whether or not Admiral Kimmel was justified in having
one task force and part of another in port on 7 December is a matter which I
discuss later on.
(b) In Fact III (page llaS) the Court points out that, because of constitutional
requirements, no blow against a potential enemy may be struck until after a
hostile attack has been delivered, unless there has been a declaration of war by
Congress. The great advantage which this gives an unscrupulous enemy is
obvious. This requirement made it impossible for Admiral Kimmel and General
Short to employ the offensive as a means of defense, and, therefore, was a definite
handicap.
[2] (c) Fact IV (page 1159) sets forth that the Commandant of the 14th
Naval District (Admiral Bloch) was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel and was
charged by him with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl
Harbor. Admiral Kimmel was, therefore, responsible for naval measures con-
cerned with local defense.
(d) Fact V (page;il60) sets forth that Admiral Kimmel and General Short
were personal friends ; that they met frequently ; that their relations were cordial
and cooperative in every respect ; that they frequently conferred, and invariably
conferred when messages were received by either which had any bearing on the
development of the United States- Japanese situation, or on their several plans
in preparing for war. Each was informed of measures being undertaken by
the other in the defense of the base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes.
This is important, in that it refutes the rumors which have been prevalent since
the Pearl Harbor incident that Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not
cooperate with one another.
(e) Part VI (page 1160) sets forth the information that the Navy Department
and the War Department had been fully informed as to the weaknesses of the
defensive installations at Pearl Harbor, and in particular that means to cope
with a carrier attack were inadequate. It further sets forth that the Secretary
of War, on 7 February 1941, expressed complete concurrence as to the importance
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2367
of the subject and the urgency of making every possible preparation to meet a
hostile attack. It is made clear that Admiral Kimmel stressed the concept that
the base at Pearl Haibor should be capable of defense by local Army and Navy
forces, leaving the Fleet free to operate without concern as to the safety of the
base. It is further made clear that both the War and the Navy Departments
had given full consideration to this matter and had been unable, during 1941,
to augment local defenses to an adequate degree, because of the general state of
unpreparedness for war.
iJj (f ) Fact VII (page 1165) sets forth that the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions and the Chief of Staff of the Army submitted a joint memorandum to the
President on H November 1941, recommending that no ultimatum be delivered
to Japan at that time, and giving, as one of the basic reasons, the existing
numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the United States Pacific Fleet.
The Court, also, points out that owing to security policies in the two countries, it
was ea.sy for Japan to conceal her own strength, while at the same time Japan
enjoyed a free opportunity to obtain information as to our own strength and
dispositions. My comment is that this state of affairs, coupled with the require-
ment that United States forces could take no overt action prior to a declaration
of war, or actual attack, must always place the United States distinctly at a dis-
advantage during the period of strained relations.
(g) Fact VIII (page 1167) stresses the fact that periodical visits to a base
are necessary for seagoing forces in order that supplies may be provided, and
opportunity given for repair and replenishment and for rest and recreation of
personnel. The Court points out that it is foreign to the concept of naval war-
fare to require seagoing personnel to assume responsibility for security from
hostile action while within the limits of a permanent naval base. The Court
remarks that this concept imposes upon the Army responsibility for base defense,
and that the United States Army fully understood this responsibility. My com-
ment is that this principle is sound enough, but it cannot be carried to an illogi-
cal extreme. In the case of Pearl Harbor, where local defenses were inadequate,
the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet could not, and did not, evade re-
sponsibility for assisting in the defense, merely because, in principle, this is not
normally a Fleet task. It appears from the record that Admiral Kimmel appre-
ciated properly this phase of the situation. His contention appears to be that
Pearl Harbor should have been strong enough for self-defense. The
[4] fact that it was not strong enough for self-defense hampered his arrange-
ments for the employment of the Fleet, but, nevertheless, he was aware of, and
accepted the necessity for, employing the Fleet in defensive measures.
(h) Fact IX (page 1169). This section of the Findings outlines the plans
made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short for the defense of Pearl Harbor.
It points out that the Naval Base Defense Officer was assigned responsibility for
distant reconnaissance, that no planes were assigned to him, but that the 69
patrol planes belonging to the Fleet were to be made available to him in case of
necessity. The Court remarks that the basic defect of this section of the plan
lay in the fact that the naval participation in long rangfe reconnaissance depended
entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to the Fleet, and that this
circumstance, forced by necessity, was at complete variance with the funda-
mental requirement that the defense of a permanent naval base must be inde-
pendent of assistance by the Fleet. The Court further remarks that the effective-
ness of the.se plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was
to be expected within narrow limits of time, that it was not possible for Admiral
Kimmel to make Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base Defense
Officer (becau.se of his own lack of planes, pilots, and crews, and because of the
demands of the Fleet in connection with Fleet operations at a base). My com-
ment is that the Court seems to have over-stressed the fact that the only patrol
planes in the area were assigned to the Fleet. In my opinion, it was sound
policy to place all aircraft of this type at the disposal of Admiral Kimmel, whose
responsibility it was to allocate all the means at his disposal as best he could
between the Fleet and the base defense forces.
[5] (i) Facts X and XI (page 1171) set forth the states of readiness of
the forces at Pearl Harbor. In so far as the Navy is concerned, the state of
readiness was predicated on certain assumptions, which included the assumption
that a declaration of war might be preceded by .surprise attacks on ships at Pearl
Harbor or surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, or by a combi-
nation of these two. The measures prescribed by Admiral Kimmel included local
patrols, daily search of operating areas by air, certain extensive antisubmarine
precautions, the netting of the harbor entrance, and the maintenance of "aug-
2368 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
mented Condition 3" on board vessels in port. "C5ondition of readiness No. 3"
provides a means of opening fire with a portion of the secondary and antiaircraft
batteries in case of a surprise encounter. The Court points out this state of
readiness did permit ships to open fire promptly when Japanese planes attacked.
Local Army forces were in "Alert No. 1" which provides for defense against
sabotage and uprisings, with no threat from without. With respect to this phase
of the matter I offer the comment that "condition of readiness No. 3" is normally
maintained in port. However, it is prerequisite that vessels in this condition
enjoy a considerable measure of protetcion by reason of adequate local defense
forces when dangerous conditions exist. This measure of protection was not
enjoyed by vessels at Pearl Haroor on 7 December, a matter which was well
known to Admiral Kimmel. It must, therefore, be assumed that he was not
aware of the imminence of the danger of attack, a matter which I discuss further
later on. I also note from this section of the Findings that Army and Navy
aircraft on the ground, and naval patrol planes moored on the water, were not
in condition to take the air promptly. Some patrol plane squadrons were in
"day-oflf for rest" status; some patrol planes were in the air for local patrol and
exercises; 50 percent were on 4 hours notice (page 669). This is further indica-
tion of the lack of appreciation of the imminence of attack, and led to the destruc-
tion of large [6] numbers of United States aircraft. This section of the
Findings, also, iwints out that there were no long range reconnaissance in effect
on 7 December, a matter which I will refer to again later on. It will be noted
that the last paragraph of Fact XI (page 1176) reads :
"The Navy's condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7 December
1941, was that best suited to the circumstances then attending the vessels and
patrol planes of the Pacific F'leet. A higher condition of readiness could have
added little, if anything, to their defense."
This seems to be a matter of opinion rather than fact. I do not concur, for
reasons set forth later on.
(j) F'act XII (page 1176). The Court sets forth that attack by carrier aircraft
can be prevented only by intercepting and destroying the carrier prior to the
launching of planes. It is further pointed out that to destroy a carrier before
she can launch her planes, her location must be known and suflScient force must
be at hand. The Court points out that in this instance Japanese carriers sailed
at an unknown time from an unknown ix>rt, and that it is an established fact
that no information of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded or received
from any source which would indicate that carriers or other ships were on their
way to Hawaii during November or December 1941. The Court deduces, and
states as a fact, that the Japanese attack on 7 December, under the circum-
stances then existing, was unpreventable and unpredictable as to time. I concur
that there was no direct and positive knowledge that the Japanese attack force
was en route to the Hawaiian area. However, as discussed later on, there was
information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that an
attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within
fairly narrow limits.
[7] (k) Fact XHI (page 1178) discusses the diflSculty of long rafige recon-
naissance with the forces available to Admiral Kimmel, and points out that
Admiral Kimmel, after weighing all factors, specifically ordered that no routine
long range reconnaissance be undertaken. The controlling reason seems to have
been Admiral Kimmel's feeling that if the Fleet patrol planes were used for
routine reconnaissance they would have been rapidly worn out and, therefore,
unavailable for Fleet purposes. Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to
make in this matter. There were many factors to be considered, and it is not
easy to put one's self in his place. However, after considering all of the infor-
mation that was at his disposal. It seems to me that he was not on entirely
sound ground in making no attempt at long range reconnaissance, particularly
as the situation became more and more tense in the few days immediately
preceding the Japanese attack. It is obvious that the means available did not
permit an all-around daily reconnaissance to a distance necessary to detect
the approach of carriers before planes could be launched. However, there were
certain sectors more dangerous than others which could have been covered to
some extent. And It would appear that such partial cover would have been
loMcal in the circumstances as known to Admiral Kimmel in late November and
early December, A pertinent matter in this connection is that when Admiral
Richardson was Commander in Chief he provided for distant reconnaissance
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2369
by patrol planes, using the few at his disposal to cover the most dangerous
sectors in rotation. He considered the arc between 170° and 350° to be of
primary importance, and believed the most probable direction of attack was
from the southwest. These patrols were discontinued when, or shortly before.
Admiral Kimmel relievetl Admiral Richardson (pages 683, 1053, 1055).
(1) Fact XIV (page 1182). This section sets forth the fact that the Array
had assumed responsibility for the air warning service, and was in the process
of ii;Sialliiig radar and other [8] elements of the air warning system,
but that the whole system was in an embryonic state on 7 December and not
in condition to function. The system was partially in use for training, and
it so happened that a mobile radar station did pick up the approaching Japanese
planes when they were about 130 miles away, and reported this fact to the
Information Center, where the only oflScer present was an officer under training,
who assumed the planes to be a llight of Army bombers known to be en route from
the United States. He made no report of the matter. My comment is that this
is indicative of the unwarranted feeling of immunity from attack that seems
to have pervaded all ranks at Pearl Harbor — both Army and Navy. If there
had been awareness of the states of tension that existed in Washington, and
awareness of Japanese potentialities, it appears that the air warning system,
embryonic as it was, could have been used to give at least an hour's warning
before the air attack struck.
(m) Fact XV (page 1186) states that the greatest damage to ships in Pearl
Harbor resulted from torpedoes launched from Japanese aircraft. The Court
points out that, though the harbor entrance was well protected against break-
through by enemy submarines or small craft, there were no antitorpedo baffles
within the harbor for the protection of individual ships, because it had been
assumed that aircraft torpedoes could not be made to run in the extremely
shoal water of Pearl Harbor. The decision not to install torpedo baffles appears
to have been made by the Navy Department (page 1187). Proposals to use
barrage ballons and smoke were considered but rejected for technical reasons.
It is evident, in retrospect, that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes
were seriously underestimated.
(n) Fact XVI (page 1188). In this section of the Findings the Court traces
the deterioration of relations with the Japanese and outlines certain informa-
tion given to Admiral Kimmel on the subject. The more important items are
as follows :
[9] (1) On 16 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed by CNO that
a grave situation had been created by the resignation of the Japanese cabinet,
that Japan might attack the United States, and that it was necessary for the
Pacific Fleet to take precautions and to make such deployments as would not
disclose strategic intentions or constitute provocative action against Japan.
(2) On 17 October, Admiral Stark addressed a personal letter to Admiral
Kimmel in which he stated his personal view that it was unlikely that the Japs
would attack the United States.
(3) On 24 October, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO stating
that chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were doubtful and
that indications were that a surpise aggressive movement in any direction,
including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.
(0) Fact XVII (page 1193). In this section the Court sets forth certain
information, which was known in Washington and which was transmitted to
Admiral Kimmel, which the Court holds to ha\^ established the fact that the
attack of T December came as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and
Navy Departments, and to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, and that
there were good grounds for their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far
East, rather than elsewhere. The summary of the information on which thib
is based is as follows :
(1) On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from CNO
beginning with the words, "This de.spatch is to be considered a war warning,"
and going on to say that an aggressive move by Japan was expected within the
next few days; [10] that there were indications of an amphibious move-
ment against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo:
and directing Admiral Kimmel to execute an appropriate defensive deployment.
(2) On 28 November, Admiral Kimmel received from General Short a War
Department Message to the effect that negotiations appeared to be terminated ;
that Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile action was possible
at any time; and that it was desirable that Japan commit the first overt act, in
case hostilities could not be avoided.
2370 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(3) On 30 November, Admiral Klmmel was included as an Information Ad-
dressee in a despatch to the Commander in Chief, Apia ic Fle^^t, directing him to
scout for information of Japanese movements in the China Sea.
(4) On 28 November, CNO advised Admiral Kimmel that it had been decided
to relieve Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops.
(5) Admiral Kimmel interpreted the foregoing as indicating that the Depart-
ment was not particularly concerned as to the possibility of a Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor at the time.
(p) Fact XVIII (1196). This section of the Findings deals with information
that became available in Washington during the period beginning 26 November.
It is set forth that from 26 November to 7 December, conversations, which had
been in progress between our Government and Japan, were continued, coming
to an end on 7 December. The circumstances under which information as to
Japanese intentions during this period came to the attention of the Navy Depart-
ment are set forth as follows :
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2371
UOMINCH riLM
UNITED STATES FLEET
MKADOUARTXR* OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIKP
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINOTON 28, D. C.
FFVA17-25
6 N0V1M4
mam
8abJ«ott
Coart of Inqulzy to inquire into tfa* &ttaok
■ftd* by Japancs* aned foreae on Paarl Harbor,
Tarritorj of Eawali, on 7 Dacaabar 194l> ordarad
bj tha Sacratary of tba laTT- on 13 July 1941.
(1) A n\abar of ■aaeagaa ta-Japaati» aaita/receiTad 7^** ^X*^^
during and prior to tbia pariod, win .dimdad in tha BaTy
Dapartmnt but vara not oant to Admiral Kiaaal. Thasa aaa-
aagae are 8UBBaj.*i£ed in tba Addandua to tha Court's rinding
of Faeta at tba back of Voluae 5 of the record. Tba text
of tha aaBBagae in act forth at length in Voluna 5, bagizming
at page 692. Theea Baesagee indicate definite Japanaee in-
tareet in diapoaitions av PaeLrl Harbor, md aention, in eoaa
caaea, a desire to know where Ibiited States ships were berthed.
Adnlral Stark testified that be considered it undesirable
to send Adairal KIiumI these despatches, because to do so
■ight Jeopardise the secrecy fiiich it was necessary to ^ '■+«„*..„ Tfc-ww
maintain as to the ability of the Navy Cepartinent to tar««k
the Japeaase endes. This contention has some aerit, in ^f
opinion. It was Adairal Stark's responsibility to protect
the sourcejof this infonaation. Howerer, it was equally
his responsibility to gire Admiral Kinoel a general picture
of the infomatlon contained in these aessages. Admiral
Stark says that he considered that the despatches he did
send to Adair&l Kioael gave an adequate picture of iliat
was known and inferred as to Japanese intentions. As set
forth under "Opinions," the Court holds that the inforaatloB
glren to A^adral Eiamel was not an adequate siaaary of the
inforaatioQ at hie disposal. I hare to concur in this Tlew.
(2) In addition to the foregoing the Court goes at
lengtii into the handling of the "H part message", originated
in Tokyo and addressed to the Japanese Aabassar^or in Washing-
ton. The first 13 parts were received in the lavy Department
on 6 December imMJ wnre hyjiw'^— m at 2100, on th&t date.
They set forth the Japanese views as to certain United States
proposals for resolving matters under dispute between the
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2372 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COMINCH FILE
UNITED STATES FLEET
HKAOOUAItTDt* OP THI COMMANDCR IN CHIBP
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WABHINOTON 2B, D. C.
rFl/A17-25
8.r.a.rr3'?4 8 N'OVWM
TIMMET
8abJ«ett Coort of Inqulzy to inqulr* into the att*ek
■ad* by JapuMa* araad foreaa oa Paarl Harbor^
TarrlioxT of Bavali, on 7 Dao«^b«r 19AX, ordarad
l7 th* Sacratary of tba la^ on 13 Jnly 19ia.
coimtrlaa, and laava no doubt that tha Dnitad Stataa propoaala
vara unaooaptabia to Japan, but dp not coaa to tha point of
indioatinc a braak in ralationa. At or about 0700, 7 Dacaal)ar,
tha Hth part of tha aaesaga vaa^daoadad. This part of tha
■aaaaga eaid that tha Japaneea Goramnant had finally lost
hopa of baing abla to adjust ralationa with tha Qaltad Statat
and that it waa ii^oaeible to raach an agraaaant through fur-
tbar nagotiationa. Thla part of tha aasaaga «aa dalirarad at
about 0900, 7 Daceabar, to tha Offica of tha Qiief of laral
Operatione, at about 0930 to tha Ihita Houaa, and at 0950 to
tha Stata Departaant for Sacrataxy Hull and Sacratary Knox.
Sacratary Knox was confarring with llr. Hull at tha Stata
DaparUant. |y,^i«^v*«<
(3) At about a030 on 7 Daeanbar, tha ao-callad "ItOO
p.a. Besaaga" aas ^aaadad in tha lavy Dapartaant. It diractad
tha Japanaae Aabasaador to dalivar tha H part aaaaaga to tha
Sacratary of Stata at liOO p.a. on that day. Tbla naaaaga vaa
of signlfieanca bacauca 1«00 p.a. in Washington aaa davB at
Honolulu. This aassaga aas dalirerad at onoa to tha Offica
of tha Chief of laTal Operations, and ioBediataly tharaaftar
to tha Stata Dapartnant, where the official who racairad it
was asked to point out to Mr. Knox and Mr. Hull the signifi-
cance of the "ItOO p.B. tine of delirery". In my opinion, tha
foregoing indicates that at about 10:30 on 7 Deceaber (O5OO
Honolulu tine) the Bavy Departaent, or at laaot, aone officer*
therein, appreciated that tha inforaation Just reoeired
pointed to tha possibility — eren to the probability —
of a dawn attaok on Pearl Harbor. General Harahall stataa
that thia aessage caae to hie attention about 11:00 a.m.,
and that ha ioMdlataly telephoned to Adairal Stark that ha
proposed to warn General Short that a break with Japan
«as iDBinent, and that an attack against Hawaii could be
expected soon. Adsdral Stark demrred at first, as to tha
- 12 -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2373
aOMI'4CH PIUI
UNITED STATES FLEET
MBAOOuAimna or thk commanocr in chbf
NAVY DEPARtMENT
WASHINOTON U. D. C.
m/117-25 0 NOV 1944
».rlaliCC3?24
VUEBIET
S«bJ«ott Cofurt of Inquiry to Inqulro into tho attack
■ado bj J&puMse araod forces on Poarl Harbor,
Tarrltory of Hawaii, on 7 Docaabor 19U, ordered
bgr tbe Secretary of the Hairy OD 13 July 1941«
seed for sendlag thia aeeaage, but after brief conaideration
aaked General Marahall to inclnda in hie proposed deepatch
direotions to paaa the contents to naval eomaanders. General
Ibrshall sent a despatch to the effect that the Japanese
were presenting "ihat aaounts to an ultinatvB at It 00 pn. ,
Washington tise, on 7 Deeeaber; that Japanese are under orders
to destroy their codes inaediately; and Ihat while the War
Departaent does not knov the significance of the hour set for
deliTering the note, you are to be on the alert accordingly
and to infora naTal authorities of this comauni cation. * He
sent this via conaercial radio, which was then the uaual aeans
of coHBunieating with the Hawaiian Departaent. The despatch
left WaAington at 12il7 on 7 Deeeaber (6U7 a.m. Honolulu tiae}
and arrlTed in the RCA office in Honolulu at 7t33 &•■• Hono-
lulu tiae. Thia was 22 ainntes before the attack began. Qy
the tiae the aessage had been d*eoded and delivered to General
Short, the attack was already underway. The Court states that
if the aost expeditious asans of deliTery had been used (plain
language telephone) this inforaation could have been reeeived
in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began. The Court
reaaxics that oTen in this erent there was no action open, nor
aeans arailnble, to Adairal Kiaasl liiich could hare stopped
the attack, or which could have had other than negligible
bearii^ upon its outeoae, since there was already in effect
a condition of readiness beet suited to the eircuastances
attending ressels within the llaite of Pearl Harbor naral baee,
and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu. I cannot go
along with this reasoning of the Court. Even two hours advance
warning would have been of great value in alerting planes and
in augasntlng the condition of readiness existing on board ship.
(4) On 3 Deeeaber (the date is not specified in the
Findings; it is sUted in Exhibit 20) Adairal Kiaasl was
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2374 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COMINCH FIL£
UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADOUAirrERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
Fn/A17-25
Serlali C'^^O^']
Subjects
6 N'0V1944
Court of Inquiry to Inquire into the attack
made by Japanese armed forces on Pearl Haroori
Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 19U.» ordered
by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1941.
informed Ihat the Jap&nese had inetructed diplomatic and
consular posts in the Far East, Kashlngton and London to
destroy most of their codes. Admiral Kimmel says (his state-
ment, page 29) that "the significance of this despatch was
diluted substantially by publication of the information in
the morning newspaper in Honolulu," and that he did not
regard it as a clear-cut warning of Japanese intentions to
strike the United States.
(5) On 4 December, Admiral Kimmel reoeived a despatch
directing the destruction of secret anr* onfidential docrments
at Guam, except those necessary for curx-ent purposes, lAiich
were to be kept ready for instant destruction in event of
emergency (Exhibit 21). This was followed on 6 December by
authorization for outlying Islands to destroy secret and confi-
dental documents "now or under later conditions of greater
emergency". (Exhibit 22)
(q) Addendum to Court's Finding of Facts (Volume 5). In this
section the Court sets forth matters which have already been dis-
cussed in the three preceding sxib-paragra^jhs; and, in addition,
touches on the matter of the so-called "Winds message". This Japan-
ese message, originating in Tokyo on 19 November, was intorecpted
aad translai*d in the Navy Department on 28 November. It set forth
that "in case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic
relations)" certain code words would be inserted in the middle of
the daily Japanese short wave news broadcast, and directed that
when these words were heard codes were to be destroyed. This
message was received In various places, including Peerl Harbor,
and Admiral Kimmel had it. A monitor watch was set at varioxia
places to look out for the expected "weather forecast". On U and
5 December, the Federal Communications Commission monitored the
expected "weather forecast" which was sent from Tokyo twice,
first at 2200 on /t December, and again at 2130 on 5 December.
The code words ap{>earing in this implementing message meant thut
- U-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2375
COM INCH FIL£
UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANOCR IN CHICP
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 29. O. C
m/Ai7-25 6 NOV 1944
serial. ■rr3'' -^4
Subject: Court of Inqulrj to inquire into the attack
nade bjr Japanese anaed forces on Pearl Harbor,
Territoiy of Hawaii, oa 7 December 19^1, ordered
by the Secretary of the Ha^ on 13 July 19^1.
Japanese relations, with Russia were in danger. These two nessages
haTe been preserved in the files of the Federal Conuaunications
Commission. In addition to this indication that the Japanese
were about to break relations idth Russia, there is evidence
(Voluae 5, page 7^6) that Captain Safford, on duty in the Office
of the Director of Naval Coimnunications , saw on U December, a
"yellow slip" on idiich was written a different version of the
ij^^lemanting code, which meant that relations with the United
States and Great Britain were in danger. Captain Safford thinks
that this message was intercepted by an East Coast station, but
he was not sure. No written trace of the message referred to
by Captain Safford could be found in the files of the War Depart-
ment or the Havy Department. There is considerable testimony in
the record as to what was done with the "Winds message". Various
officers testified that the implementing despatches were trans-
mitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval (derations and the
Director of Naval Communications, but Admiral Stark and Admiral
Noyes testified that they do not remember hearing anything about
them. It is an established fact that none if Vm ii— tt— of the
implementing messageSwere ever sent to Admiral Klmmel. However,
as noted in paragraph 2(p)(ii) above, Uje Court' finds that it is a
fact that Admiral Klmmel was informed on 3 December that the
Japanese had instructed diplomatic and conavilar posts in the Tar
Ee^t, Washington, and London, to destroy ceirtain codes.
(r) The Court further sets forth the fact (mainly under
Section XTIII on page 1196) that on 26 November a note, couched in
strong terms, was delivered hy the United States State Department
to Japanese representatives. The stipulptions contained therein
were drastic, and likeljr to be unacceptable to Japan. Admiral
Klmmel had no knowledge of the existence of such a note, nor of
its contents until after the attack. The Court points out that
Admiral Klmmel in May 19^1 had particularly asked the Chief of
Naval Operations to keep him informed of the diplomatic situation
in order that he might be "informed of all important developments
as they occur by the quickest secure means available."
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2376 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COMINCH FILE
UNITED STATES FLEET
HKADQUARTERS OP THE CSMMANDBR IN CHID'
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINOTON tS. O. C.
Fn/A17-25
Sena. rc3''?4 6 NOV 1944
Subjaott Court of Inqviixy to loqulra Into th* attack
made bgr Japanese araed forces on Pearl Barbor»
Terrltozy of Hawaii, on 7 December 194l» ordered
tir tbe Secretarj of the lavy on 13 July 19A1>
(«) Fact HZ (page 1200). The Court points out that it is
a prlne obligation of eoaaand to keep subordinate ooBaanders
constantly supplied with Inforaatlon, and that AdBl^al Stark,
having important information In his possession, during the critical
period from 26 Rovember to 7 December, failed to transmit this
information to Admiral Klmmel, thus deprlTlng the latter of a
clear picture of the existing Japanese situation as seen la
WashingtoBi I am in thorough accord with this Tlew of the Court.
(t) It will be noted from the foregoing that one of the
most ii^rtant phases of this InTeetlgation is concerned with tbe
handling of enemgr Information in the U&rj Department. In this
connection it would seem essential to a thorough exploration of
the facts to have the teBtimoi;^ of the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence, who was largely responsible for handling information of
the eneiy. It appears from the record that Rear Mairal Wilkinson,
the then Director of laval Intelligence, was not available to the
Court as a witness. I assume that the Court believes that all
essential information was obtained, despite the fact that Admiral
lilkinson did not testify; however, it appears to me that the
failure to obtain his testimoq^ was unfortunate.
3. I submit the following comment as to the Court's Opinion.
(a) In the Opinion based (» Finding II (page 1201), the
Court expresses tbe view that the presence of a large number of
combatant vessels in Pearl Harbor on 7 December was necessary, and
that the information available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific
Fleet, did not require any departure from his operating and raalnta-
nanoe schedules. I do not entirely go along with this opinion.
Had all of the Information available in the Department been properly
evaluated and pn^rly disseminated, I am inclined to believe that
Admiral Klmmel' s dispositions on Ihe morning of 7 December would
not have been as they actually were on that occasion.
-16-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2377
OOMINCH riuE
UNITED STATES FLEET
HKAoauAfrmis op thk commamokr in cmibp
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINOTON Z8. D. C
m/A17-25
S«rlalt fP^')-
nyfiiET
6 NOV 1944
Subjaott Court of loquliy to inquire into the attack
■ad* by Japanasa anaad forces on Pearl Harbor,
Territory of Hawaii, on 7 Deoeaber 19^1* ordered
I7 the Secretary of the Havy <ni 13 July 1941*
(b) In the Opinion, based on Tact VI (page 1202} the Coiirt
expresses the rie* that deficiencies in personnel and aateriel
efaioh existed in 19iU had an adverse bearing upon the effectiveness
of the defense of Peurl Harbor, on and prior to 7 Deceaber. I offer
the cooaent that, obviously, the An^ and lavy were diort of nen and
■ateriel at the tiae and thct available aeans were spread thin
throughout the various areas of probable hostility. The shortage
of aeans available to Admiral Kiamel aost be taken into consider-
ation. However, the pertinent question is whether or not he used
the aeans available to hia to the best advantage. In ^ opinion,
be did not. The fault lay in the fact that he was not fully in-
f oraed hy the Navy Departaent of what was known as to probable
Japanese intentions and of the tenseness of the situation, and
further, that his Judgasnt was to some extent faulty and that he
did not fully appreciate the ii^lications of that inforaation
lAileh was given to hia.
(e) In the Opinion, based on Finding Till (page 1202), the
Court holds that the defense of Pearl Harbor naval base was the
direct responsibility of the Axay, that the lavy was to assist
only with aeans provided to the Hth Haval District, and that the
defense of the base was a Joint operation only to this extent.
As I stated above, I think this is a narrow view of the question,
and that Admiral Eiamel was fulOy aware that, in view of the weak-
ness of local defenses, the fleet had to be eq;)loored to protect
Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiiak Islands in general.
(d) The Court holds (page 1203} that Adadral Bloch perforaad
his duties satisfactorily. I concur.
(•} In the Opinion, based on Fact IZ, (page 1203) » the
Coori states that naval defense plans ware eoaplete and sonad in
- 17 -
79716 O — 46 — pt. 1(
2378 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COMINCH FILE
UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADOUARTERS OP THE COMMANDER IN CHlCP
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINSTON ZB. D. C.
6 N0V19M
7F1/A17-25
Serial: ^
msmu
Subject! Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack
aade by Japanese anted -forces on Pearl Harbor,
Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 19^11, ordered
by the Secretary of the Havy on 13 Jr.ly 19iX,
c(Hicept, but contained a basic defect in that naval participation
depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to
and being employed by the Fleet, and that on Uie morning of 7
December, these plans were ineffective because they necessarily
were drawn on the premise that there would be advance knowledge
that an attack was to be expected within narrow llmite of time,
idiich was not the case on that morning. I cannot go along with
this view. As I have already stated, there could be no qviestion
that available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best
suited to the danger that threatened. I doubt that, with the forces
available, it would have been possible to intercept and destroy the
Japanese carriers before they launched their planes, except b^
luc]^ chance. However, I do thick that Admiral Kimmel was not
sufficiently alive to the dangers of the situation, not entirely
due to his own fault. This had a bearing on the amoxmt of damage
that was incurred by the Fleet when the Japanese did attack.
(f } The Opinion, based on Fact X (page 1204) , expreaees the
Tiew that Admiral SJ.mmel's action, taken innediately after assumlD"
oomnand, in placing in effect coopreheneive ituttructione for the
security of the Fleet at sea, is indicative of bis appreciation of
his responsibility for the security of the Fleet and that the steps
taken were adequate and effective. I concur in this.
(g) The Opinion, based on Finding U (page 120^}, as to
th« effect that the measures taken for the secivi^ in port were
adequate and proper, and that only had it been known in advance
that the attack was to take place on 7 December, covild there now
be any basis for a conclusion as to the steps that might have been
taken to lessen its ill effects. The Court takes note of suggestioas
that each day all naval planes should have been in the air, all
naval personnel at tie ir stations, and all aiiti-aircraft guns manned,
•■d expresses the view that no such course of action could have been
carried out as a matter of routine. T concur in this. The question
at issue is irtiether or not indications called for a ti^tening vp
of precautions as 7 December approached. I think they did.
- 18 -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2379
t-r 4INCHPIUI
UNITED STATES I EET
MBAOOUAimDU OP THK COMMAMCMOt IN CHID'
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINOTON U, O. C.
'"rrc3.24 « N0V1«4
SLSHliF*
8«kJaoti Court of laqnlxy to inqtilr* into tho attack
■ado lor JapaaoM araod foreoa on Poarl Harbor,
Tsrrttorx of Hawaii, on 7 Dooaabor 19^, ordarod
t7 tho S«orotax7 of tha Vavjr on 13 July 1941-
(h) la th« Opinion, basod on Finding XVIII (pago 1207) , tha
Coort holds that Adairal Kiaaal waa Juatifiad in not proriding for
roatiaa long raaga raeonnaisaaaea in tha absaaca of aqjr laforBatioo
iadleatiag that tha attack was to ba azpeotad la the Havalian area
vithin narrow llaita of tiae. I haTo already dlacasBad thia phaae
of tha aattar. I think that If all arailable inf oraation had been
placed at Adairal Ciaael'a diaposal, and that if he had eraluated
it pr^wrly, ha would bare found it aaoassaxy to do sooathing about
long range raoonnaiaeanoe in the few daya inMdiately preceding the
7th of Deeeaber.
(i) In the Opinion, baaed on Fact ITII (page 1207), the Court
eopraaaea the Tiew that there waa good ground for belief on the
part of hi^ official* in the State, War, HaTj Departaents, and
oa the part of the Aragr and lavy ia the Hawaiian area, that hostill>
ties would begin in the Far last rather than eleeiAiere. I concur
that the Far last was the aost probable scene for tte Initiation
of Japanese operations. As a aatter of fact, the Japanese did begla
to operate in the Far East on 7 Deeeaber. However, it was not 11-
logieal to si^pose that an attack on Pearl Harbor would be regarded
Igr the Japanese as one of the initial steps ia a caapalga, and there
is aiq>le evidaace that all concerned were aware of this possibilitif
•» a possibilitgr -that was straogthaned tj inforaatlcc reeelTwd in
latfiington, all of which was not giTon to Adairal Klaael.
(J) In the Opinion, based on Facts XyUI and HZ (page 1207),
the Court expresses the view that Adairal Stark failed to display
sound judgaent in that he did not transait to Adairal Kiaoel, during
the rery critical period froa 26 Aoraabar to 7 Deeeaber, laportant
iaforaatico which he had recelrad regarding the Japanese situation,
aad, espeelally, in that, on the aornli^ of 7 Deeeaber 19A1, he
did not traasait iaaediately the fact that a assiiina had been
- 19 -
2380 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
OOMINCHFILX
UNITED STATES FLEET
* MBAOaUANTVia OP TH( OOMMANDBR IN CHISP
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WAaHiNorroN u, d. c.
rFl/117-25
fcrui. CC37.7A £ N0VS44
WJEBKT
Sobjectt Court of Inqulxy to iaqulr* Into tb* attack
■ado bjr Japaaoso araad forcoa on Pearl Harbor,
Tarrltoiy of Hawaii, on 7 D»o«bar 19il, ordorod
by tho 8«eratax7 of tho laTjr on 13 July 19U>
rooaiTod #ileh appoarad to Indlcata that a braak In diploaatle
ralatioaa waa iMdnant, aad that an attack In tha Havailan area
■Ight be azpactad seen. I note froa the firat endoraaaant that tha
Judge Advocata Oaaaral takaa axoaptloo to Ihla Opinl<Mi, on the
grooad Ihat tha orldanea ahowr that Adalral Static and hla principal
adTiaara did not conatrua thla aaaaagt aa indicating an attack in
tha Havalian area. Dhlla I ooncnr in tha riaw of the Judge Advooata
Oaoaral aa to tha eonatruotion which Adairal Stark placed upon the
■taaagt in qoaation, nererUffeleaa , I note that CoaaaDder Iraaer
(attaohad to tha Coaannieationa Diylaion of the lavj Departaent)
did take atapa to invite ttie attention of tba Secretary of the Havj
to the fact that ItOO p.a. Waahiagton tlaa aeaat daan at Honolulu,
and aidnlght in Eaat Aaia (paga U of Top Secret iddendua to tha
Findii^a). It, therefore, aaeaa erident, though Admiral Stark did
not hare hia attantion drawn to tha poealble algnifieanoa of tbia
■aaaaga, nararthalaaa tha iapllcationa were appreciated by at laaat
aoae offioara of hia office. The Cotirt further expraaaea the Tiew
that bad tbia iaportaat inf oraation bean conweyed to Adairal Elnael,
it ia a aattar of conjaotura aa to ihat action he would havw takan.
I taka no exception to thia expreaalon of opinion. HowcTer, it ia
a fair eoneluaioa that if Adairal UjbmI bad been glT»n all of the
inforaation aTailabla at the Departaent, he would have been in a
poatbion to Judge the aituatlon better than he did.
U. In the final Opinia^ and Becoanandation (page 1208) the Court
finds that no offenaes hawe bean coaaitted or aerioua blaae Incurred
on the part of aiqr peraoo or peraooa In the naval aerrloe, and racoaaendi!
that no further procaadlnga be had in tha aattar. I 'concur that there
ia not adequate eridenee to airport general court aartlal proceedings,
but thia doea not bar adaiaiatrative action, if auoh action ia found
appropriate.
5. Despite the evidence that no naval officer was at fault
to a degree likely to reault in conviction if brou^t to trial, neverthe-
less the levy eaxuwt ewade a shara of responsibility for the Pearl Harl»jr
- 20 -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2381
UNITED STATES FLEET
fADOUAITHW or THK COMMANOCR IN CMISF
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINOTON U. O. C
CC3?24 ^ ^OV m
Lalt
•akj«eti Court of InquLiy to isqulr* Into th« attack
■Bde I7 Japanese araed foreaa oa Pearl Eartar,
Territory of Bavall, on 7 TJeeeaber V)AX, ordered
bj the Secretary of the lavy on 13 Jxtly 19il.
iMldant. Tliat dlea«ter cannot be regarded aa an "act of God", beyond
h«Mn power to prerent or aiticate. It la trae that the oouatzy aa a
lAiole is basically responsible in that the people were unvllliaK to
stqppart an adequate amf and aavy until it nas too late to repair the
consequences of past neglect in tiiae to deal effeetlTely with the attack
that ushered in the war. It is true that the Any vas responsible for
local defense at Pearl Harbor. l«Tertheless, sons thioge could have been
done tv the lavy to lessen the success of tha initial Japanese blo«.
Idairal Stazk and Adniral Elnnel were the responsible officers, imd it
is pertinent to exanine the poasible courses of action they night hare
taken.
(a) Adniral Stazk was, of course, aware that tfas Ibited
States was primari^ eoneernsd with its own possessions, and ttB
■ost important United States possessions in the Pacific were the
Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands. His attention should
have been centered on those two places, as the Pacific situation
becane nore end nore acute. H« bad been infened by Adniral Kinnel,
in hia letter of 26 May 19^1, that Adniral Eisael felt the need for
•arly and accurate infonation as to the general situati<xi, and
that he needed to be infomed of all ijqportant derelopaents as tfcigr
occurred by the quickest and noet secure oeans arailable. This
letter should haTe emphasised the obvious fact that Adniral Kianel
was in a difficult position, that he had to use his inltiatire to
keep his Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the situation,
and that in order to do so ho had to hare an accurate running
picture of the rapidly aoTing coiirse of diplMntic erents. In ay
opinian, Adniral Stazk failed to glTS Adniral Kinnel an adequate
•tanazy of the infonation aTailable in Washington, particnlarly
in the following req^eetat
(1) Adniral Kinnel was not infomed of the State
Departnent's note of 26 lovsaber to the Japamae. Thin
note was a definite step towards breaking relationn.
- 21 -
2382 COXGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COMINCH riLK
UNITED STATES FLEET
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WAIHINaTON 2>. D. C.
nKJin'r3224 8 NOV 1914
Sttbjecti Court of Inquiry to inqwiro into tho attack
aad* by Japanoaa araad forcoa c« Paarl Haztor,
Territozy of Hawaii, on" 7 Daoaabar 19U» ordarad
by tfaa Soeratary of tlia lavy ob 13 July 19U*
(2) Adniral KIbboI wac not infortpad of tba Bubatanaa of
oort&in iatagonytri Japaoesa aaaaacaa inquiring aa to dispoai-
tlona of shipa Inaida Paarl Harbor, afaloh indieatad a Japanaaa
intareat in Paarl Harbor aa a poaaibla targat.
(3) Adulrsl Siaaol vaa not inferaad of tha inplaaantation
of the "9iada Haaaaga'. Adalral Stark aaya ha narar got this
inforaatlcD taiMslf, bat it ia elaar Uiat it did rmch Adairal
Stark's offiea. Ttiia, togattaar with tha bandUng of othar
■attore of iafomation, indioataa lack of affioiancy in Adairal
Stark 'a organisation.
(4) AdMiral Stark failed to appraeiata tha aigalf icaaaa
of tha "liOO p.n. aaasaga" roaaiTad on tha aoming of 7 Caeaabar,
aJLthcm^ tha iqplioatlona wara appreeiatad \ff at laaat oaa of
hia rabordinatas. It appaara Ihat had thia aaaaaga baan haadlad
ly tha quickest awailabla aaana, and with dua qipraeiatioB of
ita slgnifieanea, it t^OA hure raaebed Adairal liaaal in tlaa
to aibftbla bia to naka aoaa laat ainnta praparationa that would
hava onhanoad tha ability of tfaa ahipi ia Paarl Harbor to
aaet tha Japanaaa air attack.
(5) Thera ia a certain aaaanaaB of tanor of aueh infor-
aation as Adairal Stark aant to Adairal flaaal. Tli«y do noi
coeray in thaasalraa tha aanaa of latansifieatioa of tka
erltioal relationa batwaan tha Onitad Stataa aad Japan*
(b) In ay opinion Adairal Kiaaal, daapita tha failvra of
Adaix&l St«rk to keap hla folly inforaad, ncrarthalaaa did h«Ta
8caa iadicationa of Inercaaing taaaanaas as to relations with
Japan. In paz-ticular, ba had tha "war warning* aasaaga on 27
loT«iri>ar, tha "hostile actic« poaaibla at aqy flnaat" aasaaga on
28 lovaidiar, tba 3 Daaaabar aaasaga that Japanaaa had ordered
deatnietion of codes, and tha aasaages of i and 6 Daeaabar
- 22 -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2383
OOMINCH FlUC
UNITED STATES FLEET
laAOQUARTDU OF THK COMMANOOt IN CHIKF
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINSTON 28, O. C
171/117-25
fc«u.fC3224 6 NOV 1944
mmp
SnbJ*ot( Court of loqulzy to ioqulr* Into the attack
■ade by Japasaee arasd foreaa on Pearl Barbor,
Terrltoiy of Havall, on 7 Daceabar 19^1> ordarad
bgr tba Saeratary of tha Ha-vy on 13 July 1941*
conearaLng daatruetion of Unltad Stataa saarat and oonfidantlal
■attar at outlying Paclfie lelanda. Thass Baoaagea auat ba eon-
aidared in eonnaetlon mitb. othar faoata of tba altnation, and
i4alral flrarVi atateooent on tbla phaaa of tha aattcr miat be
giT«B d«a eonaidar&tion. Aftar velc^ilDg thaaa conalderatlona,
Z aa of tha opinion that ha could and ahould have Judged nora
aaeurataly Iha grarilgr of tha danger to i^ich the Hawaiian lelaoda
wv oipoMd* The folloving oouraaa of action were open to hlni
(1) Ha could have uaed patrol aircraft which ware
arailabla to his to conduct long range reeonnalsBanoe in the
■ore dangaroua aactora. Whether or not thia would have reaultad
in detecting tha approach of tha Japanese carrlera la probla-
■atical. HevaTar, it would have oada tha Japanaaa taak Bore
difficult.
(2) Ha could hare rotated tha "in port" perioda of hia
Taaaala in a laea routina aanaar, ao aa to hare aada it
iaiwaaibla for the Japanaaa to hare predicted when there
would ba aagr Taaaala in port. This would bav* nada tha
Ji^)anaaa taak laaa •a.tj.
(3) If ha had appreciated tha gravity of tha danger aran
a faw hoora before the Japanese attack, it is logical to
nqppoaa that naval pl&nae wo\ild have been in the air durii^ tba
aarl/ Boreing period, that ahipa' battarlea would hare been
fully Banned, and that daaage ecntrol organizations would have
b*a« fully oparatiooal.
6. Tha darolietions oe tha part of idairal Stark and Adalral Eiaael
vara faulta of oaiaaion rathar than faults of aoudssion. In the caaa in
quaatiaa, tbay indieata lack of tha ai^arior judgsent necessary for
aanreiaiag aoaaaad eu—saiiiusta with tteir rank and tbair assigned duties,
rathar than oulpabla iaaffioienay.
- 25 -
2384 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COMINCM PILS
UNITED STATES FLEET
HKAOQUAirmiS OF THE COMMANDOI IN CHIKP
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 2B. D. C.
Fn/A17-25
^--4 6 NOV 1944
Serial!
fyp9|yg:4^g4i:i
Subject I Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack
■ade by Japanese araed forces on Pearl Barbory
Territory of Hawaii, on 7 Deoeober 19iU-» ordered
by the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 19A1*
7. Since trial by general court aartial is not warranted by the
evidence addxiced, appropriate adnlnietratlve action would appear to be
the relegation of both of these officers to positions In liilch lack of
8t9>erlor Judgment aay not result in future errors.
8. In qr serial 003191 of 3 loveaber, to you, I set forth at
length ay views concerning how nuch of the record bears such a rel&tion to
present allltaxy operations as to require high security classification.
Q^ ^» V«44o-^4-<A4AA«4a ^^-'^*^'* ^""^^^
2U
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2385
Judge Advocate General's First Endorsement (on Naval Coubt of Inquibt)
Navy Department,
Office of the Jttdge Advocate General,
Washint/ton 25, D. C, November 2, 19U-
First Endorsement
To: The Commander In Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
Subj : Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces
on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by
the Sx-retary of the Navy on 13 July, 1944.
1. Forwarded for comment and recommendation.
2. The weighing of conflicting evidence and testimony is peculiarly the function
of a Court of Inquiry or Board of Investigation, and not that of the reviewing
authorities. Where the testimony is such as will reasonably support either
of two or more different conclusions, it is not within the province of the Judge
Advocate General to attempt to substitute his evaluation of the evidence for
that of the Court. But where there is no creditable evidence in a record to
support a finding or opinion, or where the weight of evidence is so preponderantly
on one side that it appears unreasonable to reach a contrary conclusion, the
Judge Advocate General must hold, as a matter of law, that such a finding
or opinion is not supported by the evidence adduced. See CMO 9 of 1928, P. 8 ;
CMO 12 of 1937, P. 8 ; CMO 5 of 1986. P. 11.
3. Attention is invited to the following portion of Finding of Fact XVIII :
"In the early forenoon of 7 December, 1941, Washington time, the War and
Navy Departments had information which appeared to indicate that a break
in diplomatic relations was imminent, and, by inference and deduction, that an
attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon."
4. This Finding, standing alone, may be misleading, in the sense that it may
convey an impression that the Court concluded that responsible oflBcials of the
War and Navy Departments did in fact make the inference and deduction
underscored above. The fact that the Court, in phrasing this Finding, used the
past tense of the verb "appear", and used the expression "appeared to indicate",
rather than "should have indicated" lends support to this construction. Such an
[2] impression would not be supported by the record, as the great pre-
ponderence of the evidence before the Court refutes any such conclusion. It is
quite clear from the evidence that the responsible officials of the Navy Depart-
ment had evaluated the information available to them in Washington to
means that a hostile move by the Japanese could be expected, not in the Hawaiian
al'ea, except by submarines, but rather against Guam, the Phillipines. and British
and Dutch possessions in the Far East.
5. Those witnesses who, on 7 December, 1941, held positions in the Navy
Dapartment which qualify them to speak authoritatively as to the prevailing
opinion there just prior to the attack, are all in substantial accord that the Chief
of Naval operations and his assistants had not deducted or inferred that an
attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon. On the contrary, the
consensus in the Navy Department was that any attack would probably come
in the Far East, and the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor was given
a comparatively low probability rating. Those witnesses who stated that the
information available to the Navy Department clearly indicated, by inference
and deduction, that an attack on Hawaii could be exp^ted, were all officers who
were not on duty in the Navy Department at that time, or occupied subordinate
positions. Their testimony is opinion evidence, undoubtedly unconsciously
colored by hindsight, and arrived at by a process of selecting, from the great mass
of intelligence reports available to the Chief of Naval Operations, those which
In the light of subsequent events proved to be hints or indications of Japanese
intentions.
6. Therefore, any finding, opinion or inference that the responsible officials
of the Navy Department knew, prior to the actual attack, that an attack on
Hawaii was impending, is not supported by the evidence. The Court recognizes
this fact, as shown by its finding (last paragraph of Finding XVII) that:
"These considerations, and the sworn evidence of the witnesses testifying
before the Court, establish the fact that although the attack of 7 December came
as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and to
the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, there were good grounds for their
belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere."
2386 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[3] 7. The foregoing remarks apply equally to the underscored portion of
the Opinion expressed by the Court ( P. 1207 ) that :
"Admiral Harold li. Stark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations and responsible
for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected
of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander in Chief,
Pacific Fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, impor-
tant information which he had regarding the Japanese situation, and especially
in that, on the morning of 7 December 1&41, he did not transmit immediately the
fact that a message had been received which appeared to indicate that a break
in diplomatic relations was imminent, and, that an. attack in the Hawaiian area
might be expected noon."
As has been previously pointed out, the message herein referred to was not
construed by the Chief of Naval Operations and his principal advisers as indi-
cating an attack in the Hawaiian area.
8. It is noted that the Court finds (Finding of Fact XVIII) that the time at
which the War and Navy Departments had information .indicating a break in
diplomatic relations on 7 December 1941, and the possibility of hostile action by
the Japanese on that date, was "in the early forenoon of 7 December, Washing-
ton time." It is not considered amiss to comment in further detail on this find-
ing, in view of a widespread misconception in some quarters that this informa-
tion was known in Washington on 6 December 1941. The evidence before this
Court establishes, beyond any doubt, that the information referred to was not
available to any responsible official in Washington prior to approximately 10 a. m.,
the morning of 7 December 1941.
9. The Judge Advocate General feels constrained to comment on the apparent
contradiction bf^tween the Opinion expressed by the Court that the Chief of Naval
Operations failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in failing to
transmit certain information to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the
final Opinion that "no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred
on the part of any person in the naval service." That this is only an apparent,
and not a real, incongruity, is shown by the Opinion that "had this important
information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel. it is a matter of conjecture as
to what action he would have taken." This statement, as well as the Finding
of Facts and Opinions taken as a whole, indicate [4 J that it was the con-
clusion of the Court. aKhongh not clearly expressed, that the evidence adduced
did not prove that Admiral Stark's failure to transmit the information in question
to Admiral Kimmel was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by the Fleet
on 7 December. 1941, and that any causal connection between this failure on
Admiral Stark's part and the disaster would be entirely speculative. Such a
conclusion is fully supported by the testimony in this record.
10. Subject to the foregoing remarks, the proceedings, findings, opinions and
recommendations of the attached Court of Inquiry are, in the opinion of the
Judge Advocate General, legal.
T L. Gatch
T. L. G^TCH.
The Judge Advocate General.
Addendum to Coubt's Finding of Fact (Naval Coubt of Inquiry)
[1] In the Finding of Facts, No. XVIII, the Court has referred to "certain
other important information" as being available in the War and Navy Depart-
ments. This information was obtained by intercepting Japanese messages and
breaking their diplomatic codes. The Court has been informed that these codes
are still in use and. if it became known to the Japanese Government that they
had been broken by the United States, the codes would be changed and, as a
consequence, the war effort would be adversely affected.
For this reason, the Court has refrained from analyzing or discussing the
details of the information in its Finding of Facts but feels that its report would
not be complete' without a record of such details. The Court, therefore, submits
the following record in this addendum and transmits it to the Secretary of the
Navy for filing with other highly secret matter referred to as such in the record
of the Court's proceedings.
Highly secret messages, hereinafter mentioned, were intercepted by the War
and Navy Departments during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December,
1941, and prior thereto. The method of handling these messages in the Navy
Department was as follows :
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2387
The Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of Naval roramunications
operated directly under the Chief of [2] Naval Operations. They were
responsible to see that all messages were transmitted to him in order that
he might be kept conversant at all times with existing conditions.
Officers in Intelligence and Communications, Divisions of Naval Operations,
remained on duty night and day. They made every effort to obtain all possible
diplomatic and military inforination, in order that high officiais of our govern-
ment might be kept fully informed.
Messages were translated and placed in a folder immediately upon receipt or
intercept. The important messages were marked with a clip and taken by a des-
ignated officer to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the
Directors of War Plans, Naval Intelligence, and Naval Communications, and to
the Chief of the Far Eastern Division of Naval Intelligence. The Director of Naval
Intelligence. Captain Wilkinson, kept himself constantly informed regarding
all messages. He checked as to whether or not the Chief of Naval Operations
had seen the important ones and in many cases took them personally to the
Chief of Naval Operations and discussed them with him.
Immediately after the receipt of the note of 26 November, 1941, from the Secre-
tary of State, the Japanese representatives in Washington sent a message to
Tokyo which was intercepted by the Navy Department. This is Document 17,
E.\hibit 63, which gave to Tokyo the following stipulations contained in the
note :
(a) The recognition of Hull's "four principles".
(b) (1) Conclusion of nmtual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Moscow,
Washington, The Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.
[3] (2) Agreement between Japan. United States, England, The Nether-
lands. China and Thai on the invio'ability of French Indochina and equally
of economic treatment in French Indochina.
(3) Complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French
Indochina.
(5) Japan and the United States both definitely to promise to support no re-
gime but that of Chiang Kai-shek.
(5) The abolition of evtra territoriality, the concessions in China, and other
requirements bearing on reciprocal trade treaty, rescinding freezing orders,
stabilization of yen. etc., and for Japan to amend her tripartite pact with Ger-
many and Italy.
The Japanese representatives added in their report to Tokyo the following:
•'Both dumbfounded and stated to Hull we could not even cooperate to the extent
of even reproving this to Tokyo."
No information regarding the delivery of this note or of its contents was
transmitted to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, or to other Commanders
afloat.
From 26 November to 7 December, 1941, there was much diplomatic dispatch
traffic intercepted between Tokyo and the Japanese Ambassador in Washing-
ton which had a bearing on the critical situation existing and which was not
transmitted to the Commander in Chief, Pacific. A message dated 19 November,
1941. Tokyo to Washington, translated on 28 November, 1941, and referred to as
•'The Winds Code" was as follows :
"Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and
the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be
added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.
[^1 "(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO
KAZEAME •
"(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.**
"(3) Japan-Briti.sh relations: NISlHI NO KAZE HARE.***
"This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast
and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all
code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.
"Forward as urgent intelligence.
The Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, on 28 Noveml>er. 1941. sent to the
Chief of Naval Operations, infonnaticm to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet;
Commandant 16th Naval District; and Commandant 14th Naval District, sub-
•East wind rain.
••North wind cloudy.
•••West wind clear."
2388 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
stantially the same information as outlined above. On 5 December, 1941, the
United States Naval Attache, Batavia, sent to the Chief of Naval Operations
substantially the same information. These messages stated that at some
future date information would be sent by Japan indicating a breaking off of
diplomatic relations or possibly war between countries designated.
All tflBcers of the Communication and Intelligence Divisions in the Navy
Department, considering the expected information most important, were on
the lookout for this notification of Japanese intentions. On 4 December an
intercepted Japanese broadcast employing this code was received in the Navy
Department. Although this notification was subject to two interpretations,
either a breaking off of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United
States, or [5] war, this information was not transmitted to the Com-
mander in Chief. Pacific Fleet, or to other Commanders afloat.
It was known in the Navy Department that the Commanders-in-Chief, Pa-
cific and Asiatic Fleets, were monitoring Japanese broadcasts for this code, and
apparently there was a mistaken impression in the Navy Department that the
execute message had also been intercepted at Pearl Harbor, when in truth this
message was never intercepted at Pearl Harbor. No attempt was made by the
Navy Department to ascertain whether this information had been obtained
by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and by other Commanders afloat.
Admiral Stark stated that he knew nothing about it, although Admiral Turner
stated that he himself was familiar with it and presumed that Admiral Kimmel
had it. This message cannot now be located in the Navy Department.
It is a matter of general knowledge that Japan has had for many years a
thorough system of espionage throughout the world and continuously sought
and received information regarding the location and movements of United
States naval vessels. There were certain messages received in the Navy De-
partment which showed very clearly that Japan, at this critical period, was
particularly desirous of obtaining exact information from two sources, namely,
Manila and Honolulu. Messages between Tokyo, Manila, and Honolulu inquir-
ing especially about planes, ships, their places of anchorage, etc., in the latter
l>orts, were intercepted. Similar messages were sent to Japanese officials in
Honolulu clearly indicating that Japan was most [6] desirous of ob-
taining exact information as to ships in Pearl Harbor.
The important messages having special reference to Pearl Harbor were as
follows :
(a) On 15 November, 1941, Document 24, Exhibit 63, an intercept from Tokyo
to Honolulu, translated in Navy Department, 3 December, 1941, states: "As rela-
tions between Japan and the United States are most critical make your 'ships in
harbor report' irregular but at rate of twice a week. Although you already
are ho doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy."
(b) On 18 November, 1941, Document 37, Exhibit 63, an intercept from Tokyo
to Honolulu, translated in Navy Department on 5 December, 1941, states:
"Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein : Area "N"
Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, and areas adjacent thereto. Make your investiga-
tion with great secrecy." Note by Navy Department on this message, "Manila
Bay" probably means "Manila Bay."
(c) On 18 November, 1941, Document 40, Exhibit 63. an intercept from
Honolulu to Tokyo and translated in Navy Department 6 December, 1941, gives
information as to ships moored in certain areas in Pearl Harbor and move-
ment of ships in and out
[7] (d) On 29 November, 1941, Document 36, Exhibit 63, an intercept from
Tokyo to Honolulu, translated in Washington 5 December, 1941, states : "We have
been receiving reports from you on ship movements but in future will you also
report even when there are no movements."
Admiral Kimmel was not aware of and had no information regarding these
messages.
On 5 November, 1941, Document 7, Exhibit 63, Tokyo to Washington, was inter-
cepted. This message stresses the necessity of signing an agreement between
the United States and Japan by 25 November, 1941.
On 22 November, 1941, Document 11, Exhibit 63, intercept from Tokyo to
Washington, stated that the signing of agreement set for 25 November, 1941,
could be postponed until 29 November, and in explanation this message stated:
"• * * There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to
settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three
or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans ; if the
signing can be completed by the 29th, * * ♦ if the pertinent notes can be
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2389
exchanged ; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Nether-
lands ; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until
that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed.
After that things are automatically going to happen. * * *" ,
No intimation of the receipt of this message was transmitted to the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific, or to other Commanders afloat, nor was any information
transmitted to them regarding contents of the messages mentioned in the follow-
ing paragraphs.
[8] On 28 November, 1941, a dispatch, Document 18, Exhibit 63, was inter-
cepted between Tokyo and Washington which in part reads as follows :
'•• ♦ * The United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating
proposal" — referring to note of 26 November — "* * * the Imperial Govern-
ment can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report
of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I
will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured.
This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the
negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instruc-
tions * * *" etc.
The message indicates the position of Japan regarding the note of 26 Novem-
ber, and further indicates that within two or three days negotiations will be
de facto ruptured. Further, it emphasisses the importance of delay. Neither the
message nor any of its contents were transmitted to the Commander in Chief,
Pacific, or to other Commanders afloat.
On 29 November, 1941, Document 19, Exhibit 63, intercept Tokyo to Wash-
ington and translated by the Navy Department 30 November, 1941, directs that
Japanese representatives make one more attempt to have United States recon-
sider and states :
"♦ * * please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a. breaking
off of negotiations."
Again, on 30 November, 1941, Document 20, Exhibit 63, an intercept from
Washington to Tokyo, indicated that negotiations were to be stretched out.
These two messages indicate that the Japanese were sparring for time.
[9] On 30 November, 1941, Document 22, Exhibit 63, translated by the
Navy Department on 1 December, 1941, was intercepted, being a message from
Tokyo to Japanese representatives in Berlin, reading as follows :
"1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of
this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within
that period the Imperial Grovernment adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alli-
ance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of
the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relaticms between
Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely
within the scoi>e of that alliance. With the intent of restrainyig the United
States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying
through these negotiations.
"2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view
of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis,
has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views
and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotia-
tions rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and
French Indochina), were completely in opposition to each other.
"Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we
first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional
idealogical tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her
fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried
on between the Unite<l States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive
of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the
establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in
the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as
the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be
no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States
was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a
tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite
Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has
only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has [10] become
gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer
continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a con-
tinuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.
2390 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this atti-
tude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says
that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will
no be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty,
namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacitic. This means specifically the
Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European
war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to
Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others,
makes it impossible to find any basis in the American prop(»sal for negotiations.
What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred
with England, Australia, The Netherlands, and China — they did so repeatedly.
Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations
and has decided to regard Japan, along with (Jermany and Italy, as an enemy."
On 1 December, 1941, the Navy Department intercepted a message from Tokyo
to the Japanese Amba.ssador in Herlin as follows:
"The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured.
Say very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that
war may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan, and
this war may come quicker than anybody dreams. We will not relax our pres-
sure on the Soviet, but for the time being would prefer to refrain from any
direct moves on the north. Impress on the Germans and Italians how important
secrecy is."
On 1 December, 1941, document 21, Exhibit B3, was intercepted, being a mes-
sage from Tokyo to the Jaiianese Amba.ssador in Washington which reads as
follows :
"1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the situ-
ation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the [11]
United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the
press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan
and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only
your information).
"2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador
to Tokyo as suggested- by you at the end of your message #1124***. Please
make the necessary repi'esentations at your end only.
"3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is
an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did
so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make
investigations into this matter.
On 2 December, 1941, Document 25, Exhibit 63, intercept Washington to Tokyo,
translated by the Navy Department 3 December, 1041, reports that conversations
with the State Department continue; that the Japanese representatives stated to
Welle.s, the Under Secretary of State, that it is virtually impossible for Japan to
accept new American proposals as they now stand, and that the Japanese repre-
sentatives feel that the United States is anxious to peacefully conclude the
current difficult situation.
On 3 December, 1941, Document 29, Exhibit 63, intercept Tokyo to Washington,
translated by the Navy Department 4 December, 1941, requests their representa-
tives to explain Japan's increased forces in Indochina.
On 3 December, 1941, Document 33, Exhibit 63, intercept Washington to Tokyo,
translated by Navy Department 5 December [12] 1941, states:
"Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between
Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a
definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand."
On 6 December, 1941, Document 38, Exhibit 63, from Tokyo to Washington, was
intercepted, giving notice to the Japanese repre.seiitatives that a reply consisting
of 14 parts to American proposal of 26 November is being sent to them, directing
that secrecy sliould be maintained and stating that the time of presenting this
reply would be sent in a separate message.
The first 13 parts of this reply were intercepted and received by the Navy De-
partment at about 3 p. m., December 6, 1941, and were translated and made ready
for distribution by 9 p. m., Washington time, of that date. These 13 parts contain
a very strong and conclusive answer to the note of November 26 and state in part,
"Japan cannot accept proposal as a basis of negotiations."
*JD-1 : 6921.
**JD-1 : 6710.
***Not available.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2391
Commander Kramer, the officer whose duty it was to distribute this class of
information, prior to 9 p. m., 6 December, 1941, 'phoned Captain Wilkinson that
an important message had been received and was being translated. He also tried
to communicate with Admiral Stark and Rear Admiral Turner at tlieir homes but
found them out.
At about 9 p. m., Washington time. Commander Kramer proceeded to the White
House with the 13 parts of reply and delivered copy to a White House aide, with
the request that [13] it be delivered innnediately to the President. Kramer
then proceeded to the home of Secretary Knox where he personally delivei-ed
to the Secretary a copy of the Japanese reply. Secretary Knox read the reply, did
not discuss it in detail with Kramer, but 'phoned the Secretary of War and
Secretary of State.
Kramer then proceeded to the home of Captain Wilkinson and gave a copy
to him. Kramer told Wilkinson that he had tried to get Stark and Turner.
Wilkinson made several 'phone calls, presumably to Admiral Stark and others.
This information regarding receipt of these 13 parts or their contents was not
transmitted to the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet or other Commanders
Afloat.
Kramer then returned to his office in the Navy Department, arriving about
12 : 30 a. m., 7 December, and as no other important messages were at hand, went
home and returnetl to the Navy Department about 7 a. m. Upon his arrival he
found the 14th part of the Japanese reply had been received and decoded. He then
delivered a copy of all 14 parts to the Flag Secretary in his office of the Chief of
Naval Operations at about 9 a. m., where he found several officers gathering for
a conference with Admiral Stark. Kramer then proceeded about 9 : 30 a. m., to
the White House and made delivery of the 14 parts of the message. He pro-
ceeded then, at about 9: W a. m., to the State Department and delivered same to
the Secretary of the Navy, who was there in conference with the Secretary of
State.
At about 10:30 a. m., Kramer returned to the Navy Depart [141 ment
where he found another message had been translated. This message, .^n inter-
cept from Tokyo to Washington, was marked "Urgent, very important" and read
as follows: "Will the ambas.sador please submit to the U. S. Government (if pos-
sible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the U. S. at 1 : 00 p. m., on the 7th,
your time." Kramer delivered a copy of this message (hereinafter referred to
as the "one p. ni. message") to the Flag Secretary of Admiral Stark, the latter
at the time being in conference with several officers.
Kramer then returned to the White House and delivered the "1 : 00 p. m. mes-
sage". From there he went to the State Department where the Secretary of
the Navy was still in conference with the Secretary of State. On arrival he
requested one of the State Department assistants to present the message to
the Secretary of the Navy and to invite his attention to the fact that 1 p. m.,
Washington time, meant dawn at Honolulu and midnight in East Asia.
• Admiral Stark had arrived in his office at the Navy Department at some time
between 9 and 10:30 a. m.. on the morning of 7 December. Although he testi-
fied that he had no information prior to this time relative to the Japanese reply
to the note of November 26th, he was informed of the 14 parts and "the 1 : 00
p. m. me.ssage" not later than 10: 30 a. m., of that date. He testified that General
Marshall 'phoned him and suggested that the information regarding the delivery
of the 14 parts at 1 p. m. was most important and significant and, in his opinion,
should be transmitted to Commanders [15] in the Pacific. Admiral Stark
at first (lenmrred and hung up the receiver. Shortly thereafter he 'phoned General
Marshall requesting that, in the event he sent the message to the Connnanding Gen-
erals in the Pacific area, he instruct them to relay this message to naval opposites.
Th^ message which General Marshall sent to the Commanding General, Ha-
waiian Department (Exhibit 48) reads as follows: "Japanese are presenting
at one p. m. Eiistern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also
they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what
significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly
stop Inform naval authorities of this communication."
This message left the War Department at 11: r>2 a. m., Washington time, was
sent out over R. C. A. at 12:17 p. m. (6:47 a. m. Honolulu time) and arrived
in Honolulu's R. C. A. office at 7:33 a. m. Honolulu time. There remained but
22 minutes before the attack for delivery, decoding, dissemination, and action.
Lieut. General Short did not receive the decoded dl.spatch until the afternoon of
7 December, several hours after the attacking force had departed.
2392 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Had the telephone and plain language been used, this message could have been
received in Hawaii before the attack began. Even in this event, however, there
was no action open to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack or
which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome. There
was already in effect the condition of readi- [16] ness best suited to the
circumstances attending vessels within the limits of the Pearl Harbor Naval
Base and the Fleet planes in their air bases in Oahu.
Orin G. Murfin
Orin G. Murfin,
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret), President.
Edward C. Kalbfus
Edward C. Kalbfus,
Admiral, V. S. Navy (Ret), Member.
Adolphus Andrews
Adouphus Andrews,
Vice Admiral, U. 8. Navy (Ret), Member.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2393
EXHIBIT NO. 107A
CONFIDENTIAL
XVI
THE FINDINGS, COWCLUSiaJS AIID ACTION
BY THE SECRETAHY OF THE liAVY
(A) Findings, Conclusions and Order.
On 13 August 1945 Secretary of the fJavy James Forrestal, in
his fourth endorsement to the record of proceedings of the Pearl Harbor
Court of Inquiry made the official findings and conclusions of the
Navy Department, and his order as Secretary assessin/: responsibility
for the Pearl Harbor disaster.
The endorsement of 13 August 19A5 that was signed by Secre-
tary Forrestal has had deleted from it certain "TOP-SEX)KiiT" matter
since, pursviant to the direction of the President, the findings and
conclusions were to be made public. The endorsement with deletions
therefrom was made public by the President on 29 August 1945.
The complete endorsement of Secretary Forrestal containing
the findin£s, conclusions and action of the Navy in respect to the
Pearl Harbor disaster is as follows:
" 1. Pursuant to Executive Order dated 1*? December 1941, a
commission headed by Mr. Justice Owen J. Koberts conducted an investi-
gation into the facts surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor^
The commission repoi>ted its findings on Z3 V^nuajpy },$k2, Ihe com-
nlssion concluded in paz*t that:
672
79716 O— 46— pt. U
2394 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
"17, In the light of the vaminga and direetione
to take appropriate action, tranealtted to hoth eommanderi
between Korember 27 and December 7, and the obligation onder
the ajretcB of coordination then in effect for joint coope^>
atire action on their part, it wae a dereliction of duty
en the part of each of them not to conerUt and confer with
the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings,
and the flgppropriate meaeurea of defenae reqxiired by the
Imminence of hoatllitiea. The attitude of each, that he was
not required to inform hliceelf of and hia lack of interest
in, the measures undertaken bjr the other to carry out the
reaponaibllity assigned to aueh other under the provision*
of the plan* then in effect, denonatrated on the part of
each a lack of s^>preciation of the responsibilitiea rested
in thea and inherent in their poaltiona as commander in
chief. Pacific Fleet, and commanding general, Hawaiian
Department. '
673
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2395
CONFIDENTIAL
2. Pursuant to preo^pt of the Secretary of the M».rj dated
12 Pebroaxy 19A4» Adadral Thoaas c« Hart» USN (Retired), conducted an
floauilnatlon of witneases having knowledge of facts In connection with the
Japanese attack. Adodral Hart oospleted his exaolnatlon on 15 June 19A4*
3. Public Law Ho. 339* 78th Congress, approved 13 June 19A4>
directed the Secretary of War and the Secretaiy of the Navy, severally,
to proceed forthwith with an Investigation Into the facts surrounding the
Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to comence such proceedings against such
persons as the facte night Justify.
4. A Court of Inqolzy, consisting of Admiral Orln G. Uurfln,
USI (Retired), Adidj:<&l Edward C. Kalbfus, USN (Retired), and Vice
AdBlral Adolphus Andrews, USN (Retired), with Coanander Harold
BLea«Mier, USN, as Judge Advocate, was appointed on 13 July 1944. The
Court was directed to convene on 17 July 1944> or as soon thereafter as
practicable, for the puzpose of inquiring into all drcuastances connected
with the attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of
Hawaii, on 7 December 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to
Include in its findings « full statement of the facts it oigfat deem to be
established. The Court was further directed to state its opinion as to
whether any offenses were comnltted or serious blame incurred on the part
of any person or persons in the Naval service, and, in case its opinion
was that offenses had been conaaltted or serious blame incurredf to reconmend
specifically what further proceedings should be had.
5» The Court of Inquiry cooaenced its proceedings on 31 July
1944* and submitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944*
Certain portions of the record of proceedings before the Court, including
the findings and opinion of the Court, have been classified "TOP SECRET,"
and the balance "SECRET."
2396 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
6. The ZMt result of the findings of fact and opinion of the
Pearl Harbor Naval Court of Inquiiy, as reviewed by Judge Advocate General
of the Navy, and the Coaaander in Chief, 0. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval
Operations, and by lae, was that the evidence secured by the Court did
not warrant aiul would not support the trial by general court martial of
•Bf person or persons in the Naval Service.
7. In a^ Third Endorsenent to the Becord of Proceedings of the
Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, dated 1 December 19A4> I found that the
evidence obtained Indicated that there were errors of Judgment on the
part of Admiral Kinoel and Acknlral Stark, but that the investigation
had not gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence. Ao»
cordlngly, I directed that further investigation would be conducted by an
investigation officer and that pending the completion of the necessary
further investigation I would withhold decision as to the institution of
any proceeding against any naval officer Involved.
6. In order to Insure that the further investigation would cover
•very material question, I directed that a thorough review be made of the
prior investigations and that an appropriate suoa&ry of all information
developed in the prior Naval Investigations be prepared. Upon the corapletion
of this review of prior investigations and &fter exairjjiation of the report
of the Arn^ pearl Harbor Board, dated 3 Deceiiiber 194^f^ I appointed Admiral H*
Heivltt, USN, as investigating officer, and John F. Sonnett as counsel to
exaoine such witnesses and obtain such other evidence as might be necessary
in order fully to develop the facts in connection with the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor. The further investigation directed by ay precept of 2 Uay 1%5
was completed on 12 July 1945 end the report by Admiral Hewitt was forwarded
to the Judge Advocate General and the Coomander in Chief, United States
Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations for recommendation and comment*
675
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2397
CONFIDENTIAL
9, In his Second Endorseaent to Admiral Hewitt's Report of
further invesUgaUon, dated 10 August 1945, the Judge Advocate G«ieral ad-
vised, among other things, that he did not believe that there wee sufficient
evidence to warrant conviction of any of the officer* concerned of any
offense known to Naval Law; that the evidence indicated that the officer*
in question lacked superior judgment rather than being guilty of culpable
iaefficiency; and that "lack of superior judgment" is not an offense triable
by general court nvartinl. The Judge Advocate General further advised in
his Second Endorsement that: "I am of the opinion that any such court-
martial proceedings prior to the end of hostilities with Japan la highly
impractical and would be detrimental to the war effort, and further, that
any such proceedings during the six months iomedietely following the end
of hostilities wovLLd seriously impair the efficiency of the Nayal service."
Notwithstanding the difficulties pointed out by him, the Judge Advocate
General was of the opinion, however, that the Navy Department is morally
obligated to order Adniral KLoiael tried by general court nartial should
Admiral Kimmel so insist. The Judge Advocate General recommended that
Admiral Hevdtt's investigation be made available to Admiral Kimmel and his
counsel; that Admiral Kianel be informed that he is free to make public
anything contained in this record and in prior records as soon as that
may be done without prejudice to the public interests; and that if Admiral
Kimel insists, a general court martial should be convened to try him for
any alleged offenses he may have comDltted on or before 7 December 194l>
10. In the Third Endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's report, dated 13
August 1945* the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concux*red generally in th«
remarks and recommendations of the Judge Advocate General and expressed tlM
^pinion that the evidence was not sufficient to wazrant trial tqr court martial
676
2398 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
of any peraoa in the Maval 8«rvle« in that it maid not soataln the oharge*
roqolred by the Ax>tlclea for the Oovemnsnt of the Navyi that ulth regard
to the sufficiency of the evidence to waxrant other prooeedlnge, the
Cooraander In Chief, U* S. Fleet «as still of the opinioa that Adniral
Staxic and Admiral Kionsl, although not culpable to a degree warranting
fooraal disciplinary- action, nererthelesa laclced the superior Jodgnent
necessary for exercising eoaaand conensurate with their duties, and that
appropriate action, consisting of the relegation of these officers to
positions in which lack of svqperlor Judgnsnt might not result in future
errors, had been ti^en as to Admiral Stark and Acknlral Klnnsl, and stated
that no further action was reccxanended. Die Coonander in Chief, U* S*
Fleet, also advised, in the Ihlrd ^idorseaent, that in any event he
considered it iapractloable to bring Admiral Stax^ or Admiral Klomsl to
trial prior to the texvinatlan of hostilities with Japan beoause such pro-
ceedlngs would almost cex'talnly involve disclosure of infomatlon which would
be detrlasntal to current military operations and to national security
measures. He oonourred in the opinlte of the Judge Advocate General that
the Havy Department la morally obligated to order Admiral Kiioael to trial
before a goieral court martial should Adairal Kimmsl so insist, but stated
that this action should not be taken until after the ooifiletion of hostilltlea
with Jflfkan. He oooourrwd in the further suggestions of the Judge Advooate
Oeneral that Admiral Hewitt's InTestigation be made avallabSU to Admiral
Kiimaal and his counsel and that A<tilral Elmmel be Inforasd that he is firee
to make public anything contained in this record and in prior reoords as
soon as ihat may be done without prejudioe to national security.
11* Ihe comments of the Judge Advocate Oeneral and of the Cooaander-
in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operatioos, in their endorseaante to
the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry record, and in their endorssMnts to the
677
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2399
CONFIDENTIAL
r«port by Admiral He«ltt, are ^>prov«d subjeot to the following remarkat
(a) Court of Inquiry Finding II (1156). IhlB finding ataiaa.
In snbetanoa, that the presenoe in Pearl Harbor oo 7 Deeibar 19U1 of
ISBSk Force One atxl the battlesfalpe of Task Faroe T^ vaa neoeaaary.
The essential point here resta in Adairal Klamel*8 state-
■ant to the effect that he would not hove had the Fleet in Pearl
Harbor had he oiticlpated an air attack, ta/t Seoond Endorsenact In-
dicates that the CooBnnder in Chief, U. 5* Fleet, does not ootlrelj
"go along** with the opinion of the Coujrt that the Inf oraatlon a:Tall-
able to Admiral Slmasl did not require any departure f ran his operatioo
and maintenance sdtedules. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleets
states Airther in this ccDneotion that Admiral Kimoal could ha-ra
rotated the "in port* periods of his -vessels in less routine mnnar,
so as to have made it Impoeslble for the Japanese to have predicted
when there noold be any vessels In port, and that this muld have made
the Japanese task leas easy* I concur In the conaents of the Comaandw
in Chief, U. S. Fleet, as to this finding.
(b) Court of Inquiry Finding III (1156) Biis finding
states that, "Constitutional requirements that war be deolared by
Congress • • ." make it difficult to prevent an attack and precluded
offensive aotlon as a means of defense, and that Admiral Kimmel had
the respansibllity of avoiding overt acts.
The Conaander In Chief, U* S. Fleet, conaents that
this gives an unscrupulous eneqy a great advantage, and that the
Const! tutl coal requirement preventing offensive action as a means
of defense was a defini1>e handicap. It does not appear that there
Das any proxLinate casual relationship between the Canstltuticnal
requirement and the Instant disaster. Ihe Constitutional inhibitico
67B
2400 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
and tlM injunction &b to overt acts did not preclude either lon^ distance
reoonncdssance or a sortie tagr the Fleet. Portber, it ai9>ear8 that prior
to 7 Deoeaber 19ifl, Adiairal Klmel did not regard this Cozistitutional pro-
Tision or his responsibility to avoid overt acts as sufficient to prevent
the issuance of orders to boob unidentified suisnarlnes found in operat-
ing areas.
(c) Court of Inquiry Finding IV (1159). This states That
AdisLral Bloch was subordinate to Admiral Kionel, and was chcurged ndth
the tasjc of assisting the An^ in the defense of Pearl Harbor and,
consequently, Adndral Bloch had a responsibility for naval laeasures
concerned with local defense.
It should be noted in this connection that Admiral
Heaitt found:
"75* Ho patrol planes were luider the conmand of
Admiral Bloch. The only Navy planes suitable for long
distance reconnaissance were the Pacific Fleet patrol planes.
"76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under
the control of Admiral Kianel, and he had the responsi-
bility for their utilization. They were operated after
22 November 1941, in accordance with schediiles approved by
him at that time, which were not revised prior to the attack.
The schedules stressed training operations. They did not
provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu."
(d) Court of Inquiry Finding V (1160). The Coiurt here
finds that relations between Admiral Kiansl and General Short were
friendly, cordial and cooperative; that they invariably conferred
idien important astsages were received, and that each was sufficiently
cognizant of the measures being taken by the other.
In this connection the following conclusions by
Admiral Hewitt are approved: %
"1. The basic. war plans and the local defense plans
were soiuul and ivere designed to meet, with the available means,
619
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2401
CONFIDENTIAL
variouB types of attack, including an attack such as tfte one
which was delivered. The basic war plans and the local air
defense plans were not operative in time to meet that attacK.
The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed the existence of a
state of w»r. The local air defense plans presupposed agree-
ment between the local conmanders that an attack was iminent.
4leither of these was the case prior to the attack.
"2. The system of coanand in effect in the Hawaiian area
was that of mutual cooperation and not unity of comioand.
Cooperation between the local Amy and Navy commanders required
agreement as to the imminence of attack, which presupposed the
possession and exchange of information concerning Japanese
intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.
"3* A full exchange of infonoation is necessary to the
effective exercise of Joint Conmand. While there was consider-
able exchange of information between various krmy and Navy
intelligence agencies there was no organized system to ensure
such exchange."
The evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt indicates that there
were Informal arrsuigements for the exchange of Intelligence by the
Arqgr and Navy at Hawaii, which included the transmission to the AraQT
of some information concerning Japanese ship movements. The evidmce
obtained both by Admiral Hewitt and by the Naval Court of Inquiry
indicates, however, that neither A(feglral Klnmel nor General Short was
sufficiently informed of the degree of readiness put into effect tay the
other. It appears that after receipt of the "war warning* and prior
to 7 December 194l> Admiral Klmel and General Short conferred on sereral
occasions. Thsy discussed the reenforceoent of Mldmy and Wake. It
does not appear that they dlacossed the conditions of readiness placed
In effect or to be placed in effect, or the question or advisability
of placing in effect air reconnaissance. General Short testlfiea before
the Naval Court that after a conference with Admiral Kimmel, he placed
In effect Anqr Alert No. 1 (the anti-sabotage alert). Admiral KIobbI
testified that he did not know what alert the kimf had in effect, and
that he mode no specific InquLzy of General Short in this connection.
680
2402 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
That th«re wn« zu>t full nitval •xotange of la%<tHglo« alt*
appears from tha eTidenea. Adniral Klnmel rae«lT«A dlspatekea after 27
Vorenter 1941 relating to Jopanea* duatrootlon of oodaa and lantruetlona
to United Statea outlying ialanda to deetroy elaaalfled aaterlal. He
teatlfied before the Haral Court that he did not direct that theae he
fumlahed to General Short, and that he did not know whether or not 'the/
were fumlahed to hin. General Short teatlfied that he had not aeen
theae diapatchea.
In Tiew of theae facta, I cannot a^ree %rlth the ahoTe finding
hy the Haval Court of Inquiry. The eyatem of autual cooperation, of Joint
eonunand, was not woridng effectively - it failed. In thia connection the
following conclualon of Admiral Hewitt ia o^roTedt
"Var experience haa ahown thatt The reaponaihility for
final najor deciaiona mat derolTe on one peraon; that ia, there
Buat he "unity of cononand.'
Howerer, in respect of the aiboTe conclualon of Adairal Hewitt,
it ia ii^ortant to point out that the experience of thia war haa eoiw
cluaiTely deaonatrated that there ia no inconaiatency between the
exiatence of two or acre aeparate ailitary or naval organi aatione aa the
functioning forcea and an effective exerciae of unity of eoaaand in a
theater or in an operation. Practically all of the aajor operationa of
thia war have heen accospliahed hy two or aore diatiaet ailitary organicap*
tiona, aoae even belonging to diverae nationa, hut all acting under a
unified coamand. In auch an operation, the ooaaaadera of the aeveral
forcea and their ataffa auat function in cloae phyaieal proxiaity,
usually in the higher echelona aharing a coamon headquartera or eoaaand poat.
I do not find, however, that Adairal Kinnel ia open to
criticiaa for having failed to adviae the Jkrpy at J>earl Harbor that a auV.
aarine contact had been aade on the aoming of 7 Seoeaber 1941 , ahortly
681
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2403
CONFIDENTIAL
prior to tha air atteek. Tho orideaco obtained V idalral Bovltt aupDorta
the fellovlni; conoluelon* ty hla, which li approredt
'36. The attenpt to obtain eonflraatlon of the reported eab-
■arlne attack off Pearl Harbor wa« proper, although It ehoold have
been effected in plain language. Adequate naral action wae taken In
eendlng out the ready dettroyer. Bile Inferaatlon vaa of no laaed^
late Interest to tha Angr unleea It In fact Indicated iBalnenoy of
an air attack, an asauaptlon which was not neeeeaarlly logical*
In anjr event, oonfiraatlon waa not received until the air attadc
had coBBenced."
(e) Oonrt of Inquiry finding TI (1160). Thla stateo in
aubatance that unaroidablo d«f icieneiea in personnel and aaterial had
a bearing on the effectlTeneaa of the local dafenae of Pearl Harbor.
The CoHoander in Chief, U. 8. Tleet, peinta out, howerer, that
the pertinent ofueatlon la lAiether Aduiral Klanel uaed the meana arailable
to the beat advantage. I concur in thla coament of tha Coanander in Chief
U. S. neet.
(f ) Court of Inquiry Plnding HI (1166) . The Court f Inda
that Japan had an initial advantage becauae of the Japaneae fleet 'a
xnmerlcal auperierity, and the auperiorlty of Japeneae eaplonage.
Thet'COBBent in the Second Sidoraaaient on thla point la confined
to the general atateaent that factora auch aa thoae referred to bjr the
Court will alwaya place thla nation at a dlaadvantage during a period of
atralned relatione. Thla finding, of caurae, in general waa correct.
Vevertheleaa , aa applied to the apeelfio laauea here preaented, it overw
looka the fact thatt
(1) The nunerical superiority of the Japaneae fleet wae well
known to Adalral Stark and to Admiral KIbimI, and thla fact waa taken into
account in the war plana;
(2) Although unqueationably the United Statea waa placed at a
dlaadvantage in roatralnlng Jananeae espionage activities, the Havy and
68e
2404 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
mar D«|>«rtB«it« wre nererthalMa not wlthont laportant Intelllg«no«
advantages of tbalr on itildi ware not ayalled of to the fullest exteet*
(g) Coort of Inqnliy Finding vm (1167) » This statea that, it
was ttie direct respcoaibLllty of tbb ia^ to defend Pearl Harbor Ittval
Base, and that the Savy was to assist only with the means prorided the
Hanral District*
The Cmiimler in Chief, U*S* Fleet, is in agreeaent with "the
ftindaaental concept of naval warfare" die cussed tgr the Court, but tabs
a nore realistic view en this point* He paints out that Adairal Kiomel
was fully aware that in rim of the weakness of local defense, the Fleet
had to be otplcgred to protect Pearl Harbor. With this l coocor. It is to
be noted, aoreover, that tinder the defense plan the Havy was responsible
for the aaintensnoe of distant reconnaissaice.
(h) Court of Inquixy Fjadii^ n (ll69)« T»>b 0«urt finds that
the air defense plans wsre defectiTe becsnse of the necessity for reliance
upon Fleet aircraft which oould not be oade permanently aTailable for
local defense.
The Second IkidorseBant states that the Court has overstressed the
fact that the only patrol planes in the area were Fleet planes} that it was
sound poli^ to place all suoh air craft at Adairal Kianel*s disposal} that
it was his responsibility to allocate the plaes as best he could| that
the available aircraft had to be employed in tk« manner best suited to the
dnger that threatened} that it is doubtful iriiether with the available
forces it would ha^e been possible to destroy the carriers before they
launched their planes, except by • ludcy chsnce} that Admiral Kiomel was
not suffidcDtly alive to the situation, not entirely due to his on fault}
and that this had a bearing on the amount of damage resulting firom the
attaok* I concur in the oonments of the Ccaaander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
with respeot to this finding.
683 .
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2405
CONFIDENT IT:
(I) Court of Diqalry yimflagi 17 (11$9). nu (1167) t
n (1169) >
Basod on these fLndixigB th« oooolnalon of tbt Court la thct idmlTml. Bloch
aAtiateotosllT- panrforwd his dottlM*
11m Cammtkdur in Odef, U* S* flMt, oonears. This conBlnsion la
(J) Coort of mguiry FlixMag I (1171)» Tkl« holda adsqnats
and effactlT* Admiral KlaML^a proviaionB for the aaoorlty of the fleet
at »tm»
Ttm CoBMndar In Cbief, U* 8« Flaat, oencan* This fLndLng la
approved*
(k) Coort of Inqglry Finding n (1173) « The aubstaaee of
thla f^"<M"c la ttxaX Addral KiflBal «aa Maintaining the hif^eat eondltlan
of readlneae called for by ihB Inforaatloa arallable to hia, and that a
hifl^«r condition or readineas voold have added little to the defaoae.
In the Seoood Badoraaaant It la pointed oat that in fact the
eondltlon of readineas beli« aaintalned at the tloe of the attadc was
only that condition itileh Is nonaitllj aaintalned irban In port. This la
Hdntained on the assavitlGn that the ahora defenaea ai^ adequate to pro>
teot the Fleet. Such waa not tba oaae at Peasi Harbor, aa A<kdral Klvaal
knev.
The CoBBHidar In Chief, U. S. Tleet, /orthar states that he doea
not agree with the MoelnslcB of the Court that a higher eondltlfln of
readineas voold hare added little to the defense, and Is of the view that
the InfoCMtlan srallable to A<telral Klxatel called for a tightening op
of tte defaoae preeautlooa aa 7 Deoa^er approadied. Hth the ooaaHita of
the CoauBdar In Chief, U. S. neat, I ooDoor.
68k
2406 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
(1) Court of Inquiry Finrf^t^ ]^j (117^)' l*»e Court here
finds that there yna no infcrmation indicating that Japanese carriers
irare on their najr to attack Pearl Harbor, and that it vas not pcasihle
to ^revwit or to predict that attack*
The Second aidorsoDflnt to the Naval Court record statee 00 this
points "Ihere was Infaramtion that oi^t logically have been interpreted
as indicating that an attack ax Hawaii vas not unlikely, and that the tiaa
could be predicted within faii^y narrow lioita**
It is to be noted that one of the prinoipid natters covered in
IdaLral Hewitt's investigation was the infomaticn availnble to Addxal
Kianel, particularly during ih» critical period fron 27 Norember to
7 Deoomber 19Ul« concerning tlM location and novemants of Japanese naval
forces* This infomation, liiioh consisted principally of daily radio
IntelligeDoe suanaries setting forth the results of nonitaring Japanese
naval coamnnieations and estlaates by the Fleet Intelligence Officer, is
set forth in soas detail at pages 112-llU, inclusive, of Adairal Hewitt's
report* It there appears that there was an unusual change in Japanese
naval radio calls on 1 Decenber 19ltl} that this was regarded as indicating
an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a
large scaLej that on 2 Deoaober 19U1 Adairal Kiaaal conferred with bis
Fleet Intelligence Officer as to the iriiereabouts of Japanese fleet units,
and tbat daring that conference Admiral Kioael noticed and coaasnted m
the absence of infomaticn in the Fleet Intelligence Officer's written
estiaate as to Japanese Carrier Oivisicns 1 and 2, which consisted of four
carriers* (It has since been learned that these four carriers were anong
the six carriers which in fact were then on the high seu heading toward
Pearl Harbor*) The other Japanese oarilera were located b7 liie Hest
Ikitelligenoe Officer in his written estiaate, in Japanese hosM waters,
685
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2407
CONFIDENTIAL
with the •zoaptlon of pot«11>ly on* earrlor in tho Karataall*. In hli
tootlaoay before Adairal Etwltt, tha Fleot Zntolllco&eo Officer deeeribeA
bi* eomrerMilon with Adairal KImmI en 3 Oaeealter 1941 as follevai
"Mr. S0RTn(T7i Will you atate th* aubatano* of «bat ho said and
vhat you said, as best you recall it?
"CAFTAIV JJOWBt A* bent I recall It, Adairal Kiunel said, 'Vhat I
Tou don*t know ^ere Carrier Dlrlslon 1 and Carrier Dlrlslon 3
aret' axid I rerplled, *Ve, sir, I do not. I think they are In hose
waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these
units, Z feel pretty confident of their location.' Then Adnlral
Klmael looked at me, as sometlaes he would, with sometdiat a stem
countenance and yet partially with a twinkle Inixls eye and said,
'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and
you wouldn't know Itf ' or words to that effect. My reply was that,
'I hope they would be slighted before now', or words to that effect."
"KR. SCHTiTXTTt Tour testlnony, Ciqatain, was not quite clear to
■e, arlslne out of your description of Admiral Kinunel's twinkle
In hie eye t^en he spoke. What I affl trying to get at Is this]
Vas the dlecusslon about ths absence of Infomatlon concerning
CardiTS 1 and 2 a serious or Jocular oneT
"CAPTAIN LATTOFi Els question was absolutely serious, but tAian
he said, 'Where are Cardlrs 1 and 2', and I said, 'I do not
know precisely, but If Z mist estimate, Z would soy that they
are probably in the Kure area since we haren't heard from them
In a long time nnd they may be refitting as they finished
operations only a month and a half ago, ' and it was then yAian ha
with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to eny they could
be rounding Diamond HeadT' or words to that effect. In other
words, he was impressing' me on my complete ignorance as to their
exact location.
"MR. SOtTNETT: He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of ln>-
formatlon about those carrlersT
"CAPTAIN LATTOHt This incident has been liqiressed on my mind.
I do not say that Z quote him exactly, but Z do know that he mad«
such a statement to me in a way to point out to me that Z should
know t^ere they are but hadn't so indicated their location."
Zt is to be noted further that, as set forth In Admiral Hewitt's
report, the daily communication intelligeno* summaries received by
Adairal ITimmel stated, on December 3rd, that: "Almost a complete blank
of information on the carriers today. Z«ack of Identifications has soa».
what promoted this lack of information. Howerer, since over 300 serrlce
686
2408 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
call* hare 'baea partlallj idantif l«d alnoe the oheD^e on the flrat of
Deomher and not one carrier oall has heen recovered. It Is erldent that
carrier traffic la at a low e'b'b." and that the dalljr aunnarlea dellTered
to Adairal Klamel thereafter, and prior to the attache, indicated that there
wa* no infomatlon aa to Japaneae carriers*
In Tlew of the foresoin^, I do net approTe tha ahove finding hy
the Naval Oourt of Inqairjr* I concur entirely in the coanent of the
Conmander in Chief j U. S. Tleet, concerning thia finding. I an of the
view that the infomatlon aa to the location and moveaianta of the
Japanoae naval f orcea which waa received hy Adairal Kinaiel during the
week precedi&i; the attack, cot^led with all the other information idiich
he had received. Including the "war warning" and other aeaaagea froa the
Chief of Naval Operatlona, ahould have heen interpreted aa indicating
that an attack on Hawaii waa not unlikely and that the tine of auch an
attack could he predicted within fairly narrow limlta.
(«) eourt of Inauiry ?inding XIII (1178). It la here atated
that Adairal Xlmael'a deciaion not to conduct dally long-range reconnaia-
aance waa aound; that there were inaufflciont planea for thia purpoae; and
that auch uae of the available planea waa not stifled.
The Commander in Chief, U* 3. Tleet, in hia ezxdoraement to the Naval
Court record pointe out that Admiral Elmmel had a difficult deciaion to
make in thia matter of reeonnalaaance, and that there were many faetora
to he eonaidered. He atatea further, however, that after conaldering all
of the information that waa at Admiral Kimmel'a diepoaal, it a^eara that
Admiral Eimmel waa not on entirely aound ground in making no atteaipt at
long-range reeonnalaaance, partlculcu'ly aa the aituation became more and
■ore tenae in che few daya immediately preceding the Japaneae attaeka.
Ihla comment adds that it la ohvloun that the meana available did not
(01
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2409
CONFIDENTIAL
pviLt an all-raanil daily raoonnaiJBano* to a dlatanea neoaeaary to dataot
the ^iproMh of oarriara bafora planaa ooald ba lavndiad, tnt that thara
vara, bowvrer, oartaln aactora sora dangerous than othaiv i«iloh could hxw
bean oorered to aoae artaxit, and that aoeh particular oorar wnld hsva bean
logical in the cirouaBtancaa knoan to Adniral Ciaael in late Horeribar nd
aarly Daoaabar. Attention ia oallad totha faot that A4id.na. Riohardaon had
Hlntalned diatant raoonnaisaanea, naing tfaa fair patrol planaa at hia
dLapoaal, to oorar the aoat dangarooa aeotora in rotation, and that theaa
patrola ware diaeontimed itien or ahortly before Adairal Klaael raliared
Adbdxal Riohardaon*
m addition to theaa conanta, vith ahidi I oonoor, it Mgr ba notad
that Adairal Klmal Mm^lt had Baintainad a partial long range patrol la
the aoaaBr of 19la on the baaia of mtelligenoa raoalrad and reported by
Atlairal Blooh at that tiJM.
The following flndinga by Adbdjral Haaitt In connection idth tha
qaaation of air reoonnaiaaanoe are ipproiradt
•77« Adairal Kinal taatifiad before the Haval Court of
inquiry that he decided on Horaaber 27th that Ifaere ahoald ba
no diatant reoonnaiaasioe."
"TSs Ihere ia no avldence of any apeeiflo diaeasaian betvean
Artalral ITIwiiil and aabera of hia ataff on or after the reoaipi
of the •hmr warning," aa to the adviaability or practicability of
long range reeonnaiaMnce Tram Oahu* the IMr Plana OCCLear
thought that the 8vb>ot aoat have bean dlaoaaaed, bat could
recall no apecific diaousaion. The Coamander of the Fleet Patrol
planaa, who bad not bean infotaed of any of the aigniflcaat aazving
■aaaagea, teatifled Ihot Atelral KiHsal had no audi diaeuaalon
withhia."
"87. The Fleet patrol planaa arailable * Oahu Inthe week
preceding the attack vara not anfficiant to hare ecndacted
360 degree reoomaiaaaaoa daily for aore thai a few days*"
■69* 'Aiara vara soffielaiii Fleet patrd planaa and oreaa la
fleet a^railabla at (Mxn dating the weak preeedlng the attack
to hare floan, for at laaat aereiral weeka, a daily reowwalaaaif
eonring 128 dagreea to adiatanoe of about TOO allaa*"
688
2410 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
"90. Tbm leetora north of Oihu war* g«n«rall7 rvoognised m b«ing
Mm aoet likaLy ••otora trom which m Jkpanaee attack woald coait
If the Japanese ware to attack Pearl Harbor*"
«91» If a daily distant recoonaissance bad been floMn f roa Odm
after 27 Hovesfcer 19l4l» with the available petrol planes, the
northern sectors probably would have been searched**
"101* Ihe Japanese carriers laondied their planes tram a poeitlca
200 miles doe north of Onhu**
(n) Court of Inquiry Finding IIV (1182)* Ihls states in
substoace that the ixw^ raoar detection systea was ineffective*
Itie evidence supports the substance of the ocoBttt on this flndingf
lixidx is made in the Seoond aidorseaant; that is, Itiat althcagh the radar
detecticn system in operation at Pearl Harbor was in an embryonic stata,
neverlfaeleec, even in its then cooditioo it coald have and dicold have
eaonred to give at least an hoar's waznii^ of the attack* I cononr In
this rnisaant and also approve the following condnsion b7 Admiral Henittt
■•15* Ihe aircraft warning STStam was being qfMrated by the Anqr
daring certain periods of the day primarily for training poxpoees,
and, althou^ no. fully developed, could have served to ^ve soas
warning of the approach of Jifxanese aircraft*"
(o) Coinrt of mgoiry Findings IT (1186). this states tiiat
the best professional opinion in the Utaited States and Oreat Britain,
prior to 7 December I9I1I, was that an aircraft torpedo attack undar
conditions of shoal water and limited approad. such as thostf ikiidi
obtsinBd at Pearl Harbor, was not praoticable, aai that the Japanese
attack was successfnl pzlnoipally because of tfaa eqplogrmant of a special-
ly designed torpedo, wfaidx was a secret weapon*
Ihe only oinent in the Seoond EbdorsetMnt on this finding is thatt
■It is evidant in retrospect thai the capabilities of Japanaae alroraft
torpedoes were seriously imdarestimated*" The principal point upon «hich
the Conrt of Inquiry seems to rest its findings la the farther flLading thi
689
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2411
CONFIDENTIAL
it WM not bflillerTwi ^3T Mcrioan and British nsral aathorltlaa at ttet tl»
that torpedosa oould ba auoeeaafollx laonohad tiom alrorait in witora as
flballov aa tliQBe at Paaxl Haxt>or. As a bliBlft for this Tiav tba Court rallaa
iq>oa a latter ty tba Chief of Haval Oparatlons aarlj in I9I1I In whioh ba
indloatad that torpedoaa oould not be suooassfolly launohad froa alrplaM*
in wator tindf atmiMin dapth of 75 faet («atar at Paarl Harbor balBC
approalaatalj U5 feat). It is noted that Hm Court also refers to a sdb-
seqosnt letter put oat for the Chief of Isval Operations in June 19lil»
tor Adslral Ingersoai, itiioh is in eonfUot with the Courtis fladlag*
Ihii leUor stated, SMng other thii«8, thatt *It oaanot be aasvaad tliat
angr o^pltal or other iwlnable Teasel is safe iban at anohor trtm this tiype
of attaok if surrounded bgr water at a suffioloQt distanoe to pendt an
attadc to be developed and a soff ioiant run to am the torpedo** This
letter also advised that tocp><loes lannohed by the British at nmnto
ware, in ganoral, in 1>>1$ Athoas of vatar, althoa«h aereral Mgr bars
bean Imnched in 11-12*
The reoonda of the lacrjr Dspartaant indloated that in April* lAX*
there «as eireulated in the Dopartaent an mtelligenoe report itiioh
described the daaanstration of m a«rial torpedo in fiigland. It ivpear*
fraattiis report that the tocpedo desoxlbed vas equipped vith speolal
wlnp, aid that it required no greater depth of iAt«r for its suooessAal
l^nyy^Mng than the depth at vfaidi it nade its noxaal nil.
It lUrtber Ka>9ar» firaa the reeords of the Mnry Departaait that the
British reported aircraft torpedo attaoks during the jear 19iiO lawhieh
torpedoea were auooeesftiUj lamahed in hZ feet of water*
Finally, there is eridMiee in the reoerd to indicate that nearlj •
year prior to the aotnal attadc. the feasibili^ and eveD the prObakilitr
of an idjrplana torpedo attadc vftm Pearl Haztx>r ww uaita^literti
690
2412 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary Knox's letter of January^ 1941 » listed an air torpedo attack
as second only to air bombing in order of probability in a list of the
types of attack upon Pearl Harbor which he considered likely. His letter
had been previously cleared with Admiral Stark, and was received In
February by Adoiral KinoMl.
In view of the foregoing, the finding of the Court of Inquiry is
not approved.
(p) Coxirt of Inqxtiry Finding XVI (1188). The Court here
finds that Admiral Kimael's decision to continue preparation of the Fleet
for war, made after receiving the 24 Noven^er dispatch, was sound in
light (a) of the approval of the steps which he had taken after the dis-
patch of 16 October irtiich advised that hostilities were possible, and
(b) the Inf creation then available to him including Admiral Stark's letter
of 17 October 1941 and the dispatch of 24 November, 1941, which stated
that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including att-ack on
the Phillippines or Guam, was a possibility.
The Secona iihdorsement summarizes the Court's finding and under-
scores that portion of the 24 November dispatch which indicated thatt
"A surprise aggressive movement in any direction^ including attack on
the Philippines or Quam is a possibility...."
It should be further noted that Admiral Kimmel testified that th«
words, "A surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including
attack on the Philippines or Guam," meant to him that any attack other
than on those two places would be on foreign territory, but that the words
also included the possibility of a submarine attack on the Hawaiian
Islands.
The Court refers in its finding to a part of a personal letter
691
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2413
CONFIDENTIAL
Mat b7 Admiral Stark to Admiral Kinnel on 17 October, in vhich Admirax
Stark atated: "Personally, I do not believe the Japs are going to sail
into ua and the meseage I sent /ou merely stated the possibility; in fact,
I tempered the message handed me considerably." However, the letter also
continued: "Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case, after long
po«-»ow8 in the V/hlte House, it was felt that we should be on gtiard, at
least until something indicates the trend.'* To the letter was annexed a
poatscript stating in partt "Oenaral UarahaU Jutt e«U«d up and «a«
anxious that ae made some sort of reconnaissance so that he could feel
assured t.^.at on arrival at Wake, a Japanea* raider attack may not be in
order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any
such contingency, but that X felt it extremely Improbable and that, while
we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned
raid on any of theae island carriers in the pacific might be difficult to
detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, sjid ay advice
to him was not to worry."
It is noted that the Court does not specifically deal with the
question of the soundness of Admiral Kianel's decision to continue pre-
paration of the Fleet, in the light of the highly lii^jortant information
which he received from the Chief of Naval Operations and otherwlae during
t^ critical period after the "war warning" of November 27th.
(q) Court of Inquiry Finding xyil (1193). The Court here
fiAds that there were ^ood grounds for believing that the Japanese would
attack in the Far East.
In respect of this finding, the Coomander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
points out that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation
of Japanese operations, and that they were in fact initiated there. He
note* further that all concerned recognised the possibility that such a
692
2414 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
coranencement of hostilitiea would be accompanied by an attack upon Pearl
Harbor. He adds that this latter possibility was considerably strengthened
by information available at 'Washington, all of which was not available to
Admiral Kimmel.
It appears from the evidence obtained in Admiral Hewitt's investi-
gation that the possibility that the cofflmencement of hostilities by Japan
would include an attack upon Pearl Harbor was also strengthened by in-
formation received by Admiral Kimmel on and after the war warning of
November 27th. The estimates that had been made in the War Plans, which
had been approved by Admiral Kimmel, of course contemplated that in the
event of war with the Japanese a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was
distinctly possible. The information received by Admiral Kimmel as to
the location and movement of Japanese naval forces was, at the least,
consistent with these estimates. The following conclusion of Admiral
Hewitt in this connection is approved!
"23. The information as to Japanese naval forces which
was available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphas-
izing the movement of forces to the southward, tended to con-
centrate his attention on the probability of Japanese attacks on
the Philippines and Ualaysia. The information which was received
by Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December 1941 indicated,
however, that on Deceiii>er 1st there was an unusv^l change in
Japanese radio call signs; that, on the basis of all information
up to December 2nd, no reliable estimate couxd be made of the
whereabouts of four of Japan's ten carriers, and that there was no
information as to any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of
positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers,
a study of the movement which was possible to them, imder radio
silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due
appreciation of the possible effectsi of an air attack should have
induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to
reduce the effectiveness of such an attack . . . ."
(r) Court of Inquiry Findiog» XVIII and XH (1196).
These state in substance that Admiral Stark's failure from 26 November to
7 December 1941 to transmit to Admiral Kimnel inportaAt information in
his possession, obtained from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2415
CONFIDENTIAL
and suamarized In the addendum to the Court's findings of facts,
constitutes a oilltary error.
The comnent of the Conoander In Chief » 0. S. Fleet, as to this
finding was to the effect that Admiral Stark was at fault in falling to
give Admiral Kimmel an adequate sunmary of Information available In
Washington.
The endorsement of the Commander In Chief, U. S. Fleet, on th«
Naval Court of Inqvilry Record, further pointed out that hear Admiral
V«llklnson, formsr Director of Naval Intelligence, was not avallaible to
the Court as a witness. It was noted that these findings, and the con-
clusions of the Court based thereon, were concerned principally with the
handling of enetiQr information In the Navy Department, and that consequent-
ly, it would seem essential to a thorough exploration of the facts to have
the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who was largely re-
sponsible for handling this information. It was concluded that the failure
to obtain this testimony was unfox^unate.
With this commsnt by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I c<»i-
eurred. It Airther appeared to me that the testimony of Captain UcCollun,
who was assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence, and who, according
to other testimony In the record, had important duties in connection
with the handling of such Intercepted enejiQr information, would be most
helpful. Captain UcCoUum was also unavailable as a witness to the Court.
I ascertained that at the tims both Hear Admiral V/ilkinson aind Captain
kcCollum were actively engaged in combat operations against the enemy,
and would be so engaged until soiae date in the future. From the nature
of the duties which these officers were performing in their assignments,
I determined that in view of the paramount present needs of the war effort,
their testimony in this matter could not then feasibly be obtained.
69U
2416 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
During his later investigation^ Admiral Hewitt was able to
obtain the testijnony of Admiral Wilkinson and of Captain UcCollum, as
well as other testimony bearing upon this finding of the Court of Inquiry.
The following conclusions of Admiral Hewitt in this connectiorr are approved:
"5. Information was promptly and efficiently obtained
by the United States Navy and Army intelligence organizations
in '.Vashington, concerning the Japanese Government's actual
views as to the diplomatic negotiations and its intention to
wage war, by means of interception, descryption, and transla-
tion '>f Japanese diplomatic messages."
"6. The information which was obtained in Washington by
the V.'ar and Navy Departments from Japanese diplomatic messages
was fully exchanged. The information which was obtained by the
Navy Department as to Japanese naval movements was available
to the intelligence officers of the V'ar Department in Washington.
The War Department had information which led that Department to
believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in
November, 1V41. This appears from a Vi'ar Department dispatch of
26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel,
concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over
Tmok and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other
things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The
reconnaissance was not flown because the special Arny planes were
not made ready." . . .
"8. The information obtained by the Navy Department
from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately
disseminated within the Navy Department.
"9. Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made
requests that he be kept fully informed on subjects of interest
to the Fleet and as to all important developments, the Chief of
Naval Operations did not communicate to him important in-
formation which would have aided him materially in fully evaluat-
ing the seriousness of the situation. In particular, the failure
to transmit the State Department message of November 26th and
to send, by telephone or other expeditious means, information
of the "1 p.m." messaf-;e and its possible import, were unfortunate.
"10. rtdmirsLl Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient
information in his possession to indicate that the situation
was unusually serious, and that important developments with
respect to the outbreak of war were imminent. This included the
"war warning" message and similar important messages which
were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations.
"11, The available information in the possession of the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation,
particularly the "war warning" message, was not disseminated
695
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2417
CONFIDENTIAL
to all of his important subordinate comndnders whose cognizance
thereof was desirable. Thus Admiral BelliJiger, who commanded
the f>atrol planes, and Admiral Newton, who was at sea with a
carrier and other units, were not informed of this and other
important messages."
12. The following conclusions by Adoirail Hewitt concerning
the intelligence secured bj tapping the wires of the Japanese Consulate
General at Hawaii and by Intercepting cable messages of the Japanese
Consulate General are approved.
Conclusion 12. "Despite the fact that prior to the attack the
telephone lines of the Japanese Consul (general at Honolulu were
tapped and that various of his cable messages were secured at
Honolulu, no information T.as obtained prior to December 7th which
indicated the likelihood of a Japanese attack. The legal re-
strictions which denied access to such cable messages were a
definite handicap to the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian
area."
Conclusion 13* "Although various messages of the Japanese Consul
General at Honolulu, which indicated Japanese interest in specific
locations of ships in Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by radio
intercept stations of the Army and Navy and decrypted prior to
the attack, this information was not transmitted by the Navy
Department to admiral Kimmel. Certain other messages which were
intercepted by the Army prior to 7 December 1941, indicated the
likelihood of attack on Pearl Harbor but were not decrypted or
brought to the attention of the Navy prior to the attack,
apparently because the Arqy did not have sufficient personnel .
for such work."
13. In its final opinion and recommendation, the Court of
Inquiry finds that no offenses have been coonitted or serious blame
Incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and
reconnends that no further proceedings be had in the matter.
With respect to this opinion and recommendation of the
Court of Inquiry, I concur in the comment expressed in paragraph 5 of
the Second Endorsement that the Navy cannot avoid a share of responsibili-
ty for the Pearl Harbor incident, and that disaster cannot be regarded
as an "act of God" beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. Whether
or not it is true, as stated in the Second Endorsement, that the Country^
696
2418 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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as a whole is basically responsible in that the people were unwilling to
take adequate measures for defense until it was too late to repair the
consequences of their failure so to do, it appears that the Navy as a
whole, although its ranking officers were fully informed of the moat
recent developments in the science of warfare, failed to appreciate the
true significance of those developments until their impact had been felt
by a blow struck at a substantial portion of the Fleet. By the same
token, although the imminence of hostile action by the Japanese was known,
and the capabilities of the Japanese Fleet and Air Arm were recognized
in war p.lans made to meet Just such hostile action, these factors did not
reach the stage of conviction In the minds of the responsible officers
of the Navy to an extent sufficient to impel them to bring about that
implementation of the plans that was necessary if the initial hostile
attack was to be repelled or at least mitigated.
That this is so is manifested in ^he case of the instant
disaster in several important respects.
(a) The destructive potentiality of air attack was not
properly evaluated, although there was simple information available on
this subject in the reports of action by and against the British. That
this information was recognized is shown by the inclusion in war and
defense plans of appropriate provisions for defense against this type
of attack, but that it was not fully appreciated is shown by the fact
that these selfsame provisions were not put into effect until the initial
attack had been successful.
(b) In respect of xuiity of command, again all of the plans
made adequate provision for Joint action, mutual Interchange of intelli-
gence, and the fullest utilization of all of the available resources of
697
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2419
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^tb 9m kemj «a4 th« Htcffx In praotl«0, non* of th«M aMmrm oca*
Into l>etos to aiijr a^rocUiblo Mitcnt prior to tho sttadc.
(«) Within th« BaTjr Ittolf , th« orsMlsatloii wa« «ioh m to
•utaerse th« (Silof of Haral Operation* In a watlpllclty of datail potw
talnlBS to the prootu-Mwnt and anterlal program lncld«tal to the n^id
•xpan«ion of tho laty. This pr«clod«d hla fron glrlnc to war piano and
operations the {^divided and oontlnaln« attention which eiqierlance has
ehown they reqalre, and tended to dull hie perception of the critical
algnlflettice of eventet
In making these ohsertatloas, X as not unnlndful of the
uanal adTantage of hinds l^t, nor do X orerlook the fact that this war
has prered that any carrier strike, when pressed huw with reeolv^lon.
Is alBost iaq>osslhle to deflect* After glrlng doe consideration, howerer,
to all theee factors, X aa of the opinion that there were, nerertheless ,
areas in lAich sound Bllltary Judgement dictated the taklnc of action
lAkleh, though It ttlght not hare prevented or defeated the attadc, would
hare tMxded naterially to reduce the damage which the attack was able
to Inflict. Such action was not taken, and the responslhlllty aust canter
vqfton the officers «dio had it in their power, ea^ within his reepeetlT*
ephere, to tidce ap-oropriate action.
14. I concur, therefore, with the opinion Mpressed In paragngih
6 of the Second AidorseBMst to the Court of Inquiry record that it ie
perrtiaent to exaalne the pessihle courses of action which Adalral SteA
and Adairal Kinnel, as the reeponslhle officers, night hare tiAcen to
lessen the success of the initial Japanese hlow.
696
2420 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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(a) la pmrmgnfih 6 of the Second &idor«eaeat, it it pointed out
that idalml Stazk fallod to «1t« Adairal Ciaaol an adaijaato mamary of
iafematloB araileble in Vashixtgton, particularly is raapaot oft
(1) 9m Stata Dapartaent reply of 26 Hovesber 1941 to
the Japanese, i^ich was re/i:arded by the Japanese ae an QltiBatmt
(2) The intercepted Jananeee aeesas** inquiring as to the
disposition of ships within Pearl Harbor;
(?) The ioplementation of the "vinde" message;
(4) In failing to apDreciate the signif icancn of the
*oae p.B. aessase' received on the aoming of 7 Deeenber 1941,
and in the failure to transnit it to Adairal Kiaael by tha
efuidcest aeane available.
(5) finally, it is pointed out in this section of the
Seeond Xndorseaent that th^re is a oertain saaeness of tenor
in the coBBuni cat ions sent by Admiral Staric to Admiral Kimael
which failed to convey the sense of intensification of critical
relations between Japan and the Uhited States.
I concur generally with 'these comments axeept as to (3) and
(Q). In connection with the failure of Admiral Stark to advise Admiral
Xlaael of the implementation of the "winds" message, the following eon-
olnaion by Adairal Hewitt is epprovedi
'7. AlthoQ^ the Japanese Oovemaent established in their
diplomatic messages a code, known as the "winds" code, to be used
in radio broadcasts in order to convey information to its reore-
ssntatives as to the status of relations between Japan and other
countries, no message was intercepted prior to the atteek which
used the code words relating to the United States."
Althou^ there may be some basis for the comment that prior
te 27 Vovember 1941 there was a certain sameness of tone in the communi-
cation sent by Adairal Stark to Admiral Kimmel, it should be noted that
tha message of Vovember 27 was stronger than any message irtiich Admiral
Staric seat previously to Admiral Kimel. That message read as follows i
"THIS DISPATCH IS TO BX CONSISERKD A VAB MJMlVd 1 IHD&OTIATI CBTS
WITH JAPAlf LOCKIHO TOWAHD STABILIZATIOH 07 COITBITICfHS IN THi
PACIPIO HAVB aSASSD AH) AIT A5GRKSS1VS MOVB BT JAPAF IS EXPBCTED
WITHIU THr ma PKW DAIS X TH?? nDMB-H AITD WJJlPtOm OT JAPANISSB
TROOPS ADD THS ORGAJriZATICW OF HaVAL TASK TOPCSS IHDICATB AS
AWBIBIODS lOPEDlTIOH AGAIKST SITHTIR THE PHILIPPINBS (printed in
Ink, "thai") (B KRX PXTIKSULA OR POSSIBLY BORNSO X SSGiCOTB AV
APPHOPHIATB DSPSFSITH DZPLOTHEHT PBI3»ARATaRT TO CAHSYIITG COT THI
TASKS ASSKBTSD IH VPL 46 Z IHFOIBf DISTRICT AUD ABXT ADTH0RITIX8 Z
699
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2421
CONFIDENTIAL
A SIMILAR WARNING IS BEING SENT 3Y WAR DWARTIIENT X SPENAVO
INFORM BRITISH X CONTINafrAL DISTRICTS GUAM SAMOA DIRECTED
TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES AGAINST SABOTAGE"
CoQceming the other canments by the Conmander in Chief, U* S*
Fleet, it oLght be added that Ackniral Stark's oncLBSion consisted not
only In the failure to transndt fully to Admiral Klmnel certain of the
available Information, but also In the failure properly and speedily
to evaluate that Information, particularly on 7 December 19^1*
The evidence shams that the State Department reply to the
Japanese of 26 Novenfcer 19Ul was In fact regarded by them as an ultima-
tuaj that It was knoim in the Navy Department before 1 December 19t4l that
the Japanese regarded the reply as unacceptable; that it iras knom,
as ear]y as 1 December I9I4I, that the Japanese proposed to strike without
-warning* It was further known that subsequent to their receipt of the
State Department's note the •^spanmae were directing their emissaries in
Ifae Dtiited States to do everything is their power to allay any suspicion
of a hostile Japanese move. Against this background, there was received
on 6 Deoembar 19ltl, in the Navy Department, an Intercepted Japanese message
to their emissarLes here, which stated that a lU-part reply to the State
Department's note of 26 Noveinber 19lil was being transmitted, and further
that a specific tins fcr delivery of this reply would be transniitted from
Tokyo by a separate message. This message, together with the firet
thirteen parts of the Japaaeae reply were all available at the Navy Depart-
asot by 2100 hours of 6 Deoengber 19i4l* The language of the thirteen
parts of the Japanese reply then available indicated that the reply consti-
tuted a final breaking off of relations* All this pointed to the con-
cLialon that a surprise attack was to be simultaneous with the dellveary
of the Japanese message. Thus, #iile it was not known on 6 Decenfcer
predeely i*i«n the attaok was to be delivered, there was mple evidence to
700
2422 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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base the conclusion that a surprise move was due within narrow limits
of time.
On the morning of December 7th, by 10:30, Admiral Stark had
all fourteen parts of the Japanese reply, which in its entirety made
explicit the breakin^j off of relations. He had as well the direction for
the delivery of that reply at one p.m.. Eastern Standard Time, and there
was information available to him that this time corresponded to dawn at
Oahu and the middle of the night in the Far East. Although, as found by
Admiral Hewitt, no one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl
Harbor, yet all of these factors pointed to the possibility of such an
attack. An acute sensitivity to the tautoess of the situation would
have dictated at least a plain language telephone communication to Admiral
Kimmel, which might have provided a warning sufficient to bring about
some material reduction in damage inflicted by the Japanese attack.
(b) I concur with the comments set forth in paragraph 5(b) of the
Second itfidorsement to the Naval Court of Iniquiry record. It is there
stated that Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep
him fully informed, did have indications of the increasing tenseness of
relations with Japan. In particular, it is pointed out that he had the
••war warning message on 27 November 1940, the "hostile action possible at
any moment" message on 28 November, the 3 December message that the
Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the messages of k and 6
December that the Japanese had ordered destruction of United States
secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands.
In addition, it might be pointed out that Admiral Kimmel in his
personal letters, which are a part of the record before the Court, and
as well in the war plans approved by him, explicitly recognized the
possibility of attack upon Pearl Harbor by air; and, that the information
701
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2423
CONFIDENTIAL
r*c«lr«d bjr Adalral KIwmI conocmlac th* loeatloa aad aoTWiaiit of Jaqpanea*
naval forces after 27 VoTeaber 1941 should have been eT«l«ated, as pre-
Tloosly pointed out, as indicating- the continued and increasing poeei-
bility of such an attack. It is to be especially noted that ^ile Adnlral
Xlamel was directed in the war miming neeeage of 27 Vorcaher 1941, and
egain on 28 VoveBhsr when the Amy nessage was relayed to him, to execute
an aTjpropriate defensive deployasnt preparatory to carrying out the tanlcs
assigned in the Harj' Basic Var Plan, the chief action taken by his was
carrying forward the arrangeooits for the reenforcing of and continuing
the limited air petrols from the outlying islands, ordering on 26 Koveaber,
the depth bombing of submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area, and
exxgaging lu unproductive conferences with General Short. He continued
in effect the primary fleet activity of training and the lowest condition
of readiness (Condition III) of the flef>t in port. He neither ordered
long-rejige air reconnaissance from Oahu to any extent nor advised his fleet
air wing commander of the receipt of the war warning message. His fail-
ure to take other and more effective action is neither explainable nor
excusable by an ambiguity in the meaning of or disagreement as to what
wovdd constitute an 'appropriate defensive deployment." Admiral Ximel
coiild have referred to the initial tasks stated in the war plan of aaln-
taining fleet security at bases and gu{u*ding aomimet surprise attack by
Jaoan, and if he did not know what was meant by the phrase "atipro'Drlete
defensive deplo^nnent", he should have asked the Chief of Neval Operations
for an explanation.
The Second Bidorsement to the Haval Court record states that
Admiral Kimmel could and should have Judged more accurately the gravity of
the danger to which the Hawaiian Islands were exnosed, and that certain
oourses of action were open t« bla« ^tt
708
2424 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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(1) He oould have used the patrol airoraft available to
hla to conchict loog-raage reoonnalssaooe in the aore dangsroaa
•eotora, and tfaua made the Japanese task more dlffloalt, whether
or not this woald hare resulted in the detection of the at^roaoh
of the Japanese carriers; (2) H« oould have rotated the "in port"
psrioda of hli Tessels in a less routine manner* and thus made it
more diffioult for the Japanese to have predicted when there would
be azQT veeaals in port; (3) He oould hare maintained a hl^er
condition of readiness under itilcih Haval planes would have been in
the air dtring the early morning period, ships' batteries would have
bean A1II7 manned, and damage control organisations fall/ oparatlcnal*
Admiral Hewitt's report concludes in partt
"The absnoe of poeltlve infomatloD as to the location of
Japanese carrlars, a stw^ of the nnvmoit liiich was poesible to tbiam,
under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a
due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should havs in-
duced Admiral Kiaiel to take all piractioable precautions to reduce the
effeotlTenaea of suoh an attack* The measures which reasonably were qpan
to him werat
■ (a; Establishment of long distance air reoonnaissanoe, eoraor-
Ing the most probable approadi sectoirs to the extant possible, on
a reasonably permanent basis, with available planes and crews*
"(b) EstablishMsnt of a hi^er condition of anti-aircraft
readiness, at least during the dangerous dawn hours*
"(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control
readiness by ships in port, partioularly diring the dangerous
dam hours*
*(d) Installation of sitl-tcrpedo nets to protect the
larger vessels in port*
"(e) Maintenance of a striking foroe at sea in readiness
to intercept possible attack forces*
"(f) Maintenance of the maxlmm force of the Fleet at aea,
with entxy into port at Irregular intervals*
"(g) Checking with Azmy aa to readiness of anti-aircraft
defflnsa and aircraft warning installatlana*"
I concur with these oomaenta as to the various courses of
actiun which Adniral Kianel oould have and should hare taken* Ibe evidanoe
indloates dearly, however, that his most grievous failure was his failure
to oondttct Icng-range air reconnalssanca in the more dangerous sectora
tram Oahu during the week preceding the attadc* Ihat this la so Is
703
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2425
CONFIDENTIAL
■anlfest froa the eTldence o'btained "by Adnlral Eevltt a&d from hla
followixtg conclusion, ^Ich li hereby cpT)roTed.
Conclusion 14. "The only practicable sources from which Admiral
Eimmel could have secured infomatlon, after the receipt of the
*war warning,* as to the a^mroaeh of the attacking force, were
the aircraft warning serrice, traffic exuilyBeB of JaMaese haval
eoomnnicstions, and distant air reconnaissance from Oahu."
During the critical period after TJorember 27 the limitations
of the aircraft warning service and of radio Intelligence were evident;
the only remaining -Dracticable source upon which Admiral Kim^el was
entitled to rely for infometlen as to the Janrtanese nnval novements was
distant air reconnaissance t^lch, covering the most probable an-nroach
bearings, would as Admiral Hewitt concluded have had a reasonable chance
of success. The failure to detect the approach of the Japanese task fore i
contributed more to the success of the Japanese attack than did any other
single factor.
In addition to the coiu*Bes of action referred to by the
Commander in Chief, TJ. S. Jl.eet and by Admiral Eewltt, it was, of course,
always open to Adalral Kiamel also to trice steps to Increase cooperation
between his organization and the Army command, and to attemot to achieve
effective Joint coBBs&d.. That conditions were ideal for his accomplishing
such an objective is indicated by the evidence In the record 8>nd the fIncU
ing of the Court that the social relaticmship between him and General Short
was excellent. The need for Admiral Kimmel taking such measures existed
froa the time he took conmand of the Pacific Fleet. It increased in
urgency as the 7th of December, 1941, nptjroached.
15. The Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
to the Kaval Court record concludes thatt
"6. The derellctlonr on thepart of Admiral Stark and
Admiral Kimiiel were faults of omission rather than faults of
commission. In the case in Question , they Indicate lack of the
704
79716 O — 46 — pt. 16 33
2426 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate
with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable
inefficiency.
"7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted
by the evidence adduced, appropriate administrative action would
appear to be the relegation of both of these officers to positions
in which lack of superior judgment may not result in future
errors . "
16. In his endorsement to Admiral Hewitt's report the Conmander-
in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, states in part:
"I concur in general in the remarks and recommendations
of the Judge Advocate General as expressed in the second endorse-
ment. In answer to the specific questions asked in the first
endorsement, the following opinions are submittedi
"(a) I am of the opinion that the evidence is not
sufficient to warrant trial by court martial of any person
in the Naval Seirvice, in that the evidence will not sustain
the charges required by the Articles for the Government of
the Navy.
"(b; With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence to
warrant other proceedings, 1 am still of the opinion, which
I have previously expressed, that Admiral Stark and Admiral
Kimrael, though not culpable to a degree warranting formal
disciplinary action, were nevertheless inadequate in emergency,
due to the lack of the superior judgment necessary for
exercising command commensurate with their duties.
"(c) Appropriate action appears to me to be the relegation
of both of these officers to positions in which lack df
superior strategic judgment may not result in future errors.
The action has been taken in the case of both Admiral Stark
and Admiral Kimmel. No further action is recommended.
"(d) For the reasons stated by the Judge Advocate General,
I consider it impracticable to bring Admiral Stark and Admiral
Kimmel, or either one of them, to trial prior to the termina-
tion of hostilities with Japan, nor are court martial or
other proceedings (prior to the termination of hostilities
with Japan) advisable because such proceedings would almost
certainly involve disclosure of information which would be
detrimental to cxirrent military operations and to national
security measures."
17. The Judge Advocate General in making his endorsement to
Admiral Hewitt's report states in part:
1. "Subject report clarifiea obscure points and supplies
705
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2427
CONFIDENTIAL
omissions In the e«xlier Investigations. It is considered that
this and formf^r Investigations, taken together, present as
clear a picture of the pertinent facta as will ever be adduced.
TJith this report, therefore, I believe the investigation of the
Pearl Harbor attack shcniKt be considered completed.
2. "Admiral Hewitt's report brings out and conflnss a distinction
which impre&sed me at the time of studying the earlier investi-
gations, a distinction which does much to clarify thinking on the
question of placing responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster.
It appears that there was no lack of appreciation on the part of
any of the responsible officers that war was coming, and coming
quickly, during the critical period immediately preceding 7 Deceiver
1941. The point on which those officers failed to exercise the
discernment and Judgment to be expected from officers occupying
their positions, was their failure to appreciate, from the informa-
tion available to them, that Pearl Harbor was a likely target for
aerial attack and their failure to take the necessary steps to
prevent or minimize such a surprise attack. Each of these
officers, in estimating the critical situation, demonstrated a
poor quality of strategical planning, in that he largely ruled out
all possible courses of action by which the Japanese might begin
the war except throu^ an attack in the Weatem Pacific.
3. "I do not believe that the lack of more complete understand-
ing and co-operation between Admiral Kimnel and Lieutenant
General cohort had any great effect on the ultimate result; for it
is abundeuitly shown that they each entertained the same fallacious
views, and closer lindervtanding would most likely merely have
strengthened those views. Likewise, I submit that the importance
of information from Japanese sources has been overemphasized; for
had more basically sound principles been observed, the Pearl
Harbor disaster would not have occxirred. The security of Pearl
Harbor was the very core of our Pacific strategy, a fact which
did not receive sufficient consideration in the strategic concept
of responsible officers.
4. "In answer to the specific questions asked in the first
endorsement, the following opinions are submitted:
(a) As is more fully developed in the answer to question (b),
it is not believed that there is sufficient evidence to warrant
conviction of any of the officers concerned of any offense
known to naval law.
(b) Under the facts of this case, there are only two offenses
which are worthly of consideration: (1) Neglect of Duty
and (2) Culpable Inefficiency in the Performance of Duty.
Under either charge it would be necessary to define the duty of
the officer concerned, and to show that it was his duty to follow
a course of action other than the one he did. In my opinion
706
2428 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDENTIAL
this would be In^osslble, as the aots of omission of these
officers do not rise above the status of errors of Judgment.
No clearly defined duty can be established which was neglected or
improperly performed. As stated by Fleet Admiral King, in his
endorsement on the findings of the Court of Inquiry, the evidence
in the case boils down to the fact that the acts of the officers
in question "indicate lack of superior Judgment necessary for
exercising command commensurate with their rank and their
assigned duties, rather than culpable inefficiency." "Lack of
Superior Judgment" is not an offense triable by general court-
martial.
(d) The requirements of 39th Article for the Government of the
Navy and Section 346 of Naval Courts and Boards pertaining to
the rank of members of a general court martial will make it most
difficult to constitute a court for the trial of the officers
here concerned during war time or during a period of six months
after the cessation of hostilities. Uany of the officers of
appropriate rank, both on the active and th6 retired lists,
would be disqualified because of interest in the subject matter,
the probability of being called as a witness, or by virtue of
having been connected with one of the investigations into the
matter. If more than one of the officers in question are
brought to trial, an entirely new court would be necessary in
each case, as members who had tried a former case arising out
of the Pearl Harbor attack would be subject to challenge. The
Summoning of the necessary witnesses would result in temporarily
removing from their duty stations many of the key officers in
the naval organization. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the
opinion that any such court martial proceedings prior to the
end of hostilities with Japan is highly impractical and would
be detrimental to the wai effort, and further, that any such
proceedings during the six months immediately following the end
of hostilities would seriously impair the efficiency of the
naval service."
18. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion, and recommenda-
tion of the Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge
Advocate General thereto, and the Second indorsement of the Commander-
in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, thereto; the record findings and conclusions of
Admiral Hewitt, and the Second and Third Endorsements thereto; and on the
basis of the foregoing comments, I conclude that:
(a) Then Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch discharged his duties
adequately.
707
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2429
CONFIDENTIAL
(b) Then Adodral Husband 1£. Kinmal and Adniral Harold J), Stark,
particularly during the period from 27 November to 7 December
1941, failed to demonstrate the superior Judgment necessary for
exercising coamand commensurate with their rank and their assigned
duties.
(c) Both of these officers having been retired, appropriate
action should be taken to insure that neither of them will be
recalled to active duty in the future for any position in which
the exercise of superior Judgment nay be necessary*
(d) The appropriate committees of Congress should be fully
acquainted with the Navy*s Investigations into this matter, and
public disclosure of the facts concerning the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these investigations, should be made
as soon as such action can be taken without injuring current
military operations or the national security.
19. Accordingly, I direct t
(a) Rear Admiral Husband E. Kionel, USN (Retired;, shall not
hold any position in the United States Nuvy which requires the exercise
of superior Judgment.
(b) Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN (Retired;, shall not hold
any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of
superior Judgment.
(c) The appropriate conmittees of Congress will be fully
acquainted with the Navy*s investigations into this matter, and public
disclosure of the facts concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
obtained in these investigations, will be made as soon as such action
can be taken without injuring current military operations or the
national security.
SECRETARY OP THE NAVY
708
2430 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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(B) HaTT'a Offer tc Hear JLd»lral Kiaaiel of Court Martial.
On 7 S«ptetB%er 1943 Sear Idnlral liimel wrote to tb*
Secretary of the Kary etatlng that he desired *to he hroxight to trial
hy General Court Martial in open court at the earliest practicable
date*. On 28 ingast 1946 Secretary forrestal offered a Ckneral
Court Martial to Rear Idairal limel if the ease were still desired
hy the latter. The letter of Secretary lOrrestal to £aar Admiral
Xiamel read as follows:
"1, In your letter of Ssptcaber 7th, 1943, to the
Secretary of the laTy, you stated *It is ny personal desire
to he brought to trial by Oeneral Court Martial in open
court at the earliest practicable date. '
'2. In hie letter to you the Secretary of the ITaTy gave
you his sMsurance that a trial before General Court Martial
lAuld be had at the earliest practicable date that the public
interest and safety would permit. In riew of the present
state of the war and in Tiew of this assurance of the Secre-
tary of the Vavy I am disposed to order your trial by
General Court Martial in open court in the erent that you
still desire to be so tried,
"3. It is requested that you adrise me promptly
whether or not you desire to be tried by General Court
Martial."
On 8 September 1945 Baar Admiral Kimmel replied in
writing to the Secretary' s letter of 28 August 1945, stating that
he desired to defer replying to the Secretary's inquiry whether ha
(Eimmel) still desired a Court Martial until after the pending
Joint Congressional Xnrestigation of Pearl Harbor was completed,
fhls letter read as follows:
709
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2431
CONFIDENTIAL
'280 Bronzrlll* Boad, Broazrlll* 8, H. T,, 8 Sept«a%«r
1945. Troai Bear Adniral E, X. Xiaael, U. 8. Savy,
(Be tired), fot The Secretary of the Vtcrj, Sa'bjeett General
Court Martial in njr ease.
'1, Zn Tlew of the a^tatien for a Oon^esaieiial
Isreetij^ation before Oon^eee reeonrened and the action
of the Senate in ordering a Joint Concessional iDrestl-
gation of Pearl Earhor* X wish to defer mj replj to your
letter of 28 Angast 1945 ontil that ZnTestigation is
conpleted.'
710
2432 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 108
DEPARTKTCNT OF STATE
•Jt « A*^^ ^
/loK^
November 2, 1944.
The memorandum at the bottom
of this file, a memor&ndua by Mr.Hornbeok,
Aatefl November 27, 1941, entitled "Prob-
lem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate
of situation and certain probabllitlea",
Indexed as 711.94/2512 PS/OD. , Confi-
dential File, iP a memorandum regarding
the oontentB of which there have been
leaks and misrepresentation.
For purposes of the record there Is
now being superimposed a memorandum by
Mr. Hornbeok, of date February 28, 1944,"
In which certain pertinent facts are
stated anc: an analysis Is made of the
contents and true purport of the memo-
randum of November 27, 1941.
^^
u
3A/H:3KH:yzS
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2433
February 28,, 1944.
On Sunday •▼•nlng, February 20, Mr. Dr«w Pearson nada In
hla radio broadcaot certain statamants regarding Mr. Stanley
Hombecic. Among these, aa reported to Kr. Bornbeck on Febru-
ary 21 by the State Department's recorder, was a stataaent
that: "On November 22, 1941 Hornbeck drafted a mooioranduB
stating Japan would not attack this country. Just fifteen
days later she did attack Pearl Harbor".
On February 27, Mr. Pearson made In hie oclumn of that
day certain statements regarding Mr. Hombeck. Tcere, J^nter
alia, he stated that: "...on November 22, 1941, Just 15 days
before Pearl Harbor, he wrote an important ipeiaoraJSduB) to the
Secretary of State advising that Japan never would attack the
United States."
Such charges warrant attention. What are the facts?
Mr. Hombeck did not write on November 22, 1941 any
memorandum of estimate or prediction. He did on November 2?
write a memorandum giving an estimate of "probabilities".
Knowledge of the existence of such a mamorendum was at some
time before the end of August 1942 imparted by someone who
had knowledge thereof to some member or aiectbers of the press.
There appeared in a WasliinKton newspaper in August 1942 under
the dateline "By United Press" an article purporting to
compare the record of prophecy of Mr. Grew with that of
Mr. Hornbeok — unfavorably to the latter. In the course of
that article there was given an account of "Kornbeck's 5-1
oddrf*, as follows:
"In contrast to that record [citations of oc-
casions on which Mr. Grew Jiad 'advised the United
States to guard against a possible surprise attack']
was the viewpoint of the State Department adviser
political relations, Stanley Kuhl Hornbeck.
rnbeck was of the opinion, even after the trucu-
lent statements of Japan's two ambassadors, Kichisaburo
Npajura and Sabusu Kurusu, that Japan was bluffing.
■■; "Kornbeck's idea was that Japan would not dare
attack the United States, that it was bogged down in
Cb}.n& and that the most that need be feared was an
itttenslfied campaign against the Burma Road.
■^ ' "In mid-November, Hornbeck told consultants
that if the situation was viewed as a gambling
proposition the odds should be 5 to 1 that the Uni-
ted States and Japan would still be at peace a month
later. He said it was even money that the United
States and Japan would not be at- war soiae months
later."
The
V
2434 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
oolli:ior. c:;i. t.ict, unlciii; Ja-i;;'!. .
e:'l:otei Oi- uroa ht to e utfindctiii:
'.I-;;, lii oi' ii'ji' ■ 'uraes oi a
ill not '
-; t:.e
■ican
L :•* her
jers
.iuiliiiet: OI' the :5l' uitlon. /
■ all informtion at thut -/t
■ . I'.n opinion tiint
■ n t,fc-3 next three
■;...: , . . .■ o-j . 'livised that the last remain-
'.ites i'lnae i -Jr-i-ja loroea in ChlnR be proaptly
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2435
-3-
Ori :;ove;;iber 20, Wessrs. Domura and lurusu presented
to the Sacratary of State the last of various p oposals advanced
by the Japanese Govern. :iar.t or agents thereof durin(_" 1941 for an
agreement oetween Japan and the 'Jnited States. Six days later,
on Koveraber 20, the Secretary of State gave to I'.ey^.rs. .lonura
and ;.urusu papers which beca:ae the last of the ;■ of
counter-proposal made by the -Viorican Jovern :en'i. .he
course of the "exploratory conversations" v/hich a^. ^-^ji. ijoing
on for several months.
On the next day. 'lovembtsr 27, ' v.Tote an
inforiaal memorandum entitled "Pro^, . ;.ern delations.
Sstijofite of Situation and Cortt-.ln ^ . '' 7hHt -lerno-
randuin began with a stat ' e Japt-.neso ;o-. - : hs
laade certain plans, so.ie ire aosoiute '^
which are conditional, fo. .._.. ....itary oparatio:.., . ..^ ,.hen
stated that I.'j*. Kurusu's mission hsd had two principal ofcj ac-
tives, and that lir. llurusu haa qchi^ved neithi^r of those
objectives. Ke then raoved in" " ' ' •• - . ■ : elu-
sions as to what is probable''. .'.ion,
"?!!e .''■!; 'uTeJe lnt,^''i! 9t t^i.^ . . :.o
Ir. ■. ■ ■ ■ China to her
J.;. Japanese Gorsrn-
-.,. have forthv.'it-'
e :■ ae said that,
11 odds of 5 to ;
ti •■ :.z "•..■ar" on or b-. .cr-e
?•:■ '" the Juited .."tates and
J- ••; the I'ith of January,
anu :.fe .v;ou1j. w'., .U'j;, C;itit \-he '. ates and Japan
would not be at r brffore '^rc ,';'ted briofly",
he said, "the ui. :^es not beli.^v this ccontry
ic now on the immedi. of 'war* in the iractfic." Con-
tinuing', he said: " ..'.able probabilitv is that Japan's
'■•■^■■—■- .--■ ^nf-. near future ■■[-'\'"- -ireotod
ition in Thailand ' Ions
.ir-;a Fioad or both." . conclusion,
he seid: "Thjro is no '.v?,rrnr.t for any feelin;; on our part that
the situation in the Paci.iic has b'sen raaae worse, as regards
the interests of the Jnitou btete::, by refusal on the part of
the AEericBfi Ooverni:.":it to -'.".-Ke a deal with Japan in tanas of
'concessions' by us in r-turn for 'pledges' (j^ualified and
heaged around pledges) by Japaij to keep the peace while con-
tinuing to raake war and to prepare for more war. Japan has
been at war in eastern Asia and the western Pacific for several
years past. Japan has threatened to make war on each and every
one of her near neighbors and even on the Unitad States. Ko
price that we night have paid to Japan would buy or produce
peace in the Pacific or security for the United States (and/or
Great Britain and/or China and/or Russia) In the Pacific. The
question
2436 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sts at this
not In
mlmtion o-f
the v.-'".ole content oi
■■■ ■■ ■ <-■••— ' - " " :'. aor wm
randum of
;;-a.n.-' not a
o:' sitij'iitloa in tunas of
ovhcT-.-' su •■--•»Bted that
•]; tha
■J:.ited ^ .ri that the
_Ja:>ai ■ . -led conflict
I.: clearly perculved — and
. nes bafore--t]iat the
s'joh conflict. In sup-
-eL.tin" oids of 5-to-l h -ainst "v.'nr" ,,-ithin the ne'xrt three
week- , "t ■'-to-T. ''-«>iri?<t "■■;""" it' in th" next seven weeks .
:v3 next fourteen weeks;
■ "there cay be some armed
■' - we have b^cn and are a
part, -n tr^e .'i.tl.aiitic" ; a:.d l.i rjiTiiainc fro:a even a tentative
pro, nostication tjevoiiJ that periol, he l;.ijlied that he considered
•jere fast rimnin- .■"■. Tr. pi.^tin- i ,: conclusion:
lore v;ar or 1- -flsts at
• oontTol of ' c, not
nu-iittt
Ajaerl("\
! !i '?y, i ti -ton ■ , :ie both
;ltuntio;i the:; prevailing in
•^iivtMrr- .iH-.t before low:
Jnit-'d
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2437
v-v*-
Protol«m of Far Bastem ralatlons.
Estimate of situation and oertaln jrobat^ilitiea.
The 7ap<tDdsa Coyeimment has made oertaln plans, some
of wbloh ajre absolute and some of which are oondltional,
for new military operatlono,
Mr. Kuruau's mission has had two prlnoipal objeotiT**:
(1) to obtain, if possible, from the United States, terms
of a^eement favorable to Japan; (2) to ascertain, if pos-
sible, wh9t action, positiTe or negative, the United States
might, may or will take in the event of certain moves by
Japan.
The American Government has now given clear indl cation
that it has no intention of making "concossions" to Japan
which would be inconsistent with the declared principles
and the general objectives of American foreign policy and
that it does not intend to condone or give countenance to
policies and practice, past and present and future, of ag-
gression on Japan's part.
Mr. Kurusu' has not achieved the first objective of
his mission.
The Japanese Government has given, during the course
of the "exploratory conversations", clear evidence that it
is not that Government's- intention at the present time to
disassociate
n
'^1
2438 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-2-
diaassoclate Japan from the Tripartite Alliance; or to
give up its objective of conquering China, conquering other
regions in the Far East, and establishing a "new order" and
a "co-prosperity sphere" in eastern Asia and the western
and southern Pacific. It has persevered in distribution
and disposal of its armed forces on a pattern clearly
designed for offensive rather than merely defensive opera-
tions. '^ It has shown th«it it clearly intends to persevere
in pursuit of its general and its particular objectives by
the methods of thre -t of force or use of force — which means
continuance of contribution to instability rather than
stability of situation in the Pacific and eastern Asia.
The United States has not shown what sction it will
take on the positive side in the event of Japan's teUcing
oni, or another of saveral possible steps. Mr. Kurusu may
lievfe gained certnic impressions, but he cannot be sure.
lir. Kurusu has not achieved the second major objective of
his mission.
The business of prophesying involves a procedure of
examining facta and, es among various developments conceived
to be possible forming conclusions as to what is probable.
Th* prophecy is an expression by an individual or a
group of individual's of an opinion es to what is going to
happen.
In
^3Jig^^Jt^^m^gW^^^M-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2439
-3-
In t*^ Igned, the Japanese Intend
at this Tioment v-jpe in arid tc intensify tneir
operations townrc. 'oririgiag China to iier laiees". They have
hoped that out cf the oonversetions with the Americars Govem-
.T.ent they would ©xtrnct something which would facllitet©
their effort toward that objectiv .cw, they have
not entire: of getting from us either posi-
tive or nv:_ ^ful to them In pursuit of that
, objective,
I In the cpir.icu cf the undersigned, the Japanese Govem-
!
j 2-.ent does : e or intend or expect to have forthwith
'^ nrned cc: ' the United St'ites. The Japanese Govem-
r,ent, whii- :ir new or Ions at some
; »vill endeavor to avoid
nf,eolti;.ji or bfei:!*: attacked by the United States. It
there-.'ore w'"- not. order or enoour'-.- *:"tJon by its agents
(forensoat :h ere its ar:; ; which, if taken,
would lee; se by the United Stctes of armed force
'tr 8s relations
-^., . ,. „ i^an are concerned
^ tfcerfi ie ^ . was a week ago for
alted Stetor, to be arprehensive lest Japan make "war"
i on this oountry. Were It a matter of placing bets, the
•md-^rslgned would give odds --*■ '^'v to one that the United
Stetee
2440 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
.;:"t,i.;. Ml, J Japan wlii g£t be at "war" o:
Dectsraber i^ (the data by whloh Geuorpl 0>ir<:-f. L.b3 ai"rirK.):5
th?>t we would be 'In the olenr' flo fnr as oonsuauaatioa of
certain dis->osaIs of our f*>rc«s 1? concerned); Wf^nld wager
tiiree tc one thBi tn© Uni; ; not be
«t "wsr" on or before the 1 li. ^r iuudsxr-^ (I.e., seven weelcs
rron r.ow); woula w«ger even money thet the United States and
J«p5»r. will net b-^! «t "war" C": ^-v befor*? Msrch 1 ( «•. d[«te -nore
thai) 90 ijuw , an,.
it hPS beea estiaiBted by our dt-rw t.ee'i**''- •Vv.ji.d o*
t- our ftclvent^pe Tor us to have "time" ' r prepar'stion
atiii dlsi'ChPlft ' . The?i<° ▼enturss into ttn apeculetiv©
predict! -lii assumption thst .our ueflnition
of "war" uiust De the saiae in reference tt actlvlfies and
events in the Pacific that it is in re^i:' ' . -^ < ..^ . < «... —> ^
events in the Atlantic: the Indiowted w ,
on an ossu_uptl(:'n that, although there may b>.' -i
encounter? siEiler tv thcf-e to whica we aeve been hue tire
a party in the Atlentic, there will not be a recognized
"state of war" such as tc disrupt substexitially or put an
end t^ the present prograii ^>f our Aj-my and Kavy for disposal
within the periods mentioned of ^quL fcr
"" ■ '- ■• 5rid general .-!arr-o3e8--^LM ^r; , .•i.^^my, the under-
;.ot believe that this coiuitry is now on the
iniffiediate
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2441
Jit
:nove figair.ut Tnal 1 ?' ;,■,, '.a- Ifc/^ncn sci.:.'i ;..vw c i-'ji-'- tioi.
•i.-'Binst China. But, a .-Tiove againat a-;.a:;5f^ *-. .;.; '.,'
-:if<Jor oxxsratlou iuvoivlnf- very 3ubst.<.'L!.i;-
%,nrt It vKy :r>, it «.
bard for J ;, thlraw.
Outcii Eas -uld invi.;- , . . ,
embrollmei - •••t Britain si, _,, tfce United St-=.t.i)g;
■^ ■ • ■ • of developiiig into a major operati.r;.
;i now aeialnst «Daiil b«s a move
----■■ - ■^" ^i-,-nt. «••.•, /olve great risk;
If Bintje, ., c»i tti? onp wSi.d
connectloi. ^x^i r,uu for operetions against tte Bunna Road
and thereforw tovrTti bringing closer to an end the "Ctjina
incident". s psrt vie Iv-. t,o Yuunan
and towe.'d put^Lr^M: the ounna Roa-. ;u:aini3Sior.
(esper'"^- ■■ ^inuous air at',
ri s.-: _' with<Sreat t;
wo .Id not necessarily involve a : rt , and could be
tialted or be withdrewc from at any tme snoitld deTelopmants
in
79716 O — 46— pt. 16 34
2442 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in the general sltuatior. render such action advisable in
the -Tinlon of Japtin's nsilitary leaders.
'isonable probability is that Japan's new military ■/"
; oper"tions of the near future will be directed either toward
training position in Thailand or operetions against Yunnan
i and the Bur-ne Hoad or both.
If, when und as Japan makes either or both of those
moves, Japan will ipso facto be further disclosing what axe
her political and milltarj policies and will be further
extending herself as regards aitlitery disposals and effort
^nd as regards burden and draft upon her national capacity
(economic, social, political and military); she will be
weakening her position in the event of there coming, later,
armed conflict between herself and the United States; she
will OS exposing herself to naval and air attack on flank
and frc'm rear, if and when, by the United States; and she
will be adding to the number of her eneales and the weight
• '• r*/^ a rublic opinion adverse to her in the United States
-■ British Smjire.
There is no warrant for any feeling on our part that ^^^
the situation in the Pacific has been laade worse, as regards
the interests of the United States by refusal on the part
•of the American Government to make a deal with Japan in terms
of "concessions" by us xi. r»tum for "pledges" {qualified
and
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2443
and hedp.9d around pledged) by Japaa to keep the peace
while continuing to make wp.r and to prepare for acre war.
Japan has been at war in eastern Asia and the western Pacific
for several years pnst. Japtin has threatened to make war ?
anch and every one of her near neighbors and even on the
< United States. No price that we ailght have paid to Japan
wouji huy or produce peacje in the Pacific or security for
the United States (and/or Great Britein siid/or China and/or
• Russia) in the ?• clfic.
The [question of more war or le^ss war in the Pacific
' rests at this moment in the control of ndnda and hearts in
Tokyo, not ia the control of minds and hearts in Washington.
PA/H:SKH:FLB
2444 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 109
(Exhibit No. 109 consists of a Guide to Symbols and of Maps sub-
mitted by Admiral R. K. Turner showing the location of ships Decem-
ber 1 to 6, inclusive, 1941 and will be found reproduced as Items Nos.
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to
Proceedings of Joint Committee. )
EXHIBIT NO. 110
9 Februaby 1940.
Deab Admiral: I was glad to get your letter of January 4 and I will follow
your suggestion by sending this out by oflBcer messenger.
You want to know, what is in the back of my mind — I will set out for a broad
coverage for I am not sure just what you want — so here goes :
As far as what you would do in an emergency, there has been no change in the
basic plans with which you are thoroughly familiar from your reading in the
Department prior to taking over as CinC, Asiatic. I am told that you also read
the CinCUS plans, which makes it unnecessary for me to go into them here except
to say there has been no change.
I am in general agreement with the Asiatic Fleet Plan except possibly in the
case of the destroyers. The destroyer logistic problems involved in the support
of the long continued operations with the cruisers, as contemplated, might prove
diflBcult and might hamper the cruiser operations. One recommendation which
has been made to me is that the destroyers should remain at Manila with the
submarines and patrol planes as long as practicable and then retire to the east-
ward. This is for the purpose of harassing enemy shipping in the near vicinity
and for operations against enemy steamships which might act again our own
and neutral shipping. Retiring destroyers would require such logistic support
as might be necessary to permit them to join the Fleet to the eastward of Guam.
It may be that after further study you may desire to change the planned em-
ployment of the destroyers. You may want to divide them, using some of them
on the operations now planned and the remainder on other tasks. You may even
want to recommend a change in the major mission assigned to the Asiatic Fleet
in the Basic Plan. Any such remommendations along these lines will of course
be given great weight and study.
It is to be borne in mind of course that the present War Plans have been formu-
lated as a result of studies continuing over an extended period by a number of
oflBcers. They follow Army-Navy joint plans. In the Navy Basic Plan the
Asiatic Fleet Plan has been related and articulated to the U. S. Fleet Plan.
[2] The existing plan, — and for that Aiatter any plan — , should, in my
opinion, be changed by only one of two processes, — either after careful thought
and investigation of the effect of the change in the Orange Plan as a whole, or,
as a result, in time of war or emergency, of the factual aspects of the situation.
The changes then made (in war or emergency) may be brought about by the
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2445
President, by the Navy Department, or by the responsible Operating Task Force
Commander on the spot. It may be that tiie employment of the United States
Fleet itself,— the Joint Asiatic Force — will be changed when the emergency
arises. It may be that the employment of the forces of the Asiatic Fleet can not
be carried out as planned because of the existing conditions.
I feel that the main problem confronting you as Commander in Chief, Asiatic
Fleet, does not lie with what to do when war has been definitely joined. At such
a juncture, guided by plans, directives, conditions, and your own considered
thought on the problem, I feel confident that you will be able to make decisions
essentially correct, and better than they could be made elsewhere. The main
problem lies rather, (and this was undoubtedly in your mind when you wrote),
with what to do during a period of growing tension which may or may not cul-
minate in war. In this connection it is to be noted that War Plans, as now con-
ceived and prepared, follow the basic premise that war, (actual hostilities), has
broken out. This is, of course, by no means always the case. As so frequently
exemplified in recent years, armed forces may be employed in varying degrees,
without being followed by an actual outbreak of war. Even when actual hostili-
ties do break out they may or may not be accompanied by a formally declared
war, and the extent of hostilities may be restricted or may be unlimited.
In view of the actual situation existing today, in the Far East and elsewhere,
we might well say that we need "Tension Plans" as well as "War Plans". But
to prepare well considered "Tension Plans" we need a planning machinery that
includes the State E>epartment and possibly the Treasury Department as well as
the War and Navy Departments. Of course, we have planning machinery for
the Army and Navy which now provides for a better coordination of planning
effort than has existed in the past. We do not, however, have regularly set up
planning machinery that brings in the State Department. It is true that we
have frequent consultation with the State Department, but things are not planned
in advance, and often we do not receive advance information of State Depart-
ment action which might well have effected our own activities.
It is also true, of course, that the State Department must in a country such as
ours feel its way along to a large extent. This is unavoidable. In view of this
the State Department is probably unable always to set up, in advance, concrete
programs of their intentions.
[3] In the absence of the machinery for, or possibility of, planned coor-
dinated action, I feel that naval commanders must continue — and they do con-
tinue to employ their forces in the support of the national purpose and the na-
tional policy in such manner and to such extent that they can make the support
effectively with the forces available.
It seems to me to be the case, generally in life, that when a confusing and
disturbing situation presents itself those who are confused and uncertain tend
to arient their ideas and their actions and to rally around anyone capable of
taking a decisive attitude and determined action, even though this one himself
may be not too certain of what should be done. However, I know this is an
unnecessary comment in your case. There is no substitute for good judgment.
A primary objective that continuously confronts naval commanders, particu-
larly those in the "front line trench" as you express it, is the effective support
of policy in a manner that does not result in war. The effective support prevents
the adversary from being stimulated by the appearance of weakness, but the
effective support must of course be tempered by the avoidance of provocative
action. I feel that the people of the United States will support firm action as
long as it does not go into a degree of jingoism that would serve to provoke the
other fellow, and that if in the face of such firm but restrained attitude Japan
should step on our toes, that our country will realize that Japan herself has
provoked the action.
I realize very well the conflicting considerations with which you are faced.
By continuing your forces, or a portion of your forces, at the point of conflict —
the "Front Line Trenches" between the Japanese and the United States' inter-
ests,— you sustain United States' interests. If as the tension increases, you,
or your forces stay on the spot you thereby continue to sustain these interests,
may stay the hand of Japan, and may be the means of avoiding war instead of
provoking it.
At the same time the longer these forces remain on the spot the greater their
danger of being cut off and destroyed. If they leave too early, or leave precip-
itately, they may be saved but this action may not only fail to give maximum
support to our interests but may even be the means of provoking war by a Japan
which is apt to respond with aggressiveness to a show of weakness; and to
2446 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
respond with a hesitating attitude to a show of strength and determination on
our part.
On the other hand, if your forces stay on the spot too long in the face of
threatening dispositions of Japanese force they may be unduly and inextricably
jeopardized. It seems that some degree of exposure of a portion of the forces
of the Asiatic Fleet is unavoidable. If we are not willing to expose them, not
only will we face the surrender of interests and policies, but we accept a weak-
ened position and loss of prestige, and may even bring on a war, (after we have
weakened our position) that we have desired to avoid.
[/,] Aside from the forces that must be exixised, for a period at lease, to
this increasing threat and danger, I presume that the situation will guide you
into keeping other forces of the Asiatic Fleet strategically deposed in a manner
that will prevent their being ccmtained by Japanese forces and will permit them
to take counter measures against Japanese forces or interests. In this way, of
course, they too support the forces exposed.
Undoubtedly the disposition of your forces could be better guided if you could
be kept advised in advance of actions contemplated by the State Department.
Whenever it is possible to do so. we will keep you so advised, and whenever
State Department policies .for either temporary or longer contemplated periods
can be set forth. I will keep you informed of them.
Under conditions as they are. it seems to me, that you must continue to meet
each situation with the adroit firmness that has characterized you attitude and
that of your predecessors, — even though exposure of some of the forces of the
Asiatic Fleet is necessarily involved. I feet that the Navy Department will
continue to support such a firm position. It is the Department's intention to
maintain the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific and that fact may have an important
moral effect in the support of your own tactful handling of any incident.
We keep the State Department advised of your letters, also the President.
They are glad to get your letters. We are continually on the lookout with the
State Department for anything of moment and of interest to you. To date
nothing has been forthcoming other than what you know from despatches. I
feel safe in saying that at present the State Department does not believe war
probable in the near future, at least not in 1940; and that any pressure they put
on they hope to apply in such a manner as not to precipitate a final crisis. Of
course, they are in close touch with Senator Pittman who is the sponsor of an
embargo bill. As framed, this will would permit the President to prescribe as
to if and when to apply it. In other words, it can be used advisedly along with
other forms of pressure. We will make every effort to keep you in touch with
the situation, which is now. with the abrogation of the treaty, getting into a
stage which will be interesting to say the least.
With reference (in your letter of December 1) to the reversal of our attitude
on your proposal relative to defense of Shanghai settlements. I will simply
state now that when I sent you the despatch I did so after a conference, at
which, I, at least personally understood the stand represented to be a Govern-
ment stand and one which the State Department fully approved. Somebody
reversed. Either I was wrong or the State was wrong in the imderstanding.
However, that is water over the dam and I think it better to let it stay that way.
I simply want to let you know that here in the Navy Department we felt we
were on sound ground and acting in perfect good faith with the State Depart-
ment. I had some imcomfortable moments and so did the State Department
before the second telegram was sent to you. It is only fair to assume we were
both acting in good faith.
[5] You know Harry Yarnell thinks we should never percipitate anything
in the Western Pacific unless the principally interested powers (United States-
French-British-Dutch) act in concert. The possibility of getting such concerted
action appears to me to be improbable during the present unpredictable state
of affairs in Europe. We have been turning over in our heads whether you
could use Hongkong, Singapore, North Borneo, or French or Dutch possessions,
but there is no indication that any of them would be available. If we have to
intern anything and have any option, naturally it would be desirable to select
pf>rts in countries which might be with us later, or at least friendly to us.
To return to some of the purely naval aspects of the situation, there have
been added certain forces for which the plans now available in the Department
do not provide. In regard to patrol planes I presume that they should be added
to the local defense forces to work in conjunction with destroyers and submarines
and with the Army. I assume that they would remain in Manila Bay for
approximately the same time as the submarines, although it may be found
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2447
necessary to send away the tender early in the game. This of course can be
determined only by the man on the spot with full recognition of existing condi-
tions. If they have to look for shelter they probably would have more freedom
of movement for internment in Singapore, for example, than any other port —
and of course internment in Singapore might well turn out not to be internment
iu the end. It might be possible to have them work their way back home
depending on the situation in Guam, Wake, and Midway.
The mining situation is receiving a great deal of thought in particular as
a result of Smeallie's letter. We have authorization for the construction of
mine stowage at Marivales, but it appears impracticable, and may be undesirable,
to attempt to get money for that purpose at this time. For the present it would
appear neces.sary to continue this stowage at Cavite.
Another problem arises, however, on the question of mine stowage. The six
P-class submarines that we sent you are not now fitted to handle submarine tor-
pedo tul)e' mines but I am advised that they can be so fitted by providing stowage
and handling fittings for mines, both fore and aft. I believe that this work can
be accomplished by the submarines being laid up for no longer a period than two
or three weeks. It would be highly desirable in my opinion for these submarines
to be fitted to lay mines and for mines to be available for this purpose at Manila.
This would involve a minimum of 48 mines per submarine or a minimum for
which stowage capacity would be required for about 300 of these mines. We
would be glad to have your thought and recommendation on this point.
We have no mines at present suitable for laying by aircraft
In regard to logistics, provision must be made of course for oil and rendezvous.
We realize that and the War Plans provide for it. In addition to what provision
we can make, I [6] assume you would exercise a prefectly free reign
and would arrange to charter what you would consider to be necessary if suitable
vessels can be found available.
I have not mentioned the Marines or the Army. I have talked to Holcomb.
He does not know himself just what the plan is for the Marines, but states that
that depends almost entirely on arrangements more or less under your control,
as for example hooking up with the Chinese, removal, and, in the last analysis,
possible capture.
I have taken up the question of reinforcements for the Philippines by the
Army — both troops and planes. I think Marshall would be glad to send them
if he had them. I suggested a minimum of 20,000 men and a considerable number
of planes. Of course I realize that they would have to be sent out more or less
unostentatiously, if we were ever able to send them, and frankly, of this I have
very little hope — just at present NONE. Our army seems to be so dispersed, so
small, so lacking in material and so few units available outside of the essentials
in Hawaii and the Canal that the outlook for stationing any considerable de-
tachment elsewhere looks hopeless just now.
The question of the relief of the AUGUSTA is in the mill at present. I am
referring it to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, with the idea of getting
the AUGUSTA back for a much needed overhaul and for an increase in her
antiaircraft battery, including other important military alterations. The nigger
in the wood pile just now is that the only ship available is the HOUSTON which
has been fixed up for more or less quick use by the President whenever he
wants to cruise in the Pacific. W^e are hoping to be able to fix up another ship
at no great cost. Whether it will be the HOUSTON, the INDIANAPOLIS or
the CHICAGO we will inform you after the threshing it out here. I assume
it make^ no difference to you. Of course whatever you get will be one of the
modified ships, with the increased antiaircraft battery of 8 guns.
I have had a copy made up of allotments which we have recently sent you al-
though if I remember this has been previously covered.
Please excuse the length of this letter but as it will come by oflBcer messenger
I have tried to cover what I thought you had in mind about being kept in touch.
As an item of interest the question of whether to stay in the Philippines or
get out of the Philippines has recently been debated in the Town Hall program —
New York. One of the speakers was Mr. Paul McNutt. I am enclosing a record
of that meeting.
My own personal feeling is that we cannot do other than get out unless the
Filipinos of their own volition and in no uncertain voice request us to remain.
There is a point of honor involved as I see it which must be followed.
[7] Of course I could indulge in son>e wishful thinking that consistent with
the foregoing we could greatly Improve Guam for possible future contingencies.
What is your opinion on this?
2448 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I trust that Carolyn has fully recovered by now and that you and all the
little Harts are fine. Your prospective daughterin-law was in the Department
the other day and those who saw her said she was an exceptional, highly intelli-
gent, fine looking girl. Am sorry to say I missed her.
Keep cheerful — all good wishes.
Sincerely,
Admiral T. C. Habt,
11. 8. Navy, Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
US8 AUGUSTA.
Since dictating the foregoing, I have your letter of 29 Jan. — I would work
neither my planes nor my ships not one whit more than I felt the situation called
for — in fact I would conserve them just as far as possible.
H. R. Stark.
22 Ootobeb 1940.
Deab Tommy : You will have heard from J. O. Richardson via the HOUSTON
before this reaches you and I really haven't much to add.
I was tickled to pieces over your going on to Manila as per your plans and
scratched off a despatch with quick approval in which Colonel Knox thoroughly
concurred.
I am delighted that you have practically all important units out of China but
here again, we are leaving this entirely to your discretion.
The situation is not good and does not seem to be improving but just how
critical it is no one ever knows.
I wish there was something I could give you from the State Department but
there isn't. I think I may say safely, however, that there will be no backdown
anywhere by the United States in the Far East, unless there is a riglit-about-face
?n present day policy.
JO'S memorandum to you really gave all my thoughts and this note is just
to let you know we are thinking about you and are glad you are on the job. I
noted that in acknowledging my last letter you did not use the word "aflarmative"
which I asked you to send if you approved of the idea to send some heavy cruisers
to yon.
I am delighted over the prespect of getting our women and children out of the
Far East and know what a relief it will be to you to give them the opportunity
to come home, and also the knowledge that no more will be permitted to go out.
Every good wish as always.
Sincerely,
/s/ Bettty.
Admiral T. C. Habt,
U. 8. Navy, Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
U88 AUGUSTA.
[1] Secret i
12 NOVEMBEB, 1940.
Dear Tommy,
We are pushing ahead as rapidly as possible on the preparation of material
and personnel for any eventualities. While there is much still to be done (a con-
dition that will continue to exist for years) I can not say that matters are un-
satisfactory, so far as concerns things under my control. But we do not yet
know the direction which affairs may take.
For the past three weeks I have been spending many hours, together with a
group of officers particularly concerned, in developing a broad estimate of the
material situation as it affects possible naval war operations. This estimate,
or study, is now in the hands of the President. I do not expect any immediate
decision, but do hope that it will serve to clarify matters so that, at least, those
in authority will be fully aware of the implications of any particular policy that
may be adopted with respect to the war.
Ghormley tells me the British expected us to be in the war within a few days
after the reelection of the President — which is merely another evidence of their
slack ways of thought, and of their non-realistic views of international political
conditions, and of our own political system. They have been talking, in a large
way, about the defense of the Malay Barrier, with an alliance between them-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2449
selves, us, and the Dutch, without much thought as to what the effect would be
In Europe. But we have no idea as to whether they would at once begin to fight
were the Dutch alone, or were we alone, to be attacked by the Japanese. Then
again, the copy of the British Far Eastern War Plan which Thomas obtained at
Singapore, shows much evidence of their usual wishful thinking. Furthermore,
though I believe the Dutch colonial authorities will resist an attempt to capture
their islands, I question whether they would fight if only the Philippines, or only
Singapore, were attacked.
The Navy can, of course, make no political commitments. Therefore, we can
make no specific military plans for an allied war. However, as I told you in my
despatch, you can perform a useful service by laying, with the British and
possibly the Dutch, a framework for a future plan of cooperation, should we be
forced into the war. I rather doubt, however, that the Dutch will talk freely
with you. If they do my idea would be that you would explore [2] the
fields of :
C!ommand arrangements,
(General objectives,
General plan of cooperative action, including the approximate naval and
military deployment.
You are, of course, committed to assist the Army in the defense of Luzon.
But with allied bases to fall back on, your direct support of the Army might well
fall short, in degree, of the support you would afford were we alone to fight
Japan.
I do not believe Japan will attack us if she can avoid doing so. In fact, I
believe she will go far to avoid hostilities with the United States. It is even
doubtful if she wishes, at this time to fight the British or the Dutch. It seems
more likely that she would prefer, while maintaining a position in readiness,
to consolidate Indo-China with her positions further north, and to begin a more
or less gradual economic penetration of the Netherlands East Indies and Siam.
Should we refrain from imposing additional economic sanctions, present condi-
tions, including the recent 1,800,000 ton oil contract might be stabilized over a
considerable period of the future. Our State Department, as you may know,
had a hand in the execution of that contract.
But we never can tell. Should a war develop between Japan and an alliance
of British, Dutch and Americans, I believe that Japan will plan to :
(a) Occupy Guam, and reeforce the Mandates with troops, submarines, and
some air;
(b) Establish naval control of Philippine waters by destroying our naval and
air forces, basing her main fleet in the Pescadores and a strong, fast detachment
in Halmahera ;
(c) Capture Luzon with troops now based in Formosa and Hainan;
(d) Capture Borneo, to be followed by a campaign against the Dutch directed
from East to West.
I believe that the allied objective should be to reduce Japan's offensive power
through economic starvation ; the success of the blockade would surely depend
upon allied ability to hold the major portion of the Malay Barrier. Your own
action would, of course, be based upon your view as to the most effective method
of contributing to the attainment of the ultimate objective.
One thing (and this is for your ears alone) you can depend upon is that we
would support you, probably by sending a naval reenforcement to you at
Soerabaja or Singapore, and by other means. I would be glad to get your
views as to the size and composition of such a reenforcement ; but in making your
recommendation I trust you will keep in mind that our Navy must hold in the
Mid-Pacific, that we may also be in the war against the other two Axis Powers,
and that the collapse of Britain would force us to a major re-orientation toward
the Atlantic.
You may well appreciate that I do not welcome such a war (British Collapse).
The naval part of the War Plan, Rainbow III, for this possible war is about
completed, and will be on its way to you within a short time. We are hoping
to send naval attach^ to Singapore, Batavia, Soerabaja, Balikpapan, and Ceylon ;
possibly one of these officers may bring this plan to you via air transportation.
We are all delighted to be able to put over the dependent thing for you. The
State Department strongly supported us. I can appreciate the coals that must
have been h«aped upon you when it was learned that, while we were forcing our
dependents home, the Army was sending dependents out.
2450 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
You know how glad I always am for any opportunity to assist any or all of the
Little Harts, as well as the Big Hart, in any way in which I can.
Keep cheerful,
^ncerely
/s/ Betty.
Admiral T. C. Habt,
U. 8. Navy Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.
P. S. Am sixty today. Here's hoping ! The first three score are the hardest !
Admiral Hart
18 NOVBMBEB 1940.
p. S. Admiral Brownson's name is being submitted to the President on the list
going over to him for consideration in connection with the new destroyer. Here's
hoping.
Secret
Op-lO-MD
August 28, 1941.
Dear Tommy : Since I last wrote you, much water has gone over the dam.
I will not burden you with my recent cruise in the Atlantic and the meeting with
the British, except to tell you that is was extremely interesting. I hope and
believe much good will result. If nothing else, the fact that we got to know each
other very well is bound to be helpful.
This morning, I had a long talk with Mr. Juiji Kasai, member of the Japanese
Parliament. I was very frank with him, as I have been with Admiral Nomura,
and I find that they both seem to feel very much the same way. I think I have
written you how much Admiral Nomura has impressed us with his sincere desire
that our countries solve their problems amicably. There is no doubt in my mind
but that he has no stomach whatever for the Tri-partite Agreement, and the same
applies to Mr. Kasai. I still have some hopes, or, to put it in another way,
have not given up hope that peace in the Pacific may be maintained. However, I
could wish that hope were not sustained by such a slender thread.
Whether or not the Japanese will go into Thailand, I do not know. There
is no doubt but that if they do, the reaction in the United States will be bad.
This has been made very plan to our Japanese friends here, and, therefore, to the
home government.
I am continuing to urge strengthening of the Army forces in the Philippines,
particularly in planes and mechanized equipment, and I hope some tangible results
will take shape.
The Russian situation has complicated the entire picture. Ambassador Ouman-
sky and some of their military men from Russia are coming in tomorrow, and I
know that their demands will be very urgent.
[2] There is a good deal of a three-ring circus going on hereabouts. Short-
ages in raw materials become more acute daily. We have our own job of enor-
mous expansion in every department. We are pressed from all over the world
to sustain the forces actually fighting at the front and, of course, we recognize
the importance of this. All in all, there is a never-ending problem of struggles
for priority, and this is only one of the many problems involved — and it is a
tough one.
You guessed quite right with regard to our feeling about ADB. We told the
British in our recent meeting what we thought of it. They now have our
oflBcial letters, so one of these days we may be expecting a reply. Incidentally,
I was very frank with Admiral Pound with regard to the Command situation
which you have pictured in the Far East. I hope the changes which have or
will take place will be helpful.
I know about the very indiscreet radio and other leaks with regard to those
recently sent to China. I have taken it up with those concerned, and here's
hoping for at least some semblance of secrecy on the next one. Anyway, we
shall try.
Regarding the location of the fuel oil tanks: — I was ready to accept your
recommendation without going back again because, as you know, we said we
would leave the decision up to you. However, Ben Moreell felt a little better
after I sent the wire and your confirmation of your previous decision.
•Not much general news.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2451
"We have something over 262,000 men in the Navy, of whom about 40,000 are
reserves. Reenlistnients for tlie year have averaged a little over 70 per cent —
and still are. We are aiming for a monthly quota of 12,000 recruits, and I hope
will attain it this fall. We have, as you may Ijnow, put on a very extensive
advertising campaign in the South and in the Middle West farm belt. I am
more thankful every day that I have Nimitz as a side partner at this time. I
hope you enjoyed the letter which the Bureau of Navigation is sending out
in the interest of increasing our reenlistments. After all, that is the greatest
recruiting ground we have if we can malse it effective.
Of course, the heavy expansion puts a terrific burden on the forces afloat,
but it seems inevitable that it happens that way. [3] As you know, I
started in almost the minute I got here for great expansion in personnel, but,
like everything else, it takes TIME.
There is much talk at present regarding possibility of Japanese interference
with our sending material to Russia ; that is, if it goes between the Japanese
Islands and through the Sea of Japan to the Maritime Provinces. I rather
doubt if they will take any immediate action, because it seems to me they are
in one of those hesitation periods, but, of course, it is something that can not
be discounted. Have you any line at all on the eflSciency of the Russian sub-
marines in the Pacific. Do you recommend any Staff talks with them? When
the question you raised concerning closing the Sulu Sea came up here, I felt
it inadvisable to make any proclamation, at least at that time for fear that
later on, for some reason or other, the Japanese might use such an action by
us as a precedent for their closing the Sea of Japan. However, people don't
seem to need much in the way of precedent in these days, that being more of
a case of "Can one get away with it?"
We are directing Kimmel today to start his Southeast Force of two light
. cruisers, which you will recall WPL-51 envisaged. We have a Radar in the
Galapagos Area — incidently, another one just at present Southeast of Bermuda.
We are starting considerable operations between North America and Iceland
and the Good Lord knows if the Germans want an excuse for war, they have
plenty. I have had just exactly 11% hours at this desk so far today, and I am
afraid this letter will be terribly disjointed and loose, but I just felt like sitting
down and talking to you for a while. I am going up to the Old Allies Inn for
a bite and am coming back to finish up. There seems no end to it. Things move
so slowly at times, but I suppose no matter how they move, we would still
be impatient. Anyway, here's hoping, and every good wish to you in the wide
world, as always.
Sincerely,
/s/ BETlTr.
Admiral Thomas C. Habt, U. S. N.
Commander in Chief, Asiatic B'leet,
V. S. 8. Houston, c/o Postmaster,
San Francisco, California.
[-J] P. S. I hope to get up home over Sunday — Labor Day. I realise how
much that would mean to you too. I often recall what someone once told me —
"In this man's Navy, hard work gets you more hard work" — and no truer words
were ever said.
I just had a happy thought and indulged myself in it and called up Carolyn
and told her I was writing you. That fine girl had only cheerful things to say,
and her voice just sounded glad. She said the best news she had — after being
out all day — was to come home and find two letters from you. She also stated
that the children are all fine and, in fact, everything was fine. Just what I would
have expected from her, so I'll wind up here with good night.
Keep cheerful.
P. S. No. 2. I am taking up with Jerry Land and, in fact, already had before
receiving your letter, the question of radio operators in his Merchant ships.
Regarding the docking of the four ships you mentioned : — I knew Jerry had
had his troubles on this score, so many departments being involved and hands
being tied.
U] Op-IOD-MD
NOVEMBEB 1, IWl.
Deab Tommy : This will be in answer to yours of Septeral)er 30 and October 7.
It was fine to hear from you and to learn that you are in good fettle.
2452 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I am glad you wrote the official letter about the slowness with which official
documents reach you. Of course, I am very sorry that conditions were such that
the letter was required. I think the situation will be met alright ; give us a jolt
if it occurs again ; it's the only way we can lick it.
I have run down what information I could on the status of the Radar equip-
ment which was slated for the Sixteenth Naval District.
I tind that two (2) units SCR-288 and one (1) unit 270-b had been shipped
from San Francisco on September 8, 1941. I was later advised that the Depart-
ment had been informed that the equipment arrived in Manila on September 29,
1941. By this time, I suppose installation is well under way. I am hoping that
it will live up to expectations. If it does, it will be a great help.
Your reference to the Russians ! I agree that it would be a fine idea to get as
much information as possible about them. At the moment, there seems to be
little chance of learning anything authoritative. An officer on duty in the Depart-
ment ( in the far Eastern section of O. N. I. ) recently returned from temporary
duty in London. During the course of his "inquiring around" in the Admiralty,
a Britisher in the Intelligence branch remarked of the Russians that they were
"Inquisitive, Acquisitive, and Secretive." That seems to about size them up. Our
officer stated that the British just don't have anything of value on them. The
British think, however, that the Russian Navy is probably better than we might
ordinarily be inclined to think. The secretiveness of the Russians is hard to
understand. I suppose, however, so many hands have been turned against them in
the past that their current attitude is merely an outgrowth of the past. Even so,
they do not permit the foreign attaches and correspondents to go to the front.
[2] Our Moscow Mission, as you no doubt know, has returned. Admiral
Standley is enthusiastic about the Russians. He feels that they will hold on
for a long time to come. I am informed that General Burns shares his views.
I hope they are correct. One thing we do know is that they are in need of much
material. How that is going to be gotten to them remains a problem which will
give us many a headache before it is solved.
I am sorry that the PT situation was not better handled. I trust that the
many problems in connection with them can be worked out. The tender situation
is in hand, and I hope the fuel arrangements can be satisfactorily handled too.
The Bureau of Ships has informed me that spare parts ample to recondition
engines on the station were shipped from Detroit on October 5, 1941. Further,
seventy-five percent of the base tools are scheduled for delivery between now
and February, 1942. Ships is sending a factory service engineer to Manila.
Captain Kint'ner has just called to say that, depending on the vagaries of trans-
I)ortation, this engineer should arrive some time in November.
As noted above, I trust that the fuel situation works out satisfactorily. For
the time being, and until you can get 100 octane gas, BuShips advises that you
can use 87 octane at 4/5 load. This, I am informed, is the on*y type of gas
that was available to these craft during their employment in the South last
winter.
I hope that the PTs will be of real service to you. The British think they
are fine. On the other hand, I quote about them from a recent letter from
Kimmel :
"The 12 PTs which you sent to us I fear will be of very little use in this area.
We sent them on an average day to make a trip from Oahu to Molokai. The
reports of this trip have gone forward officially. They were practically useless
in this sea and could not make more than 10 knots. Several of them had to
turn back and a few personnel were quite seriously injured from being thrown
about. We need something much more substantial to be of any use out here."
We are considering sending you six (6) more PTs and the NIAGARA as a
tender. We are asking the Bureau of Ships to get the "FLORENCE D" for
employment as you propose. That will let you have the GOLD STAR up your
sleeve for velvet.
These boats have shown weakness when pounded into heavy seas. I might add
that we know the weaknesses of these PTs. We gave them some grueling tests
in fairly heavy weather from New London up around Block Island, down around
Fire Island and liack. They made a destroyer [S] hump to stay with
them, but all the boats which made the race suffered severe structural damage.
We deliberately pounded them to see what they would stand and to develop their
weaknesses. Profiting by what we learned, we hope to develop a much sturdier
craft. Meanwhile, we sent out what we had, hoping they would be of some use.
I trust you will be glad to get the additional SS.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2453
Sorry we cannot give you any more PBTs at the moment. They are just
not to be had. The I'BTs that we have gotten to date are not, as one might
suppose, the result of our "big (May, 1940) money". New production of these
will not come ofif the line until April, 1942. The planes that are notv leaving
the factories are those contracted for and paid for by the United Kingdom,
Canada, and the Netherlands. The VOS we are sending you is a good plane.
The engines are excellent, and there are no '"bugs" in them. Next to the PBY,
they are decidedly the best type we have for your purpose. They can carry
two 325-pound depth bombs, and that is pretty good. Two hundred forty (240)
of these depth bombs are on their way out, and some seven hundred twenty
(720) more are to follow shortly. I believe these planes will do good work for
you as an inner anti-submarine patrol. It is true that the radio is not as high-
powered as we wish it were — but even that might be to your advantage. These
24 planes and personnel will complete assembly by about January 1, 1942 at
the Naval Air Station, San Pedro, and will be despatched from that point.
With reference to your problem of cooperation with the Army, I suggest that
consideration be given to the agreement Kimmel and General Short are uow
using at Pearl Hai-bor. The name of the paper, a copy of which you now have
is "Joint Security Measures for the Protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor
Base." Our file room tells me it went out along with Serial 059230 of June
20, 1941.
Your remarks abotft the ballast in the ST. LOUIS are noted. Mike Robinson
states that the need for ballast in that ship came about as the result of endeav-
ering to introduce extensive improvement and changes in an existing design.
The ship was laid down as a development of the BROOKLYN class, with engine
and boiler arrangements modified to decrease damage from underwater explo-
sion ; the secondary battery was changed from open pedestal mounts to enclosed
twin 5"-25 caliber mounts; and finally fire control was extensively rearranged
to improve overhead view. Twin 5"38 caliber guns were subsequently developed,
and this type was adopted instead of the 5"-25 caliber. This, together with
director alterations, put a great deal of topside weight in the ship. The result
of these changes was that, while the ST. LOUIS was entirely satisfactory from
damage stability point of view under loaded conditions, she was not satisfactory
in a light condition, and ballast accordingly had to be added to make her satis-
factory to withstand heavy underwater [4] damage under any conditions
of load. Subsequent alterations, recommended by the King Board, added more
weight ; this, of course, required that additional ballast be added. Mike Robinson
remarked: "I feel very bad about the whole situation. I hardly think anyone
can be blamed. If blame there be, it should be on our Naval Treaty Limitations.
When one is given 10,000 tons around which to construct a ship, it follows that
every effort is going to be made to get as much into the ship as possible. This
the constructors did. When the new requirements for heavy anti-aircraft
batteries came along, there just wasn't enough reserve stability left in the
design to take care of the additional weights." Voila.
I took up the matter of Brooke-Popham's activities and the publicity given
the meetings of the United States and British Commanders in the Far East
with Admiral Sir Charles Little of the British Joint Staff Mission. A few days
since, I had a note from him which said, "We have referred the matter to the
Chiefs of Staff in London." It would seem that that reference should take care
of the matter.
I referred the matter of your mines to the Bureau of Ordnance. Blandy has
just brought in a letter which appears to cover the subject pretty thoroughly.
I am enclosing a copy of it, which may be of assistance to you.
I am .sorry about Bemis. It was our impression that he would be a good one
for that Job. You have had tough luck with your commandants.
As for your reconnnendation about Glassford. I am not prepared to give you
an answer at this moment. I appreciate the fact that he has been out there
well over two (2) years, but these are unusual times. The Department of State
has many reasons why a Flag Officer should be kept on the river. We practically
have to go along with them on this, and I can think of no one at the moment better
qualified for the job than Glassford. I will discuss with Nimitz the many angles
that your reconnnendation suggests to me and see if we can't work out some-
thing.
In your letter of August 19, you reconmiended that the Department select the
officer it desired ultimately to relieve you and send him out forthwith. More
recently (September 30) you asked what had become of Home's and Green-
slade's candidacy for your job. All I can say at the moment is that neither of
2454 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
these oflScers is available and both are doing important duty in their present
assignments.
Of course, I have been searching my mind for some time for someone who
has all the many exacting qualifications for your relief. As you can well
imagine — but, due to modesty, you would probably not admit — the job of find-
ing someone to measure up to your standards has not been an easy one. Many
oflScers no doubt are avail^ihle, but, in the important job you now hold, the run-
of-the-mine chap just will not do. We have to have the very best. To list just
some qfi the necessary qualifications : he must be acceptable to the President and
the Secretary ; he must be mentally and physically vigorous ; he must possess
a fine strategical mind; he must be an inspiring leader; he must be possessed
of great common sense and balance ; he must be able to take care of us in con-
ferences and guard us with the British while still viewing the problem as a
whole; he must have a profound knowledge of the employment of the most
important weapon he will have at his disposal — the submarine; and, finally, I
must have complete confidence in him. Your station is the front line trench and
one with no less qualifications than those listed can be considered.
I am considering Nimitz; it would be like losing one of my arms here ; I have
not even broached it to the Secretary. I am just telling you what is in my mind —
if and when you tell me you feel you should be relieved.
I realize 3 years are a long time on the Asiatic — particularly when it stretches
out indefinitely beyond a life of service and normal retiring age. It was not
easy for me to ask you to continue in the Far East — in lots of ways I hated to
do it — but I could think of no one else so well qualified to serve our country
out there in time of stress. Moreover, I did it also because I know your rugged
honesty — and that you will unhesitatingly tell me if you think, for any reason
I should send out someone else. Please tell me exactly how you feel about it.
With all good wishes.
Sincerely,
/s/ Betty.
Admiral T. C. Hart, U. S. Navy
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
% Postmaster, Asiatic Station,
San Francisco, California.
[1] Secret
(Re6b)
From : The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance
To : The Chief of Naval Operations
Subject : Effect of Sea Growth on Mines with Special Reference to a Mine Re-
covered in Manila Bay and Reported in a Personal letter from Admiral
Hart to Admiral Stark
1. A dispatch has been prepared containing essentially the following :
"More detailed report on recovered mine including photographs is requested.
It is suggested that this mine may have been the one reported lost in Sixteenth
Naval District letter S76-1 Serial C-9001 dated 5 February 1941. Attention is
called to the fact that tests as long as two years off Kitty Hawk and in Florida
waters even when resulting in apparent encrustation did not prevent operation.
It is suggested that condition of field in Manila Bay be tested by sweeping a few
mines at the end. First so as to make contact with antennae and second so as
to cut steel mooring with subsequent inspection under control of personnel trained
in mine recovery."
2. More detailed comment has been submitted by Commander J. B. Glennon of
the Naval Ordnance Laboratory as follows :
"The following comments are submitted relative to sea growth on mines at
Cavite and elsewhere :
"In carrying out mine endurance tests off the coast of North Carolina, the
Bureau has encountered the problem of sea growth on all assemblies not promptly
recovered. Observation of tests units on return to the Naval Ordnance Labora-
tory practically always gives an impression similar to, but in lesser degree than
that outlined by Admiral Hart. It generally appears that steel surfaces are
encrusted and horns at times rendered inoperative by a rigid layer of marine
growth. Investigation of this feature has shown that the condition of the marine
growth changes very rapidly when removed from the sea water, and that growths
which readily brush away when under water become rigid obstructions once
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2455
they start drying out. Thus this dry coating does not give a true picture of the
service condition.
[2] "Underwater tests on heavily coated mines and floats down seven
months at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, showed that mine horns and float horns
readily functioned on impact. Mines tested for endurance over considerably
longer periods in the same water frequently have been fired by contacting the
antenna with a steel wire. In general, difficulty in firing on the test field due
to fouled antenna has never been reported.
"There are four distinct ways in which sea growth might be pictured as inter-
fering with the operation of the Cavite mines :
(a) Heavy coating on the lower antenna. This antenna serves as mine moor-
ing cable and is held rigid under a 300 lb. tension. It is %" pure copper rope.
Rubbing of this rigid wire by passing submarine should brush aside any wet
growth that will cling to copper after a few months exposure.
(b) Heavy coating on upper antenna. The tension in this antenna is probably
less than 30 lbs. There appears the possibility that brushing contact of a sub-
marine might not clear a bright spot through even a wet coating on this antenna.
However, irregularities on the submarine can exercise extra stress in passing.
More important, this copper antenna is fitted with a horned float.
(c) Float horns. Each of these consists of a copper cup surrounding a star
shaped steel disc. Any sea growth existing on the oopper surface of the cup
need only be punctured or brushed aside by a sharp steel point of the star shaped
disc when the horn is bumped by a passing ship.
(d) Mine horns. These consist of a copper disc within a steel cup. The blunt
edge of the copper disc must be driven through any wet sea growth between
cup and disc. The available force for this blow between a ship and a mine,
weighing more than 500 lbs. appears sufficient to brush aside reasonable quanti-
ties of wet sea growth as this open space is only ^4" wide.
"So long as any one of these four means of firing remains open, the mine
should be considered dangerous.
[3] "It appears desirable-to know whether the mine recovered by fishermen
at Cavite was inspected by Naval authorities before or after exposure to the air,
if any immersed parts were tested for sea growth resistance what was the find-
ing? Did sea growth on mine cling to copper surfaces? In addition, information
is desired as to whether the mine was opened and inspected by Naval personnel,
were the safety devices or other features tested for performance, was the mine
positively identified as a live-loaded unit recently planted, has a report been
submitted to the Bureau of Ordnance.
"Commandant Sixteenth District's letter S76-1 Serial C-9001 dated 5 February
1941 reported the laying of two experimental mines off Corregidor on 6 August
1940. One of these was recovered complete on 29 January 1941 and was reported
upon in detail. As no mention of sea growth appears in the report, it would seem
that this objectionable feature is not always present tc an important degree.
Photographs of these Cavite mines after six months submergence show no
evidence of abnormal sea growth.
"Nothing in the above should be taken to indicate that the Naval Ordnance
Laboratory desires to belittle the bad effect of sea growth upon mines, espe-
cially those in tropical waters. The Cavite mines will suffer both in firing effi-
ciency and tidal efficiency. The field should be continually augmented with new
mines. Present estimates are that the Cavite mines should be considered
ineffective 'after one year'."
3. In addition to measures which may be taken to repair deficiencies of the
present fields by addition of Mark 6 mines, it is intended to supply new types
of mines for use by the Asiatic Fleet in the defense of the same areas. The
procurement of these mines has started and shipments will begin at an early date.
/s/ W. H. P. Blandy.
LWMcK/ELH
Op-100-MD
NOVEMBEE 7, 1941.
Dear Tommy : Recently, the Fifth Sea Lord, Rear Admiral A. L. St. George
Lyster, Royal Navy, visited the United States. He made a careful inspection of
our manner of operation of aircraft and our aircraft facilities, both, afloat and
ashore. On the conclusion of his inspection, he submitted to us his frank obser-
vations in the form of the attached notes. I thought they would be of interest
2456 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and am sending them along. Admiral Lyster impressed all of us as being an
exceptional officer.
In addition, I am sending a copy of the notes made by Captain Lord Louis
Mountbatten as the result of his observations in the fleet. He, too, impressed me
as being a very capable officer. He is keen, alert, intelligent, and is remarkably
articulate. In brief, he makes a very splendid impression. I am sure much g'ood
will result from the observations of both ot these officers.
Events are moving rapidly toward a real showdown, both in the Atlantic and
in the Pacific. The Navy is already in the war of the Atlantic, but the country
doesn't seem to realize it. Apathy, to the point of open opposition, is evident in
a considerable section of the press. Meanwhile, the Senate is dragging out the
debate with reference to the arming of the merchantmen. Whether the country
knows it or not, we are at war.
The sinking of the REUBEN JAMES, together with its large loss of life, will
do much to bring closer home this fact. Incidentally, early reports indicate that
she was struck on the port side just about the vicinity of the magzine. It is
probable that the magazine exploded, since the forward part of the ship just
disintegrated. There were only two survivors from the forward part of the ship —
the boatswain's mate of the watch and the helmsman.
The SALINAS did a good job of getting in — She took two torpedo hits with no
loss of life. The submarine surfaced fairly close aboard sometime after the
torpedoing and the Salinas thinks she got a shell into her. The submarine sub-
merged and her position was given a good depth charging by a nearby destroyer.
They think they got her !
You no doubt have noted in the press the conversations going on between the
State Department and the Japanese Foreign Office. Mr. Kurusu's trip to the
United States has its dramatic appeal, but I am dubious of it having any real
Influence.
I hope this finds you in fine fettle. Keep cheerful ! With all good wishes.
Sincerely,
/s/ Betty.
Admiral T. C. Hart, U. S. N.
U. S. S. HOUSTON,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.
Enclosures — Mountbatten's notes
Lyster's notes
Secret
Op-lO-MD
November 8, 1941.
Dear Tommy : We have at last gotten a decision regarding withdrawal of the
Marines. I have immediately acquainted you with that fact by radio. The gun
boats are still in the balance, and we have requested further word from you on
this.
The Japanese situation looks almost like an impasse to me, and I wouldn't be
surprised at anything happening in the next month or two. I imagine your
picture of that is just about as close as mine. The two points of view appear to
me simply irreconcilable. But of this, more should be in the open before long.
I have been pressing Marshall to press the Brjtish for more air force in the
Singapore area. I won't go into the details, but I think we have very good
grounds from every standpoint, both as to their present position at home, as well
as from their position in the Far East, and their airplane situation in general,
to insist on their strengthening the Malay barrier. As you know, the British
Navy is sending marked increases to the Eastern theater. I only wish we could
have gotten all this started some time ago. It might have acted as a very great
deterrent, but, in any case, I feel that the speeding up of these operations at
present is vital.
Here's hoping.
Every good wish.
Sincerely,
/s/ Betty.
Admiral T. C. Hart, U. S. N.
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, U. S. 8. AUGUSTA,
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.
BOSTON
PUBUCUBBAS,
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