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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

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PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


HEARINGS 

BSFORB  THE 

JOINT  COMMITTEE  ON  THE  INVESTIGATION 

OF  THE  PEAKL  HAEBOR  ATTACK 

C0NGBE8S  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH  CONGRESS 

FIRST  AND  SECOND  SESSIONS 

PURSUANT  TO 

S.  Con.  Res.  27  and  49 

(79th  Congress) 

A    CONCURRENT    RESOLUTION   AUTHORIZING   AN 

INVESTIGATION  OF  THE  ATTACK  ON  PEARL 

HARBOR  ON  DECEMBER  7,  1941,  AND 

EVENTS    AND    CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING    THERETO 


PART  16 

JOINT  COMMITTEE  EXHIBITS  NOB.  88  THROUGH  110 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the 
Joint  Committee  on  the  Investigation  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  Attadc 


PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


HEARINGS 

BEFORE  THE 

-8^^*5J0INT  COMMITTEE  ON  THE  INVESTIGATION 
OF  THE  PEAKL  HARBOE  ATTACK     . 
•    CONGRESS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH  CONGRESS 

FIRST  AND  SECOND  SESSIONS 

PURSUANT  TO 

S.  Con.  Res.  27  and  49 

(79th  Congress) 

A    CONCURRENT    RESOLUTION    AUTHORIZING    AN 

INVESTIGATION  OF  THE  ATTACK  ON  PEARL 

HARBOR     ON     DECEMBER    7,     1941,     AND 

EVENTS  AND  CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING  THERETO 


PART  16 

JOINT  COMMITTEE  EXHIBITS  NOS.  88  THROUGH  110 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the 
Joint  Committee  on  the  Investigation  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  Attack 


UNITED  STATES 
GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
79716  WASHINGTON  :   1946 


3^  ,     I    laj^i    .^ 

JOINT  COMMITTEE  ON  THE  INVESTIGATION  OF  THE  PEARL 
HARBOR  ATTACK 

ALBEN  W.  BARELBY,  Senator  from  Kentucky,  Chairman 
JERE  COOPER,  Representative  from  Tennessee,  Vice  Chairman 
WALTER  F.  GEORGE,  Senator  from  Georgia    JOHN    W.    MURPHY,    Representative  from 
SCOTT  W.  LUCAS,  Senator  from  Illinois  Pennsylvania 

OWEN  BREWSTER,  Senator  from  Maine  BERTRAND   W.    GEARHART,    Repreaenta- 

HOMER  FERGUSON,   Senator  from  Michl-         tive  from  California 

gan  FRANK    B.    KEEFE,    Representative    from 

J.    BAYARD   CLARK,    Representative  from         Wisconsin 
North  Carolina 


COUNSEL 


(Throngh  January  14,  1946) 

William  D.  Mitchell,  General  Counsel  /  y  ^C^ 

Gebhard  a.  Gesell,  ChieJ  Assistant  Counsel 
Jdle  M.  Hannab-ord,  Assistant  Counsel 
John  E.  Masten,  Assistant  Counsel 

(After  January  14,  1946) 

Seth  W.  Richardson,  General  Counsel 
Samuel  H.  Kadfman,  Associate  General  Counsel 
John  E.  Masten,  Assistant  Counsel 
EuwARD  P.  MORGAN,  Assistant  Counsel 
Looan  J.  Lane,  Assistant  Counsel 


HEARINGS  OP  JOINT  COMMITTEE 


Part 
No. 

Pages 

Transcript 
pages 

1 

1-  399 

1-  1058 

2 

401-  982 

1059-  2586 

3 

983-1583 

2587-  4194 

4 

1585-2063 

4195-  5460 

5 

2065-2492 

5461-  6646 

6 

2493-2920 

6647-  7888 

7 

2921-3378 

7889-  9107 

8 

3379-3927 

9108-10517 

9 

3929-4599 

10518-12277 

10 

4601-5151 

12278-13708 

11 

5153-5560 

13709-14765 

Hearings 


Nov.  15,  16,  17,  19 
Nov.  23,  24,  26  to 
Dec.  5,  6,  7,  8,  10, 
Dec.  14,  15,  17,  18, 
Dec.  31,  1945,  and 
Jan.  15,  16,  17,  18, 
Jan.  22,  23,  24,  25, 
Jan.  30,  31,  Feb.  1 
Feb.  7,  8,  9,  11,  12, 
Feb.  15,  16,  18,  19, 
Apr.  9  and  11,  and 


,  20,  and  21,  1945. 

30,  Dec.  3  and  4,  1945. 
11,  12,  and  13,  1945. 

19,  20,  and  21,  1945. 
Jan.  2,  3,  4,  and  5,  1946. 

19,  and  21,  1946. 

26,  28,  and  29,  1946. 

2,  4,  5,  and  6,  1946. 

13,  and  14,  1946. 

and  20,  1946. 

Mav  23  and  31.  1946. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE 


Part 
No. 


12 
13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22  through  25 

26 

27  through  31 

32  through  33 

34 

35 

36  through  38 

39 


Exhibits  Nos. 

1  through  6. 

7  and  8. 

9  through  43. 

44  through  87. 

88  through  1 10. 

Ill  through  128. 

129  through  156. 

157  through  172. 

173  through  179. 

180  through  183,  and  Exhibits-Illustrations. 

Roberts  Commission  Proceedings. 

Hart  Inquiry  Proceedings. 

Army  Pearl  Harbor  Board  Proceedings. 

Navy  Court  of  Inquiry  Proceedings. 

Clarke  Investigation  Proceedings. 

Clausen  Investigation  Proceedings. 

Hewitt  Inquiry  Proceedings. 

Reports  of  Roberts  Commission,  Army  Pearl  Harbor  Board, 
Navy  Court  of  Inquiry  and  Hewitt  Inquiry,  with  endorse- 
ments. 


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5. 


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XVI 


INDEX  OF   EXHIBITS 


INDEX   OF  EXHIBITS 


XVII 


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XVIII 


INDEX  OF  EXHIBITS 


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INDEX   OF   EXHIBITS 


XIX 


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EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  1937 

EXHIBIT  NO.  88 

War  Plans  Division  (OP  12) 

12-1.  Duties: 

(a)  Policy  and  Projects  Section: 

(1)  Development  of  policies  and  projects  in  support  of  war  plans. 

(2)  Collaboration  with  the  War  Department  in  preparation  of  current  plans 
for  joint  action  of  the  Army  and  Navy,  and  in  the  solution  of  current  problems. 

(3)  Collaboration  with  other  Government  departments  on  policies  and  projects 
affecting  national  defense. 

(4)  Study  of  subjects  referred  to  the  War  Plans  Division  by  the  Chief  of 
Naval  Operations. 

(5)  Action  in  advisory  capacity  in  current  administrative  matters  referred 
to  the  War  Plans  Division. 

(b)  Plans  Section: 

(1)  Direction  of  war  planning. 

(2)  Preparation  of  designated  war  plans. 

(3)  Review  of  Operating  Plans  and  Principal  Contributory  Plans. 

(4)  Collaboration  with  the  War  Department  in  preparation  of  Joint  Basic 
War  Plans. 

(5)  Collaboration  with  other  Government  departments  on  plans  affecting  na- 
tional defense. 

12-2.  The  Director  of  the  War  Plans  Division  is  a  member  of  the  Joint  Board 
(General  Order  No.  7). 

12-3.  The  War  Plans  Division  has  membership  on  the  following  committees : 

Joint  Board. 

Joint  Planning  Committee. 
Joint  Aeronautical  Board. 
Joint  Air  Advisory  Committee. 
Shore  Station  Development  Board. 

12-4.  The  War  Plans  Division  is  nonadministrative. 


EXHIBIT  NO.  89 

Responsibility  for  Defense  Against  Air  Attack  in  Hawaii 

[7]  1.  The  broad  responsibilities  of  the  Army  and  Navy  in 
Hawaii  were  contained  in  Army  and  Navy  war  plans  prepared  and 
issued  to  the  Army  and  Navy  Commanders  in  Hawaii.  These  re- 
sponsibilities were  expressed  in  the  various  plans  in  terms  of  joint 
missions  and  separate  Army  and  Navy  missions.  With  the  exception 
as  indicated  below,  these  missions  are  stated  identically  in  all  war 
plans  current  in  1941  as  follows : 

JOINT  MISSION 

,  To  hold  Oahu  as  a  main  outlying  Naval  Base,  and  to  control  and 
protect  shipping  in  the  Coastal  Zone. 

NAVY  MISSION 

To  patrol  the  coastal  zone  and  to  control  and  protect  shipping 
therein ;  to  support  the  Army  forces. 


1938    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

ARMY  MISSION 

To  hold  Oahu  against  attack  by  land,  sea  and  air  forces  and  against 
hostile  sympathizers ;  to  support  the  Naval  forces. 

2.  In  the  most  recent  plan  the  phrase  in  the  Army  Mission  "to  sup- 
port the  Naval  Forces"  was  deleted  and  the  following  was  substituted; 
"Support  Naval  Forces  in  the  protection  of  the  sea  communications 
of  the  Associated  Powers  and  in  the  destruction  of  Axis  sea  com- 
munications by  offensive  action  against  enemy  forces  or  commerce 
located  within  tactical  operating  radius  of  occupied  air  bases." 

[2]  3.  It  should  be  noted  that  in  all  cases  the  missions  called  for 
mutual  support. 

4.  Based  on  these  broad  missions  the  Commanding  General, 
Hawaiian  Department,  and  the  Navy  Commander  in  Hawaii  agreed 
to  accept  certain  responsibilities  for  defense  against  air  attack.  These 
agreements  are  to  be  found  in  the  various  local  joint  plans  and  the 
separate  plans  of  the  Army  and  Navy  in  Hawaii.  The  basic  current 
plans  in  Hawaii  on  Dec.  7,  1941  were:  The  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  De- 
fense Plan,  Hawaiian  Coastal  Frontier,  1941,  and  the  Army  and 
Navy  Operations  Orders  and  agreements  based  thereon.  These  plans 
and  agreements  contain  the  following  major  provisions  pertaining  to 
defense  against  air  attack : 

(a)  Antiaircraft  De.fen^t^ 


Responsibility 


Source 


ARMY 


NAVY. 


(1)  "Shall  provide  for:  a.  The 
defense  of  OAHU" 


*    antiaircraft 


(2)  Army  Antiaircraft,  "supported  by  Naval  Units 

placed  under  the  tactical  control  of  the  Army, 
will  operate  to  defend  Oahu  from  attacks  by 
hostile  aircraft." 
(31 

(3)  The  Army,  "Arrange  for  such  coordination  of  the 

antiaircraft  artillery  fire  of  naval  ships  in  PEARL 
HARBOR  and  the  Army  antiaircraft  defense  as 
1  may  be  practicable." 

"The  Pacifie  Fleet  and  the  Fourteenth  Naval  Dis- 
trict *  •  *  aie  taking  certain  security  meas- 
ures, which  include: 


(d)  The  organization  of  four  air  defense  groups  for  the 
control  and  distribution  of  the  antiaircraft  Are  of  all 
ships  anchored  in  Pearl  Harbor." 


"In  the  event  of  a  hostile  air  attack,  any  part  of  the 
Fleet  in  Pearl  Harbor  plus  all  Fleet  aviation  shore- 
based  on  Oahu,  will  augment  the  local  air  defense." 


[4] 
"The 


Commandant,  Fourteenth  Naval  District 
•  •  •  shall:  (a)  exercise  with  the  Army  joint 
supervisory  control  over  the  defense  against  air 
attack,  (b)  Arrange  with  the  Army  to  have  their 
antiaircraft  guns  emplaced." 


(d)  Coordinate  Fleet  antiaircraft  fire  with  the  base 
defense." 


Par  17,  Joint  Coastal  Frontier 
Defense  Plan  Hawaiian 
Coastal  Frontier,  1941 

Par  2,  FO  No.  1  NS  (Naval 
Security)  Hq.  Hawaiian 
Dept. 


Par.  36  (3),  FO  No.  1  NS  (Na- 
val Security) 


Par.  16  FO  No  1  NS  (Navy 
Security)  Hq.  Hawaiian 
Dept. 


Par.  Zg.  (2)  (6)   Pacific  Fleet 
Confidential  Letter  2  CL-41. 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1939 


Conchmon:  The  orders  and  agreements  on  the  ])art  of  the  local 
Army  and  Navy  Commanders  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  primary 
responsibility  for  antiaircraft  defense  rested  with  the  Army  but  that 
the  Navy  had  a  secondary  responsibility  in  conection  therewith. 

(b)  Aircraft  Warning  Service 


Responsibility 

Provisions 

Source 

Army 

Navy - 

(1)  The   Army   "shall   provide  for:  •    *    *    6.  "An 
antiaircraft    •    ♦    •    intelligence  and  warning 
service." 
"During  the  period  prior  to  the  completion  of  the  AWS 
installation,  the  Navy,  through  use  of  RADAR, 
and  other  appropriate  means,  will  endeavor  to  give 
such  warning  of  hostile  attacks  as  may  be  prac- 
ticable." 

Par  17,  Joint  Coastal  Frontier 
Def.  Plan,  Hawaiian  Coastal 
Frontier,  1941. 

Par.  11,  Annex  VII  Joint 
Coastal  Frontier  Def.  Plan 
Hawaiian  Coastal  Frontier. 

Cnnchision:  The  Army  had  primary  responsibility  for  the  establishment  of  an 
aircraft  warning  service.  The  Navy,  however,  agreed  to  furnish  such  means 
as  it  had.  pending  the  installation  of  the  Army  facilities  then  under  construction. 


(c)   Aircraft 

(RECONNAISSANCE  PHASE) 


Responsibility 

Provisions 

Source 

Army 

Navy             

(1)  "Shall  provide  for: 

«    *    * 

Establishment  of  an  inshore  aerial  patrol  of  the  waters 
of  the  Oahu  DCA  in  cooperation  with  the  Naval 
Inshore  Patrol." 

(1)  Navy  "shall  provide  for:  a.  An  inshore  patrol. 

b.  An  offshore  patrol    *    •    *    i.  Distant  recon- 
naissance." 

(2)  "When  naval  forces  are  insufficient  for  long  distant 

patrol  and  search  operations,  and  Army  aircraft 
are  made  available,  these  aircraft  will  be  under 
the  tactical  control  of  the  naval  commander 
directing  the  search  operations." 

Par.  17,  Joint  Coastal  Frontier 
Def.  PlanHCF. 

Par.  18,  Joint  Coastal  Frontier 

Def.  HCF. 

Par.    2c,    Annex    VII,    Joint 
Coastal  Frontier  Def.  HCF. 

le] 


(DEFENSIVE  AIR) 


Army. 
Navy. 


"b.  Defensive  air  operations  over  and  in  the  immedi- 
ate vicinity  of  Oahu  will  be  executed  under  the 
tactical  command  of  the  Army." 

(1)  "Each  commander  will    •    •    *    make  available 

without  delay  to  the  other  commander  such  pro- 
portion of  the  air  forces  at  his  disposal  as  the  cir- 
cumstances warrant." 

(2)  "With  due  consideration  to  the  tactical  situation 

existing,  the  number  of  fighter  aircraft  released 
to  Army  control  will  be  the  maximum  practic- 
able." 


Par.  26.  Annex  VII  Joint 
Coastal  Frontier  Defense 
Plan 

Par  2  Annex  VII 


Par  26.  Annex  VII 


(OFFENSIVE  AIR) 

Army 

"g. 

Support  of  naval  aircraft  forces  in  major  offensive 

Par  17j;.  Joint  Coastal  Frontier 

operations    at    sea    within    range    of    Army 

Def.  Plan 

bombers." 

Navy 

(1) 

"Shall  provide  for    *    •    •    j.    Attacking  enemy 

Par  18,  Joint  Coastal  Frontier 

Naval  Forces." 

Def.  Plan.  Par  2a  Annex  VII 

(2) 

"Joint  air  attacks  upon  hostile  surface  vessels  will 
be  executed  under  the  tactical  command  of  the 
Navy." 

1940     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[7]  Conclusion:  The  Navy  was  primarily  responsible  for  close  and  distant 
aerial  reconnaissance  and  offensive  air  operations  against  hostile  snrface  craft. 
The  army  was  primarily  responsible  for  defensive  air  operations.  Regardless  of 
the  service  primarily  resp<jnsible,  the  opposite  service  was  charged  with  support- 
ing the  operation  within  the  means  available  to  it. 

To  summarize,  it  will  be  seen  from  the  at)ove  analysis  that : 

(a)  Definite  plans  and  agreements  existed  in  Hawaii  for  defense  against 
aircraft ; 

(b)  Although  the  Army  had  the  primary  responsibility  for  antiaircraft  defense, 
aircraft  warning  service  and  defensive  air  operations  and  the  Navy  had  the  pri- 
mary responsibility  for  close  and  distant  reconnaissance,  and  offensive  air  opera- 
tions, each  service  was  charged  with  augmenting  the  forces  of  the  other  with  the 
means  available  to  them  in  order  to  provide  the  maximum  effective  defense. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  1941 

EXHIBIT  NO.  90 


ffoiiii'  Telegram  Sent  «onc.: 

ColKct  {Oty  l«tt«r 

iNWrtlrttw  w..  A... 

c>.,r^o^^.^x.  ©ppartnmtt  of  ^tatp      ^,  ,„ 

Full  rit«  ^         ,^  ,y  j:'L,f_TN' 

0.ylet1.r  Jf  .^\         ' 

Ch.r,K  to  Department        ^  ^ '  "^O  >   r 

»  '0*^        December  lA  ,    IQ^i 

AMERICAN  LEGATION       ,  0 

BERN 

J  ^  r 

AMERICAN  INTERESTS. 

Please  express  to  Sv-dss  Govenmant  this  Goirarnaeat 's 
appreciation  of  its  message  expressir;g  willingness  to 
undertake  the  representation  of  American  interests  in 
Japanese-occupied  territories  and,  waen  necessary,  in  other 
regions  of  the  Far  East. 

Department  would  be  grateful  if  Swiss  Government  would 
by  telegraph  circularize  to  its  representatives  in  - 
East,  for  the  information  of  such  American  diplomat i 
consular  offices  as  may  by  reason  of  the  present  si  _. 
find  it  impossible  to  carry  on  their  functions  or  to  coir- 
municate  v.-ith  the  Department,  the  following  messafi^e  {in 
substance  already  communicated  to  Embassy 
endeavored  without  /repeat  without^  success  z  ;  r:;,  o  i 
to  the  offices  concerned): 

iUOTE  One.   In  the  event  of  a  sudden  ei;.er 

when  communications  with  the  Doport:.ient  are 

broken 


EjKll>htTtJ  iy  ._ 
Sent  by  opcraior 


1942     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


TELt.GRAM  Sent 


Drpiirtinciit  of  ^tatr 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  1943 


ro  BC   1H*N»MiTttO 

,,  TELEGRAM  SENT  .JZ r:::  ^ 

Collect  {0»y  letter  -      - — fartair 

I  HiRht  letter  piaim 

Ch«Ke  Department.  iSepartHtPnt   Of    ^tfltC 

Full  rate 

Day  letter  Washinilon, 

NighMetler 

CKar^e  to 


reco-,:aro-    i: 


calend-.r  ys.  r,    l 
ci.oala  be  ter;airi-'ted    {■ 


Enclphttti  iy  . 

Sml  iy  eptrolor  •''  • 


1944     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Telegram  Sent 


Brpnrtmrnt  nf  *tatc 

H  ashington. 


Enci/jhertJ  hy 

Sfnt  iy  opfielor  '  M..  !'> 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  1945 


r,»nnotNTi*t  coot 


Telegram  StNT    .  .o«oo.r,oe«T,«.  code 


D rpartinr nt  of  ^tatt 

-     -  '■'i  luhingtcn. 


79716  O — 46— pt.  If 


1946     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Telegram  Sent 


Day  !.•!!- 


Qrpartmriit  of  ^tatv 

Washington, 


Stnt  by  Ofjtrul'ir  M  , 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  1947 


HrparttmMit  uf  *tnli* 


Stnl  tj,'  ,jf,e,iUi-'  M..  ,19. 


1948     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


TELtGRAM  Sent 
Qrpartiurut  of  #tatr 

ii'ii}hinil:m. 


•*^ 


Sent  by  opinjtor  M., 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1949 


Drp. 


.      ,  ,_ ., /  .e  Swiss 

■'i'ioers   charged  with   the  repre- 
j.'9i>t3   in.iBBte  .mifiiit  be  authorized 

their  c-  -  '.0,      Pie-. 

;t. 


1950     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  91 

EMBASSY  OF  THE  '  j 

UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA  1 

Tokyo,   December  15,    1941. 


oL'BJT.CT:      DESTRUCTION  CF  CUDE=,    CIlHEItD  AND   CIPHER 
DEVICSa. 


v^     • 


T^^ 


j^' 


^ 


A^^'l 


1/ 


The  HonortJblB 

Th«   ,~->ecr^tfrv  of  otate, 
..ashii-ton. 

6lr: 

I  have  the  honor  to  enclose  herewith   for  the 
Division  of  Coi-aa.r.icftJ.ns   and   Records   a   list   of 
the    codes,     -.i.-hers   and   ci.her   devices   which  were 
burned   or  destroyed  under  standing  instructions  on 
December  &,    1941   on  the   outbreak  of  war   between   the 
united  otates   and   Japan.      This   list   oom;rises   all   the 

codes 


r:; 


/*i6»»l 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  1951 


codes,  ciphers,  cipher  devices  and  other  material 
pertaining  to  codes  in  possession  of  the  Embassy. 
As  provided  by  regulation,  this  statement  is  signed 
by  the  two  officers  in  whose  presence  they  were 
bui-ned.   The  true  readings  of  all  telegrams  in 
confidential  codes  were  likewise  burned  on  December  8, 
1S41  in  the  presence  of  the  same  two  officers. 

Respectfully  yours, 

Joseph  C.  Grew. 


Enclosures : 

1/  List  of  codes,  ciphers  nnd  cipher  devices. 


lie. 2 
CL'2:gch 

Oririnnl  ;  u-;  t.,o  oo.  is-s  to  Depai-t.-ont . 


1952     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1953 


EMBASSY  OF  THE 
UNITED   STATES  OF   AMERICA 


■  Si 


.:i7IJ:-;::tial 


A 


\^^ 


7lM 


///'/^^ 


1^", 


K. 


1^ 


:^f 


Ol 

CO 


^ir: 


>ocrjtrjry  of    jtate, 
.'aahin'-ton. 


I    .xiVQ    Li:e   honor   to  rc-ort    th-it;    just    rj-ior   to   tiie 
catbr-3ak   of  v.-r   •)ef..t,'en    z.a  Unitod    ^t-t-is   ".i^   J' ;  ur.    t.'ie 
jii'oasj:'  received,    \yj   poucL  fro:..  t..e  ^-  ^.         ' 

ro.-istore--   st-)'aled    j.-ivelopec  f.dCre^oCi    l..  -      ■... 

;;n3Ulate 


f^'^ 


1954     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-    '^,<;^  .  -<-^^^'l.- 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTSE  1955 


,  o;::;o, 


1956     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EMBASSY  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 


No.   k'-jI'c 


,<!>' 


•3,    roi^rur-.i 


W- 


* 

tc 


01 


1/ 


The  Honorable 

SrcreZhrj    of  St^te 
Waehlni^-ton 
Slr:- 

I    -r.-av^    -.'p    noRor   to    ^iK.slt   ;>';'*-'-i : 

tne   .-.eEtr.ctlon  of   t  ;e   fllua  of   Vr.e  fiecortl: 
S.ctlon    -f   t  .?v. 


^.espectfully  vo'JU^e, 


File    : 0.    1?~ .2 


itiied 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  1957 


Enclopure  ho,  1  i        j'.      31^ 
"t  .ed  Feuruary  1-5,  i3-i£  ', 
-'.ajasfiv  pt  ToXyo 


-r  3ECTI>.i;'3 


■-uld 


■'C^ric   Tr 


"^         —  ' 


1958     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EMBASSY  OF  Ti-.E 
UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 

Tokyo,   Maroh   25,    1942, 
SUBJECT:      DKSTRUCTION  OF  STRICTLY  CONFIDENTIAL  FILES. 


-r:^^^ 


'0^ 

a'  1 . 


IV) 

to 

4w 
0> 


4)^ 


The  Honorable 

The  Secretary  of  State, 
Washington. 
Sir: 

1/         I  hare  the  honor  to  enclose  a  list  of  the  strictly 
confidential  material  in  the  files  of  the  ICmbassy  which 
was  burned  in  accordance  with  Section  7  of  the  Department's 
und?ited  "Instructions  to  .-di;'=ric  ;n  Diplomatic  and  Consular 
Officers  in  Japanese  Occupied  Territories  and  other  Regions 
of  the  Far  East"  received  in  January  1942  through  the 
Swiss  Lei'ation  in  Tokyo. 

In  addition  to  the  strictly  confidential  material  listed 
on  the  enclosur'?  to  this  despatch,  all  true  readin^-s  of^ 
-'  telecjrams  in  confidential  code  were  burned  on  December  8, 

1941,  as  reported  in  my  unnumbered  despatch  dated  December  15^ 
1941. 


In 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  1959 


-2- 


In  conformity  v,-ith  the  Department's  instruction, 
non-confidential  bound  and  current  correspondence  was 
not  in  /general  destroyed,  but  was  stored  in  the  Embassy 
vault  for  safe  keeping  in  custody  of  the  Swiss  repre- 
sentative, and  only  such  material  contained  therein 
v;hich  might  have  proved  compromising  to  any  individuals 
in  areas  under  Japanese  control  was  removed  and  burned. 

Respectfully  yours, 


Joseph  C.  Grew. 


Enc  losure :  \^^^     \  V- 
1/  as  indicated. 


CEB:.-h 


1960     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  92 


'I  )1.>1':  0\'  I  <  AtM'  iN; 


;^  have  so  lai 
•.■;it  rendition-" 


Mii  or  jHisonalitif  ^  (i{  the  (i.v, , 
iii.-  luart's  cuiUvui.  ^ubi,  1  <  .. 


i 

;  1     •  !  I    < 
rc:v;;n 


.-  ■  \'.  V  r  .1  ■ 
(>:mnitlr 
>t  the  C" 
pT«'tc>t 


ill  I;  t  l:i!'  iiuiuuiial  Ki'U 
;■,  and  that  when-  any 
onviiition  i^  observed  a 
i>  madr  to  the  enemy 
-eriud 


1 JH    i  ..nl    Trivv    Seal     Mr.    AUlci 


r  countries  have  iii-titi: 
_;;     ,  :  ,!i    to   sustain    -n-h    ,i    \ 

whWr  'A'.-y  :ir.-  fii:htinu;  f<  r  th.  ir  iiv<- 
I  (AM  it  !i'  the  Hou<;e  to  i  \pl  lin  (,, 
wh.tt  hi-  Kd  me  to  a?k  for  th^  r  , 
tioi.al  si'.pport  at  thi«  x\nn\  It  ha^ 
V, ;_■.,:,  «'rd  that  we  -hnnhi  hiivi-  , 
a,V.'    p.  hate    of  tl':-    k\uA   in    wl-,,  ■ 


M.'ti.in   U'l 


• :  <■    ("rown   at    thi; 

\t  U'|>tt<.!  trom  the  pruvisions 

OrJer     (Sttings     of     ih»" 

1    think    that    it    would    uuet    the   lon- 

....  .'  .1,      J 1  .....   ;i    .....  V  » i,.,l   ii,. 


th:it  may   b«>      ,  j^j  ^ve  should  >epara:. 
>ion.     In  this  ease  sc 
whieh    are  )io«tile — an 
\\hoi-<-     hostiUtv     i-i     ! 
,le.  '.ue  th.it  the  Gover 


\U.      \'.:l 


ipply 


WAR  Sm  ATION. 


!  Question  proposei 
.h-   ;:n\v   atliourn." 


the    matt' 
hi-  rtintir.'H  r^ 

!,     h.-     t'..!shid 

•'k-V    aie 
icht  at!. 


1  he    I'rinu      \": 


r       Mr.    Churchill 

■  ■  -^,it;:,.   D.v. 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1961 


-    ,  ^'^  Situation  27   JANUARY    194^  War  Situatton  594 

Uo  have  harl  a  gnat  deal  oi  bad  news  The  Prime  Minister:  A  vote  under  aU 
ill,  iy  from  the  Far  East,  and  I  think  it  the  conditions  which  hitherto  have  made 
hi-iilv  probable,  for  reasons  wliich  I  shall  the  conduct  of  Farliamentary  povernment 
l>,i-.(iitly  explain,  that  we  shall  have  a  possible.  Surely  the  hon.  Gentleman'  is 
.ir.it  deal  more.     Wrapped  up  in  this  bad      not  the  man  to  l>e  frightened  of  a  Whip? 

The  House  of  Commons,  which  is  at 
present  the  most  powerful  reprtscnlative 
Assembly  in  the  world,  must  al^)--!  am 
sure,  will  also— bear  in  mind  tlic  effect 
produced  af)road  by  all  its  proceeding's. 
We  have  al^o  to  remcmbei  how  oddly 
forei.[;ncrs  view  our  country  and  its  way 
of  (ioiof^  things.  When  Rudolf  Hess  ilew 
over  here  some  months  ago  he  firmly 
belicvtd  thai  he  had  only  to  gain 
access  to  certain  t  ircies  in  this  country 
tor  what  he  dcscribcci  as  "  the  ("hurchill 
clique  " — 

Mr.    Thorne    (Plaistow):    Where    is   hr 
now? 

The  Prime  Minister:  When  he  ouu'ht  to 
be — to  be  thrown  out  of  fK>wer  and  for  a 
Government  to  be  set  up  with  which 
ffitler  could  ne^'oti.ite  a  maunanimous 
peace.  The  only  importance  attaching  to 
the  opinions  of  Fless  is  the  fact  that  he 
was  fresh  from  the  atmosphere  ol  Hitler's 
intimate  table.  Hut,  Sir,  I  can  assure 
you  that  since  I  have  Ijt  i  n  back  in  this 
country  I  have  had  anxious  iiujuiric^  from 
a  dozen  countries,  and  rcpc>rts  ol  enemy 
propaijanda  in  a  score  ot  coiuitriis,  all 
turnini;  iijicai  the  juiiiit  wlieliu  r  His 
Majcstv's  j)i.s.iit  r,iiv,iiirni-nt  is  to  In  dis- 
r;a--i(l  hoin  {x.wii  <!  ii<it.  This  may 
si. til  -illy  tu  us.  hut  in  tlic>sc  irsouths 
abio.id  It  is  hurtiui  and  iiu.m  lui  vous  tu  the 
conuiiiiii  i-tfurl.  1  am  not  asking;  lor  any 
spcuaJ,  jKr^,on.il  tavours  in  thcsr  cirtuni- 
stjiKrs.  t>ut  i  am  sure  the  lIoi;.s.,-  wnuid 
wisii  lo  make  itj  positioii  clear,  thciclore 
1  stand  by  tlic  au'itul,  con.-iiUitionaj, 
Parbanu  nl.iry  doituiie  ul  tree  dcoatc  and 
laithlul    vutuij.;. 

.  .in  to  till    acaouiit  of  the  wjr, 

s^  .:tu!i  s  lik  .  1  lini  1  luake  tor  tiie 

,oul    i,ouhui  i.'  I      .'I    the     House. 

r  tour  montii^  .11;  -.w    had  to  copj 


,,,  w,  will  be  many  tales  of  blunders  and 

.i;,,rl^omin.t!S    :K)th  in  foresight  and  action. 

\(.  ene  w,'    pretend   lor  a   moment  that 

-!crs     .Kc   ilit-se   occur   without    there 

iicen  faults  and  shortcomin:;s.       I 

:    tins    rolling    towards    us    like    thc 

ri   a   storm,   aini   that   is   another 

i    \v)iy    1    require   a   formal,    solemn 

:    <_"•  »ij<le!j(e    from    the    House   oi 

is,  wJiich  hitherto  in  this  stru^j^le 

..r    iimclied.        The    Hou^c    would 

:s  duty  if  it  did  not  uisi-t  upon  two 

lirst,     free<iom    of-   debate,     and, 

.  .  a  clear,  honest,  blunt  Vote  there- 

i  laii  we  ^hall  all  know  where  we 

•u!  ,dl  th.  s,-  with  whom  we  have  to 

'   i. ■•';:,    ,i;iij  aUioad,  friend  or  foe, 

v   where   we  .ire  and   where   they 

1:   Is  beeai;s(    we  are  to  liave  a  tree 

(), ..  le,  in  whi<h  perhaps  20  to  30  .Mem- 

;•,  •-    .in  take  part,  that  I  tiemand  an  ex- 

'  >n  of  opinion  from  the    VX)  or  400 

iefs  who  will  h.r.c  .sat  silent. 

j-    1-;    In-ae.-c    tiiir:cs    ha\'c    ;.;orie    barlly 

.  ■■    (ifse  >  'o    -'rtie  ih  't  !  dt  m  md  a  Vote 

I     -f'-iiii.  e.      i'Ms  will  he  pl.a  '  (i  <ei  the 

•      ■  '  ■  'I'v.  to  !  e  'IV  \<r!  at  a  ;..♦.  r  st  i-e. 

'  ■■'■  w'i'c  :}■(;-  -hfiili  hamper  aiiv- 

J:.:     ii-io'i:!  critit  isjn.. 


ke.     iT     t  ••■r]i 
ls!(  I.      that      17!, 

•    v\ith    thiiikin 


"- 1  re 
that 


;r<.  ti. 


IhiKm; 


.'Ce 


triinistr.ition.  su,  \ 


m    r(  -pe.  (    ot 

1  as  it  is,  !r'  nii.cht 

•     :;  ■!    i:'n    <.^.  !M-         Hut    il   an 

.      i,'      (he  Cj'A  ,_  niiiient 

'  it!   th<,-  public   in- 

htokcn    cp,    he 

<•(!    t.i   t,  silly   hl-s 

I.    ole.  .        i  hue    IS    no 

ni-et!;..!     il!     delate. 

belt!;.; 

^!     the 

tai  |[     litllp   ?l.     lo    lOU- 

'.■I  \'-\u^  h  may  be  set 
i.:-e  .  ;,,!■  IK  bate.  liiit  no 
la  ;n  aiy-ici.aithed  in  debate, 
:ie  ihoaid  be  chitken-hcarte>l  in 
i  have  voted  ni;aitist  Govern 
have  been  elected  to  support, 
1:11,'  back,  I  have  sometimes  felt 
that  I  did  so.  Everyone  in 
h  times  must  do  what  he  thinks 


Mr.  Shinweil  (Seaham) :  A  free  vote? 


I  iiree 

with  the  toUowiiiji;  ^itiiatjua  1  iie  (jcrman 
i'lvaders  were  advancmt;,  blasting  their 
way  thioufjh  Russia.  1  he  Russians  were 
resiAtinj.;  with  the  utmost  heroism.  But  no 
oni-  could  tell  what  would  happen, 
wliether  F.eninj.;nid,  .Moscow  or  Rostov 
would  fall,  or  where  the  German  winter 
line  would  be  established.  No  one  can  tell 
now  where  it  will  be  e.stablished.  but  now 
tKe  boot  is  on  the  other  Ivg.  We  all  agree 
that    we    must    aid    the    valiant    Russian 


79716  O — 46— i)t.  1< 


1962     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


593 


H'ar  Stluatton 


HOUSE  OF  COMMONS 


iVar  Situation 


596 


[The  Priint-  Minister.] 
Armifs  to  tin.-  utmobt  limit  of  our  power. 
Hi.s  ,M.)jt?!v''s  Government  thought,  and 
I'arliiiiiK  lit  upon  roilcction  agrt-ed  with 
l.iim,  that  the  best  aid  we  could  give  to 
Rii'-ia  \va.-  in  sujiplics  of  many  kinds  of 
raw  m.ittria!?  and  of  mimitions,  particu- 
laiiy  t.iiks  and  airrraft.  Onr  Forces  at 
h,,ui  and  alToaU  iiaii  for  loni;  been  wait- 
iUj.;  ihir-tily  for  thise  weapons.  At  last 
i.iiy  Will  oihini;  tu  liand  in  large  nnm- 
bcrs.  A;  1h>;ih  we  liav  ahvay^,  the  danger 
of  inva-icn  to  consider  and  to  prepare 
a.:  Ki-t.  1  will  speak  about  the  situation 
ill  ;l;  Ni  idle  Kast  presently.  Ncverthe- 
!  at    i^remicr  Stalin -for   that    ] 

•w  1k'  wishes  to  iv  addre-.-i-d: 
ai  ,1,1  I,  i:i;il  is  tiie  form  in  which  he  tele- 
grc.phs  to  nil-  e.xactly  what  he  asked  for. 
!''i!  wholi-  quantity  was  promised  and 
^i  ;it.  Tlitre  has  been,  I  am  sorry  to  say, 
I  sni.ill  Uv^  due  to  bad  weather,  but  it 
will  he  made  up  by  the  early  days  of 
I'elriiary.  This  was  a  de<  ision  of  major 
str.;te,'4y  and  policy,  and  anyc^ne  can  see 
thrv.  it  was  ri.^ht  to  put  it  first  when  they 
!i  tile  wiuuh'rfnl  achievements,  un- 
!;  .!  for,  undreamed  of  by  us  because 
Wi-  liiitr  ku'w  the  Russian  strength,  but- 
.ill  till'  nsore  t^lorious  as  they  seem — the 
woi;  hrful  .uhitvi-niei:;^  of  the  Russian 
.•\r:!ii-  -.  (>:ir  ii!im!!i":i>  were  of  course 
only  .1  '  "ii'ri!'iitinri  to  the  Russian  victory, 
b'lt  111.  ■.  v,(T"  an  enrnuragement  in 
•••'■■■  :kt-l   hour.      Moreover,  if  we 

'■.Ml  a  loyal  effort  to  help  our 
,1;    ,1    hi  .i\  \-   :-a<  rifue   to  our 


the  oil  which  they  are  beginning  seriously 
to  need,  but  it  would  have  involved  the 
destnu  lion  of  the  Russian  Fleet  and  the 
loss,  ol  the  command  of  the  Black  Sea. 
It  would  have  affected  the  safety  of 
Turkey,  and  it  would,  in  due  course,  have 
exposed  to  the  gravest  dangers  Persia, 
Iraq.  Cyria  and  Palestine,  and  beyond 
tlu).■^e  countries,  all  of  which  are  now 
uiiiliT  our  control,  it  would  have 
(hreattried  the  Suez  Canal,  F,gypt  and  the 
.N'ik-  \all<y.  ,\l  the  same  time  as  this 
nicnicc  (jcfinefl  itself  with  hideous  and 
iri'  rr  isini;  rcaiity  as  it  seemed,  Cieneral 
vol!  i\o;nni(l.  svilli  his  array  of  10  Ger- 
;!i  !i  uid  It.'li;in  divisions  rnlren<  hed  in 
!:;-  '.itifHtl  positions  at  and  behind  the 
Ii:!i'.'\M  P.-.--.  w.is  prepariu'^  to  make  a 
lit-,  i^ive  :■.'':•  k  on  Tohruk  as  a  imlimin- 
ar\'  in  a  r'.  iiewed  advance  uy>on  Fgypt 
from  the  West.  The  Nile  \',i!!ey  was 
therefore  menaced  simu!tanet>iislv  by  a 
direct  att.irk  frc>m  the  Wisi  .tiul  !n'  a  more 
remote  but  in  some  \va\s  uiorr  deadly ' 
attack  from  the  \orth.  In  sis  h  circum- 
stances it  is  the  classic. 1!  rule  of  war, 
reinforced  by  endless  e.x.imples — and 
soific  exceptions —that  von  (irrpare  to 
I'lcht  a  (^elaviui:  .-n  tion  .njain-t  one  c>f  the 
fun  attacks  and  cotKentr.;!!.   if   possible, 


)MrwlielTTiii: 


•  i    C 


stren'.^tli 

•  tt.i.  k. 

•lal    Ar.< 


■lin.l 
We 


[una 


the   other 

Iherefore 

•         for 

..ist 
jn.in   Sea, 
1  e\ant- 


^'•.priis  to  th(    (  .' 
I     rr).i\-     I,. II    111 

.  and  prep.irip.q  in-t-ill.itions, 
ornrnnniv'atioi!-  npon  which 
.'iihi    li:    li.i~;(l,   .;^   liinr   ;ind 

v..-,;        On    tl'c    nthrr    flmk, 

!  ny  u<  ■>]:i'. 


tr  >.\-.--  Iir.  .   --  il    .1  ail 
.1.  .i.  We 

.!:■  1  (he  im- 

.    :..        ,.,    '^:].,.-l.         H'!t 


!M>     Ul- 


a  I  tu  ■  I -Kill  we 


v.  •■'.     wh.  M  we  -11    liiiw  i\i-iits,   whjili 
']'■'•.    r.,^    k   and    faMt\-   hu-n.m   effort 
'.<]  Ji  -  jn,  have  -haped  tlu'in-i  Ives,  I  am 
le  lliw  wa-  a  ri^^ht  decision. 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1963 


597 


War  Situation  27  JANUARY   1942  "'«''  5«'««''<"»  59^ 

much  more  than  doublt-  as  -troii^. 
Therefore,  it  seems  to  m^  that  this  heroic, 
epic  struggle  in  the  (ie-'ort.  though  there 
have  been  many  local  reverse--:  and  many 
ebbs  and  flows,  has  tested  our  manhood 
ill  a  searching  fashion  and  has  proved 
not  only  that  our  men  ran  die  for  King 
and  country — everyone  kiKw  that— but 
that  they  can  kill. 

I  cannot  tell  what  the  p.i-ition  ot  the 
present  moment  i-  on  the  \V<-^tern  front 
in  Cyrenaica.  We  havr  a  vers'  ilaiin-  and 
skilful  opponent  a.cainst  us  and.  may  I 
.sav  arnjss  th-  hav'oi  nf  v\ar.  a  great 
Ceiu-rai.  He  lia.,  tertainly  r.t.-ivcd  r<-in- 
fon  ein<'iit<.  AiK.ther  liattle  i-  ev(  n  rxnv  in 
prijgrts-,  and  I  make  it  a  rule  ne\<r  to 
tjy  and  proph.-N\-  h.-fnrfhand  how  h.ttilrs 
win  turn  <uit.  I  al\\a\>  rejciie  tli..!  I  ha%e 
made  tlsat  rule.  fAs  uus.  Mimbm;: 
"  What  alxxit  the  Skaggerak  ?  "'  1  hat 
wa-  lurdlv  a  Uattle.  NaturalK'.  one  df,  > 
not  -a\-  iii'a  <  aM-  hk-  that  that  \vi'  liavt  riot 
a  .iian.r,  l.iTau-o  tii.ii  i^  a[>1  to  in-  vn- 
touiagiii;^  to  thi  ,:umy  and  di'pre"in^  to 
tair  own  fnciids.  In  the  .ctnrr,!!  i;|>-hot, 
the  tait  r>'rn:iit)s  that.  when,  a.-  a  "-iar  a,co 
thr  C,frit)aiis  svin-  tclliu.u;  a!i  tli--  iiruirals 
lt;at  thi  \-  uotild  \>v  in  Sue/  bv  Maw  >vlun 


General  Auchinleck  had  demanded  five 
months'  preparation  for  his  campaign,  but 
on  i8th  November  he  fell  upon  the  enemy. 
For  more,  than  two  months  in  the  desert 
the  most  fierce,  continuous  battle  has 
raged  between  scattered  bands  of  men, 
armed  with  the  latest  weapons,  seeking 
each  other  dawn  after  dawn,  fighting  to 
the  death  throughout  the  day  and  then 
often  long  into  the  night.  Here  was  a 
battle  which  turned  out  very  differently 
from  what  was  foreseen.  All  was  dis- 
persed and  confused.  Much  depended  on 
the  individual  soldier  and  the  junior 
officer.  Much,  but  not  all:  because  tjiis 
battle  would  ha\T  been  lost  on  24th 
November  if  General  Auchinleck  had  not 
intervened  himself,  changed  the  command 
and  ordered  the  ruthless  pressure  of  the 
attack  to  be  maiiitained  without  icqarfl  to 
risks  or  consequences.  But  for  this  robu-t 
decision  we  should  now  be  back  on  the  okJ 
line  from  whi<  h  we  liad  started,  or  per- 
haps further  hack.  Tobruk  would  po.;-il)lv 
have  fallen,  and  Kommel  miqht  he  uian  h 
ing  towards  the  Nile.  Since  then  the  battle 
has  deel.ire<]  it.-elf.  Cyrenaica  has  bet  u 
regained.  It  has  still  to  bf  held.  We  h.iv^' 
not  sucfeeded  in  d< -troyitig  Ronirnil'i 
army,  but  nearly  two-thirdi  of  it  an' 
woimde<l,  prisoner^  or  dead. 


If    of 

the 

-a\' 


Perhaps  I  may  giNc  th.  Hi^'Ui  -  :■ 
House.  In  this  ^trani;<\  -rnnbrc  l),ilt 
the  de.serl,  where  our  nnu  i\.t\e  mi't 
enemy  for  the  tir-^t  tini'  !  do  no.t 
in  ever\'  n-^pect.  bi-(  aii.-v  tlii-rt  ar.-  -"mi' 
things  which  an-  no!  .ill  that  \m  had  fioj- '] 
for — but,  upon  tin  wlifile,  h.t\r  nut  hiii: 
with  ecjual  weapotis.  we  lia\t  l<;-t  in 
killed,  wuundrd  and  capturtd  al:^)::t  I'^.ooo 
ofti>  ers  and  men,  of  whc>rn  the  Ljrcatcr  p.irt 
are  B^iti^il.  We  have  in  our  po--.  --ion 
'.;t'»,5no  [uiioners.  includin-  niaiiv 
wounded,  of  \sb,oni  10,500  air  fnrmai!.- 
We    ha\a'    killed    ,uid    \voinnKd    at    iv.t-t 

Itaii.ii!-     in 

■  xaMlv.     of 

.1    ni.i.--  oi 

i,i\  e 

or    to    tli.- 

n^.ii.v.     <)f 


s'lUie  pti'i 
a  ( >(  rinan 
p>  e.ple  \N- 
htormvd  , 
V.dley.  ( 

Ue     ]\j\,      ■ 

a.:,ai;!-t  lii 
w.u'!,    iiiti 


),iT!-on,    o 

til. in  ut 
iulv  ha-  1 
!i<       i'allli 


alk-d    <A 
enl  upon 


po->-iliilit\'    ol 
iul,  and  manv 


[m:;    upon 


<  ;ii  ■  t 
1  iiurii 
hitji   i 

not  ~;i 
u-t 


laid. 


app 


)Ulited     for 
lerr-    is    ai:- 


if    wiiotu 


1 1,500  Cierman- 
,.:11  '  ..  lota.l,  .u- 
(>i,ooo  men.  Therf-  is 
eneni\'  wounded,  .-nue 
been  evai  uated  to  the 
Westward-  1  eannr.t  tell 
the  forces  of  which  (m  rural  Ko'iuiiel  di- 
posed  on  i8th  November,  little  more  than 
one-third  now  remain,  while  ^52  (ierrnan 
and  Italian  aircraft  have  been  de-troy  d 
and  3  ;'j  dernian  and  Italian  tank-  Dur- 
ing this  battle  we  ha\a  ne\t  r  ii.el  in  .u  ;i' n 
more  than  .45,o«x)  men,  a-iui-t  .-nemy 
forces — if  they  could  be  brou^h.t  to  bear — 


(ii.ink.- 
Na-.  V. 


11, 1-      : 

Wiht:;. 

niu-i,    li 

!hou-li 

hi;:i)U 

laiuh. 

to     th. 

Zeal.ind 

x,Idi.  r- 

plaved 

.-,tu!)l 


the 


s 
l-i.. 

JUd      , 

their   part    Hi  It 
rn,  .steadfast  and 


In-,  ii.in. 
-,ii!..r-. 


.li-!) 


1964     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


599 


War  Situation 


HOUSE  OF  COMMONS 


War  Siituttion 


floo 


[The  Prime   Minister.] 
of    Tohnik    by    Australian    and    British 
tro()|i>  was  an  fssential  preliminary,  over 
s»  vtii  hard  months,  to  any  success  which 
nKi\-  haw-  bei-n  achieved. 

Let  u-,  bte  what  has  happened  on  the 
()ti;ir  Hank,  tho  Northern  llank,  of  the 
Nilf  V'aik'V.  What  has  happened  to 
Palestine.  Syria,  Iraq  and  Persia?  There 
we  must  thank  Russia.  There  the  valour 
(»f  the  Russian  Armies  has  warded  off 
dangers  which  wc  saw  and  which  we  un- 
doubtedly ran.  The  Caucasus  and  the 
precious  oilfields  of  Baku,  the  great 
Anylo-Per^ian  oilfields,  are  denied  to  the 
enemy.  Winter  has  come.  Evidently 
We  have  the  time  to  strengthen  still 
further  our  Forces  and  organisations  in 
those  regions.  Tlierefore.  sir,  I  present 
to  you.  in  laying  tlie  whole  field  open  and 
bare  and  sur\-eying  it  in  all  its  parts,  for 
all  are  r«lated.  a  situation  in  the  Nile 
Valiev,  both  West  and  East,  incompar- 
ably easier  than  anything  we  have  ever 
seen,  since  we  were  deserted  by  the 
French  Hordeaux-V'ichy  Government  and 
were  set  \ipon"by  Italy.  The  House  will 
not  fail  to  discern  the  agate  points  upon 
whi<h  this  vast  improvement  has  turned. 
It  is  only  bv  the  smallest  margin  that  we 
)ia\  c  -lu  CI  I'tled  so  far  in  Iwating  Rommel 
ill  (  \i.  iiaica  and  destroying  two-thirds 
'I  !ii-  tnr.  OS.  E\ery  tank,  every  aircraft 
-qii.ul'i  .n  was  needed.  It  is  only  by  the 
\  K  t' ru  -  on  the  Russian  flank  on  tlu- 
r.l.u  K  >t.i  nM«-t  that  we  have  been  spared 
the  (A.mmninu  oi  all  tho^e  vast  lands 
tioU'  {'::>■  I. IX  iiii  ti>  the  Caspian,  which  in 
tiini  ii\.  .ti.i->  to  India,  Persia,  the 
I'li-i.r.:    (.'lil.    ih.-    Nile    Valley    and    the 

Sllr.'    i\'\'..i] 

1  'lu  -li  !\-  nf  these 

''  -'  '  li  ni!i(,'i>.  will  SCO 

\s   iKiiii  ".slv    1  ill   n^'.'urcrs  havr 

i:ic-(i  aii'i  ti\-  V,  h  i!  ;:  --iiMn  inar^in 

■l      l'\-     wiial     ^Ui'ki  -     III     rurtuiif      !"r 

uliii!)    \vc  (  i  Min   tin  I  n  (lit      wc  lia\c   --ui 

\  iv '   '  •    •        ■~\  ' .{ r<     >h('iiUl    wt     h,->\i- 

i  I '  :  '.i      wr     had     yicltU-d 

\"        -  isi'  h     ua>      M>     loud 

Ihl.  .■  ..I    l..;i!    ;  ;ii  it    v.c   vhoidd 

in\  .h;i    !  ;    ;.>  ,  '.   (  oiMiim  •-.    \\'.- 

C.t;;  ■    n:t      illr'  iipll'll, 

■■  >  \\!n.    tii.l     11.. t 

ji  I   ;  'ai!      Mli.KjJK' 

V.  i;  ,  hi.  i'     ll    \^.' 

\).-,\    .u  .  '  -^ttl-.O 

l'\.  l\     !.  'ntlli.i. 

,\il%    a.  ;  ■    -.!.  .■L.:U  (ll  (HIT 


Ai!n\ 


d   .v.A   v^ou!d   i..- 


fighting  for  life  on  the  French  shores  «» 
on  the  shores  of  the  Low  Countries.  AH 
these  troubles  of  the  Far  East  and  the 
Middle  East  might  have  sunk  to  ia- 
significance  compared  with  the  question  of 
another  and  far  worse  Dunkirk. 

Here,  let  nne  say,  I  should  like  to  pay 
my  tribute  to  one  who  has  gone  from  us 
since  I  left  this  country,  Mr.  Lees-Smith. 
who,  I  remember,  spoke  with  so  much 
profound  wisdom  on  this  point  at  a 
moment  when  many  opinions  were  in  flax 
about  it.  His  faithful,  selfless  and  wae 
conduct  of  the  important  work  which  he- 
discharged  in  this  House  was  undoubtedly 
of  great  assistance  to  us  all,  not  only  to 
the .  Government  but  to  us  all,  in  the 
various  stages  of  the  war.  His  memory 
as  a  distinguished  Parliamentarian  ■wifi 
long  find  an  honoured  place  in  the  recol- 
lection of  those  who  had  the  fortune  to 
be  his  colleague. 

Sometirfes  things  can  be  done  by  say- 
ing '.'  Yes,"  and  sometimes  things  can  be 
done  by  saying  "  No."  Yet  I  suppose 
there  are  some  of  those  who  were  vocal 
and  voluble,  and  even  clamant,  for  a 
second  front  to  be  opened  in  France,  who 
are  now  going  to  come  up  bland  and 
smiling  and  ask  why  it  is  that  we  have 
not  ample  forces  in  Malaya,  Burma, 
Borneo  and  the  Celebes.  There  are  times 
when  --o  many  things  happen,  and  happen 
>(>  quickly,  and  time  seems  to  pass  in  such 
a  ua\  that  you  can  neither  say  it  is  long 
(II  >hort.  that  it  is  easy  to  forget  what  you 
have  said  three  months  before.  You  may 
fail  to  connect  it  with  what  you  are  advo- 
cating at  the  particular  moment. 
Throughout  a  long  and  variegated 
Parliamentary  life  this  consideration 
luis  led  me  to  try  and  keep  a 
wati^liful  eye  on  that  danger  myself. 
\  .111  IK  \<  r  can  tell.  1  here  are  also  people 
>,\1;..  t.dk  and  hvar  tln-insf-ives  as  it  they 
h.td  [ucpaH-i!  tor  this  war  with  great' 
.iiiiiatui  lit-,  and  long,  careful  preparation. 
P.tit  th..t  i.■^  not  tnu-.  In  two  and  a  half 
yi.u.--  o|  tightuig  wc  have  only  just 
ni.'.n.iced  to  keep  our  head>  a!K)ve  water. 
\\h<-u  1  w.i-^  i.dle<l  upon  to  be  Prime 
Miii!>t(i.  iiiiw  iieaily  two  years  ago, 
th.  u  v.,  u  ii.'t  111. my  appHiants  tor  the 
j'.i).  >  1.  ■  tii.  li,  perhaiis.  the  market  has 
in;,':.!^.'  Jli     spite     oi      the     shameful 

nr.:\''~.<  ■■-  •  .  si'.--  niiid'Jtt-..  blatant  incom- 
pi-ti  ;n  !  ,  1 1!  ipl.ii  <-iicy,  and  lack  of  organ- 
i-iu-;  povMi  -.^hich  ire  daily  attributed  to 
lis  ;iii-l  li.':i'  whi',  h  chidingv  we  endeav- 
nlU     ti:    ]>!■!!;:       \\i-    .ife     fiecHining     tu    see 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1965 


H'ar  Sttuiilwn 


27  JANUARY    i.j4i 


War    Sltudli' 


602 


our  way  througli.  It  looks  as  it  we  weif 
in  for  a  very  bad  time,  but  provided  wc 
all  stand  to^tlher.  and  provided  wc  throw 
in  the  last  spasm  of  our  strength,  it  also 
looks,  more  than  it  ever  did  before,  as 
if  we  were  going  to  win. 

\\'Tiile  facing  Germany  and  Italy  here 
and  in  the  Nile  Valley  we  have  never  had 
any  power  to  provide  effect i\tly  for  the 
defence  of  the  Far  East.  M\  whole  argu- 
ni«nt  so  far  has  led  up  to  that  point.  It 
may  be  that  this  or  that  might  have  been 
done  which  was  not  done,  but  we  have 
never  been  able  to  provide  effectively  for 
the  defence  of  the  Far  Ivast  against  an 
attack  by  Japan.  It  ha.s  been  the  policy 
of  the  Cabinet  at  almost  all  costs  to  avoid 
embroilment  with  Japan  until  we  were 
sure  that  the  United  States  would  also  be 
engagied.  We  even  had  to  stoop,  as  the 
House  will  remember,  when  we  were  at 
our  very  weakest  point,  to  close  the  Burma 
Road  for  some  months.  I  remember  that 
some  of  our  present  critics  were  very 
angry  about  it,  but  we  had  to  do  it. 
There  never  has  been  a  moment,  there 
never  could  have  been  a  moment,  when 
Great  Britain  or  the  British  Empire, 
single-handed,  could  fight  Germany  and 
Italy,  could  wage  the  Battle  of  Britain, 
the  Battle  of  the  Atlantic  and  the  Battle 
of  the  Middle  East — and  at  the  same  time- 
stand  thoroughly  prepared  in  Burma,  the 
Malay  Peninsula,  and  generally  in  the 
Far  East  against  the  impact  of  a  vast 
military  Empire  like  Japan,  with  more 
than  70  mobile  divisions,  the  third  navy 
in  the  world,  a  great  air  force  and  the 
thrust  of  80  or  90  millions  of  hardy,  war- 
like Asiatics.  If  we  had  started  to 
scatter  our  forct-  o\er  these  immense 
areas  in  the  Far  East,  we  should  have 
been  ruined.  If  we  had  moved  large 
armies  of  troops  urgently  needed  on  the 
war  fronts  to  regions  which  were  not  at 
war  and  might  never  be  at  war  we  .should 
have  been  altogether  wrong.  We  should 
have  cast  away  the  chance,  which  has 
now  become  something  more  than  a 
chance,  of  all  of  us  emerging  safely  from 
the  terrible  plight  m  wfn'ch  we  have  been 
plunged. 

We  therefore  have  .lain — I  am  putting 
it  as  buntly  as  I  can — for  nearly  two  years 
under  the  threat  of  an  attack  by  Japan 
with  which  we  had  no  means  of  coping. 
But  as  time  has  passed  the  mighty  Ignited 
States,  under  the  leadership  of  President 
Roosevelt,  from  reasons  of  its  own  interest 
and  safety  but  also  out  of  chivalrous 
No.  24 


regard  for  the  cause  of  fnedurri  and 
denKK-racy,  has  drawn  ever  neiirer  to  the 
conhnes  of  the  struggle.  And  now  that 
the  blow  has  fallen  it  doe^  noi  f.ili  on  us 
alone.  On  the  contran',  it 
united  forces   and    iinitcd   u.iti. 


upon 
which 

luring 
mil 
tvcr 


are   unquestionably    cajiab!'-   <■' 
the   stn);;;;lc,    of    retrieving; 
of    prcvcntint,'    aiiothi-r    sn. 
Ix'irtL;  <li-li\'ti<-(l   a;;;iin. 

There  is  ,ui  ..umhu.  nt  with  ulii.  !i  1  will 
deal  a^  I  p.-  .ilong  to  pursnc  n)\-  thein<^. 

It    is     ^;.wl     l.\'     Mini<-.      "    If     "'iK'     \""     ^''l?' 

orii,ini.-.<'.l  till- inunitions  produitK^n  of  this 
.nu:itr\-  jnopcrls'  and  had  had  .1  Mini  tr 
of  Pn)dti.  (ior\  (and  that  is  n<it  .1  oi'>"'''"f» 
which  >ho,)ld  be  dn-niatisol  uji-;!  rithir 
way)  it  wciuld  have  made  t  viivlhiuj.;  .ill 
right,  'llun-  would  have  !v.  n  .non^h 
for  all  needs.  We  should  h..vc  had 
enough  supplies  for  Russia,  eno\i:;li  well- 
equipped  squadrons  and  d;\  i-ii'H-  to 
defend  tlie  British  Islands,  to  .-n^t.un  tlie 
Miiidlc  Ea.st  and  tn  ann  the  F.ir  [•',.i-t 
eff'Ttivtly."  But  that  is  really  not  true. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  our  munitions  output 
is  g!i:;uiti<',  has  tor  .s(!nie  tunc  hou  \<Ty 
lar;;e  indted,  anrl  it  is  boundin.:  ::;'  ;ii  a 
m<v-'t  ninnrkatile  manniT.  In  t'l.  l,t-t 
ye.ir.  io.|T,  although  we  were  at  •>>.ii  c-  ■-<> 
m;in\-  the;ttres  and  on  so  inan\  fi";i:-.,  we 
h.iv.'  prwdnccd  more  tliari  doulilc  the 
munitions  equipment  ot  the  (.'in'ed  States, 
wnii!'.  was  arniint;  heavilw  tliouK'i  r>f 
cour.-»e  a  lap  fiehind  on  the  road.  ibis 
conditirai  will  naturally  be  rapidly  re- 
moved as  the  full  power  of  Atnerican 
industry  come  into  full  swing.  V,ai.  Sir, 
in  the  last  si.x  months,  thank-  to  the 
energies  of  Lord  Beaverhrook  m.l  the 
solid  spadework  done  by  hi-  predecessors 
and  the  passage  of  unv^ — lie  p.irticul.irly 
a  ks  nie  to  say  that — [An  Hos.  ME.\i- 
bkk:  "  Who  did?  "]— Lord  Beaverhrook; 
I  should  have  said  it  anyway — our  muni- 
tions output  has  risen  in  the  following 
re.spe(!.>.  We  are  producing  more  than 
twice  as  main'  far  more  compile  ati'd  guns 
ever\-  month  than  we  did  in  the  p-ak  of 
1917-18  war  period,  and  the  curve  is  ri- 
ing.  The  guns  are  inhntely  more  compli- 
cated. Tank  production  has  doubled  in 
the  last  SIX  months  Small  arms  produc- 
tion is  more  than  twice  what  it  was  six 
months  ago.  Filled  rounds  of  ammuni- 
tion have  doubled  in  the  last  si.x  months. 
I  could  go  on  with  the  catalogue,  but 
these  are  not  doublings  from  early  very 
small  totals,  they  are  doublings  from  the 
totals   we   boasted    about,    as    far  as   we 

C  2 


1966     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


603 


War  Situation 


HOrSK  OF  COMMONS 


War  Situation 


[lh<-  Pririu  Miiiisttr.l 
tlarid.  six  mmiths  a^o.  There  has  betTi 
an  iinnn  use  K-.ip  forward.  In  aircraft 
prodiK  li.in  thfi-  is  a  steady  increase  not 
only  in  thf  numbers  but  also  in  the  size 
and  <iuality  of  the  aircraft,  though  I  must 
»ay  there  has  not  been  all  the  increase 
which  1  had  hoped  for. 

But  ail  this  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
preparations  it  was  open  to  us  to  make 
«n  Mala\a  and  Hurma  and  generally  in 
the  Far  Kast.  The  limitiuf^  factor  has 
not  been  troops  or  even  equipment.  The 
Imutin.i;  factor  has  been  transport,  even 
assuming  we  had  wished  to  take  this 
measure  and  had  had  this  great  surplus. 
From  the  time  that  this  present  Govern- 
ment was  formed,  from  the  moment  it 
was  formed  I  may  sav,  every  scrap  of 
shipping  we  could  draw  away  from  our 
vital  supply  routes,  everv  U-boat  escort 
we  could  divert  from  the  Battle  of  the 
Atlantic ,  has  been  busy  to  the  utmost 
capacity  to  rarrv  troops."  tanks  and  muni- 
tions from  this  I>lan(l  to  the  F.ast.  There 
has  l)een  a  cea.seles.s  flow,  and  as  for  air- 
craft they  have  not  only  been  moved 
by  sea  but  by  every  route,  some  very 
dangerous  and  costly  routes,  to  the 
Eastern  battlefields.  '  The  decision  was 
taken.  a>  I  have  explained,  to  make  our 
contribution  to  Russia,  to  try  to  beat 
Komnnl  and  to  form  a  stronger  front 
from  the  Levant  to  the  Caspian.  It 
followed  from  that  decision  that  it  was  in 
our  pu\x(,  only  to  make  a  moderate  and 
partial  pro\i>ioii  in  the  Far  East  against 
the  h>potlutical  danger  of  a  Japanese 
onslaught.  Si.vty  thousand  men.  indeed, 
were  ( onceiitrated  at  Singapore,  but  pri- 
ority in  modern  aircraft,  in  tanks,  and  in 
anu-aircrafi  and  anti  tank  artillery  was 
ac<ordcd  to  the  Nile  Valley. 

l-or  this  dt■ci^ion  in  its  brcvad  strategic 
aspe.t-..  ;uh1  a]^>()  in  its  diplomatic  f>olicy 
in  rii^anl  to  Ru>sia,  I  take  the  fullest 
personal  rc'sjwnsibility.  If  we  have 
handled  onr  resources  wrongly,  no  one  is 
so  nil!,  h  to  blame  as  me.  If  we  have  not 
got  iarce  nuKlern  air  forces  and  tanks  in 
But  nil  and  Malaya  to-night  no  one  is 
more  a.,  oiimabie  "than  I  am.  Why  then 
should  1  l)f  called  upon  to  pick  out  scape- 
goats, to  throw  thi-  blame  on  generals  or 
airmen  or  sailors?  Why,  then,  should 
I  1:h"  callwl  upon  to  drive  away  loyal  and 
trusti'd  colleaguis  and  friends' to  appease 
the  clamour  of  certain  .sections  of  the 
British  and  Australian  Press,  or  in  order 
to   take    the   edge    off   our    reverses    in 


604 


Malaya  and  the  Far  East,  and  the  punish- 
ment  which  we  have  yet  to  take  there? 
I  would  In  ,i>tiamed  to  do  such  a  thing 
at  sucli  a  time,  and  if  I  were  capable  of 
doiiii.;  it,  hiii.vc  me,  T  should  be  incapable 
of  reiideiing  this  country  or  this  House 
any  further  service. 

]  say  that  without  in  the  slightest  degree 
seeking  to  relieve  myself  from  my  duties 
and  responsil)ility  to  endeavour  to  make 
continual  improvements  in  Ministerial 
positions.  It  is  the  duty  of  every  Prime 
Minister  to  the  House,  but  we  have  to 
be  quite  sure  that  they  are  improvements 
in  every  case,  and  not  only  in  every  case 
but  in  the  setting.  I  could  not  possibly 
descend  to,  as  the  German  radio  re- 
peatedly credits  me  with,  an  attempt  to 
get  out  of  difficulties  in  which  I  really  bear 
the  main  load  by  offering  up  scapegoats 
to  public  displeasure.  Many  people,  many 
very  well-meaning  people,  begin  their 
criticisms  and  articles  by  saying,  "  Of 
course,  we  are  all  in  favour  of  the  Prime 
Minister  because  he  has  the  people  l:)ehind 
him.  Hut  what  about  the  muddles  made 
by  this  or  that  Department;  what  about 
that  general  or  this  Minister?  "  But  I 
am  the  man  that  Parliament  and  the 
nation  have  got  to  blame  for  the  general 
way  in  which  they  are  served,  and  1  can- 
not serve  them  etlectively  unless,  in  spite 
of  all  that  has  gone  wrong,  and  that  is 
going  to  go  wrong,  I  have  their  trust  and 
faithful  aid. 

1  must  linger  for  a  moment  on  our 
politkal  affairs,  l)ecause  we  are  conduct- 
ing the  war  on  the  basis  of  a  full  de- 
incKracy  and  a  free  Press,  and  that  is  an 
attempt  which  has  not  been  made  before 
in  such  ciicunistaiue:,.  A  variety  of 
attacks  are  made  upon  the  composition  of 
the  Government.  It  is  said  that  it  is 
loniiid  ii{x>n  a  party  and  political  basis. 
But  io  is  the  House  of  Commons.  It  is 
silly  to  extol  the  Parliamentary  system 
and  then,  in  the  next  breath,  to  say, 
"  Away  with  partj'  and  away  with 
politics."  From  one  quarter  I  am  told 
that  the  leaders  of  the  Labour  party  ought 
to  be  dismissed  from  the  Cabinet.  This 
would  be  a  return  to  party  Government 
pure  and  simple.  From  opj"»osite  quartets 
it  is  said  that  no  one  who  approved  of 
Munich  .^hoult!  be  allowed  to  hold  ofhce. 
To  do  that  would  be  to  cast  a  reflection 
upon  the  great  majority  of  the  nation  at 
that  time,  and  also  to  deny  the  strongest 
party  in  the  House  any  proportionate 
share  in  the  National  Government,  which 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1967 


605 


Wf  Situation 


Wmf  SituaHo* 


«o6 


again,  in  turn,  might  cause  inconvenience. 
Even  mv  litjht  hon.  Friend  the  leader  of 
the  Liht  ral  {>art\'— [An  HoK.  MEMBER  : 
"  Who  is  he?  "]— the  Secretary  of  State 
for  Air,  whose  help  to-day  I  value  so 
much  and  with  whom,  as  a  Ufelong  friend, 
it  is  a  pleasure  to  work,  even  he  has  not 
escapeti  unscathed.  If  I  were  to  show 
the  slightest  weakness  in  dealing  with 
thest>  opposite  forms  of  criticism,  not  only 
should  I  deprive  my-elf  of  loyal  and  ex- 
perienct-d  colleat^Mu.-,  but  I  should  destroy 
the  National  Govt  riimcnt  and  rupture  the 
war-time  unity  of  I'arliament  itself. 

Other  attacks  are  directed  against  in- 

liividital   AI;!\i-ter->.       I  have  been  urged 

!•>  rn.ik,     u    .A.nrplc  of  the  Chancellor  of 

till'  Diuhv  c.\  Lancaster,  who  is  now  re^ 

tu;-r.in^  fiom  his  mission  in  the  Far  East. 

Thu-.    \\v    would    be   made   to   bear  the 

blame  f. .r  our  misfortunes.     The  position 

of  thr  Ch,u;cf'l!or  of  the  Duchy  of  Lan- 

'  i  of  the  Council  which 

'.Ml  ted  to  form  at  Singa- 

'•'•r<d   obsi)lete   by   the  de- 

i  r.  t.  iml  with  the  President 

-(.t  up  a  Supreme 

,in  ti-iiting  zone  in 

!  lu    -.\  ,.i<ic  lonceptioii  ol 

■■iiiiiuindt !  !■  ih.;t.  under  the 

<iu  I  ,.  \..  i;u:uul-    hi'   ^-cfvc-, 

hi  !.  I   ot  ,',',1  aiitiiorilie.--  in 

''■■  '    ■  '  iiim.      Ihi:?  would 


!t; 

«1. ; 
\ 

V.  .; 

I.i:  . 


,1- 


n!i;.  li  u..r<.  t 
voi:r  wis!ie> 

The  out?tandu 
tlie  Houx-  >hoiil< 
tile   puq-io-  ~    of 


tht 


.■i    tin- 

■h.-.    1 

iniialili- 

thtin,    "  1 

'•ratifv 


iifion    svliii,  ii 

j'iiii^THt  lit    tor 

impending  Division 


97  JANUARY  i94» 

is  whether  His  Majesty's  Govermnent 
were  right  in  giving  a  marked  priority  in 
the  distribution  of  the  forces  and  equip- 
ment we  could  send  overseas,  to  Russia, 
to  Libya,  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  to  the 
Levant-Caspian  danger  front,  and 
whether  we  were  right  in  accepting,  for 
the  time  being,  a  far  lower  standard  of 
forces  and  equipment  for  the  Far  East 
than  for  these  other  theatres.  The  first 
obvious  fact  is  that  the  Far  Eastern 
theatre  was  at  peace  and  that  the  oth* 
theatres  were  in  violent  or  imminent  war. 
It  would  evidently  have  been  a  very  im- 
provident use  of  our  limited  resources — as 
I  pointed  out  earlier—if  we  had  kept  large 
masses  of  troops  and  equipment  spread 
about  the  immense  areas  of  the  Pacific  or 
in  In>lia,  Burma  and  the  Malay  Penin- 
sula, standing  idle,  month  by  month  and 
perhaps  vear  by  year,  without  any  war 
of(  iirring.  Thus,  we  should  have  failed 
in  our  engagements  to  Russia,  which  has 
meanwhile  'Struck  stich  staggering  blows 
at  the  Gorman  Army,  and  we  should  have 
lost  the  battle  in  Cvrenaica.  which  we 
have  not  yet  won,  and  we  might  no%v  be 
ftghtini;  (](ftnsi\"elv  well  inside  the 
Ejzvptiau  frontier.  There  is  the  question 
on  whi  h  the  TTous<-  should  make  up  its 
mind.  We  had  not  the  resources  to  meet 
all  the  perils  and  pressures  that  came 
upon  us. 

But  thi<  quc-tion,  mtious  and  large  as  it 
is  by  itM-lf.  (anuot  Ix-  whollv  decided 
without  some  attempt  to  an>\ver  the 
further  question — what  was  the  likelihood 
of  the  Far  F.astern  tlu.iln-  be^.i^  thrown 
into  war  h\-  a  Japanese  attack''  1  have 
(  vpiai'iecj  how  ven,"  (Ulicat<  Iv  we  vva!k<-d, 
.'i!(l  iiow  painful  it  was  at  times,  how  very 
lareful  1  w,is  evers"  time  that  we  -hould 
not  he  exp-,):,  kJ  bin.;!ehandi  (!  to  this 
iiii-l  o;"ht  vvhiih  we  Wt  re  iitterl\-  incapable 
..:.  But  it  >ee!in<l  iM.'tioiia!  to 
i'i.it  in  the  la-^t  ^^.ix  months — which 
1-  v-iiii  !  a:n  prin<  ij'ally  tieahiiL;  with — 
thi-  I  ipane-<-,  having  thrown  av. ,t\-  their 
(ij>p'.r'i:iiii\-  of  att.ukini;  u-.  in  the 
..i.tiinn;  I't  lo^o,  wlirii  wt,'  Were  >o  much 
N'.'.ikii  so  mui  h  ]■■-■-  will-armed.  .ii\il  all 
aloMi-.  -h'.ii!<l  ,ti  ihi-  peiitKl  ha\'e  pluir.'ed 
i:it<>  ,i  <lf -.perate  struuj^le  a.cain>t  tlir  (.,m- 
hin.  li  l-Mrc  <,f  the  Bniish  ICn.inr.  and 
i'i<  I  -utrd  States  Neverthel» -s.  nations. 
like  individtials,  commit  irrati<uiai  acts, 
•;!  th<r<;  were  forces  at  work  in  j.ipan, 
'.:•■'.  nt.  niiiriKinus,  fanatical  and  ex- 
plosive fortes,  which  no  one  could 
measure. 


'  ii 

WUn  t)(; 

:j!.'.nes 

:u:iK 

>;  =  -  --li. 

ir  u  Is. 

uiiic 

h    \s<.i; 

U    be 

Hid 

i:av<- 

t<'     W 

.1  ~ 

(uir-s- 

-Wire 

1;;    i\: 

:'.'■  i\i>\\ 

.■!  t.h- 

1968     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


607 


War  Situation 


HOUSE  OF  COMMONS 


War  SituatioM 


608 


On  the  f)ther  hand,  the  probability, 
since  th.  Atlantic  Conffionce,  at  which  I 
discusM'd  thf-se  matters  with  Mr.  Roose- 
velt, that  thf  United  States,  even  if  not 
hcr><lf  attacked,  would  come  into  a^war 
ill  the  Far  Hast,  and  thus  make  final 
victorv  sure,  seemed  to  allay  some  of  these 
anxieties,  ("liat  expatation  has  not  been 
falj-iiied  by  the  events.  It  fortified  our 
British  dteision  to  use  our  limited  re- 
.sources  on  the  actiial  fighting  fronts.  As 
time  went  on,  one  had  greater  assurance 
that  if  Japan  ran  amok  in  the  Pacific, 
we  should  not  fight  alone.  It  must  also 
lie  n  in-  ::i!Hr<-<l  thnt  over  the  whole  of  the 
r  !  ihi  -1  en,-  l)roo(]<-d  the  great  power  of 
the  rnited  States  FJeet,  (oncentrated  at 
Hawaii  It  seemed  very  unlikely  tfiat 
Japan  would  attempt  the  distant  invasion 
»>f  the  Malay  Peninsula,  the  assault  upon 
Singapore,  and  the  attack  upon  the  Dutch 
Fast  Indie-,  while  leaving  b<>hind  them 
in  their  rear  this  great  American  Fleet 
However  to  strengthen  the  position  as  the 
situation  s<x-med  to  intensify  we  sent  the 
"  Prince  of  Wales  "  and  the  "  Repul.se  " 
to  form  t!u'  .sp<-ar-point  of  the  consider- 
able battle  forces  which  we  felt  ourselves 
at  length  .ibie  to  form  in  the  Indian 
Ocean.  We  reinforced  Singapore  to  a 
considerable  extent  and  Hong  Kong  to  the 
extent  which  we  were  advised  would  be 
sufficient  to  hold  the  island  for  a  long 
lime.      Beside^    this    in    minor    \^,^\■•^    w. 


took   wl-ai  prii.n.ti. 

On    ,7t!l     Hrrrniix  I 
-uiiHt-n      ittai  k.     .: 


>p<  !1    to    l: 


their 


.t  Wa- 

lime     luiiij. 


f..r, 


the  seas,  a  local  command  of  the  air  which 
will  render  their  expulsion  and  destruction 
a  matter  of  considerable  time  and  exertion. 

Here  I  must  point  out  a  very  simple 
strategic  truth.  If  there  are  1,000  islands 
and  100  valuable  military  key  points  and 
you  put  1,000  men  on  every  one  of  them 
or  whatever  it  may  be,  the  Power  that 
has  the  command  of  the  sea  and  carries 
with  it  the  local  command  of  the  air,  can 
go  around  to  every  one  of  these  places  in 
turn,  destroy  or  capture  their  garrisons, 
ravage  and  pillage  them,  ensconce  them- 
selves wherever  they  think  fit,  and  then 
pass  on  with  their  circus  to  the  next  place. 
It  would  be  vain  to  suppose  that  such  an 
attack  could  be  met  by  local  defence. 
You  might  disperse  1,000,000  men  over 
the>e  immense  areas  and  yet  only  provide 
more  prey  to  (he  dominant  Power.  On 
the  other  hand,  these  conditions  will  be 
reversed  when  the  balance  of  sea  power 
and  air  power  changes,  as  it  will  surely 
change. 

Such  is  the  phase  of  the  Pacific  war 
into  which  we  have  now  entere<l  I  can- 
not tell  how  long  it  will  last.  All  I  can 
teli  the  House  it  that  it  will  be  attended  by 
ver\-  iieavy  puni-shment  which  we  shall 
have  to  '  :v,!ur<',  ruui  that  piesently,  if  we 
I  -,ii.!  ju-t   now  about  the 


perse V.  it 

Kiissi.ii;    tioiit,    th 

odier  it  ■.      That 

"     '    .  .I'.iselves  to 

;  place  has  I 

,  ...  .     Hu-    ultimate 


M(i\l(i(  il 


boot  will  be  on  the 
,  win'  we  should  not 
it  rattled  bciause  this 
■en  capture<i.  because, 
pow(  r  of  th<-  I'nited 
!  luouuht  to  b.  ar,  the 
\i!|  be  broUL'ht  into  play, 
orward  rt  u •<■:.-■.  !.-..>ly  to 
,)1,  pr.Ai.liil  tll.'.l  we  per 
tisat  »<■  li.L;hl  ^^;th  ih. 
1  Ifii.ii  it\-,  ati:]  provided, 
remain  united. 

liki    to   e\prr-N.    in  the 


to   expri 


(Iniir.itiori    o! 

(|iia!it\  witli 
.\nny.  undt  r 
-ti(l  l)rilli<uitl_\ 

i.!-.  t'l,    hor<i.-- 
Iuirl<-1  .:i,iin-' 


t  n:;.  .1  St.,;.': 
M-(!her,  No, 
!!i  the  iiauie  oj 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE 


1969 


'99  ^"'  ^*^*'''*^ 

the  House,  to  the  Dutch,  who,  in  the  air 
and  with  theif  submarines,  their  surface 
craft,  and  their  solid  fighting  troop,  are 
playing  one  of  the  main  parts  m  the 
struggui  now  going  on  in  the  Malaysian 
Archipelago. 

We  have  to  turn  our  eyes  for  a  moment 
to  the  hard-fought  battle  which  is  raging 
upon  the  approaches  to  Singapore  and  m 
the  Malay  Peninsula.  I  am  not  going 
to  make  any  forecast  about  that  now,  ex- 
cept that  it  will  be  fought  to  the  last  inch 
by  the  British,  Australian  and  Indian 
troops,  which  are  in  the  line  together,  and 
which  have  been  very  considerably  rem- 
forced.  The  hon.  Member  for  the  Eye 
Division  of  Suffolk  (Mr.  Granville)  had  a 
very  sound  military  id^i  the  other  day, 
when  he  pointed  out  the  importance  of 
sending  rcmforcements  of  aircraft  to  assist 
our  ground  forces  at  Singapore  and  in 
Burma.  I  entirely  agree  with  him.  In 
fact,  we  anticipated  his  suggestion.  Before 
I  left  for  the  United  States,  on  I2th  Decem- 
ber, the  moment,  that  is  to  say,  when  the 
situation  in  Singapore  and  Pearl  Harbour 
had  disclosed  itself,  it  was  possible  to  make 
a  swift  redistribution  of  our  Forces.  The 
moment  was  favourable.  General  Auch- 
inleck  was  making  headway  in  Cyrenaica; 
the  Russian  front  not  only  stood  unbroken 
but  had  begun  the  advance  in  a  magnifi- 
cent counter-attack,  and  we  were  able  to 
order  a  large  number  of  measures,  which 
there  is  no  need  to  elaborate,  but  whith 
will  be  capable  of  being  judged  by  their 
results  as  the  next  few  weeks  and  the  next 
few  months  unfold  in  the  Far  Ea.>.t. 


War  SitMoHon 


6io 


When  I  reached  the  I'nitui  States, 
accompanied  by  our  principal  officeri,  and 
large  technical  staffs,  further  impt)rt:int 
steps  were  taken  by  the  President,  with 
my  cordial  assent,  and  with  tiie  best 
technical  advise  we  could  obtain,  to  move 
from  many  directions  everythin;^  that 
ships  could  carrj'  and  all  air  power  that 
could  be  Hown  transported  and  serviced 
to  suitable  points.  The  House  would  be 
very  ill-advised  to  suppose  that  the  st-vtri 
weeks  which  have  passed  since  7th 
December  have  been  weekj>  of  apathy  and 
indecision  for  the  English-speaking  world. 
Odd  as  it  may  seem  quite  a  lot  has  been 
going  on.  Hut  we  mu^t  not  nourish  or 
indulge  light  and  extravagant  hopes  or 
suppose  that  the  advantages  which  the 
enemy  have  gained  can  soon  or  easily  be 
taken  from  him.  However,  to  sum  up 
%Jb»d  and.t^q  ^o(^  toggtJiec^  in  sgi^jf  ^ 


«7  JANUARY  .1942 

the  many  tragedies  past  and  future,  aod 
with  all  pity  tor  those  ^ho  hare  suffered 
and  will  suffer,  I  must  profess  my  pro- 
found thankfulness  for  what  has  happened 
throughout  the  whole  world  in  the  last  two 
months. 

I  now  turn  lor  a  short  space— I  hope  I 
am  not  unduly  wearying  the  House,  but  I 
feel  that  the  war  has  become  so  wide  that 
there   are   many   aspects    that    must   be 
regarded—to  the  question  of  the  organisa- 
tion,   the    international,    inter-Alhed    or 
iuter-United  Nations  organisation,  which 
must  be  developed  to  meet  the  fact  that 
we  are  a  vast  confederacy.    To  hear  some 
people  talk,   however,   one  would   think 
that  the  way  to  win  the  war  is  to  miake 
sure  that  every  Power  contributing  armed 
forces  and  every  branch  of  these  armed 
forces  is  represented  on  all  the  coimcils 
and  organisations  which  have  to  be  set  up, 
and   that   everybody   is  fully   consulted 
before  anything  is  done.     That  is  in  fact 
the  most  sure  way  to  lose  a  war.     You 
have  to  be  aware  of  tiie  well-known  danger 
of  having  "  more  harness  than  horse,"  to 
quote  a  homely  expression.     Action  to  be 
successful  must  rest  in  the  fewest  number 
of  hands  possible.    Nevertheless,  now  that 
we  are  working  in  the  closest  partnership 
with  the  Inited  States  and  have  also  to 
consider   our   Alliance    with    Russia    and 
with  China,   as  well  as  the  tonds  which 
unite  us  with  the  rest  of  the   26  United 
Nations   and   with    our   Dominions,    it   is 
evident  tliat  our  system  must  become  far 
iT.oi;-  cornpU-x  than  heretofore. 

1  had  many  discussions  with  the  F'resi- 
dent  upon  the  .Xnglo-American  war  direc- 
tion, t  specially  as  it  affect.,  this  war 
against  japan,  to  which  Rns.sia  is  not  yet 
a  partv^  Tlic  physical  and  geographical 
difficulties  ot  finding  a  common  working 
centre  for  the  leaders  of  nations  and  the 
great  staff^  of  nations  wlinh  cover  the 
whole  L'lobc  ATv  insuperable.  Whatever 
plan  IS  rn.uie  will  be  open  to  criticism  and 
man\'  \alid  ol)Jectlon^.  Tlurc  is  no  solu- 
tion th.it  .an  t>e  fuiiud  where  the  war  can 
be  .liMU-.^.-d  in. ID  d;iy  to  day  fully  by  all 
the  le;?d!!ig  militarN'  and  political  aothori- 
ti.'.  ,.Mh  erned.  !  have,  liowxver,  arranged 
with  l're^idellt  Roo>eselt  tiiat  there  should 
he  a  bo<ly  m  'Washington  called  the  Com- 
biiietl  Chiefs  of  the  Staff  Connniltee,  con- 
si-ting  of  the  three  United  States  Chiefs 
of  the  Stall,  men  of  the  highest  di^tinc- 
tion,  and  three  high  otliccrs  representing 
and  acting  under  the  general  instructions 


1970     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


6n 


War  SiiuattoH 


HOUSE  OF  CX>MMONS 


Wmr  SittuMom 


9xa 


[Thf  Prime  Minister.] 
of  the  British  Chiefs  of  the  Staff  Com- 
mittet'  ill  London.  This  body  will  advise 
thf  PR'.^idont,  and  in  the  event  of  diver- 
gfnr«>  of  vit'W  between  the  British  and 
Amcritun  Chiefs  of  the  Staff  or  their 
representatives,  the  difference  must  be  ad- 
justed by  personal  agreement  between 
him  and  me  as  representing  our  respective 
countries.  We  must  also  concert  together 
the  close-^t  as.'^fKiation  with  Premier  Stalin 
and  (loin  raiissinn)  Chiang  Kai-Shek  as 
wcil  .i>  with  the  rest  of  the  Allied  and 
Associ:ilt<l  Powers.  We  shall,  of  course, 
also  remain  in  the  closest  touch  with  one 
anoflicr  on  all  important  questions  of 
policy 

!n  order  to  wage  the  war  effectively 
nL'.iiii^t  japan,  it  was  agreed  that  I 
sIkh'M  ]"ropose  to  tho.-e  cotirerned  the 
-ettiiKM'ii  of  a  Pacifu-  Council  in  London, 
on  (he  Ministerial  plane,  comprising  Great 
Britain,  \ii-tralia.  New  Zealand  and  the 
Diitrh  C,n\(rnmeiit.  ,^s«isted  by  the 
British  Chit  fs  of  the  Staff  and  the  great 
staff>  ort;.uiisitions  beneath  them,  I  was 
to  trv  to  form  and  focu-  a  united  view. 
This  w.iiilil  <  iial>lc  the  British  Common- 
Wf.ihh  ;,>  ;i(  t  as  a  whole  and  form  part 
of  Ti!:ip-  pI.mi-  whif-h  are  at  present  far 
ad\MM.e'!  for  r.'.ll.ihorttio'i  at  the  appro- 
priate I«viK  ill  thi-  -pheres  of  defence. 
foreii;ii  Cnr-  .in.l  .>iM->p]\-.  Thus  the 
unitrd  \  .  ■.>.  -.f  tfic  Britis!)  Commonwealth 
and  thr  Dui,  h  woul'l  he  transmitted,  at 
first,  on  the  Chiefs  of  the  Staff  level,  to 
f  t'u-  St.iff  Com- 
i""ton.  Ill  the 
t'vi  CM  thi    rnemhers 

onoot-..    (li.>seti- 


his  reply.  I  am  not,  therefore,  in  a  pooj. 
lion  to-day  to  armounce,  as  I  had  hap«A, 
the  definite  and  final  arrangements  for  Qm 
Pacific  Council. 

I  should  like  to  say,  however,  that 
imderlying  these  structural  arrangement 
are  some  very  practical  and  simple  fawis 
upon  which  there  is  full  agreement.  The 
Supreme  Commander  has  assumed  control 
of  the  fighting  areas  in  the  South-West 
Pacific  called  the  "  A.B.D.A.  "  area— 
A .  B .  D.  A — called  after  the  countries 
which  are  involved,  not  the  countries 
which  are  in  the  area  but  the  countries 
which  are  involved  in  that  area,  namely, 
America,  Britain,  Dutch  and  Australasia. 
We  do  not  propose  to  burden  the  Supreme 
Commander  witfi  frequent  instructions. 
He  has  hi^  general  orders,  and  he  has 
addressed  himself  with  extraordinary 
buoyancy  to  his  most  dif&cult  task,  and 
President  Roosevelt  and  I,  representing, 
f.>r  my  pnrt,  the  British  Government,  are 
detirniined  that  he  shall  have  a  chance 
and  a  free  hand  to  carry  it  out.  The 
action  in  the  Straits  of  Macassar  under- 
takei)  by  forces  assigned  to  this  area 
app.ircntly  has  had  verj'  considerable 
stKees^,  of  the  full  extent  of  which  I  am 
not  \i  t  advised.  The  manner  in  which 
«.>i.ni'r,d  Wavell  took  up  his  task,  the 
sj).  (.1  wall  whith  he  ha.^  tlown  from  place 
to  place,  ilie  telegram^,  which  he  has  sent 
lii-.-ifibinj;  the  methods  by  which  he  was 
i;iappliii^  With  the  situation  and  the  form- 
infj  ol  tile  ( enlral  organism  which  was 
liiidid  to  cieai  with  it— ail  this  has  made 
;i  iiiti-l  ;a\oiirabie  iniprea_-,ion  upon  the 
hif;li  oliiurs,  military  and  poiilicaJ,  whom 
I  nut  in  the  L'luled  State.-j,  This  is  all 
etjiii-;  oil.  (Mir  duty,  upon  wiiii,ii  we  have 
t>(.vii  I  ■- iii.-la!iil_\'  eiigagf'd  ior  some  lirue, 
is  I.,  p.i.-o  leiuioreenieiu?  oi  every  kind, 
<.-pi'  i.iti\'  air,  inXu  the  new  war  zone,  from 
iMiv  ijuarler  and  by  (very  ineaua,  with 
tlie  liliiiost  .".peed. 

Ill  i.jiiir  to  I  .Ktend  the  -)>lein  oi  unified 
i  <..,ii.i.  Hti  \siiiiii  h...-.  iKfti  set  up  in  the 
■  .\.l*.l  >,.-\."  .in.;-  thai  i?.  to  sa>',  the 
\<.l  I'atilii — wiieie  th.e  actual 
1-  ;-'oiii<  oil.  in  order  to  extend 
tli.il  ■,-iri:;  1. 1  ail  ar^•,(^>  ill  wliii.!,  the 
iMr<  I  ■  o!  i:.'i!c  than  one  oi  the  I'liiied 
.\.iii.in^  \k<  aiiM-  th.d  is  the  term  we  have 
.i-loMN..!  will  in  ..juralint:,  the  i';a.stvv.ird 
a}ipin.nle-  t<.  .xu-tralia  dwd  New  Zealand 
h.nt  hi  t'!i  -t\!'d  liie  An/.ic  ana,  and  are 
under  liiitcd  State-  eoiumand.  the  com- 
nniuieatioiis  lietween  the  Anzac  area  and 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1971 


6x$  r«r  SUuaUon  tf  JANUARY  1942 

America  are  a  United  States  responsibility, 
whUe  the  communications  across  the 
Indian  Ocean  and  from  India  remain  a 
British  responsibility.  All  this  is  now  work- 
ing, while  the  larger  constitutional,  or  semi- 
constitutional,  discussions  and  structural 
arrangements  are  being  elaborated  by  tde- 
Hrams  passing  to  and  wo  between  so  many 
Governments.  AH  this  is  now  working 
fciBy  and  actively  from  hour  to  hour,  and 
it  must  not.  therefore,  be  supposed  that 
any  necessary  military  action  has  been 
hfOd  up  pending  the  larger  structiual 
arrangements  which  I  have  mentioned. 

Now  I  come  to  the  question  of  our  own 
Empire    or   Commonwealth    of   Nations. 
The  fact  that  Australia  and  New  Zealand 
are  in  the  immediate  danger  zone  rein- 
forces the  demand  that  they  should  be 
represented  in  the  War  Cabinet  of  Great 
Britain  and  Northern  Ireland.     We  have  . 
always  been  ready  to  form  an  Imperial 
War  Cabinet  containing  the  Prime  Minis- 
iets  of  the  four  Dominions.     Whenever 
any  of  them  have  come  here  they  have 
taken  their  seats  at  our  table  as  a  matter 
of  course.     Unhappily,   it  has  not  been 
possible  to  get  them  all  here  together  ?.t 
once.    General  Smuts  may  not  be  able  to 
come  over  from  South  Africa,   and   Mr. 
Mackenzie  King  could  unfortunately  stay 
only  for  a  short  time.      But  Mr.   Fraser 
was  with  us,  and  it  was  a  great  pleasure 
to  have  him.  and  we  had  a  three  months' 
visit  from  Mr.   Monzies,  which  was  also 
a  great  success,   and   we   were  all   very 
sorry  when  his  most  vahiable  knowledge 
of  our  affairs  and  the  war  position,  and 
his  exceptional  abilities,  were  lost.     For 
the  last   three   months   we  have  had   Sir 
Earle    Page    representing    the   Common- 
wealth Government  at  Cabinct.s  when  war 
matters  and  Australian  matters  were  under 
distmssioii    and    aj.so.    in    similar   rircum- 
stancrs    upon    the     Defeui  f    Commiltee, 
As  a  matter  of  t:tct  this  l!a^  .ilways  been 
interpreted  in  tin-  m<)•^t  lirnad  and  elastie 
fashion.     The      ,-\ii.-tralian      (jnvernment 
have    now    asked    .-jieciheally    "  that    an 
accredited  rtpresenlative  of  the  Common- 
wealth Government  should  have  the  right 
to  be  heard   in  the  War  Cabinet  in  the 
formulation  and  the  direction  of  policy." 
We  have  of  course  agreed  to  this.     New 
Zealand   feels   bound    to   ask    for   similar 
representation,  and  the  same  facilities,  will 
of   course    be    available   to   Canada    and 
South  Africa.    1  he  presence  at  the  Cabinet 
table    of    Dominion    representatives    who 
have  no  power  to  take  decisions  and  can 


War  Sititatum 


614 


only  report  to  their  Governments  evidently 
raises  some  serious  problems  but  none,  I 
trust,  which  caimot  be  got  over  with  good 
will.  It  must  not,  however,  be  supposed 
that  in  any  circumstances  the  presence  of 
Dominion  representatives  for  certain  pur- 
j>oses  could  m  any  way  affect  the  collec- 
tive responsibility  of  His  Majesty's  Ser- 
vants in  Great  Britain  to  Crown  and 
Parliament. 

I  am  sure  we  all  sympathise  with  our 
kith  and  kin  in  Australia  now  that  the 
shield  of  British  and  American  sea  power 
has,  for  the  time  being,  been  withdrawn 
from  them  so  unexpectedly  and  so  tragi- 
cally and  now  that  hostile  bombers  may 
soon  be  within  range  of  Australian  shoteS^'- 
We  shall   not  put   any  obstacle   to  tfci« 
return  of  the  splendid  Australian  trooj^ 
who  volunteered  for  Imperial  service  to 
defend  their  own  homeland  or  whatever 
part  of  the  Pacific  theatre  may  be  thought 
most  expedient.     We  are  taking  many 
measures  in  conjunction  with  the  United 
States  to  increase  the  security  of  Australia 
and  New  Zealand  and  to  send  them  rein- 
forcements, arms  and  equipment  by  the 
shortest  and  best  routes.      1   always  hesi- 
tate to  express  opinions  about  the  future, 
because   thiujLjs   turn  out   so  \er>-   oddly, 
but  I  will  go  so  far  as  to  sav  that  it  m.iy 
be  that  the  fapane.M-,  whose  game  i^  wliat 
1  may  rail    "  to  nviks'  hell   while  the  .-un 
shines,"  are  more  likelv  to  oeiupv  the.m- 
seives  in  se>  urinj,'  their  litli  pri/i-  in  tlu- 
Philippine-,    tile   L)ut<. h    V„,><    liulu-    orl 
the   .Malawm    .Ai.  hipel,)g.i  .'IkI    hi    .  ■  :  i  1 
island  b.i^e,-^  for  (i<  Icnsive  purpo  '■■  '  .1 
att;e  k  M'hi'  h  ir,  (■•l)\i<iii:.'\'  <  fuu!; 
them  ai  iv>  t.M'e;a  i!i-ta!.i .    d   !; 
nieudfiii- 'iii-:,i-:clil  whi.!'.  v.  iii  ■  '.i'a: ..:  .k-h^-- 
the   futurr  in   ni\2   and    i'<.}.v       -^'i    H<)N. 
MtMlu-.u:  '    104}  .uid  104s?   "       Ni'.  I  di> 
not  think  we  i.tii  -tret-  ii  our  \  ie\\  -  I-  ','';!'i 
tlii'-r    iI.iN  ~.    inil.    ai;.un,     v.e 


ini;-t  >i  e 
how  s\e  t^o.  I  thmk  tiie\'  aie  inia  ii  in-'p 
like'y  t"  be  atraii.L;!U,t;  tlu  hi-iIm  .-  in  \\«--i. 
di>tri<-t.^  \shi<h  tiii\-  ha\  t  !ii  ,1  la  ir.- 
likely  to  take  than  m  imd.  itak-,  .1  -e:>'i!- 
ma.-b  invasion  of  Au-traiia.  That  would 
seem  to  be  a  very  ambitious  overseas 
operation  for  Japan  to  undertake  in  the 
precarious  and  limited  in'er\-.d  before  the 


IJritish   and   Anurii 
they   must   eertainh    i 
new  building  tb 
either    rea-sonv- 
mand    of   the   1',.  iw 
everything  iti   hiiman 


r 


-  regain — a> 

ilirough   the 

,'.   and  for 

ble   com- 

,'fnwev.r, 

that    we    '.\n 


do  to  help  Auatr.dia.  or  pcr-.uide  ,\ineri<:a  - 


1972     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


615 


War  Situation 


HOUSE  OF  COMMONS 


War  Situation 


616 


to  do,  we  will  do;  and  meanwhile  I  trust 
that  rtpro.ichL-ii  and  recriminations  of  all 
kinds  will  be  avoided,  and  that  il  any 
are  niadi.',  we  in  Britain  will  not  take  part 
in  them. 

Let  me,  in  conclusion,  return  to  the  ter- 
rific changes  which  have  occurrtxJ  in  our 
affairs  during  the  last  few  months  and 
particularly  in  the  last  few  weeks.  We 
have  to  consider  the  prospects  of  the  war 
in  1942  and  also  in  1943,  and.  as  I  said 
just  now,  it  is  not  useful  to  look  further 
ahead  than  that.  The  moment  that  the 
United  States  was  set  upon  and  attacked 
by  japan.  Germany  and  Italy— that  is  to 
say,  within  a  few  days  of  December  7, 
1941 — I  was  sure  it  was  my  duty  to  cross 
the  Atlantic  and  establisli  the  closest  pos- 
sible relationship  with  the  President  and 
Government  of  the  United  States,  and  also 
to  de\(lop  the  closest  contacts,  personal 
and  professional,  betwt>en  the  I^ritish 
Chiefs  of  Staff  and  their  trans-Atlantic 
deputies,  and  with  the  American  Chiefs  of 
Staff  who  were  there  to  meet  them. 

Having  crossed  the  Atlantic,  it  was 
plainly  my  duty  to  visit  the  great 
Dominion  of  Canada.  The  House  will 
have  read  with  admiration  and  deep 
intertst  the  speech  made  by  the  Prime 
Mini-ter  of  Canada  yesterday  on  Canada's 
i:reat  and  growing  contribution  to  the 
common  cause  in  men,  in  money,  and 
in  materials.  A  notable  part  of  that  con- 
trihutinn  is  the  litiancial  offer  which  the 
CaMidiaii  (".(ivcrnrnent  ha\c  made  to  this 
conntr\-.  The  sum  involved  in  oik'  billion 
Canadian  dnllir^,  about  (jjs, 000,000.  I 
kiK.w  the  !li':'-r  wil'i  wi-h  nic  to  iimvi-y 
tn  thi-  (..'A  ( I  !i;:u  at  of  (  aiiada  our  liv<!\- 
ij'pir.  i.itioii  di  tlnir  limi-l\-  aiul  most 
^(■.I'lii;,-  olv.r.  Jt  i-  uiu.ju.dji'd  in  its 
-.  .ir  ill  til.'  wlu'lv  hi--iiir>'  ut  the  Brit!-.h 
l.!i:i!iri\  .iIk]  It  ]>  .1  (iiuvinung  pruof.  ol 
'Av  (i<  li  nr.iMitioii  of  C'.Uiacia  to  niai<r  lu-r 
:n,'.\!in!Mn  (.oatrilMitiort  towards  the  >uc- 
if~--iii!  proMA  utiiin  of  tin    war. 

!>':riii._;  tho-i  tlinr  nvih'k.  uiii.  b  I  -p<  tit 
iii  Mr.  Kt.(i-.-\i  ir->  hoiiii-  an.l  laimK  .  I 
.-;  .r)!:-!u'a  \sitli  hint  ri!atn>;,...  ;i>'t  <■:,];-  .<i 
I  ')u;:.'  A  -!iij>.  biii,  i  iliiak  1  iiiav  .-<i\'.  lu 
friiii'I-liip.  \Vr  lai;  .-.av  aiuthin;.;  to  '  .n  h. 
olh'.T.  h"Wr\-(r  painful.  W  lim  wi  [vnu-.i 
he  wniii;;  ii^y  hand,  .sa\;)!-,  "  \\i-  vvill 
tsciit  this  thmui'li  •..  !!),■  bilter  end,  wliat- 
c\cr  the  (ci-t  iiM\-  h.-."  I'alntid  him  ii->-- 
th»'  ,i.;i'^,,uiti'  atnl  'aithirtn  uniiiohih-i  il 
gii^antic  p<i\srr  ,,',  thr  p..-npl._-  ,.f  the  Cuit.  ij 


States,  canning  with  them  in  their  life  and 
cieath  struggle  the  entire,  or  almost  the 
entire.  Western  hemisphere. 

At  Washington,  we  and  our  combined 
staffb  surveyed  the  entire  scene  of  the  war, 
and  we  reached  a  number  <^f  important 
practical  decisions.  Some  of  them  affect 
future  operations  and  cannot,  of  course, 
l>e  mentioned,  but  others  have  been  made 
public  by  declaration  or  by  events.  The 
vanguard  of  an  American  Army  has 
already  arrived  in  the  United  Kingdom. 
Ver>-  considerable  forces  are  following  as 
opportimity  may  serve.  These  forces  will 
take  their  station  in  the  British  Isles  and 
face  with  us  whatever  is  comirtg  our  way. 
They  impart  a  freedom  of  movement  to  all 
forces  in  the  British  Isles  greater  than  we 
could  otherwise  have  possessed.  Numerous 
United  States  fighter  and  bomJ^er  squad- 
rons will  also  take  part  in  the  defence  o^ 
Britain  and  in  the  ever-increa.sing 
bombing  offen-i\'e  a<  liiist  Germany. 
The  I'nited  States  Navy  is  linked 
in  the  mo.st  intimate  tmion  with 
the  Admiralty,  both  in  the  Atlantic 
and  the  Pacific.  We  shall  plan  our  Naval 
moves  together  as  if  we  svcre  literally  one 
people. 

In  the  ne.xt  place,  we  fr,rmed  this  league 
of  26  United  Nations  in  which  the  prin- 
<  ipal  partners  at  the  prev«Tit  time  are 
Gnat  Britain  and  the  British  Kmpire,  the 

Uiiited  Stat. .-,  the  Union  of  Sex  i.ilist  Soviet 
Ki  publics  of  Ku.<sia.  and  the  Kepiiblic  of 
China,  tnL,'ether  with  the  <f out  hearted 
pit.  h-,  atid  the  represent, iti\t's  of  the  re.>t 
of  the  2h  powers.  This  Union  is  based 
<.;i  the  priueiples  of  the  -\i!antic  Charter. 
It  ..ini-.  at  the  (ie-trui  tion  of  Hitlerism  in 
;,i'i  'I-  f'Tins  and  inanifestatiotis  in  every 
ii.i::.r  "f  th.e  '.;lol)e.  We  will  march  for 
vvar-1  together  until  ev«  r\'  vestige  of  thi-j 
\in;iin\'  lias  been  e.\tirpat<  (i  from  the  lift- 
ol  the'woric!. 

ThitdiN',  as  1  li  i\c  I  \ji!,m:u  il  at  some 
]■  nuth,  \\e  addn-ssed  ourseh'es  to  the  war 
acai'i-t  Japan  and  to  the  nva-ure-  to  In- 
t.ike'i  to  <lefend  .-Xu-tr.dia,  X' w  /•  .ihui ',, 
the  Netlietluids  l'"..i-t  Indie-,  M.ilaya, 
Pairni.i,  ;iMd  India  a^Miiist  J.it>iMi<  >.  ,it<,i(  !; 
or  iu%a--ion. 

!•  Mirtiiiw  v,e  h.ive  e^taMi~hed  a  vast 
.  oiinno;)  1'  .!  Ill  \se  ipit;i~  ;ind  minutions, 
of  r.iw  ••!  •  r>  il-  ,iiui  oi  shipjiim,',  the  out- 
lii)',  of  u';:,  '1  :i,t-  ;>i  (  n  -it  forth  in  a  -<  rics 
ol  iiii!iior.t;ii|.i  '.shi\}i  I  h,!\e  itnlialled 
with  th"  I're-'il.;!!  ]  had  a  talk  with 
fiiai  la -t  nu:h!  ■■:.  lii'-  telephone,  as  a  result 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1973 


617  War  Situation  ij  JANUARY   1943 

of  which  an  announcement  has  been  made 
in  the  early  hours  of  this  morning  in  the 
United  States,  and  I  have  a  White  Paper 
for  the  House  which  will  be  available,  I 
think,  in  a  very  short  time.     Many  people 
have    been   staggered    by   the    figures  of 
prospective     American     output    of    war 
weapons  which  the  President  announced 
to    Congress,    and    the    Germans    have 
affected  to  regard  them  with  incredulity. 
I  can  only. say  that  I^rd   Beaverbrook 
iind  I  were  made  acquainted  beforehand 
with  all  the  bases  upon  which  these  colos- 
sal programmes  were  founded,  and  that  I 
myself  heard  President  Roosevelt  confide 
their    specific     tasks    to    the    chiefs    of 
American  industry  and  I  heard  these  men 
iccept  their  procfigious  ta-sks  and  declare 
that   they   would  and   could  fulfil   them. 
Most    important   of    all    is    the    multipli- 
>  ntion  of  our  joint  tonnage  at  sea.     The 
Aniorican  programmes  were  already  vast, 
■f  h»y  h.ive  ))een  inrreasrcl  in  the  propor- 
tion of  TOO  to  nearly  ifx).       If  thev  are 
computed,    as   completed    I   bt-licvo   they 
will  he,  \vc  shall  be  able  to  mo\-e  acros.s 
the  o-ean   spaces   in   1043   two,    thrf"°   or 
even   four  times   as   laref  annir-s   as    the 
considerable  forces  we  .ire  able  to  handle 
It  SC.-1  at  the  present  time. 

I  expect — and  I  have  mnde  no  s<cr>t 
of  it  -that  we  shall  both  of  us  re.  ei\<- 
severe  iU-iis.itje  at  the  hands  of  the 
•  Japanes"  in  10^2,  !)iit  I  believe  we  shall 
ircsr-nflv  ret'ain  tin-  n.ival  rf)mm<ind  of 
th.-  I'.i;  ifir  itirl  l)e;.;in  to  fst,i!)h"sh  an  affec- 
tive- supf-riority  in  the  air,  and  then  later 
on.  wit!i  the  great  basic  areas  in 
Au.^tr,il.i>ia,  in  India  and  in  the  Dutrh 
Flast  Indies,  we  shall  b"  able  to  set  about 
our  task  in  good  style  in  1043-  ^<  i^  no 
doubt  true  that  the  defeat  of  Jap-i'i  will 
not  necessarily  entail  the  defeat  of  Hitler, 
whereas  the  defeat  of  Hitler  would  <iiable 
the  whole  forces  of  the  united  nations  to 
be  conrentrated  upon  the  defeat  of  Jap.in. 
Hut  fix  re  i^  no  .j'ustiun  of  r'-e.irdiiK'  the 
war  in  the  P.i<  iti<  as.  a  secondary  op.ra 
tion.  The  orilv  limitation  .ippliecl  to  it- 
visoroiK  proM-i  ntion  will  be  the  shippiiii: 
available  at  anv  f,'iven  time 

it  i.-.  !no?,t  impijrtant  that  wv  should  not 
overlook  the  enormous  contribution  of 
Chiud  to  this  >trug^!e  for  world  freedom 
and  democracy.  I{  there  is  any  lesson 
I  h,ave  brought  ba<  k  from  the  United 
Statc^  that  I  <  onld  ixpress  in  one  word, 
it  would  be  •  (  hina  '■  f  That  is  in  all 
their  minds.  When  we  f.el  the  sharp 
military  qualities  of  the   Japltnese  soMk  ry 


War  Stluation 


618 


in  contact  with  our  own  troops,  although 
of  course  very  few  have  as  yet  been  en- 
gaged, we  must  remember  that  China, 
ill-armed  or  half -armed,  has,  for  four  and 
a  half  years,  single  handed,  under  its 
glorious  leader  Chiang  Kai-shek,  with- 
stood the  main  fury  ot  Japan.  We  shall 
pursue  the  struggle  band  in  hand  with 
China,  and  do  ever5^hing  in  our  power 
to  give  them  arms  and  supplies,  which  is 
all  they  need  to  vanquish  the  invaders  of 
their  native  soil  and  play  a  magnificent 
part  in  the  general  forward  movement  of 
the  United  Nations. 

Although  I  feel  the  broadening  swell  of 
victory  and  liberation  bearing  us  and  ail 
the  tortured  peoples  onwards  safely  to  the 
final  goal,   I  must  confess  to  feeling  the 
weight  of .  the  war  upon  me  even  more 
than  in  the  tremenilous  summer  days  of 
IQ40.     There  are  so  many  fronts  which 
are  open,  so  many  vulnerable  points  to 
defend,  so  many  inevitable  misfortunes, 
so  many  shrill  voices  raised  to  take  ad- 
vantage, now  that  we  can  breathe  more 
freely,  ol  all  the  turns  and  twists  of  war. 
Therefore,  1  feel  entitled  to  come  to  the 
Houst;  of  ('oinmoii!-,  vvlio-c  servant  1  am, 
and    ask   thcin    iiot.    to   press   me   to   act 
against   my   cousin  n(  c   and    better  judg- 
ment and  make  s<.a[)<.7^oats  in  order  to  im- 
pro\c  my  own  po-ition,   not  to  prcas  me 
to  do  the  things  which  may  be  clamoured 
fur  at  tile  moment  but  which  will  not  help 
in  our  war  et'tort,   but,   on  the  contrary, 
to  ^.^ivc    Mir    th"  ir   (  ncouiagement   and    to 
give  ine  their  aid.      1  have  never  viiitured 
to   prediti   the   future.        I   stand  by   my 
orji^inal  pro^^rauniic,  blood,  toil,  tears  and 
sweat,   which   i>  :iil    I    have  ever  ottered, 
to    which    I    adcird,    five    months    later, 
many  slujrtconun^s,   rmstakes  and  dis- 
apjKjintmi  lit.-.."      Hut   it   is  because   1  see 
the  light  gleatnui^  behuid  the  clouds  and 
br(/adeninf4  on  (jur   p..ll;,  that   I   make  so 
bold  now  :1^  to  (iifnani! 
t.  orilidcni  e  ot   thr   }](»!.. -!■ 
aii   .uldition.il   wiMjii  I!   in 

Uil         inil!(    li        11    llll   'I!   ^. 


.1  (le<  laration  <>i 
ol  < DinuKJUs  as 
tin    ainioury  ol 


Mr.  I'clhick- Lawrence  lulinburgh, 
Ma^tj :  'llie  I'rinir  .Mini.-iet  lia-  drawn,  iji 
Jus  own  inimil.iiil'  nunnu,  a  compre- 
hensive picture  ol  what  ha-,  been  happen- 
ing all  ovi  r  the  world  during  the  last  six 
\\eek>>  while  he  lias  been  away  from  us, 
an<l  ot  all  tiie  di-poMtimis  tiiat  have  beer, 
made  for  the  major  tontroi  of  the  war.  I 
have  no  inteati<in  of  .itn  .  i|  .:;n.;  t(j  em- 
l•t■!li^h.   ^till  Ir-.-,  '  ,   -,  •      1   ,t  piiture. 

Willi    1    p!(i(>o-i  itenipt   to 


1974     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  93 


INCOMITIG       CABL^J 

•r/s 

Ser. 
Ho. 

Hesaane 

Center 

Bufflber 

Source 

Class- 
ifica- 
tion 

Time 
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in  fi/S 
froa 
H/C* 

I^te 
ret'd 
to  E/S 
for  File 

Dis- 
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tion 

ITine            R/S 
Delivered  Clerh 

to              ia.Tr- 
Executive  ing  to 
Office         Bx.Ofc. 
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Eecord  Section                                   1 
Messafte  Center                          Dates 

DECS    1941 

See  ft 

ifis  i; 

EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  1975 

EXHIBIT  NO.  94 


WAR    DEPARTMENT 

WASHINGTON.  D.  C. 


Room  4D757 
The  Pentagon 


18  December  1945 

JdCRANDim  FOR  MR.  iCTTCHELL: 

Pursuant  to  your  request  there  are  inclosed  herewith 
the  Magic  messages  from  the  Japanese  Ambassador  in 
Washington,  transmitting  the  documents  handed  to  him  by 
the  Secretary  of  State  on  26  November  1%1. 


15 1^ 
HARJDN  DUNCCMBE 

Lt.  Col.,  GSC 


Incls . 


1976     CONGRESSIONAL  IN\^STIGATI0N  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


1 

K        '•"r-i    ;        -L    .   ,  ton   (.lonura) 
■;      To;         yok/o 

MoreiBber  ^t,  1941. 
':       i\xrple.    (  n,  Ush   text) 

,1192.                        (.art  1  or  4) 

if                                      Orftl . 

1'                                           tricil,                         ^, 

■                                            "ov^embcr   ,.'l,    ly^l. 

:i-    rf  Tfs.-nt   Liv-s    >r  trc     ov.r  :iBrat  cl    t. 

^^W 

HF 

■t.t^«.--.i.-t    U.     ..V,    -.::•,.:    ,:...,  ,..^,   b.crc.r.,i.,    ■• 

K 

rf/eraJ   t>c<nt  n  l.,for-ai    -r  (  «>x;  Ic- jt«r,    c.-.nv.T:                   .,    . 

,■  .,f 

^P' 

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'- .  re 

\\i''; 

'  r 

.     Oltt- 

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:.3  J 

r>  tries: 

1    ■    1        .  •■ 

.    MS 

ARMY 

Sfr.RFT 

wLuI\l  1                           -   •           -.      ... 

EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  1977 

SECRET 


frmn     VMixingUm  (Iwwur*) 
Toi         Takjro 
Mm— b«r  U,   1941 
IlirpX*  (AacXii^  T«Kt) 
(.tattrmmHj  Orgwat) 

#UM.  nurt  2  «r  4. 

It  1*  b«li»««4  ttalt  in  our  dia«u««loo»  »ow 
yrwBT— >  !»•  >««D  ai^*  to  r«f«r«M«  «•  th«  o«>or*l  prlsalplaa 
wilUh  MMtitwt*  tiM  bMla  ar  •  pmrntrntuX  ••ttUMnt  •«wrla& 
«to  aatlr*  H^rlfl*  *r«a..     teawttly  th*  J»pUM»M  ital)a«Hutor 
))»•  HMit**  that  tha  Jkp«ii*»«  OvrvrnHnBt  la  Aaalrou*  ot  iitm- 
tlasdae  Um  aomraraaticoa  41r«ctod  toiMurA  a  eonprahassaiT* 
n4  pmmttmX  tmi^lmmnt  ia  tt«  flMifla  araat  tlMit  it  would 
te  halpftol  taw.rd  araatlac  an  ataaai^rc  tttror^hlm  to  tha 
aaaaaaaful  aotaaata  of  tha  ooirraraatlciea  Lf  a  taaiporary 
Vw^wa  Tl-vvadll*  aauld  tw  agraad  opeu  to  ba  ^  eiTfaet  ta^la 
tlM  aamraraatlau  laak&Bg  to  »  yaaeaful  ••ttlaaMnxt  i     th« 
Main*  «ar«  aastinuiac.     Qb  ttmmbmr  20  tfaa  MpuauM  Jriba^aa^ar 
■  I— iiialiata4  t«  tfaa  taarwtary  of  Stata '  prapoaada  la  fg>fa^  to 
'tan^arafT'  aaaao i<aa  to  ]>a  tmkaa  raapaatiTalj'  hf  tba  OovaroBaat 
af  Jbyaai  aM4  Iqr  tka  OovamaMBt  of  tha  Otltad  Stataa.  vhloh 
■MLata^aa  ara  mdaratood  t«  hKra  haan  immig/ufi  to  aootnpiiah 
tba  ywrpaaa  abava  lJtdlaa.tad. 


AMIY  SECfiET 


79716  O — 46 — pt.  1( 


1978     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

SECRET 


Toi         Takjro 

fun.  part  S  af  4. 

To  ta  bmtM.mA  la  ^iiiimm*  ••A*. 

Sm  OgrwwKnt  of  t)M  aat««  Mft«M  mm* 
•MiiMtly  A«ai.r«M  to  ««B«rl)Mtt«  to  tsto  prmmatlmk  tmi  wmiMf 
toaMw*  af  p— ■  aa^  vtobiUty  Im  tlw  ^AlTla  WWk,  «i4  to 
•Lff«r<  tnrary  initwlty  far  tlw  ■wtlwiiw  «t  <i«tiMirti«M 
vith  tit*  Jh^MMM  fliiiii— >  4ir«*tad  %mmr*  — ittn^  atfk  * 
tr— 4  ^Maii  prttcru*  «f  yiti  t>irwn)i>Mt  tlM  tmalXIm  ••*•*. 
flw  wrop^saXft  irtittfh  wmtvp  BVWMwtoA  tar  tli0  JhiMMMMi  JiriMUMMAMF 
«k  IiiiMfcii   ■>  •oatoiJM  AMw  f— tfw  iridLak.  Sa  tft»  cfdadUM 
•f  tlila  (liMi— r>,  MBfUvt  vitki  tk»  f  ■iiiwOrt  iV&wtpiM 
«kiak  f««  »  fHrt  af  to*  gimarml  m*fi*\mmm%  tmtmr  »mta€tm»ttm 
mtt  to  iriO*  CMk  DUirMiwI  1mm  4m»lmtmA  thn*  t%  ««  •mmtMmt  • 
Sm  0«««naHMMk  af  tto  \hi^-rl  Stota*  toiiavM  tlHrit  Mm  siMtlMk 
•r  Mwk  fr>ya«  mmSU  ■■«  to  litaijr  t»  mbMIMNi  to  tlW 
ulttaMto  ak^JaatlTn  «/  iin— lim  y«MM  aMMr  tai^  iwipr  4NhI 
Jaati**  te  tto  ItMiTta  *r«w  •»*  it  m«pmM)  Itmk  tW'Wwi 
•ff art  to  ■■*>  to  rMwlT*  ««r  tUmrnHWM  «r  I'iw  ia 


s%4Hi;M  (»l 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1979 


SECRET 


Iki        'Salqw 

P«arpl».  (2aKll>li  t«t) 

#U«t.     (lartrMNljr  «r«Mrt)       (fmrt  *  .f  *) 

■11*  tWUi  •«>>•%  ia  ▼!««  tiia  OortmuMit  «rf  Vam  QBlted  StatM  •ff«r« 
ftr  «)M  tf>mtfUmrmUam  of  th«  JaiMMM  Gov«niM«t  «  fOMM  «f  «  te«wl  bat 

nmtm*  «ni%  dHTLng  Mar  fiirtiMHe'  marwrMUoaa. 

»•  iOm  k«ar«iji  raggMttod  i«pr«MMi«  *u  •!  fart  to  Wldg*  %tm  fMp 
tetMNMi  Mr  4r«f%  •£  Jm  2I«  1943  «m1  «•  Mptmm**  dntf t  «f  S*ptiirib«r  25tk 

*ar  — ftWK  «  "w  »i»pr<»*^  to  tiw  watlid  preUMc  «A4«r]arlii«  *  ami^vhm- 
tdv*  9wi£l»  — M-ltmint*    IMs  jpXmk  ooitalas  j«>«nl«im»  ^MOii^  «l«[i  the 
|««4rtiiMa.  Ai^pUeaUai  tf  ttw  fwciMMtfJ.  ^rlMdplM  «td«li  m  tmen  fern**  t» 
me  MHnn«»««l«M  WMuUtate  Uim  oaljr  anad  bfuU  f<a-  imitMDll*  tatMmativMO. 

»»J«IA«wi.     ••  Imp*  tti*t  la  tfat«  way  pirAgrMs  tomurd  r«.««*l!»s  a  watUc  aX 
ifcadii  tetwa«i  «w  im>  Qvnmmmit*  wmjr  %•  aa:p«dlt««. 


t  l3.Hl^4:l  (a) 


1980     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


hr   ,;.  1        .•;Ci!n,  t-vn    ("n'—r-n) 
vo'/e.Tb'r  26,  1'<1. 

»im.      C  jitr  -vsly  urc-at)         '    %rt  1  of  2) 

.'ie:iar»'y  irlr«. 

To  »>•  handled  li.  '~'>TTn«^Tit  0'1«, 

'  trlctly  confidential,   tentktlT*  and  without  coaml tar-nt . 

>■■3r^^r^l^r  21,    )0/,l. 

'AjU'i*  of  propoecrl  b»8l»   for  »{r««a«nt  b«twe«n   Um>  'liTlt«d  ?tat«« 
and  Ja,jftr.. 

t.ectl'^n  1. 

Draft  putM»1   -loclsr-.ti  on  of  nollcy. 

Thr   '.>OT»mnBnt   of   the   IM  t«d  -  t«t<i«  and   tha  OoTemaent  of  JaoMi 
both  being  Kollcitous  for  i^'t  <)«ae«  of  tbn  I'aclflc  afflrr-  thft  t^iPl^  nation- 
al  rx^Ilcl«>a  arc   dlrvotcd  toward  Ikatln^;  and  wxi»nMi.rt  peaoa  throughout  th« 
Pacific   ar«a,   tlmt  thf^r  i.bt«  ro  territorial   de»lrn  In  that  area,  that  thay 
nsvr  no   Vr.tantlor.  of  tt-rra-trninr  other  oimtrt'^B  or  of  ualnp  nllltar^   totom 
ai.  jjretBlT' ly  aealnat  any  nelghbarlnc  nAtlon,  en'   that,  Bcoordln»-ly,  In 
ti'f  Ir  rational  j)ollcl«a  they  will   aetirely  Kupport  and  giva  practical  a{>» 
jilicatlon  to  the   follopr!  n,    fundaivntal  prlnciplaa  upon  w^-lch  their  rala- 
Unnii  T-lt>    ^ach  oth»r  a-^d  with  all  other  Fpr^mnmntr  are  baaadi 

r\\     -»,,.   iTlnclple  of  Inrlolabllltar  of  territorial  Intagrltgr  and 
aovareignt^  o.    (<ach  and  all  natlona. 

'?)     The   principle  of  non-lnterferanoa  in  the  internal  affaire 

of  ot!:c>r  countriea. 

(3)  The  principle  of  eqaaUty,  including  equality  of  e«Mar«laI    ' 


opportunity  and  treataeat. 

ARMY  SECRET 


Trane.  U-?9-^   fl)  i 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  IQgl 

SECRET 


li»t        r^kym 
tkmmbmr  a6,  IMX. 

#U».       (P»rt  2  (rf  a) 

|ir«wnt  Ite  f>iiiiiw'i—B*i  fif  Jftpoi  «Mt  tlw  a**wnMMit  af  Hm  tliiitMl 

inwMllBC  rMwmBi  •atmmAm  9»ll»pm,  mkI  pranrldlMK  »  ImmIs  ftur  immmm, 
UNIT  «11X  Mrftlvilr  MppMrt  nrf  i«nMitt««U7  *pply  tk«  f*U*«liig  prtJMi- 


(2)    TIhi  iMrtMStfffai  (rf  is«4Mmil  •cmmwA*  WMjwmtLoat  mat  atelitlMt 
(4)    n»  lalMlia*  af  l^iU.  pr»1mmU.tm.  »t  tim  latMrMrts  ««  mm- 


AM!  'PS-'Uir  s^KT 


1982     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


SECRH 


W]nMB%(i  tkrm^^  fnwMMM  9l  tevAa 

••WBtrlMI. 


i&«k  «»  wUtev  tt  aU 


fWt  a»        «MM,  1MI9H1  (1) 


im 


SECKT 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1983 


SECRET 


ProBs      .aahli^ion   (NoBur*) 
Tte:         Tokyo 
November  2o,   19^. 

f\a-pLe.   (rjj^l«h   t«xt) 

1119*.     (-itrwtly  uTEBirt)     (Part  1  ot  4) 

S««p«t  fir*. 

To  b«  handlpd  In  Jommaant  Coda. 

Soetlon  2. 

Stap*  to  b«  taiava  by  the  dorartment  of  the   United    'tatea  au-id  by  tha 
GoTartMsnt  of  Japan: 

Tlie  Ooremnant  of  the  United    -tatea  and  tba  Oovemaant  of  Japan 
propose  to  take  step*  as  foll««ti 

1.     The    k>Y«rtnaE!nt  of  the  United    states  and  the    jortinamnt  of 
Japan  will  endearor  to  conclxide  a  saJtUatttral  noo-aggreaslon  pact  aaong 

irltlah   '  r.plre ,  Ohina,   Japan),  the  Wethf^rlanda ,  the  Soviet  Union, 
Thailand  and  the   Inited  rtates. 

■  2.     ?oUi    jorernmenta  will  endeavor  to  condode  araoag  the  Aaerioaa, 
Sritlsh,  i;hir»8e,   Japanese,  the  fSetherlaad  and  Thai  Oorenawnta  an  agree- 
aent  whereunder  each  of  the  oovemaanta  would  pledge  Itaelf  to  respect  ttoe 
territorial  integrity  of  French   Indo-Chlna  and,  in  the  enent  that  there 
si.ould   develop  a  threat  to  tf  e  t**rrltorlAl  Inegrlty  of  IndO'>Chlna,  to 
enter  Into   L-anedlate  consul tatlon  with  a  rlew  to  takintj:   tnjch  eeasures  as 
sa/  te  desaed  necessary  and  adrlsable  to  neet  the  tiireat  In  question. 


ARMY 


SECRET 


Trans.  U-29-<l   (I) 


1984     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

SECRET 


rnmt     «aaiiln«tea  ( 
1*1         T»ky» 
mmmbmr  3(>,  19U. 
Pvrpl*.     (EacUsii  Uact) 

HX<H>.       (ExtcwMljr  wrwmt)  (l>urt  3  af  4) 

T»  b«  bajkdlcd  U  'iiifiiiwt  0«4i. 

SMk  ■  art —lit.  wa«14  yrovld*  •!■•  tbM  MMh  9t  Hm 

U  ttM  a«rM«wifc  Mould  mt  mtiA  or  mm]^  vrmiw«m%XMX  tvMtaH*  to  &«■  iMMto 

■•»•■  «i.tii  Kraaok  ijkd»-CnUw. 

3.  Xh*  UvMrsMut  «C  J«»Mi  «111  «l«iklrMr  aU.  alXltary,  — wJ,, 
lOr  MMl  p»ll«»  ifcr>—  Xiwi  UijUm  Mad  CnM  Iidt  CliiM» 

4.  ite  Ur««tiHMit  sr  tta*  (M.tod  &«*«••  mhI  «b«  Uaremrw«  U  J^pB 
will  o»i  Bigjpart  »  aiUuuriajrt  ]WllUo*Ujr>  — owttalafciiy  —  »mf  Qmtammmt 
or  r»«lai  i«  UblJMt  uUwr  U«m>  Uw  BftUoBAl  fiftm— t  a£  tte  wimMta  •f 


^^  ^^'^  »««,  la^wna  a) 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


1985 


SECRET 


rrvmt     nMtalactoB   (Mmuo-a) 

tktymtibor  ;:c,   1941. 
i^irpX*.    (ji^atUafa  text} 

l'U94.     (P»ri  3  •!  4) 

5.  Bwth  ^ranuMuit*  will  gir*  Ki>  all  MtrateifTl  torl*i  rtght* 
1«  OslM,  iMlndla)!  ri^to  luwi  lJB.t«r»*ta  la  *nd  »ith  «gax<l  t*  i«ter- 
wtlttaAl  MitlMBMt*  MMf  oawMMlMM,  MMt  rl|»tte  «nd«r  th«  Dax«r  tV" 
teool  «f  1901. 

8»tli  QmrmnmmUM  will  *iidMTor  to  obteia  Vm  acrwMMt  •f 
tiMi  arlUah  and  vXixmt   OototrmtatB  t©  alvi,  up  extmterrttsvrlal  rlcihla 
lj»  Ghti»,  lnolwtUii;  rlgbt*  In  iat«rnaU«irt  MtU««»i»t»  tutd  In  coiwmmUm 
•»<  widsr  XlMt  Qmmr  PToiamX  «t  1901. 

*^?M  will  Mt«r  IntD  immtUUatm  tor  %im  ootwiMlon  bet»««n  tte  CkHtad 
St«*M  *>d  J*|)M  «t  «  tnuki  AgnMamt.  bftMM  upon  nMslprac*!  Mwt 
r«««ra4'.«iaUMi  tTMtMHit  «iad  ntdaaUoa  «f  inwte  bMYt«r»  by  totti  oou- 
trt««,  ijMlaOiat  M»  MdBrt*fcU«  by  Ui*  Balt«d  SiatM  ta  Mad  nar  «llk 

'•     tSw  QwrwiMBBrt  of  *&•  Untied  '"-UtM  ia>4  tte«  flowitswrni  of 
J^MM  will,  rw^MtlTOljr,  rwMm  tte  trmming  re.trlottotti  oa  Apimw 
*M»d«  la  th«  United  .  t«tMi  sad  <m  Mmriam  fud*  la  J»pM. 


AltMY,. 


SECRH 


nww.  U«39-<1  (2) 


1986     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

SECRET 


PrMii    WMAiiagiMi  (ItaBsr*) 
Tti         TMqr« 
^hmmimr  26.  VHi. 
fvrpU.  (SaglUh  t«zt) 

IU94.     CSxtntmlf  vrgamX)        (Pwrt  A  «f  4} 

SMTvt  0«A«14»  Vam  tmytrimmMA. 

t»  te  bMkdteA  I*  Q«T«raM«t  0*4». 

8.  B»th  aimwii— to  win  «8X<m  «{ioii  iqi>p37lac  tl»«  ct«tollia*tlMi 

&S  Um  dollKr-TCO  rKtw,  with  tb*  •U.«««tl«B  sT  ^a■Ml•  aidwi«*t«  f«r  lliia  iimpm, 

)mir  to  b*  wiypIUd  by  Apan  Nri  HAlf  br  «M  tW.1Ml  SU«m. 

9«     Bottt  Orirwi— iito  will  agrM  ttat  iw  AfpracMnrt  «lilete  (dtlMr  iMM  «■•-- 

ttludsd  «!•>  MiT^  tMLrd  pwiwt  atMll  b*  liit«rpt«t*di  by  It  ia  mmab  «  «9  lui  t* 

maniet  with  Um  tmiimimmial  paen^oM  •<  thl«  »(pemmma%,  tiM  —♦■WlrtMwwt 

•nd  tjr<— rftAaa  af  pM*«  UiwuKhwtt  Hw  Pa«lfl«  nrM. 

10.    9«t!]  qrwi'i—to  wlU  taM  thalr  tiinainM  t»  ■wiw  «tter  flwi'— tw 

to  adfanv  t*  mti  to  stv*  prMtlMl  «i»pUaatt<Mi  ta  th*  htmim  prnXXtlml 

tmt  •MigraBi*  jirlaBlpStM  ••%  ftrth  1«  this  ayi  iiw>.. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  "  1987 

EXHIBIT  NO.  95 

(Handwritten  note:) 

Memo 

Hornbeck  is  anxious  to  have  you  read  this.  The  high  ranking  oflScer  mentioned 
is  Adm.  Richardson. 

I  think  the  paper  is  slightly  Academic. 

/s/R.  E.  S. 
I  have  read. 

/s/  HR8. 

I  feel  that  in  the  evolving  of  the  thought  of  which  record  is  made  in  this  mem- 
orandum, I  have  brought  into  clearer  light  than  any  in  which  I  had  seen  it  before  a 
point  which  is,  I  feel,  of  fundamental  importance  in  connection  with  any  and  all  of 
our  deliberations  regarding  courses  to  be  taken  in  the  field  of  major  policy  in  regard 
to  the  Far  East :  a  point  which  has  to  do  with  something  that  is  definitely  and 
inescapably  fundamental.  I  am  sure  that  you  will  not  begrudge  the  time  which  it 
will  take  for  you  to  read  the  memorandum. 

( Stamped  : )    CONFIDENTIAL 


(Hand  printed  note : )  Return  to  Op-13. 

July  12.  1940. 

In  the  course  of  a  conversation  yesterday  with  a  high  ranking  officer  of 
the  Navy,  there  was  put  to  me  this  question:  Is  there  an  irresolvable  cmi- 
flict  of  interests  and  policies  bettveen  the  United  States  and  Japan? 

I  replied  to  this  effect :  There  is  today  a  fundamental  conflict  between  the 
United  States  and  Japan  as  regards  major  objectives  and  the  policies  which 
prevail,  respectively,  in  consequence  thereof  and  in  regard  thereto.  This  con- 
flict can  be  resolved  only  by  an  abandonment  on  the  part  of  one  country  or 
the  other  of  those  objectives  and  policies  which  it  envisages  and  by  which  it 
proceeds  at  the  present  time.  The  United  States  has  as  its  objectives:  preva- 
lence within  and  between  and  among  nations  of  peace;  prevalence  of  rules  and 
provisions  of  law ;  prevalence  of  practices  of  justice ;  prevalence  of  practices 
of  order  ;  procedure  by  commitments  and  respect  therefor  ;  prevalence  of  equality 
of  opportunity  in  terms  of  fair  treatment ;  respect  for  rights  of  nations  and  of 
individuals ;  and  due  regard  for  interests  of  nations  and  [2]  of  indi- 
viduals. Japan  (the  Japanese  military  leadership)  has  as  its  objectives  today; 
spread  and  extension  of  Japanese  political  authority  and  economic  control  into 
and  over  areas  outside  of  and  beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  present  Japanese 
Empire  (some  of  which  areas  are  inhabited  by  independent  nations  and  some 
of  which  are  dependencies  of  other  indepndent  countries — but  in  none  of 
which  there  is  a  Japanese  population  at  present  of  more  than  a  comparatively 
insignificant  minority)  ;  a  setting  up  by  whatever  means,  positive  or  negative, 
may  seem  likely  to  contribute  thereto,  of  a  Japanese  hegemony  in  eastern  Asia 
and  the  western  and  southern  Pacific;  the  working  out  of  a  "divine  Destiny" 
which  in  the  minds  of  not  a  few  Japanese  envisages  first  a  vast  Japanese  empire 
in  the  Orient  and  ultimately  a  world  supremacy  for  Japan's  "Divine  Emperor" 
These  objectives  are  in  fundamental  conflict,  globally  and  in  detail. 

In  the  case  of  the  United  States,  tlie  objectives  stated  are  the  objectives  of  the 
whole  American  ijeople.  In  the  case  of  Japan,  the  objectives  stated  are  those  of 
an  essentially  feudal  leadership,  the  "military  element",  which  comprises  prob- 
ably less  than  ten  i>ercent  of  the  naticm,  which  includes  probably  a  majority  of 
those  Japanese  who  are  descendants  of  the  fighting  men  (the  Daimyo  and  the 
Samurai)  of  the  pre-restoration  (1867)  era,  the  spearhead  among  which  is  a 
considerable  number  of  chauvinists  among  \S]  the  Army  officer  personnel 
and  to  a  le.ss  extent  among  the  Navy  officer  personnel,  which  leadership  makes 
the  nation's  decisions  and  carries  the  nation  with  it. 

The  policies  which  are  those  of  the  United  States  are  representative  of  the 
fundamental  thoughts  and  beliefs  and  attitude  of  the  people  of  the  United  States 
during  the  whole  century  and  half  of  our  national  existence.  Their  roots  run 
far  back  into  the  past.  They  run  back  to  the  days  of  Magna  Charta,  the  days  of 
John  Hampden,  the  days  of  Oliver  Cromwell,  the  days  of  the  Pilgrims  and  the 
Cavaliers,  the  days  of  the  P>oston  Tea  Party  and  the  Declaration  of  Independence, 
the  days  of  Washington  and  Jefferson  and  John  Paul  Jones  and  James  Monroe 
and  Andrew  Jackson  ;  the  days  of  the  French  Revolution ;  the  days  of  emigration 
from  Europe  of  the  German  liberals;  the  days  of  the  Civil  War;  the  days  of  our 


1988     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION   PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

liberation  of  Cuba ;  tiie  days  of  our  participation  in  the  World  War  with  popular 
enthusiasm  for  the  ideas  of  fighting  to  end  wars  and  to  make  the  world  safe  for 
democracy :  they  are  policies  which  in  a  general  way  express  the  thought  and  the 
aspirations,  inherited  by  and  developed  under  conditions  of  freedom  in  the  minds 
of  practically  all  of  the  130  million  persons  who  constitute  the  people  of  the 
United  States.  The  policies  which  are  those  of  Japan  have  no  such  universal 
and  no  such  [4]  deep-rooted  acceptance  in  and  among  the  90  million  per- 
sons who  constitute  the  people  of  the  Japanese  Empire. 

There  is  warrant  for  a  belief  that  the  conflict  between  American  and  Japanese 
objectives  and  policies  is  not  irresolvable.  There  is  warrant  for  belief  that  one 
or  tiie  other  of  the  countries  might  in  course  of  time  give  up  its  present  objectives 
and  policies. 

Where  does  the  greater  possibility,  as  regards  relinquishment,  lie?  In  giving 
consideration  to  that  question,  thought  should  be  given  to  the  comparative  quali- 
ties of  tile  two  sets  of  objectives  and  policies.  Which  of  the  two  is  the  more 
sound?  Which  of  the  two  is  more  fundamental  from  i>oints  of  view  of  human 
nature,  of  morality,  et  cetera?  Then,  consideration  should  be  given  to  historical 
facts.  It  is  a  fact  tliat  the  attitude,  the  obie<'tives  and  the  policies  of  the  Ameri- 
can people  are  a  product  of  a  long  course  of  forward-looking  evolution.  It  is  a 
fact  that  the  Japanese  nation  made  in  1867  a  substantial  break  with  its  own 
past,  and  that  during  the  last  eight  decades  the  outlook  uimhi  life  of  the  Japanese 
people  and  many  of  the  practices  of  the  Japanese  State  have  undergone  substan- 
tial change.  To  make  a  long  matter  short,  is  there  not  warrant  for  believing 
that  a  change  in  objectives  and  in  policies  by  and  on  the  part  of  Japan  would  be 
much  easier  and  is  much  more  readily  conceivable  than  would  be  and  is  a  change 
of  the  objectives  and  policies  of  the  United  States? 

[5]  How  would  (could)  a  change  on  Japan's  part  be  brought  about?  If 
Japanese  armed  forces  succeed  in  conquering  China,  taking  Indochina,  taking  the 
Netherland  East  Indies,  taking  the  Malay  States,  taking  Thailand  (Siam)  and 
Burma,  ultimately  taking  the  Philippines,  et  cetera,  et  cetera,  no  change  is 
likely.  The  conflict  between  Japanese  interests  and  objectives  and  policies  and 
those  of  the  United  States  would  ccmtinue  and  become  intensifie<l.  But  if 
Japan's  eflforts  in  China  were  to  fail,  if  Japan's  pff  )rts  to  establish  a  great  em- 
pire in  the  Far  East  were  to  be  thwarted,  if  Japan's  military  leadership  were  to 
be  in  course  of  time  discredited  in  the  eyes  of  the  middle  classes  and  the  common 
people  of  Japan,  it  is  conceivable  that  the  Japanese  nation  might  work  out  a 
modification  or  even  a  reversal  of  Japan's  objectives  and  policies. 

It  should  be  remembered  that  three  centuries  ago  a  great  Japanese  leader 
started  out  to  conquer  China  and  that  ultimately  the  Japanese  nation  gave 
up  that  idea.  It  should  be  remembered  that  not  long  after  the  Japanese 
Army  and  Navy  had  witlidrawn  from  Korea,  another  great  Japanese  leader 
decided  to  make  Japan  an  isolated  and  secluded  hermit  nation :  l>e  forbade, 
to  all  intents  and  purposes,  political,  economic  or  cultural  intercourse  between 
Jap  in  and  the  outside  world. 

[6']  The  present  conflict  between  Japanese  and  American  objectives  and 
policies  is  not  irresolvable.  There  is  little  possibility,  however,  that  the  ob- 
jectives and  policies  of  the  American  people  will  be  given  up.  Moreover,  an 
abandonment  of  them  would  not  resolve  the  conflict— for,  an  adoption,  by 
the  United  States,  in  substitution  for  them,  of  objectives  and  policies  similar 
to  or  identical  with  those  of  Japan  would  be  impossible,  and,  if  not  impossible 
and  if  made,  would  merely  c.eate  greater  conflict.  But  an  abandonment  of 
Japan's  present  objectives  and  policies  is  a  thini  by  no  means  impossible ; 
is  a  thing  which,  if  made,  would  admit  of  an  adoption  by  Japan  of  policies 
similar  to  those  of  the  United  States,  which  adoption,  if  made  and  if  lived 
up  to,  would  resolve  the  whole  conflict. 

Surrender  of  the  American  objectives  and  policies  in  favor  of  Japan  would 
serve  no  useful  purpose.  Maintenance  of  the  American  objectives  and  poli- 
cies, patient  but  unremitting  resistance  by  the  United  States  and  by  other 
countries  to  Japan's  efforts  at  conquest,  has  within  it  the  possibility  of  an 
ultimate  resolving  of  the  conflicts  between  the  objectives  and  policies  of 
Japan  and  the  objectives  and  policies  of  the  United  States  (and  those  of 
several  other  countries ) . 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  1989 

EXHIBIT  NO.  96 

July  16,  1940. 

It  is  my  thought  that  you  might  find  interesting  the  papers  here 
attached.  If  so,  and  if  you  should  feel  so  disposed,  perhaps  you  would  care 
to  send  the  memorandum  on  to  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 

You  will  note  that  there  are  on  these  papers  no  identifying  marks.  I  think 
that  it  woidd  be  well  to  give  no  indication  of  source.  The  material  stands  or 
falls  on  its  own  merits  without  reference  to  autliorship  or  location  of  the 
authors. 

(Stamped:)  CONFIDENTIAL 

(Hand  printed  :)   Return  lo  Op-13  Room  2058. 

Reflections  on  Certain  Features  of  the  Far  Eastern  Situation  and  Certain 
Problems  of  U.  S.  Far  Easte:kn  Pojcy.     Jui.y  4,  1940. 

I.  Ocneral  Obser-vations. 

The  situation  in  the  Pacific  is  one  in  which,  on  the  one  hand  Japan  and  China  are 
engaged  in  armed  hostilities  in  the  course  of  which  Japanese  armed  forces  have 
been  and  are  doing  violence  to  American  lives  and  property  and  the  Japanese 
Government  by  official  acts  is  impairing  American  rights  and  interests,  while  on 
the  otl^er  hand  there  is  constant,  though  not  now  acute,  tensicm  in  relations 
between  Japan  and  the  United  States;  it  has  been  and  is  the  policy  of  the  United 
States  to  discourage  and  to  oppose  the  course  which  Japan  is  following ;  it  is  gen- 
erally agreed  that  diplomatic  representations  by  the  American  Government, 
together  with  the  termination  of  the  treaty  of  1911  upon  this  Government's 
initiative,  and  the  moves  which  this  Government  has  made  in  disposal  of  its 
naval  forces,  have  exercised  some  restraining  influence  upon  Japan ;  it  is  now 
notorious  that  a  strong  element  in  Japan's  leadership  advocates  a  move  by  the 
Japanese  armed  forces  toward  seizure  of  French  Indo-China  and/or  the  Dutch 
East  Indies,  and  that  the  said  element  has  strong  support  among  the  Japanese 
populace;  it  is  the  estimate  of  various  observers  that  the  presence  of  the  U.  S. 
Battle  Fleet  at  Pearl  Harbor  weighs  heavily  in  Japan's  deliberations  with  regai'd 
to  the  question  of  the  Dutch  East  Indies  and  other  new  moves  of  [2]  ag- 
gression ;  the  most  effective  opposition  at  the  present  moment  t(»  Japan's  program 
of  imperialistic  expansion  is  the  resistance  which  is  being  made  by  the  Chinese; 
the  Government  and  the  people  of  the  United  States  desire  that  the  Chinese 
resistance  be  not  overcome  and  the  Japanese  effort  to  gain  control  of  China  be 
not  successful;  and  the  policy  and  the  acts  of  the  United  States  during  recent 
years  have  given  encouragement  and  support  to  the  Chinese  policy  of  resistance, 
have  strengthened  Chinese  morale,  and  have  contributed  to  the  facts  that  the 
Chinese  have  refused  to  negotiate  a  compromise  settlement  and  the  Japanese 
have  not  been  able  to  gain  an  undisputed  control  of  China  or  any  part  of  China. 

For  seventy-five  years  the  Germans,  acting  politically  and  as  a  nation,  have 
given  evidence  that  those  elements  which  exercise  decisive  leadership  of  the 
German  people  believe  in  and  rely  uiion  force  as  the  most  effective  and  the 
conclusive  instrumentality  in  international  relations.  For  forty-five  years  the 
Japanese,  acting  politically  and  as  a  state,  have  given  evidence  that  those 
elements  which  exercise  decisive  leadership  of  the  Japanese  people  believe  in  and 
rely  upon  force  as  the  most  effective  and  the  conclusive  instrumentality  in  inter- 
national relations. 

[3]  Modern  Germany  was  brought  into  existence  in  1870  through  Bis- 
marck's success  in  pursuing  his  policy  of  "Ei.>ien  uiid  Bluf.  The  present  Jap- 
anese Empire  has  been  developed  since  1867  by  a  profess  of  accumulation  under 
threat  of  force  and/or  application  of  force:  first,  seizure  of  nearby  islands;  next, 
war  upon  China  and  acquisition  of  Formosa  and  the  Pescadores;  next, 
war  upon  Russia  and  occupation  of  South  Manchuria  ;  next,  gradual  occupation 
followed  by  sudden  annexation  of  Korea  ;  next,  seizure  of  Shantung  and  the  now 
Japanese  Mandated  Islands  in  the  Pacific;  next,  the  occupation  of  all  of 
Manchuria  and  Jehol ;  and  now  the  effort  to  conquer  China. 

During  the  last  ten  years  Japanese  leadership  has  given  ample  evidence,  for 
all  who  are  willing  to  divest  themselves  of  preconceived  theories  and  natural 
prej\idices,  of  their  high  regard  for  force  and  low  I'egard  for  moral  principles. 


1990     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

legal  precepts,  and/or  constractual  obligations,  in  international  relations.  Since 
lifSS  Nazi  leadership  lias  done  the  same — hue  wiih  greater  intensity. 

In  1931  the  Japanese  resorted  to  the  use  of  force  against  China.  Neither  the 
League  of  Nations  nor  any  of  its  members  were  willing  to  take  any  forceful 
effectixe  steps  toward  stopping  the  Japanese.  Nor  was  the  United  Stales  willing 
to  take  any  such  stepvS.  The  Japanese  went  ahead,  and,  [4]  by  use  of  force, 
attained  not  only  their  objective  but  more  than  what  they  had  had  m  contempla- 
tion at  that  stage.  In  1934  the  Italians  resorted  to  use  of  force  and  found  that 
neither  the  League  of  Nations  nor  any  of  the  world  powers,  including  the  United 
States,  were  willing  to  use  force  to  stop  them.  The  Italians  achieved  ail  that  they 
had  set  out  to  achieve.  In  1937  the  Japanese  decided  to  take  the  next  step  in  a 
program  to  which  their  leadership  has  long  been  committed  in  principle,  another 
step  in  a  program  which  envisages  many  more  steps  extending  far  into  the  tuiuie. 
They  att».cked  China.  They  occupied  considerable  portions  of  China.  Neither 
the  League  of  Nations  nor  any  great  power  has  .seen  tit  forcefully  to  oppose  them. 
The  only  resistance  by  force  that  has  been  made  to  Japan's  program  of  use 
of  force  is  that  which  has  been  and  is  being  made  by  the  Chinese. 

In  1932  the  British  Government  asked  the  Japanese  Government  for  a  pledge 
that  the  Japanese  Government  would  respect  the  principle  of  the  "open  door"  in 
Manchuria,  and,  having  been  given  by  the  Japanese  Government  that  pledge, 
the  British  Government  declared  itself  satisfied.  In  1935  certain  British  and 
French  statesmen  collaborated  in  .secret  and  were  prepared  to  make  to  Italy  a 
proposal  for  a  compromise  in  regard  to  Ethiopia.  World  opinion  ruled  that 
[5]  proposal  out.  Had  l^iat  proposal  been  made  to  Mussolini,  there  is  little 
reason  lor  anyone  believing  that  it  would  have  been  accepted.  Had  it  bsen  made 
and  been  accepted,  there  is  little  warrant,  in  the  light  of  subsequent  events,  for 
any  suiiposition  that  Mussolini  would  later  have  been  restrained  by  his  acceptance 
of  it.  In  1938  Mr.  Chamberlain  made  an  agreement  with  Herr  Hitler.  Almost 
immediately  Hitler  completely  disregarded  his  part  of  the  agreement  and  went 
foi-ward  with  steps  in  a  program  which  is  conceived  in  terms  of  force  and  is 
being  carried  out  in  terms  of  force. 

The  Government  and  the  people  of  the  United  States  are  committed  by  a 
long  tradition  to  the  principle  of  opposing  conquest.  They  are  likewise  com- 
mitted to  the  principle  of  supporting  international  law.  They  are  committed  by 
a  considerable  number  of  treaties  to  the  principle  of  respecting  the  sovereignty 
and  the  territorial  and  administrative  integrity  of  China.  They  are  committed 
both  by  treaty  and  by  unilateral  declarations  (of  several  Administrations)  to  the 
principle  of  respecting  the  rights  and  interests  of  all  concerned  in  and  with 
regard  to  China.  They  are  committed  by  declarations  of  the  last  preceding  and 
the  present  Administration  to  the  principle  of  refusing  [6]  to  recognize 
(i.  e.  to  give  technical  recognition  to)  certain  types  of  change  brought  about  by 
certain  sperifl-d  methods  in  the  situation  in  the  Far  East. 

The  situation  in  the  Far  East,  as  between  Japan  and  China,  has  for  some 
months  past  been  developing  along  the  lines  which  tend  to  confirm  the  estimates 
upon  which  United  States  policy  in  this  period  has  in  large  part  been  based. 
Chinese  resistance  has  been  maintained ;  the  Japanese  have  been  un:  hie  to  bring 
matters  to  a  conclusion  at  any  point ;  processes  of  attrition  have  been  affecting 
the  Japanese  more  adversely  than  the  Chinese ;  the  Japanese  people  have  devel- 
oped doubts;  Japanese  resources  have  become  cons^^antly  more  slender;  the 
possibility  of  a  gradual  dissolution  of  the  Japanese  effort  to  conquer  China  has 
constantly  ircreased.  If  the  United  States  and  the  British  Government  will 
but  permit  "Nature"  to  take  its  course,  with  a  little  help  by  giving  some  assistance 
to  China  and  withholding  some  assistance  from  Japan,  there  is  more  than  an 
even  chance  that  the  present  Japanese  effort  to  conquer  China  will  be  brought  to 
an  end,  adversely  to  Japan,  by  processes  of  attrition  and  concomitants  thereof. 

[7]         II.  Retention  of  U.  S.  Fleet  in  the  Pacific. 

The  Battle  Fleet  is  at  present  in  the  Pa'^-ific.  It  is  based  in  major  part  on  Pearl 
Harbor.    Th^  U.  S.  Asiatic  Fleet  is  in  the  Far  Eastern  Waters. 

An  order  by  the  American  Government  for  the  U.  S.  Battle  Fleet  to  leave  the 
Pacific  would  be  equivalent  to  a  notification  to  the  Japanese  and  the  Chinese 
that  the  United  States  substantially  abandons,  for  the  time  being  at  least,  its 
effort  to  influence  the  course  of  events  as  between  Japan  and  China.  It  would 
tremendously  strengthen  Japanese  morale  and  (probably  disastrously)  weaken 
Chinese  morale.  It  would  give  assurance  to  the  Japanese  Army  in  China  that 
opportunity  exists  for  it  to  go  as  far  as  it  may  be  able  with  not  only  the  Chinese 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  1991 

but  also  American  and  other  foreifjn  nationals,  foreign  properties,  foreign  rights 
and  foreign  interests  in  China.  It  woulld  give  assurance  1o  the  Japanese  Navy 
that  opportunity  exists  for  it  to  go  as  far  as  it  may  be  able  with  foreign  terri- 
torial possessions  in  the  Pacific.  It  would  encourage  the  Japanese  tovpard  think- 
ing seriously  even  of  closing  in  upon  Singapore  and  of  stirring  up  trouble  in  India. 
It  might  resolve  such  doubts  as  many  Japanese  "entertain  of  the  advisability  of 
a  closer  association  with  Germany.  It  would  make  Japan  the  one  and  only  great 
power  exercising  effective  influence  in  the  area  of  the  [81  Pacific  and  the 
Indian  Oceans,  in  the  whole  area  westward  from  the  Panama  Canal  and  east- 
ward from  Suez  and  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  It  would  leave  the  United  States 
exposed  on  the  West  Coast ;  it  would  leave  Mexico  and  Central  America  exposed ; 
it  would  leave  the  whole  west  coast  of  South  America  exposed.  It  would  make 
it  difficult  if  not  impossible  for  any  countries  other  than  the  United  States  to 
venture  upon  exerting  of  economic  pressures  against  or  in  resistance  to  Japan ; 
,  and  it  would  increase  such  dangers  to  the  United  States  as  are  or  might  be 
involved  in  the  exerting  by  the  United  States  of  such  pressures  or  resistance. 

But,  assume  the  order  to  have  been  given,  assume  the  Fleet  to  have  left  the 
Pacific  (with  the  flow  of  consequences  which  its  departure  would  have),  assume 
that  the  tran.sit  of  the  Canal  to  have  been  made  successfully, — What  disposal 
would  be  made  in  the  Atlantic  of  this  Fleet,  and  what  necessary  and  useful 
purposes  would  that  disposal  b"  expected  to  serve?  Would  the  expectation  be 
that  the  Fleet  be  sent  to  European  waters?  Would  the  etxpectation  be  that,  if 
sent  there,  itwould  be  used  for  combat  purposes?  Would  the  expectation  be  that, 
the  Fleet  being  kept  in  American  waters,  the  mere  presence  of  the  Fleet  in  the 
Atlantic  would  in  any  way  deter  the  Germans  and  Italians  from  the  courses 
which  they  are  pursuing  in  Europe  or  would  in  any  way  be  of  assistance  to  the 
British  in  their  resistance?  Would  the  [9]  expectation  be  that  the  pres- 
ence of  the  Fleet  in  the  Atlantic  would  deter  the  Germans  and  Italians  from 
launching  attacks  in  the  near  future  upon  some  part  or  parts  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere?  Would  the  expectation  be  that  the  Fleet  would  soon  be  needed 
for  the  purpose  of  defending  this  Hemisphere  against  such  attacks  definitely 
launched? 

It  would  unquestionajjly  be  detrimental  to  the  interests  in  the  Pacific  of  the 
Allied  Powers  and  their  benevolent  associate  (the  United  States)  for  the  United 
States  to  withdraw  its  Battle  Fleet,  at  this  early  moment,  from  the  Pacific.  But 
mere  transfer  by  the  United  States  of  its  Battle  Fleet  to  the  Atlanic  would  in  no 
way  benefit  the  cause,  at  this  moment,  of  the  Allied  Powers  and  the  United  States 
in  connection  with  and  in  regard  to  the  present  phase  of  the  armed  conflict 
between  the  British  and  Germany.  The  German  menace  to  the  United  States, 
while  very  real,  is  not  yet  direct,  and  it  cannot  short  of  several  weeks  or  months 
become  a  physical  reality.  The  United  States  Fleet  has  been  and  is  needed  in 
the  Pacific;  it  is  not  yet  needed  in  the  Atlantic;  and,  if  moved  from  the  Pacific 
to  the  Atlantic  at  this  moment,  it  could  not  in  the  Atlantic  serve  purjwses  equiv- 
alent to  or  more  important  than  those  which  it  has  been  and  is  serving  in  the 
Pacific. 

[.9rt]  Hitler  still  has  some  fighting  to  do  in  Europe.  It  is  possible  that 
within  a  short  time  England  may,  following  the  fate  and  the  example  of  France, 
have  to  sue  for  peace.  It  is  possible  that  the  Briti'^h  Navy  will  be  sunk.  At  the 
worst,  Hitler  may  possibly  gain  complete  control  of  Great  Britain  and  acquire  what 
remains  of  both  the  French  and  the  British  fleets.  That,  however,  will  not  have 
happened  by  tomorrow  morning  and  is  not  likely  to  have  happened  by  the  morning 
of  a  week  from  tomorrow. 

The  logical  course  for  Hitler  and  Mussolini  to  follow  is :  Pursue  to  the  end 
their  armed  conflict  with  Great  Britain;  make  sure,  either  by  diplomacy  or  by 
armed  force,  of  the  security  of  their  rear,  that  is,  make  solid  their  relationships, 
for  better  or  for  worse,  with  the  Soviet  Union ;  consider  and  deal  with  what- 
ever problems  may  remain  as  regards  Sweden,  Switzerland,  the  Balkans,  Turkey 
and  the  Mediterranean;  meanwhile,  reorganize  and  improve  their  battered 
though  victorious  armed  forces  ;  consolidate  administratively  their  position  in  and 
over  the  areas  which  they  have  conquered;  recondition  whatever  implements 
and  munitions  of  war  they  [f)b]  may  capture  ;  take  care  of  various  economic 
and  social  problems  which  are  already  acute  and  bound  to  be  more  so,  such  as  the 
feeding  and  the  clothing  of  the  people  of  Germany  and  the  peoples  of  the  con- 
quered territories;  make  adequate  prepnrutions  for  an  ultimate  attack  upon 
iwints  in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  which  attack,  if  prematurely  made,  would  be 
almost  sure  to  be  challenged  by  the  United  States  and  would  absolutely  ensure 


1992     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

embarkation  by  the  United  States  upon  an  enormous  program  of  armament; 
meanwhile,  wage  a  diplomatic  and  propagandist  campaign,  based  upon  and  cen- 
tered in  assurances  that  Germany  and  Italy  are  sated  and  are  satisfied,  have  no 
further  territorial  objectives,  are  prepared  to  maintain  peace  in  Europe  and  to  be 
at  peace  with  the  rest  of  the  world,  and  are  in  no  way  whatever  a  menace  to  the 
security  or  the  prosperity  or  the  general  welfare  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  and 
least  of  all  to  those  of  the  United  States. 

Neither  Hitler  nor  Mussolini  nor  both  are  going  to  [10]         attack  Latin 

America  or  the  United  States  in  the  near  future — certainly  not  within  the  next 
few  weeks.  If  by  any  chance  they  should  send  over  some  sort  of  an  expedition, 
their  having  done  so  would  be  "all  to  the  good"  so  far  as  effect  upon  public 
opinion  in  this  Hemisphere,  and  especially  in  the  United  States,  is  concerned.  It 
would  help  to  wake  up  a  lot  of  people  who  are  still  only  half  awake  and  some 
more  who  are  still  sound  asleep.  From  the  point  of  view  of  general  and  particular 
political  effects,  we  should  welcome  the  making  by  Hitler  or  Mussolini  of  such 
a  mistake.    They  will  not  make  it. 

Unless  we  are  prepared  to  take  the  offensive,  in  support  of  Great  Britain,  in 
Europe,  against  Hitler,  or  unless  we  would  expect  to  be  so  prepared  before  or  by 
the  time  that  our  Fleet  could  arrive  in  the  Atlantic,  there  does  not  exist  today  any 
good  reason,  in  terms  of  use  to  be  made  of  our  Battle  Fleet,  for  moving  that 
Fleet  today  or  tomorrow  from  Pearl  Harbor. — Should  an  unforeseen  and  un- 
foreseeable emergency  develop,  the  Fleet  could  be  moved  from  Pearl  Harbor 
to  Panama,  at  a  practicable  speed,  in  13  days.  And  transit  of  the  Canal  requires 
P^o  <lays. 

If  and  when  Hitler  and  Mussolini  finish  off  England,  and  if  and  when  the 
British  fleet  is  sunk  or  is  surrendered,  the  moment  will  then  have  arrived  for 
reconsidering,  urgently,  the  question  of  a  better  (than  now)  disposal  of  [11] 
our  Fleet.  Meanwhile,  our  Fleet  stands  on  guard,  as  it  has  for  some  time  past 
stood,  in  the  Pacific — at  Pearl  Harbor,  a  highly  strategic  point.  The  presence  of 
that  Fleet  there  has  exercised  and  is  exercising  a  restraining  influence  upon 
Japan,  discouraging  new  adventurings  by  Japan  which  would  be  adverse  to 
American  and  British  and  French  and  some  other  countries'  interests  and  encour- 
aging continuance  by  the  Chinese  of  their  resistance  to  Japan.  Whenever  that 
Fleet  leaves  the  Pacific,  its  departure  will  not  only  remove  an  obstacle  to  further 
adventuring  by  Japan  but  will  actually  encourage  embarkation  by  Japan  upon 
such  adventuring ;  it  will  give  Japan  free  rein  in  the  Western  Pacific,  in  the 
Southern  Pacific  and  in  the  Indian  Ocean  ;  it  will  give  Japan  opportunity  to  place 
herself  in  full  possession  of  vastly  important  natural  resources  and  highways ;  it 
will  enable  the  Japanese  to  complete  their  blockade  of  China ;  it  will  vastly 
strengthen  Japanese  and  vastly  weaken  Chinese  morale ;  it  will  probably  mark 
the  beginning  of  the  end  as  regards  China's  resistance  to  Japan  ;  it  will  enable  the 
Japanese  to  send  vast  amounts  of  material  to  Germany  and  Italy ;  it  will  prepare 
the  way  for  full  cooperation  by  Japan  w-ith  her  Axis  associates. 

We  may  have  to  move  our  Fleet  from  the  Pacific,  and  take  those  consequences — 
in  due  course.  We  do  not  have  [12]  to  do  it  today.  To  do  it  now  when 
there  has  not  yet  come  real  need  for  doing  it  would  be  tO|indicate  that  we  are  in 
a  state  of  panic,  not  to  say  hysteria,  that  we  are  driven  into  that  state  by  the 
mere  thought  of  a  jwssible  risk  of  a  possible  attack  upon  some  point  in  "our" 
Hemisphere;  that  we,  not  having  gone  to  the  aid  of  democracy  in  Europe,  are 
ready  to  abandon  the  one  country  (China)  which  is  "opposing  force"  in  Asia; 
that,  although  we  may  be  able  at  sometime  in  the  future  to  fight,  we  are  not  able 
now  to  hold  even  a  diplomatic  position.  If  we  were  ready,  now,  to  fight,  and 
if  we  would,  now,  fight — to  prevent  the  destruction  of  the  British  Fleet — ^we 
should  at  once  move  our  Fleet,  move  it  at  full  steam  toward  Europe.  Not  being 
either  ready  or  willing,  now,  to  do  that,  we  should  still  leave  our  Fleet  where 
it  is  until  there  comes  a  time  when  we  can  do  more  with  it  elsewhere  than  we 
are  doing  with  it  now  where  it  now  is. 

If  and  when  we  do  move  the  Fleet  out  of  the  Pacific,  we  should  sinniltaneously 
do  something  substantial  in  the  line  of  giving  further  assistance  to  the  Chinese. 
We  might  well  do  some  more  of  that  momentarily  and  frequently.  The  Chinese 
Government  has  for  several  months  past  been  urgently  asking  us  for  assistance. 
The  President,  in  his  Charlottesville  address,  said :  "*  *  *  we  will  extend  to 
the  opponents  [13]  of  force  the  material  resources  of  this  nation  .  .  .". 
We  can  no  longer  give  assistance  to  France.  We  should  be  all  the  more  in 
position,  so  far  as  our  resources  are  concerned,  to  give  assistance  to  China. 
Only  Great  Britain  is  opposing  force  in  Europe  today.  Only  China  is  opposing 
force  in  eastern  Asia  today.    In  assisting  Great  Britain — in  whatever  way — we 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  1993 

work  for  our  own  security.  In  assisting  China — in  whatever  way — we  work 
toward  the  same  end. 

There  is  little  that  we  can  do  about  Europe  now.  But  we  can  still,  if  we  but 
will,  do  a  good  deal  about  the  Far  East.  Unless  we  are  prepared  to  fight  Hitler 
in  Europe,  now,  we  practically  abandon  our  position  in  Europe,  now,  because  of 
our  not  being  prepared  to  act  toward  safeguarding  it.  Our  abandonment  of 
Europe  is  automatic.  Question  then  comes  :  Not,  shall  be  abandon  our  position  in 
Asia  in  order  to  defend  our  pf)sition  in  Eun  pe,  but,  our  position  in  Europe  ali-eady 
having  been  abandoned  automatically,  shall  our  position  in  Asia  be  abandoned 
by  our  own  deliberate  action — for  tlie  sake  of  safeguarding  and  strengthening 
our  position  in  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

Defense  of  and  strengthening  of  our  position  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  does 
not  require  abandonment  of  our  position  in  Asia,  and  the  objective  of  defend- 
ing and  strengthening  [I4]  pf  our  position  in  the  Western  Hemisphere 
would  not  be  best  served  by  such  an  abandonment. 

The  unanswered  question  which  this  country  must  consider  today  is  not  the 
question  what  will  Hitler  do  in  regard  to  the  Western  Hemisphere  after  he 
has  made  himself  supreme  in  Europe.  It  is  what  will  Gemianu  and  Japan  do, 
if  and  after  Germany  has  become  supreme  in  Europe  and  Japan  has  become 
supreme  in  the  western  Pacific  and  eastern  Asia. 

It  is  an  axiom  of  military  strategy  that  "the  best  defense  is  offense". 

The  soundness  of  this  axiom  is  being  demonsti'ated  on  an  unprecedented 
scale  in  what  has  gone  on  in  Europe  recently  and  what  is  going  on  in  Europe 
today;  in  their  uxir  plans,  the  Germans  have  built  for  offense;  the  British  and — 
even  more — the  French  built  for  defense ;  the  Germans  have  taken  the  offensive 
and  the  British  and  the  French  fought  a  losing  defensive  battle — on  French  soil 
and  with  terrific  defensive  lososes^ 

The  vital  problem  which  the  people  and  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
should  be  considering  today  is  that  of  ways  and  means  whereby  Germany  and 
Italy  and  Japan  can  be  [l^a]  stopped  rather  than  that  of  ways  and 
means  whereby  the  United  States  and  the  rest  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  may 
become  prepared  to  defend  this  Hemisphere  in  a  world  in  which,  Germany  and 
Italy  and  Japan  not  having  been  stopped,  those  three  powers  and  their  satellites 
will  begin  (in  due  course)  directly  to  make  assaults  upon  the  economy,  the 
political  setup,  et  cetera,  et  cetera,  of  this  Hemisphere — with  each  of  those  three 
countries  feeling  that  it  cannot  be  secure  as  long  as  the  United  States  remains  a 
great  power  and  feeling  that  the  common  objective  of  the  three  should  be  to 
render  impotent  or  to  dt  stroy  the  United  States. 

We  should  keep  in  mind  the  fact  that  for  practical  purposes  the  world's  great 
powers  are  today  divided  into  two  camps:  on  the  one  side  are  three  aggressor 
nations — in  combination  :  Japan,  Germany,  and  Italy ;  on  the  other  side  are 
China,  Great  Britain — and  the  United  States.  (Russia  is  in  a  sense  a,  not  dis- 
interested and  not  unbia.sed  bystander,  temporarily  associated  with  but  not 
very  actively  assisting  the  three  active  aggres.sors,  and  capable  of  becoming  a 
liability  or  even  a  belligerent  enemy  to  them.)  The  United  States  has  not 
become  a  belligerent,  but  it  also  is  not  an  impartial  neutral;  its  interests  lie  on 
the  side  of  Great  Britain — and  China;  it  will  more  and  more  give  assistance  to 
Great  Britain — and  .should  do  the  same  for  China  ;  it  is  opposed  To  the  three 
aggressors;  it  will  be  regarded  more  [1-ib]  and  more  by  each  and  all  those 
aggressors  as  definitely  and  distinctly  an  enemy  state:  if  the  aggressors  win, 
the  United  States — whether  actively  a  belligerent  or  not — will  thereafter  be  con- 
sidered by  the  winners  as  having  been  for  practical  purposes  an  ally  of  the 
defeated  powers  and  as  a  power  remaining  to  be  dealt  with  and  disposed  of 
(adversely)   as  such. 

The  United  S(;ates  has  not  been  able  by  diplomacy  nor  by  measures — including 
gestures — short  of  war  to  restrain  Germany  or  Italy ;  but  it  has  thus  far  exer- 
cised some  restraining  influence  upon  Japan  and  it  is  capable  of  continuing  to 
exercise  such  influence. 

The  United  States  is  not  today  in  position  to  take  tlie  oflfensive  (with  use  of 
force) — in  the  Atlantic.  The  United  States  is  today  in  position  to  di.scourago, 
and  to  render  diflBcult  if  not  impossible,  a  move  by  one  of  the  aggressors  which, 
if  attempted  and  if  unchallenged,  would  place  that  aggressor  (which  is  closely 
.associated  with  its  fellow  aggressors)  in  undisputed  control  of  a  huge  area  in 
which  there  are  very  substantial  British  and  French  and  Netherland  and  Ameri- 
can ix)litical  and  economic  interests  and  very  substantial  resoui'ces — in  the 
Pacific. 

79716  O — 46— pt.  16 6 


1994     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

If  the  United  States  wishes  to  contribute  with  niaxinmm  effectiveness,  within 
the  limitations  under  which  we  now  work,  toward  !<t(>pping  Germany  and  her 
aggressor  associates,  [^^c]  and  tliereby  toward  assisting  the  British  and 
improving  our  own  position  as  regards  long  swing  security,  the  one  area  in 
which  we  might  operate  at  present  by  disposal  or  use  of  force  is  the  Pacific. 

A  course  based  on  the  principle  of  merely  conserving  and  adding  to  our  stock 
of  weapons — while  and  notwithstanding  tlie  fact  that  the  Nazis  and  the  Italians 
win  in  Europe  and  the  Japanese  take  iiossession  of  the  we.stern  Pacific  and  the 
Indian  Oceans — in  order  that  we  may  now  guard  and  later  defend  the  Western 
Hemisphere,  will  not  make  the  world  safe  for  the  United  States.  It  will  merely 
mean,  if  the  British  are  defeated,  that  we,  not  having  gone  to  their  aid  in  the 
Atlantic  or  the  Mediterranean,  and  not  having  safeguarded  their  position  and 
ours  in  the  Pacific,  we,  having  let  the  rest  of  the  world  go  under  to  Germany 
and  Italy  and  Japtin,  will  in  the  not  distant  thereafter  have  to  take  up  arms 
by  ourselves  (with  possibly  .some  aid  from  some  Latin  American  states)  on  the 
defensive,  against  as.saults  by  (»ne  or  two  or  three — but  all  working  together — 
of  the  successful  aggressor  nations,  those  nations  having  then  at  their  disposal 
unlimited  resources,  vast  mat<?riel,  and  a  combined  population  of  their  own  of 
200,000,000  men  and  reservoirs  of  supplementary  man  power  in  the  countries 
which  they  would  have  subjug.ited. 

The  best  defense  is  offense.  The  next  best  defense  is  preparedness  to  use  such 
weapons  as  one  may  possess  toward  preventing  one's  enemies  from  being  strength- 
ened and  prevent-  [14d]  ing  one's  friends  from  being  weakened.  The 
poorest  strategy  of  defense  is  that  of  simply  building  fortifications  while  per- 
mitting one's  position  to  be  completely  encircled  by  a  hostile  combination  the 
various  units  in  which  are  daily  becoming  stronger  and  the  combined  forces  of 
which  will  ultimately  be  overwhelming  as  regards  re.sources  and  man  iK)wer. 

The  United  States  could  today  either  throw  its  forces  in  on  tlie  side  of  the 
Briti-sh  toward  defeating  the  enemy  combination  in  Europe  or  stand  guard  in  the 
Pacific  and  prevent  Japan  from  gaining  control  of  the  western  Pacific,  eastern 
Asia,  and  the  Indian  Ocean.  If  it  does  neither  of  these  things,  and  if  G''rmany, 
Italy  and  Japan  win.  the  victorious  aggressors  will  have  before  them  and  will  give 
their  attention  to  three  tasks:  they  will  have  Russia  to  dispose  of;  they  will  have 
Latin  America  to  dispt)se  of;  and  they  will  have  the  United  States  to  dispose  of. 
If  they  attack  Russia  first,  the  United  States  will  do  nothing  about  that.  If 
they  begin  assaults  upon  Latin  America  first,  the  United  States  will  not  be  soon 
enough  and  full  enough  i>repared  to  ensure  against  aggressor  successes  there. 
If  they  attack  the  United  States  first,  we  will  be  poorly  equipped  to  .stop  them 
without  initial  and  substantial  losses  to  ourselves — and  we  would  have  prac- 
tically no  help  from  Latin  America ;  we  would  be  fight ivg  alone  against  a  combi- 
nation which  can  attack  both  from  the  east  and  from  the  west ;  and  we  have  only 
a  one-ocean  Navy. 

me]  This  country  could  today  make  a  substantial  contribution  toward 
making  the  world  safe  for  the  United  States — and  for  other  democracies.  The 
United  States  can  do  little  today  toward  preventing  Hitler  from  becoming  supreme 
in  Europe.  The  United  States  could  do  much  today  toward  preventing  Japan 
from  b'^coming  supreme  in  eastern  Asia.  The  United  States  can  (may),  of  course, 
fall  back  upon  and  fortify  its  pf)sition  within  the  Western  Hemisphere.  If  it 
chooses  to  do  this,  and  only  this,  the  probability  will  be  that,  before  long,  weak- 
ened economically  and  ciit  off  from  valuable  markets,  especially  those  from  which 
various  essential  raw  materials  are  derived  (in  the  Far  Eist),  the  United  States 
and  its  American  associates  will  be  confronted  bv  material  pressures,  including 
those  of  armed  force,  not  from  the  east  alone  but  from  the  east  and  from  the 
west — not  by  Germany  alone  but  by  Germany  and  Japan. 

Net  being  ready  and  willing  now  to  fight  toward  stopping  y51  Hitler  in 
Europe,  we  surely  should  refrain  from  giving  him  the  aid  and  comfort  of  making 
to  him  a  free  gift  of  assured  access,  through  Japan,  to  the  natural  resources  of 
the  Far  East. 

III.  "Making  Friends''  with  Japan. 

On  May  30  the  Chicago  Daily  Tribune  published  an  editorial  entitled  "How  to 
Double  the  Fleet  in  a  Week"  in  which  the  idea  was  advanced  that  the  United 
States  and  Japan  can  and  should  "come  to  a  friendly  understanding".  In  this' 
editorial  the  Tribune  said:  "The  best  defense  iK)licy  of  the  United  States  could 
be  written  within  a  few  weeks  in  a  renewed  trade  treaty  with  Japan.  ...  In 
effect  the  strength  of  the  fleet  would  be  doubled  by  cutting  half  its  problem  away." 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  1995 

On  June  3  the  Xeic  York  Daily  News  published  an  editorial  under  the  same 
title  as  that  of  the  VliUayo  T/zT^Mwe's  editorial  of  May  30.  In  this  editorial  the 
News  stated  that,  while  it  by  no  means  always  agrees  with  the  Chicago  Tribune, 
the  hitter's  editorial  under  reference  "interests  us  greatly".  It  expressed  the 
opinion  that  "by  making  friends  with  Japan"  the  United  States  can  avert  finding 
itself  "menaced  with  urgent  trouble  in  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  at  the  same  time" 
and  "would  in  effect  d-^'uble  the  strength  of  our  (its)  fleet". 

[16]  Oa  June  6,  Mr.  Lippniann  in  an  article  of  that  date  advanced  the 
view  that  the  United  States  and  Japan  should  "enter  immediately  into  friendly 
and  conciliatory  and  candid  negotations  .  .  .  for  the  avowed  purpose  of  preserving 
peace  in  the  Pacific." 

On  July  1,  Rear  Admiral  Yates  Stirling  (Retired)  expressed  in  an  article 
of  that  date  the  view  that  the  interests  of  the  United  States  "lie  in  reaching  a 
friendly  understanding  with  Japan,  if  one  can  be  attained."  Admiral  Stirling 
said  that  "history  would  indicate  that  they  (the  Japanese)  can  be  stopped  only 
by  sui^erior  military  force".  He  advocated  the  beginning  by  the  United  States 
of  "negotiations  for  a  new  basic  treaty  with  Japan"  and  an  attempt  by  the 
United  States  "generally  to  normalize  Japanese-American  relations".  He  con- 
cluded the  article  with  the  statement  that  "it  would  seem  but  the  part  of  wisdom 
to  assure  the  safety  of  our  Pacific  flank  if  we  can  do  so  with  honor." 

The  fallacy  in  the  line  of  reasoning  which  leads  to  the  conclusions  thus 
advanced  in  terms  of  suggestion  or  proposal  by  such  analysts  of  international 
relations  as  propose  that  the  United  States  should  pursue  a  policy  of  appease- 
ment toward  Japan  lies  in  the  assumed — but  not  stated — major  premise.  What 
such  analysts  assume  is  that  a  country  which  is  bent  upon  and  is  engaged  in  a 
major  [/7]  program  of  predatory  acquisitive  activity  (Japan)  and  a 
country  which  is  opposed  to  and  is  menaced  by  that  kind  of  activity  (the  United 
States)  can  merely  by  the  conclusion  by  their  governments  of  an  agreement  become 
"friends" ;  and,  further,  that  if  the  United  States  and  Japan  would  thus  "become 
friends"  the  United  States  could  expect  Japan  to  respect  and  to  safeguard 
American  interests  (and  principles)  in  the  Far  East  and  the  Pacific. — The 
authors  of  this  suggestion — and  assumption — apparently  believe  that  two  strokes 
of  a  pen  on  one  piece  of  paper  by  two  diplomats  will  transform  a  predatory  nation 
overnight  into  a  contented,  peace-loving  and  peace-supporting  power ;  also,  that 
a  treaty  can  take  the  place  of  and  do  the  work  of  a  Battle  Fleet. — In  the  case  of 
Mr.  Lippniann,  we  find  a  writer  who  on  June  4  had  expressed  regarding  "the 
conquerors"  (Nazi  Germany  and  Fascist  Italy)  the  view  that  ".  .  .  we  cannot 
buy  their  good  will  by  tryiiig  to  appease  them"  expressing  two  days  later  with 
regard  to  Japan  the  view  that  we  can  not  only  gain  Japan's  good  will  but  can 
make  of  Japan  a  friendly  and  to-be-relied-upon  associate  by  a  process  of  appease- 
ment. Query :  Do  any  of  these  protagonists  really  believe  that  Japan's  objec- 
tives and  methods  are  today  so  unlike  those  of  Germany  t^at  the  United  States 
and  Japan  could  be  "good  friends"  whereas  and  while  the  United  States  and 
Germany  [18]  cannot  possibly  be  friends;  that  the  United  States  must 
in  the  interests  of  its  own  security  oppose  Germany  but  at  the  same  time  not 
only  should  not  oppose  but  should  aid  and  support  Japan? 

Mr.  Lippmann  affirms  that  "Japan  and  the  United  States  have  nothing  to  gain 
and  a  very  great  deal  to  lose  by  going  to  war — or  even  by  standing  opposed  as 
if  they  might  be  going  to  war"  and  that  "it  follows  that  there  is  no  conflict 
between  Japan  and  the  United  States  which  is  not  reconcilable  by  diplonaacy", 
whence — that  the  United  States  has  nothing  to  gain  by  opposing  Japan.  By 
the  same  tokens,  there  were  not  long  ago  those  who,  notwithstanding  all  of  the 
evidence  which  was  available  to  the  whole  world  regarding  the  objectives  and 
the  methods  of  the  Nazi  leaders  of  Germany,  contended  that  Great  Britain  and 
France  had  nothing  to  gain  by  standing  opposed  to  Germany.  By  the  same 
tokens,  all  conflict  between  Nazi  Germany  and  Great  Britain  could  be  recon- 
ciled by  diplomacy.  (An  effort  based  on  that  principle  was  made  at  Munich.) 
By  the  same  tokens,  all  conflict  between  any  "have"  nation  or  nations  and  any 
"have  not"  nation  or  nations  could  be  reconciled  by  diplomacy.  By  the  same 
tokens,  all  conflict  between  capital  and  labor,  and  all  conflict  between  political 
parties,  and  all  conflict  between  the  law-abiding  members  and  the  predatory 
members  [19]  of  any  con>munity  could  be  settled  by  diplomacy;  the  con- 
flict between  Japan  and  China  could  be  settled  by  diplomacy ;  Japan's  desire  to 
possess  the  Netherlands  East  Indies  could  be  disposed  of  by  diplomacy ;  and 
"fifth  column"  activities  anywhere  and  everywhere  could  be  disposed  of  by 
diplomacy. 


1996     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

The  essence  of  Mr.  Lippman's  proposal  is  that  the  United  States  should  enter 
upon  a  "negotiation  which  might  lead  through  a  new  com/mercial  treaty  to  a 
political  understanding",  which  would  leave  the  American  and  the  Japanese 
navies  "free  to  maintain  order  and  stability  in  their  respective  spheres  of 
influence". 

From  1911  to  January  26.  1940  the  United  States  and  Japan  had  a  commercial 
treaty  and  they  had  a  nun>ber  of  other  treaties — including  the  Nine  Power  Tx'eaty 
and  the  Kallogg  Pact — which  collectively  were  intended  to  regulate  contacts,  to 
ensure  fair  and  equal  treatment,  and  to  maintain  peace.  Nothwithstanding  the 
existence  of  these  treaties,  Japan  embarked  upon  a  procedure  of  conquest  and 
did  all  sorts  of  violence  to  American  nationals,  American  property,  and  American 
rights  and  interests  in  general.  The  American  Government  protested  and  pled. 
Japan  went  right  on.  Finally  the  American  Government  denounced  the  com- 
mercial treaty  in  order  that  it  might  have  its  hands  free  to  take,  [20]  if  and 
when  it  saw  fit,  retaliatory  action  by  measures  short  of  war.  For  the  first  time, 
the  Japanese  becamie  alarmed  and  began  to  show  some  respect  for  American 
rights  in  the  Far  East.  Treaties  had  proved  ineffective.  Entreaties  had  proved 
ineffectual.  Fear  of  possible  material  pressures  finally  had,  and  has  been 
having,  some  influence.  What  the  Japanese  leadership  today  wfints  now  above 
all  things  is  to  be  relieved  of  all  possibility  of  pressure  from  the  United  States — 
in  order  that  Japan  may  "go  the  limit"  toward  completing  her  conquest  of 
China  and  taking  possession  of  various  great  storehouses  of  natural  resources 
in  eastern  Asia  and  the  western  Pacific.  The  conclusion  of  a  new  commercial 
treaty  at  this  time  would  be  of  tremendous  advantage  to  Japan  and  would  give 
the  Ignited  States  nothing  comparable  in  diplomatic  or  economic  value. 

A  division  of  the  Pacific  into  a  United  States  "sphere  of  influence"  on  the  east 
and  a  Japanese  "sphere  of  influence"  on  the  west  would,  it  is  true,  leave  the 
Japanese  Navy  ''free"  in  the  thus-created  Japane.se  "sphere",  but  it  would  not 
in  any  way  ensure  that  the  said  navy  would  "maintain  order  and  stability"  in 
the  said  "sphere"  or  that  Japan  would  respect  in  that  area  American,  or  British, 
or  French,  or  Netherland.  or  Soviet,  or  Chinese  rights  and  interests. 

In  passing,  attention  may  be  called  to  the  fact  that  [21]  the  Japanese 
Navy  was  "free  to  maintain  crder  and  stability"  in  the  Far  East  in  19.31;  the 
Japanese  Navy  has  been  "free"  to  do  that  thing  ever  since;  it  is  "free"  to  do  it 
today ;  and  it  has  not  done  that :  it  has  done  just  the  opposite. 

The  Japanese  have  today  no  higher  regard  for  a  diplomatic  arrangement,  an 
international  commitment,  or  a  treaty  provision  than  have  the  Germans.  Some 
of  the  Japanese  leaders  may  talk  of  or  may  make  commitments,  their  Foreign 
Office  may  negotiate  treaties,  but  the  objective  of  their  real  leaders,  the  Array 
and  the  Navy  within  the  "military  element",  is  expansion  of  Japanese  political 
authority  and  economic  power — and  Japanese  armed  force  will  move  on  and 
will  take  where  it  can,  when  it  can,  and  as  it  can,  being  checked  only  by  opposi- 
tion to  it  of  material  obstacles  which  are  or  which  it  fears  to  be  too  great  for 
it  to  overcome. 

It  is  not  "the  truth"  that  "there  is  no  conflict  between  Japan  and  the  United 
States  which  is  not  reconcilable  by  diplomacy".  The  United  States  stands  for 
peace  on  a  basis  of  law,  of  order,  of  security,  of  justice,  et  cetera.  Japan  is  bent 
today  upon  driving  occidental  interests  out  of  eastern  Asia  and  the  w-^stern 
Pacific,  and  is  bent  upon  establishing  in  eastern  Asia  and  the  western  Pacific 
by  whatever  processes  may  contribute  thereto  a  Japanese  hegemony  or  a 
great  and  constantly  greater  .Japanese  political  empire. 

[22]  There  is  no  need  or  occasion  for  the  European  war  to  come  to  the 
Pacific — unless  Japan  chooses  to  bring  (put)  it  there  and  the  United  States 
permits  Japan  to  do  so.  There  is  no  need  or  occasion  for  war  to  come  between 
the  United  States  and  Japan — ^unless  Japan  goes  further  than  she  has  already 
gone  (which  is  too  far)  in  moves  of  aggression  and  of  general  disregard  and 
destruction  of  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  United  States  (and  of  the  world 
at  large).  While  the  United  States  is  in  position  to  use  economic  pressures 
against  Japan  and  to  use  a  Fleet  against  Japan,  there  exist  material  obstacles 
which  tend  to  restrain  Japan's  leaders.  If  the  United  States  were  to  conclude 
with  Japan,  now,  a  new  treaty  ensuring  Japan  against  economic  pressures, 
and/or  if  the  United  States  removes  its  Battle  Fleet  from  the  Pacific,  one  or 
both  of  those  obstacles  will  thereby  haA-e  been  removed,  and  the  temptation  to 
Japan's  effective  leadership  ("the  military")  to  make  the  most  of  the  oppor- 
tunity thus  presented  will  have  been  increased.  Mere  concluding  of  agreements 
at  this  moment  will  not  suffice  to  convince  the  Japanese  leadership  that  "friendly 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  1997 

relations"  [2S]  with  the  United  States  henceforth  are  preferable  to  the 
gathering  in  of  s^wils  rendered,  by  the  coneludinji  of  agreements,  the  more  readily 
available  now  and  immediately  available. 

We  should,  of  course  and  by  all  means,  try  to  prevent  consummation  of  a  closer 
association  by  Japan  of  herself  with  the  axis  powers.  But,  we  should  do  more 
than  that,  we  should  try  to  prevent  advance  by  Japan  toward  further  acts  of 
aggression  and  acquisition  by  herself  on  her  own  account  and  for  her  own 
advantage — all  of  which  acts,  when  and  as  engaged  in,  will  contribute  toward 
the  working  t)Ut  of  the  plans  of  Nazi  Germany.  We  have  already  done  much 
toward  restraining  Japan.  Simultaneously,  ourselves  exercising  a  great  measure 
of  self-restraint,  we  have  been  endeavoring  to  lead  the  Japanese  to  see  that  a 
course  of  aggression  will  in  the  long  run  be  not  profitable  where  as  a  course  of 
procedure  by  peaceful  means  could  be  highly  prolitable.  We  have  talked  con- 
sistently and  constantly  of  the  imjwrtance  of  principles.  Should  we  now  make  a 
wholesale  abandonment  of  the  said  principles — thereby  conceding  that,  not  force, 
but  mere  frar  of  force  is  mightier  than  principles  and  mightier  than  professed 
devotion  to  principles? 

Reduced  to  simplest  terms,  what  the  advocates  of  an  appeasement  propose  is 
that  we  abandon  our  Far  Eastern  policy  [24]  of  a  hundred  years'  standing, 
that  we  abandon  the  idea  of  the  integrity  of  sovereignties  in  the  Far  Bast, 
that  we  abandon  such  responsibilities  as  were  and  are  ours  under  those  which 
remain  in  effect  of  the  Washington  Conference  treaties,  that  we  give  up  the 
idea  of  befriending  China  toward  resistance  to  Japan  and  thus  toward  defense 
of  various  of  our  principles  and  interests,  and  that  we  accord  Japan,  deliberately 
and  by  process  of  agreement,  what  would  amount  to  a  free  hand  in  the  western 
Pacittc  and  eastern  Asia.  Now,  if  we  wish  to  make  these  various  abandonments, 
and  if  we  wish  to  give  Japan  a  free  hand,  we  can  do  both  very  easily  and  without 
going  to  the  trouble  of  or  incurring  the  disadvantages  which  would  accrue  from 
doing  so  by  concluding  an  agreement ;  all  that  we  would  need  to  do  would  be 
to  announce  on  our  own  part  that  we  abandon  the  field,  to  withdraw  by  our 
own  orders  the  few  ships  that  we  have  in  Far  Eastern  waters  and  the  few 
marines  that  we  maintain  at  three  points  in  China,  and  to  move  our  Fleet  from 
the  Pacific  into  the  Atlantic. 

Assume,  for  the  sake  of  thorough  exploration,  that  it  were  granted  in  principle 
that  we  should  negotiate  some  kind  of  an  agreement  with  Japan.  What  might 
the  provisions  of  that  agreement  be?  What  should  they  be?  By  answers  to 
these  two  questions  the  appeasement  thesis  might  be  and  [25]  should  be 
tested.  These  two  questions  should  stand  at  the  beginning  of  Mr.  Lippmann's 
statement  of  that  thesis.  They  should  be  answered  before  he  proceeds  with 
the  contention  that  the  problem  of  Japanese-American  relations  can  be  solved 
by  diplomacy  alone  and  that  the  action  for  which  he  contends  would  produce 
the  solution. 

The  whole  of  the  appeasement  contention  rests — for  whatever  else  it  may  be 
worth — upon  an  a.ssumption  that,  promises  having  been  given  by  the  United 
States  and  promises  having  been  given  by  Japan,  the  United  States  could  there- 
after assume  and  e-'pect  that  Japan  would  live  up  to  or  perform  within  the  limits 
of  her  promises.  In  the  light  of  the  history  of  the  past  forty-five  years,  no 
such  assmuption  could  with  warrant  be  made,  and  reliance  upon  any  such 
assumption  would  be  folly. 

Japan  has  it  within  her  power  to  ensure  the  peace  of  the  Pacific.  The  United 
States  does  not  have  that  within  its  power.  Japan  needs  only  to  desist  from 
certain  courses  in  which  she  is  engaged  and  to  refrain  from  certain  courses 
toward  which  she  is  inclined — and  there  will  be  peace  in  the  Pacific.  This  means 
that  the  problem  is  a  problem  not  of  giving  pledges,  it  is  a  problem  of  action, 
a  problem  [26]  of  behavior,  a  problem  of  performance.  Action  gives 
evidence  and  proof  of  intention.  Assurances  of  intention  constitute  neither 
evidence  nor  proof. 

The  conflict  which  is  raging  today  is  between  two  great  groups  of  major 
powers,  is  between  two  ideologies,  is  between  tho.se  nations  which  have  and 
which  wish  to  hold  and  those  nations  which  are  out  to  "take" — and  this  conflict 
is  world-wide.'  On  one  side  are  China.  Great  Britain,. and  the  United  States:  on 
the  other  side  are  Japan,  Germany  and  Italy.  The  conflict  is  raging  not  alone 
in  Europe  but  also  in  the  Far  East.  The  three  powers  of  the  to-have-and-to  hold 
group  are  menaced  not  alone  in  Europe  and  on  the  Atlantic  but  in  eastern  Asia 
and  on  the  Pacific.  Whatever  any  one  of  the  to-have-and-to-hold  group  loses  is 
a  loss  for  all  members  of  the  group :  and  whatever  any  one  of  the  "take"  group 
gains  is  a  gain  for  all  members  of  that  group. 


1998     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

The  United  States,  as  a  party  to  this  conflict,  must  function  not  on  one  front 
only  but  on  tivo  fronts.  In  the  event  of  our  "abandoning"  any  angle  of  our 
western  fi-ont  (that  is,  the  western  Pacific  and  the  Far  East) — and  of  Japan's 
gaining  thereby,  and  of  China,  Great  Birtain,  et  cetera,  losing  thereby — bj'  just 
so  much  will  the  position  [27]  of  the  "have"  group  of  which  the  United 
States  is  a  member  be  weakened  and  the  "take"  group  (Japan,  Germany  and 
Italy)  be  strengthened. 

"We  cannot  buy  .  .  .  (the)  good  will"  of  the  Nazis  or  the  good  will  of  the 
Fascists.  Nor  can  we  buy  the  good  will  of  the  Japanese  military  leadership. 
"We  can  (could),  however,  earn  their  (the  Nazis'  and  the  Fascists')  contempt" 
and  we  can  (could),  by  like  efforts  of  attenipt  to  "appease"  them,  "earn  the 
contempt"  of  Japan's  military  leadership.  And  more,  we  could  also  earn  the 
contempt  of  the  British,  the  contempt  of  various  of  our  own  "neutral"  associates, 
the  contempt  and  resentment  and  bitterness  of  4(X)  million  plus  Chinese,  the 
contempt  of  the  whole  world  of  today  and  of  tomorrow. 

[28]         IV.  Encouraging  China  to  Make  a  Compromi.se  or  Adverse  Settlement 
with  Japan. 

The  Chinese  do  not  wish  today  to  make  peace  with  Japan  on  the  basis  of  any 
compromise  which  would  leave  Japanese  armed  forces  in  China.  The  Chinese 
are  war  weary,  but  no  more  so  than  are  the  Japanese.  The  Chinese  are  not 
confronted  with  any  imminent  necessity  of  making  an  early  peace  with  Japan. 
Given  a  free  held,  the  Chinese  have  at  least  even  chances  of  outlasting  the  Japa- 
nese in  a  struggle  which  is  highly  burdensome  to  each  of  the  two  countries. 
It  has  been  demonstrated  during  the  past  three  years  that  the  Japanese  belief 
and  representation  that  Japan  is  capable  of  creating  in  China  conditions  of  peace, 
law,  order,  and  stability  are  not  well  founded :  the  Japanese  have  shown  them- 
selves psychologically  unqualified  for  the  performance  of  that  task.  A  "peace" 
settlement  concluded  between  China  and  Japan  now  and  under  existing  circum- 
stances would  have  no  solid  foundations  or  anchorage.  It  would  be  inconsistent 
with  American  relation.ships  and  with  U.  S.  objectives  in  relationships  with  the 
Far  East,  and  it  would  not  on  balance  profit  the  United  States. 

[2.9]  Excerpt  frym  letter  by  a  Chinese  business  man  to  Mr.  Walter  Lipp- 
mann,  dated  June  6,  1940 

"Carried  to  its  logical  conclusion,  your  thesis  undoubtedly  means  that  China 
should  surrender  and,  like  Denmark,  Holland,  Belgium  and  Norway  cooperate 
with  the  aggressor.  It  would  also  signify  that  China's  three  years  of  desperate 
resistance  in  the  name  of  democracy,  with  its  unprecedented  sacrifice  of  human 
lives  and  property,  should  be  halted  because  of  a  European  conflict  which  may 
affect  America.  In  ca.se  any  ('hinese  leader  follows  your  logic  and  leads  his 
people  into  the  arms  of  Japan,  what  assurance  woiild  America  have  that  the 
Japanese  war  machine,  with  the  cooperation  of  4r)0,(X)0,000  Chinese  who  have 
proved  themselves  sterling  fighters,  would  not  wage  war  on  all  Pacific  countries? 
Does  such  an  eventuality  relieve  America? 

*  *  *  *  *  *  « 

"As  I  view  the  desperate  world  situation,  there  is  no  easy  short-cut  to  a  peace- 
ful settlement.  Short-cuts  no  matter  how  sincere  and  well-intended,  as  amply 
demonstrated  by  the  Munich  agreements,  only  prolong  the  agony.  The  United 
States  cannot  fight  aggression  in  one  ocean  an4  condone  it  in  the  other.  To  do  so, 
simply  destroys  America's  traditional  foreign  policy  to  no  practical  purpose. 

"The  Chinese  during  the  past  few  years  have  successfully  [SO]  resisted 
the  aggressions  of  a  mechanized  army  considered  second  only  to  Hitler's  in 
striking  power.  They  have  done  this  with  little  else  but  their  human  flesh, 
indomitable  spirit  and  courage.  Thus  far,  they  have  demonstrated  that  vitality 
and  spirit  can  count  for  ju.st  as  nmch  as  mechanized  material  in  modern  warfare. 
They  have  kept  the  Japanese  so  occupied  and  exhausted  that  Japan  today  dares 
not  move  as  rapidly  as  she  would  like  in  the  direction  of  the  Allied  and  American 
possessions  ill  the  Pacific.  Japan,  I  assure  you,  cannot  be  placated  by  momentary 
measures  of  appeasement,  and  she  fears  nothing  more  than  the  Chinese  will  to 
continue  their  undying  resistance.  America's  greatest  assurance  in  the  Pacific 
is  the  maintenance  of  this  Chinese  will  to  resist." 

[31]        Excerpts  from  Chicago  Daily  Netos  editorial,  June  10,  1940. 

"a  deal  with  japan  ? 

"In  order  to  make  a  deal  with  Japan  today,  we  would  have  to  condone,  openly 
or  covertly,  its  treaty-breaking  invasions  of  China.  We  would  have  to  betray 
not  only  our  Chinese  friends,  but  also  more  than  a  hundred  years  of  American 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  1999 

policy  in  the  Far  East.  We  would  be  imitating,  in  effect,  the  worst  and  most 
dangerous  aspects  of  Britain's  'appeasement'  efforts. 

"And  once  we  had  made  the  deal,  of  what  use  would  It  be?  Japan  has  de- 
liberately broken  one  solemn  treaty  with  us.  Why  sliould  it  l<eep  another,  any 
longer  than  its  own  interest  required?  What  guarantee  would  we  have  that,  at 
the  first  opportunity,  Japan  would  not  gang  up  against  us  with  the  rest  of  our 
enemies?    ♦ 

"No,  there  is  only  one  way  for  us  to  be  secure.  We  must  make  ourselves  able, 
by  combined  sea  and  air  power,  supported  by  a  sufficient  army,  to  wage  war,  if 
need  be,  both  in  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific.  No  diplomacy,  no  scheming,  no 
wishful  thinking,  no  device,  nothing  whatever  can  save  us  now  from  this  painful 
necessity,  sl;ort  of  a  miracle — the  miracle  of  an  Allied  victory  over  Hitler." 

[32]         Excerpts  from  article  by  Raymond  Clapper,  published  June  13,  1940. 

NO  DEAL  WITH   JAPAN 

"Because  we  are  afraid,  we  should  try  to  appease  Japan.  How?  By  selling 
out  now.  By  turning  adrift  to  the  tender  mercies  of  the  yellow  race  Australia, 
New  Zealand,  the  Philippines,  the  Dutch  East  Indies  and  all  way  stations. 

"In  ord^r  to  buy  Japan's  friendship  and  supiwrt,  we  would  put  the  seal  of  our 
approval  upon  such  a  betrayal.  We  would  scuttle  on  every. international  ideal. 
For  our  treachery  we  would  gain  nothing  but  a  Munich,  to  last  until  the  day 
when  Japan  wanted  something  else  that  had  not  been  included  in  the  bargain. 
Then  Japan  would  take  whatever  it  was  that  she  wanted  and  pay  no  more  heed 
to  her  deal  with  us  than  she  paid  to  her  treaty  pledges  wlien  she  went  into 
Manchukuo,  into  China  proper,  or  when  she  fortified  the  mandate  islands  in  the 
Pacific. 

"If  Japan  is  determined  to  extend  her  domination  in  the  Far  East,  at  least 
let  it  not  be  done  with  our  approval,  as  part  of  a  deal  with  us.  Let  us  not  be  a 
party  to  it  in  a  craven  act  that  would  instantly  be  a  tip-off  to  the  totalitarian 
powers  that  we  had  lost  our  nerve  as  completely  as  the  British  lost  theirs  in  the 
early  1930s,  when  [33]  Japan  went  into  Mancliukuo,  or  as  the  French 
lost  theirs  when  they  permitted  Hitler  to  reoccupy  the  Rhineland. 

"Don't  think  that  a  deal  wiih  japan  would  not  be  recognized  as  a  tip-off  to  all 
Latin  America,  a  tip-off  that  the  third  great  democracy  also  was  on  the  run. 
Are  we  to  invite  every  Latin  American  country  to  begin  saying  of  us,  as  the 
little  nations  of  Europe  did  of  Britain,  that  they  cannot  depend  upon  us?  Are 
we  to  give  them  that  encouragement  to  rush  into  deals  with  Hitler  as  the  new 
rising  force  that  is  to  replace  the  United  States  as  the  protector  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere? 

*  *  «  *  41  «  * 

"When  France  and  England  have  been  crushed,  only  the  United  States  and  our 
system  on  the  Western  Hemisphere,  plus  what  we  may  take  over  from  the 
British  Empire,  will  be  left  standing  in  the  way. 

"In  this  situation  we  can  trust  nobody  but  ourselves.  We  can  trust  only  our 
own  force.  We  want  none  of  the  false  sense  of  security  that  a  deal  with  Japan 
would  give  us,  a  deal  that  might  prove  as  treacherous  as  Munich.  Japan  is 
playing  the  same  game  as  the  other  crowd  and  we  should  be  foolish  to  deceive 
ourselves.  We  must  make  busy  b?ing  the  strong  neighbor  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere.  No  neighbor  now  is  a  good  neighbop  unless  he  is  strong.  We  need 
guns,  not  treaties." 

[34]        Full  text  of  Chicago  Daily  News  editorial,  June  17,  1940. 

"THE  APPEASEBS 

"The  agitation  for  appeasement  of  Japan's  ambiti<ms  in  Asia  by  American 
concession^  is  growing  among  those  who  seem  determined  to  force  the  United 
States  into  the  fatal  course  taken  by  Britain  under  Neville  Chamberlain. 

"The  proponents  of  this  idea  seem  to  think  that  Japan  wcmld  be  reasonable 
in  its  demands,  and  that,  having  signed  an  agreement  with  the  United  States, 
Japan  would  abide  by  it.  Chamberlain  had  the  same  delusions  about  Germany 
and  Italy.  We  have  had  agreements  and  treaties  with  Japan  before.  But  they 
have  been  honored  in  the  breach  rather  than  in  the  observance. 

"The  philosophy  behind  this  agitati<m  is  exemplified  by  a  thoughtful  editorial 
that  appeared  in  the  Chicago  Tribune  of  May  30.    Excerpts  from  it  are  cited  here- 


2000     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

with.     Accompanying  them  in  italics  are  excerpts  from  the  speeches  of  Neville 
Chamberlain : 

"  'The  United  States  aiul  Japan  can  come  to  a  friendly  understanding.  There 
is  no  obstacle  in  the  way  except  the  determination  of  some  Americans  to  domi- 
nate Japan's  policy  in  China.  • 

"  'And  yet  whatever  differences  there  may  be  between  [S5]  us  and  other 
nations  on  that  subject,  do  not  forget  that  we  are  all  members  of  the  human 
race.  .  .  .  There  must  be  something  in  common  between  us. 

"  'Japan  needs  peace  with  the  United  States. 

"'There  is  not  a  country  or  government  that  wants  to  see  a  European  war. 

"  'Japan  would  be  disposed  to  be  more  reasonable  if  Chinese  ports,  and  forts 
were  not  in  European  hands. 

"  'If  we  can  bring  these  four  nations  into  friendly  discussion,  into  a  settle- 
ment of  their  differences,  ice  shall  have  saved  the  peace  of  Europe  for  a 
generation. 

"  'The  Japanese  are  more  willinjr  now  than  ever  to  come  to  settle.iient  in 
China.     *     *     * 

"'Before  saying  fareircU  to  Herr  Hitler  *  *  ♦  he  repeated  to  me  icith  great 
earnestness  what  he  had  already  said  at  Herehtesgaden,  namely,  that  this  was 
the  last  of  his  territorial  ambitions  in  Europe  and  that  he  had  no  wish  to 
inHude  in  the  Reich  people  of  othn- races  than  Oermans  *  *  *  that  he  wanted 
to  be  friends  ivith  England. 

"  'America  may  be  able  to  aid  China  a  great  deal  more  effectively  if  it  isn't 
quarreling  with  Japan  than  it  can  by  keeping  up  a  futile  bombardment  of  threats 
and  hard  words.     *     ♦     * 

"  'What  we  did  was  to  save  her  (Czechoslovakia)  from  annihilation  and  give 
her  a  chance  of  new  life  as  a  new  state.  *  *  *  Therefore  I  think  the  govern- 
ment deserves  the  approval  of  this  House  for  their  conduct  of  affairs  in  this 
crisis  which  has  saved  Czechoslovakia  from  destruction  and  Europe  from 
Armageddon.' 

"The  italicized  paragraphs  exemplify  the  Chamberlain  philosophy  of  appease- 
ment and  delusion.  The  alternate  piiragraphs  exemplify  the  philosophy  of 
those  who  would  follow  the  Chamberlain  program  here.  We  know  how  falla- 
cious the  (^hamberlain  philosophy  was  in  the  case  of  Britain.  We  should  know 
liow  fallacious  it  would  be  if  applied  to  our  own  affairs." 

[37]  Excerpts  from  letter  by  Carl  Crow,  dated  June  14,  1940,  published 
in  Lynchburg,  Virginia,  News,  June  17.  IIMO. 

"No  sensible  per.son  can  disagree  with  the  argument  of  Mr.  Walter  lappniann 
that  peace  between  the  United  States  and  Japan  is  highly  desirable.  But  in 
his  contention  that  we  should  hasten  to  conclude  an  amicable  arrangement 
because  of  the  dangers  which  threaten  us  Mr.  Lippmann  ignores  consideration 
of  facts  which  must  be  better  known  to  him  than  to  most  Americans. 

"The  most  important  of  these  is  that,  as  has  so  often  been  -emphasized  by 
Japan,  the  oidy  basis  of  friendship  she  will  recognize  is  based  on  approval  of 
her  iK>licy  in  East  Asia,  involving  the  (•on(iuest  <»f  China.  Unless  we  are  pre- 
pared to  do  that  anything  else  we  might  do  would  be  as  futile  as  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain's appeasement  policy  at  Munich.  Any  move  we  might  make  toward  the 
conclusion  of  a  new  trade  treaty  woidd  be  interpreted  by  the  war  lords  who 
rule  Japan  as  an  evidence  of  weakness  and  instead  of  making  relations  better 
would  only  make  them  worse.  It  would  only  encourage  them  to  further  aggres- 
sions and  would  be  a  disservice  to  the  Japanese  people  who.se  progress  is  halted 
by  their  own  war  lords. 

******* 

[38]  "Mr.  Lippmann  appears  momentarily  to  have  forgotten  that  Hitler's 
attack  on  Europe,  Japan's  invasion  of  China  and  Mussolini's  sword  rattling  were 
all  preceded  by  the  so-called  "anti-Comintern  pact"  whereby  the  three  became 
partners  in  a  program  which  was  not  officially  disclosed  but  has  been  made 
clear  by  actions.  It  was  as  a  result  of  that  pact  and  supplemental  agreements 
that  Mussolini  is  helping  Hitler.  The  only  reason  Japan  is  not  playing  the 
same  part  is  that  she  is  bogged  down  in  China  and  the  American  fleet  is  in  the 
Pacflc.  Give  Japan  a  free  hand  and  she  would  at  once  abandon  her  policy  of 
non-involvement — a  policy  that  has  been  forced  on  her  by  her  inability  to  carry 
out  any  other.     With  the  open  or  secret  aid  of  Japan  to  Hitler  the  chances  of 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2001 

an  Allied  victory  would  be  greatly  lessened.  Indeed  we  might  face  much  graver 
dangers  than  those  which  inspire  Mr.  Lippmann's  fears — a  victorious  Germany 
on  the  Atlantic,  a  victorious  Italy  in  the  Mediterranean  and  a  victorious  Japan 
on  the  Pacific,  all  bound  together  by  a  secret  agreement  and  each  inspired  by 
the  same  conviction  that  democratic  government  should  be  crushed. 

"Faced  by  a  menace  of  that  seriousness,  what  further  measures  of  appease- 
ment could  Mr.  Lippmann  suggest?" 

[39]  Excerpts  from  article  by  Major  George  Fielding  Eliot,  published 
June  27,  1940. 

"major  E3LI0T  TAKES  SHABP  ISSXJE  WITH   MOVES  TO  APPEIASE  JAPAN 

"There  are  some  voices  in  this  country  now  raised  in  favor  of  an  American 
'understanding'  with  Japan,  as  a  means  for  freeing  our  hands  in  the  Atlantic. 
Why  there  should  be  any  more  virtue  in  a  Japanese  signature  on  a  treaty 
today  than  there  was  on  certain  previous  occassions  of  historic  note  it  is 
difficult  to  understand. 

"If  we  are  compelled  temporarily,  or  permanently,  to  abandon  certain  of  our 
Pacific  or  Far  Eastern  interests  by  the  necessity  of  concentrating  our  strength 
in  the  Atlantic,  then  we  must  do  so.  But  let  us  be  perfectly  clear  in  our  minds 
about  what  we  are  doing.  Le  us  be  sure  that  what  we  are  abandoning  is  not 
worth  more  than  what  we  can  save  by  making  any  drastic  changes  in  our  dis- 
positions. 

"We  must  do  the  best  we  can,  with  a  critical  situation  and  inadequate  military 
force,  but  let  us  not  commit  the  crowning  folly  of  again  putting  our  faith  in 
scraps  of  paper  bearing  totalitarian  seals  and  promises." 

\40]         Excerpts  from  Oakland,  California,  Tribune  editorial,  June  19,  1940 

"firmness  in  the  far  east 

"What  the  United  States'  policy  will  be  in  the  event  of  new  Japanese  aggres- 
sion we  do  not  know.  But  this  much  is  patent  on  the  basis  of  past  experience : 
Any  appeasement  of  Japan  on  the  part  of  this  country  will  defeat  its  ends  by 
encouraging  the  Tokyo  chauvinists,  by  giving  the  impression  that  we  are  weak, 
and  by  undermining  our  prestige  with  South  American  States  who  look  to  us 
for  protection.  It  also  is  clear  that  we  cannot  stop  Japan  imless  we  are  pre- 
pared for  a  protracted  naval  warfare  in  the  Pacific  and  unless  we  use  the  great 
British  naval  base  at  Singapore;  Whatever  happens,  we  must  be  uncompromis- 
ing in  our  opposition  to  the  pilfering  of  Franco-British  territory  in  the  Far 
East." 

\41]         Excerpts  from  article  by  Barnet  Nover,  published  June  28,  1940. 

"china  fights  on" 

"The  spirit  of  appea.sement  is  not  dead  ;  it  has  merely  shifted  its  habitation.  It 
is  being  urged  that  the  United  States  come  to  terms  with  Japan  in  order  that  our 
fleet  might  be  free  for  any  eventualities  that  might  occur  on  this  side  of  the 
hemifjphere.  It  may  be  that,  faced  by  threats  from  botli  Asia  and  Europe,  we 
shall  have  to  abandon  Asia  and  concentrate  our  force  to  resist  incursions  from 
the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic. 

"But  let  us  be  under  no  illusions  as  to  what  that  would  mean ;  it  would  be  a 
capiti^lation  to  Japan  and  a  capitulation  which,  in  no  sense,  would  add  to  our 
security. 

"At  the  moment  when  she  is  still  very  vulnerable  we  would  be  permitting 
Japan  to  become  invulnerable:  at  tlie  moment  when  Japan  is  still  at  our  mercy 
we  would,  b.v  a  policy  of  appeasement  toward  her,  be  placing  ourselves  at  Japan's 
mercy.  And  at  no  tiive  can  we  for  a  moment  forget  that  the  German  threat  from 
the  Ea.st  is  paralleled  by  the  Japanese  threat  from  the  West. 

"As  long  as  Great  Britain  fights  on,  the  Nazi  danger  to  us  is  limited;  as  long 
as  China  fights  on,  we  have  relatively  little  to  fear  from  Japan.  But  China, 
like  Great  [^2]  Britain,  is  fighting  our  battles  which  is  why  out  of  selfish- 
ness no  less  than  out  of  sentimental  considerations,  we  must  give  whatever  aid  we 
can  to  both  and  desert  neither. 


2002     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

"It  is  always  the  counsel  of  wisdom  when  facing  grave  emergencies  to  limit 
one's  risks;  but  nothing  is  gained  and  much  is  lost  when,  in  an  attempt  to  limit 
risks,  we  stand  a  real  chance  of  multiplying  them." 

[43]         Excerpts  from  La  Crosse,  Wisconsin,  Tribune  editorial,  June  22,  1940. 

"no  appeasement  heee" 

"Loss  of  prestige  is  one  of  Great  Britain's  chief  liabilities  at  the  present 
moment.  With  each  concession,  with  each  step  backward,  with  each  attempt  to 
stave  off  danger,  England  lost  face.  In  the  case  of  the  island  empire,  ill  pre- 
pared as  events  proved,  there  was  little  else  to  do. 

"But  the  United  States  is  not  now  in  a  situation  where  it  need  proclaim  to 
the  whole  world  it  is  afraid.  The  nation  is  unprepared  admittedly  to  fight  in 
two  oceans.  But  there  is  no  doubt  that  if  this  country  gears  itself  for  defense — 
and  it  is  gearing  itself  for  defense — It  can  meet  any  challenge. 

"It  will  not  do  to  announce  to  the  world  that  the  last  great  democracy  has 
lost  its  nerve.  South  America  must  have  faith  in  the  integrity  of  the  United 
States  and  in  this  nation's  ability  to  back  up  the  Monroe  doctrine.  Japan  will 
be  less  a  menace  if  she  fears  America  that  if  America  fenrs  her.  Any  agreement 
with  Japan  which  revealed  this  nation's  desire  for  protection  would  be  tantamount 
to  an  invitation  to  attack. 

"The  Fascist  nations  put  practical  considerations  before  [44]  ideals  or 
principles.  A  treaty  based  on  the  fright  oof  the  United  States  would  remain  in 
effect  only  so  long  as  Japan  found  it  profitable. 

"The  world  has  been  shown  with  terrible  clarity  the  effects  of  such  a  peace 
as  the  Munich  peace.     Let  not  this  nation  make  Great  Britain's  mistake." 

[45]         Excerpts  from  an  article  by  Robert  North  in  Amerasia,  July  1940. 

"AN  AMEBICAN-JAPANESE  AXIS  IS  PROPOSED 

"Appeasement  of  Japan  and  withrlrawal  of  the  United  S^^ates  naval  forces  from 
the  Pacific  is  urged  by  the  Chicago  Tribune,  the  New  Yo''k  D^Uy  News  and  Walter 
Lippraann's  column  in  the  New  York  Herald  Tribune.  They  propose  negotiation 
of  a  new  commercial  agreement  and  diplomatic  alignment  with  Japan. 

"  'Be  nice  to  Japan  now,  and  we  may  well  be  able  to  double  our  fleet's  effective 
strength  by  making  friends  with  the  Japanese  Navv,'  says  the  News.  'It  seems 
to  us  the  time  has  come  for  us  to  try  to  shut  our  back  door,  so  to  speak,  before 
sending  our  best  fighting  men,  guns,  planes  and  ships  out  our  front  door  to  try  to 
win  another  war  for  the  Allies,'  it  says  editorially.  So  it  recommends  that  we 
'insure  ourselves  against  a  two-front  war  if  we  can.  by  renewing  our  trade  treaty 
with  Japan  and  soft-pedaling  the  moral  indignation  over  Japan's  aggressions  in 
China  for  a  while.' 

"These  proposals,  if  carried  into  effect,  would  leave  the  defense  of  our  Pacific 
coast  to  the  Japanese  Navy,  instead  of  our  own.  San  Franc'sco,  Spo*^*^'*^.  Los 
Angeles.  Portland  would  be  protected  by  Japanese  promises.  So  would  Hawaii, 
the  Philippines,  and  our  trade  and  investment  position  in  [46]  the  Far 
East,  not  to  speak  of  Alaska  and  the  Pacific  approaches  to  Canada,  Mexico  and 
all  points  south  in  this  hemisphere. 

"These  newspaper  strategists  give  us  for  defense  against  Japanese  aggression 
the  Japanese  Navy.  On  its  decks  will  stand  J-ipanese  admirals,  beaming  friend- 
ship because  civilians  at  home  have  signed  another  treaty. 

"Why  not  go  the  whole  way,  gentlemen,  and  shut  the  front  door  on  the  Atlantic, 
also,  by  making  a  similar  agreement  with  Hitler?  Let  bygones  be  bvgones  with 
him.  as  with  Japan,  and  while  we  are  at  it  treble  our  navy  by  adding  the  German 
and  Italian  fleets  to  ours  along  with  the  Japanese.  Then  with  Hitler  protecting 
us  against  Hitler  onthe  East,  and  Japan  protecting  us  agairst  Japan  on  the  West, 
we  could  get  away  from  all  this  bother  about  national  defense.  We  could  use 
our  new  trade  agreements  to  strengthen  our  new  allies  for  our  own  protection. 
We  could  build  them  up  economically,  just  as  the  Allies  built  up  Hitler,  and  hope 
for  the  best." 

•  •••••• 

"If  Japan  should  emerge  from  this  war  with  her  industrial  machine  intact,  she 
would  no  longer  be  a  competitor  merely  in  knick-knacks,  toys,  light  bulbs  and 
other  small  consumers'  goods.     She  has  shifted  the  center  of  gravity  of  her  pro- 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2003 

duction  from  ligbt  to  heavy  industry.     The  capacity  of  her  heavy  industrial  plant 
has  more  than  doubled  since  1931". 

•  •••**• 

[.^7]  "Chinese  resistance  has  not  only  prevented  the  proposed  development 
of  Chinese  cotton,  but  has  compelled  importation  of  foreign  growths  for  Chinese 
mills.  But  if,  with  the  help  of  a  new  American  trade  agreement;  Japan  should 
succeed  in  subjugating  China,  or  even  in  establisliing  a  firm  foothold  in  North 
China  alone,  the  first  condition  for  complete  independence  of  American  cotton  will 
have  been  met.     China  is  the  third  largest  cotton  producer. 

"Success  of  the  New  Order  means  not  only  that  Japan  would  be  lost  as  our 
third  largest  customer  by  obtaining  new  sources  of  supply  of  the  things  she  buys 
here;  it  means  that  she  would  be  equipped  for  cut-throat  competition  in  those 
very  price  markets,  Latin  America  and  Asia,  which  offer  us  the  only  opportunity 
for  substantial  expansion.  At  a  time  when  the  European  market  appears  about 
to  be  closed  to  our  goods,  this  would  lead  toward  American  export  strangulation. 
The  effects  on  our  entire  economic  s.tructure  are  incalculable." 

[48]  Full  text  of  article  by  Walter  Lippmann  in  New  York  Herald  Tribune 
of  June  6,  1940. 

TowABD  A  Peace  With  Japan 

Although  the  attention  of  the  Americas  is  fixed  upon  Europe,  they  must  never 
forget  that  the  American  continents  are  a  great  island  set  amidst  the  oceans 
of  the  world.  On  the  west  the  ocean  washes  the  coasts  of  Asia  and  of  the 
island  empires  of  the  east. 

The  only  Navy  which  the  American  hemisphere  possesses  is  now  in  the  west- 
ern ocean.  In  that  same  ocean  there  is  the  Japanese  navy.  As  betweea  the 
United  States  and  Japan,  two  nations  which  have  never  been  at  war,  there  has 
developed  in  recent  years  a  growing  opposition  of  policies,  interests  and  diplo- 
matic principle.  Their  relationship  today  is  obviously  unstable.  The  naval 
treaty  has  lapsed.  The  commercial  treaty  has  been  abrogated.  In  respect  to 
China  the  two  countries  have  taken  positions  which  are  in  theory  irreconcilable. 
In  respect  to  the  Netherlands  Indies  their  public  declarations  promising  respect 
for  the  status  quo  are  ambiguous,  and  in  the  light  of  conceivable  developments, 
exceedingly  precarious. 

To  put  the  matter  more  plainly,  the  two  countries  confront  each  other  across 
the  vast  expanse  of  the  Pacific,  each  having  taken  a  position  where  untoward 
circumstances  or  an  uncalculated  overt  act  might  plunge  both  of  them  into 
a  prolonged  and  exhausting  struggle.  In  such  a  struggle  l-iSa]  neither 
Japan  nor  the  United  States  would  be  serving  its  vital  interests.  Both  nations 
would  be  sacrificing  them.  The  Japanese,  already  suffering  from  the  Chinese 
war,  would  by  engaging  and  exhausting  themselves  still  further  make  them- 
selves vulnerable  to  the  only  great  power,  namely  Russia,  which  can  strike  by  land 
and  by  sea  and  by  air  at  the  very  heart  of  the  Japanese  empire.  The  United 
States,  by  drifting  into,  such  a  war,  would  be  engaging  the  Navy  for  years  to 
come  in  a  confused  and  indecisive  campaign  on  the  other  side  of  our  world ;  yet 
at  that  very  moment  the  security  of  the  American  continents  may  require  the  use 
of  the  whole  Navy  to  guard  those  strategic  points  in  the  Atlantic  Ocean  which 
must  be  held  if  this  hemisphere  is  to  be  defended. 

It  is  now  a  kind  of  suicidal  madness  for  the  two  nations  to  contemplate  even 
the  possibility  of  letting  the  existing  tension  and  the  existing  conflicts  of  interest 
and  principle  de^'elop  into  a  war.  For  in  such  a  war  both  would  be  sacrificing 
much  greater  principles  than  they  were  upholding  and  both  would  be  jeopardizing 
fatally  interests  which  are  infinitely  more  important  than  those  they  were 
defending. 

♦••*••• 
Some,  perhaps,  will  feel  that  to  express  this  candid  view  of  Japanese-Ameri- 
can relations  is  to  display  a  deplorable  weakness  at  a  time  when  only  strength 
and  firmness  are  good  currency  in  international  affairs.  I  do  not  think  it  is 
weakness  to  make  the  plain  truth  the  basis  of  national  [48b]  policy. 
The  Japanese  know  their  own  strength  and  their  own  weaknesses  and  they 
know  our  strength  and  our  weaknesses ;  and  we  know  the  same  of  them  and  of 
ourselves.  Neither  they  nor  we  can  afford  to  bluff.  Neither  we  nor  they  can 
afford  to  provoke  the  other.  This  is  the  truth.  And  on  the  truth  we  shall  both 
do  well  to  found  our  policies. 


2004     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Lest  this  opinion  be  ascribed  to  a  sudden  fear  engendered  by  the  critical  state 
of  Europe,  I  hope  I  may  be  pardoned  for  saying  that  many  of  us  have  held 
and  expressed  this  view  for  a  long  time,  ever  since  the  outbreak  of  the  European 
war  was  manifestly  inevitable.  For  it  has  been  clear  to  us  that  whatever  our 
sympathies  and  interests  in  the  Far  East,  a  great  European  war  for  the  domi- 
nation of  the  Western  World  would  affect  directly  and  vitally  the  security  and 
the  independence  of  this  hemisphere.  We  have  held  that,  by  comparison,  our 
interests  in  the  Far  East  would  prove  to  be  secondary,  however  important  they 
might  under  more  normal  circumstances  appear  to  be.  We  have,  therefore, 
l;e!d  that  it  was  perilous  and  in  the  highest  degree  unstatesmanlike  to  let  develop 
an  irrec(meilable  conflict  with  Japan,  to  conceal  from  ourselves  the  immense 
gravity  of  such  a  conflict,  to  exacerbate  the  tension  by  threats  and  by  declara- 
tions that  are  too  absolute  to  be  negotiable. 

*  •  •  •  '         •  •  « 

We  have  held  that  this  provocative  attitude  was  downright  folly  especially  at  a 
time  when  the  country  was  doped  and  duped  by  a  notion  of  "neutrality"  in  Europe 
which  might  compel  it  to  stand  by  and  risk  the  collapse  of  Allied  sea  iK)wer.  We 
have  argued  that  the  policy  of  the  majority  of  the  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
of  the  Senate  during  the  month  of  Jul.^'  a  year  ago  was  a  classic  example  of  how 
misguided  men  can  imperil  the  security  of  a  nation. 

For  in  that  fatal  month  the  committee  challenged  Japan  in  the  Pacific  by  sup- 
porting, and  even  by  inciting  to,  the  abrocration  of  the  commercial  treaty,  and  by 
brandishing  the  threat  of  an  embargo;  in  the  very  same  weeks  when  it  was  pro- 
posing to  risk  a  war  with  Japan,  the  same  committee  was  refusing  to  lift  the 
embargo  on  the  sale  of  arms  to  the  Allies  on  the  ground  that  what  happened 
to  them  was  no  concern  of  ours.  It  was  a  most  awful  case  of  not  letting  your 
right  hand  know  what  your  left  hand  is  doing,  an  almost  incredible  case  of  being 
blindly  provocative  in  (me  ocean  and  blindly  supine  in  the  other  ocean.  And 
unhappily  the  Administrati(m,  which  knew  better,  acquiesced  in  this  utterly  un- 
statesmanlike policy  of  challenging  Japan  in  Asia  while  we  were  forbidden  to 
support  the  Allies  in  Europe. 

******* 

The  situation  today  is,  of  course,  worse  than  it  was  then.  But  still  the  funda- 
mental interests  involved  are  the  same.  It  is  still  true  that  Japan  and  the 
United  [4^d]  States  have  nothing  to  gain  and  a  very  great  deal  to  lose 
by  going  to  war — or  even  by  standing  opposed  as  if  they  might  be  going  to  war. 
It  is  still  true  that  our  interests  in  the  Far  East  are  secondary  to  our  interests 
in  this  hemisphere;  because  this  is  true,  it  follows  that  there  is  no  conflict  be- 
tween Japan  and  the  United  States  which  is  not  reconcilable  by  diplomacy.  We 
should,  therefore,  recognize  this  truth  and  shou'd,  I  submit,  enter  immediately  into 
friendly  and  conciliatory  and  candid  negotiations  with  the  Japanese  for  the 
avowed  pur{)ose  of  preserving  the  peace  in  the  Pacific. 

•  ***•** 
This  is  not  a  time  for  bluffing  and  this  is  not  a  time  for  indulging  that  false 

pride  which  causes  men  to  cling  to  an  untenable  position.  We  know  that  we  must 
defend  our  security  and  our  very  independence  in  this  hemisphere  and  in  the 
Atlantic  Ocean.  We  know  that  Japan  has  a  greater  interest  in  Asia  than  we 
have.  Let  us  recofnize  the  fact.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Japanese  position  in 
the  Far  East  is  at  least  as  difficult  as  is  our  position  in  the  Western  Hemisphere. 
Japan  is  at  war  with  China.  Japan  has  Soviet  Russia  for  her  nearest  neighbor. 
Her  commerce  with  this  hemisphere  is  of  critical  importance  to  the  standard  of 
life  of  the  Japanese  people. 

In  these  considerations  there  are  the  essential  elements  of  a  negotiation  which 
might  lead  through  a  new  commercial  treaty  to  a  political  understanding  based 
on  the  principle  [-'fSe]  that  the  European  war,  which  is  also  a  European 
revolution,  is  not  to  be  extended  to  the  Pacific.  We  should  aim  high  and  aim 
far — at  a  new  order  of  things  in  the  Pacific  in  which,  having  adjusted  our 
secondary  cor.flicts,  the  two  navies  will  cease  to  confront  each  other  as  potential 
antagonists  and  will  be  free  to  maintain  order  and  stability  in  their  respective 
spheres  of  influence. 

******* 

I  have  no  way  of  knowing  whether  the  Japanese  nation  will  respond  to  such 
a  change  of  American  policy.  My  belief  is  that  they  might,  that  they  do  not 
regard  themselves  as  our  enemies,  that  they  respect  the  power  we  are  capable 
of  developing  and  that  the  best  of  the  Japanese  leaders  and  the  mass  of  the 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2005 

Japanese  people  desire  peace  with  the  United  States.  Even  if  this  is  not  the  fact, 
we  shall  never,  I  believe,  regret  having  tried  wholeiieartedly  to  preserve  the 
peace  in  half  the  world. 

U9]         Full  text  of  New  York  Herald  Tribune  editorial,  July  7,  1940. 

"japan's  appeasement" 

It  is  rather  amazing  at  this  juncture,  when  the  character  of  the  totalitarian 
response  to  Mr.  Chamberlain's  appeasement  policy  is  so  familiar  to  every  Amer- 
ican, and  seems  so  inevitable  in  retrospect,  to  note  that  there  is  some  agita- 
tion in  Washington  and  elsewhere  for  the  appeasement  of  Japan.  It  is  suggested 
that  we  make  concessions  to  the  Japanese  point  of  view  and  negotiate  a  new 
commercial  treaty  with  Japan,  so  that  we  can  turn  our  backs  on  the  I'acific  and 
give  all  our  attention  to  the  menace  from  Europe.  These  suggestions,  which 
have  had  Senator  \  andenberg's  support,  must  be  borne  of  ignorance  of  the 
Japanese  point  of  view,  of  the  workings  of  the  Japanese  military  mind  and  of 
Japan's  record  of  bad  faith. 

It  can  be  stated,  without  condition  or  reservation,  that  no  price  in  terms 
of  appeasement  which  this  country  could  pay  would  buy  Japanese  good  will  or 
good  behavior  in  the  Pacific. 

To  get  even  an  empty  promise  of  security  from  a  Japan  whose  policies  are  com- 
pletely controlled  by  the  uniformed  expansionists,  this  country  would  have  to 
recognize  the  justice  of  Japan's  alienation  of  Manchuria  and  the  martyrdom 
of  China:  recognize  the  legality  of  whatever  position  Japan  can  acquire  in 
China  through  a  campaign  of  indiscriminate  slaughter  and  bestial  savagery; 
recognize  her  police  rights  and  special  interests  throughout  eastern  Asia,  the 
adjacent  waters  [49(t]  and  the  East  Indies;  and  agree  to  withdraw  all 
armed  forces  f :  om  that  part  of  the  world  and  leave  to  Japan's  discretion  what 
access  we  should  have  to  markets  and  sources  of  supply  between  Hawaii, 
Singapore  and  the  Aleutian  Islands.  And  what  would  the  pledges  bought  with 
SUCH  concessions  be  worth  in  a  crisis,  if  the  fleet  were  withdrawn  from  the 
Pacific  and  if  Nippon's  militarists  discovered  that  it  was  Japan's  heaven- 
appointed  destiny  to  expand  in  this  direction?  All  pledges  would  then  become 
as  "in  applicable"  to  Japan's  mission  in  Hawaii,  California,  Alaska,  or  witherso- 
ever weak  defenses  invited  her,  as  the  nine-power  treaty  of  1922  is  to  con- 
tinental expansion.  Remember  that  among  Asiatic  totalitarians,  as  among 
Europe's  Asiatic-minded  despots,  a  leaning  toward  appeasement  is  irrefutable 
evidence  of  weakness  and  fear;  and  remember  that,  when  the  gods  have  de- 
livered the  weak  into  the  hands  of  the  strong,  it  is  a  breach  of  faith  with  divinity 
to  keep  faith  with  weakness. 

Those  who  contend  that  we  should  buy  security  from  Japan  contend  that  the 
President,  Mr.  Hull  and  the  Senate's  Foreign  Relations  Committee  have  made 
a  bungle  of  our  relations  with  Japan.  This  is  untrue.  The  powers  of  the 
United  States  government  to  check  Japane.se  aggression  and  to  resent  flagrant 
breaches  of  faith  have  lieen  limited,  because  of  the  nation's  aversion  to  over- 
seas entanglements  and  its  fear  that  strong  measures  would  bring  reprisals, 
and  reprisals,  war.  [-i-^h]  With  such  powers  as  it  has  had,  Jiowever,  it 
has  put  the  only  effective  check  on  Japan's  intense  craving  to  profit  by  British, 
French  and  American  preoccupation  with  the  European  situation. 

The  denunciation  of  the  commercial  treaty  a  year  ago  brought  to  an  end  the 
campaign  of  persecution  against  Occidentals  in  China,  just  when  it  was  being 
extended  to  American  citizens.  Japanese  presistence  in  that  campaign  would 
have  meant  war.  The  .Administration's  refusal  to  renew  the  treaty,  since  its 
expiration  in  January,  and  its  retention  of  the  right  to  impose  disabilities  upon 
Japanese  trade  which  would  have  ham.strung  the  Japane.se  Army  have  kept  the 
militarists  in  as  placatory  a  mood  as  any  influence  could  have  short  of  the  pres- 
ence of  an  overwhelmingly  superior  army.  The  presence  of  the  fleet  in  the 
Pacific  has  been  the  only  sedative  in  the  world  that  has  restrained  Japan's  naval 
expansionists  from  adventures  that  would  have  brought  the  war  into  the 
Pacific. 


2006     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[50]         Full  text  of  Chicago  Daily  Tribune  editorial  May  30, 1940. 
"how  to  double  the  fleet  in  a  week" 

We  are  talking  excitedly  of  armaments  and  congress  is  voting  the  money  in 
billion  dollar  bills.  War  material  is  coming  out  of  the  mills  on  Capitol  hill,  but 
it  is  not  coming  out  of  the  factories,  and  for  a  long,  long  time  it  will  not  b^  com- 
ing out  of  them.  In  the  meantime  we  are  neglecting  to  improve  a  situation 
affecting  our  Pacific  frontier.  The  opportunity  is  there,  and  if  this  nation  would 
make  u.se  of  it  it  could  double  the  power  of  its  fleet  and  do  more  in  a  short  time 
to  increase  the  strength  of  its  defenses  than  it  can  do  in  a  year  of  production, 
even  on  a  24  hour  day  and  a  7  day  week. 

The  United  States  and  Japan  can  come  to  a  friendly  understanding.  There 
is  no  obstacle  in  the  way  except  the  determination  of  rome  Americans  to  dominate 
Japan's  policy  in  China.  Japan  needs  peace  with  the  United  States.  Japanese 
statesmen  may  be  looking  at  the  future  with  as  much  uncertainty  as  prudent 
Americans.  In  a  world  rapidly  changing  from  its  old  historical  trends  and 
whirling  off  its  old  historical  foundations,  Japan  may  feel  quite  as  dubious  as. 
the  United  States.  Many  overtures  have  been  made  by  Japan  for  an  under- 
standing which  would  deal  with  what  is  real  in  the  relations  of  the  two  countries 
and  avoid  what  is  superficially  confl'cting. 

[.Wa]  The  United  States  at  this  time  cannot  afford  to  conduct  its  foreign 
relations  wholly  on  moral  preconceptions.  America  may  be  able  to  aid  China 
a  great  deal  more  effectively  if  it  isn't  quarreling  with  Japan  than  it  can  by 
keeping  up  a  futile  bombardment  of  threats  and  hard  words  which  have  done 
the  Chinese  no  good  and  can  do  America  a  great  deal  of  harm. 

This  country  cannot  afford  to  have  an  enemy  in  the  Pacific.  It  is  not  necessary 
to  have  one  there.  Peaceable  trade  can  be  resumed  and  a  peaceable  understand- 
ing can  be  had.  That  understanding  would  rest  upon  material  advantages  which 
Japan  would  obtain  from  friendship  with  the  United  States  and  therefore  would 
have  the  promise  of  an  enduring  understanding. 

Japan  need  not  be  driven  into  the  German-Italian  camp.  If  events  progress 
as  they  have  been  doing  in  Europe  the  British  and  French  interests  in  China  will 
be  canceled  out.  Japan  then  will  have  won  a  major  campaign.  Its  policy  has 
been,  in  a  way,  a  duplicate  of  our  Monroe  doctrine.  Japan  has  objected  to  the 
entrenchment  of  powerful  European  nations  off  its  coast,  just  as  we  would  object 
to  the  same  thing  in  relation  to  our  national  life. 

Japan  would  be  disposed  to  be  more  reasonable  if  Chinese  ports  and  forts  were 
not  in  European  hands.  China  itself  will  be  better  satisfied  to  know  that  the 
foreigner  [oOb]  is  out.  The  Japanese  are  more  willing  now  than  ever  to 
come  to  a  settlement  in  China  which  will  relieve  them  of  a  protracted  and  expen- 
sive war.  That  may  not  be  possible  at  once,  but  an  understanding  between  the 
United  States  and  Japan  might  do  more  to  conciliate  the  Chinese  question  than 
can  be  expected  from  the  present  bellicose  attitude  of  the  American  government. 

If  we  intend  to  keep  our  Pacific  front  bristling  with  threats  the  Japanese  will 
look  for  their  associations  in  other  quarters  and  we  know  exactly  where  that 
will  be.  If  the  people  in  Washington  who  are  rushing  to  arms  in  fear  of  a 
danger  to  the  eastern  front  are  sincere,  if  they  mean  to  take  precautions  and 
provide  against  the  future,  they'll  protect  the  western  flank  by  making  a  friendly 
arrangement  with  the  power  which  controls  the  far  east.  They  won't  so  manage 
American  affairs  that  trouble  in  the  Atlantic  will  be  accompanied  by  trouble  in 
the  Pacific.  While  they  ai'e  passing  a  billion  dollar  appropriation  for  the  American 
navy  they  won't  continue  to  make  it  necessary  to  keep  the  battle  fleet  on  its 
Honolulu  base. 

By  accepting  the  Japanese  overtures  they  can  double  the  strength  of  the  fleet 
immediately.  The  best  defense  policy  of  the  United  States  could  be  written 
within  a  few  weeks  in  a  renewed  trade  treaty  with  the  Japanese.  That  peaceable 
treaty  would  immediately  enable  the  United  States  to  use  its  [50c]  fleet 
in  the  Atlantic  if  that's  where  it  is  needed.  It  would  not  be  tied  as  now  to  the 
Pacific.  In  effect  the  strength  of  the  fleet  would  be  doubled  by  cutting  half  its 
problem  away. 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2007 

EXHIBIT  NO.  97 

DEtPABfTMENT   OF    STATE, 

Adviser  on  Poutical  Relations, 

September  21,  1940. , 

Mr.  Welles  :  You  state  that  both  you  and  the  Secretary  feel  that  at  this  moment 
it  would  be  undesirable  for  the  Department  to  oppose  the  plans  of  the  Navy  to 
which  the  underlying  memorandum  relates. 

Vou  ask  for  my  reaction.  , 

The  proposal  is  susceptible  of  discussion  from  two  points  of  view:  (a)  policy 
in  foreign  relations  or  (b)  policy  in  relations  between  this  Department  and  the 
Navy  Department. 

There  arises  in  my  mind  at  once  the  question  of  which  is  more  important, 
service  of  our  objectives  in  the  field  of  foreign  relations,  or  service  of  some 
objectives  particularly  regarding  wnich  are  not  known  to  me  in  relations  between 
this  Department  and  the  Navy  Department. 

On  the  face  of  Mr.  Chapin  s  memorandum  it  appears  that  the  Navy  Department 
is  advancing  merely  a  tentative  proposal  and  that  it  is  seeking  in  good  faith 
our  opinion  of  the  proposal  on  its  merits.  If  there  exists  some  particular  and 
good  reason  why  we  should  regard  this  as  a  definitive  "plan"  of  the  Navy  and 
why  we  should  advance  no  expression  of  view  unravorable  to  it,  I  am  not  aware 
of  such  fact.  Again  reverting  to  Mr.  Chapin's  statement  [2]  of  the  prob- 
lem, I  am  compelled  to  assume  that  Admiral  Stark  will  wish  to  discuss  the 
matter  with  you  on  its  merits. 

The  proposal  calls  for  a  withdrawal  of  the  Fleet  from  Hawaiian  waters  and 
its  engagement  in  maneuvers  southward  from  San  Diego  for  a  period  of  approxi- 
mately 60  days.  The  objective  is  stated  to  be  Fleet  training.  The  problem 
involved  would  be  apparently  a  problem  of  defending  the  Panama  Canal  against 
a  naval  attack. 

As  you  know,  I  have  contended  constantly  and  consistently  during  recent 
months  that,  the  situation  in  the  Far  East  having  been  and  being  what  it  is,  the 
most  advantageous  point  at  which  to  hold  our  Fleet  is  Pearl  Harbor.  I  believe 
that  the  presence  of  the  Fleet  at  that  point  has  rendered  the  Fleet  more  useful 
that  would  have  been  its  presence  at  any  other  point,  so  long  as  disposal  of  the 
Fleet  is  simply  for  guard  duty  and  general  defense.  I  do  not  today  share  the 
view  which  I  heard  expressed  a  few  days  ago  that  the  presenc*e  of  the  Fleet  at 
Honolulu  no  longer  exarcises  any  restraining  influence  as  regards  the  situation 
In'the  Far  East.  I  believe  that  withdrawal  of  the  Fleet  eastward  would  diminish 
our  diplomatic  influence  as  regards  that  situation — even  though  it  be  announced 
that  the  withdrawal  is  only, temporary,  et  cetera,  et  cetera. 

[3]  That  the  Fleet  must  have  training  exercises  is  axiomatic.  Announce- 
ment that  the  Fleet  is  engaged  in  a  problem  relating  to  defense  of  the  Panama 
Canal  against  a  naval  attack  would  tend  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  our  policy 
is  essentially  a  policy  of  defense  in  our  own  waters  (only).  The  suggestion  is 
made  that  the  problem  be  kept  very  secret.  I  do  not  believe  it  would  be  so  kept. 
Whether  there  be  or  not  be  an  announcement,  and  whether  there  be  or  not  be 
secrecy,  the  Japanese  would  learn  enough  about  the  Fleet's  whereabouts  to  enable 
Japanese  naval  experts  to  draw  inferences,  and  their  inferences  would  be  that, 
as  always  suspected  by  them,  we  have  no  intention  of  having  our  Fleet  operate 
in  the  western  Pacific. 

I  doubt  the  need  at  this  time  for  training  on  a  problem  of  defense  of  the  Pan- 
ama Canal  against  a  naval  attack.  In  my  opinion  the  Japanese  have  no  thought 
whatever  of  any  possibility  of  a  launching  by  them  in  any  near  future  of  p.  naval 
attack  against  the  I'nited  States  or  the  Panama  Canal  or  any  part  of  South 
America. 

In  Mr.  Chapin's  memorandum  it  is  stated,  presumably  as  an  observation  ad- 
vanced by  the  Navy  Department,  that  there  might  be  an  alternative:  "a  minor 
Fleet  problem  could  be  conducted  if  necessary  in  waters  adjacent  to  Hawaii". — 
In  my  opinion  it  would  be  preferable  at  this  time  that  training  of  the  Fleet  be 
achieved  througli  such  [^]  an  exercise  than  through  the  Pacific  Coast  exer- 
cise under  reference. 

The  Navy  is  at  present  engaged  in  an  operation  involving  the  sending  of  the 
vessels  of  the  Fleet,  one-third  at  a  time,  from  Pearl  Harbor  to  San  Diego  and 
return.     There  arises  in  my  mind  the  question  why,  in  the  light  of  that  fact. 


2008    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

contemplate  at  tEis  time  a  bringing  of  the  whole  Fleet  again  back  to  the  West 
Coast  at  about  the  moment  when  that  operation  will  have  been  completed. 

In  principle,  I  would  always  doubt  the  advisability  of  sending  the  whole  pack 
of  one's  watchdogs  to  a  hospital  or  to  a  training  school  at  a  time  when  there  are 
an  unusual  number  of  ugly  prowlers  in  one's  neighborhood  or  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  one's  outlying  estates.  My  mind  reacts  adversely  to  suggestions  which 
seem  to  me  to  involve  such  a  procedure,  just  as  it  does  to  suggestions  for  the 
making  of  gestures  without  the  accompaniment  of  definite  and  decided-upon 
objectives  and  at  least  tentatively  decided-upon  intentions. 

In  these  days,  we  have  almost  ceased  to  give  consideration  to  questions  of  ex- 
pense. I  would  point  out,  however,  that  Fleet  movements  cost  money.  I  for 
one  would  rather  see  such  money  as  may  be  spent  upon  the  Navy  and  its  opera- 
tions spent  in  greater  proportion  upon  construction  of  new  planes  [5]  and 
of  new  ships  than  upon  maximum  possible  expansion  of  training  operations. 

/s/     SKH. 

PA/H :  SKH :  ZMK 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2009 


Department  of  State 
the  under  secretary 

September  20,  1940 


PA/H  -  Dr.   Hornbeck: 

Tlie  Secretary  and  I  both 
feel  that  at  thle  moment  it 
would  be  undesirable  for  the 
Department  of  State  to  oppose 
the  plans  of  the  Navy  which 
are  obviously  baaed  on  what 
in  the  judgment  of  the  Navy 
is  required  by  national  defense. 

Please  let  me  have  your 
reaction. 


U:SW:IJ 


79716  O— 46— pt.  1( 


2010    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Department  of  State 


THE  SECREJXFTY 


\ 


V 


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'0l 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2011 


IJ 

U't- 


2012    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2013 


2014    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  98 

November  26,  1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  President: 
Subject :  Japanese  Convoy  Movement  towards  Indo-China. 

About  a  month  and  a  half  ago  we  learned  through  Magic  that  the  Japanese 
Government  informed  the  Vichy  Government  that  they  proposed  to  move  ap- 
proximately 50,000  troops  into  Indo-China  in  addition  to  the  40,000  already  there 
by  previous  agreement. 

Today  information  has  accumulated  to  the  effect  that  a  convoy  of  from  ten 
to  thirty  ships,  some  of  10,000  tons  displacement,  has  been  assembled  near  the 
mouth  of  the  Yangtse  River  below  Shanghai.  This  could  mean  a  force  as  great 
as  50,000,  but  more  probably  a  smaller  number.  Included  in  this  ship  concen- 
tration was  at  least  one  landing-boat  carrier.  The  deck-load  of  one  vessel  con- 
tained heavy  bridge  equipment.  Later  reports  indicate  that  this  movement  is  al- 
ready under  way  and  ships  have  been  seen  south  of  Formosa. 

The  officers  concerned,  in  the  Military  Intelligence  Division,  feel  that  unless 
we  receive  other  infojmation.  this  is  more  or  less  a  normal  movement,  that  is,  a 
logical  follow-up  of  their  previous  notification  to  the  Vichy  Government. 

I  will  keep  you  informed  of  any  other  information  in  this  particular  field. 

(Signed)     Henry  L.   Stimson, 

Secretary  of  War. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2015 

EXHIBIT  NO.  99 

Department  of  State, 
Office  of  Far  Eastern  Affairs, 

September  26, 19U- 
Top  Secret 

There  is  attached  a  page  from  the  Congi-essional  Record  of  September  21,  1944, 
in  which  there  is  a  statement  by  Congressman  Church  in  respect  to  the  delivery 
of  a  message  to  the  State  Department  on  December  7,  1941,  by  Lieutenant 
Commander  Kramer  of  the  Navy  Department. 

Our  recollection  of  the  matter  is  as  follows :  At  about  10 :  00  a.  m.  on  Decem- 
ber 7  Mr.  Hornbeck,  Mr.  Hamilton  and  Mr.  Ballantine  came  to  the  outer  ofla.ce 
of  the  Secretary  of  State  to  discuss  the  general  situation  of  relations  with 
Japan.  They  were  shown  by  Mr.  John  Stone,  a  Foreign  Service  officer  then 
serving  as  an  assistant  in  the  office  of  the  Secretary,  a  document  the  contents  of 
which  were  pertinent  to  the  subject  of  what  they  were  going  to  discuss  with  the 
Secretary  and  which  had  then  been  delivered  to  the  outer  office  by  Lieutenant 
Commander  Kramer,  then  on  duty  in  the  Navy  Department.  Lieutenant  Com- 
mander Kramer  was  present  in  the  room.  The  document  contained  no  reference 
to  any  Japanese  military  movement  Mr.  Hornbeck,  Mr.  Hamilton  and  Mr. 
Ballantine  are  positive  that  no  statement  was  made  in  their  presence  by 
Lieutenant  Commander  Kramer,  as  alleged,  to  the'  effect  that  "this  looks  like  a 
surprise  attack  upon  Pearl  Harbor  and  a  midnight  attack  upon  the  Philippines-" 

The  conversation  in  the  Secretary's  outer  office  was  intermittent  and  scat- 
tered among  those  present  in  the  room-  In  other  words,  each  person  was  not  a 
party  to  all  of  the  conversation-  Mr-  Hornbeck  has  a  distinct  impression  that 
there  was  brought  up  Japanese  naval  disposition  with  specific  mention  of  most 
recent  advices  of  Japanese  naval  movements  in  the  Gulf  of  Siam- 

Mr.  Hamilton  recollects  also  that  Lieutenant  Commander  Kramer  remarked 
on  that  occasion,  in  reference  to  the  matter  of  an  appointment  for  the  Japanese 
Ambassador  to  see  the  Secretary  of  State  at  1 :  00  p.  m.  on  December  7,  that  the 
naming  of  the  hour  might  mean  that  it  was  the  hour  for  some  Japanese  move- 
ment.   No  mention  was  made  of  Pearl  Harbor  or  of  Hawaii  or  of  the  Philippines. 

With  regard  to  the  statement  that  Lieutenant  Commander  Kramer  then  went 
to  the  White  House  and  delivered  the  message,  they  have  no  knowledge  whether 
this  was  a  fact. 

/s/     JWB  /s/    M.  M.  H. 

FE  :  Ballantine :  HST 


2016    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  100 


CMTBO  SftAmU  l»ACinC  FUBBT 

r,  s.  &  wtJWiVLVAKU.  n«««fc«» 


8,  WAX 


«rf  NLUn  ruaa  tUa  mnmIac.    Im  Uhwa  |[dL«»iar  t«r  th«  l«r 
Mi«  1*  biM  (*  tmt  mmnm  t«r  (MUmI  FlfdUlw.    The  •ttXmm  r»- 
U  tiUi  nwiilm  Urn  4D«r'«  «ai«MliVMi  ar  AaftOim 

1.  ■•  ■«»  MriMM  frai  *  rMtf  tM  aiU  aff  BallHH 

rwM. 

2.  ■•  ami  uio(h«r  aftLocr  ««««  th«  only  wibw 
«r  a  taB-MH  «HtaMrlai.    Tte  rvtMa  fbr  him  oapiiii«  wm 
tlH*  tw  WM  Mw^tlng  up  an  ifc'at  te  than^it  to  ba  a  aai*- 
Ual  ahip  ««l  Ln  avdw  to  iMr»l«aU  ha  hai  %•  a^a  Um 
ha^^  «f  Uta  MfeMaiiaa  -  abaNt^oa  aaftar  aaaa  Into  tha 


hA«h  moA  imniirt  ih«  aator.    la  Iharai^paB  4HitmA  «mb 
tba  raaf .    Thla  »rflaar  vaa  Gav««to  ani  larlfaUir.    Tha 
«ib«r  aTtloar  h«a  iMl  baan  naaiwad.     XaCbnMtloa  la»> 
dlaabaa  tNtt  thara  ara  anr*  of  Utaaa  aaall  aataauurlaaa 
la  tba  vialnitr  aad  Um*  tbtr  aaa«  biwtglit  hai«  trm  mm 
tyya  oJT  a  MMIiar  ahi».    Tha  lOlaanar  414  atata  tb«t  ha 
bad  to  iwrtiaO  a  dlatanaa  oT  a  taanlrad  allaa  baf»i« 
rwnLv  acfwud  apaa  tba  raaf.     it  tba  tl«a  at  hla  aap- 
t«x«  tba  af flaar  «a*a  a  ataip  aatah  arauHl  bi«  aaak  ablab 
■toppa4  nuBili«  at  0010.     It  la  nat  knoNH  ab1*iar  tbla 
la  OCT  «r  WT,    Altbaatfi  ha  <B.d  not  «!«•  th»  anaar'a 
f araaa  or  diapoaltiaa  ba  «t«tad  tbat  aa  far  aa  ba  baa* 
tba  aUaak  •••  »  diaappaAntwit  In  tbat  tbagr  aaqgaatad 
•  paraXrsinc  bloa  to  our  fl»at. 

3.       Xa  aaaoi^anea  aitt)  tha  aaaurl  aeda  thlo  pria- 
onar  haa  racjuaatad  ttet  ha  onl/  bo  allaaad  to  rw— U 
milolda. 

It  -a  oTiaant  t.h2L  Uho  orfloor  appTMlatad  tba  traateant  aftordad 
hla  bjr  th»  n«val  quMrtianora  to  that  at  tha  Uw,  and  tt  ia  fait 
Uttat  with  pttpnr  handllm,  Airlhar  InTorMatloa  i^jj^  bgr  darlvad 
mw  tbla  ottiJtmr. 

^-     J^^^-  '~'  t.  T.  unoi. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2017 


IfS^V,^* 


1. 

~'m4,   a. 

;«d  UiMJr  h»l,  — 

.  .tjrf   1, 

iiul>-;.l«ut«'ts»ir.'    1 

^i. 

.«i.«M. 

j«Ttti.  aMAaflT'. 

FOURTTENTH    NAVAL  DWTHUT 
DteltU-i   lMa«H«MiM  OCln 
flfatk  n«».  Tmumt  IU*^  ,  ,.  /i^ 

fl«MNdM»  8,    1    CI 

MBKMu>an  ro%t        riMt  .       .lcmm«    rriMv 

IT/  wu  ft  graduate  of  Um  I>9*rtal 

2.  -JL   Mci  kit  .out   ele«ftUN{  at  Wy   kilul,    and   aMtwl 

111  ■   ohalr  «r-<   -^^4  in  mu  »rn:f  blitntutt.     Btfova  vM«ttflblB«  ••«  •t«rt*<l 
.     «••  iMunwd   ■■)>kt  -.^ila  .'ri«<.n«r  ««•  UUmi  aa  tik«  V*«*ti  'tt  telXaaa 

.   ;^.     That  n*    .id  •«u..  ax^or«  and  had  arouaA  wX*  naeic,   en  a  iM^ara, 
..'I    -  wiit«Ii  vhla..  :jaj   ttmlt,  anitar  lAaMa  of  It.     ?!<«  v«t«»i  va«  •tox:j^«C 
»0.     Ttm  wtiian  wait  Utaorlbwi  on  taa  r«vara«   In  Ja^waaaa  atiarMt- 
'  i .  '— Inir.alatad  aa  roU.o«rai     "Vatak  iMi  oloek,  T/pa  1,  lla*y  4i'yc.     >-c'.- 
I  A     o.   .>>«ui7l.'     T  la    ouu  atatod  that  l«a  ■•«  »£  offlaar  of  t&a 
^u««u<oae     av  akd     nvr      la  o«na   a*  lUjUo   J.JUL«JU  of  OkJl/a.^  iT«f*a*.ur - 
*;;'"  «»   'ad  lv»-.     e*  ct  a  ooo*  at  two  In  a   ub'airlcia  Milcttt  had   nir.   ■«.«.. ore 

'3f*    ^  <  raaf  u.  .rTOKtsMtai:    ao«  nXl*  r>t~t  UaJUa  .   .'laid.     Hki  atatatf  ua>t 

'^»  '  -  le   t.ia    JoAAOillr.:    .  ."loer   of   the  a   ana   tha   BaTlitKtor  •lh-. 

V.^.l    ..la   a.l.JAta   wds   t  a  «u_lne»r— •;  t !■  -      -«»  oocjiistatl   cf    .1     i' » 
and  »!.«    sMpnata.     fia  Motilttad  that   t.ia  »  .outxiat   y«s  of  >   tt.i.. 
x^ioh  oparnxad  r««a  •  nA:iar  ahl^  tait  rafuaad   U>    .l«a  Uw  imww  oi 
'.^nika,:*  o.    t„r.    lotl^r  a:.!;  or  tha  Aiatanaa  at  aaa  ot  Ma  .Uaaiittor  ;- 
atliM.  tix.  .   ..  «'   ..uUior   3:.lp.      .<:•&    )i«bt...uei!  ns  to  «^iet  ^r  t^    .  .  .- 
oxlte  »4j  4«1,aal  or  aieolrlo  proTwlia-i   i^e   rer.^oj  to  ruiawcr.       < 
•t  itad    .lit    m    .ui!   uavi   i>fca4   *r>ore   V.hu  ..-~re<l   r.tlaa'   nraii.    is.!^^ 

li    t..c   '.  ;..tiueo   Kara  aa  lus^   aa  or>e    .  .in^rad      llaa.      Tco   ouoA  «ra>^e.  c« 
'   ould  ..ot  be  :  iaoad   li>  Uila  aAaaar  n»    le  oiiTii.ual     ra«i.la*d  j«   ■%&> 
belli-  :uapad.     .ia  atatcd  t&at    .«  wlal^  tc  oocaiilt  auleltla  mt&  .laA  w^x. 
'..■U-.   M,   at   tt»    tina  at   laodla.:  oa   auura   '^ecuuoa   of   Uuri    ;.«aalblJfty   *.  Isl. 
re  V. l.-.ts>i   I.',   jiuxiz^    !i1j  o3«a>>«  aad  rrJ«l£.Lag  t.^ic   Ji>;«Qeaa  haCTj .      -.jt 
:>'    <.<!j    .  '.V   >.c    tad  new  baan  dla.;raaa(!  iu4  did  i..ol  v.aat    ila  nwaa  or    ils 
>   i.    i._ur.ntlc:;  aact  baas  to  Ja^jon.      .li^i.  uoe^jkll '«ntod  au  \,tm  tiuooaaj 
ul    I   Ic.    .Id  l.aT»Ll    oocxHiUtj   hm!    u^Jc   t«v1r  nttaak,    .le   ataVad  tliat   It 
.^vl  teoi.   ..iich  lesa  auocaasrul  t.  iir.   \>my  Uau  antlol>at«d.     R«  ax^-raatyau 
<.ur:  rlaa  ut   I.. is  aixi   i<e  vaii  aiiiicd  «  .at  thay  orl  .l->all,    axpaatad  to 
RCCk,.,  llau,    lo  ra^iila.1,  1;.  affwat,   a  loioalc-out   blow  tc   y.-xir  Iiavy. 

j.  .It  .ted  t  .at  off  .alloMS  ~i«lu  ti.itt    «nil&g 

■j<:«'.    -x  ,ru..a-.x/.      .   ca   ttnl    litlp  but  t...it   \.:gs   dur^saaa  aaa  »o 
.    ;.o   -.  .  t    ..    T  ..'.   fcraad  to  ojiaii  t.ls  ouucib:   tooor  and  ataol   m 


c.  x:^..^^ 


2018    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


In  th«  opao  .Atah  ».tl«  iMmiln-  haif  mutmtr,;»A  ii/m^rA*  hi*  tnro 
;«t.     »a  a  raault  of  VU«  aMwaTar  In  t2i«  ahAirpy  •••,   Urn  abippad  o 
-;r*at  d*al   of  wnUir  doaa  tha   !Mti«h  Alah  trlpplod  hi*  notor  «d4  t'<i» 
•otor  fallura  r««ili*4,   of   sour**,    lo   Ui«   loMi   of   atjotrvl  of   t)i« 
•ukaaLTtiM)  HiU  ala  balA«  d»«x>«4    liit<.   ■  fmt  oT«r    /.mi   bIIo   froi     'wl- 
lov*  ricid.     »!•  Aiul  hlM  r«llo*  of  near  strls'Fad,   4iv«4   lat«  t  .• 
o«*«n  aaa  aVtcayibNl  t«  vflA  ashor*.      'I*  ataiad  ii«t  ft*  Xa«t   ••■ 
hi*   ahtpKata    lo  Uia   :iaiv      aurf.      ■!»  a'lnlttad   ti.a    .oaulblilt/  that 
Ul*   i*mrj  aVcikt  anr>liu»  t..a   sulxnarlua,  kMelt  <iit^1   run   ob   U-e   rnof 
(baoauaa   :io   aua  not  axare   L.  nt    •.•ivai    :  liutaa  .uk^.    mibae  ;  ;aritly 
twhad   and   auiU  lita  miUnarlimi  ,      ■>»   atatad  tiiat    U.T9    <•  ra   no 
papara   In  tUa  aabHarlDn  <«,]  aJultfcad  t.i«t  t.ila  t>  pa  of  auboarUia 
rapvaaautad  oaaaatiaili>    a  aort  of  arilars^ad   v^rlatloo  of  a  oaa 
nan  torpedo.     :!«  atatad   ',j    :roa«iA  -.iataka  was  baUu?  aapturad. 
Thla   la  tha   rirat    llii«   1     lave    ftll»..      j-irasc    >.  .  ot  adTliie   Ja.'i;. 
about    tiild.      i  I>  a^c    .;;il      o.*      Jurll:  '    t  .n    c^^uriMi    -!  thta   ^a^tlon- 
liiS,  aiUoit  aaa  It* -uu  b^   ti<o  ui>l  of   L^o  eaapoXtuX,   lotar.  .-''tara,    1' 
davalojiad  Uuit  t..l«  <uu..,.  ofilcor    Ad   txiaa  knoHlad.ra  of  i^ac^Xla.., 
atiloii  iia  at   firui  dU  oot  ilacXoae.     Latar  on  ba  axplaluvd  bla 
L»ax;^artaaaa   L:.   thia    Uii..-ua.  a   \jj  aayln-.  tual.,   K.'.lla   la  tha    .iiMIa 
aahool,  bm  h>^  jtudla<^    .r.    ■.■ui,  but   In  tha  ^i^adangr,   la  axpaetatlor. 
of  duty  in  tlia  Ciilna  ^aaa,  1m  mi  aalaatad  Siilaaaa. 

i..  ^  .;raj»lj>',  of  a   pattr  offlaar'o   :  ht.    rUot'a 

l&alKUla  wad  iaada   b/  al..  aat   :ia  ox   lalnad   tina   altailf Icanca  uf   Via 
trarluua  iatalXs  ct  V..ia  tlarlaa. 

'j.  Ti4.are  re.jalua  tiia  ix^iulbillty ,    If  tha  .'^aval 

autUorltlaa    ii  Vttjlra,    t.ml  I. la  aubnarloa  uiy  /at  ba  loeatad  aod 
ralaad   ''or  a»n    liwiLlti,  or   ^co  _.uloiil   .latalls,   av.c. 


-.   J.   0. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2019 


Subject  I 

1. 
hundre('.  /urda  fro; 
KolJ.  At  the  tt, 
p.ncej  ».ero  eaju  •' 
'Ive  3r  fifty  pou; 
ilr«ot  hits  v.er"  i 
to  1  .-..l  within  ri: 
jub.'.frliie  eld  not 
jj>03ltlon» 

2. 
irxoTvieyifl     -..'■    <' 
oil  clic<  . 
jli.ce 


■rm^ 


HUHtABOni  SQCAIMKIIf   ftXni 

U.  a  «.    AaOOHADT.  Wniti» 

Dfoemb^r  8,    19^1 

•i-A-l 

n«tt   Intrllije:.ce  Or'ioer. 

Invodtlgttlon  of  Japsinete   9uln^  rln«  ^Vcirouad  In 

?.i>3    .^b..r'nc   w.i»ii   Tir.-'-    iljijt.?:.'   •■vaB    Lbout   nix 
i   \'.\et    b«B:!.,    oft"    -'e    e.T^    c ."    t' e   run-way   ut  B«llows 
ie   o.-  n;^'   w    ;•:      1      '    '    ■■   ^i^'  '.,    tiJ-e«  Nary  Utility 

.•"    la    'r:-  ,'1    _   '       '     -.  '    -    *- 7  be   clth*r   f..e-.ty- 

. ;    b-'.  ■■  ■  ■    :  .^ftfl    in   pu1r  ;.      Ho 

•*.      Tv  •  ^    .  ,.  ■♦-,*„    ...j.ullnj;    ^^e 

t  ,  ••'    .  •   feit-rred    Its 


The    . 


l:.e 


•:.r.    1::    ..      I-.  -. 

oo...€    .  i'  .  i..  o   t 

ao  dia*-!  ._uis;  i 

ft.-.d  ubc..:   ro-<r   . 

J«)eti 

Tlie   c 

..■u3  u  .-...-      „ : 

v,u3    .:..;\.;.   l^y    .. 
of  W'..'.    :    .:■...    . 
frOj  1  ■»   e    1  DC  u '.  * " 
be  stfcu  fro.i  ■>... 


"     ^1  ^  .. :-  - /i     3?'  t     .'iC 

..   ■'      t       ....  -      I     ,-i3      .bl-      v3 

.      ■"  '  .--    -j  .11   blaci:  \.-ith 

.hftr  "eet    ii.  leujtl., 

^.-  ■  11   j.eriscope  pro- 
;;e'-rta    *  :    te   periscope   3ha«r8. 
■  "  Df  all   '^ub;j '-i:je'i    anl   there- 
o.  .      At   Lhe   tlue,    the   subioferlne 
. -.-l3C'i.;e    she;  V-    coiil.i^  out 
•,    L."ti;-a   of  1.16  \.i,ves.      Jud^ln^ 
T      I  .--.■    .:.rcl   bottom,  v/hloh  could 
1...:     .,ye    re:    to   be   drlftinjj  in  to- 


ll.'        "^.-t   '..ll.:     :..e  xjialaw.  auour.t   of 
towed  in  uwi  lefec'.ed. 


l/J^ 


Li€Utn:.i-;;t,  U.S.    ITcivy, 


^,  jT'-^.yZ^^^ 


2020    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


£    2    £   I 

To   •   i;©m-r..  rfVctri 

nroa  JspmcM  Sawl   Offtow 
lUUOO   SAIUIUKZ 

I  th«i»W  yau   for   thm   klndlj  wUlt   of  y»tmr6»y .      torn  I 
will   write   low:,  jrour  r^q^awat*  of  :y««t«rda7   In  Japan«»«.   ri«««« 
{mrdor.  ay   p  joif  vrltiog  and  oOMposltl^n. 

1.       BhI-.K    Prihh^NAL   !?:?TORY 

In  A'CHitt  XJ¥)  X  «••  gra<lu«t*d  from  th«  Naval  Acadvqr 
and  toacaaa  a  rldahlpiMn.  In  April  of  ti.la  yaar  I  «aa  com- 
■lial  .n«c1   a    rJ^- Ilaatanant   In    Uia   navy,  my   praaant  rank. 

8.      REOiX    li'   PATTI  E 

To^oT   Monorab'.  o    "^lave"     •     ;ntry    InatltutoJ;   en  acDnoMlo 
blockada  ui"   Ja;«n,    ■    "hiiva  njt"   country,  rafaaln.-  to   aall  ua 
otl,    cottar.    a:i3    t.io    ".Ike,    until   wa    had    no  choVoa   bat    natural 
eollai;ao.      Socauio   of  thla  »•   ^ai^an  aioloaatVo  na^:otl:iU  lona 
wltii   yojr  cjuntr'.    ^t    tinto  at^dad  In  /alxura.      7:er-iroro, 
wltn    a    frland,    I    aat  out    :  or    Venri  iiarosr   wltn    *.!.»*    pur^/oaa   ol" 
•  li-.ltlnp    a   battloahlp,    &ut   a  la    to  «ccU:ent.    althou-h 

ae    ••!■«   abio    to    raucn    tha    ■oath   of   tha   ftar&op   cy   oraaplnrf 

ondameatn   yojr  boaba   falling   ilka   rain,   a  Inca  t;.-: 

BCCl>:ent   waa    I'ltal    to   taa    aubmarlna,    we   detar»ln«:'    •   •      F^ceecT 
with^jt   •sealt.ation  on  tha    aurfaca  of    tha   watar,    m.  .'.•. 

li)t<j   t'.e  aarbor,    and   cllJi*tn«   the    iran^-way   laddar,       ."O    •. 
lea;     -    t      t:ia   aaok    a«3  dla   almultanaoualy  with  bl^w:-.       i 
ar.airj    ..-rahi?    Juat   a*    In  oLdai  tUwa,   dorli;-    -ho  ko- • 
alor. ,    rir    Ta  lya   Kawano    lowerad   tha   laaat    lt!    r.   nrdad   t-" 
anamy    Bt.ip  •lt^:    It.       HowaTsr,    oecaaaa    of    t;;»j  a-  -Vdont 

a'uiT«ioa   s.  t    t^l«ll   hsrb.r    ••  o  t\ .    *«    struO    k   roar   wfeich   ijlvan 
tor.   »«,     .    s   »e    w,   ::d         ve    safoly   claared.       Ky    first   atrntn    em 
;.»...    t"n'.l<-C..      •••'■,^    t..l.      'irforei.ce   oi"    ter.   ^oc   r.-ts   the    f«te   wo:, 
deo'.ce ,    >  r.a    j;.e     >.    t:.e   warohlpa   of   your   c5-;.try   »aa  Ba«*d . 

L^oli-.f-  tr.fi    auccesB  of   our   t.l»tar— Jutautflnea    .nd  tha 
aplar.dltl    ro  . le  vementa   of   our    air    forca  ,    I    If  ^    the  MOgth  o. 
U.e  hartor,    compelbid   to  do    ao   dua    to  my    ai^marine   *^eI3vg  dls- 
•  hiad.      ',ator,    finally  being  unable  to  do  anythln.;   with  the 
•^i-^rrarlne,    I   saaa.  tnroui^  th*  ooaan  and   raachad   a-.   snMiy 
airrort.      :>Jt.»   to  my  axhauatlon,    I   aaa   captorad  without  haTln- 
tliBB    to    even   flpht.      And   thua  my   aeU    fate  haga.i. 

Due  entirely   to  my  Inaxpart  navigation  and    strategy,  ^y 
honor   as   a    aoliiler  haa   fallan  to  the    ground.      T-iua    :    !>atrayad 
the   9X7«ctatlona   of    our  100,000,000   (paopla)    and  bacpne  a  aad 
rrlo'irier  of  war  dla  loyal    to   my   country. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2021 


■•      9m   talk    I  had    with    an    jnrl*rBt«juUn.     n«va!    orCXcmr   In    th* 
hoa>   of   an  aniy   oaii    In    ^otiol  Um'  •••    rmry    pianaant.    9a««'.ta« 
I    thouftit   about   tha    tr<ou)>la    I    aoaXd    oauaa   your   otaitry  latar   ■■li, 
and  bacauaa    :    aaa   'uMt^l*    tj    aiidiira   nij    ahai  •«,     ;    -mi  t.  t'ur,    '  ilclda 
or   balrxK   ahot    to  daat)t   ^mcnna   '.mpoaalbla,    ..i»     '   ,aa   'jarni;   "•      •  "'^ 
llf*  m»  m    prl  aorjar  oi    war.       tlom    tiiot    t'lln    «         .  n    co-»io   to    ni-.)-. 
•  paaa^    I  huvm  atartad  tha    lire   a   paaca.' tl    J«   •.  ^.b-i  naval     '.  :  t  c 
abldlntt  by  tha  rulaa  of   tntamatlc'iiai    imm. 

Za  Old*n    tlMsa,   Makul    and     Itukuaai    j>    ^.tuu.    rarualnr>;    to 
oat  oilllat  or   •  furalt'n  land,   want    Into  tno  mjuitalna    ht.-^    ata 
KTaaa    (T)    untl  i    they    atarvad,    but    :,    al-i.e    I    '.«,•*'•.    <»atli.  •    y>ji 
oountry 'abraad,    h«i»»   thou^t  w»,»t    <     ;a  iu«    .' .;■    ..r.H-'o   «••.•        ir)» 
tt   la. 

Althoii^  I  ^uiT«  oauaad  y  .>•:  mauti  m. 
thins  r'^t^it  aio;.  acoordlti^;  t  j  ih'iitoj 
Inoldants    aa   Uiat   Miloti   happanad   yaatarda?   wMcK 


ny« 


/tjr,     aaoii 
rjT..    t  t« 
has   »->»>an   cont'nuad.    Uy 
r    yjar    c  '  ^ntry   with    .ra» 
bL   aa    or,.".    r.Bf'.o    t    f       ,:"ru'. 
u  rtaatii  wtilc.   t      :■-.':  i.c 


atandp.lnt  oT   your  oointr;,    n    tiatt   tr.ln 
rlc^titaounaaahaa  nada   ao^r«a   oC  lae:.  >. 
•11  day  lox^    «ltti    Utalr      ma   p  ilntod 
but   aa  a  raoult  or  t!ila,    I    mu^t   .  .ica 
too  plaaalng. 

My  •lllltvJ'.oka  to    ..l«   iwad  t.o',  hft  awntion*"* :    t  <      ?;      ::i';d 
by  ona  or  y^jur  bullets  oi'    ;•    .xr  c>^jntry  snail  mar.o  aio    vin-        a;;?. 
I    pray    .or   y  >ui-  r.  .antry'?    i«>atlng  nllltMry    -uccasa. 

An   uprli.-,  ite>  is    i^latol    h«a   baaf.   iiln»od    at  ma.      T;'.?   In    ly 
and.    Oood-bya. 

•5.      To   the    Japariiisa   pa<p"3,    as;  u -.  n  ^^  .•    ',  ■•    ->  ir- 

aalvaa,   baojmln'     a  prisoirtr   o:    *m.    ; ..    '..;oa,.  'irae, 

•hethtir   or  not  there   Is   ii    r.;c^ra     >;'    t.ie    ViCluor.v  .--t,    I 

will   coBuilt   talclda  a.x»n  r       (•jtam    ■      r.j  n/<tlv*.    Inr....    '^Tr*n 
thou^'ti  wo   ara    ananr.ed,    to   ■  '■       wit..    •;    ■.  *      aiv*.    Cl,:^it    to    ti-.«    Inst 
la   tnm   Jipa-iasa   aplrtt. 

I   pray   t:i>t    a.y  ..e«tr.   »:,.    .  ,,.•   •.  .,-.  -._•    .ell'juroa 

tnd  I  pray   *^ir.t   ■■  ■_•   .»■  li-lt  wll.    o«  a...,  ,i  •  .c.   ^      ■  .•    '  m^  ^cunl 
U'yu'lnai . 


j'iaaso    :'oi- 


1  s  tr  :c      -   .  . 
;    arr'.  veJ    Mt   « 
I   ."LB  va   : .      oA , 
tunlt       5.    ^t^■.; 

rit,  .t'. 


-.1 


Buval    ■>*ib-lle  itene' 


2022    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


rem  covFosB)  amowq  vu  uxma  (oa  m  vwraKTiriUTx  iw 
BBCAMc  k  naaonx  op  mar) 


nhttrry  bloaaoaa  r«II, 
Ut  thWB  CmXli 
Dr«noh«d   arc   th«    Ita   branohaa    and    Isavaa 
With   tha   aorrov   of    today! 

9«  I  Ilka  b«»t    "DOW*  -ms  TORPSDO"  astX    "AMOWO  THK   ;  riOTS 

TtlROUan  ns  K/IJOAKKT*.    I   axpar l.*tio«(l   all  tbaaa  things   In  thla 
Ourr«nt  battla  »rvlah  la   tha  (oal   oC   all   naval  aan'a  ambition, 
and  I   aanlfaatad   tha  Yasato  0«Aaahll    (Japanaaa   aplrlt).    Laat 
oll^t,    acain   aooraa  or  bayonata   and   aaissT'ja   vara    pointad   at 
■*  fro*  tha  front  door   and   froai   t'le  window   and    froa  abova 
1^  baad.    Soaavar,    rlght*ouanaaa  won.    And  alttiou^  as  a  raault 
of   thia   a   raerattabla  altooatlon   >-  n«  about.    I  b»p«  th«t  all 
•ould  ;  a  forglwan  with  wf  da«th.    On  tha  •«•  of- my   "fairly 
daath'  laaantln^  tha  laany  aaortfloaa  oT   your   ooantry  dua   to 
^   'oall   of  rljhtaouBnaaa',    X   aarnaatly   hopa   Uhat  thla  will 
b«  olaarlT  undaratood,    that   aupraaa  daalra  and  Joy  In  dying 
aa  a   vldlar  by  your   oountry'a  bulXata. 

I  appraolata  your  many  Vclndnaaa  ahown  ma  up  to  now, 
and   I  pngr   for  your  aucoaaa   In   tha   war. 


Roapaotfully , 
Kasao   54 


COPT 


e.  X-^2^ 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 

EXHIBIT  NO.  101 


2023 


2024    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


AVI 


LOG  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  SHIP 

At  ':i-\'-,-  rard.lgarl  llarbor. 
Passage 

lone  oescription -'a,^8  av? 


it6_ 


fS! 


II! 


OOVMt 

Or* — 
u» — 


SASOVmB 


TKUrCSATCM 


:  'Vh;fe.. 


.'iffiu^.^. 


ji  I.iMJgftjdt 


h 

Lnil((it..> 

'l{ 

c 

V  p. ' 

r. 

«.E 

Srror__ 

Dovlniioi) 


MAGAsuta  TzMreai^rfx'*: 


« 

1  . 

IfVriiKiaal  <rt  tjtiryni  ^«H**  "'  tfalfi  T»--<r*  '-"^  '^^  tv??* 


1 

m 

'Sa,vltfAt!<)U  n^oi^tblr)      »..jiii    *~%^M||ttii^^^H 

1 

EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2025 


79716  O— 46— pt.  16 8 


2026    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2027 


UNITED  STATES  SHIP 


l(/W^.- 


^Ort^i'vAl  i,»ji»{vjrt 


2028    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Pagt 


^-UiC 


LOG  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  SHIP 

ZONE  DESCRIPTION  ~—£lJyl—l£9 


4 '.  Ixiogitwig 


o-S^-f^jr  ^ 


K  11  288-50 


^  fig'  z 


^3.Tr,a.  -a2»Q_t=  |L2fi_e.c. 


j    rE*Mtv«i 

"1     loalaod- JJ&^Ui.. 

__Ji. 


Miaiimiu 


I  [gyle  !-  j 82178 1-  rio_. 


-TV — nr*r 


ti    •<  \C     iSBliil  1 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2029 


ft./' 


ADDITIONAL  SHEET 


XlB  {Coutln««d) 

|0osBn«n4iii|i  Offio«r,  LECO.'OTON,  the  following  naiiftd  uen  rooortftd  aboard  for  dut 
■jsportation  lod  tessporary  d:jty  on  LEirroT-:;  In  ocuBectlon  vrtth  g«tter»l  court 
Ufti  It  oiMBi;>l««*d.    CCAZXXt,  v",H,,  a-;l  ^0  74,  36a.23,'j.j.:-'.,  ana  oocsKR,  «r.y,, 


/?^    ^/^,^L*n^»^f 


ve.     16S5  iAiiii'S  •iiidorway.     i'",iO  i-oc«iivea  ou  board  for  us«) 
IJ.owlaa  fr*«a  prc-visions:     from  Harmon  Cc,  Ltd.;  Hoaolul'j, 

,'    sdX.      laOp«Cte4   s.B   to    Cuant.i1,v  t"  A«ting   i«y   Cleric   .7_    '  . 

;i  as  to  quality  ty  j-i^sutf,  ■  tower,   (ITC 

.;iAH  •tandlag  in.     1823  BIU  .    -s,  ia. 


•ra,  £805  3C1D*4<&^*,   U.I-.,  B.-,S»,v'«ji^;,   Wqb  rat.uiTivc*   tf  tu«| 
-■.*fira  under  ol»6.r4;os  of  oreaticg  a  distttrbaaoe,  figi(tir*s  at 
OJjarges  to  tolJnw.       h<u   rj-'ipMer  at  large  by  order  of  t5i< 
writer*    ease  231:9,  s,i?,,  ?■'-  rapoytsd  aT>oar!  upon  conjlotlc 

Says  leare,  an  tiiae. 


A 


f,  psj^orara  .  Srsi 


ir.n.r.; 


2030    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2031 


UNITED  STATES  SHIP 


R\ZM, 


.1  starboara.  side  to  bertb  3-S,  Kair/'  Yard,  Pearl 
!i.-A;.Xiu.  iin.>8,  5  wlrft  breftsts,  and  2  wire  cables.     ^ocoiviHg  li 
j  telephoas.  sejr/ico  iroa.  the  doalc.    Ko.  4  boiler  in  use  for  aval 
IjMte  presert,  Trjirleus  •iri.ts  of  thw  '.'.S,   Bleat-.  dlst.rlct  aw?  y 


,.C?  .^/j;i^.  V,  ^„  ^  ,'^^:« 


es   btf^-re.  ;-'!S:^'i    rec-'vt-o   Oij   board 

BvtSlone  •  -•-.t.loE,  ita 

by  ^t  .-.teoer,  t". 

"HigJitower,  ^oris  gruiSe 

S.   SteYfpJt   returned  frcoi  aine  days  lea^- 


•HOC  ii._i,^.  ;..i.:^,ti5Siib'a:- 
liji  aooord-r.c*  v/ith  3-a'^aV 

'lit.;..   :     ..-    -ijtritt    ?oi-  te 


■.andant 


16 

L'oor«d  6S  before, 

gton,  U.;;. 

""aval  I>i; 

iiiaiidant  1 
Qttarfl  Tenter,  v 
report  Ootadt.  1 
pureiiant  of<av":- 
left  tbf  ■ 
385  79  6^, 
atood  la. 

>^ctober  20,   1041,   i-. 
E.'ti. ,   295  52  56,   3©- 
0 ori . ajj d  1  sig  Otric&r . 
1345  aeoured  ic 
pursuant  ordajb 


Jiego,   Culiforr/ia  for  torsporary  dat/  arS  farther  traasfe-ij 
Oistyict,  -iftr  .rsiiiilf   ,   "\  J"  .    -"s  *    •       *    ,     '   ..ra-ea 
and,  Calif v'l  ilft.     -".u 
junats  as  xesTs,.     i:  31 


t&^^i.iiaj  (Hbteofj)    Mt/r  of  i^j«  j;».«r  ro  be  »cr,t  tu  aur-o 


2032    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Pate 


LOG  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  SHIP 


f  !i!lf|jl!!|i&^|  j  [i'l  il  il!j4l*fii| 

T    "!  II   ! .  t  a        i> 


s=|[ 

1 

^i  !vr^iil-| 


0-. 


t On  t».i 50,COC 


.S  Di»Kf«'4.. 
I  Drift  •»!.__ 


•  r.  f 


^:  tiiia  jwae  »o  ti«  &*»?  t<j  Biii-v*f 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2033 


ADDITIONAL  SHEET 


.-..SSfSO-if- 


-  to 

,  aooxe*  e9  1>9for«.     16C5  CHAVES  vnderway,   shiftier  berthd.     1613  F. 

W*rw(V  wiA  standing  out  to  ae.a,     1025  ORIDLSy  »}sde-n»ay  tfwl   standing    .■ 

ktacCKT  ttnd«r*«y.     1735  C»^ai<v5o   iu'ervi-y.     1745  pujsuant,  to  orders  of  «,&« 
!,£>iSing  arricei'  datbd  £7  r  j7«i.ber  l^.:  :jJ<TIH,  j.,  Jr.,  265  <3Q  09,  lUAtt.ic, 
V.3.">  was  roleasad  fr«a  ooufla«j,«iit  ond  jlacoS  uiiaisr  araea  guar'l  foi-  transfe: 


■  t&  lEXISfliTOK 


TTT  to  KavsU.  I'rJ.coB 


1600  Ttift  following  liea  l»f 4 
iDXta.   ;■,'!       337   V; 

i£«,  :{.,  Jr.,  '%v'  • 


.  iiarw  Veu'S,  ■ijt'e  ialunft 
5.  tbo  siilp  with  OT'd'sra  t,i 


0«i.f> 
1  r«i  ort 


;«  for  oo!iflne-| 

the  «L-ra2ie.u4- 


JHTBOTJa.   F.C,   i07  £1   ?.C,   G,k.£c>,    '. . 

scnxiTAjT.  W.P.,  c5o  t',  £1,  cai.r.lia.  , 

SXSKASD,  S.C.,  Z'i'/   Oi  90,  *,}  .,;,2c,  ' 
VHIilPOTf,  i.S.,  ^,74  5U3  CC,  T.-.Ss,  :. 

ffi-wiSKiDOi,  a.:..  -i74.  ?i  PA.  ».s:.ss,  '  = 
\  ..  (.:■  IP,  c.i:.^.  (ii) 


'.'tie  fcLiswlK^  -.ei. 


:.  .FM  to 

.i%"j?T   to 
::  Jisgo,  Caiif,  f^r 


2034    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT  COMMITTEE 


2035 


'  phontj  s«r?ic6  from  too  4oo>:.  Kc.  4  boiler  in  i\3o  for  auxiiiaxy  purpos-; 
ar!^  i;<j41c5l  •'•.sfsrd  it-  this  shin,  Sl4p8  jvyftsfiiit-  fir«  various  WKlts  of  TF.. 
SOP  io  c-    ""-      ■       ■  ,'       --  -      —      ........ .^»->-... ......  ^   ...  ' 

A.,   0S5  •    ~-    •--'.   -.-;..~^ 

259  30  .  ^   ^ 


{  01soruc 


:v3.as?  pcffj 


\  ^m^% 


2036    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


h\^h\i^\  f^i  p 


■ 


IH-f-fhH 


M^M^; 


ijl  jQ '  -E-^ 


Sttjtotao  \LkQ.  Coj<>«' 

s.  K._ L_jaa'_ 


Dnfl  for'c' 


g.  --[  ?ifll    J. 


13  J.S-ii' 
■     14  ISfciV 

17-lfifi^i; 
to  5iLjiiis-i 

i  :i   ICO. o' 1-3. '^ 


■i  .OIL  ._BS- 


I 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2037 


f'.EET 


..mtsssKi&i 


ttouM*  to  2'7&*T.  snd  pdcj.   iiS7*,S  «»«,   end  ££^".3  psto.     Ohaiifed  . 


2038    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2039 


2040    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


_jxza 


or  THE  UNITED  STATES  SHIP 


f  lllljfllfi^l  1 

f!  h  i^i 

"lilillll  I          J^H 

e: 

"^^^^^^^1 

EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2041 


79716  O — Hi — pt.  16 9 


2042    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2043 


■-.  oojETiaJiy  witii  Task  ?cr^ 
i'^""   nsvG     la  oruisiag  disposition  3-V.      •iTifci.aAr-i  t-i-'SiiC   i:j  :a;o.^  =  ,     c^^i-tiii-a;  u 

m"?:  ne,tsp«^  18  toots.    Plaae'g«ara3Tr^rT-j  «a  ax?-  in  i'-.?*':,««t':- 
.Barlna  8or«eii  1-A.    Jdl  v»ss«l3  stealing  ^t. 
T«88Ql.     ATerege  steaa  4iO,     Avei-sies  rpta  1 


prep. 
last 


i 


{  icto 
}  Appr*. 


It.. 

wind. 

1000  ju;^^r!<J,  orw.-  •;• 
0100,  "  ov3jfc«r  7,  154: 
^,  1941.  'lada  daily  • 
ndit;i,3na  noraal.  1x5 
•ers.p;e  rpB  156.9. 


■  Aircraft,  kgv  ■ 

.939  first  r.l'aa?. 
r.g  i"or  plaao  tf.- 
landed  on  boar: 
psBd  t.j  13  knc 

.Y,  IM...  3sa.£o,t!. 


left  to 
St9&di«5 

Sea. 2c, 

3(?  r<.',^,'- 


Joia  fleet 


.'.(':  R-  iOa  lislited  fire 

_  1540  .  J  socurad.     IS*.'" 

«p«i€kd»  to  Icji'/j'.!  ond  ";ard  airorai't.  1-iOi;  1', 
to  S'/o'S.  and  pec,  «Se'  x>so,  253'  ?■«■""♦  Cljssagsi 
r©ll6T€Jl  nX!??  en  otn^i-u  Ic.  :  -  v-  a:;-^'. -^  ;:■>;-&?  1: 
the  E 

Bud  ?■ 


1,     wn        * 


V' 


a.  w. 

Li  si;  t, -v. 


a/  ti!U  oiM«  t«  h»  Mint  tt>  »l»«>a  d  ^fll»lS»tSon 


2044    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


LOG  OF  THr 


—  ,2lt  3(aJiL-45'S4i3SSL 


•f^--aS#--^»^i^*«-^' 


isfseAuMi  <i«i^.__ 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2045 


ratf 


ADDITtONAL  SHEET 


PO   -  84 


14 


2046    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2047 


steaming  on  cours©  S70*?,  aad  pga,  aSS"  nst-eo.  i55S'  P-io,  at  18  toots,   iu 

■^aay  with  Tafllc  ?cro«  Kight  in  oruieiag  ftisposltion  6-7  :  V'.i\t\:  «zia  270'f . , 

.PRISB  guide.     Ships  daT!j.6as4.     Boiielw  IIos.  C,   4,   6,  '  '  use. 

■■ra  I?08.  1,  3,  6,  one!  S  liglkte^J  off  anfl  ii  strjiA-'by  -  lard  oposd 

j.>y  «..aots.    Tiro  oontrol,  siiip  control  aai  air  ooatrci    ''.  "■;>A;'iir.*"-!)i 
III.     liatorl&l  Condition  "B"  set  below  aeooua  d«c:<. 
Averat^e  rpja  160.                                                           ^  -,^/h  / 


„„--^. »!.,;,  «s  before. 
pr«j>ftnitory  to  launohiiis  « 
last  plane,  rssuoed  1)886  < 
set  2ou4itioa  of  Seaiiness    ..    -.    . 
Average  steaia  410.     Average  rta-a  \bX>.- 


:fe4  froa  ?,enor:<. 

„4    flr«    -..-.r.1-.-.^rl  . 


^: 


e  -  12 

Steatili-g  aa  before.     OSot 
ing  aircraft,     Stearaipg  s^*  vaxi-.^.^  ^e,--*--* 
laaQotad  lest  plane.     095?  laiLdwd  first  piase. 
oouree  tc  E7e°T.  an«l  ?go.  207°. 5  peo,  256°  psto - 

16C    rjlB.       ••^.'^r-     '■f'f       •  n«-.P,-.  ••-.:  r,.i         p     ..-r.>»-.f>-.c5K    n 

Gor.ditioEG 


IS   -   16 

ctea  .    , 
itiga  arii   _t.c-" 
Senteroe:    '"auf 
Eostij;   Ki^^', 
of  his  ;%,    f  f 

guilt:'.     '■"  '-«- 

ST2r?2>2,    '.0., 


S03      /i     Ji.i^'jJ./, 

Ive  dwys  jtid  1 


'^c  0-'     to  "i.osr^stV 

"Jays  and  to  lose  ^9  a  aoath  of  uls  pay  lo 
Of  Coaiiaaading  Officer,  .STSVa^S     '.C,  iea, 
0,3. r;,  were  oonflaei  for  a  poriod  of  five   j,.    ^  j,     . 
Court,     isai)  o^&agsd  course  right  into  wind  treparii 
Approxisiate  oourse  062";'.     Ave.  speed  15  tacts,     134 
XM«  landed  last  plane.     Ohftnged  speed  to  le  fe.^"*-- 
^,  1352  ohaoged  eourse  to  right  iato  wind  :■.■ 
plane  lauded .     1400  laat  plane  landed.     V 
■■A  hsne  course  270*T.      i"-.,— ~-   -,r^,...    .-,-, 


le  -  IS 

steaming  as  before.   1653  Boil^ 
oo;4aezioed  steeming  on  various  oouafl^^  ... -.^ 
plane  landed.  Changed  eoursa  -co  left  to  :; 
Changed  speed  to  18  toota.  1735  ehanfed  e 
1750  dariiienea  eI-Itj.  ii-npr-.-je  atean  410.  A' 


readlnees 

hoar  to  L 


aoured  frrf. 
'■trol  and  :' 


..i^,    li.S,  Ha-pj  , 
>ndla«. 


-^  <liMMM3u  oapy  of  tKit-  pa>tfi>  tu  Vc  3<r: 


2048    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


HC  UNITEtJ  S-^ATES  SHIP 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2049 


2050    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


iE  UNIT'.D 
bewail  la: 


f '^!V!!!?fen""l"^Y'!^l^iT^^  f  i 


!«j^='  i  I 


Lflg&.'Si   S7PI  SSE'ia' 


li  I 


pT-lj-sii. 


•:»iieig« 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2051 


pre  I- ji  rai- 
ls JmotB. 
rijgJi  6  to  .  t  % 
Quarters.     I'/J 


2052    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2053 


>r.'-     1  a.~  ,t 


^^-.y'^Zy^ 


2054    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


THe  Un!TEO  STATEg  «i-.-. 


w 

11 

'    ifh  '  i-" 


viijti  jew LJ»   iU~.  )   Jj,  ,  ,  -..ii...,  i» 


ri    n  4    "/O       1  <■  ,  -X,  ' 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2055 


AODITlONAt,  SHEE 


18   -  20 

.Steanilag  as 
rw^dtHsas  thr«9,  wai..^.:  :.u.... 
tiae,         Avara^«  steara  410.     Av- 


/.J.   0.  I-.   D(Sa??T,    lieut-r 


f 


• 


2056    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2057 


0^ 


79716  O — 46— pt.  16 10 


2058    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


1.00  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  SHIP 
I     xoMt  tMawwimow.  Mlaaa  .XL 


rr 


IS'  5  £«L4JBSS{ie  .JS0fi4x=_l«llM4■ 
"'  i!«,  i  .084....  ,X-.-,4Jja  -socai-  f  flfi  I'S 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2059 


2060    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2061 


2062    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


LOG  Of  TK£  UNITED  ST*iTES  SHIP       .  ,..M2S^^SIZ£ 


&X* 


r ■    ' 


,ah 


1   ^ 


f  f|i  ii  iPW'i^itii  f !  -"  i^!  lip  Hit 


j  -niifi fJ^- 


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j»  |LsauE|?-k.  '.'imisliafl- . 


■•:Ji«.,*3art,.«3i  .Tliiht  %nsJtiiT:' 


^-Mj^QQ^- 


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Ji-M 


■  mai%  ;v>  a»»»«.ij  trf  K»vtKt«*euii  iaaatJrty 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2063 


2064    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2065 


fage^JHiShL. 


UNITED  STATES  SHIP  .  g>TOgH.I3B:    ,  Jriaay  5  ae^^^i    ,  19  41 

zoNec>e«!mPTioN„lIiSa§-J2  RE:  MARKS 


0-4 

3tea;..iiig  on  course  084'T.  and  pgc,  076". 30'  psc,  079*^  pstgc,  at  aD  kr.ot3, 
186  r.p.~.  in  conpany  v/ith  Task  Force  Sleht  in  special  cruising  disposition  9-7 
(niKht),  course  and  axis  084'T,  Plane  guards  T^:'^:ii:o  and  OJUVa;  in  iiner  ar.ti- 
subniarine  screen.  Boilers  L'os-.  2,  3,  4,  5,  7,  and  8  in  use.  Ship  daricer-ed. 
Ship  control,  fire  control  and  air  control  in  condition  of  readiness  III. 
Condition  "^i"  set  below  second  deck.  Avera^^e  stean  410.  Averase  r.p.s.  166.0 

',;.  C.  K£.3tJHY,  lAgntCjg),  O.3.:.. 
4-8  (J 

Steaiiins  as  before.  C500  sounded  flight  quarters.  053c  sounded  ,^>eneral 
quarters.  0500  changed  course  into  wind  to  launob  aircraft,  steaiiing  at  various 
courses  and  speeds.  Approx.  course  095'.  C605  xirst  plane  launched.  0516  last 
plane  launched.  O^iaaged  course  to  064°T,  speaid  20  laots,  186  r.p.a.  0035" secure^ 
fixnii  general  quarters.  Set  condition  of  readiness  III,  '.;atoh  II,  ship  control 
ard  fire  control.  Lighted  ship.  Average  steasi  410.  average  r.p..-.  182.7, 

A.  HOUSS,  iiisign,  V.3.: 
8-12 

iteajilnii  as  before.  0922  steaiiing  on  various  courses  and  speeds  to  launch 
aircraft.  C925  launched  first  piano.  0924  launched  last  plane.  Changed  speed 
to  15  lOiots,  lo5  r.p.x.  .  0932  landed  first  plaae.  0940  lbx.ded  last  plane. 
Changed  speed  to  £.0   ;aiots,  189  r.p.;-.  Changed  ooiorse  to  OSCT.  and  pgc,  080"  psc 
084'  psto.  ;:ade  daily  vi^sual  exaj-i:i:ition  of  all  magazines  and  apoiieless  powder 
aetiples.  Conditions  nor_;al.  ;..ade  v.'eeicly  test  of  Eiagazine  and  shell  rooa  floodinj; 
and  spriniliag  eyst^a.  Conditions  noraal.  Averase  steaa  410.  Average  r.p.r..l64 


Lieutenant,  U.SJi. 
12-16 

Steasing  as  before.  1215  secured  degaussing  coils.  IX   313313?,  v.S. ,  Sea. 2c, 
U.3.-'.,  3rd.  Division  was  injured  vjhile  standing  in  s.ess  line  for  dir.ner,  when  he 
fell  dovm  unguarded  hatch.  Diagnosis:  Hesiatoaea  left  shoulderj  was  ad:iitted  to 
siol:  bay.  1300  went  to  flight  quarters.  1338  changed  speed  to  10  Isots,  89  r.p.: 
Chan.-^ed  course  into  vdnd  preparatory  to  laiinching  aircraft,  approximate  course 
oeo'T.  ApproxiKate  speed  10  knots,  89  r.p.ii.  1341  launched  first  plane.  1346 
launched  lest  plsme.  Changai  course  right  to  ogCT.  and  pgo.  1550  changed  coiirse 
left  into  vdi-d  to  laiid  air  group.  Appror.ir:ate  course  080°?.  Approxinate  speed 
10  kiiots,  89  r,p.:i.  1353  first  plane  landed.  1354  last  plane  landed.  Changed 
course  right  to  OgC'T.  and  pgc.  Changed  speed  to  20  imots,  1S9  r.p.n.  1413 
crave;  and  DlCriA?  exchanged  stations  in  disposition.  Averuce  stear;  410. 
Average  r.p.-..  181.5.  ^;^ 

.^^^f^WSSSTV ,   Lieutenant,  -.i.:.. 
16-16  <y 

Steaaing  as  before.  1632  oorr^.enoed  steaaing  on  various  courses  and  at 
various  speeds  preparatory  to  landing  aircraft.  1634  first  plane  lar.*"i.  .1640 
plane  6-5-4  crashed  into  barrier,  no  Inijuries  to  personnel.  1554  last  olane 
landed.  Changed  speed  to  full  speed,  20  Jcnots,  189, r. p. w.  Changed  course  to 
090'T.  and  pgo,  080'  psc,  084"  psto.  1710  sounded  general  o^uarters.  1715 
darkened  ship,  average  stean  410.  Average  r.p.E.  175,7. 

^^  ##^4r^t(..g).  U,a.l..  . 

5teai2lng  as  before.  1617  secured  fror.  general  quarters ,  set  cc.:.iiitiou  of 
readiness  throe,  v.-atch  two.  ..ivera,;e  steaE  410.^^AverQf:e  r.p..-.  189.0. 

/yj.  A.  hCL;.33,  -nsign,  U.S.I. . 
20  -  84  (/ 

iStcaning  as  before,     ^vverage  steaii  410,     ^ej^e  r.p.a,  169.0 


18  -  80 


?i3v2fr 


Approved: 


Car-tain,    Z.i,  havi^  Lieiit-Ooadr. , 

Co  J.  a;.ding. 


r.  5.  .V...VaW/«tM>. 


(Original  (ribbon)  oopy  of  Uii«  pas*  to  be  aant  to  auraau  of  Narlaatlon  monthly) 


/3 


2066    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Pate i.J|i4 


LOG  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  SHIP 

•awalian  OperatlOK  Area    ■ 


Passage 

zone  description-- lus  12 


paft.B-tw^  r.  J.  Ml*.  CommmdiKi. 


artujoaKv  mix  mt»— «o»iiiSii«»« 

•    I 

I 

1 

4                       (S 

- -— • 

GruaUat  ilcptK 

. 

(OrlKliuil  (ribbon)  copy  or  thla  page  to  be  spnt  to  Bureau  or  XAvlgatlon  moutttl;') 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2067 


NITED  STATES  SHIP 


c,er.-ar".l    luerters. 
l745  fli  -ht    :-jarteiv 


R  E:  M  A  R  K  '- 


lo'".a:i2aa  spead  to  i^O 


^^^f^tt^' 


"'44.- 


"ol  -^uid   iire  'ooa 


Senteact 
.dollars. 

o:saax.dgr  .. 
to  iaucct 
^rin;:  to  ". 

p-e.iercano;,' 


IS   -  15 

Stei.       .,  :-rore.      IE 

tuelve  rxilcs.     IvOg  aaaeu-   - 
Sioldlns?  flight  oparation;.. . 


stea:-  -ilO,     ^., 


^^ 


"7       y^      ^-■•/V 


1  first  plaae. 

..•j^re    rail-  --j-j  1 


z/'/a,*- 


a  of^  Navtgwtto 


2068    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


LOG  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  SHIP- 

At    :-Iawallaa  Qparatlng  Area . 


ZONE  DESCRIPTION 2i?ii_ii_ 


PRISE 


.„ ^576  _ 


Crdmnawttoa  Nazatw^ 


0.  p.  U3R5AY,     gaptaln,  r. a. *«», eo»».««ito((. 


1  1 1  BMcrind 0 

i(  uutodo SJJ  ZZ'^  45"  H .|  ?|  Exi-uwi         SI, 074 


rs^ 


0*  10'  w 


BsroftK  LduviMO  PoftT 

Draft  foi'd 

Draft  aft 


CompM.  Na__J54£24 

S.  H O??"    30» 


m 


Dniftlor'd 

D?mft«»t. 


(Oricm<^  Crtl>lx>n>  copT  ol  tfcta  pttse  to  b«  s»ixt  to  Boreaa  ot  Narlcstlon  loosClUy) 


y/ 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2069 


UNITED  STATES  SHIP . 

ZONE  OESCBIPTION      i  lUS^JJ- 


re:marks 


0-4 

3teo;iine  darkened  in  company  v/ith  task  force  eight  in  sj/eoial  cruising 
disposition  9-V  on  course  09C'T.  and  pgc,077'°.5  psc,  and  060°  pstc.  3peed  15 
;aiots,  139  r.p.r.;.,  using  tioilors  "os.  2,  Z,   4,  5,  7  and  8.  Fleet  course  and  axis 
OgCT,  fleet  speed  15  knots.  Fleet  guide,  i.O.V.A.,  and  C.T.C.  in  tiis  vessel. 
Task  force  iii  condition  of  readiness  three,  a-ver-jce  stea:a  410.  Average 
139.0.   . 


CV23,  Lieutenant,  ...5.. 
4-6 

-tea'  ir.c  as  before.  0525  went  to  e^neral  quart srs.  0632  lir.iited  ship 
secured  frou  general  quarters;  set  condition  three  watcU  four.  0'?40  siifte 
steering  units.  X-ort  unit  nov/  in  use.   ^i-veraj;;©  scea;ui  410.  .^vavj-ie   r.p.  .. 


O^lti^UWa*^ 


JORSiilT,  Lieutenant; ■-. 
12 
otecing  as  before.  0600  ..uatered  orevj  on  staiions.  Absentees :3iiS0L, ' 
gea.:io,'..3..  . ,  ACL  fron  0100,  ;;ove:.iber  7,  1941,  and  STACEY,  'P.L. ,  Sea.2c,"J.3.... 
aOL  fron  OICO,  .oveiber  0,  1941.  .lade  daily  inspection  of  magazines  esnd  s~okeli 
po',.-der  sajj-'les,  conditions  nonaal.  average  ateaii  410.  -average  r.p.i..  159.0. 


12 


16 

Jte 


eut(Js), 

fore.  1200  Eoimded  flight  (quarters.  ISSCynaneurering  prepara-' 
ir^:raft.  125u  lauaolied  first  plane.  1304  launched  last  :-iane. 
alont;."'.de  starboard' side  for  fueling.  1343  passed  first  line  \o 
enced  psri^pinf:  fuel  oil  to  i:C  CALL.  1443  stopped  p'^aping  fuel 
C  CALL.  1452  ::C  CALL  cist  off;  all  engines  ahead  standard  15  iiots,  139 
1505  ::aneuverinc  to  regain  position  in  center  of  foiciatioa.  1516  ch 


tory  to  la'.i:ic:..:i,j 
1340  '-'C   CjilX  ca-;in 
..C  ^ALL.   1S49  00:1; 
oil  to 


course  to  093*T.  and  pgo;  all  engines  ahead  2/3,(10  knots,  83  r.p. 3.).  1530 
sounded  flight  quarters.  1532  all  engines  eihosd  standard,  15  knots,  139  r.p 

Average  stean  410.  Averase  t.v-u.   S9.5. 


16 


■..  HOLl.Sa,  2nsign,  U.S.r. 

18  "              ' 

•ate-  'fore.  1627  stea.:ins  at  various  courses  and  speeds  Dreparatory 

to  landi:.  ..  1635  landed  first  plane,  1755  changed  speed  to  15  knots, 

139  r.p.  .  :  course  to  cgO"".   1710  sour»ded  general  auarters.  Ihsaged 
course  to  liiid  aircraft,  reduced  speed  to  7  knots,  66  r.p.:.;.'  1716  first  plane 

landed.  1716  last  plane  landed.  Changed  course  to  093 'T.  and  pec.  ;hin--ed  ssead 

to  15  knots.  1710  riect  a.-.d  ship  speed  changed  to  18  knots,  166''r.r..:. 

.kver?  :c  stesc^  410.          ,     127.1. 


Z.  E.  OTCH.   1 


E.  OvSH.  Lieutenajit,   r.3.".;. 
18-20  ' 

Jteaning  as  beCore.     1618  secured  froa  genersil  quarters;   set  condition 
r»toh  four.     1835  Stationed  fire  v/atoh  for  blovdns  tubes,     ^..verage  steaa  41Q 
Averaee  r.p..i.  I08.O 


F.  DOHSETT,   Lieutenant, 


20  -  24 

c>tea;-ins  us  before.     2000  changed  to  Zone  plus  ten  and  one-half  tine 
oh3j;ged  SDeed  to  16  icnota,   149  r.p.-;.         average  steam  410.     Avera,5;e   r.p. 


:i:. 


2200 
J.  44. 2 


'4^<:d^^ 


Approved: 


Captain,  U.S.  Navy, 
Cau.uiiding. 


'X>rt«lnal  (rlbboo)  eopr  of  till*  pace  to  b»  Mnt  to  Buraku  of  N«*%itUcm  monthly) 


V7 


2070    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


LOG  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  SHIP 


3CC 
090 

- 

1  On  hjn.1 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2071 


16-18 

Steaaing  aa  bsforo.  1610  sighted  unknown  vessel  boarins  071"!,  distance 
18  miles.  1018  sighted  ComTask  Foroe  3,  3-CA,  1  CL  and  12  DD's,  broad  on  port 
bow.  1631  sounded  flight  quarters.  1640  observed  anti-aircraft  fire  on  port 
beam.  1641  changed  course  left  into  wind  preparing  to  launoh  aircraft,  approx. 
course  061*T.,  average  speed  16  loiots.  1642  first  plane  launched.  1G59  last  plai 
launched,  1702  first  plane  landed.  Submarine  reported  bearing  305",  distance  appro- 
«,C00  yards.  Chan^,ed  oourse  right  to  120*1.  All  engines  ahead  flank.  1704 
ohaaged  course  left  to  ogCT.  1706  all  engines  ahead  standard,  15  knots,  139  r.p^ 
1720  sounded  general  (juartors.  1721  set  material  condition  Affirm,  Task  yoroo 
Sight  leas  S!TSRPRI3E  and  plane  guard  a0"s  joined  'Task  Force  i'hree.  1735  first 
plane  landed.  1726  last  plane  landed.  1736  reeumed  landing  aircraft.  Gi;3LS 
joined  tills  vessel  for  soreening.  1743  all  engines  ahead  1/3,  5  knots,  47  r.p.n. 
1744  changed  oourse  left  to  avoid  tanker.  1747  all  engines  ahead  full,  20  knots, 
169  r.p.Q.  Ch6uiged  course  left  to  270''T.  Average  steam  410.  Average  r.p.ia.  146l9, 


'.   A.  HOuaSS,  £ns 


I,  ir, 


18-20 

jteaBing  as  before,  1803  oo:jaenced  steaming  at  various  courses  and  sjieeds 
to  l*ud  aircraft.  1609  landed  one  plane.  ISIO  changed  oourse  to  270'T.  Chani-;ed 
epeed  to  12  knots,   1813  changed  speed  to  15  knots.  1827  secured  from  CJeneral 
<^iarters.  Set  oonditlon  of  readiness  II.  Set  material  condition  Baker.  1904 
changed  oourse  to  180*T.  and  pgo,  1981  changed  oourse  to  090°?.,  and  pgo,  079*30' 
p»tgo.  1948  planes  sighted  bearing  £00°T,  distant  5000  yards.  1951  flight 
quarters.  Average  steam  410,  Average  r.p.a.  181.9. 


;{jg),  U.3.K, 

20  -  24 

Steaming  as  before.  2004  turned  on  lights  required  for  flight  operations. 
2009  changed  course  left  into  the  wind  to  recover  aircraft.  3teai.iins  at  various 
apeeds  as  necessary.  Approx.  oourse  075*1,  2010  turned  on  breakdovjn  lij^.ts, 
2017  first  plane  landed.  2036  6-T-13  crashed  into  ::o,  1  barrier,  no  dair^ge  to 
plane  or  personnel.  2044  sighted  IIULL  bearing  142, 5*T.  2045  iruiL  joined 
fomation.  2113  last  plane  landed.  Changed  speed  to  15  knots,  139  r.p,m. 
2115  oo;:inenced  zigzagging  according  to  plan  :.o.  6.  2116  changed  speed  to  20  loiots 
189  r.p.a.  2117  changed  speed  to  15  knots,  139  r.p.ii.  2114  stopped  all  engines. 
2119  changed  Speed  to  15  knots,  139  r.p.a.  2125  turned  off  running  ligiits. 
Average  steam  410,  Average  r,p.a.  122.7, 


A.  II0Xi33,  Snsign, 


fim 


>^*^ 


Captain.  'J. 3.  Kavy, 
Cocnandlng. 


R.   V/.   HL"B1J-;,       ■ 


(TIUs  p«a«  *o  b«  WBt  io  BonwB  of  NkTt(»Uuii  znoothly  ot1U>  Loc  shveCa} 


2072    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2073 


UNITED  STATES  SHIP 

ZONE  DESCRIPTION     i'l'J'i    Ip? 


1941 


REMARKS 


0-4 

3t;ear..lr.G  in  c  ■  -eaU  i'orce  9-Y  on  course  093  T.  and  pgo,   c 

062°  psto,  under  bo.^  ...;  -r  2,  3,  4,   5,   7  and  6,   at  X6  kaats,  149  r..  . 

Fleet  course  093'',  fleet  -axis  020,  fleet  speed  16  ia;ot3.     Plane  guards  VC  :*J.L  -iXid 
ti'JIJLir  in  iaaer-anti  sub:aarlne  Doreen  1-i.     Fleet  guide,   C.T.C:.,  aiid  3.&.P.A.   in 
tuis  vessel.     Tag):  force  in  condition  of  readiness  three.     All  vessels  of  tils 
force  steai-iing  darkened.     CS15  cticxn.jed  s^^eed  and  fleet  speed  to  16  knots,  ie9  rya. 
Avere^^e  steas  410.     a.-jeru,,;e  r.i- —  i5£«5.  ^       „  /O/^       / 


C4 


;;ci.: 
oe 

3tea;.i.ii:  es  before.     0415  c:ia.\$ed  speed  to  20  itnots,  189 
;eaeral  cuar*ors.     udlii  cnaii ;ed  spaed  to  15  iaiots,   139  r.p.Si. 


■iSign, 


r.p.n..     0525  sounded 
C615  oiinjad -course 


j  into  tiie  '  "     ■    '-..•■..--.»-■--  *r    ■>■■ 

I  ^622  oiie:, 

i  launoiii.-- 

!  speed  to  k,..  ._.l.-j,  ^,r  i. ...  .. 

I  of  readiness  ■cares,  vetch  tnrse 
!  0716  chan.~ed  spoud  to  £C  iaiots 


-■.ill-:   aircraft.  0618  first  plane  launoied. 
.'jai-lns  at  various  courses  and  speeds  v&ile 
•3  launched.  Changed  course  to  093'?.  ahi::S9d 
..  secured  from  general  quarters,  set  condition 
070£  o;--an.5ad  speed  to  22  iajote,  2C8  r. p. :-'..• 
1B9  i.^.-z.       C730  Canged  course  to  090'?.  ar.d  p  o, 


«<« 


078' 


079'. 5  pato.  ^vcrace  steaa  410.  Av9ra~s  r.p.a.  183.5 


/  :/.   ?..   CTiE,  Lieuten 


enant,  ^'.j.  .    i 

.rse  C-7t;'.  ^^-pproxiiiate  speed  14  .-2iots,   ! 

...ic^.^i. ....  v^  jauji-j^^.,.^  .i.iOi«.ii,.  ..^vw  lauf.ched  first  plane,  0603  launched  last  ^ 

i plane.  u«ie  landed  first  plane.  Obl9  6-2  reported  siip  bearing  320,  distant  7&  sUjles. 
jce22  ship  reported  bearing  050,  distant  £5  i:.lles.  0834  last  plane  landed.  0835 
i,  „.  ,„A  ,  ._,,  . ,.  .,,  r,c   ::-.an3ed  STieed  to  12  iaota.  0647  Cliocsed  course  to  a:>proz. 

ft.  CH350  first  plane  landed,  0851  last  plane  landed,  0$55 
OSCO  On  radio  orders  from  Seoiravy,  executed  '.('ar  L-lan 
•aiprovoked  air  raid  on  tearl  Harbor  at  0800  this  date. 
.  C90C  changed  speed  to  15  knots.  0952  sigated  s_;oj£e 
;  and  JAH7XS  joined  foriJAtion.  1022  ceased  zigzagging, 
approx.  to  launch  aircraft.  1026  launched  place.  1032 
1049  oo:;i'.ieDoed  zigzagging.  1055  ceased  zigzagslag. 
jChanged  course  to  OtSO'T.  to  launch  aircraft.  1101  laxmo':ied  first  plane.  1103 
launched  last  rlar.e.  1125  la:iQed  first  pl2j;e.  1128  landed  last  plane.  1151 
c:  .i;.;;ed  ccur.-e  ^;  l.O'-',  '..7-'  psc,  079°. 5  pstc.    Averaj'e  steas  410.  Average 
;r.r ico.i. 


0904  03  ^leiicei 
jboaring  C15'7. 
jjteadied  on  cou.nc  ^ov^  j. 

changed  to  course  gcO'T. 


J.  0.  F.  30H3STT,  Lieutenant,  V. 
12-10 

taai-in-:  as  before.     1229  oo-.:enced  steaning  at  various  courses  and  speeds 
to  la'wuach  and  Ixid  aircraft.     1^54  last  plsne  landed.     1257  changed  course" to  120'T 
and  pi;o.     1511  c;:i;.".2ed  course  tc  170'T.  and  pgo.     Oaan<:ed  speed  to  £C  Imots.. 
1321  chrji.^ed  course  to  120'.\   and  pgo.     Changed  speed  to  15' knots.      1543  co;..;eneed 
steanin,^  at  various  courses  ..nd  speeds  to  launch  aircraft.     1347  changed  course 
to  C90'T.     15£:   -        ■-'■   nouree  to  fleet  course  ISO'T.     1358  co..,.er>ced  steaiung  at 
various  cours--  is  to  land  aircraft.     1406  Itst  pli:ae  landed,     a'-.^nged 

course  to  CfC  .:^n;:,ed  course  to  107'T,   095'  30'   psc,   007'   00'   pstpe. 

1424  secvjed  .-  I    iuarters.     Set  condition  of  readiness  II,     15vo  oiianred 

coarse  to  07i.'  .enced  oteaiiing  on  various  courses  and  speeds  to  launch  a^ 

land  aircraft.  _.ched  last  plane.     ISr.o  set  ::;aterial  condition  3ajcer.     1532 

last  plane  lar.uca ;ed  course  to  120'T,  and  ngc.     1540  chan.t?ed  course  tc  107'rt 

and  pgc,  095'  psc,   OSS'-  pstgc.     average  steaa  410'.     .average   r.B.i.  141.8.  ' 


Q 


eut(js),  ".3. 


Appn 

vou; 

txamined:                          ^,»           ^ 

(Oriftfnal  (ribbon)  copr  of  thla  pn««  ta  be  «cnt  to  Bur«4U  of  NavicAtlon  monthly ' 

3/ 


79716  O — 46- 


2074    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


H- 


tdJ: 


(Original  (ribbon)  copj  or  thl»  psg«  to  bo  scat  to  Biireau  of  Navigation  luonthly) 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2075 


\  y^->  -^ 


po.y,c^^cyy^<^Y 


2076    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


AppTv 

red: 

i-:»wi)ued: 

' 

"   S.X.Xantolt^ 

-     -4 

-"■ 

"" 

(Tills  pase  tf>  be  an 

nt  to  Kar«^u  ofNttviffatlf*!!  tn 

ninthly.) 

5/ 

»-,. ,. 

EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2077 


UNITED  STATES  SHIP 

ZONE  DESCRIPTION     .'JJJS    10, 


acc jra. 

pStC,    £'. 

read ice 
oourso, 

accorti  ■ 
0230  o: 


ip  in  con 


ced  zi/^za 
>.vera~e  r.:: 


4-6 

336'  pstc. 
aooordir.~  to 
quarters,  l..^ 
a/prox.  l?^.. ,  J 
aircraft.  «.  prox 
launched.   obl': 
20  l-anot?,  ■  ' 
220'?. 

aud  Pr':o, 
r.?.:-. 
Headine.  . 
6.4  ,  1'- 
lo  '.'j-.ots  . 
?gc.  C:. 
alroraf I , 
^vei\L  :-j-   r..  .  .  > 


■■fore.   0405  oiiOn^sd  course  to  350'!. 

:i  course  ri;-,;it  to  llO'T.  aiid  pgo.  0.04  a;  i 

0455  souiided  fli{;J:t  quarters.   C515  so;^.' 
..rial  Jo.:aition  J%Stira.'   0545  Task  roroe  L.-.     .    -e 
. '.^uit  IC  .uiles,  0555  chaased  course  loft  into  v,-ir.d  t:  li-js-c;-: 
course  036' r.  0657  first  plane  launched,  0559  last  plane 
;i '•zag  O'Sursc,  0605  c^ia;.~ed  course  to  ri^^ht  to  liOT,  s'ifced 
1  coasod  zii5za;;;ins.  "OSIO  sighted  destroyers  bei-rir.i 
j-;royer  'oe=irir.2'£40'?.  0020  ciianged  course  left  to  ;._ 
G79.5'  pstc.  All  eagiaes  ahead  standard,'  15  imots,  1:  r 
!.p.  0630  scoured  froa  Jeneral  Quarters,  set  Qoaditioa  of 
.  oet  ;.<.terial  Condition  3a:rsr.  0635  Joined  Task  Force 
..Ispositien  8-7,  fleet  course  090'T.  and  pge,  fleet  speed 
.;:  ruide.  0746  changed  oo-arse  and  fleet  course  to  OOO'?."  a  /. 

■  J©  DoSaussing  sqs.t.     0755  cl.ansed  coarse  into  v/ind  to  la -:, : 

■  jiirse  07&'T.,  approx.  speed  14  knots.  AYarase  steaja  410, 


ri:.| 


a.Q^U^ 


[^.'   J.  A.  HOI-jS,  inaisn,  r.S.-. 

■  as  before.  0603  last  pljine  launched.  0634  last  plane  landed,  0635 
aajfcd  opeed  to  12  :mots.  Oi.anged  ocorse  to  000*^7,  345'  psc,  345'  patge,  0847 
;^.enced  steajr.ing  ^;t  various  courses  ar.d  spseds  to  la:;d  aircraft.  C351  last  plane 
landed.   0655  ch'^njed  course  to  SiiO'r.  -md  P3C,  £68*  psc,  269'  pstgo.  0904  ooii:.eiiqed 
ziSzaG-r'n-  acoordiiic  to  plan  ;;o,  2,  Changed  speed  to"  15  laiots.  0938  3LUS  and 
JASVIJ  Joined  fon^ation.  10i2  ceased  zigzagsing.  Changed  course  to  060'?,  045'. 3C|' 
psc,  049'  pstgtt.  lOi.3  oo;_jeno©d  stea:-.!!!,-  at  various  courses  and  speeds  to  launch 
aircraft.  1032  last  plane  lau,  :        i-T-od  course  to  £80'?.  and  pgc,  £68'  ?so, 
269'  pstgc.  1049  oo:-.-:enocd  z;.         ;oordir.,5  to  plan  "'o.  g.  1055  oasiiged  cours 
to  060'r.  1057  co.-.enced  ste;-        .rious  courses  and  speeds  to  laxmch~^aircraftj, 
1103  launched  last  plane.  11C5  o..an-ed  course  to  050'?.  and  zigc.  1121  oo-^enoed 
steanin^  at  various  courses  and  speeds  to  land  aircraft.  1126  last  plane  landed. 
Changed  speed  to  15  .a-.ots.  Oliunjrel  course  to  CoO'T.  and  pgc.  1151  changed  ocurse 
to  090'T,  076'  psc,  C79°5C'  pstjc.  :.ade  daily  inspcctlon"of  magazines  and  s:i0ke- 
less  ?o\vder  saziplos.  Conditions  norL-.al,  .v/eraje  steaa  410.  ...verage  r.p.::;,  129,2, 


^^^^^■'-'-r^O^^C::r\ 


ifore.  1219  oa-.enced  zl~:: 
12£.  lUoad  full,  20  iaiots,  189  r. 

course  left  tc  C2C"i',  and  pgc,  1241  ctianjed  c;  eed  t.o  li  -..qIs,  -- 
1247  changed  course  into  \vind  to  launch  aircraft.  .1.  pr.-ic.  course 
various  speeds.  1249  first  -..-lane  launched.  Icl7  last  vlane  landc 
strean  paravanes,  uslrig  various  sreeds.  1413  atreaned  paravanes, 
streajied  unsatisfactorily.  14_2  chan-ed  course  right  into  v;in4  t_ 
recover  aircraft.  .%;;■;;:.  :;;  a'?e  j7u'..  ,  -...-ing  vi'.rious  sreed?.  : 
landed.  1444  1447  cut  1: 


Approved: 


^. 


Y.\ 


,:/ 


Oaptaiii,  I  . 

Oo;..  XtTtdir.^'  ■ 

(Oiifdnal  (rtbboiu 


I  Burrau  of   Na 


Si" 


2078    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


LOG  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  SHIP 

AT      i;.A.S.,   .'-,.:t1  ":x:'b   r,    :".  ..      . 


ZONE  DESCOIPTION 


H. 


D  \    P-.RO> 


!  ■  '  i.    r 


7  &&a^f£i 

9  535.1  15  V  l".a     C£: 


10  14£'.XJl&. 
1!  'liilc'lG. 


14  4 
14'_5 

1516 


54C 
020 


020 


,  ;  -e9_7§i,..35. ., 

,:  CO.  ?41-.^_Ea^ 
7SL  C  n^    a  c 


h-,1'- 


1=1 


D«ll_l_S  AND   EXEHCISETS 


;l  Longitudi-  157- ■  23 '.  A5" 


I  IxjiKjr.id,-      157°   OP.'-  c>a- 


1  Tarpeao  3ef anae,  :'ll.^;^itl  quarters 


jo'    33'    C0'1  it !       lonhniid 


U  !i^.[v«H  .  ..  P   '■  3  Plight  auartgra 


—40.716 
132, 6Sg- 


StA.VOilU 

D   sua,  Cour 

""             ' 

S.  H. 

trm 

VuiiatKl. 

Deviation 

-l:  -iX'- 

_., 

Uraft  fur'l_ 

Di»ft  »<t._ 


:J164_5P.C!1- 


i1 


■  15-  uiifeiaxi&Lijiia  .ja-Li- 

10  J.40,4iS-^P^3L5L!  QS.- 

1-    lK'.qit!Sil3.E!  OC-.- 

18  J.25*3J.i,.2|l2,3J  02'- 

19  JISJ  .Aj( J.4 .  3 1 12  3i  C£C 

■1,-   I  1  ",-     r,  •  _■     ■:'•..      ■  r  '• 


5000     -|74     '/Q'TSi^        a   eu 
2001.,  -  !75_  _70=,76(  _JCj^  L^ou 


(Original  (rlbboa)  copy  of  IUI»  pa^e  to  Ti*  i 


L  or  NavlguUon.  niouiUly) 


-r^ 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2079 


Page 


ADDITIONAL  SHEET 

Pale  9 -a»o«Bttb»r w. ...41 


12  -   16 

3tea-'.lag  as  before,     1£06  oeased  aigzac  irn;.      ..esuiiied  base  course  OUO'T. 
aiid  pgo.      1224  foKued  cruising  disposition  lOV,   fleet  course  020'T.   and   psc, 
fleet  spijed  13.5  iciots,  li;6  r.p.u..     K.Ti:KPRI3E  guide.     1226  submarine  reported 
sigiited  bearing  C30'T,     1^27   TxnlSr.  attacked  with  two  depth  olmrKes,     l.'i29 
all  eiigines  aiiead  full,  20  icnots,  lu9  r.p.m,     123C  all  engines  ahead  full  power. 
1233  all  engines  aliaad  13,5  knots,  120  r.p.x.;.     1303  co.  .-.euoed  ziszac'-itxc;  ttooord- 
ing  to  plan  '.'O,  2.,   speed  15.1  loiots,   140  r.p.a.     1315  subnarlne  reported  dead 
atead.     1316  ehaa^ad  course  emergency  left  to  355"!.     All  enginow    <i -=• 'i    r,  1 1 
20  knots,   139  r.p.u.     1318  all  engines  eUiead  eriergenoy.     Ceased  . 
1320  cl.anged  course  loft  to  020'T,  and  pgo,     All  engines  ahead  0 
14C  r.p.;i.     1330  ooaiienoed  zigzagrlng  according  to  plan  "o.  2,     1.^,^  ..^\,.,.^x. 
dropped  a  depth  charge  bearing  from  the  ii.T^ru-KJdS     159'   relative,     lb3'/  sounded 
flight  quarters,     average  steam  410,     average  r.p.is.     139. S, 


-.).   C.   IXilHY,   Lieut (. 


;Y,  ^eut 


-.tea.. ins  as  before.  1508  Chciced  speed  to  10  knots,  93  r.-  .  -i 

:  course  rij;;t  into  vdnd  to  recover  aircraft.   ■.  ^-^  -,  '■.-..  "„a  ,..-.,:■ 
j  plane  landed.  1012  last  plajie  landed.  Ohi.. 
I  Ohanf;ed  speed  to  20  .aiots,  1S9  r.ju;..  1617 
j  162l'o'    -  ■  ---rse  to  335"  ?.  c:;-^  --'■.  .aoti 

1631  e        rse  left  eaerge:; -  1  r.?.- 

"  1655  ..         rse  right  to  345  .   .  .  ,   IB45 

j  returii'- ^  ...   ,  course,  020°?.  u..^   ;.         ..  .^^..^  i,^  ..^a  .lui^.   .-^.juji.:.   • 

course  0^0"  i.  170C  Task  Toroe  One  It  ..  ^'ask  7oroe  ^-isht  for.ae.l 

j  cruising  disposition  9-V,  1710  couad         „uarters.  1711  darkened  s;.. 
I   Av^r6!;;e  steaii  410.  avut?. -e   :•.'-.•.,   l-ii..... 

,  A.  hoi;.':3j,'  liisigii,  u.s.i,. 

18  -  £. 

::.„^.....v  _.,  before.     1812  SBCured  froa  .general  Quarters,   set  condition  \>t 
readiness  II.     1823  secured  boilers  :;os.   2  and  4.     1825  secured  boiler  ,  j.   v. 
Aver'i;-;e  stean  410.     average  r.p.....     126. 

...  C.  :i:.:;!^",/Lieuti,'::  ,  ,   ...  . 

.20  -  24 

jtoaaing  as  before.  2030  Observed  long  oil       ..   j  aboard  port  side. 
S052  warning  report  surface  craft  h^r^v'--'-   '•   ■'-'•.   aii^a.i.,-^  ^.5  -.iles.   • .;  " 
ocs.;»encea  zigzagging  according  to  pis,-.  .'jif.ed  spelh  to  15  kr.o . 

1  r.p.ra.  Avei-age  stean  410,  .kVor.^--e  r.  .  . 

J,  A.  "a'0L.2J3,  Jri:;_       .  . 


^- 


i  r  ,  ,  u.  B.  jf..  yKHt»t9r. 


unttaly  wltb  Log  HheoUi) 

^7 


2080    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

iff '"^Mj-'f*. 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2081 


UNITED  STATES  SHIP  SlIT^iR}  EI3E 


20NF  DESCRIPTION         .lU:^     iC,  REMARKS 

.  oorcd  starboard  aide  to  r^erth  F-9,  learl  liarbor,  -..  .,   v;ltn  5  ..aaila  : 
2  wire  oaoles  and  4  breast  wires,  joiler  Vo.   2   in  use  for  a'oziliar;/  purpo:. 
boiaers  on  two  "aours  notice.  Jhips  present:  various  units  ol  ^he  1.3.  nsc„. 
SOi'A  is  Cii;oi-ao  at  subuarine  baee.  0015  coriMnced   fuellas  ship.  Draft  for-.vara 
23'  •J"  aft  38'  5".  0055  00  j^enoed  receiving  gaaslir.e.  OSCO  started  preparation* 
for  sett  ;-  underway.  0315  stopped  fuelins,  ar:ount  received  463,000  gallons 
fuel  oil  rd  61, LOO  callona  of  ^asolirje.  0353  :;e03:-;0  uader.'/ay  frozi  alongside.    ■ 

^'}.   "^     "\  lieuteaant,  V.o.:..    ^ 

4  -  c  1 

-jr..d  as  before.  040S  boiler  .":,.  i  out  in  aara  line.  0410  boiler  i 

oc  -aaiii  staa.,  line.  C4CS  tir;at  rart  re  .r.v',i  f roa  along  port  side,  ■ 
fro.u  berth  F-9,  ;  earl  Harbor,  ;.-.,  for  operatit-.cs  as  directed.    i 
,  1  to  ;,o.  9  inclusive  in  uee.  standard  speed  15  knots.  Oaptais,     i 
'^xec -Xi'.'e    ,.rioor,  i.avisjator  and  pilot  on  bridge.  Captain  ooiuiing.  :t&terfal 
Condition  ,iaker  set.  oii;5  tugs  oast  off.  Co:ir..snced  steaEiag  on  various  courses  | 
a:.d  s'.eeds,  oonforriii,:-  "^o   Oiia.-nel  to  clear  aarbor.  0520  Torpedo  defense.  0551   j 
"left  ship,  0550  passed  ei.trar.oe  oi.&nnel  buoy  ::;.  1  abea^i  to  port,   3'aan-ed 
to  IS*'!*  ^OJiansed  speed  to  20  iaiots.  0600  ciiaasei  oouxse  to  14C'?. 
jueral  ^viarters.  0o£C  o.^a^sed  course  to  OOO'T.  0629  lighted  sirip.  C53E   j 
3-oured  fron  (Jenaral  Quarters.   3et  condition  of  readiness  II.   0535  c;.anged  couBse 
to  070'T.  0640  chained  course  to  160'T.   0640  ohaaysd  oour«e  to  07C'T.  0649 
ojianssd  cour&e  to  130T.  0055  ohangod  coiirse  to  070*T.  0727  onanged  ccurse  to 
OSO'T.  0745  i'ligjit  q.uapter3.  «vera£e  stean  410.  .^-verage  r.p.a.  121.2         J 

itiis).   ''.-5.;: 

12 
3toa:_iug  as  before.   0fc02  liestroyer  on  starboard  quarter  reported  a  sub:".arin« 
sis'nted  bearing  190*  trcsa   tliem.  0815  changed  course  right  into  v.ind  to  recover  aip-.a 
craft,  approi.  ooi;rse  OoC'?,,  steaizing  at  various  speeds.  0618  first  plane 
landed.  0820  last  plane  la:ided.  O&il  fQSJse4  »5«oiai  cruising  disposition  9-7. 
0827  ohan'-,ed  course,  fleet  course  and  fleet  axis  to  Cf.C^T.  ouid  pgo.  0S37  changed 
spared  to  10  imots,  9C  r.p.a.   063B  cr.anr-.ed  course  rij^ht  into  wind  ^o  launch  airoratft. 
n  various  sp.cds  as  nfccei.sary.  .-vrpros.  course  077''2,  0840  first  jiine  laonched.t 
0641  l^st  plane  larjichedi  (>&42  first  plsne  landed.   0917  ceased  lajiding  airoraft.l 
Choji^ed  speed  to  20  imots,  ISO  r.;.:-..   -h'^r.  ~ed  csurse  to  right  to  170"^.  and  ?gc.  ' 
Subr.arine  contact  reported  b;   .         '. .-'  changed  course  to  left  into  tte  wind 
to  resune  recovery  of  planes.  contact  reported  false.   0?25  last 

plane  landed.  Changed  speed  .  ~ .'  r.p....   Jhan  ad  course  left  to 

02C'T.   0950  OHIDLST  reDoi-ted  sub.:.:riuf,  contact."  Ohaaged  course  left  to  290'!. 
0959  cUant;ed  course  left  t«  015*T.  and  pgc.  1003  chaiiged  course  left  tc  Z-iS";.     Ib04 
BSi'jj;  reported  fi~."ited  torpedo.  1010  ohan;-.ed  ec'urse  ri,--*  int;  ---■   -.■ir.i  t:  iaunop 
aircraft.  Ct.        various  s^eodK  as  necessar:'.  .■>.  :ro:u;.  o:u;-     "'".   xClC 
LjiLCil  report         -inc  on  her  starboard  bow,  1017  z^C::   a;.:,.. 
1016  launohc,        .n.e.  1019  ll^t  plane  launched.  :^-u".r2il   s-         .;2ots, 
189  r.p.;:.   .•  turaeti  to  base  course  C2C'T,  aaj  .ggc.  iO:.r  "  -e  tc  right  ' 

into  \iiiid   to  recover  aircraft,  at  varloua  apeeSs  as  ne  .  course    , 

083'r.  1027  first  plane  landed.  1C34  observed  pi£j;e  .  leas  Ic.  to  i 

water.  Changed  speed  to  Z5  ^r.ols,  1236  r.p.:;;.).  J.;Dx.i-Bd  course  ij  r-ght  to  175'?^ 
1041  cnanged  speed  to  20  i;iots.  Ohai:.:ed  course  to  ri.:iit  to  21C'T.  1C42  o.an.jed  ' 
course  into  the  v/ind  to  resa-ue  recovery  of  aircraft.  1045  G-j-1  ^irorjua  ..essa^e  j 
on  deck.  1046  :;icy  Control  reported,  Aif^^NAS  *"i»fcl"»e  ^laaa  (sussy  bo:;iber;  bearing 
345'T.,  distance  tfpprox."'  20  sill«8.  'ib¥9  first  plane  landed,  10c2  last  rlane  ! 
landed. _  C-.un  <^d  s;  eed  to  20  .:..ots,  1S9  r.p.~.,  C2i.'T.  .ind  p,;c.  1053  o..an:;ed 
speed  to  15  knots,  15;  r.i  ,_.  13 C'       '  ^peed  to  fleei.  bpeed,  to  13.5  i>.ot3,   I 

1126  r.p.a.  Co._auoed  zigzasr:!:;'-  -.j   ;ia:.  2.  1107  0i;an6«d  s'-^eed  t;  IG   i 

toots,  140  r..  ..-..   li.rc  ;■:-'. -i  :ie  bearing  OiC"?.,  d^stir:o  14  ".iler. 

j  Average   Jte        "  '.  ■.  -^      y^    C    "i    ^ ^ 


Api*rv>v«ii: 


■  Exajnioed:  y^         jA 

0,  D.  llJBHiy,  .  -~  S.   ',/.   ."•.r..L„, 

Ja-..tain,   U.S.  i:nv>-,  Lit-ut-Cor^ur. ,    ■ 

Co..™andinG. 


copy  of  tM»  pa(c  to  b«  •••><  to  Bureau  of  NiMi«Btion  monthly) 


i-f 


2082    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


LOG  or-   THE.  UNITED  STATES  SHIP 


,.i!v,. 

,':,.. 

! 

'-'» 

hi 

■•;-..,. 

i 

*^ 

4      : 

0 

i;  CO 

14 

l->\v 

lat 

13fi.O 

14 

7 

,13  i  5 

fcv'. 

140.0 

15 

14  U; 

:,>.c 

^     L,     'd'O 

140.0 

IG 

14  ? 

iiUt 

£:k  27 

140. 0 

15 

1:5  19 

;>00 

i     ;,4 

143.0 

lo 

i' 

14 '9 

Cl>5 

ii    ii.6 

147.9 

16 

8 

14 1;: 

£00 

i^.i;  124 

141.).i 

10 

0 

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020 

i:,ii  I23\ 
i     [19 

137.  S 

15 

5 

C^O 

14f:.l 

16   ■, 

15  i; 

0<..0 

H    *29 

15;  .7 

15-7 

14    t. 

020 

h:   125 

4 

li)   5 

004 

.  ?  .  18. 

df  u.it«to 23l.5,§'  .0P"„  i; 


J(  IdUtudn  ii5 '     5t  '     00 " 

XI  i-m«iii,.k-    166'   00*   45" 


bJ  LAitlut^. 


1^7"   .-.4',  X-O"  '.f 


I  On  liand 

KtpMKlRl. 

On  luin.1 

UKFMKi:  Li 

)l«ri  torM. 


11,0; 


3:.,  100 

,75,00c 


i 

5 

2c 

k5 
-•- 

.-o,e 

■"                 1 

1  :'iiiiiL.,jiartcri; ' 
•I  -  Oiiii  tion.  _;-.;;i;r 
7  jtueral.  .^uarterl 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  •  2083 


ADDITIONAL  SHEET 

>    liecamtiar , /».  .4JL 


18  -  16   (Oontiiiueii) 

1356   oeased    zigza^J.-jiag    ar.i    lOt jr;.t;-,    to    1;»:!P    c.nurr.e    or    .'■lC  :'.       !':■(,  •"    >'.-    .-rt-.r 

hydro  v:'.  one  oontaot  of  e  | 

ahead  flank,  25  icnots.  i 

left  rudder  to  oourse  Jv   _,   _   ,.,  _  .   -    -  ^.^-  .a  ' 

fleet  oo'irse  tc  SCCT.  and  i'leet  cipeed  to  lo  ^ois,     i-iio  ocuurod  ixxju  viejieraJ  ! 
Quarters.     3et  aonditioa  of  readineaa  'ft/o,  viatoh  tv;o.     Set  .>nteriol  Condition  i>.'"j;eb. 

1421  oo.-.euced  zlgzaesiag  aocordi!\3  to  plan;..:-.   J;.     >^i  i   6-<-:.,r. ..  „-.„   ,i   r;,ii        r  .[^^ 

189  r.i)....     1508  surface  lootouts  aft  report.  bg 
ahead  flank  spaed.     Jhan-sed  course  rigi*t  to 

left    to    raiU"  ;■.    anri    r:;.-c;.      1520   Ohanreti    s  .►•^':i 

zigza(-  ■  ,  sd  oouroe  ;-'  i 

rijtht   1  ver  airorai 

1527  i-i...    , -;.      lB.i:^   o.,  ^^ 

sigiited  3'j.U.<»i'ijj>3  'ceari  ipsa 

i left  to  C45*?.   and  ?go, 


k-i.ots,   108 

•arious  ooursea  aiid  speeds,     lu.v. 

r.-o.i...     1558  chaiined  oourse  lei 


/L-C^,i/4nfX>^ 


10-18 

j  3teanilng  as  'before.     ICCC  subiiurine   sif^hted  dead  ahead, 

emergency  full.     Ohanged  course  left  to  iiSS*^!.   and   '^'-•,      i.- 
{full,  £0  laiots,  168  r.p.n,     1606  chause^  course  1-: 
I  zigzagging  ascordiug  to  plan  !«o.   2.     1640  oeased  ; 
I'o.-'.'p,    -,-.rt    r  -f. .      r-,H::.red   speed  to  IS  iar.ots,   108  r. 
..    sounded  General   -.uartei-s. 
course  right  into  tlie  vd/i-' 

il'/\.V   Sii)    Cv'Uurui   .' 
iei^errenoy  flani. 


...  :, .  z:r^V'SSi,  lAout(jg),  u.-i.". 


;          jt-:    _  --i;orsj     Set  cou.iiticn  of 

readine.-        . ,      -     ■  .  ;.      1850  or.t  .   ■;   l-oiier 

lOff  t.'ie  aaiu  stox.  liftt  .  boilers  off  th'-  ".  line. 
'Average   steaa  -Ht.     AV'.-. 


to  be  •<  11 1  !■.  liur.'aa  of  NavlgjiHon  montblx  with  Log  »lie«t») 


2084    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2085 


UNITED  STATES  SHIP 


REIMARKS 


2086    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


LOG  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  SHIP 

i 

At 

zoNe 

1     CS 

pit  jllf 

Mm- 

-.>. 

K-IN-IJ 

«AK"-.:tlER 

is 

1            f 

jp     , :?   s'   i~  1-5     '     1     '»"     '  fvI?- 

,  1 

4 

fi 
6 
7 

a 

0 

Id 

l;   . 

XGt:.0 
ico.o 

i;   ■-  'i- 

la  em 

ifrHfiv 

iCr..O 

1V1.5 

1.  ""■ 

-     :?  •;i  7;: 

L-C  1.    a_c-j.    :  -      .  :; 

•-,1;^ 

-T  C9_  GO  74)     33  j    a  ou  .  rz  _     1     i  251 

to  01'  72!     ''0  '     1  ou     '.~       2     '  S5' 

lu6.1 
17i.7 

le  -  ii'"  - 

IOC 

^         IK                                   ^      "       "^                '"    '              "■          ' 

19^311B-T 

'  C90 

'^T-'Hti- 

i::i'i--5 

TOCT 

-',  71  C5  '.':■.    ::c  1    -    ■ 

-     71  55  73       C        3t 

III 

„.  „„,  ;^.,.., 

DRII-L.S  AND  exERCisea 

'  • 

if-4j.90§.. 

■  i.vr.  I'.'urr' 

t'jr- 

""'  ,  UrJt. 

Diafl 

'■j"- -^     -^ 

Ermr, 

a/t. 

Com 

lldSM    ^l■ 

I>rc 

J. 

P., 

1 

i 

>     "' 

\ 

Cr,rr,!.;t  .l.-,,iL 

i 
_J 

(Orjjjii.ui  iriiilKjiii  copy  of  this  p&ge  to  Ixi  sent  «o  auroaii  of  Niivlgatloii  momhl.v) 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2087 


Pat, 


ADDITIONAL  SHEET 


IJ jecemlieE... ,  /9.,il. 


1^  - 

iS  before.   1235  co;2a6aceii  ;.aiieuv 
to  avoid  yei-drteJ  subnarine  contact.  1229  chan.^od.  u„:r.-o  tj  'j'.O".'.  x:l 
oaansed  speed  to  IB  knots.  1256  cj. -ionced  luaneuveriji^  at  various  courses 

speeas  tp"  avoid  i-oportoj  s'b:r;r'-e  ccnt:ict.   lE-1.?  c'va— -ed  c;r-T;e  to  CCO"'.,. 


course    t,:    ,9C'.'.    i;^.d   ;  .;c .      J:.ii;.;ci   s_.<Ljt3a   to   !■-   'ji-;.. 

eccordlnn  to  plan  ;  t-.   2.     1439   oouieuced  ;.an6UVoriu- 

speeds   t.3   av^ld  roportod   3  .';.  .-.r'ne   o:^r:tc3t,      1413   c: 

pgc.  -;.<eed  to  lb  - 

145i  .aneuveri:.; 

i^ri;.  ....     1500  oiia:: 

1507   c-  e..c€Q   zigzagi^ing   aocc;-d:..,;;   Cj   ^i 

i.ounts  by  firing,     1552  ocsji.enced  jlaneuvtr 

avoid  i-eported  subi^arlne  contact,     jiverar.c 


-^ft^^.^^-, 


report  i- :; 
acoordi;:^' 

Jtead.-l.-i 


.i::ed  course  into 

Ici^ded.      J.7C1    ac  r 


,i   to 
.   oours« 


(:<-■-,  e    xz-    JJ>^'  :.      1M5  SAJ   ■ 

;.■-  OaLL.     .:c  ;all  attackeo  -  .  .  ■       .  , 

Co:.:.;-eLoed  zigzagc.ijag  to  avoid  roEiiblo  tori-edoe^.  173S  retunioU  tc 
C9G'T.  Chai'.:ed  speed  to  18  knots,  166  r.p.».  ISOO -secured  froia  ;eii 
iet  condition  of  readiness  'IHvo,  v.'atoh  one.  3et  ijsterial  ocr.">itloii 
Average   steeci  410,     /..vera^Je   r.    .    .    176.5. 


le  -  2C 

jcea-  ir.,~  a3  before.  1600 
readiaeas  -'".;o  ai.d  ;..att3ri.ai  coai 
IQlcj  secured  boii  V   ..  ;.   ... 


1  /:Z' <2,^ZtJi.<i^ 


/  :. 


:;aT,taln, 


front  of  dlspo 

.■•iccd  front  of    : 


„  ,_  .  u-„  .Cuir.  ,         0.  4.  A-.A-artfaair. 


(Thl«  |mxt-  (  M  b  ■ 


1  or  Navlgsclon  ujoDtbJ;  with  \ja\i  Bb««ta) 


^.^' 


2088    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION   PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2089 


UNITED  STATES  SHIP 


REMARKS 


,  1941 


''.4. 

.  k/3t  plane    . 


■4 .      0f-.2(J 


1  opeeJ  to 


0  ^i  xu^j^ui,^- 


/- 


^.^^^.^<'.  _ 


»r.iiiii<vl   .ril>t>ot«j   copy  of  thU  pAgr  to  »>«•  •ent   to  Bur««u  of  NjivlgMtwn  nvmthly* 


79T16  O — 46 — pt.  16 12 


2090    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


At 

Pas 

- 

r 

v 

^Sm 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2091 


ADDITIONAL  SHEET 


i     la 

I      ace 
j      tut. 
roc 


15:v 


.-Ill 
Xi5£; 
fife. 


y.  ^    /j^ 


'i^€.i / 


%^  ^'JlU 


ct 


2092    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


II 


C  S.  ^..,  Xmii^i^o' . 


^nckXa  p»«<?  to  be  sfnt  t«  Bureaa  ot  Navtgat  ion  ontnt  Wy.) 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2093 


UNITED  ST  A' 


ZONE  DESCRIPTION   . . '.  X'ili- - 


REMARKS 


0-4 

Jteu::ir^ 
tion  0-7  in 
course   i;.d  c 


-)n   course 


ea 

-,    237° 

Juide 

.1  r  -.e; 

'.r.ots 

in  Co 

(.•C&4   c 

'.-iiti 

..varc 

-e 

r 

;..'.,    1 

:'i-.. 

leut, , . 


speed  ti 

;  routine 

aooordi. 

410.     .-.-. 


,154 


'0  sounded  Oeneral   <.uarter3.     3et  .;aterial   Condition 
^ior  on  tae  :.ain  stea..  line.     Qv5E  c.un-el  course 
^Ii'oraft.     atea-.inc  at  various  speeds  as  necessar;.-, 
,  lane  lauiichfcd.     0613   last  plane  lauriCl~.ed. 
'^  r,D.....      Ciian-ed  course  right   to  250*T,   and 
.    ._     _  .     jordine  to  plan  "o.   2.     C534  32;rjw;  re-orted 
■bo£.rd.     3ii£ji,;ed  speed  to  25  Idiots,   Z5b  r.?.:j.     >jir:eavering 
an^ed  oourae   ri-z'-vi  to  i;90'T.     0635  Cfsanijed  course  to  ^50'T. 
T   c.-'.^-n-.ed  course  to   14C'T,     0541  returned  to  'oasc   oourae 
.::-0t3,   lot  r.:.--.      -  io   .-ed  froc  general  quarters. 
■,:c,  vKitca  ti;o.        5:  .   itcrial  Condition  2a;;er.      1646. 
to   plan  :     ,    ..      .7.. 3  ceased  zlssaggin;,   rs3;.-ii 
;   disoo6-ti,ji^  ri -.lit   to   34C'T.    ti:;d  ?gc,    ?:7'    r-so, 
■.t  of  disposition  r;,;iit  to  CcC^l'.    and  p^c, 
.      .^;  reported  torpedo  v.'a^e  to  r.er  star'^tard. 
^36  r.p.....     :;:-.:in;:ed  course  to  left  tO'  270°r. 
r.p.i...     ohaii^ed  course  left  to  030'?.  and 
;   units.     >ort  unit  now  in  use.     Co;^.encc'-   __    _- 
Chan'^ed   speed   to  le  Ixots,    16o'   r......      .^^V-ri -6    ;--.ejO_ 


■  .  9 . 


8-12 

otoa.ing  as  befcro.     Z'&Zi,  00  .i.cKced  stea-ding  at  various  courses  aad  speec 
to  avoid  reported  Ei;"^--arine  contact.      ^B38  o-ian^ed  comrse  to  03C°T.  and  »go., 
OlG'.:;  '    ■    '^  ,    'In'    '   .r.  :-n.      ;  ,;:.-er'    s .  eed  to  IS  i:nots.      0646   o-anged  course  to 

CeS4  5o_..enced  i;aneuveri:i~  at  various  courses 
.irine   c;ntaot.      0902   o.-.ar-ed   c-urse  to   12C't".   a.-. 
'    ■  "  ■  ■•  ^-'"-  ••1^''   "  ':   •' .  '  ^   '■   '  ;.~ed  oo'urse  -  ■ 
.  occ,   1C7' 


Oft: 


CO.;: 

10; 

var 


id  ro-ori 


;3.   lOoo  - 
.e  contact. 


steau.n.p  at 
;erir.g  at  vario 


,ods.     1114  last   piaixe  la:iaed. 
■  s,     lliiS  CO. ..er.oed  zigza/;.:in? 


u'se 
-lanj 


'Jcb<^ 

^ 

1 

\ 
\ 
\ 

1                                   ■     i;ain,   '  .  :.  P...p 

Kmi: 

""■' 

iieut-;.x:-.ar'. , 

r.  j..v,.v 

;■,-,•■  :• 

(Original  Cribbon)  copy  of  thU  fmo  to  >>■  Mat  t*  BuTMUt  of  NaTi^stion  moottity) 


7} 


2094    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Pair 


LOG  OF  THE  UN 


ZONE  DESCniF 


le'o 


lis"! 

IIP'! 


.6  \:: 


« i-- 

^-. 

i.. 

q 

l-C 

io 

... 

IV 

10 

ICc 

It 

9 

17 

1) 

ceo 

i' 

cZ 

2 

21 

^4v 


:,22  '- 


Itjy 


090jj 

o&oj ; 


170    '..X    ... 
170   CO  :?•. 

Ivo  ei  74 

?4 
70   a  74  : 
-  ,^1   c2   74  . 

;  __,_h\  jc^^  -    '70.r>il  .^ii  y^- 

3Q2g_J-_T7J^j62_?AJ._y.. 
3021   -171  :01  74l,C 


;t.  ■- .  -  I?: 


if  Uliudc-- 

15?^  45' 

50"  ;: 

30"  V.'       ■ 

II' 

ijj  htM\.i>A< 

*llx>n|rlt«  i 

"■•' 

(  IUc«ivcd_ 


r  Outukd j?t^,9Q4 

ij  RetfJtcd 0 

*|  El|«fnd«i    ,52  ,  069 
lonh.nd     .l&2,55t 


8.  H     _ 


i.  c.g  19 

C 

16-. 

■•   :rc  ir 

^ 

1?    : 

Run  No.  (Sci 
TillU!  I.)  »iil.r: 


(OrS^lluii  (rlbbou)  copy  of  tUls  pugo  to  l>e  stnt  to  Huronu  of  Navlj^llou  J 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2095 


2096    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


Pa0« 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2097 


UNITED  STATES  SHIP 


ZONE  O68CRIPTI0 


qS^Tl^ 


r  iolj.or  -.0.    i.      -— •!  i^.^^^a  , 

;r  boiler  :'o.  1.     0535  ier.eral       1 
ilers  1  to  9  inclusive  on  aain       1 


'.'  :::i.3t'HT, /Lieut (JG,  .    ..-,.-. 

.     O':^'  -^--  loft  fjr^ation  to   investigate 

■"   -               .   -.3  L-:;-rii.  .  it^'^T,  oroisiii;  fr'-"  "*---.--=-;  to 

-Joined.     c9o9  i:.!.!.-,?  reported  .;:■  .licatell 

•:-ed   flank,    ?5   rtiots,    23  5    r.p.:--  i   to        I 

Lit..    :        -    --■■    •■.-:•:::.---■•■-   accordiuG    .  .    "  .        ■ 
:tei-s.      IC.                                                :'    iaiots,   2l 
■:":ed,    ^3-                                                    course   le'"" 

.    ocurse   u-^i                                       '    ■'       •  -  .  -  - 

,;t  plane  1  :■.  "  .    . 
t   to   hv-.S': 


-ug  acoordl 


/%W^/t^ 


^^-^^ 


1-: 
1 

1 '"  ■  > 

:.ove..eiits  oi'  cru- 
otea.ainr  ".t  vari 


ifc  <-■/-,:.  <■  ^• 


(Oriabutl  (ribbon)  «af>y  or  thi*  pace  to  b«  xnt  to  Burcaa  at  Narlgntlon  monthly) 


2098    CONGRESSIOXAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


{DljtlOed. 
RKKit-nl Q 
o«b.nj,        73^000. 

BsrOKS    LCATIS-O    POXT 

DraCfoc'd 

Drift  aft 


Error _  ^ 

'__„0_C'    30"    2 

^TAXnjkMD 

Bi*o.  Coiiru« 

54C94 

«    H 

346' 

Errr* 

14*  Z 

Vftfiatioji 

13-   15-   i. 

DtyiiMix 

C   45'   2 

Arm  Emut 

Di»fl  tM'i 

Dmft  a/t 


Ttoe  to  81. ; 
Onatwt  d  : 


(Ort(limi  (ribbon)  copy  o(  tikis  pace  to  be  »eiit  to  Btu«au  of  Navlestloa  xuomthly) 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2099 


ADDITIONAL  SHEET 


14  liiicoiuber  ,.  41 


£0   -  C4   (Coutinued) 

1:.:'   pao,   191'30'  pstgc.     Average  staaiu  ilO.     Average  r.p..-..  168. 


L'HY^^.leu-.i 


aptaln,   I'.?.  - 
Co;..';ar:dlr.c:. 


(Ttala  paffe  to  b«  seat  U>  Bun^a  of  Nav1ar»tlon  mouthly  wltb  Ix>f  Nh««Ui) 


r;^ 


2100    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2101 


.!!  course  CCOT,  ^nd  pgo,  346"  jisc,  54V*  pato,  In  oonpany  v/lth  Task 
special  cruising  disposition  9-7.  C.r.C.  and  for:;:stioa  guide,  'Jid 

.ISPrJSE.  otar.dQrd- speed  15  knots,  139  r-p.n.  Jteaiin:;  at  stoxidard 
^..^v.^  v..^..  .,-ilers  :;o3.  a,  5,  5,  7,  8.  Ship  darkened.  ."'  -  •I'f-o;.  of  readiness 
i'wo  and  .^terial  Condition  Baker.  Avei-ace  stean  410,  .^v  .  139. 


^■•fore.  0515  soxk^o' 
:on  Afirm.  063; 
Ji  designated". 

.^t,ion  of  readiness 


3UBx.^. 


ieut( jg). 


4-6 

3tea--  " 
jSet  „;at<:. 
,  executed 
.  quarters,  .  . 

■  C653  oo._enced  zis/M-s^lns  to  hold  position  on  ori|i3ers  durinj  fueling  prepara 
j;:o  definite  plan  used.  0749  oiiSEjed  course  into  v/ind  to  launch  aircraft.  \: 
'course  505'T.  jpeed  15  knots,  139  r.p.:;.  Ayerage  stegn  410.  .»vera.;;9  r.p.- 


quarters.  0540  sounJe'i 
urse  left  to  29C'T,  :,■ 
ed  ship.  0650  sooure;', 
;:i  two.   ..ct  r  aterial  c^, 


/^  •  :/^>^^iZjeo- 


luar-tters. 
44 

ral 
..airer 
ti  ons , 
prox. 

139. 


£  -  la 
1     :tea:.i;!,;  as  '.t-fore.  C-^^   c"  ar.Red  speed  t 

course  left  to  CIO'  T.  and  p^c,  to  close  6aXii   I-^...  -.-^  --.-  .^..  .  .   .  ,,»....  . 
(1115  3tea.;-nc  at  various  oo^xtsgs  to  rejoin  position  ane:-;:  oi   cruisers,   .jpuod 
!l;:  .n.ots.   lliC  co.-.ei.ced  zi=;za,-  inc  to  hold  position  or.  cruisers  during  faolinc-; 
jOper-tlcns.  -tcu-.ir.c  on  various  sourses  at  12  sxo-s.  1200  counded  fli;i-.t  quarters 
|:;ada  daily  inspection  of  cagazines  and  si^okelecs  pov^fier  sa'-iples,  condition  r.orjaal. 
Livera^o  steaia  410,  .-jvera;;;©  r.p.H.  123.&.. 


.-.'.  i.   H2S.3USY, 


5Ut(Jc), 


X2  -  --•■ 

s  before.  1E44  secured  i:o,  9  boiler,  1249  secured  ;.:.'.  1  b'.lic-r. 
1£5'         :.  9  uoiler.  1251  clanged  course  left  into  t:.e  -v.-lnd  to  recover 
eircr— -.  ,.,,.i-jx.  course  340'T.  and  pgc,  approx.  speed  IS  loiots,  11£  r..  .. 
1252  landed  i'lrst  plane.  1ES7  DU'LAP,  seven  uiles  astern,  reported  contact  •.vlo). 
subiiarine.   leased  lar.din^T  -iircrcft .  is,5t  olianf;;ed  speed  to  10  ioiots,  S5  i- .  -.-.. 
1302  sent  the  f,-.'o  rey.aini-  -  - -' —  '■  »•  •  -  -  -.^  oir  to  aiR  ^'^  ■  ■  "Vi  in  attao.':ir.'- 
rcporttd  s  •:>. -rine.  130"  .  13C5  C--<         '  to  IL  .aiO'^;;, 

112  r.p..  ,  liji  ceasod  '..  ,urse  left  .        to  recriie  1.  , 

rcraft.  .o:ri:c.  course  ^^.^  ..  ~  .:.^\,...  _.,„i;d  12  laiots»  ^^^^   -^o^aaed  landir..", 
aircraft.  1359  last  plane  landed.  Jaanpod  course  ri  -.ht  to  065"T.  1347  changed 


course  left  to  160'?.   1358  ezecuted  si^-j.al 
left  to  15C'T.  and  ppc.  1405  forLeJ  =  -■:-■  i 
tfront  of  disposition  rivht  to  ItC'T. 
speed  and  fleet  speed  to  15  loiota,  _ 

changed  speed  and  fleet  speed  to  16  ■^^,   ^ 

speed  to  15  iaiots,   139  r.p..-::,     Averace  steat- 


16  -  18 


Sl'.it. 

152. 


cease  present  ezerolsfes".  Zi-.-.i:.  :<i<x   coutse 
Tuisi-.-;  dis.iosition  9-V.  1407 'c:.?n'op 
lie,'  pso,  ...J  i:.7'  pstc.  Ohan'^ed 
1453  .  jcur'-a  0.   6  boiler.   1;>::.9 
V.  r.p.r...  154-i  oaanred  speed  and  fleet 
41C,.  .ivera-j^^.p.:,.  125.8. 


?fore.  1700  general  quarters,  set  ^ 
-  speed  to  IP  laiots,  ICB  r.p.r  .  .-.vor- 


itea-.  'ilt 


mW^^^--^ 


lo  - 

^*v, --3  before.   1608  secured  fro:::  ,-eneral  s^-iurter. 

readiness   Vw>,   v;ato;;   tv/o.     3et  i;:aterial  condItl«kn  .jaiwr.^^veriicc  -t,v;»... 
ivsraie  r.p.:..  Ica.  V- ^- S^S^^ifxit. 

(^. .   ^,   J-;Ci;X3,    Ir^l-::, 
-  :;4 

Jtea,..inr;  as  before.      2o0C  oL£.r:i;ad   course   to  fleet   ccurso,      ,  '     '. 
(uriTTTT?T)   .[;  .rinTTTOIIiiT    vr,;Yl4^. 


Sxunioed: 


Saptain,   ..5.  ;''uv; 
3o  avding. 


R.  v/.  .iu-^a., 

Lieut-Oo;;idr. , 


V.  I.  jr.,  Xtetlnttr. 


(Origiiwl  (ribbon)  Ban  •*  *>><•  P»W  to  bo  Mnt  to  Bonaw  of  N«Ti«*tton  monlhlr) 


11 


2102    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


(Original  Cribboa)  copy  of  this  page  to  be  nant  to  Bureau  of  Navtgattoc  monttUy) 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2103 


9/9;.^^ 


-lit. 
1727 


before.     IS? 

oa  one.     S-. 

boiler.     .. 


<i$ 


loB'   psc,   ajid 
PGO,   126     psc. 


J  .yj.;  --ry,;  ,:■■-,....  port  to 
■So  ^40'''?.     ..e.r.euveriag 

2C34  returned  to  base 
00  ohartged  front  of 

33C0  olianged  front  of 
:3to.     flkVerage  steam  410. 


'/C.Qmr.^ 


..xitv. 


>.  jr.,  ffnttof. 


t.>  Horeaa  of  NsTlaatkm  mouttal^  wttb  Los  >Imk<u) 


2104     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2105 


RfcfviARiKS 


18  :-?;?fr;,,fl:- 


.  In  this  r3sr<~ 
■-rags  r.i 


79716  O— 46— pt.  16 13 


r>««n  «r  MMtfuHon  i 


2106     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-ES  SHIP- 


i>.      1 


]  'if'*"    1  .      "" 


bfcBuU:fct;jl.   iIfcWj-i*lAtv»» 


!jilNll,iiJ_^KlU 


t  utmNft 


U- 


,.5.15    ^3l 


might  auaxtoal 


,  Urr.l  »ll-_  . 

•.i.^  J-..v,!.,i--,. 

■  •f,b->'jai  •. 

HH^^^^^^^^I 

■Sriimiti^t^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^B 

"^H^^^l 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^H 

:>l^^^^^^^^l 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 

^^^^^1 

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1 

EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2107 


EXHIBIT  NO.  102 


rW?ti* 


2108     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


UNiTXe  flTATES  SHIP ».fi..S.   UTTSTtCiV. ^^fl«>     gj^ — »««1lter  "  '  '""* 


lOMOMimaM-llfil REMARKS 


00  to  0^  " 

ItoorAd  port  .side  to  aoorloe  flmttoraa  >-9-«,  wil  F-9-S,  For*  Island,  l>««rl  Har- 
bor, T.B.,   In  7k  fathoms  of  wat«r  with  th«  followioc  lines  In  bs«:  Ax  10"  asBlls 
htrwssrs,  on*  B"  *inlla  baw»«r,   four  1-5/8"  wire  hswsars,   and  throe  1-5/8*  wlrs 
brsests.  Boiler  Uo.   *%  and  rorward  nMohlnery  s^cae  ^Ln  use  for  ts  tulllarjr  purposes. 
SitlpM  present:    a<i;.i:cfiH:,<»  (SC?^>Con3atFor)  and  rarlotis  units  of  tb«  U.S.  l>«oirlo 
fleet  and  yard  and  district  oraft.   l^resb  enter  taitt:   telapUone -serrloes  being  re- 
selved  frota  the  shore.   0020  Plsoonr.ected  fresh  water  line  i'ro^  shore.   00)0  The 
fcllcwlne  nen  returned  titosrd  having  completed  tei3!>orary  duty  with  shora   ostrol 
detail  at  Honolulu  are*:    HEILLY,   J.a,  ,  TClc;   VHS^SR,  W.O.,   mac;    XJUIMO,   ::•.>'.., 
30««,  and  Oli,',,  s.h.,  vJClo.  01?o  a;'3;o,  /.;.,  J^felo,  having  roturced  from  llbtrty 
ta  a  drunken  end  disorderly  oonditlon,  was  plsokd  in  e^.flneaent  for  8ttrekec;tiine. 
0035  tJDXX,  •'.E.,  Co*,  was  re*    -ne'J   to  ship  under  ari'est  by  shore  patrol  aiid  ess 
Bade  a  prisoner   at   Inrj-e  by  order  of  tht    Cote,  r.' Inf  Officer.    Ohbr^rL.;   Dlsotedianos 
of  safety  orders  of  beaoh  eoard   patro-j^ 

1.1.  Eoiiaaa,  oayum,  vsn:. 
04  te  OB 

0^05  BiiOHO,  F.J.,   je^2o,   returned  t»^3«nt  ov-rr' leare  jsIb  j  >    ■   '■  -   J«<t»,  sad* 

a  j^rieouer  at  Iwrfe  by  order  of   tJie  Cots* aline  Oftiosr.  0/,10  jrur9u«at"V>  iS«WiaT      ' 
orders  of  7  I^vember,  19i»l,  'lodlflcl,  l-leoteaant   C.U«£.  UjAkOSaH,  MiM.  was  de- 
tstchod  ana  uidircc  to  duty  at  UaTal  ^ir  ;»t<ition,   ;)uoas«tt  I^iat,  khods  Xslaad. 
04J,}  i.islit«a  Ilres  uo!' r  toilers  lios.   1,6,10,12,    -tnd  15,    <y>t>i:ittuM*=d  ■«arnln,£  up 
**•  atid   "J"  units;   eotx:.er.oel  preparations  for  (^ettin^j  u/jdurway.   iJji,5  Tested  laala 
sngiottH,  hll   departncnta  ready  for  gettizi£  uadsxvajr.  06^0  iilot  OTi'Tft.JCll  aai.e        ^ 
aboard.   0705  i»erelzed  deijBunsl:^  oulls.   0726  4ot  underway  li;  aoeora«noe  with  *j|i- 
roTed  opei^ting  ashedule.    Japtaln  coOLlnfi,  i^xeoutive  Of.  lo«r,  and  ^vi^atort  ana. 
Pilot  on  the  brl'l^.  .   07J5    Joii;.on;L;0   ateeria£  various  oourses  at   varloue  speeds, 
standing  uut  of  JPearl  Barter   chsnael,  07$0  Went  to  tor;»do  del«DS«  ^usrturs.   The 
followlne  ship  r.ovenent3  occurud  during  the  wstoh:   Stood  out:  foSBnOt,  Ituk^U, 
40PKI»S.   SClTiiiJUS),  DBATruti,   ZtaCJOO,  lOKlij^'VLXK,  AUtOaiA,  rORTUMD,    aad  UMAM- 
jBOLIS.   ATor.C'-   stes'i:    2f5 .   ^vera^e  r.?.B.    54^0. 

W,  Lieutenant,   U.a.   Hayy 
0«  to  12  ^ 

0006  Fasaed  ohannel   entrance  buoye  abefni  to  port  end   starboard.   0610  CttMSgad 
apeed  to  6  Imota,   $3  r. p.m.  0?12  3treaaed  paravanes.   Jteaislng  on  various  courses 
at  various  speeds  to  olear  deiensive  sea  <>r«a  at  ohannel  entrcnoe,   0S27  3eour*d 
froa  tornedo  ^afensa,  sat  oonditlon  111  in  the  anti-airoras't  tettary.  085?  tt»' 
trlaved   -aravaneB  and  aaoured  for  sea.   0900  Xent  to  JT^i^t  qunPtara,   0901  All 
an(;ln«;.  stoopad,  shifted  to  low  apewd  U.  pole  ocabioatlou .  All  engines  aheaA  I/3, 
6  toots,   5?  r.n.B.  Steanlnc  on  various  ooUrses  at  various  speeds  fcr  fU^A   ^9*^' 
etlons.   0937  ill  en(^liie«  stopped,   out  Out  tht  two   aiboard  shafts,  all  •*Bglft«s 
ahead  i/3,   6  knots,   $3  r.p.s.   091,0  i,«nded  eisbteea  VSB  planes  of  lk>rlu«  Sooutio^ 

ruadron  3SI.   1011  All  ei^laes  stOPiWd.   Cut  In  all  stiafts,   all  ecelnes  Atead  t/3, 
knota,   61   r.p.a.   IO30  LiXU.OlOM  Joined /Task  lorce  12   In  disposition  12|J  as  ft>r- 
aatloa  e^lde  with   the  following  units  of   the  I'uciric  ileet:    CHIiJAOO   (OOBi£aojPorl» 
fMOUND,  A$TCiiU,  sad  Destroyer  Division  Mne  plus  POffnS  on  fleet  oaurae  UTO* M 
apaad  1?  loots,   149  r.p.a.   IIO3  teft  fonoatlon  to  land  elr  group.   Coajenos'!  aaC* 
auverinc  on  various  eoursaa  at  v^^rious  speeds  fcr  fligbt  operations.   112i  %rf'15 
erasiedflnto   the  barrier:   aIXAJC,    J.,   AlS^lc,   ;l'v<t  of  the  pl&ne  reoelvbd  ell^cnt 
facial  lacerati«M.  ^^k.^^^Sh^T*^'^'^ 

12  to  16 

1202  Changed   speed   to  6  knots,    $S  r.p.a.   1210  Having  aoiapleted  landing  IXXlh^^-^U 
Ult  Oroup  ehan^fed  eourse  left  to  270*  T. ,  25i,*  patf,  253*  pao.  Changed  spaed  to  1? 
knots,   U9  r.p.a.   1220  HI  anginas  stop,   out  out   "C*  unit.   1221  All  m^m*  «*••#.. 
I6j  knots.  145  r.p.a.  1222  Co:3aeuoed  zigzag  In  t.  record totoe  with  ataJMlare  slfaac 
jii^  plaa.  1^  Cbaneed  spaed  to  I7.6  knots.  IH  r.p.a.  Averaee  staas  18$.  Av«ra«a  r.j 

^  U.^^'^iipji£r^1SkAl)«llt  ConsBod^ 


Captain.  Q,s.  Bavy, 

i^oamuidlngA 


..siiKiB^ 


^i^^^ JiSt 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2109 


^ 


¥ 


m:msm 


AOOITiONAL  SHEET 


i 


..LJiOhJluU... 


Datt  ...ptcarahw — -$ <■" — 4X' 


lo   to   18 

X62i.  Caused   zlgwi.cglnij  »nrt   r«8UJaed  base  coufs«  270*  T.,   255*  patg^t  253*  mc. 
Bhnngea  dpwd  to  16.5  Knota,  14;  r.p.u.  1623  oi^ii^Bd  Jloet  «xie  to  285*  T.^o}? 

Coatsr.cec   zlgiiu^riiio  li  aO'oraance  wltL  staudarci  plan,   baa©  course  27C*  T.   atblias*> 
sp*ed  to  17.5  knots,   154  r.p.m.  1732.  D«irkt.r..>fl    b-M^.  Average  ate&a:   285.  *van»g« 

H.-.».   iiOSi*D,   Ueutaaant  ijg),   li.   J.   Kavy. 
to  20 
._.    1800   C<»tir,e<3   zi:'zaftCin^  t>uc.    rKr,\x:^fL   '-aac   i;ourse,    CliLi^oa  speed    to  loi   kaots, 
lU  r.p.S.  1930  CJiaoeed  oouras  to  265'  T.,  and  Pd^,  274*  pat^c,  274*  pac.  19J5 
Hoottrla«,   oonraenoad  zlgz«ei"lar;  changed  spe«4  to  1?^  'axota,  if>}  r.p.jn.  At  1400 
this  date  nXHTSMH,   L.S.,    250-46-31',    Flo,    surfer«d   -i    eoaix.und   lr-..-lure,    third 
r !»)<!•'*•  *«lien  th«  roll  of  tno  ship  aaused  a  door  to  flioflfl  v6  tti«  i'lnj^er.  Trafttad: 
with  Soott'3  solution,   »a3(ill;i«  t^nuze  itjPaastrif   ,itic    <5-'->Uot.   P»»t-i'^fit  w^^    ■%,*    ..■•■itt-i^ 
t«  the  alak  ilet.  Avoraee  ateea;  2S5.  Av*---  '  ,   .    . 


•  ••    Intersiltteiit  li^tfBt  rela  SiuaUa.  «."'      ■       •      -.;   2o,'.   uvaj-«g6 


«Mluuuiar,  u.irr  K  ^v**  * 


>«««BttiMi  aMMhlr  vrttk  tog  ah* 


2110     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


ir.lfoir  «•  / 


LOG  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  SHiP  -. 


12  ii:. 


r. 

10 
17 

18 
16 

1:2. a  1 ' 

Hub  No.  tlianalj  — 
TUm  to  Mt>a»it« 


(Oi<<lMa<i«>lKm}«o|^orUiteViNI«toM«WK»laB«rMMiofM*<i(|»a^  «-«>    ...n. mm 


H 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


^111 

,,  1285   •^ 


UNITED  STATES  SHIP        i^,..  ...i.: 


iONf  [>t»CM(PTION    .*l;Oi.„_ 

,i)0    to    5/. 

3t8".Bln«  under  tellers  Nob.    1 .  ' 
-^r.bln«tl;,r. ,  00  bei8«>  oour«e  285* 
-.nots,    153  «".>•■•,    enroute  fotirl   . 
rusk  Foroe  HI,   ?«oiflo  Fleet,    CU 

i.'lpet  ffulde   la  UtnUOTCN;   aXl   »h! 

!:  renorl^  ed  plan,   A««rft«e  etea;:!  2t 


REMARKS 


iCW   to   12 
o«r>n  ijuater 

^       -  ■   .r9«    -?^-  '     i  .  ,    .;■;   •'    .  - 
1   zlfZHg   lr.£.    ChHiigf"- 
■*n»s  and  8tici<?l«8B   JK 
...w-rv-  r.p.T..   15). 


|12   to   16 

12;jO   Ceau'd   zl;  i«»i;i:lne,    r 
,«;,    "liS    fle^t    «p*ed    10,^   'it» 
■;c.    U20   >/. 


17J-;  I>«srkisi.«'1    all,. 


18  to  2 

!     No   r*! 


.r.    r 


i20 
I     !.- 


•i^y^!!!:^-' 


AitprovMi:       ^SJmXUmU^  (t_ 


Kith 


T. .   snd  Mi,     ., 

slder.tif  led 
J  0 cur 3 9  to 
,    ar.,'.    pgo", 


sr,    U.S.   BaV] 


Rsvy 


YBZDS«ICK  C.   SHXaUB, 
CapUln,  C.S.  ItaTy, 
"        Bdlae. 


■^  ***Mt  Mvr  «(  au»  *^i»  *•  to  iMt  *• 


2112    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2113 


UNITED  STATES  SHIP JJ.A^.  UmOKTCJ:  ^pikS^..^..JhMmi^  I9ja 

lONB  o€»cRiPTioN  .-_*lQi_  REMARKS 

00  to  04 


StMUtlM  in  OOTipany  with  Taak  force  III   in  apoelal   cruieing  fllaposltloc  12S, 
vaAmr  boU«r«  Hos.   1,5,6,10,12,   and   15,   "A"  \mlt,  at  etondard  apacd   l?.i  knota, 
153  *'.p.«-.   on  course  285»  T.,  271*  petge,  272*  i»o.   LSHNOTON  i»  r<  raatlon  guida  i 
oantar  of   roraatloc,   OTC  and   ComTaaltKoroe  XII   i»   In  CHXC^'iO    (SCFii-CoaOmScoror ) . 
Sbtpa  darkaned,   condition  of  readiness  HI  sat  In  the  antl-alrtwrt  battarlaa  and 
danaga  control,  Ararage   ateaa  265.   ATeraga  r,r,.«i.    ^2« 

sTlRESjriJajiEns  Ign ,  V.a.  fciTjr 
04  to  06  ^ 

06W  Want  to  £enar«i   'i««rt«r8.    0645  0'BHYA.K,   P.M.,   287-26-70,   SC2e  r«oe!v«d   eoa- 
tuaion  rl  Hbit  fourth  finger  while  woriciiig  on  powder  hoist   In  No.    II  turret,  wtitn 
f lager  w&a  caught  between  two  powder  ease.  Z-ray  showed  no  fraoture.   Tiaoture  of 
»«rtblolat«  antiseptic  and  dry  dressing  applied.  Im  not  stoitted  to  sick  li»t. 
07i0  Set  condition,  of   readiness  III  in  the  antl  elrorait  batteries  aad  daiwe^e  ooQtjft 
ATsrage   steam  2t!>.   Average  r.p.B.    IJJ-ii-^^-'^  "    / 

-^i^Z^ECoC^^lMt^ot   iW,  U.S.  Kary 
08  to  12  ^-^ 

0615  Mustered  crew  on  sttttions,^>(![Os'bsentees.   0621  Went  to  geaer«l  quarters  is      | 
or^er  to   aet   oonditioD  IX,   on  sigimi   Iroa  OTC.   <XyO  Hecelved  signal  froa  Cin^ao, 
"Bostlllties  with  Jfapan  ooa.^enoad  with  air  raid  on  fearl".   Coanenoed  zig£ag,^lc£        ' 
in  aooordance  with  standard  zigzag  plan  on  signal  froa  OTC.   0«I35  Went  to  fli^tht        | 
quarters.   0830  Secured  fros  general  quarters,  set  oonditios  II,   starboard  «Kt«A.       i 
0915  Lighted   lires  under  boilers  Kos.   2,4,9.16,5,7,11,13,  •»«  14.   09*1  Msneuveriis^  • 
on  rsr ious  courses  at  various  speeds  Into  wind  iaunohiie  scouting  grdup  sad  cn^ii'ii 
sir  patrol.   0925  Cut  in  "B"  usit  end  boilers  Nos,   2,4(9,16,  on  ti^e  aain  steara  lU^- 
0936  Completed  riight  operations,  reauned  zlgzagrring.   0951  Weat  to  gwueral  qasrt* 
on  signal  froa  OTC.  0953  Cut  in  "C"  and   "D"  unit*,   boilers  Hob.   5,7,11,13,  *Pd  :.. 
on  the  aaln  ateara  line.  1012  Changed  speed  to  flenk,   i24  knots,   210  r.p.m.   on  el.-  <■ . 
froa  OTC.   1013  Maneur«>ring  on  various  courses  at  varioua  SpiMds  laun«faiuc  air  «■ 
1020  Coapleted  flight  operations,   resvsaed  ztgzaggiDg.   IO43  Maneuvering  am  tnuritii.. 
courses  at  various  speeds  launching  air  group.   1059  Coaaletad  flight  operation*!, 
ehan^ed  fleet  course  and  axis  to  102*  T,,   094*  pso,   093'  stg,   on  slpaal  from  OT 
1115  Secured  froa  general   'Quarters,   se](^onditiori   HI,    section  III .    Average  stmtM 
265.  Average  r.p.a.   174.7. 


V. 
fl  to  16 

i2l6  Xnoreased  speed   to  20  knots,  17^  r.p.a. ,   full  speed.    U   -        -sk 
lag  at  various  speeds  on  various  ooutms  to  leuseb  alreraitt.    i> 
•l«3»^ed   on  flight  deck  and  right  la^tfiag  gear  gave  awajr.   Pilot   1  . 
'OMtcleted  flight  operations  and  '^i^t  ahead  full  speed,  20  knots,   x/> 
|102*  T.,   094*  stg,   093*  pso.   1320  iXOSSfflleft  foraBtion  to  lovostl^ 
|r«»uit8  negative.    1353  aH  engines  stopped.-  Coouenced  BMki.euverirv   «' 
ma  various  courses  astern  for  stern  aircraft  operations.   135?  Coai-.^. 
jslz  relief  and   ooabet  patrol  over  the  stern  and  went  ebmtd  on  course 
jst«,   093*  P«c,  at  20  knots,  175  r.p.«.   I4OO  Secured  boilers  Kos.    3,<. 
•j*«,    '   on   30  ainutes  standby.   1427  Slowed  to  15  knotn,    130   r.p.a.   ant 
eraft.    15i4   Coapleted  aircraft  operation,   havir.c  launched   aeoond' day 
,Md  went  ahead  full   speed  20  icnots,    175  r.p.a.   Uide  dally  Inspection 
■nd  aaK>keIes8  pointer  sui^lea.   Conditions  nornal.  xremgo  stet^a  ^s5.   ATersg« 
162.9.  V,  '  "-^'"^    A         a  .        _ 

LTSt  'JTcJiBTT,   £Ml«n.   O.S.   K»vv 

l«  to  le 

1*20  Changed  course  to   210*  T. ,   197*  pstgc,  195*  P»«.   1633  Ooaa6i«n.!e<5  nt . 
various  spetrds  on  various  courses  in  eonnectlou  with  rsQovcrla^ 
Osesed   night  oper&tlons,   caae  tc   course  210*  T. ,    197*  pttgu,    ;. 
knots,   193  r.p.a.    1720  «8TH>,   «.L.-   3«l-27-68,    ^3«,    reo«lved  j -^ 
fourth  aetecarpai.   Injury  sustained  when  petlent  fell  rrois  boa  »•!... 
readlivR  and   cauctt  linger  in  looker  door.   Traatasnt:   l*»fcbillah-;  =    i- 

Ireaslng.   X-ray   ah^wa  fraoture.    iSTEF  was  net   adaitted  to   siei  i  ■.  -        ''■■' 
lltion  Toke  on  and  belo*   tLe  stcu^  iiv.:u,   ve;.-. tiation  systeaa   t 
9smer,  ^«.?  steaaing  on  various  oouMes  ao^  speeds  Xor  recovery 
Steea  285.   Aver»ye   r.p.a.   iai.9.  '      '  "' 

F&iDiKlOK  C.  BBXmt2'., 
Captain,   O.S.   Kavy , 
ZatmaAioe.. 

■    rftllsli    I  OOtiieJ  mwy  ml 


2114    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


ADDITIONAL  SHEET 


Ap^..«         HI,^^, 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE 


2115 


~T*^..                •• 

— .— 

.• 

• 

« 

%Mltek  •kW) 

'.f 

_iL_ 

^«M«>» 

, 

; 

^l9m0tM  (itf»M).  •ofr  of  t>to  p— •  <»  »<M|>  » Ifcw^  »r  |Ui»itf»«ton  moiMaNin 


.jnu^ .   ittsnumz/aa 


2116     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


.mmjsat. 


UNITED  fTATES  SHIP . 


mrrtiftTnH 


*i*i^ 


:}&Q«c.b«r    .  19  41 


«iM»c»«c"<»^toH — rum~-  REMARKS 

00  M  04 

StMDBioc  M  yert  of  Tksk  7oro«  HI 
ISaXA*  OH  •osrw  170*  X.,  X63*  P«to, 


,   OTG   (ComCruSocior-aOPA)    in  CHIOfcOC.   LBIBraTOI 
162*  psc,   spe«d  ii  krots,   193  r>P.B.   Hollars 

iios.  i,Sl,4,5,7,9.11,13,U,  »nd"l6  ial  vmits  "A","U"7C",  and  "D"  on  ttje  11m. 

Stilp  In  «ondltion  of  rMdiiMM  II.  A^ertt&a  ataaci  26^.  Avertigo  r.p.a.   193. 

04  to  08 

0$1$  Uj^ted   rire*  under  boil«ra  Ros.   3,6,^,10,1^,15,  «nd    out  XL^u  In  od  the  mill 
at««lB  line  at  05  30.   OJJO  Want  tc    ni^t   quwtars.   0.-1 1  W'siit  to   ganeral    ;jertar». 
0642  ContMoead   9taaalu£  en  varlcua  eouraes  and   apeatta  lu  conaectlou  «lt:>  launchine 
a*>rnlcg  air  patrol.  070O  Caasad  flight  operatlonr.  anl  aet  course  170*  T. ,   it>«.* 


pateo,   163*  pto 

aaetloD  I.  0728  Soimeucad  BBneurerlti^  or.  vtirious  covu-aes  eai 
oraft.  0735  -*aa»«3  lUrht  oparutl'-ns  and  :i.  i  oourae  1?0*  T. , 
foil  apa«d  22  Knots,  193  r.p.a.  Aver  i.' »r^5'ioam^.;e'>._Ajer«e* 


0715  {Joeurad  fron  genaml  quertara;   sat  condition  of  raedlDaaa  UIJ, 

apaads  tc   raaOTar  alr- 


■r.a.  i"v.o. 


16? 


pso. 


d.   tXIiMMrilU),  clualcn,   U.6.   Navy 
06  W  12  ' 

OSOO  Kuatarad  oraw  Ob  atationa,  oo  absentaas.    ;S04  CLuj&cad  apaad   to  ii,  uiota, 
aw  r.p.«.  and  •ouraa  to  174     T. ,   lo7*  stf,   16«»  pec,  0840  llbna  2-o-7>  iHD-3. 
UautecABt    (J<5)  J.^.   ffCHTER,   IBK ,   pilot  and   lANO,  i..y. ,    326-61-48,   AMiao,    craslied 
lato   tba  «aa.   Latitude  15     30'   North,   Uineltuda  loo*   50'  Weat.   Fllot  and  paaaeogar 
took  t«   c\xXi^*f  collapslbla  bout.   Di<AY70M  lai't  formation  tu   tUalr  aaalatazioa.    0935 
Bl^tad  IKDIAMaWUS,   dlataut  15  allaa,   194*  T.    1010  iiOIiUii»yoU^  Jwtned   ton...tioo 
kdA  tocA  coaaand  of  Task  Foroa  £U«  ,1050  oat  all   oloolia  back  ^  nour  to  &caa  *l\  tiai 
1027  iilowad  apaad  to  22  Ksota,  193  r. p.K;  and  coastanoed  zle;£at;tcli' 
atafidard  plan  on  basa  ooursn  170*  T. ,   164*  stg,   163*  pae.   1110  Cet  -  ii    ,n<j 

lod  slowed   epead   to    15  knots,    130  r.p.H.   113^   Jonaericwrt  rtiifuver li., 
s<&uraas  lor  launol-lng  aircriiit.   1142  CoEs>platad   launcbibs  ulrcroit  and   j,r«ip«.-»'    to 
4siid  airaraft.   2toda  dally  In&^aotlon  of  ua^azlnas  and  auoKaleai   pow'«r  J.^aplae. 
PotJ'V.rjona  n^raual.  Avara/t    staaa  ■iP5.  %JK(f«gefjf.pji.  19^^.6. 


ljU7  Ccwplatwd  rligut  optirationa,  all  planas  returned  ejieapt  2-y-7.  lUta  pl-iua  ' 
Was  reported  down  200  r;llpv  Jpoq  the  BUi,\  ^ilct  slid  radloaan  were  rwpcTtad  aabark-i 
aid  safalf  In  roboar   boat   b;.    tic^onpSny .i.*-  pl&naa.   Case  to  couraa   OoB*  T.,   055*  stg, 

f>4*  j»c.  1250  iCitidi  ui«l  ?0H7L»»HD  lei  t  the  tornutlor.  but  took  courst  to  weatwnrd. 
130  Oo  signal  froa  O.T.C.  (soaoanoed  zigzagt^^lng  in  aeoordtinae  with  staudaird  zlij- 
>,'««  plan.  1352  ItAHAN  raportnd  sutoRarine.  iitMtCi  I'iXi.  lorR'l^lor,.  to  sanroa  toe  aub- 
aM.,rlna.  Hant  to  lllrut  ju- rlars,  aentiwd  all  rotrmti^  statlon*i*Xxaeut*d  aaargency A^MI 
tlg.Tal  from  O.T.C.  I4O3  Secured  boiler  Hy.  5.  1405  On  signal  fr-ju  O.T.  .  raauaad 
riset  oooraa  068*  flaat  apeid  if*  K,!.ota.  1411  Cn  sl^nsi  frciia  u.T.C.  r«8-«i*?d  il^;- 
M#«lni<t  Vi  saoordanoa  wltli  standard  plan.  142'j  v^neu7«<rlne:  or^  various  oouraes  at 
jrarlous  speeds  launohln/f  aritl-subasriao  patrol  and   pl'ines  of  fh-^  to    i'»«lat  la  1 

faaroh  for   p*   '    '"-'      '      ->7.    15u5\yAHAJI  rejolnei   foraatlon.    152o  Coapietad  fllglJ^ 
per&tlcjic.  Aoggtng  at   lo  kosta.    15?9  Ceased   ?ir?e?jFin«     -    "'.-t,?.!    fro« 

t.T.v, ,    otan  •  15   M»t*,   1  ■> .'  r.p.a.    1537  iomt&   orulsinn  Uiapvaltl..o 

fl2S*  on  sigttrt*  *.    -     .I.e.    l';39  .'ff-'    ■-     rll^bt   qu'iptera.  154"  Ke'-ftvBd  ra-^-- 
tr  pla»a«  reported  as  e.    r.^  froc.  "  :  '.i^,  V>44  iif^iH-:"^  1 1  •-  *  f"*!' 
s&l.   AvanMTS  e'ei-    .<!-".  ATera,--    r. 


|»t<?sa 


.rt< 


Hfe-  to  18 

i6lj  «?9D«  to  g.-u-jrai 
1 640  aaeurftj  fr-ja  ganaral  ^u 
JLoa  Toka  below  th»-  pac^nd  d«- 
lor  l*UAohlnf     - "    ■   - " ' 

.'-^#ji<»*.d  to 

loiilBf    • 

l^lOQ  and  .iis«;i>.i-^o    .  -•    ••  '        !■ 

tor  the  pnrvlvor.i  of   i-i-',",    i-iaut«i(«nt 


^VJr.enoed  wneuvi.:  .  ~. ,  .  -...,..  .*.  . 
•.  :.Jltloii  of  reeainesp  n.  1722  «m; 
r  von*  P    •loR.    l''4i,    Co:'.t,l»:tv  i  ~-»nev. 

tc    .>ofc     T. ,     ^5S*  pstc,   ;;         r^. 
:.d  K.'TSK   i-.iv'-d   tearing   ^  f,, 

1,13,   Anrt    0HI;,9C       f!    tha  f..r- 
i.»-    »<-  Hi  '       ■  """  '  r   raft 

iji*{).   J.C. 


JS  uns<fc«asful.    \Vfrir--   staausi,    i'>>'-.  Av«r«~'e 

Captalu.  U.S.  S«yy.  CcactsOKSfer,  U.S.  navy. 


kv. 


Jl 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2117 


2118    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  103 


./ 


I    ;       • 
) 

'  ■  ..(■'  1 .  '.■.' 

..ial 

Frwn: 
T   ; 

At  J-,'u 


:     .    .'v;    .•  Z-.Tvii'iP.d.SS  Ail-  Gnnu.  • 

Sv.oi  ■.•',:  .(..-jrt  of  A'^tii-r.  •.it;i  .]-\finna  kxf  force 

Ht'oa-V..    T.?l.,    Ducof..u.ir  7.    1941. 

.iiu'jrarice;      (a)   Artic^.  s  ll'i  and  874.    U.S.».    Begulations. 

1.  At  ot.lj  DjcwJiber  7.   1941  I  took  off  fro..x 

ENTZiiPRISZ,   wnosc  (.osition  at   that   ti.^  was  approxinately  215 
:iilaa   •■ue  v.o5t  of  Oahu,    with  n  laission  of  searching  a  sector 
^.58*-095*  tru«  fv.r  i  distance  of  1^0  n.ilei,   and  then  to 
proceed  to  ?ord  Islin-.i.     Ensign  P.   L-   Tuaff,   U3N  in  airpl&ne 
'■ -S~2  accoapaniwd  .ne.     ky  passman  ,«r  was  Liout"*Cc»adr.   Bror^ield 
r^icnol,   USif.   Tictical  Of.'iser  attached  to  tJw  staff  of  Co-^iander 
Air-^raft,   Battle  Force.   >(ho  hiad  been  ordured  to  report  to  the 
>'or- in-Ci'itf.   P^oafic  Fleet  Ju.i..ediat6ljr  after  lay  arriiral 
'     ■  .ni   Islanri. 

At  about  0720  I  sighted  a  tanker  to  starboard, 
. roceoding  on  an  eastorly  coursj.   which  upon  investigation 
provod  to  bt  the  "PAT  IXXE»v*Y"  of  Los  Angelos,   belonging  to 
the  Hichfiold  Oil  Go.      Continuing  on  i.-j  track  of  09*3'   1 
si^atvd  and  passed  the  U*S-3.   THr6£S;i£tt  acconpaniod  by  tho 
'  -S-S.   LITCHFIELD  at  about  0740.     At  about  0810  I  passed  iUt^na 
Point  abtja..  to  .cort  aistanc-j  20  nil-is.     At  0820  paasod 
Barbjr's  Point  to  seaward  and  .at  this  tijjo  I  noticed  apprcoc- 
L'-Atoly  a  8  .uaJron  of  planes  circling  Swa  Field  in  coluaa%. 
aclioving  thoii  to  b.  tj.   S.   An-/  pursuit  pl«»sJS  i  gars  theo  a 
■.'ido  borth,   d.!cr*.asin^  kv  altitude  to  about  800  fowt  and 
■otitlnucd  toward  Ford  Islvad  Fi-ild.     At  a  point  mid-way 
D-t„.,-n  Ewa  Field  and  Ford  Island  I  notic<3d  considerable  "AA" 
fir..-   in.jad.      At  ■iL..ost  the-  sa..^J   instant  i  was  att&ciced  oy 
J  tp'^n_st   wlan.,?  frot:.  the   mar  without  warning"      ftaoognizing 
-1'  omj  plane;  tivat  had  ccupl-ted  a  dive  on  tm  - 
..  jv  ;  tov.'ard  the  ground  zig-zagging.     ky 
:n.».   .lav,'   ::urf iciont  ti^.ii  to  .  lan  tho  f ivo  ^n- 
■  cr;  lo-.dcd  and  ohar^wd  out  X  had  no  opportunity 
T.i-..   .l-Tiyj  tnat  attaCKod  r.w  appearoa  to  be  loi«- 
i  fi  ..torfi  with  nitmotablc  landing  gear.     ..y 
'.ttack«.:d  at  tao  s-u*.   ti^c  but  v%s  not  hit  -ind 
.^   ..-.;!  wi'^h  -.J,   circlin,:.  low  ovur  a  cano  fiald  to  the  Morth 
>:    •■-".rl  C-ty.      It  was  ioac;di".toi;.'  evident  that  I  was  under 
AA  Tiro  r'-gardl^ss  o:  v.hich  direction  i  •  .nu.      1  did  not  have 
sufficient  fuvi.to  return  to  tho  ship  had  I  bean  able  to  get 
•  ..•  -    CtrOiT,  thy   ialareJ.      Hoping  that  I  would  bo  rec<^ni»ed  as 
fria-.-ily  J  docidod   to  .-akj  -.  lew  appraach  to  Ford  laland  field 


th. 

in/^i  ■ 

r.  I  \ 

I    -.-•. 

, .    di-r 

L-.iIy 

f>ai.s 

'-■'('.'-•' 

:.i.- 

U,    f 

ix.j 

,;uns 

to    U30     ti. 

i;;:.. 

i.'ing 

nonopl  -jY 

'■in.-" 

;.ian 

'.^'as 

i  illULU 


-i-  ssTsaPHisE  jon  <mm> 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2119 


..•*>»;■  rt    (       (• 


1  »;^ 

In:-. 


7S-6  and  VB-^0   1   ..is   ^irdev 


2120    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

CaAG/Al6/Pb/ 

(S7v) 

Go:"Fi:/-..  :-iAi, 


^^•■:    i:'    r  >u-i-. ,    '        '*:•.■      A  ,  ■  ,     .       :  '     ....      I.:  ;'i  r-  .       i    • 

:.::.•.;->:' !-•■ 

i  Lui'.-L'.     iiKJ    t;.f   ii<  i.:^  LT  .U-or.,     ... 

onl^    -..ii'icor  detaiiedi  to  dut; 

o2  the  tr  insiiiitter  iii  tiw  tc'..c.    »    .-.^^    .u  ..-   ■.  .. .  '-•• 

with,  cither.      Tiie   licK  of  proper  joza'-iutuc-itio.-:  ;"ic  i 

telepiione     nd   mdiOi    wore    •   contributory  cuU86  to<t.. 

4  lirpl  inos  of  VF-o,    which  were  shot  down  by  our  own  AA  ^xr... 

during  the  night.      I  atteupteu  to  tr.insndt  liiidinr   Ins t r.! -t ions 

to  then  via  the   towor,    but  they  wore  umblo  to  ne  ^r.      Jt   v. 

necess^rj-  for  thoa  to  land  due  to  the  Lack  of  x'uel.      ?  - 

bIx  1  inded  safely.      I  then  itto..pt«d  to  cum..unic:ite  -..iti.  t..,.; 

2OTEHPKISE  via  the  tower  voice  set  in  order  to  rocorjnond  ■•. :.  .t 

no  ;nore  plin«s  oe  sent   in  to  Ford  Isi'\nd,    withoMt    suoc-f-  .      I 

then  learned  that    the   reiaainder  of  tne   sji^uj'  i:..'    ,    . 

launched  had  returned   to  the  ship. 

5-  Lack  of  irufonaation  that   hosti.;.it  i..  ,     .-  - 

ed  with  Japan,    proper  cofjriAinic  itions,    th^   ina:;  i 
ground  and  ohi     board  forces   to  reco^^nize  I'ric! 
know  the  proper  r>icognItion  signals  uerc   the  ooiit,riaui.wr., 
causes  for  the  loss  of  jjeraonnol    ind   airpl"nes  of  the  Jlcri;.%i".'J.w^ 
Air  Group. 

6.  No  pi  »nt,s   wero  e-u^pp-jd  ..it.i  s^lf  ik;LJ...     •.    .-i/;.-; 
or  an/.or  -    \11  :'yir\s  were  fully   -ni-cd. 

7.  The  suddcness  and  laagnitude  or  t..-   ^•. .-'■,.     -^.'ix:,: 
caused  such  a  stunning  effect  u^on  ^round  an<J  ^..i     .-.r.    :i-.';I 
Uiat  all  aircraft  were  fired  upon  regardless  of   i.ieir   ;'>>..>. 
friendly.      I  was  under  fire  until  ray  wheels  twiclx-j  •..;•.,    ■r-.-unc 
on  ford  Island  -  soiae  of  the    oms  boin^  not  r.ore   tiian  !!-•.■ 
yards  distant  frcsti  ..ic.      The   ijuportance  of  soi.ie  :.ieans  oi 
positive  identification  of  own  airplanes,    other  \,r.\::  visual 
signals  cannot  be   over  emphasized.      Tho  loss  o:~ 

fi^nters  of  '/F-6  triat  ni-jht   is  a  .:oo<:;  sxaii^ple    -.  ..    .^..-.s 

unless  proper  cooiaxmications   anu  oieans  of  controlxi;. ;   \.id 
identifying  aircraft  in  tno  air  is  available-. 

8.  I  then  received  <jrders  to  rejoLn  t.ie  SilTE.-'J.dSE 
at  sunrise  the  next  n.ornin^  viith  our  reraainias  pi.n. r.      Just 
prior  to  the  tis.u   of  our  sc.viduled  take-off,    i  uti.,../  .  lar;. 
(JRS)   toolc  off,    and  w^s   iruiaediat^i;/  x'irea  on  b,-.-  5.. is      ru 
other  sliore  batteries.      I  had    n'sviously  arran-i.-u   "...at     v-  ry 
means  available  be   taken  to  notii'v  all  hands  of  our  s^..r;Juied 

->- 


.     i,?*!' 


5 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2121 


Su:\=vct: 


it  Oar.u. 


nocoss.-ixv  t^ 
continuous 


10.          : 

........ 

oJg-., 

JV"- 

■   -iS 

for: 

:■  :;    ..t     .". ; 

;",  "'. r^    ■' 

•;>:,     :.^:^      .-./    to 

t;l    ;'.      .-x.-iiiLui 

another   .'^  ..;.      ,n,. 

/'      A     '      ■     ■ 

^►'■•rv;.:     i  <.  •-  ".t. 

At  this   :.x.M    ....   .  r 

rr.     .'r-    r.'  t    Kiiovm 

to  iiis  su  x:rior:)    . 

■    ..!.■•    -  .■    M-: 

to  iiiyone  at  tne  •- 

■  IS-   .1 

■i/lr..'    ■■     ■''. 

.  )-      ,;.ju:-t    .-, 

St  in.ina.    devotior,  - 

:   logic    -ui 

;    .-o^'^:;-.  :^3    in 

action.      It   is  r^j 

rficvT  IX' 

.V  •:.   in     fri.:i-il 

couiiondition  for    ._ 

H.   L. 

YulIXi 

i 

..  .££M»».:y&^^i& 

i^UtiU. 

!i^in«B£I«<IS»i>',- 

79716  O— 46 — pt.  16 14 


2122    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  104 


from  4>'ari  '  wr  jvv  , 
r.l  If  p  fro/t  yidwi)  '. 
(riarehi:).     ^ 

-.roll  •' ,    '  <  "• 


powi  tloi     urn    1"  •  . .. 
course   ^i'"    m-.I    "f" 


;>i   Otv.  ■:    g 


To  c  i  : 

mer.c  <•(' 

cscc 


At,  OMC    ■'■ent 


K    . or CO 

t    400 


01  , 


.HOC 


-'    -C     'of 


Tttr:; 

in. 


ti      roceol    t-    '.  T' threap*.   ".  bfl   or«"".'. 
<?or.;-vt    -fi  tro  1 .      .'it    1    Ifl    lav.;  cJ-f-ii    11 


•e  '   rod 


■ocee  ■■ 


p    •■,  -_(--(■>■'    .  , 


■a  detfl.j.-   were  ,     '      ;.  war 
t,r.    .■.-.-^-     ..   ;\Rf,^     "ctor   to 


Lcn  •;  tude   It 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2123 


SKCH.T 

Dc  ■  - 

»     i  i 

^•41    iC4iit'dJ_ 

1 1    i_ 

'    .       A- 

042 

Scouts    a  i. 

Latitude    .L    -     ;'       ,,    ^ 

at    estL  .ated   ap^ed   ■">» 

with   a   red    i  :•.>!«    w' 

'      ,. 

•k" 

.  1 1  r    1  li 

.•3«    2.30" 

:•    "K"    on    StB 

Task   Fo.'ce  T(.LLVL    .. 

■.•ce;  teO 

^\ic.h     . 

prottitle    :,,osit!  );t,h 

jf  ^Mirl  at   n.).... 

n^axlauia   apped   of   L':    .-,..     •,.  j   an^i    aireu:.    :,      ,.;;i     ^'O.. 
to    intercept    anl   dti?^.  r   ;     t'lon. 

At    1630  C     ,         .        )r;^-tij!.    .    '^rst    t    ■    :'1(!^     a  i. 

At   1840    (dusk)    oo:;.ileted    .  .uC.u.-    ill    riunes.      At    Ih44 
formation   courat     v*is  cViastjed    tc    170^. 


FRi.CER  Cr-   C  .     y  ..   .  AK  , 
Captain ,      ,  J.    ..    .     , 
Cuu^rjund i;  -  . 

Dftce    .-'-r   '',,   --'4^       ' 

Stea- -  ander 

orders   t : 

as  tanie  ".  ■^■ 

approi 

jf   i  ea: 

.vL    ......     -  vy     (f  ;        -..-r      •>■■      ^_      .;   , 

to   31L   r_il'-s.  ,      .     ,        .         r32    rort  3- 

that    -,  .    ..t    "2..^  • 

'•L:j'7-'       ;  L..jt    . 

Pilot    .1:-    ras   ei,;8r    r  V  bl^er   DO-xt.      .!ie 


2124    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


fd) 


For 


A   -  osa.!  -e    .'  ^-  3.'.  yorcr  '   ''    '_  •  * nt 

'ui\  iae'' "  t;:'t'  .rawn   fi  '  r 

^-  ■      .     *.       ;  ,e 

At    1140   relieve  •    " 

At   IZLl  ron.pl eted   i    :  VJ  .rr 

At    U.3v    set    C'.n.rsf   068*^   at   15   knots. 

At    12.^1    J. oat    3:^-;:l    of      0RT1A^■T   snd    .  'In.?  2680 

(T),    PORTLAND   lein»-   delayed  wiilie  hDRinf  :■:  .ft. 

A«-    T>j.o  'V--    ■-•''raed   by  OTC   that  CinC    ,.         .    .xA^erei 
s.  r.w'    retirer.ent    towar      - 


'•    V3  aiTied  with 
-autriBriiie    natr 


in-  er 


"Kany 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2125 


UNITED  MAUS  PACIFIC   FLtEl 
AIRCRAFT.  BATTLE  FORCE 


sr:-. '  r.      a    •' 

10  -n. 

At  ig: 
cruiser   di. 
Ovm   ^i.';hter 
f  ^  r  ed   on   bv 


i>     _:  I 


A  174G  c 
subnwrine  putr 
raa  e  uj.succes;  , 
took    course   Or 


At  ::055   the  report   o: 

At    2140    L'"         ,     ■      - 

raa  t ;    ;     to    ,'  'ir 
227    ;;.    rv/'^er 


.>ecer. :  ei 


rrJDiA-'APt:     .         .  

were  about    25 
and   LJIiO?'   were   .-« 
south  southwestwer 
070"   speed   20   k:o' 

At   0617   1"  .      'it    patro    . 

DTDIAIIA?  LIS,    CIICAX.    A.  TC;-. ..;. ,    K)HTi..'J  D   ar.r;    Hv.  .Jir 
bearing  260° 


2126     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

U.S.S.    LSXIKOTON    iiAR   DIARY 


3ZCTU-:T 


D^cetuacr   9.   194X    (Cufit'd) 


At   0624   launched   IC   V8B  and    6  V7,   Scouts  to    search   a 
circle   to    IBO   r.llea  rndLua. 

At    0755   lliLIJC  MvLlij   and    cniisers   irtiv.ou    ly   8igh*44 
joined  LKXItNOTON  and    t:i«    force  took   oraiair^t-;  disposition   12V, 
ooume  an     axis  070°,    fleet   spead   15   iciinta,   zigzagging. 

At    1£11    launched  4  VF  relief  combat    fatroi   and    14  VdB 
of  Bombing  Squadron   TWO  to   •earoh   a   ••ctor   frori   1250   position 
bearing  083''   to   117°   to   180  miles. 

At   1230   landed  4  VT  of  corabat   patrol,   and  12  73B  of 
first   scout  group  one  of  which    (2317)    wnet  oTer  the  aids  to 
starboard   and   orasi.ed,    slrkint;  Im^.sdiately   in   Lstituds 
19O-00l5»    N.   Loneituds  163O-40.8*   W.   Pilot   Snsign  H.J.H. 
Wslnzapfel ,  U.a.N.R.,   not   recovered,      iasser  ,;er   reooYsrsd   by 
U.S.S.    FLU   Siffl. 

At   1326   landed   last   of   rirst    search.     Results  of  sesroh 
nsfiutlTS. 

At   1610  landed   14  V3B  of  second  search  group.     Rssults 
of  seai^h   rersal-jd   onlj    one   ship;    the  Coast   Guar',   vessel 

At   1830   lan<led   coirbat    and     intl-subrjarins  patrol 

ncDracK  c.  ^imirAS, 

Captain,  U.S.   Navy, 
Coonanding. 

DecefflLsgr  10.   1941 

Ctotinued   stear,in^  us  part  of  Task  Force  TVfELVI,   operating  to 
soutnwest   of  OAJH;  wW'^Ifcstruotions  to  intercept  and  destroy  any 
•osmy  ship  in    the  vicinity  of  Pearl  ilartor. 

At  0130  set   all    clocks  ahead  j  hour  to  zone  plus  10|  tioi. 


r 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2127 


At,    ,'j..;    laur.c.-itjd   -i   VT  ua   ca,.  ii',   ^^11-0!,   4  vai-  ua   inner 
:iir    T,".'.r    I,    i^    V-...;   as    so., 'it  3    :       s«a;-c      360*^    (T)    to    60   :T!il«8; 


831 


VT  to    3. 
A* 

ml  ; 


aitt  .-a..     >ir 


At    060 V    lu.UwC:.e!i   4   Vlii'    "is    ir.:.«r 


til 


'415 


2128     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


UNITED  STATES  PACIFIC   fUfcET 
AIRCRAFT.  BATTLE  FORCE 

U     S.   S     LEXINGTON 

U.S. 3.    I.- ■■■     •  -  

SBCRgT  '  '— ■        .    ...    .„,.    ...... 

Alr.a78  *149,    1ft,  ;  '1  were   receive' 
And    Itflly  hi^f"    ''ftplfi'-  *•,^.A   '  ,i' ted  3tti',.-;  e 

Rrvv  was    to   exeri  t«    •  ■/ L  4ri  ap'>'ir?t    German:'   an 
addition    to   Jaor  . 

At  062fi   irSO:::;:.    .-—..-..   aud   DesRon  ONE  Ibp-    \    :       :     ....;t 
alighted   bearinM  C70°.      Foraiatlon   ^uide   wi»s  3>^f*e('    to      :t;:caGO 
and   fueling  disposition   "ISF"  was  taker   vHh   a*-    OSn   n./i 
course  070°. 

At  Oftifl   launched  14  VSc  for   inner   i^'l    lnt«»rin»'11"5te    ^ir 
patrol,    Inndin-  the   dcwn   patrol  of   4  7S"  at  0707. 

At  0713    took  course   06C<5  ^^^^  fCSOGl'C 
aloupside.       I^e  nea  wrjs  vfrr  rou^Vi    an-l  ■' ' 

Icnots  frofl!  OfiP°.     A  speed  of  (3  knott-  on   oour<5e  0'35°  w;i^'    '.aKen 
and,    although   -1  attempts   were   raade  to  ?«pn   th»»   tov  lin<":,    *>e 
weather  prerented   completion.      T^re*»  time:;   tho  "-.oorcr-er 
parted  and  on   the   fourt!    attempt    the  tcwin-r  lino  -^^s    ja      '*<'.    '  ut 
the   towinff   block  tuJtbled  anl   could  not   be  richto(3. 

At  1140  oT'lers  were   recexv6<i   to   poatpone  T'.:nl  in  ■   e.'!'    rts. 
NXOS'O  cast  off  towtnsr   line  and  ships   9e'7''-q*'»d .      T 
12  knots.     Orders  were   intercepte.^   froc  C3nCP<  r>   to 
toward  Midway  pending  more   tnvovfbXf  v/cath-  '  . 

At  1247   launched    the  relief   lir   patr   Is,    A    .'5,  for    I' ner 

and    10  \'3  3  for    icterc-ujoi  ■•i»'. 

At    1321  lande-l   the   forenocr.  -    (14  BE  ed 

course  to    390°    (T)    e>t  15   ki-otp. 

'•  At  1800   Ct'lCAOO   reported    si'♦^  tinf    two    '- 

liQoreasec  spet-  '"  '-.i 

to   invest iga  ^    . 

At   1832  resumed  fleet  speed. 

At  1908  changed  fleet  eourca   to  OOC^  and  a^ 
and   ^RDKK  rejoined    from  the    routhecst. 

At  210C   changed   course    tc   2900    (T)    from  :,1"0    to   -147 
received  Radar  reports  ol    one  avrchaft  w'  '  c^    passe*?   to  eastward 
of  the  force  on  reported    course  about   2£0  at   165  knotr. 


FRKDIRICK    C.    SFEHMAi'.', 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2129 

U.S. 3.   LEkD.'OTON  WAH   DIARY 

Jece.i.ter   I^^   1S41 

Cvontinued   operatii:?-  aa  part    of  Task  Force  T'^VELVB  in 
a  general    sxithweaterly    direction    frju.   OA.iU ,   withdrawing 
toward  Kidwav   While   secLing   suitalie  weather  and   sea 
conditions  tJ  refuel  the   force  fro:a  NSOSMO. 

At   0547   0  .anged   fleet   course   to  north. 

At   0616  launched  14  VSB  to  form  inner  and    interaediat* 
air  patrold  voaiie   fuelirig.     Fueling  course  050°  speed  8  knots. 
Took  radic   direction  finder   oejaring  on  a  patrol  plane 
reported  landed   on  the  water  southwest  of  Barbt-rs  Point,     At 
0745  ASTORI4  and  DRaYTOK  left   the   formation  p  rooesdliig  toward 
south  southeast V      At  0«13  CalCiGO  ecanmencsd  refuAllng  from 
IvTSOoHO.      1006  launched   relief  air  patrols,   12  VT,  and  landed 
first   patrols   at  1100.      At   1151   IKDIAKAJOLIS  reported  sighting 
a  torpedo  wake,  maneuvered  to  east  at   flank  speed  for  9 
minutes  when  vesuaed  station.     At  1210  PORTLAND  rsportsd 
sighting  a  submarine   bearing  £00     from  LZUNOTON.     Hsaded  to 
east   at  flank  speed   for  5  minutes  to  avoid  area.     A  searoh  of 
areas  by  destroyers  and   aircraft   failed  to  locate  any  subaarins. 
At   1235  attenipts  to  refuel  the  force  were  discontinued  due  to 
temvorary  damage  to  fueling  gear  when  CHICAGO  cast   off  hurriedly  upon 
report  of  submarine  activity. 

At  1334  launched  relief  Intersediate  and  inner  air 
patrols  and   at  1350  landed  second  patrol  grou!>a.     At  1530 
PORTER,   lAllSOK,   and  MAHAN  proceeded  toward  Pearl  Uarhor.     At 
1749  landed  all  planes    (14  7S3)    of  third  air  patrol  group, 
the   force  withdrawing  to   southward    and   »outhwestward.      At 
2310  course  was   changed   to   135°  and    at   2535  to  080'*. 


raiDIRICK  C.    SaSRKAN, 
Captain,  U.S.   Navy, 
Coibmandii^ . 


2130     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


UNIILD  blAltb  PACinC   FLEET 

AIRCRAFT.  BATTLE  FORCE 


-,^    -g,U 

:  '    •    ,.•  r.ic   of   T's.^k   .'orce    I'-.^LVE  operatLnn  to 

v,-o.;t.  oT  .       .roo**-      n-'    tnw«rd   Tearl  Jarbor  at  20  kr.ota, 

..t  0615  l«iu'.ol  ad    14  T  atd  out«r  air  patxol. 

At  1138  ooaraenood   l^vmch'nr    the   air   <?TOup  aroad   with 
GOO  111.    jonba  on  ".  ;,    to^^e.'ofls  on   '.'^,    «nd   I'O   lb,    boabo  on 
for   ferr;'   to   Ford   Islat^d,    coapletlng 'launch  at  1211* 

Ti'9  ".  was  nbout  to  anter  the   swept  ohannel   to  th« 

ex.'r«nce   >•    -  ^     •    re  'ere  raoeiveu   not    to  enter  and   to  renala 
to   southward.      T!  e  forca  proceeded  southward  and  westward   .jitil 

14r^0  vfhen   tie  approach   to   enter  was   oonnenced   at  25  knots. 

At  ICiil   0    plane  on  patrol    Lndloated  a   subnarine  about  2 

rjIIks  to   eastward  of  Ll:.7.II  rjTD.'  »     Destroyers  dropped   6  depth 

cr^r   as    in   tl  is  area  while  IJ»XIJ;oTO?I   oor.tlnu«d  at  S5  knots    to 
eiitrpinoe. 

.'it   1549  pnssed   entr' nee  buo/  to  Pearl  llarbor,    proceeded   Id 
Jerth    y-9  w^rere   oonpleted   noor,      crt   aide   to   nt   If. r^3. 

;t   1930  a   subnnrine   alarni  In   harbor  Caused    some  disturbance 
out    lo.?Istie  refuellr.;-,    -ind   re-plenlalin,^  ?nsoline   tanks,   and 
rev  iotunlllr.  -    oontlr.u*' 1 . 


f.liI)ERlCK    C.    ;:rEKliAK, 
Ctptaln.  V.O,   f-avy, 
Comr-.andlng 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2131 


UMH  1'   SI  \!l  N   i   Vv  II  It     t  i  M  I 


SECRET 


At  i:.. 
pre«9ui-a    on   ..A- 

7^x ;■  ■• 

:..ei 


3  -se 


■rt    rtvei, f orce- 


in, f^ 
or  t  ..-  LI.:.; 

3£  ^ 

Shi,  .     . 

to    font  T:^3k   Force 


:  ,    1  -ir.dedi   u  .  ,-1 

t3    Ircluded  , 

'  '745   wh«ji    u.^e 

i ng  Shi pa 


IICDIAi;. 
ooiv.a- 

rORTL-..X' 


.    h'ewtur; ,    USN) 


1] 


2132     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


UNITED  blATtS  HACiflC    FLtET 
AIRCRAFT    BATTLE  FORCE 

U     S    ^     I  tXIN  ,roN 


I-;41 


Cor.tinued    •«-»*» •^a t  "n,-  v.lrh   T-    v    -^orce 
t.^    the  aouthwenlvv  .  I.   from  o;jl  .      .cronr  •■■<.'  '    e      t 

with    interRlttent  rain   e^iuails   snii  vflrlp:  .  .         t 

0618   Inucched    1?  "S  •   to    seorcJ.   the  aerai-f.r  •;  •    - 

forxnation   to   •»   distnnce  of   IOC  r.lles   Letveer 
and  330O. 

At   0757   n    contact    re.  irt    -m.:    recelve'l    r-    ■ 
Ensi'^c   Wittier   pilot,    that   eneiay   cnrrier   bore   '10"   l:      •_ 
95  .T'iles  from  tie  0745    porltion  of    ;.olnt   o^tl'  . .      'o 
aaiplifyirwr   reports  were   receied   and    it  w  '.e 

in   oontact   had    been    ::yot   down.      A.t   0.*;13    "1 
patrol  and  at  0924    launched  Bttflifik   ^^roup    - 
7  \T   'inc'    13  VT.      \'    093"    landed  2"j£   ^ni    ': 
course  about  205  at  very   slow  speed.  .  iio* 

lb,    bombs   but    outh   niissed.      The    po-sitior  •  ' 

Lonfltude   165O-10":.   Furtl  er    luestioninr  - 

vvB  ro   "nti-aircrr.ft   fire   tl.at  nc    ixr'  tl 

s^lp   seemed   dead    in   tl.e  water.      it  v.f  e 

olrjert   rej.>orted  was    probnbly   a   bT'-e    "  it 

reported   Adrift  or.   Decenjber  6,    3-"      -  of   tie 

oor.tpct  .      ■?-'■■■   attack   <?Toup   failei:  ject, 

returne      -.  .d    wi^,   recovered  at    13'  roup  of    10 

YZ'l  'Are^-e    :    ^r.cheil   to   locate    Iho    c    ,    -  ;■    cont-jnt e'!    but 

wer<=     ."•  ■  Ir;    to   1   r-'  '.e    '.t.      A   f'r.'Tfr    > 
'.!:'*■'    i  ■•-  ',    V  o   1'.    ..^-.iv.'j    -er:   "r-'^rj-  '      ■ 

diute   air    -^atrol    ^ro'i  j.;jOO   unt :  l    :  t 


rpon   eontnct   the  NKOi;  C   had   been  oruerec 
courrte  .";40<^  '  t   V3   kiiOtrs   \-*  -lo   ■'-'^  e  ron'^in-'er 
uper'Bitft.    on   e^'  ..tL''   *in!,l  sou-warlv   courses.      ..   coirt^e   to 
the  K£0  :;  0  wf  R    *,iken  at  120  ki.uti'. 


••^'i 


FRSD^RIC:'. 
i;a?t«>  i:  ,  ' 
Cot  and  ii.. 


H 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOIXT   COMMITTEE  2133 


i!LRK7 


we.' 


08S0    ^-1  'T'  ';  :  r.e-Fn    e  ■  o.  :  •  i 

VmsilO.  :   wa?  adviped      ha  j"e   P.IV' 

41   nlles.  10   VS-   took    j  ...ate   air 

At    !,.<.  0    laur,c;.:)a   If   VS.  ■    -c;.   a    ?.f.C^    - 

ffiile.'»  for    •  ;,e   :;.-X>Si:0.      a*    1"1''    landed    ••■ 
re:^orteJ   no    y-i  ■).■!    oi"   !:n   !;0, 


Deoenber   l?--.    l.---.! 

Con' l'^:'-"^   ■^'ith   7n?k   Fcc^     I    V.:;    'ov.a    d    po-!-'-*-   <-'»(rd. 
At   061S    -  ,  HCTtO   on      .  .--m   bea:'ln  ■   01  I-IO 

launch-.^    .  '.o    searo'.  r.    pen.l-ciT-rl  "n 

'--©arlngs   l-O''-'   and   260*^  -"'00    "ook   courr-e   llO'' 

into   wina    Vor   fuelin'   a:.  cr-    •■  lor. -ri 'lo 

Btarboard    •  I  j.9   for   fviall-.    .      ;.•    O..'' 
and    '.'Ok  In'emedia'e   al"   -a'rol.      .x      1      ■     1 

a  f    iu  I  u rxae  i^  i  e     ■    "  '  •■      f;    -    "  . «  -  . 

100  .'•.11 8  F  re 
took  ; laoe  < 
caet   o   r   "^  a \ 

patrol    ■*f\-=    :  .         . 

Ja?ane.«f-  a.i   o   c  -   iu -.      a    in    ■ 

inland  La'    a  "Yokal.nna"  ■  JOO 

t-cn  „V  •        .  at  .  ut a -•'•-■•'.  .    '•  -    « 

Lave  bee        .;d;  -^o' 
at  Jalai        ;i  - 
and  CarDiv  ix  ,,  oi^     .       ";  •  -''.I'". 


.  -.avy, 


2134    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


*•  "   ■        AIRCRAFT     RAT  i 

aiCRgr 

Laoaii.  b«r   l'>.    1941 

Continued   Alti.  Taar.    yorct    ilEVai  vaatward   from 

liawailtii.   lil^nd*.      Lau.-.c.  ed   11  VoI>   to  .e    ««8terQ 

»«j:.i.-clrcle   to   300      11     ■  ^  reHfter  i\nin'viiiiied   Intenaedlate 

air   itatrol.      At   •an:'  took   cuurae   100°   Into  wind 

wl'.lia   PORTWfD  flu*  C    ICAGG    refuJed    froir    MXjSP.C  .      At    1300 
launched   12  VSH  tn   search   t!  e  weatam  aard-clrcl  e   to   icO  milea. 
Thtf  r  ad  Ionian   ui    nne    plare  re.jrted   aighting.  w^^t    iie  ti.cxitht   waa 
a   strance   jlune    In   1  itltude   7*^-L0«.  K,   Longitude   170°-50«    W.     At 
14D0   zone    ;  laa   11    tlma  on  c-iuraa   about   255°.     T'lls    report   was 
unco-xflmied   by  the   pilot  and  was  conaidered  unreliable.     At 
1553  dlacortinued  air   patrols   af.d    landed   all   ;.  lunes.      At   2C30 
refueling   of    tb.e    forcb   havlutj  boen  coiLpleted,   jroceeded    to 
west-8out!.westwhrd   at    17   i.nota;    :,E0S}10   left    rr,rr..ation. 

Received  '*brnln<j  as  to   fishing  veaaela  rendering  aii  to 
eueny   forces,   with  dlreotioxia  to  oia.i.ine,    del^e   or   alr.k  veaaela 
entagir.^    ir.    such   activities,      A  ceasage   was  received   t:.hit   Task 
?oroe   SIGHT    (iKTSRPHI^)    left   Pearl   liarLor   at    1000   to   /roceed 
to  westward  of  Jojyiston  Island  as  a    support   group, 

FRliDERICi:  C.   ^.:SRi-^, 
Csptuin,   L.^.   wavy. 
Coi;^.->andixig, 

Decen.ber   ^0.    1941 

Contiauad   v«i.tf.  Tuak   Force   ELEVSN  ]  rooeedlng  to  west 
south,  est    for   conducting  raid  on  Jaianese   fjroea   in  karsLull 
■..  j/or  ailuert    Islands.      At   0616  launched    !      vs„«  t^^   search    to 

rd   between    uearint^s   li>C      to   330    ,  .i.es,    ai.d  to    -.ct 

.:-e4i.te  ,ir  iutrcl.  At  1340  lu  ..  .i  .:terr...jn  fiit^iit 
«dinte  bir  latrul  tuiU  ascircu  of  iu9  v.e8L«rn 
..iiea. 

At    1600   a   2;e33at;e    :  Force   LIEVEN 

;n-;.:    -.^.A      \»    Inteutioj.^    .  .   v ,-.,'. .    ....I   „.c«ok   plan   "A"   at   0500 

.a   on   Londay,    2*;   Dacecber   1941.      This   involved 
i'anesfc    foroes   tit  Eakin   and  Tarawa   Islands   by 

iJ.^Ii.-ii'Vi.  ^i;-   virovir.      .-.•  orders  vvere  received  ti.at   preaent 


SBC RET 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2135 


UNHtU  SIATLS  I'ACIHl    H  (LI 
AIRCRAFT    BAini    I  JHCL 

U.b.3.    LEklNGTON    nUi   DxARY 


Peoer.Ver    .,0.    l.<41 


mission   •.*«8   cancelled    and    t\at    present      tt  ick    orde-      ..  ^-,<  1.0 
longer   in  effect.      A  later  despfito!!   adviswd   that   ClncPac 
reported   strong  air   reinforcbn.ent«  possiti^   Inoiudi.v  two 
carriers  were   being  sent    to    the  Larshulls;    tiiat.    the    ^oagiMllti 
of   surprise  attack   ty   tl.ls   force  was  iniprobable ,   and    t.iat 
CinoPac   ^ad  directed   t  .is   force   to   proceed  to  a  position  to 
support   Task  Force  roURTEEK    (S.-AATOOAJ^ . 

The   afternoon  searoii  group  was   recovered    at    i7b4.      Fleet 
oo^rBe  was   set  350''(T)    speed  16  Icnots  at   173f).     Chaiiged  clocks 
to  zone  plus  12  time  at  1900, 

rSEDKRICK  C. 

Captal;  ,    '".■..    Nmvv, 
Coffina;     ,  ,     . 

Decer.ber   21.    1:11 

Continued  with  Task  Force   ElEVSJ,"  to   north-northweatward 
to   reach  a   posit  lor.    to   «<u|>rort   Tnsk  Force   FvL"RTE]^c . 

Weather   at    i&w:     ■     ■    ..nguil-ible    fo,- 
usual   15C  E-ile   searo..    ..  ,3  r.odified   to 
patrol  wiiich  was  niair.tained  t'-roughout 


}-r;derick  C. 

Cocj-iandi^ 


2136    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


UNIICD  STATtb  H\CIHC    H-EET  ^ 

AIRCRAFT    BATTLE"  FORCE 

U     '- 

.    .    .  :^Lai:^-. 

GECP.irr 

Continued   uS   tetzTO.      k>    '  400   <■.    n.e8Stii,;e    fro:..  Cor;.i»axider-iD- 
.    iaoific   edvised      -^r  •-  ttacked   by  carrier  type 

;rt   at    13  X   on  Decc:    -  i         .  0544   fleet   courae  was  cuaxv;e<l 

rro;-  o:-t>"  to  297°  t:rA  speed  was  iiicreaaed  to  IP  knots.  At  0622  ;^ 
twelve  VoL  were  launched  to  3e£:.rc;i  the  -Aeaferri  aerdi-circle  to  > 
It'    r.jles,    results   recative. 

At    0€!5C   a   r  ea3H<?«  wag   recelTOd   f]?or    the   Tusk   Force 
Conaandor  t!:at    the   Force   wiia  directed  to  retire  toward  Tearl. 
Upon  tLe   return  of  the   forenoon  search  group  at   1000  the  Force 
rd  course  to  004°  heading   for  a   rendezvous  with  the   force 
.  ,    t.:.u;,;:0,    and   escort  WOPJ)EN,    in   latitude   leO-OO*    N. 
io;.,  :?.  ide    !'■    0-00'   W. 

A  sii  jluno  co'ubat   patrol   was  2iaintalned   between  1030  and 
1400.     At   1340  twelve  V3B  were   launched  to   search   the   northern 
se/i.i-clrcle  to  IL"   -lies.     These  returned  and  were   landed  at 
1700,   results  of   search:    NEOSHO  and  WORDEi;  located   to  ZNE, 


FREDIRICK  C.    3;:KRliAK, 
Captalfi,    'J.>.    lavy, 
Co.-'.:  andlng 


y 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2137 


UNlUD  biAll 

•  M„IFIC    fLtET 

AIR.  '    •' 

ML  FORCE 

•  'N-   li^N 

JSCUE^' 


1941 


Coi'.tinvied   'vitli    Msk   }•    rce    ;:     "."     t.-    no:  * 

rendezvous  wlt'r.   ?']*■•.  i    T^rker,    '        ■   ^ ,       .'-   Cf  1 

VS"<   for    seHTC)  ,    f ir-  •                           '^T.C   repo:*-    '  •'''•en    t. 

cover    tie   noTtycrr.    -                          •  .   10'    mil      ,  rrturi 


- •  -              1100 

v.''r  ;   "'■•■■Inr,   V"v;l'!      '  •  ■.    ■'-■    -f        left,    c^arT'e'i  vO    C7C° 

to   In.unch   nnd    lar.d    :1    :"    .      _    ...c'.ed   0   '■'  j'.i  >  edJate 

".nd   '"   7T  a<?    inner  nir    .'itrol    nul    landed    the        .  ■'enrch 

•lid  f^»itrol   '^•rou;;.      At    1.00   ta-llne    to   .'-".^031''  '  ;p   to 
ro'.i  -^  Vr^ather.      Dl;ico;.t '.  irued    effort.!   to    ref  -     • 

At   i:51C   received  report    that  rlnne   ;: -16    ,-a.    cr-iFl- 
about    fourteen  nilen   to   r.orth   of   LIT'IiriT'  . 

(Jfc')    J.    A.    Davis,    jr.,    ".. ).!.'.    and  :ki  ?,?-«;.'■(.  ■■ 

R.M.3c,,    r.r.!.'.,    were   not    .ti"'     •  «' ■  "» 

-sank.      Tosition  of  cms!    l.st  :  *  -4;"      .    ; 

177'"-22'    v..       Accompan  •  I:  -•    :  "  ••  i-    ret    i 

2 '16    -,  pg    testing    it?    -     -'  :"\ 

on   3   i.  ive  ;    t^  at   n;    •<:■  . ,  1  - 

tre    w-ter.      The   plar -^  t.ir    t  <-;  ck    ■ 

nJnutej    ••'*>,   no    r:'~r  occuvnr 

with   i  ..  •      ;  ,ii(  'j11    si  Of.. 

crash,    foimd   i.othiap   ani  ; -ration. 


*  ,    - '  ■ 

'■-t. 

;t, 

itude 

orte.^ 

that 

-f^r 

-hed 

•    fe 

At    1400    r.tit   Flee 


o 


Laurohed   8  VS.:  for    inter:  ^rd    r"   "'  -.trcl, 

".r.d    at   1440   l-nc'"      ■  ' 

At    1640    landed    af  terr.o!.':  '  ;  . 


FREDERICK    C.    ::!:K^:.'Al. , 
'Captain  ,    ".  ' .    *'rv;-  , 

Corrriard  ' :     . 


79716  O — 46 — pt.  16 15 


2138    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-"h  .'^  .k 

J :     a  sic   : 

L9»nch>icl  12   VSt',   I'or   reerc!.  o.     jlrcul'.  niler    fror 

firtev   ce:.:,er.     La-xricl-.j:   )i:.  .      &;:.',6ir.  air 

.fti'rol   *  .'.rouf'hou'    •;..'  -ar.e -e    'c  .-f    afer 

.T.alr  no  or  on  ^1   ahb.  -.  >-..aiie    .  o   an 

Of"tiffi.a*ed   30   kr.o'a.      Flee      coL.r.'«   0-:  elr.- 

•Qinfcd.      A"    1000  launc:.ed  :    '.T  sf   Ir.  1 

h.-.  >  lat.  ded  .'.orriir.  •    EearcJ.     r.u    .      /%•    1:  do/,   ar. 

ev-i>^ln-    JO  ».  re    ^o    ".he   rou'r.    for   4  ril'  or'ed 

s   ..r.eri-od  o    jecl   loca'ei  ;.,      bu.  er^o:. '.  -c  1 

.■^•iarcJ.oc  v.i'',  no.-a"  Ive    "eB-i'.p.     Ar    1  ¥3. 

for  seercl.  of   clrc-ilar  area   'o   IOC  z.L  a: 

A     IvOC    •  ;.e   force   r.ook  ar.   evj;.        co  .  • 

4  r.iles   w.er.  i  il.XI'S  repor'ei    ;  .     .f:r- f^ 

F.;er?orilc.      Inner  air  jatrol    ^enrr^.T  : 

s.'narlrie.      «•    IVuO   landed   •  r.e   aT'err  1 


\    i 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  2139 

...  i.:i:xi!/v:x)r;   .a  ,  di  .  .t 

SJSCRET 

^cd:.:.ar    25.    1j41 

As  before   cruslni'  wl;..    .apk  Jforce 
085°   af  •»  roachin..:  Jt  oorl  Harbor.      At    0:-30    re        io    r  -      o 
plus  11    t-lne.      At   06';4  launched  12   VSB  to    ."ua;-  .  a    jir 
area   to   100  r.iles.      At    1022   a  PbY  v,a«  ?i  -^  '  el   10  •  11    f 
weptwar-:      r,         -lUf'   from   sou'h    '.-o   rior'L .        air.'al;.    i   v.. 
Internie-lia*  e   ai-  va'.rol   usin;-   VF   fron  1030    'o    1''00.      I^ 
iearch  grou;    a'    1100.      A  meppare   fror.  Cor.r.an.dGr-lr.- 
OpNav  war    In'erce    'ed  anno'aiij  Ir,  •    '  .\e   a- rival  of   r.e" 
C,  V.'.   Nini'z.  a*    .    arl  ilarbor.      At   lb4'J.   took  evr 
4  sllef   no'.,   dui.    'o    a   pw.  or  r   nic.   cor.'ac*    r-j  or 
At   1830   flee'    co.-rpe   v.ap   c':ian^.-i;;  :i    'o   110°. 


frsdsri:k 

C  a .  ■  a  i  r. ,    l 
vO:.    •■  .    1:. 


2140     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  105 

SECRET 

Paeaphbase  of  Code  Cablegram  Received  at  the  War  Department  at 
14:33,  October  21,  1941. 

London.    Filed  19 :20,  October  21, 1941. 

JAPAN 

1.  It  is  thought  that  Japan  will  not  advance  southward,  except  possibly  into 
Thailand,  because  of  the  danger  of  becoming  embroiled  with  the  United  States 
and  Britain,  especially  in  view  of  the  tirm  stand  taken  by  the  U.  S.  However, 
Japanese  troops  will  be  strengthened  in  Indo-China  as  follows :  36,000  there 
now ;  an  estimated  20,000  enroute,  and  an  additional  20,000  included  in  Jap- 
anese   plans. 

2.  Agreement  among  all  previously  divergent  opinions  in  the  army  and 
navy  in  order  to  make  certain  of  their  assistance  in  any  future  projects 
launched  is  one  aim  of  the  new  cabinet,  which  is  unquestionably  geared  for 
war.  The  new  Premier  is  wholly  pro-German.  It  is  believed  that  the  Japs 
will  advance  on  Vladiavostok  and  the  Maritime  Provinces  the  minute  Soviet 
disintegration  appears  imminent.  In  the  mean  time,  speeches  by  the  new 
cabinet  should  be  viewed  as  obscuring  their  real  intent.  The  Russians  are 
still  believed  stronger  in  Siberia  in  spite  of  possible  transfers  of  troops  to  the 
other  theaters,  but  the  Maritimes  and  Vladiavostok  unquestionably  could  be 
captured  by  the  Japs. 

3.  The  above  comments  were  received  from  the  Chief  of  the  British  Far 
East    Intelligence. 

RUSSIAN     theater 

1.  The  head  of  the  British  Mission  is  now  stranded  in  Kuibishev  and  is  not 
well  in  touch  with  the  situation. 

2.  Budyenny  is  apparently  relieved  of  command  in  the  Ukraine  if  news  that 
Marshal  Kulik  has  been  made  commander  at  Rostov  is  true. 

3.  The  Germans  have  extended  their  front  approximately  12  miles  north 
of  Taganrog.  An  advance  from  Kalinin  toward  the  north  has  been  begun 
by  the  Germans,  possibly  directed  at  Vologda  and  the  railroad  running  south 
from  Archangel,  according  to  dependable  secret  reports.  Otherwise,  there  are 
no  important  developments  in  this  theater  which  have  been  verified  by  British 
official    sources. 

4.  The  above  cable  is  for  General  Miles'  personal  attention. 

Lee. 
I.  B.  #5,  10/22/41. 
Distribution : 

Under  Secretary  of  War  State  Department  (2) 

Assistant  Secretary  of  War  for  Air  Director  of  Naval  Intelligence  (2) 

Assistant  Secretary  of  War  Record    Section 

Chief  of  the  Air  Corps  (3)  Section    File 

Chief  of  the  Army  Air  Forces  Situation    Section 

A.  C.  of  S.,  G-3  EE 

A.  C.  of  S.,  WPD  CB 

G.  H.  Q.  FE 


Paraphrase  of  Code  Radiogram  Receivho  at  the  War  Department  at  14 :  09 

NOVEMBBai  9,  1941 

London,  November  9,  1941  (filed  5:  lOp)   (1045) 

The  most  likely  spot  where  Japanese  may  be  expected  to  strike  is  in  the 
Netherlands  East  Indies.  This  opinion,  from  the  British  Ambassador  to  Tokyo, 
holds  that  as  Japan  already  controls  what  she  needs  of  the  resources  of  French 
Indo-China  and  Thailand  she  will  not  proceed  against  the  latter  country.  To 
attack  British  Malaya  would  be  a  difficult  operation  and  the  rumored  Burma 
Road  drive  would  also  be  too  much  of  an  effort.  The  Netherlands  East  Indies 
could  be  assaulted  secretly  from  the  Mandated  Island,  and  would  provide  the 
oil  which  Japan  needs.     The  source  reverses  his  previous  view  and  now  believes 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2141 

Japan  no  longer  feels  that  she  must  make  every  effort  to  avoid  war  with  the 
United  States  and  this  contemplated  <)i)eration  would  confront  the  United  States 
and  the  British  with  an  accomplished  fact. 

Lee. 

IB  #4  11/10/41 
Distribution : 

Secretary  of  War  China  Mission 

Under  Secretary  of  War  Office  of  Lend-Lease  Administrator 

Assistant  Secretary  of  War  G.  H.  Q. 

Assistant  Secretary  of  War  for  Air  State  Department 

Mr.  Lauchlin  Carrie  Chief  of  the  Air  Corps 

Chief  of  the  Army  Air  Forces  Situation  Section 

Director  of  Naval  Intelligence  British  Empire  Section 

Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  (J-3.  Far  Eastern  Section 

Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  WPD 


G-2  Comment  on  November  9  Cable  From  London 
(IB   #4     11/10/41) 

1.  Gr-2  is  of  the  opinion  that  while  an  attack  on  the  Netherlands  East  Indies 
is  a  possibility,  it  is  by  no  means  probable  in  view  of:  (1)  the  action  to  be 
expected  of  the  United  States  and  Britain  before  even  a  surprise  attack  could 
be  driven  home:  (2)  the  great  danger  to  Japan  of  trying  to  by-pass  the  Philip- 
pines and  Singapore:  (3)  the  knowledge  Japanese  uuist  have  that  the  Dutch 
have  prepared  their  oil  installations  for  immediate  demolition,  so  that  it  would 
be  a  year  or  more  before  they  could  get  the  oil  anyway. 

2.  It  is  significant  that  the  Ambassador  has  reversed  his  former  view  and  no 
longer  believes  that  Japan  will  do  everything  possible  to  prevent  war  with  the 
United  States.     Such  a  development  is  not  unexi^ected. 


Paraphrase  of  Code  Radiogram  Received  at  the  Wak  Department  at  22 :  42, 

November  21,  1941 

London,  November  21,  1941  (tiled  0045  p.  m.) 

In  order  that  the  source  may  be  protected  do  not  reveal  to  the  British  that 
you  have  received  the  following  information. 

The  estimate  given  below  represents  the  con.sensus  of  all  British  intelligence 
services  as  to  Japan,  on  the  basis  of  all  information  availabli?  up  to  November 
18: 

Whether  or  not  the  government  at  Tokyo  has  decided  once  and  for  all  to  take 
the  chance  of  war  with  America  and  (Jreat  Britain  is  still  n(»t  certain,  but 
Japan's  economic  situatitm  is  making  it  necessary  to  cinne  to  such  a  decision. 
By  initiating  the  present  talk,  Japan  had  hopes  of  discovering  some  soluti<m  to  the 
problem.  Now  that  she  has  sent  her  special  envoy,  the  conversations  are  com- 
ing to  a  head  and  the  chances  are  that  she  will  make  a  basic  decision  of  the 
policy  she  will  follow. 

As  things  stand  now,  the  only  action  .she  can  take  without  danger  of  war 
with  America  and  Great  Britain  is  to  settle  the  China  incident  and  her  alterna- 
tives here  are  (1)  block  the  Burma  Road;  (2)  come  to  a  peaceful  .settlenient 
with  Chungking.  Fr(»m  the  best  available  information  at  present,  it  does  not 
appear  probable  that  Japan  will  launch  an  offensive  against  the  Burma  Road. 

In  the  event  the  current  talks  come  to  nothing  and  if  .she  then  makes  a  deci- 
sion to  go  ahead  without  regard  to  the  con.sequences  of  war  with  the  ABD 
powers,  Japan  has  the  altei-natives  of  offensives  against  (1)  Thailand.  The  tin 
and  rubber  producing  areas  are  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Kra  Isthmus  which  would 
no  doubt  be  defended  by  the  British  so  that  economically,  Japan  would  not  get 
much  by  occupying  Thailand,  and  she  stands  to  lose  much  of  what  she  is  already 
getting  from  that  country. 

(2)  Malaya.  Japan  will'certainly  occupy  Thailand  before  attacking  Malaya, 
but  any  drive  on  the  latter  country  would  certainly  involve  Japan  in  war  with 
Great  Britain  and  very  likely  with  America  also. 


2142     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(3)  Netherlands  East  Indies.  It  is  estimated  that  Japan  has  enough  oil 
supplies  to  last  for  only  nine  to  twelve  months  of  large  scale  operations,  so  that 
seizure  of  the  Netherlands  East  Indies  would  solve  a  most  urgent  problem  for 
her.  But  such  a  move  would  not  be  sound  naval  strategy  and  furthermore 
Japan  must  know  any  such  attack  would  bring  on  war  with  America  and  Great 
Britain.  The  British  believe  Japan  would  occupy  Thailand  before  moving  on 
Netherlands  Borneo  anyway. 

(4)  Soviet  Siberia.  Here  the  main  consideration  is  that  Japan  is  not  yet 
strong  enough  to  start  an  attack  which  would  undoubtedly  cost  her  plenty  in 
casualties  and  materiel,  and  might  take  a  long  time.  In  spite  of  her  offensive 
preparations,  including  increa.se  of  troops  in  this  area  from  eleven  to  29 
divisions,  Japan  will  probably  not  attack  the  Maritime  Provinces  unless  and 
until  Russian  strength  is  considerably  diminished  there. 

The  estimate  concludes  that : 

(1)  In  the  event  of  failure  of  her  last  attempt  to  get  America  to  come  to  a 
general  agreement,  Japan  will  have  to  make  up  her  mind  as  to  whether  she 
should  chance  the  war  which  would  likely  follow  further  aggressive  action  on 
her  part ; 

(2)  Japan  will  probably  not  attack  Siberia  at  pre.sent ;  she  will  wait  until 
Soviet  strength  is  decreased  ; 

(3)  Japan  will  continue  the  war  with  China  except  in  the  event  of  a 
general  agreement  with  the  United  States ; 

(4)  Japan's  movement  of  troops  from  Tongking  to  the  south  indicates  that 
she  does  not  intend  at  present  to  try  cutting  the  Burma  Road ; 

(G)  From  the  Japanese  viewpoint,  her  best  move,  the  one  with  least  chance  of 
bringing  on  a  general  war,  would  probably  be  occupation  of  Thailand.  Securing 
bases  in  Siam  would  al.so  pave  the  way  for  later  movement  against  Malaya 
or  the  Netherlands  East  Indies.  Furthermore,  a  Japanese  drive  into  Thailand 
is  indicated  by  her  recent  movements. 

Lee. 

IB  #18  4  :  15P    11/21/41 
Distribution : 

Assistant  Secretary  of  War  State  Department 

Assistant  Secretary  of  War  for  Air  Mr.  Lauchlin  Currie 

Chief  of  the  Army  Air  Forces  Office  of  Lend-Lease  Administrator, 

Chief  of  the  Air  Corps  O.  E.  M. 

Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-3  Director  of  Naval  Intelligence 

Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  WPD  Situation  Section 

G.  H.  Q.  Air  Section 

4th  Army  British  Empire  Section 

China  Mission  Far  Eastern  Section. 

[Pencilled  notation  :]  Return  to  C  of  S.     HLS. 

[Pencilled  notation  :]   To  Secretary  of  War.     GCM. 

British  Embassy  Annex, 
Ohservatory  Circle,  Washington,  D.  C,  22nd  November,  1941. 

Subject : — Japanese  Intentions. 

Sir:  The  Joint  Staff  Mission  has  received  from  the  British  Chief  of  Staff  the 
following  telegraphic  summary  of  an  estimate  by  the  Joint  Intelligence  Committee 
in  London  of  Japan's  probable  intentions. 

We  are  instructed  to  invite  you  to  draw  the  attention  of  the  United  States 
Chief  of  Staff  and  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  to  this  appreciation. 
Respectfully, 

(Signed)     R.  D.  Coleiridge, 

Commander,  R.  N. 

R.  F.  G.  JAYNB, 

Major. 
Joint  Secretaries, 
British  Joint  Staff  Mission  in  Washington. 
Commander  L.  R.  MoDoweli., 

U.  8.  Secretary  for  Collaboration, 

Room  2724,  Navy  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2143 

Enclosure 
Summary  of  Estimate  by  J.  I.  C,  London,  of  Japanese  Intentions 

1.  It  is  not  certain  that  Japan  has  reached  a  decision  to  risk  conflict  with 
Britain  and  U.  S.  A.,  but  events  are  driving  her  to  early  decision.  Japan  hopes 
that  present  conversations  in  Washington  may  provide  a  way  out.  The  climax 
of  the  conversations  now  reached  by  KURUSU'S  arrival  and  fundamental  decision 
on  policy  is  likely  to  follow  their  outcome.  Meanwhile  only  course  open  to  Japan 
which  she  may  think  would  not  involve  a  risk  of  war  with  us  and  United  States 
is  to  try  to  finish  war  in  China. 

2.  To  end  China  war  Japan  must  either  make  peace  with  CHIANG-KAI-SHEK 
or  stop  his  supplies  by  cutting  BURMA  ROAD.  Two  routes  of  attack  possible. 
Shortest  is  from  TONGKING  to  KUNMING,  but  terrain  makes  this  a  very  diffi- 
out  operation.  Longer  route  westward  of  KWANSI  province  feasible  but  oper- 
ation would  take  longer  time  than  Japan  prepared  to  give.  Latest  intelligence 
indicates  that  soutliward  movement  of  forces  from  TONGKING  and  CANTON 
suggest  major  operation  against  BURMA  ROAD  unlikely  at  present. 

3.  If  Washington  conversations  fail  and  Japan  decides  to  proceed  irrespective 
of  risk  of  war  with  Britain,  U.  S.  A.  and  Netherlands  Eiist  Indies,  she  may 
attack — 

(a)  THAILAND, 

(b)  MALAYA, 

(c)  NETHERLANDS  EAST  INDIES, 

(d)  MARITIME  PROVINCES. 

4.  THAILAND.  Japan's  infiltration  into  THAILAND  and  building  of  com- 
munications in  Indo  China,  construction  of  aerodromes,  work  on  Naval  base 
at  CAMRANH  BAY,  indicates  preparation  for  move  into  THAILAND.  Japan 
would  consider  this  move  least  likely  to  involve  action  by  ourselves  and  U.  S.  A. 
Main  strategic  advantage  only  gained  if  KRA  ISTHMUS  occupied  simultane- 
ously with  land  move  from  INDO  CHINA.  Little  economic  advantage  to  Jajmn 
in  occupation  of  THAILAND  but  object  of  attack  would  be  to  secure  important 
bases  for  further  move  south. 

5.  MALAYA.  Occupation  of  THAILAND  leads  logically  to  attack  on  MALAYA. 
This  would  be  certain  to  involve  ourselves  probably  U.  S.  A. 

6.  NETHERLANDS  EAST  INDIES.  Capture  of  Dutch  BORNEO  would  rem- 
edy Japan's  most  urgent  shortage  i.  e.  oil.  Operation  would  however  be  stra- 
tegically unsound  from  naval  point  of  view  and  Japan  would  think  it  would 
involve  conflict  with  us  and  U.  S.  A.  We  believe  attack  would  be  preceded  by 
occupation  of  THAILAND. 

7.  RUSSIAN  MARITIME  PROVINCES.  Since  beginning  of  Russian  campaign 
Japanese  forces  facing  Russia  increased  from  11  to  29  Divisions.  Only  interest 
Japan  would  have  in  attacking  Russia  would  be  the  removal  of  traditional  enemy. 
Operation  would  be  long  and  expensive  if  Russian  resistance  were  maintained. 
Japan  now  lacks  sufficient  superiority  to  make  offensive  operations  against 
Russia  probable  unless  Russian  forces  are  weakened. 

8.  CONCLUSIONS. 

(a)  Japan  will  make  last  effort  at  agreement  with  U.  S.  A.  Decision  whether 
or  not  to  take  aggressive  action  involving  major  powers  would  follow  failure 
of  conversations. 

(b)  If  such  decision  is  taken  THAILAND  will  be  first  probable  objective 
involving  least  risk  of  major  conflict.  Occupation  of  bases  in  THAILAND  includ- 
ing KRA  ISTHMUS  is  a  sound  strategic  preliminary  culminating  in  operation 
against  MALAYA  or  NETHERLANDS  EAST  INDIES.  Recent  military  move- 
ments support  opinion  that  THAILAND  is  next  objective. 

(c)  Action  against  Russia  likely  to  be  deferred  until  position  of  Russia  in  Far 
East  is  seriously  weakened. 

(d)  Operation  in  China  will  continue  in  absence  of  a  general  agreement 
with  U.  S.  A. 

(e)  Early  attack  on  BURMA  ROAD  is  unlikely  in  view  of  latest  information 
of  diversion  of  forces  southward  from  NORTHERN  INDO  CHINA  and  CANTON. 


2144     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  106 

Section  A:  Admiral  H.  R.  Stark's  Letters  to  Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel  (Pages 
2144  to  2225). 

Section  B:  Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel's  Letters  to  Admiral  H.  R.  Stark  (Pages 
2225  to  2257). 

Section  A 
Confidential 

13  January  1941. 
Deae  Mustapha  :  There  are  things  to  be  said  in  here  which  are  strictly  entre  nous 
and  therefore  I  suggest  you  destroy  this  letter  after  reading. 

I  have  given  you  a  few  days  to  let  sink  in  the  news  of  your  becoming  CinC,  U.  S. 
Fleet.  I  would  have  given  my  eye  teeth  to  have  seen  your  expression  and  to  have 
heard  your  exclamation  when  it  happened,  but  instead  I  was  just  sitting  behind 
the  scenes  congratulating  you  and  the  Navy.  I  confess  it  came  sooner  than  I 
had  anticipated  but  that  it  should  come,  I  liave  long  had  in  the  back  of  my  head 
and  while  rejoicing  with  you  I  realize  fully  the  enormous  responsibilities  placed 
on  .your  shoulders  in  one  of  the  most  critical  periods  in  our  history,  and  where  the 
Navy  more  than  any  other  branch  of  the  Government  is  likely  to  have  to  bear 
the  brunt. 

I  would  give  a  good  deal  to  sit  down  and  have  a  chat  with  you.  I  am  hoping 
J.  O.  will  turn  over  the  personal  letters  I  have  written  him.  They  give  all  the 
slants  here  that  I  know  and  they  show  the  urgency  as  I  see  it.  In  my  humble 
opinion,  we  may  wake  up  any  day  with  some  mines  deposited  on  our  front  door 
step  or  with  some  of  our  ships  bombed,  or  whatnot,  and  find  ourselves  in  another 
undeclared  war,  the  ramifications  of  which  [2]  call  for  our  strongest  and 
sanest  in*agination  and  ulans. 

I  have  told  the  Gang  here  for  months  past  that  in  my  opinion  we  were  heading 
straight  for  this  war,  that  we  would  not  assume  anything  else  and  personally  I 
do  not  see  how  we  can  avoid,  either  having  it  thrust  upon  us  or  of  our  deliber- 
ately going  in,  many  months  longer.  And  of  course  it  may  be  a  matter  of  weeks 
or  of  days.  I  would  like  to  feel' that  I  could  be  perfectly  complacent  if  some  day 
some  one  opens  the  door  of  my  ofiice  and  reports  that  the  war  is  on.  I  have  been 
moving  Heaven  and  Earth  trying  to  meet  such  a  situation  and  am  terribly  impa- 
tient at  the  slowness  with  which  things  move  here.  Even  though  I  know  much 
has  been  accomplished,  there  still  remains  much  to  be  done. 

My  estimate  of  tlie  situation — J.  O.  R.  can  give  you  this — McCrea  also  has  a 
copy — ^which  I  presented  to  the  Secretai'y  and  Rainbow  3,  both  of  which  you 
should  have,  will  give  you  fairly  clearly  my  own  thoughts.  Of  course  I  do  not 
want  to  become  involved  in  the  Pacific,  if  it  is  possible  to  avoid  it.  I  have  fought 
this  out  time  and  time  again  in  the  highest  tribunals  but  I  also  fully  realize  that 
we  may  become  involved  in  the  Pacific  and  in  the  Atlantic  at  the  same  time;  and 

to  put  it  mildly,  it  will  be  one  H of  a  job,  and  that  is  one  reason  why  I  am 

thankful  that  I  have  your  calm  judgment,  your  imagination,  your  courage,  your 
guts  and  your  head,  at  the  seagoing  end.  Also  your  can  do — rather  than 
can't. 

In  King,  I  believe  you  have  the  very  best  possible  man  to  handle  the  situation 
in  the  Atlantic  and  that  we  can  give  him  a  free  rein.  He  will  lick  things  into 
shape  and  he  knows  the  game  from  every  standpoint  and  of  course  in  this  war 
it  will  be  [3]  fought  from  every  standpoint.  On  the  other  side — in 
Tommy  Hart — I  feel  equally  confident. 

I  believe  in  Walter  Anderson  you  have  a  good  man  to  handle  the  Battleships 
but  I  do  not  commit  myself  one  inch  beyond  that.  Any  future  advancement 
beyond  that  position  will  depend  largely  on  your  recommendation  but  he  should 
fight  a  good  fight  right  there,  whether  or  not  he  goes  up.  It  is  unfortunate  in 
some  ways  that  we  could  not  get  the  additional  stars  and  rank  we  wanted  in  the 
Atlantic  but  we  could  not  and  consequently  the  accommodations  had  to  be  made 
in  the  Pacific.  With  this  you  are  familiar.  Of  course  Andy  feels  disappointed 
but  he  is  a  good  soldier.  However,  when  we  mentioned  the  possibility  of  his 
i-elieving  Snyder  next  June,  I  informed  him  that  I  would  not  commit  myself  and 
that  I  could  not  think  of  committing  you,  and  incidentally,  and  very  incidentally, 
and  in  all  cases,  the  White  House  finally  decides.  This,  of  course,  is  White 
House  prerogative  and  responsibility,  and  believe  me,  it  is  used  these  days. 

I  hope  Wilson  Brown  does  well.  He  is  fine  fiber,  as  you  know.  Frankly,  I 
had  some  misgivings  about  his  health  and  had  him  brought  to  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment for  a  thorough  checkup  by  the  Bureau  of  Medicine  and  Surgery.     It  is  not 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2145 

necessary  that  anybody,  beside  you,  should  know  this.  Medicine  and  Surgery 
gave  him  a  perfectly  clean  bill  of  health  but  I  do  think  he  should  be  watched 
while  under  strain  and  if  there  is  any  sign  of  his  not  being  able  to  stand  it,  he 
should  be  relieved.  Again,  I  am  giving  just  you  my  tiioughts.  The  President 
knows  that  I  initiated  this  physical  checkup  because  of  my  doubts,  but  beyond 
just  a  few  of  us,  it  is  not  known. 

[^]  What  I'eck  Snyder's  final  reactions  will  be,  I  don't  know.  We  wanted 
to  run  this  whole  schedule  differently  but  our  hand  was  forced.  I  have  always 
regarded  him  with  a  good  deal  of  admiration  because  of  a  feeling  that  above  all 
things  he  was  loyal  and  would  play  the  game  in  the  last  analysis  as  it  had  to  be 
played  and  as  you  and  I  have  to  do.     Here's  hoping. 

I  am  sending  you  Savvy  Cooke  and  I  feel  like  I  am  losing  one  of  my  arms.  That 
boy  has  one  of  the  best  brains  I  have  ever  run  into.  I  put  on  his  eflBciency  report 
that  I  would  make  him  an  Admiral  immediately,  if  I  had  the  authority  and  believe 
me,  if  he  were  one,  I  would  not  consent  to  his  going.  I  am  sending  him  to  sea 
to  protect  his  promotion  chances  and  am  sending  him  to  the  Fleet  Flagship  be- 
cause of  his  intimate  knowledge  and  personal  handiwork  in  all  that  we  have  done 
in  War  Plans  and  in  all  that  we  have  been  thinking.  I  feel  that  he  should  have 
a  year  in  command,  although  were  I  going  to  sea  myself  I  would  be  strongly  in- 
clined to  take  him  on  my  staff.  Where  we  put  him  he  should  be  available  to  you 
in  both  capacities.  His  capacity  for  work  is  almost  unlimited  and  in  addition 
to  all  his  other  fine  attributes,  I  have  formed  a  very  strong  affection  for  him,  as 
we  all  have.  He  is  just  as  likeable  as  he  can  be.  Siiould  his  ship  go  to  the  Navy 
Yard  and  you  would  like  to  keep  him  with  you  during  any  such  periods,  it  could 
be  arranged. 

I  am  also  enclosing  a  letter  to  you  which  I  wrote  to  Tommy  Hart  and  which  I 
am  pleased  to  say  he  stated  gave  him  a  clearer  picture  of  his  own  situation  than 
even  he  himself  had  formed  on  the  spot.     That  is  my  excuse  for  sending  it. 

Murphy,  who  is  on  Richardson's  staff,  has  been  with  us  on  three  different 
occasions  and  is  likewise  pretty  familiar  with         [5]         our  thoughts  back  here. 

I  have  directed  McCrea  to  stop  and  see  you  on  his  return  from  the  Philippines 
although  he  can  probably  add  little  to  what  Murphy  can  tell  you.  On  the  other 
hand  I  would  be  glad  to  have  you  have  a  long  talk  with  McCrea  that  we  may  get 
from  you  any  first-hand  material  you  w^ant  to  send. 

Nimitz  has  written  J.  O.  with  regard  to  several  matters  which  explain  them- 
selves so  there  is  no  need  for  repetition  on  my  part. 

J.  O.  has  been  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  personnel  situation.  He  knows 
that  it  has  been  one  of  my  first  thoughts  ever  since  I  have  been  there,  as  well  as 
Nimitz,  and  that  I  have  put  more  time  and  struggle  on  it  in  the  White  House  and 
on  the  Hill  than  on  any  other  one  subject. 

I  am  home  at  the  n)oment  laid  up  with  "flu"  and  have  been  busy  with  Mrs. 
Hull  a  good  share  of  the  afternoon,  it  now  being  ten  minutes  of  six  and  Charlie 
Wellborn  just  came  in  with  the  mail  so  I  will  close.  Were  I  to  write  you  volumes 
and  I  feel  like  it,  I  doubt  if  I  could  add  much  that  you  will  not  realize  without 
my  writing. 

Just  remember  that  I  consider  the  only  I'eason  for  my  being  alive  and  kicking 
at  the  present  time  is  to  do  everything  within  my  powej"  to  serve  the  Fleet,  and  I 
want  you  to  write  me  fully,  frankly,  critically,  and  just  think  out  loud  on  all 
subjects  wherein  the  Department  can  be  of  help.  Nimitz  and  I  are  absolutely  at 
one  in  our  common  desire  to  serve  and  I  wish  you  all  the  luck  in  the  wide  world. 

[6]  Finally  you  will  be  glad  to  know  that  there  is  a  great  deal  of  fine  and 

favorable  comment  on  your  selection  from  all  sides.  I  have  had  letters  from 
Admiral  Senn  and  Admiral  Craven  among  others,  not  to  mention  the  reaction 
here  in  Washington. 

Again  good  luck  and  keep  cheerful  and  God  Bless  You. 

Betty, 

You  know  how  I  believe  in  conferences — keeping  your  key  people  informed — 
taking  them  into  your  confidence,  and  thrashing  out  common  problems — no  bulk- 
heads— and  here  again,  I  know  you  will  accomplish  much. 
Again  good  luck. 

Rear  Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel,  USN, 
USS  HONOLULU, 

c/o  Postmaster  Fleet  Post  Office, 
Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H. 


2146     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Dear  Mustapha  :  The  following  Is  a  te/ephone  call  to  one  of  my  Aides  when  I 
happened  to  be  out : 

"Admiral  Train  said  that  the  Navy  Belief  has  received  no  money  from  the 
Fleet  during  the  Year  1940.    He  wondered  if  it  might  not  be  a  good  idea  for 
you,  as  President,  to  ask  CinC  whether  or  not  a  sum  may  be  expected,  in  view 
of  the  necessity  of  making  up  the  Society's  Annual  Report." 
Can  you  give  me  the  answer? 

Of  course  you  probably  have  all  the  "ins"  and  "outs"  by  this  time  of  Snyder's 
stand  with  reference  to  his  being  detached  and  on  which  he  insisted. 

It  is  over  the  dam  and  I  won't  say  anything  more  about  it. 

However,  you  have  Pye  in  his  place.  I  hope  the  change  is  an  acceptable  one  to 
you.  Personally  I  think  he  may  be  of  even  more  assistance  to  you  and  I  told 
the  President  you  might  even  want  to  keep  him  on  after  July. 

I  have  always  thought  Pye  one  of  the  soundest  strategists  we  have  and  when  I 
worked  under  him  during  my  last  cniise.  which  I  often  did  at  one  end  or  the 
other  of  the  line,  I  thought  his  handling  of  tactical  situations  outstanding.  Par- 
ticularly were  his  orders  a  model  of  clearness,  brevity  and  effectiveness. 

Who  gets  the  Battle  Force  next  .Tune  will  be  largely  dependent  upon  your 
recommendations.  Of  course  Andy  is  much  interested  but  I  told  him  flatly  that  I 
would  promise  him  nothing,  that  he  was  getting  a  great  job  where  he  was  going 
and  that  the  future  was  largely  in  the  lap  of  the  Gods  and  Admiral  Kimmel. 

It  always  sort  of  hits  me  with  a  thud  when  people  are  planning  ahead  and 
looking  for  something  in  advance  rather  than  giving  all  they  have  to  the  job 
iu  hand.  Andy  happens  to  be  one  of  those  fellows  who  does  give  all  he  has 
to  the  job  in  hand,  but  my  feeling  has  always  been  that  the  job  should  seek 
the  man  rather  than  the  reverse.  Thank  the  Lord  that  Nimitz  agrees  with  me 
and  if  people  understood  that  it  has  to  be  that  way  in  the  last  analysis,  it  would 
save  a  lot  of  corresixjndence  and  delicate  situations  here. 

One  of  the  biggest  kicks  I  got  out  of  your  present  job  was  that  it  Was  a 
complete  surprise  to  you  and  has  the  overwhelming  approval  of  the  Service. 

I  confess  my  own  job  here  was  something  I  had  not  dreamed  of.  Incidentally, 
I  told  Bloch  when  I  expected  to  stay  at  sea  and  he  was  talking  to  me  about 
getting  three  stars' or  more,  that  if  I  was  of  use  anywhere  it  would  be  another 
year  right  in  the  billet  where  I  had  trained  for  a  year,  and  as  far  as  I  was 
concerned  the  only  thing  that  should  count  was  the  best  interest  of  the  Fleet, 
that  was  also  would  be  my  best  interest,  and  that  I  would  serve  cheerfully 
anywhere  under  anybody.  That  is  the  kind  of  a  gang  I  hope  you  have  around 
you. 

Started  this  just  to  send  you  Train's  remarks  and  have  gone  into  something 
else.  Lord,  I  wish  I  could  see  you,  or  better  still,  that  I  could  be  with  you. 
I  would  take  most  any  old  job  down  to  the  lowliest  division  in  the  outfit. 

Every  good  luck  in  the  wide  world  and  "keep  cheerful." 
As  every  sincerely, 

/S/     Betty. 
Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel,  V.  S.  Navy, 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet, 

USS  PENNSYLVANIA,  , 

Fleet  Post  Office,  Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H. 


In  reply  refer  to  Initials  and  No. 

Navy  Department, 
Office  of  the  Chiep-  of  Naval  Operations, 

Washington,  29  January  1941. 

Dear  Mustapha  :  This  is  really  a  P.  S.  to  my  note  of  this  morning. 

I  just  want  to  let  you  know  I  am  pressing  all  I  can  to  take  over  the  Coast 
Guard  and  that  at  last  pressure  is  beginning  to  tell  and  I  am  hopeful  I  may 
be  able  to  after  the  Lend-Lease  Bill  is  out  of  the  road.  Please  don't  mention  this 
to  anyone  but  just  keep  it  in  the  back  of  your  head  as  one  of  those  things  which 
might  be  coming  along. 

The  above  is  incidental  to  what  I  did  want  to  tell  you  and  which  you  might 
mention  to  Bloch  and  that  is  I  have  asked  Waesche  to  exert  unusual  and  con- 
tinuing vigilance  in  searching  all  fishermen,  both  on  home  coasts  and  in  the 

islands,  under  the  guise  of  looking  for  narcotics ;  actually  to  insure  against 

any  secreted  Japanese  mines. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  2147 

Am  still  fighting  for  personnel — I  shouldn't  have  to — but  I  am — 
When  I  think  what  I  have  to  go  through  for  almost  every  additional  man 
for  the  Navy — and  the  Army  building  up  to  IVa  millions — it  just  doesn't  make 
sense — 

/S/     Betty. 
Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel,  £7iSA', 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet, 
V8S  PENNSYLVANIA, 

Fleet  Post  Office,  Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H. 


Navy  Department, 
OflBee  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Washington,  30  January  1941. 
Dear  Kimmel  :  Take  it  for  vi'hat  it  is  worth. 
Copies  also  to  Admiral  Bloch,  Blakeley,  Hepburn,  Freeman,  King,  Hart. 


KD 

Tokyo 

Dated  January  28,  1941 
Rec'd.  7 :  10  a.  m. 
Secretary  of  State, 
Washitigtoti, 

131,  January  28,  8  p.  m. 
Press  reports  radio  address  yesterday  afternoon  over  station  JOAK  to  Japa- 
nese in  North  America  by  Admiral  Nobucasa  Suetsugu.  Concluding  sentence 
quoted  as  follows:  "Japan  dislikes  war  but  if  United  States  persists  in  its  mis- 
understanding Japan  is  fully  prepared.  I  ask  all  of  you  as  Japanese  subjects  to 
serve  the  country  in  your  various  positions." 

Grew. 
TFV 


Secret 

In  reply  refer  to  Initials  and  No. 

Navy  Department, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Washington,  10  February  1941. 

Dear  Kimmel  :  Thank  God  for  Sundays.  It  is  my  only  day  for  quiet  study  and 
work,  and  even  then  I  have  to  kick  somebody  out  of  the  office,  because  they  long 
since  have  learned  my  habits. 

First  I  want  to  congratulate  you  and  J.  O.  on  your  perfectly  splendid  letter  of 
28  January,  serial  0140.  It  is  extremely  helpful  to  us  all  and  I  hope  you  will 
continue  in  future  communications  of  our  similar  searching  analyses.  Just  for  a 
moment  refresh  on  your  paragraph  3 ;  and  permit  me  to  say  "check  and  double 
check." 

I  continue  in  every  way  I  possibly  can  to  fight  commitments  or  dispositions  that 
would  involve  us  on  two  fronts  and  to  keep  from  sending  more  combatant  ships 
to  the  Far  East.  I  had  a  two  hour  struggle  (please  keep  this  absolutely  secret) 
in  the  White  House  this  past  week  and  thank  God  can  report  that  the  President 
still  supports  my  contentions.  You  may  be  amused  to  know  that  the  Secretary  of 
War,  Colonel  Stimson,  has  been  of  very  great  assistance  to  me  in  this  connection 
in  recent  conferences.  Mr.  Hull  never  lets  go  in  the  contrary  view  and  having 
fought  it  so  many  times  I  confess  to  having  used  a  little  more  vehemence  and  a 
little  stronger  language  than  was  becoming  in  fighting  it  out  this  last  week  for 
the  nth  time.  Present  were  the  President,  Stimson,  Knox,  Marshall  and  myself. 
I  mention  this  just  to  show  you  that  the  fight  is  always  on  and  tiiat  some  day 
•  I  might  get  upset.  But  thank  God.  to  date  at  least,  the  President  has  and  con- 
tinues to  see  it  my  way. 

Here's  hoping.  Replies  to  your  letter  of  the  28th  (0140)  and  to  J.  O.'s  letter 
of  the  25th  (0129)  are  just  signed. 

I  continue  to  press  Marshall  to  reinforce  Oahu  and  elsewhere.  You  now  know 
that  he  is  sending  out  81  fighters  to  Oahu,  which  will  give  that  place  .")0  fairly  good 
ones  and  50  of  the  latest  type.  I  jumped  to  give  him  the  transportation  for  them 
in  carriers  when  he  requested  it.  I  hope  too,  you  will  get  the  Marines  to  Midway, 
Johnson  and  Palmyra,  as  soon  as  you  can.     They  may  have  to  rough  it  for  a  time 


2148     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

until  barracks  are  built,  and  the  water  suppo,  if  inadequate,  will  have  to  be 
urovided  somehow  just  like  it  would  be  if  ♦^hey  hod  captured  an  enemy  atoll. 

Speaking  of  Marshall,  he  is  a^  tower  of  strength  to  us  all,  and  I  couldn't 
conceive  of  a  happier  relationship  than  exists  between  him  and  me.  He  will  go 
to  almost  any  length  possible  to  help  us  out  and  sometimes  contrary  to  his  own 
advisors. 

I  am  struggling,  and  I  use  the  word  advisedly,  every  time  I  get  in  the  White 
House,  which  is  rather  frequent,  for  additional  men.  It  should  not  be  necessary 
and  while  I  have  made  the  case  just  as  obvious  as  I  possible  could,  the  President 
just  has  his  own  ideas  about  men.  I  usually  tinally  get  my  way  but  the  cost  of 
effort  is  very  great  and  of  course  worth  it.  I  feel  that  I  could  go  on  the  Hill 
this  minute  and  get  all  the  men  I  want  if  I  could  just  get  the  green  light  from 
the  White  House.  As  a  matter  of  fact  what  we  now  have,  was  obtained  by  my 
finally  asking  the  President's  permission  to  go  on  the  Hill  and  state  our  needs 
as  I  saw  them  at  that  time  and  his  reply  was  "go  ahead,  I  won't  veto  anything 
they  agree  to".  However,  the  struggle  is  starting  all  over  again  and  just  remem- 
ber we  are  going  the  limit,  but  I  cannot  guarantee  the  outcome. 

Regarding  the  MK  VI  Mod  I  Exploder  ;  we  have  distributed  them  to  the  outlying 
stations  and  will  leave  the  decision  up  to  you  as  to  whether  or  not  they  should 
be  put  aboard  ship. 

Every  good  wish  in  the  world. 
As  ever  sincerely, 


Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmbx,  USN, 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet, 
USS  PENNSYLVANIA, 

Fleet  Post  Office,  Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H. 


P.  S.  I  just  realized  that  a  letter  I  had  roughed  out  in  reply  to  yours  of  the 
27th  had  not  been  sent  so  here  is  just  another  Sunday  cleanup  job  along  with 
one  or  two  other  things. 

First,  I  had  another  hour  and  a  half  in  the  White  House  today  and  the  Presi- 
dent said  that  he  might  order  a  detachment  of  three  or  four  cruisers,  a  carrier 
and  a  squadron  of  destroyers  to  make  a  cruise  to  the  Philippines;  perhaps  going 
down  through  the  Phoenix  and  Gilbert  or  the  Fiji  Islands,  then  reaching  over 
into  Mindanao  for  a  short  visit  and  on  to  Manila  and  back. 

I  have  fought  this  over  many  times  and  won,  but  this  time  the  decision  may 
go  against  me.  Heretofore  the  talk  was  largely  about  sending  a  cruise  of  this 
sort  to  Australia  and  Singapore  and  perhaps  the  N.  E.  I.  Sending  it  to  the 
Philippines  would  be  far  less  objectionable  from  a  i>olitical  standpoint  but  still 
objectionable.  What  I  want  you  to  do  is  to  be  thinking  about  it  and  be  prepared 
to  make  a  quick  decision  if  it  is  ordered. 

Spent  an  hour  this  afternoon  going  over  your  personnel  situation  with  Niniitz 
and  Kilpatrick  and  the  Doctors  and  you  will  hear  from  Nimitz  on  this.  A  couple 
of  weeks  ago.  even  before  I  got  your  letter,  the  President  told  nie  I  was  over- 
crowding our  ships  and  that  they  would  be  neither  healthy,  happy  or  sanitary 
with  increased  complements  so  we  may  have  to  ask  for  the  doctors'  opinion 
regarding  the  new  complements. 

Regarding  your  setting  up  a  place  on  shore  where  your  staff  can  do  planning 
work ;  anything  that  you  can  arrange  with  Admiral  Bloch  will  be  perfectly  satis- 
factory to  me.  I  don't  know  just  what  the  Submarine  Base  facilities  are  but  you 
may  be  able  to  put  up  some  additions  which  would  eventually  be  needed  because 
of  the  expected  increase  in  the  number  of  submarines.  I  will  have  Moreell  go 
into  these  additions  if  you  will  forward  to  me  a  sketch  lay-out  in  case  you  need 
our  help.  No  one  could  say  just  what  the  public  or  political  reaction  might  be  to 
your  shore  arrangements,  because  it  might  be  misrepresented  and  might  be 
misunderstood.  That  is  the  reason  I  suggest  any  additional  facilities  be  labelled 
additional  facilities  for  the  Submarine  Base.  It  would  not  actually  be  a  mis- 
nomer because  undoubtedly  they  will  be  when  the  Fleet  some  day  bases  back 
on  the  West  Coast. 

I  also  take  it  that  you  can  arrange  satisfactory  communications  with  Admiral 
Bloch. 

Regarding  a  set  of  quarters  for  yourself,  it  would  seem  that  the  best  solution 
and  perhaps  the  only  one  would  be  for  Admiral  Bloch  to  divert  one  of  the  new 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2149 

sets  of  five  houses  now  building  to  your  use.    Will  you  please  communicate  this 
to  Admiral  Bloch? 

I  want  you  to  know  that  we  are  doing  everything  possible  to  reach  full  agree- 
ment with  possible  Allies.  If  and  when  such  agreements  are  concluded  we  will 
inform  you  of  them. 

I  wish  we  could  send  Admiral  Bloch  more  local  defense  forces  for  the  14th 
Naval  District  but  we  simply  haven't  got  them.  If  more  are  needed  I  aee 
no  other  immediate  solution  than  for  you  to  supply  them.  I  am  moving  Heaven 
and  Earth  to  speed  up  a  considerable  program  we  have  for  small  craft  and 
patrol  vesels  for  the  Districts  but  like  everything  else,  it  takes  time  and  "dollars 
cannot  buy  yesterday". 

I  think  I  previously  wrote  you  that  I  hope  to  be  able  to  take  over  the  Coast 
Guard  after  the  Lend-Lease  Bill  is  on  the  Statute  Books.  Of  course  if  war 
eventuates  Admiral  Bloch  can  commandeer  anything  in  the  Islands  in  the  way 
of  small  craft  and  I  assume  he  has  a  full  list  of  what  would  be  available. 

All  good  wishes. 
Keep  cheerful, 

/S/    Betty. 


Secret 

In  reply  refer  to  Initials  and  No.  Op-10  Hu 

Na\'y  Department, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Washington,  25  Fehruary  I94I. 

Db:ar  Kimmel  :  I  suppose  by  this  time  your  staff  is  working  smoothly  on  the 
beach.  It  is  most  important,  as  I  have  indicated  previously,  that  as  soon  as 
possible  you  get  your  Operating  Plan  for  Rainbow  III  in  the  hands  of  Admiral 
Hart  and  your  own  subordinate  commanders,  including  those  in  command  of  the 
Pacific  and  the  Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Frontiers.  Then  we  can  get  ready  the 
subordinate  operating  plans  and  the  logistic  requirements,  the  latter  being  of 
special  importance  to  you  in  your  advanced  position. 

Particularly  in  connection  with  your  logistic  planning,  some  of  us  here  have 
wondered  as  to  whether  or  not  you  might  also  put  the  Commander  Base  Force 
and  his  staff  ashore  in  a  status  more  or  less  similar  to  your  own.  However,  this 
is  your  job  and  I  just  mention  it  en  passant. 

Even  if  we  fight  this  war  according  to  "Plan  Dog,"  we  have  so  designed  Rain- 
bow III  that  a  shift  to  "Dog"  (.see  my  despatch  of  January)  will  (at  least  at 
first)  require  only  minor  changes  in  the  tasks  of  either  the  Basic  Plan  or  your 
Operating  Plans.  The  force  we  would  move  to  the  Atlantic  possibly  would  not 
go  at  once,  and  the  force  left  with  you  will  still  be  great  enough  to  perform 
both  the  offensive  and  defensive  tasks  assigned  you.  Of  course  we  all  could 
wish  for  more. 

In  making  your  plans  for  the  more  important  offensive  raids.  I  hope  that 
you  will  not  fail  to  study  very  carefully  the  matter  of  making  aircraft  raids  on 
the  infiammable  Japanese  cities  (ostensibly  on  military  objectives),  and  the 
effect  such  raids  might  have  on  Japanese  morale  and  on  the  diversion  of  their 
forces  away  from  the  Malay  Barrier.  Such  adventures  may  seem  to  you  un- 
justified from  a  profit  and  loss  viewpoint — but,  again,  you  may  consider  that 
they  might  prove  very  profitable.  In  either  case  (and  this  is  strictly  SECRET) 
you  and  I  map  he  ordered  to  make  the,  so  it  is  just  as  well  for  you  to  have 
considered  plans  for  it. 

I  hesitated  to  take  the  chance  of  upsetting  you  with  my  despatch  and  letter 
concerning  a  viait  of  a  detachment  of  surface  forces  to  the  Far  East.  I  agree 
with  you  that  it  is  unwise.  But  even  since  my  last  letter  to  you,  the  subject 
has  twice  come  up  in  the  White  House.  Each  of  the  many  times  it  has  arisen, 
my  view  has  prevailed,  but  the  time  might  come  when  it  will  not.  I  gave  you 
the  information  merely  as  a  sort  of  advance  notice. 

Secret 

The  difficulty  is  that  the  entire  country  is  in  a  dozen  minds  about  the  war — 
to  stay  out  altogether,  to  go  in  against  Germany  in  the  Atlantic,  to  concentrate 
against  Jai>an  in  the  Pacific  and  the  Far  East — I  simply  can  not  predict  the 
outcome.  Gallup  polls,  editorials  talk  on  the  Hill  (ami  I  might  add,  all  of 
which  is  irresponsible)  constitute  a  rising  tide  for  action  in  the  Far  East 
if  the  Japanese  go  into  Singapore  or  the  Netherlands  East  Indies.  This  can 
not  be  ignored  and  we  must  have  in  the  back  of  our  heads  the  possibility  of 
having  to  swing  to  that  tide.     If  it  should  prevail  against  Navy  Department 


2150     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

recommendations,  you  would  have  to  implement  Rainbow  III,  and  forget  my 
later  despatch  concerning  "Plan  Dog".  This  would  mean  that  any  reinforce- 
ment to  the  Atlantic  might  become  impossible,  and,  in  any  case,  would  be  reduced 
by  just  so  much  as  we  would  send  to  the  Asiatic.  And  that  might  be  a  vei'y 
serious  matter  for  Britain. 

I  am  perfectly  delighted  over  getting  some  modern  Army  airplanes  in  the 
Hawaiian  area  and  jumped  at  the  opportunity  to  transport  them.  I  wish  they 
would  make  me  a  similar  offer  for  the  Philippines,  in  which  case  I  would  also 
make  available  a  carrier,  properly  escorted,  for  the  duty. 

I  know  little  of  further  interest  to  bring  up  for  the  moment.  Our  staff  con- 
versations (and  thank  the  Good  Lord  thei'e  has  been  little  no  public  leak  that 
they  are  taking  place)  are  nearing  their  conclusion  and  we  hope  will  be  finished 
in  about  ten  days.  Of  course  we  will  make  you  acquainted  with  all  decisions 
reached  just  as  soon  as  we  can. 

I  am  sending  copy  of  this  letter  to  Tommy  Hart,  whose  mind  you  now  know 
pretty  well  with  reference  to  his  job  in  the  Far  East.  I  have  been  out  of  the 
oflSce  for  a  few  days  and  I  haven't  seen  Hart's  "Estimate  of  the  Situation",  but 
I  do  know  that  War  Plans  is  delighted  with  what  he  has  sent,  and  of  course  I 
alway.s  have  been  because  of  his  grasp  of  the  entire  picture. 

I  am  enclosing  copy  of  a  memo  which  is  self-explanatory  showing  you  our 
best  estimate  of  the  Far  Eastern  present  situation.  Please  note  the  governing 
sentences  where  it  is  stated  that  a  reestimate  may  have  to  be  necessary  at  any 
time,  but  it  still  looks  to  us  as  though  this  estimate,  at  least  for  the  moment, 
were  sound. 

Keep  cheerful. 

All  good  wishes  and  Good  Luck 

Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmet.,  U.  S.  N. 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.  8.  Fleet, 
U8S  PENNSYLVANIA, 

[s]     Betty 

[1]         Sent  to  W.  H.  by  Capt.  Callaghan 

Draft 
Memorandum  fob  the  President 

11  February  1941. 

Since  your  thought  yesterday  morning  of  the  possibility  of  sending  a  detach- 
ment to  the  Phillippines  via  the  southern  route  consisting  of  approximately  4 
cruisers,  a  squadron  (9)  destroyers  and  carriers  and  jterhaps  to  permit  a  leak 
that  they  were  going  out  there  just  for  a  temporary  visit  and  then  to  return, 
I  confess  to  having  pondered  a  good  deal  on  it  last  night  during  the  wee  small 
hours  because,  as  you  know,  T  have  previously  opposed  this  and  you  have  con- 
curred as  to  its  unwisdom.  Particularly  do  I  recall  your  remark  in  a  previous 
conference  when  Mr.  Hull  suggested  this  and  the  question  arose  as  to  getting  them 
out  and  your  100%  reply,  from  my  standpoint,  was  that  you  might  not  mind 
losing  one  or  two  cruisers  (we  have  2  out  there  now),  but  that  you  did  not  want 
to  take  a  chance  on  losing  5  or  6.  Frankly,  I  breathed  a  great  sight  of  relief 
and  thought  the  issue  pi-etty  definitely  closed. 

You  al.so  called  it  a  "bluff"  and  questioned  it  from  that  standpoint.  Obviously, 
if  we  permitted  a  leak  about  their  coming  back,  there  would  be  even  less,  if  any, 
bluff,  and  again  if  we  did  not  permit  a  leak  with  regard  to  their  coming  back, 
we  would  then  certainly  look  like  turning  tail  and  I'unning  if  somethng  hap- 
pened and  we  did  come  back.  I  beliete  it  pretty  thoroughly  agreed  that  we  do 
not  want  that  force  in  the  Philippines  in  case  of  sudden  attack,  and  that  even 
were  we  to  consider  in  emergency  increasing  our  forces  in  the  Far  East,  we 
would  not  send  them  to  Manila  Bay  but  rather  to  the  southard  or  into  Dutch 
East  Indies  where  they  would  be  better  supported  and  not  so  open  to  attack. 

[2]  As  I  reported  yesterday,  recent  letters  from  Hart  state  he  is  simply 
up  against  it  for  facilities  to  care  for  what  he  has  and  only  recently  have  we 
acquired  a  vessel  to  make  available  to  him  later  on  to  help  take  care  of  his 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2151 

submarines  which  are  in  urgent  and  inunediate  need  of  a  Mother  Ship.  Likewise 
he  is  taxed  to  take  care  of  his  Air  Force  but  we  are  improving  these  facilities. 
Sometime  after  July  I  want  to  send  him  another  squadron  of  bombers.  We  expect 
to  send  four  minesweepers  (bird  class)  out  in  March. 

Specifically : — 

Sending  a  small  force  would  probably  be  no  deterrent  to  Japan  and  would 
not  increase  Japanese  difficulties  in  advancing  southward.  I  feel  we  would  be 
exposing  our  force  without  compensating  results. 

There  is  a  chance  that  further  moves  againf  Japan  will  precipitate  hostilities 
rather  than  prevent  them.  We  want  to  give  Japan  no  excuse  for  coming  in  in 
case  we  are  forced  into  hostilities  with  Germany  who  we  all  consider  our  major 
problem. 

The  Pacific  Fleet  is  now  weaker  in  total  tonnage  and  aircraft  then  the 
Japanese  Navy.  It  is,  however,  a  very  strong  force  and  as  long  as  it  is  in  its 
present  position  it  remains  a  constant  serious  and  real  threat  to  Japan's  flank. 
If  any  considerable  division  is  sent  to  Manila  it  might  prove  an  invitation  to 
Japan  to  attack  us  in  detail  and  thus  greatly  lessen  or  remove  our  serious  naval 
threat  to  her  for  a  considerable  period  to  come.  I  believe  it  would  be  a  grave 
strategic  error  at  this  time  to  divide  our  Pacific  Fleet.  We  would  then  have 
our  Fleet  divided  in  three  parts,  Atlantic,  Mid-Pacific,  and  Western  Pacific.  It 
is  true  we  only  contemplate  a  visit  out  there  but  we  might  find  recall  of  this 
additional  detachment         [3]         exceedingly  embarrassing  or  difficult. 

If  we  are  forced  into  the  war  our  main  effort  as  approved  to  date  will  be 
directed  in  the  Atlantic  against  Germany.  We  should,  if  possible,  not  be  drawn 
into  a  major  war  in  the  Far  East.  I  believe  the  Pacific  Fleet  should  at  least  at 
first  remain  strong  until  we  see  what  Japan  is  going  to  do.  If  she  remains 
quiet,  or  even  if  she  moves  strongly  toward  Malaysia,  we  could  then  vigorously 
attack  the  Mandates  and  Japanese  communications  in  order  to  weaken  Japan's 
attack  on  the  British  and  Dutch.  We  would  also  then  be  able  to  support  spare 
forces  for  the  Atlantic. 

Right  now,  Japan  does  not  know  what  we  intend.  If  we  send  part  of  the 
Fleet  to  the  Asiatic  now,  we  may  show  our  hand  and  lose  the  value  of  any 
strategic  surprise.  We  might  encourage  Japan  to  move,  rather  than  deter  her, 
and  also  we  might  very  well  compromise  our  own  future  operations. 

I  feel  we  should  not  indicate  the  slightest  interest  in  the  Gilbert  or  Solomon 
or  Fiji  Islands  at  this  time.  If  we  do,  the  Japanese  might  smell  a  i*at  and  our 
future  use  of  them,  at  least  so  far  as  surprise  is  concerned,  might  be  compromised. 
The  Japanese  could  take  steps  to  occupy  some  of  them  before  we  could  because 
she  has  had  long  training  and  is  ready  for  amphibious  operations;  we  are  not. 
If  we  lose  the  element  of  surprise  or  begin  to  show  interest,  for  example  in  the 
Gilberts,  such  previous  warning  may  delay  our  later  operations  because  Japan 
would  well  consider  nullifying  our  efforts  in  this  direction. 

I  just  wanted  to  get  this  off  my  chest  to  you  as  I  always  do  my  thoughts  and 
then  will  defer  to  your  better  judgment  with  a  cheerful  Aye,  Aye,  Sir,  and  go 
the  limit  as  will  all  of  us  in  what  y<m  decide.    I  do  think  the  matter  serious. 

[.'/]  The  establishment  of  Marine  Defense  Battailions  at  Samoa,  Palmyra, 
Johnston  and  Midway  is  now  in  progress.  I  have  not  authorized  any  leak  on  this 
because  I  have  questioned  such  a  procedure  but  if  you  feel  it  advisable  we  could, 
of  course,  do  so.  If  Japan  occupies  Saigon,  I  am  considering  recommending 
we  plan  our  mines  in  Manila.  a.ssume  a  full  posture  of  defense  in  the  Philippines 
and  send  the  Fleet  Marine  Force  from  San  Diego  to  Hawaii. 

Finally  I  want  you  to  know  I  am  notifying  Kimmel  to  be  prepared  to  send  a 
force  such  as  we  talked  about  yesterday  to  the  Philippines,  in  case  your  final  deci- 
sion should  be  to  .send  them. 

I  have  just  read  a  paraphia.se  of  a  telegram  of  7  Feb.  from  the  American 
Embassy  at  Tokyo,  which  the  State  Department  has  furnished  us.  In  it  appears 
the  following: 

"Risk  of  war  would  be  certain  to  follow  increased  concentration  of  American 
vessels  in  the  Far  East.  As  it  is  not  possible  to  evaluate  with  certainty  the 
imponderable  factor  which  such  risks  ccmstitute,  the  risk  should  not  be  taken 
unless  our  country  is  ready  to  force  hostilities." 

You  undoubtedly  have  seen  the  entire  despatch  and  obviously  I  am  picking  out 
that  portion  which  supports  my  view. 

[s]     H.  R.  S. 


2152     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Op-12-CTB 
Secret 

Febbuaby  5,  1941. 
Memorandum  for  the  President. 
Subject :  Analysis  of  the  Situation  in  Indo-China. 

1.  The  despatches  from  the  Naval  Attache  in  London  concerning  prospects 
of  an  immediate  crisis  in  Indo-China  and  Singapore  seem  to  be  a  re-hash  of  the 
story  by  Douglas  Robertson  in  the  New  York  Times  of  February  2d.  I  have 
been  watching  this  situation  with  extreme  care  and  see  no  present  reason  for 
alarm.  We  knew  in  advance  the  Japanese  were  sending  some  ships  to  Thailand 
and  Indo-China  to  enforce  cessation  of  hostilities  between  those  states.  This 
has  been  accomplished.  The  transfer  of  peace  negotiations  on  the  NATORI 
to  Tokyo  indicates  to  me  two  things. 

(1)  The  demands  by  .Japan  will  be  far-reaching  and 

(2)  The  February  10th  date  is  too  .»<(>()n  for  an  attack,  as  the  negotiations  are 
likely  to  be  rather  long-drawn  out  in  Tokyo. 

2.  A  careful  study,  including  an  evaluation  of  information  from  many  sources, 
leads  me  to  believe  that  the  following  is  the  general  plan  of  Japan  : 

(a)  She  has  some  fear  that  the  British  and  the  United  States  will  intervene 
if  she  moves  into  southern  Indo-China  and  Thailand.  Therefore,  she  wishes 
first  to  obtain  a  full  legal  right  to  enter  those  countries,  by  getting  the  consent 
of  the  governments  to  give  her  concessions  in  the  ports  and  on  shore. 

(b)  The  size  of  .Japanese  land  forces  in  F<)rmosn  and  Hainan  is  insufficient 
for  occupying  Indo-China  and  Thailand,  for  attacking  Singapore,  and  for  keep- 
ing an  exi>editionary  force  ready  to  use  against  the  I'hilipi)ines.  So  far  as 
I  can  tell,  an  insufficient  number  of  transports  is  assembled  for  a  major  move. 

Upon  a  successful  conclusion  of  the  peace  negotiations  sfie  will  assuredly 
occupy  Thailand  and  southern  Indo-China,  establish  defended  naval,  land,  and 
air  liases,  and  get  ready  for  further  eventualities.  She  may  build  up  her  land 
forces  in  Indo-China  in  readiness  for  iiftion  against  Malaya  and  British  Nortli 
Borneo,  or  may  retain  them  in  Formosa  and  Haiiuin.  I  question  her  readiness 
to  attack  the  British  before  .lune,  but  this  belief  is  subject  to  levision. 

(c)  Japan  desires  to  move  against  the  British,  the  Dutch  and  tfie  United 
States  in  succe.ssion,  and  not  to  take  on  more  than  one  at  a  time.  At  present, 
she  desires  not  to  go  to  war  with  the  United  States  at  all,  in  order  that  she  can 
continue  her  imports  of  materials  useful  for  war  and  for  her  general  economy. 
If  Japan  gets  a  favorable  opportunity,  and  believes  the  United  States  has  then 
definitely  decided  to  remain  out  of  war  altogether,  she  will  move  first  against 
Malaya  and  possibly  Burma,  hoping  the  Dutch  will  not  participate.  Her  pres- 
ent economic  conver.sations  with  the  Dutch  indicate  .she  may  be  playing  for  time, 
and  even  may  intend  to  conquer  the  Dutch  primarily  by  economic  and  political 
penetration. 

(d)  Japan  is  unlikely  to  undertake  hostilities  against  Britain  until  she  sees 
the  results  of  Germany's  next  attack  on  the  British  Isles,  and  of  Germany's 
success  in  the  Balkans.  If  tlie  Germa^is  succeed  in  conquering  the  British 
Isles,  Japan  will  at  once  move  into  Malaya,  and  possibly  into  the  Netherlands 
East  Indies.  If  the  German  attack  against  the  British  Isles  fails,  I  believe 
Japan  may  await  a  more  favorable  opportunity  before  advancing  beyond  Indo- 
China. 

3.  The  above  are  my  present  views.  They  will  change  if  we  get  information 
that  will  warrant  change.  So  far,  everything  leads  me  to  believe  that  Japan 
is  playing  for  a  secure  advance  without  too  great  an  expenditure  of  military 
energy.  The  recent  reenforcement  of  her  defense  in  the  Mandates  indicates  the 
seriousness  with  which  she  views  the  threat  by  the  Pacific  Fleet,  so  long  as  it 
remains  strong  and  apparently  ready  to  move  against  her  eastern  flank. 

H.  R.  Stabk. 


Orriginal  set  by  Clipper  Lock  Box — Confirniation  by  Capt  Lammers  2/28/41 
Secret 

27  Febbuaby  1941. 

Dear  Admiral  Habt:  Admiral  Stark  is  leaving  Washington  today  for  a 
short  trip  to  the  Caribbean,  expecting  to  be  back  on  the  job  about  13  March. 
I  have  just  brought  to  his  attention  certain  information  which  he  has  asked 
me  to  give  to  you. 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2153 

As  you  know,  we  are  having  Conversations  here  in  Washington  which  we 
hope  will  be  completed  in  from  two  to  four  weeks.  I'pon  completion  of  these 
Conversations  Rear  Admiral  V.  H.  Danckwerts,  R.  N.,  one  of  the  participants, 
will  proceed,  I  expect  by  air,  to  Singapore  and  possibly  Australia  and  New 
Zealand  to  inform  officials  there  and  also  British  CinC,  China,  of  the  results 
of  the  Conversations. 

Admiral  Danckwerts  has  expre.ssed  a  willingness  to  stop  in  Hawaii  to  talk 
to  Admiral  Kimmel  and  in  Manila  to  talk  to  you  in  regard  to  the  same.  Admiral 
Stark  thinks  this  is  an  excellent  plan.  He  wants  me  to  inform  you  of  this 
fact  and  to  say  that  I  think  Danckwerts  is  very  clever  but  honest.  IngersoU 
says  he  thinks  it  best  for  you  to  listen  and  talk  little. 

The  Department  will  inform  you  of  Admiral  Lanckwerts'  movements  and 
prospective  date  of  arrival  in  order  that  suitable  arrangements  can  be  made 
for  meeting  him. 

I  expect  to  return  to  London  as  soon  as  Conversations  are  finished.     Will 
you  therefore  acknowledge  by  radio  to  Admiral  Stark  receipt  of  this  letter? 
With  kindest  regards,  I  am.  Sincerely, 

R.  L.  Ghobmley. 

Admiral  T.  C.  Hart,  USN 

Commander  in  Chief,  Asiatic  Fleet 
U8S  HOUSTON 

(Duplicate  to  Adm.  Kimmel) 


Nav-HH.  Navy  Department, 

Burb:au  of  Navigation, 
Pemwuil  and  Conftdentinl  Washington,  D.  C,  3  March  1941. 

Deab  Kimmel:    Your  letters — references — 

(a)  Confidential,  official— #P16-3/(0217),  of  7  February  1941,  subject- 
Recommended  Complements. 

(b)  Secret,  personal,  of  18  February,  1941,  to  Stark,  on  various  matters, 
and 

(c)  Confidential,  personal,  of  16  February  1941,  to  Nimitz,  re  Ordnance 
P.  G.  and  various  matters. 

have  been  read  carefully  considered  in  the  light  of  the  situation  which  confronts 
the  Bureau  of  Navigation.  No  enclosures  were  received  with  Bunav  copy  of 
Reference  (a),  nor  have  such  enclosures  been  received  in  C.  N.  O.  office  so  far 
as  I  know. 

The  Bureau  of  Ordnance  is  so  far  behind  the  requirements  of  ordnance 
materials,  and  is  continuing  to  fall  further  behind,  that  drastic  measures  are 
necessary  if  our.  fieets,  even  at  present  strength  are  to  have  the  necessary  ord- 
nance supplies  to  carry  on  a  war.  That  drastic  measures  have  already  been 
Initiated  may  be  surmised  from  personnel  changes  already  made.^ 

Soon  to  be  superimposed  on  our  Navy  ordnance  problems  through  the 
administration  of  the  Lend-Lease  Bill  is  the  task  of  procurement,  inspection 
and  delivery  of  enormous — almost  astronomical — quantities  of  ordnance  sup- 
plies for  the  British  Navy  and  any  allies  which  may  survive  to  fight  the  Dictators. 
I  do  not  know  if  you  have  been  informed  of  all  the  new  ordnance  plants  that 
are  being  erected  in  various  parts  of  the  country  to  start  from  scratch  the 
manufacture  of  various  items  of  ordnance. 

Furlong  can  give  you  some  idea  of  these  developments  when  he  reports.  He 
should  have  had  the  help  long  ago  of  many  of  the  Ordnance  postgraduates  in 
the  Fleet,  and  he  endeavored  to  obtain  their  services  but  was  denied  by  my 
Bureau  on  the  weli-founded  theory  that  even  though  many  of  the  Ordnance 
P.  G.'s  in  the  Fleet  were  not  working  at  their  specialty,  they  were  usefully 
employed,  and  the  Fleet  should  be  saved  as  much  as  possible  from  changes. 

With  the  appointment  of  a  new  Chief  of  Bureau  of  Ordnance  the  Secretary 
directed  me  to  give  Blandy  all  practicable  aid  in  the  form  of  competent  officers 
to  assist  in  producing  ordnance  supi»lies.  The  Secretary  is  fully  aware  of 
Blandy's  requirements  in  personnel  and  the  necessity  for  taking  a  considerable 
number  of  ordnance  post  graduates  from  the  Fleet.  I  will  add  also  that  Stark 
is  fully  informed  on  this  subject. 

In  a  recent  dispatch  to  you  I  informed  you  that  Crawford  would  soon  be 
ordered  to  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance.  He  is  specially  needed  to  synced  up  torpedo 
production,  and  it  is  unfortnaiite  that  Py^  nnist  lose  this  office  from  his  staff. 
The  designation  of  the  remaining  forty  or  so  officers  is  being  left  to  you  with 

79716  O — 46— pt.  16 Ifi 


2154    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

the  idea  that  you  will  so  arrange  detachments  and  re-allocations  to  minimize 
the  damage  to  fleet  efficiency.  1  will  be  glad  to  approve  such  reassignments 
within  the  fleet  as  you  consider  necessary.  The  Atlantic  Fleet  also  gives  up 
a  number  of  Ordnance  P.  G's. 

I  note  your  warning  against  the  detachment  of  considerable  numbers  of 
qualified  oflScers  from  the  fleet  and  the  enormous  risk  therefrom.  I  yield  to  no 
one  in  my  anxiety  to  have  the  fleet  i-eady  at  the  proper  time  and  you  can  rest 
assured  that  I  am  always  ready  to  bear  full  responsibility  for  my  acts.  I  am 
fully  cognizant  of  the  great  responsibility  which  you  bear  and  it  is  my  firm 
intention  to  support  you  to  the  maximum  extent  possible. 

As  you  well  know,  this  country  is  confronted  with  a  most  diflScult  problem — 
that  of  determining  just  how  much  of  our  total  output  shall  go  to  Britain  and 
her  allies,  and  how  much  to  keep  for  ourselves.  A  wrong  guess  may  well  make 
our  own  problem  insoluble.  The  minimum  help  needed  by  Britain  is,  of  course, 
that  which  will  keep  her  actively  flghting  while  we  are  building  up  our  strength. 
No  help  at  all  or  too  little  help  to  Britain  resulting  in  her  defeat  will  greatly 
increase  and  complicate  our  problems  of  the  future. 

The  situation  i-egardiiig  aviators  is  not  unlike  that  of  Ordnance  P.  G's. 
In  order  to  build  up  our  aviation  we  must  of  necessity  have  the  services  of  qual- 
ified aviators  to  get  all  our  air  training  stations  going.  We  know  the  new 
aviation  officers  lack  a  great  deal  of  being  ready  to  serve  the  fleet  when  they 
first  report,  and  we  also  know  you  will  do  your  best  to  provide  the  additional 
training  and  experience  needed. 

If  you  will  grope  backward  through  your  memory  as  a  budget  officer  you  will 
realize  that  the  serious  shortage  of  aviators  which  now  confronts  lis  can  be 
charged  largely  to  our  failure  to  operate  Pensacola  at  maximum  capacity  during 
those  years  when  we  used  only  a  fraction  of  that  station's  capacity  to  fill  the 
pilot  seats  in  the  Fleet.  I  remember  also  our  efforts  to  obtain  funds  to  give 
active  duty  to  a  few  hundred  naval  R.  O.  T.  C.  ensigns.  While  it  is  idle  to 
speculate  on  what  might  have  been,  the  present  situation  is  not  without  its 
ironical  aspects. 

Now  for  a  discussion  of  the  enlisted  personnel  problem.  You  are  no  doubt 
aware  that  Stark  and  I  have  fought  stubbornly  and  constantly  to  increase  the 
authorized  number  of  men  in  the  Navy  and  to  bring  ships'  complements  not  only 
to  100%  but  to  115%  in  order  to  train  in  advance  of  the  readiness  of  new  or 
acquired  ships  the  key  men  for  them. 

[3]  Just  about  the  time  we  thought  we  were  well  imderway  to  that  objective, 
the  President  received  information  from  several  sources  that  our  ships  were 
being  seriously  overcrowded.  It  was  obvious  that  his  informants  were  in  or 
had  been  in  the  Fleet.  Recently,  the  Captain  of  the  TUSCALOOSA  reported  that 
his  ship  was  overcrowded  and  asked  for  detachment  of  about  50  extra  marines 
which  had  been  placed  on  board.  His  Division  Commander,  Pickens,  by  endorse- 
ment confirmed  this  opinion  and  further  stated  that  the  same  comment  applied 
to  all  heavy  cruisers. 

As  the  President  had  cruised  in  the  TUSCALOOSA  fairly  recently,  both 
he  and  his  private  physician.  Rear  Admiral  Mclntire,  were  definitely  of  the 
opinion  that  there  were  too  many  men  on  the  TUSCALOOSA  for  health  and 
comfort.  I  have  taken  steps  to  ascertain  how  many  men  were  on  board  during 
the  President's  cruise  and  at  the  time  Pickens  recommended  the  removal  of  the 
extra  marines. 

Recently  some  bluejacket  wrote  Senator  Downey,  of  California,  a  complaint 
of  intolerable  conditions  in  the  PORTLAND  due  to  overcrowding.  When  the 
matter  was  referred  to  me  I  asked  CINCUS  to  investigate  and  give  me  data 
upon  which  to  base  a  reply.  CINCUS's,  reply,  which  you  should  get  from  your 
files  and  read,  confirmed  the  overcrowding  in  the  PORTLAND  and  further  stated 
that  the  number  of  men  in  the  PORTLAND  at  the  time  of  the  complaint  was 
less  than  was  being  proposed  by  the  Fleet  Personnel  Board. 

You  will  agree  that  if  the  President  also  receives  such  comments  (and  no 
doubt  many  bluejackets  or  their  families  write  him)  Stark  and  I  will  have 
a  hard  time  selling  him  the  idea  that  ships'  complements  should  be  increased 
as  you  recommend  in  reference  (a). 

Our  recruiting  may  be  prejudiced  by  similar  letters  from  afloat  as  indicated 
by  the  following  quotation  from  a  letter  written  by  an  Inspector  of  one  of  our 
Major  Recruiting  Divisions : 

"From  underground  sources  it  appears  that  the  ships  are  so  crowded  that 
men  hesitate  to  ship  over.  I  have  had  personal  letters  arid  contacts  from  good 
men  to  that  effect.     A  relative  of  mine — a  farmer  boy  from  Maryland  whom 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2155 

I  advised  to  join  the  Navy  six  years  ago — is  a  patternmaker  first  class  on  the 
ALTAIR.  He  writes  me  for  advice  about  sliipping  over  as  living  conditions 
on  the  ship  are  almost  unbearable.  I  mention  this  because  it  seems  to  me 
a  matter  of  concern  even  though  it's  none  of  my  personal  business." 

However,  to  offset  the  above  unfavorable  picture  of  overcrowding,  Commander 
R.  W.  Gary,  U.  S.  N.,  recently  executive  officer  of  the  CHICAGO,  gave  me  a 
memorandum  of  changes  made  in  tliat  ship  to  increase  her  living  accommodations 
without  apparent  overcrowding.  I  enclose  a  copy  of  his  memorandum,  marked 
"A",  and  1  will  urge  on  the  C.  N.  O.  and  Chief  of  Bureau  of  Ships  to  [4] 
provide  the  funds  and  equipment  you  ask  in  paragraph  11  of  reference  (a), 
not  because  I  believe  the  President  will  approve  increased  complements  to  fight 
your  ships,  but  primarily  because  I  believe  that  every  combatant  ship  should 
be  ready  to  carry  on  board  as  many  excess  men  as  possible  for  training  for 
new  construction. 

The  President  now  feels  so  strongly  that  we  will  make  our  ships  unhappy 
by  overcrowding  that  Stark  and  I  will  need  every  bit  of  assistance  and  assurance 
that  you  can  give  in  order  to  obtain  his  consent  to  carrying  more  than  the  present 
100%  complement  on  board. 

I  recently  sent  you  a  draft  of  a  proposed  letter  which  should  help  a  little  in 
retlucing  unexi^ected  detachments.  I  enclose  another  copy,  marked  "B"  and 
request  your  suggestions. 

The  failure  of  many  of  our  men  to  reenlist  when  discharged  from  ships  in 
Hawaiian  waters  is  understandable  but  very  disturbing.  While  many  men 
may  leave  that  area  with  the  intention  of  reenlisting  after  leave  in  the  States, 
I  am  afraid  we  lose  a  large  number  of  trained  mechanics  to  industry  when  they 
come  home.  The  remedy  for  this  is  both  y<)Ur  problem  and  mine,  and  I  welcome 
your  suggestions  ^'or  increasing  reenlistments  afloat. 

I  appreciate  receiving  your  letter  re  broadening  the  employment  of  negroes 
aboard  ship.  Your  suggestions  are  sound  and  will  be  followed  here  as  long 
as  we  can  withstand  the  pressure.  Two  negroes  have  been  appointed  to  the 
Naval  Academy  for  the  class  entering  next  summer. 

Legislation  has  been  initiated  asking  for  232,000  men  in  the  Navy  during 
normal  times,  with  a  limit  of  300,000  for  emergency.  Prospects  for  passage  are 
favorable.  Stark  and  I  wanted  to  ask  for  about  500,000  but  were  turned  down 
by  the  President  who  insists  on  a  year  by  year  program.  Present  Operating  Force 
plan  for  1942  will  require  about  290,000  men. 

Legislation  has  been  initiated  for  going  to  three-year  Naval  Academy  course, 
commencing  with  the  class  of  1&43,  which  will  be  scheduled  to  graduate  in 
June  1942.  The  Class  of  1942  will  graduate  in  February  1942.  Pro.spects  for 
passage  favorable. 

Before  closing  this  already  too  long  letter,  let  me  assure  you  that  when  we 
get  the  report  of  youf  Personnel  Board  with  its  recommendations  for  increased 
complements,  we  will  give  it  serious  and  sympathetic  study,  particularly  if 
your  Medical  Board  of  Survey  of  Living  Conditions  on  hoard  indicates  that 
more  men  can  be  accommodated  without  prejudice  to  health  and  comfort. 

Referring  to  the  large  numbers  of  young  Reserve  Ensigns  being  ordered  to 
duty  afloat,  I  know  that  you  will  do  all  in  your  power  to  continue  their  naval 
education  and  training.  These  young  men  will  be  useful  and  valuable  in  direct 
proportion  to  the  effort  made  by  our  regular  officers  to  train  them.  [5]  We 
must  lean  very  heavily  on  them  to  help  meet  the  requirements  of  new  construction. 

In  order  that  the  Fleet  may  comprehend  the  personnel  problem  confronting 
the  NaTy  as  a  whole,  I  shall  publish  to  the  service  in  the  near  future  a  circular 
of  information  as  to  how  we  plan  to  meet  the  personnel  needs  of  our  two-ocean 
Navy.  In  spite  of  anything  we  may  attempt  to  do  ashore  we  realize  that  it  is 
on  board  ship  that  the  most  important  training  must  take  place. 

If  you  or  any  of  your  officers  have  a  formula  for  manning  new  construction 
with  nuclei  of  ship-trained  men  without  getting  them  from  the  Fleet, — by  all 
means,  let  nie  have  it ! 

With  kindest  regards  and  best  wishes,  I  am, 
Sincerely  yours, 

/S/      C.  W.  NiMITZ. 

End. 

Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmet.,  U.  S.  Navy, 

Commander-in-Chici ,  U.  8.  Pacific  Fleet, 
U.  S.  S.  Pennsi/lvania, 
Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H. 


2156     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Navy  De^'abtment, 
Bureau  of  Navigation, 
Wtishirifftnn,  D.  C.  28  Fehruary  1941. 
From  :  The  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Navigation. 
To:  Comiuander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet. 

Commander-in-Chief,  Atlantic  Fleet. 
Subject :  Transfers  to  Shore  Duty. 
Reference:   (a)   BuNav  Manual. 

1.  The  Bureau  will  furni.sh  to  the  Commander-in-Chief.  United  States  Fleet, 
Commander-in-Chief,  Atlantic  Fleet,  Commander  Base  Force,  Pacific  Fleet,  and 
Commander  Train,  Atlantic  Fleet,  the  waiting  lists  for  shore  duty  maintained 
in  accordance  with  reference  (a),  Articles  D-7024t6).  (7),  and  (8). 

2.  The  shore  duty  waiting  li.st  will  be  revl.sed  and  issued  quarterly.  It  will 
contain  only  the  top  men  on  the  list  who.se  transfer  ashore  may  normally  l)e 
expected  durinj;  the  succeeding  twelve  months.  Fleet  Reservists  will  appear  sep- 
arately on  this  list  as  the  Bureau  will  continue  to  give  preference  to  Fleet 
Reservists  for  transfer  to  shore  duty. 

3.  The  Conunander-in-Chief,  United  States  Fleet,  and  C<»mniander-in-Chief, 
Atlantic  Fleet,  are  requested  to  place  men  in  training  as  reliefs  for  men  on  the 
shore  duty  lists  so  that  the  latter  can  be  transfeired  on  short  notice. 


In  reply  refer  to 

Initials  and  No.     Op-30C-MD 

Navy  Department, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Navai-  Operations, 

Washington,  February  20, 1941. 

Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Navigation 

Subject :  Accommodations  for  Increased  Complements  of  Heavy  Cruisers. 

1.  In  accordance  with  your  request,  I  am  supplying  the  following  information 
gained  from  my  experience  as  Executive  Officer  of  the  CHICAGO  in  regard  to 
acconmiodating  the  increased  complements  of  heavy  cruisers. 

2.  When  I  left  the  fleet  on  December  21),  1940,  a  complement  required  for  heavy 
cruisers  of  the  CHICAGO  class  had  not  been  worked  out  to  the  last  man,  but 
it  appeared  to  be  very  close  to  llOO  men  necessary  to  man  the  additional  batteries 
installed,  and  maintain  the  rate  of  fire  required  by  modern  war  conditions.  I 
note,  since  my  arrival  here,  that  the  Fleet  Personnel  Board  recommends  1099  men 
for  this  class  of  cruiser. 

3.  To  meet  the  berthing,  messing  and  other  accommodations  necessary  to 
accommodate  our  estimated  number  of  100  men,  the  CHICAGO  obtained  addi- 
tional bunks  and  lockers  while  at  the  Navy  Yard — a  sufficient  number  to  bring 
the  total  up  to  996.  This  installation  was  done  principally  with  the  ship's  force. 
The  arrangement  for  installing,  these  bunks  and  lockers  was  done  entirely  by  the 
ship's  personnel  under  the  supervision  of  the  First  Lieutenant  who  gave  it  his 
careful  attention  and  succeeded  in  getting  these  in  without  violating  the  standard 
spacing  between  berths  in  any  one  tier  of  21",  and  without  finding  it  necessary 
to  utilize  any  of  the  messing  compartments.  To  accomplish  this  it  required  an 
almost  complete  rearrangement  of  berths  and  lockers  in  each  compartment. 
When  this  installation  had  been  completed,  it  was  found  possible  by  utilizing  office 
space  and  other  miscellaneous  spaces  large  enough  to  take  from  one  to  three  or 
four  berths  plus  what  space  was  left  available  in  the  berthing  compartments,  to 
install  113  additional  bunks  and  lockers.  This  number  had  been  requested  from 
the  Bureau  of  Ships,  but  I  am  advised  that  no  action  [2]  as  yet  has  been 
taken  on  that  request.  If  it  is  approved,  and  the  bunks  and  lockers  are  installed, 
there  will  be  a  total  of  1,109  bunks  and  lockers  on  the  CHICAGO. 

4.  Up  to  the  time  that  I  left  the  ship,  we  had  had  a  pt-^ak  load  of  some  1,050 
men  on  board.  The  cafeteria  system  of  feeding  this  large  number  of  men  has 
proved  to  be  satisfactory.  The  over-all  messing  time  for  this  number  of  men 
was  less  than  it  had  been  under  the  old  messing  system  for  a  lesser  number  of 
men,  but  the  actual  serving  time  was  slightly  longer,  amounting  in  all  from 
30  to  35  minutes.  The  mess  hall  space  required  was  reduced  to  two  messing 
compartments  in  place  of  three  as  previously  used,  by  the  fact  that  the  rate 
of  serving  corresponded  very  closely  to  the  rate  of  eating  by  the  men,  so  that 
as  the  latter  part  of  the  line  was  served,  the  earlier  part  of  the  line  had  eaten 
and  cleared  the  tables.     The  important  feature  of  the  satisfactory  operation  of 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2157 

the  cafeteria  system  on  any  ship,  but  particularly  ships  with  complements  con 
siderably  larger  than  originally  (lesigned  for,  is  the  organization  for  the  service 
of  the  food. 

5.  Additional  washroom  and  toilet  facilities  are  also  required  for  an  increase 
in  complement.  This  was  accomplished  in  the  firemen's  washroom,  while  the 
ship  was  at  the  yard  last  summer,  by  a  rearrangement  of  existing  installations 
which  permitted  the  installation  of  two  additional  showers,  two  additional  bucket 
troughs  (acconnnodating  about  8  men  each),  two  additional  head  tnmghs  (approx- 
imately 5  sejits  each),  one  additional  urinal.  A  similar  eliort  was  underway  in 
the  deck  force  wash  nxmi  at  the  time  I  left  the  ship,  but  I  do  not  know  the 
extent  of  the  additional  facilities  this  would  provide. 

6.  We  found  it  essential  in  the  tropics  to  take  steps  to  increase  the  ventilation 
of  some  <tf  the  berthiufr  compartments  and  the  mess  hall  where  the  steam  tables 
were  located.  This  was  accomplished  by  the  ship's  force,  but  it  is  probable  that 
additional  ventilating  equipment  will  have  to  be  installed  in  view  of  the  recent 
decision  to  blank  off  all  air  ports  on  the  second  deck  and  below,  as  well  as  some 
on  the  main  deck. 

7.  The  effect  of  the  increased  number  of  men  in  thei  berthing  compartments 
on  the  health  of  the  crew  was  consideied  by  the  medical  officer  not  to  be  a  serious 
menace,  up  until  the  time  I  left  the  ship,  provided  that  we  were  a  little  more 
meticulous  in  the  observation  of  sanitary  measures.  This  involved  a  careful 
watch  for  the  aitpearaiice  of  bedbugs,  cockroaches  and  other  germ  carrying  pests 
and  special  care  in  the  sterilization  of  mess  gear  after  meals.  It  also  included 
the  prompt  segregation  of  personnel  showing  signs  of  colds,  flu  and  other 
nose,  throat  and  chest  diseases.  Although  there  were  two  mild  epidemics  of  flu 
in  the  fleet  during  the  past  Fall,  tlm  <"HI('AGO  had  comparatively  few  cases  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  I  believe  it  was  more  crowded  at  the  time  than  any  other 
ship  in  the  fleet. 

•S.  From  my  observation  of  other  ships  which  have  had  additional  berthing 
facilities  installed  together  with  information  received  from  the  First  Lieutenant, 
before  I  left  the  ship,  we  were  of  the  opinion  that  they  had  not  been  as  successful 
in  the  arrangement  of  their  berthing  .space  as  we  had  been  on  the  CHICAGO. 
This  appeared  to  be  due  to  a  failure  to  plan  the  arrangement  with  the  same 
care  that  the  CHICAGO  had  used. 

/s/     R.  W.  Cart, 
Commander,  U.  8.  N. 
♦CHICAGO  Complement  872 

TUSCALOOSA  Complement     876 


[1]         In  reply  refer  to  Initials  and  No.  Op-lO/Dy. 

Navy  Department, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  OPEaiATioNS, 

Washington,  March  22,  19/(1. 
Secret 

Dear  Kimmel:  Your  letter  of  February  18th  was  Handed  to  me  upon  my  return 
from  an  inspection  of  N.  O.  B.,  Norfolk,  Fajardo,  Vieques  anchorage,  Pillsbury 
Sound,  St.  Thomas,  San  Juan,  Guantanamo,  various  Bahama  Islands,  Key  West, 
Miami,  Jacksonville,  Pensacola,  Charleston,  and  Parris  Lsland ; — literally,  a 
flying  trip. 

Ingersoll  wrote  you  to  acknowledge  receipt  of  your  letter.  We  have  now 
received  answers  from  the  interested  individuals  here  in  the  Department  to 
the  "questions  you  asked.  I  will  take  up  your  letter,  paragraph,  by  paragraph, 
here  goes : — 

The  Checks  for  the  Navy  Relief  and  Red  Cross  have  been  received.  You  must 
have  had  acknowledgments  by  this  time. 

Chester  Nimitz  in  his  letter  to  you  of  March  3 — a  copy  of  which  I  have — 
seemrs  to  have  answered  all  your  questions  on  personnel  so  that  I  need  not 
comment  any  further  on  that  subject :  except  that,  with  regard  to  the  Bureau 
of  Ordnance  requirements  for  post-graduate  ordnance  officers,  I  can  fully  under- 
stand your  point  of  view  in  not  wishing  to  have  those  officers  detached  from  the 
Fleet.  The  procurement  situation  in  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  is  critical.  We 
made  the  best  decision  we  could  with  the  picture  confronting  us.  You  may 
expect  a  similar  effort  to  get  legally  trained  officers  in  legal  jobs. 


2158     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

With  reference  to  the  Marines  at  Palmyra  and  Johnson  you  must,  by  now, 
have  received  my  confidential  serial  019612  of  February  26th  on  the  subject  of 
permanent  Marine  defense  force  at  Johnson,  Midway  and  Palmyra  Islands. 
Of  course  personnel  stationed  at  Johnson  and  Palmyra  islands  should  not  exceed 
the  number  provided  in  paragraph  4  of  the  letter  of  the  26th  until  satisfactory 
arrangements  are  made  for  providing  the  minimum  requirements  of  food,  water, 
and  other  essential  supplies.  We  concur  in  your  recommendation  to  send  100 
Marines  to  Palmyra  and  none  to  Johnson  for  the  present. 

No  comment  seems  necessary  on  paragraph  8  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the 
detachments  have  already  gone  to  Australia  and  New  Zealand. 

[2]  In  paragraph  9  you  request  one  Squadron  of  PT's  and  one  of  the  new 
PTC  S  at  the  earliest  possible  date.  At  the  present  moment  I  can  not  give  you 
an  answer  to  this  question  because  the  demands  of  the  British  are  such  right 
now  that  I  can't  even  make  an  estimate  of  the  number  of  PT's  and  PTC's  which 
might  be  available  to  be  sent  to  you.  I  have  an  order  now  to  give  them  28| 
immediately. 

You  also  speak  of  the  probability  that  the  Coast  Guard  will  be  taken  over 
shortly.  I  hope  to  do  that  as  soon  as  the  7  billion  dollar  appropriation  is  passed 
by  the  Congress  and  signed  by  the  President. 

Completion  of  the  quota  of  small  craft  allocated  to  the  14th  District  is  being 
pushed  as  rapidly  as  their  conversion  and  readiness  for  service  can  be  accom- 
plished. You  probably  know  the  TAMAHA  and  an  Oil  Barge  are  now  en 
route  to  Hawaii  in  tow  of  the  KANAWHA. 

With  respect  to  paragraph  10;  Admiral  Blandy  furnished  in  his  letter  to  you 
of  March  Hth,  the  shipment  dates  of  the  remaining  bombs  to  be  supplied  to  the 
Oahu  area.  It  will  be  noted  from  Blandy's fetter  that  all  requirements  will  be 
completed  either  in  the  May,  1941.  voyage  of  the  U.  S.  S.  LASSEN,  or  the 
ammunition  trip  about  October,  1941.  With  respect  to  the  bomb  supplies  in 
Oahu,  a  letter  is  about  to  be  signed  increasing  the  bombs  designated  for  that 
island  and  a.sking  you  to  assist  in  transporting  them  frons  the  mainland  to  Oahu. 
Dump  storage  of  bombs  in  Oahu  has  already  been  authorized  in  advance  of  the 
availability  of  magazines. 

I  believe  you  have  received  information  on  the  incendiary  bomb  situation ; 
5,009  are  being  procured  from  the  Army  and  delivery  is  expected  shortly. 

The  answers  to  paragraph  11  of  your  letter  are  contained  in  our  confidential 
serial  05038  of  March  18,  to  the  effect  that  it  is  the  present  intention  to  substi- 
tute PYRO  for  LASSEN  upon  the  conclusion  of  PYRO's  next  voyage  to  the 
Fleet. 

As  you  know,  the  Department  has  taken  steps  to  acquire  two  more  vessels; 
Class  C-3  cargo  ships  (Now  building  at  Tampa,  Fla.),  for  conversion  into 
ammunition  ships  but  it  is  impossible  to  tell  at  this  date  when  these  vessels  may 
be  ready  for  service. 

Referring  to  paragraph  12  of  your  letter,  need  for  destroyers  in  the  Atlantic 
Fleet  right  now  is  such  that  we  probably  will  not  be  able  to  help  you  with  addi- 
tional destroyers  for  sonse  months,  if  then ;  in  fact  we  may  have  to  take  some 
away  soon. 

[3]  In  connection  with  your  comments  in  paragraph  14  and  15  relative  to 
complements  recommended  by  the  Fleet  Personnel  Board,  the  following  pertinent 
comment  from  the  Director  of  Fleet  Maintenance  is  quoted : 

"(a)  The  Bureau  of  Ships  for  some  time  has  been  calling  attention  to  the 
continued  weight  increases,  which  have  been  taking  place  on  all  t.vpes  of  ships 
since  commissioning,  having  reached  such  proportions  that  effect  on  military 
characteristics  is  now  serious.  The  recent  weight  additions,  made  necessary  by 
improved  A.  A.  defense,  D.  G.  equipment,  splinter  protection  and  increased 
ammunition  which  could  not  be  compensated  for  by  weight  removals  in  accord- 
ance with  the  policy  established  several  years  ago,  have  greatly  accentuated  the 
overweight  situation  to  such  extent  that  no  further  uncompensated  weights 
should  be  added  until  the  results  of  the  weight  removal  survey  now  under  way 
ore  obtained. 

(b)  The  Bureau  of  Ships  estimates  that  for  each  additional  man  and  his 
personal  effects  300  lbs  additional  weight.  To  provide  bunk,  locker,  mess  gear, 
sanitary  and  other  requirements,  the  total  additional  weight  per  man  is  approxi- 
mately one-half  ton.    The  average  increases  recommended  by  the  Fleet  Personnel 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2159 

Board  over  the  Force  Operating  Plan  represents  rather  sizeable  weight  additions 

as  shown  by  table. 

Over  RfKuUing 

increase  men         weight  added 

BBs 286  143  tons 

CAs 228  114  tons 

CLs 136  78  tons 

DDs 57  28.5  tons 

(c)  While  the  decision  against  reconnnended  increases  was  based  on  weight 
and  stability  conditions  more  than  on  space  and  cost,  the  further  restrictions 
on  berthing  space  introduced  by  sealing  of  airi)orts  on  the  lower  decks  has  made 
the  space  component  of  more  importance  than  formerly. 

(d)  The  Operating  Force  Plan  has  taken  into  consideration  and  has  allowed 
increased  complements  for  the  additional  Ax\.  batteries  installed. 

(e)  The  Operating  Force  plan  represents  the  policy  of  the  Department  on 
the  number  of  men  which  can  or  should  be  assigned  to  the  various  ships  by  types. 

[4]  (f)   On  a  comparative  basis  the  coniplenieiits  now  allowed  are  10-15% 

greater  than  those  assigned  by  the  British  on  similtlr  types  of  ships. 

(g)  Correspondence  is  at  present  before  the  Bui-eau  of  Ships  requesting  com- 
ment on  the  maximum  niuiiber  of  men  which  can' be  accommodated  on  the  various 
types  of  ships  within  acceptable  limits  of  space,  weight  and  stability  considera- 
tions.    The  reopening  of  the  case  deiiends  largely  on  the  Bureau  of  Ships  reply. 

P.  S;  The  report  of  the  Fleet  Personnel  Board  is  now  in.  It  Is  anticipated  that 
it  will  be  reconnnended  for  approval  to  maximiun  extent  permissible  within  space, 
weight  and  stability  reconinieiidations  of  P>uShips. 

Paragraph  IS  of  your  letter  referred  to  the  supply  of  modern  types  of  planes 
throughout  the  Fleet.  In  this  connection  Towers  states  the  impression  that  the 
Bureau  of  Aeronautics  is  relegating  fleet  aircraft  needs  to  a  position  of  lower 
priority  than  the  general  expansion  program,  is  in  error.  He  says  that  the  Bureau 
of  Aeronautics  has  exerted  and  continues  to  exert  every  jwssible  effort  to  provide 
the  Fleet  with  new  replacement  airplanes  for  the  old  models  at  a  rate  oidy  limited 
by  the  productive  output  of  the  contractors  and  diversions  instituted  by  specific 
directives  to  the  Bureau  of  Aeronautics.  It  is  believed  appropriate  to  point  out 
that  the  Navy  Department  in  the  face  of  long  and  determined  opposition  has  been 
successful  in  establishing  the  highest  priority  for  the  following  types  and  models 
of  naval  airplanes  now  on  order  for  the  Fleet.  This  priority  (A-l-b)  is  higher 
than  that  accorded  any  Army  aircraft,  except  the  temporary  priority  given  the 
P40B's  which  are  being  sent  to  the  Hawaiian  area. 

VP PBY5  197 

VSB SBD-2  &  3  202 

VF F4F  324 

VSO S03c  260 

VSB SB2c  70 

VTB TBF  108 


1,221 


Your  paragraph  18  recommends  acquisition  of  two  more  "sea-train"  vessels. 
Acquisition  and  conversion  of  4  APV's.  2  New  .lerseys.  2  Manhattans,  was  recom- 
mended. The  President  cut  out  the  Manhattans.  Acquisition  of  the  2  New  Jer- 
seys as  you  probably  know  was  appi-oved  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  on  January 
15,  1941,  but  funds  havemot  yet  been  made  avdilahlc.  The  New  Jersey  type  is 
now  used  for  ferrying  lodded  freight  cars  from  the  East  and  Gulf  Coast  ports  to 
Havana.  The  conversion  contemplates  the  removal  of  numerous  [5] 
stanchions  and  use  of  three  decks  for  the  loading  of  aircraft.  Capacity  of  this 
type  after  full  conversion  is  estimated  to  be  approximately  60  assembled  air- 
planes of  the  .scout  bomber  size.  No  flying  on  or  flying  off  facilities  are  involved. 
I  might  a<ld  that  "plans"  for  the  conversion  of  the  Manhattan  type  contemplating 
the  installation  of  hangar  and  flying  off  deck  with  an  offset  island  bridge  and 
stack  arrangement  are  being  pro.secuted.  No  provisions  will  be  made  for  airplane 
landings  aboard  the  Manhattans.  Estimated  carrying  caiwcity  for  the  Manhat- 
tans is  80  planes  of  the  scout  bomber  class  when  the  entire  flight  deck  is  loaded ; 
under  these  conditions  the  planes  could  not,  of  cour.se,  be  flown  off. 

In  answer  to  your  connnent  in  paragraph  20  on  the  necessity  for  additional 
stores  ships  and  transports,  the  following  obtains : 


2160     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

On  15  January.  1941,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  approved  recommendations  for 
three  additional  store  ships  (AF).  The  I'resident  cnt  it  to  two.  The  status  of 
legislation  authorizing  and  appropriating  moneii  for  these  two  vessels  is  indeter- 
minate at  the  present  moment.  It  is  hoi>ed  these  vesels  will  be  acquiretl  some- 
time during  the  current  fiscal  year. 

The  six  transports  intended  for  assignment  to  Base  Force  are  being  converted 
and  made  ready  for  use  on  the  West  Coast.  It  is  expected  that  all  of  these  vessels 
will  report  for  duty  by  June  or  July,  1!)41.  In  addition  to  their  intended  employ- 
ment for  training  Marines  in  landing  operations,  it  may  frequently  be  nece.ssary 
for  forces  afloat  to  u.se  one  or  more  of  those  tran.sports  to  meet  ti'ansportation 
requirements  between  Hawaii  and  the  Island  Bases.  In  addition  to  these  ships, 
negotiations  ai'e  being  completed  now  for  the  charter  of  the  Matson  Line  ship 
WEST  CRESSEY.  She  should  be  available  within  a  short  time  and  ComTwelve 
is  being  instructed  regarding  her  loading.  It  is  planned  to  keep  her  under  charter 
for  transportation  of  supplies  to  Hawaii  until  the  CAPE  LOOKOUT  is  completed 
and  ready  for  service. 

With  refer<-nce  to  your  postscript  on  the  subject  of  Japanese  trade  routes  and 
i-esponsibility  for  tlie  furni.shing  of  se<'ret  information  to  OincUS,  Kirk  informs 
mo  that  ONI  is  fnliy  awai-e  of  its  responsibility  in  keeping  you  adequately  in- 
formed concerning  foreign  n.itions,  activities  of  these  nations  and  disloyal  ele- 
ments within  the  I'nited  States.  He  further  says  that  information  concerning 
the  location  of  all  Japanese  merchant  vessels  is  forwarded  by  airmail  weekly 
to  you  and  that,  if  you  wish,  this  information  can  be  issued  more  frequently,  or 
sent  by  despatch.  As  you  know,  ONI  40  contains  a  section  devoted  to  Japanese 
trade  routes,  the  commodities  which  move  over  these  trade  routes,  and  the 
volume  of  shipping  which  moved  over  each  route. 

[6]  This  chart  was  corrected  in  the  Spring  of  1940.  The  dale  appearing  on 
the  chart  is  the  date  15)39,  which  was  the  last  complete  year  for  which  export  and 
import  data  on  conunodities  was  available  at  the  time  the  chart  was  revised. 

Every  good  wish  as  always. 

Keep  Cheerful. 

Unload  all  you  can  on  us. 

Give  us  credit  for  doing  the  best  we  can  under  many  conflicting  and  strong 
cross  currents  and  tide  rips — just, as  we  do  you — and. 
Best  of  luck, 

/S/     Betty. 

Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel,  USN 

Commander-in-Chief.  U.  K.  Fleet, 
U.  S.  S.  PEWSYLVANIA, 
Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H. 

/ 


In  reply  refer  to  Initials  and  No.  11932 

Secret 

Navy  Department 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations 

Washington,  4  April  1941 

Dear  Kimmfl:  It  has  been  sometime  since  I  liave  dropped  you  a  line,  but  like 
.you,  have  been  literally  .sawing  wood  seven  days  a  week  and  there  has  been  noth- 
ing of  real  importance  that  I  could  tell  you  until  the  Staff  Conversations  were 
over.  Yesterday  I  sent  an  official  letter  to  you  and  to  King  and  to  Tommy  Hart 
covering  this  subject. 

I  made  a  two  weeks  in.spection  trip  in  the  West  Indies  and  our  activities  in 
the  Ignited  States  South  of  Washington,  and  just  abcmt  as  I  got  back  the  President 
shoved  off,  so  I  had  had  no  close  liaison  with  him  until  his  return  this  week. 
Spent  over  three  hours  with  him  day  before  yesterday  and  another  hour  yesterday. 
My  official  letter  on  the  staff  conversations  had  some  thoughts  in  it  as  a  result  of 
that  Conference.  I  may  tell  you  and  Hart  and  King,  in  the  strictest  confidence, 
and  I  mean  by  that,  nobody  but  you  and  Hart  and  King,  that  I  read  to  the  Presi- 
dent the  official  secret  letter  which  I  mailed  you  thi-ee  yesterday  and  received  his 
general  assent  to  it. 

I  realize  that  you  all,  just  as  much  as  I,  are  vitally  interested  in  the  matter 
of  "timing".  Something  may  be  forced  on  us  at  any  moment  which  would  pre- 
cipitate action,  though  I  don't  look  for  it  as  I  can  see  no  advantage  to  Mr.  Hitler 
in  forcing  us  into  the  war  unless,  of  course,  Matsuoka  agrees  to  fight  at  the  same 
time.    On  the  surface,  at  least,  the  Japanaese  situation  looks  a  trifle  easier,  but 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2161 

just  what  the  Oriental  miUif  plans,  none  of  us  can  be  sure.  I  have  had  several 
long  talks  with  Admiral  Nomura  and  unless  I  am  completely  fooled,  he  earnestly 
desires  to  avert  a  Japanese  crisis  with  us.  We  have  been  extremely  frank  with 
each  other. 

I  am  enclosing  a  memo  on  CiOnvoy  which  I  drew  up  primarily  to  give  the  Presi- 
dent a  picture  of  what  is  now  being  done,  what  we  would  propose  to  do  if  we  con- 
voyed, and  of  our  ability  to  do  it.  It  concerns  you  directly  in  the  detachment 
from  your  command  of  what  I  believe  to  be  necessary  for  King  to  have,  to  do  the 
job.  I  feel  it  is  only  a  matter  of  time  before  King  is  directed  to  convoy  or  patrol 
or  whatever  form  the  protective  measures  take. 

You  may  not  agree  with  me  on  this  move.  I  can  only  hope  that  I  am  right. 
The  situation  is  obviously  critical  in  the  Atlantic.  In  my  opinion,  it  is  hopeless 
except  as  we  take  strong  measures  to  save  it.  The  effect  on  the  British  of  sink- 
ings with  legard  both  to  the  food  supply  and  essential  material  to  carry  on  the  war 
is  getting  progressively  worse.  Without  our  giving  effective  aid  I  do  not  believe 
the  British  can  much  more  than  see  the  year  through,  if  that.  The  situation  is 
much  worse  than  the  average  person  has  any  idea. 

Our  officers  who  have  been  studying  the  positions  for  bases  in  the  British  Isles 
have  returned,  and  we  have  decided  on  inmiediate  construction  of  1  destroyer 
base  and  (me  seaplane  base  in  Northern  Ireland.  We  are  also  studying  Scotland 
Iceland  buses  for  further  support  of  the  protective  force  for  shipping  in  the 
northward  approaches  to  Britain. 

I  am  also  enclosing  a  memorandum,  which  I  regard  as  vitally  secret  and  which 
I  trust  you  will  burn  as  soon  as  you  have  read  it,  covering  the  President's  talk 
with  Ghormley  and  me  yesterday. 

I  hope  and  I  b?lieve  that  the  foregoing  gives  you  the  picture  pretty  much  as 
I  have  it  to  date  without  going  into  the  Balkan  situation,  labor  troubles,  bottle- 
necks and  the  million  otli-er  things  which  you  undoubtedly  can  glean  quite  well 
from  the  press. 

I  might  add  that  I  am  thoroughly  in  accord  with  your  recent  letter  to  Nimitz, 
can  assure  you  of  Nimitz'  support,  and  that  the  letter  was  helpful  from  every 
standpoint. 

We  handed  the  State  Department  and  the  Attorney  General  something 
to  unravel  when  we  took  over  the  German,  Italian  and  French  ships  last  week- 
end. I  had  about  as  busy  a  24  hours  and  about  as  interesting  as  I  have  had  for 
sometime.  I  find  that  I  stuck  my  neck  out  only  in  taking  over  the  four  Danish 
ships  in  the  Philippines,  but  at  least  we  have  them  and  even  if  there  was  no  law 
to  support  my  action,  I  am  glad  I  did  it  and  the  Big  Boss,  when  I  "fessed"  up, 
approved.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  most  of  it  was  in  hand  before  he  knew  about  it. 
This  letter  is  really  long  enough  or  I  would  tell  you  how  we  startetl  the  ball 
rolling  and  what  a  splendid  job  the  Coast  Guard  did  on  short  notice.  Of  course, 
the  pity  of  it  is  that  we  could  not  have  done  it  months  ago  before  the  sabotage 
took  place.  We  have  been  pressing  to  do  it  for  sometime  and  when  I  got  word 
SatHrday  afternoon  of  the  sabotage  on  a  couple  of  ships,  we  jumped  the  gun. 

Am  sending  copies  of  this  letter  to  King  and  to  Hart,  although  King  is  pretty 
familiar  with  affairs  here  because  of  his  proximity  and  an  occasional  visit 
which  is  a  great  help. 

I  just  realized  I  had  not  touched  on  what  we  refer  to  as  "practice  cruises" 
which  detachments  from  your  force  have  recently  made  to  Australia  and  New 
Zealand.  I  think  there  will  be  more  of  this  to  come;  my  hope  is  they  will  be 
confined  to  positions  on  the  Jap  tlanks  and  that  they  will  have  some  of  the  bene- 
fit which  the  President  and  the  State  Department  expect  from  them.  Of  interest 
to  you  is  that  we  are  directing  King  to  make  similar  visits  to  Cape  Verde,  the 
Canaries  and  the  Azores  ;  of  course  with  a  very  few  units. 

Coast  Guard  has  just  been  directed  to  turn  over  to  the  British  10  of  its  250  foot 
cutters. 

Rainbow  5  should  be  on  its  way  to  you  all  shortly. 
Keep  cheerful.    All  good  wishes. 

Sincerely, 

Bettt. 
Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel,  U.  S.  Navy, 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.  .S'.  Pacific  Fleet, 
U.  S.  -S'.  PENNSYLVANIA, 
Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H. 


2162     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

11932 
Secret  April  1941. 

OcKAN  Escort  in  Wkstekn  Atlantic 
(West  of  Longitude  30°  West) 

HALIFAX  CONVOYS  BP:F0BE  FEBKUARY  !">,   1!M1 

Usual  British  Escort ;  1  XCI., — occasionally  augmented  by  1  BB  or  1  CC  or  1  C. 

Last  Summer  Ki'itish  occasionally  augmented  the  1  XCL  by  1  large  SS. 

Westbound  traffic  has  had  no  ocean  escort. 

Ships  over  12  l<nots  go  it  alone. 

Ships  under  12  knots  put  in  9  or  6  knot  convoys. 

BERMUDA  CONVOYS  BEFORE  FEBRUARY   15,    1041 

Without  escort  until  they  join  Halifax  convoys  some  hundreds  of  miles  East  of 
Halifax. 

RECENT  DEVELOPMENTS 

About  February  1.1th  Britisii  Chiefs  of  Staff  stated  that  hereafter  all  convoys 
from  Halifax  must   be  escorted.     Minimum  strength   of  ocean   escorts  either: 
1  BB  or 
1  CC  or 
1  CA  or 

1  XCL  plus  1  large  SS 
This    st;itement    was    made    before   the    recent    cruise   of   GNEISENAU    and 
SCHARNHORST  changed  the  picture. 

U.  S.  NAVY  PLAN 

Our  concept  ft>r  the  minimum  strength  of  ocean  escorts,  so  long  as  danger  from 
GNEISENAU  and  SCHARNHORST  or  similar  vessels  remains,  is: 

1  BB  plus  XCL  plus  2  to  4  DDs. 

If  BB  be  not  available  substitute  2  CAs. 
Obviously  this  escort  might  be  weaker  than  German  attackers,  and  therefore 
covering  operations  in  the  general  area  by  heavy  ships  and  carriers  are  necessary 
at  times. 

To  keep  present  flow  of  traffic  moving,  2  to  3  convoys  a  week,  7  escort  units  are 
necessary. 

In  the  Staff  Conversations  the  British  stated  they  will  make  available  to  the     • 
United  States  for  assisting  in  the  above  work: 
10  XCL 
2  DD  (Old) 
8SS 
The  proposed  war  deployment  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet,  as  at  present  constituted, 
is: 

(a)  Northwest  Escorts,  based  in  Northern  Ireland  (Admiral  Bristol)  : 

9DD 
18  ODD 
42  VPB  (possibly  54) 

(b)  Ocean  Escorts,  Western  Atlantic: 

3  BB 
2CA 
2DL 
TDD 
4,0DD 

4  DMS 

(c)  Striking  Force,  based  Bermuda: 

2  CV 
2CA 
4  DD 

6  VPB 

(d)  Southern  Patrol,  based  Trinidad: 
4  CL  (7500  ton) 

Several  327  Coast  Guard  cutters 

(e)  Gibraltar  Submarine  Force : 
12  OSS 

(f )  Bay  of  Biscay  Force,  based  England  : 
9  OSS 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2163 

(g)   North  Atlantic  Coastal  Frontier: 

12  Vl'B  plus  Canadian  corvettes  of  an  unknown  number, 
(h)  Caribbean  and  Panama  Coastal  Frontiers: 
1  PG 
9  DD 
24  VPB 
8  OSS 
At  the  present  time  1  BB  is  under  regular  navy  yard  overhaul,  and  one  is  under 
emergency  repairs  ;  these  are  due  for  completion  respectively  19  May  and  28  April. 
The  RANGER  must  go  under  tliree  months  overhaul  April  17tii.    From  5  to  10 
DD  and  1  or  2  cruisers  must  remain  under  overhaul  most  of  the  time. 

Consideration  of  the  above  shovi^s  that  the  Atlantic  Fleet  is  unable  to  provide 
the  minimum  ocean  escoit  considered  necessary.  Shortages  will  be  especially 
bad  until  June  first.  With  the  GNEISKKAU  and  SCHARNHORST  at  large,  I 
consider  2  carriers,  at  least  2  cruisers,  and  4  destroyers  the  miniimim  for  an 
effective  striking  force. 

To  provide  a  proper  degree  of  safety  for  convoys  in  the  Western  Atlantic,  and 
to  provide  an  important  striking  unit  for  catching  raiders,  the  following  rein- 
forcements in  the  Atlantic  are  necessary  : 

3  BB  (IDAHO.  NEW  MEXICO,  MISSISSIPPI) 
1  CV  (preferably  LEXINGTON) 

6  DL. 
12  DD 

4  CL  (new),  (although  this  Division  might  come  later). 

If  this  movement  is  made,  it  should  be  done  with  the  utmost  possible  secrecy. 
The  possible  effect  of  this  transfer  as  regards  Japan  is  realized,  but  must  be 
accepted  if  we  are  to  take  an  effective  part  in  the  Atlantic. 

Secret  12212 

In  reply  refer  to  Initials  and  No. 

Navy  Department, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Navai.  Operations. 

Washington,  19  April  1941. 

Dear  Kimmei.:  Recent  correspondence  regarding  cruise  to  the  Northwest; 
Detachments  for  the  Atlantic ;  Hemispheric  Defense  Plan  No.  1 ;  etc.,  etc. ; — well 
I  can  sort  of  visualize  and  hear  you  saying  "Why  the  Hell  doesn't  Betty  make 
up  his  mind  on  what  he  wants  to  do?" 

First,  I  will  put  at  this  point  rather  than  at  the  end  of  this  letter. 

"Keep  cheerful"  and  help  me  to  keep  my  sense  of  humor  which  is  a  little  taxed 
sometimes. 

And  again : — 

Just  remember  "We  are  doing  the  best  we  can." 

I  wrote  you  about  the  Australian  Detachment.  The  President  .said  (and 
Incidentally  when  I  open  up  to  you  this  way  I  don't  expect  you  to  quote  the 
President  and  I  know  there  is  nobody  who  can  keep  things  secret  better  than  you 
can)  ;  "Betty  just  as  soon  as  those  ships  come  back  from  Australia  and  New 
Zealand,  or  perhaps  a  little  before,  I  want  to  send  some  more  out.  I  just  want  to 
keeji  them  popping  up  here  and  there,  and  keep  the  Japs  guessing."  This,  of 
course,  is  right  down  the  State  Department's  alley.  To  my  mind  a  lot  of  State 
Department's  suggestions  and  recoinmendations  are  nothing  less  than  childish 
(don't  quote  me)  and  I  have  practically  said  so  in  so  many  words  in  the  presence 
of, all  concerned,  but  after  13  months  they  finally  got  it  going.  Of  course  I 
recognize  some  m^'rit,  if  exercised  with  some  discretion — and  that  is  where  Navy 
has  to  count  on  F.  D.  R.  for  reserve ;  .so  we  did  not  have  to  send  ships  into 
Singapore  and  we  did  keep  them  on  a  flank  to  be  in  iwsition  to  go  to  woi'k  or  to 
retire  if  something  broke.. 

Interruption — The  thought  just  flashes  across  my  mind  that  Savvy  Cooke  is 
now  with  you.  He  has  much  background.  I  know  you  will  talk  to  him  freely, 
just  as  I  always  have. 

To  that  extent,  namely,  more  or  less  in  position  if  something  broke,  I  acquiesced 
in  the  Australian  Cruise  with  far  nnore  grace  than  I  would  have  otherwise.  I  am 
not  insensible  to  the  advantages  of  a  cruise  of  this  sort,  as  well  as  to  the  disad- 
vantages of  interruption  in  training. 

Now  when  the  question  of  "Popping  up  everywhere"  came  and  having  in 
mind  keeping  on  the  flank,  I  said  to  the  President:  "How  about  going  North?" 
He  said ;  "Yes,  you  can  keep  any  position  you  like,  and  go  anywhere." 


2164     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

There  was  a  little  method  in  my  madness  as  to  the  Northern  cruise;  I  thought 
for  once,  if  I  could,  I  would  give  the  State  Department  a  shock  which  might 
make  them  haul  back,  and  incidentally,  that  Northwest  cruise  has  many  good 
points.  It  still  conforms  to  the  flank,  and  a  detachment  on  an  occasional 
sortie  up  in  an  unexpected  direction  might  be  good  ball,  and  if  you  ever  want  to 
make  such  a  cruise  yourself  on  your  own  initiative,  don't  hesitate  to  ask.  Of 
course  you  can  see  what  a  striking  force  of  the  composition  I  gave  you,  and 
known  to  the  Japs,  would  mean  to  them,  in  view  of  their  unholy  fear  of 
bombing.  This  striking  detachment  would  have  been  right  in  position  for  most 
anything. 

I  had  a  broad  inward  smile  when  the  State  Department  in  effect  said ;  "Please, 
Mr.  President,  don't  let  him  do  if ;  or  words  to  that  effect.  It  was  a  little  too 
much  for  them. 

The  above  very  briefly  touches  the  high  points  of  this  episode  and  gives  you  its 
inception  and  its  calling  off. 

I  realize  sometimes  it  might  be  less  upsetting  to  you  mentally  not  to  tell  you 
these  things  and  then  have  them  called  off.  On  the  other  hand,  I  never  can 
prophesy  just  what  will  come  and  in  order  that  you  may  be  prepared,  I  endeavor 
to  keep  you  informed  as  we  go  along.  You  can  just  assume,  or  begin  to  guess, 
what  goes  on  sometimes  in  between  drinks. 

Now  let's  take  up  the  letter  we  sent  you  regarding  the  Detachment  coming 
to  the  Atlantic  and  without  checking  up,  I  believe  it  was  3  BB,  1  CV,  4  CL  and 
2  squadrons  of  destroyers.  This  was  the  first  echelon  for  the  "Battle  of  the 
Atlantic."  The  entire  world  set-up  was  gone  into  very  carefully  and  this  detach- 
ment was  one  of  the  first  means  of  implementing  what  we  had  every  reason  to 
anticipate  here.  It  was  agreed  to,  authorized  and  directed  in  its  detail  by  the 
President.  It  was  also  cancelled  by  the  President,  and  he  gave  the  specific 
direction  to  bring  only  the  one  CV  and  I  division  of  destroyers,  with  which  you 
are  now  familiar.  The  reason  for  the  change  was  that  the  President  did  not 
want,  at  this  particular  moment,  to  give  any  signs  of  seriously  weakening  the 
forces  in  the  Pacific,  and  it  is  my  opinion  tiiat  this  will  hold  xintil  there  is  some 
further  clarification,  incident  to  Matsuoka's  return  to  Tokyo  and  this  further 
illumination  on  the  Russo-Japanese  Treaty.  Don't  interpret  this  in  any  sense 
as  a  change  in  the  general  idea  of  Plan  Dog  which  the  President  again  recently 
reiterated  to  me,  and  which  still  holds.  He  does  not,  however,  even  while 
adhering  to  that  Plan,  want  to  give  Japan  any  encouragement  or  lead  right 
now  as  to  our  intentions.     I  am  telling  you,  not  arguing  with  you. 

You  have  received  the  word  with  regard  to  the  4  minesweepers. 

We  are  starting  the  "T"  Cla.ss  submarines,  now  in  the  Atlantic,  into  the  Pacific. 
You  will  have  to  look  out  for  them  some  way  or  other  until  a  Tender  is  ready, 
which  we  anticipate  will  be  sometime  in  August,— the  USS  PELIA8. 

The  foregoing  is  just  to  give  you  a  little  inside  information  on  recent  events. 
I  have  really  nothing  new  to  add.  The  situation  here  is  a  little  more  hectic  than 
usual,  particularly  because  of  the  effect  on  the  public  of  the  situation  in  the 
Balkans,  and  the  Near  Plast.  Your  estimate  of  this  situation  probably  will, 
differ  little  from  ours ;  that  it  is  critical  is  obvious. 

For  months  I  have  been  making  recommendations  along  some  lines  now  much 
in  public  discussion.  To  those  who  have  final  authority  and  responsibility  the 
time  seems  not  yet  ripe  for  their  adoption. 

Hemispheric  Defense  Plan  No.  1  specifically  implements  the  President's 
thoughts  which  he  has  been  debating  in  his  own  mind  for  sometime.  Whether 
or  not  it  will  actually  be  put  into  effect,  or  altered,  I  cannot  say.  King  is  in 
this  morning.  His  order  is  ready.  The  President  is  examining  this  situation 
further  today  as  a  result  of  conversations  with  Mr.  Hull,  who  is  counselling 
something  less  aggressive.     I  will  add  n  P.  S.  when  this  ts  typed  Monday. 

I  had  hoped  that  with  the  passage  of  the  Lend-Lease  Bill  we  could  look 
forward  to  some  unity  on  Capitol  Hill  but  just  at  present  there  seems  to  be 
far  from  that  desired  unity  on  vital  issues.  What  will  be  done  about  convoy 
and  many  other  things,  and  just  how  much  a  part  of  our  Democratic  way  of 
life  will  be  handled  by  Mr.  Gallup,  is  a  pure  guess.  From  that  you  might  think 
I  am  getting  a  little  bit  cynical,  but  believe  it  or  not,  that  is  not  the  case,  and 
I  am  sawing  wood  as  usual  and  am  still  cheerful. 

The  President  has  on  his  hands  at  the  present  time  about  as  difficult  a  situ- 
ation as  ever  confronted  any  man  anywhere  in  public  life.     There  are  tremen- 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2165 

dons  issues  at  stake,  to  which  he  is  giving  all  he  has  got.    I  only  wish  I  could  be 
of  more  help  to  him. 

Hoping  you  are  cheerful  and' with  all  good  wishes,  Sincerely, 

Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel,  U.  S.  Navy 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet, 
USS  PENNSYLVANIA. 

P.  S.  I  am  sending  copy  of  this  letter  to  Tommy  Hart,  King  returned  from 
Hyde  Park  and  as  a  result  Hemispheric  Plan  No.  1  goes  by  the  board,  and  a 
substitute,  with  no  teeth,  is  being  prepared  today. 

Betty. 


In  reply  refer  to  Initials  and  No.  Op-lO-Dy. 

Navy  Department, 
Office  of  the  Chiet'  of  Naval  Operations, 

Washington,  April  26,  lOJfl. 

Dbiab  Mustapha  :  This  is  just  to  get  you  mentally  prepared'  that  shortly  a 
considerable  detachment  from  your  fleet  will  be  brought  to  the  Atlantic. 

You  will  recall  from  my  last  letter  what  that  detachment  was  and  what  the 
President  cut  it  to,  but  only  for  the  time  being,  awaiting  some  further  clue  to  the 
Japanese  situation. 

Not  only  do  I  anticipate  the  reinforcing  of  the  Atlantic  by  the  3  BBs,  1  CV, 
4  CLs  and  2  squadrons  of  destroyers,  but  also  by  further  reinforcements. 

King  has  been  given  a  job  to  do  with  a  force  utterly  inadequate  to  do  it  on 
any  efficient  scale. 

I  am  enclosing  a  copy  of  his  last  order  which  implements  the  changed  Hemi- 
spheric Defense  Plan  No.  1  and  is  now  known  as  Hemispheric  Defense  Plan  No.  2 
or  WPL^9. 

Even  the  Press  and  those  who  wanted  to  go  all  out  in  the  Pacific  are  now  round- 
ing to  and  clamoring  for  an  all  out  in  the  Atlantic.  You  know  my  thoughts  with 
regard  to  this  which  were  set  down  in  my  Memo  about  what  is  now  known  as  Plan 
Dog  and  which  will  shortly  be  covered  by  Rainbow  5. 

Action  on  the  above,  that  is  transfer  to  the  Atlantic,  may  come  at  any  time  and 
in  my  humble  opinion  is  only  a  matter  of  time. 

No  other  news  for  the  moment  and  this  letter  is  the  result  of  a  long  conference 
yesterday  in  the  White  House. 

I  am  sending  a  copy  as  usual  to  Tommy  Hart. 

I  am  just  in  receipt  of  your  letter.    We  will  send  you  the  Public  Relations  Offi- 
cer.   I  shall  also  go  over  the  personnel  situation  again  with  Niniitz.     I  think  we 
all  see  eye  to  eye  in  what  we  want  to  do  and  I  agree  with  you  that  key  men  just 
should  not  be  removed  short  of  extreme  emergency. 
Sincerely, 

[  S  ]     Bettty. 

Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel,  USN 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.  8.  Pacific  Fleet, 
USS  PENNSYLVANIA. 


In  reply  refer  to  Initials  and  No.  Op-10  Hu 

Navy  DepabtmeiNT, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Navat.  Operations, 

Washington,  15  May  lO^l. 
Confidential 

DE.VB  Kimmel:  This  is  in  reply  to  your  letter  of  May  5,  1941,  which  it  was  a 
pleasure  to  receive. 

The  present  plans  for  the  Secretary's  trip  are  briefly  as  follows:  The  party 
will  consist  of  the  Secretary ;  Captain  Frank  E.  Beatty,  U.  S.  N..  Aide  to  the 
Secretary;  Mr.  Rawleigh  Warner  of  Chicago,  Illinois,  a  personal  friend  of  the 
Secretary's;  and  Mr.  John  O'Keefe,  private  secretary  to  the  Secretary.  It  is 
expected  that  the  party  (if  Secretary  can  get  away)  will  leave  here  May  24, 
1941,  and,  accompanied  by  Rear  Admiral  A.  W.  Fitch,  U.  S.  N.,  will  depart  from 
San  Francisco  at  near  dawn  in  XPB-  2Y-1  on  May  26,  1941,  reaching  Peai-1  Har- 


2166     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

bor,  T.  H.  late  the  same  day.  The  Secretary  is  looking  forward  with  much  antici- 
pation to  the  trip.  As  you  know,  he  is  keenly  and  intelligently  interested  in  the 
entire  Naval  Establishment,  and  the  Fleet  in  -particular.  I  am  sure  that  both 
the  Secretary  and  you  will  profit  from  the  visit. 

The  above  arrangements  are,  of  course,  only  tentative.  I  am  informed  that 
the  President  will  speak  to  the  country  on  May  27,  1941.  In  view  of  this,  I  have 
a  mild  suspicion  that  some  change  in  the  Secretary's  plans  may  be  necessary. 

All  of  us  here  are  aware  of  your  difficulties  in  connection  with  the  loss  of  so 
many  of  your  experienced  men.  Our  proposal  to  automatically  extend  enlist- 
ments during  war  knd  national  emergency  was  introduced  in  the  Senate  by 
Chairman  Walsh  on  January  14,  1941,  but  has  not  been  introduced  in  the  House, 
as  Mr.  Vinson  is  apparently  opposed  to  it.  The  matter  is  not  as  simple  as  it 
appears  on  the  surface.  The  Selective  Service  Act  provides  that  a  man  inducted 
in  the  Service  for  a  year's  training  must  be  discharged  at  the  end  of  that  period, 
unless  the  Congress  meanwhile  "has  declared  that  the  national  interest  is  im- 
periled." Nimitz  feels,  and  I  agree,  that  Congressional  action  to  freeze  our 
enlisted  personnel  can  best  be  accomplished  by  basing  our  demands  on  the  same 
grounds  provided  for  in  the  Selective  Service  Act,  i.  e.,  when  "the  national  interest 
is  imperiled."  Accordingly,  we  are  introducing  legislation  which  will  provide 
that  whenever  the  Congress  shall  declare  that  the  national  interest  is  imperiled, 
all  enlistments  in  the  regular  Navy  or  Marine  Corps  which  are  in  force  at  that 
time  and  which  will  terminate  during  such  emergency  shall  continue  in  force 
during  the  emergency,  and  that  men  detained  in  the  Service  in  accordance  with 
the  above  shall,  unless  they  extend  their  enlistment,  be  discharged  not  later  than 
6  months  after  the  date  of  termination  of  the  emergency.  At  the  same  time,  the 
legislation,  as  proposed,  [2]  provides  for  a  suspension  of  Section  1422 
of  the  Act  of  March  3,  1875,  which  provides  for  pay  and  a  quarter  for  men 
retained  in  the  Service  beyond  the  normal  expiration  of  their  enlistment. 

Meanwhile,  you  have  by  this  time  the  Department's  dispatch  about  the  provi- 
sions of  revised  statutes  of  Section  1422.  Act  of  March  3,  1875.  It  is  hoped 
that  this  will  help  relieve  the  situation  to  a  certain  extent. 

On  May  6,  the  Bureau  of  Navigation  issued  circular  letter  No.  55-41,  having 
to  do  with  the  subject  of  transfer  of  enlisted  personnel  in  forces  afloat.  In  this 
letter,  it  was  stated  that,  until  further  notice,  the  tsansfer  of  enlisted  personnel 
from  forces  afloat  will,  in  general,  be  by  rating  and  not  by  name.  This  contra- 
venes Navigation's  policy,  which  has  been  in  effect  for  some  time — that  of  order- 
ing men  from  sea  to  shore  duty,  using  length  of  Sea  Service  as  a  basis  for  such 
transfers.  The  change  will  permit  you  to  retain  your  experienced  men  and 
transfer  those  whose  service  can  best  be  spared. 

As  to  nucleus  oflBcer  personnel.  Navigation  advises  that  it  is  often  difficult,  on 
account  of  urgency  in  issuing  orders,  to  request  nominations  from  forces  afloat, 
but  every  endeavor  is  being  made  not  to  detach  experienced  officers  where  it  can 
be  avoided.  We  will  be  glad  to  receive  your  ideas  on  the  subject  of  nucleus 
crews  when  they  have  been  prepared,  as  you  suggest,  "in  a  more  definite  form." 

Your  plans  for  the  landing  at  San  Clemente  have  been  received  in  the  Navy 
Department.  Fleet  Training  has  studied  them  with  interest.  I  have  had  a 
brief  of  the  intended  operations  submitted  to  me,  and  I  think  the  exercise  will 
be  of  much  value  to  all  concerned.  Needless  to  say,  we  are  pressing  preparations 
to  the  end  that  our  landing  forces  will  be  well  equipped ;  shortages  remedied,  etc. 

Your  remark  about  the  use  of  AKs  in  connection  with  landing  oi)erations  is 
concursed  in.  We  have  been  able  to  get  two  craft  suitable  for  this  purpose  from 
the  Maritime  Commission.  Unfortunately,  the  conversion  of  these  ships  cannot 
be  completed  until  the  fall  of  1941. 

As  suggested,  I  have  informed  the  material  bureaus  of  your  ideas  about 
availing  themselves  of  shipping  facilities  between  the  coast  and  Pearl  Harbor. 
I  have  done  this  by  furnishing  personally  each  of  the  Chiefs  of  Bureaus  concerned 
with  a  copy  of  your  letter.  I  am  sure  you  can  count  on  their  active  cooperation 
in  this  imiwrtant  matter.  Yards  &  Docks,  for  one,  shares  your  concern  about 
the  matter  of  transportation,  particularly  to  the  outlying  bases.  Two  old  Panama 
Railway  Steamships— the  Ex-ANCON  and  Ex-CRISTOBAL— have  already  re- 
"  cently  been  acquired  and  are  to  be  operated  for  our  account  by  the  Matson  liine. . 
They  will  help  but  not  solve  the  problem.  How  do  you  feel  about  families  of  our 
personnel  (and  Army)  continuing  to  remain  in  Hawaii. 

At  the  moment,  there  are  no  additional  patrol  craft  that  can  be  furnished 
the  Fourteenth  Naval  District.  As  you  no  doubt  know,  effort  is  now  being  made 
to  acquire  a  number  of  sampans,  which  should  be  of  assistance  in  this  regard. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2167 

DesDiv  Eighty  (80)  is  at  Pearl  Harbor,  and  4  AMCs  are  going  forward  from 
San  Diego  under  e.scort  of  the  TIPPECANOE.  We  are  also  giving  consideration 
to  supplying  some  165'  coast  guard  bots  for  this  duty.  I  must  confess  that  our 
preliminary  survey  in  this  regard  does  not  appear  to  be  promising.  I  am  keenly 
aware  of  your  anxiety  to  save  wear  and  tear  on  your  destroyers,  as  well  as 
releasing  them  from  patrol  duties  for  the  mose  important  duty  of  perfecting 
themselves  in  other  phases  of  their  training. 

All  of  us  in  the  Department  are  bending  every  effort  to  be  prepared  for  war 
when  and  if  it  comes.    I  know  you  are  likewise  using  your  best  effort  to  make 
the  Fleet  seady  for  all  eventualities.     Acquaint  me  with  your  troubles — I  will 
do  what  I  can — always  wishing  it  were  more. 
All  good  wishes — keep  cheerful. 
Sincerely, 

[S]     Betty. 
Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmex,  U.  S.  Navy, 

Commander  in  Chief,  V.  S.  Pacific  Fleet, 
USS  PENNSYLVANIA, 

c/o  Fleet  Post  Office,  Pearl  Earhor,  T.  H. 


In  reply  refer  to  Initials  and  No.  Op-10  Hu 
Secret 

Navy  Department, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Washington,  14  May  1941 

Memorandum 

For  Commandant,  First  Naval  District 
Third  Naval  District 
Fourth  Naval  District 
Fifth  Naval  District 
Sixth  Naval  District 
Eighth  Naval  District 
Tenth  Naval  District 
Eleventh  Naval  District 
Twelfth  Naval  District 
Thirteenth  Naval  District 
Fourteenth  Naval  District 
Fifteenth  Naval  District 

You  will  recall  my  previous  letter  of  3  October  1940,  in  which  I  stressed 
readiness  and  not  to  be  taken  aback  should  somebody  suddenly  start  depositing 
mines  on  our  front  doorstep,  etc.  etc. 

I  might  add  that  I  have  no  inside  information  as  to  what  is  going  to  happen 
or  when,  but  it  seems  to  me  now,  as  it  did  then,  that  it  is  a  case  of  only 

when? 

The  trend  of  events,  and  public  opinion  certainly  all  tend  increasingly  this  way. 

If  and  when  we  do  get  in,  my  hunch  is  that  Hitler  would  certainly,  if  one 
way  or  another,  attack  our  shipping  wherever  he  thought  it  would  be  profitable, 
either  from  a  material  or  psychological  standpoint. 

I  am  cognizant  of  how  the  sweeper-small  craft-net  program  has  lagged,  am 
doing  what  I  can  about  it ;  but  it  never  seems  enough. 

This  is  just  again  to  remind  you  all  of  the  seriousness  of  the  present  situation 
and  of  the  necessity  of  our  being  ready,  to  the  utmost  extent,  to  use  what  we 
have  or  what  we  can  improvise,  should  the  issue  suddenly  be  drawn. 

Plans  and  machinery  for  convoy  are  pretty  well  in  hand  but  here,  too,  there 
may  be  hitches  or  slips  which,  in  the  last  analysis,  may  only  be  found  by  actual 
practice.  However,  convoy  games  on  paper  by  those  who  must  handle  the 
details  should  be  good  mental  exercise,  and  may  bring  to  light  certain  correctable 
deficiencies. 


2168     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

What  will  happen  in  the  Pacific  is  anyone's  guess ;  but  here,  too,  there  is  only 
one  safe  course ;  that  is  to  be  prepared,  so  far  as  humanly  possible.  Though  the 
danger  of  mines,  I'aiding  and  diversions,  and  even  of  sporadic  or  stunt  air 
attack,  may  be  more  remote  in  the  Eastern  Pacific,  we  cannot  discount  it,  and 
hence  should  likewise  be  bending  every  ounce  of  effort  of  which  we  are  capable 
not  to  be  caught  napping  in  that  area.  Japan  may  come  in  the  second  Germany 
does — possibly  preplanned  joint  action.    Russia  is  still  a  ? 

I  might  add  that  some  months  ago  (and  less  than  that)  our  studies  here 
in  the  Department  indicated  that  if  we  did  not  get  into  this  war  by  March  we 
would  be  fairly  well  off  in  the  local  defense  picture ;  later  it  was  put  at  April 
with  assurances  that  in  any  case  I  could  feel  fairly  comfortable  by  the  first 
of  May.  Now  I  am  told  the  latter  part  of  May  or  maybe  some  time  in  June 
or  the  first  of  July.  It  continues  to  be  just  "Ai'ound  the  corner."  I  think  the 
time  is  here  now  for  even  more  personal  strenuous  effort  by  all  of  us,  in 
responsible  positions. 

Keep  cheerful.  Heap  all  the  abuse  you  want  to  on  my  head,  if  it  will  help 
any  to  achieve  our  common  objective. 

I  trust  you  are  all  constantly  checking  ways  for  speeding  up  readiness  in 
every  department. 

[s]  H.  R.  Stark 
H.   R.   Stark. 

Copy  to  Admiral  King,  Kimmel,  Hart 


In  reply  refer  to  Initials  and  No.  Op-lO-Dy. 

(Received  2  June) 

Navy  Department, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Washington,  May  24,  1941. 
Secret 

Dear  Kimmei.  :  I  recently  saw  your  letter  with  regard  to  ammunition.  Regret 
the  holiday  in  training  caused  by  non-delivery  and  hope  we  can  prevent  recur- 
rence. 

We  appreciate  fully  your  personnel  troubles.  I  have  gone  over  them  with 
Nimitz  and  trust  your  thoughts  regarding  non-disturbance  of  key  personnel  can 
be  complied  with. 

I  am  sending  you  a  secret  despatch  this  afternoon  with  regard  to  occa.sional 
visits  by  small  units  of  your  Fleet  to  the  west  coast  in  the  interests  of  morale. 
While  you  have  not  suggested  this,  my  hope  is  that  it  will  be  conducive  to  con- 
tentment. Of  course  how  clo.sely  an  approved  schedule  for  this  could  be  followed 
in  these  times  I  do  not  know.  I  have  just  finished  talking  to  the  President  about 
it  and  you  can  rest  a.ssured  that  so  far  as  possible  we  will  see  it  through.  We 
would  leave  any  press  releases  on  this  subject  to  you,  as  it  is  something  for  which 
yoiir  gang  should  look  to  you. 

You  have  probably  been  surprised  over  the  movements  of  transports,  Marines, 
hospital  ships,  etc.,  to  the  east  coast,  which  you  have,  or  will  have  shortly  received. 
Please  keep  the  following  with  regard  to  it  highly  secret,  known  only  to  your 
trusted  few  whom  I  assume  you  keep  informed  regarding  such  matters.  In 
this  I  include  Bloch. 

Day  before  yesterday  afternoon  the  President  gave  me  an  over  all  limit  of 
30  days  to  prepare  and  have  ready  an  expedition  of  25,000  men  to  sail  for,  and 
to  take  the  Azores.  Whether  or  not  there  would  be  opposition  I  do  not  know  but 
we  have  to  be  fully  prepared  for  strenuous  opposition.  You  can  visualize  the 
job  particularly  when  I  tell  you  that  the  Azores  recently  have  been  greatly 
reinforced.  The  Army  of  course  will  be  in  on  this  but  the  Navy  and  the  Marines 
will  bear  the  brunt. 

I  know  your  reaction  will  be  "Why  didn't  we  get  the  transports  and  assemble 
such  a  force  months  and  months  ago."  My  only  answer  to  that  is  that  such 
thoughts  are  water  OA'er  the  dam,  and  I  am  confronted  with  the  problem  as  is 
and  not  one  as  I  would  like  to  have  had  it,  and  for  which  I  would  like  to  have 
been  ready  long  ago.  I  simply  could  not  get  authority  to  acquire  and  prepare 
the  necessary  train. 

King  of  course  is  active  and  operating  in  connection  with  Atlantic  problems — 
our  own  and  the  Briti.sh.  He  has  nothing  like  what  he  would  like  to  have  or 
what  we  would  like  to  give  him  if  we  had  it  to  give.  I  do  not  contemplate 
for  the  moment  ordering  anything  additional  to  the  Atlantic  except  auxiliaries 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2169 

In  connection  with  the  Azores  task  and  except  possibly  later  four  CA's  as  per 
Rainbow  5.    However,  I  am  not  the  final  "Boss  of  this  show". 

In  the  last  48  hours  we  have  been  following  the  situation  closely  in  Crete; 
and  yesterday  and  last  night  the  Naval  situation  to  the  eastward  and  southward 
of  Greenland. 

My  personal  feeling  is  that  it  is  only  a  matter  of  time  until  the  British  hold 
on  the  eastern  Mediterranean  is  very  much  confined  or  non-existent. 

Only  history  will  throw  a  full  light  on  the  Crete  incident.  Criticism  will  be 
rife  but  without  full  knowledge  of  the  facts  or  at  least  more  than  we  have  at 
present  I  am  withholding  final  judgment. 

German  raiders  (as  you  probably  will  have  learned  before  this)  both  surface 
and  sub-surface  are  now  working  well  inside  the  generally  accepted  limits  of  the 
Western  Hemisphere,  in  fact  to  the  westward  of  the  40th  meridian.  The  British 
escorts  therefore  get  thinner  and  thinner.  The  situation  is  not  good.  Last  night's 
naval  engagement  and  its  train  of  events  will  come  out  in  due  time. 

We  are  immediately  confronted  with  taking  over  a  considerable  number  of 
merchant  ships  for  the  Azores  task — something  I  wanted  to  do  as  long  as  over 
a  year  ago.  Also  the  Army  is  asking  me  to  man  26  of  their  ships.  I  have  been 
in  touch  with  Admiral  Waesche  for  the  last  24  hours  and  that  fellow  has  come 
across  1007o  and  is  agreeing  to  furnish  18(X)  men  and  100  officers,  which  is  liter- 
ally a  God-send  from  our  standix»int.  These  men  will  include  surfmen.  The 
lot  should  man  about  5  transports  depending  of  course  on  the  size  of  the  trans- 
ports selected. 

We  have  an  expedition  of  flying  boats  going  to  Iceland  for  temporary  basing 
and  for  reconnaisance  of  the  east  coast  of  Greenland. 

In  addition  we  are  sending  three  arctic  ships  to  the  Scoresby  Sound  area  to . 
look  for  German  meteorological  or  radio  stations  and  to  remain  there  during  the 
Summer,  besides  two  other  vessels  and  an  Army  contingent  which  are  proceeding 
with  the  construction  of  an  air  field  and  plane  base  on  the  southeast  coast  of 
Greenland. 

The  Army  also  has  an  expedition  studying  Labrador  with  a  view  to  the  possi- 
bility of  flying  planes  to  that  point  then  to  Britain  via  Greenland. 

The  anununition  situation  on  which  we  are  depending  on  the  Army  for  supply, 
is  bad.  Even  getting  enough  for  the  Azores  is  a  problem.  It  promises  not  to 
get  better  before  P^'all. 

The  Force  which  we  are  preparing  to  go  to  North  Ireland  and  Scotland  on 
the  outbreak  of  war  is  coming  along  in  good  shape  so  far  as  the  Navy  is  concerned 
but  the  Army  has  neither  the  equipment,  the  amnnmition  nor  the  aircraft  to 
defend  these  bases;  fall  again  being  the  earliest  date  when  they  can  do  this 
for  us.  Meanwhile  we  will  try  and  find  some  way  of  solving  it  with  Marines  and 
British  help  if  we  are  in  the  war  before  that  time.  God  knows  what  will  hapi)en 
if  we  are  not  in  by  that  time  though  personally  I  give  the  British  a  longer  time 
than  do  most  people  here  in  their  ability  to  hold  out.  I  most  emphatically  do 
not  believe  they  can  hold  out  indefinitely  without  effective  aid  from  us.  We  are 
being  pressed  for  ammunition  and  material  from  the  South  American  Republics : — 
not  a  happy  situation — and  not  to  mention  British  requests  for  more  DD's  etc. 

The  above  are  rambling  thoughts  for  a  few  minutes  conversation  with  you, 
Tommy  Hart  and  Admiral  Bloch.     I  will  not  try  to  put  them  in  more  logical 
sequence  or  dress  them  up  further,  simply  assuming  that  you  can  straighten 
out  the  picture  yourself  as  we  more  or  less  see  it  here. 
Keep  cheerful, 
Sincerely, 


P.  S.  When  I  last  wrote  to  you  I  indicated  by  doubts  as  to  the  Secretary 
leaving  at  this  time.  Personally  I  couhln't  see  how  he  could.  He  came  to  that 
same  conclusion  himself  and  you  have  been  informed. 

Tell  Bloch  that  I  knew  it  would  raise  "H"  with  towing  barges  to  Palmyra 
and  other  islands  when  we  ordered  the  two  tugs  to  the  Canal  Zone  but  that 
they  are  essential  for  the  Azores  operations. 

Referring  to  your  letter  of  l.'i  May  1o  Admiral  Nimitz  of  which  I  have  a  copy : — 
I  am  quite  in  agreement  with  your  thoughts.  The  despatch  about  holding  men 
over-time  was  not  with  the  idea  of  telling  you  to  do  it  but  with  the  idea  that 
if  you  found  it  necessary  you  would  have  department  backing.  I  think  your 
own  estimate  is  quite  correct. 

As  regards  freezing  men  for  the  duration — this  is  something  which  for  years 
I  have  thought  the  Country  should  have  on  the  statute  books  and  during  the 

79716  O— 4&— pt.  16 17 


2170     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

present  emergency  I  have  brought  the  point  up  many  times  but  without  success. 
I  am  not  through  trying  but  I  doubt  if  we  can  get  in  a  period  short  of  war. 

/s/     Betty. 
Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmex,  U.  S.  N., 
.  Commander-in-Chief, 

United  States  Fleet, 

U.  8.  S.  PENNSYLVANIA,  Flagship. 


Navy  DEa>ARTMENT, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 
Op-IOD-  Hu  Washington,  20  June  19.il. 

Deab  Admirai,  :  At  my  conference  this  morning  with  Admiral  Stark  he  said  that 
he  knew  just  as  soon  as  you  left  he  would  think  of  something  which  he  meant  to 
tell  you  while  you  were  here. 

I  think  what  he  wanted  was  simply  to  plant  the  thought  in  your  mind  of  smoke 
screen  around  Pearl  Harbor  in  case  of  an  air  attack  such  as  has  been  used  by  the 
British  around  some  of  their  Scotland  shipyards  or  closed  harbors. 

From  what  I  understand  it  is  something  similar  to  the  California  smudge  pots 
and  leaves  a  black  blanket  and  a  very  uncomfortable  one,  according  to  Captain 
Kirk,  over  the  area  innuediately  concerned. 

The  Germans  did  this  at  Brest,  thereby  preventing  any  accurate  bombing  or 
even  vision  of  the  targets. 

The  Admiral  asked  me  to  get  this  ofiE  as  he  had  to  go  to  conference  and  wanted 
to  catch  you  before  you  left  San  Diego ;  also  to  give  you  his  best  wishes  in  which 
all  of  us  here  join. 

Respectfully, 

/s/    J.  L.  McCkeia. 

Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel,  U.  S.  Navy, 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet, 
%  Commandant,  11th  Naval  District, 
San  Diego,  California. 


In  reply  refer  to  Initials  and  No.  HRS/clp 

Navy  Department, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Opeirations, 

Washington,  June  26,  194i- 
Delar  Kimmel:  Colonel  Maas  is  going  to  report  for  duty  with  you  shortly. 
He  was  just  in  to  say  goodbye. 

He  was  one  of  our  staunchest  supported  and  strongest  friends,  particularly  in 
opposition  to  a  single  air  force,  for  the  United  States. 

He  will  fly  from  San  Francisco  to  Hawaii  in  one  of  our  4-engine  bombers.  We 
were  all  glad  to  have  him  do  it  and  give  him  a  good  picture  of  that  type  of  craft 
which  he  has  so  strongly  supported. 

He  is  not  asking  for  any  favors  because  of  his  Congressional  importance. 
Nevertheless,  I  wanted  to  let  you  know  he  is  coming  and  feel  that  his  services  with 
the  Staff  to  Comairbatfor  may  be  very  helpful  from  many  standpoints. 

We  had  a  very  interesting  talk  yesterday  afternoon  from  Jimmy  Roosevelt.     All 
agreed  it  was  well  done.     As  you  may  know,  he  just  completed  a  thirty-five 
thousand  mile  flying  trip  with  Major  Thomas  of  the  Marine  Corps. 
This  afternoon  Wellings  is  talking. 

Am  asking  Lee  to  take  down  the  interesting  points  of  both  talks  to  send  to  you. 
Some  of  them,  I  feel,  will  be  useful  and  you  should  know. 

You  were  made  an  information  addressee  on  our  despatch  to  Tommy  Hart  with 
reference  to  the  next  move  which  Japan  might  make.  We  feel  strongly  here  that 
her  attitude,  at  the  moment  at  [2]         least,  will  continue  to  be  one  of  "watch 

and  wait". 

Our  information  on  the  German-Russian  operations  are  so  uncertain  at  the 
moment  that  it  would  be  useless  to  give  them  to  you.     We  feel  it  will  take 
at  least  a  few  more  days  to  give  any  sort  of  picture. 
Every  good  wish,  as  always, 
Sincerely, 

/s/    Bejtty. 
Admiral  Husband  E.  Kimmeil,  U.  S.  N., 
Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet, 
V.  S.  S.  PENNSYLVANIA. 
Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2171 

In  reply  refer  to  Initials  and  No.  Oi>-10  Hu 

(Received  9th  July) 

Navy  Dbpaetmbnt, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Oper.\tion8, 

Washington,  3  July  19Jfl. 
Secret 

Dbab  Mustapha:  Have  just  written  a  letter  to  Tommy  Hart  and  think  the 
following  from  it  might  be  of  interest  to  you : 

"I  am  still  lioping  you  will  be  able  to  put  over  your  thoughts  about  denying 
passage  of  the  Japanese  through  the  Eastern  part  of  the  Malaya  Barrier;  but 
I  know  from  experience  in  the  last  War,  as  well  as  in  this  one,  that  what  you 
say  about  'trade  and  raider  consciousness'  is  very  pertinent. 

"After  a  careful  study  of  the  ADB  report  we  find  that  we  are  unable  to 
approve  it.  Army  and  Navy  War  Plans  are  drawing  up  a  letter  to  the  British 
rejecting  it,  and  requesting  a  new  conference  be  held  that  will  give  a  practical 
and  realistic  operating  plan  to  carry  out  the  purpose  of  ABD-1.  The  report  has 
all  the  faults  you  mentioned,  both  in  your  official  and  your  personal  letters,  and 
I  do  not  believe  it  necessary  for  us  to  accept  any  such  ineffective  plan.  Of 
course,  I  will  forward  you  a  copy  of  our  joint  letter  to  the  British,  which  should 
be  ready  within  a  few  days." 

Have  just  finished  a  Budget  session  and  am  hoping  to  give  you  some  of  the 
things  you  want. 

I  really  have  no  interesting  news  other  than  has  been  communicated  to  you 
by  radio. 

Keep  cheerful. 
Sincerely, 


Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmeil,  U.  S.  N., 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet, 
U.  8.  S.  PENNSYLVA'NIA, 
Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H. 

P.  S.  It  looks  to  us  at  the  moment  as  you  will  judge  by  a  despatch  you  will 
receive  ere  this  as  though  the  Germans  had  persuaded  the  Japs  to  attack  Russia 
within  the  next  month.     It  is  anybody's  guess  and  only  time  will  tell. 

/&/     HRS. 


Navt   DE3»ABTMENT, 

Secret  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Op-10     Hu  Wushinnton,  7  July  19.'fl. 

Deue  Mustapha  :  Referring  to  the  last  sentence,  paragraph  4-E  : 
I  think  if  I  were  the  skipper  of  our  cruiser  and  a  foreign  man-o-war  told  the 
Dutchman  to  stop  I  would  tell  the  Dutchman  to  disregard  the  order  of  the 
foreign  man-o-war.  Moreover  I  would  lay  my  ship  fairly  close  to  the  Dutchman 
and  between  the  Dutchman  and  the  foreign  nian-o-war,  and  let  tlie  latter  do 
his  worst. 

This  is  not  an  order ;  it  is  just  a  thought  which  I  wanted  to  transmit  to  you. 

Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel,  U.  S.  N, 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.  8.  Pacific  Fleet, 
U.   8.   8.   PENN8YLVANIA. 
Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H. 

P.  S.  Your  imagination  may  produce  something  better.  I  hope  it  can.  My 
imagination  just  now  is  almost  beyond  the  elastic  limit.  It  was  working  over- 
time last  night  in  the  White  House  conference,  and  will  again  before  the  night 
is  over. 

Keep  cheerful. 


2172    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Op-IOD-MD 

July  10,  1941. 

Memorandum  for  Admiral  Hart,  Admiral  Kimmeh^  Admiral  King,  Commandants 

OF  ALL  Naval  Districts 

In  an  excellent  paper  which  I  recently  read,  I  was  struck  by  the  paragraph 
quoted  below  and  am  sending  it  to  you  for  further  circulation  or  such  use  as 
you  care  to  make  of  it. 

"It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  unity  and  effectiveness  of  effort  that  has  character- 
ized German  operations  has  been  due  not  only  to  the  organization  of  the  Higher 
Command  and  to  careful  planning  and  training.  /«  a  large  measure,  it  appears 
to  be  due  to  the  fact  that  the  personel  of  all  ranks,  including  the  highest,  is  imbued 
with  a  spirit  of  soldierly  subm^crgenoe  of  self  in  the  accomplishment  of  the  common 
undertaking.  It  is  suggested  that  it  might  tend  toward  the  removal  of  some 
sources  of  friction  in  our  Services  if  a  secret  letter  on  the  subject  were  issued 
to  oflBcers  of  the  higher  ranks,  down  to  and  including  the  grade  of  Colonel  in  the 
Army  and  Captain  in  the  Navy." 

The  lines  italicized  particularly  struck  me. 

I  am  not  aware  of  sources  of  friction  in  our  Services  at  the  present  time. 
While  differences  of  opinion  are  bound  to  crop  up,  not  only  between  the  dif- 
ferent Services,  but  between  forces  of  our  own  Service,  they  are,  so  far  as  I 
know,  being  ironed  out.  Certainly  there  is  the  will  here  in  Washington  to  pull 
together  which  is  bearing  fruit,  and  which  should  ever  grow  stronger  in  purpose 
and  effectiveness. 

There  are  many  leaves  which  we  can  take  out  of  the  German  book — as  well 
as  many  not  to  take, 

H.  R.  Stabk 


In  reply  refer  to  Initials  and  No.  Op-10  Hu 

Navy  Department, 
Office  OF  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Washington,  24  July,  1941. 
Secret  • 

Deiar  Mustapha  :  Haven't  much  to  write  about ;  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  letter 
I  dictated  to  Tommie  Hart  this  morning  contains  what  little  I  have  and  it  is 
darned  little  I  admit. 

This  is  more  just  to  let  you  know  I  am  thinking  about  you  than  anything  else. 
We  are  pushing  recruiting  just  as  hard  as  we  can  and  for  budgetary  purposes 
you  will  be  glad  to  know  the  President  has  okayed  a  figure  of  553,000  enlisted  men 
and  105,000  marines.  Please  give  us  a  "not  too  badly  done"  on  that.  But  what  a 
struggle  it  has  been.  If  we  could  only  have  gone  full  speed  two  years  ago  but 
that  is  water  over  the  dam  and  I  am  only  hoping  and  praying  we  can  take  care 
of  what  we  have  in  sight  to  man. 

I  have  asked  Blandy  to  acquaint  you  with  the  trouble  Tommie  Hart  has  had 
with  his  mines  firing  after  having  been  down  several  hours. 

Believe  it  or  not,  except  for  a  day  or  two  of  scorching  heat,  we  are  having  de- 
lightful summer  weather  in  Washington.  However,  my  fingers  are  crossed  as 
it  is  only  July. 

Am  sending  under  separate  cover  a  copy  of  the  August  number  of  "Coronet". 
Be  sure  to  unfold  the  picture  of  the  mountain  mirror  on  page  86.    Mrs.  Hull  said 
I  should  make  sure  you  did  not  overlook  it. 
All  good  wishes. 
Sincerely, 

/s/    Betty. 
Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel,  U.  S.  Navy, 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.  8.  Paeific  Fleet, 
VSS  PENNSYLVANIA, 

c/o  Postmaster,  San  Francisco,  California, 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2173 

Secret 

Oiv-10  Hu  24  Jui.Y  1941. 

De:ab  Tommie:  Things  are  happening  out  your  way  and  according  to  schedule 
from  dope  we  have  had  in  the  last  couple  of  weeks. 

Yesterday,  before  Nomura  went  to  the  State  Department,  I  had  a  two-hour 
talk  with  him ;  very  interesting,  as  my  previous  talks  with  him  have  been,  and 
of  course  he  is  worried.  I  believe  him  to  be  genuinely  sincere  in  his  desire  that 
Japan  and  the  United  States  do  not  come  to  an  open  rupture.  Of  course,  I  have 
that  same  desire,  but  there  are  many  flies  in  the  ointment,  and  in  my  talks  with 
him  I  have  not  minced  matters  one  particle,  or  minimized  the  difficulties,  or  in 
any  way  condoned  Japan's  present  course  of  action,  or  hesitated  to  discuss  per- 
fectly frankly  the  shallowness  (»f  some  of  the  reasons  she  is  putting  out  in  defense 
of  her  actions.  We  have  had  very  plain  talk.  I  like  him  and,  as  you  know,  he 
has  many  friends  in  our  Navy.  Nomura  dwelt  at  length  on  his  country's  need 
for  the  rice  and  the  minerals  of  Indo-China.  My  guess  is  that  with  the  establish- 
ment of  bases  in  Indo-China,  they  will  stop  for  the  time  being,  consolidate  their 
positions,  and  await  world  reaction  to  their  latest  move.  No  doubt  they  will  use 
their  Indo-China  bases  from  which  to  take  early  action  against  the  Burma  Road. 
Of  course,  there  is  the  possibility  that  they  will  strike  at  Borneo.  I  doubt  that 
this  will  be  done  in  the  near  future,  unless  we  embargo  oil  shipments  to  them. 
This  question  of  embargo  has  been  up  many  times  and  I  have  consistently  opposed 
it  just  as  strongly  as  I  could.  My  further  thought  is  that  they  will  do  nothing 
in  regard  to  the  Maritime  provinces  until  the  outcome  of  the  German-Russian 
war  on  the  continent  is  more  certain.  If  Russians  are  well  beaten  down,  I  think 
it  highly  probable  that  they  will  move  into  Siberia.  Meanwhile,  they  are  merrily 
going  their  way  and  just  where  it  all  will  end  I  do  not  know. 

I  had  a  talk  with  the  President  after  the  Cabinet  meeting  last  Friday  and 
again  yesterday  after  my  chat  with  Nomura,  and  have  succeeded  in  securing  an 
appointment  with  the  President  for  him  today.  I  hope  no  open  rupture  will 
come,  particularly  at  this  time,  but  it  would  be  wishful  thinking  to  eliminate 
such  a  possibility  or  to  think  that  conditions  are  getting  better  rather  than  worse. 
However,  we  can  still  struggle  for  something  better,  and  I  want  you  to  know  that 
I  am. 

[2]  Tour  people  who  have  been  laying  mines  must  have  had  an  interest- 
ing time,  but  just  what  the  Devil  the  cause  is  is  a  conundrum  still.  BuOrd 
went  to  work  on  it  and  did  not  stop  for  several  hours.  I  hope  the  despatch  sent 
you  might  give  some  clue  but,  of  course,  we  shall  be  very  apprehensive  until 
we  know.  I  mentioned  it  to  Admiral  Moore  of  the  British  Navy  who  was  in 
here  yesterday,  and  he  said  that  they  had  the  same  trouble  some  time  back  and 
found  the  cause  in  a  defective  joint  which  permitted  salt  water  to  set  up  electro- 
lytic action  with  sufficient  current  to  fire  the  mine,  and  had  to  recall  all  the 
mines  that  were  made  in  that  particular  lot.  Of  course,  our  mines  had  not  pre- 
yiously  had  that  trouble,  and  I  hope  the  trouble  will  be  found  in  faulty  assembly 
which  can  be  readily  cured.     Any  way,  here's  hopin'. 

I  was  disturbed  no  end  to  learn  that  some  of  your  net  equipment  had  not 
arrived  at  Cavite.  As  soon  as  we  got  your  despatch,  I  immediately  put  Ray 
Spear  on  the  job.  He  got  in  touch  with  Johnny  Greenslade  and  found  that 
eight  (8)  carloads  of  the  flotation  barrels  had  been  loaded  in  the  Navy  Cargo 
Ship  HERCULES  (This  ship  is  being  operated  by  the  Matson  Lines  as  agents 
for  the  Navy  Department.),  due  to  depart  from  San  Francisco  July  20.  He  also 
found  there  were  seven  (7)  carloads  of  barrels  en  route,  by  rail,  due  to  arrive 
in  the  San  Francisco  area  on  July  20.  Arrangements  were  made  to  delay  the 
sailing  of  the  ship  a  day  in  order  to  load  this  additional  shipment  on  board. 
This  has  been  done,  and  the  ship  sailed  on  July  21  and  is  due  to  arrive  at  Cavite 
on  August  10. 

With  the  arrival  of  these  barrels,  you  will  have  all  but  250.  which  are  destined 
for  the  16th  Naval  District.  The  Bureau  of  Ordnance  is  doing  its  utmost  to  get 
these  moving.  The  contractor  (a  firm  in  Conshohocken,  Pennsylvania)  has 
fallen  down  on  deliveries.  They  undertook  to  deliver  100  per  day.  So  far,  they 
have  only  been  able  to  deliver  about  half  that  number.  Ordnance  informs  me 
that  the  250  drums  will  leave  Conshohocken  some  time  this  week. 

You  are  now  undoubtedly  familiar  with  the  Iceland  situation,  and  I  am  glad 
to  say  the  Force  is  back,  and  just  when  the  next  contingent  will  go  has  not  yet 


2174    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

been  decided.     In  both  the  Far  East  and  the  Atlantic,  there  is  plenty  of  potential 
dynamite. 

I  may  say  that  the  State  Department  still  agrees  about  the  gunboats  remain- 
lug  in  China,  but  of  course,  it  is  my  understanding  that  they  could  not  well  be 
removed  at  this  season  anyway. 

I  wish  I  had  more  small  craft  to  send  you  for  District  service,  and  that  goes 
for  practically  every  District  we  have.  The  small  boat  program  was  one  of  the 
most  difficult  I  had  to  get  authorized  and  to  get  money  for.  We  have  several 
hundred  District  craft  under  construction  but,  like  everything  else,  time  is  a 
vital  factor.  We  are  just  doing  the  best  we  can  with  this  proposition.  The 
craft  we  have  converted  have  been  expensive,  costly  of  upkeep,  and  not  too 
satisfactory,  though  I  am  hoping  they  will  get  by  until  replaced  by  better 
material. 

[S]  I  think  I  previously  told  you  I  have  been  pressing  for  months  to  take 
over  the  Coast  Guard,  but  Morgenthau  has  successfully  resisted  until  finally  he 
has  given  away  in  certain  spots ;  for  example,  he  has  just  consented  to  turn  over 
the  Coast  Guard  in  the  Hawaiian  Area  to  our  control.  Also,  we  hope  to  get 
seven  of  their  large  cutters,  which  will  help  a  great  deal  in  the  Atlantic  where 
King  is  pressed  to  the  limit  to  perform  the  tasks  given  him.  I  am  trying  to 
get  their  165-foot  craft  which  also  should  be  of  assistance  in  the  14th  Naval 
District.  Waesche,  Head  of  the  Coast  Guard,  sees  everything  from  our  stand- 
point and  is  a  great  help.  Mr.  Morgenthau  in  many  ways  has  been  more  than 
helpful  to  the  Navy  Department,  but  when  it  comes  to  letting  go  of  the  Coast 
Guard,  he  draws  in.     However,  we  shall  keep  on  trying. 

I  am  late  now  for  a  conference,  and  I  don't  know  if  I  had  a  lot  of  time  I 
could  really  give  you  anything  worth  while,  but  I  feel  a  little  remiss  if  I  don't 
drop  you  a  line. 

Harry  Yarnell  is  here  and  said  he  saw  Caroline  recently  and  that  she  is  fine. 
My  little  brood  are  all  well. 

With  every  good  wish  in  the  wide  world  to  you  as  always. 
Sincerely, 


Admiral  T.  C.  Habt,  VSN, 

Commander  in  Chief,  Asiatic  Fleet, 
V8S  HOUSTON, 
c/o  Postmaster  San  Francisco,  California. 


In  reply  refer  to  Initials  and  No.  Op-lO-MD 
Secret 

Navy  Depabtment, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Opebations, 

Washington,  July  25, 1941. 
Deab  Kimmel:  I  forgot  to  mention  to  you  yesterday  that  you  may  be  called 
upon  to  send  a  carrier  load  of  planes  to  one  of  the  Asiatic  Russian  ports.    I  don't 
know  that  you  will,  but  the  President  has  told  me  to  be  prepared  for  it,  and  I 
want  you  to  have  the  thought. 

We  spent  a  great  deal  of  time  on  the  letter  which  you  will  shortly  get,  relative 
to  the  training  of  pilots.  Before  sending  it,  I  had  King's  complete  Okay.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  he  didn't  change  a  word  of  it.  I  hope  it  will  be  equally  satisfactory 
to  you. 

Sincerely, 


Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmeh:., 

V.  8.  8.  PENNSYLVANIA, 

Fleet  Post  Office,  Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H. 


Secret  Rec'd.  8  Aug.  1130 

Op-10  Hu 

Navt  Department, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval,  Operations, 

Washington,  2  August  19^1. 
Deae  Kimmel  :  I  am  grateful  for  your  letter  of  the  26th  of  July.    We  shall  go 
after  it  paragraph  by  paragraph  but  it  may  take  a  little  time.    It  is  a  good  sum- 
mary and  we  are  glad  to  get  an  occasional  check  of  this  sort. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  2175 

Also  would  be  glad  if  you  could  give  us  occasionally  a  little  personnel  interest 
as  well  as  material  and  I  would  more  than  welcome  a  little  conversational  "think- 
ing out  loud"  on  how  the  morale  of  the  Fleet  is  holding,  how  the  visits  to  the 
West  Coast  are  working  out  from  that  standpoint,  how  the  target  practices  are 
coming  along,  etc.  etc. 

We  nor  the  British  have  no  one  at  the  front  in  the  Russian-German  war 
though  both  the  Army  and  Navy  have  made  every  effort  to  this  end.  From  the 
press,  therefore,  you  have  about  as  much  information  as  we  have.  There  is  no 
doubt  they  are  willing  to  pay  the  price  where  the  stakes  are  worth  it.  The  next 
month  or  six  weeks  should  clarify  the  picture. 

I  have  written  to  Savvy  Cooke  who  has  been  good  enough  to  write  me  occa- 
sionally giving  me  his  ideas  which,  as  you  know,  I  value  so  highly  having  gotten 
the  habit  when  he  was  heading  War  Plans  here.  I  am  always  glad  to  hear  from 
him.  I  have  asked  Savvy  to  show  you  my  letter  if  he  thinks  there  is  anything  in  it 
worth  while.  Am  enclosing  copy  Bloch  might  find  something  interesting.  Good 
luck 

Keep  cheerful. 

Betty. 

Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel,  V.  S.  Navy, 
Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet, 
USS  PENNSYLVANIA, 
Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H. 

Tell  Ad.  Bloch — I  have  just  directed  sending  him  12  P.  T's — 40  knot-craft. 
HRS. 


Copy  Adm.  Kimmel 

Secret 

Op-10  Hu 

31  July  1941. 

Dear  Savvy:  I  am  grateful  to  you  for  your  letters  and  hope  that  regardless 
of  the  unsatisfactoriness  of  my  answers  or  my  failure  to  answer,  you  will  con- 
tinue to  write ; — it  seems  like  old  times. 

This  is  going  to  be  short  and  general.  I  think  you  should  burn  it  after  show- 
ing it  to  Kimmel. 

Some  of  the  things  that  you  have  asked,  and  some  of  the  things  which  Kimmel 
has  recently  asked,  and  which  I  will  answer  as  soon  as  I  can,  are  things  for 
which  I  have  been  striving  to  get  answers  in  Washington.  The  press  on  many 
of  these  points  really  gives  you  as  much  information  as  I  have. 

Within  forty-eight  hours  after  the  Russian  situation  broke,  I  went  to  the 
President,  with  the  Secretary's  approval,  and  stated  that  on  the  assumption  that 
the  Country'  decision  is  not  to  let  England  fall,  we  should  immediately  seize 
the  psychological  opportunity  presented  by  the  Russian-German  clash  and 
announce  and  start  escorting  immediately,  and  protecting  the  Western  Atlantic 
on  a  large  scale;  that  such  a  declaration,  followed  by  immediate  action  on  our 
part,  would  almost  certainly  involve  us  in  the  war  and  that  I  considered  every 
day  of  delay  in  our  getting  into  the  war  as  dangerous,  and  that  much  more 
delay  might  be  fatal  to  Britain's  survival.  I  reminded  him  that  I  had  been 
asking  this  for  months  in  the  State  Departmsnt  and  elsewhere,  etc.  etc.  etc. 
I  have  been  maintaining  that  only  a  war  psychology  could  or  would  speed  things 
up  the  way  they  should  be  speeded  up ;  that  strive  as  we  would  it  just  isn't  in 
the  nature  of  things  to  get  the  results  in  peace  that  we  would,  were  we  at  war. 

The  Iceland  situation  may  produce  an  "incident".  You  are  as  familiar  with 
that  and  the  President's  statements  and  answers  at  press  conferences  as  I  am. 
Whether  or  not  we  will  get  an  "incident"  because  of  the  protection  we  are  giving 
Iceland  and  the  shipping  which  we  must  send  in  support  of  Iceland  and  our 
troops,  I  do  not  know.     Only  Hitler  can  answer. 

The  Far  Eastern  situation  has  been  considerably  changed  because  of  the 
entrance  of  Russia  into  the  picture. 

Personally,  I  threw  into  the  arena  that  we  consider  along  with  the  British  a 
point  protectorate  over  the  Dutch  Ea.st  Indies,  as  a  move  calculated  to  prevent 
further  spread  of  war  in  the  Far  East.  It  is  a  debatable  question.  Certainly 
there  can  be  no  joy  in  our  camp  over  the  occupation  of  Indo-China.  I  think  it 
is  fairly  safe  to  say  [2]  opinion  here  in  general  holds  that  Japan  will 
not  go*  into  the  N.  E.  I.  Incidentally,  we  are  not  nearly  so  dependent  on  raw 
materials  from  the  Near  East  as  the  Public  envisages.  The  real  problem  is  a 
British  one — and  hence  our  consideration. 


2176     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

As  you  probably  know  from  our  despatches,  and  from  my  letters,  we  have  felt 
that  the  Maritime  Provinces  are  now  definitely  Japanese  objectives.  Turner 
thinks  Japan  will  go  up  there  in  August.  He  may  be  right.  He  usually  is.  My 
thought  has  been  that  while  Japan  would  ultimately  go  to  Siberia,  she  would 
delay  going  until  she  had  the  Indo-China-Thailand  situation  more  or  less  to  her 
liking  and  until  there  is  some  clarification  of  the  Russian-German  clash.  Also  she 
may  concentrate  on  the  China  "incident".  Of  course,  embargoes  or  near  embar- 
goes may  cause  any  old  kind  of  an  upset  and  make  a  reestimate  of  the  situation 
necessary. 

Regarding  the  Philippines,  as  you  know,  even  since  I  came  here  I  have  urged 
increasing  their  defenses.  The  Navy's  contribution  has  not  been  great,  but  it  has 
been  about  all  Hart  can  handle  with  the  facilities  he  has  or  which  we  have  been 
able  to  make  available.  S'till,  the  increase  is  a  factor,  namely  28  PBYs  and  11 
modern  submarines. 

We  are  delighted  with  the  Army  move  putting  the  Filipinos  in  harness ;  we 
recommended  this.  Also  it  is  being  supplemented  by  a  considerable  number  of 
planes,  fighters  and  bombers.  The  Philippines  are  not  too  easy  a  proposition  to 
crack  right  now,  and  in  a  couple  of  months  the  Army  will  have  50,000  odd  men 
there  under  arms.    But  that  is  two  months  away. 

As  for  sending  the  Fleet  to  the  Far  East,  I  still  have  literally  to  fight  for  every 
auxiliary  ship  1  get.  Tonnage  now  making  the  British  Isles  is  less  than  they  need 
for  their  maximum  effort.  There  just  isn't  enough  shipping  in  the  world  to  go 
around.  If  we  cannot  proi)erly  support  the  Near  East  and  the  British  Isles,  it  is 
obvious  we  could  not  support  our  Fleet  in  the  Far  East,  unless  we  very  greatly 
slowed  up  in  the  Atlantic. 

Our  trade  with  South  America  has  been  greatly  restricted  and  the  pressure 
from  there  is  another  thing  I  have  to  contend  with. 

Recently  we  asked  for  some  small  ships  of  very  moderate  draft  to  supply  our 
forces  in  Iceland.  We  simply  had  to  get  them,  but  were  told  we  would  have  to  give 
up  an  equivalent  tonnage  from  our  recent  acquisitions  with  which  I  think  you 
and  Kimmel  are  familiar  and  among  which,  for  example,  are  the  four  transports 
to  train  marines  on  the  West  Coast  plus  AKs,  AEs,  AFs,  etc.,  etc.  Thank  the 
good  Lord,  I  was  able  to  get  the  President  to  hold  this  in  abeyance  pending  a 
chance  for  Jerry  Land  and  me  somehow  or  other,  to  work  it  out  without  taking 
anything  away  from  the  Navy. 

Whenever  we  have  a  tanker  available  for  ten  days  or  so,  we  immediately  try  and 
help  Maritime  out.  If  we  send  something  anywhere  and  the  ship  is  coming  back 
with  any  space  available  we  offer  Maritime  the  spare  cargo  space.  The  world 
shipping  situation  is  plain  [3]  rotten.  Sometimes  I  wonder  that  with  the 
opposition  we  have  had,  (and  it  is  good,  intelligent  opposition)  that  we  have 
gotten  as  far  as  we  have.  If  any  of  our  cargo  ships  are  coming  from  Hawaii  to 
the  Coast  light,  we  should  offer  the  space  to  Maritime. 

The  pressure,  incidentally,  to  give  what  we  have  in  ships,  guns,  ammunition, 
material,  and  what  not,  to  those  actually  fighting  is  constant,  and  increasing. 
Several  times  recently  I  have  been  approached  for  destroyers  and  the  Lord  knows 
what  not.  Marshall's  troubles  in  this  respert  are  legion  and  of  course  the  fellow 
at  the  front  wants  frequently  what  we  most  lack,  particularly  such  things  as 
50  caliber  ammunition,  anti-aircraft  weapons,  patrol  vessels,  fire  control,  guns 
for  merchant  ships,  etc.,  etc. 

Do  not  think  for  a  minute  that  I  am  not  terribly  disturbed  about  our  lack  of 
Radar  on  which  I  started  pushing  the  scientific  gang  before  I  had  been  here  a 
month,  and  also  the  production  gang,  so  that  I  should  think  they  would  hate  to 
hear  me  mention  the  subject. 

Mike  Robinson  called  me  up  this  morning  and  said  he  was  sending  me  a  twelve 
page  explanation  of  what  they  have  done  in  the  last  year.  From  the  Fleet  stand- 
point and  mine,  and  of  course  from  Mike's  too,  we  all  want  more  tangible  evidence. 
The  fact  that  our  new  aircraft  carriers  will  not  be  available  until  1944  is  some- 
thing that  is  awfully  hard  to  stomach,  and  I  confess  to  considerable  indigestion 
because  of  it,  but  whether  or  not  there  is  a  suitable  remedy,  I  do  not  know. 

The  converted  LONG  ISLAND  is  promising  for  her  size,  in  fact  better  than  we 
had  hoped  for.  We  have  six  more  converting  which  will  have  much  longer  decks 
and  be  superior  in  every  way.  We  are  keeping  at  this  as  a  stop-gap  but  here  again 
it  was  not  easy  to  get  the  ships.  They  will,  in  all  probability,  go  to  the  British, 
if  we  are  not  in  the  war  when  they  are  completed.  In  fact  we  are  doing  the  work 
on  Lend-lease. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2177 

I  have  been  much  distressed  over  the  oi)eratiiig  troubles  we  have  liad  with  our 
new  planes.  Of  course  tiiey  are  gradually  being  eliminated  but  it  takes  time. 
I  still  am  glad  for  the  200  I'BY  rei)eats  we  early  made  and  which  are  coming 
along.  Of  course  they  haven't  got  what  the  later  ones  will  ha»ve  in  range  and 
performance,  etc.  Also,  performance  will  be  handicapped  by  armor  and  protec- 
tive features ;  but  we  will  have  them,  and  they  have  not  delayed  the  newer  models. 

Towers  will  have  given  you  all  the  picture  on  the  air  game.  He  went  out  a 
good  deal  at  my  insistence.  With  regard  to  the  air,  I  know  also  that  the  training 
situation  has  been  a  good  deal  of  a  niglitmare.  If  anybody  can  convince  us  of  a 
better  solution  than  the  one  we  recently  sent  out,  we  would  be  glad  to  get  it. 

To  some  of  my  very  pointed  questions,  which  all  of  us  would  like  to  have 
answered,  I  get  a  smile  or  a  "Betty,  please  don't  ask  me  that".  Policy  seems  to 
be  something  never  fixed,  always  fluid  and  changing.  There  is  no  use  kicking  on 
what  you  can't  get  definite  answei-s.  God  knows  I  would  surrender  this  job 
quickly  if  somebody  else  wants  to  take  it  up  and  I  have  offered  to,  more  than  once. 
Some  [4]  generous  souls  have  been  charitable  enough  to  ask  me  to  stick. 
I  shall,  as  long  as  I  think  I  can  be  of  use,  or  rather  that  they  think  so. 

We  are  doing  what  we  can  for  China  and  taking  unheard  of  chances  on  neu- 
trality; or  rather  unneutrality.  This  along  with  sanctions  on  Japan  make  her 
road  certainly  not  less  easy. 

Reverting  to  Japan  again  and  to  her  holding  off  in  Siberia  until  the  Russian- 
German  situation  somewhat  clarifies,  I  also  think  it  possible,  if  not  probable, 
that  one  of  the  reasons  for  Indo-China,  and  her  pressure  on  Thailand,  is  a  better 
position  for  an  "all  out"  to  clean  up  in  China.    I  take  my  hat  off  to  the  Chinks. 

As  to  the  war  and  what  people  in  this  country  are  thinking;  I  hesitate  to  say. 
However,  I  believe  that  the  proportion  of  our  population  which  feels  we  should 
enter  this  war  is  relatively  small,  and  that  with  the  majority  it  is  still  more 
or  less  an  academic  question,  perhaps  largely  because  of  its  distance  from  us. 
Whether  or  not  that  sentiment  might  change  over  night,  I  don't  know. 

We  are  somewhat  of  a  volatile  people  but  I  am  afraid  that  the  many  events 
which  have  happened  with  no  resultant  definite  action  on  our  part,  are  having 
their  effect.  Had  the  Tutuila  been  hit  and  sunk  it  might  have  created  a  wave 
of  public  opinion  which  would  have  meant  something.  As  it  is,  nobody  seems 
to  give  much  of  a  damn  about  it,  although  the  principle  involved  is  the  same, 
even  though  there  was  no  loss  of  life,  or  sinking.  On  the  other  hand,  I  believe 
the  people  would  follow  the  President  in  any  positive  action — such  as  escort — 
which  he  might  take. 

We  shall  give  aid  to  Russia.  However,  nothing,  to  date,  has  shaken  my  original 
estimate  that  the  Germans  will  take  their  limited  objectives.  She  is  having 
much  more  diflSculty  than  she  anticipated.  Of  course  I  could  hope  the  cost 
will  be  crippling.    Only  time  will  tell. 

I  have  urged  propaganda  wherever  we  could  use  it,  particularly  in  South 
America,  in  France  and  in  Africa.  French  Africa  still  has  a  semblance  of  inde- 
pendence against  anyone  who  may  attack  it.  There  is  no  doubt  in  my  mind  that 
the  Germans  could  have  cleare<l  up  in  the  Near  East  had  they  gone  in  that  direc- 
tion instead  of  to  Russia.  What  will  follow  the  Russian  campaign  is  still  a 
question  mark.  Certainly  British  strength  is  far  from  what  it  should  be  in 
the  Near  East  area. 

Believe  it  or  not,  I  am  still  keeping  cheerful,  doing  the  best  I  can;  chafing 
that  I  can  not  do  more  and  wide  open  to  suggestion. 

Before  you  destroy  this  letter  I  would  be  glad,  if  you  [5]  think  there 
is  anything  of  interest  in  it,  to  have  Admiral  Bloch  as  well  as  Admiral  Kimmel 
look  over  it;  in  fact  I  was  going  to  write  Kimmel,  so  will  let  tbis  partly  serve. 

Will  not  attempt  to  edit  this  "thinking  out  loud"  on  a  busy  morning.  Please 
be  charitable  as  to  its  lack  of  continuity.,    etc.  etc. 

With  all  good  wishes  and  good  luck. 

Sincerely, 

Captain  Charles  M.  Cooke,  Jr.,  USN., 
USS  Pennsylvania, 

%  PoHtmaMer  San  Francisco,  California. 

P.  S.  I  apologize  for  the  "short"  in  the  second  paragraph.    Just  got  to  rambling. 

P.  S.  #2.    On  second  thought,  I  am  enclosing  an  extra  copy  of  this  for  Kimmel 

which  he  can  show  to  Admiral  Bloch,  though  I  confess  one  fellow's  estimate  is 

as  good  as  another  and  I  really  wonder  whether  this  letter  is  worth  while,  but 

anyway,  as  you  know,  it  comes  with  all  good  wishes  and  good  luck  to  you  all. 


2178    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Obviously,  the  situation  in  ttie  Far  East  continues  to  deteriorate;  this  is  one 
thing  that  is  factual. 

Keep  cheerful. 

One  more  P.  S. — I  am  sending  Kimrael  the  copy  of  this  letter.  When  I  got 
to  thinking  out  loud  I  was  really  talking  to  you  all  including  Admiral  Hart,  to 
whom  I  am  also  sending  a  copy. 

H.  R.  S. 
[J]         In  reply  refer  to  Initials  and  No. 

Navy  Department, 
Office  of  the  Chibt  of  Naval  Operations, 

Washington,  August  21,  1941. 
Personal  &  Confidential 

Deab  Kimmel:  I  have  your  despatch  giving  your  reaction  to  the  personnel 
requested  from  you  for  the  comniLssioning  of  two  new  squadrons  of  patrol  planes 
and  the  squadrons  for  the  HORNET,  plus  certain  additional  men  required  for 
Kodiak  and  Dutch  Harbor.     This  picture  is  set  down  on  the  enclosed  sheet. 

We  know  how  tight  the  personnel  situation  is ;  also  the  seriousness  of  the 
Pacific  situation  which  continues  to  deteriorate.  We  have  tried  to  look  at  the 
whole  situation  as  it  exists  at  present  and  as  it  will  continue  to  confront  us,  war 
or  no  war,  with  the  expansion  now  taking  place  in  planes  for  the  Fleet  (or 
if  you  will,  call  them  replacements,  because  losses  are  bound  to  occur  once  we 
get  in). 

The  training  problem  we  have  already  gone  over  with  you. 

The  greater  part  of  the  burden  of  supplying  personnel  for  the  squadrons  now 
forming  has  been  placed  on  the  Atlantic  Fleet.  We  have  the  Atlantic  Fleet 
practically  at  the  elastic  limit  with  the  demands  just  made  on  it  which  are 
greater  than  the  demands  made  on  you,  and  in  a  situation  where  they  are  now 
operating,  in  many  respects,  on  a  war  time  .schedule — keeping  the  routes  to  and 
from  Iceland  under  surveillance  as  one  example. 

As  we  see  it  here,  after  complying  with  Bunav's  despatches,  you  would  be  left 
with  112%  of  your  allowance  of  aviation  machinist  mates,  119%  of  aviation 
metalsmiths,  118%  of  aviation  ordnance  men  and  105%  of  all  radiomen.  This 
is  an  overall  picture  of  numbers  in  each  rating  group  from  the  Base  Force  report 
of  30  June.  We  realize  that  the  distribution  of  ratings  in  each  rating  group 
leaves  considerable  to  be  desired. 

[2]  The  shore  establishments,  including  four  main  flight  training  centers, 
have  only  61%  allowance  of  aviation  ratings,  including  radiomen.  Further  reduc- 
tion there  is  just  not  practicable.  Rather  must  the  complements  of  the  flight 
training  centers  be  increased  to  approximately  100%  in  numbers,  by  January, 
in  order  to  maintain  the  training  schedule  of  those  stations,  and  to  permit  the 
stations  to  function  at  maximum  capacity,  which  they  must  do  to  meet  their  pilot 
production  schedule  necessary  for  your  needs. 

To  man  new  squadrons  we  recently  called  on  the  existing  units  in  the  Atlantic 
for  298  aviation  ratings.  In  addition  the  Atlantic  Fleet  is  supplying  105  aviation 
ratings  for  advanced  bases. 

Manning  these  new  squadrons  is  of  paramount  importance  and  we  feel  must 
take  precedence  over  duplicate  flight  crews  for  existing  squadrons.  Duplicate 
crews  will  come  in  due  time,  provided  we  do  not  neglect  training  now,  but  will 
never  came  if  we  continue  to  curtail  the  training  program.  Intensive  training 
in  aviation  ratings  and  radiomen  (qual-air)  must  be  undertaken  afloat  to  assist 
in  supplying  trained  personnel  for  the  expansion  program.  The  same  is  true 
of  all  ratings. 

Now  here's  another  shock :  Patrons  91,  92,  and  93  will  be  formed  the  last  of 
this  calendar  year  and  additional  rated  men  will  have  to  be  supplied  for  them. 
Tuck  it  in  the  back  of  your  head. 

Taking  up  Comairscofor's  despatch  of  18  August : 

1.  We  are  complying  with  his  recommendation  (a)  that  insofar  as  possible 
we  recruit  from  Patvvings  Atlantic. 

2.  We  will  not  reduce  your  qual-air  radiomen  below  one  per  patrol  plane. 
In  making  this  concession  it  is  necessary  to  ask  that  you  increase  the  rate  at 
which  radiomen  are  qualified  for  duty  in  patrol  planes  in  the  Pacific  Fleet. 

3.  Due  to  the  installation  of  special  blind  landing  instruments  it  is  considered 
that  radiomen  with  aircraft  experience  should  be  assigned  to  Dutch  Harbor  and 
to  Kodiak. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2179 

[3]  4.  Comairscofor's  recommendation  (d)  applies  with  equal  force  to  either 
coast.  Inasmuch  as  Patron  84  will  be  stationed  in  the  Atlantic,  we  thought  it 
better  to  organize  it  in  the  Atlantic.  Of  course  this  picture  might  change.  We 
can  only  handle  it  as  far  as  we  can  see. 

I  wanted  to  give  you  the  above  and  then  ask  you  to  transfer  yourself  to  my 
seat  and  what  I  am  up  aaginst  here,  and  tell  me  whether  or  not  you  think  our 
original  order  the  best  all-around  solution  to  an  obviously  vexing  and  difficult 
problem. 

The  Atlantic  Fleet  is  worse  off  in  aviation  ratings  than  the  Pacific  due  to  the 
greater  demands  which  we  have  made  on  it.  The  Atlantic  continuously  lighting 
fog,  long  hours,  and  night  work.  Many  of  the  Atlantic  units  are  operating  from 
advanced  bases  along  the  northern  route — Iceland,  Newfoundland  and  New 
England,  with  some  operations  in  Greenland. 

Nimitz  is  sending  you  a  despatch  today  holding  up  execution  of  Bunav's 
serials  1450,  1394,  1397  and  1406  of  August  11th  until  September  15th. 

Please  acknowledge  receipt  of  this  letter  by  despatch.  I  would  be  glad  to  get 
your  reply  at  the  earliest  practicable  moment.  We  shall  endeavor  not  to  renew 
demands  on  you  prior  to  15  September. 

It  is  a  time  when  a  "feller  needs  a  friend",  no  matter  where  he  is  sitting,  in 
the  Atlantic,  in  the  Pacific  or  in  Washington. 

I  am  just  back  from  the  meeting  in  the  Atlantic.  Am  wading  into  a  mass  of 
mail  which  accumulated  during  ray  two  weeks  of  absence.  Will  drop  you  a  line 
giving  you  the  best  picture  I  can  in  a  day  or  two.  Meanwhile,  many  thanks  for 
your  letters  which  I  found  waiting,  which  were  extremely  interesting,  and  which 
I  shall  circulate  to  all  concerned.  Particularly  did  I  enjoy  the  interesting  news 
in  your  letter  of  12  August. 

[.^1  I  have  just  dictated  the  above  in  the  presence  of  and  with  the  help  of 
Nimitz,  Forrest  Sherman,  Brainard  and  Ramsey  (Towers  being  away ) .  Ingersoll, 
J  am  glad  to  say,  is  getting  a  much-needed  vacation.  All  join  me  in  sending  you 
good  luck  and  best  wishes  to  all  hands. 

Keep  cheerful ! 
Sincerely, 

/s/    Betty 

Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel,  U.  S.  N., 

Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  • 

V.  S.  S.  PENNSYLVANIA, 

c/o  Postmaster,  San  Francisco,  California. 


2180    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


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EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2181 

(Rec'd.  3  Sept.) 
Navy  Department, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Opekations, 

Washington,  August  22,  ]941. 
In  reply  refer  to  Initials  and  Nos.  HRS/mjf 
Secret 

Deak  Kimmel:  When  I  left  I  asked  Ingersoll  to  reply  to  your  letter.  The 
enclosed  draft  I  have  just  inherited.  In  order  to  get  it  off  to  you  in  the  next 
clipper,  I  am  sending  it  along  as  is,  except  for  some  pencil  notes  (both  red  and 
black)  which  I  have  just  added. 

I  know  you  want  results,  not  excuses.  So  do  I.  I  am  doing  everything  from 
pleading  to  cussing  with  all  the  in-between  variations  and  hope  the  picture 
presented  is  not  too  unsatisfactory. 

I  realize  that  in  addition  to  this  letter  I  have  two  more  of  yours  to  answer 
which  I  shall  try  to  get  at  the  first  of  the  week,  if  I  can  clear  up  urgent,  current 
material  now  on  my  desk.     Still  wading  into  the  pile  I  found  on  my  return. 

There  is  much  doing  in  the  Atlantic  in  the  formative  stage.  Thank  God  we 
should  have  things  in  full  swing  before  long  and  with  plans  fairly  complete.  It 
has  changed  so  many  times — but  now  I  think  we  at  last  have  something  fairly 
definite — may-be. 

To  your  own  situation  I  am  giving  every  thought  I  know  how.  You  may  rest 
assured  that  just  as  soon  as  I  get  anything  of  definite  interest,  I  shall  fire  it 
along. 

My  best  to  your  fine  District  mate,  (Admiral  Block)  and  to  all  with  you, 
and  as  always — 

Best  of  luck — wish  you  were  close  by 
Sincerely, 

/s/    Betty. 
Admiral  Husband  E.  Kimmel,  U.  S.  N. 

VS8  Pennsylvania,  Flagship,  Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H. 


2182     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

SSSaiL  .         iUgut  19i  1941 

Dear  Muitapha:  .■  ^    -r-      /.  ^     Z.    ^^'^ 

Your  letter  of  26  July  1941  arrived  i^  the  Navy  Department 
on  the  eve  of  my  departure  for  dietant  parts.  It  was  fine  to  hear  from 
you,  and  I  appreciate  your  laying  before  me  so  frankly  the  thoughts  that 
are  gois^  through  your  mind. 

My  reply  to  you  has  been  delayed  for  two  reasonet 

1>  there  was  unsuffictent  time  between  the  receipt  of 
your  letter  and  my  departure  to  prepare  a  reply,  and 

2.  So  mai>y  of  the  points  you  raised  I  had  hoped  to  have 
the  answers  ^<^upon  ny  return  to  the  Navy  Department. 

I  can  readily  understand  your  wish  to  kept  informed  as  to 
the  Department's  policies  and  decisions  ejid  the  changes  thereto  which 
must  necessarily  be  made  tc  meet  the  changes  In  the  international  situ- 
ation. This,  we  are  trying  to  do,  auid  if  you  do  not  get  as  much  Infor- 
mation as  you  think  you  should  get,  the  answer  probably  is  that  the 
particular  situation  which  is  upoermost  in  your  mlad  has  Just  not  Jelled 
sufficiently  for  us  to  give  you  anything  authoritative. 

So  far  as  the  Russian  situation  Is  concerned,  and  the  degree 
of  cooperation  that  will  prevail  between  that  country  and  ourselVes  If 
and  when  we  become  ectlve  participants  In  the  war,  little  can  be  said 
at  the  moment.  Some  slight  aid  is  being  sent  to  Russia.  Five  bombers 
and  200  B-40's  have  already  been  allocated.  The  bombers  will  be  flown 
to  RussIp  via  Iceland  and  the  British  are  supplying  bottoms  for  the 
fighters  and  naval  escorts  for  sane.  On  11  .August  1941,  the  Russian 
Mission,  headed  by  Ambassador  Oumansky,  and  assisted  by  a  Lieutenant 
General  of  their  Jtrmy  ead  a  Captain  of  their  Navy,  was  received  by 
Secretary  Knox.  The  Ambassador  stated  thpt  his  country  had  pressing 
need  for  all  manner  of  military  supt)lie8(  pl&aes  -  and  sjiti-aircraft 
guns  in  particular.  He  announced  that  "quantities"  of  bombs,  ammunition, 
and  machine  tools  were  needed.  The  Secretary  explained  to  the  Mission 
that  the  material  they  needed  was  largely  of  Army  origin,  and  thfi.t  there 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2183 

were  no  ri,s>-rvu  stocks  in  th>-  country  frcra  v/hich  to  draw.  The  Socr^tarj' 
summarized  his  r<.marks  by  saying  that,  since  the  President  had  made 
the  decision  to  give  aid  to  Russia,  the  Navy  could  be  counti^d  upon  to 
cooperate  to  the  utmost. 

You  are  correct  in  stating  that  "the  new  situation  opens  up 
possibilities  for  us  ivhich  should  bo  fully  explored."  This  v.lll  be  done. 
The  conversations  v.-hich  took  placc^bctween  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  on  11-12 
August  soraewhat  helped  to  crj^stalize  thought  on  the  matter.  Specifically, 
no  decision  vras  reached   cs  to  v;hether  or  not  England  rrculd  declare  war 
on  Japan  if  the  Japanese  attack  the  Ilaritine  Provinces.  Neither  can  I 
forecast  rrhat  our  action  w.uld  be  if  Enrlind  declared  var  on  Japan  as 
a  result  cf  the  latter' s  attack  en  the  pro'/inces  in  question. -t/XMuyot-C  ^jjJ  ^ 

Of  course,  Japanese  action  against  the  Iiaritinc  provinces  re- 
mains a  decided  possibility.  The  results  of  such  aggressive  action, 
of  course,  lies  in  the  realm  of  conjecture.  Hov/ever,  it  is  mj'  ov/n 
thought  that  if  Japan  gets  embroiled  vdth  Russia  over  the  Maritime  prov- 
inces, such  action  could  hardly  react  other  than  to  sonev/hat  relifc-\% 
the  prt-ssure  novj-  being  exerted  by  Japan  to  the  southward. 

If  England  declares  war  on  Japan,  but  v;e  do  not,  I  very  much 
suppose  that  we  would  follow  a  coxirse  of  action  similar  to  the  one  vre 
arc  now  pursuing  in  the  Atlantic  as  n  neutral.  It  is,  of  course,  con- 
ceivable that  wc  would  lay  down  a  '■'estem  Tonisphero  Defense  plan  with 
reference  to  the  Pacific.  ^^:)',  ^u>i  /.o ■  >-(.  cnt,  -     tit',^   .a^,'^   ^■^rM-ur  V 

'7e  are  in  coapl..te  agreer.^nt  about  developing  Guam  and  bolster- 
ing the  defenses  of  the  Philippines.  The  Arr-ij'-  is  Sundinc;  everything  it 
can  out  there.  As  you  know,  we  are  sending  Tomm^''  some  PTs.  Ilorc  aid    ^ 
would  be  sent  him  if  it  were  possible  to  do  so.   I  fear,  however,  that 
it  is  pretty  .late  tc  start  on  Guam  anything  more  than  V7e  already  have 
in  hand.  Tfe  will  make  all  the  progress  v;e  con,  remuTibering  that  "Dcrllars 
Cannot  Buy  Yesterday." 


2184     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


SECRET 


In  discussing  the  priorities  in  connection  '.-rith  pn-paration 

for  a  Pajific  V/ar,  for  your  convenience,  I  shall  quote  the  paraf3raphs 

fron  youFyjlettcr  andyyComment. 

Paragraph  2(a)  of  your  letter.  Transports  and  Light  Destroyer 
Transports.  During  the  Commander-inChief 's  visit  to  '.Tashincton,ali 
the  transports,  including  the  light  destroyer  transports,  v.-ere  trans- 
ferred to  the  Atlantic.  The  nec«-S3it3'-  for  this  is  recccnized.  Never- 
theless, We  still  ni.:cd  transports  in  the  Pacific  and  the  need  is  even 
greater  ncvf  (in  point  of  view  of  tine  particularly)  because  inost  of  ■ 
our  trained  marines  T/^nt  vTith  the  transports  and  v^e  are  faced  with  an 
inncdiate  training  problen  in  addition  to  a  possible  vrar  situation. 
The  Department  has  initiated  action  to  co-plet^^  th^  M/'JIRIS  and  ZlilLIi! 
and  to  acquire  and  convert  four  nore  trcJi?;ports  for  the  Pacific,  but, 
so  far  as  is  Inoivn,  has  done  nothing  about  replajing  the  li-'ht  destroyer 
transports  (APD's).  Those  vessels  vfero  jriginally  conceived  and  devel- 
oped foi-  a  Pacific  canpaign.  T)-.ey  arc  especially  suitable  for  use.  in 
attacks  on  atolls  and  roay  be  the  only  i.-.^ans  of  readily  attaokj.ng  those 
positions.  Y.Tiile  by  no  moans  discounting  tlieir  usefulni-ss  in  the  Atl.'-Ji- 
tic,  the  need  for  then  in  the  Pacific  is  paranoimt.  If  at  all  possible, 
they  sould  be  retum>-d  to  this  ocean  at  once.  If  this  cannot  be  done, 
and  only  if  it  cannot  be  dont,  additional  destroyers  must  be  converted 
as  soon  as  possible.  V.'ork  on  the  large  trcjisports  nust  also  be  eiipedited 
and  completion  dat>..s  anticipated  if  possible. 

Comment.  Ti'e  all  recognize  that  the  APD's  were  dev>. loped 

vrith  a  Pacific  campaign  in  mind.  Vi'o  vdthdrew  them  to  the  Atlrjitic  with 

great  reluctance,  and  you  can  count  on  their  being  returned  to  the 

Pacific  at  the  earliest  opportunity.  Like^vrise,  work  is  being  pushed 

on  the  HARRIS  and  ZEILH'I.   I  must  confess  that  progress'  on  those  r.hips 

has  not  been  wholly  satisfactory. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2185 

SECRET 
ROUGH  DR.'JT  FOR  .\DI.:iR.'J.  KULiEL'S  LETTER  August  l6,  19U1 

Paragraph  2  (b)  of  your  letter  -  Marine  Equipment.  The  Sixth 
Defense  Battalion  docs  not  now  have  its  full  equipment,  particularly  -U 
guns  and  .30  and  .$0  caliber  machine  sj-ons.  The  remaininc  units  of  the 
Second  Marine  Division  were  stripped  of  much  of  tlieir  equipment  to  fit 
out  the  reenforccd  regiment  that  went  East.  There  is  practically  no 
marine  ammunition  now  on  the  Vfest  Coast.   It  is  practically  certain  that 
these  units  will  fight  before  the  /jTiiy  Mdll  and  their  needs  must  be  given 
priority.  We  can't  fight  an  amphibious  v/ar  in  the  Pacific  without  ammu- 
nition, for  the  marines. 

We  are  going  ahead  with  the  preparation  of  a  camp  in 
Oahu  for  five  thousand  marines.  V/hen  they  come,  they  should  be  fully 
equipped  for  -Tinphibious  warfare.  The  transports  etc.,  should  be  psady 
at  the  same  time.  ^Vn  estimate  of  v/hen  the  needed  equipment  and  men  will 
be  available  would  help  us  in  our  planning. 

Comment.  In  reference  to  the  3"  -U  pins,  and  the  .30  caliber 
machine  guns  of  the  Sixth  Defense  Battalion,  reports  received  at  Head- 
quarters, Marine  Corps  indicate  that  that  organization  has  had  all  of  its 
initial  allowances  in  those  weapons  since  7  Jiily  19lil;  that  is,  12  -  3" 
iU  guns,  and  30  -  .30  caliber  machine  guns.  The  shortage  in  .^0  caliber 
X.\  machine  guns  should  be  remedied  by  SepteiTiber,  19Ul. 

^\n  outline  of  the  present  situation  in  reference  to 
Marine  equipment  and  related  matters,  as  well  as  an  estimate  as  to  when 
this  equipment  will  be  available  is  contained  in  CNO  Serial  083312  which 

•Jas  forwarded  to  the  Commander  in  Chief,  U.  3.  Pacific  Fleet  about  2^ 
July  l^lA.  It  is  "jelievGd  that  this  presents  as  complete  a  picture  as 
is  possible  at  thi.s  time.  The  bulk  of  the  shortages  in  equipment  and 
ammunition  lies  in  items  which  must  be  procured  from  the  .tony.  Existing 
stocks  in  the  United  States  arc  at  prcscint  much  too  low  to  meet  the  re- 
quirements of  all  Services.  Proportionate  allocations  of  new  equipment 
for  all  Services  have  been  made  by  the  Joint  Board,  and  the  Navy  and  Mar- 
ine Corps  may  expect  their  proporti6n  to  be  delivered  from  the  manufactur- 
ers more  steadily  and  conc-istcntly  in  the  future  than  heretofore. 

The  general  shortages  in  ammunition  for  the  Marine  Forces  are 
likely  to  exist  for  some  t?jne,  however,  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that 
quantity  production  will  not  obtain  until  late  in  the  present  calendar 
year.  In  the  event  of  an  acute  emergency,  it  is  believed  that  sufficient 

ammunition  to  fill  immediate  reqtiiremcnts  of  the  Second  Division . 


79716  O — 46 — pt.  If 


2186     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


SECRET  „ 


as  it  exists  today  may  be  specially  obtained  from  the  ^Irmy.  -t^Q^mif -atta^ 

The  present  outlook  indicates  that  sufficient  person- 
nel vfill  be  available  by  1  October  19l*l,  to  form  for  expeditionary  duty 
a  reinforced  regiment  from  the  Second  Marine  Division,  and  also  leave 
within  the  Division  a  nucleus  for  training  of  ix.s  remaining  units.  It 
is  hoped  that  the  Second  Division  can  be  completed  in  personnel  by  Janu- 
ary, 19li2. 

Parngraph  2  (c)  of  your  letter  -  .Ammunition  Facilities,  The 
condition  of  ammunition  handling  and  stowage  facilities  ashore  are  in 
general  satisfactory  at  the  present  time.  Stowage  facilities  have  been 
completed,  are  in  the  process  of  constiniction,  or  are  about  to  be  started 
to  handle  assignments  of  service  reserves  of  gun  ammunition,  bombs,  mines, 
and  torpedoes.  This  includes  igloos  already  completed  and  others  now 
under  construction  at  Westloch  aid  at  Lualualci, 

New  construction  authorized  and  about  to  be  undertaken 
includes  four  powder  magazines  and  four  shell  houses  at  Lualualei, 
and  barricaded  stowage  for  live  mines,  two  new  mine  anchor  buildings  and 
a  new  mine  assembly  building  at  "Jestloch. 

New  construction  needed  to  conqjleta  stowage  and  liand- 
ling  facilities  includes  extension  of  Westloch  dock  to  a  maximum  of  two 
thousand  feet  and  the  construction  of  four  powder  magazines  and  two  shell 
houses  at  TTestloch  to  accomodate  target  practice  anrounition  which  cannot 
be  stowed  in  vessels  of  the  Fleet,  This  latter  construction  has  been 
recommended  to  the  Commandant  of  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District  in  recent 
correspondence  and  wc  have  no  word  yet  on  i^at  action  he  has  tdcen. 

Comment,  The  Bureai  of  Ordnance  has  had  all  anraunition  storaige 

items  requested  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  provided,  except: 

(a)  Extension  of  ammunition  pier  at  West  Loch,  Funds 
have  been  obtained  to  extend  the  antnunition  pier  from  600  feet  to  1^00 
feet.  Since  no  authorization  vdll  be  required  to  extend  the  pier  from 
1500  feet  to  2000  feet,  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  expects  to  divert  the 
necessary  funds  temporarily  from  other  projects  for  this  extension,  to 
avoid  delay.  Tlie  funds  required  are  $2$0,000,  which  v/ill  eventually  be 
obtaLnod  from  Conycss  to  repay  the  project  robbed, 

(b)  llo  fxinds  are  available  for  the  construction  of 

four  poT.-der  magazines  and  tvro  shell  houses  at  V/est  Loch.  No  authoriza-   ,^ 
has  been  obtained  for  the  constnaction  of  these  magazines.  The  Bureau  uv^ 
of  Orrlnance  will  have  these  magazines  included  in  the  next  authorizaion 
bill  toyypresented  to  Congress  and  will  have  the  necessary  funds  requested 
for  their  construction.  The  funds  required  are  estimates  as  at  $210,000, 

2, 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2187 

SECR2T 

The  following  was  supplied  by  the  Chief  of  the  Bureai  of  Yards 
and  Docks: 

"The  construction  of  four  powder  magazines  and  two  shell  houses 

at  Westloch  is  a  new  item  not  previously  presented  to  the  Department  and 

we  are  awaiting  word  from  the  Commandant  as  to  his  recommendation.  The 

construction  of  these  buildings  will  necessitate  the  purchase  of  additional 

land. " 

Paragraph  2  (d)  of  your  letter.  The  importance  of  building 
v^)  Navy  Yard,  Pearl  Harbor  to  the  point  conteinplated  by  the  Greenslade 
Board.  For  the  present  Navy  Yard,  Pearl' Harbor  should  be  regarded  pri- 
marily as  a  "restricted  availabiltiy"  yard.  Overhaul  of  ships  here  should 
not  include  battleships  and  cruisers  or  other  ships  for  extensive  regu- 
lar overhauls.  The  facilities  of  the  yard  should  be  confined  to  emergency 
and  low  priority  overhaul,  regardless  of  overhead  costs. 

Comment.  -Jujldtng  up  Ma^'y  Yay'd,  P&ap^j^fg'te^r-.  The  Bureau  of 
Ships  shortly  expects  an  appropriation  from  Congress  (Supplemental  19U2) 
to  take  ere  of,  among  other  things,  all  navy  yard  facilities  necess.ary 
to  repair  and  maintain  the  19U6  fleet  in  war.  Pearl  Harbor  is  funded  in 
the  anount  of  ^0,000,000  for  this  purpose,  which  includes  the  cost  of 
an  additional  major  battleship  dock.  This  dock,  together  with  the  other 
facilities  which  will  be  accor^lished  with  the  money,  will  bring  the  yard 
up  to  the  point  conten^lated  by  the  Greenslade  Board  Report.  The  time 
involved  in  expanding  Pearl  Harbor  to  the  extent  indicated  above  is  as 
follows : 

12  months  for  $0%   of  the  facilities. 

18  months  for  the  remainder  of  the  facilities, 

22  to  2U  months  for  the  dry  dock. 
Note:  -The  Commander  ip  Chief ,  N^acifi'c  Fleet,  >ind  Fleet  Main- 

tenaice  -  Operajdons  control  maJctng  ships  available  for  ovewvauls  and 

™_  u    ^    --^        /  \ 

set  the  priority  for  work  at  the  Na.\'y  Yard  yearl  Harbor,  /   \ 
/    \       /    \     /    \      ^     \ 
The  Bureau  of  Ships  has  increased  the  special  stocks  at  this 

Yard  of  spare  propellers  and  shafting  -  it  has  under  procurement,  addi- 
tional stock  in  tubing  for  boilers,  condensers,  superheaters  and  heat 
transfer  apparatus;  additional  stock  of  generators  and  ice  machines. 


2188     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

SECRET 

The  Shore  Establishments  Division  intends  to  ducnent  the  vrorking 
force  as  the  capacity  and  Trork  load  arc  increased. 

Relative  to  the  repair  facilities  at  the  Pearl  Harbor  Yard,  the 
Bureau  of  i'ards  and  -^Dcks  has  issued  instructions  to  ex;3editc  all  of 
this  T/ork  to  the  greatest  practicable  extent. 

The  reconnendation  to  confine  the  activities  of  the  Wavy  Yard, 
Pearl  Harbor  to  energency  and  low  priority  ovi.rhauls  crai  be  acconplished 
by  transferring  regular  overhauls  of  Battleships,  Carriers,  Cruisers,  and 
Destroyers  to  'Jest  Coast  yards  but  this  recoinnendation  is  not  concurred 
in  for  thi,  follovring  reasons; 

(1)  The  Greenslade  Board  report,  approved  by  the  Sec- 
retary of  the  Navy  on  iiay  lU,  l^i^l,  reconnended  that  ihc   Pearl  Harbor  Navy 
Yard  be  built  up  to  take  care  of  20  per  cent  of  the  fleet  in  the  Pacific 
when  the  two-ocean  navy  was  in  existence  and  that  the  yard  be  capable  of 
handling  "full  overhauls  and  damage"  vath  simultaneous  drydocking  facili- 
ties for  2  Battleships,  1  CR,  1  CB,  1  CA,  1  twin  DL  and  a  DL  marine  rail- 
way. Pertinent  to  this  is  a  letter  from  the  Assistant  Secretaiy  of  the 
Navy  (Shore  Establishments  Division)  uatcd  June  26,  l^iil  in  regard  to 
building  up  the  facilities  at  Pearl  Harbor  and  noting  that  no  Battleships 
or  Carriers  were  scheduled  for  overhaul  at  Pearl  Harbor  in  19li3-  The 

third  paragraph  of  this  letter  is  quoted  hercvdth: 

"It  is  believed  it  is  necessary  that  capital 

ships  be  overhauled  at  Pearl  ^^rbor  if  that  Yard  is  ex- 
pected to  perform  the  war  "task  that  has  been  assigned. 

It  is,  therefore,  recommanded  that  in  the  next  revision 
of  the  availability  schedule,  a  start  be  na.de  tov/ard  an  equit- 
able diversion  of  the  overhaul  of  Battleships  rjid  Carriers 
from  Puget  Sound  to  Pearl  na.rbor." 

-¥fce  Sir&e^fe©-?y  F-l^et— I'aintonancu  Divi&i-cn-^bclieved  that  only  by 

actual  overhaul  and  repair  of  Capital  Ships,  Destroyers,  and  Cruisers  can 

the  Pearl  f'arbor  organization  be  trained  and  made  capable  of  rop-iring         4» 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2189 

those  ships  in  cjti  cr.ercuicy,  toguthcr  v,'it!i  d^vclop-.i^nt  of  n^,cossary 

facilities. 

(2)  Runr.irs  to  BritisJi  ;.'cv-l  v.,s^uls,  p.-.rticu- 

larly  the  larj^^r  typ^s  o2   ships,  is  cbsorbinr;  r.  lai'gc 

percentage  of  th^,  r>-pair  facilities  of  continental  U.S. 

yards  and  it  is  ^xp<  cted  that  tin-  demands  "'Till  increase. 

East  Coast  yards  arc  being  used  prii.iarily  for  this  -iTCrlc 

but  it  has  bt;i,n  found  necessary  -  due  to  full  schedules  of 

these  yards  -  to  send  some  British  ships  to  Furiet  Sound 

and  i^arc  Island. 

If  these  latter  yards  arc  fully  schwdul^d  v-'ith 

our  o'-Tn  ships  (as  can  bu  (jxpuct'^d  if  all  Battleship, 

Carrier,  Cruiser,  and  D;jstrcyv,r  overhauls  are  transferred 

to  them  from  Pearl  '.'arbor)  it  is  ^-^roble.viatical  v:hether 

British  ships  can  be  repaired  and  ov^-rhauled  at  the  rate 

that  this  is  no-.:   bcin~  undertaken. 

The  fori-goinr-,  ccmLier.t  -by— I'-iU^^ ^aint ^-'i a-ne e  is  substrjntiolly 

in  accord  vrLth  your  letter  L9-5  (50)  ov^r  L9-3  Serial  01176  of  1  Aufrust 

Paragraph  2  (c)  of  "our  letter.  Provide  more  and  more  per- 
sonnel to  the  fleet  for  training.  The  p-rsonm-l  situation  has  been 
presented  to  the  Bureau  of  i'-aviration  and  that  ^ureau  is  thorour.hly 
familiar  vdth  cur  roquirer.iunts .  ".'e  cannot  provide  experienced  personnel 
for  ncvr  censtrud ion  next  year  unless  ve  obtain  recruits  and  train 
them  intensively  at  once.  I  realize  that  recruiting  has  fallen  off  ajad 
that  the  Department  is  doing  all  it  can  but  re  are  losing  trained  nen 
faster  than  'je  are  getting  neT;  recr.dts.  ^s   I  stated  in  a  recent  letter 
wc  could  use  20,000  more  rien  in  the  Pacific  ?'lect  rirht  novf.  -  «3  ^oec.^-.^  - 

Comment.  The  present  rate  of  recraiting  is  about  9j300  men 
a  month,   "-ccording  to  the  best  estimates,  about  12,000  recruits  arc  re- 
quired in  order  to  meet  the  requirenen-'.s  of  the  service  on  June  30,  19l|2 
based  on  present  allowanc>-s.   (This  estimate  is  subject  to  variables 
such  as  changes  in  dates  of  coamiscioning  si-.ips  and  stations.)  Therefore 
the  Navy  vn.ll  lack  a  proxiior.tely  32,000  men  necessar:/-  for  I-avj--  require- 
ments on  "^une  30,  19li2.  It  is  estimated  that  this  rail  bt^  enough  men  to   * 


2190    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

SECRET 
fill  conplcncnts  rnd  allov;ancc;s  on  that  dcitt,  to  an  average  of  about 

92^,  Thci  i-locts  aro  nov;  fillod  to  about  9\^o  of  conplcr.(,nt£ .  This  per- 
centage vdll  drop  due  to  large  recent  increases  in  aviation  squadron 
allowances.  It  is  estiniated  that  Navigation  can  replace  losses  in  the 
Fleets  vdth  recruits  to  maintain  then  at  about  the  sane  percentage  of 
men  aboard  to  complti.'.onts  as  at  present.  '^^-"^''•**-         /«•o-^ 

The  recent  large  vfithdrawals  f ron  the  F  ieots  have  been  due 
to  the  necessity  of  supplying  the  crows  for  the  large  number  of  auxiliary 

vessels  rccoitly  acquired  and  for  the  assembly  of  men  for  iidvancod  De- 
stroyer, Submarine,  and  Aviation  Bases.  These  demands  wi-r^,  superimposed 

upon  the  di-nands  for  the  regular  building  and  usual  purchasing  program. 

The  above  e5ti:;:ates  are  based  on  a  monthly  rate  of  recruiting 
of  9,300.  Recruitin,7  is  now  on  the  increase  end  additional  men  over 
the  9,300  monthly  •in  be  furnished  to  the  Fleets./y^o^iJT"-^'"^ 

Paragraph  2(f)  of  your  letter.  tJecd  for  a  hospital  ship  in 
the  Pacific  FTe>,t  and  for  completion  of  ne^T  hospital  at  Pearl  Ilarbor. 

Comment.  .  It  is  contei:iplated  assigning  the  SOLACE  (i'lUS),  Ex- 
IROQUOIS,  to  the  Pacific  Fleet  upon  readiness  for  service,  which  should  be 
in  the  latter  part  of  "-ugust,  19ltl.  ?uither,  it  is  contaaplate-d 
transporting  Ilobile  Base  Hospital  IIo.  2  from  Kew  York  to  Oahu  in  the 
U.S. 5.  PROCYOM  (AK19)  departing  New  York  early  in  October;  she  is  a 
l5-knot  ship  and  will  call  at  San  Die_-o  to  debark  some  personnel  and 
stores  there  en  route. 

So  far  as  the  nev/  hospital  is  concerned,  the  contract  for 
this  has  been  let  and  presumably  the  v/ork  is  underv;ay. 


Paragra  h  2(g)  of  your  letter.  Urgency  for  sv.i 
ith  llaval  District  for  patrol  purposes,  to  reli 


i.iall  craft  in  , 

the  Fourteenth  llaval  District  for  patrol  purposes,  to  relieve  the  load 
on  our  limited  number  of  destroyers. 


Comment.  The  project  is  now  underrray  to  send  twelve  PT's  to 
the  lltth  iJaval  District  as  scon  as  the  boats  con  be  prepared  and  trans- 
portation provided.  This  shipment  -.Till  follow  the  six  ilTB's  going  to 
the  l6th  Naval  District  via  the  GUADALUPE  scheduled  to  depart  from  New 
York  Yard  about  15  August  or  as  soon  thereafter  as  practicable. 
jt^t)  -  -/<^  -«'**  -*-!*.  ..^to*^  .^Cjtt.  /~44^C^^-e.  yejt^n.  .   /U^^t.^  w>>«-*.»v  ^-<^/t- 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2191 


SDcru:! 


,'d  for  acquiring  :idvanccd 
base  ;;uitt;ric 


Paragraph  2(h)  of  your  lettur.  The  need 
il  and  assciiibling  it  at  ''.are  Island. 

Commtint.  ■^ho  project  of  assuiibling  advance  Base  ilaterial  has 


been  raised  to  an  A-l-a  priority,  and  the  asscaiibling  of  this  naterial  is 
t\r 


g'  ing  ah^ad  satisfactorily 


axM, 


^L^fJL^t 


t^-Au£   «^-<.4>'<^ 


&A. 


2192     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Para[;rr.ph  2(i)  or  /our  letter.  Correspondence  hcis  rone  TcnTard 
urrin:.  that  all  available  licht  craft  in  the  Pacific  be  fitted  vdth  depth 
charges,  listening  c<--r,  etc.  This  is  important. 

Corjient.  In  this  connection,  I  quote  vcrbatira  the  ruinarks  of 
the  Fleet  Maintenance  Division  in  order  that  you  nay  have  the  entire 
picture: 

The  status  of  placinc  depth  charges  and  under-water  sound  equip- 
ment on  li  ht  craft  is  as  follo\7S  (taken  up  by  classes); 

Pi  Is  and  DtiSs  -  These  vessels  have  depth  cJu'.rgcs  and  echo-ranring 

equipment  authorizsdj  some  have  the  equipment  installed  rT.d   tjiosc  ships 

that  have  not  yet  received  thuir  echo-ran^inf;  equipment  vdll  rtt  Tod^l 

X  Series  commencinc  in  September  19lil.  .A«*l, -5/^»— ^ ^^r^y.  ^ ^ 

f       f 

AVDs  -  Stabilitj'  conditions  on  these  ships  are  not  cood  and  the 

addition  of  depth  charres,  racks,  sr  Y-oms,  and  echo-ran ^in[T  equipment 
T.lll  necessitate  compensating  ^7ci;^•ht  removal.  It  is  xinderstood  that  the 
desired  equipment  can  be  installed  providing  the  toving  reel  on  tl.e  fan 
tail  is  permanently  removed.  "A  lii^'htiTei^ht  echo-ran-_lng  ane  listening 
gear  cquipn^-nt,  Ilodel  'TZii'^,  has  been  developed  v>-hich  weighs  about  1300 
pounds,  vrith  deliveries  connencin^  in  October  l^Ul. 

The  follovTing  are  the  requirements  for  the  V/E/i  equip- 
ment : 

(a)  power  supply  115  volts  D.C. 

(b)  Head  room  required  for  hoist  train  equipment 
about  70  inches. 

(c)  At  least  2U  inches  betv:een  frames  of  ships  to 
accomodate  pedestal. 

(d)  Remote  control  of  train  by  means  of  cables  and 
sheaves,  using  hand  wheel  at  operating  position. 

The  above  equipmi-nt  is  suitable  for  any  installation 

in  jUis  (Bird  Class)  and  in  most  converted  yachts .  Additionally,  this 

equj.pm-nt  can  be  installed  in  any  ot'.ior  t:,pes  of  eliips  having  adequate 

space  and  power  supply. 

A  lightweight  listening  equipment  (I'odel  JIT-9),  about  1300 

Dounds,  has  been  developed  and  contract  avrarded  for  230  setsj  delivery 

7. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2193 

s3c?-":t 

cor.iincnccs  in  ^uf-ust  19U1  at  c   rate  ol'  10  i_ach  v;^ck.  'i'hc  follo-::in;^'  aro 
the  requirununts  for  installation  of  the  JIC-9  uquipmi-nt; 

(a)  Power  supply  115  volts  D.C.  or  21*  volts  D.C. 
(Two  tj-pcs  of  motor  cuncrators  available, 
producing  11$  volts, A.  C)  Overall  dimensions 

of  motor  generator  set  292  x  13^  x  11-3/ii  inches. 

(b)  I.Iaxiraun  head  room  required  for  hoist  train 
laechanisn  abcut  96  inches. 

(c)  Onlj'  limitation  or  frai.io  spacing  is  that  is 
pass  the  ii-inch  projector  shaft. 

(d)  No  remotu  control  -  hand  hoist  ond  train 
directly  connected  to  projector  sheift. 

This  equipnont  is  for  listening  only  (no  echo-ran(i- 

ing  feature)  and  is  suitable  for  use  in  any  type  of  ship  havirig  adequate 

space  and  pov/ur  pupply.  Space  allotted  to  the  equipment  must  provide 

for  the  hoist-train  equipment  (overall  dimensions  7' -9"  x  26|  x  20"), 

receiver  (overall  dimensions  19"  x  12"  x  l$-l/C")  cjid  sufficient  space 

for  the  operator. 

APDs  -  The  APDs  have  the  depth  charge  tracks  installed  and  noTf 
carry  2'n   -  300  pound  depth  charges.  The  stability  conditions  of  these 
ships  is  so  unsatisfactory  that  they  vdll  require  ^0   tons  of  fixed  ballast, 
'^he  installation  of  the  V/EA  echo-ranj-ing  equipment,  descrived  under  AVDs, 
above  can  be  accomadated  in  these  ships. 

/i.Is  and  AVPs  -  Thu  question  of  installing  dt-pth  charge  and 
echo-ranging  and  (or)  listening  equipment  on  these  types  has  bucn  referred 
to  the  bureau  of  Ships  for  study  and  recommendation  as  to  the  practic- 
ability of  accomplishment. 

It  should  be  pointed  out  t!  at  draft  and  stability 
conditions  of  these  vessels  is  critical  and  instructions  arj  about  to  be 
issued  limiting  their  displacements.  Informal  information  from  the  Bureau 
of  Ships  indicates  that  corapunsatory  wuirht  reducdon  must  be  y;ade  on 
practically  a  pound-f or-po  nd  basis  in  order  to  install  the  desired  equip- 
ment, '^'he  installation  of  echo-rani:ing,  or  listening  equipment  is  de- 

e. 

pendent  upon  the  delivery  schedule  as  outlined  above  under  AVDs, 


2194    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

SECK^T 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  liglitcst  depth  charge  rack 
now  developed  (carrying  six  300  pound  depth  charges)  weighs  about  1500 
poxuids.  As  each  depth  charge  with  its  equipment  weighs  U20  pounds,  the 
total  weight  of  depth  charges  and  track  to  be  compensated  for  will  be 
about  liOOO  pounds.  The  weight  of  the  lightest  underwater  soxind  equipment 
is  sdoout  1300  pounds  as  is  explained  above  under  AVDs. 

PEs,  Pes,  FYs,  and  YPs.  .Vll  these  vessels  have  depth 
charges,  the  ninnber  depending  upon  the  size  of  the  vessels.  Some  of 
these  vessels  are  equipped  with  both  depth  charge  racks  and  Y-guns, 

Echo-ranging  and  (or)  listening  equipment  has  been 
authorized  and  yrill  be  installed  as  soon  as  the  equipment  can  be  provided. 

Paragraphs  3  and  3  (a)  of  your  letter.  Communications .  The 
supply  of  communication,  radio,  and  sound  equipment  to  the  fleet  and  the 
Shore  Stations  leaves  much  to  be  desired,  although  a  great  improvement 
has  been  noted  in  the  last  year. 

Specifically  it  is  noted  that  the  Kaneohe  Air  Station 
was  acqilred,  built,  commissioned,  and  actually  operated  prior  to  the 
receipt  of  any  radio  apparatus,  except  some  which  we  diverted  from  its 
intended  advance  base  use. 

Comment,  Here  is  quoted  in  their  entirety  the  remarks  of  the 
Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Sliips: 

"During  the  fiscal  year  19U1  the  Bureau  of  Ships 
placed  contracts  for  radio  and  so\ind  material  amounting  to  aqpproximately 

$110,000,000,  The  material  contracted  for  included  all  of  the  material 
listed  in  the  191^1  and  19U2  Communication  Inq^rovement  Plans  issued  by  the 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations  and  a  large  amount  of  additional  material  required 
to  meet  previously  unanticipated  needs.  The  funds  included  in  the  regular 
19lil  budget  were  made  available  in  an  appropriation  bill  which  became  law 
on  June  11,  19U0,  but  the  bulk  of  the  funds  utilized  during  the  year  did 
not  become  available  until  passage  of  a  supplemental  appropriation  a ct  in 
mid  September  191*0,  Considering  the  time  when  the  necessaryfUnds  became 
available,  and  the  tremendous  increase  of  procurement  effort  necessary,  it 
is  felt  that  the  prosecution  of  the  entire  program  has  been  as  rapid  as 
could  reasonably  be  expected  vinder  the  circiimstances.  However,  it  is  recog- 
nized that  many  needs  of  the  service  are  of  great  urgency  and  that  any  delay 

9. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2195 

SECRET 
at  all  in  effecting  deliveries  after  needs  have  been  determined  is  object- 
ionable. Difficulties  in  obtaining  critical  materials  and  con5)onents  have 
in  some  cases  caused  serious  delays  in  deliveries  under  contracts  but 
by  use  of  increased  facilities  all  contractors  involved  have  increased 
rates  of  production  to  a  considerable  extent.  It  is  expected  that  most 
of  the  serious  needs  for  radio  and  sound  equipment  will  be  taken  care 
of  v»ithin  the  next  few  months. 

Funds  for  the  initial  allowance  of  radio  equipment  for  t  he 
Kaneohe  Air  Station  were  included  in  the  regular  IJiil  appropriation  act, 
which  became  law  on  June  11,  19U0.  Initiation  of  procurement  of  radio 
material  for  Kaneohe  was  commenced  immediately  afteB  the  funds  becsme 
available4  Funds  for  items  later  axided  to  the  allowance  became  avail- 
able in  September,  19l|0, 

The  tabiilation  below  indicates  the  present  situation  as  regards 
radio  equipment  for  the  Kaneohe  Mr  Station: 

jectcd       Remarks 


aVllowed  equip-  Installed  To  Be  Shipped  Exp' 
raent  '  D 


_____  ate 

2  TBM  1  1  Jan.l9ii2 

2  TBP  2 

1  TBU                                                     1  Mar.l9U2 
6  TBff                                                  2  Sept.l9l4l 

h  Jan.l9ii2 

2  TCA  2  Sept.l9la       1  TBO-1  in  use 
2  TCB                                                     2  N0V.I9I1I 

1  TCC  1  Aug.l9la         1  TBR-1  installed 

h  BBX/RBB/BBC  U  Indefinite     Mew  type-other 

receivers  avail- 
able if  urgently 
required 
6  RAS    .  6 

1  DY  1  11  Aug.l9ia  from  IH  Tfash 

1  DP  1  11  Aug,  191a  IDN  from  NYIil 

1  Inst.  LDG  Equip.  1  Sept.l9U2#U0  on  priority 

list;   deliveries 
start  Sept.l9iil 
1  RAU  1  Oct.l9l4l 

in  1  Jan.l9U2 

There  are  available  in  the  Pearl  Harbor  pool  several  more  TBR-1 

portable  equipments  which  may  be  utilized  to  take  care  of  immediate  needs 

at  Kaneohe  if  required.     These  TBRr-l  equipments  are  not  necessarily  reserved 

or  intended  for  advanced  base  service,  but  are  availabc  for  any  use  at 

}i 
the  discretion  of  the  CJoramandant  or  the  Commander  in  Chief, 

10. 


2196     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

2SCRET 

Paragrayh  3(b)  of  yoiir  letter.  It  took  BuEnc  two  years  to  put 
"Chinese  copies"  of  NRL's  Radar  on  six  ships. 

Comment .  Here  follows  the  remarks  of  the  Bureau  of  Ships  and 
the  Director,  Naval  Communications  Division^-n.  .^-t^^i^ ^fi-m**^  • 

"The  Model  X^F   R.IDj\R  equipment  developed  by  Naval  Research  Labor- 
atory was  installcl  in  USS  NET  YORK  12-18  December,  193C,and  was  tested 
at  the  same  time  as  the  Model  CXZ  Radar  equipment  developed  try  RCA  }l\£gt 
Co.,  and  installed  in  USS  TEX.'iS.  These  tests  continued  through  March 
1939.  Report  of  tests  was  received  from  Commander  Atlantic  Squadron 
8  April  1939.  As  a  result  of  these  tests,  the  equipment  v/as  returned 
to  Naval  Research  Laboratory  for  modifications  indicated  as  necessary. 
For  example,  the  equipment  had  no  calibrating  feature  installed.  A 
conference  was  held  with  representatives  of  all  interested  officers  of 
the  Department  as  a  rcs'ilt  of  which  it  was  decided  to  proceed  with  the 
procurement  of  a  limited  number  of  these  equipments.  The  size  and  weight 
of  the  equipment  were  at  the  time  important  factors  in  the  decision. 
Conferences  were  held  with  contractors  without  delay  and  a  specification 
was  prepared.  The  requisition  was  issued  28  July  1939  and  the  contract 
was  awarded  16  October  1939  to  RaV  Mfe.  Co.  The  time  between  the  date 
of  requisition  and  date  of  contract  was  utilized  by  the  RCA  Mfg.  Co., 
to  inspect  the  model,  work  up  estimates,  submit  bid  and  by  the  Bureaus 
of  Ships  and  Supplies  and  Accounts  to  make  award.  The  first  equipment 

was  shipped  by  factory  May  21,  19^0.  It  i-dll  be  noted  that  the  time 
for  dilivery  of  the  first  equipment  by  contractor  v/as  approximately  13 
months  from  the  date  of  completion  of  tests  in  U35  NET  YORK  and  7  months 
after  date  of  contract.  The  last  equipment  vjas  shipped  by  contractor 
on  June  20,  19ll.O,  The  dates  of  installation  of  this  equipment  were 
dictated  by  the  dates  of  availability  of  the  vessels  concerned,  A 
matter  over  which  this  Bureau  does  not  have  control.  According  to  the 
records  of  this  Bureau,  however,  installation  of  the  first  equipment 
was  completed  August  2U,  19U0,  and  the  last  on  October  la,  19U0,  and 
the  last  date  being  approximately  18  months  after  the  receipt  of  the 
report  on  NSf  YCSRK  tests. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2197 


"  The  Model  X.'lF  Rlill\R,   built  by  Kaval  Rcscr.rch  Laboratory',  was 
tested  afloat  during  the  late  v/inter  and  early  spring  of  1939.  This 
test  indicated  that  additional  equi-p;n<^nt  should  be  purchased  for  trial, 
A  study  was  made  to  dctemine  the  practica'  .bility  of  installing  the 
equipin;,nt  afloat;  this  study  isclosed  that  only  ten  (10)  ships  could 
accomodate  the  large  antenna  array  vrithout  first  making  extensive 
alterations  to  ships  or  without  experiencing  serious  interference  to 
the  radio  bean  from  the  ships'  stracturcs.  ^hief  of  llaval  Operations 

requested  prccur<-nent  of  ten  (10)  production  models  of  the  Xi'kF.  The 
earliv,st  that  funds  could  be  obtained  to  manufacture  the  :'odel  CUc'.   (copy 
of  JniL  :;odel  X;j)  was  during  fiscal  19liO,  Due  tc  the  hi:her  unit  cost 
of  the  equipr.-.ent  and  the  extraordinary  expenditures  of  radio  funds  in 
connection  vdth  "neutrality  enlcrcer.cnt",  the  Uureau  of  Ships  could  manu- 
facture but  six  (6)  complete  uniLs.  ''Iricn   additional  funds  were  nade 
available  by  emergency  appropriations,  fourteen  (lii)  Model  CJL'^'-l's  v^erc 
ordered  as  "stop-gap"  equipnv.nt  pending  completion  of  development  of 
an  improved  detector  -  the  Ilodel  SC."  ^^   •^fU*^^ ,.»,^ x^^<^  /St.,^^^  , 

Paragraph  3(c)  of  your  letter,  "or  years  BviEng  prevented  re- 
search by  NRL  in  anj''  form  of  radio  recognition  device  and  hence  retarded 
the  production  of  such  apparatus.  The  Fleet  is  still  \7ithout  it  thoufh 
it  is  under  manufacture. 

Comment.  In  this  connection,  the  '-'hiof  of  the  Bureau  of  Ships 
stat<^s: 

"  The  need  for  a  satisfactory  reccgnition  device  in  the  fleet 

has  been  recognized  by  the  Bureau  of  Ships  as  being  the  single  greatest 

one  since  tlie  time  of  the  last  war  and  ev.^ry  id^^a  advanced  by  th^.  flee*, 

the  Naval  Research  Laboratory''  or  other  laboratories  tiat  appeared  to 

offer  proma.se  has  been  thoroui:hly  investi;  ated.  This  research  has  fully 

covered  the  fields  of  ultra  violet,  visible,  infra  red,  radio  and  sound 

speitrums.  Many  systems  vfhich  .vcre  developed  tc  a  point  v/hich  warranted 

service  tests  have  been  tested  in  the  Ilect  and  all  have  been  reported 

unsatisfactory  by  the  fleet  eVen  after  modification  by  IJIIL  and  other 


12. 


2198     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

SSCRET 

laboratories  in  accordance  vritii   the  r.lshcs  of  the  fleet,  '■'■heru  has  boon 

no  lack  of  funds  in  this  connection.  I'he  IIRL  has  been  engagi-d  centinu-   ^ 

ously  since  its  ustablishment  in  efforts  to  dcv-,lop  ^  recognition  s^^stein.  j  y 

That  portion  of  the  statement  relating  to  the  preventing  of  research  by  » 

NRL  in  any  form  of  radio  recognition  device  is  not  one  of  fact."       *^ ^  t^ 

It  can  be  concluded  that  very  substantial  additions  to  Fleet  wr^ 

Radar  installations  rrill  be  nade  before  the  end  of  the  cr.lendar  year,   i*-^"-*- 

Paragraph  3(d)  of  your  letter.  T/e  riust  have  the  IFF  (Identi- 
fication, Friend  or  Foe j  for  aircraft"  aT"once.  The  program  lags  and  on 
June  llith  cnly  56  v;erc  on  order  from  Canada  -Jri-th  indefinite  delivery 
date.  See  "Aviation"  betow. 

Consent.  In  regard  to  the  forecoing,  the  Bureau  of  Aeronau- 
tics remarks  as  follov/s:  /  /y^jKrt^^f'"''^*^'^  -  '^"^out^,*/*-*^-**^-  /iry^^j^ ^m*^>^- 

"Currently,  y(Jhe  Bureau  of  Aeronautics  is  concentrating  on  the 
earliest  practicable  devolopn^-nt  and  procurcn-^nt  of  suitable  RADilH  equip- 
ment for  aircraft.  Recognition  equipment  '.^-ill  be  installed  in  all  service 
aircraft  at  the  earliest  opportunitj'.  One  hundred  (100)  iS>L   (/jaerican 
recognition)  sets  are  nov:  due  for  delivery,  and  they  ^vill  be  distributed 
to  the  fleet  in  the  most  effective  manner  possible,  liatcrial  is  being 
assembled  for  1500  American  ABA  sets  which  ttiI].  be  put  in  production  by 
General  Electric  as  soon  as  a  satisfactory  ser'/ice  test  is  completed.  fC**^A^ 
356  British  I.F.F.  sets  have  been  ru^uestedj  56  of  these  sets  are  being 
delivered  to  the  Atlantic  Fleet  and  delivery  is  rapidly  being  completed." 

The  tentative  plan  for  initial  R/iD/Jl  installations  in  a,ircraft 
is  as  follows: 

A  brief  summary  of  nomenclature  is: 

a.  /iSV  ;!K  II  -  Dritish  search  equipment  suitabl'-  for  VPBs. 

b.  ASA  -  iUnerican  search  equipment  including  high  altitude 

altimeter,  suitable  for  VPB's. 

c.  ASB  -  Ami-rican  search  equipment,  expected  to  be  suitable 

for  2  and  3  place  planes, 

13. 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2199 

d.  ;^V  -  lacil  (Fleet  ..ir  am  nodiricd) ,  British  socrch 

equipment  for  usv,  in  larce  single  engine  planes, 
c,  IlBI^  -  jinerican  r^cornition  equipnent, 

f .  IFF  -  British  rccornition  equipment, 

g.  AYA  -  /jaerican  hich  range  altimeter, 
h.  AYB  -  /iDerican  low  range  altimeter. 

i.  AI  -  I.3(  IV  -  British  Interception  equipr..,nt  -  multi-place 

airplanes. 
Search  equipment  (long  range  British  i,.SV  or  ;jnericrji  ASA)  vfill 

be  installed  in  all  PBY-5  and  subsequent  VPB  models.  Initial  installa- 
tions arc  being  made. 

It  is  expected  to  install  ASB  (snail  search  equipment)  vdth  a 

low  ranee  altimeter  in  one  plane  of  each  section  of  VT3's.  All  T3F 

airplanes  irill  have  space  reserved  for  this.  It  is  expected  to  reserve 

space  in  all  nev/  VSB  and  VSO  airplanes  for  the  ^iinerican  ASB,  and  rfhere      ^ 

practicable  install  this  equipment  in  current  typos,  \^*f 

Initial  installation  is  now  being  -made  of  the  experimental  rj^ 

model  of  the  ;lSB  in  an  SBD  airplane.  If  successful,  a  number  of  these 
planes  vrlll  be  made  available  as  soon  as  the  equipnent  is  provided. 

Steps  liTiVe  been  taken  to  obtain  models  of  the  British  I.X  II 
ASV  equipment  (modified  for  Fleet  ^ar  Arm)  for  reproduction  purposes. 
It  is  expected  to  supplement  manufacture  of  ijnerican  ASB  equipment  vrith 

an  /jnerican  version  of  the  modified  1.0C  II. 

Radio  Altimeter  (high  altitude)  will  be  installed  as  part 

of  thfc  /jnerican  search  equipr.ient  in  all  VPB  airplanes.  It  is  plamiod  to 

equip  one  airplane  of  each  section  of  VTB's  trith  hirh  altitude  altimeters 
and  another  airplane  of  each  section  of  VTB's  ^fith  a  lor;  range  altimeter 
for  use  with  the  ISB   equipnent  (as  indicated  in  poragraphs  above  re 
search  equipment. ) . 

Recoenition  equipment  vrLll  be  installed  in  all  service  airolrjics 

at  the  earliest  opportunity.  The  iirst  100  jjnerican  i'JiA  cquipnents  are 

now  due  for  delivery.  14. 


2200     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Inturcfaption  equipncnts.  Provision  Tor  thusi-  oquipnonts  vn.ll 

be  nadc  in  r.  ccrt:iin  nvmbcr  of  I'liU   "irplr.ncs  c:s  soon  as  tliL.  d^v.,lopri^nt 

in  the  United  Stc'.tcs  rjid  r.broc.d  ox  nodols  suitr.blc  lor  use  in  single 

t-nf:inc,  sinfic  place  .lii^ilcncc  permits.  Pending  this  JcvLlopnent,  c 

tt-st  installr.tion  is  being  made  of  a  British  I3C  IV  cquipr.^.cnt  in  an  5BD 

airplane.  If  successful,  a  number  of  tl:esc  planes  T/ill  be  r.v.dc  available 

for  us^  as-  interceptors  as  soon  as  this  cquipnent  crjn  be  obtained  frora 

-ither  British  or  ijnerican  source. 

Projects  have  been  initiated  to  deEi.::n  search  and  interception 

antenna  structures  v/hicb  are  most  readily  duaountable  and  which  are 

strea::ilined  as  much  as  practicable.   Developnont  of  i'lncricaji  search  ^  /  ,ojnrJt~ 

■gJ>^2,X  - 
and  interce-ition  equipnent  vrill  stress  read;;,'-  reiuoval  provisions  in  o.^Ji£ r^'^- 

order  to  result  in  maxinun  of  operational  flexibility.  '**'*^ 

Plans  for  further  installation  of  Radar  in  carrier  and  cruiser 

airplanes  are  dependent  on  installation  difficulti.s  and  initial  per- 

fomiance.  ..  more  conprchensive  plan  nay  be  expected  to  be  published 

about  Januairj'-,  19ii2.  .   ,, 

'Deliveries  liave  begun  on  lOh  l.odel  .'J;..  ITT"  equipnents  for 

aircraft  tccether  Tdth  32  nodel  BE/B?  eq'iip:,:_nts  for  shipboard  use. 

These  vlll  be  ^^iven  service  tests  in  the  ^lect  tccether  vdth  3  '-f;del 

BI  equipments  for  shipboard  use.  The  first  BI  equipment  is  due  at  KRL 
September  22,  19lil.  The  contractor  is  asses.ibling  material  for  l500  ad- 
ditional .Ji.i  equipments  and  further  production  vrill  be  authorized  just 
as  soon  as  tests  justify  the  step.  ^.11  of  the  above  is  of  .j.ierican 
design  but  because  of  desi;n  and  operational  fv,atures  it  vdll  not  oper- 
ate vdth  corresponding  British  ship,  shore  or  ?.ircraft  throes.  To  pro- 
vide for  this  contingency  two  each  of  the  latest  British  ship,  shore 
and  aircraft  equipnents  are  being  flovm  to  tlie  United  States  and  vrill 
be  modified  for  production  iji  the  United  States  and  supplied  to  all  forces 
likely  to  operate  vdth  British  forces.  These  srjnple  equipnents  are  due 
within  a  fev;  days  according  to  advic^^s  fron  the  I'avrJ.  Attrirht',  London. 
The  56  equipnents  nentioned  in  the  paragraph  to  'vhich  tliis  .or-r::ent  is 
directed  are  for  Support  Force  Aircraft  and  ei^ht  are  ncv;  in  the  process 
of  being  installed."  15* 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2201 


SECRET 

Paragr^h  3(e)  of  yoxu-  lottcr.  Radar  equipment  for  submarine 
is  highly  important.  I  am  not  informed  as  to  exact  status  of  this  but 
understand  development  is  not  entirely  satisfactory.  There  is  evidence 
that  German  subs  are  equipped  with  Radar, 

In  general,  Naval  shipboard  radio  and  sound  equipment  is  so 
ej-aboratc  that  it  cannot  be  manufactured  expeditiously,  BuEnc  should  have 
type  plans  for  apparatus  of  such  a  nature  that  they  can  c^t  results  from 
industry  and  not  make  each  new  piece  of  apparatus  a  research  job,  ■^^^■^^ 

Comment,  /\n  omni-directional  aircraft  detection  equipment 
was  tested  in  CSRiVYLING  on  2  Aucust  19U..  Although  the  results  of  the 
test  were  somewhat  discouraginc,  the  equipment  showed  sufficient  promise 
to  warrant  its  manufacture.  It  is  believed  that  the  development  of  a 
directional  antenna  system  will  jpreatly  improve  the  performance  of  the 
submarine  equipmontj  this  project  will  bo  prosecuted,     / 

Contracts  have  been  awarded  for  the  manufacture  of  10-cm  sur- 
face-ship detection  equipment  for  submarines.  This  equipment  is  due  for 
delivery  about  January  19U2,  The  equipment  which  is  being  desicned  for 
making  ni{^t  attacks  while  the  submarine  is  surfaced,  is  expected  to  be 
capable  of  taking  accurate  ranges  and  bcarinf;s  on  capital  ships  at  dis- 
tances in  the  order  of  10,000  yards. 

In  order  to  expedite  the  manufacture  of  radio  and  sound  equip- 
ment,  the  Bureau  of  Ships  has  frozen  on  current  designs.  The  delay  in 
procurement  of  radio  and  so\ind  equipment  is  n2>t  entirely  due  to  the  "elab- 
orate" design;  the  "priority  ratings"  for  raw  materials  that  the  Navy  De- 
partment is  assigned  greatly  affects  the  production  of  equipment.  The 
Bureau  of  Ships  also  is  procuring  modified  commercial  radio  equipment. 

It  has  not  been  conclusively  determined  that  the  German  submar- 
ines SXQ   equipped  with  Radar,  It  is,  however,  highly  probable  that  they 
are  so  equipped  because  it  is  known  that  these  craft  operate  with  much 
facility  at  nij^t. 

Paragraph  U(a)  of  your  letter.  Pre-Fleot  Training.  Two  units 
under  the  Fleet  at  San  Diego,  one  for  patrol  squadrons  and  one  for  carrier 
squadrons.  Moro  pilots  for  battleships  and  cruisers,  for  traini:ig  on 
board  ship.  Particular  emphasis  on  double  complements  for  patrol  squad- 
rons j  anticipation  of  snlisted  personnel  numbers  and  training  in  all 
categories,  particularly  patrol  squadrons;  building  up  the  supply  of  spire 
airplanes;  accomplishing  the  training  without  any  further  drain  on  combat 
readiness  of  active  sqiiadrons, 

16. 


79716  O— 46 — pt.  16 19 


2202     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

sscRia 

Comaente.  In  this  connection,  the  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Aeronau* 
tics  refflarka: 

"On  26  Jxily,  2  signed  a  letter  that  embodied  meaaures  for  the 
improvement  of  aviation  training  of  pilots  and  other  nemhere  of  flight 
crews  in  the  intermediate  stage  that  occurs  between  primary  school  and 
fleet  Bfuadrons.  I  hope  the  effect  will  he  salutary  and  beneficial  in 
the  irnnediate  future.  VP-13  will  be  held  at  Sen  Diego  to  launch  an  ii>- 
tensive  transitional  training  program  in  combination  with  the  Training 
lest  and  Acceptance  Unit  already  in  operation  for  patrol  planes.  It  is 
recognized  that  further  drains  on  combatant  squadrons  are  undesirable 
but  the  training  centers  must  continue  to  function  or  the  supply  of 
pilots  for  the  organisation  of  new  squadrons  will  not  be  adequate.  Every 
experienced  aviation  officer  in  the  training  establishnent  ashore  will 
be  released  for  duty  in  fleet  squodrons  as  soon  as  he  can  be  replaced. 
The  majority  of  the  expansion  of  the  aeronautical  organization  afloat 
will  be  accomplished  without  disturbing  pilots  already  in  fleet  squadrons. 

▲side  from  transitional  training  in  the  larger  ps.trol  planes, 
pilots  and  enlisted  members  of  flight  crews  must  be  trained  in  fleet  patrol 
squadrons  whose  primary  task  is  their  nreparation  for  duty  in  active  coi*- 
batant  squadrons.  Althotigh  every  squadron  on  the  West  Coast  may  be 
assigned  this  duty,  it  will  be  necessary  for  Patrol  Wings  OND  and  T.iO 
in  the  Hawaiian  Area  to  absorb  pny  excess  in  personnel  that  cflnnot  be 
trained  effectively  because  of  insufficient  numbers  of  aircraft  and  quali- 
fied personnel. 

There  will  be  an  advanced  carrier  training  organisation  at 

Snn  Diego  in  accordsjice  with  my  letter  of  28  July,  Additional  new  VO/VS 

pilots  will  commence  re-oorting  to  the  Fleet  during  August,  Any  of  these 

pilots  who  cojinot  be  trained  expeditiously  on  boprd  ship  should  be  retained 

in  the  advanced  carrier  trpinlng  squadron  at  Spn  Diego  for  more  flying, 

particularly  gunnery,  at  the  discretion  of  the  Fleet. 

■  17. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2203 

SECRST 

The  priority  pccorded  to  the  Amy  end  British  heavy  honter 

orogracs  has  l)een  the  cause  of  oxtr  nost  urgent  attention.  The  flnftl 

action  on  priorities  was  decided  at  a  conference  'between  the  Secretary 

of  the  Navy  and  the  Secretary  of  War  which  was  attended  by  representa^ 

tives  of  the  Amy  ji.iT   Corps,  the  Bureau  of  Aeronautics  and  the  Office 

of  Production  Management.  The  net  result  was  an  A-l-t  award  to  anproxl- 

nately  2,000  (plus  or  ninus  500)  additional  naval  aircraft,  and  hrings 

a  total  of  3,596  naval  aircraft  into  the  highest  nriority  classification 

given  to  aircraft.  One  hundred  per  cent  spare  ai^tcraft  are  now  planned 

for  fleet  carrier  and  ship-based  squadrons,  and  fifty  per  cent  spare 

aircraft  have  heen  recpiested  for  petrol  squadrons. 

In  connection  with  the  foregoing,  the  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of 
navigation  renarksJ 

"The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  in  his  confidential  letter^ 
0p-23-B5,(SC)  Pll-1,  Serial  081322  of  July  28,  1941,  directed  Coraandeiw 
in-Chief ,  Pacific  Fleet  end  Comnander-in-Chief ,  Atlantic  Fleet  to  es- 
tablish as  quickly  as  practicable  within  their  respective  fleets,  the 
following  unite; 

(a)  Advanced  Carrier  Training  Group,  Pacific  and  Advanced 
Carrier  Training  Group,  Atlantic— for  the  Pacific  Fleet,  in  San  Diego 
and  for  the  Atlantic  Fleet,  In  Norfolk,  Virginie^-^Purpose  of  these 
groups  is  to  give  advenced  carrier  training  to  newly  graduated  naval 
aviators,  fresh  fron  training  centers,  prior  to  assignment  to  carrier 
units  in  the  two  fleets. 

(b)  Transition  Training  Squedron,  Atlsntic  and  Transition 
Training  Squadron,  Pacific — Pui^ose  of  these  sqiiadrons  is  to  give  advpnced 
patrol  plane  tr?ining  to  newly  graduated  naval  rviators,  fresh  fron  the 
training  centers,  prior  to  assignment  to  Patrol  plane  units  in  the  two 
fleets.   These  squadrons  eJ.60  train  experienced  aviators  in  the  operation 
of  the  model  EB2Y  airplanes  in  the  Pacific  Fleet  and  the  r.odel  P3M  air- 
planes in  the  A.tlantic  Fleet.  18. 


2204     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

SECK5T 

Experienced  Naval  Aviators  hpve  plready  been  ordered  to  report 

to  these  training  groups  pnd  equpdrons  when  they  are  forned  by  Comnander- 

in-Chief,  Pacific  and  Conraander-iB-Chief,  Atlantic.  These  aviators  will 

oversee  and  administer  the  training  of  the  personnel  ordered  to  these 

units. 

By  the  letter  referred  to  Pbove,  Chief  of  Naval  Operations 
has  indicated  that  during  the  months  of  August  to  Decenber,  1941,  inclu- 
sive, a  total  of  130  additional  pilots  for  battleships  and  cruisers  will 
be  ordered  to  bothtfleets.  Also,  for  the  spne  period,  334  carrier  Dilots 
and  598  patrol  plane  pilots  will  be  ordered  to  the  above  jnentioned. 
training  units  for  assignnent  to  each  fleet. 

After  January,  1942,  the  training  centers  will  be  turning 
pilots  out  at  such  a  rate  thPt  »>t  all  tires  therepfter,  we  will  always 
have  sufficient  pilots  under  advanced  and  transition  training  or  in  the 
operating  aviation  units  to  noet  all  the  fleet  requirenents,  including 
double  complements  of  petrol  squadrons. 

Based  on  present  estimates,  the  output  of  Class  "A"  Group  IV 

Schools  trainigg  aviation  ratings  aiid  radiomen  (qualair)  will  be  approxi-* 

nately  27,096  enlisted  men  (Navy)  from  August  1941  through  June  1942, 
Sixty-five  (65)  nercent  of  the  graduates  of  these  Class  "a" 
Schools  have  been  narked  for  Pensacola,  Corpus  Christi,  Jacksonville 
and  Miami,  until  about  8,170  grrdxiates  h?ve  been  fed  Into  the  flight 
training  centers,  filling  their  allowances  (in  total  numbers)  by  pbout 
January  20,  1942. 

This  will  leave  an  estimated  bp lance  of  18,926  Glass  "A"  School 

graduates  for  the  Jorces  Afloat  and  other  shore  establishments  by  June 
30,  1942. 

The  allowances  of  patrol  nlane  squadrons  have  been  increased 

220^3  over  the  1941  allowances.' 

Paragraph  4(b)  of  youy  letter.  New  Torpedo  Planes.  Highest 
priority  —  A-l-a  —  instead  of  present  priority  which  is  A-l-b,  There 
are  only  half  enough  torpedo  planes  now  and  they  are  obsolescent,  while 
war  reports  demonstrate  that  there  nay  be  no  single  item  of  greater 
naval  impoatance. 


19. 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2205 

SECRET 

Comiaent.  The  A-l-a  rating  for  torpedo  plpnes  wrs  aot  BRtis- 

fftctory  to  the  Wpr  Depprtnent  and^the JOffice  of  Production  Mftixagenent  ^ 

without  unP-coeptRtle  reduction  in  priority  of  other  wvpI  pircrpft.  \V» 

There  is  good  reason  to  question  whether  a  higher  priority  for  torpedo  ^ 

plpnee  would  hp.ve  expedited  their  delivery.  The  Hpvy  DepPTtnent  will  j 

continue  to  exert  naxinun  effort  to  expedite  the  production  of  TfTB  for  J 

the  fleet. 


Coment.     The  conversion  of  the  U.S.S.   ■AKEFIELD  pnd 

incor-   jVk 


Ppragraph  4(c)  of  your  letter.  CGnversions  for  Carrier  Land-  .^ 
ing  Trpininp.  Auxilipry  pircrpft  carrier  conversion  was  dropped  hecpuse    .^ 

of  tine  pnd  cost  factors.  These  cpn  l>e  greatly  reduced  by  reouiring  ^ 

only  the  characteristics  needed  for  landing  talnlng.  The  need  for  these  Vvf 

ships  is  extrene.  Aircraft  carriers  should  not,  and  in  w?r  cpnnot,  be  a 

used  for  this  purpose,  while  new  -nilots  nust  he  properly  trained  hefore  ,J 

Joining  pxtive  squadrons  if  conhat  readiness  is  not  to  be  Jeopardized.  \ 

U.S.S.     ^J 
. x^ 

J  *s 

porated  is  contenplated.  Steps  are  now  being  tpken  to  procure  naterial   -?  -S 

and  equipment.  The  actual  conversions  will  be  initiated  whenever  present  ^  V^ 

services  of  these  vessels  as  transports  can  be  concluded.  It  is  probable  J  j 

also  the  the  U.S.S.  WEST  POINT  will  be  included  in  the  pbove  cptegory,  -" 

Paragraph  4(d)  of  your  letter.  A.S.V.  (ioiti-Surface  Vessel) 
Equipment.  This  is  of  the  highest  potent ipl  vplue.  apparently  none 
will  be  available  for  p8.trol  planes  until  Decenber.   It  can  be  cai;:ried 
by  other  planes,  as  shown  by  reports  of  British  toi-pedo  plane  operations. 
It  shotild  be  provided  for  every  plane  that  ceji  carry  it  aiuL  laueh  earlier 
deliveries  are  essential. 

There  is  an  aircraft  BjJiMR   project  set  up  in  the  Bureeu  of 
Aeronautics  with  the  objective  of  providing  all  necesspry  equipment  that 
can  be  carried  and  operated  efficiently  in  aircraft  with  due  considera- 
tion for  other  essentipl  equipment.  The  training  of  lUHAE  operators  is 
underway  so  that  by  the  tine  the  equipaient  arrives  there  will  be  trained 

personnel  who  are  essential  for  its  successful  operation.  aSV  sets  will 
be  provided  as  alternate  installptions  in  p11  carrier  -olaJies  that  can 
accommodate  them  and  all  pa.trol  ulrnes  will  be  ASV-equipped,  Every  possi- 
ble source  of  supply,  including  British  pnd  Canadipn,  is  being  investi- 
geted  to  accelerate  the  progrpn.   Three  hundred  Canadian  ASV  equipment 
sets  are  expected  at  the  monthly  rpte  of  one  hundred  sets  corjnencing 
1  October,  1941.  20, 


2206     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

SjiCBJiT 

or  Joe  J  flomittii!^.  Ihia  la  Absolutely  conplementary  to  and  esostifU 
for  effective  u«e  of  the  Bftdar  for  Aircraft  defense  of  the  Tleat,  with- 
out it,  the  Rada*  eaanot  differentiate  between  friendly  and  enei^  airplanes. 
There  is  no  definite  infomation  on  deliveries,  Ko  delay  whate(ver  is 
acceptable. 

SSMSal*  This  subject  h»s  been  discussed  elsewhere  in  this 
letter.  However,  it  should  be  remarked  that  the  Interior  Control  Board 
is  setting  up  essential  requirements  for  BAQAH  equipment  on  boaxd  ship. 
The  Board  has  been  Pdvised  to  incorporate  the  identification  feature  In 
ship  control  ajid  flrec control  sets  since  t'h>»»  Is  ga^A  aneMfla  te  boiiieve — 
-«»»-  Identification  is  a  very  necessary  pprt  of  the  BADtsE  Installation. 

^fffPff-pPh  at)   9f  y9Vr  ^ontr-  gngines  f9r  Haw  Patrol  Planes 
ifiatgjj..  Hose  section  failures  have  been  occurring.  Every  effort  Is 
^eis«_»ede  to  find  and  cure  the  trouble.  This  should  be  continued,  for 
it  will  be  no  help  to  the  Fleet  or  to  any  destination  of  these  planes  to 
get  new  planes  that  can't  fly  In  place  of  older  planes  that  can. 

Comnegt.  The  Bureau  of  Aeronautics  and  the  engine  manufacturer 
have  been  advised  of  the  no«e  section  failures  In  the  engines  of  VP-14, 
The  loose-coupled  shaft  In  these  engines  will  elininate  the  restrictions 
on  operating  the  engine  within  the  -oresent  critical  speed  range.  However, 
this  does  not  apply  to  VP-14  but  this  sciuadron  is  being  supplied  new  heavier 
nose  sections  which  the  bureau  believes  will  correct  present  deficiencies 
If  engine  speeds  are  kept  outside  the  critical  range.  Only  thrfee  planes 
outside  VP-14  have  encountered  failures  In  the  light  nose  sections.  The 
Heavy  noses  will  be  shipped  from  the  factory  at  the  rate  of  ten  per  week 

beginning  August  11,  1941,  with  first  deliveries  to  VP-14. 

Paragraph  4(g)  of  youp  latter.  Landplane  Tield  at  Johnston 
Island.  This  wa^  removed  from  the  project  by  the  Department.  It  should 
be  put  back.   It  is  needed  not  only  as  an  adjunct  to  local  defense  but, 
more  importantly,  as  en  aid  to  defense  pgainst  expeditions  headed  east- 
ward and  as  a  stepping  stone  for  lendplane  support  of  expeditions  headed 
westward. 

Comment:.  Funds  in  the  amount  of  $750,000  for  this  project  are 

available  and  the  necessary  construction  work  has  been  authorized. 

Paragraph  4(h)  of  your  letter^  K^ehl  Lagoon  Developcent. 
This  will  be  of  very  great  value  to  patrol  plsnes  in  the  He\/aiian  area. 
It  is  the  best  location  for  operations  of  these  planes  and  no  other  place 
Is  suitable  for  planned  patrol  plane  expenslon  In  this  area.   Inclusion 
of  facilities  for  Navy  patrol  squadrons  in  this  develoiaient  should  be 
undertaken  iEDediptely, 

31. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2207 


Cocpgnt.  The  Navy  DapArtment  hae  included  Eeehi  Lagoon  as  one 
of  fch9  Vavyo-tponsored  developments  for  cOEBeroial  seaplanes  in  the  Hawaiian 
N   area  in  its  reconnendations  to  the  Oep^rtnent  of  Cotuserce.  The  War  D^- 


/j 


partment  has  aa  appropriation  of  approxiciitely  83,300.000  for  this  project 
.  ^  and  arrangements  are  'being  made  for  additional  funds  for  the  dredging 
^^    vhi«h  la  expected  to  ooonence  very  sooB*  Vfcry  patrol  plane  facilities 

are  not  Included  in  the  provpeotive  plans  for  ttis  location.  Any  special 
facilities  for  naval  patrol  planes  for  the  present  at  least  must  "be   of 
a  temporary  nature. 

?wag>ift Ml)  9f  ygK  l^Hn*  ffgT^towfflt  tf  m  Pn»^gf 

Bf^>t9y's  foifl^.  This  approved  developcant  is  very  urgently  needed, 
there  is  a  strong  tendency  to  turn  down  many  aviation  shore  facility 
items  in  this  area  on  the  hasli  that  thay  will  be  available  when  Barber's 
point  construction  is  finisbsA«  This  mates  it  more  thPA  ever  mandatory 
to  e::pedite  the  work. 


^.  Tour  eeomeat  on  the  need  f<tr  this  development  is 
supported  who^e»heartedljr  in  the  Department  and  will  receive  the  most 
careful  attention  until  it  meets  the  Fleet's  need,  ruads  for  Barber's 
Point  in  the  amount  9f  618,605.000  will  be  available  in  August  and  work 
begun  immediately  If  the  bill,  now  pending  in  Congress,  is  passed  by  the 
Senate  and  signed  by  the  President.  The  bill  has  already  passed  the  House 
and  has  been  approved  by  the  Haval  Affairs  Committee  of  the  Senate, 

I  have  gone  into  the  subjects  you  raised  in  some  detail  because  I 
want  you  to  be  fully  advised.  Don't  hesiliate  to  tell  us  hew  you  think 
we  can  help.  We  want  to  be  of  all  assistance  possible,  end  helpful  criti- 
cism is  always  in  order. 

lou  no  doubt  have  seen  in  the  press  about  otu:  conference  at 
sea.  Aside  from  being  a  most  historic  occasion,  it  was  mdst  helpful. 
It  Is  to  my  deep  regret  that  time  and  distance  precluded  your  being  pres> 
•at« 


with  all  good  wishes r  1  «ml^  CT  yr 
r      ^   Sincere Iv. 


J  ,  '       -  Sincerely, 
O**      /S/  Betty 


2208     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(Rec'd.  Clipper  3rd  Sept.) 
Navy  Department, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Washington,  28  August  1941. 
Secret 
In  reply  refer  to  Initials  and  No.  Op-10  Hu 

Dear  Mustapha  :  Have  been  trying  to  get  a  letter  off  to  you  for  a  week,  al- 
though what  I  have  already  sent  you  covers  fairly  well  our  situation  to  date. 
I  do,  however,  want  once  again  to  thank  you  for  your  splendid  letter  of  August 
12th  which  has  been  so  thoroughly  enjoyed  by  everybody.  It  gave  us  a  great 
close-up  of  the  Fleet  which  was  more  than  welcome. 

As  of  today  we  have  about  262.000  men.  Reenlistments  for  the  year  to  date 
average  something  over  70%  and  the  same  is  true  for  the  month  of  Jaly.  Our 
advertising  campaign  for  men  is  bearing  fruit  and  we  hope  next  month  to  get 
at  least  10.000,  and  our  best  hopes  might  realize  11,000.  Our  goal  is  not  less 
than  12,000.  Tommy  Holcomb  expects  to  reach  his  allowed  75,000  in  March. 
The  goal  for  enlisted  men  (Navy)  is  all  I  can  get,  regardless  of  deficits  or 
what  not. 

I  shoved  off  the  letter  on  RDF  just  as  it  came  to  me  and  with  the  rough  notes 
I  had  made,  and  I  really  should  apologize  for  its  form,  but  the  substance  was 
there  and  that  letter,  together  with  the  previous  table  which  had  been  sent  out 
by  BuShips  will,  I  believe,  give  your  people  the  best  picture  we  have. 

I  note  what  you  say  about  not  resting  until  you  get  the' patrol  vessels  you 
have  requested  in  official  correspondence.  I  might  add  "neither  will  I".  You 
know  I  am  keenly  alive  to  your  needs.  At  present  we  are  constantly  fighting 
material  shortage  and  priorities.  You  are  thoroughly  familiar  with  the  building 
program  and  the  dates  of  completion  so  no  need  to  comment  on  it.  We  are 
ahead  of  schedule  at  present  but  the  steel  situation  grows  more  critical  daily 
and  at  last  I  believe  the  blocks  are  going  to  be  put  on  unnecessary  civilian  needs. 
Our  small  ship  program  was  the  most  difficult  to  get  started.  I  was  pei'fectly 
delighted  the  other  day  when  some  one  told  me  they  had  tried  to  buy  an  electric 
refrigerator  but  it  could  not  be  had.  Another  example:  I  ordered  an  electric 
heater  for  the  cottage  at  the  Lake  direct  from  the  Westinghouse  wholesale 
people  here  in  Washington,  who  inform  me  it  is  well  I  got  my  order  in  when  I 
did  because  it  was  the  last  one  and  no  more  would  be  manufactured.  It  has 
taken  a  long  time  to  get  the  psychology  started.  I  say  started,  because  the 
country  still  is  to  a  considerable  extent,  asleep  to  the  efforts  required. 

[2]  I  am  perfectly  delighted  with  your  reaction  to  the  recent  directives  from 
the  Office  of  Fleet  Training  relative  to  target  practices.  Of  course,  Lee  was  tickled 
to  pieces  over  your  enthusiastic  comment. 

I  have  talked  not  only  to  Nimitz  but  also  to  Carpender,  who  came  down  to  see 
me  after  I  had  given  Nimitz  your  notes  with  regard  to  personnel.  You  will  have 
heard  from  Bunav  direct. 

I  am  delighted  also  over  your  comment  about  the  reaction  facilities  and  hope 
the  good  work  in  this  connection  may  continue  to  expand  until  the  situation  is 
satisfactory. 

I  am  told  an  official  letter  was  sent  to  you  on  the  Defense  Battalion  situation 
so  will  not  repeat  here. 

Once  again,  thanks  for  the  human  side  of  the  news. 

With  regard  to  the  general  situation  in  the  Pacific  about  all  I  can  say  is  the 
Japs  seem  to  have  arrived  at  another  one  of  their  indecisive  periods.  I  can  only 
intimate  to  you  that  some  very  strong  messages  have  been  sent  to  them  but  just 
what  they  are  going  to  do  I  don't  know. 

I  told  one  of  their  Statesmen  this  morning  that  I  felt  another  move,  such  as 
one  into  Thailand,  would  go  a  long  way  towards  destroying  before  the  American 
public  what  good-will  still  remained.  As  you  know,  I  have  had  some  extremely 
frank  talks  with  them. 

I  have  not  given  up  hope  of  continuing  peace  in  the  Pacific,  but  I  could  wish 
the  thread  by  which  it  continues  to  hang  were  not  so  slender. 

There  is  much  talk  of  the  Japanese  barring  ships  carrying  anns  to  Russia.  I 
am  delighted  that  when  Admiral  Hart  asked  us  to  make  the  Sulu  Sea  a  closed 
area  we  did  not  do  it  although  there  was  some  pressure  here  for  it.  One  of 
my  principal  reasons  against  doing  it  was  because  of  the  precedent  which  it 
might  establish,  and  thus  give  the  Japs  something  to  hang  their  hat  on  if  later 
they  wanted  to  make  a  similar  pronouncement  regarding  the  Sea  of  Japan. 
We  have  to  go  through  one  of  those  holes  in  the  wall  to  get  to  the  Russian 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2209 

Maritime  Provinces.  This  also  brings  up  the  case  of  the  so-called  neutrality  zone 
encircling  the  Western  Hemisphere.  But  that,  like  the  recent  closing  of  the 
Canal  to  Japanese  ships,  is  water  over  the  dam  and  I  won't  bother  you  with  my 
troubles  on  those  pronouncements. 

Regardless  of  the  will  to  do  all  you  want  in  the  line  of  permanence  of  per- 
sonnel, please  keep  in  mind  the  tremendous  expansion  we  are  up  against,  and 
the  many  ships  which  have  to  be  commissioned.  Notwithstanding  the  fact  that 
at  least  some  of  us  foresaw  that,  regardless  of  our  efforts,  there  just  has  to  be 
considerable  compromise  in  the  arduous  task  of  building  up  and  manning  the 
so-called  Two-Ocean  Navy,  not  to  mention  all  the  other  stuff  from  AKs  and  APs 
to  AMs  and  ATs. 

[3]  Not  in  the  way  of  an  excuse,  because  I  am  not  making  any,  but  just 
giving  reasons,  I  checked  up  on  one  of  the  battleships  in  the  last  war  which  had 
been  in  commission  about  a  year.  It  has  a  complement  of  65  officers,  but  of  this 
number  had  only  13  regulars,  including  paymasters  and  doctors,  in  the  entire 
outfit.  The  other  52  were  all  Reserves  and  temporaries.  Nevertheless,  1  am  told 
those  52  filled  their  billets  very  well  and  that  they  had  a  fine  ship.  I  think  histoiy 
has  got  to  repeat  itself,  and  the  only  thing  I  see  to  do  is  loyally  to  attempt  to 
solve  our  present  situation  and  do  the  best  we  can  with  what  we  have,  and  I  know 
of  no  one  better  than  yourself  to  tackle  the  job.  That  is  why  you  are  where 
you  are. 

I  expect  all  the  kicks  and  forceful  reasons  you  can  send  me  for  change  and 
help  and  I  will  go  just  as  far  as  it  is  humanly  possible  to  do  and  so  will  every- 
body else  in  the  Department. 

We  all  know  that  Naval  personnel  will  rise  up  and  do  better  under  great  diffi- 
culties than  they  will  when  things  are  easy  and  serene  (if  they  ever  were). 

You  will  be  glad  to  know  that  the  vibration  troubles  which,  to  put  it  mildly, 
were  cause  for  concern  in  the  WASHINGTON  and  NORTH  CAROLINA  are 
uearing  solution. 

I  am  delighted  the  West  Coast  visits  are  proving  so  helpful.  I  hope  they  will 
not  have  to  be  stopped  but  only  time  will  tell. 

I  do  not  recall  for  the  moment  whether  or  not  in  previous  correspondence  I 
acknowledged  receipt  of  your  letter  of  30  July  regarding  using  one  of  your 
carriers  for  ferrying  planes  to  the  Russians.  This  is  just  one  of  the  headaches 
we  have  here. 

Mrs.  Hull  ought  to  be  reminding  me  that  she  has  a  mother  for  whom  she  has  to 
get  dinner  because  it  is  1830.    My  day  is  just  beginning. 

Keep  cheerful  and  as  always  every  good  wish  in  the  wide  world  to  you  all  and 
best  of  luck. 

Sincerely, 

/s/    Betty 

Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel,  U.  S.  Navy, 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet, 
V8S  Pennsylvania, 

c/o  Postmaster,  Sati  Francisco,  California. 


Op-lO-MD 

Secret 

September  22,  1941. 

De:ae  Tommy  :  Considerable  has  happened  since  I  last  wrote  to  you. 

So  far  as  the  Atlantic  is  concerned,  we  are  all  but,  if  not  actually,  in  it.  The 
President's  speech  of  September  11,  1941  put  the  matter  squarely  before  the 
country  and  outlined  what  he  expected  of  the  Navy.  We  were  ready  for  this ;  in 
fact,  our  orders  had  been  issued. 

In  addition  to  the  incidents  cited  by  the  President,  other  and  probably  equally 
compelling  reasons  lay  behind  his  decision.  For  some  time,  the  British  have 
found  the  problem  of  getting  supplies  across  the  Atlantic  a  difficult  one.  They 
have  never  had  enough  ships  suitable  for  escort  duty.  Their  forces  are  thinly 
spread  and,  as  a  result  of  casualties,  the  spreading  has  had  to  be  thinner  and 
thinner  as  the  campaign  has  progressed.  If  Britain  is  to  continue,  she  has  to  have 
assistance.  She  will  now  get  it  openly.  King's  forces,  too,  are  thinly  spread, 
working  as  he  is  from  20  South  to  the  Iceland  area. 

In  a  nutshell,  we  are  now  escorting  convoys  regularly  from  the  United  States  to 
points  in  the  Iceland  area,  where  tb^se  convoys  are  picked  up  by  the  British  and 
escorted  to  the  British  Isles.     In  addition  to  our  own  escort  vessels,  t^e  Canadiaris 


2210     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

are  participating.     Both  forces   (Canadian  and  our  own)   are  operating  under 
King's  direction. 

This  will  be  a  boon  for  the  British.  It  will  permit  them  to  strengthen  their 
forces  elsewhere,  both  with  heavy  and  light  ships,  particularly  in  critical  areas 
through  which  convoys  for  the  Near  East,  via  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  must  pass. 
It  will  further  help  the  British  to  meet  the  ever-present  threat  of  a  raid  on  troop 
or  merchant  ship  convoys  by  heavy  units,  in  that  it  will  narrow  the  area  in  which 
the  British  heavy  units  will  be  required  to  be  resp«nusible.  Moreover,  ships  for 
other  possible  activities,  such  as  duty  in  the  Mediterranean,  etc.,  will  thus  be 
released. 

[2]  The  area  which  we  regard  as  "our  ocean"  is  roughly  outlined  as  follows : 
all  west  of  a  line  10°  West  Longitude  to  Latitude  65°  North,  thence  by  rhumb  line 
to  a  position  53°  North,  26°  West,  thence  south  on  26°.  Unless  the  Axis  powers 
withdraw  their  men-of-war  from  this  area,  contacts  are  almost  certain  to  occur. 
The  rest  requires  little  imagination. 

The  GREER  incident  created  quite  a  stir.  Senator  Clark  (Missouri)  pushed  a 
resolution  through  the  Senate  which  called  for  the  log  of  the  ship.  This,  we  will 
not  furnish.  Mr.  Nye  (North  Dakota)  submitted  a  resolution  calling  for  an 
investigation  by  the  Naval  Affairs  Committee  into  the  whole  incident.  The 
enclosed  is  a  statement  I  propose  to  make — and  pretty  well  gives  you  the  story. 

Iceland  has,  of  course,  in  recent  months,  taken  on  much  significance  for  us. 
Since  the  President's  speech,  it  lias  taken  on  added  significance.  Since  July,  we 
have  had  450(J  marines  there,  and  on  Monday  last  we  landed  some  (3000  Army. 
While  this  Army  convoy  was  enix)ute,  the  Germans  had  by  far  the  strongest  con- 
centration of  U-boats  that  they  have  ever  had  in  the  North  Atlantic.  It  was  so 
strong  and  so  active  that  it  raised  the  very  devil  with  a  British-escorted  convoy, 
the  Germans  claiming  28  ships  sunk.  About  half  that  number  is  more  nearly 
correct,  and  admitted  by  the  British.  Our  own  Army  troop  convoy  was  in  the 
immediate  vicinity  of  the  attack  and  had  to  be  re-routed  by  despatch  several  times 
in  au  effort  to  avoid  the  area  of  action.  At  that,  seven  SS  contacts  were  had. 
We  should  have  gotten  at  least  one  SS,  which  was  attacked  under  favorable 
circumstances. 

As  to  conditions  in  your  part  of  the  world,  Mr.  Hull  has  not  yet  given  up  hope  of 
a  satisfactory  settlement  of  our  differences  with  Japan.  Chances  of  such  a 
settlement  are,  in  my  judgment,  very  slight.  Admiral  Nonuira  is  working  hard 
on  his  home  government  and,  while  he  appears  to  be  making  some  progress,  I  am 
still  from  Missouri.  It  looks  like  a  dead-lock;  but  I  suppose  as  long  as  there  is 
negotiation  there  is  hope. 

The  press  is  making  much  at  the  moment  of  the  way  the  Far  Eastern  situation 
has  apparently  quieted  down.  One  cannot  help  being  impre.ssed  with  the 
optimistic  note  of  the  editorial  writers  and  columnists  in  tliis  regard.  For  my 
own  part,  I  feel  that  false  hopes  are  being  raised.  While  on  the  surface  the 
Japanese  appear  to  be  making  mme  effort  at  reaching  a  satisfactory  solution,  I 
can  not  disregard  the  possibility  that  they  are  merely  stalling  for  time  and 
waiting  until  the  situation  in  Europe  becomes  more  stabilized.  If  Russia  falls, 
Japan  is  not  going  to  be  easily  pried  away  from  her  Axis  associations.  [5] 
She  will  no  doubt  grab  any  opportunity  that  presents  itself  to  improve  her  position 
in  Siberia.  If  Russia  can  hold  out  (which,  at  the  moment,  hardly  appears  pos- 
sible), I  feel  that  there  might  be  more  hope  of  some  sort  of  an  agreement  with 
Japan. 

The  same  sort  of  false  hopes  are  being  raised  in  our  press  with  reference  to 
the  German-Russian  situation.  There  is  no  question  but  that  the  Greece  and 
Crete  incidents  delayed  Germany's  move  on  their  Eastern  front.  I  think  it 
quite  probable  that  they  intended  to  move  against  Russia  earlier  in  the  year. 
If  the  delay  incident  to  the  two  campaigns  noted  above  have  introduced  sufficient 
delay  in  their  time  table,  which,  coupled  with  Russian  resistance,  will  permit 
the  Russians  to  carry  on  some  sort  of  a  front  this  winter,  then  possibly  those 
two  debacles  were  not  entirely  without  compensation.  The  Hun  is  after  the 
Buss  Army.  It  has  proved  far  more  of  a  stumbling  block  than  Hitler  had 
imagined.  However,  the  Germans  are  making  steady  progress.  The  Russian 
losses  in  men  and  material  are  great,  and  production  of  essential  war  materials 
is  being  much  lessened.  'When  the  Harriman  mission  returns  from  Moscow 
(Admiral  Standley  is  our  senior  Navy  meml)er),  we  will  pi'obably  get  some  real 
news.  Harry  Hopkins  saw  only  Stalin.  The  Russians  Military  Mission  that 
is  now  in  the  United  States  has  presented  very  large  requests  for  war  materials, 
and  it  makes  our  own  planning  an  ever  changing  affair. 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2211 

You  now  have  our  reply  to  your  oflScial  recommendation  concerning  the  with- 
drawal of  the  Marines  from  China.  We  recognize  the  soundness  of  all  your 
arguments,  pro  and  con,  and  we  put  some  weight  on  those  questioning  withdrawal. 
We  feel  that  a  complete  withdrawal  of  our  forces  from  China  would  create  a 
reaction  in  that  country  and  in  Japan  and  in  our  own,  that  would  be  bad. 
So,  for  the  moment  at  least,  we  will  hang  on.  1  know  you  will  open  it  up  again 
by  letter  or  despatch  if  you  consider  it  should  l)e  again  reviewed;  and  it  very 
well  may  be — there  is  little  that  is  static  in  this  old  world  at  present. 

I  would  be  less  than  frank  if  I  did  not  tell  you  that  I  am  not  fully  supported  in 
the  above  view.  Tommy  Holcomb  wants  to  withdraw,  lock,  stock,  and  barrel. 
I  can  easily  see  his  point  of  view.  He  wants  to  avoid,  if  at  all  possible,  "blood 
letting".  In  this,  he  is  supported  by  Colonel  Peck.  That  officer  feels  that  all 
or  none  of  the  marines  should  come  out.  Peck  is  against  leaving  a  "token 
force".  He  feels  that  to  do  so,  we  are  inviting  trouble  and  that  the  "token 
force"  can  be  of  little  support  to  the  local  police.  In  that,  I  agree.  But, 
something  bigger  is  at  stake.  So  far  as  China  is  concerned,  we  have  "our  foot  in 
the  door" — the  door  that  once  was  "open",  and  if  I  had  the  say  to,  it  would 
remain  there  until  I  was  ready  to  withdraw         [4\  it — or  until  the  door 

opened  to  such  a  point  that  I  could  gracefully  withdraw  if  and  when  I  saw  fit.  I 
agree  that  proper  timing  may  be  extremely  difficult.  You  may  be  right  that 
they  should  come  now.  I  hope  I  am  right  in  holding  on.  Ultimately,  I  hope 
we  may  both  see  alike.     I  don't  enjoy  not  being  100%  with  you. 

You  know  how  I  have  long  felt  about  reinforcing  the  Philippines.  The  enclosed 
memorandum  shows  what  is  in  the  wind.  Personallj',  I  am  delighted,  and  I  am 
sure  you  will  be,  too.  I  thuik  it  should  have  a  pronounced  effect  in  prevention — 
or,  if  not,  then  in  execution. 

We  are  awaiting  with  interest  your  reply  to  our  despatch  about  additional 
aircraft  for  you  and  our  proposition  about  giving  you  some  additional  long- 
range  submarines.     It  is,  I  take  it,  largely  a  question  of  your  upkeep  facilities. 

Take  care  of  yourself.  Keep  cheerful !  And  every  good  wish  in  the  wide 
world. 

Sincerely, 

[s]     Betty 

Admiral  T.  C.  Habt,  USN 

Cotnimander-in-Chief,  Asiatic  Fleet 

%  Postmaster,  Asiatic  Station, 
San  Francisco,  California. 


Secret 

Memorandum  for  Admiral  Stark : 

Septembeb  12,  1941. 

Dear  Betty  :  You  asked  me  about  what  we  are  doing  for  the  Philippines  : 

August  26:  There  sailed  from  San  Francisco  part  of  a  regiment  of  antiaircraft 
troops  and  some  reserve  supplies. 

September  8:  There  sailed  from  San  Francisco  the  remainder  of  the  anti- 
aircraft regiment,  a  tank  battalion  of  50  tanks,  50  of  the  latest  pursuit  planes, 
and  the  personnel  to  man  them,  which  brings  the  modern  pursuit  planes  in  the 
Philippines  up  to  80. 

September  J 8:  50  self-propelled  mounts  for  75  cannon  to  be  shipped  from  San 
Francisco,  and  50  more  tanks. 

Today  The  squadron  of  nine  Flying  Fortresses  landed  in  Manila  after  suc- 
cessfully flying  the  route  Midway,  Wake,  New  Britain,  Dutch  East  Indies. 

September  30:  Two  squadrons  (26  planes)  of  Flying  Fortresses  will  leave  San 
Francisco  for  Hawaii  en  route  to  the  Philippines. 

October:  A  reserve  of  pursuit  planes  will  have  been  in  process  of  shipment, 
about  32  in  October,  rising  to  a  total  of  130  by  December. 

November:  Probably  a  reserve  of  six  to  nine  of  the  super  Flying  Fortresses, 
B-24  type  planes  will  be  transferred  to  Manila.  The.se  planes  will  have  an  oper- 
ating radius  of  1,500  miles,  with  a  load  of  14,000  bombs,  which  means  that  they 
can  reach  0.saka  with  a  full  load  and  Tokyo  with  a  partial  load.  They  have 
pressure  cabins  and  can  operate  continuously  35,000  feet  for  bombing. 

December:  Another  group  of  Flying  Fortresses,  some  35  planes,  goes  to 
Manila. 

A  group  of  dive  bombers,  some  54  planes,  also  goes. 


2212     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

A  group  of  pursuit,  some  130  planes,  along  with  two  additional  squadrons  to 
build  up  the  previous  pursuit  group,  will  be  dispatched. 
A  50%  reserve  is  being  established  for  all  these  planes. 


You  may  have  had  word  of  this  already ; 
I  gave  original  to  Mr.  Stimson. 


G.  C.  M. 

Chief  of  Staff. 


(Rec'd  4  Oct.) 

Navy  Depaktment, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Washington,  23  September  lO^l. 

In  reply  refer  to  Initials  and  No.  Op-10  Hu 
Secret 

Deab  Kimmel:  This  is  in  reply  to  your  letter  of  12  September.  I  have  sent 
you  a  copy  of  my  letter  of  22  September  to  Tommy  Hart  which  gives  some  of 
the  picture  as  I  see  it  up  to  that  date. 

At  the  present  time  the  President  has  issued  shooting  orders  only  for  the 
Atlantic  and  Southeast  Pacific  sub-area. 

The  situation  in  the  Pacific  generally  is  far  different  from  what  it  Is  in  the 
Atlantic.  The  operations  of  raiders  in  the  Pacific  at  present  are  not  very  wide- 
spread or  very  effective.  Most  of  the  merchantmen  in  the  Pacific  are  of  United 
States  or  Panamanian  flag  registry.  Instittuing  any  steps  toward  eliminating 
raiders  outside  of  waters  close  to  the  continents  of  North  and  South  America, 
might  have  unfavorable  repercussions,  which  would  not  be  worth  the  cost  to  the 
United  States  in  the  long  run.  The  longer  we  can  keep  the  situation  in  the 
Pacific  in  status  quo,  the  better  for  all  concerned. 

One  of  the  things  you  did  not  mention  is  what  action  the  United  States  and 
the  United  Kingdom  would  take  were  Japan  to  attack  Siberia.  The  policy  of 
either  government  under  such  circumstances  has  not  yet  been  clarified.  In  the 
meantime  we  are  preparing  an  agenda  for  staff  conversations  with  the  Russians. 

In  reply  to  question  (a)  your  existing  orders  to  escorts  are  appropriate  under 
the  present  situation.  They  are  also  in  accordance  with  Art.  723  U.  S.  Navy 
Regulations ;  no  orders  should  be  given  to  shoot  at  the  Present  Time,  other 
than  those  clearly  set  forth  in  this  article.  I  believe  there  is  little  possibility 
of  an  Italian  or  German  raider  molesting  a  naval  ship,  but  there  might  be  an- 
other "Robin  Moore"  incident  in  the  Pacific,  in  which  case  the  President  might 
give  orders  for  action  in  the  Pacific  similar  to  those  now  in  effect  in  the  Atlantic ; 
but  that  is  something  for  the  future. 

Art.  723,  U.  S.  N.  R.  reads  as  follows : 

"The  use  of  force  against  a  foreign  and  friendly  state  or  against  anyone  within 
the  territories  thereof,  is  illegal. 

The  right  of  self-preservation,  however,  is  a  right  which  belongs  to  States  as 
well  as  to  individuals,  and  in  the  case  of  States  it  includes  the  protection  of  the 
State,  its  honor,  and  its  possessions,  and  the  lives  and  property  of  its  citizens 
against  arbitrary  violence,  actual  or  impending,  [2]  whereby  the  State 
or  its  citizens  may  suffer  irreparable  injury.  The  conditions  calling  for  the 
application  of  the  right  of  self-preservation  cannot  be  defined  beforehand,  but 
must  be  left  to  the  sound  judgment  of  responsible  ofllcers,  who  are  to  perform 
their  duties  in  this  respect  with  all  possible  care  and  forbearance.  In  no  case 
shall  force  be  exercised  in  time  of  peace  otherwise  than  as  an  application  of 
the  right  of  self-preservation  as  above  defined.  It  must  be  used  only  as  a  last 
resort,  and  then  only  to  the  extent  which  is  absolutely  necessary  to  accomplish 
the  end  required.  It  can  never  be  exercised  with  a  view  to  inflicting  punishment 
for  acts  already  committed." 

Regarding  question  (b),  we  have  no  definite  information  that  Japanese  sub- 
marines have  ever  operated  in  close  vicinity  to  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  Alaska 
or  our  Pacific  Coast.  They  may  have  been  near  Wake  recently.  The  existing 
orders,  that  is  not  to  bomb  suspected  submarines  except  in  the  defensive  sea 
areas,  are  appropriate.  If  conclusive,  and  I  repeat  conclusive,  evidence  is 
obtained  that  Japanese  submarines  are  actually  in  or  near  United  States  terri- 
tory, then  a  strong  warning  and  a  threat  of  hostile  action  against  such  sub- 
marines would  appear  to  be  our  next  stop.    Keep  us  informed. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2213 

We  have  no  intention  of  furtjier  reducing  the  Pacific  Fleet  except  that  pre- 
scribed in  Rainbow  5,  that  is  the  withdrawal  of  four  cruisers  about  one  month 
after  Japan  and  the  United  States  are  at  war.  The  existing  force  in  the  Pacific 
Is  all  that  can  be  spared  for  the  tasks  assigned  your  fieet,  and  new  construction 
will  not  make  itself  felt  until  next  year. 

The  operations  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  ought  not  to  be  considered  separately 
from  the  operations  of  the  Asiatic  Fleet  and  the  British  and  Dutch  forces  in  the 
Far  East.  Furthermore,  the  Japan-Soviet  situation  requires  considerable 
attention  from  Japan's  naval  forces.  While  offensives  by  the  Pacific  Fleet  in 
the  Central  Pacific  may  not  draw  important  Japanese  naval  forces  in  that  direc- 
tion, they  ought  to  have  an  important  effect  in  pinning  the  Japanese  Navy  to 
northern  water,  or  to  bases  in  the  Western  Pacific,  and  thus  divert  them  away 
from  the  Philippines  and  the  Malay  Barrier.  By  copy  of  my  letter  to  Admiral 
Hart  you  now  know  that  the  Armiy  is  building  up  its  Philippine  Garrison,  and 
plans  important  increases  in  Army  air  forces  in  the  Philippines.  Dutch  and 
British  air  and  land  forces  are  also  gradually  increasing  in  strength.  We  are 
now  informed  by  the  British  that  thej  plan  to  send  the  Battleships  ROYAL 
SOVERIGN,  RAMILIES  and  RESOLUTION  to  arrive  on  the  East  Indian 
Station  by  late  December ;  to  retain  there  the  REPULSE  until  relieved  by  the 
RENOWN  in  January ;  and  to  send  one  or  two  modern  capital  ships  to  the  East 
Indian  Station  early  in  the  new  year.  These,  with  one  carrier,  and  a  total  of 
four  eight-inch  cruisers  and  thirteen  six-inch  cruisers  (seven  modern)  ought  to 
make  the  task  of  the  Japanese  in  moving  southward  considerably  more  difficult. 
It  should  make  Japan  think  twice  before  taking  action,  if  she  has  taken  no  action 
by  that  time. 

[3]  I  may  be  mistaken,  but  I  do  not  believe  that  the  major  portion  of  the 
Japanese  Fleet  is  likely  to  be  sent  to  the  Marshalls  or  the  Caroline  Islands  under 
circumstances  that  now  seem  possible. 

The  NORTH  CAROLINA  and  the  WASHINGTON  are  not  as  yet  finally  com- 
pleted and  have  had  no  target  practice.  We  ought  to  put  aside  any  thought 
that  these  two  battleships  will  be  of  any  practical  use  to  us  before  the  end  of 
next  March,  and  I  would  consider  it  most  unwise  to  reach  any  final  decision 
now  as  to  which  Fleet  they  ought  ultimately  to  be  attached.  At  present,  the 
need  for  them  is  far  greater  in  the  Atlantic  than  in  the  Pacific,  particularly  if 
we  are  to  make  possible  the  movement  of  British  naval  forces  from  the  Atlantic 
to  the  Far  East  Area. 

With  regard  to  the  first  and  last  paragraphs  on  page  two,  I  believe  that,  in  all 
probability,  the  Pacific  Fleet  can  operate  successfully  and  effectively  even 
though  decidedly  weaker  than  the  entire  Japanese  Fleet,  which  certainly  can 
be  concentrated  in  one  area  only  with  the  greatest  diflBculty. 

The  following  despatch  has  just  been  brought  to  my  attention.  You  no  doubt 
have  seen  it  but  I  will  quote  it  as  a  reminder. 

"Rear  Admiral  Toshio  Matsunaga  Retired  in  interview  published  in  Hochi 
States  Japanese  should  face  future  with  calm  confidence  in  ability  Army  Navy 
repel  air  attacks  x  Japan  need  not  worry  about  weak  ABCD  powers  encircle- 
ment plans  X  quoted  as  stating  he  has  fiown  over  Guana  total  sixteen  times  once 
this  year  without  sighting  single  American  plane  x  American  air  power  Far 
East  negligible  x  prior  retirement  Matsunaga  served  twelve  years  as  aviator 
Commander  Ryujo  Acagi  Tateyama  Air  Station  now  Director  Japan  airways." 

In  connection  with  the  foregoing  would  it  not  be  possible  for  your  force  to 
"carefully"  get  some  pictures  of  the  Mandated  Islands? 

Keep  Cheerful. 

Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel,  U.  S.  N., 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.  »*?.  Pacific  Fleet, 
U.  S.  S.  PENNSYLVANIA, 

c/o  postmaster,  San  Francisco,  California. 

P.  S.  I  have  held  this  letter  up  pending  a  talk  with  Mr.  Hull  who  has  asked 
me  to  hold  it  very  secret.  I  may  sum  it  up  by  saying  that  conversations  with 
the  Japs  have  practieally  reached  an  impasse.  As  I  see  it  we  can  get  nowhere 
towards  a  settlement  and  peace  in  the  Far  East  until  and  unless  there  is  some 
agreement  between  Japan  and  China — and  just  now  that  seems  remote.  Whether 
or  not  their  inability  to  come  to  any  sort  of  an  understanding  just  now — is — or — 
is  not — a  good  thing — I  hesitate  to  say. 

Copy  to  Admiral  Hart. 

29  Spetembeb  1941. 

P.  S.  #2 :  Admiral  Nomura  came  in  to  see  ine  this  morning.  We  talked  for 
about  an  hour.     He  usually  comes  in  when  he  begins  to  feel  near  the  end  of  his 


2214     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

rope ;  there  is  not  much  to  spare  at  the  end  now.  I  have  helped  before  but 
whether  I  can  this  time  or  not  I  do  not  know.  Conversations  without  results 
cannot  last  forever.  If  they  fall  through,  and  it  looks  like  they  might,  the  situa- 
tion could  only  grow  more  tense.  I  have  again  talked  to  Mr.  Hull  and  I  think 
he  will  make  one  more  try.  He  keeps  me  pretty  fully  informed  and  if  there 
is  anything  of  moment  I  will,  of  course,  hasten  to  let  you  know. 

Our  transports  which  recently  landed  a  contingent  of  Army  in  Iceland  will, 
God  willing,  in  another  day  be  clear  of  the  submarine  concentration  through 
which  they  have  had  to  run  and  we  will  breathe  easy  with  regard  to  them.  How- 
ever, it  is  a  continuous  game  now  and  yesterday  I  am  glad  to  state  we  delivered 
our  first  big  convoy  to  the  British  after  having  gone  through  safely  from  New- 
foundland well  into  the  Eastern  Atlantic.  We  also  have  a  combatant  force 
going  up  to  strengthen  the  Iceland  situation  for  the  next  few  weeks  because  of 
the  British  situation  and  the  possibility  of  a  sortie  of  a  German  contingent 
which  is  under  surveillance. 

I  saw  a  photograph  of  your  picture.  It  looks  great  and  I  think  it  is  a  fine 
thing  to  have  it  recorded ;  the  boys  will  be  proud  of  it  always. 

[s]    Betty 

Secret  Received  23  Oct. 

Op-10  Hu  Navt  Depabtment, 

Ofeice  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Opekations, 

Washington,  11  Octo1)er  1941. 

Deab  Kimmex:  Things  have  been  popping  here  for  the  last  twenty-four  hours 
but  from  our  despatches  you  know  about  all  that  we  do. 

Personnally  I  do  not  believe  the  Japs  are  going  to  sail  into  us  and  the  message 
I  sent  you  merely  stated  the  "possibility"  ;  in  fact  I  tempered  the  message  handed 
to  me  considerably.  Perhaps  I  am  wi-ong,  but  I  hope  not.  In  any  case  after  long 
pow-wows  in  the  White  House  it  was  felt  we  should  be  on  guard,  at  least  until 
something  indicates  the  trend. 

If  I  recall  correctly  I  wrote  you  or  Tommie  Hart  a  forecast  of  the  fall  of  the 
Japanese  Cabinet  a  couple  of  weeks  ago  after  my  long  conference  with  Nomura 
and  gave  the  dope  as  I  saw  it. 

You  will  also  recall  in  an  earlier  letter  when  War  Plans  was  forecasting  a 
Japanese  attack  on  Siberia  in  August,  I  said  my  own  judgment  was  that  they 
would  make  no  move  in  that  direction  until  the  Russian  situation  showed  a 
definite  trend.    I  think  this  whole  thing  works  up  together. 

With  regard  to  merchant  shipping  it  seemed  an  appropriate  time  to  get  the 
reins  in  our  hands  and  get  our  routing  of  them  going.  In  other  words,  take  the 
rap  now  from  the  Hill  and  the  Press  and  all  the  knockers,  so  that  if  and  when 
it  becomes  an  actual  necessity  to  do  it,  it  will  be  working  smoothly. 

We  shall  continue  to  strive  to  maintain  the  status  quo  in  the  Pacific.  How 
long  it  can  be  kept  going  I  don't  know,  but  the  President  and  Mr.  Hull  are 
working  on  it. 

The  stumbling  block,  of  course,  is  the  Chinese  incident  and  personnally  without 
going  into  all  its  ramifications  and  face-saving  and  Japanese  Army  attitude,  civil 
attitude  and  Navy  attitude  I  hardly  see  any  way  around  it.  I  think  we  could 
settle  with  Nomura  in  five  minutes  but  the  Japanese  Army  is  the  stumbling  block. 
Incidentally,  the  Chinese  also  think  that  they  will  lick  Japan  before  they  get 
through  and  are  all  for  keeping  going  rather  than  giving  way  anywhere.  A  nice 
setup  for  not  sounding  the  gong. 

Kitts  was  in  this  morning  and  I  shall  have  a  long  talk  with  him  before  he 
goes  back. 

Off  hand  without  going  into  the  "ins"  and  "outs"  I  see  no  reason  for  your 
stopping  your  normal  visits  to  the  Coast.  The  ships  concerned  constitute  self- 
contained  task  forces.  We  have  left  it  up  to  you  and  I  am  just  giving  you 
my  reaction. 

We  have  no  other  news  yet  regarding  the  torpedoing  of  the  KEARNY  except 
that  she  was  hit  and  is  proceeding  slowly  to  Iceland.  She  was  deflected  from 
an  American  escorted  convoy  to  a  Canadian  escorted  convoy  which  was  being  hard 
pressed.  Of  course  losses  are  bound  to  be  in  order.  My  hope  is  that  they  can 
be  kept  to  a  mininmm  with  the  curve  ever  favoring  our  end. 

In  August  for  the  first  time  there  was  a  slight  net  gain  in  shipping.  Our 
effort,  of  course,  is  to  have  that  confirmed  in  subsequent  months  for  two  reasons — 
accelerated  shipbuilding  and  better  protection  to  convoys  with  results — decreased 
sinkings. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  2215 

I  know  how  you  and  Admiral  Hart  must  be  pleased  with  the  Army  increased 
air  In  the  Philippines.  The  Island  of  Wake  is  a  vital  link  in  this  connection. 
If  it  is  put  out  of  commission  it  stops  Army  air  reinforcements.  I  hope  we  can 
maintain  the  integrity  of  these  Island  bases  and  push  as  fast  as  possible  their 
completion.  You  have  all  the  dope  that  I  have  on  this  and  know  the  studies  that 
are  being  made  for  alternate  routes. 

You  will  be  glad  to  know  that  recruiting  is  still  on  the  increase  and  I  can  assure 
you  I  have  your  personnel  situation  always  on  my  conscience  as  well. as  most 
every  other  situation  affecting  everything  afloat. 
Keep  cheerful ! 
Sincerely, 

Bbttt. 
Will  add  a  P.  S.  in  the  a  :  m.,  want  this  to  make  the  clipper. 

H.  R.  S. 
Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel,  U.  S.  Navy, 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.  8.  Pacific  Fleet, 
U.  S.  S.  PENNSYLVANIA, 

c/o  Postmaster,  San  Francisco,  California. 

P.  S.  Very  little  news  from  the  Kearny,  and  we  are  asking  her  nothing,  feel- 
ing that  she  will  notify  us  as  soon  as  she  can.  Radio  silence  may  be  essential. 
All  we  do  know  is  that  she  was  torpedoed  in  the  forward  fire  room  and  is  now 
making  8  knots.  Not  a  thing  on  casualties  or  beyond  the  bare  facts  given  above. 
I  will  release  everything  to  the  press  as  soon  as  I  can,  so  you  should  know  almost 
as  soon  as  I  do. 

Pinky  Schuirmann  made  up  an  estimate  for  me  yesterday  on  the  Jap  cabinet 
situatior\,  which  sums  up  my  thoughts  better  than  I  have  been  able  to -set  them 
down.  He  and  I  see  very  much  eye  to  eye  on  this.  I  am  enclosing  copy  of  what 
he  gave  me. 

Marshall  just  called  up  and  was  anxious  that  we  make  some  sort  of  a  recon- 
naissance so  that  he  could  feel  assured  that  on  arrival  at  Wake,  a  Japanese  raider 
attack  may  not  be  in  order  on  his  bombers.  I  told  him  that  we  could  not  assure 
against  any  such  contingency,  but  that  I  felt  it  extremely  improbable  and  that, 
while  we  keep  track  of  Japanese  ships  so  far  as  we  can,  a  carefully  planned  raid 
on  any  of  these  Island  carriers  in  the  Pacific  might  be  diflBcult  to  detect.  How- 
ever, we  are  on  guard  to  the  best  of  our  ability  and  my  advice  to  him  was  not 
to  worry. 

He  also  thought  it  advisable  that  I  release  him  at  this  time  from  the  aerial 
photographs  I  wanted  him  to  get  of  the  mandates,  stating  that  they  might  be 
detected  and  might  complicate  the  international  situation  I  agreed,  and  he 
stated  that  he  would  endeavor  to  make  them  later. 

I  have  nothing  else  for  the  moment. 

I  will  send  copy  of  this  to  Tommy  Hart  as  usual,  and  I  assume  also,  as  usual, 
that  you  will  show  Bloch. 

H.  R.  S. 


In  reply  refer  to  Initials  and  No. 

NAVT    DEa'ARTMENT, 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Washington,  October  17,  19J/1. 
Memorandum  for  the  C.  N.  O. 

I  believe  we  are  inclined  to  overestimate  the  importance  of  changes  in  the 
Japanese  Cabinet  as  indicative  of  great  changes  in  Japanese  political  thought 
or  action. 

The  plain  fact  is  that  Japanese  politics  has  been  ultimately  controlled  for  years 
by  the  military.  Whether  or  not  a  policy  of  peace  or  a  policy  of  further  military 
adventuring  is  pursued  Is  determined  by  the  military  based  on  their  estimate  as 
to  whether  the  time  is  opportune  and  what  they  are  able  to  do,  not  by  what  cabi- 
net is  in  power  or  on  diplomatic  maneuvi^ring,  diplomatic  notes  or  diplomatic 
treaties. 

Prince  Konoye  has  been  Premier  and  Konoye  Cabinets  in  office  for  the  most 
of  the  last  five  years.  Time  and  again  he  and  his  Foreign  Ministers  have  expressed 
disapproval  of  the  acts  committed  by  the  Japanese  Military,  but  remedial  action 
has  not  been  taken. 

Konoye  was  Premier  when  the  attack  on  China  began,  he  declared  Japan's 
policy  was  to  beat  China  to  her  knees. 


2216     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

The  most  that  can  be  claimed  for  the  last  Konoye  Cabinet  is  that  it  may  have 
restrained  the  extremists  among  the  military  not  that  it  has  opposed  Japan's 
program  of  expansion  by  force.  When  opportunities  arise,  during  the  coming 
months,  which  seem  favorable  to  the  military  for  further  advance,  they  will  be 
seized. 

At  the  present  time  the  influence  of  the  extremists  goes  up  and  down  depend- 
ing on  the  course  of  the  war  in  Russia. 

The  same  bill  of  goods,  regarding  the  necessity  of  making  some  concession  to 
the  "moderates"  in  order  to  enable  them  to  cope  with  the  "extremists"  has  been 
offered  to  the  United  States  since  the  days  when  Stimson  was  Secretary  of  State 
and  Debuchi  Ambassador. 

Present  reports  are  that  the  new  cabinet  to  be  formed  will  be  no  better  and 
no  worse  than  the  one  which  has  just  fallen.  Jai)an  may  attack  Russia,  or  may 
move  southward,  but  in  the  final  analysis  this  will  be  determined  by  the  military 
on  the  basis  of  opportunity,  and  what  they  can  get  away  with,  not  by  what 
cabinet  is  in  power. 

/S/      R.  E.  SCHUIRMANN. 


CW/vt 

Secret 

October  27,  1941. 

My  Dkar  Admiral  Kimmel:  During  Commander  Kitts  recent  visit  here,  he 
and  Admiral  Stark  discussed  the  enclosed  secret  memorandum  for  the  Secretary 
of  State.  Admiral  Stark  wished  the  enclosed  copy  to  be  forwarded  to  you  and 
has  directed  me  to  do  so  because  of  his  own  ab.sence  from  the  city  in  connection 
with  the  observance  in  Chicago  of  Navy  Day. 
Very  respectfully, 

Charles  Wellborn,  Jr., 

Conntumder  U.  S.  N. 
Aide  to  Admiral  Stark. 
Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel,  U.  S.  N., 

Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet, 
U.  S.  S.  PENNSYLVANIA, 

%  Postmaster,  San  Francisco,  Cal. 


[i]        Secret 

HRS/HU  8  October  1941. 

Memorandum  for  the  Secretary  of  State 

This  morning  you  asked  me  what  I  thought  would  be  the  advantages  and 
disadvantages  of  abolishing  the  combat  zones  around  the  British  Isles  and 
elsewhere.  You  also  inquired  as  to  the  possibility  of  United  States  naval  craft 
escorting  all  the  way  across  the  Atlantic ;  also  as  to  the  disadvantages  and 
advantages  that  would  occur  should  Hitler  declare  war  on  the  United  States. 

The  chief  advantages  to  abolishing  the  combat  zones,  would,  as  I  see  it,  be: 

(a)  It  would  permit  American  flag  vessels  to  enter  British  ports.  This  would 
be  of  some  importance  now  but  of  much  greater  importance  as  the  United 
States  Merchant  Marine  increases  in  size.  The  United  Kingdom  is  handicapped 
for  man-power.  Any  great  increase  in  their  Merchant  Marine  might  mean 
reduction  In  their  output  of  munitions.  Therefore,  there  can  be  no  question 
but  that  it  would  be  advantageous  from  the  war  effort  standpoint  if  the  United 
States  flag  vessels,  manned  by  American  crews,  could  increase  the  shii>ping 
both  to  the  British  Isles  and  to  other  military  areas.  Moreover  since  our  ships, 
particularly  those  which  we  are  now  building,  are  generally  faster  than  British 
cargo  ships,  submarine  losses  might  be  expected  to  decrease. 

(b)  It  is  impracticable  for  the  ocean  e.scorts  based  in  North  America,  whether 
United  States  or  British,  to  make  the  entire  trip  across  the  Atlantic  under 
normal  circumstances.  Furthermore,  due  to  the  fact  that  a  large  number  of 
submarines  have  been  operating  in  the  Western  Atlantic  Area,  no  United  States 
escort  vessels  could  now  be  sent  to  the  British  Isles  unless  they  were  replaced 
in  the  Western  Atlantic  Area  by  British  escort  vessels.  Were  some  of  our  Ships 
to  operate  in  British  waters  it  would  have  the  advantage  of  raising  British 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2217 

Morale,  encouraging  resistance  to  the  Germans  liy  subjugated  peoples  and 
peoples  in  fear  of  subjugation,  and  would  give  the  American  people  a  stake  in 
the  decisive  war  area. 

(c)  A  special  feature  of  the  situation  discussed  iir  subparagraph  (b),  would 
probably  be  the  deterring  effect  on  Italy  with  relation  to  a  further  war  effort, 
and  the  encouraging  effect  on  the  French  to  resist  German  demands. 

[2]  (d)   The  effect  on  the  German  people  might  be  to  lower  their  morale 

and  thus  reduce  their  wor  effort.  This,  of  course,  might  be  offset  to  considerable 
extent,  if,  in  the  near  future,  they  were  to  succeed  in  completely  defeating  the 
Russian  Armies. 

(e)  It  seems  probable  that  Germany  would  declai'e  war  on  the  United  States. 
The  possible  disadvantages  of  this  are  referred  to  in  the  succeeding  paragraph. 
The  advantages  of  declaration  of  war  would  be  that  the  United  States  would  be 
given  a  free  hand  in  the  operation  of  its  armed  forces;  it  would  gain  important 
belligerent  rights  over  neutral  shipping  and  commei-ce ;  and  is  would  permit  the 
Pacific  and  Asiatic  Fleets  to  be  employed  for  eradicating  German  raiders  in  the 
Pacific  Ocean.  It  would  give  encouragement  to  resistance  to  the  Germans  by  sub- 
jugated peoples  and  peoples  in  fear  of  subjugation.  The  United  States  could  take 
appropriate  action  against  enemy  subjects,  spies  and  agents  within  its  borders. 
It  would  also  permit  specific  offensive  plans  to  be  made  by  the  United  States  Army 
and  Navy.  It  would  tremendously  enhance  the  war  effort  put  forth  by  this 
country  and  we  could  plan  well  into  the  future  for  the  defeat  of  Germany  with 
some  assurance  which  we  cannot  now  do. 

The  disadvantages  would  be  : 

(a)  Until  the  present  strength  of  the  armed  forces  is  materially  increased 
by  the  programs  now  under  way,  the  results  which  would  be  immediately  apparent 
might  be  disappointing  to  the  American  and  other  peoples. 

(b)  A  declaration  of  war  by  the  United  States  against  Germany  unless  Germany 
had  previously  declared  was  against  the  United  States,  might  bring  Japan  into 
the  war  as  an  active  belligerent.  This  would  be  without  question  a  decided  dis- 
advantage because  the  United  States  would  then  be  engaged  in  actual  hostilities 
on  two  fronts ;  something  we  may  have  to  accept,  but  every  effort  should  be  made 
to  avoid  this  situation.  I  might  add  that  I  believe  efforts  in  this  behalf  will  best 
be  served  by  our  continued  strong  stand  against  Japanese  aggression. 

(c)  It  is  questionable  if  sentiment  in  South  America  will  actively  support  the 
United  States  until  this  country  is  in  a  position  to  make  a  much  stronger  effort 
by  land  and  sea  than  it  is  now  able  to  do  and  until  the  results  of  its  participation 
are  apparent. 

(d)  A  declaration  of  war  would  cause  the  loss  of  many  of  our  contacts  for 
information  which  we  now  have  in  Germany,  Italy,  and  elsewhere  in  Europe. 
This,  however,  should  not  be  a  determining  factor.  I  simply  set  it  down,  as  one  of 
the  disadvantages. 

[S]  It  has  long  been  my  opinion  that  Germany  cannot  be  defeated  unless 
the  United  States  is  wholeheartedly  in  the  war  and  makes  a  strong  military  and 
naval  effort  wherever  strategy  dictates.  It  would  be  very  desirable  to  enter  the 
war  under  circumstances  in  which  Germany  were  the  aggressor  and  in  which 
case  Japan  might  then  be  able  to  remain  neutral.  However,  on  the  whole,  it  is 
my  opinion  that  the  United  States  should  enter  the  war  against  Germany  as 
soon  as  possible,  even  if  hostilities  with  Japan  must  be  accepted. 

It  must  be  recognized  that  if  Germany  declares  war  on  the  United  States  and 
if  the  United  States  in  consequence  declares  war  on  Germany,  the  United  States 
must  at  the  same  time  declare  war  on  all  nations  who  are  Allies  of  Germany.  This 
is  particularly  true  in  the  case  of  Italy,  as  no  distinction  could  be  made  at  sea 
between  German  and  Italian  vessels.  Such  action  probably  would  have  a  very 
marked  effect  on  the  morale  of  the  Italian  people.  It  might  be  possible  not  to 
declare  war  on  such  nations  as  Finland  where  the  possibility  of  United  States 
forces  coming  in  contact  with  Finnish  forces  are  remote.  However,  there  are 
Finnish  merchant  vessels  in  oi)eration  in  the  Atlantic  Ocean.  I  do  not  include 
Japan  as  an  Ally  of  Germany — at  least — Not  Yet. 

The  foregoing  has  been  hurriedly  set  down  following  your  call.  I  thought  it 
better  to  write  it  than  to  give  it  to  you  over  the  phone. 

I  might  finally  add  that  I  have  assumed  for  the  past  two  years  that  our  country 
would  not  let  Great  Britain  fall;  that  ultimately  in  order  to  prevent  this  we 
would  have  to  enter  the  war  and  as  noted  above  I  have  long  felt  and  have  stated 
that  the  sooner  we  get  in  the  better. 

79716  0—46 — pt.  16 20 


2218     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

P.  S.  I  did  not  set  down  in  the  attached  notes  what  I  have  mentioned  to  you 
before,  namely,  that  I  do  not  believe  Germany  will  declare  war  on  us  until  she  is 
good  and  ready ;  that  it  will  be  a  cold-blooded  decision  on  Hitler's  part  if  and 
when  he  thinks  it  will  pay,  and  not  until  then. 

He  has  every  excuse  in  the  world  to  declare  war  on  us  now,  if  he  were  of  a 
mind  to. 

He  had  no  legitimate  excuse  in  the  world  (except  to  serve  his  own  ends)  to 
invade  the  countries  he  has. 

When  he  is  ready,  he  will  strike,  and  not  before. 


Secret  ' 

Op-lfr-MD 

November  4,  1941. 
Memorandum  for — 

Admiral  King. 

Admiral  Kimmel. 

Admiral  Hart. 

I  am  just  about  to  get  out  something  like  the  enclosed  and  thought  you  might 
be  interested. 

With  regard  to  the  Salinas,  she  was  hit  by  two  torpedoes,  one  fairly  well  aft 
and  one  about  half  way  between  the  first  hit  and  the  bow.  The  submarine  then 
came  up  on  her  quarter  and  tired  three  more  torpedoes,  two  of  which  went 
astern  and  one  ahead.  At  this  time  the  Salinas  fired  at  her — thinks  she  hit  her — 
and  the  Dupont  is  believed  to  have  finished  off  the  submarine.  This  information 
came  by  despatch.  Detailed  reports  are  noi  >ei  in.  we  are,  oi  cvuro^,  o^^it- 
pedaling  any  materiel  news  and  have  mentioned  nothing  regarding  any  sinking 
or  alleged  sinking  of  submarines.  We  are  constantly  making  submarine  contacts, 
they  having  concentrated  in  our  part  of  the  northern  passage  for  some  time  past. 

One  of  the  destroyers  reported  getting  a  great  deal  of  oil  to  the  surface  after 
a  bombing  of  a  submarine,  but  her  written  reports  likewise  are  not  yet  in. 

Regarding  the  REUBEN  JAMES,  she  went  down  so  quickly  that  we  know 
little.  A  despatch  states  that  she  was  hit  forward  about  abreast  No.  1  stack. 
The  explosion  was  so  violent  that  it  is  possible  a  magazine  was  set  off.  The 
whole  forward  end  of  the  ship  was  detached  and  sunk  almost  immediately — 
and  the  aft  part  about  5  minutes  later. 

When  the  stern  sank,  a  number  of  depth  charges  let  go,  adding  to  the  number 
of  casualties.  Rescue  operations  were  greatly  hampered  by  oil,  darkness,  pres- 
ence of  submarine,  and  cold.     We  published  the  casualty  list  this  morning. 

[2]  We  have  a  report  that  the  safety  pins  on  the  depth  charges  had  pre- 
viously jarred  loose.  This,  of  course,  is  being  looked  into  by  the  Bureau  of 
Ordnance.    The  above  is  about  all  I  know  at  present. 

Lessons  learned  will,  of  course,  be  communicated  after  reports  are  in  and  study 
made. 

My  best  to  all  hands. 
.  Keep  cheerful ! 

H.  R.  Stabk. 


November  4,  1941. 

A  release  announcing  the  torpedoing  of  the  SALINAS  has  just  been  made,  she 
having  safely  arrived  at  St.  Johns. 

The  SALINAS  was  torpedoed  on  29-30  October  1941,  the  day  before  the 
REUBEN  JAMES  was  tori^edoed.  Initial  reports  showed  her  speetl  to  be  re- 
duced to  5  knots  and  she  had  a  long  voyage  to  make  the  nearest  port.  Obviously, 
to  have  made  public  her  damaged  condition  would  have  meant  a  direct  invita- 
tion for  further  attack  on  her  in  the  submarine  infested  waters  through  which 
she  had  to  pass.  Secrecy,  therefore,  was  essential  and  every  effort  was  made 
to  maintain  it. 

Relative  to  the  above,  the  following  incident  occurred : 

One  of  the  girls  employed  in  the  Navy  Department  reported  to  the  OflScer  in 
Charge  of  the  Office  where  she  worked  that  she  heard  two  officers  telling  about 
the  torpedoing  of  a  naval  vessel,  the  SALINAS.  She  said  she  could  not  help 
but  hear  them  and  wondered  if  it  were  true. 

It  should  be  unnecessary  to  elaborate  on  this.  Loose  talk  in  public  places, 
over  the  telephone,  in  the  home,  at  a  party,  or  anywhere  else,  except  in  strictly 
oflBcial  circles,  may  bring  disastrous  results,  the  magnitude  of  which  could  only 
be  weighed  by  what  happened  to  be  at  stake. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2219 

It  should  not  be  necessary  to  add  that  this  must  stop.  Any  one  worth  his  or 
her  salt  must  realize  the  potential  danger  of  carrying  outside  his  or  her  office 
to  anyone,  ichose  husiness  it  is  not,  anything  regarding  naval  plans  or  operations, 
movements  or  damage  to  ships,  etc. 

This  memorandum  has  been  intentionally  withheld  until  the  SALINAS  ar- 
rived in  port. 

(Mimeographed  and  distributed  to  Department.) 


Secret  22408 

In  reply  refer  to  Initials  and  No  I.p-IOD-MD  Received  via  clipper 

14  Nov 
Navy  DEapABTMENT, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Washington,  November  7,  1941. 

Dear  Mustapha:  This  is  in  reply  to  your  letter  of  October  22,  1941.  It  was 
fine  to  hear  from  you  and  to  learn  that  you  are  in  a  fine  fettle. 

Ok  on  the  disposition  which  you  made  in  cormection  with  the  recent  change 
in  the  Japanese  Cabinet.     The  big  question  is — What  next?! 

I  note  the  great  desirability  of  man}/  things  for  the  Pacific  Fleet — particularly 
destroyers  and  cruisers.  We  just  haven't  any  destroyers  or  cruisers  to  give 
you  at  the  moment,  nor  is  the  prospect  bright  for  getting  any  for  you  in  the  near 
future.  I  fully  appreciate  your  need  for  them.  We  could  profitably  employ 
twice  the  number  we  now  have  if  they  were  available.  I  will  not  burden  you 
with  a  recital  of  King's  troubles,  but  he  is  up  against  it  for  DDs  for  escort — 
and  defense  against  raiders. 

The  NORTH  CAROLINA  and  WASHINGTON  are  not  expected  to  be  avail- 
able before  March.  As  pointed  out  in  my  letter  of  September  23,  1941,  I  do 
not  think  any  permanent  assignment  of  either,  or  both  of  these  ships  can  be 
made  at  this  time.  We  are  assigning  them  to  King  now  in  the  interest  of  train- 
ing— arriving  etc. 

With  the  possible  exception  of  one  division,  it  is  our  intention  to  send  the  long- 
range  submarines  to  the  Pacific  as  they  come  along.  As  you  no  doubt  know, 
twenty-seven  (27)  of  the  1525-ton  SS  are  due  for  completion  in  calendar  1942. 

Due  to  the  urgency  for  providing  the  destroyers  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet  with 
high-spee<l  anti-submarine  searching  equipment,  27  of  the  29  Model  QC  retractile 
domes  and  projectors  have  been  diverted  from  mine  craft  of  the  Pacific  Fleet 
and  Local  Defense  Force  destroyers  in  the  Pacific  to  the  Atlantic  Fleet.  Inas- 
much as  the  power  stacks,  controls,  etc.,  for  the  29  QC  equipments  need  not  be 
installed  in  the  Atlantic  Fleet,  it  will  be  necessary  for  the  manufacturer  to 
produce  only  27  additional  retractile  domes  and  projectors  in  order  to  complete 
the  QC  equipments  required  for  the  ships  from  which  the  equipment  has  been 
diverted.  The  Bureau  of  Ships  is  being  requested  to  expedite  procurement  of 
the  additional  domes  and  projectors.  This  additional  procurement  should  not 
require  a  great  deal  of  time  since  the  manufacturer  is  tooled  for  this  production 

Two  of  the  original  order  of  29  complete  QC  equipments  will  be  delievered  to 
the  Pacific  Fleet.  Additionally,  two  preliminary  models  (one  at  Mare  Island 
and  one  at  Norfolk)  can  be  made  available  to  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet, 
as  soon  as  installation  plans  for  this  new  type  of  retractile  dome  equipment  can 
be  completed  by  the  Navy  Yards  concerned. 

I  note  your  criticism  of  the  Gunnery  Radar.  The  Model  FA  fire  control  RADAR 
is  the  first  production  equipment  for  the  Navy.  This  equipment  is  unsatisfactory 
because  of  its  low-power  output  and  the  short  life  of  the  vacuum  tubes.  Only 
ten  production  models  were  manufacture<l ;  these  were  manufactured  for  the 
purpose  of  tooling  the  shops  for  later  and  improved  models  could  be  developed 
and  manufactured.  The  FA  equipment  was  installed  in  eight  HONOLULU 
Class  Cls,  WICHITA,  and  Radio  Materiel  School,  Bellevue. 

The  improved  fire  control  equipment  is  the  Model  FC.  This  equipment  employs 
magnetron  generators  and  has  a  very  much  higher  powered  output.  It  should 
be  understood,  however,  that  because  of  the  high  frequencies  used  by  fire  control 
RADAR,  long  ranges  on  aircraft  cannot  be  obtained.  The  long  range  aircraft 
detection  equipment  is  intended  to  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  tracking  aircraft 
until  the  aircraft  are  within  range  of  the  fire  control  RADAR.  Fire  control 
RADAR  will  detect  and  range  on  aircraft  at  ranges  greatly  in  excess  of  the 
ranges  of  the  antiaircraft  guns. 


2220     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Relative  to  the  two  Seati-ain  vessels  which  we  i-ecently  acquired  and  which  are 
now  undergoing  conversion  for  use  in  transporting  Aircraft,  they  now  have 
readiness  dates  of  December  2nd  and  December  16th.  It  is  our  present  intention 
to  assign  one  to  the  Train  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet  and  one  to  the  Base  Force,  Pacific, 
but  if  we  have  to  send  planes  to  the  Near  East,  we  may  have  to  use  these  ships 
for  this  purpose.  We  are  also  going  to  take  over  the  remaining  other  3  vessels 
of  this  type  and  propose  to  use  them  un-converted  for  anticipated  transport  of 
planes  to  Europe-Russia-China-?  May  have  to  charter  them  rather  than  take 
them  over — in  order  conserve  Navy  personnel. 

You  asked  about  merchant  ship  conversions  for  carrier  landing  training  opera- 
tions. The  field  from  which  to  get  ships  for  this  purpose  is,  as  you  know, 
extremely  limited.  However,  the  best  of  these  have  been  earmarked  for  conversion 
to  AVG's  as  soon  as  they  can  be  made  available.  Right  now  the  ones  we  have 
in  mind  are  engaged  in  an  important  duty.    Conversion  will  take  12  to  15  months. 

[3]  Your  study  of  the  Installations  and  defenses  of  Wake.  Midway,  John- 
ston, and  Palmyra  arrived  in  the  Department  yesterday.  It  is  being  routed  to 
War  Plans  for  study.  I  had  an  opportunity  to  skim  through  it  hurriedly,  and  it 
looked  like  a  very  good  paper.     It  will  be  of  much  help  to  us. 

In  connection  with  the  aircraft  routes  to  the  Orient  via  a  southerly  detour, 
I  am  enclosing  a  copy  of  a  letter  which  I  write  to  Admiral  Bloch. 

Admiral  Lyster.  the  Fifth  Sea  Lord,  recently  visited  us.  He  is  quite  a  chap 
and  impressed  us  as  knowing  his  job,  and  being  a  very  able  officer.  I  am  enclos- 
ing,, as  being  of  possible  interest  to  you,  copies  of  the  notes  which  he  gave  to 
us  as  a  result  of  his  observations  on  the  manner  in  which  we  employ  our  aircraft. 

In  addition,  I  am  .sending  a  copy  of  the  notes  made  by  Captain  Lord  Louis 
Mountbatten  as  the  result  of  his  observations  in  the  fleet.  He,  too,  impressed  me 
as  being  a  very  capable  officer.  I  am  sure  much  good  will  i-esult  from  the  observa- 
tions of  both  of  these  officers. 

Things  seem  to  be  moving  steadily  towards  a  crisis  in  the  Pacific.  Just  when 
it  will  break,  no  one  can  tell.  The  principle  reaction  I  have  to  it  all  is  what  I 
have  written  you  before;  it  continually  gets  "worser  and  worser" !  A  month 
may  see,  literally,  most  anything.  Two  irreconcilable  policies  can  not  go  on 
forever — particularly  if  one  party  can  not  live  with  the  set  up.  It  doesn't  look 
good. 

All  good  wishes. 
Sincerely, 

/S/    Betty, 

Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel,  U.  S.  N., 
U.  S.  S.  PENNSYLVANIA, 

c/o  Postmas'ter,  San  Francisco,  California 

British  movement  of  BB  to  far  east  area— I  hope — will  be  completed  in 
December. 


Secret  22915    received  Clipped  20  Nov. 

In  reply  refer  to  Initials  and  No.  Op-IOD-MD 

Navt  Department, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Washington,  November  14,  19^1. 
removed  conf.  letter  182 
on  Fortification  Guam 

Dear  Mustapha  :  This  is  in  answer  to  yours  of  October  29,  November  6  and 
7,  1941.    It  was  fine  to  hear  from  you  and  to  learn  that  you  are  going  strong. 

I  have  not  been  able  to  get  very  much  definite  information  about  Mr.  Hallet 
Abend.  I  am  enclosing  a  copy  of  a  memorandum  which  Public  Relations  had 
given  me  about  him.  I  am  told  by  an  officer  who  recently  returned  from  the 
Asiatic  Station  that  he  enjoyed  a  ffood  reputation  as  a  correspondent  out  there. 
This  same  source  stated  that  the  Jaips  had  beaten  him  up  in  Shanghai  and  de- 
stroyed a  manuscript  of  a  book  he  was  about  to  submit  to  his  publishers. 

I  had  previously  seen  the  clipping  from  the  New  York  Times,  which  you  sent 
me,  the  authorship  of  which  is  credited  to  Mr.  Abend.  The  way  the  yarn  was 
written,  one  could  easily  spot  it  as  a  "phoney". 

Just  what  we  will  do  in  the  Far  East  remains  to  be  seen.  Attached  hereto  is 
a  copy  of  our  Estimate,  which  was  recently  submitted  by  General  Marshall  and 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2221 

me  to  the  President.    You  can  see  from  it  our  ideas  on  the  subject.    Whether  or 
not  our  advice  will  be  followed  remains  to  be  seen. 

If  Mr.  Churchill's  speech  of  Monday  last,  given  at  the  Lord  Mayor's  house,  is 
the  expression  of  British  policy,  it  would  seem  there  might  be  considerable  truth 
in  the  information  given  to  you  by  Mr.  Abend. 

Your  estimate  of  the  Japanese  bases  and  forces  in  the  Mandates  has  been 
received  in  the  Department.  It  will  be  carefully  studied.  From  a  hasty  exam- 
ination, it  appears  to  be  a  very  complete  paper. 

I  have  taken  up  with  Van  Keuren  the  subject  of  the  listening  gear  for  ships 
you  listed  in  your  letter  of  November  6.  Like  Radar,  the  delay  in  getting  this 
gear  was  caused  by  getting  or,  rather,  not  getting  into  production.  At  last,  we  are 
"over  the  hump"  and  [2]  listening  gear  is  coming  on  rapidly.  Deliveries 
are  underway,  and  four  (4)  or  five  (5)  sets  will  go  to  Pearl  Harbor  by  each 
ship  from  now  on.  By  mid-December  you  should  have  received  about  2i:  sets. 
Of  course,  you  can  divert  these  for  installation  as  you  see  fit. 

With  regard  to  the  VSO's  going  to  the  Asiatic.  These  will  go  out,  orated,  in 
a  merchant  ship.  Instructions  to  do  this  have  been  issued  to  Com.  12.  You 
should  receive  a  copy  of  the  order  to  do  this  in  due  time. 

Regarding  your  comments  about  the  desirability  of  having  fight  deck  merchant 
.ships  for  use  in  training  aviators  for  carrier  duty : — I  agree  with  you  100%. 
The  trouble  is  that  we  just  can't  get  the  ships  to  convert  into  carriers.  The 
converted  SS  MORMACMAIL  (now  the  USS  LONG  ISLAND)  is  far  from 
satisfactory.  She  should  have  twenty  (20)  knots  and  actually  hasn't  sixteen 
(16)  knots.  She  just  doesn't  have  speed  enough.  She  can  be  operated  if  con- 
ditions of  wind  are  such  as  to  give  her  the  required  apparent  wind  across  the 
deck.     Unless  this  condition  prevails,  she  is  almost  worthless  as  a  carrier. 

Incidentally,  five  (5)  of  this  type  are  being  converted  in  our  yards  for  the 
British  under  Lend-Lease.  The  large  fast  ships  which  we  now  have  and  which 
cottid  be  converted  for  the  duty  you  have  in  mind  are  currently  engaged  in  an 
important  mission  (transporting  British  troops  to  the  Middle  Kast— obviously 
most  secret)  and  will  be  so  engaged  for  a  number  of  months.  I  would  give  a  lot 
if  we  had  those  ships  noiv  converted  to  carriers  and  fully  equipped  for  combat 
purposes. 

The  only  other  ships  under  U.  S.  registry  out  of  which  we  could  get  twenty 
(20)  knots  (if  we  had  them)  are  the  four  (4)  Matsons  and  the  three  (3)  Moore- 
McCormicks  now  engaged  in  the  South  American  rim.  We  have  had  our  eye 
on  the  NORMANDIE.  Thus  far.  State  Department  and  President  are  adamant. 
I  suppose  they  think  that  to  take  hei-  over  would,  in  some  way,  drive  Vichy  closer 
to  Germany.    All  in  all,  a  dismal  picture  for  the  converted  carrier  idea  prevails. 

The  General  Board  has  recently  completed  a  study  on  Guam.  I  am  enclosing  a 
copy  of  this  paper  for  your  study.  I  would  appreciate  getting  your  reaction  to  it. 
Of  course,  if  Guam  were  fortified  and  developed  at  the  moment,  we  could  make 
much  use  of  it.  One  item  to  which  I  have  liec-n  giving  much  th(>ught  and  upon 
which  I  would  like  your  advice — what  do  you  think  of  going  ahead  now  with 
the  construction  of  a  landing  field  out  there?  The  thought  I  have  is  that  we  could 
construct  such  a  field  which  might  be  of  .service  to  us.  To  be  sure,  we  might  lose 
it,  but  we  could  build  into  it  provisions  for  its  at  least  temporary  destruction. 

[3]  The  next  few  days  hold  much  for  us.  Kurusu's  arrival  in  Wa.shington 
has  been  delayed.  I  am  not  hopeful  that  anything  in  the  way  of  better  under- 
standing between  the  United  States  and  .iapan  will  come  of  his  visit.  I  note  this 
morning  in  the  press  despatches  a  listing  of  a  number  of  p<^)ints  by  the  Japan 
Times  and  Advertiser  upon  which  concession  by  the  United  States  was  necessary 
for  the  "solution  of  the  Pacific  Crisis."  Complete  capitulation  by  the  United 
States  on  every  point  of  difference  between  the  Japanese  and  this  country  was 
indicated  as  a  satisfactory  solution.  It  will  be  impossible  to  reconcile  such 
divergent  points  of  view. 

With  all  good  wishes !    Keep  cheerful. 
Sincerely, 

/S/    Bm-TY. 

Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel.  U.  S.  N., 
U.  S.  8.  PENNSYLVANIA, 

c/o  Postmaster,  San  Francisco,  California. 


2222     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[i]        Secret 
Serial  0130012 

Wak  and  Na\'y  Deipabtmeint, 
Washington,  Nox^ember  5,  19Jfl. 
Memorandum  for  the  President : 
Subject :  Estimate  concerning  Far  Eastern  Situation. 

The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  and  the  Chief  of  Staff  have  reexamined  the 
military  situation  in  the  Far  East,  particularly  in  the  light  of  messages  recently 
received  from  the  American  Ambassador  to  Chungking,  the  Magryder  Mission, 
and  the  United  States  Naval  Attache.  These  despatches  have  indicated  it  to 
be  Chiang-Kai-Shek's  belief  that  a  Jai>anese  attack  on  Kuming  is  imminent,  and 
that  military  support  from  outside  sources,  particularly  by  the  use  of  United 
States  and  British  air  units,  is  the  sole  hope  for  defeat  of  this  threat.  The 
Secretary  of  State  has  requested  advice  as  to  the  attitude  which  this  Government 
should  take  toward  a  Japanese  offensive  against  Kunming  and  the  Burma  Road. 

There  is  little  doubt  that  a  successful  Japanese  offensive  against  the  Burma 
Road  would  be  a  very  severe  blow  to  the  Chinese  Central  Government.  The 
result  might  even  be  the  collapse  of  further  effective  military  resistance  by  that 
Government,  and  thus  the  liquidation  by  Japan  of  the  "China  incident."  If  use 
of  the  Burma  Road  is  lost,  United  States  and  British  Commonwealth  aid  to 
China  will  be  seriously  curtailed  for  some  months.  If  resistance  by  the  Chinese 
Central  Government  ceases,  the  need  for  Japanese  troops  in  China  will  be  reduced. 
These  troops  can  then  be  employed  elsewhere,  after  the  lapse  of  time  sufficient 
to  permit  their  withdrawal. 

[2 J  Concentration  of  Japanese  troops  for  the  contemplated  offensive,  based 
in  northern  Indo-China,  cannot  be  completed  in  less  than  about  two  months, 
although  initial  offensive  operations  might  be  undertaken  before  that  time.  The 
advance  toward  Kunming  over  nearly  three  hundred  miles  of  rough  country,  with 
poor  communications,  will  be  extremely  difficult.  The  maintenance  of  supply  lines 
will  not  be  easy.  The  Chinese,  on  favorable  defense  terrain,  would  have  a  good 
chance  of  defeating  this  offensive  by  the  use  of  ground  troops  alone,  provided 
these  troops  are  adequate  in  quality  and  numbers. 

The  question  that  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  and  the  Chief  of  Staff  have 
taken  under  consideration  is  whether  or  not  the  United  States  is  justified  in 
undertaking  offensive  military  operations  with  U.  S.  forces  against  Japan,  to 
prevent  her  from  severing  the  Burma  Road.  They  consider  that  such  operations, 
however  well-disguised,  would  lead  to  war. 

At  the  present  time  the  United  States  Fleet  in  the  Pacific  is  inferior  to  the 
Japanese  Fleet  and  cannot  undertake  an  unlimited  strategic  offensive  in  the 
Western  Pacific.  In  order  to  be  able  to  do  so,  it  would  have  to  be  strengthened  by 
withdi-awing  practically  all  naval  vessels  from  the  Atlantic  except  those  assigned 
to  local  defense  forces.  An  unlimited  offensive  by  the  Pacific  Fleet  would  i*equire 
tremendous  merchant  tonnage,  which  could  only  be  withdi-awn  from  services  now 
considered  essential.  The  result  of  withdrawals  from  the  Atlantic  of  Naval  and 
merchant  strength  might  well  cause  the  United  Kingdom  to  lose  the  Battle  of  the 
Atlantic  in  the  near  future. 

[3]  The  only  current  plans  for  war  against  Japan  in  the  Far  East  are  to 
conduct  defensive  war,  in  cooperation  with  the  British  and  Dutch,  for  the  defense 
of  the  Philippines  and  the  British  and  Dutch  East  Indies.  The  Philippines  are 
now  being  reinforced.  '  The  present  combined  naval,  air,  and  ground  forces  will 
make  attack  on  the  islands  a  hazardous  undertaking.  By  about  the  middle  of 
December,  1941,  United  States  air  and  submarine  strength  in  the  Philippines  will 
have  become  a  positive  threat  to  any  Japanese  operations  south  of  Formosa.  The 
U.  S.  Army  air  forces  in  the  Philippines  will  have  reached  its  projected  strength 
by  February  or  March,  1942.  The  potency  of  this  threat  will  have  then  increased 
to  a  point  where  it  might  well  be  a  deciding  factor  in  deterring  Japan  in  operations 
in  the  areas  south  and  west  of  the  Philippines.  By  this  time,  additional  British 
naval  and  air  reinforcements  to  Singapore  will  have  arrived.  The  general 
defensive  strength  of  the  entire  southern  area  against  possible  Japanese  operations 
will  then  have  reached  impressive  proportions. 

Until  such  time  as  the  Burma  Road  is  closed,  aid  can  be  extended  \to  Chiang- 
Kai-Shek  by  measures  which  probably  will  not  result  in  war  with  Japan.  These 
measures  are :  continuation  of  economic  pressure  against  Japan,  supplying  in- 
creasing amounts  of  munitions  under  the  Lend-Lease,  and  continuation  and 
acceleration  of  aid  to  the  American  Volunteer  Group. 

The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  and  the  Chief  of  Staff  are  in  accord  in  the 
following  conclusions : 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2223 

[4]  (a)  The  basic  military  policies  and  strategy  agreed  to  in  the  United 
States-British  Staff  Conversations  remain  sound.  The  primary  objective  of 
the  two  nations  is  the  defeat  of  Germany.  If  Japan  l>e  defeated  and  Germany 
remain  undefeated,  decision  will  still  have  not  been  reached.  In  any  case,  an 
unlimited  offensive  war  should  not  be  undertaken  against  Japan,  since  such  a 
war  would  greatly  weaken  the  combined  effort  in  the  Atlantic  against  Germany, 
the  most  dangerous  enemy. 

(b)  War  between  the  United  States  and  Japan  should'be  avoided  while  build- 
ing up  defensive  forces  in  the  Far  East,  until  such  time  as  Japan  attacks  or 
directly  threatens  territoi-ies  whose  security  to  the  United  States  is  of  very 
great  importance.  Military  action  against  Japan  should  be  undertaken  only 
in  one  or  more  of  the  following  contingencies : 

(1)  A  direct  act  of  war  by  Japanese  armed  forces  against  the  territory  or 
mandated  territory  of  the  United  States,  the  British  Commonwealth,  or  the 
Netherlands  East  Indies ; 

(2)  The  movement  of  Japanese  forces  into  Thailand  to  the  west  of  100°  East 
or  South  of  10°  North ;  or  into  Portuguese  Timor,  New  Caledonia,  or  the  Loyalty 
Islands. 

[5]  (c)  If  war  with  Japan  can  not  be  avoidetl,  it  should  follow  the  strategic 
lines  of  existing  war  plans ;  i.  e.,  military  operations  should  be  primarily  de- 
fensive, with  the  object  of  holding  territory,  and  weakening  Japan's  economic 
position. 

(d)  Considering  world  strategy,  a  Japanese  advance  against  Kunming,  into 
Thailand  except  as  previously  indicated,  or  an  attack  on  Russia,  would  not 
justify  intervention  by  the  United  States  against  Japan. 

(e)  All  possible  aid  short  of  actual  war  against  Japan  should  be  extended 
to  the  Chinese  Central  Government. 

(f )  In  case  it  is  decided  to  undertake  war  against  Japan,  complete  coordinated 
action  in  the  diplomatic,  economic,  and  military  fields,  should  be  undertaken  in 
common  by  the  United  States,  the  British  Commonwealth,  and  the  Netherlands 
East  Indies. 

The  Chief  of  Naval  Oi)eration8  and  the  Chief  of  Staff  recommend  that  the 
United  States  policy  in  the  Far  East  be  based  on  the  above  conclusions. 

Specifically,   they  recommend : 

That  the  dispatch  of  United  States  armed  forces  for  intervention  against  Japan 
in  China  be  disapproved. 

That  material  aid  to  China  be  accelerated  consonant  with  the  needs  of  Russia, 
Great  Britain,  and  our  own  forces. 

[6]  That  aid  to  the  American  Volunteer  Group  be  continued  and  accelerated 
to  the  maximum  practicable  extent. 

That  no  ultimatum  be  delivered  to  Japan. 


Chief  of  Staff. 


Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 


Secret 

In  reply  refer  to  Initials  and  No.  HRS/Hu  Sec  #6 

received  3rd  Dec 
#23593    Clipper 
Navy  JDEPAETMEnvx, 
Office  of  thk  Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Washington,  26  November  19Jfl. 
Dear  Mustapha  :*  This  is  in  answer  to  yours  of  15  November.     If  I  didn't 
appreciate  your  needs  as  well  as  Tommy  Hart's  and  King's  I  would  not  be  work- 
ing almost  literally  eighteen  hours  a  day  for  all  three  of  you. 

We  have  .sweat  blood  in  the  endeavor  to  divide  adequately  our  forces  for  a 
two  ocean  war ;  but  you  cannot  take  inadequate  forces  and  divide  them  into  two 
or  three  parts  and  get  adequate  forces  anywhere.  It  was  for  this  reason  that 
almost  as  soon  as  I  got  here  I  started  working  on  increasing  the  Navy.  It  was 
on  the  basis  of  inadequate  forces  that  ABC-1  and  Rainbow  5  were  predicated  and 
which  were  accepted  by  all  concerned  as  about  the  best  compromise  we  could 
get  out  of  the  situation  actually  confronting  us. 

I  agree  with  you  for  exami)le  that  to  cruise  in  Japanese  home  waters  you 
should  have  substantial  increa.se  in  the  strength  of  your  fleet  but  neither  ABC-1 
or  Rainbow  5  contemplate  this  as  a  general  policy.  After  the  British  have 
strengthened  Singapore,  and  under  certain  auspicious  conditions,  opportunity  for 


2224     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

raids  in  Japanese  waters  may  present  themselves,  but  this  will  be  the  exception 
rather  than  the  rule. 

It  might  interest  you  to  know  that  King  strongly  recommended  his  taking  the 
destroyers  which  we  now  have  in  our  West  Coast  ports,  and  the  Secretary  was 
sold  on  it ;  however  it  has  been  successfully  resisted  to  date.  King  said  that  if 
they  were  out  with  you  on  the  firing  line  he  would  not  make  such  recommendation, 
but  where  they  were  he  thought  they  were  legitimate  pi'ey.  He,  too,  you  know 
is  up  against  it  for  suflBcient  forces  to  perform  his  tasks.  Just  stop  for  a  minute 
and  realize  that  into  his  heavy  routine  escort  work  he  has  added  at  the  moment 
large  U.  S.  troop  transports  for  Iceland  on  the  one  hand,  British  on  another  in 
Northern  waters,  and  still  another  of  20,0G0  which  have  been  brought  over  and 
are  now  on  their  way  to  Cape  Town  and  possiblj'  to  Durban  because  of  Bub- 
marines  operating  off  Cape  Town.  Obviously  these  troop  movements  are  highly 
secret.  We  are  at  our  wit's  end  in  the  Atlantic  with  the  butter  spread  extremely 
thin  and  the  job  continuously  increasing  in  toughness. 

Regarding  personnel,  we  have  at  last  succeeded  in  g;etting  the  President  to 
authorize  our  use  of  draftees.  I  have  been  after  this  for  months.  Now  that 
I  have  got  permission  it  will  take  some  time  to  get  it  through  the  Congress  as 
we  have  to  have  special  [2]  legislation  to  use  our  funds  for  this  purpose. 
It  has  been  ray  hope  to  use  draftees  wherever  possible  in  District  work  and  Air 
Stations,  tugs,  net  la.vers.  mine  layers,  mine  sweepers,  etc.  etc.  Navigation  is 
working  to  see  just  how  many  such  men  can  be  replaced,  thus  releasing  men  to 
the  Fleet. 

Believe  it  or  not,  the  REUBEN  JAMES  set  recruiting  back  about  15%.  We  are 
increasing  our  advertising  campaigns  extensively ;  not  only  that,  but  Navigation 
is  hiring  civilian  managers  to  assist  in  recruiting.  Draftees  however  constitute 
something  sure  and  I  only  wish  I  could  have  gotten  them  months  ago.  The  Presi- 
dent in  giving  final  approval  said  he  just  hated  to  do  it ;  but  sentiment  is  fast 
getting  out  of  my  system,  if  there  is  any  left  in  it  on  this  war. 

Regarding  permanence  of  personnel  I  have  been  over  with  Nimitz  in  detail 
some  to  the  recent  changes  and  he  will  write  you  the  details.  There  is  a  problem 
here  as  well  as  elsewhere ;  and  while  we  expect  you  and  want  you  to  hammer 
away  on  your  own  difficulties,  just  occasionally  remember  that  we  fully  realize 
our  only  existence  here  is  for  the  Fleet  and  that  we  are  doing  the  best  we  can 
with  increasingly  vexing  problems. 

Your  letters  at  least  give  us  ammunition,  if  not  much  comfort. 

I  asked  Nimitz  last  week  to  give  me  the  figures  showing  the  percentage  of  inen 
now  on  board  on  the  basis  of  the  old  complements.  Enclosed  is  a  table  he  has  just 
handed  me.  It  may  be  poor  consolation  but  at  least  it  is  something  to  know  that 
the  Fleet  has  more  men  now  than  at  any  time  since  the  last  war.  I  do  not  have 
the  data  for  the  last  war.  This  does  not  mean  that  we  are  at  all  satisfied  with 
it,  but  it  is  something  I  have  been  following.  I  assure  you  every  effort  is  being 
made  to  improve  it.  It  is  steadily  improving,  but  all  too  slowly  to  satisfy  any 
of  us. 

One  thing  I  forgot  to  mention  was  your  "the  Pacific  Fleet  must  not  be  con- 
sidered a  training  fleet  for  support  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet  and  the  Shore  Establish- 
ment." I'll  hand  that  one  to  King.  Once  in  a  while  something  happens  which 
gives  real  interest.  I  think  I'll  have  a  gallery  ready  to  see  King  when  he  reads 
that,  particularly  after  a  recent  statement  of  his  that  he  noted  he  was  getting 
fewer  men  and  had  less  percentage  of  complement  than  did  the  Pacific  Fleet, 
etc.  etc. 

Keep  cheer/ul. 
Sincerely, 

[S]     Betty. 

Admiral  H.  E.  Kimmel,  U8N, 

Commander  in  Chief,  U.  8.  Pacific  Fleet, 
USS  PENNSYLVANIA, 

o/o  Postmaster,  San  Francisco,  California. 

[3]  P.  S.  I  held  this  up  pending  a  meeting  with  the  President  and  Mr. 
Hull  today.  .1  have  been  in  constant  touch  with  Mr.  Hull  and  it  was  only  after 
a  long  talk  with  him  that  I  sent  the  message  to  you  a  day  or  two  ago  showing 
the  gravity  of  the  situation.  He  confirmed  it  all  in  today's  meeting,  as  did  the 
President.    Neither  would  be  surprised  over  a  Japanese  surprise  attack.    From 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2225 


many  angles 'an  attack  on  the  Philipi)iiies  would  be  the  most  enil)arrassin}i  thing 
that  could  happen  to  us.  There  are  s<»nie  here  wlio  think  it  likely  to  occur. 
I  do  not  give  it  the  weight  others  do,  but  I  included  it  because  of  the  strojig 
feeling  among  some  people.  You  know  I  have  generally  held  that  it  was  not 
time  for  the  Japanese  to  proceed  against  Russia.  I  still  do.  Also  I  still  rather 
look  for  an  advance  into  Thailantl,  Indo-China,  Burma  Road  area  as  the  most 
likely. 

I  won't  go  into  the  pros  or  cons  of  what  the  United  States  may  do.  I  will 
be  damned  if  I  know.  I  wish  I  did.  The  only  thing  I  do  know  is  that  we  may 
do  most  anything  and  that's  tlie  only  thing  I  know  to  be  prepared  for ;  or  we 
may  do  nothing — I  think  it  is  more  likely  to  be  "anything". 

/S/    HRS.  . 


Summary — Nov.  25,  1941 


Type 


BBS 

CVs.... 

CAs 

CLs 

DDs  (1850  Ton) 

(1500  Ton)  (8  at  192) 

(18  at  191) 

(4  at  196) 

(Sat  178)-. 

(10  at  187)... 

(12  at  200) 

(1200  Ton)  (Asiatic). 

(4  at  132).. 

(33  at  126).. 

SSs  (4at29) 

(22  at  39) 

(22) 

(6at54) 

Patrol  Vessels 

OOLALA 

ISABEL 

Totals.. 


Comple- 
ment 
fiscal 
year 
1939 


19,  351 
6,990 
12,164 
11,490 
3,119 
1,536 
3,438 

784 
1,424 
1,870 
2,400 
1,644 

528 
3,906 

174 

858 
1,203 

324 
1,062 

282 
84 


76,631 


Comple- 
ment 
recom- 
mended 
by  fleet 
BD 


26,583 

7,602 

18,508 

15,860 

3,900 

1,920 

4,392 

1,000 

1,952 

2.480 

3,000 

1,898 

584 

4,626 

192 

946 


348 


Present 
comple- 
ment 


22,244 

7,258 

15, 878 

14,156 

3,119 

1,536 

3,438 

784 

1,424 

1,870 

2,364 

1,716 

536 

4,209 

180 

858 

1,203 

324 

1,078 

320 

84 


84,849 


Number 
onBD 


19,  870 

6,902 

14, 067 

12,896 

2,826 

1,346 

3,138 

728 

1,312 

1,717 

2,171 

1,673 

446 

3,704 

230 

891 

1,390 

375 

1,109 

290 

82 


77,163 


%  on  BD  as  of  Oct.  31 
where  available  other- 
wise September  30 


To  1939 
comple- 
ment 


102.68 
98.74 

115.64 

112.23 
90.60 
87.63 
91.27 
92.85 
92.13 
91.82 
90.46 

101.  76 
84.46 
94.82 

132.18 

103.  84 
115.54 
115.  74 

104.  42 
102.83 

97.61 


103. 39 


To  present 
comple- 
ment 


89.32 
91.68 
88.59 
91.09 
90.60 
87.63 
91.27 
92.85 
92.13 
91.82 
91.83 
97.49 
83.20 
88.00 
127.78 
103.84 
115.54 
115.74 
102.  87 
90.62 
97.61 


90.94 


[i] 


Section  B 
Commander  Cbuisebs,  Battle  Force 


UNITED  STATES  FLEET 


Confidential 


U.  S.  S.  Honolulu, 
Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H.,  January  21, 19^1. 


Dear  Betty:  I  received  your  letter  of  13  January.  You  may  be  sure  that 
I  will  keep  you  fully,  frankly  and  probably  even  critically  informed  of  the 
situation  out  here. 

During  even  the  brief  time  that  I  have  had  to  survey  the  situation,  I  am 
particularly  impressed  with  the  lack  of  Army  equipment,  for  the  task  of  defending 
this  base.  This  matter  has  been  fully  covered  in  recent  official  correspondence. 
I  think  the  supply  of  an  adequate  number  of  Army  planes  and  guns  for  the 
defense  of  Pearl  Harbor  should  be  given  the  highest  priority.  I  will  expand  on 
this  later.  It  Ls  sufficient  at  this  time  to  state  that  a  secure  base  here  is  of 
paramount  importance.  I  have  discussed  this  matter  fully  with  McCrea  and 
he  has  taken  notes  on  my  ideas,  and  I  am  sure  that  he  will  present  them  fully. 


2226     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

We  have  been  together  long  enough  so  that  I  am  sure  you  are  quite  familiar 
with  my  methods  of  doing  business.  You  know  how  I  appreciate  the  value  of 
conferences.  I  agree  that  it  is  essential  to  keep  the  principal  subordinates  within 
the  command,  fully  informed  of  the  circumstances  as  they  develop.  I  shall 
follow  such  a  policy. 

As  you  know,  the  Fleet  Personnel  Board,  with  Theobald  at  the  head  of  it, 
has  been  giving  long  and  careful  study  to  the  personnel  requirements  of  the 
ships  of  the  different  types.  I  shall  probably  be  required  to  make  recommenda- 
tions on  this  subject  shortly  after  I  take  over.  It  appears  wise  to  now  fill 
all  ships  with  personnel  to  capacity,  both  on  account  of  the  needed  increase  in 
complement  to  man  the  ships,  and  to  train  men  for  new  construction. 

[2]  I  now  come  to  a  point  which  I  have  discussed  fully  with  Joe  and  with 
which  we  are  in  complete  accord.  Richardson  believes  and  recommends  that 
under  present  conditions  I  should  move  ashore  with  my  staff.  I  believe,  from 
my  conception  of  what  a  campaign  in  the  Pacific  under  present  policies  will 
amount  to,  that  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  and  his  staff  should 
be  quartered  ashore  in  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District,  at  least  in  the  initial 
stages  of  the  campaign.  Facilities  on  the  Fleet  flagship  are  not  suflScient  to 
provide  living  and  working  accommodations  for  the  personnel  required  on  the 
staff.  It  is  neither  desirable  nor  practicable  to  scatter  the  staff  through  other 
ships  of  the  Fleet.  As  I  see  it,  the  only  solution  lies  in  having  them  assembled 
ashore  in  the  district.  I  have  looked  into  this  matter  to  a  certain  extent  and 
believe  that  existing  facilities  within  the  district,  particularly  at  the  Submarine 
Base,  are  such  that  the  staff  can  be  quartered  there.  It  appears  that  certain 
modifications  and  additions  to  the  present  communication  set-up  will  have  to 
be  provided,  in  order  that  a  complete  communication  set-up  will  be  available. 
Facilities  for  oflice  space,  quarters  for  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  staff 
can  be  made  available  with  little  rearrangement  of  what  now  exists  in  the 
Submarine  Base.  Of  course,  that  would  be  of  a  temporary  nature.  As  soon 
as  I  have  investigated  this  whole  thing  more  fully  and  have  had  an  opportunity 
to  visualize  the  picture  more  completely,  I  believe  that  the  correct  solution  to 
the  whole  problem  will  lie  in  the  erection  of  a  separate  building  to  house  the 
complete  requirements  of  the  Commander-in-Chief's  staff  ashore  in  the  Four- 
teenth Naval  District.  I  am  not  prepared  to  give  you  the  details  of  this  at 
this  writing.  Incidentally,  in  connection  with  the  requirements  of  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  I  believe  that  he  himself  should  be  assigned  to  one  of 
the  official  quarters  now  in  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District. 

You  appreciate,  of  course,  that  this  question  of  housing  the  staff  ashore,  has 
not  passed  much  beyond  the  preliminary  investigations.  As  you  know,  however, 
I  have  already  obtained  quarters  for  the  War  Plans  Section  in  the  Submarine 
Base  and  that  section  of  four  officers  and  all  the  files  necessary  for  their  work 
will  be  moved  into  those  quarters  very  soon  after  1  February.  If  further  study 
of  the  Pacific  set-up,  as  I  visualize  it,  [3]  substantiates  my  present  ideas, 
and  if  the  quarters  I  have  in  mind  in  the  Submarine  Base  show  that  they  can 
take  my  staff,  I  shall  move  from  the  PENNSYLVANIA  to  those  quarters  as 
soon  as  they  can  be  made  ready.  In  that  connection,  of  course,  you  understand 
that  the  present  facilities  on  board  the  PENNSYLVANIA  will  remain  intact 
and  that  I  shall  arrange  matters  ashore  so  that  my  entire  staff  and  myself  can 
move  on  board  the  PENNSYLVANIA  within  a  few  hours.  I  shall,  of  course,  be 
on  board  the  PENNSYLVANIA  whenever  tactical  exercises  ai"e  conducted  and 
during  any  other  times  when  I  feel  the  necessity  for  it.  My  staff  battle  organi- 
zation will  require  training  on  the  PENNSYLVANIA,  and  I  shall  embark  on 
that  ship  for  enough  fleet  work  to  keep  them  trained  for  any  emergency. 

If  I  move  ashore  and  find  that  the  arrangement  as  I  now  visualize  it  is  the 
correct  one,  I  shall  have  plans  drawn  up  for  a  permanent  Fleet  Center  ashore. 
I  shall  submit  the  plans  to  the  Bureau  and  request  funds  for  its  immediate 
construction. 

Things  are  buzzing  around  here,  and  I  am  taking  every  opportunity  and  a 
lot  of  Joe's  time,  to  get  his  points  of  view  on  many  vital  questions  that  are 
involved  in  this  job.  I  was  sorry  to  hear  that  you  had  an  attack  of  the  fii^, 
but  happy  to  know,  from  the  press  reports  of  the  arrival  of  the  KING  GEORGE  V, 
that  you  were  able  to  get  to  sea  in  the  Chesapeake  to  greet  the  new  Ambassador. 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2227 

That  seems  to  be  about  all  for  this  time;  but  I  am  sure  that  I  shall  have  a  lot 
more  to  tell  you  in  our  continued  correspondence. 

My  kindest  regards  and  best  wishes  to  you  and  your  good  wife,  as  always. 
Most  sincerely  yours, 

s/    H.  E.  Kimmel. 

H.  E.  KlMMEL. 

Admiral  H.  R.  Stabk,  U.  S.  Navy, 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Navy  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. 


[i]         CinC  File  No. 

United  States  Fleet 
Secret  U.  S.  S.  Pennsyi-vania,  Flagship 

Peabl  Harbor,  T.  H.,   18  February  19^1. 

Deab  Bettt  :  Your  letter  of  29  January  reached  me  on  14  February,  and  your 
letter  of  10  February  arrived  on  board  on  16  February.  You  will  note  that  the 
delays  were  due  to  interference  with  clipper  schedules. 

A  check  has  already  been  sent  to  the  Navy  Relief  for  $39,000.00  and  one  to  the 
American  Red  Cross  for  $9,900.00.  This  was  done  by  Richardson  just  prior  to 
his  detachment.    I  trust  that  the  Navy  Relief  has  received  it  by  now. 

I  will  inform  Bloch  in  regard  to  the  search  of  fishermen  and  think  it  an  ex- 
cellent idea.    I  believe  this  search  has  been  in  effect  here  for  some  time. 

Nimitz  has  written  me  to  put  not  more  than  100%  complement  on  any  type  of 
ship.  I  will  pass  this  along  to  Calhoun,  but  with  the  present  rates  of  supply  and 
attrition  I  see  small  chance  of  exceeding  100%. 

I  wrote  Nimitz  today  in  regard  to  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  requirements  for 
post  graduate  ordnance  oflScers  to  be  employed  on  shore,  and  asked  Nimitz  to 
show  you  the  letter  when  he  receives  it.  You  will  note  that  I  took  occasion 
in  this  letter  to  reiterate  the  need  for  additional  enlisted  personnel  in  all  types 
of  ships.  From  my  standpoint  there  is  every  urge  to  train  just  as  many  men  as 
is  possible.  This  is  in  addition  to  the  need  for  men  in  existing  ships.  The  new 
construction  program  will,  in  a  reasonable  time,  make  inordinate  demands  on 
the  Fleet.  I  would  repeat  here  what  I  said  in  my  letter  to  Nimitz,  that  the  con- 
dition of  the  Fleet  within  the  next  few  months  may  be  of  much  greater  im- 
portance to  the  Nation  than  the  completion  of  the  two-ocean  Navy  in  1946. 

I  was  delighted  to  learn  about  the  Army  fighters.  The  first  contingent  is  now 
on  its  way,  together  with  certain  equipment  for  the  outlying  islands.  In  addition 
to  the  fighters  I  believe  it  of  the  highest  importance  to  send  just  as  many  Army 
bombers  and  adequate  supplies  of  bombs  to  Oahu  as  the  Army  establishment 
can  support  with  the  greatest  effort.  The  need  for  Army  anti-aircraft  guns 
should  also  be  stressed.  Active  and  immediate  steps  are  being  taken  to  coordi- 
nate the  Ai'my  and  Navy  air  effort  as  well  as  the  ground  crew  defenses  of  Pearl 
Harbor.  [21  I  had  a  couple  of  interviews  with  Short  and  find  him  fully 
alive  to  the  situation  and  highly  cooperative.  I  recommend  that  you  keep  con- 
tinuous pressure  on  this  question  of  Army  reinforcement  of  Oahu. 

The  full  complement  of  Marines  has  landed  at  Midway.  We  utilized  Crudiv 
EIGHT,  Desdiv  ELEVEN,  and  the  ANTAR£:S  to  transfer  troops,  baggage, 
equipment,  etc.  You  will  have  received  our  statement  of  the  conditions  existing 
at  Johnson  and  Palymra.  In  this  I  tried  to  give  you  a  complete  picture,  together 
with  the  only  possible  solution  I  see  with  the  forces  available.  The  transfer  to 
these  islands  of  the  maximum  numbers  you  indicated  may  carry  with  it  very 
difficult  complications,  as  a  sudden  call  in  the  midst  of  the  operation  might 
involve  serious  consequences.  As  I  gather  from  researches,  the  orders  involve 
a  drastic  change  from  the  original  conception  of  the  forces  to  be  supported  at 
Johnson  and  Palymra.  I  think  our  recommenadtion  to  send  100  Marines  to 
Palymra  and  none  to  Johnson  for  the  present,  should  be  accepted. 

Will  study,  prepare  plans,  and  be  ready  for  a  quick  decision  in  case  orders 
are  received  for  a  detachment  of  cruisers,  destroyers,  and  a  carrier  to  make  the 
proposed  cruise  to  Manila  or  elsewhere.  From  my  standpoint  this  appears  to  be 
a  most  ill-advised  move.  Our  strength  in  destroyers  and  cruisers  is  already  lim- 
ited. A  carrier  can  ill  be  spared  if  we  are  to  carry  out  other  poposed  plans. 
While  my  political  horizon  is  limited,  I  believe  we  should  be  prepared  for  war 
when  we  make  this  move. 


2228     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

The  detail  of  local  defense  forces  for  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District  will  have  to 
be  made  from  the  Fleet.  This  is  a  further  drain  on  our  small  craft.  In  this 
connection  I  am  recommending  in  separate  corerspondence  that  you  send  out  one 
squadron  of  PTs  and  one  squadron  of  the  new  PTC  sub-chasers  at  the  earliest 
possible  date.  I  presume  Bloch  has  his  plans  for  commandeering  local  craft,  but 
I  will  check  with  him  and  also  inform  him  of  the  probability  that  the  Coast 
Guard  will  be  taken  over  shortly. 

Bill  Halsey  has  been  bombarding  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  in  an  attempt  to 
get  an  increased  supply  of  bombs.  The  copy  of  their  reply,  which  I  think  you 
should  read,  leaves  us  with  very  little  hope  for  early  alleviation  of  this  most 
unsatisfactory  condition.  In  separate  corerspondence,  which  will  go  forward 
at  the  same  time  as  this  letter,  we  are  recommending  the  shipment  of  these 
bombs  to  Oahu  in  advance  of  the  preparation  of  regultaion  proof  stowages.  I 
think  we  must  accept  the  hazard  and  possible  \,i\  deterioration  which 
may  ensue  from  shelter  stowage.  The  total  lack  of  incendiary  bombs  should  be 
remedied  at  the  earliest  date. 

The  subject  of  reserve  ammunition  for  the  Fleet  has  been  covered  in  various 
letters.  I  feel  that  the  number  of  ammunition  ships  in  commission  and  being 
converted  is  still  entirely  inadequate  to  handle  the  situation. 

I  feel  that  a  surprise  attack  (submarine,  air,  or  combined)  on  Pearl  Harbor  is 
a  possibility.  We  are  taking  immediate  practical  steps  to  minimize  the  damage 
Inflicted  and  to  ensure  that  the  attacking  force  will  pay.  We  need  anti-submarine 
forces, — DDs  and  patrol  craft.  The  two  squadrons  of  patrol  craft  will  help  when 
they  arrive. 

After  a  thorough  investigation,  we  are  pr(»ceeding  to  fit  existing  facilities  at  the 
Submarine  Base  to  permit  shore  basing  my  staff  and  my.self.  Just  when  I  will 
move  ashore  deiwnds  upon  the  supply  of  essential  equipment.  I  have  only  one 
object,  that  is  to  so  place  myself  and  my  staff  that  we  can  best  accomplish  the 
task  before  us. 

To  revert  once  more  to  the  question  of  enlisted  personnel,  Theobald's  board,  in 
my  opinion,  has  contributed  more  to  the  Fleet  than  any  single  factor  in  a  very  long 
time.  It  did  a  most  excellent  job  and,  in  the  absence  of  positive  evidence  that 
they  are  wrong,  we  should  accept  their  recommendations.  I  have  ordered  the 
Medical  Board,  the  members  of  which  represent  all  tyi)es  of  ships,  and  have  told 
them  to  expedite  their  proceedings.  I  propose  to  give  you  their  findings  by 
despatch. 

Before  the  report  of  the  Fleet  Personnel  Board  reached  your  office,  I  sent  you  a 
despatch  outlining  the  minimum  complements  prescribed  by  the  Board  for  each 
type  of  ship.  In  reply  I  was  informed  by  despatch  that  the  complements  recom- 
mended exceeded  those  assigned  in  the  Force  Operating  Plan  for  1942,  and  was 
instructed  not  to  install  bunks,  lockers,  and  messing  facilities  in  excess  of  the 
complements  already  arrived  at  by  the  Department.  I  am  go  convinced  that  the 
complements  recommended  by  the  Fleet  Personnel  Board  are  the  minimum  re- 
quired to  serve  the  ships  in  a  campaign,  and  that  the  findings  of  the  Medical  Board 
will  not  declare  the  larger  complements  to  be  contrary  to  standards  of  health  and 
comfort,  that  I  sent  another  despatch  last  night  asking  for  a  reconsideration  of 
your  decision.  Bunks  [4]  and  lockers  do  not  add  greatly  to  the  weight  of 
a  ship  and  are  not  unduly  expen.sive.  It  is  my  frank  opinion,  as  stated  in  the  most 
recent  despatch  on  this  subject,  that  even  if  complements  are  not  increased  imme- 
diately to  the  limit  recommended,  it  is  better  to  install  bunks  and  lockers  now 
rather  than  do  so  in  the  confusion  of  mobilization,  for  I  am  convinced  that  if  we 
take  part  in  this  war  we  shall  most  certainly  have  to  build  up  our  complements  as 
recommended  by  the  Fleet  Board. 

The  Bureau  of  Navigation  has  forwardeed  me  a  long  list  of  officers  of  post  grad- 
uate training,  now  afloat,  wanted  by  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  for  duty  ashore. 
These  oflScers  occupy  important  command,  gunnery,  and  staff  positions.  I  realize 
the  necessity  for  expediting  ordnance  projects  and  I  want  to  help  in  every  way  I 
can.  But  the  number  of  experienced  officers  in  the  ships  at  the  present  time  is 
dangerously  low.  I  can  not  view  the  detachment  of  additional  experienced  officers 
but  with  the  greatest  concern.  I  have  asked  the  Bureau  of  Navigation  to  give 
me  an  opportunity  to  comment  on  the  detachment  in  each  case  of  officers  with 
ordnance  experience,  prior  to  final  action. 

T  also  hope  that  drastic  steps  can  be  taken  to  stop  the  continuing  turnover  of 
personnel,  particularly  qualified  personnel.  The  detachment  and  changes  of 
qualified  enlisted  men  concerns  me  almost  as  much  as  the  detachment  of  qualified 
and  experienced  officers. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2229 

I  come  to  another  question  of  the  highest  Importance, — the  supply  of  modern 
type  planes  throughout  the  Fleet.  I  am  forwarding  under  separate  cover  a  copy 
of  a  letter  written  to  the  Bureau  of  Aeronautics  on  this  subject.  I  have  gathered 
the  distinct  impression  that  the  Bureau  of  Aeronautics  is  primarily  concerned 
with  the  expansion  program  and  that  the  supply  of  planes  and  itersonnel  to  man 
the  Fleet  takes  a  secondary  place.  Obstacles  are  offered  to  most  of  Halsey's 
recommendations.  I  cannot  subscribe  to  these  views.  We  must  have  the  most 
modern  planes  in  our  csirriers  and  other  surface  vessels,  in  fact  in  all  the  aero- 
nautical organization  afloat.  I  realize  of  course  the  necessity  for  personnel 
ashore,  particularly  in  the  aeronautical  organization,  to  train  new  personnel  and 
to  produce  the  material.  But  the  balance  should  be  maintained,  and  in  any  event 
the  latest  type  planes  should  be  supplied  the  Fleets.  The  forces  afloat  have 
repeatedly  recommended  the  acquisition  of  two  or  more  "seatrain"  vessels  to 
transport  airplanes.  I  am  not  familiar  with  the  technical  difl8culties  involved, 
but  if  it  is  at  all  possible  to  do  so — and  Halsey  in-  [5]  sists  that  it  is — I 
think  this  work  should  be  undertaken  at  once.  The  recent  required  use  of  carriers 
to  transport  Army  planes  to  Oahu  illustrates  the  necessity  for  providing  some 
means  for  aii-plane  transport.  Transporting  planes  and  equipment  by  carrier  is 
highly  expensive,  both  in  lost  training  of  flyers  and  non-availability  of  carrier  for 
other  duty. 

We  are  going  ahead  with  Plan  Dog  and  RAINBOW  THREE.  Prior  to  the 
receipt  of  the  letters  received  in  the  mail  yesterday  we  had  given  priority  to 
Plan  Dog,  but  as  you  state  you  wish  priority  to  be  given  RAINBOW  THREE,  we 
will  do  so. 

The  necessity  for  additional  store  ships  and  transports  is  accentuated  by  plac- 
ing Marines  on  the  outlying  islands  and  I  hope  nothing  will  stand  in  the  way 
to  promptly  supply  those  now  planned,  and  to  further  increase  them  as  soon  as 
practicable. 

I  shall  decide  upon  the  distribution  of  the  exploders  after  consultation  with 
Withers  and  Draemel. 

With  kindest  regards  and  best  wishes. 
Sincerely, 

/S/      H.  E.  KlMMEL. 

Admiral  H.  R.  S?tabk,  U.  S.  Navy. 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Navy  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. 

P.  S.  We  receive  through  radio  and  other  intelligence  rather  reliable  reports 
on  the  positions  of  Japanese  merchant  ships,  but  we  have  no  definite  informa- 
tion on  the  important  Japanese  trade  routes.  Can  you  send  us  the  latest  informa- 
tion you  have  on  this?     I  am  initiating  separate  correspondence  on  this  topic. 

I  have  recently  been  told  by  an  oflScer  fresh  from  Washington  that  ONI  con- 
siders it  the  function  of  Operations  to  furnish  the  Commander-in-Chie|f  with 
information  of  a  secret  nature.  I  have  heard  also  that  Operations  considers  the 
responsibility  for  furnishing  the  same  type  of  information  to  be  that  of  ONI. 
I  do  not  know  that  we  have  missed  anything,  but  if  there  is  any  doubt  as  to  whose 
responsibility  it  is  to  keep  the  Commander-in-Chief  fully  informed  with  pertinent 
reports  on  subjects  that  should  be  of  interest  to  the  Fleet,  will  you  kindly  fix 
that  responsibility  so  that  there  will  be  no  misunderstanding? 

HEK. 


[1]        CinC  File  No. 

SECRET 

CONFIDENTIAL 

Unitej)  States  Fleet 

U.  S.  S.  Pennsylvania,  Flagship 

TJ.  8.  {'suibmarine  \Base, 
Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H.,  April  22,  1941. 
Deab  Betty:  So  far  I  have  not  felt  the  need  for  a  Public  Relations  Officer 
on  my  Staff.  Situated  as  we  are,  the  majority  of  this  work  has  beon  Miery 
succ-essfully  handled  by  the  District  under  Admiral  Bloch.  We  have  been  in 
perfect  accord  as  to  what  should  and  should  not  be  released.  From  the  stand- 
point of  the  newspaper  and  publicity  men  the  situation  may  not  be  as  satisfactory 
as  it  is  from  my  standpoint.  I  can  see  where  the  services  of  a  man  like  Waldo 
Drake  could  be  of  great  value  to  the  Service.    So  my  answer  is  that  if  you  can 


2230     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

send  Waldo  Drake  out  here  to  serve  on  my  staff,  I  will  be  very  glad  to  havb 
him.    An  individual  with  less  experience  might  do  more  harm  than  good. 

We  have  been  very  much  gratified  at  the  responses  to  the  items  I  enumerated 
in  my  letter  of  February  18.  However,  there  is  one  outstanding  deficiency  that 
still  exists  in  the  Fleet — namely,  permanency  of  personnel.  The  detachment  of 
oflScers  and  men  continues.  I  have  written  at  length  to  Nimitz  on  this  subject. 
I  understand  in  some  degree  the  personnel  problem  that  confronts  you  and 
Nimitz.  I  feel  that  the  establishment  of  a  nucleus  of  trained  and  experienced 
oflScers  and  men  in  each  ship  of  the  Fleet  is  vital.  This  nucleus  should  include 
the  Captain,  Executive  OflScer,  Heads  of  Departments  and  as  many  other  key 
officers  as  the  Bureau  feels  they  can  retain  in  the  ship  for  the  duration  of  the 
emergency.  For  the  enlisted  personnel  the  same  principle  should  govern,  particu- 
larly as  regards  Chief  Petty  Officers  and  Petty  Officers  First  Class.  We  cannot 
produce  a  satisfactory  state  of  battle  efficiency  unless  we  have  some  degree  of 
permanency  in  this  nucleus  of  personnel.  We  must  have  on  board  a  certain 
number  of  officers  and  men  who  know  the  ship,  know  the  organization  and  who 
can  whip  the  new  personnel  into  shape  by  guiding  their  effort.s.  I  know  that  you 
and  Nimitz  are  doing  all  that  you  can  but  I  cannot  refrain  from  calling  your 
attention  to  it  once  more. 

Is  it  not  ijossible  to  obtain  legislation  which  will  stop  the  discharge  of  qualified 
men  and  i)erniit  them  to  remain  in  their  present  billets? 

I  have  now  been  established  in  my  office  on  shore  for  some  little  time  and  things 
are  working  vei*y  smoothly.  I  am  of  course  prepared  to  move  aboard  ship  on  very 
short  notice. 

[2]  I  know  you  are  cognizant  of  the  condition  in  the  Carriers,  as  I  have 
detailed  it  in  various  official  correspondence.  The  effect  of  detachment  of  a 
carrier  or  any  light  forces  from  this  command  will  affect  the  operations  out  of 
all  proportion  to  the  apparent  fighting  strength  of  the  forces  detached.  This  I 
know  you  will  understand  and  in  anything  that  you  do  I  know  you  will  carefully 
weight  all  the  factors  involved. 

Admiral  Danckwarts  spent  a  couple  of  days  with  us  and  gave  me  considerable 
information  which  is  of  value.  I  did  not,  however,  commit  myself  in  any  way 
and  tried  to  avoid  talking  too  much. 

My  kindest  regards  find  best  wishes  to  you. 

We  are  all  cheerful. 

Most  sincerely  yours, 

H.  E.  KiMMEL. 

p.  S.  I  must  urge  you  once  more  to  do  all  in  your  power  to  fill  the  ships 
with  enlisted  personnel  to  the  limit  of  their  capacity.  Our  ideas  on  this  subject 
have  been  submitted  in  great  detail.  The  last  submitted  about  two  weeks  ago 
was  the  report  of  our  medical  board  on  this  subject. 

/s/     Kim  MEL. 
Admiral  H.  R.  Stark.  U.  S.  Navy, 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Navy  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. 


[1]        Confidential 
Via  Clipper  Air  Mail 

Commandek-in-Chief 

United  States  Fleet 

U.  S.  STn?MARiNE  Base, 
Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H.,  Ma/y  5,  19^1. 

Dear  Betty  :  I  have  your  despatch  in  regard  to  the  proposed  visit  of  the 
Secretary.  I  am  forwarding  an  official  letter  on  this  subject  in  this  same  mail. 
I  think  we  will  be  able  to  give  him  an  interesting  time  out  here.  I  indicated 
the  time  that  he  might  spend  at  sea  if  he  so  desires.  I  imagine,  however,  when 
we  make  up  the  final  schedule  he  will  probably  want  to  spend  more  time  in  port 
than  I  have  indicated  in  my  official  letter.  There  are  a  great  many  developments 
in  and  around  the  Pearl  Harbor  area  that  he  should  see  and  in  which  I  am  sure 
he  will  be  very  much  interested.  A  perfectly  enormous  amount  of  work  has  been 
accomplished  in  this  district  and  it  is  all  going  ahead  full  blast  at  the  present 
time. 

We  had  planned  rather  extensive  tactical  maneuvers  for  Task  Forces  ONE, 
TWO  and  THREE  which  involved  a  trip  to  Midway  by  Task  Force  ONE  and  to 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2231 

Palmyra  by  Task  Force  TWO.  When  I  received  your  letter  in  regard  to  certain 
ship  movements  we  decided  to  curtail  these  operations  and  to  maintain  Task 
Forces  ONE  and  TWO  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Oahu.  I  do  not  want  to  be 
caught  short  in  the  event  of  any  sudden  demands. 

Tell  the  Secretary  that  I  will  be  very  pleased  indeed  to  see  him.  I  am 
endeavoring  to  keep  you  informed  primarily  by  official  correspondence  of  the 
needs  of  the  Fleet.  I  believe  you  are  fully  cognizant  of  all  the  problems.  As  you 
know,  our  principal  problem  out  here  is  one  of  supply,  i)articularly  to  outlying 
bases.  Our  food  ships,  store  ships,  oilers  and  ammunition  ships  are  barely  ade- 
quate now  and  this  would  be  the  cause  of  concern  in  the  event  of  hostilities. 
I  know  you  are  doing  all  you  can  along  this  line.  The  transports  are  coming 
along  very  slowly.  Brown  goes  to  the  Coast  with  a  minimum  force,  starting 
in  a  few  days  to  look  over  the  progress  of  the  landing  force  needs  and  to  conduct 
the  scheduled  exercise  at  San  Clemente.  It  looks  now  as  though  King's  estimate 
that  an  AK  will  be  required  to  accompany  each  division  of  transports  to  transport 
equipment,  particularly  landing  boats,  is  absolutely  correct.  I  feel  that  in  any 
landing  exercises  that  we  may  undertake,  it  should  be  done  only  when  we  have 
ample  equipment  and  personnel  to  pursue  our  objectives  tx)  a  successful  conclusion, 
even  in  the  event  of  the  loss  of  very  important  units.  In  other  words  the 
landing  should  not  be  attempted  until  we  have  what  amounts  to  an  overwhelming 
force  capable  of  a  simultaneous  landing. 

[2]  We  are  losing  quite  a  percentage  of  experienced  enlisted  men  who,  upon 
the  expiration  of  their  enlistment,  go  into  civil  life  to  accept  the  high  wages  now 
prevailing.  This  is  a  cause  of  concern  and  I  repeat  again  something  should  be 
done  to  retain  these  men.  The  only  method  I  can  see  is  by  congressional  legisla- 
tion of  some  kind.  We  are  attempting  to  use  every  bit  of  Fleet  transportation 
from  the  West  Coast  to  Honolulu  to  bring  personnel  and  supplies  out  here.  I 
believe  you  might  help  things  if  you  would  indicate  to  the  material  bureaus  the 
shortage  of  shipping  in  order  that  they  might  go  out  of  their  way  to  meet  our 
demands  as  to  cargo  such  as  bombs  and  ammunition.  The  type  of  incident  I  have 
in  mind  is  the  shipment  of  the  supply  of  bombs  from  N.  A.  S.,  San  Diego,  which 
we  finally  straightened  out  with  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  after  the  exchange 
of  several  despatches. 

I  hope  Nimitz  is  taking  our  idea  of  nucleus  crews  seriously.  This  applies  to 
officers  as  well  as  men.  We  must  have  sufficient  experienced  men  in  key  positions 
in  the  ship  who  know  the  ship  in  order  to  properly  train  the  young  reserve  officers 
and  the  recruits.  Of  course,  this  is  over  and  above  the  urgent  necessity  to  keep 
these  ships  in  a  condition  to  meet  an  emergency.  Briefly  I  think  if  some  twenty 
percent  of  the  complement  could  be  considered  permanently  assigned  to  the  ships 
that  it  would  help  things  enormously.  I  shall  send  forward  our  ideas  on  this  sub- 
ject in  a  more  definite  form  shortly. 

I  know  the  demands  upon  you  for  patrol  craft  of  all  descriptions  but  I  must 
again  bring  to  your  attention  the  urgent  need  in  this  area  for  some  patrol  craft 
fitted  with  listening  gear  and  carrying  a  few  depth  charges.  The  demands  upon 
destroyers  would  then  be  somewhat  relieved  and  they  fould  have  time  to  perfect 
themselves  in  other  phases  of  their  training. 

My  kindest  regards  and  best  wishes  to  you  alwbys. 
Most  sincerely  yours, 

/s/    Kimmel. 

H.  E.  Kimmel. 

Admiral  H.  R.  Stark,  U.  S.  Navy, 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Navy  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. 


Air  Mail 
United  States  Pacific  Fleet 
[i]         Cincpac  File  No. 

Confidential  U.  S.  S.  PENNSYLVANIA,  Flagship 

Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H.,  May  16,  1941. 
Dear  Betty:    The  ammunition   situation  continues  unsatisfactory   and  is  a 
source  of  concern  to  me  in  regard  to  gunnery  school  and  target  practice  ammuni- 
tion as  it  effects  training,  and  mobilization  and  reserve  service  ammunition  as 
it  effects  the  general  readiness  of  the  Fleet.     The  problem  as  we  see  it  here  is 


2232     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

chiefly  one  of  transportation,  since  in  general  the  ammunition  is  available  but  not 
where  we  can  get  at  it. 

Late  in  the  winter  I  asked  that  giumery  school  ammunition  be  delivered  to 
the  Hawaiian  Area  not  later  than  2  June,  1941  and  that  certain  target  practice 
amunition  be  delivered  here  for  use  early  in  the  gunnery  year.  Action  on  this 
request  was  an  order  to  assemble  gunnery  school  ammunition  at  N.  A.  D.  Mare 
Island  by  15  May  1941,  with' the  request  that  it  be  delivered  to  Pearl  Harbor 
by  vessels  of  the  Fleet  since  no  other  transportation  was  available,  and  an  order 
for  shipment  of  a  large  part  of  the  requii-ed  target  practice  ammunition  by  PYRO 
and  LASSEN  from  the  East  Coast  by  loading  various  vessels  of  the  Base  Force 
with  gunnery  school  anumition  as  it  is  assembled  at  Mare  Island  during  this 
month,  we  are  in  a  fair  way  of  getting  enough  of  it  here  by  2  June  to  commence 
gunnery  school  firings. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  PYRO  and  LASSEN  were  not  sche<luled  to  arrive  before 
the  end  of  July  I  requested  by  despatch  that  target  practice  ammunition  be 
shipped  by  rail  across  country  .so  that  it  too  could  be  transported  here  by  vessels 
of  the  Fleet,  stating  that  we  could  u.se  this  ammunition  as  soon  as  delivered.  This 
request  was  not  approved  for  reasons  best  known  to  the  Department.  Since  the 
LASSEN  is  now  .scheduled  to  arrive  here  about  21  July,  with  a  part  of  this  ammu- 
nition, and  the  PYRO  about  11  August,  with  the  remainder,  there  will  be  a  period 
of  approximately  two  months  during  which  the  Fleet  will  be  deprived  of  gun- 
nery training  except  for  gunnery  school  firings. 

Since  PYRO  and  LASSEN  are  already  loading  on  the  East  Coast  no  further 
action  to  expedite  shipment  of  target  practice  ammunition  appears  feasible,  and 
we  shall  have  to  accept  the  handicap  in  training  imiwsed  by  the  lack  of  this  ammu- 
nition. This  is  already  water  over  the  dam  and  I  mention  it  only  because  I  feel 
the  time  has  come  when  the  long  haul  of  ammunition  between  the  Ea.st  and  West 
Coa.sts  by  amunition  ships  should  cease  and  full  use  be  made  of  rail  transporta- 
tion to  place  needed  amunition  at  West  Coast  ports  where  we  can  get  at  it.  Ob- 
viously in  the  event  of  hostilities  water  transportation  of  ammunition  from  the 
East  to  the  West  Coast  will  be  too  slow  and  risky. 

The  shortage  of  machine  gun  ammunition,  particularly  .50  caliber,  has  placed 
us  in  a  very  serious  position.  Upon  the  urging  of  the  Department  I  recommended 
a  cut  to  the  minimum  possible  allowance  per  gun  for  annual  training  and  pro- 
posed to  transfer  all  type  gunnery  school  machine  gun  allowances  to  the  Fleet 
Machine  Gun  School.  Type  gunnery  [2]  school  allowances  of  machine 
gun  ammunition  have  since  been  eliminated  entirely,  and  we  now  find  ourselves 
in  the  position  where  the  Fleet  Machine  Gim  School  has  only  enough  ammuni- 
tion to  last  until  10  June.  On  that  date  we  shall  be  forced  to  close  down  the 
Fleet  Machine  Gun  School  unless  more  ammunition  is  made  available. 

I  stress  the  urgent  need  for  early  delivery  of  target  ammunition  in  ample 
quantities  because  the  turnover  of  personnel  continues  high  and  I  can  see  no 
improvement  in  the  near  future.  The  only  way  we  can  counteract  this  and  give 
adequate  training  to  large  masses  of  green  personnel  is  to  provide  ammunition 
for  frequent  firings. 

I  have  stressed  gunnery  school  and  target  practice  ammunition  because  up  to 
the  opening  of  hostilities  they  may  be  considered  our  first  requirement,  and  we 
can  only  hope  that  the  last  increments  of  mobilization  supply,  which  are  on  their 
way,  arrive  in  time.  So  far  as  mobilization  supply  is  concerned  the  battleships 
and  heavy  cruisers  are  well  fixed.  The  light  cruisers  and  destroyers  are  still 
short,  particularly  in  6",  5"  anti-aircraft  and  depth  charges,  although  am- 
munition orders  indicate  that  by  midsummer  deficiencies  will  be  made  up.  In 
this  connection  it  is  suggested,  when  forces  are  moved  from  the  Pacific  to  the 
Atlantic,  that  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  be  informed  as  early  as  it  is  practicable  to 
do  so,  in  order  that  final  increments  of  mobilization  ammunition,  and  target  prac- 
tice ammunition  for  that  matter,  loaded  in  ships  for  delivery  to  Pearl  Harbor  may 
be  diverted  at  West  Coast  ports  and  not  brought  out  here. 

The  situation  in  regard  to  reserve  service  ammunition  is  entirely  unsatisfactory. 
Here  again  I  realize  it  is  largely  a  matter  of  transportation  and  that  reserve 
service  ammunition  must  come  after  mobilization  ammunition.  When  PYRO 
becomes  available  as  a  ship  of  the  Base  Force  she  can  be  used  in  shuttle  trips 
to  the  coast  to  bring  up  our  reserve  supply.  We  are  making  every  effort  to  trans- 
port ammunition  of  all  kinds  in  vessels  of  the  Fleet,  and  I  am  happy  to  note 
that  the  Naval  Air  Station  San  Diego  was  permitted  to  give  up  some  aircraft 
bombs  for  transportation  out  here  in  ENTERPRISE.  Also  an  order  to  ship  1,000 
depth  charge  from  Howthorne  was  a  great  help.  These  will  be  transported  in 
ships  of  the  Fleet. 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2233 

Once  we  are  over  the  mldsunimer  hnnip  we  shall  be  in  a  much  bettei"  position, 
provided  the  inevitable  d(»es  not  happen  first.  Even  then,  lujwever,  the  supply 
of  reserves  will  be  critical  and  the  use  of  rail  transportation  urgent. 

With  kindest  regards. 
Sincerely, 

H.  E.  KiMMBX. 

Copy  to  Rear  Admii'al  Blandy. 

United  States  Fleet 
U.  S.  S.  PENNSYI.VANIA,  Flagship 

CinC  File  No.  A16/0828 

Secret  26  May  1&41. 

From:  CinC 

To:  OpNav 

Subj  :  Survey  of  Conditions  in  Pac.  Ft. 

I.  PERSONNEL. 

(a)  Stahiliti/.  A  most  important,  perhaps  the  most  important  factor  in  the 
day  by  day  readiness  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  is  the  question  of  stabilizing  personnel — 
both  officers  and  men.  The  Fleet  is  doing  all  it  can,  and  is  making  good  progress, 
in  absorbing  new  men  and  training  new  officers,  but  facts  are  facts  and  neither 
the  Fleet  nor  the  individual  ships  can  be  a  coordinated  war  machine  if  the 
present  rapid  turnover  of  personnel  is  continued. 

(b)  Permanency  of  Officer  Personnel.  Regular  and  experienced  officers  have 
been  detached  at  an  alarming  rate.  Cooke,  for  example,  who  came  to  the 
PENNSYLVANIA  the  latter  part  of  February,  is  fourth  on  the  list  of  twelve 
l)attleship  captains  in  time  on  present  billet.  Executive  officers  are  going,  if 
anything  even  more  frequently.  The  situation  is  no  better  in  cruisers.  There 
appears  to  be  a  tendency  to  give  priority  in  importance  to  shore  duty  over  sea 
duty ;  witness,  transfer  of  officers  skilled  in  fire  control  and  gunnery  to  produc- 
tion and  inspection  jobs  ashore,  and  the  all  too  frequent  detachment  of  com- 
manding and  executive  officers  and  [2]  heads  of  departments  from  ships 
■of  all  types.  Expansion  of  the  Forces  Afloat  does  call  for  sacrifice  in  per- 
manency of  assignment  in  the  Fleet,  but  we  cannot  afford  to  replace  our  ex- 
perienced officers  with  reserves,  most  of  whom  are  untrained,  if  we  are  to  be 
ready  for  serious  business.  It  does  seem  that  much  can  be  done  toward  stabil- 
izing the  experienced  personnel  we  now  have.  Ordering  captains,  executives 
and  heads  of  departments  of  the  various  types,  well  knowing  that  they  will 
be  eligible  for  selection  and  promotion  within  six  months  is  an  example  of  a 
condition  readily  susceptible  of  correction. 

(c)  Permanency  of  Enliafed  Personnel.  The  situation  is  well  known  to  the 
Department,  as  indicated  by  a  recent  directive  to  take  full  advantage  of  the 
law  and  retain  men  whose  enlistments  expire  outside  the  continental  limits  of. 
the  United  States.  The  drastic  trend  in  reduction  of  reenlistments  in  the  Navy 
as  a  whole  in  the  month  of  April  is  of  serious  import  to  the  Fleet.  Even  in 
the  Pearl  Harbor  area  the  wages  offered  ashore  are  so  attractive  and  the 
jobs  are  so  many  that  skilled  men  whose  enlistments  expire  are  tempted  not 
to  reenlist.  A  recent  survey  of  Battleship  Division  THREE  indicates  that  of 
the  men  who.se  enlistments  expire  between  1  June  and  31  August  1941,  68.9% 
do  not  intend  to  reenlist.  This  is  in  line  with  a  recent  report  of  the  Bureau  of 
Navigation  showing  a  reduction  in  reenlistments  for  the  month  of  April  from 
83.09%  to  09.53%.  The  Commander-in-Chief  has  requested  the  Bureau  [3] 
of  Navigation  to  initiate  legislation  to  hold  for  the  duration  of  the  war  all 
men  now  enlisted  in  the  Navy.  He  does  not  look  with  favor  upon  the  directive 
mentioned  in  the  first  sentence  of  this  sub-paragraph.  It  is  discriminatory  and 
does  not  apply  equally  to  all  Fleets  or  even  to  all  ships  of  the  Pacific  Fleet, 
since  some  ships  overhaul  on  the  Coast  while  others  overhaul  at  Pearl  Harboi. 
The  Fleet  must  and  gladly  will  train  and  provide  men  for  new  construction  and 
outlying  stations  to  the  limit  of  its  capabilities,  but  it  should  be  unnecessary  to 
assign  to  shore  duty  so  many  experienced  petty  officers  as  we  now  find  ashore. 
There  is  an  urgent  necessity  that  a  continuous  supply  of  recruits  be  furnished  for 
training.  It  should  be  pointed  out  that  since  September,  with  new  meti  started 
coming  in  in  large  numbers,  all  vessels  have  had  to  absorb  recruits  in  a  large 
proportion.  In  the  Fleet  as  a  whole,  complements  are  now  made  up  of  over 
25%  of  men  with  the  maximum  of  a  year's  service,  and  in  some  ships  the 

79716  O — 46 — i)t.  16 21 


2234     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

figure  approaches  50%.  In  the  case  of  newly  acquired  transports,  cargo  ships, 
tanliers  and  the  like,  the  complements  are  almost  100%  reserve,  with  little  previ- 
ous Naval  training.  Present  conditions  are  worse  rather  than  better  when  new 
ships  in  large  numbers  are  added  to  the  Navy.  The  situation  will  be  extremely 
acute  if  we  are  then  at  war.  It  is  obvious  that  there  are  limitations  on  the 
capacity  of  active  ships  for  supplying  the  large  numbers  of  officers  and  men 
required  to  man  the  Navy  now  building,  unless  the  immediate  [4]  fighting 
capacity  of  the  ships  is  seriously  crippled. 

Long  range  plaiming,  with  reasonable  foresight  as  to  future  needs,  is  an 
imperative  necessity.  It  would  appear  that  training  activities  ashore  must  be 
greatly  expanded,  as  the  physical  capacities  of  the  ships  limits  the  number  that 
can  be  trained  in  the  Fleet.  The  possibility  that  we  may  have  to  provide  and 
quarter,  ashore,  a  pool  of  trained  men  for  new  construction  should  be  carefully 
examined,  and  provision  now  made  for  it,  if  found  necessary. 

A  problem  of  immediate  importance  is  brought  about  by  a  recent  letter  from 
the  Bureau  of  Navigation  which  states  that  between  now  and  September  some 
3.080  men,  more  than  half  of  whom  are  rated,  will  be  taken  from  the  Fleet  for 
new  construction  and  for  this  purpose  allocations  are  made  in  the  ratio  of  72% 
Pacific  Fleet  to  28%  Atlantic  Fleet.  Unless  a  readjustment  is  made  in  these 
figures  to  correspond  to  the  recent  readjustment  in  the  relative  strengths  of  these 
Fleets,  the  Pacific  Fleet  will  be  seriously  stripped  of  experienced  men  and  may 
be  unable  to  furnish  some  of  the  ratings  demanded. 

(d)  Health  and  Morale.  The  desirability,  if  international  conditions  permit, 
of  health  and  recreation  trips  to  the  Coast  by  Task  Forces,  each  of  which  shall 
be  no  more  than  one-fourth  the  strength  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  as  now  constituted 
must  be  given  serious  consideration. 

[5]  (e)  Assif/nment  of  Flag  Officers.  It  is  particularly  desired  that  Vice 
Admiral  Pye  be  retained  as  Commander  of  the  Battle  Force.  Admiral  Pj'e  is 
able,  vigorous,  and  loyal ;  and  is  an  oflScer  whom  I  would  select,  above  all  others, 
as  Commander  Battle  Force. 

(f)  Uniform.  There  is  too  much  change  and  experimentation  at  this  time. 
It  is  not  important  whether  rank  is  shown  on  the  sleeve  or  on  the  shoulder  of  a 
khaki  uniform,  nor  is  it  important  whether  tho  eagle  of  the  cap  device  faces  to 
left  or  to  right.  As  for  the  khaki  working  uniform  the  Commander-in-Chief  is  con- 
vinced that  it  lessens  the  dignity  and  military  point  of  view  of  the  wearer  and 
has  a  tendency  to  let  down  the  efliciency  of  personnel.  Reports  from  the  aircraft 
squadrons  are  to  the  effect  that  from  any  considerable  altitude  they  are  unable 
to  detect  the  color  of  the  uniform  on  ships  at  sea. 

IL  AVIATION. 

(a)  Aviation  Training.  The  following  requirements  for  aviation  have  been 
urged  but  favorable  action  has  not  yet  been  taken : — 

(1)  Newly  graduated  pilots  for  carriers,  battleships  and  cruisers  should  first 
be  ordered  to  San  Diego  for  indoctrination  in  Fleet  squadron  work  and  familiariza- 
tion with  latest  types  of  planes. 

(2)  Replacement  carrier  groups  should  be  built  up  at  San  Diego,  for  indoc- 
trination of  new  graduates  and  for  rotation  with  groups  already  in  carriers. 

[6]         (3)   The  rating  of  Aircraft  Radioman  should  be  established. 
The  following  requirements  are  in  process  of  correction  but  progress  is  too 
slow : 

(1)  The  level  of  experience  of  pilots  in  the  Fleet  is  very  low  and  the  total 
number  is  too  low. 

(2)  The  level  of  exi^erience  of  aviation  ratings  in  the  Fleet  is  low  and  the 
allowances  are  not  filled. 

(3)  The  rating  of  Aircraft  Bomber,  though  approved,  has  not  yet  been 
established. 

(b)  Aviation  Material.  The  following  items  which  apply  to  aviation  are  in 
process  of  correction  but  progress  is  too  slow : 

(1)  Carrier  torpedo  planes  are  obsolescent  and  spare  carrier  torpedo  planes 
are  too  few. 

(2)  Replacement  of  other  carrier  planes  with  more  modern  types  is  not  yet 
completed  and  the  replacement  planes  are  not  yet  fully  modernized. 

(3)  There  are  not  yet  enough  spare  carrier  planes  of  the  new  types  and 
the  stock  of  spare  parts  and  engines  is  too  low. 

(4)  Deliveries  of  ordnance  and  radio  equipment  for  new  planes  have  been 
too  slow. 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2235 

(5)  Cruiser  planes  are  obsolescent  and  deliveries  of  replacements  have  been 
too  slow. 

(6'  Modernized  patrol  planes  are  not  yet  available  in  quantity.  There  are 
none  in  the  Hawaiian  area  and  there  i.s  no  early  [7]  prospect  for  replace- 
ment of  those  of  the  older  tyiie  now  in  the  Hawaiian  area. 

(7)  There  have  been  no  deliveries  of  special  radio  equipment  for  patrol 
planes,  corresponds  to  RADAR  for  ships,  which  will  enormously  increase  the 
potentialities  of  these  planes. 

(8)  There  is  a  serious  shortage  of  aircraft  machine  gun  ammunition. 

(9)  No  armor-piercing  bombs,  antiaircraft  bombs  or  aerial  depth  bombs  are 
yet  available. 

(10)  There  is  a  very  serious  shortage  of  aircraft  torpedoes  and  of  equipment 
for  their  maintenance  and  overhaul. 

(11)  Completions  of  new  carriers  and  new  patrol  plane  tenders  are  too  slow. 

(12)  Provision  for  bombs  and  for  refueling  planes  at  outlying  bases  is 
sketchy. 

(13)  There  has  been  serious  delay  in  deliveries  of  equipment  under  the 
cognizance  of  other  Bureaus  than  Yards  and  Docks  in  connection  with  the 
construction  of  new  air  stations  and  bases. 

In  addition  to  the  afore-nientioned  items  the  following  have  been  urged  but 
favorable  action  has  not  yet  been  taken : 

(1)  Aircraft  overhaul  at  N.  A.  S.,  Pearl  Harbot,  now  limited  to  patrol  planes, 
should  be  expanded  to  provide  for  all  planes  now  based  in  this  area.  Transfer 
to  and  from  West  Coast  for  overhaul  is  impracticable. 

(2)  Additional  barracks  should  be  established  at  N.  A.  S.  Pearl  Harbor. 

L&l  (c)  Separate  Air  Force.  This  ever  present  question  is  again  being 
brought  to  the  fore,  in  view  of  Mr.  Scrugham's  recent  utterances.  It  is  vital  that 
the  Navy's  air  service  remain  as  it  is.  Our  naval  aviation  is  generally  recog- 
nized, throughout  the  world,  as  being  the  best  equipped,  best  trained,  and  most 
advanced  of  any  naval  air  service.  This  has  been  brought  about  by  the  mutual 
recognition  of  the  intimate  relationship  between  air  and  surface  sea  forces, 
particularly  in  far-flung  operations  distant  from  established  bases.  Effective 
cooperation,  in  naval  operations,  between  air  and  surface  craft  requires  the  closest 
kind  of  coordination,  predicated  upon  precise  knowledge  of  each  other's  capabili- 
ties, limitations,  and  tactics.  This  can  only  be  attained  by  day-by-day  operations, 
association,  and  exchange  of  ideas*  as  an  integral  part  of  one  organization.  It  is 
vital  that  this  relationship  continue,  even  at  the  expense  (though  this  feature  is 
greatly  exaggerated)  of  some  duplication  of  effort  between  the  Army  and  the 
Navy.  Mr.  Scrugham's  chief  complaint,  which  deals  chiefly  with  duplication  of 
facilities  at  coastal  air  stations  and  the  proximity  at  those  stations  to  each  other, 
is  not  a  valid  one.  The  services  perform  separate  functions ;  the  Army  in  extend- 
ing the  range  of  coastal  batteries  and  the  Navy  in  extending  the  mobility  and 
coverage  of  ships  in  off  shore  search.  The  proximity  of  the  fields  to  each  other  is 
largely  a  matter  of  the  vagaries  of  Congress  and  the  [5]  availability  of 
land.  The  United  States,  due  to  its  physical  separation  from  its  most  probable 
enemies,  has  less  need  for  a  concentrated,  offensive,  air  striking  force  than  other 
nations.  The  present  GHQ  air  force,  however,  amply  supplies  this  need.  It  may 
be  noted,  in  passing,  that,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  Air  Corps  is  a  part  of  the 
Army,  the  strong  tendency  within  that  Corps  for  separation,  has  prevented  the 
development  of  effective  cooperation  between  ground  and  air  forces.  A  separate 
air  corps  w-ould  make  the  situation  much  worse — for  the  Navy  it  would  mean  the 
death  of  naval  aviation. 

The  British  have  found  it  necessary  to  place  their  coastal  air  command  under 
the  direct  control  of  the  Navy.  Aside  from  discoordination  of  operations,  this 
command  was  suffering  from  lack  of  proper  types. 

HI.  MATERIAL,  GENERAL. 

(a)  Priorities.  The  Navy  is  at  present  suffering  from  a  shortage  of  material 
and  is  experiencing  difficulty  in  having  this  shortage  corrected.  The  principal 
items,  and  those  that  directly  affect  our  early  readiness,  are  (1)  small  arms  and 
machine  gun  ammunition  for  airplanes  and  the  Fleet  Marine  Force;  (2)  airplanes, 
esi)ecially  those  equipped  with  modern  armor  and  armament;  (3)  close-range 
antiaircraft  guns,  especially  a  1.1",  Bofors,  and  Oerlikon ;  (4)  ammunition  in 
general,  particularly  adequate  reserves,  and  bombs  of  all  kinds.  Our  ability  to 
correct  these  deficiencies  is  [/O]  limited  by  two  factors,  (1)  aid  to  Great 
Britain,  and  (2)  rapid  expansion  of  the  Army.  Both  of  these  limiting  factors  are 
admittedly  of  great  importance  and  are  entitled  to  proper  weight  in  any  system  of 


2236     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

priorities,  but,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Fleet,  it  appears  that  there  is  a 
tendency  to  twerlook  the  time  factor.  A  priority  system  based  on  relative  quanti- 
ties needed  by  the  three  comiieting  agencies.  Britain,  Army  and  the  Navy,  will 
prove  fatally  defective,  if  the  time  of  beginning  active  operations  is  overlooked. 
As  the  situation  appears  now,  the  Navy  may  be  called  on  for  active  operations  in 
contact  with  well  equipped  opposing  forces,  yet  is  prevented  from  obtaining  vitally 
necessary  needs  by  the  magnitude  of  the  needs  of  Britain  and  the  Army.  If  we 
are  going  into  action  first,  our  needs  must  be  filled  ahead  of  the  Army's  and  those 
sine  qua  non  needs  such  as  small  arms  and  machine  gun  ammunition,  modern 
airplanes,  and  modern  close-range  antiaircraft  guns,  must  be  filled  ahead  of 
Britain's.  There  is  a  minimum  need  for  the  Navy  without  which  it  can  not  fight 
at  all.  Irrespective  of  how  small  that  need  may  be  I'elative  to  the  quantitative 
demands  of  others,  it  must  be  filled  first. 

It  is  important  to  bring  out  this  point  now,  since  it  is  understood  that  tlie 
Army  is  basing  its  procurement  program  on  a  4,000,(X)0  man  Army.  If  alloca- 
tion be  based  on  relative  quantities,  under  such  a  program,  the  Navy  will  get 
little  consideration.  The  [11]  imminence  of  active  operations  should  be 
the  criterion.  Of  course,  the  Navy  Department  is  in  a  better  position  to  judge 
that  than  we  are,  but  we've  been  led  to  believe  we  were  pretty  close  to  war  on 
several  occasions,  but  we  still  didn't  get  the  items  we  need. 

(b)  RADAR  Equipment.  Such  excellent  results  are  being  obtained  from  the 
few  RADAR'S  furnished  that  we  should  install  now  the  equipment  which  will 
work,  and  not  wait  for  something  better  to  be  developed.  Delivery  of  RADAR 
should  be  accelerated. 

IV.  COMMUNICATIONS. 

The  need  for  establishment  of  confidential  call  signs  is  urgent.  With  the 
present  system  of  calls  the  text  of  a  message  may  sometimes  be  inferred  from 
the  radio  calls  used.  The  danger  of  the  present  system  is  that  codes  may  be 
compromised,  as  well  as  information  disclosed.  The  cryptographic  aid  section 
of  opNav  should  immediately  get  out  confidential  call  signs  and  more  crypto- 
graphic aids. 

V.  OPERATIONS. 

(a)  Fleet  Operations.  With  the  recent  detachment  of  many  of  the  most  mod- 
ern and  effective  units,  the  adequacy  and  suitability  of  the  forces  i-emaining  to 
accomplish  the  tasks  to  which  they  may  be  assigne<i  is  very  doubtful. 

In  the  Pacific,  our  potential  enemy  is  far  away  and  hard  to  gjet  at.  He  has 
no  exposed  vital  interests  within  reach  of  Pearl  Harbor,  and  has  a  system  of 
defense  in  the  Mandates,  Marianas,  [12]  and  Bonins  that  requires  land- 
ing operations,  supported  by  sea  forces,  against  organized  land  positions  sup- 
ported by  land-based  air.  This  is  the  hardest  kind  of  opposition  to  overcome 
and  requires  detailed  preparation  and  rehearsal.  It  also  requii'es  a  preponder- 
ance of  light  force  and  carrier  strength,  in  which  we  are  woefully  deficient  in 
the  Pacific.  Our  present  strength  is  in  battleships— which  come  into  play  only 
after  we  have  reduced  the  intervening  organized  positions.  They  (battleships) 
will  have  to  be  used  to  "cover"  the  intervening  operations  and  prevent  interference 
therewith,  but  their  real  value  can  not  be  realized  until  the  intervening  oppo- 
sition has  been  overcome  and  a  position  obtained  from  which  solid  strength  can 
be  brought  to  bear.  The  Japanese  are  not  going  to  expose  their  main  fleet  until 
they  are  either  forced  to  do  so  by  our  obtaining  a  position  close  enough  to  threaten 
their  vital  interests  or  it  is  advantageous  for  them  to  do  so  by  our  having  "broken 
our  backs",  so  to  speak,  by  going  up  against  their  land  positions  and  attrition 
operations. 

The  foregoing  discussion  is  brought  out  to  emphasize  that  the  role  of  light 
forces,  and  particularly  carriers,  in  the  Pacific,  is  far  more  important  than  a 
casual  evaluation  of  relative  strength  would  suggest.  Under  RAINBOW  5, 
the  Pacific  Fleet  (perhaps  justifiably,  in  view  of  the  Atlantic  situation)  is  so 
reduced  in  light  force  and  carrier  strength  that  its  capabilities  for  offensive 
[13]  operations  of  a  decisive  nature  are  severely  crippled.  Quick  results 
may  only  be  hoped  for — common  sense  dictates  that  it  is  largely  hope,  based 
principally  upon  the  idea  that  Japan  will  make  a  fundamental  mistake,  and 
that  bold  action  may  be  able  to  take  advantage  of  it. 

In  the  Pacific,  with  enemy  vital  interests  so  far  away,  and  no  bases  of  our  own 
within  striking  distance,  the  logistic  pi'oblem  is  acute.  We  have  not,  at  present, 
suflBcient  ammunition,  provisions,  cargo  ships  or  tanks  to  support  active  oi)era- 
tions  in  the  Western  Pacific — where  the  real  battleground  will  be.    We  are  having 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2237 

difficulty,  even  now,  supi)<»rtiiig  the  construction  and  defense  activities  of  our 
own  outlying  bases.  More  auxiliary  vessels  are  needed,  now,  for  that  purpose,  and 
future  needs  must  be  anticipated  to  allow  for  acquisition  and  conversion  of  the 
ships.  Our  past  experieJice,  in  this  regard,  has  not  been  a  happy  one — the  lag 
between  acquisition  and  entrance  into  service  being  six  months  to  a  year.  Repair 
and  maintenance  facilities  at  advanced  bases  can  not  be  created  overnight,  nor 
can  the  Fleet  remain  long  without  them. 

(b)  Fourteenth  Naval  Diatrict.  The  defense  of  the  Fleet  base  at  Pearl 
Harbor  is  a  mater  of  considerable  concern.  We  should  continue  to  bring  pres- 
sure to  bear  on  the  Army  to  get  more  antiaircraft  guns,  airplanes,  and  RADAR 
equipment  in  Hawaii  and  to  insure  priority  for  this  over  Continental  and 
expanding  Army  needs. 

\H]  The  naval  forces  available  to  the  Commandant  are  meager  to  the 
point  of  non-evistence.  A  Fleet  base  is  a  place  of  rest,  recreation,  and  resus- 
tenance  and  must  afford  protection  of  the  Fleet  at  anchor  and  during  entrance 
and  egress  independent  of  the  units  of  the  Fleet.  If  units  of  a  fleet  must  be 
employed  f(u-  its  own  defense,  in  its  base,  its  freedom  of  action  for  offensive 
operations  is  seriously  curtailed — possibly  to  the  point  where  it  is  tied  to  the 
base  by  the  necessities  for  defense  of  that  base.  The  need  for  patrol  boats  and 
other  small  craft,  especially  those  equipped  with  listening  devices,  is  urgent. 
The  Fleet  must  be  relieved  of  those  functions  which  properly  belong  to  the 
District.  The  Fleet  does  not  have  the  desti-oyei-s  or  other  vessels  to  take  over 
those  duties.  The  situation  has  been  brought  to  the  Department's  attention  by 
letter.  It  is  now  much  more  serious  as  many  destroyers  have  been  detached 
from  this  Fleet. 

(c)  Marine.  The  necesity  for  closely  coordinated  training  of  Marines  and 
the  ships  which  will  support  their  landing  operations  is  readily  apparent.  Opera- 
tions of  this  character  require  detailed  training  and  realistic  rehearsal.  At  pres- 
ent, the  Marines  and  their  ti-aining  ground  (San  Clemente)  are  in  one  location 
and  the  ships  in  another,  2000  miles  away.  We  need  a  training  ground  for  landing 
operations  and  a  camp  for  a  substantial  portion  of  the  Fleet  Marine  Force  in 
the  Hawaiian  area.  This  need  will  be  worse,  if  we  get  in  war  in  the  Pacific, 
because  we  will  not  only  need  a  training  ground  and  [15]  large  camp 
site  for  Marine.s,  but  also  must  train  and  rehearse,  as  the  campaign  progresses, 
Army  forces  as  well. 

Kahoolawe  is  practically  undeveloped  and  can  be  used  as  an  Hawaiian  San 
Clemente.  A  camp  site  for  5,000  Marines  has  been  selected  and  recommended  for 
acquisition.     This  program  should  be  pushed. 

The  Sixth  Defense  Battalion  should  be  brought  to  Hawaii  now  in  order  to 
relieve  the  Seventh  Defense  Battalion  at  Midway  where  the  latter  has  been 
stationed  for  some  months.  Equipment  for  this  battalion  should  be  provided  as 
soon  as  possible.  Other  defen.se  battalions  now  in  the  Hawaiian  area  are  being 
used  for  other  outlying  bases. 

(d)  Loffistic  Support.  Ships  to  transport  men  and  materials  to  and  fi'om  the 
Coast  and  to  supply  the  outlying  islands  is  urgent. 

There  is  similar  urgency  in  the  need  for  ships  to  transport  aircraft.  Aircraft 
carriers  should  not  be  used  for  this  purpose  in  peacetime  and  cannot  be  so  em- 
ployed in  war.    Action  has  repeatedly  been  requested. 

VI.  NATIONAL  POLICY. 

(a)  Although  largely  uninformed  as  to  day-by-day  developments,  one  cannot 
escape  the  conclusion  that  our  national  policies  and  diplomatic  and  military 
moves  to  implement  them,  are  not  fully  coordinated.  No  policy,  today,  is  any 
better  than  the  force  available  to  support  it.  While  this  is  well  recognized  in 
[1€]  principle,  it  is,  apparently,  lost  sight  of  in  practice.  We  have,  for  ex- 
ample, made  strong  expressions  of  (mr  intention  to  retain  an  effective  voice  in 
the  F'ar  East,  yet  have,  so  far,  refused  to  develop  Guam  or  to  provide  adequate 
defense  for  the  Philippines.  We  retained  the  Fleet  in  Hawaii,  last  summer,  as 
a  diplomatic  gesture,  but  almost  sinmltaneously  detached  heavy  cruisers  to  the 
Atlantic  and  retained  new  destroyers  there,  and  almost  demobilized  the  Fleet 
by  wholesale  changes  in  personnel. 

We  .should  decide  on  what  we  are  going  to  do  about  the  Philippines,  now,  and 
provide  for  their  defense,  if  retained.  It  is  easily  conceivable  that  50.000  troops 
and  400  airplanes  on  Luzon,  might  prove  a  sufficient  deterrent  to  Japan  to 
prevent  direct  action.  We  should  develop  Guam  and  provide  for  its  defense 
commensurate  with  its  state  of  development.  It  is  foolish  to  develop  it  for  some 
one  else  to  use. 


2238     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

The  military  branches  of  the  government  should  be  told,  by  the  diplomatic 
branch,  what  effect  it  is  desired  to  produce  and  their  judgment  as  to  the  means 
available  and  the  manner  of  its  accomplishment  should  be  accorded  predominant 
weight. 

Our  Hemispheric  Defense  policy  must  comprehend  the  fullest  cooperation  be- 
tween participating  nations  and  our  commitments  limited  by  our  available  force. 
A  strong  component  of  that  force  is  bases.  No  Hemispheric  Defense  policy  that 
does  not  provide  for  our  free  use  [17]  and  development  of  South  American 
bases  (and  local  military  and  logistic  suport)  can  be  effective. 

Vn.  INFORMATION. 

(a)  The  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet  is  in  a  very  difQcult  position.  He 
is  far  removed  from  the  seat  of  government,  in  a  complex  and  rapidly  changing 
situation.  He  is,  as  a  rule,  not  informed  as  to  the  policy,  or  change  of  policy, 
reflected  in  current  events  and  naval  movements  and,  as  a  result,  is  unable  to 
evaluate  the  possible  effect  upon  his  own  situation.  He  is  not  even  sure  of  what 
force  will  be  available  to  him  and  has  little  voice  in  matters  radically  affecting 
his  ability  to  carry  out  his  assigned  tasks.  This  lack  of  information  is  disturb- 
ing and  tends  to  create  uncertainty,  a  condition  which  directly  contravenes  that 
singleness  of  purpose  and  confidence  in  one's  own  course  of  action  so  necessary 
to  the  conduct  of  military  operations. 

It  is  realized  that,  on  occasion,  the  rapid  developments  in  the  international 
picture,  both  diplomatic  and  military,  and,  perhaps,  even  the  lack  of  knowledge 
of  the  military  authorities  themselves,  may  militate  against  the  furnishing  of 
timely  information,  but  certainly  the  present  situation  is  susceptible  to  marked 
improvement.  Full  and  authoritative  knowledge  of  current  policies  [18] 
and  objectives,  even  though  necessarily  late  at  times,  would  enable  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet  to  modify,  adapt,  or  even  re-orient  his  possible 
courses  of  action  to  conform  to  current  concepts.  This  is  particularly  applicable 
to  the  current  Pacific  situation,  where  the  necessities  for  intensive  training  of 
a  partially  trained  Fleet  must  be  carefully  balanced  against  the  desirability  of 
interruption  of  this  training  by  strategic  dispositions,  or  otherwise,  to  meet 
impending  eventualities.  Moreover,  due  to  this  same  factor  of  distance  and 
time,  the  Department  itself  is  not  too  well  informed  as  to  the  local  situation, 
particularly  with  regard  to  the  status  of  current  outlying  island  development, 
thus  making  it  even  more  necessary  that  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet 
be  guided  by  broad  policy  and  objectives  rather  than  by  categorical  instructions. 

It  is  suggested  that  it  be  made  a  cardinal  principle  that  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  Pacific  Fleet  be  immediately  informed  of  all  important  developments  as 
they  occur  and  by  the  quickest  secure  means  available. 

VIII.  PUBLIC  OPINION. 

(a)  As  preparation  for  war,  the  current  mental  and  moral  preparation  of 
our  people,  as  reflected  in  the  newspapers  and  magazines,  is  utterly  wrong.  To 
back  into  a  war,  unsupported  or  only  half-heartedly  supported  by  public  opinion, 
is  to  court  losing  it.  [19]  A  left-handed,  vacillating  approach  to  a  very 
serious  decision  is  totally  destructive  of  that  determination  and  firmness  of 
national  character  without  which  we  cannot  succeed.  The  situation  demands 
that  our  people  be  fully  informed  of  the  issues  involved,  the  means  necessary 
and  available,  and  the  consequences  of  success  or  failure.  When  we  go  in,  we 
must  go  with  ships,  planes,  guns,  men  and  material,  to  the  full  extent  of  our 
resources.  To  tell  our  people  anything  else  is  to  perpetrate  a  base  deception 
which  can  only  be  reflected  in  lackadaisical  and  half-hearted  prosecution. 

/S/      H.  E.  KiMMEL. 


Navy  DEyAKTMENT, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Washington,  4  June  1941- 
Confidential 
Memorandum  for  Admiral  Stark 

The  agreement  entered  into  betwixt  the  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian 
Department,  and  the  Commandant,  14th  Naval  District,  in  regard  to  joint  action 
of  the  Army  and  Navy  Air  Corps  in  Hawaii  provides : 

(a)  That  in  activities  in  the  defense  of  Oahu  and  the  other  islands  against 
enemy  bombing  attacks  the  command  shall  be  vested  in  the  Army  Air  Corps  as- 
sisted by  Navy  fighters  which  may  be  available. 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2239 

(b)  That  in  a  mission  which  involves  bombing  of  enemy  ships  the  command 
shall  be  vested  in  the  Navy  Air  Commander  in  charge  of  the  Base.  Briefly,  when 
an  alarm  is  sounded  the  Navy  patrol  planes  take  off  to  locate  the  enemy  ships 
and  when  located  in  the  Navy  directs  the  efforts  of  the  Army  and  Navy  bombers 
in  the  offensive  action  which  they  take  against  the  enemy  ships. 

The  liaison  betwixt  the  Army  and  Navy  Air  Corps  in  Hawaii  is  very  satis- 
factory and  weekly  drills  in  air  raid  alarms  with  the  two  services  acting  in 
unisoji  are  held.  These  drills  have  developed  many  weaknesses  but  the  condi- 
tions are  steadily  improving  and  it  is  felt  they  are  in  much  better  shape  now 
than  they  were  a  few  months  ago.  The  conditions  will  continue  to  be  unsatis- 
factory imtil  certain  equipment  has  been  supplied  and  the  personnel  drilled  in 
its  use. 

There  are  about  140  light  Army  planes  (fighters  and  light  bombers)  and  21 
heavy  bombing  Army  planes  now  in  the  Islands.  These  in  addition  to  some 
obsolescent  bombers  and  fighters.  It  is  believed  that  the  number  of  Army  bomb- 
ers in  the  Islands  should  be  at  least  four  times  the  number  that  they  have  there 
now  and  it  is  felt  these  planes  should  be  sent  out  as  soon  as  it  is  practicable 
to  do  so. 

There  are  not  now  a  sufficient  number  of  Army  pilots  to  man  all  the  Army 
planes  in  the  Islands. 

[S]       H.  E.  KiMMEL. 

[i]  Commander-in-Chief 

United  States  Pacific  Fleett 
U.  S.  S.  Pennsylvania,  Flagship 

Secret  Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H.,  July  26,  lOJfl. 

Dear  Betty  :  When  the  proposed  visit  of  the  Under  Secretary  was  announced 
my  staff  prepared  a  list  of  topics  which  might  be  of  interest  for  discussion  while 
Mr.  Forrestal  and  his  party  are  here.  Not  knowing  the  punwse  of  Mr.  For- 
restal's  visit  or  whether  he  is  informed  concerning  the  general  nature  of  our 
war  plans  and  our  problems  I  decided  it  better  to  combine  these  notes  into  a 
letter  to  you  and  believe  quicker  action  can  be  obtained  in  that  way.  Following 
•are  the  principal  items  of  which  I  have  been  thinking: 

(1)  The  importance  of  keeping  the  Commander-in-Chief  advised  of  Depart- 
ment policies  and  decisions  and  the  changes  in  policies  and  decisions  to  meet 
changes  in  the  international  situation. 

(a)  We  have  as  yet  received  no  official  information  as  to  the  U.  S.  attitude 
towards  Russian  participation  in  the  w.ir,  particularly  as  to  the  degree  of 
cooperation,  if  any,  in  the  Pacific,  between  the  U.  S.  and  Russia  if  and  when 
we  become  active  participants.  Present  plans  do  not  include  Rusisa  and  do  not 
provide  for  coordinated  action,  joint  use  of  bases,  joint  communication  systems 
and  the  like.  The  new  situation  opens  up  possibilities  for  us  which  should  be 
fully  explored  and  full  advantage  taken  of  any  opportunities  for  mutual  support. 
Pertinent  questions  are : 

( 1 )  Will  England  declare  war  on  Japan  if  Japanese  attack  Maritime  Provinces? 

(2)  If  answer  to  (1)  is  in  the  affirmative,  will  we  actively  assist,  as  tentatively 
provided  in  case  of  attack  on  N.  E.  I.  or  Singapore? 

(3)  If  answer  to  (2)  is  in  the  affirmative,  are  plans  being  prepared  for  joint 
action,  mutual  support,  etc.? 

(4)  If  answer  to  (1)  is  negative,  what  will  England's  attitude  be?  What  will 
ours  beV 

(5)  If  England  declares  war  on  Japan,  but  we  do  not,  what  is  attitude  in 
regard  to  Japanese  shipping,  patrol  of  Pacific  waters,  commerce  raiders,  etc.? 

(b)  Depending  upon  the  progress  of  hostilities,  the  Russian  situation  appears 
to  offer  an  opportunity  for  the  strengthening  of  our  Far  Eastern  defenses,  par- 
ticularly Guam  and  the  I'hilippines.  Cert.iinly,  no  matter  how  the  fighting  goes, 
Japan's  attention  will  be  partially  diverted  fi*om  the  China  and  Southern  adven- 
tures by  either  (1)  diversion  of  forces  for  attack  on  Russia  or  (2)  nec-essity 
for  providing  [2]  for  Russian  attack  on  her.  It  is  conceivable  that  the 
greater  the  German  succe.ss  on  the  P^astern  front,  the  more  Russia  will  be  pushed 
toward  Asia,  with  consequent  increased  danger  to  Japan's  "New  Order"  for  that 
area.  In  my  opinion  we  should  push  our  development  of  Guam  and  accelerate 
our  bolstering  of  the  Philippines.     The  Russo-Axis  war  may  give  us  more  time. 

(2)   Priorities  in  connection  with  preparation  for  a  Pacific  war: — 


2240     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(a)  Transports  and  Liffht  Destroyer  Transports. — During  the  Commander- 
in-Chiefs  visit  to  Washington,  all  the  transports,  including  the  light  destroyer 
transports,  were  transferred  to  the  Atlantic.  The  necessity  for  this  is  I'ecog- 
nized.  Nevertheless,  we  still  need  transports  in  the  Pacific  and  the  need  is  even 
greater  now  (in  i>oint  of  view  of  time  particularly)  because  most  of  our  trained 
marines  went  with  the  transports  and  we  are  faced  with  an  immediate  training 
problem  in  addition  to  a  pf)ssible  war  situation.  The  Department  has  initiated 
action  to  complete  the  HARRIS  and  ZEILIN  and  to  acquire  and  convert  four 
more  transports  for  the  Pacific,  but,  so  far  as  is  known,  has  done  nothing  about 
replacing  the  light  destroyer  transports  (APD's).  These  vessels  were  originally 
conceived  and  developed  for  a  Parifie  campaign.  They  are  especially  suitable 
for  use  in  attacks  on  atolls  and  may  be  the  only  means  of  readily  attacking 
those  positions.  While  by  no  means  discounting  their  usefulness  in  the  Atlantic, 
the  need  for  them  in  the  F'aciflc  is  paramount.  If  at  all  possible,  they  should  be 
returned  to  this  ocean  at  once.  If  this  cannot  be  done,  and  only  if  it  cannot  be 
done,  additional  destroyers  must  be  converted  as  soon  as  x)«ssible.  Work  on  the 
large  tran.sports  must  also  be  expedited  and  completion  dates  anticipated  if 
possible.. 

(b)  Marine  Equipment:  Tlie  Sixth  Defense  Battalion  does  not  now  have  its 
full  equipment,  particularly  AA  guns  and  .30  and  .50  caliber  machine  guns.  The 
remaining  units  of  the  Second  Marine  Division  were  stripi)ed  of  much  of  their 
equipment  to  fit  out  the  reenforced  regiment  that  went  East.  There  is  practically 
no  marine  ammunition  now  on  the  West  Coast.  It  is  practically  certain  that 
these  luiits  will  fight  befcue  the  Army  will  and  their  needs  nmst  be  given  pri- 
ority. We  can't  fight  an  amphibious  war  in  the  Pacific  without  ammunition  for 
the  marines. 

[3]  We  are  going  ahead  with  the  preparation  of  a  camp  in  Oahu  for  five 
thousand  marines.  When  they  come  they  should  be  fully  equipped  for  amphibi- 
ous warfare.  The  tran.sports  etc.,  should  be  ready  at  the  same  time.  An  estimate 
of  when  the  needed  equipment  and  men  will  be  available  would  help  us  in  our 
planning. 

(c)  Awnmnition  Facilities:  The  condition  of  ammunition  handling  and 
stowage  facilities  ashore  are  in  general  satisfactory  at  the  present  time.  Stowage 
facilities  have  bepn  completed,  are  in  the  process  of  c(mstruction,  or  are  about 
to  be  started  to  handle  assignments  of  service  reserves  of  gun  ammunition,  bombs, 
mines,  and  torpedoes.  This  includes  igloos  alrejtdy  completed  and  others  now 
under  construction  at  Westloch  and  at  Lualualei. 

New  construction  authorized  and  about  to  be  umlertaken  includes  four  powder 
magazines  and  four  shell  hou.ses  at  Lualualei,  and  barracaded  .stowage  fctr  live 
mines,  two  new  mine  anchor  buildings  and  a  new  mine  assembly  building  at 
Westloch. 

New  construction  needed  to  complete  stowage  and  handling  facilities  includes 
extension  of  Westloch  dock  to  a  maximum  of  two  thousand  feet  and  the  con- 
struction of  four  powder  magazines  and  two  shell  houses  at  Westloch  to  accom- 
modate target  practice  ammunition  which  cannot  be  stowed  in  vessels  of  the 
Fleet.  This  latter  construction  has  been  recommended  to  the  Commandant  of 
the  Fourteenth  Naval  District  in  recent  correspondence  and  we  haVe  no  word 
yet  on  what  acti<m  he  has  taken. 

(d)  The  importance  of  building  up  Navy  Yard,  Pearl  Harbor  to  the  point 
contemplated  by  the  Greenslade  Boatd.  For  the  present  Navy  Yard,  Pearl  Har- 
bor should  be  regarded  primarily  as  a  "restricted  availability"  yard.  Overhaul 
of  ships  here  should  not  include  battleships  and  cruisers  or  other  ships  for 
extensive  regular  overhauls.  The  facilities  of  the  yard  should  be  confined  to 
emergency  and  low  priority  overhaul,  regardless  of  overhead  costs. 

(e)  Provide  more  and  more  personnel  to  the  Fleet  for  training.  The  personnel 
situation  has  been  presented  to  the  Bureau  of  Navigation  and  that  Bureau  is 
thoroughly  familiar  with  our  requirements.  We  cannot  provide  experienced 
personnel' for  new  construction  next  year  unless  we  obtain  recruits  and  train 
them  intensively  at  once.  I  realize  [4]  that  recruiting  has  fallen  off  and 
that  the  Department  is  doing  all  it  can  but  we  are  losing  trained  men  faster 
than  we  are  getting  new  recruits.  As  I  stated  in  a  recent  letter  we  could  use 
20,000  more  men  in  the  Pacific  Fleet  right  now. 

(f)  Need  for  a  hospital  ship  in  the  Pacific  Fleet  and  for  completion  of  new 
hospital  at  Pearl  Harbor. 

(g)  Urgency  for  small  craft  in  the  Fourteenth  Naval  District  for  patrol  pur- 
poses, to  relieve  the  load  on  our  limited  number  of  destroyers. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2241 

(h)  The  need  for  acquiring  advanced  base  material  and  assembling  it  at 
Mare  Island. 

(i)  Correspondence  has  gone  forwanl  urging  that  all  available  light  craft  in 
the  Pacific  be  fitted  with  depth  charges,  listening  gear,  etc.     This  is  important. 

(3)  Communicatiomi.  The  supply  of  communication,  radio,  and  sound  equip- 
ment to  the  Fleet  and  the  Shore  Stations  leaves  much  to  be  desired,  although  a 
great  improvement  has  been  noted  in  the  last  year. 

(a)  Specifically  it  is  noted  that  the  Kaneohe  Air  Station  was  acquired,  built, 
conimissi<med,  and  actually  operated  prior  to  the  receipt  i>f  any  radio  apparatus, 
except  some  which  we  diverted  from  its  intended  advance  base  use. 

(b)  It  took  BuEng  two  years  to  put  "Chinese  copies"  of  NRL's  Radar  on 
six  ships. 

(c)  For  years  BuEng  prevented  research  by  NRL  in  any  form  of  radio  recog- 
nition device  and  hence  retarded  the  production  of  such  apparatus.  The  Fleet 
is  still  without  it  though  it  is  under  manufacture. 

(d)  We  must  have  the  IFF  (Identification,  Friend  or  Foe)  for  aircraft  at 
once.  The  program"  lags  and  on  June  14th  only  56  were  on  order  from  Canada 
with  indefinite  delivery  date.     See  "Aviation"  below. 

(e)  Radar  equipment  for  submarines  is  highly  important.  I  am  not  informed 
as  to  exact  status  of  this  but  understand  development  is  not  entirely  satisfactory. 
There  is  evidence  that  German  subs  are  equipped  with  Radar. 

[5]  In  general,  Naval  shipboard  radio  and  sound  equipment  is  so  elaborate 
that  it  cannot  l>e  manufactured  expeditiously.  BuEng  should  have  tj'pe  plans  for 
apparatus  of  such  a  nature  that  they  can  get  results  from  industry  and  not 
make  each  new  piece  of  apparatus  a  research  job. 

(4)  Aviation  Requirements.  These  items,  all  of  which  have  recently  been 
taken  up  with  the  Department,  are  summarized  briefly  :— 

(a)  Pre-FIeet  Trainiuf/.  Two  units  under  the  Fleet  at  San  Diego,  one  for 
patrol  squadrons  and  one  for  carrier  squadrons.  More  pilots  for  battleships  and 
cruisers,  for  training  on  board  ship.  Particular  emphasis  on  double  comple- 
ments for  patrol  squadrons;  anticipation  of  enlisted  personnel  numbers  and 
training  in  all  categories,  particularly  patrol  squadrons;  building  up  the  supply 
of  spare  airplanes;  accomplishing  the  training  witiiout  any  further  drain  on 
combat  readiness  of  active  squadrons. 

(b  )Netc  Torpedo  Planes.  Highest  priority— A-l-a — instead  of  present  priority 
which  is  A-l-b.  There  are  ordy  half  enough  torpedo  planes  ni)w  and  they  are 
obsolescent,  while  war  reports  demonstrate  that  there  may  be  no  single  item 
of  greater  naval  importance. 

(c)  Conversions  for  Carrier  Landing  Training.  Auxiliary  aircraft  carrier  con- 
versi(m  was  dropped  because  of  time  and  cost  fa<'tors.  These  can  be  greatly  re- 
duced by  requiring  only  the  characteristics  needed  for  landing  traiiung.  The  nee<l 
for  these  ships  is  extreme.  Aircraft  carriers  should  not,  and  in  war  cannot,  be 
used  for  this  purpose,  while  new  i)ilots  must  be  properly  trained  before  joining 
active  squadrons  if  combat  readiness  is  not  to  be  jeopardized. 

(d)  A.  S.  V.  {Anti-l^urfact  Vessel)  Equipment.  This  is  of  the  highest  poten- 
tial value.  Apparently  none  will  be  available  for  patrol  planes  until  December. 
It  can  be  carried  by  other  planes,  as  shown  by  rejiorts  of  British  tori)edo  plane 
operations.  It  should  be  provided  for  every  plane  that  can  carry  it  and  much 
earlier  deliveries  are  essential. 

(e)  /.  F.  F.  (Identtfieation.  Friend  or  Foe)  Equipment.  This  is  absolutely 
complementary  to  and  essential  for  effective  use  of  the  Radar  for  airciaft  defense 
of  the  Fleet.  Without  it,  the  Radar  cannot  differentiate  between  friendly  and 
enemy  airplanes.  There  is  no  definite  information  on  deliveries.  No  delay  what- 
ever is  acceptable. 

[6]  (f)  Engines  for  New  Patrol  Planes  (PIiY-5's).  Nose  section  failures 
have  been  occurring.  Every  effort  is  being  made  to  find  and  cure  the  trouble. 
This  should  be  continued,  for  it  will  be  no  help  to  the  Fleet  or  to  any  destination 
of  the.se  planes  to  get  new  planes  that  can't  fly  in  place  of  older  planes  that  can. 

(g)  Landplane  Field  at  Johnston  Island.  This  was  removed  from  the  project 
by  the  Department.  It  should  be  put  back.  It  is  needed  not  oidy  as  an  adjunct 
to  local  defense  but,  more  imjiortantly,  as  an  aid  to  defense  against  expeditions 
headed  eastward  and  as  a  stepping  stone  for  landplane  support  of  expeditions 
headed  westward. 

(h)  Keehi  Lagoon  Development.  This  will  be  of  very  great  value  to  patrol 
planes  in  the  Hawaiian  area.  It  is  the  best  location  for  operations  of  these 
planes  and  no  other  place  is  suitable  for  planned  patrol  plane  expansion  in  this 


2242     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

area.     Inclusion  of  facilities  for  Navy  patrol  squadrons  in  this  development 
should  be  undertaken  immediately. 

(i)  Development  of  the  N.  A.  S.  Barber's  Point.  This  approved  development 
is  very  urgently  needed.  There  is  a  strong  tendency  to  turn  down  many  aviation 
shore  facility  items  in  this  area  on  the  basis  that  they  will  be  available  when 
Barber's  Point  construction  is  finished.  This  makes  it  more  than  ever  mandatory 
to  expedite  the  work. 

My  kindest  regards  and  best  wishes  always. 
Most  sincerely  yours, 

/S/     H.    E.    KIMMEL. 
Admiral  H.  R.  Staek,  U.  S.  Navy, 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Navy  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. 


Cincpac  File  No. 
Secret 

United  States  Pacific  Fleet 

U.  S.  S.  Pennsylvania,  Flagship 

Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H.,  July  30,  1941. 

Deab  Betty:  In  acknowledging  receipt  of  your  letter  of  25  July  as  to  the 
possibility  of  using  a  carrier  for  transporting  a  load  of  planes  to  one  of  the 
Asiatic  Russian  ports,  I  want  to  give  some  of  my  own  views  as  to  such  aoi 
undertaking. 

Whether  or  not  planes  are  to  be  supplied  to  the  Russians  may  be  outside  my 
province,  but  I  do  remain  keenly  aware  of  our  own  deficiencies  in  aircraft.  It 
is  quite  an  undertaking  for  the  United  States  to  supply  planes  to  any  quarter  of 
the  globe  in  which  fighting  against  Axis  Powers  may  occur. 

My  views  against  diversion  of  carriers  from  their  proper  duties  to  act  a^ 
aircraft  transports  are  well  known.  If  planes  must  be  sent  from  the  United 
States  to  Russia,  the  question  of  flying  them  out  via  Alaskan  and  Eastern 
Siberia  fields  should  be  most  fully  inquired  into.  That  appears  to  be  the 
most  logical  method  of  effecting  delivery. 

Should  it  be  finally  determined  to  use  one  of  our  carriers  as  a  transport,  the 
time  chosen  should  be  one  in  which  all  three  Pacific  Fleet  carriers  are  available 
for  operation.  This  is  essential  in  order  to  minimize  the  danger  to  the  carrier 
transport. 

The  port  of  destination  should  certainly  not  be  to  the  westward  of  the  Japan- 
Kurile-Kamchatka  line. 

I  entertain  no  doubt  that  such  an  operation,  if  discovered,  (as  is  highly 
probable),  will  be  tantamount  to  initiation  of  a  Japanese-American  War.  If 
we  are  going  to  take  the  initiative  in  commencing  such  a  war,  I  can  think  of 
more  effective  ways  for  gaining  initial  advantage. 

A  carrier  sent  on  such  an  operation  manifestly  must  be  protected.  After 
careful  consideration,  I  am  constrained  to  feel  that  the  minimum  escort  and 
covering  force  provided  should  be  the  entire  Pacific  Fleet.  I  also  feel  that 
combatant  air  or  naval  forces  of  a  potential  enemy  encountered  should  be 
engaged  at  once  rather  than  wait  for  them  to  gain  an  initial  advantage  through 
destroying  any  part  of  my  own  fighting  strength. 

In  short,  it  is  my  earnest  conviction  that  use  of  a  carrier  to  deliver  aircraft 
to  Asiatic  Russian  ports  in  the  present  period  of  strained  relations  is  to  invite 
war.  If  we  have  decided  upon  war,  it  would  be  far  better  to  take  direct  offensive 
action.  If  for  reasons  of  political  expediency,  it  has  been  determined  to  force 
Japan  to  fire  the  first  shot,  let  us  choose  a  method  that  will  be  more  advantageous 
to  ourselves.  Certainly  an  operation  such  as  that  proposed  is  far  less  likely  to 
bluff  Japan  into  acquiescence  or  inactivity  than  it  is  to  disturb  her  to  the  point 
of  hostile  use  of  bombs,  torpedoes  and  guns. 
Sincerely, 

H.  E.  KiMMEL. 

Admiral  H.  R.  Staek,  U.  S.  Navy, 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Navy  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2243 

[jf]         Cincpac  File  No. 
Confidential 

United  States  Pacific  Fleet,  U.  S.  S.  Pennsylvania,  Flagship 

Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H.,  August  12. 1941. 

Dear  Betty  :  Your  news  about  the  approval  of  533,000  men  and  105,000  Marines 
for  the  Navy  is  good  news.  I  agree  with  everything  you  said  in  your  letter  on 
the  subject  and  I  certainly  give  you  and  Nimitz  full  credit  for  getting  them  under 
the  conditions  which  exist.  We  should  lose  no  time  in  getting*  our  ships  filled 
up.  I  am  ready  to  accept  draftees  if  we  cannot  get  them  by  voluntary  enlistments 
quickly. 

I  forwarded  to  Furlong  all  the  information  you  gave  me  about  Tommy  Hart's 
trouble  with  mines.  We  are  waiting  for  Blandy's  report,  which  I  have  not  yet 
seen.    I  should  like  to  have  it  at  an  early  date. 

Thanks  very  much  for  the  copy  of  Coronet  which  you  sent  to  me.  I  turned 
to  page  86  and  was  somewhat  shocked  at  the  appearance  of  the  photograph  on 
that  page.  However,  I  sent  it  on  to  Dot  and  know  that  she  will  be  pleased  as 
I  was  to  receive  it.    Please  give  my  regards  to  Mrs.  Hull. 

I  note  Ghormley's  views  on  the  importance  of  RDF,  or  RADAR  as  we  call 
it.  I  think  I  can  assure  you  that  the  oflScera  of  the  Fleet  are  fully  alive  to  the 
importance  of  this  development.  We  have  stressed  its  use  in  every  exercise 
and  are  constantly  drilling  and  training  with  it.  We  have  had  men  tran.sferred 
to  the  ships  so  equipped  to  the  limit  of  the  capacity  of  ships  having  them.  Army 
personnel  have  been  trained  aboard  ships.  I  think  you  understand  fronr  our  let- 
ters as  well  as  from  my  verbal  remarks  to  you  on  this  subject  how  important  we 
feel  this  development  to  be.  I  believe  the  numbers  of  the  equipment  in  the  Fleet 
is  far  behind  what  it  should  be.  I  shall  permit  nothing  to  interfere  ^ith  its 
installation  in  the  ships  as  we  receive  the  gear.  It  should  be  given  the  highest 
priority  in  manufacture,  supply  and  installation.  We  have  not  yet  received  any 
purely  g;unnery  RADAR.  In  this  connection,  stress  should  be  laid  upon  what 
the  British  call  "IFF"  (Identification,  Friend  or  Foe)  for  installation  in  ships  and 
planes;  to  the  ASV  (or  RADAR  in  a  plane  to  spot  surface  vessels)  ;  to  the  AI 
(RADAR  in  a  plane  to  spot  other  planes).  I  don't  know  when  we  can  expect 
these  various  types  of  RADAR  but  I  do  know  that  we  need  no  urging  in  the 
Fleet  to  do  anything  within  our  power  to  get  and  use  all  the  various'  types  of 
RADAR  that  have  been  developed. 

Many  thanks  for  the  news  about  the  detail  of  the  twelve  PT's  to  the  Four- 
teenth Naval  District.  This  is  a  good  start  but  neither  Bloch  nor  I  will  rest 
easy  until  we  get  the  various  patrol  vessels  we  have  requested  in  oflScial  corre- 
spondence. I  do  hope  you  will  impress  on  the  Secretary  the  vital  importance  of 
this  [2]  matter.  We  need  more  ships  of  all  types  for  a  successful  Pacific 
campaign  but  I  believe  we  need  submarines,  destroyers,  carriers  and  cruisers  even 
more  than  we  need  battleships.    This  is  a  vast  ocean. 

You  have  approved  our  plan  for  putting  guns  and  anarines  on  Wake.  The  first 
detachment  of  165  Marines,  one  battery  of  5"  and  one  battery  of  3"  are  now  on 
their  way.  We  will  send  the  additional  guns  when  transiwrtation  becomes  avail- 
able. A  recent  survey  of  the  men  required  to  man  the  defenses  of  Wake  plus  the 
other  outlying  islands  indicates  the  desirability  of  forming  another  defense 
battalion  for  service  in  this  area.  I  feel  that  there  is  no  doubt  that  an  additional 
defense  battalion  to  provide  periodic  reliefs  and  replacements  will  be  necessary. 
We  will  give  you  an  oflBcial  letter  on  this  subject  shortly. 

We  have  received  the  Department's  plan  in  regard  to  the  Marine  Division  and 
transports  and  your  ideas  as  to  the  composition  of  the  5,000  men  to  be  stationed 
in  Oahu.  We  agree  in  general  with  all  the  plans  but  we  would  like  the  men, 
equipment  and  transports  now.  I  know  that  you  also  would  like  them  and  will 
get  them  just  as  quickly  as  it  is  humanly  possible  to  do  so.  I  find  that  some  of 
the  defen.se  battalions  already  out  here  are  shy  in  equipment.  The  anti-aircraft 
guns  for  Wake  are  not  equipped  with  directors.  The  battalions  are  short  in  .30 
caliber  and  .50  caliber  machine  guns  and  ammunition.  I  do  think  that  the  few 
machine  guns  required  by  these  battalions  should  be  spared  from  other  activities 
and  I  hope  that  the  ammunition  situation  will  be  remedied  very  shortly. 

The  recreation  facilities  at  Pearl  Harbor  are  coming  rapidly  to  a  state  where 
they  can  and  are  being  used  by  the  men  of  the  Fleet.  Baseball,  Softball  and  foot- 
ball fields,  though  by  no  means  entirely  adequate  have  been  commissioned  and 


2244     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

we  have  large  numbers  of  men  who  occupy  these  fields  daily.  The  swimming 
pool  at  Aiea  is  filled  to  capacity  at  all  times.  We  can  use  at  least  two  more  pools 
of  this  same  size.  The  Fleet  Recreation  Center  was  partially  commissioned  on 
the  first  of  Aujjust  and  will  be  in  full  operating  condition  within  another  week. 
It  has  been  crowded  with  men  from  the  day  it  was  oijened.  The  facilities  in- 
clude a  very  larire  soft  drink  and  sandwich  stand,  an  enormous  bar  where  beer 
is  servefl,  and  a  large  number  of  chairs  and  tables  in  a  very  pleasant  surround- 
ing. It  includes  ten  bowling  alleys,  eleven  pool  tables,  a  reading  and  writing 
room,  all  of  which  have  been  in  commission  from  the  first  ,of  August.  The 
stadium  will  be* in  commission  within  the  week.  It  is  suitable  for  boxing  and 
wrestling  tournaments  or  ship's  entertainments  and  for  the  movies.  It  will  seat 
approximately  6,000  men  and  movies  can  be  shown  to  approximately  4,000  men 
at  one  time.  About  a  thousand  families  are  now  living  in  the  houses  built  for 
that  purpo.se.  All  of  tbe  [3]  remainder  will  be  in  commission  by  the 
first  of  January.  These  houses  are  being  finished  daily  and  are  occupied  as  soon 
as  completed.     Bloch  is  going  a  great  job. 

The  visits  to  the  West  Coast  have  been  very  successful  and  have,  I  believe, 
helped  all  hands.  The  are  worth  while  and  I  believe  should  be  continued  as  long 
as  the  international  sitmition  permits.  I  have  watched  the  internatitmal  situation 
in  relation  to  the  crui-ses  to  the  West  Coast  and  shall  not  hesitate  to  cancel  them 
if,  in  my  opinion,  the  situation  so  warrents.  Y(^u  will  probably  have  informa- 
tion sooner  than  I  do  which  will  warrant  the  cancellation  of  such  cruises  and  I 
shall  of  course  expect  advices  or  orders  from  you  on  this  subject. 

The  Honolulu  people  have  been  very  fine  in  their  continued  efforts  to  entertain 
the  officers  and  men  of  the  Fleet  in  their  homes  and  on  their  plantations.  The 
entertainment  of  enlisted  men  by  the  Honolulu  i)eople  has  been  on  a  scale  which 
taxes  their  capacity  and  is  still  going  on.  They  deserve  great  credit  for  every- 
thing that  they  have  done,  except  the  increase  in  rentals. 

We  recently  submitted  a  letter  dealing  with  the  permanency  of  detail  of 
Captains  and  Executive  Officers  of  battleships.  This  letter  was  prepared  by 
Admiral  I'ye  at  my  instigation.  I  forwarded  it  with  my  hearty  approval.  The 
letter  strongly  recommends  that  no  officer  be  assigned  as  Captain  or  Executive 
Office  of  a  battleship  unless  it  is  reasonably  certain  that  he  will  remain  in  that 
billet  for  not  less  than  two  years.  Specifically,  it  recommends  that  no  officer 
coming  up  for  selection  within  the  period  of  his  detail  be  assigned  to  either 
of  tlie.«e  two  billets.  I  consider  this  a  matter  of  first  importance.  If  you  read 
the  letter  to  the  Bureau  of  Navigation  you  will  see  that  no  Captain  or  Executive 
Officer  now  in  these  ships  has  been  there  for  as  long  as  a  year.  The  exact  times 
are  set  forth.  We  cannot 'expect  satisfactory  progress  unless  we  make  the  tours 
of  duty  of  our  officers  sufficiently  long  for  them  to  give  something  to  the  job. 
I  know  this  is  an  old  story  but  it  is  an  old  stoiy  which  is  much  to  the  discredit 
of  our  service.  The  recommendations  from  battleships  apply  with  equal  force 
to  heavy  and  light  cruisers.  In  these  ships  the  Captains  in  general  comply  with 
the  specifications  set  forth  because  they  are  taken  from  the  more  junior  ones. 
In  the  case  of  Executives  I  fear  the  situation  is  about  the  same  as  it  is  in  battle- 
ships. Brown  is  now  making  a  survey  of  the  Captains  and  Executives  in  cruisers 
and  I  expect  to  forward  that  shostly  to  the  Bureau  of  Navigation. 

In  another  recent  letter  to  the  Bureau  of  Navigation  we  made  specific  recom- 
mendations in  regard  to  the  Commanding  Officers  of  destroyer  divisions  and 
squadrons.  I  am  happly  to  say  that  Nimitz  has  informed  me  that  he  will  can-y 
out  our  recommendations  in  regard  [4]  to  the  destroyer  division  and 
squadron  commanders.  I  wish  to  add  that  I  have  not  yet  had  time  to  hear  from 
the  Bureau  of  Navigation  in  regard  to  the  battleship  Captains  and  Executives. 

I  feel  that  gunnery  in  the  Fleet  is  better  than  we  have  any  right  to  expect 
considering  the  enormous  changes  in  personnel  and  the  lack  of  permanency  of 
the  officers.  We  have  of  course  stressed  battle  procedures  above  everything  else 
and  you  well  know  how  much  more  experience  and  training  it  takes  to  be  pre- 
pared fos  battle  than  for  a  target  practice.  Recent  reports  that  have  come  to 
me  on  the  firing  of  SRP  "B"  are  very  encouraging.  The  reports  are  fragmentary 
and  I  hear  most  about  the  ships  that  have  made  high  scores.  For  example,  the 
LOUISVILLE  has  three  "E"  turrets,  six  "E"  five-inch  giuis  and  one  "E"  three- 
inch  gun.  I  know  this  because  I  went  aboard  the  LOUISVILLE  a  couple  of  days 
ago.    Other  ships  are  doing  very  well  indeed. 

Recent  directives  from  the  Office  of  Fleet  Training  have  put  our  target  prac- 
tices on  a  much  fore  realistic  and  practical  basis.  We  feel  that  in  the  event  of 
hostilities  we  will  be  forced  to  make  very  few  changes,  if  any,  in  these  directives. 
We  are  scheduling  our  services  and  area  assignments  in  accoi-dance  with  these 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2245 

directives  now  and  I  hear  from  all  sides  that  it  is  considered  much  more  satis- 
factory than  anything  we  have  ever  had  before. 

To  summarize,  I  feel  that  the  morale  of  the  officers  and  men  of  the  Fleet  is 
very  satisfactory,  that  eveyoiie  is  working  to  the  limit  of  his  capacity,  that  we 
are  never  ^^oinj;  to  be  satisfied  ;  but  that  we  all  feel  that  we  are  making  progress 
and  beginning  to  get  some  dividends  from  our  efforts. 

What  we  neefl  more  than  anything  else  right  now  is  men.  I  have  recently 
written  Nimitz  that  this  Fleet  can  use  20,000  additional  men  today.  I  will  not 
go  into  that  further  at  this  time  because  I  know  that  both  you  and  Nimitz  know 
this  just  as  well  as  I  do. 

Keep  cheerful.    We  are  ready  to  do  our  damnedest. 
Yours  as  always, 

H.  E.  KiMMEX. 

Admiral  H.  R.  Stark.  V.  S.  Navy, 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 
Navy  Departmemt, 
Washington,  D.  C. 

United  States  Pacific  Fi^eet 

U.  S.  S.  Pennsylvania  (Flagship) 

Pearl  Harisor,  T.  H.,  2^  August  1941. 
Personal 
Secret 

Admiral  H.  R.  Stark,  U.  S.  Navy, 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Navy  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Dear  Betty:  I  mailed  today  an  official  letter  on  the  condition  of  the  material 
readiness  of  the  fighting  squadrons  in  the  Pacific  Fleet.    I  wish  to  call  your  atten- 
tion particularly  to  the  un.satisfactoi-y  conditions  disclosed  in  this  lettei'. 

We  now  have  on  hand  and  operating  from  carriers  41  F4F-3  and  F4F-3A 
fighting  planes  (of  which  6  are  currently  luider  overhaul  or  major  repair)  and 
17  obsolescent  fighting  planes.  Tills  makes  a  total  of  52  fighting  planes  available 
for  3  aircraft  carriers  and  2  Marine  fighting  squadrons  in  the  Pacific  Fleet.  Our 
operating  allowance,  not  counting  spares,  is  90. 

I  think  you  should  take  some  drastic  action  to  remedy  this  deplorable  condition. 
My  kindest  regards  as  always. 
Most  sincerely  yours, 

/S/      H.  E.  KlMMEL. 

12  September  1941  Admiral  Stark  wrote  the  following  note  on  above  letter  and 
returned  to  Admiral  Kimmel. 
Dear  Mustapha  : 
See  our  serial  0136723  of  12  sept. 
Best  we  can  do. 
Keep  cheerful. 

/S/    BEnrT. 

[i]  United  States  Fleet 

U.  S.  S.  Pennsylvania,  Flagship 

Peabi.  Harbor,  T.  H.,  August  26,  1941. 
CinC  File  No. 
P16-l/MM/(96) 
Serial  01342 
Confidential 

From :  Commander-in-Chief,  Unite<l  States  Pacific  Fleet. 
To:  The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 
Subject :  Expan.'^ion  Program — Personnel  for. 
References : 

(a)  CinCpac  Conf.  disp.  lS23r.l  of  August  1941. 

(b)  BuNav  serials  1386,  1394,  1397,  1406  and  14.50  of  August  11,  1941. 

(c)  BuNav  Conf.  disp.  201824  of  August  1941. 

1.  Transfer  orders  dated  August  11,  1941  from  the  Bureau  of  Navigation  to- 
Commander  Base  Force  Subordinate  Command,  as  enumerated  in  references  (b), 


2246     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

require  a  total  of  222  rated  men  from  the  Pacific  Fleet  for  transfer  to  U.  S.  S. 
HORNET  squadrons,  two  new  Atlantic  patrol  squadrons  and  the  Naval  Air 
Stations,  Kodiak  and  Dutch  Harbor.  The  Pacflc  Fleet  has  only  a  bare  minimum 
of  such  ratings  to  meet  present  operating  requirements.  Similar  ratings  are 
needed  for  advanced  training  groups  now  in  the  process  of  being  formed  in  the 
Pacific.  The  Commander-in-Chief  has  had  no  previous  warning  of  this  heavy 
demand  upon  the  Pacific  Fleet.  As  indicated  in  reference  (c),  transfer  of  these 
ratings  is  being  held  in  abeyance  pending  departmental  reconsideration. 

2.  Of  these  222  rated  men  a  total  of  88  radiomen  qualified  in  aircraft  is  required 
and  a  total  of  61  aviator  machinist's  mates  in  the  experienced  class  namely  chiefs, 
first  and  second  class  is  required.  In  order  that  a  bare  minimum  of  one  qualair 
radioman  be  assigned  each  operating  plane  requiring  such  a  rate  for  the  per- 
formance of  its  mission,  a  total  of  437  such  ratings  is  required  in  the  Pacific 
Fleet.  According  to  the  latest  available  figures  there  are  a  total  of  324  such  rat- 
ings in  the  Pacific  Fleet  and  the  transfer  of  88  in  accordance  with  reference  (b) 
will  leave  a  total  of  236  or  54%  of  the  minimum  needed  for  safety  and  ability 
to  carry  out  the  mission  of  all  operating  planes  requiring  such  ratings.  Figures 
in  regard  to  aviation  machinist's  mates  indicate  a  total  of  988  chief,  first  and 
second  class  allowed,  whereas  there  are  only  722  now  holding  these  rates  in 
the  Pacific  Fleet  or  73%.  Removal  of  61  such  ratings  as  required  in  reference 
(b)  will  reduce  the  percentage  to  67%.  These  percentages  will  be  further  reduced 
by  the  transfer  of  such  ratings  to  the  advanced  training  groups  now  forming 
in  the  Pacific.  These  ratings  of  qualair  I'adioman  and  chief,  first  and  second 
class  aviation  machinist's  mates  must  be  considered  key  personnel  in  the  aero- 
nautical organization.  Safety  of  operations  and  ability  to  carry  out  the  mission 
depend  on  such  ratings.  The  reduction  of  the  percentage  of  these  key  men  will 
adversely  affect  readiness  for  war  of  Pacific  Fleet  aviation. 

[2]  3.  The  Commander-in-Chief  has  repeatedly  pointed  out  to  the  Bureau 
of  Navigation  the  increasingly  serious  situation  which  is  resulting  from  rapid 
expansion  of  all  phases  of  Naval  activities  without  sufficient  increases  in  avail- 
able men  in  the  Fleet  to  train  for  purposes  of  meeting  the  personnel  require- 
ments of  this  expansion.  The  current  practice  of  constantly  withdrawing 
trained  men  from  the  Fleet  cann()t  continue  if  the  Fleet  is  to  remain  in  a  satis- 
factory state  of  readiness.  The  huge  building  program,  both  aircraft  and  surface 
vessels,  will  require  more  trained  personnel  for  manning  than  can  possibly  be 
obtained  under  the  current  program  of  draining  already  under-complemented 
Fleet  units.  At  least  two  years  are  re<iuired  to  train  acceptable  petty  oflBcers. 
The  consequences  of  continuing  along  the  present  apparently  unplanned  path  will 
be  dire.  The  critical  shortage  with  which  the  combatant  air  units  of  the  Fleet 
will  be  faced  if  the  subject  transfers  are  made  is  merely  the  beginning  of  a 
deplorable  situation  which  will  certainly  develop  unless  there  is  adequate  plan- 
ning for  training  personnel  to  meet  the  demands  of  expansion.  The  Pacific  Fleet 
can  and  will  train  the  required  ratings  if  given  the  material.  Class  "A"  schools 
must  be  immediately  enlarged  to  cover  the  entire  program.  Induction  of  recruits 
must  b^  enormously  increased. 

4.  The  Commander-in-Chief  is  convinced  that  the  building  program  and  the 
training  program  are  not  synchronized.  Unless  intra -departmental  coordination 
and  review  of  the  entire  question  of  supplying  personnel  for  the  expanding  Navy 
are  effectively  undertaken,  the  current  condition  cannot  be  sensibly  improved. 

5.  It  is  therefore  most  urgently  recommended : 

(a)  That,  in  meeting  the  immediate  demands  of  expansion,  the  distribution 
of  available  personnel  in  the  Navy  be  reviewed  ^nd  a  program  be  established  for 
the  acquisition  of  required  ratings  from  the  forces  both  afloat  and  ashoi'e  in  such 
a  manner  as  to  avoid  the  depletion  of  any  ratings  below  an  acceptable  minimum 
in  any  combatant  organization ;  this  review  to  form  the  basis  for  the  reconsidera- 
tion, requested  in  reference  (a),  of  current  orders  for  transfer  of  aviation  ratings. 

(b)  That  the  entire  expansion  program  be  reviewed  in  order  to  determine  in 
detail  the  rate  at  which  personnel  will  be  required  properly  to  man  the  new 
units. 

[3]  (c)  That,  through  the  immediate  and  adequate  expansion  of  Class  "A" 
service  schools  and  the  supply  of  additional  recruits  to  the  Fleets  and  shore 
stations,  the  training  of  men  be  undertaken  now  in  suflBcient  numbers  to  meet 
the  maximum  demands  as  they  occur. 

/S/      H.  E.   KlMMEZ^ 

Copy  to : 
BUNav 
BuAer 
Combasefor  Subcom 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2247 

[1]         Cine  File  No. 

Personal 

Confidential 

United  States  Fleet 

U.  S.  S.  Pennsylvania,  Flagship 

Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H.,  August  26,  1941. 
Admiral  H.  R.  Stakk,  U.  S.  Navy,  . 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Navy  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Deab  BETrry.  I  have  your  letter  of  21  August  dealing  with  the  question  of  avia- 
tion personnel  required  to  man  new  patrol  plane  squadrons  and  the  squadrons  for 
the  HORNET  plus  certain  additional  men  required  for  Kodiak  and  Dutch  Harbor. 
I  have  some  appreciation  of  the  problem  which  confronts  you  and  I  wish  to  state 
that  I  yield  to  no  one  in  my  desire  to  be  of  the  maximum  assistance  to  the  Navy  as 
a  whole,  but  my  immedkite  responsibility  is  the  Pacific  Fleet.  You  must  bear  with 
me  if  I  present  the  viewpoint  and  opinion  as  viewed  from  where  I  sit.  I  know 
that  you  have  never  wanted  anything  else  and  you  can  rest  assured  that  you  will 
never  get  anything  else  from  me. 

In  the  first  place,  the  orders  for  the  transfers  directed  in  the  various  Bunav 
serials  left  no  time  for  consideration  and  to  make  the  best  distribution  of  transfers. 
The  situation  changes  so  rapidly  in  i)ersonnel  and  almost  invariably  for  the  force 
that  I  can  see  no  answer  except  to  make  my  protest  and  gather  the  facts  based  on 
the  very  latest  figures.  As  we  set  forth  in  the  oflScial  letter  which  is  now  on  its 
way  to  you,  we  now  have  in  the  ratings  of  aviation  machinist's  mates  :  chiefs,  first 
class  and  second  class,  just  73%  of  complement.  When  transfers  directed  by  the 
serials  in  question  are  completed  we  will  have  67%  of  complement  in  these  ratings. 
The  excess  is  entirely  in  third  class  ratings.  We  can  spare  these  ratings  with  least 
resultant  harm  to  the  organizations.  We  have  been  trying  to  build  up  these 
ratings  against  the  time  when  we  could  look  forward  to  double  crews.  You  know 
full  well  that  the  chiefs,  first  class  and  second  class,  are  the  men  that  bear  the 
brunt  of  maintaining  the  planes  and  insuring  their  safe  and  efficient  operation. 
I  think  when  you  lump  the  third  class  ratings  into  a  picture  to  indicate  an  over- 
complement  the  picture  is  not  accurate.  We  make  no  protest  on  the  transfer  of 
third  class  ratings  and  will  be  glad  "to  comply  under  the  existing  circumstances. 

[2]  On  the  basis  of  one  (qualair)  radioman  for  each  plane,  we  now  have 
74%  of  the  number  required.     After  transfers  are  completed  we  will  have  54%. 

I  note  in  the  directive  for  transfers  to  the  HORNET  that  16  (qualair)  radiomen 
are  required  for  the  Utility  Unit. 

Transfers  required  take  long-time  men,  leaving  us  with  all  the  short-timers 
which  is  an  added  handicap.  We  are  now  attempting  to  organize  our  pre-Fleet 
training  units  at  San  Diego  who  require  most  of  all  the  ratings  I  have  just 
mentioned. 

Our  percentages  deduced  from  the  Base  Force  reports  of  30  June  vary  by  some 

II  to  16%  from  the  figures  given  in  your  letter  and  they  are  uniformly  lower  than 
your  figures. 

If  after  you  have  read  this  letter  you  still  feel  that  we  should  make  the  transfers 
required  by  Bunav  serials  1386,  1394,  1397,  1406,  and  14.50,  we  can  complete  the 
transfers  from  the  Pacific  Fleet  by  30  September,  with  the  bulk  completed  consid- 
erably earlier  than  that  and  at  the  same  time  insure  the  ratings  are  taken  from 
activities  which  will  result  in  the  least  harm  in  the  various  organizations. 

If  you  can  assure  me  that  we  wont  be  fighting  the  Japs  within  the  next  six 
months  I  will  gladly  make  the  transfers  without  the  least  protest.  We  can,  will, 
and  have  been,  training  men  in  this  Fleet  just  as  rapidly  as  the  existing  facilities, 
including  the  number  of  recruits  supplied,  permit.  I  will  not  say  anything  further 
about  the  need  for  additional  men  because  you  have  my  views  In  a  great  many 
communications  on  the  subject  and  I  know  you  are  doing  everything  within  your 
power  to  improve  the  situation. 

I  will  take  steps  to  insure  the  preliminary  planning  necessary  to  an  exi>editious 
execution  of  the  orders  contained  in  the  various  serials  and  will  give  the  order  to 
go  ahead  just  as  soon  as  you  indicate  by  dispatch  or  otherwise  what  your  judgment 
dictates. 

With  kindest  regards  and  best  wishes. 
Sincerely  yours, 

H.    E.   ElMMGTT.. 


2248     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[1]         CinC  File  No. 
Secret 

United  States  Fleeh 

U.  S.  S.  Pennsylvanha,  Flagship 

Peael  Harbor,  T.  H.,  September  12, 1941. 

Dear  "Betty"  :  We  all  listened  to  the  President's  speech  with  great  interest. 
With  that  and  King's  operation  orders,  of  which  we  have  copies,  the  situation  in 
the  Atlantic  is  fairly  clear.    But  what  about  the  Pacific? 

I  noted  that  BidwelTs  Southeast  Pacitic  Force  has  shooting  orders  for  surface 
raiders  east  of  100°  West,  which  seems  to  clear  that  up  as  far  as  raiders  are  con- 
cerned, but  just  how  significant  was  the  restriction,  limiting  offensive  action  to 
"siu'face  raiders"?  Of  course  I  know  that  the  possibility  of  German  or  Italian 
submarines  in  that  area  is  slight  and  Japanese  improbable,  but  the  question  arises 
as  to  just  how  much  we  can  discount  the  threat  of  Japanese  action.  This  uncer- 
tainty, coupled  with  current  riuuors  of  U.  S.-Japanese  rapproachment  and  the 
absence  of  any  specific  reference  to  the  Pacific  in  the  President's  speech,  leaves 
me  in  some  doubt  as  to  just  what  my  situation  out  here  is.  Specific  questions 
that  arise  are: 

(a)  What  orders  to  shoot  should  be  issued  for  areas  other  than  Atlantic  and 
Southeast  Pacific  sub-areas?  This  is  particularly  pertinent  to  our  present 
escorts  f(»r  ships  proceeding  to  the  Far  East.  So  far.  my  orders  to  them  have 
been  to  protect  their  convoy  from  interference;  to  avoid  use  of  force  if  possible, 
but  to  use  it  if  necessary.  These  orders,  at  least  by  implication,  preclude  taking 
the  offensive.  Shouldn't  I  now  change  them  to  direct  offensive  measures  against 
German  and  Italinn  raiders?  In  view  of  the  delicate  nature  of  our  present  Pacific 
relations,  with  particular  reference  to  their  fiuidity,  I  feel  that  you  are  the  only 
one  who  can  an.swer  this  question. 

(b)  Along  the  same  lines,  but  more  specifically  related  to  the  Japanese  situa- 
tion, is  what  to  do  about  submarine  contacts  off  Pearl  Harbor  and  the  vicinity. 
As  you  know,  our  present  orders  are  to  trail  all  contacts,  but  not  to  bomb  unless 
you  are  in  the  defensive  sea  area.  Should  we  now  bomb  contacts,  without  wait- 
ing to  be  attacked? 

[2]  The  emphasis,  in  the  President's  speech,  on  the  Atlantic  also  brings  up 
the  question  of  a  possible  further  weakening  of  this  Fleet.  A  strong  Pac-iflc  Fleet 
is  unquestionably  a  deterrent  to  Japan — a  weaker  one  may  be  an  invitation.  I 
cannot  escape  the  conclusion  that  the  maintenance  of  the  "'status  quo"  out  here 
is  almost  entirely  a  matter  of  the  strength  of  this  Fleet.  It  must  be  reduced, 
and,  in  event  of  actual  hostilities,  must  be  increased  if  we  are  to  undertake  a  bold 
offensive. 

Our  present  shortage  of  carriers,  cruisers  and  destroyers  gives  me  much  con- 
cern, as  it  is  these  types  that  must  bear  the  brunt  of  our  early  operations.  Later, 
we'll  need  a  superiority  in  all  types,  as,  according  to  reports,  new  Japanese 
BB's,  CV's  and  CA's  are  coming  out  and  the  balance  is  going  against  us.  We  can- 
not carry  the  war  very  far  into  the  Pacific  until  we  are  able  to  meet  the  Japanese 
Fleet  on  at  least  equal  terms.  Pertinent  to  the  maintenance  of  the  "stitus  quo" 
and,  if  necesary,  later  hostilities,  is  the  disposition  of  the  NORTH  CAROLINA 
and  WASHINGTON.  I  feel  that  their  moveiuent  to  the  Pacific,  now,  would  have 
a  tremendous  effect  on  Japan  and  would  remove  any  impression  that  all  our 
thoughts  are  on  the  Atlantic.  If  we  can't  do  it  now,  we  should  at  least  be  pre- 
pared to  do  it  later  if  the  situation  deteriorates. 

When  we  get  into  a  shooting  war  with  Germany  there  will  be  an  increased 
demands  for  escorts  in  the  Pacific.  In  view  of  the  immense  distance  involved 
and  the  character  of  probable  opposition,  this,  in  the  main,  means  cruisers.  We 
may  need  additional  cruisers  and  I  cannot  see  how  we  can  handle  the  job  prop- 
erly if  our  cruiser  strength  is  reduced.  We  now  have  three  cruisers  on  escort 
duty  to  Manila.  My  orders  are  to  escort  to  Manila  but  not  to  escort  on  the  return 
trip.    Bidwell  in  the  Southeast  Pacific  has  two  cruisers. 

I  feel  better  now  that  we  have  gotten  something  at  Wake.  The  success  of 
the  Army  flight  has  re-emphasized  its  importance,  and,  while  by  no  means 
"impregnable",  its  present  defensive  strength  is  considerable  and  will  require 
the  exposure  of  quite  a  force  to  capture  it.  It  is  even  possible  [3]  that 
should  its  capture  be  an  early  objective  of  Japan,  such  an  effort  might  be 
supported  by  a  substantial  portion  of  their  Combined  Fleet,  which  would  create, 
for  us,  a  golden  opportunity  if  we  have  the  strength  to  meet  it.    Do  not  misunder- 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2249 

stand  me — I  don't  discount  the  Atlantic  problem — but  from  where  I  sit,  I  discount 
the  Pacific  problem  even  less.  Until  we  can  keep  a  force  liere  strong  enough  to 
meet  the  Japanese  Fleet  we  are  not  secure  in  the  Pacific — and  the  Pacific  is  still 
very  mucli  a  part  of  the  world  situation. 

I  IvJiow  you  have  these  thoughts  in  ndnd  and  share  my  concern,  but  I  am 
not  sure  but  that  there  are  some  in  Washington  who  might  be  inclined  to  overlook 
them. 

Please  let  me  have  your  views  on  the  questions  raised  herein.  With  regard  to 
offensive  action  against  raiders  in  the  Pacific  and  submarines  off  Hawaii,  etc., 
I  presume  I  will  get  official  orders,  if  any  change  in  present  policy  is  desired. 
Sincerely, 

/S/      KiMMEL. 
[1]  •  COMMANDKR-IN-rHIF:F 

United  States  Pacific  Fleet 

U.  S.  S.  Pennsylvania,  Flagship 

Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H.,  October  22,  19A1. 
#1 
Secret 

Dear  Betty  :  On  receipt  of  your  despatches  following  the  change  in  tlie  Japanese 
cabinet  we  made  the  following  dispositions  :— 

Continued  to  maintain  the  patrol  of  two  Submarines  at  Midway. 

Despatched  twelve  patrol  planes  to  Midway. 

Despatched  two  submarines  to  Wake.    They  will  arrive  there  on  23  October. 

Despatched  the  CASTOR  and  two  destroyers  to  Johnston  and  Wake  with  ad- 
ditional marines,  amnuinition  and  stores. 

The  CURTISS  arrives  at  Wake  on  21  October  with  gas,  lube  oil  and  bombs. 

Prepared  to  send  six  patrol  planes  from  Midway  to  Wake,  replacing  the  six 
at  Midway  from  Pearl  Harbor. 

Despatched  additional  marines  to  Palmyra. 

Placed  Admiral  Pye,  with  the  ships  making  a  health  cruise,  on  twelve  hours 
notice  after  20  October.  .  i 

Had  six  submariries  prepared  to  depart  for  Japan  on  short  notice. 

Put  some  additional  security  measures  in  effect  in  the  operating  areas  outside 
Pearl  Harbor. 

Delayed  the  sailing  of  the  WEST  VIRGINIA  until  about  17  November  when 
she  is  due  to  go  for  an  overhaul  to  Puget  Sound  and  deferred  final  decision  until 
that  time. 

With  minor  changes  I  propose  to  continue  the  health  cruises  to  the  Pacific  Coast ' 
until  soJuething  more  definite  develops.    The  despatch  in  regard  to  the  submarines 
for  Manila  went  forward  to  you  today. 

I  previously  pointed  out  to  you  the  great  desirability  of  many  things  in  the 
Pacific  Fleet.  If  you  will  bear  with  me  I  want  now  to  repeat  some  of  them 
once  more.  The  urgency  for  additional  patrol  craft  in  this  area  is  as  great  as 
ever.  Such  craft  are  not  [2]  worthwhile  unless  they  can  operate  in 
trade  wind  seas  which  result  from  winds  from  15  to  35  knots  blowing  almost 
continuously.  The  12  PT's  which  you  sent  to  us  I  fear  will  be  of  very  little  use 
in  this  area.  We  sent  them  on  an  average  day  to  make  a  trip  from  Os<hu  to 
Molokai.  The  reports  of  this  trip  have  gone  forward  officially.  They  were  prac- 
tically useless  in  this  sea  and  could  not  make  more  than  10  knots.  Several  of 
them  had  to  turn  back  and  a  few  personnel  were  quite  seriously  injured  from 
being  thrown  about.  We  need  something  much  more  substantial  to  be  of  any  use 
out  here.  In  this  connection  I  noted  that  the  Department  diverted  the  listening 
gear  allocated  to  the  four-stackers  (DM's)  in  this  Fleet  to  Atlantic  destroyers 
and  we  will  get  no  listening  gear  for  these  craft  until  a  new  c(mtract  is  made. 
I  had  fondly  hoped  that  all  these  craft  would  be  fitted  with  listening,  gear  by  the 
first  of  December. 

In  order  to  get  anything  like  the  capabilities  of  the  heavy  ships  of  this  Fleet 
made  effective  we  requiie  at  least  two  more  squadrons  of  destroyers.  Every 
exercise  we  plan  we  find  the  destroyers  are  lacking.  You  can  well  understand 
of  course,  that  two  squadrons  is,  in  my  opinion,  a  very  modest  request.  We  can 
use  many  more. 

I  have  been  struggling  with  the  availability  of  battleships  and  am  concerned 
about  the  long  interval  between  overhauls  that  will  result  if  we  continue  to  have 
only  one  battleship  overhaul  at  one  time.     I  am  loath  to  reduce  the  operational 

79716  O— 46— i»t.  16 22 


2250     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

forces  by  more  than  that  particularly  as  the  interim  availability  further  reduces 
the  number  available  for  operations.  Two  more  battleships  out  here,  particularly 
if  they  could  be  the  NORTH  CAROLINA  and  WASHINGTON,  would  ease  the 
situation  enormously.  We  have  indications  that  one  new  battleship  has  been 
commissioned  by  the  Japanese  and  rumors  that  an  additional  one  will  s6on  be 
placed  in  commission.  Such  a  contingency  will  further  disturb  the  balance  of 
power  in  the  Pacific. 

We  can  use  all  the  Jong  range  submarines  that  you  can  send  us.  They  can 
be  most  effective  in  keeping  destroyers  and  other  patrol  craft  occupied  near  the 
Japanese  bases,  homeland,  and  trade  routes. 

We  should  have  more  cruisers  because  we  can  expect  that  Jap  raider  activities 
will  result  from  employment  of  a  considerable  number  of  converted  merchant 
types  as  well  as  old  cruisers  in  this  work.  Then,  too,  our  own  planned  offensive 
operations  require  cruisers  and  more  cruisers.  The  least  you  can  do  for  us 
is  to  leave  us  with  the  cruisers  we  have.  I  can  easily  keep  three  or  four  more 
divisions  profitably  occupied  when  war  breaks. 

The  type  of  operations  we  have  planned  in  the  early  stages  of  the  war  puts  a 
premium  on  aircraft  operations  from  carriers.  We  [5]  have  only  three. 
One  of  them  is  occupied  part-time  in  training  activities  at  San  Diego.  I  note 
in  a  letter  signed  by  Ingersoll  and  received  today  that  the  chances  of  getting 
a  merchant  ship  converted  to  a  carrier  for  training  purposes  at  San  Diego  are 
very  poor.  I  feel  that  this  matter  shoiild  be  pushed ;  that  we  should  have 
at  least  one  such  vessel  in  the  Atlantic  and  one  in  the  Pacific.  Uiitil  we  do  get 
such  a  ship  we  are  required  to  occupy  a  considerable  time  of  a  carrier  at  greatly 
increased  cost,  diversion  from  active  operations  and  reduction  in  the  efficiency 
of  the  carrier.  These  carrier  training  vessels  will  be  useful  so  long  as  the  war 
lasts  and  will  pay  for  themselves  many  times  over. 

We  had  information  some  time  ago  that  you  were  converting  two  sea  train 
vessels  for  use  in  transporting  aircraft.  What  has  become  of  them?  Are  they 
operating  in  the  Atlantic  and  so  you  propose  to  send  a  carrier  to  San  Diego  to 
ferry  planes. 

I  feel  that  the  training  in  the  Fleet  is  coming  along  very  well.  The  shooting 
so  far  has  been  very  good  by  any  standards.  We  are  developing  the  use  of  radar 
and  our  principal  handicap  at  the  present  time  is  lack  of  material  and  lack  of 
trained  personnel.  Both  are  being  reme<lie(l  at  a  satisfactory  rate.  We  have  had 
no  experience  yet  with  the  use  of  gunnery  radar.  The  first  sets  are  now  being 
installed.  The  gunnery  radar  installed  in  the  HONOLULU  Class  is  a  bitter  dis- 
appointment. Thel  have  been  able  to  get  surface  ships  at  ranges  not  in  excess 
of  twenty  thousand  yards,  on  a  big  ship,  and  around  twelve  thousand  on  a 
destroyer.  This  radar  is  apparently  useless  for  the  detection  of  aircraft.  Luckily, 
this  type  is  being  installed  in  the  HONOLULU  Class  only.  It  is  useful  only  for 
short  range  work  against  surface  craft  at  night  or  in  low  visibility.  I  presume 
steps  are  being  taken  to  eliminate  or  radically  improve  this  type  of  radar. 

The  radar  installed  in  the  battleships  and  carriers  is  well  worthwhile  and 
we  have  got  highly  creditable  results  from  its  use. 

The  new  big  drydock  here  has  been  pumped  out  and  the  contractors'  forces 
are  now  in  process  of  cleaning  it  out  preparatory  to  finishing  off  the  bottom.  I  am 
informed  that  an  emergency  docking  will  be  possible  any  time  after  about  the 
15th  of  November,  although  the  dock  will  not  be  entirely  completed  until  some- 
time later  than  that. 

The  recreation  facilities  are  being  added  to  and  I  believe  the  men  are  in  much 
beter  shape  now  than  they  were  a  few  months  ago.  The  shooting  has,  I  believe, 
served  to  increase  their  confidence  in  themselves,  to  a  considerable  degree. 

[4]  I  sent  forward  to  you  today  an  exhaustive  study  on  the  installations  and 
defenses  of  Wake,  Midway,  Johnston  and  Palmyra.  I  hope  it  will  be  of  assistance 
in  deciding  what  you  want  done  out  here.  I  feel  that  a  comprehensive  plan  is 
essential  if  we  are  to  get  coordinated  results  in  the  shortest  time.  This  we  tried 
to  give  you. 

You  will  note  that  we  recommend  two  full  defense  battalions  over  and  above  the 
requirements  of  the  Islands  now  occupied  in  order  to  provide  two  balanced  forces 
to  occupy  any  desired  location  on  short  notice.  Until  such  time  comes  these 
personnel  can  be  used  to  rotate  the  defense  battalions  at  the  various  permanently 
garrisoned  islands. 

The  investigation  of  an  alternate  land  plane  route  to  the  Eastward  of  the 
Marshalls  and  on  to  Australia  has  my  hearty  approval.  We  may  be  able  to  get 
some  quick  results  from  the  expedition  to  Christmas  Island  sufficient  to  permit  the 
routing  of  four-engine  land  plane  bombers  from  Oahu  to  Christmas  to  Suva  to 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2251 

Noumea  and  on  to  Australia.  Additional  stepping  stones  are,  of  course,  highly 
desirable.  In  this  connection,  however,  it  must  be  remembered  that  there  are  not 
enough  ships  now  available  to  handle  our  own  island  developments.  Without 
greatly  augmented  shipping  facilities  we  cannot  possibly  assume  the  additional 
burden  for  the  Army. 
My  best  regards  to  you  always. 
Most  sincerely  yours, 

[S]       H.   E.    KIMMEIL. 

Admiral  H.  R.  Stabk,  U.  S.  Navy, 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 
Navy  Department, 

Washington,  D.  C. 


Commandeb-in-Chief 

united  states  pacific  fleen* — flagship 

Secret 

Peabl  Harbob,  T.  H.,  October  29, 19 U. 

Drab  Betty  :  I  had  Mr.  Hallet  Abend  for  lunch  with  me  today.  He  has  just 
completed  a  tour  for  the  Reader's  Digest  and  his  travels  took  him  to  Singapore, 
Manila,  Java,  Dutch  East  Indies,  Australia  and  New  Zealand.  He  gave  us  some 
very  interesting  information.  The  most  vital  information  was  information  which 
he  had  received  from  oflGlcials  in  Australia  and  New  Zealand  that  if  Japan  attacks 
Russia  the  British  Empire  will  declare  war  on  Japan.  He  was  also  assured  that 
the  Dutch  East  Indies  would  follow  Great  Britain  and  that  the  dutch  are  anxious 
that  the  war  start.  They  feel  that  the  present  set-up  in  the  world  gives  fhem  a 
better  chance  now  than  they  will  ever  have  again,  so  long  as  Japan  has  her  bases  in 
Indo  China. 

At  the  present  writing  it  appears  that  the  most  probable  direction  for  Japanese 
adventures  is  to  the  Northward.  If  they  do  embark  on  such  an  adventure  and 
Britain  and  the  Dutch  East  Indies  declare  war  on  Japan,  what  will  we  do? 

I  have  no  means  of  knowing  the  accuracy  of  the  statements.  It  may  be  that  the 
idea  was  planted  with  Mr.  Abend  as  a  propaganda  measure  and  he  was  told  by  the 
oflScials  who  informed  him  that  he  could  pubish  it  after  he  got  to  the  United  States. 
I  am  informing  you  in  order  that  you  may  run  it  down,  and  also  in  the  hope  that 
you  may  give  me  some  inkling  of  what  we  will  do  in  such  a  contingency. 

My  kindest  regards  and  best  wishes,  always. 
Most  sincerely  yours, 

[S]      H.   El   KiMMEL. 

P.  S.     The  officials  told  Mr.  Abend  that  this  information  came  from  the  Privy 
Council  but  he  was  not  privileged  to  use  this. 
Admiral  H.  R.  Stakk,  V.  8.  Navy, 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 
Navy  Department, 

Washington,  D.  C. 


[i]  United  States  Pacitic  Fleet 

U.  S.  S.  Pennstlvania,  Flagship 
Cincpac  File  No. 
Personal  and  Confidential  Peabl  Hakbok,  T.  H.,  November  6,  1941. 

Dear  Betty  :  I  have  just  signed  a  communication  to  you  setting  forth  our 
estimate  of  the  Japanese  bases  and  forces  in  the  Mandates.  This  estimate 
represents  meticulous  observations,  principally  by  radio,  over  a  long  period  of 
time  with  what*  we  conceive  to  be  reasonable  deductions  therefrom.  I  think 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  Japanese  have  expanded  very  large  sums  and 
much  effort  in  their  attempt  to  strengthen  the  Mandates  and  provide  numerous 
operating  bases  for  submarines  and  aircraft.  The  numbers  of  aircraft  are  of 
necessity  an  etsimate,  but  with  adequate  operating  bases  for  both  submarines 
and  aircraft,  additional  forces  can  be  very  quickly  moved  into  the  Mandates, 
depending  upon  the  situation. 


2252     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

You  will  note,  of  course,  that  our  estimate  differs  considerably  from  the  one 
prepared  in  the  Navy  Department.  I  doubt  very  much  if  the  Navy  Department's 
effort  has  had  the  care  expended  upon  it  that  we  have  given  to  the  one  we 
submitted. 

I  must  call  your  attention  again  to  the  anti-submarine  effort  that  will  be 
required  in  this  area  and  at  sea  if  our  operations  are  to  be  carried  on  with  rea- 
sonable security.  You  have  approved  installation  of  sound  gear  in  the  DM's, 
in  the  AM's,  the  AVP's,  certain  AT's,  and  the  AVD's.  At  the  present  writing, 
the  following  vessels  of  these  classes  are  lacking  in  sound  gear  and  we  have  been 
furnished  no  date  from  the  Department  on  which  we  can  expect  deliveries  of 
same. 

DM's:  PRUITT,  TRACY,  PREBLE,  SICARD,  DORSEY,  LAMBERTON, 
BOGGS  and  ELLIOT. 

AVP's:  TEAL,  PELICAN,  SWAN  and  AVOCET. 

AM's:  BOBOLINK.     GREBE,     KINGFISHER,     RAIL,     ROBIN,     SEAGULL, 
TERN.  TURKEY,  VIREO. 
XXXXXXXXXX  and  XXXXXXXX 

AT's:  NAVAJO  and  SEMINOLE. 

AVD's:  HULBERT.  BALLARD,  THORNTON,  WILLIAMSON,  GILLIS  and 
McFARLAND. 

[2]  In  other  words,  we  have  in  this  area  2f>  ships  which  can  be  fitted  with 
sound  gear  and  which  are  not  so  fitted.  This  is  a  very  large  number  of  potentially 
useful  submarine  hunters. 

I  note  that  you  plan  to  send  24  VSO's  to  the  Asiatic  Fleet  in  January.  I  pre- 
sume that  you  now  plan  to  send  those  VSO's  crated,  in  cargo  vessels.  Unless 
the  situation  changes  materially  I  strongly  recommend  against  sending  them  in 
a  carrier. 

I  have  frequently  mentioned  the  very  great  desirability  of  having  a  flight  deck 
merchant  ship  for  use  in  training  aviators  for  carrier  duty.  On  reflection,  I 
have  changed  my  mind  to  the  extent  that  instead  of  providing  one  carrier  of  this 
type  for  each  coast,  we  should  provide  about  ten  such  carriers  for  each  coast. 
Such  ships  operating  in  conjunction  with  cruisers  or  even  destroyers,  have  a  very 
great  i)otential  value.  Of  course,  the  mercantile  aircraft  carriers  I  am  now 
recommending  should  be  fully  equipped  for  combat  puri)oses — something  that 
I  did  not  contemplate  when  we  recommended  the  carrier  for  flight  deck  training 
only. 

My  kindest  regards  and  best  wishes,  always. 
Most  sincerely  yours, 

H.  E.  Kim  MEL. 

P.  S.  I  have  forwarded  today  by  air  mail  the  comments  of  Com-14,  the  C!om- 
manding  General,  and  myself  on  the  subjiect  of  a  combined  operating  center  for 
the  Army  and  Navy  in  Oahu.  You  will  note  that  we  have  presented  several 
objections  and  feel  that  in  any  event  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Commander  Sub- 
marines, Scouting  Force,  and  Commander  Base  Force  have  no  place  in  such  an 
operating  center.  I  feel  that  the  quarters  and  buildings  we  have  requested  for 
these  agencies  should  be  proceeded  with  forthwith ;  no  matter  what  decision 
is  finally  made  in  regard  to  an  operating  center  the  buildings  we  have  requested 
will  be  necessary. 

Admiral  H.  R.  Stakk.  U.  S.  Navy, 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 
Navy  Department, 

Washington,  D.  C. 


[i]  United  States  Pacific  Fleet 

U.  S.  S.  Pennsylvania,  Flagship 

Cincpac  File  No. 

Secret  Pearl  Harbor,  T.  H.,  15  November,  19J^1. 

Dear  "Betty"  :  In  repeated  correspondence  I  have  set  forth  to  you  the  needs 
of  the  Pacific  Fleet.  These  needs  are  real  and  immediate.  I  have  seen  the  ma- 
terial and  personnel  diverted  to  the  Atlantic.  No  doubt  they  are  needed  there. 
But  I  must  insist  that  more  consideration  be  given  to  the  needs  of  the  Pacific 
Fleet. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2253 

In  case  of  war  in  the  Pacific  we  shall  have  a  problem  difficult  of  solution  under 
any  circumstances;  one  requiring ^i  major  effort  to  bring  the  war  to  a  successful 
conclusion.  During  preparation  for  such  an  effort  we  must  be  in  a  position  to 
make  Japanese  operations  costly  and  of  limited  effectiveness.  The  strength 
of  this  fleet  limits  our  freedom  of  action  and  lack  of  modern  equipment  in 
ships  we  now  have  limits  their  effectiveness. 

We  must  be  in  a  position  to  minimize  our  own  losses,  and  to  inflict  maximum 
damage  to  Japanese  fleet,  merchant  shipping,  and  bases.  We  should  have  suffi- 
cient strength  in  this  fleet  for  such  effective  operations  as  to  permit  cruising 
at  will  in  the  Japanese  Mandated  Island  area,  and  even  on  occasions  to  Japanese 
home  waters.  We  should  have  the  strength  to  make  any  enemy  operations 
against  Wake  a  highly  hazardous  undertaking.  To  do  these  things  substantial 
increase  of  the  strength  of  this  Fleet  is  mandatory. 

Greater  permanence  of  personnel  is  required  to  obtain  tl^at  ship,  unit  and  fleet 
efficiency  so  essential  for  readiness  to  fight.  Reduction  of  changes  to  a  minimum 
especially  in  key  positions,  must  be  accomplished.  Detachment  of  officers  and 
men  has  already  dangerously  reduced  efliciency  of  this  fleet  and  they  continue. 
Well  qualified  officers  are  in  many  instances,  detached  to  fill  billets  much  less 
important,  in  my  opinion  than  those  filled  in  this  fleet.  Battleship  Captains 
must  be  chosen  for  proficiency  regardless  of  seniority. 

This  fleet  requires  approximately  9,000  men  to  fill  complements;  it  can  utilize 
an  additional  10.000. 

[2]  If  this  fleet  is  to  reach  and  maintain  a  satisfactory  degree  of  readiness 
for  offensive  action,  the  foregoing  requirements  must  be  met ;  and  it  must  not 
be  considered  a  training  fleet  for  support  of  the  Atlantic  Fleet  and  the  shore 
establishment. 

With  best  wishes, 

H.   E.   KiMMEL. 


Commander-in-Chief 
United  States  Pacific  Fleet 
U.  S.  S.  Pennsylvania,  Flagship 

Ser.  #8 
S-e-c-r-e-t 

PE1A.RL  Haebor,  T.  H.,  December  2, 19^1. 

De.\r  Betty  :  We  had  your  despatches  in  regard  to  reinforcing  the  outlying 
islands  with  Army  pursuit  planes  and  Army  personnel.  With  regard  to  the 
u.se  of  Army  pursuits  on  the  island  bases,  some  time  ago  we  investigated  the 
feasibility  of  putting  some  kind  of  fighters  on  the  outlying  islands  and  decided 
at  the  time  that  our  best  chance  of  quickly  reinforcing  the  i.slands  and  to  make 
the  minimum  demands  upon  the  supplies  in  the  island  that  we  should  send  a 
minimum  number  of  ground  crews  to  Wake  and  Midway  in  order  when  the 
time  came,  to  be  in  a  position  to  fly  off  the  Marine  planes  from  a  carrier  or  to 
send  them  direct  from  Pearl  to  Midway  in  the  case  of  the  SBD's.  At  the  time 
your  despatch  in  regard  to  Army  pursuits  was  received  we  had  the  WRIGHT 
at  Wake  discharging  the  Marine  ground  crews  and  she  arrives  at  Midway 
tomorrow,  December  3,  to  discharge  Marine  ground  crews  there. 

Halsey,  in  the  ENTERPRISE,  with  three  heavy  cruisers  and  a  squadron  of 
destroyers,  will  fly  off  12  Marine  fighting  planes  for  Wake  tomorrow  morning 
after  which  he  returns  to  Pearl.  We  have  been  covering  his  advance  by  2  VP 
squadrons  operating  from  Johnston,  Midway  and  Wake.  Upon  the  completion 
of  the  movement  we  now  plan  to  return  one  VP  squadron  to  Pearl  and  leave 
the  other  one  at  Midway  awaiting  further  developments.  I  will  hold  the  Marine 
SBD's  at  Pearl  awaiting  further  developments  as  they  can  fly  under  their  own 
power  from  Pearl  to  Midway. 

During  all  the  period  that  I  have  been  in  command  the  question  of  the 
development  of  supply  and  defense  of  these  outlying  bases  has  been  a  very 
difficult  one.  We  cannot  expect  to  supply  Wake  quickly  and  expeditiously  until 
we  have  a  space  to  put  a  ship  alongside  for  loading  and  unloading.  The  Com- 
mandant of  the  District  has  been  and  is  exerting  every  effort  to  obtain  this 
objective.    As  you  know,  ships  have  been  delayed  in  unloading  at  Wake  for  as 


2254     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

long  as  28  days,  due  to  bad  weather,  and  it  is  not  unusual  for  a  ship  to  take 
as  much  as  7  or  8  days.  This,  in  the  face  of  any  opposition,  presents  an  impos- 
sible situation.  Present  facilities  at  Wake  must  be  improved,  particularly  as 
to  storage  of  fuel  oil,  aviation  gas,  food  and  ammunition.  This  work  should 
not  stop  and  the  1,000  defense  workers  at  Wake  are  essential  to  keep  this  work 
moving  as  rapidly  as  material  can  be  supplied.  A  recent  estimate  by  Bloch  sets 
the  time  for  the  completion  of  the  ship  channel  to  about  the  first  of  May.  I  hope, 
and  so  does  he,  that  this  date  can  be  anticipated.  At  the  present  time  we  cannot 
support  more  personnel  on  Wake  than  we  now  have  there.  As  you  will  remember, 
we  put  six  5"  guns  and  twelve  3"  [2]  anti-aircraft  guns,  together  with 
a  number  of  machine  guns  on  the  island,  well  knowing  that  we  did  not  have 
suflBcient  marine  personnel  to  man  them.  However,  I  think  good  progress  has 
been  made  in  organizing  the  defense  workers  to  assist  in  the  manning  of  the 
battery  at  Wake.  In,  case  the  present  situation  should  ease,  we  can  readily 
withdraw  the  Marine  fighters  from  Wake  in  order  to  decrease  the  demands  upon 
the  facilities  there  and  also  in  order  to  keep  up  the  training  of  the  pilots  of 
these  planes. 

The  situation  at  Midway  is  somewhat  better  than  at  Wake.  You  will  note 
from  our  report  of  the  defenses  submitted  today  that  we  have  shipped  three  of 
the  four  7"  guns  to  Midway.  Also  we  have  shipped,  or  are  shortly  shipping,  four 
of  the  3"-50  anti-aircraft  guns  to  Midway.  These,  in  addition  to  the  batteries 
already  installed  there,  which  comprise  six  5"-ol's  and  twelve  3"  anti-aircraft. 
You  will  also  note  from  our  oflQcial  letter  submitted  today  that  the  defenses  of 
Johnston  and  Palmyra,  while  not  what  we  would  like  to  have,  are  nevertheless 
not  entirely  inadequate. 

Your  despatches  in  regard  to  the  use  of  Army  personnel  and  the  organization 
of  Army  defense  forces  to  be  used  in  outlying  islands  is  being  given  earnest  con- 
sideration. I  know  you  appreciate  the  difTiculties  of  mixing  Army,  Marine  Corps 
and  Navy  personnel  in  a  small  island  base.  I  believe  you  will  subscribe  to  the 
principle  that  all  these  outlying  bases  must  be  under  Navy  command  and  the 
forces  there  must  be  subject  to  the  orders  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  without 
any  qualification  whatsoever.  I  anticipate  some  difficulties  along  this  line  when 
Army  personnel  is  injected  into  the  picture  unless  a  very  clear  directive  is  isssued 
jointly  by  the  War  and  Navy  Department.  On  inquiry  and  conference  with  the 
Army  I  find  that  the  Army  in  Hawaii  has  no  guns,  either  surface  or  anti-aircraft, 
available  for  outlying  bases.  They  can  supply  some  .30  caliber  machine  guns  and 
rifles.  I  have  frequently  called  to  your  attention  the  inadequacy,  of  the  Army 
anti-aircraft  defense  in  the  Pearl  Harbor  area  with  particular  reference  to  the 
shortage  of  anti-aircraft  guns.  So  far,  very  little  has  been  done  to  improve  this 
situation.  With  nothing  but  .30  caliber  machine  guns  and  rifles  the  replacement 
of  Marines  by  Army  at  outlying  bases  now  will  result  in  an  increased  number  of 
Marines  in  Oahu  with  no  suitable  equipment  as  Army  would  require  all  of  the 
Marine  equipment  now  in  the  islands.  The  Marines  in  the  outlying  islands  are 
trained,  acclimated  and  efficient  beyond  standards  immediately  obtainable  by  the 
Army  even  if  they  took  over  the  present  Marine  equipment.  We  cannot  appreciably 
increase  the  number  of  military  personnel  in  the  outlying  islands  unless  we  re- 
move the  defense  workers.  We  cannot  afford  to  remove  the  defense  workers  if 
we  expect  ever  to  reach  a  satisfactory  condition  in  the  islands.  Essential  items 
include,  as  I  have  previously  stated,  \3]  provisions  to  berth  a  ship  at  Wake, 
completix)n  of  air  fields  at  Palmyra  and  Johnston  and  completion  of  fuel,  gaso- 
line, food  and  ammunition  housing  at  all  bases.  I  am  proposing  in  official  cor- 
respondence that:  (2)  the  Army  organize  3  defense  battalions  of  approximately 
800  men  each ;  that  steps  be  taken  in  Washington  to  supply  them  with  guns,  both 
surface  and  anti-aircraft ;  supply  them  with  37mm  or  .50  caliber  machine  guns ; 
to  make  up  a  well  balanced  defense  battalion ;  that  prijor  to  the  time  the  equip- 
ment of  these  organizations  is  supplied  that  they  drill  with  the  five  inch  guns  of 
the  Fourth  Defense  Battalion  now  at  Pearl  as  long  as  the  equipment  is  available 
here.  If  it  is  decided  to  supply  these  battalions  with  some  other  caliber  of  guns, 
that  sufficient  number  of  guns  of  the  type  to  be  used  be  shipped  to  Oahu  to  be 
utilized,  for  training  puriwses.  (b)  that  these  Army  defense  battalions  be  held 
in  readiness  to  (1)  furnish  replacement  to  presently  occupied  islands  (2)  to  re- 
lieve battalions  in  presently  occupied  islands  (3)  to  garrison  islands  to  be 
occupied. 

The  Marine  garrison's  now  at  Midway,  Johnston  and  Palmyra  should  be  re- 
tained there  for  the  present.  They  will  not  be  withdrawn  until  arms  and  equip- 
ment for  the  Army  defense  battalions  have  been  received  and  the  Army  trained. 
At  this  time  a  decision  can  be  made  according  to  the  situation  then  existing. 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2255 

That  the  Army  organize  three  18-plane  pursuit  squadrons  and  keep  them  in  an 
expeditionary  status;  maintain  the  ground  crews  organized  and  ready  to  man 
them ;  maintain  the  planes  ready  to  be  transported  by  carrier  when  ordered. 

The  Array  has  orders  to  defend  C'anton  and  Christmas.  We  are  turning  over 
to  them  two  five-inch  51  guns  for  use  at  Canton.  These  they  will  man  with 
Army  personnel  and  supplement  with  some  obsolete  anti-aircraft  guns  and 
machine  guns.    The  expedition  is  now  due  to  leave  here  on  December  ninth. 

The  Army  is  also  sending  some  obsolete  guns  and  a  garrison  to  Christmas.  I 
will  let  you  know  more  definitely  what  they  sent  when  I  find  out  exactly. 

I  feel  that  we  cannot  determine  the  defenses  of  Canton  and  Christmas  until 
we  find  out  how  much  personnel  can  be  maintained  there.  Meanwhile  the  Army 
is  sending  some  forces  there. 

[4]  In  view  of  the  foregoing  I  am  unable  to  understand  the  reason  for  the 
despatches  from  the  War  and  Navy  Department  directing  us  to  utilize  the  Army 
in  the  defense  of  the  outlying  bases,  as  we  can  hope  for  no  relief  from  this  quarter 
until  they  have  been  supplied  with  suitable  equipment. 

I  feel  the  wiser  course  is  to  continue  to  organize  Marine  defense  battalions 
and  supply  them  with  the  necessary  equipment.  I  believe  we  can  train  Marine 
defense  tmttalions  just  as  rapidly  as  the  Army  can  do  so  and  probably  as 
rapidly  as  the  equipment  can  be  supplied.  If  there  is  any  prospect  of  the  imme- 
diate supply  of  considerable  quantities  of  suitable  equipment  I  can  see  some 
reason  for  injecting  the  Army  into  the  picture. 

I  think  it  would  be  well  for  you  to  read  the  despatch  sent  by  the  War  Depart- 
ment to  the  Commanding  General  on  this  subject.  It  dififers  considerably  from 
the  one  you  sent  to  us  in  that  the  War  Department  says  they  will  take  over  the 
defense  of  some  outlying  bases  from  the  Navy  in  accordance  with  an  agreement 
to  be  reached  by  the  Commanding  General  and  myself.  Your  despatch  left  me 
with  the  conviction  that  the  Army  was  to  reinforce  the  Naval  and  Marine  forces 
on  the  outlying  bases  in  case  of  necessity.    I  feel  that  this  should  be  clarified. 

We  have  one  transport  in  commission  which,  due  to  a  delay  in  the  sailing  of  the 
WHARTON  we  are  now  obliged  to  use  for  one  trip  to  transport  essential  Naval 
personnel  from  the  West  Coast  to  the' Fleet.  The  other  transiwrts,  to  a  total  of 
six,  are  in  various  stages  of  completion.  The  Marines  at  San  Diego  are  in  urgent 
need  of  transport  training  and  will  not  be  ready  to  come  to  Hawaii  until  some 
time  in  February.  I  can  see  very  little  chance  for  any  overseas  expedition  even 
on  a  small  scale  until  that  date.  Eventually  this  war  will  require  a  much 
greater  number  of  transports  and  supply  ships  in  the  Pacific.  We  are  working 
on  an  estimate  of  the  requirements.  This  estimate,  in  addition  to  some  thirty  or 
forty  transports  and  an  equal  number  of  supply  ships  must  also  include  a  thirty 
to  fifty  i)ercent  increase  in  the  fighting  strength  of  the  Fleet  before  we  can  occupy 
the  Mar.shalls  and  Carolines  in  an  advance  across  the  Pacific. 

With  these  considerations  in  mind  I  am  at  loss  to  understand  the  considerations 
which  injected  the  Array  into  the  picture. 

[5]         My  kindest  regards  and  best  wishes,  always. 
Most  sincerely  yours, 

H.  E.  KiMMEL 

P.  S.  The  Commanding  General  of  the  Hawaiian  Air  Detachment  made  the 
statement  in  conference  that  his  pursuit  planes  could  not  operate  farther  than 
35  miles  from  land.  If  this  be  the  case,  I  can  see  very  little  use  for  Army  pursuit 
planes  in  nn  outlying  island.  This,  added  to  the  inability  of  this  type  plane  to 
land  on  a  carrier,  makes  them  practically  useless  for  an  overseas  expedition  of 
any  kind.  Except  for  the  four-engined  Anny  bombers,  we  must  depend  upon  Navy 
and  Marine  Corps  planes  to  support  any  overseas  expedition  and  to  man  outlying 
l)ases.  This  is  and  has  been  one  of  my  reasons  for  urging  the  supply  of  all  types 
of  carrier  planes. 

P.  S.  You  will  note  that  I  have  issued  orders  to  the  Pacific  Fleet  to  depth 
bomb  all  submarine  contacts  in  the  Oahu  operating  area. 

H.  E.  K. 

Admiral  H.  R.  Staek,  U.  S.  Navy, 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Navy  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. 

[61  P.  S.  In  connection  with  the  development  of  outlying  bases  by  the 
Army,  I  must  invite  your  attention  to  the  fact  that  when  the  War  Department 
issued  orders  to  the  Commanding  General  out  here  to  develop  these  bases  they 
authorized  him  to  charter  ships  and  to  take  all  other  necessary  steps  to  insure 


2256     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

the  early  completion  of  the  project.  He  has  already  taken  over  three  large 
inter-island  vessels  and  has  caused  some  army  transports  and  other  shipping 
to  be  diverted  to  the  supply  of  Christmas  and  Canton.  He  has  also  chartered  a 
number  of  smaller  vessels  such  as  tugs  and  sampans. 

I  feel  he  has  done  an  excellent  job.  I  feel  that  the  Navy  personnel  in  this  area 
with  equal  authority  would  have  their  efforts  much  facilitated.  I  do  not  know 
the  considerations  which  pronipted  the  Navy  to  turn  over  the  development  of 
the  island  bases  to  the  Army  I  do  know  that  it  has  complicated  our  problems 
considerably. 

The  Conmiandiiig  General  is  keeping  me  informed  of  what  he  is  doing  but 
frequently  the  information  is  s<>  late  that  I  have  been  unable  to  plan  adequate 
protection.  I  am  sure  it  is  no  fault  of  his  because  he  informs  me  as  soon  as  he 
himself  is  informed.  I  have  nothing  but  the  highest  praise  for  the  way  General 
Short  has  taken  hold  of  this  problem  which  dropped  in  his  lap. 

H.  E.  KIMMEL. 

[7]  P.  S.  From  correspondence  which  General  Short  has  furnished  me 
I  note  that  the  Army  is  engaged  in  developing  air  fields  in  Fijii  and  New 
Caledonia.  This  will  involve  questions  of  supply  and  protection  both  of  shipping 
and  the  fields  themselves.  The  Australians  I  understand  are  loath  to  assume 
the  protection  of  the  field  in  New  Caledonia.  The  Navy  is  bound  to  be  involved 
in  these  affairs.  I  fear  we  may  l)ecome  so  much  concerned  with  defensive 
roles  that  we  may  become  unable  to  take  the  offensive.  Too  much  diversion 
of  effort  for  defense  will  leave  us  an  inadequate  force  with  which  to  take  the 
offensive. 

With  regard  to  the  escort  of  convoys  by  using  a  single  cruiser  to  escort  not 
to  exceed  8  ships,  we  endeavor  to  limit  the  number  of  cruisers  so  occupied  at  one 
time  to  four.  We  now  find  that  routing  via  Torres  Strait  to  Manila,  we  are  going 
to  have  seven  crui.sers  continuously  occupied  with  convoy  duty.  This  without  any 
consideration  for  such  protection  as  may  eventually  be  required  from  San 
Francisco  to  Oahu.  I  realize  of  course  that  the  demands  for  trans-Pacific  escorts 
may  decrea.se  if  it  becomes  impossible  to  route  ships  to  Manila  but  it  will  still 
be  necessary  to  supply  the  Asiatic  Fleet  and  our  allies  in  the  Far  East. 

/S/     H.  E.  KIMMEL. 


[1]         Ser.  #9 
Secret 

Com  MANDEB-i  N -Chief 

United  States  Pacific  Fleet 

U.  S.  S.  Pennsylvania,  Flagship 

Peabl  Harbor,  T.  H..  December  12,  1941. 

Dear  Betty :  Thanks  for  your  letter.  The  Secretary  is  here  and  I  have  given 
him  verbally  as  complete  an  account  of  the  action  last  Sunday  as  1  could.  Pye, 
Bloch  and  General  Short  were  present  during  the  interview.  ~ Briefly,  we  had 
considered  an  air  raid  on  Hawaii  as  a  very  remote  possibility,  particularly  at 
the  time  that  it  occurred.  There  were  10  VP's  in  the  air  that  morning  but  they 
of  course  could  not  adequately  cover  369°  of  ai'c  and  their  primary  effort  was 
directed  against  the  submarine  menace  which  everyone  fully  recognized.  In 
our  endeavor  to  avoid  wearing  out  both .  personnel  and  planes,  we  had  made 
periodic  sweeps  to  the  Northward  and  Westward  but  none  were  made  on  the 
morning,  in  question.  You,  of  course,  are  familiar  with  the  exchanges  of  VP 
squadrons  and  the  teething  trouble  that  such  new  squadrons  always  experience. 

Full  precautions  were  taken  by  all  ships  at  sea  and  I  am  happy  to  state 
that  no  casualties  were  incurred  by  any  of  them.  The  submarines  were  promptly 
and  I  hope  effectively,  dealt  with.  We  believe  that  since  the  action  started  we 
have  accounted  for  several  submarines.  A  task  force  commanded  by  Newton, 
including  one  carrier,  was  between  here  and  Midway  and  about  400  miles  from 
Midway,  South  of  the  line  of  islands.  This  task  force  included  1  carrier,  3 
CA's  and  a  squadron  of  destroyers.  Brown,  in  the  INDIANAPOLIS,  with  4  DM's 
was  in  the  vicinity  of  Johnston  Island.    Halsey,  in  the  ENTERPRISE,  with  3 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  2257 

CA's  and  9  DD's  was  about  200  miles  west  of  Oahii.     The  MINNEAPOLIS,  with 
4  DM's,  was  in  the  operating  area  to  the  Southward  of  Oahu. 

The  approximate  locations  of  these  forces  are  shown  on  the  chart  and  in  the 
statement  enclosed  herewith.  The  Army  anti-aircraft  guns  were  not  manned. 
The  condition  of  readiness  of  their  planes  is  being  reported  by  General  Short. 

The  ships  in  harbor  opened  fire  very  promptly  but  the  first  attack  wave  was 
practically  unopposed.  The  fact  that  all  ships  were  able  to  open  fire  so  promptly 
during  the  breakfast  hour  indicates  that  the  ships  in  harbor  were  alert  and 
prepared. 

No  amount  of  explanation  can  alter  the  results  which  are  included  in  a  letter 
which  I  am  sending  along  to  you  today,  giving  in  such  detail  as  is  now  possible, 
the  damage  sustained.  Prompt  and  vigorous  action  was  taken  in  an  attempt  to 
intercept  and  destroy  the  attacking  force.  The  Fifth  Column  activities  added 
great  confusion  and  it  was  most  difficult  to  evaluate  the  reports  received. 

[2]  We  gave  Halsey,  Brown  and  Newton  our  best  information  and  estimates. 
Our  first  estimate,  based  on  very  meager  information  indicated  a  carrier  might 
be  to  the  Northward.  Halsey  had  hardly  steadied  on  a  course  in  that  direction 
when  he  intercepted  a  message  as  to  strong  enemy  forces  approaching  Barber's 
Point  and  promptly  diverted  his  ship  and  search  to  the  Southward.  A  false  report 
of  a  transport  landing  troops  at  Barber's  Point  was  picked  up  by  an  lenemy 
ship  and  rebroadcast. 

For  a  time,  indications  seemed  to  point  more  definitely  to  a  carrier,  to  the 
Southward  than  to  the  Northward  and  I  advised  the  forces  at  sea  that  enemy 
carriers  might  be  in  both  directions.  Radar  information  was  conflicting  ;  but  that 
indicating  planes  to  the  Southward  was  strongly  supported  by  R.  D.  F.  bearings 
(not  bilateral)  of  two  Japanese  calls  showing  carriers  in  that  direction.  Probably 
they  were  made  by  enemy  ships  planted  there  for  the  purpose ;  although  some 
possibility  still  exists  that  a  carrier  may  have  been  there. 

We  will  endeavor  to  give  you  a  complete  account  of  our  efforts  when  time 
permits.  Up  to  now  we  have  been  far  too  busy  in  handling  taatters  of  the 
moment  and  planning  for  the  future  to  collate  and  analyze  the  vast  amount 
of  conflicting  matter  that  came  in  at  the  time. 

I  am  enclosing  an  estimate  of  the  situation,  which  will  show  you  our  present 
ideas  on  what  we  hope  to  accomplish.  Needless  to  say  we  have  been  up  to  our 
ears  in  getting  re-oriented ;  so  much  so  that  we  have  scarcely  had  time  to  feel 
the  terrific  shock. 

The  Secretary  is  taking  with  him  photographs  of  the  type  of  submarine  which 
entered  the  harbor.  This  submarine  74'  x  '^Y/,  bolted  together  in  3  sections 
and  capable  of  24  knots  submerged,  can  pass  under  or  around  most  nets.  The 
Pearl  Harbor  anti-submarine  net  was  down  at  the  time  the  raid  started.  The 
submarine  carried  photographed  silhouettes  of  Oahu  from  every  angle  of  ap- 
proach ;  and,  among  other  things  in  its  locker,  it  had  an  American  Ensign.  I 
shall  forward  shortly,  considerable  detailed  information  of  this  vessel. 

Charts  and  other  things  from  crashed  planes,  as  well  as  information  gained 
from  the  submarine  prove  that  this  raid  was  planned  for  months.  Details  had 
been  worked  out  with  the  greatest  care.  Each  pilot,  judging  from  material  from 
unburned  or  partially  burned  planes,  carried  a  book  of  silhouettes  of  our  ships. 
The  charts  of  Pearl  Harbor  in  planes  were  as  good  as  anything  we  have.  [3] 
They  showed  the  berths  for  all  types  of  our  ships.  I  entertain  no  doubt  that  the 
loss  of  the  OGLALA  was  entirely  due  to  the  fact  that  she  was  in  the  PENN- 
SYLVANIA'S normal  berth. 

The  inspiring  thing  in  all  this  business  is  the  conduct  of  officers  and  men. 
During  the  action  it  was  magnificent  and  their  efforts  since  have  been  untiring 
and  effective.  As  destroyers  were  clearing  the  harbor,  they  were  boarded  by 
men  from  sunken  ships  anxious  to  do  their  part.  Numerous  instances  have  been 
reported  to  me  of  mass  volunteering  from  sunken  ships  to  go  to  sea  in  ships  that 
were  left.  Marines,  hearing  of  attacks  on  Midway  and  Wake,  have  insisted  on 
being  sent  there. 

Morale  of  all  ofl^cers  and  men  is  high.  They  have  but  one  tliought  and  that 
is  to  be  able  to  get  at  the  enemy. 

My  kindest  regards  and  best  wishes  to  you  always. 
Most  sincerely  yours, 


/S/      H.    E.   KiMMEL. 


Admiral  H.  R.  Stark.  U.  S.  Navy, 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations, 

Navy  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. 


2258    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  107 

CONFIDENTIAI, 

APPENDIX  TO  NARRATIVE  STATEMENT  OF  EVIDENCE  AT  NAVY  PEARL 
HARBOR  INVESTIGATIONS 

(Reports  (formerly  Top  Secret)  advisory  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  in  Navy 
Pearl  Harbor  Investigations.  See  Narrative  Statement  of  Evidence  at  Navy 
Pearl  Harbor  Investigations,  Vol.  II,  for  official  Navy  action  (formerly  Top 
Secret)  on  the  reports) 

Navy  Department,  Washington,  D.  C. 

COMMANDEB   IN   CHIEF,   UNITED   STATES   FlEET,   THIRD  ENDORSEMENT   TO   REPORT  OF 

Further  Pearl,  Harbor  Investigation  by  Admiral,  H.  K.  Hewitt,  U.  S.  Navy 

[i] 

United  States  Fleet 

headquarters  of  the  commander  in  chief 

Navy  Department,  Washington  25,  D.  C. 
FF1/A17 
Serial:  002008 
Top  Secret 

Third  Endorsement  to  Adm.  Hewitt's  Report  to  SecNav  dated  12  July  1945. 
From :  Commander  in  Chief,  United  States  Fleet  and  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 
To :  The  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

Subject :  Report  of  Further  Pearl  Harbor  Investigation  by  Admiral  H.  K.  Hewitt, 
U.  S.  Navy. 

1.  I  concur  in  general  in  the  remarks  and  recommendations  of  the  Judge 
Advocate  General  as  expressed  in  the  second  endorsement.  In  answer  to  the 
specific  questions  asked  in  the  first  endorsement,  the  following  opinions  are 
submitted : 

(a)  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the  evidence  is  not  sufficient  to  warrant  trial  by 
court  martial  of  any  person  in  the  Naval  Service,  in  that  the  evidence  will  not 
sustain  the  charges  required  by  the  Articles  for  the  Government  of  the  Navy. 

(b)  With  regard  to  tlie  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  to  warrant  other  proceed- 
ings, I  am  still  of  the  opinion,  which  I  have  previously  expressed,  that  Admiral 
Stark  and  Admiral  Kimmel,  though  not  culpable  to  a  degree  warranting  formal 
disciplinary  action,  were  nevertheless  inadequate  in  emergency,  due  to  the  lack 
of  the  superior  judgment  necessary  for  exercising  command  commensurate  with 
their  duties. 

(c)  Appropriate  action  appears  to  me  to  be  the  relegation  of  both  of  these 
officers  to  positions  in  which  lack  of  superior  strategic  judgment  may  not  result 
in  future  errors.  The  action  has  been  taken  in  the  case  of  both  Admiral  Stark 
and  Admiral  Kimmel.     No  further  action  is  recommended. 

[2]  (d)  For  the  reasons  stated  by  the  Judge  Advocate  General,  I  consider 
it  impracticable  to  bring  Admiral  Stark  and  Admiral  Kimmel,  or  either  one  of 
them,  to  trial  prior  to  the  termination  of  hostilities  with  Japan,  nor  are  court 
martial  or  other  proceedings  (prior  to  the  termination  of  hostilities  with  Japan) 
advisable  because  such  proceedings  would  almost  certainly  involve  disclosure  of 
information  which  would  be  detrimental  to  current  military  operations  and  to 
national  security  measures. 

2.  I  concur  in  the  opinion  of  Judge  Advocate  General  that  the  Navy  De- 
partment is  morally  obligated  to  order  Admiral  Kimmel  to  trial  before  a  General 
Court  Martial,  should  Admiral  Kimmel  so  insist.  However,  this  action  should 
not  be  taken  until  after  the  completion  of  hostilities  with  Japan. 

3.  I  concur  in  the  suggestion  of  the  Judge  Advocate  that  this  record  be  made 
available  to  Admiral  Kimmel  and  his  counsel ;  that  Admiral  Kimmel  be  informed 
that  he  is  free  to  make  public  anything  contained  in  this  record  and  prior  records 
as  goon  as  that  may  be  done  without  prejudice  to  security;  that  if- Admiral 
Kimmel  insists,  a  General  Court  Martial  will  be  convened  to  try  him  for  alleged 
offenses  he  may  have  committed  on  or  before  December  7, 1941. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  2259 

4.  As  to  Admiral  Hewitt's  deductions  from  war  experience — paragraph  28,  page 
180-— I  am  unable  to  concur  fully  with  (a)  thereof  but  do  concur  fully  with 
(b)  thereof.  Nor  am  I  able  to  concur  fully  in  his  paragraph  29  (page  180) — 
which  parallels  his  paragraph  28  (a) — for  the  reason  that  he  himself  sets  forth 
in  substance  at  various  places  in  his  "findings"  and  "conclusions",  namely,  that 
while  the  system  of  command  was  that  of  mutual  cooperation  it  was,  in  reality, 
incomplete  and  inadequate  implementation  of  that  system  which  was  at  fault 
There  is  the  further  fact  that,  given  the  information  which  was  available  in 
Washington,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  system  of  mutual  cooperation 
would  have  been  fully  alerted  and  made  to  function  effectively. 

[s]     E.  J.  King 
E.  J.  King. 


The  Judge  Advocate  General's 
Second  Endobsement 

ON 

The  Re^pobt  of  Fubtheb  Pbabl  Habbob  Investigation 

BY 

AoMiBAL  H.  K.  Hewitt,  U.  S.  Navy 

[i] 

Depabtment  of  the  Navy, 
Office  of  the  Judge  Advocate  Genebal, 

Washington,  D.  C,  10  August  1945.   ' 
Top  Secret 

Second  Endorsement 

From :    The  Judge  Advocate  General. 
To :        Commander-in-Chief,  United  States  Fleet,  and 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 

Subject :   Report  of  further  Pearl  Harbor  investigation  by  Admiral 
H.  K.  Hewitt,  U.  S.  Navy. 

1.  Subject  report  clarifies  obscure  points  and  supplies  omissions  in  the  earlier 
investigations.  It  is  considered  that  this  and  former  investigations,  taken 
together,  present  as  clear  a  picture  of  the  pertinent  facts  as  will  ever  be  adduced. 
With  this  report,  therefore,  I  believe  the  investigation  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  attack 
should  be  considered  completed. 

2.  Admiral  Hewitt's  report  brings  out  and  confirms  a  distinction  which 
impressed  me  at  the  time  of  studying  the  earlier  investigations,  a  distinction 
which  does  much  to  clarify  thinking  on  the  question  of  placing  responsibility  for 
the  Pearl  Harbor  disaster.  It  appears  that  there  was  no  lack  of  appreciation 
on  the  i>art  of  any  of  the  responsible  officers  that  war  was  coming,  and  coming 
quickly,  during  the  critical  period  immediately  preceeding  7  December  1941-, 
The  point  on  which  those  oflScers  failed  to  exercise  the  discernment  and  judgment 
to  be  expected  from  oflScers  occupying  their  positions,  was  their  failure  to 
appreciate,  from  the  information  available  to  them,  that  Pearl  Harbor  was  a 
likely  target  for  aerial  attack  and  their  failure  to  take  the  necessary  steps  to 
prevent  or  minimize  such  a  surprise  attack.  Elach  of  these  officers,  in  estimating 
the  critical  situation,  demonstrated  a  poor  quality  of  strategical  planning,  in 
that  he  largely  ruled  out  all  possible  courses  of  action  by  which  the  Japanese 
might  begin  the  war  except  through  an  attack  in  the  Western  Pacific. 

3.  I  do  not  believe  that  the  lack  of  more  complete  understanding  and 
co-operation  between  Admiral  Kimmel  and  Lieutenant  General  Short  had  any 
great  affect  on  the  ultimate  result;  for  it  is  abundantly  shown  that  they  each 
entertained  the  same  fallacious  views,  and  closer  understanding  would  most 
likely  merely  have  strengthened  those  views.  Likewise,  I  submit  that  the  impor- 
tance of  information  from  Japanese  sources  has  been  overemphasized ;  for  had 
more  basically  sound  principles  been  observed,  the  Pearl  Harbor  disaster  would 
not  have  occurred.    The  security  of  Pearl  Harbor  was  the  very  core  of  our 


2260     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Pacific  strategy,  a  fact  which  did  not  receive  suflScient  consideration  in  the 
strategic  concept  of  responsible  oflScers. 

[2]  4.  In  answer  to  the  specitic  questions  asked  in  the  first  endorsement, 
the  following  opinions  are  submitted : 

(a)  As  is  more  fully  developed  in  the  answer  to  question  (b),  it  is  not  believed 
that  there  is  suflBcient  evidence  to  warrant  conviction  of  any  of  the  oflScers  con- 
cerned of  any  offense  known  to  naval  law. 

(b)  Under  the  facts  of  this  case,  tliere  are  only  two  offenses  which  are  worthy 
of  consideration:  (1)  Neglect  of  Duty  and  (2)  Culpable  Inefficiency  in  the 
Performance  of  Duty.  Under  either  charge  it  would  be  necessary  to  define  the 
duty  of  the  officer  concerned,  and  to  show  that  it  was  his  duty  to  follow  a  course 
of  action  other  than  the  one  he  did.  In  my  opinion  this  would  be  impossible,  as 
the  acts  of  omi.ssion  of  the.se  officers  do  not  rise  above  the  status  of  errors  of 
judgment.  No  clearly  defined  duty  can  be  established  which  was  neglected  or 
improperly  performed.  As  stated  by  Fleet  Admiral  King,  in  his  endorsement  on 
the  findings  of  the  Ccmrt  of  Inquiry,  the  evidence  in  the  case  boils  down  to  the 
fact  that  the  acts  of  the  officers  in  question  "indicate  lack  of  superior  judgment 
necessary  for  exercising  command  commensurate  with  their  rank  and  their 
assigned  duties,  rather  than  <-ulpable  inefiiciency."  "Lack  of  Superior  Judgment" 
is  not  an  offense  triable  by  general  court-martial. 

(c)  The  charges  and  specifications  for  any  court-martial  proceedings  must 
be  filed  not  later  than  a  date  "six  months  after  the  termination  of  hostilities  in 
the  present  war  with  Japan  as  proclaimed  by  the  President  or  as  specified  in 
a  concurrent  resolution  of  the  two  Houses  of  Congress,  whichever  is  the  earlier." 
Public  Law"  77 — 79th  Congress,  approved  June  7,  194rt.  There  are  serious  doubts 
as  to  the  constitutionality  of  this  and  the  earlier  extensions  of  the  Statute  of 
Limitations  enacted  by  the  Congress  since  7  December  1941  and  applicable  to 
trials  arising  out  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  disaster  as  a  violation  of  the  Constitu- 
tional prohibition  against  ex  post  fncto  laws.  Admiral  Kimmel  has  executed 
a  waiver  of  the  Statute  of  Liniitati<ms  for  a  period  of  six  months  past  the  end 
of  the  present  war,  and  therefore  the  question  of  the  validity  of  the  Congressional 
extensions  is  not  controlling  in  his  ca.se.  However,  as  it  has  become  apparent 
since  the  time  that  Admiral  Kinnnel  was  requeste<l  to  execute  this  waiA^er  that 
other  officers  are  also  blameworthy,  it  is  my  opinion  that  the  Navy  Department 
would  be  acting  in  an  inequitable  manner  in  instituting  any  proceedings  against 
Admiral  Kimmel  on  his  waiver,  unle.ss  Admiral  Kimmel  himself  so  requests. 

[S]  (d)   The  requirements  of  39th  Article  for  the  Government  of  the  Navy 

and  Section  346  of  Naval  Courts  and  Boards  pertaining  to  the  rank  of  members 
of  a  general  court-martial  will  make  it  most  difficult  to  constitute  a  court  for  the 
trial  of  the  officers  here  concerned  during  war  time  or  during  a  period  of  six 
mxjnths  after  the  cessation  of  hostilities.  Many  of  the  officers  of  appropriate  rank, 
both  <m  the  active  and  the  retired  lists,  would  be  disqualified  because  of  interest 
in  the  subject  matter^  the  probability  of  being  called  as  a  witness,  or  by  virtue 
of  having  been  connected  with  one  of  the  investigations  into  the  matter.  If  more 
than  one  of  the  officers  in  question  are  brought  to  trial,  an  entirely  new  court 
would  be  necessary  in  each  case,  as  members  who  had  tried  a  former  case  arising 
out  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  attack  would  be  subject  to  challenge.  The  Summoning 
of  the  necessary  witnesses  would  result  in  temporarily  removing  from  their  duty 
Statiotfs  many  of  the  key  officers  in  the  naval  organization.  For  the  foregoing 
reasons,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  any  such  court  martial  proceedings  prior  to 
the  end  of  hostilities  with  Japan  is  highly  impractical  and  wotild  be  detrimental 
to  the  war  effort,  and  further,  that  any  such  proceedings  during  the  six  months 
immediately  following  the  end  of  hostilities  would  seriously  impair  the  efficiency 
of  the  naval  service. 

5.  Notwithstanding  the  difficulties  pointed  out  above,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that 
the  Navy  Department  is  morally  obligated  to  order  Admiral  Kimmel  tried  by 
general  court-martial  should  Admiral  Kimmel  so  insist.  In  August  1943,  Secre- 
tary Knox  sent  Admiral  Kimmel  a  memorandum  from  which  the  following  is 
quoted,  "I  feel  that  it  would  be  to  the  best  interests  of  all  concerned  if  you  should 
now  agree  not  to  plead  the  statute  of  limitations  in  bar  of  trial  upon  my  assurance 
that  the  trial  will  be  had. at  the  earliest  practicable  date."  And  in  Admiral  Kim- 
mel's  waiver  he  agreed.  "I  will  not  plead,  nor  permit  any  attorney  or  other  person 
on  my  behalf  to  plead,  the  statute  of  limitations  in  bar  of  my  trial  by  General 
Court-Martial  in  open  court  for  any  alleged  offenses  with  which  I  may  be  charged 
relating  to  the  period  on  or  before  Dember  (sic)  7th,  1941,  should  my  trial  be 
held  during  the  present  war  or  within  six  (6)  months  thereafter." 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2261 

6.  I  suggest  that  this  record  l)e  made  available  to  Admiral  Kimmel  and  his 
counsel ;  that  Admiral  Kimmel  be  informed  that  he  is  free  to  make  public  anything 
contained  in  this  record  and  prior  records  as  soon  as  that  may  be  done  without 
prejudice  to  the  public  interests;  that  if  he  insists,  a  general  court-martial  will 
be  convened  to  try  him  for  alleged  offenses  he  may  have  committed  on  or  before 
December  7,  1941 ;  and  that  his  decision  be  abided. 

/s/    T.  L.  Gatch. 
T.  L.  Gatch. 


The  Secretary  of  the  Navy's  First  Endorsement  on  the  Report  of  Further 
Pearl  Harbor  Investigation  by  Admiral  H.  K.  Hewitt,  U.  S.  Navy 

The  Secret^-ry  of  the  Navy 

Washington 
First  Endorsement. 
To:  The  Judge  Advocate  General. 

Commander-in-Chief,  United  States  Fleet  and 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations.  ' 

Subject:  Record  of  proceedings  and  Report  of  further  Pearl  Harbor  investiga- 
tion by  Admiral  H.  Kent  Hewitt,  USN. 

1.  Forwarded  for  comment  and  recommendation. 

2.  The  endorsement  by  the  Judge  Advocate  General  will  include  his  opinion 
(a)  as  to  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  to  warrant  court-martial  or  other 
proceedings,  (b)  as  to  the  offense  or  offenses  which  might  be  made  the  subject 
of  court-martial  or  other  proceedings,  assuming  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence 
concerning  such  offense  or  offenses,  (c)  as  to  the  date  prior  to  which  any  such 
court-martial  or  other  proceeding  must  be  in.stituted,  and  (d)  as  to  the  practi- 
cability of  any  such  court-martial  or  other  proceeding  prior  to  the  termination 
of  hostilities  with  Japan,  particularly  in  view  of  the  regulations  concerning  the 
comiK»sition  of  a  court  and  in  view  of  the  necessity  of  obtaining  testimony  from 
witnesses  engaged  in  operaticms  against  the  enemy. 

3.  The  endorsement  by  the  Commander-in-Chief,  United  States  Fleet  and 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations  will  include  his  opinion  (a)  as  to  the  sufficiency  of  the 
evidence  to  warrant  court-martial  or  otiier  proceedings,  (b)  as  to  the  practica- 
bility of  any  such  court-martial  or  other  proceeding  prior  to  the  termination  of 
hostilities  with  Japan,  particularly  in  view  of  the  regulations  concerning  the 
composition  of  a  court  and  in  view  of  the  necessity  of  obtaining  testimony  from 
witnesses  engaged  in  operations  against  the  enemy,  and  (c)  as  to  the  advisa- 
bility of  any  such  court-martial  or  other  proceeding  prior  to  the  termination 
of  hostilities  with  .lapan,  particularly  in  view  of  the  po.ssihility  of  disclosure  of 
information  relating  to  current  and  prospective  military  operations  and  to 
national  security. 

Forbestal, 


Report  of  Further  Investigation  Into  the  Facts  Surrounding  the  Japanese 
Attack  on  Pearl  Harbor,  7  December  1941,  by  Admiral  H.  K.  Hewitt, 
U.  S.  Navy 

12  July,  1945. 
From:  H.  Kent  Hewitt,  Admiral,  U.  S.  Navy. 
To :  The  Secretary  of  tiie  Navy. 
Subject:  Report  of  further  investigation  in  the  facts  surrounding  the  Japanese 

attack  on  Pearl  Harbor,  7  December  1941. 
Reference : 

(a)  Report  of  Commission  appointed  by  the  President  to  investigate  and 

report  the  facts  lelating  to  the  Japanese  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor,  7 
December,  1941. 

(b)  Record  of  examination  of  witiies.ses  having  knowledge  of  the  facts  in  con- 

nection   with    the   Japanese   attack    cm    Pearl    Harbor,   conducted   by 
Admiral  Tlwimas  C.  Hart,  USN  (Ret.). 

(c)  Public  Law  339,  78th  Congress. 

(d)  Precept  appointing  Naval  Pearl  Harbor  Court  of  Inquiry,  13  July  1944. 


2262    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(e)  Record  of  proceedings  and   report   of  Naval  Pearl  Harbor  Court  of 

Inquiry. 

(f)  First  Endorsement,   dated  2  November  11)44,   by   the  Judge  Advocate 

General,  and  Second  Endorsement,  dated  6  November  1944,  by  Com- 
mander in  Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet  and  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  to  record 
of  proceedings  of  Naval  Pearl  Harbor  Court  of  Inquiry. 

(g)  Report  of  Army  Pearl  Harbor  Board,  dated  20  October  1944. 

(h)  Letter  3  December  1944  from  Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet  and  Chief 
of  Naval  Operations,  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  on  report  of  Army 
Pearl  Harbor  Board. 

(i)  Procebt  2  May  1945  appointing  H.  Kent  Hewitt,  Admiral,  U.  S.  Navy,  to 
conduct  further  Pearl  Harbor  investigation. 

(j)  Memorandum  18  May  1945,  concerning  the  scope  of  the  further  investi- 
gation and  approval  thereof  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

(k)  Precept  6  July  1945  amending  reference  (i). 
Enclosure : 

(A)  Report  of  further  investigation  into  the  facts  surrounding  the  Japanese 

attack  on  Pearl  Harbor,  7  December  1941. 

(B)  Record  of  proceedings  of  this  investigation  and  exhibits  therein. 

1.  Tlie  precept  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  dated  2  May  1945,  reference  (i) 
as  amended  by  reference  (k),  directed  that  Admiral  H.  Kent  Hewitt,  USN„ 
make  a  study  of  the  previous  investigations,  that  such  further  investigation  as 
might  appear  to  be  necessary  be  then  conducted,  and,  that  upon  completion  of 
the  investigation  a  report  be  submitted  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  setting  forth 
the  findings  and  conclusions  reached. 

2.  Review  of  the  previous  investigations  disclosed  that  various  matters  of 
Importance,  principally  concerning  intelligence,  had  not  been  investigated  thor- 
oughly. The  subjects  proposed  for  further  investigation  were  approved  by  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  on  21  May  1945. 

3.  Counsel  in  this  investigation  was  John  F.  Sonnett,  Special  Assistant  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy.  Also  assisting  were  Lieutenant  Commander  Benjamin 
H.  Griswold,  III,  USNR,  and  Lieutenant  John  Ford  Baecher,  USNR.  The  re- 
porters were  Ship's  Clerk  Ben  Harold,  USNR,  and  Chief  Yeoman  Raymond  E. 
Reese,  USNR.  These  men  took  a  special  oath  to  maintain  the  security  of  the 
information  developed  during  the  investigation. 

4.  During  this  proceeding,  which  commenced  14  May  1945,  the  testimony  of 
38  witnesses,  some  of  whom  had  testified  previously,  was  taken  on  26  day,  at 
Washington,  D.  C,  at  San  Francisco,  and  at  Pearl  Harbor.  81  exhibits  were 
received. 

5.  Delivered  herewith  are  the  report  of  this  further  investigation  (Enclosure 
A),  and  the  record  of  proceedings  and  exhibits  therein  (Enclosure  B).  In  pre- 
paring this  report,  an  effort  has  been  made  to  present,  in  one  document,  the  essen- 
tial facts  within  the  scope  of  this  inquiry  which  have  been  developed  by  this  and 
preceding  investigations. 

H.  Kent  Hewitt, 

Rbi^rt  by  Admiral  H.  K.  Hewitt  on  FtrETHEB  Pearl  Harbor  Investigation 

TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 
Introduction.    Prior  Investigations  and  Scope  of  this  Investigation.  Page  * 

A.  The  Roberts  Commission 1 

B.  Admiral  Hart's  Investigation 4 

C.  Naval  Court  of  Inquiry 4 

D.  Army  Pearl  Harbor  Report 11 

E.  Findings  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  and  further  Investigation 14 

F.  Witnesses  in  this  Investigation 15 

G.  Exhibits  received  In  this  investigation 18 

Seeton  I.     The  War  and  Defense  Plans. 

A.  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  Operating  Plan  Rainbow  Five 23 

B.  Joint     Coastal     Frontier     Defense     Plan,      Hawaiian     Theater,      Orange 

14NB-JCD-42 31 

C.  Annex  VII,  Section  VI,  to  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan 34 

D.  Joint  estimate  covering  Army  and  Navy  air  action  in  the  event  of  sudden 

hostile  action  against  Oahu 35 

E.  Naval  Base  Defense  Force  Operation  Plan  No.  1-41  and  Naval  Base  Defense 

Air  Force  Plan 37 

F.  Pacific  Fleet  Letter  on  security  of  the  fleet  at  base  and  In  operating  areas 39 

G.  Execution  of  Plans  prior  to  7  December  1941 41 

H.  Admiral  Kimmel's  Views  as  to  the  possibility  of  a  surprise  air  attack 42 

I.  Adequacy  of  forces  to  carry  out  tasks  assigned 44 

J.  Command    Organization 45 

Findings 49 

'  Pages  referred  to  are  indicated  by  italic  figures  enclosed  by  brackets  and  represent  pages 
of  original  exhibit. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  2263 

Section  II.    Japanese  Espionage  at  Hawaii.  Page  ' 

Espionage    Reports 53 

FindiugH 21         59 

Section  III.    Naval  Intelliffence  and  Events  Preliminary  to  the  Attack. 

A.  The  organization  of  Naval  Inteiligence  in  generai  ;  sources  of  information, 

and  relations  with  the  Paeilic  Fleet 60 

B.  The  approach  of  war ;  intercepted  communications  available  at  Washington 

and  messages  sent  by  CNO  to  Admiral  Kimmel. 

1.  The  resignation  of  the  Japanese  Cabinet  and  October  16th  dispatch 62 

2.  Japanese  messages  concerning  German  attitude  ;   Nomura's  desire  to 

resign g3 

3.  Action  talcen  by  Admiral  Kimmel 64 

4.  The  tirst  Japanese  deadline  message  ;  Japanese  interest  In  American 

ships 65 

5.  Arrival  of  Kurusu  ;  Stark  and  Marshall  recommendations  as  to  ulti- 

matum   gg 

6.  Further  and  final  Japanese  "deadline  messages  " III"  _~ I  66 

7.  The  November  24th  dispatch  to  CincPac  and  others I__II  67 

8.  Dispatches  concerning  reenforcement  of  Wuke  and  Midway 68 

,?•  Intercepted  Japanese  communications  of  November  26th  and  27th 69 

10.  The  State  Department  note  of  November  26th  and  Japanese  reaction 

thereto  ;  the  war  warning  of  November  27th 70 

11.  The  dispatch  of  November  28th 73 

12.  Intercepted  diplomatic  communications,  November  29  t«  6  December 

1941 y^ 

13.  Intercepted  Japanese  espionage  messages  between  29  November  and  6 


December   1!)41- 


82 


14.  Intercepted  message  advising  of  fourteen-part  reply  by  Japanese  and 
,K    ^      hrst  thirteen  parts  of  reply — 6  December  1941 8'' 

15.  Communications  intercepted  on  7  December  1941 83 

16.  Delivery  of  part  14  and  the  1  p.  m.  message  and  action  takeii 85 

17.  Messages  sent  to  Admiral  Kimmel  between  29  November  and  7  December 

18.  Admiral  Kimmel's  failure  t~o  transmit  informat^onfo  subordinate  com" 

manders o- 

9:  ^^^  interception  of  Japanese  telephone  and  cable  messages ~__  88 

D.  The  "winds"  code  and  the  alleged  "winds"  message. 

1.  Prior   investigations grj 

2.  The  basis  o'f  the  previous  findings  that  there  was"  a   "winds"  "execute 

message  prior  to  the  attack 9Y 

3.  Evidence  obtained  in  this  investigation  concerning  "winds"  message  100 
B.  Information  concerning  the  organization  of  the  Japanese  Navy             b         -  v 

1.  ONI  report  of  25  July  1941 __  ^(^^ 

2    Pacific  Fleet  Intelligence  Bulletin  No.  45-41 I-I-I"--~II~"I"""  107 

F.  Information  concerning  the  location  and  movements  of  Japanese  naval  forces 

o    Information  available  at  the  time  of  the  war  warning 110 

2.  Admiral  Kimmel's  source  of  information  after  the  war  warnlng___  111 
Flndln  ^°'*''"™*t'*'°  received  by  Admiral  Kimmel  after  the  war  warning I  112 

Section  IV.  Reconnaissance'.  ^~^ 

A.  The  Responsibility  for  Long  Distance  Reconnaissance _  1^4 

B.  Reconnaissance  Conducted  from  Oahu_-_       __"__!_  ~_  1^^ 

C.  Proposed  Army  Reconnaissance  to  Jaluit I IZ_I__IIIII  136 

S"  mu     Direction  to  Execute  an  Appropriate  Defensive  Deployment  _  137 

S-  Z^^  Reconnaissance  that  could  have  been  flown i^T 

F.  The  Sectors  which  would  have  been  covered  __             '              "  iqq 

Findings "  jjn 

Section  V.   The  Attack  on  Pearl  Harbor.      ~ 

A.  Japanese  submarines  on  7  December  1941 143 

B.  Suspicious  submarine  contacts  prior  to  7  December  1941~ I_~"  148 

C.  Detection  of  Aircraft  by  the  Army  Radar  System ~  140 

D.  The  Air  Attack _        __~imZ"~I  140 

E.  Location  of  Pacific  Fleet  Units "            ""  {I? 

F.  Condition    of    Readiness i^4 

G.  Reaction  to  the  Attack I I~IIIII~IIIII"II~IIII  153 

?-rJ^°™i?°**'*^'<'"  '^"'I  ^o^<'">^°ts  of  the  Attacking  Force  I_  _     ~           "     '  155 

I.  The  Casualties  and  Damage -         __  i^^ 

Findings r ;:_:: ::":—:": — : :-  Js? 

Section  VI.  Findings  and  Conclusions.  ~  ~     ~ 

A.  Restatement   of  Findings __     _   _  150 

B.  Conclusions I ^ J  jjg 

of  or^^nal'^exhTbit  *°  ^^^  Indi^-ated  by  italic  figures  enclosed  by  brackets  and  represent  pages 
[1]        INTRODUCTION — PRIOR  INVESTIGATIONS  AND  SCOPE  OF  THIS  INVESTIGATION 

A.  The  Roberts  Cormnission. 

Pursuant  to  Executive  Order  dated  December  1941,  a  Coininission,  headed 
by  Mr.  Justice  Owen  J.  Roberts,  conducted  an  investigation  into  the  facts  sur- 
rounding the  Japanese  attack  on  Pearl  Harl)or.  The  Commission  reported  its 
findings  on  23  January  1942  and  concluded  : 

"1.  Effective  utilization  of  the  military  power  of  the  Nation  is  essential  to 
success  in  war  and  requires:  First,  the  coordination  of  the  foreign  and  military 

policies  of  the  Nation ;  and,  second,  the  coordination  of  the  operations  of  the 
Army  and  Navy. 


2264     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

"2.  The  Secretary  of  State  fulfilled  his  obligations  by  keeping-  the  War  and 
Navy  Departments  in  close  touch  with  the  international  situation  and  fully  advis- 
ing them  respecting  the  course  and  probable  termination  of  negotiations  with 
Japan. 

"3.  The  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  fulfilled  their  obliga- 
tions by  conferring  frequently  with  the  Secretary  of  State  and  with  each  other 
and  by  keeping  the  Chief  of  Staff  and  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  informed 
of  the  course  of  the  negotiations  with  Japan  and  the  significant  implications 
thereof. 

"4.  The  Chief  of  Staff  and  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  fulfilled  their  obliga- 
tions by  consulting  and  cooperating  with  each  other  and  with  their  superiors, 
respecting  the  joint  defense  of  the  Hawaiian  coastal  frontier;  and  each  knew  of, 
and  concurred  in,  the  warnings  and  orders  sent  by  the  other  to  the  responsible 
commanders  with  respect  to  such  defense. 

"5.  The  Cliief  of  Staff  of  the  Army  fulfilled  his  connnand  responsibilities  by 
issuing  a  direct  order  in  connection  with  his  warning  of  probable  hostilities,  in 
the  following  words:  'Prior  to  hostile  Japanese  action  you  are  directed  to  under- 
take such  reconnaissance  and  other  measures  as  you  deem  necessary.' 

"6.  The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  fulfilled  his  command  responsibility  by  issu- 
ing a  warning  and  by  giving  a  direct  order  to  the  connnander  in  chief,  Pacific 
Fleet,  in  the  following  words: 

"  'This  despatch  is  to  be  considered  a  war  warning.' 
and 

"  'Execute  an  appropriate  defensive  deployment  preparatory  to  carrying  out  the 
tasks  assigned.' 

[2]  "7.  The  responsible  connnanders  in  the  Hawaiian  area,  in  fulfillment  of 
their  obligation  to  do  so,  prepared  plans  which,  if  adapted  to  and  used  for  the 
existing  eniergency,  would  have  been  adequate. 

"8.  In  the  circumstances  the  responsibility  of  these  commanders  was  to  confer 
upon  the  question  of  putting  into  effect  and  adapting  their  joint  defense  plans. 

"9.  These  commanders  failed  to  ccmfer  with  respect  to  the  warnings  and  orders 
issued  on  and  after  November  27,  and  to  adapt  and  use  existing  plans  to  meet 
the  emergency. 

"10.  Tlie  order  for  alert  No.  1  of  the  Army  command  in  Hawaii  was  not  ade- 
quate to  meet  the  emergency  envisaged  in  the  warning  messages. 

"11.  The  state  of  readiness  of  the  Naval  forces  on  the  morning  of  December  7 
was  not  such  as  was  required  to  meet  the  emergency  envisaged  in  the  warning 
messages. 

"12.  Had  orders  issued  by  the  Chief  of  Staff  and  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations 
November  27,  1941,  been  complied  with,  the  aircraft  warning  system  of  the  Army 
should  have  been  operating;  the  distant  reconnaissance  of  the  Navy,  and  the 
inshore  air  patrol  of  the  Army,  should  have  been  maintained;  the  antiaircraft 
batteries  of  the  Army  and  similar  shore  batteries  of  the  Navy,  as  well  as  additional 
antiaircraft  artillery  located  on  vessels  of  the  fleet  in  Pearl  Harbor,  should  have 
been  manned  and  supplied  with  ammunition;  and  a  high  state  of  readiness  of 
aircraft  should  have  been  in  effect.  None  of  these  conditions  was  in  fact  inaug- 
urated or  maintained  for  the  reason  that  the  responsible  commanders  failed  to 
consult  and  cooperate  as  to  necessary  action  based  upon  the  warnings  and  to 
adopt  measures  enjoined  by  the  orders  given  them  by  the  chiefs  of  the  Army  and 
Navy  commands  in  Washington. 

"13.  There  were  deficiencies  in  personnel,  weapons,  equipment,  and  facilities  to 
maintain  all  the  defenses  on  a  war  footing  for  extended  periods  of  time,  but  these 
deficiencies  should  not  have  affected  the  decision  of  the  responsible  commanders 
as  to  the  state  of  readines  to  be  prescribefl. 

"14.  The  warning  message  of  December  7,  intended  to  reach  both  commanders 
in  the  field  at  about  7  a.  m.  Hawaiian  time.  December  7.  1941,  was  but  an  added 
precaution,  in  view  of  the  warnings  and  orders  i>reviously  issued.  If  the  message 
had  reached  its  destination  at  the  time  intended,  it  would  still  have  been  too  late 
to  be  of  substantial  u.se,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  commanders  had  failed  to 
take  measures  and  make  dispositions  prior  to  the  time  of  its  anticipated  receipt 
which  would  have  been  effective  to  warn  of  the  attack  or  to  meet  it. 

[3]  "l.").  The  failure  of  the  officers  in  the  War  Department  to  observe  that 
General  Short,  neither  in  his  reply  of  November  27  to  the  Chief  of  Staffs  message 
of  that  date,  nor  otherwi.«e.  had  reported  the  measures  taken  by  him  and  the 
transmission  of  two  messages  concerned  chiefly  with  sabotage  which  warned 
him  not  to  resort  to  illegal  methods  against  sabotage  or  espionage,  and  not  to 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2265 

take  measures  which  would  alarm  the  civil  population,  and  the  failure  to  reply 
to  his  message  of  November  2!)  outlining  in  full  all  the  actions  he  had  taken 
against  sabotage  only,  and  referring  to  nothing  else,  tended  to  lead  General 
Short  to  believe  that  what  he  had  done  met  the  requirements  of  the  warnings 
and  orders  received  by  him. 

"16.  The  failure  of  the  commanding  general,  Hawaiian  Department,  and  the 
commander  in  chief,  I'aciflc  Fleet,  to  confer  and  cooperate  with  respect  to  the 
meaning  of  the  warnings  received  and  the  measures  nece.ssay  to  comply  with 
the  orders  given  them  under  date  of  November  27.  1941,  resulted  largely  from 
a  sense  of  security  due  to  the  opinion  prevalent  in  diplomatic,  military  and 
naval  circles,  and  in  the  public  press,  that  any  immediate  attack  by  Japan 
would  be  in  the  Far  East.  The  existence  of  such  a  view,  however  prevalent, 
did  not  relieve  the  commanders  of  the  responsibility  for  the  security  of  the 
Pacitic  Fleet  and  our  most  important  outpost. 

"17.  In  the  light  of  the  warnings  and  directions  to  take  appropriate  action, 
transmitted  to  both  commanders  between  November  27  and  December  7,  and  the 
obligation  under  the  system  of  coordination  then  in  effect  for  joint  cooi)erative 
action  on  their  part,  it  was  a  derelection  of  duty  on  the  part  of  each  of  them  not 
to  consult  and  confer  with  the  other  respecting  the  meaning  and  intent  of  the 
warnings,  and  the  appropriate  measures  of  defense  reuired  by  the  imminence 
of  hostilities.  The  attitude  of  each,  that  the  was  not  reuired  to  inform  himself 
of,  and  his  lack  of  interest  in,  the  measures  undertaken  by  the  other  to  carry 
out  the  responsibility  assigned  to  such  other  under  the  provisions  of  the  plans 
then  in  effect,  demonstrated  on  the  part  of  each  a  lack  of  appreciation  of  the 
responsibilities  vested  in  them  and  inherent  in  their  positions  as  commander 
in  chief.  Pacific  Fleet,  and  commanding  general,  Hawaiian  Department. 

"19.  Causes  contributory  to  the  .success  of  the  Japanese  attack  were : 

Disregard  of  international  law  and  custom  relating  to  declaration  of  war 
by  the  Japanese  and  the  adherence  by  the  United  States  to  such  laws  and 
customs. 

Restrictions  which  prevented  effective  counterespionage. 

Emphasis  in  the  warning  messages  on  the  probability  of  aggressive  action 
in  the  Far  East,  and  on  antisabotage  measures. 

14]  Failure  of  the  War  Department  to  reply  to  the  message  relat- 
ing to  the  antisabotage  measures  instituted  by  the  Commanding  General, 
Hawaiian  Department. 

Nonreceipt  by  the  interested  parties,  prior  to  the  attack,  of  the  warning 
message  of  December  7,  1941. 

"20.  When  the  attack  develoi>ed  on  the  morning  of  December  7,  1941,  the 
officers  and  enli.sted  men  of  both  services  were  present  in  sufficient  number  and 
were  in  Ht  condition  to  perft)rm  any  duty.  Except  for  a  negligible  number, 
the  use  of  intoxicating  liquor  on  the  preceding  evening  did  not  affect  tJieir 
efficiency. 

"21.  Subordinate  commanders  executed  their  superiors'  orders  without  ques- 
tion.   They  were  not  responsible  for  the  state  of  readiness  prescribed." 

B.  Admiral  Hart's  Investigation. 

Pursuant  to  precept  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  dated  12  February  1944, 
Admiral  Thomas  C.  Hart,  USN  (Retired),  conducted  an  examination  of  wit- 
nesses having  knowledge  of  facts  in  connection  with  the  Japanese  attack. 
Admiral  Hart  completed  his  examination  on  15  June  1944. 

C.  Naval  Court  of  Inquiry. 

Public  Law  No.  339.  7Sth  Congress,  approved  13  June  1944,  directed  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  severally,  to  proceed  forthwith  to 
investigate  the  facts  surrounding  the  Pearl  Harbor  catastrophe,  and  to  com- 
mence such  proceedings  against  such  persons  as  the  facts  might  justify. 

A  Court  of  Inquiry,  consisting  of  Admiral  Orin  (}.  Murfin,  I'SN  (Retired), 
Admiral  Edward  C  Kalbfus,  USN  (Retired),  and  Vice  Admiral  Adolphus  An- 
drews, USN  (Retired),  with  Commander  Harold  Biesemeier,  USN,  as  Judge 
Advocate,  was  appointed  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  on  13  July  1944.  The 
Court  was  directed  to  convene  on  17  July  1944,  or  as  soon  thereafter  as  prac- 
ticable, for  the  purpose  of  inquiring  into  all  circumstances  connected  with  the 
attack  made  by  Japane.se  forces  on  Pearl  Harbor,  Territory  of  Hawaii,  on  7 
December  1941 ;  to  inquire  thoroughly  into  the  matter,  and  to  include  in  its 

79716  0—46 — pt.  16- 28 


2266     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

findings  a  full  statement  of  the  facts  it  might  deem  to  be  established.  The 
Court  was  further  directed  to  state  its  opinion  as  to  whether  any  offenses  were 
committed  or  serious  blame  incurred  on  the  part  of  any  person  or  persons  in 
the  Naval  service,  and,  in  case  its  opinion  was  that  offenses  had  been  committed 
or  serious  blame  incurred,  to  recommend  specifically  what  further  proceedings 
should  be  had.  The  Court  of  Inquiry  commenced  its  proceedings  on  31  July 
1944,  and  submitted  the  record  of  its  proceedings  on  20  October  1944. 

[5]         The  Court  of  Inquiry  concluded: 

"Basetl  on  finding  II,  the  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  presence  of  a  large 
number  of  combatant  vessels  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  in  Pearl  Harbor  on  7  December 
1941,  was  necessary,  and  that  the  information  available  to  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  did  not  require  any  departure  from  his  operating  and  mainte- 
nance schedules. 

"Based  on  Finding  III,  the  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  Constitutional 
requirement  that,  prior  to  a  declaration  of  war  by  the  Congress,  no  blow  may  be 
struck  until  after  a  hostile  attack  has  been  delivered,  prevented  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  from  taking  offensive  action  as  a  means  of  defense  in  the 
event  of  Japanese  vessels  or  planes  appearing  in  the  Hawaiian  area,  and  that  it 
imposed  upon  him  the  responsibility  of  avoiding  taking  any  action  which  might 
be  construed  as  an  overt  act. 

"Based  cm  Finding  V,  the  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  relations  between 
Admiral  Husband  E.  Kimmel.  U.S.N.,  and  Lieut.  General  Walter  C.  Short,  U.  S. 
Army,  were  friendly,  cordial  and  cooperative,  that  there  was  no  lack  of  interest, 
no  lack  of  appreciation  of  responsibility,  and  no  failure  to  cooperate  on  the  part 
of  either,  and  that  each  was  cognizant  of  the  measures  being  undertaken  by  the 
other  for  the  defense  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  Naval  Base  to  the  degree  required  by 
the  common  interest. 

"Based  on  Finding  VI,  the  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  deficiencies  in  per- 
sonnel and  material  which  existed  during  1941,  had  a  direct  adverse  bearing 
upon  the  effectiveness  of  the  defense  of  Pearl  Harbor  on  and  prior  to  7  December. 

"Based  on  Finding  VII,  the  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  superiority  of  the 
Japane.se  Fleet  over  the  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  during  the  year  1941,  and  the  ability 
of  Japan  to  obtain  military  and  naval  information  gave  her  an  initial  advantage 
not  attainable  by  the  United  States  up  to  7  December  1941. 

"Ba.sed  on  Finding  VIII,  the  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  defense  of  the  Pearl 
Harbor  Naval  Base  was  the  direct  responsibility  of  the  Army,  that  the  Navy  was 
to  assist  only  with  the  means  provided  the  14th  Naval  District,  and  that  the 
defense  of  the  base  was  a  joint  operation  only  to  this  extent.  The  Court  is  further 
of  the  opinion  that  the  defense  should  have  been  such  as  to  function  effectively 
independently  of  the  Fleet,  in  view  of  the  fundamental  requirement  that  the 
strategic  freedom  of  action  of  the  Fleet  must  be  assured  demands  that  the  defense 
of  a  permanent  naval  base  be  so  effectively  provided  for  and  conducted  as  to 
remove  any  anxiety  of  the  Fleet  in  regard  to  the  security  of  the  base,  or  for  that 
of  the  vessels  within  its  limits. 

[6]  "Based  on  Findings  IV,  VIII  and  IX.  the  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that 
the  duties  of  Rear  Admiral  Claude  C.  Bloch,  U.S.N.,  in  connection  with  the  defense 
of  Pearl  Harbor,  were  performed  satisfactorily. 

"Based  on  Finding  IX,  the  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  detailed  Naval 
Participation  Air  Defense  plans  drawn  up  and  jointly  agreed  upon  were  com- 
plete and  sound  in  concept,  but  that  they  contained  a  basic  defect  in  that  naval 
participation  depended  entirely  upon  the  availability  of  aircraft  belonging  to 
and  being  employed  by  the  Fleet,  and  that  on  the  morning  of  7  December  these 
plans  were  ineffective  because  they  necessarily  were  drawn  on  the  premise  that 
there  would  be  advance  knowledge  that  an  attack  was  to  be  expected  within 
narrow  limits  of  time,  which  was  not  the  case  on  that  morning. 

"The  Court  is  further  of  the  opinion  that  it  was  not  possible  for  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific  Fleet,  to  make  his  Fleet  planes  permanently  available 
to  the  Naval  Ba.se  Defense  OflBcer  in  view  of  the  need  for  their  employment  with 
the  Fleet. 

"Based  on  Finding  X,  the  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  Admiral  Kimmel's  action, 
taken  immediately  after  assuming  command,  in  placing  in  effect  comprehensive 
instructions  for  the  security  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  at  sea  and  in  the  operating  areas, 
is  indicative  of  his  appreciation  of  his  responsibility  for  the  security  of  the  Fleet, 
and  that  the  steps  taken  were  adequate  and  effective. 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2267 

"Based  on  Finding  XI,  the  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that,  by  virtue  of  the  informa- 
tion that  Admiral  Kimmel  had  at  hand  which  Indicated  neither  the  possibility 
nor  the  imminence  of  an  air  attack  on  Pear  Harbor,  and  bearing  in  mind  that  he 
had  not  knowledge  of  the  State  Department's  note  of  26  November,  the  Navy's 
condition  of  readiness  on  the  morning  of  7  December,  1941,  which  resulted  in  the 
hostile  planes  being  brought  under  heavy  fire  of  the  ships'  anti-aircraft  batteries 
as  they  came  within  range,  was  that  best  suited  to  the  circumstances,  although 
had  all  anti-aircraft  batteries  been  manned  in  advance,  the  total  damage  in- 
flicted on  ships  would  have  been  lessened  to  a  minor  extent  and  to  a  degree 
which  is  problematical ;  and  that,  had  the  Fleet  patrol  planes,  slow  and  unsuited 
for  aerial  combat,  been  in  the  air,  they  might  have  escaped  and  the  number  of 
these  planes  lost  might  thus  have  been  reduced. 

"The  Court  is  of  the  opinion,  however,  that  only  had  it  been  known  in  advance 
that  the  attack  would  take  place  on  7  December,  could  there  now  be  any  basis 
for  a  conclusion  as  to  the  steps  that  might  have  been  taken  to  lessen  its  ill  effects, 
and  that,  beyond  the  fact  that  conditions  were  unsettled  and  that,  therefore, 
anything  might  happen,  there  was  nothing  to  distinguish  one  day  from  another 
in  so  far  as  expectation  of  attack  is  concerned. 

[7]  "It  has  been  suggested  that  each  day  all  naval  planes  should  have  been 
in  the  air,  all  naval  personnel  at  their  stations,  and  all  anti-aircraft  guns  manned. 
The  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  wisdom  of  this  is  questionable  when  it  is  con- 
sidered that  it  could  not  be  known  when  an  attack  would  take  place  and  that,  to 
make  sure,  it  would  have  been  necessary  to  impose  a  state  of  tension  on  the 
personnel  day  after  day,  and  to  disrupt  the  maintenance  and  operating  schedules 
of  ships  and  planes  beginning  at  an  indefinite  date  between  16  October  and  7 
December. 

"Based  on  Finding  XII,  the  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that,  as  no  information  of 
any  sort  was  at  any  time  either  forwarded  or  received  from  any  source  which 
would  indicate  that  Japanese  carriers  or  other  Japanese  ships  were  on  their  way 
to  Hawaii  during  November  or  December,  1941,  the  attack  of  7  December  at 
Pearl  Harbor,  delivered  under  the  circumstances  then  existing,  was  unpreventable 
and  that  when  it  would  take  place  was  unpredictable. 

"Based  on  Finding  XIII,  the  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  action  of  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  in  ordering  that  no  routine,  long-range  recon- 
naissance be  undertaken  was  sound  and  that  the  use  of  Fleet  patrol  planes  for 
daily,  long-range,  all-around  reconnaissance  was  not  possible  with  the  inadequate 
number  of  Fleet  planes  available,  and  was  not  justified  in  the  absence  of  any 
information  indicating  that  an  attack  was  to  be  expected  in  the  Hawaiian  area 
within  narrow  limits  of  time. 

"Based  on  Finding  XIV,  the  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  shore-based  air 
warning  system,  an  Army  service  under  the  direct  control  of  the  Army,  was  inef- 
fective on  the  morning  of  7  December,  in  that  there  was  no  provision  for  keeping 
track  of  planes  in  the  air  near  and  over  Oahu,  and  for  distinguishing  between  those 
friendly  and  those  hostile  and  that,  because  of  this  deficiency,  a  flight  of  planes 
which  appeared  on  the  radar  screen  shortly  after  0700  was  confused  with  a  flight 
of  Army  B-17s  en  route  from  California,  and  that  the  information  obtained  by 
Army  radar  was  valueless  as  a  warniTig,  because  the  planes  could  not  be  identified 
as  hostile  until  the  Japanese  markings  on  their  wings  came  into  view. 

"Based  on  Finding  XV,  the  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  by  far  the  greatest 
portion  of  the  damage  inflicted  by  the  Japanese  on  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor  was  due 
to  specially  designed  Japanese  torpedoes,  the  development  and  existence  of  which 
was  unknown  to  the  United  States. 

"Based  on  Finding  XVI,  and  particularly  in  view  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Oper- 
ations' approval  of  the  precautions  taken  and  the  deployments  made  by  Admital 
Kimmel  in  accordance  with  the  directive  contained  in  the  dispatch  of  16  October 
1941.  the  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  Admiral  Kimmel's  decision  made  [8] 
after  receiving  the  dispatch  of  24  November,  to  continue  the  preparations  of  the 
Pacific  Fleet  for  war,  was  sound  in  the  light  of  the  information  then  available 
to  him. 

"Based  on  Finding  XVII,  the  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that,  although  the  attack 
of  7  December  came  as  a  surprise,  there  were  good  grounds  for  the  belief  on  the 
part  of  high  officials  in  the  State,  War,  and  Navy  Departments,  and  on  the  part  of 
the  Army  and  Navy  in  the  Hawaiian  area,  that  hostilities  would  begin  in  the 
Far  East  rather  than  elsewhere,  and  that  the  same  considerations  which  in- 
fluenced the  sentiment  of  the  authorities  in  Washington  in  this  respect,  support 
the  interpretation  which  Admiral  Kimmel  placed  upon  the  "war  warning  mes- 


2268     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

sage"  of  27  November,  to  the  effect  that  this  message  directed  attention  away  from 
Pearl  Harbor  rather  than  toward  it. 

"Based  on  Findings  XVIII  and  XIX,  the  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  Admiral 
Harold  R.  Stark,  U.  S.  N.,  (^hief  of  Naval  Operations  and  responsible  for  the 
operations  of  the  Fleet,  failed  to  display  the  sound  judgment  expected  of  him  in 
that  he  did  not  transmit  to  Admiral  Kiramel,  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet, 
during  the  very  critical  period  26  November  to  7  December,  important  information 
which  he  had  regarding  the  Japanese  situation  and,  especially,  in  that,  on  the 
morning  of  7  December,  1941  he  did  not  transmit  immediately  the  fact  that  a 
message  had  been  received  which  appeared  to  indicate  that  a  break  in  diplomatic 
relations  was  imminent,  and  that  an  attack  in  the  Hawaiian  area  might  be 
expected  soon. 

"The  Court  is  further  of  the  opinion  that,  had  this  important  information 
been  conveyed  to  Admiral  Kimmel,  it  is  a  matter  of  conjecture  as  to  what  action 
he  would  have  taken. 

"Finally,  based  upon  the  facts  established,  the  Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  no 
offenses  have  been  committed  nor  serious  blame  incurred  on  the  part  of  any 
person  or  persons  in  the  naval  service." 

[9]  Fleet  Admiral  Ernest  J.  King,  USN,  commented  in  detail  on  the  findings 
of  the  Court  of  Inquiry  in  the  Second  Endorsement  thereto.  He  concluded,  in 
part: 

"Despite  the  evidence  that  no  naval  oflicer  was  at  fault  to  a  degree  likely  to 
result  in  conviction  if  brought  to  trial,  nevertheless  the  Navy  cannot  evade  a 
share  of  responsibility  for  the  Pearl  Harbor  incident.  That  disaster  cannot  be 
regarded  as  an  "act  of  God",  beyond  human  power  to  prevent  or  mitigate.  It  is 
true  that  the  country  as  a  whole  is  basically  responsible  in  that  the  people  were 
unwilling  to  support  an  adequate  army  and  navy  until  it  was  too  late  to  repair 
the  consequences  of  past  neglect  in  time  to  deal  effectively  with  the  attack  that 
ushered  in  the  war.  It  is  true  that  the  Army  was  responsible  for  local  defense 
at  Pearl  Harbor.  Nevertheless,  some  things  could  have  been  done  by  the  Navy 
to  lessen  the  success  of  the  initial  Japanese  blow.  Admiral  Stark  and  Admiral 
Kimmel  were  the  responsible  oflicers.  and  it  is  pertinent  to  examine  the  possible 
courses  of  action  they  might  have  taken. 

"(a)  Admiral  Stark  was,  of  course,  aware  that  the  United  States  was  primarily 
concerned  with  its  own  possessions,  and  the  most  important  United  States  posses- 
sions in  the  Pacific  were  the  Philippine  Islands  and  the  Hawaiian  Islands.  His 
attention  should  have  been  centered  on  those  two  places,  as  the  Pacific  situation 
became  more  and  more  acute.  He  had  been  informed  by  Admiral  Kimmel,  in  his 
letter  of  26  May  1941,  that  Admiral  Kimmel  felt  the  need  for  early  and  accurate 
information  as  to  the  general  situation,  and  that  he  needed  to  be  informed  of  all 
important  developments  as  they  occurred  by  the  quickest  and  most  secure  means 
available.  This  letter  should  have  emphasized  the  obvious  fact  that  Admiral 
Kimmel  was  in  a  difficult  position,  that  he  had  to  use  his  initiative  to  keep  his 
Fleet  dispositions  in  step  with  changes  in  the  situation,  and  that  in  order  to  do 
so  he  had  to  have  an  accurate  running  picture  of  the  rapidly  moving  course  of 
diplomatic  events.  In  my  opinion.  Admiral  Stark  failed  to  give  Admiral  Kimmel 
an  adequate  summary  of  the  information  available  in  Washington,  particularly  in 
the  following  respects : 

"(1)  Admiral  Kimmel  was  not  informed  of  the  State  Department's  note  of 
26  November  to  the  Japanese.  This  note  was  a  definite  step  towards  breaking 
relations. 

"(2)  Admiral  Kimmel  was  not  informed  of  the  substance  of  certain  intercepted 
Japanese  messages  inquiring  as  to  dispositions  of  ships  inside  Pearl  Harbor, 
which  indicated  a  Japanese  interest  in  Pearl  Harbor  as  a  possible  target, 

"(3)  Admiral  Kimmel  was  not  informed  of  the  implementation  of  the  "Winds 
message".  Admiral  Stark  says  he  never  got  this  information  himself,  but  it  is 
clear  that  It  [10]  did  reach  Admiral  Stark's  office.  This,  together  with 
the  handling  of  other  matters  of  information,  indicates  lack  of  efficiency  in 
Admiral  Stark's  organization. 

"(4)  Admiral  Stark  failed  to  appreciate  the  significance  of  the  '1:00  p.  m. 
message'  received  on  the  morning  of  7  December,  although  the  implications  were 
appreciated  by  at  least  one  of  his  subordinates.  It  appears  that  had  this 
message  been  handled  by  the  quickest  available  means,  and  with  due  appreciation 
of  its  significance,  it  might  have  reached  Admiral  Kimmel  in  time  to  enable  him 
to  make  some  last  minute  preparations  that  would  have  enhanced  the  ability  of 
the  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor  to  meet  the  Japanese  air  attack. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2269 

"(5)  There  is  a  certain  sameness  of  tenor  of  such  information  as  Admiral 
Stark  sent  to  Admiral  Kimmel.  •  They  do  not  convey  in  themselves  the  sense 
of  Intensification  of  the  critical  relations  between  the  United  States  and  Japan. 

"(b)  In  my  opinion  Admiral  Kimmel,  despite  the  failure  of  Admiral  Stark 
to  keep  him  fully  informed,  nevertheless  did  have  some  indications  of  increasing 
tenseness  as  to  relations  witli  Japan.  In  particular,  he  had  the  'war  warning' 
message  on  27  November,  the  'hostile  action  p<issible  at  any  moment'  message 
on  28  November,  the  3  December  message  that  Japanese  had  ordered  destruction 
of  codes,  and  the  messages  of  4  and  H  Decemi)er  concerning  destruction  of  United 
States  secret  and  confidential  matter  at  outlying  Pacific  Islands.  These  messages 
must  be  con.'sidered  in  connection  with  other  facets  of  the  situation,  and  Admiral 
Kimmel's  statement  on  this  phase  of  the  matter  must  be  given  due  consideration. 
After  weighing  these  considerations,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  he  could  and  should 
have  judged  more  accurately  the  gravity  of  the  danger  to  which  the  Hawaiian 
Islands  were  exposed.     The  following  courses  of  action  were  open  to  him: 

"(1)  He  could  have  used  patrol  craft  which  were  available  to  him  to  conduct 
long  range  reconnaissance  in  the  more  dangerous  sectors.  Whether  or  not  this 
would  have  resulted  in  detecting  the  approach  of  the  Japanese  carriers  is  proble- 
matical.    However,  it  would  have  made  the  Japanese  task  more  difficult. 

"(2)  He  could  have  rotated  the  'in  port'  periods  of  his  vessels  in  a  less  routine 
manner,  so  as  to  have  made  it  impossible  for  the  Japanese  to  have  predicted 
when  there  would  be  any  vessels  in  port.  This  would  have  made  the  Japanese 
task  less  easy. 

[//]  "(3)  If  he  had  appreciated  the  gravity  of  the  danger  even  a  few  hours 
before  the  Japanese  attack,  it  is  logical  to  .suppose  that  naval  planes  would  have 
been  in  the  air  during  the  early  morning  period,  that  ships'  batteries  would 
have  been  fully  manned,  and  that  damage  control  organizations  would  have 
been  fully  operational. 

"The  derelictions  on  the  part  of  Admiral  Stark  and  Admiral  Kimmel  were 
faults  of  omission  rather  than  faults  of  commission.  In  the  case  in  question, 
they  indicate  lack  of  superior  judgment  necessary  for  exercising  conmiand 
commensurate  with  their  rank  and  their  assigned  duties,  rather  than  culpable 
inefficiency." 

D.  Army  Pearl  Harbor  Report. 

Pursuant  to  Public  Law  No.  339,  78th  Congress,  an  Army  Board  conducted 
investigation  into  the  Japanese  attack,  and  on  20  October  1944  submitted  its 
report  to  the  Secretary  of  War.  The  Army  report  discussed,  among  other 
things,  various  matters  involving  the  Navy,  such  as  the  Navy's  command  rela- 
tionships at  Hawaii,  the  "tapping"  of  the  telephone  wires  of  the  Japanese  con- 
sul in  Hawaii  by  Naval  Intelligence,  information  secured  by  Navy  I'adio  intelli- 
gence as  to  the  location  and  movements  of  Japanese  naval  forces,  the  Navy's 
responsibility  for  long  range  reconnaissance  ("The  heart  of  the  defense  of  Oahu"), 
and  the  entrance  of  Japanese  submarines  into  Pearl  Harbor  on  and  allegedly 
prior  to  7  December  1941.  The  Army  report  commented  critically  as  to  (a)  the 
Navy's  failure  to  conduct  long  range  reconnaissance,  (b)  the  Navy's  failure  to 
advise  General  Short  of  the  presence  of  a  Japanese  task  force  in  the  Jaluits  in 
late  November  1941,  (c)  the  Navy's  failure  to  advise  General  Short  of  certain 
messages,  relating  to  the  destruction  of  codes  by  the  Japanese  during  the  first 
week  of  December  1941,  and  (d)  the  Navy's  failure  to  advise  General  Short  of 
the  sinking  of  a  Japanese  submarine  on  the  morning  of  7  December  1941,  prior 
to  the  air  attack.  The  Army  report  included  a  finding  that  relations  between 
General  Short  and  Admiral  Kimmel  were  not  satisfactory,  as  a  practical  matter, 
although  cordial.  Concerning  intelligence  generally,  the  Army  report  stated, 
at  page  232 : 

"The  Japanese  armed  forces  knew  everything  about  us.  We  knew  little 
about  them.  This  was  a  problem  of  all  our  intelligence  agencies.  This  should 
not  come  to  pass  again.  Our  intelligence  service  must  be  brought  in  line  with 
the  part  which  we  are  to  play  in  world  affairs. 

"We  must  know  as  much  about  other  major  world  powers  as  they  know  about 
us.  This  is  an  absolute  condition  precedent  to  intelligent  planning  by  those 
charged  with  formulating  our  international  policies  and  providing  for  our  se- 
curity. Our  intelligence  service  should  be  second  to  none  in  its  efficiency.  It 
must  not  be  inferred  that  this  is  the  exclusive  function  of  the  M.  I.  D.  It  is  a 
national  problem. 


2270    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[121  "In  the  past  our  intelligence  service  has  suffered  from  lack  of  funds, 
lack  of  interest,  and  legal  obstacles  and  regulations.  Steps  should  be  taken  to 
correct  all  of  these." 

After  consideration  of  the  Army  Pearl  Harbor  Report,  Fleet  Admiral  King,  in 
a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  dated  3  December  1944,  stated  in  part: 

"The  Army  Board  finds  it  difficult  to  understand  the  relations  between  the 
Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Pacific  Fleet,  the  Commander  Hawaiian  Sea  Fron- 
tier, the  Commandant.  FOURTEENTH  Naval  District,  and  the  local  Air  Com- 
mander (Rear  Admiral  Bellinger).  The  Board  makes  the  comment  'The  Army 
had  a  difficult  time  in  determining  under  which  of  the  three  shells  (Kimmel, 
Bloch,  or  Bellinger)  rested  the  pea  of  performance  and  responsibility.'  My 
comment  as  to  this  is  that  there  are  some  unavoidable  complexities  in  the  Com- 
mand relationships  between  a  fleet,  a  frontier,  and  a  fleet  base  in  the  frontier. 
However,  in  this  case,  there  was  no  possibility  of  misunderstanding  the  fact 
that  all  naval  forces  were  under  Admiral  Kimmel.  He  and  General  Short 
should  have  been  able  to  work  out  better  arrangements  for  cooperation  than 
they  did.  The  reasons  why  they  did  not  have  been  discussed  in  paragraphs 
4  and  5  above. 

"The  Army  Board  stresses  the  point  that  General  Short  was  dependent  upon 
the  U.  S.  Navy  for  infonnation  as  to  what  the  Japanese  Navy  was  doing  and  for 
estimates  of  what  the  Japanese  Navy  could  do.  This  view  is  obviously  sound. 
It  was  a  naval  responsibility  to  keep  not  only  General  Short  but  also  the  War 
Department  fully  acquainted  with  the  estimate  of  the  Japanese  naval  situation. 
There  was  some  failure  to  pass  on  to  General  Short  and  the  War  Department 
information  which  should  have  been  .given  to  them  by  the  Navy,  but  the  basic 
trouble  was  that  the  Navy  failed  to  appreciate  what  the  Japanese  Navy  could, 
and  did,  do. 

"The  Army  Board  reports  on  three  matters  which  should  be  further  investi- 
gated by  the  Navy.     These  are  : 

"a.  It  was  stated  that  the  War  Department  received  information  from  some 
naval  agency  that  on  or  about  25  November  radio  intercepts  had  located  a 
Japanese  task  force,  including  carriers,  in  the  Marshall  Islands.  About  1  De- 
cember it  was  reported  that  this  force  assumed  radio  silence.  It  is  noted  in 
the  Record  that  this  information  never  got  to  General  Short.  There  is  some 
reference  to  this  incident  in  the  Record  of  the  Naval  Court,  but  it  was  not 
followed  up,  presumably  because  the  officer  who  was  Director  of  Naval  Intelli- 
gence at  the  time  was  not  called  as  a  witness.  The  matter  is  probably  not  of 
importance,  since  even  if  there  actually  was  a  Japanese  force  in  the  Marshalls 
it  apparently  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor.  However, 
for  the  sake  of  completing  the  naval  Record,  this  matter  should  be  pursued 
further. 

[13]  "b.  The  Army  Board  is  of  the  opinion  that  Japanese  midget  submarines 
operated  freely  inside  of  Pearl  Harbor  for  several  days  prior  to  the  7th  of  Decem- 
ber, for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  information.  This  opinion  is  based  on  the  testi- 
mony of  an  official  of  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation,  who  apparently 
reached  his  conclusions  by  a  study  of  certain  captured  Japanese  charts  which 
were  made  available'  to  F.  B.  I.  by  Naval  Intelligence.  So  far  as  is  known,  there 
is  no  real  ground  for  the  supposition  that  Japanese  submarines  were  able  to  roam 
around  Pearl  Harbor  at  will,  but  since  the  allegation  is  made  in  the  Army  Record, 
it  is  advisable  to  clear  up  any  doubt  that  may  exist  by  further  naval  investigation. 

"c.  There  is  reference  to  the  fact  that  information  was  obtained  from  naval 
and  F.  B.  I.  espionage  over  telephones  and  cables  in  Hawaii,  but  no  record  of 
what  this  information  was.    This  should  be  cleared  up. 

"The  Army  Board  finds  that  the  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Army  was  at  fault  in 
that  he  failed  to  keep  General  Short  informed  of  the  international  situation  and 
that  he  delayed  in  getting  critical  information  to  General  Short.  In  these  respects, 
the  Army  Report  parallels  the  Naval  Court  findings  as  to  the  Chief  of  Naval  Opera- 
tions. The  Army  Board  further  finds  that  General  Marshall  was  at  fault  and  that 
he  failed  to  keep  his  Deputies  informed  of  what  was  going  on,  so  that  they  could 
act  intelligently  in  his  absence ;  in  that  he  did  not  take  action  on  General  Short's 
report  on  28  November  that  he  had  established  'Alert  No.  1' ;  and  in  that  he 
lacked  knowledge  of  conditions  of  readiness  in  the  Hawaiian  Command. 

"The  Army  Board  finds  that  General  Short  was  at  fault  in  that  he  failed  to 
place  his  command  in  an  adequate  state  of  readiness  (the  information  which  he 
had  was  incomplete  and  confusing,  but  it  was  sufficient  to  warn  him  of  tense  re- 
lations), in  that  he  failed  to  reach  and  agreement  with  local  naval  officials  for 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2271 

implementing  joint  Army  and  Navy  plans  and  agreements  for  joint  action,  in 
that  he  failed  to  inform  himself  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  long-distance  reconnais- . 
sance  being  conducted  by  the  Navy,  and  in  that  he  failed  to  replace  ineflScient 
staff  oflBcers. 

"I  find  nothing  in  the  Record  of  the  Army  Board  to  cause  me  to  modify  the 
opinions  expressed  in  my  endorsement  on  the  Record  of  the  Naval  Court  of  In- 
quiry, except  in  relatijon  to  the  cooperation  between  Admiral  Kinnnel  and  Gen- 
eral Short.  In  view  of  the  extensive  and  explicit  Ascussion  of  this  phase  of  the 
matter  by  the  Army  Board,  I  am  no  longer  of  the  opinion  that  cooperation  be- 
tween these  two  oflScers  was  adequate  in  all  respects.  The  cordial,  but  informal, 
contact  which  they  maintained  evidently  was  not  suflScient  to  coordinate  the 
means  at  their  disposal  to  the  best  advantage.  However,  as  already  pointed  out, 
this  fault  was  part  and  parcel  of  the  [I'f]  general  blindness  to  Japanese 
potentialities  in  the  Central  Pacific  which  was  the  basic  cause  of  the  Pearl  Harbor 
disaster.  Tlie  many  details  discussed  by  the  Army  Board  and  the  Naval  Court 
are  useful  in  showing  how  this  blindness  redounded  to  our  disadvantage,  but 
they  do  not,  in  my  opinion,  prove  anything  more  than  that  the  two  naval  officers 
in  the  high  commands  concerned — Admiral  ^tark  and  Admiral  Kimmel — failed 
to  display  the  superior  judgment  they  should  have  brought  to  bear  in  analysing 
and  making  use  of  the  information  that  became  available  to  them. 

•'I  recommend  that  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  cause  further  investigation  to 
be  made  in  the  matter  referred  to  in  paragraph  8  above ;  namely,  the  alleged  radio 
contact  with  a  Japanese  force  in  the  Marshall  Islands,  the  alleged  presence  of 
Japanese  midget  submarines  inside  Pearl  Harbor  prior  to  7  December,  and  the 
substance  of  information  obtained  by  naval  and  F.  B.  I.  telephone  and  cable  in- 
tercept^. I  do  not  think  it  necessary  to  reconvene  the  Court  for  this  purpose, 
The  proposed  investigation  could  be  made  by  another  Court,  or  by  an  investigat- 
ing officer,  for  attachment  to  the  Record  of  the  original  Court  of  Inquiry." 

E.  Findings  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  and  Further  Investigation. 

Upon  review  of  the  previous  investigations,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  found 
that  there  were  errors  of  judgment  on  the  part  of  certain  officers  in  the  Naval 
Service,  both  at  Pearl  Harbor  and  at  Washington.  The  Secretary  further  found 
that  the  previous  investigations  had  not  exhausted  all  possible  evidence  and  that 
the  investigation  directed  thy  Public  Law  339  of  the  78th  Congress  should  be  con- 
tinued until  the  testimony  of  every  witness  in  possession  of  material  facts  should 
be  obtained  and  all  possible  evidence  exhausted.  The  Secretary  stated  that  his 
decision  would  be  reviewed  when  the  investigation  was  finally  complete,  in  the 
light  of  the  evidence  then  at  hand. 

The  precept  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  dated  2  May,  1945,  and  amended  6 
July,  1945,  directed  that  Admiral  H.  Kent  Hewitt,  USN,  make  a  study  of  the  previ- 
ous investigations,  that  such  further  investigation  as  might  appear  to  be  necessary 
be  then  conducted,  and  that  upon  completion  a  report  be  submitted  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Navy  setting  forth  the  findings  and  conclusions  reached. 

Review  of  the  previous  investigations  disclosed  that  various  matters  of  im- 
portance, principally  concerning  intelligence,  had  not  been  investigated  throughly. 
The  subjects  proposed  for  further  investigation  were  approved  by  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  on  21  May,  1945. 

Counsel  in  this  investigation  was  John  F.  Sonnett,  Special  Assistant  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy.  Also  assisting  were  Lieutenant  Commander  Benjamin 
H.  Griswold,  III,  USNR,  and  Lieutenant  John  Ford  Baecher,  USNR.  The  re- 
porters were  Ship's  Clerk  Ben  Harold,  USNR,  and  Chief  Yeoman  Raymond  E. 
Reese,  USNR.  These  men  took  a  special  oath  to  maintain  the  security  of  the 
information  developed  during  the  investigation. 

[15]         F.  Witnesses  in  this  Investigation. 
At  Pearl  Harbor  in  1941: 

Captain  Edwin  T.  Lay  ton,  USN,  Intelligence  Officer,  Pacific  Fleet.     (R.  182) 
Captain  Joseph  J.  Rochefort,  USN,  In  charge  of  Communications  Intelligence 

Unit,  Fourteenth  Naval  District.     (R.  43;  R.  541) 
Vice  Admiral  Willian  W.  Smith,  USN,  Chief  of  Staff,  CincPac.     (R.  335) 
Vice  Admiral  Charles  H.  McMorris,  USN,  War  Plans  Officer,  CincPac.     (R.  293) 
Rear  Admiral  Walter  S.  DeLany,  USN,  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  Operations, 

CincPac.     (R.  163) 


2272     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Vice  Admiral  Patrick  N.  L.  Bellinger,  USN,  Commander,  Hawaiian  Based  Patrol 
Wings,  Commander,  Patrol  Wing  Two,  Commander,  Task  Force  Nine,  Commander, 
Fleet  Air  Detachment,  Pearl  Harbor.     (R.  471) 

Captain  John  B.  Earle,  USN,  Chief  of  Staff,  14th  N.  D.     (R.  451) 

Mr.  George  Street,  Manager,  RCA,  Honolulu.     (R.  411) 

Rear  Admiral  Irving  H.  Mayfield,  USN,  District  Intelligence  Officer,  14th  N.  D. 
(R.  554) 

Captain  Thomas  H.  Dyer,  USN,  Cryptanalytical  and  Decrypting,  Fleet  Radio 
Unit,  Pacific  Fleet.     (R.  418) 

Captain  Joseph  Finnegan,  USN,  Translator,  Fleet  Radio  Unit,  Pacific  Fleet. 
(R.  554) 

Commander  Wesley  A.  Wright,  USN,  Assistant  Comnninications  Officer,  Cinc- 
Pac,  on  temporary  duty  with  Com  14  Cimimuni  cat  ions  Intelligence  Unit.     (R.  442) 

Lieutenant  (jg)  Farnsley  C.  Woodward.  USN,  Cryptanalyst,  Communications 
Intelligence  Unit,  14th  N.  D.      (R.  541) 

[16']  Colonel  Alva  B.  Laswell,  USMC,  Translator,  Communications  Intel- 
ligence Unit,  14th  N.  D.  (R..541) 

Captain  William  W.  Outerbridge,  USN,  Commanding  Officer,  USS  W^ARD. 
(R.  87)  ' 

Lieutenant  Commauder  Monroe  H.  Hubbell,  USNR,  Commanding  Officer,  USS 
CONDOR.     (R.  428) 

Richard  W.  Humphrey,  RM3c,  USNR,  Bishop's  Point  Radio  Station. 

Lieutenant  Oliver  H.  Underkofler,  USNR,  Communications  Office,  14th  N.  D. 
(R.  465) 

Lieutenant  Donald  Woodrum,  USNR,  District  Intelligence  Office,  14th  N.  D. 
(R.  376) 

Commander  Harold  S.  Burr,  USNR,  Com  14  Liaison  Officer  at  General  Short's 
Headquarters.     (R.  376) 

Brigadier  General  Carroll  A.  Powell,  USA,  Signal  Officer,  Hawaiian  Depart- 
ment.     (R.  387) 

At  the  Philippines  in  19J,1: 

Captain  Redfield  Mason,  USN.  Fleet  Intelligence  Officer,  Asiatic  Fleet.     (R.  68) 
Commander  Rudolph  J.  Fabian,  USN,  Officer  in  Charge,  Radio  Intelligence 
Unit,  Corregidor.      (R.  68) 

At  Washington,  D.  C  in  1941: 

Vice  Admiral  Theodore  S.  Wilkinson,  USN,  Director  of  the  Office  of  Naval 
Intelligence.     (R.  389) 

Captain  Arthur  H.  McCollum,  USN,  In  charge  of  Far  Eastern  Section,  Foreign 
Branch,  ONI.     (R.  10) 

Captain  Laurence  F.  Safford,  USN,  Communications  Security  Section.  (R. 
97;  R.  529) 

Captain  Alwin  D.  Kramer,  USN,  ONI  and  Communications  Security  Section. 
(R.  128) 

Mrs.  Dorothy  Edgers,  Research  Analyst,  ONI.     (R.  511) 

[17]  Lieutenant  Commander  Fi-ancis  M.  Brotherhood,  USNR,  Communica- 
tions Security  Section.     (R.  143) 

Lieutenant  Frederick  L.  Freeman,  LTSN,  Communications  Security  Section. 
(R.  149) 

Lieutenant  Commander  Allan  A.  Murray,  USNR,  Communications  Security 
Section.      (R.  433) 

Lieutenant  Commander  George  W.  Linn,  USNR,  Communications  Security 
Section.      (R.  140) 

Lieutenant  Commander  Alfred  V.  Pering,  USNR,  Communications  Security 
Section.      (R.  148) 

Other  icitnesses: 

Captain  William  R.  Smedberg,  III,  USN,  now  Assistant  Combat  Intelligence 
Officer,  Staff,  Cominch.     (R.  4) 

Lieutenant  Commander  Leo  Reierstad,  LTSNR,  now  in  charge  of  a  translating 
unit  in  Op-16-FE.      (R.  158) 

Lieutenant  (jg)  Joseph  M.  Conant,  USNR,  Translation  sub-section  head  in  Op- 
]6-FE.      (R.  1.58) 

Commander  Walter  Karig,  LTSNR,  Lieutenant  Welbourn  Kelley,  USNR,  authors 
of  "Battle  Report."     (R.  80) 

Lieutenant  Commander  Gilbert  E.  Boone,  USNR,  head  of  Op-20-GL.  (R.  554; 
R.  607) 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2273 


[18]         G.  Exhibits  Received  in  this  hiveittiiiation. 
Received  in  this  investigation  were  the  followiiifr  exlul)its  : 


Precept  convening  investigation ._ 

Modification  of  precept,  directing  report  of  findings  and  conclusions 

Narrative  statement  by  counsel  of  previous  Navy  investigations... 

CinCPOA  Weekly  Confidential  Intelligence  Bulletin  of  8  December  1944,  relating  to  the 

attacking  forw. 
A  translation  of  a  captured  Japanese  submarine  chart,  showing  courses  and  location  of 

U.  S.  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor. 
CinCPOA  Confidential  Intelligence  Bulletin  of  20  October  1944,  containing  description  of 

Japaese  midget  submarines. 

OXI  document  "ONI  220-J,  Japanese  Submarines". .   

Berthing  plan  at  Pearl  Harbor,  7  December  1941  (Ex.  fiO  of  Naval  Court)... 

Photostatic  copies  of  Conil4  and  Coml6  dispatch  estimates  of  Japanese  fleet  location  and 

movements,  26  November  194i. 

ONI  Bulletin  of  1  December  1941,  Japanese  fleet  locations.. _ 

McCollum  memorandum  estimating  situation  as  of  1  December  1941 

"Battle  Report" _ 

FCC  radio  intercepts  regarding  "winds"  code  (Ex.  65  of  Naval  Court) 

Collection  of  intercepted  Japanese  dispatches — 

i Photostatic  copies  of  captured  Japanese  submarhie  chart,  showing  courses  and  location  of 
U.  S.  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor. 

Collection  of  intercepted  Japanese  dispatches  (Ex.  63  of  Naval  Court). 

Copies  of  dispatches  sent  from  RI  unit,  Corregidor,  regarding  Japanese  fleet  movements... 
Photostat  of  captured  Japanese  submarine  chart  used  for  Plate  V  of  "Battle  Report" 

Log  of  conversation  between  WARD  and  CONDORon  the  morning  of  7  December  1941 

Tentative  copies  of  Communication  Intelligence  Summaries,  for  1  November  1941  to  6  De- 
cember 1941,  at  Pearl  Harbor. 

Message  from  Tokyo  establishing  the  hidden  word  code 

Pacific  Fleet  Intelligence  Bulletin  of  27  November  1941  concerning  composition  of  Japanese 

Navy. 
Daily  Communication  Intelligence  Summaries,  14  October  1941  to  5  December  1941,  given 

to  Fleet  Intelligence  Offlcer  (Captain  Lay  ton)  for  delivery  to  Admiral  Kimmel. 
Memorandum  of  1  December  1941  from  Fleet  Intelligence  Officer  to  Admiral  Kimmel,  esti- 
mating Japanese  ship  locations. 

November  21th  dispatch  from  CNO  to  CincPac  (Ex.  15  of  Naval  Court) 

"War  Warning"  (Ex.  17  of  Naval  Court) 

Lay  ton  Intelligence  reports  from  6  October  1941  to  2  December  1941 

Paraphrased  copies  of  dispatches  from  various  intelligence  agencies  delivered  to  CincPac 

Memorandum  from  Fleet  Intelligence  Officer  to  Admiral  Kimmel  regarding  proposed  Army 

aerial  reconnaissance  of  Mandated  Islands. 
Intercepted  Japanese  consular  dispatches  delivered  to  Fleet  Intelligence  Officer  about  De- 
cember 10th. 
Two  Japanese  panorama  views  of  Pearl  Harbor  with  Japane.se  log  on  reverse  side,  recovered 
from  submarine  (returned  to  Captain  Lay  ton). 

Photostat  of  Japanese  log  on  reverse  of  exhibit  30 

Translations  of  exhibits  30  and  30A.. 

Panorama  sketch  of  Pearl  Harbor  from  position  five  miles  south  of  Pearl  Harbor,  recovered 
from  submarine  (returned  to  Captain  Layton). 

Photostats  ofexhibit31 

Original  Japanese  chart  of  Pearl  Harbor  recovered  from  Japanese  midget  submarine  (re 
turned  to  Captain  Layton). 


Photostat  of  exhibit  32 

Original  Japanese  chart  of  Pearl  Harbor  recovered  from  Japanese  submarine,  showing  defen- 
sive installations  (returned  to  Captain  Layton). 

Photostatic  copy  of  exhibit  33 

Staff  Instructions,  CincPac,  1941 

U.    S.    Pacific    Fleet    Operating    Plan,    Rainbow    Five    (Navy    Plan    O-l,    Rainbow 

Five)  (WPPac-46). 
Letter  of  9  September  1941  from  CNO  to  CincPac,  approving  Pacific  Fleet  Operating  Plan 

Rainbow  Five. 
Letter  of  25  July  1941  from  CincPac  to  CNO,  submitting  Pacific  Fleet  Operating  Plan 

Rainbow  Five. 
Photostatic  copy  of  schedules  .setting  forth  utiliz.ation  of  patrol  planes  of  Pacific  Fleet  from 

17  November  to  31  December  and  approved  22  November  1941. 
Transcripts  of  intercepted  t('lei)hone  calls  of  Ja[)anese  Consul  and  Vice  Consul  in  Honolulu 

from  October  to  2  December  19)1  (Consul's  marked  38A;  Vice  Consul's  marked  38B). 

Copy  of  intercepted  "Mori  conversation" 

ONI  Summaries  of  messages  sent  by  Japanese  Consul  in  Honolulu  from  1  December  to  6 

December  1941. 

F  ile  of  work  sheets  on  Jap  d  iplomat  ic  t  rafl^c  (incorporated  in  other  exhibit) 

Paper  showing  part  of  decryption  process  of  Japanese  "P.\"  code 

Duty  Officer,  Navy  Yard,  Pearl  Harbor,  information  sheets 

Extract  from  signal  log  of  gate  vessel  of  7  December  1941 


2274     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

118]         G.  Exhibits  Received  in  this  Investigation — Continued 
Received  in  this  investigation  were  the  following  exhibits — Continued 


Description 


E  xtract  from  quartermaster's  log  of  gate  vessel  of  7  December  1941 

Extract  from  log  of  Signal  Tower,  Navy  Yard,  Pearl  Harbor,  of  7  December  1941 

Collection  of  documents,  containing  Annex  VII,  Section  VI,  Joint  Agreements,  to  Joint 

Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan. 
Collection  of  dispatches  regarding  submarine  contacts  at  Pearl  Harbor  in  November  and 

December,  1941. 
Bellinger  "Estimate  of  Situation". 


Letter  from  ComTaskFor  9,  to  CinC,  20  December  1941,  on  recomiaissance  prior  to  attack. 

Despatches  cited  in  exhibit  50 

ComTaskFor  9  letter  of  22  October  1941.  file  0026 

ComTaskFor  9  letter  of  16  January  1941 

ComPatWing  2  letter  to  CNO,  of  11  December  1940 

Watch  and  duty  schedules  of  Patrol  Wings  One  and  Two  prior  to  attack.. 

RCA  Communications,  Inc.,  statement,  listing  certain  Japanese  cable  messages  from 

Honolulu  in  November  and  December,  1941. 
Coded  messages  from  Japanese  Consul  General  at  Honolulu,  via  RCA,  among  those  listed 

in  exhibit  55,  received  by  Navy  5  December  1941. 

Pages  7  to  12  of  exhibit  56,  containing  messages  not  decrypted  until  after  the  attack 

Coded  messages  from  Japanese  Consul  General  at  Honolulu,  via  RCA,  among  those  listed 

in  exhibit  55,  received  by  Navy  after  the  attack. 
Coded  messages  from  Japanese  Consul  General  at  Honolulu,  via  RCA,  received  by  Navy 

on  night  of  7  December  and  subsequently  translated. 
Collection  of  dispatches  from  Naval  Communication  files  relating  to  Japanese  fleet  move- 
ments and  locations  during  the  period  27  Novfember  to  7  December  1941. 

Collection  of  Japanese  plain  language  news  broadcasts 

Collection  of  memoranda  relating  to  messages  received  at  Naval  Communications  in 

various  Japanese  code  systems. 
Memorandum  of  Naval  Communications,  surveying  work  sheets  processed  by  Navy  of 

Japanese  purple  system. 
Report  from  DIO,  14th  N.  D.,  to  Director  of  Naval  Intelligence,  of  19  April  1942,  relating 

to  coded  dispatch  traffic  of  Japanese  Consul  General,  Honolulu. 
Certified  collection  of  documents  relating  to  anti-torpedo  bafSes  for  protection  against 

torpedo  plane  attacks. 
Copy  of  Itr.  from  Secretary  of  War  to  Secretary  of  Navy,  dated  7  February  1941,  relating 

to  air  defense  at  Pearl  Harbor. 


CincPac  secret  letter  of  7  August  1941  relating  to  the  organization  of  the  Orange  fleet 

Map  showing  the  location  of  ships  present  at  Pearl  Harbor  on  7  December  1941 

Telephone  log  of  radio  unit  at  Pearl  Harbor,  showing  calls  made  and  received  on  7  December 

1941  as  to  Jap  fleet  locations. 
Photostatic  copies  of  memoranda  relating  to  questioning  of  captain  of  Japanese  captured 

submarine. 
Pacific  Fleet  Weekly  Intelligence  Bulletin  for  11  June  1945,  containing  description  of  midget 

submarines  and  method  of  transport  to  Pearl  Harbor. 
Selected  collection  of  Pearl  Harbor  dispatches,  miscellaneous  subjects,  taken  from  CincPac 

Headquarters. 
Collection  of  dispatches  relating  to  proposed  Army  reconnaissance  in  November  of  1941... 

Collection  of  dispatches  of  December  7  and  8,  1941,  from  CincPac 

CincPac  secret  letter  of  12  December  1941  reporting  damage  to  ships  at  Pearl  Harbor  as 

result  of  attack  and  other  details. 

Photostatic  copy  of  War  Diarv  of  Com  14  from  7  December  1941  to  1  January  1942 — 

War  Diarv  of  USS  WARD;  War  Diary  of  0-in-C,  Net  and  Boom  Defenses,  14th  N.  D.; 

War  Diary  of  USS  CONDOR;  excerpts  from  diary  of  0-in-C,  Net  and  Boom  Defenses, 

14th  N.  D.,  WARD,  and  CONDOR. 
Photostatic  copy  of  1st  and  2nd  endorsements  on  Com  14  letter  of  30  December  1941  relating 

to  early  morning  submarine  contact  on  7  December  1941. 
Collection  of  correspondence  relating  to  combined  operating  center  for  Army  and  Navy... 
Typewritten  translation  and  copy  of  intercepted  Japanese  communication  contained  in 

exhibit  20,  and  notes  relating  thereto. 
Photostatic  copy  of  page  44  of  volume  containing  translations  of  files  of  operations  orders, 

orders,  memos,  and  serials  dealing  with  Japanese  Navy  plans,  recovered  from  Jap  CA 

NACHI. 

Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan,  Hawaiian  Theater _ 

Collection  of  photostatic  copies  of  ONI  memoranda  dealing  with  organization  and  loca- 
tions of  Jap  fleet  as  estimated  during  November  and  up  to  December  1,  1941. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2275 

[23]  I 

THE    WAR    AND    DEFENSE    PLAA'S 

A.  U.  8.  Pacific  Fleet  Operating  Plan  Ruinhow  Five. 

On  26  July  1941,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  Operating  Plan-  Rainbow  Five  (Exliibit  35) 
was  distributed  to  the  Pacific  Fleet  by  Admiral  Kininiel.  This  plan  was  designed 
to  implement  the  Navy  basic  war  plan  (Rainbow  Five)  in  so  far  as  the  tasks 
assigned  the  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  were  concerned.  It  was  approved  9  September 
1941  by  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  (Exhibit  36).    The  plan  provided,  in  part : 

"INTRODITCTION 
CHAPTER  IV.    MOBrUZATION 

"0401.  At  the  date  of  issue  of  this  plan,  the  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet  has  virtually 
mobilized,  and  is  operating,  with  intensive  security  measures,  from  the  Pearl 
Harbor  ba.se.  It  is  expected,  therefore,  that  the  major  portion  of  the  Fleet  can 
be  ready  for  active  service  within  four  days  of  an  order  tor  general  mobilization. 
To  provide  for  the  contingency  of  M-day  being  set  prior  to  the  date  on  which 
hostilities  are  to  open,  the  day  of  execution  of  this  Plan  is  de.signated  throughout 
the  Plan  as  W-day.  The  day  that  hostilities  open  with  Japan  will  be  designated 
J-day.    This  may  or  may  not  coincide  with  W-day." 

"CHAPTER   11.  ASSUMPTIONS 

"1211.  The  general  as.sumptions  on  which  this  Plan  is  based  are: 

"a.  That  the  A.ssociated  Powers,  comprising  initially  the  United  States,  the 
British  Commonwealth  (less  Eire),  the  Netherlands  East  Indies,  the  Governments 
in  Exile,  China,  and  the  'Free  French'  are  at  war  against  the  Axis  powers,  com- 
prising either : 

"1.  Germany,  Italy,  Roumania,  Hungary,  Bulgaria,  or 

"2.  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  Roumania,  Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and  Thailand. 

"Note:  As  of  22  June  war  exists  between  the  European  Axis  and  Russia,  and 
the  latter  may  be  tentatively  considered  as  an  ally  against  that  part  of  the 
Axis  but  not  necessarily  against  Japan."    *    *    * 

[24]  "CHAPTER  III.  INFORMATION 

"1314.  The  concept  of  the  war  in  the  Pacific,  as  set  forth  in  ABC-1  is  as 
follows : 

"Even  if  Japan  were  not  initially  to  enter  the  war  on  the  side  of  the  Axis 
Powers,  it  would  still  be  necessary  for  the  Associated  Powers  to  deploy  their 
forces  in  a  mariner  to  guard  against  Japane.se  intervention.  If  Japan  does  enter 
the  war,  the  military  strategj-  in  the  Far  East  will  be  defensive.  The  United 
States  does  not  intend  to  add  to  its  present  military  strength  in  the  Far  East 
but  \yill  employ  the  United  States  Pacific  Fleet  offensively  in  the  manner  best 
calculated  to  weaken  Japanese  economic  power,  and-  to  support  the  defense  of 
the  Malay  barrier  by  diverting  Japanese  strength  away  from  Malaysia.  The 
United  States  intends  to  so  augment  its  forces  in  the  Atlantic  and  Mediterranean 
areas  that  the  British  Commonwealth  will  be  in  a  jwsition  to  release  the  neces- 
sary forces  for  the  Far  East." 

"CHAPTER  m.  INFORMATION. 

"Section  3.  Estimate  of  Enemy  Action 

"1331.  It  is  believed  that  German  and  Italian  action  in  the  Pacific  will  be 
limited  to  commerce  raiding  with  converted  types,  and  po.s.sibly  with  an  occasional 
pocket  battleship  or  heavy  cruiser. 

"1332.  It  is  conceived  that  Japanese  action  will  be  as  follows : 

"a.  The  principal  offensive  effort  to  be  toward  the  eventual  capture  of 
Malaysia  (including  the  Philippines)  and  Hong  Kong. 

"b.  The  secondary  offensive  efforts  to  be  toward  the  interruption  of  American 
and  Allied  .sea  communications  in  the  Pacific,  the  Far  East  and  the  Indian  Ocean, 
and  to  accomplish  the  capture  of  Guam  and  other  outlying  positions. 

"c.  The  offensive  against  China  to  be  maintained  on  a  reduced  scale  only. 

"d.  The  principal  defensive  efforts  to  be : 


2276     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

"1.  Destruction  of  threatening  naval  forces. 

"2.  Holding  positions  for  their  own  use  nnd  denying  positions  in  the  Central 
and  Western  Pacific  and  the  Far  East  which  may  be  suitable  for  advanced  bases. 

[25]         "3.  Protecting  national  and  captured  territory  and  approaches. 

"1333.  To  accomplish  the  foregoing  it  is  believed  that  Japan's  initial  action 
will  be  toward : 

"a.  Capture  of  Guam. 

"b.  Establishment  of  control  over  the  South  China  Sea,  Philippine  waters,  and 
the  waters  between  Borneo  and  New  Guinea,  by  the  establishment  of  advanced 
bases,  and  by  the  destruction  of  United  States  and  allied  air  and  naval  forces 
in  these  regions,  followed  by  the  capture  of  Luzon. 

"c.  Capture  of  Northern  Borneo. 

"d.  Denial  to  the  United  States  of  the  use  of  the  Marshall-Caroline-Marianas 
area  by  the  use  of  fixed  defenses,  and,  by  the  operation  of  air  forces  and  light 
naval  forces  to  reiluce  the  strength  of  the  United  States  Fleet. 

"e.  Reenforcement  of  the  Mandate  Islands  by  troops,  aircraft  and  light  naval 
forces. 

"f.  Possibly  raids  or  stronger  attacks  on  Wake,  Midway  and  other  outlying 
United  States  positions. 

"1334.  The  initial  Japanese  deployment  is  therefore  estimated  to  be  as  follows : 

"a.  Troops  and  aircraft  in  the  Homeland,  Manchukuo,  and  China  with  strong 
concentrations  in  Formosa  and  Hainan,  fairly  strong  defenses  in  the  Carolines, 
and  comparatively  weak  but  constantly  growing  defenses  in  the  Marshalls. 

"b.  Main  fleet  concentration  in  the  Inland  Sea,  shifting  to  a  central  position 
(possibly  Pescadores)  after  the  capture  of  Guam  and  the  reenforcement  of  the 
Mandates. 

"c.  A  strong  fleet  detachment  in  the  Mindanao-Celebes  area  (probable  main 
base  in  Halmahera). 

"d.  Suflacient  units  in  the  Japan  Sea  to  counter  moves  of  Russian  Naval  forces 
in  that  area. 

"e.  Strong  concentration  of  submarines  and  light  surface  patrol  craft  in  the 
Mandates,  with  such  air  scouting  and  air  attack  units  as  can  be  supported  there. 

"f.  Raiding  and  observation  forces  widely  distributed  in  the  Pacific,  and  sub- 
marines in  the  Hawaiian  area."    *    ♦    * 

[26]  "Part  II.  Outline  of  Tasks 

"chapter   I.    TASKS   ASSIGNED  BY   NAVY   BASIC  PI.AN — MISSION 

"2101.  The  Navy  Basic  War  Plan  (Rainbow  Five)  assigns  the  following  tasks 
within  the  Pacific  Area  to  the  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet : 

"a.  Support  the  forces  of  the  associated  powers  in  the  Far  East  by  diverting 
enemy  strength  away  from  the  Malay  Barrier,  through  the  denial  and  capture 
of  positions  in  the  Marshalls,  and  through  raids  on  enemy  sea  communications 
and  positions ; 

"b.  Prepare  to  capture  and  establish  cont  ol  over  the  Caroline  and  Marshall 
Island  area,  and  to  establish  an  advanced  fleet:  base  in  Truk  ; 

"c.  Destroy  Axis  sea  communications  by  capturing  or  destroying  vessels  trad- 
ing directly  or  indirectly  with  the  enemy; 

"d.  Support  British  naval  forces  in  the  area  south  of  the  Equator  as  far  west 
as  longitude  155°  east ; 

"e.  Defend  Samoa  in  Catagory  'D'; 

"f.  Defend  Guam  in  category  'F'; 

"g.  Protect  the  sea  communications  of  the  Associated  Powers  by  escorting, 
covering,  and  patrolling  as  required  by  circumstances,  and  by  destroying  enemy 
raiding  forces ; 

"h.  Protect  the  territory  of  the  Associated  Powers  in  the  Pacific  Area  and  pre- 
vent the  extension  of  enemy  military  power  into  the  Eastern  Hemisphere  by 
destroying  hostile  expeditions  and  by  supporting  land  and  air  forces  in  denying 
the  enemy  the  use  of  land  jwsitions  in  that  hemisphere ;"     *     *     *. 

"chapter  II.    TASKS   FX)RMUI^TED  TO  ACCOMPLISH  THE  ASSIGNED   MISSIONS 

"2201.  It  will  be  noted  that  the  tasks  assigned  in  the  previous  chapter  are 
based  upon  Assumption  a2  of  paragraph  1211  (Japan  in  the  war).  In  formu- 
lating tasks  the  Commander-in-Chief  has  provided  also  for  Assumption  al  and 
divides  the  tasks  to  be  accomplished  by  the  Pacific  Fleet  into  phases,  as  follows : 

[27]        "a.  Phase  I — Initial  tasks — Japan  not  in  the  war. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2277 

"b.  Phase  lA — ^Initial  tasks — Japan  in  the  war. 

"c.  Phase  II,  etc., — Succeeding  taslcs. 

"2202.  Pha.se  I  taslcs  are  as  follows : 

"a.  Complete  luobilization  an<l  prepare  for  distant  operations ;  thereafter  main- 
tain all  types  In  constant  readiness  for  distant  service. 

"b.  Maintain  fleet  security  at  bases  and  anchorages  and  at  sea. 

"c.  Transfer  the  Atlantic  reenforcement,  if  ordered. 

"d.  Transfer  the  Southeast  Pacific  Force,  if  ordered. 

"e.  Assign  twelve  patrol  planes  and  two  small  tenders  to  Pacific  southern  and 
a  similar  force  to  Pacific  northern  naval  coastal  frontier,  on  M-day. 

"f.  Assign  two  submarines  and  one  submarine  rescue  vessel  to  Pacific  northern 
naval  coastal  frontier  on  M-day. 

"g.  Protect  the  communications  and  territory  of  the  Associated  Powers  and 
prevent  the  extension  of  enemy  military  power  into  the  Western  Hemisphere  by 
patrolling  with  light  forces  and  patrol  planes,  and  by  tlie  action  of  striking  groups 
as  necessary.  In  so  doing  support  the  British  naval  forces  south  of  the  equator 
as  far  west  as  longitude  155°  East. 

"h.  Esfablish  defensive  submarine  patrols  at  Wake  and  Midway. 

"i.  Observe,  with  submarines  outside  the  three  mile  limit,  the  possible  raider 
bases  in  the  Japanese  Mandates,  if  authorized  at  the  time  by  the  Navy  Department. 

"j.  Prosecute  the  establishment  and  defense  of  subsidiary  bases  at  Midway, 
Johnston,  Palmyra,  Samoa,  Guam  and  Wake,  and  at  Canton  if  authorized. 

"k.  Continue  training  operations  as  practicable. 

"1.  Move  the  maximum  practicable  portion  of  Second  Marine  Division  to  Hawaii 
for  training  in  landing  operations. 

"m.  Guard  against  surprise  attack  by  Japan. 

[28]  "Phase  lA 

"2203.  Phase  lA  tasks  are  as  follows : 

"a.  Continue  tasks  outlined  in  2202  a,  b,  g,  h,  and  k. 

"b.  Accomplish  such  of  the  tasks  in  2202  c,  d,  e,  f,  and  j  as  have  not  been 
completed. 

"c.  Make  an  initial  sweep  for  Japanese  merchantmen  and  enemy  raiders  and 
tenders  in  the  northern  Pacific. 

"d.  Continue  the  protection  of  the  territory  and  communications  of  the  Asso- 
ciated Powers,  and  of  the  naval  coastal  frontier  forces,  chiefly  by  covering 
operations. 

"e.  1.  Make  reconnaissance  and  raid  in  force  on  the  Marshall  Islands. 

"2.  If  available  cruisers  and  other  circumstances  i)ermit,  make  cruiser  raids 
against  Japanese  shipping  in  waters  between  Nan.sei  Shoto  and  Nanpo  Shoto. 

"f.  Establish  and  maintain  maximum  practicable  submarine  patrols  against 
Japanese  forces  and  communications  near  the  Japanese  homeland. 

"g.  Maintain  air  patrols  against  enemy  forces  in  the  approaches  to  Oahu  and 
outlying  bases. 

"h.  Escort  important  shipping,  including  troop  movements,  between  the  Hawai- 
ian Area  and  the  West  coast. 

"i.  Route  shipping  in  the  fleet  control  zone  when  established. 

"J.  Augment  the  local  defense  forces  of  the  Hawaiian  naval  coastal  frontier 
as  necessary. 

"k.  Move  from  San  Diego  to  Hawaii  the  remaining  units  and  equipment  of  the 
Second  Marine  Division. 

"1.  Prepare  to  capture  and  establish  control  over  the  Marshall  Island  area." 

"Pabt  III.  Task  Assignment 

"chapter  I.   PHASE  I 

"Section  4.  Task  Force  Nine  (Patrol  Plane  Force) 

"3141.  Task  Force  Nine  will  perform  the  tasks  assigned  in  the  following  para- 
graphs of  this  section. 

[29]  "3142.  On  W-day  transfer  twelve  patrol  plane.s  and  two  tenders  to 
each  of  the  Pacific  southern  and  Pacific  northern  naval  coastal  frontiers.  Con- 
tinue administration  of  these  forces  and  rotate  detail  at  discretion. 

"3143.  Perform  tasks  assigned  in  the  patrol  and  sweeping  plan  (Annex 
I)."  ,•     *    ♦ 


2278     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 
"Part  V.  Special  Provisions 

"CHAPTER  IV.    TENTATIVE  OPERATION  PLANS,  PHASES  I  AND  lA 

"Section  1.  Phase  I 

United  States  Pacific  Fleet 

U.    S.   S.  PENNSYLVANIA,  Flagship 

Place 

Date 
"Operation  Plan  No.  1-R5."     ♦     •     * 

"I.  Information,  Assumptions,  etc.,  as  previously  given  in  Parts  I,  II,  and  III 
of  Navy  Plan  O-l,  Rainbow  Five. 

"2.  This  Fleet  will,  in  the  Pacific  Area,  protect  the  territory  and  sea  com- 
munications of  the  Associated  Powers  and  will  support  British  Naval  Forces 
south  of  the  equator  as  far  west  as  Ix)ngitude  15.t°  East,  while  continuing 
training  and  guarding  against  attack  by  Japan."     *     *     * 

"Annex  I 

United  States  Pacific  Fleet, 

U.  S.  S.  PENNSYLVANIA,  Flagship 

Place 

Date 
"Patrol  and  Sweeping  Plan."    *     *    * 

"1.  Information  and  Assumptions  as  previously  given  in  Parts  I,  II,  and  III 
of  this  Navy  Plan  O-l,  Rainbow  Five.  Latest  information  of  enemy  dispositions, 
estimated  intentions,  and  location  of  merchant  shipping  will  be  furnished  by 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  U.  S.  Pacific  Fleet,  at  time  of  execution. 

[30]  Phase  I. 

"2.  This  Fleet  will,  in  the  Pacific  Area,  protect  the  territory  and  sea  communi- 
cations of  the  Associated  Powers  by  : 

"(a)  Patrolling  against  enemy  forces,  particularly  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Ha- 
waiian Islands;  and  on  shipping  lanes  (1)  West  Coast-Hawaii,  (2)  Trans- 
Pacific  westward  of  Midway  and  (3)  in  South  Seas  in  vicinity  of  Samoa. 

"(b)  Escorting  as  conditions  require  and  forces  available  permit. 

"(c)   Covering. 

"(d)   Employing  striking  forces  against  enemy  raids  and  expeditions. 

"(e)  Routing  shipping."     *     ♦     * 

"3.   (d)   7'asfc  Force  ^me  (Patrol  Plane  Force). 

"(1)  Having  due  regard  for  time  required  to  overhaul  and  unkeep  planes  and 
for  conservation  of  personnel,  maintain  maximum  patrol  plane  search  against 
enemy  forces  in  the  approaches  to  the  Hawaiian  area. 

"(2)  Initially  base  and  operate  one  patrol  plane  squadron  from  Midway.  At 
discretion  increase  the  number  of  planes  operating  from  bases  to  westward  of 
Pearl  Harbor  to  two  squadrons,  utilizing  Johnston  and  Wake  as  the  facilities 
thereat  and  the  situation  at  the  time  makes  practicable. 

"(3)  Be  prepared,  on  request  of  Commander  Task  Force  Three,  to  transfer 
one  patrol  squadron  and  tenders  to  that  force  for  prompt  operations  in  the  South 
Pacific. 

"(4)  Be  particularly  alert  to  detect  disguised  raiders. 

"(5)   In  transferring  planes  between  bases,  conduct  wide  sweep  enroute. 

"(6)  Planes  engaged  in  training  operations  furnish  such  assistance  to  Naval 
Coastal  Frontiers  in  which  based  as  may  be  practicable. 

[31]  "  (7)  Effect  closest  cooperation  practicable  with  surface  forces  engaged 
in  sweeping  during  initial  sweep  of  Phase  lA. 

"(8)  Modify  patrols  as  necessary  in  order  to  carry  out  tasks  assigned  In 
Marshall  Raiding  and  Reconnaissance  Plan  (Annex  II  to  Navy  Plan  O-l ) ."    *    *    * 

B.  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan,  Hawaiian  Theater,  Orange  IJfND- 
JCD-42 
The  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan,  Hawaiian  Coastal  Frontier,  Hawaiian 
Department  and  FOURTEENTH  Naval  District  (14ND-JCD-42),  was  signed  and 
placed  in  effect  on  11  April  1941  by  the  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Depart- 
ment, and  by  the  Commandant,  FOURTEENTH  Naval  District  (Exhibit).  The 
plan  was  based  on  the  joint  Army  and  Navy  basic  war  plans,  and  was  to  constitute 
the  basis  on  which  all  subsidiary  peace  and  war  projects,  joint  operating  plans, 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2279 

and  mobilization  plans  would  be  based.  The  method  of  coordination  under  the 
plan  was  by  mutual  cooperation  which  was  to  apply  to  all  activities  wherein  the 
Army  and  the  Navy  would  operate  in  coordination  until  and  if  the  method  of 
unity  of  command  were  invoked.    The  tasks  asigned  were  as  follows : 

"14.  TASKS. 

"a.  Joint  Task.  To  hold  OAHU  as  a  main  outlying  naval  base,  and  to  control 
and  protect  shipping  in  the  Coastal  Zone. 

"b.  Army  Tusk.  To  hold  OAHU  against  attacks  by  sea,  land,  and  air  forces,  and 
against  hostile  sympathizers  ;  to  support  the  naval  forces. 

"c.  Navy  Task.  To  patrol  the  Coastal  Zone  and  to  control  and  protect  shipping 
therein ;  to  support  the  Army  forces." 

The  Hawaiian  Naval  Coastal  Zone  was  defined  as  "The  Hawaiian  Naval 
Coastal  Zone  comprises  the  waters  of  the  Hawaiian  Costal  Frontier"  (Oahu  and 
such  adjacent  land  and  sea  areas  as  were  required  for  the  defense  of  Oahu). 

The  plan  provided  that  the  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Department,  and 
the  Commandant,  FOURTEENTH  Naval  District,  should  provide  for  the  follow- 
ing: 

"17.  ARMY.  The  Commanding  General,  HAWAIIAN  DEPARTMENT,  shall 
provide  for : 

"a.  The  beach  and  land,  seacoast  and  antiaircraft  defense  of  OAHU  with  par- 
ticular attention  to  the  PEARL  HARBOR  NAVAL  BASE  and  naval  forces  present 
thereat,  HONOLULU  HARBOR,  CITY  OF  HONOLULU,  and  the  SCHOFIELD 
BARRACKS— WHEELER  FIELD— LUALUALEI  area.  The  increasing  import- 
ance of  the  KANEOHE  area  is  recognized. 

[32]         '"b.  An  antiaircraft  and  gas  defense  intelligence  and  warning  service. 

"c.  Protection  of  landing  fields  and  naval  installations  on  outlying  islands 
consistent  with  available  forces. 

"d.  Defense  of  installations  on  OAHU  vital  to  the  Army  and  Navy  and  to  the 
civilian  community  for  light,  power,  water,  and  for  interior  guard  and  sabotage, 
except  within  naval  establishments. 

"e.  Defense  against  sabotage  within  the  HAWAIIAN  ISLANDS,  except  within 
naval  shore  establishments. 

"f.  Establishment  of  an  inshore  aerial  patrol  of  the  waters  of  the  OAHU 
D.  C.  A.,  in  cooperation  with  the  Naval  Inshore  Patrol  (see  par.  18.a.),  and  an 
aerial  observation  system  on  outlying  islands,  and  an  Aircraft  Warning  Service 
for  the  HAWAIIAN  ISLANDS. 

"g.  Support  of  naval  aircraft  forces  in  major  offensive  operations  at  sea  con- 
ducted within  range  of  Army  bombers. 

"h.  Provide  personnel  for  and  Army  communication  facilities  to  harbor  control 
post  provided  for  In  paragraph  18.e. 

"i.  In  conjunction  with  the  Navy,  a  system  of  land  communications  (coordi- 
nated by  means  of  teletype,  telegraph  loops,  and  radio  intercepts,  and  detailed 
joint  instructions)  to  insure  prompt  transmittal  and  interchange  of  hostile 
intelligence.  Radio  communication  between  the  Army  and  the  Navy  will  be 
governed  by  'Joint  Army  and  Navy  Radio  Procedure,  The  Joint  Board,  1940'. 

"j.  An  intelligence  service,  which,  in  addition  to  normal  functions,  will  gather, 
evaluate,  and  distribute  both  to  the  Army  and  to  the  Navy,  information  of 
activities  of  enemy  aliens  or  alien  sympathizers  within  the  HAWAIIAN 
ISLANDS. 

"k.  Counter-espionage  within  the  HAWAIIAN  IS'LANDS. 

"1.  Control  of  dangerous  aliens  or  alien  sympathizers  in  the  HAWAIIAN 
ISLANDS. 

"m.  Army  measures  to  assure  effective  supervision,  control,  and  censorship 
over  communication  systems  which  will  conform  to  Joint  Action  of  the  Army 
and  the  Navy,  1935,  Chapter  IX. 

"n.  Supply  of  all  Army  and  civil  population  in  the  HAWAIIAN  ISLANDS. 

[33]  "0.  Hospitalization  of  all  Army  and  civil  population  in  the  HAWAIIAN 
ISLANDS. 

"p.  Reception  and  distribution  of  personnel  and  supplies  for  the  Army  and  of 
supplies  for  the  civil  population. 

"18.  NAVY.  The  Commandant,  FOURTEENTH  NAVAL  DISTRICT,  shall  pro- 
vide for : 

"a.  An  inshore  patrol. 

"b.  An  offshore  patrol. 

"c.  An  escort  force. 

"d.  An  attack  force. 


2280     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

"e  Provide  and  maintain  a  harbor  control  post  for  joint  defense  of  PEARL 
and  HONOLULU  HARBORS. 

"f.  Installation  and  operation  of  an  underwater  defense  for  PEARL  and 
HONOLULU  HARBORS.  (Hydro-acoustic  posts,  fixed,  when  developed  and 
installed  probably  will  be  under  cognizance  of  the  Army.) 

"g.  Support  of  Army  forces  in  the  OAHU-D.  C.  A.  and  installation  of  submarine 
mine  tields  in  the  defense  of  the  OAHU-D.  C.  A.  as  may  be  deemed  necessary  and 
practicable. 

"h.  Sweeping  channels  and  mine  fields. 

"i.  Distant  reconnaissance. 

"j.  Attacking  enemy  naval  forces. 

"k.  Maintenance  of  interior  guard  and  defense  against  sabotage  within  all 
naval  shore  establishments. 

"1.  In  conjunction  with  the  Army,  as  provided  for  in  paragraph  17  t.,  a  local 
communication  service  to  insure  prompt  transmittal  and  interchange  of  intel- 
ligence. 

"m.  Navy  measures  to  assure  effective  supervision,  control  and  censorship  over 
communication  systems  which  will  conform  to  Joint  Action  of  the  Army  and  the 
Navy,  1935,  Chapter  IX. 

"n.  Operation  of  a  Naval  intelligence  system,  including  counter-espionage,  for 
the  collection,  evaluation,  and  dissemination  of  hostile  information. 

"o.  Supply  and  hospitalization  of  all  local  naval  defense  forces. 

[34]  "p.  Operation  or  supervision  of  all  water  transportation  and  facilities 
pertaining  thereto." 

C.  Annex  VII.  .S'c(7/(»?  VI,  to  the  Joint  Coantal  Frontier  Defense  Plan. 

Annex  VII,  Section  VI  to  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan,  Hawaiian 
Department  and  Fourteenth  Naval  District,  dated  28  March  1941,  and  approved 
by  Admiral  Bloch  and  General  Short  2  April  1941,  (Exhibit  47),  dealt  with  joint 
security  measures  and  protection  of  the  Fleet  and  Pearl  Harbor  base.  It  stated 
that  in  order  to  coordinate  joint  defensive  measures  for  the  security  of  the  Fleet 
and  for  the  Pearl  Harbor  Naval  ba.se  for  defen.se  against  hostile  raids  or  air 
attacks  delivered  prior  to  a  declaration  of  war,  and  before  a  general  mobilization 
for  war,  there  were  adopted  the  following  agreements  : 

Paragraph  II,  in  re.spect  of  joint  air  operations,  provided  that  when  the  Com- 
manding General  and  ComFOURTEEN  agreed  that  the  threat  of  a  hostile  raid 
or  attack  was  sufficiently  imminent  to  warrant  such  action,  each  commander 
would  take  such  preliminary  steps  as  were  necessary  to  make  available  without 
delay  to  the  other  commander  such  proportion  of  the  air  forces  at  his  disposal 
as  circumstances  warranted  in  order  that  joint  operations  might  be  conducted  in 
accordance  with  the  following  plans:  (a)  joint  air  attacks  upon  hostile  surface 
vessels  to  be  conducted  under  the  tactical  command  of  the  Navy;  (b)  defensive 
air  operations  over  and  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Oahu  to  be  executed  under 
the  tactical  command  of  the  Army;  (c)  when  naval  forces  were  insufficient  for 
long  distance  patrol  and  search  operations,  and  Army  aircraft  were  made  avail- 
able, these  aircraft  would  be  under  the  tactical  control  of  the  naval  commander 
directing  the  search  operations. 

Paragraph  III  provided  for  joint  communications,  and,  among  other  things, 
that  all  information  of  the  presence  or  movements  of  hostile  aircraft  offshore 
from  Oahu  secured  through  Navy  channels  would  be  transmitted  promptly  to  the 
Command  Post  of  the  Army  provisional  Anti-Aircraft  Brigade  and  the  Aircraft 
Warning  Service  Information  Center;  that  subsequently,  when  the  Army  aircraft 
warning  service  was  established,  provision  would  be  made  for  transmission  of 
information  on  the  location  or  distance  of  hostile  and  friendly  aircraft,  and 
special  wire  or  radio  circuits  would  be  made  available  for  the  use  of  Navy  liaison 
officers  so  that  they  might  make  their  own  evaluation  of  the  available  information 
and  transmit  it  to  their  respective  organizations. 

Paragraph  IV  related  to  joint  anti-aircraft  measures,  the  arrival  and  departui'e 
procedure  for  aircraft,  balloon  barrages.  Marine  Corps  anti-aircraft  artillery,  and 
Army  Aircraft  Warning  Service.  It  provided  that  the  latter  service  was  to  l)e 
expedited  in  its  installation  and  operation  by  the  Army  and.  "during  the  period 
prior  to  the  completion  of  the  AWS  installation,  the  Navy,  through  use  of  Radar 
and  other  appropriate  means,  will  endeavor  to  give  such  warning  of  hostile  attacks 
as  may  be  practicable." 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2281 

[35]  D.  Joint  Estimate  Covering  Army  and  Nary  Air  Action  in  the  Event 
of  Sud(le)i  Hostile  Aetiwi  Against  Ouhu. 

Oil  31  March  1941.  Rear  Admiral  Bellinger,  Coiuniander  Naval  Base  Defense 
Air  Force  (Commander  Patrol  Wing  Two),  and  Major  General  F.  L.  Martin, 
Commanding  Hawaiian  Air  Force,  prepared  a  joint  estimate  covering  joint 
Army  and  Navy  air  action  in  flie  event  of  sudden  hostile  action  against  Oahu  or 
Fleet  units  in  the  Hawaiian  area  (Exhibit  49). 

Paragraph  I  of  the  estimate  included  a  "Summary  of  the  Situation,"  which 
indicated  that  relations  between  the  United  States  and  Orange  were  strained, 
uncertain,  and  varying ;  that  in  the  past  Orange  had  never  preceded  hostile 
action  by  a  declaration  of  war ;  that  a  successful  sudden  raid  against  our  ships 
and  naval  installations  on  Oahu  might  prevent  effective  offensive  action  by  our 
forces  in  the  western  Pacilic  for  a  long  period;  that  a  strong  part  of  our  fleet 
was  constantly  at  sea  in  the  operating  areas,  organized  to  take  prompt  offensive 
action  ;  and.  that  it  appeared  possible  that  Orange  submarines  and/or  an  Orange 
fast  raiding  force  might  arrive  in  Hawaiian  waters  with  no  prior  warning  from 
our  Intelligence  Service. 

Paragraph  II  of  the  estimate  embraced  a  "Survey  of  Opposing  Strengths," 
indicating,  among  other  things,  that  Orange  might  send  into  the  Hawaiian  area 
one  or  more  submarines  and  one  or  more  fast  raiding  forces  composed  of  carriers 
supported  by  fast  cruisers;  that  the  most  diflBcult  situation  to  meet  would  be 
when  several  of  the  above  elements  were  present  and  closely  coordinating  their 
actions;  and  that  the  aircraft  available  in  Hawaii  were  inadequate  to  maintain 
for  any  extended  period  from  bases  on  Oahu  a  patrol  extensive  enough  to  insure 
that  an  air  attack  from  an  Orange  carrier  could  not  arrive  over  Oahu  as  a  com- 
plete surprise. 

Paragraph  III  of  the  estimate  dealt  with  "Possible  Enemy  Action."  It  stated 
that  a  declaration  of  war  might  be  preceded  by  a  surprise  submarine  attack  on 
ships  in  the  operating  area,  a  surprise  attack  on  Oahu,  including  ships  and 
installations  in  Pearl  Harbor,  or  a  combination  of  these  two;  that  it  appeared 
the  most  likely  and  dangerous  form  of  attack  on  Oahu  would  be  an  air  attack, 
most  likely  launched  from  one  or  more  carriers  which  would  probably  approach 
inside  of  3(X)  miles.  It  was  further  pointed  out  that  a  single  attack  might  or 
might  not  indicate  the  presence  of  more  submarines  or  more  planes  waiting  to 
attack  after  defending  aircraft  have  been  drawn  away  by  the  original  thrust ; 
that:  "(d)  any  single  submarine  attack  might  indicate  the  presence  of  consider- 
able undiscovered  surface  forces,  probably  composed  of  fast  ships  accompanied 
by  a  carrier" ;  and  that  in  a  dawn  air  attack  there  was  a  high  possibility  that  it 
could  be  delivered  as  a  complete  surprise  in  spite  of  any  patrol  that  we  might 
be  using. 

Paragraph  IV  of  the  estimate  considered  "Action  Open  to  Us."  It  was  stated 
that  it  would  be  desirable  to  run  daily  patrols  as  far  as  possible  to  seaward 
through  360°,  but  this  could  only  be  effectively  maintained  with  present  person- 
nel and  material  for  a  very  short  period,  and.  as  a  practicable  measure,  could 
not  therefore  be  undertaken  unless  other  intelligence  [36]  indicated  that 
a  surface  raid  was  probable  within  rather  narrow  limits  of  time.  Reference  was 
made  to  other  types  of  action  open  in  the  event  of  a  surprise  attack  on  ships  in  the 
operating  area  or  on  the  islands,  and  pointed  out  that  none  of  the  outlined  courses 
of  action  could  be  initiated  by  our  forces  until  an  attack  was  known  to  be 
imminent  or  had  occurred. 

Paragraph  V  contained  "Decisions."  The  primary  decision  was  that  the 
Naval  Base  Defense  Air  Force  would  locate  and  attack  forces  initiating  hostile 
action  against  Oahu  or  fleet  unis  in  order  to  prevent  or  minimize  damage  to 
our  forces  from  a  surprise  attack,  and  to  obtain  information  upon  which  to  base 
coordinated  retaliatory  measures.  A  number  of  subsidiary  decisions  were  made, 
including  decisions  for  the  establishment  of  a  search  and  attack  group,  an  air 
combat  group,  the  assignment  of  missions  to  the  groups,  and  definitions  of  condi- 
tions of  readiness.  The  search  and  attack  group  was  to  he  under  the  Commander 
Naval  Base  Defense  Air  Force-Commander  Patrol  Wing  Two,  and,  in  accordance 
with  current  conditions  of  readiness,  included  patrol  squadrons  and  Army 
bombardment  and  reconnais.sance  squadrons. 

[31]  E.  Naval  Base  Defense  Force  Operation  Plan  No.  1-J,1,  and  Naval  Base 
Defense  Air  Force  Plan. 

Admiral  Bloch.  as  Naval  Base  Defense  Officer,  issued  his  Operation  Plan  No. 
3-41,  on  February  27,  1941  (Exhibit  r>3  of  the  Naval  Court).  The  Task  Organiza- 
tion prescribed  was:  (a)  Destroyer  Patrol  (Commander  Inshore  Patrol)  con- 
sisting of  two  destroyers,  a  boom  patrol,  d.  harbor  patrol,  and  an  A/B  boom 

79716  0—46 — pt.  16 24 


2282     CONGRESSIONAL  IN\'ESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

and  minesweeper,  (b)  Base  Defense  Air  Force  (Commander  Patrol  "Wing  Two) 
in  conjunction  witli  tlie  Army,  (c)  Antiaircraft  Defense  (District  Marine  Officer) 
in  conjunction  with  the  Army,  (d)  Harbor  Control  Post  (District  Operations 
Officer)  in  conjunction  with  the  Army.  This  plan  directed 'attention,  among 
other  things,  to  the  Hawaiian  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan,  and  stated: 

"By  cooperation  in  support  of  the  Army,  Naval  security  measures  will  be  estab- 
lished as  necessary  for  the  joint  protection  of  Pearl  Harbor  Base  in  order  to 
safeguard  the  Fleet. 

"In  conjunction  with  the  Commanding  General  Hawaiian  Department,  the 
Naval  Base  Defense  Officer  (Commandant  Fourteenth  Naval  District)  will 
arrange  to  coordinate  joint  effort ;  to  set  conditions  of  readiness ;  to  hold  required 
drills;  to  make  "alarm"  and  "all  clear"  signals. 

AssuDiptiotis. 

(a)  That  no  responsible  foreign  power  will  provoke  war  under  existing  con- 
ditions, by  attack  on  the  Fleet  or  base,  but  that  irresponsible  and  misguided 
nationals  of  such  powers  may  attempt : 

(1)  Sabotage  from  small  craft  on  ships  based  in  PEARL  HARBOR. 

(2)  Block  the  entrance  channel  to  PEARL  HARBOR  by  sinking  an  obstruction 
in  the  channel. 

(3)  Lay  magnetic  or  other  mines  in  the  approaches  to  PEARL  HARBOR. 

(b)  That  a  declaration  of  war  might  be  preceded  by : 

(1)  A  surprise  submarine  attack  on  ships  in  base  area — probable. 

(2)  A  surprise  air  attack  on  ships  in  PEARL  HARBOR — possible. 

(3)  A  combination  of  these  two — i>ossibl(?." 

Annexed  to  Operation  Plan  1-41  were:  A  detailed  Inshore  Patrol  Plan,  called 
Annex  "A ;"  a  detailed  Naval  Base  Defense  Air  Force  Plan,  called  Annex  "Baker ;" 
a  detailed  Anti-aircraft  Defense  Plan,  called  Annex  "C ;"  a  detailed  Harbor 
Control  Post  Plan,  called  "D ;"  and  a  detailed  Communications  Plan,  known  as 
Annex  "Easy." 

Annex  "Baker."  the  detailed  Naval  Base  Defense  Air  Force  Plan,  dated  9  April 
1941,  was  prepared  by  Admiral  Bellinger  and  approved  by  Admiral  Bloch.  It 
divided  the  Task  Organization  into  (a)  Search  and  Attack  Group,  consisting 
of  patrol  squadrons  and  other  planes,  including  Army  reconnaissance  squadrons, 
and  (b)  an  air  combat  group.  This  plan  was  made  in  accordance  with  the  Joint 
Estimate,  dated  31  March  1941,  which  is  digested  above.  The  Naval  Base 
Defense  Air  Force  was,  according  to  this  plan,  to  [38]  locate  and  destroy 
hostile  forces  raiding  against  Oahu  or  Fleet  units  in  the  operating  areas.  The 
plan  was  effective  upon  receipt  and  became  operative  without  signal  in  the 
event  of  a  surprise  attack  on  Oahu.  It  might  be  made  operative  by  dispatch. 
In  the  meantime,  conditions  of  readiness,  prescribed  in  Addendum  Two  to  this 
plan,  would  be  taken  as  directed  by  the  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Depart- 
ment, for  Army  units,  and  by  the  Naval  Base  Defense  Officer  (ComFOURTEEN) 
for  Navy  units.  The  condition  of  material  readiness  was  to  be  signified  by  a 
letter,  such  as  "E."  signifying  that  all  aircraft  were  conducting  i-outine  operations 
and  none  were  ready  for  the  purposes  of  this  plan,  and  the  condition  of  operational 
readiness  by  a  number,  such  as  ".5,"  signifying  that  all  types  of  available  planes 
would  be  ready  in  four  hours.  It  was  also  required  that  a  dispatch  readiness 
report,  as  of  1500  each  day,  be  made  by  each  unit  assigned  by  this  plan  to  a 
task  group,  stating  the  number  of  planes  and  readiness. 

[39]  F.  Pacific  Fleet  Letter  on  Security_  of  the  Fleet  at  Base  and  in 
Operating  Areas. 

Pacific  Fleet  Confidential  Letter  No.  2CL-41,  from  the  Commander  in  Chief, 
Pacific  Fleet,  to  the  Pacific  Fleet,  concerning  the  security  of  the  Fleet  at  base 
and  in  operating  areas,  was  issued  in  February,  1941  and  reissued  in  revised  form 
on  14  October  1941. 

This  order  provided  that  the  Security  of  the  Fleet  was  predicated  on  two 
assumptions : 

(a)  That  no  responsible  foreign  power  would  provoke  war  under  present 
existing  conditions  by  attack  on  the  Fleet  or  base,  but  that  irresponsible  land 
misguided  nationals  of  such  powers  might  attempt  (1)  sabotage  on  ships  based 
in  Pearl  Harbor  from  small  craft,  (2)  to  block  the  entrance  to  Pearl  Harbor  by 
sinking  an  obstruction  in  the  channel,  (3)  to  lay  magnetic  or  other  mines  in  the 
approaches  to  Pearl  Harbor ; 

(b)  That  a  declaration  of  wav  might  be  preceded  by  (1)  a  surprise  attack  on 
ships  in  Pearl  Harbor,  (2)  a  surprise  submarine  attack  on  ships  in  operating 
areas,  (3)  a  combination  of  the  two. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2283 

Security  measures  were  prescribed  covering  : 

A.  Continuous  patrols,  inshore,  boom  and  harbor. 

B.  Intermittent  patrols  to  consist  of  a  destroyer  offshore  patrol  and  an  air 
pfttrol.  The  destroyer  patrol  was  to  consist  (a)  of  a  patrol  to  10  miles  from  the 
entrance,  (b)  three  destroyers  to  search  12  hours  prior  to  sortie  or  entry  of  Fleet 
or  Task  Force,  (c)  one  destroyer  (READY  DUTY)  for  screening  heavy  ships, 
other  than  during  a  Fleet  or  Task  Force  sortie  or  entry,  to  be  on  one  hour's  notice. 
The  air  patrol  was  to  consist  of  daily  search  of  operating  areas,  as  directed  by 
Commander  Aircraft,  Scouting  Force,  an  "air  patrol  to  cover  entry  or  sortie  of  a 
Fleet  or  Task  Force,  an  air  patrol  during  entry  or  departure  of  a  heavy  ship  at 
other  times.  There  also  was  to  be  a  daily  sweep  for  magnetic  and  anchored 
mines. 

C.  Sortie  and  entry. 

D.  Openating  areas. 

E.  Ships  at  sea. 

F.  Ships  in  port. 

The  security  provisions  covering  defense  against  air  attack  (G),  described  the 
principal  Army  anti-aircraft  gun  defenses  of  Pearl  Harbor,  and  directed  that 
Marine  defense  battalions  would  assist  the  Army  in  manning  them  ;  and  provided 
that  in  the  event  of  a  hostile  air  attack,  any  part  of  the  Fleet  in  harbor,  plus  all 
fleet  aviation  shore  based  on  Oahu,  would  augment  the  local  "air  defense;  it 
prescribed  air  defense  sectors  and  a  berthing  plan  in  Pearl  Harbor.  It  further 
provided  that  the  senior  oflScer  embarked,  exclusive  of  CincPac,  should  insure 
berthing  so  as  to  develop  the  maximum  anti-aircraft  gunfire ;  and  that 
ComFOURTEEN,  as  Naval  UO]  Base  Defense  Officer,  should  exercise 
with  the  Army  joint  supervisory  control  over  the  defense  against  air  attack,  and 
take  other  action,  including  supervisory  control  over  naval  shore  based  aircraft, 
arranging  through  the  Commander  of  Patrol  Wing  Two  for  coordination  of  the 
joint  air  effort  between  the  Army  and  the  Navy,  and  coordinate  Fleet  anti-air- 
ci-aft  flre  with  the  base  defense  by  advising  the  Senior  Officer  Embarked  (exclu- 
sive of  CincPac)  of  the  condition  of  readiness  to  maintain,  and  by  holding 
drills,  etc. 

Three  conditions  of  naval  base  defense  readiness  were  prescribed.  Condition 
III  read  as  follows  : 

"Anti-aircraft  battery  (guns  which  bear  in  assigned  sector)  of  at  least  one 
ship  in  each  sector  manned  and  ready.  (Minimum  of  four  guns  required  for  each 
.sector.)     Condition  of  aircraft  as  prescribed  by  Naval  Base  Defense  Officer." 

The  procedure  to  be  followed  by  the  task  forces  in  the  event  of  an  air  attack 
was  also  set  forth :  the  Senior  Officer  embarked  was  to  execute  an  emergency 
sortie  order,  .sending  destroyers  out  and  preparing  a  carrier  and  heavy  ships  and 
submarines  for  sortie;  the  Task  Force  Commander  at  sea  was  to  dispatch  a 
striking  unit,  etc. ;  and  the  Naval  Base  Defense  Officer  was  to  give  the  alarm 
indicating  that  an  attack  was  in  progress  or  imminent,  inform  the  Task  Force 
Commander  at  sea  of  the  attack  and  type  of  attacking  aircraft,  launch  air  search 
for  enemy  ships,  and  arm  and  prepare  all  bombing  units  available. 

The  action  to  be  taken  if  a  submarine  attacked  in  the  operating  area  was  set 
forth.  It  was  provided  that  the  ship  attacked  was,  among  other  things,  to  origi- 
nate a  plain  language  dispatch  containing  the  essential  details;  various  actions 
were  to  be  taken  by  other  ships ;  and  the  Patrol  Wings  were  to  assume  readiness 
for  search  and  for  offensive  action,  to  carry  out  search  as  directed  by  Task  Force 
Commander,  and  to  prepare  to  establish  station  patrol  at  a  220  mile  radius  from 
the  scene  of  attack  at  one  hour  before  daylight  of  the  next  succeeding  daylight 
period.  The  shore  based  fleet  aircraft  were  to  prepare  to  relieve  planes  over  the 
attack  area,  unless  Pearl  Harbor  were  also  attacked,  in  which  case  the  instruc- 
tions issued  by  the  Naval  Base  Defense  Officer  would  have  priority.  It  was  fur- 
ther provided  that  "It  must  be  remembered  that  a  single  attack  may  or  may  not 
indicate  the  presence  of  more  submarines  waiting  to  attack,"  that  "(3)  it  must 
be  remembered  too,  that  a  single  submarine  attack  may  indicate  the  presence  of 
a  considerable  surface  force  probably  composed  of  fast  ships  accompanied  by  a 
carrier.  The  Task  Force  Commander  must,  therefore,  assemble  his  task  groups 
as  quickly  as  the  situation  and  daylight  conditions  warrant  in  order  to  be  pre- 
pared to  pursue  or  meet  enemy  ships  that  may  be  located  by  air  search  or  other 
means." 

l-in         G.  Execution  of  Plans  Prior  to  7  December  19Jfl. 

(1)  The  Pacific  Fleet  Ojierating  Plan  Rainbow  5  provided  that  the  day  of 
execution  of  the  plan  was  to  be  designated  as  W-Day,  and  that  the  day  upon 


2284     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

which  hostilities  opened  with  Japan  would  be  J-Day.  which  might  or  might  not 
coincide  with  W-Day.  Prior  to  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor,  W-Day  had  not 
been  designated. 

(2)  The  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan  had  been  signed  and  placed 
in  effect  on  11  April  1941  by  the  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Department, 
and  by  the  Commandant,  Fourteenth  Naval  District.  It  will  be  recalled  that 
under  this  plan  the  method  of  coordination  of  Army  and  Navy  effort  was  "by 
mutual  cooperation"  and  not  "unity  of  command."  It  will  be  recalled  further 
that  under  this  plan  the  Army  task  was  to  hold  Oahu  against  attacks  by  sea, 
land,  and  air  forces,  and  against  hostile  sympathizers ;  and  to  .support  the  Naval 
forces ;  and,  that  the  Navy  task  was  to  patrol  the  coastal  zone  and  control  and 
protect  shipping  therein  ;  and  to  support  the  Army  forces ;  and,  that  the  Navy 
was  obliged  to  provide  distant  reconnaissance. 

(3)  Annex  VII,  Section  6  of  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan,  which 
provided  for  joint  defensive  measures  for  defense  against  hostile  raids  or  air 
attacks  delivered  prior  to  a  declaration  of  war  (including  joint  air  operations 
and  for  the  use  of  Army  aircraft  by  the  Navy  for  long  distance  patrol  when 
Navy  forces  were  insufficient ) ,  was  to  become  effective  when  the  Connnanding 
General  and  ComFOURTEEN  agreed  that  the  threat  of  a  hostile  raid  or  attack 
was  sufficiently  imminent  to  warrant  such  action.  No  such  agreement  was  made 
prior  to  the  attack  on  December  7th. 

(4)  The  Naval  Base  Defense  Force  Operation  Plan,  which  provided  for  an 
Inshore  Patrol  consisting  of  two  desti-oyers,  a  boom  patrol,  a  harbor  patrol, 
and  an  A/B  boom  and  minesweepers,  a  Base  defense  air  force,  anti-aircraft 
defense,  and  a  harbor  control  post,  although  effective  as  to  the  inshore  patrol 
was  not  in  operation  as  to  the  base  defense  air  force. 

(."))  The  Naval  Base  Defense  Air  Force  Plan,  dated  9  April  1941,  which  was 
an  annex  to  the  Naval  Base  Defense  Force  Plan  and  which  had  been  made  in 
accordance  with  the  joint  estimate  of  Bellinger  and  Martin,  dated  31  March 
1941,  was  effective  upon  receipt.  It  was  to  become  operative  without  a  signal 
in  the  event  of  a  surprise  attack  on  Oahu  and  it  might  have  been  made  oper- 
ative bv  dispatch.  It  was  not  made  operative  until  the  attack  on  7  December 
1941. 

(6)  The  Pacific  Fleet  Letter  on  security  of  the  Fleet  at  base  and  in  operat- 
ing areas,  which  recognized  the  possibility  of  a  surprise  attack  on  ships  in 
Pearl  Harbor  and  which  set  forth  security  measures  including  patrols  to  be 
conducted  both  by  destroyers  and  by  aircraft,  was  in  effect  during  1941,  and 
in  revised  form  after  14  October  1941. 

[^2]  H.  Admiral  KimmeVs  Vieira  as  to  the  Possibility  of  a  Surprise  Air 
Attack. 

It  appears  from  the  War  and  Defense  Plans,  above  summarized,  that  it  was 
believed  that  prior  to  a  declaration  of  war  there  might  be  a  surprise  attack 
by  the  Japanese  on  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor  or  a  surprise  submarine  attack  on 
ships  in  the  operating  areas.  The  possibility  of  a  surprise  air  attack  on  ships 
in  Pearl  Harbor  had  been  expressed  as  early  as  24  January  1941  by  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy,  in  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War  (Exhibit  64),  a  copy  of  which 
was  received  by  Admiral  Kimmel  shortly  after  he  assumed  command  of  the 
Pacific  Fleet.     In  that  letter,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  wrote: 

"If  war  eventuates  with  Japan,  it  is  believed  easily  possible  that  hostilities 
would  be  initiated  by  a  surprise  attack  upon  the  fleet  or  the  naval  base  at  Pearl 
Harbor  .  .  .  The  dangers  envisaged  in  their  order  of  importance  and  prob- 
abilities are  considered  to  be:  (1)  air  bombing  attack,  (2)  air  torpedo  plane 
attack,  (3)  sabotage,  (4)  submarine  attack,  (5)  mining,  (6)  bombardment 
by  gunfire." 

In  his  testimony  before  the  Naval  Court  of  Inquiry,  Admiral  Kimmel  indi- 
cated some  confusion  as  to  his  agreement  with  and  his  evaluation  of  the  above 
letter  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy.  He  testified  that  he  had  felt  that  the  most 
probable  form  of  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  was  by  submarine,  and  that  a  bomb- 
ing attack  was  the  second  most  probable,  but  that  he  had  been  of  the  view 
that  there  was  no  danger  of  an  air  torpedo  attack  because  the  water  was  too 
shallow.  He  ther\  corrected  his  testimony,  characterizing  his  previous  testi- 
mony as  erroneous,  and  stated  that  hie  had  regarded  an  air  attack  as  no  more 
than  a  possibility. 

It  appears  clearly  that  Admiral  Kimmel  at  all  times  during  his  command  of 
the  Pacific  Fleet  was  of  the  view  that  a  surprise  air  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  was 
a  possibility.    Thus,  in  a  letter  by  Admiral  Richardson,  prepared  in  collaboration 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2285 

with  Admiral  Kimniel,  on  25  JuDuary  1941  (Exhibit  70,  Naval  Court),  it  was 
stated  in  part  that  the  security  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  would  be  predicated  on  cer- 
tain assumptions,  including  an  assumption  that  Japan  might  attack  without 
warning  and  the  further  assumption  that  Japanese  attacks  might  be  expected 
against  shipping,  outlying  positions,  or  naval  units,  and  that  surprise  raids  on 
Pearl  Harbor  were  possible.  Again,  in  a  letter  of  18  February  1941,  concerning 
the  adequacy  of  local  defense  (Exhibit  30,  Naval  ('ourt).  Admiral  Kimmel 
stated,  "I  feel  that  a  surprise  attack  (submarine,  air,  or  combined)  on  Pearl 
Harbor  is  a  possibility."  And,  as  previously  pointed  out,  the  Fleet  Security 
Letter,  reissued  on  14  October  1941,  predicated  the  security  of  the  Fleet  on 
two  assnmptions,  one  of  which  was  that  a  declaration  of  war  might  be  preceded 
by  a  surprise  attack  on  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor.  This,  Admiral  Kimmel  testified 
before  the  Naval  Court,  referred  to  a  surprise  air  attack. 

In  connection  with  Admiral  Kimmel's  statement  before  the  Naval  Court  of 
Inquiry  that  he  thought  there  was  no  danger  of  an  air  [^S]  torpedo 
attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  because  tiie  water  was  too  shallow,  several  letters  from 
the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  shoidd  be  noted: 

On  15  February  1941  (Exhibit  49,  Naval  Court),  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations 
wrote  to  CincPac  regarding  anti-torpedo  baffles  for  protection  against  attacks  on 
Pearl  Harbor.  This  stated  that  the  shallow  depth  of  water  limited  the  need  for 
anti-torpedo  nets  in  Pearl  Harbor  and  the  congestion  and  the  necessity  for 
maneuvering  room  limited  the  practicability  of  the  present  type  of  baffles.  The 
letter  indicated  that  a  minimum  depth  of  water  of  75  feet  might  be  assumed 
necessary  successfully  to  drop  torpedoes  from  planes  and  that  the  desirable  height 
for  dropping  is  60  feet  or  less.  There  were  various  other  considerations  stated. 
The  recommendations  and  conunents  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  were  especially 
desired.  A  similar  letter  was  sent  by  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  to  the  Com- 
mandants of  various  Naval  Districts,  including  the  Fourteenth,  on  17  February 
1941  (Exhibit  54,  Naval  Court). 

The  reply  to  the  request  for  recommendations  and  comments  was  made  on  20 
March  1941,  in  a  letter  by  Admiral  Bloch.  stating  that  the  depth  of  water  at  Pearl 
Harbor  was  45  feet,  and  for  that  and  other  reasons,  he  did  not  recommend  anti- 
torpedo  baffles.  CincPac  agreed,  until  such  time  as  a  light  efficient  net  were 
developed. 

In  June,  1941,  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  sent  another  letter  to  the  Com- 
mandants of  Naval  Districts,  copy  to  CincPac  and  others,  referring  to  recent 
developments,  and  to  experience  at  Taranto.  which  stated  that  no  minimum  depth 
of  water  could  be  assumed  safe  as  regards  torpedo  attack  if  there  were  sufficient 
water  around  a  ship  to  permit  an  attack  to  be  developed  and  a  sufficient  run  to 
arm  the  torpedo,  but  that  such  an  attack  in  10  fathoms  or  more  was  more  likely 
than  in  shallow  water  (Exhibit  55,  Naval  Court).  The  torpedoes  at  Taranto, 
it  was  .said,  were  launched  in  thirteen  to  fifteen  fathoms  although  some  may  have 
been  in  eleven. 

Admiral  Kimmel  testified  that  on  this  correspondence  he  based  his  opinion  that 
there  was  no  chance  of  an  air  torpedo  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor — and  that  even 
after  the  June  letter,  he  did  not  think  that  torpedoes  would  run  in  such  shallow 
water.  He  pointed  out  that  the  Navy  made  no  effort  to  place  such  nets  in  Pearl 
Harbor.  He  later  stated  that  he  did  not  think  an  aerial  torpedo  attack  would  be 
made  because  he  did  not  think  such  torpedoes  would  run  in  Pearl  Harbor  and  did 
not  give  this  a  great  deal  of  consideration  for  that  reason. 

[44]         I-  Adequacy  of  Forces  to  Catry  Out  Tasks  Assigned. 

The  adequacy  of  forces  assigned  to  the  Pacific  Fleet  for  carrying  out  the  tasks 
assigned  in  the  war  plans  was  the  subject  of  testimony  before  both  Admiral  Hart 
and  the  Naval  Court  of  Inquiry.  From  the  testimony  it  appears  that  although 
there  were  shortages  concerning  which  Admiral  Kimmel  had  extensive  corre- 
spondence with  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  there  was  general  agreement  by 
the  witnesses  to  the  effect  that  the  Fleet  was  considered  adequate  to  carry  out 
the  initial  tasks  assigned  in  the  war  plans.  The  initial  tasks,  it  will  be  recalled, 
were  primarily  defensive  in  nature.  As  will  appear  subsequently  in  this  report, 
the  number  of  fleet  patrol  planes  in  the  Hawaiian  area  was  not  sufficient  to  enable 
a  360  degree  reconnaissance  to  be  flown  daily  from  Oahu  for  more  than  a  few 
days,  but  was  snifflcient  for  air  reconnaissance  of  the  more  dangerous  sectors  to 
have  been  flown  for  at  least  several  weeks.  To  this  extent,  therefore,  the  patrol 
planes  assigned  to  the  Pacific  Fleet  were  a  limiting  factor  as  to  the  Fleet's  ability 
to  carry  out  one  of  the  initial  ta.sks  assigned  in  the  war  plans,  namely,  to  "main- 
tain air  patrols  against  enemy  forces  in  the  approaches  of  Oahu  .  .  ." 


2286     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

The  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan  stated  that  the  Navy  through  Com- 
FOURTEEN,  would  provide  for  distant  reconnaissance  from  Oahu.  Admiral 
Bloch  had  no  air  forces  assigned  to  him  and  had  to  rely  upon  the  Fleet  planes, 
which  were  under  the  control  of  Admiral  Kimmel,  for  the  accomplishment  of  this 
task.  Thus  naval  patrol  planes  could  be  and  were  used  for  long  distance  recon- 
naissance from  Oahu  only  when  they  were  made  available  by  Admiral  Kimmel  for 
that  purpose. 
[45]         J.  Command  Organization. 

(1)  Methods  of  Coordination  Between  Army  and  Navy  Commands. 
According  to  "Joint  Action  of  the  Army  and  Navy,  1935,"   (Exhibit  6,  Naval 

Court),  the  operations  of  Army  and  Navy  forces  were  to  be  coordinated  by 
one  of  two  methods  : 

(a)  Mutual  cooperation,  or, 

(b)  The  exercise  of  unity  of  command. 

(2)  Coordination  Betiveen  Army  and  Navy  Commands  in  Hawaii. 

The  command  organization  in  the  Hawaiian  area  was  designed  to  function 
through  "mutual  cooperation"  between  the  Army  and  Navy.  This  was  the 
normal  method  of  coordination  according  to  Joint  Action  of  the  Army  and  the 
Navy  (Exhibit  6,  page  5),  and  applied  to  the  defense  of  Pearl  Harbor  as  well 
as  the  entire  Hawaiian  area. 

(3)  Desirability  of  Unity  of  Command. 

(a)  Unity  of  Command  for  Haicaii  considered  in  Washington.  Admiral  Stark 
testified  before  the  Naval  Court  that,  prior  to  7  December  1941,  he  had  given 
much  thought  to  the  question  of  unity  of  command  in  Hawaii  but  that  no  satis- 
factory solution  or  decision  had  been  reached  as  far  as  the  Navy  Department 
was  concerned.  It  had  been  the  topic  of  many  conversations  with  the  Chief 
of  Staff  of  the  Army,  but  it  was  anticipated  only  for  amphibious  operations 
(page  29,  Naval  Court).  He  and  the  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Army  could  have 
placed  unity  of  command  into  effect  at  Hawaii,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the 
Secretaries  of  War  and  of  the  Navy  (page  39,  Naval  Court).  However,  "Joint 
Action  of  the  Army  and  the  Navy"  (Exhibit  6,  Naval  Court)  does  not  indicate 
that  the  approval  of  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  would 
have  been  required. 

(b)  Unity  of  Command  foi-  Hawaii  considered  at  Pearl  Harbor.  Admiral 
Stark  testified  that  Admiral  Kimmel,  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Pacific 
Fleet,  in  mutual  agreement  with  the  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Depart- 
ment, could  have  placed  unity  of  command  in  effect  in  Oahu  (Naval  Court, 
page  39;  Exhibit  6.  page  5).  Admiral  Kimmel  testified  (Roberts  Commission, 
page  538;  Naval  Court,  page  296)  that  he  had  never  had  any  discussion  with 
the  Commanding  General  of  the  Hawaiian  Department  on  the  desirability  of 
putting  unity  of  command  into  effect  in  the  Hawaiian  area,  but  did  state  that 
where  command  is  vested  in  one  agency,  much  better  results  can  be  obtained 
than  when  responsibility  is  divided. 

Admiral  Kimmel  testified  that  so  far  as  the  authority  of  ComFOURTEEN  to 
accomplish  unity  of  command  was  concerned,  ComFOURTEEN  did  not  have  the 
authority  without  reference  to  him  and  that  he  would  not  have  approved  this 
nor  accepted  the  responsibility  for  Army  action  without  reference  to  the  Navy 
Department. 

[46]  Under  the  Naval  Base  Defense  Plan  (Exhibit  53,  NC),  unity  of  com- 
mand was  vested  in  the  Commander  Naval  Base  Defense  Air  Force  over  all 
offensive  air  operations  and  under  the  Army  Air  Commander  for  all  defensive 
air  operations,  but  only  after  the  plan  had  been  activated. 

(c)  Weakness  of  "Mutual  Cooperation." 

(i)  Air  Command.  Admiral  Bellinger  testified  that  the  weakness  of  the  air 
defense  plan  was  that  there  was  no  one  officer  in  command  until  after  the  plan 
was  activated.  The  Bellinger-Martin  estimate  (Exhibit  49)  he  believed  to  be 
sound,  but  said  that  it  lacked  sanction  and  that  the  missing  sanction  was  unity 
of  command. 

(ii)  Recommendation  of  Joint  Command  Center.  In  an  endorsement  dated 
6  December  1941  from  the  Director,  Radio  Liaison  Division,  to  the  Director, 
Naval  Districts  Division,  advocating  a  combined  operating  center  for  the  Army 
and  Navy  at  Pearl  Harbor  (which  was  not  established  prior  to  the  attack). 
Admiral  Hooper  stated  "The  most  perfect  set-up  for  command  is  one  in  which 
the  supreme  commander  is  exercised  by  one  officer  best  equipped  of  any  for  the 
task  .  .  .  Because  our  defense  is  under  two  officers,  Army  and  Navy,  we  must 
try  and  arrange  matters  so  that  when  component  parts  of  the  commands  are 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2287 

interwoven  these  two  can  function  as  nearly  as  possible  as  one."     (Exhibit  77.) 

The  recommendation  for  a  Joint  Command  Center  in  Hawaii  was  originated 
by  a  dispatch  from  OpXav  to  ComFOI'RTEEN  on  15  October  1&41  (Exhibit  77), 
requesting  that  consideration  be  given  to  the  construction  of  a  combined  oper- 
ating center  .sutficient  in  size  and  facilities  to  accommodate  in  time  of  emer- 
gency staffs  of  all  essential  operating  activities  of  both  Army  and  Navy  in 
Hawaii.  An  informal  joint  working  committee  had  been  formed  in  Washington 
to  endeavor  to  improve  cooperation  of  Army  and  Navy  shore  defense  activities 
by  the  formation  of  joint  command  centers.  A  reply  to  the  above-mentioned 
dispatch  strongly  recommending  against  such  a  move  is  contained  in  a  letter 
from  ComFOURTEEN  to  CNO,  via  CincPac,  enclosing  a  letter  from  General 
Short  to  ComFOURTEEN  and  an  endorsement  by  CincPac. 

General  Short  stated  that  while  he  was  strongly  in  favor  of  combined  operat- 
ing centers  for  equivalent  units  of  Army  and  Navy  forces,  he  did  not  believe 
that  all  of  the  operating  centers  should  be  combined  into  one  single  building, 
because  it  was  necessary  that  Army  headquarters  be  located  in  separate  com- 
mand posts  for  efficiency  of  individual  operation.  It  was  also  undesirable  from 
communication  and  security  standpoint.  He  suggested  that,  as  an  alternative, 
additional  space  for  Navy  units  be  constructed  adjacent  to  the  existing  command 
posts  for  equivalent  Army  units. 

[//7]  In  the  basic  letter  (Exhibit  77)  ComFOURTEEN  recommended  that 
no  steps  be  taken  to  concentrate  the  Army  and  Navy  in  a  common  building  and 
believed  that  the  best  interests  of  the  CinC  Pacific  Fleet  would  be  served  by  one 
building  with  only  agencies  of  the  Fleet  therein. 

The  CinC  Pacific  Fleet  in  his  endorsement  to  this  letter  stated  that  the  mission 
of  the  Army  and  the  Fleet  were  considerably  different,  the  operation  of  one  being 
defensive  and  local,  while  the  operations  of  the  other  were  offensive  and  far- 
flung.  Strategic,  rather  than  tactical,  cooperation  was  indicated  and  therefore 
the  necessity  for  rapid  receipt  and  exchange  of  information  and  arrival  at  quick 
decision  was  of  less  importance.  He  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  establishment 
of  a  combined  operating  center  for  the  Army  and  Navy  in  Hawaii  was  not  only 
unnecessary,  but  definitely  undesirable. 

(4)  Disagreement  concerning  Unity  of  Command  at  the  Outlying  Islands. 

The  evidence  in  the  previous  investigations  and  in  this  investigation  indicates 
that  there  was  some  consideration  of  unity  of  command  at  outlying  islands  dur- 
ing the  critical  period  27  November  to  7  December  1941.  This  occurred  as  a  result 
of  dispatches  by  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  to  CincPac  on  26  November  1941 
(Exhibits  18  and  40,  Naval  Court),  in  which  it  was  advised  that  the  Army  had 
agreed  to  reenforce  Midway  and  Wake  with  Army  personnel  and  to  station  25 
Army  pursuit  planes  at  Midway  and  25  at  Wake  provided  that  Admiral  Kimmel 
consideretl  this  feasible  and  desirable.  It  was  stated  that  it  would  be  necessary 
for  Admiral  Kimmel  to  transport  these  planes  and  ground  crews  from  Oahu  to 
Midway  and  Wake  on  aircraft  carriers,  that  the  planes  would  be  flown  off  at 
destination  and  that  the  ground  crews  would  be  landed  in  boats.  Admiral 
Kimmel  was  directed  to  confer  with  the  Commanding  General  concerning  this 
matter,  and  to  advise  as  soon  as  practicable. 

It  appears  that  this  subject  was  considered  at  some  length  in  conferences  held 
by  Admiral  Kimmel  on  and  after  27  November  1941.  The  discussion  of  unity  of 
command  as  to  these  islands  was  summarized  by  Vice -Admiral  Smith  in  his 
testimony  in  this  investigation.  He  said  that  Admiral  Kimmel  asked  the  Army 
what  he  could  expect  of  Army  fighters  at  Wake,  and  that  General  Martin  of 
the  Army  Air  Force  replied  that  the  Army  did  nor  allow  such  planes  to  go  more 
than  l.T  miles  offshore.  Admiral  Kimmel  then  stated  that  the  Army  planes 
were,  therefore,  no  good  to  him. 

General  Short  stated  that  if  he  manned  those  islands,  he  must  command  them 
and  "Kimmel  replied,  'Over  my  dead  body.  The  Army  should  exercise  no  com- 
mand over  Navy  bases.'  General  Short  replied,  'Mind  you,  I  don't  want  these 
islands.  I  think  they  are  better  manned  by  Marines.  But  if  I  must  put  planes 
and  troops  on  them,  then  I  must  command  them.'"  (Page  352,  record  of  this 
investigation). 

[Jf8]  Admiral  Kimmel's  concern  over  the  question  of  command  at  the  out- 
lying islands  was  indicated  by  his  dispatch  of  November  2&th  to  the  Chief  of 
Naval  Operations,  advising  of  the  proposed  reenforcement  of  Midway  and  Wake 
with  Marine  fighter  planes  and  that  he  would  investigate  more  thoroughly  the 
feasibility  and  practicability  of  relieving  them  with  Army  planes.  In  this  dis- 
patch he  stated,  "All  outlying  forces  must  be  exclusively  under  Naval  command" 


2288     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(Exhibit  76,  Naval  Court).  Similarly,  in  a  letter  of  2  December  1941  to  Admiral 
Stark  (Exhibit  50  of  the  Naval  Court),  Admiral  Kimniel  advised  that  the  dis- 
patches in  regard  to  the  use  of  Army  pex'sonnel  were  being  given  earnest  consid- 
eration, that  he  believed  Admiral  Stark  woiild  subscribe  to  the  principle  that 
all  these  outlying  islands  must  be  under  Navy  command  and  the  forces  there 
subject  to  the  orders  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  without  any  qualifications 
whatsoever,  and  that  he  expected  some  difficulties  along  this  line  when  Army 
personnel  were  injected  into  the  picture  unless  a  very  clear  directive  were  issued 
jointly  by  the  War  and  Navy  Departments. 

It  appears  that  Midway  and  Wake  were  reeiiforced  with  squadrons  of  Marine 
planes,  and  that  therefore,  unity  of  command  under  the  Navy,  actually  existed 
at  those  islands.  No  solution  of  the  command  problem,  in  the  event  of  possible 
future  inclusion  of  Army  forces,  was  reached. 

[Jf9]        Findings 

1.  T^e  basic  assumption  of  the  Rainbow  Five  War  Plan  was  that  the  United 
States  and  her  Allies  would  be  at  war  with  the  Axis  Powers,  either  including  or 
excluding  Japan. 

2.  The  Navy  Basic  War  Plan  (Rainbow  Five)  assigned  various  offensive  tasks 
to  the  Pacific  Fleet,  including  the  capture  of  positions  in  the  Marshalls  and 
raids  on  enemy  sea  communications  and  positions,  and  various  defensive  tasks, 
including  the  task  of  protecting  the  territory  of  the  A.ssociated  Powers  in  the 
Pacific  area  and  preventing  the  extension  of  enemy  military  power  into  the 
Eastern  Hemisphere  by  destroying  hostile  expeditions. 

3.  The  Pacific  Fleet  Operating  Plan  (Rainbow  Five)  assigned  to  the  Fleet 
various  initial  tasks,  including  the  maintenance  of  fleet  security  at  the  bases, 
at  anchorages,  and  at  sea,  the  protection  of  the  communications  and  territory 
of  the  As.sociated  Powers  by  patrolling  with  light  forces  and  patrol  planes,  the 
establishment  of  defensive  submarine  patrols  at  Wake  and  Midway,  and  guard- 
ing against  surprise  attack  by  Japan. 

4.  The  Pacific  Fleet  Operating  Plan  (Rainbow  Five)  and  annexes  included 
among  the  initial  tasks  to  be  performed  by  the  patrol  planes  the  maintenance 
of  the  maximum  patrol  plane  search  practicable  in  the  approaches  to  the 
Hawaiian  area. 

5.  The  Pacific  Fleet  Operating  Plan  was  to  be  put  into  effect  on  W-day,  which, 
it  was  stated,  might  or  might  not  coincide  with  the  day  that  hostilities  opened 
with  Japan.    W-day  was  not  fixed  prior  to  the  attack. 

6.  The  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan,  Hawaiian  Theater,  was  based 
on  the  Joint  Army  and  Navy  Basic  War  Plans.  It  constituted  the  basis  of 
subsidiary  peace  and  war  project.s,  joint  operating  plans,  and  mobilization  plans. 
The  method  of  coordination  under  the  plan  was  to  be  by  mutual  cooperation  until 
and  unless  unity  of  command  were  invoked. 

7.  Under  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan  the  Army's  task  was  to 
hold  Oahu  against  attacks  by  sea,  land  and  air  forces,  and  against  hostile 
sympathizers,  and  to  .support  the  naval  forces.  The  Navy's  task  was  to  patrol 
the  coastal  zone  (which  included  Oahu  and  such  adjacent  land  and  sea  areas 
as  were  required  for  the  defense  of  6ahu),  and  to  patrol  and  protect  shipping 
therein,  and  to  support  the  Army  forces. 

8.  One  of  the  specific  tasks  assigned  to  the  Navy  in  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier 
Defense  Plan  was  that  the  Commandant.  FOURTEENTH  Naval  District,  should 
provide  for  distant  reconnaissance. 

[50]  9.  The  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan  was  placed  in  effect  on 
11  April  1941  by  the  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Department,  and  by  the 
Commandant,  FOURTEENTH  Naval  District. 

10.  Annex  VII,  Section  VI,  to  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan  was 
an  agreement  between  the  Conunandant,  FOURTEENTH  Naval  District,  and 
the  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Department,  as  to  joint  defensive  measures 
for  the  security  of  the  Fleet  and  for  the  Pearl  Hai'bor  Naval  Base  against 
hostile  raids  or  air  attacks  delivered  prior  to  a  declaration  of  war. 

11.  Annex  VII,  Section  VI,  to  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan  pro- 
vided, among  other  things,  for  joint  air  operations  and  provided  that  when  naval 
forces  were  insufficient  f(»r  long  distance  patrol  and  search  operations  and  Army 
aircraft  were  made  available,  the  latter  would  be  under  the  tactical  control  of 
the  naval  commander  directing  search  operations. 

12.  Annex  VII,  Section  VI,  to  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan  also 
provided  that  the  Army  was  to  expedite  the  Installation  of  its  aircraft  warning 
service,  and  that  prior  to  the  completion  of  that  service  the  Navy,  through  the 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2289 

use  of  radar  and  other  appropriate  means,  would  endeavor  to  give  such  warning 
of  hostile  attacks  as  misht  be  practicable. 

13.  Annex  VII,  Section  VI,  of  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan  pro- 
vided that  when  the  Commanding  General  and  ComFOURTKEN  agreed  that 
the  threat  of  a  hostile  raid  or  attack  was  sufficiently  imminent  to  warrant 
such  action,  each  commander  would  take  steps  to  make  available  to  the  other 
the  air  forces  at  his  dispo.sal,  in  order  that  joint  operations  might  be  conducted 
in  accordance  with  the  plan. 

14.  The  Conxmanding  General  and  ComFOURTEEN  did  not  effect  any  agree- 
ment prior  to  the  attack  that  the  threat  of  a  hostile  raid  or  attack  was  sufficiently 
imminent  to  warrant  placing  Annex  VII.  Section  VI,  in  operation. 

15.  The  Naval  Base  Defense  Force  Operation  Plan  provided  among  other 
things,  for  a  Base  Defense  Air  Force  in  conjunction  with  the  Army.  One  of 
the  assumptions  was  that  it  was  possible  that  a  declaration  (»f  war  might  be 
preceded  by  a  surprise  air  attack  on  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor,  that  it  was  probable 
that  there  might  be  a  surpri.se  submarine  attack  on  ships  in  the  base  area,  and 
that  a  combination  of  both  forms  of  attack  was  possible. 

16.  The  joint  estimate  by  Admiral  Bellinger  and  General  Martin  stated, 
among  other  things,  that  the  most  likely  and  dangerous  form  of  attack  on  Oahu 
would  be  an  air  attack  that  would  most  likely  be  launched  from  carriers  which 
would  probably  approach  inside  of  three  hundred  miles.  The  estimate  also 
stated  that  any  single  submarine  attack  miffht  indicate  the  presence  of  con- 
siderable undiscovered  surface  forces,  probably  composed  of  [51]  fast 
ships  accompanied  by  a  carrier.  This  Estimate  came  to  the  attention  of  Admiral 
Kimmel  and  Admiral  Bloch. 

17.  The  Naval  Base  Defense  Air  ForcePlan  was  prepared  by  Admiral  Bellinger 
and  approved  by  Admiral  Bloch.  This  plan,  which  was  designated  Annex 
"Baker"  to  the  Naval  Base  Defense  Force  Operation  Plan,  made  specific  provi- 
sion for  joint  air  operations  by  the  Army  and  Navy.  The  Plan  was  effective  upon 
receipt.  It  was  to  become  operative  without  signal  in  the  event  "of  a  surprise 
attack,  or  might  be  made  operative  by  dispatch.  In  the  meantime  conditions  of 
readiness  for  aircraft  were  to  be  as  directed  by  the  Commanding  General,  Ha- 
waiian Department,  for  Army  units,  and  by  ComFOURTEEN,  as  Naval  Base 
Defense  OflScer,  for  Navy  units. 

18.  The  Pacific  Fleet  letter  on  security  of  the  Fleet  at  base  and  in  operating 
areas,  which  was  reissued  by  Admiral  Kimmel  in  revised  form  on  14  October 
1941,  provided  that  the  Fleet's  security  was  predicated  on  several  assumptions, 
one  of  which  was  that  a  declaration  of  war  might  be  preceded  by  a  surprise  attack 
on  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor,  a  surprise  submarine  attack  on  ships  in  the  operating 
areas,  or  a  combination  of  the  two.  This  letter  also  stated  that  a  single  sub- 
marine attack  might  indicate  the  presence  of  a  considerable  surface  force  probably 
composed  of  fast  ships  accompanied  by  a  carrier. 

19.  The  Pacific  Fleet  security  letter  prescribed  security  measures,  injluding 
provisions  for  defense  against  air  attack.  It  provided,  among  other  things,  that 
ComFOURTEEN,  as  Naval  Base  Defense  Officer,  should  exercise  with  the  Army 
joint  supervisory  control  over  the  defense  against  air  attack  and  that  he  should 
take  other  action,  including  supervisory  control  over  naval  shore-based  aircraft, 
and  arrange  through  the  Commander  of  Patrol  Wing  Two  for  coordination  of  the 
joint  air  effort  by  the  Army  and  the  Navy. 

20.  Under  the  Pacific  Fleet  security  letter,  the  security  measures  were  to  include 
intermittent  patrols  to  consist  of  a  destroyer  offshore  patrol,  and  an  air  patrol. 
The  air  patrol  was  to  consist  of  daily  search  of  fleet  operating  areas  as  directed 
by  Aircraft  Scouting  Force,  one  covering  the  entry  or  sortie  of  a  fleet  or  task  force, 
and  one  during  the  entry  or  departure  of  a  heavy  ship  at  other  times. 

21.  The  only  local  defense  plans  in  effect  and  operative  prior  to  the  attack  of 
7  December  1941  were  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan,  under  which  the 
Navy  was  obliged  to  provide  distant  reconnaissance,  and  the  Pacific  Fleet  security 
letter,  under  which  the  only  aircraft  patrol  from  Oahu  was  a  daily  search  of  fleet 
operating  areas,  a  search  during  entry  or  sortie  of  a  fleet  or  task  force,  and  during 
the  entry  or  departure  of  a  heavy  ship  at  other  times. 

[52]  22.  The  Pacific  Fleet  Operating  Plan  (Rainbow  Five),  approved  by  the 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  in  estimating  probable  enemy  (Japanese)  action, 
visualized  that  one  of  the  enemy  defensive  efforts  would  be  "destruction  of 
threatening  naval  forces" ;  that  initial  action  would  include  "possible  raids  or 
stronger  attacks  on  Wake,  Midway,  and  other  outlying  United  States  positions" ; 
and  that  the  initial  Japanese  deployment  would  include  "raiding  and  observation 


2290     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

forces  widely  distributed  in  the  Pacific,  and  that  submarines  in  the  Hawaiian 
area.  .  .  ."  (Underscoring  supplied.)  The  possibility  of  an  attack  on  Hawaii 
was,  therefore,  included  but  in  no  way  emphasized. 

23.  Admiral  Kimmel  was  of  the  opinion,  throughout  his  tenure  of  command  of 
the  Pacific  Fleet,  that  a  surprise  air  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  was  a  possibility. 
Neither  he  nor  the  key  members  of  his  staff  appear  to  have  considered  it  as  a 
serious  probability. 

24.  The  method  of  command  established  in  the  local  plans  was  that  of  "mutual 
cooperation."  The  relations  between  the  responsible  commanders  were  cordial. 
However,  there  was  not  in  existence,  prior  to  the  attack,  any  permanent  operating 
setup  which  could  ensure  the  constant  and  timely  exchange  of  information,  deci- 
sions, and  intended  courses  of  action  so  essential  to  the  efficient  conduct  of  joint 
operations,  particularly  in  an  emergency.  A  recent  proposal  looking  to  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  Joint  Command  Center  had  been  the  subject  of  adverse  recommenda- 
tions by  the  responsible  local  commanders,  both  Army  and  Navy. 

25.  In  accordance  with  "Joint  Action,"  unity  of  command  for  the  defense  of 
Oahu  could  have  been  placed  in  effect  by  local  agreement  between  the  Command- 
ing Oeneral  of  the  Hawaiian  Department  and  the  Commandant  of  the  FOUR- 
TEENTH Naval  District.  The  latter,  however,  would  naturally  not  make  such 
an  agreement  without  the  approval  of  his  immediate  superior,  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet.  The  question  of  unity  of  command  for  outlying  islands 
was  discussed  between  Admiral  Kinnuel  and  General  Short  in  connection  with  a 
proposal  for  reenforcement  of  Wake  and  Midway  by  Army  planes.  General 
Short's  position  was  that  if  Army  forces  were  involved,  the  command  must  be  his. 
Admiral  Kimmel  maintained  that  the  command  of  naval  bases  must  remain  with 
the  Navy.    The  islands  were  reenforced  i^ith  Marine  planes. 

[5S]  II 

JAPANESE  ESPIONAGE    AT  HAWAII 

The  center  of  Japanese  espionage  at  Hawaii  was  the  Japanese  Consulate 
General  located  in  Honolulu.  As  a  matter  of  regular  routine,  information  was 
collected  by  the  Consulate  General  concerning  the  location  and  movements  of 
United  States  ships  in  and  around  Pearl  Harbor  and  concerning  defense 
preparations.  This  information  was  forwarded  by  the  Japanese  Consulate 
General  to  Tokyo  and  elsewhere  in  coded  messages  sent  via  commercial  com- 
munication companies.  A  collection  of  such  messages,  which  has  been  decrypted 
and  translated,  appears  in  Exhibit  13  of  this  investigation  and  in  Exhibit  63 
of  the  Naval  Court.  This  collection  of  messages  does  not  include  every  such 
message,  but  does  fully  illustrate  the  type  of  espionage  reports  which  were 
made.  Subsequent  to  the  attack,  the  incoming  and  outgoing  message  log  of 
the  Japanese  Consulate  General  at  Honolulu  was  recovered  and  translated. 
These  logs  indicate  the  nature  of  all  of  the  communications  to  and  from  the 
Japanese  Consulate  General  and  show  the  frequency  with  which  espionage 
reports  were  sent  by  the  Consul  during  1&41.  A  copy  of  the  log  is  set  forth 
in  Exhibit  62. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  espionage  reports  submitted  during  1941  by  the 
Japanese  Consulate  General  became  increasingly  more  detailed  and,  in  the 
first  week  of  December,  1941,  indicated  the  likelihood  of  a  surprise  attack  on 
Pearl  Harbor.  The  possession  of  all  of  those  messages  by  the  American 
intelligence  services  prior  to  the  attack  would  have  been  of  inestimable  value. 
Some  of  them,  as  will  appear  later,  were  obtained  prior  to  the  attack.  Those 
obtained,  however,  although  indicating  Japanese  intere.st  in  the  location  and 
movements  of  ships  in  and  from  Pearl  Harbor,  did  not  include  those  messages, 
particularly  during  the  first  week  of  December,  1941,  which  indicated  the 
likelihood  of  an  air  attack.  It  may  also  be  noted  at  this  point  that  those 
Consulate  messages  which  were  obtained  prior  to  7  December  1941  were 
decrypted  and  translated  in  Washington  but  not  at  Pearl  Harbor. 

illustrative  of  the  type  of  message  sent  earlier  in  1941  is  a  report  from 
Honolulu  to  Tokyo,  dated  10  March  1941,  which  describes  various  vessels  seen 
in- Pearl  Harbor  (Translated  by  Navy,  April  5 — Document  1,  Exhibit  13).  The 
Japanese  interest  in  the  location  of  ships  in  particular  areas  of  Pearl  Harbor 
is  demonstrated  by  a  dispatch  from  Tokyo  to  Honolulu,  dated  24  September 
1941,   requesting   reports  of  vessels   in   five   sub-areas  of  Pearl   Harbor,   and 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2291 

requesting  reports  of  warships  and  aircraft  carriers  at  anchor  and  tied  up  at 
wharves,  buoys  and  doclis.  Particular  request  was  made  for  mention  of  the 
fact  when  there  were  two  or  more  vessels  alongside  the  same  wharf  (Army 
translation,  October  9 — Document  2,  Exhibit  13).  The  Japanese  Consul  at 
Honolulu  established  a  code  to  refer  to  the  location  of  vessels  in  particular 
areas  (Navy  translation,  October  10 — Document  3,  Exhibit  13).  Tokyo  on  18 
November  1941  requested  a  report  on  vessels  anchored  in  certain  areas  and 
it  directed  that  the  investigation  be  made  with  great  secrecy  (Army  translation, 
December  2 — Document  9,  Exhibit  13).  A  report  was  sent  by  Honolulu  to  Tokyo 
on  18  November  1941  setting  forth  the  warships  in  the  harbor  in  certain 
areas,  commenting  on  the  [54]  presence  or  absence  of  aircraft  carriers, 
and  describing  in  detail  the  course  of  certain  destroyers  which  were  observed 
entering  the  harbor  (Army  translation,  December  6 — Document  10,  Exhibit  13). 
On  November  20th,  Tokyo  requested  a  comprehensive  investigation  of  the  Fleet 
bases  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  Hawaiian  military  reservation  (Army  translfi- 
tion,  December  6 — Document  7,  Exhibit  13). 

On  24  November  1941,  Honolulu  reported  to  Tokyo  concerning  the  Fleet  prac- 
tice of  leaving  Pearl  Harbor,  conducting  maneuvers,  and  returning,  that  the 
Fleet  had  not  remained  for  a  long  period  of  time  nor  conducted  maneuvers  at 
Lahaina  Road,  that  destroyers  and  submarines  were  the  only  vessels  anchored 
there ;  that  battleships  seldom  entered  the  port  of  Hilo,  Hanalei  or  Haneo ; 
that  virtually  no  one  had  observed  battleships  in  maneuver  areas ;  and,  stated 
that  the  Fleet  maneuvered  for  one  week  at  sea,  either  to  the  south  of  Maui  or 
to  the  southwest  and  pointed  out  that  aircraft  carriers  maneuvered  by  them- 
selves. This  also  mentioned  the  times  when  cruisers  and  other  ships  left  Pearl 
Harbor  and  how  long  they  were  away,  and  generally  how  long  they  remained 
at  Pearl  Harbor  when  anchored  there  (Army  translation,  December  16 — Docu- 
ment 23,  Exhibit  13). 

On  November  28th,  Tokyo  requested  intelligence,  which  was  described  as 
being  of  major  importance,  concerning  the  movements  of  battleships  out  of  the 
harbor,  pointing  out  that  if  such  movements  were  reported  but  once  a  week, 
the  vessels  could  have  traveled  far,  and  that  Honolulu  was  to  use  its  own 
judgment  in  deciding  on  reports  covering  such  movements.  As  to  capital  ships, 
it  was  requested  that  reports  of  the  entrance  or  departure  and  length  of  time 
at  anchor  from  the  time  of  entry  into  port  until  departure  be  made  (Army 
translation,  December  8 — Document  13,  Exhibit  13).  On  November  28th, 
Honolulu  reported  to  Tokyo  concerning  the  B-17  planes  at  Midway  and  range 
of  anti-aircraft  guns,  observations  of  maneuvers  by  tr(K)ps,  prospective  rein- 
forcements of  troops  at  Honolulu  during  December  or  January,  and  advised 
of  the  presence  of  a  carrier  usually  about  15,000  feet  south  of  Pearl  Harbor 
and  one  or  two  destroyers  at  the  entrance  of  the  harbor  (Army  translation, 
December  8 — Document  16,  Exhibit  13). 

The  messages  sent  by  the  Japanese  Consul  during  the  week  of  1  December 
to  7  December  1941,  are  of  particular  significance.  A  message  of  December  1st 
reported  on  ship  maneuvers  and  described  the  place  where  maneuvers  were 
held  as  about  500  nautical  miles  southeast  of  Oahu,  and  stated  the  reasons 
why  that  conclusion  had  been  reached.  This  message  set  forth  the  "usual" 
schedule  for  departure  and  return  of  the  battleships  and  stated  that  they  left  on 
Tuesdays  and  returned  on  Fridays,  or  left  on  Friday  and  returned  on  ^Saturday 
of  the  following  week,  and  that  all  ships  stayed  in  port  about  a  period  of 
one  week.  In  view  of  their  importance,' five  other  messages  sent  during  the 
first  week  in  December,  1941,  are  quoted  in  full : 

From:  Tokoyo  (Togo) 

To  :   Honolulu 

December  2,  1941  ( translated  by  Army  30  December  1941 ) 

J-19 

#123  (Secret  outside  the  department) 

In  view  of  the  present  situation,  the  presence  in  port  of  warships,  airplane 
carriers,  and  cruisers  is  of  [55]  utmost  importance.  Hereafter,  to  the 
utmost  of  your  ability,  let  me  know  day  by  day.  Wire  me  in  each  case  whether 
or  not  there  are  any  observation  balloons  above  Pearl  Harbor  or  if  there  are 
any  indications  that  they  will  be  sent  up.  Also  advise  me  whether  or  not  the 
warships  are  provided  with  antimine  nets. 


2292     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


From:  Honolulu  (Kita) 

To         Tokyo 

3  December  1941  ( translated  by  Navy  11  December  1941 ) 

(PA-K2) 

#245  (in  2  parts,  complete)  (Military  Secret). 

'From  Ichiro  Fujii  to  the  Chief  of  #3  Section  of  Military  Staff  Headquarters. 
1.  I  wish  to  change  my  method  of  communicating  by  signals  to  the  following : 
I.  Arrange  the  eight  signals  in  three  colunms  as  follows : 


Meaning 

Signal 

Battleship    divisions    including    scouts    and 

Preparing  to  sortie.  .        .              .... 

5 

screen  units. 

Preparing  to  sortie 

2 

Bnttleship  divisions 

All  departed  between  1st  and  3rd 

3 

Several  departed  between  1st  and  3rd 

4 

All  departed  between  1st  and  3rd 

5 

Battleship  divisions..    

-Ml  departed  between  4th  and  6th.-  

6 

Carriers 

Several  departed  between  4th  and  6th 

7 

Carriers 

All  departed  between  4th  and  6th 

8 

2.  Signals. 

I.  Lanikai  Beach  House  will  show  lights  during  the  night  as  follows : 

Signal 

[56]         One  light  between    8  and    9  p.  m 1 

One  light  between    9  and  10  p.  m 2 

One  light  between  10  and  11  p.  m 3 

One  light  between  11  and  12  p.  m 4 

II. 

Two  lights  between  12  and  1  a.  m 5 

Two  lights  between    1  and  2  a.  m 6 

Two  lights  between    2  and  3  a.  m 7 

Two  lights  between    3  and  4  a.  m 8 

(Part  2) 

III.  Lanikai  Bay,  during  daylight. 

If  there  is  a  "star"  on  the  head  of  the  sail  of  the  Star  Boat  it  Indicates  signals 
1,  2,  3,  or  4. 

If  there  is  a  "star"  and  a  Roman  numeral  III  it  indicates  signal  5,  6,  7,  or  8. 

IV.  Lights  in  the  attic  window  of  Kalama  House  will  indicate  the  following : 

Times  Signal 

1900-2000 3 

2000-2100 J 4 

2100-2200 5 

2200-2300 6 

2300-2400 7 

0000-0100 8 

V.  K.G.M.B.     Want  Ads. 

A.  Chinese  rug  etc.  for  sale,  apply  P.  O.  box  1476  indicates  signal  3  or  6. 

B.  CHIC  .  .  CO  farm  etc.  apply  P.  O.  box  1476  indicates  signal  4  or  7. 

C.  Beauty  operator  wanted  etc.  apply  P.  O.  box  1476  indicates  signal  5  or  8. 

3.  If  the  above  listed  signals  and  wireless  messages  cannot  be  made  from 
Oahu,  then  on  Maui  Island,  6  miles  to  the  northward  of  Kula  Sanatorium  at 
a  point  halfway  between  Lower  Kulu  Road  and  Haleakala  Road  (latitude 
20°40'  N.,  longitude  156°19'  W.,  visible  from  seaward  to  the  southeast  and  south- 
west of  Maui  Island)  the  following  signal  bonfire  will  be  made  daily  until  your 
EXEX  signal  is  received : 

[57]  Times  Signal 

From    7-2 3  or  6 

From  8-9 4  or  7 

From   9-10 5  or  8 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2293 

From :  Honolulu 

To:  Tokyo 

5  December  1941  (translated  by  Navy  10  December  1941) 

(PA-K2) 

#252 

(1)  During  Friday  morning,  the  rith,  the  three  battleships  mentioned  in  my 
message  #239  arrived  here.     They  had  been  at  sea  for  eight  days. 

(2)  The  Lexington  and  five  heavy  cruisers  left  port  on  the  same  day. 

(3)  The  following  ships  were  in  port  on  the  afternoon  of  the  5th: 

S  battleships. 
3  light  cruisers. 
16  destroyers. 

Four  ships  of  the  Honolulu  class  and were  in  dock. 


From :  Honolulu 

To:  Tokyo 

December  6,  1941  (translated  by  Army  8  December  1941) 

PA-K2 

#253     Re  the  last  part  of  your  #123. 

1.  On  the  American  Continent  in  October  the  Army  began  training  barrage 
balloon  troops  at  Camp  Davis,  North  Carolina.  Not  only  have  they  ordered 
four  or  five  hundred  balloons,  but  it  is  understood  that  they  are  considering  the 
use  of  these  balloons  in  the  defense  of  Hawaii  and  Panama.  In  so  far  as 
Hawaii  is  concerned,  though  investigations  have  been  made  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Pearl  Harbor,  they  have  not  set  up  mooring  equipment,  nor  have  they 
selected  the  troops  to  man  them.  Furthermore,  there  is  no  indication  that  any 
training  for  the  maintenance  of  balloons  is  being  undertaken.  At  the  present 
time  there  are  no  signs  of  barrage  balloon  equipment.  In  addition,  it  is  difficult 
to  imagine  that  they  have  actually  any.  However,  even  though  they  have 
actually  [58]  made  preparations,  because  they  must  control  the  air  over 
the  water  and  land  runways  of  the  airports  in  the  vicinity  of  Pearl  Harbor, 
Hickam,  Ford  and  Kwa,  there  are  limits  to  the  balloon  defense  of  Pearl  Harbor. 
I  imagine  that  in  all  probability  there  is  considerable  opportunity  left  to  take 
advantage  for  a  surprise  attack  against  these  places. 

2.  In  my  opinion  the  battleships  do  not  have  torpedo  nets.  The  details  are 
not  known.     I  will  report  the  results  of  my  investigation. 


From :  Honolulu. 

To:  Tokyo 

December  6, 1941  (translated  by  Army  8  December  1941) 

PA-K2 

#254. 

1.  On    the  evening  of   the   5th,    among   the   battleships   which   entered    port 

were  and  one  submarine  tender.     The  following  ships  were  observed  at 

anchor  on  the  6th  : 

9  battleship.s,  3  light  cruisers,  3  submarine  tenders,  17  destroyers,  and  in 
addition  there  were  4  light  crui.sers,  2  destroyers  lying  at  docks  (the  heavy 
cruisers  and  airplane  carriers  have  all  left.) 

2.  It  appears  that  no  air  reconnaissance  is  being  conducted  by  the  fleet  air  arm. 


Findinffs. 

[59]  26.  Japanese  espionage  at  Pearl  Harbor  was  effective  and,  particularly 
during  the  critical  period  27  November  to  7  December  1941,  resulted  in  the  fre- 
quent transmission  to  Japan  of  information  of  great  importance  concerning  the 
Pacific  Fleet,  the  movements  and  locations  of  ships,  and  defense  preparations. 

27.  Certain  reports  .sent  by  the  Japanese  Consul  General  via  a  commercial  com- 
munications company  at  Honolulu  in  the  week  preceding  the  attack  indicated 
the  likelihood  of  an  air  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor. 


2294     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

28.  It  will  appear  subsequently  that  various  coded  messages  sent  by  the  Jap- 
anese Consul  General  at  Honolulu,  which  did  not  indicate  the  likelihood  of  an 
air  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor,  wei'e  intercepted  by  Army  and  Navy  radio  intercept 
stations  and  were  decoded  in  Washington,  D.  C.  prior  to  the  attack ;  that  others 
which  were  obtained  at  Honolulu  by  Naval  Intelligence  prior  to  the  attack  were, 
with  the  exception  of  a  few  unimportant  messages,  in  a  code  which  could  not  be 
decripted  there  before  December  7th ;  and,  that  three  messages  intercepted  by 
Army  radio  intercept  stations  at  Hawaii  and  at  San  Francisco,  which  indicated 
the  likelihood  of  an  air  attack,  were  forwarded  to  the  War  Department  for  de- 
cryption but  were  either  not  received  there  prior  to  the  attack  or  were  not 
decrypted  prior  to  the  attack.  If  the  United  States  intelligence  services  had  been 
able  to  obtain  and  to  decode  and  tran.slate  promptly  all  of  the  espionage  reports 
sent  by  the  Japanese  'Consul  General  during  the  period  27  November  to  7  Decem- 
ber 1941,  the  information  so  obtained  would  have  been  of  inestimable  value. 

[60]  III 

NAVAL  INTELLIGENCE  AND  H:VENTS  PRFXIMINARY  TO  THE  ATTACK 

A.  The  Organization  of  Naval  Intelligence  in  General;  Sources  of  Information, 
and  Relations  with  the  Pacific  Fleet. 

The  Office  of  Naval  Intelligence,  which  was  under  the  Chief  of  Naval  Opera- 
tions, consisted  of  two  main  branches — Domestic  and  Foreign.  The  Domestic 
Branch  had  to  do  with  internal  espionage  and  other  subversive  activities  of  for- 
eign nationals  or  organizations  inimical  to  national  and  particularly  naval  wel- 
fare. It  maintained  branch  offices  in  various  of  the  principal  cities  of  the  United 
States,  including  Honolulu.  The  Foreign  Branch  was  organized  into  a  number  of 
sections,  of  which  one  was  the  Far  Eastern  Section.  The  Director  of  Naval 
Intelligence  was  Rear  Admiral  T.  S.  Wilkinson,  Jr.  The  officer  in  charge  of  the 
Far  Eastern  Section  of  the  Foreign  Branch  was  Commander  Arthur  H.  McCollum. 

The  primary  sources  of  information  which  the  Far  Eastern  Section  had  were 
Naval  Attache  reports  from  Japan  and  China,  observers'  reports  from  various 
ports  in  the  Far  East,  reports  from  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Asiatic  Fleet 
and  from  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Pacific  Fleet,  including  reports  as  to 
radio  intelligence,  and  reports  of  investigations  conducted  by  the  domestic  branch 
of  ONI,  particularly  from  Honolulu,  and  State  Department  reports  at  Washing- 
ton. A  most  important  part  of  the  information  provided  to  the  Far  Eastern  Sec- 
tion was  supplied  by  a  unit  at  Washington  known  as  OP-20-G.  This  was  under 
the  command  of  Commander  Laurence  F.  Safford  and  supplied  information 
obtained  from  communication  or  radio  intelligence.  This  section  was  staffed 
both  by  Communication  officers  and  Intelligence  officers.  The  information 
received  by  OP-20-G  was  supplied  to  Lt.  Comdr.  Alvin  D.  Kramer  of  ONI,  who 
was  working  with  that  section,  and  was  transmitted  by  him  to  the  head  of  the 
Far  Eastern  Section  and  to  the  Director  of  Naval  Intelligence. 

The  section  known  as  OP-20-G  was  concerned  with  the  interception,  decryp- 
tion, and  translation  of  Japanese  messages.  In  addition  it  was  responsible  for 
furnishing  the  Navy's  own  codes  and  ciphers  and  for  the  supervision  of  the,  secur- 
ity of  the  Navy's  own  communications.  Japanese  messages  were  intercepted  by 
various  methods,  including  radio  interception  by  a  number  of  radio  intercept 
stations  located  in  the  United  States,  which  transmitted  the  Japanese  communi- 
cations, as  intercepted 'by  them,  to  OP-20-G  for  decryption  and  translation.  In 
addition  to  reports  from  intercept  stations  located  in  the  United  States,  this  sec- 
tion received  reports  from  communication  intelligence  units-  located  at  Pearl 
Harbor  and  in  the  Philippines.  This  unit  was  concerned  with  the  plans  and  in- 
tentions of  foreign  governments,  principally  Japan,  and  with  intelligence  relat- 
ing to  naval  operations  in  the  Atlantic.  The  communications  intelligence  organ- 
ization at  Pearl  Harbor,  which  had  subsidiary  stations  at  Oahu,  Midway,  Samoa, 
and  Dutch  Harbor,  was  concerned  primarily  with  the  dispositions  and  [61] 

plans  of  navel  forces  in  the  Pacific  and  with  surveillance  of  Japanese  naval  com- 
munications. The  communications  intelligence  unit  in  the  Philippines,  which  was 
located  at  Corregidor,  was  concerned  with  Japanese  naval  communications  and 
Japanese  diplomatic  communications.  The  Officer  in  Charge  of  the  communica- 
tions intelligence  unit  at  Pearl  Harbor  was  Lt.  Comdr.  Joseph  J.  Rochefort.  The 
officer  in  charge  of  the  communications  intelligence  unit  at  Corregidor  until  Sep- 
tember, 1941  was  Lt.  Comdr.  Rudolph  J.  Fabian.  He  remained  thereafter  assisting 
that  unit. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2295 

Japanese  diplomatic  cominuiiications  were  in  various  codes,  such  as  the  code 
known  ase  "purple"  code,  the  "red"  code,  the  "J-19"  code,  the  "PAK  2",  and  the 
"La."  code.  The  so-called  "purple"  code  contained  the  most  important  Japanese 
diplomatic  messages.  Messages  in  this  and  in  other  diplomatic  codes  were  inter- 
ceptt'd  and  read  at  the  Philippines  primarily  for  the  purpose  of  local  information. 
They  were  sent,  as  intercepted,  to  the  Navy  Department  in  one  of  the  Navy's  own 
codes.  All  intercepted  diplomatic  traffic  was  sent  to  Washington  whether  o;r  not 
it  was  deciphered  and  read  at  the  Philippines.  None  of  this  information  was  sent 
from  the  Philippines  to  Pearl  Harbor.  The  unit  at  Pearl  Harbor  was  intercepting 
and  decrypting  no  Japanese  diplomatic  traffic.  It  had  been  directed  to  concen- 
trate on  Japanese  naval  systems.  The  unit  at  Washington  was  charged  with  the 
general  control  of  the  units  at  Corregidor,  Pearl  Harbor,  and  at  Washington,  and 
handled  the  Japanese  diplomatic  systems  and  also  handled  some  Japanese  naval 
systems. 

Intercepted  Japanese  diplomatic  traffic  received  by  the  Washington  unit  was 
pooled  with  similar  traffic  intercepted  by  the  Army  and  was  decrypted  and  trans- 
lated by  the  Navy  and  the  Army  on  an  alternate  day  basis.  The  resulting  infor- 
mation was  distributed  daily  by  ONI  to  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  and  to 
(tthers  in  the  Navy  Department.  The  President  and  the  State  Department  simi- 
larly were  furnished  this  information  daily. 

It  appears  that,  although  the  Navy  enjoyed  considerable  success  in  decrypting 
Japanese  diplomatic  communications,  the  Japanese  naval  codes  were  not  being 
read.  Information  obtained  by  radio  intelligence,  therefore,  from  Japanese 
naval  traffic  was  based  almost  entirely  on  so-called  "traffic  analysis"  and  not 
upon  reading  of  the  message  themselves. 

The  units  at  Pearl  Harbor  and  the  Philippines  advised  the  Washington  unit 
of  the  results  of  their  traffic  analyses  of  Japanese  naval  communications,  and  of 
the  estimated  location  and  movement  of  Japanese  naval  forces,  and  also  ex- 
changed information  with  one  another  on  that  subject.  The  units  also  exchanged 
information  on  technical  subjects,  that  is,  pertaining  to  codes  and  ciphers  and 
keys  for  decyphering  codes. 

Information  developed  from  the  reading  of  the  "purple"  messages  was  not 
sent  to  the  Pearl  Harbor  unit  as  such.  It  does  appear,  however,  that  various  of 
the  warning  messages  and  other  dispatches  sent  by  the  Chief  of  Naval  Opera- 
tions to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  were  based  upon  information 
derived, from  the  Japanese  diplomatic  messages. 

[62]'  Thus  it  appears  that  the  knowledge  of  the  Comander-ift-Chief  of  the 
Pacific  Fleet  as  to  the  status  of  diplomatic  relations  with  Japan  depended  pri- 
marily upon  the  messages  sent  to  him  by  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations.  The 
information  received  by  the  radio  intelligence  unit  at  Pearl  Harbor  as  to  the 
location  and  movement  of  Japanese  naval  forces  was,  however,  brought  directly 
to  the  attention  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  daily  by  the 
Fleet  Intelligence  Officer,  as  was  other  material  of  an  intelligence  nature. 

B.  The  Approach  of  War:  Intercepted  Communications  Availahle  at  Washington, 
and  Messages  Setit  by  CNO  to  Admiral  Kimmel. 

It  should  be  noted  that  the  Japanese  communications  which  were  intercepted 
and  decoded  and  translated  by  the  War  and  Navy  Departments,  as  set  forth  in 
this  section,  were  not  sent  to  Admiral  Kimmel.  Various  of  the  messages  sent  to 
Admiral  Kimmel  by  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  were  based  on  these  Japanese 
communications. 

(1)   The  resignation  of  the  Japanese  Cabinet  and  October  16th  dispatch. 

On  16  October  1941,  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  sent  a  di.spatch  to  Cinclant, 
CincPac  and  CincAF  (Exhibit  13.  Naval  Court),  reading  as  follows: 

"The  resignation  of  the  Japanese  cabinet  has  created  a  grave  situation  X 
If  a  new  cabinet  is  formed  it  will  probably  be  strongly  nationalistic  and  anti 
American  X  If  the  Konoye  cabinet  remains  the  effect  will  be  that  it  will  operate 
under  a  new  mandate  which  will  not  include  rapprochement  with  the  US  X  In 
either  case  hostilities  between  Japan  and  Russia  are  a  strong  possibility  X 
Since  the  US  and  Britain  are  held  responsible  by  Japan  for  her  present  desperate 
situation  there  is  also  a  possibility  that  Japan  may  attack  these  two  powers  X 
In  view  of  these  possibilities  you  will  take  due  precautions  including  such  prepara- 
tory deployments  as  will  not  disclose  strategic  intention  nor  constitute  provocative 
actions  against  Japan  X  Second  and  third  adees  inform  appropriate  army  and 
naval   district   authorities  X     Acknowledge" 

On  17  October  1941,  Admiral  Stark  wrote  to  Admiral  Kimmel  (Exhibit  38,  Naval 
Court).    In  this  letter,  Admiral  Stark  advised  that  things  had  been  "popping" 


2296     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

here  for  the  last  twenty-four  hours,  but  from  the  dispatches  Admiral  Kimmel 
knew  about  all  that  they  did.  He  said,  "Personally,  I  do  not  believe  the  Japanese 
are  going  to  sail  into  us  and  the  message  I  sent  you  merely  stated  the  'possibility  ;' 
in  fact,  I  tempered  the  message  handed  me  considerably.  Perhaps  I  was  wrong, 
but  I  hope  not.  In  any  case  after  long  pow-wows  in  the  White  House,  it  was 
felt  that  we  should  be  on  guard,  at  least  until  something  indicates  the  trend." 

[63]  Admiral  Stark  continued  that  Admiral  Kimmel  would  recall  that  in 
an  earlier  letter,  when  War  Plans  was  forecasting  a  Japanese  attack  on  Siberia  in 
August,  Admiral  Stark  had  said  that  his  own  judgment  was  that  they  would 
make  no  move  in  that  direction  until  the  Russian  situation  showed  a  definite 
trend.  In  this  letter  he  said  that  he  thought  this  whole  thing  worked  up  together. 
He  stated  that  efforts  would  be  made  to  maintain  the  status  quo  in  the  Pacific. 
How  long  it  could  be  kept  going,  he  did  not  know,  but  the  President  and  Mr. 
Hull  were  woi'king  on  it.  ,To  this  letter  was  annexed  a  postscript,  stating  in 
part,  "General  Marshall  just  called  up  and  was  anxious  that  we  make  some 
sort  of  i-econnaissance  so  that  he  could  feel  assured  that  on  arrival  at  Wake, 
a  Japanese  raider  attack  may  not  be  in  order  on  his  bombers.  I  told  him  that 
we  could  not  assure  against  any  such  contingency,  but  that  I  felt  it  extremely  im- 
probable and  that,  while  we  keep  track  of  Japanese  ships  as  far  as  we  can,  a 
carefully  planned  raid  on  any  of  these  island  carriers  in  the  Pacific  might  be 
difficult  to  detect.  However,  we  are  on  guard  to  the  best  of  our  ability,  and  my 
advice  to  him  was  not  to  worry." 

Also  annexed  was  a  memorandum  of  17  October  1941.  by  Rear  Admiral  Schuir- 
mann,  estimating  the  importance  of  changes  in  the  Japanese  Cabinet.  The  sub- 
stance of  this  analysis  was  that  the  military  would  determine  Japanese  action 
whether  to  attack  Russia  or  move  southward,  and  would  make  this  decision  on 
the  basis  of  opportunity  and  what  they  could  get  away  with,  and  that  it  would 
not  be  determined  by  the  cabinet  in  power. 

(2)  Japanese  mcn^agcs  conceiniyui  Gernmn  attitude;  Noniina's  desire  to 
resign. — On  18  October  1941,  the  Navy  translated  an  intercepted  Japanese  com- 
munication from  Berlin  to  Tokyo,  dated  1  October  1941,  which  stated  that  the 
Germans  were  becoming  increasingly  dissatisfied  with  Japan's  postion,  particu- 
larly because  Japan  was  not  advising  Germany  of  the  negotiations  with  the  United 
States,  although  the  United  States  was  advising  England  (Document  4,  Exhibit 
63,  Naval  Court). 

A  Japanese  message  from  Tokyo  to  Washington,  dated  16  October  1941,  was 
intercepted  and  translated  on  17  October  1941.  In  this  Toyoda  advised  Aomura 
that  although  he  had  been  requested  by  both  the  German  and  Italian  Ambassadors 
in  Tokyo  to  give  them  confidential  information  on  the  Japanese-United  States 
negotiations,  he  had,  in  consideration  of  the  nature  of  the  negotiations,  been 
declining  to  do  so.  However,  early  in  October,  following  the  Gennan  attacks 
on  American  merchant  ships  and  the  consequent  revival  of  the  movement  for 
revision  of  the  neutrality  act,  the  German  authorities  demanded  that  the  Japanese 
Government  submit  to  the  American  Government  a  message  that  if  the  Roosevelt 
Administration  continued  to  attack  the  Axis  powers,  a  belligerent  situation 
would  inevitably  arise  between  Germany,  Italy,  and  the  United  States,  which, 
under  the  Three-Power  Agreement,  might  lead  Jai^an  to  join  immediately  the 
war  against  the  United  States.  It  was  indicated  that  such  a  message  was 
being  considered  and  there  were  reasons  which  would  not  permit  of  postpone- 
ment (Document  3,  Exhibit  63,  Naval  Court). 

[64]  On  22  October  1941,  Nomura  sent  a  message  to  Tokyo  which  was  inter- 
cepted and  translated  on  23  October  1941.  in  which  he  said  that  he  was  sure  that 
he,  too,  should  go  out  with  the  former  cabinet ;  that  he  knew  that  the  Secretary 
of  State  realized  how  sincere  he  was  and  yet  how  little  influence  he  had  in 
Japan  ;  that  there  were  some  Americans  who  trusted  him  and  who  said  that 
things  would  get  better  for  him,  but  that  their  encouragement  was  not  enough; 
that  among  his  confreres  in  the  United  States  there  were  some  who  felt  the  same 
way,  but  they  were  all  poor  deluded  souls ;  that  the  instructions  could  be  carried 
out  by  Wakasugi ;  that  Nomura  did  not  want  to  be  the  bones  of  a  dead  horse ;  that 
he  did  not  want  to  ocntinue  "this  hypocritical  existence,  deceiving  other  people;" 
that  he  was  not  trying  to  flee  from  the  field  of  battle,  but  as  a  man  of  honor,  that 
was  the  only  way  open  for  him  to  tread ;  and  that  he  sought  permission  to  return 
to  Japan  (Document  5,  Exhibit  63,  Naval  Court). 

On  23  October  1941,  a  message  from  Tokyo  to  Washington  of  the  same  date  was 
intercepted  and  translated,  which  stated  that  the  efforts  Nomura  was  making 
were  appreciated ;  that,  as  he  was  well  aware,  the  outcome  of  those  negotiations 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2297 

had  11  jrreat  l)earinfc  upon  the  decision  as  to  which  load  the  Inii>erial  (ioverninent 
woiUd  proceed;  that  as  such  it  was  an  exceedinj^ly  iinpoitaiit  matter;  that  they 
were  placiuj;  all  of  their  reliance  on  Nomura's  reports  for  information  on  this 
matter;  that  for  those  reasons  they  hoped  that  he  would  see  tit  to  saci'ifice  his 
personal  wishes  and  remain  at  his  post  (Docuinent  (5,  Kxhihit  (53,  Naval  Court). 

(3)    Action  tdkcn  by  Admiral  Kiiinnrl. 

Admiral  Kimmel  advised,  in  a  letter  of  October  22nd  (Exhibit  14,  Naval 
Court),  that  the  action  talcen  included  maintaining  two  submarines  for  patrol 
at  Midway,  dispatching  twelve  patrol  planes  to  Midway,  prepai'ing  to  send  six 
patrol  planes  from  Midway  to  Wake,  and  to  replace  the  six  at  Midway  from 
Pearl  Harbor,  sending  two  submarines  to  Vv'ake,  and  sending  additional  Marines 
and  stores  there,  dispatching  additional  Marines  to  Palmyra,  placing  Admiral 
Pye  and  his  ships  on  twelve  hours  notice,  getting  six  submarines  ready  to  depart 
for  Japan  on  short  notice,  putting  some  additional  security  measures  in  effect  in 
the  operating  areas  outside  Pearl  Harbor. 

On  7  November  1941,  Admiral  Stark  wrote  to  Admiral  Kimmel  (Exhibit  74, 
Naval  Court)  in  reply  to  Admiral  Kinunel's  letter  of  October  22nd.  He  stated, 
among  other  things,  "O.  K.  on  the  dispositions  which  you  made  in  connection  with 
recent  change  in  the  Japanese  cabinet.  The  l»ig  question  i.s— what  next?!"  Also, 
"Things  seem  to  be  moving  steadily  towards  a  crisis  in  the  Pacific.  Just  when  it 
will  break,  no  one  can  tell.  The  principal  reaction  I  have  to  it  all  is  what  I  have 
written  you  before ;  it  continually  gets  'worser  and  worser' !  A  month  may  see, 
literally,  most  anything.  Two  irreconcilable  policies  cannot  go  on  forever — 
particularly  if  one  party  cannot  live  with  the  setup.    It  doesn't  look  good." 

[6o]  (4)  The  first  Japanese  deadline  message;  Japanese  interest  in 
American  ships. 

On  5  November  1941,  the  Navy  translated  a  message  from  Tokyo  to  Washington, 
reading  as  follows : 

"(Of  utmost  secrecy). 

"Because  of  various  circumstances,  it  is  absolutely  necessary  that  all 
arrangements  for  the  signing  of  this  agreement  be  completed  by  the  25th  of 
this  month.  I  realize  that  this  is  a  diflBcult  order,  but  under  the  circumstances 
it  is  an  unavoidable  one.  Please  understand  this  thoroughly  and  tackle  the 
problem  of  saving  the  Japanese-U.  S.  relations  from  falling  into  a  chaotic  condi- 
tion.   Do  so  with  great  determination  and  with  unstinted  effort,  I  beg  of  you. 

"This  information  is  to  be  kept  strictly  to  yourself  only." 

During  the  first  half  of  November,  there  were  translated  in  Washington 
various  intercepted  Japane.se  communications  concerning  ships  and  planes  at 
Manila  and  Seattle  (Documents  1-8,  Exhibit  68,  Naval  Court).  According  to 
one  of  these  messages,  which  was  dated  ■">  Noveujber  1941,  the  Navy  General 
Staff  wanted  investigation  done  at  Manila  as  to  the  conditions  of  airports,  types 
of  planes  and  numbers  of  planes  there,  warships  there,  machinery  belonging  to 
land  forces,  and  the  state  of  progress  being  made  on  all  equipment  and 
establishments. 

(5)   Arrival  of  Kurtisu;  Stark  and  Marshall  recommendations  as  to  ultimatum. 

The  situation  existing  early  in  November  was  .summarized  by  Nomura,  in  a 
report  to  Tokyo,  dated  10  November  1941,  intercepted  on  November  12th 
(Document  8,  Exhibit  63,  Naval  Court)  by  reference  to  a  report  from  the  legal 
advi.ser  to  the  Jaiianese  Embassy,  who  had  conferred  with  Senator  Thomas  and 
Secretary  Hull,  that  the  United  States  was  not  bluffing,  that  if  Japan  invaded 
again,  the  United  States  would  fight  with  Japan,  that  psychologically  the  Ameri- 
can people  were  ready,  that  the  Navy  was  ready  and  prepared  for  action. 
Nonmra  ahso  reported  that  he  had  a  conversation  with  "a  certain  Cabinet 
member"  who  had  said  that  Nomura  was  indeed  a  dear  friend,  that  he  would 
tell  him  alone  this:  that  the  American  government  was  receiving  reports  that 
Japan  would  be  on  the  move  again  and  did  not  believe  that  Nomura's  visit  to  the 
President  or  the  coming  of  Kurusu  would  have  any  effect  on  the  general  situation. 
Nomura  .said  that  he  had  explained  how  impatient  the  Japanese  had  bec-ome  since 
the  freezing,  how  eager  they  were  for  a  quick  understanding,  how  they  did  not 
desire  a  Japanese-American  war,  and  how  they  hoped  for  peace  until  the  end. 
The  Cabinet  member  replied,  however,  that  the  President  and  Secretarv  of 
State  believed  "those  reports."  [60]  Nomura  also  said  that  his  friend 
had  stated  that  the  United  States  could  not  stop  because  if  Japan  moved,  some- 
thing would  have  to  be  done  to  save  the  "face",  of  the  United  States. 

Admiral    Stark    w-as    not    hopeful    that    anything    in    the    wav    of    better 
understanding  between  the  United  States  and  Japan  would  come  from  Kurusu's 

79716  ()— 4() — i>t.  1« 25 


2298     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

visit.  His  opinion  was  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  reconcile  the  Japanese  and 
American  views.  Admiral  Stark  so  advised  Admiral  Kimmel  by  letter  dated 
14  November  1941  (Exhibit  39,  Naval  Court).  With  this  letter,  Admiral  Stark 
also  sent  to  Admiral  Kimmel  a  copy  of  a  memorandum,  dated  5  November  1941, 
by  Admiral  Stark  and  General  Marshall,  for  the  President.  This  was  concerned 
with  the  belief  of  Chiang-Kai-Shek  that  a  Japanese  attack  on  Kumming  was 
imminent  and  that  outside  military  support  was  the  sole  hope  for  the  defeat 
of  that  threat.  The  memorandum  considered  whether  the  United  States  would 
be  justified  in  undertaking  offensive  operations  against  the  Japanese  to  prevent 
her  from  severing  the  Burma  Road.  The  memorandum  stated  that  the  Fleet  in 
the  Pacific  was  inferior  to  the  Japanese  Fleet  and  could  not  undertake  an  unlim- 
ited strategic  offensive  in  the  Western  Pacific.  It  pointed  out  that  by  the 
middle  of  December,  1941,  United  States  air  and  submarine  strength  in  the 
Philippines  would  become  a  positive  threat  to  any  Japanese  operations  south 
of  Formosa.  The  recommendations  were  in  general  that  all  aid  short  of  war 
be  given  to  China  and  that  no  ultimatum  be  given  to  Japan. 

(6)  Further  and  Final  Japanese  ''deadline  messages." 

At  this  time,  information  was  received  in  Washington  that  the  Japanese 
Government  had  established  a  further  and  final  deadline  for  the  completion  of 
diplomatic  negotiations.  This  consisted  of  two  messages  from  Tokyo  to 
Washington,  which  were  intercepted  and  translated  by  the  Army,  as  follows : 

(a)  A  translation  on  17  November  1941  (Document  10,  Exhibit  68,  Naval 
Court),   of  a   dispatch,  dated   November   16th.   the   highlights   of   which   were: 

"*  *  *  The  fate  of  our  Empire  hangs  by  the  slender  thread  of  a  few 
days,  so  please  fight  harder  than  you  ever  did  before. 

"What  you  say  is  of  course  so  *  ♦  *  but  I  have  only  to  refer  you  to  the 
fundamental  policy  laid  down  in  my  #725  (in  which  Togo  says  that  conditions 
within  and  without  Japan  will  not  permit  any  further  delay  in  reaching  a 
settlement  with  the  United  States)  *  *  ♦  try  to  realize  what  that  means. 
In  your  opinion  we  ought  to  wait  and  see  what  turn  the  war  takes  and  remain 
patient  *  *  *  the  situation  renders  this  out  of  the  question.  I  set  the 
deadline  for  the  solution  of  these  negotiations  in  my  #736,  and  there  will  be 
no  change.  Please  try  to  understand  that.  You  see  how  [67]  short  the 
time  is ;  therefore,  do  not  allow  the  United  States  to  sidetrack  us  and  delay 
the  negotiations  any  further.  Press  them  for  a  solution  on  the  basis  of  our 
proposals,  and  do  your  best  to  bring  about  an  immediate  solution." 

(b)  On  22  November  1941  (Document  11,  Exhibit  63,  Naval  Court),  a  transla- 
tion of  a  dispatch  of  the  .same  date,  reading  in  substance : 

"To  both  you  Ambassadors. 

"It  is  awfully  hard  for  us  to  consider  changing  the  date  we  set  in  my  #736. 
You  should  know  this,  however,  I  know  you  are  working  hard.  Stick  to  our  fixed 
policy  and  do  your  very  best.  Spare  no  efforts  and  try  to  bring  about  the  solution 
we  desire.  There  are  reasons  beyond  your  ability  to  guess  why  we  wanted  to 
settle  Japanese-American  relations  by  the  25th,  but  if  within  the  next  three  or 
four  days  you  can  finish  your  conversations  with  the  Americans ;  if  the  signing 
can  be  completed  by  the  29th  (let  me  write  it  out  for  you — twenty  ninth)  ;  if  the 
pertinent  notes  can  be  exchanged;  if  we  can  get  an  understanding  with  Great 
Britain  and  the  Netherlands;  and  in  short  if  everything  can  be  finished,  we  have 
decided  to  wait  until  that  date.  This  time  we  mean  it,  that  the  deadline  abso- 
lutely cannot  be  changed.  After  that  things  are  automatically  going  to  happen. 
Please  take  this  into  your  careful  consideration  and  work  harder  than  you  ever 
have  before.  This,  for  the  present,  is  for  the  information  of  you  two  Ambassa- 
dors alone." 

(7)  The  November  2Jfth  dispateh  to  CincPac  and  others. 

On  24  November  1941  (Exhibit  15),  a  dispatch  (which  before  the  Naval  Court 
Admiral  Stark  said  was  based  in  part  on  the  "deadline"  intercept — page  775), 
was  sent  by  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  to  CincAP,  CincPac,  ComELBVBN, 
ConiTWELVE,  ComTHIRTEEN,  and  ComFIFTEEN  for  action,  reading: 

"Chances  of  favorable  outcome  of  negotiations  with  Japan  very  doubtful  X 
This  situation  coupled  with  statements  of  Japanese  Government  and  movements 
their  naval  and  military  forces  indicate  in  our  opinion  that  a  surprise  aggressive 
movement  in  any  direction  including  attack  on  Philippines  or  Guam  is  a  possi- 
bility X  Chief  of  Staff  has  seen  this  dispatch  concurs  and  requests  action  ad- 
dressees to  inform  senior  Army  officers  their  areas  X  Utmost  secrecy  necessary 
in  order  not  to  complicate  an  already  tense  situation  or  precipitate  Japanese 
action  X    Guam  will  be  informed  separately" 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2299 

[68]  On  25  November  1941  (Exhibit  47,  Naval  Court),  Admiral  Stark  wrote 
to  Admiral  Kimmel  in  response  to  his  letter  of  17  October  1941,  on  the  inadequacy 
of  local  defense  forces  in  Hawaii  .(Exhibit  4(),  Naval  Court).  Admiral  Stark 
stated  that  CincPac  had  taken  cognizance  of  his  responsibilities  in  connection 
with  tasks  pertaining  to  the  Hawaiian  Coastal  Frontier  and  that  the  forces  avail- 
able in  the  Hawaiian  area,  both  Fleet  and  local  defense  forces,  and  the  actual 
operations  of  our  own  and  hostile  forces  would  indicate  the  numbers  of  Fleet 
Vessels  or  aircraft  required  to  be  assigned  to  local  defense  tasks.  Admiral 
Stark's  letter  continued  by  summarizing  the  situation  in  regard  to  increasing 
the  local  defense  forces  and,  among  other  things,  pointed  out  that  the  Depart- 
ment had  no  additional  airplanes  available  for  assignment  to  the  FOURTEENTH 
Naval  District.  A  marginal  note  on  a  copy  of  this  letter,  apparently  written  in 
Hawaii,  stated,  "In  other  words,  look  to  the  Fleet.  They  seem  to  forget  that  the 
Fleet  has  offensive  work  to  do." 

On  25  November  1941  (Exhibit  16,  Naval  Court),  Admiral  Stark  also  wrote  a 
personal  letter  to  Admiral  Kimmel  stating,  among  other  things,  that  Admiral 
Stark  agreed  with  Admiral  Kimmel  that,  for  example,  to  cruise  in  Japanese 
home  waters,  Admiral  Kimmel  should  have  a  substantial  increase  in  the  strength 
of  his  fleet,  but  pointed  out  that  neither  ABC-1  nor  Rainbow-5  contemplated  this 
as  a  general  policy ;  after  the  British  strengthened  Singapore,  and  under  certain 
auspicious  occasions,  opportunity  for  raids  in  Japanese  waters  might  present 
themselves,  but  this  would  be  the  exception  rather  than  the  rule.  A  postscript  to 
this  letter  stated  that  both  Mr.  Hull  and  the  President  confirmed  the  gravity  of  the 
situation  indicated  by  the  message  which  Admiral  Stark  sent  a  day  or  two  before. 
It  stated  further  that  neither  the  President  nor  Mr.  Hull  would  be  surprised  over 
a  Japanese  surprise  attack ;  that  from  many  angles  an  attack  on  the  Philippines 
would  be  the  most  embarrassing  thing  that  could  happen  to  us ;  and  there  were 
some  who  thought  it  likely  to  occur.  Admiral  Stark  further  stated :  "I  do  not 
give  it  the  weight  others  do,  but  I  included  it  because  of  the  strong  feeling  among 
some  people.  You  know  I  have  generally  held  that  it  was  not  the  time  for  the 
Japanese  to  proceed  against  Russia.  .  I  still  do.  Also  I  still  rather  look  for  an 
advance  into  Thailand.  Indo-China,  Burma  Road  area  as  the  most  likely  *  *  * 
I  won't  go  into  the  pros  and  cons  of  what  the  United  States  may  do.  I  will  be 
damned  if  I  know.  I  wish  I  did.  The  only  thing  I  do  know  is  that  we  may  do 
most  anything  and  that's  the  only  thing  I  know  to  be  prepared  for;  or  we  may 
do  nothing — I  think  it  is  more  likely  to  be  anything." 

(8)  Dispatches  concei'ning  reenforcement  of  Wake  and  Midway. 

On  26  November  1941,  a  dispatch  (Exhibit  40,  Naval  Court)  was  sent  by  the 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations  to  CincPac  stating  that  the  Array  had  offered  to  make 
available  some  units  of  infantry  for  reenforcing  defense  battalions  now  on  sta- 
tion, if  Admiral  Kimmel  considered  that  desirable ;  also,  that  the  Army  proposed 
to  prepare,  in  Hawaii,  garrison  troops  for  advances  bases  which  Admiral  Kimmel 
might  occupy,  but  was  unable  to  provide  any  antiaircraft  units.  Admiral  Kimmel 
was  instructed  to  take  this  into  consideration  and  [69]  advise  when  prac 
ticable  the  number  of  troops  desired  and  recommended  armament. 

Also  on  26  November  1941,  another  dispatch  (Exhibit  18)  was  sent  to  CincPac 
which  stated  that  in  order  to  keep  the  planes  of  the  Second  Marine  Aircraft  Wing 
available  for  expeditionary  use.  OpNav  had  requested  the  Army,  and  the  Army 
had  agreed,  to  station  twenty-five  Army  pursuits  at  Midway  and  a  similar  number 
at  Wake,  provided  CincPac  considered  this  feasible  and  desirable;  that  it  would 
be  necessary  for  CincPac  to  transport  these  planes  and  ground  crews  from  Oahu 
to  these  stations  on  aircraft  carriers,  and  that  the  planes  would  be  flown  off  at 
destination ;  that  ground  personnel  would  be  landed  in  boats  and  essential  spare 
parts,  tools  and  ammunition  would  be  taken  in  the  carrier  or  on  later  trips  of 
regular  Navy  supply  vessels ;  that  the  Army  understood  that  these  forces  must 
be  quartered  in  tents;  that  the  Navy  must  be  responsible  for  supplying  water 
and  subsistence  and  transporting  other  Army  supplies;  that  the  stationing  of 
these  planes  must  not  be  allowed  to  interfere  with  planned  movements  of  Army 
bombers  to  the  Philippines;  and,  that  additional  parking  areas  should  be  laid 
promptly  if  necessary.  A  question  was  raised  as  to  whether  or  not  Navy  bombs 
at  outlying  positions  could  be  carriedby  Army  bombers  which  might  fly  to  those 
positions  in  order  to  support  Navy  operations.  CincPac  was  directed  to  confer 
with  the  Commanding  General  and  advi.se  as  soon  as  practicable. 

(9)  Iniertepted  Japanese  communications  of  November  26th  and  27th. 

On  November  26th  and  27th,  there  were  available  in  Washington  additional 
intercepted  Japanese  messages,  all  of  which  had  been  sent  from  Tokyo,  as  follows : 


2300     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(a)  A  Navy  translation  on  27  November  1941  (Document  14,  Exhibit  63,  Naval 
Court)  of  a  message  to  Nanking,  dated  15  November  1941,  in  the  so-called  "Purple"' 
code,  addressed  to  "Naval  authorities"  which  stated : 

"We  are  now  in  the  midst  of  very  serious  negotiations  and  have  not  reached 
an  agreement  as  yet.  As  the  time  limit  is  near  please  have  them  (defer?)  for 
a  while." 

(b)  A  Navy  translation  on  26  November  1941  (Document  13,  Exhibit  63,  Naval 
Court)  of  a  message  to  Washington,  dated  19  November  1941,  stating  that: 

"When  our  diplomatic  relations  are  becoming  dangerous,  we  will  add  the 
•following  at  the  beginning  and  end  of  our  general  intelligence  broadcasts: 

"(1)    if  it  is  Japan-U.  S.  relations,  'HIGASHI', 

"(2)   Japan-Russia  relations,  'KITA', 

"(3)   Japan-British  relations,   (including  Thai,  Malaya  and  N.  E.  I.),  'Nishi'. 

[70]  "The  above  will  be  repeated  five  times  and  included  at  beginning  and 
end.     Relay  to  Rio  de  Janeiro,  Buenos  Aires,  Mexico  City,  San  Francisco." 

(c)  An  Anny  translation  on  26  November  1941  (Document  9,  p]xhibit  68,  Naval 
Court),  of  a  message  to  Manila,  dated  20  November  1941,  in  the  "purple"  code, 
marked  "Strictly  Secret"  and  stating : 

"Please  advise  immediately  the  results  of  your  investigations  as  to  the  type 
of  draft — presumed  to  be  in  the  waters  adjacent  to  Subic  Bay."  (Near 
Manila,  P.  I.) 

"Furthermore,  please  transmit  these  details  to  the  Asama  Maru  as  well  as 
to  Tokyo." 

(d)  An  Army  translation  on  26  November  1941  (Document  12,  Exhibit  63, 
Naval  Court)  of  a  message  to  Washington,  dated  26  November  1941,  in  the 
"purple"  code,  which  stated  : 

"To  be  handled  in  Government  Code. 

"The  situation  is  momentarily  becoming  more  tense  and  telegrams  take  too 
long.  Therefore,  will  you  cut  down  the  substance  of  your  reports  of  negotiations 
to  the  minimum  and,  on  occa.sion,  cjiU  up  Chief  YAMAMOTO  of  the  American 
Bureau  on  the  telephone  and  make  your  request  to  him.  At  that  time  we  will 
use  the  following  code:"   (Codes  were  then  set  fiu-th.) 

(10)  The  Stute  Department  note  of  November  26th  and  Japanese  reaction 
thereto;  the  irar  irarning  of  November  27th. 

The  diplomatic  negotiations  with  the  Japanese  representatives,  Nomura  and 
Kurusu,  came  to  a  head  on  26  November  1941.  At  that  time,  the  State  Depart- 
ment presented  a  proposal  to  the  Japanese  and  that  Department  reported  to  the 
Navy  Department,,  among  others,  that  it  had  no  further  hopes  of  composing 
matters  with  the  Japanese.  The  Japanese  reaction  to  this  proposal  api>ears 
from  dispatches  which  were  subsequently  decrypted  and  translated.  They  are 
as  follows : 

(a)  An  Army  translation  (Document  17,  Exhibit  63,  Naval  Court)  of  a  mes- 
sage from  Washington  (Nomura)  to  Tokyo,  dated  26  November  IJMl,  in  the 
"purple"  code  and  marked  "Extremely  urgent,"  which  stated: 

"At  4 :  4.^)  on  the  afternoon  of  the  26th  I  and  Ambassador  KURUSU  met  with 
Secretary  HULL  and  we  talked  for  about  two  hours. 

"HULL  said,  'For  the  last  several  days  the  American  Government  has  been 
getting  the  ideas  of  various  quartei'S,  as  well  as  conferring  carefully  with  the 
nations  concerned,  on  the  provisional  treaty  proposal  presented  by  Japan  on 
[71]  the  20th  of  this  month,  and  I  am  sorry  to  tell  you  that  we  cannot  agree 
to  it.  At  length,  however,  we  feel  compelled  to  propose  a  plan,  tentative  and 
without  commitment,  reconciling  the  points  of  difference  between  our  proposal 
of  June  21st  and  yours  of  September  25th.'  So  saying,  he  presented  us  with  the 
following  two  proposals : 

"A.  One  which  seeks  our  recognition  of  his  so-called  'four  principles.' 

"B.  (1)  The  conclusion  of  a  mutual  non-aggressive  treaty  between  Tokyo, 
Washington,  Moscow,  the  Netherlands,  Chungking  and  Bangkok. 

(2)  Agreement  between  Japan,  the  United  States,  England,  the  Netherlands, 
China  and  Thai  on  the  inviolability  of  French  Indo-China  and  equality  of 
economic  treatment  in  French  Indo-China. 

"(3)  The  complete  evacuation  of  Japanese  forces  from  China  and  all  French 
Indo-China. 

"(4)Japan  and  the  United  States  both  definitelv  promise  to  support  no  regime 
in  China  but  that  of  CHIANG-KAI-SHEK. 

"(5)   The  abolition  of  extra-territoriality  and  concessions  in  China.- 

"(6)  The  conclusion  of  a  reciprocal  trade  treaty  between  Japan  and  the 
United  States  on  the  basis  of  most  favored  nation  treatment. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2301 

"(7)   The  mutual  rescimliug  of  the  Japanese  and  American  freezing  orders. 

"(8)   Stabilization  of  yeu-dollar  exchange. 

"(9)  No  matter  wiiat  sort  of  treaties  either  Japan  or  the  United  States  has 
contracted  with  third  countries,  tiiey  both  definitely  promise  that  these  treaties 
will  not  be  interpreted  as  hostile  to  the  objectives  of  this  treaty  or  to  the 
maintenance  of  peace  in  the  Pacific.  (This  is,  of  course,  supi)osed  to  emasculate 
the  Three-Power  Pact.) 

"In  view  of  our  negotiations  all  along,  we  were  both  dumbfounded  and  said 
we  could  not  even  cooperate  to  the  extent  of  reporting  this  to  Tokyo.  We  argued 
back  furiously,  i)ut  HULL  remained  solid  as  a  rock.  Why  did  the  United 
States  have  to  propose  such  hard  terms  a.s  theseV  Well,  England,  the  Nether- 
lands, and  China  doubtless  put  her  up  to  it.  Then,  too,  we  have  been  urging 
them  to  quit  helping  CHIANG,  and  lately  a  number  of  important  Japanese  in 
speeches  have  been  urging  that  we  strike  at  England  and  the  United  States.  More- 
over, there  have  been  rumors  that  we  are  demanding  of  Thai  that  she  give  us 
complete  control  over  her  national  defense.  All  that  is  reflected  in  these  two 
hard  proposals,  or  we  think  so." 

[72]         (b)   An  Army  translation  (Document  16,  Exhibit  63,  Naval  Court)  of  a 
message  from  Washington  to  Tokyo,  dated  26  November  1041,  in  the  "purple" 
code  and  marked  "Extremely  urgent,"  message  #1180,  reading : 
"From  NOMURA  and  KURUSU. 

"As  we  have  wired  you  several  times,  there  is  hardly  any  possibility  of  having 
them  consider  our  'B"  proiK)sal  in  toto.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  let  the  situa- 
tion remain  tense  as  it  is  now,  sorry  as  we  are  to  say  so,  the  negotiations  will 
inevitably  be  ruptured,  if  indeed  they  may  not  already  be  called  so.  Our 
failure  and  humiliation  are  complete.  We  might  suggest  one  thing  for  saving 
the  situation.  Although  we  have  grave  misgivings,  we  might  propose,  first,  that 
President  ROOSEVELT  wire  you  that  for  the  sake  of  posterity  he  hopes  that 
Japan  and  the  United  States  will  cooperate  for  the  maintenance  of  peace  in 
the  Pacific  (just  as  soon  as  you  wire  us  what  you  think  of  this,  we  will  nego- 
tiate for  this  sort  of  an  arrangement  with  all  we  have  in  us),  and  that  you 
in  return  reply  with  a  cordial  message,  thereby  not  only  clearing  the  atmosphere, 
but  also  gaining  a  little  time.  Considering  the  possibility  that  England  and 
the  United  States  are  scheming  to  bring  the  Netherlands  Indies  under  their 
protection  through  military  occupation,  in  order  to  forestall  this,  I  think  we 
should  propose  the  establishment  of  neutral  nations,  including  French  Indo- 
China,  Netherlands  India  and  Thai.  (As  you  know,  last  September  President 
ROOSEVELT  prop<ised  the  neutrality  of  French  Indo-China  and  Thai.) 

"We  suppose  that  the  rupture  of  the  present  negotiations  does  not  necessarily 
mean  war  between  Japan  and  the  United  States,  but  after  we  break  off,  as  we 
said,  the  military  occupation  of  Netherlands  India  is  to  be  expected  of  England 
and  the  United  States.  Then  we  would  attack  them  and  a  clash  with  them 
would  be  inevitable.  Now,  the  question  is  whether  or  not  Germany  would  feel 
duty  bound  by  the  third  article  of  the  treaty  to  help  us.  We  doubt  if  she  would. 
Again,  you  must  remember  that  the  Sino- Japanese  incident  would  have  to  wait 
until  the  end  of  this  world  war  before  it  could  possibly  be  settled. 

"In  this  telegram  we  are  expressing  the  last  personal  opinions  we  will  have 
to  express,  so  will  Your  excellency  please  be  good  enough  at  least  to  show  it 
to  the  Minister  of  the  Navy,  if  only  to  him ;  then  we  hope  that  you  will  wire 
back  instantly." 

(c)  An  army  translation  (Document  18,  Exhibit  (>3,  Naval  Court)  of  a  message 
from  Tokyo  to  Washington,  dated  28  November  1941,  in  the  "purple"  code, 
reading: 

[73]        "Re  your  #1189. 

"Well,  you  two  Ambassadors  have  exerted  superhuman  efforts  but,  in  spite  of 
this,  the  United  States  has  gone  ahead  and  pre.sented  this  humiliating  proposal. 
This  was  quite  unexpected  and  extremely  regrettable.  The  Imperial  Govern- 
ment can  by  no  means  use  it  as  a  basis  for  negotiations.  Therefore,  with  a 
report  of  the  views  of  the  Imperial  Government  on  this  American  proposal 
which  I  will  send  .vou  in  two  or  three  days,  the  negotiations  will  be  de  facto 
ruptured.  This  is  inevitable.  However,  I  do  not  wish  you  to  give  the  impre.s- 
sion  that  the  negotiations  are  broken  off.  Merely  say  to  them  that  you  are 
awaiting  instructions  and  that,  although  the  opinions  of  your  Government  are 
not  yet  clear  to  you,  to  your  own  way  of  thinking  the  Imi)erial  Government 
has  always  made  just  claims  and  has  borne  great  sacrifices  for  the  sake  of 
peace  in  the  Pacific.     Say  that  we  have  always  demonstrated  a  long-suffering 


2302     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

and  conciliatory  attitude,  but  that,  on  the  other  hand,  the  United  States  has  been 
unbending,  making  it  impossible  for  Japan  to  establish  negotiations.  Since 
things  have  come  to  this  pass,  I  contacted  the  man  you  told  me  to  in  your  #1180 
and  he  said  that  under  the  present  circumstances  what  you  suggest  is  entirely 
unsuitable.  From  now  on  do  the  best  you  can."  (Note:  The  man  is  the  Navy 
Minister. ) 

On  27  November  1941,  Admiral  Kimmel  received  a  dispatch  from  CNO,  which 
has  been  termed  the  "war  warning."     It  read : 

"This  dispatch  is  to  be  considered  a  war  warning  X  Negotiations  with  Japan 
looking  toward  stabilization  of  conditions  in  the  Pacific  have  ceased  and  an 
aggressive  move  by  Japan  is  expected  within  the  next  few  days  X  The  num- 
ber and  equipment  of  Japanese  troops  and  the  organization  of  naval  task  forces 
indicate  an  amphibious  expedition  against  either  the  Philippines  (printed  in  ink, 
"Thai")  or  Kra  Pennsula  or  possibly  Borneo  X  Execute  an  approprate  defen- 
sive deployment  preparatory  to  carrying  out  the  tasks  assigned  in  WPL  46  X 
Inform  District  and  Army  authorities  X  A  similar  warning  is  being  sent  by 
War  Department  X  Spenavo  inform  British  X  Continental  districts  Guam 
Samoa  directed  take  appropriate  measures  against  sabotage" 

(11)  The  dispatch  of  November  28th: 

On  November  28th,  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  sent  a  copy  of  a  dispatch 
to  CincPac  for  information  which  was  received  on  November  29th  (Exhibit  19, 
Naval  Court),  which  repeated  a  dispatch  which  had  been  sent  by  the  Army  to 
Commander,  Western  Defense  Command,  as  follows : 

[74]  "Negotiations  with  Japan  appear  to  be  terminated  to  all  practical  pur- 
poses with  only  the  barest  possibility  that  the  Japanese  Government  might  come 
back  and  offer  to  continue  X  Japanese  future  action  unpredictable  but  hostile  ac- 
tion possible  at  any  moment  X  If  hostilities  cannot  repeat  not  be  avoided  the 
United  States  desires  that  Japan  commit  the  first  overt  act  X  This  policy  should 
not  repeat  not  be  construed  as  restricting  you  to  a  course  of  action  that  might 
jeopardize  your  defense  X  Prior  to  hostile  Japanese  action  you  are  directed 
to  undertake  such  reconnaissance  and  other  measures  as  you  deem  necessary 
but  these  measures  should  be  carried  out  so  as  not  repeat  not  to  alarm  civil 
population  or  disclose  intent  X  Report  measures  taken  X  A  separate  message  is 
being  sent  to  G-2  Ninth  Corps  area  re  subversive  activities  in  the  United  States  X 
Should  hostilities  occur  you  will  carry  out  the  tasks  assigned  in  Rainbow  Five 
so  far  as  they  pertain  to  Japan  X  Limit  dissemination  of  this  highly  secret  in- 
formation to  minimum  essential  officers" 

The  Navy  dispatch  continued  that  WPL-52  was  not  applicable  to  the  Pacific 
area  and  would  not  be  placed  in  effect  in  that  area,  except  as  then  in  force 
in  Southeast  Pacific  Sub  Area,  Panama  Coastal  Frontier.     It  stated  further : 

"Undertake  no  offensive  action  until  Japan  has  committed  an  overt  act  X 
Be  prepared  to  carry  out  tasks  assigned  in  WPL  46  so  far  as  they  apply  to 
Japan  in  case  hostilities  occur" 

(12)  Intercepted  diplomatic  commiMications.  November  29  to  December  6, 
191,1. 

On  30  November  1941,  there  was  a  Navy  translation  of  a  message  from  Tokyo 
to  the  Japanese  emissaries  in  Washington,  dated  29  November  1941  (Document 
19,  Exhibit  63,  Naval  Court),  requesting  that  they  make  one  more  attempt  to  dis- 
cuss the  situation  with  the  United  States,  and  to  state  that  the  United  States 
had  always  taken  a  fair  position  in  the  past ;  that  the  Imperial  Government  could 
not  understand  why  the  United  States  was  taking  the  attitude  that  the  new 
Japanese  proposals  could  not  be  the  basis  of  discussion,  but  instead  had  made 
new  proposals  which  ignored  actual  conditions  in  East  Asia  and  which  would 
greatly  injure  the  prestige  of  the  Imperial  Government ;  that  the  United  States 
should  be  asked  what  had  become  of  the  basic  objectives  that  the  United  States 
had  made  as  the  basis  for  negotiations  for  seven  months ;  and  that  the  United 
States  should  be  asked  to  reflect  on  the  matter.  The  emissaries  were  directed  ia 
carrying  out  this  instruction  to  be  careful  that  this  did  not  lead  to  anything 
like  a  breaking  off  of  negotiations. 

[75]  Also  on  30  November  1941,  there  was  a  Navy  translation  of  a  trans- 
Pacific  radio  telephone  conversation  from  Kurusu  in  Washington  to  Yamamoto 
in  Tokyo,  in  which  a  telephone  code  was  used  (Document  20,  Exhibit  63,  Naval 
Court).  This  indicated  that  Kurusu  expected  a  long  message  ("probably  To- 
kyo's reply  to  Mr.  Hull's  proposals'')  ;  that  the  President  was  returning  appar- 
ently because  of  the  speech  of  the  Japanese  Premier  which  Kurusu  said  was  hav- 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2303 

ing  strong  rei^ercussions  here;  that  Kurusu  said  that  unless  the  Premier  and 
others  used  greater  caution  in  speeches,  it  would  put  the  Japanese  emissaries 
here  in  a  very  difficult  position ;  that  care  should  be  exercise'd,  that  Yaraamoto 
said  that  they  were  being  careful ;  that  Kurusu  wanted  the  Foreign  Minister 
told  that  the  emissaries  here  had  expected  to  hear  something  different — some 
good  word — but  instead  got  this  (the  Premier's  speech)  ;  that  the  Japanese- 
American  negotiations  were  to  continue;  that  Yamamoto  wanted  them  to  be 
stretched  out ;  that  Kurusu  needed  Yamamoto's  help  to  do  this,  and  that  both 
the  Premier  and  the  Foreign  Minister  would  need  to  change  the  tone  of  their 
speeches  and  that  all  would  have  to  use  some  discretion ;  that  Yamamoto  said 
the  real  problem  that  the  Japanese  were  up  against  was  the  effect  of  happen- 
ings in  the  South. 

There  were  four  significant  Japanese  communications  intercepted  on  1  De- 
cember 1941,  as  follows : 

(a)   Navy  translation — (Document  21,  Exhibit  63,  Naval  CJourt) 

From  :  Tokyo 
To :  Washington 
1  December  1941 
(Purple  CA) 
#865  Re  my  #857 

"1.  The  date  set  in  my  message  #812  has  come  and  gone,  and  the  situation 
continues  to  be  increasingly  critical.  However,  to  prevent  the  United  States 
from  becoming  unduly  suspicious  we  have  been  advising  the  press  and  others 
that  though  there  are  some  wide  differences  between  Japan  and  the  United 
States,  the  negotiations  are  continuing.  (The  above  is  for  only  your  infor- 
mation.) 

"2.  We  have  decided  to  withhold  submitting  the  note  to  the  U.  S.  Ambassador 
to  Tokyo  as  suggested  by  you  at  the  end  of  your  message  #1124.  Please  make 
the  necessary  representations  at  your  end  only. 

"3.  There  are  reports  here  that  the  President's  sudden  return  to  the  capital 
is  an  effect  of  Premier  Tojo's  statement.  We  have  an  idea  that  the  President 
did  so  because  of  his  concern  over  the  critical  Far  Eastern  situation.  Please 
make  investigations  into  this  matter." 

[76]         Army  translation — (Document  22,  Exhibit  63,  Naval  Court) 

From :  Tokyo 
To :  Berlin 
November  30,  1941 
Purple 

#986     (Strictly  Secret  (To  be  handled  in  Government  Code) 
(Part  1  of  2)  (Secret  outside  the  Department) 

"1.  Japan-American  negotiations  were  commenced  the  middle  of  April  this 
year.  Over  a  period  of  half  a  year  they  have  been  continued.  Within  that 
period  the  Imperial  Government  adamantly  stuck  to  the  Tri-Partite  Alliance 
as  the  cornerstone  of  its  national  policy  regardless  of  the  vicissitudes  of  the 
international  situation.  In  the  adjustment  of  diplomatic  relations  between 
Japan  and  the  United  States,  she  has  based  her  hopes  for  a  solution  definitely 
within  the  scope  of  that  alliance.  With  the  intent  of  restraining  the  United 
States  from  participating  in  the  war,  she  boldly  assumed  the  attitude  of  carrying 
through  these  negotiations. 

"2.  Therefore,  the  present  cabinet,  in  line  with  your  message,  with  the  view 
of  defending  the  Empire's  existence  and  integrity  on  a  just  and  equitable  basis, 
has  continued  the  negotiations  carried  on  in  the  past.  However,  their  views 
and  ours  on  the  question  of  the  evacuation  of  troops,  upon  which  the  negotia- 
tions rested  (they  demandetl  the  evacuation  of  Imperial  troops  from  China 
and  French  Indo-China),  were  completely  in  opjwsition  to  each  other. 

"Judging  from  the  course  of  the  neogtiations  that  have  been  going  on,  we 
first  came  to  loggerheads  when  the  United  States,  in  keeping  with  its  traditional 
idealogical  tendency  of  managing  international  relations,  re-emphasized  her 
fundamental  reliance  upon  this  traditional  policy  in  the  conversations  carried 
on  between  the  United  States  and  England  in  the  Atlantic  Ocean.  The  motive 
of  the  United  States  in  all  this  was  brought  out  by  her  desire  to  prevent  the 
establishment  of  a  new  order  by  Japan,  Germany,  and  Italy  in  Europe  and  in 
the  Far  East  (that  is  to  say,  the  aims  of  the  Tri-Partite  Alliance).  As  long 
as  the  Empire  of  Japan  was  in  alliance  with  Germany  and  Italy,  there  could 
be  no  maintenance  of  friendly  relations  between  Japan  and  the  United  States 


2304     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

was  the  stand  they  took.  From  this  point  of  view,  they  began  to  demonstrate  a 
tendency  to  demand  the  divorce  of  the  Imperial  Government  from  the  Tri- 
partite Alliance.  This  was  brought  out  at  the  last  meeting.  That  is  to  say 
that  it  has  only  been  in  the  negotiations  of  the  last  few  days  that  it  has  be- 
come gradually  more  and  more  clear  that  the  Imperial  Government  could  no 
longer  [77]  continue  negotiations  with  the  United  States.  It  l>ecame 
clear,  too,  that  a  continuation  of  negotiations  would  inevitably  be  detrimental 
to  our  cause." 

(Part  2  of  2) 

"3.  The  proposal  presented  by  the  United  States  on  the  26th  made  this  attitude 
of  theirs  clearer  than  ever.  In  it  there  is  one  insulting  clause  which  says  that 
no  matter  what  treaty  either  party  enters  into  with  a  third  power  it  will  not 
be  interpreted  as  having  any  bearing  upon  the  basic  object  of  this  treaty,  namely 
the  maintenance  of  peace  in  the  Pacific.  This  means  specifically  the  Three- 
Power  Pact.  It  means  that  in  case  the  United  States  enters  the  European  war 
at  any  time  the  Japanese  Empire  will  not  be  allowed  to  give  assistance  to  Ger- 
many and  Italy.  It  is  clearly  a  trick.  This  clause  alone,  let  alone  others, 
makes  it  impossible  to  find  any  basis  in  the  American  proposal  for  negotiations. 
What  is  more,  before  the  United  States  brought  forth  this  plan,  they  conferred 
with  England,  Australia,  the  Netherlands,  and  China — they  did  so  repeatedly. 
Therefore,  it  is  clear  that  the  United  States  is  now  in  collusion  with  those 
nations  and  has  decided  to  regard  Japan,  along  ~\vith  Germany  and  Italy,  as 
an  enemy." 

(c)  On  1  December  1941,  the  Army  translated  an  intercepted  message  from 
Tokyo  to  the  Japanese  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  dated  30  November  1941  (Docu- 
ment 6,  Exhibit  13),  which  in  substance  statetl : 

The  conversations  between  Tokyo  and  Washington  now  stand  ruptured.  Say 
very  secretly  to  Hitler  and  Ribbentrop  that  there  is  extreme  danger  that  war 
may  suddenly  break  out  between  the  Anglo  Saxon  nations  and  Japan,  and  that 
the  time  of  the  breaking  out  of  this  war  may  come  quicker  than  anybody 
dreams.  We  will  not  relax  our  pressure  on  the  Soviet,  but  for  the  time  being 
would  prefer  to  refrain  from  any  direct  moves  on  the  north.  .  .  .  Impress  on 
the  Germans  and  Italians  how  important  .secrecy  is. 

(d)  Army  translation — (Document  23,  Exhibit  63,  Naval  Court) 

From :  Washington  (Nomura) 

To:  Tokyo 

November  28,  1941 

Purple 

#1214     To  be  handled  in  Government  Code. 

"Re  my  #1190. 

"So  far  silence  has  been  maintained  here  concerning  our  talks  with  the  United 
States ;  however,  now  the  results  of  our  conference  of  the  26th  are  out  and 
headlines  like  [78]  this  are  appearing  in  the  papers:  'Hull  Hands  Peace 
Plan  to  Japanese',  and  'America  Scorns  a  Second  Munich.'  The  papers  say 
that  it  is  up  to  Japan  either  to  accept  the  American  proposal  with  its  four 
principles,  or  face  war,  in  which  latter  case  the  responsibility  would  be  upon 
Japan. 

"This  we  must  carefully  note." 

On  3  December  1941,  there  was  available  the  Army  translation  of  a  report  by 
Kurusu  and  Nomura  to  Tokyo,  dated  2  December  1941  (Document  25,  Exhibit 
63,  Naval  Court),  which  stated: 

"Today,  the  2nd,  Ambassador  KURUSU  and  I  had  an  interview  with  Under- 
Secretary  of  State  WELLES.  At  that  time,^  prefacing  his  statement  by  saying 
that  it  was  at  the  direct  instruction  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  he 
turned  over  to  us  the  substance  of  my  separate  wire  #1233.  Thereupon  we 
said :  'Since  we  haven't  been  informed  even  to  the  slightest  degree  concerning 
the  troops  in  French  Indo-China,  we  will  transmit  the  gist  of  your  representa- 
tions directly  to  our  Home  Government.  In  all  probability  they  never  con- 
sidered that  such  a  thing  as  this  could  possibly  be  an  upshot  of  their  proposals 
of  November  20th.'  The  Under-Secretary  then  said :  'I  want  to  to  know  that 
the  stand  the  United  States  takes  is  that  she  opposes  aggression  in  any  and  all 
parts  of  the  world.'  Thereupon  we  replied :  'The  United  States  and  other  coun- 
tries have  pyramided  economic  pressure  upon  economic  pressure  upon  us  Japa- 
nese.     (I  made  the  statement  that  economic  warfare  was  even  worse  than 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2305 

forceful  aggression.)  We  haven't  tht>  time  to  argue  the  pros  and  eons  of  this 
question  or  the  rights  or  wrongs.  The  people  of  Japan  are  faced  with  economic 
pressure,  and  1  want  you  to  know  that  we  have  hut  the  choice  between  sub- 
mission to  this  pressure  or  breaking  the  cliains  that  it  invokes.  We  want  you 
to  realize  this  as  well  as  the  situation  in  which  all  Japanese  find  themselves 
as  the  result  of  the  four-year  incident  in  China  ;  the  President  recently  expressed 
cognizance  of  the  latter  situation.  Furthermore,  I  would  have  you  know  that 
in  replying  to  the  recent  American  proposals,  the  Imperial  Government  is  giving 
the  most  profound  consideration  to  this  important  question  which  has  to  do 
with  our  national  destiny.'  Under-Secretary  WELLES  said :  'I  am  well  aware 
of  that.'  I  continued :  'We  cannot  overemphasize  the  fact  that,  insofar  as  Japan 
is  concerned,  it  is  virtually  impossible  for  her  to  accept  the  new-  American  pro- 
posals as  they  now  stand.  Our  proposals  proferred  on  the  21st  of  June  and  the 
proposals  of  September  25th,  representing  our  greatest  conciliations  based  on 
the  previous  proposal,  still  stand.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  agreement  of 
both  sides  was  in  the  offing,  it  has  come  to  naught.  At  this  late  juncture  to 
give  thoughtful  consideration  to  the  new  proposals  certainly  will  not  make  for 
a  smooth  and  speedy  settlensent  of  the  negotiations.  Recently,  we  promised 
to  evacuate  our  troops  from  French  Indo-China  in  [79]  the  event  of  a 
settlement  of  the  Sino-Japanese  incident  and  the  establishment  of  a  just  peace 
in  the  Far  East.  In  anticipating  the  settlement  of  fundamental  questions,  the 
question  of  the  representations  of  this  date  would  naturally  dissolve.'  The 
Under-Secretary  assiduously  heard  us  out  and  then  said :  'The  American  pro- 
posals of  the  26th  were  brought  about  by  the  necessity  to  clarify  the  position 
of  the  United  States  because  of  the  internal  situation  here.'  Then  he  continued : 
'In  regard  to  the  opinion  that  you  have  expressed,  I  will  make  it  a  point 
immediately  to  confer  with  the  Secretary.'  I  got  the  impression  from  the 
manner  in  which  he  spoke  that  he  hoped  Japan  in  her  reply  to  the  American 
proposals  of  the  26th  would  leave  this  much  room.  Judging  by  my  interview 
with  Secretary  of  State  HULL  on  the  1st  and  my  conversations  of  today,  it  is 
clear  that  the  United  States,  too,  is  anxious  to  peacefully  conclude  the  current 
difficult  situation.  I  am  convinced  that  they  would  like  to  bring  about  ai  speedy 
settlement.  Therefore,  please  bear  well  in  mind  this  fact  in  your  considerations 
our  reply  to  the  new  American  proposals  and  to  my  separate  wire  it  1233." 

There  were  various  intercepted  Japanese  communications  of  interest  available 
on  4  December  1^1,  as  follows : 

(a)  Navy  translation — (Document  26,  Exhibit  63,  Naval  Court) 

From:  Toyko 
To:  Hsinking 
1  December  1941 
(Purple) 
#893 

"•  *  *  In  the  event  that  Manchuria  participates  in  the  war  *  *  *  in 
view  of  various  circumstances  it  is  our  policy  to  cause  Manchuria  to  participate  in 
the  war  in  which  event  Manchuria  will  take  the  same  steps  toward  England  and 
America  that  this  country  will  take  in  case  war  breaks  out. 

"A  summary  follows: 

"1.  American  and  British  consular  officials  and  offices  will  not  be  recognized  as 
having  special  rights.  Their  business  will  be  stopped  (the  sending  of  code  tele- 
grams and  the  use  of  short  wave  radio  will  be  forbidden).  However  it  is  desired 
that  the  treatment  accorded  them  after  the  suspension  of  business  be  comparable 
to  that  which  Japan  accords  to  consular  officials  of  enemy  countries  resident  in 
Japan. 

[80]  "2.  The  treatment  accorded  to  British  and  American  public  property, 
private  property,  and  to  the  citizens  themselves  shall  be  comparable  to  that 
accorded  by  Japan. 

"3.  British  and  American  requests  to  third  powers  to  look  after  their  consular 
offices  and  interests  will  not  be  recognized. 

"However,  the  legal  administrative  steps  taken  by  Manchoukuo  shall  be  equita- 
ble and  shall  correspond  to  the  measures  taken  by  Japan. 

"4.  Tlie  treatment  accorde<l  Russians  resident  in  Manchoukuo  shall  conform  to 
the  provisions  of  the  Japanese-Soviet  neutrality  pact.  Great  care  shall  be  exer- 
cised not  to  antagonize  Russia." 

(b)  Navy  translation — (Document  27,  Exhibit  63,  Naval  Court) 


2306     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

From :  Washington 

To:  Tokyo 

1  December  1941 

(Purple) 

#1227 

(This  raised  the  question  of  a  possibility  of  a  conference  between  persons  in 
whom  the  leaders  have  confidence  to  have  the'  make  one  final  effort  to  reach  some 
agreement.  The  meeting  to  be  held  at  some  midway  point,  such  as  Hono- 
lulu *  *  *  It  was  said  that  this  last  effort  might  facilitate  the  final  decision 
as  to  war  or  peace.) 

(c)  Navy  translation — (Document  29,  Exhibit  63,  Naval  Court) 

From :  Tokyo 

To :  Washington 

3  December  1941 

(Purple) 

#875    Chief  of  Office  routing. 

"Re  your  #1232 

"Please  explain  the  matter  to  the  United  States  along  the  following  lines: 
"There  seem  to  be  rumors  to  the  effect  that  t)ur  military  garrisons  in  French 
Indo-China  are  being  strengthened.  The  fact  is  that  recently  there  has  been  an 
unusual  amount  of  activity  by  the  Chinese  forces  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Sino- 
French  Indo-China  border.  In  view  of  this,  we  have  [81]  increased  our 
forces  in  parts  of  northern  French  Indo-China.  There  would  naturally  be  some 
movement  of  troops  in  the  southern  part  a.s  a  result  of  this.  We  presume  that  the 
source  of  the  rumors  is  in  the  exaggerated  reports  of  these  movements.  In  doing 
so,  we  have  in  no  way  violated  the  limitations  contained  in  the  Japanese-French 
joint  defense  agreement." 

(d)  Navy  translation — (Document  31,  Exhibit  63,  Naval  Court) 

From :  Washington 

To:  Tokyo 

3  December  1941 

(Purple) 

#1243 

"If  we  continue  to  increase  our  forces  in  French  Indo-China,  it  is  expected  that 
the  United  States  will  close  up  our  Consulates,  therefore  consideration  should 
be  given  to  steps  to  be  taken  in  connection  with  the  evacuation  of  the  consuls." 

On  5  December  1941,  there  were  available  translations  of  additional  inter- 
cepted Japanese  communications  dealing  with  the  diplomatic  negotiations,  as 
follows : 

(a)  Army  translation — (Document  33,  Exhibit  63,  Naval  Court) 

From :  Washington 

To:  Tokyo 

3  December  1941 

(Purple) 

#1243 

"Judging  from  all  ipdications,  we  feel  that  some  joint  military  action  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  with  or  without  a  declaration  of  war,  is  a 
definite  certainty  in  the  event  of  an  occupation  of  Thailand." 

(b)  Navy  translation — (Document  34,  Exhibit  63,  Naval  Court) 

Prom :  Washington 

To :  Tokyo 

1  December  1941 

(Purple) 

#1225 

(This  is  a  report  of  conversations  held  by  Japanese  representatives  with  Secre- 
tary Hull  on  December  1st,  which  referred  to  the  Japanese  Premier's  speech, 
the  President's  return,  Japanese  troop  movements,  and  apparent  agreement  as 
to  the  impossibility  of  reaching  an  agreement.) 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2307 

[82]  (13)  Intercepted  Japanese  espionage  messages  between  29  November 
and  6  December  WJ^l. 

During  this  period  there  were  available  to  the  Navy  and  to  the  Army  in  Wash- 
ington translations  of  intercepted  Japanese  espionage  reports  concerning  Manila, 
San  Francisco  and  Honolulu.  From  these  it  appeared  that  the  Japanese  were 
interested  in  the  movements  of  ships  to  and  from  those  ports.  The  messages 
relating  to  Honolulu  were  as  follows  : 

(a)  On  December  3rd,  the  Navy  Department  translated  a  communication 
from  Tokyo  to  Honolulu,  dated  15  November  1941  (Document  24,  Exhibit  63, 
Naval  Court),  which  stated  that  since  relations  between  Japan  and  the  United 
States  were  most  critical,  the  "Ships  in  the  harbor  report"  should  be  made  irregu- 
larly but  at  the  rate  of  twice  a  week  and  that  extra  care  should  be  taken  to 
maintain  secrecy. 

(b)  On  December  5th,  there  was  available  at  the  War  Department  a  transla- 
tion of  a  message  from  Tokyo  to  Honolulu,  dated  18  November  1941,  i-equesting 
reports  on  vessels  in  certain  areas  of  Pearl  Harbor,  and  directing  that  the  investi- 
gation be  made  with  great  secrecy  (Document  37,  Exhibit  63,  Naval  Court). 

(c)  Also  available  on  December  5th  at  the  Navy  Department  was  a  translation 
of  a  message  from  Tokyo  to  Honolulu,  dated  29  November  1941,  stating  that  re- 
ports had  been  received  on  ship  movements,  but  in  the  future  Honolulu  was  also 
to  report  even  when  there  were  no  movements  (Document  36,  Exhibit  63,  Naval 
Court) . 

(d)  On  December  6th,  there  was  available  at  the  War  Department  a  transla- 
tion of  a  message  from  Honolulu  to  Tokyo,  dated  18  November  1941,  ( Document 
40,  Exhibit  63,  Naval  Court),  reporting  on  ships  anchored  in  Pearl  Harbor  and 
in  certain  areas  of  the  harbor,  and  pointing  out  that  the  Saratoga  was  not  in 
harbor  and  that  the  Enterprise  or  some  other  vessel  was  in  a  particular  area. 
This  message  also  reported  on  the  course  of  certain  destroyers  which  had  been 
observed  entering  the  harbor. 

(14)  Intercepted  message  advising  of  fourteen-part  reply  by  Japanese  and 
first  thirteen  parts  of  reply — 6  December  19Jfl. 

On  6  December  1941,  the  Army  translated  an  intercepted  Japanese  communica- 
tion (Document  38,  Exhibit  63,  Naval  Court),  from  Tokyo  to  Washington,  which 
read : 

"1.  The  Government  has  deliberated  deeply  on  the  American  proposal  of  the 
26th  of  November  and  as  a  result  we  have  drawn  up  a  memorandum  for  the 
United  States  contained  in  my  separate  message  #902  (in  English). 

[83]  "2.  This  separate  message  is  a  very  long  one.  I  will  .send  it  in  four- 
teen parts  and  I  imagine  you  will  receive  it  tomorrow.  However,  I  am  not  sure. 
The  situation  is  extremely  delicate,  and  when  you  receive  it  I  want  you  please 
to  keep  it  secret  for  the  time  being. 

"3.  Concerning  the  time  of  presenting  this  memorandum  to  the  United  States, 
I  will  wire  you  in  a  separate  message.  However,  I  want  you  in  the  meantime 
to  put  it  in  nicely  drafted  form  and  make  every  preparation  to  present  it  to  the 
Americans  just  as  soon  as  you  receive  instinictions." 

Also  on  6  December  1941,  the  Navy  translated  the  first  thirteen  parts  of  the 
Japanese  reply  (Document  39,  Exhibit  63,  Naval  Court),  which  had  been  sent 
from  Tokyo  to  Washington  in  the  Japanese  diplomatic  code.  It  may  be  noted 
that  the  translations  of  parts  8  and  9  of  the  reply  which  were  originally  indi- 
cated as  Navy  translations  were  corrected  so  as  to  indicate  that  they  were  trans- 
lated by  the  Army.  These  13  parts  which  are  not  set  forth  here,  but  particularly 
part  13,  disclosed  that  the  Japanese  were  of  the  view  that  the  American  proposal, 
viewed  in  its  entirety,  could  not  be  accepted  by  the  Japanese  as  a  basis  of  negotia- 
tions. 

The  message  concerning  delivery  of  the  Japanese  reply,  and  the  first  thirteen 
parts  of  that  reply,  were  received  in  the  Navy  Department  by  3  p.  m.  on  6 
December  1941.  After  decryption  and  translation  by  about  9  p.  m.  on  December 
6th,  they  were  distributed  by  Lt.  Comdr.  Kramer  to  the  White  House  and  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy.  The  Secretary  of  War  and  Secretary  of  State  apparently 
also  received  copies  and  a  meeting  was  called  of  the  three  Secretaries  for  ten 
o'clock  on  the  following  morning. 

(15)  Communications  intercepted  on  7  December  lO^l. 

The  Japanese  communications  which  were  translated  and  available  on  the 
morning  of  7  December  1941  included  the  following : 
(a)   From:  Washington  (NomuraJ 


2308     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

To:  Tokyo 
December  3,  1941 
Purple  (Urgent) 
#1256.     Re  your  #875 

"I  received  your  reply  immediately.  I  presume,  of  course,  that  this  reply  was 
a  result  of  consultations  and  profound  consideration.  The  United  States  Gov- 
ernment is  attaching  a  great  deal  of  importance  on  this  reply.  Especially  since 
the  President  i.ssued  his  statement  yesterday,  it  is  being  rumored  among  the 
journalists  that  this  reply  is  to  be  the  key  deciding  whether  there  will  be  war 
or  peace  between  Japan  and  the  United  States.  There  is  no  saying  but  what 
the  United  States  Government  will  take  a  bold  step  depending  [H^]  upon 
how  our  reply  is  made.  If  it  is  really  the  intention  of  our  government  to  arrive 
at  a  settlement,  the  explanation  you  give,  I  am  afraid,  would  neither  satisfy 
them  nor  prevent  them  taking  the  bold  step  referred  to — even  if  your  reply  is 
made  for  the  mere  purpose  of  keeping  the  negotiations  going.  Therefore,  in  view 
of  what  has  been  elucidated  in  our  proposal  which  I  submitted  to  the  President 
on  November  10th,  I  would  like  to  get  a  reply  which  gives  a  clearer  impression 
of  our  peaceful  intentions.  Will  you,  therefore,  reconsider  this  question  with 
this  in  mind  and  wire  me  at  once." 

(b)  From:  Washington 

To:  Tokyo 
December  G,  1941 
Purple  (Urgent) 
#1272 

"In  addition  to  carrying  on  frontal  negotiations  with  the  President  and 
HULL,  we  also  worked  directly  and  indirectly  through  Cabinet  members  having 
close  relations  with  the  President  and  through  individuals  equally  influential 
(because  of  its  delicate  bearing  upon  the  State  Department,  please  keep  this 
point  strictly  secret).    Up  until  this  mcmient  we  have  the  following  to  report: 

"(1)  On  the  4th  those  engaged  in  Plan  "A"  dined  with  the  President  and  advised 
him  against  a  Japanese-American  war  and  urged  him  to  do  the  'introducing'  at 
once  between  Japan  and  China.  However,  the  President  did  not  make  known 
what  he  had  in  mind.  According  to  these  men,  this  attitude  of  the  President 
is  his  usual  attitude.  Recently,  when  the  President  discussed  matters  with 
LEWIS  and  settled  the  strike  question,  I  understand  that  he  did  so  on  the  advice 
of  these  individuals. 

"(2)  Those  carrying  on  IMan  "B"  Included  all  of  our  proposal  of  November 
20th  into  that  of  September  25th  and  after  incorporating  those  sections  in  the 
United  States'  proposal  of  November  26th  which  are  either  innocuous  or  advan- 
tageous to  us (MESSAGE   INCOMPLETE) " 

(c)  From:  Budapest 

To:  Tokyo 

December  7,  1941 

LA 

#104     Re  my  #103 

''On  the  6th,  the  American  Minister  presented  to  the  Government  of  this  country 
a  British  Government  communique  to  the  effect  that  a  state  of  war  would  break 
out  on  the  7th. 

"Relayed  to  Berlin." 

[85]  (d)   Navy  translation— (Document  39,  Exhibit  63,  Naval  Court) 

From :  Tokyo 

To :  Washington  • 

7  December  1941 

(Purple-Eng) 

#902     Part  14  or  14 

(Note:  In  the  forwarding  instructions  to  the  radio  station  handling  this  part, 
appeared  the  plain  English  phrase  "VERY  IMPORTANT") 

"7.  Obviously  it  is  the  intention  of  the  American  Government  to  conspire  with 
Great  Britain  and  other  countries  to  obstruct  Japan's  efforts  toward  the  establish- 
ment of  peace  through  the  creation  of  a  New  Order  in  East  Asia,  and  especially 
to  preserve  Anglo-American  rights  and  interests  by  keeping  Japan  and  China 
at  war.  This  intention  has  been  revealed  clearly  during  the  course  of  the  present 
negotiations.  Thus,  the  earnest  hope  of  the  Japanese  Government  to  adjust 
Japanese-American  relations  and  to  preserve  and  promote  the  peace  of  the 
Pacific  through  cooperation  with  the  American  Government  has  finally  been  lost. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2309 

"The  Japanese  Government  regrets  to  have  to  notify  hereby  the  American 
Government  that  in  view  of  the  attitude  of  the  American  Government  it  cannot 
but  consider  that  it  is  imiJossible  to  reach  an  agreement  through  further 
negotiations." 

(e)   Army  translation — (Document  41,  Exhibit  63,  Naval  Court) 

From :  Tokyo 
To :  Washington. 
December  7,  IWl 

Purple  (Urgent-^ Very  Important) 
#907    To  be  handled  in  government  code. 
Re  my  #902. 

"Will  the  Ambassador  please  submit  to  the  United  States  Government  ( if  possi- 
ble to  the  Secretary  of  State)  our  reply  to  the  United  States  at  1 :  00  p.  m.  on  the 
7th,  your  time." 

(16)   Delivery  of  Part  14  and  the  1  p.  m.  message  and  action  taken. 

The  evidence  indicates  that  Part  14  of  the  Japanese  reply,  which  required 
decoding  but  not  translation,  was  received  between  030.">  and  0700  on  7  December 
1941.  and  that  it  and  the  first  13  parts  were  distributed  [86]  by  Lt.  Comdr. 
Kramer  to  Admiral  Stark's  office  between  0900'  and  0930,  and  then  to  the  White 
House  and  to  the  State  Department.  The  "1  p.  m.  delivery  message"  was  not 
distributed  at  this  time.  Ki-amer  testified  that  he  returned  to  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment at  about  10 :  20  and  found  that  message  and  certain  other  messages,  such 
as  a  message  which  directed  the  destruction  of  Japanese  codes,  still  on  hand  and 
another  which  thanked  the  Ambassador  for  his  services.  This  material,  Kramer 
testified,  was  delivered  to  Admiral  Stark  at  about  10:  30,  and  then  to  the  White 
House  and  to  the  State  Department. 

The  evidence  indicates  that  the  "1  p.  m.  message"  was  decrypted  and  was  avail- 
able in  Japanese  in  the  Navy  Department  prior  to  0700  on  7  December  1941,  and 
that  because  there  was  no  Japanese  translator  on  duty  it  was  sent  to  the  Army 
for  translation  at  about  0700.  It  is  not  clear  when  the  Army  returned  the 
translation  of  that  message.  Kramer  stated  that  it  was  not  in  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment when  he  left  to  distribute  the  fourteen-part  reply  between  0900  and  0930 
that  morning,  but  that  he  found  it  upon  his  return  to  the  Navy  Department  at 
about  10:  20.  It  would  appear,  therefore,  that  the  Army  returned  its  translation 
of  the  "1  p.  m.  message"  some  time  between  0900  and  1020  on  7  December  1941. 
It  further  apiiears  that  several  hours'  advance  notice  of  the  contents  of  that 
message  may  have  been  lost  because  there  was  no  Japanese  translator  on  duty 
at  the  Navy  Department  on  that  Sunday  morning,  and  because  it  was  necessary 
to  wait  for  an  Army  translation. 

Prior  investigations  developed  the  fact  that,  after  consultation  with  Admiral 
Stark  that  morning.  General  Marshall  sent  a  message  to  various  Army  commands, 
including  the  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Department.     The  message  read: 

"Japanese  are  presenting  at  one  p.  m.  Eastern  Standard  time  today  what 
amounts  to  an  ultimatum  also  they  are  under  orders  to  destroy  their  code  machine 
immediately  stop  Just  what  significance  the  hour  set  may  have  we  do  not 
know  but  be  on  alert  accordingly  stop  Inform  naval  authorities  of  this  com^ 
munication." 

The  prior  investigations  also  developed  the  fact  that  the  Army  radio  was 
unable  to  raise  Hawaii  that  morning  and  accordingly  sent  that  message  by  com- 
mercial cable  in  code.  The  message,  according  to  General  Short's  prior  testi- 
mony, was  received  by  the  Signal  Ofl3cer  at  Hawaii  at  1145,  and  decoded  some  four 
hours  after  the  attack. 

Whether  or  not  the  Army  message  would  have  reached  the  Commanding  Gen- 
eral. Hawaiian  Department,  prior  to  the  attack  if  a  Navy  translator  had  been 
on  duty  on  the  morning  of  7  December  1941,  or  if  the  Army  had  immediately  trans- 
lated and  returned  the  "1  p.  m.  mesage,"  is  speculative.  It  is,  moreover,  also 
speculative  as  to  what  action  might  have  been  taken  by  General  Short  or  Admiral 
Kimmel  had  they  received  that  Army  message  prior  to  the  attack. 

[87]  (17)  Messages  sent  to  Admiral  Kimmel  between  29  November  and 
7  December  1941. 

The  messages  sent  by  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  to  Admiral  Kimmel  dur- 
ing this  period  dealt  primarily  with  the  destruction  of  codes  by  the  Japanese 
and  with  the  advisability  of  destruction  of  United  States  codes  at  Guam.  The 
messages  are  discussed  subsequently  in  this  report. 


2310     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(18)  Admiral  KimmeVs  failure  to  transmit  information  to  subordimite 
commanders. 

It  appears  from  the  testimony  secured  by  Admiral  Hart  in  his  investigation 
that  Admiral  Newton  left  Pearl  Harbor  on  5  December  1941  with  a  piowerful 
force  consisting  of  the  Lexington,  Chicago,  Portland,  and  five  destroyers,  to 
deliver  a  squadron  of  planes  to  Midway.  He  testified  that  on  that  mission  he 
gave  no  special  orders  regarding  the  arming  of  planes  or  regarding  preparation 
for  war,  other  than  the  ordinary  routine.  He  said  that  he  never  saw,  nor  was 
he  ever  informed  of  the  contents  of  the  October  16th  dispatch,  concerning  the 
resignation  of  the  Japanese  cabinet,  of  the  November  24th  dispatch  advising 
of  the  possibility  of  a  surprise  aggressive  movement  by  the  Japanese  in  any 
direction,  including  attack  on  the  Philippines  or  Guam,  or  the  November  27th 
war  warning.  He  said  that  except  for  what  he  read  in  the  newspapers,  he  did 
not  learn  anything  during  the  period  November  26th  to  December  5th  which 
indicated  the  increased  danger  of  hostilities  with  Japan. 

Admiral  Bellinger,  who  was  consmander  of  Task  Force  Nine,  consisting  of  the 
patrol  planes  of  the  Pacific  Fleet,  testified  in  this  investigation  that  he  never 
saw  nor  did  he  learn  the  contents  of  the  October  16th,  November  24th,  or  Novem- 
ber 27th  dispatches  from  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 
[88^         C.  The  Interception  of  Japanese  Telephone  and  Cable  Messages. 

It  appears  that  in  Washington,  D.  C,  the  Navy  was  receiving  information 
obtained  from  intercepted  Japanese  telephone  and  cable  messages.  For  example, 
on  30  November  1941,  the  Navy  decrypted  and  translated  a  trans-Pacific  radio 
telephone  conversation  in  code  between  Kurusu  in  Washington  and  Yamamoto 
in  Tokyo  (Document  20,  Exhibit  63,  Naval  Court).  And,  on  10  October  1941, 
the  Navy  decrypted  and  translated  a  cable  message  from  Honolulu  to  Wash- 
ington, in  which  a  code  was  established  for  reporting  the  location  of  vessels  in 
Pearl  Harbor,  which  message  had  been  photographed  in  the  cable  office  in 
Washington  and  thus  obtained  by  the  Navy   (Document  3,  Exhibit  13). 

For  many  months  prior  to  the  attack,  the  Office  of  Naval  Intelligence  at  Hono- 
lulu had  been  tapping  the  telephone  wires  of  the  Japanese  Consul  and  of  the 
Japanese  Vice  Consul.  For  a  period  of  time  also  the  home  telephones  of  these 
officials  had  been  tapped.  The  taps  on  the  lines  of  the  Consulate  were  removed 
on  2  December  1941  by  direction  of  Captain  Mayfield,  who  was  then  the  District 
Intelligence  Officer.  The  evidence  indicates  that  he  took  this  action  because 
he  was  fearful  that  the  existence  of  such  telephone  taps  would  be  discovered 
by  the  Japanese  Consul.  His  fear  arose  from  the  fact  that  an  FBI  tap  on  the 
lines  of  a  Japanese  official  of  the  NYK  Line  had  been  detected  by  a  telephone 
company  employee  who  had  advised  the  District  Intelligence  Office  of  this.  A 
representative  of  the  District  Intelligence  Office  subsequently  had  informed  the 
local  FBI  office.  It  was  learned  tha.t  the  FBI  office  had  complained  to  the  tele- 
phone company  concerning  the  disclosure  of  its  tap.  In  light  of  this  situation, 
Captain  Mayfield  directed  that  the  Navy  taps  be  removed. 

It  appears  that  no  important  military  infornsation  was  intercepted  by  means 
of  the  Navy  Intelligence  taps  on  the  lines  of  the  Japanese  Consulate  General. 
Exhibits  38A  and  38B  of  this  investigation  consist  of  photostatic  copies  of  the 
notes  made  of  the  telephone  conversations  over  the  Japanese  Consul  General's 
line  and  the  Japanese  Vice  Consul's  line  during  the  period  1  October  19il  to  2 
December  1941. 

Subsequent  to  2  December  1941,  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  appar- 
ently continued  its  telephone  taps  and  in  this  fashion  on  or  about  5  December 
1941  learned  the  contents  of  a  telephone  conversation  between  a  man  named 
Mori  in  Hawaii  and  a  person  in  Japan.  The  fact  of  this  conversation  was 
brought  to  the  attention  of  the  District  Intelligence  Officer,  and  on  6  December 
1941,  a  transcript  of  the  conversation  was  furnished  to  him  and  arrangements 
were  made  for  a  representative  of  the  District  Intelligence  Office  to  listen  to  the 
recording  of  the  telephone  conversation ;  this,  however,  was  not  done  until  after 
the  attack.  A  transcript  of  the  telephone  conversation,  with  marginal  notes 
made  by  the  District  Intelligence  representative  after  the  attack,  in  Exhibit  39 
of  this  investigation.  It  may  be  noted  that  it  appears  from  prior  investigations 
that  this  conversation  was  brought  to  the  attention  of  General  Short  [8P] 
on  the  evening  of  6  December  1941,  and  apparently  nothing  could  be  made  out  of 
it  and  no  action  was  taken  concerning  it.  There  is  no  evidence  indicating  that 
this  telephone  conversation  was  brought  to  Admiral  Kimmel's  attention  prior  to 

In  the  conversation,  there  was  mention  of  the  flights  of  airplanes  daily,  the 
number  of  sailors  preseat,  the  attitude  of  local  Japanese,  the  local  construction 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2311 

projects,  the  size  of  the  local  population,  the  precautionary  measures  taken  at 
night  time,  the  use  of  searchlights  at  night,  the  emphasis  in  Honolulu  newspapers 
on  the  southern  advance  of  Japan  into  French  Indo-China,  the  visit  of  Kurusu, 
the  local  climate,  the  visit  of  LitvinofE,  the  Russian  Ambassador,  the  recent 
return  of  a  Japanese  from  Honolulu  to  Japan,  and  the  number  of  Japanese  in 
the  United  States  Army.  The  person  in  Japan  inquired  for  information  about 
the  United  States  Fleet.  Mori  stated  that  he  knew  nothing  about  the  Fleet,  and 
that  since  they  tried  to  avoid  talking  about  such  matters  they  did  not  kniow 
much  about  the  Fleet.  He  said  he  didn't  know  whether  all  of  the  Fleet  had 
gone,  but  that  the  Fleet  present  seemed  small,  and  it  seemed  that  the  Fleet  had 
left.  The  person  in  Japan  then  inquired  whether  that  was  so  and  what  kind  of 
flowers  were  in  bloom  in  Hawaii.  Mori  stated  that  the  flowers  in  bloom'  were 
the  fewest  out  of  the  whole  year,  however  that  the  hibiscus  and  the  poiusettia 
were  in  bloom.  He  later  stated  that  the  Japanese  chrysanthemums  were  in  full 
bloom. 

There  is  some  reason  to  believe  that  the  statements  concerning  flowers  in  the 
Mori  telephone  conversation  were  the  use  of  code  words  indicating  the  absence 
or  presence  of  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor.  In  this  connection,  the  Operation  Order 
for  the  Japanese  task  force  which  attacked  Pearl  Harbor  (Exhibit  3)  provided 
for  the  use  of  a  radio  broadcast  code  in  which  the  statement  "The  cherry  blos- 
soms are  in  all  their  glory"  would  signify  that  there  were  "No  warships  in  Pearl 
Harbor."  This  lends  support  to  the  theory  advanced  by  representatives  of  the 
District  Intelligence  Office  in  their  testimony  to  the  effect  that  the  primary 
purpose  of  the  Mori  telephone  conversation  over  the  trans-Pacific  radio  was  to 
provide  information  to  Japanese  Fleet  units  which  would  be  listening  in  on  that 
frequency. 

The  espionage  reports  submitted  by  the  Japanese  Consul  at  Honolulu  have 
been  previously  discussed.  It  will  be  recalled  that  in  those  coded  messages 
considerable  information  was  given  of  the  movement  of  ships  and  location  of 
ships  in  Pearl  Harbor  and  of  defense  preparations  at  Oahu.  Certain  messages 
sent  during  the  first  week  of  December,  1941,  indicated  the  likelihood  of  an 
attack  by  air  on  Pearl  Harbor.  The  Japanese  Consulate  General  at  Honolulu 
transmitted  its  messages  via  commercial  companies  using  the  various  communi- 
cations companies  alternately.  During  the  month  of  November,  the  McKay 
Radio  Company  handled  the  messages  primarily,  and  during  the  month  of 
December,  1941,  RCA  was  transmitting  the  messages. 

[90]  Prior  to  December,  1941,  efforts  had  been  made  by  the  District  Intel- 
ligence Officer  to  get  access  to  the  files  of  the  communications  companies  and 
thus  to  secure  copies  of  the  Japanese  Consul  General's  messages.  These  efforts 
were  without  success,  in  view  of  the  legal  prohibitions  against  the  disclosure  of 
such  messages.  During  a  visit  by  Mr.  Sarnoff,  President  of  RCA,  the  District 
Intelligence  Officer  requested  him  to  cooperate  with  the  Navy  by  making  such 
messages  available,  and  pointed  out  the  importance  to  the  country  of  giving  the 
Navy  access  to  such  messages. 

On  5  December  1941,  RCA  Communications,  at  Honolulu,  turned  over  to 
Captain  Mayfield,  the  District  Intelligence  Ofllcer,  copies  of  some  messages  which 
had  been  sent  by  the  Japanese  Consul  via  RCA  on  the  third  and  fourth  of  Decem- 
ber. These  messages,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  unimportant  plain  language 
messages,  were  in  code.  Captain  Mayfield  turned  them  over  to  the  FOUR- 
TEENTH Naval  District  Communication  Intelligence  Unit,  headed  by  Lieutenant 
Commander  Rochefort,  for  decryption  and  translation.  That  organization  Had 
not  been  working  on  Japanese  diplomatic  trafl5c  Efforts  were  immediately 
made  to  decrypt  and  to  translate  those  messages.  The  messages  so  received 
by  Captain  Mayflejd  and  turned  over  to  the  FOURTEENTH  Naval  District 
Communication  Intelligence  for  decryption  and  translation  were  not  identified 
in  any  record  made  at  the  time.  Lieutenant  Woodward,  who  did  the  decryption 
of  them,  has  identified,  to  the  best  of  his  recollection,  the  messages  received  on 
December  5th  as  those  set  forth  in  Exhibit  56  and  at  pages  7-11  of  Exhibit  SOA 
of  this  investigation. 

Various  Japanese  codes  were  used  in  the  messages,  including  the  "LA"  code, 
which  was  the  simplest  and  evidently  the  least  important.  The  messages  in 
that  code,  and  the  plain  language  messages,  were  decoded  and  read  prior  to  the 
attack.  The  "LA"  code  messages  so  read  are  pages  1-5  of  Exhibit  56.  They 
contained  no  important  military  information.  One,  for  example,  reported  the 
departure  of  a  transport  and  another  related  to  the  cost  of  sending  families 
home  to  Japan. 


2312     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

The  testimony  of  Lieutenant  Woodward,  who  decrypted  the  messages,  of 
Colonel  Lasswell  and  Captain  Finnegan,  who  translated  various  of  the  messages, 
of  Captain  Rochefort,  who  was  in  charge  of  the  unit,  and  of  Admiral  Mayfield, 
who  was  District  Intelligence  OflBcer,  indicate  that  no  information  of  military 
importance  was  obtained  prior  to  the  attack  from  any  of  the  Japanese  Consul- 
ate's messages.  It  has  been  testified  that  various  of  the  other  messages  received 
on  5  December  1941  were  in  a  Japanese  code  known  as  the  "PA"  or  "PA-K2" 
system  and  that  efforts  to  decrypt  these  were  not  successful  until  after  the 
attack.  The  messages,  as  identified  by  Lieutenant  Woodward,  will  be  found 
at  pages  6-23  of  Exhibit  56  (supplied  by  the  Radio  Intelligence  Unit)  and  at 
pages  7-12  of  Exhibit  56A  (supplied  by  the  District  Intelligence  Office).  They 
were  as  follows : 

(1)  December  3rd  to  Tokyo — Advising  that  a  freighter  in  military  service 
departed  on  the  second  and  that  a  named  ship  arrived  on  the  third  (p.  10, 
Exhibit  56A). 

(2)  December  3rd  to  Tokyo — Advising  that  the  WYOMING  and  two  seaplane 
tenders  left  port.  The  balance  of  the  message  was  not  recovered  (p.  8, 
Exhibit  56A). 

[.9/]  (3)    December  3rd  to  Tokyo — In  connection  with  the  handling  of  ex- 

penses for  steamer  passage  to  Japan. 

(4)  December  Srd  to  Tokyo — Advising  of  a  change  in  method  of  communi- 
cating by  signals,  .so  that  each  of  the  numbers  one  to  eight  had  a  certain  meaning 
as  to  departures  and  dates  of  departure  of  ships,  wliich  niuul)ers  were  to  be 
communicated  by  lights  in  beach  house-s,  by  the  use  of  a  sailboat,  by  certain  want 
ads  to  be  broadcast  over  a  local  radio  station,  and  by  bonfires  at  certain  points 
if  the  previous  signals  could  not  be  made  ( p.  12,  Exhibit  ~)6). 

(5)  December  3rd  to  Tokyo  and  elsewhere — Regarding  money  taken  in  for  sale 
of  tickets  (p.  16,  Exhibit  56). 

(6)  December  3rd  to  Tokyo — Advising  that  the  WYOMING  and  two  seaplane 
tenders  departed  the  third  (p.  22,  Exhibit  56) . 

(7)  December  3rd  to  Tokyo  and  San  Francisco — Advising  that  a  transport  had 
sailed  for  the  Mainland  and  that  a  ship  had  arrived  from  San  Francisco  (p.  20, 
Exhibit  56). 

A  photostatic  copy  of  the  December,  1941,  bill  of  RCA  Communications  at 
Honolulu,  covering  the  Japanese  Con.sul  General's  messages  in  November  and 
December,  1941,  was  received  from  the  District  Intelligence  Office  at  Honolulu 
(Exhibit  55).  This  indicates  that  there  were  four  radiograms  sent  on  November 
2nd,  two  on  November  13th,  four  on  December  1st,  and  two  on  December  2nd. 
The  testimony  concerning  these  is  to  the  effect  that  they  were  not  received  or 
read  prior  to  the  attack,  that  they  were  received  later  and  were  thought  to  be 
in  more  complex  codes,  probably  machine  codes,  as  there  were  no  indicators  by 
which  they  could  be  identified. 

It  further  appears  from  Exhibit  55  that  there  were  various  other  radiograms 
charged  to  the  Japanese  Consul  General  for  December  4th  and  5th,  and  three  for 
December  6th.  The  testimony  concerning  these  indicates  that  none  was  obtained 
prior  to  the  attack. 

The  two  messages  listed  on  the  RCA  bill  for  December  4th,  according  to 
Lieutenant  Woodward,  were  among  a  group  of  messages  received  on  the  night 
of  December  7th  (p.  4-5,  Exhibit  56A).  It  was  later  learned  that  one  advised 
Tokyo  that  an  English  gunboat  arrived  on  the  third  and  departed  and  that  the 
sailors  had  come  ashore  and  had  received  mail  at  the  British  Consulate  ;  the  other 
advised  that  a  light  cruiser  had  departed  hastily  on  the  fourth   (Exhibit  57). 

The  five  radiograms  listed  on  the  RCA  bill  for  December  5th  were  received 
after  the  attack  and  were  actually  two  messages  to  Tokyo,  the  second  having  been 
sent  also  to  San  Francisco,  Seattle,  and  Washington,  D.  C.  The  first  message 
reported  the  arrival  on  the  morning  of  the  5th  of  three  battleships,  which  had 
been  at  sea  for  eight  days,  also  that  the  LEXINGTON  and  five  cruisers  had  left 
the  same  day,  and  that  eight  battleships,  three  cruisers,  and  sixteen  destroyers 
were  in  port.  The  second  message  has  not  been  translated.  It  relates  to  funds 
of  the  Consulate  peneral  (Exhibit  57). 

[92]  The  three  radiograms  charged  for  December  6th  were  actually  two 
messages  in  the  "PA-K2"  code  (Exhibit  57).  The  first,  which  was  translated 
after  the  attack,  was  sent  to  Tokyo  and  to  Washington  at  6 :  01  p.  m.  on  6 
December  1841.    It  set  forth  the  ships  observed  at  anchor  on  the  sixth  and  stated  : 

"*  *  *  9  battleships,  3  light  cruisers,  3  submarine  tenders,  17  destroyers, 
and  in  addition  there  were  4  light  cruisers,  2  destroyers  lying  at  docks  (the 
heavy  cruisers  and  airplane  carriers  have  all  left). 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2313 

"2.  It  appears  that  no  air  reconnaissance  is  being  conducted  by  the  fleet  air 
arm." 

The  other  message  of  December  fith,  which  was  filed  at  12 :  i)8  p.  m.  that  day, 
was,  after  decryption,  translated  by  Joseph  Fiiuiegaii,  now  a  Captain,  IT.  S.  N., 
who  reported  for  duty  in  the  radid  intelligence  unit  on  the  9th  or  10th  of  Decem- 
ber, 1941.     He  translated  that  message  (Exhibit  ~>1)  as  follows  : 

"From  :  KITA 

"To :  F.  M.  TOKYO  6  Dec.  41. 

"Referring  to  last  paragraph  of  your  No.  123 

"1.  The  avmy  ordered  several  hundred  balloons  for  training  at  Camj)  Davis 
NC  on  the  American  mainland.  They  considered  (at  that  time)  the  practicai)ility 
of  their  employment  in  the  defense  of  Hawaii  and  Panama.  Investigation  of  the 
vicinity  of  Pearl  Harbor  reveals  no  locations  selected  for  their  use  or  any  prepara- 
tion for  constructing  moorings.  No  evidence  of  training  or  personnel  prepara- 
tions were  seen.  It  is  concluded  that  their  installation  would  i)e  ditlicult.  Even 
if  they  were  actually  provided  they  would  interfere  with  operations  at  nearby 
Hickam  Field,  Ewa  Field  and  Ford  Island.  The  whole  matter  seems  to  have 
been  dropped. 

"2.  Am  continuing  in  detail  the  investigation  of  the  nonuse  of  nets  for  torpedo 
defense  of  battleships  and  will  report  further." 

Captain  Fiiniegan  admitted  in  his  testimony  that  the  last  sentence  of  the  first 
paragraph  of  his  translation  was  an  incorrect  translation.  As  appears  from 
an  Army  translation  of  that  message  (Exhibit  57),  that  sentence,  correctly 
translated,  was  as  follows  : 

"I  imagine  that  in  all  pi'obability  there  is  considerable  opportunity  left  to  take 
advantage  for  a  surprise  attack  against  these  places." 

As  previously  noted,  among  the  messages  turned  over  to  the  District  Intelli- 
gence Officer  and  to  ConiFOURTEEN* Communication  Intelligence  Unit  for  de- 
cryption and  translation  on  r>  December  1941,  was  the  [93]  message  fron\ 
Honolulu  to  Tokyo  dated  3  December  1941,  which  established  a  system  of  signals 
to  be  used  from  Oahu  by  means  of  lights  at  beach  houses,  the  use  of  a  sailboat, 
by  want  ads  on  a  radio  station,  and  bonfires.  This  message  was  in  the  possession 
of  the  Radio  Communications  Intelligence  Unit  from  ">  December  to  10  December 
1941,  at  which  time  it  wsa  successfully  decrypted  and  translated.  The  Japanese 
Consul  General's  signal  message  of  December  3rd  was  not  only  in  the  possession 
of  the  Navy  at  Pearl  Harbor  prior  to  the  attack,  but  was  also  in  the  possession 
of  the  Navy  Department  at  Washington  prior  to  the  attack.  A  copy  of  that 
message  as  contained  in  the  Op-20-G  files  at  the  Navy  Department,  indicates  that 
it  was  translated  on  11  December  1941,  and  that  it  had  been  intercepted  by  an 
Army  radio  intercept  station  at  Fort  Hunt,  Va.  (Document  22,  Exhibit  13).  In 
fact,  however,  that  message  was  decrypted  and  translated  in  rough  form  prior  to 
1  p.  m.,  6  December  1941,  by  Mrs.  Edgers,  a  translator  assigned  to  the  Op-2()-G 
Unit,  Navy  Department.  She  testified  that  she  believed  that  it  was  shown  that 
afternoon  to  Kramer  and  that  he  examined  it  in  rough  form.  Kramer  did  not 
recall  this  but  did  recall  going  over  the  message  thoroughly  on  December  8th. 
Evidently  further  work  on  this  message  was  deferred  on  December  6th  because 
of  the  pressure  of  work  on  the  thirteen  parts  of  the  Japanese  fourteen-part  reply 
which  were  being  decrypted  that  afternoon  and  evening. 

It  should  be  noted  that  a  message  from  Tokyo  to  Honolulu  dated  2  December 
1941,  was  intercepted  by  the  Army  radio  intercept  unit  at  Fort  Shafter,  Hawaii 
(Document  24,  Exhibit  13).  This  message  stated  that  in  view  of  the  present 
situation  the  presence  of  warships,  airplane  carriers,  and  cruisers  was  of  utmost 
importance,  that  there  should  be  daily  reports,  that  there  should  be  reports 
whether  or  not  there  were  observation  balloons  above  Pearl  Harbor,  or  an  indi- 
cation that  they  would  be  set  up,  and  whether  or  not  the  warships  were 
provided  with  anti-nnne  nets.  The  message  apparently  was  forwarded  from 
Fort  Shafter  by  mail  to  the  Army.  The  Army  translation  of  the  message  bears 
a  note  that  the  message  was  received  on  December  23rd  and  translated  on  30 
December  1941,  by  the  Army.  It  has  been  testified  by  Brigadier  General  Powell, 
Signal  Officer,  Hawaiian  Department,  that  no  decryption  was  done  at  Fort 
Shafter,  but  that  all  intercepted  traffic  was  forwarded  to  Washington  for  decryp- 
tion and  translation. 

Finally,  it  appears  that  the  two  highly  significant  messages  sent  by  the  Japanese 
Consul  General  during  the  afternoon  of  December  6th  were  both  intercepted  by  the 
Army  intercept  station  at  San  Francisco  and  forwarded  to  the  Army  in  Washing- 
ton by  teletype  (Docs.  14,  15,  Exhibit  13).    Both  of  these  were  in  the  Japanese 

7971(5  ()— 46— pt.  16 26 


2314     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

code  known  as  the  "PA-K2"  code  and  are  indicated  to  have  been  translated  by 
the  Army  on  Monday,  December  8,  1941.  According  to  Captain  Safford,  the 
longer  message,  stating  that  there  was  "considerable  opportunity  left  to  take 
advantage  for  a  surprise  attack"  against  Pearl  Harbor,  and  that  the  battleships 
did  not  have  torpedo  nets,  could  have  been  decrypted  in  about  an  hour  and  a 
half;  and  the  shorter  message,  which  stated  in  part  that  no  air  reconnaissance 
was  being  conducted  by  the  Fleet  air  arm,  could  have  been  decrypted  in  less  than 
an  hour. 

[94]         D.  The  "Winds  Code"  and  the  Alleged  "Winds  Message." 

In  the  latter  half  of  November,  1941,  the  Japanese  Government  by  messages 
to  Washington  and  elsewhere  established  two  codes  to  be  used  for  communication 
between  Tokyo  and  elsewhere.  The  first  has  been  referred  to  as  the  "winds  code." 
In  that  code  certain  Japanese  words  were  to  be  added  in  the  middle  and  at  the 
end  of  the  daily  Japanese  language  short-wave  news  broadcasts  and  could  also 
be  used  ili  Morse  code  messages,  which  words  would  apparently  be  weather 
reports.  Thus,  the  Japanese  words  "HIGASHI  NO  KAZEAME"  which  meant 
"East  wind  rain,"  would  actually  mean  that  Japan-United  States  relations  were 
in  danger.  Words  were  also  supplied  for  Japan-Russian  relations  and  for  Japan- 
British  relations.  The  existence  of  this  code  was  brought  to  the  attention  of  the 
Navy  Department  late  in  November  through  the  interception  and  decryption 
of  Japanese  messages  establishing  the  code,  and  also  through  information  to 
the  same  effect  received  from  other  sources  such  as  the  United  States  Naval  At- 
tache at  Batavia.  It  appeared  that  the  use  of  the  code  words  would  indicate  a 
breaking  off  of  diplomatic  relations  or  possibly  war  between  the  countries 
designated. 

The  Japanese  also  established,  late  in  November,  1941,  a  code  system  which 
has  been  referred  to  as  the  "hidden  word  code."  This  code  was  not  discussed  in 
previous  investigations.  The  establishment  of  the  code  was  first  learned  through 
the  interception  and  decryption  in  Washington,  D.  C.  of  several  Japanese  diplo- 
matic commimications  which  had  been  sent  from  Tokyo  on  and  after  2  December 
1941  (Documents  6,  8,  12,  17  and  20,  Exhibit  13).  This  code  was  intended  to  be 
used,  when  telegraphic  communications  might  be  severed,  as  a  means  of  inform- 
ing Japanese  diplomats  of  the  situation  concerning  the  country  in  which  they 
were  located.  Thus  the  word  "KODAMA"  meant  Japan,  the  word  "KOYANATI" 
meant  England,  the  word  "MINAMI"  meant  United  States,  and  the  word  "HAT- 
TORI"  meant  that  relations  between  Japan  and  another  country,  to  be  identified 
by  a  code  word,  were  not  in  accordance  with  expectations.  It  may  be  noted  that 
the  meaning  of  the  last  word,  as  set  forth  in  the  Navy  translation  of  the  "hidden 
word  code,"  differs  from  the  meaning  which  the  War  Department  cryptanalyst 
testified  should  have  been  given  to  the  word.  According  to  his  testimony,  the 
word  should  have  been  translated  as  meaning  that  relations  were  on  the  verge  of 
crisis  or  that  hostilities  might  commence. 

Prior  investigations  conducted  by  the  Army  Pearl  Harbor  Board  and  the 
Naval  Pearl  Harbor  Court  of  Inquiry  resulted  in  findings  that  prior  to  7  December 
1941  there  had  been  a  "winds  code  message"  by  the  Japanese  in  which  the  code 
words  relating  to  the  United  States  were  used,  and  that  this  message  had  been 
intercepted  by  the  Navy  Department  prior  to  the  attack  and  communicated  to  the 
Army,  but  that  no  copy  of  it  could  be  found  in  the  Army  or  Navy  files.  It  appears 
that  these  findings  were  based  primarily  on  the  testimony  of  Captain  Safford  and 
of  Captain  Kramer  of  the  Navy  Department. 

It  should  be  noted  that  a  Japanese  message  using  the  "winds  code"  words 
relating  to  the  United  States,  if  received  on  3  or  4  December,  or  at  any  other 
time  prior  to  7  December  1941,  would  have  conveyed  no  information  of  im- 
portance which  the  Navy  and  War  Departments  did  not  already  possess.  Such 
a  message  would  have  indicated  either  a  break  in  diplomatic  relations  or  possibly 
war  with  the  United  States.  That  both  the  Navy  Department  and  the  War 
Department,  and  Admiral  Kimmel  as  well,  were  already  aware  that  a  break 
in  diplomatic  relations  or  war  with  the  United  States  was  imminent,  is  clearly 
established  by  the  [95]  November  27th  "war  warning"  to  Admiral  Kimmel, 
and  by  the  repetition  on  November  28th  by  the  Navy  of  the  Army's  warning 
dispatch  to  General  Short. 

In  view,  however,  of  the  findings  by  the  Naval  Court  of  Inquiry  and  the  Army 
Pearl  Harbor  Board  that  a  "winds  n\essage"  relating  to  the  United  States  was 
received  about  3  December  1941,  and  that  no  copy  of  it  could  be  found,  further 
investigation  on  this  point  was  deemed  necessary. 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2315 

(1)  Prior  investigatio'nx. 

(a)  The  Naval  Court  of  Inquiry: 

In  the  "Addendum"  to  its  findings,  tiie  Naval  Pearl  Harbor^  Court  of  Inquiry 
stated  concerning  the  "Winds  Code"  as  follows : 

"From  26  November  to  7  December,  1£;41,  there  was  much  diplomatic  dispatch 
traffic  intercepted  between  Tokyo  and  the  Japanese  Ambassador  in  Washington 
which  had  a  bearing  on  the  critical  situation  existing  and  which  was  not  trans- 
mitted to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific.  A  message  dated  19  November,  1941, 
Tokyo  to  Washington,  translated  on  28  November  1941,  and  referred  to  as  'The 
Winds  Code'  was  as  follows  : 

"  'Regarding  the  broadcast  of  a  special  message  in  an  emergejncy. 

"'In  case  of  emergency  (danger  of  cutting  off  our  diplomatic  relations),  and 
the  cutting  off  of  international  communications,  the  following  warning  will  be 
added  in  the  middle  of  the  daily  Japanese  language  short  wave  news  broadcast. 

"(1)  In  case  of  a  Japan-U.  S.  relations  in  danger:  HIGASHI  NO 
KAZEAME* 

'"(2)   Japan-U.  S.  S.  R.  relations:  KOTANOKAZE  KUMORI.** 

"'(3)   Japan-British  relations:  NISHI  NO  KAZE  HARE.*** 

"  'This  signal  will  be  given  in  the  middle  and  at  the  end  as  a  weather  forecast 
and  each  sentence  will  be  repeated  twice.  When  this  is  heard  please  destroy 
all  code  papers,  etc.     This  is  as  yet  to  be  a  completely  secret  arrangement. 

"  'Forward  as  urgent  intelligence.' 

[96]  "The  Commander-in-Chief,  Asiatic  Fleet,  on  28  November,  1941,  sent 
to  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  information  to  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific 
Fleet ;  Commandant  16th  Naval  District ;  and  Commandant  14th  Naval  District, 
substantially  the  same  information  as  outlined  above.  On  5  December,  1941, 
the  United  States  Naval  Attache,  Batavia,  sent  to  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations 
substantially  the  same  information.  These  messages  stated  that  at  some  future 
date  information,  would  be  sent  by  Japan  indicating  a  breaking  off  of  diplomatic 
relations  or  possibly  war  between  countries  designated. 

"All  oflScers  of  the  Communication  and  Intelligence  Divisions  in  the  Navy 
Deipartment,  considering  the  expected  information  most  important,  were  on  the 
lookout  for  this  notification  of  Japanese  intentions.  On  4  December  an  inter- 
cepted Japanese  broadcast  employing  this  code  was  received  in  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment. Although  this  notification  was  subject  to  two  interpretations,  either  a 
breaking  off  of  diplomatic  relations  between  Japan  and  the  United  Stateis,  or 
war,  this  information  was  not  transmitted  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific 
Fleet,  or  to  other  Commanders  afloat. 

"It  was  known  in  the  Navy  Department  that  the  Commanders-in-Chief,  Pacific 
and  Asiatic  Fleets,  were  monitoring  Japanese  broadcasts  for  this  code,  and 
apparently  there  was  a  mistaken  impression  in  the  Navy  Department  that  the 
e\xecute  message  had  al.so  been  Intercepted  at  Pearl  Harbor,  when  in  truth  this 
message  was  never  intercepted  at  Pearl  Harbor.  No  attempt  was  made  by  the 
Navy  Department  to  a.scertain  whether  this  information  had  been  obtained  by 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific,  and  by  other  Commanders  afloat. 

"Admiral  Stark  stated  that  he  knew  nothing  about  it,  although  Admiral  Turner 
stated  that  he  himself  was  familiar  with  it  and.  presumed  that  Admiral  Kimmel 
had  it.     This  message  cannot  now  be  located  in  the  Navy  Department." 

(b)  The  Army  Pearl  Harhor  Board: 

The  "Top  Secret"  and  separate  portion  of  the  Army  Pearl  Harbor  Board's  re- 
port referred  to  the  "Winds  Message."  The  report  stated  that  a  winds  execute 
mes.sage  reading  "War  with  the  United  States,  war  with  Britain,  including  the 
Netherlands  East  Indies,  except  peace  with  Russia"  had  been  received  in  the 
Navy  Department  on  3  December  1941 ;  that  the  Navy  admitted  that  that  mes- 
sage was  received  prior  to  December  6th ;  that  the  War  Departnvent  files  con- 
tained no  copy  of  the  message.  The  report  referred  in  this  connection  to  testi- 
mony by  Captain  Safford,  who  stated  that  such  a  message  had  been  received 
by  Commander  Kramer,  who  had  been  [97]  notified  by  Brotherhood  of 
its  receipt,  and  that  it  had  been  seen  by  Safford  at  8  :00  a.  m.  on  December  4th. 
Safford  stated  that  no  copy  of  the  message  could  be  found  in  the  Navy  Department 
files. 

The  Army  report  further  stated  that  on  December  5th,  Admiral  Noyes  called 
Colonel  Sadtler,  at  9 :  30  a.  m.,  saying :  "Sadtler,  the  message  is  in."  Apparently 
based  on  Sadtler's  testimony,  the  report  also  stated  that  Sadtler  did  not  know 

•East  wind  rain. 
••North  wind  cloudy. 
•••West  wind  clear. 


2316     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

whetber  this  meant  war  with  the  United  States,  but  believed  it  meant  war  wit! 
either  the  United  States,  Russia  or  (ireat  Britain  ;  that  he  discussed  it  with  hi» 
superiors  and  was  instructed  to  confer  with  Admiral  Noyes;  and  that  he  tele- 
phoned Admiral  Noyes,  who  said  that  he  was  too  busy  and  would  have  to  confer 
with  Sadtler  later.  Sadtler  then  saw  various  officers  in  the  War  Department,  all 
of  whom  did  not  think  that  any  further  information  should  be  sent  to  Hawaii. 

It  also  appeared  that  the  Army  Board  had  received  testimony  on  this  matter 
from  Colonel  Bratton,  who  said  that  Sadtler,  acting  on  behalf  of  Colonel  Bratton, 
had  arranged  for  the  FCC  to  monitor  Japanese  broadcasts.  Apparently  Bratton 
testified  that  no  information  reached  him  before  December  7th  which  indicating 
a  break  in  relations  with  the  United  States  and  that  he  did  not  think  that  any 
such  information  had  reached  anyone  else.  He  referred  to  an  FCC  intercept 
which  was  not  the  me.ssage  for  which  they  had  been  looking. 

(2)  The  basis  of  the  previous  findings  that  there  was  a  Winds  Execute  mes- 
sage prior  to  the  attack. 

The  basis  for  the  Army  Pearl  Harbor  Board  finding  that  a  "winds  message" 
relating  to  the  United  States  had  been  received  appears,  to  the  extent  known  by 
the  Navy,  in  the  above  sununary  of  the  top  secret  i>ortion  of  the  Army  Board's 
report.  That  indicates  that  primarily  the  basis  for  the  finding  was  the  testimony 
of  Captain  Safford.  In  addition  to  Safford's  testimony,  there  was  apparently 
testimony  by  Sadtler  ()f  a  conversation  with  Admiral  Noyes  in  which  he  referred 
to  a  "winds  message"  but  not  to  the  contents  of  that  message. 

Captain  Safford  .testified  before  Admiral  Hart  and  before  the  Naval  Pearl  Har- 
bor Court  of  Inquiry.  His  testimony  was  the  primary  basis  for  the  Naval  Court 
of  Incjuiry's  findings  that  a  "winds  message"  relating  to  the  United  States  had 
been  received.  In  addition  to  his  testimony,  the  Naval  Court  of  Inquiry  had 
testimony  from  Captain  Kramer  bearing  on  this  subject  which  tended  to  support 
the  finding. 

In  his  testimony  before  Admiral  Hart.  Captain  Safford  said  : 

"On  the  4th  of  December,  1!)41,  Commander  McCollum  drafted  a  long  warning 
message  to  the  Commanders  in  Chief  of  the  Asiatic  and  Pacific  Fleets,  summariz- 
ing significant  events  up  to  that  date,  quoting  the  'Winds  Message',  and  ending 
with  the  positive  warning  that  war  was  inuninent.  Admiral  Wilkinson  approved 
this  me.ssage  and  discussed  it  with  Admiral  Noyes  in  my  [,98]  presence. 
I  was  gven  the  message  to  read  after  Admiral  Noyes  i-ead  it,  and  saw  it  at  about 
three  p.  m..  Washington  time,  on  December  4,  1941.  Admiral  Wilkinson  asked, 
'What  do  you  think  of  the  mes.sage?'  Admiral  Noyes  i-eplied,  'I  think  it  is  an 
insult  to  the  intelligence  of  the  Conmiander  in  Chief.'  Admiral  Wilkinson  stated. 
'I  do  not  agree  with  you.  Admiral  Kimmel  is  a  very  busy  man,  with  a  lot  of 
things  on  his  mind,  and  he  may  not  see  the  picture  as  clearly  as  you  and  I  do.  I 
think  it  only  fair  to  the  Commander  in  Chief  that  he  be  given  this  warning  and 
I  intend  to  send  it  if  I  can  get  it  released  by  the  front  office.'  Admiral  Wilkin- 
son then  left  and  I  left  a  few  minutes  later.  At  the  time  of  the  .Japanese  attack 
on  Pearl  Harbor,  I  thought  that  this  message  of  warning  had  been  sent,  and  did 
not  realize  until  two  years  later,  when  I  studied  the  Roberts  report  very  care- 
fully, that  McCollum's  message  had  not  been  sent.  In  order  to  clarify  the  above 
statement  and  my  answer  to  a  previous  question,  it  is  necessary  to  explain  what 
is  meant  by  the  'Winds  Message'.  The  'Winds  Message'  was  a  name  given  by 
Army  and  Navy  personnel  performing  radio  intelligence  duties  to  identify  a  plain- 
language  Japanese  news  broadcast  in  which  a  fictitious  weather  report  gave 
warning  of  the  intentions  of  the  Japanese  (iovernment  with  respect  to  war 
against  the  United  States.  Britain  (including  the  N.  E.  I.),  and  Russia.  We 
received  a  tip-off  from  the  British  in  Singapore  in  late  November,  1941,  which 
was  immeditely  forwarded  to  the  Navy  Department  by  the  Commander  in  Chief, 
U.  S.  Asiatic  Fleet,  with  an  information  copy  to  the  Conmiander  in  Chief,  Pacific 
Fleet.  We  also  received  a  tip-off  from  the  Dutch  in  Java  through  the  American 
Consul  General  and  through  the  Senior  Military  Observer.  The  Dutch  tip-off 
was  handled  in  routine  fashion  by  the  coding  rooms  of  the  State  Department, 
War  Department,  and  Navy  Department.  The  Director  of  Naval  Intelligence  re- 
quested that  special  effort  be  made  to  monitor  Radio  Tokyo  to  catch  the  'Winds 
Message'  when  it  should  be  sent,  and  this  was  done.  Froin  November  28  until 
the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor,  Tokyo  broadcast  schedules  were  monitored  by  about 
12  intercept  stations,  as  follows :  N.  E.  I.  at  Java;  British  at  Singapore;  U.  S. 
Army  at  Hawaii  and  San  Francisco;  U.  S.  Navy  at  Corrigedor,  Hawaii,  Bremer- 
ton, and  four  or  five  stations  along  the  Atlantic  seaboard.  All  Navy  intercept 
stations  in  the  continental  United  States  were  directed  to  forward  all  Tokyo 
plain-language  broadcasts  by  teletype,  and  Bainbrldge  Island  ran  up  bills  of  sixty 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2317 

dollars  per  day  for  this  material  alone.  The  'Winds  Message'  was  actually 
hroadcast  (luring  the  evening  of  I)eceniber  3,  1941  (Washington  Time),  which 
was  December  4  by  (ireenwich  time  and  Tokyo  time.  The  combination  of  fre- 
quency, time  of  day,  and  radio  propagation  was  such  that  the  'Winds  Message' 
was  heard  only  on  the  East  Coast  of  the  United  States,  and  even  then  by  only  one 
or  two  of  the  Navy  stations  that  were  listening  for  it.  The  other  nations  and 
other  Navy  C.  I.  units,  not  hearing  the  'Winds  Message'  themselves  and  not 
receiving  any  word  from  the  Navy  Department,  naturally  presumed  [y.9] 
that  the  'Winds  Message'  had  not  yet  been  sent,  and  that  the  Japanese 
Government  was  still  deferring  the  initiation  of  hostilities.  When  the  Japanese 
attacked  Pearl  Harbor,  the  British  at  Singapore,  the  Dutch  at  Java,  and  the 
Americans  at  Manila  were  just  as  surprised  and  astonished  as  the  Pacific  Fleet 
and  Army  posts  in  Hawaii.  It  is  apparent  that  the  War  Department,  like  the 
Navy  Department,  failed  to  send  out  information  that  the  'Winds  Message'  had 
been  sent  by  Tokyo.  The  'Winds  Message'  was  received  in  the  Navy  Department 
during  the  evening  of  December  3,  1941,  while  Lieutenant  (jg)  Francis  M.  Broth- 
erhood, U.  S.  N.  R.,  was  on  watch.  There  was  some  question  in  Brotherhood's 
mind  as  to  what  this  message  really  meant  because  it  came  in  a  different  form 
from  what  had  been  anticipated.  Brotherhood  called  in  Lieutenant  Commander 
Kramer,  who  came  down  that  evening  and  identified  the  message  as  the  'Winds 
Message'  we  had  been  looking  for.  The  significant  part  of  the  'Winds  Message' 
read:  'HIGASHI  NO  KAZEAME.  NISHI  NO  KAZE  HARE.  The  negative 
form  of  KITA  NO  KAZE  KUMORI'.  The  literal  translation  of  these  phrases  is : 
'EAST  WIND  RAIN.  WEST  WIND  CLEAR.  NEITHER  NORTH  WIND  NOR 
CLOUDY'.  The  meaning  of  this  message  from  the  previously  mentioned  tip-off 
was :  'War  with  the  United  States.  War  with  Britain,  including  the  N.  E.  I.,  etc. 
Peace  with  Russia.'  I  first  saw  the  'Winds  Message*  about  8 :  (X)  a.  m.  on  Thurs- 
day, December  4,  1941.  Lieutenant  A.  A.  Murray,  U.  S.  N.  R.,  came  into  my 
office  with  a  big  smile  on  his  face  and  piece  of  paper  in  his  hand  and  said,  'Here 
it  is!"  as  he  handed  me  the  'Winds  Message.'  As  I  remember,  it  was  the  original 
yellow  teletype  sheet  with  the  significant  'Winds'  underscored  and  the  meaning 
in  Kramer's  handwriting  at  the  bottom.  Smooth  copies  of  the  translation  were 
immediately  prepared  and  distributed  to  Naval  Intelligence  and  to  S.  I.  S.  in  the 
War  Department.  As  the  direct  result  of  the  'Winds  Message,'  I  prepared  a  total 
of  five  messages,  which  were  released  between  1200  and  1600  that  date,  ordering 
the  destruction  of  cryptographic  systems  and  secret  and  confidential  papers  by 
certain  activities  on  the  Asiatic  Station.  As  a  direct  result  of  the  'Winds  Mes- 
sage.' McCollum  drafted  the  long  warning  message,  previously  referred  to,  which 
was  disapproved  by  higher  authority,  but  which  the  Navy  Department  C.  I.  Unit 
believed  had  been  sent.  Both  Naval  Intelligence  and  the  Navy  Department  C.  I. 
Unit  regarded  the  'Winds  Message'  as  definitely  committing  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment to  war  with  the  United  States  and  Britain,  whereas  the  information  of 
earlier  dates  had  been  merely  statements  of  intent.  We  believed  that  the  Jap- 
anese would  attack  by  Saturday  (December  6),  or  by  Sunday  (December  7)  at 
the  latest.  The  following  officers  recall  having  seen  and  having  read  the  'Winds 
Message' :  Captain  L.  F.  Saflford,  U.  S.  N.,  Lieutenant  Commander  F.  M.  Brother- 
hood, U.  S.  N.  R.,  Lieutenant  Commander  A.  A.  Murray,  U.  S.  N.  R.,  and  Lieu- 
tenant ( jg)  F.  L.  Freeman,  U.  S.  N.  The  following  officers  knew  by  hearsay  that 
the  'Winds  Message'  had  been  intercepted  but  did  not  actually  see  it  themselves : 

Commander  L.  W.  Parke,  U.  S.  N. 

Lieutenant  Commander  G.  W.  Linn,  U.  S.  N.  R. 

Ensign  Wilmer  Fox,  U.  S.  N. 

Major  F.  B.  Rowlett,  Signal  Corps  Reserve  *  *  *." 
[100]  "The  'Winds  Message'  was  last  seen  by  myself  about  December  14,  1941, 
when  the  papers  which  had  been  distributed  in  early  December  were  assembled 
by  Kramer,  checked  by  myself,  and  then  turned  over  to  the  Director  of  Naval 
Communications  for  use  as  evidence  before  the  Roberts  Commission,  according 
to  my  understanding  at  the  time." 

Before  the  Naval  Court  of  Inquiry,  Captain  Safford  repeated  in  substance  his 
prior  testimony  and  stated  that  Lieutenant  Murray  or  possibly  Kramer  brought 
him  the  message ;  that  he  couldn't  determine  from  what  Navy  intercept  station 
the  me.ssage  had  come ;  that  he  had  a  vague  recollection  of  a  second  "Winds  Mes- 
sage", but  had  been  unable  to  find  any  trace  of  it  until  he  testified  before  Admiral 
Hart ;  that  since  that  time  he  learned  that  the  FCC  had  intercepted  a  "Winds 
Message"  at  Portland,  but  that  he  did  not  recognize  that  mes.sage.  He  did  not 
recall  any  of  the  FCC  intercepts  contained  in  Exhibit  65  of  the  Naval  Court  of 


2318     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Inquiry,  none  of  which  indicated  a  break  with  the  United  States.  He  stated 
further  than  despite  repeated  search  since  November,  1943,  no  copy  of  the  "Winds 
Message"  could  be  found  in  the  tiles ;  that  Lieutenant  Commander  Brotherhood 
had  told  him  that  he  knew  the  disposition  of  them,  but  did  not  care  to  tell  Safford. 
Also  Safford  said  that  he  knew  what  had  happened  to  the  Army  copies  of  that 
message  through  very  "second  hand  and  devious  sources."  He  also  repeated  his 
prior  testimony  to  the  effect  that  about  the  middle  of  the  first  week  in  December, 
1944,  Commander  McCollum  had  drafted  a  long  dispatch  which  included  informa- 
tion about  the  "Winds  Message,''  and  which  dispatch  had  not  been  sent  out. 

Commander  Kramer  in  his  testimony  before  the  Naval  Court,  said  that  on 
December  3rd  or  4th  he  had  been  shown  a  "Winds  Message"  by  the  watch  officer 
and  took  it  immediately  to  Captain  Safford,  who  took  it  to  Admiral  Noyes.  This 
was  a  plain-language  message  and,  as  shown  to  him,  contained  the  phrase  trans- 
lated as  "East  Wind  Rain"  which  meant  strained  r^ations  or  a  break  with  the 
United  States.  The  message  had  been  on  teletype  paper  and  indicated  that  it 
had  come  through  an  USN  intercept  station. 

Among  the  witnesses  before  the  Naval  Court  of  Inquiry  who  testified  that  so 
fjar  as  they  knew  there  had  never  been  a  'Winds  Message"  relating  to  the  United 
States  were  Admiral  Stark,  General  Marshall,  and  Admiral  Noyes.  Neither 
Admiral  Wilkinson  nor  Commander  McCollum,  who  were  alleged  by  Safford  to 
have  had  knowledge  of  the  "Winds  Message,"  was  a  witness  before  the  Naval 
Court  of  Inquiry,  as  both  were  at  the  time  actively  engaged  in  combat  operations. 

(3)  Evidence  Ohtahied  in  this  Investigation  Concerning  ''Winds  Message." 

(a)   Testimony  of  Captain  Safford: 

Captain  Safford  testified  that  in  the  Fall  of  1943  it  appeared  that  there  was- 
going  to  be  a  trial  or  court  martial  of  Admiral  Kimmel.  He  realized  that  he 
would  be  one  of  the  important  witnesses  and  that  his  memory  was  vague.  Accord- 
ingly, he  began  looking  around  to  get  [101]  information  in  order  to  pre- 
pare a  written  statement  which  he  could  use  in  his  testimony.  He  noticed  that 
in  the  Roberts  report  there  was  no  reference  to  the  "Winds  Message"  or  to  the 
dispatch  which  McCollum  had  drafted.  Safford  then  began  talking  to  everyone 
who  had  been  around  at  the  time  to  see  what  they  could  remember,  and  to  see  if 
they  could  give  him  leads  so  that  it  would  be  a  matter  of  fact  and  not  a  matter 
of  memory.     He  talked  the  thing  over  with  various  of  the  Army  people. 

Safford  testified  that  he  had  written  to  Brotherhood  and  that  Brotherhood 
had  written  back  saying  that  he  didn't  care  to  tell  Safford  about  the  disposition 
of  the  copies  of  the  "Winds  Message,"  but  when  Brotherhood  returned  to  the 
United  States,  Safford  asked  him  about  it  and  found  out  that  there  had  been  a 
misunderstanding.  Brotherhood  had  been  referring  to  the  false  "Winds  Mes- 
sage" (Document  2  of  Exhibit  65  of  the  Naval  Court),  which  apparently  related 
to  Russia,  but  which  was  a  genuine  weather  broadcast. 

Safford  stated  that  he  had  information  "third  hand"  concerning  the  Army's 
copies  of  the  "Winds  Message,"  and  that  he  thought  it  might  be  confirmed  in  the 
testimony  of  Colonel  Sadtler  before  the  Army  investigation.  He  stated  that  his 
information  from  the  Army  came  through  W.  F.  Friedman,  a  cryptanalyst  in  the 
War  Department,  and  that  the  information  was  that  the  copies  of  the  "Winds 
Message"  had  been  de.stroyed  in  the  War  I)epartment  by  then  Colonel  Bissell  on 
the  direct  orders  of  General  Marshall.  Safford  also  stated  that  Colonel  Bratton 
of  the  War  Department  had  had  some  question  about  the  message  and  had  asked 
Admiral  Noyes  by  telephone  for  a  copy  of  the  original  of  the  "Winds  Message," 
but  that  Admiral  Noyes  had  refused  to  comply  on  the  grounds  that  the  Navy 
translation  was  correct.  This,  he  said,  .should  appear  in  Colonel  Bratton's  testi- 
mony before  the  Army  investigation.  He  also  stated  that  a  Captain  Shukraft  of 
the  Army  knew  thqt  the  "Winds  Message"  had  been  received. 

Safford  testified  that  he  had  talked  with  Kramer  shortly  before  his  testimony 
during  this  investigation,  and  that  contrary  to  his  earlier  impression,  Kramer 
told  him  that  the  "Winds  Message"  and  various  other  intercepts  relating  to  Japan 
had  not  been  turned  over  to  the  Roberts  Commission,  but  about  9  December  1941 
had  been  collected  and  shown  to  Under  Secretary  Forrestal,  during  the  absence 
of  Secretary  Knox.  He  also  said  that  Kramer  told  him  that  he  did  not  recall 
the  "Winds  Message"  specifically.  Safford  also  stated  that  the  reference  in 
McCollum's  message  to  the  "Winds  Message"  was  very  short  and  was  the  last 
item  in  McCollum's  draft  dispatch. 

Safford  testified  that  it  now  appears  more  likely  that  the  "Winds  Message" 
was  received  early  in  the  morning  of  December  4th,  Washington  time,  rather 
than  the  night  before,  because  the  watch  officers  who  were  on  duty  recollected 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2319 

only  the  false  "Winds  Message/'  and  not  the  "true  'Winds  Message.'  "  The 
vagaries  of  high  frequency  radio,  he  said,  resulted  in  the  message  being  inter- 
cepted only  on  the  East  Coast  of  the  United  States,  and  that  such  conditions  were 
not  unusual.  He  pointed  out  that  they  had  to  call  on  Corregidor  to  cover  the 
Tokyo-Berlin  circuits  because  the  combined  efforts  of  intercept  stations  on  the 
East  Coast,  [102]  West  Coast,  Hawaii  and  England  could  not  provide 
better  than  about  fifty  percent  coverage.  Although  he  had  no  knowledge  as  to 
which  Naval  station  allegedly  intercepted  the  mes.sage,  his  first  guess  was  the 
station  at  Cheltenham,  Maryland,  and  his  second  guess  was  Winter  Harbor, 
Maine.  He  stated  that  the  logs  of  those  stations  and  of  the  Navy  Department  had 
been  destroyed  during  one  of  the  numerous  moves  and  no  record  had  been  kept. 

Referring  to  the  message  telephoned  by  the  FCC  to  Lieutenant  Commander 
Brotherhood  at  9:  05  p.  m.  on  December  4th  (Exhibit  65,  Naval  Court),  he  said 
that  this  was  the  "false"  message  which  appeared  on  the  surface  to  use  the 
"winds"  code  words  relating  to  Russia,  but  which  was  a  genuine  weather  broad- 
cast. This  message,  he  said,  Brotherhood  telephoned  to  Admiral  Noyes  and 
later  Kramer  took  one  look  at  it  and  said  it  was  not  what  was  wanted  and  threw 
it  into  the  waste  basket.  He  said  that  that  message  was  received  twelve  hours 
or  more  after  what  he  referred  to  as  the  "true  winds  message." 

Safford  identified  Document  4,  Exhibit  65,  as  a  true  "winds"  message  relating 
to  England,  which  was  intercepted  on  7  Decen^ber  1941  after  the  attack  on  Pearl 
Harbor. 

Safford  testified  that  he  had  been  advised  that  the  Dutch  had  been  monitoring 
for  a  "winds"  execute  message,  but  that  prior  to  the  attack  they  had  intercepted 
no  such  message. 

(b)   Captain  Kramer's  testimony: 

Captain  Kramer  said  that  he  had  testified  previously  concerning  the  "winds" 
message  but  wanted  to  go  over  that  previous  testimony  in  the  light  of  thinking 
it  over  since  that  time.  He  said  that  he  had  had  no  recollection  of  a  "winds" 
message  at  the  time  it  was  first  mentioned  to  him,  the  spring  of  1944,  but  after 
receiving  from  Safford  some  of  the  details  of  the  circumstances  surrounding  it, 
he  did  recall  a  message  some  days  before  7  December  1941,  about  the  middle  of 
the  week,  and  did  recall  being  shown  such  a  message  by  the  watch  officer  and 
walking  with  him  to  Captain  Safford's  office  and  being  present  while  he  turned  it 
over  to  Captain  Safford.  Captain  Kramer  thought  that  that  message  had  been 
a  "winds"  message,  but  did  not  recall  the  wording  of  it.  He  said  it  might 
have  been  one  using  the  code  words  referring  to  the  United  States,  as  he  previ- 
ously testified,  but  he  was  less  positive  of  that  now  than  he  had  been  at  the  time 
of  his  previous  testimony.  The  reason  for  this  revision  of  his  view  was  that  on 
thinking  it  over,  he  had  a  rather  sharp  recollection  that  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
week  preceding  the  attack  there  was  still  no  specific  mention  of  the  Unitefl  States 
in  any  of  the  Japanese  traflBc.  For  that  reason  he  was  under  the  impression 
when  he  testified  during  this  investigation  that  the  message  referred  to  England 
and  possibly  to  the  Dutch  rather  than  to  the  United  States,  although  it  may  have 
referred  to  the  United  States,  too.     He  just  didn't  recall. 

Captain  Kramer  testified  that  on  the  morning  of  December  7th,  a  Japanese 
"hidden  word"  code  message  was  received  and  was  hurriedly  translated  by  him 
as  he  was  about  to  leave  the  Navy  Department 'to  deliver  other  messages.  The 
message  as  translated  by  Kramer  was,  "Relations  between  Great  Britain  and 
Japan  are  not  in  accordance  with  expectations"  (Exhibit  20).  In  his  [103] 
haste,  Kramer  overlooked  the  word  "MINAMI '  which  was  contained  in  the 
Japanese  Message  and  which  referred  to  the  United  States.  He  testified  that 
after  he  returned  to  the  Navy  Department  and  shortly  before  1  p.  m.  on  December 
7th,  he  discovered  his  mistake  and  made  a  penciled  correction  on  the  file  copy 
of  the  translation.  He  testified  further  that  he  believed  that  he  made  several 
telephone  calls  about  fifteen  minutes  before  the  attack  and  advised  the  officer  in 
charge  of  the  Far  Eastern  Sec-tion  of  ONI  and  an  officer  of  G-2  of  the  War 
Department.  The  copies  of  the  translation  in  the  Navy  Department's  files  do 
not  disclose  any  correction  of  the  translation  (Exhibit  20).  Kramer  testified 
concerning  this  that  a  number  of  copies  of  the  translation  were  made  at  the  time, 
and  that  undoubtedly  Jiis  correction  was  made  on  another  copy  which  has  since 
been  discarded. 

Cap'tain  Kramer  also  stated  that  he  had  been  under  the  impression  until  he 
testified  before  this  investigation  that  the  "hidden  word  message"  of  7  December 
1941  had  been  a  "Winds  Message,"  but  now  recognized  it  as  a  "hidden  word  mes- 
sage." He  stated  that  he  thought  that  the  "hidden  word  message",  which  he 
identified  as  having  been  received  on  7  December,  was  among  the  group  of  mes- 


2320     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

sages  shown  to  Mr.  Forrestal  about  9  December  1941,  when  he  hastily  reviewed  a 
folder  of  that  traffic  for  Mr.  Forrestal.  This  was  done,  he  said,  because  of  the 
fact  that  previously  Mr.  Forrestal  had  not  seen  such  material. 

(c)  Lieutenant  Commander  Brotherhood's  Testimony: 

Lt.  Conidr.  Brotherhood  testified  that  he  was  one  of  the  four  watch  officers  who 
were  on  watch  in  Captain  Safford's  section  during  the  first  week  of  December, 
1941.  He  said  that  he  had  never  received  an  intercept  or  message  wherein  the 
"Winds  Code"  words  relating  to  the  United  States  were  used.  He  said  that  About 
December  4th,  he  received  a  telephone  message  from  the  FCC  in  which  the  words 
apparently  relating  to  Russia  were  used ;  that  he  called  Admiral  Noyes,  who  com- 
mented that  tlie  wind  was  blowing  from  a  "funny"  direction,  and  that  he,  Brother- 
hood, did  not  think  at  the  time  that  it  was  an  actual  "Winds  Message."  Brother- 
hood stated  that  shortly  before  he  testified  in  this  investigation,  he  had  had  a 
conversation  with  Safford  who  stated  that  Brotherhood  had  called  him  about 
December  4th  or  5th  and  had  told  him  that  such  a  message  had  arrived.  Brother- 
hood said  he  did  not  recall  the  telephone  conversation  and  that  he  believed, 
therefore,  that  he  had  called  Captain  Safford  at  that  time. 

(d)  Lieuteniint  Comnuinder  Linn's  Testimony: 

Linn  testified  that  a  24-hour  watch  was  maintained  in  Captain  Safford's 
section;  that  he  was  senior  officer  of  that  watch,  and  was  one  of  the  four  officers 
who  stood  that  watch  during  the  first  week  in  December,  1941.  Any  intercept 
which  had  come  into  that  section,  he  said,  would  have  had  to  come  through  one 
of  the  four  watch  officers.  He  was  familiar  with  the  "Winds  Code"  and  he  never 
saw  any  intercept  [lO'i]  prior  to  7  December  1941  in  which  the  "winds" 
code  words  relating  to  the  United  States  were  used. 

(e)  Lieutenant  Commander  Pering's  Testimony: 

Pering  testified  that  he  was  one  of  the  four  watch  officers  standing  watch 
during  the  first  week  of  December,  1941,  in  Captain  Safford's  section.  He  knew 
of  the  existence  of  the  "winds"  code  and  he  never  saw  any  intercept  using  the 
code  words  relating  to  the  United  States. 

(f)  Lieutenant  Commander  Murray's  Testimony: 

Murray  testified  that  he  was  one  of  the  four  watch  officers  standing  a  twenty- 
four  hour  watch  in  Captain  Safford's  section  during  the  first  week  in  December, 
1941.  He  testified  that  no  "winds"  code  execute  relating  to  the  United  States 
ever  came  to  iiis  attention  during  that  week.  He  said  that  after  the  attack,  Linn 
had  told  him  that  a  "winds"  message  had  come  in  on  7  December  1941. 

(g)  Lieutenant  Frretnan's  Testimony: 

Freeman  testified  that  he  was  in  a  .section  which  disseminated  to  ONI  intelli- 
gence receive<l  from  the  field  radio  intelligence  units ;  that  his  unit  worked  very 
closely  with  Captain  Safford's  unit,  and  that  every  effort  was  made  to  monitor 
for  a  "winds"  message.  Freeman  was  one  of  the  officers  mentioned  by  Captain 
Safford,  in  his  testimony  before  Admiral  Hart,  as  having  personal  knowledge  of 
the  receipt  of  a  "winds"  message  relating  to  the  United  States.  He  testified  that 
he  never  knew  of  any  intercept  of  a  "winds"  message  relating  to  the  United  States. 

(h)   Captain  McCoUum's  Testimony: 

Captain  McCoUum  testified  that  he  had  been  familiar  with  the  "winds"  code; 
that  he  had  no  knowledge  of  any  message  transmitted  which  contained  the  words 
relating  to  the  United  States ;  that  the  message  which  contained  the  words  ap- 
parently relating  to  Russia  had  been  received  during  the  first  week  of  December, 
1941,  but  that  in  his  opinion  that  was  a  bona  fide  weather  report.  He  said  further 
that  during  the  first  week  of  December,  1841,  he  drafted  a  dispatch  summarizing 
the  situation  which  he  wanted  to  have  sent  out ;  that  he  remembered  no  reference 
to  any  "winds"  message  in  that  dispatch ;  and,  that  the  dispatch  was  based  on  a 
memorandum  of  his  dated  1  December  1941  which  did  not  refer  to  a  "winds" 
message  (Exhibit  10).  He  did  not  know  whether  or  not  his  draft  dispatch  had 
been  sent  out.     It  had  been  submitted  to  Admiral  Wilkinson. 

(i)   Admiral  Wilkinson's  Testimony: 

AdmiralWilkinson  testified  that  his  only  recollection  of  the  "winds"  code  was 
that  some  time  after  the  attack,  some  one,  possibly  Commander  McCoUum,  had 
mentioned  to  him  that  a  message  using  a  "winds"  code  had  been  received.  Pos- 
sibly, he  said,  it  was  the  message  received  on  the  7th  using  the  words  relating  to 
England.  He  did  not  recall  anything  about  the  long  dispatch  which  McCollum 
had  drafted  and  which  [lOo]  Captain  Safford  had  testified  Admiral 
Wilkinson  had  endeavored  to  have  sent  out. 

(j)   Captain  Mason's  and  Commander  Fabian's  Testimony: 

Captain  Mason,  who  was  Fleet  Intelligence  Officer,  Asiatic  Fleet,  and  Com- 
mander Fabian,  who  was  in  the  Radio  Intelligence  Unit  at  Corregidor,  both  testi- 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2321 

fled  that  intensive  efforts  had  been  made  there  to  monitor  for  any  Japanese  broad- 
casts using  the  "winds"  code,  and  that  nothing  was  received  wlierein  the  words 
relating  to  the  United  States  were  used.  In  this  connection,  it  should  l)e  noted 
that  it  was  the  view  of  the  Navy  Department  that  the  unit  at  Corregidor.  because 
of  its  geographical  location,  was  in  a  niucii  better  position  to  intercept  Jap- 
anese radio  broadcasts  than  were  the  units  at  I'earl  Harbor  or  Washington  (see 
Exhibit  8). 

They  also  testified  that  close  liaison  was  maintained  with  British  Intelligence 
services  in  the  Philippines,  that  the  British  had  been  monitoring  for  a  "winds" 
message  also,  and  that  had  such  a  message  been  receive<l  by  the  British,  they 
most  certainly  would  have  been  advised  of  its  receipt,  but  that  they  received  no 
information  from  the  British  as  to  the  receipt  of  a  "winds"  message  prior  to  the 
attack. 

(k)   Captain  LaytorCs  Testimony: 

Captain  Layton,  Pacific  Fleet  Intelligence  Officer,  testified  that  he  had  been 
familiar  with  the  "winds"  code;  that  efforts  were  made  to  monitor  for  the  use  of 
that  code;  and  all  available  Japanese  language  officers  were  placed  on  continuous 
watch  on  several  circuits  and  were  to  c<n'er  all  known  news  broadcasts  emanating 
from  Japan;  that  he  checked  up  each  day  with  Commander  Kodiefort  and  that 
no  "winds"  intercept  was  received  prior  to  7  December  1941,  nor  did  they  receive 
any  dispatch  from  any  source  stating  that  such  an  intercept  had  been  heard. 

(1)   Captain  Safford  recalled: 

Captain  Safford  was  recalled  and  testified  that  he  never  had  a  conversation 
with  Colonel  Sadler  concerning  the  existence  of  a  "winds"  message.  He  stated 
that  he  could  not  recall  distinctly  whether  or  not  he  received  a  call  from  Brother- 
hood about  December  4th  in  which  Brotherhood  advised  of  the  receipt  of  a  mes- 
sage apparently  using  the  Russian  "winds"  code  words.  He  had  had  a  vague 
idea  that  there  was  another  "winds"  message,  and.  he  said,  the  FCC  intercept 
seemed  to  fill  the  bill.  He  said  further,  however,  that  until  1944  he  did  not  recall 
having  seen,  or  knowing  of  the  FCC  intercept  in  which  the  words  relating  to 
Russia  were  used. 

(m)   Mr.  Friedman's  Testimony: 

Mr.  Friedman,  a  cryptaiialyst  of  the  War  Department,  stated  that  prior  to  7 
December  1941  he  had  no  information  as  to  whether  or  not  a  "winds"  message 
had  been  intercepted.  He  said  that  he  had  had  several  conversations  with  Captain 
Safford  concerning  the  subject,  the  first  one  about  a  year  and  half  ago,  and  none 
later  than  six  months  prior  to  his  [lOG]  testimony  in  this  investigation. 
He  said  that  SalTord  had  indicated  in  the  course  of  the  early  conversations  that 
there  had  been  a  "winds"  message,  but  that  no  copies  could  be  found  in  the  Navy's 
files,  and  that  his  theory  was  that  it  had  been  intercepted  by  a  Navy  East  Coast 
station.  Mr.  Friedman  also  testified  that  about  a  year  and  a  half  ago  he  had  a 
conversation  with  Colonel  Sadler,  who  had  indicated  that  a  "winds"  message 
had  come  in  on  the  4th  or  r)th  of  December;  that  he  had  been  notitied  either 
directly  or  by  somebody  in  the  Navy,  possibly  Admiral  Noyes,  that  the  message 
was  in ;  that  there  had  been  some  question  about  the  exact  Japanese  words  which 
had  been  used,  and  that  Sadler  had  not  seen  the  message  himself,  and  Mr.  Fried- 
man thouglit  that  Colonel  Sadler  also  told  him  that  they  had  tried  to  get  a  verifi- 
cation from  Admiral  Noyes  but  had  not  been  successful,  whereupon  the  G-2 
authorities  simply  passed  the  matter  over  since  there  was  apparently  nothing  to 
substantiate  the  existence  of  the  mes.sage.  Mr.  Friedman  said  that  he  had  asked 
Sadler  whether  he  had  ever  seen  a  copy  of  that  message,  and  Colonel  Sadler  said 
that  he  had  not,  but  that  he  had  been  told  by  somebody  that  the  copies  had  been 
ordered  or  directed  to  be  destroyed  by  General  Marshall.  Mr.  Friedman  testi- 
fied that  he  regarded  this  as  highly  inconceivable,  but  that  in  conversation  with 
Captain  Safford  he  probably  just  passed  that  out  as  one  of  those  crazy  things  that 
get  started,  and  that  he  had  lio  idea  that  Safford  would  repeat  that  statement. 
Mr.  Friedman  had  no  knowledge,  directly  or  Indirectly,  concerning  the  existence 
of  a  "winds"  message  relating  to  the  United  States,  apart  from  his  conversations 
with  Captain  Safford  and  Colonel  Sadler. 

(n)    Captain  Rochefort's  Testimony: 

Captain  Rochefort,  who  was  in  charge  of  the  Radio  Intelligence  Unit  at  Pearl 
Harbor,  testified  that  they  monitored  for  any  "winds"  code  message,  covering 
all  known  broadcasts  from  Tokyo  on  a  twenty-four  hour  basis,  and  that  results 
were  nil.  He  testified  further  that  he  had  made  an  exhaustive  .search  into  all 
available  Navy  records  and  could  find  no  trace  of  any  "winds"  message  prior 
to  7  December  1941. 


2322     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL.  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[i07]         E.  Information  Concerning  the  Organization  of  the  Japanese  Navy. 

(1)  ONI  Report  of  29  July  1941. 

On  July  291:h,  the  Oflace  of  Naval  Intelligence  issued  a  revised  report,  which 
had  been  prepared  by  Commander  McCollum,  dealing  with  the  organization  of 
the  Japanese  Navy.  This  stated  that,  as  a  result  of  information  which  had  been 
received,  it  was  possible  to  give  a  much  more  complete  picture  of  the  organization 
of  the  Japanese  Navy.  It  stated  that  the  Japanese  naval  forces  afloat  were  or- 
ganized into  two  main  commands — the  Combined  Fleet  and  the  Japanese  Naval 
Forces  in  China.     The  Combined  Fleet  included : 

(a)  First  Fleet,  or  Battle  Force. 

(b)  Second  Fleet,  or  Scouting  Force. 

(c)  Third  Fleet,  or  Blockade  and  Shipping  Control  Force. 

(d)  Fourth  Fleet,  or  Mandated  Islands  Defensive  Force. 

(e)  Submarine  Force  (also  called  the  Sixth  Fleet). 

The  Combined  Fleet  and  First  Fleet,  under  the  command  of  Admiral  Yamamoto, 
consisted  of  various  BatDivs,  a  CruDiv,  three  CarDivs  and  two  destroyer  squad- 
rons. BatDiv  3  (KONGO,  HIYEI,  KIRISHIMA,  HARUNA)  was  included.  The 
carrier  divisions  were  CarDiv  3  (ZUIKAKU,  SHOKAKU)  ;  CarDiv  5  (RYU JO, 
HOSHO)  ;   and  CarDiv  7  (CHITOSE.  CHIYODA,  MIZUHO). 

The  Second  Fleet,  under  the  command  of  Vice  Admiral  Koga,  included  various 
cruiser  divisions,  two  carrier  divisions  and  two  destroyer  squadrons.  (CarDiv  8 
(CHIKUMA  and  TONE)  was  included.  The  carrier  divisions  were:  (CarDiv  1 
(AKAGI  and  KAGA),  and  CarDiv  2  (SORYU  and  HIRYU). 

The  Third  Fleet  included  CarDiv  6  (NOTORO  and  KAMIKAWA  MARU)  and 
various  minelayer  and  minesweeper  divisions,  a  base  force  and  sub-chaser 
squadrons. 

The  composition  of  the  Fourth  Fleet  or  Mandates  Fleet,  and  of  the  Submarine 
Fleet  and  of  the  Japanese  Naval  Forces  in  China  was  also  given.     (Exhibit  81.) 

(2)  Pacific  Fleet  Intelligence  Bulletin  Number  45-^1. 

On  27  November  1941  (when  the  "war  warning"  was  received),  the  Commander 
in  Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  distributed  Pacific  Fleet  Intelligence  Bulletin  Number 
45-41  (Exhibit  21).  This  bulletin  dealt  with  the  organization  of  the  Japanese 
Navy  and  with  Japanese  Forces  and  installations  in  the  Mandated  Islands.  It 
was  a  revision  of  the  ONI  bulletin  above  summarized  and  replaced  that  bulletin 
on  the  subject  of  the  Japanese  Fleet.     This  stated : 

"The  principal  change  consists  of  a  further  increase  in  the  number  of  fleet  com- 
mands. This  has  arisen  from  the  regrouping  of  aircraft  carriers  and  seaplane 
tenders  into  separate  forces,  and  from  the  creation  of  special  task  forces  in  con- 
nection with  the  southward  advance  into  Indo-China.  The  regrouping  has 
resulted  in  a  notable         \.108'\         specialization  within  the  various  commands, 


as»shown  below : 


Major  Fleet  Commands 


I.  Combined  Fleet 

1.  First  Fleet (Battle  Force) 3    Batdivs,    1    Crudiv,    2 

Desrons 

2.  Second  Fleet (Scouting  Force) 4  Crudivs,  2  Desrons,  etc. 

3.  Third  Fleet (Blockade    &    Transport     Small  Craft. 

Force) 

4.  Fourth  Fleet (Mandate  Defense  Force).   1   Desron,    1   Subron  and 

many  small  units. 

5.  Fifth  Fleet ?  ? 

6.  Sixth  Fleet (Submarine  Fleet) 6  Subrons 

7.  Carrier  Fleet (Aircraft  Carriers) 5  Cardivs 

8.  Combined  Air  Force _    (Seaplane  tenders,  etc.)..   4  Airrons,  &  shore  based 

planes. 

II.  Japanese  Naval     (Staff  Headquarters) 1  PG  and  3  DD's 

Forces  in  China. 

1 .  First  China  Exped.     (Central  China) Gunboats 

Fleet. 

2.  Second  China     (South  China) 1    CA,    1    CL   and   small 

Exped.  Fleet.  craft. 

3.  Third  China  Exped.     (North  China) Torpedo  Boats,  etc. 

Fleet. 

4.  Southern  Exped.     (Saigon) 1  CL,  transports  and  mme 

Fleet.  craft. 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2323 

The  Japanese  Navy  now  includes  more  vessels  in  active  service  than  ever 
before.  More  merchant  ships  have  been  taken  over  by  the  Navy,  and  the  line 
between  merchant  ship  and  naval  auxiliary  grows  fainter  all  the  time.  The 
base  forces  and  guard  divisions  in  the  Mandated  Islands  have  also  greatly 
increased  the  strength  of  the  Navy,  which  is  on  full-war-time  footing." 

The  Combined  Fleet  and  First  Fleet  as  listed  in  this  bulletin  included  three 
BatDivs,  among  which  was  BatDiv  3  (HIYEI,  KONGO,  KIRISHIMA  and 
HARUNA — as  to  the  latter  it  was  stated  that  it  had  been  inactive  during  1941 
and  was  probably  undergoing  major  repairs).  Also  included  was  a  cruiser 
division  and  two  destroyer  squadrons. 

The  Second  Fleet  included  four  CruDivs  and  two  destroyer  squadrons.  One 
of  the  CruDivs  was  CruDiv  8  (TONE,  CHIKUMA). 

The  composition  of  the  Third,  Fourth  and  Sixth  (Submarine)  Fleets  was 
given  in  some  detail  in  this  bulletin.  As  to  a  Fifth  Fleet,  it  stated  "The  com- 
position of  a  new  Fifth  Fleet  is  still  unknown.  The  flagship  has  been  reported 
at  Maizuru." 

[109]  The  composition  of  the  Carrier  Fleet,  with  the  KAGA  as  flagship, 
and  consisting  of  ten  carriers  and  sixteen  destroyers,  was  listed  as  follows : 

CarDiv  1:  AKAGI,  KAGA  (F)  and  a  destroyer  division. 
CarDiv  2:  SORYU  (F)  and  HIRYU  and  a  destroyer  division. 
CarDiv  3:  RYUJO  (F)  and  HOSHO  and  a  destroyer  division. 
CarDiv  4 :  ZUIKAKU  and  SHOKAKU  and  a  destroyer  division. 
CarDiv-:  KORYU  and  KASUGA  (MARU). 

As  will  appear  subsequently,  the  forces  which  attacked  Pearl  Harbor  on  7 
December  1941  included  six  carriers,  the  KAGA  and  AKAGI  (CarDiv  1),  the 
SORYU  and  HIRYU  (CarDiv  2),  and  the  ZUIKAKU  and  SHOKAKU.  The 
latter  two  carriers  had  been  identified  as  CarDiv  4  in  the  Pacific  Fleet  Intelli- 
gence Bulletin,  as  CarDiv  3  (annexed  to  the  First  Fleet)  in  the  earlier  ONI 
bulletin,  and  as  CarDiv  5,  in  Exhibit  3,  which  sets  forth  the  composition  of  the 
attacking  force. 

Also  included  in  the  attacking  force  were  the  HIYEI  and  KIRISHIMA  (two 
of  the  battleships  of  BatDiv  3 )  which  had  been  listed  in  the  intelligence  bulletins 
as  assigned  to  the  Combined  Fleet  and  First  Fleet,  and  the  TONE  and  CHIKUMA 
(CruDiv  8)  which  had  been  listed  in  the  intelligence  bulletins  as  assigned  to  the 
Second  Fleet. 

[110]        Information  Concerning  the  Location  and  Movements  of  Japanese  Naval 
Forces. 

The  evidence  indicates  that  there  were  no  formal  arrangements  whereby  the 
Navy  communicated  to  the  Army  estimates  of  the  location  and  movements  of 
Japanese  naval  forces.  OflBcers  of  the  Far  Eastern  Section  of  Military  Intelli- 
gence at  Washington  had  access  to  charts  maintained  in  the  Far  Eastern  Division 
of  the  Office  of  Naval  Intelligence  showing  such  information,  and  had  access  to 
radio  intelligence  information  available  in  the  Navy  Department,  and  the  situa- 
tion was  discussed  with  them.  At  Pearl  Harbor,  an  intelligence  officer  of  the 
Hawaiian  Air  Force  received  some  general  information  concerning  Japanese 
movements  from  the  Fleet  Intelligence  Officer. 

(1)  Information  available  at  the  time  of  the  "War  Warning." 

The  procedure  for  handling  radio  intelligence  information  concerning  Japanese 
movements  was  set  forth  in  a  dispatch  of  24  November  1941  from  OpNav  to 
CincAF,  information  ComSIXTEEN,  CincPac,  ALUSNA  Chungking,  ASTALUSNA 
Shanghai,  and  ALUSNA  Tokyo  (Exhibit  8).  This  dispatch  stated  that  Japanese 
naval  movements  as  reported  by  the  individual  information  addresses  were  often 
conflicting  because  of  their  necessarily  fragmentary  nature  and  that  since  Com- 
SIXTEEN intercepts  were  considered  most  reliable,  it  was  suggested  that  other 
reports  be  carefully  evaluated  and  sent  to  ComSIXTEEN  for  action  and  to 
OpNav  for  information  and,  that  after  combining  all  incoming  reports,  Com- 
SIXTEEN was  to  direct  dispatches  to  OpNav,  info  CincPac,  based  on  all  informa- 
tion received  and  indicating  the  ComSIXTEEN  evaluation. 

The  Japanese  naval  situation  as  estimated  by  ComFOURTEEN  on  26  November 
1941,  was  set  forth  in  a  dispatch  of  that  date  to  OpNav,  information  CincPac, 
CincAF,  and  ComSIXTEEN.  This  dispatch  stated  that  for  the  past  month  the 
Commander  of  the  Second  Fleet  had  been  organizing  a  task  force  consisting  of 
Second  Fleet  and  other  units  and,  after  discussing  various  other  units,  stated: 
"There  is  believed  to  be  strong  concentration  of  submarines  and  air  groups  in 


2324    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

the  Marshalls  which  comprise  Airon  24.  at  least  one  caiTier  division  unit,  plus 
probably  one-third  of  the  submarine  fleet.  Evaluate  above  to  indicate  strong 
force  may  be  preparinjr  to  operate  in  southeastern  Asia  while  component  parts 
may  operate  from  Palao  and  Marshalls." 

On  the  same  day,  ComSIXTEEN  sent  a  dispatch  to  CincPac,  OpNav,  Com- 
FOURTEEN  and  CincAF,  discussing  in  considerable  detail  the  estimate  of  Com- 
SIXTEEN concerning  the  location  and  probable  movements  of  Japanese  Fleet 
units  (Exhibit  8).  This  stated  that  traffic  analysis  for  the  past  few  days  had 
indicated  that  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Second  Fleet  was  directing  some 
units  of  the  First,  Second,  Third  and  Fourth  Fleets  in  a  loose-knit  task  foi-ce 
organization  that  apparently  would  be  divided  into  two  sections.  One  section 
expected  to  operate  in  the  South  China  area,  was  referred  to  in  the  dispatch  as 
the  "first  .section."  The  "first  section"  was  estimated  to  consist  of  CruDiv  7, 
AirRon  6,  Defense  iJivision  1,  pesron  3,  and  Subron  6.  The  "second  section" 
consisted  of  units  expected  to  '  [111]  operate  in  the  Mandates.  The  "second 
section"  was  believed  to  include  Crudiv  ;">.  Cardiv  3,  RYUJO  and  one  MARU.  It 
was  indicated  that  BatDiv  8  might  be  included  in  the  "second  section,"  but  that 
this  could  not  be  clarified  yet.  The  dispatch  further  stated :  "Cannot  confirm 
supposition  that  carriers  and  submarines  in  force  are  in  the  Mandates  X  Oiir 
best  indications  are  that  all  known  First  and  Second  Fleet  carriers  still  in 
Sasebo-Kure  area."     The  evaluation  was  considered  to  be  reliable. 

During  this  time,  the  Oflice  of  Naval  Intelligence  was  issuing  fortnightly  sum- 
maries of  current  national  situations.  The  summary  for  1  December  1941  (Exhibit 
9)  was  distributed  by  air  mail.  The  statements  therein  as  to  the  Japanese  naval 
situation,  which  portion  was  prepared  by  the  Far  Eastern  Section  of  ONI,  were 
based  upon  information  which  had  been  received  at  least  three  or  four  days  prior 
to  the  date  of  the  document.    This  stated  : 

"Deployment  of  naval  forces  to  the  southward  has  indicated  clearly  that 
extensive  preparations  are  underway  for  hostilities.  At  the  same  time  troop 
transports  and  freighters  are  pouring  continually  down  from  Japan  and  northern 
China  coast  ports  headed  south,  apparently  for  French  Indo-China  and  Formosan 
ports.  Present  movements  to  the  south*  appear  to  be  carried  out  by  small 
individual  units,  but  the  organization  of  an  extensive  task  force,  now  definitely 
indicated,  will  probably  take  sharper  form  in  the  next  few  days.  To  date  this 
task  force,  under  the  command  of  the  Commander  in  Chief  Second  Fleet,  appears 
to  be  subdivided  into  two  major  task  groups,  one  gradually  concentrating  off  the 
Southeast  Asiatic  coast,  the  other  in  the  Mandates.  Each  constitutes  a  strong 
striking  force  of  heavy  and  light  cruisers,  units  of  the  Con>bined  Air  Force, 
destroyer  and  submarine  squadrons.  Although  one  division  of  battleships  also 
may  be  assigned,  the  major  capital  ship  strength  remains  in  home  watex'S,  as  well 
as  the  greatest  portion  of  the  carriers. 

"The  equipment  being  carried  south  is  a  vast  assortment,  including  landing 
boats  in  considerable  numbers.  Activity  in  the  Mandates,  under  naval  control, 
consists  not  only  of  large  reinforcements  of  personnel,  aircraft,  munitions  but 
also  of  construction  material  with  yard  workmen,  engineers,  etc." 

(2)  Admiral  KimmeVs  sources  of  information  after  the  "war  warning." 

The  ComFOURTEEN  communication  intelligence  unit  continued  the  practice, 
which  had  been  followed  for  some  time  past,  of  preparing  daily  communications 
intelligence  summaries  for  submission  to  Admiral  Kimmel  via  Lt.  Comdr.  Layton, 
the  Fleet  Intelligence  Oflicer.  Photostatic  copies  of  the  communication  intelli- 
gence sununaries  from  14  October  to  14  December  1941,  [112]  constitute 
Exhibit  22  of  this  investigation.  Lieutnant  Commander,  Layton,  who  presented 
these  summaries  to  Admiral  Kimmel,  also  prepared  daily  intelligence  reports 
which  were  distributed  to  various  members  of  CincPac's  staff.  The  intelligence 
memoranda  were  not  given  to  the  Admiral  or  Chief  of  Staff  because  they  saw 
the  basic  material  upon  which  the  reports  were  based.  The  intelligence  reports 
by  Layton  for  the  period  6  October  to  2  December  1941,  constitute  Exhibit  26. 
None  was  prepared  after  December  2nd.  according  to  Layton. 

The  daily  communication  intelligence  summaries  together  with  the  dispatches 
received  by  Admiral  Kimmel  from  other  organizations  during  the  period  27 
November  to  7  December  1941.  constituted  the  only  sources  of  information  which 
he  had  during  that  period  concerning  the  location  and  movements  of  Japanese 
naval  forces. 

(3)  Information  received  by  Admiral  Kimmel  after  the  "war  warning." 

The  critical  period  commenced  on  27  November  1941,  when  the  Japanese  force, 
which  was  to  attack  Pearl  Harbor,  secretly  left  Tankan  Bay,  Etorofu  Island  and, 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2325 

in  radio  silence,  proceeded  undetected  toward  Pearl  Harbor.  The  Japanese  force, 
which  included  tliree  of  Japan's  Carrier  Divisions,  CarDiv  1,  AKA(jI,  KAGA  ; 
CarDiv  2.  HIRYU.  SOKYU;  CarDiv  T),  SHOKAKU,  ZCIKAKU;  BatDiv  3,  first 
section,  HIYEI,  KIKIS'HIMA  ;  CruDiv  S,  CHIKl'MA  ;  and  other  lighter  vessels, 
cruised  for  ten  days  to  a  point  20o  miles  north  of  Oahu,  where  the  phmes  were 
launched  for  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  the  Novenil)er  2'4th  dispatch  from  CNO  in  part  had 
stated  that  the  diplomatic  situation  and  statements  of  the  Japanese  Government 
and  movements  of  their  naval  and  military  forces  indicated  that  a  surprise 
aggressive  movement  in  any  direction,  including  attack  on  the  Philippines  or 
Guam,  was  a  possibility.  The  "war  warning"  of  the  27th  had  stated  that  an 
aggressive  move  by  Japan  was  exi)ected  within  the  next  few  days  and  that  the 
number  and  equii»ment  of  Japanese  troops  and  the  organization  of  naval  task 
forces  indicated  an  amphibious  expedition  against  either  the  Philippines,  Thai, 
or  Kra  Peninsula,  or  possibly  Borneo. 

The  information  which  Admiral  Kimmel  subsequently  received  as  to  the 
location  and  movements  of  Japanese  naval  forces  was  as  follows : 

28  Not-ember  19. ',1: 

The  Naval  Attache  at  Shanghai  reported  in  his  dispatch  270855  the  sightings 
by  the  master  of  a  foreign  ves.sel,  which  had  left  Hong  Kong  en  route  to  Shanghai, 
of  many  transports  proceeding  south  singly  or  in  small  groups. 

\lhi]  The  November  27th  ComFOURTEEN  radio  intelligence  summary  de- 
livered on  November  28th,  stated  that  in  general  trathc  volume  was  a  little  below 
normal,  due  to  poor  signals  on  certain  frequencies  and  that  the  Tokyo-Takao 
circuit  was  unreadable  on  mid-watch.  Some  tactical  traffic  was  heard,  inter- 
cepted from  carriers.  Bako,  Sania  and  Saig(m  were  active  as  originators.  Tlie 
main  Tokyo  originat(»r  was  the  intelligence  activity  wliich  sent  five  dispatches 
t(»  the  major  commanders.  The  direction  finder  activity  was  very  high.  As 
to  the  Combined  Fleet,  it  w'as  said  that  there  was  still  no  evidence  of  any  further 
movement  from  the  Kure-Sasebo  area.  The  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Combined  Fleet 
originated  several  messages  of  general  address  he  had  been  fairly  inactive  as  an 
originator.  The  Commander  in  Chief,  Second  Fleet,  originated  many  messages 
to  the  Third  Fleet  and  other  units.  As  to  the  Third  Fleet,  it  was  stated  that 
there  was  nothing  to  indicate  any  movement.  As  to  the  Fourth  Fleet  Commander, 
it  was  said  that  he  frequently  addressed  dispatches  to  the  defense  forces 
in  the  Mandate,  and  also  that  there  was  no  further  information  on  the  presence 
of  Carrier  Division  Five  in  the  Mandates.  The  Commander  Submarine  Force, 
it  was  stated,  was  still  in  the  Chichijima  area.  C<mcerning  air  forces  in  general, 
it  was  indicated  that  an  air  unit  in  the  Takao  area  addressed  a  dispatcli  to  the 
KORYU  and  SHOKAKU  and  that  "Carriers  are  still  located  in  home  waters." 
This  simnnary  was  initialed  by  Admiral  Kimmel. 

It  appears,  therefore,  that  as  of  this  time  the  ConiFOURTEEN,  ComSIXTEEN, 
and  Washington  radio  intelligence  units  were  of  the  opinion  that  the  ma.1or  portion 
of  the  Japane.se  carriers  were  in  "home  waters;"  that  ComFOURTF'EN  was  of 
the  opinion  that  a  carrier  unit  was  in  the  Marshalls,  and  that  ComSIXTEEN 
expected  CarDiv  3  to  optn-ate  in  the  Mandates.  The  evidence  disclosed  that 
the  term  "home  waters"  was  understood  differently  by  the  Far  Eastern  Section 
of  ONI,  which  prepared  the  1  December  1941  ONI  estimate,  and  by  the  Fleet 
Intelligence  Oflicer,  Pacific  Fleet.  Captain  McCollum  testified  that  the  term 
meant  the  normal  cruising  grounds  of  the  Japane.se  Fleet,  roughly  west  of  the  180 
meridian  of  hmgitude  and  north  of  the  southern  end  of  Formosa,  and  included 
the  Kurile  Islands  but  not  the  Aleutians.  Captain  Layton,  the  Fleet  Intelligence 
Oflicer,  testified  that  "home  waters"  meant  to  him,  and  was  understood  by  Admiral 
Kimmel  to  mean,  the  drill  grounds  of  the  Inland  Sea  and  approaches  to  Kyushu, 
the  coastal  offshore  area,  the  li^ei  Bay  Area  in  general  the  waters  surrounding 
Honshu,  Shikoku  and  Kyushu,  but  not  including  northern  Japan  and  the  Kuriles, 
to  a  point  about  60  miles  east  of  Japan. 

29  November  1941: 

On  November  28th,  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  .sent  a  copy  of  a  dispatch 
to  CincPac  for  information  which  was  received  on  November  20th  (Exhibit  19, 
Naval  Court).  This  repeated  a  dispatch  which  had  been  sent  by  the  Army  to 
Commander,  Western  Defense  Command,  as  follows : 

[llJf]  "Negotiations  with  Japan  appear  to  be  terminated  to  all  practical 
purposes  with  only  the  barest  possibility  that  the  Japanese  Government  might 
come  back  and  offer  to  continue  X    Japanese  future  action  unpredictable  but 


2326     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

hostile  action  possible  at  any  moment  X  If  hostilltizes  cannot  repeat  not  be 
avoided  the  United  States  desires  that  Japan  commit  the  first  overt  act  X  This 
policy  should  not  repeat  not  be  construed  as  restricting  you  to  a  course  of  action 
that  might  jeopardize  your  defense  X  Prior  to  hostile  Japanese  action  you  are 
directed  to  undertake  such  reconnaissance  and  other  measures  as  you  deem 
necessary  but  these  measures  should  be  carried  out  so  as  not  repeat  not  alarm 
civil  population  or  disclose  intent  X  Report  measures  taken  X  A  separate 
message  is  being  sent  to  G-2  Ninth  Corps  Area  re  subversive  activities  in  the 
United  States  X  Should  hostilities  occur  you  will  carry  out  the  tasks  assigned 
in  Rainbow  Five  so  far  as  they  pertain  to  Japan  X  Limit  dissemination  of  this 
highly  secret  information  to  minimum  essential  oflScers." 

The  Navy  dispatch  continued  that  WPL-52  was  not  applicable  to  the  Pacific 
area  and  would  not  be  placed  in  effect  in  that  area,  except  as  then  in  force  in 
Southeast  Pacific  Sub  Area,  Panama  Coastal  Frontier.     It  stated  further : 

"Undertake  no  offensive  action  until  Japan  has  committed  an  overt  act  X  Be 
prepared  to  carry  out  tasks  assigned  in  WPL  46  so  far  as  they  apply  to  Japan  in 
case  hostilities  occur" 

On  the  28th  of  November,  ComFOURTEEN  addressed  to  OpNav,  information 
CincAF,  and  stated: 

"Following  received  by  British  Consul  from  usually  reliable  source  X  Japanese 
will  attack  Krakow  Isthmus  from  sea  on  One  December  without  ultimatum  or 
declaration  in  order  to  get  between  Bangkok  and  Singapore  X  Attackers  will 
proceed  direct  from  Hainan  and  Formosa  X  Main  landing  to  be  made  at 
Songkhola  X"  (Singora) 

ComSIXTEEN  in  a  dispatch  of  the  28th  addressed  to  CincAF,  OpNav,  CincPac, 
ComFOURTEEN,  stated  that  an  unidentified  ship  believed  to  be  a  light  cruiser 
had  apparently  relieved  the  KASHII  as  flagship.  Southern  Expeditionary  Fleet ; 
that  this  ship  was  now  in  the  Camranh  Bay-Saigon  area. 

OpNav,  in  dispatch  281633,  addressed  CincAF,  info  CincPac,  ComS^IXTEEN, 
ComFOURTEEN,  and  supplied  information  from  State  Department,  from  Saigon, 
dated  November  26th,  which  stated  that  five  days  previously  U15]  Orange 
troops  and  supply  vessels  began  to  put  in  at  Saigon,  taking  up  all  available 
quay  space ;  that  20,000  troops  had  landed  and  that  10,000  had  arrived  from  the 
north  by  rail  during  the  same  period ;  that  the  total  troops  in  South  Indo-China 
totaled  70,000.  It  observed  that  there  was  an  estimate  of  some  128,000,  but 
considered  that  too  high.  It  reported  that  many  trucks  had  landed  and  were 
moving  troops  and  supplies  to  the  interior.  It  observed  that  this  movement  is 
of  large  proportions  and  indicates  ho.stilities  against  Thailand  may  begin  soon. 
It  also  forwarded  information  from  Hanoi,  also  from  the  State  Department, 
dated  November  26th,  that  said  supplies  and  military  equipment,  particularly 
railway,  rolling  stock,  gasoline,  landing  at  Haiphong  even  recently  augmented 
and  are  being  transshipped  south.  Among  recently  landed  artillery  are  anti-tank 
guns ;  that  the  Japanese  had  recently  purchased  a  considerable  number  of  native 
boats  along  the  coast  of  Tongking  Province.  It  was  reported  they  desired  to 
purchase  500.  These  boats  were  being  sent  south.  Further  reports  from  Hanoi, 
dated  November  25th,  said  that  the  American  Consul  had  received  reliable  infor- 
mation that  the  Governor  General  had  ascertained  from  an  agent  that  around 
1  December,  without  either  declaration  of  war  or  ultimatum,  Nippon  Navy  will 
attack  Kra  Isthmus.  Simultaneously  the  Army  would  advance  on  Thailand; 
that  great  increased  troop  landings  and  movements  were  noted  south  ;  that  during 
last  few  days  about  4,000  men  have  landed.  On  November  25th  and  26th,  1,500 
would  go  south  by  special  train  ;  that  in  Tongking  there  were  approximately  25,000 
Jap  troops  and  at  Gillam  there  were  approximately  ninety  airplanes.  Dated 
November  26th,  Hanoi,  was  the  report  that  on  early  November  25th  the  Haiphong 
mayor  had  advised  all  interested  persons  that  the  Japanese  intended  to  sequester 
all  freight  en  route  to  China,  that  the  Japanese  had  demanded  keys  to  all  ware- 
houses by  noon  November  25th. 

The  ComFOURTEEN  radio  intelligence  summary  of  the  28th,  delivered  the 
29th,  stated  generally  that  traffic  volume  was  normal,  communications  to  and 
from  South  China  and  between  the  Mandates  and  the  Empire  were  very  heavy. 
No  tactical  traffic  was  seen.  The  suspected  radio  intelligence  net  was  very 
active  and  was  becoming  more  so.  Much  traffic  was  directed  to  the  Tokyo 
direction  finder  command  from  various  stations  and  this  command  also  originated 
messages  of  high  precedence  to  the  major  fleet  commanders.     It  was  said  that 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2327 

"This  activity  is  interpreted  to  indicate  that  the  radio  intelligence  net  is  operating 
at  full  strength  upon  U.  S.  naval  communications  and  IS  GETTING  RESULTS." 
As  to  the  Combined  Fleet,  it  was  stated  that  there  was  no  indicatio^i  of  movement 
of  any  of  its  units.  As  to  the  Third  Fleet,  there  was  little  activity  from  its  units 
save  for  the  Commander  in  Chief.  The  bulk  of  the  Fourth  Fleet  was  said  to 
be  still  at  Truk.  The  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  South  China  Fleet  originated 
more  traffic  than  usual  and  addressed  his  fleet  collectively  for  information  to  the 
Commander  in  Chief,  Second,  and  Commander  in  Chief,  Third  Fleets.  There 
was  little  indication  of  submarine  activity.  This  summary  was  initialed  by 
Admiral  Kimmel. 

[116]  The  ComSIXTEEN  communication  intelligence  unit  sent  a  dispatch 
on  the  2yth  noting  various  recent  developments  from  radio  intelligence,  such  as 
various  encrypted  addresses  noted  in  the  preceding  two  days  traffic,  that  various 
additional  units  now  appeared  to  be  associated  with  the  "first  section"  (South 
China  area),  referred  to  in  ComSIXTEEN's  November  26th  dispatch,  that  the 
Hiyei  (which  in  fact  was  en  route  to  Pearl  Harbor)  and  Kongo  appeared  to  be 
associated  definitely  with  the  "first  section,"  but  no  movement  from  the  Takao 
area  had  been  noted,  and,  that  the  Cine  Combined  Fleet  was  to  leave  the  Kure 
zone  that  day,  the  Sasebo  zone  on  December  1st,  and  enter  the  Bako  zone  on 
the  2nd. 

30  November  1941  : 

On  30  November  1941,  OpNav  sent  a  dispatch  to  CincAF  for  action  and  to 
CincPac  for  information  (Exhibit  76,  Naval  Court),  which  advised  in  part: 

"Indications  that  Japan  about  to  attack  points  on  Kra  by  overseas  expedi- 
tion X  *  *  *  Desire  you  cover  by  air  the  line  Manila  Camranh  Bay  on  three 
days  commencing  upon  receipt  of  this  dispatch  x     *     *     *" 

A  second  similar  dispatch  was  also  sent  on  the  same  day  (Exhibit  Tt,  Naval 
Court)  requesting  a  daily  report  from  CincAF,  even  if  there  were  no  contacts 
and  the  information  were  all  negative. 

The  communication  intelligence  summary  of  the  29th  delivered  this  day  stated 
generally  that  traffic  volume  was  above  normal,  and  that  the  traffic  to  South 
(^hina  was  still  very  high.  A  good  share  of  the  traffic  was  made  up  of  messages 
of  an  intelligence  nature.  Tokyo  intelligence  sent  eleven  messages  during  the 
day  to  major  commanders  both  ashore  and  afloat,  while  the  radio  intelligence 
activity  at  Tokyo  sent  four  long  messages  to  the  major  commanders.  In  addition 
to  the  stations  normally  reporting  to  Tokyo  radio  Yokosuka  (near  Tokyo)  sent 
in  reports.  This  station  had  not  previously  been  seen  to  submit  reports.  The 
direction  finder  net  controlled  directly  by  Tokyo  was  up  during  the  night  with 
much  activity.  The  Navy  Minister  originated  his  usual  AlNav,  and  the  naval 
general  staff  addressed  Commanders,  Second  Fleet,  Third  Fleet,  Combined  Air 
Force,  and  the  South  China  Unit.  A  unit  which  had  been  addressed  as  the  103rd 
air  group  originated  one  dispatch  whose  address  was  composed  entirely  of 
enciphered  calls  and  it  was  apparent  that  he  had  no  navy  call  list.  One  address 
was  "Eleventh  Air  Fleet."  Since  this  had  appeared  before,  it  was  evidence  that 
the  use  of  Kantai  was  intentional  in  making  positively  known  the  existence  of 
an  air  fleet.  Its  composition  was  unknown.  The  dispatches  indicated  that 
various  units  were  under  the  immediate  command  of  the  Commander  in  Chief, 
Second  Fleet,  including  Cardiv  3,  and  the  Third  Fleet. 

Associated  with  the  Third  Fleet  were  two  battleships  but  their  assignment 
was  not  yet  definite.  Various  messages  were  sent  by  the  Commander  in  Chief, 
Third  Fleet,  and  he  held  extensive  communication  with  [117]  the  Com- 
mander in  Chief,  Second  Fleet,  and  Bako.  The  Cine  Fourth  Fleet  was  relatively 
inactive.  He  was  still  in  the  Truk  area.  There  was  some  traffic  for  Commander 
Submarine  Force,  who  was  at  Chichyima  the  previous  day,  and  also  some  traffic 
from  the  Commander  in  Chief,  China  Fleet. 

1  December  1941  •' 

A  copy  of  a  dispatch  by  CNO  to  CincAF,  301709,  was  received  by  CincPac,  re- 
ferring to  the  previous  dispatch  which  had  directed  an  air  search  on  the  line 
Manila  to  Camranh  Bay,  directing  that  a  report  be  made  daily  even  if  the  in- 
formation were  all  negative  (Exhibit  77,  Naval  Court). 

A  dispatch  from  OpNav.  dated  1  December  1941,  was  also  received  referring 
to  a  Thailand-Japanese  intrigue  aimed  at  forcing  the  British  to  attack  Thai  as 
a  counter-move  to  a  Japanese  landing  in  Kota  Bharu,  whereupon  Thai  would 
declare  war  and  ask  Japanese  help. 

A  dispatch  of  1  December  from  ComSIXTEEN  advised  of  radio  intelligence 
information  indicating  that  various  units  under  Cine  Third  Fleet  were  in  the 


2328     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Takao  area  and  that  Cine  Second  Fleet  had  shifted  from  Kure  to  Sasebo  ap- 
parently en  route  to  South  China  waters. 

The  communication  intellijjence  siunmary  for  November  30th,  delivered  on 
December  1st,  stated  generally  that  traffic  volume  was  less  than  for  the  past 
few  days,  that  the  traffic  consisted  largely  of  dispatches  bearing  old  dates.  No 
reason  could  be  given  for  the  retransmission  of  these  messages  unless  the  high 
volume  of  traffic  for  the  past  few  days  had  prevented  the  repetition  of  dispatches. 
The  number  of  dispatches  originate<l  on  the  30th  was  very  small.  The  only 
tactical  circuit  heard  was  one  with  the  carrier  AKAGI  and  several  MARUs. 
As  to  the  Combined  Fleet  and  First  Fleet,  it  was  stated  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  of 
those  Fleets  were  in  Kure.  In  the  same  message,  the  Chief  of  Staff,  Second 
Fleet,  was  not  listed  in  any  location.  Other  traffic  indications  were  that  he  was 
at  sea.  The  Commander  in  Chief,  Second  Fleet,  sent  one  dispatch  to  his  usual 
addressees  of  the  Third  Fleet  and  Combined  Air  Force,  but  also  included  the 
KONGO  and  HIYEI,  which  it  was  said  placed  them  as  members  of  his  task 
force.  (The  HIYEI  was  actually  en  rtmte  to  Pearl  Harbor.)  As  to  the  Third 
Fleet,  it  was  said,  "No  information  obtained  as  to  the  location  of  the  Com- 
mander in  Chief,  Third  Fleet,  which  gives  the  strong  impression  that  he  is 
underway."  The  Fourth  Fleet  was  believed  to  be  still  in  the  Truk  area.  It  was 
said  that  the  continued  as.sociation  of  Jaluit  and  Commander  Submarine  Force, 
plus  his  known  progress  from  the  Empire  to  Chichijime  to  Saipan  made  his 
destinati<m  obviously  the  Marshalls;  also  that  since  one  of  his  large  units  ar- 
rived in  the  Marshalls  some  time  ago,  that  unit  could  not  agree  with  Com- 
SIXTEEN  that  there  was  not  a  sul)marine  c<mcentrjiti<>n  in  that  area.  "Every 
evidence  points  to  a  concentration,  not  only  the  small  Fourth  Fleet  submarines 
there,  but  al.so  a  good  proportion  of  the  Fleet  submarines  of  the  Submarine 
Force."  It  was  also  said  that  "the  presence  of  a  unit  of  plane  guard  destroyers 
Indicates  the  presence  of  at  least  one  carrier  in  the  Mandates,  alth(mgh  this 
has  not  been  confirmed."  This  communication  summary  was  initialed  by  Ad- 
miral Kimmel  and  Admiral  McMorris,  the  War  Plans  Officer. 

[//8]  A  dispatch  was  re<'eived  from  ConiSIXTEEN,  addressed  to  OpNav, 
information  CincAF,  CincPac,  and  ConiFOL'RTEEN,  to  the  effect  that  a  reassign- 
ment of  all  JaiKinese  naval  calls  had  occurred  jit  midnight. 

2  Dccenihcr  I'J-'fl: 

On  2  December  1941,  ConiSIXTEEN  reported  that  Ciiic  Second  and  Cine 
Third  Fleets  were  in  the  Takao  area,  and,  that  broadcasts  to  tteet  xunts  were 
being  sent  by  Takao  or  Bako  in  addition  to  Tokyo.  Also  reported  was  the  fact 
that  the  Japanese  Ambassador  at  Bangkok  had  requested  i)ermission  to  de- 
stroy codes. 

CincAF  also  reported  that  a  patrol  plane  had  spotted  nine  submarines  on  a 
southerly  course  in  the  South  China  Sea  betwo(>ii  Camranh  Bay  and  the  Philip- 
pines. Also  that  three  submarines  were  sighted  070  from  Saigon,  180  miles, 
heading  south,  and  that  twenty-one  transports,  with  air  patrol  overhead,  were 
at  Camranh  Bay. 

A  report  from  the  Assistant  Naval  Attache,  Shanghai,  advised  of  the  arrival 
of  14,000  trooiis  sailing  from  there  the  week  ending  the  22nd. 

The  communication  intelligence  summary  for  the  previous  day  stated  gen- 
erally that  all  service  radio  calls  of  forces  alloat  changed  promptly  at  0000  1 
December.  Previously  service  calls  had  been  changed  after  a  i)eriod  of  six 
months  or  more.  Calls  were  last  changed  on  1  November  1041.  The  fact  that 
service  calls  lasted  only  one  month  indicated  an  additional  progressive  step  in 
preparing  for  active  operations  on  a  large  scale.  For  a  period  of  two  to  three 
days  prior  to  the  change  of  calls,  the  bulk  of  the  radio  traffic  consisted  of  dis- 
patches from  one  to  four  or  five  days  old.  It  appeared  that  the  Japanese  Navy 
was  adopting  more  and  more  security  provisions.  A  study  of  traffic  prior  to 
0000  1  December  indicated  that  an  effort  was  made  to  deliver  all  dispatches 
using  old  calls  so  that  promptly  with  the  change  of  calls  there  would  be  a  mini- 
mum of  undelivered^  dispatches  and  consecpient  confusion  and  comprimiise. 
Either  that,  or  the  large  number  of  old  messages  may  have  been  used  to  pad  the 
total  volume  and  make  it  appear  as  if  nothing  nnusnal  were  pending.  It  should 
be  noted  that  the  sentence  in  the  above  summary  reading  "The  fact  that  service 
calls  lasted  only  one  month  indicates  an  additional  progressive  step  in  prepar- 
ing for  active  operations  on  a  large  scale"  was  underscored  in  red  pencil  com- 
mencing with  the  words  "service  calls."  Captain  Layton  testified  that  to  the 
best  of  his  recollection  this  was  underlined  by  Admii-al  Kimmel  at  the  time. 

The  summary  further  stated  as  to  the  First  Fleet  "nothing  to  indicate  that  this 
fleet  as  a  fleet  is  operating  outside  of  Empire  waters."     As  to  the  Second  Fleet, 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2329 

it  was  stated  "This  fleet  is  believed  proceeding  from  tiie  Kure-Sasebo  area  in 
the  direction  of  South  China  and  Indo-China  ;"  Takao  did  not  appear  to  play 
an  important  role  in  the  traffic ;  consequently,  the  assumption  was  made  that 
this  fleet  was  passing  up  Takao.  As  to  the  Third  Fleet,  it  was  stated  there  was 
"nothing  to  report  except  that  the  [//.9]  same  associations  of  Second, 
Third  Fleets  and  Combined  Air  Force  with  South  China  and  Indo-China  Forces 
continued.  As  to  Fourth  Fleet,  "No  change  in  the  Fourth  Fleet  or  Mandates 
area."  As  to  Fifth  Fleet,  "Nothing  to  report."  As  to  submarines,  it  was  stated 
a  large  number  of  the  Submarine  Force  was  believed  to  be  in  the  area  eastward 
of  Yokosuka-Chichijime  and  Saipan.  As  to  Combined  Air  Force,  it  was  stated 
"No  change."  As  to  carriers,  it  was  said  "No  change."  This  summary  was 
initialed  by  Admiral  Kimmel. 

In  accordance  with  the  request  of  Admiral  Kimmel,  Layton,  the  Fleet  Intelli- 
gence Officer,  prepared  a  memorandum  for  the  Admiral  dealing  with  the  loca- 
tion of  the  Japanese  Fleet.  This  memorandum  was  prepared,  according  to 
Layton,  on  the  evening  of  1  December,  and  was  submitted  by  him  to  Admiral 
Kimmel  on  2  December  1941.  The  original  memorandum  is  Exhibit  23.  The 
memorandum  bears  certain  notations  in  red  pencil  which,  Layton  testified,  were 
inserted  by  him  on  December  2nd  prior*  to  submission  of  the  memorandum  to 
Admiral  Kimmel,  and  which  reflected  the  later  information  received  after 
preparation  of  the  memorandum  on  the  night  of  December  lst-2nd.  It  also  bears 
certain  lead  pencil  notations  which  Layton  identified  as  the  handwriting  of 
Admiral  Kimmel.  This  memorandum,  according  to  Layton,  summarized  hia 
best  estimate  of  the  location  of  the  Japanese  Fleet,  based  on  all  information 
available  to  him  and  to  Admiral  Kimmel  up  to  and  including  1  December  1941. 

Layton's  estimate  stated  that  from  the  best  available  information,  units  of 
the  Orange  (Japanese)  were  "thought''  to  be  located  as  listed  in  the  memorandum. 
In  the  Kure-Sasebo  area  he  listed  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Combined 
Fleet  and  Commander  in  Chief,  First  Fleet,  with  six  battleships,  "(?)",  and  other 
units.  He  listed  the  Commander  in  Chief,  Third  Fleet,  at  Nagara  initially  and 
then  corrected  it  in  red  to  indicate  that  it  was  at  Takao.  Also  in  the  Kure-Sasebo 
area  he  located  Cruiser  Division  8. 

In  the  Shanghai  area,  Layton's  estimate  located  the  Commander  in  Chief, 
China  Fleet,  the  Shanghai  base  force,  and  an  air  group. 

In  the  Bako-Takao  area,  Layton  listed  Third  Fleet  submarine  squadrons  and 
various  destroyers  and  the  Commander  of  the  Combined  Air  Force  with  numerous 
air  groups  and  the  KASUGA  MARU  (thought  to  be  a  converted  carrier  with  36 
planes).  He  estimated  that  the  Commander  in  Chief,  Second  Fleet,  had  been 
en  route  to  Takao  (this  he  corrected  in  red  pencil  to  indicate  that  he  was  at 
Takao)  with  a  cruiser  division,  destroyers,  and  with  "Cardiv  4 — two  CV  and 
four  DD;  Cardiv  3— two  CV  and  3  DD;  Batdiv  3  less  HARIJNA— 3  BB  (maybe 
2  BB)"  and,  he  added  in  red  pencil,  certain  cruisers  and  Destroyer  Division  2. 

In  the  Hainon-Canton  area,  Layton  located  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the 
South  China  Fleet  and  various  cruisers  and  destroyers  and  transports.  In  the 
French  Indo-China  area,  he  located  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  an  Expeditionary 
Fleet  with  various  ships  including  21  transports  and  some  base  forces  among 
others.  In  the  Mandates  area,  he  located  at  Palao  an  air  group  [120]  and 
base  force ;  at  Truk,  the  Commander  in  (^hief  of  the  Fourth  Fleet  with  cruisers 
and  destroyers,  and  a  base  force  and  an  air  group.  At  Saipan,  he  located  the 
Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Submarine  Force  with  possibly  submarines  and 
various  air  groups  and  a  base  force.  In  the  Marshalls  area,  he  located  various 
air  groups  and  the  carrier  "KORYU?  plus  plane  guards",  and  several  submarine 
squadrons  and  base  force. 

Layton's  memorandum  did  not  make  any  reference  to  the  location  of  Carrier 
Divisions  1  and  2  of  the  Japanese  Fleet  (which  in  fact  were  en  route  to  attack 
Pearl  Harbor).  According  to  Layton,  on  2  December  1941,  during  his  conference 
with  Admiral  Kimmel,  the  Admiral  noticed  and  commented  on  the  absence  of 
information  concerning  Japanese  Carrier  Divisions  1  and  2.  In  his  testimony,  he 
described  the  conversation  on  this  point  as  follows  : 

"Mr.  SoNNETT :  Will  you  state  the  substance  of  what  he  said  and  what  you  said, 
as  best  you  recall  it? 

"Captain  Layton:  As  best  I  recall  it,  Admiral  Kimmel  said,  "What!  You 
don't  know  where  Carrier  Division  1  and  Carrier  Division  2  are?'  and  I  replied, 
'No,  sir,  I  do  not.  I  think  they  are  in  home  waters,  but  I  do  not  know  where  they 
are.  The  rest  of  these  units,  I  feel  pretty  confident  of  their  location.'  Then 
Admiral  Kimmel  looked  at  me,  as  sometimes  he  would,  with  somewhat  a  stern 
countenance  and  yet  partially  with  a  twinkle  in  his  eye  and  said,  'Do  you  mean 

79716  O — 46 — pt.  16 27 


2330     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

to  say  that  they  could  be  rounding  Diamond  Head  and  you  wouldn't  know  it?' 
or  words  to  that  effect.  My  reply  was  that,  'I  hope  they  would  be  sighted  before 
now,'  or  words  to  that  effect."  ... 

"Mr.  Sonnett:  Your  testimony,  Captain,  was  not  quite  clear  to  me,  arising 
out  of  your  description  of  Admiral  Kimmel's  twinkle  in  his  eye  when  he  spoke. 
What  I  am  trying  to  get  at  is  this :  Was  the  discussion  about  the  absence  of 
information  concerning  Cardivs  1  and  2  a  serious  or  jocular  one? 

"Captain  Layton  :  His  question  was  ab.solutely  serious,  but  when  he  said, 
'Where  are  Cardivs  1  and  2?'  and  I  said,  'I  do  not  know  precisely,  but  if  I  must 
estimate,  I  would  say  that  they  are  probably  in  the  Kure  area  since  we  haven't 
heard  from  them  in  a  long  time  and  they  may  be  refitting  as  they  finished  opera- 
tions only  a  month  and  a  half  ago,'  and  it  was  then  when  he,  with  a  twinkle  in 
his  eye,  said,  'Do  you  mean  to  say  they  could  be  rounding  Diamond  Head?'  or 
words  to  that  effect.  In  other  words,  he  was  impressing  me  on  my  complete 
ignorance  as  to  their  exact  location. 

"Mr.  Sonnett  :  He  was  conscious,  therefore,  of  your  lack  of  information 
about  those  carriers? 

[121]  "Captain  Layton  :  This  incident  has  been  impressed  on  my  mind.  I 
do  not  say  that  I  quote  him  exactly,  but  I  do  know  that  he  made  such  a  statement 
to  me  in  the  way  to  point  out  to  me  that  I  should  know  where  they  are  but  hadn't 
so  indicated  their  location." 

S  December  19. ifl  : 

It  will  be  recalled  that  on  December  3rd  dispatches  were  sent  by  CNO  to  CincPac 
and  others  advising  that  Japanese  diplomatic  and  consular  posts  at  Hong  Kong, 
Singapore,  Batavia,  Manila,  Washington,  and  London,  had  been  ordered  to  destroy 
the  "purple"  machine  and  most  of  the  codes  and  ciphers. 

Layton  testified  that  at  the  time  Admiral  Kimmel  asked  him  what  the  "purple 
machine"  was;  that  he  did  not  know  and  made  inquiry ;  that  he  advised  Admiral 
Kimmel  that  it  was  the  Japanese  diplomatic  electrical  coding  machine;  that  he 
did  not  then  know  whether  or  not  the  Japanese  consul  at  Hawaii  had  such  a 
machine  ;  and,  that  he  subsequently  learned  that  the  Japanese  consul  there  did  not 
have  such  a  machine. 

The  communication  intelligence  summary  delivered  on  the  3rd,  covering  the  2nd, 
stated  generally  that  the  most  prominent  factor  in  the  traffic  was  the  apparent 
confusion  in  the  routing  of  traffic  for  certain  major  parts  of  the  Japanese  Fleet. 
There  were  instances  where  the  same  dispatch  was  repeated  several  times  after  it 
had  appeared  on  the  Tokyo  broadcast  and  also  where  Takao  radio  received  the 
same  dispatch  that  it  had  previously  sent.  It  was  stated  that  ComSIXTEP^N  had 
reported  Second  and  Third  Fleets  in  Takao  area,  and  that  Takao  radio  was  broad- 
casting traffic  to  these  fleets.  The  broadcast,  it  was  said,  was  not  uncovered  at 
ComFOURTEEN  and  contrary  to  the  location  report,  there  was  one  indication 
that  these  two  fleets  were  not  close  to  Takao.  In  several  instances,  Takao  radio 
forwarded  traffic  to  Tokyo  for  these  fleets.  It  was  said  that  "Summing  up  all 
reports  and  indications,  it  is  believed  that  the  large  fleet  made  up  of  Second,  Third 
and  First  Fleet  units,  has  left  Empire  waters,  but  is  either  not  close  enough  to 
Takao  for  good  communications  or  is  proceeding  on  a  course  not  close  to  Takao." 
It  was  further  stated,  "The  change  of  calls  on  December  1st  has  prevented  this 
office  from  making  definite  statement  as  of  this  date  of  the  units  now  in  the  south- 
ern area.  To  further  complicate  the  situation,  Shanghai  radio  handled  a  consid- 
erable amount  of  traffic  which  obviously  was  originated  by  and  destined  for  units 
in  the  Takao  area."  Also  it  was  pointed  out  generally  that  "There  was  a  very 
high  percentage  of  high  precedence  traffic  originated  both  by  major  forces  afloat 
and  Tokyo."  As  to  the  First  Fleet,  it  was  stated  that  despite  the  lack  of  positive 
identifications,  the  First  Fleet  appeared  relatively  quiet  and  that  "from  inconclu- 
sive evidence,  it  appears  as  if  there  may  have  been  a  split  in  the  original  or  normal 
combined  fleet  staff  and  that  these  may  be  two  supreme  commanders  with  staffs. 
As  an  example,  traffic  routing  indicates  one  combined  fleet  call  associated  with  the 
Second  and  Third  Fleets,  and  apparently  in  company,  while  another  combined 
fleet  call  appears  not  associated  with  the  Second  and  Third  Fleets."  As  to  the 
Second  Fleet,  it  was  stated  "No  units  have  stood  out  prominently  in  [122] 
the  last  two  or  three  days.  This  is  probably  due  to  lack  of  new  identifications,  but 
contributes  somewhat  to  the  belief  that  a  large  part  of  the  Second  Fleet  is  under- 
way in  company."  As  to  the  Third  Fleet,  it  said  there  was  nothing  to  report. 
As  to  the  Mandates,  it  was  said  that  the  association  of  submarine  force  and  Fourth 
Fleet  continued. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2331 

Concerning  carriers,  this  summary  stated,  "Almost  a  complete  blank  of  infor- 
mation on  the  carriers  today.  Lack  of  identifications  has  somewhat  promoted  this 
lack  of  information.  However,  since  over  200  service  calls  have  been  partially 
identified  since  the  change  on  the  first  of  December  and  not  one  carrier  call  has 
been  recovered,  it  is  evidence  that  carrier  traffic  is  at  a  low  ebb."  This  summary 
was  initialed  by  Admiral  Kimmel. 

//  December  J 941: 

On  4  December  1941,  OpNav  sent  a  dispatch  (Exhibit  21,  Naval  Court)  to 
NavStaGuam  for  action,  and  to  CincAF,  CincPac,  ComFOURTKEN,  and  Com- 
SIXTEEN  for  information  stating: 

"Guam  destroy  all  secret  and  confidential  publications  and  other  classified 
matter  except  that  essential  for  current  purposes  and  special  intelligence  retain- 
ing minimum  cryptographic  channels  necessary  for  essential  communications  with 
CINCAF  CINCPAC  COMFOURTEEN  COMSIXTEEN  and  OPNAV  X  Be  pre- 
pared to  destroy  instantly  in  event  of  emergency  all  classified  matter  you  retain  X 
Report  crypto  channels  retained." 

ComSIXTEEN  advised,  in  a  dispatch  received  on  December  4th,  that  seven 
transports  had  been  sighted  off  Saigon  on  15  November  1941,  and  on  the  20th  a 
seaplane  carrier  northeast  of  Amoy. 

The  Assistant  Naval  Attache,  Shanghai,  advised,  in  a  dispatch  received  4 
December,  that  several  large  liners  had  been  carrying  supplies  and  personnel  to 
the  Carolines,  that  3.(X)0  laborers  had  landed  at  Jaluit  and  that  certain  islands 
were  being  specially  developed. 

The  Naval  Attache,  Tokyo,  advised  in  a  dispatch  received  this  day  that  a  trans- 
port loaded  with  aircraft  and  another  with  naval  personnel  had  left  Yokahama  on 
27  November  1941. 

The  previous  day's  communication  intelligence  summary  stated  under  the  head- 
ing "General,"  that  traffic  volume  was  normal  with  receiving  conditions  good. 
The  present  state  of  call  recovery  did  not  permit  much  detailed  information  to  be 
obtained.  The  extensive  use  of  alternate  calls  by  the  major  commands  slowed  up 
identification  of  even  these  units.  Very  few  units  had  been  positively  identified 
so  far.  The  Chief  of  the  Naval  General  Staff  originated  three  long  dispatches  to 
the  Commanders  in  Chief,  Combined,  Second,  and  Third  Fleets.  Tokyo  intelli- 
gence originated  nine  [J 23]  dispatches  to  the  same  addresses.  It  was 
stated  that  the  presence  of  the  Commander  in  Chief,  Second  Fleet,  in  Taiwan 
waters  was  not  revealed  by  radio  traffic.  It  was  stated  that  it  was  the  impression 
that  both  the  Second  and  Third  Fleets  were  underway,  but  that  this  was  not  veri- 
fied by  radio  intelligence  means.  It  was  also  stated  that  there  were  some  Fourth 
Fleet  units  in  the  ^Marshall  Islands  but  their  identity  was  not  known.  It  was 
stated  also  that  there  was  "no  information  on  submarines  or  carriers."  This 
summary  was  initialed  by  Admiral  Kimmel. 

5  December  1941: 
Tliere  were  no  dispatches  of  an  intelligence  nature  received  by  CincPac.  The 
previous  day's  communication  intelligence  summary  stated  that  in  general  traffic 
volume  was  normal  with  fair  receiving  conditions.  Takao  radio  instituted  a  fleet 
broadcast  system  using  the  prefix  UTU  in  heading  so  that  there  were  two  fieet 
broadcasts  now  in  oi)eration.  So  far  only  a  few  jiiessages  had  been  placed  on  the 
Takao  broadcast.  There  were  a  large  number  of  urgent  messages,  most  of  these 
from  Tokyo  to  the  major  commanders.  Tokyo  intelligence  originated  messages 
to  the  Chiefs  of  Staff.  China  Fleet.  Combined  Fleet,  Third  Fleet,  South  China 
Fleet,  French  Indo-China  Force,  and  same.  In  all,  this  activity  sent  twelve  mes- 
sages to  the  major  commanders.  As  to  the  Combined  Fleet,  it  was  stated  "The 
outstanding  item  of  today's  traffic  is  the  lack  of  messages  from  the  Commander  in 
Chief,  Second  Fleet,  and  Commander  in  Chief,  Third  Fleet.  These  previously  very 
talkative  commanders  are  now  very  (juiet.  While  the  fleet  calls  are  not  yet  well 
identified,  the  lack  of  traffic  from  these  commands  cannot  be  a.scribed  to  that. 
These  two  commands  are  still  prominent  as  addressees.  It  is  now  believed  that 
the  Commander  in  Chief.  Second  Fleet,  is  in  the  vicinity  of  Takao  and  that  the 
apparently  conflicting  evidence  is  due  to  traffic  destined  for  the  Tokyo  UTU  broad- 
cast, which  CincSecond  Fleet  is  still  copying."  As  to  the  Fourth  Fleet,  it  was 
stated  that  the  Commander  in  Chief  sent  a  message  to  various  units  and  that  no 
further  check  could  be  made  on  the  presence  of  Fourth  Fleet  units  in  the  Marshalls 
and  that  Jaluit  appeared  many  times  in  the  day's  traffic,  being  associated  with 
Commander  Submarine  Force,  Tokyo  radio  and  an  oil  tanker.  As  to  South  China, 
it  was  stated  that  Bako  continued  as  an  active  originator  addressing  many  mes- 


2332     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

sages  to  Sama  and  Saigon.     Except  for  traflSc  between  South  China  commanders, 
all  units  in  that  area  were  quiet.     This  summary  was  initialed  by  Admiral  Kimmel. 

6  December  1941: 

Several  dispatches  dated  6  December  1941  were  found  in  the  CincPac  files,  but 
it  does  not  aiJpear  whether  or  not  they  were  received  prior  to  the  attack.  One 
was  an  OpNav  dispatch  authorizing  CincPac  to  direct  the  destruction  of  secret  and 
confidential  documents  at  our  outlying  islands  "in  view  of  the  international  situ- 
ation and  the  exposed  position  of  our  outlying  Pacific  islands."  (Exhibit  22, 
Naval  Court).  Other  dispatches  dated  the  6th,  from  the  Naval  Observer  at  Wel- 
lington, advised  of  Japanese  destruction  of  codes ;  from  the  Assistant  Naval 
Attache,  Shanghai,  advised  of  the  departure  south  of  Japanese  troops  and  increase 
of  Japanese  gendarmerie  force  in  Shanghai ;  and,  from  CincAF,  advised  of  a 
[124]  25-ship  convoy,  a  10-ship  convoy,  and  3  ships,  off  Saigon,  French  Indo- 
China,  all  of  which  appeared  to  be  headed  in  a  westerly  direction,  also  30  ships 
and  a  cruiser  were  sighted  in  Camranh  Bay. 

The  radio  intelligence  summary  for  5  December,  which  was  delivered  on  the 
6th,  was  the  last  summary  delivered  to  Admiral  Kimmel  before  the  attack.  It 
stated  in  general  that  traffic  volume  was  hevay.  All  circuits  were  overloaded 
with  Tokyo  broadcasts  going  over  full  24  hours.  Tokyo  Mandates  circuit  in 
duplex  operations.  These  were  .several  new  intercept  schedules  heard.  It  was 
noted  that  some  traffic  being  broadcast  was  several  days  old  which  indicated  the 
uncertainty  of  delivery  existing  in  the  radio  organization.  There  were  many 
messages  of  high  precedence  which  appeared  to  be  caused  by  the  jammed  condi- 
tion of  all  circuits.  A  plain  language  message  was  sent  by  the  captain  of  the 
OKAWA  from  Tokyo  to  Takao,  probably  for  further  relay,  addressed  to  the  Chief 
of  the  Political  Affairs  Bureaii  saying,  "In  reference  to  the  Far  Eastern  crisis 
what  you  said  is  considered  important  to  this  end,  but  proceed  with  what  you  are 
doing,  specific  orders  will  be  issued  soon." 

As  to  the  Combined  Fleet,  it  was  stated  that  neither  the  Second  nor  Third  Fleet 
Commanders  had  originated  any  traffic.  They  were  .still  frequently  addressed  but 
were  receiving  their  traffic  over  broadcasts.  It  was  stated  that  "They  are  un- 
doubtedly in  Takao  area  or  farther  south  since  the  Takao  broadcast  handles  nearly 
all  their  traffic.  No  traffic  from  the  Commander  Carriers  or  Submarine  Force 
has  been  see^i  either." 

There  was  no  traffic  from  the  Third  Fleet,  but  some  traffic  to  that  fleet.  There 
was  also  some  traffic  to  the  Fourth  Fleet  addressed  at  Jaluit,  strengthening  the 
impression  that  the  Commander  in  Chief,  Fourth  Fleet,  was  in  the  Marshalls.  As 
to  South  China,  there  was  much  traffic  addressed  to  the  Commander  in  Chief, 
Second  Fleet,  by  Sama.  Bako  continued  as  an  active  originator  with  many  dis- 
patches to  the  Second  and  Third  Fleets.  The  Commander  Combined  Air  Force 
appeared  to  be  busy  with  the  movement  of  air  corps,  several  of  which  were  moving 
probably  to  Indo-China. 

[125]        Findings. 

29.  Naval  Intelligence  was  effectively  organized  to  acquire  information  from 
coded  diplomatic  messages  between  the  Japanese  Government  and  its  repre- 
sentatives. Through  the  interception  of  Japanese  diplomatic  messages  and  their 
decryption  and  translation  in  Washington,  D.  C,  prior  to  the  attack,  knowledge 
was  obtained  on  the  Government's  actual  views  concerning  the  diplomatic 
situation,  of  the  Japanese  Government's  intention  to  wage  war,  and  of  the  fact 
that  hostilities  were  impending  and  imminent. 

30.  The  information  acquired  in  Washington  through  the  interception  of 
Japanese  diplomatic  messages  was  adequately  and  promptly  disseminated  at 
Washington  by  Naval  and  military  Intelligence  to  the  Chief  of  Naval  Opera- 
tions, to  the  Army  Chief  of  Staff,  to  the  State  Department,  and  to  the  President. 

31.  The  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  had  to  rely  upon  the  Chief  of 
Naval  Operations  for  information  as  to  the  status  of  the  diplomatic  negotia- 
tions with  the  Jaj)anese,  and  had  requested  to  be  kept  fully  informed  on  this 
subject. 

32.  The  Japanese  diplomatic  messages,  acquired  by  Naval  Intelligence  at 
Washington  were  not  transmitted  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  as 
such.  Reasons  advanced  for  this  course  of  action  were  that  the  Japanese  might 
intercept  the  naval  messages  and  learn  of  the  Navy's  success  in  decrypting 
Japanese  (^odes;  that  the  volume  of  intercepted  messages  was  so  great  that  the 
transmission  of  them,  particularly  during  the  critical  period,  would  have  over- 
taxed the  Navy's  communications  facilities,;  and,  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2333 

Chief  of  Naval  Operations  to  evaluate  such  information  and  to  advise  CincPae 
of  the  important  facts  learned. 

33.  Various  of  the  warning  messages  sent  by  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations 
to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  were  based  on  the  information  ob- 
tained from  intercepted  J'apanese  messages. 

34.  The  warnings  sent  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  during  No- 
vember (particularly  the  "war  warning"  of  the  27th)  and  early  December,  1941, 
indicated  in  unmistakable  language  that  the  diplomatic  negotiations  had  ceased, 
that  war  with  Japan  was  imminent,  and  that  Japanese  attacks  might  occur 
at  any  moment. 

35.  The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  did  not  advise  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
Pacific  Fleet,  of  certain  intercepted  Japanese  messages  indicating  interest  in 
the  location  of  ships  ifi  Pearl  Harbor.  These  were  more  specific  than  other 
intercepted  messages  indicating  Japanese  interest  in  the  movements  of  ships 
to  or  from  other  ports. 

[126]  36.  The  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  was  not  fully  advised  of 
certain  other  information  obtained  from  intercepted  Japanese  messages  after 
the  November  2f7th  "war  warning,"  which  made  further  evident  the  termination 
in  fact  of  the  diplomatic  negotiations  and  the  Japanese  intention  to  wage  war. 

S7.  On  the  morning  of  7  December  1941,  there  was  brought  to  the  attention  of 
the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  an  intercepted  message  in  which  the  Japanese 
(government  instructed  its  representatives  to  present  to  the  State  Department 
at  1  p.  m.  the  Japanese  Government's  final  reply  terminating  the  diplomatic 
negotiations.  Mention  was  made  of  the  fact  that  1  p.  m.  Washington  time  was 
about  dawn  at  Honolulu  and  about  the  middle  of  the  night  in  the  Far  East, 
No  one  stated  that  this  indicated  an  air  attack  at  Pearl  Harbor. 

38.  This  so-called  "1  p.  m.  delivery  message,"  which  consisted  of  one  sen- 
tence, had  been  intercepted  at  a  naval  radio  intercept  station  at  Bainbridge  Island 
in  the  State  of  Washington  and  forwarded  to  the  Navy  Department  by  teletype. 
It  was  decrypted  and  available  in  the  Navy  Department  at  about  0700  on 
December  7th.  It  was  sent  to  the  Army  for  translation  because  there  was  no 
Japanese  translator  on  duty  in  the  Navy  Department  at  that  time.  The  trans- 
lation, which  could  have  been  done  by  a  qualified  translator  in  a  few  minutes, 
was  not  received  from  the  Army  until  after  0900. 

39.  Although  he  was  in  possession  of  this  highly  significant  information  sev- 
eral hours  before  the  attack,  and  there  were  available  means  whereby  the 
information  could  have  been  transmitted  to  Admiral  Kimmel  immediately, 
including  a  "scrambler"  telephone  maintained  by  the  Army,  Admiral  Stark 
initially  was  not  disposed  to,  and  did  not,  send  any  message  to  Admiral  Kimmel. 
Instead  he  relied  on  the  transmission  of  a  message  by  the  War  Department  to 
General  Short,  which  was  to  be  furnished  also  to  Admiral  Kimmel. 

40.  Admiral  Stark  has  previously  testified  that  he  did  not  consider  it  nec- 
essary to  telephone  to  Admiral  Kimmel  on  the  morning  of  7  December  and 
that  he  had  not  telephoned  at  any  time  previous  to  the  attack,  but  that  one 
regret  which  he  ha3  was  that  he  had  not  telephoned  a  message  that  morning  to 
Admiral  Kimmel  or  paralleled  the  Army  message  on  the  naval  radio  system. 

41.  The  message  sent  by  General  Marshall  on  7  December  1941;  which  was 
received  after  the  attack,  advised  that  the  Japanese  were  presenting  an  ulti- 
matum at  1  p.  m.,  that  they  were  under  orders  to  destroy  their  code  machine, 
that  it  was  not  known  just  what  significance  the  hour  set  might  have  but  that 
the  addressees  were  to  be  on  the  alert  accordingly,  and  that  the  naval  authori- 
ties were  to  be  informed. 

42.  The  warnings  which  were  sent  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific -Fleet, 
Indicated,  as  to  the  possible  places  of  Japanese  attack,  on  November  24th,  that 
"a  surprise  aggressive  movement  in  any  direction,  including  attack  on  the 
Philippines  or  Guam,  is  a  possibility,"  and,  on  November  27th,  that  "an  aggressive 
movement  by  the  Japanese  is  expected  [127]  within  the  next  few  days. 
The  number  and  equipment  of  Japanese  troops  and  organization  of  naval  task 
forces  indicate  an  amphibious  expedition  against  either  the  Philippines,  Thai  or 
Kra  F*eninsula,  or  possibly  Borneo." 

43.  Although  the  warnings  which  were  sent  by  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations 
to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  drew  attention  to  probable  Japanese 
objec'tives  to  the  southward  and  southeastward  of  Japan,  and  did  no*  specifically 
mention  Pearl  Harbor,  both  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  and  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  were  aware  of  the  possibility  of  a  Japanese  attack  on  Pearl 
Harbor.    They  did  not  regard  such  an  attack  as  probable. 


2334     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

44.  The  Japanese  established  several  codes  in  November,  1941,  which  were  to 
be  used  in  radio  transmissions  to  convey  to  their  representatives  information 
concerning  the  status  of  relations  between  Japan  and  the  United  States,  and  other 
countries.  These  were  known  as  the  "winds"  code  and  the  "hidden  word"  code. 
The  "winds"  code  was  designed  to  indicate  a  break  in  diplomatic  reUitions,  or 
possibly  war,  with  England  or  the  United  States  or  Russia  by  the  use  in  weather 
broadcasts  of  certain  Japanese  words  signifying  wind  directions. 

45.  The  interception  of  a  "winds"  me.ssage  relating  to  the  United  States  during 
the  first  week  of  December.  IWl,  would  not  have  conveyed  any  information  of 
significance  which  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  and  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
Pacific  Fleet,  did  not  already  have. 

46.  No  message  in  the  "winds"  code  relating  to  the  United  States  was  received 
by  any  of  the  watch  oflBcers  in  the  Navy  Department  to  whom  such  a  message 
would  have  come  had  it  been  received  in  the  Navy  Department.  No  such  message 
was  intercepted  by  the  radio  intelligence  units  at  I'earl  Harbor  or  in  the  Philip- 
pines, although  intensive  efforts  were  made  by  those  organizations  to  intercept 
such  a  niesage.  The  evidence  indicates  further  that  no  such  message  was  inter- 
cepted by  the  British  or  the  Dutch,  despite  their  efforts  to  intercept  such  a 
message.  Neither  the  Fleet  Intelligence  OflBcer  of  the  Asiatic  Fleet  nor  the  Fleet 
Intelligence  Officer  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  nor  the  Intelligence  Officer  of  the  Far 
Eastern  Section  of  the  Office  of  Naval  Intelligence,  recalled  any  such  message. 
The  Chief  of  Naval  Operatiohs.  the  Director  of  Naval  Connuunications,  and  the 
Director  of  Naval  Intelligence  recalled  no  such  message.  Testimony  to  the 
effect  that  a  "winds"  code  message  was  received  prior  to  the  attack  was  given 
by  Captain  Safford,  in  charge  of  Op-20-G,  a  connuunications  security  section  at 
the  Navy  Department,  who  stated  that  such  a  message  was  received  on  December 
3rd  or  4th,  that  it  related  to  the  United  States,  and  that  no  copy  could  be  found 
in  the  Navy  or  Army  files.  In  his  testimony  before  Admiral  Hart,  Captain  Safford 
named,  in  addition  to  himself,  three  other  officers  who.  he  stated,  recalled  having 
seen  and  read  the  "winds"  nies.sage.  ?]ach  of  those  officers  testified  that  he  had 
never  seen  such  a  message.  The  only  other  testimony  to  the  effect  that  a  "winds" 
message  was  received  was  by  Captain  Kramer,  an  intelligence  officer  assigned 
to  Op-20-G,  who  said  that  ho  recalled  that  there  was  a  message  but  could  not 
recall  whether  or  not  it  related  to  the  United  States  or  England  or  Russia.  It 
may  be  noted  that  until  he  testified  in  this  [128]  investigation,  Captain 
Kramer  erorneously  thought  that  a  "hidden  word"  message  intercepted  on  the 
morning  of  December  7th  had  been  a  "winds"  message. 

47.  On  the  morning  of  December  7th.  the  intercepted  "hidden  word"  code  mes- 
sage was  translated  by  Kramer.  In  his  haste,  due  to  the  necessity  of  delivering 
other  messages,  including  the  "1  p.  m.  delivery  message,"  he  overlooked  a  code 
word  relating  to  the  United  States  and  translated  the  message  as  meaning  only 
that  "relations  between  Japan  and  England  are  not  in  accordance  with  expecta- 
tions." He  testified  that  he  later  discovered  the  error  and  a  few  minutes  before 
1  p.  m.  on  December  7th,  he  telephoned  the  correction  to  his  superior  officer  in 
the  Office  of  Naval  Intelligence  and  to  an  officer  of  Army  Military  Intelligence. 

48.  Except  for  the  omission  of  the  United  States,  the  "hidden  word"  code 
message  was  literally  translated  and  did  not  sufficiently  refiect  previous  diplo- 
matic interceptions  which  indicated  that  the  message  was  to  convey  the  idea  of 
a  crisis  involving  the  countries  in  question. 

49.  The  sources  of  intelligence  as  to  the  Japanese  which  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  had  prior  tu  the  attack  included,  in  addition  to  the  Chief  of 
Naval  Operations,  the  District  Intelligence  Officer  of  the  FOURTEENTH  Naval 
District,  and  the  Fleet  Intelligence  Officer  of  the  Pacific  Fleet. 

50.  Under  the  supervision  of  the  District  Intelligence  Officer  of  the  FOUR- 
TEENTH Naval  District,  the  telephone  lines  of  the  Japanese  Consul  General  and 
the  Japanese  Vice  Consul  at  Honolulu  were  tapped  for  some  months  prior  to  the 
attack.  These  were  discontinued  on  2  December  1941  because  the  District  Intel- 
ligence Officer  feared  that  the  existence  of  such  taps  might  be  discovered,  result- 
ing in  undesirable  complications.  No  information  of  military  or  naval  signifi- 
cance was  obtained  by  means  of  the  telephone  taps. 

51.  On  6  December  1941  the  local  representative  of  the  Federal  Bureau  of 
Investigation  at  Honolulu  delivered  to  the  District  Intelligence  Officer  a  tran- 
script of  a  trans-Pacific  radio  telephone  conversation  between  a  person  in  Hono- 
lulu named  "Mori"  and  a  person  in  Japan,.  This  was  examined  by  the  District 
Intelligence  Officer.  It  was  decided  that  the  conversation  should  be  further 
studied  by  a  Japanese  linguist  of  the  District  Intelligence  Office,  who  was  to 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2335 

listen  to  the  recording  of  the  conversation.  This  was  not  done  until  after  the 
attack.  The  transcript  furnished  on  December  Gth  indicated  tliat  tlie  person  in 
Japan  was  interested,  among  other  tilings,  in  the  daily  llights  of  airplanes  from 
Honolulu  and  in  the  number  of  ships  present.  During  the  conversation,  refer- 
ences were  made  to  flowers,  which,  it  now  appears,  may  have  been  code  words 
signifying  the  presence  or  absence  of  ships,  and  a  method  of  conveying  informa- 
tion to  the  approaching  Japanese  ships,  which  presumably  would  have  been 
listening  in  on  the  conversation.  Prior  investigations  indicate  that  the  "Mori 
conversation"  was  also  brought  to  the  attention  of  General  Short  on  6  December 
1941. 

[129]  52.  Under  the  supervision  of  the  District  Intelligence  Officer  of  the 
FOURTEENTH  Naval  District,  copies  of  various  cable  messages  from  and  to 
the  Japanes»e  Consul  General  at  Honolulu,  via  a  commercial  communications 
company,  were  obtained  during  the  tirst  week  of  December,  1941.  This  was 
the  first  time  that  such  messages  had  been  obtained.  The  messages  were  in 
code  and  efforts  were  made  immediately  to  decrypt  and  translate  them.  Some 
messages  were  decrypted  before  the  attack.  These  contained  no  information  of 
particular  significance. 

53.  No  information  secured  at  Oahu  prior  to  the  attack  by  means  of  the 
telephone  taps  or  through  the  interception  of  messages  of  the  Japanese  Consul 
General  indicated  the  likelihood  of  war  or  of  an  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor. 

54.  One  of  the  Japanese  Consul  General's  messages,  which  was  obtained  by 
the  District  Intelligence  Officer  and  turned  over  on  5  December  1{>41  to  the  Radio 
Intelligence  Unit  for  decryption  and  translation,  was  a  message  dated  December 
3rd.  This  message  was  in  a  Japanese  code  known  as  the  "PA-K2."  It  was 
decrypted  and  translated  by  the  Radio  Intelligence  Unit  at  Pearl  Harbor  after 
the  attack.  The  message  was  one  in  which  the  Japanese  Consul  General  advised 
of  a  change  in  a  method  which  had  been  established  for  communication  by  visual 
signals  from  Oahu,  whereby  lights  in  houses  on  the  beach,  the  use  of  a  sailboat, 
certain  want  ads  to  be  broadcast  over  a  local  radio  station,  and  bonfires,  would 
convey  information  as  to  the  presence  or  absence  of  various  types  of  warships 
of  the  Pacific  Fleet.  Although  the  Radio  Intelligence  Unit  at  Pearl  Harbor 
was  unable  to  decrypt  this  message  prior  to  the  attack,  the  message  was  decrypted 
and  translated  in  rough  form  on  6  December  1941  by  a  civilian  translator  in 
Op-20-G  of  the  Navy  Department  in  Washington.  That  section  had  received 
the  message  from  an  Army  radio  intercept  station  at  Fort  Hunt.  Virginia.  Cap- 
tain Kramer  testified  he  had  no  specific  recollection  of  having  seen  this  transla- 
tion prior  to  the  attack,  but  the  evidence  indicates  that  the  rough  translation 
was  shown  to  him  on  the  afternoon  of  December  6th  and  that  due  to  the  pi-essure 
of  work  on  other  important  Japanese  diplomatic  messages,  no  action  was  taken 
on  the  translation  until  8  December  1941. 

55.  On  2  December  1941,  the  Japanese  Consul  General  at  Honolulu  received  a 
coded  message  from  Tokyo  which  stated  that  in  view  of  the  existing  situation, 
the  presence  of  ships  in  port  was  of  utmost  importance,  that  daily  reports  were 
to  be  submitted,  that  the  reports  should  advise  whether  or  not  there  were 
observation  balloons  at  Pearl  Harbor,  and  whether  or  not  the  warships  were 
provided  with  anti-torpedo  nets.  This  message  was  intercepted  by  an  Army 
radio  intercept  station  at  Fort  Shafter.  Hawaii,  and  apparently  was  forwarded 
by  mail  to  the  War  Department  for  decryption  and  translation.  The  translation 
supplied  by  the  Army  indicates  that  the  message  was  translated  on  30 
December  1941. 

56.  On  the  afternoon  of  6  December  1941,  the  Japanese  Consul  General  at 
Honolulu  sent  two  messages  in  the  "PA-K2"  code  which  indicated  the  likelihood 
of  an  air  attack.  The  first  reported  that  there  were  no  signs  of  barrage  balloon 
equipment  at  Pearl  Harbor,  that  in  all  probability  there  was  considerable  oppor- 
tunity left  to  take  advantage  for  a  surprise  attack  against  Pearl  Harbor,  Hickam, 
Ford,  and  Ewa,  and  that  the  battleships  [ISO]  did  not  have  torpedo  nets. 
The  second  message  reported  on  the  ships  at  anchor  on  December  6th,  and 
stated  that  it  appeared  that  no  air  reconnaissance  was  being  conducted  by  the 
Fleet  air  arm.  These  messages  were  not  obtained  by  Naval  Intelligence  at 
Honolulu  prior  to  the  attack.  They  were,  however,  both  intercepted  by  an 
Army  intercept  station  at  San  Francisco  and  were  forwarded  by  teletype  to  the 
Army.  The  translations  of  these  messages  furnished  by  the  Army  indicate  that 
they  were  translated  on  December  Sth.  They  could  have  been  decrypted  and 
translated  in  the  Navy  Department  in  about  an  hour  and  a  half. 


2336     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

57.  There  were  no  formal  arrangements  whereby  the  Navy  communicated  to 
the  Army  estimates  of  the  location  and  movements  of  Japanese  naval  forces. 
Officers  of  the  Far  Eastern  Section  of  Military  Intelligence  at  Washington  had 
access  to  charts  maintained  in  the  Far  Eastern  Division  of  the  Office  of  Naval 
Intelligence  showing  such  information,  and  had  access  to  radio  intelligence 
information  available  in  the  Navy  Department,  and  the  situation  was  discussed 
with  them.  At  Pearl  Harbor,  an  intelligence  officer  of  the  Hawaiian  Air  Force 
received  some  general  information  concerning  Japanese  movements  from  the 
Fleet  Intelligence  Officer. 

58.  The  War  Department  had  information  which  led  that  Department  to 
believe  that  Japanese  naval  forces  were  In  the  Marehalls  in  November,  1941. 
This  appears  from  a  War  Department  dispatch  of  26  November  1941  to  General 
Short,  information  to  Admiral  Kimmel,  concerning  a  special  photographic 
reconnaissance  to  be  flown  over  Truk  and  Jaluit,  in  order  to  obtain  information, 
among  other  things,  as  to  the  number  and  location  of  naval  vessels.  The  recon- 
naissance was  not  flown  because  the  special  Army  planes  were  not  made  ready. 

59.  On  27  November  1941,  a  Pacific  Fleet  Intelligence  bulletin  was  distributed 
by  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  to  his  command.  This  bulletin  set 
forth  the  available  information  concerning  the  organization  of  the  Japanese 
Navy.  It  revised  an  earlier  bulletin  on  the  same  subject  and  pointed  out  that 
the  principal  change  was  a  further  increase  in  the  number  of  fieet  commands. 
This  arose  from  the  regrouping  of  aircraft  carriers  and  seaplane  tenders  into 
separate  forces.  The  bulletin  stated,  among  other  things,  that  the  Japanese 
Carrier  Fleet  consisted  of  ten  carriers  which  were  organized  into  five  divisions, 
each  having  two  carriers. 

60.  Current  information,  derived  from  traffic  analyses,  concerning  the  location 
and  movements  of  Japanese  naval  forces  was  obtained  by  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  Pacific,  from  the  Fleet  Intelligence  Officer,  who  received  it  primarily  from 
the  Radio  Intelligence  Unit  at  Pearl  Harbor.  Such  information  also  was  con- 
tained in  dispatches  from  the  Radio  Intelligence  Unit  in  the  Philippines  and 
from  the  Far  Eastern  Section  of  Naval  Intelligence  in  Washington,  D.  C. 

61.  Fortnightly  Intelligence  bulletins  were  issued  by  the  Office  of  Naval 
Intelligence  and  mailed  to  the  Pacific  Fleet,  among  others.  These  included  sum- 
maries of  the  information  concerning  Japanese  naval  forces  which  had  been 
received  from  the  Radio  Intelligence  Units  at  Pearl  Harbor  and  at  the 
Philippines. 

[131]  62.  On  November  26th,  ComFOURTEEN  sent  a  dispatch  to  OpNav, 
information  to  CincPac,  CincAF,  and  ComSIXTEEN,  which  summarized  the 
information  as  to  Japanese  naval  movements  obtained  by  the  Radio  Intelligence 
Unit  at  Pearl  Harbor  during  the  preceding  month.  The  dispatch  indicated  that 
the  Commander  Second  Fleet  had  been  organizing  a  task  force  comprising  units 
of  various  fleets.  This  dispatch  stated  that  there  was  believed  to  be  a  strong 
concentration  of  submarines  and  air  groups  in  the  Marshalls,  which  included  at 
least  one  carrier  division  unit  (not  necessarily  a  carrier),  plus  probably  one- 
third  of  the  submarine  fleet.  The  estimate  was  that  a  strong  force  might  be 
preparing  to  operate  in  southeastern  Asia  while  component  parts  might  operate 
from  Palo  and  the  Marshalls. 

63.  The  radio  intercepts  by  the  radio  Intelligence  unit  located  in  the  Philip- 
pines were  considered  by  OpNav  to  be  the  most  reliable  because  of  the  location 
of  the  unit.  On  26  November  1941,  the  radio  intelligence  unit  in  the  Philippines, 
in  a  dispatch  to  CincPac,  OpNav  and  others,  commented  on  the  above  dispatch 
of  ComFOURTEEN  and  stated  that  traffic  analysis  for  the  past  few  days  had 
indicated  that  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Second  Fleet,  was  directing  various  fleet 
units  in  a  loose-knit  task  force  that  apparently  would  be  divided  into  two  sections. 
The  first  section  was  expected  to  operate  in  the  South  China  area.  The  second 
section  was  expected  to  operate  in  the  Mandates.  It  was  estimated  that  the 
second  section  included  "Car  Div  3,  RYUJO,  and  one  MARU."  This  dispatch 
also  stated  that  the  ComSIXTEEN  unit  could  not  confirm  the  supposition  that 
carriers  and  submarines  in  force  were  in  the  Mandates,  and  that  their  best 
indications  were  that  all  known  carriers  were  still  in  the  Sasebo-Kure  area.  It 
was  stated  that  this  evaluation  was  considered  to  be  reliable. 

64.  From  time  to  time  after  November  27th,  there  were  sighting  reports  from 
the  Asiatic  Fleet  and  other  observers,  copies  of  which  were  received  by  Admiral 
Kimmel,  which  confirmed  the  movement  of  important  Japanese  naval  forces  to 
the  southward  of  Japan.  These,  however,  did  not  report  the  movement  of 
carriers. 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2337 

65.  After  November  27th,  the  Radio  Intelligence  Unit  at  Pearl  Harbor  con- 
tinued the  practice  of  preparing  daily  summaries  of  the  information  received 
through  their  traffic  analysis  of  Japanese  naval  communications,  which  were 
submitted  to  Layton,  the  Fleet  Intelligence  Officer,  for  transmittal  to  Admiral 
Kimmel  on  the  following  morning.  Admiral  Kimmel  received  and  initialed  these 
summaries  daily  on  and  after  27  November.  On  December  6th,  he  initialed 
the  summary  dated  December  5th,  which  was  the  last  one  he  received  prior  to  the 
attack. 

66.  On  November  28th,  Admiral  Kimmel  received  a  communication  intelli- 
gence summary  dated  November  27th,  which  stated,  among  other  things,  that 
there  was  no  further  information  on  the  presence  of  a  carrier  division  in  the 
Mandates  and  that  "carriers  were  still  located  in  home  waters."  The  next 
day,  he  received  the  November  28th  summary  which  indicated,  among  other 
things,  the  view  that  the  Japanese  radio  intelligence  net  was  [132]  operat- 
ing at  full  strength  upon  U.  S.  Naval  communications  and  "IS  GETTING 
RESULTS."  There  was  no  information  set  forth  in  the  summary  as  to  car- 
riers. On  the  following  day.  Admiral  Kimmel  received  the  summary  dated 
November  29th,  which,  among  other  things,  indicated  that  Carrier  Division  3 
was  under  the  immediate  command  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Second  Fleet. 
On  December  1st,  Admiral  Kimmel  received  the  previous  day's  summary  which 
stated  as  to  carriers  that  the  presence  of  a  unit  of  plane  guard  destroyers  indi- 
cated the  presence  of  at  least  one  carrier  in  the  Mandates,  although  this  had 
not  been  confirmed. 

67.  The  December  1st  summary,  which  Admiral  Kimmel  received  stated  that 
all  Japanese  service  radio  calls  of  forces  afloat  had  changed  promptly  at  0000 
on  1  December ;  that  previously  service  calls  had  been  changed  after  a  period 
of  six  months  or  more  and  that  calls  had  been  last  changed  on  1  November 
1941.  This  summary  stated,  and  was  underscored  by  Admiral  Kimmel,  that 
"The  fact  that  service  calls  lasted  only  one  month  indicates  an  additional 
progressive  step  in  preparing  for  operations  on  a  large  scale."  It  also  stated, 
among  other  things,  that  a  large  number  of  submarines  were  believed  to  be 
east  of  Yokosuka-Chichijima  and  Saipan,  and  as  to  carriers  that  there  was 
"no  change." 

68.  On  2  December  1941,  Admiral  Kimmel  examined  a  memorandum  which 
Layton  had  prepared  on  December  1st  at  his  request.  This  contained  Layton's 
estimate,  on  the  basis  of  all  available  information,  of  the  location  of  Japanese 
naval  forces.  This  estimate  placed  in  the  Bako-Takao  area  Carrier  Division  4 
and  Carrier  Division  3,  which  included  four  carriers,  and  the  "KASUGA  MARU" 
(believed  to  have  been  a  converted  carrier).  The  estimate  placed  one  carrier 
"KORYU  ( ?)  plus  plane  guards"  in  the  Marshalls  area. 

69.  Layton's  written  estimate  made  no  mention  of  Japanese  Carrier  Divisions 
1  and  2,  consisting  of  four  carriers.  This  omission  was  deliberate.  The  reason 
was  that  Layton  considered  that  the  information  as  to  the  location  of  those 
carriers  was  not  sufficent  to  warrant  a  reliable  estimate  of  their  whereabouts. 

70.  On  2  December  1941,  Admiral  Kimmel  and  Layton  had  the  following 
conversation : 

"Captain  Layton.  As  best  I  recall  it.  Admiral  Kimmel  said,  'What!  You 
don't  know  where  Carrier  Division  1  and  Carrier  Division  2  are?"  and  I  replied, 
'No,  sir,  I  do  not.  I  think  they  are  in  home  waters,  but  I  do  not  know  where 
they  are.  The  rest  of  the.se  units,  I  feel  pretty  confident  of  their  location.'  Then 
Admiral  Kimmel  looked  at  me,  as  sometimes  he  would,  with  somewhat  a  stern 
countenance  and  yet  partially  with  a  twinkle  in  his  eye  and  said,  'Do  you  mean 
to  say  that  they  could  be  rounding  Diamond  Head  and  you  wouldn't  know  it?' 
or  words  to  that  effect.  My  reply  was  that,  'I  hope  they  would  be  sighted  before 
now,'  or  words  to  that  effect."     *     *     * 

[133]  "Captain  Latton  :  His  question  was  absolutely  serious,  but  when 
he  said,  'Where  are  Cardivs  1  and  2?'  and  I  said,  'I  do  not  know  precisely,  but 
if  I  must  estimate,  I  would  say  that  they  are  probably  in  the  Kure  area  since' 
we  haven't  heard  from  them  in  a  long  time  and  they  may  be  refitting  as  they 
fini.shed  operations  only  a  month  and  a  half  ago,'  and  it  was  then  when  he,  with  a 
twinkle  in  his  eye,  said,  'Do  you  mean  to  say  they  could  be  rounding  Diamond 
Head?'  or  words  to  that  effect.  In  other  words,  he  was  impressing  me  on  my 
complete  ignorance  as  to  their  exact  location." 

"Captain  Layton.  This  incident  has  been  impressed  on  my  mind.  I  do  not 
say  that  I  quote  him  exactly,  but  I  do  know  that  he  made  such  a  statement  to 
me  in  the  way  to  point  out  to  me  that  I  should  know  where  they  are  but  hadn't 
so  indicated  their  location." 


2338     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

71.  The  December  2nd  radio  intelligence  summary,  which  was  delivered  to  Ad- 
miral Kimmel  on  December  3rd,  stated  as  to  carriers :  ■* 

"Almost  a  complete  blank  of  information  on  the  carriers  today.  Lack  of 
identitication  has  somewhat  promoted  this  lack  of  information.  However,  since 
over  2lK)  service  calls  have  been  partially  identified  since  the  change  on  the 
first  of  December  and  not  one  carrier  call  has  been  recovered,  it  is  evident  that 
carrier  traffic  is  at  a  low  ebb." 

72.  The  radio  intelligence  summary  delivered  to  Admiral  Kimmel  on  December 
4th  stated,  in  part,  "No  information  on  submarines  or  carriers."  The  summary 
delivered  on  December  5th  made  no  mention  of  carriers.  The  summary  delivered 
on  December  6th  stated,  in  part,  "No  traffic  from  the  Commander  Carriers  or 
Submarine  Force  has  been  seen  either." 

[134]        Confidential 

IV 

RECONNAISSANCE 

A.  The  ResponsibiUiy  for  Long  Dii^tarwe  Reconnaissance, 

1.  The  Navy's  obligation.  Under  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan 
(Exhibit  80>,  which  was  in  effect  prior  to  the  attack,  the  Navy  was  responsible 
for  long  distance  reconnaissance. 

Annex  VII,  Section  VI,  to  the  joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan  made 
provision  for  joint  air  action  by  the  Army  and  Navy  for  defen.se  against  hostile 
raids  or  air  attacks  to  a  declaration  of  war.  Under  this  agreement,  if  the 
naval  aircraft  were  insufficient  for  long  distance  patrol  and  search  operations 
and  Army  aircraft  were  made  available,  the  Army  aircraft  were  to  be  ustf^ 
by  the  Navy.  This  plan  was  implemented  by  the  Naval  Base  Defense  Air  Force 
Plan,  under  which  Admiral  Bellinger  would  command  the  Navy  and  Army  patrol 
planes.  Annex  VII,  Section  VI,  to  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defen.se  Plan  and 
the  Naval  Base  Defense  Air  Force  Plan  were  not  operative  prior  to  the  attack. 
An  agreement  between  the  Coiunianding  General  and  ComFOURTEEN  that 
threat  of  a  hostile  attack  was  inuninent  was  a  prerequisite  to  the  operation  of 
Annex  VII,  Section  VI.     No  such  agreement  was  made  prior  to  the  attack. 

2.  Control  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  patrol  phines.  The  Pacific  Fleet  patrol  planes 
were  actually  under  the  control  and  operating  in  accordance  with  the  orders 
of  Admiral  Kimmel.  Thus,  on  November  22nd  he  approved  the  schedules  for  the 
employment  of  those  planes,  which  remained  in  effect  up  to  the  time  of  the 
attack.  His  responsibility  for  the  operations  of  the  patrol  planes,  which  were 
under  the  command  of  Commander,  Task  Force  Nine,  of  the  Pacific  Fleet,  is 
further  indicated  by  the  fact  that  he  directed  search  oiierations  by  those  planes 
at  Midway  and  Wake. 

Admiral  Bellinger,  who  commanded  Task  Force  Nine,  which  consisted  of  Patrol 
Wings  One  and  Two  of  the  Fleet,  was  under  the  counnand  of  ComFOURTEEN 
only  when  the  Naval  Base  Defense  Air  Force  Plan  was  activated  for  the  purpose 
of  drills. 

The  responsibility  for  the  employment  of  the  fleet  patrol  planes  was,  as  Admiral 
Kimmel  testified  before  the  Naval  Court,  his  responsibility  and  was  accepted 
by  him.  He  testified  further  that  Admiral  Bloch  had  asked  for  the  dispatch  of 
patrol  planes  for  a  search  if  he  had  felt  that  it  was  necessary.  In  this  connection 
it  should  be  noted  that  on  October  17,  1941,  Admiral  Bloch  had  asked  for  certain 
Fleet  utility  planes  to  be  used  for  inshore  patrol  and  that  they  were  not  made 
available  to  him  (Exhibit  46.  Naval  Court).  It  should  be  noted  that  ComFOUR- 
TEEN had  no  planes  assigned  to  him. 

Admiral  Bellinger  testified  that  he  was  responsible  for  the  operation  of  the 
Fleet  planes  in  accordance  with  the  orders  of  Admiral  [135]  Kimmel. 
He  said,  however,  that  it  was  not  his  responsibility  to  decide  whether  or  not  long 
range  reconnaissance  should  be  conducted.  Rear  Admiral  A.  C.  Davis,  who  was 
the  Fleet  Air  Officer  on  CincPac's  staff  in  1941,  testified  before  Admiral  Hart 
that  his  duties  were  primarily,  if  not  almost  entirely,  concerned  with  technical 
training  and  logistic  matters  . 

3.  Conferences  after  21  November  19^1  concerning  reconnaissance.  There  is 
no  evidence  that  on  or  after  27  November  1941  the  necessity  or  advisability  of  long 
distance  reconnaissance  was  specifically  discussed  between  Admiral  Kimmel  and 
any  member  of  his  Staff  or  Task  Force  Commanders.  Admiral  McMorris,  the 
War  Plans  Officer,  testified  that  he  thought  the  subject  was  discussed,  but  that 
he  could  recall  no  specific  conference  dealing  with  this  subject.    Admiral  Bellinger 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2339 

testified  that  there  was  no  such  conference  in  which  he  participated.  Admiral 
Kimniel's  testimony  before  the  Naval  Court  was  to  the  elfect  that  on  November 
27th  he  decide<l  not  to  conduct  long  range  reconnaissance.  It  is  signiiicant  that 
Captain  Layton,  who  was  the  Fleet  Intelligence  Officer,  stated  that  he  did  not 
tell  Admiral  Kinunel  prior  to  December  7th  that  aerial  reconnaissance  from  Oahu 
would  be  advisable  in  view  of  the  available  intelligence  because  he  knew  that 
reconnaissance  was  being  conducted  by  the  Fleet  patrol  planes.  He  said  that  he 
was  not  familiar  with  the  extent  of  the  reconnaissance,  but  definitely  believed 
that  reconnaissance  was  being  conducted.  Neither  the  Chief  of  Staff  nor  the 
Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  and  Operations  Officer  could  recall  any  discussion  of  the 
advisabili*^y  or  necessity  for  long  range  reconnaissance  from  Oahu  between  No- 
vember 27th  and  December  7th. 

B.  Reconnaissance  Conducted  from  Oahu. 

Although  the  schedules  for  the  Fleet  patrol  planes  (Exhibit  37)  did  not  pro- 
A'ide  for  any  reconnaissance  from  Oalm,  the  Fleet  Security  Letter  (Exhibit  8  NC) 
directed  that  there  be  a  patrol  of  the  Fleet  operating  areas.  The  Fleet  operating 
areas  were  thirty  miles  to  the  south  of  Oahu. 

During  the  period  30  November  to  7  December  1941,  certain  searches  were  flown 
from  Wake  and  Midway.  The  extent  of  these  searches  api)ears  in  Exhibit  50A 
of  this  investigation.  One  squadron  had  been  sent  to  Midway  on  the  3()th  of 
November  and  searched  en  route;  another  squadron  had  been  sent  from  Midway 
to  Wake  on  the  1st  of  December  and  returned  to  Pearl  Harbor  prior  to  the  attack, 
searching  en  route  (Exhibit  r)0,  5(»A). 

Prior  to  7  December  1941  the  last  daily  long  distance  reconnaissance  flown 
from  Oahu  was  in  tlie  summer  of  1941.  According  to  Admiral  Bloch's  previous 
testimony  some  time  during  the  sununer  of  1941,  on  the  basis  of  some  intelli- 
gence or  information  which  he  could  not  recall,  lie  asked  Admiral  Kimmel  to  direct 
reconnaissance  on  a  section  towards  Jaluit  and  this  was  done  for  several  days. 
Admiral  Kimmel  recalled  that  such  reconnaissance  had  been  rtown  for  a  few 
days  on  the  line  from  Jaluit  to  I'earl  Harbor  and  stated  that  they  had  in  mind 
that  they  might  catch  a  submarine  on  the  surface  out  there  and  perhaps  any 
other  vessel  there.  Despite  thorough  examination  of  the  available  records  of 
I'atwing  Two,  of  the  CincPac  opei-ation  files,  of  the  ComFOURTEEN  files,  of 
the  CincPac  secret  dispatches  for  1941  and  confidential  and  restricted  dispatches 
for  June,  July,  and  August.  1941,  no  record  of  this  reconnaissance  could  be  found. 
None  of  the  witnesses  examined  recalled  the  reconnaissance  or  the  reasons  for 
it. 

[J36]         C.  Proposed  Arm]/  Reconnaissance  to  Jaluit. 

In  the  Army  report  it  was  stated  that  on  November  26th  the  Army  directed 
General  Short  to  send  two  B-24's  to  Jaluit  on  a  reconnaissance  mission  to  look 
for  various  things,  including  ships.  However,  the  Army  report  does  not  state 
whether  this  reconnaissance  actually  took  place. 

Before  the  Roberts'  Committee,  (ieneral  Gerow  said  that  reiK)rts  had  been 
received  of  Japanese  concentrations  in  the  Mandated  Islands  and  they  assumed 
that  every  effort  was  being  made  to  identify  any  Japanese  movements  in  that 
direction.  He  stated  that  those  two  B-24's  were  sent  out  with  an  idea  of  trying 
to  confirm  information  that  had  been  received  from  other  soui-ces.  If  no  recon- 
nai.ssance  at  all  were  done  after  the  Army's  me.ssage  to  General  Short  which 
directed  such  recomiaissance  as  he  deemed  necessary,  General  Gerow  said  that 
would  have  been  considered  a  failure  to  obey  orders. 

The  status  of  this  leconnaissance  has  been  quite  definitely  confirmed  by  Cap- 
tain Layton's  testimony  in  this  investigation.  In  the  latter  part  of  November, 
1941,  Captain  Layton  stated,  either  Admiral  Kimmel  directed  him  to  establish  c(m- 
tact  with  the  Hawaiian  Air  Force  pertaining  to  this  reconnaissance  or  else  his 
opposite  number.  Colonel  Haley,  came  to  him  with  the  infoi-mation  of  the  pend- 
ing reconnaissance  and  requested  his  assistance  towards  delineating  the  api>ro- 
priate  objectives  and  to  furnish  the  pilots  and  crews  with  intelligence  material  for 
briefing.  He  was  also  ivquested  to  assist  in  the  projected  recomiaissance.  The 
reconnaissance  mifortunately  never  materialized,  he  stated,  because  only  one 
plane  arrived  and  there  were  delays  due  to  uncomi)leted  camera  installations. 
He  was  never  informed  that  one  plane  had  arrived,  but  later  learned  that  it  was 
destroyed  in  the  attack  on  Hickam  Field.  The  Navy  was  extremely  anxious  that 
the  reconnaissance  be  made  at  the  earliest  possible  date,  and  Admiral  Kimmel, 


2340     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

upon  receipt  of  Captain  Layton's  ineniorandupi  concerning  information  he  had 
obtained  at  the  conference,  asked  him  how  soon  the  reconnaissance  might  be 
expected.  Captain  Layton  relayed  Colonel  Raley's  answer  to  the  Admiral  to 
the  effect  that  the  delay  was  due  to  non-installation  or  non-completion  of  in- 
stallation of  cameras  and  the  time  was  still  not  definitely  fixed.  A  photostatic 
copy  of  a  memorandum  of  November  2Stli  from  Captain  Layton  to  Admiral  Kimmel 
concerning  this  reconnaissance  api)ears  in  the  record  as  Exhibit  28.  l\irthermore, 
Oaptain  Layton  was  questioned  as  to  hi>!  knowledge  of  any  discussion  concerning 
the  possibility  of  the  use  of  Navy  pla'ies  for  this  recoiniaissance.  Captain  Layton 
replied  that  it  was  not  discussed  with  him,  but  he  thought  that  PBY  '•Catalinas" 
could  not  be  used  because  their  appearance  over  the  Marshalls  would  have  been 
an  overt  act,  wiiile  the  Army  planes,  on  the  other  hand,  would  have  been  flying 
ostensibly  from  Wake  to  Port  Darwin  en  n>ute  to  the  Philippines.  Captain  Layton 
was  particularly  anxious  that  this  reconnaissance  be  carried  out  to  check  on  his 
information  as  to  the  presence  w  absence  of  air  strength  and  carriers  and  sub- 
marines and  naval  concentrations  in  the  Marshalls  area,  including  Truk.  This 
was  an  ideal  opi)<»rtnnity  t(»  establish  the  reliability  of  existing  intelligence  on 
Japanese  naval  dispositions  and  developments  in  the  Mandated  Islands. 

Admiral  Bellinger  recalled  nothing  concerning  the  proposed  Army  reconnais- 
sance flight  over  the  Mandated  Islands. 

[137]         D.  The  Direction  to  Execute  an  Appropriate  Defensive  Deployment. 

Among  the  tasks  assigned  to  the  Pacific  Fleet  by  the  Basic  Navy  War  Plan 
was  to  protect  the  tei-ritory  of  the  Associated  Powers  in  the  Pacific  area  by 
destroying  hostile  expeditions  and  by  supporting  land  and  air  forces  in  denying 
the  enemy  the  use  of  land  positions  in  that  hemisphere.  It  will  be  recalled 
that  the  Pacific  Fleet  War  Plan,  which  was  designed  to  implement  the  Navy 
Basic  War  Plans,  provided,  among  other  things,  that  in  the  event  of  war  with 
the  Axis  Powers,  including  or  excluding  Japan,  the  patrol  planes  of  the  Pacific 
Fleet  were  to  conduct  the  maxinuun  recoiniaissance  possible  of  the  approaches 
to  Oahu.  The  Pacific  Fleet  Plan  was  not  ordered  to  be  executed  prior  to  the 
attack.  On  the  27th  of  November,  however,  in  the  war  warning,  which  advised 
that  an  aggressive  move  by  Japan  was  expected  within  a  few  days,  the  Chief  of 
Naval  Operations  had  directed  Admiral  Kimmel  to  "Execute  an  appropriate 
defensive  deployment  preparatory  to  carrying  out  the  tasks  assigned  in  WPL-46." 

On  tlie  following  day,  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  in  his  dispatch  which 
repeated  the  Army  dispatch  advising  that  hostilities  were  possible  at  any  mo- 
ment, had  directed  that  Admiral  Kimmel  was  to  "Be  prepared  to  carry  out  the 
tasks  assigned  in  WI'L-46." 

Admiral  Kimmel  testified  before  the  Naval  Court  that  as  the  result  of  the 
"war  warning,''  he  continued  the  security  measures  already  in  effect  (supra, 
page  64)  ;  carried  out  the  planned  movements  of  carriers  to  Wake  and  Midwa.v, 
with  reconnaissance  en  route;  carried  out  reconnais.sance  at  Midway  and  Wake; 
increased  security  measures  in  fleet  operating  areas  southward  of  Oahu ;  and, 
on  November  28th,  issued  an  order  directing  extreme  vigilance  against  subma- 
rines in  operating  areas  and  depth  bombing  of  all  contacts,  suspected  to  be 
hostile,  in  certain  of  the  operating  areas  (page  5,  Exhibit  70).  There  is  no 
evidence  of  any  other  specific  action  taken  by  Admiral  Kinunel  after  27  No- 
vember 1941,  in  order  to  carry  out  the  direction  contained  in  the  war  warning 
or  the  direction  in  the  message  of  November  28th.  It  does  appear  that  so  far 
as  the  Fleet  patrol  planes  at  Oahu  were  concerned,  their  training  continued 
along  the  same  lines  which  had  been  followed  prior  to  the  "war  warning." 

,The  testimony  by  Admiral  McMorris,  the  War  Plans  Officer,  and  others  in 
this  investigation,  is  to  the  effect  that  the  establishment  of  long  distance  air 
reconnaissance  from  Oahu  would  have  been  an  "Appropriate  defensive  deploy- 
ment preparatory  to  carrying  out  the  tasks  assigned  in  WPL-46." 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  memoranda  prepared  by  the  War  Plans 
Ofiicer  on  November  30th  and  5  December  1941,  setting  forth  the  action  to  be 
taken  if  war  developed  with  Japan  in  twenty-four  or  forty-eight  hours,  con- 
tained no  provision  for  the  establishment  of  reconnaissance  from  Oahu  (Ex- 
hibit 69A  and  69B,  Naval  Court).  As  Vice  Admiral  Smith,  Chief  of  Staff, 
testified,  what  they  were  thinking  about  in  the  Pacific  was  not  the  defense  of 
Pearl  Harbor.  They  were  thinking  about  the  Fleet  and  the  readiness  of  the 
Fleet. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2341 

E.  The  Reconnaissance  that  Could  Have  Been  Flown. 

A  review  of  past  reconnaissance  during  Admiral  Kimmel's  tour  of  duty  sheds 
no  light  on  this  problem  because  he  testified  that  he  had  never  attempted  to 
cover  any  large  sector  by  long  range  reconnaissance  and  that  a  patrol  out  to 
300  miles  was  almost  useless  unless  as  a  Kuard  against  an  air  raid,  although 
any  patrol  has  some  value  as  far  as  surface  ships  are  concerned.  However, 
his  predecessor,  Admiral  Richardson,  had  established  a  distant  patrol,  "in  view 
of  the  fact  that  constant  and  repeated  warnings  were  received  of  the  possible 
outbreak  of  the  war  in  the  immediate  future"  (p.  1053,  Naval  Court).  This 
patrol,  he  said,  was  designated  to  cover  [138]  a  given  sector  adequately 
and  was  rotated  daily.  The  sector  which  was  primarily  covered  more  ade- 
quately and  frequently  than  any  other  was  from  170°  to  the  westward  to  about 
350".     That  to  the  eastward  was  not  covered. 

Admiral  Richardson  also  testified  that  this  patrol  would  not  have  been  ade- 
quate to  positively  detect  an  approaching  combat  force  having  as  its  intention 
the  delivery  of  an  attack  early  in  the  morning,  but  that  it  certainly  would  have 
made  the  attack  more  difficult.  These  patrols  were  discontinued  when  or 
shortly  before  Admiral  Kinimel  relieved  Admiral  Richardson. 

Admiral  Bellinger's  testimony  on  the  reconnaissance  that  could  have  been 
flown  during  the  critical  period  is  obviously  the  most  valuable  on  the  subject. 
He  stated  that  after  October  28th,  while  there  were  107  VP  assigned  to  all 
units  of  Aircraft  Scouting  Force,  only  eighty-one  were  available.  Of  these, 
fifty-four  had  just  arrived  and  were  the  PBY-.j  type,  with  limited  available 
spare  parts.  The  number  of  plane  crews  did  not  quite  equaP  the  number  of 
planes  available.  If  one  could  consider  eighty-one  planes  available,  and  assum- 
ing that  there  would  have  been  none  lost  because  of  breakdowns  requiring  spare 
parts,  it  would  have  been  practicable  to  use  one-third,  about  twenty -seven  planes, 
for  daily  patrol.  Each  plane  could  cover  a  sector  of  eight  degrees  with  a  radius 
of  700  miles,  totalling  approximately  216  degrees  daily.  This,  however,  would 
have  been  the  absolute  niaximnni  because  of  the  lack  of  sutRcient  crews  and 
spare  parts.  144  degrees  could  have  been  covered  daily  based  on  the  use  of 
eighteen  planes  daily  of  the  fifty-four  new  PBY-5's.  Actually,  on  7  December 
1941  there  were  in  all  only  sixty-one  planes  available  at  Oahu,  one  squadron 
of  which  had  just  returned  from  Midway  and  AVake  and  required  overhaul. 
This  left  forty-nine  planes  actually  available,  one-third  of  which  would  have 
been  able  to  cover  128  degrees. 

Admiral  Bellinger  testified  that  if  he  had  received  a  directive  from  Admiral 
Kimmel  during  the  first  week  of  December,  1941,  to  conduct  360  degrees  recon- 
naissance with  the  available  Navy  planes,  it  would  have  been  possible  to  main- 
tain such  reconnaissance  for  not  more  than  four  or  five  days.  His  estimate  of 
the  duration  of  the  daily  128-degree  search  was  that  it  could  have  been  flown 
until  the  failure  of  planes  and  the  lack  of  spare  parts  reduced  the  planes  to  such 
an  extent  that  further  reconnaissance  was  impossible.  It  appears  that  such 
reconnaissance  could  have  been  carried  on  for  an  indefinite  period  and  Admiral 
Bellinger's  "^'ague"  estimate  was  that  it  could  have  been  carried  on  for  several 
weeks. 

Admiral  Davis  testified  before  Admiral  Hart  that :  "There  were  not  enough 
planes  and  pilots  to  establish  and  maintain  a  long  range,  360  degree  search 
indefinitely,  or  even  for  more  than  a  limited  time.  There  were.,  however,  enough 
to  approximate  this  by  using  relatively  short  range  planes  in  the  least  dan- 
gerous sectors,  and  by  obtaining  some  assistance  by  available  Army  aircraft, 
so  that  I  think  it  could  have  been  undertaken,  had  it  been  considered  essential, 
on  the  basis  that  reenforcements  could  have  arrived  before  personnel  and 
materiel  fatigue  set  in.  Unless  reenforcements  arrived,  it  could  not  have  been 
maintained." 

[139]         F.  The  Sectors  Which  Would  Have  Been  Cornered. 

Had  partial  .reconnaissance  been  flown  from  Oahu  during  the  first  week  of 
December,  1941,  it  appears  that  the  northern  sectors  would  have  been  covered. 
Admiral  Bellinger  testified  that  he  considered  the  northern  sectors  as  the  most 
dangerous  sectors  primarily  because  of  the  prevailing  winds  which  would  facilitate 
carrier-ba.^ed  plane  operations  in  that  sector.  He  stated  that  had  tlie  normal  plan 
been  carried  out  after  the  attack,  on  December  7th  patrol  planes  would  have 
searched  the  northern  sector,  and  that  some  few  planes  did  search  that  sector. 
But  there  had  been  searches  made  to  the  south  because  of  information  received 
from  CincPac  to  the  effect  that  a  radio  bearing  indicated  that  the  attacking  force 
was  to  the  .south. 


2342     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[I4O]         Findings. 

73.  Other  than  radio  intelligence  and  sighting  reports  from  other  sources,  the 
only  practicai)le  way  by  which  the  Comniander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  could  have 
obtained  information  as  to  the  location  or  movements  of  Japanese  naval  forces 
from  27  November  to  7  December  1941  was  by  long  distance  air  reconnaissance. 

74.  Under  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan,  the  Navy  had  the  obligation, 
through  Com  14,  to  conduct  distance  reconnaissance,  and  under  Annex  VII,  Section 
VI,  to  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan,  naval  forces  were  to  be  supple- 
mented by  available  Army  aircraft  if  the  naval  aircraft  were  insuflBcient  for  long 
distance  patrol  and  search  oi^eratlons.  As  previously  pointed  out,  the  latter  plan 
was  not  in  operation  l)ecause  an  agreement  between  the  Commanding  General 
and  Com  14  that  threat  of  a  hostile  attack  was  imminent  was  a  prerequisite  and 
no  such  agreement  had  been  made  prior  to  the  attack.  Tlie  Naval  Base  Defense 
Air  Force  Plan,  which  implemented  the  agreements  for  joint  Army-Navy  air 
action,  similarly  was  not  operative  prior  to  the  attack. 

75.  No  patrol  planes  were  under  the  command  of  Admiral  Bloch.  The  only 
Navy  planes  .suitable  for  long  distance  reconnaissance  were  the  Pacific  Fleet  patrol 
planes. 

76.  The  Pacific  Fleet  patrol  planes  were  under  the  control  of  Admiral  Kimmel, 
and  he  had  the  re.spon.sil)ility  for  their  utilization.  They  were  operated  after  22 
November  1941  in  accordance  with  schedules  approved  by  him  at  that  time,  which 
were  not  revised  prior  to  the  attack.  The" schedules  stressed  training  operations. 
They  did  not  provide  for  distant  reconnaissance  from  Oahu. 

77.  Admiral  Kimmel  testified  before  the  Naval  Court  of  Inquiry  that  he  decided 
on  November  27th  that  there  should  be  no  distant  reconnaissance. 

78.  There  is  no  evidence  of  any  specific  discussion  between  Admiral  Kimmel 
and  members  of  his  staff  on  or  after  the  receipt  of  tiie  "war  warning",  as  to  the 
advisability  or  practicability  of  long  range  reconnaissance  from  Oahu.  The  War 
Plans  OflBcer  thought  that  the  subject  must  have  been  discussed,  but  could  recall 
no  si)ecific  discussion.  The  Connnander  of  the  Fleet  i>atrol  planes,  who  had  not 
been  informed  of  any  of  the  significant  warning  messages,  testified  that  Admiral 
Kimmel  had  no  such  discussion  with  him. 

79.  The  joint  estimate  by  Admiral  Bellinger,  Commander,  Fleet  Patrol  Planes, 
and  General  Martin,  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Air  Force,  which  was  used 
as  a  basis  for  the  joint  Army-Navy  agreements,  was  prophetic  in  its  estimate 
that  in  the  event  of  attack  on  Hawaii,  the  most  likely  and  dangerous  form  of  at- 
tack would  be  an  air  attack  to  be  launched  at  dawn  from  carriers  about  200  miles 
from  Oahu.  This  estimate  stated  that  the  action  open  as  a  counter-measure 
included  daily  patrols  as  far  as  possible  from  Oahu.  to  sectors  through  360  degrees, 
to  reduce  the  possibilities  of  surface  or  air  surprise.  It  further  stated  that  such 
[Ikl]  patrols  could  be  effectively  maintained  with  the  personnel  and  material 
available  at  the  time  (March.  1941)  for  a  very  short  period  and  that  such 
patrols  were  not  practicable  unless  other  intelligence  indicated  that  a  surface 
raid  was  probable  within  narrow  limits  of  time.  According  to  Admiral  Bellinger, 
it  was  realized  by  the  responsible  oflBcers  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  that  another  course 
of  action  which  was  always  open  was  to  fly  a  patrol  of  less  than  360  degrees, 
with  the  available  aircraft,  covering  the  more  dangerous  sectors. 

80.  A  daily  search  of  the  Fleet  operating  areas  to  the  southward  of  Oahu  was 
being  carried  out  prior  to  the  attack,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the 
Pacific  Fleet  letter  on  security  of  the  Fleet  at  base  and  in  oijerating  areas. 

81.  No  distant  reconnaissance  was  flown  from  Oahu  during  the  critical  i)eriod 
27  November  to  7  December  1941.  The  last  previous  distant  reconnaissance 
flown  from  Oahu  appears  to  have  been  for  several  days  during  the  summer  of 
1941  on  a  sector  toward  Jaluit.  This  reconnaissance  had  been  directed  by  Admiral 
Kimmel  at  Admiral  Bloch's  request. 

82.  Late  in  November,  1941,  the  Army  planned  to  conduct  a  reconnaissance 
flight  from  Oahu  to  Jaluit  and  Truk,  with  the  Navy  assisting  by  providing  intelli- 
gence. The  reconnaissance  was  not  flown  because  the  Army  planes  were  not 
made  ready  prior  to  the  attack. 

83.  The  Navy  Basic  War  Plan  assigned  to  the  Pacific  Fleet  the  task  of  pro- 
tecting the  territory  of  the  Associated  Powers  in  the  Pacific  area  by  destroying 
hostile  expeditions  and  by  supporting  land  and  air  forces  in  denying  the  enemy 
the  u.se  of  land  positions  in  that  hemisphere.  Under  the  pi'ovisions  of  Pacific 
Fleet  Operating  Plan  Rainbow  Five,  when  that  plans  bt^came  effective,  the  Pacific 
Fleet  patrol  planes  were  to  maintain  maximum  patrol  plane  search  against  enemy 
forces  in  the  approaches  to  the  Hawaiian  area,  having  due  regard  for  time 
required  for  overhaul  and  repair  of  planes  and  for  conservation  of  personnel. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2343 

84.  In  the  war  warning  of  November  27th,  which  advised  that  negotiations  with 
Japan  had  ceased  and  that  an  aggressive  move  by  Japan  was  expected  within  a 
few  days,  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  directed  tht  Admiral  Kimmel  "execute 
an  appropriate  defensive  deployment  preparatory  to  carrying  out  the  tasks 
assigned  in  WPL-46." 

85.  The  dispatch  of  November  28th  repeated  an  Army  dispatch,  which,  among 
other  things,  advised  General  Short  that  Japanese  future  action  was  unpredicta- 
ble but  that  hostile  action  was  possible  at  any  moment.  The  Navy  dispatch 
directed  that  Admiral  Kimmel  was  to  undertake  no  offensive  action  until  Japan 
had  committed  an  overt  act  and  that  he  was  to  "be  prepared  to  carry  out  tasks 
assigned  in  WPL-46  so  far  as  they  apply  to  Japan  in  case  hostilities  occur." 

86.  The  establishment  of  long  distance  air  reconnaissance  from  Oahu  would 
have  been  an  "appropriate  defensive  deployment  preparatory  to  carrying  out  the 
tasks  assigned  in  WPL— 46." 

[1-^2]  87.  The  Fleet  patrol  planes  available  at  Oahu  in  the  week  preceding 
the  attack  were  not  sufficient  to  have  conducted  360  degree  reconnaissance  daily 
for  more  than  a  few  days. 

88.  Prior  to  the  attack,  requests  had  been  made  by  the  Pacific  Fleet  to  the  Navy 
Department  to  increase  the  number  of  patrol  planes  assigned  to  the  Fleet.  Some 
new  replacement  planes  had  been  sent  to  the  Fleet  during  October  and  November, 
1941.  Additional  planes,  as  evidenced  by  the  prompt  arrival  of  reenforcements 
after  December  7th,  could  have  been  made  available  by  the  Navy  Department,  but 
at  the  expense  of  defenses  in  other  areas.  The  Ntevy  Department  presumably  knpw 
that  the  number  of  planes  available  at  Oahu  were  not  sufficient  to  conduct  360 
degree  reconnaissance  daily  for  more  than  a  few  days.  The  evidence  in  prior 
investigations  indicates  that  after  November  27th,  responsible  officers  in  the 
Navy  Departmeent  thought  that  reconnaissance  was  being  conducted  from  Oahu 
to  the  extent  practicable  with  the  planes  available  there. 

89.  There  were  sufficient  Fleet  patrol  planes  and  crews  in  fact  available  at 
Oahu  during  the  week  preceding  the  attack  to  have  flown,  for  at  least  several 
weeks,  a  daily  reconnaissance  covering  128  degrees  to  a  distance  of  about  700 
miles. 

90.  The  sectors  north  of  Oahu  were  generally  recognized  as  being  the  most  likely 
sectors  from  which  a  Japanese  attack  would  come,  if  the  Japanese  were  to  attack 
Pearl  Harbor. 

91.  If  a  daily  distant  reconnaissance  had  been  flown  from  Oahu  after  27  Novem- 
ber 1941,  with  the  available  patrol  planes,  the  northern  sectors  probably  would 
have  been  searched. 

um  V 

THE   ATT.\CK   ON   PE.\RL   HARBOR 

A.  Prelude:  Japanese  Suhmarines  on  7  December  19Jil. 

At  0342,  7  December  1941,  the  USS  CONDOR,  a  minesweeper,  sighted  a  sub- 
marine periscope  off  the  entrance  buoys  to  Pearl  Harbor.  This  was  in  a  defen- 
sive sea  area  where  American  submarines  had  been  restricted  from  ox)erating 
submerged.  When  sighted,  the  .submarine  was  proceeding  toward  the  entrance 
Buoys.  It  was  about  100  feet  from  and  on  a  collision  course  with  the  CONDOR, 
but  turned  sharply  to  port.     The  CONDOR  simultaneously  turned  to  starboard. 

The  CONDOR  reported  the  incident  by  blinker  to  the*  USS  WARD  between 
0350  and  0358.  The  WARD  was  a  destroyer  of  the  Inshore  Patrol  then  engaged 
in  patrol  duty  off  the  entrance  to  the  harbor.  The  CONDOR  then  continued 
on  its  assigned  mission.    The  message  to  the  WARD  read  : 

"Sighted  submerged  submarine  on  westerly  course,  speed  9  knots." 

After  receiving  this  visual  signal,  the  WARD  made  a  sonar  search  for  about 
an  hour  and  a  half,  without  result.  It  then  communicated  by  radio  with  the 
CONDOR,  asking: 

"What  was  the  approximate  distance  and  course  of  the  submarine  that  you 
sighted?" 

At  0520  the  CONDOR  replied  : 

"The  course  was  about  what  we  were  steering  at  the  time  020  magnetic  and 
about  1000  yards  from  the  entrance  apparently  heading  for  the  entrance." 

In  response  to  further  inquiries  made  by  the  WARD  between  0521  and  0536, 
the  CONDOR  advised  again  that  the  last  time  it  had  sighted  the  submarine 
was  at  about  OSHO  and  that  it  was  apparently  headed  for  the  entrance.  On 
receiving  the  message  giving  the  submarine's  course  as  about  020  magnetic,  the 


2344     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

captain  of  the  WARD  realized  tiiat  his  searcli  had  been  in  the  WTfong  direction. 
He  then  continued  searching,  but  again  without  result. 

The  CONDOR  made  no  report  of  the  incident,  except  to  the  WARD.  The 
captain  considered  that  the  identification  at  that  time  was  not  positive  enough 
to  make  a  rewrt  to  other  than  the  Senior  Officer  Present  Afloat.  The  Senior 
Officer  Present  Afloat,  Lieutenant  Commander  Outerbridge,  who  commanded 
the  WARD,  made  no  report  to  higher  authority.  The  captain  of  the  WARD 
thought  that  the  CONDOR  might  have  been  mistaken  in  concluding  that  it  had 
seen  a  submarine. 

The  radio  conversation  betweeVi  the  WARD  and  CONDOR  was  overheard 
and  transcribed  in  the  log  of  the  Section  Base,  Bishop's  Point,  Oahu,  a  radio 
station  then  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Commander,  Inshore  Patrol,  14th 
N.  D.   (Ex.  18).     Since  the  conversation  was  solely         [H4]  between  the 

ships  and  was  not  addressed  to  the  Section  Base  and  no  request  was  made  that 
it  be  relayed,  the  Bishop's  Point  Radio  Station  did  not  relay  or  report  it  to 
higher  authority.  The  loudspeaker  watch  on  the  same  frequency,  which  was 
maintained  in  the  Comnmnications  Office,  14th  N.  D.,  did  not  overhear  or  inter- 
cept the  WARD-CONDOR  conversation. 

At  the  entrance  to  Pearl  Harbor  there  was  stationed  a  gate-vessel  charged 
with  opening  and  closing  the  net  at  the  entrance.  This  anti-torpedo  net  was, 
according  to  Admiral  Bloch's  previous  testimony,  45  feet  in  depth.  The  deepest 
part  of  the  channel  was  72  feet.  A  Japanese  submarine  subsequently  recovered 
was  about  20  feet  from  keel  to  conning  tower. 

The  instructions  of  the  Captain  of  the  Yard  were  that  the  net  should  be  kept 
closed  from  sunset  to  sunrise  and  opened  only  on  orders  from  him,  from  the 
Assistant  Captain  of  the  Yard,  or  from  the  Yard  Duty  Officer  who  could  be 
reached  via  the  signal  tower  (Exhibit  43).  The  log  of  the  gate-vessel  indicates 
that  the  net  was  opened  and  closed  a  number  of  times  during  the  night  of 
December  6-7.  At  0458  on  the  7th,  the  gate  was  opened  and  the  CROSSBILL 
and  the  CONDOR  stood  in.  It  was  not  until  0846  that  the  gate  was  closed. 
The  Commanding  Officer  of  the  CONDOR  testilied  that  at  0532,  when  the 
CONDOR  came  in,  conditions  of  visibility  were  very  good  and  were  "approaching 
daylight  conditions." 

The  log  of  the  signal  tower  for  December  6-7,  1941  records  the  closing  of  the 
gate  at  2250  on  6  December,  which  was  followed  by  an  entry  at  0600  that  the 
ANTARES  was  reported  off  the  harbor  (Exhibit  46).' 

The  USS  ANTARES,  with  a  500-ton  steel  barge  in  tow,  arrived  off  Pearl 
Harbor  from  Canton  and  Palmyra  at  about  0605,  when  it  exchanged  calls  with 
the  WARD.  At  0630  the  ANTARES  sighted  a  suspicious  object,  which  appeared 
to  be  a  small  submarine,  about  1500  yards  on  its  starboard  quarter.  The 
ANTARES  notified  the  WARD  and  asked  it  to  investigate,  and  several  minutes 
later,  at  about  0633,  observed  a  Navy  patrol  plane  circle  and  drop  two  smoke 
pots  near  the  object.     (Exhibit  73) 

The  WARD  complied  and  at  0640  sighted  an  unidentified  submarine  one  point 
off  its  starboard  bow,  apparently  following  the  ANTARES  in  to  Pearl  Hai'bor. 
General  Quarters  were  sounded  and  all  engines  ordered  full  ahead,  increasing 
the  WARD'S  speed  from  five  to  twenty-five  knots.  At  0645  she  opcnetl  fire 
with  guns  1  and  3,  firing  one  shot  from  each  gun.  The  attack  lasted  only  one 
or  two  minutes.  The  first  shot,  at  a  range  of  approximately  100  yards,  passed 
d'  ectly  over  the  conning  tower ;  the  second,  from  No.  3  gun,  at  fifty  yards  or 
less,  hit  the  submarine  at  the  waterline  junction  of  the  hull  and  conning  tower. 
At  about  this  time,  the  ANTARES,  observing  the  fire  of  the  WARD,  also  noted 
the  Navy  patrol  plane  appeared  to  drop  bombs  or  depth  charges  at  the  sub- 
marine. The  submarine  heeled  over  to  starboard  and  started  to  sink.  The 
WARD  ceased  firing  and  then  dropped  depth  charges.  A  large  amount  of  oil 
appeared  on  the  surface.  The  submarine  went  down  in  1,200  feet  of  water. 
(Exhibit  74). 

[145]  At  0651  the  WARD  sent  a  radio  message  to  the  Commandant,  FOUR- 
TEENTH Naval  District  (Exhibit  18)  : 

"We  have  dropped  depth  charges  upon  subs  operating  in  defensive  sea  area." 

The  captain  of  the  WARD,  after  reflecting  that  this  message  might  not  be  inter- 
preted as  showing  a  surface  submarine  contact,  at  0653  sent  the  following  supple- 
mentary message : 

"We  have  attacked  fired  upon  and  dropped  depth  charge  upon  submarine  oper- 
ating in  defensive  sea  area." 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2345 

This  message  was  received  by  the  Bishop's  Point  radio  station,  relayed  to  the 
Officer  in  Charge,  Net  and  liooni  Defenses,  Inshore  Pati'ol,  and  delivered  by  the 
Conununications  Watch  Officer,  FOURTEENTH  Naval  District,  to  the  ConiFOUR- 
TEEN  Duty  Officer.  The  Duty  Officer  notiiied  the  ConiFOURTEEN  Chief  of  Staff 
at  0712  and,  at  the  hitter's  direction,  tlie  Duty  Officer  of  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
Pacific  Fleet,  at  0715. 

The  ConiFOURTEEN  Chief  of  Staff  informed  Admiral  Bloch.  Because  of 
numerous  previous  reports  of  submarine  contacts,  their  reaction  was  that  the 
"WARD  had  probably  been  mistaken,  but  that  if  it  were  not  a  mistake,  the  WARD 
and  the  relief  ready  duty  destroyer  MONAGHAN,  which  was  dispatched,  could 
take  care  of  the  situation,  while  the  Commander-in-Chief.  Pacific  Fleet,  to  whom 
they  had  referred  the  information,  had  the  power  to  take  any  other  action  which 
might  be  desired. 

The  CincPac  Staff  Duty  Officer  was  given  the  report  at  about  0720  by  the  Assist- 
ant Duty  Officer.  After  several  attempted  phone  calls  to  ascertain  whether 
Admiral  Bloch  knew  of  the  report,  the  Staff  Duty  Officer  received  a  phone  message 
at  0740  from  the  duty  officer  of  PatWing  2  that  a  patrol  plane  had  reported  that  a 
submarine  had  been  sunk  in  the  defensive  sea  area;  sinuiltaneously,  another 
phone  call  from  FOURTEENTH  Naval  District  advised  the  CincPac  Staff  Duty 
Officer  that  Admiral  Bloch  had  been  informed  of  the  sinking  and  had  ordered  the 
ready  duty  destroyer  out  to  assist  the  WARD  and  the  standby  destroyer  to  get  up 
steam.  The  Staff  Duty  Officer  then  phoned  Admiral  Kimmel  and  gave  him  both 
messages  and  the  information  as  to  the  action  taken  by  Admiral  Bloch.  About 
this  time.  Captain  Ramsey,  of  PatWing  2,  phoned  again  and  the  Staff  Duty  Officer 
suggested  he  make  his  search  planes  available  in  case  the  Admiral  wanted  them. 

Admiral  Kimmel  testified  before  the  Naval  Court  that  between  0730  and  0740 
he  received  a  report  that  a  submarine  had  been  attacked  off  Pearl  Harbor.  He 
said  that  he  was  waiting  for  an  amplification  of  this  report  when  the  air  attack 
commenced.  He  also  stated  that  the  officer  who  reported  the  sinking  of  the  sub- 
marine should  have  broadcast  in  plain  language,  but  that  he  had  reported  in  code, 
w'hich  caused  delay.  Admiral  Kimmel  also  testified  that  after  27  November 
1941,  there  had  been  about  a  half-dozen  of  such  reports,  and  hence  amplification 
of  the  report  was  necessary. 

[146]  The  evidence  indicates  that  the  reports  by  the  WARD  were  in  plain 
language  but  that  a  request  for  verification  by  the  WARD  was  later  sent  in  code 
by  the  ComFOURTEEN  Communication  Officer  at  the  direction  of  the  ComFOUR- 
TEEN  Duty  Officer.  The  WARD's  reply  to  that  request  was  also  in  code  and  was 
deciphered  at  about  the  time  when  the  air  attack  commenced. 

A  .Japanese  midget  submarine  entered  Pearl  Harbor  and,  after  the  air  attack 
had  commenced,  fired  both  of  its  torpedoes,  one  of  which  exploded  on  the  beach 
of  Ford  Island,  passing  between  the  RALEIGH  and*'the  CURTISS,  and  the  other 
buried  itself,  it  was  believed,  in  the  mud  near  the  berth  of  the  UTAH.  This  sub- 
marine was  sunk  by  the  CURTISS  and  recovered  from  the  harbor  some  weeks 
after  the  attack.  It  had  been  so  thoroughly  destroyed  that  nothing  of  intelli- 
gence value  could  be  obtained  from  it.  Whether  or  not  this  was  the  submarine 
which  had  been  sighted  by  the  CONDOR  could  not  be  determined.  No  other 
submarine  was  detected  in  the  harbor. 

Another  Japanese  midget  submarine  was  beached  off  Bellows  Field,  Oahu,  and 
captured  on  the  next  day,  along  with  its  commanding  officer.  Various  documents 
were  recovered  from  this  submarine  including  a  chart  of  Pearl  Harbor,  on  which 
was  laid  out  a  course  into  the  harbor,  anmnd  Pearl  Harbor,  and  out  of  the  harbor 
(Exhibits  32A,  33A).  On  this  chart  (Ex.  33A)  were  indicated  the  positions  of 
various  ships  in  the  harbor.  The  charted  positions  differed  substantially  from 
the  actual  berthing  arrangements  on  December  7th.  This  fact  led  the  Army 
Pearl  Harbor  Board  to  conclude  that  the  submarine  had  been  in  the  harbor  for 
reconnaissance  prior  to  December  7th. 

The  conclusion  of  the  Army  Pearl  Harbor  Board  that  the  Japanese  midget 
submarines  "nmst  have  been  in  the  harbor  a  few  days  before  the  attack  and  evi- 
dently were  moving  into  and  out  of  the  harbor  at  will"  (Report,  Army  Pearl 
Harbor  Board,  page  155)  is  based  wholly  on  the  legends  appearing  on  the  Japanese 
njaps  (Exhibits  32,  32A,  33,  33A)  captured  in  the  midget  submarine  that  was 
sunk  off  Bellows  Field,  and  on  the  testimony  of  Robert  L.  Shivers,  FBI  Agent  in 
charge  at  Honolulu  on  7  December  1941,  which,  in  turn,  is  likewise  based  solely 
on  the  legends  appearing  on  the  same  maps  (Rep.  APHB,  page  155).  At  the 
present  time,  Mr.  Shivers  is  Collector  of  the  Port  at  Honolulu,  and  is  in  a  pre- 
carious physical  condition  due  to  a  serious  heart  ailment.    Mr.  Shivers  was  inter- 

79716  O — 46 — pt.  16 28 


2346     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

viewed  in  Honolulu  during  the  first  week  of  June,  1945,  and  he  stated,  as  also 
appears  in  the  Army  Pearl  Harbor  Board  report  (page  155),  that  his  conclusion 
that  Japanese  submarines  had  been  in  Pearl  Harbor  prior  to  the  attack  was  based 
on  an  examination  of  the  maps  in  question,  and  that  he  had  no  other  information 
to  sustain  his  C(»nclusion.  Mr.  Shivers  likewise  had  no  further  information  to 
supply  in  respect  of  the  intelligence  situation  or  the  intelligence  information  that 
was  available  in  Honolulu  prior  to  7  December  1941,  except  to  say  that  he  was 
mystified  that  the  ONI  tap  of  the  telephone  line  of  the  Japanese  Consulate  at 
Honolulu  was  lifted  on  2  December  1941,  pursuant  to  an  order  issued  by  Captain 
(now  Rear  Admiral)  Mayfleld,  the  DIO.  Since  Mr.  Shivers'  statements  were  no 
different  from  those  given  by  him  in  his  testimony  of  record  before  the  Army 
Pearl  Harbor  Board,  and  since  the  basis  of  his,  and  the  conclusion  of  the  Army 
Pearl  Harbor  Board,  are  shown  to  be  erroneous  by  a  careful  study  of  the  legends 
on  the  maps  in  question,  on  which  those  conclusions  were  based,  and  since  his 
health  was  so  precarious,  it  was  deemed  not  necessary  to  call  him  as  a  witness. 
[i^T]  For  the  following  reasons,  it  appears  that  the  Japanese  midget  sub- 
marine from  which  was  obtained  the  chart  of  Pearl  Harbor  was  not  in  the 
harbor  on  that  day,  and  probably  had  not  been  there  on  any  prior  occasion : 

(a)  The  following  facts  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  recovered  chart  was 
an  attack  plati  rather  than  an  actual  track  and  log  of  events  : 

(1)  The  characters  marking  certain  points  on  the  chart  (Exhibit  33  and  33A) 
were  in  Chinese  ideographs  which  give  no  indication  of  tense.  For  instance, 
the  notation  which  has  been  variously  translated  as  "Enemy  ship  sunk"  and 
"Attack  and  sink  enemy  ships"  could  have  been  the  future  meaning.  Similarly 
the  notation  translated  as  "Fixed  position,"  could  mean  "Position  to  be  fixed," 
a  natural  course  of  action  before  entering  the  channel. 

(2)  The  times  marked  on  the  chart  were  unquestionably  Tokyo  time  ( — ^9). 
This  is  confirmed  by  the  computation,  on  the  back  of  the  chart,  of  the  time 
of  dawn  and  sunrise  at  Pearl  Harbor  on  December  8  (Tokyo  time). 

(3)  Based  on  (2),  times  along  the  track  were  all  in  daylight,  commencing 
at  the  channel  entrance  at  dawn. 

(4)  The  northwesterly  portion  of  the  track,  to  the  northward  of  Ford  Island, 
passed  through  an  area  which  was,  and  had  been,  occupied  by  a  number  of 
ships  moored  to  buoys,  and  could  not  have  been  followed  by  a  submarine. 

(5)  The  courses  and  notations  were  much  more  neat  and  meticulous  than 
any  that  could  have  been  made  during  the  passage  of  narrow  and  crowded 
waters  by  the  navigator  of  a  two-man  submarine. 

(6)  The  major  Japanese  operation  plan  for  the  Pearl  Harbor  attack,  as  re- 
cojistructed  by  a  captured  Japanese  yeoman,  and  confirmed  generally  by  cap- 
tured documents,  provided  that  the  midget  submarines  were  to  enter  the  harbor 
and  after  the  initiation  of  the  air  attack  were  to  attack  with  torpedoes.  The 
times  on  the  chart  were  in  conformity  with  this,  since,  converted  into  Hon- 
olulu time,  there  was  a  waiting  period  inside  the  harbor  entrance  from  0545  to 
0840  and  the  turning  point  south  of  Ford  Island  was  timed  0900. 

(b)  The  submarine  had  its  full  allowance  of  two  torpedoes  when  recovered. 

(c)  The  submarine  commander,  on  interrogation,  stated  that  he  had  failed  in 
his  mission  (Exhibit  68). 

(d)  The  information  on  the  chart  was  of  a  nature  that  could  more  readily 
be  obtained  by  civilian  observers  from  the  area  surrounding  Pearl  Harbor  than 
by  dangerous  submarine  reconnaissance.  As  has  appeared  earlier,  the  Japanese 
Consul  General  had  been  communicating  just  such  intelligence  to  Tokyo. 

(e)  Notations  on  the  chart  indicate  that  the  submarine  commander  received 
intelligence  reports  as  late  as  December  5th. 

[1^8]  Intelligence  information  recently  received  indicates  that  the  midget 
submarines  were  carried  by  and  launched  from  mother  submarines  (Exhibit 
69).  They  were  carried  on  the  main  deck  abaft  the  conning  tower  and  secured 
to  the  pressure  hull  by  means  of  heavy  clamps.  The  midgets  used  in  the  Pearl 
Harbor  attack  were  41  feet  in  length,  had  a  reported  cruising  range  of  175  to 
180  miles  at  their  most  economical  speed  of  4  to  6  knots,  did  not  have  a  radio 
transmitter,  and  carried  a  crew  of  two  men.  They  were  armed  with  two  tor- 
pedoes and  apparently  carried  the  same  designation  number  as  their  mother 
subs.  The  exact  number  with  the  Japanese  task  force  is  not  definitely  known, 
but  there  is  substantial  proof  that  there  were  at  least  five. 

The  midget  submarine  beached  off  Bellows  Field  from  which  the  chart  was 
recovered  bore  the  designation  of  "1-18,"  apparently  that  of  its  "mother."  In 
the  recovered  chart,  at  various  points  along  the  sides  of  the  entrance  channel 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2347 

from  Hammer  Point  to  Hospital  Point,  are  notations  in  faint  pencil,  "1-16," 
"1-20,"  1-22,"  "1-18."  "1-24."  From  information  received,  it  is  now  known  that 
these  are  the  designations  of  the  submarines  which  carried  the  five  midgets 
known  to  have  been  present.  The  times  on  the  recovered  chart  indicate  a  wait- 
ing period  in  the  narrow  harbor  entrance  area  from  0115  to  0410  (0445  to  0840, 
Hawaiian  time).  It  therefore  appears  to  be  a  logical  assumption  that  the  five 
midget  submarines  were  to  lie  in  wait  in  the  narrow  entrance  channel,  approxi- 
mately in  the  positions  indicated,  with  the  object  of  torpedoing  ships  attempt- 
ing to  sortie,  thus  blocking  the  channel ;  and  that  after  the  initial  air  attack 
had  been  completed,  they  were  to  proceed  around  Ford  Island  and  complete  the 
destruction.  The  midget  submarine  which  was  sunk  west  of  Ford  Island  appar- 
ently followed  just  such  a  plan.  Confirmation  of  this  assumption  is  found  in 
a  captured  copy  of  the  Japanese  Plan  for  this  operation,  wherein  the  following 
initial  task  is  assigned  to  the  Sixth  Fleet  (Submarine  Force)  :  "Will  obsei've 
and  attack  American  Fleet  in  HAWAII  area.  Will  make  a  sufprise  attack  on 
the  channel  leading  into  PEARL  HARBOR  and  attempt  to  close  it.  If  the 
enemy  moves  out  to  fight  he  will  be  pursued  and  attack." 

B.  Suspicious  Submarme  Contacts  Prior  to  7  December  19^1. 

It  was  suspected  in  Washington  for  some  time  prior  to  December  7th  that 
our  Fleet  based  at  Pearl  Harbor  was  being  kept  under  observation  by  Japanese 
submarines,  there  having  been,  over  a  period  of  six  months,  reports  by  our 
destroyers  of  such  contacts.  The  Fleet  also  received  reports  that  Japanese 
submarines  were  reconnoitering  the  approaches  to  Pearl  Harbor.  The  number 
of  such  reports  at  Pearl  Harbor  prior  to  the  attack  was  placed  by  one  witness 
at  from  ten  to  fifteen,  several  of  which  occurred  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of 
the  entrance  to  Pearl  Harbor.  The  contacts  were  on  underwater  sound  con- 
tacts, which  were  not  confirmed  by  sightings. 

A  search  of  the  files  of  CincPac  has  resulted  in  locating  dispatches  that  refer 
to  three  suspicious  contacts  during  the  five  weeks  preceding  Pearl  Harbor: 

(1)  On  3  November  1941,  an  oil  slick  area  in  latitude  20-10,  longitude  157-41 
was  observed  by  a  patrol  plane,  and  crossed  by  Task  Force  One ;  an  air  search 
of  a  fifteen  mile  area  bv  the  patrol  plane,  a  sound  search  of  an  unspecified  area 
by  the  USS  WORDEN  and  an  inwstigation  by  [im  the  USS  DALE 
produced  negative  results  (Exhibit  48;  dispatches  031920,  032035,  032133,  032330, 
040042). 

(2)  On  28  November  1941,  after  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  had 
issued  an  order  requiring  extreme  vigilence  against  possible  hostile  submarines, 
restricting  submerged  submarine  operations  to  certain  areas,  and  providing  that 
all  submarine  contacts  in  other  areas  suspected  to  be  hostile  were  to  be  depth 
-bombed,  the  USS  HELENA  reported  that  a  radar  operator,  without  knowledge 
of  the  CincPac  alert,  was  positive  that  a  submarine  was  in  a  restricted  area 
(Exhibit  48;  dispatch  280835).  A  search  by  a  task  group  with  three  destroyers, 
of  the  western  border  and  the  northern  half  of  that  area,  pursued  from  281050 
to  281845,  when  abandoned  by  290000,  produced  no  contacts  (Exhibit  48;  dis- 
patches 281050,  281133,  281704,  281845). 

(3)  During  the  night  of  2  December  1941,  the  USS  GAMBLE  reported  a  clear 
metallic  echo  in  latitude  20-30,  longitude  158-23,  which  was  lost  in  a  change  of 
range,  that  was  evaluated  to  have  been  too  rapid  to  indicate  the  presence  of  a 
submarine  (Exhibit  48;  di.spatch  022336).  An  investigation,  ordered  to  be  made 
by  Desron  4  (Exhibit  48;  dispatch  030040),  apparently  was  negative. 

C.  Detection  of  Aircraft  by  the  Army  Radar  System. 

It  appears  from  the  prior  investigations  that  about  0702  on  the  morning  of  7 
December  1941,  two  Army  privates  on  duty  at  a  mobile  radar  unit  on  the  northern 
part  of  Oahu  discovered  an  unusually  large  response  on  the  radar  in  a  northerly 
direction  and  from  about  136  miles.  This  information  they  reported,  at  about 
0715,  to  an  Army  ofllcer  on  duty  at  the  Army  Information  Center.  The  Army 
oflBcer  stated  that  he  had  some  information  to  the  effect  that  a  flight  of  Army 
B-17's  was  due  in  that  morning,  and  he  thought  that  the  planes  detected  by  the 
radar  were  those  Army  planes.  He  did  not  suspect  enemy  planes  and  made  no 
effort  to  report  to  his  superior. 

The  evidence  indicates  that  neither  this  information  nor  any  other  informa- 
tion as  to  the  direction  from  which  the  planes  approached  or  on  which  they 
departed  was  transmitted  to  the  Naval  authorities  on  the  day  of  the  attack. 


2348     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

D.  The  Air  Attack. 

The  Japanese  air  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor,  according  to  most  observers,  started 
at  0755.  It  l)egan  with  dive  bombing  and  strafing  of  the  Naval  Air  Station  at 
Ford  Island,  and  at  the  Army's  Hickam  Field.  This  was  followed  at  Pearl  Harbor 
by  attacks  on  major  units  of  the  Fleet,  launched  by  torpedo  planes  and  dive 
bombers,  and  was  accompanied  by  strafing-  Next  there  occurred  two  distinct 
horizontal  bombing  attacks  from  high  altitudes,  the  last  immediately  preceding 
a  final  intensive  dive  bombing  attack.  Almost  simultaneously  with  the  raid  on 
Pearl  Harbor,  the  Japanese  attacked  [JdO]  the  Kaneohe  Bay  Naval  Air 
Station  and  Bwa  Field  at  Barber's  Point  was  strafed.  Approximately  150  planes 
took  part  in  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor.  The  raid  is  reported  variously  to  have 
ended  at  from  0940  to  1130  and  some  Japanese  planes  are  known  to  have  been 
over  Oahu  after  1200. 

The  CincPac  Staff  Duty  Officer  learned  of  the  inception  of  the  air  raid  during 
his  second  telephone  converstion  of  the  morning  with  Admiral  Kimmel,  when 
he  was  advising  of  a  report  by  the  WARD,  after  its  submarine  repoi-ts,  that  it 
had  detained  a  sampan.  He  immediately  told  the  Admiral  of  his  receipt  from 
the  signal  tower  of  this  message: 

"Japanese  are  attacking  Pearl  Harbor  X    This  is  no  drill." 

E.  Location  of  Pacific  Fleet  Units. 

At  the  time  of  the  attack,  the  forces  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  were,  according  to 
Admiral  Kimmel  (Exhibit  73),  disposed  partly  in  port  and  partly  at  sea  as 
follows : 

(1)  In  Pearl  Harbor: 

(a)  Task  Force  One,  Vice  Admiral  Pye  commanding  (less  one  battleship,  one 
light  cruiser  and  one  destroyer)  comprising  five  battleships,  four  light  cruisers, 
seventeen  destroyers,  two  light  cruisers,  and  four  mine  layers. 

(b)  Task  Force  Two  (under  the  command  of  Vice  Admiral  Halsey,  who  was 
at  sea  with  units  thereof  constituting  a  separate  task  force — Task  Force  Eight) 
comprising  three  battleships,  eight  destroyers,  one  light  cruiser,  and  four  mine 
layers. 

(c)  Task  Force  Three  (less  detached  units  under  command  of  Vice  Admiral 
Brown  at  sea,  and  less  a  separate  task  force — Task  Force  Twelve — which  was 
at  sea  under  Rear  Admiral  Newton's  command)  comprising  two  heavy  cruisers, 
and  four  mine  layers  which  were  under  overhaul. 

(d)  Five  submarines  and  the  submarine  tender  PELIAS  of  Task  Force  Seven. 

(e)  The  TANGIER,  HULBERT,  CURTIS,  and  THORNTON,  and  Patrol  Squad- 
rons VP  11,  12,  14,  22,  23,  and  24  (a  total  of  about  sixty  planes)  of  Task  Force 
Nine. 

(f )  Marine  Air  Squadrons  VMSB  232  and  VMJ  252  (a  total  of  twenty  planes) 
at  Ewa,  Oahu. 

(g)  Two  destroyer  tenders  and  the  Base  Force,  consisting  of  the  ARGONNE, 
plus  auxiliaries  and  repair  vessels,  and  planes  of  Base  Force  Aircraft  Squadrons 
VJ-1,  VJ-2,  and  VJ-3,  as  follows :  19  J2F,  9  JRS,  2  PBY-1,  1  J2V. 

(2)  At  Sea: 

(a)  Task  Force  Eight  (Vice  Admiral  Halsey  commanding)  consisting  of  one 
aircraft  carrier  (ENTERPRISE),  three  heavy  cruisers  and  nine  destroyers,  lo- 
cated 200  miles  west  of  Pearl  Harbor,  standing  to  eastward,  was  returning  to 
Pearl  Harbor  after  landing  a  Marine  Air  Squadron  at  Wake  Island. 

(b)  Task  Force  Three  (Vice  Admiral  Brown  commanding),  less  units  in  port, 
consisting  of  one  heavy  cruiser  and  one  mine  laying  squadron,  less  two  of  its 
divisions,  was  exercising  with  landing  boats  at  Johnston  Island. 

[i52]  (c)  Task  Force  Twelve  (Rear  Admiral  Newton  commanding),  ordi- 
narily a  comjKjnent  of  Task  Force  Three,  consisting  of  one  aircraft  carrier  (LEX- 
INGTON), three  heavy  cruisers,  and  fyfe  destroyers,  located  about  425  miles 
southeast  of  Midway,  was  proceeding  on  a  westerly  course  to  land  a  Marine 
Air  Squadron  on  Midway  Island. 

(d)  One  heavy  cruiser  and  one  mine  laying  division,  ordinarily  a  part  of  Task 
Force  Three,  were  engaged  in  "normal  operations"  at  sea  southwest  of  Oahu. 

(e)  Four  submarines  of  Task  Force  Seven,  somewhere  at  sea  en  route  to  Pearl 
Harbor. 

(3)  At  other  places: 

(a)  At  Midway  Island,  two  submarines  of  Task  Force  Seven  and  Patrol  Squad- 
ron VP-21  (consisting  of  twelve  planes)  of  Task  Force  Twelve. 

(b)  At  Wake  Island,  two  submarines  of  Task  Force  Seven  and  a  Marine  Air 
Squadron. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2349 

(c)  At  Johnston  Island  (in  addition  to  Task  Force  Three,  undergoing  exercise), 
two  Base  Force  PBY-1  planes. 

(d)  At  Mare  Island,  Ave  submarines  of  Task  Force  Seven. 

(e)  At  San  Diego,  four  submarines  of  Task  Force  Seven. 

To  sum  up :  At  Pearl  Harbor,  there  were  eight  battleships,  two  heavy  cruisers, 
four  light  cruisers,  two  old  light  cruisers,  one  old  cruiser  mine  layer,  eight 
destroyers,  five  submarines,  twelve  uiiiie  layers,  two  destroyer  tenders,  one  sub- 
marine tender^  four  aircraft  tenders,  various  auxiliary  and  repair  ships,  and 
111  aircraft  of  various  types,  of  which  nine  were  under  overhaul.  At  sea,  there 
were  two  aircraft  carriers,  eight  heavy  cruisers,  fourteen  destroyers,  four  sub- 
marines, and  one  mine  layer  squadron  less  one  division.  At  other  places,  there 
were  thirteen  submarines,  fourteen  Navy  Patrol  planes  and  one  Marine  Air 
Squadron. 

Except  as  to  Task  Forces  Eight  and  Twelve,  which  were  on  special  missions  to 
reenforce  Wake  and  Midway  Islands,  the  dispositions  of  Pacific  Fleet  Units  as 
noted  above  were  in  accordance  with  a  previously  worked  out  fleet  employment 
schedule. 

[153]        F.  Condition  of  Readiness. 

(1)  The  ships  in  port: 

The  testimony  in  previous  investigations  showed  some  confusion  as  to  the 
condition  of  readiness  which  was  in  effect  on  ships  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  in  Pearl 
Harbor  at  the  time  of  the  attack.  It  appears,  however,  that  whether  or  not 
Condition  III,  as  prescribed  in  the  Pacific  Fleet  Letter  on  security  of  the  Fleet, 
was  in  effect,  the  condition  aboard  the  battleships  was  in  excess  of  that  condi- 
tion. Each  of  the  battleships  had  two  5-inch  anti-aircraft  guns  ready  and  two 
machine  guns  manned.  While  the  Fleet  letter  on  security  fixed  responsibility 
on  the  senior  oflBcer  present  in  each  air  defense  sector  for  fire  control  in  his  sector, 
no  particular  damage  control  organization  was  prescribed  in  that  letter  or  func- 
tioning on  the  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor  at  the  time  of  the  attack.  The  evidence 
in  prior  investigations  indicates  that  the  anti-aircraft  batteries  of  the  ships  were 
quickly  manned  and,  considering  the  circumstances,  were  effectively  used  against 
the  Japanese  attackers. 

(2)  The  aircraft  of  the  Pacific  Fleet: 

The  condition  of  readiness  in  force  as  to  the  Fleet  aircraft  was  Baker  5 
(50  per  cent  of  the  assigned  aircraft  to  be  ready  on  four  hours  notice)  with 
machine  guns  and  ammunition  in  all  planes  not  undergoing  maintenance  work. 
Three  squadrons  (one  at  Midway,  one  at  Pearl  Harbor,  and  one  at  Kaneohe) 
were  in  condition  Afirm  5  (100  per  cent  assigned  aircraft  to  be  ready  on  four 
hours  notice).  This  was  augmented  on  December  7th  by  specific  duty  assign- 
ments which  required  six  planes  from  Patrol  Squadron  FOURTEEN  and  from 
Patrol  Squadron  TWENTY-FOUR  (at  Kaneohe)  and  from  Patrol  Squadron 
TWELVE  (at  Pearl  Harbor)  to  be  ready  for  flight  on  30  minutes  notice.  On 
the  morning  of  December  7th,  three  patrol  planes  of  a  squadron  based  at 
Kaneohe  were  in  the  air  on  morning  security  patrol  armed  with  depth  charges, 
three  were  ready  for  flight  on  30  minutes  notice,  and  four  on  four  hours  notice; 
and  four  planes  of  a  squadron  at  Pearl  Harbor  were  in  the  air  conducting  tactics 
with  submarines  and  one  plane  was  ready  for  flight  on  30  minutes  notice. 

G.  Reaction  to  the  Attack. 

The  hostile  character  of  the  attacking  planes  was  not  recognized  until  the 
bombs  fell,  but  there  followed  an  immediate  and  general  realization  of  that 
fact,  and  a  prompt  application  of  such  defensive  measures  as  were  then  cajjable 
of  being  carried  out.  General  Quarters  was  sounded  in  all  units  ashore  and 
afloat  and,  as  has  been  pointed  out  above,  anti-aircraft  batteries  were  manned 
and,  considering  the  damaged  condition  of  the  ships,  employed  to  the  fullest 
possible  effect.  There  was,  however,  an  unfortunate  lapse  of  time  before  damage 
control  measures  on  the  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor  could  be  carried  forward,  result- 
ing in  the  suffering  of  much  damage  that  might  otherwise  have  been  prevented 
or  minimized.  The  damages  so  quickly  suffered  included  a  partial  breakdown 
of  the  oominunication  system,  preventing  an  accurate  interchange  of  necessary 
information,  including  radio  direction  bearings  of  the  attacking  force.  The 
futility  of  the  attempted  countermeasures  in  locating  and  attacking  the  Japanese 
striking  force  was  due,  in         [134]        large  part,  to  a  flood  of  wild  and  con- 


2350     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

flicting  reports  as  to  the  location  and  strength,  and  probable  intentions,  of  units 
of  the  Japanese  force. 

The  evidence  obtained  in  the  previous  investigation  demonstrates  clearly  that 
the  officers  and  men  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  met  the  attack,  individually  and  jointly, 
with  great  heroism. 
[155]        H.  Composition  and  Movements  of  the  Attacking  Force. 

The  chief  source  of  information  concerning  the  Japanese  force  which  attacked 
Pearl  Harbor  is  a  Japanese  prisoner  of  war  who  was  captured  on  Saipan  during 
the  Mariana.s  Campaign.  The  POW  was  a  chief  yeoman  in  the  Japanese  Navy, 
attached  to  thg  staff  of  the  Commander  in  Chief,  Combined  Fleet,  Admiral 
Yamamoto.  The  reconstruction  by  the  POW  of  the  events  preceding  and  leading 
up  to  Pearl  Harbor  has  been  substantiated  and  verified  by  other  information, 
including  that  contained  in  a  copy  of  Japanese  (^ombined  Fleet  Operation  Order 
No.  1,  recovered  from  the  Japanese  cruiser  NACHI  that  vpas  sunk  in  Manila  Bay. 
The  prisoner's  reconstruction  of  the  orders  to  the  striking  force  is  contained  in 
Exhibit  3. 

The  movements  of  the  striking  force  were  provided  for  in  the  Japanese  Secret 
Operation  Order  No.  1,  dated  1  November  1941,  wliich  stated  that  war  would  be 
declared  on  the  United  States  on  X-Day,  expected  to  be  in  the  early  or  middle 
part  of  December,  and  that  on  or  about  X-16  Day  the  carrier  task  force  would 
depart  its  base  and  proceed  by  way  of  Tankan  Bay  (Hotokappu  Bay),  Etorofu 
Island  and  the  Kuriles  for  Pearl  Harbor,  where  it  would  deliver  a  surprise 
attack.  Japanese  Combined  Fleet  Secret  Operation  Order  No.  3,  dated  10 
November  IJMl,  fixed  as  X-Day  8  December  IWl,  B.  L.  T.   (Exhibit  3). 

The  Japanese  striking  force  actually  left  Saiki  Anchorage  near  the  Bongo 
Channel  some  time  between  November  20  and  November  22,  1941,  East  Longitude 
Time,  and  proceeded  to  Tankan  Bay,  Etorofu  Island.  At  the  latter  place  it 
assembled  and  fueled,  and  departed  on  or  about  28  November  1941,  E.  L.  T., 
and  heade<l  eastward  under  heavy  front.  The  force  proceeded  in  an  easterly 
direction  heading  on  course  about  085°,  to  a  point  in  longitude  about  170°  W. ; 
then  turned  southeast  on  course  about  135  degrees,  and  proceeded  to  a  i)oint 
northwest  to  due  north  of,  and  approximately  200  miles  from,  the  island  of 
Oahu,  where  it  arrived  early  in  the  morning  of  8  December  1941,  E.  L.  T.  From 
that  position  the  Pearl  Harbor  attack  was  launched.  Following  the  attack, 
the  striking  force  retired  initially  to  the  northwest,  on  a  heading  of  about  300°, 
to  a  point  about  longitude  170°  E.,  thence  to  the  southwest,  irregularly  on  varying 
headings  to  a  point  near  140°  E.,  and  thence  northwest  to  Kyushu  (Exhibit  3, 
page  16). 

The  striking  force  consisted  of  three  of  Japan's  five  carrier  divisions,  the 
KAGA  and  AKAGI  (CarDiv  1)  ;  HIRYU  and  SORYU  (CarDiv  2)  ;  SHOKAKU 
and  ZUIKAKU  (sometimes  referred  to  as  CarDiv  3,  sometimes  as  CarDiv  4 
and  sometimes  as  CarDiv  5)  :  the  HIYEI  and  KIRISHIMA  (two  of  the  battle- 
ships of  BatDiv  3);  the  TONE  and  CHIKUMA  (CarDiv  8),  and  of  various 
destroyers  and  submarines. 

Cooperating  with  the  foregoing  striking  force  was  a  large  part  of  the  Japanese 
Sixth  (Submarine)  Fleet.  That  fleet  left  the  Japanese  Inland  Sea  about  18 
November  1941,  E.  L.  T.  At  the  time  of  the  attack,  many  Japanese  submarines 
were  concentrated  at  the  mouth  of  Pearl  Harbor  for  the  purpose  of  making 
torpedo  attacks  on  any  United  States  ships  that  attempted  to  escape  from  the 
air  attack  in  the  harbor.  As  previously  pointed  out,  the  evidence  indicates  that 
only  one  midget  submarine  succeeded  in  entering  the  harbor. 
[156]         I.  The  Casualties  and  Damage. 

The  facts  as  to  the  casualties  and  damage  appear  fully  in  the  record  of  the 
Naval  Pearl  Harbor  Court  of  Inquiry : 

(1)  An  examination  of  reports  in  the  Bureau  of  Personnel  showed  that  there 
were  3,963  casualties  as  a  result  of  the  Japanese  Pearl  Harbor  attack,  of  which 
896  were  wounded  and  3,067  were  either  killed,  dead  of  wounds,  or  are  missing 
and  declared  dead. 

(2)  The  damage  to  fleet  units  in  Pearl  Harbor  was  extensive.  The  Battleships 
ARIZONA,  CALIFORNIA,  OKLAHOMA,  and  WEST  VIRGINIA  were  sunk  and 
the  NEVADA  beached  to  prevent  its  sinking.  The  auxiliary  vessels  UTAH  and 
OGLALA  were  also  sunk.  All  other  battleships  in  the  harbor,  PENNSYLVANIA, 
MARYLAND,  and  TENNESSEE,  the  Cruisers  HELENA,  HONOLULU,  and 
RALEIGH,  the  destroyers  SHAW,  CASSIN,  and  DOWNES,  and  the  auxiliaries 
CURTIS  and  VESTAL,  were  seriously  damaged. 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 
(3)  The  damage  to  airplanes  was  as  follows: 


2351 


Type 


Patrol - --- 

Fighters. ._ 

Scout  bombers 

Torpedo  bombers 

Battleship  and  cruiser  planes 
Utility  and  transport  planes. 

Totals 


No.  present 
Dec.  7 


301 


No.  on  hand 
after  raid 


No.  usable 
after  raid 


52 


[157]         Findings. 

92.  On  the  morning  of  7  December  1941,  shortly  before  the  air  attack  on  Pearl 
Harbor,  there  were  reports  of  suspected  and  actnal  hostile  submarine  activity. 
The  second  advised  of  a  surface  and  depth  charge  attack  on  a  submarine.  Only  the 
latter  report  reached  responsible  officers.  Due  to  reports  on  previous  days  of 
sound  contacts  with  submarines,  conlirmation  was  sought.  The  action  initiated 
by  CoiuFOTJRTEEN,  in  dispatching  the  ready  duty  destroyer,  was  in  accord 
with  the  provisions  of  the  Fleet  security  letter. 

93.  Confirmation  of  the  report  of  the  sinking  of  a  submarine  was  not  received 
by  Admiral  Kimmel  or  by  Admiral  Bloch  prior  to  the  air  attack. 

94.  There  is  no  evidence  warranting  the  conclusion  that  a  Japanese  submarine 
entered  Pearl  Harbor  prior  to  December  7th.  The  one  midget  submarine 
known  to  have  been  in  Pearl  Harbor  on  the  morning  of  December  7th  was  sunk 
after  making  an  ineffectual  attack. 

95.  Evidence  of  the  approach  of  a  large  liight  of  planes  from  the  northward, 
obtained  by  Army  enlisted  men  operating  a  radar  installation  for  instruction 
purposes,  was  not  communicated  either  to  the  Navy  or  to  responsible  Army 
commanders. 

96.  The  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  and  ComFOURTEEN  had  no  previ- 
ous warning  of  the  air  attack,  which  was  initiated  by  the  enemy  at  0755.  The 
attack  was  skillfully  executed,  and  resulted  in  serious  losses  of  life  and  damage. 

97.  The  battleships  each  had  two  5"  anti-aircraft  guns  ready  and  two  machine 
guns  manned,  which  was  in  excess  of  the  requirements  of  Condition  III  as 
prescribed  in  the  Fleet  Security  I>etter.  As  to  Fleet  aircraft  based  at  Oahu, 
seven  were  in  the  air  (3  on  morning  security  patrol  armed  with  depth  charges 
and  4  engaged  in  tactics  with  submarines)  ;  ten  were  on  30  minutes  notice;  and 
the  balance  of  forty-four  on  four  hours  notice. 

98.  As  a  result  of  adherence  to  Fleet  schedules  which  had  been  issued  in 
September,  1941,  the  Pacific  Fleet  battleships,  with  one  exception,  were  all  in 
IK)rt  and  were  etitlier  sunk  or  damaged.  Due  to  the  fortunate  coincidence  which 
resulted  in  the  aircraft  carriers  being  at  sea,  they  were  uninjured. 

99.  It  has  been  learned,  since  7  Deceml)er  1941,  that  the  Japanese  task  force 
which  attacked  Pearl  Harbor  left  Saiki  Anchorage,  near  the  Bongo  Channel 
sometime  between  20  and  22  November  1941,  East  Longitude  Time,  and  proceeded 
to  Tankan  Bay,  Etorofu  Island,  in  the  Kuriles.  The  force  then  assembled  and 
fueled.  It  departed  on  or  about  28  November  1941,  East  Longitude  Time,  and 
proceeded  in  an  easterly  direction  to  about  170°  West  Longitude,  then  southeast 
to  a  point  about  200  miles  from  Oahu. 

100.  The  Japanese  striking  force  included  three  Carrier  Divisions,  among 
which  were  Carrier  Divisions  1  and  2.  Five  days  before  the  attack,  the  Fleet 
Intelligence  Officer  had  advised  Admiral  Kimmel  that  he  could  not  reliably 
estimate  the  location  of  Carrier  Divisions  1  and  2. 

[J58]  101.  The  Japanese  carriers  launched  their  planes  from  a  position  20O 
miles  due  north  of  Oahu. 


[159] 


VI. 

A.   FINDINGS 


1.  The  basic  assumption  of  the  Rainbow  Five  War  Plan  was  that  the  United 
States  and  her  Allies  would  be  at  war  with  the  Axis  Powers,  either  including  or 
excluding  Japan. 

2.  The  Navy  Basic  War  Plan  (Rainbow  Five)  assigned  various  offensive  tasks 
to  the  Pacific  Fleet,  including  the  capture  of  positions  in  the  Marshalls  and  raids 


2352     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

on  enemy  sea  communications  and  positions,  and  various  defensive  tasks,  includ- 
ing the  task  of  protecting  the  territory  of  the  Associated  Powers  in  the  Pacitic 
area  and  preventing  the  extension  of  enemy  military  power  into  the  Eastern 
Hemisphere  by  destroying  hostile  expeditions. 

3.  The  Pacific  Fleet  Oi)erating  Plan  (Rainbow  Five)  assigned  to  the  Fleet 
various  initial  tasks,  including  the  maintenance  of  fleet  security  at  the  bases,  at 
anchorages,  and  at  sea,  the  protection  of  the  communications  and  territory  of 
the  Associated  Powers  by  patrolling  with  light  forces  and  ^trol  planes,  the  estab- 
lisbuient  of  defensive  submarine  patrols  at  Wake  and  Midway,  and  guarding 
against  surprise  attack  by  Japan. 

4.  The  Pacific  Fleet  Operating  Plan  (Rainbow  Five)  and  annexes  included 
among  the  initial  tasks  to  be  performed  by  the  patrol  planes  the  maintenance  of 
the  maximum  patrol  plane  search  practicable  in  the  approaches  to  the  Hawaiian 
area. 

5.  The  Pacific  Fleet  Operating  Plan  was  to  be  put  into  effect  on  W-day,  which 
it  was  stated,  might  or  might  not  coincide  with  the  day  that  hostilities  opened 
with  Japan.     W-day  was  not  fixed  prior  to  the  attack. 

6.  The  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Detense  Plan,  Hawaiian  Theater,  was  based  on 
the  Joint  Army  and  Navy  Basic  War  Plans.  It  constituted  the  basis  of  suboiuiaiy 
peace  and  war  projects,  joint  operating  plans,  and  mobilization  plans.  The 
method  of  coordination  under  the  plan  was  to  be  by  mutual  cooperation  until  and 
unless  unity  of  connuand  were  invoked. 

7.  Under  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan  the  Army's  task  was  to  hold 
Oahu  against  attacks  by  sea,  land  and  air  forces,  and  against  hostile  sympathizers,, 
and  to  support  the  naval  forces.  The  Navy's  task  was  to  patrol  the  coastal  zone 
(which  included  Oahu  and  such  adjacent  land  and  sea  areas  as  were  required  for 
the  defense  of  Oahu),  and  to  patrol  and  protect  shipping  therein,  and  to  support 
the  Army  forces. 

8.  One  of  the  specific  tasks  assigned  to  the  Navy  in  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier 
Defense  Plan  was  that  the  Commandant,  FOURTEENTH  Naval  District,  should 
provide  for  distant  reconnaissance. 

9.  The  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan  was  placed  in  effect  on  11  April  1941 
by  the  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Department,  and  by  the  Commandant, 
FOURTEENTH  Naval  District. 

[160]  10.  Annex  VII,  Section  VI,  to  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan 
was  an  agreement  between  the  Commandant,  FOURTEENTH  Naval  District,  and 
the  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Department,  as  to  joint  defensive  measures 
for  the  .security  of  the  Fleet  and  for  the  Pearl  Harbor  Naval  Base  against  hostile 
raids  or  air  attacks  delivered  prior  to  a  declaration  of  war. 

11.  Annex  VII,  Section  VI,  to  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan  provided, 
among  other  things,  for  joint  air  operations  and  provided  that  when  naval  forces 
were  insufficient  for  long  distance  patrol  and  search  operations  and  Army  aircraft 
were  made  available,  the  latter  would  be  under  the  tactical  control  of  the  naval 
commander  directing  search  operations. 

12.  Annex  VII,  Section  VI,  to  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan  also 
provided  that  the  Army  was  to  expedite  the  installation  of  its  aircraft  warning 
service,  and  that  prior  to  the  completion  of  that  service,  the  Navy,  through  the 
use  of  radar  and  other  appropriate  means,  would  endeavor  to  give  such  warning 
of  hostile  attacks  as  might  be  practicable. 

13.  Annex  VII,  Section  VI,  of  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan  provided 
that  when  the  Commanding  General  and  ComFOURTEEN  agreed  that  the  threat 
of  a  hostile  raid  or  attack  was  suflBcicntly  imminent  to  warrant  such  action,  each 
commander  would  take  steps  to  make  available  to  the  other  the  air  forces  at  his 
disposal,  in  order  that  joint  operations  might  be  conducted  in  accordance  with  the 
plan. 

14.  The  Commanding  General  and  ComFOURTSEN  did  not  effect  any  agreement 
prior  to  the  attack  that  the  threat  of  a  hostile  raid  or  attack  was  sufficiently 
imminent  to  warrant  placing  Annex  VII,  Section  VI.  in  operation. 

15.  The  Naval  Base  Defense  Force  Operation  Plan  provided,  among  other 
things,  for  a  Base  Defense  Air  Force  in  conjunction  with  the  Army.  One  of  the 
assumptions  was  that  it  was  possible  that  a  declaration  of  war  might  be  preceded 
by  a  surprise  air  attack  on  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor,  that  it  was  probable  that  there 
might  be  a  surprise  submarine  attack  on  ships  in  the  base  area,  and  that  a  com- 
bination of  both  forms  of  attack  was  possible. 

16.  The  joint  estimate  bv  Admiral  Bellinger  and  General  Martin  stated,  among 
other  things,  that  the  most  likely  and  dangerous  form  of  attack  on  Oahu  would 
be  an  air  attack  that  would  most  likely  be  launched  from  carriers  which  would 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2353 

probably  approach  inside  of  three  hundred  miles.  The  estimate  also  stated  that 
any  single  submarine  attack  might  indicate  the  presence  of  considerable  undis- 
covered surface  forces,  probably  composed  of  fast  ships  accompanied  by  a  carrier. 
This  Estimate  came  to  the  attention  of  Admiral  Kimmel  and  Admiral  Bloch. 

17.  The  Naval  Base  Defense  Air  Force  Plan  was  prepared  by  Admiral  Bellinger 
and  approved  by  Admiral  Bloch.  This  plan,  which  was  designated  Annex  "Baker" 
to  the  Naval  Base  Defense  Force  Operation  l^lan,  made  specitic  provision  for  joint 
air  operations  by  the  Army  and  Navy.  The  plan  was  effective  upon  receipt.  It 
was  to  become  operative  without  signal  in  the  event  of  a  surprise  attack,  or  might 
be  made  operative  by  dispatch.  In  the  meantime,  conditions  of  readiness  for 
aircraft  were  to  be  as  directed  by  the  Commanding  General,  Hawaiian  Depart- 
ment, for  Army  units,  and  by  [161]  ComFOURTEEN,  as  Naval  faase 
Defense  Officer,  for  Navy  units. 

18.  The  Pacific  Fleet  letter  on  security  of  the  Fleet  at  base  and  in  operating 
areas,  which  was  reissued  by  Admiral  Kimmel  in  revised  form  on  14  October 
1941,  provided  that  the  Fleet's  security  was  predicated  on  several  assumptions, 
one  of  which  was  that  a  declaration  of  war  might  be  preceded  by  a  surprise 
attack  on  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor,  a  surprise  submarine  attack  on  ships  in  the 
operating  areas,  or  a  combination  of  the  two.  This  letter  also  stated  that  a 
single  submarine  attack  might  indicate  the  presence  of  a  considerable  surface 
force  probably  composed  of  fast  ships  accompanied  by  a  carrier. 

19.  The  Pacific  Fleet  security  letter  prescribed  security  measures,  including 
provisions  for  defense  against  air  attack.  It  provided,  among  other  things,  that 
ComFOURTEEN,  as  Naval  Base  Defense  Officer,  should  exercise  with  the  Army 
joint  supervisory  control  over  the  defense  against  air  attack  and  that  he  should 
take  other  ^ction,  including  supervisory  control  over  naval  shore-based  aircraft, 
and  arrange  through  the  Commander  of  Patrol  Wing  Two  for  coordination  of 
the  joint  air  effort  by  the  Army  and  the  Navy. 

20.  Under  the  Pacific  Fleet  security  letter,  the  security  measures  were  to 
Include  intermittent  patrols  to  consist  of  a  destroyer  offshore  patrol,  and  an  air 
patrol.  The  air  patrol  was  to  consist  of  daily  search  of  fleet  operating  areas  as 
directed  by  Aircraft  Scouting  Force,  one  covering  the  entry  or  sortie  of  a  fleet 
or  task  force,  and  one  during  the  entry  or  departure  of  a  heavy  ship  at  other 
times. 

21.  The  only  local  defense  plans  in  effect  and  operative  prior  to  the  attack  of 
7  December  1941  were  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan,  under  which 
the  Navy  was  obliged  to  provide  distant  reconnaissance,  and  the  Pacific  Fleet 
security  letter,  under  which  the  only  aircraft  patrol  from  Oahu  was  a  daily  search 
of  fleet  operating  areas,  a  search  during  entry  or  sortie  of  a  fleet  or  task  force, 
and  during  the  entry  or  departure  of  a  heavy  ship  at  other  times. 

22.  The  Pacific  Fleet  Operating  Plan  (Rainbow  Five),  approved  by  the  Chief 
of  Naval  Operations,  in  estimating  probable  enemy  (Japanese)  action,  visualized 
that  one  of  the  enemy  defensive  efforts  would  be  "destruction  of  threatening 
naval  forces"  :  that  initial  action  would  include  "possible  raids  or  stronger  attacks 
on  Wake,  Midway,  and  other  outlying  United  States  positions" ;  and  that  the 
initial  Jananese  deployment  would  include  "raiding  and  observation  forces 
wAdely  distributed  in  the  Pncifie,  and  that  submarines  in  the  Hawaiian  area.  *  *  •" 
(Italics  supplied.)  The  possibility  of  an  attack  on  Hawaii  was,  therefore, 
included  but  in  no  way  emphasiz«^d. 

23.  Admiral  Kimmel  was  of  the  opinion,  throughout  his  tenure  of  command  of 
the  Pacific  Fleet,  that  a  surprise  air  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  was  a  possihility. 
Neither  he  nor  the  key  members  of  his  staff  appear  to  have  considered  it  as  a 
serious  probability. 

21.  The  method  of  command  established  in  the  local  plans  was  that  of  "mutual 
cooperation."  The  relations  between  the  responsible  commanders  were  cordial. 
However,  there  was  not  in  existence,  prior  to  the  attack,  any  permanent  operat- 
ing setup  which  could  insure  the  constant  and  timely  exchange  of  information, 
decision.s.  and  intended  courses  of  action  so  essential  to  the  efficient  conduct  of 
joint  operations,  particularly  in  an  emergency.  A  recent  proposal  looking  to  the 
establishment. of  a  Joint  Command  Center  had  been  the  subject  of  adverse 
recommendations  by  the  responsible  local  commanders,  both  Army  and  Navy. 

[162]  2f).  In  accordance  with  "Joint  Action,"  unity  of  command  for  the 
defense  of  Oahu  could  have  been  placed  in  effect  by  local  agreement  between 
the  Commnndine  Generfil  of  the  Hawaiian  Department  and  the  Commandant  of 
the  FOFRTFENTH  Naval  District.  The  latter,  however,  would  naturally  not 
make  such  an  agreement  without  the  approval  of  his  immediate  superior,  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet.    The  question  of  unity  of  command  for  out- 


2354     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

lying  islands  was  discussed  between  Admiral  Kimmel  and  General  Short  in  con- 
ueciion  witii  a  pioposal  lor  reenforcement  of  *vake  and  .Midway  by  Army  planes. 
General  Short's  position  was  that  if  Army  forces  were  involved,  tiie  command 
must  be  his.  Admiral  Kimmel  maintained  that  the  command  of  naval  bases 
must  remain  wiih  the  JNavy.     'ihe  isiands  were  reenforced  wiih  Marine  planes. 

26.  Japanese  espionage  at  Pearl  Harbor  was  eirective  and,  particularly  uuriug 
the  critical  period  2/  November  to  7  December  15M1,  resulted  in  tlie  frequent 
transmission  to  Japan  of  information  of  great  importance  concerning  the  faciiic 
Fleet,  the  movements  and  locations  of  snips,  and  defense  preparations. 

27.  Certain  reports  sent  by  the  Japanese  Consul  General  via  a  commercial 
communications  company  at  Honolulu  in  the  week  preceding  the  attack  indicated 
the  likelihood  of  an  air  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor. 

2S.  It  will  appear  subsequently  that  various  coded  messages  sent  by  the  Japa- 
nese Consul  Geiieral  at  Honolulu,  which  did  not  indicate  the  likeahood  of  an  air 
attack  on  Pearl  Harbor,  were  intercepted  by  Army  and  Navy  radio  intercept 
stations  and  were  decoded  in  Washington,  D.  C.  prior  to  the  attack;  that  others 
which  were  obtained  at  Honolulu  by  ^\aval  Intelligence  prior  to  the  attack  were, 
with  the  exception  of  a  few  unimi.ortant  messages,  in  a  code  which  could  not 
be  decrypted  there  before  December  7th ;  and,  that  three  messages  intercepted 
by  Army  radio  intercept  stations  at  Hawaii  and  at  San  Francisco,  which  indi- 
cated the  likelihood  of  an  air  attack,  were  forwarded  to  the  War  Department  for 
decryption  but  were  either  not  received  there  prior  to  the  attack  or  were  not 
decrypted  prior  to  the  attack.  If  the  United  States  intelligence  services  had  been 
able  to  obtain  and  to  decode  and  translate  promptly  all  of  the  espionage  reports 
sent  by  the  Japanese  Consul  General  during  the  period  27  November  to  7  December 
1941,  the  information  so  obtained  would  have  been  of  inestimable  value. 

29.  Naval  Intelligence  was  effectively  organized  to  acquire  information  from 
coded  diplomatic  messages  between  the  Japanese  Government  and  its  representa- 
tives. Through  the  interception  of  Japanese  diplomatic  messages  and  their 
decryption  and  translation  in  Washington,  D.  C,  prior  to  the  attack,  knowledge 
was  obtained  of  the  Japsinese  Government's  actual  views  concerning  the  diplo- 
matic situation,  of  the  Japanese  Government's  intention  to  wage  war,  and  of 
the  fact  that  hostilities  were  impending  and  imminent. 

30.  The  information  acquired  in  Washington  through  the  interception  of 
Japanese  diplomatic  messages  was  adequately  and  promptly  disseminated  at 
Washington  by  Naval  and  Military  Intelligence  to  the  Chief  ^f  Naval  Operations, 
to  the  Army  Chief  of  Staff,  to  the  State  Department,  and  to  the  President. 

[163]  31.  The  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  had  to  rely  upon  the 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations  for  information  as  to  the  status  of  the  diplomatic 
negotiations  with  the  Japanese,  and  had  requested  to  be  kept  fully  informed 
on  this  subject. 

32.  The  Japanese  diplomatic  messages  acquired  by  Naval  Intelligence  at  Wash- 
ington were  not  transmitted  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  as  such. 
Reasons  advanced  for  this  course  of  action  were  that  the  Japanese  might  inter- 
cept the  naval  messages  and  learn  of  the  Navy's  success  in  decrypting  Japanese 
codes ;  that  the  volume  of  intercepted  messages  was  so  great  that  the  trans- 
mission of  them,  particularly  during  the  critical  period,  would  have  overtaxed 
the  Navy's  communications  facilities ;  and,  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  Chief 
of  Naval  Operations  to  evaluate  such  information  and  to  advise  CincPac  of 
the  important  facts  learned. 

33.  Various  of  the  warning  messages  sent  by  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations 
to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  w-ere  based  on  the  information  obtained 
from  intercepted  Japanese  messages. 

34.  The  warnings  sent  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  during  No- 
vember (particularly  the  "war  warning"  of  the  27th)  and  early  December,  1941, 
indicated  in  unmistakable  language  that  the  diplomatic  negotiations  had  ceased, 
that  war  with  Japan  was  imminent,  and  that  Japanese  attacks  might  occur  al 
any  moment. 

35.  The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  did  not  advise  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
Pacific  Fleet,  of  certain  intercepted  Japanese  messages  indicating  interest  in  the 
location  of  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor.  These  were  more  specific  than  other  inter- 
cepted messages  indicating  Japanese  interest  in  the  movements  of  ships  to  or 
from  other  jwrts. 

36.  The  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  was  not  fully  advised  of  certain 
other  information  obtained  from  intercepted  Japanese  messages  after  the  Novem- 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT  COMMITTEE  2355 

ber  27th  "war  warning,"  which  made  further  evident  the  termination  in  fact  of 
the  diplomatic  negotiations  and  the  Japanese  intention  to  wage  war. 

37.  On  the  morning  of  7  December  1941,  there  was  brought  to  the  attention 
of  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  an  intercepted  message  in  which  the  Japanese 
Government  instructed  its  representatives  to  present  to  the  State  Department 
at  1  p.  m.  the  Japanese  Government's  final  reply  terminating  the  diplomatic 
negotiations.  Mention  was  made  of  the  fact  that  1  p.  m.  Washington  time  was 
about  dawn  at  Honolulu  and  about  the  middle  of  the  night  in  the  Far  East.  No 
one  stated  that  this  indicated  an  air  attack  at  Pearl  Harbor. 

38.  This  so-called  "1  p.  m.  delivery  message,"  which  consisted  of  one  sentence, 
had  been  intercepted  at  a  naval  radio  intercept  station  at  Bainbridge  Island  in 
the  State  of  Washington  and  forwarded  to  the  Navy  Department  by  teletype. 
It  was  decrypted  and  available  in  the  Navy  Department  at  about  0700  on  Decem- 
ber 7th.  It  was  sent  to  the  Army  for  translation  because  there  was  no  Japanese 
translator  on  duty  in  the  Navy  D;'partment  at  that  time.  The  translation,  which 
c(tuld  have  been  done  by  a  qualiMed  translator  in  a  few  minutes,  was  not  received 
from  the  Army  until  after  0900. 

[164]  39.  Although  he  was  in  possession  of  this  highly  significant  informa- 
tion several  hours  before  the  attacli,  and  there  were  available  means  whereby 
the  information  could  have  been  transmitted  to  Admiral  Kimmel  immediately, 
including  a  "scrambler"  telephone  maintained  by  the  Army,  Admiral  Starlt  ini- 
tially was  not  disposed  to,  and  did  not,  send  any  message  to  Admiral  Kimmel. 
Instead  he  relied  on  the  transmission  of  a  message  by  the  War  Department  to 
General  Short,  which  was  to  be  furnished  also  to  Admiral  Kimmel. 

40.  Admiral  Stark  has  previously  testified  that  he  did  not  consider  it  necessary 
to  telephone  to  Admiral  Kimmel  on  the  morning  of  7  Dacember  and  that  he  had 
not  telephoned  at  any  time  previous  to  the  attack,  but  that  one  regret  which  he 
had  was  that  he  had  not  telephoned  a  message  that  morning  to  Admiral  Kimmel 
or  paralleled  the  Army  message  on  the  naval  radio  system. 

41.  The  message  sent  by  General  Marshall  on  7  December  1941,  which  was 
received  after  the  attack,  advised  that  the  Japanese  were  presenting  an  ultimatum 
at  1  p.  m.,  that  they  were  under  orders  to  destroy  their  code  machine,  that  it 
was  not  known  just  what  significance  the  hour  set  might  have  but  that  the 
addressees  were  to  be  on  the  alert  accordingly,  and  that  the  naval  authorities 
were  to  be  informed. 

42  The  warnings  which  were  sent  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet, 
indicated,  as  to  the  possible  places  of  Japanese  attack,  on  November  24th,  that  "a 
surprise  aggressive  movement  in  any  direction,  including  attack  on  the  Philip- 
pines or  Guam,  is  a  possibility,"  and,  on  November  27th,  that  "an  aggressive 
movement  by  the  Japanese  is  expected  within  the  next  few  days.  The  number 
and  equipment  of  Japanese  troops  and  organization  of  naval  task  forces  indicate 
an  amphibious  expedition  against  either  the  Philippines,  Thai  or  Kra  Peninsula, 
or  possibly  Borneo." 

43.  Although  the  warnings  which  were  sent  by  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations 
to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  drew  attention  to  probable  Japanese 
objectives  to  the  southward  and  southeastward  of  Japan,  and  did  not  specifically 
mention  P^'arl  Harbor,  both  the  Chief  of  Naval  Oj^erations  and  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  were  aware  of  the  possibility  of  a  Japanese  attack  on 
Pearl  Harbor.     They  did  not  regard  such  an  attack  as  probable. 

44.  The  Japanese  established  several  codes  in  November,  1941,  which  were  to 
be  used  in  radio  transmissions  to  convey  to  their  representatives  information 
concerning  the  status  of  relations  between  Japan  and  the  United  States,  and 
other  countries.  These  were  known  as  the  "winds"  code  and  the  "hidden  word" 
code.  The  "winds"  code  was  designed  to  indicate  a  break  in  diplomatic  relations, 
or  possibly  war,  with  England  or  the  United  States  or  Russia  by  the  use  in 
weather  broadcasts  of  certain  Japane.«!e  words  signifying  wind  directions. 

45.  The  interception  of  a  "winds"  message  relating  to  the  United  States  during 
the  first  week  of  December  1941,  would  not  have  conveyed  any  information  of 
significance  which  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  and  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
Pacific  Fleet,  did  not  already  have. 

[165]  46.  No  message  in  the  "winds"  code  relating  to  the  United  States  was 
received  by  any  of  the  watch  oflScers  in  the  Navy  Department  to  whom  such  a  mes- 
sage would  have  come  had  it  been  received  in  the  Navy  Department.  No  such 
message  was  intercepted  by  the  radio  intelligence  units  at  Pearl  Harbor  or  in  the 
Phillippines,  although  intensive  efforts  were  made  by  those  organizations  to  inter- 
cept such  a  message.    The  evidence  indicates  further  that  no  such  message  was 


2356     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

intercepted  by  the  British  or  the  Dutch,  despite  their  efforts  to  intercept  such  a 
message.  Neither  the  Fleet  Intelligence  Officer  of  the  Asiatic  Fleet  nor  the  Fleet 
Intelligence  OflScer  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  nor  the  Inteligence  Officer  of  the  Far 
Eastern  Section  of  the  Office  of  Naval  Intelligence,  recalled  any  such  message. 
The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  the  Director  of  Naval  Communications,  and  the 
Director  of  Naval  Intelligence  recalled  no  such  message.  Testimony  to  the 
effect  that  a  "winds"  code  message  was  received  prior  to  the  attack  was  given 
by  Captain  Safford,  in  charge  of  Op20-G,  a  conmmnications  security  section  at 
the  Navy  Department,  who  stated  that  such  a  message  was  received  on  December 
3d  or  4th,  that  it  related  to  the  United  States,  and  that  no  copy  could  be  found 
in  the  Navy  or  Army  files.  In  his  testimony  before  Admiral  Hart,  Captain 
Safford  named,  in  addition  to  himself,  three  other  officers  who,  he  stated,  re- 
called having  seen  and  read  the  "winds"  message.  Each  of  those  officers  testi- 
fied that  he  had  never  seen  such  a  message.  The  only  other  testimony  to  the 
effect  that  a  "winds"  message  was  received  was  by  Captain  Kramer,  an  intelli- 
gence officer  assigned  to  Op-20-G,  who  said  tha.t  he  recalled  that  there  was  a 
message  but  that  he  could  not  recall  whether  or  not  it  related  to  the  United  States 
or  England  or  Russia.  It  may  be  noted  that  until  he  testified  in  this  investiga- 
tion, Captain  Kramer  erroneously  thought  that  a  "hidden  word"  message  inter- 
cepted on  the  morning  of  December  7th  had  been  a  "winds"  message. 

47.  On  the  morning  of  December  7th,  the  intercepted  "hidden  word"  code 
message  was  translated  by  Kramer.  In  his  haste,  due  to  the  necessity  of  deliver- 
ing other  messages,  including  the  "1  p.  m.  delivery  message,"  he  overlooked  a  code 
word  relating  to  the  United  States  and  translated  the  message  as  meaning  only 
that  "relations  between  Japan  and  England  are  not  in  accordance  with  expecta- 
tions." He  testified  that  he  later  discovered  the  error  and  a  few  minutes  be- 
fore 1  p  m.  on  December  7th,  he  telephoned  the  correction  to  his  superior  officer  in 
the  Office  of  Naval  Intelligence  and  to  an  officer  of  Army  Military  Intelligence. 

48.  Except  for  the  omission  of  the  United  States,  the  "hidden  word"  code  mes- 
sage was  literally  translated  and  did  not  sufficiently  reflect  previous  diplomatic 
interceptions  which  indicated  that  the  message  was  to  convey  the  idea  of  a  crisis 
involving  the  countries  in  question. 

49.  The  sources  of  intelligence  as  to  the  Japanese  which  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  Pacific  Feet,  had  prior  to  the  attack  included,  in  addition  to  the  Chief  of 
Naval  Operations,  the  District  Intelligence  Officer  of  the  FOURTEENTH  Naval 
District,  and  the  Fleet  Intelligence  Officer  of  the  Pacific  Fleet. 

[166]  50.  Under  the  supervision  of  the  District  Intelligence  Officer  of  the 
FOURTEENTH  Naval  District,  the  telephone  lines  of  the  Japanese  Consul  Gen- 
eral and  the  Japanese  Vice  Consul  at  Honolulu  were  tapped  for  some  months  prior 
to  the  attack.  These  were  discontinued  on  2  December  1941  because  the  District 
Intelligence  Officer  feared  that  the  existence  of  such  taps  might  be  discovered, 
resulting  in  undesirable  complications.  No  information  of  military  or  naval  sig- 
nificance was  obtained  by  means  of  the  telephone  taps. 

51.  On  6  December  1941  the  local  representatives  of  the  Federal  Bureau  of 
Investigation  at  Honolulu  delivered  to  the  District  Intelligence  Officer  a  tran- 
script of  a  trans-Pacific  radio  telephone  conversation  between  a  person  in  Hono- 
lulu named  "Mori"  and  a  person  in  Japan.  This  was  examined  by  the  District 
Intelligence  Officer.  It  was  decided  that  the  conversation  should  be  further 
studied  by  a  Japanese  linguist  of  the  District  Intelligence  Office,  who  was  to  listen 
to  the  recording  of  the  conversation.  This  was  not  done  until  after  the  attack. 
The  transcript  furnished  on  December  6th  indicated  that  the  person  in  Japan  was 
interested,  among  other  things,  in  the  daily  flights  of  airplanes  from  Honolulu 
and  in  the  number  of  ships  present.  During  the  conversation,  references  were 
made  to  flowers,  which,  it  now  appears,  may  have  been  code  words  signifying 
the  presence  or  absence  of  ships,  and  a  method  of  conveying  information  to  the 
approaching  Japanese  ships,  which  presumably  would  have  been  listening  in  on 
the  conversation.  Prior  investigations  indicate  that  the  "Mori  conversation"  was 
also  brought  to  the  attention  of  General  Short  on  6  December  1941. 

52.  Under  the  supervision  of  the  District  Intelligence  Officer  of  the  FOUR- 
TEENTH Naval  District,  copies  of  various  cable  messages  from  and  to  the  Jap- 
anese Consul  General  at  Honolulu,  via  a  commercial  communications  company, 
were  obtained  during  the  first  week  of  December,  1941.  This  was  the  first  time 
that  such  messages  had  been  obtained.  The  messages  were  in  code  and  efforts 
were  made  immediately  to  decrypt  and  translate  them.  Some  messages  were 
decrypted  before  the  attack.  These  contained  no  information  of  particular 
significance. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2357 

53.  No  information  secured  at  Oahu  prior  to  the  attack  by  means  of  the  tele- 
phone taps  or  through  the  interception  of  messages  of  the  Japanese  Consul  Gen- 
eral indicated  the  likelihood  of  war  or  of  an  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor. 

54.  One  of  the  Japanese  Consul  General's  messages,  which  was  obtained  by 
the  District  Intelligence  Officer  and  turned  over  on  5  December  1941  to  the  Radio 
Intelligence  Unit  for  decryption  and  translation,  was  a  message  dated  December 
3rd.  This  message  was  in  a  Japanese  code  known  as  the  "PA-K2."  It  was 
decrypted  and  translated  by  the  Radio  Intelligence  Unit  at  Pearl  Harbor  after 
the  attack.  The  message  was  one  in  which  the  Japanese  Consul  General  advised 
of  a  change  in  a  method  which  had  been  established  for  communication  by  visual 
signals  from  Oahu,  whereby  lights  in  houses  on  the  beach,  the  use  of  a  sailboat, 
certain  want  ads  to  be  broadcast  over  a  local  radio  station,  and  bonfires,  would 
convey  information  as  to  the  presence  or  absence  of  various  types  of  warships  of 
the  Pacific  Fleet.  Although  the  Radio  Intelligence  Unit  at  Pearl  Harbor  was 
unable  to  decrypt  this  message  prior  to  the  attack,  the  message  was  decrypted  and 
translated  in  rough  form  on  6  December  1941  by  a  civilian  translator  in  Op-20-G 
of  the  Navy  Department  in  Washington.  That  section  had  received  the  mes- 
sage from  an  Army  radio  intercept  station  at  Fort  Hunt,  Virginia.  Captain 
Kramer  testified  he  had  no  specific  recollection  of  having  seen  this  translation 
prior  to  the  [167]  attack,  but  the  evidence  indicates  that  the  rough  trans- 
lation was  shown  to  him  on  the  afternoon  of  December  6th  and  that  due  to  the 
pressure  of  work  on  other  important  Japanese  diplomatic  messages,  no  action  was 
taken  on  the  translation  until  8  December  1941. 

55.  On  2  D^^ember  1941.  the  Japanese  Consul  General  at  Honolulu  received  a 
coded  message  from  Tokyo  which  stated  that  in  view  of  the  existing  situation, 
the  presence  of  ships  in  port  was  of  utmost  importance,  that  daily  reports  were 
to  be  submitted,  that  the  reports  should  advise  whether  or  not  there  were  obser- 
vation balloons  at  Pearl  Harbor,  and  whether  or  not  the  warships  were  pro- 
vided with  anti-torpedo  nets.  This  message  was  intercepted  by  an  Army  radio 
intercept  station  at  Fort  Shafter,  Havaii,  and  apparently  was  forwarded  by 
mail  to  the  War  Department  for  decryption  and  translation.  The  translation 
supplied  by  the  Army  indicates  that  the  message  was  translated  on  30  December 
1941. 

56.  On  the  afternoon  of  6  December  1941,  the  Japanese  Consul  General  at 
Honolulu  sent  two  messages  in  the  "PA-K2"  code  which  indicated  the  likelihood 
of  an  air  attack.  The  first  reported  that  there  were  no  signs  of  barrage  balloon 
equipment  at  Pearl  Harbor,  that  in  ail  probability  there  was  considerable  oppor- 
tunity left  to  take  advantage  for  a  surprise  attack  against  Pearl  Harbor,  Hickam, 
Ford,  and  Ewa,  and  that  the  battleships  did  not  have  torpedo  nets.  The  second 
message  rejported  on  the  ships  at  anchor  on  December  6th,  and  stated  that  it 
appeared  that  no  air  reconnaissance  was  being  conducted  by  the  Fleet  air  arm. 
These  messages  were  not  obtained  by  Naval  Intelligence  at  Honolulu  prior  to 
the  attack.  They  were,  however,  both  intercepted  by  an  Army  intercept  station 
at  San  Francisco  and  were  forwarded  by  teletype  to  thQ  Army.  The  translations 
of  these  messages  furnished  by  the  Array  indicate  that  they  were  translated  on 
December  8th.  They  could  have  been  decrypted  and  translated  in  the  Navy 
Department  in  about  an  hour  and  a  half. 

57.  There  were  no  formal  arrangements  whereby  the  Navy  communicated  to 
the  Army  estimates  of  the  location  and  movements  of  Japanese  naval  forces. 
Officers  of  the  Far  Eastern  Section  of  Military  Intelligence  at  Washington  had 
access  to  charts  maintained  in  the  Far  Eastern  Division  of  the  Office  of  Naval 
Intelligence  showing  such  information,  and  had  access  to  radio  intelligence  in- 
formation available  in  the  Navy  Department,  and  the  situation  was  discussed 
with  them.  At  Pearl  Harbor,  an  intelligence  officer  of  the  Hawaiian  Air  Farce 
received  some  general  information  concerning  Japanese  movements  from  the 
Fleet  Intelligence  Officer. 

58.  The  War  Department  had  information  which  led  that  Department  to 
believe  that  Japanese  naval  forces  were  in  the  Marshalls  in  November.  1941. 
This  appears  from  a  War  Dopartn^ent  dispatch  of  26  November  1941  to  General 
Short,  information  to  Admiral  Kimniel,  concerning  a  special  photographic  recon- 
naissance to  be  flown  over  Truk  and  Jaluit,  in  order  to  obtain  information, 
among  other  things,  as  to  the  number  and  location  of  naval  vessels.  The 
reconnaissance  was  not  flown  because  the  special  Army  planes  were  not  made 
ready. 

59.  On  27  November  1941,  a  Pacific  Fleet  Intelligence  Bulletin  was  distributed 
by  the  Commander- in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  to  his  command.         [168]        This 


2358    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

bulletin  set  forth  the  available  information  concerning  the  composition  of  the 
Japanese  Navy.  It  revised  an  earlier  bulletin  on  the  same  subject  and  pointed 
out  that  the  principal  change)  was  a  further  increase  in  the  number  of  tleet 
commands.  This  arose  from  the  regrouping  of  aircraft  carriers  and  seaplane 
tenders  into  separate  forces.  The  bulletin  stated,  among  other  things,  that 
the  Japanese  Carrier  Fleet  consisted  of  ten  carriers  which  were  organized  into 
five  divisions,  each  having  two  carriers. 

60.  Current  information,  derived  from  traffic  analyses,  concerning  the  location 
and  movements  of  Japanese  naval  forces  was  obtained  by  the  Commander  in 
Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  from  the  Fleet  Intelligence  Officer,  who  received  it  pri- 
marily from  the  Radio  Intelligence  Unit  at  Pearl  Harbor.  Such  information 
also  was  contained  in  dispatches  from  the  Radio  Intelligence  Unit  in  the  Phil- 
ippines and  from  the  Far  Eastern  Section  of  Naval  Intelligence  in  Washington, 
D.  C. 

61.  Fortnightly  Intelligence  bulletins  were  issued  by  the  Office  of  Naval  In- 
telligence and  mailed  to  the  Pacific  Fleet,  among  others.  These  included  sum- 
maries of  the  informtfition  concerning  Japan€>se  naval  forces  which  had  been 
received  from  the  Radio  Intelligence  Units  at  Pearl  Harbor  and  at  the  Philippines. 

62.  On  November  26th,  Coir.FOURTEEN  sent  a  dispatch  to  OpNav,  informa- 
tion to  CincPac,  CincAF,  and  ComSIXTEEN,  which  summarized  the  Information 
as  to  Japanese  naval  movements  obtained  by  the  Radio  Intelligence  Unit  at 
Pearl  Harbor  during  the  i)receding  month.  The  dispatch  indicated  that  the 
Commander  Second  Fleet  had  been  organizing  a  task  force  comprising  units  of 
various  fleets.  This  dispatch  stated  that  there  was  believed  to  be  a  strong 
concentration  of  submarines  and  air  groujps  in  the  Marshalls,  which  included  at- 
least  one  carrier  division  unit  (not  necessarily  a  carrier),  plus  probably  one- 
third  of  the  submarine  fleet.  The  estimate  was  that  a  strong  force  might  be 
preparing  to  operate  in  .southeastern  Asia  while  component  parts  might  operate 
from  Palao  and  the  Marshalls. 

63.  The  radio  intercei)ts  by  the  radio  intelligence  unit  located  in  the  Philippines 
were  considered  by  OpNav  to  be  the  most  reliable  because  of  the  location  of  the 
unit.  On  26  November  1941,  the  radio  intelligence  unit  in  the  Philippines,  in 
a  dispatch  to  CincPac,  OpNav  and  others,  commented  on  the  above  dispatch  of 
ConiFOURTEKN  and  stated  that  traffic  analysis  for  the  past  few  days  had  indi- 
cated that  the  Commander  in  Chief,  Second  Fleet,  was  directing  various  fleet 
units  in  a  loose-knit  task  force  that  apparently  would  be  divided  into  two  sec- 
tions. The  first  section  was  expected  to  operate  in  the  South  China  area.  The 
.second  section  was  expected  to  operate  in  the  Mandates.  It  was  estimated  that 
the  second  section  included  "CarDiv  3,  RYUJO,  and  one  MARU."  This  dispatch 
also  stated  that  the  ComSIXTEKN  unit  could  not  confirm  the  supiwsition  that 
carriers  and  submarines  in  force  were  in  the  Mandates,  and  that  their  best  in- 
dications were  that  all  known  carriers  were  still  in  the  Sasebo-Kure  area.  It 
was  stated  that  this  evaluation  wa^  considered  to  be  reliable. 

64.  From  time  to  time  after  November  27th,  there  were  sighting  reports  from 
the  Asiatic  Fleet  and  other  observers,  copies  of  which  were  received  by  Admiral 
Kimmel,  which  confirmed  the  movement  of  important  Japanese  naval  forces  to 
the  southward  of  Japan.     These,  however,  did  not  report  the  movement  of  carriers. 

[169]  65.  After  November  27th,  the  Radio  Intelligence  Unit  at  Pearl  Harbor 
continued  the  practice  of  preparing  daily  summaries  of  the  information  received 
through  their  traffic  analysis  of  Japanese  naval  communications,  which  were 
submitted  to  Layton.  the  Fleet  Intelligence  Officer,  for  transmittal  to  Admiral 
Kinanel  on  the  following  morning.  Admiral  K'mmel  received  and  initialed  these 
summaries  dailv  on  and  after  27  November.  On  December  6th.  he  initialed  the 
summary  dated  December  5th,  which  was  the  last  one  he  received  prior  to  the 
attack. 

66.  On  November  28th.  Admiral  Kimmel  received  a  communication  intelli- 
gence summary  dated  November  27th,  which  stated,  among  other  things,  that 
there  was  no  further  information  on  the  presence  of  a  carrier  division  in  the 
Mandates  and  that  "carriers  were  still  located  in  home  waters."  The  next  day, 
he  received  the  November  28^h  summary  which  indicated,  among  other  things, 
the  view  that  the  Japanese  radio  intelligence  net  was  operating  at  full  strength 
upon  U.  S.  Naval  communications  and  "IS  GETTING  RESULTS."  There  was 
no  informal tion  set  forth  in  the  summary  as  to  carriers.  On  the  following  day. 
Admiral  Kimmel  received  the  sunsmary  dated  November  29th.  which,  among 
other  things,  indicated  that  Carrier  Division  3  was  under  the  immediate  com- 
mand of  the  Commander  in  Chief,  Second  Fleet.    On  December  1st,  Admiral 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2359 

Kimmel  received  the  previous  day's  summary  which  stated  as  to  carriers  that 
the  presence  of  a  unit  of  plane  guard  destroyers  indicated  the  presence  of  at 
least  one  carrier  in  ihe  Mandates,  although  this  had  not  been  couflim-id. 

b7.  The  December  1st  summary,  which  Admiral  Kimmel  received,  stated  that 
all  Japanese  service  radio  calls  of  forces  afloat  had  changed  promptly  at  0000 
on  1  December;  that  previously  service  calls  had  been  changed  after  a  period 
of  six  months  or  more  and  that  calls  had  been  last  changed  on  1  November  1D41. 
This  summary  stated,  and  was  underscored  by  Admiral  Kimn:>3l,  that  "The  fact 
that  service  calls  lasted  only  one  month  indicates  an  additional  progressive  step 
in  preparing  for  operations  on  a  large  scale."  It  also  stated,  among  other  things, 
that  a  large  number  of  submarines  were  believed  to  be  east  of  Yososuka-Chichi- 
jima  and  Saipan,  and  as  to  carriers  that  there  was  "no  change." 

68.  On  2  December  li>41,  Admiral  Kimmel  examined  a  menaorandum  which 
Layton  had  prepared  on  December  1st  at  his  request.  This  contained  Layton's 
estimate,  on  the  basis  of  all  available  information,  of  the  location  of  Japanese 
naval  forces.  This  estimate  placed  in  the  Bako-Takao  area  Carrier  Division  4 
and  Carrier  Division  3,  which  included  four  carriers,  and  the  "KASUGA  MARU" 
(believed  to  have  been  a  converted  carrier).  The  estimate  placed  one  carrier 
"KORYU(  ?)  plus  plane  guards"  in  the  Marshalls  area. 

69.  Layton's  written  estimate  made  no  mention  of  Japanese  Carrier  Divi- 
sions 1  and  2,  consisting  of  four  carriers.  This  omission  was  deliberate.  The 
reason  was  that  Layton  considered  that  the  infornaation  as  to  the  location  of 
those  carriers  was  not  sufficient  to  warrant  a  reliable  estimate  of  their 
whereabouts. 

70.  On  2  December  IWl,  Admiral  Kimmel  and  Layton  had  the  following 
conversation : 

[170]  "CAPTAIN  LAYTON:  As  best  I  recall  it.  Admiral  Kimmel  said, 
'What !  You  don't  know  where  Carrier  Division  1  and  Carrier  Division  2  are?' 
and  I  replied,  'No,  sir,  I  do  not.  I  think  they  are  in  home  waters,  but  I  do  not 
know  where  they  are.  The  rest  of  these  units,  I  feel  pretty  confident  of  their 
location.'  Then  Admiral  Kimmel  looked  at  me,  as  sometimes  he  would,  with 
somewhat  a  stern  countenance  and  yet  partially  with  a  twinkle  in  his  ey^  ftnd 
said,  'Do  you  mean  to  say  that  they  could  be  rounding  Diamond  Head  and  you 
wouldn't  know  it?'  or  words  to  that  effect.  My  reply  was  that,  '1  nope  tuey 
would  be  sighted  before  now,'  or  words  to  that  effect."     ♦     ♦     ♦ 

"CAPTAIN  LAYTON :  His  question  was  absolutely  serious,  but  when  he  said, 
'Where  are  Cardivs  1  and  2?'  and  I  said,,  'I  do  not  know  precisely,  but  if  I  must 
estimate,  I  would  say  that  they  are  probably  in  the  Kuro  area  since  we  haven't 
heard  from  them  in  a  long  time  and  they  may  be  refitting  as  they  finished  opera- 
tions only  a  month  and  a  half  ago,'  and  it  was  then  when  he,  with  a  twinkle  in 
his  eye,  said,  'Do  you  mean  to  say  they  could  be  rounding  Diamond  Head?'  or 
words  to  that  effect.  In  other  words,  he  was  impressing  me  on  my  complete 
ignorance  as  to  their  exact  location."     *     *     * 

"CAPTAIN  LAYTON :  This  incident  has  been  impressed  on  my  mind.  I  do 
not  say  that  I  quote  him  exactly,  but  I  do  know  that  he  made  such  a  statement 
to  me  in  the  way  to  point  out  to  me  that  I  should  know  where  they  are  but  hadn't 
so  indicated  their  location." 

71.  The  December  2nd  radio  intelligence  summary,  which  was  delivered  to 
Admiral  Kimmel  on  December  3rd,  stated  as  to  carriers: 

"Alnaost  a  complete  blank  of  information  on  the  carriers  today.  Lack  of 
identification  has  somewhat  promoted  this  lack  of  information.  However,  since 
over  2'^0  service  calls  have  been  partially  identified  since  the  change  on  the  1st 
of  December  and  not  one  carrier  call  has  been  recovered,  it  is  evident  that 
carrier  traffic  is  at  a  low  ebb." 

72.  The  radio  intelligence  summary  delivered  to  Admiral  Kimmel  on  Decem- 
ber 4th  stated,  in  part,  "No  information  on  submarines  or  carriers."  The  sum- 
mary delivered  on  December  5th  made  no  mention  of  carriers.  The  summary 
delivered  on  December  6th  stated,  in  part,  "No  traffic  from  the  Commander 
Carriers  or  Submarine  Force  has  been  seen  either." 

'  73.  Other  than  radio  intelligence  and  sighting  reports  from  other  sources,  the 
only  practicable  way  by  which  the  Commander  in  Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  could 
have  obtained  information  as  to  the  location  or  movements  of  Japanese  naval 
forces  from  27  November  to  7  December  1941  was  by  long  distance  air 
reconnaissance. 

[171]  74.  Under  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan,  the  Navy  had  the 
obligation,  through  ComFOURTEEN.  to  conduct  distant  reconnaissance,  and  under 
Annex  VII,  Section  VI,  to  the  Joint  Coastal  Frontier  Defense  Plan,  naval  forces 


2360     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

were  to  be  supplemented  by  available  Army  aircraft  if  the  naval  aircraft  were 
insufficient  for  long  distance  patrol  and  search  operations.  As  previously  pointed 
out,  the  latter  plan  was  not  in  operation  because  an  agreement  between  the  Com- 
manding General  and  ComFOURTEEN  that  threat  of  a  hostile  attack  was  immi- 
nent was  a  prereQuisite  and  no  such  agreement  had  been  made  prior  to  the  attack. 
The  Naval  Base  Defense  Air  Force  Plan,  which  implemented  the  agreements  for 
joint  Army-Navy  air  action,  similarly  was  not  operative  prior  to  the  attack. 

75.  No  patrol  planes  were  under  the  command  of  Admiral  Bloch.  The  only 
Navy  planes  suitable  for  long  distance  reconnaissance  were  the  Pacific  Fleet  patrol 
planes. 

76.  The  Pacific  Fleet  patrol  planes  were  under  the  control  of  Admiral  Kimmel, 
and  he  had  the  responsibility  for  their  utilization.  They  were  operated  after  22 
November  1941  in  accordance  with  schedules  approved  by  him  at  that  time,  which 
were  not  revised  prior  to  the  attack.  The  schedules  stressed  training  operations. 
They  did  not  provide  for  distant  reconnaissance  from  Oahu. 

77.  Admiral  Kimmel  testified  before  the  Naval  Court  of  Inquiry  that  he  decided 
on  November  27th  that  there  should  be  no  distant  reconnaissance. 

78.  There  is  no  evidence  of  any  specific  discussion  between  Admiral  Kimmel  and 
members  of  his  staff  on  or  after  the  receipt  of  the  "war  warning,"  as  to  the 
advisability  or  practicability  of  long  range  reconnaissance  from  Oahu.  The  War 
Plans  Officer  thought  that  the  subject  must  have  been  discussed,  but  could  recall 
no  specific  discussion.  The  Commander  of  the  Fleet  planes,  who  had  not 
been  informed  of  any  of  the  significant  warning  messages,  testified  that  Admiral 
Kimmel  had  no  such  discussion  with  him. 

79.  The  joint  estimate  by  Admiral  Bellinger,  Commander,  Fleet  Patrol  Planes, 
and  General  Martin,  Commanding  General.  Hawaiian  Air  Force,  which  was  used 
as  a  basis  for  the  joint  Army-Navy  agreements,  was  prophetic  in  its  estimate  that 
in  the  event  of  attack  on  Hawaii,  the  most  likely  and  dangerous  form  of  attack 
would  be  an  air  attack  to  be  launched  at  dawn  from  carriers  about  200  miles  from 
Oahu.  This  estimate  stated  that  the  action  open  as  a  counter-measure  included 
daily  patrols  as  far  as  possible  from  Oaliu,  to  sectors  through  360  degrees,  to  reduce 
the  possibilities  of  surface  or  air  surprise.  It  further  stated  that  such  patrols 
could  be  effectively  maintained  with  the  personnel  and  materiel  available  at  the 
time  (March,  1941)  for  a  very  short  period  and  that  such  patrols  were  not  practica- 
ble unless  other  intelligence  indicated  that  surface  raid  was  probable  within 
narrow  limits  of  time.  According  to  Admiral  Bellinger,  it  was  realized  by  the 
responsible  oflicers  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  that  another  course  of  action  which  was 
always  open  was  to  fly  a  patrol  of  less  than  360  degrees,  with  the  available  aircraft, 
covering  the  more  dangerous  sectors. 

[172]  80.  A  daily  search  of  the  Fleet  operating  areas  to  the  southward  of 
Oahu  was  being  carried  out  prior  to  the  attack,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions 
of  the  Pacific  Fleet  letter  on  security  of  the  Fleet  at  base  and  in  operating  areas. 

81.  No  distant  reconnaissance  was  flown  from  Oahu  during  the  critical  period 
27  November  to  7  December  1941.  The  last  previous  distant  reconnaissance  flown 
from  Oahu  appears  to  have  been  for  several  days  during  the  summer  of  1941  on  a 
sector  toward  Jaluit.  This  reconnaissance  had  been  directed  by  Admiral  Kimmel 
at  Admiral  Bloch's  request. 

82.  Late  in  November,  1941,  the  Army  planned  to  conduct  a  reconnaissance 
flight  from  Oahu  to  Jaluit  and  Truk,  with  the  Navy  assisting  by  providing  intelli- 
gence. The  reconnaissance  was  not  flown  because  the  Army  planes  were  not 
made  ready  prior  to  the  attack. 

83.  The  Navy  Basic  War  Plan  assigned  to  the  Pacific  Fleet  the  task  of  protecting 
the  territory  of  the  Associated  Powers  in  the  Pacific  area  by  destroying  hostile 
expeditions  and  by  supporting  land  and  air  forces  in  denying  the  enemy  the  use  of 
land  positions  in  that  hemisphere.  Under  the  provisions  of  Pacific  Fleet  Operating 
Plan  Rainbow  Five,  when  that  plan  became  effective,  the  Pacific  Fleet  patrol 
planes  were  to  maintain  maximum  patrol  plane  search  against  enemy  forces  in  the 
approaches  to  the  Hawaiian  area,  having  due  regard  for  time  required  for  over- 
haul and  repaid  of  planes  and  for  conservation  of  personnel. 

84.  In  the  war  warning  of  November  27th,  which  advised  that  negotiations  with 
Japan  bad  ceased  and  that  an  aggressive  move  by  Japan  was  expected  within  a  few 
days,  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  directed  that  Admiral  Kimmel  "execute  an 
appropriate  defensive  deployment  preparatory  to  carrying  out  the  tasks  assigned 
in  WPL-46." 

85.  The  dispatch  of  November  28th  repeated  an  Army  dispatch,  which,  among 
other  things,  advised  General  Short  that  Japanese  future  action  was  unpredict- 
able but  that  hostile  action  was  possible  at  any  moment.    The  Navy  dispatch  di- 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2361 

rected  that  Admiral  Kinimel  was  to  undertake  no  offensive  action  until  Japan 
had  committed  an  overt  act  and  that  he  was  to  "be  prepared  to  carry  out  tasks 
assigned  in  WPL-46  so  far  as  they  apply  to  Japan  in  case  hostilities  occur." 

86.  Tlie  esiablishment  of  long  uistance  air  reconnaissance  from  (rntiu  would 
have  been  an  "'appropriate  deiensive  deployment  preparatory  to  carrying  out  the 
tasks  assigned  in  WPL^6." 

87.  The  Fleet  patrol  planes  available  at  Oahu  in  the  week  preceding  the  attack 
were  not  sufficient  to  have  conducted  360  degree  reconnaissance  daily  for  more 
than  a  few  uays. 

88.  Prior  to  the  attack,  requests  had  been  made  by  the  Pacific  Fleet  to  the  Navy 
Department  to  increase  the  number  of  patrol  planes  assigned  to  the  Fleet.  Some 
new  replacement  planes  had  been  sent  to  the  Fleet  during  October  and  November, 
1941.  Additional  planes,  as  evidenced  by  the  prompt  arrival  of  reenforcements 
after  December  7th,  could  have  been  made  available  by  the  Navy  Dvipartment,  but 
at  the  expense  of  deienses  in  other  areas.  The  [ITS]  Navy  Department 
presumably  knew  that  the  number  of  planes  a\ailable  at  Oahu  were  not  suft^cient 
to  conduct  360°  reconnaissance  daily  tor  more  than*  a  few  days.  The  evidence  in 
prior  investigations  inoicates  that  after  November  27th,  responsible  officers  in  the 
Navy  Department  though  that  reconnaissance  was  being  conducted  from  Oahu 
to  the  extent  practicable  with  the  planes  available  there. 

89.  There  were  sufficient  Fleet  patrol  planes  and  crews  in  fact  available  at 
Oahu  during  the  week  preceding  the  attack  to  have  flown,  for  at  least  several 
weeks,  a  daily  reconnaissance  covering  128°  to  a  distance  of  about  700  miles. 

90.  The  sectors  north  of  Oahu  were  generally  recognized  as  being  the  most  likely 
sectors  from  which  a  Japanese  attack  would  come,  if  the  Japanese  were  to  attack 
Pearl  Harbor. 

91.  If  a  daily  distant  reconnaissance  had  been  flown  from  Oahu  after  27  Novem- 
ber 1941,  with  the  available  patrol  planes,  the  northern  sectors  probably  would 
have  been  searched. 

92.  On  the  morning  of  7  December  1941,  shortly  before  the  air  attack  on  Pearl 
Harbor,  there  were  reports  of  suspected  and  actual  hostile  submarine  activity. 
The  second  advised  of  a  surface  and  depth  charge  attack  on  a  submarine.  Only 
the  latter  report  reached  responsible  officers.  Due  to  reports  on  previous  days  of 
sound  contacts  with  submarines,  confirmation  was  sought.  The  action  Initiated 
by  ComFOURTEEN,  in  dispatching  the  ready  duty  destroyer,  was  in  accord  with 
the  provisions  of  the  Fleet  security  letter. 

93.  Confirmation  of  the  report  of  the  sinking  of  a  submarine  was  not  received  by 
Admiral  Kimmel  or  by  Admilar  Bloch  prior  to  the  air  attack. 

94.  There  is  no  evidence  warranting  the  conclusion  that  a  Japanese  submarine 
entered  Pearl  Harbor  prior  to  December  7th.  The  one  midget  submarine  known 
to  have  been  been  in  Pearl  Harbor  on  the  morning  of  December  7th  was  sunk  after 
making  an  ineffectual  attack. 

95.  Evidence  of  the  approach  of  a  large  flight  of  planes  from  the  northward, 
obtained  by  Army  enlisted  n»en  operating  a  radar  installation  for  instruction 
purposes,  was  not  communicated  either  to  the  Navy  or  to  responsible  Army 
commanders. 

96.  The  Commander  in  Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  and  ComFOURTEEN  had  no 
previous  warning  of  the  air  attack,  which  was  initiated  by  the  enemy  at  0755. 
The  attack  was  skillfully  executed,  and  resulted  in  serious  losses  of  life  and 
damage. 

97.  The  battleships  each  had  two  5"  antiaircraft  guns  ready  and  two  machine 
guns  manned,  which  was  in  excess  of  the  requirements  of  Condition  III  as 
prescribed  in  the  Fleet  Security  I^etter.  As  to  Fleet  aircraft  based  at  Oahu, 
seven  were  in  the  air  (3  on  morning  security  patrol  armed  with  depth  charges 
and  4  engaged  in  tactics  with  submarines)  ;  ten  were  on  30  minutes  notice;  and 
the  balance  of  forty-four  on  four  hours  notice. 

[n/f]  98.  As  a  result  of  adherence  to  Fleet  schedules  which  had  been  issued 
in  September,  1941,  the  Pacific  Fleet  battleships,  with  one  exception,  were  all  in 
port  and  were  either  sunk  or  damaged.  Due  to  the  fortunate  coincidence  which 
resulted  in  the  aircraft  carriers  being  at  sea,  they  were  uninjured. 

99.  It  has  been  learned,  since  7  December  1941,  that  the  Japanese  task  force 
which  attacked  Pearl  Harbor  left  Saiki  Anchorage,  near  the  Bongo  Channel, 
sometime  between  20  and  22  November  1941,  East  Longitude  Time,  and  proceeded 
to  Tankan  Bay,  Etorofu  Islaod,  in  the  Kuriles.    The  force  then  assembled  and 


79716  O— 46 — pt. 


2362     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

fueled.  It  departed  on  or  about  28  November  1941,  East  Longitude  Time,  and 
proceeded  in  an  easterly  direction  to  about  170°  West  Longitude,  then  southeast 
to  a  point  about  200  miles  from  Oahu. 

100.  The  Japanese  striking  force  included  three  Carrier  Divisions  among  which 
were  Carrier  Divisions  1  and  2.  Five  days  before  the  attack,  the  Fleet  Intelligence 
Officer  had  advised  Admiral  Kimmel  that  he  could  not  reliably  estimate  the 
location  of  Carrier  Divisions  1  and  2. 

101.  The  Japanese  carriers  launched  their  planes  from  a  position  30O  miles  due 
north  of  Oahu. 

[115]  B.  Conclusions. 

1.  The  basic  war  plans  and  the  local  defense  plans  were  sound  and  were  de- 
signed to  meet,  with  the  available  means,  various  types  of  attack,  including  an 
attack  such  as  the  one  which  was  delivered.  The  basic  war  plans  and  the  local 
air  defense  plans  were  not  operative  in  time  to  meet  that  attack.  The  Rainbow 
Five  war  plans  presupposed  the  existence  of  a  state  of  war.  The  local  air  defense 
plans  presupposed  agreement  between  the  local  commanders  that  an  attack  was 
imminent.     Neither  of  these  was  the  ca.se  prior  to  the  attack. 

2.  The  system  of  connnand  in  effect  in  the  Hawaiian  areq  was  that  of  mutual 
cooperation  and  not  unity  of  con)mand.  Cooperation  between  the  local  Army  and 
Navy  commanders  required  agreement  as  to  the  imminence  of  attack,  which  pre- 
supposed the  possession  and  exchange  of  information  concerning  Japanese  inten- 
tions and  movements  of  Japanese  naval  forces. 

3.  A  full  exchange  of  information  is  necessary  to  the  effective  exercise  of  Joint 
Command.  While  there  was  a  considerable  exchange  of  information  between 
various  Army  and  Navy  intelligence  agencies  there  was  no  organized  system  to 
ensure  such  exchange. 

4.  Current  and  detailed  information  which  was  obtained  by  the  Japanese  as  to 
the  location  and  movements  of  American  naval  forces  and  as  to  the  preparations 
being  made  for  defense  against  an  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  contributed  to  the 
success  of  their  attack. 

5.  Information  was  promptly  and  efficiently  obtained  by  the  United  States  Navy 
and  Army  intelligence  organizations  in  Washington,  concerning  the  Japanese 
(Government's  actual  views  as  to  the  diplomatic  negotiations,  and  its  intention  to 
wage  war,  by  means  of  interception,  decryption,  and  translation  of  Japanese 
diplomatic  messages. 

6.  The  information  which  was  obtained  in  Washington  by  the  War  and  Navy 
Departments  from  Japanese  diplomatic  messages  was  fully  exchanged.  The 
information  which  was  obtained  by  the  Navy  Department  as  to  Japanese  naval 
movements  was  available  to  intelligence  officers  of  the  War  Department  in  Wash- 
ington. The  War  Department  had  information  which  led  that  Department  to 
believe  that  Japanese  naval  forces  were  in  the  Marshalls  in  November,  1941.  This 
appears  from  a  War  Department  dispatch  of  26  November  1941  to  General  Short, 
information  to  Admiral  Kimmel,  concerning  a  .special  photographic  reconnaissance 
to  be  flown  over  Truk  and  Jaluit,  in  order  to  obtain  information,  among  other 
things,  as  to  the  number  and  location  of  naval  vessels.  The  reconnaissance  was 
not  flown  because  the  special  Army  planes  were  not  made  ready. 

7.  Although  the  Japanese  (iovernnient  established  in  their  diplomatic  messages 
a  code,  known  as  the  "wind.s"  code,  to  be  used  in  radio  broadcasts  in  order  to 
convey  information  to  its  representatives  as  to  the  status  of  relations  between 
Japan  and  other  countries,  no  message  was  intercepted  prior  to  the  attack  which 
used  the  code  words  relating  to  the  United  States. 

[nO]  8.  The  information  obtained  by  the  Navy  Department  from  intercepted 
Japanese  diplomatic  messages  was  adequately  disseminated  within  the  Navy 
Department. 

9.  Although  Admiral  Kimmel  some  months  before  had  made  requests  that  he  be 
kept  fully  informed  on  subjects  of  interest  to  the  Fleet  and  as  to  all  important 
developments,  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  did  not  communicate  to  him  impor- 
tant information  which  would  have  aided  him  materially  in  fully  evaluating  the 
seriousness  of  the  situation.  In  particular,  the  failure  to  transmit  the  State 
Department  message  of  November  26th  and  to  send,  by  telephone  or  other  expedi- 
tious means,  information  of  the  "1  p.  m."  message  and  its  possible  import,  were 
unfortunate. 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2363 

10.  Admiral  Klnimel,  nevertheless,  did  have  suflacient  inforiuatior.  in  his  posses- 
sion to  indicate  that  the  situation  was  unusually  serious,  and  that  important 
developments  with  respect  to  the  outbreak  of  war  were  imminent.  This  included 
the  'war  warning"  message  and  similar  important  messages  whfch  were  sent  by 
the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 

11.  The  available  information  in  the  possession  of  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
Pacific  Fleet,  as  to  the  existing  situation,  particularly  the  "war  warning"  mes- 
sage, was  not  disseminated  to  all  of  his  important  subordinate  commanders  whose 
cognizance  thereof  was  desirable.  Thus  Admiral  Bellinger,  who  commanded  the 
patrol  planes,  and  Admiral  Newton,  who  was  at  sea  with  a  carrier  and  other  units, 
were  not  informed  of  this  and  other  important  messages. 

12.  Despite  the  fact  that  prior  to  the  attack  the  telephone  lines  of  the  Japanese 
Consul  General  at  Honolulu  were  tapped  and  that  various  of  his  cable  messages 
were  secured  at  Honolulu,  no  information  was  obtained  prior  to  December  7th 
which  indicated  the  likelihood  of  a  Japanese  attack.  The  legal  restrictions  which 
denied  access  to  such  cable  messages  were  a  definite  handicap  to  the  intelligence 
agencies  in  the  Hawaiian  area. 

13.  Although  various  messages  of  the  Japanese  Consul  General  at  Honolulu, 
which  indicated  Japanese  interest  in  specific  locations  of  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor, 
were  intercepted  by  radio  intercept  stations  of  the  Army  and  Navy  and  decrypted 
prior  to  the  attack,  this  information  was  not  transmitted  by  the  Navy  Department 
to  Admiral  Kimmel.  Certain  other  messages  which  were  intercepted  by  the  Army 
prior  to  7  December  1941,  indicated  the  likelihood  of  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  but 
were  not  decrypted  or  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  Navy  prior  to  the  attack, 
apparently  because  the  Army  did  not  have  sufficient  i)ersonnel  for  such  work. 

14.  The  only  practicable  sources  from  which  Admiral  Kimmel  could  have  secured 
information,  after  the  receipt  of  the  "war  wfirning,"  as  to  the  approach  of  the 
attacking  force,  were  the  aircraft  warning  service,  traffic  analyses  of  Japanese 
naval  communications,  and  distant  air  reconnaissance  from  Oahu. 

[/77]  15.  The  aircraft  warning  system  was  being  operated  by  the  Army 
during  certain  periods  of  the  day  primarily  for  training  purposes,  and,  although 
not  fully  developed,  could  have  served  to  give  some  warning  of  the  approach  of 
Japanese  aircraft. 

16.  The  principal  basis  for  estimates  of  the  location  of  Japanese  naval  forces 
was  the  intelligence  obtained  by  the  Navy  from  traffic  analysis  of  Japanese  naval 
comnmnication.s. 

17.  A  carrier  attack  could  not,  with  certainty,  have  been  prevented,  for  the 
following  reasons : 

(a)  Certain  prevention  of  such  an  attack  requires  interception  and  destruc- 
tion of  the  carriers  before  attack  planes  can  be  launched. 

(b)  The  forces  necessary  to  insure  such  interception  and  destruction,  any- 
where in  the  vast  area  which  would  have  had  to  be  covered,  were'not  available, 
and  could  not  have  been  expected  to  be  available. 

(c)  If  the  Japanese  task  force  had  been  detected  at  nightfall,  the  probability 
of  its  successful  interception  and  destruction  prior  to  the  following  dawn  would 
liave  been  small. 

18.  Prior  warning  of  an  impending  air  attack,  even  as  little  as  one  half  hoiir, 
would  have  served  consideral)ly  to  reduce  the  effectiveness  of  the  attack,  for  the 
iollowing  reasons : 

(a)  Ships'  antiaircraft  batteries  would  have  been  fully  manned  and  ready. 
It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  antiaircraft  fire  was  more  effective  against  the  subse- 
quent attacks  than  the  initial  air  attack. 

(b)  Enemy  dwracter  of  the  approaching  planes  would  have  been  immediately 
appreciated  and  they  would  have  been  engaged  at  once. 

(c)  The  maximum  condition  of  damage  control  readiness  would  have  been  set, 
thus  facilitating  the  isolation  of  damage  received. 

(d)  Many  planes  could  have  been  in  the  air.  in  readiness. 

(e)  (Jround  disi)er.sal  of  planes  could  have  been  improved. 

1!).  The  only  adequate  means  of  a.ssuring  detection  of  an  approaching  carrier 
attack  was  by  3(^)°  distant  air  search  from  Oahu.  Suthcient  planes  were  not 
available  to  carry  out  an  all-round  distant  air  reconnaissance  daily  for  more 
than  a  few  days. 

[/78]  20.  A  thorough  appreciation  of  the  danger,  the  capabilities  of  the 
available  planes,  and  the  importance  of  the  defense  of  Pearl  Harbor  might  have 
justified  the  allotment  by  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  of  additional  patrol  planes 


2364     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

to  the  Pacific  Fleet.  Although  the  additional  planes,  if  assigned,  would  not  have 
been  sufficient  for  a  360°  daily  search,  they  would  have  increased  the  area 
which  could  have  been  effectively  covered  and  might  have  acted  as  an  induce- 
ment to  such  employment.  Admittedly,  in  making  over-all  plane  assignments, 
it  was  necessary  for  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  to  weigh  the  prospective 
needs  of  the  Pacific  and  the  Atlantic,  where  hostilities  with  Axis  submarines  were 
already  in  progress. 

21.  Partial  air  reconnaissance,  covering  a  sector  of  some  120  degrees,  could 
have  been  maintained  daily  from  Oahu  for  a  considerable  period  of  time  with 
the  Fleet  patrol  planes  controlled  by  Admiral  Kimmel  and  could  have  been 
designed  to  cover  the  most  probable  approach  bearings  from  which  an  attack 
might  have  been  expected.  Such  reconnaissance  would  have  had  a  reasonable 
chance  of  success. 

22.  Neither  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific 
Fleet,  nor  the  key  members  of  the  latter's  staff,  seem  to  have  given  serious 
consideration  after  27  November  1941  to  the  possibility  or  probability  of  an  air 
attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  or  of  its  possible  effect. 

23.  The  information  as  to  Japanese  naval  forces  which  was  available  to  the 
Commander  in  Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  emphasizing  the  movement  of  forces  to  the 
southward,  tended  to  concentrate  his  attention  on  the  probability  of  Japanese 
attacks  on  the  Philippines  and  Malaysia.  The  information  which  was  received 
by  Admiral  Kimmel  during  the  first  week  of  December  1941  indicated,  however, 
that  on  December  1st  there  was  an  unusual  change  in  Japanese  radio  call  signs ; 
that,  on  the  basis  of  all  information  up  to  December  2nd,  no  reliable  estimate 
could  be  made  of  the  whereabouts  of  four  of  Japan's  ten  carriers,  and  that  there 
was  no  information  as  to  any  of  the  carriers  thereafter.  The  absence  of  positive 
information  as  to  the  location  of  the  Japanese  carriers,  a  study  of  the  movement 
which  was  possible  to  them,  under  radio  silence,  through  the  unguarded  areas 
of  the  Pacific,  and  a  due  appreciation  of  the  possible  effects  of  an  air  attack 
should  have  induced  Admiral  Kimmel  to  take  all  practicable  precautions  to 
reduce  the  effectiveness  of  such  an  attack.  The  measures  which  reasonably 
were  open  to  him  were : 

(a)  Establishment  of  long  distance  air  reconnaissance,  covering  the  most 
probable  approach  sectors  to  the  extent  possible,  on  a  reasonably  permanent  basis, 
with  available  planes  and  crews. 

(b)  Establishment  of  a  higher  condition  of  anti-aircraft  readiness,  at  least 
during  the  dangerous  dawn  hours. 

(c)  Establishment  of  a  higher  degree  of  damage  control  readiness  by  ships  in 
port,  particularly  during  the  dangerous  dawn  hours. 

(d)  Installation  of  antitorpedo  nets  to  protect  the  larger  vessels  in  port. 
[179]         (e)   Maintenance  of  a  striking  force  at  sea  in  readiness  to  intercept 

possible  attack  forces. 

(f )  Maintenance  of  the  maximum  force  of  the  Fleet  at  sea,  with  entry  into  port 
at  irregular  intervals. 

(g)  Checking  with  Army  as  to  readiness  of  antiaircraft  defense  and  aircraft 
warning  installations. 

24.  Admiral  Kimmel's  estimate  as  to  the  probability  of  submarine  attack  in 
the  Hawaiian  area  was  justified  by  subsequent  events. 

25.  Throughout  his  incumbency  as  Commander  in  Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  Admiral 
Kimmel  was  energetic,  indefatigable,  resourceful,  and  positive  in  his  efforts  to 
prepare  the  Fleet  for  war.  In  considering  the  action  which  he  could  have  taken, 
it  should  be  noted  that : 

(a)  Establishment  of  the  maximum  plane  reconnaissance  would  have  meant 
the  stoppage  of  aircraft  training  which  was  of  great  importance  to  the  naval 
expansion  program,  and  might  have  resulted  in  wear  and  tear  on  planes  and 
crews  which  would  have  reduced  their  later  effectiveness. 

(b)  Higher  conditions  of  readiness  would  have  interfered  with  the  rest  and 
relaxation  residable  in  port  for  the  maintenance  of  personnel  efficiency. 

(c)  Failure  to  install  antitorpedo  nets  was  influenced  (i)  by  information  from 
CNO  which  made  it  appear  that  effective  drops  of -aircraft  torpedoes  with  the 
depths  of  water  and  length  of  run  available  in  Pearl  Harbor  were  not  probable ; 
(ii)  the  interference  such  nets  would  have  caused  in  harbor  operations  due  to 
crowded  conditions. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2365 

(d)  The  presence  of  two  carrier  task  forces  at  sea  at  the  time  on  necessary 
ferry  trips  did,  in  a  way,  provide  striking  forces  and  some  reconnaissance. 

(e)  In  view  of  the  submarine  menace  and  the  concentration  of  antiaircraft 
batteries,  it  was  questionable  whether  ships  were  safer  in  port  or  at  sea. 

26.  The  attempt  to  obtain  confirmation  of  the  reported  submarine  attack  off 
Pearl  Harbor  was  proper,  although  it  should  have  been  effected  in  plain  language. 
Adequate  naval  action  was  taken  in  sending  out  the  ready  destroyer.  This  in- 
formation was  of  no  immediate  interest  to  the  Army  unless  it  in  fact  indicated 
imminency  of  an  air  attack,  an  assumption  which  was  not  necessarily  logical. 
In  any  event,  confirmation  was  not  received  until  the  air  attack  had  commenced. 

[180]  27.  More  effective  action  would  have  been  taken  both  before  and 
after  the  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  had  there  been  in  existence  in  the  Hawaiian 
area  a  suitable  operating  agency  for  the  adequate  exercise  of  joint  command 
functions.  This  omission  was  the  fault  of  no  one  person,  but  of  the  existing 
system. 

28.  War  experience  has  shown  that : 

(a)  The  responsibility  for  final  major  decisions  must  devolve  on  one  person; 
that  is,  there  must  be  "unity  of  command." 

■(b)  In  planning  and  executing  joint  operations,  responsible  commanders  of  the 
different  services,  who  are  to  act  jointly,  and  the  principal  members  of  their 
staffs,  must  be  in  close  physical  touch,  and  not  entirely  dependent  on  telephonic, 
radio,  or  similar  communications.  In  no  other  way  can  a  full  exchange  of 
information  and  ideas  be  assured  nor  the  possibility  of  misunderstanding  be 
prevented. 

(c)  Command  organizations  which  are  to  function  effectively  in  an  emergency 
must  be  in  active  operation  prior  to  .such  emergency. 

29.  Based  on  the  foregoing,  military  command  of  outlying  stations,  such  as 
Hawaii,  should,  even  in  peacetime,  be  established  under  the  principle  of  "Unity 
of  Conmiand.'-'     The  commander  exercising  such  joint  command  should  be  assisted 

,by  a  joint  staff,  capable  of  advising  him  in  the  functions  of  both   services 
concerned. 

H.  K.  Hewitt. 


Sbceetary  of  the  Navy's  3bd  Endorsement  (on  Naval  Couet  of  Inquiry ) 

Department  of  the  Navy, 

Ottce  of  the  Secretary, 
Washington,  1  December  1944- 
Third  Endorsement  to  Record  of  Proceedings  of  Pearl  Harbor  Court  of  Inquiry. 

Subject :  Court  of  Inquiry  to  inquire  into  the  attack  made  by  Japanese  armed 
forces  on  Pearl  Harbor,  Territory  of  Hawaii,  on  7  December  1941, 
ordered  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  on  13  July  1944. 

1.  On  the  basis  of  the  record,  findings,  opinion  and  recommendation  of  the 
Court  of  Inquiry,  the  Fir.st  Endorsement  of  the  Judge  Advocate  General,  and  the 
Second  Endorsement  of  the  Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet,  I  find  that  the 
evidence  obtained  to  date  indicates  that  there  were  errors  of  judgment  on  the 
part  of  Admiral  Kimmel  and  Admiral  Stark.  I  am  not  satisfied,  however,  that 
the  investigation  has  gone  to  the  i>oint  of  exhaustion  of  all  possible  evidence. 

2.  Further  investigation  into  this  matter  will  be  conducted  by  an  investigating 
officer,  and,  in  addition  to  the  subjects  recommended  for  further  investigation 
by  the  Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet  in  the  Second  Endorsement,  will  include 
the  taking  of  the  testimony  of  Rear  Admiral  Wilkinson  and  Captain  McCollum, 
and  such  other  investigation  as  may  appear  to  be  necessary  in  order  to  ascertain 
all  of  the  relevant  facts  relating  to  the  Japanese  attack.  Pending  the  completion 
of  the  necessary  further  investigation  into  this  matter,  I  withhold  decision  as 
to  the  institution  of  any  proceeding  against  any  naval  oflBcer  involved. 

Forrestal, 
Secretary  of  the  Navy. 


2366     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

COMMANDEB   IN    CHIEF   U.    S.    FLEET   2ND   ENDORSEMENT    (ON    NaVAL   COtnEW   OK 

Inquiry) 

Cominch  File 

[i]  United  States  Fleet 

Headquarters  of  the  Commander  in  Chief 

Navy  Department, 
Washington  25,  D.  C,  6  November,  19^4- 
FF1/A17-25 

Serial :  003224 

Top  Secret 

Second  Endorsement  to  Record  of  Proceedings  of  Pearl  Harbor  Court  of  Inquiry. 

From :  The  Commander  in  Chief,  United  States  Fleet  and  Chief  of  Naval  Opera- 
tions. 

To :  The  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

Subject:  Court  of  Inquiry  to  inquire  into  the  attack  made  by  Japanese  armed 
forces  on  Pearl  Harbor,  Territory  of  Hawaii,  on  7  December  1941,  or- 
dered by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  on  13  July  1941. 

1.  I  concur  in  the  Findings,  Opinion  and  Recommendation  of  the  Court  of 
Inquiry  in  the  attached  case  subject  to  the  opinion  expressed  by  the  Judge  Advo- 
cate General  in  the  First  Endorsement  and  to  the  following  remarks. 

2.  (a)  As  to  Facts  I  and  II  (page  1156),  the  routine  practice  of  rotating  units 
of  the  Fleet,  so  that  each  -vessel  had  approximately  two-thirds  of  its  time  at 
sea  and  one-third  in  port,  was  usual  and  necessary.  Definitely  scheduled  upkeep 
periods  in  port  were  required,  not  only  for  keeping  the  ships  in  good  mechanical 
condition,  but,  also,  for  giving  the  personnel  sufficient  recreation  to  keep  them 
from  going  stale.  Whether  or  not  Admiral  Kimmel  was  justified  in  having 
one  task  force  and  part  of  another  in  port  on  7  December  is  a  matter  which  I 
discuss  later  on. 

(b)  In  Fact  III  (page  llaS)  the  Court  points  out  that,  because  of  constitutional 
requirements,  no  blow  against  a  potential  enemy  may  be  struck  until  after  a 
hostile  attack  has  been  delivered,  unless  there  has  been  a  declaration  of  war  by 
Congress.  The  great  advantage  which  this  gives  an  unscrupulous  enemy  is 
obvious.  This  requirement  made  it  impossible  for  Admiral  Kimmel  and  General 
Short  to  employ  the  offensive  as  a  means  of  defense,  and,  therefore,  was  a  definite 
handicap. 

[2]  (c)  Fact  IV  (page  1159)  sets  forth  that  the  Commandant  of  the  14th 
Naval  District  (Admiral  Bloch)  was  subordinate  to  Admiral  Kimmel  and  was 
charged  by  him  with  the  task  of  assisting  the  Army  in  the  defense  of  Pearl 
Harbor.  Admiral  Kimmel  was,  therefore,  responsible  for  naval  measures  con- 
cerned with  local  defense. 

(d)  Fact  V  (page;il60)  sets  forth  that  Admiral  Kimmel  and  General  Short 
were  personal  friends  ;  that  they  met  frequently  ;  that  their  relations  were  cordial 
and  cooperative  in  every  respect ;  that  they  frequently  conferred,  and  invariably 
conferred  when  messages  were  received  by  either  which  had  any  bearing  on  the 
development  of  the  United  States- Japanese  situation,  or  on  their  several  plans 
in  preparing  for  war.  Each  was  informed  of  measures  being  undertaken  by 
the  other  in  the  defense  of  the  base  to  a  degree  sufficient  for  all  useful  purposes. 
This  is  important,  in  that  it  refutes  the  rumors  which  have  been  prevalent  since 
the  Pearl  Harbor  incident  that  Admiral  Kimmel  and  General  Short  did  not 
cooperate  with  one  another. 

(e)  Part  VI  (page  1160)  sets  forth  the  information  that  the  Navy  Department 
and  the  War  Department  had  been  fully  informed  as  to  the  weaknesses  of  the 
defensive  installations  at  Pearl  Harbor,  and  in  particular  that  means  to  cope 
with  a  carrier  attack  were  inadequate.  It  further  sets  forth  that  the  Secretary 
of  War,  on  7  February  1941,  expressed  complete  concurrence  as  to  the  importance 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2367 

of  the  subject  and  the  urgency  of  making  every  possible  preparation  to  meet  a 
hostile  attack.  It  is  made  clear  that  Admiral  Kimmel  stressed  the  concept  that 
the  base  at  Pearl  Haibor  should  be  capable  of  defense  by  local  Army  and  Navy 
forces,  leaving  the  Fleet  free  to  operate  without  concern  as  to  the  safety  of  the 
base.  It  is  further  made  clear  that  both  the  War  and  the  Navy  Departments 
had  given  full  consideration  to  this  matter  and  had  been  unable,  during  1941, 
to  augment  local  defenses  to  an  adequate  degree,  because  of  the  general  state  of 
unpreparedness  for  war. 

iJj  (f )  Fact  VII  (page  1165)  sets  forth  that  the  Chief  of  Naval  Opera- 
tions and  the  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Army  submitted  a  joint  memorandum  to  the 
President  on  H  November  1941,  recommending  that  no  ultimatum  be  delivered 
to  Japan  at  that  time,  and  giving,  as  one  of  the  basic  reasons,  the  existing 
numerical  superiority  of  the  Japanese  Fleet  over  the  United  States  Pacific  Fleet. 
The  Court,  also,  points  out  that  owing  to  security  policies  in  the  two  countries,  it 
was  ea.sy  for  Japan  to  conceal  her  own  strength,  while  at  the  same  time  Japan 
enjoyed  a  free  opportunity  to  obtain  information  as  to  our  own  strength  and 
dispositions.  My  comment  is  that  this  state  of  affairs,  coupled  with  the  require- 
ment that  United  States  forces  could  take  no  overt  action  prior  to  a  declaration 
of  war,  or  actual  attack,  must  always  place  the  United  States  distinctly  at  a  dis- 
advantage during  the  period  of  strained  relations. 

(g)  Fact  VIII  (page  1167)  stresses  the  fact  that  periodical  visits  to  a  base 
are  necessary  for  seagoing  forces  in  order  that  supplies  may  be  provided,  and 
opportunity  given  for  repair  and  replenishment  and  for  rest  and  recreation  of 
personnel.  The  Court  points  out  that  it  is  foreign  to  the  concept  of  naval  war- 
fare to  require  seagoing  personnel  to  assume  responsibility  for  security  from 
hostile  action  while  within  the  limits  of  a  permanent  naval  base.  The  Court 
remarks  that  this  concept  imposes  upon  the  Army  responsibility  for  base  defense, 
and  that  the  United  States  Army  fully  understood  this  responsibility.  My  com- 
ment is  that  this  principle  is  sound  enough,  but  it  cannot  be  carried  to  an  illogi- 
cal extreme.  In  the  case  of  Pearl  Harbor,  where  local  defenses  were  inadequate, 
the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Pacific  Fleet  could  not,  and  did  not,  evade  re- 
sponsibility for  assisting  in  the  defense,  merely  because,  in  principle,  this  is  not 
normally  a  Fleet  task.  It  appears  from  the  record  that  Admiral  Kimmel  appre- 
ciated properly  this  phase  of  the  situation.  His  contention  appears  to  be  that 
Pearl  Harbor  should  have  been  strong  enough  for  self-defense.  The 
[4]  fact  that  it  was  not  strong  enough  for  self-defense  hampered  his  arrange- 
ments for  the  employment  of  the  Fleet,  but,  nevertheless,  he  was  aware  of,  and 
accepted  the  necessity  for,  employing  the  Fleet  in  defensive  measures. 

(h)  Fact  IX  (page  1169).  This  section  of  the  Findings  outlines  the  plans 
made  by  Admiral  Kimmel  and  General  Short  for  the  defense  of  Pearl  Harbor. 
It  points  out  that  the  Naval  Base  Defense  Officer  was  assigned  responsibility  for 
distant  reconnaissance,  that  no  planes  were  assigned  to  him,  but  that  the  69 
patrol  planes  belonging  to  the  Fleet  were  to  be  made  available  to  him  in  case  of 
necessity.  The  Court  remarks  that  the  basic  defect  of  this  section  of  the  plan 
lay  in  the  fact  that  the  naval  participation  in  long  rangfe  reconnaissance  depended 
entirely  upon  the  availability  of  aircraft  belonging  to  the  Fleet,  and  that  this 
circumstance,  forced  by  necessity,  was  at  complete  variance  with  the  funda- 
mental requirement  that  the  defense  of  a  permanent  naval  base  must  be  inde- 
pendent of  assistance  by  the  Fleet.  The  Court  further  remarks  that  the  effective- 
ness of  the.se  plans  depended  entirely  upon  advance  knowledge  that  an  attack  was 
to  be  expected  within  narrow  limits  of  time,  that  it  was  not  possible  for  Admiral 
Kimmel  to  make  Fleet  planes  permanently  available  to  the  Naval  Base  Defense 
Officer  (becau.se  of  his  own  lack  of  planes,  pilots,  and  crews,  and  because  of  the 
demands  of  the  Fleet  in  connection  with  Fleet  operations  at  a  base).  My  com- 
ment is  that  the  Court  seems  to  have  over-stressed  the  fact  that  the  only  patrol 
planes  in  the  area  were  assigned  to  the  Fleet.  In  my  opinion,  it  was  sound 
policy  to  place  all  aircraft  of  this  type  at  the  disposal  of  Admiral  Kimmel,  whose 
responsibility  it  was  to  allocate  all  the  means  at  his  disposal  as  best  he  could 
between  the  Fleet  and  the  base  defense  forces. 

[5]  (i)  Facts  X  and  XI  (page  1171)  set  forth  the  states  of  readiness  of 
the  forces  at  Pearl  Harbor.  In  so  far  as  the  Navy  is  concerned,  the  state  of 
readiness  was  predicated  on  certain  assumptions,  which  included  the  assumption 
that  a  declaration  of  war  might  be  preceded  by  .surprise  attacks  on  ships  at  Pearl 
Harbor  or  surprise  submarine  attack  on  ships  in  operating  areas,  or  by  a  combi- 
nation of  these  two.  The  measures  prescribed  by  Admiral  Kimmel  included  local 
patrols,  daily  search  of  operating  areas  by  air,  certain  extensive  antisubmarine 
precautions,  the  netting  of  the  harbor  entrance,  and  the  maintenance  of  "aug- 


2368     CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

mented  Condition  3"  on  board  vessels  in  port.  "C5ondition  of  readiness  No.  3" 
provides  a  means  of  opening  fire  with  a  portion  of  the  secondary  and  antiaircraft 
batteries  in  case  of  a  surprise  encounter.  The  Court  points  out  this  state  of 
readiness  did  permit  ships  to  open  fire  promptly  when  Japanese  planes  attacked. 
Local  Army  forces  were  in  "Alert  No.  1"  which  provides  for  defense  against 
sabotage  and  uprisings,  with  no  threat  from  without.  With  respect  to  this  phase 
of  the  matter  I  offer  the  comment  that  "condition  of  readiness  No.  3"  is  normally 
maintained  in  port.  However,  it  is  prerequisite  that  vessels  in  this  condition 
enjoy  a  considerable  measure  of  protetcion  by  reason  of  adequate  local  defense 
forces  when  dangerous  conditions  exist.  This  measure  of  protection  was  not 
enjoyed  by  vessels  at  Pearl  Haroor  on  7  December,  a  matter  which  was  well 
known  to  Admiral  Kimmel.  It  must,  therefore,  be  assumed  that  he  was  not 
aware  of  the  imminence  of  the  danger  of  attack,  a  matter  which  I  discuss  further 
later  on.  I  also  note  from  this  section  of  the  Findings  that  Army  and  Navy 
aircraft  on  the  ground,  and  naval  patrol  planes  moored  on  the  water,  were  not 
in  condition  to  take  the  air  promptly.  Some  patrol  plane  squadrons  were  in 
"day-oflf  for  rest"  status;  some  patrol  planes  were  in  the  air  for  local  patrol  and 
exercises;  50  percent  were  on  4  hours  notice  (page  669).  This  is  further  indica- 
tion of  the  lack  of  appreciation  of  the  imminence  of  attack,  and  led  to  the  destruc- 
tion of  large  [6]  numbers  of  United  States  aircraft.  This  section  of  the 
Findings,  also,  iwints  out  that  there  were  no  long  range  reconnaissance  in  effect 
on  7  December,  a  matter  which  I  will  refer  to  again  later  on.  It  will  be  noted 
that  the  last  paragraph  of  Fact  XI  (page  1176)  reads : 

"The  Navy's  condition  of  readiness  in  effect  on  the  morning  of  7  December 
1941,  was  that  best  suited  to  the  circumstances  then  attending  the  vessels  and 
patrol  planes  of  the  Pacific  F'leet.  A  higher  condition  of  readiness  could  have 
added  little,  if  anything,  to  their  defense." 

This  seems  to  be  a  matter  of  opinion  rather  than  fact.  I  do  not  concur,  for 
reasons  set  forth  later  on. 

(j)  F'act  XII  (page  1176).  The  Court  sets  forth  that  attack  by  carrier  aircraft 
can  be  prevented  only  by  intercepting  and  destroying  the  carrier  prior  to  the 
launching  of  planes.  It  is  further  pointed  out  that  to  destroy  a  carrier  before 
she  can  launch  her  planes,  her  location  must  be  known  and  suflScient  force  must 
be  at  hand.  The  Court  points  out  that  in  this  instance  Japanese  carriers  sailed 
at  an  unknown  time  from  an  unknown  ix>rt,  and  that  it  is  an  established  fact 
that  no  information  of  any  sort  was,  at  any  time,  either  forwarded  or  received 
from  any  source  which  would  indicate  that  carriers  or  other  ships  were  on  their 
way  to  Hawaii  during  November  or  December  1941.  The  Court  deduces,  and 
states  as  a  fact,  that  the  Japanese  attack  on  7  December,  under  the  circum- 
stances then  existing,  was  unpreventable  and  unpredictable  as  to  time.  I  concur 
that  there  was  no  direct  and  positive  knowledge  that  the  Japanese  attack  force 
was  en  route  to  the  Hawaiian  area.  However,  as  discussed  later  on,  there  was 
information  that  might  logically  have  been  interpreted  as  indicating  that  an 
attack  on  Hawaii  was  not  unlikely,  and  that  the  time  could  be  predicted  within 
fairly  narrow  limits. 

[7]  (k)  Fact  XHI  (page  1178)  discusses  the  diflSculty  of  long  rafige  recon- 
naissance with  the  forces  available  to  Admiral  Kimmel,  and  points  out  that 
Admiral  Kimmel,  after  weighing  all  factors,  specifically  ordered  that  no  routine 
long  range  reconnaissance  be  undertaken.  The  controlling  reason  seems  to  have 
been  Admiral  Kimmel's  feeling  that  if  the  Fleet  patrol  planes  were  used  for 
routine  reconnaissance  they  would  have  been  rapidly  worn  out  and,  therefore, 
unavailable  for  Fleet  purposes.  Admiral  Kimmel  had  a  difficult  decision  to 
make  in  this  matter.  There  were  many  factors  to  be  considered,  and  it  is  not 
easy  to  put  one's  self  in  his  place.  However,  after  considering  all  of  the  infor- 
mation that  was  at  his  disposal.  It  seems  to  me  that  he  was  not  on  entirely 
sound  ground  in  making  no  attempt  at  long  range  reconnaissance,  particularly 
as  the  situation  became  more  and  more  tense  in  the  few  days  immediately 
preceding  the  Japanese  attack.  It  is  obvious  that  the  means  available  did  not 
permit  an  all-around  daily  reconnaissance  to  a  distance  necessary  to  detect 
the  approach  of  carriers  before  planes  could  be  launched.  However,  there  were 
certain  sectors  more  dangerous  than  others  which  could  have  been  covered  to 
some  extent.  And  It  would  appear  that  such  partial  cover  would  have  been 
loMcal  in  the  circumstances  as  known  to  Admiral  Kimmel  in  late  November  and 
early  December,  A  pertinent  matter  in  this  connection  is  that  when  Admiral 
Richardson  was  Commander  in  Chief  he  provided  for  distant  reconnaissance 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2369 

by  patrol  planes,  using  the  few  at  his  disposal  to  cover  the  most  dangerous 
sectors  in  rotation.  He  considered  the  arc  between  170°  and  350°  to  be  of 
primary  importance,  and  believed  the  most  probable  direction  of  attack  was 
from  the  southwest.  These  patrols  were  discontinued  when,  or  shortly  before. 
Admiral  Kimmel  relievetl  Admiral  Richardson  (pages  683,  1053,  1055). 

(1)  Fact  XIV  (page  1182).  This  section  sets  forth  the  fact  that  the  Array 
had  assumed  responsibility  for  the  air  warning  service,  and  was  in  the  process 
of  ii;Sialliiig  radar  and  other  [8]  elements  of  the  air  warning  system, 
but  that  the  whole  system  was  in  an  embryonic  state  on  7  December  and  not 
in  condition  to  function.  The  system  was  partially  in  use  for  training,  and 
it  so  happened  that  a  mobile  radar  station  did  pick  up  the  approaching  Japanese 
planes  when  they  were  about  130  miles  away,  and  reported  this  fact  to  the 
Information  Center,  where  the  only  oflScer  present  was  an  officer  under  training, 
who  assumed  the  planes  to  be  a  llight  of  Army  bombers  known  to  be  en  route  from 
the  United  States.  He  made  no  report  of  the  matter.  My  comment  is  that  this 
is  indicative  of  the  unwarranted  feeling  of  immunity  from  attack  that  seems 
to  have  pervaded  all  ranks  at  Pearl  Harbor — both  Army  and  Navy.  If  there 
had  been  awareness  of  the  states  of  tension  that  existed  in  Washington,  and 
awareness  of  Japanese  potentialities,  it  appears  that  the  air  warning  system, 
embryonic  as  it  was,  could  have  been  used  to  give  at  least  an  hour's  warning 
before  the  air  attack  struck. 

(m)  Fact  XV  (page  1186)  states  that  the  greatest  damage  to  ships  in  Pearl 
Harbor  resulted  from  torpedoes  launched  from  Japanese  aircraft.  The  Court 
points  out  that,  though  the  harbor  entrance  was  well  protected  against  break- 
through by  enemy  submarines  or  small  craft,  there  were  no  antitorpedo  baffles 
within  the  harbor  for  the  protection  of  individual  ships,  because  it  had  been 
assumed  that  aircraft  torpedoes  could  not  be  made  to  run  in  the  extremely 
shoal  water  of  Pearl  Harbor.  The  decision  not  to  install  torpedo  baffles  appears 
to  have  been  made  by  the  Navy  Department  (page  1187).  Proposals  to  use 
barrage  ballons  and  smoke  were  considered  but  rejected  for  technical  reasons. 
It  is  evident,  in  retrospect,  that  the  capabilities  of  Japanese  aircraft  torpedoes 
were  seriously  underestimated. 

(n)  Fact  XVI  (page  1188).  In  this  section  of  the  Findings  the  Court  traces 
the  deterioration  of  relations  with  the  Japanese  and  outlines  certain  informa- 
tion given  to  Admiral  Kimmel  on  the  subject.  The  more  important  items  are 
as  follows : 

[9]  (1)  On  16  October  1941,  Admiral  Kimmel  was  informed  by  CNO  that 
a  grave  situation  had  been  created  by  the  resignation  of  the  Japanese  cabinet, 
that  Japan  might  attack  the  United  States,  and  that  it  was  necessary  for  the 
Pacific  Fleet  to  take  precautions  and  to  make  such  deployments  as  would  not 
disclose  strategic  intentions  or  constitute  provocative  action  against  Japan. 

(2)  On  17  October,  Admiral  Stark  addressed  a  personal  letter  to  Admiral 
Kimmel  in  which  he  stated  his  personal  view  that  it  was  unlikely  that  the  Japs 
would  attack  the  United  States. 

(3)  On  24  October,  Admiral  Kimmel  received  a  despatch  from  CNO  stating 
that  chances  of  favorable  outcome  of  negotiations  with  Japan  were  doubtful  and 
that  indications  were  that  a  surpise  aggressive  movement  in  any  direction, 
including  attack  on  the  Philippines  or  Guam,  was  a  possibility. 

(0)  Fact  XVII  (page  1193).  In  this  section  the  Court  sets  forth  certain 
information,  which  was  known  in  Washington  and  which  was  transmitted  to 
Admiral  Kimmel,  which  the  Court  holds  to  ha\^  established  the  fact  that  the 
attack  of  T  December  came  as  a  surprise  to  high  officials  in  the  State,  War,  and 
Navy  Departments,  and  to  the  Army  and  Navy  in  the  Hawaiian  area,  and  that 
there  were  good  grounds  for  their  belief  that  hostilities  would  begin  in  the  Far 
East,  rather  than  elsewhere.  The  summary  of  the  information  on  which  thib 
is  based  is  as  follows : 

(1)  On  27  November  1941,  Admiral  Kimmel  received  a  despatch  from  CNO 
beginning  with  the  words,  "This  de.spatch  is  to  be  considered  a  war  warning," 
and  going  on  to  say  that  an  aggressive  move  by  Japan  was  expected  within  the 
next  few  days;  [10]  that  there  were  indications  of  an  amphibious  move- 
ment against  either  the  Philippines,  Thai,  or  Kra  Peninsula,  or  possibly  Borneo: 
and  directing  Admiral  Kimmel  to  execute  an  appropriate  defensive  deployment. 

(2)  On  28  November,  Admiral  Kimmel  received  from  General  Short  a  War 
Department  Message  to  the  effect  that  negotiations  appeared  to  be  terminated ; 
that  Japanese  future  action  was  unpredictable;  that  hostile  action  was  possible 
at  any  time;  and  that  it  was  desirable  that  Japan  commit  the  first  overt  act,  in 
case  hostilities  could  not  be  avoided. 


2370    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

(3)  On  30  November,  Admiral  Klmmel  was  included  as  an  Information  Ad- 
dressee in  a  despatch  to  the  Commander  in  Chief,  Apia  ic  Fle^^t,  directing  him  to 
scout  for  information  of  Japanese  movements  in  the  China  Sea. 

(4)  On  28  November,  CNO  advised  Admiral  Kimmel  that  it  had  been  decided 
to  relieve  Marine  garrisons  at  Midway  and  Wake  with  Army  troops. 

(5)  Admiral  Kimmel  interpreted  the  foregoing  as  indicating  that  the  Depart- 
ment was  not  particularly  concerned  as  to  the  possibility  of  a  Japanese  attack  on 
Pearl  Harbor  at  the  time. 

(p)  Fact  XVIII  (1196).  This  section  of  the  Findings  deals  with  information 
that  became  available  in  Washington  during  the  period  beginning  26  November. 
It  is  set  forth  that  from  26  November  to  7  December,  conversations,  which  had 
been  in  progress  between  our  Government  and  Japan,  were  continued,  coming 
to  an  end  on  7  December.  The  circumstances  under  which  information  as  to 
Japanese  intentions  during  this  period  came  to  the  attention  of  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment are  set  forth  as  follows : 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2371 


UOMINCH  riLM 


UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

MKADOUARTXR*  OF  THE  COMMANDER  IN  CHIKP 

NAVY     DEPARTMENT 
WASHINOTON  28,  D.  C. 


FFVA17-25 


6  N0V1M4 


mam 

8abJ«ott 


Coart  of  Inqulzy  to  inquire  into  tfa*  &ttaok 
■ftd*  by  Japancs*  aned  foreae  on  Paarl  Harbor, 
Tarritorj  of  Eawali,  on  7  Dacaabar  194l>  ordarad 
bj  tha  Sacratary  of  tba  laTT-  on  13  July  1941. 


(1)  A  n\abar  of  ■aaeagaa  ta-Japaati»  aaita/receiTad  7^**  ^X*^^ 
during  and  prior  to  tbia  pariod,  win  .dimdad  in  tha  BaTy 
Dapartmnt  but  vara  not  oant  to  Admiral  Kiaaal.  Thasa  aaa- 

aagae  are  8UBBaj.*i£ed  in  tba  Addandua  to  tha  Court's  rinding 

of  Faeta  at  tba  back  of  Voluae  5  of  the  record.  Tba  text 

of  tha  aaBBagae  in  act  forth  at  length  in  Voluna  5,  bagizming 

at  page  692.  Theea  Baesagee  indicate  definite  Japanaee  in- 

tareet  in  diapoaitions  av  PaeLrl  Harbor,  md  aention,  in  eoaa 

caaea,  a  desire  to  know  where  Ibiited  States  ships  were  berthed. 

Adnlral  Stark  testified  that  be  considered  it  undesirable 

to  send  Adairal  KIiumI  these  despatches,  because  to  do  so 

■ight  Jeopardise  the  secrecy  fiiich  it  was  necessary  to  ^  '■+«„*..„ Tfc-ww 

maintain  as  to  the  ability  of  the  Navy  Cepartinent  to  tar««k 

the  Japeaase  endes.  This  contention  has  some  aerit,  in  ^f 

opinion.  It  was  Adairal  Stark's  responsibility  to  protect 

the  sourcejof  this  infonaation.  Howerer,  it  was  equally 

his  responsibility  to  gire  Admiral  Kinoel  a  general  picture 

of  the  infomatlon  contained  in  these  aessages.  Admiral 

Stark  says  that  he  considered  that  the  despatches  he  did 

send  to  Adair&l  Kioael  gave  an  adequate  picture  of  iliat 

was  known  and  inferred  as  to  Japanese  intentions.  As  set 

forth  under  "Opinions,"  the  Court  holds  that  the  inforaatloB 

glren  to  A^adral  Eiamel  was  not  an  adequate  siaaary  of  the 

inforaatioQ  at  hie  disposal.  I  hare  to  concur  in  this  Tlew. 

(2)  In  addition  to  the  foregoing  the  Court  goes  at 
lengtii  into  the  handling  of  the  "H  part  message",  originated 
in  Tokyo  and  addressed  to  the  Japanese  Aabassar^or  in  Washing- 
ton. The  first  13  parts  were  received  in  the  lavy  Department 
on  6  December imMJ  wnre  hyjiw'^— m  at  2100,  on  th&t  date. 
They  set  forth  the  Japanese  views  as  to  certain  United  States 
proposals  for  resolving  matters  under  dispute  between  the 


-  11  - 


2372    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


COMINCH  FILE 


UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

HKAOOUAItTDt*  OP  THI  COMMANDCR  IN  CHIBP 

NAVY    DEPARTMENT 
WABHINOTON  2B,  D.  C. 

rFl/A17-25 

8.r.a.rr3'?4  8  N'OVWM 

TIMMET 

8abJ«ett      Coort  of  Inqulzy  to  inqulr*  into  the  att*ek 

■ad*  by  JapuMa*  araad  foreaa  oa  Paarl  Harbor^ 
TarrlioxT  of  Bavali,  on  7  Dao«^b«r  19AX,   ordarad 
l7  th*  Sacratary  of  tba  la^  on  13  Jnly  19ia. 


coimtrlaa,  and  laava  no  doubt  that  tha  Dnitad  Stataa  propoaala 
vara  unaooaptabia  to  Japan,  but  dp  not  coaa  to  tha  point  of 
indioatinc  a  braak  in  ralationa.  At  or  about  0700,  7  Dacaal)ar, 
tha  Hth  part  of  tha  aaesaga  vaa^daoadad.  This  part  of  tha 
■aaaaga  eaid  that  tha  Japaneea  Goramnant  had  finally  lost 
hopa  of  baing  abla  to  adjust  ralationa  with  tha  Qaltad  Statat 
and  that  it  waa  ii^oaeible  to  raach  an  agraaaant  through  fur- 
tbar  nagotiationa.  Thla  part  of  tha  aasaaga  «aa  dalirarad  at 
about  0900,  7  Daceabar,  to  tha  Offica  of  tha  Qiief  of  laral 
Operatione,  at  about  0930  to  tha  Ihita  Houaa,  and  at  0950  to 
tha  Stata  Departaant  for  Sacrataxy  Hull  and  Sacratary  Knox. 
Sacratary  Knox  was  confarring  with  llr.  Hull  at  tha  Stata 
DaparUant.  |y,^i«^v*«< 

(3)  At  about  a030  on  7  Daeanbar,  tha  ao-callad  "ItOO 
p.a.  Besaaga"  aas  ^aaadad  in  tha  lavy  Dapartaant.  It  diractad 
tha  Japanaae  Aabasaador  to  dalivar  tha  H  part  aaaaaga  to  tha 
Sacratary  of  Stata  at  liOO  p.a.  on  that  day.  Tbla  naaaaga  vaa 
of  signlfieanca  bacauca  1«00  p.a.  in  Washington  aaa  davB  at 
Honolulu.  This  aassaga  aas  dalirerad  at  onoa  to  tha  Offica 
of  tha  Chief  of  laTal  Operations,  and  ioBediataly  tharaaftar 
to  tha  Stata  Dapartnant,  where  the  official  who  racairad  it 
was  asked  to  point  out  to  Mr.  Knox  and  Mr.  Hull  the  signifi- 
cance of  the  "ItOO  p.B.  tine  of  delirery".  In  my   opinion,  tha 
foregoing  indicates  that  at  about  10:30  on  7  Deceaber  (O5OO 
Honolulu  tine)  the  Bavy  Departaent,  or  at  laaot,  aone  officer* 
therein,  appreciated  that  tha  inforaation  Just  reoeired 
pointed  to  tha  possibility  —  eren  to  the  probability  — 
of  a  dawn  attaok  on  Pearl  Harbor.  General  Harahall  stataa 
that  thia  aessage  caae  to  hie  attention  about  11:00  a.m., 
and  that  ha  ioMdlataly  telephoned  to  Adairal  Stark  that  ha 
proposed  to  warn  General  Short  that  a  break  with  Japan 
«as  iDBinent,  and  that  an  attack  against  Hawaii  could  be 
expected  soon.  Adsdral  Stark  demrred  at  first,  as  to  tha 


-  12  - 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2373 

aOMI'4CH  PIUI 

UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

MBAOOuAimna  or  thk  commanocr  in  chbf 

NAVY    DEPARtMENT 

WASHINOTON  U.  D.  C. 

m/117-25  0  NOV  1944 

».rlaliCC3?24 

VUEBIET 

S«bJ«ott      Cofurt  of  Inquiry  to  Inqulro  into  tho  attack 

■ado  bj  J&puMse  araod  forces  on  Poarl  Harbor, 
Tarrltory  of  Hawaii,  on  7  Docaabor  19U,  ordered 
bgr  tbe  Secretary  of  the  Hairy  OD  13  July  1941« 

seed  for  sendlag  thia  aeeaage,  but  after  brief  conaideration 
aaked  General  Marahall  to  inclnda  in  hie  proposed  deepatch 
direotions  to  paaa  the  contents  to  naval  eomaanders.  General 
Ibrshall  sent  a  despatch  to  the  effect  that  the  Japanese 
were  presenting  "ihat  aaounts  to  an  ultinatvB  at  It 00  pn. , 
Washington  tise,  on  7  Deeeaber;  that  Japanese  are  under  orders 
to  destroy  their  codes  inaediately;  and  Ihat  while  the  War 
Departaent  does  not  knov  the  significance  of  the  hour  set  for 
deliTering  the  note,  you  are  to  be  on  the  alert  accordingly 
and  to  infora  naTal  authorities  of  this  comauni  cation.  *  He 
sent  this  via  conaercial  radio,  which  was  then  the  uaual  aeans 
of  coHBunieating  with  the  Hawaiian  Departaent.  The  despatch 
left  WaAington  at  12il7  on  7  Deeeaber  (6U7  a.m.  Honolulu  tiae} 
and  arrlTed  in  the  RCA  office  in  Honolulu  at  7t33  &•■•  Hono- 
lulu tiae.  Thia  was  22  ainntes  before  the  attack  began.  Qy 
the  tiae  the  aessage  had  been  d*eoded  and  delivered  to  General 
Short,  the  attack  was  already  underway.  The  Court  states  that 
if  the  aost  expeditious  asans  of  deliTery  had  been  used  (plain 
language  telephone)  this  inforaation  could  have  been  reeeived 
in  Hawaii  about  two  hours  before  the  attack  began.  The  Court 
reaaxics  that  oTen  in  this  erent  there  was  no  action  open,  nor 
aeans  arailnble,  to  Adairal  Kiaasl  liiich  could  hare  stopped 
the  attack,  or  which  could  have  had  other  than  negligible 
bearii^  upon  its  outeoae,  since  there  was  already  in  effect 
a  condition  of  readiness  beet  suited  to  the  eircuastances 
attending  ressels  within  the  llaite  of  Pearl  Harbor  naral  baee, 
and  the  Fleet  planes  at  their  air  bases  on  Oahu.  I  cannot  go 
along  with  this  reasoning  of  the  Court.  Even  two  hours  advance 
warning  would  have  been  of  great  value  in  alerting  planes  and 
in  augasntlng  the  condition  of  readiness  existing  on  board  ship. 

(4)  On  3  Deeeaber  (the  date  is  not  specified  in  the 
Findings;  it  is  sUted  in  Exhibit  20)  Adairal  Kiaasl  was 


-13  - 


2374    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


COMINCH  FIL£ 


UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

HEADOUAirrERS  OF  THE  COMMANDER  IN  CHIEF 

NAVY    DEPARTMENT 
WASHINGTON  25,  D.  C. 


Fn/A17-25 

Serlali       C'^^O^'] 


Subjects 


6  N'0V1944 


Court  of  Inquiry  to  Inquire  into  the  attack 
made  by  Japanese  armed  forces  on  Pearl  Haroori 
Territory  of  Hawaii,  on  7  December  19U.»  ordered 
by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  on  13  July  1941. 


informed  Ihat  the  Jap&nese  had  inetructed  diplomatic  and 
consular  posts  in  the  Far  East,  Kashlngton  and  London  to 
destroy  most  of  their  codes.  Admiral  Kimmel  says  (his  state- 
ment, page  29)   that  "the  significance  of  this  despatch  was 
diluted  substantially  by  publication  of  the  information  in 
the  morning  newspaper  in  Honolulu,"  and  that  he  did  not 
regard  it  as  a  clear-cut  warning  of  Japanese  intentions  to 
strike  the  United  States. 

(5)  On  4  December,  Admiral  Kimmel  reoeived  a  despatch 
directing  the  destruction  of  secret  anr*  onfidential  docrments 
at  Guam,  except  those  necessary  for  curx-ent  purposes,  lAiich 
were  to  be  kept  ready  for  instant  destruction  in  event  of 
emergency  (Exhibit  21).  This  was  followed  on  6  December  by 
authorization  for  outlying  Islands  to  destroy  secret  and  confi- 
dental  documents  "now  or  under  later  conditions  of  greater 
emergency".   (Exhibit  22) 

(q)  Addendum  to  Court's  Finding  of  Facts  (Volume  5).  In  this 
section  the  Court  sets  forth  matters  which  have  already  been  dis- 
cussed in  the  three  preceding  sxib-paragra^jhs;  and,  in  addition, 
touches  on  the  matter  of  the  so-called  "Winds  message".  This  Japan- 
ese message,  originating  in  Tokyo  on  19  November,  was  intorecpted 
aad  translai*d  in  the  Navy  Department  on  28  November.  It  set  forth 
that  "in  case  of  emergency  (danger  of  cutting  off  our  diplomatic 
relations)"  certain  code  words  would  be  inserted  in  the  middle  of 
the  daily  Japanese  short  wave  news  broadcast,  and  directed  that 
when  these  words  were  heard  codes  were  to  be  destroyed.  This 
message  was  received  In  various  places,  including  Peerl  Harbor, 
and  Admiral  Kimmel  had  it.  A  monitor  watch  was  set  at  varioxia 
places  to  look  out  for  the  expected  "weather  forecast".  On  U  and 
5  December,  the  Federal  Communications  Commission  monitored  the 
expected  "weather  forecast"  which  was  sent  from  Tokyo  twice, 
first  at  2200  on  /t   December,  and  again  at  2130  on  5  December. 
The  code  words  ap{>earing  in  this  implementing  message  meant  thut 


-  U- 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2375 


COM  INCH  FIL£ 


UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  COMMANOCR  IN  CHICP 

NAVY    DEPARTMENT 
WASHINGTON  29.  O.  C 

m/Ai7-25  6  NOV  1944 

serial.  ■rr3'' -^4 

Subject:      Court  of  Inqulrj  to  inquire  into  the  attack 

nade  bjr  Japanese  anaed  forces  on  Pearl  Harbor, 
Territoiy  of  Hawaii,  oa  7  December  19^1,  ordered 
by  the  Secretary  of  the  Ha^  on  13  July  19^1. 


Japanese  relations,  with  Russia  were  in  danger.  These  two  nessages 
haTe  been  preserved  in  the  files  of  the  Federal  Conuaunications 
Commission.  In  addition  to  this  indication  that  the  Japanese 
were  about  to  break  relations  idth  Russia,  there  is  evidence 
(Voluae  5,  page  7^6)  that  Captain  Safford,  on  duty  in  the  Office 
of  the  Director  of  Naval  Coimnunications ,  saw  on  U  December,  a 
"yellow  slip"  on  idiich  was  written  a  different  version  of  the 
ij^^lemanting  code,  which  meant  that  relations  with  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  were  in  danger.  Captain  Safford  thinks 
that  this  message  was  intercepted  by  an  East  Coast  station,  but 
he  was  not  sure.  No  written  trace  of  the  message  referred  to 
by  Captain  Safford  could  be  found  in  the  files  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment or  the  Havy  Department.  There  is  considerable  testimony  in 
the  record  as  to  what  was  done  with  the  "Winds  message".  Various 
officers  testified  that  the  implementing  despatches  were  trans- 
mitted to  the  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Naval  (derations  and  the 
Director  of  Naval  Communications,  but  Admiral  Stark  and  Admiral 
Noyes  testified  that  they  do  not  remember  hearing  anything  about 
them.  It  is  an  established  fact  that  none  if  Vm   ii— tt—  of  the 
implementing  messageSwere  ever  sent  to  Admiral  Klmmel.  However, 
as  noted  in  paragraph  2(p)(ii)  above,  Uje  Court'  finds  that  it  is  a 
fact  that  Admiral  Klmmel  was  informed  on  3  December  that  the 
Japanese  had  instructed  diplomatic  and  conavilar  posts  in  the  Tar 
Ee^t,  Washington,  and  London,  to  destroy  ceirtain  codes. 

(r)  The  Court  further  sets  forth  the  fact  (mainly  under 
Section  XTIII  on  page  1196)  that  on  26  November  a  note,  couched  in 
strong  terms,  was  delivered  hy  the  United  States  State  Department 
to  Japanese  representatives.  The  stipulptions  contained  therein 
were  drastic,  and  likeljr  to  be  unacceptable  to  Japan.  Admiral 
Klmmel  had  no  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  such  a  note,  nor  of 
its  contents  until  after  the  attack.  The  Court  points  out  that 
Admiral  Klmmel  in  May  19^1  had  particularly  asked  the  Chief  of 
Naval  Operations  to  keep  him  informed  of  the  diplomatic  situation 
in  order  that  he  might  be  "informed  of  all  important  developments 
as  they  occur  by  the  quickest  secure  means  available." 


-  15  - 


2376    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


COMINCH  FILE 


UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

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Fn/A17-25 

Sena.  rc3''?4  6  NOV  1944 

Subjaott      Court  of  Inqviixy  to  loqulra  Into  th*  attack 

made  bgr  Japanese  araed  forces  on  Pearl  Barbor» 
Terrltozy  of  Hawaii,  on  7  December  194l»  ordered 
tir  tbe  Secretarj  of  the  lavy  on  13  July  19A1> 

(«)  Fact  HZ  (page  1200).  The  Court  points  out  that  it  is 
a  prlne  obligation  of  eoaaand  to  keep  subordinate  ooBaanders 
constantly  supplied  with  Inforaatlon,  and  that  AdBl^al  Stark, 
having  important  information  In  his  possession,  during  the  critical 
period  from  26  Rovember  to  7  December,  failed  to  transmit  this 
information  to  Admiral  Klmmel,  thus  deprlTlng  the  latter  of  a 
clear  picture  of  the  existing  Japanese  situation  as  seen  la 
WashingtoBi  I  am  in  thorough  accord  with  this  Tlew  of  the  Court. 

(t)  It  will  be  noted  from  the  foregoing  that  one  of  the 
most  ii^rtant  phases  of  this  InTeetlgation  is  concerned  with  tbe 
handling  of  enemgr  Information  in  the  U&rj  Department.  In  this 
connection  it  would  seem  essential  to  a  thorough  exploration  of 
the  facts  to  have  the  teBtimoi;^  of  the  Director  of  Naval  Intelli- 
gence, who  was  largely  responsible  for  handling  information  of 
the  eneiy.  It  appears  from  the  record  that  Rear  Mairal  Wilkinson, 
the  then  Director  of  laval  Intelligence,  was  not  available  to  the 
Court  as  a  witness.  I  assume  that  the  Court  believes  that  all 
essential  information  was  obtained,  despite  the  fact  that  Admiral 
lilkinson  did  not  testify;  however,  it  appears  to  me  that  the 
failure  to  obtain  his  testimoq^  was  unfortunate. 

3.   I  submit  the  following  comment  as  to  the  Court's  Opinion. 

(a)  In  the  Opinion  based  (»  Finding  II  (page  1201),  the 
Court  expresses  tbe  view  that  the  presence  of  a  large  number  of 
combatant  vessels  in  Pearl  Harbor  on  7  December  was  necessary,  and 
that  the  information  available  to  the  Commander  in  Chief,  Pacific 
Fleet,  did  not  require  any  departure  from  his  operating  and  raalnta- 
nanoe  schedules.  I  do  not  entirely  go  along  with  this  opinion. 
Had  all  of  the  Information  available  in  the  Department  been  properly 
evaluated  and  pn^rly  disseminated,  I  am  inclined  to  believe  that 
Admiral  Klmmel' s  dispositions  on  Ihe  morning  of  7  December  would 
not  have  been  as  they  actually  were  on  that  occasion. 


-16- 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2377 


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m/A17-25 
S«rlalt   fP^')- 

nyfiiET 


6  NOV  1944 


Subjaott      Court  of  loquliy  to  inquire  into  the  attack 

■ad*  by  Japanasa  anaad  forces  on  Pearl  Harbor, 
Territory  of  Hawaii,  on  7  Deoeaber  19^1*  ordered 
I7  the  Secretary  of  the  Havy  <ni  13  July  1941* 


(b)  In  the  Opinion,  based  on  Tact  VI  (page  1202}  the  Coiirt 
expresses  the  rie*  that  deficiencies  in  personnel  and  aateriel 
efaioh  existed  in  19iU  had  an  adverse  bearing  upon  the  effectiveness 
of  the  defense  of  Peurl  Harbor,  on  and  prior  to  7  Deceaber.  I  offer 
the  cooaent  that,  obviously,  the  An^  and  lavy  were  diort  of  nen  and 
■ateriel  at  the  tiae  and  thct  available  aeans  were  spread  thin 
throughout  the  various  areas  of  probable  hostility.  The  shortage 
of  aeans  available  to  Admiral  Kiamel  aost  be  taken  into  consider- 
ation. However,  the  pertinent  question  is  whether  or  not  he  used 
the  aeans  available  to  hia  to  the  best  advantage.  In  ^  opinion, 
be  did  not.  The  fault  lay  in  the  fact  that  he  was  not  fully  in- 
f  oraed  hy  the  Navy  Departaent  of  what  was  known  as  to  probable 
Japanese  intentions  and  of  the  tenseness  of  the  situation,  and 
further,  that  his  Judgasnt  was  to  some  extent  faulty  and  that  he 
did  not  fully  appreciate  the  ii^lications  of  that  inforaation 
lAileh  was  given  to  hia. 

(e)  In  the  Opinion,  based  on  Finding  Till  (page  1202),  the 
Court  holds  that  the  defense  of  Pearl  Harbor  naval  base  was  the 
direct  responsibility  of  the  Axay,  that  the  lavy  was  to  assist 
only  with  aeans  provided  to  the  Hth  Haval  District,  and  that  the 
defense  of  the  base  was  a  Joint  operation  only  to  this  extent. 
As  I  stated  above,  I  think  this  is  a  narrow  view  of  the  question, 
and  that  Admiral  Eiamel  was  fulOy  aware  that,  in  view  of  the  weak- 
ness of  local  defenses,  the  fleet  had  to  be  eq;)loored  to  protect 
Pearl  Harbor  and  the  Hawaiiak  Islands  in  general. 

(d)  The  Court  holds  (page  1203}  that  Adadral  Bloch  perforaad 
his  duties  satisfactorily.  I  concur. 

(•}  In  the  Opinion,  based  on  Fact  IZ,  (page  1203) »  the 
Coori  states  that  naval  defense  plans  ware  eoaplete  and  sonad  in 


-  17  - 


79716  O — 46 — pt.  1( 


2378    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

COMINCH  FILE 

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WASHINSTON  ZB.  D.  C. 


6  N0V19M 


7F1/A17-25 

Serial:  ^ 

msmu 

Subject!       Court  of  Inquiry  to  inquire  into  the  attack 

aade  by  Japanese  anted  -forces  on  Pearl  Harbor, 
Territory  of  Hawaii,  on  7  December  19^11,  ordered 
by  the  Secretary  of  the  Havy  on  13  Jr.ly  19iX, 


c(Hicept,  but  contained  a  basic  defect  in  that  naval  participation 
depended  entirely  upon  the  availability  of  aircraft  belonging  to 
and  being  employed  by  the  Fleet,  and  that  on  Uie  morning  of  7 
December,  these  plans  were  ineffective  because  they  necessarily 
were  drawn  on  the  premise  that  there  would  be  advance  knowledge 
that  an  attack  was  to  be  expected  within  narrow  llmite  of  time, 
idiich  was  not  the  case  on  that  morning.   I  cannot  go  along  with 
this  view.  As  I  have  already  stated,  there  could  be  no  qviestion 
that  available  aircraft  had  to  be  employed  in  the  manner  best 
suited  to  the  danger  that  threatened.  I  doubt  that,  with  the  forces 
available,  it  would  have  been  possible  to  intercept  and  destroy  the 
Japanese  carriers  before  they  launched  their  planes,  except  b^ 
luc]^  chance.  However,  I  do  thick  that  Admiral  Kimmel  was  not 
sufficiently  alive  to  the  dangers  of  the  situation,  not  entirely 
due  to  his  own  fault.  This  had  a  bearing  on  the  amoxmt  of  damage 
that  was  incurred  by  the  Fleet  when  the  Japanese  did  attack. 

(f }  The  Opinion,  based  on  Fact  X  (page  1204) ,  expreaees  the 
Tiew  that  Admiral  SJ.mmel's  action,  taken  innediately  after  assumlD" 
oomnand,  in  placing  in  effect  coopreheneive  ituttructione  for  the 
security  of  the  Fleet  at  sea,  is  indicative  of  bis  appreciation  of 
his  responsibility  for  the  security  of  the  Fleet  and  that  the  steps 
taken  were  adequate  and  effective.   I  concur  in  this. 

(g)  The  Opinion,  based  on  Finding  U  (page  120^},  as  to 
th«  effect  that  the  measures  taken  for  the  secivi^  in  port  were 
adequate  and  proper,  and  that  only  had  it  been  known  in  advance 
that  the  attack  was  to  take  place  on  7  December,  covild  there  now 
be  any  basis  for  a  conclusion  as  to  the  steps  that  might  have  been 
taken  to  lessen  its  ill  effects.  The  Court  takes  note  of  suggestioas 
that  each  day  all  naval  planes  should  have  been  in  the  air,  all 
naval  personnel  at  tie  ir  stations,  and  all  aiiti-aircraft  guns  manned, 
•■d  expresses  the  view  that  no  such  course  of  action  could  have  been 
carried  out  as  a  matter  of  routine.  T  concur  in  this.  The  question 
at  issue  is  irtiether  or  not  indications  called  for  a  ti^tening  vp 
of  precautions  as  7  December  approached.  I  think  they  did. 


-  18  - 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2379 


t-r  4INCHPIUI 


UNITED  STATES  I     EET 

MBAOOUAimDU  OP  THK  COMMAMCMOt  IN  CHID' 

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'"rrc3.24  «  N0V1«4 


SLSHliF* 


8«kJaoti      Court  of  laqnlxy  to  inqtilr*  into  tho  attack 

■ado  lor  JapaaoM  araod  foreoa  on  Poarl  Harbor, 
Tsrrttorx  of  Hawaii,  on  7  Dooaabor  19^,  ordarod 
t7  tho  S«orotax7  of  tha  Vavjr  on  13  July  1941- 

(h)  la  th«  Opinion,  basod  on  Finding  XVIII  (pago  1207) ,  tha 
Coort  holds  that  Adairal  Kiaaal  waa  Juatifiad  in  not  proriding  for 
roatiaa  long  raaga  raeonnaisaaaea  in  tha  absaaca  of  aqjr  laforBatioo 
iadleatiag  that  tha  attack  was  to  ba  azpeotad  la  the  Havalian  area 
vithin  narrow  llaita  of  tiae.  I  haTo  already  dlacasBad  thia  phaae 
of  tha  aattar.  I  think  that  If  all  arailable  inf  oraation  had  been 
placed  at  Adairal  Ciaael'a  diaposal,  and  that  if  he  had  eraluated 
it  pr^wrly,  ha  would  bare  found  it  aaoassaxy  to  do  sooathing  about 
long  range  raoonnaiaeanoe  in  the  few  daya  inMdiately  preceding  the 
7th  of  Deeeaber. 

(i)  In  the  Opinion,  baaed  on  Fact  ITII  (page  1207),  the  Court 
eopraaaea  the  Tiew  that  there  waa  good  ground  for  belief  on  the 
part  of  hi^  official*  in  the  State,  War,  HaTj  Departaents,  and 
oa  the  part  of  the  Aragr  and  lavy  ia  the  Hawaiian  area,  that  hostill> 
ties  would  begin  in  the  Far  last  rather  than  eleeiAiere.  I  concur 
that  the  Far  last  was  the  aost  probable  scene  for  tte  Initiation 
of  Japanese  operations.  As  a  aatter  of  fact,  the  Japanese  did  begla 
to  operate  in  the  Far  East  on  7  Deeeaber.  However,  it  was  not  11- 
logieal  to  si^pose  that  an  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  would  be  regarded 
Igr  the  Japanese  as  one  of  the  initial  steps  ia  a  caapalga,  and  there 
is  aiq>le  evidaace  that  all  concerned  were  aware  of  this  possibilitif 
•»  a  possibilitgr  -that  was  straogthaned  tj  inforaatlcc  reeelTwd  in 
latfiington,  all  of  which  was  not  giTon  to  Adairal  Klaael. 

(J)  In  the  Opinion,  based  on  Facts  XyUI  and  HZ  (page  1207), 
the  Court  expresses  the  view  that  Adairal  Stark  failed  to  display 
sound  judgaent  in  that  he  did  not  transait  to  Adairal  Kiaoel,  during 
the  rery  critical  period  froa  26  Aoraabar  to  7  Deeeaber,  laportant 
iaforaatico  which  he  had  recelrad  regarding  the  Japanese  situation, 
aad,  espeelally,  in  that,  on  the  aornli^  of  7  Deeeaber  19A1,  he 
did  not  traasait  iaaediately  the  fact  that  a  assiiina  had  been 


-  19  - 


2380    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

OOMINCHFILX 

UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

*    MBAOaUANTVia  OP  TH(  OOMMANDBR  IN  CHISP 

NAVY    DEPARTMENT 
WAaHiNorroN  u,  d.  c. 

rFl/117-25 

fcrui.    CC37.7A  £  N0VS44 

WJEBKT 

Sobjectt      Court  of  Inqulxy  to  iaqulr*  Into  tb*  attack 

■ado  bjr  Japaaoso  araad  forcoa  on  Pearl  Harbor, 
Tarrltoiy  of  Hawaii,  on  7  D»o«bar  19il,  ordorod 
by  tho  8«eratax7  of  tho  laTjr  on  13  July  19U> 

rooaiTod  #ileh  appoarad  to  Indlcata  that  a  braak  In  diploaatle 
ralatioaa  waa  iMdnant,  aad  that  an  attack  In  tha  Havailan  area 
■Ight  be  azpactad  seen.  I  note  froa  the  firat  endoraaaant  that  tha 
Judge  Advocata  Oaaaral  takaa  axoaptloo  to  Ihla  Opinl<Mi,  on  the 
grooad  Ihat  tha  orldanea  ahowr  that  Adalral  Static  and  hla  principal 
adTiaara  did  not  conatrua  thla  aaaaagt  aa  indicating  an  attack  in 
tha  Havalian  area.  Dhlla  I  ooncnr  in  tha  riaw  of  the  Judge  Advooata 
Oaoaral  aa  to  tha  eonatruotion  which  Adairal  Stark  placed  upon  the 
■taaagt  in  qoaation,  nererUffeleaa ,  I  note  that  CoaaaDder  Iraaer 
(attaohad  to  tha  Coaannieationa  Diylaion  of  the  lavj  Departaent) 
did  take  atapa  to  invite  ttie  attention  of  tba  Secretary  of  the  Havj 
to  the  fact  that  ItOO  p.a.  Waahiagton  tlaa  aeaat  daan  at  Honolulu, 
and  aidnlght  in  Eaat  Aaia  (paga  U  of  Top  Secret  iddendua  to  tha 
Findii^a).  It,  therefore,  aaeaa  erident,  though  Admiral  Stark  did 
not  hare  hia  attantion  drawn  to  tha  poealble  algnifieanoa  of  tbia 
■aaaaga,  nararthalaaa  tha  iapllcationa  were  appreciated  by  at  laaat 
aoae  offioara  of  hia  office.  The  Cotirt  further  expraaaea  the  Tiew 
that  bad  tbia  iaportaat  inf  oraation  bean  conweyed  to  Adairal  Elnael, 
it  ia  a  aattar  of  conjaotura  aa  to  ihat  action  he  would  havw  takan. 
I  taka  no  exception  to  thia  expreaalon  of  opinion.  HowcTer,  it  ia 
a  fair  eoneluaioa  that  if  Adairal  UjbmI  bad  been  glT»n  all  of  the 
inforaation  aTailabla  at  the  Departaent,  he  would  have  been  in  a 
poatbion  to  Judge  the  aituatlon  better  than  he  did. 

U.       In  the  final  Opinia^  and  Becoanandation  (page  1208)  the  Court 
finds  that  no  offenaes  hawe  bean  coaaitted  or  aerioua  blaae  Incurred 
on  the  part  of  aiqr  peraoo  or  peraooa  In  the  naval  aerrloe,  and  racoaaendi! 
that  no  further  procaadlnga  be  had  in  tha  aattar.  I  'concur  that  there 
ia  not  adequate  eridenee  to  airport  general  court  aartlal  proceedings, 
but  thia  doea  not  bar  adaiaiatrative  action,  if  auoh  action  ia  found 
appropriate. 

5.   Despite  the  evidence  that  no  naval  officer  was  at  fault 
to  a  degree  likely  to  reault  in  conviction  if  brou^t  to  trial,  neverthe- 
less the  levy  eaxuwt  ewade  a  shara  of  responsibility  for  the  Pearl  Harl»jr 


-  20  - 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2381 


UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

fADOUAITHW  or  THK  COMMANOCR  IN  CMISF 

NAVY    DEPARTMENT 

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CC3?24  ^  ^OV  m 


Lalt 


•akj«eti      Court  of  InquLiy  to  isqulr*  Into  th«  attack 

■Bde  I7  Japanese  araed  foreaa  oa  Pearl  Eartar, 
Territory  of  Bavall,  on  7  TJeeeaber  V)AX,   ordered 
bj  the  Secretary  of  the  lavy  on  13  Jxtly  19il. 

iMldant.  Tliat  dlea«ter  cannot  be  regarded  aa  an  "act  of  God",  beyond 
h«Mn  power  to  prerent  or  aiticate.  It  la  trae  that  the  oouatzy  aa  a 
lAiole  is  basically  responsible  in  that  the  people  were  unvllliaK  to 
stqppart  an  adequate  amf  and  aavy  until  it  nas  too  late  to  repair  the 
consequences  of  past  neglect  in  tiiae  to  deal  effeetlTely  with  the  attack 
that  ushered  in  the  war.  It  is  true  that  the  Any  vas  responsible  for 
local  defense  at  Pearl  Harbor.  l«Tertheless,  sons  thioge  could  have  been 
done  tv  the  lavy  to  lessen  the  success  of  tha  initial  Japanese  blo«. 
Idairal  Stazk  and  Adniral  Elnnel  were  the  responsible  officers,  imd  it 
is  pertinent  to  exanine  the  poasible  courses  of  action  they  night  hare 
taken. 

(a)  Adniral  Stazk  was,  of  course,  aware  that  tfas  Ibited 
States  was  primari^  eoneernsd  with  its  own  possessions,  and  ttB 
■ost  important  United  States  possessions  in  the  Pacific  were  the 
Philippine  Islands  and  the  Hawaiian  Islands.  His  attention  should 
have  been  centered  on  those  two  places,  as  the  Pacific  situation 
becane  nore  end  nore  acute.  H«  bad  been  infened  by  Adniral  Kinnel, 
in  hia  letter  of  26  May  19^1,  that  Adniral  Eisael  felt  the  need  for 
•arly  and  accurate  infonation  as  to  the  general  situati<xi,  and 
that  he  needed  to  be  infomed  of  all  ijqportant  derelopaents  as  tfcigr 
occurred  by  the  quickest  and  noet  secure  oeans  arailable.  This 
letter  should  haTe  emphasised  the  obvious  fact  that  Adniral  Kianel 
was  in  a  difficult  position,  that  he  had  to  use  his  inltiatire  to 
keep  his  Fleet  dispositions  in  step  with  changes  in  the  situation, 
and  that  in  order  to  do  so  ho  had  to  hare  an  accurate  running 
picture  of  the  rapidly  aoTing  coiirse  of  diplMntic  erents.  In  ay 
opinian,  Adniral  Stazk  failed  to  glTS  Adniral  Kinnel  an  adequate 
•tanazy  of  the  infonation  aTailable  in  Washington,  particnlarly 
in  the  following  req^eetat 

(1)  Adniral  Kinnel  was  not  infomed  of  the  State 
Departnent's  note  of  26  lovsaber  to  the  Japamae.  Thin 
note  was  a  definite  step  towards  breaking  relationn. 


-  21  - 


2382    COXGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION   PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


COMINCH  riLK 

UNITED  STATES  FLEET 


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WAIHINaTON  2>.  D.  C. 


nKJin'r3224  8  NOV  1914 


Sttbjecti      Court  of  Inquiry  to  inqwiro  into  tho  attack 

aad*  by  Japanoaa  araad  forcoa  c«  Paarl  Haztor, 
Territozy  of  Hawaii,  on" 7  Daoaabar  19U»  ordarad 
by  tfaa  Soeratary  of  tlia  lavy  ob  13  July  19U* 

(2)  Adniral  KIbboI  wac  not  infortpad  of  tba  Bubatanaa  of 
oort&in  iatagonytri  Japaoesa  aaaaacaa  inquiring  aa  to  dispoai- 
tlona  of  shipa  Inaida  Paarl  Harbor,  afaloh  indieatad  a  Japanaaa 
intareat  in  Paarl  Harbor  aa  a  poaaibla  targat. 

(3)  Adulrsl  Siaaol  vaa  not  inferaad  of  tha  inplaaantation 
of  the  "9iada  Haaaaga'.  Adalral  Stark  aaya  ha  narar  got  this 
inforaatlcD  taiMslf,  bat  it  ia  elaar  Uiat  it  did  rmch  Adairal 
Stark's  offiea.  Ttiia,  togattaar  with  tha  bandUng  of  othar 
■attore  of  iafomation,  indioataa  lack  of  affioiancy  in  Adairal 
Stark 'a  organisation. 

(4)  AdMiral  Stark  failed  to  appraeiata  tha  aigalf icaaaa 

of  tha  "liOO  p.n.  aaasaga"  roaaiTad  on  tha  aoming  of  7  Caeaabar, 
aJLthcm^  tha  iqplioatlona  wara  appreeiatad  \ff   at  laaat  oaa  of 
hia  rabordinatas.  It  appaara  Ihat  had  thia  aaaaaga  baan  haadlad 
ly  tha  quickest  awailabla  aaana,  and  with  dua  qipraeiatioB  of 
ita  slgnifieanea,  it  t^OA  hure   raaebed  Adairal  liaaal  in  tlaa 
to  aibftbla  bia  to  naka  aoaa  laat  ainnta  praparationa  that  would 
hava  onhanoad  tha  ability  of  tfaa  ahipi  ia  Paarl  Harbor  to 
aaet  tha  Japanaaa  air  attack. 

(5)  Thera  ia  a  certain  aaaanaaB  of  tanor  of  aueh  infor- 
aation  as  Adairal  Stark  aant  to  Adairal  flaaal.  Tli«y  do  noi 
coeray  in  thaasalraa  tha  aanaa  of  latansifieatioa  of  tka 
erltioal  relationa  batwaan  tha  Onitad  Stataa  aad  Japan* 

(b)  In  ay  opinion  Adairal  Kiaaal,  daapita  tha  failvra  of 
Adaix&l  St«rk  to  keap  hla  folly  inforaad,  ncrarthalaaa  did  h«Ta 
8caa  iadicationa  of  Inercaaing  taaaanaas  as  to  relations  with 
Japan.  In  paz-ticular,  ba  had  tha  "war  warning*  aasaaga  on  27 
loT«iri>ar,  tha  "hostile  actic«  poaaibla  at  aqy  flnaat"  aasaaga  on 
28  lovaidiar,  tba  3  Daaaabar  aaasaga  that  Japanaaa  had  ordered 
deatnietion  of  codes,  and  tha  aasaages  of  i  and  6  Daeaabar 


-  22  - 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2383 


OOMINCH  FlUC 


UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

laAOQUARTDU  OF  THK  COMMANOOt  IN  CHIKF 

NAVY    DEPARTMENT 

WASHINSTON  28,  O.  C 


171/117-25 

fc«u.fC3224  6  NOV  1944 

mmp 


SnbJ*ot(      Court  of  loqulzy  to  ioqulr*  Into  the  attack 

■ade  by  Japasaee  arasd  foreaa  on  Pearl  Barbor, 
Terrltoiy  of  Havall,  on  7  Daceabar  19^1>  ordarad 
bgr  tba  Saeratary  of  tha  Ha-vy  on  13  July  1941* 

conearaLng  daatruetion  of  Unltad  Stataa  saarat  and  oonfidantlal 
■attar  at  outlying  Paclfie  lelanda.  Thass  Baoaagea  auat  ba  eon- 
aidared  in  eonnaetlon  mitb.   othar  faoata  of  tba  altnation,  and 
i4alral  flrarVi  atateooent  on  tbla  phaaa  of  tha  aattcr  miat  be 
giT«B  d«a  eonaidar&tion.  Aftar  velc^ilDg  thaaa  conalderatlona, 
Z  aa  of  tha  opinion  that  ha  could  and  ahould  have  Judged  nora 
aaeurataly  Iha  grarilgr  of  tha  danger  to  i^ich  the  Hawaiian  lelaoda 
wv  oipoMd*  The  folloving  oouraaa  of  action  were  open  to  hlni 

(1)  Ha  could  have  uaed  patrol  aircraft  which  ware 
arailabla  to  his  to  conduct  long  range  reeonnalsBanoe  in  the 
■ore  dangaroua  aactora.  Whether  or  not  thia  would  have  reaultad 
in  detecting  tha  approach  of  tha  Japanese  carrlera  la  probla- 
■atical.  HevaTar,  it  would  have  oada  tha  Japanaaa  taak  Bore 
difficult. 

(2)  Ha  could  hare  rotated  tha  "in  port"  perioda  of  hia 
Taaaala  in  a  laea  routina  aanaar,  ao  aa  to  hare  aada  it 
iaiwaaibla  for  the  Japanaaa  to  hare  predicted  when  there 
would  ba  aagr  Taaaala  in  port.  This  would  bav*  nada  tha 
Ji^)anaaa  taak  laaa  •a.tj. 

(3)  If  ha  had  appreciated  tha  gravity  of  tha  danger  aran 
a  faw  hoora  before  the  Japanese  attack,  it  is  logical  to 
nqppoaa  that  naval  pl&nae  wo\ild  have  been  in  the  air  durii^  tba 
aarl/  Boreing  period,  that  ahipa'  battarlea  would  hare  been 
fully  Banned,  and  that  daaage  ecntrol  organizations  would  have 
b*a«  fully  oparatiooal. 

6.   Tha  darolietions  oe  tha  part  of  idairal  Stark  and  Adalral  Eiaael 
vara  faulta  of  oaiaaion  rathar  than  faults  of  aoudssion.  In  the  caaa  in 
quaatiaa,  tbay  indieata  lack  of  tha  ai^arior  judgsent  necessary  for 
aanreiaiag  aoaaaad  eu—saiiiusta  with  tteir  rank  and  tbair  assigned  duties, 
rathar  than  oulpabla  iaaffioienay. 


-  25  - 


2384    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


COMINCM  PILS 


UNITED  STATES  FLEET 

HKAOQUAirmiS  OF  THE  COMMANDOI  IN  CHIKP 

NAVY    DEPARTMENT 
WASHINGTON  2B.  D.  C. 

Fn/A17-25 

^--4  6  NOV  1944 

Serial! 


fyp9|yg:4^g4i:i 


Subject I      Court  of  Inquiry  to  inquire  into  the  attack 

■ade  by  Japanese  araed  forces  on  Pearl  Barbory 
Territory  of  Hawaii,  on  7  Deoeober  19iU-»  ordered 
by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  on  13  July  19A1* 

7.  Since  trial  by  general  court  aartial  is  not  warranted  by  the 
evidence  addxiced,  appropriate  adnlnietratlve  action  would  appear  to  be 
the  relegation  of  both  of  these  officers  to  positions  In  liilch  lack  of 
8t9>erlor  Judgment  aay  not  result  in  future  errors. 

8.  In  qr  serial  003191  of  3  loveaber,  to  you,  I  set  forth  at 
length  ay  views  concerning  how  nuch  of  the  record  bears  such  a  rel&tion  to 
present  allltaxy  operations  as  to  require  high  security  classification. 


Q^  ^»  V«44o-^4-<A4AA«4a  ^^-'^*^'*   ^""^^^ 


2U 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2385 

Judge  Advocate  General's  First  Endorsement  (on  Naval  Coubt  of  Inquibt) 

Navy  Department, 
Office  of  the  Jttdge  Advocate  General, 

Washint/ton  25,  D.  C,  November  2,  19U- 

First  Endorsement 

To:  The  Commander   In   Chief,   U.   S.   Fleet   and   Chief  of  Naval   Operations. 

Subj  :  Court  of  Inquiry  to  inquire  into  the  attack  made  by  Japanese  armed  forces 

on  Pearl  Harbor,  Territory  of  Hawaii,  on  7  December  1941,  ordered  by 

the  Sx-retary  of  the  Navy  on  13  July,  1944. 

1.  Forwarded  for  comment  and  recommendation. 

2.  The  weighing  of  conflicting  evidence  and  testimony  is  peculiarly  the  function 
of  a  Court  of  Inquiry  or  Board  of  Investigation,  and  not  that  of  the  reviewing 
authorities.  Where  the  testimony  is  such  as  will  reasonably  support  either 
of  two  or  more  different  conclusions,  it  is  not  within  the  province  of  the  Judge 
Advocate  General  to  attempt  to  substitute  his  evaluation  of  the  evidence  for 
that  of  the  Court.  But  where  there  is  no  creditable  evidence  in  a  record  to 
support  a  finding  or  opinion,  or  where  the  weight  of  evidence  is  so  preponderantly 
on  one  side  that  it  appears  unreasonable  to  reach  a  contrary  conclusion,  the 
Judge  Advocate  General  must  hold,  as  a  matter  of  law,  that  such  a  finding 
or  opinion  is  not  supported  by  the  evidence  adduced.  See  CMO  9  of  1928,  P.  8 ; 
CMO  12  of  1937,  P.  8 ;  CMO  5  of  1986.  P.  11. 

3.  Attention  is  invited  to  the  following  portion  of  Finding  of  Fact  XVIII : 
"In  the  early  forenoon  of  7  December,  1941,  Washington  time,  the  War  and 

Navy  Departments  had  information  which  appeared  to  indicate  that  a  break 
in  diplomatic  relations  was  imminent,  and,  by  inference  and  deduction,  that  an 
attack  in  the  Hawaiian  area  could  be  expected  soon." 

4.  This  Finding,  standing  alone,  may  be  misleading,  in  the  sense  that  it  may 
convey  an  impression  that  the  Court  concluded  that  responsible  oflBcials  of  the 
War  and  Navy  Departments  did  in  fact  make  the  inference  and  deduction 
underscored  above.  The  fact  that  the  Court,  in  phrasing  this  Finding,  used  the 
past  tense  of  the  verb  "appear",  and  used  the  expression  "appeared  to  indicate", 
rather  than  "should  have  indicated"  lends  support  to  this  construction.  Such  an 
[2]  impression  would  not  be  supported  by  the  record,  as  the  great  pre- 
ponderence  of  the  evidence  before  the  Court  refutes  any  such  conclusion.  It  is 
quite  clear  from  the  evidence  that  the  responsible  officials  of  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment had  evaluated  the  information  available  to  them  in  Washington  to 
means  that  a  hostile  move  by  the  Japanese  could  be  expected,  not  in  the  Hawaiian 
al'ea,  except  by  submarines,  but  rather  against  Guam,  the  Phillipines.  and  British 
and  Dutch  possessions  in  the  Far  East. 

5.  Those  witnesses  who,  on  7  December,  1941,  held  positions  in  the  Navy 
Dapartment  which  qualify  them  to  speak  authoritatively  as  to  the  prevailing 
opinion  there  just  prior  to  the  attack,  are  all  in  substantial  accord  that  the  Chief 
of  Naval  operations  and  his  assistants  had  not  deducted  or  inferred  that  an 
attack  in  the  Hawaiian  area  could  be  expected  soon.  On  the  contrary,  the 
consensus  in  the  Navy  Department  was  that  any  attack  would  probably  come 
in  the  Far  East,  and  the  possibility  of  an  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  was  given 
a  comparatively  low  probability  rating.  Those  witnesses  who  stated  that  the 
information  available  to  the  Navy  Department  clearly  indicated,  by  inference 
and  deduction,  that  an  attack  on  Hawaii  could  be  exp^ted,  were  all  officers  who 
were  not  on  duty  in  the  Navy  Department  at  that  time,  or  occupied  subordinate 
positions.  Their  testimony  is  opinion  evidence,  undoubtedly  unconsciously 
colored  by  hindsight,  and  arrived  at  by  a  process  of  selecting,  from  the  great  mass 
of  intelligence  reports  available  to  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  those  which 
In  the  light  of  subsequent  events  proved  to  be  hints  or  indications  of  Japanese 
intentions. 

6.  Therefore,  any  finding,  opinion  or  inference  that  the  responsible  officials 
of  the  Navy  Department  knew,  prior  to  the  actual  attack,  that  an  attack  on 
Hawaii  was  impending,  is  not  supported  by  the  evidence.  The  Court  recognizes 
this  fact,  as  shown  by  its  finding  (last  paragraph  of  Finding  XVII)  that: 

"These  considerations,  and  the  sworn  evidence  of  the  witnesses  testifying 
before  the  Court,  establish  the  fact  that  although  the  attack  of  7  December  came 
as  a  surprise  to  high  officials  in  the  State,  War,  and  Navy  Departments,  and  to 
the  Army  and  Navy  in  the  Hawaiian  area,  there  were  good  grounds  for  their 
belief  that  hostilities  would  begin  in  the  Far  East,  rather  than  elsewhere." 


2386    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

[3]  7.  The  foregoing  remarks  apply  equally  to  the  underscored  portion  of 
the  Opinion  expressed  by  the  Court  ( P.  1207 )  that : 

"Admiral  Harold  li.  Stark,  USN,  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  and  responsible 
for  the  operations  of  the  Fleet,  failed  to  display  the  sound  judgment  expected 
of  him  in  that  he  did  not  transmit  to  Admiral  Kimmel,  Commander  in  Chief, 
Pacific  Fleet,  during  the  very  critical  period  26  November  to  7  December,  impor- 
tant information  which  he  had  regarding  the  Japanese  situation,  and  especially 
in  that,  on  the  morning  of  7  December  1&41,  he  did  not  transmit  immediately  the 
fact  that  a  message  had  been  received  which  appeared  to  indicate  that  a  break 
in  diplomatic  relations  was  imminent,  and,  that  an.  attack  in  the  Hawaiian  area 
might  be  expected  noon." 

As  has  been  previously  pointed  out,  the  message  herein  referred  to  was  not 
construed  by  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  and  his  principal  advisers  as  indi- 
cating an  attack  in  the  Hawaiian  area. 

8.  It  is  noted  that  the  Court  finds  (Finding  of  Fact  XVIII)  that  the  time  at 
which  the  War  and  Navy  Departments  had  information  .indicating  a  break  in 
diplomatic  relations  on  7  December  1941,  and  the  possibility  of  hostile  action  by 
the  Japanese  on  that  date,  was  "in  the  early  forenoon  of  7  December,  Washing- 
ton time."  It  is  not  considered  amiss  to  comment  in  further  detail  on  this  find- 
ing, in  view  of  a  widespread  misconception  in  some  quarters  that  this  informa- 
tion was  known  in  Washington  on  6  December  1941.  The  evidence  before  this 
Court  establishes,  beyond  any  doubt,  that  the  information  referred  to  was  not 
available  to  any  responsible  official  in  Washington  prior  to  approximately  10  a.  m., 
the  morning  of  7  December  1941. 

9.  The  Judge  Advocate  General  feels  constrained  to  comment  on  the  apparent 
contradiction  bf^tween  the  Opinion  expressed  by  the  Court  that  the  Chief  of  Naval 
Operations  failed  to  display  the  sound  judgment  expected  of  him  in  failing  to 
transmit  certain  information  to  the  Commander  in  Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  and  the 
final  Opinion  that  "no  offenses  have  been  committed  nor  serious  blame  incurred 
on  the  part  of  any  person  in  the  naval  service."  That  this  is  only  an  apparent, 
and  not  a  real,  incongruity,  is  shown  by  the  Opinion  that  "had  this  important 
information  been  conveyed  to  Admiral  Kimmel.  it  is  a  matter  of  conjecture  as 
to  what  action  he  would  have  taken."  This  statement,  as  well  as  the  Finding 
of  Facts  and  Opinions  taken  as  a  whole,  indicate  [4  J  that  it  was  the  con- 
clusion of  the  Court.  aKhongh  not  clearly  expressed,  that  the  evidence  adduced 
did  not  prove  that  Admiral  Stark's  failure  to  transmit  the  information  in  question 
to  Admiral  Kimmel  was  the  proximate  cause  of  the  damage  suffered  by  the  Fleet 
on  7  December.  1941,  and  that  any  causal  connection  between  this  failure  on 
Admiral  Stark's  part  and  the  disaster  would  be  entirely  speculative.  Such  a 
conclusion  is  fully  supported  by  the  testimony  in  this  record. 

10.  Subject  to  the  foregoing  remarks,  the  proceedings,  findings,  opinions  and 
recommendations  of  the  attached  Court  of  Inquiry  are,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
Judge  Advocate  General,  legal. 

T  L.  Gatch 
T.  L.  G^TCH. 
The  Judge  Advocate  General. 


Addendum  to  Coubt's  Finding  of  Fact  (Naval  Coubt  of  Inquiry) 

[1]  In  the  Finding  of  Facts,  No.  XVIII,  the  Court  has  referred  to  "certain 
other  important  information"  as  being  available  in  the  War  and  Navy  Depart- 
ments. This  information  was  obtained  by  intercepting  Japanese  messages  and 
breaking  their  diplomatic  codes.  The  Court  has  been  informed  that  these  codes 
are  still  in  use  and.  if  it  became  known  to  the  Japanese  Government  that  they 
had  been  broken  by  the  United  States,  the  codes  would  be  changed  and,  as  a 
consequence,  the  war  effort  would  be  adversely  affected. 

For  this  reason,  the  Court  has  refrained  from  analyzing  or  discussing  the 
details  of  the  information  in  its  Finding  of  Facts  but  feels  that  its  report  would 
not  be  complete' without  a  record  of  such  details.  The  Court,  therefore,  submits 
the  following  record  in  this  addendum  and  transmits  it  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  for  filing  with  other  highly  secret  matter  referred  to  as  such  in  the  record 
of  the  Court's  proceedings. 

Highly  secret  messages,  hereinafter  mentioned,  were  intercepted  by  the  War 
and  Navy  Departments  during  the  very  critical  period  26  November  to  7  December, 
1941,  and  prior  thereto.  The  method  of  handling  these  messages  in  the  Navy 
Department  was  as  follows : 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2387 

The  Director  of  Naval  Intelligence  and  the  Director  of  Naval  roramunications 
operated  directly  under  the  Chief  of  [2]  Naval  Operations.  They  were 
responsible  to  see  that  all  messages  were  transmitted  to  him  in  order  that 
he  might  be  kept  conversant  at  all  times  with  existing  conditions. 

Officers  in  Intelligence  and  Communications,  Divisions  of  Naval  Operations, 
remained  on  duty  night  and  day.  They  made  every  effort  to  obtain  all  possible 
diplomatic  and  military  inforination,  in  order  that  high  officiais  of  our  govern- 
ment might  be  kept  fully  informed. 

Messages  were  translated  and  placed  in  a  folder  immediately  upon  receipt  or 
intercept.  The  important  messages  were  marked  with  a  clip  and  taken  by  a  des- 
ignated officer  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  the 
Directors  of  War  Plans,  Naval  Intelligence,  and  Naval  Communications,  and  to 
the  Chief  of  the  Far  Eastern  Division  of  Naval  Intelligence.  The  Director  of  Naval 
Intelligence.  Captain  Wilkinson,  kept  himself  constantly  informed  regarding 
all  messages.  He  checked  as  to  whether  or  not  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations 
had  seen  the  important  ones  and  in  many  cases  took  them  personally  to  the 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations  and  discussed  them  with  him. 

Immediately  after  the  receipt  of  the  note  of  26  November,  1941,  from  the  Secre- 
tary of  State,  the  Japanese  representatives  in  Washington  sent  a  message  to 
Tokyo  which  was  intercepted  by  the  Navy  Department.  This  is  Document  17, 
E.\hibit  63,  which  gave  to  Tokyo  the  following  stipulations  contained  in  the 
note : 

(a)  The  recognition  of  Hull's  "four  principles". 

(b)  (1)  Conclusion  of  nmtual  non-aggression  treaty  between  Tokyo,  Moscow, 
Washington,  The  Netherlands,  Chungking  and  Bangkok. 

[3]  (2)  Agreement  between  Japan.  United  States,  England,  The  Nether- 
lands. China  and  Thai  on  the  invio'ability  of  French  Indochina  and  equally 
of  economic  treatment  in  French  Indochina. 

(3)  Complete  evacuation  of  Japanese  forces  from  China  and  all  French 
Indochina. 

(5)  Japan  and  the  United  States  both  definitely  to  promise  to  support  no  re- 
gime but  that  of  Chiang  Kai-shek. 

(5)  The  abolition  of  evtra territoriality,  the  concessions  in  China,  and  other 
requirements  bearing  on  reciprocal  trade  treaty,  rescinding  freezing  orders, 
stabilization  of  yen.  etc.,  and  for  Japan  to  amend  her  tripartite  pact  with  Ger- 
many and  Italy. 

The  Japanese  representatives  added  in  their  report  to  Tokyo  the  following: 
•'Both  dumbfounded  and  stated  to  Hull  we  could  not  even  cooperate  to  the  extent 
of  even  reproving  this  to  Tokyo." 

No  information  regarding  the  delivery  of  this  note  or  of  its  contents  was 
transmitted  to  the  Commander  in  Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  or  to  other  Commanders 
afloat. 

From  26  November  to  7  December,  1941,  there  was  much  diplomatic  dispatch 
traffic  intercepted  between  Tokyo  and  the  Japanese  Ambassador  in  Washing- 
ton which  had  a  bearing  on  the  critical  situation  existing  and  which  was  not 
transmitted  to  the  Commander  in  Chief,  Pacific.  A  message  dated  19  November, 
1941.  Tokyo  to  Washington,  translated  on  28  November,  1941,  and  referred  to  as 
•'The  Winds  Code"  was  as  follows : 

"Regarding  the  broadcast  of  a  special  message  in  an  emergency. 

"In  case  of  emergency  (danger  of  cutting  off  our  diplomatic  relations),  and 
the  cutting  off  of  international  communications,  the  following  warning  will  be 
added  in  the  middle  of  the  daily  Japanese  language  short  wave  news  broadcast. 

[^1  "(1)  In  case  of  a  Japan-U.  S.  relations  in  danger:  HIGASHI  NO 
KAZEAME  • 

"(2)   Japan-U.   S.   S.   R.   relations:   KITANOKAZE  KUMORI.** 

"(3)  Japan-Briti.sh  relations:  NISlHI  NO  KAZE  HARE.*** 

"This  signal  will  be  given  in  the  middle  and  at  the  end  as  a  weather  forecast 
and  each  sentence  will  be  repeated  twice.  When  this  is  heard  please  destroy  all 
code  papers,  etc.    This  is  as  yet  to  be  a  completely  secret  arrangement. 

"Forward  as  urgent  intelligence. 

The  Commander  in  Chief,  Asiatic  Fleet,  on  28  Noveml>er.  1941.  sent  to  the 
Chief  of  Naval  Operations,  infonnaticm  to  Commander  in  Chief,  Pacific  Fleet; 
Commandant  16th  Naval  District;  and  Commandant  14th  Naval  District,  sub- 


•East  wind  rain. 
••North  wind  cloudy. 
•••West  wind  clear." 


2388    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

stantially  the  same  information  as  outlined  above.  On  5  December,  1941,  the 
United  States  Naval  Attache,  Batavia,  sent  to  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations 
substantially  the  same  information.  These  messages  stated  that  at  some 
future  date  information  would  be  sent  by  Japan  indicating  a  breaking  off  of 
diplomatic   relations   or   possibly   war   between   countries   designated. 

All  tflBcers  of  the  Communication  and  Intelligence  Divisions  in  the  Navy 
Department,  considering  the  expected  information  most  important,  were  on 
the  lookout  for  this  notification  of  Japanese  intentions.  On  4  December  an 
intercepted  Japanese  broadcast  employing  this  code  was  received  in  the  Navy 
Department.  Although  this  notification  was  subject  to  two  interpretations, 
either  a  breaking  off  of  diplomatic  relations  between  Japan  and  the  United 
States,  or  [5]  war,  this  information  was  not  transmitted  to  the  Com- 
mander in  Chief.  Pacific  Fleet,  or  to  other  Commanders  afloat. 

It  was  known  in  the  Navy  Department  that  the  Commanders-in-Chief,  Pa- 
cific and  Asiatic  Fleets,  were  monitoring  Japanese  broadcasts  for  this  code,  and 
apparently  there  was  a  mistaken  impression  in  the  Navy  Department  that  the 
execute  message  had  also  been  intercepted  at  Pearl  Harbor,  when  in  truth  this 
message  was  never  intercepted  at  Pearl  Harbor.  No  attempt  was  made  by  the 
Navy  Department  to  ascertain  whether  this  information  had  been  obtained 
by  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific,  and  by  other  Commanders  afloat. 

Admiral  Stark  stated  that  he  knew  nothing  about  it,  although  Admiral  Turner 
stated  that  he  himself  was  familiar  with  it  and  presumed  that  Admiral  Kimmel 
had  it.     This  message  cannot  now  be  located  in  the  Navy  Department. 

It  is  a  matter  of  general  knowledge  that  Japan  has  had  for  many  years  a 
thorough  system  of  espionage  throughout  the  world  and  continuously  sought 
and  received  information  regarding  the  location  and  movements  of  United 
States  naval  vessels.  There  were  certain  messages  received  in  the  Navy  De- 
partment which  showed  very  clearly  that  Japan,  at  this  critical  period,  was 
particularly  desirous  of  obtaining  exact  information  from  two  sources,  namely, 
Manila  and  Honolulu.  Messages  between  Tokyo,  Manila,  and  Honolulu  inquir- 
ing especially  about  planes,  ships,  their  places  of  anchorage,  etc.,  in  the  latter 
l>orts,  were  intercepted.  Similar  messages  were  sent  to  Japanese  officials  in 
Honolulu  clearly  indicating  that  Japan  was  most  [6]  desirous  of  ob- 
taining exact  information  as  to  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor. 

The  important  messages  having  special  reference  to  Pearl  Harbor  were  as 
follows : 

(a)  On  15  November,  1941,  Document  24,  Exhibit  63,  an  intercept  from  Tokyo 
to  Honolulu,  translated  in  Navy  Department,  3  December,  1941,  states:  "As  rela- 
tions between  Japan  and  the  United  States  are  most  critical  make  your  'ships  in 
harbor  report'  irregular  but  at  rate  of  twice  a  week.  Although  you  already 
are  ho  doubt  aware,  please  take  extra  care  to  maintain  secrecy." 

(b)  On  18  November,  1941,  Document  37,  Exhibit  63,  an  intercept  from  Tokyo 
to  Honolulu,  translated  in  Navy  Department  on  5  December,  1941,  states: 
"Please  report  on  the  following  areas  as  to  vessels  anchored  therein :  Area  "N" 
Pearl  Harbor,  Manila  Bay,  and  areas  adjacent  thereto.  Make  your  investiga- 
tion with  great  secrecy."  Note  by  Navy  Department  on  this  message,  "Manila 
Bay"  probably  means  "Manila  Bay." 

(c)  On  18  November,  1941,  Document  40,  Exhibit  63.  an  intercept  from 
Honolulu  to  Tokyo  and  translated  in  Navy  Department  6  December,  1941,  gives 
information  as  to  ships  moored  in  certain  areas  in  Pearl  Harbor  and  move- 
ment of  ships  in  and  out 

[7]  (d)  On  29  November,  1941,  Document  36,  Exhibit  63,  an  intercept  from 
Tokyo  to  Honolulu,  translated  in  Washington  5  December,  1941,  states :  "We  have 
been  receiving  reports  from  you  on  ship  movements  but  in  future  will  you  also 
report  even  when  there  are  no  movements." 

Admiral  Kimmel  was  not  aware  of  and  had  no  information  regarding  these 
messages. 

On  5  November,  1941,  Document  7,  Exhibit  63,  Tokyo  to  Washington,  was  inter- 
cepted. This  message  stresses  the  necessity  of  signing  an  agreement  between 
the  United  States  and  Japan  by  25  November,  1941. 

On  22  November,  1941,  Document  11,  Exhibit  63,  intercept  from  Tokyo  to 
Washington,  stated  that  the  signing  of  agreement  set  for  25  November,  1941, 
could  be  postponed  until  29  November,  and  in  explanation  this  message  stated: 

"•  *  *  There  are  reasons  beyond  your  ability  to  guess  why  we  wanted  to 
settle  Japanese-American  relations  by  the  25th,  but  if  within  the  next  three 
or  four  days  you  can  finish  your  conversations  with  the  Americans ;  if  the 
signing  can  be  completed  by  the  29th,    *     *    ♦    if  the  pertinent  notes  can  be 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2389 

exchanged ;  if  we  can  get  an  understanding  with  Great  Britain  and  the  Nether- 
lands ;  and  in  short  if  everything  can  be  finished,  we  have  decided  to  wait  until 
that  date.  This  time  we  mean  it,  that  the  deadline  absolutely  cannot  be  changed. 
After  that  things  are  automatically  going  to  happen.     *     *     *"   , 

No  intimation  of  the  receipt  of  this  message  was  transmitted  to  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific,  or  to  other  Commanders  afloat,  nor  was  any  information 
transmitted  to  them  regarding  contents  of  the  messages  mentioned  in  the  follow- 
ing paragraphs. 

[8]  On  28  November,  1941,  a  dispatch,  Document  18,  Exhibit  63,  was  inter- 
cepted between  Tokyo  and  Washington  which  in  part  reads  as  follows : 

'••  ♦  *  The  United  States  has  gone  ahead  and  presented  this  humiliating 
proposal" — referring  to  note  of  26  November — "*  *  *  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment can  by  no  means  use  it  as  a  basis  for  negotiations.  Therefore,  with  a  report 
of  the  views  of  the  Imperial  Government  on  this  American  proposal  which  I 
will  send  you  in  two  or  three  days,  the  negotiations  will  be  de  facto  ruptured. 
This  is  inevitable.  However,  I  do  not  wish  you  to  give  the  impression  that  the 
negotiations  are  broken  off.  Merely  say  to  them  that  you  are  awaiting  instruc- 
tions   *     *     *"  etc. 

The  message  indicates  the  position  of  Japan  regarding  the  note  of  26  Novem- 
ber, and  further  indicates  that  within  two  or  three  days  negotiations  will  be 
de  facto  ruptured.  Further,  it  emphasisses  the  importance  of  delay.  Neither  the 
message  nor  any  of  its  contents  were  transmitted  to  the  Commander  in  Chief, 
Pacific,  or  to  other  Commanders  afloat. 

On  29  November,  1941,  Document  19,  Exhibit  63,  intercept  Tokyo  to  Wash- 
ington and  translated  by  the  Navy  Department  30  November,  1941,  directs  that 
Japanese  representatives  make  one  more  attempt  to  have  United  States  recon- 
sider and  states : 

"♦  *  *  please  be  careful  that  this  does  not  lead  to  anything  like  a. breaking 
off  of  negotiations." 

Again,  on  30  November,  1941,  Document  20,  Exhibit  63,  an  intercept  from 
Washington  to  Tokyo,  indicated  that  negotiations  were  to  be  stretched  out. 

These  two  messages  indicate  that  the  Japanese  were  sparring  for  time. 

[9]  On  30  November,  1941,  Document  22,  Exhibit  63,  translated  by  the 
Navy  Department  on  1  December,  1941,  was  intercepted,  being  a  message  from 
Tokyo  to  Japanese  representatives  in  Berlin,  reading  as  follows  : 

"1.  Japan-American  negotiations  were  commenced  the  middle  of  April  of 
this  year.  Over  a  period  of  half  a  year  they  have  been  continued.  Within 
that  period  the  Imperial  Grovernment  adamantly  stuck  to  the  Tri-Partite  Alli- 
ance as  the  cornerstone  of  its  national  policy  regardless  of  the  vicissitudes  of 
the  international  situation.  In  the  adjustment  of  diplomatic  relaticms  between 
Japan  and  the  United  States,  she  has  based  her  hopes  for  a  solution  definitely 
within  the  scoi>e  of  that  alliance.  With  the  intent  of  restrainyig  the  United 
States  from  participating  in  the  war,  she  boldly  assumed  the  attitude  of  carrying 
through  these  negotiations. 

"2.  Therefore,  the  present  cabinet,  in  line  with  your  message,  with  the  view 
of  defending  the  Empire's  existence  and  integrity  on  a  just  and  equitable  basis, 
has  continued  the  negotiations  carried  on  in  the  past.  However,  their  views 
and  ours  on  the  question  of  the  evacuation  of  troops,  upon  which  the  negotia- 
tions rested  (they  demanded  the  evacuation  of  Imperial  troops  from  China  and 
French  Indochina),  were  completely  in  opposition  to  each  other. 

"Judging  from  the  course  of  the  negotiations  that  have  been  going  on,  we 
first  came  to  loggerheads  when  the  United  States,  in  keeping  with  its  traditional 
idealogical  tendency  of  managing  international  relations,  re-emphasized  her 
fundamental  reliance  upon  this  traditional  policy  in  the  conversations  carried 
on  between  the  Unite<l  States  and  England  in  the  Atlantic  Ocean.  The  motive 
of  the  United  States  in  all  this  was  brought  out  by  her  desire  to  prevent  the 
establishment  of  a  new  order  by  Japan,  Germany,  and  Italy  in  Europe  and  in 
the  Far  East  (that  is  to  say,  the  aims  of  the  Tri-Partite  Alliance).  As  long  as 
the  Empire  of  Japan  was  in  alliance  with  Germany  and  Italy,  there  could  be 
no  maintenance  of  friendly  relations  between  Japan  and  the  United  States 
was  the  stand  they  took.  From  this  point  of  view,  they  began  to  demonstrate  a 
tendency  to  demand  the  divorce  of  the  Imperial  Government  from  the  Tri-Partite 
Alliance.  This  was  brought  out  at  the  last  meeting.  That  is  to  say  that  it  has 
only  been  in  the  negotiations  of  the  last  few  days  that  it  has  [10]  become 
gradually  more  and  more  clear  that  the  Imperial  Government  could  no  longer 
continue  negotiations  with  the  United  States.  It  became  clear,  too,  that  a  con- 
tinuation of  negotiations  would  inevitably  be  detrimental  to  our  cause. 


2390    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

"3.  The  proposal  presented  by  the  United  States  on  the  26th  made  this  atti- 
tude of  theirs  clearer  than  ever.  In  it  there  is  one  insulting  clause  which  says 
that  no  matter  what  treaty  either  party  enters  into  with  a  third  power  it  will 
no  be  interpreted  as  having  any  bearing  upon  the  basic  object  of  this  treaty, 
namely  the  maintenance  of  peace  in  the  Pacitic.  This  means  specifically  the 
Three-Power  Pact.  It  means  that  in  case  the  United  States  enters  the  European 
war  at  any  time  the  Japanese  Empire  will  not  be  allowed  to  give  assistance  to 
Germany  and  Italy.  It  is  clearly  a  trick.  This  clause  alone,  let  alone  others, 
makes  it  impossible  to  find  any  basis  in  the  American  prop(»sal  for  negotiations. 
What  is  more,  before  the  United  States  brought  forth  this  plan,  they  conferred 
with  England,  Australia,  The  Netherlands,  and  China — they  did  so  repeatedly. 
Therefore,  it  is  clear  that  the  United  States  is  now  in  collusion  with  those  nations 
and  has  decided  to  regard  Japan,  along  with  (Jermany  and  Italy,  as  an  enemy." 

On  1  December,  1941,  the  Navy  Department  intercepted  a  message  from  Tokyo 
to  the  Japanese  Amba.ssador  in  Herlin  as  follows: 

"The  conversations  between  Tokyo  and  Washington  now  stand  ruptured. 
Say  very  secretly  to  Hitler  and  Ribbentrop  that  there  is  extreme  danger  that 
war  may  suddenly  break  out  between  the  Anglo  Saxon  nations  and  Japan,  and 
this  war  may  come  quicker  than  anybody  dreams.  We  will  not  relax  our  pres- 
sure on  the  Soviet,  but  for  the  time  being  would  prefer  to  refrain  from  any 
direct  moves  on  the  north.  Impress  on  the  Germans  and  Italians  how  important 
secrecy  is." 

On  1  December,  1941,  document  21,  Exhibit  B3,  was  intercepted,  being  a  mes- 
sage from  Tokyo  to  the  Jaiianese  Amba.ssador  in  Washington  which  reads  as 
follows : 

"1.  The  date  set  in  my  message  #812**  has  come  and  gone,  and  the  situ- 
ation continues  to  be  increasingly  critical.  However,  to  prevent  the  [11] 
United  States  from  becoming  unduly  suspicious  we  have  been  advising  the 
press  and  others  that  though  there  are  some  wide  differences  between  Japan 
and  the  United  States,  the  negotiations  are  continuing.  (The  above  is  for  only 
your  information). 

"2.  We  have  decided  to  withhold  submitting  the  note  to  the  U.  S.  Ambassador 
to  Tokyo  as  suggested-  by  you  at  the  end  of  your  message  #1124***.  Please 
make  the  necessary  repi'esentations  at  your  end  only. 

"3.  There  are  reports  here  that  the  President's  sudden  return  to  the  capital  is 
an  effect  of  Premier  Tojo's  statement.  We  have  an  idea  that  the  President  did 
so  because  of  his  concern  over  the  critical  Far  Eastern  situation.  Please  make 
investigations  into  this  matter. 

On  2  December,  1941,  Document  25,  Exhibit  63,  intercept  Washington  to  Tokyo, 
translated  by  the  Navy  Department  3  December,  1041,  reports  that  conversations 
with  the  State  Department  continue;  that  the  Japanese  representatives  stated  to 
Welle.s,  the  Under  Secretary  of  State,  that  it  is  virtually  impossible  for  Japan  to 
accept  new  American  proposals  as  they  now  stand,  and  that  the  Japanese  repre- 
sentatives feel  that  the  United  States  is  anxious  to  peacefully  conclude  the 
current  difficult  situation. 

On  3  December,  1941,  Document  29,  Exhibit  63,  intercept  Tokyo  to  Washington, 
translated  by  the  Navy  Department  4  December,  1941,  requests  their  representa- 
tives to  explain  Japan's  increased  forces  in  Indochina. 

On  3  December,  1941,  Document  33,  Exhibit  63,  intercept  Washington  to  Tokyo, 
translated  by  Navy  Department  5  December         [12]         1941,  states: 

"Judging  from  all  indications,  we  feel  that  some  joint  military  action  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  with  or  without  a  declaration  of  war,  is  a 
definite  certainty  in  the  event  of  an  occupation  of  Thailand." 

On  6  December,  1941,  Document  38,  Exhibit  63,  from  Tokyo  to  Washington,  was 
intercepted,  giving  notice  to  the  Japanese  repre.seiitatives  that  a  reply  consisting 
of  14  parts  to  American  proposal  of  26  November  is  being  sent  to  them,  directing 
that  secrecy  sliould  be  maintained  and  stating  that  the  time  of  presenting  this 
reply  would  be  sent  in  a  separate  message. 

The  first  13  parts  of  this  reply  were  intercepted  and  received  by  the  Navy  De- 
partment at  about  3  p.  m.,  December  6,  1941,  and  were  translated  and  made  ready 
for  distribution  by  9  p.  m.,  Washington  time,  of  that  date.  These  13  parts  contain 
a  very  strong  and  conclusive  answer  to  the  note  of  November  26  and  state  in  part, 
"Japan  cannot  accept  proposal  as  a  basis  of  negotiations." 


*JD-1  :   6921. 
**JD-1  :   6710. 
***Not  available. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2391 

Commander  Kramer,  the  officer  whose  duty  it  was  to  distribute  this  class  of 
information,  prior  to  9  p.  m.,  6  December,  1941,  'phoned  Captain  Wilkinson  that 
an  important  message  had  been  received  and  was  being  translated.  He  also  tried 
to  communicate  with  Admiral  Stark  and  Rear  Admiral  Turner  at  tlieir  homes  but 
found  them  out. 

At  about  9  p.  m.,  Washington  time.  Commander  Kramer  proceeded  to  the  White 
House  with  the  13  parts  of  reply  and  delivered  copy  to  a  White  House  aide,  with 
the  request  that  [13]  it  be  delivered  innnediately  to  the  President.  Kramer 
then  proceeded  to  the  home  of  Secretary  Knox  where  he  personally  delivei-ed 
to  the  Secretary  a  copy  of  the  Japanese  reply.  Secretary  Knox  read  the  reply,  did 
not  discuss  it  in  detail  with  Kramer,  but  'phoned  the  Secretary  of  War  and 
Secretary  of  State. 

Kramer  then  proceeded  to  the  home  of  Captain  Wilkinson  and  gave  a  copy 
to  him.  Kramer  told  Wilkinson  that  he  had  tried  to  get  Stark  and  Turner. 
Wilkinson  made  several  'phone  calls,  presumably  to  Admiral  Stark  and  others. 
This  information  regarding  receipt  of  these  13  parts  or  their  contents  was  not 
transmitted  to  the  Commander  in  Chief  Pacific  Fleet  or  other  Commanders 
Afloat. 

Kramer  then  returned  to  his  office  in  the  Navy  Department,  arriving  about 
12 :  30  a.  m.,  7  December,  and  as  no  other  important  messages  were  at  hand,  went 
home  and  returnetl  to  the  Navy  Department  about  7  a.  m.  Upon  his  arrival  he 
found  the  14th  part  of  the  Japanese  reply  had  been  received  and  decoded.  He  then 
delivered  a  copy  of  all  14  parts  to  the  Flag  Secretary  in  his  office  of  the  Chief  of 
Naval  Operations  at  about  9  a.  m.,  where  he  found  several  officers  gathering  for 
a  conference  with  Admiral  Stark.  Kramer  then  proceeded  about  9 :  30  a.  m.,  to 
the  White  House  and  made  delivery  of  the  14  parts  of  the  message.  He  pro- 
ceeded then,  at  about  9:  W  a.  m.,  to  the  State  Department  and  delivered  same  to 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  who  was  there  in  conference  with  the  Secretary  of 
State. 

At  about  10:30  a.  m.,  Kramer  returned  to  the  Navy  Depart  [141  ment 
where  he  found  another  message  had  been  translated.  This  message,  .^n  inter- 
cept from  Tokyo  to  Washington,  was  marked  "Urgent,  very  important"  and  read 
as  follows:  "Will  the  ambas.sador  please  submit  to  the  U.  S.  Government  (if  pos- 
sible to  the  Secretary  of  State)  our  reply  to  the  U.  S.  at  1 :  00  p.  m.,  on  the  7th, 
your  time."  Kramer  delivered  a  copy  of  this  message  (hereinafter  referred  to 
as  the  "one  p.  ni.  message")  to  the  Flag  Secretary  of  Admiral  Stark,  the  latter 
at  the  time  being  in  conference  with  several  officers. 

Kramer  then  returned  to  the  White  House  and  delivered  the  "1 :  00  p.  m.  mes- 
sage". From  there  he  went  to  the  State  Department  where  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy  was  still  in  conference  with  the  Secretary  of  State.  On  arrival  he 
requested  one  of  the  State  Department  assistants  to  present  the  message  to 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  and  to  invite  his  attention  to  the  fact  that  1  p.  m., 
Washington  time,  meant  dawn  at  Honolulu  and  midnight  in  East  Asia. 

•  Admiral  Stark  had  arrived  in  his  office  at  the  Navy  Department  at  some  time 
between  9  and  10:30  a.  m..  on  the  morning  of  7  December.  Although  he  testi- 
fied that  he  had  no  information  prior  to  this  time  relative  to  the  Japanese  reply 
to  the  note  of  November  26th,  he  was  informed  of  the  14  parts  and  "the  1 :  00 
p.  m.  me.ssage"  not  later  than  10:  30  a.  m.,  of  that  date.  He  testified  that  General 
Marshall  'phoned  him  and  suggested  that  the  information  regarding  the  delivery 
of  the  14  parts  at  1  p.  m.  was  most  important  and  significant  and,  in  his  opinion, 
should  be  transmitted  to  Commanders  [15]  in  the  Pacific.  Admiral  Stark 
at  first  (lenmrred  and  hung  up  the  receiver.  Shortly  thereafter  he  'phoned  General 
Marshall  requesting  that,  in  the  event  he  sent  the  message  to  the  Connnanding  Gen- 
erals in  the  Pacific  area,  he  instruct  them  to  relay  this  message  to  naval  opposites. 

Th^  message  which  General  Marshall  sent  to  the  Commanding  General,  Ha- 
waiian Department  (Exhibit  48)  reads  as  follows:  "Japanese  are  presenting 
at  one  p.  m.  Eiistern  Standard  time  today  what  amounts  to  an  ultimatum  also 
they  are  under  orders  to  destroy  their  Code  machine  immediately  stop  Just  what 
significance  the  hour  set  may  have  we  do  not  know  but  be  on  alert  accordingly 
stop  Inform  naval  authorities  of  this  communication." 

This  message  left  the  War  Department  at  11:  r>2  a.  m.,  Washington  time,  was 
sent  out  over  R.  C.  A.  at  12:17  p.  m.  (6:47  a.  m.  Honolulu  time)  and  arrived 
in  Honolulu's  R.  C.  A.  office  at  7:33  a.  m.  Honolulu  time.  There  remained  but 
22  minutes  before  the  attack  for  delivery,  decoding,  dissemination,  and  action. 
Lieut.  General  Short  did  not  receive  the  decoded  dl.spatch  until  the  afternoon  of 
7  December,  several  hours  after  the  attacking  force  had  departed. 


2392    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

Had  the  telephone  and  plain  language  been  used,  this  message  could  have  been 
received  in  Hawaii  before  the  attack  began.  Even  in  this  event,  however,  there 
was  no  action  open  to  Admiral  Kimmel  which  could  have  stopped  the  attack  or 
which  could  have  had  other  than  negligible  bearing  upon  its  outcome.  There 
was  already  in  effect  the  condition  of  readi-  [16]  ness  best  suited  to  the 
circumstances  attending  vessels  within  the  limits  of  the  Pearl  Harbor  Naval 
Base  and  the  Fleet  planes  in  their  air  bases  in  Oahu. 

Orin  G.  Murfin 
Orin  G.  Murfin, 
Admiral,  U.  S.  Navy  (Ret),  President. 
Edward  C.  Kalbfus 
Edward  C.  Kalbfus, 
Admiral,  V.  S.  Navy  (Ret),  Member. 
Adolphus  Andrews 
Adouphus  Andrews, 
Vice  Admiral,  U.  8.  Navy  (Ret),  Member. 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2393 

EXHIBIT  NO.  107A 


CONFIDENTIAL 


XVI 


THE  FINDINGS,  COWCLUSiaJS  AIID  ACTION 
BY  THE  SECRETAHY  OF  THE  liAVY 


(A)  Findings,  Conclusions  and  Order. 

On  13  August  1945  Secretary  of  the  fJavy  James  Forrestal,  in 
his  fourth  endorsement  to  the  record  of  proceedings  of  the  Pearl  Harbor 
Court  of  Inquiry  made  the  official  findings  and  conclusions  of  the 
Navy  Department,  and  his  order  as  Secretary  assessin/:  responsibility 
for  the  Pearl  Harbor  disaster. 

The  endorsement  of  13  August  19A5  that  was  signed  by  Secre- 
tary Forrestal  has  had  deleted  from  it  certain  "TOP-SEX)KiiT"  matter 
since,  pursviant  to  the  direction  of  the  President,  the  findings  and 
conclusions  were  to  be  made  public.  The  endorsement  with  deletions 
therefrom  was  made  public  by  the  President  on  29  August  1945. 

The  complete  endorsement  of  Secretary  Forrestal  containing 
the  findin£s,  conclusions  and  action  of  the  Navy  in  respect  to  the 
Pearl  Harbor  disaster  is  as  follows: 

"  1.  Pursuant  to   Executive  Order  dated  1*?  December  1941,  a 
commission  headed  by  Mr.  Justice  Owen  J.  Koberts  conducted  an  investi- 
gation into  the  facts  surrounding  the  Japanese  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor^ 
The  commission  repoi>ted  its  findings  on  Z3  V^nuajpy  },$k2,     Ihe  com- 
nlssion  concluded  in  paz*t  that: 


672 


79716  O— 46— pt.  U 


2394    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 


"17,  In  the  light  of  the  vaminga  and  direetione 
to  take  appropriate  action,  tranealtted  to  hoth  eommanderi 
between  Korember  27  and  December  7,  and  the  obligation  onder 
the  ajretcB  of  coordination  then  in  effect  for  joint  coope^> 
atire  action  on  their  part,  it  wae  a  dereliction  of  duty 
en  the  part  of  each  of  them  not  to  conerUt  and  confer  with 
the  other  respecting  the  meaning  and  intent  of  the  warnings, 
and  the  flgppropriate  meaeurea  of  defenae  reqxiired  by  the 
Imminence  of  hoatllitiea.  The  attitude  of  each,  that  he  was 
not  required  to  inform  hliceelf  of  and  hia  lack  of  interest 
in,  the  measures  undertaken  bjr  the  other  to  carry  out  the 
reaponaibllity  assigned  to  aueh  other  under  the  provision* 
of  the  plan*  then  in  effect,  denonatrated  on  the  part  of 
each  a  lack  of  s^>preciation  of  the  responsibilitiea  rested 
in  thea  and  inherent  in  their  poaltiona  as  commander  in 
chief.  Pacific  Fleet,  and  commanding  general,  Hawaiian 
Department. ' 


673 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2395 

CONFIDENTIAL 

2.  Pursuant  to  preo^pt  of  the  Secretary  of  the  M».rj  dated 

12  Pebroaxy  19A4»  Adadral  Thoaas  c«  Hart»  USN  (Retired),  conducted  an 
floauilnatlon  of  witneases  having  knowledge  of  facts  In  connection  with  the 
Japanese  attack.  Adodral  Hart  oospleted  his  exaolnatlon  on  15  June  19A4* 

3.  Public  Law  Ho.  339*  78th  Congress,  approved  13  June  19A4> 
directed  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Secretaiy  of  the  Navy,  severally, 
to  proceed  forthwith  with  an  Investigation  Into  the  facts  surrounding  the 
Pearl  Harbor  catastrophe,  and  to  comence  such  proceedings  against  such 
persons  as  the  facte  night  Justify. 

4.  A  Court  of  Inqolzy,  consisting  of  Admiral  Orln  G.  Uurfln, 
USI  (Retired),  Adidj:<&l  Edward  C.  Kalbfus,  USN  (Retired),  and  Vice 
AdBlral  Adolphus  Andrews,  USN  (Retired),  with  Coanander  Harold 
BLea«Mier,  USN,  as  Judge  Advocate,  was  appointed  on  13  July  1944.  The 
Court  was  directed  to  convene  on  17  July  1944>  or  as  soon  thereafter  as 
practicable,  for  the  puzpose  of  inquiring  into  all  drcuastances  connected 
with  the  attack  made  by  Japanese  forces  on  Pearl  Harbor,  Territory  of 
Hawaii,  on  7  December  1941;  to  inquire  thoroughly  into  the  matter,  and  to 
Include  in  its  findings  «  full  statement  of  the  facts  it  oigfat  deem  to  be 
established.  The  Court  was  further  directed  to  state  its  opinion  as  to 
whether  any  offenses  were  comnltted  or  serious  blame  incurred  on  the  part 
of  any  person  or  persons  in  the  Naval  service,  and,  in  case  its  opinion 

was  that  offenses  had  been  conaaltted  or  serious  blame  incurredf  to  reconmend 

specifically  what  further  proceedings  should  be  had. 

5»  The  Court  of  Inquiry  cooaenced  its  proceedings  on  31  July 

1944*  and  submitted  the  record  of  its  proceedings  on  20  October  1944* 

Certain  portions  of  the  record  of  proceedings  before  the  Court,  including 

the  findings  and  opinion  of  the  Court,  have  been  classified  "TOP  SECRET," 
and  the  balance  "SECRET." 


2396    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 

6.  The  ZMt  result  of  the  findings  of  fact  and  opinion  of  the 
Pearl  Harbor  Naval  Court  of  Inquiiy,  as  reviewed  by  Judge  Advocate  General 
of  the  Navy,  and  the  Coaaander  in  Chief,  0.  S.  Fleet  and  Chief  of  Naval 
Operations,  and  by  lae,  was  that  the  evidence  secured  by  the  Court  did 

not  warrant  aiul  would  not  support  the  trial  by  general  court  martial  of 
•Bf  person  or  persons  in  the  Naval  Service. 

7.  In  a^  Third  Endorsenent  to  the  Becord  of  Proceedings  of  the 
Pearl  Harbor  Court  of  Inquiry,  dated  1  December  19A4>  I  found  that  the 
evidence  obtained  Indicated  that  there  were  errors  of  Judgment  on  the 
part  of  Admiral  Kinoel  and  Acknlral  Stark,  but  that  the  investigation 
had  not  gone  to  the  point  of  exhaustion  of  all  possible  evidence.  Ao» 
cordlngly,  I  directed  that  further  investigation  would  be  conducted  by  an 
investigation  officer  and  that  pending  the  completion  of  the  necessary 
further  investigation  I  would  withhold  decision  as  to  the  institution  of 
any  proceeding  against  any  naval  officer  Involved. 

6.    In  order  to  Insure  that  the  further  investigation  would  cover 

•very  material  question,  I  directed  that  a  thorough  review  be  made  of  the 

prior  investigations  and  that  an  appropriate  suoa&ry  of  all  information 

developed  in  the  prior  Naval  Investigations  be  prepared.  Upon  the  corapletion 

of  this  review  of  prior  investigations  and  &fter  exairjjiation  of  the  report 

of  the  Arn^  pearl  Harbor  Board,  dated  3  Deceiiiber  194^f^  I  appointed  Admiral  H* 

Heivltt,  USN,  as  investigating  officer,  and  John  F.  Sonnett  as  counsel  to 

exaoine  such  witnesses  and  obtain  such  other  evidence  as  might  be  necessary 

in  order  fully  to  develop  the  facts  in  connection  with  the  Japanese  attack  on 

Pearl  Harbor.  The  further  investigation  directed  by  ay  precept  of  2  Uay  1%5 

was  completed  on  12  July  1945  end  the  report  by  Admiral  Hewitt  was  forwarded 

to  the  Judge  Advocate  General  and  the  Coomander  in  Chief,  United  States 
Fleet  and  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  for  recommendation  and  comment* 

675 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2397 

CONFIDENTIAL 

9,  In  his  Second  Endorseaent  to  Admiral  Hewitt's  Report  of 
further  invesUgaUon,  dated  10  August  1945,  the  Judge  Advocate  G«ieral  ad- 
vised, among  other  things,  that  he  did  not  believe  that  there  wee  sufficient 
evidence  to  warrant  conviction  of  any  of  the  officer*  concerned  of  any 
offense  known  to  Naval  Law;  that  the  evidence  indicated  that  the  officer* 

in  question  lacked  superior  judgment  rather  than  being  guilty  of  culpable 
iaefficiency;  and  that  "lack  of  superior  judgment"  is  not  an  offense  triable 
by  general  court  nvartinl.  The  Judge  Advocate  General  further  advised  in 
his  Second  Endorsement  that:  "I  am  of  the  opinion  that  any  such  court- 
martial  proceedings  prior  to  the  end  of  hostilities  with  Japan  la  highly 
impractical  and  would  be  detrimental  to  the  war  effort,  and  further,  that 
any  such  proceedings  during  the  six  months  iomedietely  following  the  end 
of  hostilities  wovLLd  seriously  impair  the  efficiency  of  the  Nayal  service." 
Notwithstanding  the  difficulties  pointed  out  by  him,  the  Judge  Advocate 
General  was  of  the  opinion,  however,  that  the  Navy  Department  is  morally 
obligated  to  order  Adniral  KLoiael  tried  by   general  court  nartial  should 
Admiral  Kimmel  so  insist.  The  Judge  Advocate  General  recommended  that 
Admiral  Hevdtt's  investigation  be  made  available  to  Admiral  Kimmel  and  his 
counsel;  that  Admiral  Kianel  be  informed  that  he  is  free  to  make  public 
anything  contained  in  this  record  and  in  prior  records  as  soon  as  that 
may  be  done  without  prejudice  to  the  public  interests;  and  that  if  Admiral 
Kimel  insists,  a  general  court  martial  should  be  convened  to  try  him  for 
any  alleged  offenses  he  may  have  comDltted  on  or  before  7  December  194l> 

10.  In  the  Third  Endorsement  to  Admiral  Hewitt's  report,  dated  13 
August  1945*  the  Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet,  concux*red  generally  in  th« 
remarks  and  recommendations  of  the  Judge  Advocate  General  and  expressed  tlM 
^pinion  that  the  evidence  was  not  sufficient  to  wazrant  trial  tqr  court  martial 


676 


2398    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 

of  any  peraoa  in  the  Maval  8«rvle«  in  that  it  maid  not  soataln  the  oharge* 
roqolred  by  the  Ax>tlclea  for  the  Oovemnsnt  of  the  Navyi  that  ulth  regard 
to  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  to  waxrant  other  prooeedlnge,  the 
Cooraander  In  Chief,  U*  S.  Fleet  «as  still  of  the  opinioa  that  Adniral 
Staxic  and  Admiral  Kionsl,  although  not  culpable  to  a  degree  warranting 
fooraal  disciplinary-  action,  nererthelesa  laclced  the  superior  Jodgnent 
necessary  for  exercising  eoaaand  conensurate  with  their  duties,  and  that 
appropriate  action,  consisting  of  the  relegation  of  these  officers  to 
positions  in  which  lack  of  svqperlor  Judgnsnt  might  not  result  in  future 
errors,  had  been  ti^en  as  to  Admiral  Stark  and  Acknlral  Klnnsl,  and  stated 
that  no  further  action  was  reccxanended.  Die  Coonander  in  Chief,  U*  S* 
Fleet,  also  advised,  in  the  Ihlrd  ^idorseaent,  that  in  any  event  he 
considered  it  iapractloable  to  bring  Admiral  Stax^  or  Admiral  Klomsl  to 
trial  prior  to  the  texvinatlan  of  hostilities  with  Japan  beoause  such  pro- 
ceedlngs  would  almost  cex'talnly  involve  disclosure  of  infomatlon  which  would 
be  detrlasntal  to  current  military  operations  and  to  national  security 
measures.  He  oonourred  in  the  opinlte  of  the  Judge  Advocate  General  that 
the  Havy  Department  la  morally  obligated  to  order  Admiral  Kiioael  to  trial 
before  a  goieral  court  martial  should  Adairal  Kimmsl  so  insist,  but  stated 
that  this  action  should  not  be  taken  until  after  the  ooifiletion  of  hostilltlea 
with  Jflfkan.  He  oooourrwd  in  the  further  suggestions  of  the  Judge  Advooate 
Oeneral  that  Admiral  Hewitt's  InTestigation  be  made  avallabSU  to  Admiral 
Kiimaal  and  his  counsel  and  that  A<tilral  Elmmel  be  Inforasd  that  he  is  firee 
to  make  public  anything  contained  in  this  record  and  in  prior  reoords  as 
soon  as  ihat  may  be  done  without  prejudioe  to  national  security. 

11*  Ihe  comments  of  the  Judge  Advocate  Oeneral  and  of  the  Cooaander- 
in-Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet  and  Chief  of  Naval  Operatioos,  in  their  endorseaante  to 
the  Pearl  Harbor  Court  of  Inquiry  record,  and  in  their  endorssMnts  to  the 

677 


EXHIBITS   OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2399 

CONFIDENTIAL 

r«port  by  Admiral  He«ltt,  are  ^>prov«d  subjeot  to  the  following  remarkat 

(a)  Court  of  Inquiry  Finding  II  (1156).     IhlB  finding  ataiaa. 
In  snbetanoa,  that  the  presenoe  in  Pearl  Harbor  oo  7  Deeibar  19U1  of 
ISBSk  Force  One  atxl  the  battlesfalpe  of  Task  Faroe  T^  vaa  neoeaaary. 

The  essential  point  here  resta  in  Adairal  Klamel*8  state- 
■ant  to  the  effect  that  he  would  not  hove  had  the  Fleet  in  Pearl 
Harbor  had  he  oiticlpated  an  air  attack,     ta/t  Seoond  Endorsenact  In- 
dicates that  the  CooBnnder  in  Chief,  U.  5*  Fleet,  does  not  ootlrelj 
"go  along**  with  the  opinion  of  the  Coujrt  that  the  Inf  oraatlon  a:Tall- 
able  to  Admiral  Slmasl  did  not  require  any  departure  f  ran  his  operatioo 
and  maintenance  sdtedules.     The  Commander  in  Chief,   U.  S.  Fleets 
states  Airther  in  this  ccDneotion  that  Admiral  Kimoal  could  ha-ra 
rotated  the  "in  port*  periods  of  his  -vessels  in  less  routine  mnnar, 
so  as  to  have  made  it  Impoeslble  for  the  Japanese  to  have  predicted 
when  there  noold  be  any  vessels  In  port,  and  that  this  muld  have  made 
the  Japanese  task  leas  easy*     I  concur  In  the  conaents  of  the  Comaandw 
in  Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet,  as  to  this  finding. 

(b)  Court  of  Inquiry  Finding  III  (1156)     Biis  finding 
states  that,  "Constitutional  requirements  that  war  be  deolared  by 
Congress  •  •  ."  make  it  difficult  to  prevent  an  attack  and  precluded 
offensive  aotlon  as  a  means  of  defense,  and  that  Admiral  Kimmel  had 
the  respansibllity  of  avoiding  overt  acts. 

The  Conaander  In  Chief,   U*  S.  Fleet,  conaents  that 
this  gives  an  unscrupulous  eneqy  a  great  advantage,   and  that  the 
Const! tutl coal  requirement  preventing  offensive  action  as  a  means 
of  defense  was  a  defini1>e  handicap.     It  does  not  appear  that  there 
Das  any  proxLinate  casual  relationship  between  the  Canstltuticnal 
requirement  and  the  Instant  disaster.     Ihe  Constitutional  inhibitico 

67B 


2400    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 

and  tlM  injunction  &b  to  overt  acts  did  not  preclude  either  lon^  distance 
reoonncdssance  or  a  sortie  tagr  the  Fleet.  Portber,  it  ai9>ear8  that  prior 
to  7  Deoeaber  19ifl,  Adiairal  Klmel  did  not  regard  this  Cozistitutional  pro- 
Tision  or  his  responsibility  to  avoid  overt  acts  as  sufficient  to  prevent 
the  issuance  of  orders  to  boob  unidentified  suisnarlnes  found  in  operat- 
ing areas. 

(c)  Court  of  Inquiry  Finding  IV  (1159).  This  states  That 
AdisLral  Bloch  was  subordinate  to  Admiral  Kionel,  and  was  chcurged  ndth 
the  tasjc  of  assisting  the  An^  in  the  defense  of  Pearl  Harbor  and, 
consequently,  Adndral  Bloch  had  a  responsibility  for  naval  laeasures 
concerned  with  local  defense. 

It  should  be  noted  in  this  connection  that  Admiral 

Heaitt  found: 

"75*  Ho  patrol  planes  were  luider  the  conmand  of 
Admiral  Bloch.  The  only  Navy  planes  suitable  for  long 
distance  reconnaissance  were  the  Pacific  Fleet  patrol  planes. 

"76.  The  Pacific  Fleet  patrol  planes  were  under 
the  control  of  Admiral  Kianel,  and  he  had  the  responsi- 
bility for  their  utilization.  They  were  operated  after 
22  November  1941,  in  accordance  with  schediiles  approved  by 
him  at  that  time,  which  were  not  revised  prior  to  the  attack. 
The  schedules  stressed  training  operations.  They  did  not 
provide  for  distant  reconnaissance  from  Oahu." 

(d)  Court  of  Inquiry  Finding  V  (1160).  The  Coiurt  here 
finds  that  relations  between  Admiral  Kiansl  and  General  Short  were 
friendly,  cordial  and  cooperative;  that  they  invariably  conferred 
idien  important  astsages  were  received,  and  that  each  was  sufficiently 
cognizant  of  the  measures  being  taken  by  the  other. 

In  this  connection  the  following  conclusions  by 
Admiral  Hewitt  are  approved:  % 

"1.  The  basic. war  plans  and  the  local  defense  plans 
were  soiuul  and  ivere  designed  to  meet,  with  the  available  means, 

619 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2401 

CONFIDENTIAL 

variouB  types  of  attack,  including  an  attack  such  as  tfte  one 
which  was  delivered.  The  basic  war  plans  and  the  local  air 
defense  plans  were  not  operative  in  time  to  meet  that  attacK. 
The  Rainbow  Five  war  plans  presupposed  the  existence  of  a 
state  of  w»r.  The  local  air  defense  plans  presupposed  agree- 
ment between  the  local  conmanders  that  an  attack  was  iminent. 
4leither  of  these  was  the  case  prior  to  the  attack. 

"2.  The  system  of  coanand  in  effect  in  the  Hawaiian  area 
was  that  of  mutual  cooperation  and  not  unity  of  comioand. 
Cooperation  between  the  local  Amy  and  Navy  commanders  required 
agreement  as  to  the  imminence  of  attack,  which  presupposed  the 
possession  and  exchange  of  information  concerning  Japanese 
intentions  and  movements  of  Japanese  naval  forces. 

"3*  A  full  exchange  of  infonoation  is  necessary  to  the 
effective  exercise  of  Joint  Conmand.  While  there  was  consider- 
able exchange  of  information  between  various  krmy  and  Navy 
intelligence  agencies  there  was  no  organized  system  to  ensure 
such  exchange." 

The  evidence  obtained  by  Admiral  Hewitt  indicates  that  there 

were  Informal  arrsuigements  for  the  exchange  of  Intelligence  by  the 

Arqgr  and  Navy  at  Hawaii,  which  included  the  transmission  to  the  AraQT 

of  some  information  concerning  Japanese  ship  movements.  The  evidmce 

obtained  both  by  Admiral  Hewitt  and  by  the  Naval  Court  of  Inquiry 

indicates,  however,  that  neither  A(feglral  Klnmel  nor  General  Short  was 

sufficiently  informed  of  the  degree  of  readiness  put  into  effect  tay  the 

other.  It  appears  that  after  receipt  of  the  "war  warning*  and  prior 

to  7  December  194l>  Admiral  Klmel  and  General  Short  conferred  on  sereral 

occasions.  Thsy  discussed  the  reenforceoent  of  Mldmy  and  Wake.  It 

does  not  appear  that  they  dlacossed  the  conditions  of  readiness  placed 

In  effect  or  to  be  placed  in  effect,  or  the  question  or  advisability 

of  placing  in  effect  air  reconnaissance.  General  Short  testlfiea  before 

the  Naval  Court  that  after  a  conference  with  Admiral  Kimmel,  he  placed 

In  effect  Anqr  Alert  No.  1  (the  anti-sabotage  alert).  Admiral  KIobbI 

testified  that  he  did  not  know  what  alert  the  kimf  had  in  effect,  and 

that  he  mode  no  specific  InquLzy  of  General  Short  in  this  connection. 

680 


2402    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 

That  th«re  wn«  zu>t  full  nitval  •xotange  of  la%<tHglo«  alt* 
appears  from  tha  eTidenea.  Adniral  Klnmel  rae«lT«A  dlspatekea  after  27 
Vorenter  1941  relating  to  Jopanea*  duatrootlon  of  oodaa  and  lantruetlona 
to  United  Statea  outlying  ialanda  to  deetroy  elaaalfled  aaterlal.  He 
teatlfied  before  the  Haral  Court  that  he  did  not  direct  that  theae  he 
fumlahed  to  General  Short,  and  that  he  did  not  know  whether  or  not 'the/ 
were  fumlahed  to  hin.  General  Short  teatlfied  that  he  had  not  aeen 
theae  diapatchea. 

In  Tiew  of  theae  facta,  I  cannot  a^ree  %rlth  the  ahoTe  finding 

hy  the  Haval  Court  of  Inquiry.  The  eyatem  of  autual  cooperation,  of  Joint 

eonunand,  was  not  woridng  effectively  -  it  failed.  In  thia  connection  the 

following  conclualon  of  Admiral  Hewitt  ia  o^roTedt 

"Var  experience  haa  ahown  thatt  The  reaponaihility  for 
final  najor  deciaiona  mat  derolTe  on  one  peraon;  that  ia,  there 
Buat  he  "unity  of  cononand.' 

Howerer,  in  respect  of  the  aiboTe  conclualon  of  Adairal  Hewitt, 
it  ia  ii^ortant  to  point  out  that  the  experience  of  thia  war  haa  eoiw 
cluaiTely  deaonatrated  that  there  ia  no  inconaiatency  between  the 
exiatence  of  two  or  acre  aeparate  ailitary  or  naval  organi aatione  aa  the 
functioning  forcea  and  an  effective  exerciae  of  unity  of  eoaaand  in  a 
theater  or  in  an  operation.  Practically  all  of  the  aajor  operationa  of 
thia  war  have  heen  accospliahed  hy  two  or  aore  diatiaet  ailitary  organicap* 
tiona,  aoae  even  belonging  to  diverae  nationa,  hut  all  acting  under  a 
unified  coamand.  In  auch  an  operation,  the  ooaaaadera  of  the  aeveral 
forcea  and  their  ataffa  auat  function  in  cloae  phyaieal  proxiaity, 
usually  in  the  higher  echelona  aharing  a  coamon  headquartera  or  eoaaand  poat. 

I  do  not  find,  however,  that  Adairal  Kinnel  ia  open  to 
criticiaa  for  having  failed  to  adviae  the  Jkrpy  at  J>earl  Harbor  that  a  auV. 
aarine  contact  had  been  aade  on  the  aoming  of  7  Seoeaber  1941 ,  ahortly 

681 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2403 

CONFIDENTIAL 

prior  to  tha  air  atteek.  Tho  orideaco  obtained  V  idalral  Bovltt  aupDorta 

the  fellovlni;  conoluelon*  ty  hla,  which  li  approredt 

'36.  The  attenpt  to  obtain  eonflraatlon  of  the  reported  eab- 
■arlne  attack  off  Pearl  Harbor  wa«  proper,  although  It  ehoold  have 
been  effected  in  plain  language.  Adequate  naral  action  wae  taken  In 
eendlng  out  the  ready  dettroyer.  Bile  Inferaatlon  vaa  of  no  laaed^ 
late  Interest  to  tha  Angr  unleea  It  In  fact  Indicated  iBalnenoy  of 
an  air  attack,  an  asauaptlon  which  was  not  neeeeaarlly  logical* 
In  anjr  event,  oonfiraatlon  waa  not  received  until  the  air  attadc 
had  coBBenced." 

(e)  Oonrt  of  Inquiry  finding  TI  (1160).  Thla  stateo  in 
aubatance  that  unaroidablo  d«f icieneiea  in  personnel  and  aaterial  had 
a  bearing  on  the  effectlTeneaa  of  the  local  dafenae  of  Pearl  Harbor. 

The  CoHoander  in  Chief,  U.  8.  Tleet,  peinta  out,  howerer,  that 
the  pertinent  ofueatlon  la  lAiether  Aduiral  Klanel  uaed  the  meana  arailable 
to  the  beat  advantage.  I  concur  in  thla  coament  of  tha  Coanander  in  Chief 
U.  S.  neet. 

(f )  Court  of  Inquiry  Plnding  HI  (1166) .  The  Court  f Inda 
that  Japan  had  an  initial  advantage  becauae  of  the  Japaneae  fleet 'a 
xnmerlcal  auperierity,  and  the  auperiorlty  of  Japeneae  eaplonage. 

Thet'COBBent  in  the  Second  Sidoraaaient  on  thla  point  la  confined 
to  the  general  atateaent  that  factora  auch  aa  thoae  referred  to  bjr  the 
Court  will  alwaya  place  thla  nation  at  a  dlaadvantage  during  a  period  of 
atralned  relatione.  Thla  finding,  of  caurae,  in  general  waa  correct. 
Vevertheleaa ,  aa  applied  to  the  apeelfio  laauea  here  preaented,  it  overw 
looka  the  fact  thatt 

(1)  The  nunerical  superiority  of  the  Japaneae  fleet  wae  well 
known  to  Adalral  Stark  and  to  Admiral  KIbimI,  and  thla  fact  waa  taken  into 
account  in  the  war  plana; 

(2)  Although  unqueationably  the  United  Statea  waa  placed  at  a 
dlaadvantage  in  roatralnlng  Jananeae  espionage  activities,  the  Havy  and 


68e 


2404    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 

mar  D«|>«rtB«it«  wre  nererthalMa  not  wlthont  laportant  Intelllg«no« 
advantages  of  tbalr  on  itildi  ware  not  ayalled  of  to  the  fullest  exteet* 
(g)  Coort  of  Inqnliy  Finding  vm  (1167) »    This  statea  that,  it 
was  ttie  direct  respcoaibLllty  of  tbb  ia^  to  defend  Pearl  Harbor  Ittval 
Base,  and  that  the  Savy  was  to  assist  only  with  the  means  prorided  the 
Hanral  District* 

The  Cmiimler  in  Chief,  U*S*  Fleet,  is  in  agreeaent  with  "the 
ftindaaental  concept  of  naval  warfare"  die  cussed  tgr  the  Court,  but  tabs 
a  nore  realistic  view  en  this  point*    He  paints  out  that  Adairal  Kiomel 
was  fully  aware  that  in  rim  of  the  weakness  of  local  defense,  the  Fleet 
had  to  be  otplcgred  to  protect  Pearl  Harbor.    With  this  l  coocor.     It  is  to 
be  noted,  aoreover,  that  tinder  the  defense  plan  the  Havy  was  responsible 
for  the  aaintensnoe  of  distant  reconnaissaice. 

(h)  Court  of  Inquixy  Fjadii^  n  (ll69)«     T»>b  0«urt  finds  that 
the  air  defense  plans  wsre  defectiTe  becsnse  of  the  necessity  for  reliance 
upon  Fleet  aircraft  which  oould  not  be  oade  permanently  aTailable  for 
local  defense. 

The  Second  IkidorseBant  states  that  the  Court  has  overstressed the 
fact  that  the  only  patrol  planes  in  the  area  were  Fleet  planes}  that  it  was 
sound  poli^  to  place  all  suoh  air  craft  at  Adairal  Kianel*s  disposal}  that 
it  was  his  responsibility  to  allocate  the  plaes  as  best  he  could|  that 
the  available  aircraft  had  to  be  employed  in  tk«  manner  best  suited  to  the 
dnger  that  threatened}  that  it  is  doubtful  iriiether  with  the  available 
forces  it  would  ha^e  been  possible  to  destroy  the  carriers  before  they 
launched  their  planes,  except  by  •  ludcy  chsnce}  that  Admiral  Kiomel  was 
not  suffidcDtly  alive  to  the  situation,  not  entirely  due  to  his  on  fault} 
and  that  this  had  a  bearing  on  the  amount  of  damage  resulting  firom  the 
attaok*     I  concur  in  the  oonments  of  the  Ccaaander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet, 

with  respeot  to  this  finding. 

683  . 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2405 

CONFIDENT  IT: 

(I)  Court  of  Diqalry  yimflagi  17  (11$9).  nu  (1167) t 

n  (1169) > 

Basod  on  these  fLndixigB  th«  oooolnalon  of  tbt  Court  la  thct  idmlTml.  Bloch 

aAtiateotosllT-  panrforwd  his  dottlM* 

11m  Cammtkdur  in  Odef,  U*  S*  flMt,  oonears.    This  conBlnsion  la 

(J)  Coort  of  mguiry  FlixMag  I  (1171)»    Tkl«  holda  adsqnats 
and  effactlT*  Admiral  KlaML^a  proviaionB  for  the  aaoorlty  of  the  fleet 
at  »tm» 

Ttm  CoBMndar  In  Cbief,  U*  8«  Flaat,  oencan*    This  fLndLng  la 
approved* 

(k)  Coort  of  Inqglry  Finding  n  (1173) «    The  aubstaaee  of 
thla  f^"<M"c  la  ttxaX  Addral  KiflBal  «aa  Maintaining  the  hif^eat  eondltlan 
of  readlneae  called  for  by  ihB  Inforaatloa  arallable  to  hia,  and  that  a 
hifl^«r  condition  or  readineas  voold  have  added  little  to  the  defaoae. 

In  the  Seoood  Badoraaaant  It  la  pointed  oat  that  in  fact  the 
eondltlon  of  readineas  beli«  aaintalned  at  the  tloe  of  the  attadc  was 
only  that  condition  itileh  Is  nonaitllj  aaintalned  irban  In  port.    This  la 
Hdntained  on  the  assavitlGn  that  the  ahora  defenaea  ai^  adequate  to  pro> 
teot  the  Fleet.    Such  waa  not  tba  oaae  at  Peasi  Harbor,  aa  A<kdral  Klvaal 
knev. 

The  CoBBHidar  In  Chief,  U.  S.  Tleet,  /orthar  states  that  he  doea 
not  agree  with  the  MoelnslcB  of  the  Court  that  a  higher  eondltlfln    of 
readineas  voold  hare  added  little  to  the  defense,  and  Is  of  the  view  that 
the  InfoCMtlan  srallable  to  A<telral  Klxatel  called  for  a  tightening  op 
of  tte  defaoae  preeautlooa  aa  7  Deoa^er  approadied.    Hth  the  ooaaHita  of 
the  CoauBdar  In  Chief,  U.  S.  neat,  I  ooDoor. 

68k 


2406    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 

(1)  Court  of  Inquiry  Finrf^t^  ]^j  (117^)'    l*»e  Court  here 
finds  that  there  yna  no  infcrmation  indicating  that  Japanese  carriers 
irare  on  their  najr  to  attack  Pearl  Harbor,  and  that  it  vas  not  pcasihle 
to  ^revwit  or  to  predict  that  attack* 

The  Second  aidorsoDflnt  to  the  Naval  Court  record  statee  00  this 
points     "Ihere  was  Infaramtion  that  oi^t  logically  have  been  interpreted 
as  indicating  that  an  attack  ax  Hawaii  vas  not  unlikely,  and  that  the  tiaa 
could  be  predicted  within  faii^y  narrow  lioita** 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  one  of  the  prinoipid  natters  covered  in 
IdaLral  Hewitt's  investigation  was  the  infomaticn  availnble  to  Addxal 
Kianel,  particularly  during  ih»  critical  period  fron  27  Norember  to 
7  Deoomber  19Ul«  concerning  tlM  location  and  novemants  of  Japanese  naval 
forces*     This  infomation,  liiioh  consisted  principally  of  daily  radio 
IntelligeDoe  suanaries  setting  forth  the  results  of  nonitaring  Japanese 
naval  coamnnieations  and  estlaates  by  the  Fleet  Intelligence  Officer,  is 
set  forth  in  soas  detail  at  pages  112-llU,  inclusive,  of  Adairal  Hewitt's 
report*    It  there  appears  that  there  was  an  unusual  change  in  Japanese 
naval  radio  calls  on  1  Decenber  19ltl}  that  this  was  regarded  as  indicating 
an  additional  progressive  step  in  preparing  for  active  operations  on  a 
large  scaLej  that  on  2  Deoaober  19U1  Adairal  Kiaaal  conferred  with  bis 
Fleet  Intelligence  Officer  as  to  the  iriiereabouts  of  Japanese  fleet  units, 
and  tbat  daring  that  conference  Admiral  Kioael  noticed  and  coaasnted  m 
the  absence  of  infomaticn  in  the  Fleet  Intelligence  Officer's  written 
estiaate  as  to  Japanese  Carrier  Oivisicns  1  and  2,  which  consisted  of  four 
carriers*     (It  has  since  been  learned  that  these  four  carriers  were  anong 
the  six  carriers  which  in  fact  were  then  on  the  high  seu  heading  toward 
Pearl  Harbor*)    The  other  Japanese  oarilera  were  located  b7  liie  Hest 

Ikitelligenoe  Officer  in  his  written  estiaate,  in  Japanese  hosM  waters, 

685 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2407 

CONFIDENTIAL 

with  the  •zoaptlon  of  pot«11>ly  on*  earrlor  in  tho  Karataall*.  In  hli 

tootlaoay  before  Adairal  Etwltt,  tha  Fleot  Zntolllco&eo  Officer  deeeribeA 

bi*  eomrerMilon  with  Adairal  KImmI  en  3  Oaeealter  1941  as  follevai 

"Mr.  S0RTn(T7i  Will  you  atate  th*  aubatano*  of  «bat  ho  said  and 
vhat  you  said,  as  best  you  recall  it? 

"CAFTAIV  JJOWBt     A*  bent  I  recall  It,  Adairal  Kiunel  said,  'Vhat I 
Tou  don*t  know  ^ere  Carrier  Dlrlslon  1  and  Carrier  Dlrlslon  3 
aret'  axid  I  rerplled,  *Ve,  sir,  I  do  not.  I  think  they  are  In  hose 
waters,  but  I  do  not  know  where  they  are.  The  rest  of  these 
units,  Z  feel  pretty  confident  of  their  location.'  Then  Adnlral 
Klmael  looked  at  me,  as  sometlaes  he  would,  with  sometdiat  a  stem 
countenance  and  yet  partially  with  a  twinkle  Inixls  eye  and  said, 
'Do  you  mean  to  say  that  they  could  be  rounding  Diamond  Head  and 
you  wouldn't  know  Itf '  or  words  to  that  effect.  My  reply  was  that, 
'I  hope  they  would  be  slighted  before  now',  or  words  to  that  effect." 

"KR.  SCHTiTXTTt  Tour  testlnony,  Ciqatain,  was  not  quite  clear  to 
■e,  arlslne  out  of  your  description  of  Admiral  Kinunel's  twinkle 
In  hie  eye  t^en  he  spoke.  What  I  affl  trying  to  get  at  Is  this] 
Vas  the  dlecusslon  about  ths  absence  of  Infomatlon  concerning 
CardiTS  1  and  2  a  serious  or  Jocular  oneT 

"CAPTAIN  LATTOFi  Els  question  was  absolutely  serious,  but  tAian 
he  said,  'Where  are  Cardlrs  1  and  2',  and  I  said,  'I  do  not 
know  precisely,  but  If  Z  mist  estimate,  Z  would  soy  that  they 
are  probably  in  the  Kure  area  since  we  haren't  heard  from  them 
In  a  long  time  nnd  they  may  be  refitting  as  they  finished 
operations  only  a  month  and  a  half  ago, '  and  it  was  then  yAian  ha 
with  a  twinkle  in  his  eye,  said,  'Do  you  mean  to  eny  they  could 
be  rounding  Diamond  HeadT'  or  words  to  that  effect.  In  other 
words,  he  was  impressing' me  on  my  complete  ignorance  as  to  their 
exact  location. 

"MR.  SOtTNETT:  He  was  conscious,  therefore,  of  your  lack  of  ln>- 
formatlon  about  those  carrlersT 

"CAPTAIN  LATTOHt  This  incident  has  been  liqiressed  on  my  mind. 
I  do  not  say  that  Z  quote  him  exactly,  but  Z  do  know  that  he  mad« 
such  a  statement  to  me  in  a  way  to  point  out  to  me  that  Z  should 
know  t^ere  they  are  but  hadn't  so  indicated  their  location." 

Zt  is  to  be  noted  further  that,  as  set  forth  In  Admiral  Hewitt's 

report,  the  daily  communication  intelligeno*  summaries  received  by 

Adairal  ITimmel  stated,  on  December  3rd,  that:  "Almost  a  complete  blank 

of  information  on  the  carriers  today.  Z«ack  of  Identifications  has  soa». 

what  promoted  this  lack  of  information.  Howerer,  since  over  300  serrlce 

686 


2408    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 

call*  hare  'baea  partlallj  idantif l«d  alnoe  the  oheD^e  on  the  flrat  of 
Deomher  and  not  one  carrier  oall  has  heen  recovered.  It  Is  erldent  that 
carrier  traffic  la  at  a  low  e'b'b."  and  that  the  dalljr  aunnarlea  dellTered 
to  Adairal  Klamel  thereafter,  and  prior  to  the  attache,  indicated  that  there 
wa*  no  infomatlon  aa  to  Japaneae  carriers* 

In  Tlew  of  the  foresoin^,  I  do  net  approTe  tha  ahove  finding  hy 
the  Naval  Oourt  of  Inqairjr*  I  concur  entirely  in  the  coanent  of  the 
Conmander  in  Chief j  U.  S.  Tleet,  concerning  thia  finding.  I  an  of  the 
view  that  the  infomatlon  aa  to  the  location  and  moveaianta  of  the 
Japanoae  naval  f orcea  which  waa  received  hy  Adairal  Kinaiel  during  the 
week  precedi&i;  the  attack,  cot^led  with  all  the  other  information  idiich 
he  had  received.  Including  the  "war  warning"  and  other  aeaaagea  froa  the 
Chief  of  Naval  Operatlona,  ahould  have  heen  interpreted  aa  indicating 
that  an  attack  on  Hawaii  waa  not  unlikely  and  that  the  tine  of  auch  an 
attack  could  he  predicted  within  fairly  narrow  limlta. 

(«)  eourt  of  Inauiry  ?inding  XIII  (1178).  It  la  here  atated 
that  Adairal  Xlmael'a  deciaion  not  to  conduct  dally  long-range  reconnaia- 
aance  waa  aound;  that  there  were  inaufflciont  planea  for  thia  purpoae;  and 
that  auch  uae  of  the  available  planea  waa  not  stifled. 

The  Commander  in  Chief,  U*  3.  Tleet,  in  hia  ezxdoraement  to  the  Naval 
Court  record  pointe  out  that  Admiral  Elmmel  had  a  difficult  deciaion  to 
make  in  thia  matter  of  reeonnalaaance,  and  that  there  were  many  faetora 
to  he  eonaidered.  He  atatea  further,  however,  that  after  conaldering  all 
of  the  information  that  waa  at  Admiral  Kimmel'a  diepoaal,  it  a^eara  that 
Admiral  Eimmel  waa  not  on  entirely  aound  ground  in  making  no  atteaipt  at 
long-range  reeonnalaaance,  partlculcu'ly  aa  the  aituation  became  more  and 
■ore  tenae  in  che  few  daya  immediately  preceding  the  Japaneae  attaeka. 
Ihla  comment  adds  that  it  la  ohvloun  that  the  meana  available  did  not 

(01 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2409 

CONFIDENTIAL 

pviLt  an  all-raanil  daily  raoonnaiJBano*  to  a  dlatanea  neoaeaary  to  dataot 
the  ^iproMh  of  oarriara  bafora  planaa  ooald  ba  lavndiad,  tnt  that  thara 
vara,  bowvrer,  oartaln  aactora  sora  dangerous  than  othaiv  i«iloh  could  hxw 
bean  oorered  to  aoae  artaxit,  and  that  aoeh  particular  oorar  wnld  hsva  bean 
logical  in  the  cirouaBtancaa  knoan  to  Adniral  Ciaael  in  late  Horeribar  nd 
aarly  Daoaabar.    Attention  ia  oallad  totha  faot  that  A4id.na.  Riohardaon  had 
Hlntalned  diatant  raoonnaisaanea,  naing  tfaa  fair  patrol  planaa  at  hia 
dLapoaal,  to  oorar  the  aoat  dangarooa  aeotora  in  rotation,  and  that  theaa 
patrola  ware  diaeontimed  itien  or  ahortly  before  Adairal  Klaael  raliared 
Adbdxal  Riohardaon* 

m  addition  to  theaa  conanta,  vith  ahidi  I  oonoor,  it  Mgr  ba  notad 
that  Adairal  Klmal  Mm^lt  had  Baintainad  a  partial  long  range  patrol  la 
the  aoaaBr  of  19la  on  the  baaia  of  mtelligenoa  raoalrad  and  reported  by 
Atlairal  Blooh  at  that  tiJM. 

The  following  flndinga  by  Adbdjral  Haaitt  In  connection  idth  tha 

qaaation  of  air  reoonnaiaaanoe  are  ipproiradt 

•77«    Adairal  Kinal  taatifiad  before  the  Haval  Court  of 
inquiry  that  he  decided  on  Horaaber  27th  that  Ifaere  ahoald  ba 
no  diatant  reoonnaiaasioe." 

"TSs    Ihere  ia  no  avldence  of  any  apeeiflo  diaeasaian  betvean 
Artalral  ITIwiiil  and  aabera  of  hia  ataff  on  or  after  the  reoaipi 
of  the  •hmr  warning,"  aa  to  the  adviaability  or  practicability  of 
long  range  reeonnaiaMnce  Tram  Oahu*    the  IMr  Plana  OCCLear 
thought  that  the  8vb>ot  aoat  have  bean  dlaoaaaed,  bat  could 
recall  no  apecific  diaousaion.     The  Coamander  of  the  Fleet  Patrol 
planaa,  who  bad  not  bean  infotaed  of  any  of  the  aigniflcaat  aazving 
■aaaagea,  teatifled  Ihot  Atelral  KiHsal  had  no  audi  diaeuaalon 
withhia." 

"87.    The  Fleet  patrol  planaa  arailable  *  Oahu  Inthe  week 
preceding  the  attack  vara  not  anfficiant  to  hare  ecndacted 
360  degree  reoomaiaaaaoa  daily  for  aore  thai  a  few  days*" 

■69*    'Aiara  vara  soffielaiii  Fleet  patrd  planaa  and  oreaa  la 
fleet  a^railabla  at  (Mxn  dating  the  weak  preeedlng  the  attack 
to  hare  floan,  for  at  laaat  aereiral  weeka,  a  daily  reowwalaaaif 
eonring  128  dagreea  to  adiatanoe  of  about  TOO  allaa*" 

688 


2410    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 

"90.    Tbm  leetora  north  of  Oihu  war*  g«n«rall7  rvoognised  m  b«ing 
Mm  aoet  likaLy  ••otora  trom  which  m  Jkpanaee  attack  woald  coait 
If  the  Japanese  ware  to  attack  Pearl  Harbor*" 

«91»    If  a  daily  distant  recoonaissance  bad  been  floMn  f  roa  Odm 
after  27  Hovesfcer  19l4l»  with  the  available  petrol  planes,  the 
northern  sectors  probably  would  have  been  searched** 

"101*  Ihe  Japanese  carriers  laondied  their  planes  tram  a  poeitlca 
200  miles  doe  north  of  Onhu** 

(n)  Court  of  Inquiry  Finding  IIV  (1182)*     Ihls  states  in 
substoace  that  the  ixw^  raoar  detection  systea  was  ineffective* 

Itie  evidence  supports  the  substance  of  the  ocoBttt  on  this  flndingf 

lixidx  is  made  in  the  Seoond  aidorseaant;  that  is,  Itiat  althcagh  the  radar 

detecticn  system  in  operation  at  Pearl  Harbor  was  in  an  embryonic  stata, 

neverlfaeleec,  even  in  its  then  cooditioo  it  coald  have  and  dicold  have 

eaonred  to  give  at  least  an  hoar's  waznii^  of  the  attack*    I  cononr  In 

this  rnisaant  and  also  approve  the  following  condnsion  b7  Admiral  Henittt 

■•15*     Ihe  aircraft  warning  STStam  was  being  qfMrated  by  the  Anqr 
daring  certain  periods  of  the  day  primarily  for  training  poxpoees, 
and,  althou^  no.  fully  developed,  could  have  served  to  ^ve  soas 
warning  of  the  approach  of  Jifxanese  aircraft*" 

(o)  Coinrt  of  mgoiry  Findings  IT  (1186).     this  states  tiiat 
the  best  professional  opinion  in  the  Utaited  States  and  Oreat  Britain, 
prior  to  7  December  I9I1I,  was  that  an  aircraft  torpedo  attack  undar 
conditions  of  shoal  water  and  limited  approad.  such  as  thostf  ikiidi 
obtsinBd  at  Pearl  Harbor,  was  not  praoticable,  aai  that  the  Japanese 
attack  was  successfnl  pzlnoipally  because  of  tfaa  eqplogrmant  of  a  special- 
ly designed  torpedo,  wfaidx  was  a  secret  weapon* 

Ihe  only    oinent  in  the  Seoond  EbdorsetMnt  on  this  finding  is  thatt 
■It  is  evidant  in  retrospect  thai  the  capabilities  of  Japanaae  alroraft 
torpedoes  were  seriously  imdarestimated*"    The  principal  point  upon  «hich 
the  Conrt  of  Inquiry  seems  to  rest  its  findings  la  the  farther  flLading  thi 

689 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2411 

CONFIDENTIAL 

it  WM  not  bflillerTwi  ^3T  Mcrioan  and  British  nsral  aathorltlaa  at  ttet  tl» 
that  torpedosa  oould  ba  auoeeaafollx  laonohad  tiom  alrorait  in  witora  as 
flballov  aa  tliQBe  at  Paaxl  Haxt>or.    As  a  bliBlft  for  this  Tiav  tba  Court  rallaa 
iq>oa  a  latter  ty  tba  Chief  of  Haval  Oparatlons  aarlj  in  I9I1I  In  whioh  ba 
indloatad  that  torpedoaa  oould  not  be  suooassfolly  launohad  froa  alrplaM* 
in  wator  tindf  atmiMin  dapth  of  75  faet  («atar  at  Paarl  Harbor  balBC 
approalaatalj  U5  feat).    It  is  noted  that  Hm  Court  also  refers  to  a  sdb- 
seqosnt  letter  put  oat  for  the  Chief  of  Isval    Operations  in  June  19lil» 
tor  Adslral  Ingersoai,  itiioh  is  in  eonfUot  with  the  Courtis  fladlag* 
Ihii  leUor  stated,  SMng  other  thii«8,  thatt    *It  oaanot  be  aasvaad  tliat 
angr  o^pltal  or  other  iwlnable  Teasel  is  safe  iban  at  anohor  trtm  this  tiype 
of  attaok  if  surrounded  bgr  water  at  a  suffioloQt  distanoe  to  pendt  an 
attadc  to  be  developed  and  a  soff ioiant  run  to  am  the  torpedo**    This 
letter  also  advised  that  tocp><loes  lannohed  by  the  British  at  nmnto 
ware,  in  ganoral,  in  1>>1$  Athoas  of  vatar,  althoa«h  aereral  Mgr  bars 
bean  Imnched  in  11-12* 

The  reoonda  of  the  lacrjr  Dspartaant  indloated  that  in  April*  lAX* 
there  «as  eireulated  in  the  Dopartaent  an  mtelligenoe  report  itiioh 
described  the  daaanstration  of  m  a«rial  torpedo  in  fiigland.    It  ivpear* 
fraattiis  report  that  the  tocpedo  desoxlbed  vas  equipped  vith  speolal 
wlnp,  aid  that  it  required  no  greater  depth  of  iAt«r  for  its  suooessAal 
l^nyy^Mng  than  the  depth  at  vfaidi  it  nade  its  noxaal  nil. 

It  lUrtber  Ka>9ar»  firaa  the  reeords  of  the  Mnry  Departaait  that  the 
British  reported  aircraft  torpedo  attaoks  during  the  jear  19iiO  lawhieh 
torpedoea  were  auooeesftiUj  lamahed  in  hZ  feet  of  water* 

Finally,  there  is  eridMiee  in  the  reoerd  to  indicate  that  nearlj  • 

year  prior  to  the  aotnal  attadc.  the  feasibili^  and  eveD  the  prObakilitr 

of  an  idjrplana  torpedo  attadc  vftm  Pearl  Haztx>r  ww  uaita^literti 

690 


2412    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 

Secretary  Knox's  letter  of  January^  1941 »  listed  an  air  torpedo  attack 
as  second  only  to  air  bombing  in  order  of  probability  in  a  list  of  the 
types  of  attack  upon  Pearl  Harbor  which  he  considered  likely.  His  letter 
had  been  previously  cleared  with  Admiral  Stark,  and  was  received  In 
February  by  Adoiral  KinoMl. 

In  view  of  the  foregoing,  the  finding  of  the  Court  of  Inquiry  is 
not  approved. 

(p)  Coxirt  of  Inqxtiry  Finding  XVI  (1188).  The  Court  here 
finds  that  Admiral  Kimael's  decision  to  continue  preparation  of  the  Fleet 
for  war,  made  after  receiving  the  24  Noven^er  dispatch,  was  sound  in 
light  (a)  of  the  approval  of  the  steps  which  he  had  taken  after  the  dis- 
patch of  16  October  irtiich  advised  that  hostilities  were  possible,  and 
(b)  the  Inf creation  then  available  to  him  including  Admiral  Stark's  letter 
of  17  October  1941  and  the  dispatch  of  24  November,  1941,  which  stated 
that  a  surprise  aggressive  movement  in  any  direction,  including  att-ack  on 
the  Phillippines  or  Guam,  was  a  possibility. 

The  Secona  iihdorsement  summarizes  the  Court's  finding  and  under- 
scores that  portion  of  the  24  November  dispatch  which  indicated  thatt 
"A  surprise  aggressive  movement  in  any  direction^  including  attack  on 
the  Philippines  or  Quam  is  a  possibility...." 

It  should  be  further  noted  that  Admiral  Kimmel  testified  that  th« 
words,  "A  surprise  aggressive  movement  in  any  direction,  including 
attack  on  the  Philippines  or  Guam,"  meant  to  him  that  any  attack  other 
than  on  those  two  places  would  be  on  foreign  territory,  but  that  the  words 
also  included  the  possibility  of  a  submarine  attack  on  the  Hawaiian 
Islands. 

The  Court  refers  in  its  finding  to  a  part  of  a  personal  letter 

691 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2413 

CONFIDENTIAL 

Mat  b7  Admiral  Stark  to  Admiral  Kinnel  on  17  October,  in  vhich  Admirax 
Stark  atated:  "Personally,  I  do  not  believe  the  Japs  are  going  to  sail 
into  ua  and  the  meseage  I  sent  /ou  merely  stated  the  possibility;  in  fact, 
I  tempered  the  message  handed  me  considerably."  However,  the  letter  also 
continued:  "Perhaps  I  am  wrong,  but  I  hope  not.  In  any  case,  after  long 
po«-»ow8  in  the  V/hlte  House,  it  was  felt  that  we  should  be  on  gtiard,  at 
least  until  something  indicates  the  trend.'*  To  the  letter  was  annexed  a 
poatscript  stating  in  partt  "Oenaral  UarahaU  Jutt  e«U«d  up  and  «a« 
anxious  that  ae  made  some  sort  of  reconnaissance  so  that  he  could  feel 
assured  t.^.at  on  arrival  at  Wake,  a  Japanea*  raider  attack  may  not  be  in 
order  on  his  bombers.  I  told  him  that  we  could  not  assure  against  any 
such  contingency,  but  that  X  felt  it  extremely  Improbable  and  that,  while 
we  keep  track  of  Japanese  ships  so  far  as  we  can,  a  carefully  planned 
raid  on  any  of  theae  island  carriers  in  the  pacific  might  be  difficult  to 
detect.  However,  we  are  on  guard  to  the  best  of  our  ability,  sjid  ay  advice 
to  him  was  not  to  worry." 

It  is  noted  that  the  Court  does  not  specifically  deal  with  the 
question  of  the  soundness  of  Admiral  Kianel's  decision  to  continue  pre- 
paration of  the  Fleet,  in  the  light  of  the  highly  lii^jortant  information 
which  he  received  from  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations  and  otherwlae  during 
t^  critical  period  after  the  "war  warning"  of  November  27th. 

(q)  Court  of  Inquiry  Finding  xyil  (1193).  The  Court  here 
fiAds  that  there  were  ^ood  grounds  for  believing  that  the  Japanese  would 
attack  in  the  Far  East. 

In  respect  of  this  finding,  the  Coomander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet, 

points  out  that  the  Far  East  was  the  most  probable  scene  for  the  initiation 

of  Japanese  operations,  and  that  they  were  in  fact  initiated  there.  He 

note*  further  that  all  concerned  recognised  the  possibility  that  such  a 

692 


2414    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 

coranencement  of  hostilitiea  would  be  accompanied  by  an  attack  upon  Pearl 
Harbor.  He  adds  that  this  latter  possibility  was  considerably  strengthened 
by  information  available  at  'Washington,  all  of  which  was  not  available  to 
Admiral  Kimmel. 

It  appears  from  the  evidence  obtained  in  Admiral  Hewitt's  investi- 
gation that  the  possibility  that  the  cofflmencement  of  hostilities  by  Japan 
would  include  an  attack  upon  Pearl  Harbor  was  also  strengthened  by  in- 
formation received  by  Admiral  Kimmel  on  and  after  the  war  warning  of 
November  27th.  The  estimates  that  had  been  made  in  the  War  Plans,  which 
had  been  approved  by  Admiral  Kimmel,  of  course  contemplated  that  in  the 
event  of  war  with  the  Japanese  a  surprise  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  was 
distinctly  possible.  The  information  received  by  Admiral  Kimmel  as  to 
the  location  and  movement  of  Japanese  naval  forces  was,  at  the  least, 
consistent  with  these  estimates.  The  following  conclusion  of  Admiral 
Hewitt  in  this  connection  is  approved! 

"23.  The  information  as  to  Japanese  naval  forces  which 
was  available  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  emphas- 
izing the  movement  of  forces  to  the  southward,  tended  to  con- 
centrate his  attention  on  the  probability  of  Japanese  attacks  on 
the  Philippines  and  Ualaysia.  The  information  which  was  received 
by  Admiral  Kimmel  during  the  first  week  of  December  1941  indicated, 
however,  that  on  Deceiii>er  1st  there  was  an  unusv^l  change  in 
Japanese  radio  call  signs;  that,  on  the  basis  of  all  information 
up  to  December  2nd,  no  reliable  estimate  couxd  be  made  of  the 
whereabouts  of  four  of  Japan's  ten  carriers,  and  that  there  was  no 
information  as  to  any  of  the  carriers  thereafter.  The  absence  of 
positive  information  as  to  the  location  of  the  Japanese  carriers, 
a  study  of  the  movement  which  was  possible  to  them,  imder  radio 
silence,  through  the  unguarded  areas  of  the  Pacific,  and  a  due 
appreciation  of  the  possible  effectsi  of  an  air  attack  should  have 
induced  Admiral  Kimmel  to  take  all  practicable  precautions  to 
reduce  the  effectiveness  of  such  an  attack  .  .  .  ." 

(r)  Court  of  Inquiry  Findiog»  XVIII  and  XH  (1196). 

These  state  in  substance  that  Admiral  Stark's  failure  from  26  November  to 

7  December  1941  to  transmit  to  Admiral  Kimnel  inportaAt  information  in 

his  possession,  obtained  from  intercepted  Japanese  diplomatic  messages, 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2415 

CONFIDENTIAL 

and  suamarized  In  the  addendum  to  the  Court's  findings  of  facts, 
constitutes  a  oilltary  error. 

The  comnent  of  the  Conoander  In  Chief »  0.  S.  Fleet,  as  to  this 
finding  was  to  the  effect  that  Admiral  Stark  was  at  fault  in  falling  to 
give  Admiral  Kimmel  an  adequate  sunmary  of  Information  available  In 
Washington. 

The  endorsement  of  the  Commander  In  Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet,  on  th« 
Naval  Court  of  Inqvilry  Record,  further  pointed  out  that  hear  Admiral 
V«llklnson,  formsr  Director  of  Naval  Intelligence,  was  not  avallaible  to 
the  Court  as  a  witness.  It  was  noted  that  these  findings,  and  the  con- 
clusions of  the  Court  based  thereon,  were  concerned  principally  with  the 
handling  of  enetiQr  information  In  the  Navy  Department,  and  that  consequent- 
ly, it  would  seem  essential  to  a  thorough  exploration  of  the  facts  to  have 
the  testimony  of  the  Director  of  Naval  Intelligence,  who  was  largely  re- 
sponsible for  handling  this  information.  It  was  concluded  that  the  failure 
to  obtain  this  testimony  was  unfox^unate. 

With  this  commsnt  by  the  Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet,  I  c<»i- 
eurred.  It  Airther  appeared  to  me  that  the  testimony  of  Captain  UcCollun, 
who  was  assigned  to  the  Office  of  Naval  Intelligence,  and  who,  according 
to  other  testimony  In  the  record,  had  important  duties  in  connection 
with  the  handling  of  such  Intercepted  enejiQr  information,  would  be  most 
helpful.  Captain  UcCoUum  was  also  unavailable  as  a  witness  to  the  Court. 
I  ascertained  that  at  the  tims  both  Hear  Admiral  V/ilkinson  aind  Captain 
kcCollum  were  actively  engaged  in  combat  operations  against  the  enemy, 
and  would  be  so  engaged  until  soiae  date  in  the  future.  From  the  nature 
of  the  duties  which  these  officers  were  performing  in  their  assignments, 
I  determined  that  in  view  of  the  paramount  present  needs  of  the  war  effort, 
their  testimony  in  this  matter  could  not  then  feasibly  be  obtained. 

69U 


2416    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION   PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 

During  his  later  investigation^  Admiral  Hewitt  was  able  to 

obtain  the  testijnony  of  Admiral  Wilkinson  and  of  Captain  UcCollum,  as 

well  as  other  testimony  bearing  upon  this  finding  of  the  Court  of  Inquiry. 

The  following  conclusions  of  Admiral  Hewitt  in  this  connectiorr  are  approved: 

"5.  Information  was  promptly  and  efficiently  obtained 
by  the  United  States  Navy  and  Army  intelligence  organizations 
in  '.Vashington,  concerning  the  Japanese  Government's  actual 
views  as  to  the  diplomatic  negotiations  and  its  intention  to 
wage  war,  by  means  of  interception,  descryption,  and  transla- 
tion '>f  Japanese  diplomatic  messages." 

"6.  The  information  which  was  obtained  in  Washington  by 
the  V.'ar  and  Navy  Departments  from  Japanese  diplomatic  messages 
was  fully  exchanged.  The  information  which  was  obtained  by  the 
Navy  Department  as  to  Japanese  naval  movements  was  available 
to  the  intelligence  officers  of  the  V'ar  Department  in  Washington. 
The  War  Department  had  information  which  led  that  Department  to 
believe  that  Japanese  naval  forces  were  in  the  Marshalls  in 
November,  1V41.  This  appears  from  a  Vi'ar  Department  dispatch  of 
26  November  1941  to  General  Short,  information  to  Admiral  Kimmel, 
concerning  a  special  photographic  reconnaissance  to  be  flown  over 
Tmok  and  Jaluit,  in  order  to  obtain  information,  among  other 
things,  as  to  the  number  and  location  of  naval  vessels.  The 
reconnaissance  was  not  flown  because  the  special  Arny  planes  were 
not  made  ready."  .  .  . 

"8.  The  information  obtained  by  the  Navy  Department 
from  intercepted  Japanese  diplomatic  messages  was  adequately 
disseminated  within  the  Navy  Department. 

"9.  Although  Admiral  Kimmel  some  months  before  had  made 
requests  that  he  be  kept  fully  informed  on  subjects  of  interest 
to  the  Fleet  and  as  to  all  important  developments,  the  Chief  of 
Naval  Operations  did  not  communicate  to  him  important  in- 
formation which  would  have  aided  him  materially  in  fully  evaluat- 
ing the  seriousness  of  the  situation.  In  particular,  the  failure 
to  transmit  the  State  Department  message  of  November  26th  and 
to  send,  by  telephone  or  other  expeditious  means,  information 
of  the  "1  p.m."  messaf-;e  and  its  possible  import,  were  unfortunate. 

"10.  rtdmirsLl  Kimmel,  nevertheless,  did  have  sufficient 
information  in  his  possession  to  indicate  that  the  situation 
was  unusually  serious,  and  that  important  developments  with 
respect  to  the  outbreak  of  war  were  imminent.  This  included  the 
"war  warning"  message  and  similar  important  messages  which 
were  sent  by  the  Chief  of  Naval  Operations. 

"11,  The  available  information  in  the  possession  of  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  Pacific  Fleet,  as  to  the  existing  situation, 
particularly  the  "war  warning"  message,  was  not  disseminated 

695 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2417 

CONFIDENTIAL 

to  all  of  his  important  subordinate  comndnders  whose  cognizance 
thereof  was  desirable.  Thus  Admiral  BelliJiger,  who  commanded 
the  f>atrol  planes,  and  Admiral  Newton,  who  was  at  sea  with  a 
carrier  and  other  units,  were  not  informed  of  this  and  other 
important  messages." 

12.  The  following  conclusions  by  Adoirail  Hewitt  concerning 

the  intelligence  secured  bj  tapping  the  wires  of  the  Japanese  Consulate 
General  at  Hawaii  and  by  Intercepting  cable  messages  of  the  Japanese 
Consulate  General  are  approved. 

Conclusion  12.   "Despite  the  fact  that  prior  to  the  attack  the 
telephone  lines  of  the  Japanese  Consul  (general  at  Honolulu  were 
tapped  and  that  various  of  his  cable  messages  were  secured  at 
Honolulu,  no  information  T.as  obtained  prior  to  December  7th  which 
indicated  the  likelihood  of  a  Japanese  attack.  The  legal  re- 
strictions which  denied  access  to  such  cable  messages  were  a 
definite  handicap  to  the  intelligence  agencies  in  the  Hawaiian 
area." 

Conclusion  13*  "Although  various  messages  of  the  Japanese  Consul 
General  at  Honolulu,  which  indicated  Japanese  interest  in  specific 
locations  of  ships  in  Pearl  Harbor,  were  intercepted  by  radio 
intercept  stations  of  the  Army  and  Navy  and  decrypted  prior  to 
the  attack,  this  information  was  not  transmitted  by  the  Navy 
Department  to  admiral  Kimmel.  Certain  other  messages  which  were 
intercepted  by  the  Army  prior  to  7  December  1941,  indicated  the 
likelihood  of  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor  but  were  not  decrypted  or 
brought  to  the  attention  of  the  Navy  prior  to  the  attack, 
apparently  because  the  Arqy  did  not  have  sufficient  personnel  . 
for  such  work." 

13.  In  its  final  opinion  and  recommendation,  the  Court  of 
Inquiry  finds  that  no  offenses  have  been  coonitted  or  serious  blame 
Incurred  on  the  part  of  any  person  or  persons  in  the  Naval  service,  and 
reconnends  that  no  further  proceedings  be  had  in  the  matter. 

With  respect  to  this  opinion  and  recommendation  of  the 
Court  of  Inquiry,  I  concur  in  the  comment  expressed  in  paragraph  5  of 
the  Second  Endorsement  that  the  Navy  cannot  avoid  a  share  of  responsibili- 
ty for  the  Pearl  Harbor  incident,  and  that  disaster  cannot  be  regarded 
as  an  "act  of  God"  beyond  human  power  to  prevent  or  mitigate.  Whether 

or  not  it  is  true,  as  stated  in  the  Second  Endorsement,  that  the  Country^ 

696 


2418    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 

as  a  whole  is  basically  responsible  in  that  the  people  were  unwilling  to 
take  adequate  measures  for  defense  until  it  was  too  late  to  repair  the 
consequences  of  their  failure  so  to  do,  it  appears  that  the  Navy  as  a 
whole,  although  its  ranking  officers  were  fully  informed  of  the  moat 
recent  developments  in  the  science  of  warfare,  failed  to  appreciate  the 
true  significance  of  those  developments  until  their  impact  had  been  felt 
by  a  blow  struck  at  a  substantial  portion  of  the  Fleet.  By  the  same 
token,  although  the  imminence  of  hostile  action  by  the  Japanese  was  known, 
and  the  capabilities  of  the  Japanese  Fleet  and  Air  Arm  were  recognized 
in  war  p.lans  made  to  meet  Just  such  hostile  action,  these  factors  did  not 
reach  the  stage  of  conviction  In  the  minds  of  the  responsible  officers 
of  the  Navy  to  an  extent  sufficient  to  impel  them  to  bring  about  that 
implementation  of  the  plans  that  was  necessary  if  the  initial  hostile 
attack  was  to  be  repelled  or  at  least  mitigated. 

That  this  is  so  is  manifested  in  ^he  case  of  the  instant 
disaster  in  several  important  respects. 

(a)  The  destructive  potentiality  of  air  attack  was  not 
properly  evaluated,  although  there  was  simple  information  available  on 
this  subject  in  the  reports  of  action  by  and  against  the  British.  That 
this  information  was  recognized  is  shown  by  the  inclusion  in  war  and 
defense  plans  of  appropriate  provisions  for  defense  against  this  type 
of  attack,  but  that  it  was  not  fully  appreciated  is  shown  by  the  fact 
that  these  selfsame  provisions  were  not  put  into  effect  until  the  initial 
attack  had  been  successful. 

(b)  In  respect  of  xuiity  of  command,  again  all  of  the  plans 

made  adequate  provision  for  Joint  action,  mutual  Interchange  of  intelli- 
gence, and  the  fullest  utilization  of  all  of  the  available  resources  of 

697 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2419 

CONFIDENTIAL 

^tb  9m  kemj  «a4  th«  Htcffx   In  praotl«0,  non*  of  th«M  aMmrm  oca* 
Into  l>etos  to  aiijr  a^rocUiblo  Mitcnt  prior  to  tho  sttadc. 

(«)  Within  th«  BaTjr  Ittolf ,  th«  orsMlsatloii  wa«  «ioh  m  to 
•utaerse  th«  (Silof  of  Haral  Operation*  In  a  watlpllclty  of  datail  potw 
talnlBS  to  the  prootu-Mwnt  and  anterlal  program  lncld«tal  to  the  n^id 
•xpan«ion  of  tho  laty.  This  pr«clod«d  hla  fron  glrlnc  to  war  piano  and 
operations  the  {^divided  and  oontlnaln«  attention  which  eiqierlance  has 
ehown  they  reqalre,  and  tended  to  dull  hie  perception  of  the  critical 
algnlflettice  of  eventet 

In  making  these  ohsertatloas,  X  as  not  unnlndful  of  the 
uanal  adTantage  of  hinds  l^t,  nor  do  X  orerlook  the  fact  that  this  war 
has  prered  that  any  carrier  strike,  when  pressed  huw  with  reeolv^lon. 
Is  alBost  iaq>osslhle  to  deflect*  After  glrlng  doe  consideration,  howerer, 
to  all  theee  factors,  X  aa  of  the  opinion  that  there  were,  nerertheless , 
areas  in  lAich  sound  Bllltary  Judgement  dictated  the  taklnc  of  action 
lAkleh,  though  It  ttlght  not  hare  prevented  or  defeated  the  attadc,  would 
hare  tMxded  naterially  to  reduce  the  damage  which  the  attack  was  able 
to  Inflict.  Such  action  was  not  taken,  and  the  responslhlllty  aust  canter 
vqfton  the  officers  «dio  had  it  in  their  power,  ea^  within  his  reepeetlT* 
ephere,  to  tidce  ap-oropriate  action. 

14.    I  concur,  therefore,  with  the  opinion  Mpressed  In  paragngih 
6  of  the  Second  AidorseBMst  to  the  Court  of  Inquiry  record  that  it  ie 
perrtiaent  to  exaalne  the  pessihle  courses  of  action  which  Adalral  SteA 
and  Adairal  Kinnel,  as  the  reeponslhle  officers,  night  hare  tiAcen  to 
lessen  the  success  of  the  initial  Japanese  hlow. 

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2420    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

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(a)  la  pmrmgnfih  6  of  the  Second  &idor«eaeat,  it  it  pointed  out 
that  idalml  Stazk  fallod  to  «1t«  Adairal  Ciaaol  an  adaijaato  mamary  of 
iafematloB  araileble  in  Vashixtgton,  particularly  is  raapaot  oft 

(1)  9m  Stata  Dapartaent  reply  of  26  Hovesber  1941  to 

the  Japanese,  i^ich  was  re/i:arded  by  the  Japanese  ae  an  QltiBatmt 

(2)  The  intercepted  Jananeee  aeesas**  inquiring  as  to  the 
disposition  of  ships  within  Pearl  Harbor; 

(?)  The  ioplementation  of  the  "vinde"  message; 

(4)  In  failing  to  apDreciate  the  signif icancn  of  the 
*oae  p.B.  aessase'  received  on  the  aoming  of  7  Deeenber  1941, 
and  in  the  failure  to  transnit  it  to  Adairal  Kiaael  by  tha 
efuidcest  aeane  available. 

(5)  finally,  it  is  pointed  out  in  this  section  of  the 
Seeond  Xndorseaent  that  th^re  is  a  oertain  saaeness  of  tenor 
in  the  coBBuni cat ions  sent  by  Admiral  Staric  to  Admiral  Kimael 
which  failed  to  convey  the  sense  of  intensification  of  critical 
relations  between  Japan  and  the  Uhited  States. 

I  concur  generally  with  'these  comments  axeept  as  to  (3)  and 
(Q).  In  connection  with  the  failure  of  Admiral  Stark  to  advise  Admiral 
Xlaael  of  the  implementation  of  the  "winds"  message,  the  following  eon- 
olnaion  by  Adairal  Hewitt  is  epprovedi 

'7.  AlthoQ^  the  Japanese  Oovemaent  established  in  their 
diplomatic  messages  a  code,  known  as  the  "winds"  code,  to  be  used 
in  radio  broadcasts  in  order  to  convey  information  to  its  reore- 
ssntatives  as  to  the  status  of  relations  between  Japan  and  other 
countries,  no  message  was  intercepted  prior  to  the  atteek  which 
used  the  code  words  relating  to  the  United  States." 

Althou^  there  may  be  some  basis  for  the  comment  that  prior 
te  27  Vovember  1941  there  was  a  certain  sameness  of  tone  in  the  communi- 
cation sent  by  Adairal  Stark  to  Admiral  Kimmel,  it  should  be  noted  that 
tha  message  of  Vovember  27  was  stronger  than  any  message  irtiich  Admiral 
Staric  seat  previously  to  Admiral  Kimel.  That  message  read  as  follows  i 

"THIS  DISPATCH  IS  TO  BX  CONSISERKD  A  VAB  MJMlVd  1  IHD&OTIATI CBTS 
WITH  JAPAlf  LOCKIHO  TOWAHD  STABILIZATIOH  07  COITBITICfHS  IN  THi 
PACIPIO  HAVB  aSASSD   AH)  AIT  A5GRKSS1VS  MOVB  BT  JAPAF  IS  EXPBCTED 
WITHIU  THr  ma   PKW  DAIS  X  TH??  nDMB-H  AITD  WJJlPtOm  OT   JAPANISSB 
TROOPS  ADD  THS  ORGAJriZATICW  OF  HaVAL  TASK  TOPCSS  IHDICATB  AS 
AWBIBIODS  lOPEDlTIOH  AGAIKST  SITHTIR  THE  PHILIPPINBS  (printed  in 
Ink,  "thai")  (B  KRX  PXTIKSULA  OR  POSSIBLY  BORNSO  X  SSGiCOTB  AV 
APPHOPHIATB  DSPSFSITH  DZPLOTHEHT  PBI3»ARATaRT  TO  CAHSYIITG  COT  THI 
TASKS  ASSKBTSD  IH  VPL  46  Z  IHFOIBf  DISTRICT  AUD  ABXT  ADTH0RITIX8  Z 

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EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2421 

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A  SIMILAR  WARNING   IS  BEING  SENT  3Y  WAR  DWARTIIENT  X     SPENAVO 
INFORM  BRITISH  X     CONTINafrAL  DISTRICTS  GUAM  SAMOA  DIRECTED 
TAKE  APPROPRIATE  MEASURES  AGAINST  SABOTAGE" 

CoQceming  the  other  canments  by  the  Conmander  in  Chief,  U*  S* 
Fleet,  it  oLght  be  added  that  Ackniral  Stark's  oncLBSion  consisted  not 
only  In  the  failure  to  transndt  fully  to  Admiral  Klmnel  certain  of  the 
available  Information,  but  also  In  the  failure  properly  and  speedily 
to  evaluate  that  Information,  particularly  on  7  December  19^1* 

The  evidence  shams  that  the  State  Department  reply  to  the 
Japanese  of  26  Novenfcer  19Ul  was  In  fact  regarded  by  them  as  an  ultima- 
tuaj  that  It  was  knoim  in  the  Navy  Department  before  1  December  19t4l  that 
the  Japanese  regarded  the  reply  as  unacceptable;  that  it  iras  knom, 
as  ear]y  as  1  December  I9I4I,  that  the  Japanese  proposed  to  strike  without 
-warning*     It  was  further  known  that  subsequent  to  their  receipt  of  the 
State  Department's  note  the  •^spanmae  were  directing  their  emissaries  in 
Ifae  Dtiited  States  to  do  everything  is  their  power  to  allay  any  suspicion 
of  a  hostile  Japanese  move.     Against  this  background,  there  was  received 
on  6  Deoembar  19ltl,  in  the  Navy  Department,   an  Intercepted  Japanese  message 
to  their  emissarLes  here,  which  stated  that  a  lU-part  reply  to  the  State 
Department's  note  of  26  Noveinber  19lil  was  being  transmitted,  and  further 
that  a  specific  tins  fcr  delivery  of  this  reply  would  be  transniitted  from 
Tokyo  by  a  separate  message.     This  message,  together  with  the  firet 
thirteen  parts  of  the  Japaaeae  reply  were  all  available  at  the  Navy  Depart- 
asot  by  2100  hours  of  6  Deoengber  19i4l*     The  language  of  the  thirteen 
parts  of  the  Japanese  reply  then  available  indicated  that  the  reply  consti- 
tuted a  final  breaking  off  of  relations*     All  this  pointed  to  the  con- 
cLialon  that  a  surprise  attack  was  to  be  simultaneous  with  the  dellveary 
of  the  Japanese  message.     Thus,  #iile  it  was  not  known  on  6  Decenfcer 

predeely  i*i«n  the  attaok  was  to  be  delivered,  there  was  mple  evidence  to 

700 


2422    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

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base  the  conclusion  that  a  surprise  move  was  due  within  narrow  limits 
of  time. 

On  the  morning  of  December  7th,  by  10:30,  Admiral  Stark  had 
all  fourteen  parts  of  the  Japanese  reply,  which  in  its  entirety  made 
explicit  the  breakin^j  off  of  relations.  He  had  as  well  the  direction  for 
the  delivery  of  that  reply  at  one  p.m..  Eastern  Standard  Time,  and  there 
was  information  available  to  him  that  this  time  corresponded  to  dawn  at 
Oahu  and  the  middle  of  the  night  in  the  Far  East.  Although,  as  found  by 
Admiral  Hewitt,  no  one  stated  that  this  indicated  an  air  attack  at  Pearl 
Harbor,  yet  all  of  these  factors  pointed  to  the  possibility  of  such  an 
attack.  An  acute  sensitivity  to  the  tautoess  of  the  situation  would 
have  dictated  at  least  a  plain  language  telephone  communication  to  Admiral 
Kimmel,  which  might  have  provided  a  warning  sufficient  to  bring  about 
some  material  reduction  in  damage  inflicted  by  the  Japanese  attack. 

(b)  I  concur  with  the  comments  set  forth  in  paragraph  5(b)  of  the 
Second  itfidorsement  to  the  Naval  Court  of  Iniquiry  record.  It  is  there 
stated  that  Admiral  Kimmel,  despite  the  failure  of  Admiral  Stark  to  keep 
him  fully  informed,  did  have  indications  of  the  increasing  tenseness  of 
relations  with  Japan.  In  particular,  it  is  pointed  out  that  he  had  the 
••war  warning  message  on  27  November  1940,  the  "hostile  action  possible  at 
any  moment"  message  on  28  November,  the  3  December  message  that  the 
Japanese  had  ordered  destruction  of  codes,  and  the  messages  of  k  and  6 
December  that  the  Japanese  had  ordered  destruction  of  United  States 
secret  and  confidential  matter  at  outlying  Pacific  Islands. 

In  addition,  it  might  be  pointed  out  that  Admiral  Kimmel  in  his 

personal  letters,  which  are  a  part  of  the  record  before  the  Court,  and 

as  well  in  the  war  plans  approved  by  him,  explicitly  recognized  the 

possibility  of  attack  upon  Pearl  Harbor  by  air;  and,  that  the  information 

701 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2423 

CONFIDENTIAL 

r*c«lr«d  bjr  Adalral  KIwmI  conocmlac  th*  loeatloa  aad  aoTWiaiit  of  Jaqpanea* 
naval  forces  after  27  VoTeaber  1941  should  have  been  eT«l«ated,  as  pre- 
Tloosly  pointed  out,  as  indicating- the  continued  and  increasing  poeei- 
bility  of  such  an  attack.  It  is  to  be  especially  noted  that  ^ile  Adnlral 
Xlamel  was  directed  in  the  war  miming  neeeage  of  27  Vorcaher  1941,  and 
egain  on  28  VoveBhsr  when  the  Amy  nessage  was  relayed  to  him,   to  execute 
an  aTjpropriate  defensive  deployasnt  preparatory  to  carrying  out  the  tanlcs 
assigned  in  the  Harj'  Basic  Var  Plan,  the  chief  action  taken  by  his  was 
carrying  forward  the  arrangeooits  for  the  reenforcing  of  and  continuing 
the  limited  air  petrols  from  the  outlying  islands,  ordering  on  26  Koveaber, 
the  depth  bombing  of  submarine  contacts  in  the  Oahu  operating  area,  and 
exxgaging  lu  unproductive  conferences  with  General  Short.  He  continued 
in  effect  the  primary  fleet  activity  of  training  and  the  lowest  condition 
of  readiness  (Condition  III)  of  the  flef>t  in  port.  He  neither  ordered 
long-rejige  air  reconnaissance  from  Oahu  to  any  extent  nor  advised  his  fleet 
air  wing  commander  of  the  receipt  of  the  war  warning  message.  His  fail- 
ure to  take  other  and  more  effective  action  is  neither  explainable  nor 
excusable  by  an  ambiguity  in  the  meaning  of  or  disagreement  as  to  what 
wovdd  constitute  an  'appropriate  defensive  deployment."  Admiral  Ximel 
coiild  have  referred  to  the  initial  tasks  stated  in  the  war  plan  of  aaln- 
taining  fleet  security  at  bases  and  gu{u*ding  aomimet  surprise  attack  by 
Jaoan,  and  if  he  did  not  know  what  was  meant  by  the  phrase  "atipro'Drlete 
defensive  deplo^nnent",  he  should  have  asked  the  Chief  of  Neval  Operations 
for  an  explanation. 

The  Second  Bidorsement  to  the  Haval  Court  record  states  that 
Admiral  Kimmel  could  and  should  have  Judged  more  accurately  the  gravity  of 
the  danger  to  which  the  Hawaiian  Islands  were  exnosed,  and  that  certain 

oourses  of  action  were  open  t«  bla«  ^tt 

708 


2424    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 


(1)  He  oould  have  used  the  patrol  airoraft  available  to 
hla  to  conchict  loog-raage  reoonnalssaooe  in  the  aore  dangsroaa 
•eotora,  and  tfaua  made  the  Japanese  task  more  dlffloalt,  whether 
or  not  this  woald  hare  resulted  in  the  detection  of  the  at^roaoh 
of  the  Japanese  carriers;  (2)  H«  oould  have  rotated  the  "in  port" 
psrioda  of  hli  Tessels  in  a  less  routine  manner*  and  thus  made  it 
more  diffioult  for  the  Japanese  to  have  predicted  when  there  would 
be  azQT  veeaals  in  port;  (3)  He  oould  hare  maintained  a  hl^er 
condition  of  readiness  under  itilcih  Haval  planes  would  have  been  in 
the  air  dtring  the  early  morning  period,  ships'  batteries  would  have 
bean  A1II7  manned,  and  damage  control  organisations  fall/  oparatlcnal* 

Admiral  Hewitt's  report  concludes  in  partt 

"The  absnoe  of  poeltlve  infomatloD  as  to  the  location  of 
Japanese  carrlars,  a  stw^  of  the  nnvmoit  liiich  was  poesible  to  tbiam, 
under  radio  silence,  through  the  unguarded  areas  of  the  Pacific,  and  a 
due  appreciation  of  the  possible  effects  of  an  air  attack  should  havs  in- 
duced Admiral  Kiaiel  to  take  all  piractioable  precautions  to  reduce  the 
effeotlTenaea  of  suoh  an  attack*     The  measures  which  reasonably  were  qpan 
to  him  werat 

■  (a;  Establishment  of  long  distance  air  reoonnaissanoe,  eoraor- 
Ing  the  most  probable  approadi  sectoirs  to  the  extant  possible,  on 
a  reasonably  permanent  basis,  with  available  planes  and  crews* 

"(b)  EstablishMsnt  of  a  hi^er  condition  of  anti-aircraft 
readiness,  at  least  during  the  dangerous  dawn  hours* 

"(c)  Establishment  of  a  higher  degree  of  damage  control 
readiness  by  ships  in  port,  partioularly  diring  the  dangerous 
dam  hours* 

*(d)  Installation  of  sitl-tcrpedo  nets  to  protect  the 
larger  vessels  in  port* 

"(e)  Maintenance  of  a  striking  foroe  at  sea  in  readiness 
to  intercept  possible  attack  forces* 

"(f)  Maintenance  of  the  maxlmm  force  of  the  Fleet  at  aea, 
with  entxy  into  port  at  Irregular  intervals* 

"(g)  Checking  with  Azmy  aa  to  readiness  of  anti-aircraft 
defflnsa  and  aircraft  warning  installatlana*" 

I  concur  with  these  oomaenta  as  to  the  various  courses  of 

actiun  which  Adniral  Kianel  oould  have  and  should  hare  taken*     Ibe  evidanoe 

indloates  dearly,  however,  that  his  most  grievous  failure  was  his  failure 

to  oondttct  Icng-range  air  reconnalssanca  in  the  more  dangerous  sectora 

tram  Oahu  during  the  week  preceding  the  attadc*     Ihat  this  la  so  Is 

703 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2425 

CONFIDENTIAL 

■anlfest  froa  the  eTldence  o'btained  "by  Adnlral  Eevltt  a&d  from  hla 

followixtg  conclusion,  ^Ich  li  hereby  cpT)roTed. 

Conclusion  14.  "The  only  practicable  sources  from  which  Admiral 
Eimmel  could  have  secured  infomatlon,  after  the  receipt  of  the 
*war  warning,*  as  to  the  a^mroaeh  of  the  attacking  force,  were 
the  aircraft  warning  serrice,  traffic  exuilyBeB  of  JaMaese  haval 
eoomnnicstions,  and  distant  air  reconnaissance  from  Oahu." 

During  the  critical  period  after  TJorember  27  the  limitations 

of  the  aircraft  warning  service  and  of  radio  Intelligence  were  evident; 

the  only  remaining  -Dracticable  source  upon  which  Admiral  Kim^el  was 

entitled  to  rely  for  infometlen  as  to  the  Janrtanese  nnval  novements  was 

distant  air  reconnaissance  t^lch,  covering  the  most  probable  an-nroach 

bearings,  would  as  Admiral  Hewitt  concluded  have  had  a  reasonable  chance 

of  success.  The  failure  to  detect  the  approach  of  the  Japanese  task  fore  i 

contributed  more  to  the  success  of  the  Japanese  attack  than  did  any  other 

single  factor. 

In  addition  to  the  coiu*Bes  of  action  referred  to  by  the 

Commander  in  Chief,  TJ.  S.  Jl.eet  and  by  Admiral  Eewltt,  it  was,  of  course, 

always  open  to  Adalral  Kiamel  also  to  trice  steps  to  Increase  cooperation 

between  his  organization  and  the  Army  command,  and  to  attemot  to  achieve 

effective  Joint  coBBs&d..  That  conditions  were  ideal  for  his  accomplishing 

such  an  objective  is  indicated  by  the  evidence  In  the  record  8>nd  the  fIncU 

ing  of  the  Court  that  the  social  relaticmship  between  him  and  General  Short 

was  excellent.  The  need  for  Admiral  Kimmel  taking  such  measures  existed 

froa  the  time  he  took  conmand  of  the  Pacific  Fleet.  It  increased  in 

urgency  as  the  7th  of  December,  1941,  nptjroached. 

15.  The  Second  Endorsement  of  the  Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet, 

to  the  Kaval  Court  record  concludes  thatt 

"6.  The  derellctlonr  on  thepart  of  Admiral  Stark  and 
Admiral  Kimiiel  were  faults  of  omission  rather  than  faults  of 
commission.  In  the  case  in  Question  ,  they  Indicate  lack  of  the 

704 


79716  O — 46 — pt.  16 33 


2426    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 


superior  judgment  necessary  for  exercising  command  commensurate 
with  their  rank  and  their  assigned  duties,  rather  than  culpable 
inefficiency. 

"7.  Since  trial  by  general  court  martial  is  not  warranted 
by  the  evidence  adduced,  appropriate  administrative  action  would 
appear  to  be  the  relegation  of  both  of  these  officers  to  positions 
in  which  lack  of  superior  judgment  may  not  result  in  future 
errors . " 

16.  In  his  endorsement  to  Admiral  Hewitt's  report  the  Conmander- 

in-Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet,  states  in  part: 

"I  concur  in  general  in  the  remarks  and  recommendations 
of  the  Judge  Advocate  General  as  expressed  in  the  second  endorse- 
ment. In  answer  to  the  specific  questions  asked  in  the  first 
endorsement,  the  following  opinions  are  submittedi 

"(a)  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the  evidence  is  not 
sufficient  to  warrant  trial  by  court  martial  of  any  person 
in  the  Naval  Seirvice,  in  that  the  evidence  will  not  sustain 
the  charges  required  by  the  Articles  for  the  Government  of 
the  Navy. 

"(b;  With  regard  to  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  to 
warrant  other  proceedings,  1  am  still  of  the  opinion,  which 
I  have  previously  expressed,  that  Admiral  Stark  and  Admiral 
Kimrael,  though  not  culpable  to  a  degree  warranting  formal 
disciplinary  action,  were  nevertheless  inadequate  in  emergency, 
due  to  the  lack  of  the  superior  judgment  necessary  for 
exercising  command  commensurate  with  their  duties. 

"(c)  Appropriate  action  appears  to  me  to  be  the  relegation 
of  both  of  these  officers  to  positions  in  which  lack  df 
superior  strategic  judgment  may  not  result  in  future  errors. 
The  action  has  been  taken  in  the  case  of  both  Admiral  Stark 
and  Admiral  Kimmel.  No  further  action  is  recommended. 

"(d)  For  the  reasons  stated  by  the  Judge  Advocate  General, 
I  consider  it  impracticable  to  bring  Admiral  Stark  and  Admiral 
Kimmel,  or  either  one  of  them,  to  trial  prior  to  the  termina- 
tion of  hostilities  with  Japan,  nor  are  court  martial  or 
other  proceedings  (prior  to  the  termination  of  hostilities 
with  Japan)  advisable  because  such  proceedings  would  almost 
certainly  involve  disclosure  of  information  which  would  be 
detrimental  to  cxirrent  military  operations  and  to  national 
security  measures." 

17.   The  Judge  Advocate  General  in  making  his  endorsement  to 

Admiral  Hewitt's  report  states  in  part: 

1.    "Subject  report  clarifiea  obscure  points  and  supplies 

705 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2427 

CONFIDENTIAL 


omissions  In  the  e«xlier  Investigations.  It  is  considered  that 
this  and  formf^r  Investigations,  taken  together,  present  as 
clear  a  picture  of  the  pertinent  facta  as  will  ever  be  adduced. 
TJith  this  report,  therefore,  I  believe  the  investigation  of  the 
Pearl  Harbor  attack  shcniKt  be  considered  completed. 

2.  "Admiral  Hewitt's  report  brings  out  and  conflnss  a  distinction 
which  impre&sed  me  at  the  time  of  studying  the  earlier  investi- 
gations, a  distinction  which  does  much  to  clarify  thinking  on  the 
question  of  placing  responsibility  for  the  Pearl  Harbor  disaster. 

It  appears  that  there  was  no  lack  of  appreciation  on  the  part  of 
any  of  the  responsible  officers  that  war  was  coming,  and  coming 
quickly,  during  the  critical  period  immediately  preceding  7  Deceiver 
1941.  The  point  on  which  those  officers  failed  to  exercise  the 
discernment  and  Judgment  to  be  expected  from  officers  occupying 
their  positions,  was  their  failure  to  appreciate,  from  the  informa- 
tion available  to  them,  that  Pearl  Harbor  was  a  likely  target  for 
aerial  attack  and  their  failure  to  take  the  necessary  steps  to 
prevent  or  minimize  such  a  surprise  attack.  Each  of  these 
officers,  in  estimating  the  critical  situation,  demonstrated  a 
poor  quality  of  strategical  planning,  in  that  he  largely  ruled  out 
all  possible  courses  of  action  by  which  the  Japanese  might  begin 
the  war  except  throu^  an  attack  in  the  Weatem  Pacific. 

3.  "I  do  not  believe  that  the  lack  of  more  complete  understand- 
ing and  co-operation  between  Admiral  Kimnel  and  Lieutenant 
General  cohort  had  any  great  effect  on  the  ultimate  result;  for  it 
is  abundeuitly  shown  that  they  each  entertained  the  same  fallacious 
views,  and  closer  lindervtanding  would  most  likely  merely  have 
strengthened  those  views.  Likewise,  I  submit  that  the  importance 
of  information  from  Japanese  sources  has  been  overemphasized;  for 
had  more  basically  sound  principles  been  observed,  the  Pearl 
Harbor  disaster  would  not  have  occxirred.  The  security  of  Pearl 
Harbor  was  the  very  core  of  our  Pacific  strategy,  a  fact  which 
did  not  receive  sufficient  consideration  in  the  strategic  concept 
of  responsible  officers. 

4.  "In  answer  to  the  specific  questions  asked  in  the  first 
endorsement,  the  following  opinions  are  submitted: 

(a)  As  is  more  fully  developed  in  the  answer  to  question  (b), 
it  is  not  believed  that  there  is  sufficient  evidence  to  warrant 
conviction  of  any  of  the  officers  concerned  of  any  offense 
known  to  naval  law. 

(b)  Under  the  facts  of  this  case,  there  are  only  two  offenses 
which  are  worthly  of  consideration:   (1)  Neglect  of  Duty 

and  (2)  Culpable  Inefficiency  in  the  Performance  of  Duty. 
Under  either  charge  it  would  be  necessary  to  define  the  duty  of 
the  officer  concerned,  and  to  show  that  it  was  his  duty  to  follow 
a  course  of  action  other  than  the  one  he  did.  In  my  opinion 

706 


2428    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION   PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 

this  would  be  In^osslble,  as  the  aots  of  omission  of  these 
officers  do  not  rise  above  the  status  of  errors  of  Judgment. 
No  clearly  defined  duty  can  be  established  which  was  neglected  or 
improperly  performed.  As  stated  by  Fleet  Admiral  King,  in  his 
endorsement  on  the  findings  of  the  Court  of  Inquiry,  the  evidence 
in  the  case  boils  down  to  the  fact  that  the  acts  of  the  officers 
in  question  "indicate  lack  of  superior  Judgment  necessary  for 
exercising  command  commensurate  with  their  rank  and  their 
assigned  duties,  rather  than  culpable  inefficiency."  "Lack  of 
Superior  Judgment"  is  not  an  offense  triable  by  general  court- 
martial. 


(d)  The  requirements  of  39th  Article  for  the  Government  of  the 
Navy  and  Section  346  of  Naval  Courts  and  Boards  pertaining  to 
the  rank  of  members  of  a  general  court  martial  will  make  it  most 
difficult  to  constitute  a  court  for  the  trial  of  the  officers 
here  concerned  during  war  time  or  during  a  period  of  six  months 
after  the  cessation  of  hostilities.  Uany  of  the  officers  of 
appropriate  rank,  both  on  the  active  and  th6  retired  lists, 
would  be  disqualified  because  of  interest  in  the  subject  matter, 
the  probability  of  being  called  as  a  witness,  or  by  virtue  of 
having  been  connected  with  one  of  the  investigations  into  the 
matter.  If  more  than  one  of  the  officers  in  question  are 
brought  to  trial,  an  entirely  new  court  would  be  necessary  in 
each  case,  as  members  who  had  tried  a  former  case  arising  out 
of  the  Pearl  Harbor  attack  would  be  subject  to  challenge.  The 
Summoning  of  the  necessary  witnesses  would  result  in  temporarily 
removing  from  their  duty  stations  many  of  the  key  officers  in 
the  naval  organization.  For  the  foregoing  reasons,  I  am  of  the 
opinion  that  any  such  court  martial  proceedings  prior  to  the 
end  of  hostilities  with  Japan  is  highly  impractical  and  would 
be  detrimental  to  the  wai  effort,  and  further,  that  any  such 
proceedings  during  the  six  months  immediately  following  the  end 
of  hostilities  would  seriously  impair  the  efficiency  of  the 
naval  service." 


18.    On  the  basis  of  the  record,  findings,  opinion,  and  recommenda- 
tion of  the  Court  of  Inquiry,  the  First  Endorsement  of  the  Judge 
Advocate  General  thereto,  and  the  Second  indorsement  of  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet,  thereto;  the  record  findings  and  conclusions  of 
Admiral  Hewitt,  and  the  Second  and  Third  Endorsements  thereto;  and  on  the 
basis  of  the  foregoing  comments,  I  conclude  that: 

(a)  Then  Rear  Admiral  Claude  C.  Bloch  discharged  his  duties 
adequately. 

707 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2429 

CONFIDENTIAL 


(b)  Then  Adodral  Husband  1£.  Kinmal  and  Adniral  Harold  J),  Stark, 
particularly  during  the  period  from  27  November  to  7  December 
1941,  failed  to  demonstrate  the  superior  Judgment  necessary  for 
exercising  coamand  commensurate  with  their  rank  and  their  assigned 
duties. 

(c)  Both  of  these  officers  having  been  retired,  appropriate 
action  should  be  taken  to  insure  that  neither  of  them  will  be 
recalled  to  active  duty  in  the  future  for  any  position  in  which 
the  exercise  of  superior  Judgment  nay  be  necessary* 

(d)  The  appropriate  committees  of  Congress  should  be  fully 
acquainted  with  the  Navy*s  Investigations  into  this  matter,  and 
public  disclosure  of  the  facts  concerning  the  Japanese  attack 

on  Pearl  Harbor,  obtained  in  these  investigations,  should  be  made 
as  soon  as  such  action  can  be  taken  without  injuring  current 
military  operations  or  the  national  security. 

19.        Accordingly,  I  direct t 

(a)  Rear  Admiral  Husband  E.  Kionel,  USN  (Retired;,  shall  not 
hold  any  position  in  the  United  States  Nuvy  which  requires  the  exercise 
of  superior  Judgment. 

(b)  Admiral  Harold  R.  Stark,  USN  (Retired;,  shall  not  hold 
any  position  in  the  United  States  Navy  which  requires  the  exercise  of 
superior  Judgment. 

(c)  The  appropriate  conmittees  of  Congress  will  be  fully 
acquainted  with  the  Navy*s  investigations  into  this  matter,  and  public 
disclosure  of  the  facts  concerning  the  Japanese  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor, 
obtained  in  these  investigations,  will  be  made  as  soon  as  such  action 
can  be  taken  without  injuring  current  military  operations  or  the 
national  security. 


SECRETARY  OP  THE  NAVY 


708 


2430    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 

(B)  HaTT'a  Offer  tc  Hear  JLd»lral  Kiaaiel  of  Court  Martial. 

On  7  S«ptetB%er  1943  Sear  Idnlral  liimel  wrote  to  tb* 

Secretary  of  the  Kary  etatlng  that  he  desired  *to  he  hroxight  to  trial 

hy  General  Court  Martial  in  open  court  at  the  earliest  practicable 

date*.  On  28  ingast  1946  Secretary  forrestal  offered  a  Ckneral 

Court  Martial  to  Rear  Idairal  limel  if  the  ease  were  still  desired 

hy  the  latter.  The  letter  of  Secretary  lOrrestal  to  £aar  Admiral 

Xiamel  read  as  follows: 

"1,  In  your  letter  of  Ssptcaber  7th,  1943,  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  laTy,  you  stated  *It  is  ny  personal  desire 
to  he  brought  to  trial  by  Oeneral  Court  Martial  in  open 
court  at  the  earliest  practicable  date. ' 

'2.  In  hie  letter  to  you  the  Secretary  of  the  ITaTy  gave 
you  his  sMsurance  that  a  trial  before  General  Court  Martial 
lAuld  be  had  at  the  earliest  practicable  date  that  the  public 
interest  and  safety  would  permit.  In  riew  of  the  present 
state  of  the  war  and  in  Tiew  of  this  assurance  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Vavy  I  am  disposed  to  order  your  trial  by 
General  Court  Martial  in  open  court  in  the  erent  that  you 
still  desire  to  be  so  tried, 

"3.  It  is  requested  that  you  adrise  me  promptly 
whether  or  not  you  desire  to  be  tried  by  General  Court 
Martial." 

On  8  September  1945  Baar  Admiral  Kimmel  replied  in 
writing  to  the  Secretary' s  letter  of  28  August  1945,  stating  that 
he  desired  to  defer  replying  to  the  Secretary's  inquiry  whether  ha 
(Eimmel)  still  desired  a  Court  Martial  until  after  the   pending 
Joint  Congressional  Xnrestigation  of  Pearl  Harbor  was  completed, 
fhls  letter  read  as  follows: 


709 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  2431 

CONFIDENTIAL 


'280  Bronzrlll*  Boad,  Broazrlll*  8,  H.  T,,   8  Sept«a%«r 

1945.     Troai     Bear  Adniral  E,  X.  Xiaael,  U.  8.  Savy, 
(Be tired),     fot     The  Secretary  of  the  Vtcrj,     Sa'bjeett     General 
Court  Martial  in  njr  ease. 

'1,     Zn  Tlew  of  the  a^tatien  for  a  Oon^esaieiial 
Isreetij^ation  before  Oon^eee  reeonrened  and  the  action 
of  the  Senate  in  ordering  a  Joint  Concessional  iDrestl- 
gation  of  Pearl  Earhor*   X  wish  to  defer  mj  replj  to  your 
letter  of  28  Angast  1945  ontil  that  ZnTestigation  is 
conpleted.' 


710 


2432    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  108 


DEPARTKTCNT    OF    STATE 


•Jt « A*^^  ^ 


/loK^ 


November  2,  1944. 


The  memorandum  at  the  bottom 
of  this  file,  a  memor&ndua  by  Mr.Hornbeok, 
Aatefl  November  27,  1941,  entitled  "Prob- 
lem of  Far  Eastern  Relations.   Estimate 
of  situation  and  certain  probabllitlea", 
Indexed  as  711.94/2512  PS/OD. ,  Confi- 
dential File,  iP  a  memorandum  regarding 
the  oontentB  of  which  there  have  been 
leaks  and  misrepresentation. 

For  purposes  of  the  record  there  Is 
now  being  superimposed  a  memorandum  by 
Mr.  Hornbeok,  of  date  February  28,  1944," 
In  which  certain  pertinent  facts  are 
stated  anc:  an  analysis  Is  made  of  the 
contents  and  true  purport  of  the  memo- 
randum of  November  27,  1941. 


^^ 


u 


3A/H:3KH:yzS 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2433 


February  28,,  1944. 


On  Sunday  •▼•nlng,  February  20,  Mr.  Dr«w  Pearson  nada  In 
hla  radio  broadcaot  certain  statamants  regarding  Mr.  Stanley 
Hombecic.   Among  these,  aa  reported  to  Kr.  Bornbeck  on  Febru- 
ary 21  by  the  State  Department's  recorder,  was  a  stataaent 
that:   "On  November  22,  1941  Hornbeck  drafted  a  mooioranduB 
stating  Japan  would  not  attack  this  country.   Just  fifteen 
days  later  she  did  attack  Pearl  Harbor". 

On  February  27,  Mr.  Pearson  made  In  hie  oclumn  of  that 
day  certain  statements  regarding  Mr.  Hombeck.   Tcere,  J^nter 
alia,  he  stated  that:   "...on  November  22,  1941,  Just  15  days 
before  Pearl  Harbor,  he  wrote  an  important  ipeiaoraJSduB)  to  the 
Secretary  of  State  advising  that  Japan  never  would  attack  the 
United  States." 


Such  charges  warrant  attention.   What  are  the  facts? 

Mr.  Hombeck  did  not  write  on  November  22,  1941  any 
memorandum  of  estimate  or  prediction.  He  did  on  November  2? 
write  a  memorandum  giving  an  estimate  of  "probabilities". 
Knowledge  of  the  existence  of  such  a  mamorendum  was  at  some 
time  before  the  end  of  August  1942  imparted  by  someone  who 
had  knowledge  thereof  to  some  member  or  aiectbers  of  the  press. 
There  appeared  in  a  WasliinKton  newspaper  in  August  1942  under 
the  dateline  "By  United  Press"  an  article  purporting  to 
compare  the  record  of  prophecy  of  Mr.  Grew  with  that  of 
Mr.  Hornbeok — unfavorably  to  the  latter.   In  the  course  of 
that  article  there  was  given  an  account  of  "Kornbeck's  5-1 
oddrf*,  as  follows: 

"In  contrast  to  that  record  [citations  of  oc- 
casions on  which  Mr.  Grew  Jiad  'advised  the  United 
States  to  guard  against  a  possible  surprise  attack'] 
was  the  viewpoint  of  the  State  Department  adviser 
political  relations,  Stanley  Kuhl  Hornbeck. 
rnbeck  was  of  the  opinion,  even  after  the  trucu- 
lent statements  of  Japan's  two  ambassadors,  Kichisaburo 
Npajura  and  Sabusu  Kurusu,  that  Japan  was  bluffing. 

■■;   "Kornbeck's  idea  was  that  Japan  would  not  dare 
attack  the  United  States,  that  it  was  bogged  down  in 
Cb}.n&  and  that  the  most  that  need  be  feared  was  an 
itttenslfied  campaign  against  the  Burma  Road. 

■^  '    "In  mid-November,  Hornbeck  told  consultants 
that  if  the  situation  was  viewed  as  a  gambling 
proposition  the  odds  should  be  5  to  1  that  the  Uni- 
ted States  and  Japan  would  still  be  at  peace  a  month 
later.   He  said  it  was  even  money  that  the  United 
States  and  Japan  would  not  be  at-  war  soiae  months 
later." 

The 


V 


2434    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION   PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


oolli:ior.  c:;i.   t.ict,    unlciii;   Ja-i;;'!.    . 
e:'l:otei  Oi-   uroa  ht   to  e   utfindctiii: 


'.I-;;,    lii      oi'    ii'ji'    ■  'uraes   oi    a 


ill   not   ' 


-;  t:.e 

■ican 

L  :•*  her 


jers 

.iuiliiiet:    OI'    the    :5l' uitlon.     / 

■   all    informtion   at   thut  -/t 

■   .    I'.n   opinion   tiint 
■  n    t,fc-3   next    three 


■;...:      ,         .       .  .■   o-j  .   'livised   that   the   last   remain- 
'.ites    i'lnae  i   -Jr-i-ja   loroea    in  ChlnR    be  proaptly 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2435 


-3- 


Ori  :;ove;;iber  20,  Wessrs.  Domura  and  lurusu  presented 
to  the  Sacratary  of  State  the  last  of  various  p  oposals  advanced 
by  the  Japanese  Govern. :iar.t  or  agents  thereof  durin(_"  1941  for  an 
agreement  oetween  Japan  and  the  'Jnited  States.  Six  days  later, 
on  Koveraber  20,  the  Secretary  of  State  gave  to  I'.ey^.rs.    .lonura 
and  ;.urusu  papers  which  beca:ae  the  last  of  the  ;■         of 
counter-proposal  made  by  the  -Viorican  Jovern  :en'i.        .he 
course  of  the  "exploratory  conversations"  v/hich  a^.   ^-^ji.  ijoing 
on  for  several  months. 

On  the  next  day.  'lovembtsr  27,  '  v.Tote  an 

inforiaal  memorandum  entitled  "Pro^,  .  ;.ern  delations. 

Sstijofite  of  Situation  and  Cortt-.ln  ^  . ''  7hHt   -lerno- 

randuin  began  with  a  stat    '     e  Japt-.neso  ;o-.      -    :  hs 
laade  certain  plans,  so.ie  ire  aosoiute  '^ 

which  are  conditional,  fo.  .._..  ....itary  oparatio:.., .   ..^    ,.hen 

stated  that  I.'j*.  Kurusu's  mission  hsd  had  two  principal  ofcj  ac- 
tives, and  that  lir.  llurusu  haa  qchi^ved  neithi^r  of  those 
objectives.  Ke  then  raoved  in"       "  '    '  ••  -  .  ■     :  elu- 
sions as  to  what  is  probable''.  .'.ion, 
"?!!e  .''■!; 'uTeJe  lnt,^''i!  9t  t^i.^                      .  .  :.o 
Ir. ■.           ■  ■       ■                 China  to  her 
J.;.                                     Japanese  Gorsrn- 
-.,.                                       have  forthv.'it-' 
e  :■                                       ae  said  that, 
11                                     odds  of  5  to  ; 
ti                                 •■  :.z   "•..■ar"  on  or  b-. .cr-e 
?•:■                                '"  the  Juited  .."tates  and 
J-                                ••;  the  I'ith  of  January, 
anu  :.fe  .v;ou1j.  w'.,          .U'j;,  C;itit  \-he     '.      ates  and  Japan 
would  not  be  at          r  brffore  '^rc        ,';'ted  briofly", 

he  said,  "the  ui. :^es  not  beli.^v       this  ccontry 

ic  now  on  the  immedi.         of  'war*  in  the  iractfic."  Con- 
tinuing', he  said:   "        ..'.able  probabilitv  is  that  Japan's 

'■•■^■■—■-    .--■       ^nf-.   near  future  ■■[-'\'"-    -ireotod 

ition  in  Thailand     '     Ions 
.ir-;a  Fioad  or  both."        .  conclusion, 
he  seid:   "Thjro  is  no  '.v?,rrnr.t  for  any  feelin;;  on  our  part  that 
the  situation  in  the  Paci.iic  has  b'sen  raaae  worse,  as  regards 
the  interests  of  the  Jnitou  btete::,  by  refusal  on  the  part  of 
the  AEericBfi  Ooverni:.":it  to  -'.".-Ke   a  deal  with  Japan  in  tanas  of 
'concessions'  by  us  in  r-turn  for  'pledges'  (j^ualified  and 
heaged  around  pledges)  by  Japaij  to  keep  the  peace  while  con- 
tinuing to  raake  war  and  to  prepare  for  more  war.   Japan  has 
been  at  war  in  eastern  Asia  and  the  western  Pacific  for  several 
years  past.   Japan  has  threatened  to  make  war  on  each  and  every 
one  of  her  near  neighbors  and  even  on  the  Unitad  States.   Ko 
price  that  we  night  have  paid  to  Japan  would  buy  or  produce 
peace  in  the  Pacific  or  security  for  the  United  States  (and/or 
Great  Britain  and/or  China  and/or  Russia)  In  the  Pacific.   The 

question 


2436    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


sts  at   this 
not   In 


mlmtion  o-f 


the  v.-'".ole    content    oi 

■■■  ■■  ■    <-■••—    '  -  "    "  :'. aor  wm 


randum  of 
;;-a.n.-'  not   a 
o:'   sitij'iitloa   in   tunas   of 
ovhcT-.-'    su  •■--•»Bted   that 
•];  tha 

■J:.ited  ^  .ri  that  the 

_Ja:>ai  ■     .  -led   conflict 

I.:    clearly    perculved — and 
.  nes  bafore--t]iat   the 
s'joh  conflict.      In  sup- 
-eL.tin"  oids  of  5-to-l   h -ainst   "v.'nr"    ,,-ithin  the  ne'xrt   three 
week-  ,    "t    ■'-to-T.    ''-«>iri?<t    "■■;"""      it'  in  th"   next   seven  weeks . 

:v3   next   fourteen  weeks; 
■    "there  cay  be   some  armed 
■'  -   we   have   b^cn  and    are   a 

part,     -n   tr^e  .'i.tl.aiitic"  ;    a:.d   l.i   rjiTiiainc  fro:a  even   a  tentative 
pro,  nostication  tjevoiiJ  that    periol,    he  l;.ijlied   that   he   considered 
•jere   fast   rimnin-    .■"■.      Tr.    pi.^tin-      i ,:   conclusion: 
lore  v;ar  or   1-  -flsts   at 

•   oontTol    of       '  c,    not 


nu-iittt 
Ajaerl("\ 


!  !i      '?y,   i  ti  -ton  ■  ,    :ie    both 
;ltuntio;i   the:;   prevailing   in 
•^iivtMrr-   .iH-.t    before   low: 


Jnit-'d 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE 


2437 


v-v*- 


Protol«m  of  Far  Bastem  ralatlons. 

Estimate  of  situation  and  oertaln  jrobat^ilitiea. 

The  7ap<tDdsa  Coyeimment  has  made  oertaln  plans,  some 
of  wbloh  ajre  absolute  and  some  of  which  are  oondltional, 
for  new  military  operatlono, 

Mr.  Kuruau's  mission  has  had  two  prlnoipal  objeotiT**: 
(1)  to  obtain,  if  possible,  from  the  United  States,  terms 
of  a^eement  favorable  to  Japan;  (2)  to  ascertain,  if  pos- 
sible, wh9t  action,  positiTe  or  negative,  the  United  States 
might,  may  or  will  take  in  the  event  of  certain  moves  by 
Japan. 

The  American  Government  has  now  given  clear  indl cation 
that  it  has  no  intention  of  making  "concossions"  to  Japan 
which  would  be  inconsistent  with  the  declared  principles 
and  the  general  objectives  of  American  foreign  policy  and 
that  it  does  not  intend  to  condone  or  give  countenance  to 
policies  and  practice,  past  and  present  and  future,  of  ag- 
gression on  Japan's  part. 

Mr.  Kurusu'  has  not  achieved  the  first  objective  of 
his  mission. 

The  Japanese  Government  has  given,  during  the  course 
of  the  "exploratory  conversations",  clear  evidence  that  it 
is  not  that  Government's- intention  at  the  present  time  to 

disassociate 


n 


'^1 


2438    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


-2- 

diaassoclate  Japan  from  the  Tripartite  Alliance;  or  to 
give  up  its  objective  of  conquering  China,  conquering  other 
regions  in  the  Far  East,  and  establishing  a  "new  order"  and 
a  "co-prosperity  sphere"  in  eastern  Asia  and  the  western 
and  southern  Pacific.   It  has  persevered  in  distribution 
and  disposal  of  its  armed  forces  on  a  pattern  clearly 
designed  for  offensive  rather  than  merely  defensive  opera- 
tions. '^  It  has  shown  th«it  it  clearly  intends  to  persevere 
in  pursuit  of  its  general  and  its  particular  objectives  by 
the  methods  of  thre  -t   of  force  or  use  of  force — which  means 
continuance  of  contribution  to  instability  rather  than 
stability  of  situation  in  the  Pacific  and  eastern  Asia. 

The  United  States  has  not  shown  what  sction  it  will 
take  on  the  positive  side  in  the  event  of  Japan's  teUcing 
oni,  or  another  of  saveral  possible  steps.  Mr.  Kurusu  may 
lievfe  gained  certnic  impressions,  but  he  cannot  be  sure. 
lir.   Kurusu  has  not  achieved  the  second  major  objective  of 
his  mission. 

The  business  of  prophesying  involves  a  procedure  of 
examining  facta  and,  es  among  various  developments  conceived 
to  be  possible  forming  conclusions  as  to  what  is  probable. 

Th*  prophecy  is  an  expression  by  an  individual  or  a 
group  of  individual's  of  an  opinion  es  to  what  is  going  to 
happen. 

In 


^3Jig^^Jt^^m^gW^^^M- 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT    COMMITTEE  2439 


-3- 

In   t*^  Igned,    the  Japanese    Intend 

at   this   Tioment  v-jpe   in   arid   tc    intensify   tneir 

operations  townrc.     'oririgiag  China   to  iier   laiees".      They  have 
hoped   that  out   cf  the   oonversetions  with  the  Americars  Govem- 
.T.ent    they  would  ©xtrnct   something  which  would   facllitet© 
their  effort   toward   that   objectiv  .cw,    they  have 

not   entire:  of  getting   from  us  either   posi- 

tive  or  nv:_  ^ful  to   them   In   pursuit   of  that 

,  objective, 

I  In   the   cpir.icu   cf  the  undersigned,    the   Japanese  Govem- 

! 

j  2-.ent  does  :        e  or  intend  or  expect  to  have  forthwith 

'^  nrned  cc:  '  the  United  St'ites.   The  Japanese  Govem- 

r,ent,  whii-         :ir  new  or  Ions  at  some 

;  »vill  endeavor  to  avoid 

nf,eolti;.ji  or  bfei:!*:  attacked  by  the  United  States.   It 

there-.'ore  w'"-  not.  order  or  enoour'-.-  *:"tJon  by  its  agents 

(forensoat  :h  ere   its  ar:;         ;  which,  if  taken, 

would  lee;         se  by  the  United  Stctes  of  armed  force 

'tr  8s  relations 

-^.,  .  ,.  „  i^an  are  concerned 

^  tfcerfi  ie  ^  .  was  a  week  ago  for 

alted  Stetor,  to  be  arprehensive  lest  Japan  make  "war" 

i  on  this  oountry.  Were  It  a  matter  of  placing  bets,  the 

•md-^rslgned  would  give  odds  --*■  '^'v   to  one  that  the  United 

Stetee 


2440    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


.;:"t,i.;.   Ml, J   Japan  wlii   g£t  be  at  "war"   o: 

Dectsraber   i^    (the   data  by  whloh  Geuorpl   0>ir<:-f.   L.b3   ai"rirK.):5 
th?>t   we  would  be    'In  the   olenr'    flo   fnr  as  oonsuauaatioa  of 
certain  dis->osaIs   of   our  f*>rc«s    1?   concerned);   Wf^nld   wager 
tiiree   tc   one   thBi   tn©  Uni;  ;    not    be 

«t  "wsr"  on  or  before  the  1  li.  ^r  iuudsxr-^  (I.e.,  seven  weelcs 
rron  r.ow);  woula  w«ger  even  money  thet  the  United  States  and 
J«p5»r.  will  net  b-^!  «t  "war"  C":  ^-v  befor*?  Msrch  1  ( «•.  d[«te  -nore 
thai)   90  ijuw  ,    an,. 

it    hPS  beea  estiaiBted   by   our   dt-rw t.ee'i**''-  •Vv.ji.d    o* 

t-    our   ftclvent^pe  Tor  us  to  have   "time"    '  r   prepar'stion 

atiii   dlsi'ChPlft '  .      The?i<°   ▼enturss    into  ttn  apeculetiv© 

predict!  -lii   assumption  thst  .our  ueflnition 

of   "war"   uiust    De   the   saiae   in  reference   tt    actlvlfies  and 
events    in  the  Pacific   that   it    is   in  re^i:'    '      .   -^  <  ..^  .  < «...    —>  ^ 
events   in  the  Atlantic:      the   Indiowted   w  , 
on   an   ossu_uptl(:'n   that,    although  there  may   b>.'  -i 

encounter?    siEiler   tv  thcf-e   to  whica  we   aeve   been  hue   tire 
a  party   in  the  Atlentic,    there  will  not    be   a  recognized 
"state  of  war"   such  as  tc   disrupt   substexitially  or   put   an 
end    t^    the   present    prograii  ^>f   our  Aj-my   and  Kavy   for  disposal 
within   the    periods  mentioned    of  ^quL  fcr 

""     ■        '-    ■•   5rid  general    .-!arr-o3e8--^LM  ^r; ,    .•i.^^my,    the   under- 
;.ot   believe  that   this  coiuitry   is  now  on  the 

iniffiediate 


EXHIBITS   OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2441 


Jit 

:nove    figair.ut   Tnal  1  ?' ;,■,,    '.a-   Ifc/^ncn    sci.:.'i   ;..vw  c  i-'ji-'- tioi. 
•i.-'Binst  China.      But,    a  .-Tiove  againat   a-;.a:;5f^   *-.  .;.;    '.,' 
-:if<Jor   oxxsratlou    iuvoivlnf-   very    3ubst.<.'L!.i;- 
%,nrt    It   vKy  :r>,    it   «. 

bard   for   J  ;,  thlraw. 

Outcii  Eas  -uld  invi.;-    ,  .  . , 

embrollmei  -  •••t  Britain   si,  _,,    tfce  United  St-=.t.i)g; 

■^  ■  •       ■  •    of  developiiig  into    a  major  operati.r;. 

;i  now  aeialnst  «Daiil   b«s  a  move 

----■■  - ■^"  ^i-,-nt.  «••.•,         /olve  great  risk; 

If  Bintje,  .,    c»i  tti?   onp    wSi.d 

connectloi.  ^x^i  r,uu  for  operetions  against  tte  Bunna  Road 
and  thereforw  tovrTti  bringing  closer  to  an  end  the  "Ctjina 
incident".  s    psrt   vie   Iv-.  t,o  Yuunan 

and    towe.'d    put^Lr^M:    the   ounna   Roa-.  ;u:aini3Sior. 

(esper'"^-    ■■  ^inuous  air  at', 

ri  s.-:  _'    with<Sreat   t; 

wo  .Id   not  necessarily   involve   a   :  rt ,   and   could    be 

tialted  or  be  withdrewc    from  at   any  tme   snoitld  deTelopmants 

in 


79716  O — 46— pt.  16 34 


2442    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION   PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 


in  the   general   sltuatior.  render   such  action  advisable   in 
the    -Tinlon   of  Japtin's  nsilitary    leaders. 

'isonable   probability   is  that   Japan's  new  military       ■/" 

;  oper"tions   of   the  near  future  will    be   directed  either  toward 
training   position   in  Thailand   or  operetions   against  Yunnan 

i  and   the  Bur-ne   Hoad   or  both. 

If,    when  und   as  Japan  makes   either  or  both  of   those 
moves,    Japan  will    ipso   facto     be  further  disclosing  what   axe 
her   political   and  milltarj    policies  and  will  be   further 
extending  herself  as  regards  aitlitery  disposals  and  effort 
^nd   as  regards  burden  and   draft   upon  her  national   capacity 
(economic,    social,    political  and  military);    she  will  be 
weakening   her   position   in  the   event  of  there  coming,    later, 
armed   conflict   between  herself  and  the  United  States;    she 
will   OS  exposing  herself  to  naval   and  air  attack  on  flank 
and   frc'm  rear,    if   and  when,    by   the  United  States;    and  she 
will  be  adding   to  the  number  of   her  eneales   and   the  weight 
•  '•   r*/^  a    rublic   opinion  adverse   to  her   in  the  United  States 
-■  British  Smjire. 
There  is   no  warrant  for  any  feeling  on   our   part   that  ^^^ 
the   situation   in  the   Pacific  has  been   laade  worse,    as   regards 
the   interests  of  the  United  States   by  refusal  on  the  part 

•of  the  American  Government   to  make  a   deal   with  Japan   in  terms 

of  "concessions"   by   us   xi.  r»tum  for  "pledges"    {qualified 

and 


EXHIBITS  OF   JOINT   COMMITTEE  2443 


and  hedp.9d  around   pledged)    by   Japaa  to   keep  the  peace 
while  continuing  to  make  wp.r  and  to   prepare  for  acre  war. 
Japan   has  been  at   war  in   eastern  Asia  and  the  western  Pacific 
for   several  years   pnst.     Japtin   has   threatened  to   make  war     ? 
anch   and    every  one   of  her  near  neighbors   and   even  on  the 
<    United  States.     No   price   that  we  ailght   have   paid   to  Japan 
wouji    huy  or  produce  peacje   in  the  Pacific  or  security  for 
the  United  States   (and/or  Great  Britein  siid/or  China  and/or 
•  Russia)    in   the   ?•  clfic. 

The  [question  of  more  war  or  le^ss  war   in   the  Pacific 
'    rests   at  this  moment   in   the  control  of  ndnda   and   hearts   in 
Tokyo,    not    ia  the  control  of  minds  and  hearts   in  Washington. 


PA/H:SKH:FLB 


2444    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

EXHIBIT  NO.  109 

(Exhibit  No.  109  consists  of  a  Guide  to  Symbols  and  of  Maps  sub- 
mitted by  Admiral  R.  K.  Turner  showing  the  location  of  ships  Decem- 
ber 1  to  6,  inclusive,  1941  and  will  be  found  reproduced  as  Items  Nos. 
26,  27,  28,  29,  30,  31,  and  32  in  EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS  to 
Proceedings  of  Joint  Committee. ) 


EXHIBIT  NO.  110 


9  Februaby  1940. 

Deab  Admiral:  I  was  glad  to  get  your  letter  of  January  4  and  I  will  follow 
your  suggestion  by  sending  this  out  by  oflBcer  messenger. 

You  want  to  know,  what  is  in  the  back  of  my  mind — I  will  set  out  for  a  broad 
coverage  for  I  am  not  sure  just  what  you  want — so  here  goes : 

As  far  as  what  you  would  do  in  an  emergency,  there  has  been  no  change  in  the 
basic  plans  with  which  you  are  thoroughly  familiar  from  your  reading  in  the 
Department  prior  to  taking  over  as  CinC,  Asiatic.  I  am  told  that  you  also  read 
the  CinCUS  plans,  which  makes  it  unnecessary  for  me  to  go  into  them  here  except 
to  say  there  has  been  no  change. 

I  am  in  general  agreement  with  the  Asiatic  Fleet  Plan  except  possibly  in  the 
case  of  the  destroyers.  The  destroyer  logistic  problems  involved  in  the  support 
of  the  long  continued  operations  with  the  cruisers,  as  contemplated,  might  prove 
diflBcult  and  might  hamper  the  cruiser  operations.  One  recommendation  which 
has  been  made  to  me  is  that  the  destroyers  should  remain  at  Manila  with  the 
submarines  and  patrol  planes  as  long  as  practicable  and  then  retire  to  the  east- 
ward. This  is  for  the  purpose  of  harassing  enemy  shipping  in  the  near  vicinity 
and  for  operations  against  enemy  steamships  which  might  act  again  our  own 
and  neutral  shipping.  Retiring  destroyers  would  require  such  logistic  support 
as  might  be  necessary  to  permit  them  to  join  the  Fleet  to  the  eastward  of  Guam. 

It  may  be  that  after  further  study  you  may  desire  to  change  the  planned  em- 
ployment of  the  destroyers.  You  may  want  to  divide  them,  using  some  of  them 
on  the  operations  now  planned  and  the  remainder  on  other  tasks.  You  may  even 
want  to  recommend  a  change  in  the  major  mission  assigned  to  the  Asiatic  Fleet 
in  the  Basic  Plan.  Any  such  remommendations  along  these  lines  will  of  course 
be  given  great  weight  and  study. 

It  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  of  course  that  the  present  War  Plans  have  been  formu- 
lated as  a  result  of  studies  continuing  over  an  extended  period  by  a  number  of 
oflBcers.  They  follow  Army-Navy  joint  plans.  In  the  Navy  Basic  Plan  the 
Asiatic  Fleet  Plan  has  been  related  and  articulated  to  the  U.  S.  Fleet  Plan. 

[2]  The  existing  plan, — and  for  that  Aiatter  any  plan — ,  should,  in  my 
opinion,  be  changed  by  only  one  of  two  processes, — either  after  careful  thought 
and  investigation  of  the  effect  of  the  change  in  the  Orange  Plan  as  a  whole,  or, 
as  a  result,  in  time  of  war  or  emergency,  of  the  factual  aspects  of  the  situation. 
The  changes  then  made  (in  war  or  emergency)  may  be  brought  about  by  the 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2445 

President,  by  the  Navy  Department,  or  by  the  responsible  Operating  Task  Force 
Commander  on  the  spot.  It  may  be  that  tiie  employment  of  the  United  States 
Fleet  itself,— the  Joint  Asiatic  Force — will  be  changed  when  the  emergency 
arises.  It  may  be  that  the  employment  of  the  forces  of  the  Asiatic  Fleet  can  not 
be  carried  out  as  planned  because  of  the  existing  conditions. 

I  feel  that  the  main  problem  confronting  you  as  Commander  in  Chief,  Asiatic 
Fleet,  does  not  lie  with  what  to  do  when  war  has  been  definitely  joined.  At  such 
a  juncture,  guided  by  plans,  directives,  conditions,  and  your  own  considered 
thought  on  the  problem,  I  feel  confident  that  you  will  be  able  to  make  decisions 
essentially  correct,  and  better  than  they  could  be  made  elsewhere.  The  main 
problem  lies  rather,  (and  this  was  undoubtedly  in  your  mind  when  you  wrote), 
with  what  to  do  during  a  period  of  growing  tension  which  may  or  may  not  cul- 
minate in  war.  In  this  connection  it  is  to  be  noted  that  War  Plans,  as  now  con- 
ceived and  prepared,  follow  the  basic  premise  that  war,  (actual  hostilities),  has 
broken  out.  This  is,  of  course,  by  no  means  always  the  case.  As  so  frequently 
exemplified  in  recent  years,  armed  forces  may  be  employed  in  varying  degrees, 
without  being  followed  by  an  actual  outbreak  of  war.  Even  when  actual  hostili- 
ties do  break  out  they  may  or  may  not  be  accompanied  by  a  formally  declared 
war,  and  the  extent  of  hostilities  may  be  restricted  or  may  be  unlimited. 

In  view  of  the  actual  situation  existing  today,  in  the  Far  East  and  elsewhere, 
we  might  well  say  that  we  need  "Tension  Plans"  as  well  as  "War  Plans".  But 
to  prepare  well  considered  "Tension  Plans"  we  need  a  planning  machinery  that 
includes  the  State  E>epartment  and  possibly  the  Treasury  Department  as  well  as 
the  War  and  Navy  Departments.  Of  course,  we  have  planning  machinery  for 
the  Army  and  Navy  which  now  provides  for  a  better  coordination  of  planning 
effort  than  has  existed  in  the  past.  We  do  not,  however,  have  regularly  set  up 
planning  machinery  that  brings  in  the  State  Department.  It  is  true  that  we 
have  frequent  consultation  with  the  State  Department,  but  things  are  not  planned 
in  advance,  and  often  we  do  not  receive  advance  information  of  State  Depart- 
ment action  which  might  well  have  effected  our  own  activities. 

It  is  also  true,  of  course,  that  the  State  Department  must  in  a  country  such  as 
ours  feel  its  way  along  to  a  large  extent.  This  is  unavoidable.  In  view  of  this 
the  State  Department  is  probably  unable  always  to  set  up,  in  advance,  concrete 
programs  of  their  intentions. 

[3]  In  the  absence  of  the  machinery  for,  or  possibility  of,  planned  coor- 
dinated action,  I  feel  that  naval  commanders  must  continue — and  they  do  con- 
tinue to  employ  their  forces  in  the  support  of  the  national  purpose  and  the  na- 
tional policy  in  such  manner  and  to  such  extent  that  they  can  make  the  support 
effectively  with  the  forces  available. 

It  seems  to  me  to  be  the  case,  generally  in  life,  that  when  a  confusing  and 
disturbing  situation  presents  itself  those  who  are  confused  and  uncertain  tend 
to  arient  their  ideas  and  their  actions  and  to  rally  around  anyone  capable  of 
taking  a  decisive  attitude  and  determined  action,  even  though  this  one  himself 
may  be  not  too  certain  of  what  should  be  done.  However,  I  know  this  is  an 
unnecessary  comment  in  your  case.     There  is  no  substitute  for  good  judgment. 

A  primary  objective  that  continuously  confronts  naval  commanders,  particu- 
larly those  in  the  "front  line  trench"  as  you  express  it,  is  the  effective  support 
of  policy  in  a  manner  that  does  not  result  in  war.  The  effective  support  prevents 
the  adversary  from  being  stimulated  by  the  appearance  of  weakness,  but  the 
effective  support  must  of  course  be  tempered  by  the  avoidance  of  provocative 
action.  I  feel  that  the  people  of  the  United  States  will  support  firm  action  as 
long  as  it  does  not  go  into  a  degree  of  jingoism  that  would  serve  to  provoke  the 
other  fellow,  and  that  if  in  the  face  of  such  firm  but  restrained  attitude  Japan 
should  step  on  our  toes,  that  our  country  will  realize  that  Japan  herself  has 
provoked  the  action. 

I  realize  very  well  the  conflicting  considerations  with  which  you  are  faced. 
By  continuing  your  forces,  or  a  portion  of  your  forces,  at  the  point  of  conflict — 
the  "Front  Line  Trenches"  between  the  Japanese  and  the  United  States'  inter- 
ests,— you  sustain  United  States'  interests.  If  as  the  tension  increases,  you, 
or  your  forces  stay  on  the  spot  you  thereby  continue  to  sustain  these  interests, 
may  stay  the  hand  of  Japan,  and  may  be  the  means  of  avoiding  war  instead  of 
provoking  it. 

At  the  same  time  the  longer  these  forces  remain  on  the  spot  the  greater  their 
danger  of  being  cut  off  and  destroyed.  If  they  leave  too  early,  or  leave  precip- 
itately, they  may  be  saved  but  this  action  may  not  only  fail  to  give  maximum 
support  to  our  interests  but  may  even  be  the  means  of  provoking  war  by  a  Japan 
which  is  apt  to  respond  with  aggressiveness  to  a  show  of  weakness;  and   to 


2446    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

respond  with  a  hesitating  attitude  to  a  show  of  strength  and  determination  on 
our  part. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  your  forces  stay  on  the  spot  too  long  in  the  face  of 
threatening  dispositions  of  Japanese  force  they  may  be  unduly  and  inextricably 
jeopardized.  It  seems  that  some  degree  of  exposure  of  a  portion  of  the  forces 
of  the  Asiatic  Fleet  is  unavoidable.  If  we  are  not  willing  to  expose  them,  not 
only  will  we  face  the  surrender  of  interests  and  policies,  but  we  accept  a  weak- 
ened position  and  loss  of  prestige,  and  may  even  bring  on  a  war,  (after  we  have 
weakened  our  position)  that  we  have  desired  to  avoid. 

[/,]  Aside  from  the  forces  that  must  be  exixised,  for  a  period  at  lease,  to 
this  increasing  threat  and  danger,  I  presume  that  the  situation  will  guide  you 
into  keeping  other  forces  of  the  Asiatic  Fleet  strategically  deposed  in  a  manner 
that  will  prevent  their  being  ccmtained  by  Japanese  forces  and  will  permit  them 
to  take  counter  measures  against  Japanese  forces  or  interests.  In  this  way,  of 
course,  they  too  support  the  forces  exposed. 

Undoubtedly  the  disposition  of  your  forces  could  be  better  guided  if  you  could 
be  kept  advised  in  advance  of  actions  contemplated  by  the  State  Department. 
Whenever  it  is  possible  to  do  so.  we  will  keep  you  so  advised,  and  whenever 
State  Department  policies  .for  either  temporary  or  longer  contemplated  periods 
can  be  set  forth.  I  will  keep  you  informed  of  them. 

Under  conditions  as  they  are.  it  seems  to  me,  that  you  must  continue  to  meet 
each  situation  with  the  adroit  firmness  that  has  characterized  you  attitude  and 
that  of  your  predecessors, — even  though  exposure  of  some  of  the  forces  of  the 
Asiatic  Fleet  is  necessarily  involved.  I  feet  that  the  Navy  Department  will 
continue  to  support  such  a  firm  position.  It  is  the  Department's  intention  to 
maintain  the  U.  S.  Fleet  in  the  Pacific  and  that  fact  may  have  an  important 
moral  effect  in  the  support  of  your  own  tactful  handling  of  any  incident. 

We  keep  the  State  Department  advised  of  your  letters,  also  the  President. 
They  are  glad  to  get  your  letters.  We  are  continually  on  the  lookout  with  the 
State  Department  for  anything  of  moment  and  of  interest  to  you.  To  date 
nothing  has  been  forthcoming  other  than  what  you  know  from  despatches.  I 
feel  safe  in  saying  that  at  present  the  State  Department  does  not  believe  war 
probable  in  the  near  future,  at  least  not  in  1940;  and  that  any  pressure  they  put 
on  they  hope  to  apply  in  such  a  manner  as  not  to  precipitate  a  final  crisis.  Of 
course,  they  are  in  close  touch  with  Senator  Pittman  who  is  the  sponsor  of  an 
embargo  bill.  As  framed,  this  will  would  permit  the  President  to  prescribe  as 
to  if  and  when  to  apply  it.  In  other  words,  it  can  be  used  advisedly  along  with 
other  forms  of  pressure.  We  will  make  every  effort  to  keep  you  in  touch  with 
the  situation,  which  is  now.  with  the  abrogation  of  the  treaty,  getting  into  a 
stage  which  will  be  interesting  to  say  the  least. 

With  reference  (in  your  letter  of  December  1)  to  the  reversal  of  our  attitude 
on  your  proposal  relative  to  defense  of  Shanghai  settlements.  I  will  simply 
state  now  that  when  I  sent  you  the  despatch  I  did  so  after  a  conference,  at 
which,  I,  at  least  personally  understood  the  stand  represented  to  be  a  Govern- 
ment stand  and  one  which  the  State  Department  fully  approved.  Somebody 
reversed.  Either  I  was  wrong  or  the  State  was  wrong  in  the  imderstanding. 
However,  that  is  water  over  the  dam  and  I  think  it  better  to  let  it  stay  that  way. 
I  simply  want  to  let  you  know  that  here  in  the  Navy  Department  we  felt  we 
were  on  sound  ground  and  acting  in  perfect  good  faith  with  the  State  Depart- 
ment. I  had  some  imcomfortable  moments  and  so  did  the  State  Department 
before  the  second  telegram  was  sent  to  you.  It  is  only  fair  to  assume  we  were 
both  acting  in  good  faith. 

[5]  You  know  Harry  Yarnell  thinks  we  should  never  percipitate  anything 
in  the  Western  Pacific  unless  the  principally  interested  powers  (United  States- 
French-British-Dutch)  act  in  concert.  The  possibility  of  getting  such  concerted 
action  appears  to  me  to  be  improbable  during  the  present  unpredictable  state 
of  affairs  in  Europe.  We  have  been  turning  over  in  our  heads  whether  you 
could  use  Hongkong,  Singapore,  North  Borneo,  or  French  or  Dutch  possessions, 
but  there  is  no  indication  that  any  of  them  would  be  available.  If  we  have  to 
intern  anything  and  have  any  option,  naturally  it  would  be  desirable  to  select 
pf>rts  in  countries  which  might  be  with  us  later,  or  at  least  friendly  to  us. 

To  return  to  some  of  the  purely  naval  aspects  of  the  situation,  there  have 
been  added  certain  forces  for  which  the  plans  now  available  in  the  Department 
do  not  provide.  In  regard  to  patrol  planes  I  presume  that  they  should  be  added 
to  the  local  defense  forces  to  work  in  conjunction  with  destroyers  and  submarines 
and  with  the  Army.  I  assume  that  they  would  remain  in  Manila  Bay  for 
approximately  the  same  time  as  the  submarines,  although  it  may  be  found 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2447 

necessary  to  send  away  the  tender  early  in  the  game.  This  of  course  can  be 
determined  only  by  the  man  on  the  spot  with  full  recognition  of  existing  condi- 
tions. If  they  have  to  look  for  shelter  they  probably  would  have  more  freedom 
of  movement  for  internment  in  Singapore,  for  example,  than  any  other  port — 
and  of  course  internment  in  Singapore  might  well  turn  out  not  to  be  internment 
iu  the  end.  It  might  be  possible  to  have  them  work  their  way  back  home 
depending  on  the  situation  in  Guam,  Wake,  and  Midway. 

The  mining  situation  is  receiving  a  great  deal  of  thought  in  particular  as 
a  result  of  Smeallie's  letter.  We  have  authorization  for  the  construction  of 
mine  stowage  at  Marivales,  but  it  appears  impracticable,  and  may  be  undesirable, 
to  attempt  to  get  money  for  that  purpose  at  this  time.  For  the  present  it  would 
appear  neces.sary  to  continue  this  stowage  at  Cavite. 

Another  problem  arises,  however,  on  the  question  of  mine  stowage.  The  six 
P-class  submarines  that  we  sent  you  are  not  now  fitted  to  handle  submarine  tor- 
pedo tul)e' mines  but  I  am  advised  that  they  can  be  so  fitted  by  providing  stowage 
and  handling  fittings  for  mines,  both  fore  and  aft.  I  believe  that  this  work  can 
be  accomplished  by  the  submarines  being  laid  up  for  no  longer  a  period  than  two 
or  three  weeks.  It  would  be  highly  desirable  in  my  opinion  for  these  submarines 
to  be  fitted  to  lay  mines  and  for  mines  to  be  available  for  this  purpose  at  Manila. 
This  would  involve  a  minimum  of  48  mines  per  submarine  or  a  minimum  for 
which  stowage  capacity  would  be  required  for  about  300  of  these  mines.  We 
would  be  glad  to  have  your  thought  and  recommendation  on  this  point. 

We  have  no  mines  at  present  suitable  for  laying  by  aircraft 

In  regard  to  logistics,  provision  must  be  made  of  course  for  oil  and  rendezvous. 
We  realize  that  and  the  War  Plans  provide  for  it.  In  addition  to  what  provision 
we  can  make,  I  [6]  assume  you  would  exercise  a  prefectly  free  reign 
and  would  arrange  to  charter  what  you  would  consider  to  be  necessary  if  suitable 
vessels  can  be  found  available. 

I  have  not  mentioned  the  Marines  or  the  Army.  I  have  talked  to  Holcomb. 
He  does  not  know  himself  just  what  the  plan  is  for  the  Marines,  but  states  that 
that  depends  almost  entirely  on  arrangements  more  or  less  under  your  control, 
as  for  example  hooking  up  with  the  Chinese,  removal,  and,  in  the  last  analysis, 
possible  capture. 

I  have  taken  up  the  question  of  reinforcements  for  the  Philippines  by  the 
Army — both  troops  and  planes.  I  think  Marshall  would  be  glad  to  send  them 
if  he  had  them.  I  suggested  a  minimum  of  20,000  men  and  a  considerable  number 
of  planes.  Of  course  I  realize  that  they  would  have  to  be  sent  out  more  or  less 
unostentatiously,  if  we  were  ever  able  to  send  them,  and  frankly,  of  this  I  have 
very  little  hope — just  at  present  NONE.  Our  army  seems  to  be  so  dispersed,  so 
small,  so  lacking  in  material  and  so  few  units  available  outside  of  the  essentials 
in  Hawaii  and  the  Canal  that  the  outlook  for  stationing  any  considerable  de- 
tachment elsewhere  looks  hopeless  just  now. 

The  question  of  the  relief  of  the  AUGUSTA  is  in  the  mill  at  present.  I  am 
referring  it  to  the  Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Fleet,  with  the  idea  of  getting 
the  AUGUSTA  back  for  a  much  needed  overhaul  and  for  an  increase  in  her 
antiaircraft  battery,  including  other  important  military  alterations.  The  nigger 
in  the  wood  pile  just  now  is  that  the  only  ship  available  is  the  HOUSTON  which 
has  been  fixed  up  for  more  or  less  quick  use  by  the  President  whenever  he 
wants  to  cruise  in  the  Pacific.  W^e  are  hoping  to  be  able  to  fix  up  another  ship 
at  no  great  cost.  Whether  it  will  be  the  HOUSTON,  the  INDIANAPOLIS  or 
the  CHICAGO  we  will  inform  you  after  the  threshing  it  out  here.  I  assume 
it  make^  no  difference  to  you.  Of  course  whatever  you  get  will  be  one  of  the 
modified  ships,  with  the  increased  antiaircraft  battery  of  8  guns. 

I  have  had  a  copy  made  up  of  allotments  which  we  have  recently  sent  you  al- 
though if  I  remember  this  has  been  previously  covered. 

Please  excuse  the  length  of  this  letter  but  as  it  will  come  by  oflBcer  messenger 
I  have  tried  to  cover  what  I  thought  you  had  in  mind  about  being  kept  in  touch. 

As  an  item  of  interest  the  question  of  whether  to  stay  in  the  Philippines  or 
get  out  of  the  Philippines  has  recently  been  debated  in  the  Town  Hall  program — 
New  York.  One  of  the  speakers  was  Mr.  Paul  McNutt.  I  am  enclosing  a  record 
of  that  meeting. 

My  own  personal  feeling  is  that  we  cannot  do  other  than  get  out  unless  the 
Filipinos  of  their  own  volition  and  in  no  uncertain  voice  request  us  to  remain. 
There  is  a  point  of  honor  involved  as  I  see  it  which  must  be  followed. 

[7]  Of  course  I  could  indulge  in  son>e  wishful  thinking  that  consistent  with 
the  foregoing  we  could  greatly  Improve  Guam  for  possible  future  contingencies. 
What  is  your  opinion  on  this? 


2448    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

I  trust  that  Carolyn  has  fully  recovered  by  now  and  that  you  and  all  the 
little  Harts  are  fine.     Your  prospective  daughterin-law  was  in  the  Department 
the  other  day  and  those  who  saw  her  said  she  was  an  exceptional,  highly  intelli- 
gent, fine  looking  girl.    Am  sorry  to  say  I  missed  her. 
Keep  cheerful — all  good  wishes. 

Sincerely, 
Admiral  T.  C.  Habt, 

11.  8.  Navy,  Commander  in  Chief,  Asiatic  Fleet, 

US8  AUGUSTA. 

Since  dictating  the  foregoing,  I  have  your  letter  of  29  Jan. — I  would  work 
neither  my  planes  nor  my  ships  not  one  whit  more  than  I  felt  the  situation  called 
for — in  fact  I  would  conserve  them  just  as  far  as  possible. 

H.  R.  Stark. 


22  Ootobeb  1940. 

Deab  Tommy  :  You  will  have  heard  from  J.  O.  Richardson  via  the  HOUSTON 
before  this  reaches  you  and  I  really  haven't  much  to  add. 

I  was  tickled  to  pieces  over  your  going  on  to  Manila  as  per  your  plans  and 
scratched  off  a  despatch  with  quick  approval  in  which  Colonel  Knox  thoroughly 
concurred. 

I  am  delighted  that  you  have  practically  all  important  units  out  of  China  but 
here  again,  we  are  leaving  this  entirely  to  your  discretion. 

The  situation  is  not  good  and  does  not  seem  to  be  improving  but  just  how 
critical  it  is  no  one  ever  knows. 

I  wish  there  was  something  I  could  give  you  from  the  State  Department  but 
there  isn't.  I  think  I  may  say  safely,  however,  that  there  will  be  no  backdown 
anywhere  by  the  United  States  in  the  Far  East,  unless  there  is  a  riglit-about-face 
?n  present  day  policy. 

JO'S  memorandum  to  you  really  gave  all  my  thoughts  and  this  note  is  just 
to  let  you  know  we  are  thinking  about  you  and  are  glad  you  are  on  the  job.  I 
noted  that  in  acknowledging  my  last  letter  you  did  not  use  the  word  "aflarmative" 
which  I  asked  you  to  send  if  you  approved  of  the  idea  to  send  some  heavy  cruisers 
to  yon. 

I  am  delighted  over  the  prespect  of  getting  our  women  and  children  out  of  the 
Far  East  and  know  what  a  relief  it  will  be  to  you  to  give  them  the  opportunity 
to  come  home,  and  also  the  knowledge  that  no  more  will  be  permitted  to  go  out. 

Every  good  wish  as  always. 
Sincerely, 

/s/    Bettty. 

Admiral  T.  C.  Habt, 

U.  8.  Navy,  Commander  in  Chief,  Asiatic  Fleet, 

U88  AUGUSTA. 


[1]        Secret  i 

12  NOVEMBEB,  1940. 

Dear  Tommy, 

We  are  pushing  ahead  as  rapidly  as  possible  on  the  preparation  of  material 
and  personnel  for  any  eventualities.  While  there  is  much  still  to  be  done  (a  con- 
dition that  will  continue  to  exist  for  years)  I  can  not  say  that  matters  are  un- 
satisfactory, so  far  as  concerns  things  under  my  control.  But  we  do  not  yet 
know  the  direction  which  affairs  may  take. 

For  the  past  three  weeks  I  have  been  spending  many  hours,  together  with  a 
group  of  officers  particularly  concerned,  in  developing  a  broad  estimate  of  the 
material  situation  as  it  affects  possible  naval  war  operations.  This  estimate, 
or  study,  is  now  in  the  hands  of  the  President.  I  do  not  expect  any  immediate 
decision,  but  do  hope  that  it  will  serve  to  clarify  matters  so  that,  at  least,  those 
in  authority  will  be  fully  aware  of  the  implications  of  any  particular  policy  that 
may  be  adopted  with  respect  to  the  war. 

Ghormley  tells  me  the  British  expected  us  to  be  in  the  war  within  a  few  days 
after  the  reelection  of  the  President — which  is  merely  another  evidence  of  their 
slack  ways  of  thought,  and  of  their  non-realistic  views  of  international  political 
conditions,  and  of  our  own  political  system.  They  have  been  talking,  in  a  large 
way,  about  the  defense  of  the  Malay  Barrier,  with  an  alliance  between  them- 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2449 

selves,  us,  and  the  Dutch,  without  much  thought  as  to  what  the  effect  would  be 
In  Europe.  But  we  have  no  idea  as  to  whether  they  would  at  once  begin  to  fight 
were  the  Dutch  alone,  or  were  we  alone,  to  be  attacked  by  the  Japanese.  Then 
again,  the  copy  of  the  British  Far  Eastern  War  Plan  which  Thomas  obtained  at 
Singapore,  shows  much  evidence  of  their  usual  wishful  thinking.  Furthermore, 
though  I  believe  the  Dutch  colonial  authorities  will  resist  an  attempt  to  capture 
their  islands,  I  question  whether  they  would  fight  if  only  the  Philippines,  or  only 
Singapore,  were  attacked. 

The  Navy  can,  of  course,  make  no  political  commitments.  Therefore,  we  can 
make  no  specific  military  plans  for  an  allied  war.  However,  as  I  told  you  in  my 
despatch,  you  can  perform  a  useful  service  by  laying,  with  the  British  and 
possibly  the  Dutch,  a  framework  for  a  future  plan  of  cooperation,  should  we  be 
forced  into  the  war.  I  rather  doubt,  however,  that  the  Dutch  will  talk  freely 
with  you.  If  they  do  my  idea  would  be  that  you  would  explore  [2]  the 
fields  of : 

C!ommand  arrangements, 

(General  objectives, 

General  plan  of  cooperative  action,  including  the  approximate  naval  and 
military  deployment. 

You  are,  of  course,  committed  to  assist  the  Army  in  the  defense  of  Luzon. 
But  with  allied  bases  to  fall  back  on,  your  direct  support  of  the  Army  might  well 
fall  short,  in  degree,  of  the  support  you  would  afford  were  we  alone  to  fight 
Japan. 

I  do  not  believe  Japan  will  attack  us  if  she  can  avoid  doing  so.  In  fact,  I 
believe  she  will  go  far  to  avoid  hostilities  with  the  United  States.  It  is  even 
doubtful  if  she  wishes,  at  this  time  to  fight  the  British  or  the  Dutch.  It  seems 
more  likely  that  she  would  prefer,  while  maintaining  a  position  in  readiness, 
to  consolidate  Indo-China  with  her  positions  further  north,  and  to  begin  a  more 
or  less  gradual  economic  penetration  of  the  Netherlands  East  Indies  and  Siam. 
Should  we  refrain  from  imposing  additional  economic  sanctions,  present  condi- 
tions, including  the  recent  1,800,000  ton  oil  contract  might  be  stabilized  over  a 
considerable  period  of  the  future.  Our  State  Department,  as  you  may  know, 
had  a  hand  in  the  execution  of  that  contract. 

But  we  never  can  tell.  Should  a  war  develop  between  Japan  and  an  alliance 
of  British,  Dutch  and  Americans,  I  believe  that  Japan  will  plan  to : 

(a)  Occupy  Guam,  and  reeforce  the  Mandates  with  troops,  submarines,  and 
some  air; 

(b)  Establish  naval  control  of  Philippine  waters  by  destroying  our  naval  and 
air  forces,  basing  her  main  fleet  in  the  Pescadores  and  a  strong,  fast  detachment 
in  Halmahera ; 

(c)  Capture  Luzon  with  troops  now  based  in  Formosa  and  Hainan; 

(d)  Capture  Borneo,  to  be  followed  by  a  campaign  against  the  Dutch  directed 
from  East  to  West. 

I  believe  that  the  allied  objective  should  be  to  reduce  Japan's  offensive  power 
through  economic  starvation ;  the  success  of  the  blockade  would  surely  depend 
upon  allied  ability  to  hold  the  major  portion  of  the  Malay  Barrier.  Your  own 
action  would,  of  course,  be  based  upon  your  view  as  to  the  most  effective  method 
of  contributing  to  the  attainment  of  the  ultimate  objective. 

One  thing  (and  this  is  for  your  ears  alone)  you  can  depend  upon  is  that  we 
would  support  you,  probably  by  sending  a  naval  reenforcement  to  you  at 
Soerabaja  or  Singapore,  and  by  other  means.  I  would  be  glad  to  get  your 
views  as  to  the  size  and  composition  of  such  a  reenforcement ;  but  in  making  your 
recommendation  I  trust  you  will  keep  in  mind  that  our  Navy  must  hold  in  the 
Mid-Pacific,  that  we  may  also  be  in  the  war  against  the  other  two  Axis  Powers, 
and  that  the  collapse  of  Britain  would  force  us  to  a  major  re-orientation  toward 
the  Atlantic. 

You  may  well  appreciate  that  I  do  not  welcome  such  a  war  (British  Collapse). 

The  naval  part  of  the  War  Plan,  Rainbow  III,  for  this  possible  war  is  about 
completed,  and  will  be  on  its  way  to  you  within  a  short  time.  We  are  hoping 
to  send  naval  attach^  to  Singapore,  Batavia,  Soerabaja,  Balikpapan,  and  Ceylon  ; 
possibly  one  of  these  officers  may  bring  this  plan  to  you  via  air  transportation. 

We  are  all  delighted  to  be  able  to  put  over  the  dependent  thing  for  you.  The 
State  Department  strongly  supported  us.  I  can  appreciate  the  coals  that  must 
have  been  h«aped  upon  you  when  it  was  learned  that,  while  we  were  forcing  our 
dependents  home,  the  Army  was  sending  dependents  out. 


2450    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

You  know  how  glad  I  always  am  for  any  opportunity  to  assist  any  or  all  of  the 
Little  Harts,  as  well  as  the  Big  Hart,  in  any  way  in  which  I  can. 
Keep  cheerful, 
^ncerely 

/s/    Betty. 
Admiral  T.  C.  Habt, 

U.  8.  Navy  Commander  in  Chief,  U.  S.  Asiatic  Fleet. 

P.  S.  Am  sixty  today.     Here's  hoping !     The  first  three  score  are  the  hardest ! 

Admiral  Hart 

18  NOVBMBEB  1940. 

p.  S.  Admiral  Brownson's  name  is  being  submitted  to  the  President  on  the  list 
going  over  to  him  for  consideration  in  connection  with  the  new  destroyer.  Here's 
hoping. 


Secret 
Op-lO-MD 

August  28,  1941. 

Dear  Tommy  :  Since  I  last  wrote  you,  much  water  has  gone  over  the  dam. 

I  will  not  burden  you  with  my  recent  cruise  in  the  Atlantic  and  the  meeting  with 
the  British,  except  to  tell  you  that  is  was  extremely  interesting.  I  hope  and 
believe  much  good  will  result.  If  nothing  else,  the  fact  that  we  got  to  know  each 
other  very  well  is  bound  to  be  helpful. 

This  morning,  I  had  a  long  talk  with  Mr.  Juiji  Kasai,  member  of  the  Japanese 
Parliament.  I  was  very  frank  with  him,  as  I  have  been  with  Admiral  Nomura, 
and  I  find  that  they  both  seem  to  feel  very  much  the  same  way.  I  think  I  have 
written  you  how  much  Admiral  Nomura  has  impressed  us  with  his  sincere  desire 
that  our  countries  solve  their  problems  amicably.  There  is  no  doubt  in  my  mind 
but  that  he  has  no  stomach  whatever  for  the  Tri-partite  Agreement,  and  the  same 
applies  to  Mr.  Kasai.  I  still  have  some  hopes,  or,  to  put  it  in  another  way, 
have  not  given  up  hope  that  peace  in  the  Pacific  may  be  maintained.  However,  I 
could  wish  that  hope  were  not  sustained  by  such  a  slender  thread. 

Whether  or  not  the  Japanese  will  go  into  Thailand,  I  do  not  know.  There 
is  no  doubt  but  that  if  they  do,  the  reaction  in  the  United  States  will  be  bad. 
This  has  been  made  very  plan  to  our  Japanese  friends  here,  and,  therefore,  to  the 
home  government. 

I  am  continuing  to  urge  strengthening  of  the  Army  forces  in  the  Philippines, 
particularly  in  planes  and  mechanized  equipment,  and  I  hope  some  tangible  results 
will  take  shape. 

The  Russian  situation  has  complicated  the  entire  picture.  Ambassador  Ouman- 
sky  and  some  of  their  military  men  from  Russia  are  coming  in  tomorrow,  and  I 
know  that  their  demands  will  be  very  urgent. 

[2]  There  is  a  good  deal  of  a  three-ring  circus  going  on  hereabouts.  Short- 
ages in  raw  materials  become  more  acute  daily.  We  have  our  own  job  of  enor- 
mous expansion  in  every  department.  We  are  pressed  from  all  over  the  world 
to  sustain  the  forces  actually  fighting  at  the  front  and,  of  course,  we  recognize 
the  importance  of  this.  All  in  all,  there  is  a  never-ending  problem  of  struggles 
for  priority,  and  this  is  only  one  of  the  many  problems  involved — and  it  is  a 
tough  one. 

You  guessed  quite  right  with  regard  to  our  feeling  about  ADB.  We  told  the 
British  in  our  recent  meeting  what  we  thought  of  it.  They  now  have  our 
oflBcial  letters,  so  one  of  these  days  we  may  be  expecting  a  reply.  Incidentally, 
I  was  very  frank  with  Admiral  Pound  with  regard  to  the  Command  situation 
which  you  have  pictured  in  the  Far  East.  I  hope  the  changes  which  have  or 
will  take  place  will  be  helpful. 

I  know  about  the  very  indiscreet  radio  and  other  leaks  with  regard  to  those 
recently  sent  to  China.  I  have  taken  it  up  with  those  concerned,  and  here's 
hoping  for  at  least  some  semblance  of  secrecy  on  the  next  one.  Anyway,  we 
shall  try. 

Regarding  the  location  of  the  fuel  oil  tanks: — I  was  ready  to  accept  your 
recommendation  without  going  back  again  because,  as  you  know,  we  said  we 
would  leave  the  decision  up  to  you.  However,  Ben  Moreell  felt  a  little  better 
after  I  sent  the  wire  and  your  confirmation  of  your  previous  decision. 

•Not  much  general  news. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2451 

"We  have  something  over  262,000  men  in  the  Navy,  of  whom  about  40,000  are 
reserves.  Reenlistnients  for  tlie  year  have  averaged  a  little  over  70  per  cent — 
and  still  are.  We  are  aiming  for  a  monthly  quota  of  12,000  recruits,  and  I  hope 
will  attain  it  this  fall.  We  have,  as  you  may  Ijnow,  put  on  a  very  extensive 
advertising  campaign  in  the  South  and  in  the  Middle  West  farm  belt.  I  am 
more  thankful  every  day  that  I  have  Nimitz  as  a  side  partner  at  this  time.  I 
hope  you  enjoyed  the  letter  which  the  Bureau  of  Navigation  is  sending  out 
in  the  interest  of  increasing  our  reenlistments.  After  all,  that  is  the  greatest 
recruiting  ground  we  have  if  we  can  malse  it  effective. 

Of  course,  the  heavy  expansion  puts  a  terrific  burden  on  the  forces  afloat, 
but  it  seems  inevitable  that  it  happens  that  way.  [3]  As  you  know,  I 
started  in  almost  the  minute  I  got  here  for  great  expansion  in  personnel,  but, 
like  everything  else,  it  takes  TIME. 

There  is  much  talk  at  present  regarding  possibility  of  Japanese  interference 
with  our  sending  material  to  Russia ;  that  is,  if  it  goes  between  the  Japanese 
Islands  and  through  the  Sea  of  Japan  to  the  Maritime  Provinces.  I  rather 
doubt  if  they  will  take  any  immediate  action,  because  it  seems  to  me  they  are 
in  one  of  those  hesitation  periods,  but,  of  course,  it  is  something  that  can  not 
be  discounted.  Have  you  any  line  at  all  on  the  eflSciency  of  the  Russian  sub- 
marines in  the  Pacific.  Do  you  recommend  any  Staff  talks  with  them?  When 
the  question  you  raised  concerning  closing  the  Sulu  Sea  came  up  here,  I  felt 
it  inadvisable  to  make  any  proclamation,  at  least  at  that  time  for  fear  that 
later  on,  for  some  reason  or  other,  the  Japanese  might  use  such  an  action  by 
us  as  a  precedent  for  their  closing  the  Sea  of  Japan.  However,  people  don't 
seem  to  need  much  in  the  way  of  precedent  in  these  days,  that  being  more  of 
a  case  of  "Can  one  get  away  with  it?" 

We  are  directing  Kimmel  today  to  start  his  Southeast  Force  of  two  light 
.  cruisers,  which  you  will  recall  WPL-51  envisaged.  We  have  a  Radar  in  the 
Galapagos  Area — incidently,  another  one  just  at  present  Southeast  of  Bermuda. 
We  are  starting  considerable  operations  between  North  America  and  Iceland 
and  the  Good  Lord  knows  if  the  Germans  want  an  excuse  for  war,  they  have 
plenty.  I  have  had  just  exactly  11%  hours  at  this  desk  so  far  today,  and  I  am 
afraid  this  letter  will  be  terribly  disjointed  and  loose,  but  I  just  felt  like  sitting 
down  and  talking  to  you  for  a  while.  I  am  going  up  to  the  Old  Allies  Inn  for 
a  bite  and  am  coming  back  to  finish  up.  There  seems  no  end  to  it.  Things  move 
so  slowly  at  times,  but  I  suppose  no  matter  how  they  move,  we  would  still 
be  impatient.  Anyway,  here's  hoping,  and  every  good  wish  to  you  in  the  wide 
world,  as  always. 
Sincerely, 

/s/     BETlTr. 

Admiral  Thomas  C.  Habt,  U.  S.  N. 

Commander  in  Chief,  Asiatic  B'leet, 
V.  S.  8.  Houston,  c/o  Postmaster, 
San  Francisco,  California. 

[-J]  P.  S.  I  hope  to  get  up  home  over  Sunday — Labor  Day.  I  realise  how 
much  that  would  mean  to  you  too.  I  often  recall  what  someone  once  told  me — 
"In  this  man's  Navy,  hard  work  gets  you  more  hard  work" — and  no  truer  words 
were  ever  said. 

I  just  had  a  happy  thought  and  indulged  myself  in  it  and  called  up  Carolyn 
and  told  her  I  was  writing  you.  That  fine  girl  had  only  cheerful  things  to  say, 
and  her  voice  just  sounded  glad.  She  said  the  best  news  she  had — after  being 
out  all  day — was  to  come  home  and  find  two  letters  from  you.  She  also  stated 
that  the  children  are  all  fine  and,  in  fact,  everything  was  fine.  Just  what  I  would 
have  expected  from  her,  so  I'll  wind  up  here  with  good  night. 

Keep  cheerful. 

P.  S.  No.  2.  I  am  taking  up  with  Jerry  Land  and,  in  fact,  already  had  before 
receiving  your  letter,  the  question  of  radio  operators  in  his  Merchant  ships. 

Regarding  the  docking  of  the  four  ships  you  mentioned : — I  knew  Jerry  had 
had  his  troubles  on  this  score,  so  many  departments  being  involved  and  hands 
being  tied. 
U]         Op-IOD-MD 

NOVEMBEB  1,    IWl. 

Deab  Tommy  :  This  will  be  in  answer  to  yours  of  Septeral)er  30  and  October  7. 
It  was  fine  to  hear  from  you  and  to  learn  that  you  are  in  good  fettle. 


2452    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

I  am  glad  you  wrote  the  official  letter  about  the  slowness  with  which  official 
documents  reach  you.  Of  course,  I  am  very  sorry  that  conditions  were  such  that 
the  letter  was  required.  I  think  the  situation  will  be  met  alright ;  give  us  a  jolt 
if  it  occurs  again  ;  it's  the  only  way  we  can  lick  it. 

I  have  run  down  what  information  I  could  on  the  status  of  the  Radar  equip- 
ment which  was  slated  for  the  Sixteenth  Naval  District. 

I  tind  that  two  (2)  units  SCR-288  and  one  (1)  unit  270-b  had  been  shipped 
from  San  Francisco  on  September  8,  1941.  I  was  later  advised  that  the  Depart- 
ment had  been  informed  that  the  equipment  arrived  in  Manila  on  September  29, 
1941.  By  this  time,  I  suppose  installation  is  well  under  way.  I  am  hoping  that 
it  will  live  up  to  expectations.    If  it  does,  it  will  be  a  great  help. 

Your  reference  to  the  Russians !  I  agree  that  it  would  be  a  fine  idea  to  get  as 
much  information  as  possible  about  them.  At  the  moment,  there  seems  to  be 
little  chance  of  learning  anything  authoritative.  An  officer  on  duty  in  the  Depart- 
ment ( in  the  far  Eastern  section  of  O.  N.  I. )  recently  returned  from  temporary 
duty  in  London.  During  the  course  of  his  "inquiring  around"  in  the  Admiralty, 
a  Britisher  in  the  Intelligence  branch  remarked  of  the  Russians  that  they  were 
"Inquisitive,  Acquisitive,  and  Secretive."  That  seems  to  about  size  them  up.  Our 
officer  stated  that  the  British  just  don't  have  anything  of  value  on  them.  The 
British  think,  however,  that  the  Russian  Navy  is  probably  better  than  we  might 
ordinarily  be  inclined  to  think.  The  secretiveness  of  the  Russians  is  hard  to 
understand.  I  suppose,  however,  so  many  hands  have  been  turned  against  them  in 
the  past  that  their  current  attitude  is  merely  an  outgrowth  of  the  past.  Even  so, 
they  do  not  permit  the  foreign  attaches  and  correspondents  to  go  to  the  front. 

[2]  Our  Moscow  Mission,  as  you  no  doubt  know,  has  returned.  Admiral 
Standley  is  enthusiastic  about  the  Russians.  He  feels  that  they  will  hold  on 
for  a  long  time  to  come.  I  am  informed  that  General  Burns  shares  his  views. 
I  hope  they  are  correct.  One  thing  we  do  know  is  that  they  are  in  need  of  much 
material.  How  that  is  going  to  be  gotten  to  them  remains  a  problem  which  will 
give  us  many  a  headache  before  it  is  solved. 

I  am  sorry  that  the  PT  situation  was  not  better  handled.  I  trust  that  the 
many  problems  in  connection  with  them  can  be  worked  out.  The  tender  situation 
is  in  hand,  and  I  hope  the  fuel  arrangements  can  be  satisfactorily  handled  too. 

The  Bureau  of  Ships  has  informed  me  that  spare  parts  ample  to  recondition 
engines  on  the  station  were  shipped  from  Detroit  on  October  5,  1941.  Further, 
seventy-five  percent  of  the  base  tools  are  scheduled  for  delivery  between  now 
and  February,  1942.  Ships  is  sending  a  factory  service  engineer  to  Manila. 
Captain  Kint'ner  has  just  called  to  say  that,  depending  on  the  vagaries  of  trans- 
I)ortation,  this  engineer  should  arrive  some  time  in  November. 

As  noted  above,  I  trust  that  the  fuel  situation  works  out  satisfactorily.  For 
the  time  being,  and  until  you  can  get  100  octane  gas,  BuShips  advises  that  you 
can  use  87  octane  at  4/5  load.  This,  I  am  informed,  is  the  on*y  type  of  gas 
that  was  available  to  these  craft  during  their  employment  in  the  South  last 
winter. 

I  hope  that  the  PTs  will  be  of  real  service  to  you.  The  British  think  they 
are  fine.  On  the  other  hand,  I  quote  about  them  from  a  recent  letter  from 
Kimmel : 

"The  12  PTs  which  you  sent  to  us  I  fear  will  be  of  very  little  use  in  this  area. 
We  sent  them  on  an  average  day  to  make  a  trip  from  Oahu  to  Molokai.  The 
reports  of  this  trip  have  gone  forward  officially.  They  were  practically  useless 
in  this  sea  and  could  not  make  more  than  10  knots.  Several  of  them  had  to 
turn  back  and  a  few  personnel  were  quite  seriously  injured  from  being  thrown 
about.    We  need  something  much  more  substantial  to  be  of  any  use  out  here." 

We  are  considering  sending  you  six  (6)  more  PTs  and  the  NIAGARA  as  a 
tender.  We  are  asking  the  Bureau  of  Ships  to  get  the  "FLORENCE  D"  for 
employment  as  you  propose.  That  will  let  you  have  the  GOLD  STAR  up  your 
sleeve  for  velvet. 

These  boats  have  shown  weakness  when  pounded  into  heavy  seas.  I  might  add 
that  we  know  the  weaknesses  of  these  PTs.  We  gave  them  some  grueling  tests 
in  fairly  heavy  weather  from  New  London  up  around  Block  Island,  down  around 
Fire  Island  and  liack.     They  made  a  destroyer         [S]  hump  to  stay  with 

them,  but  all  the  boats  which  made  the  race  suffered  severe  structural  damage. 
We  deliberately  pounded  them  to  see  what  they  would  stand  and  to  develop  their 
weaknesses.  Profiting  by  what  we  learned,  we  hope  to  develop  a  much  sturdier 
craft.    Meanwhile,  we  sent  out  what  we  had,  hoping  they  would  be  of  some  use. 

I  trust  you  will  be  glad  to  get  the  additional  SS. 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2453 

Sorry  we  cannot  give  you  any  more  PBTs  at  the  moment.  They  are  just 
not  to  be  had.  The  I'BTs  that  we  have  gotten  to  date  are  not,  as  one  might 
suppose,  the  result  of  our  "big  (May,  1940)  money".  New  production  of  these 
will  not  come  ofif  the  line  until  April,  1942.  The  planes  that  are  notv  leaving 
the  factories  are  those  contracted  for  and  paid  for  by  the  United  Kingdom, 
Canada,  and  the  Netherlands.  The  VOS  we  are  sending  you  is  a  good  plane. 
The  engines  are  excellent,  and  there  are  no  '"bugs"  in  them.  Next  to  the  PBY, 
they  are  decidedly  the  best  type  we  have  for  your  purpose.  They  can  carry 
two  325-pound  depth  bombs,  and  that  is  pretty  good.  Two  hundred  forty  (240) 
of  these  depth  bombs  are  on  their  way  out,  and  some  seven  hundred  twenty 
(720)  more  are  to  follow  shortly.  I  believe  these  planes  will  do  good  work  for 
you  as  an  inner  anti-submarine  patrol.  It  is  true  that  the  radio  is  not  as  high- 
powered  as  we  wish  it  were — but  even  that  might  be  to  your  advantage.  These 
24  planes  and  personnel  will  complete  assembly  by  about  January  1,  1942  at 
the  Naval  Air  Station,  San  Pedro,  and  will  be  despatched  from  that  point. 

With  reference  to  your  problem  of  cooperation  with  the  Army,  I  suggest  that 
consideration  be  given  to  the  agreement  Kimmel  and  General  Short  are  uow 
using  at  Pearl  Hai-bor.  The  name  of  the  paper,  a  copy  of  which  you  now  have 
is  "Joint  Security  Measures  for  the  Protection  of  the  Fleet  and  Pearl  Harbor 
Base."  Our  file  room  tells  me  it  went  out  along  with  Serial  059230  of  June 
20,  1941. 

Your  remarks  abotft  the  ballast  in  the  ST.  LOUIS  are  noted.  Mike  Robinson 
states  that  the  need  for  ballast  in  that  ship  came  about  as  the  result  of  endeav- 
ering  to  introduce  extensive  improvement  and  changes  in  an  existing  design. 
The  ship  was  laid  down  as  a  development  of  the  BROOKLYN  class,  with  engine 
and  boiler  arrangements  modified  to  decrease  damage  from  underwater  explo- 
sion ;  the  secondary  battery  was  changed  from  open  pedestal  mounts  to  enclosed 
twin  5"-25  caliber  mounts;  and  finally  fire  control  was  extensively  rearranged 
to  improve  overhead  view.  Twin  5"38  caliber  guns  were  subsequently  developed, 
and  this  type  was  adopted  instead  of  the  5"-25  caliber.  This,  together  with 
director  alterations,  put  a  great  deal  of  topside  weight  in  the  ship.  The  result 
of  these  changes  was  that,  while  the  ST.  LOUIS  was  entirely  satisfactory  from 
damage  stability  point  of  view  under  loaded  conditions,  she  was  not  satisfactory 
in  a  light  condition,  and  ballast  accordingly  had  to  be  added  to  make  her  satis- 
factory to  withstand  heavy  underwater  [4]  damage  under  any  conditions 
of  load.  Subsequent  alterations,  recommended  by  the  King  Board,  added  more 
weight ;  this,  of  course,  required  that  additional  ballast  be  added.  Mike  Robinson 
remarked:  "I  feel  very  bad  about  the  whole  situation.  I  hardly  think  anyone 
can  be  blamed.  If  blame  there  be,  it  should  be  on  our  Naval  Treaty  Limitations. 
When  one  is  given  10,000  tons  around  which  to  construct  a  ship,  it  follows  that 
every  effort  is  going  to  be  made  to  get  as  much  into  the  ship  as  possible.  This 
the  constructors  did.  When  the  new  requirements  for  heavy  anti-aircraft 
batteries  came  along,  there  just  wasn't  enough  reserve  stability  left  in  the 
design  to  take  care  of  the  additional  weights."    Voila. 

I  took  up  the  matter  of  Brooke-Popham's  activities  and  the  publicity  given 
the  meetings  of  the  United  States  and  British  Commanders  in  the  Far  East 
with  Admiral  Sir  Charles  Little  of  the  British  Joint  Staff  Mission.  A  few  days 
since,  I  had  a  note  from  him  which  said,  "We  have  referred  the  matter  to  the 
Chiefs  of  Staff  in  London."  It  would  seem  that  that  reference  should  take  care 
of  the  matter. 

I  referred  the  matter  of  your  mines  to  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance.  Blandy  has 
just  brought  in  a  letter  which  appears  to  cover  the  subject  pretty  thoroughly. 
I  am  enclosing  a  copy  of  it,  which  may  be  of  assistance  to  you. 

I  am  .sorry  about  Bemis.  It  was  our  impression  that  he  would  be  a  good  one 
for  that  Job.     You  have  had  tough  luck  with  your  commandants. 

As  for  your  reconnnendation  about  Glassford.  I  am  not  prepared  to  give  you 
an  answer  at  this  moment.  I  appreciate  the  fact  that  he  has  been  out  there 
well  over  two  (2)  years,  but  these  are  unusual  times.  The  Department  of  State 
has  many  reasons  why  a  Flag  Officer  should  be  kept  on  the  river.  We  practically 
have  to  go  along  with  them  on  this,  and  I  can  think  of  no  one  at  the  moment  better 
qualified  for  the  job  than  Glassford.  I  will  discuss  with  Nimitz  the  many  angles 
that  your  reconnnendation  suggests  to  me  and  see  if  we  can't  work  out  some- 
thing. 

In  your  letter  of  August  19,  you  reconmiended  that  the  Department  select  the 
officer  it  desired  ultimately  to  relieve  you  and  send  him  out  forthwith.  More 
recently  (September  30)  you  asked  what  had  become  of  Home's  and  Green- 
slade's  candidacy  for  your  job.    All  I  can  say  at  the  moment  is  that  neither  of 


2454    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

these  oflScers  is  available  and  both  are  doing  important  duty  in  their  present 
assignments. 

Of  course,  I  have  been  searching  my  mind  for  some  time  for  someone  who 
has  all  the  many  exacting  qualifications  for  your  relief.  As  you  can  well 
imagine — but,  due  to  modesty,  you  would  probably  not  admit — the  job  of  find- 
ing someone  to  measure  up  to  your  standards  has  not  been  an  easy  one.  Many 
oflScers  no  doubt  are  avail^ihle,  but,  in  the  important  job  you  now  hold,  the  run- 
of-the-mine  chap  just  will  not  do.  We  have  to  have  the  very  best.  To  list  just 
some  qfi  the  necessary  qualifications :  he  must  be  acceptable  to  the  President  and 
the  Secretary ;  he  must  be  mentally  and  physically  vigorous ;  he  must  possess 
a  fine  strategical  mind;  he  must  be  an  inspiring  leader;  he  must  be  possessed 
of  great  common  sense  and  balance ;  he  must  be  able  to  take  care  of  us  in  con- 
ferences and  guard  us  with  the  British  while  still  viewing  the  problem  as  a 
whole;  he  must  have  a  profound  knowledge  of  the  employment  of  the  most 
important  weapon  he  will  have  at  his  disposal — the  submarine;  and,  finally,  I 
must  have  complete  confidence  in  him.  Your  station  is  the  front  line  trench  and 
one  with  no  less  qualifications  than  those  listed  can  be  considered. 

I  am  considering  Nimitz;  it  would  be  like  losing  one  of  my  arms  here ;  I  have 
not  even  broached  it  to  the  Secretary.  I  am  just  telling  you  what  is  in  my  mind — 
if  and  when  you  tell  me  you  feel  you  should  be  relieved. 

I  realize  3  years  are  a  long  time  on  the  Asiatic — particularly  when  it  stretches 
out  indefinitely  beyond  a  life  of  service  and  normal  retiring  age.  It  was  not 
easy  for  me  to  ask  you  to  continue  in  the  Far  East — in  lots  of  ways  I  hated  to 
do  it — but  I  could  think  of  no  one  else  so  well  qualified  to  serve  our  country 
out  there  in  time  of  stress.  Moreover,  I  did  it  also  because  I  know  your  rugged 
honesty — and  that  you  will  unhesitatingly  tell  me  if  you  think,  for  any  reason 
I  should  send  out  someone  else.     Please  tell  me  exactly  how  you  feel  about  it. 

With  all  good  wishes. 
Sincerely, 

/s/    Betty. 

Admiral  T.  C.  Hart,  U.  S.  Navy 

Commander  in  Chief,  Asiatic  Fleet, 

%  Postmaster,  Asiatic  Station, 

San  Francisco,  California. 


[1]         Secret 

(Re6b) 

From  :  The  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance 

To :  The  Chief  of  Naval  Operations 

Subject :  Effect  of  Sea  Growth  on  Mines  with  Special  Reference  to  a  Mine  Re- 
covered in  Manila  Bay  and  Reported  in  a  Personal  letter  from  Admiral 
Hart  to  Admiral  Stark 

1.  A  dispatch  has  been  prepared  containing  essentially  the  following : 
"More  detailed  report  on  recovered  mine  including  photographs  is  requested. 

It  is  suggested  that  this  mine  may  have  been  the  one  reported  lost  in  Sixteenth 
Naval  District  letter  S76-1  Serial  C-9001  dated  5  February  1941.  Attention  is 
called  to  the  fact  that  tests  as  long  as  two  years  off  Kitty  Hawk  and  in  Florida 
waters  even  when  resulting  in  apparent  encrustation  did  not  prevent  operation. 
It  is  suggested  that  condition  of  field  in  Manila  Bay  be  tested  by  sweeping  a  few 
mines  at  the  end.  First  so  as  to  make  contact  with  antennae  and  second  so  as 
to  cut  steel  mooring  with  subsequent  inspection  under  control  of  personnel  trained 
in  mine  recovery." 

2.  More  detailed  comment  has  been  submitted  by  Commander  J.  B.  Glennon  of 
the  Naval  Ordnance  Laboratory  as  follows : 

"The  following  comments  are  submitted  relative  to  sea  growth  on  mines  at 
Cavite  and  elsewhere : 

"In  carrying  out  mine  endurance  tests  off  the  coast  of  North  Carolina,  the 
Bureau  has  encountered  the  problem  of  sea  growth  on  all  assemblies  not  promptly 
recovered.  Observation  of  tests  units  on  return  to  the  Naval  Ordnance  Labora- 
tory practically  always  gives  an  impression  similar  to,  but  in  lesser  degree  than 
that  outlined  by  Admiral  Hart.  It  generally  appears  that  steel  surfaces  are 
encrusted  and  horns  at  times  rendered  inoperative  by  a  rigid  layer  of  marine 
growth.  Investigation  of  this  feature  has  shown  that  the  condition  of  the  marine 
growth  changes  very  rapidly  when  removed  from  the  sea  water,  and  that  growths 
which  readily  brush  away  when  under  water  become  rigid  obstructions  once 


EXHIBITS  OF  JOINT   COMMITTEE  2455 

they  start  drying  out.  Thus  this  dry  coating  does  not  give  a  true  picture  of  the 
service  condition. 

[2]  "Underwater  tests  on  heavily  coated  mines  and  floats  down  seven 
months  at  Kitty  Hawk,  North  Carolina,  showed  that  mine  horns  and  float  horns 
readily  functioned  on  impact.  Mines  tested  for  endurance  over  considerably 
longer  periods  in  the  same  water  frequently  have  been  fired  by  contacting  the 
antenna  with  a  steel  wire.  In  general,  difficulty  in  firing  on  the  test  field  due 
to  fouled  antenna  has  never  been  reported. 

"There  are  four  distinct  ways  in  which  sea  growth  might  be  pictured  as  inter- 
fering with  the  operation  of  the  Cavite  mines : 

(a)  Heavy  coating  on  the  lower  antenna.  This  antenna  serves  as  mine  moor- 
ing cable  and  is  held  rigid  under  a  300  lb.  tension.  It  is  %"  pure  copper  rope. 
Rubbing  of  this  rigid  wire  by  passing  submarine  should  brush  aside  any  wet 
growth  that  will  cling  to  copper  after  a  few  months  exposure. 

(b)  Heavy  coating  on  upper  antenna.  The  tension  in  this  antenna  is  probably 
less  than  30  lbs.  There  appears  the  possibility  that  brushing  contact  of  a  sub- 
marine might  not  clear  a  bright  spot  through  even  a  wet  coating  on  this  antenna. 
However,  irregularities  on  the  submarine  can  exercise  extra  stress  in  passing. 
More  important,  this  copper  antenna  is  fitted  with  a  horned  float. 

(c)  Float  horns.  Each  of  these  consists  of  a  copper  cup  surrounding  a  star 
shaped  steel  disc.  Any  sea  growth  existing  on  the  oopper  surface  of  the  cup 
need  only  be  punctured  or  brushed  aside  by  a  sharp  steel  point  of  the  star  shaped 
disc  when  the  horn  is  bumped  by  a  passing  ship. 

(d)  Mine  horns.  These  consist  of  a  copper  disc  within  a  steel  cup.  The  blunt 
edge  of  the  copper  disc  must  be  driven  through  any  wet  sea  growth  between 
cup  and  disc.  The  available  force  for  this  blow  between  a  ship  and  a  mine, 
weighing  more  than  500  lbs.  appears  sufficient  to  brush  aside  reasonable  quanti- 
ties of  wet  sea  growth  as  this  open  space  is  only  ^4"  wide. 

"So  long  as  any  one  of  these  four  means  of  firing  remains  open,  the  mine 
should  be  considered  dangerous. 

[3]  "It  appears  desirable-to  know  whether  the  mine  recovered  by  fishermen 
at  Cavite  was  inspected  by  Naval  authorities  before  or  after  exposure  to  the  air, 
if  any  immersed  parts  were  tested  for  sea  growth  resistance  what  was  the  find- 
ing? Did  sea  growth  on  mine  cling  to  copper  surfaces?  In  addition,  information 
is  desired  as  to  whether  the  mine  was  opened  and  inspected  by  Naval  personnel, 
were  the  safety  devices  or  other  features  tested  for  performance,  was  the  mine 
positively  identified  as  a  live-loaded  unit  recently  planted,  has  a  report  been 
submitted  to  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance. 

"Commandant  Sixteenth  District's  letter  S76-1  Serial  C-9001  dated  5  February 
1941  reported  the  laying  of  two  experimental  mines  off  Corregidor  on  6  August 
1940.  One  of  these  was  recovered  complete  on  29  January  1941  and  was  reported 
upon  in  detail.  As  no  mention  of  sea  growth  appears  in  the  report,  it  would  seem 
that  this  objectionable  feature  is  not  always  present  tc  an  important  degree. 
Photographs  of  these  Cavite  mines  after  six  months  submergence  show  no 
evidence  of  abnormal  sea  growth. 

"Nothing  in  the  above  should  be  taken  to  indicate  that  the  Naval  Ordnance 
Laboratory  desires  to  belittle  the  bad  effect  of  sea  growth  upon  mines,  espe- 
cially those  in  tropical  waters.  The  Cavite  mines  will  suffer  both  in  firing  effi- 
ciency and  tidal  efficiency.  The  field  should  be  continually  augmented  with  new 
mines.  Present  estimates  are  that  the  Cavite  mines  should  be  considered 
ineffective  'after  one  year'." 

3.  In  addition  to  measures  which  may  be  taken  to  repair  deficiencies  of  the 
present  fields  by  addition  of  Mark  6  mines,  it  is  intended  to  supply  new  types 
of  mines  for  use  by  the  Asiatic  Fleet  in  the  defense  of  the  same  areas.  The 
procurement  of  these  mines  has  started  and  shipments  will  begin  at  an  early  date. 

/s/  W.  H.  P.  Blandy. 
LWMcK/ELH 

Op-100-MD 

NOVEMBEE   7,    1941. 

Dear  Tommy  :  Recently,  the  Fifth  Sea  Lord,  Rear  Admiral  A.  L.  St.  George 
Lyster,  Royal  Navy,  visited  the  United  States.  He  made  a  careful  inspection  of 
our  manner  of  operation  of  aircraft  and  our  aircraft  facilities,  both,  afloat  and 
ashore.  On  the  conclusion  of  his  inspection,  he  submitted  to  us  his  frank  obser- 
vations in  the  form  of  the  attached  notes.     I  thought  they  would  be  of  interest 


2456    CONGRESSIONAL  INVESTIGATION  PEARL  HARBOR  ATTACK 

and  am  sending  them  along.     Admiral  Lyster  impressed  all  of  us  as  being  an 
exceptional  officer. 

In  addition,  I  am  sending  a  copy  of  the  notes  made  by  Captain  Lord  Louis 
Mountbatten  as  the  result  of  his  observations  in  the  fleet.  He,  too,  impressed  me 
as  being  a  very  capable  officer.  He  is  keen,  alert,  intelligent,  and  is  remarkably 
articulate.  In  brief,  he  makes  a  very  splendid  impression.  I  am  sure  much  g'ood 
will  result  from  the  observations  of  both  ot  these  officers. 

Events  are  moving  rapidly  toward  a  real  showdown,  both  in  the  Atlantic  and 
in  the  Pacific.  The  Navy  is  already  in  the  war  of  the  Atlantic,  but  the  country 
doesn't  seem  to  realize  it.  Apathy,  to  the  point  of  open  opposition,  is  evident  in 
a  considerable  section  of  the  press.  Meanwhile,  the  Senate  is  dragging  out  the 
debate  with  reference  to  the  arming  of  the  merchantmen.  Whether  the  country 
knows  it  or  not,  we  are  at  war. 

The  sinking  of  the  REUBEN  JAMES,  together  with  its  large  loss  of  life,  will 
do  much  to  bring  closer  home  this  fact.  Incidentally,  early  reports  indicate  that 
she  was  struck  on  the  port  side  just  about  the  vicinity  of  the  magzine.  It  is 
probable  that  the  magazine  exploded,  since  the  forward  part  of  the  ship  just 
disintegrated.  There  were  only  two  survivors  from  the  forward  part  of  the  ship — 
the  boatswain's  mate  of  the  watch  and  the  helmsman. 

The  SALINAS  did  a  good  job  of  getting  in — She  took  two  torpedo  hits  with  no 
loss  of  life.  The  submarine  surfaced  fairly  close  aboard  sometime  after  the 
torpedoing  and  the  Salinas  thinks  she  got  a  shell  into  her.  The  submarine  sub- 
merged and  her  position  was  given  a  good  depth  charging  by  a  nearby  destroyer. 
They  think  they  got  her  ! 

You  no  doubt  have  noted  in  the  press  the  conversations  going  on  between  the 
State  Department  and  the  Japanese  Foreign  Office.  Mr.  Kurusu's  trip  to  the 
United  States  has  its  dramatic  appeal,  but  I  am  dubious  of  it  having  any  real 
Influence. 

I  hope  this  finds  you  in  fine  fettle.    Keep  cheerful !    With  all  good  wishes. 
Sincerely, 

/s/  Betty. 

Admiral  T.  C.  Hart,  U.  S.  N. 
U.  S.  S.  HOUSTON, 

c/o  Postmaster,  San  Francisco,  California. 
Enclosures — Mountbatten's  notes 
Lyster's  notes 


Secret 
Op-lO-MD 

November  8,  1941. 

Dear  Tommy  :  We  have  at  last  gotten  a  decision  regarding  withdrawal  of  the 
Marines.  I  have  immediately  acquainted  you  with  that  fact  by  radio.  The  gun 
boats  are  still  in  the  balance,  and  we  have  requested  further  word  from  you  on 
this. 

The  Japanese  situation  looks  almost  like  an  impasse  to  me,  and  I  wouldn't  be 
surprised  at  anything  happening  in  the  next  month  or  two.  I  imagine  your 
picture  of  that  is  just  about  as  close  as  mine.  The  two  points  of  view  appear  to 
me  simply  irreconcilable.     But  of  this,  more  should  be  in  the  open  before  long. 

I  have  been  pressing  Marshall  to  press  the  Brjtish  for  more  air  force  in  the 
Singapore  area.  I  won't  go  into  the  details,  but  I  think  we  have  very  good 
grounds  from  every  standpoint,  both  as  to  their  present  position  at  home,  as  well 
as  from  their  position  in  the  Far  East,  and  their  airplane  situation  in  general, 
to  insist  on  their  strengthening  the  Malay  barrier.  As  you  know,  the  British 
Navy  is  sending  marked  increases  to  the  Eastern  theater.  I  only  wish  we  could 
have  gotten  all  this  started  some  time  ago.  It  might  have  acted  as  a  very  great 
deterrent,  but,  in  any  case,  I  feel  that  the  speeding  up  of  these  operations  at 
present  is  vital. 

Here's  hoping. 

Every  good  wish. 
Sincerely, 

/s/    Betty. 

Admiral  T.  C.  Hart,  U.  S.  N. 

Commander  in  Chief,  Asiatic  Fleet,  U.  S.  8.  AUGUSTA, 
c/o  Postmaster,  San  Francisco,  California. 


BOSTON 


PUBUCUBBAS, 


«-.-:;,.Sl